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WORLD ORDER TRANSFORMATION AND SECURITY POLICY CHALLENGES

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Abstract: This study has a twofold aim. It focuses on the complex challenges that emerge as a result of the redistribution and coordination of economic power, adding the aspects related to the functional transformation of human society – the so-called connectography – to the horizon of interpretation.

Taking into account the possible scenarios of power shifts, it examines the new security aspects which arise primarily as a result of players' inability to adapt to the complexity of the political challenge. The authors pay special attention to the global and regional contexts of the possibilities for the creation of the strategic security environment. They discuss the potential consequences of the simultaneous application of hard and soft power, i.e. "flexible geometry".

The authors also analyse the changes envisaged for the period until 2050, which tie the importance of the shift in the geopolitical competition to the appreciation of water resources, which will render the efforts made to acquire energy carriers less fierce.

Keywords: Security Policy, flexible geometry, connectography, water resources, adaptable

INTRODUCTION: PAX SINICA – A MYTH OR THE TRUTH?

Nothing in the world is more weak and soft than water, yet nothing surpasses it in conquering the hard and strong – there is nothing that can compare. All know that the weak conquers the strong and the soft conquers the hard. But none are able to act on this. (Laozi: The Dao De Jing)

One of the most exciting areas of the theory of international relations is the international transfer of power. There is rich literature on the examination of hegemony cycles: it is a real intellectual challenge to follow the process of a state rising and becoming the key player of the international stage, then weakening and, finally displaced from its dominant position by another rising player. The system of the causes and effects in the shift of power always contains exciting details, whose understanding often requires "innovation in interpretation" as the core question is

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always why all the factors that used to ensure dominance all of a sudden become insufficient to retain it and what new factors become dominance creators.

An increasing number of studies are published nowadays, repeating that we are witnessing a cycle shift, in which Pax Americana is gradually replaced by Pax Sinica, i.e. the international dominance of China.

The new financial institutions created by China, like the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund, operate within the framework of the current global economic and financial order. The OBOR is one of the most significant initiatives of the past three decades; if properly implemented, it will reshape the global economic order. Although the OBOR is a loose and flexible scheme, it is entirely different from other, usually contract- or rule-based, integration models. The AIIB and the Silk Road Fund complement, rather than replace, the activities of global and regional multilateral development banks. The OBOR can be construed as a geo-economic concept rather than as a geopolitical strategy. It is based not on geopolitical rivalry but on economic cooperation, mutual trust and mutual benefits. (**Tianping, 2018)** According to **Tianping** if one examines the official communication and narrative, one can see that they go far beyond geopolitical considerations. The OBOR initiative serves open cooperation and is centred around economic and cultural cooperation. Its aim is not to create exclusive and elite groups or to undermine existing multilateral mechanisms. (Yang, 2014)

Naturally, there is a lot of debate around this issue, mostly because China and the processes currently taking place there are difficult to understand based on the ideas and ideologies of the developed world. China's history and culture are very different from those of Europe or, in a broader sense, of the West (Szunomár, 2012); China is a "multi-faceted rising power" (Sun, 2012 p. 1), meaning that it is very complex as regards its position, its development as a world power and its aims and ambitions. China is not a nation state but a civilisation state, and is shaped by its civilisation consciousness (Jacques, 2009, pp. 414, 435).

Though China's growth and rise as a world power poses a challenge on the entire world yet analyses focus only on current processes and problems, while there is no literature presenting relations in a comprehensive and complex manner or highlighting China's own way. However, one thing is beyond doubt: the fact that China, one of the key international players, has features different from those of the other ones will inevitably impact the entire international system itself.

In the complex system of the relations of globalisation, China's world power position is unquestionable – but the Chinese way is in many aspects different from the conventional western model of modernisation. Using this western model as our point of reference, therefore, it is rather difficult to understand China and the processes that are taking place there. China is a developing and a developed country at the same time as it carries the main features of both. China's GDP exceeds that of the USA – yet there is severe poverty in this country: over 150 million live there in deep poverty today. (Szunomár, 2012)

China's power politics also differs from the western concept, yet its unique foreign policy deviates from its own former set of principles in a way that continuity exists only over a very broad time horizon. China is a multi-coloured "civilisation-state" and, for millennia, has been held together by the "consciousness of unity", which is the most important political value even in our days.

In its efforts to build relations with other regions and countries, China gives preference to the means and tools of soft power over hard power. Nevertheless, the doctrine of "peaceful rise" ("heping jueqi") – and its reinterpreted form, "peaceful development" ("heping fazhan") – implies its systematic preparation to have a world power position. (Pathak, 2015)

What path China will walk in the 21st century may be fundamentally significant in a civilisation history respect – and, similarly, to what extent and with whom China is willing to cooperate with carries a significant message.

In diplomacy, China aims at communication rather than confrontation; it seeks partnerships, not allies. China intends to pursue an independent and peaceful foreign policy, it will protect its reasonable interests, and commits itself to build stable and well-balanced relationship frameworks with the major powers. China, however, wishes to take part in global governance, it wants to play an active role in the reformation and development of the system of global governance, and wishes to contribute to global governance with Chinese wisdom and power. One of the key initiatives of this policy is One Belt One Road (OBOR), which can be considered as a public good that China provides for the world. OBOR is a comprehensive initiative, which contains political communication, the coordination of policies, infrastructure deployment, connection, trade and construction projects, financial integration, as well as interpersonal relations. **(Tianping, 2018)**

A MULTIPOLAR WORLD ORDER WITH SOFT POWER?

"A world order with multiple centres has opportunities to offer" (Orbán, 2018, p. 42)

China's rise as a world power means the appearance of a new political pole. In modern history, it is the first time that a developing country has been the world's largest economy and that such a position has been held by a non-western state but one with different historical and civilisation roots. (Jacques, 2010). The Chinese economic miracle can be best understood in the light of Joshua Cooper Ramo's "Beijing consensus" theory (despite all the shortcomings of this theory), i.e. in a special Chinese development model. In his scandalous study, the author identifies three factors as the motors of China's economic development: innovation and continuous experiments with new ideas, observing sustainable development and the principle of the fair distribution of goods and the emphasis on "China's own way" and its desire for self-identification. (Ramo, 2004) Ramo's "Beijing consensus", which is compared to the "Washington consensus", is least liked by the Chinese: they insist on the "specially Chinese socialism" and the "socialist market economy" interpretation models.

The Chinese catching-up model is modernisation and the return to the country's own traditional system of values at the same time. While the majority of economic reforms have been based upon the adaptation of the elements of the western model, the Chinese process of position building is a unique concept, which is based on the country's own tradition. Szunomár (2012, p. 14) created a new concept for democracy as understood by Chinese traits: she calls it "sinocracy".

The way in which hard power is overruled by soft power can also be considered as a paradigm shift. Confucianism is experiencing a renaissance. "*The weak and supple overcomes the strong and hard. Fish must not emerge from the deeps; the vital tools of a state must not be revealed." (Laozi: The Dao De Jing. Poem 36)*

The concept of soft power has always been a well-known concept in China. After it was introduced into the public domain by Nye (2004), Chinese political scientists also began to study it and, not long after, terms referring to soft power were introduced into the vocabulary of government politics ("ruan shili", "ruan Liliang", "ruan guoli", "ruan quanli"). The desire and need to increase soft power is most strongly present in foreign economic relations and upon it is built the concept of the harmonic world order – which is indisputably conscious position building. (Szunomár, 2012)

In the 1990s, when attempts were made to express power in figures and make it measurable, Chinese scientists worked out the concept of Comprehensive National Power (CNP) (zonghe guoli). (Rácz, 2007) In the calculation of this index, "soft" factors are also taken into account in the measurement of economic, military, natural, political, social, international relations, scientific, technological, educational and other resources. "Comprehensive national power" has become a basic concept in Chinese political thinking and, as part of that, "soft power" has also become a recognised political concept. (Li Mingjaing, 2008, p. 6)

At the 60th anniversary UN Summit in 2005, President Hu Jintao identified the ancient theory of the "harmonic world" (Bell, 2008 pp. 8-13) as the foundation of the new world order, which is "desirable" to everyone. "By a harmonic world order the leaders of China mean a multipolar international system which is free from conflicts, is built on cooperation and offers appropriate conditions for peaceful development to the nations of the world – including, of course, China. Another important feature of China's foreign policy in the new millennium is that the country behaves in an increasingly flexible and adaptable manner and proactively shapes its bilateral and multilateral relations." (Szunomár, 2012, p. 43) In essence, the harmonic world order means a multipolar world, and China truly aims at creating a multipolar world order ("shijie duojihua"). (Cheng & Zhang, 1999 pp. 101-102)

Along with soft powers, China is thus becoming an independent pole of power. Paradoxically, in contrast to the original concept of Nye, soft power gets converted into hard power. (Salát, 2010) According to Khanna, influence can today be increased not through wars but through the deployment of a strong, interconnected infrastructure. It is this strategy that China follows in its OBOR initiative. (Khanna, 2017)

From the point of view of its world power ambitions, the strengthening and deepening of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization seem to be China's number one strategic and economic interest. (Horváth, 2010) The establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is in reality the institutionalisation of China' influence in Middle Asia, and the New Silk Road project – *whose aim is to re-connect old areas and commercial roads on the Euro-Asian continent, with China being the centre – supports the development of the region's infrastructure and trade, deepens regional economic cooperation and increases China's influence on world economy and politics alike.*

"The world needs to firmly advance all types of regional cooperation as this has proved effective for promoting global development. We need to remain committed to multilateralism, which is the effective pathway to peace, development and the settlement of global issues… Multilateralism is not out of date, but should be carried forward. Cooperation among big countries needs to be strengthened. … Big countries have more resources and more capabilities. They have the responsibility and the obligation to play a greater role in maintaining international peace and security and make more contributions to human development and progress, … global governance should be improved so as to solve the imbalances in world development and realize sustainable growth of the world economy. China is actively participating in global governance." (Wang Yi, 2017)

POST-WEST AND POST-ORDER?

"*The international security environment is arguably more volatile today than at any point since World War II. Some of the most fundamental pillars of the West and of the liberal international order are weakening." (Munich Security Report 2017)*

As a result of the strengthening of rising powers and the changes taking place in the relations between major powers, fundamental changes are taking place in power balance and in

the international order. According to security policy analysts, the world is in the state of the highest level of instability ever, and many used to consider the year 2017 as a critical period. In this critical year, however, it was stated on two occasions that China considered it was high time it took over the world leader role.

Both important speeches (Wang Yi, 2017; Xi, 2017) described China as a responsible major power that is committed to finding the solutions to the problems of the international community but, at the same time, consciously referred to China as a challenger of the United States and drew a contrast with the latter. In contrast to the approach that blames globalisation and recommends isolation and protectionism as the solution, the Chinese government considers that the main problem is that there is no order in the world and, therefore, it proposes the creation of a new international order as the solution. "According to the Chinese government, for the international community to avoid war, it needs an appropriate leader – which is nobody else but China. They use three arguments to support this position. Firstly, China has long and diverse historical experience about development, which enables it to properly respond to challenges. Secondly, the country has the resources required to fulfil the proposed leading position. Thirdly, China has firmly decided to play an active role in shaping international politics." (*Klemensits & Eszterhai, 2017)*

It is a security policy matter, however, how uniform the intellectual space will be in which the attempts are made to respond to the global social, political, economic and ecological issues in our multipolar world. The international order planned by China is not fully compatible with the world order dominated by America. (One must realise that the Chinese narrative draws a distinction between the world order and the international order, as the former, i.e. 'world order', means the world order led by the USA, in China's terminology.)

China cannot fully identify with the world order dominated by the USA. On the one hand, China is supportive of the current international order – on the other, it is a reformer thereof. That is what makes the question of how uniform the axioms will be based on which critical trends and the organising principles of the next few decades can be interpreted essential. Another area we cannot easily forecast is the normative and ideological environment that will exist 35 years hence. (Walt, 2015)

According to the forecasts, in 2050, power will still be in the hands of nation states; there is little chance for the formation of other multinational political entities besides the EU – but it is likely that further small states will be established. The economic performance of individual nations puts a limit to their international influence and, bearing this in mind, the key strategic players will comprise, besides the USA, China, Russia and the EU, India and Brazil. (2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy)

And although the number of global conflicts has shown a decreasing tendency since 1945, due to the events of recent years and the growing tension between China and America, it continues to be unrealistic to hope that the year 2050 will be much more peaceful than our days. (*Klemensits & Eszterhai, 2017)*

According to the analyses and forecasts of the world's leading think-tanks, the re-division of the world is likely to result in the deepening of geopolitical crises in the future. (Vision–2050; Global Risks 2035). Par excellence, one of the key security policy questions that influence our future is how the world's power architecture will become multipolar. Due to its technological superiority, the USA is likely to retain its supremacy. "And now we are looking only to the future. … From this moment on, it's going to be America First." (Trump, 2017)

 At the same time, China and India, through the international institutions preferred by them, will represent the majority of the world's population, which will be increasingly difficult for the USA to counterbalance. It is far from certain that the parallel application of America's

hard and soft powers ("flexible geometry"), even together with the establishment of new institutions and alliances, will suffice to maintain Washington's global hegemony in the second half of our century. (Stancil & Dadush, 2010) It is also important, however, that demographic processes might push American foreign policy in the opposite way, as nearly every third American citizen will belong to the Latin ethnicity by 2060, who – according to research findings – have far more trust in international institutions, e.g. the UN. Transnational threats, climate change, terrorism and the fight of rising nations in the new international order will require America's foreign policy to be far more carefully balanced than in our days. (Sullivan, 2015) In this emerging architecture, European states, according to forecasts, have no other choice than to establish regional alliances and a collective foreign policy.

However, "in the first decades of this century, not only the global issues themselves but also the consequences of the successfulness or failure of their management will have a significant impact on long-term changes, the positions of individual regions and states, and, at the end of the day, on the future of humankind, even beyond the first century of the third millennium." (Simai, 2016, p.12)

We ought to make reference to an expert public opinion research carried out by the Post-Crisis World Institute, according to which the world's biggest problem will be the lack of resources in the future, as the Earth will not be able to satisfy the demand resulting from the increase of its population. While in the 20th century geopolitical competition revolved around the acquisition of energy carriers, by 2050, the fight for water will have become at least as important. (Vision–2050

When discussing the security of the future, the human aspect of security is becoming increasingly important, which is not yet a central topic of the security policy discourse, although its importance in the context of civilisation – at least in the context in which we interpret existence today – is far higher than conventionally examined risk factors. Robots will increasingly force humans out of warfare. Soldiers will be needed but, owing to the fast development of genetic and bio-technology, robots will have capabilities which are considered superhuman today. (Kott et al. 2015) People will lose their controlling role and can be no more than arbiters in the fight between robots.

At the same time, through the amalgamation of the human body and technology, humankind will start a journey whose direction is unpredictable and in which we will no longer be able to control the speed and impacts of development. *(Klemensits & Eszterhai, 2017)*

"Human beings acquired phenomenal power, which surpassed their knowledge as well as their capacity to control it and to control themselves." (Peccei, 1982, p. 26)

THE CHALLENGE AND/OR PARADOX
OF CONNECTOGRAPHY

"*There will be lots of tension in the world, there will be lots of conflict, there will be lots of struggle to control resources, economic power and so forth. But it is a very different kind from previous generations and connectivity is the reason why it is so much more complex, but ultimately also so much more stable.*" (Khanna, 2017, p. 19)

Today's globalised world features new political and security conditions. As a result, the identification of threats and dangers requires a brand new approach. Connectivity is one of the key drivers of the transition to a far more complex global system. Economies are increasingly integrated, the population is more and more mobile, the cyberspace is less and less distinct from physical reality, and climate change is shaking the fundamentals of our life. The

significant – and often suddenly occurring – feedback loops of these phenomena remain almost entirely incomprehensible. And even if connectivity makes the world more complex and unpredictable, it offers fundamental opportunities to increase collective flexibility. (Khanna, 2017, p. 16)

New types of challenges emerge and, due to their interrelations and mutual impacts, they can be construed in some unique complexity: challenges intertwine and mutually amplify one another's impacts, symmetrically or asymmetrically. These new challenges contain migration, terrorism, organised crime, the environmental security aspects related to globalisation and, in the long term, also climate change and its increasingly conflict generating nature – and, in essence, all of these are related to demographic changes in one way or another. (Major-Čudan, 2017)

"Overall, today's geopolitical situation is characterized by a persistent and multidimensional competition and the parallel weakening of existing relationships. This trend permeates several different sectors and topics, creating an amorphous world order, in which we have to face symmetrical and asymmetrical challenges at the same time. The changes in the balance of power between world powers divert the political energy from the solution of common and important problems (e.g. climate change), and chaos gains ever more ground." (Csizmadia, 2017, p. 88)

The reality of the currently shaping and continuously changing world / international order is the world of geo-economy, in which the nature and mechanisms of fundamental conflicts are different from what they used to be like. "In the 21st century, the world consists of connected networks and, consequently, we have arrived from wars to a "tug of war", as each major power is connected to the others." The nature of geo-political competition has changed." (Khanna, 2017, p. 15) What used to be the war for territory has by now become a war fought for connectivity. Decentralisation is the strongest political weapon of our days. However, even though and while empires are falling apart everywhere in the world, and power is concentrated in the hands of provinces, regions and cities, which aim at achieving an increasing level of autonomy in their financial and diplomatic affairs, another important part and result of decentralisation is also surfacing. These smaller political units, which manage shared resources, are trying to form larger communities in a mere struggle for survival. This trend, as described by Parag Khanna (2017, p. 15), appears from East Africa to South-East Asia: new, dynamic regional alliances are formed along the shared infrastructure and institutions. North America is also developing towards becoming a real supercontinent.

Consequently, the cornerstones of the enforcement of interests have also changed. "The different subsystems of security comprise a complex system (at the international, national and organisational levels), in which interactions are increasingly direct and strong. By our days, the management of even a local disaster or crisis has unavoidably become a complex and, in a sense, global task. (For this reason, for example, modern disaster management systems must be complex and flexible.) … It is an important aspect also in the organisation of defence policies that the establishment of security must also entail opportunities for development, rather than simply being some restriction to maintain integrity. About the security subsystem we must point out that the system and the subsystems are not autotelic: important social and international cooperation expectations exist towards them, which are, at the same time, the content related dimensions of the key preconditions of continuous operation." (Ürmös, 2013, p. 154)

It is beyond doubt, however, that the new responses must be so given to these new challenges that, at the same time, the meaning of the concept of 'security' must also be significantly broadened and reinterpreted in its increasing complexity, which we have been experiencing in recent decades. Security policy has very many different aspects. One that is interesting to

network theory is this whole war on terror. These days the war on terror has been transferred to a network theory basis. After all, in today's conflicts it is not two great armies facing one another, but large armies face little groups who organize in networks. "In the United States, a new doctrine appeared, accordingly, which is called net-war. In the next 30-50 years, all of America's wars will mean fighting against smaller groups, not a real, regular army.

In these cases, fighter planes and tanks will not be as useful. Understanding communities, mapping, emotions, learning who is friend and enemy within a village will be much more important, because the civilians and military active population has become fully intertwined and indistinguishable from one another. We must figure out who is our friend, and who is our enemy. This is very important paradigm shift all over the world." (Barabási, 2018, p. 123)

In the past few decades, the complexity of systems and problems has increased in almost all areas, risks have multiplied, and actual or potential threats have extended to ever broader regions of the world. Of these threats, the ones that increase humankind's destructive power and capabilities are especially dangerous. (Simai, 2016, p. 358)

"According to Kurzweil, while human thinking describes our environment using linear models, in reality the changes of the world around us are exponential, i.e. constantly accelerating. Singularity is when the pace of the changes ahead reaches a point where we cannot reliably predict their effect beyond a certain point relatively close in time, i.e. the event horizon. In Kurzweil's scenario, singularity is a future period in which technological change will be so rapid and far-reaching, that human life will irreversibly change as a result." (Csizmadia, 2017, p. 141)

Different positions exist about the changes generated by accelerating technological development. On the one hand, according to some forecasts, the most suitable solutions to challenges will come from further technology development. In Friedman's vision wars in the 21st century will be characterized by the use of advanced technologies, smaller armies and fewer casualties. The environment and energy will gain importance, and the world's energy supply will be mainly based on energy production systems installed in space. (Friedman, 2011)

On the other hand, there are fears that the Earth's resources will be depleted, and some forecasts, which deal with the controllability of artificial intelligence, do not clearly predict encouraging scenarios regarding the endless development of technology. To quote Simai, it is a fact that past prognoses regarding scientific discoveries and technological development for a 30-40-year period have proven true in a high percentage. There are likely to have been two reasons for this: on the one hand, the high-level scientific knowledge of those who made the prognoses, on the other, the knowledge and application of the chain reactions encapsulated in technological development, whose elements are new ideas, research, new discoveries, inventions and the appearance and dissemination of the resulting innovations. Future research projects have come to the conclusion, mainly from the tendencies of development, that, in the near future, no state can expect a decrease in uncertainty factors or the emergence of a more tranquil, better organised world that carries no major risks." (Simai, 2016, pp. 365-366)

However, from the experience gained during the nearly two past decades of the 21st century, we can conclude that the future of humankind is determined by a chain of challenges whose two extreme points are climate change and social security in a broad sense, deeply embedded in the problem of human security.

Global climate change is tightly related to the problem of social security. The rapid and radical transformation of the physical environment jeopardises the current economic, social and political operation of both global and local societies. Security policy experts all agree that there is another security policy threat factor, which is tightly related to water sources and warming: the shortage of food. Due to increasingly extreme climate conditions, droughts and

desertification jeopardise the Earth's carrying capacity just like the uneven distribution of precipitation in space and time. (Ugrin & Major, 2018)

As a result of climate impacts, the traditional order of life is forced to transform, which, as a spillover effect, impacts the economic and social activities that provide welfare. Social inequalities grow and take root and, as a result, social conflicts and deviance may significantly increase.

According to George Friedman, the new crisis will be that of the middle class. The source of the problem is not inequality but the fact that the middle class wants to have a standard of living which not everyone can succeed in achieving. (Friedman, 2011) It is unclear what this problem means if examined globally, and what answers can be expected to this question.

By contrast, the American National Intelligence Council's volume that deals with global trends describes four possible future scenarios, to be finally shaped by the major megatrends and the game-changers which influence the ultimate outcome. 1. Individual empowerment 2. Diffusion of poverty 3. Demographic patterns 4. Food, water, energy nexus. (Nye, 2013 p. 143)

Our planet is basically overpopulated, this is beyond doubt, but we do not know when the activities of humankind and the exploitation of the natural environment will reach the point of no return. In our days, environmentally conscious development is part of the political order of the day – yet we can take it for granted that conflicts will arise in this sector that will have an impact on all the others. The most sensitive conflict zone, however, is that of efforts for the acquisition of drinking water sources. (Ürmös, 2013, p. 154) And that is fight for life in the most direct sense.

Going forward, beyond the 21st century, one challenge is likely to be our system of values, as a consequence of the growing uncertainty around man's anthropological self-reference. We must cope with these challenges already in the post-human world. It is very essential, though, along what coordinates we start to construe that reality.

SUMMARY

"These paint a picture of the world where the possession of power will be just as important as chasing profits, and this will be coupled with the increasing economic engagement of the state; economic warfare will undermine economic integration; multilateral systems will regress to the regional level instead of becoming global; oil prices will be low and fickle, therefore countries will compete for markets rather than resources." (Csizmadia, 2017, p. 90)

Finding the balance in a world that is becoming multipolar, the integration of individual states with different interests, political cultures and histories into the changing global system and the interrelations between them will be fundamental security policy issues in the decades to come. (Simai, 2016, p. 364)

At the same time, the shift in the global system of powers in the fight for markets, the instability of the financial world, poverty and demographical issues, together with climate change, comprise a complex security related source of danger and challenge. In this scenario, in the course of the management of these problems not only those organising principles will be defined along which solutions can be construed but the interest relations between subsystems will also receive a unique function and, in essence, reactions may increase the complexity of challenges.

Paradoxically, the context of security policy starts to make sense not when one establishes cooperation between conflicting interests – in any sense – but when one creates dynamic balances between and in competitions for cooperation.

"This shows that we are witnessing the rise of geo-economics, a competition in the language of trade but with the logic of war." (Csizmadia, 2017, p. 90)

The question thus remains: to what extent can we expect a truly harmonic and life-centred world if and when soft power, which gets manifested in China's strategy, dominates?

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