



University
of Glasgow

Min, Byung-O (2004) Electoral change and voting behaviour in independent voters in South Korea, 1992-2002: are independent voters rational in voting choice? PhD thesis.

<http://theses.gla.ac.uk/6814/>

Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author

A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge

This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the Author

The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the Author

When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given


**Electoral Change and Voting Behaviour of Independent Voters
in South Korea, 1992-2002:
Are Independent Voters Rational in Voting Choice?**

by
Byung-O Min

**A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to
the Department of Politics, Faculty of Social Science,
University of Glasgow**

April 2004

Copyright © 2004 by Byung-O Min
All rights reserved.



Abstract

This study is about how independent voters make their vote decision in presidential election focusing on electoral behaviour in South Korea. The main argument of this thesis is that voters are not very rational in voting choice when party constraints are absent. Both qualitative and quantitative approaches are employed in this study and provide a comprehensive analysis of voting behaviour of independent voters in the new democracy. In particular, the use of focus group interviews and in-depth one-to-one interviews conducted during the 2002 Korean Presidential Election provides detailed analysis of electoral behaviour in Korea.

Korean voters have developed party identification, a long-term psychological attachment with a particular political party, under the institutional underdevelopment of the political parties in the new democracy. Regionalism is the predominant factor to explain partisan alignment in Korea, but ideological self-identification also accounts for the partisan alignment in new democracy. Over the last 10 years, party identification has markedly weakened in Korea, a 15 year old democracy, in contrast to experiences of other new democracies. This weakening of party identification is largely due to changes in political interest and dissatisfaction with political processes in new democracy.

My findings confirm that the increase of independents and the process of partisan dealignment are closely related to a decline of electoral stability. But an increase of independent voters who are free from party constraints has not lead to an increase of rational voting behaviour in Korean presidential elections. Although independent voters are most interested in short-term considerations, such as candidate evaluation, issue stands, and government performance, their voting choice is not politically rational. Independent voters are more likely to make vote decision based on insufficient information and heavily rely on candidate image rather than substance in their voting choice. Many independent voters cast their ballot based on the candidates' affective dimensions, such as integrity, empathy and appearance, rather than cognitive dimensions, such as competence to solve the nation's urgent problems.

Contents

Abstract / iii

Contents / iv

List of Figures and Tables / viii

Acknowledgements / xiv

Note on Transliteration /xvi

Abbreviations /xvii

Chapter 1. Introduction / 1

Partisan Decline, Electoral Volatility, and Candidate Image / 1

Making Electoral Choice / 4

Themes and Plan of the Thesis / 5

The Significance of the Study / 8

PART I: THEORY, METHOD, AND DATA

Chapter 2. Context: Political Culture and Electoral Change in Korea /12

1. Political Changes and Political Culture before 1987: The Long Way to Democracy / 14

Rhee Syngman's Autocracy: 1948-1960 / 15

A Short Period of Democracy: 1960-1961 / 17

Park Chung Hee's Semi-Authoritarian Government: 1961-1972 / 18

Park Chung Hee's Authoritarian Regime (The 'Yusin'): 1972-1979 / 20

Chun Doo-hwan's Authoritarian Regime: 1980-1997 / 23

2. Politics and Elections in the New Democracy: Change and Continuity of Political Culture and Political Behaviour / 25

The 'Six Republic' of Roh Tae Woo, 1988-1992 / 26

The 'Civilian Democratic Government' of Kim Young Sam, 1993-1997 / 28

The 'People's Government' of Kim Dae-jung, 1998-2002 / 32

The 'Participatory Government' of Roh Moo-hyun, 2003 / 36

3. Explaining Electoral Behaviour in Korea / 39

The Modernisation Theory: '*yeo-chon-ya-do*' (rural area for the ruling and urban area for the opposition) / 39

Democratic Movement and Electoral Behaviour in Korea: '*Minju dae Ban-minju*' (Pro-democracy vs. Anti-democracy) / 41

'Region Voting' in New Democracy / 45

New Research Interest in Korean Electoral Studies / 48

Chapter 3. Theory / 53

1. Theories and Models of Voting Choice / 54

Party Identification and Independent Voters / 54

Electoral Dealignment / 59

Voting Behaviour of Independents: Short-term Factors / 62

2. The Model of Voting Choice of Independents / 68

The Model of Voting Choice / 68

Classifying Voters / 71

Propositions and Hypotheses / 72

Chapter 4. Method and Data / 75

1. Method / 75

Qualitative Approach and Electoral Studies / 76

The Multi-Strategy Research: The Voting Behaviour of Independent Voters in Korea / 82

2. Data and Fieldwork / 84

Qualitative Data on Korean Electoral Behaviour / 84

Quantitative Survey Data on Korean Electoral Behaviour / 89

Quality of the Data: Validity and Reliability / 91

PART II: ELECTORAL DEALIGNMENT AND INDEPENDENT VOTERS

Chapter 5. Party Affiliation in a New Democracy / 94

1. Party Identification under Institutional Underdevelopment of Party Politics / 94

Instability of Party Politics in Korea / 96

Old Party Affiliations in the New Democracy / 99

2. The Main Features and Limits of Party Identification in Korea / 107

Instability of Party Affiliation / 107

Party Identification and Political Leaders / 117

Party Identification and Voting Preference in a Specific Election / 121

Party Identification and Election: Effects of 'Electoral Cycle'? / 126

Positive and Negative Party Identification / 129

Party Identification and Vote Choice / 132

Chapter 6. The Bases of Partisan Alignment in a New Democracy / 136

Electoral Realignment in the New Democracy: A Hypothetical Explanation

- 1. Partisan Alignment and Realignment in a New Democracy /139**
 - Regionalism and Electoral Alignment / 140
 - Age and Electoral Alignment / 149
 - Education and Electoral Alignment / 153
 - Gender and Electoral Alignment / 154
 - The Urban-Rural Difference and Electoral Alignment / 156
 - Religion and Electoral Alignment / 158
 - Social Class and Electoral Alignment / 160
 - Level of Income and Electoral Alignment / 162
 - Occupation and Electoral Alignment / 164
 - Ideological Self-image and Electoral Alignment / 167
- 2. Model of Partisan Alignment in Korea / 170**
 - Preliminary Explanation of Partisan Alignment: Qualitative Data / 171
 - A Model of Partisan Alignment: Multiple Regression Analysis / 173

Chapter 7. Partisan Decline and Independent Voters / 182

- 1. Partisan Dealignment in Korea / 182**
 - Levels of Party Identification / 183
 - The Strength of Party Identification / 187
 - The Importance of Political Parties in Vote Decision-Makings / 190
- 2. Main Characteristics of Independent Voters in Korea / 195**
 - Two Types of Independent Voters / 195
 - Socio-Economic Characteristics of Independents in Korea / 199
 - Ideology and Independent Voters / 214
- 3. The Causes of Partisan Decline in Korea / 215**
 - Generational Patterns / 216
 - Cognitive Mobilization / 217
 - Interest in Politics / 222
 - Dissatisfaction with Political Parties and Democratic Process / 225
 - The Lack of Differences between the Political Parties / 232
 - Multiple Regression Analysis of Partisan Decline in Korea / 233

PART III: THE VOTING BEHAVIOUR OF INDEPENDENT VOTERS

Chapter 8. Independent Voters and Volatile Election: Are Independents

Floating Voters? / 237

- 1. Turnout and Independents: ‘Vanishing Voters’? / 238**
 - Decline in Voter Turnout in Korea / 239

Declining Turnout and Increasing Independent Voters / 245

The Model of Individual Turnout Behaviour / 250

2. Volatile and Late Vote Decision: Floating Voters? / 252

Swing Vote and Independents / 253

Hesitancy in Vote Decision / 256

Changing Vote Intention: Volatile Voters? / 261

Chapter 9. Independent Voters and Election Campaigns: Are Independents Responsive to Campaigns? / 265

1. TV Presidential Debates and Independent Voters / 267

Television: the Most Important Source of Information / 268

Watching TV Debates: How and Who? / 271

Impacts of TV Debates / 278

2. The Internet Campaigns and Independent Voters / 288

Potential Influence of Campaigns in the Internet / 289

The Internet Campaigns in the 2002 Election: Aggregate Data / 292

The 'Digital Divide' in Election Campaigns / 295

Chapter 10. Independent Voters and Making Voting Choice: Are Independents Rational Voters? / 302

1. Making Voting Choice / 302

Determinants of Voting Choice in Korea / 303

Correlations between Independents and Short-term Considerations / 310

The Regression Model of Voting Choice: Partisans vs. Independents / 312

2. Independents and Voting Choice: Rational Voters? / 326

The Poorly Informed Voter / 326

'Economic Perception' and Voting Choice / 329

Candidate Evaluation: Competence vs. Image / 333

Chapter 11. Conclusion / 338

Empirical Findings / 338

An Overview Model of Voting Decision of Independent Voters / 344

Democracy without Political Parities / 346

Suggestions for Further Research / 350

Appendix 1. Tables / 354

Appendix 2. Figures / 371

Bibliography / 372

List of Figures and Tables

Figures

Figure 3.1 The Causal Model of Voting Choice / 69

Figure 5.1. The Evolution of Major Political Parties in Korea, 1987-2002 / 104

Figure 5.2. Changes in Party Affiliation and Candidate Popularity in Presidential Election, 1997 / 123

Figure 5.3. Changes in Party Affiliation and Candidate Popularity in Presidential Election, 2002 / 124

Figure 6.1 A Model of Partisan Alignment / 174

Figure 6.2 Regression Model of Partisan Alignment, 1997 / 178

Figure 6.3 Regression Model of Partisan Alignment, 2002 / 180

Figure 7.1 Levels of Party Identification and Levels of Interests in Election, 1992-2002 / 186

Figure 7.2 Bar Chart: Redistribution of Party Identification, 1992-2002 / 187

Figure 8.1 Decline of Turnout in Korean Elections, 1987-2002 / 239

Figure 9.1 Schema of the Impacts of the Internet Campaigns on Voters / 291

Figure 10.1 The Model of Voting Choice in the 2002 Presidential Election / 314

Figure 10.2 The Causal Path of Voting Choice in the 2002 Presidential Election: All Voters / 317

Figure 10.3 The Causal Path of Voting Choice in the 2002 Presidential Election: Partisan only / 318

Figure 10.4 The Causal Path of Voting Choice in the 2002 Presidential Election: Independents only / 319

Figure 10.5 The Causal Path of Voting Choice in the 2002 Presidential Election: Four Types of Voters / 322

Tables

Table 2.1 Political Evolution in Korea before a Transition to Democracy, 1948-1987 / 14

Table 2.2 Presidential Elections in the 'First Republic', 1948-1960 / 17

Table 2.3 General Election in the 'Second Republic', 1960 / 18

Table 2.4 General Elections in the 'Third Republic', 1960-1971 / 20

Table 2.5 Presidential Elections in the 'Third Republic', 1960-1971 / 20

Table 2.6 General Elections in the 'Yusin' Period, 1972-1979 / 22

Table 2.7 Presidential Election in Korea, 1987 / 26

Table 2.8	General Election in Korea, 1988	/ 28
Table 2.9	Presidential Election in Korea, 1992	/ 29
Table 2.10	General Election in Korea, 1992	/ 30
Table 2.11	General Election in Korea, 1996	/ 32
Table 2.12	Presidential Election in Korea, 1997	/ 33
Table 2.13	General Election in Korea, 2000	/ 35
Table 2.14	Presidential Election in Korea, 2002	/ 37
Table 3.1	Four Types of Voters	/ 72
Table 5.1.	Numbers of Political Parties in Korea, 1987-2002	/ 97
Table 5.2.	Numbers of Party Membership, 2001	/ 99
Table 5.3.	Share of Votes by Independent Candidates in Parliamentary Elections, 1948-1971	/ 101
Table 5.4.	Share of the Vote by Major Parties in Direct Presidential Elections, 1948-2002	/ 101
Table 5.5.	Share of the Vote by Major parties in Parliamentary Election, 1987-2002	/ 102
Table 5.6.	Voter's Perception of Ideological Characteristics of Political Parties, 1987	/ 105
Table 5.7.	Party Identification in Presidential Election, 1997	/ 108
Table 5.8.	Party Identification in Presidential Election, 2002	/ 109
Table 5.9.	Election Results before and after a Merger of the Ruling Party in 1990	/ 120
Table 5.10.	Average of Levels of Party Identification during Election Year, 1997 and 2002	/ 127
Table 5.11.	Change in the Level of Party Identification before and after Presidential Election, 2002	/ 128
Table 5.12.	Positive and Negative Feelings to the Parties in Presidential Election, 1997 and 2002	/ 129
Table 5.13.	Crosstab: Negative Feelings toward the Competing Parties, 1997 and 2002	/ 130
Table 5.14.	Crosstab: Party Identification and Vote Choice, 1992	/ 133
Table 5.15.	Crosstab: Party Identification and Vote Choice, 1997	/ 133
Table 5.16.	Crosstab: Party Identification and Vote Choice, 2002	/ 134
Table 6.1	Age of the Electorate, 1987-2002	/ 139
Table 6.2	Regional Share of Votes by Political Parties in Presidential Election, 1987-2002	/ 142
Table 6.3	Crosstab: Party Identification and Regional Identification, 1992-2002	/ 144
Table 6.4	Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Regional Background, 1992-1997	/ 145
Table 6.5	Social Discrimination by Region: marriage partner	/ 146
Table 6.6	Social Discrimination by Region: business partner	/ 147

- Table 6.7 Experience of Regional Discrimination / 147**
- Table 6.8 Consideration of Candidate's Hometown in Voting Choice / 148**
- Table 6.9 Summary of Regression Analysis: Influence of Regionalism on Electoral Vote Decision, 1997 / 148**
- Table 6.10 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Age, 1992-2002 / 150**
- Table 6.11 ANOVA: Age Groups and Evaluation on Government Performance, 1992 and 1997 / 152**
- Table 6.12 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Education, 1992-2002 / 154**
- Table 6.13 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Gender, 1992-2002 / 155**
- Table 6.14 T-test Equality of Means: Gender and Evaluation on Government Performance, 1992-2002 / 156**
- Table 6.15 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Location, 1992-2002 / 157**
- Table 6.16 Crosstab: Voter's Hometown and Size of Residence Area, 1992-2002 / 158**
- Table 6.17 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Religion, 1992-2002 / 159**
- Table 6.18 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Class, 1992-2002 / 162**
- Table 6.19 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Household Income, 1992-2002 / 164**
- Table 6.20 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Occupation, 1992-2002 / 165**
- Table 6.21 ANOVA: Occupation Groups and Evaluation of Government Performance, 1992-2002 / 167**
- Table 6.22 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Self-identified Ideology, 1997-2002 / 169**
- Table 6.23 T-test for Equality of Means: Partisan Alignment and Ideology, 1997-2002 / 170**
- Table 6.24 Bivariate Regression Analysis on Partisan Alignment, 1992 / 175**
- Table 6.25 Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Partisan Alignment (only social and economic variables), 1992 / 176**
- Table 6.26 Bivariate Regression Analysis on Partisan Alignment, 1997 / 177**
- Table 6.27 Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Partisan Alignment, 1997 / 177**
- Table 6.28 Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Ideology, 1997 / 177**
- Table 6.29 Bivariate Regression Analysis on Partisan Alignment, 2002 / 178**
- Table 6.30 Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Partisan Alignment, 2002 / 179**
- Table 6.31 Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Ideology, 2002 / 179**
- Table 7.1 Partisan Decline in Korea, 1992-2002 / 184**
- Table 7.2 Changes in the Strength of Party Identification (Vote Consistency in Three Consecutive Elections), 1992-1997 / 189**
- Table 7.3 Changes in the Strength of Party Identification (Vote Consistency in Two Consecutive Elections), 1992-2002 / 189**
- Table 7.4 The Most Important Factor in Vote Choice (Presidential Election), 1992-2002 /**

Table 7.5 The Most Important Factor in Vote Choice (parliamentary and Local Election), 1992-2002 / 191

Table 7.6 Partisan Loyalty in Vote Choice, 1992-2002 / 194

Table 7.7 Electoral Change in Korea, 1992-2002 / 198

Table 7.8 Electoral Change in the USA, 1980-2000 / 199

Table 7.9 Crosstab: Age and Independents, 1992-2002 / 200

Table 7.10 Crosstab: Age and Korean Voters, 1992-2002 / 201

Table 7.11 Crosstab: Education and Independents, 1992-2002 / 202

Table 7.12 Crosstab: Education and Korean Voters, 1992-2002 / 203

Table 7.13 Crosstab: Size of Residence Area and Independents, 1992-2002 / 204

Table 7.14 Crosstab: Size of Residence Area and Korean Voters, 1992-2002 / 204

Table 7.15 Crosstab: Gender and Korean Voters, 1992-2002 / 205

Table 7.16 Crosstab: Religion and Independents, 1992-2002 / 206

Table 7.17 Crosstab: Region and Independents, 1992-2002 / 207

Table 7.18 Crosstab: Region and Korean Voters, 1992-2002 / 208

Table 7.19 Crosstab: Levels of Income and Independents, 1992-2002 / 209

Table 7.20 Crosstab: Levels of Income and Korean Voters, 1992-2002 / 210

Table 7.21 Crosstab: Occupation and Independents, 1992-2002 / 211

Table 7.22 Crosstab: Occupation and Korean Voters, 1992-2002 / 212

Table 7.23 Crosstab: Class and Independents, 1992-2002 / 213

Table 7.24 Crosstab: Class and Korean Voters, 1992-2002 / 213

Table 7.25 Crosstab: Ideology and Independents, 1992-2002 / 214

Table 7.24 Crosstab: Ideology and Korean Voters, 1992-2002 / 214

Table 7.27 Non-Party Identifiers by Five-Year Cohorts, 1992-2002 / 217

Table 7.28 Crosstab: Levels of Education and Age, 2002 / 218

Table 7.29 T-test for Equality of Means: Understanding Politics by Age Cohorts (only voters who have college education), 2002 / 219

Table 7.30 Crosstab: Independent Voters and Education (only voters who are below 35 years old), 2002 / 220

Table 7.31 T-Test for Equality of Means: Understanding Politics by Partisanship, 1997-2002 / 220

Table 7.32 ANOVA: The Degree of Understanding Politics by Korean Voters, 1997-2002 / 221

Table 7.33 Crosstab: Independent and Interest in Politics, 1992-2002 / 223

Table 7.34 Dissatisfaction with Politicians and Political Process, 1992-1997 / 226

Table 7.35 T-Test for Equality of Means: Independents and Satisfaction with Politics,

1997-2002 / 228
Table 7.36 ANOVA: Performance of Incumbent Government by Party Identification, 1992-2002 / 229
Table 7.37 T-Test for Equality of Means: Satisfaction with Performance of Government and Independents, 1997-2002 / 230
Table 7.38 ANOVA: Satisfaction with Performance of Government and Korean Voters, 1992-2002 / 230
Table 7.39 Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Partisanship: Partisan Decline, 1992-2002 / 239
Table 8.1 Vote Turnout by Age in Presidential Election, 1992-2002 / 241
Table 8.2 Turnout by Social and Economic Characteristics of Voters, 1992-2002 / 242
Table 8.3 Correlationship and Partial Correlationship between Education and Turnout, 1992-2002 / 244
Table 8.4 Crosstab: Vote Turnout by Party Identification, 2002 / 246
Table 8.5 Turnout Rate by Four Types of Voters, 1997-2002 / 246
Table 8.6 Abstention by Party Identification, 1992-2002 / 247
Table 8.7 Reasons for Abstention from Voting by Party Identification, 2002 / 248
Table 8.8 The Multiple Regression Model of Turnout (stepwise method), 2002 / 252
Table 8.9 Flow of the Vote between Presidential Elections of 1997 and 2002 / 254
Table 8.10 Vote Consistency between 1997 and 2002 / 255
Table 8.11 The Timing of Voting Decision by Party Identification, 1992-2002 / 257
Table 8.12 Crosstab: The Timing of Vote Decisions by Four Types of Voters, 1992-2002 / 258
Table 8.13 ANOVA: The Timing of Vote Decision by Four Types of Voters, 1992-2002 / 259
Table 8.14 Changing Vote Preference during an Election, 1997 and 2002 / 263
Table 9.1 Frequency Table: The Source for the Information that Voters Concerned in Presidential Election, 2002 / 268
Table 9.2 Important Source of Information by Four Types of Voters, 2002 / 269
Table 9.3 Popularity Rating of TV Presidential Debates, 1997-2002 / 272
Table 9.4 Watching TV Presidential Debates, 2002 / 275
Table 9.5 Watching TV Presidential Debates and Independent Voters, 1997-2002 / 276
Table 9.6 Watching TV Presidential Debates by Four Types of Voters, 1997-2002 / 276
Table 9.7 Influence of TV Campaign on Vote Decision and Independent Voters, 1997-2002 / 279
Table 9.8 Influence of TV Campaign on Vote Decision by Four Types of Voters, 1997-2002 / 280

Table 9.9 TV Presidential Debates and Change in Vote Preference /	282
Table 9.10 TV Presidential Debates and Vote Decision, 2002 /	282
Table 9.11 TV Debates and Vote Change by Party Identification, 2002 /	283
Table 9.12 Perception toward Each Candidate's Performance in Debate, 2002 /	285
Table 9.13 Correlation between Source of Information and Sociological Variables, 2002 /	296
Table 9.14 Correlation between Source of Information and Political Attitudes, 2002 /	297
Table 9.15 Crosstab: the Internet by Party Identification and Four Types of Voters, 2002 /	298
Table 10.1 Loyalty Rate: Party Identification and Voting Choice, 1997-2002 /	304
Table 10.2 The Mean Scores of Self-identified Ideology by Voting Choice, 1997-2002 /	305
Table 10.3 The Mean Scores of Issue Position by Voting Choice, 2002 /	307
Table 10.4 The Mean Scores of Government Performance Evaluation by Voting Choice, 1992-2002 /	308
Table 10.5 Candidate Evaluation and Voting Choice, 1997-2002 /	309
Table 10.6 Correlation Coefficients between Voting Choice and Explanatory Variables, 2002 /	311
Table 10.7 Partial Correlation Coefficients between Voting Choice and Explanatory Variables, 2002 /	312
Table 10.8 Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Voting Choice in the 2002 Presidential Election: All Voters /	316
Table 10.9 Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Voting Choice in the 2002 Presidential Election: Partisan vs. Independents /	317
Table 10.10 Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Voting Choice in the 2002 Presidential Election: Four Types of Voters /	320
Table 10.11 Summary of Regression Model of Voting Choice Adding Interaction Terms: Partisan-Independents Difference /	324
Table 10.12 Summary of Regression Model of Voting Choice Adding Interaction Terms: Attentive-Apolitical Independents Difference /	325

Acknowledgements

I have had a great deal of help from my supervisor, Professor William L. Miller, while working on this research. My praise for him knows no bounds. His encouragement pushed me to finish on time and his accurate criticism led me to rewrite a great deal. He was always tolerant about my attempts to disturb his own research regardless of my frequent visits. His help exceeded reasonable expectations and he made it possible for my research to be done so quickly.

I want to express my appreciation to the University of Kentucky, from whom I received excellent research training, when I was a postgraduate student in the late 1980s. Professor Daniel N. Nelson and Professor Chung-in Moon showed their enthusiasm for comparative studies and helped to sharpen my own thinking on social research. More than 10 years later, when I consulted him about my study in the United Kingdom, Professor Nelson spent many hours on the telephone in order to introduce me to his colleagues and friends of British universities, for which I am grateful.

This research reflects my experiences working for a political party in Korea. From 1995 to 2001, I served on the parliamentary staff of the Floor Leader of the Millennium Democratic Party and had an invaluable opportunity to deepen my knowledge about the realities of political life. In particular, I have benefited enormously from my exchanges with key figures in Korean politics, the late MP Shin Ki-ha, MP Hahn Hwa-Kap, and MP Park Sang-cheon — all were the head of my office. They also provided strong encouragement for this research. Several colleagues, friends, and scholars — Professor Lee Seok-soo, the late Dr. Dong-chin Rhee and Rabin Rhee, Professor Hwang Ju-hong, Professor Kil Soong-hoom, Kwak Hae-Gohn, Heo Young Jae, Cho Dae-hyun, Chae Yoon-ki, Park Chul San, Yang Sunmo, Professor Kang Won-Tack, and Professor Cho Sungdai--- provided the advice, help, and encouragement. I would like to thank them. Especially, my colleague Dr. Fraser W. Duncan took valuable his time from his own demanding research to correct my writing, for which I am very grateful.

Financial support from the British Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth, a Chevening scholarship in 2001-02, is gratefully acknowledged. I am pleased to thank Yoon Min-kyung of the British Embassy in Seoul. The Korea Social Science Data Center allowed me to use their valuable survey data. The Research Bank in Seoul carried out focus-group discussions. I also recognize the aid of several students in Korea who conducted in-depth interviews. I want to thank them. In particular, I am very happy to acknowledge the advice and help of Kim Heon Tae of the Korea Society Opinion Institute (KSIOI) in collecting essential data of this research.

Finally, I would like to thank my parents, whose love, trust, and encouragement has given me support throughout my life and were the most essential to this research effort.

Byung-O Min

Glasgow, Scotland, April 2004

Note on Transliteration

In general, Korean words and names in this thesis conform to the new Korean transliteration system recommended by Korean government in 2000. Exceptions are made for individual's names which were spelled idiosyncratically (for example, Rhee Syngman). Also, family names precede given names (for example, Min Byung-O instead of Byung-O Min) when the names appear in the text.

Abbreviations

- DJP = Democratic Justice Party (*minjeongdang*)
DLP = Democratic Liberal Party (*minjadang*)
DLP* = Democratic Labor Party (*minnodang*)
DP = Democratic Party (*minjudang*)
GNP = Grand National Party (*hannaradang*)
MDP = Millennium Democratic Party (*minjudang*)
NCNP = National Congress for New Democracy (*gugminhoeui*)
NDRP = New Democratic Republican Party (*sin-gongwhadang*)
NKP = New Korea Party (*sinhangugdang*)
NPP = New Party for People (*gugminsindang*)
NPRD = New Politics Reform Party (*sinjeongdang*)
NU21 = National Unity 21 (*gugmintonghwap isipil*)
PDP = Peace Democratic Party (*pyeongmindang*)
RDP = Reunification Democratic Party (*tongil minjudang*)
ULD = United Liberal Democrats (*jaminryeon*)
UNP = Unification National Party (*gugmindang*)
PV = Peoples' Victory 21 (*gugminseungri isipil*)

Chapter 1. Introduction

This study is about how individuals in a new democracy make their voting choice. It focuses on voters in South Korea (hereafter Korea). In particular, it is about how independent voters who do not have psychological attachment to a particular political party vote in presidential elections.

Partisan Decline, Electoral Volatility, and Candidate Image

The 1997 and the 2002 Korean presidential elections were striking for their extreme volatility in electoral behaviour. During the election year, voters' candidate preferences and voting intentions fluctuated greatly in pre-elections polls. In each election, one candidate's popularity in polls reached as high as 55 per cent of the electorate, but within the election year had also fallen to as low as 20 per cent. The outcome of each election was unpredictable with leading contenders unable to sustain their support. Another distinct feature of the 1997 and the 2002 presidential elections was an increase in the relative importance of candidate image in voting choice along with an expansion of media campaigns, particularly TV presidential debates. Many voters started to support a particular candidate before the candidate firmly offered policies or election pledges. In voting choice, voters heavily relied on candidate's personal traits, specifically affective dimensions of character rather than cognitive dimensions.

In the 1997 presidential election, a long-time leader in the race, Lee Hoi Chang, enjoyed great popularity for a while. He was the nominee of the ruling party, which had never been defeated any presidential election, and was also considered a man of integrity regarding his unshakeable convictions in his career as a judge and a high-ranking public officer. His popularity peaked at almost 55 per cent of the electorate. In the early stage of the campaign, the other major contender, Kim Dae-jung, hardly matched with Lee Hoi Chang. As a man of ability, Kim Dae-jung, a candidate of the major opposition party, gained an extremely solid support of about 30 per cent of the electorate, but was struggling to expand this support. This was particularly due to his negative image in the electorate which had been propagated by the authoritarian government during his long struggle for democracy. Although Kim Dae-jung was highly evaluated in terms of his competence to solve the nation's urgent problems and offered new policies that were carefully developed over a long time, he did not lead the race in the 1997 presidential election until two months before the day of election. However, the election race changed suddenly when voters questioned whether Lee Hoi Chang's two sons had intentionally

avoided the national duty of military service. His image of integrity was ruined mainly due to this single issue and voter support for him fell. After this issue became public, his popularity in pre-election polls fell suddenly to about 25 per cent level, though he finally shared about 40 per cent of valid votes in the election.

The 2002 presidential election show a similar pattern. The election was very unstable with public support for candidates very volatile. Voters paid attention to candidate image rather than issue stances or policies. Roh Moo-hyun, an outsider within the ruling political party, won the presidential primary of the ruling Millennium Democratic Party, in the first example of a presidential primary election in Korean political history. During the presidential primary, Roh had a great opportunity to make himself known to the electorate and was suddenly widely supported in the electorate. His popularity in the polls reached its highest level at over 60 per cent, an extremely high level of popularity in a Korean presidential election. As an activist in the pro-democracy movement, he was considered a man of integrity. As a self-educated lawyer who rose from poverty, he was seen as one of the few politicians who could empathise with ordinary people. But the high point of his popularity in the electorate could not be sustained for long. As the bubble burst, the support of the electorate for Roh Moo-hyun fell sharply less than three months after the end of the primary.

While the popularity of Roh Moo-hyun fell to lower than 20 per cent of the electorate, an independent candidate, Chung Mong-joon, joined the 2002 presidential race as the result of a sudden increase in popular support. Chung was for a while the leader in a three-way election race. Chung gained wide support mainly due to his competence demonstrated in the 2002 World Cup football tournament partly held in Korea. As a chief administrator of the international event held in Korea, Chung benefited from the unexpected success of Korean national football team in the games and grew in popularity. Voters liked Chung based on his positive image, such as his relatively youthful and good-looking appearance, while Chung's positions on the issues were rather ambiguous and Chung did not offer many specific policies or election pledges. Similar to Roh Moo-hyun's experience several months before, Chung was struggling to maintain his lead in the election race, and Chung and Roh, who both drew support from young and liberal voters, finally agreed on an election coalition. Chung stopped running for the presidency and Roh became the unified candidate for presidency.

These two key features of the 1997 and the 2002 presidential elections were closely related to a change in the electorate and in election campaigns. One potential explanation of unstable elections relates to changes in the electorate. In Korea, partisan decline was apparent and the strength of party affiliation had weakened markedly. Independent voters free from party constraints in voting behaviour were very responsive to election

campaigns and changed their voting intention depending upon the occurrence of new issues or new information. Independent voters drifted along between parties during the election year, while partisans were anchored to a political party. An increase of independent voters is closely related to an increase of volatility in electoral behaviour.

Changes in election campaigns are related to an increased reliance on candidate image in voting choice. In the 1997 and the 2002 presidential elections, television played a key role in the election campaigns. TV presidential debates were introduced for the first time in the 1997 presidential election and various types of TV debates were widely held during the year, while the use of traditional campaign tools such as electioneering tour, out-door gatherings, and canvassing door to door, was markedly reduced in the 1997 presidential election and particularly in the 2002 presidential election. A candidate utilising the new campaign tools could expand their support swiftly. In the 1997 presidential election, nearly four million voters (about 19.2 per cent of valid votes) supported a third party candidate, Rhee In-je. Although he was far behind the leading candidates, he decisively influenced the outcome of the three-way race in the 1997 presidential election. Rhee In-je who withdrew from the ruling New Korea Party (later Grand National Party) did not have any organisational support, while the two candidates of major political parties had strong support in each party's regional stronghold. The remarkable success of Rhee In-je in electioneering cannot be separated from his outstanding performance in a various TV debates during the year in which he impressed with his eloquence. He was much younger and dynamic, particularly compared to the major party's candidate, Kim Dae-jung. He attempted to adopt the image of Park Chung Hee whom many conservative voters remembered regarding his strong leadership in a rapid economic development in Korea. In the TV presidential debates, Rhee was able to show assured competence and his positive personal traits, while even Kim Dae-jung, a veteran politician and well-informed man with a broad vision, revealed his uneasiness in the TV debate format. In the debates, Rhee did not offer new policies or a better vision of the nation's future compared to the two other candidates of major political parties. Rhee's campaign team was extremely constrained in human and financial resources. A member of Rhee's campaign team in charge of the development of policies or election pledges confessed that he could not develop new policies and instead developed policies and election pledges by a selective combination of the two major parties' policies and election pledges, particularly the major opposition party, i.e., Kim Dae-jung's party. In the TV debates, all candidates discussed policies and their policy stances. Kim was good in terms of substance of policy and election pledges, but Rhee was outstanding in his effective advocacy of policy. Rhee read and practised a principle of modern election campaigns: he focused on style and image, but nothing with substance.

Making Electoral Choice

The salient features of Korean presidential election raise a question about voting choice models that are based on electoral behaviour in mature democracies. Are independent voters who cast a ballot on the basis of short-term considerations rational compared to partisans who stick to partisan loyalty? There are two contending theories on voting choice: the party identification model and the rational choice approach.¹ The former focuses on voting behaviour of partisans who feel close to a political party, while the latter concentrates on how voters cast a ballot when party constraints are absent. On the one hand, according to the party identification model, voters who have an enduring psychological attachment to a particular political party have a consistency in voting behaviour within an election and between elections. Partisans reveal their loyalty to their political party in elections and the electoral behaviour of partisans is stable. On the other hand, according to the rational choice approach, voters cast their ballots on the basis of rational calculations. When deciding upon their voting choice, voters rely on short-term considerations, such as candidates' stances on issues, incumbent government performance, and a candidate's competence, and voters are also responsive to campaigns. Electoral behaviour is therefore relatively unstable. In the party identification model, voters are constrained by partisan loyalty and are not able to be rational in voting choice due to party constraints. In the rational choice approach, voters are free from party constraints and are able to select a candidate on the basis of rational calculations. Voters are thus rational actors.

When we consider both changes in partisan alignment and two distinct types of voters or voting behaviour together, a decline of partisans implies an increase of instability in electoral behaviour. Also, an increase of independent voters means that more voters rely on short-term considerations in voting choice. However, an absence of party constraints does not necessary imply that voters are rational in making their voting decision. Considering electoral behaviour in Korea, it is questionable whether voters who are free from party constraints vote rationally. As a prerequisite condition for making rational voting choices, sufficient information related to the choice should be available to the voter. Without this information, rational calculation is not possible. Independent

¹ For an overview of electoral studies, see William L. Miller and Richard G. Niemi, 'Voting: Choice, Conditioning and Constraint,' in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris, eds, *Comparing Democracies 2: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective* (London: Sage, 2001), pp. 169-209; Samuel Barnes, 'Electoral Behavior and Comparative Politics,' in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds, *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.115-41.

voters in Korea are less interested in politics, and pay less attention to elections. So, it is unlikely that independent voters have sufficient information on issues and candidates compared to partisans. If independent voters cast ballots based on limited information, and if they rely on affective traits of candidates rather than candidate issue positions or candidate competence, their voting choice is irrational. The rational choice approach may justify this irrational voting behaviour in terms of an instrumental definition of rationality --- i.e., how best to achieve a voter's political goals. But voting choice based on irrational considerations, such as style and image of candidates, cannot be rational. They may believe that their choice is best to achieve their political interests, but they may make a wrong choice because they evaluate candidates based on irrational judgements. For example, if voters believe that a candidate will carry out policies that are beneficial for the poor in society because the candidate has the image of an ordinary citizen, their vote decision may not result in the desired outcome.

Themes and Plan of the Thesis

The main theme of this thesis is that the increasing number of independent voters in Korea are not rational in voting choice. Independent voters are relatively alienated from politics, pay relatively less attention to elections and election campaigns and make their voting decision with limited information about issues and candidates. They also rely heavily on candidate factors, particularly candidate image, in making their electoral choice. This choice, then, is far from a rational voting choice, and independents voters can hardly be described as rational.

This thesis consists of 11 chapters. Chapter 2 describes the political development of Korean democracy focusing on changes and continuities in political cultures, party politics, and elections. It briefly assesses both political developments under authoritarian governments and the consolidation of democracy after 1987.

This chapter also reviews achievements and trends of Korean electoral studies. The modernisation theory, which was popular in explaining voting electoral behaviour under authoritarian regimes, is no longer useful due to a critical change in electoral behaviour after a transition to democracy. The politics of region have dictated electoral behaviour in the new democracy, but a weakening of regionalism in electoral behaviour has been detected recently.

Chapter 3 reviews the existing literature on electoral behaviour and voting choice models, which have been developed on the basis of electoral behaviour in mature democracies, particularly the USA and the United Kingdom. Theories on party identification, partisan alignment and dealignment, rational choice models of vote

decision, and campaign effects are discussed in order to provide the framework for analysis and the guiding propositions in examining the voting behaviour of individual independents in Korea. This chapter also presents a causal model of voting choice and guiding propositions to study electoral behaviour in Korea.

Chapter 4 discusses research methods and approaches chosen for the collection and analysis of data in studying voting behaviour of independent voters in Korea. In particular, it justifies combining a qualitative approach and quantitative approach within a study of electoral behaviour. It focuses on how qualitative methods that are generally neglected in the study of electoral behaviour can complement the weaknesses of quantitative data based on structured surveys when a proper practice of surveys is difficult. This chapter also assesses the fieldwork methods used to collect qualitative data. The procedures of focus group interviews and in-depth interviews conducted in the 2002 presidential election are described in detail, and the strengths and weaknesses of both qualitative and quantitative data used in the analysis of Korean voter's behaviour are discussed.

Chapter 5 focuses on party affiliation in Korea. It investigates whether Korean voters have developed party affiliations comparable to the party affiliations found in mature democracies. Korean political parties are institutionally underdeveloped. Party politics is unstable, and the 'meeting and parting' of political parties is common, but the concept of party identification is nonetheless useful to explain Korean voting behaviour. In contrast to findings in other new democracies, specifically post-communist countries in Europe, Korean voters have to some extent developed party identification, the enduring psychological attachment to a particular political party.

Furthermore, qualitative data provide insights into the origin of party identification and its changes. Party affiliation in Korea is mixed in terms of its nature. Many voters become affiliated with a particular party influenced by their regional identification, but some voters feel close to a particular party based on long-term policy preferences. Indeed, party affiliation is not fixed, but is changeable depending on policy performance of political parties.

Chapter 6 looks at partisan alignment in Korea. Patterns of partisan alignment have continued over the last 10 years under conditions of extreme party system instability. This confirms the argument discussed in chapter 5 that Korean voters have developed party affiliation and that party identification is useful to predict Korean electoral behaviour. 'Region' again dictates partisan alignment. The two major political parties in Korea are based on strong support in two regions which are political rivals. But although it is predominant, regional identification is not the only factor to explain partisan alignment in Korea. In addition to regional divisions, the electorate has now also become divided on the basis of ideological orientation as a consequence of the sudden decline of anti-

Communism after fifty years and the accompanying improvements in North-South Korean relations.

Chapter 7 explores the partisan decline and the increase of independent voters in the new democracy. The level of party identification in Korea has markedly declined for last 10 years. It examines the main causes of partisan decline in Korea. In particular, interest in politics and dissatisfaction with democratic system or process are scrutinised. It reveals that many Korean voters nowadays reject any attachment to the political parties at a time when voters' interest in politics is diminishing and popular dissatisfaction with party politics is increasing.

This chapter also explores the social and economic characteristics of independent voters in Korea. Independent voters are classified into two types of independents: a new type comprising those who are interested in politics, and traditional independents who are alienated from politics. The two types of independent voters are distinguished in terms of different social and economic characteristics and different political attitudes.

Chapter 8 looks at the electoral participation of independent voters, in particular in comparison to partisans. In contrast to partisans who feel a utility of vote participation or who are willing to express their loyalty to a particular party, independent voters are less likely to go to the polls. The causes of the differences in voter turnout are discussed.

This chapter also examines independent voters as floating voters. Independent voters, who do not have a 'party anchor', drift and are affected by short-term 'political storms'. They also make relatively late voting decisions compared to partisans who have a simple criterion for their electoral choice. Independent voters also make late voting decisions because they find it difficult to gather sufficient information and see fewer differences between the contending candidates.

Chapter 9 focuses on the effects of the campaign on independent voters' voting choice. The key question is whether independent voters are more responsive to election campaigns as a result of their lack of party constraints. Compared to partisans, independent voters who are free from party constraints and do not have a strong voting intention before the official campaigns evaluate or re-evaluate candidates depending upon new information gathered from the various campaigns. In particular, this chapter focuses on TV presidential debates, which is the most important information source for voters during elections. TV debates held during the official campaign period attract many viewers and the potential influence on voters of such programmes is considerable. But the impact of TV debates on voting choice is not strong enough to shape the electoral choice of voters nor make them change their mind.

Internet campaigns in Korea, a country with a very high rate of Internet usage, are discussed. It is widely accepted that Internet campaigns greatly affected the outcome of

the 2002 presidential election in Korea. In particular, Internet campaigns attracted great attention amongst younger voters and it could be said to have significantly affected their voting choice. However, the impact of Internet campaigns on voting choice has been exaggerated. The 'digital divide' is distinctive in voter's exposure to Internet campaigns. Internet campaigns are not for every voter, but for a particular group of voters who have a strong vote intention.

Chapter 10 examines the voting choice of independent voters in contrast to the voting choice of partisans. While partisans rely on long-term factors such as party affiliation and ideology, independent voters cast a ballot based on short-term considerations such as candidate evaluations, issue preferences, and evaluations of incumbent government performance. Although independents make a voting decision based on a calculation about candidates, issue, and government performance compared to partisans, it is doubtful that the voting choice of independent voters is rational. Independent voters who rely heavily on candidate factors as the criteria for their preference evaluate candidates based on insufficient information. Such voters gather information on candidate image rather than a candidate's policies and/or their political achievements. Many independent voters do not know all the candidates but are knowledgeable about a particular one. Independent voters evaluate candidates based on what they feel about a candidate, i.e., the candidate's image. Candidate competence is not a priority in the evaluation, but perceptions of integrity and empathy are important.

Finally, chapter 11, the conclusion, assesses key findings of the thesis and provides a synthetic explanation on how independent voters make voting choices. Also, the chapter makes some suggestions for further analysis.

The Significance of the Study

The study is important in several respects. First, the study is based on field research undertaken to collect data on Korean electoral behaviour and provides new information for a better understanding of electoral behaviour in Korea. The study is one of only a few comprehensive analyses of Korean voting behaviour, particularly the voting behaviour of independent voters. Currently, English-language literature on Korean electoral behaviour is very rare. There has been some empirical research on Korean electoral behaviour after the transition to democracy in 1987, but most of this research focuses only on a specific issue in a particular election and does not provide a comprehensive or systematic examination of the dynamics of electoral behaviour in Korea. Based on richer data, the study attempts a comprehensive analysis to cover most of salient issues in study of Korean electoral behaviour.

Second, the study contributes to a theoretical development of the study of voting choice. In the nomothetic tradition of social science, a universal generalisation of human behaviour is the ultimate goal. The present of electoral studies is nowhere near to the completion of this goal yet. Most research on electoral behaviour has been carried out in mature democracies. Students of electoral studies have relatively neglected analysis of electoral behaviour in new democracies, although the 'third wave' of democratisation spread throughout post-communist Europe and Asia.² A study of electoral behaviour in the new democracies can shed light on theories and models of electoral behaviour based on experiences in mature democracy and contribute to an improvement or refinement of existing theories and models.³ While comparative analysis covering several countries is desirable, a country-specific study which uses concepts suitable for comparative study is also good for an in-depth understanding of electoral behaviour within a certain cultural context.

Third, the study contributes to the methodological development of electoral studies. This thesis employs both quantitative and qualitative approach in the collection and analysis of data. Several researchers on social and political studies argue that combining qualitative and quantitative is feasible and desirable, but in practice the integration of the two distinct approaches is rarely achieved in one study.⁴ Qualitative approach provides richer data to examine hypotheses and also provides insights into a different dimension of electoral behaviour. By combining two different approaches, electoral behaviour can be explained broadly and deeply. The thesis is therefore an exploratory work implementing a multi-method research design to study electoral behaviour.

Finally, beyond exploring empirical findings, the thesis raises an important question about the consolidation of democracy in Korea.⁵ Democracy is rule by the people and the people exercise their power by casting a ballot in elections. The quality of democracy may be largely determined by the level of popular participation in election and the quality of the voter's choice.⁶ When voters throw away their voting power, or cast a ballot

² There are a few systemic researches on mass publics in post-communist Europe. For example, William L. Miller, Stephen White, and Paul Haywood, *Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1998).

³ Pippa Norris, ed., *Elections and Voting Behaviour: New Challenges, New Perspective* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), pp. xiii-xxv, at p. xiii.

⁴ For a rare example of studying mass publics based on the combination of both quantitative and qualitative approach, see William L. Miller, Ase B. Grodeland, and Tatyana Y. Koshechkina, *A Culture of Corruption?: Coping with Government in Post-communist Europe* (New York: Central European University Press, 2001).

⁵ Linz and Stephen suggest multi-dimensionality in consolidating new democracy. Juan Linz and Alfred Stephen, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

⁶ For a comprehensive study that discusses the consolidation of Korean democracy in the light of change in mass publics, see Doh C. Shin, *Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

without careful considerations, democracy is undermined. When voters neglect policies and the issue stances of candidates or political parties and rely solely on candidate's image, voting choice resembles a beauty contest rather than a true election in which voters decide the policy direction for the nation. For last 15 years, Korean democracy has been consolidating and there is no doubt that free and fair elections take place in Korea today. But democracy is not fully consolidated yet or may be deteriorating as a result of changes in electoral behaviour. If more voters become less interested in politics and elections and rely on candidate image in voting choice, democracy may be at risk of decay.

PART ONE
THEORY, METHOD, AND DATA

Chapter 2. Context: Political Development and Political Culture in Korea

The aim of this chapter is to describe political development in Korea focusing on changes and continuities in political culture and electoral behaviour. It is widely accepted that political behaviour can be better understood within a cultural context.¹ Indeed, some political behaviour may be meaningful only within a certain social context. More generally, political behaviour is influenced by political culture and values, which have evolved over a long period of time. So in order to develop a general framework for an analysis of Korean electoral behaviour, it is necessary to start with a basic understanding of the course of political development in Korea.

Koreans have experienced rapid political and economic change for several decades, and voters have developed their political values and political attitudes in this rapidly changing society. Their values, attitudes, and behaviour has changed much over time, but some aspects of them have not changed so much.

Many countries got independence after the Second World War, but only a few have achieved both economic prosperity and political democracy. Korea is one of these few. During the last four decades, Korea has been transformed from one of the poorest countries in the world to one of the 'newly industrialised countries' (NICs).² Koreans proudly celebrate their economic achievement as the 'Miracle of the Han River', and the Korean economy remains very dynamic, despite the recession in 1997.³

Along with rapid economic development, a pre-modern Confucian society has been transformed into a modern society. Korea, which was a typical rural society, has become very highly urbanised. A modern public educational system has been developed, and the level of higher education markedly increased.⁴ The population has more than doubled in

¹ Recently, students of electoral behaviours have recognised the importance of context in understanding electoral behaviour. See Christopher Wlezien and Mark N. Franklin, 'The Future of Election Studies: Introduction', *Electoral Studies*, 21 (2002), 157-60.

² For example, the gross domestic product (GDP) of Korea in 2001 consisted of 4.6 per cent in the agricultural, forestry and fisheries sector, 42.8 per cent in the mineral and industrial sector, 8.2 per cent in the construction sector, and 52.6 per cent in the service sector. Also, in 2002, the heavy industries occupied 76.8 per cent of the entire industrial production. See *Korea Scope*, at <http://www.koreascope.org>.

³ For example, the Korean economy registered a high annual growth-rate of 8.7 per cent for over 30 years after 1965. Per capita national income peaked in 1996 as 10,548 US dollars. After the economic crisis in 1997, per capita national income in 2001 was still 8,900 dollars. In 1962 it was less than 87 dollars. So per capita national income in 2001 was over one hundred times greater than in 1962. In 1999, the Korean economy was the 13th biggest economy in the world in terms of GDP. See the *National Statistics Agency*, at <http://kosis.nso.go.kr>.

⁴ For example, the number of college students per 10,000 of population in 1965 was 48.3. In 2001

the last fifty years and the quality of life has markedly improved.⁵ Civil society developed gradually and a variety of civil activist movements blossomed. Many Koreans have travelled and studied abroad and Korea itself has opened up to a globalising world.

Korea became part of the 'Third Wave' of democracy, the global surge of democratisation in the 1980s and the 1990s.⁶ When there were major street demonstrations and protests against nearly three-decades of military dictatorship, the authoritarian government yielded to people's claims and submitted to a competitive presidential election. The 'June Uprising' of 1987 was characterised as a middle class revolution. It was initiated by pro-democracy student demonstrations, but carried forward by the middle class. Since the transition to democracy in 1987, democratic institutions and procedures have been progressively consolidated, even though political culture and political behaviour — the residues of past authoritarian rule — have changed more slowly. There are controversies over the quality of this new democracy in Korea, but at least Koreans have chosen a President in free, fair, and competitive elections every five years since 1987. In sum, Korean democracy has been steadily consolidated over the last fifteen years without serious interruption.⁷

This chapter consists of three sections. The first describes political evolution and political culture under authoritarian regimes before the transition to democracy in 1987. The second describes the changes and continuities of political culture and electoral behaviours under the new democracy, focusing on the four consecutive presidential elections after the transition to a democracy in 1987. It reviews the issues, election results, and political consequences of each of the four. The third section discusses electoral studies of the Korean electorate, focusing on relations between political change and political behaviour. It summarises the achievements, and the limits of previous research on Korean electoral behaviour.

it was 622.5. The number of college students was 2,947,000 in 2001, compared to 139,000 in 1965. College education expanded markedly in the 1990s: in 2000, 70.5 per cent of high school graduates entered colleges compared to only 35 per cent in 1992. The *National Statistics Agency*, at <http://kosis.nso.go.kr>.

⁵ The population of South Korea was more than 47 millions in 2001 compared to approximately 20 million in 1948. And the combined population of the two Koreas, North and South, was about 67 millions in 1999, making it the 15th largest population in the world. The *National Statistics Agency*, at <http://kosis.nso.go.kr>.

⁶ See Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). Also, Larry Diamond et al., *Consolidating Third-Wave Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1997).

⁷ For a good assessment of democratic consolidation in Korea see Larry Diamond and Byung-Kook Kim, eds, *Consolidating Democracy in South Korea* (Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).

1. Political Change and Political Culture before 1987: The Long Way to Democracy

Democracy has developed with many setbacks and trials since Koreans formed their own government in 1948.⁸ Korea regained independence from Japanese colonialism in 1945 at the end of World War II, but it was divided into North and South Korea by the two superpowers, the USA and USSR, under the Cold War system. After American and Soviet military occupation for three years, South Korea (hereafter Korea) adopted the American presidential system, while North Korea developed a communist state and has remained a totalitarian regime. As in many Third World states, the progress of Korean democracy was interrupted and disturbed by military coups and dictatorships. Politics itself was a continuation of dictatorships and political turmoil. Before 1987 Korea had no experience of governmental change through elections, only the experience of military coups replacing one authoritarian government with another.

Political evolution in Korea before the 1987 transition to democracy can be divided into five periods: (1) President Rhee Syngman's autocracy, 1948-1960, (2) a short period of democracy led by Prime Minister Chang Myon, 1960-1961, (3) the 'Third Republic' as President Park Chung Hee's military government, 1961-1971, (4) President Park Chung Hee's authoritarian 'Yusin' (revitalising reform) period, 1972-1979, and finally (5) President Chun Doo-hwan's 'Fifth Republic', 1980-1987.⁹ Political evolution to 1987 is summarised in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1 Political Evolution in Korea before the Transition to Democracy, 1948-1987

Year	Government & Leader	Political System	Key Events
1948-1960	The 'First Republic' President Rhee Syngman	presidential system (direct election)	Korean War, 1950-53
1960-1961	The 'Second Republic' Prime Minister Chang Myon	parliamentary system	'April Student Uprising' of 1960
1961-1972	The 'Third Republic' President Park Chung Hee	presidential system (direct election)	Military coup d'etat of 1961 Economic Development Plans
1972-1979	The 'Yusin' period President Park Chung Hee	presidential system (indirect election)	'Yusin' Constitution
1980-1987	The 'Fifth Republic' President Chun Doo-hwan	presidential system (indirect election)	Military coup d'etat of 1979 Gwangju Massacre of 1980 'June Uprising' of 1987

⁸ As a detailed description on contemporary political history of Korea, John Kie-chiang Oh, *Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and Economic Development* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999).

⁹ Sung-joo Han, 'South Korea: Politics in Transition', in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds, *Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), pp. 266-303.

Rhee Syngman's Autocracy: 1948-1960

Rhee Syngman (often called 'Syngman Rhee' in the west) who was preferred by the American government and largely supported by conservative political groups and politicians in Korea, was the first President of the new nation-state. He ruled for 12 years, becoming increasingly dictatorial and determined to extend his rule with a life-Presidency.

Rhee's Autocracy and Confucian Culture

The 'First Republic' under President Rhee was an autocracy. Although the constitution written under the strong influence of the American government, promised a viable form of democracy, his government was arbitrary and dictatorial. His dictatorial rule was made possible by the pre-modern political culture that prevailed in society. Koreans who had lived in a Confucian society and under Japanese totalitarian colonial rule had no experience of democracy and lacked much understanding of democratic values or civic culture.¹⁰ For example, in Confucian political culture, people should obey the state as they do their parents.¹¹ Civil society did not exist, and political institutions such as political parties and parliament were premature or in the early stage of their development.¹² Political parties mushroomed in the new nation, but these 'parties' were nothing more than cliques or transient entities. On the other hand many civil servants and administrators who had served under Japanese colonial rule survived to serve in Rhee's administration and continued to rule society without a deep understanding of democracy

¹⁰ Oh, *Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and Economic Development*, pp. 12-15 and 33. In Korean politics, the influence of Confucian culture on political understanding, political culture, and political behaviour remained pervasive, and the culture impeded the development of political parties. See Byung-Kook Kim, 'Party Politics in South Korea's Democracy: The Crisis of Success', in Larry Diamond and Byung-Kook Kim, eds, *Consolidating Democracy in South Korea* (Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2000), pp. 53-86; Doh C. Shin, *Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 187. Many scholars have argued that Asian political culture associated with the Confucian cultural heritage is an obstacle to progress towards democracy in Asia. See Lucian W. Pye, *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1985).

¹¹ For a detailed description of Confucian politics, see Sangjun Kim, 'The Genealogy of Confucian *Moralpolitik* and its Implications for Modern Civil Society', in Charles K. Armstrong, ed., *Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy and the State* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 57-91.

¹² During the post liberation years, most Koreans were sceptical of political parties. Indeed, only 13.5 per cent and 12.8 per cent of Korean voters in the first and second National Assembly elections in 1948 and in 1950 respectively agreed that political parties were necessary institutions in a democracy. Il-mun Cho and Kyung-woo Yun, 'Popular Perception of Political Parties', in C. I. Eugene Kim and Young Whan Kihl, eds, *Party Politics and Elections in Korea* (Silver Spring: The Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1976), pp. 84-94, at p.85.

or democratic values.

The Korean War and Anti-communism

During his term, the Korean War in 1950-1953 totally devastated Korean society.¹³ It also had a lasting influence on political culture and behaviour. Rhee's government officially expressed anti-communism, and there was no tolerance for communists or communism in society. Rhee often attacked his political rivals as pro-communist and his government passed the National Security Law of 1958, which defined any pro-communist activities or expression as treason.¹⁴ During the following fifty years, there was a high level of tension between the two Koreas and a stream of minor military conflicts and incidents. Since the 1950-53 war, the Korean peninsula has remained one of the most heavily armed areas in the world. In these circumstances, any ideological tolerance for communism hardly existed in society.

Students' Uprising

Rhee's government was corrupt and incapable of managing Korea's poor rural economy which had been ravaged by the war. Koreans could find no hope for the future of their country and their lives. Many disliked their corrupt and incapable government but the dictator was able to remain in office by rigging elections and repressing opposition.¹⁵

¹³ The Korean War was recorded in history as the first 'hot war' between the East and the West under the Cold War international system. The United Nation forces from sixteen countries participated in the war to support the South Korea. On the other side, the USSR backed North Korea, and China intervened directly and fought against the UN forces in the war. The number of war casualties, both military and civilian, was huge. According to official statistics from the Ministry of National Defence of Korea, almost 800,000 soldiers of the UN forces including Korean military forces died or were wounded in the war, while the number of casualties on the other side was estimated at more than two millions. In addition, almost one million civilians in South Korea alone were killed or wounded. Most industrial factories and infrastructure in Korea were totally destroyed. More than three million lost their homes and became refugees. One million were separated from their family and had to live in two different Koreas without seeing or communicating with each other for the next fifty years. See, the Ministry of National Defence of Korea, at <http://www.mnd.go.kr>.

¹⁴ For example, Rhee's government prosecuted Cho Bong-am, a leader of the Progressive Party and a major contender in presidential election of 1956, for the violation of the National Security Law and executed him. Although there has been a controversy over Cho Bong-am, it is widely accepted that Rhee's government framed Cho Bong-am on charges of espionage for North Korea. For Cho Bong-am and the Progressive Party, see Tae-yeong Chung, *Chobongamgwa jinbodang* (Cho Bong-Am and the Progressive Party) (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1991); Jung-seok Seo, *Chobongamgwa osipnyeonda* (Cho Bong-Am and 1950s) (Seoul: Yeoksabipyongsas, 1999).

¹⁵ For example, in the election of 15 March 1960, the Minister of Home Affairs managed the systemic vote rigging at the national level. Policemen, local civil servants, various pro-government pressure group members, and even organised gangs were illegally involved in the election campaign. They sometimes directly threaten voters and candidates. They directly disturbed

Civil servants including the national police were directly involved in various illegal activities to maintain his autocracy. Factionalism within or between opposition groups prevented united action against the civilian dictator. In addition to unfair and corrupt electoral practices, President Rhee had the good fortune that candidates of the major opposition party, Shin Ik-hee and Chough Pyong Ok, died suddenly just before election day in 1956 and 1960 (See Table 2.2).

Table 2. 2 Presidential Elections in the 'First Republic', 1948-1960

Presidency	Election Date	Candidates	Result
the 2 nd	August 1952	Rhee Syngman, Liberal Party (<i>Jayudang</i>) Cho Bong-am, independent Lee Si-hyeong, independent Shin Hyeong-woo, independent	74.6% 11.4% 10.9% 3.1%
the 3 rd	May 1956	Rhee Syngman, Liberal Party (<i>Jayudang</i>) Cho Bong-am, independent Shin Ik-hee, National Democratic Party (<i>Minjudang</i>)	70.0% 30.0% 0%
the 4 th	March 1960	Rhee Syngman, Liberal Party Chough Pyong Ok, National Democratic Party (<i>Minjudang</i>)	100% 0%

Source: Korean Election Commission.

Note: Figures are the percentages of valid votes.

Rhee tried to extend his rule by revising the constitution which limited presidential office to three terms. His authoritarian government failed to get the required two-thirds vote in the National Assembly, but achieved its goal through a creative interpretation of the requirement.¹⁶ But this led to university student uprisings. When many Korean students and intellectuals went out on the street to demand respect for democratic procedures, the civilian dictator had to step down in April 1960.

A Short Period of Democracy: 1960-1961

After their bad experience of presidential dictatorship, Koreans overthrew the presidential system, and adopted a parliamentary system. The Democratic Party (*Minjudang*) won the general election of 1960 and Chang Myon was elected as the first and only Prime

opposition party's election campaigns. Ballot boxes were replaced by fake ballot boxes during delivery process. True votes were replaced by fake votes during the counting process. Ki-ha Lee, *Hanguk jeondang baldalsa* (A history of development of political parties in Korea) (Seoul: Uihoiyeongchisa, 1961); Research Institute for the April Uprising (*Sawolhyeokmyeongyeonguso*), ed., *Hanguk sahoi byeonhyeok wundonggwa sawolhyeokmyeong* (Social reform movement in Korea and the April Uprising) (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1990).

¹⁶ The ruling party failed to get two third of votes in the National Assembly, which was required for a revision of the constitution. The ruling party gained 135 votes among total 203 votes – one vote short of the required number. But the Speaker of the National Assembly calculated two-thirds of votes by rounding down to the nearest integer and passed the bill.

Minister of a parliamentary government (see Table 2.3). His government was democratic but was weakened when the ruling party indulged in factional conflicts soon after he took power. In addition it faced endless social turmoil. After the April Student Uprising, Koreans who were oppressed under Rhee's autocracy asserted their own interests. The ideological conflict between the left and the right intensified. Demonstrations and strikes continued everyday, but the government proved unable to effectively manage social conflict.

Table 2.3 General Election in the 'Second Republic', 1960

The Assembly	Date	Political Party	Share of vote	Seat
The 5 th	July 1960	Democratic Party (<i>Minjudang</i>)	41.7%	175
		independents	46.8%	49
		Socialist People's Party (<i>Samindang</i>)	6.0%	4
		Liberal Party (<i>Jayudang</i>)	2.8%	2
		others	2.7%	3
		Total	100%	233

Source: The National Assembly of Korea.

Chang's government failed to consolidate the new democracy. His new parliamentary administration held power for only nine months. Then a group of young military officials led by Park Chung Hee, who had already planned and prepared for a military *coup d'etat* under the Rhee government, interrupted the constitutional order in May 1961. The military junta blamed Chang Myon's government for being corrupt, incapable of defending society from internal and external communist threats, and failing to foster social development.

Park Chung Hee's Semi-Authoritarian Government: 1961-1972

Park Chung Hee, a leader of military junta, again revised the constitution and restored a presidential system. He became the new president and ruled Korean state for 18 years as a military dictator until his assassination in 1979.

Making Legitimacy through Economic Development

Having gained power by military *coup d'etat*, Park Chung Hee tried to justify his rule by achieving economic growth. He immediately started economic development plans. Japan was a major source of economic investment in the early stages of economic development. Park successfully claimed reparations from Japan for its 36 year colonial rule in Korea. At the same time he copied Japanese industrial policy and developmental

strategy. His Economic Planning Board (EPB), a Korean version of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) with highly concentrated power, tightly controlled the economy and pursued an export-led industrial policy based on the cheap labour of workers eager for employment.¹⁷

During his 18 year rule, the economy was transformed from a poor rural economy to an industrial economy. The 'state capitalism' or 'developmental state', backed by the military and supported by bureaucrats, could effectively mobilise and allocate national resources for Korean economic development, and achieved great success in the economy.¹⁸ There is no doubt that Park produced great economic performance. And it is not surprising that some Koreans who experienced this rapid economic transition from poverty to a successful industrialised society still admire the dictator, particularly for his economic achievements.¹⁹

However, political freedom was restricted and democratisation was retarded. Park severely oppressed opposition political leaders and extensively limited civic freedom. It was a 'developmental dictatorship' or 'bureaucratic authoritarian regime', similar to those in Latin America, though more successful achieving its own goals.²⁰

Unfair Elections

Under the 'Third Republic', the incumbent government was superior to the oppositions at electoral campaigning. The ruling party, the Democratic Republican Party (DRP, *Gonghwadang*), was well organised, tightly controlled, and well financed, while the opposition groups were split and poorly financed. Local administrative organisations were often involved in illegal campaign activities for the incumbent government. These unfair practices distorted electoral competition. In elections, the ruling party gained more votes in rural areas and secured a majority of seats in parliament (see Table 2.4).²¹

¹⁷ For Japanese industrial policy or developmental strategy, see Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982).

¹⁸ Stephan Haggard, *Pathways from the Periphery* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).

¹⁹ One of President Park's daughters, Park Geun-hye, is currently a member of the National Assembly and is considered one of the leading politicians in Korea. Her influence is based on the support of Koreans who admire Park Chung Hee.

²⁰ See Hyug Baeg Im, 'The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea', *World Politics*, 39 (1987), 231-57. For the concept of bureaucratic authoritarianism, see Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism : Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973).

²¹ The constitution of the 'Third Republic' stipulated that any candidates for presidency or the National Assembly must be nominated by duly registered political parties. Indeed, independent candidacy was forbidden.

Table 2.4 General Elections in the 'Third Republic', 1960-1971

The Assembly	Date	Political Party	Share of vote	Seat
The 6 th	November 1963	Democratic Republican Party	33.5%	110
		Democratic Justice Party	20.1%	41
		Democratic Party	13.6%	13
		Liberal Democratic Party	8.1%	9
		others (8 parties)	24.7%	2
		Total	100%	175
The 7 th	June 1967	Democratic Republican Party	50.6%	129
		New Democratic Party	32.7%	45
		others (9 parties)	16.7%	1
		Total	100%	175
The 8 th	May 1971	Democratic Republican Party	48.8%	113
		New Democratic Party	44.4%	89
		others (4 parties)	6.8%	2
		Total	100%	204

Source: The National Assembly of Korea.

However, the ruling party could not dominate presidential elections, though the ruling party had such a great advantage over the opposition. The military junta barely won the presidential election in 1963. The presidential election in 1971 was another example. Park Chung Hee, who tightly controlled Korean military, won all of six hundred thousand soldiers' votes. Other governmental organisations and bureaucrats took the initiative in vote rigging, but nonetheless Park defeated his major opponent, Kim Dae-jung, by a margin of less than one million votes (see Table 2.5).

Table 2.5 Presidential Elections in the 'Third Republic', 1960-1971

Presidency	Date	Candidates	Result
the 5 th	October 1963	Park Chung Hee, Democratic Republican Party	46.6%
		Yun Po-son, Democratic Justice Party	45.1%
		three others	8.3%
the 6 th	May 1967	Park Chung Hee, Democratic Republican Party	51.4%
		Yun Po-son, New Democratic Party	40.9%
		four others	7.6%
the 7 th	April 1971	Park Chung Hee, Democratic Republican Party	53.2%
		Kim Dae-jung, New Democratic Party	45.3%
		three others	1.5%

Source: The Korean Election Commission.

Note: Figures are percentages of valid votes.

Park Chung Hee's Authoritarian Regime (The 'Yusin'): 1972-1979

In 1972, Park intensified his authoritarian rule and tightened control over the society. After the strong challenge to his power in the 1971 presidential election he was determined to remain in office for life and in 1972 he again revised the Korean constitution, replacing direct election of the president with indirect election. He called

this new constitution the '*Yusin*' (revitalising reform) constitution.

The Reign of Terror

His regime turned to a higher level of authoritarianism. In the '*Yusin*' constitution, direct competition for the presidency was abolished, and Park appeared on track for a lifetime dictatorship. Park intensified efforts to coerce opposition political leaders and limit civic freedom. College students and intellectuals had persistently protested against the military dictatorship, but Park's government mercilessly oppressed them.

In the '*Yusin*' period, Park often suspended the constitutional order and proclaimed martial law. Under the 1975 revision of the criminal code anti-government dissidents were kept in prison. Park always justified his coercive rule in the name of national security interests regarding the potential threat from North Korea. His regime often cracked down on dissidents and politicians who asked for democracy or who opposed to the government policies by applying the National Security Law that banned any cooperation with or expression of sympathy for communism or communist North Korea.

The Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), founded by Kim Jong-pil who had been Park Chung Hee close assistant of in the military coup, was one of the major tools for military-backed authoritarianism. The KCIA carried out widespread political inspections of opposition activities and was itself directly involved in political manoeuvring. The KCIA encouraged the anti-communist sentiment of the Korean public and made use of it to oppress dissidents. The KCIA often arrested dissidents without anyone knowing, tortured them, and even tried to kill them. For example, the KCIA kidnapped Kim Dae-jung, a prominent leader of democratic movement and a major candidate in the 1971 presidential election, in Tokyo and would have killed him but for American intervention. Park's rule was a reign of terror.

Parliament and Elections for Form's Sake

The legislative body did not fulfill a parliamentary role. The authoritarian regime controlled it. The ruling party always secured a majority of seats and dominated the National Assembly (See Table 2.6). This was achieved by an ingenious electoral system, by rigged elections, and by severe repressions the opposition.²² Furthermore, according

²² The parliamentary electoral system favoured the ruling party. Two candidates were elected in each electoral district. Candidates of the ruling party were elected in most electoral districts. Then the ruling party could easily achieve a majority in the National Assembly by adding one third of seats appointed by President. The ruling party also indulged in unfair practices. Civil servants including police and intelligence agency staff were illegally involved in election campaigns to

to the *Yusin* constitution, Park appointed one third of the Assembly members, called the '*Yujeonghoi*' (a group for *Yusin* politics). So under the authoritarian government, the National Assembly was a mere rubber-stamp for administration policy. The opposition, a minority group in the National Assembly, often fought against the ruling majority in the Assembly and tried to obstruct proceedings, but the government passed bills if necessary suppressing resistance in the Assembly by force.

Table 2. 6 General Elections in the '*Yusin*' Period, 1972-1979

The Assembly	Date	Political Party	Share of vote	Seat
the 9 th	February 1973	Democratic Republican Party	38.7%	73
		New Democratic Party	32.6%	52
		Independents	18.6%	19
		Democratic Unification Party	10.1%	2
		<i>Yujeonghoi</i>	—	73
		Total	100%	219
the 10 th	December 1978	Democratic Republican Party	31.7%	68
		New Democratic Party	32.8%	61
		independents	28.1%	22
		Democratic Unification Party	7.4%	3
		<i>Yujeonghoi</i>	—	77
		Total	100%	231

Source: The National Assembly of Korea.

Elections were not competitive. Korean constitutions have always guaranteed a free and fair election, but this was not practiced under the authoritarian regime. Voters had a free choice. But their choice was often constrained, and elections were not fair. Electoral fraud was pervasive. The authoritarian ruling party bribed voters. Local civil servants illegally influenced electorates in their voting decision. News media censored by the authoritarian government were not fair towards opposition parties in reporting elections. Electoral obstruction against opposition party candidates or supporters of opposition parties was systematic.

Social Change under Rapid Industrialisation

During his rule in 1970s, Park Chung Hee pushed ahead with industrialisation. 'State capitalism' gaining confidence in its economic success in 1960s ambitiously invested in heavy industries such as steel, automobiles, and shipbuilding. A few companies such as Hyundai, Samsung, and Daewoo, which had the full support of the state, gained power in the economy and turned into big conglomerates, '*chaebol*', within the fast growing

support candidates of the ruling party and to disrupt campaigns of the opposition.

economy. However, *chaebols* caused problems.²³ Under the industrial policy which favoured *chaebols*, the authoritarian government oppressed any labour movements and restricted most of the basic rights of workers.²⁴ The industrial policy also hindered the entrance of small companies into the market and a few *chaebols* monopolised the economy. Conversely, *chaebols* were connected to political corruption. Indeed, *chaebols* provided a huge amount of political funds to the ruling group, and the principle of separation of political and economic affairs was not upheld. The close relationship between the ruling group and *chaebols* for their mutual benefit became a critical problem under this 'crony capitalism'.

Rapid industrialisation produced many other social and political problems. In Korea, economic growth was the top priority. Social welfare and the equitable distribution of wealth was ignored. In election campaigns, the ruling group always emphasised economic growth and political stability, while the opposition only argued for liberal democracy and did not effectively raise questions of social welfare. The gap between rich and the poor widened, but the state ignored the problem. Similarly, during industrialisation, the inequality between regions within the nation-state intensified. *Gyeongsang*, the southeastern region and the home region of the President, benefited mostly, while *Jeolla*, the southwestern region and the home region of Park's political rival, Kim Dae-jung, was excluded from industrialisation.

Chun Doo-hwan's Authoritarian Regime: 1980-1987

Park Chung Hee's life Presidency ended when he was assassinated in 1979 by a close aide, Kim Jae-kyu, chief of the Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). However, Park's death was not followed by democratisation but by another military dictatorship, the 'Fifth Republic'. Chun Doo-hwan, who developed his career under Park's guardianship, led a military *coup d'etat* on December of 1979 and became the next dictator in Korea.

'Gwangju Massacre'²⁵

Chun faced strong opposition in the society to the new military dictatorship. During

²³ For the problems of the *chaebol* economy and its reform, see Dae-whan Kim and Gyun Kim, *Hangug jaebeol gaehyeoklon* (Reform of *chaebol* in Korea) (Seoul: Nanam, 1999).

²⁴ In the 1970s, labour workers began to demand better working conditions and worker's rights. During the 1970s, more than 2,500 labour unions were formed, and labour struggles intensified. In 1970, Chun Taeil, a young labour worker, killed himself to criticise inhumane working conditions. This was considered as a starting point for labour struggles under the authoritarian government.

²⁵ According to a new transliteration system recommended by Korean government in 2000, *Kwangju* is spelled as *Gwangju*.

the first half of 1980, several thousand university students and dissidents, demanding democracy and an end to military intervention in politics, demonstrated almost everyday. Chun proclaimed marshal law. All universities were closed and all political activities banned. The military court under marshal law sentenced Kim Dae-jung, a leader of democratic movement to death. This provoked a protest against the new military dictatorship in *Gwangju*, a big city in *Jeolla* region where Kim Dae-jung came from. It was brutally suppressed by military forces and several hundreds citizens in *Gwangju* were killed.

This massacre changed the political culture. The people of *Jeolla* region, the victim of the massacre, became firm in their determination to resist the authoritarian government. Moreover, the *Gwangju* massacre directly encouraged the evolution of anti-Americanism in Korea. Korean democratic movement activists blamed the USA for sitting idly as a spectator during the military *coup d'état* in 1979 and the subsequent *Gwangju* massacre in 1980. Korean military forces had moved into *Seoul* and *Gwangju* without an operational order from the American Commander, despite the fact that Korean military forces had remained under American Command since the Korean War. Student activists and dissidents doubted American foreign policy on democratisation and criticised the American government for backing the new military dictatorship.

Another Reign of Terror

Chun's government, the 'Fifth Republic', did not differ from Park's. It was also based on military force and violence. His government tightened the suppression of anti-government movements. Leading opposition politicians were arrested and banned from political activities. Riot police occupied the campuses of all of major universities and brutally suppressed any student gatherings by using tear gas and force. Under Chun, the opposition was disrupted and became somewhat submissive before the 1985 general election.

The authoritarian government tightly controlled the news media. It nationalised a private broadcasting company and exerted pressure upon owners of newspapers to discharge journalists who criticised the military government. More than one hundred journalists in the *Dong-a Daily Newspaper*, one of major newspapers and the most critical newspaper to the government at that time, were fired in 1980. The Chun's government forced journalists to follow the guidance provided by the authoritarian government and exercised rigid censorship on news reports. As the result, most news media and many journalists were submissive to the authoritarian government and even took the lead in supporting the authoritarian regime. A few number conservative newspapers began to

dominate the newspaper market.²⁶

Pro-Democracy Movement and the People's Uprising of 1987

Under this 'Fifth Republic', labour movements were still restrained and worker's interests were ignored, though the working class had increased during the rapid industrialisation. However, under Chun's military dictatorship, student anti-government activists tried to mobilise labour workers into pro-democracy movements. Student activists influenced by Western Marxism and by the indigenous '*Minjung*' (people's) ideology helped workers to develop their consciousness and them into the anti-government movement.²⁷ This pro-democracy coalition of students and workers with dissidents was the main force in the 'June Uprising' of 1987.²⁸

Chun Doo-hwan elected by an indirect election ruled for a seven-year official term. In 1987, he tried to pass his power to the general-turned-politician Roh Tae Woo who was a close friend from his cadet days in the Army Academy and had led the military coup with him seven years earlier. However, this caused a massive protest against the authoritarian government. The public demanded a direct election for the next president. Finally, the authoritarian government had to yield to public opinion, and direct presidential elections, abolished in 1972, were restored in 1987.²⁹

2. Politics and Elections in the New Democracy:

Change and Continuity in Political Culture and Political Behaviour

Since 1987, democracy has been consolidated without any interruption, though there is an ongoing argument about the quality of democracy in Korea.³⁰ In the new democracy, four

²⁶ Jun-man Kang, '*Eollonhaksalgwa sugueollomui tansaeng*' (Killing journalism and the birth of conservative journalism), *Inmulgwa sasang* (People and thought), 55 (2002), 118-35.

²⁷ The discourse emphasises the role of the grassroots in social and political development. The term *Minjung* refers to the grassroots. *Minjung* is defined as the social class which resists the dominant power and drives social and political progress. For an overview of the discourse, see *Hansindaehak jaesamsegaeyeonguso* (The Center for Cultural Studies in Third World at Hansin University), ed., *Hangug minjunglomu hyeondangye* (The current stage of *minjung* discourse) (Seoul: Dolbegae, 1989).

²⁸ Hagen Koo, 'Engendering Civil Society: The Role of the Labor Movement', in Charles K. Armstrong, ed., *Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy and the State* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 109-31, at pp. 111-4; Sunhyuk Kim, *The Politics of Democratization in Korea: The Role of Civil Society* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), pp. 103-4.

²⁹ For a detailed analysis on the transition to democracy in 1987, see James Cotton, 'From Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea', *Political Studies*, 37 (1989), 244-59.

³⁰ For a discussion on the consolidation of democracy in Korea, see Diamond and Kim, eds, *Consolidating Democracy in South Korea*.

presidential elections, four general elections, and three local elections were held. In general, elections were fair, free, and competitive. Korea even experienced a power transition from one party to another at the Presidential election of 1997 – for the first time in Korean politics. The military is no longer a power group in politics and a military reentry into the politics is no longer conceivable.³¹

However, the new democracy is still in the process of consolidating democracy. Aspects of authoritarian political practice and culture still remain. Political corruption is still a major problem in Korean politics. The parliamentary and political parties are still institutionally underdeveloped. And under the new democracy, regionalism or regional cleavages appeared as a new problem in politics. Furthermore, Korean democracy also has to cope with challenges in globalisation, though it survived a serious economic recession of 1997 rather well.

The 'Sixth Republic' of Roh Tae Woo, 1988-1992

In the 1987 presidential election, the candidate of the authoritarian ruling party, Roh Tae Woo, won the election with 36 percent of the votes. Roh won the election thanks to divisions among candidates linked with the democratic movements. Two opposition leaders, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae-jung, who were at once long time rivals and colleagues during their decades-long fight against authoritarian governments, now ran for Presidency. Their division handed victory to the authoritarian party, albeit on a relatively small minority vote of scarcely more than one third of voters (see Table 2.7).

Table 2.7 Presidential Election in Korea, 1987

Candidates & Parties	Result (share of votes)
Roh Tae Woo, Democratic Justice Party (DJP, <i>Minjeongdang</i>)	36.6%
Kim Young Sam, Reunification Democratic Party (RDP, <i>Tongilminjudang</i>)	28.0%
Kim Dae-jung, Peace Democratic Party (PDP, <i>Pyeongmindang</i>)	27.0%
Kim Jong-pil, New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP, <i>Gonghwadang</i>)	8.1%
Other	0.3%
Total	100%

³¹ Free election is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for democracy. Linz and Stepan suggest that the concept of democratic consolidation is multi-dimensional: i.e., the concept comprises behavioural, attitudinal, and constitutional dimensions. In terms of the behavioural dimension, no political groups should seriously attempt to overthrow the elected government. In terms of the attitudinal dimension, the public should strongly support the democratic idea and the democratic system. Constitutionally, people should rely on established norms and procedures in resolving political conflicts. Considering these various dimensions, we may argue that Korean democracy has been consolidated. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 5-7.

Source: the Korean Election Commission.

The Split of the Opposition and Intensification of Regionalism

In the 1987 election campaign, the ruling party, the Democratic Justice Party (DJP, *Minjeongdang*), emphasised political stability and security for economic development. The ruling party also asserted that opposition contenders who lacked of experience of government would not be able to control economic problems and security issues. Also, the authoritarian ruling party mobilised all the resources at its disposal --- such as the local administrative structure, a huge amount of campaign funding, and the government controlled news media --- to survive in the new democracy by winning the election.

Meanwhile, the two major contenders of the opposition, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae-jung, failed to achieve the single candidacy that a majority of the electorate desperately wanted. The two Kim's camps blamed each other for the failure to achieve a single candidacy and competed against each other in mobilising huge numbers of their loyal supporters to mass rallies during the campaign period.³²

The result of the split in the opposition was severe. Koreans faced to a quite strange situation: a transition to democracy started, but military junta survived and continued to rule. Koreans had to wait another five years to elect a civilian government. Furthermore, supporters of democracy were divided into several groups --- voters loyal to Kim Young Sam, voters loyal to Kim Dae-jung, and voters disappointed with both the Kims --- and regional cleavages became intensified and came to overshadow Korean politics.

The First Divided Government

Roh's government was a weak government resting only on the support of a small minority in the election. Under the 'Sixth Republic' of Roh Tae Woo, military-turned-politicians including Roh extended their political lives, but they are no longer able to rule as they had done under previous regimes. Koreans who had revolt against the military-backed authoritarian government in June of 1987 no longer accepted military interference in politics and demanded the consolidation of democracy.³³

Roh faced a very strong challenge from the opposition in parliament which the past authoritarian regimes had never experienced. In the 1988 Parliamentary election, just

³² For a detailed description of the 1987 presidential election, see Manwoo Lee, *The Odyssey of Korean Democracy* (New York: Praeger, 1990).

³³ For a detailed analysis of politics under President Roh's government, see Robert E. Bedeski, *The Transformation of South Korea: Reform and Reconstitution in the Sixth Republic under Roh Tae Woo, 1987-1992* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994).

after the inauguration of his government, the ruling party was short of a majority. This produced 'divided government' within a presidential system for the first time in Korean political history. The election result reflected regional cleavages combined with a newly adopted first-past-the-post electoral system (see Table 2.8).³⁴

In a multi-party system with a minority ruling party, the government could not ignore the demands of the opposition for consolidating democracy. Investigation hearings on the 'Gwangju Massacre' in 1980 and on the misrule of Chun's government were held in the National Assembly. Many new labour unions were formed and the labour movement came into full blossom. Workers often went on strike and claimed their share in the proceeds of economic development.

Table 2. 8 General Election in Korea, 1988

Political Party	Share of Votes	Number of Seats
Democratic Justice Party (DJP, <i>Minjeongdang</i>)	34.0%	125
Peace Democratic Party (PDP, <i>Pyeongmindang</i>)	19.3%	70
Reunification Democratic Party (RDP, <i>Tongilminjudang</i>)	23.8%	59
New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP, <i>Gonghwadang</i>)	15.6%	35
independents	4.8%	9
others (10 parties)	2.5%	1
Total	100%	299

Source: The National Assembly of Korea.

The Annexation of Three Parties

The ruling party, the DJP, overcame its lack of a majority in parliament by a party merger. In 1990, the ruling party merged with two opposition parties, the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP, *Tongilminjudang*) led by Kim Young Sam and the New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP, *Gonghwadang*) led by Kim Jong-pil. As the result, the multi-party system turned to a two-party system, and the new ruling party, the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP, *Minjadang*), was able to dominate the National Assembly. Old habits were again prevalent in the National Assembly. Sloppy proceedings and even physical confrontation were not unusual. Further political reform was postponed.

The 'Civilian Democratic Government' of Kim Young Sam, 1993-1997

The two Kims, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae-jung, again competed against each other in the next presidential election of 1992. However, by that time, Kim Young Sam was the

³⁴ In the parliamentary election system under the authoritarian regimes, two candidates were elected in each electoral district.

candidate for the ruling party. Kim Young Sam, a long time leader of democratic movement, participated in the merger of three political parties in 1990, and became a candidate of the merged ruling party, the DLP (*Minjudang*), in the 1992 presidential election. In the election, Kim Young Sam then won the election and became the first civilian president for last 30 years, though he was the new candidate of the old authoritarian ruling party or its successor (see Table 2.9).³⁵

Old Campaign Issues and Behaviour in New Democracy

The main issues in the campaign were again regionalism and anti-communism. The ruling party argued that Kim Dae-jung, who was a major contender and advocate of political and economic reform, would be pro-communist. And the incumbent government stirred up regional antagonism among Korean electorates against *Jeolla* region, Kim Dae-jung's hometown region.

Table 2.9 Presidential Election in Korea, 1992

Candidates & Parties	Results (share of votes)
Kim Young Sam, Democratic Liberal Party (DLP, <i>Minjudang</i>)	42.0%
Kim Dae-jung, Democratic Party (DP, <i>Minjudang</i>)	33.8%
Chung Ju-young, Unification National Party (UNP, <i>Gugmindang</i>)	16.3%
Park Chan-jong, New Politics Reform Party (NPRP, <i>Sinjeongdang</i>)	6.4%
others (three candidates)	1.5%
Total	100%

Source: The Korean Election Commission.

Meanwhile, Chung Ju-young, the owner of the Hyundai business group --- the biggest *chaebol* in Korea --- formed a new political party, the Unification National Party (UNP, *Gugmindang*), just before the general election in 1992, and achieved some success in the election (see Table 2.10). Then, Chung ran for the presidency.³⁶ Korean voters fed up with two Kims' domination of Korean politics looked for the third party candidate. Some thought that Chung, a successful businessman, might be a better candidate to deal with an impending economic decline.³⁷ However, it seems that his achievement in the

³⁵ For the 1992 presidential election and the consolidation of democracy before the election, see James Cotton, ed., *Politics and Policy in the New Korean State: From Roh Tae-Woo to Kim Young-Sam* (Melbourne: Longman, 1995).

³⁶ For explanations on the resurgence of the UNP, see Won-Taek Kang, 'The Rise of a Third Party in South Korea: The Unification National Party in the 1992 National Assembly Election', *Electoral Studies*, 17 (1998), 95-110; Gil-hyun Yang, 'Liberalisation and the Political Role of the Chaebol in Korea: The Rise of and Fall of the Unification National Party (UNP)', in James Cotton, ed., *Politics and Policy in the New Korean State: From Roh Tae-Woo to Kim Young-Sam* (Melbourne: Longman, 1995), pp. 83-108.

³⁷ Another example was Park Chan-jong in the presidential election. Park gained more than one

election was not possible without his fortune and his company. He was suspected of illegally mobilising Hyundai workers in his campaign and spent a huge amount of illegal campaign funds. However, the two Kims' campaign teams also were not free from illegal campaign funding. After the election, Kim Young Sam confessed that an excessive use of campaign funding was a major political problem that Korea must overcome.

Table 2. 10 General Election in Korea, 1992

Political Party	Share of Votes	Number of Seats
Democratic Liberal Party (DLP, <i>Minjudang</i>)	38.5%	149
Democratic Party (DP, <i>Minjudang</i>)	29.2%	97
Unification National Party (UNP, <i>Gugmindang</i>)	17.4%	31
independents	11.5%	21
other (3 parties)	3.4%	1
Total	100%	299

Source: The National Assembly of Korea

In the election, the opposition also raised questions about public servants and local administrative organisations illegally campaigning for the ruling party. News media maintaining a good relationship with the incumbent government were also not free from criticism for unfair electoral reports. In sum, the election was relatively fair, free and competitive, but the old habits of electoral campaigning persisted to some degree.

Intensification of Regionalism in Politics and Elections

In the first two years of his term in office, Kim Young Sam excelled in political and economic reform. Kim's 'Civilian Democratic Government' introduced various measures to reduce political corruption and achieve greater economic justice. Kim also established civilian control over the military and prevented a military reentry to politics by disbanding a faction of military officials, '*Hanahoi*' (One association), which had been a major pillar of the past authoritarian regime.

In June 1995, local elections, which had been postponed for several years, finally took place. This was another symbol of the consolidation of the new democracy though the results clearly reflected regional cleavages. In *Gyeongsang* region, the ruling Democratic Liberal Party (DLP, *Minjudang*) did well. In *Jeolla* region, voters showed their loyalty to the opposition Democratic Party (DP, *Minjudang*). And in *Chungcheong* region, a new political party, the United Liberal Democrats (ULD, *Jaminlyeon*) led by Kim Jong-pil, dominated the election. Kim Jong-pil withdrew from the DLP that he had

and half million votes in the election, though he did not have strong organisational support in the campaign. He was popular among educated young urban voters.

helped to form in 1990 and founded the ULD just before the local election. Kim Jong-pil focused on regional self-respect in the *Chungcheong* region.

The highlight was the election for Mayor of Seoul, the capital city. The candidate of the DP, Cho Soon, won the election while the candidate of the DLP was not even a major competitor.

Kim Dae-jung, who was defeated in the last three presidential elections and had retired from politics in 1992, was encouraged by the victory of the DP in the local election, and decided to return to presidential politics. He formed a new opposition party, the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP, *Gugminhoeui*), and more than two-thirds of National Assembly members of the DP moved to his new party. The NCNP became a major opposition party and the opposition was divided again.

The regional cleavage in partisan alignment was deepened by the breakup of the opposition. The NCNP depended heavily on the loyal support of electorates in *Jeolla* region (Kim Dae-jung's home region) and the DP barely survived except in urban areas such as *Seoul* and *Busan*.

The return of Kim Dae-jung to politics meant a restoration of the old rivalry between Kim Yong Sam and Kim Dae-jung, and intensified the tension between the ruling and the opposition party. Under strong pressure from the opposition, Kim Young Sam's government prosecuted two former military-turned-presidents, Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae Woo, for their *coup d'etat* in 1979. By doing so, the 'Civilian Democratic Government' tried to break off relations with the former authoritarian government, but the ruling party lost the support of conservative electorates in Northern *Gyeongsang* region, the home region of two imprisoned former presidents. Kim Young Sam then built up his ruling party's strength by recruiting well known popular reformist politicians such as Lee Hoi Chang and Park Chan-jong and by changing the name of his ruling party to the New Korea Party (NKP, *Sinhangugdang*).

The ruling NKP did well in the general election of 1996, and especially advanced in electoral districts in Seoul traditionally considered strongholds of the opposition. The NCNP swept *Jeolla* region, but failed to achieve the anticipated number of National Assembly seats due to its many defeats in Seoul. As they did in local elections a year before, the ULD again dominated elections in their own home ground, *Chungcheong* region. The DP, which did not have any regional foothold, was a major loser in these regional cleavages (see Table 2.11).³⁸

³⁸ As a summary of the parliamentary election, see Peter Morris, 'Notes on Recent Elections: Electoral Politics in South Korea', *Electoral Studies*, 15 (1996), 550-62.

Table 2. 11 General Election in Korea, 1996

Political Party	Share of Votes	Number of Seats
New Korea Party (NKP, <i>Sinhangugdang</i>)	34.5%	139
National Congress for New Politics (NCNP, <i>Gugminhoeui</i>)	25.3%	79
United Liberal Democrats (ULD, <i>Jaminlyeon</i>)	16.2%	50
Democratic Party (DP, <i>Minjudang</i>)	11.2%	15
independents	11.9%	16
others (4 parties)	0.9%	0
Total	100%	299

Source: The National Assembly of Korea

Challenges to the Civilian Government

The NKP outperformed all other parties in the general election, but failed to secure a majority of seats in the National Assembly. The 'Civilian Democratic Government' tried to overcome this situation by adopting an undemocratic strategy — tempting National Assembly members from opposition parties or independents. Several Assembly members moved to the ruling party for their own interests without considering party platform or policy, and the ruling party soon obtained a majority in the National Assembly.

In the last year of his term in office, Kim Young Sam faced to a strong challenge not only from opposition parties, but also from the civil society. When the ruling majority party passed a bill to revise the Labour Law by stealth, excluding opposition party members, the *Minjunochong* (Korean Confederation of Trade Union) led by journalist-turned labour activist Kwon Young-gil, called a nation-wide strike. Kim's government also lost popular support when his son was arrested for corruption and as the impending economic recession of 1997 was anticipated.

The 'People's Government' of Kim Dae-jung, 1998-2002

Kim Dae-jung, who was a charismatic political leader but had lost the last three presidential elections in 1971, in 1987, and in 1992, again ran for President in the 1997, and was finally elected. The 1997 presidential election was a watershed in Korean political development. The perpetual ruling party finally and unambiguously lost the election. For the first time in Korea, it was a real power transition from one party to another by means of an election (see Table 2.12).³⁹

³⁹ For a summary of the 1997 presidential elections, Won-Taek Kang and Hoon Jaung, 'Notes on Recent Elections: The 1997 Presidential Election in South Korea', *Electoral Studies*, 18 (1999), 599-608. Also, see Nam-Young Lee, ed., *Hanguui seongeo* (Elections in Korea), vol. 2 (Seoul: Pureungil, 1998).

Table 2. 12 Presidential Election in Korea, 1997

Candidates & Parties	Results (share of votes)
Kim Dae-jung, National Congress for New Politics (NCNP, <i>Gugminhoeui</i>)	40.3%
Lee Hoi Chang, Grand National Party (GNP, <i>Hannaradang</i>)	38.7%
Rhee In-je, New Party for the People (NPP, <i>Gugminsindang</i>)	19.2%
Kwon Young-gil, People's Victory 21 (PV, <i>Gugminseongli 21</i>)	1.2%
others (three candidates)	0.6%
Total	100%

Source: the Korean Election Commission.

Election Issues and the Election Coalition Based on Region

In the 1997 Presidential election, three candidates, Lee Hoi Chang and Rhee In-je along with Kim Dae-jung, were major contenders. The ruling New Korea Party (NKP), nominated Lee Hoi Chang by a free vote in a party convention. However, Rhee In-je, a major contender in the NKP competition for the candidacy, withdrew from the party and formed a party, the New Party for People (NPP, *Gugminsindang*) in order to run for presidency by himself. The ruling NKP, coped with this situation by annexing an opposition party, the Democratic Party (DP) led by Cho Soon, and changing the name of the merged party to the Grand National Party (GNP, *Hannaradang*).

In the mean time, Kim Dae-jung, a candidate of a major opposition party, the NCNP, declared that he would create a coalition government with Kim Jong-pil, the leader of the ULD, if he won the election. The coalition between two political parties, which had quite different party platforms, and between two politicians, who had lived much different political lives --- one as a leader of democratic movement, the other as a key member of authoritarian military dictatorship --- was unexpected. The coalition was prompted by the growth of regionalism. Kim Dae-jung had the support of the people in *Jeolla* region, while Kim Jong-pil had the support of the people in *Chungcheong* region.

The campaign slogan or strategy of the ruling party did not differ from that in previous elections, as the leading opposition candidate had not changed. Lee Hoi Chang and the ruling GNP accused Kim Dae-jung of being pro-communist, and the GNP even encouraged suspicion of a secret connection between Kim's camp and the North Korean communist leadership. The GNP also tried to stimulate 'anti-*Jeolla* regional sentiment' that had been promoted by authoritarian governments and was widespread in the nation. On the other hand, Kim Dae-jung argued for a power transition to the opposition party such as Korea had never experienced. He asserted that a power transition would represent the true consolidation of democracy. In a major economic recession that hit the economy in 1997, the NCNP also criticised the incumbent government's ability and management of the economy and Kim tried to demonstrate his ability to control the economic crisis. Rhee

In-je of the NPP, the youngest of the three candidates, argued for generational change in political leadership. And the NCNP, together with its 'regional coalition' of the ULD, and the NPP, effectively used the fact that Lee's two sons had been exempted from national military service duty to raise question about his morality. In short, candidate personality or candidate factor was a much more important issue than policies or election pledges in this campaign.

TV debates were introduced for the first time in Korean presidential election history. Opposition candidates, who were relatively weak in campaign finance and organisation compared to the ruling party candidate, took advantage of this new way of electioneering. Rhee In-je, a relatively unknown candidate, especially enjoyed the TV debates. Rhee also performed relatively well in the TV debates and enhanced his positive image markedly.⁴⁰

Another Divided Government

After his election, Kim Dae-jung coped swiftly with economic crisis. His government paid back all loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) within two and a half years and stabilised the Korean economy. His government also achieved a great advance in North-South Korean relationships. Kim Dae-jung visited North Korea and held a summit meeting with North Korean leader in 2000, the first time for fifty-five years. Kim Dae-jung also introduced social security programs and tried to extend social welfare.

However, the ruling party, the NCNP, was a minority in the National Assembly. From the inauguration day of his government, Kim Dae-jung had to cope with a big opposition party, the GNP, and at the same time, had to try to please the ULD, a coalition party that had a somewhat different party platform or policy stance. Kim Dae-jung also lost political support due to his unavoidable measures to overcome economic crisis. During the economic crisis, the flexibility of the labour market was increased, and the salaried class, who had supported Kim Dae-jung in 1997, was a major victim.

Before the general election of April 2000, the ruling party, the NCNP, tried to extend its political basis by recruiting reform-minded new politicians and even changed its name to the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP, *Minjudang*), but the former ruling party failed to be the biggest party, let alone get a majority in the National Assembly (see Table 2.13). Again, regional cleavages or regionalism influenced the result of election.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Seung-chan Yang, 'Television seongeo toron bangsongui yeonghyangnyeok yeongu' (the impact of televised debates in the Korean presidential election), *Bangsongyeongu*, 48 (1999), 284-322.

⁴¹ For a summary of the general election, Won-Taek Kang and Scott Walker, 'Notes on Recent Elections: The 2000 National Assembly Elections in South Korea', *Electoral Studies*, 21 (2002), 473-533. Also, see Youngjae Jin, ed., *Hangugui seongeo* (Elections in Korea), vol. 4 (Seoul: Korea

Table 2. 13 General Election in Korea, 2000

Political Party	Share of Votes	Number of Seats
Grand National Party (GNP, <i>Hannaradang</i>)	39.0%	133
Millennium Democratic Party (MDP, <i>Minjudang</i>)	35.9%	115
United Liberal Democrats (ULD, <i>Jaminlyeon</i>)	9.8%	17
Democratic National Party (DNP, <i>Mingugdang</i>)	3.7%	2
independents	9.4%	5
others (4 parties)	2.3%	1
Total	100.0%	273

Source: The National Assembly of Korea.

During the second half of his term in office, Kim Dae-jung was confronted by various challenges. The bigger opposition party always tackled the minority government in the parliament. Opposition groups continually stirred up regionalism and anti-*Jeolla* regional sentiment. There was strong tension between Kim's government and major conservative newspapers in a situation where three major conservative newspapers controlled about 75 per cent of the market shares. The opposition party and conservative newspapers focused their criticism on Kim Dae-jung's 'Sunshine Policy', a peaceful approach toward North Korea. Furthermore, political scandals and corruptions connected with his two sons and his close assistants eroded his support.

The Consolidation of Democracy: Achievement and Limits

In general, during Kim Dae-jung's rule, Korean democracy was consolidated. Civil activist movements burgeoned and gained a strong voice in the society. Ideological divisions were weakened, and many progressive organisations such as the *Jeongyojo* (Korean Teachers' and Educational Workers' Union), which was an illegal organisation before Kim's government, were allowed. The power of the legislative body was enhanced by revisions to the National Assembly Act, such as the introduction of special prosecutor system.

However, fully-fledged political reform was not achieved, though a certain level of institutionalisation of political system was recognised. Political corruption remained a chronic problem in Korean politics. Political parties were not fully developed institutionally, and democratic practices within parties were not implemented. Several dozen members of the National Assembly often withdrew from a party and switched to another party for their own individual interests without considering party platforms or policy. Parliament was more like a battlefield between government and opposition for

party interests rather than a place for discussing public policy, and direct physical confrontation was not exceptional. Elections were fair and public servants stopped exerting influence on electorates for the ruling party, but violations of election laws in terms of campaign funding were not eradicated. Electorates were split by regionalism, and political parties inflamed regional antagonisms as a tactic in election campaigns.

The 'Participatory Government' of Roh Moo-hyun, 2003

The three Kims – Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae-jung, and Kim Jong-pil – who were charismatic leaders and dominated Korean politics for a long time, were no longer the main actors in the 2002 presidential elections. For the first time in thirty years none of them ran for the presidency, and none of them strongly influenced voters. This reflected on a generational change in political elites and also in voters.

The Race in the Election: Volatile Voters

The 2002 presidential election was more like a horse race, and electoral support was volatile. During the year, the popularity of parties and candidates went up and down depending upon political events. On the one hand, Lee Hoi Chang was the *de facto* candidate of the GNP, a major opposition party, from early in the year. His popularity stayed about thirty five percent in polls. On the other hand, Roh Moo-hyun and Chung Mong-joon at different times got ahead of Lee for a while, but soon fell behind. However, just before the start of the official campaign period, Chung withdrew from the race and declared his support for Roh and Roh then returned to the lead.

The ruling party, the MDP, used a primary election for the first time in Korean political history. In this primary election, which was modeled upon American presidential primaries, non-party members along with party members could participate. Roh Moo-hyun, who did not have a strong support within the party itself, gained popularity during the primary campaign and won. Voters welcomed the primary as a symbol of the development of democracy within a party and paid attention to the event. The aim of the MDP was accomplished, and the MDP recovered its popularity amongst the electorate. Roh was supported by more than sixty percent of the entire electorate according to polls in May 2002, immediate after the primary election.

However, it did not take a long for that great success of Roh and the MDP in May 2002 to become a spring dream. As it was revealed that President Kim's two sons were involved in corruption, the MDP's popularity again sharply declined. The MDP was a loser in local elections in June 2002. Indeed, the candidate of the MDP for Mayor of the

capital Seoul was roundly defeated. Roh was also confronted by attacks from unfriendly conservative newspapers tackling and experienced a sharp declining in popularity. Within his party he faced to criticism after the MDP's failure in the local elections.

Roh overcame this crisis by forming a coalition with Chung Mong-joon, a son of a 'Chaebol' Hyundai family, in November just before the beginning of official campaign period. Chung had become a strong candidate for the presidency through the 2002 World Cup Football Games held by Korea and Japan together. Koreans were pleased with the achievement of their Football Team and rated Chung's achievement as the representative of Korean Football Association highly. As Roh lost popularity, Chung took top place in the polls for a while and formed a new party, National Unity 21 (NU 21), but his popularity also declined soon. It was expected that Lee Hoi Chang, a candidate of the biggest party would win the presidential election if both Roh and Chung ran. Both Roh and Chung, who were supported by younger generations and shared a common interest in defeating a conservative candidate in the presidential election, agreed that only one of them should run for presidency. They decided which of them it should be by consulting the polls. Roh became the candidate to compete with Lee Hoi Chang. Through this coalition deal, Roh regained the lead and won the election.

Table 2. 14 Presidential Election in Korean, 2002

Candidates & Parties	Election results
Roh Moo-hyun, Millennium Democratic Party (MDP, <i>Minjudang</i>)	48.9%
Lee Hoi Chang, Grand National Party (GNP, <i>Hannaradang</i>)	46.6%
Kwon Young-gil, Democratic Labour Party (LP, <i>Minnodang</i>)	3.9%
others (3 candidates)	0.6%
Total	100%

Source: The Korean Election Commission.

Campaigns and Election Issues

In the 2002 presidential election, the main contenders were the candidates of the two major parties – unlike previous presidential elections where there were more than two strong contenders. During campaign, Roh pledged himself to further political reform. He argued for overthrowing an outdated politics and introducing a new politics, and asserted that the opposition party, as a descendent of the old ruling party in authoritarian regimes, could not put any political reform in practice. Lee depended on a negative campaign emphasising Roh's instability in behaviour and attitudes, and at the same time, the poor performance of the incumbent government.

The illegal use of a huge amount of election campaign funding, previously a chronic problem in Korean elections, was no longer issue in the 2002 election. Mass rallies based

on mobilised audiences disappeared. TV debates and TV election broadcasts were the most important means in electioneering. Campaigners focused on the media and most electors depended solely on the media to provide information for their vote decision. In this media campaign, as Rhee In-je had done in 1997, journalist-turned-labour-activist Kwon Young-gil, the candidate of the Democratic Labour Party, performed relatively well in the TV debates and gained a wider support from the electorate though he was never a major contender. In addition, the Internet appeared as a new tool of campaigning in one of the most webbed societies in the world. Roh whose support was based on the younger generation effectively used the Internet in the campaign.⁴² There is some truth in the claim that President Roh is the 'first internet president' in the world.⁴³

Voters were again split by region. Lee gained most votes in *Gyeongsang*, the southeastern region, whereas Roh swept almost all the votes in *Jeolla*, the southwestern region. A similar pattern was visible in the electoral districts in Seoul. The candidate of the GNP, Lee Hoi Chang, won the election in the districts where many voters come from *Gyeongsang*, while the candidate of the MDP, Roh Moo-hyun, won in the districts where many came from *Jeolla*. It is important to note that this regional cleavage was not related to the candidates themselves. Roh Moo-hyun, the candidate of the MDP, was from *Gyeongsang* region, but he did not do so much better than Kim Dae-jung, who came from *Jeolla* had done in 1997 in gaining votes in *Gyeongsang* region.

Anti-communism no longer had special impact on electioneering. Younger generations, who were born in the post-Korean War period and who had experienced great developments in North-South Korean relationships under the incumbent government, were relatively free from ideological stiffness. It was a good example for weakening ideological stiffness among electorates that the candidate of the Democratic Labour Party, a progressive party, gained almost one million votes in the election. Instead, Korean electorates were roughly divided into the pro and the con concerning the 'Sunshine policy' of the incumbent government, an engagement policy toward North Korea. At the same time, 2002 was the first occasion in South Korean electoral history when anti-Americanism appeared as a main issue.

A generational difference in political attitudes and electoral behaviours became a main feature of electoral cleavage in Korea. The electorates were by and large divided into the below forty years old and the above forty years old. The younger supported Roh and the older voted for Lee. Roh's victory in the election was largely thanks to the

⁴² Korea ranks third in the world in terms of Internet use. According to a survey in 2002 conducted by the Ipsos-Reid Corporation, a market research firm, 53 per cent of Koreans had gone online at least once over the previous 30 days. See 'Around the World, Gains in Internet Use', *The New York Times*, 16 February 2003.

⁴³ Jonathan Watts, 'World's First Internet President Logs on', *The Guardian*, 24 February 2003.

younger who actively participated in the campaign through the Internet. In the past younger people were less interested in the campaign or election, but the 2002 election was different. The under 40 year olds who made up a great majority of the electorate were suddenly interested in the election and determined the result. It was a 'revolt by the younger'.

3. Explaining Electoral Behaviour in Korea

The Modernisation Theory: 'yeo-chon-ya-do' (rural area for the ruling and urban area for the opposition)⁴⁴

Under the authoritarian regime, the most prominent explanation of Korean voting behaviour focused on the difference in voting results between rural and urban areas. The authoritarian ruling party gained more votes in rural areas whereas opposition parties gained more votes in urban areas.⁴⁵ That pattern of voting recurred in both presidential and parliamentary elections.

The phenomenon was mainly explained by the different level of political consciousness between voters in rural and urban areas.⁴⁶ The authoritarian party could more effectively mobilise electorates in rural areas who relatively had low levels of political understanding or political consciousness. According to this explanation, voters in rural areas indulged in 'conformity voting'. They were more likely to adapt themselves to circumstances rather than exercise their own judgment. Indeed, their voting decision was greatly influenced by family, relatives, community, and – critically – by local bureaucrats. The authoritarian ruling party could easily bribe voters in rural areas. And local civil servants who had direct influence on the community life of voters in rural areas often persuaded or sometimes threatened voters to cast their vote for a candidate of the authoritarian ruling party.

⁴⁴ For a review of Korean electoral studies before 1987, see Soong-hoom Kil, 'Seongeoyeongumunheonoe banyeongdoin ironui byeonhwa' (Changes in theory reflected in literature in electoral studies), in Soong-hoom Kil, Kwang Woong Kim, and Byong Man Ahn, eds, *Hanguui seongeo* (Elections in Korea) (Seoul: Dasan Publishers, 1987), pp. 69-98.

⁴⁵ Kap-yun Lee, *Hanguui seongeowa jiyekjuui* (Korean elections and regionalism) (Seoul: Oreum, 1998), p. 30.

⁴⁶ Cheon-ju Yun, *Tupyo chamyewa jeongchibaljeon* (Voter participation and political development) (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1989); Chong-Lim Kim, 'Political Participation and Mobilized Voting', in Chong-Lim Kim, ed., *Political Participation in Korea* (Santa Barbara: Clio Books, 1980), pp. 119-42; Jae-on Kim and Byung Chul Koh, 'Electoral Behavior and Social Development in South Korea: An Aggregate Data Analysis of Presidential Elections', *Journal of Politics*, 34 (1972), 845-54.

Explaining Mobilised Voters in Rural Area

Political culture and social structure in rural society was used to explain why voters in rural areas were more easily mobilised than voters in urban areas. First, Korean traditional culture or values, especially Confucian culture, had been relatively unchanged in rural areas. This traditional political culture emphasised loyalty to authority and respect for hierarchical order. Other people, such as family leaders or community leaders, could definitely affect voters who had this traditional political culture and lacked more modern democratic values or political understanding of the meaning of democratic elections.

Second, traditional rural communities were characterised by a hierarchical order and an extended family system. In traditional community life, family relationships were important. In traditional society, the concept of family differed from concept of family in modern society. In an extended family system, 'family' included a large number of relatives. It was more like a tribe or clan. In traditional communities, most members of such an extended family respected the family leader's decisions, and elections were not an exception. In other words, in rural communities, there was a good channel for mobilising voters effectively, and voters were easily mobilised.

However, there is another explanation why voters in rural areas supported the authoritarian ruling party.⁴⁷ In elections, the ruling party, which monopolised all kinds of state resources, always promised to help the development of local communities, by such means as the construction of bridges, roads, and hospitals. So, voters preferred candidates of ruling party in elections. Local bureaucrats, or opinion leaders of rural communities could tempt electorates with such baits or expected rewards. In addition, opposition parties lacked human resources because the authoritarian government and ruling party almost monopolised the pool of highly qualified potential candidates. This was especially true in rural electoral districts. So in elections, through their lack of human and financial resources, opposition parties had to concentrate on urban electoral districts and almost gave up on elections in rural areas. In these circumstances, opposition party candidates in rural areas were not equal to ruling party candidates in terms of quality or status. Indeed, ruling party candidates were usually far superior to opposition party candidates.

Limits of the Model of Mobilised Voters

⁴⁷ Kisuk Cho, *Hamnijeok seontaek* (Rational choice) (Seoul: Hanul, 1996), pp. 106-16. However, this argument is not empirically confirmed due to lack of data. Also, there is no close relation between supports for the ruling party and pledges for local development according to a recent empirical research. See Lee, *Hanguui seongeowa jiyekjuui* (Korean elections and regionalism), p. 33.

Although the mobilisation explanation helps explain the pattern of voting behaviour of the Korean electorate under authoritarian government, this explanation had limits. First, it explained the pattern of voting behaviour at the aggregate level but was less successful at explaining the voting behaviour of individual voters. Second, the model could not be applied to explain the voting behaviour of Korean electorates in general. It focused on voting behaviour in rural areas. It could not explain the substantial support for the ruling party in urban areas. And this problem got more serious as Korea industrialised. During the industrialisation of Korea, the population of rural areas declined rapidly to become a small percentage of voters in the electorate.

Third, the explanation fails to explain voting behaviour in rural areas under the new democracy after 1987. The pattern of voting behaviour in rural areas persists, even though the explanatory power of the variables is much weakened. Electorates in rural area are still more likely to support for the authoritarian party, even though it is now an opposition party without the ability to distribute state resources, and even though traditional rural communities have disintegrated and voters in rural areas cannot so easily be mobilised. Under the WTO system, agricultural issues are salient and farmers have begun to articulate particular interests.

Moreover, the concept of ruling and opposition party is much confused due to the power transition of 1997, the first democratic transition in Korean political history. However, the old generation which is the main component of rural areas still supports the descendent of the old authoritarian ruling party. For example, many older electorates in rural areas say they have always checked “box number 1” on the ballot paper throughout their life, and they hardly change their voting habit.⁴⁸

In short, the explanation of voting behaviour in rural areas based on mobilisation cannot deal with voting behaviour in rural areas under the new democracy. Other factors should be considered to explain why voters in rural areas still support for the successor of the authoritarian ruling party.⁴⁹

Democratic Movement and Electoral Behaviours in Korea: ‘*Minju dae Ban-minju*’ (Pro-democracy vs. Anti-democracy)

⁴⁸ In Korean ballot system, a candidate of the biggest party in the National Assembly is assigned number 1 in ballot paper. A candidate of the second biggest party in the National Assembly is assigned the next number in ballot paper, so on. Also, in Korean political history, old authoritarian ruling party and its descendent has been the biggest party in the National Assembly.

⁴⁹ Lee Kap-yun explained the difference in voting behaviour between the rural and the urban area focusing on age and education factor. Indeed, the older and the less educated voters are more likely to support for the authoritarian ruling party and they remain in rural area. Lee, *Hangugui seongeowa jiyekjuui* (Korean elections and regionalism), pp. 25-40.

In the Korean political process or elections, political leaders rather than political parties have been the key actors. Among the three main factors in voting choice -- party, candidate, and issues -- the candidate factor has been the most important in Korean voting decisions.⁵⁰ The instability of the political party system and ideological stiffness are the main reasons why Korean electorates depend on the candidate factor in the voting decisions rather than on party or issues.

'Meeting and Parting' (Ihapjipsan) of Political Parties

In Korea, the main feature of party politics is 'meeting and parting'. This is especially true for opposition parties. Authoritarian governments had suppressed opposition parties or political leaders with all sorts of measures, and opposition party activities were extremely constrained. Furthermore, authoritarian governments always tried to disrupt opposition parties and promote factional struggles -- the old principle of "divide and rule". Consequently, new opposition parties appeared often, but had short lives.

It is hard to say that opposition parties were modern political parties. They were not systemised organisations. Opposition parties, which were oppressed by authoritarian governments, lacked human and financial resources, while the authoritarian party developed a systemised organisation and built a nation wide network to keep in touch with local individual electorates. Furthermore, authoritarian governments had made voters hold a biased view against opposition parties, which were described as factional struggles, agitators, and cliques.

In these circumstances, an opposition party was heavily dependent on a political leader who could gain personal support. Charismatic leaders formed parties and dominated them and the life span of a political party was usually the same as the political life of a prominent leader. In this sense, even the ruling party was not an exception. A dictator who took power by a coup formed a ruling party to support his reign, and the party collapsed when he lost power.

Since democratisation in 1987, the situation has not changed much. Most political parties in Korea still remain at a low level of institutionalisation. 'Meeting and parting' is still the main characteristic of party politics in Korea. One political leader of each

⁵⁰ Myoung-soon Shin, '*Hanguui jeongchi chamyewa jeongchi baljeon*' (Political participation and political development in Korea), in Korean Political Science Association, ed., *Hanguk jeongchi balcheonui tuegseonggwa jeonmang* (Features and prospect for political development in Korea) (Seoul: Korean Political Science Association, 1984). Cited from Cho, *Hamnijeok seontaek* (Rational choice), p. 120.

political party dominates that political party.⁵¹ Many citizens have a negative perception of political parties as a whole. And political parties are treated with contempt as the least respected institution or the least developed organisations in society.⁵²

No difference among Political Parties

Party competition, based on differences on public policy, has been completely absent. A political party representing a particular social class has not existed. Party platforms or policies do not have a significant weight. There are several reasons why party platforms or policies are ignored in party politics. First, political parties have been formed and dominated by political leaders. Many political parties were built in haste just before an election. In many cases, they copied and modified the party platforms and policies of another party. Second, under the authoritarian regime, the labour movement was extremely restricted. Therefore, it was difficult to expect the advent of a political party representing specific class interests. Third, the ideological orientation of society was favourable to right-wing ideology. Under the Cold War system, South Korean always feared the threat of North Korea. And Koreans who had experienced the Korean War in the 1950s held very strong anti-communism views. Dictators encouraged the people's anti-communist sentiment, and made use of ideological rigidity to maintain or consolidate their rule. For example, authoritarian governments often accused opposition political leaders of being communists or pro-communists who would cooperate with North Korea. Authoritarian governments even framed and executed such opponents. In this situation, the appearance of a progressive or left-wing party was practically impossible.

Due to the ideological rigidity or inclination towards a right-wing ideology in society, party competition based on different policies did not exist. In elections, opposition parties criticised the lack of freedom and argued for democracy. Electorates did not pay attention to specific detailed policies. They hardly recognised differences in public policies across different political parties and considered any election pledge on public policies as rhetoric. On the other hand, the authoritarian ruling party always raised issues of security, economic growth and political stability.

Even the descendent of the authoritarian party after 1987 stimulated feelings of uneasiness on security issues. The New Korea Party (NKP), the ruling party at that time,

⁵¹ Lee Kap-yun pointed three main characteristics of political parties in Korea: (1) no difference in terms of ideology and issue, (2) the instability of the party system, and (3) domination by a prominent leader. Lee, *Hanguui seongeowa jiyeokjuui* (Korean elections and regionalism), pp. 141-52.

⁵² For example, in assessments of party performance, Koreans perceive political parties negatively. Indeed, 73 per cent of voters perceived that political parties serve only party interests rather than public interests. See Shin, *Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea*, pp. 180-2.

and the news media cooperated to exaggerate a minor intrusion of North Korean soldiers in the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) during the 1996 general election. It affected voters who had strong anti-communism views and affected the result of the election.

'McCarthyism' is still often used to attack political rivals. In the 1997 presidential election, Kim Dae-jung was criticised as pro-communist. Even in the 2002 presidential primary election of the MDP, led by President Kim Dae-jung, a strong candidate was attacked by another candidate and by conservative newspapers for being a radical or on the left.

Electoral Cleavage of the Government and the Opposition

When modern political parties were not institutionalised and competition on public policy did not exist, a key concept to explain individual voting behaviour under the authoritarian regime was a political attitude of 'pro-ruling' or 'pro-opposition' party.⁵³ The concept differs from the concept of party identification or party affiliation in Western democracies. Korean electorates had difficulty in developing a party affiliation with specific parties due to the short life span of most parties, especially opposition parties. Therefore, the concept was not related to a specific political party. Like US party identification, however, the political attitude of pro-ruling and pro-opposition was formed over a long period of time. It was a long-term predisposition, even a belief-system. Voters who supported democracy or freedom were more likely to have a pro-opposition attitude, while voters who preferred stability to freedom were more likely to have a pro-ruling party attitude. This political attitude of pro-ruling or pro-opposition party was associated with the social and economic characteristics of individual voters. Younger generations, higher educated voters, and men in urban areas were more likely to have pro-opposition party attitudes.

The political attitude of pro-ruling and pro-opposition party may no longer be so useful to explain voting behaviour of Korean electorates after the democratisation of 1987. Political development and change have confused the electorates. The authoritarian ruling party merged with two opposition parties in 1990. One of the two most prominent leaders of democratic movement, Kim Young Sam, won the 1992 presidential election as the candidate of the merged ruling party. Finally, an opposition party won the 1997

⁵³ Jung-bin Cho, 'Yugwonjaui yeoyaseonghyanggwae tupyohaengtae' (Pro-ruling and pro-opposition voter attitude and voting behaviour), in Nam-Young Lee, ed., *Hanguki seonge* (Elections in Korea), vol. 1 (Seoul: Nanam, 1993), pp. 49-66; Chan-wuk Park, 'Jae14dae gughoiuiwon chongseongeoaeseoui jeongdangjiji bunseok' (An analysis of party support in the 14th general election), in Nam-Young Lee, ed., *Hanguki seonge* (Elections in Korea), vol. 1, pp. 67-115.

presidential election and became a 'ruling party' for the first time in 50 years. So it is natural for Korean electorates to be perplexed now with the concept of ruling party or opposition party.

Under the authoritarian regime, the main issue in elections was political: constitutional democracy or freedom. The cleavage of Korean electorate could be well described by a value dimension --- pro-democracy and anti-democracy or pro-authoritarianism. Voters who emphasised democracy were more likely to feel pro-opposition. Voters who preferred authoritarianism were more likely to feel pro-ruling party. However, under new democracy after 1987, such grand political issues are less important, even though political corruption and reform are still the main issue in elections. The cleavage of Korean electorates can no longer be fully explained by one dimension of liberalism versus authoritarianism. Another dimension also should be considered. Korean electorates have begun to pay attention to issues, such as welfare, income inequality, and inflation. In order to explain cleavages in Korean electorates, a second value dimension of egalitarianism and market liberalism must be added.

'Region Voting' in New Democracy

There has been another realignment of the Korean electorate. The electorate, which was aligned with a political attitude of pro-ruling party and pro-opposition party under the authoritarian government, has been realigned with regions. Since 1987, chronic regionalism in politics has been intensified.⁵⁴

Regionalism in Elections

Geography now plays an essential role in Korean elections. Regions are much more important than programs or social criteria. One major political party nearly monopolises public support in one region, and another major party controls another region.⁵⁵ The competition between the two major parties, the ruling party and the first opposition party, parallels a regional antagonism between the Southwestern and the Southeastern region in Korean peninsular. For example, in the 2000 General Election, the Grand National Party (GNP), the descendent of the old authoritarian party, swept every electoral district in the

⁵⁴ See Lee, *Hanguui seongeowa jiyekjuui* (Korean elections and regionalism). Also, Kisuk Cho, *Jiyekjuui seongeowa hamnijeok yugwonja* (Regional voting and rational voters) (Seoul: Nanam, 2000).

⁵⁵ For example, in the 2002 presidential election, Roh Moo-hyun, a candidate of the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP), gained over 90 per cent of votes in *Jeolla* region, while Lee Hoi Chang, a candidate of the Grand National Party (GNP), took approximately 70 per cent of votes in *Gyeongsang* region.

Southeast region, while the ruling Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) won every electoral district in Southwest region.

During the 1990s, regionalism or 'region voting' developed from an antagonism or competition between the Southeastern and Southwestern regions — *Gyeongsang and Jeolla* — to extend to other regions. In the 1996 General Election, the United Liberal Democrat (ULD) calling for a regional self-respect won elections in all electoral districts in the Midwest, *Chungcheong*.

It is true that a 'region voting' is detected in some other democracies, where electorates cast their vote based on regional political and economic interests.⁵⁶ However, in Korea, region voting is somewhat different. In Korea, 'region voting' is based on an irrational sentiment, regionalism or regional antagonism, rather than regional interests or ethnic interests. Indeed, voting behaviour in Korea is closely related to voters' regional identifications. For example, voters in Seoul, capital city and a metropolitan city, are not free from regionalism. Seoul citizens come from various regions in Korea, but their voting choice is greatly affected by regionalism. A voter chooses a candidate because the candidate comes from the same province as he or she. A voter in Seoul who comes from the Southeastern region, *Gyeongsang*, is more likely to support the GNP, while a voter who comes from the Southwestern region, *Jeolla*, is more likely to vote for the MDP.

Reasons of the Intensification of Regionalism in New Democracy

Why has regionalism or region voting suddenly intensified among Korean electorates after democratisation?⁵⁷ First, in the 1987 Presidential Election, the split in the democratic camp which had led the democratisation campaign against the

⁵⁶ For example, in British elections, there has been a 'regional polarisation' in voting patterns, particularly the north-south divide — Scotland and the North of England have given more support to the Labour Party. This pattern intensified at the end of 1970s. For effects of region on voting behaviour in the United Kingdom, see William L. Miller, *The End of British Politics?: Scots and English Political Behaviour in the Seventies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); Ron Johnston, Charles Pattie and Ed Fiedhouse, 'The Geography of Voting and Representation: Regions and the Declining Importance of the Cube Law', in Anthony Heath et al., *Labour's Last Chance?: The 1992 Election and Beyond* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994), pp. 255-74.

⁵⁷ There are two controversial arguments on the beginning of regionalism in Korean presidential elections. Indeed, a group of scholars argued that the region voting started from the 1971 presidential election, and another group of scholars argued that the region voting became apparent from the 1987 presidential election. For the former, Man-heum Kim, '*Jeongchigyunyeol, jeongdangjeongchi geurigo jiyeokjuui*' (Political cleavage, party politics and regionalism), *Hangukjeongchihakhoebo* (Korean Political Science Review), 28 (1994), 215-37; Cho, *Jiyeokjuui seongeowa hamnijeok yugwonja* (Regional voting and rational voters). For the latter, Lee, *Hangugui seongeowa jiyeokjuui* (Korean elections and regionalism); Ho-Cheol Sohn, *Samgimeul neomeoseo* (Over three Kims) (Seoul: Pureonsup, 1997). For the beginning of regionalism in elections, see Myeong-se Kang, '*Jiyeokjuineun eonje sijakdoeeonneunga?*' (When did regionalism in presidential elections in Korea begin?), *Hangukgwa gugjejeongchi* (Korea and international politics), 35 (2001), 127-58.

authoritarian government, caused a realignment of Korean electorates and intensified the regional antagonism. In 1987, the candidate of the authoritarian party won the presidential election with only 36 per cent of votes. Two charismatic political leaders, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae-jung, who were heralds of the Korean democratic movement, ran for the president separately, and the two Kims divided the voters who supported Korean democratisation. Each side blamed the other for the failure of the election. Korean electors who had a political attitude of pro-opposition party were divided into two camps. Purely by coincidence, Kim Young Sam comes from the Southeastern region, *Gyeongsang*, and Kim Dae-jung comes from the Southwestern region, *Jeolla*, and personal loyalties transmuted into regional loyalties. 'Region voting' has replaced the political attitude of pro-ruling or pro-opposition party in Korean elections. It was a 'party realignment'.⁵⁸

However, some scholars argue that the regional antagonism between the Southeastern and the Southwestern region has a long history, and 'region voting' was found in Korean presidential elections before 1987.⁵⁹ However, this argument is not valid when we examine voting behaviour under authoritarian regime. Even though there has been regional antagonism in Korean history and culture, Regionalism was not main factor of the vote under authoritarian government. For example, in the 1971 Presidential Election, Kim Dae-jung, who was the candidate for a unified opposition party, gained a substantial number of votes in Busan, the second biggest city in Korea and located in Southeastern region, although the ruling party candidate, President Park Chung Hee, was from that Southeastern region. Also, a regional division of Korean electorates in general elections appeared for the first time in 1988.⁶⁰ 'Region voting' emerged when the democratic camp was disrupted in 1987 and persisted thereafter.

Second, politicians or political parties have stirred up regional emotions, and voters seem to go for it.⁶¹ Many party politicians have found it tempting to use regional sentiments to win an election or to gain public supports. Politicians usually point out a regional inequality in local development or regional disproportion in appointments of senior government posts, while they neglect good public policies or programs. For example, the opposition party claims the president excessively favours fellow natives of

⁵⁸ Lee, *Hanguui seongeowa jiyekjuui* (Korean elections and regionalism).

⁵⁹ Kim, '*Jeongchigyunyeol, Jeongdangjeongchi Geurigo Jiyekjuui*' (Political cleavage, party politics and regionalism); Cho, *Jiyekjuui seongeowa hamnijeok yugwonja* (Regional voting and rational voters).

⁶⁰ Scholars generally agree that the region voting in National Assembly elections started in the 1988 general election. Kang, '*Jiyekjuuineun eonje sijakdoeeonneunga?*' (When did regionalism in presidential elections in Korea begin?).

⁶¹ Lee, *Hanguui seongeowa jiyekjuui* (Korean elections and regionalism); Sohn, *Samgimeul neomeoseo* (Over three Kims); Kang, '*Jiyekjuuineun Eonje Sijakdoeeonneunga?*' (When did regionalism in presidential elections in Korea begin?).

his home province for senior government posts. This stimulates local voter's sentiments, and politicians gain support more effectively.

Third, latent regional antagonism was ignited in Korean politics when a control factor disappeared. Under the authoritarian regime, the passion for democracy overwhelmed regional sentiments. However, when Korea achieved a democratised society, the latent regionalism in Korean social culture or history became apparent in politics. The origin of regionalism as a social culture may be traced to traditional society. In Korean history, people who come from the Southeast, *Gyeongsang*, had formed the ruling class in the society, while the Southwest, *Jeolla*, was a place of exile. The governing class had encouraged Koreans to have a prejudice against Southwestern people. Some social researches show that this cultural discrimination against Southwestern people persists in current society.⁶² Incidentally, two military dictators who governed the country for almost 30 years before 1987 also came from the Southeast. And under them the Southeast benefited from economic development. At the same time, the authoritarian government tended to promote cultural discrimination against the Southwest.⁶³

But, regardless of the reasons why regionalism became prominent in the new democracy, region is now a key factor in explaining current Korean politics. The Korean party system is based upon regional monopolisation. Stimulating regional sentiments is the main campaign strategy in any elections. And 'region voting' is the most powerful explanation of Korean voting behaviour.

New Research Interest in Korean Electoral Studies

Since Korean democratisation in 1987, Korean election studies have reached a new stage. There are three reasons why the study of Korean voting behaviour flourished in the new democracy. First, the value of elections has been reappraised. Korea has redefined the importance of elections in the political process.⁶⁴ Under the authoritarian political system, in which freedom of the press, assembly, and association was restricted and opposition parties were oppressed, an election was merely an attempt to provide some political

⁶² Gan-chae Na, '*Jiyeokganui sahoejeok georigam*' (Social distance between regions), in Korean Sociology Association, ed., *Hanguki jiyeokjuuiwa jiyeokgaldeung* (Regionalism and regional conflicts in Korea) (Seoul: Seongwonsa, 1990). Cited from Lee, *Hanguki seongeowa jiyeokjuui* (Korean elections and regionalism), pp. 49-50.

⁶³ Some scholars argue that the regionalism in Korea is an exclusion and discrimination of a certain region, *Jeolla*. This discrimination has been promoted by the ruling bloc and has played a role in politics as an ideology in authoritarian regimes. Jang-jip Choi, *Hnguk minjujuui jogeongwa jeonmang* (Conditions and prospect for democracy in Korea) (Seoul: Nanam, 1996).

⁶⁴ For example, the voting rate in the 1987 presidential election, the first election in new democracy, suddenly increased. Cheon-ju Yun, '*Tupyochamyewoui Byeonhwawa Jeongchibaljeon*' (Change in vote participation and political development), in Kwang Woong Kim, ed., *Hanguki seongeo jeongchihak* (Electoral politics in Korea) (Seoul: Nanam, 1990), pp. 23-88.

legitimacy for the ruling forces. In these circumstances, studies of Korean voting behaviour were ignored. However, the new competitive democracy has increased Korean interest in election studies.

Second, a new democracy provides more liberal surroundings for social and political research. In the new social atmosphere, a behavioural approach to individual voting choice is flourishing. Surveys on political attitudes or public opinion are carried out quite often. Most news media report public opinion polls at regular intervals. And electorates feel free to give their honest view on political issues in a survey which they were unable to do under the authoritarian regime.

Third, a group of young researchers on Korean elections, who studied voting theory abroad, usually the USA, have a good knowledge of data analysis. They are actively doing empirical research, and they are also trying to adapt theories and models from mature democracies to explain Korean elections and voting behaviour.⁶⁵

New Issues and Candidates

In the new democracy, new political issues have appeared and electorates behave somewhat differently. Korean electorates have become more sensitive to economic issues, such as inflation, even though regionalism is the predominant factor in Korean voting behaviour. Under the authoritarian regime, very broad political and constitutional issues were prominent. In any elections, these issues always overwhelmed other social and economic issues. Now Korean electorates have achieved the democracy they sought for several decades, their interests have changed.

Korea experienced a very serious economic crisis in 1997. In order to overcome the shortage of foreign currency and to stabilise Korean currency, Korea had to borrow short-term loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The economic recession hurt not only the national economy, but also the living standards of many individuals, even though the economy officially recovered from the recession within three or four years.⁶⁶

Korean electorates now respond to a wider variety of detailed policy issues in elections. Democratisation, the end of Cold War system, and globalisation eroded the ideological rigidity of electorates, and voters are beginning to pay attention to new issues,

⁶⁵ For example, a group of researchers, the Korean Election Studies Association, has generated empirical data for every election since 1992, and these data is provided to any researchers by the Korea Social Science Data Center.

⁶⁶ It is generally agreed that economic factors provide only a limited explanation of vote decisions in Korea. However, the economic recession of 1997 had some influence on voting behaviour in the 1997 presidential election. See Hyeon-wu Lee, 'Hangugeseoui gyeongjetupyo' (Economic voting in Korea), in Nam-Young Lee, ed., *Hangugui seongeo* (Elections in Korea), vol. 2 (Seoul: Pureungil, 1998), pp. 99-150.

such as the promotion of a social welfare system, unemployment, the liberalisation of the Korean economy, and foreign policy toward North Korea.

However, increasing interest in new issues does not automatically produce a corresponding rise in issue voting. In Korean elections, voters are often concerned with the candidates' personal qualities rather than policy issues. For example, the presidential candidate of the biggest party in the 1997 presidential election, Lee Hoi Chang, lost his popularity markedly when the fact that his two sons had been exempted from national military service duty was revealed. His popularity rapidly dropped down from about 45 per cent to about 20 per cent within a month.

In the new democracy, labour movements have been active. Labour relations acts have been revised and the rights of labour have markedly improved. Labour unions have achieved a great success in increasing wages and enhancing working conditions. However, labour workers have not voted as a bloc in elections. Even labour unions have failed to express a unified opinion in elections. In the new democracy, class is still not the main factor in Korean elections.⁶⁷

Political Apathy and Dissatisfaction with Politics

In the new democracy, political apathy among Korean electorates has increased.⁶⁸ Unlike the strong passion shown in the democratic movement of 1987, Korean electorates have become cynical and apathetic towards political parties and politicians. People still talk about political issues, but their view of politics is by and large negative. Independents, who do not have any party affiliation, have markedly increased in number contrary to what might be expected in a consolidating democracy.

There are several plausible explanations for the increase in political apathy among Korean electors. First, those who expected a better political system or an improved political process have been disappointed with politics and politicians in the new democracy. They have realised that political processes or political dynamics in the new democracy do not differ all that much from the authoritarian regime. The collapse of political parties, political corruption and political conflict in parliament have all given electors a negative view of politics, and they have become apathetic towards political

⁶⁷ There was some change in the 2002 presidential election. Indeed, the Democratic Labour Party (DLP, *Minnodang*) supported by the Korean Confederation of Trade Union (*Minjunochong*) gained almost one million votes. However, it is doubtful that most votes for the DLP were based on class interests.

⁶⁸ Declining 'social trust' and 'civic engagement' is a general trend in both mature and new democracies during the last decades of the twentieth century. Pippa Norris, 'Introduction: The Growth of Critical Citizens?' in Pippa Norris, ed., *Critical Citizen: Global Support for Democratic Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 1-27.

issues.⁶⁹

Second, politics is no longer so dominant in society. Under authoritarian rule, political power or political relationships had been closely related to economic prosperity. Indeed, in a 'developmental dictatorship', political power had a great influence on the business world. In a sense, politics dictated many things. However, circumstances have changed. Now Korean people have achieved a democracy, they have become more interested in economic than political issues, and in individual well being rather than public affairs. They have become depoliticised.

Third, the Korean electorate as a whole is now very young. Voters who are less than 40 years old make up more than 55 per cent of the Korean electorate. Only 36 per cent of the electorate is older than 50 years old. The younger generations, who were born in the post-Korean War baby-boom period and grew up in a better economic situation, have behaved somewhat differently compared to their parents' generation. Political interest or participation of the younger generation is much lower than that of the older.⁷⁰

Media and Election

The influence of the media has markedly increased in the new society. Under the authoritarian government, the freedom of the press was severely restricted, and the authorities always censored news reports and used news media as a means to promote public support for the authoritarian government. TV news was notorious. For example, reports of presidential activities were the main story on TV news every day. In the new democracy, all news media enjoy the freedom of the press, even though there is a controversy about self-censorship of news media. TV news now takes a neutral position on political issues and maintains a balance in political or election coverage.⁷¹ Furthermore, TV has become one of the most important means of election campaigning in Korea. In the 1997 presidential election, presidential TV debates were introduced, and it is estimated that more than 70 per cent of the electorate watched the debates at least

⁶⁹ An increase of political apathy or dissatisfaction is related to a decrease of vote turnout in Korea. See Won-Taek Kang, 'Tupyo bulchamgwa jeongchijeok bulmanjok' (Abstention from voting and political dissatisfaction), *Hangukjeongchihakhoebo* (Korean Political Science Review), 36 (2002), 153-73.

⁷⁰ For generation factor in elections in Korea, see Jin Min Chung and A-lan Hwang, 'Minjuhwa ihu hangugui seongjeongchi' (Electoral politics in Korea after a transition to democracy), *Hangukjeongchihakhoebo* (Korean Political Science Review), 33 (1999), pp. 115-34.

⁷¹ However, it is arguable that some parties got more coverage and more favourable treatment in TV news, though the equal treatments are assumed. The bias is found even in mature democracies. For example, in British election, the parties did not receive equal treatment in terms of TV coverage and favour. William L. Miller, *Media and Voters: The Audience, Content, and Influence of Press and Television at the 1987 General Election* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 50-77.

once during that campaign. TV is now the major source of information for the electorate.⁷²

Under the new democracy, there is no censorship of newspapers by the authorities, and newspapers have expressed their own political views more distinctly than TV news.⁷³ However, it is considered that the editorial policy of newspaper is not independent from the owner of the newspaper. Owners often directly affect the political view of the newspaper. Owners of newspapers are enormously powerful in politics. Three major newspapers taking about 75 per cent of Korean newspaper market share are considered as conservative, and these newspapers obviously have great potential to influence the public.

New media have appeared and begun to play a role in politics.⁷⁴ A majority of Koreans have e-mail addresses and access the Internet on a regular basis. The Internet has affected political communication and challenged the dominance of traditional news media in the circulation of information.⁷⁵ Political parties and politicians use the Internet to communicate with its constituencies. And election campaigning on the Web is now very common.

⁷² See Seung-chan Yang, 'Television seongeo toron bangsongui yeonghyangnyeok yeongu' (the impact of televised debates in the Korean presidential election).

⁷³ This trend is found in mature democracies. For example, British analysts argue that British press is highly partisan, while television is not. M. Hollingsworth, *The Press and Political Dissent: A Question of Censorship* (London: Pluto, 1986); Seaton and Pimlott, 'The Struggle for Balance', in Seaton and Pimlott, eds, *The Media in British Politics* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1987), pp. 133-53, at p.133. Cited from Miller, *Media and Voters*, p. 51.

⁷⁴ See Yong-cheol Kim and Seongi Yun, 'Internetui jeongchijeok hwaryonggwa 16dae chongseon' (Political use of Internet and the 16th general election), *Hangukjeongchihakhoebo* (Korean Political Science Review), 34 (2000), 129-47.

⁷⁵ The *OhmyNews* is a good example in the 2002 presidential election. See Howard W. French, 'Online Newspaper Shakes Up Korean Politics', *The New York Times*, 6 March 2003.

Chapter 3. Theory

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the theoretical underpinning of the study of the voting behaviour of independent voters in Korea. This chapter reviews the literature on voting choice developed in mature democracies and provides a framework of analysis for the study.

In early electoral studies, political independents or non-party identifiers were considered as a 'remnant' and were neglected in the analysis of electoral behaviour. In the 1970s and 1980s, the strength of party identification seriously weakened. Many voters in mature democracies shifted from strong to weak party identification or moved from being party identifiers to becoming non-identifiers. Accordingly, research interest in independents increased. Independent voters are no longer ignorable in the study of electoral behaviour and an exploration of voting choice of independent voters is necessary for a better understanding of electoral behaviour. However, as yet we have too few systematic studies of the voting patterns of independents, even though there is a vast literature on partisan decline.

In an era of partisan decline, students of electoral behaviour have emphasised short-term considerations in voting choice, such as issue preference, candidate evaluation, and job performance of incumbent government. Moreover, many researchers argued that voters are more influenced by election campaigns and the media, when party affiliation is weakened. Therefore, many voters begin to cast a ballot based on rational calculation rather than on an unconditional loyalty to a political party.

According to these contending approaches to the study of electoral behaviour, i.e., the social psychological approach (i.e., the party identification model) and the rational choice approach, it is expected that the voting behaviour of independent voters who are free from party constraints is different from voting behaviour of partisans. Party identification, a long-term predisposition, explains much of partisan electoral behaviour and is a dominant factor in explanations of partisan voting choice. Partisans confirm their loyalty to a political party in most elections. Thus, partisans are stable in their voting behaviour. When party constraints are absent, voters rely on short-term considerations in their voting choice and change their voting intention depending upon political developments. The electoral behaviour of independent voters is therefore unstable compared to that of partisans.

This chapter consists of two sections. The first section discusses theories and models that are useful to explain the voting behaviour of Korean independent voters. The literature review focuses on theories and models of voting behaviour originating mainly

in the USA and Western European democracies because there are few empirical studies of Korean voting behaviour, particularly independent voters. The second section suggests a model of voting choice that is a framework of analysis of empirical research on voting behaviour of the Korean independent electorate. In addition, the second section provides propositions and hypotheses that guide the study of voting choice of independent voters.

1. Theories and Models of Voting Choice

Party Identification and Independent Voters

It has been widely argued that party identification, or ‘partisan self-image’, is a central concept in understanding individual political behaviour. The model of party identification originated in American electoral studies and was applied to electoral studies in other democracies.¹ Since the model of party identification, or the ‘Michigan model’ based on large-scale survey, was introduced in 1950s, party identification has been always a controversial concept in electoral studies.² The concept and its measurement have been the focus of much argument. The applicability of the concept to different cultural contexts outside the USA has been questioned. Furthermore, the strength of party affiliation has weakened and the number of party identifiers has declined in many mature democracies with a decline of ‘party voting’ widely recognised. While the importance of party identification in electoral studies has been contentious, party identification is nevertheless still a critical concept in electoral studies. Most voters in many democracies still identify themselves with political party, and use the ‘party cue’ in understanding complex political affairs and in voting choice.

The Concept of Party Identification

Party identification, which is a concept derived from a psychological theory, is a sense of group identity or belonging. Party identification is a psychological bond between the individual and the group. Therefore, party identification is “some engagement of

¹ Angus Campbell et al., *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960); David Butler and Donald Stokes, *Political Change in Britain* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1969).

² For an excellent summary of discussions on party identification, see Martin Harrop and William L. Miller, *Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1987), pp. 130-45. Also, William L. Miller and Richard G. Niemi, ‘Voting: Choice, Conditioning, Constraint’, in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris, eds, *Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting* (London: Sage, 2002), pp. 169-88.

partisan feeling with self-identity”.³ The nature of party affiliation is often compared to the nature of religious affiliation.⁴

Another element of the concept of party identification is “an extended time horizon”.⁵ Adults do not often change their personal identities and “party identification is an enduring long-term attribute for most people, from early adulthood until the last year”.⁶ Therefore, “party identification is viewed as the most stable of all political attitudes”.⁷ Moreover, the early researchers of the Michigan model believed that party identification is passed from parent to child, and it is consistently maintained. The individual strength of partisan attachment reaches its peak in a voter’s middle and old age. Furthermore, party identification is one of the most widely shared political attitudes. In general, most voters in the many mature democracies identify with the parties, though the level of party identification differs across countries. Party identification, a long-term predisposition and the most widely shared political attitude, is a key element of continuity between elections.

The Michigan school’s social psychological perspective of party identification, which mainly emphasised emotional ties and identity, has been criticised. Fiorina suggested a reformulation of the concept of party identification focusing on voters’ retrospective evaluations on party performance. Fiorina showed that partisan identification is greatly influenced by voters’ “past political events and experiences”. In particular, the performance of incumbent government and people’s retrospective evaluation affect partisanship.⁸ Therefore, according to the revisionist view, party identification is responsive to short-term forces, while the original Michigan model considered party identification as a cause of short-term evaluations on candidates and issues rather than the effect of short-term forces. Issues bring about change in partisanship. Voters switch their parties from election to election largely according to policy consideration.⁹ Party identification is strengthened or weakened reacting to party performance.¹⁰

In addition, the concept of stable partisanship has been challenged. Empirical studies

³ Philip E. Converse and Roy Pierce, ‘Measuring Partisanship’, *Political Methodology*, 11 (1985), 143-66.

⁴ Warren Miller and J. Merrill Shanks, *The New American Voter* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 120-21.

⁵ Converse and Pierce, ‘Measuring Partisanship’, p.143.

⁶ Philip E. Converse and George B. Markus, 1979. ‘Plus ça Change ...: The New CPS Election Study Panel’, *American Political Science Review*, 73 (1979), 32-49; Miller and Shanks, *The New American Voter*.

⁷ Miller and Shanks, *The New American Voter*, p. 118.

⁸ Morris P. Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* (New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 200.

⁹ V. O. Key, Jr., *The Responsible Electorate* (New York: Vintage, 1966).

¹⁰ Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*.

revealed that partisan attachment is much less stable than was believed. Empirical research showed that the intergenerational transmission of party identification is not critical.¹¹ Many studies provided that the difference of partisan strength across different age cohorts is not due to the lifetime consolidation of partisanship, but a generational characteristic. Thus, political change in electoral alignments was caused by change in the composition of the electorate rather than by changes in attitudes of those already in the electorate.¹²

In new democracies, such as Korea, voters have more difficulties in developing long-term party attachment.¹³ In general, the parties have been formed and dissolved frequently. Social group ties with the parties are weak. The level of party identification is low and the intensity of partisanship is not strong. Voters are at the pre-aligned stage, and parental partisanship is negligible. In this circumstance, party identification can hardly be understood as an enduring, stable attitude unchanged thorough an individual's lifetime. In a new democracy, party identification is influenced by short-term factors, such as political events and politician. For example, party identification is often linked to self-identity with popular political leaders or ideology. Party identification may be another expression of a feeling of attachment with political leaders. In new democracies, the level of party identification fluctuates quite regularly over time. Change in the partisanship in new democracies often includes transitions from one party to another party, while change in partisanship in mature democracies is characterised as change between party identifiers and non-party identifiers.

The Concept of Independents

In the Michigan model, independents are conceptualised as voters who do not profess their partisan attachment. Partisanship is measured by its direction and its strength. Voters are allocated into five categories, or seven categories, in 'a continuum of partisanship': strong Democrats, weak Democrats, independent, weak Republican, and strong Republican. In the seven-point scale, independents are subdivided into Democrat 'leaner', 'pure' independent, and Republican 'leaner'. The independent 'leaners' are those who profess a sense of feeling closer to one party, though they do not express

¹¹ M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, *The Political Character of Adolescence: The Influence of Families and Schools* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

¹² Paul R. Abramson, *Generational Change in American Politics* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975). Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik, *The Changing American Voter* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979).

¹³ For psychological identification with political parties in other new democracies, particularly post-communist countries, see William L. Miller, Stephen White, and Paul Heywood, 'Political Values Underlying Partisan Cleavages in Former Communist Countries', *Electoral Studies*, 17 (1998), 197-216.

partisan attachment. The 'pure' independents are voters who neither profess a partisan predisposition nor any inclination to a party.

Many researchers argued that a one-dimensional concept and measurement of party identification and non-partisanship based on American two-party system is flawed because it assumes that partisanship and non-partisanship are mutually exclusive alternatives. Empirical research found 'intrasitivities' in a linear relationship between party identification and the vote.¹⁴ The 'leaner' independents, those who deny party identification but profess inclination to the parties, are more partisan in their voting compared to the weak party identifiers and often match the strong party identifiers. As a result, a multidimensional conceptualisation and measurement of partisanship has been suggested.¹⁵

Miller and Wattenberg argued that one-dimensional concept and measurement of partisanship have combined 'non-preference' respondents and self-labelled 'independents' into the same category and have failed to account for various independents.¹⁶ The no-preference, apolitical non-partisans should be distinct from relatively politically interested independents in their level of political involvement and attitudes toward political independence.

Many researchers also divided partisan independents into sub-groups according to their political awareness or interests in politics.¹⁷ One type of independent is not interested in political affairs, and so they do not have party preference. They are called 'apolitical' independents. Most of independents in the 1950s and the 1960s were considered apolitical independents. They are uninterested and uninformed about politics. "Far from being more attentive, interested, and informed, independents tend as a group to be somewhat less involved in politics. They have somewhat poorer knowledge of the issues, their image of the candidates is fainter, their interest in the campaign is less, their concern outcome is relatively slight, and their choice between competing candidates, although it is made later in the campaign, seems much less to spring from discoverable

¹⁴ John R. Petrocik, 'An Analysis of the Intransitivities in the Index of Party Identification', *Political Methodology* 1 (1974), 31-47.

¹⁵ Richard S. Katz, 'The Dimensionality of Party Identification: Cross-National Perspectives', *Comparative Politics*, 10 (1979), 147-63; David Valentine and John Van Wingen, 'Partisanship, Independence, and the Partisan Identification Question', *American Politics Quarterly*, 8 (1980), 165-86; Herbert F. Weisberg, 'Multidimensional Conceptualization of Party Identification', *Political Behavior*, 2 (1980), 33-60.

¹⁶ Arthur H. Miller and Martin P. Wattenberg, 'Measuring Party Identification: Independent or Non-Partisan Preference?', *American Journal of Political Science*, 27 (1983), 106-21.

¹⁷ Asher, Herbert Asher, *Presidential Elections and American Politics* (Homewood, Ill: Dorsey, 1980); Gerald M. Pomper, *Voter's Choice: Varieties of American Electoral Behavior* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975); Jack Dennis, 'Political Independence in America', *British Journal of Political Science*, 18 (1988), 77-109 and 197-219.

evaluations of the elements of national politics".¹⁸ The other type of independent or non-party identifier is politically conscious, but do not have party preference. They differ from the 'apolitical' independents. In the 1970s and 1980s, educated and informed partisans who were critical of party performance and who no longer depended on a 'partisan cue' in understanding the complexity of politics called themselves independents.

Furthermore, Dennis argued that independent means more than simply the absence of partisan attachment. He explained the growth of independents in American voters as a result of a change in popular attitudes toward political independence, and suggested four dimensions to distinguish a variety of types of partisanship and independence.¹⁹

The Function of Party Identification

Party identification directly affects voting decision. In *The American Voter*, it was argued that party identification, or 'partisan self-image' is the most critical variable among the many factors to explain voting choice, such as party, issue, and candidate. The authors of *The American Voter* suggested that party identification is closely associated with voting choice. They found that most strong party identifiers vote for the party and independent voters who do not identify with party vote for different parties. Thus, strong Democrats vote for candidate of the Democratic Party and strong Republican vote for candidate of the Republican Party in American elections.

Moreover, party identification indirectly influences voting choice through affecting the voter's response to short-term forces, such as candidates or issues. One of main functions of party identification is to shape the voter's view of politics. "Party identification is the most enduring of political attitudes, responsible for shaping a wide variety of values and perceptions".²⁰ The Michigan school calls it 'perceptual screen'. Therefore, it is expected that partisans share similar perceptions and evaluations of politics.

Furthermore, empirical research found that party identification influences other political attitudes, but also party identification is influenced by preference for policy or politician.²¹ In this way, party identification is the result as well as the cause in a causal flow. In the non-recursive explanation of party identification, it is assumed that party identification is susceptible to short-term factors. Fiorina emphasised that an individual's

¹⁸ Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, p.143.

¹⁹ He suggested a classification of 'political autonomy', 'anti-partyism', 'partisan neutrality', and 'partisan variability'. Dennis, 'Political Independence in America', p. 202.

²⁰ Miller and Shanks, *The New American Voter*, p.117.

²¹ John E. Jackson, 'Issues, Party Choice, and Presidential Votes', *American Journal of Political Science*, 19 (1975), 161-85.

evaluation of incumbent government performance causes change in individual partisanship.²²

The Origin of Party Identification

The origins of party identification have not been well understood.²³ In the development of party identification, the family plays essential role. Early empirical research provided a relationship between an individual's party preference and parental partisanship. According to the early studies of political socialisation, the family is the primary source of partisanship. Family party loyalty affects the partisanship of childhood and this partisanship evolves in later life.

The thesis of 'familial socialisation' has been challenged. Empirical research showed that there was a weaker partisan relationship between child and parent than one might be expected.²⁴ Furthermore, the thesis of family influence on partisanship cannot answer the question of the source of the parental partisanship. And in particular, in new democracies, where a relatively small proportion of the electorate identifies with a party, the rapid increase of party identifiers within a short period time cannot be explained by parental partisanship.

Electoral Dealignment

The Concept of Electoral Dealignment

Independents have greatly increased in mature democracies over the last three decades. Now, the political party, which was the basis of the modern democratic political process, is facing serious challenges. Electoral dealignment and partisan decline can be detected in many ways. The proportion of voters in the electorate who identify with a party has rapidly decreased and the number of non-party identifiers is increasing. The strength of party loyalty among party identifiers has markedly weakened. Also, from a behavioural perspective, 'party voting' has declined, and voters often defect from their party in voting choice.

Empirical research showed that the a growing body of voters in the USA and

²² Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*.

²³ Richard G. Niemi and M. Kent Jennings, 'Issues and Inheritance in the Formation of Party Identification', *American Journal of Political Science*, 35 (1991), 970-88.

²⁴ Jennings and Niemi, *The Political Character of Adolescence: The Influence of Families and Schools*; Richard G. Niemi and Richard S. Katz, and David Newman, 'Reconstructing Past Partisanship: The Failure of the Party Identification Recall Questions', *American Journal of Political Science*, 24 (1980), 633-51.

Western Europe have moved from party identifiers to non-party identifiers over the last three decades, though most voters in mature democracies still declare themselves party identifiers.²⁵ However, differences in the level of partisan decline across countries should not be ignored.²⁶ Some countries have experienced a rapid decline of partisanship, such as the USA, while some countries still maintain a relatively high level of partisanship, such as the UK. Additionally, a decay of partisanship has generally been identified in mature democracies. By contrast, in new democracies, such as the post-communist countries, the electorate is at the pre-aligned stage and the level of partisanship is still increasing from a low level.²⁷

The UK, the oldest democracy in the world, is not an exception to the general trend of declining partisanship. In terms of the proportion of voters who identify with the parties, the level of partisanship has declined slowly and almost 90 per cent of the British electorate still identify with the parties. However, the UK is not an exception to partisan decline in terms of the strength of party loyalty. Even though most of the electorate still identify with the parties, a large percentage of party identifiers have only 'semi-detached preferences' rather than a strong attachment to political parties. 30 years ago, there were more 'very strong' party identifiers than 'not very strong', but now 'not very strong' party identifiers outnumber the 'very strong' identifiers.²⁸ Furthermore, the relatively high level of partisanship of the British electorate is related to the validity problem in measuring party identification. Bartle suggested that the questionnaire used in the British Election Studies failed to measure a long-term partisan preference. In answering the survey questions, respondents were easily influenced by their voting choice in the upcoming election, and the size of non-identifiers in the British electorate was consistently underestimated.²⁹

In addition to the substantial proportion of the electorate withdrawing their support

²⁵ Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, *The Changing American Voter*; Martin P. Wattenberg, *The Decline of American Political Parties: 1952-1996* (Cambridge, Mass and London: Harvard University Press, 1998); Hermann Schmitt and Soren Holmberg, 'Political Parties in Decline?', in Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, eds, *Citizens and the State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 95-133; Russell J. Dalton, 'The Decline of Party Identification', in Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds, *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp.19-36; Harold D. Clarke and Marianne C. Stewart, 'The Decline of Parties in the Minds of Citizens', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1 (1998), 357-78.

²⁶ Herman Schmitt, 'On Party Attachment in Western Europe and the Utility of Eurobarometer Data', *West European Politics*, 12 (1989), 122-39.

²⁷ William L. Miller, Stephen White, and Paul Haywood, *Values and Political Changes in Postcommunist Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp.197-216.

²⁸ Ivor Crewe and Katarina Thomson, 'Party Loyalties: Dealignment or Realignment?', in Geoffrey Evans and Pippa Norris, eds, *Critical Elections: British Parties and Voters in Long-term Perspective* (London: Sage, 1999), pp. 64-86.

²⁹ John Bartle, 'The Measurement of Party Identification in Britain: Where Do We Stand Now?', in Jonathan Tonge et al., eds, *British Elections and Parties Review*, vol. 11 (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 9-22.

for parties, the degree of 'party voting' has also been markedly weakened, and now voters respond to issues and other short-term factors than in the past.³⁰ For example, in the American electorate, 'split-ticket voting' is no longer unusual.³¹

However, many scholars still maintain the position that 'party voting' is the most important factor to explain voting choice, though they also recognise the decline of partisan attachment in the electorate. Party identification is still a relatively stable political attitude and party identification explains electoral behaviour much better than any other factors.³² In the USA, the 'defection rate', which refers to party identifiers voting for parties other than their own, has recently decreased and 'party voting' regained its strength.³³ Moreover, party identification is very useful to explain electoral behaviour, such as the 'defection' or participation. For example, party identification can be used to explain how responsive voters are likely to be to campaigns and to predict how much voters are likely to defect from their own party in voting.³⁴

The Cause of Partisan Decline

There are two rival theories or approaches to electoral dealignment. One is the 'sociological explanation' and the other is the 'political explanation'.³⁵ The sociological explanation focuses on 'socio-structural change'. One theory of partisan decline emphasises that electoral dealignment is a consequence of social and political modernisation, such as increasing levels of education and the growth of the mass media. In advanced industrial societies, the media have replaced political parties as the source of political information and rising education has produced voters who are cognitively sophisticated and who can understand complexities of politics without relying on political party. In post-industrial societies, voters have become less dependent on party than voters in the past, producing a new type of independent.³⁶ In addition, generation is an important factor to explain electoral dealignment. Generational change is closely related to the decline of party identification in the American and British electorate. In these democracies, the decrease in partisanship is largely explained by the increase of young

³⁰ Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, *The Changing American Voter*.

³¹ Wattenberg, *The Decline of American Political Parties: 1952-1996*.

³² Converse and Markus, 'Plus ca Change: The New CPS Election Study Panel'; Miller and Shanks, *The New American Voter*.

³³ Larry M. Bartels, 'Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996', *American Journal of Political Science*, 44 (2000), 35-50.

³⁴ Miller and Shanks, *The New American Voter*.

³⁵ Miller and Niemi, 'Voting: Choice, Conditioning, and Constraint'; Dalton, 'The Decline of Party Identification'.

³⁶ Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan, and Paul Allen Beck. 1984. *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

voters who did not have a party attachment.³⁷

The political explanation of electoral dealignment emphasises that partisan decline is caused by the parties. Some researchers argued that the degree of political polarisation and ideological conflict between the parties explains the different level of partisanship across different mature democracies.³⁸ Related to this is an explanation focusing on voters' dissatisfaction with parties. Many country specific studies emphasise that poor performance by the parties is the root cause of dealignment.³⁹ In mature democracies, the decay of partisanship is related to voter's dissatisfaction with political parties and the democratic process. For example, in the USA, the effects of political turbulence such as Vietnam War and Watergate scandal were linked to the decline of partisanship in the 1960s and 1970s.⁴⁰

Voting Behaviour of Independents: Short-Term Factors

Voting choice is explained by long-term predispositions and short-term factors. Long-term predispositions such as belief-systems and psychological partisan attachments explain stability in voting preference over time, and short-term factors, such as issue and candidate, explain voting change depending upon new events. Voting choice is also constrained by the political system and conditioned by the media and social context.⁴¹

Independent voters, those who approach each election without an established long-term predisposition (i.e., party identification) will behave somewhat differently from those who identify with the parties. When a partisan cue is absent, voters are more responsive to short-term factors such as the issues of the day and the selection of candidates in specific election as well as election campaigns and the media.

Electoral Volatility and Floating Voter

In the Michigan model, party identification is treated as a long-term influence on voter's party choice and other political attitudes. Party identification, as an enduring attitude across a series of elections, is distinct from short-term factors specific to one

³⁷ Miller and Shanks, *The New American Voter*.

³⁸ Schmitt and Holmberg, 'Political Parties in Decline?'

³⁹ Carsten Zelle, 'Social Dealignment Versus Political Frustration: Contrasting Explanations of the Floating Voters in Germany', *European Journal of Political Research*, 27 (1995), 319-45; Harold Clarke, Nitish Dutt, and Allen Kornberg, 'The Political Economy of Attitudes toward Polity and Society in Western European Democracies', *Journal of Politics*, 55 (1993), 998-1021.

⁴⁰ Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, *The Changing American Voter*.

⁴¹ For an overview of the long-term and short-term factors, see Miller and Niemi. 'Voting: Choice, Conditioning, and Constraint'.

election such as issues and candidates.⁴² Thus, long-term factors provide continuity in election and the short-term factors make each election unique.

Partisan decline is related to the increasing volatility of elections. Many argued that the growth of independents is related to an increase of political instability and of the volatility of the voters. For example, empirical research shows that the weakening of party identification is associated with an increase in 'split-ticket voting' by American voters.⁴³ Empirical studies discovered that partisan decline is related to the growing volatility of party vote share between elections in mature democracies.⁴⁴ Moreover, at the individual level, the weakening of partisanship produces a decline in voting consistency between succeeding elections.⁴⁵

But some researchers have argued that the increasing number of independents is not related to the volatility of the electorate.⁴⁶ Keith argues that the independent 'leaners' are 'covert partisans' and that they are very similar to the 'weak' party identifiers in their voting behaviour and political involvement. 'Pure' independents are also less likely to vote. Therefore, the growth of independents is not linked to increased political instability. However, it is not correct to say that independent 'leaners' are essentially covert partisans, even though their voting choice may reveal an inclination to one party. For example, independents denying partisanship may profess inclination to a political party due to other factors, such as political leaders or issues, rather than a sense of feeling closer to a party. It is possible that voters have an inclination to a party due to their favourite political leaders, while they do not have party identification as a group identity. In new democracies such as Korea, where political parties are dissolved and renamed so often, voters find it difficult to develop a long-term party identification. Many of them profess their party identification on the basis of a closer feeling to political leaders, and they are consistent between elections. But voters easily change their party identification or party inclination from one party to another, when political leaders move to other party or form a new party. In these circumstances, the feeling of identity with political leaders provides the element of electoral continuity rather than a feeling of party-identity.

⁴² Campbell et al., *The American Voter*.

⁴³ Wattenberg, *The Decline of American Political Parties: 1952-1996*; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, *The Changing American Voter*.

⁴⁴ Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck, *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment*; Dalton, 'The Decline of Party Identification'; Ivor Crewe and David Denver, eds, *Electoral Change in Western Democracies* (London: Groom Helm, 1985).

⁴⁵ Russell J. Dalton, Ian McAllister, and Martin P. Wattenberg, 'The Consequences of Partisan Dealignment', in Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds, *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 37-63.

⁴⁶ Bruce E. Keith et al., 'The Partisan Affinities of Independent 'Leaners'', *British Journal of Political Science*, 16 (1986), 155-184; Bruce E. Keith et al., *The Myth of the Independent Voter* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

Furthermore, the absence of party identification does not mean a lack of continuity in election. It is possible that independents who do not identify with a party still maintain a consistency in voting choice. Other long-term predisposition, such as ideology and a voter's position on the permanent issues, affect voting choice, and can explain continuity in election. For example, American voters are divided along the liberal-conservative value dimension, and this value dimension influences voters. Therefore, voters may cast their ballots according to their evaluation of the policy or issue position of each party. It has been shown that in new democracies where party identification is not well developed such as Russia, voters often find self-identification from a politician or an ideology rather than political party.⁴⁷

Issue Voting and Rational Voter

Many argue that salient issues are significant short-term factors explaining voting choice. Voters do not automatically cast their ballot according to party identification. In the Michigan model, the individual voter is not treated as an autonomous decision-maker, and voting is more like an act of affirmation according to a long-term predisposition. It is assumed that voter lacks comprehensive knowledge and understanding of politics and economic issues.⁴⁸ In the rational choice approach, the voter is a rational decision-maker, and voters make their decision based upon careful consideration of the issues at each election.⁴⁹ Voters respond to short-term conditions, especially, economic issues, and cast their ballot based on rational calculation about economic prosperity. Indeed, the rational actor is the cognitively mobilised voter.

Among many issues, the influence of economy on voting choice is particularly widely discussed in electoral studies and the literature is voluminous. Many agree that economic factors influence voting choice, but the results of empirical studies of 'economic voting' are somewhat inconclusive. First, some insisted upon 'retrospective voting'. In this model, the voter evaluates present economic conditions compared to past economic conditions, and votes for or against the party in office according to the evaluation.⁵⁰ Others argued for a model 'prospective voting' where the voter considers economic conditions in the future, and votes for the party which is expected to manage

⁴⁷ Miller and White, 'Political Values Underlying Partisan Cleavages in Former Communist Countries'.

⁴⁸ Campbell et al., *The American Voter*.

⁴⁹ Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1957).

⁵⁰ Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*; John A. Ferejohn, 'Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control', *Public Choice*, 50 (1986), 5-25.

the economy better than the other parties.⁵¹ Second, there is another controversial argument between 'sociotropic voting' and 'pocketbook voting'. Empirical research suggests that voters are mainly concerned with the management of the national economy rather than worried about their own individual economic conditions.⁵² Related to this argument, some suggest that the voter depends upon his or her personal perception of economic conditions rather than objective economic reality.⁵³

It would be incorrect to claim that independents are more likely to vote on issues or economics as a rational actor. In order to be a rational actor, voters should have sophisticated cognition to understand the complexity of political affairs and also get sufficient information. Furthermore, voters should be interested in public affairs and pay attention to politics. However, it seems that the majority of voters in most democracies are not fully meet these conditions, even though educational levels and the role of the media have increased. For example, increasing education is not related to an increase of interests in public affairs or politics. In Korea, younger generations are better educated compared to the generation of their parents, but are strong individualistic and are less interested in politics compared to their parents.

'Candidate-Centred Politics' and Candidate Image

Evaluations of the candidates affect the vote. The early Michigan model of party identification did not absolutely ignore the effects of the candidate factor on the election, but emphasised party identification as the primary determinant of voting choice. It was assumed that a voting decision is not made on the basis of the candidate factor or issues. With partisan decline, however, the candidates have become more important than other factors in voting choice. Now, in the USA, the candidates are considered as an essential determinant of the outcome of election, and it is called as 'candidate-centred politics'.⁵⁴ Kelly and Mirer also argued that the candidate is the primary determinant of vote

⁵¹ Michael B. MacKuen, 'Comment on President and the Prospective Voter', *Journal of Politics*, 58 (1996), 793-801; David Sanders, 'Government Popularity and the Next General Election', *Political Quarterly*, 62 (1991), 235-61; David Sanders, 'Why the Conservatives Won – Again', in Anthony King et al., eds, *Britain at the Polls 1992*. (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993), pp. 171-222.

⁵² Michael S. Lewis-Beck, *Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988); Donald R. Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet, 'Sociotropic Politics: The American Case', *British Journal of Political Science*, 11 (1981), 129-62.

⁵³ Pamela Johnston Conover and Stanley Feldman, 'Emotional Reactions to the Economy: I'm Mad as Hell and I'm not going to Take It Anymore', *American Journal of Political Science*, 28 (1984), 50-78.

⁵⁴ Martin Wattenberg, *The Rise of Candidate Centered Politics*, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991).

decision.⁵⁵ In the election, voters consider the candidates' characteristics or image, such as competence, leadership, integrity, and empathy, rather than their policies and public pledges. Some research highlighted that voters pay attention to candidate characteristics related to issues rather than the issue itself.⁵⁶ Furthermore, voters change their partisanship when they find an attractive candidate.⁵⁷

The role of the candidates in campaigns has become more important. The rise of 'candidate-centred politics' is closely related to the increasing role of the media in the election. In election coverage, the media focus on candidates rather than parties. The media often treat the election as a horse race between the competing candidates. It is fair to say that, when little or nothing is known about the candidates, party identification is the primary determinant of voting decision. However, in different circumstances, in which the media provide sufficient information on the candidates and also many voters do not have or only have weak partisan attachments, party identification cannot be the primary determinant of voting behaviour.

Election Campaign, Media, and Responsive Voter

Recent research has shown that the effects of the campaign and the media on the election are significant. Early election studies developed a 'minimal effects' model of the media; voters hardly changed their voting intention, and the media only reinforce existing public opinion.⁵⁸ In the Michigan model of party identification, the minimal effects model was justified. Voter with strong partisanship depend on 'party cues' in evaluating political affairs and information, and are more likely to maintain his or her partisan view through the process of the 'perceptual screen'.

Recently, the minimal effects model has been challenged. Some media studies suggested that the media plays an important role in making and changing public opinion. First, the influence of media is explained by the notion of 'agenda setting' and 'priming'.⁵⁹ Furthermore, recent studies showed that the media have considerable power

⁵⁵ Stanley Kelly, jr. and Thad W. Mirer, 'The Simple Act of Voting', *American Political Science Review*, 68 (1974), 572-91.

⁵⁶ D. Glass, 'Evaluating Presidential Candidates: Who Focus on Their Personal Attributes?', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 49 (1986), 517-34.

⁵⁷ Donald E. Stokes, 'Some Dynamic Elements of Contest for the Presidency', *American Political Science Review*, 60 (1966), 19-28.

⁵⁸ Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gauder, *The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948); Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

⁵⁹ Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kinder, *News That Matters: Agenda-Setting and Priming in a Television Age* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

to persuade voters directly and play an important role to change people's opinion.⁶⁰

The campaign effects also have been re-evaluated. In the past research, the model of minimal effects of campaigns was widely accepted. Then, it was assumed that the outcome of the election was predetermined before the beginning of the campaign by factors such as loyal partisanship and the performance of incumbent government, and that the campaign had little influence on the outcome of election. There have been various theories to explain why campaign effects are limited. One is the theory of 'offsetting effects'. The net influence of a campaign might be small but that might disguise a much stronger influence of campaigns which is hidden because competing messages are mutually cancelled.⁶¹

Moreover, the influence of the campaign on the vote has been denied because the most voters could hardly recall campaign events or advertisements that might affect their vote.⁶² But a new model of the individual assessment of campaign message was introduced. Graber argued that "the fact that so little specific information can be recalled from a story does not mean that no learning has taken place" and that voters draw conclusions from campaign information even though they did not remember its contents.⁶³ This argument was repeated in other research, and it is called 'the on-line model of information processing'.⁶⁴

The model of minimal effects of campaigns has been challenged. Recent research showed that campaigns do affect the vote.⁶⁵ Many campaign studies concluded that campaigns activate underlying predispositions and reinforce existing partisan views. Partisans are not likely to defect their own party and are more likely to harden their partisan loyalty through campaign exposure.⁶⁶ If campaigns do affect voters, but the

⁶⁰ William L. Miller, *Media and Voters: The Audience, Content and Influence of Press and Television at the 1987 General Election* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Larry M. Bartels, 'Messages received: The Political Impact of Media Exposure', *American Political Science Review*, 87 (1993), 267-85; John R. Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

⁶¹ Andrew Gelman and Gary King, 'Why Are American Election Polls so Variable when Votes Are so Predictable?', *British Journal of Political Science*, 23 (1993), 409-51.

⁶² Alan I. Abramowitz, 'Name Familiarity, Reputation, and the Incumbency Effect in a Congressional Election', *Western Political Quarterly*, 28 (1975), 668-84; W. Russell Neuman, *The Paradox of Mass Politics: Knowledge and Opinion in the American Electorate* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986).

⁶³ Doris A. Graber, *Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide* (New York: Longman, 1984), p.73.

⁶⁴ Milton Lodge, Kathleen M. McGraw, and Patrick Stroh, 'An Impression-Driven Model of Candidate Evaluation', *American Political Science Review*, 83 (1989), 399-419; Milton Lodge, Marco R. Steenbergen, and Shawn Brau, 'The Responsive Voter: Campaign Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation', *American Political Science Review*, 89 (1995), 309-26.

⁶⁵ Shanto Iyengar and A. F. Simon, 'New Perspective and Evidence on Political Communication and Campaign Effects', *Annual Review of Psychology*, 51 (2000), 149-69.

⁶⁶ Steven E. Finkel, 'Reexamining the Minimal Effects Model in Recent Presidential Campaigns', *Journal of Politics*, 55 (1993), 1-21; Gelman and King, 'Why Are American Election Polls so

voting choice of loyal partisans is almost fixed to their political party, we can assume that campaigns affect mainly independent voters. Therefore, it is natural that election campaigners focus on independent voters who are more likely to respond to election campaigns. Furthermore, it is expected that the voting choice of independents determines the outcome of elections when the level of loyal partisans of competing parties is almost even.

In conclusion, the voting behaviour of independents, who are free from partisan constraints in their evaluation of political affairs and who can access sufficient information about the election, differs from party identifiers. Independents are more responsive to the influence of campaigns and the media, and are more likely to change their voting decision. The voting decision of independents is not made on the basis of party identification, but is determined by short-term factors, such as candidate characteristics and issues.

2. The Model of Voting Choice of Independents

The Model of Voting Choice

How do Korean voters, particularly independent voters, cast a ballot in elections? To explore individual electoral choice for the Korean President, a modified and simplified variant of the 'causal stages' model is assumed.⁶⁷ The causal model of voting choice incorporates three main different groups of potential explanatory variables: (1) stable social and demographic characteristics, such as age, education, class, and region; (2) long-term predispositions, such as party identification and permanent positions toward policy-related conflicts (or individual ideological self-image); and (3) short-term political attitudes, such as issue preferences, candidate evaluation, and government performance evaluation. Also, it is assumed that the causal relations are conditioned by an intervening variable, i.e., election campaigns (see Figure 3.1).


The model includes three causal stages. At the first stage of the causal model, stable social and economic characteristics of individual voters influence the voter's long-term predispositions such as permanent positions toward policy-related conflicts in society and an enduring psychological attachment to a particular political party. Also, we may expect

Variable when Votes Are so Predictable?'; Thomas M. Holbrook, *Do Campaign Matter?* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996); Stephen Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar, *Going Negative: How Political Advertisements Shrink and Polarize the Electorate* (New York: Free Press, 1995).

⁶⁷ Miller and Shanks, *The New American Voter*, pp.189-211.

that stable social and economic characteristics of voters may bypass long-term predispositions in the causal-chain and directly associate with short-term political attitudes such as salient issue positions and candidate evaluations. But, in order to simplify the model, the causal relationship between socio-economic variables and short-term political attitudes is excluded from the model.

Figure 3.1 The Causal Model of Voting Choice



Note: Bold line = causal relations for partisans; Non-bold line = causal relations for independents.

Keys: Party ID = Party identification.

At second stage of the model, the voter's long-term predispositions affect their short-term political attitudes. The party affiliation of individual voters influences their positions on salient issues, evaluation of incumbent government's performance, and evaluation of candidate's competence and quality. In addition, a voter's continuing positions toward long-term policy-related conflict affects their perception of short-term considerations.

The voter's positions on policy-related conflicts affect the party affiliation of individual voters in Korea. For instance, under the authoritarian regimes, Korean voters could develop and maintain political identification with either the government or opposition rather than with parties. This long-term political attitude accurately explained electoral behaviour in Korea where political parties were institutionally underdeveloped.

It is expected that this relationship remains in the new democracy.

We may expect that there is a recursive relationship between two long-term predispositions. Party affiliation enhances individual voters enduring positions on policy-related conflicts and vice versa. However, it is assumed here that the party affiliation of individual voters does not greatly influence long-term policy-related preferences of individual voters in Korea where the life span of all political parties is much shorter than the duration of long-term policy-related preferences.

At the third stage of the model, short-term considerations and party affiliation determine the voting choice of individual voters. At the causal stage, we can assume that there is a key difference in voting choice between partisans and independent voters. On the one hand, the voting choice of individual partisans is largely determined by their psychological attachment with a political party. Partisans also rely on short-term considerations, but the influence of short-term factors on voting choice is not as strong because the short-term considerations are largely determined by their partisanship (see bold lines in Figure 3.1).

On the other hand, the voting choice of independent voters is mainly determined by short-term factors, such as their positions toward salient issues, their evaluation of incumbent government performance, and their evaluation of candidates (see non-bold lines in Figure 3.1). Furthermore, the causal relationship between short-term considerations and the voting choice of independent voters is shaped by election campaigns and the media. Campaigns and the media, an essential element of campaigns, affect individual voting choice by providing election information to voters and setting the agenda. For example, the media, particularly newspapers, affect the evaluation of candidates and government performance, guiding issue preference, and making voting decision.

The relationship between socioeconomic characteristics of individual voters and long-term predispositions are bounded by cultural context. Therefore, it is expected that partisan alignments vary across different countries. For example, the regional cleavage is a key factor to explain the partisan alignment in Korean democracy, while class, religion, and ethnic group often explain patterns of partisanship in Western democracies. Also, the structure of elections and electoral systems also significantly influence the relationship between short-term factors and voting choice. In particular, tactical thinking can play a considerable role in individual voting choice. Voters do not want to waste their ballots. Neither do they want to let disliked candidate win the election. In the decision-making process, voters evaluate the possibility of preferred or disliked candidates winning, and may change their voting intention and cast a ballot for the candidate who is not their most preferred candidate (see Figure 3.1).

It is assumed that there is no any single dominant influence on the vote to account for all individual voters. For example, party identification cannot explain the voting choice of non-partisans, though party identification is very valuable as a tool to explain the behaviour of other voters. Also, the issue variable cannot account for the electoral behaviour of those who are not interested in and lack knowledge on policy-related issues. Therefore, all three main factors, i.e., party, issue, and candidate, play some role in making individual voting decision, but the explanatory power of each variable differs across voters.

Moreover, it is not assumed that all main factors influence each individual voting decision. Some voters may depend heavily on one of factors, and some voters are affected by all of three variables. It is assumed that the candidate factor is essential, particularly for independent voters. Their voting decision is essentially a choice between candidates, rather than parties. Individual voters pay attention to candidate characteristics rather than issues or parties. In their voting decision, individual voters mainly consider three aspects of candidate characteristics: (1) candidate personal image, such as competence, leadership, and empathy; (2) candidate's characteristics related to salient issues; and (3) candidate's partisanship. Thus, other variables such as party and issue play some role in shaping candidate evaluation, and candidate evaluation of individual voters is a key factor to explain voting choice of individual voters.

Classifying Voters

In classifying Korean voters, two dimensions are considered: party identification and interest in politics. First, voters are divided into two groups in terms of party identification: party identifiers and non-party identifiers (or partisans and independents). Party identifiers (or partisans) have a sense of attachment with the parties. Non-party identifiers (or independents) are those who do not identify with the parties. Second, voters are classified into two groups in terms of interest in politics. One group of voters is interested in political affairs and pay attention on politics. The other group of voters are relatively less interested in politics and public affairs. By combining two dimensions, four types of voters are classified: (1) critical partisans, those who have partisan affiliation and pay attention to politics and public affairs; (2) habitual partisans, those who have partisanship and are relatively less interested in politics; (3) attentive independents, those who do not identify with the parties and are very interested in public affairs; and (4) apolitical independents, those who do not identify party identification and also are not interested in politics (see Table 3.1).

Table 3.1 Four Types of Voters

		Partisanship	
		Party identifiers	Non-party identifiers
Interest in politics	High	Critical Partisan	Attentive Independent
	Low	Habitual Partisan	Apolitical Independent

It is assumed that each different type of voter behaves differently in making their voting choice. Thus, the voting behaviour of different types of voters is explained by different explanatory variables.

Critical partisan: It is expected that all long-term predispositions and short-term factors (ideology, party identification, issue, candidate, and government performance in Figure 3.1) affect the voting choice of critical partisans.

Habitual partisan: The voting choice of habitual partisans is more likely to be affected by party identification and candidate factors, but not by long or short-term policy preferences or government performance evaluation.

Attentive independent: The voting choice of attentive independents is largely determined by long and short-term issue preferences, candidate evaluation, and government performance evaluation.

Apolitical independent: Apolitical voters are more likely to make their voting decision on the basis of candidate factor, particularly candidate's image.

Propositions and Hypotheses

Partisan Dealignment

It is assumed that Korean voters have developed the enduring psychological attachment to a particular political party despite the extreme instability of the political parties. In addition, partisan dealignment has taken place, even though Korea is a new democracy. Party affiliation in Korea is same with that in mature democracies in terms of its function and role in electoral behaviour.

Hypothesis 1: Most Korean voters have an enduring psychological attachment to a particular political party.

1.1 In Korea, the strength of individual partisanship is maintained over time, but has also changed on the basis of evaluation of performance of political parties.

1.2 In Korea, the strengthening and weakening of individual party identification is closely related to support for political leaders.

1.3 Regionalism is the key determinant of the partisan alignment in the new democracy. In particular, *Gyeongsang* people affiliate with the Grand National Party or its ancestor parties, while *Jeolla* people feel close to the Millennium Democratic Party.

1.4 Ideology (or long-term ideological self-image) is another key factor to explain the partisan alignment in Korea. In particular, conservatives are affiliated with the Grand National Party that is the successor party of the old authoritarian ruling party, while liberals support the Millennium Democratic Party that has developed from the pro-democracy opposition before the transition to democracy.

Hypothesis 2: The key determinant of the voting choice of partisans is party affiliation in Korea's new democracy.

2.1 Party identification affects candidate evaluation, issue preference, and government performance evaluation.

2.2 Partisans vote continually for a particular political party in a series of elections.

2.3 Critical partisans rely on long-term predisposition in voting choice, but also consider short-term factors, particularly candidate competence and quality, while habitual partisans solely depend on party affiliation in making vote choice.

Hypothesis 3: Party affiliation has weakened in Korea for last 10 years.

3.1 An increase of cognitively sophisticated voters is related to partisan decline in Korea.

3.2 The young are more likely to be independent voters.

3.3 Independent voters are more likely to be dissatisfied with politics compared to partisans.

Voting Choice of Independent Voters

It is assumed that the voting behaviour of independent voters is different from that of party identifiers who are heavily affected by partisan loyalty. Independent voters who are free from party constraints rely on short-term considerations in making their voting decision. Independent voters carefully examine various factors and make their voting decision based on sufficient information. Voters are more rational in making their electoral choice when party constraints are absent. The voting decision of independent voters is affected by election campaigns and changes their voting intentions depending upon new information. Therefore, the voting decision of independent voters is late

compared to partisans.

Hypothesis 4: Voting behaviour of independent voters is unstable compared to that of party identifiers.

4.1 Independent voters are more likely to change their voting intention over time.

4.2 Independent voters are more likely to make a late voting decision compared to partisans.

Hypothesis 5: Independent voters are more responsive to election campaigns and the media compared to partisans.

5.1 Election campaigns affect on the voting choice of independent voters.

5.2 The impact of the TV debates and Internet on voting choice of individual voters is considerable in Korean presidential elections.

Hypothesis 6: Independent voters are more rational than partisans in voting choice.

6.1 Independent voters rely on short-term considerations rather than long-term factors in making vote choice.

6.2 When partisanship is absent, the choice of candidates is the most important factor to determine vote choice.

6.3 Independent voters, particularly attentive independents, take into account a candidate's specific policies and pledges rather than their image.

6.4 Economic perceptions, both 'prospective' speculation and 'retrospective' evaluation of the nation's economy, affect the voting choice of independent voters.

6.5. Independent voters gather more information and make their vote choice based on sufficient information compared to partisans.

Chapter 4. Method and Data

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the methods and research strategy chosen to conduct the collection and analysis of data. Also, this chapter assesses the generation of qualitative data through fieldwork and discusses the quality of qualitative and quantitative data used in the analysis of Korean electoral behaviour.

This chapter consists of two sections. The first section will discuss potential advantages and disadvantages of 'multi-strategy research', i.e., the integration of qualitative and quantitative approach in collection and analysis of data, chosen to conduct the research. It will be argued that combining qualitative and quantitative approach within a research project can provide in-depth understandings of electoral behaviour while a single method research can often fail to get as a broad and deep picture of a phenomenon. This section also will specify the type of multi-strategy research employed in this study of voting behaviour of independent voters.

The second section will summarise the data used in the analysis of Korean electoral behaviour. The role of fieldwork to generate qualitative data during the 2002 presidential election will be examined. Also, election survey data taken for 'second analysis' of individual electoral behaviour will be summarised. Finally, questions of measurement validity and the reliability of both qualitative and quantitative data will be discussed.

1. Method

In this thesis, I use a 'multi-strategy' research in the collection and analysis of data. Both quantitative and qualitative approaches are used in order to collect and analyse data. Quantitative survey data conducted by a research group of Korean scholars is employed and statistical methods are used to analyse the data. At the same time, focus group and in-depth interviews collected during the 2002 presidential election are examined through the responses of respondents in the interviews. It is expected that combining qualitative and quantitative approaches to examine electoral behaviour can broaden and deepen understandings of voting behaviour. While quantitative research based on a large-scale survey data has sometimes provided only vague understandings of electoral behaviour, qualitative research can provide insights into the motivation of individuals.

Qualitative Approach and Electoral Studies

A Bias in Election Studies

The qualitative approach is nothing new in social research, but is very rare in electoral studies. Since the end of 1980s, the qualitative approach, which was relatively neglected by social researchers due to the methodological dominance of behaviouralism and positivism, has been reappraised in social research. Most texts on social research nowadays cover equally both qualitative and quantitative approaches, and even discuss the advantages of combining a qualitative and quantitative approach within a study.¹

However, in contrast to the rapid progress of methods and approaches in other disciplines, almost all electoral studies solely rely on quantitative survey methods. Since the early 1990s, political scientists have also recognised the worth of the qualitative approach in political research, but nonetheless few students of electoral behaviour have conducted research on the basis of qualitative methods.² For example, *Electoral Studies*, a leading journal in the field, has not carried any articles based on qualitative approach except for an article in a recent issue.³ Considering qualitative approach is almost totally ignored in study of electoral behaviour, it is not strange that there is little research based on combining both qualitative and quantitative approaches in the study of political behaviour.⁴ Students of electoral behaviour who stick to quantitative statistical analysis based on large-scale survey data hardly consider applying a qualitative approach in their research. For example, when students of electoral behaviour recently discussed a new direction for the future of election studies in order to overcome the limits of the 'Michigan model' research based on quantitative data analysis accompanied with large-scale surveys, an improvement of survey methods was discussed, but the qualitative

¹ For example, Alan Bryman, *Social Research Methods* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). Tim May, *Social Research: Issues, Methods, and Process* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2001). For an overview of the qualitative approach, see Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, 'Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research', in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, eds., *Handbook of Qualitative Research* (London: Sage, 2000), 2nd edition, pp. 1-29.

² For a discussion on qualitative and quantitative distinction in political science, Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

³ For example, John Bartle, 'Measuring Party Identification: an Exploratory Study with Focus Groups', *Electoral Studies*, 22(2003), 217-237.

⁴ A rare example of political research combining quantitative and qualitative approach, William L. Miller, Ase B. Grodeland, and Tatyana Y. Koshechkina, *A Culture of Corruption: Coping with Government in Post-communist Europe* (New York: Central European University Press, 2001). Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

approach was totally excluded from their discussion.⁵

It is interesting that the authors of *The American Voter*, a seminal electoral study designed on the Michigan model research, analysed both qualitative and quantitative data in the book although they gave a strong emphasis to the quantitative aspect. But students of electoral studies largely influenced by the Michigan model research have totally ignored the qualitative approach for the last 40 years and still fail to incorporate it in their research. This conforms to Kuhn's argument about the delay of paradigm changes, even though it is questionable that adopting qualitative approach can be considered a paradigmatic change.⁶

Apart from academic researchers, since the early 1990s, practitioners in election campaigns, such as Dick Morris in Bill Clinton's election campaign team, or Philip Gould in Tony Blair's campaign team, have heavily relied on qualitative methods, particularly focus group interviews, to keep track of electoral attitudes, preferences, and behaviour.⁷ Focus groups may become indispensable in governing democracies. Bill Clinton said "There is no one more powerful than a member of a focus group. If you really want to change things, that's where you want to be".⁸

Qualitative and Quantitative Distinction in Social Research Methods

Most researchers recognise the distinction between quantitative and qualitative in social research methods. A clear difference between qualitative and quantitative research is related to measurement, i.e., quantification. In other words, quantitative research employs quantification in the collection and analysis of data, and qualitative research emphasises words rather than quantification.

Incommensurability between Quantitative and Qualitative Approach: Besides a superficial difference, i.e., the issue of measurement, many researchers recognise that there are fundamental differences between quantitative and qualitative researches.⁹ Bryman contrasts qualitative research with quantitative research in three aspects. First, considering the principal orientation to the role of theory in relation to research, quantitative research has a deductive approach and qualitative research entails an

⁵ Electoral Studies has a special issue on the future of election studies based on a conference held in March 1999. See *Electoral Studies*, 21 (2002), 157-338.

⁶ Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

⁷ 'Gambling on Gurus Who Won't Choose Red', *The Guardian*, 10 August 1996. Dick Morris, *Behind the Oval Office: Getting Reelected Against All Odds* (Riverside, CA: Renaissance Books, 1998). Philip Gould, *The Unfinished Revolution: How the Modernisers Saved the Labour Party* (London: Abacus, 1998).

⁸ 'Focus Groups Feed on Politics', *The Guardian*, 14 July 1997.

⁹ Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, p.20.

inductive approach. Typically, quantitative research tests theories and qualitative research emphasises the generation of theories. Second, regarding epistemological orientation, quantitative research adopts the practice and norms of the natural science model, particularly positivism, and qualitative research emphasises individual interpretation of the social world. Third, concerning ontological orientation, quantitative research is 'objectivism' and qualitative research is 'constructionism'. Quantitative research assumes that social reality is an objective reality, and qualitative research considers social reality is a property of individual creation.¹⁰

In other words, several researchers argue that quantitative and qualitative methods are incompatible with each other due to their differences in epistemological, ontological, and methodological underpinnings. These researchers argue that qualitative and quantitative distinction is based on paradigmatic differences, and combining qualitative and quantitative methods is problematic. "Qualitative and quantitative paradigms have entirely different goals, different uses of research methods, and the need for different criteria to fit with each paradigm... One cannot mix research method across qualitative and quantitative paradigm".¹¹

The Same Logic of Inference: Although the qualitative and quantitative distinction has been recognised, several researchers nowadays do not agree that one or other of the approaches is superior to the other. David de Vaus takes an eclectic position in view of research methods. He suggests that empirical social research comprises various types of research, i.e., descriptive research and explanatory research, or theory building approach or theory testing approach. Indeed, "any research design can, in principle, use any type of data collection method and can use either quantitative or qualitative data".¹² Bryman also argues that the distinction of quantitative and qualitative research is not always clear nor fixed. Studies often have characteristics of both these two approaches within a research project, though one of them is more strongly emphasised. Many researchers even deliberately combine these two distinctive approaches within a research so that they supplement each other or even bring about a synergy effect.¹³ Bryman is opposed to the notion that qualitative and quantitative approaches are incomparable or 'incommensurable' with each other because the two approaches are based on different epistemological and ontological assumptions. He suggests that combining quantitative and qualitative approach within a study can enhance the collection and analysis of data.

¹⁰ Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, p.20, and pp.421-41

¹¹ Madeleine Leininger, 'Evaluation Criteria and Critique of Qualitative Research Studies', in J. M. Morse, ed., *Critical Issues in Qualitative Research Methods* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994), pp.95-115, at p.101. Recited from Rosaline S. Barbour, 'Mixing Qualitative Methods: Quality Assurance or Quality Quagmire?', *Qualitative Health Research*, 8(1998), 352-61, at p.353.

¹² David de Vaus, *Research Design in Social Research* (London: Sage, 2001), pp.1-16.

The bias against non-quantitative approaches within political science has weakened. Several political scientists nowadays share the notion that the logic of good qualitative and quantitative research is essentially the same and the difference between two approaches is merely stylistic, though the controversy over the qualitative-quantitative divide in political research has not been concluded yet.¹⁴ Gary King et al. argue that the same rules of causal inference apply to both the qualitative and quantitative approaches. “The differences between the quantitative and qualitative traditions are only stylistic and are methodologically and substantively unimportant”.¹⁵ Furthermore, they suggest that the combination of quantitative and qualitative data is feasible and desirable. “Indeed, much of the best social science research can combine quantitative and qualitative data, precisely because there is no contradiction between the fundamental processes of inference involved in each”.¹⁶

Advantages of Combining the Qualitative and Quantitative Approach

There is no doubt that each approach has advantages and disadvantages and strengths and weaknesses. There is much room for improvement in research methods when both qualitative and quantitative approaches are employed within a research project. A qualitative approach can supplement, or offset the weaknesses of, a purely quantitative approach in election studies.

Limits of Quantitative Surveys: For the last 50 years, the ‘Michigan model research’ based on quantitative approach accompanied with large-scale surveys has made a great contribution to the development of elections studies. However, there are many unsolved questions in the study of voting behaviour. Although the quantitative approach based on large-scale surveys is still a powerful and useful tool in studying electoral behaviour, a new approach or paradigm is necessary to answer unsolved questions. In social research, qualitative approaches such as participatory observation, focus group interviews, and in-depth interviews, have gained in prominence during the last fifteen years as the drawbacks of traditional survey based on structured questionnaires have been revealed. Surveys are expensive and time-consuming. Surveys often fail to provide in-

¹³ Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, pp.21-2.

¹⁴ For a discussion on qualitative methods in political research, King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, and a symposium on this book. David Latin et al., ‘The Qualitative-Quantitative Disputation: Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba’s *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*’, *American Political Science Review*, 89(1995), 454-481.

¹⁵ King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, p.4.

¹⁶ Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, ‘The Importance of Research Design in Political Science’, *American Political Science Review*, 89 (1995), 475-481, at p.475.

depth understanding of a research issue. The limits of quantitative survey method are less about the potential power of survey methods, and more about the difficulties in the proper carrying out of surveys.¹⁷

Quantitative surveys have a number of problems. First, one of main problems with quantitative surveys is concerned with small sample size. In order to achieve statistical significance, the sample size should be more than 2,000 cases, in which the estimate of sampling error is plus and minus 3 per cent against the true percentage. Even this number is not sufficient for sub-group analysis, and sub-group analysis is limited. Indeed, sub-group analysis may fail to gain statistical significance due to small sample size.¹⁸

Second, quantitative survey method is affected by different cultural contexts. Surveys do not consider the social and cultural context.¹⁹ In some societies, respondents do not want to reveal their own opinion, and this causes measurement errors. In other words, surveys may be unreliable depending upon the cultural 'space' the research is conducted within and the research topic. Third, another limit or problem of quantitative surveys is concerned with establishing causation. Quantitative analysis can recognise covariance or correlation between variables, but a causal direction is not certain depending upon the research question.²⁰

Fourth, quantitative methods sometimes fail to reveal meaning. "Critics argue that quantitative methods may establish 'what' and 'when', but not 'why': motivation and meanings are inevitably hidden".²¹ Surveys ask respondents directly about motivation of their behaviour, but respondents may reluctant to disclose deeper motivations of their behaviour. Fifth, quantitative studies are not appropriate to study a decision-making process for a short period of time. Multi-wave panel surveys can be adopted to explore a decision-making process, but it is too expensive and difficult to control panel surveys. Finally, quantitative surveys are not flexible. A researcher may ask the wrong questions in surveys, but there is little space for feedback or dialogue in conducting surveys.

How the Qualitative Approach Enhances the Quantitative Approach: When it is

¹⁷ For arguments for and against survey, see William L. Miller, *The Survey Method in the Social and Political Sciences: Achievements, Failures, Prospects* (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), pp.47-91. William L. Miller, 'Quantitative Method', in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, eds., *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (London: Macmillan Press, 1995), pp.154-172, at pp.166-170.

¹⁸ Miller, *The Survey Method in the Social and Political Sciences*, pp.9-15. Also, John Zaller, 'The Statistical Power of Election Studies to Detect Exposure Effects in Political Campaigns', *Electoral Studies*, 21 (2002), 297-329.

¹⁹ For contextual effects and its measurement, see M. Johnson, W. Phillips Shively, and R.M. Stein, 'Contextual Data and the Study of Elections and Voting Behavior: Connecting Individuals to Environments', *Electoral Studies*, 21 (2002), 219-233. Michael March, 'Electoral Context', *Electoral Studies*, 21 (2002), 207-217.

²⁰ For a discussion on difficulties in disentangling cause and effect, John Curtice, 'The State of Election Studies: Mid-life Crisis or New Youth?', *Electoral Studies*, 21 (2002), 161-168.

²¹ Miller, 'Quantitative Method', p.169.

difficult to carry out quantitative surveys satisfactorily, qualitative studies, such as in-depth interviews, or focus group interviews, can supplement incomplete quantitative surveys. Qualitative approach can thus enhance quantitative research.²² First, qualitative studies can assist researchers to identify relevant variables to investigate, particularly when new topics are studied. Also, qualitative studies can help researchers to detect new variables, which have been overlooked in previous work. Before conducting large-scale surveys, qualitative research, such as focus group interviews or in-depth interviews, can be used in order to develop survey questionnaires of considerable sophistication.

Second, qualitative researches can generate hypotheses or research questions. One aim of qualitative research is to develop theories, while an aim of quantitative research is to test theories. Third, qualitative approach can provide explanations for deviant cases. Quantitative approach emphasises generalisation and neglects outliers unless measuring errors are detected. Qualitative approach focuses on deviant cases. 'Non-systemic variables' are important in explaining the variance between different phenomena, while quantitative approach relies on 'systemic variables' in explaining such variance.²³

Finally, another strength of qualitative studies is the practice of process tracing, which is not effectively studied through quantitative survey method. In qualitative research, researchers can look closely at "the decision process by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes" and identify the true reasons for a particular decision.²⁴

Promises of Multi-Strategy Research: In sum, several researchers suggested that the integration of these two different approaches, or 'multi-strategy research', is feasible and desirable. The potential for combining qualitative and quantitative is considerable.²⁵ Each approach has strengths and weaknesses, but combining the two approaches can help overcome these. The 'triangulation' of different methods on the same research problem can be the best strategy to improve the quality of research.²⁶ First, combining the two approaches will provide richer data to test theoretical claims. Researchers can be much

²² Rosaline Barbour, 'The Case for Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches in Health Services Research', *Journal of Health Services Research Policy*, 4 (1999), 39-43, p.41.

²³ Sidney Tarrow, 'Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Political Science', *American Political Science Review*, 89 (1995), 471-474, p.472.

²⁴ King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, p.226. Also, Tarrow, 'Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Political Science', p.472.

²⁵ Jane Ritchie, 'The Applications of Qualitative Methods to Social Research', in Jane Ritchie and Jane Lewis, eds, *Qualitative Research Practice* (London: Sage, 2003), pp.24-46, at pp. 38-44. However, still some researchers emphasise that two approaches are incomparable and the integration of two distinct approaches is not feasible. Yvonna S. Lincoln and E. G. Guba, 'Paradigmatic Controversies, Contradictions, and Emerging Confluences' in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, eds, *Handbook of Qualitative Research* (London: Sage, 2000), 2nd edition, pp. 163-88.

²⁶ Tarrow, 'Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Political Science', pp.473-4. Clive Seale, *The quality of qualitative Research* (London: Sage, 1999), pp.52-61.

more confident with findings which have been yielded by more than one method. Combining qualitative and quantitative methods can produce an improvement in the 'trustworthiness' of findings.

Second, when two different approaches are used in the investigation of a reality, researchers get a deeper knowledge of that reality and a single fixed reality can be known objectively.²⁷ Two distinctive approaches provide a different kind of evidence. "By and large, the two research traditions can be viewed as contributing to the understanding of different aspects of the phenomenon in question".²⁸ The integration of two approaches may provide a broader and deeper understanding of reality.

The Multi-Strategy Research: The Voting Behaviour of Independent Voters in Korea

There are a variety of ways to combine qualitative and quantitative approaches in a study.²⁹ The type of the methodological integration chosen to conduct the collection and analysis of data will be different depending upon the research question and the phenomenon to be investigated. In addition, the type of combining qualitative and quantitative approach will differ depending upon prevailing research constraints, i.e., time, cost, and context.

In general, this study of the voting behaviour of independent voters in Korea prioritises the quantitative method in the analysis of data in order to achieve the goal of generalisation, although the research uses both the quantitative and qualitative methods equally in gathering data.³⁰ This is based on the main question of the research. The main research question compares the voting patterns of independent voters compared to party identifiers. Cross-sectional quantitative analysis at the individual level is the basis of the research, while the qualitative analysis and data provides a deeper understanding of the meaning of the individual's behaviour.

Combining the Two Approaches Concurrently

A qualitative approach can be combined with quantitative methods in three different

²⁷ Seale, *The quality of qualitative Research*, p.53.

²⁸ Alan Bryman, *Quantity and Quality in Social Research* (London: Routledge, 1998), p.170.

²⁹ For example, Bryman specified 10 different ways to combine quantitative and qualitative approach. Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, pp.447-54.

³⁰ Morgan classified multi-strategy research in terms of the priority given to either qualitative or quantitative method as the principal data-gathering tool. David L. Morgan, "Practical Strategies for Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Application for Health Research, *Qualitative Health Research*, 8 (1998), 362-76.

ways in terms of the possible sequential relationship of qualitative and quantitative studies: (1) Preceding statistical enquiry; (2) Alongside statistical enquiry; or (3) As a follow-up to statistical enquiry.³¹ Such sequential relationships are common ways of combining qualitative and quantitative approaches but this study is not based on these methods. In this study, the qualitative and quantitative aspects were conducted separately. The qualitative data was generated during the 2002 presidential election, but the quantitative data used here comes from a survey by other researchers. Therefore, this study cannot exploit fully the potential benefits of combining qualitative and quantitative approach in sequence, e.g., in sequential combination, qualitative research can be an exploratory study to develop hypothesis and to help the construction of survey questionnaires of considerable sophistication. In other words, the research focuses on combining approaches in the analysis rather than collection of data because the qualitative research did not precede the quantitative surveys which were constructed and carried out independently.

Three Ways of Combining the Two Approaches in the Research

In the research, by combining qualitative and quantitative approaches, the qualitative research enhances the quantitative work and *vice versa* in three dimensions, i.e., ‘facilitation’, ‘complementarity’, and ‘triangulation’.³²

Facilitation: First, qualitative research facilitates quantitative research. One of the ways in which qualitative research can prepare the ground for quantitative research is to provide hypotheses that can be subsequently tested in quantitative approach. In the research, hypotheses are mainly deduced from existing theories or previous research on voting choice, but causal relations are adjusted or established on the basis of findings from qualitative research. Meanwhile, quantitative research also facilitates qualitative research. The researcher can select interviewees based upon findings of previews quantitative research identifying sub-groups of respondents.

Complementarity: Second, qualitative approach compensates for the shortcomings of the quantitative approach. Indeed, a qualitative approach studies a different dimension of the phenomenon, which a quantitative investigation cannot examine.³³ In designing interviews and constructing interview questions, qualitative research sets out to uncover

³¹ Ritchie, ‘The Applications of Qualitative Methods to Social Research’, pp. 38-44.

³² M. Hammersley, ‘The Relationship between Qualitative and Quantitative Research: Paradigm Loyalty versus Methodological Eclecticism’, in J. T. E. Richardson, ed., *Handbook of Research Methods for Psychology and the Social Science* (Leicester: BPS Book, 1996).

³³ Bryman referred this issue as the relationship between ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ level. Bryman, *Quantity and Quality in Social Research*, p.147-51.

findings that a quantitative survey may have failed to gather. In the study, the quantitative aspect is concerned with the behaviour of voters while the qualitative approach reveals the meaning of actions, i.e., the underlying motives and causes of voting behaviour. Qualitative analysis provides a deeper understanding of the decision-making process of individual voters. Meanwhile, some quantification of findings from qualitative research can help to overcome the problem of generalisation in qualitative research.

Triangulation: Third, qualitative research is used to corroborate quantitative research findings. In the research design, qualitative data is used here to crosscheck findings provided by the quantitative research.³⁴ Qualitative analysis reinforces the evidence of the findings of the quantitative research if there is consistency between the findings in qualitative and in quantitative research. The results of the qualitative analysis suggests new questions or demands further analysis if there are contradictions between the findings in qualitative and in quantitative approach. By the triangulation of qualitative and quantitative data, the research provides a more complete picture of a voter's thinking, though not necessarily a more certain one.³⁵ Regardless of the confirmation or contradiction of findings, the triangulation of qualitative and quantitative data strengthens the total research project.

2. Data and Fieldwork

This study is based on combination of three types of data — i.e., focus group interviews, semi-structured in-depth interviews, and a large-scale survey. I collected the qualitative data during fieldwork in the 2002 presidential election, and I acquired the survey data in the form of data-matrix, i.e., SPSS data files, from the Korea Social Science Data Center.

Qualitative Data on Korean Electoral Behaviour

Fieldwork: Focus Group Interviews

Focus group interviews were used to discover voters' perceptions toward political parties and underlying causes of voting behaviour. I drew up the questions, but left the interviewing to a research agency. A research company, Research Bank, recruited

³⁴ Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, pp.447-9.

³⁵ Ritchie, 'The Applications of Qualitative Methods to Social Research', p.44.

participants and conducted the focus group interviews.³⁶ Two group interviews were held in a room of the research agency in Seoul on 26 December 2002. I observed the discussion through a two-way mirror and was able to contact a moderator during the discussions. All discussions were tape-recorded and were transcribed by the research agency.

Interviewees: I initially planned to recruit only independent voters or non-party identifiers in their 30s or the early 40s, but this had to be changed due to the extreme difficulties experienced in finding independent voters who went to the polls and were willing to participate in the focus group discussions. The research company looked for participants a week before the day of election, but failed to recruit enough people wanting to join the focus groups. This was due to several factors. First, many independent voters did not go to the polls. Second, independents who are relatively less interested in politics were not willing to talk about politics with strangers. Third, most people were busy preparing for the holiday season in December. Therefore, I allowed weak party identifiers to participate in the focus groups. I expected that mixing independents and weak partisans would not prevent the focus groups from having a free discussion.³⁷ Also, I expected that I could use partisans as a reference group to compare against the voting behaviour focused on independent voters.

Participants are between 30 to 45 years old. I mainly focused on this age group of voters because they are relatively more involved in the election compared to younger voters and they are relatively free from the partisan constraints more common among older voters. Younger and older members of the electorate were excluded because I believed that a wide age gap among participants might deter free discussions. Also, I divided participants into two groups for women and men because I assumed that female participants might be more passive or quieter in mixed groups discussing politics. The number of participants in each female group was 8 and the number for male groups was 9. All female participants were fulltime housewives, and most male participants were non-manual workers or self-employed.

All participants of the focus groups lived in Seoul. I decided that my qualitative research, i.e., the focus group interviews and in-depth interviews, would focus on voters in a particular region, Seoul and the suburb of Seoul. Financial and time constraints were the key reason, but I expected that the restriction in recruiting interviewees would not prevent me achieving my research target which was to explore the voting behaviour of

³⁶ Research Bank is small, but is an experienced research agency, particularly in qualitative research. Roh Hee-sun was a moderator for the focus groups.

³⁷ In relation to problems in determining participants, Morgan said that "the goal is homogeneity in background, not homogeneity in attitudes". David L. Morgan, *Focus Groups As Qualitative Research* (London: Sage, 1988), p.46.

independent voters, and not the differences in independent voters' electoral behaviour across different regions. More than 10 million people live in Seoul, the capital city of Korea, and about one third of Koreans live in Seoul and the nearby, *Gyeonggi* region. Many inhabitants of Seoul and its suburb come from the various regions of Korea. In this way, Seoul can be considered as a very large size sample of Korean population. Another reason to focus solely on Seoul is that the voting behaviour of Koreans in other regions, particularly *Jeolla*, *Gyeongsang*, and *Chungcheong*, is influenced by regionalism or party affiliation strongly connected to regionalism. In other words, a large proportion of independent voters reside in Seoul and nearby compared to local districts. Brief personal information about the participants is summarised in Table A4.1 (see Appendix).

Contacts with the Moderator: I had a meeting with the moderator one week before the interviews. I had the meeting in advance in order to provide her with enough time to prepare the focus group interviews. I realised that the moderator had experience of many market research studies and some social research, but not any political research. It was practically impossible to find a moderator with experience of political research, because focus groups interviews in market research are very popular, but focus group interviews in social research, particularly political research, are rare in Korea.

As the best alternative, I considered that I might take the moderator's role in the discussion. But this option had disadvantages as well as advantages. Indeed, if I moderated the discussions, focus groups would concentrate on the most important topics in my research, but as an inexperienced moderator, I might fail to lead the discussions effectively. By contrast, a professional moderator could lead the discussion more effectively and induce participants to speak spontaneously in the discussions, though she was not familiar with the topics.

Rather than take the risk, I hired the professional moderator and instead, I observed the discussions and secured a way to communicate with the moderator during the discussions if I needed to. I tried to illustrate the research purpose and topics to the moderator before the discussion. I provided the moderator with my interview questions one week before the preparation meeting. Then, I clarified my questions and explained the underlying theoretical notions of each question in the preparation meeting. In the meeting, I discussed possible answers and was able to add follow-up questions into the original questionnaire. Indeed, the moderator developed an adequate level of knowledge of the topic.

Topics: The focus groups mainly discussed three topics. The first topic was about the participants' perceptions and attitudes toward political parties. Participants discussed their perceptions and evaluation of party politics and politicians. They also discussed why they did or did not feel close to political parties. The second topic was related to

participants' experience of election campaigns. They spoke about the most important information source in the election with a particular focus on the TV debate involving the candidates. Participants were asked what they got from watching the TV debates and whether TV debates affected their voting choice. The third topic was about why they voted as they did in the presidential election, the most important consideration in their voting choice and the timing of their voting decision. These three topics were repeated in one-to-one in-depth interviews with some additional questions.

Fieldwork: Semi-structured In-depth Interviews

In total, 56 semi-structured interviews were carried out in Seoul and urban areas in *Gyeonggi* region within 2 weeks following the election, 19 December 2002. All interviewees were ordinary citizens who live in the cities and had turned out to vote in the 2002 election. Each interview took time between 40 minutes and 80 minutes and was tape-recorded. I made transcripts based on the tapes after all interviews were conducted, while a group of students conducted the interviews.

Contacts with Interviewers: I initially planned to conduct all interviews by myself, but I had to ask other people to help conduct the interviews. First, it was very difficult to find volunteers who were willing to talk about politics for approximately one hour. This was partially related to the fact that most people were busy at that time of year, the end of December. Independent voters were relatively less interested in politics and thus reluctant to be interviewed about politics. Also, it seemed that many independent voters did not vote, and so it was difficult to recruit interviewees who were independent voters and went to the poll in the last presidential election. Second, it was practically impossible to set up more than three interviews for a day when I had to visit each respondent's home or a place where interviewee wanted to have the meeting. I anticipated that I should complete all interviews within a short period time because voters quickly forget election campaigns or what they did in an election. These problems might have been solved if I had recruited interviewees through a research company. In such a scenario, interviewees were expected to visit an office of the research company, and more than five or six interviews could be scheduled for a day. However, I could not take this option because both interviewees and the research company would require payment. As an alternative way to recruit interviewees at low cost, I recruited interviewers who could find voluntary interviewees and conduct interviews.

The 10 interviewers consisted of mostly postgraduate and some undergraduate students in politics or related disciplines. I had a meeting with interviewers in Seogang University, Seoul, on 23 December 2002 before conducting interviews. Some of them

missed the meeting and I had to contact with them through telephone and e-mail. I provided each interviewer with a semi-structured interview questionnaire and made them aware of the exact reasons for each question. Furthermore, I emphasised the differences between open-ended interviews and structured survey interviews because most interviewers were not familiar with the process of in-depth interviews. I encouraged them to ask follow-up questions to interviewees, and discouraged them from stopping interviewees from saying anything. I knew that the quality of the interviewing would largely determine the quality of the interviewing, but it was difficult to recruit experienced interviewers due to a lack of research funding. Instead, in order to help the inexperienced interviewers, I provided interviewers a detailed questionnaire, in which many possible follow-up questions were included. I also anticipated that I could crosscheck the quality of the interviewing because all interviews were tape-recorded. Following this check, I found most interviewers were not particularly flexible in the interviewing, but did not act contrary to my guidelines. On a few occasions, I found that an interviewer made mistakes during some parts of interviews. For example, one interviewer failed to induce respondents to answer spontaneously or instantly, and so sometimes suggested a hint or possible answers to the respondents. These mistakes could be detected, however, from the tapes and were excluded the answers from the data during the transcription-making process.

Developing Semi-structured Questionnaire: I conducted in total four informal interviews with my family members and friends in order to pre-test the semi-structured questionnaire that I provided the interviewers. These informal interviews were not used as core information in this research because I conducted the interviews before the election and I revised many parts of the questionnaire depending on the feedback from the informal interviews. In other words, I excluded the informal interviews from my core data on the voting behaviour of independent voters because the informal interviews were not completed and were not consistent with the formal interviews conducted by the hired interviewers.

Selection of Interviewees: Each interviewer recruited 4-6 interviewees. The process of selecting interviewees was not a true random sample based on scientific rules, but I was concerned to minimise any potential bias in selecting interviewees. I provided interviewers a guideline for recruitment of interviewees as follows:

- First, I demanded that interviewees should be mainly independent voters who went to the polls in the 2002 presidential election. However, I expected that they might have difficulties finding qualified interviewees because the research agency had experienced the same problem when recruiting participants for focus groups interviews. Therefore, I allowed them to

include weak party identifiers when they could not find independent voters.

- Second, I stipulated that interviewees should not be related either through family or friendship. Indeed, no more than one interviewee from a family should be recruited. No interviewee should be a friend or a colleague of other interviewees.
- Third, I wanted interviewees to be as diverse as possible in terms of occupation, gender, and age.
- Finally, I asked that all interviewees live in Seoul or the suburb of Seoul in the *Gyeonggy* region.

In total, 56 people were interviewed. In terms of party affiliation, 42 interviewees were independent voters and 14 interviewees were party identifiers (see Table 4.A2 in Appendix). Although the selection of interviewees was not based on a scientific sampling method, the 42 interviewees who were independent voters consisted of various types of voters in terms of social characteristics and roughly represented the population — i.e., independent voters in Seoul area. The 42 independents were comprised of:

- 20 men and 22 women.
- 25 interviewees below 30 years old and 17 interviewees 30 years old or above with 7 interviewees over 44 years old.
- 14 students, 9 non-manual workers, 7 self-employed workers, 6 fulltime housewives, 3 professional, and 3 unemployed or other types of workers.
- 30 residents of Seoul and 12 living in the suburb of Seoul, i.e., *Gyeonggi* region.
- 14 interviewees originated from *Gyeongsang*, 10 interviewees were from *Chungcheong*, 8 interviewees were from *Seoul* or *Gyeonggi*, 6 interviewees were from *Jeolla*, and 4 interviewees were from another region.
- 15 interviewees were relatively interested in politics and 27 interviewees were not.

Quantitative Survey Data on Korean Electoral Behaviour

‘Secondary analysis’ of quantitative data is adopted in this research i.e., the data being used has been collected by other scientists. Secondary analysis has disadvantages and advantages.³⁸ Researchers can save data-gathering costs and time. The quality of the data is relatively safe because the data is collected by a group of scientists. But secondary analysis has some disadvantages. Researchers are separated from the collection of data,

³⁸ Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, pp. 196-201. Piergiorgio Corbetta. *Social Research: Theory*,

and so cannot control data quality. Moreover, researchers establish the issues what they want to analyse or examine, but important questions may not be fully answered due to the absence of key variables in the data. However, I expected that these problems could be partially overcome by the triangulation of qualitative and quantitative approaches in the collection and analysis of data. For example, in the qualitative research, I tried to add some questions about voter's attitudes, value, and behaviour, which were excluded in surveys.

In this thesis, survey data from the Korea Social Science Data Center (KSDC) is used in the quantitative analysis of individual voting behaviour. The survey was conducted by a group of Korean researchers in electoral studies. This group of Korean researchers has conducted a post-election survey immediately after every election since 1992. The KSDC collects this survey data and provides the data to any individual researcher who wants to use it. Survey data from the KSDC is the only dataset that is available for individual researchers to access. During the election year, news media, political parties, and campaign teams conducted a total of more than a hundred surveys but it is impossible for individual researchers to access these datasets. Even most news media did not open the results of these surveys in the form of cross tabulations to the public.³⁹ In other words, survey data from the KSDC is the only dataset to be available for individual researchers to access. At the same time, the KSDC survey data is the only available dataset to examine change and continuity of electoral behaviour over time, though there has been some inconsistency in survey questions across different surveys carried out by the KSDC.

In this thesis, the dataset from the KSDC, the Korean Presidential Election Study of 2002 (hereafter KPES) is mainly used in order to explore individual voting behaviour. Furthermore, in order to examine changes and continuities in voting behaviour across different elections, two datasets, the KPES of 1992 and 1997, are used. Some general election surveys from the KSDC also used. The sample size of each presidential election survey is 1,200 in 1992, 1,200 in 1997, and 1,500 in 2002. The samples were selected based on a stratified random sampling from the whole electorate excluding residences in *Jeju*. The standard error of these surveys is plus and minus 3 per cent point. Each survey was conducted within a week following the election. Interviewers visited selected respondents and conducted face-to-face interviews based on a structured questionnaire.

Methods, and Techniques (London: Sage, 2003), pp.150-51.

³⁹ Chosun Daily Newspaper, Choongang Daily Newspaper, and SBS television reveal results of most surveys in the form of cross tabulations. But still they do not allow individual researchers to access the dataset in the form of data-matrix.

Quality of the Data: Validity and Reliability

An important concern in any research is the assessment of validity and reliability of findings. Although employing both quantitative and qualitative approach can enhance the quality of research, such as internal validity or external validity of research design, the integration of qualitative and quantitative method does not guarantee the quality of data. Therefore, questions of measurement validity and reliability must be addressed.

Quality of Interview Data

The validity of findings is not an important issue in qualitative research if we agree that there is no perfect validity of findings. Focus group interviews or in-depth interviews have high 'face validity' unless the researcher deviates from established procedures.⁴⁰ An interviewee's comments are believable, though people are not always trustworthy. A respondent may hold back important information or distort answers intentionally in a structured questionnaire survey, but they often fail to mislead the interviewer in qualitative interviews. For example, in this research, among the total of 56 in-depth interviewees, 4 respondents gave inconsistent answers about party affiliation. Indeed, in a mini-survey conducted in a very early part of the interview, 4 of 56 interviewees concealed their party affiliation, but could not hold back the information in order to make comments on other questions and subsequently revealed their party affiliation during the in-depth interview.

Concerning the reliability or 'dependability' issue, the qualitative data about the voting behaviour of independent voters in Korea is reliable. Even though the selection of interviewees was not based a rigorous scientific random sampling method — this was not feasible and not needed due to a small number of interviewees --- interviewees were randomly recruited. Furthermore, all interviews followed a structured process so that the method used in the collection of the data is easily repeated. Following the same process and a similar context, a repeat research project should arrive at similar results.

Quality of Survey Data

We may assess that the quality of the survey data obtained from the KSDC is not in question in terms of measurement validity and reliability because the survey was conducted by a group of election study specialists and was based on a questionnaire that

⁴⁰ Richard A. Krueger, *Focus Groups: A practical Guide for Applied Research* (London: Sage,

has been developed and used for several years. Measurement validity of the survey data is therefore not a significant issue. However, some potential problems of the survey data related to 'unsystematic' measurement errors can be recognised.

One problem is related to the timing of the survey. The survey was carried out after the election. As discussed above, in questionnaire surveys, respondents can easily mislead interviewers intentionally or unintentionally. Respondents sometimes might not speak truthfully in the post-election survey. Some respondents might conceal their true feelings, attitudes, and behaviour in answering sensitive questions, such as voting choice or party affiliation. For instance, the reliability of a measurement of individual party affiliation might be questioned. Also, the level of party identification for the defeated party shrinks and the level of party identification for the winning party swells in the post-election survey compared to the polls conducted just before the election.

The distribution of voting choice suggests a similar measurement error. The percentage of respondents who voted for the winning candidate is bigger than the actual share of votes received by the candidate. Additionally, measurement of voter turnout is problematic in the post-election survey. Voter turnout rate as measured by the post-election survey is much higher than actually happened. Another potential problem is related to difficulties in measuring campaign effects. Election campaigns easily escape voters' memories immediately after the election ended, and respondents hardly remember any election campaigns in the post-election survey. In addition, a respondents' voting choice might affect their answers in the post-election survey. For example, in the survey, they might answer that they had voted for a candidate because they assessed the quality or competence of a candidate favourably, but this generous evaluation of the candidate in the post-election survey might be a post-election justification for their original electoral choice.

PART TWO
ELECTORAL DEALIGNMENT
AND
INDEPENDENT VOTERS

Chapter 5. Party Affiliation in a New Democracy

The aim of this chapter is to explore the concept of party identification in Korea. The main features of party affiliation and the limits of the concept in the new democracy will be discussed. An analysis of party affiliation is required to explore the electoral behaviour of independents. The concept of party identification suggests a division of voters into those affiliated to a particular political party and those unaffiliated to any political party. It is also assumed that party identifiers are different from non-party identifiers in terms of voting behaviour. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the concept of party identification in Korea before further analysis of independent voters and their behaviour in election.

This chapter consists of two sections. The first section discusses the existence of long-term party affiliation under circumstances of party system instability. I will argue that psychological identification has developed among the electorate in the new democracy, although party politics is institutionally underdeveloped. The second section explores key features and limits of the concept of party identification in the new democracy. I will argue that party affiliation in the new democracy is changeable and depends upon the performance of political parties unlike the assumption of long-term stability of party identification made by the authors of *The American Voter*.¹

1. Party Identification under Institutional Underdevelopment of Party Politics

Modern democracy entails mass politics and mass voters, and political parties still play many essential roles in mass politics. "Political parties structure the popular vote, integrate and mobilise the mass of citizenry; aggregate diverse interests; recruit leaders for public office; and formulate public policy."² Mass participation and mass politics is unthinkable without political parties. In other words, as long as mass politics is associated with political parties and as long as the functions associated with political parties are important in democratic politics, party identification which shows a relationship between mass voters and political parties can explain the political behaviour of mass voters.

As discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis, party identification is a key concept in explaining mass electoral behaviour in mature democracies, but is still one of the most

¹ Angus Campbell et al., *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960).

² Peter Mair, 'Introduction', in Peter Mair, ed., *The West European Party System* (Oxford: Oxford

controversial concepts in the electoral research.³ Electoral studies specialists have explored the limits of the party identification model. The concept and its measurement have been discussed and the decline of party identifiers is recognised in many democracies.⁴ Moreover, the applicability of the concept in different political culture outside of the USA has been challenged.

In particular, considering the long-term nature of party identification, it is questionable whether one can refer to an enduring partisanship in a new democracy only fifteen years old. The history of the new democracy is not only short, but also unstable, so it may be not possible to refer to the 'endurance of partisanship'. Students of Korean electoral studies often exclude the concept of party identification in their research because of the institutional underdevelopment of political parties in Korea.⁵ Few researchers directly approached party identification, but some researchers have measured the party affiliation of the electorate in terms of political attitude to the pro-ruling and pro-opposition political parties instead of the concept of party identification.⁶ In doing so, they are seeking in pro-ruling and pro-opposition attitudes a 'functional equivalent' to party identification.⁷

University Press, 1990), p. 1.

³ See Warren Miller and J. Merrill Shanks, *The New American Voter* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).

⁴ For a good summary of the concept of party identification and the party identification model of voting, see Martin Harrop and William L. Miller, *Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1987), pp. 130-45. For limits and issues of the concept of party identification, see Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe, Dennis Farlie, eds, *Party Identification and Beyond* (London: John Wiley & Sons, 1976). For decline of party identification in mature democracies, see William L. Miller and Richard G. Niemi, 'Voting: Choice, Conditioning, and Constraint', in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris, eds, *Comparing Democracies 2* (London: Sage, 2002), pp. 169-209; Herman Schmitt and Soren Holmberg, 'Political Parties in Decline?', in Hans-Dieter Klingmann and Dieter Fuchs, eds, *Citizens and the State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 95-123; Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds, *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

⁵ For example, Youngjae Jin, *Budongcheong yugwonja hyeongtae bunseok* (An analysis of floating voters) (Seoul: Jipmundang, 2002), pp. 10-11. However, a few researchers have dealt with the concept of party identification in explaining Korean electoral behaviour. For example, A-ran Hwang, 'Jeongdangtaedowa tupyohangtae' (Party identification and voting behaviour), in Nam-Young Lee, ed., *Hangugui seongeo* (Elections in Korea), vol. 2 (Seoul: Pureungil, 1998), pp. 257-314.

⁶ Government identification is corresponded to party identification where parties are weak such as new democracies in post-communist Europe. See William L. Miller, Stephen White, and Paul Heywood, *Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe* (London; Macmillan, 1998), pp. 302-7.

⁷ For example, Jung-bin Cho, 'Yugwonjaui yeoyaseonghyanggwawa tupyohaengtae' (Pro-ruling and pro-opposition voter attitude and voting behaviour), in Nam-Young Lee, ed., *Hangugui seongeo* (Elections in Korea), vol. 1 (Seoul: Nanam, 1993), pp. 49-66. Also, Chan-wuk Park, 'Jae 14dae gughoiuiwon chongseongeoaeoseoui jeongdangjiji bunseok' (An analysis of the support for Political Parties in the 14th general election), in Nam-Young Lee, ed., *Hangugui seongeo* (Elections in Korea), vol. 1 (Seoul: Nanam, 1993), pp. 67-115. However, the concept of political attitude of pro-ruling and pro-opposition party may be no longer useful due to the power transition from a party to another party in the 1997 presidential election. Voters have been confused of the

The nature of party identification and the nature of party attachment in the new democracy should be discussed prior to further analysis of the partisan alignment and of independent voters without party attachments. Several questions or problems related to the nature of party identification in new democracy should be explored. Is it possible for voters to develop a durable attachment to a political party in the new democracy where political parties are institutionally underdeveloped and the political party system is very unstable? How do short-term political affairs affect party attachment? Is it party identification if party identification is changeable within a relatively short-period time? Does party identification differ from party preference or candidate popularity in a specific election? Is there any relationship between attachment to a party and attachment to a political leader? How do negative feelings to a political party constrain electoral behaviour? Finally, does party identification explain voting choice in the new democracy?

Instability of Party Politics in Korea

Political parties in Korea's new democracy are institutionally underdeveloped. It is possible that voters are confused by unstable party politics, and it is very difficult for voters to develop any long-term party affiliation. Furthermore, the concept of party identification in the new democracy may not be same as party identification in advanced democracies.

'Meeting and Parting' of Political Parties

Political parties in Korea have a relatively short life. 'Meeting and parting' is the best term to describe the development of political party in Korea. For example, since the transition to democracy in 1987, about sixty political parties emerged while forty-six parties have dissolved during the sixteen years of the new democracy. Each year approximately four political parties are newly formed and approximately three political parties disappear. On average nine political parties are in existence each year although twenty-two political parties were registered in 2002 (see Table 5.1).⁸

Major political parties are not exempt from the 'meeting and parting'. For example, in most elections, the Korean electorate cast their vote for a candidate of a newly formed political party. Indeed, in the 1987 presidential election, all of the major competing

concepts of the ruling party and the opposition party since the electorate experienced a power transition the first time for 40 years. Instead of the pro-ruling and pro-opposition party attitude, the ideological disposition of the voters is often measured in recent surveys.

⁸ A revision of Political Party Act of 2002 has eased the legal conditions of political party, and has promoted the establishment of many new parties.

parties except the authoritarian ruling party, the Democratic Justice Party (DJP), were formed just before the election. In the 1992 presidential election, all competing parties were new parties. The authoritarian ruling party was transformed into a gigantic party, the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) by annexing two opposition parties in 1990. A major opposition party also changed to a new party, the Democratic Party (DP), in 1990, as a response to the appearance of the DLP. Third party, the Unification National Party (UNP), was formed in election year. In the 1997 presidential election, the ruling party annexed one of opposition party, United Democratic Party (UDP), and changed its name to the Grand National Party (GNP) just before the election. The major opposition party, the New Congress for New Politics, was formed two years before the election, and the third party, the New Party for People (NPP), was formed just before the election. The presidential election of 2002 again conformed to this pattern. The major opposition party, the GNP, again fought the election, but the ruling party, the NCNP, was dissolved and became the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) in 2000. By 2003, the United Liberal Democrats (ULD), formed in 1995, has the longest history among all existing parties in Korea.

Table 5. 1 Numbers of Political Parties in Korea, 1987-2002

	NUMBER OF POLITICAL PARTIES (A)	NUMBER OF PARTIES FORMED (B)	NUMBER OF PARTIES DISAPPEARED (C)
1987	8	6	1
1988	13	4	12
1989	5	0	0
1990	5	4	3
1991	6	1	3
1992	4	6	2
1993	8	1	0
1994	9	1	3
1995	7	5	3
1996	9	5	3
1997	11	6	6
1998	11	2	3
1999	10	0	2
2000	8	6	2
2001	12	3	3
2002	12	10	0
2003	22	*	*
Total		60	46

Source: Calculated from the National Election Commission, *Jeongdangui hwaldonggaehwang mit jaesansanghwang bogogip* (A report on general activities and financial status of political parties), 1988-1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 (Seoul: the National Election Commission, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003).

Notes: The figures of column (a) are numbers of parties by 1st of January of each year. The figures of column (b) and (c) are numbers of parties formed and abolished during each year. Also, the figures include cases of only change in party name.

Political Parties for a few Political Leaders

Another significant feature of political parties in Korea is that political parties are formed and dissolved by a few political leaders who can mobilise many political supporters, such as ‘three Kims’ — Kim Dae-jung, Kim Young Sam, and Kim Jong-pil. Kim Dae-jung was involved in the establishment of the PDP in 1987, the DP in 1990, the NCNP in 1995, and the MDP in 2000. Kim Young Sam was involved in the foundation of the RDP in 1987, the DLP in 1990, and the NKP in 1996. Kim Jong-pil also formed the NDRP in 1987 and ULD in 1995, and was involved in the creation of the DLP in 1990.

In general, a political leader forms a party or annexes other party for his own political interests, and the political party becomes a group of politicians following the political leader. Political parties are more like an organisation for the interests of the politicians, especially in an impending election. Indeed, many political parties in Korea are formed just before elections and are dissolved afterwards. For example, the UNP led by Chung Ju-young, the owner of Hyundai business group, was formed in 1992 and gained more than 16 per cent of votes in both the parliamentary and presidential elections of 1992. However, it was dissolved after the 1992 presidential election. Another case is the NPP led by Rhee In-je, who after withdrawing from the ruling NKP formed the NPP just before the 1997 presidential election. It gained about twenty per cent of votes in the election, but was later annexed to the new ruling NCNP in 1998.

The Lack of Grassroots Participation in Political Parties

No Korean political parties can be described as a modern political party in terms of grassroots participation in party activities. Every major party has a nation-wide organisation, but the political parties do not employ this structure for communication, policy making, and debate. Party activities are extremely concentrated around the leaders and core politicians. Indeed, political parties are formed from the top down and run by a small number of politicians. In this way, they are more like ‘cadre parties’ rather than a ‘mass parties’. The major political parties claim that they each have more than one million official party members. However, the numbers do not reflect ‘true’ members, but ‘factitious’ members or party members in name only.⁹ For example, according to the National Election Commission of Korea, only a few official party members pay the party membership fee.¹⁰ In 2001, the GNP, the biggest party in the National Assembly and

⁹ ‘Special topic on political party reform’, *Dong-A Daily Newspaper*, 7 January 2003.

¹⁰ Illegal campaign activities explain one of reasons why political parties produced many ‘factitious’ members. According to the Election Act in Korea, candidates can contact own their

major opposition party, has approximately only thirteen thousand members who pay fees out of approximately 2.7 million official members. The ruling MDP has only approximately ten thousand 'actual' members out of a total of 1.8 million official members. It is clear that the number of party members is exaggerated when the ULD party membership is considered. There are more than 1.3 million ULD party members officially registered in Korea out of a total electorate of 24 million. This membership statistic appears exaggerated considering the number of ULD party identifiers in public polls is now only about 1 or 2 per cent of valid respondents (see Table 5.2).

Table 5. 2 Numbers of Party Membership, 2001

	A	B	C
Grand National Party	2,684,307	13,288	0.50%
Millennium Democratic Party	1,824,248	10,453	0.57%
United Liberal Democrats	1,364,735	530	0.04%
Democratic Labour Party	10,314	6,552	63.53%

Source: The National Election Commission. Copied from *Dong-A Daily Newspaper*, 7 January 2003.

Keys: A = Numbers of registered members; B = Numbers of members who pay partisan fee; and C = proportion of B in A.

Lack of Ideological Differences between Political Parties

Finally, most political parties are indistinguishable from each other in terms of policy and party platform. Many political parties are formed hastily before elections, and in many cases, they copy each other's policies. Politicians assume that voters are less affected by policies or election pledges when making their voting decision, and voters also assume that policies or pledges articulated by every major party are not distinctive or even meaningless.

Old Party Affiliations in the New Democracy

The institutional underdevelopment of political parties does not confirm that party identification does not exist in Korea. The electorate may find it difficult to develop a long-term party affiliation due to party system instability and the institutional

party members without restrictions, but are strictly regulated in contacting non-party members during the election campaigns. For example, small group indoor meetings for election campaigns are absolutely restricted during the election campaign period because candidates sometimes illegally give money and provide food to voters in the meetings. In a sense, the '*Eatanswill Election*' of Charles Dickens has existed in Korea and so the Korean Election Act restricts various types of campaign activities. Therefore, political parties often recruit new party members in order to avoid these legal restrictions in campaigns. In other words, many new official party members

underdevelopment of the political parties, but the electorate may adjust to these unique circumstances and develop a certain form of party affiliation.

The Legacy of Old Party Politics

First, Korea is a new democracy, but party politics has a history of about 40 years before the transition to democracy in 1987. During the 1950s, party politics was established in Korea although it was barely developed. Many political parties were established immediately after the founding of the new independent nation-state in 1948, but they were nothing more than transitional entities or cliques. Moreover, in the early period of the new state, the Korean electorate did not recognise the value of party politics or the importance of political parties in a representative democracy. For example, during the post-liberation years, most voters were very sceptical to political parties. In the first and the second parliamentary election of 1948 and 1950, only 13.5 per cent and 12.8 per cent of the voter perceived that political parties are a necessary institution for a representative democracy. However, this figure increased markedly later. Indeed, in the late 1960s, more than three out of four Korean voters (76.1 per cent) considered political parties essential.¹¹

This perception was reflected in election results. During the first decade of the new independent government, apart from the election of 1958, independent candidates took the biggest share of votes in every parliamentary election. Indeed, as shown in Table 5.3, independent candidates had approximately 38 per cent of votes in the first parliamentary election of 1948, approximately 63 per cent in 1950, approximately 48 per cent in 1954, approximately 22 per cent in 1958, and approximately 49 per cent and 47 per cent in 1960.¹²

However, from the late 1950s, few parties had established themselves in voters' minds, even though so many parties had formed and dissolved. Under the military-backed authoritarian regimes from the 1960s, Korean politics had rapidly become a bi-party political system with a dominant ruling party and a major opposition party. Korean voters also mainly fell into two camps: pro-authoritarian ruling party and pro-democracy opposition party. As shown in results of presidential elections, most Korean voters were aligned with the two major parties. As shown in Table 5.4, in each of the three direct

are mobilised and join a political party without strongly supporting it.

¹¹ Il-mun Cho and Kyung-woo Yun, 'Popular Perception of Political Parties', in C. I. Eugene Kim and Young Whan Kihl, eds, *Party Politics and Elections in Korea* (Silver Spring: The Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1976), pp. 84-94, at p. 85.

¹² This trend was not continued in the 1960s because a new constitution under the military-backed authoritarian regime prevented independents from running for the presidency or membership of

presidential elections --- in 1963, in 1967, and in 1971 --- under the authoritarian regime, the two major parties had more than 90 per cent share of the votes.

Table 5. 3 Share of Votes by Independent Candidates in Parliamentary Elections, 1948-1971

	INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES	THE 1ST PARTY	THE 2ND PARTY
1948	38.0%	24.6%	12.7%
1950	62.9%	9.8%	9.7%
1954	47.9%	36.8%	7.9%
1958	21.5%	42.1%	34.2%
1960	49.3%	39.0%	5.9%
	46.8%	41.7%	6.0%

Source: Calculated from election statistics provided by the National Election Commission.

Note: In 1960, the National Assembly composed of the two Houses, which was first also last time in Korean political history. In this table, the first row of 1960 is about the Upper House and the second row of 1960 is about the Low House.

Table 5. 4 Share of the Vote by Major Parties in Direct Presidential Elections, 1948-2002

	THE 1ST PARTY (A)	THE 2ND PARTY (B)	THE 3RD PARTY	(A) + (B)
1952	74.6%	0.0%	0.0%	74.6%
1956	70.0%	0.0%	0.0%	70.0%
1960	100%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
1963	46.6%	45.1%	4.5%	91.7%
1967	51.4%	40.9%	2.4%	92.3%
1971	53.2%	45.3%	1.0%	98.5%
1987	36.6%	28.0%	27.0%	64.6%
1992	42.0%	33.8%	16.3%	75.8%
1997	40.3%	38.7%	19.2%	79.0%
2002	48.9%	46.6%	3.9%	95.5%

Source: Calculated from election statistics provided by the National Election Commission.

Notes: In 1952, there was only one party candidate. Indeed, other competitors in the election were independent candidates. In 1956 and 1960, a major opposition party candidate suddenly died during the election campaign. From 1972 to 1986, there was no direct presidential election under military-backed authoritarian regimes. In 1997, there was a power transition from one party to other party, which was first time in Korean presidential elections.

The legacy of authoritarian-era party politics has continued after the transition to democracy in 1987. In 1987, Korean voters quickly developed affiliations to the main three political parties and this quick partisan alignment was possible due to the legacy of party politics before the transition to democracy in 1987. While voters were mainly divided into the pro-authoritarian government voters and the pro-democracy voters under the authoritarian regimes before 1987, pro-democracy voters were realigned in new democracy. Two prominent democratic leaders, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young Sam, previously banned from political activity, were allowed to return to the political world in 1987. Pro-democratic Korean voters now supported either the Peace Democratic Party led

by Kim Dae-jung or the Reunification Democratic Party led by Kim Young Sam. Meanwhile, voters who had supported the ruling authoritarian party under the past authoritarian regimes continually supported the ruling Democratic Justice Party.

In the new democracy, the party system again has evolved into a bi-party system. In the 1988 parliamentary election, the three major parties and one minor party divided the National Assembly seats. In 1992 parliamentary election, the two major parties and one minor party held most of the National Assembly seats. In the parliamentary election of 1996, two large parties and one smaller party became 'parliamentary parties', which formed negotiation groups in the National Assembly.¹³ However, in the 2002 parliamentary election, two major parties took most seats in the National Assembly (see Table 5.5). Also, the results of presidential elections have produced the same pattern. In the 1987 presidential election, the candidates of the three major parties and one minor party competed for the presidency. In the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections, two major parties and one minor party were the main competitors. In 2002 presidential election, two major parties were involved in the competition (see Table 5.4). In conclusion, although many parties have been formed and dissolved in the new democracy, only a few have been successful in establishing themselves in voters' minds.

Table 5.5 Share of the Votes by Major Parties in Parliamentary Elections, 1987-2002

	THE 1 ST PARTY (A)	THE 2 ND PARTY (B)	THE 3 RD PARTY	(A) + (B)	(A)+(B)+(C)
1988	34.0%	23.8%	19.3%	57.8%	77.1%
1992	38.5%	29.2%	17.4%	67.7%	85.1%
1996	34.5%	25.3%	16.2%	59.8%	76.0%
2000	39.0%	35.9%	9.8%	74.9%	84.7%

Source: Calculated from election statistics provided by the National Election Commission.

The Historical Lineage of Political Parties

Second, the historical lineage and continuities of the political parties should be recognised, even though 'meeting and parting' of political parties is an important feature of Korean politics. While names and components of political parties in Korea have changed repeatedly over time, the two major competitors in party politics have maintained their basic forms and their 'historical lineages' have been continued.

As shown in Figure 5.1, the incumbent ruling party, the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP), has developed from the Peace Democratic Party (PDP) formed by Kim

¹³ According to National Assembly Act, the minimum number of seats for a negotiation group is 20 seats, and only representatives of negotiation groups, floor leaders, are involved in the management of various activities at the National Assembly.

Dae-jung in 1987. Even the MDP acknowledges its historical relationship with the pro-democracy opposition parties existing before 1987. For example, former President Kim Dae-jung argued that the historical lineage of the MDP should trace back to the Democratic Party led by Chough Pyung Ok under President Rhee's autocracy in 1950s.¹⁴ At the same time, the present major opposition party, the Grand National Party (GNP), has its origin in the Democratic Justice Party (DJP), which was formed under the military-backed authoritarian regime in 1981. These two major parties have maintained their central place in party politics for the last fifteen years after the democratic transition in 1987, although they sometimes separated and annexed small parties, or sometimes merely changed their names.


The Continuity of Political Parties in terms of Ideology: 'Party Families'

Third, the MDP and the GNP have maintained not only their key party members, but also most of their party platforms. The MDP has adopted the PDP's party platform and policies, and is considered more liberal and reformist. On the other hand, the GNP, the descendent of the authoritarian party, has maintained its more conservative party platform without critical changes. The MDP and its predecessor parties have emphasised a peaceful relationship between the two Koreas and an 'engagement policy' toward North Korea, while the authoritarian ruling parties have stressed military build-up and have preferred a 'containment policy' toward North Korea. Also, the MDP and historical opposition parties have demanded economic justice and a balanced economic development between big and small business, while the authoritarian parties have always promoted economic growth regardless of inequalities of distribution and have pursued an industrial policy favouring big companies.

In Figure 5.1, political parties are placed in terms of the ideological spectrum of the liberal and the conservative or the left and the right. For example, the United Liberal Democrats (ULD), which is the third party in the present party system, is considered and views itself as the most conservative party in the party system. The conservative politician, Kim Jong-pil, formed and led the ULD. He was the right hand man of dictator Park Chung Hee, and also formed Korean Democratic Republican Party (KDRP), another a conservative party in 1987.

¹⁴ Former president Kim Dae-jung articulated that "I think that the Democratic Party has been continued by leaderships of Shin Ik-Hee, Chough Pyung Ok, Park Soon-chun, and Chung Il-hyeong and has devoted itself and has contributed to democracy in Korea". See *Hanguk daily newspaper*, 12 June 2003, and also various newspapers on same day.

Figure 5. 1 The Evolution of Major Political Parties in Korea, 1987-2002



Source: Formulated based upon political party registry records of the National Election Commission.

Keys: P= presidential election; G = Parliamentary election; L = local election; PDP = Peace Democratic Party; RDP = Reunification Democratic Party; DJP = Democratic Justice Party; NDRP = New Democratic Republican Party; DP = Democratic Party; DLP = Democratic Liberal Party; UNP = Unification National Party; ULD = United Liberal Democrats; NCNP = National Congress for New Politics; UDP = United Democratic Party; NKP = New Korea Party; NPP = New Party for People; GNP = Grand National Party; and MDP = Millennium Democratic Party.

The electorate can accurately recognise the relative positions of each political party on the ideological spectrum. According to surveys, Korean voters consistently locate the major political parties in roughly the same place in the ideological spectrum of the left and the right. For example, as shown in Table 5.6, in the 1987 presidential election, voters identified the DJP, the authoritarian ruling party, as the most conservative party, while they recognised the PDP led by Kim Dae-jung as the most progressive party. The RDP led by Kim Young Sam was in the middle of these two parties.¹⁵

Table 5.6 Voters' Perception of Ideological Characteristics of Political Parties, 1987

	GENDER		AGE			EDUCATION		
	Men	Women	20s	30s	40s	Middle school	High school	University
More Conservative								
DJP	44.1	44.5	42.0	37.2	39.1	37.3	46.3	40.3
PDP	8.1	12.5	8.9	15.2	11.6	14.4	9.5	6.7
RDP	20.3	17.3	19.8	23.4	26.8	22.9	17.4	23.9
Other	27.5	25.7	29.3	24.2	22.5	25.4	26.8	29.1
Total (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
More Progressive								
DJP	7.4	13.3	7.5	12.7	21.7	16.8	9.0	6.6
PDP	55.8	52.3	57.3	42.7	44.8	49.6	53.5	60.3
RDP	27.5	27.8	26.4	33.1	26.6	27.2	28.9	23.3
Other	9.3	6.6	8.8	11.5	6.9	6.4	8.6	9.8
Total (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Copied from Jong-min Hyeon, 'Seongeoinui jaepyeonseonggwa tpyo' (Electoral realignment and vote), *Hangukjeongchihakhoebo* (Korean Political Science Review), 23 (1990), 209-26, p. 217.

Note: Sample size of the panel survey was 1,500.

In 2002, a survey also showed the same pattern, though party names has changed since 1987. Voters identified the MDP as the most progressive party and considered the GNP to be a relatively conservative party. For example, in a survey conducted by a major daily newspaper, voters perceived the ruling MDP is more progressive compared to the GNP. In an 11-point scale from zero to ten (0 = strong progressive, 10 = strong conservative), the MDP was placed at 4.7 with the GNP at 6.9.¹⁶ Also, the ideological positions of members of each political party fit this pattern. For example, in a survey conducted by a major daily newspaper, among members of the National Assembly, members of the ruling MDP were more liberal or progressive compared to members of the opposition GNP in terms of policy preference.¹⁷ In an 11-point scale from zero to ten (where zero means a strong progressive and ten means a strong conservative), members

¹⁵ Jong-min Hyeon, 'Seongeoinui jaepyeonseonggwa tpyo' (Electoral realignment and vote), p.218.

¹⁶ *Dong-A Daily Newspaper*, 2 April 2003.

¹⁷ *Choongang Daily Newspaper*, 23 February 2002.

of the MDP averaged 3.7, while the average score for members of the GNP was 5.3. Indeed, there was a quite distinct difference between the two major parties in terms of ideological position of the Assembly members measured by policy preferences. In conclusion, differences between the major parties existed and the electorate recognised the differences despite the widespread understanding in Korean politics that ideological distinctions between the parties are minimal.

Voter's Perception of the Continuity of Political Parties

As a result of the continuity in the major political parties, the Korean electorate has been able to develop party identification, despite the frequent changes within the parties. Korean electors can recognise and distinguish between the major political parties, even though they have often changed their names and forms. Korean voters may confuse the new names of the parties, but can identify the new parties by their leaders. For example, in 2000, the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP) was renamed the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) in order to mitigate its negative public image in the south-east region, *Gyeongsang*. However, it failed because voters in the region correctly identified the MDP as the new name of the former NCNP. Some voters even confused the NCNP with the old party name, such as the PDP or the DP, but they still remembered the leader of the parties, Kim Dae-jung.

Furthermore, most party supporters have transferred their loyalty to the new parties when the two major parties have changed their names and forms. For example, most of electorate in the south-west region of Korea have supported the PDP, the DP, the NCNP, and the MDP in elections during the last 15 years. On the other hand, voters in south-east region have continually shown their loyalty to the GNP, the NKP, the DLP, and the DJP in each election.

Qualitative data generally confirmed that voters are able to recognise the identity of each major political party regardless of alterations in name and its form. Interviewees often understood the lineage of the major political parties when answering the question of how long they maintained their party attachment. For example, "I have continually identified with the political party [the Millennium Democratic Party] since the last presidential election five years ago" (I-204).¹⁸ "Since I preferred Mr. Kim Dae-jung in the [1997] presidential election, I have identified with the party [MDP]" (I-207). "I have not felt affiliation to the party [GNP] for very long. About 10 years ago, I suddenly changed

¹⁸ She began to identify herself with the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP), and maintained her party attachment even though the party changed its name and its form to the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) in 2000.

my thinking to the politics, and shifted from candidate-centred thinking to party-centred thinking” (I-213).¹⁹ Therefore, although the conditions of the ‘meeting and parting’ and institutional underdevelopment of political party may confuse voters and make it difficult for them to develop party affiliation, they can nevertheless develop a certain form of party identification.

2. The Main Features and Limits of Party Identification in Korea

Although Korean voters have been able to develop party identification in very unstable party politics, this does not mean that the concept in the new democracy is exactly equivalent to that in advanced democracies where partisanship has developed under a stable party system over a period of several decades. It is expected that party identification in the new democracy is somewhat different from party identification in advanced democracies because of Korea’s unique political culture. This will be examined through a discussion of the main features of party affiliation in Korea.

Instability of Party Affiliation

A key feature of party identification, as an enduring predisposition, is its long-term stability. For example, in *The American Voter*, a redistribution of party identification was not feasible for several years.²⁰ Unlike party affiliation in mature democracies where the party system is very stable, party identification in the new democracy is relatively unstable even within a relatively short time period. The level of party identification in Korea has often changed depending upon political affairs during a relatively short-period time.

As shown in Table 5.7, the level of affiliation to each political party rose and fell during the final six months of 1997. The ruling NKP/GNP experienced a great change in the level of party identification, while the level of the major opposition NCNP party identification was relatively stable. During six months, the highest level of the GNP party identification was 31.3 per cent on 21 July 1997 and the lowest was 14.9 per cent on 25 October 1997. Table 5.8 shows the redistribution of party identification during 2002. In this year, the level of the major opposition GNP party identification was relatively stable,

¹⁹ He assumed a historical link between the GNP and its old form, and ignored the fact that the GNP is only five years old.

²⁰ The distribution of party identification in 1952 was almost identical to that in 1958. Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, p.124.

but the level of the ruling MDP party identification frequently fluctuated. During the election year, the highest level of the MDP party identification was 29.7 per cent on 23 March 2002 and the lowest level was 16.4 per cent on 2 November 2002.

Table 5. 7 Party Identification in Presidential Election, 1997

DATE	N	NKP/GNP	NCNP	ULD	UDP	NPP	NON
14-Jun-97	missing	22.9%	23.7%	10.0%	4.4%		31.7%
21-Jul-97	1580	31.3%	21.8%	7.9%	5.6%		32.7%
31-Jul-97	1605	29.3%	23.6%	9.7%	4.4%		32.8%
13-Aug-97	1012	23.5%	26.0%	9.2%	6.6%		34.3%
17-Sep-97	1033	17.6%	23.8%	5.1%	8.2%		44.7%
27-Sep-97	1555	20.7%	27.1%	6.0%	5.0%		39.2%
25-Oct-97	2106	14.9%	28.9%	3.8%	3.8%	15.7%	32.7%
4-Nov-97	1050	15.2%	26.7%	2.7%	3.0%	17.9%	34.7%
8-Nov-97	1030	18.1%	29.0%	2.7%	1.8%	13.8%	34.4%
15-Nov-97	1039	19.6%	26.2%	2.7%	2.3%	12.2%	36.5%
20-Nov-97	5260	22.6%	25.7%	1.3%		10.2%	39.9%
29-Nov-97	1212	22.1%	26.4%	1.6%		8.3%	41.4%
2-Dec-97	1580	23.0%	26.3%	1.5%		11.8%	37.3%
3-Dec-97	3151	22.8%	26.6%	2.2%		11.0%	37.1%
6-Dec-97	1232	17.9%	24.4%	1.5%		10.0%	45.9%
8-Dec-97	1536	21.6%	29.1%	1.1%		12.1%	35.9%
10-Dec-97	1026	19.8%	28.0%	2.2%		12.6%	36.9%
13-Dec-97	2603	23.4%	27.2%	1.0%		9.4%	38.8%
15-Dec-97	4046	23.6%	26.2%	1.4%		12.6%	35.8%
17-Dec-97	2210	25.6%	28.7%	1.0%		12.5%	32.0%
18-Dec-97	2500	25.6%	31.2%	0.5%		11.9%	30.2%
19-Dec-97	1524	26.0%	30.4%	1.8%		13.3%	28.2%

Data: Gallup Korea, various surveys in 1997.

Keys: N = sample size; NKP/GNP = New Korea Party and the Grand National Party later; NCNP = National Congress for New Politics; ULD = United Liberal Democrats; UDP = United Democratic Party; NPP = New Party for People; and NON = non-identifiers.

Notes: The following question is used in measuring party identification: indeed, 'Which political party do you support?'

Non-identifiers includes 'no answer' or 'don't know' in surveys.

The proportion of 'no answer' and 'don't know' is expected about 5 per cent of total respondents. In the surveys of 21st July, 31st July, 13th August, and 19th December the proportions of 'no answer' and 'don't know' were 8.9 per cent, 5.6 per cent, 5.6 per cent, and 4.7 per cent, respectively.

Table 5.8 Party Identification (%) in Presidential Election, 2002

DATE	N	GNP	MDP	ULD	DLP	NU21	OTHER	NON
22-12-2001	3157	33.0	23.0	1.8			1.7	40.5
27-Feb-02	1042	32.1	22.7	2.5			1.9	40.7
2-Mar-02	1053	31.5	27.7	1.7	0.0		1.6	37.4
23-Mar-02	1597	28.2	29.7	1.7			2.4	38.0
25-Apr-02	1023	30.6	28.2	1.3	1.9		1.3	36.9
1-May-02	1053	31.5	27.7	1.7	0.0		1.6	37.4
1-Jun-02	1010	30.8	24.2	1.1	1.3		1.9	40.9
6-Jul-02	1011	36.4	20.2	1.4	3.4		1.2	37.4
17-Aug-02	1030	35.9	20.1	0.8	4.9		1.4	36.8
22-Sep-02	1054	32.9	20.1	1.4	4.0		2.0	39.5
30-Sep-02	1056	33.5	21.9	1.7	4.2		2.0	36.7
19-Oct-02	1040	33.9	21.6	1.2	4.5		1.6	37.3
19-Oct-02	1040	30.6	14.5	0.6	4.1	20.2	0.4	29.4
2-Nov-02	1040	32.5	16.4	1.2	3.6	9.3	0.7	36.4
16-Nov-02	2010	34.2	19.5	1.1	4.8	7.7	0.4	32.2
02-Dec-03	2072	35.9	27.7	0.4	4.7	3.6	0.3	27.4
05-Dec-02	2138	35.4	26.0	0.7	6.2	3.2	0.4	28.2
09-Dec-02	2030	34.6	28.2	1.1	7.8	5.2	0.5	22.7
12-Dec-02	2164	35.8	26.6	1.2	6.9	3.4	0.3	25.8
15-Dec-02	2055	34.1	27.4	0.7	9.5	3.7	0.2	24.3
16-Dec-02	2055	36.1	28.0	0.4	8.1	3.1	0.1	24.14
17-Dec-02	2150	33.5	27.8	1.3	7.5	3.1	0.3	26.5
18-Dec-02	2055	38.9	29.1	0.9	7.4	2.6	0.3	20.7

Data: Gallup Korea, various surveys in 2002.

Keys: N = sample size; GNP = Grand National Party; MDP = Millennium Democratic Party; ULD = United Liberal Democrats; DLP = Democratic Labour Party; NU21 = National Unity 21; and NON = non-identifiers.

Notes: The following question is used in measuring party identification: 'Which political party do you support?'

Independents include 'no answer' and 'do not know' in the surveys.

The second row of 19th October is about the percentage of party identification when Chung Mong-joon's expected (at this stage as yet unformed) new party (NU21) was included in the surveys.

Measurement Errors?

Considering the fluctuations in the level of party identification in Korea within a relatively short-period time, the limits of the data or possible measurement errors should be discussed. First, most of the data used in Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 came from relatively small sized samples. The sample sizes of most surveys are about 1000, and the estimated standard error of these surveys is plus and minus 3 per cent point in the true percentage with 95% confident interval. Therefore, although there was a clear change in the level of party identification during the election year, fluctuations in the level of party identification within a short-period time may be a relatively minor concern.

Another possible problem related to the limits of the data is the question used in

measuring party identification. The dataset is based on a simple question — “Which political party do you support (*jijihaneun jeongdang*)?” The questionnaire does not ask specifically about a long-term predisposition, and the questionnaire may fail to distinguish between party identification as a long-term political attitude and party preference a short-term attitude immediately prior to an election. In British electoral studies, it has been argued that the level of party identification is different depending upon the specific question used.²¹ In Korean electoral studies, party identification has often been measured, but there is no single established question to measure party identification. The question used to measure party identification is quite different depending upon surveys or researchers. There is even no consistency in the question used by the group of leading academic researchers in Korea. For example, the data generated and accumulated by the Korean Social Science Data Center are also based on inconsistent questions. They used the question — “Which political party do you feel close to (*ggapge neugineun jeongdang*)?” — in 1992, but they used different wording — “Which political party do you prefer (*joahaneun jeongdang*) in general?” — in 1997 and in 2002. In general, professional pollsters in social research widely use the question — “Which political party do you support (*jijihaneun jeongdang*)?” — in measuring party identification of Korean electorate, and academic researchers have also used the same question.²² They are all questions with some merit, but they have not been designed in accordance with the Michigan model. The validity of these questions still is questionable, despite their wide use in Korea. Therefore, an explanation of change in party identification within a relatively short-term period is more difficult due to this potential measurement problem.

Strength of Party Identification

Despite the potential problems of measurement errors, several key features of party identification in Korea should be noted in view of the changes in the level of party

²¹ John Bartle, ‘The Measurement of Party Identification in Britain: Where Do We Stand Now?’, in Jonathan Tonge et al., eds, *British Elections and Parties Review*, vol. 11 (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 9-22.

²² Academic researchers also often used a same question in measuring party identification. For example, in a survey conducted by a major research institute in Korea, the Sejong Institute, party identification is measured by a same question — i.e., ‘Do you have any political party you support?’ See the Sejong Institute, ed., *Je sipodae chongseon bunseok* (Analyses of the 15th general election) (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1996); and especially, Lee Nae-young, ‘*Je sipodae chongseonui tupyohaengtae byeonhwa*’ (Changes in electoral behaviour in the 15th general election), pp. 95-128. Another researcher also used a similar question — i.e., ‘Which party do you think speaks for you?’ — in measuring party identification. See Aie-Rie Lee and Yong U. Glasure, ‘Party Identifiers in South Korea: Differences in Issue Orientations’, *Asian Survey*, 35: 4 (1995), 367-76.

identification during election year. First, the instability of party identification suggests that the strength of party identification is so weak that party identification is easily affected by short-term political affairs. We assume that the strong identifiers are relatively constant in their party attachment and that the weak identifiers are relatively sensitive to short-term political events. It is assumed that the strength of party identification in Korea is relatively weak compared to a mature democracy. However, it is difficult to examine the strength of party identification due to the lack of appropriate data. It is also not possible to examine whether the drifters or changeable party identifiers are usually weak party identifiers.²³

Although there are limits on analysis based on aggregated data, we may assume the approximate number of the strong party identifiers relatively less affected by short-term political affairs and the number of weak party identifiers who easily change their partisanship as a consequence of short-term factors. Although the level of party identification for the two major parties varied during the election year, the level of party identification for the GNP did not fall below 28.2% with that of the MDP not falling below 14.5%. It is assumed that the majority of party identifiers maintained their party attachment under unfavourable political conditions, even though some party identifiers abandoned their partisanship according to changes in political conditions.

Before the beginning of the official election campaign in 1997, the level of party identification of the GNP fluctuated. The lowest level was about 15 per cent on the end of October, while average level of party identification of GNP during the period was about 21 per cent and the highest level was about 31 per cent with about a 16 per cent gap between the highest level and the lowest level. This wide gap may be interpreted as resulting from the strength of individual party identification. We may assume that half of GNP party identifiers had a strong party attachment, while a half of them were willing to give this up depending upon political conditions. In 2002, the MDP also experienced a great change in the level of party identification. The lowest level was 16.4 per cent in early November and the highest level was 29.7 per cent, while the average level of party identification with the MDP was about 23 per cent with the gap between the highest level and the lowest level about 13 per cent. Again, we may assume that a half of party identifiers of the MDP never changed their party affiliation even though the party faced to a serious crisis, while half of party identifiers were willing to abandon their party identification under unfavourable political conditions.

In sum, only a half of party identifiers at most are strong party identifiers who have an enduring affiliation immune from short-term effects. Also, when we assume that the

²³ In order to measure changes in individual party identification, a multi-wave panel survey is

average level is the true level of party identification, among the weak party identifiers who gave up their party affiliations, half of them were short-term supporters for the political parties in the election rather than party identifiers with a long-term affiliation. It might be guessed that about 5-6 per cent point of party identifiers are those who express short-term party preferences when the level of party identification reaches its highest level — i.e., 31.3 per cent of the GNP in 1997 and 29.7 per cent of the MDP in 2002.

Party Identification and Short-term Political Affairs

Second, positive or negative political issues and events directly related to the political parties cause changes in the level of party identification. Political affairs mainly related to the candidates have relatively less influence on the level of party identification. For parties not experiencing a serious internal party conflict, the level of party identification was relatively stable during election year. For example, party identification for the NCNP was relatively stable about 25 per cent before December in 1997. In 2002, party identification with the GNP also was relatively stable at about 32-33 per cent.

On the other hand, those political parties having a serious setback, such as internal conflict or even the withdrawal of a faction from the party, experienced great decreases in identification. For example, in 1997, the NKP/GNP was involved in an internal party conflict, and Rhee In-je left the party in order to form a new party to run for the presidency by himself. During this internal conflict, some NKP/GNP party identifiers drifted to the new party following Rhee In-je or became non-identifiers. During this conflict, the level of party identification of the NKP/GNP dropped to 15.2 per cent, but soon recovered to the previous level, i.e. about 21-22 per cent, when the official election campaign started.

In 2002, the level of MDP party identification stayed quite stable at 22-23 per cent, although the level of party identification reached to 29-30 per cent for a while after the presidential primary. However, when the MDP experienced a serious internal party conflict, party identification fell to about 16-17 per cent. When the internal conflict was over and the MDP announced an electoral coalition with the strong candidate Chung Mong-joon on 25 November 2002, the level of the MDP party identification rose to higher than the usual level. Thus when a party has a serious problem, identification with it in the electorate was about 5-6 per cent lower than its average level.

Unlike negative political events directly related to the parties, political issues or scandals related to the candidates have less impact on the levels of party identification.

For example, in 1997, Kim Dae-jung was embroiled in a series of negative events such as a formation of illegal fund, but the level of the MDP party identification was relatively stable. In 2002, the popularity of Lee Hoi Chang fell rapidly due to his family's luxurious houses and a suspicion about his illegal involvement in his two sons' exemptions from national military duty. Despite this, the level of GNP party identification was relatively stable. Therefore, the popularity of individual candidates does not seem to greatly affect the level of party identification.

However, positive political events related to both the parties and the candidates bring about an increase in the level of party identification. If a candidate was officially nominated by the parties after a free intra-party competition, the candidate's popularity and the level of party identification increased. For example, in 1997, the level of the NKP/GNP party identification increased rapidly and reached its highest level at 31.3 per cent. In 2002, the MDP also experienced the same pattern of increase at the end of the presidential primary, which was introduced for first time in Korean political history. The level of MDP party identification jumped to about 28-29 per cent from about 22-23 per cent. However, this increase of party identification was not sustained. When candidates have faced unfavourable political issues and events, the level of party identification swiftly decreased to the previous level. Therefore, an increase of a candidate's popularity within a short-period time causes an increase in party identification, but this returns to the previous level when the bubble of the candidate popularity bursts.

The Flow of Party Identification

Third, regarding increases or decreases in the level of party identification, the direction of change of party identification must be discussed. In order to examine the direction of redistribution of party identification, panel survey data is required, but such data is not available. Although aggregate data can only show directions of change in party identification to a limited extent, changes in the level of non-party identification provide a hint as to the direction of change.

It is assumed here that party identifiers may give up their affiliation to a political party depending upon political conditions, but usually become non-party identifiers and later return to the same political party rather than move to another political party. This assumption is well-supported by the fact that many voters have both positive feelings to a party and negative feelings to another party. This would suggest that party identifiers are hardly likely to move to another party they previously had negative feelings about. Also, Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 shows that a decrease of the level of party identification in one political party is not related to an increase in the level of party identification for another

party. For example, in 1997, the shifts in the level of party identification with the GNP were closely related to changes in the level of non-party identification.

However, this argument does not explain changes in party identification when a new party is formed and attracts adherents from the existing parties. For example, in 1997, the level of party identification of the GNP decreased markedly when the NPP was formed. Although it is clear that many party identifiers of the GNP gave up their party identification when the new party was formed, it is not possible to estimate the direction of change of party identification. Some identifiers may have switched to the new party, but some of them may have become non-party identifiers.

It can be assumed that the voters who identified with the new party were mainly former non-party identifiers rather than former party identifiers of the established political parties. In 1997, when Rhee In-je withdrew from the GNP and formed the NPP, the level of party identification of the GNP decreased. As shown in Table 5.7, the decrease of non-party identifiers was bigger than the decrease of the GNP party identifiers between the survey on 27 September and the survey on 25 October in 1997. Some party identifiers who gave up their party affiliation to the NKP/KNP turned to non-identifiers rather than to the new party, while many non-party identifiers who were dissatisfied with the major parties moved to the new party.²⁴ Indeed, it is quite possible that the aggregate data actually underestimates the numbers of non-party identifiers moving to the NPP.

In 2002, a similar situation developed. In the 2002 presidential election, Chung Mong-joon suddenly received a great public supports and tried to find a way to run for the presidency. He was widely supported by younger voters who were mainly non-party identifiers and by those MDP identifiers disappointed with their own candidate, Roh Moo-hyun. On 19 October, Gallup Korea included a question about electoral supports for an expected new party, the National Unity 21. About 20 per cent of voters were willing to change their partisanship if the new party was set up (see shaded cells in Table 5.20). As shown in the difference between the distribution of party identification excluding the new party and the distribution including the new party in the survey, some GNP identifiers moved to the new party (i.e., 3 per cent), while many non-identifiers (i.e. 8 per cent) supported the new party. Also, many MDP identifiers (i.e., 7 per cent) were willing to change their party affiliation to the new party. They were generally younger voters, a group thought to identify only weakly with parties. Concerning the changes in party identification of the MDP, it is might be assumed that some MDP identifiers moved to the new party, but some also became non-party identifiers, as in 1997. However, this argument is inconclusive due to the lack of data.

²⁴ Gallup Korea believed that some NKP (later GNP) identifiers and many non-identifiers move to

From this data then, it is not expected that many voters switch from one political party to a rival major party, particularly as party identifiers of two major political parties also strongly dislike the rival political parties.²⁵ While Keith and his colleagues suggested that the weak party identifiers are the hidden party identifiers, there are a thin line between weak party identifiers and non-party identifiers.²⁶

The Revisionist Understanding of Party Identification

The instability of party identification raises questions about the quality of party identification as an enduring predisposition. This may be directly related to an incorrect measurement which fails to distinguish between party identification as a long-term enduring affiliation and party preference in a specific election as a short-term attitude. However, at the same time, instability of partisan affiliation should be understood as an important feature of party attachment in the instable Korean party system. In other words, party identification in Korea is a changeable political attitude rather than an enduring or unchangeable political predisposition as the Michigan model assumed. Changes of party identification can be understood as a part of the nature of party identification, and this conforms to an alternative conceptualisation of party identification. While the Michigan model focuses on long-term stability of party identification, a revisionist perspective suggests that party identification is evaluated based on the performance of political parties. This school of thought argues that the level of party identification changes over time, though this does not mean instant evaluations or short-term changes in the level of party identification.²⁷

Qualitative Data: Durable, but Weak Party Affiliations

In contrast to survey data, in-depth interview data suggests that party affiliation is durable and maintained without interruption, and that changes of party identification from one party to another is very unusual. Most respondents who identify with a political party revealed that they have not experienced any change in their party affiliation. Following this, the changes in the level of party identification within a relatively short-period time revealed by the quantitative data can be understood as a change between the weak party

the NPP, the new party. *Chosun Daily Newspaper*, 10 November 1997.

²⁵ Negative party identifications in Korea are discussed in the later part of this section.

²⁶ For the concept of the hidden party identifiers, see Bruce E. Keith et al., *The Myth of the Independent Voter* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

²⁷ For a revisionist understanding of the concept of party identification, see Morris P. Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* (New Haven and London: Yale University

identifiers and non-party identifiers.

However, at the same time, many party identifiers also suggested that they are able to give up their attachment to a particular political party under specific circumstances in the future. Indeed, it seems that most party identifiers were not fully satisfied with the party they attach to and that their identification is not unconditional.

Changing party affiliation based on policy preference: Party identifiers who have a rational basis for their affiliation, such as policy preferences or ideology, suggested that they would lose this identification if the party was no longer matched with their policy preference or ideology. For example, “I have supported the party because I think the party is more liberal than any other parties, but if the party is not liberal, I will be disappointed and give up my affiliation to the party” (I-207). “I am willing to change to a more progressive party if I can find one” (I-204). “Of course, I can change my affiliation to a party... I would support a new party if the party proposed better welfare polices” (I-212), “I would be unlikely to change my party affiliation, but it will be different if a new party speaks for the poor” (I-208).

In conclusion, the qualitative interview data show that party identification varies depending upon the performance of political parties. Voters do not align themselves to a particular party unconditionally. The attachment to a particular political party is not similar to religious attitudes as the Michigan model assumed.²⁸ Party identifiers examine and compare policies and the behaviour of political parties and make a change in their affiliation if the party deviates from their preferences.

Fragile party affiliation based on regionalism: Among party identifiers who were influenced by regionalism or the family, most interviewees also suggested the possibility of changing their party affiliation if a better political party was formed. This again implied that despite their attachment to a party for family or regional reasons, they were not fully satisfied with the party and were waiting for another party that can fulfil their expectations. “I can change it. If any party shares my ideas, I will change my party affiliation” (I-202). “If other party has better policies, I will give up my present affiliation” (I-206). “I may support any party which provides us with a better vision of our society” (I-214). “If president Roh runs the government well, I may change my affiliation and support his party” (I-210).

Absolute Loyalty: A few party identifiers denied any possibility of giving up their attachment to a political party. These voters had some common characteristics. They were generally old and constrained by regionalism concerning their partisanship. For example,

Press, 1981).

²⁸ Miller and Shanks compared the nature of party identification with religious affiliation. Miller and Shanks, *The New American Voter*, p. 120.

“I have never thought about it” (I-213). “I do not have any desire for it. I believe in my party” (I-205). “I will not give up my attachment to the party” (I-203). The data suggests that these party identifiers initially had an attachment to a particular party due to regionalism, and this partisanship has strengthened over time. Such identifiers conform to the image of party identifiers assumed by the Michigan model.

Party Identification and Political Leaders

Another potential problem related to the concept of party identification in new democracy is that party identification may be affiliation to a politician rather than to a political party where the party has been formed and dominated by one individual. It is possible, then, that voters identify themselves with a political party because they prefer a politician who leads the party, and that their party affiliation may change if the politician leaves the political party.

One-Man Dominated Political Parties

In the new democracy, the ‘three Kims’ --- Kim Dae-jung, Kim Young Sam, and Kim Jong-pil --- were charismatic politicians popular with Korean voters, and it is possible that the party affiliation of many voters was nothing but an expression of supports for one of the three Kims. For example, when the three Kims were released from the ban preventing them from political activity in 1987, they formed new parties which immediately gained support from a large proportion of the Korean electorate. Another example was when Kim Dae-jung, who retired from politics immediately after the failure in the 1992 presidential election, returned to politics and formed a new party, the NCNP, in 1995. Many former party identifiers of the Democratic Party moved to the NCNP following Kim Dae-jung.

Party affiliations with a new party formed just before elections may be related to the personal popularity of the individual who formed and led the party. For example, in the 2002 presidential election, approximately twenty per cent of Korean electorate identified themselves with a new party --- the National Unity 21 formed by one time leading candidate Chung Mong-joon --- even before the party had actually formed and been named (see Table 5.8, especially, figures in shaded cells). In 1997, the New Party for People formed by Rhee In-je was another example of a close relationship between party affiliation and support for an individual politician. During the election the NPP gained a respectable level of party affiliation, but the number of NPP adherents diminished soon after the election.

The Annexation of Three Political Parties and Electoral Response

However, party affiliation cannot be considered as the same as the popularity of a politician or a candidate in an election. For example, when three major parties merged and formed a giant ruling party in 1990, the level of the party affiliation of the new party did not increase greatly. Many party identifiers with former parties did not move to the new party following their preferred politicians — in this case, Kim Young Sam and Kim Jong-pil.

Changes in the level of party identification: The level of party identification before the merger of the three parties in 1990 is unknown.²⁹ Most researchers did not include party identification in measuring various political attitudes in the early period of democracy. Therefore, it is not possible to directly compare the level of party identification before the merge of three parties to the level subsequently. The level of party identification in the 1987 presidential election is unknown, but it can be assumed that the level of party identification in the early period of the new democracy was not so much higher than the level before the transition to democracy in 1987.³⁰

Although it is not possible to directly examine change in the level of party identification caused by the merger of three political parties, the low level of party identification of the merged parties suggests that an annexation of two opposition parties to the ruling DJP did not greatly increase the level of party identification with the ruling party. In a survey conducted by the press three months after the merger in 1990, the level of party identification of the new Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) was only 13.9 per cent, while the level of party identification of a remaining opposition PDP was 15.6 per cent.³¹ In other words, the level of party identification of the gigantic ruling party was still lower than the major opposition party. It is also interesting that the level of the expected new party, the Democratic Party, was 12.5 per cent in the same survey.³² This implies that

²⁹ Under the authoritarian regimes, the level of party identification was very low. In 1985, two years before the transition to democracy, only 24.3% of the voters identified themselves with a political party. Indeed, about 75.7% of the voters were non-party identifiers or did not answer. See Cheon-ju Yun, *Tupyo chamyewa jeongchibaljeon* (Vote participation and political development) (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1989), pp. 204-15.

³⁰ In the 1987 presidential elections, there was a survey on people's positive and negative feelings to political parties, though this was not a true measurement of party identification. Approximately 30 per cent of respondents have a positive feeling to each two opposition parties — the Peace Democratic Party and the Reunification Democratic Party. Only 6 per cent of respondents answered that they feel positively to the Democratic Justice Party, the authoritarian ruling party, while about 58 per cent of respondents said a negative feeling to the party. Hyeon, 'Seongeoinui jaepyeonseonggwa tupyo' (Electoral realignment and vote), pp. 219-20.

³¹ The survey was conducted through telephones, and the sample size was 1,600. *Dong-A Daily Newspaper*, 8 May 1990.

³² Some of politicians of the former RDP did not follow their boss Kim Young Sam who jointed to

many party identifiers of the former RDP did not follow Kim Young Sam and preferred some form of reconstruction or continuation of the RDP. In the same survey, 53.1 per cent of the respondents answered that they do not feel close to any party. It would seem likely that this figure included some former party identifiers of the RDP who were confused of the merger of the political parties and became non-identifiers. Another survey conducted by the same newspaper two months later showed a similar result. Here the level of party identification of the DLP, the PDP, and the DP was 11.4 per cent, 16.0 per cent, and 13.5 per cent, respectively, while the level of non-identifiers was 59.1 per cent.³³

In summary, it seems that there was little change in the distribution of partisanship resulting from the merger of the three political parties in 1990, though this analysis is not conclusive due to the lack of data. Many party identifiers of the RDP and the NDRP did not follow their leader's decision to merge with the ruling party. This would therefore suggest that party affiliation is not same with a mere support for a popular political leader.

Outcome of the following election: This argument is also confirmed by election results. It is true that election results do not directly indicate the level of party affiliation, but it is possible to estimate an increase or decrease of the level of party identification based upon election results because a party's share of votes in any election is roughly a combination of the votes of loyal partisans and the votes of non-party identifiers influenced by short-term factors. If there is a great change from one election to the next, we would expect significant change in party affiliations. This has been borne out in British elections. In British elections, there is a positive relation between an increase in the share of the vote and an increase of the level of party identification.³⁴ We would therefore expect a redistribution of party identification to accompany the redistribution of the vote at the same election.

According to Korean election results in 1988 and in 1992, it appears that the merger of the three major parties and the birth of a giant ruling party in 1990 did not bring about a merger of their electorates. In 1987 and 1988, the three parties, which participated in the merger of 1990, together took 72.7 per cent and 73.4 per cent share of the vote, respectively. However, in the two elections in 1992, the merged ruling party gained only 42.0 per cent and 38.5 per cent of votes (see Table 5.9). Indeed, there was no mathematical increase of support for the merged party in elections. The election result suggests that some of the voters followed the political decision of party leaders, but most

the formation of the DLP, and tried to rebuild the RDP — the party's provisional new name was the Democratic Party.

³³ *Dong-A Daily Newspaper*, 16 July 1990.

³⁴ Ivor Crewe and Katarina Thomson, 'Party Loyalties: Dealignment or Realignment?', in Geoffrey Evans and Pippa Norris, eds, *Critical Elections: British Parties and Voters in Long-term Perspective* (London: Sage, 1999), pp. 64-86.

of them defected from the party leaders and instead supported either the new third party, the UNP, or the remaining major opposition party. Therefore, it is not true that party identification or party affiliation was merely based on loyalty to a political leader when most partisans did not actually follow their political leader's decision.

Table 5.9 Election Results before and after a Merger of the Ruling Party in 1990

	BEFORE THE MERGER		AFTER THE MERGER	
Presidential Election (1987 and 1992)	DJP	36.6%	DLP	42.0%
	RDP	28.0%		
	NDRP	8.1%		
	PDP	27.0%	DP	33.8%
	Other/independents	0.2%	Other/independents	24.3%
Parliamentary election (1988 and 1992)	DJP	34.0%	DLP	38.5%
	RDP	23.8%		
	NDRP	15.6%		
	PDP	19.3%	DP	29.2%
	Other/independents	7.3%	Other/independents	32.3%

Source: Calculated from election statistics provided by the National Election Commission.

Key: DJP = Democratic Justice Party; RDP = Reunification Democratic Party; NDRP = New Democratic Republican Party; PDP = Peace Democratic Party; DLP = Democratic Liberal Party; and DP = Democratic Party.

Party Identification without Dominant Political Leaders

Furthermore, the period of the 'three Kims' in politics was over, but party affiliations formed during the period of the two Kims continued. Party leadership was handed over to a new generation by those who had created the parties. Kim Young Sam withdrew from the GNP in 1997 and retired from politics in early of 1998, and Kim Dae-jung did take exactly same steps five years later, but party identifiers of both the GNP and the MDP maintained their loyalties despite the departure of their beloved. Again this demonstrates that party affiliation with the two major parties in the new democracy is different from mere loyalty to political leaders. Some voters may develop party affiliation because of charismatic leaders, but the affiliation is maintained even when the leaders no longer present in the parties and party affiliation is consolidated.

Qualitative Data: Attachment to Political Parties rather than Politicians

Qualitative data generally confirmed the argument that party identification with a party is different from a support for a certain political leader. In answering the question of whether a withdrawal of a preferred political leader from a party would affect an

interviewee's affiliation to the party, most party identifiers said that they would maintain their partisanship to a party, even though their preferred politicians leave the party. For instance, "I feel I am a member of the party. In the party, there are several thousands members. Even if one of the members leaves the party, I cannot change my partisanship" (I-213). "I do not care about the withdrawal of a politician from the party [Democratic Labour Party]. I affiliate with the party without regard for any politicians in the party" (I-212). "I think that the political party consists of many members, and the withdrawal of a politician will not affect my party affiliation" (I-209). "I like the party due to policies rather than politicians. So, I will maintain my party identification even if a few politicians withdrew from the party" (I-208). "I support the party as a whole rather than a particular politician of the party, and the withdrawal of a politician is not a matter of consideration for me" (I-203). "A withdrawal from a party and an affiliation to another party is not rightful. I will not change my party affiliation" (I-204). A respondent was more critical, "If my preferred politician left my party, I would no longer like the politician" (I-206).

However, some interviewees suggested that they may follow a politician who left the party. They generally opposed the withdrawal of politicians from a party, but some also suggested they might consider following their preferred politician. For example, "If a politician who I like left the party, I may follow him depending upon the circumstance" (I-210). "I think that the party is working rather than the politician. I believe the party. But, I may change my thinking depending upon the reason why my preferred politician had to leave the party" (I-205).

Party Identification and Voting Preference in a Specific Election

Voters find it difficult to distinguish between party identification and voting preference in a specific election, and respondents may express their voting preference in a specific election rather than a durable party identification. Voters' party identification is thus affected by their voting preference in a specific election. For example, British researchers argue that British voters change their party identification to conform with changes in their voting preference.³⁵

Relatively Stable Party Identification and Unstable Candidate Preference

³⁵ David Butler and Donald Stokes, *Political Change in Britain* (London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 41-2. Cited from Ivor Crewe, 'Party Identification Theory and Political Change in Britain', in Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe, and Dennis Farlie, eds, *Party Identification and Beyond: Representations of Voting and Party Competition* (London: John Wiley & Sons), pp. 33-62, at p. 51.



Although some party identifiers may confuse their voting preferences with their affiliation with a political party and change of party identification is related to change of voting choice, party identification can still be distinguished from candidate preference in a specific election. For example, in the 1997 and 2002 presidential elections, the level of party identification for the two major parties was much more stable than candidate popularity, even though both party identification and candidate popularity fluctuated depending upon political issues and events during the election year (see Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3).

As discussed above, candidate factors affected the level of party identification. When the level of support for party candidate increased, the level of party identification increased as well. In 1997, when Lee Hoi Chang's popularity markedly increased, the level of the NKP/GNP party identification increased. In 2002, when the level of Roh Moo-hyun's popularity peaked just after he was nominated in the primary, the level of party identification of the MDP markedly increased. However, increased levels of party identification decreased soon after Lee or Roh lost their popularity. In this context, it is true that some proportion of party identification is related to candidate popularity. However, this fact does not suggest that party identification is generally identical with candidate popularity.

Although the level of party identification and the level of candidate popularity varied together during the election year, there is some difference in the degree of the change. The level of candidate popularity increases or decreases to a greater degree compared to the level of party identification. Moreover, the level of party identification generally remains at a certain level despite rapid falls in a candidate's popularity. This can be seen in the level of party identification of the NCNP in 1997 and the GNP in 2002. Conversely, the level of party identification reached its lowest level when the parties were involved in internal conflict rather than when candidates faced a serious personal problem. For example, the NKP/GNP in 1997 and the MDP in 2002 experienced serious internal conflicts causing the level of party identification for each party to fall to its lowest point.



It must also be noted that an increase or decrease of the level of party identification and candidate popularity do not always go together. For example, in 1997, at some points, the level of party identification of the NCNP increased when the level of the candidate popularity decreased, or vice versa. This was again evident in 1997 when Kim Dae-jung joined with Kim Jong-pil through an election coalition between the NCNP and the ULD. Consequently, Kim Dae-jung gained more popularity, but the level of party identification of the NCNP was unchanged.

Figure 5. 2 Changes in Party Affiliation and Candidate Popularity in Presidential Election, 1997



Data: Gallup Korea, various surveys in 1997.

Figure 5.3 Changes in Party Affiliation and Candidate Popularity in Presidential Election, 2002.



Data: Gallup Korea, various surveys in 2002

Because the level of party identification was relatively stable and the level of candidate popularity was relatively unstable, there was a moment when the level of party affiliation was higher than the level of candidate popularity. For example, in 2002, candidate popularities of both major parties, the GNP and the MDP, were lower than party affiliations of the parties. Indeed, the level of popularity of Lee Hoi Chang, a presidential candidate of the GNP, was 33.1 per cent and the level of party affiliation of the GNP was 35.3 per cent while 76.1 per cent of the GNP party identifiers supported Lee Hoi Chang. Also, popularity of Roh Moo-Hyun, a presidential candidate of the MDP, was 17.0 per cent and party affiliation for the MDP was 21.0 per cent, while only 50.6 per cent of the MDP party identifiers were loyal to their own party candidate.³⁶ This reverse of the level of candidate popularity and the level of party affiliation suggests that party identification is not mere support for a candidate.

The Influence of Candidate Preference on Party Identification

Although a voter's attachment to a political party is distinct from their preference for a specific candidate in a presidential election, it should be noted that candidate preferences does influence party affiliation. Qualitative data shows that a few interviewees pointed to a candidate as the sole reason why they feel close to a particular party. For example, "I do not support a candidate because I identify with a party. Instead, I support the party because I like a presidential candidate of the party" (I-211). "In the 1997 election, I voted for the present president because I thought that he was good for democracy, and I did the same thing in this election" (I-207). The same respondent, in answering a question of why they have an affiliation to a particular party, referred to the candidates of the party she felt close to.

In the in-depth interviews, many party identifiers suggested a candidate of a political party as one of the reasons why they identified with a particular party. However, in general, a candidate was not the first reason for their party affiliation, but a secondary factor. Additionally, most party identifiers who referred to a candidate as the reason why they feel close to a particular party have maintained their partisanship since developing the affiliation. For example, in answering a question of why they feel close to a particular party, many partisans mentioned regionalism, "I am from *Gyeongsang*, so regional feeling affected my party affiliation. Also, I like the candidate of the party" (I-214). "I lived in *Daegu* [a big city in *Gyeongsang* region], so I like the party. As another reason, I like Mr. Lee Hoi Chang, the presidential candidate" (I-210). "I know it is not right, but I

³⁶ *Kyeonghyang Daily Newspaper*, 7 October 2002.

am influenced by regionalism. Also, I like a politician in the party, and his old home is same as mine” (I-201). “My parents are from the *Jeolla* region... From my childhood, I heard that Mr. Kim Dae-jung was a victim of a rigged election under president Park’s rule... I think that Mr. Kim is a very able man and has done a lot of things for the transition to democracy, so I began to support him [or his party]” (I-206).

Therefore, many interviewees suggested that their voting choice had consolidated and turned into party affiliation. An election is a moment for them to think about politics and parties. They are suddenly interested in politics during elections and gain information about candidates, with the candidates influential in the development of an affiliation. Then, this partisanship is continued to the next election and support for a candidate turns into party identification.

However, although positive feelings towards a candidate may lead to party affiliation, it is wrong to overestimate the influence of candidate factor. Compared to the power of regionalism the candidate factor may be not especially influential in the direction of partisanship. Regionalism may be the initial reason for affiliation with positive feelings towards candidates developing because the politician belongs to the party and they feel close to a candidate because the politician belongs to the party. Also, in the interviews, many felt that they were not honourable because they were affected by regionalism. From this, it can be suggested that they tried to justify their affiliation to a particular party by suggesting a candidate as a secondary reason why they identified with the party.

Party Identification and Election: Effects of ‘Electoral Cycle’?

Another feature of party identification in Korea is that party affiliations are often influenced by elections. The percentage of party identifiers in the electorate increased throughout the election year and peaked on the day of election.³⁷ In addition to this increase, the levels of party identification rapidly changed between the days immediately before and after the ballot.³⁸

³⁷ In British elections, feelings about political parties grow and are strengthened during election years compared to non-election times. William L. Miller et al., *How Voters Change: The 1987 British Election Campaign in Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 4.

³⁸ A regular ‘inter-election swing’ in party popularity has been found in mature democracies. The electoral cyclical pattern consists of three stages: (1) a ‘short-lived burst’ of additional support for the winning party immediately after elections (the honeymoon effect), (2) a ‘slow erosion’ of the party’s popularity (the mid-term effect), and (3) the ‘run-up’ to the next election (the swing-back effect). Using Gallup polls conducted in each month between 1987 and 1999, a graph can be drawn to illustrate an electoral cycle in British elections. After 11 June 1987, 9 April 1992, popularity of Conservative Party increased and after 1 May 1997, popularity of Labour Party increased, while the popularity gradually declined during the mid-term period (see Figure 5.A1 in

'Swing-Back Effects'

Close to an election day party identifiers gradually increased and non-party identifiers fell in number. For instance, according to surveys by Gallup-Korea during the election year, the average level of party identification for each major party during December was roughly between 2 and 4 per cent higher than the average level of party identification before December. As shown in Table 5.10, in 2002, the average of the level of party identification for the GNP before December was 32.6 per cent while the average during December was 35.3 per cent. The average for the MDP before December was 23 per cent while the average during December was 27.6 per cent. Five years earlier during the previous presidential election, the average level of party identification for the GNP before December was 21.5 per cent while the average during December was 22.9 per cent. The average of the level of party identification for the NCNP that year before December was 25.7 per cent while the average during December was 27.8 per cent.

This change can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, during election campaigns, some non-party identifiers turn into party identifiers because they are attracted by a specific candidate. Their party affiliation may be nothing but an expression of their preference for a certain candidate, and may not be an enduring partisanship. On the other hand, it could be suggested that weak party identifiers who do not express their party affiliation before eventually revealed their own party affiliation closer to the election day.

Table 5.10 Average of Levels of Party Identification during Election Year, 1997 and 2002

		AVERAGE OF LEVELS OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION		
		January through November (A)	December (B)	(B) – (A)
<u>1997</u>	Number of surveys	12	10	
	GNP	21.5%	22.9%	1.4%
	NCNP	25.7%	27.8%	2.1%
<u>2002</u>	Number of surveys	14	8	
	GNP	32.6%	35.3%	2.7%
	NCNP	23.1%	27.6%	4.5%

Data: Gallup-Korea, various surveys in 1997 and in 2002.

Appendix). For the effects of the electoral cycle in mature democracies, See William L. Miller and T. Mackie, 'The Electoral Cycle and the Asymmetry of Government and Opposition Popularity: An Alternative Model of the Relationship between Economic Consideration and Political Popularity', *Political Studies*, 21 (1973), 263-79; C.A.E. Goodhart and R.J. Bhansali, 'Political Economy', *Political Studies*, 18 (1970), 43-106; James A. Stimson, 'Public Support for American Presidents: A Cyclical Model', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 40 (1976), 1-21; Stephanie Stray and Mick Silver, 'Government Popularity, Bi-Election and Cycles', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 36 (1983), 49-55; Richard Johnston, 'Business Cycles, Political Cycle and the Popularity of Canadian Government, 1974-1998', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 32 (1999), 499-520.

'Post-Election Euphoria'

Concerning the relationship between elections and party identification, there is a clear redistribution of party affiliation following the election result. As shown in Table 5.11, the level of party identification of a winning party in an election was sustained and increased, while the level of party identification for losing parties in elections decreased markedly after the election. Some GNP identifiers switched to non-party identifiers after the election, while some non-party identifiers developed an affiliation with the MDP.

Table 5. 11 Change in the Level of Party Identification before and after Presidential Election, 2002

	BEFORE ELECTION (A)	AFTER ELECTION		THE DIFFERENCE	
		(B)	(C)	(A) & (B)	(A) & (C)
Number of cases	1122	1500	1000		
GNP	33.8%	23.3%	24.0%	-10.5%	-9.8%
MDP	27.5%	27.0%	35.1%	-0.5%	7.6%
All other parties	10.5%	9.0%	6.9%	-1.0%	-3.6%
Non-identifiers	28.2%	40.5%	34.0%	12.3%	5.8%

Data: Column (A) and (C) is based on surveys conducted by the TNS-Korea on 17 December 2002 and on 25 February 2003, respectively. The standard error is +3.0% and -3.0% with 95% confidence interval. Column (B) is based on a post-election survey conducted by the Korean Social Science Data Center, i.e., Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.

Keys: GNP = Grand National Party; and MDP = Millennium Democratic Party.

A change in the distribution of party identification between pre-election surveys and post-election surveys suggests that the level of party identification included some spurious party identifiers. In pre-election surveys, they gave their party preference for the upcoming election rather than a long-term affiliation, immediately abandoning this affiliation after their party lost the election. However, at the same time, this suggests that at least about 23 per cent of Korean voters are strong party identifiers for the GNP, and they have enduring affiliations that is stable regardless of the election result. Conversely, the level of party identification of the MDP increased in the two months after the election, i.e., the level increased by 7.6 per cent as shown in Table 5.11. This suggests that among the party identifiers for the MDP are many weak party identifiers whose identification developed following the election result. This party affiliation is thus very weak, and it can be expected that this attachment will change depending upon political circumstances.

Some change in the level of party identification before and after an election may be customary in the new democracy, but a similar trend in identification in mature democracies has been detected. A panel survey in British Election Study shows that there

was a similar pattern of changes between pre-election study and post-election studies. Gallup polls conducted each month also show a post-election burst of additional popularity for the winning party in the 1987, 1992, and 1997 British General Elections. Indeed, the popularity of the winning party increased 2-3 per cent immediately after each election, while the third party, the Liberal Democratic Party experienced a decline of popularity immediately after each election (see Table A5.2 in Appendix).³⁹ Nonetheless, the change is marginal compared to the Korean case (see Table A5.1 in Appendix)

Positive and Negative Party Identification

Negative feelings towards political parties are evident in the new democracy. Voters not only feel positively toward certain political parties, but they also have a negative feeling toward political parties.⁴⁰ In terms of positive and negative party identification, voters can be classified into four categories; that is, (1) those who have both positive and negative party identification, (2) those who have only positive party identification, (3) those who have only negative party identification, and (4) those who do not have any party identification.⁴¹

Table 5.12 shows that 49.1 per cent of total voters in 1997 and 42.6 per cent in 2002 had negative feelings to a party with more than two thirds of party identifiers feeling this way. Therefore, most party identifiers in the new democracy also have a party they do not like.

Table 5. 12 Positive and Negative Feelings to the Parties in Presidential Election, 1997 and 2002

	N	PARTY IDENTIFIERS		NON-IDENTIFIERS		Total
		I	II	III	IV	
1997	1190	49.1%	13.9%	13.7%	23.4%	100.0%
2002	1500	42.6%	16.9%	13.9%	26.6%	100.0%

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997 and 2002, by KSDC.

Keys: I = those who have both positive and negative party identification; II = those who have only positive identification; III = those who have only negative identification; and IV = those who have neither positive nor negative identification.

Note: The following questions are used: i.e., 'Which political party do you like?' and 'Which political party do you dislike?'

³⁹ Calculated from David Butler and Gareth Butler, *Twentieth-Century British Political Facts, 1900-2000* (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 276-78.

⁴⁰ Party affiliation includes both 'attracting quality of a party' and 'repelling quality of a party'. See Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, pp. 121-22.

⁴¹ Using a similar system, Ivor Crewe classifies four types of party identifiers focusing on negative identification: the Polarised identifiers; the Loyal identifiers; the Negative identifiers; and Apathetic identifiers. See Crewe, 'Party Identification Theory and Political Change in Britain', pp. 52-4.

Impacts of Negative Feeling to Political Parties on Voting Choice

In this classification, type III and type IV voters are non-party identifiers in a measurement based only on positive feeling toward a party. However, even though they are non-party identifiers, the type III of electorate will be constrained by their negative feelings towards a party in their voting decision as it can be assumed that they are more likely not to vote for the candidate of the party they dislike and are more likely to vote for another party despite their lack of party affiliation. In this way, negative party identification constrains electoral choice and can direct voting direction, just as positive party identification does. If we assume bi-party competition, the voting behaviour of non-party identifiers with a negative feeling to a party will actually be similar to the hidden party identifiers. According to Table 5.12, approximately one third of non-party identifiers in Korea have a negative feeling to a party. Taking into account these negative identifiers, the level of the 'pure' non-party identifiers, who do not have any partisan constraints, is reduced from 36.9 per cent to 23.4 per cent in 1997 and from 40.5 per cent to 26.6 per cent in 2002. Of the non-identifiers in the Korean electorate, it is estimated that one third are not totally free from any partisan constraints in their vote choice.

Table 5. 13 Crosstab: Negative Feelings toward the Competing Parties, 1997 and 2002

	N	GNP	NCNP	NPP	OTHER	NONE	TOTAL
1997							
GNP identifiers	217	1.4%	46.1%	26.7%	0.5%	25.3%	100%
NCNP identifiers	388	71.1%	2.1%	6.4%	0.5%	19.8%	100%
NPP identifiers	123	42.5%	32.5%	1.6%	0.8%	23.6%	100%
Non-identifiers	441	15.9%	10.0%	10.2%	0.9%	63.0%	100%
	N	GNP	MDP	ULD	OTHER	NONE	TOTAL
2002							
GNP identifiers	350	--	40.6%	20.6%	9.5%	29.4%	100%
MDP identifiers	405	52.6%	0.2%	11.6%	5.0%	30.6%	100%
DLP identifiers	85	41.9%	16.3%	23.3%	2.3%	16.3%	100%
Non-identifiers	608	15.1%	5.8%	8.4%	5.1%	65.6%	100%

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997 and 2002.

Keys: N = number of cases; GNP = Grand National Party; NCNP = National Congress for New Politics; NPP = New Party for People; MDP = Millennium Democratic Party; UDL = United Liberal Democrats; and DLP = Democratic Labour Party.

Negative feelings mainly exist among the partisans of the two largest parties. For example, as shown in Table 5.13, in 1997, GNP partisans disliked the NCNP (46.1%) the most, but also significant minority also disliked the NPP (26.7%), the separatists from the GNP. On the other hand, most party identifiers of the major opposition NCNP (71.1%) had negative feelings towards the GNP. In 2002, again the negative feeling existed mainly

between partisans of two major parties, the major opposition GNP and the ruling MDP, – i.e., 40.6 per cent of the GNP identifiers and 52.6 per cent of the MDP identifiers felt negatively to the other major party.

This antagonism towards other parties is not unique to Korean. Party identifiers in mature democracies often dislike competing parties. For example, in British election in 2001, most Labour Party identifiers strongly disliked the competing Conservative Party (see Table A5.3 in Appendix). In the 11-point scale from zero to ten where zero stands for strongly dislike and ten stands for strongly like, 54.5 per cent of Labour Party identifiers expressed their feelings towards the Conservative Party as 2 or less with the average score for all Labour Party identifiers 2.37. Conservative Party identifiers also had a strongly negative feelings towards the Labour Party, although to a lesser extent than the antipathy of Labour Party identifiers towards the Conservatives. The average score is 3.17, and 37.5 per cent of Conservative Party identifiers expressed their feelings about the Labour Party as 2 or less. Thus, the existence of negative feelings towards an opponent by loyal party identifiers is common both in new and in mature democracies.

Negative Feelings to Parties and Candidates in Korean Presidential Election

Negative feelings to a competing party or a candidate may be important in understanding voting behaviour in Korean presidential elections. There is a widely shared perception that negative feelings towards parties and/or candidates exist and affect electoral behaviour. For example, in 2002, many voters in *Gyeongsang* region often said that they were willing to cast their vote for Roh Moo-hyun if he was not the candidate of the MDP. They liked Roh, but they could not support the candidate of the MDP. Meanwhile, most voters in *Jeolla* region ruled out voting for Lee Hoi Chang because Lee was the candidate for the GNP. This negative perception of a party affected Lee's popularity during the election. In the presidential election of 2002, Lee enjoyed very favourable conditions due to the failures of the incumbent government and an internal conflict within the ruling party. However, his popularity was stuck at 40 per cent and the level of party affiliation of the GNP was very stable at about 30 per cent during the election year, while the party affiliation and candidate popularity of the MDP fluctuated continually throughout the year. Many voters were disappointed with the incumbent government and the ruling party candidate, but at the same time, they did not want to support the GNP candidate. During the election, pollsters suggested that approximately half of the Korean electorate had negative feelings towards the GNP and/or Lee Hoi Chang, and therefore Lee could not achieve popularity ratings of 50 per cent in spite of favourable political conditions.

In 1997, Kim Dae-jung's popularity and party affiliation for the NCNP were relatively stable, while the ruling NKP/GNP experienced great volatility in terms of candidate popularity and party affiliation. The NKP was involved in internal conflict and split into the GNP and NPP, as did its partisans. However, the failures and conflicts within the ruling party were not related to increases or decreases in the party affiliation of the major opposition NCNP and the popularity of its candidate Kim Dae-jung. Kim Dae-jung and the NCNP were unable to increase Kim's popularity and NCNP party affiliation by attracting the NKP supporters. These voters wandered between the GNP and the NPP and between Lee Hoi Chang and Rhee In-je, but very few supported the NCNP or Kim Dae-jung. This can be understood as resulting from the strongly negative view of Kim Dae-jung and his party existing among Korean voters, especially, voters in *Gyeongsang* region, the stronghold of the ruling NKP. Therefore, there was 'anti-candidate voting' against Kim Dae-jung.⁴²

Party Identification and Vote Choice

Although there are some limits of the concept of party identification in Korea because of an institutional underdevelopment of party politics, party identification has developed and exists in the new democracy. Furthermore, party identification constrains voting choice in the new democracy. Partisan affiliation has a very strong correlation with voting choice in new democracy. As shown in Table 5.14, in election of 1992, almost every party identifier of major parties voted for their own party candidate (i.e., 91.2 per cent of the ruling DLP party identifiers, 86.3 per cent of the major opposition DP party identifiers, and 83.1 per cent of the UNP party identifiers). In the presidential election of 1997, the same pattern was clear. Of the ruling GNP party identifiers, 94.7 per cent voted for Lee Hoi Chang, the GNP candidate, and 84.9 per cent of a major opposition NCNP party identifiers voted for the NCNP candidate Kim Dae-jung (see Table 5.15). In 2002, again most of party identifiers support for their party candidate; 90.5 percent of the major opposition GNP party identifiers and 94.9 per cent of the ruling MDP party identifiers were loyal to their own party (see Table 5.16).

In general, party identifiers of small parties were relatively less loyal to their own party, though still more than half cast their ballot for their own party in elections. Indeed, in the 1992 presidential election, 42.9 per cent of party identifiers of the NPRP led by Park Chan-jong voted for another candidate. In the 1997 election, 37.4 per cent of the

⁴² For the concept of 'anti-candidate voting', see L. Sigelman and M. M. Gant, 'Anticandidate Voting in the 1984 Presidential Election', *Political Behaviour*, 11 (1989), 81-92. Cited from Hwang, '*Jeongdangtaedowa tupyohangtae*' (Party identification and voting behaviour), pp. 273-4.

NPP partisans moved to other party candidate. In 2002, 55.8 per cent of partisans of the LDP did not support their own party candidate in vote choice. Small party partisans were quite likely to defect from own party candidate to a major party candidate in an election. This trend may result from their perception about the likelihood of a small party candidate winning. In general, voters do not want to waste their ballots and therefore tend to support a major party candidate. When this occurs, they are more likely to move to a candidate of a major party close to their own party. For example, in 2002, 44.2 per cent of party identifiers of the Democratic Labour Party, the most progressive party in Korea, cast their ballot for Roh Moo-hyun of the MDP, who is considered a progressive and reform-minded politician.

Table 5. 14 Crosstab: Party Identification and Vote Choice, 1992

PARTY IDENTIFICATION	N	VOTE CHOICE				Total
		Kim Y. (DLP)	Kim D. (DP)	Chung J. (UNP)	Park C. (NPRP)	
Total	1066	50.4%	30.5%	10.7%	8.4%	100.0%
DLP	434	91.2%	2.5%	3.5%	2.8%	100.0%
DP	299	8.0%	86.3%	3.7%	2.8%	100.0%
UNP	65	6.2%	7.7%	83.1%	3.1%	100.0%
NPRP	42	16.7%	21.4%	4.8%	57.1%	100.0%
Other	6	33.3%	33.3%		33.3%	100.0%
Non-identifiers	220	47.3%	18.2%	14.5%	20.0%	100.0%

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992.

Keys: N = number of cases; DLP = Democratic Liberal Party; DP = Democratic Party; UNP = Unification National Party; and NPRP = New Politics Reform Party.

Table 5. 15 Crosstab: Party Identification and Vote Choice, 1997

PARTY IDENTIFICATION	N	VOTE CHOICE				Total
		Lee H. (GNP)	Kim D. (NCNP)	Rhee I. (NPP)	Other	
Total	1083	37.2%	41.0%	17.3%	4.5%	100.0%
GNP	207	94.7%	3.4%	1.4%	0.5%	100.0%
NCNP	372	3.0%	84.9%	10.8%	1.3%	100.0%
NPP	115	13.9%	13.0%	62.6%	10.4%	100.0%
Other	17	11.8%	41.2%	17.6%	29.4%	100.0%
Non-identifiers	372	47.8%	26.6%	18.5%	7.0%	100.0%

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997.

Keys: N = number of cases; GNP = Grand National Party; NCNP = National Congress for New Politics; and NPP = New Party for People.

Table 5. 16 Crosstab: Party Identification and Vote Choice, 2002

PARTY IDENTIFICATION	N	VOTE CHOICE			
		Lee H. (GNP)	Roh M. (MDP)	Kwon Y. (DLP)	Total
Total	1312	38.8%	56.5%	4.7%	100.0%
GNP	328	90.5%	8.8%	0.6%	100.0%
MDP	370	4.1%	94.9%	1.1%	100.0%
ULD	11	9.1%	72.7%	18.2%	100.0%
UP21	19	26.3%	57.9%	15.8%	100.0%
DLP	77	11.7%	44.2%	44.2%	100.0%
Other	9	22.2%	77.8%		100.0%
Non-identifiers	498	36.1%	60.4%	3.4%	100.0%

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.

Keys: N = number of cases; GNP = Grand National Party; MDP = Millennium Democratic Party; ULD = United Liberal Democrats; NU21 = National Unity 21; and DLP = Democratic Labour Party.

In 1997, party identifiers of the ULD also showed their loyalty in a different way. The ULD did not nominate own candidate for presidency, but supported Kim Dae-jung of the NCNP through an electoral coalition with the NCNP. Although data was limited, approximately 40 percent of ULD partisans supported Kim Dae-jung following the coalition, while only approximately 10 per cent of the partisans voted for Lee Hoi Chang, the candidate of the ruling party.⁴³

When most partisans are loyal to their own party in voting choice, it can be expected that election results will be greatly affected by the electoral behaviour of non-party identifiers who make up a sizeable proportion of the electorate (i.e., 22.7% in 1992, 36.9 % in 1997, and 40.5% in 2002). In 2002, Roh Moo-hyun gained 60.4 per cent of votes of non-identifiers, while Lee Hoi Chang was supported by 36.1 per cent of non-party identifiers. This seems to confirm the widely accepted argument that Roh's victory in the election was possible because he attracted younger voters, who are more likely to be non-identifiers.

However, earlier data does not fully support the argument that non-identifiers' vote choice strongly influences the outcomes of elections. In 1997, Kim Dae-jung attracted only 26.6 per cent of non-party identifiers, compared 47.8 per cent of non-party identifiers for Lee Hoi Chang. Consequently, Kim Dae-jung's victory was not based on gaining more supports amongst non-identifiers, but was instead possible through the GNP/NKP split during the election. Korean voters actually had a negative perception of Kim Dae-jung, a long-serving politician. Before the transition to democracy in 1987, authoritarian government tainted him as a radical and pro-communist. This negative

⁴³ In the Korean Presidential Election Study of 1997, the ULD were included in 'other parties'. However, the ULD was one of the three largest parties in the National Assembly. Therefore, most 'other party' identifiers may be considered ULD identifiers. An additional problem is that the

image was further worsened by the intensification of regionalism in the new democracy. Kim was a charismatic leader in his home region, *Jeolla*, but was also strongly disliked in other regions, especially, *Gyeongsang*. In such circumstances, he was not able to attract many non-identifiers in the election, but he was able to win the election due to a split within the pro-ruling party and its partisans.

In conclusion, party politics is unstable, and the 'meeting and parting' of political parties is common in the new democracy, but Korean voters have to some extent developed party identification, the enduring psychological attachment to a particular political party. In particular, most Korean voters can effectively recognise and distinguish between the major political parties in terms of politicians, loyal supporters, and platforms and policies of the political parties, even though the forms and names of the political parties have changed frequently. Moreover, partisan loyalty to a political party in voting choice is considerable.

However, the strength of party affiliation in Korea is generally weak and the endurance of party affiliation is quite problematic. The level of party identification is unstable within a relatively short-time period and the voting intention of party identifiers is affected by short-term political events in the course of election campaigns. Indeed, individual party affiliation is changeable and is affected by performance of political parties, in line with the revisionist view of party identification.

Considering the long-term duration of party affiliation, it is expected that the pattern of electoral alignment has continued over time in the new democracy. At the same time, when party affiliation is changeable and is affected by short-term factors in the new democracy, it is assumed that the pattern of partisan alignment has some extent changed in the last 15 years. Change and continuity in partisan alignment in the new democracy will be explored in the following chapter, Chapter 6. If we find that most voters are aligned with a few political parties and have maintained their affiliation to the parties over time, this will confirm the argument discussed in this chapter, Chapter 5, that Korean voters have developed party affiliation and that party identification is useful to predict Korean electoral behaviour.

Chapter 6. The Bases of Partisan Alignment in a New Democracy

The aim of this chapter is to explore partisan alignment in Korea. First, socio-demographic bases of partisan alignment will be explored. Although the regional cleavage is the predominant factor to explain the partisan alignment in the new democracy, I will argue that some other characteristics of voters, particularly ideology, also explain partisan alignment in Korea.

Second, changes and continuities in the pattern of partisan alignment in the new democracy will be explored. Although party politics is unstable in the new democracy, most Korean voters are aligned with a few political parties, especially the two major political parties, and have maintained their affiliation to the parties over time. I will argue that a pattern of partisan alignment under authoritarian regimes has generally been maintained in the new democracy, but also that there have been some changes in the partisan alignment following social and political changes, such as the split of opposition group, the improvement of North and South Korea relations, and the severe economic recession in 1997.

This chapter consists of two main sections. In the first section following a brief introductory analysis of partisan alignment, relationships between socio-economic characteristics of voters and party alignment will be examined in order to explore changes and continuities in the pattern of electoral alignment. In second section, a multiple regression analysis will be used and a model of partisan alignment will be examined.

Electoral Realignment in the New Democracy: A Hypothetical Explanation

Political and social developments have influenced partisanship and electoral alignment in Korea. Following political and social changes, Korean voters have been dealigned and realigned. In terms of electoral alignments, the political development of the new democracy may be divided into three periods. It is expected that some changes in electoral alignments occurred in the 1987 presidential election and when the three parties merged in 1990. However, due to a lack of data, my analysis will mainly focus on the electoral alignment from the 1992 presidential election.

The first Period: 1987-1992

Authoritarian legacy: The first period from 1987 to 1992 is characterised as the legal continuation of authoritarian government. In 1987, a direct presidential election was

restored, but a military officer-turned politician and the personal friend of former dictator won the presidential election in 1987 mainly due to the split between the two leaders of pro-democracy opposition groups¹. Those who preferred the authoritative ruling party maintained this loyalty to the ruling party. Indeed, it is expected that traditional supporters for the ruling authoritarian party, such as the less educated, the lower class, those residing in rural area, and women, were inclined towards the ruling party in 1992.

A split in pro-democracy voters: The pro-opposition party voters under the authoritarian regime were divided into two main groups in the new democracy. Following the split in the opposition camp in the 1987 election, another critical political change influenced on partisan alignment. Kim Young Sam, leader of the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) and one of two prominent leaders in the long-time democratic movement, joined the authoritarian ruling party in the merger of three political parties in 1990. Some voters affiliated with the RDP followed Kim Young Sam's political decision, but some voters moved to the Peace Democratic Party (PDP) and formed a major new opposition party the Democratic Party (DP). Also, some electors, who were disappointed with Kim Young Sam, but did not like Kim Dae-jung either, became independent or moved to a new third party, such as the Unification National Party (UNP) led by Chung Ju-young, or to the New Politics Reform Party (NPRP) led by Park Chan-jong, who was a reformist politician in the opposition camp. It is expected that the higher educated voters among the pro-opposition electorate, who were more critical of the inability of the Kims to agree on a single candidacy in 1987 and were disappointed with the merger of the RDP with the authoritarian ruling party, shifted their support to the new political parties or became non-party identifiers.

The Second Period: 1993-1997

Intensification of regionalism: During the second period from 1993 to 1997, party politics again was in turmoil and the regional cleavage of the pro-opposition voters was intensified. In 1995, Kim Dae-jung, who retired from politics after losing the presidential election in 1992, returned to politics and formed a new opposition party, the National Congress for New Democracy (NCNP). This split the major opposition party, the Democratic Party (DP). Most of politicians in the DP moved to the NCNP, and as did many partisans. In general, politicians and voters who were from the *Jeolla* region, Kim's home province, followed Kim, while politicians and voters who did not move to the NCNP were generally people from non-*Jeolla* region.

¹ For a historical evolution of Korean politics, see Chapter 2 of this dissertation.

Dealignment of the pro-ruling voters: It is expected that there was a change in the pro-ruling party voters. The ruling party led by Kim Young Sam made steps to disconnect the new ruling party from the former authoritarian government. Kim Young Sam government prosecuted two former military officers-turned presidents and invited reform-minded politicians into the ruling party. Traditional supporters for the authoritarian party were disappointed with the ruling party led by President Kim Young Sam, especially voters in the Northern *Gyeongsang* region, the native region of the former three presidents. It is expected therefore that this caused changes in the partisanship of pro-ruling party voters.

The economic recession in 1997: Another influential factor in changes in the partisan alignment in the new democracy was the economic crisis in 1997. The national economy had been ruined in the new democracy. The state capitalist model, which was based on cheap labour forces and a few big business companies, failed to adjust to changes in domestic and global market conditions, and began to lose its dynamism as various social and economic problems were revealed. Eventually, Koreans experienced a serious economic crisis in 1997. During this economic deterioration and economic crisis, voters who were traditionally supported the authoritarian ruling party were disappointed with the performance of the ruling party. Thus, it is expected that there was partisan dealignment or realignment during the second period of political development of new democracy, 1993-1997.

The Third Period: 1998-2002

Continuation of regionalism: During the third period from 1998 to 2002, the regional cleavage in the new democracy intensified. Having lost power in the 1997 presidential election, the new opposition, which, tried to define the new ruling government as a government based on *Jeolla* people in order to gain the unconditional support from voters in *Gyeongsang*. It is expected that partisan alignment based on regional cleavage continued and intensified in the third period.

Changes in ideology: However, in the third period from 1998 to 2002, it is expected that ideology became a new factor to explain partisan alignment. Kim Dae-jung, who was a long-time supporter of a peaceful relationship between North and South Korea and called for the end of the Cold War in the Korean peninsula, was elected in the 1997 presidential election. Under Kim Dae-jung government, the North and South relations improved remarkably. The leaders of the two Koreas met in *Pyeongyang*, the capital of North Korea, for the first time in half a century. The summit meeting brought a great improvement in the North and South relations. Along with this, ideological rigidity in the

new democracy was weakened. The electorate is roughly divided into two groups in terms of the government's approach to the communist North. Conservative voters prefer a containment policy toward North Korea, which emphasises a cautious approach to the North and South relations, while liberals prefer an engagement policy with the North, which is pursued by the government.

The generational division of voters: Considering the ideological division of partisans, some changes in the age composition of the electorate should be considered. A baby-boomer generation entered to the electorate, and Korean voters as a whole become relatively younger than before. Indeed, more than half of the electorate is less than 40 years old (see Table 6.1). The young who are born after the Korean War of 1950-1952 are relatively free from the ideological bias against the left.² Also, younger voters who have lived in a relatively affluent society prefer political democracy to economic growth unlike the older who having spent their most lives in a poor society, prefer economic growth to political freedom. Younger voters are defined here as voters under 30 years old in 1987 and under 45 years old in 2002 (more than half of the electorate in 2002). This suggests that the difference between older and younger voters should be evident in partisan alignments in Korea.

Table 6. 1 Age of the Electorate, 1987-2002

YEAR	AGE					
	Total	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 & over
1985	100%	34.60%	23.70%	17.80%	12.40%	11.50%
1990	100%	31.40%	26.60%	17.00%	13.10%	11.90%
1995	100%	27.70%	27.40%	18.20%	13.10%	13.60%
2000	100%	24.30%	25.40%	21.30%	13.20%	15.80%

Data: Calculated based on Korean National Census, 1985, 1990, 1995, & 2000 from the Korea National Statistical Office.

Note: The figures are not based on registered voters, but are close to the official numbers of voters. Indeed, the National Election Commission officially reported the distribution of the electorate by age groups in the 2002 presidential election, and the distribution is almost same with the figures for 2000 in this table (i.e., 23.2 per cent for 20-29 years old, 25.1 per cent for 30-39 years old, 22.4 per cent for 40-49 years old, 12.9 per cent for 50-59 years old, and 16.4 per cent for 60 years old and over).

1. Partisan Alignment and Realignment in New Democracy

² For example, a survey conducted by the TNS-Korea shows a post-Cold War electoral change. Indeed, most of Korean voters (i.e., 71 per cent of respondents) prefer progressive politicians to conservative politicians. 'Voters' break from the ideology is obvious', *Munhwa Daily Newspaper*, 11 April 2002.

Regionalism and Electoral Alignment

While class, religion, and ethnic group are the main factors in explaining electoral alignment in Western democracies, region and regionalism should be considered as the most important factor to explain Korean party alignments³ and is the main feature of party and electoral politics in Korea.

Regional Distribution of Votes

Major contending parties in Korea have been based on a specific regional stronghold.⁴ In 2002, the opposition Grand National Party (GNP), a descendent of the old authoritarian ruling party, has strong support from the *Gyeongsang* region, while the ruling MDP, a successor party of the pro-democracy opposition party, is popular in the *Jeolla* region. Election results clearly show the regional cleavage of the electorate. In 1987, the DJP and the RDP had strong support from *Gyeongsang* region, while the PDP was well-supported in the *Jeolla* region. In the 1997 election, the GNP performed well in the *Gyeongsang* region, while the NCNP gained most votes in the *Jeolla* region. Also, in 2002, the GNP dominated the *Gyeongsang* region, but the MDP was strong in the *Jeolla* region (see Table 6.2).

In parliamentary elections, the same pattern existed. In every parliamentary election from 1988 to 2000, the DJP, the DLP, the NKP and the GNP were successful in

³ A geographical cleavage within the electorate is not rare in other democracies. In a comparative study, Hearl et al. found that 'distinctiveness of regional voting' is common in many European democracies. See Derek J. Hearl, Ian Budge, and Bernard Perason, 'Distinctiveness of Regional Voting: A Comparative Analysis Across the European Community (1979-1993)', *Electoral Studies*, 15 (1996), 167-82. Also, regional voting is divided into two distinct types. One type of regional voting is disproportionate support for statewide political parties, which exists in recent British elections, or in Canadian elections. Another type of regional voting is support for nationalist and regionalist parties based on minority nationalist movement, such as the *Bloc Quebecois* in Canada or the Catalan nationalist of Convergence and Union (CiU) and the Basque National Party (PMV) in Spain. There is no ethnic minority in Korea and regional voting in Korea is classified as differential support for political parties operating at a statewide level. For an assessment of recent Canadian elections, see Neil Nevitte et al., *Unsteady State: The 1997 Canadian Federal Election* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); L. LeDuc, 'The Federal Election in Canada, November 2000', *Electoral Studies*, 21 (2002), 655-9. For a brief note on recent Spanish election, Josep M. Colomer, 'The 2000 General Election in Spain', *Electoral Study* 20 (2001), 490-5. For regional results of the 2001 British General Election, see David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, *The British General Election of 2001* (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 262-3.

⁴ Hereafter, the major party A and the major party B will be used in order to identify two contending major political parties which change their forms and names over time. For instance, the major party A refers to the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) in 1992, and the Grand National Party (GNP) in 1997 and in 2002. Also, the major party B refers to the Democratic Party (DP) in 1992, the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP) in 1997, and the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) in 2002. Indeed, the major party A has a historical lineage from authoritarian ruling parties before a transition to democracy in 1987, while the major party B links to pro-democracy opposition parties before democratisation.

Gyeongsang region, while the PDP, the DP, the NCNP, and the MDP won in most electoral districts in the *Jeolla* region. Also, in 1996, the ULD, the third party at that time, swept every electoral district in the *Chungcheong* region (see Table A6.1 in Appendix).

Regional Support: Political Parties vs. Candidates

Presidential election results show that regional support is more related to political parties rather than candidates. Lee Hoi Chang was the 2002 candidate of the GNP from the *Chungcheong* region, but failed to gain more votes in this region than other contending candidates. In 1997, Kim Jong-pil who was the dominant political leader in the region left the race for the presidency and officially supported Kim Dae-jung as a result of an election coalition between the NCNP and the ULD. Many voters in *Chungcheong* region followed their respected leader Kim Jong-pil's decision in the election (see Table 6.2).

Another good example to show that regional support is for the political parties rather than the candidates is from the 2002 presidential election. Roh Moo-hyun, who was candidate of the MDP, is from the *Gyeongsang* region, but gained only about 26 per cent of votes in this region, compared to approximately 49 per cent of votes in the national level. Meanwhile, 93.2 per cent of voters in *Jeolla* region supported Roh, just about the same as the result for Kim Dae-Jung in 1997 (94.4%). The same trend is again visible in 2002 when Lee Hoi Chang was not especially popular in his home region but attracted 69.4 per cent of votes in *Gyeongsang* region. This level of support in the region actually exceeded that for *Gyeongsang* native Kim Young Sam, who was the candidate of the DLP in 1992 (68.8%) (see Table 6.2).

Regional Identification: Beyond Geographical Boundaries

Geographical domination of political parties in elections may be shown in other democracies, though the degree is not so strong as it is in Korea. For example, in British parliamentary elections, the geography of the vote has been critical to outcomes. Vote gains in 1980s-90s for the Conservatives were concentrated in the South. In 2002, the proportion of Conservative votes from the South was 71.6 per cent, while the proportion from the North was 28.3 per cent per cent.⁵ In American elections, southern states were a historical strong foothold of the Democratic Party, even though this domination is now over.

⁵ Pippa Norris, 'Apathetic Landslide: The 2001 British General Election', in Pippa Norris, ed., *Britain Votes 2001* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 1-25, at pp. 12-13.

Table 6. 2 Regional Share of Votes (%) by Political Parties in Presidential Election, 1987-2002

	MAJOR PARTY (A)	MAJOR PARTY (B)	THIRD PARTY	MINOR PARTY	ALL OTHER	TOTAL
1987	DJP	PDP	RDP	NDRP		
Total	36.6	27.0	28.0	8.1	0.2	100
Seoul	30.0	32.6	29.1	8.2	0.1	100
Gyeonggi	41.0	22.1	28.1	8.7	0.2	100
Gangwon	59.3	8.8	26.1	5.4	0.3	100
Chungcheong	33.1	11.9	20.1	34.6	0.3	100
Jeolla	9.9	88.4	1.2	0.5	0.1	100
Gyeongsang	49.7	5.0	42.4	2.5	0.3	100
Jeju	49.8	18.6	26.8	4.5	0.3	100
1992	DLP	DP	UNP	NPRP		
Total	42.0	33.8	16.3	6.4	1.5	100
Seoul	36.4	37.7	18.0	6.4	1.4	100
Gyeonggi	36.6	31.9	22.7	7.2	1.6	100
Gangwon	41.5	15.5	34.1	6.9	2.0	100
Chungcheong	36.9	27.8	24.3	8.7	2.3	100
Jeolla	4.3	91.9	2.3	0.6	0.9	100
Gyeongsang	68.8	10.1	12.2	7.5	1.4	100
Jeju	40.0	32.9	16.1	8.8	2.1	100
1997	GNP	NCNP	NPP			
Total	38.7	40.3	19.2		1.8	100
Seoul	40.9	44.9	12.8		1.5	100
Gyeonggi	35.7	39.1	23.5		1.7	100
Gangwon	43.2	23.8	30.9		2.1	100
Chungcheong	27.4	43.9	26.6		2.1	100
Jeolla	3.3	94.4	1.5		0.8	100
Gyeongsang	59.1	13.5	25.1		2.4	100
Jeju	36.6	40.6	20.5		2.4	100
2002	GNP	MDP				
Total	46.6	48.9			4.5	100
Seoul	45.0	51.3			3.7	100
Gyeonggi	44.3	50.5			5.2	100
Gangwon	52.5	41.5			6.0	100
Chungcheong	41.3	52.5			6.2	100
Jeolla	4.9	93.2			1.9	100
Gyeongsang	69.4	25.8			4.8	100
Jeju	39.9	56.1			4.0	100

Note: The shaded figure refers to share of the vote in the candidate's home region.

Data: Computed based on election statistics from the National Election Commission.

Keys: DJP = Democratic Justice Party; PDP = Peace Democratic Party; RDP = Reunification Democratic Party; NRDP = New Republican Democratic Party; DLP = Democratic Liberal Party; DP = Democratic Party; UNP = Unification National Party; NPRP = New Political Reform Party; GNP = Grand National Party; NCNP = National Congress for New Politics; NPP = New Party for People; MDP = Millennium Democratic Party.

However, in Korean elections, the regional cleavage has been even more significant. The regional cleavage is the predominant factor in determining voting choice and partisan alignments not only in the electoral districts in two competing regions, but also in almost the entire nation. For example, voters in Seoul city, which is composed of people from various regions of the nation, are also affected by region. Voters who come from

Gyeongsang region are more likely to support the GNP, while voters who come from *Jeolla* region are more likely to support the MDP.

A Debate on 'Regional Party'

Because of the domination within two regions by the two major parties, the major parties in Korea have been recognised and indeed criticised as 'regional parties'. This perception is widely shared by many scholars, politicians, and journalists in Korea. For example, in 2003, the ruling MDP was involved in an internal conflict concerning ways to overcome the regional limits of its electoral support, especially, its poor performances in the *Gyeongsang* region. Those looking for a radical change within the party including even its dissolution, argued that the MDP is a regional party because of its weakness in the *Gyeongsang* region. On the other hand, those who favoured maintaining the party as it is, asserted that the MDP gained parliamentary seats from every region except the *Gyeongsang* region and outperformed all other parties in every region except *Gyeongsang* region in terms of number of seats in the last parliamentary election. In a survey related to this controversial argument within the MDP, a majority of the electorate also perceived that both major parties, the MDP and the GNP, were regional parties based on support from specific regions. Indeed, 56 per cent of respondents perceived that the MDP is a regional party based on *Jeolla*, and 73.1 per cent of them answer that the GNP is a regional party based on *Gyeongsang* region.⁶

However, it may be an exaggeration to denounce these major parties as regional parties, despite their strong showing in specific regions and from voters originating from these areas. Both the MDP and the GNP gained support not only from *Gyeongsang* or *Jeolla*, but also from the other regions. Approximately half of party identifiers of these parties and more than half of their voters who supported these parties in election are not related to this regional cleavage (see Table 6.3). It is therefore an overstatement to define two major political parties as regional parties due to their regional strength or regional weakness, and it is also wrong to assume that regionalism or region factor is the only variable which explains partisan alignments in the new democracy. In order to explain fully partisan and electoral alignments, it is necessary to explore other factors.

⁶ The survey was conducted by a research agency, the Research & Research. See '*Jeongchigwon inyeome ttala jaepyeondwaeya*' (The political circles should be realigned on the basis of ideology), *The Pressian Internet Newspaper*, 7 May 2003.

Table 6.3 Crosstab: Party Identification and Regional Identification, 1992-2002

PARTY IDENTIFICATION	N	REGIONAL IDENTIFICATION			
		<i>GYEONGSANG</i>	<i>JEOLLA</i>	OTHER	TOTAL
1992					
DLP identifiers	470	52.1%	3.6%	44.3%	100%
DP identifiers	324	13.9%	58.6%	27.5%	100%
UNP identifiers	70	35.7%	1.7%	62.6%	100%
1997					
GNP identifiers	219	49.8%	1.8%	48.4%	100%
NCNP identifiers	390	6.4%	56.4%	37.2%	100%
NPP identifiers	124	45.2%	3.2%	51.6%	100%
2002					
GNP identifiers	349	53.6%	2.0%	44.4%	100%
MDP identifiers	400	10.3%	48.0%	41.7%	100%

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: N = number of cases; DLP = Democratic Liberal Party; DP = Democratic Party; UNP = Unification National Party; GNP = Grand National Party; NCNP = National Congress for New Politics; NPP = New Party for People; MDP = Millennium Democratic Party.

Partisan Alignment based on Regionalism

As shown in Table 6.4, the relationship between party affiliation and region is statistically significant. The value of Pearson's Chi-square is shown to be 389.570 in 1992, 330.735 in 1997, and 272.432 in 2002, and the differences are significant at the 0.5 level. Thus, for the last 10 years, people in the *Gyeongsang* and *Gangwon* regions have been more affiliated with the GNP and its ancestor parties, while people in the *Jeolla* region have been inclined to the MDP and its predecessors. However, the 1997 presidential election was a turning point in the distribution of party identifiers across regions. The MDP overtook the GNP in terms of party identifiers in *Seoul*, *Gyeonggi*, and *Chungcheong*, and in general, this pattern was continued in 2002.

As discussed above, the partisan cleavage of region is based on the existing regional antagonism mainly between two contending regions — *Gyeongsang* and *Jeolla*. Political regionalism strongly affects the political behaviour of the voters who came from these two regions with very strong support for either the GNP or the MDP in every election. In particular, *Jeolla* people' political support for the MDP is extremely strong. As shown in Table 6.4, about 70 per cent and about 80 per cent of voters who came from *Jeolla* region identified themselves with the MDP in 2002 and the NCNP in 1997, respectively.

Regional Discrimination as the Cause of Political Regionalism

Why do voters in *Jeolla* region reveal and maintain a very strong loyalty to the MDP — and its old form, the NCNP, the DP, and the PDP — in elections? The answer can be found in the characteristics of Korean regionalism. A key feature of the regionalism is the

social 'exclusion' of *Jeolla* people and regional discrimination against *Jeolla* people in Korean society. A detailed discussion about the origin of regional discrimination is beyond the scope of this research, but it is useful to describe briefly political events related to causes of regionalism in order to understand electoral behaviour.

Table 6. 4 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Regional Background, 1992-1997

	N	MAJOR PARTY A	MAJOR PARTY B	THIRD PARTY	TOTAL	PEARSON χ^2 (P)
1992						389.570 (0.000)
<i>Seoul</i>	82	56.1%	29.3%	14.6%	100%	
<i>Gyeonggi</i>	87	58.6%	17.2%	24.1%	100%	
<i>Gangwon</i>	34	55.9%	17.6%	26.5%	100%	
<i>Chungcheong</i>	154	54.5%	27.9%	17.5%	100%	
<i>Jeolla</i>	210	8.1%	90.5%	1.4%	100%	
<i>Gyeongsang</i>	33	74.0%	13.6%	12.4%	100%	
<i>Jeju</i>	1	100.0%	—	—	100%	
the North	9	77.8%	11.1%	11.1%	100%	
Total	908	51.8%	35.7%	12.6%	100%	
1997						330.735 (0.000)
<i>Seoul</i>	66	31.8%	56.1%	12.1%	100%	
<i>Gyeonggi</i>	60	35.0%	43.3%	21.7%	100%	
<i>Gangwon</i>	36	47.2%	36.1%	16.7%	100%	
<i>Chungcheong</i>	132	24.2%	50.0%	25.8%	100%	
<i>Jeolla</i>	228	1.8%	96.5%	1.8%	100%	
<i>Gyeongsang</i>	190	57.4%	13.2%	29.5%	100%	
<i>Jeju</i>	16	68.8%	12.5%	18.8%	100%	
the North	5	80.0%	20.0%	—	100%	
Total	733	29.9%	53.2%	16.9%	100%	
2002						272.432 (0.000)
<i>Seoul</i>	87	40.6%	54.0%	—	100%	
<i>Gyeonggi</i>	89	51.7%	48.3%	—	100%	
<i>Gangwon</i>	36	63.9%	36.1%	—	100%	
<i>Chungcheong</i>	98	41.8%	58.2%	—	100%	
<i>Jeolla</i>	199	3.5%	96.5%	—	100%	
<i>Gyeongsang</i>	228	82.0%	18.0%	—	100%	
<i>Jeju</i>	3	—	100%	—	100%	
the North	9	55.6%	44.4%	—	100%	
Total	749	46.6%	53.4%	—	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: N = number of cases; 'Major party A' refers to the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and the Grand National Party in 1997 and 2002; 'Major party B' refers to the Democratic Party in 1992, the National Congress for New Politics, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; 'Third party' refers to the Unification National Party in 1992 and the New Party for People in 1997.

Political discrimination: Before the transition to democracy in 1987, military-backed political leaders of authoritarian states, who came from *Gyeongsang*, discriminated against *Jeolla* region in social and economic development as well as strongly favouring candidates from *Gyeongsang* in the appointment of high level governmental posts. Furthermore, the authoritarian state suppressed Kim Dae-jung, the leader of democratic movement who came from *Jeolla*, and military forces killed civilian, pro-democracy Kim supporters in *Gwangju*, the biggest city in *Jeolla* region. In these

social and political circumstances, *Jeolla* people have developed a strong regionalism as a 'resistance to the discrimination', and showed a very strong loyalty to Kim Dae-jung and his party as a way to overcome the political and social alienation of the region. In particular, regional resistance to the authoritarian regimes and the regional identity of *Jeolla* people intensified after the experience of the 'Gwangju massacre' in 1980.

Under the authoritarian regimes, the *Gyeongsang* people continued and intensified regional discrimination against *Jeolla* people, a long established public prejudice. During this period, regional discrimination against *Jeolla* functioned as a ruling ideology to justify a political domination by *Gyeongsang* people. In this sense, regionalism in *Gyeongsang* is characterised as a 'hegemonic' regionalism. Furthermore, *Gyeongsang* people blamed Kim Dae-jung for the split within the opposition camp and the failure to overcome the successor of the authoritarian party in the 1987 presidential election.

Social discrimination against Jeolla people: The regional discrimination in Korean society is well-supported by survey data which has confirmed that regional discrimination against *Jeolla* people exists in society. For example, according to survey data, Koreans are relatively reluctant to wed or join in business someone from *Jeolla*. Those from *Gyeongsang* show a particularly strong dislike of *Jeolla* people (see Table 6.5 and Table 6.6). A negative perception of *Jeolla* people exists in society, and people from *Jeolla* have experienced more regional discrimination compared to people from other regions. Table 6.7 shows a relatively higher level of experience of regional discrimination for *Jeolla* people.

Table 6.5 Social Discrimination by Region: marriage partner

RESPONDENT'S HOMETOWN	AS A MARRIAGE PARTNER						
	<i>Seoul/ Gyeonggi</i>	<i>Gangwon</i>	<i>Chungcheong</i>	<i>Jeolla</i>	<i>Gyeongsang</i>	<i>Jeju</i>	the North
<i>Seoul</i>	1.29	1.52	1.57	1.81	1.66	1.73	1.73
<i>Gyeonggi</i>	1.29	1.35	1.47	1.91	1.64	1.59	1.77
<i>Gangwon</i>	1.57	1.40	1.57	1.97	1.63	1.71	1.92
<i>Chungcheong</i>	1.53	1.56	1.37	1.90	1.61	1.67	1.80
<i>Jeolla</i>	1.37	1.52	1.43	1.24	1.63	1.45	1.66
<i>Gyeongsang</i>	1.57	1.60	1.63	2.07	1.35	1.67	1.93
<i>Jeju</i>	1.58	1.62	1.67	2.14	1.43	1.76	1.86
the North	1.55	1.45	1.73	2.00	1.91	1.91	1.45
Total	1.46	1.52	1.52	1.81	1.55	1.63	1.80

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997.

Notes: Question 26A (i.e., 'What do you think the following person as a marriage partner for you or your family member?') is used. The figure refers to the average score in a 3-point scale (1 = agree, 2 = no preference, an 3 = disagree). A high score means strong opposition to marrying people (or family members marrying someone) who came from the region.

Table 6.6 Social Discrimination by Region: business partner

RESPONDENT'S HOMETOWN	AS A BUSINESS PARTNER						
	<i>Seoul/ Gyeonggi</i>	<i>Gangwon</i>	<i>Chungcheong</i>	<i>Jeolla</i>	<i>Gyeongsang</i>	<i>Jeju</i>	the North
<i>Seoul</i>	1.37	1.55	1.60	1.88	1.69	1.69	1.68
<i>Gyeonggi</i>	1.34	1.38	1.46	1.94	1.58	1.56	1.63
<i>Gangwon</i>	1.69	1.49	1.65	2.07	1.68	1.78	1.99
<i>Chungcheong</i>	1.52	1.55	1.45	2.04	1.64	1.69	1.76
<i>Jeolla</i>	1.47	1.60	1.55	1.36	1.70	1.52	1.68
<i>Gyeongsang</i>	1.68	1.64	1.68	2.18	1.39	1.73	1.96
<i>Jeju</i>	1.68	1.62	1.67	2.05	1.57	1.81	1.95
the North	1.36	1.64	1.91	2.27	1.82	1.91	1.45
Total	1.53	1.57	1.58	1.91	1.58	1.66	1.79

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997.

Note: Question 26B (i.e., 'What do you think the following person as your business partner?') is used. The figure refers to the average score in a 3-point scale (1 = agree, 2 = no preference, and 3 = disagree). A high score means strong opposition to being involved in business with people who came from the region.

Table 6.7 Experience of Regional Discrimination

RESPONDENT'S HOMETOWN	REGIONAL DISCRIMINATION					
	A	B	C	D	E	Total
<i>Seoul</i>	1.94	1.98	1.96	1.96	1.92	1.95
<i>Gyeonggi</i>	1.97	1.91	1.95	1.95	1.97	1.95
<i>Gangwon</i>	1.92	2.00	1.97	1.97	1.92	1.96
<i>Chungcheong</i>	1.91	1.96	1.94	1.97	1.95	1.95
<i>Jeolla</i>	1.70	1.88	1.75	1.87	1.82	1.81
<i>Gyeongsang</i>	1.94	1.97	1.96	1.97	1.95	1.96
<i>Jeju</i>	1.83	1.92	1.88	1.96	1.92	1.91
the North	1.92	1.83	1.92	1.92	1.92	1.90
Total	1.88	1.94	1.91	1.95	1.92	1.92

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997.

Keys: A = personal humiliation; B = financial loss; C = disadvantage in employment; D = disadvantage in promotion; and E = treated distantly by peer group.

Notes: Q25 (i.e., 'Have you experienced the following regional discriminations?') is used. The figure refers to the average score in a 2-point scale (1 = yes, and 2 = no). A low score means more experience of regional discrimination.

Candidate's home region in elections: In terms of the influence of a candidate's home region on voting choice, *Jeolla* natives pay more attention to a candidate's regional origin in voting choice than other people in other regions (see Table 6.8). Table 6.8 shows that the average score for all voters is 2.84 in 4-point scale (i.e., 1 = very much consider, 2 = somewhat consider, 3 = not much consider, and 4 = never consider). Korean voters answered that they generally did not pay much attention to a candidate's regional background in their electoral choice despite the existence of a strong regional cleavage in the electorate. This suggests that the regional cleavage in elections is related to the political parties rather than candidates.

It can be assumed that the existence of regional discrimination against *Jeolla* and the experience of regional discrimination has caused strong support for *Jeolla* native

politicians and the MDP and its predecessor parties. The data shows that voters who experienced regional discrimination are more likely to be affected by regional factors in their voting choice. More experience of regional discrimination is related to greater considerations of a candidate's home region in deciding upon their vote.

Table 6. 8 Consideration of Candidate's Hometown in Voting Choice

RESPONDENT'S HOMETOWN	N	MEAN	STD. DEVIATION
<i>Seoul</i>	145	3.07	0.82
<i>Gyeonggi</i>	115	3.15	0.83
<i>Gangwon</i>	74	3.04	0.90
<i>Chungcheong</i>	197	3.10	0.88
<i>Jeolla</i>	262	2.34	0.93
<i>Gyeongsang</i>	352	2.80	0.87
<i>Jeju</i>	25	2.96	0.79
The North	12	2.92	1.08
Total	1182	2.84	0.92

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997.

Key: N = number of cases; Mean = average score in a 4-point scale (1 = very much, 2 = somewhat, 3 = not much, and 4 = not at all). A low score refers to greater consideration of candidate's home region in voting choice.

Table 6.9 is a summary of regression analysis. Experiences of regional discrimination and negative feelings to other regions are used as independent variables. The dependent variable is consideration of candidate's home region in voting decision. The Stepwise method excluded two independent variables and only the experience of regionalism variable fitted the model. The experience of regionalism is related to the consideration of a region factor in political activities, while regional bias is not closely related to political regionalism. In sum, the difference in the level of experience of regional discrimination explains why the regional factor is relatively important in *Jeolla*. It suggests that *Jeolla* voters strongly support the MDP and its predecessors because they have experienced strong regional discrimination.

Table 6. 9 Summary of Regression Analysis: Influence of Regionalism on Electoral Vote Decision, 1997

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	BETA	T	SIGNIFICANT
Experience of regionalism	-0.214	-7.255	0.000
Regional Bias – business	-0.046	-1.576	0.115
Regional Bias – marriage	-0.041	-1.376	0.169
Adjusted R square	0.045		

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997.

Note: Concerning dependent variable, a high value means less consideration of candidate's home region in vote decision; Concerning independent variables, a high value means more experience of regionalism or strong regional bias; 'Experience of regionalism' is based on a compute of scores in five different aspects of regional discrimination.

Age and Electoral Alignment

One of the major empirical research trends in Korea was based on modernisation theory focusing on differences in the level of political awareness across various social groups. According to the modernisation theory, gender, education, and age were key variables to explain electoral behaviour. Women, the less educated, and the old have a relatively low level political awareness compared to men, the higher educated, and the young. The former groups were more easily mobilised by authoritarian parties, and the difference in the level of political awareness also explained why the authoritarian ruling parties performed strongly in rural areas in every elections.⁷

Although the mobilisation of voters became more difficult following the democratic transition in 1987, it is expected that party identifiers in new democracy continue to feel close to the political party that they were affiliated to under the authoritarian regimes. As a result of the continuation of old party affiliations, it is expected that there are no critical changes in partisan alignment in terms of gender, education, and age.

Age and Electoral Alignment

A linear relationship between age and partisanship has been revealed in the last three presidential elections. In these elections, young voters feel close to the major party B and the older affiliate with the major party A. Table 6.10 shows that Pearson's correlations for each of the three presidential elections are statistically significant. In addition, party identifiers for a third party --- the UNP in 1992 and the NPP in 1997 --- were younger than party identifiers for the major party B. The average age of third party identifiers was lower than those of the other parties in 1992 and in 1997. This difference in average age among the political parties in 1997 is statistically significant, though the difference between the major party B and third party in 1992 is not statistically significant (see Table A6.2 in Appendix).

Regarding partisan realignment in the new democracy, older pro-opposition party supporters under authoritarian regime remained loyal to the two leaders of opposition group --- Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae-jung --- when the pro-democracy political group was divided in new democracy. In contrast, the young, who were disappointed with two

⁷ For the modernisation approach to Korean electoral behaviour under authoritarian politics, see Chong Lim Kim, Young Whan Kihl, and Seong-Tong Pai, 'The Modes of Citizen Political Participation: An Analysis of Nationwide Survey Results', in Chong Lim Kim, ed., *Political Participation in Korea* (Oxford: Clio Press, 1980), pp. 35-55.

Kims' political decision and who in any case were relatively weak party identifiers, drifted to a new third party, such as the UNP in 1992 and the NPP in 1997.

Table 6. 10 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Age, 1992-2002

	N	MAJOR PARTY A	MAJOR PARTY B	THIRD PARTY	TOTAL	PEARSON CORRELATION (P)
1992						
20-24	90	35.6%	45.6%	18.9%	100%	-0.245 (0.000)
25-34	251	38.2%	43.8%	17.9%	100%	
35-44	222	51.8%	36.5%	11.7%	100%	
45-54	146	58.9%	30.8%	10.3%	100%	
55-64	108	73.1%	23.1%	3.7%	100%	
65 and over	91	68.1%	24.2%	7.7%	100%	
Total	908	51.8%	35.7%	12.6%	100%	
1997						
20-24	76	25.0%	55.3%	19.7%	100%	-0.189 (0.000)
25-34	201	20.4%	56.2%	23.4%	100%	
35-44	191	34.0%	46.6%	19.4%	100%	
45-54	150	30.0%	59.3%	10.7%	100%	
55-64	75	33.3%	56.0%	10.7%	100%	
65 and over	41	58.5%	36.6%	4.9%	100%	
Total	734	29.8%	53.1%	17.0%	100%	
2002						
20-24	88	30.7%	69.3%		100%	-0.110 (0.002)
25-34	134	39.6%	60.4%		100%	
35-44	191	48.7%	51.3%		100%	
45-54	145	57.2%	42.8%		100%	
55-64	112	55.4%	44.6%		100%	
65 and over	85	37.6%	62.4%		100%	
Total	755	46.4%	53.6%		100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: N = number of cases; 'Major party A' refers to the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and the Grand National Party in 1997 and 2002; 'Major party B' refers to the Democratic Party in 1992, the National Congress for New Politics, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; and 'Third party' refers to the Unification National Party in 1992 and the New Party for People in 1997.

Note: In this analysis, three political parties are coded in an ordinal scale (i.e., Major Party A is coded 1, Major Party B is coded 2, and Third Party is coded 3).

Young Voters in the 2002 Presidential Election

In 2002, partisan differences between the two major parties among the different age groups clearly existed with major party B receiving even more support among younger voters. It is widely accepted that age was the key factor in explaining electoral cleavage in the 2002 presidential election. In general, Roh Moo-hyun, the presidential candidate of the MDP, was supported by younger voters and Lee Hoi Chang, the presidential candidate of the GNP, was supported by older ones. Also, Roh's victory was possible because a possible competitor Chung Mong-joon withdrew from the race. Chung was a leading contender in the election for a while, and his early success was largely due to his

popularity among the young. Roh and Chung were popular among the same types of voters, especially the young, and the electoral coalition between Roh and Chung was a key factor in determining the 2002 election result.

In 2002, it was widely accepted by many pollsters that the key age groups were those a few years younger than 45 years old.⁸ The young, particularly those who had started college in the 1980s and those involved in the 1987 People's Uprising, were relatively critical of the conservative parties and supported pro-democracy parties and liberal parties. The 30-40 year old cohort in the 2002 presidential election was the most liberal age cohorts. The survey from Korean Social Science Data Center confirms this finding. According to self-identified ideology, where a higher score means strongly conservative, the average scores of 'liberal/conservative' ideology for all cohorts of over 45 years old are above the average for all voters while those for all cohorts below 44 are smaller than the average score for all voters. In particular, the 30-34 year old cohort is most liberal, followed by the 25-29 year old cohort and 34-40 year old cohort (see Table A6.3 in Appendix).

Older Voters and Party Alignment

It is interesting that there were some changes in the party alignment among the oldest voters. In 1992 and 1997, voters over 65 years old generally preferred major party A, but this pattern changed in 2002. Unlike the previous election, major party B was the ruling party in the 2002 election. This may suggest that voters over 65 years old are always close to the party in power regardless of the characteristics of the party possibly as a result of their lack of political awareness. However, an alternative interpretation may be suggested in view of a revisionist perspective on party identification. Changes in partisan alignment may be a result of the performance of the ruling party. The ruling MDP has emphasised social welfare, and introduced a national pension system, which is the main pillar of social security system in Korea. The oldest section of the electorate have directly benefited, and are thus sympathetic to the ruling party.

In 1997, among the 45-65 years old cohort, the proportion of party identifiers for major party B, the NCNP, is bigger than that of major party A, the GNP, unlike the previous election. A critical deterioration of the Korean economy under Kim Young Sam government may be related to this change in party affiliation. It is assumed that voters of the age group who were relatively more sensitive to economic conditions and who were relatively main victims of a serious national economic crisis in 1997, were much more

⁸ 'Special Topic: Experts' Round-table Talk on the 2002 Presidential Election', *Munhwa Daily Newspaper*, 26 December 2002.

disappointed with the ruling party's performance.

In order to examine the above hypothetical explanation, the difference in evaluations of the performance of the incumbent government across different age groups is considered. As shown in Table 6.11, one-way ANOVA analysis shows that the older age groups evaluated the performance of the government very badly, and the age group difference was no longer statistically significant in 1997. Indeed, in 1992, the older generations were generally generous to the government compared to younger ones, and the difference was statistically significant. However, in 1997, the difference between older and younger groups disappeared and the older generations also expressed their disappointment with the government. Therefore, it can be suggested that the economic recession caused the weak partisans to withdraw their loyalty from the ruling Grand National Party.

However, this does not suggest a switch of party identification from the GNP to the NCNP. Indeed, it is noticeable that the proportion of older voters among all partisans suddenly decreased in 1997. Many former party identifiers of the GNP, who were disappointed with the performance of the ruling GNP, withdrew their party affiliation. It is suspected that some of them became independents while others followed Rhee In-je and switched their partisanship to the New Party for People.

Table 6. 11 ANOVA: Age Groups and Evaluation on Government Performance, 1992 and 1997

	N	Mean	Std.D	ANOVA
<u>1992</u>				F = 11.064 Sig. = 0.000
20-24	131	3.66	.99	
25-34	336	3.71	.93	
35-44	290	3.50	1.08	
45-54	196	3.28	1.13	
55-64	123	3.14	1.09	
65 and over	111	3.11	1.11	
Total	1187	3.47	1.07	
<u>1997</u>				F = 1.030 Sig. = .399
20-24	151	4.34	.70	
25-34	337	4.26	.87	
35-44	286	4.32	.83	
45-54	227	4.30	.85	
55-64	126	4.21	.87	
65 and over	75	4.12	.93	
Total	1202	4.28	.84	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992 and 1997.

Keys: N = number of cases; Mean = average score in a 5-point scale (i.e., 1 = very good, 2 = good, 3 = average, 4 = bad, 5 = very bad).

Note: The figures for 1992 are based on a transformation of a 4-point scale to a 5-point scale. Therefore, Standard deviation for 1992 is bigger than that for 1997.

In addition to changes in the partisan alignment of older voters, the average age of

party identifiers for major party B increased from 39 years old in 1992 to 43 years old in 1997, while that of the major party A (at about 45 years old) did not change between 1992 and 1997. It is assumed that this increase in the average age of NCNP identifiers was a natural increase going together with the maturation of the party while the average age of the GNP did not change due the defection of the older identifiers. However, this argument is not conclusive due to the lack of data such as panel survey data.

Education and Electoral Alignment

In 1992, the pattern of electoral support which existed in the authoritarian regimes was repeated. The less educated voters were affiliated with the DLP, the successor party of the old authoritarian parties, while the more educated voters felt close to the DP, a pro-democracy party. Also, partisans of third party, the UNP, were relatively well educated compared to those of two major parties. This confirms our expectation that higher educated pro-democratic voters under authoritarianism were disappointed with the split of the two Kims, and hoped for a new party. The difference in the level of education among three parties is linear and is statistically significant, as shown in Table 6.12.

In 1997, although the pattern of the relationship between party identification and education continued to some extent, for example, third party identifiers recorded relatively high levels of education compared to party identifiers for the other parties, the difference in the level of education between the two major parties no longer existed. Again, in 2002, there was no difference in educational level between party identifiers for the two parties. Pearson's correlation coefficient is not statistically significant (see Table 6.12 and also Table A6.4 in Appendix).

The change in partisan alignment in terms of the level of education implies that less educated voters who were easily mobilised under the authoritarian regimes are no longer loyal to the long time ruling party. As discussed above, researchers explained the difference in electoral behaviour between less and more educated voters by focusing on differences in the level of political awareness. Under authoritarian rule, higher educated voters called for democracy first, while less educated voters supported the ruling party, emphasising national economic growth and national security at the expense of political freedom. The pattern remained in 1992 after the transition to democracy, but in 1997, these differences disappeared at least in terms of party affiliation.

Concerning the change in partisan alignment, it is notable that the proportion of less educated voters among all partisans reduced in 1997. Although this decrease may be related to an increase of the level of education among the entire electorate, the change in the party alignment of less educated voters suggests that former party identifiers of the

GNP defected from the party in 1997. Their change in partisanship suggests that party identification may vary depending upon changes in the political environment. Moreover, their support for the old ruling party under the authoritarian government may not be related to the level of political awareness, if it is assumed that the level of political awareness is stable over time. Under the authoritarian governments, the support for the old ruling party of less educated voters may have been due to their policy preferences or evaluation of government performance. Subsequently, the poor performance of the ruling party and the decline of the national economy in the new democracy caused them to drift from the party.

Table 6. 12 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Education, 1992-2002

	N	MAJOR PARTY A	MAJOR PARTY B	THIRD PARTY	TOTAL	PEARSON CORRELATION (P)
1992						
Primary school	195	66.7%	28.2%	5.1%	100%	0.204 (0.000)*
Middle school	164	61.6%	32.9%	5.5%	100%	0.160 (0.000)**
High school	340	44.1%	36.8%	19.1%	100%	
College	209	42.6%	43.1%	14.4%	100%	
Total	908	51.8%	35.7%	12.6%	100%	
1997						
Primary school	83	39.8%	54.2%	6.0%	100%	0.088 (0.017)*
Middle school	85	32.9%	60.0%	7.1%	100%	0.032 (0.426)**
High school	308	26.3%	50.3%	23.4%	100%	
College	254	30.3%	53.9%	15.7%	100%	
Total	730	30.0%	53.2%	16.8%	100%	
2002						
Primary school	89	44.9%	55.1%		100%	0.020 (0.585)**
Middle school	106	48.1%	51.9%		100%	
High school	281	48.4%	51.6%		100%	
College	274	43.4%	56.6%		100%	
Total	750	46.1%	53.9%		100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: N = number of cases; Major party A = the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and the Grand National Party in 1997 and in 2002; Major party B = the Democratic Party in 1992, the National Congress for New Politics in 1997, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; Third party = the Unification National Party in 1992, and the New Party for People in 1997.

Notes: * All three parties are included in the statistical test. Indeed, in this analysis, three political parties are coded in an ordinal scale (i.e., Major Party A is coded 1, Major Party B is coded 2, and Third Party is coded 3).

** Only two major parties are included in the statistic test.

Gender and Electoral Alignment

In general, gender does not explain much electoral behaviour in new democracy. While women were relatively more mobilised in elections under authoritarian rule, there is now little difference between men and women. However, as full-time housewives, who account for a great proportion of all women, remain strong supporters of the successor party of the old authoritarian ruling party, it is expected that a difference in partisan

alignment between men and women may still exist in the new democracy.

Table 6.13 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Gender, 1992-2002

	N	MAJOR PARTY A	MAJOR PARTY B	THIRD PARTY	TOTAL	PEARSON CRRELATION (P)
1992						
Man	426	50.2%	36.2%	13.6%	100%	-0.035 (0.295)*
Woman	482	53.1%	35.3%	11.6%	100%	-0.020 (0.579)**
Total	908	51.8%	35.7%	12.6%	100%	
1997						
Man	380	25.5%	54.5%	20.0%	100%	-0.115 (0.002)*
Woman	356	34.8%	51.4%	13.8%	100%	-0.088 (0.029)**
Total	730	30.0%	53.0%	17.0%	100%	
2002						
Man	374	47.1%	52.9%		100%	0.014 (0.702)**
Woman	381	45.7%	54.3%		100%	
Total	755	46.4%	53.6%		100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Note: * Included three parties. Indeed, in this analysis, three political parties are coded in an ordinal scale (i.e., Major Party A is coded 1, Major Party B is coded 2, and Third Party is coded 3); ** Included only two major parties.

Keys: N = number of cases; Major party A = the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and the Grand National Party in 1997 and in 2002; Major party B = the Democratic Party in 1992, the National Congress for New Politics in 1997, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; Third party = the Unification National Party in 1992, and the New Party for People in 1997.

As shown in Table 6.13, a statistical test shows that gender generally does not explain partisan alignment in the new democracy. However, the 1997 presidential election study revealed a somewhat different result. Here, there was a statistical difference between major party A identifiers and major party B or third party identifiers in terms of sex (see also Table A6.5 in Appendix). This may be related to the economic crisis during the election year. Koreans faced a critical economic recession in 1997 and many voters held the incumbent government and ruling party responsible for the crisis. Men who directly suffered from the economic recession might have been more critical to the ruling party, while women who were relatively less sensitive to the recession and who historically favoured the ruling party might be less critical to the ruling party. This explains the fact that the New Party for People (NPP), which was favoured by the former identifiers of the Grand National Party and the former independents in urban area, had more male partisans rather than female partisans.

As shown in Table 6.14, a difference between male and female evaluations of government performance has existed over time, although the difference has been reduced and was not statistically significant in 2002. Men have been relatively more critical of government performance. Therefore, it is expected that men were greatly influenced by the poor performance of the ruling GNP and defected from the Grand National Party to

the NPP or became non-identifiers.

Table 6. 14 T-test for Equality of Means: Gender and Evaluation on Government Performance, 1992-2002

	N	Mean	Std.D	Test-statistics
1992				t = 2.340
Men	582	3.54	1.07	Sig. = 0.019
Women	605	3.40	1.06	
Total	1187	3.46	1.07	
1997				t = 1.898
Men	614	4.32	.82	Sig. = 0.058
Women	590	4.23	.86	
Total	1204	4.28	.84	
2002				t = 1.178
Men	739	3.30	1.01	Sig. = 0.239
Women	761	3.24	1.00	
Total	1500	3.27	1.01	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Key: N = number of cases. Mean = average score in a 5-point scale (i.e., 1 = very good, 2 = good, 3 = average, 4 = bad, and 5 = very bad).

The Urban-Rural Difference and Electoral Alignment

The urban-rural alignment based on differences in the level of political awareness was a key variable in explaining electoral behaviour under the authoritarian regimes. However, it is expected that the urban-rural alignment in electoral behaviour is no longer a useful explanatory tool in the new democracy because the urbanisation of society has progressed very rapidly and because voters in rural area are no longer so easy to mobilise.

A Reversal of Urban-Rural Differences in Party Alignment

In 1992, the old pattern, strong rural support for the ruling party and urban support for the opposition party, was maintained. The partisanship for major party A was strong in rural areas, while third party partisanship was based in urban areas. The difference in party identifiers of the three parties in terms of the size of area is statistically significant. In 1997 and in 2002, the relationship between rural-urban area and partisanship is statistically significant, but the direction of the relationship is reversed i.e., the major party A is strong in urban areas and major party B is strong in rural areas (see Table 6.15 and also Table A6.6 in Appendix).

Unequal Urbanisation across Regions

The reversal of the relationship between the two major parties and the type of

residence area may be related to the level of urbanisation across different regions. The *Gyeongsang* region could have become more urbanised compared to *Jeolla* or *Chungcheong* regions during last 10 years. As people in *Gyeongsang* are strong supporters of the Grand National Party, unequal urbanisation might explain why urban voters are now relatively strong supporters of the GNP.

Table 6. 15 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Location, 1992-2002

	N	MAJOR PARTY A	MAJOR PARTY B	THIRD PARTY	TOTAL	PEARSON χ^2 (P)
1992						13.146 (0.011)
Big city	449	51.9%	34.7%	13.4%	100%	
Small city	236	43.6%	42.8%	13.6%	100%	
Rural area	223	60.1%	30.0%	9.9%	100%	
Total	908	51.8%	35.7%	12.6%	100%	
1997						9.528 (0.049)
Big city	346	34.4%	48.8%	16.8%	100%	
Small city	282	28.7%	55.0%	16.3%	100%	
Rural area	108	19.4%	61.1%	19.4%	100%	
Total	736	30.0%	53.0%	17.0%	100%	
2002						14.733 (0.001)
Big city	360	52.8%	47.2%		100%	
Small city	302	43.0%	57.0%		100%	
Rural area	93	32.3%	67.7%		100%	
Total	755	46.4%	53.6%		100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997 and 2002.

Keys: N = number of cases; Major party A = the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and the Grand National Party in 1997 and in 2002; Major party B = the Democratic Party in 1992, the National Congress for New Politics in 1997, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; Third party = the Unification National Party in 1992, and the New Party for People in 1997.

Table 6.16 shows the relations between voter's hometown and size of residence area. More than half of voters who are from *Gyeongsang* live in a big city, and this proportion is greater than that of voters who are from *Jeolla*. However, the proportion has not changed much over time. Consequently, the reversal of the urban/rural partisanship divide cannot be explained by an increased urbanisation of the *Gyeongsang* people. In 1992, more than half of *Gyeongsang* people lived in urban areas, but the partisanship of the major party A, the Democratic Liberal Party, was strong in rural areas.

Politicisation of Voters in Rural Area?

Another interpretation of a reverse of the relationship between major political party and type of residence area is related to a politicisation of voters in rural areas. Voters in rural areas are very vulnerable under the global world economic system, and try to actively defend their own interests in the new democracy, while rural voters were

mobilised under the authoritarian regimes. Farmers may therefore feel close to the major party B that has suggested a protection of agriculture under the WTO system rather than the major party A which has pursued an economic globalisation at the expense of farmers. A change of the partisanship of farmer in the new democracy will be discussed again later.

Table 6. 16 Crosstab: Voter's Hometown and Size of Residence Area, 1992-2002

	N	Big city	Small city	Rural county	Total	PEARSON χ^2 (P)
1992						114.966 (0.000)
<i>Seoul</i>	129	85.3%	12.4%	2.3%	100%	
<i>Gyeonggi</i>	131	45.0%	26.7%	28.2%	100%	
<i>Gangwon</i>	63	23.8%	36.5%	39.7%	100%	
<i>Chungcheong</i>	204	41.2%	29.4%	29.4%	100%	
<i>Jeolla</i>	238	39.1%	34.0%	26.9%	100%	
<i>Gyeongsang</i>	419	52.3%	25.3%	22.4%	100%	
<i>Jeju</i>	1	100.0%			100%	
The North	15	86.7%	6.7%	6.7%	100%	
Total	1200	49.5%	26.8%	23.7%	100%	
1997						106.932 (0.000)
<i>Seoul</i>	149	67.1%	30.9%	2.0%	100%	
<i>Gyeonggi</i>	118	52.5%	34.7%	12.7%	100%	
<i>Gangwon</i>	76	30.3%	31.6%	38.2%	100%	
<i>Chungcheong</i>	198	36.9%	37.9%	25.3%	100%	
<i>Jeolla</i>	266	44.7%	43.2%	12.0%	100%	
<i>Gyeongsang</i>	360	53.9%	34.7%	11.4%	100%	
<i>Jeju</i>	25	72.0%	12.0%	16.0%	100%	
The North	12	83.3%	8.3%	8.3%	100%	
Total	1204	49.8%	35.7%	14.5%	100%	
2002						131.475 (0.000)
<i>Seoul</i>	208	76.0%	19.2%	4.8%	100%	
<i>Gyeonggi</i>	175	32.6%	57.1%	10.3%	100%	
<i>Gangwon</i>	93	36.6%	58.1%	5.4%	100%	
<i>Chungcheong</i>	216	45.8%	39.4%	14.8%	100%	
<i>Jeolla</i>	278	40.3%	40.3%	19.4%	100%	
<i>Gyeongsang</i>	499	51.5%	40.3%	8.2%	100%	
<i>Jeju</i>	6	16.7%	83.3%		100%	
The North	16	56.3%	31.3%	12.5%	100%	
Total	1491	48.8%	40.4%	10.9%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Key: N = number of cases.

Religion and Electoral Alignment

Unlike Western democracies where religious conflict has been salient and religion is still a key factor to explain social cleavages, Koreans have not experienced any serious religious conflicts, and religion has hardly been considered as a factor to explain electoral behaviour. However, as shown in Table 6.17, there is a close relationship between religion and partisanship, and the relationship is statistically significant. Buddhists are related to support for major party A while Protestantism is related to support for major party B. In

the division between Buddhists and Protestants, Catholics and atheists are located in the middle.

Table 6. 17 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Religion, 1992-2002

	N	MAJOR PARTY A	MAJOR PARTY B	THIRD PARTY	PEARSON χ^2 (P)
1992					
Buddhist	299	62.5%	25.1%	12.4%	36.748 (0.000)
Protestant	212	42.9%	46.7%	10.4%	
Catholic	78	51.3%	30.8%	17.9%	
Other	17	70.6%	29.4%	0.0%	
None religion	302	46.4%	40.1%	13.6%	
Total	908	51.8%	35.7%	12.6%	
1997					
Buddhist	217	45.6%	37.8%	16.6%	49.086 (0.000)
Protestant	176	23.3%	65.9%	10.8%	
Catholic	65	27.7%	50.8%	21.5%	
Other	23	30.4%	56.5%	13.0%	
None religion	252	21.8%	57.5%	20.6%	
Total	733	30.0%	53.1%	16.9%	
2002					
Buddhist	195	56.4%	43.6%		22.903 (0.000)
Protestant	223	40.8%	59.2%		
Catholic	78	59.0%	41.0%		
Other	12	16.7%	83.3%		
None religion	247	40.9%	59.1%		
Total	755	46.4%	53.6%		

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: N = number of cases; Major party A = the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and the Grand National Party in 1997 and in 2002; Major party B = the Democratic Party in 1992, the National Congress for New Politics in 1997, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; Third party = the Unification National Party in 1992, and the New Party for People in 1997.

Value Difference?

This division can be interpreted by differences in political attitudes across the different religions. Buddhists are more conservative, while Protestants are more liberal about religious doctrine. Also, under the authoritarian period, many Protestant religious leaders directly participated in social movements for democracy, though some clergymen and churches kept a close relationship with authoritarian governments. During 1980s, Protestant and Catholic religious leaders influenced by the liberation theology originating from Latin America called for democracy and emphasised active participation of religious people in social reform. Meanwhile, Buddhist religious leaders were relatively silent on political issues. In this cultural context, Protestants feel close to the major party B, while Buddhists are more inclined to support major party A.

Regional Distribution of Religion

However, the Buddhist-Protestant alignment in party identification is related to regional distribution of each religion. Buddhism is strong in the *Gyeongsang* region while Protestantism is strong in the *Jeolla* region. The regional distribution of religions originated in pre-modern society. Historically, the Christian religion flourished in the *Jeolla* region with the introduction of the religion to Koreans, while Buddhism, a traditional religion, has been very strong in traditional society of the *Gyeongsang*.

The distribution of religion across regions confirms this argument. A great proportion of voters from *Gyeongsang* are Buddhists, while a high percentage of voters from *Jeolla* are Protestants. There is also a relatively high number of Protestants among voters from *Chungcheong*, which was politically close to major party B in the 1997 presidential election (see Table A6.7 in Appendix).

Social Class and Electoral Alignment

In Western democracies, social class has been an important basis of political partisanship and class voting is significant, though many researchers argue that class is no longer dominant in politics and new factors such as postmaterial values should be included in explanations of electoral behaviour.⁹ In general, class affects partisan choice and there is a linkage between classes and political parties. Typically, manual workers support left wing parties and the non-manual workers support either the centre or right wing parties. This linkage between classes and political parties exists even in the United States where class-based parties have not emerged. Here, the working class prefers the Democratic Party that advocates policies in favour of the working class.¹⁰

In contrast to Western democracies, it is widely accepted that class is not an important factor to explain Korean politics because none of the major political parties have been based on the class cleavage. In Korean politics, all major parties have identified themselves as a 'catch-all' party, and class-based major parties have not emerged, though a minor party, the Democratic Labour Party, was formed based on one of two national labour unions in 2000.¹¹ Under the authoritarian regimes, freedom of

⁹ For a recent discussion on class politics in voting behaviour in Western democracies, see Geoffrey Evans, ed., *The End of Class Politics?: Class Voting in Comparative Context* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

¹⁰ Michael Hout, 'Classes, Unions, and the Realignment of US Presidential Voting, 1952-1992', in Geoffrey Evans, ed., *The End of Class Politics?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) pp. 59-82.

¹¹ The previous form of the Democratic Labour Party was the People's Victory 21 (PV) in the 1997 presidential election. As a candidate of the PV, Kwon Young-gil ran for the presidency. Then, in 2002, he again ran for the presidency, as a candidate of the Democratic Labour Party. His share

expression or freedom of thought was limited and leftist thought was legally condemned. During the rapid industrialisation under authoritarian regimes, the labour movement was restricted severely, and a class-conscious working class did not develop. In the new democracy, labour movements have become more successful, but the movement has hardly advanced to political and social issues. In short, researchers generally agree that class does not explain much electoral behaviour in Korea.¹² Therefore, it is not expected that a significant relationship between class and party affiliation will exist.

Beginning of Class Politics?

There is no single universal class scheme in electoral studies in Korea.¹³ Each researcher uses a different class framework. In this research, the Goldthorpe five-class schema is adopted.¹⁴ As shown in Table 6.18, there were no class differences between the partisans of the major parties in 1992 and in 1997, but there is a statistical difference between partisans of the political parties in terms of class in 2002. Therefore, it is suggested that class is beginning to explain partisan alignments in Korea and that regionalism is not the only factor. It also suggests that partisans are beginning to align according to economic interests or preferences. One of most notable change is the distribution of partisanships among the Petty Bourgeois in 1997. The Petty Bourgeois class has historically supported the authoritarian party, but not in 1997. Again, the economic recession in the end of 1997 may explain the change in the partisanship of the Petty Bourgeois. The class is relatively more sensitive to any economic recession, and they withdrew their support for the ruling party.

of the vote markedly increased between two presidential elections, but he merely gained 3.9 per cent of votes in the 2002 presidential election.

¹² For an analysis of class-based electoral behaviour in Korea, see Young-tae Chung, 'Gyegeupbyeol topyohangtaeleul tonghae bon sipsadae daeseon' (An analysis of the 14th presidential election focusing on class voting), in Nam-Young Lee, ed., *Hanguui seongeo* (Elections in Korea), vol. 1 (Seoul: Nanam, 1993), pp. 139-83.

¹³ Chung, 'Gyegeupbyeol topyohangtaeleul tonghae bon sipsadae daeseon' (An analysis of the 14th presidential election focusing on class voting), p. 140.

¹⁴ The schema includes the following classes: the Salaried (managers, professionals, administrators); Routine manual worker (clerks, secretaries); the Petty Bourgeoisie (employer and the self-employed); Foremen and Technicians; and the Working Class (rank and file manual employees in industry and agriculture). The Goldthorpe class schema is based on employment status as well as on occupation. The employment status is important in explaining electoral behaviour, and the Goldthorpe class schema is arguably the most influential operationalisation of social class in British electoral studies. For a classification of occupations in the Goldthorpe class schema, see John H. Goldthorpe and Keith Hope, *The Social Grading of Occupations: A New Approach and Scale* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974). For the schema in electoral studies, Anthony Heath et al., *Understanding Political Change* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1991), pp. 66-7.

Table 6. 18 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Class, 1992-2002

	N	MAJOR PARTY A	MAJOR PARTY B	THIRD PARTY	TOTAL	PEARSON χ^2 (P)
1992						
the Salariat	91	51.6%	35.2%	13.2%	100%	11.514 (0.174)
Routine Non-manual Workers	72	45.8%	33.3%	20.8%	100%	
the Petty Bourgeois	207	49.8%	40.6%	9.7%	100%	
Foremen and Technicians	13	30.8%	53.8%	15.4%	100%	
the Working Class	132	56.1%	29.5%	14.4%	100%	
Total	515	50.7%	36.1%	13.2%	100%	
1997						
the Salariat	89	31.5%	52.8%	15.7%	100%	15.433 (0.051)
Routine Non-manual Workers	56	21.4%	53.6%	25.0%	100%	
the Petty Bourgeois	232	23.3%	62.5%	14.2%	100%	
Foremen and Technicians	10	20.0%	30.0%	50.0%	100%	
the Working Class	80	23.8%	53.8%	22.5%	100%	
Total	467	24.6%	57.4%	18.0%	100%	
2002						
the Salariat	87	40.2%	59.8%		100%	11.162 (0.025)
Routine Non-manual Workers	65	44.6%	55.4%		100%	
the Petty Bourgeois	158	51.9%	48.1%		100%	
Foremen and Technicians	9	0.0%	100.0%		100%	
the Working Class	80	47.5%	52.5%		100%	
Total	399	46.1%	53.9%		100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: N = number of cases; 'Major party A' refers to the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and the Grand National Party in 1997 and 2002; 'Major party B' refers to the Democratic Party in 1992, the National Congress for New Politics, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; and 'Third party' refers to the Unification National Party in 1992 and the New Party for People in 1997.

Note: Although there are too few foremen and technicians in the survey data, it is assumed that this does not much disturb the result of the statistical analysis.

Level of Income and Electoral Alignment

The absence of major class-based parties in Korea does not disprove the existence of a linkage between partisan affiliation and the economic status of Korean voters. Although many journalists and researchers often assume that there is not much difference between political parties in terms of policies, the two competing major parties, the descendent of the authoritarian party and the successor to the pro-democracy party, have had significant policy differences. Major party A has emphasised market freedom and approved of the contribution of big business groups (*chaebol*) while major party B has always preferred social welfare and economic justice as well as a balanced development between the *chaebol* and medium or small business companies. Furthermore, each major party has identified itself with the representation of either the middle class or the lower class, and

many voters have perceived this class identification. Major party A, which has emphasised market freedom and economic efficiency, has been perceived as a political party for the rich and the upper-middle class, while major party B, which has emphasised social security system and economic justice in the market, has been recognised as a political party for the poor and the lower-middle class.

This linkage between political parties and the economic status of voters can be seen in election results. For example, election results in every district in Seoul clearly show this linkage. Major party A won in every electoral district where the upper or middle class live such as the southern part of Seoul, while major party B generally won in the poorer areas such as the northern part of the city.

Electoral Alignment: the Poor vs. the Rich

The survey data shows mixed results. As shown in Table 6.19, in 1992, the difference in the economic status of party identifiers between political parties is statistically significant (i.e., Chi-square = 37.150, $p = 0.000$). However, the relation did not fit with previous expectations. The poor were more likely to be aligned to major party A while the rich affiliated with third party, the Unification National Party (see Table A6.8 in Appendix). The relationship between the poor and major party A can be interpreted as a continuation of a pattern which existed in the authoritarian regimes. Before the transition to democracy, the poor appreciated the economic performance of the authoritarian government and also preferred economic development to political democracy. Considering the long-term duration of party identification, this continuation of partisanship is not unexpected.

The socio-economic characteristic of third party identifiers may be related to the personal qualities of the leader of the party. Chung Ju-young of the Unification National Party, owner of Hyundai business group and the most successful businessman in Korea, promised better management of the economy, and wealthier voters generally supported the party. This suggests that party identifiers consider policies and party platform when developing an affiliation with political parties. Also, this implies that party attachment with third party is not quite distinguished from partisan support in election because of a short life of the third party.

In 1997 and 2002, the relationship is not statistically significant, but the direction of the relationship was reversed. The poor show greater affiliation with major party B in 1997 and 2002, in contrast to their affiliation with major party A in 1992. This may be related to differences in policies pursued by two major political parties for the last 10 years. For example, major party B, such as the NCNP in 1997, has claimed to stand for

the poor and has pledged itself to social welfare and economic justice, while the GNP has asserted market freedom and has proposed policies for the rich. It is suggested that two major parties have distinctive images, and that this affects party identifiers. Also, this implies that the distinction between partisanship of two major parties in terms of economic status will be evident in the future, if the political party system is continued.

Table 6. 19 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Household Income, 1992-2002

	N	MAJOR PARTY A	MAJOR PARTY B	THIRD PARTY	TOTAL	PEARSON χ^2 (P)
1992						37.150 (0.000)
Low	364	59.9%	31.0%	6.8%	100%	
Middle	495	46.9%	39.2%	11.9%	100%	
High	49	40.8%	34.7%	21.8%	100%	
Total	908	51.8%	35.7%	12.6%	100%	
1997						2.813 (0.590)
Low	235	27.7%	55.3%	17.0%	100%	
Middle	375	29.7%	53.1%	15.8%	100%	
High	113	33.0%	48.7%	18.9%	100%	
Total	723	29.9%	53.1%	17.0%	100%	
2002						1.536 (0.464)
Low	255	45.1%	54.9%		100%	
Middle	328	48.5%	51.5%		100%	
High	132	51.5%	48.5%		100%	
Total	715	47.8%	52.2%		100%	

Data: Korean Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: N = number of cases; Major party A = the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and the Grand National Party in 1997 and in 2002; Major party B = the Democratic Party in 1992, the National Congress for New Politics in 1997, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; Third party = the Unification National Party in 1992, and the New Party for People in 1997.

Occupation and Electoral Alignment

A further feature of Korean elections has been differences in electoral behaviour across different occupational categories. In general, full-time housewives, farmers, public servants, and unemployed workers have supported the authoritarian ruling parties, while students, white-collar workers, and blue-collar workers have preferred the pro-democracy opposition parties. Therefore, it is expected that in the new democracy there is a link between partisanship and occupations, if the pattern of party preferences under the authoritarian regimes remained.

As shown in Table 6.20, there is a close relation between party affiliation and occupational categories in the 1997 and 2002 elections and the differences between the two major parties are statistically significant (i.e., Pearson's chi-square is 31.460 with $p = 0.000$ in 1997, and chi-square is 23.467 with $p = 0.000$ in 2002). Although the distribution of partisans across occupational categories is not statistically significant in

the 1992 presidential election (i.e., $p > 0.05$), some categories of occupation followed the old pattern of party preferences.

Table 6. 20 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Occupation, 1992-2002

	N	MAJOR PARTY A	MAJOR PARTY B	THIRD PARTY	PEARSON χ^2 (P)
1992					
Professional & Public servant	70	51.4%	37.1%	11.4%	23.186 (0.057)
White collar worker	101	46.5%	32.7%	20.8%	
Self-employed worker	113	49.6%	38.9%	11.5%	
Blue collar worker	117	49.6%	34.2%	16.2%	
Farmer	114	56.1%	37.7%	6.1%	
Student	53	41.5%	47.2%	11.3%	
Full-time housewife	225	51.1%	37.8%	11.1%	
Unemployed worker & other	115	62.6%	24.3%	13.0%	
Total	908	51.8%	35.7%	12.6%	
1997					
Professional & Public servant	73	31.5%	53.4%	15.1%	43.061 (0.000)
White collar worker	80	22.5%	53.8%	23.8%	
Self-employed worker	188	23.4%	63.8%	12.8%	
Blue collar worker	86	24.4%	51.2%	24.4%	
Farmer	40	22.5%	55.0%	22.5%	
Student	59	23.7%	62.7%	13.6%	
Full-time housewife	145	44.1%	40.7%	15.2%	
Unemployed worker & other	46	50.0%	37.0%	13.0%	
Total	717	30.1%	53.1%	16.7%	
2002					
Professional & Public servant	63	34.9%	65.1%		23.467 (0.001)
White collar worker	91	48.4%	51.6%		
Self-employed worker	125	53.6%	46.4%		
Blue collar worker	70	51.4%	48.6%		
Farmer	43	25.6%	74.4%		
Student	70	30.0%	70.0%		
Full-time housewife	142	51.4%	48.6%		
Unemployed worker & other	128	48.4%	51.6%		
Total	732	45.9%	54.1%		

Data: Korean presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Note: The classification of occupation follows a common classification used by many social research agencies in Korea such as Gallup Korea and TNS Korea.

Keys: N = number of cases; Major party A = the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and the Grand National Party in 1997 and in 2002; Major party B = the Democratic Party in 1992, the National Congress for New Politics in 1997, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; Third party = the Unification National Party in 1992 and the New Party for People in 1997.

Students and Housewives in New Democracy

In 1992, students generally were affiliated with major party B, while full-time housewives who were loyal supporters of the authoritarian ruling party transferred their support to the successor party of the old ruling party. Students and full-time housewives showed the same pattern in 1997 and in 2002. Their political values may explain this

pattern of party affiliation. In Korean politics, students were always the centre of social movements for democracy. For instance, students were the main force in the transition to democracy in 1987. In the new democracy, students have supported extensive political reforms and have challenged the authoritarian political culture embedded in the society. On the other hand, housewives have preferred the *status quo* and supported only incremental reform rather than a rapid social change. Also, housewives have been relatively less critical of government performance.

Farmers in the New Democracy

Partisan alignment among farmers has changed over time. In 1992, more farmers were affiliated with party A than party B. In a sense, the distribution of farmer's partisanship in 1992 followed their old pattern. Under authoritarian regimes, farmers experienced rapid economic development in the early stage of industrialisation, and voters in rural areas strongly supported the authoritarian ruling party. During the rapid industrialisation under the authoritarian regime, one of the popular social slogans was 'building a rich rural area', and voters in rural areas benefited during industrialisation. However, in the new democracy, farmers have suffered. During the Kim Yong Sam government, Korea joined to the WTO at the expense of farmers' interests in the domestic market, while the opposition party firmly supported the protection of the agricultural sector. It may be assumed that farmers were very disappointed with the ruling party and withdrew their support from the political party. As shown in Table 6.21, in 1992, farmers were relatively less critical about the incumbent government's performance, but in 1997, farmers were not exceptional in their critical evaluation of the government's poor performance. Then, in 2002, farmers were actually more positive about the performance of the new ruling party than any other occupational groups.

However, the reliability of this is limited due to small sample size. Also, this explanation is also problematic when we consider a main characteristic of party identification — a long-term psychological attachment. It is not expected that a party identifier would switch from the major party A to the major party B, even though the major party B proposed various policies to attract farmers. A possible alternative interpretation focuses on a decrease of farmers among all partisans. As shown in Table 6.20, the proportion of farmer among all partisans markedly decreased in 1997. This suggests that farmers who identified themselves with the major party A in 1992 gave up this affiliation in 1997, while most farmers who affiliated in 1992 with major party B retained attachment this five years later.

Table 6. 21 ANOVA: Occupation Groups and Evaluation of Government Performance, 1992-2002

	N	Mean	Std.D	ANOVA
1992				F = 5.491 Sig. = 0.000
Professionals / Public Servants	95	3.60	1.11	
White collar workers	161	3.70	.96	
Self-employed	147	3.53	1.06	
Blue collar workers	150	3.37	1.03	
Farmers	132	3.26	1.16	
Students	75	3.92	.85	
Housewives	272	3.42	1.07	
Unemployed	155	3.23	1.10	
Total	1187	3.48	1.07	
1997				F = 2.494 Sig. = 0.015
Professionals / Public Servants	136	4.43	.82	
White collar workers	132	4.36	.84	
Self-employed	275	4.30	.85	
Blue collar workers	116	4.22	.87	
Farmers	68	4.26	.86	
Students	121	4.39	.69	
Housewives	229	4.15	.88	
Unemployed	92	4.10	.89	
Total	1169	4.28	.84	
2002				F = 2.963 Sig. = 0.004
Professionals / Public Servants	126	3.19	.98	
White collar workers	197	3.36	.98	
Self-employed	237	3.41	.99	
Blue collar workers	132	3.27	1.02	
Farmers	66	3.00	1.08	
Students	179	3.04	.85	
Housewives	285	3.28	.99	
Unemployed	237	3.27	1.10	
Total	1459	3.26	1.00	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: N = number of cases; and Mean = average score in a 5-point scale (i.e., 1= very good, and 5 = very bad).

Ideological Self-Image and Electoral Alignment

In Western democracies, ideological self-image of the left and the right is useful in explaining electoral behaviour, particularly electoral relationships with political parties.¹⁵

However, in Korea, it is widely accepted that political ideology does not help explain voting choice.¹⁶ The authoritarian government always emphasised the military threat

¹⁵ For a detailed analysis of the relationship between party identification and ideology in the United Kingdom, see William L. Miller, Annis May Timpson, and Michael Lessnoff, *Political Culture in Contemporary Britain: People and Politicians, Principles and Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 295-320.

¹⁶ As one of the few studies which emphasises ideology in voting behaviour, see Won-Taek Kang, 'Yukwonjaui jeongchiinyeomgwa sipjukdae chongseon' (Political ideology of voters and the 16th general election: an overlap of regional cleavage and ideological cleavage), in Youngjae Jin, ed., *Hangukui seongeo* (Elections in Korea), vol. 4 (Seoul: Korean Social Science Data Center, 2002), pp. 101-32.

from the North Korea, and Korean voters who experienced the Korean War had an extreme dislike of the left. Indeed, the electorate was extremely skewed to the right in terms of ideology and political values, and the left was hardly accepted. Furthermore, in terms of ideological characteristics, all major parties have resembled conservative parties, although to varying degrees.

This does not mean that Korean voters are homogenous in terms of political ideology. After a transition to democracy in 1987, ideological rigidity has been markedly weakened in the society. The high level of tension between North and South has been reduced and many Koreans look for a peaceful relationship with the communist North. In addition, those who were born after the Korean War have entered the electorate, and now a greater percentage of the electorate did not experience the war. These post-war generations are less likely to have a bias against the left. Eventually, a democratic socialist party appeared in the new democracy and the party took a respectable share of the vote in the 2002 election.

Although there have been some changes after the transition to democracy, it may be premature to apply the 'left/right' ideological labels to the electorate in Korea where the public have a strong bias against socialism and regard the left as socialist. Some researchers suggest that rather the American terminology of 'liberal/conservative', which is relatively independent from economic egalitarianism, may be more appropriate to explain ideological distinctions amongst Korean voters.¹⁷ However, in Western democracies, the ideological labels of 'left/right' is not restricted to economic egalitarianism. For example, when both the British public and elite use the ideological labels left and right, they have often comprised two distinct but connected dimensions --- i.e., the dimension 'liberal/authoritarian' and the dimension 'egalitarian/inegalitarian'. For instance, the left are committed to both liberty and equality, while the right are more likely to be both authoritarian and inegalitarian.¹⁸ Thus no matter what ideological labels are used in the analysis of Korean voters, we may assume that ideological self-image comprises at least two distinct dimensions, liberty and equality, and ideological self-image is useful to explain electoral behaviour in Korea if there is a degree of coherence in voters' values.¹⁹ In the new democracy, voters in Korea show differences in attitudes

¹⁷ Won-Taek Kang, 'Yukwonjaui inyeomjeok seonghyanggwa tupyohangtae' (Ideological attitude of voters and voting behaviour), in Nam-Young Lee, ed., *Hangukui seongeo* (Elections in Korea), vol. 2 (Seoul: Pureungil, 1998), pp. 47-96, at pp. 48-9. Also, according to a survey, half of Korean voters do not have an ideological consistency across various social issues. Only 48.7 per cent of respondents have ideology as a belief-system, and 51.3 per cent of voters reveal different ideological dispositions depending upon different issues. Sample size is 1,000 and the estimated standard error is plus and minus 3% point in the true percentage. See 'Ideological disposition of Koreans', *Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper*, 3 June 2002.

¹⁸ Miller, Timpson, and Lessnoff, *Political Culture in Contemporary Britain*, pp. 295-320.

¹⁹ In this thesis, I apply the words 'liberal and conservative' in measuring ideological self-image

toward political, social, and economic reform. For instance, some electors prefer the *status quo*, while others support reform. Each voter also has a different position on the scope and tempo of reforms.

Ideological Self-Image and Partisan Alignment

It is expected that ideological self-image explains differences in the electorate and ideological differences amongst voters explain partisan alignments in Korea. It is assumed that those who identify themselves as being conservative are more likely to align themselves with the successor of the old authoritarian party, while those who identify themselves as being the liberal are more inclined towards the descendant of the old pro-democracy party. It is also expected that partisans aligned with third parties took a middle position between the positions of the two major parties.

Table 6. 22 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Self-Identified Ideology, 1997-2002

	N	MAJOR PARTY A	MAJOR PARTY B	THIRD PARTY	TOTAL	PEARSON CORRELATION (P)
<u>1997</u>						
Strong conservative	56	50.5%	42.9%	7.1%	100%	0.262* (0.000)
Conservative	225	40.0%	44.0%	16.0%	100%	
Centrist	140	28.6%	51.4%	20.0%	100%	
Liberal	188	19.1%	58.5%	22.3%	100%	
Strong liberal	63	11.1%	73.0%	15.9%	100%	
Total	672	29.9%	52.2%	17.9%	100%	
<u>2002</u>						
Strong conservative	39	66.7%	33.3%		100%	0.363 (0.000)
Conservative	209	70.3%	29.7%		100%	
Centrist	223	47.1%	52.9%		100%	
Liberal	231	27.3%	72.7%		100%	
Strong liberal	53	17.0%	83.0%		100%	
Total	755	46.4%	53.6%		100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997 and 2002.

Note: * only two major parties are included in the statistical test.

Keys: N = number of cases; 'Major party A' refers to the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and the Grand National Party in 1997 and 2002; 'Major party B' refers to the Democratic Party in 1992, the National Congress for New Politics, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; and 'Third party' refers to the Unification National Party in 1992 and the New Party for People in 1997.

This hypothetical notion is corroborated by a statistical test based on survey data of

because these words are widely used by the public and politicians in Korea. The terminology of 'progressive and conservative' (*jinbo* and *bosu*), which was used in the survey depicted in the table, or 'reformist and conservative' (*gaehyeok* and *bosu*) is also widely used to label ideological position of publics and politicians. But the words 'left and right' (*jwapa* and *wupa*) are very rarely used in measuring voter's ideology in Korea. The word 'left' connotes pro-communist and conservative politicians and journalists often use this word when they attack the progressive politicians or intellectuals in Korea.

self-identified ideological position. In both the 1997 and 2002 election studies, party identifiers of major party A are relatively conservative and party identifiers of major party B are relatively liberal.²⁰ Indeed, as shown in Table 6.22, ideology is correlated with party identification (i.e., Pearson's correlation coefficient is 0.262 and 0.363 in 1997 and 2002, respectively) and the relations are statistically significant (i.e., $p = 0.000$). Also, contrary to earlier expectations about the ideological position of third party identifiers, these voters are almost same with party identifiers of major party B in term of ideology. As shown in Table 6.23, the mean scores of the two opposition parties (i.e., major party B and third party) are almost identical and the t-test for equality of means rejects ideological differences between party identifiers of these two parties (i.e., $p = 0.956$). Finally, according to the mean scores, party identifiers of two parties became more liberal between the 1997 and the 2002 election. This suggests that Korean voters as a whole may be becoming more liberal.

Table 6. 23 T-Test for Equality of Means: Partisan Alignment and Ideology, 1997-2002

	N	MEAN	STD. DEVIATION	T	SIG. (2-TAILED)
1997					
Major party A	201	2.52	1.05		
Major Party B	351	3.16	1.17		
Third party (C)	120	3.15	1.05		
Compare A an B				-6.354	0.000
Compare A and C				-5.183	0.000
Compare B and C				0.055	0.956
2002					
Major party A	350	2.66	.94		
Major Party B	405	3.41	.98		
Compare A an B				10.698	0.000

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Note: Mean = average score in a 5-point scale (i.e., 1= very conservative and 5 is very liberal).

Keys: N = number of cases; 'Major party A' refers to the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and the Grand National Party in 1997 and 2002; 'Major party B' refers to the Democratic Party in 1992, the National Congress for New Politics, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; and 'Third party' refers to the Unification National Party in 1992 and the New Party for People in 1997.

2. A Model of Partisan Alignment in Korea

As discussed earlier, various social and economic factors are related to partisan alignment. In particular, region is the main factor explaining electoral alignments in Korea with some other variables also being related to region. For example, religion is related to partisan alignment, but it is also related to regional distribution. Moreover, it can be seen that the

²⁰ A same analysis for the 1992 election is excluded due to a lack of data.

ideological distribution of voters is also linked regional patterns. Therefore, it can be question whether any factors other than region are necessary to explain partisan alignment, even though correlations exists between partisanship and social and economic factors.

Preliminary Explanation of Partisan Alignment: Qualitative Data

The qualitative data suggests several factors to explain partisanship in Korea. In the in-depth interviews, party identifiers were asked about why they feel close to a particular political party. Regionalism was the key factor to explain their partisanship, but other variables also were influential.

Regionalism

First of all, the regional cleavage explains the partisan alignment of the two major parties, the Grand National Party and the Millennium Democratic Party. Among the 14 interviewees who identified themselves with a particular political party, all interviewees who have an attachment to the GNP were from the *Gyeongsang* region. All respondents who are from the *Jeolla* feel close to the MDP.

Regionalism without regional interest: However, the respondents' affiliation to certain political parties based on region was not solely related to regional interests. Regionalism was mentioned as the main reason why they have an affiliation to the political parties, even though they thought that regionalism was not honourable. For example, in answering the question about the reasons why they feel close to a particular party, they said, "I lived in *Daegu* [a big city in *Gyeongsang* region]. As a *Daegu* citizen, I began to like and prefer the party. I know that people in *Daegu* still support the Grand National Party" (I-210), "Well, I have criticised regionalism [in the early part of this interview], but I am not free from the regionalism either due to my age" (I-213), "Regionalism is the main reason [why I feel close to the Grand National Party]. I have been influenced by regionalism because I lived in *Gyeongsang* region (I-209), and "Well, I know that this is regionalism. My parents are from the *Jeolla* region. I did not much like the Millennium Democratic Party, but my parents influenced my party affiliation. People who are from the *Jeolla* region are influenced by the regionalism" (I-206).

Overestimation of regionalism: Although there is a clear relationship between party identification and region, policy preferences or image of political parties should not be ignored in explaining the partisan alignment in Korea. Some interviewees who are from either *Gyeongsang* or *Jeolla* and identified themselves with the two major parties claimed

other reasons for this identification rather than regionalism. For example, in responding to a question about why they feel close to a particular party, some respondents who are from two rival regions answered, “Every political party pursues power. [I believe] that the party will perform well in government if the party formed a government” (I-203), and “I am interested in the fall of the authoritarian political party” (I-204) and she did indeed support the political party that led the transition to democracy. A participant in a focus group interview who is from the *Jeolla* region and identified with the Millennium Democratic Party also suggested another reason. “The old ruling party were in power continually for a long time. So, I expected that the party could do something that the old ruling party failed to do” (FF1). Another participant in a focus group interview who is from *Jeolla* region and identified with the Millennium Democratic Party also said, “The party does not go with the current of the time, and sticks to its original intentions” (FM8).

In sum, it is noticeable that the relationship between region and partisan alignment is more likely overestimated in quantitative survey data. For example, it is not true that all voters from *Jeolla* and affiliated to the Millennium Party are influenced by regionalism regarding their partisanship. Most of them identified with the party due to regionalism, but some of them did not. Statistical analysis based on a correlation between a sociological variable, i.e., home region, and party identification, fails to distinguish the identifiers who are affected by regionalism from the identifiers who are free from this, and overestimates the influence of regionalism on partisanship.

Political Leaders

Respondents who are free from regional constraints suggest several different reasons why they feel close to a particular party. Among them, many respondents referred to the political leaders of the party, especially the presidential candidates as a reason for their party affiliation. Although they mentioned a candidate or a specific political leader, it appeared that they made a connection between the image of the politician and the image of the political party. For example, again, to the question about the reasons why they feel close to a particular political party, respondents answered, “I voted for the incumbent president in the [1997] presidential election. I thought that he would do something for political democracy. Again, I supported the candidate of the party in the [2002] presidential election for the same reason” (I-207), and “I think that the candidate will contribute to political democracy and social justice... I like the party because of the politician I like” (I-211).

Long-term Policy Preference

Respondents identifying with the Democratic Labour Party (DLP) more directly mentioned their policy preferences, but they referred to the general image of the party rather than specific policies. For example, “Because the party speaks for the poor, the workers, and the alienated class... In a sense, their policies are not realistic, but I am very interested in their suggestions to social welfare for the ordinary people” (I-212).

A Model of Partisan Alignment: Multiple Regression Analysis

Model

A causal model of partisan alignment is adopted and modified from the renowned funnel model of Michigan school in electoral studies. The Michigan model assumed that social and economic factors affect party identification, and then party identification determines political attitudes including a belief-system. However, as discussed above, qualitative analysis suggests that ideology and general policy preferences are one of main reasons why voters feel close to a particular political party. Although it is true that voters more and more rely on their partisanship to interpret political information and partisanship affects voter’s political attitudes, qualitative data show that political attitude such as policy preferences and ideology also influence the direction of party identification. Therefore, unlike the Michigan model, in this study, it is assumed that social and economic factors are associated with belief-systems and political attitudes, such as ideology. Thus, belief-systems and/or political attitudes affect party affiliation. At the same time, it is assumed that some social and economic factors are directly related to partisan alignment. The causal relationship is summarised in Figure 6.1.


Dependent Variable

As the dependent variable in the regression model, party alignment is measured by party identification for the two major parties assuming two-party system (i.e., 1 = party identification for major party A, and 2 = party identification for major party B). Major party A refers to the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and the Grand National Party in 1997 and in 2002, i.e., those parties tracing a lineage back to the authoritarian ruling party. Major party B refers to the Democratic Party in 1992, the National Congress for New Politics in 1997, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002, i.e., those parties historically connected to the pro-democracy opposition party.

In the study, linear regression models are used in the analysis of a dichotomous

dependent variable. In general, it is assumed that the dependent variable is an uncensored scale numeric variable in linear regression models. Thus, a logistic regression model rather than a linear regression model is the appropriate statistical model in the analysis of a binary dependent variable. Nevertheless, in the research, linear regression models have been used in the analysis of the dichotomous dependent variable because the results of the linear regression model are easier to explain to the less statistically-inclined. Moreover, a logistic regression model was also undertaken during the course of the research, but did not yield alternative results --- as might be expected, given the range of the dependent variable.

Figure 6.1 A Model of Partisan Alignment



Keys: A = social and economic factors, B = belief-system or political attitudes, and C = party identification.

Independent Variables

As independent variables in the regression model of partisan alignment, social and economic factors such as age, gender, region, class, urbanisation, income, religion, and education are included.

- Region is measured by the respondent's hometown and is recoded into a 3-point scale of the two rival regions in Korea (i.e., 1 = *Gyeongsang*, 2 = all other region, and 3 = *Jeolla*).
- The Goldthorpe class schema is used. In the Goldthorpe class schema, classes are divided into the Salaried, Non-manual workers, the Petty Bourgeoisie, Forman and technician, and the working class, and each class is valued from 1 to 5 in order.²¹
- Urbanisation factor is measured based upon size of respondent's residences (i.e., 1 = big city, 2 = small city, 3 = rural county).

²¹ It is assumed that the Goldthorpe class schema is linear. The class schema has been developed as an alternative to 'non-manual/manual' dichotomy of social class. The Goldthorpe class schema is based on employment status as well as on occupation and the Petty Bourgeoisie is an intermediate class in the 'non-manual/manual' dichotomy. For the schema in British electoral studies, Heath et al., *Understanding Political Change*, pp. 66-7.

- A gender variable is included in this regression model, and men are coded as 1 and women are coded as 2.
- The level of income is based on self-reported household income and is measured in a 9-point ordinal scale (i.e., 1 = the lowest level, and 9 = the highest level).
- Religion is measured in a 3-point scale regarding their values and orientation related to political issues (i.e., 1 = Buddhist, 2 = other religious people and non religious people, and 3 = Protestant).
- The level of education is measured in a 4-point ordinal scale (i.e., 1 = the lowest level, and 4 = the highest level).
- As a key explanatory variable, ideology is included. Self-identified ideological position in a 5-point scale from the strong conservative to the strong liberal (i.e., 1 = strong conservative, 2 = conservative, 3 = centre, 4 = liberal, and 5 = strong liberal). However, ideology is excluded in the regression analysis for the 1992 presidential election due to the lack of data.

The Result of Regression Analysis: 1992

Bivariate regression on party identification: First, a series of bivariate regressions of each eight variables on partisan alignment are examined. Table 6.24 shows the regression coefficients for eight independent variables. Age, education, region, religion, and income variables explain effectively partisan alignment. Younger, more educated, people from *Jeolla*, Christians, and richer voters are more likely to identify with the major party B, while older, less educated, people from Gyeongsang, Buddhists, and poorer voters are more likely to identify themselves with the major party A.

Table 6. 24 Bivariate Regression Analysis on Partisan Alignment, 1992

	Beta	T	Sig.
Age	-.224	-6.469	0.000
Sex	.020	-.557	0.579
Education	.160	4.552	0.000
Location	-.038	-1.070	0.285
Region (hometown)	.584	20.272	0.000
Religion	.183	5.227	0.000
Income	.109	3.076	0.002
Class	-.044	-.926	0.355

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992.

Note: Ideology is omitted due to a lack of data.

Multiple regression on party identification: Second, a multiple regression analysis is applied to examine the influence of social and economic variables on partisan

alignment. The method used in the regression analysis is called stepwise. Only two variables, region and education, are related to partisan alignment, according to the result of the multiple regression analysis. As shown in Table 6.25, the model including two independent variables explains 40.3 per cent of variance in the dependent variables (i.e., Adjust R-square = 0.403). The regional variable is the principal factor to explain partisan alignment, while education also explains some variation. Some independent variables, which are significant in bivariate regression analyses, such as age, income, and religion are not statistically significant in the multiple regression analysis. This result suggests that age and income variables are correlated with education variables, and religion is related to regional distribution.

Table 6.25 Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Partisan Alignment (only social and economic variables), 1992

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Beta (Sig.)			
Region	.620	.625	N/A
Education		.143	
Adjusted R-Square	.383	.403	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992.

Note: Method is stepwise. Excluded variables are income, gender, location, religion, class, and age.

The Result of Regression Analysis: 1997

Bivariate regression on party identification: First, bivariate regressions of each independent variable on partisan alignment are used. As shown in Table 6.26, age, region, and religion variables again explain partisan alignment as they did in 1992. Younger, people from *Jeolla*, and Christian voters are associated with the major party B, while older, people from *Gyeongsang* region, and Buddhist voters are related to the major party A. Furthermore, the location and sex variables also effectively explain differences in party identification in 1997 in contrast to 1992. In 1997, people in rural regions and men are more likely to vote for major party B, while people in big cities and women are associated with major party A. Furthermore, the relationship between the ideology variable and partisan alignment is statistically significant. Liberals identify with major party B, while there is also a connection between conservatives and major party A party identification.

Multiple regression on party identification: Second, a multiple regression analysis based on stepwise method shows that region and ideology variables together explain 39.6 per cent of variance in the dependent variables (see Table 6.27). Region is the main explanatory variable, but ideology also explains partisan alignment, although its

explanatory power is small.

Table 6. 26 Bivariate Regression Analysis on Partisan Alignment, 1997

	Beta	T	Sig.
Age	-.132	-3.273	.001
Sex	-.088	-2.187	.029
Education	.032	.797	.426
Location	.121	3.013	.003
Region (hometown)	.625	19.713	.000
Religion	.227	5.734	.000
Income	-.037	-.916	.360
Class	-.023	-.456	.648
Ideology	.262	6.354	.000

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997.

Table 6. 27 Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Partisan Alignment, 1997

	Model 1	Model 2
<u>Beta (Sig.)</u>		
Region	0.609 (0.000)	0.595 (0.000)
Ideology		0.171 (0.000)
Adjusted R-Square	.369	.396

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997.

Note: Method is stepwise. Excluded variables are income, gender, education, location, religion, class, and age.

Multiple regression on ideology: Third, the relationship between social and economic variables and ideology is examined by multiple regression analysis. Table 6.28 shows that age and region variables explain ideological differences, although the two variables together explain only 3 per cent of variance in ideology variables. Younger Koreans and people from *Jeolla* region are more likely to be liberal, while older voters and people from *Gyeongsang* region are more inclined to be conservative.

Table 6. 28 Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Ideology, 1997

	Model 1	Model 2
<u>Beta (Sig.)</u>		
Age	-.158 (0.000)	-.158 (0.000)
Region		.091 (0.018)
Adjusted R-Square	.023	.030


Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997.

Note: Method is stepwise. Excluded variables are income, gender, education, location, religion, and class.

The causal-chain of party identification: According to the results of multiple regression analyses, the model of partisan alignment is refined, as shown in Figure 6.2. Age and region variable explain ideology, and then region and ideology explain differences in party identification. Partisan alignment is determined by region, but

ideology also explains some partisan alignment while the age variable is indirectly related to partisan alignment.

Figure 6.2 Regression Model of Partisan Alignment, 1997



Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997.

Note: The figures refer to beta in multiple regression analyses.

The Result of Regression Analysis: 2002

Bivariate regression on party identification: In 2002, as shown in Table 6.29, bivariate regression analysis suggests that age, location, region, religion, and ideology variables are related to partisan alignment. In addition, income is associated with partisan alignment, and the relationship is statistically significant when the significance level is 0.1. However, it is noticeable that the direction of the relation has changed compared to that in 1992, that is richer voters are more inclined to major party A and poorer voters major party B.

Table 6. 29 Bivariate Regression Analysis on Partisan Alignment, 2002

	Beta	T	Sig.
Age	-.084	-2.326	.020
Sex	.014	.382	.702
Education	.020	.546	.585
Location	.140	3.869	.000
Region (hometown)	.591	20.020	.000
Religion	.114	3.157	.002
Income	-.071	-1.910	.057
Class	.067	1.344	.180
Ideology	.363	10.698	.000

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.

Multiple regression on party identification: Again multiple regression analysis is used, employing the stepwise method. The regression analysis suggests that three explanatory variables, region, ideology, and income, are related to partisan alignment. Region still remains the most important variable explaining partisan alignment alone accounting for 34.4 per cent of variance in partisan alignment, while other two variables

explain only 6.9 per cent of variance in the dependent variable. Although ideology explains only a small amount of variance in partisan alignment, the explanatory power of ideology variable has increased somewhat compared to that in 1997 (see Table 6.30).

Table 6. 30 Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Partisan Alignment, 2002

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Beta (Sig.)			
Regionalism	0.588 (0.000)	0.527 (0.000)	0.517 (0.000)
Ideology		0.258 (0.000)	0.268 (0.000)
Income			-.095 (0.017)
Adjusted R-Square	.344	.405	.413

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.

Note: Method is stepwise. Excluded variables are education, gender, location, religion, class, and age.

Multiple regression on ideology: The relationship between the social and economic variables and ideology are examined in Table 6.31 which shows three social and economic variables are related to ideology. Younger people and voters from *Jeolla* are associated with the major party B, as they were in 1992. However, in 2002, education also explains differences in ideology, though education explains only 1 per cent of the variance in ideology variable.

Table 6. 31 Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Ideology, 2002

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Beta (Sig.)			
Age	-.187 (0.000)	-.188 (0.000)	-.129 (0.002)
Region		.139 (0.018)	.139 (0.000)
Education			.123 (0.002)
Adjusted R-Square	.034	.052	.062

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.

Note: Method is stepwise. Excluded variables are income, gender, location, religion, and class.


The causal-chain of party identification: According to the results of two multiple regression analyses, the causal model of partisan alignment can be refined. Figure 6.3 shows that region is a powerful explanatory variable in terms of the partisan alignment in Korea. Additionally, income and ideology also help to explain differences in party identification, while education and age indirectly explain partisan alignment through ideological differences.

Summary

The preceding analysis has shown that region is the predominant variable in

explaining the partisan alignment in Korea. The explanatory power of region has been very strong over the past 10 years. Multiple regression analyses has suggested that partisan support is mainly based on regional support. Major party A is based on the support of people from *Gyeongsang*, while major party B receives disproportionate support from the *Jeolla* region.

Figure 6.3 Regression Model of Partisan Alignment, 2002



Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.

Note: The figures refer to beta in multiple regression analyses.

However, region is not the only factor to explain the partisan alignment in Korea. Ideology is another important variable to explain partisan alignment in Korea, although it must be conceded that its influence is secondary. Both major parties call themselves centrist ‘catch-all’ parties between conservatism and liberalism. News media and scholars often ignore the policy differences between the two major parties. However, this is rejected by partisans. Party identifiers of the major party B are more liberal, while party identifiers of the major party A are more conservative.

Moreover, the regression analysis suggests that younger Koreans are more likely to align themselves with major party B because of their greater liberalism, while older voters being more conservative tend to be affiliated with major party A.²² Finally, economic factors have also begun to explain partisan alignments in Korea. In general, major party A has pursued policies for the rich, while the major party B had articulated

²² In British political culture, there is a similar relationship among social-demographic variables, ideology, and party preference, though the relation is not entirely similar to that in Korea. In the United Kingdom, the young, the higher educated, and the working class support liberal or egalitarian values. Thus, liberals and voters supporting egalitarianism are associated with the Labour Party rather than the Conservative Party in vote preference. See Miller, Timpson, and Lessnoff, *Political Culture in Contemporary Britain*, pp. 295-320 and p. 438.

policies for the poor. This may suggest that Korean voters begin to align with political parties based upon their economic interests.

In conclusion, patterns of partisan alignment have continued over the last 15 years under conditions of extreme party system instability. But partisan alignment has also changed in the new democracy. Indeed, the cleavage based on the distinction between pro-government and pro-opposition supporters in authoritarian regimes has weakened and the electorate has been aligned along the regional cleavage in the new democracy. The change in partisan alignment in the new democracy largely reflects electoral dealignment. In the new democracy, fewer voters align with political parties and non-party identifiers have increased. Patterns and causes of electoral dealignment in the new democracy will be explored in the following chapter, Chapter 7.

Chapter 7. Partisan Decline and Independent Voters

The aim of this chapter is to examine partisan decline and to explore the nature of the increasing number of independents in Korea. As a new democracy, Korea has matured very quickly in terms of the level of party affiliation, while other new democracies are still at the pre-aligned stage. However, partisan decline is now apparent in Korea. This chapter will look at how partisan decline is apparent in the new democracy. Who are the independents in Korean new democracy? Are the increasing number of new independents different from old independents who are alienated from politics? What are the causes of partisan decline? How well do theories of partisan decline developed in mature democracies explain partisan decline in Korea's new democracy?

This chapter consists of three sections. The first section examines partisan decline in Korea. The level of party identification in Korea has decreased during the last ten years. In addition, the first section examines the weakening of the strength of party affiliation in terms of partisan loyalty in voting choice. The second section discusses the social and economic characteristics of increasing independent voters. Two types of independent voters are identified and are compared with each other in terms of socio-economic characteristics and political attitudes. Finally, section three explores the causes of partisan decline and the increase in independent voters. Both quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that decreasing voters' interest in politics, largely caused by electoral dissatisfaction with political process or political parties, is the main cause of partisan decline in Korea.

1. Partisan Dealignment in Korea

Mass political parties are still central in democratic politics, but changes in the types and roles of political parties have been apparent in mature Western democracies for several decades. Even though the disappearance of political parties is hardly anticipated, the decay of political parties or the 'failure' of political parties is widely recognised in many democracies. Partisan dealignment, the reduction or weakening of partisan loyalties, is a major symptom of the decay of political parties and is one of the main electoral trends in Western democracies.¹

¹ For changes in the types and roles of political parties and partisan dealignment in Western democracies, see Scott C. Flanagan and Russell J. Dalton, 'Models of Change', in Peter Mair, ed.,

Korea's democracy is only 15 years old, but has already experienced dealignment. Many voters are estranged from political parties, especially the major political parties, and voters are sceptical to political parties and party politics. Evidence of partisan dealignment includes the rapid decline of the level of party identification. Moreover, voters are not stable in their voting patterns, and fewer and fewer voters support the same party over a series of elections. Furthermore, only a small percentage of voters consider political parties when making their voting decision with other attitudes more important in the choice.

Levels of Party Identification

The decline of long-term levels of psychological party identification is shown in many democracies. For example, since the mid-1960s, the USA has experienced a rapid decline of partisans, and nowadays, more than 30 per cent of American voters do not identify with one of the two major parties.² Additionally, many partisans have switched their party identification, and party identification as a valuable guide to electoral behaviour has dropped in importance.³ A comparative study based on electoral changes in nineteen mature democracies also shows that many party identifiers have turned to non-party identifiers during the last three decades, even though the majority of the voters in the democracies still identify themselves with political parties.⁴ However, while partisan decline is a common phenomenon in mature democracies, it is not universal across all democracies. In contrast to the mature democracies, new democracies have experienced an increase in the level of party identification. Post-communist societies remain in the 'pre-aligned' stage in which many voters have still not developed a strong psychological attachment to a political party.⁵ Furthermore, the level of party identification in the new democracies of Southern democracies, such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal, is actually

The Western European Party System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 232-52. Also, as a comprehensive analysis of partisan dealignment in Western mature democracies, Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds, *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

² For American independent voters and their voting behaviour, see Martin P. Wattenberg, *The Decline of American Political Parties, 1952-1996* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998). Also, Bruce Keith et al., *The Myth of the Independent Voter* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

³ S. M. Lipset, 'The Elections, the Economy and Public Opinion: 1984', *Political Studies*, 18 (1985), pp. 28-38. Cited from Martin Harrop and William L. Miller, *Elections and Voters: a Comparative Introduction* (London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 141-42.

⁴ Russell J. Dalton, 'The Decline of Party Identifications', in Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds, *Politics without Partisans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 19-36.

⁵ William L. Miller, Stephen White, and Paul Heywood, *Values and Political Changes in Postcommunist Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 167-71

increasing.⁶

In contrast to other new democracies, Korea has already experienced a partisan decline and a weakening of partisan loyalties for the past 15 years. The level of party identification has declined, and a growing proportion of the electorate describe themselves as independents. According to some polls, there are more non-identifiers than party identifiers among the electorate.⁷ Table 7.1 clearly shows partisan decline in Korea. The level of party identification among Korean voters in presidential elections has dropped from 77.3 per cent in 1992 to 59.5 per cent in 2002. The percentage of non-party identifiers in the electorate has almost doubled from 22.7 per cent to 40.5 per cent between the 1992 presidential election and the 2002 presidential election.

Table 7.1 Partisan Decline in Korea, 1992-2002

Year	Number of cases	Party Identifiers	Non-party Identifiers	Total
1992 (P)	1,184	77.3%	22.7%	100%
1995 (L)	1,200	59.2%	40.8%	100%
1996 (G)	1,200	58.1%	41.9%	100%
1997 (P)	1,199	63.1%	36.9%	100%
1998 (L)	1,494	47.9%	52.1%	100%
2000 (G)	936	27.2%	72.8%	100%
2002 (P)	1,500	59.5%	40.5%	100%

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997 and 2002; Korean General Election Study, 1992, 1996, and 2000; and Korean Local Election Study, 1995, 1998, and 2002.

Keys: P = presidential election; G = parliamentary election; L = local election.

Note: Various questions are used in measuring party identification. , "Which political party do you feel close to?" (Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992; Korean General Election Study, 1996; and Korean Local Election Study, 1995); "Which political party do you prefer?" (Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997 and 2002, and Korean Local Election Study, 1998); "What is the name of the political party?" in response to the supplementary question, "Do you feel close to a particular political party?" (Korean General Election Study, 2000).

The percentage of non-party identifiers in the electorate is much larger in non-presidential elections compared to presidential elections. As shown in Table 7.1, levels of party identification in presidential elections were relatively higher than those in parliamentary elections or in local elections, and there are more non-party identifiers than party identifiers in the 1998 local election and in the 2000 general election.

A direct comparison of the level of party identification across different level of elections is problematic due to limitations of data, i.e., an inconsistency in survey questions. We may suspect that this inconsistency in survey question wordings could

⁶ Herman Schmitt and Soren Holmberg, 'Political Parties in Decline?', in Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, eds, *Citizens and State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 95-133, at p. 107.

⁷ News media often refer to an increase of non-party identifiers among the electorate as an indicator for the failure of political parties in Korea, e.g., *Joongang Daily Newspaper*, 26 January

cause the difference in the level of party affiliation across different presidential elections. Indeed, the level of party identification dropped markedly between 1992 and 1997 presidential election when two different survey question wordings were used. In contrast, the level of party identification was relatively stable between the 1997 and 2002 presidential elections when the same survey question wording was used.

However, even though two different question wordings were used across different presidential elections, there is no difference in the meaning and the nuances of the different wordings used in the Korean-language. Also, different surveys conducted at a similar time point using different question wordings have seemed to reveal a similar level of party affiliation. For example, the question in the 2000 General Election Study in particular is very different from questions in other election studies, and reveals a very high level of non-party identification compared to the level in other studies. Among a total of 1,100 respondents in the 2000 General Election Study, 163 respondents (14.8%) answered 'don't know', while 256 respondents (23.35%) answered 'yes' and 681 respondents (61.9%) answered 'no'. However, this higher level of non-party identification is not only explained by difference in the question. A poll conducted by a daily newspaper in early 2000 which used a different question wording also revealed that 71.1 per cent of respondents identified themselves as non-party identifiers.⁸

Party Identification and Interest in Election

The variation in levels of party identification across different types of elections is related to differences in the level of popular interest in elections. Voters are far more interested in presidential elections than in parliamentary or local elections. Therefore, greater electoral interest in presidential elections is related to the higher level of party identification in presidential elections than in different elections.


Surveys confirm that there are differences in the level of public interest in elections depending upon the type of contest. Figure 7.1 shows that the level of party identification generally moves together with levels of electoral interest in a specific election. The level of electoral interests in parliamentary and local elections is much lower than that in presidential elections. Accordingly, the level of party identification is also relatively lower in parliamentary and local elections compared to presidential elections. It should also be noted that electoral interest in presidential elections has been stable at the same level for the last 10 years, while the level of electoral interest in parliamentary and local

2000.

⁸ The sample size of the poll was 800. In measuring party identification, "Which political party do you support?" is used. *Joongahng Daily Newspaper*, 26 January 2000.

elections has decreased markedly. The difference in the level of voter's interest across different types of election has widened, and this is also reflected in an increasing gap between levels of party identification in the different types of election.

Figure 7.1 Levels of Party Identification and Levels of Interests in Election, 1992-2002




Data: Korean Presidential Election Survey, 1992, 1997, and 2002; Korean General Election Study, 1992, 1996, and 2000; Korean Local Election Study, 1995 and 1998.

Keys: P = presidential Election; G = parliamentary general election; L = local election.

Note: Levels of electoral interest in election are based on the percentage of respondents who say 'very much interested' in answering the question, "How much were you interested in last election?".

The Redistribution of Party Identification

Along with changes in the level of party identification, redistributions of party identification between two major parties have taken place. As shown in the bar chart in Figure 7.2, the level of party identification with the two major parties has markedly decreased between 1992 and 2002. Only a half of Korean voters described themselves as party identifiers with the two major political parties in 2002. While the level of party identification with the major party B remained at 27 per cent, partisans of the major party A dropped from 39.2 per cent to 23.3 per cent between 1992 and 2002. Therefore, partisan dealignment has mainly affected major party A, the old ruling party. The margin of changes in party identification with major party A is similar to changes in non-party identification. Regarding the very low level of party identification of the major party A in 1997, it can be speculated that the partisan dealignment of the major party A was mainly caused by its poor performance in office, such as the critical economic recession at this time.

Figure 7.2 Bar Chart: Redistribution of Party Identification, 1992-2002

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: Major party A = Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and Grand National Party in 1997 and in 2002; Major party B = Democratic Party in 1992, National Congress for New Politics in 1997, and Millennium Democratic Party in 2002.

The Strength of Party Identification

A weakening of the strength of party identification is further evidence of partisan decline. Some Western democracies have witnessed no decline in levels of party identification, but they have still experienced a weakening of the strength of party affiliation. For example, the level of party identification in the United Kingdom has remained at a relatively very high level, even though there has been a critical redistribution of party identification among parties.⁹ There has been only a marginal decline in the level of party identification over the last thirty years, and about 90 per cent of British voters still identify themselves with a political party.¹⁰ However, the U.K. is not an exception from partisan decline in terms of the strength of party identification. Although most British voters still declare themselves party identifiers, many party identifiers have only a 'semi-detached preferences' rather than a strong attachment to the political party. Thus, there are more 'weak' party identifiers than 'very strong' party identifiers among British voters,

⁹ Ivor Crewe and Katarina Thomson, 'Party Loyalties: Dealignment or Realignment?', in Geoffrey Evans and Pippa Norris, eds, *Critical Elections: British Parties and Voters in Long-term Perspective* (London: Sage, 1999), pp. 64-86.

¹⁰ However, the continuing decline in partisanship among British voters should be noted. The percentage of non-party identifiers among the electorate increased from 7 per cent to 10 per cent during the period of 1997 and 2001. Paul Whiteley et al., 'Turnout', in Pippa Norris, ed., *Britain Votes 2001* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 211-24, at p. 221.

in contrast to the electorate of about thirty years ago.¹¹

It is not possible to examine a weakening of partisan attachment to political parties in Korea mainly due to the lack of data. Unfortunately, no election surveys include a question about the strength of party identification in Korea. Nevertheless, given the instability of party identification over a relatively short time period, it can be suggested that party attachments in Korea are not very strong. As discussed in Chapter 5 of this dissertation, the level of party identification in Korea is unstable and party affiliation is often affected by changes in political circumstances and events. Moreover, some voters fail to distinguish between party identification and party preference in a particular election. Some voters' affiliation to a particular political party is not an enduring predisposition as the Michigan model of party identification assumed. It seems then that Korean party identifiers include many party identifiers who have only a semi-detached preference.

Vote Consistency in Consecutive Elections

Although there is no direct measurement of the strength of party identification, changes in voting patterns over a series of elections might indicate a weakening of party identification. It is assumed that party identifiers are loyal to the own political party in election, and that the degree of the loyalty indicates the strength of party identification. Therefore, partisans who voted three times for own political party in three consecutive elections are the *very strong party identifiers*. *Fairly strong party identifiers* refers to partisans who voted twice for their own political party over three consecutive elections. Partisans who voted only once for their own political party in three consecutive elections are *weak party identifiers*. Finally, partisans who were never loyal to their own political party in a series of three elections are *spurious party identifiers*.

Table 7.2 shows a weakening of party identification between 1992 and 1997. 64.9 per cent of the partisans of the two major parties revealed a very strong loyalty to their political party in 1992, but this fell to 60.5 per cent of partisans in 1997. Also, the proportion of the fairly strong party identifiers decreased from 23.4 per cent in 1992 to 19.1 per cent in 1997, while the proportion of the weak party identifiers jumped from 8.5 per cent to 15.4 per cent in 1997. From this data, it is obvious that partisan loyalties weakened between 1992 and 1997.

¹¹ Crewe and Thomson, 'Party Loyalties: Dealignment or Realignment?', pp.75-6. According to a survey, British Election Study 2001, the percentage of the strong party identifiers among British voters is only 13.5 per cent while the percentage of the weak party identifiers among the electorate

Table 7. 2 Changes in the Strength of Party Identification (Vote Consistency in Three Consecutive Elections), 1992-1997

Party Identification	1992			1997		
	Party A	Party B	A+B	Party A	Party B	A+B
Very strong identifiers	66.8%	62.0%	64.9%	66.0%	57.4%	60.5%
Fairly strong identifiers	26.2%	19.0%	23.4%	23.9%	16.3%	19.1%
Weak identifiers	5.3%	13.4%	8.5%	8.5%	19.3%	15.4%
Spurious identifiers	1.6%	5.6%	3.2%	1.6%	7.0%	5.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	431	284	715	188	326	514

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992 and 1997.

Key: Party A = Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and Grand National Party in 1997 and in 2002; Party B = Democratic Party in 1992, Nation Congress for New Politics in 1997, and Millennium Democratic Party in 2002.

Note: Only partisans of two major parties are included. Also, voters who did not have the right to vote in any one of two previous elections are excluded.

It is impossible to examine changes in the strength of party identification between 1997 and 2002 due to the lack of data. In the 2002 survey, the question about vote choice in previous elections was limited to only the last presidential election. Therefore, voting consistency in two consecutive presidential elections is examined instead of partisan voting patterns over a series of three elections. Here, partisans who voted for their own political party in two consecutive presidential elections are *strong party identifiers*. Partisans who voted for their own political party in one of two consecutive presidential elections are *weak party identifiers* and partisans who never voted for their own political party in either presidential election are defined as *spurious party identifiers*.

Table 7. 3 Changes in the Strength of Party Identification (Vote Consistency in Two Consecutive Elections), 1992-2002

Party Identification	1992			1997			2002		
	Party A	Party B	A+B	Party A	Party B	A+B	Party A	Party B	A+B
Strong identifiers	79.3%	69.9%	75.6%	77.9%	62.9%	68.4%	63.9%	76.7%	70.5%
Weak identifiers	17.9%	17.8%	17.9%	19.5%	28.1%	25.0%	28.4%	18.7%	23.4%
Spurious identifiers	2.8%	12.2%	6.5%	2.6%	9.0%	6.6%	7.7%	4.6%	6.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	435	286	721	195	334	529	324	348	672

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: Party A = Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and Grand National Party in 1997 and in 2002; Party B = Democratic Party in 1992, Nation Congress for New Politics in 1997, and Millennium Democratic Party in 2002.

Note: Only partisans of two major parties are included and those who did not have vote right in previous election are excluded.

As shown in Table 7.3, a weakening of the strength of party identification between 1992 and 1997 is again obvious, but no change between 1997 and 2002 is found.

Consequently, while over the last decade, the strength of party identification has decreased, there has been little recent change. It is also important to recognise that most partisans do still have strong loyalties to a political party.

The Importance of Political Parties in Vote Decision-Makings

In voting choice, political parties are of declining importance. Korean voters take less consideration of political parties in their electoral choice with the proportion of Korean voters who think about parties when reaching their decision decreasing. As shown in Table 7.4, voters rely far more on candidate factors rather than political parties when making their mind up. 47 per cent and 63.6 per cent of the electorate answered candidate as the most important factor in their vote decision in 1992 and in 2002, respectively, while a relatively small proportion of the electorate considered the party as the most important factor in their vote decision. Furthermore, this proportion is falling. In 1992, 14.6 per cent of the electorate rated the political party as the most important factor in their voting choice, but in 2002, this had fallen to only 8.5 per cent of the electorate.

Table 7. 4 The Most Important Factor in Vote Choice (Presidential Election), 1992-2002

Factors	1992		1997		2002	
	All Voters	Partisans	All Voters	Partisans	All Voters	Partisans
Political Party	14.6%	16.8%	6.0%	6.9%	8.5%	11.3%
Policies / Pledges	30.9%	30.5%	13.7%	13.8%	23.5%	23.8%
Candidate	47.4%	47.3%	75.4%	75.2%	63.6%	61.1%
Other factors	7.2%	5.3%	4.9%	4.1%	4.5%	3.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	1102	861	1192	754	1323	820

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: All = distributions based on all voters; Partisan = distributions based on only partisans among all voters.

Note: The following question is used: 'Which factor did you most consider in your vote choice?'

We may expect that partisans give more weight to political parties compared to those who do not have any party identification. However, as shown in Table 7.4, partisans are not very different from non-partisans in terms of the weight of political party in their electoral choice, although it is relatively more important to partisans than to non-partisans. Overall, partisans also rate the candidate factor as much more important in their voting decision.

Compared to presidential elections, a much larger proportion of voters consider that political party is the most important factor in their vote choice in parliamentary and local elections. Moreover, the decrease of the relative importance of political party in general

and local elections is smaller than the decrease in presidential elections. In the 2000 general election, 22.7 per cent of the electorate still indicated that the political party was the most important factor in their electoral choice (see Table 7.5). Nonetheless, the candidate factor is overwhelmingly more important in electoral choice, and its importance has markedly increased over the last 10 years. Therefore, regardless of the type of elections, Korean voters more and more make their decision based on candidate factor with parties declining in importance.

Table 7.5 The Most Important Factor in Vote Choice (Parliamentary and Local Election), 1992-2000

Factors	1992 (G)	1995 (L)	1996 (G)	1998 (L)	2000 (G)
Political Party	28.9%	21.3%	23.0%	18.5%	22.7%
Policies/election pledges	25.3%	25.3%	21.0%	6.2%	6.3%
Candidate	31.8%	46.5%	44.0%	52.9%	67.6%
Other factors	13.9%	6.9%	12.0%	22.4%	3.4%
Total	100.0%	100%	100.0%	100%	100%
Number of cases	1034	1050	974	1017	822

Data: Korean General Election Study, 1992, 1996, and 2000; Korean Local Election Study, 1995 and 1998.

Keys: G = Parliamentary election; L = local election.

Notes: The following question is used: 'Which factor did you most consider in your vote choice?'; In the 1998 local election study, 'other factors' include 'regional development', which accounts for 18 per cent of total respondents. Apart from the 1998 local election study, no election studies include 'regional development' in the question.

Reasons of the Difference

Why is there a difference in the weight of political party in vote decision-making across different types of elections? This can be explained through the different amount of information available. In presidential elections, voters have a greater amount of information compared to parliamentary or local elections where voters often have insufficient information. On the one hand, voters are relatively more interested in presidential elections and therefore gain a greater amount of information candidates and electoral issues. The presidential election campaign is relatively prolonged, and news media provide voters more information about candidates and electoral issues. On the other hand, voters are less interested in parliamentary and local elections and thus fail to get enough information for making their vote decision. The election campaigns for general elections and local elections are relatively short and voters do not have enough time to gather information about candidates. As a result, voters with insufficient information rely more on political parties when making their electoral choice. Therefore, voters give more weight to political parties in general and local elections compared to presidential elections.

In addition to the survey data, qualitative data also shows a clear difference in the level of public interest in elections depending upon the type of election. Almost all participants in the in-depth interviews and focus group interviews acknowledged that they were more interested in presidential elections compared to parliamentary or local elections.

Importance of presidency: Furthermore, in answering a question about why they are more interested in presidential elections compared to parliamentary and local elections, voters pointed out the importance of presidency in the political system in which president has exclusive political powers.¹² Respondents believed that the president is much more important than member of the National Assembly or mayor of any city. For example, “The President is the man who leads this nation-state, so I am more interested in presidential elections compared to general elections or local elections” (FF5). “It is natural for me to be much interested in presidential elections. The President leads this society” (FF4). “The President is the head of this state, so the presidential decision greatly influences the quality of our lives” (I-107). “My country will be better if we elect a better man as president” (I-135). “I think that the president has the power to decide the direction my country goes in” (I-214). “I was more interested in this presidential election [compared to last local election] because I think that the future of my country depends upon the man who wins the election” (I-108). “In the presidential election, we select the man who leads this country” (I-125).

Many interviewees also directly stated that parliamentary and local elections were not important. For examples, “To be honest with you, I don’t care about parliamentary elections and local elections” (I-113). “Somehow I think that all local elections are not important” (I-116). “I was not interested in the local election at all” (I-119). “I was not interested in the local election. I thought that there was no difference regardless of whoever won the election” (I-124; I-133). “I don’t have any affection toward the region where I am living, so I did not care about the [local] election” (I-128).

Insufficient information: In answering the same question about why they are more interested in presidential elections compared to parliamentary and local elections, many respondents referred to insufficient information on candidates or election issues in the lower level of elections. For examples, “In the last local election, I had not the slightest

¹² According to the Korean constitution, the principle of checks and balances between the three political bodies, which originated in the American presidential system, is embodied in Korean politics. However, in practice, presidential power often overwhelms other political bodies, i.e., the legislature and judiciary. For example, the president has veto power over any bill passed in the National Assembly. In practice, the government does not have any difficulty in gaining the consent of ruling party MPs to pass bills in the National Assembly. In relation to the judiciary, the president appoints all judges in the Supreme Court although the appointment requires the approval of the National Assembly. In Korea, there is an ongoing debate about limiting the dominance of

idea about the candidates, and I selected a candidate as a blind man tries to find a door handle. So, I did not have any interest in the local election” (FM1). “I got hardly any information about candidates in the local election” (I-118). “Candidates in local election were unknown to me, and I did not even know what they are going to do [when they are elected]. But, presidential candidates were well-known and I thought that the president has an influence on our daily lives” (I-127). “I hardly knew about the candidates in the general election. There were too many candidates” (I-136). “I did not greatly consider the candidate’s [personality or quality] in last local election. I think that I did not have enough information [about candidates]” (I-134).

Several respondents pointed out the lack of interest in parliamentary and local elections as the main reason why they had only insufficient information in these elections. “I did not know very much about the candidates in the local election. Also, I think that local elections are relatively less important compared to presidential election, so I paid less attention to the last local election” (I-126). “In general elections, I went to a voting booth only with a sense of duty that I have to cast my ballot. So, I went to the poll without having any knowledge about candidates. I did not have much interest in the election. There were too many candidates, and I did not know about how they were going to speak for the people [in local governments or local parliaments]” (I-206). “I hardly even knew the candidates’ names in the local elections... I did vote in the local election, but I did not want to do it” (FF2). “In general and local elections, candidates were not to be trusted. So, I lost interest in the elections” (I-208).

Differences in news media attention to elections: Interviewees also suggested that they are more interested in presidential elections because news media and other people pay more attention to presidential elections. For example, “I was more interested in presidential election because so many people were talking about the election everywhere” (I-139). “Unlike the last local election, there were controversial issues in the last presidential election. It was interesting for me to watch the debates on TV” (FM3). “The Presidential election received too much coverage in the news media” (FM3). “In the last local election, voters hardly knew about candidates. In contrast to the local election, there were lots of arguments about Roh Moo-hyun in the Internet and the mass media. Some people supported him, and some voters criticised him. I became interested in the election after seeing the arguments in the mass media and on the Internet” (FM4). He also said, “I did not vote in the last local election. The mass media is important in the presidential election. The presidential TV debates were on air during prime time. Therefore, I watched all three debates, and even my wife who is not interested in politics also watched the

debates” (FM4). “I gained much information from the mass media during this presidential election compared to the last local election or general election” (FF6).

Voters are less interested in parliamentary and local elections and make their voting decisions based on insufficient information about the candidates and issues. As a result, among several factors to influence on vote choice, political party is relatively important in parliamentary and local elections compared to presidential elections. An interviewee comes straight to the point. “In the local election, I did not consider candidates or policies, but I considered political parties [in my vote choice]” (I-204).

Political Party and Vote Preference

Political parties still play an important role in determining Korean voting behaviour, even if less and less of the electorate give weight to political parties compared to other factors such as candidates. Partisan loyalty measured by consistency between party identification and vote choice in the presidential election has remained at a high level, though the percentage of party identifiers in Korean voters has decreased and political parties become less important in electoral choice. As shown in Table 7.6, in the 2002 presidential election, 83 per cent of party identifiers voted for the candidate of their own political party, while 86 per cent of party identifiers were loyal to own party in their voting choice in 1992. This continuation of a high level of partisan loyalty points to only marginal decline in the last ten years.

Table 7.6 Partisan Loyalty in Vote Choice, 1992-2002

	Number of cases	Party Identifiers		Non-party Identifiers	Total
		Loyal Partisans	Defectors		
<u>1992</u>					
All voters	1080	67.8%	11.0%	21.2%	100%
Only party identifiers	851	86.0%	14.0%		100%
<u>1997</u>					
All voters	1172	50.1%	13.7%	36.3%	100%
Only party identifiers	747	78.6%	21.4%		100%
<u>2002</u>					
All voters	1326	51.4%	10.6%	38.0%	100%
Only party identifiers	822	83.0%	17.0%		100%

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: Loyal partisans = those who voted for own party; Defectors = those who voted for other parties.

Note: Voters who did not vote are excluded.

In 1997, the level of partisan loyalty was low at 78.6 per cent, but this was also affected by the specific electoral competition at that time. During the 1997 presidential

election, a relatively high number of party identifiers of the ruling party, the New Korea Party (NKP), defected from their own political party in election. In 1997, the NKP was involved in a factional conflict within the party and turned into the Grand National Party (GNP). In this process, Rhee In-je, who came second in the competition for the presidential nomination of the party, withdrew from the party and ran for the presidency himself. Therefore, some partisans of the party abandoned their party in order to support their preferred candidate, Ree In-je.

Party identification still accounts for the voting choice of half of the electorate although levels of party identification are dropping. Table 7.6 shows that the majority of voters have party identification and most party identifiers vote for the own party. Thus, the voting choice of more than half of Korean voters is explained by party identification, though the percentage has been declined markedly from 67.8 per cent to 51.4 per cent during the last ten years with a decrease of the percentage of partisans in the electorate.

2. Main Characteristics of Independent Voters in Korea

Partisan dealignment is a key feature of electoral changes in Korea in the last 10 years, as discussed in the previous section. A decrease in party identifiers and an increase of independent voters is apparent in Korea. Before explaining the cause of partisan decline or patterns of voting behaviour of the increasing independent voters, it is necessary to examine the nature of independent voters involved in the process of partisan dealignment in Korea. Who are the independents? Are independent voters different from partisans in terms of social and economic characteristics or political attitudes? Are the growing number of new independent voters different from existing old non-party identifiers in terms of social and economic characteristics or political attitudes?

Two Types of Independent Voters

Independent voters are simply defined as those who do not identify themselves with any political party. However, it cannot be assumed that all voters who do not have an attachment to a political party are homogeneous. If we assumed a homogeneous group of independent voters, we would fail to grasp the diversity of independent voters. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate further this category of independent voter.

Two Different Interpretations of Increasing Independent Voters

'Hidden partisans': Regarding the nature of increasing independent voters in advanced democracies, there are two distinct interpretations. One group of researchers argues that many independent voters are actually the 'hidden' partisans who are similar to weak party identifiers in their voting behaviour.¹³ According to this conceptualisation of independent voters, many independent voters reject identification with any party, but nonetheless lean to one of major parties. The true independent voters who do not lean to any political party are a relatively small proportion of the electorate. Thus, the increasing number of independent voters is the result of a weakening of electoral attachments. These researchers examined voting patterns of independents in American elections, and found that most of independent voters consistently vote for one of the two major parties in each election despite their lack of identification. In this way, independents are similar to weak party identifiers. Therefore, an increase of independents can be understood as a weakening of the strength of party identification, but not necessarily as an increase in the number of true independent voters. They argue that it is a 'myth' to interpret the independent as a new type of voter whose voting behaviour is different from party identifiers.

However, this interpretation of increasing independent voters is based on the stable bi-partisan political system in the USA, but is limited in explaining electoral changes in different political contexts. For example, electoral support for a new third party in one election, such as support for Ross Perot in the 1992 American presidential election, is not adequately explained in this one-dimensional conceptualisation of independent voters.¹⁴ As Korean party politics is quite different from American stable bi-partisan politics, and it is necessary to apply a multi-dimensional conceptualisation of independent voters.¹⁵

Moreover, independent 'leaners' who vote for a political party should not be confused with party identifiers with an enduring sense of group identity or belonging.¹⁶ It is possible that independent 'leaners' vote for a political party due to their candidate preferences or their policy preferences rather than party affiliation. In some cases, voters might also consider tactical voting. Party identifiers who have an attachment to a minor party often vote for a major party because they do not want to waste their ballots. For

¹³ Keith et al., *The Myth of the Independent Voter*.

¹⁴ For a relation between Ross Perot and independent voters, see Wattenberg, *The Decline of American Political Parties 1952-1996*, pp. 168-98.

¹⁵ For a discussion on the one-dimensional and the multi-dimensional conceptualisation of independent voters, see Herbert F. Weisberg, 'A Multidimensional Conceptualization of Party Identification', *Political Behaviour*, 2 (1980), 33-60. Students of Korean electoral behaviour also suggest a multi-dimensional conceptualisation of the independent voter among Korean voters. For example, Lee Hyeon-chul, '*Mudangpaui tupyohangtae: 16dae chongseonuil jungsimeuro*' (Voting behaviour of non-party identifiers: focusing on the 16th general election), *Hangukjeongchihakhoebo* (Korean Political Science Review), 34 (2000), 137-60.

¹⁶ Warren Miller and J. Merrill Shanks, *The New American Voter* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard

example, in the 2002 Korean presidential election, a half of Democratic Labour Party (DLP) identifiers voted for Roh Moo-hyun, the candidate of the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP). Some of them voted for Roh Moo-hyun because they liked Roh, if not the MDP. Some of them did not want to waste their votes, and voted for Roh as the second best candidate considering the candidate's personal traits and issue stands. Some of them wanted to prevent Lee Hoi Chang and the Grand National Party from gaining power, so they helped Roh Moo-hyun to win the election.

'New independents': An alternative interpretation of the growth of independent voters in advanced democracies emphasises a change in the nature of non-party identifiers. Some researchers reject the theory that independent voters are merely voters who do not identify themselves with a political party in American bi-party competition. They suggest that the new independent voters should be understood on the basis of a multi-dimensional conceptualisation. The decrease of party identifiers is understood as following from the emergence over the last few decades of a new type of non-party identifier or independent voter among the American electorate as a result of social change.¹⁷ Traditional non-party identifiers are alienated from politics and so do not have any attachment to a political party. In contrast, the new independents are relatively interested in politics and elections in spite of their lack of party affiliation. Also, new independent voters have benefited from the news media and higher education. They no longer rely on political parties for receiving and interpreting information on political affairs. The appearance of the new independents implies a critical change in electoral behaviour. The new independents voters are more likely to behave differently from partisans at elections and it is expected that there would be changes in patterns of electoral behaviour.

Two Types of Independent Voters: Attentive and Apolitical Independents

According to this alternative conceptualisation of independent voters, it is expected that non-party identifiers are not homogeneous in terms of social and economic characteristics and voting behaviours. The classification and subdivision of independent voters is therefore necessary. As suggested in chapter 3 of this thesis, following the distinction of the new independent voters from the traditional non-party identifiers, all non-partisans are classified into two types of voters focusing on the degree of interest in politics. The same dichotomous scheme can be applied to voters who have party

University Press, 1996), p.127.

¹⁷ Wattenberg, *The Decline of American Political Parties 1952-1996*, pp.36-49. Also, Arthur H. Miller and Martin P. Wattenberg, 'Measuring Party Identification: Independent or No Partisan

affiliation. Thus, four types of voters can be identified by this two by two classification: (1) the *critical partisan*; (2) the *habitual partisan*; (3) the *attentive independent*; and (4) the *apolitical independent* (see Table 3.1 in Chapter 3 of this thesis).

According to this classification of voters, the electoral changes in Korea during last 10 years are summarised in Table 7.7. In 1992, partisans were almost equally divided into critical partisans and habitual partisans. Two thirds of independent voters were apolitical independents with only one third attentive independents. This pattern was continued in 2002 although the percentage of partisans in the electorate has decreased markedly. Both critical and habitual partisans have decreased and both attentive and apolitical independents have increased during last the 10 years. In particular, the increase in apolitical independents is remarkable. The proportion of apolitical independents in the electorate has almost doubled during the last decade. In short, the increase of independent voters in Korea has been mainly caused by the rapid increase of apolitical independent voters although the proportion of attentive independents has also grown.

Table 7.7 Electoral Change in Korea, 1992-2002

	1992 (A)	1997	2002 (B)	Difference (A-B)
Number of cases	1182	1198	1500	
Critical Partisans	40.3%	44.5%	30.0%	-10.3%
Habitual partisans	37.0%	18.6%	29.5%	-7.5%
Attentive independents	8.2%	17.5%	13.5%	+5.3%
Apolitical independents	14.6%	19.4%	27.0%	+12.4%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Note: In this classification of voters, two questions of the surveys are used. One is a question about party identification. Those who identify themselves with a political party are recoded as partisans, and those who deny identifying themselves with a political party are recoded as independent voters. Another is a question about a degree of interest in election. The surveys of 1992 and 1997 do not include any question about interest in politics. Therefore, a question about interest in the election is used instead of a question about interest in politics. The question is recoded into two values: (1) 'very much interested' in the election, and (2) 'somewhat interested' or 'not interested' in the election.

This pattern of change is somewhat different from American electoral changes during last two decades. In general, electoral change in the USA was been relatively gradual during last 20 years (see Table 7.8). In contrast to Korea, there have been many more habitual partisans than critical partisans among American voters. Habitual partisans have decreased (i.e., -2.6 per cent point), but critical partisans have increased very marginally (i.e., 0.4 per cent point). In the USA, almost three quarters of non-party identifiers have been apolitical independents (i.e., 30.5 per cent in 2000) rather than attentive independents (i.e., 8.5 per cent in 2000). The proportion of attentive

independents in the electorate has been less than 10 per cent of American voters during last two decades except for the 1992 presidential election (i.e., 13.1 per cent in 1992). Therefore, there have been relatively more attentive independent and critical partisans in Korea with a greater proportion of habitual partisans and apolitical independents in the USA. Also, there was little decline in electoral interest in politics and partisan decline has been marginal in the USA in the last two decades in comparison to the more evident partisan decline in Korea over the last decade.

Table 7.8 Electoral Change in the USA, 1980-2000

	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	Difference
Number of cases	1399	1914	1758	2234	1529	1537	
Critical Partisans	20.2%	21.1%	20.0%	25.9%	21.1%	20.6%	0.4%
Habitual Partisans	43.0%	43.2%	42.8%	34.9%	45.4%	40.4%	-2.6%
Attentive Independents	9.6%	7.4%	7.9%	13.1%	6.0%	8.5%	-1.1%
Apolitical Independents	27.2%	28.3%	29.3%	26.1%	27.4%	30.5%	3.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

Data: American National Election Study, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, and 2000.

Keys: Difference = the change between 1980 and 2000; Critical partisans = partisans who are very interested in politics; Habitual partisans = partisans who are not very interested in politics; Attentive independents = non-party identifiers who are very interested in politics; Apolitical independents = non-party identifiers who are not very interested in politics.

Note: Two variables are used in this analysis (i.e., vcf0302, party identification, and vcf0310, interest in the election). Variable vcf0302 (party identification) is recorded as 1 = party identifiers and 2 = non-party identifiers or independents. Variable vcf0310 (interest in the election) is recorded as 1 = very much interested in political campaign and 2 = somewhat or not very interested in political campaign.

Variable vcf0313 (interested in public affairs) would be a better variable to measure voter's general interest in politics, but vcf0130 (interest in the election) is used in this analysis in order to match with Korean cases.

Socio-Economic Characteristics of Independents in Korea

Independent voters make up a substantial proportion of the electorate in Korea, and a better understanding of independent voters is necessary to comprehend electoral changes in Korea. An examination of the nature of independent voters may also provide a clue for solving the puzzle of partisan decline in Korea.¹⁸

Age and Independent Voters

¹⁸ There are a few previous studies of socio-demographic characteristics of independent voters in Korea. One of them was based on an election survey in the 1998 local election and another was based on an election survey in the 2002 general election. However, considering the conceptualisation of independent voters, these studies are not comparable to this research. For example, in these studies, independent voters are defined and classified based on vote consistency in a series of elections. For example, Lee, '*Mudangpau tupyohangtae: 16dae chongseomull*

Younger members of the electorate are more likely to be independents compared to older voters. As shown in Table 7.9, there are relatively more independent voters among the youngest age group compared to older cohorts, while the proportion among the voters who are 55-64 years old is relatively small. For example, in 2002, 46 per cent of the voters who are 20-24 years old are independent, while 32.8 per cent of the voters who are 55-64 years old are independent, a pattern repeated in 1992 and in 1997. The difference in the distribution of independent voters across different age groups is statistically significant.

Table 7.9 Crosstab: Age and Independents, 1992-2002

Age cohort	Number of cases	Party Identifiers	Non-party Identifiers	Total	Test statistics
1992					
20-24	132	68.2%	31.8%	100%	Pearson Chi-Square = 16.770 Sig. = 0.005
25-34	335	75.8%	24.2%	100%	
35-44	290	77.9%	22.1%	100%	
45-54	194	75.3%	24.7%	100%	Pearson's R = -.095 Sig. = 0.001
55-64	123	87.8%	12.2%	100%	
65 and over	110	82.7%	17.3%	100%	
Total	1184	77.3%	22.7%	100%	
1997					
20-24	151	53.0%	47.0%	100%	Pearson Chi-Square = 14.198 Sig. = 0.014
25-34	336	62.2%	37.8%	100%	
35-44	285	68.4%	31.6%	100%	
45-54	223	68.2%	31.8%	100%	Pearson's R = -.030 Sig. = 0.292
55-64	127	59.1%	40.9%	100%	
65 and over	75	58.7%	41.3%	100%	
Total	1197	63.1%	36.9%	100%	
2002					
20-24	213	54.0%	46.0%	100%	Pearson Chi-Square = 14.987 Sig. = 0.010
25-34	335	53.1%	46.9%	100%	
35-44	365	61.4%	38.6%	100%	
45-54	265	63.4%	36.6%	100%	Pearson's R = -.079 Sig. = 0.002
55-64	177	67.2%	32.8%	100%	
65 and over	145	60.7%	39.3%	100%	
Total	1500	59.5%	40.5%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Furthermore, there was also a linear relation between age and partisanship, and the relationship is statistically significant in 1992 (i.e., Pearson's $R = -0.095$, $p < 0.05$). However, the relationship was not statistically significant in 1997 due to a sudden increase of independent voters between 55 and 64 years old. This may be related to a sharp decrease of the ruling party identifiers in 1997, as discussed in Chapter 6. Many partisans of the ruling party were disappointed with the government performance, particularly after a severe economic recession in 1997, and abandoned the party.

Consequently, partisan decline in 1997 was led by older voters, traditionally a core support group for the ruling party.

Table 7. 10 Crosstab: Age and Korean Voters, 1992-2002

Age	N	Critical Partisan	Habitual Partisan	Attentive Independent	Apolitical Independent	Total	Test Statistics
<u>1992</u>							Chi-Square = 34.935 Sig.= 0.003
20-24	132	34.8%	33.3%	7.6%	24.2%	100%	
25-34	334	43.4%	32.3%	6.9%	17.4%	100%	
35-44	290	39.3%	38.6%	9.7%	12.4%	100%	
45-54	194	41.2%	34.0%	10.8%	13.9%	100%	
55-64	123	43.9%	43.9%	6.5%	5.7%	100%	
65 and over	109	33.9%	48.6%	6.4%	11.0%	100%	
Total	1182	40.3%	37.0%	8.2%	14.6%	100%	
<u>1997</u>							Chi-Square = 66.575 Sig.= 0.000
20-24	151	28.5%	24.5%	13.2%	33.8%	100%	
25-34	336	39.0%	23.2%	16.4%	21.4%	100%	
35-44	285	48.8%	19.6%	16.5%	15.1%	100%	
45-54	223	55.6%	12.6%	18.4%	13.5%	100%	
55-64	127	48.8%	10.2%	23.6%	17.3%	100%	
65 and over	74	45.9%	12.2%	23.0%	18.9%	100%	
Total	1196	44.6%	18.5%	17.6%	19.4%	100%	
<u>2002</u>							Chi-Square = 54.858 Sig.= 0.000
20-24	213	19.2%	34.7%	10.8%	35.2%	100%	
25-34	355	22.1%	31.0%	14.3%	32.5%	100%	
35-44	365	32.9%	28.5%	12.9%	25.8%	100%	
45-54	265	32.1%	31.3%	15.8%	20.8%	100%	
55-64	177	40.7%	26.6%	13.6%	19.2%	100%	
65 and over	145	40.0%	20.7%	13.1%	26.2%	100%	
Total	1500	30.0%	29.5%	13.5%	27.0%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Key: N = number of cases.

There is a clear difference in the average age between partisans and independent voters, but the age difference has been reduced over the last 10 years. The difference was 3.54 years old in 1992 but by 2002, it had dropped to 2.12 years old. The differences are statistically significant at the 0.05 level (see Table A7.1 in Appendix). However, the relation between age and partisanship is blurred when independent voters are subdivided. Attentive independent voters and critical partisans who are interested in politics are relatively much older than the apolitical independents and habitual partisans. Table 7.10 shows the age difference across the four different types of voters. The difference is statistically significant in each of the three elections. As shown in Table 7.11, there are relatively more the apolitical independents among the youngest age group compared to other age groups, while the attentive independents are relatively equally distributed across different age groups. There are also relatively more habitual partisans among younger voters with relatively more critical partisans among older voters.

ANOVA analysis reveals that the difference in average age across the four types of voters is statistically significant in each of the three elections. In general, critical partisans are the oldest, and apolitical independent the youngest. Also, in terms of average age, the attentive independent is similar to the critical partisan, while the habitual partisan is similar to the apolitical independent. This pattern is appeared in all three elections (see Table A7.2 in Appendix).

Education

Using education as a variable can also help to explain independent voters. The relation between levels of education and independent voters was statistically significant in 1992 and in 1997, but not in 2002. As shown in Table 7.11, independent voters are more likely have attended higher education. For example, 45.2 per cent of voters who experienced college level education were independent voters in 1997, compared to 31.9 per cent of middle school graduated voters.

Table 7. 11 Crosstab: Education and Independents, 1992-2002

	Number of cases	Party Identifiers	Non-party Identifiers	Total	Test statistics
<u>1992</u>					
Primary	231	84.4%	15.6%	100%	Pearson Chi-square = 29.997 Sig. = 0.000
Middle school	202	82.7%	17.3%	100%	
High school	434	78.6%	21.4%	100%	Pearson's R = .146 Sig. = 0.000
College	317	66.9%	33.1%	100%	
Total	1184	77.3%	22.7%	100%	
<u>1997</u>					
Primary	139	62.6%	37.4%	100%	Pearson Chi-square = 26.348 Sig. = 0.000
Middle school	124	68.5%	31.5%	100%	
High school	447	70.5%	29.5%	100%	Pearson's R = .080 Sig. = 0.006
College	482	54.8%	45.2%	100%	
Total	1192	63.0%	37.0%	100%	
<u>2002</u>					
Primary	150	60.0%	40.9%	100%	Pearson Chi-square = 4.963 Sig. = 0.175
Middle school	180	63.9%	36.1%	100%	
High school	560	61.3%	38.7%	100%	Pearson's R = .042 Sig. = 0.106
College	602	56.1%	43.9%	100%	
Total	1492	59.4%	40.6%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Moreover, in 1992, there was a linear relationship between level of education and the proportion of independent voters, but the linear relationship has no longer existed since 1997. Many voters with only a low level of education became independent voters in 1997 and in 2002. For example, 40 per cent of primary school graduated voters were independent voters in 2002 compared to 15.6 per cent of voters in 1992. This fact is

related to changes in partisan alignment, as discussed in Chapter 6. The defection of less educated voters from the old ruling party was a critical part of partisan decline in 1997.

Table 7.12 shows the distribution of the four types voters across different levels of education. The relationship between education level and the four types of voters in each election are statistically significant (i.e., $p < 0.05$). In 2002, there was a relatively large number of attentive independents with college level education compared to other levels of education. Furthermore, there was a high number of critical partisans with primary school level of education. Finally, there was a larger proportion of habitual partisans in the group of voters with middle level of education compared to those with more and less education.

The difference in the average level of education across the four types of voters was statistically significant in 1992 and 1997, but not in 2002. For example, the average level of education of critical partisans was relatively less compared to the average for other types of voters, while the average for attentive independents was relatively higher compared to the average of other voters (see Table A7.3 in Appendix).

Table 7.12 Crosstab: Education and Korean Voters, 1992-2002

Education level	Number of cases	Critical Partisan	Habitual Partisan	Attentive Independent	Apolitical Independent	Total	Test Statistics
1992							Pearson Chi-square = 43.363 Sig. = 0.000
Primary school	231	35.5%	48.9%	3.9%	11.7%	100%	
Middle school	200	45.5%	37.0%	5.5%	12.0%	100%	
High school	434	42.4%	36.2%	8.1%	13.4%	100%	
College	317	37.5%	29.3%	13.2%	19.9%	100%	
Total	1182	40.3%	37.0%	8.2%	14.6%	100%	
1997							Pearson Chi-square = 39.578 Sig. = 0.000
Primary school	138	52.9%	9.4%	21.7%	15.9%	100%	
Middle school	124	48.4%	20.2%	16.1%	15.3%	100%	
High school	447	49.4%	21.0%	13.9%	15.7%	100%	
College	482	36.5%	18.3%	20.3%	24.9%	100%	
Total	1191	44.5%	18.5%	17.6%	19.4%	100%	
2002							Pearson Chi-square = 19.034 Sig. = 0.025
Primary school	150	37.3%	22.7%	16.0%	24.0%	100%	
Middle school	180	30.0%	33.9%	8.3%	27.8%	100%	
High school	560	29.5%	31.8%	11.4%	27.3%	100%	
College	602	28.9%	27.2%	16.4%	27.4%	100%	
Total	1492	30.1%	29.3%	13.5%	27.1%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Size of Residence Area: Urban vs. Rural

There is no difference in the proportion of independent voters across different sizes of residential areas. Although there are relatively more independent voters in urban areas

compared to rural areas, the difference is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. For example, as shown in Table 7.13, in 2002, the proportion of independent voters among voters in large city was 42.3 per cent, the proportion among voters in small city was 39.4 per cent, and the proportion among voters in rural area was 36.8 per cent. However, the difference is not statistically significant (i.e., $p = 0.324$).

Table 7.13 Crosstab: Size of Residence Area and Independents, 1992-2002

Residence	Number of cases	Party Identifiers	Non-party Identifiers	Total	Test statistics
1992					Pearson Chi-Square = 3.247 Sig. = 0.197
Large city	588	76.9	23.1	100%	
Small city	318	74.8	25.2	100%	
Rural county	278	80.9	19.1	100%	
Total	1184	77.3	22.7	100%	
1997					Pearson Chi-Square = 5.660 Sig. = 0.059
Large city	595	59.8%	40.2%	100%	
Small city	431	66.8%	33.2%	100%	
Rural county	173	65.3%	34.7%	100%	
Total	1199	63.1%	36.9%	100%	
2002					Pearson Chi-Square = 2.252 Sig. = 0.324
Large city	730	57.7%	42.3%	100%	
Small city	607	60.6%	39.4%	100%	
Rural county	163	63.2%	36.8%	100%	
Total	1500	59.5%	40.5%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Table 7.14 Crosstab: Size of Residence Areas and Korean Voters, 1992-2002

Residence	N	Critical Partisan	Habitual Partisan	Attentive Independent	Apolitical Independent	Total	Test Statistics
1992							Pearson Chi-square = 7.191 Sig. = 0.304
Large city	586	38.9%	37.9%	8.5%	14.7%	100%	
Small city	318	43.1%	31.8%	8.8%	16.4%	100%	
Rural county	278	39.9%	41.0%	6.8%	12.2%	100%	
Total	1182	40.3%	37.0%	8.2%	14.6%	100%	
1997							Pearson Chi-square = 6.266 Sig. = 0.394
Large city	595	43.0%	16.8%	19.2%	21.0%	100%	
Small city	431	46.2%	20.6%	15.8%	17.4%	100%	
Rural county	172	45.3%	19.8%	16.3%	18.6%	100%	
Total	1198	44.5%	18.6%	17.5%	19.4%	100%	
2002							Pearson Chi-Square = 9.435 Sig. = 0.150
Large city	730	29.0%	28.6%	14.5%	27.8%	100%	
Small city	607	32.0%	28.7%	13.8%	25.5%	100%	
Rural county	163	27.0%	36.2%	8.0%	28.8%	100%	
Total	1500	30.0%	29.5%	13.5%	27.0%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Key: N = number of cases.

As shown in Table 7.14, there is also no difference in the four types of voters across different sizes of residential areas, though there are relatively more habitual partisans and

fewer attentive independents in rural areas in 2002. The attentive independents tend to live in a large city, while the habitual partisans are more likely to reside in a rural area. The difference in the average size of residence area across different types of voters is not statistically significant (i.e., $p = 0.725$, $p = 0.250$, $p = 0.221$, in 1992, in 1997, and in 2002, respectively) though with this caveat in mind, it is still noticeable that the average size for attentive independents was relatively smaller than the averages for other types of voter and the size of residential area for habitual partisans was relatively bigger than that of the other types of voter (see Table A7.4 in Appendix). This pattern is repeated in all three presidential elections.

Gender and Independent Voters

Introducing a gender variable does not help to explain independent voters. The relationship between sex and independent voters is not statistically significant (i.e., $p = 0.154$, $p = 0.581$, and $p = 0.227$, in 1991, in 1997, and in 2002, respectively) (see Table A7.5 in Appendix). However, as shown in Table 7.15, the gender variable is significantly associated with the four types of voters. Men are more likely to be critical partisans or attentive independents than women with a greater proportion of habitual partisans and apolitical independents among women. The difference is statistically significant in 1992 and in 2002 (i.e., $p = 0.015$, and $p = 0.000$, respectively), but not in 1997 (i.e., $p = 0.641$). ANOVA analysis shows the same pattern (see Table A7.6 in Appendix).

Table 7.15 Crosstab: Gender and Korean Voters, 1992-2002

Sex	Number of cases	Critical Partisan	Habitual Partisan	Attentive Independent	Apolitical Independent	Total	Test Statistics
<u>1992</u>							Pearson Chi-Square = 10.504 Sig. = 0.015
Men	571	42.9%	32.6%	9.6%	14.9%	100%	
Women	611	37.8%	41.1%	6.9%	14.2%	100%	
Total	1182	40.3%	37.0%	8.2%	14.6%	100%	
<u>1997</u>							Pearson Chi-Square = 1.682 Sig. = 0.641
Men	612	45.3%	18.6%	16.2%	19.9%	100%	
Women	586	43.7%	18.6%	18.9%	18.8%	100%	
Total	1198	44.5%	18.6%	17.5%	19.4%	100%	
<u>2002</u>							Pearson Chi-Square = 26.340 Sig. = 0.000
Men	739	34.1%	26.9%	16.0%	23.0%	100%	
Women	761	26.0%	31.9%	11.2%	30.9%	100%	
Total	1500	30.0%	29.5%	13.5%	27.0%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Religion and Independent Voters

Religion does not explain independent voters in 1997 and in 2002, but the relationship between religion and independent voters was statistically significant in 1992. In 1992, there were relatively more partisans among Buddhists compared to other religious groups, but the difference between Buddhists and other religious people disappeared in 1997 and in 2002. Also, as shown in Table 7.16, voters who do not have any major religion or who are non-religious people are more likely to be independents, while voters from the major religions in Korea are more likely to be partisans. Furthermore, the relationship between the four types of voters and religion is not statistically significant in 1997 and in 2002 (i.e., $p = 0.242$, and $p = 0.333$, respectively), but is significant in 1992 (i.e., $p = 0.000$) (see Table A7.7 in Appendix).

The decrease of partisans among Buddhists is related to the increasing number of independent voters among partisans of old ruling party. As discussed in chapter 6, Buddhists are closely associated with the old ruling party. The decrease of partisanship among Buddhists appears to have contributed to partisan decline, in particular of the old ruling party, in Korea during last 10 years.

Table 7. 16 Crosstab: Religion and Independents, 1992-2002

	Number of cases	Party Identifiers	Non-party Identifiers	Total	Test statistics
1992					Pearson Chi-Square = 21.879 Sig. = 0.000
Buddhists	357	84.3%	15.7%	100%	
Protestants	267	79.8%	20.2%	100%	
Catholics	108	72.2%	27.8%	100%	
Other	26	65.4%	34.6%	100%	
Non-religion	426	71.8%	28.2%	100%	
Total	1184	77.3%	22.7%	100%	
1997					Pearson Chi-Square = 1.464 Sig. = 0.833
Buddhists	335	65.4%	34.6%	100%	
Protestants	285	63.9%	36.1%	100%	
Catholics	114	61.4%	38.6%	100%	
Other	38	60.5%	39.5%	100%	
Non-religion	422	61.6%	38.4%	100%	
Total	1194	63.1%	36.9%	100%	
2002					Pearson Chi-Square = 6.846 Sig. = 0.144
Buddhists	376	60.1%	39.9%	100%	
Protestants	408	63.0%	37.0%	100%	
Catholics	143	61.5%	38.5%	100%	
Other	31	45.2%	54.8%	100%	
Non-religion	542	56.6%	43.4%	100%	
Total	1500	59.5%	40.5%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Region or Regionalism and Independent Voters

Independent voters can also be investigated in terms of regional differences. As

shown in Table 7.17, there are relatively more partisans amongst voters from *Jeolla* region compared to voters from other regions, while there are relatively more independent voters in the *Seoul*, *Gyeonggi*, and *Gangwon* regions. Voters who are from one of regions where regionalism is strong are more likely to be partisans and conversely those from regions where regional feeling is not so strong are relatively more likely to be independents. By looking at the *Chungcheong* region, further support for this argument can be found. Kim Jong-pil and his political party, the United Liberal Democrats (ULD), mobilised effectively voters from the *Chungcheong* region in each election until the 1997 presidential election, and there were relatively fewer independent voters until 1997 (i.e., 24.0 % in 1992, and 31.8 % in 1997). By 2002, however, Kim Jong-pil or the ULD no longer stood for election, and the proportion of independent voters among voters from the region jumped to 45.8 per cent.

Table 7. 17 Crosstab: Region and Independents, 1992-2002

	Number of cases	Party Identifiers	Non-party Identifiers	Total	Test statistics
1992					Pearson Chi-Square = 48.712 Sig. = 0.000
<i>Seoul</i>	129	63.6%	36.4%	100%	
<i>Gyeonggi</i>	127	69.3%	30.7%	100%	
<i>Gangwon</i>	58	60.3%	39.7%	100%	
<i>Chungcheong</i>	204	76.0%	24.0%	100%	
<i>Jeolla</i>	237	88.6%	11.4%	100%	
<i>Gyeongsang</i>	414	80.7%	19.3%	100%	
<i>Jeju</i>	1	100.0%		100%	
The North	14	71.4%	28.6%	100%	
Total	1184	77.3%	22.7%	100%	
1997					Pearson Chi-Square = 104.911 Sig. = 0.000
<i>Seoul</i>	148	49.3%	50.7%	100%	
<i>Gyeonggi</i>	117	52.1%	47.9%	100%	
<i>Gangwon</i>	76	55.3%	44.7%	100%	
<i>Chungcheong</i>	198	68.2%	31.8%	100%	
<i>Jeolla</i>	263	87.5%	12.5%	100%	
<i>Gyeongsang</i>	357	53.8%	46.2%	100%	
<i>Jeju</i>	25	64.0%	36.0%	100%	
The North	12	41.7%	58.3%	100%	
Total	1196	63.0%	37.0%	100%	
2002					Pearson Chi-Square = 33.671 Sig. = 0.000
<i>Seoul</i>	208	56.7%	43.3%	100%	
<i>Gyeonggi</i>	175	62.3%	37.7%	100%	
<i>Gangwon</i>	93	48.4%	51.6%	100%	
<i>Chungcheong</i>	216	54.2%	45.8%	100%	
<i>Jeolla</i>	278	73.4%	26.6%	100%	
<i>Gyeongsang</i>	499	55.9%	44.1%	100%	
<i>Jeju</i>	6	50.0%	50.0%	100%	
The North	16	62.5%	37.5%	100%	
Total	1491	59.4%	40.6%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Nevertheless, among voters from *Gyeongsang* region, historically strong supporters

of the old ruling party, the proportion of independent voters markedly increased in 1997. Only 19.3 per cent of voters from the region were independents in 1992, but 46.2 per cent and 44.1 per cent of voters from the region were independents in 1997 and in 2002, respectively. This change again implies that partisan decline in Korea has been connected to the decrease of party identifiers of the ruling party in 1997. The very poor performance of the government and the ruling party disappointed its traditional loyal supporters causing a drop in party affiliation among core supporters.

Table 7.18 Crosstab: Region and Korean Voters, 1992-2002

Region	N	Critical Partisan	Habitual Partisan	Attentive Independent	Apolitical Independent	Total	Test Statistics
1992							Chi-Square = 72.918 Sig. = 0.000
Seoul	129	31.8%	31.8%	12.4%	24.0%	100%	
Gyeonggi	127	33.9%	35.4%	11.0%	19.7%	100%	
Gangwon	58	32.8%	27.6%	12.1%	27.6%	100%	
Chungcheong	204	42.6%	33.3%	9.8%	14.2%	100%	
Jeolla	236	54.7%	33.9%	4.2%	7.2%	100%	
Gyeongsang	413	36.3%	44.3%	6.5%	12.8%	100%	
Jeju	1		100%			100%	
The North	14	50.0%	21.4%	21.4%	7.1%	100%	
Total	1182	40.3%	37.0%	8.2%	14.6%	100%	
1997							Chi-Square = 171.502 Sig. = 0.000
Seoul	148	29.7%	19.6%	23.6%	27.0%	100%	
Gyeonggi	117	36.8%	15.4%	25.6%	22.2%	100%	
Gangwon	75	33.3%	21.3%	16.0%	29.3%	100%	
Chungcheong	198	49.0%	19.2%	19.7%	12.1%	100%	
Jeolla	263	74.5%	12.9%	8.7%	2.8%	100%	
Gyeongsang	357	31.9%	21.8%	17.9%	28.3%	100%	
Jeju	25	40.0%	24.0%	20.0%	16.0%	100%	
The North	12	33.3%	8.3%	16.7%	41.7%	100%	
Total	1195	44.6%	18.4%	17.6%	19.4%	100%	
2002							Chi-Square = 65.494 Sig. = 0.000
Seoul	208	28.8%	27.9%	15.4%	27.9%	100%	
Gyeonggi	175	33.1%	29.1%	12.6%	25.1%	100%	
Gangwon	93	30.1%	18.3%	20.4%	31.2%	100%	
Chungcheong	216	29.6%	24.5%	19.4%	26.4%	100%	
Jeolla	278	41.4%	32.0%	9.4%	17.3%	100%	
Gyeongsang	499	22.4%	33.5%	11.8%	32.3%	100%	
Jeju	6	33.3%	16.7%	16.7%	33.3%	100%	
The North	16	50.0%	12.5%	12.5%	25.0%	100%	
Total	1491	30.0%	29.4%	13.6%	27.0%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Key: N = number of cases.

As shown in Table 7.18, the relationship between region and the four types of voter in each of the three elections are statistically significant (i.e., $p = 0.000$). Among voters from the *Jeolla* region, there are relatively high proportion of critical partisans, while voters from *Gyeongsang* region relatively more inclined towards apolitical independents and the habitual partisans. The relatively high level of apolitical independent voters

among voters in *Gyeongsang* suggests that *Gyeongsang* people lost their interest in politics and party attachment during last the 10 years due to political changes in the new democracy unfavourable to the old ruling party.

Levels of Income and Independent Voters

In terms of income, there was no significant relationship in 2002 but these two variables were associated with each other in 1992 and in 1997. As shown in Table 7.19, there are relatively more independent voters among the high earning voters compared to the poor in 1992 and in 1997. The percentage of independent voters among low earners has markedly increased over time, and the difference in proportion of independent voters across different income groups disappeared in 2002. Lower-income voters who were traditional supporters for the old ruling party withdrew their support for the party and became independent voters during the last 10 years. The t-test for equality of means shows differences in the average levels of income between partisans and independent voters. Independent voters have relatively higher incomes compared to partisans. The difference is statistically significant in 1992 and in 1997, but not in 2002 (see Table A7.8 in Appendix).

Table 7.19 Crosstab: Levels of Income and Independents, 1992-2002

Income level	Number of cases	Party Identifiers	Non-party Identifiers	Total	Test statistics
<u>1992</u>					
Low	258	83.2%	16.8%	100%	Pearson Chi-Square = 17.630 Sig. = 0.000 Pearson's R = .137 Sig. = 0.000
Middle	681	79.4%	20.6%	100%	
High	253	65.6%	34.4%	100%	
Total	1184	77.3%	32.3%	100%	
<u>1997</u>					
Low	339	70.5%	29.5%	100%	Pearson Chi-Square = 11.810 Sig. = 0.003 Pearson's R = .094 Sig. = 0.001
Middle	520	61.2%	38.8%	100%	
High	320	58.4%	41.6%	100%	
Total	1179	63.1%	36.9%	100%	
<u>2002</u>					
Low	487	59.1%	40.9%	100%	Pearson Chi-Square = 0.006 Sig. = 0.997 Pearson's R = .001 Sig. = 0.979
Middle	670	59.3%	40.7%	100%	
High	278	59.0%	41.0%	100%	
Total	1435	59.2%	40.8%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

As shown in Table 7.20, the income variables and the four types of voters are associated with each other. The relation is statistically significant in 1992 and in 1997, but not in 2002 (i.e., $p = 0.000$ in 1992, $p = 0.006$ in 1997, and $p = 0.193$ in 2002). In 1992, the low-income group contains relatively more critical partisans and habitual partisans

with relatively more attentive independents and apolitical independents in the higher income group. This pattern continued in 1997, but not in 2002. Also, this pattern is confirmed in an ANOVA analysis. In general, attentive independents and apolitical independents have higher incomes compared to critical partisans and habitual partisans (see Table A7.9 in Appendix).

Table 7.20 Crosstab: Levels of Income and Korean Voters, 1992-2002

Income	Number of cases	Critical Partisan	Habitual Partisan	Attentive Independent	Apolitical Independent	Total	Test Statistics
1992							Pearson Chi-Square = 29.770 Sig. = 0.000
Low	250	42.0%	41.2%	4.0%	12.8%	100%	
Middle	680	41.9%	37.5%	7.8%	12.8%	100%	
High	252	34.1%	31.3%	13.5%	21.0%	100%	
Total	1182	40.3%	37.0%	8.2%	14.6%	100%	
1997							Pearson Chi-Square = 18.069 Sig. = 0.006
Low	183	56.8%	15.8%	15.8%	11.5%	100%	
Middle	675	42.5%	20.1%	17.0%	20.3%	100%	
High	320	40.9%	17.5%	20.0%	21.6%	100%	
Total	1178	44.3%	18.8%	17.7%	19.3%	100%	
2002							Pearson Chi-Square = 8.666 Sig. = 0.193
Low	487	30.6%	28.5%	13.8%	27.1%	100%	
Middle	670	27.0%	32.2%	12.8%	27.9%	100%	
High	278	33.5%	25.5%	16.2%	24.8%	100%	
Total	1435	29.5%	29.7%	13.8%	27.0%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Occupation and Independent Voters

Independent voters are unequally distributed across occupations. The relationship between occupation and independent voters is statistically significant in 1992 and in 1997, but not in 2002. As shown in Table 7.21, the percentage of independent voters among students and white-collar workers was relatively large, while the proportion among farmers or blue-collar workers was relatively small. This pattern is replicated in each of the three elections. Meanwhile, the percentage of independent voters among white-collar workers is still relatively larger, but increased marginally during last 10 years.

As shown in Table 7.22, the relationship between occupation and the four types of voters is significant in 1992 and in 1997, but not in 2002. In general, farmers and blue-collar workers are more likely to be critical partisans, while housewives are more inclined to habitual partisanship. The percentage of apolitical independents among students is also relatively large, while conversely the percentage of attentive independents among professional and public servants is high.

Table 7. 21 Crosstab: Occupation and Independents, 1992-2002

Occupation	N	Party Identifiers	Non-party Identifiers	Total	Test statistics
<u>1992</u>					Pearson Chi-Square = 30.850 Sig. = 0.000
Professionals & Public servants	92	76.1%	23.9%	100%	
White-Collar Workers	160	63.8%	36.3%	100%	
Self-employers	145	78.6%	21.4%	100%	
Blue-Collar Workers	149	79.9%	20.1%	100%	
Farmers	131	88.5%	11.5%	100%	
Students	75	72.0%	28.0%	100%	
Housewives	278	80.9%	19.1%	100%	
Unemployed & other	154	74.7%	25.3%	100%	
Total	1184	77.3%	22.7%	100%	
<u>1997</u>					Pearson Chi-Square = 26.956 Sig. = 0.000
Professionals & Public servants	137	55.5%	44.5%	100%	
White-Collar Workers	132	62.1%	37.9%	100%	
Self-employers	271	70.1%	29.9%	100%	
Blue-Collar Workers	115	75.7%	24.3%	100%	
Farmers	68	60.3%	39.7%	100%	
Students	120	54.2%	45.8%	100%	
Housewives	228	64.9%	35.1%	100%	
Unemployed & other	93	51.6%	48.4%	100%	
Total	1164	63.3%	36.7%	100%	
<u>2002</u>					Pearson Chi-Square = 4.377 Sig. = 0.735
Professionals & Public servants	126	61.1%	38.9%	100%	
White-Collar Workers	197	57.9%	42.1%	100%	
Self-employers	237	60.3%	39.7%	100%	
Blue-Collar Workers	132	63.6%	36.4%	100%	
Farmers	66	66.7%	33.3%	100%	
Students	179	55.3%	44.7%	100%	
Housewives	285	57.9%	42.1%	100%	
Unemployed & other	237	59.1%	40.9%	100%	
Total	1459	59.4%	40.6%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Key: N = number of cases.

Social Class and Independent Voters

Social class is another variable which can be used to analyse independent voters. As shown in Table 7.23, the distribution of independent voters across different social classes is statistically significant. In general, the percentage of independent voters among non-manual workers is larger than the percentage among manual workers. For example, in 1997, the percentage of independent voters among routine non-manual workers was 32.9 per cent compared to 15.2 per cent among the manual workers. This pattern was replicated in 2002. Furthermore, there was a linear relationship between party identification and social class and the relation is statistically significant in all three presidential elections.

Also, the relation between social class and the four types of voters is statistically

significant. As shown in Table 7.24, independent voters among the routine non-manual workers are more likely to be apolitical independents rather than attentive independents. In comparison to routine non-manual workers, independent voters among the Salariat included a greater proportion of attentive independents. There are relatively more the critical partisans rather than the habitual partisans among the petty bourgeois. The manual working class also includes more critical partisans rather than habitual partisans.

Table 7. 22 Crosstab: Occupation and Korean Voters, 1992-2002

Occupation	N	Critical Partisan	Habitual Partisan	Attentive Independent	Apolitical Independent	Total	Test Statistics
1992							
Professionals & Public servants	92	46.7%	29.3%	12.0%	12.0%	100%	Chi-Square = 49.010 Sig. = 0.001
White-Collars	160	31.9%	31.9%	11.9%	24.4%	100%	
Self-employs	145	39.3%	39.3%	8.3%	13.1%	100%	
Blue-Collars	149	44.3%	35.6%	6.7%	13.4%	100%	
Farmers	131	52.7%	35.9%	5.3%	6.1%	100%	
Students	75	42.7%	29.3%	8.0%	20.0%	100%	
Housewives	277	39.4%	41.5%	7.9%	11.2%	100%	
Unemployed & other	153	32.0%	42.5%	6.5%	19.0%	100%	
Total	1182	40.3%	37.0%	8.2%	14.6%	100%	
1997							
Professionals & Public servants	137	38.0%	17.5%	24.1%	20.4%	100%	Chi-Square = 57.648 Sig. = 0.000
White-Collars	132	41.7%	20.5%	17.4%	20.5%	100%	
Self-employs	271	55.0%	15.1%	14.4%	15.5%	100%	
Blue-Collars	115	53.9%	21.7%	8.7%	15.7%	100%	
Farmers	68	48.5%	11.8%	23.5%	16.2%	100%	
Students	120	31.7%	22.5%	13.3%	32.5%	100%	
Housewives	227	41.9%	22.9%	18.5%	16.7%	100%	
Unemployed & other	93	40.9%	10.8%	23.7%	24.7%	100%	
Total	1163	44.9%	18.4%	17.3%	19.4%	100%	
2002							
Professionals & Public servants	126	33.3%	27.8%	14.3%	24.6%	100%	Chi-Square = 23.800 Sig. = 0.303
White-Collars	197	26.9%	31.0%	14.2%	27.9%	100%	
Self-employs	237	30.0%	30.4%	15.2%	24.5%	100%	
Blue-Collars	132	34.1%	29.5%	12.1%	24.2%	100%	
Farmers	66	40.9%	25.8%	15.2%	18.2%	100%	
Students	179	23.5%	31.8%	14.5%	20.2%	100%	
Housewives	285	24.9%	33.0%	12.6%	29.5%	100%	
Unemployed & other	237	35.4%	23.6%	11.4%	29.5%	100%	
Total	1459	29.8%	29.5%	13.5%	27.1%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Key: N = number of cases.

Table 7. 23 Crosstab: Class and Independents, 1992-2002

Social Class	Number of cases	Party Identifiers	Non-party Identifiers	Total	Test statistics
1992					
Salariat	126	70.6%	29.4%	100%	Pearson Chi-Square = 19.314 Sig. = 0.000
Routine non-manual worker	146	67.1%	32.9%	100%	
Petty bourgeois	258	82.2%	17.8%	100%	Pearson's R = -.132 Sig. = 0.001
Foreman and technician	22	72.7%	27.3%	100%	
Manual worker	125	84.8%	15.2%	100%	
Total	677	77.0%	23.0%	100%	
1997					
Salariat	176	55.1%	44.9%	100%	Pearson Chi-Square = 12.670 Sig. = 0.013
Routine non-manual worker	134	70.1%	29.9%	100%	
Petty bourgeois	336	69.6%	30.4%	100%	Pearson's R = -0.085 Sig. = 0.002
Foreman and technician	12	58.3%	41.7%	100%	
Manual worker	65	67.7%	32.3%	100%	
Total	723	65.8%	34.2%	100%	
2002					
Salariat	195	58.5%	41.5%	100%	Pearson Chi-Square = 5.333 Sig. = 0.225
Routine non-manual worker	200	57.0%	43.0%	100%	
Petty bourgeois	285	61.1%	38.9%	100%	Pearson's R = -0.071 Sig. = 0.049
Foreman and technician	12	58.3%	41.7%	100%	
Manual worker	86	70.9%	29.1%	100%	
Total	778	60.4%	39.6%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Table 7. 24 Crosstab: Class and Korean Voters, 1992-2002

Social Class	N	Critical Partisan	Habitual Partisan	Attentive Independent	Apolitical Independent	Total	Test Statistics
1992							
Salariat	126	39.7%	31.0%	14.3%	15.1%	100%	Chi-Square = 34.018 Sig. = 0.001
Routine non-manual worker	146	30.8%	36.3%	8.9%	24.0%	100%	
Petty bourgeois	258	45.0%	37.2%	6.2%	11.6%	100%	
Foreman/technician	22	36.4%	36.4%	18.2%	9.1%	100%	
Manual worker	125	53.6%	31.2%	6.4%	8.8%	100%	
Total	677	42.2%	34.7%	8.7%	14.3%	100%	
1997							
Salariat	176	38.1%	17.0%	25.6%	19.3%	100%	Chi-Square = 31.007 Sig. = 0.002
Routine non-manual worker	134	46.3%	23.9%	12.7%	17.2%	100%	
Petty bourgeois	36	54.8%	14.9%	15.5%	14.9%	100%	
Foreman/technician	12	41.7%	16.7%	—	41.7%	100%	
Manual worker	65	50.8%	16.9%	10.8%	21.5%	100%	
Total	723	48.5%	17.3%	16.7%	17.4%	100%	
2002							
Salariat	195	31.8%	26.7%	18.5%	23.1%	100%	Chi-Square = 19.867 Sig. = 0.070
Routine non-manual worker	200	27.0%	30.0%	11.0%	32.0%	100%	
Petty bourgeois	285	29.8%	31.2%	14.4%	24.6%	100%	
Foreman/technician	12	25.0%	33.3%	25.0%	16.7%	100%	
Manual worker	86	44.2%	26.7%	14.0%	15.1%	100%	
Total	778	31.1%	29.3%	14.7%	24.9%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Key: N = Number of cases.

Ideology and Independent Voters

Ideological differences between partisans and independent voters are statistically significant. As shown in Table 7.25, more independent voters take the central position in the conservative-liberal spectrum, while partisans are more likely to be either conservatives or liberals.

The distribution of the four types of voters across different ideological positions is also statistically significant. Apolitical independent voters tend to be in the centre of the political spectrum, while attentive independent voters are more inclined to be liberals. Also, critical partisans are more likely to be conservatives or liberals rather than centrists (see Table 7.26).

Table 7.25 Crosstab: Ideology and Independent, 1997-2002

Ideology	Number of cases	Party Identifiers	Non-party Identifiers	Total	Test statistics
<u>1997</u>					Pearson Chi-Square = 4.826 Sig. = 0.090
Conservative	448	63.2%	36.8%	100%	
Centrist	241	59.3%	40.7%	100%	
Liberal	391	67.8%	32.2%	100%	
Total	1080	64.0%	36.0%	100%	
<u>2002</u>					Pearson Chi-Square = 24.005 Sig. = 0.000
Conservative	400	66.8%	33.3%	100%	
Centrist	484	51.0%	49.0%	100%	
Liberal	616	61.4%	38.6%	100%	
Total	1500	59.5%	40.5%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Table 7.26 Crosstab: Ideology and Korean Voters, 1997-2002

Ideology	Number of cases	Critical Partisan	Habitual Partisan	Attentive Independent	Apolitical Independent	Total	Test Statistics
<u>1997</u>							Pearson Chi-square = 12.951 Sig. = 0.044
Conservative	448	44.6%	18.5%	15.4%	21.4%	100%	
Centrist	241	41.9%	17.4%	18.7%	22.0%	100%	
Liberal	391	47.1%	20.7%	18.9%	13.3%	100%	
Total	1080	44.9%	19.1%	17.4%	18.6%	100%	
<u>2002</u>							Pearson Chi-square = 62.199 Sig. = 0.000
Conservative	400	33.3%	33.5%	9.0%	24.3%	100%	
Centrist	484	20.7%	30.4%	12.6%	36.4%	100%	
Liberal	616	35.2%	26.1%	17.2%	21.4%	100%	
Total	1500	30.0%	29.5%	13.5%	27.0%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

The difference in the average ideological scores between partisans and independents

is not significant (see Table A7.10 in Appendix), However, the difference in the average scores across the four types of voters is statistically significant. In 2002, attentive independent voters as a whole were more liberal compared to the more centrist position of habitual partisans and apolitical independent voters (see Table A7.11 in Appendix).

3. The Causes of Partisan Decline in Korea

Why have more Korean voters become detached from political parties during the last 10 years unlike voters in other new democracies? What are the causes of partisan decline in Korea? There are two controversial approaches to the cause of partisan decline in mature democracies.¹⁹ The '*sociological explanation*' focuses on socio-structural changes which have changed the nature of electorates including changes in social cleavages, the expansion of education, and the emergence of mass media.²⁰ As a result of the modernisation processes in mature democracies, contemporary voters have better skills and enough information to understand the complexities of politics, and they no longer need political parties as a political cue.²¹ They are thus less dependent on political parties compared to traditional voters causing partisan decline in mature democracies. Also, public values and interests have diversified to include post-material values, which emphasise individualism and contradicts the discipline of party politics Therefore, partisan decline is very apparent among younger generation.²²

As another approach to the cause of partisan decline, the '*political explanation*' finds the causes of partisan dealignment in changes in party politics and the 'failure of parties'. Several scholars argue that popular dissatisfaction with the performance of political parties and democratic process is the cause of partisan decline.²³ Also, some researchers suggest growing ideological convergence between political parties in mature democracies as the cause of partisan decline.²⁴

¹⁹ William L. Miller and Richard G. Niemi, 'Voting: Choice, Conditioning, and Constraint', in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris, eds, *Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting* (London: Sage, 2002), pp. 169-88, at pp. 177-8. Also, Russell J. Dalton, 'The Decline of Party Identification' in Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds, *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 19-36, at p. 29.

²⁰ Harrop and Miller, *Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction*, pp. 139-40.

²¹ Russell J. Dalton, 'Cognitive Mobilization and Partisan Dealignment in Advanced Industrial Democracies' *Journal of Politics*, 46 (1984), 264-84. Also, Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

²² Miller and Shanks, *The New American Voter*, pp. 151-88.

²³ Carsten Zelle, 'Social Dealignment vs. Political Frustration: Contrasting Explanation of the Floating Vote in Germany', *European Journal of Political Research*, 27 (1995), 319-45.

²⁴ Schmitt and Holmberg, 'Political Parties in Decline?'; Larry M. Bartels, 'Partisanship and

These theories based on electoral changes in mature democracies will be applied to explain the causes of partisan decline in Korea. The sources of partisan dealignment in Korea will be identified and discussed focusing on five factors; generational patterns, cognitive mobilisation, interest in politics, dissatisfaction with political parties and the democratic process, and the lack of ideological difference.

Generational Patterns

There is a positive relationship between age and partisanship in Korea, as discussed in the previous section. Independent voters are disproportionately concentrated among the young. According to the model of party identification, the young do not have party attachment or have only weak partisanship. Older voters are not only more likely to be partisans but the strength of partisanship also increases with age.

Considering the positive relationship between the young and independent voters, the influx of young voters without party attachment into the electorate may help explain partisan decline in Korea. However, the influx of young voters cannot fully account for the decline in the level of party identification in Korea during the last 10 years. First, the percentage of young voters in the electorate did not increase during the last 10 years, but decreased continually, although half of the electorate is still below 40 years old. For example, the percentage of those between 20-29 years old in the electorate decreased from 31.4 per cent to 24.3 per cent during the last 10 years, while the percentage of those 60 years old or above increased gradually from 11.9 per cent to 15.8 per cent during this period (see Table 6.1 in Chapter 6).

Furthermore, as shown in Table 7.27, voters did not become partisans as they aged in contrast to a theme of the party identification model. It is true that there were more independents among the young rather than older voters in the last three presidential elections. However, the percentage of independent voters in each cohort increased during 1992-2002, though the margin of change is different in each cohort. The percentage of independent voters for cohort X and cohort VII also increased substantially during last 10 years (i.e., 22.4 per cent). The percentage for the cohort VI and the cohort V also markedly increased compared to other cohorts (i.e., 19.2 per cent point and 18.7 per cent, respectively). Therefore, not only the young, but also older voters contributed to the decline in the level of party identification in Korea. The increase of independent voters is apparent in particular among intermediate cohorts rather than among relatively younger or older cohorts.

Table 7. 27 Non-Party Identifiers (%) by Five-Year Cohorts, 1992-2002

Cohort	Percentage who were Non-Party Identifiers			
	1992 (A)	1997	2002 (B)	(B) – (A)
X	Age 55-59 16.7	Age 60-64 43.8	Age 65-69 39.1	22.4
IX	Age 50-54 22.0	Age 55-59 39.2	Age 60-64 29.5	7.5
VIII	Age 45-49 27.2	Age 50-54 31.0	Age 55-59 36.6	9.4
VII	Age 40-44 21.0	Age 45-49 33.0	Age 50-54 43.4	22.4
VI	Age 35-39 22.9	Age 40-44 30.5	Age 45-49 32.1	19.2
V	Age 30-34 23.8	Age 35-39 32.5	Age 40-44 42.5	18.7
IV	Age 25-29 24.6	Age 30-34 42.0	Age 35-39 35.1	10.5
III	Age 20-24 31.8	Age 25-29 34.4	Age 30-34 47.6	15.8
II		Age 20-24 47.0	Age 25-29 45.8	
I			Age 20-24 46.0	
Total	22.7	36.9	40.6	17.9

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Cognitive Mobilisation

The growth of the independent has been linked to rising political sophistication in the electorate in mature democracies. Voters who achieve a high level of educational attainment are less reliant on political parties to comprehend the complexity of politics. Thus, it is assumed that an increase in the electorate's educational levels during the modernisation process causes a decline in party-reliant partisans.

Educational Attainment

An improvement of educational attainment: The educational attainment of Korean voters has increased markedly. Table 7.28 shows the distribution of educational levels across different age cohorts. The percentage of voters who have college level education among 20-24 years cohort is 70.3 per cent, while among the over 60 years cohort it is only 6.9 per cent. This difference between a better-educated younger generation and less educated older voters is statistically significant (i.e., Chi-square = 751.616, $p = 0.000$). Also, ANOVA analysis shows a difference in the degree of educational attainment across different cohorts (see Table A7.12 in Appendix). The average education level of the

youngest cohort is 3.70 and the average of the oldest cohort is 1.72 where 1 is the lowest educational level to 4 is the highest education level. The relationship between age and educational attainment is also linear (i.e., Pearson's Correlation Coefficient = -0.611, $p = 0.000$). In conclusion, it would seem quite possible that the substantial increase of the level of education among the voters has contributed to the increase of independent voters in Korea.

Education and partisanship: Furthermore, as discussed in the previous section of this chapter, educational attainment is associated with partisanship. The difference in the percentage of independent voters across different educational groups was statistically significant in 1992 and in 1997, but not in 2002 (see Table 7.11 in section two of this chapter). A change in partisanship among voters who have only primary school education accounts for why the relation is not significant in 2002. The relationship between the level of education and partisanship is not linear. On the one hand, the percentage of independent voters among voters with higher education is relatively high and this pattern was replicated in the last three presidential elections. On the other hand, the percentage of independent voters among electors with the lowest level of educational attainment was relatively small in 1992, but was larger in 1997 and in 2002. Thus, the growth of new independent voters cannot simply be attributed to rising levels of political sophistication. The increase in independent voters among those who have only the lowest level of education has to be explained by other factors.

Table 7.28 Crosstab: Levels of Education and Age, 2002

Age	Number of cases	Levels of Education					Test Statistics
		Primary	Middle School	High School	College and the above	Total	
20-24	209	0.0%	0.5%	29.2%	70.3%	100%	Pearson Chi-square = 751.616 Sig. = 0.000
25-34	335	0.6%	2.7%	38.8%	57.9%	100%	
35-44	354	1.4%	7.4%	48.9%	42.3%	100%	
45-54	263	7.2%	22.1%	44.9%	25.9%	100%	
55-64	177	24.3%	29.9%	29.4%	16.4%	100%	Pearson's R = -0.611 Sig. = 0.000
65 and over	144	56.3%	22.2%	14.6%	6.9%	100%	
Total	1492	10.1%	12.1%	37.5%	40.3%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election, 2002

Education and understanding the complexity of politics: Although independent voters have a relatively higher level of education compared to partisans, it is debatable whether a higher level of education results in greater political sophistication. Is it true that voters with a college education do not need political parties in order to comprehend the complexity of politics?

While it is expected that college educated voters would show greater political

sophistication and have relatively less difficulties in understanding politics, many college university students confessed that they have difficulties in understanding politics. Moreover, the young generally find it difficult to understand the complexity of politics compared to older voters. In qualitative data, many respondents who have college level education and who are generally young expressed their difficulties in understanding the complexity of politics. For example, “I think that it is difficult for me to understand political affairs. I hardly understood the political process before I had a college education. Then, I graduated from university, but I still do not really understand politics” (I-140). “Politics is too complicated for ordinary people to comprehend” (I-124). “To be honest with you, it seems to me that politics is so complicated” (I-123; I-130; I-128).

Table 7.29 shows that there is difference in the degree of understanding politics across age cohorts among voters who have college education. In general, the younger, college-educated voters have relatively more difficulties in understanding politics compared to older voters with a college education. Therefore, education explains some political sophistication, but does not fully explain it. Some other factors should be included in measuring political sophistication.

Table 7. 29 T-test for Equality of Means: Understanding Politics by Age Cohorts (only voters who have college education), 2002

Age	Number of cases	Mean	Std. Deviation	Test Statistics
20-24	147	3.90	1.31	F = 6.187 Sig. = 0.000 Pearson's R = 0.210 Sig. = 0.000
25-34	194	4.16	1.35	
35-44	154	4.26	1.40	
45-54	68	4.49	1.24	
55-64	29	4.86	1.19	
65 and over	10	5.70	1.16	
Total	602	4.22	1.36	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.

Keys: Mean = average score in a 7-point scale (i.e., 1 = lowest level to 7 = highest level).

The young and partisanship: Among younger voters, the level of education cannot effectively distinguish partisans from independent voters. The percentage of voters who achieve a college level of education among younger generations in Korea is very high at more than 70 per cent. In order to test this argument, the relation between college education and independent voters is examined only for voters below 35 years old. The level of education is recoded into college level and below college level because there are only a few voters with education below high school level. As shown in Table 7.30, there is no difference in partisanship between the two educational levels among young voters. Therefore, educational attainment is not a perfect indicator for political sophistication.

Table 7.30 Crosstab: Independent Voters and Education (only voters who are below 35 years old), 2002

Education level	Number of cases	Party Identifiers	Non-party Identifiers	Total	Test statistics
Non-college education	203	55.2%	44.8%	100%	Pearson Chi-Square = 0.452 Sig. = 0.534
College education	341	52.2%	47.8%	100%	
Total	544	53.3%	46.7%	100%	

Data: Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.

Note: Understanding politics is measured in a 7-point scale where 1 is the lowest level and 7 is the highest level. In the 2002 presidential election study, Question 21 (“Do you think that you have a better knowledge and a good deal of understanding of politics or elections compared to other people?”) is used.

Understanding politics

Partisans vs. independents: As an alternative indicator for the level of political sophistication, the degree of difficulty in understanding politics is used. It is assumed that the sophisticated do not find it difficult to understand the complexity of politics compared to the unsophisticated. The difference in the degree of difficulties in understanding politics between partisans and independent voters is not statistically significant in 1997, but is significant in 2002 (see Table A7.13 in Appendix).

Table 7.31 T-Test for Equality of Means: Understanding Politics by Partisanship, 1997-2002

	Number of cases	Mean	Std. Deviation	t	Sig.(2-sided)
<u>1997</u>					
Party identifiers	750	2.56	.89	-1.018	0.309
Non-party identifiers	435	2.62	.88		
<u>2002</u>					
Party identifiers	892	4.14	1.50	5.313	0.000
Non-party identifiers	608	3.73	1.36		

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997 and 2002.

Keys: Mean in 1997 = average score in a 4-point scale (i.e., 1 = ‘very difficult’ to 4 = ‘not at all difficult’); Mean in 2002 = average score in a 7-point scale (i.e., 1 = ‘very little understanding’ to 7 = ‘very high understanding’).

Note: In 1997, Question 30-6 (i.e., “Do you agree with the statement that politics is too difficult for you to understand?”) is used to measure the level of understanding politics. In 2002, Question 21 (i.e., “Do you think that you have a better knowledge and a good deal of understanding of politics or elections compared to other people?”) is used in the measurement.

However, it should be noted that independent voters have relatively more difficulties in understanding politics compared to partisans, contrary to the thesis of the cognitive mobilisation theory that assumes an increase of cognitive sophistication has caused partisan decline in mature democracies during last several decades. As shown in Table 7.31, the T-test for equality of means also suggests that independent voters have relatively more difficulties in understanding the complexity of politics. This fact suggests that an

increased level of politically sophisticated voters cannot account for the increase of independent voters in Korea during the last 10 years. It also backs up one of the arguments of this thesis that a relatively large number of lowly educated partisans have become independents in this decade.

Attentive independents vs. apolitical independents: The pattern of the relationship between levels of understanding politics and partisanship is mixed when independent voters are subdivided into attentive independents and apolitical independents. Attentive independent voters have a relatively better understanding of politics compared to apolitical independents (see Table A7.14 in Appendix). Furthermore, the level of understanding politics among attentive independent voters is similar to the level among critical partisans, while the level of understanding apolitical independent voters is similar to the level among the habitual partisans (see Table 7.32). As discussed in the early part of this chapter, there are more apolitical independent voters than attentive independent voters among all independent voters, and the number of apolitical independents has grown more substantially during last 10 years compared to attentive independent voters. The increase of independent voters and the decrease of party identifiers has been led by apolitical independent voters with relatively less political sophistication rather by politically sophisticated attentive independent voters.

Table 7. 32 ANOVA: The Degree of Understanding Politics by Korean Voters, 1997-2002

	Number of cases	Mean	Std. Deviation	ANOVA
1997				
Critical partisan	527	2.59	0.92	F = 0.961 Sig. = 0.410
Habitual partisan	222	2.51	0.83	
Attentive independent	208	2.66	0.92	
Apolitical independent	227	2.58	0.83	
Total	1184	2.58	0.89	
2002				
Critical partisan	450	4.64	1.44	F = 65.638 Sig. = 0.000
Habitual partisan	442	3.64	1.40	
Attentive independent	203	4.28	1.34	
Apolitical independent	405	3.46	1.29	
Total	1500	3.98	1.46	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997 and 2002.

Keys: N = number of cases; Mean in 1997 = average score in a 4-point scale (i.e., 1 = 'very difficult' to 4 = 'not at all difficult'); Mean in 2002 = average score in a 7-point scale (i.e. 1 = 'very little understanding' to 7= 'very high understanding').

Note: In 1997, Question 30-6 (i.e., "Do you agree on the statement that politics is too difficult for you to understand?") is used to measure the level of understanding politics. In 2002, Question 21 (i.e., "Do you think that you have a better knowledge and a good deal of understanding of politics or elections compared to other people?") is used in the measurement.

Understanding politics and interest in politics: Qualitative data shows that there is no clear relation between independent voters and understanding politics. There is also no

difference between independent voters and partisans in terms of their understanding of politics nor between attentive independents and apolitical independents. Neither was a clear pattern evident amongst partisans also did not show a clear pattern regarding difficulties in understanding politics. Furthermore, there is no difference in political understanding between men and women, between highly educated voters and voters with a lower level of education, and between the young and the old.

Many respondents suggested a lack of interest in politics as a reason why they had some difficulties in understanding it. For example, “In a sense, it is true that I have some difficulties in understanding politics, but I think that a lack of interest in politics is the reason why I find it difficult” (I-118). “As an ordinary person who is not interested in politics, I don’t really understand politics” (I-133). “I think that it is natural for me to have some difficulties in understanding politics because I am not interested in politics” (I-142). “You can get enough information about politics from mass media as long as you are interested in politics” (I-105; I-211).

Many voters also argued that politics itself is relatively easy to understand, but unpredictable political process and Korean politicians make it difficult for voters to understand politics. For example, “Politics itself is not so complicated to understand, but politicians mess it up” (I-114; I-120; I-127). “The public has difficulties in understanding politics because politicians block public access to political affairs” (I-106; I-122; I-208).

Interest in Politics

Traditional non-party identifiers are alienated from politics and so have no party attachments. In contrast to the traditional non-party identifiers, a growing body of independent voters in mature democracies during the last few decades are relatively interested in politics. According to this argument, it is expected that the proportion of politically interested voters among the part of the electorate who do not identify themselves with a political party has increased over time, and that it is a rise in the number of attentive independent voters which has brought about the increase in the independent voters among the electorate in Korea.

Partisan Decline and Indifference to Politics

Survey data shows that the argument based on experience of the voters in mature democracies does not fit with electoral change in Korea. As discussed in the previous section, the increase of apolitical independents rather than attentive independents mainly contributed to the increase of independent voters in the Korean voters (see Table 7.7).

Also, independent voters in Korea are more likely to be less interested in politics than partisans. Survey data confirms the relationship between the degree of interest in politics and independent voters. Table 7.33 shows that partisans are relatively more interested in politics than independent voters. Also, the T-test for equality of means also backs up this difference in the degree of interest between partisans and independent voters (see Table A7.15 in Appendix).²⁵ For example, in 2002, the degree of interest in politics among partisans is 4.23 and the degree among independent voters is 3.68 where 1 is the lowest level of interests and 7 is the highest level of interest in 7-point scale. The result of analysis of survey data implies that a decrease of interest in politics has caused partisan decline in the new democracy.

Table 7.33 Crosstab: Independent and Interest in Politics, 1992-2002

	Number of cases	Party Identifiers	Non-party Identifiers	Total	Test statistics
1992					
Interested	1037	78.6%	21.4%	100%	Pearson Chi-Square = 8.766 Sig. = 0.004
Not interested	145	67.6%	32.4%	100%	Pearson's R = .086
Total	1182	77.2%	22.8%	100%	Sig. = 0.003
1997					
Interested	1076	65.4%	34.6%	100%	Pearson Chi-Square = 24.475 Sig. = 0.000
Not interested	122	42.6%	57.4%	100%	Pearson's R = .143
Total	1198	63.1%	36.9%	100%	Sig. = 0.000
2002					
Interested	1268	61.6%	38.4%	100%	Pearson Chi-Square = 15.379 Sig. = 0.000
Not interested	232	47.8%	52.2%	100%	Pearson's R = 0.101
Total	1500	59.5%	40.5%	100%	Sig. = 0.000

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Losing Interest in Politics: Qualitative Data

A lack of interest in politics as a cause of partisan decline: Qualitative data also confirms that a lack of interest in politics is the most important factor in explaining a lack of party attachment. In answering a question about the reasons why they do not feel close to any political party, many independent voters who were generally young mentioned a lack of interest in politics. For example, "I am not interested in any political party because I am not interested in politics" (I-109; I-137; I-139; I-123; I-118; I-112). "A lack of interest in politics is the fundamental reason why I do not feel close to any political party" (I-138). "I am not interested in politics, though I heard about politics [from my parents]. I

²⁵ In this analysis, interest in a specific election is used instead of interest in politics due to the limitation of survey data. However, in the 2002 survey, there was a question to measure respondent's general interest in politics. So, it is possible to examine again the difference in interest in politics between partisans and independent voters based on the question about interest in politics. The result shows a same pattern with the result of analysis based on the question about

think that it is meaningless for me to support a political party” (I-113). “Well, I think that I am not interested in politics. I did not pay attention to any political party” (I-117).

Young voters and a lack of interest in politics: The relation between the level of interest in politics and the strength of partisanship also explains why more young people are independent voters compared to older voters. New voters entering the electorate are relatively less interested in politics and have poor knowledge of politics. Political interest and partisan attachments typically only develop later on in life.

The qualitative data confirms that young people develop more interest in politics with age. In answering to a question about interest in politics and any changes in the level of the interest during the last 10 years, many young voters referred to an increase of interests in politics with age, even though the degree of interests was still low. For example, some of them explained that they are not interested in politics because they are too young to be concerned with politics. “I am very young, and I haven’t thought about politics” (I-133). “I am young, and I don’t have any knowledge on politics” (I-201). “Still I do not really understand the importance of politics” (I-123). Others confessed that their interests in politics had increased with age. “I recently become interested in politics. The presidential election is one of the causes. Age is another cause” (I-211). “As I grow older, I have expanded my mental horizons about life” (I-104; I-208; I-136; FM3). Older voters also said that ageing affected their interests in politics. A party identifier directly referred to the age effect. “Now I am getting more and more interested in politics unlike I was young” (I-213).

Causes of falling interest in politics: Why did voters lose their interest in politics? The qualitative data suggest that electoral disappointment with politics is a significant reason why voters lost interest in politics. For example, in answering a question about why they lost their interests in politics during the last 10 years, independent voters referred to their dissatisfaction with politics. “All politicians are pitiful, and politics is very distressing to me. So, I don’t want to think about politics, and then I no longer have any interest in politics” (I-135). “I am not interested in politics because nothing has been changed in politics during the past few years” (I-124; FF5). “I was fairly interested in democracy. However, I am sick and tired of politics in my country nowadays, and I have lost all my interest in politics” (I-131; FM1; FM5; FM6). One partisan also expressed her negative feelings about contemporary politics. “I found that there was no change in politics under Kim Dae-jung government [compared to politics under the old governments]” (I-210).

Also, several voters who continued to be indifferent to politics during the last 10

years pointed out a lack of political development as the reason they were not interested in politics. “Nothing has been changed. Political corruption is still prevalent. People are not interested in politics” (I-109). “Because I think that all politicians are bastard” (I-125). “Why do I need to pay attention to politics? Political parties always quarrel with each other about small matters” (I-142).

Dissatisfaction with Political Parties and Democratic Process

The new democracy in Korea has been consolidated since the transition in 1987. Despite political developments in the new democracy, public dissatisfaction with politics and/or politicians is increasing. High expectation has turned toward deep disappointment with the democratic process. Korean voters who were eager for democracy in 1987 despair of the continuation of older patterns of party politics and feel contempt toward politicians in the new society. This high level of dissatisfaction with politics among the voters may explain partisan decline in Korea.

Dissatisfaction with political parties and politicians

Feelings toward political parties: In general, almost all voters are dissatisfied and distrust incumbent politicians and the present political parties. Qualitative data shows that there is no difference in dissatisfaction with political parties between partisans and independent voters. Both attentive independent voters and apolitical independent voters expressed their dissatisfaction with political parties, though the most restrained voters were the apolitical independent voters indifferent to politics.

In answering questions about their feelings to political parties, most interviewees referred to negative words --- factionalism and bossism, political disputes, party interest put first, meeting and parting of political parties and defections, corruption, and a lack of different policies and ideas. For example, “They are childish. I don’t think that political parties are looking after the interests of the nation. Political parties always indulge in political disputes” (I-206; I-108; I-205; I-213; I-120; I-116; I-115). “I think that all political parties are bad. Political parties pursue party interests too much at the expense of those of the nation” (I-139; I-134; I-119; FF3). “They usually ignore compromise and negotiation” (I-138). “Political parties are similar to organised gangs who fight against enemy frantically for their own organisational interests. Political parties in Korea are only looking for power, but don’t speak for the nation” (I-131; I-124; FM8). “They always speak ill of each other” (I-207; I-133; I-128; I-117). “I don’t trust many political parties because they are often formed and demolished according to their political interests in

elections” (I-137; I-204; I-123). “Political parties are formed and demolished depending upon politician’s interests. I think that they have no sense of honour” (I-201) “Politics is corrupted” (I-202; I-141). “Political parties remind me of political corruption” (I-204; I-135). “A minority opinion is totally ignored within political parties” (I-130; I-113). “Political parties in Korea are not democratic organisations. They are similar to one-man dictatorships” (I-209; I-208; I-142; FF4).

An increase in dissatisfaction with political parties and politicians: Survey data confirms that electoral dissatisfaction with politician or political parties has increased in Korea. As shown in Table 7.34, in 1992, the percentage of voters who were satisfied with politicians among the electorate was 25.6 per cent, while the percentage was 10.3 per cent in 1997. Also, the level of voter dissatisfaction with political parties was very high at roughly the same level of dissatisfaction with politicians in 1997.

Table 7. 34 Dissatisfaction with Politicians and Political Parties, 1992-1997

Dissatisfaction		Number of cases	Frequency	Mean
<u>1992</u> Politicians	Very good	9	0.8%	2.89
	Good	282	23.8%	
	Bad	730	61.5%	
	Very bad	166	14.0%	
	Total	1187	100%	
<u>1997</u> Politicians	Very good	18	1.5%	3.27
	Good	106	8.8%	
	Bad	609	50.5%	
	Very Bad	463	38.4%	
	Total	1196	100%	
<u>1997</u> Political Parties	Very Good	8	0.7%	3.23
	Good	157	13.1%	
	Bad	570	47.7%	
	Very bad	459	38.4%	
	Total	1194	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992 and 1997.

Keys: Mean = average score in a 4-point scale (1= very good to 4 = very bad).

Note: The following questions are used. In 1992, Question 27, “Are politicians carrying out their job well?”. In 1997, Question 30-2, “Do you agree that politicians (President and Congressman) do not keep their election promises?”, and Question 30-3, “Do you agree that political parties are interested only in votes?”.

Distrusting political parties and a lack of party affiliation: Independent voters are dissatisfied with politics and political parties in Korea. Qualitative data shows that electoral dissatisfaction or disappointment with politics and politicians is one of the three main reasons why voters do not feel close to any political party. There is no difference in this regard between attentive independents and apolitical independents. Also, voters who referred to dissatisfaction included many relatively older voters. For example, “I don’t feel close to any particular political party. I can’t trust any political parties. I don’t care about political parties, though I care about the politicians who belong to the political

parties” (I-105; I-120). “I think that there is no political party doing what a party should” (I-108; FF4). “Politicians often move from one party to other party as *migratory birds* do” (I-110; I-112).²⁶ “I feel that political parties are like dressing rooms [because politicians often change their ideological position]. Politicians often switch their party memberships from one party to other party [without considering a party line]” (FF6). “Both the ruling party and the opposition party only look for their own party interests [rather than interests of the nation]” (I-115; I-119; I-136; FF4). “No political parties speak for the public” (I-130). “I was interested in political parties when they led the democratic movement in Korea. However, now I think that all political parties in Korea are the same as a group of gangsters these days” (I-131). “I know that political parties always fight against each other, so I began to dislike all political parties” (FM6; FM4). “How can I feel close to a political party? Each political party may disappear soon” (FF8).

Considering the relationship between dissatisfaction with politics and independent voters, it is expected that partisans who are disappointed with politics during the last 10 years have lost their party attachment. Of the in-depth interviewees, only three respondents admitted that they had had party attachment for a while, and then become independent voters. All of them referred to their disappointment with their political party as the reason they gave up their partisanship. For example, “I had party affiliation in the past. However, the political party took power and became corrupt. So, I am disappointed with the party” (I-115; I-125). “I supported the ruling party in the past. However, I realise that every ruling party is involved in political corruption. I feel that party attachment is meaningless” (I-113).

Independent voters vs. partisans: Survey data also shows the relationship between dissatisfaction with contemporary politics and independent voters. Independent voters were relatively less satisfied with politics compared to partisans. The relationship between independent voters and the degree of dissatisfaction with politics is statistically significant in 1992, but not in 1997 (see Table A7.16 in Appendix). Table 7.35 also shows that independent voters have a relatively negative perception of politicians or political parties compared to partisans. It is likely that electoral dissatisfaction with politics was intensified in 1997 in view of the critical economic recession at that time. The extremely high level of dissatisfaction with politics at this point included not only independent voters, but also many partisans, so the difference in the level of dissatisfaction between independent voters and partisans disappeared in this year. This confirms that former partisans of the old ruling party contributed to the process of partisan decline in 1997, as discussed in the first section of this chapter, resulting in a redistribution of party

²⁶ The term ‘migratory birds’ (*Cheolsae*) is often used to describes politicians’ negative habit of

identification.

The relationship between dissatisfaction and the four types of voters is also statistically significant in 1992, but not in 1997. Habitual partisans were relatively satisfied with politics, while attentive independent voters were relatively dissatisfied with politics (see Table A7.17 and Table A7.18 in Appendix).

Quantitative analysis probing the relationship between electoral dissatisfaction and partisan decline is not conclusive due to the lack of data. The 2002 presidential election study did not include any question about popular dissatisfaction with politics. Therefore, voter perceptions towards the overall performance of the incumbent government are used in order to explore changes in the relationship between dissatisfaction with politics and independent voters.

Table 7. 35 T-Test for Equality of Means: Independents and Satisfaction with Politics, 1992-1997

	Number of cases	Mean	Std. Deviation	t	Sig. (2-sided)
<u>1992</u>					
Party identifiers	905	2.86	.62	3.091	0.002
Non-party identifiers	267	2.99	.67		
<u>1997</u>					
Party identifiers	750	2.21	.71	1.694	0.091
Non-party identifiers	436	2.28	.68		

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: Mean = average score in a 4-point scale.

Note: In the 1992 presidential election study, Question 27 (“Are politicians carrying out their job well?”) is used (i.e., 1 = ‘very satisfied’ to 4 = ‘very dissatisfied’); In the 1997 presidential election study, Question 30-3 (“Do you agree that political parties are interested only in votes?”) is used (i.e., 1 = ‘strongly disagree’ to 4 = ‘strongly agree’).

Dissatisfaction with Overall Performance of Government

Effects of partisanship on government performance evaluation: It can be assumed that independent voters are more critical of the performance of the incumbent government compared to partisans if dissatisfaction with politics and the democratic process has been a cause of partisan decline. However, it should be noted that according to the model of party identification partisans take quite different positions in evaluating the performance of incumbent government depending upon the direction of partisanship. Partisans who feel close to the ruling party are relatively generous in evaluating the performance of incumbent government, while partisans attached to opposition parties are more negative.

Empirical survey data supports this argument. As shown in Table 7.36, there is a

changing their party membership in Korea.

wide difference in perception of the incumbent government's performance between ruling party identifiers and major opposition party identifiers. Moreover, independent voters are less negative about government performance compared to voters aligned to opposition parties, but more negative than those partisans who identify themselves with the ruling party. For example, in 1992, the average score for government performance of given by ruling party identifiers was 2.53, while the average score given by opposition party identifiers was 3.04. This difference in average score between the ruling and the opposition party identifiers is statistically significant. The average score awarded by independent voters is similar to the score given by third party identifiers. The score for independent voters is larger than the score for the ruling party, and the difference is statistically significant. Independent voters are more favourable in their assessment of government performance than opposition party identifiers, and the difference is statistically significant. This pattern of difference is replicated in 1997 and in 2002.

Table 7. 36 ANOVA: Performance of Incumbent Government by Party Identification, 1992-2002

	Number of cases	Mean	Std. Deviation	ANOVA
1992				F = 50.020 Sig. = 0.000
Party identifiers (ruling party)	462	2.53	0.60	
Party identifiers (opposition party)	323	3.04	0.59	
Party identifiers (Third and small party)	121	2.93	0.57	
Non-party identifiers	266	2.85	0.63	
Total	1172	2.78	0.64	
1997				F = 10.131 Sig. = 0.000
Party identifiers (ruling party)	220	4.08	0.85	
Party identifiers (opposition party)	388	4.44	0.75	
Party identifiers (Third and small party)	146	4.14	0.92	
Non-party identifiers	442	4.29	0.86	
Total	1196	4.28	0.84	
2002				F = 101.022 Sig. = 0.000
Party identifiers (ruling party)	405	2.63	0.91	
Party identifiers (opposition party)	350	3.75	0.95	
Party identifiers (Third and small party)	137	3.47	0.92	
Non-party identifiers	608	3.36	0.90	
Total	1500	3.27	1.01	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: Mean = average score in a 4-point scale in 1992 (i.e., 1 = 'very good' to 4 = 'very bad'), and average score in a 5-point scale in 1997 and in 2002 (i.e., 1 = 'very good' to 5 = 'very bad').

Independent voter's perception toward government performance: How do Korean voters perceive the performance of the incumbent government? In general, independent voters are relatively more negative towards the performance of incumbent government compared to partisans, as shown in Table 7.37 (see also Table A7.19 in Appendix). The relation between independent voters and dissatisfaction with the performance of

government is statistically significant in 2002, but not in 1992 nor in 1997.

There is a difference in perception of the performance of the government across the four types of voters. As shown in Table 7.38 (also Table A7.20 in Appendix), attentive independent voters are relatively negative to government performance compared to other types of voters. Furthermore, habitual partisans are relatively more positive to the performance of government compared to other types of voters although in 2002 critical partisans were more favourable.

Table 7. 37 T-test for Equality of Means: Satisfaction with Performance of Government and Independents, 1992-2002

	Number of cases	Mean	Std. Deviation	t	Sig. (2-sided)
1992					
Party identifiers	906	2.77	0.64	-1.770	0.077
Non-party identifiers	266	2.85	0.63		
1997					
Party identifiers	754	4.28	0.83	-0.156	0.876
Non-party identifiers	442	4.29	0.86		
2002					
Party identifiers	892	3.20	1.07	-3.070	0.002
Non-party identifiers	608	3.36	.90		

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: Mean = average score in a 4-point scale in 1992 (i.e., 1 = 'very good' to 4 = 'very bad'), and average score in a 5-point scale in 1997 and in 2002 (i.e., 1 = 'very good' to 5 = 'very bad').

Table 7. 38 ANOVA: Satisfaction with Performance of Government and Korean Voters, 1992-2002

	Number of cases	Mean	Std. Deviation.	ANOVA
1992				
Critical partisan	473	2.82	0.69	F = 4.325 Sig. = 0.005
Habitual partisan	431	2.71	0.58	
Attentive independent	97	2.93	0.73	
Apolitical independent	169	2.80	0.57	
Total	1170	2.79	0.64	
1997				
Critical partisan	531	4.34	0.82	F = 4.108 Sig. = 0.007
Habitual partisan	222	4.12	0.85	
Attentive independent	210	4.34	0.92	
Apolitical independent	232	4.24	0.80	
Total	1195	4.28	0.84	
2002				
Critical partisan	450	3.12	1.11	F = 4.779 Sig. = 0.003
Habitual partisan	442	3.28	1.01	
Attentive independent	203	3.34	.94	
Apolitical independent	405	3.37	.88	
Total	1500	3.27	1.01	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: Mean = average score in a 4-point scale in 1992 (i.e., 1 = 'very good' to 4 = 'very bad'), and average score in a 5-point scale in 1997 and in 2002 (i.e., 1 = 'very good' to 5 = 'very bad').

Voter Perceptions of Political Development and Democracy in Korea

A strong belief in the democratic idea: A very high level of dissatisfaction with the present politics does not imply public disappointment with principles of democracy or democratic political system. Although most respondents in in-depth interviews were dissatisfied with the present political parties and party politics in Korea, most of them firmly believed that political parties are a necessary institution in a democracy. In particular, every partisan agreed that political parties are necessary for democracy. For example, “I think that political parties are the best system to check the power in a democracy” (I-108; I-107; I-206). “Good politics will be realised when people are able to speak various opinions” (I-118; I-139). “I think that political development cannot be expected without political parties”(I-128). “Without political parties, there is no democracy” (I-126) “I don’t know any alternative system for replacing political parties in democratic political process” (I-203). “It will be a dictatorship if there is no political party” (I-207; FF6). “Political parties are indispensable because political parties check government” (FF5). “I don’t oppose a political party system, although the present political parties are very bad” (I-122).

Public perception of contemporary democracy in Korea: While Korean voters are not fully satisfied with political developments in Korea, they recognised positive changes in democracy during the last 10 years. Almost every voter agreed that Korea is a democracy, if not a full democracy. Partisans do not differ from independents in evaluating the new democracy. For example, many interviewees argued that Korea is certainly a democratic country, but falls somewhat short of mature democracies in Western countries. “Korea is a democratic country, but is not equivalent to advanced democracies” (I-207). “Korea is a middle level country in terms of political democracy” (I-204; I-202; I-209; I-108; I-115; I-132; I-134; I-137). Some interviewees were critical of Korean democracy, though they agreed that Korea is a democratic country. “Korea is in a transitional stage to a full democracy” (I-121). “Korea is only a procedural democracy, [but not a substantial democracy]” (I-124; I-130; I-131; I-129; I-110; I-123). Some interviewees pointed out “vestiges of authoritarian political culture” (I-122), “the existence of social groups that maintained vested interests” (I-106; I-211), or “social and political corruption” (I-125) as reasons why they cannot fully support Korean democracy.

Positive perception of democratic development for last 15 years: Although most interviewees were not fully satisfied with Korean democracy, most of them also appreciated the political developments made in Korea during the last 10 years. Many pointed out a strengthening of popular political awareness as evidence for political

development. For example, “Compared to 10 years ago, people pay attention to politics and politicians should be aware of peoples’ criticism” (I-102; I-103). “Peoples’ political consciousness is much stronger than before, but politicians do not act in accordance with the change in peoples’ consciousness” (I-117; I-129; I-133; I-135). “In these days, politicians changed to some extent and are aware of public opinion” (I-107; I-139; I-207; I-212; I-213; FM8)

A few respondents said that Korean democracy had regressed during the past decade. They blamed politics for falling living standards during the last 10 years. For example, “Because the poor get poor and the rich get rich, [I think that politics has become worse during last 10 years]” (I-135) “Unlike 10 years ago, popular living standards have severely suffered due to politics these days” (I-141). “The poor people are getting worse due to the high level of inflation” (I-205). “Ordinary peoples’ living conditions have hardly changed” (FF4).

Summary: The voters questioned recognised political progress in Korea during the last decade, though they are not fully satisfied with the present politics or democracy in Korea. Moreover, voters still saw the virtues of a democratic political system. They believe that political parties are a key institution in the democratic process despite their criticism of present politics and parties. Considering their positive evaluation of changes in Korean’s democracy, it is difficult to argue that their dissatisfaction with the democratic process and system has increased during the last 10 years. It is also not likely that popular disappointment with democracy and the democratic system has caused an increase of independent voters and partisan decline.

The Lack of Differences between the Political Parties

In Korean politics, the lack of differences amongst political parties is cause of the failures of political parties. Many voters perceive that most political parties are the same in terms of policies and behaviour. When all political parties are similar in terms of their policies and activities, it is logical that voters have little preference for one party over another. However, as argued in Chapter 6, partisans do recognise differences in ideology and policies between the major parties and feel close to the party that shares their policy and ideological preferences. On the other hand, it is expected that independent voters are less able to see the differences between political parties compared to partisans.

Qualitative data shows that Korean voters perceive that there is no difference in policies across political parties. In answering a question about differences in policies between the parties, most respondents did not see a clear difference. For example, “In overall, there is no large difference in policies across political parties. Some differences

may exist, but the differences are merely by-products of political quarrels” (I-130). “They merely change words and phrases. Policies are not different in substance” (I-129; I-113; I-107). “Most policies suggested by political parties are for show only” (I-125).

Furthermore, many independent voters referred to the similarity of all existing political parties in terms of ideology, policies, and behaviour, and as a result of this lack of distinctiveness had no attachment to a party. In answering a question about the reasons why they do not feel close to any political party, roughly one third of independent voters pointed out the lack of distinctiveness among political parties. Attentive independents and apolitical independents were alike in this regard. For example, “All political parties are fairly similar to each other. They do not have a clear party line. So, I do not feel close to a particular political party (I-133; I-101; I-106; I-128). “Every politician is similar to each other, and every political party is similar to each other” (I-101; I-104; I-132). “I cannot find anything to distinguish one party from another” (I-103; I-140). “I cannot find any difference among political parties, so I don’t have any party that I feel close to” (I-125; FM4).

Multiple Regression Analysis of Partisan Decline in Korea

Many factors undoubtedly contributed to the increase of independent in Korea. However, it seems that the sociological explanation based on changes in characteristics of voters does not accurately fit the process of partisan decline in Korea. This chapter has shown that independent voters are more likely young, but that the age factor cannot explain the fact that many older partisans have become independents during the previous decade. In addition, education is associated with partisanship, but education does not explain the lack of partisanship among the highly educated young generation nor was education strongly related to cognitive sophistication in understanding politics.

Qualitative data generally supported the political explanation rather than the sociological explanation. According to qualitative data, a lack of interest in politics, the similarities of political parties, and disappointment or dissatisfaction with political parties and/or politics were the three main reasons why independent voters had become detached from political parties. Obviously, these factors are related to each other. Voters become indifferent to politics because they are disappointed with politics. Also, voters were dissatisfied with politics because they cannot see differences among political parties in terms of policies or behaviours. In order to examine the relationship between these variables and the explanatory power of these factors, a multiple regression model of partisan decline is employed.

The Model

The dependent variable of this model is party identification, and is recoded into a dichotomous variable (i.e., 1 = party identifiers, and 2 = non-party identifiers). Four independent variables --- age, education, interest in politics, and dissatisfaction with politics --- are included in the regression model. The lack of distinctiveness among political parties is a potential independent variable to explain independent voters, but is excluded due to the lack of data. *Age* in years is used. *Education* is coded with 4 values (i.e., 1 = lower level of education to 4 = high level of education). *Interest in politics* is measured in a 4-point scale (i.e., 1 = low level of interest to 4 = high level of interest), but in a 7-point scale in 2002 (i.e., 1 = low level of interest to 7 = high level of interest). *Dissatisfaction with politics* is measured by public perception of government performance, and is coded in a 5-point scale (i.e., 1 = low level of dissatisfaction to 5 = high level of dissatisfaction), but in a 4-point scale in 1992.

The Result

Overall, the regression model is not especially useful in explaining independent voters in Korea. As shown in Table 7.39, the model explains only a small proportion of variance of the dependent variable. For example, in 2002, interest in politics and dissatisfaction with politics together explain only 3.4 per cent of variance. Although the model does not explain much about independent voters, interest in politics is the most powerful explanatory variable. Education, which was the most powerful explanatory variable in 1992, does not explain independent voters in 2002.

In conclusion, as has been often found in country specific case studies of partisan decline in mature democracies, the 'political explanation' rather than the 'sociological explanation' is more appropriate in accounting for partisan decline in Korea. In the new democracy, fewer and fewer voters identify with political parties not because they lost the need to rely upon parties for information about politics as a result of higher education and the increased role of the media but because political interest has dropped in part because of dissatisfaction with party politics in the new democracy.

Table 7. 39 Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Partisanship: Partisan Decline, 1992-2002

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
1992			
Education	.148 (0.000)	.173 (0.000)	
Interest in politics		.162 (0.000)	
Dissatisfaction with politics			
Age			
Adjust R-square	0.021	0.046	
1997			
Interest in politics	.221 (0.000)	.215 (0.000)	
Education		.056 (0.050)	
Dissatisfaction with politics			
Age			
Adjust R-Square	0.048	0.050	
2002			
Interest in politics	-.173 (0.000)	-.172 (0.000)	-.171 (0.000)
Dissatisfaction with politics		.074 (0.004)	.074 (0.004)
Age			-.070 (0.006)
Education			
Adjust-R-square	0.029	0.034	0.038

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Note: The figures are Beta (standardised coefficients) and significant; Method is called stepwise; Dependent variable is recoded in a 2-point scale (i.e., 1 = party identifiers, and 2 = non-party identifiers); Dissatisfaction with politics is based on a question about performance of incumbent government (i.e., Question 24 in 1992, Question 18 in 1997, and Question in 36 in 2002: "How do you rate the performance of incumbent government"); Interest in politics is based on Question 1 in 1992 and Question 1 in 1997 ("How much were you interested in the last election?"); Interested in politics is based on Question 27 in 2002 ("In general, how much are you interested in politics or elections?").

PART THREE

THE VOTING BEHAVIOUR OF INDEPENDENT VOTERS

Chapter 8. Independent Voters and Volatile Election: Are Independents Floating Voters?

The aim of next three chapters is to explore the voting behaviour of independent voters and contrast it with the voting behaviour of partisans. In next three chapters, I will compare the voting behaviour of independent voters with the voting behaviour of partisans in terms of turnout, timing of vote decision, consistency in voting choice across different elections, change in voting intention within an election, response to election campaigns, and determinants of voting choice.

While a key concept to explain the voting behaviour of partisans is *'loyalty'*, the term for independent voters is *'choice'*.¹ On the one hand, the voting behaviour of partisans who have enduring psychological attachment to political parties is restrained by their psychological commitment to the party. Partisans also rely on political parties as an *'information shortcut'* in understanding the complexity of politics, and they are not responsive to election campaigns. Their vote choice is constrained, and is strongly tied to their political parties. Their voting behaviour is stable between elections and within an election. On the other hand, independent voters, who are free from party constraints, rely on short-term considerations such as issues, candidates, or government performance, when they make vote decisions. In the absence of party cues, independent voters are responsive to election campaigns. Their voting behaviour is relatively unstable and changeable depending upon short-term considerations compared to partisans who are anchored to political parties. Independent voters are often described as *'floating voters'*. But is it true that independent voters cast their ballot based on rational calculation compared to partisans restrained by party loyalty? Is there any difference in the voting behaviour between attentive independents and apolitical independents?

This chapter explains the voting behaviour of independent voters focusing on turnout and the timing of vote decision. This chapter consists of two sections. The first section examines changes in turnout over the last decade in Korea and differences in turnout between independents and partisans. In this section, it will be argued that party affiliation explains turnout to some extent in Korea, but a voter's interest in the election is the most powerful variable in explaining turnout in Korea. The second section examines the voting behaviour of independents focusing on the timing of vote decision, vote swing, and

¹ Martin Harrop and William L. Miller, *Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction* (London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 99. Also, for a general overview on voting theories, see William L. Miller and Richard G. Niemi, 'Voting: Choice, Conditioning, and Constraint', in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris, eds, *Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting* (London: Sage, 2002), pp.169-88.

change in voting intention within an election. In this section, it will be confirmed that independent voters make late voting decisions compared to partisans. But at the same time, it will also be argued that many independent voters make voting decision before the official campaigns begin and hardly change their early vote decision.

1. Turnout and Independents: 'Vanishing Voters'?

There are two different approaches to explain voter turnout.² One approach explains turnout focusing on sociological variables with the civic voluntarism model being an example of this kind of approach. In this, the socio-economic status of voters is related to turnout. For example, voters who have a higher education are more likely to vote compared to voters who have a low level of education.³ Modernisation theory which explained electoral behaviour under the authoritarian regimes in Korea as 'conformity voting' also belongs to this theoretical tradition.⁴ Voters who have a relatively high level of social and economic status vote voluntarily, while voters who have a low level of social and economic status either do not vote or require mobilisation to vote.

The other approach is derived from the rational choice model. According to the model, voters go to the poll based upon a rational calculation. In this way, voters compare the cost of voting with the benefit of voting, and go to the polls when the benefit is greater than the cost.⁵ The simple version of the utility model cannot account for voters who vote without seeing the benefit of voting, and the model began to include a wide variety of incentives in order to explain turnout within the paradigm.⁶ Now this approach incorporates many psychological variables such as subjective feelings of political efficacy. The relationship between partisanship and turnout is explained within this paradigm. Voters who have an attachment to a particular political party are satisfied with themselves when they express their loyalty to a political party in voting.⁷ More partisans turn out

² Paul Whiteley et al., 'Turnout', in Pippa Norris, ed., *Britain Votes 2001* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp.211-24.

³ Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, Jae-On Kim, *Participation and Political Equality: a Seven-Nation Comparison* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

⁴ Wook Kim, 'Tupyochamyewa gigwon' (Vote turnout and abstention), in Nam-Young Lee, ed., *Hanguui seongeo* (Elections in Korea), vol. 2 (Seoul: Pureungil, 1998), pp.199-254, at pp.202-8.

⁵ Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Low, 1957). William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, 'A Theory of the Calculus of Voting', *American Political Science Review*, 62 (1968), 25-43.

⁶ For the 'paradox of voter turnout' and a critique of rational choice theory, see Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), chapter 4.


⁷ Morris P. Fiorina, 'The Voting Decision: Instrumental and Expressive Aspects', *Journal of Politics*, 38 (1976), 390-415.

compared to independent voters who cannot expect to have this kind of satisfaction.

Decline in Voter Turnout in Korea

Voter turnout has continually dropped in recent elections in Korea, and the 2002 presidential election was not an exception. The turnout of 70.8 per cent in 2002 was the lowest in a presidential election since the direct presidential election was introduced in 1952. This percentage is almost 10 per cent lower than the percentage in 1997. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 8.1, turnout in parliamentary and local elections is much lower compared to that in presidential elections. For example, in the 2002 local election, more than a half of voters did not go to the polls. It was first time that turnout rate was below 50 per cent in any elections except by-elections.

Figure 8. 1 Decline of Turnout in Korean Elections. 1987-2002



Source: Formulated based on the National Election Commission, *Je 15dae daetongryeongseongeo tupyoyul bunseok* (An analysis of turnout in the 15th presidential election) (Seoul: National Election Commission, 1998), and the National Election Commission, *Je 16dae daetongryeongseongeo tupyoyul bunseok* (An analysis of turnout in the 16th presidential election) (Seoul: National Election Commission, 2003).

Voter turnout has dropped in many mature democracies.⁸ For example, voter turnout

⁸ For a comparative analysis of declining turnout in mature democracies, see Mark N. Franklin, 'The Dynamics of Electoral Participation', in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris, eds, *Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting* (London: Sage, 2002), pp. 148-68.

for the 2000 American presidential election was as low as 51 per cent, and turnout for the 2002 mid-term congressional election was 39 per cent. Also, turnout for the 2001 British parliamentary election was 59.2 per cent.⁹ Therefore, turnout for the 2002 Korean presidential election was still high compared to voter turnout in mature democracies, but turnout for the 2000 Korean parliamentary election was lower than turnout for the 2001 British parliamentary elections.

Actual Account of Turnout

The National Election Commission in Korea reported that some socio-economic variables such as age, occupation, and region are related to voter turnout for both the 1997 presidential election and the 2002 presidential election.¹⁰ For example, Table 8.1 shows that the old are more likely to vote compared to the young. This pattern has been evident throughout the last 10 years, but the percentage of turnout in every age cohort has declined. Indeed, turnout does not seem to be increasing as voters age. The turnout rate of 30-34 years old voters in 2002 was 64.3 per cent, while the turnout rate of 20-24 years old voters in 1992 was 69.8 per cent. Also, in general, turnout among younger voters has been falling faster than among older ones. The turnout of 25-29 and 30-34 years old voters has decreased substantially during the last 10 years. However while the turnout rate of the youngest group was generally the lowest compared to all other age groups, but it was not in 2002. In this year, the turnout rate of 20-24 years old voters was higher than the turnout rate of 25-29 years old voters. Also, the turnout gap between age groups has widened. For example, the margin of differences between the highest turnout and lowest turnout was 20.1 per cent point in 1992, 23.5 per cent point in 1997, and 28.5 per cent point in 2002.

Socio-economic variables that often explained electoral behaviour under the authoritarian regimes such as sex or urban-rural difference do not account for voter turnout in the new democracy.¹¹ The turnout rate of young women (i.e., 20-24 years old age group) is much lower than turnout rate of young men, but the difference between all

⁹ For voter turnout in recent British elections, see Whiteley et al., 'Turnout'.

¹⁰ National Election Commission, *Je 15dae daetongryeongseongeo tupyoyul bunseok* (An analysis of turnout in the 15th presidential election) (Seoul: National Election Commission, 1998), and National Election Commission, *Je 16dae daetongryeongseongeo tupyoyul bunseok* (An analysis of turnout in the 16th presidential election) (Seoul: National Election Commission, 2003). The National Election Commission estimated turnout rate based on a very large size of sample (i.e., 4.8 per cent of about 32,300,000 voters) in the 1997 presidential election, and counted actual turnout based on all voters in the 2002 presidential election.

¹¹ National Election Commission, *Je 16dae daetongryeongseongeo tupyoyul bunseok* (An analysis of turnout in the 16th presidential election). Kim, '*Tpyochamyewa gigwon*' (Vote turnout and abstention).

men and women is not statistically significant.¹² The difference in turnout between urban voters and rural voters, which was one of main pattern of voter turnout under authoritarian regimes, no longer exist in Korea. This suggests that 'conformity voting' or 'mobilised voting' no longer prevails in the new democracy.

Table 8.1 Vote Turnout by Age in Presidential Election, 1992-2002

Age	1992 (A)	1997 (B)	2002 (C)	(A) - (C)
20-24 years old	69.8%	66.4%	57.9%	-11.9%
25-29 years old	73.3%	69.9%	55.2%	-18.1%
30-34 years old	82.1%	80.4%	64.3%	-17.8%
35-39 years old	85.9%	84.9%	70.8%	-15.1%
40-49 years old	88.8%	87.5%	76.3%	-12.5%
50-59 years old	89.9%	89.9%	83.7%	-6.2%
60 and over 60 years old	83.2%	81.8%	78.7%	-4.5%
Total	81.9%	80.7%	70.8%	-11.1%

Source: National Election Commission, *Je 15dae daetongryeongseongeo tupyoyul bunseok* (An analysis of turnout in the 15th presidential election) (Seoul: National Election Commission, 1998), and National Election Commission, *Je 16dae daetongryeongseongeo tupyoyul bunseok* (An analysis of turnout in the 16th presidential election) (Seoul: National Election Commission, 2003).

Turnout in Post-Election Surveys

The National Election Commission provided actual turnout with only a few socio-economic variables. In order to examine other sociological variables and psychological variables, individual level survey data from the Korean Presidential Election Study is used.¹³ Table 8.2 shows the relationship between turnout and various sociological variables in survey data from the Korean Presidential Election Study.

¹² National Election Commission, *Je 16dae daetongryeongseongeo tupyoyul bunseok* (An analysis of turnout in the 16th presidential election).

¹³ There is a potential problem related to using the survey data. In the survey, respondents who voted were over-sampled and respondents who did not vote were under-sampled. The official turnout rate was 70.8 per cent in 2002, but the percentage in the survey data from Korean Presidential Election Study was 88.4 per cent. There was therefore an overestimate of 17.6 per cent point in the survey data (see Table the below).

	1992	1997	2002
Turnout in the post-election survey (A)	92.5%	93.4%	88.4%
Official Turnout (B)	81.9%	80.7%	70.8%
The difference (A-B)	10.6%	12.7%	17.6%

The overestimation of the turnout rate in election survey research is common in Korea, though the cause of the overestimation has not been explained. However, it can be assumed that the under-sampling of non-voters does not greatly affect statistical analyses because the samples are randomly selected.

Table 8.2 Turnout by Social and Economic Characteristics of Voters, 1992-2002

	1992		1997		2002	
	N	Turnout	N	Turnout	N	Turnout
Age						
20-24	132	86.4%	152	81.6%	213	81.7%
25-34	341	92.4%	337	90.5%	335	84.8%
35-44	292	95.5%	287	94.1%	365	88.8%
45-54	199	97.0%	227	96.9%	265	91.7%
55-64	124	93.5%	127	97.6%	177	94.4%
65 and over	112	92.9%	75	94.7%	145	92.4%
Total	1200	93.4%	1205	92.4%	1500	88.4%
Chi-square	17.616		40.554		24.891	
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.003		0.000		0.000	
Gender						
Men	582	94.2%	614	92.0%	739	89.7%
Women	618	92.7%	593	92.9%	761	87.1%
Total	1200	93.4%	1207	92.5%	1500	88.4%
Chi-square	1.010		0.349		2.459	
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.315		0.555		0.117	
Location						
Big city	594	92.4%	601	92.5%	730	87.5%
Small or medium city	322	93.8%	431	91.9%	607	88.6%
Rural county	284	95.1%	175	93.7%	163	91.4%
Total	1200	93.4%	1207	92.5%	1500	88.4%
Chi-square	2.287		0.606		2.007	
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.319		0.739		0.367	
Education						
Primary School	236	93.2%	140	98.6%	150	95.3%
Middle School	205	95.1%	125	96.0%	180	87.8%
High School	439	92.7%	450	90.9%	560	87.3%
College	320	93.4%	485	91.1%	602	87.7%
Total	1200	93.4%	1200	92.4%	1492	88.3%
Chi-square	1.340		12.495		7.974	
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.720		0.006		0.047	
Region						
Seoul	129	93.0%	149	84.6%	208	87.0%
Gyeonggi	131	95.4%	118	89.8%	175	89.7%
Gangwon	63	87.3%	76	92.1%	93	86.0%
Chungcheong	204	92.6%	198	91.9%	216	83.3%
Jeolla	238	97.1%	266	96.6%	278	92.1%
Gyeongsang	419	91.9%	360	93.3%	499	89.4%
Jeju	1	100.0%	25	100.0%	6	33.3%
The North	15	100.0%	12	91.7%	16	93.8%
Total	1200	93.4%	1204	92.4%	1491	88.3%
Chi-square	12.773		23.576		28.783	
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.078		0.001		0.000	
Income						
Low	253	95.3%	340	93.8%	487	88.1%
Middle	692	93.4%	642	91.9%	670	88.5%
High	255	91.8%	204	92.2%	278	86.1%
Total	1200	93.4%	1186	92.5%	1435	88.0%
Chi-square	2.529		1.225		0.619	
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.282		0.542		0.734	

(Continued)

	1992		1997		2002	
	N	Turnout	N	Turnout	N	Turnout
Occupation						
Professionals / Public servants	96	96.9%	137	92.0%	126	89.7%
White-collar workers	162	95.1%	132	91.7%	197	85.3%
Self-employers	147	91.2%	275	94.2%	237	89.9%
Blue-collar workers	151	86.8%	116	90.5%	132	84.8%
Farmers	134	97.0%	69	95.7%	66	98.5%
Students	75	86.7%	121	86.0%	179	87.2%
Housewives	279	96.1%	229	96.1%	285	87.7%
Unemployed / Other	156	93.6%	93	91.4%	237	88.6%
Total	1200	93.4%	1172	92.7%	1459	88.2%
Chi-square	26.246		15.061		10.950	
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000		0.035		0.141	
Class						
Salariat	130	96.9%	176	92.6%	195	90.3%
Non-manual workers	148	88.5%	134	89.6%	200	82.0%
Petty-bourgeoisie	261	92.7%	341	94.1%	285	91.6%
Foreman	23	95.7%	12	75.0%	12	91.7%
The Working class	128	94.5%	66	97.0%	86	90.7%
Total	690	93.0%	729	92.9%	778	88.7%
Chi-square	8.437		10.527		12.223	
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.077		0.032		0.016	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Key: N = number of cases.

Sociological characteristics of turnout: In the 2002 Korean Presidential Election Study, age, gender, and urban-rural variables explained different rates of turnout in the electorate, as these variables did in the analysis based on actual account of turnout provided by the National Election Commission. The turnout of the youngest age group remained reasonably stable while the turnout of other age groups decreased. There is a statistically significant relationship between education and turnout. A low level of education is related to high turnout. This runs contrary to a well-known comparative study of electoral participation, which suggested a relationship between a high level of education and a high level of turnout.¹⁴ The high level of turnout for the voters who have low level of education may be related to the age of voters. Voters who have only primary school education are relatively old. In the survey, 85.8 per cent with only primary school education were 50 years old or over. In order to estimate the net effects of education on turnout, both the Pearson correlation and partial correlation are examined. The Pearson correlation shows that there is a positive relationship between lower educational attainment and higher turnout. The relationship is statistically significant in 1997 and 2002. However, the partial correlation suggests that there is a negative relationship between lower educational attainment and higher turnout, but the relationship between education and turnout controlling for age is not statistically significant in any of the three

¹⁴ Verba, Nie, and Kim, *Participation and Political Equality: a Seven-Nation Comparison*.

elections (see Table 8.3).

Table 8. 3 Correlationship and Partial Correlationship between Education and Turnout, 1992-2002

	1992	1997	2002
Pearson Correlationship	0.008	0.089	0.052
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.785	0.002	0.046
N	1200	1200	1492
Partial Correlationship	-0.030	-0.003	-0.034
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.302	0.936	0.187
N	1200	1199	1492

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Note: Partial correlationship = partial correlationship between education and turnout controlling for age variable; Education variable is coded as 1 = primary school, 2 = middle school, 3 = high school, and 4 = college; Turnout variable is coded as 1 = vote and 2 = not vote; Age variable is based on actual age.

Regional difference in turnout: In 2002, voter turnout varied across the different regions. A higher proportion of voters from the *Jeolla* region went to the polls compared to voters from other regions. A high level of politicisation among *Jeolla* people may explain the difference in turnout. As discussed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, people from *Jeolla* are highly politicised compared to people from other regions on account of their strong regionalism. They are interested in politics, and are more likely to have party affiliation compared to people from other regions.

Concerning the relation between region and turnout, it is interesting that turnout for voters from *Chungcheong* region dropped substantially compared to voters from other regions, which was confirmed in the analysis based on the actual account of turnout provided by the National Election Commission. The drop in turnout among people from *Chungcheong* may be related to a weakening of regionalism in this area. As discussed elsewhere in this study, people from the *Chungcheong* region were relatively free from the regional competition that has dominated electoral behaviour in the new democracy. However, regionalism among voters in the *Chungcheong* region increased suddenly from the 1995 local election and in the 1997 presidential election, the *Chungcheong* region was one of three main axes of the 'politics of region' in Korea. However, regionalism in the region has weakened since the 2000 general election. For example, the United Liberal Democrats (ULD), which articulates the regional pride of *Chungcheong* people, won all seats in the region in the 1996 general election, but only won about one third of electoral districts in the region in the 2002 general election. If it is assumed that regionalism encourages and mobilises voters to go to the poll, a weakening of regionalism would cause a sharp decline of turnout for *Chungcheong* people.

Economic characteristics of turnout: The economic status of voters does not explain voter turnout. There is no significant difference in turnout across different income

groups in 2002. However, social class and occupation do explain variance in turnout. In last three presidential elections, farmers were more likely to vote compared to other occupational groups of people. Turnout for housewives was relatively high in 1992 and in 1997, but not in 2002. In contrast, turnout among students was lower compared to other people in 1992 and in 1997, but higher in 2002. This is related to a relatively high turnout for the youngest cohort (i.e., 20-24) in the 2002 presidential election compared to previous presidential elections. Finally, a lower proportion of non-manual workers voted compared to other classes or occupational groups of people, and this pattern was continued in the last three presidential elections.

Summary

Although some socio-economic variables are associated with turnout, these variables do not account for the declining turnout in new democracy because such sociological variables have not changed enough to explain the drop in turnout during the previous decade.¹⁵ For example, the proportion of young voters has not increased during the last 10 years, though the young still make up more than half of the electorate. As sociological variables cannot explain the decline of voter turnout in Korea, the causes of the decline of turnout will be sought in changes in electoral attitudes and preferences, such as a decrease in feelings of political efficacy, an increase in dissatisfaction with politics, or a weakening of partisanship in Korea.

Declining Turnout and Increasing Independent Voters

Difference in Turnout between Independents and Partisans

Have an increase of independent voters contributed to the decline of turnout in Korea? Empirical survey evidence shows that fewer independent voters turn out to vote compared to partisans with a psychological attachment to a political party. As shown in Table 8.4, the difference in turnout between partisans and independent voters is statistically significant in the last three presidential elections. Also, turnout rate for independent voters has dropped substantially from 89.6 per cent to 82.9 per cent during the last 10 years, while the turnout rate for partisans has decreased marginally from 94.5 per cent to 92.2 per cent. Thus, the difference in turnout rate between partisans and

¹⁵ British researchers also argued that sociological variables do not account for decline of voter turnout for recent British elections because sociological variables do not change enough to explain the drop in turnout. See Whiteley et al., 'Turnout', pp. 211-2.

independent voters has widened last 10 years. The difference in turnout between partisans and independent voters was 4.9 per cent point in 1992, 7 per cent point in 1997, and 9.3 per cent point in 2002. Therefore, party identification does explain turnout in Korea and its explanatory power has increased over the last 10 years.

Table 8.4 Crosstab: Vote Turnout by Party Identification, 2002

	1992		1997		2002	
	N	Turnout	N	Turnout	N	Turnout
Partisans	913	94.5%	756	95.0%	892	92.2%
Independents	269	89.6%	442	88.0%	608	82.9%
Total	1182	93.4%	1198	92.4%	1500	88.4%
Chi-square	8.259		19.336		30.219	
Sig. (2-sided)	0.004		0.000		0.000	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Key: N = number of cases.

However, the relationship between independents and a low level of turnout is not sustained when the independents are divided into attentive independents and apolitical independents. More attentive independent voters go to the polls compared to habitual partisans, while turnout for apolitical independent is relatively lower than any other types of voters. This pattern is repeated in the last three presidential elections (see Table 8.5). This implies that the change in political attitudes such as the decrease in the level of interest in politics and partisan decline have contributed to a decrease in turnout during the last 10 years.

Table 8.5 Turnout Rate by Four Types of Voters, 1997-2002

	1992		1997		2002	
	N	Turnout	N	Turnout	N	Turnout
Critical Partisans	476	97.9%	533	97.4%	450	96.0%
Habitual Partisans	437	90.8%	223	89.2%	442	88.2%
Attentive Independents	97	95.9%	210	97.6%	203	91.6%
Apolitical Independents	172	86.0%	231	79.3%	405	78.5%
Total	1182	93.4%	1198	92.4%	1500	88.4%
Chi-square	36.310		86.742		65.983	
Sig. (2-sided)	0.000		0.000		0.000	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997 and 2002.

Keys: N = number of cases.

Although a greater proportion of partisans voted compared to independents, there are differences in turnout across partisans of different political parties. The turnout for small party identifiers is low compared to that of major party identifiers (see Table 8.6). Why are partisans of minor parties more likely to abstain from voting compared to partisans of major parties? We may assume that age explains the difference, that is minor party identifiers are relatively young compared to major party identifiers. As discussed in

Chapter 6 of this thesis, party identifiers for the old ruling party (major party A) are relatively old, while party identifiers for minor parties are relatively young. However, in 1992, turnout among partisans of the UNP, a minor party, was as high as the turnout of major party partisans despite this age difference. Indeed, we need to consider another factor to explain the difference in turnout between major party partisans and minor party partisans. With a very aggressive campaign in the presidential election, the UNP effectively mobilised their loyal partisans in the election. On the other hand, in 2002, the election was a competition between the two major parties. Party identifiers with an attachment to the non-major parties either had no presidential candidate from their own party or did not see any possibility of winning the election. This may explain the difference in turnout between major party partisans and non-major party partisans.

In conclusion, party identification is associated with voter turnout. Independents are less likely to vote compared to partisans. As discussed in the previous chapter, independent voters have increased substantially in Korea during last 10 years. This implies that partisan decline has contributed to declining turnout in Korea. However, the pattern of turnout between partisans and independents is not clear when independent voters are divided into apolitical and attentive independents. A greater percentage of attentive independents turned out to vote compared to apolitical independents or even habitual partisans.

Table 8.6 Abstention by Party Identification, 1992-2002

	1992		1997		2002	
	N	Abstention	N	Abstention	N	Abstention
Party Identification						
Major Party A	470	6.2%	221	4.1%	350	5.7%
Major Party B	324	5.6%	390	4.6%	405	7.9%
All other Parties	121	2.5%	146	7.5%	137	13.1%
Non-party identification	269	10.4%	442	12.0%	608	17.1%
Total	1184	6.6%	1199	7.6%	1500	11.6%
Chi-square	10.396		21.026		35.513	
Sig. (2-sided)	0.015		0.000		0.000	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: N = number of cases; Major Party A = Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, Grand National Party in 1997 and 2002; Major Party B = Democratic Party in 1992, National Congress for New Politics in 1997, and Millennium Democratic Party in 2002.

Why do Independent Voters Abstain from Voting?

There are two distinct causes of abstentions — i.e., ‘*indifference*’ and ‘*alienation*’.¹⁶

¹⁶ Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*; Richard Brody and Benjamin Page, ‘Indifference, Alienation, and Rational Decisions: The Effects of Candidate Evaluation on Turnout and Vote’,

'Abstention due to indifference' means that voters cannot make a voting choice because they do not see any differences between candidates. 'Abstention due to alienation' means that voters do not vote because they are dissatisfied with all candidates or democratic politics. In this type of abstention, voters do not feel that elections offer political efficacy due to the failure of democratic politics or political parties. The dichotomous classification of abstention does not comprise all types of abstentions and another type of abstention can be added. Some voters are not interested in politics regardless of their satisfaction with politics. Thus, another cause of abstentions is *apathy*, which is distinguished from alienation abstention based on dissatisfaction with politics.

The Korean Presidential Election Study included a question about self-identified reasons why voters did not go to the poll, though it is not possible to do a statistical analysis due to the small number of cases of absentees in the survey. Survey evidence suggests that more than half of Korean non-voters did not go to the polls due to non-political reasons, i.e., private matters (see Table 8.7). Apathy is only a minor reason. Excluding abstentions due to non-political reasons, more partisans cited the lack of differences between candidates as a reason why they did not vote in the 2002 presidential election than independents, while more independent voters referred to a lack of political efficacy of voting. Therefore, alienation was a main reason for abstentions in the 2002 presidential election, and was especially true for independents.

Table 8.7 Reasons for Abstention from Voting by Party Identification, 2002

	N	Partisans	Independents	Total
<u>Reasons for abstention from voting</u>				
No difference between candidates	26	17.1%	13.5%	14.9%
No political efficacy of voting	30	12.9%	20.2%	17.2%
No interest in politics or election	12	5.7%	7.7%	6.9%
Due to private matters / no answer	106	64.3%	58.7%	60.9%
Total	174	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.

Keys: N = number of cases.

In the in-depth interviews and focus group interviews, non-voters were not included. Therefore, there is no direct question about why they did not vote or why they went to the polls. Although there was no direct measurement of abstentions from election, interviewees indirectly suggested the reasons why they did not vote in other elections, e.g., previous presidential elections, parliamentary elections, or local elections, in answering a question about their different levels of interest in various types of election. This may suggest reasons for abstentions, if we assume a positive relationship between

interest in election and vote turnout.¹⁷

Feelings of political efficacy: Interviewees suggested two main incentives to vote, i.e., feelings of political efficacy and the candidate factor. In the interviews, voters stated they had a strong feeling of the significance of presidential elections compared to parliamentary and local elections. Therefore, they vote in presidential elections because they believe that the presidency is important and felt a stronger sense in the political efficacy of voting. Conversely, they did not vote in lower levels of elections because they did not have this feeling. For example, “I hardly participate in any local elections. Somehow I think that local elections are not important” (I-116). “I was not interested in the local election. I believed that there was no difference regardless of whoever won the election” (I-124; I-133; I-139; I-128). “I am fed up with Korean politics...I am not interested in any kind of election. I am not interested in casting a ballot” (I-131).

Candidates: Many respondents suggested that candidates affected the level of their interest in election. When they are able to distinguish one candidate from the other candidates, they are more interested in the election. They did not vote in lower levels elections or previous presidential elections because they did not see a clear difference among the candidates. In the 2002 presidential election, Korean voters who were fed up with political corruption expected that Roh Moo-hyun would carry out political reforms and get rid of political corruption in Korea. For example, “I had not been interested in any elections, but was interested in last presidential election... A new politician ran for the presidency. In previous presidential elections, there were no new politicians. Always the same politicians ran for the presidency again and again. So, I was not interested in these elections” (I-105; FM9). “There was no difference among the candidates. So, I began to lose interest in earlier elections” (I-118). “I looked forward to the end of the ‘three Kims’ domination’ over Korean politics. I hoped that a new candidate would bring better politics” (I-121; I-120; I-110; I-134; I-30; I-138; I-121; I-212; I-214; FM5; FF7; FF5).

Lack of information: Some respondents suggested that they give up voting if they do not have enough information about candidates or the election. For example, “In the last local election, voters hardly know even the candidates’ names...So, I did not vote in last local election” (FM 4; FF2) “In the last general election, I did not know anything about the candidates who ran for a seat in my electoral district” (I-127; I-136).

Feeling of ‘civic duty’: Finally, some respondents referred to a feeling of ‘civic duty’ as an incentive of participation in election, which is an important independent variable suggested by the rational choice model of turnout. For example, “In general elections, I went to the voting booth only with a sense of duty that I have to cast my ballot

¹⁷ In Chapter 7, I have partially used this part of the interview data. So, I will discuss this data briefly in order to avoid a repetition.

anyway" (I-206; I-137). "I am very much disappointed with all politicians. I think that all politicians are the same [bad]. I truly did not want to vote this time, but I did, because of my children. I thought that my children would not go to the polls either, if I gave up exercising my voting right" (FF3). They turned out to vote because they feel that they should cast a ballot anyway, even though they were not interested in the election nor did they have a strong preference for any candidate. To some extent, turning out to vote based on a feeling of 'civic duty' implies irrational behaviour as they are casting their ballot without actually having any preference.

The Model of Individual Turnout Behaviour

How does party affiliation explain turnout compared to other social psychological variables such as electoral interest in politics? In order to uncover the key factors affecting turnout in Korea, a multiple regression model of turnout is employed.

The Model of Regression Analysis

Considering the two distinctive approaches to voter turnout, two sociological variables and six psychological variables are included in the regression model.¹⁸ As social psychological variables, 'party identification', 'feeling of political efficacy', 'interest in politics', 'interest in election', 'government performance evaluation', and 'insufficiency of election information' are examined in the regression analysis.

Party identification: Party identification is recoded into a dichotomous variable --- i.e., partisans or independents. Voters aligned to political parties confirm their loyalty to a political party and feel satisfaction through supporting their own political parties in elections. Therefore, it is assumed that partisans will have more incentive to participate in voting compared to independent voters.

Political efficacy of election: Feelings of political efficacy are measured in a 4-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree.¹⁹ It is assumed that voters who feel political efficacy at elections are more likely to vote compared to voters who do not feel this.

Interest in politics and interest in election: Although interest in politics may not be

¹⁸ In a British electoral study, researchers suggested three incentives for electoral participation --- i.e., individual values and beliefs such as subjective feelings of efficacy, attitudes toward political parties and leaders of party, and the context of the election such as the degree of competition. However, due to a lack of data, the context of the election is not included in this analysis of turnout in Korea. See Whiteley et al., 'Turnout', pp. 216-20.

¹⁹ The following question is used: 'Do you agree that voting can change government policies?'

clearly distinct from interest in election, it is assumed here that interest in politics does differ from interest in election. ‘Interest in politics’ is a relatively long-term attitude to politics while ‘interest in election’ is a short-term attitude to a specific election. The level of interest in election is related to the interest in politics, but is also influenced by the context of election, such as the degree of competition and the candidate. Because the survey data does not include any variables to measure the context of election, the ‘interest in election’ variable has been included as an alternative.

Information: The adequacy of election information is measured in a 3-point scale from sufficiency to insufficiency based on a survey question (i.e., “Did you have sufficient information when you made vote decision?”). This variable is included in order to examine ‘mobilised voting’ in Korea.²⁰ According to modernisation theory, voters go to the poll as a result of mobilisation, though they do not have sufficient information or knowledge about the election. Under the authoritarian regimes, the voting turnout of less educated, older, rural and female voters is often explained by mobilised voting. However, it is assumed that mobilised voting is no longer useful to explain turnout in Korea. If the sufficiency of information does explain turnout, then mobilised voting is no longer useful to explain turnout in Korea.

Perception toward government performance: Government performance evaluation is measured in a 5-point scale from very good to very poor performance. It is assumed that this variable is related to voter satisfaction with politics and/or democracy and that those satisfied with politics and/or democracy are more likely to vote, while those who are not satisfied with politics or democracy are more likely to abstain. Because the survey data does not include any question about satisfaction with politics or democracy, voter satisfaction with government performance has been used as a proxy measurement of satisfaction with politics.

Controlling variables and dependent variable: Finally, two sociological variables, ‘age’ and ‘education’, are included as controlling variables. Age is measured in years. Education is measured in a 4-point scale from the lowest level of education through to the highest level. The dependent variable is individual turnout. Those who voted in the election are coded 1 and those who did not vote are coded 2.

The Result of Regression Analysis

The method used in this multiple regression analysis is called stepwise. As shown in Table 8.8, five independent variables explain turnout in the 2002 presidential election.

²⁰ Kim, ‘*Tpyochamyewa gigwon*’ (Vote turnout and abstention), pp.228-30.

Interest in election, feeling of political efficacy, and age explained variations in turnout well, but insufficiency of information and party identification explained only a small amount of variance in the dependent variable. This result is generally similar to the research on turnout in the 1997 presidential election in which the elector's interest in election and party affiliation were the key factors in explaining vote turnout.²¹

Table 8.8 The Multiple Regression Model of Turnout (stepwise method), 2002

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Interest in election	0.246	0.210	0.198	0.177	0.169
Political efficacy of election		0.133	0.138	0.127	0.122
Age			-0.113	-0.110	-0.106
Information on candidates				0.091	0.082
Party identification					0.077
Interest in politics					
Performance of incumbent government					
Education					
Adjusted R-square	0.060	0.075	0.087	0.094	0.099

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.

Note: The method is called stepwise. The figures refer to standardised coefficients (beta). Variables that do not display beta in this table are excluded variables in the regression model.

In conclusion, independent voters were relatively more likely to abstain compared to partisans. This relationship is statistically significant, though the explanatory power of party identification in a multiple regression model is relatively not strong compared to other explanatory variables. Furthermore, among independent voters, attentive independents are different from apolitical independents in terms of turnout. Unlike apolitical independents, attentive independents are more inclined to actually vote. Attentive independents interested in politics also were more likely to vote compared to the habitual partisans without a great interest in voting. A voter's interest in the election was a key factor to determine turnout in the 2002 presidential election.

2. Volatile and Late Vote Decision: Floating Voters?

Partisan *dealignment* is related to an increasing electoral volatility in mature democracies.²² According to the party identification model, voters who have an enduring psychological attachment to a particular political party are not greatly affected by short-

²¹ Kim, 'Tupyochamyewa gigwon' (Vote turnout and abstention), pp. 232-6.

²² For British electoral dealignment and electoral volatility, Bo Sarlvik and Ivor Crewe, *Decade of Dealignment: The Conservative Victory of 1979 and Electoral Trends in the 1970s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

term considerations such as issues or political events. Their voting choice is mainly constrained by their commitment to a particular political party. Partisans are stable in the voting behaviour as party attachments are stable. In contrast to partisans, independent voters who are responsive to the impacts of short-term factors are unstable in the voting behaviour. Independents swing from party to another party at different elections. The voting intentions of independent voters are also changeable during an election. Independent voters hesitate when making their electoral choice and their vote decision is delayed compared to partisans.

In this section, the difference between partisans and independents in voting behaviour will be examined in three aspects — i.e., vote consistency between elections, hesitancy in making a voting decision during an election, and change in voting preference within an election.

Swing Vote and Independents

Partisans who have an enduring party affiliation express their loyalty to political parties by voting for their parties in elections. Partisans who are anchored to political parties are not affected by short-term factors, and the voting of partisans is based on psychological commitment rather than ‘choice’. Thus, partisans vote for the same political party in most elections and their voting choice is stable over time. In contrast, independents are affected by short-term factors in their vote choice, which is different depending on conditions of each election. As a result, their electoral choice is inconsistent across different elections.

Voting Consistency in Consecutive Elections

More than 60 per cent of all voters in Korea consistently voted for a party in two consecutive presidential elections (the 1997 and the 2002 presidential elections). Considering the institutional instability of the party system in Korea, this figure is relatively big. Also, the voting consistency rate for major parties is higher than that for the minor parties. Approximately 75 per cent of voters who voted for one of two major parties in 1997 again voted for that party in 2002. On the other hand, only 47.4 per cent of voters who voted for Democratic Labour Party (DLP) in 1997 returned to the party in the 2002 presidential election (see Table 8.9). Tactical voting may explain the relatively low consistency in voting choice among DLP partisans. Compared to major party partisans, a minor party’s partisans are more likely to defect from their own political party in voting choice. In the 2002 presidential election, some liberal voters favourable to Kwon Young-gil actually voted for Roh Moo-hyun.

When we convert these figures to the percentage of all voters, 61.1 per cent of the electorate voted for the same party in two consecutive presidential elections. 23.9 per cent of the electorate voted for the Grand National Party, 36.5 per cent of the electorate supported the Millennium Democratic Party (or the National Congress for New Politics in 1997), and 0.7 per cent of the electorate voted for Democratic Labour Party. Also, 2.7 per cent of the voters did not go to the polls in the two presidential elections. If we assume abstention is another form of political choice, about 63.8 per cent of the electorate showed voting consistency in the two consecutive presidential elections. Furthermore, if the New Party for People that gained a substantial support in the 1997 election had not dissolved, the percentage of voters who voted consistently in a series of elections would have increased (see Table 8.9).²³

Table 8.9 Flow of the Vote between Presidential Elections of 1997 and 2002

			Vote Choice in 2002					Total
			N	GNP	MDP	DLP	Abstention	
Vote in 1997	GNP	All Voters	414	73.7%	15.0%	3.4%	8.0%	100%
		Partisans	259	83.0%	8.9%	2.7%	5.4%	100%
		Independents	155	58.1%	25.2%	4.5%	12.3%	100%
	NCNP (→ MDP)	All Voters	617	14.1%	75.5%	1.8%	8.6%	100%
		Partisans	391	11.8%	80.1%	2.3%	5.9%	100%
		Independents	226	18.1%	67.7%	0.9%	13.3%	100%
	NPP	All Voters	102	36.3%	45.1%	5.9%	12.7%	100%
		Partisans	51	43.1%	41.2%	5.9%	9.8%	100%
		Independents	51	29.4%	49.0%	5.9%	15.7%	100%
	PV21 (→ DLP)	All Voters	19	10.5%	36.8%	47.4%	5.3%	100%
		Partisans	15	0.0%	33.3%	60.0%	6.7%	100%
		Independents	4	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100%
	Abstention	All Voters	125	29.6%	36.0%	7.2%	27.2%	100%
		Partisans	57	38.6%	36.8%	10.5%	14.0%	100%
		Independents	68	22.1%	35.3%	4.4%	38.2%	100%
	Total	All Voters	1277	36.6%	49.0%	3.8%	10.5%	100%
		Partisans	773	38.5%	49.5%	4.4%	6.6%	100%
		Independents	504	32.3%	48.2%	3.0%	16.5%	100%

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.

Keys: N = number of cases; GNP = Grand National Party; NCNP = National Congress for New Politics; MDP = Millennium Democratic Party; NPP = New Party for People; PV21 = People's Victory 21; DLP = Democratic Labour Party.

Note: The estimated is based on how voters in 2002 recalled voting in 1992. Constant voters are highlighted in shade. A few voters supported minor party's candidates are excluded. Also, the voters who did not have a voting right in 1997 are excluded.

Swing Voters: Independents vs. Partisans

Are partisans different from independents in terms of voting consistency? Empirical

²³ In the 1997 presidential elections, Rhee In-je, presidential candidate of the New Party for People (NPP), shared 19.2 per cent of valid votes. But, in the survey, Rhee gained about 8 per cent of votes.

survey evidence shows that independent voters lack consistency in electoral choice between two presidential elections compared to partisans. Table 8.10 shows that 83 per cent of partisans who voted for Lee Hoi Chang in 1997 supported Lee Hoi Chang again in 2002, while 80.1 per cent of partisans who voted for Kim Dae-jung in 1997 voted for Roh Moo-hyun in 2002. The percentage of consistent independent voters was much lower compared to the percentage of consistent partisans. In the two presidential elections, 58.1% of independent voters who voted for Lee Hoi Chang voted again for Lee Hoi Chang in 2002 while 67.7 per cent of independent voters who supported Kim Dae-jung in 1997 voted for Roh Moon-hyun in 2002. If we convert the figures to the percentage of all voters, 70.5 per cent of partisans voted repeatedly for a particular party in two consecutive presidential elections while 53.3 per cent of independent voters were consistent in electoral choice in the two presidential elections.

In conclusion, partisans were more consistent in voting choice between two consecutive presidential elections compared to independents. Moreover, critical partisans were much more consistent compared to habitual partisans, while attentive independents were more consistent than apolitical independents. The difference is statistically significant at the 0.05 level (see Table 8.9).

Table 8. 10 Vote Consistency between 1997 and 2002

	Number of cases	Voting Choices in two presidential elections			Chi-square (Sig.)
		Consistency	Inconsistency	Total	
Total	1277	63.7%	36.3%	100%	
Partisan	773	70.5%	29.5%	100%	38.742
Independents	504	53.4%	46.6%	100%	(0.000)
Critical partisans	403	75.4%	24.6%	100%	
Habitual partisans	370	65.1%	34.9%	100%	49.635
Attentive independents	181	57.5%	42.5%	100%	(0.000)
Apolitical independents	323	51.1%	48.9%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002

Note: The estimated is based on how voters in 2002 recalled voting in 1992. A few voters supported minor party's candidates in either one of two presidential elections are excluded. The voters who did not have a voting right in 1997 are excluded. Also, abstentions are considered as a type of vote choice, and so are included in this analysis.

Although the proportion of independent voters who voted repeatedly for a political party in a series of presidential elections is much smaller than the proportion of partisans, it should be noted that more than half of independent voters voted consistently for a particular political party in presidential elections. This may suggest that actually half of independent voters lean towards a political party, even if they do not consider themselves party affiliated. Consequently, it might be suggested that they are 'hidden' partisans or

independent 'leaners'.²⁴ However, it is possible that independent voters might vote for a political party in a series of presidential elections due to other reasons than 'hidden' party attachment. For example, independents might vote for the same party in every presidential election due to particular policies or public pledges promised by a political party. They might vote for a particular party continually due to their candidate preference, even though they do not have an enduring psychological attachment to a particular political party.

Hesitancy in Vote Decision

In terms of the timing of vote decision, there is a difference between partisans and independent voters. Making a decision about voting is relatively simple and straightforward for voters with an attachment to political parties. Their voting choice is a confirmation of a candidate of their party and as such is almost fixed. In contrast to partisans, independent voters, who do not have information shortcut, may try to understand the complexity of politics without any guide. To do this, independent voters need to spend a long time accumulating information on presidential candidates. Therefore, the voting decision of independents is later than that of partisans.

The Timing of Voting Decision: Independents vs. Partisans

Election survey data confirms that independent voters decide upon their vote later than partisans. The same pattern of the relationship between partisanship and vote decision timing is repeated in each of the three elections and the difference in the timing of voting choice between partisans and independent voters is also statistically significant in each election. For example, in 2002, more than half of the electorate made their voting choice more than one month before the day of election. The percentage of partisans who made vote decision more than one month before the day of election was 56.9 per cent, while the percentage of independent voters doing likewise was 44.4 per cent (see Table 8.11).

Although independents made a comparatively late voting choice, it should be noted that almost a half of independent voters (i.e., 44.4 per cent in 2002, but 20.3 per cent in 1992) made their vote decision before the official election campaign began in the 2002 presidential election. This suggests that many independent voters are actually relatively stable in their electoral preference. Thus, it is not possible to describe most independent

²⁴ Bruce E. Keith et al., *The Myth of the Independent Voter* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

voters as floating voters. Some of them were available during the campaign, but many of them were not.

Table 8.11 The Timing of Voting Decision by Party Identification, 1992-2002

	N	Vote Decision Time							Test statistics
		Over 30 days before e-day	15-30 days before e-day	8-14 days before e-day	4-7 days before e-day	1-3 days before e-day	Election day	Total	
1992									
Partisans	864	43.4% (43.4)	10.4% (53.8)	12.5% (66.3)	11.6% (77.9)	14.5% (92.4)	7.6% (100)	100%	Chi-square = 51.456 Sig. = 0.000
Independents	241	20.3% (20.3)	13.7% (34.0)	12.9% (46.9)	18.7% (65.6)	18.3% (83.9)	16.2% (100)	100%	
Total	1105	38.4% (38.4)	11.1% (49.5)	12.6% (62.1)	13.1% (75.2)	15.3% (90.5)	9.5% (100)	100%	
1997									
Partisans	718	59.5% (59.5)	9.7% (69.2)	7.5% (76.7)	11.0% (87.7)	8.1% (95.8)	4.2% (100)	100%	Chi-square = 69.438 Sig. = 0.000
Independents	389	37.0% (37.0)	9.3% (46.3)	9.0% (55.3)	16.5% (71.8)	15.9% (87.7)	12.3% (100)	100%	
Total	1107	51.6% (51.6)	9.6% (61.2)	8.0% (69.2)	12.9% (82.1)	10.8% (92.9)	7.0% (100)	100%	
2002									
Partisans	821	56.9% (56.9)	10.2% (67.1)	7.9% (75.0)	9.4% (84.4)	8.6% (93.0)	6.9% (100)	100%	Chi-square = 25.172 Sig. = 0.000
Independents	504	44.4% (44.4)	11.3% (55.7)	7.7% (63.4)	14.3% (77.7)	13.9% (91.6)	8.3% (100)	100%	
Total	1325	52.2% (52.2)	10.6% (62.8)	7.8% (70.6)	11.2% (81.8)	10.6% (92.4)	7.5% (100)	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Key: e-day = election day.

Note: The figures in parentheses are the accumulated percentage for each row.

The following question is used: "How long ago did you decide that you would vote the way you did?"

Critical partisans generally made their voting decision earlier than other types of voters. The difference in the timing of vote decision across the four types of voters is statistically significant, and this pattern was continued in last three presidential elections. For example, in the 2002 presidential election, 64.5 per cent of critical partisans made their voting decision before the official campaign begin, while 43.7 per cent of apolitical independents made an early choice. The difference can also be seen by looking at the proportion making their choice just before the election. Only 7.5 per cent of critical partisans made their voting choice within the 3 days prior to the day of election, while 25.5 per cent of apolitical independents did made their voting choice in this period (see Table 8.12).

Table 8.12 Crosstab: The Timing of Vote Decision by Four Types of Voters, 1992-2002

	N	Vote Decision Time							Test statistics
		Over 30 days before e-day	15-30 days before e-day	8-14 days before e-day	4-7 days before e-day	1-3 days before e-day	Election day	Total	
1992									
Critical P	465	52.7% (52.7)	10.1% (62.8)	12.9% (75.7)	9.0% (84.7)	10.1% (94.8)	5.2% (100)	100%	Chi-square = 107.093 Sig. = 0.000
Habitual P	397	32.2% (32.2)	10.8% (43.0)	12.1% (55.1)	14.6% (69.7)	19.6% (89.3)	10.6% (100)	100%	
Attentive I	93	24.7% (24.7)	17.2% (41.9)	11.8% (53.7)	16.1% (69.8)	11.8% (81.6)	18.3% (100)	100%	
Apolitical I	148	17.6% (17.6)	11.5% (29.1)	13.5% (42.6)	20.3% (62.9)	22.3% (85.2)	14.9% (100)	100%	
Total	1103	38.3% (38.3)	11.2% (49.5)	12.6% (62.1)	13.1% (75.2)	15.3% (90.5)	9.5% (100)	100%	
1997									
Critical P	518	66.0% (66.0)	7.3% (73.3)	7.3% (80.6)	9.7% (90.3)	5.8% (96.1)	3.9% (100)	100%	Chi-square = 128.990 Sig. = 0.000
Habitual P	199	42.7% (42.7)	16.1% (58.8)	8.0% (66.8)	14.6% (81.4)	14.1% (95.5)	4.5% (100)	100%	
Attentive I	205	43.9% (43.9)	10.7% (54.6)	10.2% (64.8)	13.7% (78.5)	12.2% (90.7)	9.3% (100)	100%	
Apolitical I	184	29.3% (29.3)	7.6% (36.9)	7.6% (44.5)	19.6% (64.1)	20.1% (84.2)	15.8% (100)	100%	
Total	1106	51.6% (51.6)	9.6% (61.2)	8.0% (69.2)	12.9% (82.1)	10.8% (92.9)	7.0% (100)	100%	
2002									
Critical P	431	64.5% (64.5)	10.9% (75.4)	6.3% (81.7)	8.8% (90.5)	5.3% (95.8)	4.2% (100)	100%	Chi-square = 75.207 Sig. = 0.000
Habitual P	390	48.5% (48.5)	9.5% (58.0)	9.7% (67.7)	10.0% (77.7)	12.3% (90.0)	10.0% (100)	100%	
Attentive I	186	45.7% (45.7)	14.0% (59.7)	6.5% (66.2)	17.2% (83.4)	14.0% (97.4)	2.7% (100)	100%	
Apolitical I	318	43.7% (43.7)	9.7% (53.4)	8.5% (61.9)	12.6% (74.5)	13.8% (88.3)	11.6% (100)	100%	
Total	1325	52.2% (52.2)	10.6% (62.8)	7.8% (70.6)	11.2% (81.8)	10.6% (92.4)	7.5% (100)	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: N = number of cases; Critical P = Critical Partisans; Habitual P = Habitual Partisans; Attentive I = Attentive Independents; Apolitical I = Apolitical Independents.

Note: The figures in parentheses are the accumulated percentage for each row.

The following question is used: "How long ago did you decide that you would vote the way you did?".

Table 8.13 is a summary of the difference across four types of voters. The result of ANOVA analysis suggests differences in the average score for the timing of voting decision across the four different types of voters. Critical partisans made an early choice about their vote, while apolitical independents made a late voting choice compared to other types of voters. In terms of the timing of making their electoral choice, habitual partisans and attentive independents behaved similarly. The differences across different types of voters are statistically significant. It is noticeable that voters who are interested in elections such as the critical partisans or the attentive independents made an early vote decision compared to voters uninterested in elections such as habitual partisans or apolitical independents.

Table 8.13 ANOVA: The Timing of Vote Decision by Four Types of Voters, 1992-2002

	1992			1997			2002		
	N	Mean	Std.D	N	Mean	Std.D	N	Mean	Std.D
Critical Partisan	465	4.71	1.63	518	5.07	1.50	431	5.08	1.49
Habitual Partisan	397	3.90	1.81	199	4.45	1.67	390	4.42	1.83
Attentive Independents	93	3.72	1.84	205	4.33	1.80	186	4.52	1.64
Apolitical	148	3.37	1.70	184	3.59	1.88	318	4.22	1.88
Independents	1103	4.15	1.80	1106	4.57	1.74	1325	4.60	1.75
Total F (sig.)	30.972 (0.000)			38.617 (0.000)			18.054 (0.000)		

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Key: Mean = average score in a 5-point scale (i.e., 1 = late vote decision to 5 = early vote decision).

Note: In 1992, the mean difference between the critical partisans and three other types of voters, and between habitual partisans and apolitical independents are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

In 1997, the mean difference between critical partisans and three other types of voters, between habitual partisans and apolitical independents, and between attentive independents and apolitical independents are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

In 2002, the mean difference between critical partisans and three other types of voters is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

Overall, more voters made an early vote decision in 2002 than in 1997. The average score for the timing of voting decision was 4.15 point in 1992, but 4.60 point in 2002 (see Table 8.13). This is related to a change in elections over the last 10 years. In 2002 and 1997, each political party nominated presidential candidate relatively early through a presidential primary or a competition within the parties. For example, the presidential primary in the early part of the year gave Roh Moo-hyun the opportunity to become widely known amongst the public. Lee Hoi Chang, leader of the Grand National Party, had ran for the presidency in 1997 and was the party's *de facto* candidate. After each party's presidential candidates was nominated, public appearances provided the presidential candidates with the chance to publicise their candidacy. For example, from the 1997 presidential election, candidates were invited to various types of TV interviews and debates. Before the official election campaign began, candidates and political parties were nonetheless actively involved in campaigning. Voters could gain much information about candidates before the official election campaign began, and were thus able to make an early decision about their choice.

Why Did Independents Make Late Decision?

Many voters made very late voting decisions close to the day of election. In 2002, almost 30 per cent of all voters made their decision very close to the day of election, i.e., within 3 days. A third of independent voters (i.e., 36.5 per cent) made their vote choice as

late as 3 days before the day of election, and as well as a quarter of all partisans (i.e., 24.9 per cent). The high percentage for partisans implies that a substantial proportion of partisans hesitated before making their decision and did chose their own party only after careful consideration of other factors such as candidates and policies. Qualitative interview data generally confirms that partisans made an earlier decision than independent voters. In the in-depth interviews, interviewees were asked about why they made an early or late vote decision. In the qualitative data, of a total of 56 respondents, 9 out of 14 partisans and 15 out of 42 independents made their decision before the official election began. All partisans had made their mind up at least one week before the day of election but 9 out of 42 independent voters only decided in the 3 days before the day of election.

Lack of interest in election: Why did voters make their vote decision so late? Qualitative interview data suggest that partisans made a late choice because they were not very interested in the election. They did not follow the election campaign, but eventually felt that they could not delay making a decision when the day of election approached. For example, “I was not interested in the election at all. I thought that I should make vote decision before it was too late” (I-210; I-208). Independent voters made an early vote decision when they were paying attention to election events, such as the presidential primary. Some of them suggested that they began to support a candidate immediately after the presidential primary or the official nomination. Independent voters interested in politics gathered information about candidates through political events, and were able to come to an early decision. For example, “I began to support Roh Moo-hyun immediately after he won the presidential primary” (I-106). “I made my voting decision about one or two months before the election...I thought that I had enough information for making a voting decision”(I-140). “I had enough knowledge about what candidates had done as politicians. I could made a voting decision [so early]” (I-115; I-107; I-119).

Lack of difference among candidates: Some independents voters made late voting decisions because they could not see a clear difference among candidates. For example, “I did not have a clear preference for any candidates because I could not see great differences among the candidates. But I thought that a decision was inevitable, so I made it” (I-103; I-138; I-109; I-101). “I made a late voting decision because I did not like any of the candidates. When I made my decision, I did not have any particular reasons why I voted for him. I just voted him” (I-112; I-123). “I could not make my voting decision. The day before the election, I overheard that some labour workers having a conversation about Kwon Young-gil. At that moment, I made my decision” (I-128).

Lack of confidence: Some independents made a late voting decision because they were not sure about a particular candidate who they liked to some extent. For example, “I

was not sure about his qualities or abilities as a presidential candidate. [So, I made a late decision]" (I-104; I-141). "I considered Roh Moo-hyun for a long time, but I could not make a final decision [until it was close to the day of election]" (I-128). Some of them voted tactically. For example, "I could not make a choice between two candidates [Roh Moo-hyun and Kwon Young-gil]. I leaned towards Kwon. But, I voted for Roh when I heard that Chung Mong-joon had broken off his electoral coalition with Roh" (I-126; I-102; FM1; FM4; FM5).

Changing Vote Intention: Volatile Voters?

According to the party identification model, partisans who are firmly anchored to a political party are less likely to be influenced by a 'political storm', while independent voters who do not have the party anchor are more inclined to change their electoral preference depending upon political events within a prolonged campaign. The long-term loyalty of partisans and their reliance on parties for information about politics means that they are relatively less affected by short-term political affairs and their vote preferences are relatively stable. Unlike partisans, independent voters without a long-term party attachment and unconstrained by partisanship are more affected by a transitory events, and change their electoral preferences depending upon their reconsideration of short-term factors such as candidates or policies.

Changes in Voting Intention: Independents vs. Partisans

Table 8.14 shows that independent voters were more likely to change their mind about their electoral preference compared to partisans. The difference between partisans and independents was relatively large in 1997 compared to the difference in 2002. 33 per cent of independent voters changed their voting decision in 1997, but this fell to 22.2 per cent in 2002, while the percentage for partisans was unchanged at about 15 per cent. The difference between partisans and independent voters in terms of a changed voting intention remains when four types of voters are examined. Attentive independents and apolitical independents are more inclined to change their voting decision than critical partisans and habitual partisans. In particular, in 2002, a quarter of attentive independents changed their voting intention. This implies that attentive independents were more responsive to campaigns or short-term issues than other types of voters in the 2002 presidential election.

The reason why attentive independents were more likely to alter their electoral preference in 2002 is related to the political context of the election. In 2002, two leading

candidates, Roh Moo-hyun and Chung Mong-joon, agreed on a single candidacy against the other leading candidate, Lee Hoi Chang, one month before the day of the election. Consequently, it was unavoidable that voters who supported Chung Mong-joon change their voting intention because Chung Mong-joon stopped running for presidency just before the official campaign began.²⁵ Voters who made an early voting decision before the official campaign began were more likely to be attentive independents rather than apolitical independents. Thus, independent voters who had to change their vote decision due to the withdrawal of Chung Mong-joon were more likely to be attentive independents rather than apolitical independents.

Post-election survey data shows that 21.2 per cent of voters experienced a change in their electoral preference in the 1997 presidential election, while 17.9 per cent of the voters did so in 2002 (see Table 8.14). This percentage is actually large, but is not so great compared to the wide gap between the highest and lowest point of the individual candidates' popularity during the election year. As discussed in Chapter 5, each candidate's popularity rose and fell considerably during the year before the shorter official campaign began. This fluctuation of voting preference at the aggregate level data implies a shift in individual vote preferences during the election year. For example, in 2002, Roh Moo-hyun, the ruling party's candidate, fluctuated between about 60 per cent to about 20 per cent. In 1997, Lee Hoi Chang also experienced a similar degree of a vacillation in his popularity during the election year.

The difference in the degree of changing voting intention between pre-election surveys and the post-election survey implies that fluctuation of candidate preference during the year was largely affected by changes in the strength of voting intentions from one candidate to non-preference rather than changes from one candidate to another candidate. In other words, it seems that voters began to support one candidate, but experienced a weakening of voting intention depending upon political events during the prolonged election campaign. This was reflected in changes in candidate preference in the pre-election surveys. Voters supported a particular candidate in a poll, but turned to non-preference in the next poll. Also, it seems that voters eventually voted the candidate whom they preferred initially rather than switch to another candidate. Therefore, in the post-election survey, they did not report changes in their vote intention during the election year.

²⁵ The Korean Presidential Election Study shows that about 35 per cent of voters who changed vote decision cited the single presidential candidacy of Roh Moo-hyun and Chung Mong-joon as the reason why they changed their vote choice.

Table 8. 14 Changing Vote Preference during an Election, 1997 and 2002

	1997				2002			
	Vote Change				Vote Change			
	N	Change	No change	Total	N	Change	No change	Total
Partisans	716	14.8%	85.2%	100%	892	15.0%	85.0%	100%
Independents	388	33.0%	67.0%	100%	608	22.2%	78.8%	100%
Total	1004	21.2%	78.8%	100%	1500	17.9%	82.1%	100%
Pearson Chi-square	49.821				12.670			
Sig. (2-sided)	0.000				0.000			
Critical Partisans	517	14.9%	85.1%	100%	450	13.6%	86.4%	100%
Habitual Partisans	198	14.6%	85.4%	100%	442	16.5%	83.5%	100%
Attentive Independent	204	31.9%	68.1%	100%	203	25.6%	74.4%	100%
Apolitical Independent	184	34.2%	65.8%	100%	405	20.5%	79.5%	100%
Total	1103	21.2%	78.8%	100%	1500	17.9%	82.1%	100%
Pearson Chi-square	49.903				16.408			
Sig. (2-sided)	0.000				0.001			

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997 and 2002.

Key: N = number of cases.

Note: Question 2-4 in 1997 and Question 15 in 2002 (i.e., "Did you change your mind before you voted the way you did?") are used in this analysis; Data for 1997 is not available.

Why Did Voters Change Their Initial Choice?

In the in-depth interviews, there were not very many voters who changed their decision based on a re-evaluation of the candidates during the election year. In particular, independents delayed making their vote decision, but once made, they maintained it as much as partisans did. Among the 56 interviewees, 13 respondents changed their voting decision at least once during the year. Of this group, there were 4 out of the 14 partisans and 9 out of the 42 independents, but only 6 of them changed their vote decision after re-evaluating the candidates. 4 independents were forced to change their vote choice because Roh Moo-hyun and Chung Mong-joon agreed on an election coalition and Chung stopped running for presidency. For example, "I initially supported Chung Mong-joon, but I had to change my voting decision due to the electoral coalition" (I-109; I-123; I-125; I-134).

Also, one independent voter and two partisans changed their decision based on tactical thinking. They preferred Kwon Young-gil to the other candidates, but changed their mind because they knew that Kwon did not have any chance of winning. When Chung Mong-joon declared a breach in the election coalition the day before the day of election, voting intentions were particularly affected²⁶. Voters who did not want to see

²⁶ In the day before the election day, Chung suddenly declared his withdrawal from the election coalition with Roh. Roh's supporters and those who did not want to let a conservative candidate, Lee Hoi Chang, win were worried that Roh might lose the election if Chung's supporters changed their vote intention following Chung's decision. Thus, voters who expected an easy victory for Roh suddenly worried about the possibility of him losing the election. Therefore, many voters who originally intended to vote for Kwon Young-gil, a candidate of Democratic Labour Party, changed their voting intention and finally voted for Roh rather than Kwon. Also, among Roh's supporters,

Lee Hoi Chang win the election changed their voting decision and went for Roh Moo-hyun. For example, “I anticipated that Roh Moo-hyun could win the election. I made my vote decision for Kwon Young-gil, but the change in coalition over night forced me vote for Roh Moo-hyun” (I-212; I-126).

Among those who did not change their vote decision, some interviewees stated that their decision was not totally firm for a while. For example, “Well, I did not change my decision eventually, but I was thinking about changing my voting intention” (I-132; I-202; I-102; I-104).

those who did not have a strong desire to go to the polls before the event changed their mind and participated in the election in order to secure Roh’s victory.

Chapter 9. Independent Voters and Election Campaigns: Are Independents Responsive to Campaigns?

The aim of this chapter is to examine whether independents are responsive to campaigns compared to partisans. In this chapter, it will be argued that TV campaigns, particularly TV debates, influence voters in shaping political attitudes, but that the impact of the TV debates on voting choice is not strong enough to change pre-existing voting decisions. In addition, it will be argued that the impact of the Internet on voting choice in the 2002 presidential election was insignificant, contrary to a common belief.

Do campaigns matter? Do campaigns affect voting choice? This is an ongoing debate in study of election campaigns.¹ Researchers have concluded that as voters make their choice before the official election campaign begins and subsequently maintain this throughout the election campaigns, election campaigns have only 'minimal effects' on voting choice.² Unlike the assumption of the mass propaganda model of political communication, the minimal effects model assumes that voters are not entirely passive recipients, but pay attention to only the information they agree with. In this 'selective exposure' to campaigns and the mass media, partisans mainly reinforce their party support and rarely change their voting intention. Thus, the main feature of the effect of campaigns is reinforcement, not change. Campaigns fail to lead to changes in voting choice.³

The debate on campaign effects has been reopened in the last two decades with the increase of voters without close ties to political parties. A growing body of evidence based on more sophisticated research approaches such as experimental methods suggests that campaigns do fundamentally affect vote choice.⁴ Campaigns affect agenda setting

¹ For a succinct summary of theories about impacts of political communication accompanying campaigns on voters, see William L. Miller, *Media and Voters: The Audience, Content, and Influence of Press and Television at the 1987 General Election* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 1-9, and Pippa Norris et al., *On Message: Communicating the Campaign* (London: Sage, 1999), pp.1-19. William L. Miller recognised three models of media influence: the propaganda model, the minimal effects model, and the consumer model. Pippa Norris identified three schools of thought in study of influence of political communication: theories of mass propaganda, theories of partisan reinforcement, and theories of cognitive, agenda-setting and persuasion effects.

² Steven Finkel, 'Re-examining the Minimal Effects Model in Recent Presidential Campaigns', *The Journal of Politics*, 55(1993), 1-21.

³ Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice: How the Voter Make Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944). Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and W. N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

⁴ Pippa Norris, 'Campaign Communication', in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris, eds, *Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenge in the Study of Elections and Voting* (London: Sage, 2002), pp.127-47, at pp. 132-3. For research emphasising campaign effects in the

and shape perceptions with subsequent changes in attitudes eventually influencing voting choice.⁵

Regardless of these debates on campaign effects, many researchers generally agree that some people are more responsive to campaigns compared to others. Researchers suggest that political awareness, partisan intensity, prior political knowledge, and interest in politics determine the susceptibility of individuals to campaigns.⁶ Therefore, party identification and partisan disposition is a key variable to explain campaign effects. Theorists advocating the 'minimal effects' model argue that partisans who are anchored to a political party are not greatly influenced by election campaigns, so the voting behaviour of partisans is less likely to be influenced by election campaigns compared to independent voters. Furthermore, researchers who argue for campaign effects find that there are considerable variations among the electorate, and suggest that the campaign effect on vote choice is conditional on partisan dispositions or previous preference.⁷ Campaigns do not indiscriminately impact on the electorate, but are more likely to affect independent voters or undecided voters compared to partisans or voters who have vote preference.

The 'cognitive consonance' theory also suggests a psychological mechanism to explain differences in campaign impacts across various groups of voters. According to this theory, people do not alter, but strengthen their attitudes and values when they are exposed to information that is incongruous with attitudes or perceptions they hold.⁸ Therefore, voters with a feeling of attachment to a political party are likely to resist changing their previous attitudes and perceptions, and campaigns rarely change their voting choice. On the other hand, voters who do not have party affiliation or do not have

last two decades, see Miller, *Media and Voters*; Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder, *News That Matters: Televisions and American Opinion* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987); Shanto Iyengar and A. F. Simon, 'New Perspective and Evidence on Political Communication and Campaign Effects', *Annual Review of Psychology*, 51 (2000), 149-69.

⁵ Norris et al., *On Message*. Also, an on-line model of candidate evaluation process argues that voters immediately adjust their overall evaluation of the candidate when they are exposed to campaign events and information, even though they forget most campaign information over time and hardly recollect campaign information in post-election surveys. Milton Lodge, Marco R. Steenbergen, and Shawn Brau, 'The Responsive Voter: Campaign Information and Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation', *American Political Science Review*, 89 (1995), 309-326.

⁶ James A. Thurber, Candice J. Nelson, and David A. Dulio, 'Introduction', in James A. Thurber, Candice J. Nelson, and David A. Dulio, eds, *Crowded Airwaves: Campaign Advertising in Elections* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), pp.1-9, at p.5. John Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

⁷ Stephen Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar, *Going Negative: How Political Advertisements Shrink and Polarize the Electorate* (London: Free Press, 1995). D. Sunshine Hillygus and Simon Jackman, 'Voter Decision Making in Election 2000: Campaign Effects, Partisan Activation, and the Clinton Legacy', *American Journal of Political Science*, 47 (2003), 583-596.

⁸ Milton Lodge and Ruth Hamill, 'A Partisan Schema for Political Information Processing', *American Political Science Review*, 80 (1986), 505-520. Pamela Conover and Stanley Feldman, 'How People Organize the Political World: A Schematic Model', *American Journal of Political Science*, 28 (1984), 95-126.

vote preference are potentially open to campaign effects.

Do campaigns have a powerful impact upon the electorate in Korea where independent voters are increasing and partisan loyalty is weakening? And are campaigns a significant determinant of the outcome of Korean presidential election? The first section of this chapter examines the effects of election campaigns on voting choice focusing on TV presidential debates. The TV presidential debate is the most influential source of information for elections. If we fail to find even a modest impact of TV presidential debates on voting choice, we can expect other sources of information to have an even weaker effect. The second section of this chapter discusses the impact of the Internet campaign on voting choice. This new form of electioneering was thought to have particularly affected the young.

1. TV Presidential Debates and Independent Voters

Mao Tse-tung who led Chinese communist revolution said, "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun". As a journalist said, if Mao were a politician living in the present Korean democracy, he might rephrase this to political power grows out of the tube of a television set. Political parties, candidates, and campaigners believe that TV presidential debates greatly affect voting choice and TV presidential debates determine the outcome of elections in Korea. Every political party, candidate and campaigner spent a great deal of effort and campaign moneys preparing for the TV presidential debates. For example, in the 1997 presidential election, the campaign camp of candidate Kim Dae-jung believed firmly that the TV presidential debates could influence voters, and that Kim's better performance in TV debates was one of the key factors contributing to his victory in the election.⁹

There were three TV presidential debates both in 1997 and in 2002.¹⁰ In each TV presidential debate, the three major candidates appeared together and debated various issues. It is estimated that a maximum of 20 million electors watched each TV debate. The TV debate is the only campaign event to attract so many voters' attention at one time.

⁹ For example, according to my personal recollections, MP Park Sang-cheon often emphasised the impacts of TV debates on the outcome of the 1997 presidential election. As the floor leader of the National Congress for New Politics, Park introduced TV presidential debates in the 1997 presidential election. Park also chaired the party's media campaign committee during the 1997 presidential election campaign.

¹⁰ Here I focus on TV presidential debates that were held during the official campaign period and in which three major contenders appeared together. Many TV debates, in which one candidate appeared and debated with the panel before the official campaign began, are excluded in my analysis.

The press promptly reported the campaign event in detail, and many voters often had talked with family members, friends, and colleagues about the debates at the end of each. Therefore, it might be guessed that the influence of the TV debates was considerable.

Television: the most Important Source of Information

Weighing TV Campaigns

The TV campaign, such as TV debates or TV speeches, was the most important source of information about candidates and issues. In answering a survey question about the source of information affecting their vote decision, 82.7 per cent of all voters cited that the television campaign was the most influential information source among various types of election campaigns. Apart from the TV campaign, the news media was next important with 48.8 per cent of respondents referring to news from mass media and a further 21.3 per cent of respondents cited family members or other people (see Table 9.1).¹¹

Table 9. 1 Frequency Table: The Source for the Information that Voters Concerned in Presidential Election, 2002

	1 st Answer (A)		2 nd Answer (B)		Total (A+B)	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
TV (interviews, debates, and speeches)	1223	82.7	13	1.0	1236	43.5
Campaign poster, letters, and books	61	4.1	152	11.2	213	7.5
The Internet or telephone	43	2.9	128	9.4	171	6.0
Public speeches, or canvass	34	2.3	114	8.4	148	5.2
News reports by TV, radio, or newspaper	96	6.5	664	48.8	760	26.8
Family members or other people	21	1.4	290	21.3	311	11.0
Total	1478	100.0	1361	100.0	2839	100.0

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.

Key: N = number of cases.

Note: Cases of 'no answer' in the survey are excluded. Question 19 ("Which was the most important source for the information on candidates that you concerned?") is used in this analysis.

There was no difference in attaching weight to television between partisans and

¹¹ This generally confirms the results of a pre-election survey conducted by a civil activist group, People's Coalition for Media Reform. In the pre-election survey, voters perceived that television (i.e., TV news or TV debates) was the most influential information medium. In answering a survey question about the most influential information medium affecting vote decision, 28.4 per cent, 28.0 per cent, 22.6 per cent, and 7.8 per cent of respondents cited TV debates, TV news, newspapers and magazines, and political websites, respectively. In the survey, the old were more dependent than other age groups on newspapers and magazines, while the young relied on TV debates and TV news, at <http://www.pcmr.or.kr>.

independent voters. However, there was a difference across four types of voters. Critical partisans and attentive independents attached greater weight to TV debates and TV speech compared to other types of voters (see first answer in Table 9.2). In second answer, critical partisans and attentive independent relied more on news from the mass media compared to other types of voters, while habitual partisans and apolitical independents were significantly more likely than critical partisans or attentive independents to rely on family members and other people, though they too relied more on the media than on these personal contacts (see Table 9.2).

Table 9.2 Important Source of Information by Four Types of Voters, 2002

	Four types of Voters					
	N	C-P	H-P	At-I	Ap-I	Total
1st Answer						
TV (interviews, debates, and speeches)	1233	84.8%	80.5%	84.4%	82.0%	82.7%
Campaign poster, letters, and books	61	2.9%	4.6%	5.0%	4.5%	4.1%
The Internet or telephone	43	3.8%	2.3%	4.5%	1.8%	2.9%
Public speeches, or canvass	34	2.3%	3.4%	0.0%	2.3%	2.3%
News reports by TV, radio, or newspaper	96	5.4%	7.1%	5.5%	7.5%	6.5%
Family members or other people	21	0.7%	2.1%	0.5%	2.0%	1.4%
Total	1478	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Pearson Chi-square = 22.403 Sig. (2-sided) = 0.098						
2nd Answer						
TV (interviews, debates, and speeches)	13	1.0%	1.5%	1.6%	0.0%	1.0%
Campaign poster, letters, and books	152	11.9%	13.2%	8.0%	9.8%	11.2%
The Internet or telephone	128	7.3%	9.5%	10.2%	11.1%	9.4%
Public speeches, or canvass	114	8.6%	7.5%	7.5%	9.5%	8.4%
News reports by TV, radio, or newspaper	664	51.9%	44.5%	57.2%	45.9%	48.8%
Family members or other people	290	19.2%	23.9%	15.5%	23.6%	21.3%
Total	1361	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Pearson Chi-square = 25.497 Sig. (2-sided) = 0.044						

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.

Keys: N = number of cases; C-P = critical partisan; H-P = habitual partisan; At-I = attentive independent; Ap-I = apolitical independents.

Why Did Voters Rely on TV Campaigns?

Why do voters, both partisans and independents, rely so heavily on TV campaigns in gathering information about candidates and election issues? In in-depth interviews and focus group interviews, respondents revealed several reasons why they relied on TV campaigns, particularly TV presidential debates, compared to other ways of campaigns. Most interviewees referred to the strengths of TV debates compared to other types of information source.

Direct evaluation: First, many interviewees suggested that the TV debates were the only part of the campaign in which they could know and evaluate candidates by themselves. Voters want to get primary sources rather than secondary sources in

evaluating candidates. As a Korean proverb puts it, “seeing something once is much better than hearing it from other people one hundred times”. For example, “Unlike other information sources, such as campaign pamphlets, candidates engage in dialogue with other candidates in TV debates. I can understand candidates better when I see directly what they are saying. The TV debates helped me a lot to know about the candidates” (I-139; I-125). “The TV debates greatly affected me because I can directly see the candidates” (I-104; I-108; I-114; I-123). “In the TV debates, the candidates have to answer a question that they do not anticipate. In answering this question, candidates sometimes give an unvarnished account of what they think” (I-105; I-107; I-118). “News reports are written by reporters and campaign pamphlets were produced by someone...In the TV debates, candidates themselves have to speak [to other contender]. TV debates are useful for me to judge each candidate’s capability” (I-102; I-107).

Some voters even perceived that newspapers, as a secondary information source, are not impartial and discredited information from newspapers. For example, “In the TV debates, candidates are themselves involved in a discussion. [So TV debates are better than newspapers]...All newspapers have a different perspective on the candidates depending on their political inclination” (I-209). “I think that newspapers are not impartial. So I do not read the newspaper [politics section]” (FM2).

Convenience: Second, TV debates are convenient for voters to compare all major candidates at a time. Voters can see differences in policies and issue preferences among the candidates without extra effort. For example, “To be honest, it is difficult to know the various policies offered by each political party if we do not have a strong interest in election. In the TV debates, we can get a summary of each party’s policies. This is very useful for me” (I-130; I-124). “In a TV speech or speech in the streets, one person speaks alone. But, in the TV debates, we can easily compare each candidate with the other candidates when we see a dispute between the candidates” (I-139; I-201; I-1027; I-208).

Minimum efforts: Third, minimum effort is required to watch the TV debates. Without some interest in politics or elections, voters do not read newspapers or use the Internet. Some voters do not read newspapers, particularly the politics section, and many voters do not use the Internet to gather election information. Compared to other campaign methods, voters can watch the TV without a strong intention to watch the debates and without much interest in the election. For example, “We just need to turn on the power, and then we can get information from the major candidates” (I-124). “It is much more convenient for me to watch the TV debate than to read newspapers because I am old” (I-135). “The TV debates were very useful for me [to know candidates]. It was convenient for me to see the candidates on television. It was good because I could get information about policies in detail” (I-101).

Entertainment: Fourth, the TV debates are enjoyable and easily understandable. Some voters may feel that TV debate is similar to a ping-pong game. A candidate raises a question and other candidates defend themselves. The candidates also know that they are fighting with each other in the debates, but they actually talk to the public through the TV. The candidates tried to make any dull topics simple enough for ordinary citizens to understand without difficulty. For example, “I expected that candidates would abuse each other in the debates... However, I realised that it was fun to watch debates” (FF8).

Initiating other campaigns: Finally, the running time of each TV debate is about two hours, but the TV debates initiate other types of campaign activity. News media report on the TV debates in detail. Many voters chat with other people about the TV debates after watching the debates. Roughly more than one third of the respondents in the in-depth interviews revealed that they had discussed them with other people, such as family and friends. For example, “I chatted with many people. We were talking about which candidate was better in debates” (I-106; I-124; I-126; I-122; I-116; I-140; I-203). “Unfortunately, I did not watch the TV debates, but I heard about them from other people” (I-113).

However, it is noticeable that some voters are more likely to have a conversation with others after watching debates than others. Most women participants in the focus group interviews did not discuss the debates with others. Most women in the focus group had watched the TV debates with their husband and had talked with them while watching the debates, but they did not have a chance to talk with other people after watching debates. For example, “I did not discuss the election with other people [after watching the TV debates]. We [housewives] hardly talk about politics” (FF7). “I chatted a little bit with my husband [during watching TV debates]. But, I did not talk about the election with my neighbours.” (FF5; FF2; FF7; FF8). Half of the men in the focus group interviews had a chance to talk about the TV debates with their colleagues in their work place. In the in-depth interviews, respondents who had discussed the TV debates with others were generally men rather than women. In addition, the old were relatively less likely to have talked about the debates with others compared to younger interviewees, and they were even reluctant to talk about the election with neighbours who have a different opinion. For example, “I do not talk about politics with neighbours as much as possible. Most of them come from the *Jeolla* region [while I am not from *Jeolla* region].” (I-141).

Watching TV Debates: How and Who?

Watching TV Debates without Much Attention

A huge number of voters watched TV presidential debates during the election period. According TV audience measurement research companies, half of all voters watched the debates in 1997 when the TV debate was first introduced into the Korean presidential election. The popularity rating of TV debates dropped in 2002. Although the number of voters who watched TV debates was still enormous, only one third of the electorate watched each three debate in 2002 (see Table 9.3).

Table 9.3 Popularity Rating of TV Presidential Debates, 1997-2002

	1 st Debate	2 nd Debate	3 rd Debate
1997			
Date	1 December 1997	7 December 1997	14 December 1997
Topic	Economy	Politics	Social & Cultural issues
Popularity rating	55.7%	52.5%	51.0%
2002			
Date	3 December 2002	10 December 2002	16 December 2002
Topic	Politics & Foreign Policy	Economy & Science	Social & Cultural issues
Popularity rating	33.8%	32.3%	36.6%

Source: TV audience measurement by Media Service Korea (MSK) in 1997, and by TNS-Media Korea in 2002, at <http://www.tnsmk.co.kr/company/main.html>.

Note: The audience measurement companies selected about 1,000 or 1,200 households in Korea and installed a special device ('Peoplemeter') in the homes of each panel member. A computer system automatically records and counts the average audience rate throughout the broadcasting.

Pre-election surveys from TNS-Korea show that the percentage of voters who watched each TV debate in 2002 was much bigger than the popularity rating found by the TV audience measurement research companies. The proportion of respondents who watched the first TV debate in the electorate was 71 per cent. The percentages for the second and the third TV debate were 66.5 per cent and 63.4 per cent, respectively (Table 9.4). In the surveys, voters who watched the debates for a minimum of 15 minutes were counted as viewers, so the percentages were relatively large.¹² Considering the popularity rating measured by TV audience measurement system was relatively low, these relatively high percentages in surveys imply that a large proportion of viewers watched the TV debates for only a limited amount of time.¹³

Qualitative data largely confirms that most independent voters watched the TV debates only briefly or cursorily. Almost all women in focus group interviews reported that they watched only a part of the debates or watched them with interruptions. For

¹² Also, the potential overestimation of watching debates maybe related to the 'self-selection effect' in surveys as turnout is usually overestimated in surveys.

¹³ TNS-Korea conducted these telephone surveys immediately after the end of each TV debates. The results of these TNS-Korea surveys were partly reported by a newspaper, *Munwhailbo*. However, due to the Election Act in Korea, it is prohibited to reveal candidate popularity in polls during the official campaign period. Thus, the newspaper did not report the outcome of these surveys in detail.

example, “During watching TV debates, I often went to the kitchen to do something. [So I could not watch TV debates continually]” (FF4; FF6; FF1) “I only watched some part of the debates intermittently when my husband watched them” (FF3). All male participants also watched only part of the TV debates and some of them watched the debates without paying much attention. For example, “I could not watch the first debate because I was busy at work. I watched the second debate for last 30 minutes. I watched only the third debate” (FM3; FM4; FM5; FM1) “I watched one of the debates, but I watched it under the influence of drink” (FM6).

In the in-depth interviews, many respondents also confessed that they watched the debates inattentively. Among 56 respondents, 8 voters did not watch the TV debates at all. Roughly half of respondents watched at least one of three debates thoroughly and the rest watched the debates for only a limited time or intermittently. Also, among the respondents who watched at least most part of one debate, some revealed that they did not watch it with much attention. For example, “I watched all three debates without much consideration. I already made my voting decision before watching the TV debates” (I-111). “I skimmed most of them. I already knew a lot about the candidates and issues before watching the TV debates. [So, I did not expect anything new]” (I-114).

Who Watched the TV Presidential Debates?

Social and economic characteristics of viewers: Table 9.4 shows who watched the TV debates in the 2002 presidential election. In general, there are relatively strong relationships between viewing the TV debates and sociological characteristics of voters. For example, there is a linear relation between age and watching TV debates. The old were more likely to watch the debates than younger voters. The difference was relatively large, and the pattern was repeated in all three debates. Men were more likely to watch the TV debates than women. There was no difference in watching the TV debates across voters who have different levels of educational attainment, though in the third presidential debate, those who have only lower education were actually more likely to watch the debate than those with higher level of education. Although the relationship between watching the debates and voters from different regions did not have a clear pattern, voters who from *Jeolla* were more likely to watch the programmes than voters from Seoul and *Gyeonggi*. The economic characteristics of voters also are associated with watching the candidate debates. Wealthier voters were less inclined to watch the TV debates compared to poorer ones. In terms of occupation, students and blue-collar workers were not relatively disinclined to view the debates, whereas farmers were more likely to watch the TV debates than any other occupational groups. As a result of these socio-economic

characteristics of viewers, we may presume that those with a pre-existing vote preference were more likely to watch the TV debates than those voters still undecided. For example, as discussed in a previous section of this chapter, older voters tended to make early voting decision before the official election campaign compared to more youthful voters.

Vote intention: Survey evidence from TNS-Korea confirms that those with a candidate preference (or voting intention) were more likely to watch the TV debates than those who without this. For example, 72.9 per cent of voters who had a candidate preference watched the first TV debate, while 57 per cent of voters who did not have a preference watched it. In the third debate, 64.1 per cent of voters with a preferred candidate watched the broadcast compared to 59.1 per cent of those voters without such a preference (see Table 9.4). Thus, voters who were potentially open to the impact of the TV campaign did not watch the debates as much as others. Therefore, the impact of the TV debates on voter's voting choice and the election outcome was attenuated by the fact that those most open to influence were less likely to watch, if it is assumed that viewers who have strong vote intention were less likely to change their vote intention regardless how much they were exposed by election campaigns.

Partisans vs. independents: The voters who watched the TV debates the most were loyal partisans who had a firm voting intention rather than the weak partisans and independents who were potentially open to the impacts of the debates. For example, pre-election survey evidence from TNS-Korea shows that 72.4 per cent of party identifiers watched the first TV debate, while 67.2 per cent of independent voters watched it. Also, 69.0 per cent and 65.5 per cent of partisans watched the second and third debates respectively compared to 60.3 per cent and 58 per cent of independent voters (see Table 9.4).

The post-election survey also shows the same pattern. As shown in Table 9.5, the survey evidence suggests that the percentage of partisans who watched all or most of TV debates in 2002 was 76.9 per cent, while the percentage of independent voters who watched all or most of TV debates was 68.8 per cent. There is clear difference in the average score of watching TV debates in a 4-point scale (i.e., 1 = watching all of them to 4 = never watch TV debate) for partisans and independent, and the difference is statistically significant.

However, the difference between partisans and independents is blurred when the difference among the four types of voters is considered as there is no difference between critical partisans and attentive independent voters. In terms of the average score in the 4-point scale, critical partisans and attentive independents watched the debates more compared to habitual partisans and apolitical independents. This implies that watching the TV debates is related to the level of individual interest in the election rather than party

affiliation (see Table 9.6).

Table 9.4 Watching TV Presidential Debates, 2002

	The 1st Debate		The 2nd Debate		The 3rd Debate	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
All	1000	71%	1000	66.5%	1000	63.4%
Age						
20-24	116	52.5%	102	46.4%	116	46.3%
25-29	123	67.9%	136	57.0%	123	59.4%
30-34	134	64.1%	134	63.8%	134	54.2%
35-39	124	71.8%	122	67.2%	124	61.3%
40-44	124	75.9%	133	63.7%	124	56.3%
45-49	94	67.7%	88	71.7%	94	60.0%
50 and over 50	285	81.6%	285	79.1%	285	81.6%
Gender						
Men	492	74.6%	493	68.3%	492	63.8%
Women	508	67.4%	507	64.8%	508	63.0%
Education						
Middle school	221	70.9%	215	65.5%	230	72.9%
High school	366	70.8%	351	67.3%	370	63.2%
College	409	71.1%	425	66.5%	398	58.2%
Hometown						
<i>Seoul / Gyeonggi</i>	123	68.5%	152	65.8%	144	56.5%
<i>Chungcheong</i>	167	73.0%	193	66.1%	179	62.7%
<i>Jeolla</i>	247	74.0%	231	63.6%	234	68.2%
<i>Gyeongsang</i>	338	68.4%	307	68.3%	315	63.7%
<i>Gangwon / Jeju / other</i>	112	72.0%	105	68.9%	112	64.4%
Income						
Low	324	73.0%	314	67.1%	312	68.6%
Medium	292	69.4%	301	63.9%	262	63.4%
High	306	72.1%	309	67.9%	319	59.3%
Occupation						
White-collar workers	166	68.3%	171	68.1%	157	57.3%
Self-employed	176	72.3%	173	73.4%	195	64.4%
Farmers	72	78.5%	64	73.8%	72	71.2%
Blue-collar workers	88	68.6%	70	53.5%	87	54.2%
Full-time Housewives	314	73.4%	331	66.6%	328	66.7%
Students	80	57.2%	83	49.3%	77	49.8%
Unemployed / other	103	73.5%	104	70.7%	81	76.0%
Vote intents						
Vote	811	74.0%	800	71.3%	863	66.1%
Not vote (= abstention)	189	58.2%	200	42.5%	137	46.7%
Candidate Preference*						
Lee Hoi Chang (GNP)	364	73.7%	373	71.7%	371	66.3%
Roh Moo-hyun (MDP)	456	72.1%	434	68.4%	437	63.9%
Kwon Young-gil (DLP)	59	73.8%	69	N/A	60	52.3%
No preference / other	121	57.0%	124	N/A	132	59.1%
Party Identification						
Grand National Party	330	70.4%	352	71.7%	339	69.7%
Millennium Democratic Party	297	71.1%	268	68.4%	271	62.2%
Democratic Labour Party	69	84.1%	67	63.3%	72	64.2%
All other parties	38	78.9%	28	53.6%	37	40.5%
Independent voters	266	67.2%	285	60.3%	281	58.0%

Data: TNS-Korea Presidential Election Survey on 4 December 2002, on 11 December 2002, and on 16 December 2002.

Keys: N = number of cases; % = percentage of voters who watched the debates more than 15 minutes; The 1st Debate = TV presidential debate on 3 December 2002; The 2nd Debate = TV

presidential debate on 10 December 2002; The 3rd Debate = TV presidential debate on 16 December 2002.

Note: * = based on combined answers to a question about candidate preference and answers to a follow-up question for respondents who did not identify any candidate in the first question.

Table 9.5 Watching TV Presidential Debates and Independent Voters, 1997-2002

	Number of cases	Watching TV Presidential Debates					Average score
		All	Most	Almost not	Not at all	Total	
1997							
Partisans	753	31.1%	57.4%	10.2%	1.3%	100%	1.82
Independents	441	22.2%	55.8%	20.2%	1.8%	100%	2.02
Total	1194	27.8%	56.8%	13.9%	1.5%	100%	1.89
Pearson Chi-square Sig. (2-sided)	28.227 0.000						
2002							
Partisans	892	21.4%	55.5%	20.9%	2.2%	100%	2.04
Independents	608	13.3%	51.5%	30.9%	4.3%	100%	2.26
Total	1500	18.1%	53.9%	24.9%	3.1%	100%	2.13
Pearson Chi-square Sig. (2-sided)	33.711 0.000						

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997, and 2002.

Key: Average score = average in a 4-point scale from 1 = 'watching all' to 4 = 'not watching at all'.

Table 9.6 Watching TV Presidential Debates by Four Types of Voters, 1997-2002

	Number of cases	Watching TV Presidential Debates					Average score
		All	Most	Almost not	Not at all	Total	
1997							
Critical Partisans	529	35.9%	56.0%	7.4%	0.8%	100%	1.73
Habitual Partisans	223	19.7%	60.5%	17.0%	2.7%	100%	2.03
Attentive Independents	210	33.3%	56.7%	9.0%	1.0%	100%	1.78
Apolitical Independents	231	12.1%	55.0%	30.3%	2.6%	100%	2.23
Total	1193	27.8%	56.7%	13.9%	1.5%	100%	1.89
Pearson Chi-square Sig. (2-sided)	113.503 0.000						
2002							
Critical Partisans	450	31.8%	55.8%	10.9%	1.6%	100%	1.82
Habitual Partisans	442	10.9%	55.2%	31.0%	2.9%	100%	2.26
Attentive Independents	203	24.1%	57.6%	16.7%	1.5%	100%	1.96
Apolitical Independents	405	7.9%	48.4%	38.0%	5.7%	100%	2.41
Total	1500	18.1%	53.9%	24.9%	3.1%	100%	2.13
Pearson Chi-square Sig. (2-sided)	179.217 0.000						

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997, and 2002.

Key: Average score = average in a 4-point scale from 1 = 'watching all' to 4 = 'not watching at all'.

Note: In 1997 and in 2002, mean difference between critical partisans and attentive independents in one side and habitual partisans or apolitical independents in other side is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Mean difference between habitual partisans and apolitical independents is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

What Did They Get from the TV Presidential Debates?

In the in-depth and focus group interviews, respondents were asked about what kind of information they were interested in or they expected to get from watching the televised debates. Respondents talked about anything that they got from watching the debates and what they spoke about with other people afterwards.

Image, personal traits, and style: Many respondents referred to the image of a candidate rather than their policy and issue preferences. For example, “In the TV debates, a candidate’s image is important. I did not see any difference in their policies, but saw some differences in their image... I discussed with my friends about the candidate’s appearance and personality [after watching TV]” (I-140). “I felt that one candidate was a narrow-minded man and other candidate is relatively reckless” (I-206; I-122). “I had a talk with other people about which candidate would lead the nation with strong leadership” (I-135). “I read his character by his face. I began to know about his qualities” (I-132). “He [Kwon Young-gil] did not offer realisable policies, but he showed us his dignified manner” (FM5). “I felt that Lee Hoi Chang was refined, but hypocritical. I felt that Roh Moo-hyun was not refined, but open” (FM8).

Some respondents referred to a candidate’s personality and qualities. For example, “I felt that one candidate was not refined and another candidate was calm and at ease” (I-114). “I tried to understand the personality of each candidate” (I-123). “I tried to find out which candidate is firm in his convictions” (I-108). Some respondents pointed to a trivial thing such as candidate’s speaking talent. “I think that an eloquent speaker has a great advantage in TV debates” (I-141). “I think that political leaders should be fluent” (I-111). “I tried to see who led the discussion well” (I-125). “I tried to evaluate the candidates’ speaking talent and their general knowledge” (I-133). “I thought that Roh Moo-hyun spoke convincingly in the debates. I only remember that he spoke fluently” (FF1; FF3).

Some viewers watched the debates focusing on candidate performance in TV debates. For example, “We had a talk about who was better in the debates” (I-102). “I had a chat with colleagues in the company: Who was better? Did he well reply to other candidate’s response? Did they match each other’s performance?” (FM1). Finally, a few respondents mentioned that they tried to get information about policies, but their interest in policies was largely related to the candidates’ reliability. For example, “I had a talk with my friends about whether the candidates would keep their election pledges” (I-107; I-127; I-209).

Why image?: Why did viewers take more notice of image rather than policy or issue preference of candidates? Many voters are more interested in candidate’s personality rather than candidate’s policy preference. They want to get information about candidate

personality and quality. They believed that a candidate's personality and competence is more important rather than the policies they offered. Some argued that candidate evaluation should be based on personality and the candidate's qualities rather than the policies they offered. For example, "I became familiar with their personality, qualities, and personal appearance by watching the TV debates... I assumed that only the candidate with a better personality or qualities can offer better policies and will keep his public pledges" (I-132). Some of them assumed that there were no major differences in policy between the candidates. For example, "Because I assumed that there were no differences in policy direction between the major candidates, I was more interested in personality" (I-214).

The viewing behaviour of voters is related to why viewers get hardly any information about policies and issues from the TV debates. As discussed above, many voters watched the TV debates briefly or cursorily. Voters who watched the debates cursorily might fail to totally follow them. They might look only at appearances, such as speaking style or facial expression, rather than substance, such as policy and issue preferences. For example, "In the TV debates, candidates discussed their policies, but it seems to me that there was nothing memorable. I did not watch the debates without interruptions. During the TV debates, my husband asked for something to eat and I went to the kitchen for a while" (FF1).

Also, the format of TV debate is related to why viewers get information about candidate personality and image rather than policies. Candidates answered each question within one or one and half minutes. They were allowed to reply or object to another candidate's comments a couple of times. Therefore, candidates hardly explained their issue positions in detail. Some viewers were aware of the limits of the TV debates. For example, "The TV debate is a debate without much substance. I think that we can get much better information from newspapers. I think that the TV debate is no better [than other types of information source]" (I-129; I-211; I-214). "I did not get much information from the debates. Candidates did not have enough time to speak. One candidate said something very briefly and another candidate reply, but did not finish what he tried to speak. I could not understand well what they said" (I-FF2).

Impact of TV debates

Response to TV Campaign: Are Independents Voters more Impressionable?

Who are affected by TV campaigns such as TV debates or televised speeches? Were the impact of TV debates conditional on partisanship, that is was there any difference in

impacts of TV campaigns on voting choice between partisans and independents? It was assumed that independent voters are responsive to TV campaigns compared to partisans. More partisans have already made their vote decision before the official campaign began compared to independent voters. Also, partisans were constrained by their party affiliation when watching the television coverage, while independents were free from such constraints when they watched coverage of the election.

Contrary to initial expectations, the post-election survey data suggests that there is no significant difference between partisans and independents in terms of the self-perceived impact of the TV campaign upon vote decision. For example, the average score of influence of TV campaigns in a 4-point scale (i.e., 1 = very much influenced to 4 = not at all influenced) for partisans is almost identical to the average score for independents in 2002 (see Table 9.7).

Table 9.7 Influence of TV Campaign on Vote Decision and Independent Voters, 1997-2002

	Number of cases	Influence of TV Campaign					Average score
		Very much	Some-what	Almost none	Not at all	Total	
1997							
Partisans	665	48.9%	38.0%	10.8%	2.3%	100%	1.66
Independents	344	43.9%	40.1%	13.7%	2.3%	100%	1.74
Total	1009	47.2%	38.8%	11.8%	2.3%	100%	1.69
Chi-square (sig.)	2.992 (0.393)						
t (sig.)	-1.565 (0.118)						
2002							
Partisans	672	28.1%	49.9%	14.1%	7.9%	100%	2.02
Independents	390	24.1%	56.9%	13.3%	5.6%	100%	2.01
Total	1062	26.6%	52.4%	13.8%	7.1%	100%	2.01
Chi-square (sig.)	5.729 (0.126)						
t (sig.)	0.241 (0.804)						

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997, and 2002.

Note: Voters who did not watch TV debate at all or who hardly watch TV debates are excluded in this analysis.

However, there are some across the four types of voters. Critical partisans and attentive independents were more inclined to recognise the influence of the TV campaign on their electoral choice compared to apolitical independents and habitual partisans (see Table 9.8). This conforms to the earlier finding discussed above that critical partisans and attentive independents are more reliant on television in gathering information about candidates and the election compared to habitual partisans and apolitical independents (see the above Table 9.2). It seems natural that those who relied on TV campaigns for their information felt a greater influence of television on their electoral preference.

Table 9.8 Influence of TV Campaign on Vote Decision by Four Types of Voters, 1997-2002

	Number of cases	Influence of TV Campaign				Total	Average score
		Very much	Some-what	Almost none	Not at all		
1997							
Critical Partisans	485	54.0%	34.0%	9.7%	2.3%	100%	1.60
Habitual Partisans	179	35.2%	49.2%	13.4%	2.2%	100%	1.83
Attentive Independents	189	54.5%	30.7%	13.2%	1.6%	100%	1.62
Apolitical Independents	155	31.0%	51.6%	14.2%	3.2%	100%	1.90
Total	1008	47.2%	38.8%	11.7%	2.3%	100%	1.69
Chi-square (Sig.)	42.923 (0.000)						
F (Sig.)	8.548 (0.000)						
2002							
Critical Partisans	389	31.4%	45.5%	14.1%	9.0%	100%	2.01
Habitual Partisans	283	23.7%	55.8%	14.1%	6.4%	100%	2.03
Attentive Independents	165	30.9%	50.9%	13.3%	4.8%	100%	1.92
Apolitical Independents	225	19.1%	61.3%	13.3%	6.2%	100%	2.07
Total	1062	26.6%	52.4%	13.8%	7.1%	100%	2.01
Chi-square (Sig.)	21.570 (0.011)						
F (Sig.)	1.042 (0.373)						

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997, and 2002.

Key: Average score = average in a 4-point scale where 'much influence' is 1 and 'no influence at all' is 4.

Note: In 1997, the mean difference between critical partisans and attentive independents on one side and apolitical independents and habitual partisans in the other side is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

Influence of the TV Debates on the Outcome of Election

In the post-election survey, most voters cited the TV campaign as the most important source of information that affected their vote choices. Moreover, most voters felt that the TV coverage of the election affected their voting decision. Despite this, it can still be questioned whether the debates directly impacted upon their electoral choice and thus determined the outcome of election when many viewers had already made up their mind by the time they watched the debates. There are two different types of influence of campaigns on voters regarding the outcome of election. If the TV debates only reinforced the voting preference of viewers, the debates did not greatly affect the outcome of election. In this way, TV debates, which is the most important part of the campaign, produced only minimal effects. If voters made up or changed their electoral choice after watching the TV debates, the three programmes might affect the election result.

In the post-election survey, it is difficult to measure the direct impact of the televised debates on voting choices. Respondents can hardly even remember what was discussed in the TV debates. Furthermore, respondents are not likely to distinguish reinforcement

effects from change effects. For example, the effect of the programmes on someone who watched the programmes with a strong voting intention might only be reinforcement of voting choice, but he or she might have felt that the debates did influence his or her vote decision. In order to examine the direct impact of the candidate debates on voting decision, it is necessary to measure shifts in voting preference immediately after the end of each TV debate. By examining changes in candidate preference in pre-election surveys before and after TV debates, Gallup-Korea concluded that TV debates did not greatly affect vote change in the 1997 presidential election.¹⁴ However, this verdict was inconclusive. Although there were some changes in voting intention before and after the TV debates at aggregate level, it is difficult to argue that the TV debates directly brought about changes in vote preference as change might have occurred for other reasons rather than the debates.

Changing vote intention or making vote choice after watching TV debates: In 2002, TNS-Korea included in their surveys questions to measure the direct influence of the debates conducted immediately after the end of each programme. The surveys revealed that 8.2 per cent of voters who watched the first TV debates changed their voting preference or decided upon a candidate after watching the TV debate (see Table 9.9). The percentage for the second TV debate was 6.6 per cent, and the percentage for the third TV debates was 8.3 per cent. Therefore, the average percentage of voters directly influenced by the three TV debates after watching the debates was 7.7 per cent. Each TV debate affected on average 5 per cent of all voters, i.e., approximately one million voters, so we might argue that the potential impact of TV debates on the outcome of election was immense.

However, in view of the flows of voting preference among candidates, the impact of each TV debate on the outcome of election was limited. Table 9.10 shows the flow of voting choice influenced by the TV debates. After the first TV debate, 1.2 per cent of all voters began to support Lee, but 0.9 per cent of all voters switched to other candidates from Lee. Thus, Lee added only 0.3 per cent of all voters by his participation in the first debate. Roh Moo-hyun gained only 1.0 per cent, while Kwon Yong-gil gained 2.3 per cent of all voters. The relative success of Kwon Young-gil confirmed previous research

¹⁴ According to Gallup-Korea, the support for the major candidates changed before and after the debates in the 1997 presidential election in the following way:

	The First Debate	The Second Debate	The Third Debate
Lee Hoi Chang	-3.0%	-0.7%	-1.0%
Kim Dae-jung	-0.2%	+1.0%	-0.9%
Rhee In-je	+3.1%	+0.9%	+1.6%

See Gallup-Korea, *Jesipodae daetongryeongseongeo tupyohangtae* (Voting behaviour in the 15th presidential election) (Seoul: Gallup-Korea, 1998), pp.194-95.

results that the televised presidential election debates mainly affect voting choice for third party or relatively unknown candidates.¹⁵

Table 9.9 TV Presidential Debates and Change in Vote Preference, 2002

	N	Influence of TV presidential debates		
		Change (A)	Make decision (B)	Total (A + B)
The 1st Debate				
All voters	1000	2.8%	3.0%	5.8%
Among voters who watched TV debate	710	4.0%	4.2%	8.2%
The 2nd Debate				
All voters	1000	2.6%	1.8%	4.4%
Among voters who watched TV debate	665	3.9%	2.6%	6.6%
The 3rd Debate				
All voters	1000	3.3%	2.0%	5.3%
Among voters who watched TV debate	634	5.2%	3.2%	8.3%

Data: TNS-Korea Presidential Election Survey on 4 December 2002, on 11 December 2002, and on 16 December 2002.

Note: The following question is used: "Did you change your preference for a candidate or begin to support a candidate after watching the TV presidential debate?"

Table 9.10 TV Presidential Debates and Vote Decision, 2002

		Total	Lee	Roh	Kwon	Other candidates	No answer / don't know
1st	Gain (A = a + b)	5.8%	1.2%	2.1%	2.4%		0.1%
	Make decision (a)	3.0%	0.5%	1.4%	1.0%		0.1%
	Switch (b)	2.8%	0.7%	0.7%	1.4%		
	Lose (B)	2.8%	0.9%	1.1%	0.1%	0.7%	
	Net change (A - B)		0.3%	1.0%	2.3%		
2nd	Gain (A = a + b)	4.4%	1.0%	1.7%	1.4%		0.3%
	Make decision (a)	1.8%	0.2%	0.8%	0.5%		0.3%
	Switch (b)	2.6%	0.8%	0.9%	0.9%		
	Lose (B)	2.6%	0.4%	1.4%	0.3%	0.5%	
	Net change (A - B)		0.6%	0.3%	1.1%		
3rd	Gain (A = a + b)	5.3%	1.4%	2.2%	0.8%		0.9%
	Make decision (a)	2.0%	0.6%	0.7%	0.2%		0.5%
	Switch (b)	3.3%	0.8%	1.5%	0.6%		0.4%
	Lose (B)	3.3%	1.2%	1.0%	0.7%	0.4%	
	Net change (A - B)		0.2%	1.2%	0.1%		

Data: TNS-Korea Presidential Election Survey on 4 December 2002, on 11 December 2002, and on 16 December 2002.

Note: percentage refers to proportion in all voters including both those who watched TV or those who did not watch.

¹⁵ A study on the impact of the TV debates on voting choice in the 1997 Korean presidential election suggested that Rhee In-je, third party candidate, benefited from the TV debates. See Seoung-chan Yang, 'Television seongeotoron bangsongui yeonhangryeok yeongu' (The impacts of televised debates in the Korean presidential election), *Bangsongyeongu*, 48(1999), 284-322. For a similar research finding in American electoral studies, J. S. Trent and R. V. Friedenberg, *Political Campaign Communication* (New York: Preager, 1991), p. 235.

Considering the election was basically a competition between the two major parties' candidates, Lee and Roh, the first TV debate affected only very marginally the outcome of election. The outcome of the second and the third TV debates did not differ greatly from the first TV debate. In terms of the net change, the difference between Lee and Roh was very small. Lee gained a total of 1.1 per cent of all voters through his participation in the three TV debates, while Roh gained in total 2.5 per cent. Therefore, the margin between the two contending candidate was only 1.4 per cent. Roh won the TV debates over Lee, but winning the TV debates did not greatly determine the outcome of the election.

Impacts of TV debates on voting choice — independents vs. partisans: Independent voters were more inclined to change or make their voting decision after watching the TV debates compared to partisans, though the difference is marginal. For example, 7.9 percent of partisans were affected by the first TV debate, while 9.1 per cent of independents were affected. After watching the second TV debate, 6.1 per cent of partisans and 7.9 per cent of independent voters changed or made their vote decision. In the third TV debate, 8.1 per cent of partisans and 9.1 per cent of independents were affected by TV debates (see Table 9.11).

Table 9.11 TV Debates and Vote Change by Party Identification, 2002

		N	Changing or Making Vote Decision			
			Yes	No	Don't know	Total
1st	Total (= A + B)	710	8.2%	89.4%	2.3%	100%
	Partisans (A = a + b + c + d)	531	7.9%	89.8%	2.3%	100%
	Grand National Party (a)	233	6.0%	92.1%	1.9%	100%
	Millennium Democratic Party (b)	211	6.0%	90.1%	3.6%	100%
	Democratic Labour Party (c)	58	14.5%	85.5%	0.0%	100%
	Other parties (d)	29	24.0%	76.0%	0.0%	100%
	Independent Voters (B)	179	9.1%	88.0%	2.8%	100%
2nd	Total (= A + B)	665	6.6%	92.1%	1.3%	100%
	Partisans (A = a + b + c + d)	493	6.1%	93.1%	0.8%	100%
	Grand National Party (a)	252	4.1%	95.6%	0.3%	100%
	Millennium Democratic Party (b)	183	7.3%	92.7%	0.0%	100%
	Democratic Labour Party (c)	42	11.3%	83.9%	4.8%	100%
	Other parties (d)	16	12.5%	81.3%	6.2%	100%
	Independent Voters (B)	172	7.9%	88.8%	3.3%	100%
3rd	Total (= A + B)	634	8.3%	91.7%		100%
	Partisans (A = a + b + c + d)	471	8.1%	91.9%		100%
	Grand National Party (a)	236	5.9%	94.1%		100%
	Millennium Democratic Party (b)	168	7.3%	92.7%		100%
	Democratic Labour Party (c)	46	15.0%	85.0%		100%
	Other parties (d)	16	23.8%	76.2%		100%
	Independent Voters (B)	163	9.1%	90.9%		100%

Data: TNS-Korea Presidential Election Survey on 4 December 2002, on 11 December 2002, and on 16 December 2002.

Among partisans, voters who were affiliated with minor parties were more responsive to the televised debates compared to partisans of major parties. For example, after watching the first TV debate, 14.5 per cent of the Democratic Labour Party's partisans and 24.5 per cent of the voters aligned to other minor parties changed or made vote decision (see Table 9.11). The same pattern was shown in the second and the third TV debate. This implies that partisans who have an affiliation with minor parties cast a ballot on the basis of 'tactical voting'.

Why Did the TV Debates Have Only A Minimal Impact on Vote Choice?

The pre-election surveys from TNS-Korea, which directly measured the influence of the TV debate on individual voting decisions, revealed that the programmes did not greatly affect individual voters' decisions nor therefore the outcome of election in spite of the many respondents who felt the TV coverage of the campaign had affected their choice of candidate. What was the reason for this limited impact?

Watching TV debates with a voting intention: First, most voters had made their voting decision before watching the TV debates. As discussed above, more than half of voters made their decision before the official campaign began, and also most voters did not change their preference during election. According to the TNS-survey, about 90 percent of the voters who watched the first TV debate had a candidate preference before the programme.¹⁶ In third TV debate, about 94 per cent of the voters who watched the debate had a candidate preference. Therefore, only 10 per cent and 6 per cent of voters who watched first and third TV debate respectively were potentially open to influence. Many voters watched the debates and gathered information from them, but most voters did not change their vote decision.

Watching TV debates through partisan eyes: Second, voters do not watch the debates without preconceptions. Most viewers are not impartial examiners in a contest, but are similar to sports fans watching their favourite team's game. Voters who had strong political attitudes, such as party affiliation and candidate preference, are more likely to feel that their preferred candidate has performed well in TV debates, which thus consolidates their preference. In answering a survey question about who performed well in the debates, more than half of all partisans thought that their preferred candidate had done well compared to other candidates. Only a small percentage of partisans felt that a rival party's candidate had performed well. In contrast to partisans, independents voters

¹⁶ In the surveys, TNS-Korea repeatedly asked respondents who did not reveal candidate preference in first question about individual candidate preference. Therefore, the proportion of respondents who did not have candidate preference was relatively small, i.e., about 12 per cent of all respondents in each survey.

free from party constraints were divided equally across candidates in estimating candidate's performance in the debates (see Table 9.12).

Meanwhile, a quarter of partisans and a third of independents who watched TV debates answered that there was little to choose between them in terms of evaluating debate performance. Voters may change or make their voting decision after watching the debates if they feel that one of candidate was good at debates compared to others. When voters feel no difference across candidates in terms of candidate performance in debates, voters will not change or make vote decision according to what they learn from TV debates (see Table 9.12).

Table 9.12 Perception toward Each Candidate's Performance in Debate, 2002

Partisanship		N	Lee	Roh	Kwon	No difference	Don't know	Total
1 st	Total	710	21.1%	27.5%	24.0%	23.3%	4.2%	100%
	GNP	233	46.4%	11.8%	17.6%	21.2%	3.0%	100%
	MDP	211	2.6%	50.1%	22.8%	19.4%	5.1%	100%
	DLP	58	11.1%	25.5%	49.6%	11.6%	2.2%	100%
	Independents	179	14.4%	21.5%	23.4%	35.2%	5.5%	100%
2 nd	Total	665	28.1%	29.0%	17.5%	22.4%	3.1%	100%
	GNP	252	54.2%	9.7%	13.3%	19.6%	3.2%	100%
	MDP	183	4.9%	59.2%	14.0%	17.8%	4.1%	100%
	DLP	42	14.0%	30.2%	39.3%	13.8%	2.7%	100%
	Independents	172	20.1%	23.5%	21.4%	32.7%	2.3%	100%
3 rd	Total	634	24.6%	28.4%	15.8%	27.1%	4.1%	100%
	GNP	236	51.4%	8.1%	10.5%	26.4%	3.6%	100%
	MDP	168	4.4%	54.5%	14.5%	22.5%	4.1%	100%
	DLP	46	4.6%	27.5%	48.4%	13.1%	6.3%	100%
	Independents	163	13.5%	31.1%	14.4%	36.7%	4.2%	100%

Data: TNS-Korea Presidential Election Survey on 4 December 2002, on 11 December 2002, and on 16 December 2002.

Note: Partisans who are loyal to their party candidates are highlighted in bold.

The following question was used in this analysis: "Who performed best in the debate?"

A few other party identifiers who watched TV debates are not displayed in this table, but are included in total number.

Impacts of TV Debates on Vote Choice: Qualitative Data

Qualitative interview data generally confirms the result of quantitative analysis. In the in-depth interviews, few interviewees perceived an effect of the debates on their vote decision. Among 36 respondents in the in-depth interviews who watched the debates at least once, 7 respondents believed that TV debates affected to some extent their vote decision. It is interesting that all 7 affected independent voters except one were young women, a half of them fulltime housewives. In the focus group interviews, 2 participants among the 13 independent voters felt that TV debates affected to some extent their vote choice. These two participants were coincidentally also young housewives. Some male

participants in focus group interviews referred to the impact of the debates on their vote decision, but they also agreed that the influence was not strong enough to cause a change or bring about a vote decision. However, this does not suggest that women are more responsive to the TV debates compared to men. Rather, it implies that someone who is not interested in elections and who does not have a firm preference, such as Korean housewives, is relatively more responsive to TV debates.

There is a clear difference between those already with a candidate preference and those without one in terms of the impact of the televised debates on voting choice. Those who were affected by the programmes either had a weak voting preference or none at all before watching. In the qualitative interview data, among those who were influenced by TV debate on their vote choice, half of them had a weak vote preference and half of them did not have a voting preference before watching the debates.

Confirming vote intentions: Those who made a firm vote decision before watching TV debates did not watch them in order to gather new information, but instead tried to confirm their decision. Those who had a voting preference before watching the debates believed that their preferred candidate had done well in the debates. For example, “Before watching the TV debate, I made my vote decision based on some information that I had gathered from news media and the Internet. After watching the debates, I was convinced that I made the right decision” (I-115). “Because I was convinced that I made the right choice, [I did not change my decision after watching TV debates]” (I-130; I-142). “My beliefs about my preferred candidate were confirmed after watching the TV debate” (I-107; I-133). “I watched the TV debate in order to confirm my voting decision. I thought that he had done well in the debates” (I-134; FM4).

Focusing on a preferred candidate: Additionally, those who had a voting preference before watching the debates focused on their preferred candidate when watching the television. For example, “I only paid attention to one [of three participant in the debates]. Therefore, I think that it did not have any impact on my vote choice” (I-123). “I got some useful information [from TV debate]... But, I did not change my vote decision [after watching TV debate]. I have supported him [Roh Moo-hyun] since he participated in the presidential primary. I was only interested in whether he was firm in his convictions” (I-106). “I made my vote decision before watching the TV debate. I focused on whether he is flexible in dealing with the situation that he faced in the debates” (I-125).

Changing weak vote intentions: A few interviewees who did not have a firm vote preference before watching the debates reported that they changed their voting intention after watching the debates. For example, “I had supported Lee Hoi Chang because he is the opposition party’s candidate. But, I realised that Roh Moo-hyun will be a good president [even though Roh is the ruling party’s candidate] after watching the TV

debates” (I-104; I-121).

Gathering information: Most respondents who did not have any vote preference reported that they gathered some useful information from TV debates, but that they did not make their vote decision immediately after watching the debates. Therefore, TV debates affected voters to some degree, but the impact was not strong enough to make voters choose a candidate. For example, “Yes, I was to some extent affected by the TV debates... However, I could not make my decision. I could not conclude that one candidate was better than the others. It was very difficult for me to choose one” (FF8). “I got some information from TV debates, but I already knew most of them” (I-105; I-111).

No influence: Finally, most respondents watched the debates inattentively or watched only a small part of the debates answered that the programmes did not affect their vote decision at all. For example, “I did not watch the debates closely. So, I cannot say that I got some useful information from them” (I-112). “I did not take the TV debates seriously. I watched only a small part of one of the debates... I don’t think that I was affected by the debate” (FF7; I-109). “I could not follow the debate well. I don’t think that I gathered useful information from TV debates” (FF2).

The Gap between Results in Pre-election and Post-election Studies

Although the reinforcement process explains the minimal effects of the TV debates, one puzzle still is unsolved. In the post-election survey, many respondents perceived that they had been strongly influenced by the TV campaigns. Why is the result of the post-election survey so different from the result of pre-election surveys?

Other TV debates: First, in the post-election survey, respondents might not distinguish the impacts of the TV debates held during the official election campaign period from the potential impacts of televised debates held before the official election campaign began. Each candidate appeared several dozen times in television debates during the election year. In these debates, each candidate discussed various issues with a panel. This type of TV debate was more like a press conference. In the in-depth interviews, some respondents referred to the impacts of these debates before the official campaign began. For example, “I was not affected by the televised presidential debates. I made this voting decision a long time ago after watching a TV debate held before the official campaign began” (I-111; I-120). Considering the accumulated impact of all of these TV debates on voters, it is true that the debates were the most important source of information and voters relied on them to gather information affecting their voting decision.

The most salient aspect of the campaign: Second, the TV debate is the most popular

information source in elections, and also probably the most memorable event among the various election campaigns. Not only those enthusiastic about the election watch the debates, but also those less interested pay attention to the debates. Those who gather information from other sources, such as newspaper or the Internet, are more likely to get nothing new from the debates, and instead see their pre-existing preference reinforced. In the post-election survey, they may believe that they were affected by the TV debates, even though they did not change their vote decision. Meanwhile, those who do not pay much attention to elections also probably watch the debates because this format of campaign is convenient and requires only minimum effort, as discussed above. They rely solely on the TV debates in gathering information about candidates and issues, and it is natural that they feel impact of TV debates on their vote decision. For example, "I did not have enough chance to gather information from other sources. So, I would say that the TV debates were useful for me to gather information" (I-116).

Indirect impacts: Third, voters did not change or make vote decision immediately after watching TV debates, but they might have done later. TV debates occupied the attention of most of the electorate for a while. News media fully reported the events, and the issues raised became significant aspects in the election. As revealed in the qualitative interview data, roughly half of voters who watched the presidential debates talked with others about the programmes. Someone who saw some differences between candidates might re-evaluate the TV debates after reading or watching the news media's reports or after finding out other people's opinions. In this case, it is arguable that a clear-cut distinction between the influence of the TV debates themselves and the impact of the news media is almost impossible. But, at least, it is certain that the televised debates between the candidates were a central part of the campaign and the accumulated impact of the three programmes on the election cannot be totally ignored.

2. The Internet Campaigns and Independent Voters

The Internet campaign is no longer new in many democracies. In the 2002 Korean presidential election, one of the key features of the campaign was the widespread use of the Internet. In terms of Internet use, Korea ranks very highly in the world. For example, in terms of broadband penetration, Korea is ranked first in the world with approximately 21 subscribers for every 100 inhabitants in 2002.¹⁷ According to a survey in 2000, 53 per cent of Korean adults go online and Korea is third, while the USA and Canada are first

¹⁷ 'International Telecommunication Union (ITU) national reports in 2002'. Cited from <http://isis.nic.or.kr>, the official web site of the Korea Network Information Center (KRNIC).

and second, respectively.¹⁸ The number of Korean voters who go online was approximately 16 million in 2002 compared to 1.6 million Internet users in 1997.

After the significant increase in the number of Internet users, all political parties and candidates recognised the potential effects of the Internet as an information medium and very actively used the Internet in electioneering. Roh Moo-hyun, who was supported by the young, non-manual workers, and liberals in urban area, particularly took advantage of the opportunities for a cyberspace election campaign. Supporters of Roh Moo-hyun came together on-line and made a contribution to Roh's winning the presidential primary.¹⁹ Many people believed that Roh Moo-hyun's victory was possible because he could effectively mobilise strong supporters through a very successful piece of Internet electioneering.²⁰ Roh Moo-hyun, who won the election, even was acclaimed as the 'world's first Internet president'.²¹

How did the Internet campaigns affect voters in the 2002 presidential election? Was the Internet important in electioneering compared to other types of campaigns? Who were responsive to the Internet campaigns? Were independent voters more responsive to the Internet campaigns than partisans?

Potential Influence of Campaigns in the Internet

The Internet campaigns included various activities in cyberspace. E-mails and the websites started by candidates and political parties are very common forms of the Internet campaigning. Election campaign adverts on non-campaign websites were to some extent attempted in the 2002 presidential election. Voters read newspapers on the Internet. Online newspapers are to some extent different from traditional off-line newspapers. For example, on the Internet, readers read news, but also make comments and leave their opinions. Most of all, people look at bulletin boards. In cyberspace, people not only simply gather information, but also participate in innumerable debates. Readers of online newspapers are not mere consumers of information, but are 'prosumers' who produce information and share information with others.²²

The potential of the Internet as an information medium is considerable. Campaigners

¹⁸ The survey conducted by Ipsos-Reid, a marketing research firm based in the USA, on 6,600 adults in twelve countries. See 'Around the World, Gains in Internet Use', *The New York Times*, 16 February 2003.

¹⁹ 'Internetui him jeongchileul baggunda' (Power of the Internet changes politics), *Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper*, 15 May 2002.

²⁰ Andrew Ward, 'Netizens wooed in South Korea poll', *Financial Times*, 18 December 2002.

²¹ Jonathan Watts, 'World's first internet president logs on', *The Guardian*, 24 February 2003.

²² The term 'prosumer' is coined by the futurist Alvin Toffler in his book *The Third Wave*. He combined two terms, 'producer' and 'consumer'. Alvin Toffler, *The Third Wave* (London: Pan Books, 1981), pp. 275-295.

can reach many voters at a time and deliver information to voters swiftly and at minimal cost. Voters can gather much information from various websites, but also peruse bulletin boards. Some of them actively participate in debates, and articulated their opinions to others via the Internet. Many people appreciate these strengths of the Internet as an information medium, and have no doubt that the influence of the Internet campaign on voters was considerable.

However, as a result of a number of features of the Internet as information medium, the potential influence of Internet campaigns is limited. First, the 'digital divide', a division between information 'haves and have-nots', is one limit of the Internet campaign. Although voters are connected to the Internet, many voters, particularly amongst the older and poorer sections of the electorate, still cannot access the Internet. Therefore, it is inevitable that Internet campaigns target only some voters rather than all. Second, Internet campaigns require voters who are willing to spend time and effort to gather information. For example, voters can gather information from the TV or newspapers without real effort. In the Internet, voters must have more intention to gather information. Without a relatively strong intention, people do not go to political websites. Some voters go to only specific websites, such as the sites offered by their preferred political party. Some voters do not open e-mails sent by candidates or political parties that they do not like. Thus, only voters who have a strong interest in the election and politics are exposed by the Internet campaigns. Participation in debates in cyberspace requires a strong political interest. In addition, such users tend to have strong political attitudes and select the information they are exposed to.

The Effects of the Internet Campaign on Voting Choice: a Schema


How do Internet campaigns affect voters? Figure 9.1 is a schema of the impact of the Internet campaigns on voters focusing on the degree of individual interest in the election and the strength of political attitudes. The first box on the left hand side of the diagram depicts *passive Internet campaigns*, such as e-mail and the Internet adverts. In the passive Internet campaigns, voters are indiscriminately exposed to information, although some voters may delete e-mails from candidates without reading them. Voters do not need much effort to be exposed to this type of Internet campaign. At this stage, Internet campaigns are not very different from traditional campaigns such as mailing campaign pamphlets.

The next box of the diagram is *active Internet campaigns*. In this stage, only voters who look for information are exposed to the Internet campaigns. There are several different types of actively gathering information from the Internet. These activities are

arranged from the bottom to the top in terms of differences in the degree of required effort to gather the information. Reading the Internet newspapers requires a minimum amount of effort but a strong interest in elections and strong political attitudes are prerequisites for voters to participate in debates and write opinions on bulletin boards. In such activities, voters are not only recipients of information, but they also transmit and produce information. The next two boxes refer to the effects of the Internet campaigns on voters. Voters who are exposed to information change or reinforce their attitudes and values, and then change or make vote choice.

In sum, the form of transmission of information through the Internet varies depending upon the level of the voter's interest in the election and the strength of their political attitudes. Those who are not interested in politics are more likely to only be affected by the passive Internet campaigns whereas voters with a strong political interest reach to the upper level of the 'ladder' of active Internet campaigns. Clicking the website of a particular political party is a choice. Without already having a political preference, it is unlikely that voters will visit party websites. It is assumed that the degree and nature of the impact of the Internet on voters differs depending on the types of activities. Passive users of the Internet who are not interested in election are not likely to be affected by these campaigns. Low level active users who read other people's opinions and newspapers are relatively responsive to campaigns. Active users of the Internet who have strong political attitudes reinforce their attitudes and values when they are exposed to Internet election campaigns.

Figure 9. 1 Schema of the Impacts of the Internet Campaigns on Voters



The Internet Campaigns in the 2002 Election: Aggregate Data

How many voters collect information from the Internet during the election campaign? How often were the voters connected to the Internet for acquiring information about candidates and the election? These questions are related to estimating the potential influence of the Internet on voters at the aggregate level. It is assumed that the more voters exposed to Internet information, the bigger the potential impact of the Internet on the electorate is. In short, the scale of the Internet campaigns in the 2002 election was large, but was not as great as people said.

E-mail

Every political party regularly sent e-mails to a large numbers of recipients. For example, the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) sent campaign e-mails at least once per week to about 100,000 voters before the official campaign began. During the early part of the official campaign period, the political party sent a campaign e-mail every day to about 200,000 recipients, but twice per a week during the later part of the official campaign period.²³ It is expected that recipients forwarded the e-mail to their friends, so real number of recipients might be more than 200,000.

However, the MDP found that many recipients did not open the e-mail, and consequently, reduced the frequency of e-mails. The total number of voters who were exposed to the e-mail including voters who received the e-mail from the first recipients might be less than 200,000. Considering this number is less than 1 per cent of the electorate, the potential influence of the e-mail campaign on the outcome of the election was very small. Also, the mailing list was not carefully constructed. The MDP hurried to gather e-mail addresses very close to the beginning of official campaign and little information was known about the recipients' political attitudes. It can be reasonably supposed that as a result of this haste, most voters in the mailing list were supporters for Roh Moo-hyun or the MDP. If most recipients were supporters of the MDP or the candidate, the e-mail campaign could reinforce their voting preference, but would not change their voting intention or cause them to make their electoral choice.

Websites

All political parties started up websites during the election campaign. The Internet

²³ Millennium Democratic Party, *Je 16dae daetongryeong seongeo baekseo* (A white paper on the 16th presidential election) (Seoul: Millennium Democratic Party, 2003), p. 208.

became a central means of delivering information to voters during the campaign. For example, the MDP started an official campaign website by combining the party website and a previous candidate's personal website two months before the official campaign began. The record for the number visiting the website in one day was 860,855 on the voting day, and the daily average number visiting the site during the official election campaign period was 316,307. The average number reading each piece of news, article, or letter in the bulletin board in the websites was about 200, and the total number reading on the site over the 30 days before the voting day was 5,611,869. The website also provided video files, and the number of voters who watched the most viewed video clip in the website was 1,624,338.²⁴ Therefore, given the number of voters who visited the website, the potential influence of the Internet is enormous.

However, it might be speculated that the number of voters who clicked the websites included many loyal supporters of the party and the candidate. For example, the website of the Democratic Labour Party was brought down once because so many voters (about 80,000) suddenly visited the website. Many voters who visited the website at that time were strong supporters of the candidate of the MDP. They visited the website and tried to leave a memo to persuade Kwon Young-gil, presidential candidate of the DLP, to withdraw from the running for presidency. This seems to suggest that there were more than 100,000 loyal supporters for Roh Moo-hyun or the MDP, who actively participated in the Internet campaigns. It can be inferred that these loyal supporters accounted for a large proportion of those visiting the website of the MDP.

Internet Newspapers

In discussing the Internet campaigns in the 2002 Korean presidential election, online newspapers, such as *Ohmynews*, cannot be ignored. This new type of newspaper has grown rapidly with an increase in the number of Internet users. For example, the *Ohmynews* recorded a maximum of one million people visiting the website in one day during the 2002 presidential election. These Internet newspapers challenged the conservative newspapers that dominate the newspaper market in Korea, and potentially influenced the outcome of the election.²⁵ According to research in mature democracies,

²⁴ Millennium Democratic Party, *Je 16dae daetongryeong seongeo baekseo* (A white paper on the 16th presidential election), pp. 217-220. However, this video clip was an exceptional case. The video clip showed the party convention and caused a quarrel among voters. In the convention, Roh Moo-hyun cried, and the rival election camp raised doubts about the truth of his tears. So, voters tried to find out the truth by watching the video from the website. The number of viewers who watched second most viewed video clip was about a half million.

²⁵ Howard W. French, 'Online Newspaper Shakes Up Korean Politics', *The New York Times*, 6 March 2003.

the press affect voters in shaping their attitudes and values.²⁶ Before the appearance of the Internet newspapers, three conservative newspaper, Chosun Daily Newspaper, Joongang Daily Newspaper, and Dong-A Daily Newspaper, dominated the Korean newspaper market, and the potential influence of the three conservative newspapers on voters and on the outcome of the election was enormous. Furthermore, a tension between the reformist government and these conservative newspapers reached a peak when the government prosecuted these newspapers for tax evasion.

The domination of these conservative newspapers was weakened by entrance of the 'alternative newspapers', the online newspapers. At the same time, the 'war' between the government and the press weakened the credibility of these conservative newspapers. The online newspapers often directly criticised the conservative newspapers, and took an opposing stance on many political and social issues. In doing so, the online newspapers challenged the potential power of the conservative newspapers in agenda setting, which is the main means by which the press can influence an election outcome. For example, the online newspapers reported intensively about an accident related to American military forces in Korea and led the growing feeling of anti-Americanism during the election campaign period, while the conservative newspapers emphasised the traditional alliance relationship between Korea and the USA and were hostile to the spread of anti-American sentiment within society.

Frequent readers of the online newspapers tend to be liberal or progressive. For example, many readers write their own opinions on each report in online newspapers, and the number of opinions added to each report is often around a hundred. Most opinions added by readers supported the tone of online newspapers and criticised the tone of the conservative press. Thus, the online newspapers became an online forum for discussing and propagating liberal positions of political and social issues, and effectively challenged the press domination of the conservative newspapers in Korea.²⁷

Also, liberal voters actively participated in discussions in *on-line* forums, but were also very active in real *off-line* political movements, such as anti-American demonstrations during the official election campaign period. In view of the balance the online news sources provided to the conservative dominance within the printed press, the Internet newspapers played an important role in the election, and might have affected the outcome of the election.

²⁶ For example, William L. Miller's research on British electoral behaviour in the 1987 general election revealed that the press affected voters, though TV did not. Miller, *Media and Voters*.

²⁷ In an empirical study of the political characteristics of American Internet users, "people who used the Internet for political activity are actually more liberal or Democrats than the public at large". See Kevin A. Hill and John E. Hughes, *Cyberpolitics: Citizen Activism in the Age of the Internet* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), p. 4 and pp. 27-46.

The 'Digital Divide' in Election Campaigns

Who Gathered Information from the Internet?

Empirical survey data from the Korea Social Science Data Center provides information about the socio-economic characteristics of voters who acquired information from the Internet during the 2002 presidential election. The Internet was not the main source of information on candidates or election during the election compared to other sources of information, such as TV debates, news media, and campaign pamphlets and posters (see Table 9.1). In answering a question about the most important source for information on candidates or election, only 2.9 per cent of respondent chose the Internet as their first choice, and 9.4 per cent of respondents cited the Internet in their second choice. Therefore, a total of 12.3 per cent of the electorate relied on the Internet for finding out information about the election.²⁸

The Social Characteristics of 'Netizen': In terms of sociological variables, voters who depended on the Internet for gathering information during the election tended to be the young, the high educated, urban residents, and non-manual workers rather than the old, the less educated, rural residences, and manual workers (see Table 9.13). Other sources of information except campaign pamphlets and posters were not associated with socio-economic characteristics of the voters. Campaign pamphlets and posters, which were traditional medium of campaigns, were useful for voters among the old, less educated, rural residents, and manual workers. Thus, voters who relied on the Internet contrasted with those depending upon campaign pamphlets and posters. A further difference was that women were more inclined to gather information from family members, friends, and other people compared to men.

²⁸ It is noted that the percentage does not mean 87.7 per cent of the voters did not get any information from the Internet. The percentage is based on the relative importance of the Internet in collecting information compared to other mediums of election campaigns. Thus, it is expected that a larger percentage than 12.3 per cent of the electorate used the Internet and gathered information from the Internet.

Table 9. 13 Correlation between Source of Information and Sociological Variables, 2002

		Sources of Information about Candidates or Election.					
		Internet	News	Family / friend	Pamphlet / poster	Meeting /speech	TV debate
Age	Pearson's R	-0.180	-0.014	0.012	0.103	0.025	0.023
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.602	0.657	0.000	0.366	0.403
	N	1361	1361	1361	1361	1361	1361
Education	Pearson's R	0.139	-0.019	-0.011	-0.070	-0.029	0.011
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.489	0.672	0.010	0.287	0.679
	N	1353	1353	1361	1361	1353	1361
Sex	Pearson's R	-0.026	-0.030	0.077	0.038	-0.002	-0.024
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.330	0.269	0.005	0.165	0.955	0.379
	N	1361	1361	1361	1361	1361	1361
Urban/rural	Pearson's R	-0.065	0.033	-0.015	0.055	0.025	-0.029
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.017	0.226	0.571	0.041	0.363	0.286
	N	1361	1361	1361	1361	1361	1361
Income	Pearson's R	0.051	-0.028	-0.001	0.006	-0.003	-0.018
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.064	0.314	0.962	0.842	0.920	0.526
	N	1305	1305	1305	1305	1305	1305
Class	Pearson's R	-0.182	-0.008	-0.068	0.079	0.014	0.045
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.028	0.822	0.069	0.034	0.712	0.229
	N	715	715	715	715	715	715

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.

Note: Correlations which is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) is highlighted in bold.

Age refers to age in year; Education is coded from 1 = primary to 4 = college; Sex is coded as 1 = male and 2 = female; Urban/rural is coded from 1 = big city to 3 = rural county; Income is coded from 1 = the lowest level to 9 = the highest level; Class is coded from 1 = professional, 2 = non-manual worker, 3 = petty-bourgeoisie, 4 = foreman and technician, and 5 = manual working class. Source of information is based on a question, i.e., "Which was the most important source for the information on candidates and the election that you concerned? Select two sources of information". Each source of information is recoded as 0 = those who did not gather information from the source, 1 = gathered information from each source (the 2nd answer), 2 = gathered information from the source (the 1st answer).

Political Attitudes of 'Netizen': In terms of the relationship between political attitudes and sources of information, the Internet users are distinct from non-users. Voters who gathered information from the Internet were interested in politics, had a relatively strong understanding of politics, were liberal, felt the political efficacy of elections, and relatively distrusted the news media.²⁹ Again, in terms of political attitudes, voters who depended on the Internets in gathering information contrasted with voters who relied on other people or campaign pamphlets and posters. In view of the high level of tension

²⁹ A study on the impact of the Internet on Korean voters in the 2000 general election suggests that there are differences in voting behaviour between those who actively use the Internet and those who do not. Also, voters who are interested in politics off-line are relatively more interested in politics in online too. See Yong-cheol Kim and Seongi Yun, 'Internetui jeongchijeok hwaryonggwa 16dae chongseon' (Political use of Internet and the 16th general election), *Hangukjeongchihakhoebo* (Korean Political Science Review), 34 (2000), 129-47, at pp. 140-44. The same pattern is also found in mature democracies. In American politics, people who are active in on-line politics are also active in off-line politics. "The mobilization of public expression will still largely be the creation of groups and individuals who currently dominate the political landscape". See Richard Davis, *The Web of Politics: The Internet's Impact on the American Political System* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp 1-8, at p. 5.

between the government and the conservative press, which was discussed above, it is noticeable that voters who relied on the Internet in gathering information showed less trust towards the news media compared to voters who did not gather information from the Internet (see Table 9.14).

Table 9. 14 Correlation between Source of Information and Political Attitudes, 2002

		Internet	News	Family / friend	Pamphlet / poster	Meeting /speech	TV debate
Interests in politics	Pearson's R	0.097	-0.007	-0.075	-0.064	0.000	0.030
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.783	0.010	0.018	0.986	0.266
	N	1361	1361	1361	1361	1361	1361
Understanding politics	Pearson's R	0.084	-0.050	-0.063	-0.063	0.050	0.049
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.002	0.064	0.020	0.019	0.066	0.069
	N	1361	1361	1361	1361	1361	1361
Ideology	Pearson's R	-0.135	-0.024	0.059	0.003	-0.014	0.064
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.380	0.030	0.904	0.613	0.018
	N	1361	1361	1361	1361	1361	1361
Political efficacy of election	Pearson's R	-0.067	0.002	0.064	0.059	0.062	-0.066
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.014	0.936	0.019	0.031	0.022	0.015
	N	1350	1350	1350	1350	1350	1350
Trust news media	Pearson's R	0.115	0.001	0.067	-0.028	-0.074	-0.049
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.968	0.016	0.314	0.008	0.077
	N	1302	1302	1302	1302	1302	1302
Party identification	Pearson's R	0.007	0.031	-0.012	-0.020	-0.021	0.004
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.804	0.260	0.648	0.457	0.429	0.882
	N	1361	1361	1361	1361	1361	1361

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.

Note: Correlation which is significant at the 0.05 level is highlighted in bold.

Interest in politics is coded in a 7-point scale from 1 = not at all to 7 = very much interested in politics; Understanding politics is coded in a 7-point scale from 1 = very little understand to 7 = very well understand; Ideology is coded in a 5-point scale from 1 = very liberal to 5 = very conservative; Political efficacy of election is coded as 1 = very high to 4 = very low; Trust in news media is coded as 1 = very trust to 4 = very distrust; Party identification is recoded as 1 = party identifiers and 2 = non-party identifiers.

The source of information is based on the question, i.e., "Which was the most important source for the information on candidates and the election that you concerned? Select two sources of information". Each source of information is recoded as 0 = those who did not gather information from the source, 1 = gathered information from the source (the 2nd answer), 2 = gathered information from the source (the 1st answer).

Independents vs. partisans: There is no difference between partisans and independents in using the Internet for gathering information on candidates and election issues. However, as shown in Table 9.15, the difference in gathering information from the Internet across different party identifiers is statistically significant (i.e., Chi-square = 35.621, $p = 0.000$ at the 0.05 level). Those who identify themselves with the Grand National Party (GNP) hardly relied on the Internet compared to those who with attachment to the Millennium Democratic Party and in particular minor party identifiers. This difference may be related to the difference in the main characteristics of party identifiers of each political party. For example, as discussed in Chapter 6, partisans who

have attachment to the Grand National Party are old compared to partisans who feel close to other parties.³⁰ In sum, the Internet was important in the 2002 presidential election campaign for some voters, but not for every voter.

Table 9. 15 Crosstab: the Internet by Party Identification and Four Types of Voters, 2002

	N	Gathering information from the Internet				Chi-square (Sig.)
		No	To some extent	Very much	Total	
Total	1361	87.6%	9.4%	3.0%	100%	
Party Identification (1)						3.022 (0.221)
Partisans	797	88.2%	8.4%	3.4%	100%	
Independent Voters	574	86.7%	10.8%	2.5%	100%	
Party Identification (2)						35.621 (0.000)
Grand National Party	309	94.2%	5.2%	0.6%	100%	
Millennium Democratic Party	366	85.8%	10.7%	3.6%	100%	
Other parties	122	80.3%	9.8%	9.8%	100%	
Independent Voters	564	86.7%	10.8%	2.5%	100%	
Four types of voters						9.314 (0.157)
Critical Partisans	395	88.4%	7.3%	4.3%	100%	
Habitual Partisans	402	88.1%	9.5%	2.5%	100%	
Attentive Independents	187	85.6%	10.2%	4.3%	100%	
Apolitical Independents	377	87.3%	11.1%	1.6%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.

Note: Gathering information from the Internet is based on a question, i.e., "Which was the most important source of information on candidates and the election? Select two sources of information". Those who did not gather information from the source are recoded as 'No', those who referred to the Internet in the 2nd answer are recoded as 'To some extent', and those who chose the Internet in the 1st answer are recoded as 'Very much' in this table.

Also, considering their political attitudes and socio-economic characteristics of the voters who are more likely to use the Internet, it was assumed that they were more likely to be critical partisans or attentive independents rather than habitual partisans or apolitical independents. Table 9.15 shows that attentive independents are more likely to gather information from the Internet compared to other types of voters, though the difference in gathering information from the Internet across four types of the electorate is not statistically significant.

Active Users or Passive Users?: Qualitative Data

Qualitative interview data also confirms that the majority of respondents did not use the Internet for gathering information on the election. Among a total of 73 interviewees in

³⁰ A survey conducted by a civil activist group, People's Coalition for Media Reform, during the election campaign period yielded the same result. The Internet was relatively important for the young and the voters who support Roh Moo-hyun while the old relied on newspapers for acquiring information compared to the young. See 'Daeseon bodeo daehan icha yeolonjosa gyeolgwa' (The results of the second survey on election reports), <http://pcmr.or.kr>.

focus groups and in-depth interviews, 18 respondents reported that they used the Internet for this purpose. This percentage is higher than the percentage in the quantitative survey data discussed above (i.e., 12.4 per cent). However, it should be noted that all interviewees resided in highly urbanised areas and many participants were non-manual workers or students and young, who were more likely to use the Internet compared to other groups.

Who relied on the Internet?: There was no clear difference between partisans and independents in terms of using the Internet. However, over two thirds of respondents exposed to the Internet campaigns were generally interested in politics, while the others were relatively uninterested in politics. Independent voters who were relatively less interested in politics were not willing to expend any effort to visit the websites. Therefore, the Internet campaigns were not for everyone, but only those who were interested in the election. For example, “I use the Internet all day for various tasks, but I am reluctant to go to political websites” (FM6; I-102). “I often use the Internet, but I did not go to the [election] websites because that would annoy me” (I-101). “I did not go to the official websites of candidates. I was reluctant to go there. I assumed that the websites always boast about their own candidate (I-125).

The ‘digital divide’ was apparent in the age difference of Internet users in the election campaign. Almost all respondents who gathered information from the Internet were young, i.e., below 30 years old. Some young respondents even believed that most of their peer group actively used the Internet for gathering information on the candidates and issues. For example, “Almost all voters of age 20-30s including me use the Internet [for gathering information on candidates and issues]. We can get information from the Internet quickly and easily” (I-201; I-111). In contrast to the young, the old hardly use the Internet for any purpose. Old respondents were even cynical about acquiring information from the Internet. For example, “Someone even asserted that the Internet had a bad influence on voters. My peer group voters [late 50s] do not think that the Internet campaigns are beneficial” (I-203). “I heard about ‘*Rohsamo*’ [in the Internet]. I did not want to be one of *Rohsamo*. I feared a bad influence from them” (I-106).³¹

Did the Internet influence on vote choice?: What did respondents get or try to get from the Internet? Most of them answered that they were interested in other voters’ opinions on candidates and election issues. For example, “The young often use the Internet. As a young voter, I want to know what other young people think [about election

³¹ ‘*Rohsamo*’ (a group for people who love Rho Moo-hyun) was organised spontaneously by some supporters. The number of memberships reached to about 100,000 voters. A young supporter initiated this organisation through sending e-mails to some potential supporters from an Internet café in a local city.

issues]" (I-117). "I did not search for information [on candidates or policies] from the Internet. I went to the Internet in order to see other people's opinions about the election issues" (I-115; I-119; I-126; I-204; I-211). "Mostly, I want to know what loyal supporters for Roh Moo-hyun think about election issues" (I-113).

There was a wide gap between Internet users and non-users concerning perceptions about the worth of information in the Internet. As one of reasons why they relied on the Internet, some of Internet users stated that they did not trust major newspapers which were not impartial and critical to the ruling party. For example, "I trust information on the Internet presented by ordinary people compared to information from the mass media which is bias to one side [the right]" (I-124). However, some respondents who did not rely on the Internet raised questions about the credibility of information gathered from the Internet. Some thought that users gathered rumours or gossip rather than valuable information. For example, "I think that I cannot trust the Internet as an information source" (I-130). "I usually got rumours and gossip from the Internet [rather than information of policies]" (FM2; FM5).

In general, respondents who were exposed to Internet campaigns believed that the Internet was useful and to some extent affected their voting choice. They believed that Internet campaigns enhanced the level of interests in election among young voters. For example, "The Internet campaign was very important in the last election. Young voters were able to use the Internet [rather than the old], and I think that this affected the outcome of election" (I-115). "I realised that young voters strongly supported Roh Moo-hyun. I was influenced [by this]" (I-122). "I think that Internet campaigns increased interest in the election among the young voters" (I-206).

In conclusion, voters were relatively passive rather than active in the Internet campaigns. Most of voters who gathered information from the Internet answered that they read bulletin boards in order to know about other people's thinking on candidates or issues. Nobody said that he or she presented their own opinion on Internet bulletin boards. Only a few respondents went to the official website of candidates or political parties. In addition, only a few interviewees answered that they received campaign e-mails. Therefore, most voters were not exposed to the Internet campaigns of the parties and only a few were active in the Internet campaigns of the parties. Thus, the significance of the Internet campaigns in the 2002 presidential election should not be overestimated.

Summary

Internet campaigns caught the attention of many voters in the 2002 presidential election. The young who were usually alienated from politics suddenly came together on-line and

articulated their opinion about politics. It seems true that the Internet activities were related to the higher turnout for the youngest age cohort, i.e. 20-24 years old age cohort, compared to that of the 25-29 age cohort, which occurred for the first time in Korean elections. However, it is doubtful that the Internet significantly affected voting choice in the 2002 election or indeed the eventual outcome of the election. Although the potential influence of the Internet on voters was considerable, online campaigning was relatively limited in the 2002 presidential election contrary to many people's perception.

Furthermore, for those active in the online campaigns who were more likely to be interested in politics and have a viewpoint, the impact of the Internet campaign on voting choice was limited. The Internet campaigns did not indiscriminately affect voters, and its potential influence was restricted to only certain types of voters. Those relying upon the Internet tended to be predominantly young, non-manual workers, and students. However, a considerable proportion of the electorate was not able to use the Internet and many voters among those who are able to use the Internet did not use the Internet for gathering information. Furthermore, those who are less likely to use the Internet, such as the old, are more interested in election and are more likely to go to the poll compared to those who are more likely to use the Internet, such as the young. Also, voters who are very interested in elections, such as strong partisans rather independent voters, visited websites to acquire information. These types of voters who have strong political attitudes, such as party affiliation and ideology, hardly changed their vote preference, and instead, had their attitudes reinforced by the Internet campaigns. In sum, the actual impact of the Internet campaigns on voting choice was limited.³²

Although the effects of the Internet campaigns on voters in the 2002 presidential election should not be overestimated, this is not to claim that the Internet campaigns had no influence on the outcome of the election. In the 2002 election, the Internet might have contributed to the victory of Roh Moo-hyun because of the 'digital divide' favouring him. Those who are active in the Internet were more likely to support Roh Moo-hyun. Strong loyal supporters for Roh were mobilised through the Internet. They dominated the cyberspace election campaign where Lee Hoi Chang and his supporters were barely noticeable. Based on the almost one-sided domination in the Internet campaigns, Roh's campaign effectively mobilised young voters sensitive to peers' opinions.

³² In a post-election survey of 1,000 voters, it was revealed that impact of online campaigns on voting choice was minimal. Only 7.7 per cent of the respondents answered that they were influenced by information gathered from party websites. Also, 44.5 per cent of the respondents felt no influence of the Internet campaigns, and 47.8 per cent of the respondents answered some influence. The researcher, Won-Taek Kang, concluded that impact of Internet campaigns had been exaggerated to some extent in Korea. Won-Taek Kwang, *Hangugui seongeo jeongchi* (Electoral Politics in South Korea: Ideology, Region, Generation and Media) (Seoul: Pureungil, 2003), pp. 385-415.

Chapter 10. Independent Voters and Making Voting Choice: Are Independents Rational Voters?

The aim of this chapter is to examine how independent voters make their voting choice. This chapter focuses on short-term and long-term factors affecting voting choice. The voting choice of independent voters will be compared to that of partisans. In doing so, it will be argued that the voting choice of independent voters is not rational, nor is it very different from the electoral choice of partisans.

There is no doubt that various factors explain individual voting choice. Factors explaining individual voting preference include both long-term factors, such as party identification and values, and short-term factors, such as candidates, issues, and performance evaluation.¹ Moreover, it is expected that the voting behaviour of independent voters is different from voting behaviour of partisans. The voting behaviour of partisans is largely determined by long-term predispositions. In particular, an enduring psychological attachment to political parties is the most significant factor to explain partisan voting behaviour. Party affiliation is emotional and similar to a religious belief. The voting choice of partisans is constrained by this psychological commitment to parties, and their electoral choice is a manifestation of this loyalty. Partisans are relatively immune from short-term influences on voting choice such as candidates, government performance evaluation, and issues. It could be argued that the voting behaviour of partisans is irrational because they heavily rely on their emotional attachment to parties in their voting choice.

On the other hand, independent voters are free from party constraints in making the voting decision. Independents who do not have the enduring psychological attachment to political parties are relatively responsive to short-term influences on voting choice. In contrast to partisans, independent voters may make their decisions based on a rational calculation of candidates, government performance evaluation, and issues. What is the key factor to explain the voting choice of independent voters? Is it true that independent voters are more rational voters compared to partisans? Are partisans free from all short-term influences when making their voting choice?

1. Making Voting Choice

¹ For a summary of contending models and theories of voting choice, see William L. Miller and Richard G. Niemi, 'Voting: Choice, Conditioning, and Constraint', in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris, eds, *Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting* (London: Sage, 2002), pp.169-88.

Determinants of Voting Choice in Korea

Party Identification and Voting Choice

Party identification accurately predicts voting choice in Korea. Although political parties have been institutionally underdeveloped and the party system has not been stable, majority voters have developed party identification and voted for that party in elections. Partisan loyalty to the Grand National Party (GNP) was generally very strong, while partisan loyalty to the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) was strengthened in 2002. The degree of partisan loyalty may be explained by partisan dissatisfactions with presidential candidates of the party. Although partisans generally vote for their own party candidate, partisans are able to defect from their party when they are dissatisfied with candidates.² In 1992 and 1997, Kim Dae-jung, who was an experienced leader of the pro-democratic movement, was a strong contender, but at the same time, many voters had very strong negative feelings towards him. Indeed, the so called 'anti-Kim Dae-jung' sentiment was pervasive among Korean voters. In 1992, 8.2 per cent of Democratic Party partisans voted for Kim Young Sam, who had been another political leader in the democratic movement. In 1997, 10.9 per cent of National Congress for New Politics partisans voted for Rhee In-je, the third party candidate and a defector from the Grand National Party (GNP) rather than their own party candidate, Kim Dae-jung (see Table 10.1).

In 2002, Lee Hoi Chang faced a similar situation to that which Kim Dae-jung had experienced in 1992 and 1997. Many voters were hostile towards him. Pre-election surveys often suggested that half of all voters were strongly against him. The electoral pact between Roh Moo-hyun and Chung Mong-joon aiming at one candidacy was largely based on the large number of voters who did not want to allow Lee to win the election. At the same time, people in *Gyeongsang*, the main stronghold of the GNP, had more positive feelings about Roh Moo-hyun who came from the region. The partisan loyalty of the GNP dropped and 8.8 per cent of GNP partisans voted for Roh Moo-hyun in the 2002 presidential election (see Table 10.1).

Partisan loyalty to third party or minor parties was substantially weaker than the loyalty shown to major parties by their partisans. The difference in the degree of partisan loyalty is related to the partisan's expectation of their party winning the election. In 1992, Chung Ju-young, owner of *Hyundai* company, formed the Unification National Party and

² G. B. Markus and P. E. Converse, 'A Dynamic Simultaneous Equation Model of Electoral Choice', *American Political Science Review*, 73(1979), 1055-70.

achieved a remarkable success in the 1992 general election held about eight months before the presidential election. Chung never led the race, but was nonetheless a relatively strong candidate in the 1992 presidential election. In 1997, Rhee In-je defected from the Grand National Party after he failed to be nominated as the presidential candidate in the GNP convention. He formed the New Party for People just before the official campaign began. He launched an aggressive election campaign, but Rhee was not a strong contender compared to Chung in 1992. In the 2002 presidential election, Kwon Young-gil was not a real contender. His party, the Democratic Labour Party, did not have a single seat in parliament at that time, and he openly stated that he aimed to gain a maximum of 5 per cent of the valid votes.

Table 10.1 Loyalty Rate: Party Identification and Voting Choice, 1997-2002

1992	Party Identification					
	N	DLP	DP	UNP	Non	Total
Vote for Kim Young Sam (DLP)	528	93.8%	8.2%	6.3%	59.1%	55.3%
Vote for Kim Dae-jung (DP)	314	2.6%	88.1%	7.9%	22.7%	32.9%
Vote for Chung Ju-young (UNP)	112	3.6%	3.8%	85.7%	18.2%	11.7%
Total	954	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
1997	N	GNP	NCNP	NPP	Non	Total
Vote for Lee Hoi Chang (GNP)	401	95.1%	3.0%	15.5%	51.4%	39.2%
Vote for Kim Dae-jung (NCNP)	437	3.4%	86.1%	14.6%	28.6%	42.8%
Vote for Rhee In-je (NPP)	184	1.5%	10.9%	69.9%	19.9%	18.0%
Total	1022	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
2002	N	GNP	MDP	DLP*	Non	Total
Vote for Lee Hoi Chang (GNP)	501	90.5%	4.1%	11.7%	36.1%	39.4%
Vote for Roh Moo-hyun (MDP)	715	8.8%	94.9%	44.2%	60.4%	56.2%
Vote for Kwon Young-gil (DLP*)	57	.6%	1.1%	44.2%	3.4%	4.5%
Total	1273	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Note: loyalty rate is highlighted in bold.

Keys: N = number of cases; DLP = Democratic Liberal Party; DP = Democratic Party; UNP = Unification National Party; GNP = Grand National Party; NCNP = National Congress for New Politics; NPP = New Party for People; MDP = Millennium Democratic Party; DLP* = Democratic Labour Party; Non = non-party identifiers.

Ideological Self-Image and Voting Choice

The ideological orientation of individual explains voting choice. In particular, ideologies or values may provide a basis for voting choice in new democracies where political parties are not based on strong social cleavages or where long-term party identification is not well developed.³ Unlike electoral studies in mature democracies,

³ Miller and Niemi, 'Voting: Choice, Conditioning, and Constraint', p.173. Also, William L. Miller, Stephen White, and Paul Heywood, *Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1998).

Korean electoral studies often ignore ideology and values in explaining voting choice. Researchers argued that political parties are not based on social cleavages and there are no ideological differences between political parties in Korea.⁴ However, as discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis, Korean voters do perceive an ideological difference between political parties. Although regionalism is the dominant explanatory variable in terms of electoral alignments, ideology is also a key factor. When political parties are historically associated with particular values and voters recognise ideological distinctions between the parties, ideology can explain voting choice.

Table 10.2 The Mean Scores of Self-identified Ideology by Voting Choice, 1997-2002

	1997			2002		
	N	Mean	Std.D	N	Mean	Std.D
Vote for Party A	362	3.38	1.02	509	3.24	.95
Vote for Party B	398	2.90	1.15	741	2.56	.93
Vote for Party C	180	2.85	1.14	62	2.37	.83
Total	940	3.07	1.12	1312	2.81	.99

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997 and 2002.

Note: Mean = average score in a 5-point scale (i.e., 1 = very liberal to 5 = very conservative); The 1992 presidential election is excluded due to lacks of data.

Keys: N = number of cases; Std.D = standardized deviation; Party A = Grand National Party (Lee Hoi Chang) in 1997 and in 2002; Party B = National Congress for New Politics (Kim Dae-jung) in 1997, and Millennium Democratic Party (Roh Moo-hyun) in 2002; Party C = New Party for People (Rhee In-je) in 1997, and Democratic Labour Party (Kwon Young-gil) in 2002.

Empirical survey evidence shows that voter's self-identified liberal-conservative ideology explains voting choice in Korea.⁵ The self-identified conservatives voted for Lee Hoi Chang of the Grand National Party, the successor party of the old ruling authoritarian party. The self-identified liberals voted for Roh Moo-hyun of the Millennium Democratic Party (or Kim Dae-jung of the National Congress for New Politics in 1997), historically the pro-democracy party. Table 10.2 shows that there is a clear difference in the average score of ideology, which is measured in a 5-point scale (i.e., 1 = strong liberal to 5 = strong conservative), across voting choice. For instance, in 1997, the average score for those who voted for Lee Hoi Chang was 3.38, while the average

⁴ Recently, there are a few studies on the relationship between ideology and voting choice in Korea. For example, Won-Taek Kang, '*Yugwonjaui inyeomjeok seonghyanggwa tupyohangtae*' (Voter's ideological attitude and voting choice), in Nam-Young Lee, ed., *Hanguui seongeo* (Elections in Korea), vol. 2 (Seoul: Pureungil, 1998), pp.47-96.

⁵ According to the spatial theory, voters consider each political party's placement on an ideological spectrum and vote for the party that is closest to the voter's individual ideological orientation. Ideological 'proximity' between individual voters and political parties determines voting choice. Ideological proximity may be a better independent variable because each individual voter perceives the placement of each political party in ideological spectrum differently. However, in my analysis, ideological proximity is not used due to a lack of data. For the spatial theory, see Melvin Hinich and Michael Munger, *Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994).

score for those who voted for Kim Dae-jung was 2.90. The difference is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. In 2002, the average score for Lee Hoi Chang was 3.24, while the average score for Roh Moo-hyun was 2.56 and again the difference is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. It is noticeable that the average score for those who voted Kwon Young-gil was 2.37 point. Kwon was a presidential candidate of the Democratic Labour Party, which is considered a progressive party in Korean political context. Voters who supported Kwon were liberal compared to voters who voted for the two major party candidates in the election.

Issues and Voting Choice

In an era of partisan decline, voters depend on ‘policy issues’ or ‘non-policy issues’ in their voting choice. In an ‘issue voting’ model, voters are similar to consumers who look for the product fitted to their preferences.⁶ In this model, it is assumed that voters recognise the salient issues in the election. Voters have their own issue positions, know each candidate’s issue position and are able to distinguish each candidate issue position from the positions of other candidates. Voters then cast their ballot to the candidate who offers the best match with their issue preferences.⁷

The relationships between voting choice and voters’ issue positions on four different salient issues in the 2002 presidential elections are examined. First, foreign policy toward North Korea was a key issue in the election. In general, conservative voters and the major opposition party, the Grand National Party (GNP), argued for the containment policy toward North Korea focusing on military force, while liberal voters and the ruling party, the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP), supported an engagement policy toward North Korea, which emphasised an improvement of North-South Korea relations.

Second, the question of the Korean-USA alliance was another important issue during the 2002 presidential election. Voters who recognised that the alliance relationship is unequal sought a revision of the relationship, while other voters opposed anything detrimental to relationship. Roh Moo-hyun stressed Korean sovereignty, while Lee argued for the consolidation of the alliance relationship during the election year.

Third, voters’ position on market reforms was another key issue. Roh Moo-hyun emphasised the role of government in market reforms, while Lee asserted market freedom and the minimal role of government. Finally, the expansion of the social welfare system was another significant issue in the election. Roh Moo-hyun was sympathetic to the

⁶ Hilda T. Himmelweit, P. Humphreys, and M. Jaeger, *How Voters Decide* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1985).

⁷ Angus Campbell et al., *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley & Son, 1960), p.180.

position of the working class and demanded an expansion of the welfare system and greater economic justice in society. Lee Hoi Chang represented the interests of business companies and advocated providing better market conditions for investors.

As shown in Table 10.3, in general, the voters who took a conservative position on each issue tended to vote for Lee Hoi Chang, while those who took a liberal position on each issue were more inclined to support Kwon Young-gil, the candidate of the Democratic Labour Party. The difference is maintained when we focus on the candidates of the two major parties. There is a difference in issue positions between those who voted Lee Hoi Chang and those who voted Roh Moo-hyun, and the mean difference between those who voted Lee and those who voted Roh is statistically significant on every issue except issue on market freedom.

Table 10.3 The Mean Scores of Issue Position by Voting Choice, 2002

	Issue 1 (the North-South relations)			Issue 2 (Korea-USA relations)		
	N	Mean	Std.D	N	Mean	Std.D
Vote for Lee	486	2.92	.88	475	1.83	.97
Vote for Roh	716	2.19	.85	702	1.66	.84
Vote for Kwon	61	2.36	.91	61	1.64	.86
Total	1263	1.48	.93	1238	1.71	.90
	Issue 3 (market freedom)			Issue 4 (welfare)		
	N	Mean	Std.D	N	Mean	Std.D
Vote for Lee	450	2.52	.85	485	2.37	.95
Vote for Roh	670	2.44	.89	718	2.16	.93
Vote for Kwon	61	2.39	1.04	58	2.33	1.13
Total	1181	2.47	.88	1261	2.25	.95

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.

Keys: N = number of cases; Mean = average score in a 4-point scale (i.e., 1 = very agree to 4 = very disagree). Std.D = standardized deviation.

Note: In issue one, the mean difference between Lee and Roh and between Lee and Kwon is significant at the 0.05 level. In issue two, the mean difference between Lee and Roh is significant at the 0.05 level; In issue four, the mean difference between Lee and Kwon is significant at the 0.05 level; In issue three, any mean difference is not significant at the 0.05 level.

The following questions are used: **Issue 1:** "Even though North Korea developed nuclear weapons, the South Korean government should provide economic aid to North Korea in view of Korean nationalism. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?"; **Issue 2:** "The SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) should be revised, even though the alliance relationship between Korea and the USA may be endangered. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?"; **Issue 3:** "The government should not interfere in business economic activities, though business companies do not carry out rationalisation of enterprises by themselves. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?" (Recoded as 1 = very disagree to 4 = very agree); **Issue 4:** "The government should expand social welfare even though this means we pay more tax. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?".

Government Performance and Voting Choice

Voters may cast their ballot in response to government performance. Voters may approve or disapprove what an incumbent government accomplished and cast their ballot accordingly. Those who think the incumbent government has done well vote for the

ruling party's candidate, while those who evaluate the incumbent government's performance negatively vote for the opposition party's candidate. According to the 'retrospective voting' theory, voters do not carefully examine various policies. Voters are not interested in policies, but are interested in performance.⁸ In the 'retrospective voting' model, voters develop a party identification, which is not an emotional attachment, but is based on all experiences with competing parties. Party identification is enduring, but is influenced by the rational assessment of the performance of the incumbent government.⁹ Thus, partisans are not always loyal to their political party in voting choice. Partisans do not vote for their political party if they disapprove of the performance of their party in government or if they approve of a different party's government performance. Independent voters free from party constraints are more responsive to their evaluation of government performance compared to partisans.¹⁰

Table 10. 4 The Mean Scores of Government Performance Evaluation by Voting Choice, 1992-2002

	1992			1997			2002		
	N	Mean	Std.D	N	Mean	Std.D	N	Mean	Std.D
Vote for Party A	534	3.11	1.10	403	4.13	.86	509	3.77	.91
Vote for Party B	327	3.83	.96	446	4.41	.80	741	2.87	.93
Vote for Party C	114	3.65	.98	189	4.19	.87	62	3.55	.90
Total	975	3.42	1.09	1038	4.26	.85	1312	3.25	1.02

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Note: In 1992 and 2002, 'Party A' was ruling party, and in 2002, 'Party B' was ruling party; **Mean for the ruling party is highlighted in bold**; In 1992, scores of government performance evaluation are recoded from a 4-point scale to a 5-point scale.

Keys: N = number of cases; Mean = average score in a 5-point scale (i.e., 1 = very good to 5 = very bad); Std.D = standardized deviation; Party A = Democratic Liberal Party (Kim Young Sam) in 1992, Grand National Party (Lee Hoi Chang) in 1997 and in 2002; Party B = Democratic Party (Kim Dae-jung) in 1992, National Congress for New Politics (Kim Dae-jung) in 1997, and Millennium Democratic Party (Roh Moo-hyun) in 2002; Party C = Unification National Party (Chung Ju-young) in 1992, New Party for People (Rhee In-je) in 1997, and Democratic Labour Party (Kwon Young-gil) in 2002.

There is a relationship between evaluation of government performance and voting choice in the last three Korean presidential elections. As shown in Table 10.4, those who voted for the ruling party's candidate rate incumbent government performance positively compared to those who voted for other party's candidate. At the same time, those who

⁸ Morris Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981).

⁹ For a brief assessment of Fiorina's retrospective voting, see Harrop and Miller, *Elections and Voters*, pp. 149-51.

¹⁰ Shanto Iyengar and John R. Petrocik, 'Basic Rule Voting: Impact of Campaigns on Party-and-Approval Voting', in James A. Thurber, Candice J. Nelson, and David A. Dulio, eds, *Crowded Airwaves: Campaign Advertising in Elections* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), pp. 113-48, at p. 119.

voted for the major opposition candidate rate the incumbent government's performance negatively compared to those who voted for other party's candidate. This pattern is repeated in every presidential election. In particular, it is interesting that this pattern was maintained in the 1997 presidential election, in which a critical economic recession was the key issue and the performance of the incumbent government was rated as very poor.

Candidate and Voting Choice

It is widely recognised that out of the three main factors to explain voting choice (i.e. party identification, issue preferences, and candidate evaluation), candidate evaluation is the most important factor in explaining voting choice in Korea.¹¹ In the post-election survey from the Korea Social Science Data Center, more than 60 per cent of all voters reported that candidate evaluation was the most important factor on their own decision among the various factors which might affect voting choice. In particular, this is true in presidential elections rather than parliamentary or local elections in Korea, as discussed in chapter 7 of this thesis.

Table 10.5 Candidate Evaluation and Voting Choice, 1997-2002

1997	Candidate who is best able to solve the nation's urgent problems					
	N	Lee H.	Kim D.	Rhee I.	other	Total
Vote for Lee Hoi Chang	392	96.2%	15.0%	15.7%	63.6%	38.3%
Vote for Kim Dae-jung	445	2.3%	72.2%	8.2%	20.5%	43.5%
Vote for Rhee In-je	187	1.5%	12.8%	76.1%	15.9%	18.3%
Total	1024	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
2002	N	Lee H.	Roh M.	Kwon Y.	other	Total
Vote for Lee Hoi Chang	506	95.5%	8.0%	23.5%	36.4%	38.8%
Vote for Roh Moo-hyun	736	3.4%	90.2%	27.1%	54.5%	56.4%
Vote for Kwon Young-gil	62	1.1%	1.8%	49.4%	9.1%	4.8%
Total	1304	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997, and 2002.

Key: N = number of cases.

In general, there is a very strong association between candidate evaluation and voting choice in both the 1997 and 2002 presidential elections. For example, 96.2 per cent and 95.5 per cent of the voters who believed in Lee Hoi Chang's competence to solve the nation's urgent issues voted for him in 1997 and 2002 respectively. The relation between

¹¹ Kil Soong-hoom, 'Hanguginui jeongchuisikbyeonhwa' (Changes in Korean political values), *Hangugjeongchihakhoibo* (Korean Political Science Review), 26(1993), 133-52. Myoung-soon Shin, 'Hangugui jeongchi chamyewa jeongchi baljeon' (Political participation and political development in Korea), in *Hangugjeongchihaghoi* (Korean Political Science Association), ed., *Hangug jeongchi balcheomui tuegseonggwa jeonmang* (Features and prospect for political development in Korea) (Seoul: Korean Political Science Association, 1984).

candidate competence and voting choice is relatively weak for voters who evaluate the third candidate highly. While they believed that the third party's candidate is the most competent person, they nonetheless voted for one of major party candidates. For example, in 2002, among voters who rate Kwon Young-gil highly, only 49.4 per cent of voters voted Kwon Young-gil (see Table 10.5).

It is interesting that those who rate Kim Dae-jung highly were relatively less loyal to the candidate in voting choice. In 1997, many voters believed that Kim Dae-jung, a very experienced politician and a man of profound learning, was the most competent candidate who would be able to manage the economic recession effectively. However, Kim Dae-jung failed to convert this high evaluation into votes. 27.8 per cent of voters who recognised Kim Dae-jung's competence voted for other candidates. Many voters recognised that Kim Dae-jung was a man of great abilities, but still thought him untrustworthy. This implies that candidate evaluation is based on a number of dimensions rather just a single dimension.

Correlations between Independents and Short-term Considerations

Do independent voters depend on short-term considerations in making their voting choice compared to partisans? In order to examine the difference in the impact of short-term considerations on the voting choice of partisans and independents, Pearson's correlation coefficients are examined. Only the two major candidates are included and voting choice is coded as a dichotomous variable. Thus, those who voted Roh Moo-hyun are coded 1 and those who voted Lee Hoi Chang are coded 2.

The set of correlation coefficients suggests that voting choice is strongly associated with each variable, i.e., party identification, ideological self-image, government performance evaluation, candidate evaluation, and issue preferences concerning North-South Korea relations (see Table 10.6). The correlation coefficients are examined against two separated subgroups, i.e., partisans and independents. There is some difference between the correlation coefficients for partisans and for independents. Correlation coefficients for partisans are generally bigger than for independents. Again, the correlation coefficients between voting choice and the explanatory variables are examined against four subgroups, i.e., critical partisans, habitual partisans, attentive independents, and apolitical independents. The correlation coefficients for the critical partisans are generally bigger than other correlation for other subgroups.

Although the correlation coefficients for partisans, particularly the critical partisans, are bigger than correlations for independents, we cannot conclude that partisans cast their ballots based on short-term considerations compared to independents. The correlation

coefficients suggest that a variable is associated with another variable, but do not suggest the causal relationship between two variables, that is correlations measure association, but correlations are not the same as causation. In the relationship between voting choice and short-term factors, party identification affects both voting choice and short-term factors such as issue, candidate, and government performance, so the relationship between these variables are strongly associated. Thus, 'spurious' relationships are observed. Partial correlation coefficients between voting choice and short-term factors, controlling party identification, confirm the spurious relationship. Partial correlation coefficients, controlling party identification, are much smaller than the correlation coefficients, and some of the partial correlations are not statistically significant. Therefore, it is not true that partisans are more affected by short-term factors in voting choice compared to independents, when we control the spurious variable, i.e., party identification (see Table 10.7).

Table 10. 6 Correlation Coefficients between Voting Choice and Explanatory Variables, 2002

Subgroups of sample	Explanatory Variables				
	Party Identification	Ideology	Performance	Candidate	Issue
All voters	.673	.335	.432	.849	.385
Partisans only	.873	.351	.495	.861	.401
Independents only	N.A.	.300	.338	.827	.361
Critical Partisans only	.859	.437	.544	.871	.465
Habitual Partisans only	.885	.231	.431	.848	.312
Attentive Independents only	N.A.	.324	.332	.807	.345
Apolitical Independents only	N.A.	.277	.343	.837	.366

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.

Note: Figures are Pearson's correlation coefficients between voting choice and each variable. All correlations in this table are significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Each variable is coded as the follow: **Voting Choice:** 1 = Roh Moo-hyun, and 2 = Lee Hoi Chang; **Party Identification:** 1 = Millennium Democratic Party, 2 = Other parties, and 3 = Grand National Party; **Ideological Self-image:** 1 = very liberal to 5 = very conservative; **Government Performance:** 1 = very good to 5 = very poor; **Candidate Evaluation:** 1 = Roh Moo-hyun, 2 = neiter Roh nor Lee, and 3 = Lee Hoi Chang (based on the question of "Who is the best candidate to solve the nation's urgent problem that you most concern?"); **Issue Position:** 1 = very agree to 4 = very disagree (based on the question of "Even though North Korea developed nuclear weapons, South Korean government should provide economic aids to North Korea in view of Korean nationalism. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?").

Although Pearson's correlation coefficients and partial correlations suggest a strong association between each explanatory variable and voting choice, the effects of each explanatory variable on the dependent variable is likely to be overestimated, as discussed above, i.e. because of spurious relationships for partisans. In order to estimate the net effects of each explanatory variable on voting choice, it is necessary to control for the effects of other variables on the same dependent variable. Multiple regression analysis is

one way this can be achieved.

Table 10.7 Partial Correlation Coefficients between Voting Choice and Explanatory Variables, 2002

Subgroups of sample	Explanatory Variables			
	Ideology	Performance	Candidate	Issue
All voters	.202**	.218**	.736**	.228**
Partisans only	.105**	.162**	.603**	.085*
Critical Partisans only	.131*	.163**	.589**	.096
Habitual Partisans only	.080	.172**	.629**	.073

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.

Note: The figure is partial correlation coefficients between voting choice and each variables controlling party identification.

* = Correlations is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); ** = Correlations is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The Regression Model of Voting Choice: Partisans vs. Independents

The Regression Model

A multiple regression model of voting choice in the 2002 presidential election is constructed and tested. In the regression model, the dependent variable is voting choice in the 2002 presidential election. To simplify this analysis, only two major candidates are included in the regression model. The election was basically a competition between the two major parties, and the two candidates shared about 95 per cent of valid vote. It will not impair the regression model that the third candidate, Kwon Young-gil who polled less than 4 per cent of valid votes, is excluded. Therefore, voting choice is a dichotomous variable. Someone who voted for Roh Moo-hyun of the Millennium Democratic Party is coded 1 and someone who voted Lee Hoi Chang of the Grand National Party is coded 2.

Six independent variables are included in the specification of the regression model. It is assumed that three long-term factors and three short-term factors explain voting choice. Economic perception is another potential independent variable, but is excluded from the regression model due to a limitation of data. Although economic voting is not included in the regression model, it is expected that government performance evaluation largely reflects the economic performance of the incumbent government. Therefore, it is assumed that the government performance evaluation variable includes retrospective economic perception.

Party affiliation: One of the long-term predisposition explaining voting choice is party affiliation. A partisan who has party affiliation with the Millennium Democratic Party is coded 1, independent voter is coded 2, and partisan affiliated with the Grand

National Party is coded 3.

Ideological self-image: As another long-term factor explaining voting choice, self-assessments of liberal-conservative ideology are included in the model specification. Individual ideological orientation is measured in a 5-point ordinal scale. A strong liberal is coded 1 and a strong conservative is coded 5.

Regionalism: As another long-term factor, regionalism is included in the regression model. It is widely accepted that regionalism is the predominant factor to explain electoral behaviour in Korea. As described in Chapter 2 of this thesis, in Korean politics, *Jeolla* people have always strongly supported the new ruling party, the Millennium Democratic Party, while *Gyeongsang* people have supported the old ruling party Grand National Party. In this analysis, regionalism is measured by a respondent's home region. In view of the rivalry between two regions, *Gyeongsang* and *Jeolla*, regionalism is recoded in a 3-point ordinal scale. Voters from *Jeolla* are coded 1, those from *Gyeongsang* are coded 3, and all others are coded 2.

Government performance evaluation: First, government performance evaluation is included in the regression model. It is assumed that those who evaluate government performance positively vote for the ruling party's candidate, and those who evaluate government performance negatively vote for the opposition party's candidate. Government performance is measured by an individual voter's perception of how the incumbent government is generally performing. Government performance is coded in a 5-point ordinal scale. A very good performance is coded 1 and a very bad performance is coded 5.

Candidate evaluation: As another short-term consideration affecting voting choice, candidate evaluation is included in the regression model. Candidate evaluation is measured by a voter's perception toward the candidate's competence to solve the nation's urgent problems identified by the voter. Someone who considered Roh Moo-hyun the best man to manage the nation's urgent problems is coded 1, while voters who perceived Lee Hoi Chang as the best candidate to handle the nation's urgent problems are coded 3. All others are coded 2.


Issue preference: Finally, as another short-term factor to explain voting choice, individual position on a key issue is added in the regression model. The issue position is based on the electoral split of North-South Korean relations. To simplify this analysis, some other potential issues that were discussed above, such as economic reform, expansion of welfare, and Korea-USA alliance relationship, have been excluded in the regression analysis. The differential position in the issue of North-South Korea relations explains voting choice in the 2002 presidential election more than other key issues. The issue position is measured in a 4-point ordinal scale. Someone who prefers an

improvement of peaceful relationship, i.e., engagement policy toward North Korea, is coded 1 and someone who opposes the engagement policy toward North Korea is coded 4.

The Causal-Chain

In the regression model, it is assumed that these independent variables affect each other, while each independent variable affects the dependent variable separately. Figure 10.1 is a summary of the causal-chain in the voting choice model. First, it is assumed that two long-term factors, i.e., regionalism and ideology, influence party identification. As explored in Chapter 6 of this thesis, regionalism and ideology are two key factors in explaining the partisan alignment in Korea. Voters feel close to a particular party due to the regional and ideological characteristics of the party. Liberals and voters from *Jeolla* are more likely to have affiliation with the Millennium Democratic Party, while the conservative or voters from *Gyeongsang* are more inclined to feel close to the Grand National Party.

Figure 10.1 The Causal Model of Voting Choice in the 2002 Presidential Election



Keys: L = long-term factors; S = short-term factors; D = dependent variable.

Second, it is assumed that party identification and regionalism impact upon government evaluation. Partisans affiliated with the ruling party are more likely to evaluate government performance positively, while partisans affiliated with the opposition party are more likely to be critical of government performance. It is assumed

that regionalism is also associated with government performance. Voters from *Gyeongsang* are more likely to be disappointed with the government led by president Kim Dae-jung who came from the rival *Jeolla* region.

Third, it is assumed that candidate evaluation is affected by three long-term predispositions. Voters from *Jeolla* are more likely to rate the candidate of the Millennium Democratic Party highly, while voters from *Gyeongsang* are inclined to evaluate highly the candidate of the Grand National Party. Also, partisans are more likely to see their own party's candidate as the best candidate. Ideological orientation also affects candidate evaluation. Liberals perceive a reformist candidate is better at running the government, while conservative voters would highly evaluate the more conservative candidate.

Finally, party identification and ideology affect a voter's issue position. Partisans are more likely to take positions on issues in line with their party's position on the issue. Individual ideological orientation is associated with individual issue position. Liberals will take a liberal position on each issue, while the conservative will take the opposite position on the same issue.

The Result of Regressions: All Voters

The regression model offers a convincing explanation of voting choice in Korea. As shown in Table 10.8, all six explanatory variables together explain 76.1 per cent of variance in the dependent variable (i.e., adjusted $R^2 = .761$). Also, the regression model of voting choice shows that every independent variable in the model except regionalism affected voting choice controlling for all other variables. Considering the sizes of the coefficients (Beta) and t-ratio, the candidate factor and party affiliation are the most significant explanations of voting choice. In particular, the effects of the candidate factor on voting choice are much bigger than that of other explanatory variables. This result corresponds with voter's perception of their voting choice. In a survey question about what the most important factor affecting their voting choice, more 60 per cent of voters cited candidate factors rather than party, policy, and issues. Elections in Korean can therefore be accurately described as 'candidate-centred'. The effects of the candidate factor on voting choice are stronger in a presidential election than in a parliamentary or local election.

Although the direct effects of other explanatory variables cannot compete with the effects of the candidate factor, long-term variables affected voting choice not only directly, but also indirectly. A set of additional regressions for estimating indirect effects of the long-term factors on voting choice was examined. First, a regression on party affiliation

highlighted that the regionalism and ideology variables together explained 26.8 per cent of variance in party identification (i.e., $R^2 = 0.268$). The result of regression analysis suggests that regionalism is the key factor to explain party affiliation among Korean voters, but ideology cannot be ignored in explaining partisan alignment in Korea, as discussed in Chapter 6.

Table 10. 8 Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Voting Choice in the 2002 Presidential Election: All Voters

	Standardized Coefficients (Beta)	t-ratios	Sig.(2-sided)
(Constant)		9.771	.000
Regionalism	.033	1.908	.057
Ideology	.038	2.424	.016
Party identification	.192	9.424	.000
Government performance	.040	2.349	.019
Candidate	.671	33.621	.000
Issue	.049	3.011	.003
Adjusted R ²	.761		
F-ratio (Sig.)	591.554 (.000)		

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002

Note: Dependent variable is voting choice; the Method is called 'Enter'.


These three long-term factors affected short-term factors. All three long-term factors affected candidate evaluation, together explaining 39.2 per cent of variance in candidate evaluation (i.e., $R^2 = 0.392$). In particular, the effect of party affiliation on candidate evaluation, controlling for regionalism and ideology, were sizeable (i.e., Beta = 0.489). Additional regression analyses also showed that regionalism and party affiliation explained voters' government performance evaluation while ideology and party affiliation affect on voters' issue positions. The effects of regionalism and ideology on government performance evaluation and issue position were relatively modest, while effects of party affiliation on these dependent variables were relatively large (see Figure 10.2).

Separate Subgroups Regressions: Partisans vs. Independent voters

In order to examine the different effects of the explanatory variables on voting choice for partisans and independent voters, the sample was split into partisans and independent voters, with the regression model of voting choice estimated for each subgroup. As shown in Table 10.9, two separate subgroup regressions showed that independent voters solely depend on short-term considerations in their voting choice, while partisans rely on long-term factors. Indeed, in the result of subgroup regression for partisans, coefficients of government performance and issues are very small and are not

statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

Figure 10. 2 The Causal Path of Voting Choice in the 2002 Presidential Election: All Voters



Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.
 Keys: L = long-term factors; S = short-term factors; D = dependent variable.
 Note: figures = standardized coefficients (Beta).

Table 10. 9 Summary of Separate Subgroup Regressions on Voting Choice in the 2002 Presidential Election: Partisan vs. Independents


	Sample Subgroup - Partisans			Sample Subgroup - Independents		
	Standardized Coefficients (Beta)	t-ratios	Sig.	Standardized Coefficients (Beta)	t-ratios	Sig.
(Constant)		12.909	.000		5.411	.000
Regionalism	.049	2.503	.013	.017	.608	.544
Ideology	.018	1.053	.293	.055	1.955	.051
Party identification	.432	15.061	.000	n/a	n/a	n/a
Government performance	.030	1.579	.115	.067	2.335	.020
Candidate	.475	18.017	.000	.753	24.983	.000
Issue	.010	.546	.585	.073	2.505	.013
Adjusted R ²	.841			.680		
F-ratio	579.989			193.923		
(Sig.)	.000			.000		

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.

Note: Dependent variable is voting choice.

In the result of subgroup regression for independent voters, the effects of regionalism and ideology on voting choice are small and not statistically significant. The choice of candidates significantly affects voting choice for both partisans and independent voters. In particular, independent voters are more heavily affected by the candidate factor in their voting choice, while partisans are largely influenced by both party affiliation and candidate factor. The two separate subgroup regressions are visually summarised in Figure 10.3 and Figure 10.4.

Figure 10.3 The Causal Path of Voting Choice in the 2002 Presidential Election: Partisan only




Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.

Keys: L = long-term factors; S = short-term factors; D = dependent variable.

Note: figures = standardized coefficients (Beta).

* Beta which is not significant at the 0.05 level is not displayed.

Figure 10. 4 The Causal Path of Voting Choice in the 2002 Presidential Election: Independents only



Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.

Keys: L = long-term factors; S = short-term factors; D = dependent variable.

Note: figures = standardized coefficients (Beta).

* Beta which is not significant at the 0.05 level is not displayed.

Separate Subgroup Regressions: Four Types of Voters

The sample is divided again and the regression model of voting choice is estimated against the four subgroups, i.e., critical partisans, habitual partisans, attentive independents, and apolitical independents. Four separate subgroup regressions yield outputs somewhat different from that in two separate subgroup regressions, i.e., partisan vs. independent voters.

Firstly, concerning the determinants of voting choice, the separate subgroup regressions show that candidate evaluation is the most important determinant of voting choice. But party identification is more important than candidate evaluation in the case of habitual partisans. Habitual partisans rely more on party loyalty in voting choice rather than the candidate factor, while critical partisans consider candidate quality first in voting choice, though they are also constrained by party loyalty (see Table 10.10).

Secondly, issue positions, which affect the voting choice of independent voters as a whole, do not determine the voting choice of both attentive and apolitical independents.

Furthermore, the voting choice of both attentive and apolitical independents is determined by long-term considerations, although the impact of such factors is small. Ideological self-image affects the voting choice of attentive independents while regionalism influences the voting choice of apolitical independents (see Table 10.10).

Thirdly, we can see some differences in the relations between long-term factors and short-term factors in the causal-chain. In the case of the critical partisans, regionalism does not influence their evaluation of government performance, and in the case of habitual partisans, the relations between self-identified ideology and issue position is not statistically significant. Also, the effects of party identification on short-term factors are greater for critical partisans than for habitual partisans (see Figure 10.5).

Table 10. 10 Summary of Separate Subgroup Regressions on Voting Choice in the 2002 Presidential Election: Four Types of Voters

Variables	Sample Subgroups							
	Critical Partisan		Habitual Partisan		Attentive Independent		Apolitical Independent	
	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.
(Constant)		.000		.000		.000		.000
Regionalism	.075	.006	.005	.853	-.064	.141	.072	.030
Ideology	.039	.117	.007	.741	.093	.040	.036	.287
Party identification	.369	.000	.524	.000	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Government performance	.038	.179	.029	.229	.144	.001	.019	.596
Candidate	.478	.000	.444	.000	.749	.000	.783	.000
Issue	.026	.298	.013	.551	.039	.397	.065	.058
Adjusted R ²	.823		.864		.677		.706	
F-ratio	281.415		339.288		77.028		141.505	
(Sig.)	.000		.000		.000		.000	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.

Note: Dependent variable is voting choice (i.e., 1 = Roh Moo-hyun, and 2 = Lee Hoi Chang).

Finally, there are some differences in the effects of self-identified ideology and regionalism on party identification between the critical partisan and the habitual partisan. The effect of ideology on party identification is greater for the critical partisan than for the habitual partisan, while the effect of regionalism on party identification is greater for the habitual partisan than for the critical partisan (see Figure 10.5).

The results of the series of regressions suggest that the choice of candidates is the key factor in determining voting choice, and this is true particularly for independent voters. This result matches with voters' perceptions about their voting choice. In a survey question about the factor that they concerned most in their vote decision, most voters cited the importance of candidates. This is particularly apparent in presidential elections rather than parliamentary elections or local elections, as discussed in chapter 7. However, although we cannot deny the strong relationship between voting choice and candidate

evaluation, we may argue that an individual's voting choice may affect their candidate evaluation. For example, in the post-election survey, respondents may think that a particular candidate is best qualified to deal with national issues because they had already voted for that candidate in the recent election. Therefore, voters may justify their voting choice by making a favourable evaluation of the candidate they cast their ballot for.¹² Also, it is arguable that selecting the most able candidate is similar to choosing a candidate to vote for, and so it is difficult to measure these two concepts separately.


Party identification accurately explains voting choice in Korea. Although political parties are institutionally underdeveloped and the party system is unstable, many voters have developed party identification which constrains their voting choice, as argued in Chapter 5. Furthermore, Korean political parties are not based on social class cleavages and the partisan alignment is largely based on regionalism. But, the regression results show that ideology is another key factor to explain party attachments. Contrary to the widely shared perception about political parties in Korea, voters align based on ideology.

We may speculate that other explanatory variables that are not included in the model specification may also affect voting choice. Age might be a good example. In the 2002 presidential election, pollsters and campaigners suggested that age differences were important in voting choice. Younger voters strongly supported Roh Moo-hyun while older Koreans supported Lee Hoi Chang. To examine the effects of age differences on voting choice, age variable was added in the regression model. The result of the regression model including the age variable suggests that age differences did not affect voting choice, controlling for other explanatory variables. The coefficient of the age variable is very small and is not statistically significant (i.e., Beta = 0.024, $t=1.571$, and $p = 0.116$).

Also, in order to estimate the indirect effect of age on voting choice, a set of supplementary regression models was examined. Age did not affect party identification, but was strongly associated with ideology. The young were more likely to be liberal and older voters conservative (i.e., Pearson $R = .228$). Age did not affect government performance evaluation, but did affect candidate evaluation and issue positions. However, the effect of age on candidate evaluation and issue positions was smaller than the effects of other variables, such as party identification and ideology although the coefficients were statistically significant. Moreover, the regression models were not greatly improved by adding age variable. To achieve parsimony of the model, therefore, the age variable was excluded in the model specification.

¹² Young-tae Kim, '*Hangugeseoui gyeonjetupyoo*' (Economic voting in Korea), in Nam-Young Lee, ed, *Hangugui seongeo* (Elections in Korea), vol. 2 (Seoul: Pureungil, 1998), pp.99-150, at pp. 129-30.

Figure 10. 5 The Causal Chain of Voting choice in the 2002 Presidential Election: Four Types of Voters



Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.

Keys: L = long-term factors, S = short-term factors, and D = dependent variable; ① = Critical Partisan, ② = Habitual Partisan, ③ = Attentive Independent, ④ = Apolitical Independent.

Note: Figures = standardized coefficients (Beta); R^2 = Adjusted R-square; * = Beta which is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

A Statistical Examination on the Difference in Effects for Subgroups

Partisan-independent difference: In a separate groups analysis, we found

differences in the coefficients of each explanatory variable for partisan and independent voters. Although differences in the causal path of voting choice for partisans and independent voters were found, we may ask whether the effect of each explanatory variable on voting choice in the regression model varies by partisan and independent voters, that is whether the difference is statistically significant. In order to test the different effects of each explanatory variable on voting choice for partisans and independent voters, interaction terms are added into the regression model of voting choice.¹³ The regression prediction equation is as follows and the model allows us to test for the differential effects of each explanatory variable by partisan-independent difference:

$$Y (\text{VOTE}) = a + b_1(\text{REGIONALISM}) + b_2(\text{IDEOLOGY}) + b_3(\text{PARTY}) + b_4(\text{PERFORMANCE}) + b_5(\text{CANDIDATE}) + b_6(\text{ISSUE}) + b_7(\text{REGION*ID}) + b_8(\text{IDEOLOGY*ID}) + b_9(\text{PARTY*ID}) + b_{10}(\text{PERFORMANCE*ID}) + b_{11}(\text{CANDIDATE*ID}) + b_{12}(\text{ISSUE*ID})$$

In the model, 'ID dummy variable' is coded as partisan = 1 and independent voters = 0. Also, REGION*ID, IDEOLOGY*ID, PARTY*ID, PERFORMANCE*ID, CANDIDATE*ID, and ISSUE*ID are interaction terms (i.e., multiplying each explanatory variable by ID dummy variable).

The coefficients for the interaction term estimate the extent to which the effects of explanatory variables differ for the partisan and independent voters sample subgroups.¹⁴ The regression model yields effects of these six explanatory variables, i.e., REGIONALISM through ISSUE, on voting choice for independent voters. The effects of these six independent variables on the voting choice of partisans can be estimated by summing coefficients. For example, the coefficients of the candidate variable for partisans are the sum of coefficients of candidate variable for independent voters and coefficients of its interaction term.

Estimating the coefficients of the interaction term, the effects of each explanatory variable on voting choice for independent voters are greater than the effects of each explanatory variable for partisans apart from the regionalism variable (see Table 10.11).

¹³ Melissa A. Hardy, 'Regression with Dummy Variables', in Michael S. Lewis-Beck, ed., *Regression Analysis* (London: Sage, 1993), pp. 69-158, at pp. 101-16.

¹⁴ Where partisan = 1 and independent voter = 0, the regression prediction equation for partisans is like the following:

$$Y (\text{VOTE}) = a + (b_1 + b_7)(\text{REGIONALISM}) + (b_2 + b_8)(\text{IDEOLOGY}) + (b_3 + b_9)(\text{PARTY}) + (b_4 + b_{10})(\text{PERFORMANCE}) + (b_5 + b_{11})(\text{CANDIDATE}) + (b_6 + b_{12})(\text{ISSUE})$$

Also, the regression prediction equation for independent voters is like the following:

$$Y (\text{VOTE}) = a + b_1(\text{REGIONALISM}) + b_2(\text{IDEOLOGY}) + b_3(\text{PARTY}) + b_4(\text{PERFORMANCE}) + b_5(\text{CANDIDATE}) + b_6(\text{ISSUE})$$

However, the coefficients of each interaction term except candidate and party identification are not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Party affiliation is only important to those who have party identification, so it is unnecessary to compare the effects of party affiliation on voting choice for partisans to the effects for independents. Therefore, the regression prediction equation shows that only the effect of the candidate factor on voting choice for independent voters is greater than the effect of the candidate factors for partisans. The difference is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Partisans cast a ballot based on party affiliation and the candidate, while independent voters who do not have party affiliation heavily depend on the candidate factor in making voting choice along with other short-term considerations.

Table 10. 11 Summary of Regression Model of Voting Choice Adding Interaction Terms: Partisan-Independent Difference

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T-ratios	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	.378	.059		11.075	.000
Regionalism	.012	.017	.018	.715	.475
Ideology	.029	.013	.059	2.300	.022
Party identification	-.031	.036	-.049	-.886	.376
Government performance	.035	.013	.073	2.747	.006
Candidate	.396	.013	.764	29.391	.000
Issue	.038	.013	.071	2.947	.003
Regionalism*ID	.020	.023	.048	.900	.368
Ideology*ID	-.021	.016	-.070	-1.328	.184
Party identification*ID	.215	.017	.335	6.021	.000
Government performance*ID	-.021	.016	-.076	-1.306	.192
Candidate*ID	-.152	.021	-.360	-7.343	.000
Issue*ID	-.038	.017	-.095	-1.944	.052
Adjusted R ²	.779				
F-ratio	328.430				
Sig. (2-sided)	.000				

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002

Note: Dependent variable is voting choice.

Attentive-apolitical independent difference: As shown above in Table 10.10 and Figure 10.5, there are differences in the coefficients of each explanatory variable for attentive independents and apolitical independents. In separate subgroup regressions, the effects of candidate variable, government performance variable, and ideology variable for attentive independents are statistically significant at the 0.05 level, whereas the effects of candidate variable and regionalism variable for apolitical independents are statistically significant.

In order to examine whether the difference in the effects of each explanatory variable on voting choice for attentive independents and apolitical independents is

statistically significant, another regression model with interaction terms is undertaken. The regression prediction equation is as follows:

$$Y (\text{VOTE}) = a + b_1(\text{REGIONALISM}) + b_2(\text{IDEOLOGY}) + b_3(\text{PERFORMANCE}) + b_4(\text{CANDIDATE}) + b_5(\text{ISSUE}) + b_6(\text{REGION*INTEREST}) + b_7(\text{IDEOLOGY*INTEREST}) + b_8(\text{PERFORMANCE*INTEREST}) + b_9(\text{CANDIDATE*INTEREST}) + b_{10}(\text{ISSUE*INTEREST})$$

In the model, 'INTEREST' dummy variable is coded as 'having strong interest in politics' = 1 and 'not having strong interest in politics' = 0. Also, REGION*INTEREST, IDEOLOGY*INTEREST, PERFORMANCE*INTEREST, CANDIDATE*INTEREST, and ISSUE*INTEREST are interaction terms (i.e., multiplying each explanatory variable by INTEREST dummy variable).

Table 10. 12 Summary of Regression Model of Voting Choice Adding Interaction Terms: Attentive-Apolitical Independent Difference

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T-ratios	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	.363	.035		10.443	.000
Regionalism	.076	.015	.112	5.145	.000
Ideology	.011	.011	.023	1.054	.292
Government performance	.018	.011	.038	1.592	.112
Candidate	.394	.012	.758	31.792	.000
Issue	.041	.012	.079	3.460	.001
Regionalism*INTEREST	-.052	.021	-.122	-2.566	.010
Ideology*INTEREST	.025	.014	.080	1.796	.073
Government performance*INTEREST	.026	.015	.095	1.740	.082
Candidate*INTEREST	-.008	.019	-.018	-.453	.651
Issue*INTEREST	-.014	.017	-.042	-.884	.377
Adjusted R ²	.736				
F-ratio	332.010				
Sig. (2-sided)	.000				

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002

Note: Dependent variable is voting choice.

Estimating the coefficients of the interaction terms, the effects of each explanatory variable on voting choice for attentive independent voters are not different from the effects of each explanatory variable on voting choice for apolitical independent voters apart from the regionalism factor (see Table 10.12). Indeed, the regression prediction equation shows that only the effect of the regionalism factor on voting choice for apolitical independent voters is greater than the effects of the regionalism factor for attentive independent voters. In sum, we may conclude that in general, attentive

independents are not very different from apolitical independents in terms of voting behaviour, even though apolitical independent voters consider regionalism in voting choice and attentive independent voters do not.

2. Independents and Voting Choice: Rational Voters?

According to the quantitative survey data above, independent voters are more affected by short-term considerations on voting choice compared to partisans. Independent voters cast a ballot for a candidate who has the competence to solve the nation's urgent problems. The voting choice of independents is more responsive to the influence of government evaluation and issue preference. We may conclude that independent voters cast their ballots based on rational calculation, and thus are more rational voters compared to partisans. However, qualitative interview data suggests that independent voters did not cast a ballot based on rational calculations. First, independents voters do not make their voting decision with sufficient information. The opposite is true. Independent voters are less informed than partisans. It is doubtful that poorly informed voters make a voting choice based on rational calculations. Second, the qualitative interview data suggests that independent voters are not particularly influenced by their evaluation of the incumbent government. The voting choice of independents does not correspond to their perception of the health of the economy. Finally, the qualitative interview data also reveals that independents heavily rely on candidate evaluation in making their voting choice, but this is not necessarily rational. Independents often base their vote on the candidates' affective traits, such as warmth, or even non-political traits, such as appearance or image, which is completely unrelated to the candidates' competence.

The Poorly Informed Voters

Rational choice requires sufficient information for making the right choice. If voters were not well informed, they could not make a voting choice based on careful examination of the candidates.

Voting Choice without Sufficient Information

Limited information: First, qualitative interview data suggests that many voters had insufficient or minimal information when they made their voting choice. In in-depth interviews, roughly half of independents reported that they did not have sufficient

information in making their voting choice, while one quarter of independents believed that they had enough information for voting choice. In contrast to independents, more than a half of partisans revealed that they had sufficient information for voting choice. In the focus group interviews, most independent voters reported that they did not have sufficient information about candidates or policies when they cast a ballot. For example, “I had only minimal information” (FM2), “I had a cursory knowledge about the candidates. I did not know them certainly” (FM1; FM4). “I made my voting decision based on some basic information and something I watched in the TV debates” (FM6). “I did not give much attention to the election. [so, I did not have much information]” (FM5).

Passiveness in gathering information: Second, most independents are not active in gathering information, and this would be a main reason why they did not have sufficient information. In a question about the main information source for their information, many independent voters reported that they depended solely or mostly on the TV debates. This implies that they were not very eager to gather information from other sources that demanded more efforts or interest in the election. For example, “I hardly read newspapers [about election] because I was busy with business. I could watch the TV debate because it was scheduled in the evening” (I-141). Some respondents confessed that a lack of interest in election was the main reason why they failed to acquire much information for voting choice. For example, “I think that I did not give attention to election” (I-138; I-133). “I was less interested in the election. So, I did not try to go to the Internet or to watch TV debates to gather information” (I-140; I-129).

Lacks of interest in election: In focus group interviews, participants suggested that they were not interested in the election, so they did not have sufficient information. For example, “I was not interested in the election. I did not want to give attention to the election this time. Because I was not interested in election, I hardly know about any of the candidates, but I voted” (FF3). “To be honest with you, I was not interested in the election, so I did not even read newspapers. I had preconceptions about each candidate I which I could not lose” (FF2). “If I had tried to gather information, I could gather information. However, I did not try to gather information” (FM2; FF3). “I did not gather information... I cast my ballot on the basis of my feelings rather than information” (FF2).

Reliance on family members and friends: Also, approximately one quarter of independent voters in qualitative in-depth interviews referred to other people, particularly family members or friends, as the main information source. Because independent voters are less interested in elections and are relatively less sophisticated in understanding politics, they depend on other people’s opinions rather than finding out information themselves. For example, “Because I can’t really understand politics, I did not gather much information. I got information from other people, so I did not have much

information” (I-132). “I feel that what I heard from my friends was the most valuable information” (I-130). “I heard something from my friends during the coffee break. That was enough for me to make my voting choice” (I-131). In sum, the voters in the interviews did not pay much attention to the election and did not gather sufficient information for making voting choice. This implies that they did not make voting choice based on a careful comparison of all contending candidates.

Voting Choice with Incomplete Information

Considering the quality and substance of information that voters obtained, it is doubtful that independent voters were able to make a careful calculation about their electoral choice.

Unbalanced information: First, voters are narrow-minded when collecting information about candidates or the election in general. Qualitative data suggests that many independents were informed about only one candidate rather than all major contenders in election because they had a preconceived preferences for one candidate or were less interested in the election. For example, “To be honest, I knew about the candidate whom I voted for, but not about other candidates” (I-116; I-117; I-124). “I was not very interested in the election. I did not compare all the candidates. I only got some information about the one candidate who I liked” (I-133). “I had a prejudice against one [of the two major candidates]. I knew that I should not have any prejudice in order to know him in detail...” (I-134). “I did not give attention to all candidates except one candidate whom I supported” (FF5).

Preponderance to candidate traits: Second, in the voters’ mind, there were no policies or issues, but only the candidates’ quality. Even a candidate’s non-political traits, such as appearance, are important. In the qualitative in-depth interviews, many independents reported that they were interest in knowing a candidate’s traits, particularly their integrity or personality. For example, “I focused on the candidates’ qualities rather than policies or issues. I think that appearance and eloquence are important” (I-111). “I was very interested in the candidates’ qualities” (I-142; I-133; I-126; I-101; I-107).

In answering a question about the kinds of information that they wanted to know, many independents suggested that they were not interested in finding out about issues or policies offered by the candidates. They even discredited all policies and election pledges offered by all candidates. For example, “There was no difference in policies between candidates. So, I could not make a voting choice based on policies” (I-102; I-122; I-134). “Because all candidates issued policies recklessly, I could not rely on election pledges. So, I tried to know about what the candidates had done as politicians” (I-115). “I did not

believe election pledges. I focused on the candidate's quality and personality" (I-116; I-125; FF6).

'Economic Perception' and Voting Choice

Most Korean electors believed that the economy was the nation's most urgent problem to be solved. In the Korean Presidential Election Study survey data, almost 80 per cent of voters perceived that economic issues, such as inflation, unemployment, or economic growth, were the most important national matters. However, qualitative data revealed that independent voters' economic perception did not greatly affect their voting choice in the 2002 presidential election. Neither expectation of better personal economic conditions nor perception of the state of the economy explained voting choice. In the in-depth interviews, approximately a half of independents reported that they did not pay much attention to economic issues when making a voting decision. Also, among those who referred to the impact of the economy on voting choice, a half of them suggested only a modest impact of the economy on their choice. Only a small number of respondents firmly believed that their economic perception was a significant factor determining their voting choice.

Why was Economic Perception Unimportant in Voting Choice?

Lack of difference in economic issues: First, voters failed to perceive any salient economic issues and faced a lack of differences in economic issue among the candidates. When there is no difference in economic issues, it is not possible to expect economic voting. In the in-depth interviews, many respondents reported that they did not perceive a clear difference in the candidates' economic policies or the candidates' competence to solve economic issues among the candidates. For example, "I do not think that any one of the candidates can improve economy in a short time" (I-105; I-119). "I think that all candidates lack the competence to manage the nation's economy effectively" (I-106). "I did not think that the state of the nation's economy or my financial conditions will change greatly as a result of the election outcome" (I-112). "I think that the economic policies offered by all candidates failed to attract voters' attention. In a broad sense, all candidates' economic policies were similar" (I-203). Voters also recognised that the nation's economy is largely influenced by economic conditions in the world market. For example, "The Korean economy is strongly influenced by the market conditions of the world economy. Regardless of who becomes president, there will be no difference" (I-211; I-112; FM6; FM5).

Lacks of interest and understanding: Second, a lack of understanding or interest in the economy is another reason why voters find it difficult to make their electoral choice based on economic conditions. For example, a student said, “I am not interested in economic issues, so I did not consider economic issues when I cast my ballot” (I-138; I-116). “Because I do not know about the economy, I did not consider economic matters when I made my voting choice” (I-127; I-207). Also, in the interviews, most respondents showed that they had only a small amount of information on economic policies and issues, though some of them believed that economic issue was important in their voting choice. For example “I do not know any specific economic policies offered by the candidates” (I-109).

Ambiguous influence of economic perception: Some respondents who referred to the impact of economic considerations on voting choice were less certain later about its influence on their choice of candidate. In follow-up questions, they often denied its importance on voting choice. For example, a professional said, “I think that the economy was important in my voting choice. I think that my business is directly influenced by the state of the nation’s economy... I was not affected by prospective economic benefits. For instance, I am middle class, but I voted Kwon Young-gil who represents the economic interests of the working class and the poor... I did not consider the state of the nation’s economy... Incumbent government evaluation was not at all related to my vote for Kwon” (I-208).

Unimportance of Individual Economic Interest

‘Pocket-book voting’ did not explain voting choice to a significant extent in the 2002 presidential election. In a question about whether they anticipated any change in their personal financial conditions depending on the result of election, almost all respondents answered that they did not expect any difference in their personal economic situation regardless of who won the election. For example, “I suspect that no people thought about this [personal economic benefit]” (I-111). “Politicians are not the man who gives me my paycheck” (I-125). “I hardly even considered it [a relation between voting choice and personal economic benefit]” (I-131; I-138).

Prospective Perception of the Nation’s Economy

‘Prospective economic voting’ based on the nation’s economic conditions may explain voting choice to some extent in the 2002 presidential election, but the relation between voting choice and prospective economic perception is questionable.

Approximately half of independents expected an improvement in the national economy, but many of them did not clearly confirm the influence of their perception of future economic conditions on their voting choice. They referred to their expectation about the national economy, but this was more like an expression of their wishful thinking in post-election interviews. For example, “I hope that the state of nation’s economy is better in near future” (I-111; I-121; I-123; I-125; I-138). A young woman said, “I did not really consider economic issues... I believe that the nation’s economy will be better [under the new administration]” (I-113).

Candidates’ competence rather than their policies: Voters suggested that they focused on candidates’ economic competence or qualities rather than specific policies offered. For example, “I thought that he can run the government effectively, and this would lead to an increased economic competitiveness in the world market” (I-128). In a sense, their economic perception about the future did not influence their voting preference, but candidate preference instead influenced their expectations about the economy. They preferred a candidate due to other reasons, and then believed that the state of the nation’s economy would improve if their preferred candidate won election. For example, “I thought that he [Lee Hoi Chang] will run the nation’s economy well because has a broad knowledge” (I-132). “I thought that he [Lee Hoi Chang] has a more competence to manage the nation’s economy because he is man with a varied career in government” [I-133].

Salient Economic Issues in the 2002 election: Some independent voters who took the economy into their consideration in making their voting choice suggested salient economic issues in the 2002 presidential election. Some of them referred to economic inequality within society and social welfare. For example, “I excluded any candidate who offered economic policies focused on economic growth [rather than welfare] in my voting choice” (I-129). “I expected that the living conditions of the poor would improve when he became president” (I-201). Some of them even referred to a political issue relevant to their economic expectations. For example, “I thought that he would clean up political corruption, and this is related to the state of the nation’s economy” (I-141; I-209).

Retrospective Perception of the Nation’s Economy

‘Retrospective economic voting’ did not explain voting choice in the 2002 presidential election. Most independent voters suggested that they did not greatly consider the incumbent government’s economic performance when they made their voting choice. For example, “I know about it [the state of the economy], but I did not consider it much in my voting decision” (FM1). Only a few independent voters revealed

that their government evaluation affected their voting choice. For example, “I think that Kim Dae-jung administration was very poor in economic performance, so I cast a ballot to an opposition party’s candidate” (I-133). Some respondents agreed that incumbent government was poor in economic performance, but did not clearly suggest that their retrospective economic evaluation affected their voting. For example, “I do not want to talk about it [because I think the government’s performance was so bad]” (I-142; I-141; I-124; I-107).

Blaming current government for the bad economy: In the in-depth interviews, most independent voters agreed that the state of the nation’s economy was bad, but there was no consensus that Kim Dae-jung’s administration was responsible for the bad economic conditions. Some of them blamed the incumbent government for the bad economic conditions, while others recognised that Kim Dae-jung’s administration overcame a critical economic recession five years previously. The nation’s economic condition was bad, but had been worse when Kim Dae-jung was elected in 1997. Also, this implies that voters did not give much credit to the opposition party either, although voters did not directly mention that the previous government was responsible for the economic recession. For example, “Although, many people complain that the nation’s economic conditions are bad, I think that the incumbent government was not the worst in managing economy” (I-130; I-104; I-134). “I don’t agree that Kim Dae-jung’s government is heavily responsible for the nation’s bad economic conditions. I don’t think that we can blame the government for the nation’s economic conditions and should punish the government in election” (FM2).

Linking current government and candidate: Independent voters suggested that they did not regard the ruling party’s candidate as being connected with the incumbent government. This may be natural in Korea where political party politics are not stable. In the 2002 presidential election, especially, Roh Moo-hyun won the presidential primary and was nominated for president by the ruling party, but the ruling party did not fully support him even after he was nominated. Many independent voters did not really consider him as the ruling party’s presidential candidate, and so did not blame him for the failure of incumbent government. For example, “I know that Kim Dae-jung’s administration failed economically... I did not vote for the political party, but voted Roh Moo-hyun because I believed that he is man of competence” (I-115). “Roh Moo-hyun was not from the mainstream faction of the Millennium Democratic Party. [So, he is not responsible for the failure of incumbent government]” (I-130; I-113). “I evaluated the candidates’ competence in voting choice. I did not evaluate the incumbent government’s performance” (I-137). “I don’t think that any president can solve all economic problems... I don’t agree that Roh Moo-hyun will be similar to the incumbent president

in managing economic problems because he is a presidential candidate of the ruling party. I believe that Roh Moo-hyun is not Kim Dae-jung” (FF8).

In conclusion, economic perception was not a key factor to explain voting choice for independents in the 2002 presidential election. Opposition party partisans were relatively critical of the incumbent government, but they also often mixed economic performance and political issues, such as political corruption or economic aid to North Korea. They criticised everything related to the incumbent government, including economic performance. Most independent voters did not really consider economic voting in the 2002 presidential election. They saw no difference between the candidates in economic policies or competence to solve the urgent economic problems. They were split in evaluating the government’s economic performance. They hardly thought about individual economic benefits when they cast a ballot. The economy was not a significant issue and ‘economic voting’ based economic perceptions does not explain voting choice in the 2002 presidential election to a great extent. For example, “I didn’t expect that we could overcome an economic crisis within a short-period time when I cast a ballot. I did not expect any personal benefit either. I expect that we should scrape out political corruption first even if we cannot solve economic problems at this moment” (FM4).

Candidate Evaluation: Competence vs. Image

Korean electors lay weight on candidate factors in electoral choice. In the 2002 Korean Presidential Election Study, more than 60 per cent of all voters answered that they attached importance to candidate factors in making their voting decision. In the in-depth and focus group interviews, most respondents referred to their ‘candidate perception’ as the most important factor influencing their voting choice. In the in-depth interviews, thirty-five of forty-two independent voters reported that they cast a ballot based on candidate evaluations. Nine of fourteen partisans relied on candidate evaluation as the criteria for voting choice. In the focus group interviews, almost all independents reported that candidate evaluation was the most important factor determining their voting choice, while a few partisans referred to policies.

Some of them articulated the reasons why they depended on candidate evaluation in their voting choice. Respondents presumed that there was no policy difference across candidates. Also, they stressed the candidates’ ability to realise policies rather than the substance of policies. For example, “Every political party offers good policies. No political party suggests bad policies. So I paid attention to the candidates” (FM4; I-116; I-119). “The candidate factor was important in my voting choice. The candidates’ abilities takes precedence over policies. Candidates will realise policies” (FM2; I-134). “I did not

know policies in detail. I just believed that he will conduct state affairs well if he become president” (1-202). “I cast a ballot on the basis of candidate evaluation. Only a competent president can offer good policies and realise them” (FF2).

As examined above, a multiple regression analysis showed that candidate evaluation is a major factor to explain voting choice. Candidates matter to voters, but particularly to independents. Voting choice based on candidate evaluation may be rational behaviour. Independent voters who lay greater weight on candidate evaluation compared to partisans may be rational voters compared to partisans who are constrained by psychological party affiliation. However, a voter’s candidate evaluations are not always politically rational. Voters do not always carefully compare all candidates. Voters evaluate candidates with only limited information. Voters sometimes evaluate candidates on the basis of irrational aspects of the candidate’s traits such as appearance. If a voter’s candidate evaluation is not based on careful examination and comparison, or if voters evaluate candidates on the basis of superficial image of candidates, it is difficult to conclude that voting choice based on candidate evaluations is rational.

Multi-Dimensions of Candidate Traits

Voters’ perceptions of candidates or candidate image consists of various candidate traits such as competence, integrity, leadership, and empathy.¹⁵ These candidate traits are categorised into ‘cognitive’ dimension and ‘affective’ dimensions.¹⁶ Candidate competence and integrity are included in the cognitive dimension, while leadership and empathy are in the affective dimension. Also, these candidate traits are distinguished into ‘performance related’ traits and ‘personal’, ‘non-political’ traits, though researchers often do not cover personal, non-political dimensions in their research.¹⁷

Based upon the various traits of candidates and the various possible categories, candidate’s traits are classified into related aspects of candidate evaluation based on five dimensions. The first is the *candidate’s competence* to solve the nation’s urgent problems. The competence dimension comprises the candidate’s intelligence, ability as a statesman, or varied political career. The second dimension of candidate traits is *trustworthiness*. Trustworthiness dimension comprises integrity, reliability, sincerity and honesty as a

¹⁵ J. Merrill Shanks and Warren E. Miller, ‘Policy Direction and Performance Evaluation: Complementary Explanations of the Regan Elections’, *British Journal of Political Science*, 20 (1990), 143-235.

¹⁶ Arthur H. Miller, Martin P. Wattenberg, and Oksana Malanchuk, ‘Schematic Assessments of Presidential Candidates’, *American Political Science Review*, 80 (1986), 521-540.

¹⁷ Dieter Ohr and Henrik Oscarsson, ‘Leader Traits, Leader Image and Voting choice’, a paper presented at the 2003 Meeting of the European Consortium for Political Research, 18-21 September 2003, Marburg, Germany, p.3.

politician. The third dimension is *leadership* such as the candidate's quality as political leader, or the ability to communicate with people. *Empathy* such as warmth and the affinity the voter feels with the candidate is another dimension of candidate traits. Finally, the *personal* dimension refers to non-political quality of candidates such as age and appearance.

Candidate evaluations are more rational or less rational depending upon the criteria of evaluation. If voters evaluate candidates on the basis of the candidate's competence or trustworthiness and cast a ballot based on candidate evaluation, voting choice is more rational. If voters evaluate candidates on the basis of leadership and cast a ballot based on candidate evaluation, voting choice is less rational compared to candidate evaluation and voting choice on the basis of candidate's competence or trustworthiness. If voters' candidate evaluations are largely based on empathy or personal factors and cast a ballot based on candidate evaluations, voting choice is more irrational.

Weighing Candidate Images over Candidate Competence

In the in-depth interviews, the majority of independents supported a particular candidate focusing on the candidate's trustworthiness or leadership attributes. Some of them evaluated candidates on the basis of empathy dimension of candidate's traits. Only a few mentioned the candidate's competence to solve the nation's urgent problems. Also, most partisans answered that they evaluated the candidate focusing on the candidate's competence, trustworthiness, and leadership, while few referred to empathy as the criteria for candidate evaluation. This suggests that independents were relatively more dependent on affective dimensions of candidate traits, while partisans were more reliant on the cognitive dimensions of candidate's traits. Meanwhile, most independents referred to only one dimension of candidate's traits, while most partisans cited more than one dimension. This implies that independents evaluate candidates with limited information compared to partisans. Partisans who were better informed about candidate could refer to various aspects of candidate's traits in the post-election interviews, while independents who were not interested in election could not.

Integrity and Reliability: Many independent voters reported that integrity and reliability were important in their candidate evaluation. Integrity and reliability attributes were closely related to Roh Moo-hyun rather Lee Hoi Chang in the 2002 presidential election. Many people perceived that Roh Moo-hyun was firm in his convictions and was not corrupt. Voters appreciated Roh's uprightness. Voters gave credit to Roh Moo-hyun and believed that he would be able to realise his political programmes or policies if he were elected. For example, "I appreciated highly his firm conviction, which he showed us

through his work in the past” (I-106; I-115; I-138; FM7). “I believed that he is not corrupt. I voted for him because he is man of integrity” (I-125). “I believe that he will keep his election pledges” (I-113; I-111). Some electors who voted Lee Hoi Chang suggested that they voted for him because he was an honourable man. For example, “I voted for him because he is honest. When he was a judge he never allowed any corruption” (I-141; I-142).

Leadership: Meanwhile, electors who voted for Lee Hoi Chang often referred to the leadership dimension of the candidate’s traits. Lee Hoi Chang has filled various government posts including premiership and he was superior to Roh Moo-hyun in this aspect of candidate traits. For example, “The candidate’s qualities are the most important in voting choice... I believed that someone who has strong leadership could run government well” (I-119; I-120; I-124; FF5) “Leaders should act with prudence and should not be self-righteous” (I-128; FF5).

Empathy: In the 2002 presidential election, empathy was one of the most important dimensions in candidate evaluations. Roh Moo-hyun was particularly strong in this respect compared to Lee Hoi Chang. Roh was born in a poor family in a rural area and he did not go to college, while Lee Hoi Chang was born in an upper class family and he is one of the elite of society. Voters preferred Roh because they perceived that Roh looked liked an ordinary person. For example, “I like his personality... I like his image of common people” (I-140; I-121; I-201). “I feel that he is a warm-hearted man. I feel friendly toward him. I feel that he is similar to one of my neighbours” (I-105). “I voted for him because I believed that he fully understands how common people live” (I-108; I-113). “He truly understands our lives” (I-130). “I really like him because of his humanity” (I-123; I-137; I-139). “I believed that someone to whom we could feel friendly should be president” (I-134). Even some independents referred to personal, non-political traits. For example, “I prefer a young candidate” (FF6).

In sum, most independents cast their ballot on the basis of candidate evaluation (or candidate perception). In evaluating a candidate’s quality, few considered competence to solve urgent the nation’s problems. Many independents preferred one candidate to others in terms of trustworthiness, leadership, and empathy. This contradicts the results of the quantitative analysis as discussed above. Survey data showed a strong association between voting choice and evaluation of a candidate’s competence, but qualitative interview data suggested that voters hardly evaluate candidates on the basis of competence in problem-solving.

Although it is difficult to conclude whether independents are rational in candidate evaluation compared to partisans, it is clear that the voting choice of many independent voters is based on a superficial image of the candidates. Therefore, voting choice based

on short-term considerations is not always rational. Rational voting is possible when voters are well-informed about candidates in voting choice. Voters who gather most of their information from TV debates do not understand very well the policy differences between candidates. They do not have enough information for voting choice, but they cast a ballot anyway. One participant in the focus groups, although an extreme example, exemplified the irrationality of the voting choice of many independents. "I cannot distinguish one candidate from another candidate, although I watched the TV debates... I did not really know Lee Hoi Chang nor Roh Moo-hyun. But, I decided to vote for Lee because he is perfect image of my husband. Lee looks like my husband who is nice to me, so I began to trust him" (FF8).

Chapter 11. Conclusion

In this chapter, the findings of this study will be summarised, focusing on the nature of independent voters in Korea and how they make their voting decision. There are two main results. First, partisan dealignment and the increase in independent voters in Korea over the last 10 years have been caused by falling electoral interest in politics, which was partly related to electoral disappointment and dissatisfaction with the political processes of the new democracy. Second, independent voters who are free from party constraints are responsive to short-term considerations in voting choice, but this does not mean that the electoral choice of independent voters is politically rational. These results also have important normative consequences.

Empirical Findings

The Electorate Has Developed Party Identification Despite the Instability of Political Parties in New Democracy

The findings of this thesis reject a widely held assumption that Korean voters cannot have long-term psychological attachments to a political party because all political parties in Korea are institutionally underdeveloped. Most Korean voters can effectively recognise and distinguish between the major political parties in terms of politicians, loyal supporters, and platforms and policies of the political parties, even though the forms and names of the political parties have changed frequently.

The strength of party affiliation in Korea is generally weak and the endurance of party affiliation is quite problematic. In particular, the level of party identification is unstable within a relatively short-time period and the voting intention of party identifiers is affected by short-term political events in the course of election campaigns. However, party identification is still clearly distinguished from party preference or candidate preference in a specific election. Moreover, partisan loyalty to a political party in voting choice is considerable. In post-election surveys, more than 90 per cent of the partisans of two major parties reported that they voted for the candidate of their political party in a specific election.

Ideological Self-image also Explains Partisan Alignment in the New Democracy

After the transition to democracy in 1987, the electoral cleavage based on the distinction between pro-government and pro-opposition supporters has been weakened when the historical opposition camp leading democratic movement was split. In the new democracy, the electorate has been aligned along the regional cleavage based on regional antagonism between people from two rival regions — *Gyeongsang* and *Jeolla*. In the new democracy, *Gyeongsang* remains the regional basis for the conservative old ruling party, while *Jeolla* region become the stronghold of the opposition party (or new ruling party since 1997) demanding political and economic reforms within Korea.

Although regionalism is the main explanation for the partisan alignment in Korea, multiple regression analysis also reveals that ideological self-image explains the partisan alignment in the new democracy. Liberals identify themselves with the historical pro-democracy party (the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002) and conservatives align themselves with the authoritarian old-ruling party (the Grand National Party in 2002). This finding rejects the controversial argument that the partisan alignment of all major political parties in Korea merely reflects the regional cleavage because the major parties cannot be clearly distinguished in terms of party platform and social class.

Public Disinterest in Politics Has Caused Partisan Decline in New Democracy

For the last decade, partisan decline has been extensive in Korea. After the transition to democracy in 1987, most Koreans quickly aligned with political parties. This runs counter to the pattern in other new democracies such as post-communist countries and Southern European countries where the electorates are still at the pre-aligned stage. Not only have most Koreans developed some form of party allegiance but there have also been signs that Korea is now following the trends of the established Western democracies. There has been a major electoral dealignment in Korea over the last decade. Survey evidence shows that the level of party identification dropped from 77.3 per cent to 59.5 per cent between the 1992 and the 2002 presidential election.

These findings suggest that the ‘political explanation’ rather than the ‘sociological explanation’ is more convincing in explaining partisan decline in Korea. Both quantitative and qualitative data confirm that electoral dissatisfaction with politics and disinterest in politics are the main causes of partisan decline. Many Koreans who had sought democracy for a long time before the eventual transition achieved in the June People’ Uprising in 1987 had high hopes for the new democracy, but were soon disappointed with the political processes of the new democracy where old party politics prevailed.

Although most voters are dissatisfied with the current political process and political

parties in Korea, most do not reject democracy or democratic institutions and system. Indeed, qualitative data showed that most Koreans firmly believe that political parties are a key institution in the democratic political process.

Party Identification Is Enduring, but also Changeable

The 1997 presidential election was a critical election in terms of electoral dealignment. In particular, a weakening of party affiliation with the old ruling party took place in the new democracy. At the aggregate level, party identification with the old ruling party (i.e., the Grand National Party) markedly decreased in the 1997 presidential election when Korea faced to a critical economic recession. Many voters who had been loyal to the authoritarian ruling party, such as the less educated, women, farmers, low-income earners, and the self-employed, stopped supporting the Grand National Party. This rejects the view that party affiliation of individual voters endures and is consolidated over the course of their lifetime. Individual party affiliation is changeable and is affected by performance of political parties, in line with the revisionist view of party identification.

Independents in the New Democracy Are Apolitical rather than Politically Attentive

The findings of this study suggest that the young, students, white-collar workers and non-manual workers, centrists in liberal-conservative ideological self-image, and voters not from *Gyeongsang* and *Jeolla* are more likely to be independent voters. In particular, the increasing number of independent voters in Korea has been based on an increase in 'apolitical independents' who are not interested in politics rather than 'attentive independents' interested in politics. The young are more likely to be alienated from politics. Education enhances neither interest in politics nor produces a better understanding of politics. In the new democracy, individual voters have become less interested in public affairs and are rapidly withdrawing from politics.

Voting Behaviour of Independent Voters Are Unstable

The findings also confirm that voting behaviour of independent voters is quite different from voting behaviour of partisans in terms of turnout, changes in voting intention, and the timing of electoral choice. Nonetheless, the findings also show that the voting behaviour of many independent voters is stable in general.

Independents as vanishing voters: In the new democracy, voter turnout in

presidential elections has decreased markedly from 90 per cent to 71 per cent between 1987 and 2002. Quantitative surveys confirm that independent voters are more likely to absent from voting compared to partisans, but partisan enthusiasm explains only a small variance of turnout. Multiple regression analysis shows that interest in elections is the most important factor to explain a decline in turnout in Korea. Qualitative data also confirmed that voters mainly do not go to the polls because of a lack of interest in elections and politics.

Independents as hesitant voters: Individual voting behaviour of independent voters is unstable compared to that of partisans. Independent voters made a later voting decision compared to partisans. Approximately 22 per cent of independent voters made their voting choice within three days of the day of the election. However, although the voting decision of independent voters was later than that of partisans, approximately 45 per cent of independent voters made voting decision before the official campaigns began. Qualitative data suggested that voters hesitated in making voting decision when they were less interested in the election, did not see many differences between the candidates, and did not have sufficient information about candidates and the election.

Independents as floating voters: The voting intention of individual independent voters is less stable compared to that of partisans. Approximately 22 per cent of independent voters changed their vote intention at least once, while only 15 per cent of partisans changed theirs. But qualitative data showed that independent voters also hardly changed their voting intention, though the strength of vote preference was varied to some extent during the course of election campaigns.

Independents as swing voters: In terms of voting consistency between consecutive elections, many independent voters cast their ballot for the same political party, though independent voters were less consistent compared to partisans. Indeed, about 71 per cent of partisans who voted for one of two major parties in the 1997 presidential election voted for a same party in the 2002 presidential election, while about 53.3 per cent of independent voters did so.

The Impact of Election Campaigns on Voting Choice Are Minimal

The findings did not confirm the hypothesis that independent voters are more responsive to election campaigns compared to partisans. Regardless of whether the voter was a partisan or independent, the electorate did not seem to be greatly affected by election campaigns. The minimal effect theory is useful in explaining electoral behaviour in Korea. In particular, the TV presidential debates and the Internet campaigns provided much information about candidate and election to individual voters, but the impact of the

debates and the Internet was not strong enough for individual voters to change their earlier voting intention or to make voting decision.

TV presidential debates — the king of election campaigns, but minimal effects: In contrast to a common belief about the considerable impact of the televised debates between the candidates on voting choice, the presidential debates held during the official campaign period did not have a major influence the electoral choice of both partisans and independents. Quantitative surveys confirmed that the impact of the debates on voting choice was minimal and the TV debates did not have much bearing on the outcome of the 2002 presidential election. Qualitative data also highlighted that voters did not watch TV debates carefully, but instead watched the debates cursorily and only in part. Also, voters were more likely to watch TV debates with a firm voting intention or at least favouring one candidate.

The impact of Internet campaigns was exaggerated: Empirical evidences show that influence of the Internet on voting choice was overstated, although extensive use was made of the Internet in the 2002 presidential election campaign. The young, the higher educated, the liberal, those who are interested in politics, and those who distrust the news media are more likely to go to the Internet for gathering information. But partisanship did not really explain the 'digital divide'. Qualitative interview data confirmed that most independent voters did not much pay much attention to the election campaigns on the Internet. Active participants of the Internet campaigns, who made up a relatively small percentage of the electorate and were more likely to have a strong voting intention, did not change their choice for a candidate regardless of the degree of exposure to the Internet campaigns. Those who were active off-line were also active on-line and the Internet hardly shaped or changed voting choice, even though the Internet was considered as one of key information mediums in the 2002 presidential election.

Independents Depend on Short-term Considerations in Making Voting Choice

Quantitative evidence supports that partisans relied on long-term psychological attachment to a political party when they made their voting choice. Although party identification is a key factor to explain the voting choice of partisans, candidate factors also played a role in making this choice. In particular, critical partisans paid attention to the candidates when deciding upon their choice of candidate, while habitual partisans relied solely on party affiliation. Quantitative analysis showed that independent voters who were free from party constraints in voting choice were more responsive to short-term considerations, particularly candidate factors. Attentive independents very interested in politics also took government performance into account when making their choice. In

short, subgroup multiple regression analysis confirms that independent voters are more influenced by short-term factors, such as candidate evaluation, issue preference, and government performance compared to partisans who heavily relied on their long-term psychological attachment.

Independents Cast a Ballot Based on Candidate Images rather than Policies

However, qualitative data rejects the hypothesis that the voting behaviour of independent voters is politically rational. In post-election surveys, many voters answered that they voted for a candidate on the basis of their evaluation of candidate's competence. However, the relationship between voting choice and evaluation of candidate competence is often overestimated in post-election surveys. For instance, voters might justify their voting choice in post-election surveys. In the case of some voters, candidate evaluation did not influence voting choice in elections, but voting choice affected their candidate evaluation in post-election surveys.

Qualitative data confirmed this argument. The key issue is about what kinds of information they use in their voting choice.¹ Independent voters were most responsive to the candidate factor in making their voting choice, but the candidates' competence to solve critical national problems was hardly considered. Independent voters did not know much about the candidates' issue stances, policies, and pledges, but knew only a small amount of information about the candidates' image, particularly, the affective dimension of candidates' traits. Also, independent voters made their decision with only a limited amount of information. Indeed, qualitative data showed that the choice of voters who cast a ballot on the basis of candidate evaluation was not politically rational.

Attentive Independent Voters are Distinguished from Apolitical Independent Voters in terms of Socio-Economic Characteristics, Political Attitudes, and Voting Behaviour

In general, the four types of voters are distinctive in terms of socio-economic characteristics and voting behaviour. Partisans are different from independents, but at the same time, partisans are not homogeneous and not all independents are the same in terms of social and economic characteristics and voting behaviour. Critical partisans are clearly distinguished from habitual partisans and apolitical independents also are quite different

¹ Milton Lodge, Marco R. Steenbergen, and Shawn Brau, 'The Responsive Voter: Campaign Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation', *American Political Science Review* 89 (1995), 309-26, at. 322.

from attentive independents in terms of social and economic characteristics and voting behaviour.

Regarding socio-economic characteristics and political attitudes, attentive independents are different from apolitical independents in many aspects. For instance, attentive independents are relatively older (35-54 years old), higher educated, male, professionals, the Salaris, liberal, understand politics well, and critical of politics, while apolitical independents are relatively younger (20-34 years old), less educated, female, students, routine non-manual workers, the centre in liberal-conservative ideological spectrum, poorly understand politics, and less critical of politics.

Furthermore, attentive independents are closer to critical partisans than apolitical independents in certain aspects of voting behaviour. For example, partisans are more likely to go to the polls compared to independent voters, but the voter turnout rate of attentive independent voters is higher than the turnout rate of habitual partisans. Also, in terms of the timing of vote decision, partisans make an early voting choice compared to independents, but attentive independent voters make a voting choice earlier than habitual partisans.

Finally, attentive independent voter behave differently from apolitical independent in voting choice. Both attentive independents and apolitical independents heavily rely on candidate factor in voting choice. But ideology and government performance also explain the voting choice of attentive independents, whereas only regionalism explains voting choice of apolitical independents in addition to candidate factor.

Overall, the study confirms that non-party identifiers are not homogeneous in terms of social and economic characteristics and voting behaviour. Also, the study shows that the classification and subdivision of independent voters following the distinction of the new independent voters from the traditional non-party identifiers is useful in the analysis of electoral behaviour.

An Overview Model of the Voting Decision of Independent Voters

The results of this study point to three main features of the electoral decision-making process of independent voters. First, independent voters are less interested in politics and do not pay much attention to election campaigns. Second, independent voters make their voting decision based on limited and insufficient information. Third, independent voters rely heavily on candidate factors in voting choice, but evaluate candidates on the basis of candidate's images rather than candidate's issue stances and policies. These main features of voting behaviour of independent voters suggest a brief overview model of voting decision.

Initial Influence of Election Campaigns

In prolonged election campaigns, independent voters receive a small amount of information from campaign events or news reports and develop a positive feeling to a specific candidate even before the official election campaigns begin. In particular, during the presidential primary or party convention for nomination, the news media increase reports about election events and voters are more likely to gain information about candidates and the election. At this stage, voters get some information about candidate images from TV interviews and news reports. Candidate preference and voting intention based on candidate image is not firm and is vulnerable to contrary information. So, each candidate's popularity fluctuates in the course of the election campaigns.

Consolidating Candidate Preference

In general, independent voters who are not very interested in politics and elections do not actively gather information about candidate and election. What they get from election campaigns is more likely to be about the image of the candidates rather than substance because they do not actively gather information. When they add new information, they are more likely to reinforce their feeling to the candidate.

Among independent voters, those who are enthusiastic about election campaigns make their voting decision and consolidate their candidate preference before the official campaign begin, but those who are less interested in elections have only weakly favour one candidate and begin to pay attention to the election campaign only when the official campaigns start.

Making Voting Choice

Reinforcing voting intention: Those who have a preference for a party or candidate pay a great deal of attention to the election campaigns during the official campaign period, but they do not give equal attention to all candidates. They are more likely to be interested in acquiring information to support their existing voting intention. Their voting intention is not therefore affected by campaigns, but is reinforced.

Making a voting decision based on minimal information: Independent voters who are less interested in the election begin to pay some attention to the election when the day of election is close. They rely heavily on the TV debates to find out about the election because viewing the TV debates does not demand much effort and voters can collect

information conveniently. Voters watch the TV debates cursorily, but not carefully. What they get from TV debates is not substance, but image. Also, they are not very interested in elections and do not actively use the Internet to find out information. Family members and friends often decisively influence their voting choice because they do have only minimal amount of information.

They make their voting decision very close to the day of election. They make their choice based on minimal and quite inappropriate information. Their voting preference is not clear and sometime they cannot come to a decision. Those who do not pay attention to the election cannot make a decision and are more likely to abstain.

Democracy without Political Parties

One of the important conclusions to be drawn from the research is related to a question about the quality of new democracy. Is partisan decline good for the development of new democracy in Korea? The findings suggest that a weakening of party affiliation accompanied with an expansion of higher education and the development of the mass media has not resulted in an increase of rational voters in elections. Again, the issue is not how much independent voters are responsive to short-term considerations in voting choice, but what kind of information is involved in their voting choice.

Irrational Voting Choice

In Korea's young democracy, voting choice constrained by party affiliation is often condemned as irrational voting behaviour because partisan attachments are largely based on irrational regionalism. Major political parties often instigate regionalism among the electorate during the campaign and voters respond enthusiastically to it. Many partisans do not care about a candidate's competence and capability. Many partisans do not carefully compare the policies offered by different candidates. In such circumstances, party voting is irrational because voters rely on party loyalty influenced by irrational regional antagonism. But the findings of this study suggest that the voting choice of independent voters free from party constraints is not rational either. In a sense, partisan dealignment is related to a weakening of irrational regionalism in party politics. Yet at the same time, partisan dealignment also suggests there is an increase in ill-informed individual voters and that candidate image becomes even more significant in voting choice, which can be easily manipulated. Therefore, partisan dealignment is not a positive sign for the consolidation of the new democracy in Korea.

A decay of political parties as a result of partisan dealignment does not signify an

increase in rational electoral behaviour. The rational choice model has assumed that voters are rational because they can maximise the utility to achieve their goals.² Unfortunately, it is not true that voters are rational actors in elections. In an era of partisan decline, voters are less interested not only in political parties, but also in politics in general. Voters do not pay much attention to election campaigns and cast a ballot based on insufficient or inappropriate information. Indeed, their voting choice is not based on rational calculation, but on images that are easily manipulated³.

The rational choice model has often assumed that voters are the same with consumers.⁴ But the findings of this study suggest that voters are less careful in choosing their politicians than they are when buying a car for instance. Most consumers examine very carefully the various factors involved in their decisions, such as price, terms, performance, and appearance, and also compare many different models when they make a decision to buy their own cars. Unfortunately, many voters do not behave in the same way when they make voting decision. In voting choice, people are similar to reckless consumers. In their evaluation of candidates, voters rely on images and do not recognise policies offered by candidates. Sometimes voters are swayed by image and thus mistakenly believe a candidate advocating conservative policies is a liberal.

We may argue that voters who are poorly informed still be able to behave rationally by using effective 'information shortcuts'. According to Downs, most voters have little incentive to gather information about parties, candidates, and issues in order to improve their voting choice. Therefore, voters rely on information shortcuts to simplify their choice and economise cognitive strategies.⁵ Downs suggested party identification as a typical information shortcut. Also, a political belief-system, i.e., ideology, is a kind of information shortcut that voters often use. In line with Downs' view of information shortcuts, Popkin argued that voters use various kinds of cues in making judgments --- even small experiences from daily life or personal behaviour, such as eating corn shucks of tamales.⁶ This is what Popkin called 'low-information rationality' or 'gut reasoning'.⁷

² Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: a Critique of Applications in Political Science* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 2.

³ For example, in the 1997 presidential election, Rhee In-je tried to adopt the image of former president Park Chung Hee, who was a dictator, but who many people still admired due to his economic achievements in economic development. Rhee In-je was, like Park, a short man and even copied Park's hair style, though his party (the New Party for People) hastily copied policies and election pledges from that of a major opposition party (the National Congress for New Politics) led by Kim Dae-jung, a long-time political rival of Park, in the election. Based on his image, Rhee was able to gain support from many voters who respected Park's leadership in economic development.

⁴ Gordon Tullock, *The Vote Motive* (London: Institute for Economic Affairs, 1976), p.5.

⁵ Anthony Downs, *The Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Low, 1957).

⁶ During the 1976 American presidential election campaign, President Gerald Ford tried to eat tamales, a Mexican food, in order to show his empathy with Mexican-American voters. But he made a mistake. Indeed, he bit the corn shucks which serve as a wrapper because he did not know

Is voting choice based on information shortcuts, i.e., the low-information rationality, rational? Again, the issue is not how much information is involved in voting choice but what kind of information is used in making a voting decision. In other words, when the cues that voters use are irrelevant, the gut reasoning cannot be rational. For example, tamale shucking may be a useful cue to choose chefs and the choice based on the cue may be rational. But tamale shucking is not a relevant cue to make a choice for a president who is going to rule the society and the voting behaviour relying on the cue is more likely to be irrational.⁸ Voting choice using irrelevant cues is not very different from a choice based on instincts or even bias rather than rational calculations.

Furthermore, even if we accept the logic of information shortcuts, it is still doubtful that independent voters use information shortcuts in their voting choice. Indeed, empirical findings in the study suggest that ideology, i.e., an important information shortcut, does not help explain voting choice for independent voters as well as for partisans, as examined in Chapter 10 of this thesis.

'Image Politics' and Meaningless Elections

When candidate image rather than substance is important in individual voting choice, candidates then care about developing their image during the campaign, but not about developing policies that they will carry out when in government. A president who won the election based on carefully constructed images during the election campaign is not interested in the fulfilment of election pledges when he or she is in office. A president, who does not adequately prepare for running the government and lacks strong competence to manage the pressing problems in contrast to his or her image, inevitably depends on professional bureaucrats, who have a great deal of experience in administration. A new president may bring a new style to the administration, but the substance of the government's policies remains without much change from one government to the next. For example, many cabinet members and social and economic policies of the incumbent government led by President Roh Moo-hyun, who has the image of a liberal politician, are conservative.

In these circumstances, one of the main functions of elections in representative democracies cannot be attained. If citizens cannot decide the direction of the nation

that he should not eat the corn shucks. Thus, due to this incident, voters viewed Gerald Ford as a man who has little understanding of different ethnic culture and Ford failed to attract votes from Mexican-Americans. Samuel L. Popkin, *The Reasoning Voters: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 1.

⁷ Samuel L. Popkin, *The Reasoning Voters*, p. 7.

⁸ Louis Menand, 'The Unpolitical Animal', *The New Yorker*, 30 August 2004.

through electing their political leaders, a crucial part of elections is lost. In representative democracies, people cannot be involved directly in making and administering national policies and cannot directly influence the government. Voters only indirectly influence the government through political leaders whom they empower. Therefore, voting is the only way for citizens to secure their influence upon the government. But many voters do not properly exercise this sovereign power. Voters often waste their power because their voting choice is often based on inappropriate information that is manipulated during the course of election campaigns.

When many voters do not carefully exercise their voting power, democracy cannot rest upon sound foundations. Regardless of the expansion of higher education and the mass media, it is difficult to expect a better democracy if more voters are less interested in politics and cast a ballot more and more depending on candidate image rather than substance. Unless voters are politically rational in voting choice, it is unlikely that the candidates who are successful will be sufficiently qualified.

A False 'Party Politics'

In Korean parliamentary elections, some people known across the nation with a positive image of their work in the mass media, particularly TV, ran for the parliament and often succeeded in gaining election. It is not suggested that TV entertainers, such as comedians, actors and actresses, or TV talk show hosts, should not run for the office. However, it is legitimate to question whether they have their own clear issue stances and even whether they are knowledgeable about public affairs.

In all parliamentary elections, every major party in Korea competes to recruit potential candidates who have a good image and are well known to people regardless of their ideological orientation and issue stances. Most of them have never been partisans of the political party and may even have opposed the party's issue positions in the past. In these circumstances, political parties do not necessarily consist of people united by common positions on issues and policies. Political parties become solely a form of electoral machine and party platforms and election pledges are mere accessories to decorate political parties.

In sum, the decay of party politics and the prevalence of 'image politics' represent a deterioration of democracy. A weakening of party affiliation does not lead to an increase of voters who are politically aware. The decay of party politics does not result in an increase of voters who make voting choice based on rational calculations. When voters rely on image in voting choice and are less interested in politics, democracy cannot be healthy.

Suggestions for Further Research

Independent Voters and the Study of Korean Elections

Partisan dealignment is a common phenomenon in many democracies and independent voters are no longer 'outliers' or 'remnants' in electoral behaviour. As one of the first studies to consider partisan dealignment in the Korean context, the thesis has provided new findings about voting behaviour of independent voters in Korea, but further analysis of independent voters is required.

In the research, the voting behaviour of the attentive independent voters, who are much interested in politics, has been compared with the voting behaviour of the apolitical independent voters, who are not very interested in politics, by using quantitative survey data. But the analysis was inconclusive due to the lack of data. For instance, in the qualitative analysis, the attentive independents have not been clearly distinguished from the apolitical independents.

The findings have some limits as to their capacity for generalisation because the qualitative data collection was limited to a specific group of voters, i.e., those residing in Seoul city or its suburb. Although it is expected that independent voters have a similar pattern of electoral behaviour, additional investigations into the voting behaviour of independent voters with different social characteristics, such as those living in rural areas or in regions where regionalism is very strong, are required.

Electoral studies of Korean voters have been limited as yet. As discussed in the thesis, even some of basic concepts in electoral studies have not been well developed in the study of Korean elections. For example, the concept of party identification is not clearly defined in Korea and each researcher uses a different survey question in measuring party identification. Also, a systematic and consistent accumulation of research data is important in the study of Korean elections. For example, in the election year, more than a hundred election surveys are conducted in Korea, but the public and researchers are not allowed to access the data. Only a limited number of people use the results of surveys once and the data is discarded. Such data if publicly available would provide a valuable resource for researchers.

Combining Both Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches

As demonstrated in the thesis, combining both qualitative and quantitative analysis in electoral studies is possible and desirable. In particular, the qualitative approach should

be included in more election studies. Combining the two different methods within one study provides at the very least richer data. Moreover, a better understanding of a social phenomenon is possible when we apply two different methods within one study. Each method investigates different dimensions of the same phenomenon and provides a more comprehensive understanding of a social phenomenon. In particular, the social context surrounding electoral behaviour can be accurately represented in qualitative methods while quantitative methods often fail to achieve it. For example, in this research, the qualitative evidence suggests that the relationship between regionalism and party affiliation in Korea is often overestimated in quantitative analysis. Indeed, the qualitative approach uncovered that the regionalism of individual voters overlaps with their ideological self-image and suggests that ideological self-image was often ignored or inadequately included in explanations of the Korean partisan alignment.

This research clearly shows that the qualitative approach compensates for some of the limitations of the quantitative approach and vice versa. One of the difficulties researchers often have in hypo-deductive approaches is related to determining the direction of causations. While associations are not same as causal relations in quantitative analyses, a causal direction of associated variables can be discerned more easily in qualitative analysis. For example, in this study, a causal relationship between party affiliation and the long-term policy preferences of individual voters in Korea is straightforward in qualitative approach.

Multi-Wave Panel Studies

Multi-wave panel studies covering both pre-election and post-election are required in order to overcome the limits of post-election studies. The findings suggest that approximately half of voters, both partisans and independent voters, made their voting decision before the official campaign began. Most voters did not change their voting intention, although the strength of vote intention varied depending upon new information and political events. Also, in post-election interviews, most voters hardly remember most election campaigns and political events that affected their voting choice, but this does not mean that voters were not affected by all campaigns.⁹ Voters acquired a small amount of information about the candidates, particularly images, but drew conclusions about the sincerity and issue positions of the candidates from the information.¹⁰ Therefore, it is difficult to discern the true factors influencing voting decision if we rely only on

⁹ Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau, 'The Responsive Voter: Campaign Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation'.

¹⁰ Samuel L. Popkin, *The Reasoning Voter*.

respondents' vague memories in post-election interviews. Research on voting choice should cover the dynamics of electoral behaviour in prolonged election campaigns.

In particular, qualitative in-depth interviews applying a multi-wave panel study is recommended to explore the decision-making process of individual voters. Multi-wave panel surveys can show *how* voting intention has changed, but in-depth interviews are better suited to explaining *why* voting intention is changed in the course of election campaigns. It is expected that multi-wave qualitative studies based on carefully recruited panel groups could produce many benefits and also partially overcome the limits of qualitative research in generalising research findings.

Comparative Electoral Studies

Comparative studies, particularly country-specific case studies in a comparative perspective, are recommended in the study of electoral behaviour.¹¹ In their seminal work, Przeworski and Teune suggested the '*most different system analysis*' in comparative study.¹² They strongly insisted upon the need to develop universal generalisations about human behaviour across different cultures and national boundaries. Indeed, they denied including the influence of culture or institutions on mass behaviour. Comparative electoral studies looking for universal generalisations have achieved much over the last three decades, but there are still many unknown answers in comparative electoral studies. Causal relationships of electoral behaviour vary in strength across different cultures. A casual relationship that is strong in some cultures does not exist in other environments. Comparative studies looking for universal generalisations have not answered these questions.

In social science, generalisations of social phenomena and human behaviour cannot be ignored, but peculiarities of electoral behaviour across different cultures should not be neglected either.¹³ Mass behaviour is bounded by culture. Mass behaviour can be interpreted properly only when cultural context is included.¹⁴ In other words, culture or context is one of the key variables to explain mass behaviour. Recently, researchers have

¹¹ For the current stage of comparative electoral studies, see Samuel H. Barnes, 'Electoral Behavior and Comparative Politics', in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds, *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 115-41.

¹² Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (Malabar, Florida: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1970).

¹³ Barnes, 'Electoral Behavior and Comparative Politics', p. 136.

¹⁴ The multicultural approach has stressed cultural context in the study of social phenomena. "Moreover, individuals are reflections of the cultural and social units to which they belong. Personal identity is determined by the cultural and social units into which its members have been enculturated and socialized." Brian Fay, *Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science: a Multicultural Approach* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 4.

stressed the 'middle range theory' or 'partial universalism' in comparative studies.¹⁵ Researchers have begun to realise the importance of context in electoral studies.¹⁶ Indeed, neither universal generalisation nor the peculiarities of any given situation in a specific country should be ignored in comparative studies. When both generalisations and peculiarities are uncovered in electoral studies, a better understanding about electoral behaviour is possible and we are able to develop more sophisticated theories.

This is the reason why we need further research on elections in new democracies. Most electoral studies have focused on elections in mature Western democracies, but as yet there are only a few studies on elections and electoral behaviour in new democracies. A full understanding about electoral behaviour in different contexts can enrich our knowledge about mass behaviour and lead to the development of more sophisticated theories.

Furthermore, this is one of reasons why the qualitative approach should be included in the study of mass behaviour. Of the methods involved in comparative studies, the quantitative approach is more useful in studies looking for universal generalisations about mass behaviour, while the qualitative approach is more appropriate to look for peculiarities of mass behaviour. Comparative studies or country specific case studies in a comparative perspective are required in further research about elections.

¹⁵ Barnes, 'Electoral Behavior and Comparative Politics', p.136. Green and Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: a Critique of Applications in Political Science*, p. 69.

¹⁶ Christopher Wlezien and Mark N. Franklin, 'The Future of Election Studies: Introduction', *Electoral Studies*, 21 (2002), 157-60.

Appendix 1: Tables

Table A4.1 Participants in Focus Group Interviews

ID	Age	Occupation	Education	Hometown	Interested in Politics	Party Identification
Group One: Women						
FF1	33	Fulltime Housewife	University	<i>Jeolla</i>	Very much	MDP
FF2	44	Fulltime Housewife	University	<i>Seoul</i>	Somewhat	Independent
FF3	39	Fulltime Housewife	High School	<i>Chungcheong</i>	Not much	Independent
FF4	35	Fulltime Housewife	University	<i>Gyeongsang</i>	Very much	Independent
FF5	40	Fulltime Housewife	University	<i>Gangwon</i>	Somewhat	Independent
FF6	32	Fulltime Housewife	High School	<i>Gyeongsang</i>	Somewhat	Independent
FF7	34	Fulltime Housewife	College	<i>Chungcheong</i>	Somewhat	Independent
FF8	37	Fulltime Housewife	College	<i>Seoul</i>	Somewhat	Independent
Group Two: Men						
FM1	41	Non-manual worker	University	<i>Seoul</i>	Somewhat	Independent
FM2	34	Engineer	University	<i>Gyeonggi</i>	Much	Independent
FM3	35	Non-manual worker	University	<i>Gangwon</i>	Somewhat	GNP
FM4	34	Self-employed	University	<i>Seoul</i>	Somewhat	Independent
FM5	33	Self-employed	Postgraduate	<i>Seoul</i>	Much	Independent
FM6	41	Non-manual worker	University	<i>Gyeongsang</i>	Very much	Independent
FM7	34	Non-manual worker	University	<i>Chungcheong</i>	Somewhat	Independent
FM8	36	Non-manual worker	Postgraduate	<i>Jeolla</i>	Much	MDP
FM9	44	Self-employed	High school	<i>Chungcheong</i>	Much	GNP

Key: MDP = Millennium Democratic Party; GNP = Grand National Party.

Note: Party affiliation is identified from dialogues in the discussions.

Table A.4.2 Interviewees in In-depth Interviews

ID	Sex	Age	Occupation	Education	Hometown	Interest in Politics	Party Identification
Independent Voters							
I-101	F	33	Non-manual worker	University	<i>Gyeongsang</i>	yes	Independent
I-102	F	34	Fulltime Housewife	PG	<i>the north</i>	yes	Independent
I-103	M	60	Self-employed	High school	<i>Gyeongsang</i>	yes	Independent
I-104	F	28	Fulltime Housewife	University	<i>Gyeongsang</i>	no	Independent
I-105	M	28	Non-manual worker	University	<i>Gyeongsang</i>	no	Independent
I-106	M	42	Professional	PG	<i>the north</i>	yes	Independent
I-107	F	53	Fulltime Housewife	High school	<i>Chungcheong</i>	no	Independent
I-108	F	27	Non-manual worker	University	<i>Chungcheong</i>	no	Independent
I-109	F	24	Non-manual worker	University	<i>Seoul</i>	no	Independent
I-110	M	54	Self-employed	PG	<i>Chungcheong</i>	no	Independent
I-111	M	25	Student	University	<i>Gyeongsang</i>	no	Independent
I-112	M	30	other	University	<i>Seoul</i>	no	Independent
I-113	F	22	other	University	<i>Chungcheong</i>	yes	Independent
I-114	F	25	Non-manual worker	University	<i>Jeolla</i>	no	Independent

(Continued)

I-115	M	43	Self-employed	University	<i>Jeolla</i>	yes	Independent
I-116	F	21	Student	University	<i>Chungcheong</i>	no	Independent
I-117	F	22	Student	University	<i>Seoul</i>	no	Independent
I-118	F	22	Student	University	<i>Chungcheong</i>	no	Independent
I-119	M	35	Self-employed	University	<i>Seoul</i>	yes	Independent
I-120	F	24	Non-manual worker	University	<i>Gyeongsang</i>	no	Independent
I-121	M	56	Self-employed	High school	<i>Gyeongsang</i>	no	Independent
I-122	F	25	Student	PG	<i>the north</i>	yes	Independent
I-123	M	25	Student	University	<i>Chungcheong</i>	no	Independent
I-124	F	29	Non-manual worker	University	<i>Gyeongsang</i>	yes	Independent
I-125	M	30	Non-manual worker	University	<i>Gyeongsang</i>	no	Independent
I-126	F	25	Student	PG	<i>Gyeongsang</i>	yes	Independent
I-127	F	23	Student	University	<i>Gyeongsang</i>	no	Independent
I-128	M	23	Student	University	<i>Gyeongsang</i>	yes	Independent
I-129	F	25	Professional	University	<i>Chungcheong</i>	no	Independent
I-130	M	28	Student	PG	<i>Jeolla</i>	yes	Independent
I-131	M	28	Student	PG	<i>Jeolla</i>	no	Independent
I-132	F	39	Fulltime Housewife	High school	<i>Chungcheong</i>	no	Independent
I-133	M	22	Student	University	<i>Gyeonggi</i>	no	Independent
I-134	F	34	Fulltime Housewife	University	<i>Chungcheong</i>	no	Independent
I-135	F	70	Unemployed	High school	<i>Gyeongsang</i>	no	Independent
I-136	M	21	Student	University	<i>Jeolla</i>	yes	Independent
I-137	M	24	Non-manual worker	University	<i>Gangwon</i>	no	Independent
I-138	M	32	Professional	PG	<i>Jeolla</i>	no	Independent
I-139	F	29	Fulltime Housewife	University	<i>Seoul</i>	no	Independent
I-140	F	25	Student	PG	<i>Gyeonggi</i>	yes	Independent
I-141	M	53	Self-employed	High school	<i>Gyeongsang</i>	yes	Independent*
I-142	M	49	Self-employed	High school	<i>Gyeonggi</i>	no	Independent*
Party Identifiers							
I-201	M	26	other	University	<i>the north</i>	yes	MDP*
I-202	F	24	Non-manual worker	University	<i>Gangwon</i>	no	MDP*
I-203	M	57	Professional	University	<i>Gyeongsang</i>	yes	GNP
I-204	F	38	other	University	<i>Jeolla</i>	yes	MDP
I-205	F	54	Fulltime Housewife	High school	<i>Gyeongsang</i>	yes	GNP
I-206	F	25	Unemployed	University	<i>Jeolla</i>	no	MDP
I-207	F	25	Unemployed	University	<i>Chungcheong</i>	yes	MDP
I-208	F	27	Professional	University	<i>Gyeongsang</i>	yes	DLP
I-209	M	53	Self-employed	University	<i>Gyeongsang</i>	yes	GNP
I-210	F	48	Self-employed	High school	<i>Gyeongsang</i>	no	GNP
I-211	M	23	Student	University	<i>Chungcheong</i>	yes	DLP
I-212	F	43	Professional	PG	<i>the north</i>	yes	DLP
I-213	M	47	Self-employed	High school	<i>Gyeongsang</i>	yes	GNP
I-214	M	38	Professional	PG	<i>Gyeongsang</i>	yes	GNP

Key: MDP = Millennium Democratic Party; GNP = Grand National Party; DLP = Democratic Labour Party; PG = postgraduate school.

Note: * = An inconsistency of party identification between answer in mini-survey before interview and answer during interview; Hometown is based on hometown of interviewees' father.

Table A5. 1 Party Identification in British Election, 2001

	PRE ELECTION (A)	POST ELECTION (B)	THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN (A) AND (B)
Number of cases	3163	2331	
Labour Party	42.0%	44.5%	+2.5%
Conservative Party	23.5%	23.1%	-0.4%
Liberal Party	8.3%	10.3%	+2.0%
Other	6.5%	6.8%	+0.3%
Non-identifiers	13.4%	12.1%	-1.3%
No answer / don't know	6.3%	3.2%	-3.1%

Data: British Election Studies, 2001.

Table A5. 2 Change in Voting Intention between Pre-election and Post-election

Date		Voting Intention (%)		
The day of election	Month (Polling Date)	Conservative Party	Labour Party	Liberal Democratic Party
11 June 1987	May	39	28	30
	June	41	34	23.5
	July	44.5	33	20.5
9 April 1992	March	37.4	37.8	19.7
	April	38.5	38.0	20.0
	May	40.6	39.3	16.1
1 May 1997	April	N/A	N/A	N/A
	May	23.3	56.9	14.7
	June	24.2	60.4	11.5

Data: Selectively copied from Gallup Polling Findings in David Butler and Gareth Butler, *Twentieth-Century British Political Facts, 1900-2000* (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp-276-8.

Note: The shaded cells refer to the percentage for the winning party.

Table A5.3 Feel About a Competing Party by Labour and Conservative Party Identifiers in British Election, 2001

	LABOUR PARTY IDENTIFIERS' ATTITUDE TO CONSERVATIVE PARTY			CONSERVATIVE PARTY IDENTIFIERS' ATTITUDE TO LABOUR PARTY		
	N	Valid %	Cumulative %	N	Valid %	Cumulative %
Strongly dislike 0	267	25.9	25.9	73	13.6	13.6
1	120	11.7	37.6	51	9.5	23.0
2	174	16.9	54.5	78	14.5	37.5
3	159	15.5	70.0	92	17.1	54.6
4	138	13.4	83.4	87	16.2	70.8
5	118	11.5	94.8	98	18.2	89.0
6	30	2.9	97.8	37	6.9	95.9
7	15	1.5	99.2	13	2.4	98.3
8	5	.5	99.7	8	1.5	99.8
Strongly like 9	3	.3	100.0	1	.2	100.0
Total	1029	100.0		538	100.0	
Mean		2.37			3.17	
Std. Deviation		1.97			2.02	

Data: British Election Study, 2001

Table A6.1 Region and Share of Votes by Political Parties in Parliamentary election, 2000

	TOTAL	SHARE OF THE VOTE BY PARTIES					
		GNP	MDP	ULD	other	independent	total
Total	100%	39.0%	35.9%	9.8%	6.0%	9.4%	100%
Seoul	21.4%	43.3%	45.1%	4.7%	5.4%	1.6%	100%
Gyeonggi	22.5%	39.6%	40.8%	12.3%	2.8%	4.4%	100%
Gangwon	3.6%	38.6%	36.5%	10.2%	6.7%	8.1%	100%
Chungcheong	10.3%	23.2%	30.0%	34.8%	5.1%	6.9%	100%
Jeolla	12.4%	3.7%	66.8%	2.0%	0.4%	27.1%	100%
Gyeongsang	28.6%	56.0%	13.1%	6.6%	11.7%	12.7%	100%
Jeju	1.3%	44.2%	49.4%	0.6%	0.4%	5.3%	100%

Data: Calculated from election statistics provided by the National Election Commission.

Keys: GNP = Grand National Party; MDP = Millennium Democratic Party; and ULD = United Liberal Democrats.

Table A6.2 T-Test for Equality of Means: Partisan Alignment and Age, 1992-20002

	N	MEAN (AGE)	STD. DEVIATION	T	SIG. (2-TAILED)
<u>1992</u>					
Major party A	470	45.72	15.40		
Major Party B	324	38.71	13.87		
Third party (C)	114	36.58	12.32		
Compare A and B				6.594	0.000
Compare A and C				6.747	0.000
Compare B and C				1.518	0.130
<u>1997</u>					
Major party A	221	43.47	15.27		
Major Party B	390	40.08	13.04		
Third party (C)	125	36.27	10.99		
Compare A and B				2.895	0.004
Compare A and C				5.601	0.000
Compare B and C				3.218	0.001
<u>2002</u>					
Major party A	350	45.41	14.00		
Major Party B	405	42.83	16.21		
Compare A and B				2.326	0.020

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: N = number of cases; Mean = average age; 'Major party A' refers to the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and the Grand National Party in 1997 and 2002; 'Major party B' refers to the Democratic Party in 1992, the National Congress for New Politics, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; 'Third party' refers to the Unification National Party in 1992 and the New Party for People in 1997.

Table A6.3 ANOVA: Average Scores of Ideological Self-Image by Cohorts, 2002

Cohorts	Number of cases	Mean	Std. Deviation	ANOVA
20-24	213	2.65	.84	F = 9.736 Sig. = 0.000
25-29	144	2.58	.91	
30-34	191	2.49	.89	
35-39	191	2.60	.90	
40-44	174	2.86	.97	
45-49	159	3.02	1.08	
50-54	106	3.08	1.06	
55-59	89	3.09	.98	
60-64	88	3.19	1.06	
65-69	69	3.04	.91	
Total	1424	2.79	.98	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.

Note: Mean = average score in a 5-point scale (i.e., strong liberal is 1, liberal is 2, center is 3, conservative is 4, and strong conservative is 5).

Table A6.4 T-Test for Equality of Means: Partisan Alignment and Education, 1992-2002

	N	MEAN (EDUCATION)	STD. DEVIATION	T	SIG. (2-TAILED)
<u>1992</u>					
Major party A	470	2.42	1.09		
Major Party B	324	2.77	1.04		
Third party (C)	114	3.01	0.84		
Compare A and B				-4.591	0.000
Compare A and C				-6.321	0.000
Compare B and C				-2.440	0.015
<u>1997</u>					
Major party A	219	2.92	1.04		
Major Party B	388	2.99	0.98		
Third party (C)	123	3.20	0.71		
Compare A and B				-0.797	0.426
Compare A and C				-2.871	0.004
Compare B and C				-2.541	0.012
<u>2002</u>					
Major party A	346	2.97			
Major Party B	404	3.01	1.00		
Compare A and B				-0.547	0.585

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Note: Mean = average score in a 4-point scale (i.e., the lowest level is 1, and the highest level is 4).

Keys: N = number of cases; Major party A = the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and the Grand National Party in 1997 and in 2002; Major party B = the Democratic Party in 1992, the National Congress for New Politics in 1997, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; Third party = the Unification National Party in 1992, and the New Party for People in 1997.

Table A6.5 T-Test for Equality of Means: Partisan Alignment and Gender, 1992-2002

	N	MEAN	STD. DEVIATION	T	SIG. (2-TAILED)
1992					
Major party A	470	1.54	0.50		
Major Party B	324	1.52	0.50		
Third party (C)	114	1.49	0.50		
Compare A and B				0.555	0.579
Compare A and C				1.026	0.306
Compare B and C				0.614	0.540
1997					
Major party A	221	1.56	0.50		
Major Party B	390	1.47	0.50		
Third party (C)	125	1.39	0.49		
Compare A and B				2.187	0.029
Compare A and C				3.054	0.002
Compare B and C				1.526	0.129
2002					
Major party A	350	1.50	0.50		
Major Party B	405	1.51	0.50		
Compare A and B				-0.382	0.702

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: N = number of cases, Mean = average score in a two-point scale (i.e., 1 = man, and 2 = woman).

Table A6.6 T-Test for Equality of Means: Partisan Alignment and Location, 1992-2002

	N	MEAN (LOCATION)	STD. DEVIATION	T	SIG. (2-TAILED)
1992					
Major party A	470	1.79	0.86		
Major Party B	324	1.73	0.78		
Third party (C)	114	1.67	0.78		
Compare A and B				1.088	0.277
Compare A and C				1.391	0.165
Compare B and C				0.687	0.491
1997					
Major party A	221	1.56	0.66		
Major Party B	390	1.74	0.73		
Third party (C)	125	1.70	0.74		
Compare A and B				-3.013	0.003
Compare A and C				-1.905	0.058
Compare B and C				0.423	0.672
2002					
Major party A	350	1.54	0.65		
Major Party B	405	1.74	0.71		
Compare A and B				-3.895	0.000

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: N = number of cases; Mean = average score in a 3-point scale (i.e., 1 is large city, 2 is small city, and 3 is rural county); Major party A = the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and the Grand National Party in 1997 and in 2002; Major party B = the Democratic Party in 1992, the National Congress for New Politics in 1997, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; Third party = the Unification National Party in 1992, and the New Party for People in 1997.

Table A6.7 Crosstab: Voter's Regional Identification and Religion, 1992-2002

	N	Buddhist	Protestant	Catholic	Other	Non	Total	Test statistics
1992								Pearson's Chi-Square = 92.427 Sig. = 0.000
Seoul	129	20.2%	27.1%	10.9%	1.6%	40.3%	100%	
Gyeonggi	131	29.0%	16.8%	9.9%	2.3%	42.0%	100%	
Gangwon	63	23.8%	20.6%	12.7%	1.6%	41.3%	100%	
Chungcheong	204	25.5%	28.4%	8.3%	1.0%	36.8%	100%	
Jeolla	238	18.9%	30.3%	8.8%	2.5%	39.5%	100%	
Gyeongsang	419	44.2%	15.5%	7.2%	2.6%	30.5%	100%	
Jeju	1					100.0%	100%	
The North	15	20.0%	20.0%	33.3%	6.7%	20.0%	100%	
Total	1200	30.3%	22.3%	9.0%	2.2%	36.2%	100%	
1997								Pearson's Chi-Square= 117.309 Sig. = 0.000
Seoul	148	16.2%	31.1%	13.5%	1.4%	37.8%	100%	
Gyeonggi	118	27.1%	22.0%	16.1%	2.5%	32.2%	100%	
Gangwon	76	28.9%	18.4%	13.2%	2.6%	36.8%	100%	
Chungcheong	198	30.8%	23.7%	10.1%	2.0%	33.3%	100%	
Jeolla	266	15.4%	30.8%	7.9%	4.5%	41.4%	100%	
Gyeongsang	357	39.8%	17.4%	5.6%	3.4%	33.9%	100%	
Jeju	25	68.0%	8.0%	8.0%	4.0%	12.0%	100%	
The North	12		66.7%	16.7%	8.3%	8.3%	100%	
Total	1200	28.3%	23.9%	9.5%	3.1%	35.3%	100%	
2002								Pearson's Chi-Square =108.671 Sig. =0.000
Seoul	208	13.9%	34.6%	16.3%	0.5%	34.6%	100%	
Gyeonggi	175	18.3%	33.7%	9.1%	2.3%	36.6%	100%	
Gangwon	93	25.8%	20.4%	8.6%	1.1%	44.1%	100%	
Chungcheong	216	25.5%	30.1%	5.1%	4.2%	35.2%	100%	
Jeolla	278	17.6%	33.1%	7.2%	1.8%	40.3%	100%	
Gyeongsang	499	36.5%	18.2%	9.4%	2.2%	33.7%	100%	
Jeju	6	50.0%	16.7%	16.7%		16.7%	100%	
The North	16	12.5%	43.8%	18.8%		25.0%	100%	
Total	1491	25.2%	27.2%	9.4%	2.1%	36.1%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Key: N = number of cases.

Table A6.8 T-Test for Equality of Means: Partisan Alignment and Income, 1992-2002

	N	MEAN	STD. DEVIATION	T	SIG. (2-TAILED)
1992					
Major party A	470	3.76	1.98		
Major Party B	324	4.18	1.82		
Third party (C)	114	4.73	2.02		
Compare A an B				-3.076	0.002
Compare A and C				-4.616	0.000
Compare B and C				-2.679	0.008
1997					
Major party A	216	5.82	2.37		
Major Party B	384	5.64	2.25		
Third party (C)	123	5.90	2.14		
Compare A an B				0.916	0.360
Compare A and C				-0.321	0.749
Compare B and C				-1.135	0.257
2002					
Major party A	346	2.97	0.98		
Major Party B	404	3.00	1.00		
Compare A an B				-0.547	0.585

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: N = number of cases; Mean = average score in a 9-point scale (i.e., 1 = smallest income and 9 is largest income); Major party A = the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and the Grand National Party in 1997 and in 2002; Major party B = the Democratic Party in 1992, the National Congress for New Politics in 1997, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; Third party = the Unification National Party in 1992, and the New Party for People in 1997.

Table A7. 1 T-Test for Equality of Means: Age and Party Identification, 1992-2002

	Number of cases	Mean	Std. Deviation	t	Sig.
1992					
Party identifiers	915	42.03	14.95	3.355	0.001
Non-party identifiers	269	38.58	14.42		
1997					
Party identifiers	757	40.34	13.73	0.981	0.327
Non-party identifiers	442	39.51	14.45		
2002					
Party identifiers	892	42.77	15.06	2.669	0.008
Non-party identifiers	608	40.65	15.19		

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: Mean = the average age of each group.

Table A7. 2 ANOVA: Age and Korean Voters, 1992-2002

	Number of case	Mean Age	Std. Deviation	ANOVA
1992				F = 5.659 Sig. = 0.001
Critical partisan	476	41.16	14.37	
Habitual partisan	437	42.95	15.51	
Attentive independent	97	40.47	13.42	
Apolitical independent	172	37.52	14.89	
Total	1182	41.24	14.89	
1997				F = 18.187 Sig. = 0.000
Critical partisan	533	42.23	13.43	
Habitual partisan	223	35.69	13.21	
Attentive independent	210	42.39	13.94	
Apolitical independent	232	36.90	14.43	
Total	1198	40.01	13.97	
2002				F = 12.699 Sig. = 0.000
Critical partisan	450	45.30	15.31	
Habitual partisan	442	40.20	14.36	
Attentive independent	203	42.55	14.73	
Apolitical independent	805	39.70	15.34	
Total	1500	41.91	15.14	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Table A7.3 ANOVA: Education and Korean Voters, 1992-2002

	Number of cases	Mean	Std. Deviation	ANOVA
<u>1992</u>				
Critical partisan	476	2.71	1.03	F = 11.850 Sig. = 0.000
Habitual partisan	437	2.53	1.09	
Attentive independent	97	3.13	0.95	
Apolitical independent	172	2.91	1.06	
Total	1182	1.71	1.07	
<u>1997</u>				
Critical partisan	530	2.94	1.00	F = 6.237 Sig. = 0.000
Habitual partisan	220	3.17	0.85	
Attentive independent	210	3.09	1.06	
Apolitical independent	213	3.25	0.96	
Total	1191	3.07	0.98	
<u>2002</u>				
Critical partisan	423	4.39	2.17	F = 0.103 Sig. = 0.958
Habitual partisan	426	4.36	1.94	
Attentive independent	198	4.46	2.19	
Apolitical independent	388	4.37	1.97	
Total	1435	4.39	2.05	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: Mean = average score in a 4-point scale (i.e. 1 = lowest level of education, and 4 = highest level of education).

Table A7.4 ANOVA: Size of Residence Areas and Korean Voters, 1992-2002

	Number of cases	Mean	Std. Deviation	ANOVA
<u>1992</u>				
Critical partisan	476	1.75	0.81	F = 0.411 Sig. = 0.745
Habitual partisan	437	1.75	0.84	
Attentive independent	97	1.68	0.78	
Apolitical independent	172	1.70	0.78	
Total	1182	1.74	0.81	
<u>1997</u>				
Critical partisan	530	1.67	0.72	F = 1.371 Sig. = 0.250
Habitual partisan	220	1.70	0.72	
Attentive independent	210	1.59	0.71	
Apolitical independent	213	1.60	0.72	
Total	1191	1.65	0.72	
<u>2002</u>				
Critical partisan	450	1.63	.66	F = 1.469 Sig. = 0.221
Habitual partisan	442	1.66	.70	
Attentive independent	203	1.54	.61	
Apolitical independent	405	1.61	.69	
Total	1500	1.62	.67	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: Mean = average score in a 3-point scale (i.e. 1 = large city, 2 = small city, and 3 = rural area).

Table A7.5 Crosstab: Gender and Independents, 1992-2002

Sex	Number of cases	Party Identifiers	Non-party Identifiers	Total	Test statistics
1992					Pearson Chi-Square = 2.032 Sig. = 0.154
Men	571	75.5%	24.5%	100%	
Women	613	79.0%	21.0%	100%	
Total	1184	77.3%	22.7%	100%	
1997					Pearson Chi-Square = 0.304 Sig. = 0.581
Men	612	63.9%	36.1%	100%	
Women	687	62.4%	37.6%	100%	
Total	1199	63.1%	36.9%	100%	
2002					Pearson Chi-Square = 1.474 Sig. = 0.227
Men	739	61.0%	39.0%	100%	
Women	761	58.0%	42.0%	100%	
Total	1500	59.5%	40.5%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Table A7.6 ANOVA: Gender and Korean Voters, 1992-2002

	Number of cases	Mean	Std. Deviation	ANOVA
1992				F = 3.521 Sig. = 0.015
Critical partisan	476	1.49	0.50	
Habitual partisan	437	1.57	0.50	
Attentive independent	97	1.43	0.50	
Apolitical independent	172	1.51	0.50	
Total	1182	1.52	0.50	
1997				F = 0.560 Sig. = 0.642
Critical partisan	533	1.48	0.50	
Habitual partisan	223	1.49	0.50	
Attentive independent	210	1.53	0.50	
Apolitical independent	232	1.47	0.50	
Total	1191	1.49	0.50	
2002				F = 8.913 Sig. = 0.000
Critical partisan	450	1.44	0.50	
Habitual partisan	442	1.55	0.50	
Attentive independent	203	1.42	0.49	
Apolitical independent	405	1.58	0.49	
Total	1500	1.51	0.50	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: N = number of cases; Mean = average score in a 2-point scale (i.e., 1 = man, and 2 = woman).

Table A7. 7 Crosstab: Religion and Korean Voters, 1992-2002

Religion	N	Critical Partisan	Habitual Partisan	Attentive Independent	Apolitical Independent	Total	Test Statistics
1992							Pearson Chi-Square = 39.252 Sig. = 0.000
Buddhist	355	39.4%	44.8%	5.4%	10.4%	100%	
Protestant	267	47.2%	32.6%	7.9%	12.4%	100%	
Catholic	108	43.5%	28.7%	11.1%	16.7%	100%	
Other religion	26	50.0%	15.4%	19.2%	15.4%	100%	
Non-religion	426	35.2%	36.6%	9.4%	18.8%	100%	
Total	1182	40.3%	37.0%	8.2%	14.6%	100%	
1997							Pearson Chi-Square = 14.985 Sig. = 0.242
Buddhist	335	43.6%	21.8%	15.8%	18.8%	100%	
Protestant	285	47.7%	16.1%	18.6%	17.5%	100%	
Catholic	114	45.6%	15.8%	25.4%	13.2%	100%	
Other religion	38	42.1%	18.4%	21.1%	18.4%	100%	
Non-religion	421	43.2%	18.3%	15.9%	22.6%	100%	
Total	1193	44.6%	18.5%	17.6%	19.3%	100%	
2002							Pearson Chi-Square = 13.508 Sig. = 0.333
Buddhist	376	29.5%	30.6%	14.4%	25.5%	100%	
Protestant	408	31.9%	31.1%	11.3%	25.7%	100%	
Catholic	143	32.2%	29.4%	14.0%	24.5%	100%	
Other religion	31	29.0%	16.1%	29.0%	25.8%	100%	
Non-religion	542	28.4%	28.2%	13.7%	29.7%	100%	
Total	1500	30.0%	29.5%	13.5%	27.0%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Key: N = number of cases.

Table A7. 8 T-Test for Equality of Means: Income and Independents, 1992-2002

	Number of cases	Mean	Std. Deviation	t	Sig.
1992					
Party identifiers	915	4.03	1.95	-4.766	0.000
Non-party identifiers	269	4.69	2.16		
1997					
Party identifiers	744	5.74	2.26	-2.717	0.007
Non-party identifiers	435	6.11	2.27		
2002					
Party identifiers	849	4.38	2.06	-0.161	0.872
Non-party identifiers	586	4.40	2.04		

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: Mean = average score in monthly household income coding by 1-9 scale (i.e., 1 is the lowest and 9 is the highest).

Table A7.9 ANOVA: Levels of Income and Korean Voters, 1992-2002

	Number of cases	Mean	Std. Deviation	ANOVA
1992				F = 8.688 Sig. = 0.000
Critical partisan	476	4.06	2.00	
Habitual partisan	437	3.98	1.89	
Attentive independent	97	4.96	2.02	
Apolitical independent	172	4.53	2.23	
Total	1182	4.18	2.02	
1997				F = 3.101 Sig. = 0.026
Critical partisan	530	5.67	2.30	
Habitual partisan	220	5.92	2.14	
Attentive independent	210	6.06	2.36	
Apolitical independent	213	6.16	2.18	
Total	1191	5.88	1.27	
2002				F = 0.103 Sig. = 0.958
Critical partisan	423	4.39	2.17	
Habitual partisan	426	4.36	1.94	
Attentive independent	198	4.45	2.19	
Apolitical independent	388	4.37	1.97	
Total	1500	4.39	2.05	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: Mean = average score in a 9-point scale (i.e., 1 = the lowest income level, and 9 = the highest income level).

Table A7.10 T-Test for Equality of Means: Independents and Ideology, 1992-2002

	Number of cases	Mean	Std. Deviation	t	Sig. (2-sided)
1997					
Party identifiers	691	2.99	1.15	1.269	0.205
Non-party identifiers	389	2.90	1.05		
2002					
Party identifiers	892	3.16	1.04	-0.942	0.346
Non-party identifiers	608	3.21	0.88		

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: Mean = average score in a 5-point scale (i.e., 1 = 'very conservative' to 5 = 'very liberal').

Table A7.11 ANOVA: Ideology and Korean Voters, 1997-2002

	Number of cases	Mean	Std. Deviation	ANOVA
1997				F = 2.270 Sig. = 0.079
Critical partisan	485	2.98	1.17	
Habitual partisan	206	3.03	1.11	
Attentive independent	188	3.03	1.11	
Apolitical independent	201	2.78	0.98	
Total	1080	2.96	1.12	
2002				F = 7.526 Sig. = 0.000
Critical partisan	450	3.25	1.11	
Habitual partisan	442	3.08	0.96	
Attentive independent	203	3.42	0.91	
Apolitical independent	405	3.10	0.84	
Total	1500	3.18	0.98	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: Mean = average score in a 5-point scale (i.e. 1 = very conservative, 2 = conservative, 3 = center, 4 = liberal, and 5 = very liberal).

Table A7. 12 ANOVA: Levels of Education by Age Cohorts, 2002

Age	Number of cases	Mean	Std. Deviation	Test Statistics
20-24	209	3.70	.4703	F= 189.304 Sig. = 0.000
25-34	335	3.54	.5822	
35-44	364	3.32	.6709	
45-54	263	2.89	.8716	
55-64	177	2.38	1.0270	
65 and over	144	1.72	.9567	
Total	1492	3.08	.9593	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002.

Keys: Mean = average score in a 4-point scale (i.e. 1 = lowest educational level to 4 = the highest educational level).

Table A7. 13 Independent Voters by the Degree of Understanding Politics, 1997-2002

Understanding politics	Number of cases	Party Identifiers	Non-party Identifiers	Total	Test statistics
<u>1997</u>					Pearson Chi-Square = 1.831 Sig. = 0.608
Very difficulty	141	68.1%	31.9%	100%	
Some difficulty	391	62.7%	37.3%	100%	
Not much difficulty	473	63.2%	36.8%	100%	
Not at all	180	61.1%	38.9%	100%	
Total	1185	63.3%	36.7%	100%	
<u>2002</u>					Pearson Chi-square = 35.543 Sig. = 0.000
1 (Very little knowledge)	85	51.8%	48.2%	100%	
2	146	54.8%	45.2%	100%	
3	274	52.6%	47.4%	100%	
4	506	56.7%	43.3%	100%	
5	287	64.1%	35.9%	100%	
6	107	73.8%	26.2%	100%	
7 (Very much knowledge)	95	77.9%	22.1%	100%	
Total	1500	59.5%	40.5%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997 and 2002.

Keys: N = number of cases; Mean in 1997 = average score in a 4-point scale (i.e., 1 = 'very difficult' to 4 = 'not at all difficult'); Mean in 2002 = average score in a 7-point scale (i.e. 1 = 'very little understand' to 7 = 'very much understand').

Note: In 1997, Question 30-6 (i.e., "Do you agree with the statement that politics is too difficult for you to understand?") is used to measure the level of understanding politics. In 2002, Question 21 (i.e., "Do you think that you have a better knowledge and a good deal of understanding of politics or elections compared to other people?") is used in the measurement.

Table A7. 14 Crosstab: Understanding Politics and Korean Voters, 1992-2002

Understanding politics	N	Critical Partisan	Habitual Partisan	AT-I	AP-I	Total	Test Statistics
1997							Chi-Square = 20.426 Sig. = 0.015
Very difficult	141	46.8%	21.3%	17.0%	14.9%	100%	
Somewhat difficult	390	45.4%	17.2%	16.4%	21.0%	100%	
Not difficult	473	40.8%	22.4%	16.7%	20.1%	100%	
Not at all difficult	180	50.6%	10.6%	22.8%	16.1%	100%	
Total	1184	44.5%	18.8%	17.6%	19.2%	100%	
2002							Chi-Square = 205.146 Sig. = 0.000
1 (Very little knowledge)	85	14.1%	37.6%	7.1%	41.2%	100%	
2	146	15.8%	39.0%	7.5%	37.7%	100%	
3	274	15.7%	36.9%	9.5%	38.0%	100%	
4	506	26.3%	30.4%	17.2%	26.1%	100%	
5	287	42.5%	21.6%	14.6%	21.3%	100%	
6	107	57.9%	15.9%	12.1%	14.0%	100%	
7 (Very much knowledge)	95	57.9%	20.0%	18.9%	3.2%	100%	
Total	1500	30.0%	29.5%	13.5%	27.0%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997 and 2002.

Keys: N= number of cases; AT-I = Attentive Independent; AP-I = Apolitical Independent.

Note: In 1997, Question 30-6 (i.e., "Do you agree with the statement that politics is too difficult for you to understand?") is used to measure the level of understanding politics. In 2002, Question 21 (i.e., "Do you think that you have a better knowledge and a good deal of understanding of politics or elections compared to other peoples?") is used in the measurement.

Table A7. 15 T-Test for Equality of Means: Independents and Interest in Politics, 1992-2002

	Number of cases	Mean	Std. Deviation	t	Sig. (2-sided)
1992					
Party identifiers	913	1.60	.72	-4.776	0.000
Non-party identifiers	269	1.84	.78		
1997					
Party identifiers	756	1.38	.65	-7.478	0.000
Non-party identifiers	442	1.71	.79		
2002					
Party identifiers	892	1.63	.73	-6.450	0.000
Non-party identifiers	608	1.89	.77		
2002*					
Party identifiers	892	4.23	1.58	6.875	0.000
Non-party identifiers	608	3.68	1.45		

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: Mean = average score in a 4-point scale (i.e., 1 = 'very interested' to 4 = 'not at all interested').

Note: * = Calculated based upon scores in a 7-point scale (i.e., 1 = not at all interested in politics to 7 = very much interested in politics).

Table A7. 16 Crosstab: Independents and Satisfaction with Politics, 1992-1997

	Number of cases	Party Identifiers	Non-party Identifiers	Total	Test statistics
1992					
Satisfaction	287	81.2	18.8	100%	Pearson Chi-Square = 3.399 Sig. = 0.075 Pearson's R = .054 Sig. = 0.065
Dissatisfaction	885	75.9	24.1	100%	
Total	1172	77.2	22.8	100%	
1997					
Satisfaction	164	68.9	31.1	100%	Pearson Chi-Square = 2.627 Sig. = 0.116 Pearson's R = .047 Sig. = 0.105
Dissatisfaction	1022	62.3	37.3	100%	
Total	1186	63.2	36.8	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Table A7. 17 Crosstab: Satisfaction with Politics and Korean Voters, 1992-1997

	Number of cases	Critical Partisan	Habitual Partisan	Attentive Independent	Apolitical Independent	Total	Test Statistics
1992							
Satisfaction	285	37.9%	43.2%	5.6%	13.3%	100%	Pearson Chi-Square = 7.955 Sig. = 0.046
Dissatisfaction	885	41.0%	34.9%	9.0%	15.0%	100%	
Total	1170	40.3%	36.9%	8.2%	14.6%	100%	
1997							
Satisfaction	164	44.1%	20.7%	17.1%	14.0%	100%	Pearson Chi-Square = 3.729 Sig. = 0.292
Dissatisfaction	1021	48.2%	18.2%	17.6%	20.1%	100%	
Total	1185	44.6%	18.6%	17.6%	19.2%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Table A7. 18 ANOVA: Satisfaction with Politics and Korean Voters, 1992-1997

	Number of cases	Mean	Std. Deviation.	ANOVA
1992				
Critical partisan	471	2.92	0.63	F = 7.226 Sig. = 0.000
Habitual partisan	432	2.79	0.59	
Attentive independent	96	3.06	0.72	
Apolitical independent	171	2.95	0.63	
Total	1170	2.89	0.63	
1997				
Critical partisan	529	3.23	0.71	F = 1.311 Sig. = 0.269
Habitual partisan	220	3.18	0.70	
Attentive independent	208	3.31	0.71	
Apolitical independent	228	3.26	0.64	
Total	1185	3.24	0.70	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Keys: Mean = average score in a 4-point scale (i.e. 1 = very satisfied, and 4 = not at all satisfied).

Table A7. 19 Crosstab: Independent Voters and Satisfaction with Performance of Incumbent Government, 1992-2002

	Number of cases	Party Identifiers	Non-party Identifiers	Total	Test statistics
<u>1992</u>					Chi-square = 3.138 Sig. = 0.371
Very good	12	83.3%	16.7%	100%	
Good	356	80.1%	19.9%	100%	
Bad	676	76.5%	23.5%	100%	
Very Bad	128	73.4%	26.6%	100%	
Total	1172	77.3%	22.7%	100%	
<u>1997</u>					Chi-square = 0.459 Sig. = 0.795
Good	36	63.9%	36.1%	100%	
The average	168	60.7%	39.3%	100%	
Bad	992	63.4%	36.6%	100%	
Total	1196	63.0%	37.0%	100%	
<u>2002</u>					Chi-square = 23.479 Sig. = 0.000
Good	353	70.5%	29.5%	100%	
The average	543	56.0%	44.0%	100%	
Bad	604	56.1%	43.9%	100%	
Total	1500	59.5%	40.5%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Table A7. 20 Crosstab: Satisfaction with Performance of Incumbent Government and Korean Voters, 1992-2002

	Number of cases	Critical Partisan	Habitual Partisan	Attentive Independent	Apolitical Independent	Total	Test Statistics
<u>1992</u>							Chi-square = 37.789 Sig. = 0.000
Very good	12	66.7%	16.7%	16.7%	0.0%	100%	
Good	355	38.6%	41.4%	6.5%	13.5%	100%	
Bad	675	38.4%	38.1%	7.7%	15.9%	100%	
Very Bad	128	53.9%	19.5%	15.6%	10.9%	100%	
Total	1170	40.4%	36.8%	8.3%	14.4%	100%	
<u>1997</u>							Chi-square = 16.639 Sig. = 0.011
Good	36	47.2%	16.7%	22.2%	13.9%	100%	
Average	168	32.7%	28.0%	18.5%	20.8%	100%	
Bad	991	46.3%	17.1%	17.3%	19.4%	100%	
Total	1195	44.4%	18.6%	17.6%	19.4%	100%	
<u>2002</u>							Chi-square = 40.290 Sig. = 0.000
Good	353	42.2%	28.3%	11.3%	18.1%	100%	
Average	543	24.7%	31.3%	13.6%	30.4%	100%	
Bad	604	27.6%	28.5%	14.7%	29.1%	100%	
Total	1500	30.0%	29.5%	13.5%	27.0%	100%	

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Note: In 1997 and in 2002, a 5-point scale is recoded into a 3-point scale. Indeed, 'very good' and 'good' are combined, and 'bad' and 'very bad' are combined. The following questions are used: In 1992, Question 24 ("Do you think that incumbent government is doing well in conducting state affairs?"); In 1997, Question 18 ("What do you think about the overall performance of incumbent government?"); In 2002, Question 36 ("What do you think about the overall performance of Kim Dae-jung's government?").

Table A8. 1 Correlation and Partial Correlation between Education and Turnout, 1992-2002


	1992	1997	2002
Pearson Correlation	0.008	0.089	0.052
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.785	0.002	0.046
N	1200	1200	1492
Partial Correlation	-0.030	-0.003	-0.034
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.302	0.936	0.187
N	1200	1199	1492

Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002.

Note: Partial correlation = partial correlation between education and turnout controlling for age variable; Education variable is coded as 1 = primary school, 2 = middle school, 3 = high school, and 4 = college; Turnout variable is coded as 1 = vote and 2 = not vote; Age variable is based on actual age.

Appendix 2. Figures

Figure A5.1 British Electoral Cycle (Voting Intention), 1987-1999



Data Source: Formulated based on Gallup poll records in David Butler and Gareth Butler, *Twentieth-Century British Political Facts 1900-2000* (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 276-9.

- Barrow, Stewart. 1977. 'Electoral Behaviour and Conservative Politics.' In Mark Lomas, Ian Mackay and Alan S. Zakariasen, eds., *Conservative Politics: Continuity, Culture, and Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bartels, Larry M. 1993. 'Messages received: The Political Impact of Media Lockout.' *American Political Science Review* 77:267-284.
- Bartels, Larry M. 2000. 'Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996.' *American Journal of Political Science* 44:35-50.
- Bartle, John. 2001. 'The Measurement of Party Identification in Britain: Where Do We Stand Now?' In Jonathan Tonge, Lynn Bannock, David Dawson, and Lisa Harrison, eds., *British Elections and Parties Review*, Vol. 11, London: Frank Cass.
- Bartle, John. 2002. 'Tracking Party Identification in the British Party with Focus Groups.' *Electoral Studies* 22:217-237.
- Beales, Robert L. 1994. *The Transformation of South Korea: Politics and the Media in the State Bureaucracy, 1973-1979*. London: Routledge.
- Berelson, Bernard Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William M. McPhee. 1954. *Survey Methods*. University of Chicago Press.
- Bryman, Alan. 1978. *Quantitative and Qualitative Research*. London: Routledge.
- Bryman, Alan. 2001. *Social Research Methods*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Padge, Ian. Ina Chong, David Padge, eds. 1976. *Party Identification and Beyond: An Investigation of Party and Party Identification*. London: John Wiley & Sons.

Bibliography

With some exceptions, citations of articles in the press and electronic newsletters are not listed individually in this bibliography. Korean-language literature are listed separately.

- Abramowitz, Alan I. 1975. 'Name Familiarity, Reputation, and the Incumbency Effect in a Congressional Election.' *Western Political Quarterly* 28:668-684.
- Abramson, Paul R. 1975. *Generational Change in American Politics*. Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books.
- Ansolabehere, Stephen and Shanto Iyengar. 1995. *Going Negative: How Political Advertisements Shrink and Polarize the Electorate*. New York: Free Press.
- Asher, Herbert. 1980. *Presidential Elections and American Politics*. Homewood, Ill: Dorsey.
- Barbour, Rosaline S. 1998. 'Mixing Qualitative Methods: Quality Assurance or Quality Quagmire?' *Qualitative Health Research* 8:352-61.
- Barbour, Rosaline S. 1999. 'The Case for Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches in Health Services Research.' *Journal of Health Services Research Policy* 4:39-43.
- Barnes, Samuel. 1997. 'Electoral Behavior and Comparative Politics.' In Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds., *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bartels, Larry M. 1993. 'Messages received: The Political Impact of Media Exposure.' *American Political Science Review* 87:267-285.
- Bartels, Larry M. 2000. 'Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1956.' *American Journal of Political Science* 44:35-50.
- Bartle, John. 2001. 'The Measurement of Party Identification in Britain: Where Do We Stand Now?' In Jonathan Tonge, Lynn Bennie, David Denver, and Lisa Harrison, eds., *British Elections and Parties Review*, Vol. 11. London: Frank Cass.
- Bartle, John. 2003. 'Measuring Party Identification: an Exploratory Study with Focus Groups.' *Electoral Studies* 22:217-237.
- Bedeski, Robert E. 1994. *The Transformation of South Korea: Reform and Reconstitution in the Sixth Republic under Roh Tae Woo, 1987-1991*. London: Routledge.
- Berelson, Bernard, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee. 1954. *Voting*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bryman, Alan. 1998. *Quantity and Quality in Social Research*. London: Routledge.
- Bryman, Alan. 2001. *Social Research Methods*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Budge, Ian, Ivor Crewe, Dennis Farlie, eds. 1976. *Party Identification and Beyond: Representations of Voting and Party Competition*. London: John Wiley & Sons.

- Burnham, Walter Dean. 1965. *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics*. New York: Norton.
- Butler, David and Dennis Kavanagh. 2002. *The British General Election of 2001*. Houndsmills: Palgrave.
- Butler, David and Gareth Butler. 2000. *Twentieth-Century British Political Facts, 1900-2000*. London: Macmillan.
- Butler, David, and Donald Stokes. 1974. *Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral Choice*. London: MacMillan. 2nd edition.
- Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York: Wiley & Son.
- Cho, Il-mun and Kyung-woo Yun. 1976. 'Popular Perception of Political Parties.' In C. I. Eugene Kim and Young Whan Kihl, eds., *Party Politics and Elections in Korea*. Silver Spring: The Research Institute on Korean Affairs.
- Clarke, Harold D., and Marianne C. Stewart. 1998. 'The Decline of Parties in the Minds of Citizens.' *Annual Review of Political Science* 1: 357-378.
- Clarke, Harold, Nitish Dutt, and Allen Kornberg. 1993. 'The Political Economy of Attitudes toward Polity and Society in Western European Democracies.' *Journal of Politics* 55: 998-1021.
- Colomer, Josep M. 2001. 'The 2000 General Election in Spain.' *Electoral Study* 20:490-5.
- Conover, Pamela and Stanley Feldman. 1984. 'Emotional Reactions to the Economy: I'm Mad as Hell and I'm not going to Take It Anymore.' *American Journal of Political Science* 28:50-78.
- Conover, Pamela and Stanley Feldman. 1984. 'How People Organize the Political World: A Schematic Model.' *American Journal of Political Science*, 28:95-126.
- Converse, Philip E. and George B. Markus. 1979. 'Plus ca Change ...: The New CPS Election Study Panel.' *American Political Science Review* 73:32-49.
- Converse, Philip E. and Roy Pierce. 1985. 'Measuring Partisanship.' *Political Methodology* 11:143-166.
- Corbetta, Piergiorgio. 2003. *Social Research: Theory, Methods, and Techniques*. London: Sage.
- Cotton, James, ed. 1995. *Politics and Policy in the New Korean State: From Roh Tae-Woo to Kim Young-Sam*. Melbourne: Longman.
- Cotton, James. 1989. 'From Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea.' *Political Studies* 37:244-59.
- Crewe, Ivor and Katarina Thomson. 1999. 'Party Loyalties: Dealignment or Realignment?' In Geoffrey Evans and Pippa Norris, eds., *Critical Elections: British Parties and Voters in Long-term Perspective*. London: Sage.
- Crewe, Ivor, and David Denver, eds. 1985. *Electoral Change in Western Democracies*. London: Groom Helm.
- Crewe, Ivor. 1976. 'Party Identification Theory and Political Change in Britain.' In Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe, and Dennis Farlie, eds., *Party Identification and Beyond*. London: John Wiley & Sons.

- Curtice, John. 2002. 'The State of Election Studies: Mid-life Crisis or New Youth?' *Electoral Studies* 21:161-168.
- Dalton, Russell J. 1984. 'Cognitive Mobilization and Partisan Dealignment in Advanced Industrial Democracies.' *Journal of Politics* 46:264-84.
- Dalton, Russell J. 2000. 'The Decline of Party Identification.' In Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds., *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dalton, Russell J. and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds., *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
- Dalton, Russell J., Ian McAllister, and Martin P. Wattenberg. 2000. 'The Consequences of Partisan Dealignment.' In Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds., *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dalton, Russell J., Scott C. Flanagan, and Paul Allen Beck. 1984. *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Davis, Richard. 1999. *The Web of Politics: The Internet's Impact on the American Political System*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- De Vaus, David. 2001. *Research Design in Social Research*. London: Sage.
- Dennis, Jack. 1988a. 'Political Independence in America. Part I.' *British Journal of Political Science* 18:77-109.
- Dennis, Jack. 1988b. 'Political Independence in America. Part II.' *British Journal of Political Science* 18:197-219.
- Denzin, Norman K. and Yvonna S. Lincoln. 2000. 'Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research.' In Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, eds., *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. London: Sage.
- Diamond, Larry, and Byung-Kook Kim, eds. 2000. *Consolidating Democracy in South Korea*. Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Diamond, Larry, Mark Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-Mao Tien. 1997. *Consolidating Third-Wave Democracies*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper and Low.
- Evans, Geoffrey, ed. 1999. *The End of Class Politics?: Class Voting in Comparative Context*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fay, Brian. 1996. *Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science: a Multicultural Approach*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Ferejohn, John A. 1986. 'Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control.' *Public Choice* 50:5-25.
- Finkel, Steven E. 1993. 'Reexamining the Minimal Effects Model in Recent Presidential Campaigns.' *Journal of Politics* 55:1-21.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1976. 'The Voting Decision: Instrumental and Expressive Aspects.' *Journal of Politics* 38:390-415.

- Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Heaven and London: Yale University Press.
- Flanagan, Scott C. and Russell J. Dalton. 1990. 'Models of Change.' In Peter Mair, ed., *The Western European Party System*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Franklin, Mark N. 2002. 'The Dynamics of Electoral Participation.' In Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris, eds., *Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting*. London: Sage.
- French, Howard W., 'Online Newspaper Shakes Up Korean Politics.' *The New York Times*, 6 March 2003.
- Gelman, Andrew, and Gary King. 1993. 'Why Are American Election Polls so Variable when Votes Are so Predictable?' *British Journal of Political Science* 23:409-451.
- Glass, D. 1986. 'Evaluating Presidential Candidates: Who Focus on Their Personal Attributes?' *Public Opinion Quarterly* 49:517-534.
- Goldthorpe, John H. and Keith Hope. 1974. *The Social Grading of Occupations: A New Approach and Scale*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Goodhart, C.A.E. and R.J. Bhansali. 1970. 'Political Economy.' *Political Studies* 18:43-106.
- Gould, Philip. 1998. *The Unfinished Revolution: How the Modernisers Saved the Labour Party*. London: Abacus.
- Graber, Doris A. 1984. *Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide*. New York: Longman.
- Green, Donald P. and Ian Shapiro. 1994. *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: a Critique of Applications in Political Science*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Haggard, Stephan. 1990. *Pathways from the Periphery*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Hammersley, M. 1996. 'The Relationship between Qualitative and Quantitative Research: Paradigm Loyalty versus Methodological Eclecticism.' In J. T. E. Richardson, ed., *Handbook of Research Methods for Psychology and the Social Science*. Leicester: BPS Book.
- Han, Sung-joo. 1989. 'South Korea: Politics in Transition.' In Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Hardy, Melissa A. 1993. 'Regression with Dummy Variables.' In Michael S. Lewis-Beck, ed., *Regression Analysis*. London: Sage.
- Harrop, Martin and William L. Miller. 1987. *Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction*. London: Macmillan.
- Hearl, Derek J., Ian Budge, and Bernard Perason. 1996. 'Distinctiveness of Regional Voting: A Comparative Analysis Across the European Community (1979-1993).' *Electoral Studies* 15:167-82.
- Heath, Anthony, Roger Jowell, and John Curtice. 1991. *Understanding Political Change: the British Voter 1964-1987*. Oxford: Pergamon Press.

- Hill, Kevin A. and John E. Hughes. 1998. *Cyberpolitics: Citizen Activism in the Age of the Internet*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Hillygus, D. Sunshine and Simon Jackman. 2003. 'Voter Decision Making in Election 2000: Campaign Effects, Partisan Activation, and the Clinton Legacy.' *American Journal of Political Science* 47:583-596.
- Himmelweit, Hilda T., P. Humphreys, and M. Jaeger. 1985. *How Voters Decide*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
- Hinich, Melvin and Michael Munger. 1994. *Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Holbrook, Thomas M. 1996. *Do Campaign Matter?* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Hout, Michael. 1999. 'Classes, Unions, and the Realignment of US Presidential Voting, 1952-1992.' In Geoffrey Evans, ed., *The End of Class Politics?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Im, Hyug Baeg. 1987. 'The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea.' *World Politics* 39:231-57.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Iyengar, Shanto and Donald R. Kinder. 1987. *News that Matters: Televisions and American Opinion*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Iyengar, Shanto and John R. Petrocik. 2000. 'Basic Rule Voting: Impact of Campaigns on Party-and-Approval Voting.' In James A. Thurber, Candice J. Nelson, and David A. Dulio, eds., *Crowded Airwaves: Campaign Advertising in Elections*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Iyengar, Shanto, and A. F. Simon. 2000. 'New Perspective and Evidence on Political Communication and Campaign Effects.' *Annual Review of Psychology* 51:149-169.
- Jackson, John E. 1975. 'Issues, Party Choice, and Presidential Votes.' *American Journal of Political Science* 19:161-185.
- Jennings M. Kent, and Richard G. Niemi. 1974. *The Political Character of Adolescence: The Influence of Families and Schools*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Johnson, Charlmers. 1982. *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Johnson, M., W. Phillips Shively, and R.M. Stein. 2002. Contextual Data and the Study of Elections and Voting Behavior: Connecting Individuals to Environments.' *Electoral Studies* 21:219-233.
- Johnston, Richard. 1999. 'Business Cycles, Political Cycle and the Popularity of Canadian Government, 1974-1998.' *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 32:499-520.
- Jonathan Watts, 'World's first internet president logs on', *The Guardian*, 24 February 2003.

- Kang, Won-Taek, and Hoon Jaung. 1999. 'Notes on Recent Elections: The 1997 Presidential Election in South Korea.' *Electoral Studies* 18:599-608.
- Kang, Won-Taek, and Scott Walker. 2002. 'Notes on Recent Elections: The 2000 National Assembly Elections in South Korea.' *Electoral Studies* 21:473-533.
- Kang, Won-Taek. 1998. 'The Rise of a Third Party in South Korea: The Unification National Party in the 1992 National Assembly Election.' *Electoral Studies* 17:95-111.
- Katz, Richard S. 1979. 'The Dimensionality of Party Identification: Cross-National Perspectives.' *Comparative Politics* 10:147-63.
- Keith, Bruce E., David B. Magleby, Candice J. Nelson, Elizabeth Orr, Mark C. Westlye, and Raymond E. Wolfinger. 1992. *The Myth of the Independent Voter*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Keith, Bruce E., David B. Magleby, Candice J. Nelson, Elizabeth Orr, Mark C. Westlye, and Raymond Wolfinger. 1986. 'The Partisan Affinities of Independent 'leaners'.' *British Journal of Political Science* 16:155-184.
- Kelly, Stanley, jr. and Thad W. Mirer. 1974. 'The Simple Act of Voting.' *American Political Science Review* 68:572-591.
- Keohane, Gary King, Robert O. and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Key, V. O. Jr. 1966. *The Responsible Electorate*. New York: Vintage.
- Kim, Byung-Kook. 2000. 'Party Politics in South Korea's Democracy: The Crisis of Success.' In Larry Diamond and Byung-Kook Kim, eds., *Consolidating Democracy in South Korea*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Kim, Chong-Lim. 1980. 'Political Participation and Mobilized Voting.' In Chong-Lim Kim, ed., *Political Participation in Korea*. Santa Barbara: Clio Books.
- Kim, Chong Lim, Young Whan Kihl, and Seong-Tong Pai. 1980. 'The Modes of Citizen Political Participation: An Analysis of Nationwide Survey Results.' In Chong Lim Kim, ed., *Political Participation in Korea*. Santa Barbara: Clio Press, 1980.
- Kim, Jae-on and Byung Chul Koh. 1972. 'Electoral Behavior and Social Development in South Korea: An Aggregate Data Analysis of Presidential Elections.' *Journal of Politics* 34:845-54.
- Kim, Sangjun. 2002. 'The Genealogy of Confucian Moralpolitik and Its Implications for Modern Civil Society.' In Charles K. Armstrong, ed., *Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy and the State*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Kim, Sunhyuk. 2000. *The Politics of Democratization in Korea: The Role of Civil Society*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Kinder, Donald R., and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1981. 'Sociotropic Politics: The American Case.' *British Journal of Political Science* 11:129-162.
- King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1995. 'The Importance of Research Design in Political Science.' *American Political Science Review* 89:475-481.
- Koo, Hagen. 2002. 'Engendering Civil Society: The Role of the Labor Movement.' In Charles K. Armstrong, ed., *Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy and the*

- State*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Krueger, Richard A. 1988. *Focus Groups: A practical Guide for Applied Research*. London: Sage.
- Kuhn, Thomas S. 1970. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Latin, David et al. 1995. 'The Qualitative-Quantitative Disputation: Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba's Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research.' *American Political Science Review* 89:454-481.
- Lazarsfeld, Paul F., Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet. 1944. *The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- LeDuc, L. 2002. 'The Federal Election in Canada, November 2000.' *Electoral Studies* 21:655-9.
- Lee, Aie-Rie and Yong U. Glasure. 1995. 'Party Identifiers in South Korea: Differences in Issue Orientations.' *Asian Survey* 35:367-376.
- Lee, Manwoo. 1990. *The Odyssey of Korean Democracy*. New York: Praeger.
- Leininger, Madeleine. 1994. 'Evaluation Criteria and Critique of Qualitative Research Studies.' In J. M. Morse, ed., *Critical Issues in Qualitative Research Methods* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage).
- Lewis-Beck, Michael S. 1988. *Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Lincoln, Yvonna S. and E. G. Guba. 2000. 'Paradigmatic Controversies, Contradictions, and Emerging Confluences.' In Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, eds., *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 2nd edition. London: Sage.
- Linz, Juan and Alfred Stephen. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lipset, S. M. 1985. 'The Elections, the Economy and Public Opinion: 1984.' *Political Studies* 18:28-38.
- Lodge, Milton and Ruth Hamill. 1986. 'A Partisan Schema for Political Information Processing.' *American Political Science Review* 80:505-520.
- Lodge, Milton, and Patrick Stroh. 1993. 'Inside the Mental Voting Booth: An Impression-Driven Model of Candidate Evaluation.' In Shanto Iyengar and William J. McGuire, eds., *Explorations in Political Psychology*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Lodge, Milton, Kathleen M. McGraw, and Patrick Stroh. 1989. 'An Impression-Driven Model of Candidate Evaluation.' *American Political Science Review* 83:399-419.
- Lodge, Milton, Marco R. Steenbergen, and Shawn Brau. 1995. 'The Responsive Voter: Campaign Information and Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation.' *American Political Science Review* 89:309-326.
- MacKuen, Michael B. 1996. 'Comment on President and the Prospective Voter.' *Journal of Politics* 58:793-801.

- Mair, Peter, ed. 1990. *The West European Party System*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- March, Michael. 2002. 'Electoral Context.' *Electoral Studies* 21:207-217.
- Markus, G. B. and P. E. Converse. 1979. 'A Dynamic Simultaneous Equation Model of Electoral Choice.' *American Political Science Review* 73:1055-1070.
- May, Tim. 2001. *Social Research: Issues, Methods, and Process*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Miller, Arthur H. and Thomas F. Klobucar. 2000. 'The Development of Party Identification in Post-Soviet Societies.' *American Journal of Political Science* 44:667-686.
- Miller, Arthur H. Martin P. Wattenberg, and Oksana Malanchuk. 1986. 'Schematic Assessments of Presidential Candidates.' *American Political Science Review* 80:521-540.
- Miller, Arthur H., and Martin P. Wattenberg. 1983. 'Measuring Party Identification: Independent or No-Partisan Preference?' *American Journal of Political Science* 27:106-121.
- Miller, Warren. 1976. 'The Cross-National Use of Party Identification as a Stimulus to Political Inquiry. In Budge, Ian, Ivor Crewe, Dennis Farlie, eds., *Party Identification and Beyond: Representations of Voting and Party Competition*. London: John Wiley & Sons.
- Miller, Warren and J. Merrill Shanks. 1996. *The New American Voter*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
- Miller, William L. 1983. *The Survey Method in the Social and Political Sciences: Achievements, Failures, Prospects*. London: Frances Pinter.
- Miller, William L. 1987. *Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction*. Houndmills and London: The Macmillan Press.
- Miller, William L. 1991. *Media and Voters: The Audience, Content and Influence of Press and Television at the 1987 General Election*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Miller, William L. 1995. 'Quantitative Method.' In David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, eds., *Theory and Methods in Political Science*. London: Macmillan Press.
- Miller, William L. and Richard G. Niemi. 2002. 'Voting: Choice, Conditioning, and Constraint.' In Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris, eds., *Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting*. London: Sage.
- Miller, William L. and Stephen White. 1998. 'Political Values Underlying Partisan Cleavages in Former Communist Countries.' *Electoral Studies* 17:197-216.
- Miller, William L. and T. Mackie. 1973. 'The Electoral Cycle and the Asymmetry of Government and Opposition Popularity: An Alternative Model of the Relationship between Economic Consideration and Political Popularity.' *Political Studies* 21:263-79.
- Miller, William L., Harold D. Clark, Martin Harrop, Lawrence LeDuc, and Paul F. Whiteley. 1990. *How Voters Change: The 1987 British Election Campaign in Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Miller, William L., Annis May Timpson, and Michael Lessnoff. 1996. *Political Culture in*

- Contemporary Britain: People and Politicians, Principles and Practice.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Miller, William L., Ase B. Grodeland, and Tatyana Y. Koshechkina. 2001. *A Culture of Corruption?: Coping with Government in Post-communist Europe.* New York: Central European University Press.
- Miller, William L., Stephen White, and Paul Haywood. 1998. *Values and Political Changes in Postcommunist Europe.* London: Macmillan.
- Morgan, David L. 1988. *Focus Groups As Qualitative Research.* London: Sage, 1988.
- Morgan, David L. 1998. 'Practical Strategies for Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Application for Health Research.' *Qualitative Health Research* 8:362-76.
- Morris, Dick. 1998. *Behind the Oval Office: Getting Reelected Against All Odds.* Riverside, CA: Renaissance Books.
- Morris, Peter. 1996. 'Notes on Recent Elections: Electoral Politics in South Korea.' *Electoral Studies* 15:550-62.
- Neuman, W. Russell. 1986. *The Paradox of Mass Politics: Knowledge and Opinion in the American Electorate.* Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
- Nevitte, Neil et al. 2000. *Unsteady State: The 1997 Canadian Federal Election.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nie, Norman H., Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik. 1976. *The Changing American Voter.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Niemi, Richard G., and M. Kent Jennings. 1991. 'Issues and Inheritance in the Formation of Party Identification.' *American Journal of Political Science* 35:970-988.
- Niemi, Richard G., and Richard S. Katz, and David Newman. 1980. 'Reconstructing Past Partisanship: The Failure of the Party Identification Recall Questions.' *American Journal of Political Science* 24:633-651.
- Norris, Pippa, John Curtice, David Sanders, Margaret Scammell, and Holli A. Semetko. 1999. *On Message: Communicating the Campaign.* London: Sage.
- Norris, Pippa, ed. 1998. *Elections and Voting Behaviour: New Challenges, New Perspective.* Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Norris, Pippa. 2001. 'Apathetic Landslide: The 2001 British General Election.' In Pippa Norris, ed., *Britain Votes 2001.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Norris, Pippa. 2002. 'Campaign Communication.' In Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris, eds., *Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenge in the Study of Elections and Voting.* London: Sage.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo A. 1973. *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics.* Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California.
- Oh, John Kie-chiang. 1999. *Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and Economic Development.* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Ohr, Dieter and Henrik Oscarsson. 2003. 'Leader Traits, Leader Image and Vote Choice.' A paper presented at the 2003 Meeting of the European Consortium for

- Political Research, 18-21 September, 2003, Marburg, Germany.
- Petrocik, John R. 1974. 'An Analysis of the Intransitivities in the Index of Party Identification.' *Political Methodology* 1:31-47.
- Pomper, Gerald M. 1975. *Voter's Choice: Varieties of American Electoral Behavior*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Popkin, Samuel L. 1991. *The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Przeworski, Adam and Henry Teune. 1970. *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry*. Malabar Florida: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Pye, Lucian. W. 1985. *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
- Riker, William H. and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1968. 'A Theory of the Calculus of Voting.' *American Political Science Review* 62:25-43.
- Ritchie, John. 2003. 'The Applications of Qualitative Methods to Social Research.' In Jane Ritchie and Jane Lewis, eds., *Qualitative Research Practice*. London: Sage.
- Sanders, David. 1991. 'Government Popularity and the Next General Election.' *Political Quarterly* 62: 235-261.
- Sanders, David. 1993. 'Why the Conservatives Won – Again.' In Anthony King, Ivor Crewe, David Denver, Kenneth Newton, Philip Norton, David Sanders, Patrick Seyd, eds., *Britain at the Polls 1992*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
- Sarlvik, Bo and Ivor Crewe. 1983. *Decade of Dealignment: The Conservative Victory of 1979 and Electoral Trends in the 1970s*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schmitt, Herman. 1989. 'On Party Attachment in Western Europe and the Utility of Eurobarometer Data.' *West European Politics* 12:122-39.
- Schmitt, Hermann, and Soren Holmberg. 1995. 'Political Parties in Decline?' In Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, eds., *Citizens and the State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Seale, Clive. 1999. *The quality of qualitative Research*. London: Sage.
- Shanks, J. Merrill and Warren E. Miller. 1990. 'Policy Direction and Performance Evaluation: Complementary Explanations of the Regan Elections.' *British Journal of Political Science* 20:143-235.
- Shin, Doh C. 1999. *Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sigelman L. and M. M.Gant, 1989. 'Anticandidate Voting in the 1984 Presidential Election.' *Political Behavior* 11:81-92.
- Stimson, James A. 1976. 'Public Support for American Presidents: A Cyclical Model.' *Public Opinion Quarterly* 40:1-21.
- Stokes, Donald E. 1966. 'Some Dynamic Elements of Contest for the Presidency.'

- American Political Science Review* 60:19-28.
- Stray, Stephanie and Mick Silver. 1983. 'Government Popularity, Bi-Election and Cycles.' *Parliamentary Affairs* 36:49-55.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 1995. 'Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Political Science.' *American Political Science Review* 89:471-474.
- Thurber, James A., Candice J. Nelson, and David A. Dulio, eds. 2000. *Crowded Airwaves: Campaign Advertising in Elections*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Toffler, Alvin. 1981. *The Third Wave*. London: Pan Books.
- Trent, J. S. and R. V. Friedenberg. 1991. *Political Campaign Communication*. New York: Preager.
- Tullock, Gordon. 1976. *The Vote Motive*. London: Institute for Economic Affairs.
- Valentine, David and John Van Wingen. 1980. 'Partisanship, Independence, and the Partisan Identification Question.' *American Politics Quarterly* 8:165-86.
- Verba, Sidney, Norman H. Nie, Jae-On Kim. 1978. *Participation and Political Equality: a Seven-Nation Comparison*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Wattenberg, Martin P. 1998. *The Decline of American Political Parties: 1952-1996*. Cambridge, Mass and London: Harvard University Press.
- Wattenberg, Martin. 1991. *The Rise of Candidate Centered Politics*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
- Weisberg, Herbert F. 1980. 'Multidimensional Conceptualization of Party Identification.' *Political Behavior* 2:33-60.
- Whiteley, Paul, Harold Clarke, David Sanders and Marianne Stewart. 2001. 'Turnout.' In Pippa Norris, ed., *Britain Votes 2001*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wlezien, Christopher, and Mark N. Franklin. 2002. 'The Future of Election Studies: Introduction.' *Electoral Studies* 21:157-60.
- Yang, Gil-hyun. 1995. 'Liberalisation and the Political Role of the *Chaebol* in Korea: The Rise of and Fall of the Unification National Party (UNP).' In James Cotton, ed., *Politics and Policy in the New Korean State: From Roh Tae-Woo to Kim Young-Sam*. Melbourne: Longman.
- Zaller, John. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Zaller, John. 2002. 'The Statistical Power of Election Studies to Detect Exposure Effects in Political Campaigns.' *Electoral Studies* 21:297-329.
- Zelle, Carsten. 1995. 'Social Dealignment vs. Political Frustration: Contrasting Explanations of the Floating Vote in Germany.' *European Journal of Political Research* 27:319-45.

Korean-language literature

- Cho, Jung-bin. 1993. 'Yugwonjaui yeoyaseonghyanggwa tupyohaengtae' (Pro-ruling and pro-opposition voter attitude and voting behavior). In Nam-Young Lee, ed., *Hangugui seongeo* (Elections in Korea), Vol. 1. Seoul: Nanam.
- Cho, Kisuk. 1996. *Hamnijeok seontaek* (Rational choice). Seoul: Hanul.
- Cho, Kisuk. 2000. *Jiyeokjuui seongeowa hamnijeok yugwonja* (Regional voting and rational voters). Seoul: Nanam.
- Choi, Jang-jip. 1996. *Hnguk minjujuui jogeongwa jeonmang* (Conditions and prospect for democracy in Korea). Seoul: Nanam.
- Chung, Jin Min, and A-lan Hwang. 1999. 'Minjuhwa ihu hangugui seongeojeongchi' (Electoral politics in Korea after a transition to democracy). *Hangukjeongchihakhoebo* (Korean Political Science Review) 33:115-34.
- Chung, Tae-yeong. 1991. *Chobongamgwa jinbodang* (Cho Bong-Am and the progressive party). Seoul: Hangilsa.
- Chung, Young-tae. 1993. 'Gyegeupbyeol topyohangtaeleul tonghae bon sipsadae daeseon' (An analysis of the 14th presidential election focusing on class voting). In Nam-Young Lee, ed., *Hangugui seongeo* (Elections in Korea), Vol. 1. Seoul: Nanam.
- Gallup-Korea. 1998. *Jesipodae daetongryeongseongeo tupyohangtae* (Voting behaviour in the 15th presidential election). Seoul: Gallup-Korea.
- Gallup-Korea. 2003. *Jesipyukdae daetongryeongseongeo tupyohangtae* (Voting behaviour in the 16th presidential election). Seoul: Gallup-Korea.
- Hwang, A-ran. 1998. 'Jeongdangtaedowa tupyohangtae' (Party identification and voting behaviors). In Nam-Young Lee, ed., *Hangugui seongeo* (Elections in Korea), Vol. 2. Seoul: Pureungil.
- Hyeon, Jong-min. 1990. 'Seongeooinui jaepyeonseonggwa tupyoo' (Electoral realignment and vote). *Hangukjeongchihakhoebo* (Korean Political Science Review) 23:209-226.
- Jin, Youngjae, ed. 2002. *Hangugui seongeo* (Elections in Korea), Vol. 4. Seoul: Korean Social Science Data Center.
- Jin, Youngjae. 2002. *Budongcheong yugwonja hyeongtae bunseok* (An analysis of floating voters). Seoul: Jipmundang.
- Kang, Jun-man. 2002. 'Eollonhaksalgwa sugueollonui tansaeng (Killing journalism and the birth of conservative journalism).' *Inmulgwa sasang* (People and thought) 55:118-35.
- Kang, Myeong-se. 2001. 'Jiyeokjuuineun eonje sijakdoeeonneunga?' (When did regionalism in presidential elections in Korea begin?). *Hangukgwa gugjejeongchi* 35:127-58.
- Kang, Won-Taek. 1998. 'Yugwonjaui inyeomjeok seonghyanggwa tupyohangtae' (Voter's ideological attitude and voting choice). In Nam-Young Lee, ed., *Hangugui seongeo* (Elections in Korea), Vol. 2. Seoul: Pureungil.
- Kang, Won-Taek. 2002. 'Tupyoo bulchamgwa jeongchijeok bulmanjok' (Abstention from

- voting and political dissatisfaction). *Hangukjeongchihakhoebo* (Korean Political Science Review) 36:153-73.
- Kang, Won-Taek. 2002. 'Yukwonjaui jeongchiinyeomgwa sipyukdae chongseon' (Political ideology of electorates and the 16th general election: an overlap of regional cleavage and ideological cleavage). In Youngjae Jin, ed., *Hangugui seongeo* (Elections in Korea), Vol. 4. Seoul: Korean Social Science Data Center.
- Kang, Won-Taek. 2003. *Hangugui seongeo Jeongchi* (Electoral Politics in South Korea: Ideology, Region, Generation and Media) (Seoul: Pureungil).
- Kil, Soong-hoom. 1987. 'Seongeoyeongumunheonoe banyeongdoin ironui byeonhwa' (Changes in theory reflected in literature in electoral studies). In Soong-hoom Kil, Kwang Woong Kim and Byong Man Ahn, eds., *Hangugui seongeo* (Elections in Korea). Seoul: Dasan Publishers, 1987.
- Kil, Soong-hoom. 1993. 'Hanguginui jeongchiuisikbyeonhwa' (Changes in Korean political values). *Hangukjeongchihakhoibo* (Korean Political Science Review) 26:133-52.
- Kim, Dae-whan and Gyun Kim. 1999. *Hangug jaebeol gaehyeoklon* (Chaebol reform in Korea). Seoul: Nanam.
- Kim, Man-heum. 1994. 'Jeongchigyunyeol, Jeongdangjeongchi Geurigo Jiyeokjuui' (Political cleavage, party politics and regionalism). *Hangukjeongchihakhoebo* (Korean Political Science Review) 28:215-37.
- Kim, Wook. 1998. 'Tupyochamyewa gigwon' (Vote turnout and abstention). In Nam-Young Lee, ed., *Hangugui seongeo* (Elections in Korea), Vol. 2. Seoul: Pureungil.
- Kim, Yong-cheol and Seongi Yun. 2000. 'Internetui jeongchijeok hwaryonggwa 16dae chongseon' (Political use of Internet and the 16th general election). *Hangukjeongchihakhoebo* (Korean Political Science Review) 34:129-47.
- Kim, Young-tae. 1998. 'Hangugeseoui gyeongjetupyo' (Economic voting in Korea). In Nam-Young Lee, ed., *Hangugui seongeo* (Elections in Korea), Vol. 2. Seoul: Pureungil.
- Lee, Hyeon-chul. 2000. 'Mudangpau tupyohangtae: 16dae chongseonuil jungsimeuro' (Voting behavior of non-party identifiers: focusing on the 16th general election). *Hangukjeongchihakhoebo* (Korean Political Science Review) 34:137-160.
- Lee, Hyeon-wu. 1998. 'Hangugeseoui gyeongjetupyo' (Economic voting in Korea). In Nam-Young Lee, ed., *Hangugui seongeo* (Elections in Korea), Vol. 2. Seoul: Pureungil.
- Lee, Kap-Yun. 1998. *Hangugui seongewa jiyeokjuui* (Korean elections and regionalism). Seoul: Oreum.
- Lee, Nae-young. 1996. 'Je sipodae chongseonui tpyohaengtae Byeonhwa' (Changes in electoral behaviors in the 15th general election). In Sejong Institute, ed., *Je sipodae chongseon Bunseok* (An analysis of the 15th general election). Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1996.
- Lee, Nam-Young, ed. 1998. *Hangugui seongeo* (Elections in Korea), Vol. 2. Seoul: Pureungil.
- Millennium Democratic Party. 2003. *Jesipyukdae daetongryeong seongeo baekseo* (A

- white paper on the 16th presidential election). Seoul: Millennium Democratic Party.
- Na, Gan-chaе. 1990. 'Jiyeokganui sahoejeok georigam' (Social distance between regions). In *Hangug sahoihaghoi* (Korean Sociology Association), ed., *Hangugui jiyeokjuuiwa jiyeokgaldeung* (regionalism and regional conflicts in Korea). Seoul: Seongwonsa.
- National Election Commission. 1998. *Je 15dae daetongryeongseongeo tupyoyul bunseok* (An analysis of turnout in the 15th presidential election). Seoul: National Election Commission.
- National Election Commission. 2003. *Je 16dae daetongryeongseongeo tupyoyul bunseok* (An analysis of turnout in the 16th presidential election). Seoul: National Election Commission.
- Park, Chan-wuk. 1993. 'Jae 14dae gughoiuiwon chongseongeoaeoseoui jeongdangjiji bunseok' (An analysis of the support for political parties in the 14th general election). In Nam-Young Lee, ed., *Hangugui seongeo* (Elections in Korea), Vol. 1. Seoul: Nanam.
- Seo, Jung-seok. 1999. *Chobongamgwa osipnyeondaе* (*Cho Bong-Am and 1950s*). Seoul: Yeoksabipyeongsa.
- Shin, Myoung-soon. 1984. 'Hangugui jeongchi chamyeowa jeongchi baljeon' (Political participation and political development in Korea). In *Hangug jeongchihaghoi* (Korean Political Science Association), ed., *Hangug jeongchi balcheonui tuegseonggwa jeonmang* (Features and Prospect for Political Development in Korea). Seoul: Korean Political Science Association.
- Soh, Ho-Cheol. 1997. *Samgimeul neomeoseo* (Over three Kims). Seoul: Pureonsup.
- Yang, Seung-chan. 1999. 'Television seongetoron bangsongui yeonghyangnyeok Yeongu' (The impacts of televised debates in the Korean presidential election). *Bangsonyeongu* 8:284-322.
- Yun, Cheon-ju. 1989. *Tupyo chamyeowa jeongchibaljeon* (Vote participation and political development). Seoul: Seoul National University Press.
- Yun, Cheon-ju. 1990. 'Tupyo chamyeoui byeonhwawa jeongchibaljeon' (Change in vote participation and political development). In Kwang Woong Kim, ed., *Hangugui seongeo jeongchihak* (Electoral politics in Korea). Seoul: Nanam.

Data sets

- Korea Social Science Data Center. *Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992, 1997, and 2002*.
- Korea Social Science Data Center. *Korean General Election Study, 1992, 1996, and 2000*.
- Korea Social Science Data Center. *Korean Local Election Study, 1995, 1998, and 2002*.