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SENIOR MANAGERS IN IRAQI SOCIETY:  
THEIR BACKGROUND AND ATTITUDES

by

MOAYAID S. SULIEMAN

Thesis

submitted in part fulfilment of the  
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to

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D E D I C A T I O N

To my deceased parents,  
whose encouragement has  
sustained me for so many  
years.

D E C L A R A T I O N

No portion of the work referred to in this study has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institution of learning.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

		<u>Page</u>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS		
ABSTRACT		
CHAPTER ONE	INTRODUCTION .....	1
TWO	THE GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION OF IRAQ .....	53
	1. Location and Geographical Character- istics .....	53
	2. Population .....	57
THREE	SOCIAL COMMUNITIES IN IRAQ .....	63
	1. The Bedouin Community .....	64
	2. The Village Community .....	72
	3. The City Community .....	79
FOUR	POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN IRAQ FROM 1921-1980 .....	90
	1. Political Environment .....	90
	2. Economic Environment .....	94
FIVE	RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, PRACTICES AND EDUCATION OF THE PEOPLE IN IRAQ .....	117
	1. Islam and Economic Progress of the Arab World .....	117
	2. The Ethnic Composition of the Society.	120
	3. Islam Beliefs and Practices .....	122
	4. Educational Status of the People .....	127

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'D)

		<u>Page</u>
CHAPTER SIX	BACKGROUND AND CAREER PATTERNS OF IRAQI MANAGERS WITH SOME INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS .....	139
	1. Personal and Social Characteristics. ....	140
	1 - Age of Managers .....	140
	2 - Education .....	142
	3 - Size of the family .....	145
	4 - Social origins .....	149
	2. Career Patterns .....	153
	1 - Length of service .....	153
	2 - Length of service in the current companies .....	154
	3 - Length of time served in the current post .....	156
	4 - Inter-firm mobility .....	156
	3. Managers' Backgrounds and Career Patterns in the light of Size of Company .....	159
SEVEN	HOW MANAGERS SPEND THEIR TIME AND WHAT ACTIVITIES DO THEY PERFORM .....	170
	1. Managers' Activities .....	173
	1 - How long do they work .....	175
	2. How long do they Spend on Each Activity and Why .....	175
	1 - Paperwork activity .....	175
	2 - Planning activity .....	176
	3 - Organising activity .....	180

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'D)

	<u>Page</u>
4 - Communication activity .....	182
5 - Research activity .....	191
6 - Personal activity .....	193
7 - Complex activity .....	194
EIGHT SOCIAL PRESSURES ON MANAGERS .....	203
1. Socio-Cultural Pressures .....	205
1 - Strong family and tribal relation- ships .....	205
2 - Dislike of manual work .....	206
3 - Low Level of industrial consciousness and literacy .....	206
4 - Low value of time.....	207
2. Business and Social Community .....	209
1 - Patronage and Nepotism .....	209
2 - Shortage of skilled manpower .....	213
3 - Low Level of Productivity .....	214
4 - Private visits at the office .....	215
5 - Marketing constraints .....	218
6 - Workers are of agricultural and rural origin .....	219
NINE THE MANAGER'S DECISION-MAKING STYLES.....	235
1. Decision-Making Styles .....	235
2. A Decision-Making Profile of the Iraqi Managers .....	240
1 - The frequency distribution .....	242
2 - The power-sharing continuum .....	250



TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'D)

	<u>Page</u>
CHAPTER TEN SUMMARY .....	266 256
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	295 285
APPENDIX .....	317

LIST OF TABLES

	<u>Page</u>
TABLES	
1.1 A Statistical Profile of Arab Executive Presented by Muna's Study in 1980.	31
2.1 The Population of Iraq in 1965, 1970 and 1977.	57
2.2 Distribution of Population by Area and Age Groups in 1977.	60
4.1 The Kings and Presidents who Ruled Iraq between 1921 and 1979.	94
4.2 Gross Domestic Product of the Public Sector, 1971-1978, at Current Prices.	96
4.3 Total Investment Allocations of the Economic Sectors, 1951-1959.	104
4.4 Industrial Manpower in the Large Companies Classified by Occupational Categories and Sectors: 1977.	110
5.1 Percentages of Illiteracy Among the Population Classified by Sex and Area, 1977.	129
5.2 Levels of Education in Iraq, by Area of Residence, 1977.	130
5.3 Number of Schools, Students in Iraq in 1970/71, 74/75 and 1978/79.	131
6.1 Age Distribution of the Managers by Sectors.	140
6.2 Mean, Standard Deviations and Variances of Managers' Ages Classified by their Sectors.	141
6.2A Analysis of Variance of Managers' Ages According to their Sectors.	142

LIST OF TABLES (CONT'D)

TABLES	<u>Page</u>
6.3 Comparison of Educational Level of Managers in Three Countries: United Kingdom, United States and Japan.	143
6.4 Comparison of Managers' Education Levels Classified by Sectors.	144
6.5 Managers' Education Levels According to their ages.	145
6.6 Managers' Children Classified by Sectors.	146
6.7 Number of Children Classified by the Age of their Fathers.	147
6.8 Managers' Education Level and Number of Children.	148
6.9 Children Classified According to their Father's Place of Birth.	148
6.10 Mean, St. Dev. and Variance of the Children Classified by their Father's Place of Birth.	149
6.10A Analysis of Variance of Managers' Children.	149
6.11 Managers' Social Classes, by Sectors.	151
6.12 Social Classes of the Managers Classified by Age.	151
6.13 Relationship Between Social Class and Managers' Education.	152
6.14 The Relationship between Managers' Social Classes and the Number of Children.	153
6.15 Means, St.Dev. and Variance of Managers' Years of Service in his Current Company by Sector.	155

LIST OF TABLES (CONT'D)

	<u>Page</u>
TABLES	
6.15A Analysis of Variance of Managers' Years of Service in the Current Company.	155
6.16 Managers' Inter-Firm Mobility, by Sector.	157
6.17 Managers' Ages Classified by the Size of Companies.	160
6.18 Managers' Number of Children, by Size of Company.	181
6.19 Managers' Education, by Size of the Company.	162
6.20 Managers' Years of Service, by Size of the Company.	163
6.21 Managers' Mobility, by Size of the Company.	164
6.22 Managers' Social Classes, by Size of the Company.	164
6.23 Managers' Place of Birth, by Size of the Company.	165
7.1 Time Spent on Planning Activity, by Managers per Working Day	178
7.2 Time Spent on Organising Activity, by Managers per Working Day	181
8.1 Social Pressures as Reported by the Iraqi Managers (N = 44).	204
8.2 Level of Patronage and Nepotism During the Last Five Years as Reported by Managers.	211
8.3 Reasons of Mediation as Reported by the Managers (N = 44).	212

LIST OF TABLES (CONT'D)

	<u>Page</u>
TABLES	
9.1 Comparison between Decision Styles Employed in this Research and those of Previous Investigators.	238
9.2 Distribution of Decision Styles for each Decision, by Managers.	243
9.3 Distribution of Decision Styles for each Decision, by Managers and Sectors.	248
9.4 Distribution of Responses by Styles for Three Decision Groups.	252
9.5 Distribution of Responses by Styles and Sector for Three Decision Groups.	254
9.6 Mean Score of Managers for Three Categ- ories of Decisions, by Sector.	255

LIST OF FIGURES AND MAPS

		<u>Page</u>
FIGURE	1.1 Fiedler's Model of Leadership	13
	1.2 The Life Cycle Theory of Leadership	20
	1.3 The Manager's Roles "Activities"	
	According to Henry Mintzberg	34
	3.1 Social Structure of the Tribe	65
	4.1 Planning System in the Public	
	Sector in Iraq	98
	5.1 Weber's Thesis of the Protestant	
	Ethnic	118
	7.1 Relative Importance of Managerial	
	Skills	171
	7.2 Average Work Time Allocation of	
	Managers	174
	7.3 Time Spent in Oral Communication by	
	Managers with Subordinates, Customers,	
	Superiors.	185
	7.4 Average Time of Manager Interactions	
	with Subordinates, Superiors and	
	Customers	186
	9.1 The Power Sharing Continuum	237
	9.2 Decision-Making Styles: A Comparison	
	Between Muna's Study and the Current	
	Study	246
	9.3 The Frequency Distribution of Decision	
	Styles for Each Decision by Managers	
	and Sectors	249
MAP	IRAQ : GENERAL MAP	55

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Moayaid S. Sulieman.



## ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to cast light on a group of senior managers currently working in Iraq. It investigates their personal-social background, career patterns and decision-making styles in the light of the Western management standards. The thesis also tries to bring into the light how the Iraqi managers spend their time and what activities they exercise inside their firms. In addition, it attempts to show the contemporary social constraints or pressures which face managers in Iraq.

The assumption is made that in order to understand management styles and the principal personal-social background and career patterns of a group of managers in a given country, prior understanding of their social and cultural values is vital. Without such prior understanding of the social and cultural context, the analysis and the interpretation of the managers' characteristics and their management styles will be incomplete.

Thus, the point of departure is to start the analysis by careful examination of Iraq; its geography, social communities, religions, education, political and economic development. In addition, the analysis extends itself to cover the past and the contemporary attitudes toward men and women, time, manual work and toward the size of the family.

The thesis then proceeds to discuss the principal characteristics of forty four Iraqi managing directors. The results broadly indicate that most of the personal-social characteristics and career

patterns of these managers are a reflection of their larger society. The same is equally true with their management styles.

What already exists in the industrial firms studied also exists in the larger society; the links between industrial organisations and the Iraqi society in terms of social values and attitudes toward time, manual work, superiority of men over women, remain strong despite the fact that the society is undergoing considerable social and economic changes. So, too, the principal characteristics of the managers studied, whether in terms of their personal-social background, their career patterns or their decision-making styles, are by and large similar to the general features of the society in large.

The analysis also indicates that in order to work according to Western management standards, the Iraqi manager needs not only a long period of time, but also requires massive efforts to get rid of a heavy heritage of different but interlocking social pressures and constraints.

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1. LEADERSHIP THEORIES:

It is virtually impossible to discuss and analyse in a systematic way a group of managers who plan, organise, lead and control the work of other people (subordinates) to achieve predetermined objectives without discussing leadership theories.

Many theories of leadership have been developed and research undertaken attempting to prove or disprove them. Rather than presenting an overwhelmingly long catalogue of all these, the intention here is to discuss only a few of these theories.

Before discussing these theories, two important points need to be made clear: first, what is leadership? Second, what are the differences between the role of leader and manager?

#### What is Leadership?

Attempts to define leadership or describe a leader have been many and varied. According to Stogdill:

"There are almost as many different definitions of leadership as there are persons who have attempted to define the concept." 1

In the past, some reviewers have focused on outstanding personal characteristics and have defined leadership around those personal traits. For example, Tead, in 1929, regarded leadership as a combination of traits which enable an individual to induce others

to accomplish a given task.<sup>2</sup> Others, including Allen and Bennis, have looked at leadership as the art of inducing compliance.<sup>3</sup> Compliance refers both to a relation in which an actor behaves in accordance with a directive supported by another actor's power, and to the orientation of the subordinated actor to the power applied.<sup>4</sup>

In addition, there are others, recognising the complexity of social situations in which we all operate, who have taken into account the many social variables that are present and interacting.

Definition of leadership, then, depends on the focus of attention. Interest in the influence process might develop the definition of a leader as one who either influences others or who causes the group to reach predetermined objectives. Attending to leadership as a selection process might define it as one of the sociometric choices.<sup>5</sup> A simpler representation of an accomplished fact would characterise the leader as an individual in a certain office, while a more arbitrary characterization depicts a leader as one who engages in "leadership behaviour".<sup>6</sup>

A further approach is one that concentrates on specific descriptive functions of a leader.<sup>7</sup> The symbolic leader has prestige but no power, the administrative leader "gets things done", while the expert or more precisely the theorist, stands out because of his special qualifications.<sup>8</sup>

Some attempt may be made, however, to focus this diversity of information toward a shorter verbal definition of leadership based on a unitary conceptual framework. The concept of "role" for instance, is one that may be useful in a description of leadership. In this view, leadership, quite simply, is a role that is occupied by a person.<sup>9</sup> Defining leadership in this way identifies a leader as a member of a

group where he is assigned a certain status by that group and engages in the behaviour that is associated with the position he occupies.

Many other definitions are listed in the literature; the great variety of the few definitions listed above suggest that there is little agreement as to the meaning of the concept and that little exists in the way of unifying theory.

#### The differences between leader and manager:

Many of the activities in the leadership role seem to relate also to the duties of the manager; certainly such items as setting objectives and giving feedback on work performance do overlap the two roles. This is not to say that the leader and the manager are one and the same. A manager "may" be a leader and a leader "may" be a manager - but neither need be the same.<sup>10</sup> A manager is appointed to fill a particular formal position within the organisational hierarchy, with the primary responsibility of attaining assigned objectives. On the other hand, the leader is a uniquely personal-istic phenomenon, in that followers (not the organisation) define who is and who is not a leader - should a "leader" have no followers, no leader exists.<sup>11</sup> The leader is also more nearly concerned with the well-being of his followers, encouraging by personal appeal the efforts of his followers toward the accomplishment of goals to which the members already have a sense of obligation or personal commitment.

By contrast, the manager typically operates within objectives that have been imposed on both manager and subordinate from a higher level: subordinates may or may not have a personal commitment to

organisational objectives or a sense of involvement and an obligation to achieve task-oriented goals. In the worst situation, the manager is responsible for achieving objectives toward which the members of the group unit are completely antipathetic and in which they are quite uninterested.<sup>12</sup>

The major differences between manager and leader lie in their source of influence. While the manager obtains authority from the organisation and employs it to obtain results from his subordinates and to achieve organisationally prescribed objectives, the leader exists in the relationship with followers and receives power directly from those followers. In rather pure terms, this is the difference between the formal theory of authority and the acceptance theory of authority.<sup>13</sup> Based on such a point one can say that there is another principal difference between manager and leader: it is their work continuity in this position. The harsh taskmaster manager may continue in office as long as his performance is accepted by the formal organisation, whereas the leader maintains the leadership position only through the day-to-day wishes of the followers. Their criterion for continuing to accept that person as a leader is how well he is facilitating the group's accomplishment of their objectives.

#### THE TRAITS THEORIES OF LEADERSHIP

The first systematic effort by psychologists and other theorists to understand leadership was to attempt to identify the traits or personal characteristics of individual leaders. Until the middle 1940's leadership research centred on identifying the traits of leaders and such traits as honesty, loyalty, ambition, aggressiveness, initiative and drive were deemed important.<sup>14</sup>

The traits theories rest on the assumption that the individual is more important than the situation, that if we can identify the distinguishing traits of successful leaders, we shall have the clue to the leadership problem, that if we cannot make good leaders we will at least be able to select good leaders.<sup>15</sup>

In general, the traits theories have not been a very fruitful approach to explaining leadership. It holds that leadership traits are widespread throughout the population; that they can be observed and measured; and that their possession is causally related to leader success. In fact, it is not this simple in reality. In Iraq, for example, not all leaders (managers) possess the same traits, and many non-leaders (non-managers) may possess all the personal traits which are relevant to successful management. In the same way, it is difficult to define many of these traits; it is not possible to identify universal, specific traits common to all leaders. In a specific culture, specific traits are doomed; out of dozens of studies, there is no uniformity of identified traits or any significant correlations of traits with actual instance of leadership. In 1940, Byrd examined twenty lists of traits that were attributed to leaders in various surveys and discovered none of the items appearing on all lists.<sup>16</sup> Jennings in 1961 said:

"fifty years of study have failed to produce one personality trait or set of qualities that can be used to discriminate between leaders and non-leaders." 17

Yet, one of the most obvious weakness of traits theories is that it failed to consider the influence of situational factors in determining who is the leader (or the manager) and what type of characteristics he

possesses.<sup>18</sup> In Iraq, for example, it is very difficult to understand why managers have a certain set of traits unless we understand the society and its economic and social developments including that of political development. Traits are important, but they are only one part of the whole situation. The members of the work group and the situation itself (task, technology, goals, structure) are also major variables for leadership is a function of the leader, the followers and the situation.

However, despite their failures, the traits theories should not be discarded too hastily, for they have made some contributions toward clarifying the nature of leadership. Several studies have indicated a significant correlation between certain traits and leadership effectiveness. Stogdill in 1948 found from a review of the literature that there was a definite correlation between the traits of intelligence, scholarship, dependability, responsibility, social participation, and socio-economic status of leaders compared with non-leaders.<sup>19</sup> Ghiselli, in 1961, noted significant relationship between leadership effectiveness and the traits of intelligence, supervisory ability, initiative, self-assurance, and individuality in the way work was done.<sup>20</sup> Davis, likewise, observed in 1972 that leaders do have high intelligence, broad social interests and maturity, strong motivation to accomplish, and great respect for, and interest in, people.<sup>21</sup>

#### THE BEHAVIOURAL THEORIES OF LEADERSHIP

When it became evident that effective leaders did not seem to have any distinguishing traits, researchers tried to isolate the



behaviours that made leaders effective. They tried to discover what effective leaders did, how they delegated tasks, how they communicated with and tried to motivate their subordinates, how they carried out their tasks, and so on. Unlike traits, however, behaviours can be learned; it followed, therefore, that individuals trained in the appropriate leadership behaviours would be able to lead more effectively.<sup>22</sup> Research showed, nevertheless, that leadership behaviours appropriate in one situation were not necessarily appropriate in another.

Nevertheless, despite growing evidence that effective leadership behaviour depends at least partially on the leader's situation, some researchers have reached the conclusion that certain management behaviours are more effective than others in a wide variety of circumstances. These researchers have focused on two aspects of leadership behaviour: leadership functions and leadership styles.

#### Leadership functions and Styles:

The first aspect of the behavioural approach to leadership shifted the focus from the individual leader to the functions that leaders performed within their group. According to leadership functions researchers, in order for a group to operate effectively, the leader has to perform two principal functions: "task-related" or problem-solving functions and "group maintenance" or social functions.

Studies in this area have found that most effective groups have some form of shared leadership in which one person (the manager) performs the task function, while another group member performs the social function.<sup>23</sup> An individual who is able to perform both roles successfully would obviously be an especially effective leader.

The second perspective on leadership behaviour focuses on the style a leader uses in dealing with subordinates. Researchers have identified two leadership styles: a task-oriented style and an employee-style. Task-oriented managers direct and closely supervise subordinates to ensure that the task is performed to their satisfaction. Employee-oriented managers try to motivate rather than control subordinates. They encourage subordinates to perform tasks by allowing them to participate in decisions that affect them and by forming friendly, trusting, and respectful relationships with subordinates.

Research has tried to determine which of these two leadership styles leads to the most effective group performance. At Ohio State University, researchers (Stogdill and Shartle) studied the effectiveness of what they called "Initiating structure" (task-oriented) and "consideration" (employee-oriented) leadership behaviour.<sup>24</sup> They found that employee turnover rates were lowest and employee satisfaction highest under leaders who were rated high in "consideration". Conversely, leaders who were rated low in consideration (high in initiating structure) had high grievance and turnover rates among their subordinates.

Similarly, researchers at the University of Michigan distinguished between job-centred and employee-centred managers. Job-centred managers set rigid work standards, organised tasks down to the last detail, prescribed the work methods to be followed, and closely supervised their subordinates. Employee-centred managers encouraged subordinates participation in goal setting and in other work decisions and helped ensure high performance by inspiring trust and

respect. They found that the most effective leaders were those who had supportive relationships with their subordinates, tended to use group rather than individual decision-making, and encouraged their subordinates to set and achieve high performance goals.<sup>25</sup>

### THE SITUATIONAL THEORIES OF LEADERSHIP

The trait and behavioural theories produced research showing that effective leadership seemed to depend on a number of variables, such as organisational climate, the nature of the tasks and work activities, and managerial values and experience. No one trait was common to all effective leaders; no one style was most effective in all situations.<sup>26</sup> Researchers then took the next logical step. They tried to identify the factors in the situation that influence the effectiveness of a certain leadership style. Since the early work of Tannenbaum and Schmidt (1958) many researchers have added to, and elaborated on, the situational factors that affect the leadership style a manager selects and how effective a particular style is.<sup>27</sup>

How the work situation affects a manager will depend on his perception of the situation. For example, a manager who believes that his subordinates are lazy and low in ability will manage them on that basis for a prolonged period, even if the subordinates are actually eager to work and have excellent skills.<sup>28</sup> In order for the manager's leadership style to change to one that is more appropriate to the situation, the manager's perception of the situation will first have to change.<sup>29</sup>

As regards those factors that influence leader effectiveness,

Reitz, Hersey and Blanchard found that these factors include the leader's personality, past experience, and expectations; the superior's expectations and behaviour, the subordinates' characteristics; expectations and behaviour; the requirements of the task; the organisational climate and policies; and the expectations and behaviour of peers.

These factors also influence the leader in return. The influence process is "reciprocal". That is, leaders and subordinates influence each other and affect the effectiveness of the organisation as a whole.<sup>30</sup>

#### THE CONTINGENCY THEORIES OF LEADERSHIP

While the situational theories of leadership concentrated on the importance of situation and identified various situational factors that can influence leadership behaviour, the contingency theories attempt to:

- a) identify which of these factors is most important under a given set of circumstances, and
- b) predict the leadership style that will be most effective under those circumstances.<sup>31</sup>

In the section below, a review of three of the more recent and well-known contingency theories of leadership are given:

## Fiedler's Theory of Leadership

Fiedler's basic assumption is that it is quite difficult for managers to alter the styles that have helped them develop successful careers.<sup>31</sup> For this reason, he believes that trying to change a manager's style to fit the situation is inefficient or useless. Since styles are relatively inflexible, and since no one style is appropriate for every situation, effective group performance can be achieved by matching the manager to the situation or by changing the situation to fit the manager.<sup>33</sup>

The leadership style that Fiedler contrasts are similar to the "employee-centred" and "task-oriented" styles discussed above. What differentiates his theory from the others is the measuring he used. He measured leadership style on a simple scale that indicated "the degree to which a man described favourably or unfavourably his least preferred co-worker (LPC)" - the employee with whom the person could work least well. It is this measure that locates an individual on the leadership style continuum. According to Fiedler's findings:

"a person who describes his least preferred co-workers in a relatively favorable manner tends to be permissive, human relations-oriented and considerate of the feelings of his men. But a person who describes his least preferred co-worker in an unfavorable manner - who has what we have come to call a low LPC rating - tends to be managing, task-controlling, and less concerned with the human relation aspects of the job." 34


Fiedler has identified three elements in the work situation that help determine which leadership style will be effective:

- a) The leader-member relationship, which is the most critical variable in determining the situation's favourableness.
- b) The degree of task structure, which is the second most important input into the favourableness of the situation; and
- c) The leader's position power obtained through formal authority, which is the third most critical dimension of the situation.<sup>35</sup>

The situation is favourable to the leader if all three of the above elements are high. In other words, if the leader is generally accepted by followers (high first element), if task is very structured and everything is "spelled out" (high second element), and if a great deal of authority and power is formally attributed to the leader's position (high third element), the situation is very favourable. If the opposite exists (if the three elements are low), the situation will be very unfavourable for the leader. Fiedler was convinced that the favourableness of the situation in combination with the leadership style determines effectiveness.

Fiedler concluded that under favourable and very unfavourable situations, the task-directed or "hard-nosed" type of leader was most effective. However, when the situation was only moderately favourable or unfavourable (the intermediate range of favourableness), the human relations leader was most effective. Figure 1.1 summarises this relationship between leadership style and the favourableness of the situation.

FIGURE 1.1 FIEDLER'S MODEL OF LEADERSHIP



Source: F.E. Fiedler, A Theory of Leadership, op.cit., pp. 146.

Why is the task-directed type of leader successful in very favourable situations? Fiedler offered the following explanation:

"In the very favorable conditions in which the leader has power, informal backing, and a relatively well-structured task, the group is ready to be directed, and the group expects to be told what to do. Consider the captain of an airliner in its final landing approach. We would hardly want him to turn to his crew for a discussion on how to land." 35

As an example of why the task-oriented leader is successful in a highly unfavourable situation, Fiedler cited:

"the disliked chairman of a volunteer committee which is asked to plan the office picnic on a beautiful Sunday. If the leader asks too many questions about what the group ought to do or how he should proceed, he is likely to be told that "we ought to go home." 37

Although the validity of Fiedler's theory has been questioned, it is widely agreed that he has made a significant contribution to our understanding of how leaders and situations can be matched for effective performance.<sup>38</sup>

### Path-Goal Theory of Leadership

Like other contingency theories, the path-goal theory tries to help understand and predict leadership effectiveness in different situations. The theory, formulated relatively recently by Evans and House, represents a new and evolving approach.<sup>39</sup>

The path-goal theory is based on the expectancy/valence theory. Briefly the expectancy/valence theory states that an individual's motivation depends on his expectation of reward and the valence, or



attractiveness, of that reward. The path-goal theory focuses on the leader as a source of rewards. It attempts to predict how different types of rewards and different leadership styles affect the motivation, performance and satisfaction of subordinates. House and his colleagues identified four specific types of leader behaviour on three subordinate expectations:

- a) Directive leadership - the behaviour involved in letting subordinates know what is expected of them, providing specific guidance, standards, and schedules of work to be done as well as rules and regulations
- b) Supportive leadership - is characterised by a friendly and approachable leader who shows concern for the status, well-being and needs of subordinates
- c) participative leadership - a leader who consults with subordinates, solicits their suggestions before making a decision
- d) Achievement-oriented leadership - the activity of setting challenging goals of emphasising improvement in performance, expressing confidence in and high expectations of subordinates' ability to perform at the highest standards.

The three types of subordinate expectations are: Job satisfaction; Acceptance of the leader; and Expectations about effort performance-reward relationship.

The path-goal theory involves two propositions. First, leader behaviour is acceptable and satisfying to subordinates to the extent

that the subordinates see such behaviour as an immediate source of satisfaction or as instrumental to future satisfaction. Second, the leader behaviour will be motivational (e.g. will increase effort) to the extent that it makes satisfaction of subordinates' needs contingent on effective performance and it complements the environment of subordinates by the guidance, clarity of direction, and rewards necessary for effective performance.<sup>40</sup>

In the light of these propositions, the motivational functions of the leader consist of increasing the number and kinds of personal pay-offs to subordinates for work-goal attainment and making paths to these payoffs easier to travel by clarifying the paths, reducing the barriers and increasing the opportunities for subordinates' satisfaction.

Path-goal contingency variables:

Two kinds of situational variables are presented as contingency variables that help determine the most effective leadership style: (1) the personal characteristics of subordinates, and (2) the environmental pressures and demands in the workplace with which subordinates must cope.

The leadership style subordinates favour will, according to House, be partially determined by their personal characteristics. He cites studies suggesting that individuals who believe that what happens to them occurs because their behaviour - "internals" - are more satisfied with a participative leadership style. Individuals who believe events occur to them because of luck or fate - "externals" - are more satisfied with a directive leadership style.<sup>41</sup>

Subordinates' evaluation of their own ability will also influence subordinate style performance. Those who feel highly skilled and capable may resent an overly controlling manager, whose directives will be seen as counterproductive rather than rewarding. Subordinates who feel less skilled or able, on the other hand, may prefer a manager whose more directive behaviour will be seen as enabling them to carry out their tasks properly and therefore making it possible for them to earn organisational rewards.

As regards the environmental variable - the environment of subordinates, it consists of those factors that are not within the control of the subordinate but which are important to satisfaction or to the ability to perform effectively. These include the task, the formal authority system of the organisation, and the work group. Each of these factors may serve as stimuli to motivate and direct the subordinate to perform his work. They may also act to reduce variability in behaviour, and they may serve as rewards for accomplishing desired performance.<sup>42</sup>

The path-goal theory indicates that leader behaviour will be motivational to the extent that it helps subordinates cope with environmental uncertainties, threats from others, or sources of frustration. It further indicates that when goals, and paths to desired goals, are apparent because of the routine nature of the task, clear group norms, or objective control of the formal authority system, attempts by the manager to clarify paths and goals would be redundant and would be seen by subordinates as an imposition of unnecessarily close control.

It seems that this theory is more realistic than Fiedler's theory. It takes into account the personality characteristics of subordinates, as well as situational variables. It should also be noted that the path-goal theory does not only attempt to suggest what type of manager behaviour may be more effective in particular situations, it also attempts to explain why manager is effective. However, the empirical evidence to date suggests that the theory, like many others, has problems predicting subordinate performance. One study suggests that subordinate performance may cause changes in manager behaviour instead of, as predicted by the theory, the other way around.<sup>43</sup> These uncertainties will probably be reduced as future research on the theory becomes more standardized and well-defined.<sup>44</sup>

#### The Life Cycle Theory of Leadership:

The third major contingency approach to leadership is Hersey's and Blanchard's "life cycle theory",<sup>45</sup> which holds that the most effective leadership style varies with the "maturity" of subordinates. These scholars define maturity not as age or emotional stability but as desire for achievement, willingness to accept responsibility, and task-related ability and experience.


Hersey and Blanchard believe that the relationship between a manager and subordinates moves through four phases as subordinates develop and "mature" and that managers need to vary their leadership style with each phase. (See Figure 1.2).

In the first phase - when subordinates first enter the organisation - a high task orientation by the manager is most appropriate. Subordinates have to be instructed in their tasks and familiarized with the organisation's rules and procedures. As subordinates begin to learn their tasks (phase 2), task-oriented management remains essential, because subordinates are not yet willing or able to accept full responsibility. However, the manager's trust in and support of subordinates can increase as the manager becomes familiar with subordinates and wishes to encourage further efforts on their part. Thus, the manager can start to use employee-oriented behaviour (phase 3).

In the third phase, the subordinates' ability and achievement motivation are increased, and subordinates actively begin to seek greater responsibility. The manager will no longer need to be directive (indeed, close direction might be resented). However, the manager will continue to be supportive and considerate in order to strengthen the subordinates' resolve for greater responsibility.

As subordinates gradually become more confident, self-directing, and experienced, the manager can reduce the amount of support and encouragement (phase 4). Subordinates are then "on their own" and no longer need or expect a directive relationship with their manager.

FIGURE 1.2: THE LIFE CYCLE THEORY OF LEADERSHIP



Source: Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Balanchard, op.cit., p. 165.

The life cycle theory of leadership has generated interest because it recommends a leadership that is dynamic and flexible rather than static. The motivation, ability and experience of subordinates must constantly be assessed in order to determine which style combination would be most appropriate. If the style is appropriate, according to these researchers, it will not only motivate subordinates but also help them move toward "maturity". Thus, the manager who develops his subordinates, increases their confidence, and helps them learn their work, will constantly be shifting his style.

Although this theory is focused on the maturity of subordinates, it gives little attention to other variables which have an important influence on the way that a manager behaves. Among these variables are, the amount of time available for goal accomplishment, the nature of the job or the task to be done, the manager's own personality traits, and the expectations of the manager's boss. For example, a manager might be unable to use low-task and low-relationships (phase 4) with his subordinates if his boss's style is high-task and low-relationships (phase 1). In addition, most of us are not completely flexible and feel more comfortable with some leadership styles than with others. Some people find it quite difficult to change their style to any degree. However, and as Hersey and Blanchard say, the maturity concept is a good means for use in choosing the appropriate behaviour with an individual or a group at a particular time.<sup>46</sup>

The previous discussion of leadership theories indicates the following points:

- 1 - There are almost as many different definitions of leadership as there are persons who have attempted to define the concept. This reflects that there is little agreement as to the meaning of the concept and that little exists in the way of unifying theory of leadership.
- 2 - Based on the above point, it is no surprise therefore to find that there are many different theories in leadership; the traits theories; the behavioural theories; the situational theories and the contingency theories. While the traits and the behavioural theories have ignored the situational and environmental variables in determining a leader or a manager behaviour, the situational and contingency theories paid special attention to these dimensions and looked at a leader behaviour as the outcome of three interlocked groups of variables; the leader and his characteristics; his subordinates and their characteristics and the situation and its characteristics. Thus, in order to understand the behaviour of the leader or the manager, special attention must be paid to the situation in which he works; to the people with whom he interacts.
- 3 - Though some researchers have distinguished between the leaders and the managers in the light of their source of influence and authority, leadership is a means rather than an end in itself, and this means can be used by everyone regardless of his position, whether he is a manager of corporation or a husband in a family. Indeed, this idea calls us to point out at this stage that not all leadership behaviour of a certain leader is directed toward achieving organisational objectives.



## 2. CROSSCULTURAL STUDIES IN MANAGEMENT

The demand for studies of management in various countries of the world has grown rapidly in the last three decades. This demand comes both from academic specialists who are searching for fundamental administrative concepts and from practicing managers who must direct organisations in other countries.

Many researchers have signalled out the need for crosscultural studies in management. Robert Dahl, for example, was among the first to express the need for comparative studies in this field:

"The comparative aspects of public administration have been largely ignored; and as long as the study of public administration is not comparative, claims for - a science of public administration - sound rather hollow." 47

Heady, in a recent summary of the subject, mentioned:

"Those who are attempting to construct a science of administration recognise that this depends, among other things, on success in establishing propositions about administrative behavior which transcend national boundaries ..... The limitations and hazards of .... parochialism are now being recognised, and we are on the threshold of a new era in administrative studies that will stress comparative analysis." 48

A careful examination of the crosscultural management studies reveals that there are two schools of management theories in this field: the universal school and the cultural school.

The universalists believe that no appreciable difference exists in managerial behaviour across cultures. Since managers must perform the same basic functions regardless of culture, their general behaviour is determined functionally.<sup>49</sup> Should differences

exist, they are products of the individual or organisational situation. Among the theorists of this school are Likert, Mouton and Blake.<sup>50</sup> Koontz also has suggested that there is universality of management practices in such areas as network planning, variable budgeting, utilization of rate-of-return on investment, and break-even analysis.<sup>51</sup>

As regards the cultural school, it believes that culture is the independent variable in explaining managerial behaviour and attitudes. The researchers of this school have postulated that international attitudinal and behavioural differences are the result of divergent values within different cultural spheres.<sup>52</sup>

Abundant evidence has suggested that cultural values do affect management behaviour. Vroom indicated that particular worker values may prohibit the worker from participating in decision-making.<sup>53</sup> And for Ryterband and Barrett, managers in a culture may adopt styles and values that are unique and even abrasive to others' ways of doing things and still achieve "Western" organisational goals.<sup>54</sup> Richman concluded that it seems apparent that cultural constraints will continue to have varying, and often major, impacts on managerial performance and the achievement of corporate objectives in international business firms, throughout much or most of the world.<sup>55</sup>

Farmer and Richman have shown how all elements of the management process (e.g. planning, control, organisation, staffing, marketing, production, procurement, etc.) are potentially constrained by variables in the cultural environment.<sup>56</sup>

One of the most important features of the cultural school is that management style in developing countries is authoritarian-paternalistic

and that this style is the result of their socio-cultural milieu.<sup>57</sup>

The observation made by Barrett and Bass in 1970 seems to typify the conclusions of these studies:

"There are differences among countries in the preferred style of leadership. These differences in leadership styles appear to be largely culturally based and at this point in time it would be naive to advocate one model of leadership style as being optimum for all cultural groups." 58

Many of these studies have also believed that the stage and the phase of industrialisation is a major factor in determining manager-subordinates relationship. Harbison and Myers, for example, indicated that:

"The process of industrialisation tends, other things being equal, to limit managerial authority, both as a consequence of its direct effects on the industrial system and of its indirect effects on society as a whole." 59

There are, however, a number of reservations about the majority of crosscultural studies. First, the basic data of these studies have distilled from mailed questionnaires. In addition to the usual problems connected with questionnaires, there is the possibility that the questions might be interpreted differently by managers using different languages and in different cultural settings. Second: most of the literature in crosscultural management is written by scholars who have grown up in an environment alien to the countries they describe. Although outsiders may be more objective in their observations, their perceptions are hampered by their own cultural backgrounds and their lack of understanding of foreign environments.

Third, the current literature of crosscultural management studies covers only a small part of the world's countries. It needs to be expanded to cover such countries as China, Spain, Turkey, Iran, and the Arab countries in order to make better judgements.

In the Arab world, there is, according to the author's knowledge, only one crosscultural study on the Arab managers. It is Muna's study<sup>60</sup>. In the section below, a summary of this study and its main shortcomings is presented.

### 3. MUNA AND THE ARAB EXECUTIVE

Muna investigated fifty-two Arab executives from six Arab countries; Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Through his semi-structured interviews he described what these managers think, feel and do within the present Arab environment and given the social pressures placed upon them. He also investigated their decision making styles and tried to explore to what extent these managers permit subordinates' participation in decision making.

Muna identified four decision-making styles as follows:<sup>61</sup>

- Style 1 (Own decision): Executive makes decisions without consulting subordinates, but may consult superiors, partners, or outsiders.
- Style 2 (consultation): Prior consultation with subordinates.

- Style 3 (Joint decision-making): Joint decision making with subordinates, and,
- Style 4 (Delegation): Delegation of decisions to subordinates. That is the manager asks subordinate to make decision on his own.

In addition he prepared seven problems (decisions) and asked the manager to indicate which style he uses in each decision. The seven decisions were grouped by Muna into three sub-groups as follows:<sup>62</sup>

- Personnel decisions group: Includes three decisions (a) the decision to promote one of the employees directly supervised by one of the manager's subordinates; (b) the decision to discipline one of the employees directly supervised by one of the manager's subordinates and, (c) the decision to terminate the services of one of the employees directly supervised by one of the manager's subordinates.
- Departmental decisions group: Includes three decisions or problems (a) the decision to reduce the total workforce of the company by 20 per cent; (b) the decision to increase the workforce in a subordinate's department/division; (c) the decision to alter or modify the formal organisation chart of a given department in the company.
- Organisational decision group: includes only one decision. The decision to introduce a new product, or enter a new market, or take on a new project; or expand existing work facilities.

The main findings of Muna's study can be summarized as follows:

- 1 - The Arab managers are under strong social pressures. Pressures from their families and relatives. Pressures from their friends and from the wider society as a whole. These pressures have a great negative influence on the manager's thinking, time, behaviour and, consequently, on their performance.

The problem of low value placed upon time by the people working with these managers, the problem of low "industrial mentality" of the workers, the problem of visiting at work office as well as the problem of social restriction on women's work are only a few examples of the pressures these managers face. Furthermore, the Arab manager lives in a society where family and friendship remain important and prevalent factors even in the functioning of formal institutions and groups. The use of personal (family and friendship) ties and connections is not only widespread, but is also an important and necessary means of doing business. In the Arab world, Muna says, the use of such personalities and connections is evident in a wide range of activities. Typical examples that were provided by Muna's managers included:

(a) expediting and getting a work-permit, a passport or a visa, and generally by-passing or expediting most governmental formalities and paperwork; (b) obtaining referrals or employment; and (c), knowing about, negotiating, and eventually securing a multi-million dollar business contract.<sup>63</sup>

- 2 - The Arab manager uses style 2 (consultation) in decision-making more than any other style. According to his findings 55% of all

the managers studied use style 2; 22% use style 1 (own decision); 13% use style 3 (joint decision) and only 10% use style 4 (delegation).<sup>64</sup> Muna's findings also indicate that managers interviewed involved their subordinates more in personnel-related decisions than in departmental and organisational decisions.<sup>65</sup>

3 - The study also revealed that such variables as the age of the manager and his level of education have significant effect on manager's decision-making approach. The older the Arab manager is the more autocratic he tends to be - sharing less of his decision-making power with his subordinates. The only reason for this, Muna argues, is that the Arabs respect age. On the other hand, managers without a university education are more democratic with their subordinates in decision making when compared to university-educated managers.

4 - Muna's study also indicated that the Arab managers tend to be more person-oriented than role or task-oriented. They engage in prolonged rituals when starting a business discussion; they value loyalty over efficiency; they use personal ties and connections extensively; and they adhere to the open-door tradition.<sup>66</sup>

Doubtless Muna's study has uncovered many interesting points of the Arab managers and enriched the crosscultural management studies in this respect. However, Muna's study suffers from the following shortcomings:

1 - Muna did not analyse the managers' decision-making styles according to the nature of their business (manufacturing, trade and services) nor did he analyse them according to company ownership (public company, private company). Indeed, he analysed them only as a group. As can be seen from Table 1.1 there are 24 managers (46%) work in manufacturing organisations while the remainder work in trade and services, or in mixed organisations. Had Muna taken such differences in his analysis he would have been, probably, reached different results particularly in such matters as the decision-making approaches of these managers. What is mentioned above can also be applied in the field of the type of the ownership of the companies - there are 20 managers (38%) working in family organisations.

2 - Muna's study does not represent all the Arab countries, nor does it statistically represent each one of the country's studied. Take for example, he interviewed only 9 managers from Egypt; 10 managers from Jordan and 9 managers from Kuwait, despite the fact that Egypt is the biggest country in the Arab world in terms of population (43 million) whereas both Jordan and Kuwait have less than 3 million.

3 - Muna confuses the issue fundamentally when he divides the managers' social background into the following three categories: tribal, rural and urban. Social background cannot be divided in this way for a very simple reason, the tribe is a social community and it can be found in towns as well as villages or rural areas. The term "rural" and "urban" refer to places more than anything else.



TABLE 1.1 A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF ARAB EXECUTIVE PRESENTED BY MUNA'S STUDY IN 1980

Country	N	Age: mean (range)	University education		Social Background			Ownership			Nature of business		
			With	Without	Tribal	Rural	Urban	Family	Partner- ship	Govern- ment	Mfg.	Trade & Services	Mixed
Egypt	9	52 (40-62)	9	-	-	1	9	3	-	6	7	2	-
Jordan	10	52 (39-69)	9	1	-	7	3	4	5	1	7	2	1
Kuwait	9	42 (33-52)	7	2	-	8	2	7	1	1	1	5	3
Lebanon	8	44 (33-53)	7	1	-	4	4	1	7	-	3	5	-
Sudi Arabia	10	42 (29-50)	8	2	1	4	5	3	3	4	5	3	2
UAE	6	45 (38-53)	4	2	2	1	3	2	4	1	1	4	1
Totals	52	46 (29-69)	44	8	3	25	24	20	20	12	24	21	7

Source: F.A. Muna, op.cit., p. 126.

4 - Muna did not give us any idea on such matters as how these managers spend their daily work; what activities they perform. In addition, he did not mention anything about mobility and career patterns. Furthermore, at the time he talked about managers' responsibilities for their families he did not give us any information about the size of these families. So too, he did not indicate the social classes of these managers.

5 - Finally, Muna did not compare the Arab managers social background with those working in the developed countries.

#### 4. MINTZBERG AND THE MANAGER'S JOB

Perhaps the newest approach to management theory to catch the attention of academics and practitioners alike is the managerial role approach in analysing managers' activities, popularized by Henry Mintzberg of McGill University.<sup>67</sup> Essentially, this approach aims at observing what managers actually do and from such observation come to conclusions as to what managerial activities (or rules) are.

Although different researchers have studied the actual work of managers from chief executives to in supervisors, Mintzberg has given this approach sharp visibility.<sup>68</sup>

By systematically studying the activities of five chief executives in a variety of organisations, Mintzberg concluded that there is considerable similarity in the behaviour of managers at all levels. All managers, Mintzberg argued, have formal authority over their subordinates, and they derive status from that authority. This status causes all managers to be involved in interpersonal

relations with subordinates, peers, and superiors, who in turn, provide managers with the information they need to make decisions. These different aspects of a manager's job cause managers at all levels to be involved in a series of interpersonal, informational, and decisional roles, which Mintzberg defined as "organised sets of behaviours." See Figure 1.3.


#### 1 - Interpersonal Roles:

As can be seen from Figure 1.3, there are three interpersonal roles or activities which help the manager keep the organisation running smoothly. Thus, although the duties associated with these activities are often routine, the manager cannot ignore them. As head of a unit, the manager sometimes acts as a "figurehead" by performing certain ceremonial duties - greeting visitors, attending a subordinate's wedding, taking a customer to lunch, and so on. In addition, the managers adopt the leader role-hiring, training, encouraging and motivating his employees. Finally, the manager also plays the interpersonal role of "liaison", by dealing with people other than his subordinates or superiors such as suppliers, customers and peers.

#### 2 - Informational Roles:

There are three informational roles (monitor, disseminator and spokesman) in which managers gather and disseminate information. As "monitor", the manager constantly looks for information that can be used to advantage. Subordinates are questioned and unsolicited

FIGURE 1.3: THE MANAGER'S ROLES "ACTIVITIES" ACCORDING TO HENRY MINTZBERG.



Source: H. Mintzberg, "The Manager's Job: Folklore and Fact",  
op.cit., p. 55.

information is also collected, usually through the manager's system of personal contacts. In the "disseminator" role, the manager distributes to subordinates important information that would otherwise be inaccessible to them. Finally, as a "spokesman", the manager transmits some of the information he has collected to individuals outside his unit.

3 - Decision Roles:

Figure 1.3 also indicates that there are four decisional roles the manager adopts. In the role of "entrepreneur", the manager tries to improve the unit. For example, when he receives a good idea, he launches a development project to make that idea a reality. In the role of "disturbance handler", on the other hand, the manager responds to situations that are beyond his control, such as a strike, bankrupt customer, and the like. As a "resource allocator", the manager is responsible for deciding how and to whom the resources of the organisation and the manager's own time will be allocated. In addition, he screens all important decisions made by his subordinates before they are put into effect.

The fourth and last decisional role the manager exercises is that of "negotiator". Managers spend a great deal of their time as negotiators, because only they have the information and authority that negotiators require.

Some Notes on Mintzberg's Work:

Mintzberg's concept of the manager's job offers a useful reminder that our definition of management as a series of functions -

planning, organising, leading and controlling - is a somewhat idealised but useful overview of what managers try to do. In fact, managers operate in a constantly changing environment. Although they attempt to follow systematic and rational procedures, they are often interrupted in their work.

The idea of Mintzberg is important because it yields perspectives for a more realistic view of traditional managerial functions. The functions help explain managerial processes, whereas the Mintzberg approach helps us picture the realism of the day-to-day behaviour of managers. In the present study of the Iraqi managers, for example, the reader will discover that these managers not only exercise managerial activities but they also exercise personal activities. However, Mintzberg's work is still of limited usefulness, at least for the following reasons:

- 1 - The sample used in his study is too small.
- 2 - Many of the activities Mintzberg found are, in fact, evidences of planning, organising, leading and controlling. For example, what is resource allocation, <sup>but</sup> planning? Likewise, the entrepreneurial role is certainly an element of the whole area of planning. And the interpersonal roles are mainly evidences of leading. So, too, the informational roles can be fitted into a number of the functional areas.
- 3 - We believe that the manager's roles presented by Mintzberg are incomplete. Where in them does one find such important managerial activities as selecting and appraising managers, determining major strategies, structuring organisation and research activities?

- 4 - The five chief executives studied by Mintzberg were only from medium and large organisations.<sup>69</sup> Without including all the sizes (small, medium and large organisations), it is difficult to make a comprehensive managerial study, particularly when one deals with the work of the managers.

#### 5. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The present study has eight major objectives:

- 1: To find out the principal characteristics of the Iraqi top managers from the point of view of their personal characteristics (age, place of birth, level of education) and their social characteristics, including size of the family and social origin.
- 2: To show their career patterns (length of service and inter-firm mobility).
- 3: To compare these characteristics with other managers working in some Western countries, such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Japan.
- 4: To find out the type of interrelationships that exist between these characteristics, on one hand, and to discover whether these characteristics differ according to the size of the companies in which these managers work, the ownership of the company (public or private) and the place of birth of the managers, on the other hand.

- 5: To show how these managers spend their time and what activities they perform during their working day and to find out whether the length of each activity differs across the morning and the evening periods, and if so, why?
- 6: To find out what are the principal social pressures the Iraqi managers face in their work, and to explain the main factors responsible for their existence.
- 7: To find out their decision-making styles and to discover which style they are normally using. In addition, to find out whether this style differs across different types of decisions (problems), sectors, or not. Likewise, to make a comparison between these results and that of Muna's study.
- 8: It is also among the objectives of this study to investigate the soundness of some of the crosscultural management researchers who confirm that management styles in the developing countries are authoritative and that the managers in these countries tend to reduce subordinates' participation in decision making to the lowest degree.

## 6. SIZE OF THE SAMPLE, RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA ANALYSIS

### Size of the Sample:

It was originally intended to base the analysis on a sample of 100 managers, drawn equally from the public and private sectors. However, due to unforeseen difficulties in arranging interviews with



sampled managers, a final achieved sample of 44 managers was obtained.

The subjects of this study are, thus, forty-four managing directors working in the industrial sector. Twenty managers work in the public sector and the remainder are from the private sector.

The organisations in which these managers work are different in size (small, medium and large organisations). The biggest organisation has 5,005 employees, while the smallest one has 48 employees.

These organisations are located in Baghdad Province, Ninevah Province, Aribl Province and Sulaimaniyah Province. The majority are located in Baghdad Province. This is mainly because Baghdad is the capital of Iraq and the bulk of the industrial organisations are located in it. On the other hand, Baghdad is the biggest city in terms of population.

As a capital, it is more developed than any other city in Iraq.

The forty-four organisations produce different types of products including foodstuffs, beverage and tobacco, textiles, ready-made clothes, leather industries, manufactured metal industries and cement industry.

Admittedly, the size of the sample is not very large. However, taking into account the novelty of industry in Iraq, as well as the various handicaps that the researcher has faced, the sample can be regarded as representative. In addition, if we compare the size of

the sample of this study with Muna's and Mintzberg's samples, we would be in a favourable position.

Among the principal difficulties that we encountered in the fieldwork of this study are the following:

- 1: In Iraq it is very difficult to arrange an interview with a managing director particularly if the interview takes more than two hours. To get an interview with a public sector managing director one must pass through a prolonged procedure of formalities. For example, to achieve this study, the researcher had been forced to take prior approval from two ministries, the Ministry of Industry and Ministry of Planning. This alone took from the researcher's time almost one month.
- 2: Many managers have avoided my interview, either because (as I heard from their secretaries) they were "too busy", or because they did not want others, particularly researchers, to unveil what they actually did.
- 3: The length of the interview, together with other methods which the researcher used to verify what these managers said, particularly when they were discussing their decision-making approaches, have put another obstacle toward achieving more interviews. Take, for example, my interviews with each manager and his assisting managers, which took more than one day.
- 4: Add to this the researcher was interviewing his subjects in their companies and these companies were not located in one place. On the contrary, they were scattered through different places and provinces. This also put another difficulty towards achieving

larger sample. To give an example, he had to travel from Baghdad to Arbil twice and stayed in Arbil two weeks in order to interview three managers.

#### Methodology and Data Analysis:

To achieve the objectives of this study, several different methods have been used to gather the relevant material. In the first place, a careful review of what has been written on leadership theories and crosscultural management studies was undertaken. The work of other scholars who made studies on managers and their job, whether in the Western countries or in the Eastern countries, has been also carefully reviewed. The aim of this procedure was threefold:

First: to show that leadership theories have become a very complex subject on one hand, and that the modern leadership theories have paid especial attention to the importance of the environmental variables in defining a leader behaviour and in determining management performance in a given organisation or society.

Second: to show that the crosscultural management studies need to be more precisely directed to take account of other cultures and cover more countries if we really seek a better development of management theories and what managers actually do.

Third: to compare the results of the present study with the results of crosscultural management studies.

Another review of what has been written in both the Western and Eastern countries about the Arab society and culture in general and the Iraqi society and its culture in particular was also undertaken. The principal reason for this stems from the author's view which can be summarised as follows:

"To understand a group of managers and their personal-social characteristics as well as their management styles, prior understanding of their society and culture is vital"

In the second place, the forty-four managing directors have been interviewed at their companies. None of them have been interviewed outside his company. The items of the interview have been gathered from the work of different researchers including Heller, Clark, Muna.<sup>70</sup>

The material of the interview have been grouped into four sections, as follows:

- 1) General information about the manager and his company.
- 2) The manager's decision-making approaches.
- 3) The manager's attitude toward his subordinates and the Iraqi society as a whole.
- 4) The manager's average time spent in the various activities in a working day. (See the appendix).

In addition to these methods, various governmental and organisational reports and documents and censuses have been used to shed light on the current characteristics of the people of Iraq, the successive government and the economic development during the last decades.

### Data Analysis:

Before starting the analysis presented in this study, a preliminary cluster analysis using the "CLUSTAN PACKAGE" had been run for the data gathered to discover the most frequent patterns of associations or clusters.<sup>71</sup> This analysis showed two patterns of clusters. The first was the cluster of the public sector managers and their personal-social as well as their career pattern attributes, while the second cluster was the private sector managers and their personal-social and career pattern characteristics. It is these two clusters that we analysed in depth by using the STATISTICAL PACKAGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES (SPSS).<sup>72</sup> The aim was to expand the analysis of these two clusters in the light of the major variables that caused such a difference on the one hand, and to examine the associational degree that exists between a given variable "characteristic" and the other variables, on the other.

Because the current study is an exploratory study, most of the data collected were based on nominal and ordinal level scales. The simple  $X^2$  test as well as Cramer's and Kendall's tests and coefficient test were used.

As regards the assumption of interval scale we made when we analysed the managers' decision-making styles, it is consistent with assumptions made by other researchers. Thus, Heller, Muna, using a similar continuum, assumed a four-point equal interval scale. The same process can also be found in the work of Vroom and Yetton. All these researchers have looked at delegation (style 4 in this study) as a separated style distinguishes itself by an equal distance (see Figure 9.1 and Table 9.1).

## 7. THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

Immediately after this introduction, chapter two gives an idea about the geography and the population of Iraq. It indicates that there are three different districts in Iraq: the mountains; the desert and the alluvial plain. The desert district forms 60% of the whole area and its climate covers more than half of the country. Iraq owes its existence to the rivers Tigris and Euphrates more than any other natural resources, despite the fact that the people have suffered a lot from them and were victims rather than beneficiaries of these rivers. The chapter also shows that the continuous threat of the desert and the rivers has affected the national economy and influenced people to follow a certain type of social adaptation. The chapter also indicates that Iraq is not going to be under population pressure within the next future.

Chapter three deals with the society of Iraq. It shows that there are three interlocked social communities: the Bedouin, the village and the city communities. These communities are highly interrelated and share common social values. The chapter also discusses the principal factors that link these communities with each other. Chapter four investigates the political and economic development in Iraq between 1921 and 1980. It shows that the problem of political instability, particularly before 1968, has split people's personality and widened the gulf between the people and the successive governments. The chapter also shows that agriculture was, until the recent past, the principal occupation of the people and modern industry is new in Iraq and the year 1950 can be regarded as the real beginning

of this new era.

In Chapter Five we turn our attention to the religious beliefs, practices and education of the people in Iraq.

Chapter six investigates the Iraqi managers and their personal-social characteristics. It compares these managers according to their age, education, place of birth, size of the family, and social origins. The chapter also investigates the managers' career patterns. In addition, it compares these characteristics with the characteristics of some of those managers who are working in the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan. The chapter also compares the Iraqi managers' characteristics in the light of their organisations ownership on one hand, and the size of their organisations, on the other.

Chapter seven discusses how the Iraqi managers spend their time and sheds light on their major activities, and how long they spend on each activity.

Chapter eight attempts to uncover and discuss the principal social pressures or constraints that interfere with the managers' work in Iraq. It also shows to what extent these managers can control such constraints.

Chapter nine discusses the managers' decision-making styles. It tries to show to what extent the Iraqi managers let subordinates participate in decision-making and what style is the most common among these managers. The chapter also tries to examine the thesis of the crosscultural scholars which indicates that the authoritative

decision-making style is the prevailing style in the developing countries. Chapter nine also tries to examine the argument which insists that there is no universal leadership style that is "best" in all situations (or different problems), and that leadership is a contingent variable depends on the situation in which a manager works. The chapter also compares Muna's results of the Arab managers' approach in decision-making with the results of this study.

A brief summary of the study, arguments and conclusions described in chapters two to nine is given in chapter ten. An attempt is made in this chapter to evaluate the success of this study in meeting its stated objectives.

As regards the appendices, appendix 1 shows a brief summary of methodology, data analysis and representativeness of the sample that is used in the study. Appendix 2 shows the interview schedule and its four divisions, background information about the manager and his organisation; the manager's attitude subordinate(s) and the Iraqi society and, finally, the managers' activities and the average time spent in each activity in a working day.



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## CHAPTER TWO

### THE GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION OF IRAQ

#### INTRODUCTION

From early times men have reflected on the influences of geographical conditions on human society. Perceiving the differences between the modes and exigencies of human life in the mountains, on the plains, and by the seaboard, in the desert and in the forest, in temperate regions and in the tropics, various thinkers attributed a dominant role to geography, regarding it as the primary determinant of the wealth and health, the size and energy of population, of their customs and social organisations and so forth.

While the author rejects the idea that geography is the primary factor in determining the major characteristics of a given population, he agrees with Maciver and Page that it has an influence on their health and wealth, their work and their modes of living.<sup>1</sup>

The task of this chapter is to cast light on the geographical and population characteristics of Iraq.

#### 1.0 LOCATION AND GEOGRAPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Present Iraq covers an area of approximately 438,000 sq. km. It is situated on the south-west of Asia, bounded on the north by Turkey, on the east by Iran, on the West by Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, on the south by Arab Gulf, Kuwait and Sudi Arabia.

The country can be divided into three districts: mountains, desert and alluvial plain. The mountainous district is situated in

the north and north-east of the country and forms one fifth of the total area. The desert (approx. 60% of the whole area) is situated in the west of Iraq. The alluvial plain is in the form of a rectangle (650 km. long and 250 km. wide) and extends between Balad on the Tigris river and Ramadi on the Euphrates river in the north and Iranian frontiers on the east and the desert plateau on the west. It is broken in the south by marsh land.<sup>2</sup> (See the following Map)

### 1.1 Climate



Though there are three different climates - Mediterranean, steppes and desert, the desert climate is the prevailing one and covers about 70% of Iraq's area. The Mediterranean climate covers the mountains and characterises by cool winter where snow falls and rainfall ranges between 400-1000 mm. annually. The steppes climate exists between the highlands and the desert. The hot desert climate is characterised by a great temperature variation between day and night, summer and winter, the maximum of which reaches 40-45C. To subsist in such an environment, people have been forced to maintain strong family and tribal relationships and grant the very highest value to the solidarity of members of these social institutions for everyone is dependent on the support and co-operation of his fellows.

It is this desert environment, as will be seen later, that forced the people to place high value on man's superiority over women, hospitality and disparage manual work.<sup>3</sup>

### 1.2 Rivers

Iraq has two main rivers: Tigris and its tributaries, and the river Euphrates. Sir William Willcocks, a British engineer, whose studies of the Tigris-Euphrates system form the basis for the unified





**IRAQ ; General Map**

development of the central valley of Iraq, has contrasted the unpredictability and violence of these rivers to the manageability of the Nile. Those streams are being harnessed today, but their rampages are a historic feature of the area.<sup>4</sup>

Tigris is 1718 km. long, of which 1418 km. in Iraq, while Euphrates is 2,300 km. long, of which 1213 km. in Iraq. The two rivers united in the southern part of Iraq to constitute Shatt Al-Arab, 110 km. long, which pours into the Arabian Gulf. Though the country owes its existence to these rivers, more than any other natural resources such as oil, the people until the recent past were victims rather than the beneficiaries. Not very long, as recently as 1956, devastating floods threw Iraq's economy into a state of acute emergency. The total losses of these floods were estimated, at that time, at about 10 million Iraqi Dinar.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, these rivers have posed a challenge to the riparian agricultural population since earliest times. Yet, they play tantalizing tricks on farmers. For example, in the spring, the surging rivers pour out an over-abundance of water, whereas during the summer, when the sun parches the land, the water of these rivers contain a heavy proportion of salt and silt, and due to their bifurcating nature which allows small amounts to be dammed, the more the water supply is increased, the worse the salt problem becomes. Salinity of the soil at present affects about 60% of all irrigated land and the annual losses of fertile land are estimated at 70 thousand donums.<sup>6</sup>

The continuous threats of desert and rivers have, as will be seen later, affected the national economy and influenced individuals to follow a certain type of social adaptation. In addition, the

desert environment on the one hand, and the continual threat of the rivers, on the other, are largely responsible, in my opinion, to the problem of rural-urban migration in Iraq.

## 2.0 POPULATION

The 1977 census placed the population of the country at 12 million with an annual growth rate of about 3.3% per annum.<sup>7</sup> During 1965 to 1977 the urban population sharply increased while the rural population decreased. Table 2.1 which shows a comparison between the rural and urban populations for the years 1965, 1970 and 1977, indicates unusual rates of increase for urban dwellers.

Table 2.1 The Population of Iraq in 1965, 1970 and 1977 (in thousands)

Year	Rural	Urban	Total*
1965	3.935	4.112	8.047
%	49	51	100
1970	3.959	5.247	9.206
%	43	57	100
1977	4.454	7.645	12.099
%	37	63	100

Republic of Iraq,

Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics for different Years.

\* Figures do not include citizens abroad.

Such imbalance increases in the urban population can be explained by two points:

First: there is a continuous process of migration from the villages to the cities. For example, while the annual growth rate is 3.3% per annum, the urban population grew at 5.3% and the rural population at 0.9% per annum. This means that about 1.9 million of the villagers have migrated from the rural areas to settle in the cities.<sup>8</sup>

Second: the current regime, since its establishment in 1968, has announced that Iraq is a homeland for any Arab who wishes to live in this country.

As a result of the second point, there are many thousands of Egyptians working nowadays in the public and private sectors. Al-Hassan gives a very conservative estimate of their number, about 100 thousand.<sup>9</sup>

Indeed, the problem of migration not only gave the government an urbanisation problem but also (as will be seen later) reduced the productivity of both industrial and agricultural sectors. Despite massive spending in cities for housing and other social welfare, there is still a serious risk that the process of urbanisation may proceed at a more rapid rate than the government can cope with, particularly in the short run.

## 2.1 Population Density

Population density ranges from 4 persons per sq. km. in Muthana province (to the south of Baghdad) to 619 in Baghdad province, but these averages have little meaning since they include large desert areas having no sedentary population whatever.<sup>10</sup> The density for the present agricultural area of Iraq is 200 per sq. km.

The largest area empty of sedentary population is the desert

south and west of the Euphrates. Other large districts without settled inhabitants, such as the desert of Al-Jazirah, lie west of a line running southward from Mosul. The most densely settled region lies along the rivers. On the Euphrates the heaviest settlement is to the south, principally in the cities of Kerbela, Najaf and Al-Simawah. The region of closely settled land on the Tigris begins near Samarra and follows the river and its tributaries, notably the Gharraf and Dujaylah systems. To the south, in Maysan province, rice supports a large population, and in the Shatt Al-Arab a narrow belt of close settlement follows the line of irrigated date palm gardens.

On the northern plain the population is fairly heavy between Mosul and Kirkuk. In the mountains settlement is confined to a series of valleys, and the chief mountain centre, the city of As-Sulaimaniya, is located in the largest of these valleys. Settlement thins out as the terrain becomes higher and more broken.

Age-group distribution of the population, as given in the 1977 census, indicates that over one third of the population (37%) is under 9 years of age. It also indicates that almost two thirds of the population (74%) is under 30 years of age. Only 11% of the population are above 50 years of age. The following Table reflects such a fact.

Table 2.2: Distribution of population by Area and Age Groups in 1977 (thousands)

Age groups years	Rural Area	Urban Area	Total	%
Less than 9	1,804	2,623	4,427	36
10 - 19	830	1,721	2,551	21
20 - 29	650	1,278	1,928	16
30 - 39	360	753	1,113	9
40 - 49	292	504	796	7
50 - 59	231	334	565	5
60 - 69	150	227	377	3
70 and more	152	204	356	3

Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics 1978, op.cit., 27.

As regards sex distribution, the same census indicates that 48% of the population are females as against 52% of males. In 1977, the birth rate was estimated at 40 persons per thousand, the death rate at 14 per thousand.<sup>11</sup>

Figures presented above show that the general picture in Iraq is one of a young and rapidly increasing population. Though the country is not immediately threatened by population pressure, the rapid rate of expansion presents the possibility that at some time in the future, over-population may result.

## Summary

Iraq has three different districts; mountains, desert and the alluvial plain. The desert district forms 60% of the whole area and its climate covers almost 70% of Iraq's area. The country owes its existence to the rivers Tigris and Euphrates, more than any other natural resources despite the fact that the people, until the recent past, were victims rather than beneficiaries of these rivers. In addition to the flood problems which were quite common during the previous decades, these rivers contain a heavy proportion of salt and silt. Due to the bifurcating nature of these rivers which allows small amounts to be dammed, the more the water supply is increased, the worse the salt problem becomes.

The continuous threat of desert and rivers has, as will be seen later, affected the national economy and influenced people to follow a certain type of social adaptation. The harsh environment coupled with the continual threat of the rivers have also influenced individuals to migrate into cities and this argument will become more obvious in the next chapters. On the other hand, the 1977 census placed the population of Iraq at 12 million with an annual growth rate of about 3.3% per annum. Between the years 1965 and 1977 the urban population has sharply increased at the expense of rural population. Population density ranges from 4 persons per sq. km. in Muthana province to 619 persons in Baghdad province. The most densely settled region lies along the rivers. Age-group distribution of the population indicates that over half of the population is under 24 years of age and this confirms that the general population picture in Iraq is one of a young and rapidly increasing population. However, this increase does not mean that Iraq is going to be under population pressure within the next future.

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## CHAPTER THREE

### SOCIAL COMMUNITIES IN IRAQ

#### INTRODUCTION

The term "community" denotes a collectivity of people who occupy a geographical area; people who are together engaged in economic and political activities and who essentially constitute a self-governing social unit with some common values and experience feelings of belonging to one another. Examples are a city, a town, a village.<sup>1</sup> With such a definition in mind, the people of Iraq can be divided into three broad kinds of communities; the bedouin, the village and the city communities, each of which has its own social and economic conditions.

We do not give in this chapter a full comprehensive study of the main characteristics of each community; however, both the bedouin and the villager are important from the perspective of this study for they hold a key role in sustaining the traditional Arab values. Furthermore, and as will be seen later, the majority of the industrial workers as well as the managers, are of rural origin. Many of the practices, customs, institutions and instincts of the early bedouin life have developed over several centuries to become the warp and woof of the urbanized personality in Iraq. In his many writing, Al-Wardi confirms that and says:

"The civilization in Iraq, more than any other Arab country in the area, had for centuries fallen under the pressure of the tribal culture. The latter is viewed as a reservoir from which urban civilization derived its principal customs."<sup>2</sup>

Thus, an understanding of the main characteristics of these communities not only helps in explaining the major characteristics of the Iraqi

senior managers, but also interprets most of their managerial and personal behaviour.

### 1.0 THE BEDOUIN COMMUNITY

The bedouins of Iraq, or the tent dwellers, inhabit the Desert Administration areas west of the Euphrates, across the river, the Jazirah region, adjacent to Nanavah province. The bedouin community, whether in Iraq or in other Arab countries, is the source of human being and civilization in the Arab society. Ibn Khaldun, five hundred years ago, wrote that the desert is the basis and reservoir of civilization and cities ... the existence of bedouins is prior to, and the basis of the existence of cities and towns.<sup>3</sup>

The bedouins consider themselves of noble lineage and are the most elevated and distinguished of mankind because they are free men and warriors.<sup>4</sup> They claim that they alone have the right to be called Arab.<sup>5</sup>

No precise statistics on their number are available; however Harris in 1958 estimated the number as about 250,000 persons, with about half of them living in Kerbela province; 70,000 in Mosul province; 30,000 in Muntafik and 2,500 in Dulaim province.<sup>6</sup>

Bedouins have long depended upon the villages and town communities mainly because they are far from being self-sufficient on the one hand and because they acquire some of their needs by force in raid (Ghazu) which are entirely disappeared nowadays, on the other. However, traditionally, the raid and counter-raid were elevated by the economic and social conditions of the desert life to the rank of a major institution.


Consequently, vestiges of this practice lie at the base of the economic structure of bedouin society. According to the rules of the game, a raid is a sort of national sport - no blood should be shed except in cases of extreme necessity.<sup>7</sup>

### 1. Social Structure of the Bedouin Community

The tribe "Qabilah" is the main social structure in the desert. The size of each tribe varies from one place to another. One tribe may consist of only a few families while others may consist of hundreds or even thousands of tents.

The tribe is usually subdivided into two or more sub-tribes (Ashirah, literally clan); each clan, in turn, is divided into two or more sub-divisions (Firgah, literally troop). The latter consists of two or further divisions (Fakhdh); the fakhdh is divided into two or more (Hamulah), and finally the hamulah into two or more related extended families. These divisions can be shown clearly in the following Figure:<sup>8</sup>

Figure (3.1) Social Structure of the Tribe



## 2. Leadership of the tribe

Each tribe is headed by a man called "Sheikh" or "Aga" or "Beg".<sup>9</sup> He comes from one of its aristocratic houses. The Sheikh's main duties are to represent his tribe in dealing with the government; to mediate intratribal disputes; to act as arbitrator and judge in conflict cases concerning his tribe; to give consent to marriage and divorce; to receive the guests in the guest tents which he maintains on behalf of the tribe; and to work generally for the tribe's welfare. He also takes a certain due from tribal members according to their ability to pay.

The position of Sheikh is a heredity one for it tends to pass from father to son if the latter has such personal qualities as courage, tempered by caution and wisdom, wealth to enable him to be generous. He is expected to have a fatherly or patriarchal attitude toward his followers - be firm but just and kind.<sup>10</sup>

## 3. The Majlis

A Sheikh does not exercise his office alone. He advises in all matters by a council. This council or parliament (so to speak) serves two things: first it is the guest-house of the tribe and, second, it is the centre from which the sheikh administers his tribe. The members of the council are the heads of the various sub-divisions of the tribe. It is intended to reflect the "sense" of the tribe on any matter of importance. All adult males of the tribe may attend the Majlis, but when more serious matters are brought up for discussion, young adults usually leave the tent.

#### 4. Some Related Concepts and Attitudes

Under the never-ending pressure of hostile environment the bedouins have established some social concepts and attitudes. We need to keep them in mind for most of these concepts and attitudes are still in existence in modern Iraq. We shall argue later in this thesis that some of these concepts and attitudes are largely associated with the backwardness of the managers and management. While such facts will become more obvious in the next chapters, the aim in the following pages is to cast light on some of these concepts and attitudes.

##### 4.1 Superiority of men over women

The man, irrespective of his position or job, regards himself as highly superior to the woman. Within each family, the man is the strong chief, the boys are the future chiefs; the woman is the weak creature or servant; the girls the future servants. By the same token, within each tribe the men are all-powerful and the women totally subservient; the man dominated completely whereas the women are good insofar as they served the men and deliver more boys.

##### 4.2 Loyalty and Affiliation

The mark of the bedouin is his complete absorption into tribal life. The tribe and its parts are the primary objects of personal loyalty. Tribal affiliation is the source of safety and, conversely, expulsion from the tribe for some grievous offence is the gravest sentence. Professor Hitti, in explaining the tie of a bedouin to his tribe, indicates that "no worse calamity could befall a bedouin than the loss of his tribal affiliation, for a tribeless man is practically helpless. His status is that of an outlaw beyond the pale of protection and safety."<sup>11</sup>

Traditionally, the loyalty of the bedouin may be traced along three main basis:<sup>12</sup>

(a) Kinship: which goes from the family to the tribe.

(b) Religion: which goes from sub-sect to sect and to religion.

For example, Islam has two major sects: "Shiites" and "Sunnites", each of which has its believers. Members of one sect try to help each other. However when an outsider tries to threaten Islam as a religion, all muslims unite to face such a situation.

(c) Ethnic characteristics: such as language, race, etc., which establish an additional basis for the operation of tribal loyalty.

These bases of loyalty do not usually conflict with each other, but if they do, kinship comes first, then religion and finally language and other ethnic characteristics.<sup>13</sup> Indeed, from the bedouin's view, it is only through the blood tie that their loyalty toward the tribe can be sustained.

#### 4.3 Cohesiveness

The motivating factor behind tribe cohesiveness is survival. In this respect, the individual member's rights are always subordinate to the good of the tribe as a whole. Two mechanisms provide feedback strongly reinforcing such a cohesiveness:

(a) Material: that is individual's survival depends on the group's survival and this stems from the fact that without joint self-defence against the rigorous aridity of the desert, on the one hand, and against the invasion or raid of other tribe, on the other, individual will face many difficulties.

(b) Spiritual: and this is related to a theory of blood kinship which is based on a blood tie between all members of the tribe through the male-line.

#### 4.4 Conformity

Conformity in all the important matters that belong to the tribe is insurance for the cohesiveness and survival of the tribe. The pressure of this concept extends to almost all areas of tribal life and even governs how much work a man must do, and indeed how hard he must work. He must do no more or less work than is expected of him within a very narrow permitted range. To give an example, one can imagine the situation of adult males inside the Majlis; they must not participate in tribe decision making unless the shiekh permits them to do so. On the contrary, as we have seen earlier, some<sup>of</sup> them (particularly the young males) have to leave the Miglis if there are some serious problems.

#### 4.5 Shame

Probably one of the most important concepts governing conformity is that of shame or "EAB". This is perhaps the most overused word inside the tribe. The slightest deviation from approved limits on the part of man, woman and child elicits the immediate warning "EAB" which in itself is censure. Thus, the permissible limits to behaviour of any person are defined by this word. Yet there is no question in the mind of any person as to what constitutes shame. The child, since his first years, hears this word, and this elastic concept never leaves him, for he is governed by it until he dies.

#### 4.6 Attitude toward Manual Work

The bedouin places a very low value on manual work. Men are created to defend the tribe and raid others. The priority of the raid may be clearly explained by an early poet which expresses the guiding principle of such an attitude:

"Our business is to make raids on the enemy, on our neighbour and on our own brother, in case we find none to raid but a brother!" 14

From the bedouin's standpoint, any manner of living other than that of bearing arms is unworthy and shameful.<sup>15</sup> They regard all people who do not bear arms and exercise raid as inferior and refuse to give their daughters in marriage even to the leading families of their tribes.<sup>16</sup>

#### 4.7 Attitude toward Time

According to the bedouin's point of view, time is not fixed or measurable as we know it. It is what happens as the wheat matures or a camel grows up - a characteristic sequence of events. In his eyes, time is measured only in a macro sense by natural events such as birth, puberty and death. Almost all of life is governed by the regular unhurried flow of such events of nature. There is no sense of urgency or time pressure. Life goes along at its "natural" pace. The bedouin (and the villager, as will be seen later) understands time as a circle rather than as a straight line. The circle suggests repetition and another chance to pass this way.<sup>17</sup>

The natural events which measure time - the movement of the sun, the phases of the moon, the seasons of the year - all are recurring, suggesting a circular pattern. If today is lost or wasted, there is no concern, for it will return tomorrow. According to the bedouin's view, life and time are endless repetition.



#### 4.8 Generosity and Courtesy

A guest for any bedouin is considered and treated as a sacred thing. To refuse a guest such a courtesy in a land where there are no inns or hotels, or to harm him after accepting him as a guest, is an offence not only against the established customs and honour, but against God Himself, the real protector.<sup>18</sup> This hospitality has grown mostly out of human helplessness in the desert. Thus, there is a strong dependence on one another. Hospitality of the tent is granted to travellers and those who need protection from an avenger. No one dares to refuse such a request and remain respectable in the eyes of the bedouins community. The bedouin must take the responsibility for the protection of his guest (even if he is a murderer) and offer him food and a place to sleep at least for three days. During this period, and when the guest is an outlaw, the protector has the opportunity to visit the pursuer and try to settle the problem. When his efforts failed, the guest must leave the tent and seek protection elsewhere. Indeed, this kind of protection permits a third party (the host or the protector) to interfere, mediate and to seek honourable settlement.<sup>19</sup>

#### 5. The Decline of Nomadism

The bedouin's freedom to ignore the laws, taxes, boundaries and the purpose of the central government, to raid and wander is now being curtailed or abolished in Iraq.<sup>20</sup> The main reason for their decline is the growing application of new technology. Motorized transport has reduced and promises to eliminate the need for the camels; modern transportation has also weakened their capacity to escape from government control; new weapons monopolised by the government have

dramatically reduced their power. Equally, the increase in education among this community has introduced the bedouin to new wants and is leading them to adopt new tastes and customs which can be satisfied only by cities. The reaction of the nomads to these changes can be noticed through two lines. First, some of them tried to retain their traditional life within some modification. Namely, they settled in villages and combined cultivation and animal breeding.<sup>21</sup> The second is that with the establishment of the Iraqi army, and as a result of the investments of international oil companies in Iraq, thousands of the bedouins have relinquished the desert and become either soldiers in the national army or taken jobs in the oil companies.<sup>22</sup>

The romantic past is left behind, though not forgotten; bedouin values continue to be prized but the bedouin himself has in fact become either a farmer or industrial worker.<sup>23</sup>

## 2.0 VILLAGE COMMUNITY.

Iraq is the land of villages, and the villagers form the backbone of the country. Not so long ago, as early as 1950, 80% of the five million of people lived in villages, and 90% of the villagers were cultivators. Current statistics of the number of these villages and of the social life of the villagers are unavailable. However, in 1957, the number was in excess of 8,000 villages.<sup>24</sup> The villages, ranging in population <sup>between</sup> 200 to 2,000 or more, are almost entirely agricultural. The typical village is a cluster of huts huddled together without any orderly design. The huts are so constructed as to keep out heat, cold and sandstorms at the minimum expense. Consequently,

they consist of a single or two rooms, with thick walls and a doorway, which usually opens on a small enclosed yard that is used for cooking food and keeping animals. In order to avoid sand and sunlight, windows are either very small or totally lacking. Sanitary facilities, including latrines, are generally lacking. The villages are necessarily located near a source of water, by a canal or a river or a well.

The villager considers himself as a settled nomad and claims that his origin is from a formerly nomad tribe.<sup>25</sup> In his village, particularly if it is small, he believes that he is related to everyone else, just as the bedouin believes that he is kin to all members of his tribe. The theory of blood ties between all members of a village is the strongest factor in holding the group together. The villagers look to their village in the same way as the bedouins look to their tribes. To them, the village is a tightly bound community in which most of the members belong to each other and help one another in time of need. Finally, the Iraqi village is not just a cluster of houses made of stone and mud, but it is a frame which holds the clan or the fakhdh and it serves as a reference group and the villagers usually identify themselves by the name of their villages.<sup>26</sup>

1) Some related concepts and attitudes:

The concepts, attitudes and the social values of the village community are almost similar to those of the bedouin community. The man is the most powerful and acts as superior authority in his house. Hospitality and display go together in the village as they do in the desert community. Each village has one or two guest houses known as

"Mudif". The larger the guest house is, the more respectable his owner is.<sup>27</sup> The Mukhtar or the village manager likes the bedouin sheikh, has a Mudif wherein he receives the village's guests.<sup>28</sup>

The courtesy or mediation which was discussed earlier also exists in the village. Anyone seeking protection from another tribe or individual can find his needs in the Mudif. Once he enters it, nobody can harm or attack him.<sup>29</sup> Likewise, loyalty and cohesiveness as well as conformity have also appeared inside the village. Since the majority of the villagers belong to one class, they are more likely to be faithful to their relatives. The basic kinship system which prevails among the bedouin community is also found in the village. The villager is bound to his kinship group by a network of mutual obligations which are strongest among the extended family, but which can also bring the whole lineage together in facing any outside threat. Every individual must help his relative when the latter faces a trouble or an argument in which blood has been shed arises between the relative and the others. He must, as Quint puts it, pick up the nearest weapon - dagger, club, rifle, etc., - and join the fray. He can ask neither the cause of the fight nor with whom justice lies. He can only help his relative.<sup>30</sup>

As regards manual work, indeed the villager's view towards this matter resembles the bedouin's view. That is, he also discriminates between the type of occupations and sees that different occupations have unequal degrees of social prestige. The prestige attaching to certain occupations such as "Imam", landowner, a farmer works in his own land, are more than that of carpenters, shepherd, craftsman, mason, gardener, barber and so forth. The landless villager is not necessarily the poorest person in the village, but, to be sure, he is the least respected.

Handcrafts and trade are not esteemed as highly as landownership despite the fact they are economically better off.<sup>31</sup> Up to date there are many local chants "Housa" still criticising the social statue of the weaver and describe him as liar, cowardly and dishonest.<sup>32</sup> On the other hand, the religious group - Moslem Mallah and Christian priests - are held in special social positions, irrespective of their financial situation. Their prestige depends upon their piety and learning, not on the passion for land. Indeed, the religious man is the authority on traditions and customs and leads the villagers in prayer.

As regards attitude towards time, indeed, the whole body of the villager thought is pre-eminently determined by agriculture. Every aspect of his life is penetrated by it. His experience is confined to it. Even his strictly non-agricultural activities, such as marriage (and hence childhood), are timed according to agricultural activity. Only death escapes it, and is itself the only escape. Geared to the agricultural cycle, the villager tends to regard things as recurrent; he knows that times cannot always be bad, nor can they always be good. No change from the established cycle is expected. The passage of the seasons, the sun and the rain, are mysteries and are incorporated in a large body of superstitious practices and beliefs almost approaching animism, binding the villager to the past. To sum up, the villager lives in the balance of nature, and neither seeks to control its forces nor those of his fellow man.

## 2.) Social Structure:

In contrast to the bedouin social structure, the extended family is the main social unit, not only <sup>in</sup> the village community, but, as will

be seen later, in the urban community as well. However, in some villages, particularly those situated far from the main cities, the clan and its sub-divisions are still prevailing. As such, and since the family is a mineature society and the values and beliefs and customs that exist in the family are largely similar to those of the society, the discussion of the family and its inner life is unavoidable in this study.

#### The extended family:

The extended family is the essence of social structure of contemporary Iraq. The Iraqi family has a different and wider connotation than that which is customary existing in more developed countries. The term includes many more distant relatives and kinsmen than in, say, the United Kingdom, in the narrower sense. In most villages and cities, the family consists of the father and wife, their unmarried children, their married sons with their families. The trend towards the nuclear family (a married man and woman with their offspring) is something new in the main cities and when it exists, it does not mean that the new married couple have destroyed their social and economic relations with their families.<sup>33</sup>

In 1940, the ratio of the extended families among all population was 82%. Surely this ratio has decreased during the following decades, particularly among the townsmen, but still there are more than 50% of all population living in extended families.<sup>34</sup> Koranic injunction, economic motivation, and considerations of prestige and family strength all contribute to the traditional high value placed on large families. The greater the number of children, especially sons, the greater the

prestige of the father, and through him, that of the family as a whole. Among the poor, children are still regarded as economic assets; the cost of their maintenance is small and they begin to contribute to the family income at an early age.<sup>35</sup>

The Iraqi family controls and shapes its members' behaviour in such a way that they must think twice before deciding any decision on such matters as the choice of a wife or a husband, or even the type of business.<sup>36</sup> Marriage is a family rather than a personal affair. The mass media have introduced young people to the Western notion of romantic love, but as yet it has had little influence on marriage.<sup>37</sup> Because the sexes do not ordinarily mix socially, young men and women have few or no acquaintances among the opposite sex. Parents arrange marriages for their children, finding a mate either through their personal contacts or sometimes through a professional matchmaker.

Though there are close relations between family and society in terms of integrity, the person is more associated with his family than with society as a whole. Many researches carried out in other Arab countries endorse such a behaviour and mention that it is easier for a person to respond to his family demands than to accept the demands and obligations of society.<sup>38</sup> Consequently, men have to pay close attention to their families' matters, particularly those relating to social interactions such as education and economic affairs.<sup>39</sup>

When we discuss the relationships that exist within a family we find that the father, or the senior male member, exercises almost undisputed authority, making the major decisions affecting the family welfare, representing it in dealing with outsiders, and punishing its members for transgressions. Members' view him with a mixture of awe and fear. They have to gain his approval, prior to taking any important decision and this can only be achieved by their obedience to his different

orders.

As regards men's attitude towards women, it is almost the same as what we have seen in the bedouin community. Women are weaker than men in mind and body. The honour of the family, easily damaged and nearly irreparable, depends on the conduct of its women; consequently they are expected to be decorous, modest and circumspect. The slightest implication of unavenged impropriety, especially if publicly acknowledged, can irreparably damage the family's honour. Female virginity before marriage and fidelity afterward are considered essential to its maintenance. If they discover a transgression, men are traditionally bound to punish the offending woman. The girl with a bad reputation may disappear suddenly from her house; everyone can guess what has happened, but no one speaks about it. Girls, whether in the village or in the city, are brought up to believe that they are inferior to men and must cater to them, and boys believe that they are entitled to the care and solicitude of women.

On the other hand, the males are let loose in search of sexual experience with females in an attempt to prove their virility. If it happened and a man traps a girl, seldom does he marry her - he feels she will do the same thing with others. Since such anomalous conduct is common, it is easy to discover why females are brought up in a different way. Indeed, most women in Iraq refuse to work night-shifts, or to work away from their families, because of this behaviour. As will be seen later, many managers covered by this study are deeply depressed because of such behaviour. As a matter of fact, the upbringing of girls in all Arab countries is calculated to keep them away from men, and to warn them of the dangers and subterfuges to which they are liable to fall



victims at any moment.<sup>40</sup>

Although we shall cast another light on the problem of sexual discrimination in another chapter, it is worth noticing that, in some parts of Iraq, when a man mentions his wife in front of another man, he apologises because he uttered an unmentionable subject.<sup>41</sup>

Fortunately education, and in particular the education of an increasing number of girls, as well as the fact that more and more females are seeking paid work outside the home, are both contributing to relatively rapid changes in the social status of the Iraqi women particularly in the main cities. Women are thus moving towards a different understanding of their own role in society and feel they are more entitled to the respect of others, and to self-respect also.<sup>42</sup>

### 3.0 : THE CITY COMMUNITY

Among the eighteen provinces, Baghdad, Basrah and Mosul are the most important ones. In 1977, 44% of the total population and 74% of all industrial establishments were located in these three provinces.<sup>43</sup>

#### 3.1 Baghdad:

Our discussion will be confined to the city of Baghdad and its community for the following reasons:

- 1 - Baghdad is the capital of Iraq and is the seat of government, social institutions as well as foreign embassies and companies.
- 2 - It is the country's biggest city whether in terms of population, or the number of industrial establishments. In 1977, 27% of the twelve million people and 67% of all large industrial establishments were located in it.<sup>44</sup>

3 - As a capital, Baghdad is more developed than any other city in Iraq. This is true whether in terms of medical facilities, or other social aspects. For example, in 1977, 21% of all hospitals and 30% of all youth centres and 17% of all sport clubs as well as 16% of all post officers were located in Baghdad.<sup>45</sup> On the other hand, Baghdad has three universities, while the remainder of the country have another three spread among the other provinces.

These points not only indicate that Baghdad is the most advanced city, but also confirm that its social situation, degree of urbanisation and modernisation are much more advanced than what currently exists in other cities.

Baghdad was built by the second Abbasid Caliph, Abu Jafar Al-Mansur, in 770.<sup>46</sup> The city reached its golden age during the Abbasids era notably at the time of Harun Al-Rashid and his son Al-Mamun. It has attracted poets, musicians, philosophers, scientists and literary men from all over the Islamic World. The centre of its intellectual life was Dar Al-Hikmah "The Abode of Wisdom", founded by Al-Masmur as an academy, a museum, a library and a bureau of translation. This was done at a time when no academies or universities existed in Europe.<sup>47</sup> However, the unrivalled glory of the city has given way to appalling administration, invasion, massacre, and a final decline through the four hundred years of stagnant Turkish rule until the early twentieth century. The year 1258 heralded centuries of disaster. After the five hundred years of Abbasid rule, the Mongols under the leadership of Halago raced down from Asia to destroy and pillage. In Baghdad,

Hulago and then Tarmurlane slew poets, traders, scholars and divines. They destroyed the irrigation system which made the country rich. They destroyed schools, mosques and houses. Under the Persian empire and the Turkish Walais "Governors" Baghdad might be described as the city of illiteracy, poverty and corruption.<sup>48</sup>

### 3.2 The People of Baghdad:

At the outset, it is important to stress that in Iraq there are no clear-cut lines between the townsmen and the villagers in terms of social values. Many townsmen were of relatively recent tribal origin. Even today, a large number of the inhabitants of Baghdad, quite apart of the tribal immigrants of the last four decades, still remember the name of the tribe to which they once belong.<sup>49</sup> In the towns the influence of the old norms and traditions, if considerably reduced, nonetheless, persists. The psychology and ways of the old order - the work of long years - as well as the bedouin and villager values, traditions and norms are still embedded in the life of a broad cross-section of the people, and will not easily wither away.<sup>50</sup>

The city dweller, whether he is 'Baghdadi, or 'Basrawi', or 'Musulli', still admires the country values. Attitude towards manual work, hospitality and mediation, family loyalty and assisting relatives, the principles of shame and honour, are almost similar to those of the village and nomadic life. During the last two decades, the mind of the townsmen has changed considerably and this is mainly because of education, but the way of life, the way of dealing with people are, by and large, similar to what we have seen earlier in the bedouin and

village communities. The main reason causing this interlocked relationship between the values of country and town is the continual rural-urban migration. A sizeable portion of the people of Baghdad were born in villages. Indirect but massive evidence of this exists in the fact that the population of this city is increasing at a higher rate than that of the country in which they are located. Baghdad, whose population was 3.1 million in 1977, had increased almost 683% since 1947. A high rate of natural increase has contributed to this growth pattern, but the primary factor responsible for the excess of urban growth over nationwide growth has been the migration of rural people to Baghdad.<sup>51</sup> For example, in 1960 more than a quarter of the population of Baghdad consisted of people who had migrated from rural areas.<sup>52</sup> The volume of migration to Baghdad was 164,461 in the year 1947. This figure climbed to 335,464 migrants in 1957 and to 545,766 migrants in 1965.<sup>53</sup> According to the projections of the Iraqi Ministry of Planning, the number of migrants to Baghdad will reach 35309 in 1980 and 38253 in 1983.<sup>54</sup>

The previous migration studies in Iraq found that the main factors that caused villagers' migration were the continual conflict between the peasants and the landlords; the lack of employment opportunities outside agriculture in the village; poverty and low level of living in the rural areas compared to urban centres and especially Baghdad; the lack of health care, education and social services in the rural areas.<sup>55</sup> Indeed the impact on a country like Iraq of a movement on such a scale and at such a pace can be imagined. It unbalanced the economy, drained away the strength of many rural areas, and made the capital city top-heavy with unskilled people, who brought many social problems, and exacerbated those social problems already existing in the city.

### 3.3 Kinship

Earlier we have mentioned that there are close relationships between the social organisations of the city and those of the village in Iraq. Al-Wardi, in his writing about the Iraqi towns and cities of the recent past, refers to the "tribale" alliance between city dwellers and rural people.<sup>56</sup> Harris, on the other hand, also confirms such a relationship and indicates that the social organisation of the Iraqi city shows a basic resemblance to those of the nomadic tribe and village.<sup>57</sup> While this resemblance has considerably disappeared among the educated townsmen, among the poorer classes the likeness is reinforced by the villagers who are still drifting to the town bringing their patterns with them.

Within the city of Baghdad the extended families are grouped into lineages. Paternal descent and authority, family loyalty and co-operation within the lineage are still prevailing, although the cohesiveness of the extended kin group varies from the traditional closeness to the looser ties of the western-influenced family. For example, it is quite common to discover that the extended family has one or two (or even more) nuclear families residing in one house (Dar) or living not far away from each other, but under the leadership of the father or the elder brother. The same extended family has close relationships with other relatives and some of these relatives are still living in rural areas or in other towns. Continuous visits between members of the kin groups are common and such a behaviour is largely based upon the fact that these kin groups represent, so to speak, the individual's second line of defence. When a person is in danger or

in trouble, when he needs help in the performance of an economic task or a ceremonial obligation, whenever, in short, he requires a measure of assistance beyond what his own immediate family can provide, he turns to the members of his larger kin group for aid or succour. He in turn, of course, is under reciprocal obligations toward them.

Summary:

The society of Iraq consists of three distinctive social communities; the bedouin, the village and city communities. These are highly interrelated and share common social values. Many of the practices, customs, institutions and instincts of the early bedouin life have developed over centuries to become the warp and woof of the modern personality in Iraq. The interrelationship between these communities is strong and is reinforced by the continuous rural-urban migration on the one hand, and by the extended family (with its kin groups) the most common social organisation in Iraq, on the other.

Whether in the extended family or in the society as a whole, individual attitudes toward women, hospitality and courtesy, family loyalty and assisting relatives, attitude toward manual work and toward time, as well as the principles of honour and shame are almost identical. As regards social structure, the tribe in the bedouin community and, to some extent, in the village community, is the major social organisation. On the other hand, the extended family is the most prevailing social unit in almost all villages and cities.

Individual behaviour, whether in the capital or in a village, is

largely directed by family tradition. The larger cities of Iraq are undergoing a transition involving both things and ideas, but the way of life, the way of treating material objects, are by and large, still under the impact of traditional life with all its social values. The Iraqi family, generally speaking, is highly authoritarian and conducive to dependent-type personalities. Ultimate authority in this social organisation rests with the head of the family. Matters of family policy, honour, relations with other families, and so forth, are determined by the head of the family.

NOTES

1. See, G. Duncan Mitchell, ed., A Dictionary of Sociology (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), p. 32; Dennis E. Poplin, Communities, A Survey of Theories and Methods of Research (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972), p. 9.
2. Ali Al-Wardi, A Study in the Nature of Iraqi Society, (Baghdad: Al-Ani Press, 1965), pp. 4 and 115.
3. Ibn Khaldun, The Mugaddimah, Translated from Arabic by Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), Vol. 1, pp. 252-3.
4. Carleton S. Coon, "The Nomads" in Social Forces in the Middle East, ed. Sydney Nettleton Fisher (New York: Cornell University Press, 1955), p. 30.
5. Abdul Wahab M. Al-Dahiri, The Introduction of Technology into Traditional Societies and Economies, Using Iraq as a Case Study, (Baghdad: Al-Ani Press, 1969), p. 60.
6. George L. Harris, IRAQ, its Population, its Society, its Culture (New Haven: Harf Press, 1958), p. 147.
7. Phillip K. Hitti, The Arab, A Short History, (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 4th ed. 1960), p. 13.
8. George L. Harris, op.cit., p. 68.
9. In Arabic language, the word "Sheikh" means elder. In Kurdish provinces, tribal chiefs carried either the title of "Agha" or that of "Beg". See, Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 63.
10. Ibid., p. 83.
11. Phillip K. Hitti, op.cit., p. 14.
12. Abdul Salam Y. Idrisi, "Economic Planning in Iraq: A Critique" (Ph.D. thesis, Syracuse University, 1970), p. 40.
13. Ibid., Loc. cit.



14. Phillips, K. Hitti, op. cit., p. 13.
15. Abdul Salam Y. Idrisi, op.cit., p. 40.
16. Hanna Batatu, op.cit., p. 68.
17. Vern Terpstra, The Cultural Environment of International Business (Ohio: South-Western Publishing Co., 1978), p. 69.
18. Phillip K. Hitti, op.cit., p. 14.
19. Abdul Wahab M. Al-Dahiri, op.cit., p. 66.
20. George L. Harris, op.cit., p. 71.
21. Abdul Wahab M. Al-Dahiri, op.cit., p. 67.
22. See, Sydney N. Fisher, op.cit., p. 81; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, The New Arab Social Order, A Study of Social Impact of Oil Wealth (Colorado, Westview Press Inc., 1982), p. 6; Hanna Batatu, op.cit., p. 26.
23. George L. Harris, op.cit., p. 72.
24. See, Hanna Batatu, op.cit., p. 140; George L. Harris, op.cit., p. 72.
25. Hanna Batatu, op.cit., p. 141.
26. For example, Al-Rawi from the village of Rawa; Al-Ani from the village of Ana; Al-Badri from Badrah; Al-Shatri from Al-Shatra.
27. Abd Ali Salman, The Rural Society in Iraq; (Baghdad: Dar Al-Rashide Publishers, 1980), p. 88.
28. The position of the "Mukhtar" is usually engaged by a man who is either the chief of the clan or the 'fakhdh', or he is the head of the largest family in the village.
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46. Kahtan A. Al-Madfai, "Baghdad" in The New Metropolis in the Arab World, ed. Moore Berger (Bombay: Allied Publishers Private Ltd., 1960), pp. 41-5.
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## CHAPTER FOUR

### POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

#### IN IRAQ FROM 1921-1980

##### INTRODUCTION

The political and economic environments are closely intertwined. Political environment - the attitudes and actions of political and government leaders and legislators - not only constitute an important part of the external environment of a given enterprise, but it also constrains, promotes and regulates business and managers' behaviour. Every business enterprise is encircled with a web of laws and regulations. Some are designed to protect workers, consumers, and communities. Others are designed to make contracts enforceable and to protect property rights. Many are designed to regulate the behaviour of managers and their subordinates in business and other enterprises. There is relatively little that a manager can do in any organisation that is not in some way concerned with, and often specifically controlled by, a law or regulation.<sup>1</sup>

In Iraq, many economic laws have been enacted to achieve political rather than economic ends. This situation was the dominant phenomenon particularly during the years 1921-1968. Such a fact will become more apparent in this chapter. The chapter is devoted to investigate the political and economic developments in Iraq during the period 1921-1980.

##### 1.0.: POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Iraq has passed through a very dark period during the last four hundred years. Its history is a vivid record of easily awakened

antagonisms, conflicting interests and political instability. The history of Iraq during the Turkish empire (1534-1917) can be summarised as that of a frontier province between the body of Turkish empire to the west and the Persian empire to the east. Numerous campaigns from both sides were fought on Iraqi soil.<sup>2</sup> Under that empire, tribal life dominated the country and tribal chiefs were often at loggerheads with each other, and were more or less independent of effective Turkish control. Indeed, the Turkish Walies (Governors) were unable to maintain order, nor were they honest persons. They were preoccupied with the task of extracting as much wealth as they could for themselves. Little was done to enrich the country and the popular demand for tax reform and social justice was never seriously considered.<sup>3</sup>

On the other side, the health and other social services, such as transportation and communication systems and education, were very poor. What medical and health facilities that existed were concentrated in Baghdad - the capital.<sup>4</sup> The inadequacy of transportation and communication systems can be illustrated by the fact that land-travel had to be either by foot or by donkeys. No rail road existed before the first World War except one short line between Baghdad and Sammurra.<sup>5</sup> The inadequacy of educational facilities during that time can be better understood by the fact that until 1950, 98% of the people were illiterate.<sup>6</sup>

Direct British Control was maintained in Iraq from 1917 to 1920 while its future status was decided by the peace-makers in Europe. This was followed by a monarchical regime which lasted from 1921 to 1958. Since its establishment in 1921, the Iraqi government faced both

the political task of building up a national administration and the economic problems of developing the country's resources. Indeed, until 1958, the dominant features of the regime were insecurity, corrupt administration, and flagrant abuse of authority. Talking specifically, during the years 1921 to 1931, expenditure on defence, justice and police averaged 40% of all government expenditure.<sup>7</sup> Between 1921 to 1951 there were 47 cabinets.<sup>8</sup> The same period has witnessed an intense internal struggle for power which absorbed time and attention and prevented effective consideration being given to developmental problems.

On the other hand, and as a result of such political instabilities including the fact that the primary aim of each cabinet that came to power was to prepare its own development programme and to bring its own supporters, corruption increased in public life. The royal family itself seemed to have taken a large part in the spread of such a phenomenon.<sup>9</sup> The existence of bribery and dishonesty for personal gain has been the most unsatisfactory feature of government machinery as most Iraqis freely admit. A British observer noted that:

"Even the ministers have been known to take advantages of their positions for their personal profit." 10

From 1950 onwards, however, attention was focussed on economic development largely because development funds became available from the increased oil royalties which Iraq begun to receive from then on. Indeed, the advent of oil revenues has increased political instability and corruption. Corruption was openly exercised and the government was not blind to such a phenomenon. For example, in 1955 King Faysal II mentioned:

"The government is aware of the weak machinery of the government due to the presence of inefficient individuals and persons of ill-repute in the government service." 11

The situation of political instability and corruption became even worse after the fall of the monarchical regime in 1958. Between 1958 and 1968 there were four major changes of regime; seven major attempts to topple one or other of the government in power and at least double that number of more minor efforts.<sup>12</sup> During this period there were more than twenty four cabinets. The frequent cabinet changes brought more than 180 different Iraqis to ministerial positions, more than 28% of them were military officers.<sup>13</sup> Insecurity and political instability generally resulted in changes of managers at most levels. Such continuous changes created a situation of anxiety and apprehension and gave rise to apathy, irresponsibility and lack of motivation among the majority of the people including managers.<sup>14</sup>

Table 4.1 gives a summary of the kings and presidents who ruled Iraq between 1921 and 1979. It indicates that three of them were murdered (two of them were kings).

The political instability and frequent coups d'etat together with the frequent abuse of authority have adversely affected the economic and social programmes and split the Iraqi personality. The political welter of narrow interests prevented a well-directed economic policy, even though each new regime declared itself anxious to further economic development. No wonder, therefore, we discover that the Iraqis, under such chaotic circumstances, became more depressed, fearful of and aversive to responsibility and distrust neither government leader nor government institutions.

TABLE 4.1. THE KINGS AND PRESIDENTS WHO RULED IRAQ BETWEEN 1921 and 1979

Year	Name of the King or President
1921-1933	King Faisal I (natural death) )
1933-1939	King Ghazi (killed) ) Kingdom
1939-1958	King Faisal II (killed) ) of
1958-1963	President Abd Al-Karim Gasim ) Republic
	(killed) ) of
1963-1966	President Abd Al-Salam Aref ) Iraq
	(natural death) )
1963-1968	President Abd Al-Rahman Aref )
	(dismissed) )
1968-1979	President Ahmad Hassan Al- )
	Baker (natural death) )
1979-	President Saddam Hussein )

## 2.0 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Having discussed the political situation and its instability, it is possible now to discuss the other side of the coin - the economic development. The initial discussion will focus on the agricultural situation, followed by an investigation of the industrial situation. The argument in favour of discussing the agricultural milieu stems from the fact that:

- 1 - Iraq is predominantly an agricultural country with about a half of the population deriving their income from cultivation and animal husbandry.
- 2 - During the last thirty years there was, as we have seen earlier, a continuous rural-urban migration such that two-thirds of the present industrial manpower is drawn from rural areas. This point will be discussed in greater detail later.



3 - About 50% of the managers sampled in this research are of rural origin and had participated in agricultural activities in one way or another. Consequently, they lived within or under the agricultural environment and were largely governed by, or suffered from its influences including its feudal characteristics.

Thus, by understanding the peasants' life we uncover an important part of the Iraqi environment and this will help in explaining why managers behave in a certain way.

However, before discussing the economic development, two important points must be noticed: the first is the role of oil revenues in the economy of Iraq and the second is planning system under the leadership of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party.

1) The role of oil revenues in Iraq economy:

The Iraqi economy is heavily dependent on oil revenues. After the nationalization of oil industry in 1972, the share of oil sector in the national product jumped from 35% in 1970 to 60% in 1974. Its contribution to the total government revenues increased from 52% in 1971 to 87% in 1976, and crude oil accounted for some 98% of the total exports in 1975.<sup>15</sup>

The recent official statistics give no information either on production or exports of this product. Nevertheless, an examination of the gross domestic product of the public sector in Iraq during the years 1971-1978 reveals that the contribution of the commodity sector

has increased sharply after oil nationalisation. For example, the commodity sector's contribution in the gross domestic product was 20% in 1971, and rose to 57% in 1973 and to 81% in 1978. Table 4.2 gives more information about this fact and shows the contribution of the other sectors in gross domestic product.

TABLE 4.2 GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR, 1971-1978, AT CURRENT PRICES (I.D. million)

Sectors	1971	%	1972	%	1973	%	1978	%
Commodity	74.5	2.0	169.6	35	464.6	57	4403.5	81
Distribution	76.2	2.1	92.7	19	97.7	12	402.2	7
Services	204.9	5.9	224.2	46	248.1	31	663.6	12
G.D.P.	355.6	100	486.5	100	810.4	100	5469.3	100

Source: Annual abstract of statistics 1978, op.cit., p. 135.

## 2) Planning System under the Leadership of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party:

The Arab Ba'th Socialist Parth (ABSP) who came into power since 1968, is a socialist revolutionary party believing socialism to be a vital prerequisite for the liberation, unity and renaissance of the Arab nation.<sup>16</sup> Perhaps one of the most sophisticated ideological documents of the party in its present configuration is the Political Report of the Eighth Congress of January 1974. According to this report, planning is the basic need for laying the prerequisites of the transition to socialism.<sup>17</sup>

The economy of Iraq is a planned economy and firmly directed by the central government, whose objective is to expand the public sector (the socialist sector) to encompass eventually the entire economy. Centralised planning and decentralised execution are the basic ideals and principles which guide the planning system in Iraq.<sup>18</sup>


Planning system consists of five levels as follows:<sup>19</sup>

- (A) Planning Board: It is the higher planning authority. It consists of the president of the Republic or the vice-president of the Revolutionary Command Council (chairman) and the membership of all ministers as well as the Governor of Iraqi Central Bank. The principal task of this board is to plan for the economy as a whole.
- (B) The Steering Committee: is comprised of the Minister of Planning (chairman) and the membership of the heads of technical departments in the Ministry of Planning and five part-time members. The task of this committee is to study the subjects and the projects related to the plan as an introductory for adopting an appropriate decision. After that, the committee submits the plan together with the adopted decisions to the planning board to authorise it.
- (C) The Ministereal level: Each Ministry must study its planned projects before submitting them to the Steering Committee.
- (D) State Organisation: A State organisation in Iraq consists of a number of production companies (state establishments). The common link between such companies is that they produce similar products or services. An example is the State

Organisation for Construction Industries which comprises all cement companies in Iraq. The task of the state organisation is to study each proposal or project submitted by any one of its companies before submitting it to the Ministry.

- (E) State Establishment: The state establishment or the state enterprise is the basic economic unit in the public sector. It is regarded as an entity in its own right. It is an autonomous legal person in question of legal transactions, and works on the profit-and-loss accounting principle. As regards planning, the state establishment puts forward its own proposals for consideration by higher bodies, which then ratify and/or modify it before returning to the enterprise. As can be seen from Figure 4.1, the state establishment is directly subordinate to a ministry; to its subdivision. It is headed by a managing director who is formally obliged to take note of the various departments within the enterprise, however, when taking important decisions.

FIGURE 4.1 PLANNING SYSTEM IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN IRAQ



## 2.1 AGRICULTURE

Though Iraq, since the dawn of history, has been known as an agricultural region, the land output is low.<sup>20</sup> At present, only half of the cultivable land is actually farmed and that is only on an intermittent basis.<sup>21</sup> In my previous study, I found five factors principally responsible for the backwardness of agriculture in Iraq: floods, primitive irrigation systems, feudal relationships, laws of agrarian reform and illiteracy of the peasants.<sup>22</sup> Some of these factors including floods and illiteracy, have been discussed earlier. The remaining factors are of particular interest in this chapter because they are largely responsible for other characteristics of the behaviour of the people. Take for example, the problem of irrigation and drainage system. It represents a major handicap for agriculture success. The peasants, due to their ignorance and poverty and, perhaps, because there are large tillable areas in comparison with their number, have been brought up on using the shifting-system of cultivation and practicing a haphazard and wasteful system of farming and their methods of soil preparation are inadequate.<sup>23</sup> These and other reasons have depleted the soil and combined to produce an increase in land salinization and decrease land productivity.<sup>24</sup>

As for the problem of feudalism, indeed the agricultural sector until 1970 was characterised by the control of feudalism over most of the fertile land, whereas the majority of the farmers were living in utter poverty and ignorance, smitten by disease. The system of land

tenure before 1970 brought grave economic defects and was (particularly before 1958) often socially vicious, especially in the south part of Iraq. It lies behind most of the social, economic and political problems of the country.<sup>25</sup>

The 1958/59 agricultural census revealed that ownership of agricultural land was concentrated; only 2% of the land owners controlled 68% of the total agricultural land, whereas 86% of the landowners controlled 10.5% of the agricultural land.<sup>26</sup> Indeed, the big landowners were either the chiefs of the tribes or ministers and other government officers, or the royal family.<sup>27</sup> It is therefore not surprising to find that the first priority of the 1958 revolution was to redress the condition of agricultural landownership and to free the poor peasants from such a burdensome situation. Thus, in September of the same year a land reform law was enacted, which was modelled on that of Egypt in spite of the fact that agriculture in the two countries had little in common.<sup>28</sup> According to that law, individual ownership was limited to (2,500 sq.km.) of irrigated land and (5,000 sq.km.) of rain-irrigated land. As a matter of fact, the law did not achieve its objectives for the following five major reasons:<sup>29</sup>

- 1 - The government authorities did not clearly realise the scale and complexity of the problem nor had they a clear understanding of the strength of the feudalists, nor did they have enough officials capable of effective farm management.
- 2 - The poor situation of the peasants, given the fact that they were and still are illiterate, did not permit them to recognise the importance of such a progressive law.

3 - Land was expropriated rapidly while distribution was extremely slow. For example, out of the total twelve million donums which were referred to the government by this law, only 6.94 donums were sequestered up to 1968; of these lands only 2.58 million donums were distributed. The fundamental reason for the substantial delay in distribution was Iraq's under-developed administrative infrastructure. This meant that not only were there insufficient trained administrators to supervise the actual process of distribution but, probably more indispensable, the government was unable to provide the important services such as irrigation, marketing and the provision of credit that had formerly been provided, albeit at a price, by the landlords. These services were supposed to have been provided by the co-operatives, but by 1968 only 443 co-operatives had been established, just over half the estimated 800 minimum needed to provide the necessary services for Iraq's cultivable land.<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, the supply of trained personnel (agronomists, engineers, supervisors and accountants) was totally inadequate to staff the co-operatives that had been established.<sup>31</sup>

4 - Moreover, the Law No. 30 - 1958 gave the landlord whose property exceeded the maximum, the right to keep the best land with the highest, abundant water, close to communication networks and cities. Consequently, only the bad lands were distributed to the peasants.

During 1958-1968 many amendments were made to that law to strengthen the landlords' power against the poor peasants. To be free from such a

situation there was little alternative for peasants but to abandon the land and migrate to the cities, especially to Baghdad where, according to Qasim's propaganda, the fellahin (peasants:sing:fellah) would be able to live in palaces.<sup>32</sup> Land productivity for the above reasons became low even by comparison with neighbouring countries which contend with similar problems.<sup>33</sup>

In May 1970 a new agrarian reform law was promulgated, which also reduced the size of land holding and paid special attention to the rights of co-cultivators and agricultural workers in the land they till. Furthermore, the new law treated the basic issues that were overlooked by the old law (Law No. 30 of 1958) and corrected the latter's flaws.<sup>34</sup> It also eliminated feudal ownership and the semi-feudal relationships in the rural areas, particularly in the middle and south of Iraq. As to the northern area, the kwid landlords and feudalists remained in control of most of the cultivated areas supported by the insurgent agent. Up to 1975, neither the opportunity nor the appropriate condition were available to apply the agrarian reform law in this area. But after crushing the insurgency and the prevalence of peace and security in the area, the government issued Law No. 90 on May 1975, which was a complementary measure to the Agrarian Reform Law No. 117 of 1970. Extraordinary efforts were exerted by the government to execute the law in the shortest possible time. This led to sequestering an area of 633,645 donums; and an area of 1.19 million donums of a total 4.95 million donums were distributed to farmers. The total numbers of beneficiaries amounted to 59,145 families in 1978.<sup>35</sup>



## 2.2 INDUSTRY

At the beginning of 1920 there was no industry worth mentioning. Consumer goods production, other than agricultural, used to come from abroad or industrialised by traditional vocational methods, such as the manufacture of metal and clay utensils, bricks, handwoven textile, carpentry, blacksmithing, and other, which basically depends on manual skills.<sup>35</sup>

After the establishment of the royal regime in 1921, some foodstuff and consumption industries such as textiles, detergents (soap) cigarettes, printing and alcoholic drinks were established. During the thirties, when world crisis prevailed (1929-1933) the country was affected and suffered a recession in investments; no new industrial projects were initiated during the war period. But after the establishment of the industrial bank in 1947, some industrial projects such as cement, vegetable oils, spinning and weaving, bricks, were flourished in the private sector.<sup>37</sup> Though oil revenues had occurred since 1950 and there was a "Development Board", the industrial sector was intentionally neglected during the fifties. This fact becomes more obvious in the following discussion.

In 1954, Iraq had 22,460 industrial establishments, of which 45% were one-man businesses; 93% employed less than five persons each. Many of these establishments were nothing but handicraft workshops. On the other hand, factories employing more than 20 persons formed just over 1% of the total but these "large units" gave employment to 43% of all non-oil industrial workers.<sup>38</sup>

The poor situation of the agricultural sector, together with the miserable status of most of the peasants forced the government to intensify agricultural development and to pay little attention to industrial development. A closer examination of the pattern of investment allocations for the main economic sectors during 1951 to 1959, as shown in the following table, endorses this fact.

TABLE 4.3 TOTAL INVESTMENT ALLOCATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC SECTORS, 1951-1959 (I.D. Million)

Sectors	The first economic plan 1951 - 1956		The second economic plan 1955 - 1959	
	Amount	%	Amount	%
Agriculture	66.1	42.5	114.4	37.6
Industry	31.1	20.0	43.3	14.3
Transport	29.0	18.7	74.2	24.4
Building	20.6	13.3	60.7	20.0
Others	8.6	5.5	11.4	3.7
Total	115.4	100.0	304.1	100.0

Source: Ferhang Jalal, op.cit., p. 33.

As can be seen from the table, the agricultural sector took the lion's share in terms of total allocation during the first and the second economic plans, whereas the industrial sector occupied the second position in the first economic plan and the third place in the second plan.

During this period some new industrial projects such as bitumen refinery, sugar plant, cotton textiles and another two cement factories were founded. However, the country's capacity for industrial growth was limited primarily by the shortage of skilled labour and technical and managerial personnel; the small domestic market; an inability to compete with foreign products; and the timidity of private initiative.<sup>39</sup> Perhaps it is useful to mention at this stage that until 1959 there was no ministry with responsibility for industry. Instead, what Iraq had during that time was only a Department of Industry in the Ministry of Economy and the Industrial Bank under the control of the Ministry of Development. The latter played a considerable role in promoting industry and still plays an influential role in industrial development of the private sector.

Although the Development Board gave priority to agriculture and its bias towards this sector was correct at least during that time, it did not completely neglect industry. Its plans, as we observed above, allocated I.D. 74.5 million to this sector compared to just I.D. 4 millions total investments in modern industrial plans up to 1951.<sup>40</sup> This, however, did not satisfy Quassim's government. Thus, after the 1958 Revolution more attention was given to industrialization of the country. The Development Board was disbanded and replaced with a Planning Board and a Ministry of Planning (Law 74, 1959). At the same time, a Ministry of Industry was created to undertake activities concerned with the industrialization and to supervise the public and private sectors. Indeed, the industrial sector accomplished

some progress and occupied the leading position among the sectors which the government began to develop in accordance with the 1961 Detailed Economic Plan. From the I.D. 556.2 million allocated to various sectors, the industrial sector received I.D. 166.8 million (almost 30% of the total allocation) of which I.D. 95 million was covered by the two agreements signed with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.<sup>41</sup>

In addition, legislation was enacted to encourage the participation of the private sector and protect the national products. Two methods were adopted; first, restriction of imports, and secondly, facilities and assistances were given to industry as per the Industrial Projects Encouragement Law. This, in addition to the protection given to local industry, helped in the increase of industrial production in the post-revolution period.

Meanwhile, the support accorded to the Industrial Bank and the increase of its capital to I.D.10 million have positively contributed to the establishment of new industries, encouraging those who possess funds to invest in some industrial projects. In 1962 the number of industrial licences amounted to 140; and the metal industries occupied position No. 1 among such industries.<sup>42</sup>

However, private sector investors and the Industrial Bank's contribution in industry were hampered due to the nationalization laws which promulgated in July 1964. By these laws, 30 industrial companies were nationalized. This led to a sudden expansion of the public sector's activity in industry.<sup>43</sup> Apparently, the purpose behind such a movement was political but not economic. It was designed to align the economic

structure of Iraq more closely to that of Egypt as desired by the Nasserites.<sup>44</sup> Similarly, nationalization was followed by the imposition of an unworkable bureaucracy, the inefficiency of which seems to have grown steadily more pronounced. In effect, the problem arises not because the displacement of private by public ownership, but because of the heavy and cumbersome hand of bureaucracy which accompanied the latter. The industrial sector at that time was suffering from corruption, maladministration and inefficiency. It was draining the state's budget instead of contributing to the economic development and did not provide the government with new resources.<sup>45</sup>

In 1965, another five-year plan was presented to run up to 1969. This plan, like the previous one, gave first priority to industry. Though almost two-thirds of its projects were exactly the same as the previous one, its novelty was the provision of I.O. 4.5 million for "new industrial projects" which included tractor and motor car assembly, a project for salt production and a chip-board project.<sup>46</sup>

In 1968 the Ba'ath Party came to power and much effort has been devoted to industrialise the country. Special attention has been devoted to complete the unfinished projects and to expand some existing factories and new industries have been introduced. As for the private sector, legislation was enacted to encourage public participation in industry. The incentives applied by the government in this field were the exemption of income tax, tax-exemption on imports of new materials and machinery. The government also provided the necessary plots of land, services, loans and other bank facilities.<sup>47</sup>

The present government is forging ahead with an industrialization programme at a speed unmatched by any of the previous regimes. It

believes that the backward Iraq society cannot be radically changed without giving to industrialization its due importance, since industry constitutes one of the basic pillars of progress in modern age. For the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, it is only through industrialization that the economic independence can be achieved.<sup>48</sup> The party also realised that industrialization in Iraq is the basic means towards transforming it from an underdeveloped agrarian society to a developed agro-industrial society. In addition, industrialization will permit the industrial sector to play a greater part in national income formation.<sup>49</sup>

The industrial sector took the first place among the economic sectors in the years that followed 1968. In the first plan (1970-1974) total allocation for industry was I.D. 391 million, whereas the agricultural sector, for instance, took the second position with an allocation of 366.2 million. Meanwhile, the total investments of the industrial sector during the first three years of the second development plan (1975-1980) was I.D. 2123 million, representing about 47% of the combined investments in all the economic sectors.<sup>50</sup>

As for the type of modern industries, the emphasis is on the exploitation of locally available raw materials with export potential and diversification away from dependence on oil, and a complete revitalization of the mostly small-scale industries which have dominated the non-oil industry.<sup>51</sup> Industries such as glass, paper, sulphur extraction, steel rolling mill and rayon, fertilizer and petrochemicals industries (which had been planned for almost ten years but were nowhere near implementation) started their production a few years ago. Others such as phosphates, tyre plants, motor manufacturing complex are due to be opened in 1983. On the other hand, Iraq's construction industry is expanding fast; cement output in 1976 was 2.8 million tons and rose to seven million tons following the opening of another seven new factories in 1978.

### 2.3 The Industrial Manpower:

Before discussing the type and the quantitative side of the industrial manpower, it is important to know who is the industrial worker. The previous discussions of the Iraqi communities and that of the economic development revealed that:

- 1 - Strong relationships exist among the nomad, the village and the city communities in terms of their social values and other traditional customs. The continual rural-urban migration is largely responsible for this situation.
- 2 - Until lately, agriculture was the dominant occupation of the majority of the people. In addition, the feudalistic behaviour of tribal Sheik's and landlords was the prevailing feature in agriculture.
- 3 - Modern industry is absolutely new and the year 1950 can be regarded as the real beginning of this new era.

These points indicate that the industrial worker in Iraq is a peasant villager, and a member of the traditional society. This fact, combined with the novelty of industry in Iraq, keeps in the factory worker many of the attitudes of the non-industrial society; he remains a villager and industrial employment, for him, is not yet a way of life.<sup>52</sup>

It is quite important to remember at this stage that the agricultural environment has a very specific attribute which impresses itself on the mentality of the villager and is reflected in his social life. He is not, like the urban factory worker, an employee working

under immediate supervision at a task specifically assigned to him. Whether he is a tenant or a freeholder, even where he is a serf, his time and seasons, his varying tasks and his alternations of work and rest, are set for him not only by the commands of a master but also by the exigencies of nature and the constraints of social structure.

The factory workers are still a very minor group in the society. In 1977, the industrial workforce was 9.1% of the total workforce in Iraq.<sup>53</sup> Different studies have been carried out during the last fifteen years (some of them were under the supervision of the International Labour Organisation) to evaluate and analyse the actual situation of manpower in Iraq and to estimate future manpower requirement. All these studies have been indicated that the shortage of skilled manpower is acute in all economic sectors and the number of unskilled workers in the industrial sector is higher than that of skilled workers.<sup>54</sup>

According to the 1977 census data, 55.9% of all industrial manpower working in the large companies are unskilled. Table 4.4 shows this fact and indicates that the share of skilled workers in the total number employed in these companies is lower than 40%.<sup>55</sup>

TABLE 4.4. INDUSTRIAL MANPOWER IN THE LARGE COMPANIES CLASSIFIED BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES AND SECTORS: 1977.

Occupational Categories	Public Sector		Private Sector		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Managers and high professionals	2014	1.9	569	1.3	2573	1.7
Technicians	4,392	4.2	249	0.6	4641	3.1
Skilled workers	4,515	42.7	13,832	31.1	58987	39.3
Semi-skilled and unskilled workers	5,4169	51.2	29,773	67.0	83942	55.9
Total	105,730 ✓	100.0	44,413 ✓	100.0	150,143 ✓	100.0

Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics 1978, op.cit., Table 4/4, p. 98.



The shortage of skilled manpower in industry represents one of the principal obstacles in increasing productivity in this sector. As will be seen later, 64% of the managers surveyed in this study are disappointed by the shortage of skilled manpower. Yet the situation of these managers becomes more complicated if we understand that semi-skilled and unskilled workers are by and large of rural origin and, for reasons mentioned earlier in chapter three, dislike manual work.

#### SUMMARY

The chapter has tried to shed some light on the political and economic developments during the years 1921-1980. The political environment during this period was highly unstable and there were frequent coups d'etat. The different regimes that came to power before 1968, together with the flagrant abuse of authority, have adversely affected the economic and social transformations and split the Iraqi personality and, consequently, widened the gap between the successive governments and the people.

The links between political and economic aims are unquestionable. Many of the economic laws and legislation which were enacted in agriculture and industry, were aimed at achieving political rather than economic ends.

On the other hand, agriculture until the recent past was the main occupation and two-thirds of the people engaged in it. Meanwhile, the history of modern industry is quite new in Iraq and the year 1950 can be regarded as the real beginning of such a new era.

In addition, the problems of agriculture which imposed on the peasants by nature or by the feudalistic behaviour of the tribal shieks and landlords or by the government through its different agrarian reform laws have forced the peasants to abandon the land to search for work in the cities. Thousands of the peasants found their target inside the industrial sector which witnessed considerable expansion after the nationalisation of oil wealths.

Today, the industrial sector faces acute shortage in skilled manpower. The majority of the industrial workers are of village origin. This fact, coupled with the novelty of modern industry, keeps in the factory worker many of the attitudes of the agricultural society; he remains a villager and unable to adapt himself to the requirements of the industrial context.

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## CHAPTER FIVE

### RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, PRACTICES AND EDUCATION OF THE PEOPLE IN IRAQ

#### INTRODUCTION

Religions have an important influence on human behaviour. Social interactions and social relations, e.g., the role of women, political organisations and education systems are all significantly affected by the religion of the society.<sup>1</sup>

Religions also have an impact at the practical or micro level of the business enterprise. In Iraq, for example, Islam plays a significant part in the life of the people and their conduct; it is strictly prohibited to advertise for any type of alcohol either on local radio or television; during the fasting month "RAMADAN" all factories and public institutions reduce their working hours and all restaurants and coffeehouses must be closed during this month from sunrise to sunset.

The purpose of this chapter is to investigate four principal points: Islam and economic progress of the Arab World; the ethnic composition of the Iraqi society; the Islamic beliefs and practices, and, education of the people in Iraq.

#### 1.0 : ISLAM AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF THE ARAB WORLD


Since the publication of Max Weber's "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism" scholars of various theoretical persuasions have argued that Islam is the main impediment to the economic and industrial development of the Arab World<sup>2</sup>. The point of departure for many scholars of this genre has been to view the economic backwardness

in the Arab World in terms of a lack of those protestant ethic factors which accounts for the capitalistic-economic development of the industrialized communities.<sup>3</sup>

According to Turner, Weber's thesis that secularization involves relegation of religion to purely private choice, on one hand, and that secularization was the social product of capitalism and protestantism on the other, has become the base line of much contemporary sociological research.<sup>4</sup> In the light of this argument, in which capitalism is equated with rationalisation, economic development becomes contingent upon a rational process characterized by an institutional differentiation in the areas of politics, economics and religion.<sup>5</sup>

The link between religion and social development is further elaborated on the basis of a mediation process affecting individual personality. Zureik, for example, sees that the basic premise underlying this psychological approach to modernism is that there are some personality traits associated with the protestant ethic which are conducive to modernization. These include: a high level of personal motivation, mastery of the environment, dedication to the work ethic, orientation to the future and so forth.<sup>6</sup> Weber's thesis, which provides the basis for this mode of reasoning, could be presented as follows:<sup>7</sup>

Figure 5.1: Weber's Thesis of the Protestant Ethic





As a matter of fact, Islam as a religion, does not hold direct responsibility for the present Arab World backwardness, nor does it stand against economic and industrial progress. Maxime Rodinson, for example, argues that Islam teachings and Koranic values are not antithetical either to capitalism or socialism.<sup>8</sup> Another scholar, D.S. Robert, confirms that trade and business activities have always had a significant place in the minds of Muslims.<sup>9</sup> The language and ideas of the Koran reflect the fact that it was first addressed to the people engaged in commerce.<sup>10</sup> The society in which Islam was born, the society of Mecca, was already a centre of capitalist trade and the prophet was a successful merchant.<sup>11</sup> The inhabitants of Mecca, the prophet's tribe, caused their capital to fructify through trade and loans at interest in a way that Weber would call rational.<sup>12</sup> According to Rodinson, the merchants of the Muslims Empire conformed perfectly to Weber's criteria for capitalistic activity. He describes them as follows:

"They seized any and every opportunity for profit, and calculated their outlays, their encashments and their profits in money terms." 13

The great development of trade in the Muslim Middle Ages shows that at least part of production was directed towards the market, towards exchange values. Specialization in products both of the crafts and of agriculture was common. Some towns wove silk in various forms: damask, satin, etc., while others worked with cotton, or made carpets or leather articles. There were even towns that specialised in the exporting of soap, rose-water, scent, wax, honey, ointments and saffron.<sup>14</sup>

Nevertheless, strict Islamic law and custom restricted an individual's right to hold property in certain basic respects. It is not permissible, for example, to make a charge for such primary products as water and grass. Certain commercial practices are forbidden by the Koran: those which are either fraudulent, involve trade of impure goods (wine, pigs, etc.), or in goods that are common to everyone (water, grass and fire). Speculation in food, especially with a view to cornering the market, is forbidden. In addition, the Muslim law strictly forbids the lending of money at interest-usury.<sup>15</sup>

While the religious ban on lending at interest played a part in hindering an important outlet for financial activity, the Muslim religion never raised any objection to economic and industrial development. As a matter of fact the economic and industrial backwardness of the Arab countries including Iraq has resulted not because the Islamic religion, but because these countries have long suffered from colonialism and imperialist plunder; the majority of the people were and are still illiterate; authoritative and military governments; tribal relationships; the problem of extended family and method of child-rearing.<sup>16</sup> Still there is the problem of traditional values which exercises a significant influence on economic and industrial development.

## 2.0 : THE ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE SOCIETY

The Iraqi society is very heterogeneous with respect to ethnic or religious origins, more than other Arab countries.<sup>17</sup> Aggravating the problem of this heterogeneity of the society is the high value

placed on group feelings. Each member of an ethnic or religious group feels a strong relationship toward his group and considers those who belong to other groups as outsiders rather than as nationals of his country. Though this type of group feeling becomes less common among townsmen, nonetheless it still persists in the countryside and small towns. The reason for this feeling, traditionally, may be the many cases in which a group had invaded and then dominated the area until it was defeated by another group.<sup>18</sup>

The major religions in today's Iraq are: Islam, which is divided into two major sects - "Shiites" and "Sunnites"; Christianity; Sebacan and Yezidis. The population may also be divided into the following groups: Arabs- Kurds; Turkmans; Sarbiyas and Armenians. Each of which speaks different language and has different rituals and traditions. Other than the Muslim Arabs, who are the majority, minorities vary in their size from the Kurds, who comprise about 20% of the population, to the Sarbiyas and other minorities who are only a few thousands each.<sup>19</sup>

Indeed, this situation, namely the existence of different religions and languages provided that each ethnic group has different rituals and traditions, has put a lot of difficulties before the government and management. On the macro level, for example, most of the national plans issued during the sixties were unworkable in the north of Iraq because of the interior war between the Kurds and the central government. As regarding the practical or micro level of the business firm, needless to say that such an in-group feeling is one of the main reasons behind the establishment of informal organisation which is largely work against the planned management objectives in Iraq. Each member of an ethnic group tries to assist his group

and render to its member all possible facilities, even if it was against the established policies of the organisation.<sup>20</sup>

### 3.0 : ISLAMIC BELIEFS AND PRACTICES

About 90% of the population are Muslims and Islam is the state religion.<sup>21</sup> As such, the author believes that only through a comprehensive discussion of this religion one can understand a lot of people behaviour in Iraq including that of the managers who are the subject of this study. In addition, many of the traditional concepts that we discussed earlier have their roots in this religion.

To start with, Islam is both belief and legislation, which organises all the relationships of man.<sup>22</sup> A Muslim is one who accepts and submits to the will of God.<sup>23</sup> The "Sharia" or Law of Islam embraces every detail of human life and this includes personal actions as well as social relations and community life, including the Government.<sup>24</sup>

The orthodox muslims are fatalists in the sense that they strongly believe that what the Lord has planned for them they have to face. God is able to do anything - from blessings to misfortune. The Iraqi , as a religious person, considers the recognition and worship of God through Islam the principal concern of his life. He views himself as a humble creature whose life, at any moment, becomes whatever the Lord wills it to become. By keeping on the right path, by performing religious obligation - the five pillars of Islam - one can merit the blessing of "Allah" and avoid misfortune.

Indeed, there are some holy places in the cities of Kerbala, Najaf and Baghdad, which rank next in importance only to those in Sudia Arabia. Many religious schools exist in these places, not only famous in the Islamic World, but they have an important impact on social life in Iraq. They continuously strengthen and reinforce the Islamic behaviour of the people. The muslim has a tendency to believe implicitly that his life has been worked out by the Lord before his birth. Nothing can be done to alter what has been destined for him. Indeed, such a belief causes the Arab personality to be passive towards his environment rather than to attempt to influence it.<sup>25</sup> Whether in Iraq, or in other Arab countries, when a misfortune comes, people immediately start to find an explanation for it within the system of Islam. If such an explanation is found, the majority, and this is largely because of their illiteracy, would be inclined to consider it as a punishment sent by God for their sins:

"Those that commit sin shall be punished for their sins" 26

On the other hand, Islam is a brotherhood with no social distinction and no official priesthood. All men are equal under Islam. Unfortunately, for the female species of the mankind, this does not appear to include her. Kergan explains this point in the following way:

"A principle of Islam teachings has been the inferior status of women, probably deriving from the hardships of desert and nomadic life." 27

Though Kergan was successful in his explanation and reminded us of the importance of the desert in this respect, nevertheless, and

according to the Koran, women are inferior in their souls and bodies and men have to spend their wealth to maintain them. The principle of superiority of men over women, which we have discussed in Chapter three, repeats itself in the Koran as follows:

"Men have authority over women because Allah has made the one superior to the other, and because they spend their wealth to maintain them. Good women are obedient." 28

In fact, the Islamic World as a whole would probably have been more advanced socially and economically if customs and traditions had treated women as equal rather than as inferior. Inequality of sex will continue so long as illiteracy is the dominant feature among the masses. As will be seen later, the problem of superiority or inferiority and social restriction on women - especially their exclusion from the work arena, represents considerable constraint on manager's decisions and their organisational performance.

Another important issue in Islam is the concept of alms or "Al-Zakat." According to Islam an alms is a method of increasing people's cohesiveness. Alms are the properties which the rich voluntarily give for the sake of charity. They are supposed to be given in various ways: by supporting parents and relatives and helping the needy in general. It may also take the form of good deeds or even kind words.<sup>29</sup> Indeed, the misunderstanding of such an act, has affected individual behaviour to the degree that many people are inclined to help a needy person in order to gain good status in the next life:

"Whatever alms you give shall rebound to your own advantage, provided that you give them for the love of Allah. And whatever alms you give shall be paid back to you in full: you shall not be wronged." 30

The author believes that the misinterpreting of alms concepts among the people, who are by and large illiterate, is one of the principal reasons behind exercising "Wasta" or mediation in the Arab world. Mediation in this study means assisting another person to gain some personal advantages. While we shall investigate the problem of mediation in Iraq in more detail in the next chapters, it is important to discuss here other Islamic concepts: income, family size and individual success or failure.

As far as income, size of the family (number of children), individual success or failure are concerned, the majority of the people believe that such things are in the hand of the Lord. Nobody can increase or decrease things like these without the will of God. They believe that even their most minute activities are planned by God and closely watched by Him:

"He knows the visible and unseen. He is the Mighty one, the Merciful, who excelled in making of all things." 31

In this view, God determines a person's fate even before his birth. Thus, the decline in economic conditions, the death of a person, the sickness, the number of children, the success or the failure in achieving certain objectives and such, are largely interpreted as due to the will of God. It follows that a human being, by his own efforts, cannot improve his condition - Allah alone can do that. Consequently what is the use of arduous efforts when they may fail because they are against the will of God? This probably explains why the people frequently use the word "Inshallah" - "God Willing" in their daily life, which is reflecting a basic Muslim attitude toward the world. Equally, the commonly quoted Koranic phrases "it is

written" and "it was willed by Allah" symbolize attitudes toward the value of human effort which many Muslims have held for centuries. Men exercise no ultimate control over events in a world in which all things are ordained by God. Success is the manifestation of God's benevolence; failure is simply God's withholding of benevolence. Such beliefs are largely existing among the illiterate people.

#### Folk Belief and Superstition:

Though the majority of the people believe in Islam, popular customs and beliefs are still persistent among uneducated townsmen and villagers. Transmitted orally from generation to generation, these customary beliefs work side by side with Islam. The Jinns and ghosts, the use of magic and the "evil eye" are quite common in the rural areas and still exist among uneducated people.

The man who has lost God's blessing by violating such community moral canons as those pertaining to truthfulness, loyalty to family and relatives is at the mercy of these malignant spirits, who have power to bring sickness and misfortune. They are propitiated with charms, amulets, and prayers. The jinns and the evil spirits may also be propitiated by partaking of the "baraka", the mystical power of someone who has "Wajh Khayr", a good face. The "baraka" of these lucky ones may be obtained by eating with them, being given some of their property, or receiving their good wishes. Most old men and women in Iraq are assumed to be possessed of a lucky face, either because they have succeeded in living a long time or because their approach to the grave in old age is thought to bring them nearer to supernatural.<sup>32</sup>



As regards "evil eye" needless to say that such a belief is still in existence. The evil eye is a mysterious and hateful power carried by the glance of a certain person, is much feared in both the village and nomadic groups, and to lesser extent in larger cities. Objects of a sky-blue colour or sky-blue decorations around the windows or doors of dwellings are thought to be efficacious in warding off the "evil eye".<sup>33</sup>

On the other hand, local cults and saints are numerous and one can see them almost in every village. Closer to God than his fellows, the saint is able to perform miracles by the grace of Allah. Practically almost every village has a grave shrine to some man or woman locally esteemed as a saint. The cults which have grown up around these saints give the villager a sense of security against the omnipresent evil spirits. Disease and childlessness are among the most frequent misfortunes against which the help of the saints is invoked.

#### 4.0: EDUCATIONAL STATUS OF THE PEOPLE

Education plays a significant role in the economic and social development in every society. Nowadays, a society must be an "educated society" in order to progress, to grow, even to survive.<sup>34</sup> A lot of the traditional beliefs, values and customs that we have discussed above can be eradicated or, at least, minimized by education. Unfortunately, modern education is new in Iraq and this fact will become more obvious in the following discussion.

Until the advent of western influence in the nineteenth century, education in Iraq was dominated by the Islamic tradition of religious and classical learning. The curriculum of elementary schools was based on memorization of the Koran; reading and writing perceived secondary emphasis. With the establishment of the mandate in 1921, the public school system organised under Turkish rule began slowly to expand under British supervision. However, the establishment of the public school system did not displace the network of village "Kuttabs", the traditional religious school. Thanks to oil royalties and the spirit of the governments that followed the royal regime which are largely behind the increase of education among the people. Nevertheless, the steady increase in the number of students in all levels of study does not cover the fact that two shortcomings characterise the current system of education in Iraq. The first is that education, particularly in primary and secondary schools, represents an amalgam of the religiously oriented Islamic tradition. Though the "Al-Kutab School" has disappeared years ago, the old pattern of learning by rote persists in secular education, and it frequently conflicts with new teaching methods. Eloquence and the ability to quote from the Koran or to marshal proverbs in argument are still the marks of an educated man in many parts of Iraq.

The second point is that the concept of superiority of men over women, which we discussed earlier, also embodies itself in the field of education. Men are more educated than women and this is true whether among rural or urban dwellers. Table 5.1 reflects such a fact.

TABLE 5.1 PERCENTAGES OF ILLITERACY AMONG THE POPULATION CLASSIFIED BY SEX AND AREA, 1977

Area	Sex		Total
	Men	Women	
Urban	26	58	41.3
Rural	56	93	74.8
Total	36	71	53

Source: Ministry of Planning, Abstract of Statistics, op.cit., Table 2/8 p. 35.

As can be seen from this table, the proportion of illiterate people (amongst those aged ten years and more) was 53% in 1977. This proportion did not only differ between urban areas (41.3%) and rural areas (74.8%), but it also differs between men and women. Men, irrespective of their areas, have higher percentages of literacy than women. Indeed, such high rates of illiteracy are not surprising when one considers the density of population per sk.km. (27 persons), the problem of communication within the country. However, the difference between men and women in this respect has only one main explanation; the majority of the families, notably the rural ones or those who have rural background, were/are against female education. Surely the number of educated women has sharply increased during the last two decades, nonetheless, the old generation still has the upper hand in determining female behaviour and the place of women in the social structure.

On the other hand, levels of education, especially higher education, are deplorably low. Table 5.2 indicates that the majority

of the people are illiterate (53%), or only read and write (22.7%), or primary school certificate holders (13%) or intermediate school certificate holders (4.2%) or secondary school certificate holders (3.1%). Only 2.1% of the population hold baccalaureus certificates and just a small handful of the people (0.2%) have higher education. The table also shows that the urban dwellers have better chances in all levels of education when compared with the rural dwellers.

TABLE 5.2: LEVELS OF EDUCATION IN IRAQ, BY AREA OF RESIDENCE, 1977

Level of Education	Areas		Total
	Urban	Rural	
Illiterate	41.31	74.80	53.0
Read and write only	27.00	14.60	22.7
Primary Sch.	16.40	6.46	13.0
Intermediate Sch.	5.50	1.30	4.2
Secondary Sch .	4.51	0.70	3.1
Baccalaureus	3.00	0.60	2.1
Higher Education	0.29	0.02	0.2
Unknown	1.81	1.52	1.7
Total Percentage	100	100	100
Total Population	4,923,407	2,631,845	7,555,257

Source: Ministry of Planning, Abstract of Statistics, op.cit., Table 2/8, p. 35.

To cope with the problem of illiteracy, the government adopted the following three policies during the last decade:

First: Expansion of the right to education and its dissemination in accordance with the principle of equal opportunity among the citizens.<sup>35</sup>

Second: Making education free in all stages of study since 1974. The aim of this measure was to assist students of limited income from lower income families to continue their education.<sup>36</sup>

Third: Launching a comprehensive campaign to eradicate illiteracy for those aged between 15 to 45 years in all parts of Iraq. The campaign was started in May, 1978.<sup>37</sup>

As a result of these policies the number of students as well as the number of schools have increased considerably during this period.

Table 5.3 shows this increase.

Table 5.3. NUMBER OF SCHOOLS, STUDENTS IN IRAQ IN 1970/71, 74/75, AND 1978/79.

Year	Primary Stage				Secondary Stage			
	No. of Sch.s	Increase %	No. of Students (000)	Increase %	No. of Sch.s	Increase %	No. of Students (000)	Increase %
1970/71	5617	-	1.120	-	921	-	304	-
1974/75	6170	10	1.521	36	1099	19	452	49
1978/79	10560	88	2.459	120	1579	71	782	157

Source: Ministry of Planning, Abstract of Statistics 1978, op.cit., Tables 11/3 and 11/7, pp. 237-41.

As can be seen from the table, the total number of the primary school students was 1.12 million in 1970/71, rose to 1.52 in 1974/75, and to 2.45 million in 1978/79. That is, there was a 120% increase in the number of primary school students. The number of primary schools has also increased from 5617 in 1970/71 to 10560 in 1978/79, registering an increase equal to 88%. On the other hand, the number of secondary school students also has changed positively to become 782 thousand in 1978/79 after it was 304 thousand at the beginning of 1970. Again, secondary schools have also increased to match the increase in students number, (see table 5.3 ).

The same is equally true in regard to the number of universities and students. While the number of students was 43 thousand in 1970, it rose to 91 thousand in 1979. The number of universities has also increased from four to seven during the said period. In addition, there is a plethora of institutions specialising in various aspects of post-secondary education.

### Problems of Education

The steady expansion of education brought with it a substantial fall in the admission standards and eventually led to a decline in the quality of the students. Though there was a considerable increase in the number of students, the increase in the number of teachers (in all stages of study) lagged behind.<sup>38</sup> It is a well known fact, that it is much easier to increase the number of students than to improve the quality of education. To improve and raise the quality of education in Iraq, far-reaching changes in the attitudes of both teachers and students are needed. For example, old-fashioned teaching methods are

still lingering in higher education. Dictation of lectures are common in all stages of study and passively received by students, committed to memory. On the other hand, examination questions require only the reproduction of dictated notes, often in the same words in which they were given out. The considerable number of old-fashioned Egyptian teachers in Iraq seems to have encouraged such practices.<sup>39</sup>

As for students, the majority are still cramming by heart lecture notes, the importance of which they often do not grasp. Indeed, such a travesty of learning produced baneful effects on the whole education system.<sup>40</sup> On the other hand, relations between university education and society as a whole are ill-defined and academic researchers are few. The graduate student has insufficient practical training background. Each year, thousands of students are graduated from universities and schools. Their training cannot be effectively used in industrial or agricultural products, or in those of expanding public services.<sup>41</sup>

Finally, two crucial points need to be recognised at this stage. The first is that illiteracy has produced passive attitudes, particularly among the aged persons, towards education and its importance in today's world. Still there are those who are preventing children (largely the girls) from schools. Many do not believe in modern knowledge, neither are they impressed by the western man going to the moon. A considerable number of aged people believe that education is only fit for young people. If a man (aged 40 plus) goes to school, many would laugh at him, mock at him by saying:

"Look! The aged man goes to school - "ALKUTTAB"?"

Secondly, the government enacted in 1974 Law No. 103 and obliged herself to find employment for each graduate inside government machinery. Though the law brought many advantages for those who are from poor-classes, it also jeopardised the national development plans and the proper functioning of production and services in Iraq. Again, it reduced competition among university students by eliminating the basic incentives for hardwork, by giving them equal opportunity irrespective of their marks.

#### SUMMARY:

The chapter has tried to shed light on four principal points. Islam and the economic progress of the Arab World; the ethnic composition of the Iraqi society; Islamic beliefs and practices and education of the people in Iraq. Many points can be picked up from the chapter, but the most important from the point of view of this study are:

- 1 - Islam as a religion does not hold direct responsibility for the Arab backwardness, nor does it account for its economic stagnation. Colonialism and imperialist plunder, illiteracy, authoritative and military governments, tribal relationships, kinship and the problems of the extended family and methods of child-rearing, are all responsible for the economic backwardness of the Arab countries including Iraq.
- 2 - The society of Iraq, is very heterogeneous with respect to ethnic and religious origins. Each member of an ethnic group feels a strong relationship toward his group and largely considers those



who belong to other groups as outsiders. Such an in-group feeling is considerably reduced during the recent past, however, it still persists. The principal factor behind its existence is illiteracy, the author believes.

- 3 - Islam is still powerfully holding its followers and is the state religion. Individuals must behave in the light of this religion and its Koranic teachings. It is so, because Islam is both belief and legislation which organises all the relationships of man. On the other hand, Islam strengthens such nomadic and village values as hospitality, family loyalty, assisting relatives and superiority of men over women. Because of illiteracy, there are many customary beliefs and traditional habits still working among the people.
- 4 - As regards education, in fact modern education is new in Iraq. During the last thirty years, massive efforts have been spent by the successive governments to eradicate illiteracy. Though these efforts have been successfully organised and their results were encouraging, yet still the majority of the people are illiterate. The link between society and education is too strong. It seems that the idea of men's superiority over women, which exists in the Iraqi society also works in the field of education; men are more educated than women irrespective of their place of living. Passive attitudes toward education exist among the aged persons; many refuse to enrol their daughters in school. In addition, the present education systems suffer from the backwardness of teaching methods which are largely based on dictation of lectures.

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CHAPTER SIXBACKGROUNDS AND CAREER PATTERNS OF IRAQI MANAGERS  
WITH SOME INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONSINTRODUCTION

The backgrounds and career patterns of managers have gained growing attention in recent years as a result of studies of management training on the one hand, and as a result of increasing prosperity and the growth of business firms, on the other. Yet the investigations that have been undertaken in this field have not always sought to explain to what extent a society can shape the personal and social characteristics of managers nor have they examined the interrelationships that might be existing between the characteristics of a group of managers in a given society.

This chapter sets out to investigate and shed light on the personal and social characteristics as well as the career patterns of forty four Iraqi senior managers. The chapter consists of three sections. The first examines these managers from the point of view of their age, education, number of children, place of birth and social origins. The second deals with such aspects of their careers as mobility between firms and the length of service. The third section presents a comparison of these characteristics and the size of companies studied.

Below are the results with comparisons of the characteristics of some managers in a number of developed countries, such as the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan.

## 1.0 : PERSONAL AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS

### 1. Age of Managers:

The average (mean) age of the Iraqi managers is 46.7 years. Different studies in the United Kingdom give almost the same average. For example, according to Clement's study the average of 646 managers studied is 46 years, although it is 49 years for senior managers.<sup>1</sup> Another study, carried out by Clark, indicates that it is also 46 years for all managers studied. However, Clark goes further and demonstrates that the average varies according to the manager's sector; 50 years in the public sector as against 42 years in the private sector.<sup>2</sup> More recently, in 1978, Melrose-Woodman found the average age of 4525 managers ranging between 46 to 55 years.<sup>3</sup> In other countries, the average age is even higher. For example, it is between 55 and 64 years in the United States,<sup>4</sup> and 55 to 65 or more in Japan.<sup>5</sup>

Table 6.1 demonstrates the forty four managers by age and sectors and indicates that the dominant age group of the public sector managers ranges from 31 to 40 years and 41 to 50 years for those working in the private sector.

TABLE 6.1 AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE MANAGERS BY SECTORS

Age Group	Public Sector Managers		Private Sector Managers		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
31-40	11	55	3	12	14	32
41-50	8	40	10	42	18	41
51-60	1	5	7	29	8	18
61-70	-	-	4	17	4	9
Total	20	100	24	100	44	100

$\chi^2 = 13.04$     4df     $p < 0.01$   
Cramer's V = 0.54.

While no manager (aged 62 years or above) works in the public sector, four private sector managers fall into this category. Thus, it can be seen that as age decreases the probability of the number of managers working in the private sector increases as opposed to those working in the other sector. Statistically, a significant relation exists between the age of managers and the type of sector.

As pointed out previously, Clark's study of British managers indicates that the public sector manager is older than the private sector manager. It is interesting in this connection to note that the opposite exists in Iraq. The average age of the public sector manager is 41.9 years as against 50.8 years in the private sector. Political instability, we believe, is largely responsible for this situation. As seen earlier, continuous political instability has become a feature of life in Iraq notably during the last few decades. In coming into power, the first action of these governments was to remove the previous government's appointees and replace them with their own. Senior managers were not exempted from such a change.<sup>6</sup> Statistically, there is a significant variance between the mean of each group of managers and its sector, ( $p \leq 0.00$ ). See the following two tables.

TABLE 6.2 MEAN STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND VARIANCES OF MANAGERS' AGES  
CLASSIFIED BY THEIR SECTORS

Sector	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Variance
Public	20	41.90	5.01	16.09
Private	24	50.79	8.27	68.52
Total	44	46.75	7.99	63.82

TABLE 6.2.A ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF MANAGERS' AGES ACCORDING TO THEIR SECTORS

Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	D.F.	Mean Square	F	Sig
Between Groups	862.49	1	862.49	19.25	0.0001
Within Groups	1881.76	42	44.80		

## 2. Education:

The increasing scale and complexity of business organisation, the proliferation of managerial techniques and the technical transformation of many branches of industry have caused more firms in the developed countries to regard education, particularly higher education, as a prerequisite for top-management positions. It is also acknowledged that without continuous education, a manager is more likely to be incapable of achieving sound equilibrium between the internal requirements of the organisation and the external demands.

International comparisons of managers' education are notoriously difficult, because differing standards and traditions as well as periods, lie behind apparently comparable statistics. However, Table 6.3 showing data from three different developed countries, suggests that higher education, particularly in the United States and Japan, has become a prior criterion for top-management.



TABLE 6.3 COMPARISON OF EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF MANAGERS IN THREE COUNTRIES :  
UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES AND JAPAN.

Country/Researcher	Size of Sample	% of Managers with higher education	Year of Study
<u>United Kingdom</u>			
Clark <sup>1)</sup>	818	35.1	1966
Woodman <sup>2)</sup>	4525	28	1978
<u>United States</u>			
Burck <sup>3)</sup>	800	95	1976
<u>Japan</u>			
Aonuma <sup>4)</sup>	1500	90	1965

Source: 1) D.G. Clark, op.cit., p. 40  
 2) M. Woodman, J., op.cit., Tables 49 and 50.  
 3) C.G. Burck, op.cit., p. 174.  
 4) Aonuma, Y. and Nichon no Keieiso, op.cit., p. 117.

The same is also true in other developed countries. For example, in France, the percentage of executives with higher education is 91; in Belgium 85 and in Denmark 51.<sup>7</sup> Data of the managers sampled in this study reveal that the public sector managers have more formal education than the private sector managers. A comparison of the forty four managers classified by sectors is presented in Table 6.4 below. As can be seen, 95% of the public sector managers have university education compared to just 29% or 7 managers of the private sector. While there is no manager holding a primary school certificate in the public sector, 46% or 11 out of 24 managers in the private sector have this degree or less. Ironically, four of the private sector managers are illiterate. The above results indicate that in the public sector, a person must have at least secondary school certificate in order to climb the managerial tree and become a senior manager.

TABLE 6.4. COMPARISON OF MANAGERS' EDUCATION LEVELS CLASSIFIED BY SECTORS

Sector	Level of Education						Total	
	Primary or Less		Secondary		University or more			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Public	-	-	1	5	19	95	20	100
Private	11	46	6	25	7	29	24	100
Total	11	25	7	16	26	59	44	100

$\chi^2 = 19.91$       2 D.F.      Sign = 0.0000  
Cramer's V = 0.67

Data also revealed that the managers' education level does not only significantly differ between sectors but also has significant association with his age. Table 6.5 shows managers' educational level and their ages. It indicates that as manager's age decreases, his education level increases. For example, while 12 managers (aged between 31 and 40 years) have university education, only 4 managers (aged between 51 and 60 years) have this qualification but none amongst those aged 61 years or more. Indeed, as age increases, the level of education decreases. The principal reason for this situation is that the successive governments since 1958 have paid special attention to education.

TABLE 6.5 /

TABLE 6.5 MANAGERS' EDUCATION LEVELS ACCORDING TO THEIR AGES

Age Group	Education Level						Total	
	Primary or less		Secondary		University or more			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
31-40	1	9.0	1	14.3	12	46.2	14	31.8
41-50	5	45.5	3	42.9	10	38.5	18	40.9
51-60	2	18.2	2	28.6	4	15.3	8	18.2
61-70	3	27.3	1	14.2	-	-	4	9.1
Total	11	100.0	7	100.0	26	100.0	44	100.0

Kendall TAU, C = 0.36

Sig. = 0.002

Figures in Table 6.5 indicate that there are 26 managers (19 from the public sector) with university education. A detailed examination of their fields of study reveals that 11 managers have management and economic education (four of them working in the private sector); 5 have engineering education; 3 have legal education and 3 graduated from colleges of sciences; only 2 managers have arts education and the remainder hold university degrees in agriculture. Data also reveal that four out of the twenty six managers have master and doctoral degrees - one of them works in the private sector.

As will be seen later, the educational level of the managers has a significant relationship with number of children, mobility, years of service, social class and size of company.

### 3. Size of the family:

In the preceding chapters we discovered that societal factors including education of the people, interrelationships that exist within family members, and the Islamic faith have a decisive impact on the working

structure of the Iraqi society. It must be appreciated at this stage that these factors still exert an important influence on the behaviour of men. In this respect, the family size of the managers might be regarded as a sound indicator of the impact of these factors.

The managers were asked to number their children. Table 6.6 shows the managers' children classified by sector. It indicates that 75% of these managers have three children or more each.

TABLE 6.6. MANAGERS' CHILDREN CLASSIFIED BY SECTORS\*

Number of Children	Public Manager		Private Manager		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
0 - 2	6	30	5	21	11	25
3 - 4	13	65	8	34	21	48
5 - 6	1	5	3	12	4	9
7 - 8	-	-	3	12	3	7
9 - 10	-	-	5	21	5	11
Total	20	100	24	100	44	100

\* N.B. Not all these families are completed.

A detailed examination of this table reveals that a significant association exists between the number of children of managers and managers' sectors. Kendall's TAU.C = 0.386, sig = 0.009  $p \leq 0.01$ )<sup>B</sup>. It also shows that public sector managers tend to have less children than those in the private sector. While 95% of the public managers have four or less children each, only 55% of the private managers fell into this category. The remainder in the private sector have between 5 to 10 children each. Ironically, five out of the twenty four private

sector managers have ten children each but none amongst the public sector managers have more than six children.

The evidence reveals that a significant relationship exists between numbers of children and age, education level, place of birth (to some extent) and the company size of these managers. While company size will be investigated later, the other features are our intention here. A comparison between number of children and manager's age is reflected in Table 6.7 below.

TABLE 6.7                      NUMBER OF CHILDREN CLASSIFIED BY THE AGE OF THEIR FATHERS

Manager Age	Number of Children								N	Total %
	0 - 2		3 - 4		5 - 6		7 - 10			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%		
31 - 40	4	36.4	9	43	-	-	1	12.5	14	32
41 - 50	4	36.4	9	43	2	50	3	37.5	18	41
51 - 60	2	18.2	3	14	2	50	1	12.5	8	18
61 - 70	1	9.0	-	-	-	-	3	37.5	4	9
Total	11	100	21	4	100	8	100		44	100

The number of children has a positive relation with the age of the manager. The older managers have more children than the younger ones. As the age decreases, the number of children decreases as well (Kendall's TAU.B = 0.24) (Sig = 0.036.  $P \leq 0.05$ ).

We believe that the level of education of the manager is largely accountable for such a situation. Table 6.8 showing the number of the children corresponding to the managers' education levels supports this image. Managers with primary school certificate (or less) or secondary

school degree have more children than managers with university education, (Kendall's TAU.C = 0.30  $p < 0.01$ ).

TABLE 6.8 MANAGERS' EDUCATION LEVEL AND NUMBER OF CHILDREN

Manager's number of children	Education Level						Total	
	Primary or less		Secondary		University		N	%
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
0 - 2	4	36.4	3	42.9	14	53.8	21	47.7
3 - 4	-	-	3	42.9	12	46.2	15	34.1
5 - 6	1	9.1	-	-	-	-	1	2.3
7 - 10	6	54.5	1	14.2	-	-	7	15.9
Total	11	100.0	7	100.0	26	100.0	44	100.0

Despite the fact that managers who were born in rural areas (i.e. the village) have, to some extent, positive attitudes towards large families, the evidence suggests no significant variance exists between the mean of the children when classified by managers' place of birth. Consult Table 6.9 below.

TABLE 6.9 CHILDREN CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO THEIR FATHERS' PLACE OF BIRTH

Number of Children	Rural Managers		Urban Managers		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
0 - 2	5	10.8	6	30.0	11	25.0
3 - 4	10	41.7	11	55.0	21	47.7
5 - 6	3	12.5	1	5.0	4	9.1
7 - 10	6	25.0	2	10.0	8	18.2
Total	24	100.0	20	100.0	44	100.0

Indeed this point augments our previous argument which indicates that the Iraqi manager, due to some societal factors outlined above, prefers many children irrespective of his place of birth. Consult the following two tables (6.10 and 6.10A).

TABLE 6.10 MEAN, ST. DEV. AND VARIANCE OF THE CHILDREN CLASSIFIED BY THEIR FATHERS' PLACE OF BIRTH

Place of Birth	No. of Managers	No. of Children	Mean	Std.Dev.	Variance
Rural	24	106	4.41	2.82	7.95
Urban	20	68	3.40	2.16	4.67
Total	44	174	3.95	2.57	6.60

TABLE 6.10A ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF MANAGERS' CHILDREN

Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	D.F.	Mean Squares	F test	Sig.
Between Groups	11.28	1	11.28	1.74	0.195
Within Groups	272.63	42	6.49		

Not significant at  $p < 0.01$

#### 4. Social Origins

No official data of social classes exists in Iraq partly because the social communities (as we have seen earlier) are controlled by tribal and ethnic relationships and partly because the present government's ideology stands against the idea of classifying people according to their wealth.<sup>9</sup> However, in order to complete the comparison of the backgrounds of the managers, it is worth examining their social origins.

Each manager was asked to mention the principal occupation of his father. These occupations were classified into the following three social classes:

Lower class: includes unskilled and semi-skilled workers.

Middle class: includes skilled manual and clerical occupations

Upper class: includes professional occupation, senior officials  
in the government.

The evidence indicates that the majority of these managers belong to the lower class. Only four managers are from the middle class and the remainder (17 managers) are from the upper class. Although international comparison of managers' social classes is difficult because differing standards underline each study, studies in the United States and United Kingdom reveal that most managers studied are from upper and middle class backgrounds. For example, in the United States, according to Fortune's study, 90.7% out of 800 managers are from these categories.<sup>10</sup> The same is true in the United Kingdom. Clark's study demonstrates that 85% of the managers' parents belong to Classes I, II and III. The remainder are from the lower class.<sup>11</sup> This suggests that there is still a hard core of determined and able individuals who can succeed regardless of the social structure around them.

Turning to the Iraqi managers from the point of view of their social classes and sectors, no significant relation exists between the two dimensions. Nevertheless, investigation of the figures presented in Table 6.11 shows that most public managers (65%) are from middle and lower-class backgrounds. The same is equally true among the private sector managers; 58% belong to the lower class. The Table also depicts that only 17 managers of the whole sample are from upper-class. In Iraq, while "money" is the key factor for a person to become a manager in the private sector, even if he does not have formal education, the way to top-management positions in the public sector is open to men from different social classes once college education is obtained.



TABLE 6.11 MANAGERS' SOCIAL CLASSES, BY SECTORS

Social Class	Public Managers		Private Managers		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Lower class	9	45	14	58	23	52
Middle class	4	20	-	-	4	9
Upper class	7	35	10	42	17	39
Total	20	100	24	100	44	100

$\chi^2 = 5.29$  2 df. Not significant at  $p \leq 0.05$ .

Cramer's V = 0.34.

The matter of the social status of managers raises two important questions - one, which class is the most dominant among the younger managers and the other whether there is a significant relation between the social class of managers and their education level. Top-management positions are filled by managers drawn from all social classes and age groups. Table 6.12 below shows that no significant relation exists between the managers' age and their social classes. This would appear to mean that whatever the age a person is, he can become a manager provided he has the necessary qualifications.

TABLE 6.12 SOCIAL CLASSES OF THE MANAGERS CLASSIFIED BY AGE

Age Groups	Social Class						Total	
	Lower		Middle		Upper		N	%
	N	%	N	%	N	%		
31 - 40	6	26	1	25	7	41	14	32
41 - 50	8	35	3	75	7	41	18	41
51 - 60	6	26	-	-	2	12	8	18
61 - 70	3	13	-	-	1	6	4	2
Total	23	100	4	100	17	100	44	100

Kendall's TAU, C = -0.20

Not significant at  $p \leq 0.05$

On the other hand, a significant relation has been discovered between the educational level of the manager and his social class. Table 6.13 below demonstrates that 70% of the managers from the upper-class and all those belonging to the middle class have university education while only 44% of the managers in lower-class have such a qualification.

TABLE 6.13 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL CLASS AND MANAGER'S EDUCATION

Education level	Social Class						Total	
	Lower		Middle		Upper		N	%
	N	%	N	%	N	%		
Primary or less	9	39	-	-	2	12	11	25
Secondary	4	17	-	-	3	18	7	16
University	10	44	4	100	12	70	26	59
Total	23	100	4	100	17	100	44	100

Kendall, TAU,B = 0.286

Sig. at  $p \leq 0.05$

Indeed, whether in Iraq or elsewhere, the financial situation of a family plays a decisive role in children's education; the richer the family, the more it is financially able to spend on the children's education. Studies in the other countries corroborate such findings. For example, in the United States, Newcomer's Study reveals that 60% of managers from lower-class background do not have university education; 50% of middle class managers have college education; 74% of wealthy managers have university education.<sup>12</sup> In the United Kingdom, Clark's study leads to the same conclusion. Out of 119 top managers there were 53 managers from classes I and II of whom only one had a primary school certificate; the remainder either have secondary school (7 managers) or grammar (25 managers) or private education (20 managers).

Only 5 managers out of those from the lower classes have private education.<sup>13</sup>

Evidence in Iraq also shows that no significant association exists between the social classes of managers and the number of children they have. According to Table 6.14, 59% (or 10) of upper class managers and 43% (or 10) of lower class managers have three or more children each. Indeed, this point also strengthens our previous argument that Iraqi families, for reasons mentioned earlier, prefer many children or large families - managers are no exception.

TABLE 6.14: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MANAGERS' SOCIAL CLASSES AND THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN

Number of children	Social Class						Total	
	Lower		Middle		Upper			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
0 - 2	13	57	1	25	7	41	21	48
3 - 4	5	22	3	75	7	41	15	34
5 - 6	1	4	-	-	-	-	1	2
7 - 10	4	17	-	-	3	18	7	16
Total	23	100	4	100	17	100	44	100

Kendall's TAU,C = 0.085

Not significant  $p \leq 0.05$

## 2.0 : CAREER PATTERNS

### 1. Length of Service:

In terms of the length of service, the managers taken in the sample show significant differences. While all the public sector managers have twenty years service or less, 58% of the private sector managers have between 21 and 55 years of service, 14 having 30 years or more. Out of the 14 managers only five were born in towns and the remainder were born in villages. Needless to say, the age of the

manager has a significant relation with the length of service<sup>14</sup>. However, the over-all picture of the length of service of these managers is modified by many factors, such as the place of birth, educational level, the type of the sector and the size of the company of the manager. While the size of the company will be discussed later, the others are our intention now.

Findings also indicate that the place of birth of these managers has a significant relation with the length of service. 75% of all the managers who have more than 30 years service were born in villages; the average years of service of rural managers is 29.5 years as against 23.1 years for those who were born in towns.<sup>15</sup>

The influence of the educational level is very much according to expectation; the managers who have secondary school certificates or less have more than twenty years service, while 45% of all university-graduated managers have less than this period.<sup>15</sup>

The type of sector in which a manager works is no exception. All the public sector managers have less than 31 years service. While 42% of private sector managers fall into this category, the remainder have more than this period (between 31 to 55 years).<sup>17</sup>

## 2. Length of Service in the Current Companies:

Data reveal that 75% of public sector managers have ten years or less in their current companies. Only four managers have between 11 to 20 years and only one has 25 years experience in his current company. As for the private sector managers, 11 have ten years or less; 12 have between 11 to 20 years, and only one manager has 28 years in his

present company. Statistically, no significant relation exists between the length of the service in the current company and the type of the sector in which a manager works. See the following two tables (6.15 and 6.15A):

TABLE 6.15 MEANS, ST.DEV. AND VARIANCES OF MANAGER'S YEARS OF SERVICE IN HIS CURRENT COMPANY, BY SECTOR

Sector & No. of Managers	Total Years in this Company	Mean	St. Dev.	Variance
Public (20)	26	1.30	0.75	0.32
Private (24)	38	1.58	0.58	0.34
Total (44)	64	1.45	0.59	0.35

TABLE 6.15A ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF MANAGERS' YEARS OF SERVICE IN THE CURRENT COMPANY

Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	D.F.	Mean Squares	F	Sig.
Between groups	0.876	1	0.876	2.621	0.113*
Within groups	14.033	42	0.334		

\* not significant at p 0.01

Analysis by age reveals that 57.1% of the managers aged (31 to 40) and 55.6% of the managers aged (41 to 50) and 75% of all managers aged 51 and more, have been in their present companies for less than ten years. It is also true that the higher the educational level of a manager, the less the length of service in his current company; 63.6% of the

managers who have primary school certificates or less have more than ten years service; 57.1% of those with secondary education have ten years or less, while 69.2% of all university graduated managers have less than ten years service.

### 3. Length of Time Served in Current Post:

The length of time these managers have served in their current posts vary between and within groups. In the public sector, 90% of managers have served 5 years or less while the remainder have served between 6 to 10 years. In the private sector, 50% of managers have served between 11 to 25 years; 21% between 6 to 10 years and the remainder either have 5 years or less in their current posts. A significant relation exists between the years of service of managers in their current posts and the type of sector in which they are employed. Private sector managers have more years of experience in their current posts when compared with those in the public sector.<sup>18</sup>

### 4. Inter-Firm Mobility:

The previous analysis of the lengths of service of these managers suggests that public sector managers are more mobile than private sector managers. Table 6.16 below confirms this finding: 75% of the private sector managers have spent their entire career either in one or two companies whereas 55% of the public sector managers have moved between three to six companies.

TABLE 6.16: MANAGERS' INTER-FIRM MOBILITY, BY SECTOR

No. of Firms	Public Managers		Private Managers		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
1 - 2	9	45.0	18	75.0	27	61.4
3 - 4	9	45.0	6	25.0	15	34.1
5 - 5	2	2.0	-	-	2	4.5
Total	10	100.0	24	100.0	44	100.0

Kendall's TAU.C = -32

p &lt; 0.01

Studies in other developed countries (except Japan) present the same conclusions. viz., public managers are more mobile than their counterparts in the private sector. In the United States, Warner et al. indicate that 30% of all private sector managers studied have worked in four to seven companies compared to 56% in the public sector.<sup>19</sup> Clark's study of British managers led to the same result; 43% of all private sector managers in the sample have been employed by their present companies for less than 15 years compared to just 24% of public sector managers.<sup>20</sup>

The picture given in the previous table must be considered with the differing age structure and type of education of these managers. Ironically, no significant relation exists between the age of the managers or their educational levels and the number of mobilities. 93% of managers aged 31 to 40 years and 89% of managers aged 41 to 50, as well as all those aged 51 and more, have moved between one to three companies. Just nine out of the forty four managers have spent their entire career

in one company - all private sector managers and aged less than 51 years. The evidence also reveals that the type of education of a manager does not influence his mobility in Iraq. All managers who have elementary school (or less) or secondary education have moved between one to three companies, while only 15% of all those who have university qualifications have changed their employers between four to six times - all from the public sector.

It is common knowledge that mobility inside the public sector is largely outwith the control of managers. In Iraq as in other developing countries, a public sector manager is like a soldier at the mercy of the government and does not know when he will be transferred or retired nor what his destination will be.

Reasons behind manager mobility:

The sudden expansion of industry in the public sector, coupled with the fact that the country suffers severely from the shortage of skilled management cadres, are largely responsible for managers mobility in the public sector. Likewise, the problem of political instability must not be overlooked.

As regards private sector, the author believes that the principal reason for manager mobility is imitation. Once a private enterprise succeeds in selling a certain product, many of the remaining enterprises try to imitate or copy its product. Some managers, due to their poor education and industrial experience, endeavour to change their companies or their products and start another new business or produce other articles similar to that of their successful competitors. On the other hand, the shortage of skilled workers, coupled with the fact that the



majority of the private sector enterprises are small in terms of size and capital, are among the reasons that stimulate managers to change their companies. Yet the problems of importing raw materials represent another reason for manager mobility in the private sector.

As we have seen earlier, family and relatives obligations are strong among the Iraqi communities. Many managers look at this relationship as a pressure works against their success. The evidence suggests that some of the managers sampled in this study had asked their superiors to transfer them into another area (province) in order to avoid such a social pressure.

### 3.0 MANAGERS' BACKGROUNDS AND CAREER PATTERNS IN THE LIGHT OF SIZE OF COMPANIES

So far we have discussed the characteristics of the managers sampled regardless of the size of their companies. The aim of this section is to recompare these characteristics in the light of such a criterion.

The forty four companies have been ordered into three groups according to the size of the workforce as follows:

- Small Companies:           100 workers or less
- Medium Companies:       101 to 500 workers, and
- Large Companies:         501 workers and more.

The smallest company was 48 employees and the largest one in the sample was 5,005 employees.

The data confirms that the age of managers has a negative relation with the size of company. The older the manager is, the more likely he is to run a small or medium sized company; as the size increases, the number of young managers increases. Table 6.17 shows the age of managers according to the size of companies. It confirms such a direction. Just 11 out of 14 managers (aged 31 to 40) run large companies, the remainder either have medium or small companies. The same is also true when we reconsider the older managers (aged 51 years or more); eight managers have small companies; three have medium companies and only one has large company.

TABLE 6.17: MANAGERS' AGES CLASSIFIED BY THE SIZE OF COMPANIES

Managers' Ages	Size of Company						Total	
	Small		Medium		Large			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
31 - 40	2	12	1	14	11	55	14	32
41 - 50	7	41	3	43	8	40	18	41
51 - 60	5	29	2	29	1	5	8	18
61 - 70	3	18	1	14	-	-	4	9
Total	17	100	7	100	20	100	44	100

Kendall's TAU C = -0.45

Significant at  $p < 0.01$

The evidence also shows that the managers working in large companies have a higher level of education, less children and less years of service than those who are working inside medium or small companies.

The picture given in Table 6.18 shows the number of children of managers in the light of the size of the companies. It indicates that 95% of all the managers working in the large companies have four children or less each, while 57% of all the managers working in the medium companies and 53% of all those working in the small companies have the same qualifications.

On the other hand, while 47% of all the managers working in the small companies and almost 43% of all those working in the medium companies have between 5 to 10 children each, only 5% (one manager) of those working in the large companies have more than four children. Thus, in this respect one can safely conclude that as the size of the company increases, the number of manager's children is likely to decrease.

TABLE 6.18: MANAGERS' NUMBER OF CHILDREN, BY SIZE OF COMPANY

No. of children	Size of Company						Total	
	Small		Medium		Large			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
0 - 2	3	18	2	28.5	6	30	11	25
3 - 4	6	35	2	28.5	13	65	21	48
5 - 6	2	12	1	14.3	1	5	4	9
7 - 10	6	35	2	28.5	-	-	8	18
Total	17	100	7	100	20	100	44	100

Kendall's TAU,  $C = -0.31$

$p \leq 0.0001$

Type of education also significantly differs across the forty four companies. All managers with primary school education or less have small companies - except one who works in a medium company. Two out of seven managers with secondary education are working in medium and large companies. And just seven out of twenty six managers who have university

qualifications either have medium companies (5 managers) or small ones.

Table 6.19 below reflects such a picture.

TABLE 6.19: MANAGERS' EDUCATION, BY THE SIZE OF THE COMPANY

Managers' education	Size of Company						Total	
	Small		Medium		Large			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Primary or less	10	58.8	1	14.3	-	-	11	25.0
Secondary	5	29.4	1	14.3	1	5.0	7	15.9
University	2	11.8	5	71.4	19	95.0	26	59.1
Total	17	100.0	7	100.0	20	100.0	44	100.0

Kendall, TAU, B = 0.71

Significant at  $p < 0.0001$

Our evidence also suggests that the relation between manager's years of service and the size of the company is great. As can be seen from Table 6.20, the managers who have small or medium companies have longer service than those in the larger companies. The main reason is their educational level. As we have seen in Table 6.19, 95% of all managers working in the large companies have university education compared with 71.4% in the medium size companies and 11.8% in the small companies. It is also true that all the large companies surveyed belong to the public sector and, generally speaking, one must have university education to become a managing director in the public sector.

Table 6.20 /

TABLE 6.20: MANAGERS' YEARS OF SERVICE, BY SIZE OF THE COMPANY

Managers' Years of Service	Size of the Company						Total	
	Small		Medium		Large		N	%
	N	%	N	%	N	%		
Less than 20	1	5.9	2	28.6	9	45.0	12	27.3
21 - 30	3	17.6	4	57.1	11	55.0	18	40.9
31 - 40	9	52.9	1	14.3	-	-	10	22.7
41 - 55	4	23.6	-	-	-	-	4	9.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Kendall's TAU,C = -0.60

p &lt; 0.0001

Background details of a more personal nature about the managers in the light of the size of the company also reveal major differences between these managers. The managers were reclassified according to this criterion and their mobility, social origins as well as place of birth. Table 6.21 showing managers mobility by the size of the company indicates that the manager in the large companies have more mobility, than those in the medium or small companies. Those who have changed their employers more than four times belong to large companies. 55% of all the managers working in the large companies have moved between 3 to 6 employers compared with 28.6% of all the middle companies' managers, and 23.5% of all the small companies' managers have just moved between 3 to 4 employers.

Table 6.21 /

TABLE 6.21: MANAGERS' MOBILITY, BY SIZE OF COMPANY

Managers' Mobility	Size of Company						Total	
	Small		Medium		Large			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1 - 2	13	76.5	5	71.4	5	45.0	27	61.4
3 - 4	4	23.5	2	28.6	9	45.0	15	34.1
5 - 6	-	-	-	-	2	10.0	2	4.5
Total	17	100.0	7	100.0	20	100.0	44	100.0

Kendall's TAU, C = 0.30

p ≤ 0.05

On the other hand, no significant relation exists between managers' social backgrounds and the size of the companies. Table 6.22 showing a redistribution of the managers in light of their social origins and the size of the companies discloses that top management posts, irrespective of the size of the company, are filled by men drawn from different social backgrounds. It follows, therefore, that the top rank positions in the majority, if not all, of the industrial organisations in Iraq, are not restricted to a particular social class.

TABLE 6.22: MANAGERS' SOCIAL CLASSES, BY SIZE OF COMPANIES

Social background	Size of Company						Total	
	Small		Medium		Large			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Lower	12	70.6	2	28.6	9		23	52.3
Middle	-	-	-	-	4	9.1	4	9.1
Upper	5	29.4	5	71.4	7		17	38.6
Total	17	100.0	7	100.0	20	100.0	44	100.0

Kendall's TAU, B = 0.13

Not significant at p &lt; 0.01 or p &lt; 0.05

What about the managers' place of birth and the size of the companies? Are the urban managers dominating in top management positions or their peers - and if so, where?

The forty four managers were resorted according to their place of birth and the size of the companies. Table 6.23 represents a summary of such a classification. As can be seen from the table, no significant association exists between the two variables despite the fact that 55% of all the managers working in the large companies have been born in urban areas (i.e. the towns), the remainder from rural areas. Yet, the table also shows that the rural managers are the dominant ones in the small and middle size companies largely because, as we have seen earlier, they have lower levels of education than those working in the large companies: A level which does not entitle them to take the risks of the large scale companies.

TABLE 6.23: MANAGERS' PLACE OF BIRTH, BY SIZE OF THE COMPANY

Place of Birth	Size of the Company						Total	
	Small		Middle		Large		N	%
	N	%	N	%	N	%		
Rural	9	52.9	6	85.7	9	45.0	24	54.5
Urban	8	47.1	1	14.3	11	55.0	20	45.5
Total	17	100.0	7	100.0	20	100.0	44	100.0

$\chi^2 = 3.50$       2.df      Not significant

Cramer's V = 0.28      Contingency coefficient = 0.27.

SUMMARY:

The chapter has examined the background and career patterns of forty four senior managers. The managers were compared according to their age, education, number of children, place of birth and social origins. Comparisons also have been made between these managers in the light of their career patterns, including inter-firm mobility and length of service. In addition, the chapter has tried to compare these managers in the light of the size of their companies.

Data indicated that the managers who are working in the private sector tend to be older, have more children, more years of service and less mobility than those working in the public sector. It is also indicated that the managers working in large companies are younger than those working in medium and small companies; they are more educated, more mobile and have less service years than those working in medium and small companies.

As regards the social classes, it seems that though the majority belong to lower and middle social classes, there are some managers who belong to the upper-classes. That is, the way to top-management positions is open to men from different social strata rather than being limited to certain social classes. However, data indicates that the size of family of these managers is not significantly associated with a certain social class. Rather, it is a matter of other social and personal factors including (managers) level of education. On the other hand, the social class does possess direct impact on managers education; 70% of the managers from the upper-class and all those drawn from the middle class have university education, while only 44% of all those from the lower-class have such a qualification.



This result clarifies that whether in Iraq or in other countries, the financial situation of a family plays an important role in children's education. The richer the family, the more it is financially able to spend on the children's education.

As regards managers mobility, among the principal reasons that are responsible for the public sector's mobility, are the sudden expansion of industry; the shortage of skilled management cadre and the problem of political instability. As regards private sector managers' mobility, we blame the problems of imitation and illiteracy to be among the main factors that are responsible for their mobility. Once a private enterprise succeeds in selling a product, many other private enterprises change or modify their enterprises to produce products similar to that of the successful competitors.

NOTES

1. R.V. Clements, Managers - A Study of Their Careers in Industry, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958), p. 184.
2. D.G. Clark, The Industrial Manager, His Background and Career Pattern (London: Business Publication Ltd., 1966), pp. 156-9.
3. Melrose-Woodman, J. Profile of the British Manager (London: British Institute of Management, 1978), p. 8.
4. See Mabel Newcomer, The Big Business Executives (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); Charles, G. Burck "A Group Profile of the Fortune 500 Chief Executives" Fortune, May, 1976, pp. 173-6.
5. For the Japanese Managers, see, Thomas F.D. Adams and N. Kobayashi, The World of Japanese Business (London: Ward Lock Ltd., 1969), pp. 121-2. "The Managerial Class in Japan" in Japan's Managerial Systems: Tradition and Innovation, ed. M.Y. Yoshino (Massachusetts Institute of Technology: The MIT Press,) 1968, p. 141.
6. See Chapter Four.
7. Mike Smith, et al. Introducing Organisational Behaviour (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1982), p. 9.
8. Also we found a significant variance existed between the means of children of each group of managers (i.e. public and private). F-test = 7.044 with 1.d.f. (sig. = 0.011. p 0.05). While the mean equals 3 children in the public sector and 5 children in the private sector, it is 4 children for all managers.
9. Saad Muhammad Authman, The Theoretical Bases for Socialist Application in Iraq, (Baghdad: Dar Al-Rashid, 1981), pp. 248-50.
10. Charles G. Burck, op.cit., pp. 174-6.

11. D. G. Clark, op.cit. p. 157.
12. M. Newcomer, op.cit., Table 29, p. 76.
13. D. G. Clark, op.cit. Table 41, p. 190.
14. In this study, the relationship is very strong. (Kendall's TAU,  $B = 0.67$ ,  $p \leq 0.0000$ ).
15. Kendall's TAU,  $C = 0.67$ .  $p < 0.00001$ .
16. F-test = 5.23.  $p \leq 0.05$ .
17.  $\chi^2 = 17.67$ . 3 df.  $p \leq 0.01$ . Cramer's V = 0.63.
18.  $\chi^2 = 17.91$ . 4 df.  $p \leq 0.01$ . Cramer's V = 0.64.
19. W.L. Warner, et al., The American Federal Executive (New York: Yale University Press, 1966), Table 27, p. 170.
20. D.G. Clark, op.cit., p. 93.

CHAPTER SEVENHOW MANAGERS SPEND THEIR TIME  
AND WHAT ACTIVITIES DO THEY PERFORM

'If we do not know what managers do, how can we claim to teach management to students in Business School? How can we expect management development programs to improve the performance of practicing managers?'

Henry Mintzberg<sup>1</sup>

INTRODUCTION


Though the managerial literature is rich in general discussions of the manager's job in the organisation, unfortunately these writings rest upon a very meagre empirical research of systematically recorded data and they are heavily polemical in character. Such simple facts as how managers spend their time at work day and what activities they engage in, have only been touched on in a few studies.<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, it is quite acceptable among management scholars that managers need different skills, such as technical, human, and conceptual to perform their work effectively.<sup>3</sup> It is also agreed that while these skills are interrelated, the importance of each one is relative, viz. each skill seems to vary with the level of management responsibility. Nevertheless, one cannot refute the fact that in an industrial enterprise, at its lower levels, the major need is for technical and human skills. At the middle levels, management effectiveness depends largely on human and conceptual talents whereas at the top, conceptual skills, such as planning and

organizing, become the most important for successful management.

In 1977, Keith Davis presented this idea in terms of percentage as follows:<sup>4</sup>

FIGURE 7.1 RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF MANAGERIAL SKILLS



The figure indicates that as the level of a manager goes up in an organisation hierarchy, his conceptual skill increases as well. In other words he pays more attention, more time, to such conceptual skills as planning and organizing than what he pays to technical skills.<sup>5</sup> However, data in hand does reveal that reality does not always concur with theory.

The aim of this chapter is to cast light on managers' activities in Iraq and to explain how long do the managers studied spend on each one of these activities and why.

Before presenting the results, it is important to explain how the author obtained the data.

In this respect, seven activities were chosen to cover the bulk of the manager's work.<sup>6</sup> They are, paperwork, planning, organising, communications, research, personal activity and complex activity.<sup>7</sup> Each manager was asked to estimate how he divides his daily time between these activities. The definition of an activity was left to the discretion of the manager. When a manager failed to distinguish a certain episode from others, he was asked to put his estimate in "complex activity". Thus, the complex activity represents any combination of two or more activities.<sup>8</sup>

This method (i.e., asking the manager to estimate the time he spends on his activities) is widely used, partly due to its simplicity and partly because it needs less time and effort in comparison with other methods such as to ask a manager to use a diary or to let others observe and record his activities. However, the method has one great disadvantage because managers, for different reasons, try either to overestimate or underestimate certain activities or functions. To avoid such a bias, the researcher used his own observation to supplement managers' estimates and asked the manager what he was doing on a particular activity.

In order to make our findings more useful, the working day of the managers was divided into two periods; the morning period which

ends at noon, and the evening period.


### 1.0 : MANAGERS' ACTIVITIES

What activities do the forty four managers perform? Which activity is the dominant one and why do managers give little time to certain activities? Are there differences between public managers' activities and those exercised by private managers and if so, why?

The aim of this section, and the next one, is to attempt to answer such questions. Figure 7.2 shows the average time allocations of managers for the seven activities in terms of percentages in a working day. According to this table, the main activities of the public sector managers are communications, paperwork, complex and personal activities, while the private managers' main activities are concentrated on communications, personal and complex activities.

Activities such as planning, organising and research consume less time when compared with the time given to paperwork, communications, complex and personal activities. The figure also shows that managers spend most of their time in communications activities. While this result supports Mintzberg's and Stewart's studies (i.e., they both found that communications activity take up the bulk of managers' job)<sup>9</sup>, it does not mean that the manager (as can be seen from the table) has to devote little time to planning or organising activities or to give importance to personal and paperwork activities.<sup>10</sup>

**FIGURE 7.2 AVERAGE WORK TIME ALLOCATION OF MANAGERS**  
(In Minutes)





### 1.1 How Long Do They Work

The average working hours for the forty four managers is 10½ hours a day. It is 10½ for the public sector manager, and 10 hours for the private sector manager. This includes time spent in personal activities and working at home. When we remember that the working days are six a week (Friday is a holiday) then the weekly average hours is 63 hours for the public sector managers and 60 hours for the private sector managers. Totally they are working 61½ hours a week which is longer in comparison with Stewart's study of 160 British managers (43 to 44 hours).<sup>11</sup>

### 2.0 : HOW LONG DO THEY SPEND ON EACH ACTIVITY AND WHY?

Having found out the main activities of the managers and how long do they work, on average, per day, it is now possible to discuss how long do they spend on each activity and why.

#### 2.1 Paperwork Activity

The evidence indicates that whilst the public sector manager spends on paperwork activities about 16% of his daily time, on average, the private sector manager allocates about 5% of his daily time for this purpose. While the time-range of this activity in the public sector is between 60 and 180 minutes, it only takes 5 to 70 minutes of private sector manager's time.

On the other hand, the public sector manager gives more time for paperwork activity in the evening period (almost one hour on average) than that in the morning (40 minutes). However, the same is not true in the private sector because the manager gives more time for this activity in the morning than that in the evening.

Though all public sector managers studied exercise paperwork activity during both periods, six out of the twenty four private sector managers avoided doing so in the afternoon period partly because their companies are small (25 to 50 employees) and, partly because they mainly give oral instructions for most internal matters.

One of the principal reasons that make the public sector managers devote more time to paperwork activity in comparison with the private sector's situation is that they are working in larger companies. As we have seen earlier in chapter six, all the public managers studied have large companies (501 - 5005 employees) whereas the private sector managers have either medium companies (101 - 500 employees) or small companies (100 employees or less). The evidence indicates that 60% of the public sector managers take a lot of their paperwork to their home after working hours to finish it in due time. Yet some of them prefer to come early in the morning for the same purpose. On the other hand, all the private sector managers perform their paperwork activity inside the company and during working hours.

This result must not surprise us. While the Iraqi public sector manager at work, he cannot control his own time. His daytime is for inter-personal work, interaction with other managers, clients, customers, meetings and such. Thus paperwork has to be taken home because only at home he can be protected from outside interruption and he controls the use of his own time.

## 2.2 Planning Activity:

It is a common fact that managers plan for four reasons: <sup>12</sup>

- (a) planning leads to organisational success;
- (b) planning leads to feelings of success and satisfaction by employees;
- (c) planning helps a manager cope with change, and
- (d) planning is necessary for effective performance.

Planning is a mental managerial activity involving the arrangement of multiple linked decisions on ends and on means to accomplish a long-range, or major objective.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, planning is the first function a manager has to exercise if he wants to perform other functions. On the other hand, poor planning does not only produce poor results but it also threatens organisation survival and its growth regardless of how effectively the other management functions are carried out. Accepting such a perspective indicates that managers, irrespective of their place (i.e., the country) or their sector, must focus on planning and give it due weight if they want to succeed and achieve considerable growth for their organisation.<sup>14</sup>

However, it seems that management in Iraq leaves much to be desired compared to this criterion (i.e., of western management theory).

Each manager in the sample was asked to estimate, on average, how long he spends on planning activities during the morning and the evening periods per day. Table 7.1 summarises their answers. As can be seen from the table, the public sector manager gives 38 minutes (or 7.3%) on average of his daily work for this activity, while the private sector manager devotes just 22 minutes (or 3.7%) of his daily work for this activity.

TABLE 7.1 TIME SPENT ON PLANNING ACTIVITY BY MANAGERS PER WORKING DAY (in minutes)

Sectors	Morning Period	Evening Period	Total
<u>Public</u>			
Weighted Average	27	25	38
Range	15 - 60	15 - 60	15 - 60
<u>Private</u>			
Weighted Average	14	16	22
Range	5 - 30	5 - 30	15 - 45

Time range also differs across sectors; it is between 15 to 60 minutes among public sector managers and 5 to 45 minutes in the private sector.

On the other hand, no large variances exist, between the average times across the two periods in each sector. As can be seen from the table, the difference is two minutes in each sector. However, the public sector manager devotes more time for planning activities in the morning (28 minutes) than that in the evening period (25 minutes). The opposite is true in the private sector where the manager devotes less time in the morning (14 minutes) than that in the evening (16 minutes).

Evidence also reveals that six managers from the public sector avoid exercising planning activity in the morning period. Only fifteen managers from the private sector exercise this activity

in the morning period. On the other hand, eleven managers (six of them from the public sector) avoid practising planning activities in the evening. Finally, the evidence also indicates that while all public sector managers sampled practise this activity in their working days, two managers from the private sector do not exercise it at all.

Why this little time for planning activity?

Having reached this stage, it is quite important to understand why managers devote little time to such a principal activity. Different factors are responsible for this situation. Chief among them are:

First: As we have explained earlier in Chapter Four Iraq is a socialist country. The government actively and directly controls the economy through a predetermined comprehensive economic plan. Once the plan is approved, public sector managers are bound to attain its objectives. Failure to achieve such objectives by an organisation brings undesirable consequences to its managing director.<sup>15</sup> It is quite common that central planning in most underdeveloped countries, including Iraq, is still immature and rational flexibility for economic plans is rare. On the other hand, the government, according to its comprehensive predetermined plans, determines the future of public sector's companies including their expansion or liquidation. It controls companies' production and protects their goods from foreign competitors. Thus, under such circumstances the role of a public sector manager is very restricted in exercising planning activities. Take for example, why must he invest a large proportion of his time on planning and engage himself in such problems as growth

or expansion when he largely depends on government-financial assistance rather than on his internal resources? Why should he direct his effort to planning activity, when planning and its objectives are largely out of his hand? Again, why should he actively exercise such an important function while the government protects his company's products and local as well as foreign competitors are rare?

Data also indicates that the private sector manager devotes less time to planning activity compared with that of the public sector manager. In addition, some of these private sector managers avoid doing such an activity in their working day. However, when we reconsider their level of education, we find most of them are either illiterate or at the edge of illiteracy.<sup>16</sup>

Second: in the preceding chapters we have discovered how the Iraqi personality looks at the future and how it deals with physical subjects. We have also discovered that political instability has been a feature of life during a very long period of time. These and other factors, such as the type of interrelationships that exist within family members, the type of interrelationships that exists between the government and the people, which is largely based on suspicion and distrust, must all be considered here for they play an important role in management behaviour and the attitude of managers toward planning.

### 2.3 Organising Activity

When a manager spends little time on such an essential activity as planning, it would be more likely he will allocate more time for

other management activities. As a result of different reasons outlined earlier, managers in Iraq are less future-oriented than those working in a developed country. This fact becomes more obvious if we realise that they are allocated more time for organising activity than that of planning. Around 7% of their daily time is assigned to this purpose on average. Table 7.2 below shows that the public sector manager spends more time of his working day (46 minutes) on this activity than that given by the private sector manager (42 minutes), mainly because the former has larger company than that of the private sector manager.

While the public sector managers accord an identical time to organising activity (15 to 60 minutes) during the two periods, the private sector managers leave more time in the morning (5 to 60 minutes) than that of the evening period (5 - 30 minutes) to carry out this activity.

TABLE 7.2 TIME SPENT ON ORGANISING ACTIVITY BY MANAGERS PER WORKING DAY ( in minutes )

Sector	Morning Period	Evening Period	Total
<u>Public</u>			
Weighted Average	27	24	46
Range	15 - 60	15 - 60	15 - 90
<u>Private</u>			
Weighted Average	26	21	43
Range	5 - 60	5 - 30	15 - 75

Indeed, such differences are also reflected in the average times; in the morning, the public sector manager grants 27 minutes compared with 25 minutes of the afternoon period, to organising activity. The private sector manager also does the same, but with slight difference in terms of a few minutes.

Ironically, eight managers (four from the public sector) openly admitted they are giving no time for this activity during the afternoon period. Here, it is interesting to remember what George wrote about the importance of organising to a manager:

"A manager .... is a constant organiser. Organisation is involved in his every communication. Organisation is part of his every plan; and organisation is a vital part of any attempt on his part to check or control activities."<sup>17</sup>

#### 2.4 Communication Activity

In an organisation - which is a miniature society - communication serves the same fundamental purposes as it does in the larger society. Without communication no organisation could long exist. Communication is not only essential for integrating management activities but it also integrates a given organisation with its external environment.<sup>18</sup> It is through this mechanism a manager becomes aware of the need of his subordinates, customers, the availability of suppliers, the different regulations of governments and the concerns of a society. On the other hand, the importance of communication in organisation was pointed out by Barnard who said:

".... in an exhaustive theory of organisation, communication would occupy a central place, because the structure, extensiveness, and scope of organisation are almost entirely determined by communication techniques." 19



In carrying out their planning, organizing, directing and control responsibilities, managers communicate. As a matter of fact, they often spend the majority of their time communicating.<sup>20</sup> In a study of 28 managers in a single company, Carroll found communication took up four-fifths of the manager's time. He also discovered that the average manager spends on average nearly 43% of his time on conversing with others; 20% preparing and writing reports and memos and about 18% for reading and reviewing written communication.<sup>21</sup> Stewart brought into the light that managers spend on average two-thirds of their time in communication.<sup>22</sup> While Mintzberg confirmed this fact,<sup>23</sup> Hinrichs stressed that this is especially the case of senior managers.<sup>24</sup>

Henry Mintzberg, whose work we discussed in chapter one, has described the manager's job in terms of three types of roles.<sup>25</sup>

Communication plays a vital role in each:

- (a) In their "interpersonal roles" managers act as the figurehead and leader of their organisational unit, interacting with subordinates, customers, suppliers, and with peers in the organisation. Mintzberg cites studies that indicate managers spend about 45% of their contact time with peers, about 45% with people outside their units, and only 10% with supervisors.
- (b) In their "informational roles" managers seek information from peers, subordinates, and other personal contacts about anything that may affect their job and responsibilities. They also disseminate interesting or important information in return. In addition, they provide suppliers, peers, and relevant groups outside the organisation with information about their unit as a whole.

(c) In their "decisional roles" managers implement new projects, handle disturbances, and allocate resources to their unit's members and departments. Some of the decisions that managers make will be reached in private, but they will be based on information that has been communicated to the managers. The managers, in turn, will have to communicate these decisions to others.

As for the Iraqi managers, communication also possesses an exceptional importance. In Figure 7.2 we have seen that verbal interactions take up 42% of the public sector manager's time, and around 48% of the private sector manager's time. A detailed examination of managers' contacts are summarised in Figure 7.3.

As can be seen, the public sector manager spends on average less time on face-to-face contacts with subordinates, customers and superiors when compared with the private sector manager. However, he spends more time on telephone contacts with subordinates and superiors, but less time with customers, than that of the private sector managers.

In order to make these comparisons more meaningful, each manager was asked to estimate, on average, how long he spends on each type of these verbal communications during the morning and the evening periods. Figure 7.4 summarises their answers.

FIGURE 7.3: TIME SPENT IN ORAL COMMUNICATION BY MANAGERS WITH SUBORDINATES, CUSTOMERS , SUPERIORS.





FIGURE 7.4: AVERAGE TIME OF MANAGER INTERACTIONS WITH SUBORDINATES, SUPERIORS AND CUSTOMERS



#### 2.4.1 Managers interactions with subordinates

On average, face-to-face contacts with subordinates take up more of the manager's time than any other type of communication. The managers spend almost two hours a day on this activity with a range of time from one to four hours a day. Neither the average time nor the range is identical between these sectors.

While on average the public manager spends 113 minutes, ranging between 50 to 180 minutes a day, his counterpart's average time is slightly more than two hours with a fairly wide range of time of one to four hours. Variation also exists within the morning and the evening periods despite the fact that the forty four managers devote more time for this activity in the morning than in the evening. On average, the public sector manager spends about one hour in the morning and 50 minutes in the evening, whereas his counterpart gives 70 minutes in the morning and 54 minutes in the evening to face-to-face contacts with subordinates.

On the other hand, telephoning subordinates consumes 30 minutes, on average, of the public manager's time and around 25 minutes of the private manager's time. Time-range between sectors differs as well; 15 to 55 minutes in the public sector and 15 to 40 minutes in the private sector. Though the public sector manager does allocate almost 15 minutes, on average, for telephoning in each period, the private manager spends more time in the morning (16 minutes) than in the evening period (12 minutes) on average for the same purpose.

The aforesaid figures indicate that the public sector manager allocates less time for interviews with subordinates, but more time on the telephone, in comparison with the manager in the private sector. The variation in the amount of time can be explained by two factors. The first is the size of company, while the second is the location of manager's office. The public sector managers have large companies (500 employees or more each), all of which have two factories or more located in different areas (or provinces) throughout the country, whereas the private sector managers have small or medium companies located within a small area. None of them run a factory in another province. Consequently subordinates of the public sector manager are employed over a larger area and the distance between the two requires telephone contacts rather than face-to-face interviews. On the other hand, the matter is quite different with the private sector manager, for he and his subordinates work in one place and face-to-face contacts are convenient.

#### 2.4.2 Manager's contacts with Superiors:

Manager's contacts with those who control the policy of the company are vital. Through such, a manager receives, discusses new objectives and policies. Meanwhile, it is by this mechanism a manager gives information about the current situation of the organisation. Data reveals that such communications with superiors take around 53 minutes on average, of the public sector manager's time each day, of which 20 minutes are spent on the telephone. In the private sector, an average of 55 minutes of the manager's time to communicate with their superiors, of which only 15 minutes are spent on the telephone. The time range between the sectors also differs.

In the public sector it is between 10 to 60 minutes for interviews and 5 to 60 minutes for telephones, whereas in the private sector it is between 10 to 80 minutes for interviews and 5 to 15 minutes for telephone contacts. While all the public sector managers contact their superiors, only ten out of all the private sector managers do the same. The remainder are factory-owners. How do the managers divide their time between the periods to achieve such activities? It seems that while public sector managers estimate an identical time between the periods, their counterparts spend more time in the evening (28 minutes on average) for interviews with their superiors, than in the morning (22 minutes on average).

Furthermore, while the public sector manager devotes 14 minutes, on average, to communicate with his superiors on the telephone (as against 13 minutes in the morning on average), his peer spends the same time in each period (10 minutes on average).

#### 2.4.3 Manager's External Contacts:

The importance of management's communications with customers, suppliers and other groups in a society is unquestionable.<sup>26</sup> In addition, an effective functioning of management activities is impossible without good reciprocal information between these partners. Managers must concentrate on such an important "linking-pin" if they are seeking survival and prosperity for their organisations. Indeed, it is only through such communications that a manager can mesh internal operations with external demands. With this idea in mind, it is quite surprising, therefore, to discover that in practice a

managing director avoids communication with the customers and suppliers. Unfortunately, the data in hand leads to this conclusion. Nine managers (two from private sector) deny practising such an activity. "It is the responsibility of our department's manager", one public sector manager said, or, "our customers seldom come and discuss", the two private sector managers assured the researcher.

As for those practising this activity, indeed, the private sector manager grants more time to contacting outside people through interviews (63 minutes on average) and telephones (23 minutes on average) than the public sector manager. The latter spends, on average, 51 minutes in such interviews with some 16 minutes, on average, for telephones.

Positive attitude towards the importance of such communications is clearly recognised among the private sector managers in comparison with the other ones. The variation in time spent in contacting outsiders might strengthen this argument. Face-to-face contacts range from 15 to 90 minutes in the public sector and 15 to 120 minutes in the private sector. The same is equally true in respect of the telephone; 10 to 30 minutes in the public sector as against 10 to 45 minutes in the private sector.

How long do they spend on these contacts between the two periods? It seems that the manager, irrespective of his sector, spends more time on interviewing customers and suppliers in the morning than in the evening. While on average the public sector manager devotes 38 minutes in the morning to meeting such people (as against 21 minutes in the evening), his counterpart gives an average of 43 minutes in the morning and an average of half an hour in the evening. Both spend more time on telephones in the evening than in the morning. While the



average sticks to 10 minutes in the morning and to 12 minutes in the evening in the public sector, in the private sector it is 12 and 13 minutes respectively.

2.5 Research Activity:

Generally speaking, when little time is paid to planning and external communications (customers, suppliers and others) the gap between the organisation and its environment becomes larger. Today's world is full of continuous changes - rapid changes in technology, changes in the workforce, consumers and suppliers demands and changes in social values and society demands. Only through continuous systematic research can an organisation retain its dynamic equilibrium and keep up to date. In other words, a business organisation will continue in a healthy and lively existence only as long as its managers give due regard to research activity in their daily work. While such a fact has become quite obvious in the developed countries where managers consider themselves as managers of change rather than stagnant ones,<sup>27</sup> it is common to find managers of developing countries giving little attention to this activity. This is borne out in this study as well as in findings reported in literature on the subject.<sup>28</sup> While all the public sector managers spend an average of 36 minutes (approx. 5.8% of their daily working hours), nine out of all the private sector managers exercise this activity and give it an average of 24 minutes (approx. 4.1% of their daily working hours). Further evidence reveals that most of the public sector managers who allocate 30 minutes or more for planning and give 20 to 30 minutes to external contacts are more likely to get involved in research activity (spending between 15 to 30 minutes a day) than those who give little time for planning and external contacts. On the other hand, the

private sector managers, who negate exercising this activity are of low level education - the best one among them is of secondary school level. Considerable relation exists between the size of company and the time that the manager invests in this activity. While all the public sector managers work in large companies, the private sector managers are responsible for either medium or small companies. The smaller the size the lesser the time the manager devotes to research activity. The same is equally true with planning. However, this trend does not work with the time that a manager spends on external communications. Earlier, we discovered that the private managers spend more time in external contacts than the public sector manager. Three possible explanations might help in understanding this contradiction. First, while it is difficult to interview a public sector manager (due to some chronic problems including routine procedures), the private manager has a lot of time for interviewing outsiders. Seldom he refuses or lets others hinder such a policy. Secondly, while the public sector manager's work covers the whole country, the private sector manager works in a local area of a certain province and largely deals with relatives. Thirdly, it is necessary to remember that in the public sector organisations there are always specialists who work besides the manager and the outsiders can consult them. However, it is the private sector manager who grips everything and one has no choice but to interview him.

Finally, evidence indicates that the public sector manager devotes more time in the morning to research activity (27 minutes on average) than in the evening (22 minutes). His peer, on the other

hand, stands in the opposite side. More time in the evening (19 minutes) as against (12 minutes) in the morning. Indeed the private manager uses most of his morning time in observing employees performance.

## 2.6 Personal Activity:

What time the manager devotes to his personal activity is indeed more than that devoted to planning, organising and research activities. It is believed that organisations could achieve more success if the managers devoted some of their personal time to management activities. Of course some of their personal affairs are unavoidable. However, it must be understood that the time required to manage an industrial organisation should not be taken lightly.

The findings indicate that this activity takes up around 94 minutes of the manager's daily time on average. While the government has restricted the public sector manager's personal affairs, the private sector manager has unlimited time for such activities. Data demonstrates that the public sector manager spends 66 minutes on average to these activities (approx. 10.5% of his daily time) whereas his counterpart grants almost two hours or 19.6% of his daily time to personal activities. Variation between the time range is obvious. For example, in the public sector, the time range is between 40 to 100 minutes whereas in the private sector it is between 60 to 240 minutes a day.

## 2.7 Complex Activity:

In reality, management activities are not easy to classify according to theory, partly because they are strongly webbed with each other and partly because some day-to-day episodes are ambiguous and controvertible.<sup>29</sup> Yet, the thing that deserves keeping in mind is that when planning activity is unclear in a manager's mind, other managerial activities will be vague and pending between "black" and "white". It is believed that the more episodes a manager fails to diagnose, the more likely he is either suffering from inadequate managerial education or the current managerial circumstances are beyond his control.

For all the reasons mentioned above, the "complex activity" was adopted. It is a combination of two or more activities used in this research when the manager was unable to diagnose a certain event. Data in hand reveals that these managers spend large proportions of their time in such an activity. Ironically, the time the manager devotes to this group of activities is more than that devoted to planning, or organising, or even to research activities. Yet, the public sector manager spends even more time on this activity than the private sector manager, 78 and 69 minutes respectively.<sup>30</sup> While the former leaves more time in the evening for this activity (43 minutes as against 35 minutes in the morning) the private sector manager does the same, but gives less time in each period; 36 minutes in the evening and 32 minutes in the morning. The time range also differs between the sectors. In the public sector it is between 45 to 120 minutes as against 45 to 150 minutes in the other sector. Findings also indicate that the majority of the private sector managers have not only low educational level but have also no management education at all.

Summary:

The chapter has tried to uncover how the Iraqi managers spend their time and what activities do they exercise inside the organisation. To achieve that, seven activities were chosen to cover the bulk of the manager's work. They are, paperwork, planning, organising, communication, research, personal and complex activities. Each manager was asked to estimate how he divides his daily time between such activities. The definition of an activity was left to the manager himself. When a manager failed to distinguish a certain episode from others, he was asked to put it in "complex activity".

Scholars of management and organisation theories agreed that, at the top of an organisation structure, conceptual skills such as planning and organising activities are the most important skills a manager has to perform. In other words, a senior manager must pay exceptional attention to the conceptual skills and devote more time to them compared to what he devotes to technical and human skills if he seeks growth and success for his organisation.

The evidence of the Iraqi managers shows:

1. The average working hours for the forty four managers is 10½ hours. It is 10½ hours for the public sector manager and 10 hours for the private sector manager. Total average hours per week is 63 hours for the public sector manager as against 60 hours in the private sector.
2. In the public sector, if we exclude communication activity, the paperwork activity takes up more of the manager's time

than any other type of activities. He spends on paperwork activity around 16% of his daily time, on average, while the private sector manager devotes about 5% of his time for this purpose.

3. The evidence also shows that planning and organising activities take up less than what the managers devote to personal activity. The author believes that the industrial organisations in Iraq would achieve more success if the managers devote some of their personal time to the real management activities. The author also believes that central planning in the public sector, together with the negative attitude of the Iraqi personality are by and large responsible for this meagre time the managers give to planning activity. The type of interrelationships that exist between the government and the people, which is largely based on suspicion, must also be considered here, because it plays an important influence on management behaviour and the attitude of managers toward planning.
4. As regards organising activity, the evidence shows that these managers devote more time for this activity compared to what they accord to planning activity. The public sector manager spends more time of his working day (46 minutes) on this activity than that given by his peer (42 minutes) mainly because the former has larger enterprise.

5. All managers studied confirm that communication activity takes the bulk of their daily time. While this confirmation gives support to Mintzberg and other scholars in the western countries, the type of communication must be regarded here. In this study, communication activities have been divided into three types: manager-subordinate communication; manager-superiors communications and manager-customers communications. The evidence indicates that the first type "manager-subordinates communications" takes up more of the manager's time than any other type of communications. The public sector manager spends, on average, less time on face-to-face contacts with subordinates, customers and superiors when compared with the private sector manager. However, he spends more time on telephone contacts with subordinates and superiors, but less time with customers, than that of the private sector manager. The variation in the amount of time can be explained by two factors. The first is the size of the company while the second is the location of manager's office. While the public sector managers have large companies and all of which have two factories or more, the private sector managers have either medium or small companies. Consequently, subordinates of the public sector managers are working over a large area and the distance between them and their senior managers' office permits telephone contacts rather than face-to-face contacts.

On the other hand, the public sector manager devotes less time for superiors contacts in comparison with the situation of the private sector manager.

The importance of management's communications with the outsiders (customers, suppliers and so forth) in today's society is unquestionable. Unfortunately, our evidence shows that these managers devote very little time for such communications. Nine managers (two from private sector) deny practicing this vital activity. The private sector manager devotes more time to contacting outside people compared with the public sector manager's situation.

6. As regards research activity, needless to remind, that when little time is devoted to planning and other principal activities including organising and external communications, the importance of research activity will be minimised and takes little attention from the manager. While the author believes that only through continuous systematic research can an organisation retain its dynamic equilibrium and keep up to date, fifteen managers in the sample (all from private sector) do not devote any time for research activity. Further evidence also reveals that most of the public sector managers who allocate 30 minutes or more for planning, and give 20 to 30 minutes to external communication, are more likely to get involved in research activity.
7. As regards their personal activities, the evidence shows that the public sector manager devotes, on average, less time for this activity (66 minutes) when compared to that of the private sector manager (120 minutes).



8. The data also indicates that the time the managers devote to "complex activity" is more than that devoted to planning, or organising, or even to research activity. Yet, the public sector manager allocates even more time on this activity, compared to the private sector manager. If we understand that this activity is a combination of two or more activities and the manager can use it only when he fails to diagnose a certain event, we can imagine how vague are the managerial activities in the minds of these managers.

NOTES

1. Henry Mintzberg, The Nature of Managerial Work (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), p. 3.
2. For a summary of these studies see: Robert Dubin, "Business Behaviour Behaviourally Viewed" in Social Approaches to Business Behavior ed. Chris Argyris, et al, (Homewood, Ill: Dorsey-Irwin, 1962), pp.11-20; Rosemary Stewart, Managers and their Jobs: A Study of the Similarities and Differences in the Ways Managers Spend their Time (London: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 12-9.
3. Robert L. Katz, "Skills of an Effective Administrators", Harvard Business Review 33 (January-February 1955): 33-42; Henry Mintzberg, op.cit., p. 23; James A.F. Stoner, Management, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 2nd ed. 1982), pp. 19-22.
4. Keith Davis, Human Behavior at Work . (New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1977), p. 110.
5. Theodore T. Herbert, Dimensions of Organisational Behavior (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 2nd ed., 1981), pp. 35-7.
6. These activities were collected from Robert Dubin and S. Lee Spray, "Executive Behavior and Interaction", Industrial Relations, A Journal of Economy and Society, 3 (February 1964): 99-108; Rosemary Stewart, op.cit., pp. 29-49; Henry Mintzberg, op.cit., pp. 28-39.
7. See the Appendix.
8. The same method was used by Robert Dubin and S. Lee Spray, op.cit., p. 100.
9. See Henry Mintzberg, op.cit., p. 32; Rosemary Stewart, op.cit., p. 68.

10. J.R. Hinrichs "Communication Activity of Industrial Research Personnel", Personnel Psychology, No. 17, 1964, pp. 193-204.
11. Rosemary Stewart, op.cit., p. 30.
12. William F. Glueck, Management (Illinois: The Dryden Press, 2nd ed., 1980), p. 201.
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Robert R. Blake & Jane S. Mouton, The New Managerial Grid (Houston: Culf Publishing, 1978), p. 290.
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15. Fred Gottheil, "Iraqi and Syrian Socialism: An Economic Appraisal" World Development, Vol. 9, No. 1/10, 1981, pp. 825-37.
16. See Table 6.4.
17. Claude S. George, Jr., The History of Management Thought (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 165.
18. Harold Koontz, Cyril O'Donnell and Heinz Wehrich, Management (New York: McGraw-Hill International Book Co., 1980), p. 689.
19. Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1938).
20. Stephen J. Carroll and Henry L. Tosi, Organizational Behavior (Chicago: St. Clairs Press, 1977), p. 237.
21. Stephen J. Carroll, "A Central Signalling Technique for Measuring the Time and Allocations for Managers" Unpublished Research Study, Cited in Stephen J. Carroll and Henry L. Tosi, op.cit., p. 238.
22. Rosemary Stewart, op.cit., p. 63.
23. Henry Mintzberg, The Nature of Managerial Work, op.cit., p. 32.

24. J.R. Hinrichs, op.cit., pp. 193-204.
25. Henry Mintzberg, *The Manager's Job: Folklore and Fact*, op.cit., pp. 49-61.
26. Harold J. Leavitt, W.R. Dill and H.B. Eyring, The Organisational World; A Systematic View of Managers and Management (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1973), p. 209.
27. For further discussions of this point see, Thomas W. Johnson and John E. Stinson, Management Today and Tomorrow (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1978), pp. 315-28.
28. Charles A. Myers, "Lessons from Abroad for American Management" in Comparative Management and Marketing, ed. J. Boddewys (Glenview Ill: Foresman & Co., 1969), pp. 286-96.
29. James A.F. Stoner, op.cit., p. 16.
30. The General average is 73 minutes.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### SOCIAL PRESSURES ON MANAGERS

"The Arab executive lives in a society where family and friendship remain important and prevalent factors even in the functioning of formal institutions and groups"

Farid A. Muna (1980)<sup>1</sup>

#### INTRODUCTION

As we have seen earlier, the Iraqi society consists of three communities (bedouin, village and city). They co-exist and interact with each other and share common social values and traditional customs. The three communities have a strong kinship structure as a base for their social organisation. Thus, the clan remains the basis of bedouin community, while the extended family in village and city communities plays the important role that the clan does play in the tribe.<sup>2</sup>

We have seen also that Iraq, as a developing country, suffers from four principal handicaps: (a) political instability; (b) massive illiteracy among the people; (c) backward economy and (d) novelty of industry.<sup>3</sup>

In view of these facts, the present chapter attempts to discover what are the principal social pressures (namely social constraints) these managers face in their daily work.

To achieve this, the managers were asked to answer the following question:

In your society, what are the major social pressures that interfere with your work as a manager such that you are unable to exercise full control over them. Will you give us some examples?

A large number of social pressures were mentioned by the forty four managers. However, only those mentioned by six or more managers are summarised in Table 8.1. Although closely interrelated, these pressures are divided into those that emerge from the wider society (socio-cultural) and those pressures or constraints from the managers' immediate business and social communities.

TABLE 8.1: SOCIAL PRESSURES AS REPORTED BY THE IRAQI MANAGERS  
(N = 44).

Type	Frequency	Percentage
<u>First: Socio-cultural pressures</u>		
1 - Strong family and tribal relationships	28	63
2 - Dislike of manual work	26	59
3 - Low level of industrial consciousness and literacy	25	57
4 - Low value of time	18	41
5 - Inequality of sex	17	39
<u>Second: Business and social community</u>		
1 - Patronage and nepotism	27	61
2 - Shortage of skilled manpower	23	52
3 - Low level of productivity	20	45
4 - Private visits at the office	18	41
5 - Marketing constraints	14	32
6 - Workers are of agricultural and rural origin	6	13

## 1.0 : SOCIO-CULTURAL PRESSURES

### 1.1 Strong family and tribal relationships

In a group-oriented society such as Iraq, individual behaviour is largely determined by family and tribal relationships. Though educated city-dwellers are, to some extent, free from such pressures, they remain significant in the lives of the majority of the people.<sup>4</sup>

As we have seen earlier in Chapter three, Iraq is mainly a patriarchal society, arranged marriages are common and the extended family (with its concomitant responsibilities appertaining to the breadwinner) is the norm. It is no surprise, therefore, to find twenty eight managers (64% of those sampled) stating that family and tribal ties are the major constraint on their performance. Ten of these managers regard family and kinship as a principal obstacle to the efficient functioning of industry. Four managers, from the public sector, felt these pressures to be so intense that they obtained transfers to areas away from their original cities to free themselves from such restraints.

As there are few divisions between family affairs and business affairs in Iraq, fourteen managers (32%) were of the opinion that the maximum "Business is Business" is not really applicable to Iraqi society. According to them, there are many links between family and business - most of them illegal. They are illegal because of inequality of sex, lack of industrial mentality and other social constraints including nepotism.

## 1.2 Dislike of manual work

The problem of the negative attitude toward manual work is deeply rooted among the bedouin community. As we have seen earlier, from the bedouin's standpoint, any manner of living other than that of bearing arms is unworthy and shameful. It seems that this problem still occurs among the people. Twenty six managers (59%) mentioned that some of their workers still dislike manual work and demand only clerical and administrative work. "The workers," one manager explained, "feel that clerical and administrative work is more respectful in this society than manual work."

## 1.3 Low level of industrial consciousness and literacy

Iraq, as seen earlier in chapter five, suffers from a high illiteracy rate in excess of 50%. However, according to twenty five managers (57%) people not only suffer from such an attitude, they have a low level of industrial consciousness as well. They lack regard for physical objects including machines, products and materials. "They are", as three managers put it, "devaluing company assets, acting as if their company belongs to an enemy." Ten managers mentioned that people lack regard of industrial discipline in such things as aversion to systems and formal regulations, lack of organization mentality, and non-professional attitudes toward business and industrial management.

In industrial societies, behaviour tends to be rigidly prescribed, either by written rules, or by unwritten social codes. The presence of these rules satisfied peoples emotional need for order and predictability in society. Even if people break these rules by their own



behaviour, they will feel that it is right that the rules exist. "Law and Order" are important symbols, within a school, a factory or in the society as a whole: they satisfy deep emotional needs in people.<sup>5</sup>

In the underdeveloped societies, including Iraq, there are also written and unwritten rules, but they are more considered as a matter of convenience and less sacrosanct. People are able to live comfortably in situations where there are no rules and where they are free to invent their own behaviour.<sup>6</sup>

#### 1.4 Low value of time:

In traditional societies, time is generally not a scarce resource. Life in such societies is relatively unhurried and time is conceived as circular (returning into itself) rather than linear. In fact, the same situation exists in Iraq.<sup>7</sup> There is generally little weight given to the value of time. Penrose discussed the problem of time in Iraq and concluded:

"This is characteristic of any bureaucracy which is not under some sort of external pressure, and is notoriously common in states bureaucracies: it is especially damaging when extended to "business" enterprise." 8

Indeed, the problem is even more acute because either managers or workers respect time.<sup>9</sup> As we have seen earlier in Chapter seven, the managers studied pay more time for their personal affairs compared to what they accord to management activities, including planning and organising.

Turning to the Iraqi workers and how these managers look at them from the time's point of view, we find that eighteen managers (41%) expressed displeasure regarding the negative attitude toward the value of time that exists among the workers as well as other people.

Ten managers dogmatized that:

"Workers do not work properly during the assigned working hours and this, in turn, compels close supervision to ensure that they are working properly"

Another eight managers (all from the private sector) were irritated because their workers seldom work. According to these managers, the workers are:

"either chatting on social matters or, some of them, leave their workplace to visit another friend in another department for a chat or at least drink a cup of tea."

As a matter of fact, the problem of time is quite common in most Arab countries. According to Muna's study, for example, one of the Arab executives gravest problems is the low placed value on time by many of his countrymen. Executives were deeply concerned and irritated by the lack of appreciation towards time shown by people with whom they come into contact.<sup>10</sup> Lack of punctuality in time schedules and appointments, procrastination and "tomorrow" attitude, are quite common among the people.<sup>11</sup>

### Inequality of Sex

Though the situation of woman has changed, if only slowly, by the introduction of modern education and a few progressive laws (particularly the last twenty years), the conception of their position in society still presents many handicaps in practical life, as it

still leaves them inferior and unequal in a male-dominated society.<sup>12</sup>

In the previous chapters we observed that men, whether in the bedouin community or the Islamic culture are superior to women. For example, women, according to the bedouin and village norms, are prepared to hold house responsibility and stay at home away from the business area. As a matter of fact, such a discrimination between men and women is also obvious in industry to the degree that seventeen managers (39%) looked at this problem as an outstanding constraint on their behaviour. "We don't want women in management posts, their absence avoids us many problems", seven managers from the private sector confirmed. Another six managers considered social restrictions on women, especially their exclusion from the work arena, as a constraint on their organisational performance; they admitted that they are unable to let women work at night shifts partly because such a decision includes a moral problem, and partly because women's fathers, husbands and brothers, prevent them from working at night. A further four managers mentioned that their workers do stand against women participation in management work, putting various impediments before their progress in management hierarchy. They also blamed traditions for restricting women's participation in industrial work, namely, to work side by side with men on production lines.<sup>13</sup>

## 2.0: BUSINESS AND SOCIAL COMMUNITY

### 2.1 Patronage and nepotism

In industrial societies, it is felt to be "right" that in business, all people should be treated alike: friendships and enmities should not affect business deals. Business considerations should have

precedence over personal friendships and preferences. In other words, business behaviour should be "universalist". Of course, this norm is often violated, but such violations are considered objectionable.<sup>14</sup>

In underdeveloped societies, even in business, people think in terms of "we" (our family, friends, tribe) and "they" (the others). Relations, friends, tribesmen, get better deals than strangers and, according to Hofstede, it is normal and "right".<sup>15</sup> The sociological term for such a behaviour is "particularist".<sup>16</sup>

Clearly, in the world of business, a manager cannot function properly if he/she is expected to play the part of patron or "be nepotic", exercising favouritism to facilitate the advancement of others (relatives, friends and so forth) irrespective of their qualifications or business requirements. In a developing country like Iraq, patronage as well as nepotism are a widespread phenomenon in most spheres of life, both public and private. It permeates all sectors of the economy and social life.<sup>17</sup>

In fact, the problem of patronage and nepotism must be considered in the light of other social factors. We have seen, for example, in the previous chapters that Iraq has passed through a very dark period during the last four hundred years. We have also observed that during the last fifty years or so, at least six principal features characterised the society; political instability, illiteracy, rural-urban migration, nomadism, family and tribal relationships. Each one of these features promotes and reinforces such behaviour.

It is difficult for managers to resist placement and promotion claims particularly if the patron pressing these claims on behalf of parents, brothers or friends, holds a prominent position in government or industry. What irritates managers is that these patrons show little understanding of management's duty to ensure that only people capable of doing particular jobs are given these jobs.<sup>18</sup>

Similarly, while business contracts should be properly allocated according to sound business principles, instead, in Iraq, we find that these are largely done through the influences of patrons and relatives.

While twenty seven managers (61%) confirmed that patronage and nepotism remain a major problem today, hampering their work, only eleven of them believe that it is less of a problem than five years ago. The other sixteen managers stated that in their opinion the level of this problem is either the same (20% of the sample) or greater than before (16%).

TABLE 8.2: LEVEL OF PATRONAGE AND NEPOTISM DURING THE LAST FIVE YEARS AS REPORTED BY MANAGERS

Level of Nepotism	Frequency	Percentage
Less than five years ago	11	25
Same as before	9	20
More than before	7	16
No answer	17	39
Total	44	100

In fact, the phenomenon appears to be so endemic to the extent that one could be justified in saying that it is the national way of life rather than a temporary aberration.

Having reached this stage, let us look at the main reasons of this phenomenon.

Reasons of mediation:

The forty four managers were asked to mention what are the main reasons responsible for practicing mediation and for nepotism in Iraq. Table 8.3 summarizes their answers.

TABLE 8.3 REASONS OF MEDIATION AS REPORTED BY THE MANAGERS (N=44)

Reason	Frequency	Percentage
1. Family, kinship and friendship ties	34	77
2. Illiteracy	22	50
3. Shortage of products	17	37
4. Mistrust between employers, workers and customers	10	23
5. Others	8	18

As can be seen from the Table, thirty four managers (77%) regard family ties, kinship and friendship relations as the principal factor for exercising mediation and nepotism. Twenty two managers (50%) looked at illiteracy as an important factor for practicing mediation. They felt that people who are educated and possess a knowledge of the working of society are less likely to be involved in such practices. Seventeen managers (37%) pointed to the shortages (resulting from either inefficient or poor distribution) as having significance when there is a limited supply of goods allied to high levels of demand - there is large scope for systematic nepotism. Also, ten managers (23%), are of the opinion that mutual distrust between government agencies, private enterprises and individual people is another important factor in this respect.

Other reasons behind the spread of mediation were noted by eight managers (18%). These range from bureaucratic inefficiency and procrastination to lack of incentives (financial and promotional) as well as little encouragement of worker mobility. These managers also felt that comprehensive central planning increased their problems on the one hand, and also increased the problems of the public, particularly those seeking jobs in a certain government institution. As managers, they felt that central planning increased their problems by restricting freedom and flexibility in decision-making while curtailing their ability to select suitable personnel for whichever position requires filling.

## 2.2 Shortage of skilled manpower

One of the most important resources available to any organisation, many would say the most important, is its employees.<sup>19</sup> However, it is the author's point of view that the quality of these employees must be considered so long as it plays an important part in any organisation's success. In Iraq, as we observed earlier, the scarcity of skilled manpower is very acute.<sup>20</sup> This could be endorsed by the fact that twenty three managers (52%) stressed that the lack of skilled workers is a major obstacle to progress and development, of whom ten stressed that they could not replace old machines with modern ones due to such problems. A further five managers said that while it is easy to bring in advanced machinery, it is difficult to find trained staff capable of running it properly.

Furthermore, many of the public sector managers surveyed were irritated because recruitment procedures are outwith their hands and this has decreased managers' ability to choose the right person for the right job. Indeed, what is clear is that industrial development

cannot be achieved without an adequate number of properly skilled workers available at the right place and time.<sup>21</sup>

### 2.3 Low Level of productivity:

"There should be no increase in wages if there is no increase in productivity. The quantity and quality of Iraqi productivity needed to be improved in industry, agriculture, and services."

Saddam Hussein, 1976.

The proceeding discussions lead to the inference that the Iraqi workers' productivity, whether in industry, agriculture or service sectors, is deplorably low. Despite the presence of such a fact under one's nose, unfortunately only twenty managers (45%) were able to confirm such a truth. As for the rest, (i.e. 24 managers) they refrained from any answer possibly because they felt that answering one way or the other would put them in trouble. More than ten managers were of the opinion that the productivity of the Iraqi worker does not exceed 30% of those who are working in developed countries.

Here it is worth mentioning that the problem of productivity has been discussed on the national level in the autumn of 1976.

Though the working paper of these discussions has showed different factors which adversely affected productivity, such as inflexibility of labour laws, lack of specialisation inside management machinery, and the "Umbrellas" of the state organisations which were used to protect senior managers and union leaders,<sup>22</sup> none had been given to such crucial factors as the pressure on managers exercised by ministers, heads of institutions and union leaders;



the problem of agricultural background of the majority of the workers and its impact on productivity. So are the problems of inadequate or inefficient utilisation of labour "under utilisation of the workers;<sup>23</sup> the problem of the Law No. 103 which was legislated in 1974, by which the government has obliged herself to find employment for each graduate in government organisation.<sup>1</sup> All those who have participated in the discussions and "seminars" had avoided discussing senior managers' qualifications and to what extent it fits management standards and their enterprises.

According to the researcher's view, to raise productivity, one must take into account the scarcity of "human capital", the quality of workers and managers; the problems of bad planning in production and purchasing as well as storage systems; the problems of inadequate provision for training and human development; ineffective incentive systems and the problem of promotion which is largely based on seniority, or perhaps on favouritism; the differences between wages of private and public sectors; bad administrative control; badly designed administrative structure; the problems of patronage and nepotism as well as the problems of underemployment and upon-unemployment. Those and other economic and non-economic inputs into the social production function must be taken into account if strategies to raise productivity are to succeed in Iraq..

#### 2.4 Private visits at the office

Managers' time is high-priced and important for their decisions affect company survival, growth, as well as those who are connected with its implementation. As such, therefore, it seems profitable to schedule "capitalize" managers' time in such a way that very few friends or relatives are permitted to drop into their office during

working hours for non-business chats over coffee. Though many would accept such a policy, (59%) of the managers sampled are of the opposite view. Only eighteen managers (41%) indicated that they were annoyed by their visitors. Six managers said:

"It is easier to organise , or even to restrict, workers' visitings than to control that of outsiders. "

In their opinion, restricting friends or relatives visits would make them angry with you. In their eyes, you are a discourteous and dishonoured person. The others, twelve managers, were irritated because their workers come from any level of the company without going through hierarchy.

On the other hand, most of those who prefer an unconditioned open-door policy, believe that such a policy lets them know what is going around, and it minimizes the gulf between them and their subordinates.

What has been said above indicates that the problem of visiting does not only concern workers within an establishment; it extends to outsiders as well.

At this point, it seems reasonable to ask the following question: Why do such visitings take place? To answer this, we need to remember the strength of the relationships between an organisation and its external environment. Indeed, the external environment has a major impact on what the organisation does and the way it goes about achieving its major objective.<sup>24</sup> As regards visiting habits, in fact, this social phenomenon is fairly common in Iraq and other Arab countries. In the previous chapters we have discovered that each sheikh, each family has a "Majlis" (assembly or guest room or simply visiting room) where the visitor can either pay his respects, or request

a favour, or submit a grievance.<sup>25</sup> As an Arab, you have to respect your visitors irrespective of their visiting times. Indeed, social pressure on this matter is profound. On the other hand, the people of Iraq are still living in a pre-industrial era. Not very far back, only three decades ago, all the Iraqi cities were suffering from backwardness and dramatic political instability. It is true that Iraq has made considerable economic and social progress within the last thirty years; however, it is believed that the country needs massive efforts and time to change and modify people's behaviour to grasp the new concepts that entailed industrialization. At this point, it will, perhaps, be helpful if we remember that in 1977, around 70% of all the houses in Iraq were built either in mud (hut) or sarifa. Many of which were nothing but tents.<sup>26</sup> Thus, one could be justified in saying that the majority of the people are still living in an atmosphere characterized by tribal relations and other traditional customs and values.

Thus far we are examining tribal and family life in terms of social visitings and social relations. We need to consider further why such behaviour exists inside institutions. To understand this situation, let us recall what Leavitt, Dill and Eyring have said in 1973:

"You cannot hire a piece of man. You cannot hire just the machinist's skill. You must hire the whole machinist, with all the accessories attached - his ethnic background, his education, his political activism and all the rest of him. You cannot hire a hand." 27

Another scholar, Boas, sheds some light on this situation as follows:

"From our earliest days we imitate the behaviour of our environment and our behaviour in later years is determined by what we learn as infants and children. The response to any stimulus depends upon these early days." 26

## 2.5 Marketing constraints

Fourteen managers (32%) singled out different marketing problems including the shortage of raw material and the absence of efficient distribution systems as major constraints on their business. So too, they protested despairingly, that some societal values and norms still restrict certain types of advertising and marketing. For example, six managers indicated that they cannot advertise their wares (cosmetics, garments, spirits, etc.) neither on television or radio, mainly because the society is conservative. Three managers said:

"In Iraq, we cannot apply the same marketing and advertising methods which are now fairly common in the West. Take for example, door-to-door selling, selling through magazines or catalogues, mail advertising. They are completely absent in Iraq. In fact we need many years to use them successfully."

Another manager mentioned that the use of modern marketing and advertising methods is fruitless mainly because the current supply of any industrial product is less than the actual local demand.

Indeed, businessmen in Iraq are not yet used to the idea of the mass consumer market that is slowly but surely developing. They want to get the sale over and done with as quickly as possible, and in only very few cases or places is the customer allowed to return or exchange an item that he has purchased. In many enterprises and shops, signs are displayed cautioning customers that once the goods leave the premises, the sale is final and no exchange

is allowed. Until quite recently, and even now in most cases, very few enterprises extend credit to their customers, or allow them to buy on an instalment plan. Many of the private managers covered by this study have signs placed in their office, stating that this enterprise does not allow any business on credit. The sign may run something like this:

"Please forgive us .... please do not blame us, but we cannot extend credit."

The private managers still depend on their personal acquaintances and knowledge in advertising their business. Even in the medium of public enterprises, the personal touch is still maintained, and indeed expected.

#### 1.6 Workers are of agricultural and rural origin

At this point, the reader is quite aware that the people of Iraq practiced agricultural activities since the dawn of history. Until today, the majority are involved in such matters. Indeed, agricultural activities in pre-developed countries are still a process which only partially are controllable. Namely it still controls by the whims of nature and people are still far away from applying systematic and scientific methods. For example, in Iraq, not very long ago, the peasants were raising their hands into the sky - the home of God - and asking God to give them rain. Such a faith, and many others, in an invisible supernatural power has led them to be more dependent rather than independent on themselves; their innovations, initiatives, and ability are nothing but inferior and unpretentious. On the other hand, if we remember that within the last three decades there were many immigration waves from villages

into the main cities, it becomes obvious that the majority of the workers have agricultural backgrounds. Six managers were of the opinion that the agricultural background of the workers represented another set of pressures. Firstly, because those workers were more illiterate than those born in towns and consequently they have little ambition to change or adapt their agricultural behaviour to match industrial requirements. Secondly, they lack initiative power whether in terms of systematic thinking or of applying new work methods.

#### SUMMARY:

The chapter has attempted to uncover and discuss the principal social pressures or constraints that interfere with managers' work and to what extent the managers studied are able to exercise full control over such constraints.

Two groups of social pressures were presented by the managers. The first group was "socio-cultural pressures" while the second group of pressures was "business and social community".

The first group indicated that managers cannot work in a completely unconstrained way. Moreover, they are not able to exercise the same degree of freedom over their own organisation of work as their Western counterparts. They have to pay special attention to their families, relatives and friends, mainly because the society is a group-society and largely based on the theory of blood relationship. Because Iraq is a developing country, and because the people still admire the bedouin and village values and customs, these managers

face different sorts of social pressures. Chief among them are a dislike of manual work; low level of industrial mentality and literacy; low value of time and sex discrimination.

Under the second group of pressures, "Business and social community" we discovered that the managers were irritated because of patronage and nepotism among the people who deal with them: unskilled workers; low level of productivity; unscheduled private visits to their office during the working hours; marketing constraints. Some of their workers are of rural origin and this reinforces the web of social constraint surrounding the managers' job.

What is obvious from the chapter is that the Iraqi managers, like other Arab managers, are under strong social pressures. Pressures from their families, relatives and friends. Pressures from their workers and finally, pressures from the wider society as a whole.

NOTES

1. Farid A. Muna, The Arab Executive (London: The Macmillan Press, 1980), p. 12.
2. See Chapter Three.
3. For further information about the characteristics of the under-developed countries see, Charles P. Kindleberger, Economic Development (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965); Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World (New York: Longman Inc., 1977); Alan B. Mountjoy, Industrialisation and Developing Countries (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1975).
4. P.A. Marr, "The Iraqi Village, Prospects for Change" in Reading in Arab Middle Eastern Societies and Cultures, ed., Abdulla M. Lutfiyya and Charles W. Churchill (Netherlands: Mouton & Co., 1970), pp. 328-38.
5. See for example, Harry M. Johnson, Sociology: A Systematic Interaction (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1961), pp. 18-25.
6. Gæret Hofstede, Culture and Management (Geneva: 1983), pp. 18-25.
7. See Chapter Three; see also, Edward Hall, The Silent Language (New York: Doubleday, 1959), pp. 10-33.
8. Edith and E.F. Penrose, Iraq, International Relations and National Development (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1978), p. 472.
9. Saddam Hussein, Utilizing All the Efforts to Maximize Production (Baghdad: Dar Al-Huriyah for Publishings, 1976), p. 12.
10. Farid A. Muna, op.cit., p. 89; Republic of Sudan, The M.D.P.C., A Strategy for Management Development (Khartoum: 1978), p. 22.
11. Ibid.
12. Saddam Hussein, The Revolution and Woman in Iraq (Baghdad: Dar Al-Thawrah Press, 1981), pp. 21-31; Idem, On Social and Foreign Affairs in Iraq, (London: Croom Helm, 1979), pp. 11-32.



13. For this point see, Edith and E.F. Penrose, op.cit., pp. 188-90.
14. See, Greet Hofstede, op.cit., p. 21; Talcott Parsons, "Family Structure and the Socialization of the Child" in Family, Socialization and Interaction Process, ed. Talcott Parsons and R.F. Bales (Glencoe: Free Press, 1955), pp. 50-70; Harry M. Johnson, op.cit., pp. 138-41; Harry C. Bredemeir and Richard M. Stephenson, The Analysis of Social Systems (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston Inc., 1962), pp. 16-23.
15. Greet Hofstede, op.cit., Loc. cit.
16. Ibid.
17. Saddam Hussein, Utilizing All the Efforts to Maximize Production, op.cit., p. 8.
18. Malik Mansure, The Productivity and Development in the New Society (Baghdad: Dar Al-Huriyah for Printing, 1979), pp. 21-3.
19. Rensis Likert, The Human Organisation; Its Management and Value, (New York: McGraw-Hill, Book Co., 1967), pp. 1-5.
20. See Chapter Four.
21. United Nations, UNIDO, Manpower for Industry: Industrialisation of Developing Countries, Problems and Prospects (New York: 1969), p.5.
22. Al-Thawrah Newspaper Baghdad, 8,9,10 September 1976; Nori Najem: Towards Building a New Administrative System (Baghdad: Dar Al-Thawrah Press, 1978), pp. 81-96.
23. Under-utilization of the Iraqi workforce is manifested in two forms: first: the majority of the people are working less than they would like, daily, weekly, or monthly; they are nominally working fulltime but their productivity is so low to the degree that reduction in hours would have a negligible impact on total output. In fact, they are "underemployed". Secondly, we are still suffering from the problem of "open-unemployment", namely, those people who are able and often eager to work but for whom no suitable jobs are

- available. For further discussions on this matter, see: Michael P. Tadaro, Economics for a Developing World (Hong Kong: Longman Group Ltd., 1981), pp. 74-5.
24. Theodor T. Herbert, Dimensions of Organisational Behaviour, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 2nd ed.1981), p. 99; Joseph L. Massie and Jan Luyties, Management in an International Context (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972), p. 13.
25. Peter Hobday, Sudia Arabia Today (London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1978), pp. 67-8; Hemsley Longrigg and Frank Stoakes, Iraq (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1958), pp. 183-205.
26. Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Annual Abstract of Statistic 1978, (Baghdad: 1979), p. 48.
27. Harold J. Leavitt, W.R. Dill and Henry B. Eyring, The Organisational World: A Systematic View of Managers and Management (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1973), p. 128.
28. Franz Boas, Anthropology and Modern Life (New York: Rev. ed., 1932), p. 56.

## CHAPTER NINE

### THE MANAGER'S DECISION-MAKING STYLES

#### INTRODUCTION:

The last two chapters concluded with the findings that while the Iraqi managers devote little time to management activities, compared with what they accord to paperwork and personal activities, they are under strong social pressures: pressures from their families, relatives and friends; pressures from their workers and from the wider society as a whole.

The intention in this chapter is to explore how these managers employ power in decision-making and to what extent they permit their subordinates in such a process. The term "power" in this chapter means the manager's ability to exert influence over the act of his subordinates.<sup>1</sup>

#### 1.0 : DECISION-MAKING STYLES

Much of human behaviour is a reflection of the decisions people make, and the process that regulates and controls these choices or decisions are central to any scientific discipline that purports to understand and predict human behaviour.

Many theorists, including Simon, Cyert and March believe that, since managing is characterised by decision making, the central focus of management theory can be decision making and the rest of management thought can be built around it.<sup>2</sup> Yet, according to Vroom and Yetton,

understanding the process of the decision making is critical, not only for the explanation of individual behaviour, but also for the behaviour of complex organisations.<sup>3</sup>

During the last thirty years an immense literature on leadership and/or management styles has developed. Most of this literature, as we observed in chapter one, has discussed the decision-making process. One facet of this highly complex phenomenon is the manager's choice of how much he involves subordinates in the decision-making process.<sup>4</sup>

In chapter one of this study we have also observed that one of the most important features of the cultural school of management is that management style in the developing countries is authoritarian-paternalistic and that this style is the result of their socio-cultural environment. It is among the aims of this chapter to discover the validity of such a thesis in Iraq.

We are also interested in providing support to scholars of organisational behaviour who emphasise that there is no one best management style and leadership is a contingent variable - depending on the situation in which a manager works.<sup>5</sup>


We are also interested in examining Muna's results which confirms that the Arab executive uses consultation in his decision making more than any other style.

The conceptual framework and the methods used in this study of decision making styles have been gathered from seven taxonomies published during the last forty years. Table 9.1 summarises these

resources and from which the reader can observe that the last three studies (Heller, 1971; Vroom and Yetton, 1973; Muna, 1980) had a substantial impact on the current study.

The various decision making styles used by a manager have been defined and ordered by a four point equal interval scale reflecting the various degrees of power-sharing between the manager and his subordinate(s). Figure 9.1 demonstrates this continuum.

FIGURE 9.1: THE POWER SHARING CONTINUUM



The current continuum is almost similar to the continua used in Heller's and Muna's studies with one main difference; we enlarged Style 3 (Joint decision making) to include the idea that when a manager makes joint decisions with subordinate(s) he may consult his superiors, partners or outsiders.<sup>6</sup>

The only difference between Heller's and Muna's continua is that Muna regards Heller's Style 2 (own decision with explanation) as an

**TABLE 9.1 COMPARISON BETWEEN DECISION STYLES EMPLOYED IN THIS RESEARCH AND THOSE OF PREVIOUS INVESTIGATORS (ADAPTED FROM VROOM AND YETTON, 1973 AND MUNA, 1980)**

Lewin, Lippit & White (1939)	Maler (1955)	Tannenbaum and Schmidt (1958)			Likert (1967)		Heller (1971)		Vroom & Yetton (1973)		Muna (1980)	Sulleman (present study)
Auto-c ratic L eader- ship	Auto- cratic Manage- ment	Manager makes decision and announ- ces it	Manager sells de- cision	Manager presents ideas & invites quest- ions	Explo- tive autho- rita- tive systems 1)	Bene- volent autho- ritat- ive systems 2)	Own decisi- on with deta- iled expl- ana- tion Style1	Own decisi- on with deta- iled expl- ana- tion Style2	Manager makes decision himself (A1)	Manager makes decision obtaining necessary information from sub- ordinate (A11)	Manager makes decision without consult- ing sub- ordinates but may consult superior, partners or out- siders (Style 1)	Manager makes decision with- out consulting subordinate(s) but may consult superior, partners or outsiders (Style 1)
	Consul- tative Manage- ment	Manager presents tentative decisions subject to changes	Manager pre- sents problem, gets suggest- ions, makes decisions	Consultat- ive (System 3)	Prior con- sultation with sub- ordinates (Style 3)		Manager shares problem with sub- ordinate, makes own decision (C1)	Manager shares problem with group, makes own decision (C11)	Prior con- sultation with sub- ordinates (Style 2)	Prior consulta- tion with sub- ordinates Style 2)		
Demo- c ratic leader- ship	Group dis- cuss- ion	Manager defines limits, asks group to make deci- sion	Manager perm- its group to make decision within pre- scribed limits	Participa- tive group (System 4)	Joint deci- sion making with sub- ordinates (Style 4)		Manager & subordina- te toge- ther arr- ive at mutually agreeable decision (G1)	Manager (acting like chairman) & group dis- cuss, eval- uate & make a group decision (G11)	Joint deci- sion- making with subordinate (Style 3)	Joint decision- making with sub- ordinate(s). Man- ager may consult superior, partner or outsider (Style 3)		
Laissez- faire Leader- ship						Delegation of decisions to subordinates ( Style 5)	Delegation of deci- sions to subordinate (D)	Delegation of decisi- on to sub- ord.(Style 4)	Delegation of decisi- on to sub- ord.(Style 4)	Delegation of dec- isions to sub- ordinate (Style 4)		

elaboration on Style 1 (own decision without explanation). Indeed we share Muna's view which says:

"To explain or to 'sell' the decision to subordinates is not likely to change either the power wielded by the executive or the influence exerted by his subordinates on the outcome of a decision he had already made." 7

The other thing which forced the present researcher to avoid Heller's classification of Style 1 and Style 2 is that the majority of the managers interviewed were unable to distinguish between these two styles.

On the other hand, the current study shares Heller's and other scholars' inclusion of delegation as an extension to the conventional decision-making styles. It highlights an essential managerial responsibility with potentially great benefits to the manager, the subordinate, and the organisation as a whole.<sup>8</sup> When used properly, delegation has several important advantages. The first and most obvious is that the more tasks managers are able to delegate, the more opportunity they have to seek and accept increased responsibilities from higher level managers. Thus, as managers we will try to delegate not only routine matters but also tasks requiring thought and initiative, so that we can be free to function with maximum effectiveness for our organisations.

Another advantage of delegation is that it frequently leads to better decisions, since subordinates closest to the "firing line" are likely to have a clearer view of the facts.<sup>9</sup> In addition, effective delegation speeds up decision making. Valuable time is lost when subordinates must check with their superiors (who then may have to check with their superiors) before making a decision. This delay is eliminated

when subordinates are authorised to make the necessary decision on the spot. Finally, delegation causes subordinates to accept responsibility and exercise judgement. This not only helps train subordinates - an important advantage of delegation - but also improves their self-confidence and willingness to take initiative.<sup>10</sup>

## 2.0 . A DECISION-MAKING PROFILE OF THE IRAQI MANAGERS

A semi-structured interview method was used to obtain information about the managers styles in decision making. Each manager was presented with a description of four alternative decision styles as follows:

- (A) You make the decision, no previous consultation with your subordinate(s). You may tell your subordinate(s) what the problem is in getting the information from him/them but his/their role is to provide you the necessary information rather than generating or evaluating alternative solution. Sometimes you may discuss the problem with your superiors, partners or with outsiders.
- (B) You share the problem with your subordinate(s), getting his/their ideas and suggestions, then you make your decision which may or may not reflect his/their influence.
- (C) You share the problem with your subordinate(s), and together you analyse the problem and arrive at a mutually agreeable solution. You may consult and discuss the problem with your superiors, partners or with outsiders.



(D) You delegate the problem to your subordinate, providing him with any relevant information that you possess, but giving him responsibility for solving the problem by himself. You may or may not ask him to report his discussion to you. You seldom veto his decision.

Each manager, then, was given ten decisions and requested to specify which of the alternatives he would normally use. The ten decisions were as follows:

- 1 - The decision to increase the salary of one of your direct subordinates.
- 2 - The decision to increase the number of the workforce in a certain department.
- 3 - The decision to hire one of several applicants to work in your subordinates' departments.
- 4 - The decision to promote or to increase the salary of one of your subordinate's workers.
- 5 - The decision to terminate one of your subordinate's workers.
- 6 - The decision to introduce a new product(s).
- 7 - The decision to enter a new market.
- 8 - The decision to expand the total current production capacity of your company.
- 9 - The decision to change or modify the formal organisation chart of the company.
- 10 - The decision to change responsibilities and authorities of the head of a certain department.

To avoid response bias, two methods were used. The first was to ask each manager to give some documents which supported his argument in a certain alternative while the second was to ask his direct subordinate(s) about the same decision. For example, when a manager says: I normally use the second alternative when I take the decision to introduce a new product or to enter a new market, the researcher, after the meeting, usually makes another interview with manager's direct subordinate(s) to see to what extent the manager was true.

Coding procedures were taken after long discussions and usually when the researcher left the company.

Two methods were used to analyse the data. The first was to use frequency distribution of responses to each of the ten decisions in the light of these four alternative decision-making styles. The second method used the concept of the power-sharing continuum. Let us examine each one.

#### 1 - The frequency distribution:

The frequency distribution helps us examine today's argument which confirms that different managers use different decision-making styles for one common problem and that managers rarely employ one decision-making style across different types of problems.<sup>11</sup>

Table 9.2 shows the results of the frequency distribution of responses to each of the ten decisions classified according to the four alternatives of decision making.

TABLE 9.2: DISTRIBUTION OF DECISION STYLES FOR EACH DECISION BY MANAGERS (N = 44) (EXPRESSED AS %)

DECISIONS	STYLES				TOTAL
	(1) Own Decision	(2) Consultation	(3) Joint Decision	(4) Delegation	
1. To increase the salary of one of your direct subordinates	86	7	7	-	100
2. To increase the number of the workforce in a certain department	52	25	23	-	100
3. To hire one of several applicants to work in your subordinates' departments	43	34	16	7	100
4. To promote or to increase the salary of one of your subordinate's workers	34	41	20	5	100
5. To terminate one of your subordinate's workers	68	27	5	-	100
6. To introduce a new product(s)	25	11	63	-	100
7. To enter a new market	30	16	54	-	100
8. To expand the total production capacity of the company	27	14	59	-	100
9. To change/modify the formal organisation chart of the company	41	18	41	-	100
10. To change the responsibilities and authorities of the head of a certain department.	68	23	9	-	100
ALL DECISIONS	47	22	30	1	100

As can be seen from the Table, the managers studied have employed different styles for each one of the ten problems or decisions and no one has one specific style across different types of decisions.

Oddly enough, almost all the managers avoid employing Style 4 (delegation). The same is equally true, that Style 1 (own decision) is predominantly preferred by the managers for this specific set of decisions.

Though the results give support to the cultural school of management in that the authoritative management style is fairly common in the developing countries, the author suspects the argument of Haribson and Myers which we discussed in Chapter One. According to these theorists, authoritative or participative management style depends on the level of industrialisation of a given country.<sup>12</sup> Level of technology alone, in my opinion, is not a decisive factor in changing management decision-making philosophy. The social community, family structure, the relationships that exist within a family as well as the different social pressures that surround managers must all be considered when we talk about management style in a given country.

It is also possible that a different set of problems (decision~~s~~) lead to different styles. Nevertheless, when we reconsider the type of relationship that exists between fathers and sons on one hand and the different social pressures or constraints that surround the Iraqi managers on the other, we can conclude that the authoritative decision-making style will continue to be the salient feature irrespective of what the type of the problems or level of technology


are. Levinson endorses such a view and mentions:

"Management practices vary according to the more obvious aspects of the family structure in a particular culture or sub-culture .... Each person has a posture toward authority, derived from relationships with the only figures known as a child - parents and surrogates." 13

The current results differ from what Muna has found in six Arab countries in 1980.<sup>14</sup> Figure 9.2 represents a comparison between Muna's study of 52 Arab managers and the present study. It shows that Muna's style 2 (consultation) is the dominant one while in this study, it is style 1 (own decision). Though the comparison is difficult, largely because Iraq was not included in Muna's study, the number of non-industrial managers must be considered. While there were 28 trade and service managers in Muna's study, nothing like that exists in the current study - all are industrial managers. As an Arab, the author believes that managers of trade and service organisations are more flexible and tolerant on such matters as time, formalities, and other regulations including decision-making than managers of industrial organisations. In other words, managers in such trade and service organisations tend to use less centralised decision procedures than their colleagues in the industrial organisations.

Figure 9.2 also indicates that managers in these two studies pay meagre attention to style 4 (delegation). Indeed, whether in Muna's study or the present study, style 1 and style 2 are the prevailing ones. This indicates that the Arab managers, regardless

FIGURE 9.2: DECISION-MAKING STYLES: A COMPARISON BETWEEN MUNA'S STUDY AND THE CURRENT STUDY.



of their countries, type of business, are inclined to use authoritative styles over subordinates. Concerning that delegation is important to the organisation, the refusal of managers to delegate and let subordinate(s) actively participate in decision making process has the effect of stifling initiative and/or eliminating valuable training experience as well as contributing to subordinates' dissatisfaction.<sup>15</sup> However, when we re-examine the situation of the Iraqi managers in the light of their sectors, we discover that the private sector managers are more inclined to use style 1 (own decision) irrespective of the type of the problem, whereas in the public sector, the managers are more inclined to use style 3 (joint decision) almost in all situations (see Table 9.3 and Figure 9.3).

The principal reason of such a difference is that the public sector manager does not have a free hand, or more precisely, free enterprise. In addition, and as we have observed in chapter four of this study, the economy of Iraq is run according to a national comprehensive centralised economic plan. A public sector manager must fulfil the objective of his company which is already specified by his ministry in the light of the national comprehensive plan. A failure to fulfil such objectives will put the manager in a problem.<sup>15</sup>


TABLE 9.3: DISTRIBUTION OF DECISION STYLES FOR EACH DECISION, BY MANAGERS AND SECTORS (N = 44) (expressed as %)

DECISIONS	STYLES AND SECTORS								TOTAL
	(1) Own Decision		(2) Consultation		(3) Joint Decision		(4) Delegation		
	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	
1. To increase the salary of one of your direct subordinates	90	83	10	4	-	13	-	-	100
2. To increase the number of the workforce in a certain department	20	79	35	17	45	4	-	-	100
3. To hire one of several applicants to work in your subordinate departments	20	63	35	33	35	4	10	-	100
4. To promote or to increase the salary of one of your subordinates' workers	20	46	45	37	30	13	5	4	100
5. To terminate one of your subordinate's workers	70	67	30	25	-	8	-	-	100
6. To introduce a new product(s)	10	37	5	17	85	46	-	-	100
7. To enter a new market	5	50	15	17	80	33	-	-	100
8. To expand the total production capacity of the company	5	46	15	13	80	41	-	-	100
9. To change/modify the formal organisation chart of the company	20	58	30	8	50	34	-	-	100
10. To change the responsibilities and authorities of the head of a certain department	60	75	30	17	10	8	-	-	100
ALL DECISIONS	32	60	25	19	41	20.6	1.5	0.4	100



Figure 9.3

THE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF DECISION STYLES FOR EACH DECISION BY MANAGERS AND SECTORS (N = 44),  
(Expressed as %)



## 2 - The power-sharing continuum:

The second method of analysing the data presented in this chapter was to make use of the power-sharing continuum and the assumption that its four styles are separated by equal intervals (see Figure 9.1). This assumption allows using the main scores of all the managers or each group of managers according to their sectors. This method enables us to analyse the variances among these scores. The same method was used by other scholars in analysing decision-making styles.<sup>17</sup>

The following values were assigned to components of the power-sharing continuum (see Fig. 9.1), style 1 (own decision) = 10; style 2 (consultation) = 20; style 3 (joint decision) = 30; and style 4 (delegation) = 40. Thus, a high score implies that a manager allows his subordinate large influence in decision making. Conversely, a low score indicates that the manager allows little influence in decision making or simply, the manager has more control over the outcome of the decision.

Let us, at this stage, investigate the mean score of all the managers and compare it with the mean score of each sub-group of managers according to their sectors. While the mean score is 19 for all the managers, it is 21 in the public sector and 16 in the private sector. This indicates that subordinates participation in decision-making in the public sector is more than those who are working in the private sector. In other words, the public sector manager is

more participative (or democratic) in decision making than the private sector manager. In effect, such a difference between mean scores suggests that it will be fruitful to extend the analysis in two ways:

First: Breakdown the decisions according to their importance:

The fact that some decisions are more important to the business than others, or have particular importance to subordinate(s) or to a certain department but not to the company as a whole, leads us to breakdown the previous ten decisions into three levels or groups.<sup>18</sup>

- a: Personnel decisions; deal with personnel matters of subordinate(s), such as promotion, termination, salary increase, hiring a new employee and so forth. Decisions 1, 3, 4 and 5 are of this type.
- b: Departmental decisions; include those dealing with a certain department such as increasing the total number of workforce of one department, or to change the responsibilities and authorities of a certain department, and the like. Decision 2 and 10 are of such types.
- c: Organisational decisions; represent those decisions which are of critical importance to the company because they involve potential serious consequences such as long-term planning, financial risks, large outlays and other issues relevant to the organisation. Decisions 6, 7, 8 and 9 represent this category.

In the light of these three groups of decisions, let us examine the responses of the managers for these groups of decisions to see

whether they can differentiate these categories (situations) of decisions in the power-sharing styles they use. Table 9.4 summarises this distribution.

TABLE 9.4: DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES BY STYLE FOR THREE DECISION GROUPS (N = 44) (percentages)\*

Decision Group	Styles			
	(1) Own decision	(2) Consultation	(3) Joint decision	(4) Delegation
Personnel (Decision 1,3,4,5)	58	27	12	3
Departmental (Decisions 2 and 3)	60	24	16	-
Organisational (Decisions 6,7,8,9)	31	15	54	-
Weighted average	47	22	30	1

(\*The table is a reduction of table 9.2).

The above table highlights two important points:

- a - personnel and departmental decisions are largely carried out by the managers themselves. This behaviour increases as we move from Style 1 to Style 4. That is, the manager becomes more autocratic.
- b - on the contrary, organisational decisions stand on the other side of the power-sharing continuum where managers permit subordinates participation in such decisions. In other words, they are more participative.

However, such a conclusion should not be taken on its face value. As it can be seen from the table, this is not always true because subordinates participation sharply fluctuates along the continuum. This matter will become clearer in the second method of our analysis.

Second: Managers' situation according to his sector.

The responses of the managers for these groups of decisions have been broken down according to managers' sectors. Table 9.5 summarises this redistribution and indicates that in the private sector, Style 1 (own decision) is the prevailing one irrespective of the type of the decision. Whereas in the public sector, although Style 3 (joint decision) is the dominant one, the manager uses it only with organisational decisions on issues such as purchasing a new capital equipment, entering a new market or producing a new product.

TABLE 9.5: DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES BY STYLE AND SECTOR  
FOR THREE DECISION GROUPS (N = 44) (percentages)

Decision Group		Styles				Total
		(1) Own decision	(2) Consultation	(3) Joint decision	(4) Delegation	
Personnel:	A*	50	30	16	4	100
	B**	65	25	9	1	100
Departmental;	A	40	32	28	-	100
	B	77	17	6	-	100
Organisational;	A	10	16	74	-	100
	B	48	14	38	-	100
Weighted average;	A	32	25	41	2	100
	B	60	19.2	20.4	0.4	100

\* A = Public sector managers

\*\*B = Private sector managers

Having reached this point, let us first look at the mean score of each group of decisions in the light of managers' sectors, as shown in Table 9.6. From the table it is clear that the forty four managers involve their subordinates more in organisational decisions than in the personnel and departmental decisions.

TABLE 9.6 MEAN SCORE OF MANAGERS FOR THREE CATEGORIES OF DECISIONS, BY SECTOR.

Sector	Personnel decisions	Departmental decisions	Organizational decisions	N
Public	17.4	18.8	26.4	20
Private	14.8	12.9	17.3	24
All managers	16.0	17.1	23.2	44

Closer examination of the table reveals that all the mean scores of public sector managers are consistently increasing as we move from personnel to departmental to organisational decisions. In the private sector the situation slightly differs despite the fact that managers are more participative (according to these mean scores) in organisational decisions when compared with other categories. They involve their subordinates more in personnel decisions than in departmental decisions.

Ironically, such findings are inconsistent with both Heller's and Muna's results. Both have concluded that managers tend to be less autocratic when dealing with problems related to subordinates, and more autocratic when facing organisational decisions.<sup>19</sup>

From Table 9.5 and Table 9.6 emerge two important questions:

First: Why do public sector managers apply Style 3 (joint decision) when dealing with organisational decisions and use Style 1 (own decision) and Style 2 (consultation) with personnel and departmental problems?

Second: Why do private sector managers tend to be less autocratic when dealing with personnel problems and more autocratic with departmental problems?

Chapters four and six discussed many things, including:

First: that the economy is directed by central planning. Central planning and decentralised execution of the economic plan are the basic principles which guide each economic unit in the public sector. We have also discovered that there are several levels of authority over the public industrial enterprises (see Figure 4.1).

The difficulties that face the process of decision-making in the public industrial enterprises have been described in a United Nation report and discussed at a conference in Beirut in October 1973. According to Edith and E.F. Penrose, this report showed:



".... that industrial enterprises were, in effect, organised as part of the state bureaucracy and were given very little autonomous power of decision. There were several levels of authority over the enterprise, including not only the state organisation to which it belonged but also up to at least four ministries (Industry, Planning, Economy, Finance) and a variety of sub-ministerial agencies. Nearly all decisions had to go through layers; many of them had to go high up in the relevant ministries. The planning, evaluation and implementation of investment decisions required approval from a number of sources, and even the implementation might be undertaken by an agency outside the enterprise. Pricing decisions were made by the state organisation, and were subject to ministerial approval, giving the enterprise very little flexibility to meet market conditions. Even to sell off obsolete inventories, surplus raw materials, etc., managers of enterprises had to obtain authorization from higher authority and then sell at public auctions according to procedures laid down." 20

These difficulties show that the public sector manager does not have enough power to make radical changes (organisational decisions) in his enterprise when compared with the power of his counterpart in the private sector enterprise. These difficulties also indicate that not only are there many levels of decision-making in the public sector, but the process is highly centralised.

To achieve radical changes in his enterprise, the public sector manager must have prior approval from his superiors, including the minister.

On the other hand, the public sector industrial manager, according to the Iraqi labour laws, must let workers participate in organisational decisions. This, coupled with the fact that the

majority of the public sector managers are young and highly mobile have forced them to apply Style 3 (Joint decision).<sup>21</sup> Yet, in day-to-day matters, their behaviour is almost similar to that of their peers in the private sector - both are more autocratic.

Second: the shortage of skilled manpower in Iraq is very acute, as discussed earlier. Indeed, while the public sector managers pay little attention to this matter (partly because there are other governmental bodies responsible for supporting manpower and because he is working in the government and such matters as profit or losses do not affect him directly), the private sector manager keenly regards such issues for they have a direct effect on his financial position. This coupled with the fact that the majority of these managers have good experience in their current companies have made them less autocratic when dealing with subordinates' problems. As a matter of fact, the findings, together with the reasons mentioned above, lend some support to Vroom's suggestion that "it makes more sense to talk about participative and autocratic situations than it does to talk about participative and autocratic managers."<sup>22</sup>

#### SUMMARY:

Much of human behaviour is a reflection of the decisions people make. The processes that regulate and control these decisions are central to any scientific discipline that endeavours to understand and predict human behaviour. During the last thirty years or so, an immense literature on leadership and/or decision making styles

has been carried out. Most of this literature has discussed the ways and the problems of manager-subordinates participation in decision making. On the other hand, the reader of this literature finds that there are many cross-cultural studies that have concluded that the managers of the developing countries are more authoritative in decision making when compared with their peers in developed countries.

This chapter has attempted to discover to what extent the Iraqi managers let subordinates participate in decision making and what leadership style is the most common among these managers. The chapter has also tried to examine the thesis of the cross-cultural management scholars which indicates that authoritative management style or simply authoritative decision making style is the prevailing style in the developing countries. In addition, the chapter has tried to investigate Muna's results of the Arab executive on one hand, and to examine the argument which insists that there is no universal management or leadership style that is "best" in all situations (or different problems) and that leadership is a contingent variable - depending on the situation in which a manager works.

The conceptual framework and the methods used in this chapter have been gathered from seven taxonomies published during the last four decades. The various decision-making styles used by managers have been defined and ordered by four point equal interval scale, reflecting the various degrees of power-sharing between the manager and subordinates.

A semi-structured interview method was used to obtain the information about the manager styles in decision making. Each manager was presented with a description of four alternative decision styles. The alternative styles were Style 1 (own decision): Style 2 (consultation): Style 3 (joint decision) and Style 4 (delegation). Each manager then was given ten decisions and requested to specify which of the alternatives he would normally use.

Two methods were used to analyse the data obtained. The first was to use frequency distribution of responses to each of the ten decisions in the light of the four alternatives of decision-making styles. The second method of analysing the data was to make use of the power-sharing continuum and the assumption that its four styles are supported by equal intervals. While this assumption allowed the use of main scores of all the managers studied, it also enabled us to analyse the variances among these scores.

Among the results the chapter has achieved are:

**First:** The managers studied have employed different styles for each one of the ten decisions and none of the managers has one specific universal style across these different types of decisions.

**Second:** Almost all the managers have avoided employing Style 4 (delegation).

Third: Style 1 (own decision) was predominantly preferred by the managers for this specific set of decisions. This result differs from what Muna has discovered in the other Arab countries. He found that Style 2 (consultation) is the prevailing one among his subjects. The only reason for such a difference, according to the author's opinion, is that Muna's study has included 28 managers (54% of all the sample) working in trade and service organisations whereas the managers covered by the present study are all industrial managers. As an Arab, the author believes that managers of trade and service organisations are more flexible and tolerant on such matters as time, regulations and other managerial aspects including decision making than the industrial managers.

Fourth: Subordinates participation in decision making in the public sector was more than their counterparts in the private sector. More precisely, the public sector managers were more inclined to let subordinates participate in decision making than the private sector managers. This result forced us to extend the analysis in two ways:

- a) breakdown the ten decisions according to their content or importance into three groups as follows: decisions bear direct importance to the subordinates; decisions have specific importance to a department, and decisions have special importance to the company as a whole. The aim was to see whether the managers can

differentiate these categories (situations) of decisions in the power-sharing styles they use, on one hand, and to discover on which group these managers are authoritative, on the other.

- b) analyse these groups of decisions in the light of the managers' sectors.

The first method indicated that the managers used Style 1 (own decision) in handling personnel and department matters and used Style 3 (joint decision) in organisational decisions.

As regards the second method of analysis, the evidence indicated that Style 1 was the prevailing one in the private sector irrespective of the type of the decision. Whereas, in the public sector, although Style 3 was the dominant one, the managers used it only with organisational decisions.

These findings are inconsistent with both Heller's and Muna's results. Both have concluded that managers tend to be less autocratic when dealing with problems related to subordinates and more autocratic when facing organisational decisions. While it is difficult to compare between managers from different countries on the one hand, and because the Iraqi managers were absent in these studies on the other, the present findings lend some support to Vroom's suggestion that "it makes more sense to talk about participative and autocratic situations than it does to talk about participative and autocratic managers.

Fifth: The findings presented in this chapter also indicate that it is misleading to generalise about management style, even when using a situational approach such as that of Vroom and Yetton, in a vacuum, or with superficial cross-cultural effort. It is essential to refer to the prevailing culture and situational factors of the environment to understand the meaning of the specific behaviours involved in "Style" and "situation".

Notes

1. See, J. Clifton Williams, Human Behaviour in Organisation (Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western Publishing Co., 1978), pp. 167-8; James A.F. Stoner, Management, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 2nd ed. 1982), p. 304; John R.P. French and Bertram Raven, "The Basis of Social Power", in Studies in Social Power, ed. Dorwin Cartwright (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan, 1959), pp. 150-67; Reinhard Bendix, Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule, (California: California University Press, 1978); Dalton E. McFarland, Management: Foundation and Practices, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 5th ed., 1979), pp. 355-58.
2. See, Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, (New York: Macmillan, 2nd ed. 1957); Idem, Models of Man: Social and Rational, (New York: Wiley, 1957); see also, James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organisations, (New York: Wiley, 1958); Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, (Englewood, Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963).
3. Victor H. Vroom and Philip W. Yetton, Leadership and Decision-Making (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973); p. 5.
4. Frank A. Heller, Managerial Decision-Making (London: Tavistock Publication Ltd., 1971), p. xv.
5. Fred E. Fiedler and Martin M. Chemers, Leadership and Effective Management (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1974), pp. 76-7; Fred E. Fiedler, A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967).



6. Frank A. Heller, op.cit., p. 27; Farid A. Muna, The Arab Executive (London: The Macmillan Press, 1980), p. 47.
7. Farid A. Muna, op.cit., p. 45.
8. See, Frank A. Heller, op.cit., pp. 44 and 88; Victor H. Vroom and Philip W. Yetton, op.cit., pp. 20-5; Rensis Likert, New Patterns of Management (New York: McGraw Hill, 1961); Victor H. Vroom, "Leadership" in Handbook of Industrial and Organisational Psychology, ed. Marvin D. Dunnette (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1976), pp. 1527-51; Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton, The New Managerial Grid, (Houston: Gulf Publishing, 1978), pp. 177-96.
9. James A.F. Stoner, op.cit. p. 316.
10. Ibid., p. 317.
11. Theodor T. Herbert, Dimensions of Organisational Behaviour (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 2nd ed., 1981), p. 397.
12. F. Harbison and C.A. Myers, Management in the Industrial World, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960), pp. 123-7.
13. Harry Levinson, Executive, The Guide to Responsive Management (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 50.
14. See Chapter one.
15. Henry L. Sisk and J. Clifton Williams, Management and Organisation (Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western Publishing Co., 4th ed., 1981), p. 229.
16. For more details of the economic plan in Iraq, see Chapter four.
17. See, for example, Frank A. Heller, op.cit., pp. 53-4; Farid A. Muna, op.cit., pp. 50-3.
18. See Frank A. Heller, op.cit., p. 45.
19. Ibid., p. 86; Farid A. Muna, op.cit., p. 52.
20. Edith and E.F. Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1978), pp. 470-74.
21. See, Tables 6.1 and 6.16.
22. Victor H. Vroom, Leadership, op.cit., p. 1545.

## CHAPTER TEN

### SUMMARY

The present study is an exploratory study. It has attempted to explore the following principal aspects of the Iraqi managers:

1. Their personal-social and career patterns and characteristics.
2. The type of interrelationships that exist between these characteristics, and whether these characteristics differ according to:
  - a: the size of the organisations in which these managers are working
  - b: the ownership of the organisations - public and private, and
  - c: the managers' place of birth - rural and urban.
3. The study has also tried to discover and document the decision-making styles of the Iraqi managers and which style is most common among them. Likewise, to discover whether their styles differ across different decisions (problems) or across different sectors (organisation ownership).
4. To show how these managers spend their time and what activities they perform in their work and to find out how long they spend in each activity and to what extent the length of each activity differs across the periods (the morning and the evening periods) and across the sectors and what are the principal reasons that are responsible for such differences.
5. A comparison of the principal characteristics of the Iraqi managers with the characteristics of some of those working in some developed countries was also among the objectives of this study.

6. It was also among the objectives of this study to investigate the argument of the cross-cultural management theorists which confirms that management style in the developing countries is authoritative and managers in such countries minimize subordinate's participation in the decision-making process to the lowest degree.

To achieve these and other objectives mentioned through the nine chapters of this study, several different methods have been used. In the first place, a careful review of the relevant literature in leadership theories and crosscultural management studies was undertaken. The work of other researchers who had made studies on managers and their jobs, whether in the Western or in the Eastern countries, has also been carefully investigated. This method helped us to discover the following points:

- 1 - There are almost as many different definitions of leadership as there are persons who have attempted to define the concept. There is little agreement as to the meaning of the concept and there is little in the way of unifying theory of leadership.
- 2 - There are different theories of leadership. The traits theories, the behavioural theories, the situational theories and the contingency theories. The situational and contingency theories are more accurate in dealing with leadership because they look at leadership as an interacting process which differs from what we have seen in the traits and behavioural theories - they both looked at leadership as an independent variable and the leader or the manager can work the way he likes.

3. Leadership is a means - it is not an end in itself. This means can be used by managers and non-managers. Accepting such a criterion indicates that not all leadership behaviour of a certain leader or manager is directed towards achieving organisational objectives.
4. From the field of the crosscultural management studies we have discovered the following points:
  - a: there are two schools of management, the universal school and the cultural school. The first believes that no appreciable difference exists in managerial behaviour across countries while the second school, "the cultural school" believes that culture is the independent variable in explaining managerial behaviour.
  - b: One of the most important features of the cultural school of management is that management style in developing countries is authoritative and managers in such countries avoid subordinate participation in the decision-making process. Many studies in this school have shown that the level of industrialisation is the major factor in determining manager-subordinate relationship.
  - c: The current literature of crosscultural management studies covers only a small part of the world. It needs to be extended to cover such countries as China, Spain, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and the rest of the other Arab countries, in order to be more representative on the one hand, and to make better judgement in the field of management, on the other.

Another review of what has been written in the Western and the Eastern countries about the Arab society and its culture, including that of Iraq was also undertaken. This was so important from the point of view of this study, mainly because without such a prior understanding of the Iraqi society and its culture across long periods of time, the analysis of the Iraqi managers (in terms of their backgrounds, characteristics and decision-making styles) would have been incomplete.

In addition to these methods, 44 managing directors have been interviewed in Iraq. These managers are working in industrial organisations. 20 managers from the public sector and the remainder are working in the private sector. The organisations in which these managers work differ in sizes - the biggest one has 5,005 employees and the smallest one has 48 employees. These organisations are located in different provinces - Baghdad, Ninevah, Arbile and Sulaimaniyah provinces. The forty four organisations produce different types of products ranging from foodstuff, beverage and tobacco to textiles, ready-made clothes, leathers industries, manufactured industries and cement industries.

## FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

In this part, a summary of the principal findings of this study is presented. These findings are classified into two groups. The first group of the findings cover the country as a whole - its geographical characteristics, its society, its political and economic environment. Thus, the findings of this group cover four chapters in this study; the second, third, fourth and the fifth chapters.

The second group of the findings are concerned with the Iraqi managers, their backgrounds, characteristics and career patterns. How they spend their time and what activities do they perform. What are the principal social pressures "constraints" they perform and their decision-making styles. The findings of this second group cover the last four chapters.

### 1.0 MODERN IRAQ: GEOGRAPHICAL ENVIRONMENT, SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

#### 1. GEOGRAPHICAL ENVIRONMENT:

Iraq has an area of approximately 438,000 sq.km. The country can be divided into three regions: the mountains in the north and north-east, the alluvial plain in the middle and south, the desert. The desert covers 60% of the whole country and is situated in the west. Except in the mountains, the desert climate is the prevailing one in all parts of Iraq. It is characterised by a great temperature variation between day and night, summer and winter, the maximum of which reaches 40-45<sup>o</sup>C.

## Tigris and Euphrates: A Continuous Challenge

Until very recently the people were victims rather than the beneficiaries of the main two rivers - Tigris and Euphrates. They have posed a challenge to the riparian agricultural population since earliest times and still play tantalizing tricks on them. In the Spring, the surging rivers pour out an over-abundance of water, whereas during the summer, when the sun parches the land, they provide barely enough water for irrigation. Equally, the water of these rivers contains a heavy proportion of salt and silt, and due to their bifurcating nature, which allows only a small amount to be dammed, the more the water supply is increased, the worse the salt problem becomes.

The continual challenge of these rivers together with the continuous challenge of the desert environment are among the principal pushing factors that are responsible for people migrating toward towns and cities.

### 2. SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

#### Population: Heterogeneous

The people were 8 million in 1965, 9 million in 1970 and 12 million in 1977. Iraq does not suffer from the spectre of over-population. Age-group distribution of the population, as given in the 1977 census, indicates that almost two-thirds of the population are under 30 years of age. Different races and religions exist - Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and Syriac. The majority are Muslims and the second religion is Christianity. About 90% of the population are Muslims and Islam is the state religion.

The orthodox muslims are fatalists in the sense that they strongly believe that what the Lord has planned for them they have to face. The Iraqi, as a religious person, considers the recognition and worship of God through Islam the principal concern of his life. He views himself as a humble creature, whose life at any moment, becomes whatever the Lord wills it to become.

As far as income, size of family (number of children) individual success or failure are concerned, the majority of the people believe that these things are in the hands of God. It follows that a human being, by his own efforts cannot improve his condition - Allah alone can do that. Consequently what is the use of arduous efforts when they may fail because they are against the will of God?

#### Social Communities: The Bedouin, the Village and the City Communities

In Iraq there are three communities, the bedouin, the village and the city communities. In terms of social values and customs, they are closely interrelated and the desert is the principal reservoir for the village and city communities. The bedouin community has declined but many of its practices, customs, institutions and instincts of the early bedouin life have developed over centuries to become the warp and woof of modern society in Iraq. Most beduins have moved from desert and settled in villages and towns. The romantic past is left behind, though not forgotten; bedouin values, customs and attitudes (superiority of man over women, generosity, attitude toward time and manual work) continue to be prized but the bedouin himself has in fact become either a farmer or industrial worker.



The village community is the backbone of the country and Iraq is the land of villages. Not so long ago, as early as 1950, 80% of the five million people lived in villages, and 90% of the villagers at that time were cultivators. In 1957 the number of villages was in excess of 8,000 villages. The villager considered himself as a settled nomad and claims that his origin is from a formerly nomad tribe. The same values of the bedouin community also exist in the village community. Most of the villagers have abandoned their villages and migrated to cities.

As regards the city communities, there are no clear-cut lines between the townsmen and the villagers in terms of social values. Many townsmen were of relatively recent tribal origin. Even today, a large number of the inhabitants of Baghdad - the capital of Iraq - quite apart of the tribal immigrants of the last forty years, still remember the name of the tribe to which they once belonged. In the towns, the influence of the old norms and traditions, even if considerable reduced, nevertheless, still persist. The psychology and the ways of the old order - the work of long years- as well as the bedouin and villager values, traditions and norms are still embodied in the life of a broad cross-section of the people, and will not easily wither away.

#### Social Structure: Past and Present

##### Social Structure in the past: The Tribe, the Clan and The Family

Under the never-ending pressure of environment, three interlocked social institutions characterised the ancient society of Iraq: The Tribe, the Clan and the Family. All developed in the context of conventional ancient and primitive patriarchal society. In such a

social structure the man regarded himself as highly superior as a strong chief, the boys the future chiefs; the woman was the weak creature or servant, the girls the future servants. So too, within each clan the men were all-powerful and the women totally subservient. In the same vein, within each tribe the men dominated completely and the women were good insofar as they produced boys, served their men and responded to their whims.

Indeed, this acute perception of male superiority also existed between tribes and clans. Within a clan or even tribe, men related to one another as men; except that when a man somehow failed to carry out his male role - exacting revenge for some offence to his clan or tribe or family, for instance - he was declassified into a status akin to womanhood. Within such a value system, then, not only were men superior to women, but certain men were superior to other men, certain families, it thus followed, were superior to other families - for if a man disgraced himself, reduced himself to womanhood, then his family was reduced as well.

From this evolved the consecutive ideas that certain clans were superior to other clans, certain tribes within an area superior to other tribes of that area, the tribal society of one area superior to that of another, and so on up the ladder.

#### Contemporary Social Structure: The Extended Family and the Clan:

The extended family is the principal social structure in contemporary Iraq despite the fact that the clan structure pervades villages and small towns.

The Iraqi family has a different and wider connotation than that which is customary existing in the developed countries. The term includes many more distant relatives and kinsmen than in, say, the United Kingdom, in the narrower sense. In most villages and cities, the extended family consists of the father and wife, their unmarried children, their married sons with their families. The trends towards nuclear family is something new in the cities of Baghdad, Mosul and Basra and when it exists, it does not mean that the new married couple have freed themselves from their social and economic obligations toward their parents.

The father in the Iraqi family plays a dominant role, and his image is that of a patriarch presiding over his family's affairs. The descent in the family is patrilineal. That is, each man is identified as belonging to his father's family, not his mother's.

The Iraqi family controls and shapes its members' behaviour in such a way that they must think twice before deciding such decisions as marriage and the type of business to engage in. Marriage is a family rather than a personal affair. Because the sexes do not ordinarily mix socially, young men and women have few or no acquaintances among the opposite sex.

Males in the family look at females as weak creatures. The honour of the family, easily damaged and nearly irreparable, depends on the conduct of its women. Consequently, women are expected to be decorous, modest and circumspect.

Within the large cities the extended families are grouped into lineages. Paternal descent and authority, family loyalty and

co-operation within the lineage are still prevailing, although the cohesiveness of the extended kin group varies from the traditional closeness to the looser ties of the western-influenced family.

Educational Status of the People: Massive illiteracy, Men are better educated than women, Urban dwellers have better chances in education.

Education plays a significant role in the economic and social development in every society. Nowadays, a society must be an educated society in order to progress, to grow, even to survive. Many of the traditional beliefs, values and customs discussed above can be eradicated or, at least minimized by modern education. Unfortunately, modern education is new in Iraq. Let us here reconsider some of our findings. Illiteracy is the most salient feature in Iraq. In 1950, 96% of the population were illiterate. The most recent census of 1977 showed that 53% of the people were illiterate; in urban areas the proportion was 41% as against 75% in the rural areas. Men, whether in urban or rural areas, are better educated than women.

Though the contemporary government has made massive efforts to eradicate illiteracy and the number of students in all studying stages has increased dramatically, the quality of education leaves much to be desired and the role of university inside the society is weak and fails to develop an integrated philosophy of life to the new generation. Old fashioned teaching methods still linger, dictation of lectures is common and passively received by students - committed to memory.

### 3. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

#### Political Environment: Instability across the centuries, Corruption and Lack of Order.

Iraq's history is a vivid record of easily awakened antagonisms, conflicting interests and political instability. During the Turkish empire (1534-1917), numerous campaigns between the Turks and the Persians were fought on Iraqi soil. Tribal and clan life dominated the country and tribal chiefs (sheikhs) were often at loggerheads with each other, and were more or less independent of effective Turkish control. Likewise, the Turkish Walies were unable to maintain order, nor were they honest persons; they were preoccupied with the task of extracting as much wealth as they could for themselves. Little was done to enrich the country and the continual popular demand for tax reform and social justice was never seriously considered.

During the British mandate <sup>of</sup> the monarchical regime (1917-1958), the dominant features in Iraq, were insecurity, corrupt administration and flagrant abuse of authority.

Between 1920 and 1950, 47 cabinets came to power, and more than 24 cabinets between 1950 and 1968. The aim of each cabinet was to prepare its own development programme and to bring its own supporters. The political welter of narrow interests prevented a well-directed economic policy, even though each new regime (or cabinet) was anxious to further economic development and political order. Corruption has increased dramatically at almost all levels of the government. The gap between the people and the successive governments has increased and distrust increased over the years.

Economic Environment: Oil revenue is the main resource for development, Mainly Agriculture, Modern industry is new.

Oil revenues:

The Iraqi economy is heavily dependent on oil revenues. After the nationalization of oil industry in 1972, the share of the oil sector in the national product jumped from 35% in 1970 to 60% in 1974. Its contribution to the total government revenues increased from 52% in 1971 to 87% in 1976, and crude oil accounted for 98% of the total exports in 1975. The economy is firmly directed by central government, whose objectives are to expand the public sector to encompass eventually the entire economy. Centralised planning and decentralised execution are the basic ideals and principles which guide the economy in Iraq.

Agriculture: The everlasting problem

Iraq is predominantly an agricultural country with about half of its population deriving their income directly or indirectly from cultivation and animal husbandry.

During the last forty years, thousands of peasants have moved from the agricultural land and settled in the major cities of Iraq. Different but interlocked factors caused their migration, chief among them were:

Feudalism: Until 1970, the agricultural sector characterized itself by the control of feudalism over the most fertile land, whereas the majority of the peasants lived in utter poverty and ignorance. The feudal system brought grave economic

defects and was often socially vicious. It lies behind most of the social and economic problems in Iraq.

#### Land salinization and irrigation methods:

The salt and silt that characterise the land, together with the problems of floods and scarcity of water during the summer period are among the principal factors for peasants' migration. Poor irrigation and drainage systems still impede agricultural progress and enrich land salinization.

#### Land reform laws:

During the last thirty years more than one land reform law was enacted. The aim of these laws was to redistribute the land ownership between peasants and reduce the size of the land holding of the large holders. While these laws were progressive in terms of their social justice, the successive governments before 1968 did not realise the scale and complexity of the agricultural problems nor had they a clear understanding of the strength of the feudalists, nor did they have enough officials capable of effective farm management. Land was expropriated rapidly while distribution was extremely low.

The above factors combined to produce continuous rural-urban migration which not only affects agricultural productivity but creates considerable difficulties against industrial progress.

Industry: New era, Baghdad has the lion's share, the industrial workers are villagers in origin

Iraq witnessed modern industry at the beginning of 1950 when oil revenues started to accumulate. During that decade, the industrial sector was hindered because the royal regime believed that Iraq is an agricultural country and, therefore, should not expand industry.

Though this sector expanded steadily during the sixties, its expansion was arbitrary and brought unfavourable results to the economy as a whole, because it aimed at creating new basis of politics and finding new opportunities to large numbers of unemployed persons.

The present government is forging ahead with an industrialization programme at a speed unmatched by any of the previous regimes. It believes that the backward Iraq society cannot be radically changed without giving to industrialization its due importance, since industry constitutes one of the basic pillars of progress in the modern age. As a result, the industrial sector took the first place among the economic sectors in the years that followed 1968. In the first economic comprehensive plan (1970 - 1974) total allocation for industry was I.D. 391 million, whereas the agriculture sector, for instance, took the second position with an allocation of 366.2 million. Meanwhile, the total investments of the industrial sector during the first three years of the second development plan (1975 - 1980) was I.D. 2123 million, representing about 47% of the combined investments in all the economic sectors.



Most industrial establishments are located in Baghdad. Baghdad has the lion's share in industrial establishments. In 1977, 67% of all large industrial establishments were located in Baghdad - the capital of Iraq.

Most industrial workers - and managers - in Iraq are of village origin. The industrial worker is a peasant villager, and a member of the traditional agricultural society. This fact, combined with the novelty of industry in Iraq and the continual villagers' migration, keeps in the factory worker many of the attitudes of the non-industrial society; he remains a villager and industrial employment, for him, is not yet a way of life. While the agricultural environment has a very specific quality which impresses itself on the mentality of the villager and is reflected in his social life, the urban factory worker is an employee working under immediately supervision at a task specifically assigned to him.

In Iraq, the factory workers are still a very minor group in the society and most of them are unskilled.

Second: THE IRAQI SENIOR MANAGERS, PRODUCT OF THEIR ENVIRONMENT

The previous findings indicate what is Iraq - its geography, its social and economic environments. In the following section of findings, we are going to look at the Iraqi managers, their personal-social characteristics and career patterns, how they spend their time and what activities do they perform. What are the principal

social constraints they face in their society and their decision-making styles. Many of the findings we discuss here are, in fact, the result of the larger society with all its conflicting interests, values, customs and traditions.

#### 1 - BACKGROUNDS AND CAREER PATTERNS:

##### Age:

The average age of the forty four managers studied is 46.7 years. It is 41.9 years in the public sector and 50.8 years in the private sector. This is quite different from what we have observed in the studies of the Western managers, where managers in the public sector are more aged than those working in the private sector. Two principal reasons can clarify the situation in Iraq. They are political instability and the acute shortage of skilled manpower in the public sector establishments.

##### Education:

The public sector managers in Iraq have more formal education when compared with the private sector managers. 95% of the public sector managers have university education compared to just 29% of the private sector managers. While there is no manager holding a primary school certificate in the public sector, 46% in the private sector have this degree or less. Two principal factors can explain why. The first is that a high level of education is preferred by the government in senior management positions in the public sector. The second is that, in the private sector, once you are rich you can become a managing director. Likewise, as we have seen above,

the private sector managers are more aged compared with their counterparts in the public sector. Indeed, in Iraq the more elder the person is, the more likely he is to be less educated than the younger persons - more than 90% of the Iraqis were illiterate in 1950. Add to this fact, most of the private managers covered by this study are of rural origin, if we remember, the rural areas have less chance in education when compared with the urban areas.

Size of the family:

Evidence indicates that 75% of the Iraqi managers in this study have three children or more. It also shows that public sector managers tend to have less children in comparison with the private sector managers. While 95% of the public sector managers have four or less children each, only 55% of the private sector managers fell into this category. The remainder have between five and ten children each. To explain the reason, the author will mention two factors:

- a: In Iraq, as mentioned earlier, the people admire large families and the extended family is a good example. We must not forget the influence of Islamic religion in this respect.
- b: Age of the manager and his place of birth have also to be considered as well as his level of education. The aged managers are less educated and more likely to have come from villages. Orthodox Islamic faith in the villages, according to the author's view, is more prevalent, particularly among the uneducated and the aged people.

Place of birth:

24 managers out of the 44 managers studied are from rural areas. This reflects the horizontal social movement between the rural and the urban areas in Iraq. If we still remember, between 1965 and 1977 there were more than one million who had migrated from villages and settled in the main cities of Iraq - notably Baghdad.

Social origins:

The evidence indicates that 53% of the managers are from the lower class (their fathers are either unskilled or semi-skilled workers). A strong relationship exists between the educational level of the manager and his social class. 70% of the managers from the upper class and all those from the middle class have university education, while only 44% of the managers in lower class have such a qualification.

Indeed, whether in Iraq or elsewhere, the financial situation of a family plays a decisive role in children's education; the richer the family, the more it is financially able to spend on the children's education.

Career patterns:

While all the public sector managers have twenty years service or less, 58% of the private sector managers have twenty one years or more. The age of the manager has a significant relation with the

length of a manager's service in Iraq. Our evidence also indicates that 75% of the public sector managers have ten years or less in their current companies. Only four managers have between eleven and twenty years and only one has 25 years experience in his current company. As for the private sector managers, eleven have 10 years or less; twelve have between 11 to 20 years, and only one manager has 28 years in his current company.

The length of time these managers have served in their present posts as managing directors also varies. In the public sector, 90% of managers have served 5 years or less while the remainder have served between 6 and 10 years. In the private sector, 50% of managers have served between 11 and 25 years; 21% between 6 and 10 years and the remainder either have 5 years or less in their current posts.

The length of the service whether in the whole life of these managers or whether in their present companies, or in their present posts has its explanations in the problems of political instability across the years, the problems of the shortage of the management cadre as well as the educational levels of the managers studied.

The previous analysis of the lengths of service of these managers indicates that the public sector managers are more mobile than the private sector managers. 75% of the private sector managers have spent their entire career either in one or two companies, whereas 55% of the public sector managers have moved between three and six companies.

The age of a manager is not positively associated with the number of manager's moves in Iraq. In this study the evidence indicates that the older managers have less inter-firms mobility when compared with the young managers' situation. The young managers work in the public sector. The older the manager is the more likely he is to work in the private sector and, the less movements between companies he has.

Mobility inside the public sector in Iraq is largely outwith the control of managers. A public sector manager is like a soldier at the mercy of the government and does not know when he will be transferred or retired, nor what his destination will be.

If we look at these managers in the light of the size of their companies we find that those working in the large companies (501 employees or more) are younger than those working in medium (101 to 500 employees) and small companies (100 employees or less); they are more educated, more mobile and have less service years than those working in medium and small companies.

## 2 - HOW THEY SPEND THEIR TIME AND WHAT ACTIVITIES DO THEY PERFORM?

The evidence presented in this study indicates that the average working hours for these managers is 10½ hours. It is 10½ hours in the public sector and 10 hours in the private sector. Total average hours per week is 63 hours for the public sector manager compared with 60 hours in the private sector.

### Paperwork

In the public sector, if we exclude communication activity, the paperwork activity takes up more of the manager's time than any other type of activity. He spends on paperwork matters around 16% of his daily time, on average, while the private sector manager spends around 5% of his time in this activity.

One of the principal reasons that make the public sector manager devote more time to paperwork activity in comparison with the private sector manager's situation is that they are working in larger companies. 60% of the public sector managers take a lot of their paperwork to their home after working hours to finish it in due time. Yet some of them prefer to come early in the morning to his office for the same purpose. Contrary to the public sector managers, all the private sector managers studied perform their paperwork activity inside their companies and during the working hours.

This result must not surprise us. In addition to the fact that the public sector companies are larger in their size when compared with the size of the private sector companies, the public sector manager cannot control his own time inside the company. His daytime is for inter-personal work, interaction with other managers, clients, customers, meetings and so forth. Thus paperwork has to be taken home because only at home can he be protected from outside interruption and he controls the use of his own time.

### Planning and Organising Activities:

Scholars of management and organisation theories agreed that at the top of an organisation structure, conceptual skill, such as

planning and organising activities are the most important skills a manager has to perform. Unfortunately, evidence in hand indicates that the Iraqi manager devotes more time to his personal activity than that devoted to planning or organising. We believe that the industrial sector in Iraq would achieve more progress if the managers devote some of their personal time to management activities. We also believe that central planning in the public sector, together with the negative attitude of the Iraqi personality are among the reasons that are responsible for the meagre time these managers give to planning activity. The distrust that exists between the governmental establishments and the people must also be considered in this respect.

The evidence also shows that these managers devote more time for organising activity compared to what they accord to planning activities. We believe that when a manager spends little time on planning it would be more likely that he will devote more time for other activities including organisation.

#### Communication Activity:

Like the Western managers, the Iraqi managers devote the bulk of their daily time to communication activity. In this study, communication activities have been divided into three types: manager-subordinate communications; manager-superiors communications and manager-customers communication. The Iraqi manager, irrespective of his sector, engages himself with subordinates communications more than any other type of communication. In the public sector, a manager



spends, on average, less time on face-to-face contacts with subordinates, customers and superiors when compared with the private sector manager. Likewise, he spends more time on telephone contacts with subordinates and superiors, but less time with customers, than that of the private sector manager. Size of the company and the manager's office location are among the principal reasons for time variation as well as for the method used by these managers in communication. While the public sector manager has a large company and usually consists of two factories or more, the private sector manager has either medium or small company. Consequently, subordinates of the public sector manager are working over a large area and the distance between them and the manager's office permits telephone contacts rather than face-to-face contacts.

The evidence indicates that the public sector manager devotes less time to superiors and customers contacts when compared with his counterpart in the private sector.

#### Research Activity:

The link between planning and research activities is profound. When planning is outwith a manager's control, when the government is responsible for the future of the public sector companies, and when (in the private sector) there are illiterate managers, and finally, when the demand for the products these companies produce is high compared with the actual supply, then one would expect little time for research activity. While the evidence indicates that all the public sector managers devote less time to research activity compared with what they accord to planning and organising activities,

63% of the private sector managers devote no time for this activity at all. We believe that only through continual systematic research can an organisation retain its dynamic equilibrium and keep up to date.

#### Personal and Complex Activities:

The findings indicate that the Iraqi manager, irrespective of his sector, devotes more time for personal activities than that devoted to planning, organising and research activities. The findings also show that this activity takes up around 94 minutes of the manager's daily time on average. In addition, the private sector manager devotes more time for this activity compared with the public sector manager.

The evidence also shows that the forty four managers studies devote more time for what we had called "complex activities" compared to what they accord to planning, or organising or research activity. Yet, the public sector manager devotes more time for this activity than that granted to personal activity, while the private sector manager devotes less time to this activity in comparison with what he accords to his personal activities. Size of the company, the ownership of the company and other personal qualifications are among the factors that are responsible for this divergence.

### 3. SOCIAL CONSTRAINTS HINDERING MANAGEMENT WORK

There are different but interlocking social constraints or pressures which face and hinder these managers in their work. The managers studied cannot work in a completely unconstrained way.

They are not able to exercise the same degree of freedom over their own organisations of work as the Western managers. There is no surprise in this result. The Iraqi managers are working in a group-oriented society; they have to pay special attention to their families, relatives and friends. Iraqi society is a developing society and the people still admire the bedouin and village values. The worker himself still dislikes his manual work and continuously seeks clerical works because, in his opinion, such works are more respectful than manual work. So, too, he still pays little weight to the value of time and lack of punctuality in time schedules and appointments, procrastination and the "tomorrow" attitude are quite common among the workers and the Iraqis as a whole.

Among other social constraints are inequality of sex, the problem of mediation and private visits to these managers from the outsiders while they are working.

While all these sorts of pressures and constraints can be linked with the bedouin and the village communities, these managers face another type of constraint, largely because the society still lives in agricultural environment and industry itself represents a new era in Iraq. Chief among such constraints are the problem of low level of industrial mentality, low level of productivity and shortage of skilled manpower. The problems of marketing constraints must also be remembered in this respect.


What is obvious from this study is that the Iraqi managers are under strong social pressures from their families, relatives

and friends, their subordinates and finally, from the society at large. Most, if not all, of these pressures do not exist in Western countries. To cope with such pressures and work in a way similar to that of the Western managers, the Iraqi manager needs a long time.

#### 4. DECISION-MAKING STYLES

Despite the fact that these managers used different styles for each one of the ten decisions or problems that we had given to them, the evidence indicates two principal points. The first is that most of the managers have used style 1 (own decision) with all these decisions. The second is that most of them have avoided style 4 (delegation) with this set of decisions.

While these results give support to the crosscultural management studies which confirms that the authoritative management style is fairly common in the developing countries, it also gives some support to the theorists of organisational behaviour who emphasise that there is no one best management style and a manager's style is a contingent variable - depending on the situation in which he works.

The findings presented in this study also differs from what Muna has found in other Arab countries. He found that style 2 (consultation) is predominantly preferred by the managers when they dealt with problems similar to the problems used in this study. 

The principal reason for this difference, we believe, is that in Muna's sample there were 28 managers working in trade and service organisations, while all the managers of the present study are industrial managers. In the Arab world, trade and service managers are more flexible and tolerant in such matters as time, formalities and other regulations including decision making, than managers of industrial organisations.

The results presented, whether in this study or Muna's study, show that the Arab managers, irrespective of their countries and type of the business, are more inclined to use style 1 (own decision) and style 2 (consultation). That is, they use the authoritative management style with their subordinates and do not permit them to participate in decision-making process. By so doing, these managers have eliminated a valuable training opportunity and experience for their subordinates.

It is those customs, traditions, values, together with other social and industrial constraints, which are largely responsible for the managers' aversion toward subordinates participation in decision making process.

The evidence also shows that the public sector manager in Iraq is more inclined to use style 3 (joint decision) across different problems, whereas the private sector manager prefers using style 1 (own decision) irrespective of the type of the problem in hand. The principal reason for this different situation is that the public sector manager does not have, like his counterpart, a free enterprise, nor has he a free hand in the organisation. If we still

remember, the Iraqi economy is centralised economy and the public sector manager has to work within the limits of the central economic plan. The industrial organisation, on the other hand, is organised as a part of the state bureaucracy and the manager has very little autonomous power of decisions. There are several levels of authority over the industrial enterprise. Nearly all decisions have to go through layers; many of them, particularly those relating to investment, creating of new products or new markets, have to go high up in the relevant government body. To achieve radical changes in his enterprise, the public sector manager must have prior approval from his superiors, including the minister.

All the points presented indicate that the environment has a great influence on the manager's characteristics (personal-social and career patterns); thinking and behaviour. We do not say that these managers have only a small role in their society, nor have we over-estimated their importance in the progress of the economy. The thing that we have repeatedly emphasised throughout this study is that in order to understand the principal characteristics of a group of managers working in a given country, a prior understanding of their society is essential. Without such a prior understanding, the analysis, the interpretation of their characteristics, attitude and behaviour will be incomplete.

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## APPENDICES

## APPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGY, DATA ANALYSIS AND REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SAMPLE

METHODOLOGY

The forty four managers studied were senior managers. Forty one of them were managing directors and the remaining were deputy managers.

The term "managing director" means in this study the person who formally heads the organisation (either because he is the owner, or because the owner or the government has appointed him to fill this position); He oversees the whole organisation and is responsible for all its activities such as production, marketing and finance.

The term "deputy manager" means the person who exercises the work of managing director but he does not formally head the organisation.

All the managers were personally interviewed in their organisations. Two days have been spent almost in each organisation. The researcher undertook three main activities while he was in the organisation.

- a) Interviewing the manager. This activity took the major share of the researcher's time.
- b) Interviewing his direct subordinate(s) and secretary. The aim here was to gather information about the manager's previous time and how he divided his daily work. In addition, the researcher was investigating the soundness of the manager's discussions which related to his decision making approaches.
- c) Observing the manager while he was working. The observation here took two aspects. The purpose of the first aspect was to obtain

an idea about the manager's behaviour with his subordinates, supervisors and outsiders. The purpose of the second aspect of our observations was to obtain a general notion of how the manager uses his time and how much he devotes to his various activities. Examples of the first group of observations were to observe how the manager behaves, speaks with his subordinates and how they respond when he talks with them or asks them certain questions or to give their opinions on a certain matter and to what extent he permits them to express their own opinions on the various matters they come across. In addition, how the manager behaves, speaks with his superior(s) and outsiders including customers were among this group of observations. Examples of the second type of the observations were how many visitors he received in this two day period, how much time he devoted to his personal activities. How much he communicated with his subordinates, superiors and what was the types of these communications (e.g. telephone, interview). What party initiated communication was also noted.

The researchers started each interview by explaining the importance of managers' co-operation in the success of this study and in achieving its various objectives. In addition, each manager was assured that his personal information and attitudes would be regarded as confidential and would only be used for the purpose of the study. After that, the researcher proceeded with his various questions.

- General information about the manager and his organisation.
- The manager's decision making approaches.
- Manager's attitudes towards his subordinate(s) and Iraqi society.
- Finally, the manager's average time that he spent in the various

activities in his working day.

To obtain information about managers' approaches in decision making, each manager was presented with a description of four alternative decisions styles.<sup>1</sup>

Each manager was then given ten decisions and requested to specify which of the four alternatives he would normally use.<sup>2</sup>

To avoid response bias, two methods were used. The first was to ask each interviewee to give some documents which support his argument of using a certain alternative while the second method was to ask his direct subordinate(s) about the same alternative and to what extent his manager normally uses it with a given problem (e.g. one of these ten decisions).<sup>3</sup>

As regards manager activities, seven activities were chosen to cover the bulk of his work. They were paperwork; planning; organising; communications; research; personal activities and complex activity.<sup>4</sup> Each manager was asked to estimate how he divides his daily time on average among these activities. The definition of an activity was left to the manager himself. When a manager failed to distinguish a certain episode from others, he was asked to put his estimate in "complex activity". Thus, complex activity has been defined in this study to mean any combination of two or more activities which the manager was unable to allocate individually. This method was used by Rubert Dubin and S. Lee Spray when they examined the behaviour and interaction of a group of executives.<sup>4</sup>

To make the findings more useful, the working day of the manager was broadly divided into two periods; the morning period which ends at noon, and the evening period.



## DATA ANALYSIS

Before starting the analysis presented in this study, a preliminary cluster analysis using the "CLUSTAN PACKAGE" was used for the data gathered to discover the most frequent patterns of associations among these variables. The analysis broadly indicated two patterns of clusters; the public sector managers' cluster and the private sector managers' cluster. It is these two clusters that we analysed in depth by using the "STATISTICAL PACKAGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE" (SPSS). The aim was to expand the analysis of these clusters in the light of the major variables that caused such a difference on the one hand, and to examine the degree of associations that exists between a given variable and the other variables, on the other.

Because the current research is an exploratory study, therefore, most of the data collected were based on nominal and ordinal level scales. Thus, the simple  $X^2$  test as well as Cramer's and Kendall's tests and coefficient test were used. Sometimes more than one test was used in analysing the association between two variables; the purpose of this procedure was to show the reader the strength of this relationship across different tests.

As regards the assumption of internal scale we made when analysed the managers' decision-making styles, it is indeed consistent with assumptions made by other scholars. Thus, Heller, Muna, using a similar continuum, assumed a four-point equal interval scale. The same assumption can be found in the work of Vroom and Yetton.<sup>5</sup>

All these researchers have regarded delegation (style 4 in this study) as a separate style distinguishes itself by an equal distance from the other three styles. (See Figure 9.1 and Table 9.1). The present study assumes the same thing, that is, delegation is also separated from style 3 (joint decision).

The ten decisions given to the managers studied were broken down into three groups; personal decisions; departmental decisions and, organisational decisions. This was based on the nature of the decisions as well as on the high intercorrelation between the decisions within each group. For example, decisions 1, 3, 4 and 5 were highly interrelated and, belonged more to personal problems or group than to any other groups of decisions.

Two methods were used to analyse the ten decisions. The first was to use the frequency distribution of responses to each one of these decisions in the light of the four decision-making alternative styles. The second method was to make use of the power-sharing continuum and the assumption that its four styles are separated by equal intervals. (see Figure 9.1). Indeed, this assumption allows using the main scores of all the managers or each group of managers according to their sectors. This second method also enabled us to analyse the variances among each group of the managers.

The following values were assigned to the components of the power-sharing continuum; Style 1 (own decisions) = 10; Style 2 (consultation) = 20; Style 3 (joint decision) = 30; and Style 4 (delegation) = 40. Thus, a high score indicates that the manager allows his subordinate(s) large influence in decision making process. Conversely, a low score

indicates that the manager allows his subordinate(s) little influence in decision making process. Or simply, the manager has more control over the outcome of the decision.

#### THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE SAMPLE

Originally it was intended to base the analysis on a sample of 100 managing directors drawn equally from the public and private sectors. However, due to unforeseen difficulties in arranging interviews with sampled managers, a final achieved sample of 44 managers was obtained. A sample of this size can not be regarded as representative of modern manufacturing industry but the following points are relevant:

- a) The sample was drawn from public and private industrial sector.
- b) All these managers and their organisations have been selected from modern manufacturing industries and modern industry itself is new in Iraq. The year 1950 can be regarded as the beginning of the modern industry in this developing country.
- c) An attempt was made to select managers from three organisational size categories: small (100 employees or less); medium (between 101-500 employees), and large (over 501 employees).
- d) The sample was drawn from more than one province. There were 24 managers from Baghdad, 12 managers from Mosul and 8 managers from Arbil and Sulaimaniyah provinces.
- e) An attempt was also made to select managers from different age groups and different social classes. There were 14 managers their age between

31 and 46 years; 18 managers between 41 and 45 years old and 12 managers between 51 and 70 years old. The same is equally true if we examine their social backgrounds: 23 managers were from lower class, 4 from middle class and 17 managers from upper class.

NOTES

1. See p. 230.
2. See p. 231 for these ten decisions.
3. See p. 232.
4. Robert Dubin and S. Lee, Spray, "Executive Behavior and Interaction",  
Industrial Relations, A Journal of Economy and Society, 3 (February  
1964): 99-108.
5. See Chapter 9.

APPENDIX 2    THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Dear Sir,

The present research is intended for the doctorate degree in management studies, University of Glasgow. Its principal aim is to explore the personal-social characteristics of the Iraqi senior managers. It also tries to cast light on their career patterns; decision-making styles; attitude toward Iraqi society; how they spend their time in work and what activities they perform.

The interview will cover the following points:

1. Background information
2. Manager's decision-making styles
3. Manager's attitudes towards subordinates and Iraqi society as a whole
4. The average time spent by the manager in different activities during the day.

The researcher, knowing your invaluable time, would highly appreciate your permission to interview him. All your personal information and attitudes would be regarded as confidential and would only be used for the purpose of this research.

Your personal help would be deeply appreciated. It would also contribute to the advancement of management in Iraq of knowledge on this subject.

Moayaid S. Sulieman

1. GENERAL INFORMATION

Code Number .....

Date and place of birth:

Date: .....

Place of birth: City:..... Village: .....

Marital Status:

Single: ..... Married: ..... Widower .....

Number of children .....

Principal product(s) of the company .....

Position held in the company .....

How long have you held this position? .....

Total number of employees .....

Ownership of the company:

Private: ..... Public: .....

Manager Status:

Owner: ..... Employed: .....

When did you commence with this company? .....

What was your first work in your life, and how old were you at that time?

.....  
.....

What type of school did you last attend full time?

Type of school:

a - Elementary Sch.

b - Intermediate Sch.

c - Secondary Sch.


(Please tick one)

Did you attend college?

Yes

No

If "yes", please give details as follows:

College attended

University

Country

Degree

a -

b -

c -

d -

How many companies have you been employed by during your career?

Only one company

Two companies

Three companies

Four companies


(Please tick one)

If more, please specify the number .....

Have you attended management training course(s)?

Yes

No

If "Yes", how long was it? .....

Where?.....

Have you undertaken any vocational full/part time study?

Yes

No

If "Yes", how long was it? .....

Where? .....

What is/was your father's occupation? .....

What /...



What is/was your father's level of education?

Illiterate

Read and write only

Elementary School

Intermediate School

Secondary School

College

<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>

(Please tick one)

## 2. DECISION-MAKING STYLES

In this section, we are concerned with managerial decision-making styles. Decision making in any organisation can be regarded as a prime factor in management. Many alternative methods of decision making exist, among them the following. Rarely is there one perfect method that can be applied to all problems in all situations.

### I. Own Decision:

You make the decision, no previous consultation with your subordinate(s). You may tell your subordinate(s) what the problem is in getting the information from them but their role is to provide you the necessary information rather than generating or evaluating alternative solution. Sometimes you may discuss the problem with your superiors, partners or with outsiders.

### II. Consultation:

You share the problem with your subordinate(s), getting his/their ideas and suggestions, then you make your decision which may or may not reflect his/their influence.

### III. Joint Decision:

You share the problem with your subordinate(s), and together you analyse the problem and arrive at a mutually agreeable solution. You may consult and discuss the problem with your superiors, partners or with outsiders.

### IV. /

#### I V. Delegation

You delegate the problem to your subordinate, providing him with any relevant information that you possess, but giving him responsibility for solving the problem by himself. You may or may not ask him to report his decision to you. You seldom veto his decision.

Below is a set of decisions.. Would you indicate which of the above four alternative decision-making styles you normally use to arrive at each one of these decisions.

1 - The decision to increase the salary of one of your direct subordinates.

- Own decision
- Consultation
- Joint Decision
- Delegation


2 - The decision to increase the number of the workforce in a certain Department.

- Own Decision
- Consultation
- Joint Decision
- Delegation


3 - The decision to hire one of several applicants to work in your subordinates' departments

- Own Decision
- Consultation
- Joint Decision
- Delegation


4 - The decision to promote or to increase the salary of one of your subordinate's workers

- Own decision
- Consultation
- Joint Decision
- Delegation


5 - The decision to terminate one of your subordinate's workers

- Own decision
- Consultation
- Joint Decision
- Delegation


6 - The decision to introduce a new product(s)

- Own Decision
- Consultation
- Joint Decision
- Delegation


7 - The decision to enter a new market

- Own decision
- Consultation
- Joint Decision
- Delegation


8 - The decision to expand the total current production capacity of your company

- Own decision
- Consultation
- Joint Decision
- Delegation


9 - The decision to change or modify the formal organisation chart of the company

- Own decision
- Consultation
- Joint Decision
- Delegation


10 - The decision to change responsibilities and authorities of the head of a certain department.

- Own Decision
- Consultation
- Joint Decision
- Delegation


3 • THE MANAGER'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SUBORDINATES  
AND THE IRAQI SOCIETY

- 1 - In your society, what are the major social pressures that interfere with your work as a manager such that you are unable to exercise full control over them. Will you give us some examples?
- 2 - Could you please mention some of the ideas, programmes or even changes that you as a manager would like to implement, but find yourself restricted from doing so because of the Iraqi traditions, customs and values, or because of some governmental laws and procedures?
- 3 - Can you specify the major characteristics of your subordinates in particular and the Iraqi workers in general. How would you rank them in comparison with their Western counterpart?
- 4 - Do you think that mediation (nepotism and patronage system) exists in the Iraqi society?

Yes

No

a: /

a: If "Yes", do you think it is, (within the last five years):

- a - Less than before \_\_\_\_\_
- b - Same as before \_\_\_\_\_ (Please tick one)
- c - More than before \_\_\_\_\_
- d - No answer \_\_\_\_\_

b: In your opinion, what are the principal reasons that are responsible for mediation in Iraq?

## 4 • THE MANAGER'S ACTIVITIES

In this section, we are concerned with your job activities and how long you spend in your working day. To help you estimate as precisely as possible your working time, a group of activities is presented below. These activities are divided into two periods: the morning period and the evening period. You are requested to estimate the average time that you normally spend on each of these activities. The definition of each activity is your responsibility, you can define each activity the way you like. When you fail to distinguish a certain episode from others, you are advised to put your estimate in "complex activity".

Type of Activity	Before Noon (average time)	After Noon (average time)	Total Time (average)
1 - Reading and answering mail (paperwork)			
2 - Planning activity			
3 - Organising activity			
4 - Communications:			
a - With employees			
- face to face			
- telephone			
b - With public			
- face to face			
- telephone			
c - With superiors			
- face to face			
- telephone			
5 - Research and development activity			
6 - Personal activity			
7 - Complex activity			