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# **World city-ness in a historical perspective: Probing the long-term evolution of the Jakarta metropolitan area**

## **Abstract**

Most studies in the ‘world cities’ literature tend to frame the global connectivity of cities in the context of a specific form of globalization that began unfolding in the 1970s (i.e. the ‘new international division of labor’). In this paper, we argue for the need to frame the global connectivity of cities in long-term urban trajectories across different phases of globalization. To this end, we explore the trajectory of the Jakarta metropolitan area (JMA) from the period prior to the arrival of Western merchants into Southeast Asia into its current role as being one of the major cities in the Global South. We find that the emergence and ensuing path-dependent evolution of the JMA into a strategic site of economic globalization is linked with its initial formation as the Dutch strategic base for securing and expanding its commercial system in Asia and the repeated explicit and implicit privileging of the city as a strategic site for engagements with the wider global and regional context by the national government. The character and function of the JMA in the current stage of global economy is, therefore, a product of a long-term evolutionary process with different phases co-producing Jakarta into what it has become today.

*Keywords:* historical accumulation; Jakarta metropolitan area; world city research

## **Introduction**

The ‘world city literature’ has arguably developed into one of the most prominent research agendas for the study of cities and metropolitan regions under conditions of contemporary globalization (Derudder et al., 2012; Knox & Taylor, 1995; Short, 2004). The genesis of the world city literature as currently practiced is strongly linked to two interrelated sets of global politico-economic restructuring

processes that started unfolding in the 1970s: first, the emergence of a new international division of labor (NIDL), and second, the crisis of North Atlantic Fordism (Brenner & Keil, 2006; Lai, 2009). The key proposition of this body of literature is that this capitalist restructuring had led to the emergence of a global network of cities functioning as the strategic sites for global economic operations. Mainly fueled by John Friedmann's 'The World City Hypothesis' (1986; see also Friedmann & Wolff, 1982) and later Saskia Sassen's 'The Global City' (1991), the world city literature has become a solid yet increasingly diverse literature that enhances our understanding of the centrality and role of cities in global context (Hoyler & Harrison, 2017; Pisonero, 2016; van Meeteren, Derudder, & Bassens, 2016). It is hardly surprising, therefore, that most studies under the world city rubric tend to be circumscribed by the specific conditions of the current form of globalization that started unfolding in the 1970s. As a result, until very recently relatively limited attention has been devoted to understanding how the character and development of these strategic places have also been shaped by previous rounds of transnational engagement: the historical accumulation of their 'global engagements' long before the advent of contemporary globalization. These strategic sites were not simply 'national' before the 1970s; rather, such 'cities have long performed both national and international functions' (King 1990a: 8) as for instance so clearly visible in London's current role as 'world city' clearly being tied to the imperial past of the United Kingdom and London's central role therein (Massey, 2007).

In this paper, our aim is to enrich this literature by retracing how also Global South cities' current global centrality is often built on their longstanding global connections. The broader starting point of this paper is an attempt to engage with some of the major strands of critique leveled at the world city literature, notably regarding its putative *universalist* and *end-state* dispositions. Following the call to extend the geographical locus of the world city literature from the very heartbeat of world cities at the apex of the world city hierarchy to the more peripheral parts of the global economy (e.g. Bunnell & Maringanti, 2010; Kleibert, 2017; Robinson, 2002), here we seek to understand the historical continuity of urban developmental processes across different phases of globalization from and through the Jakarta metropolitan area (JMA), Indonesia's most prominent urban region in terms of

population concentration, economic strength, and global connectivity. While some studies have linked the origins of many of today's world cities to the emergence of the modern world-system (Kloosterman & Lambregts, 2007; Mielants, 2017; Taylor, Hoyler, & Smith, 2012), this strand of research has largely overlooked the experience of cities in the Global South (see King 2012). Indeed, as King (1990b: 78) observed several decades ago:

‘The question is whether the real development of London or Manchester can be understood without reference to India, Africa, and Latin America any more than can the development of Kingston (Jamaica) or Bombay be understood without the former. Nevertheless, the real division of scholarship, as well as the ideological underpinnings that help to keep them alive, ensure that histories of ‘First’, ‘Second’ and ‘Third’-World cities are still kept tidily apart.’

As such, a close scrutiny of the JMA may help uncovering how the long-term urban trajectory of such a major urban center in the Global South was affected by the development of its engagements with the world economy.

The remainder of this paper consists of three main parts. First, we briefly discuss some of the recent debates in the world city literature, followed by an overview of the conceptual background we propose for retracing the genesis of contemporary world cities. The following section narrates the urban trajectory of the JMA starting from the pre-colonial period to the present day. Chronologically, we divide this into four periods, and for each period we discuss the evolution of the character and key functions of the JMA, as well as its positionality within the global, regional and national urban networks. In the final section, we summarize the historical narrative of the JMA and reflect on the broader implications in the context of an evolving world city research literature.

### **World city research: Process and historical legacies**

One of the most recurring critiques of the world city literature, mainly as raised by post-colonial scholars, has been its putative ‘universalist’ nature (Robinson, 2002, 2006; Roy, 2009). Having

emerged from efforts to make sense of urban-economic issues located in highly specific geo-historical conditions (i.e. deindustrializing cities in the Global North), the dominant narrative of the world city research agenda is argued to have normalized the distinctive features of North American and Western European cities. In particular, this critique points to conceptually foregrounding trends of post-industrialization and the increasing role of financial and producer services firms in the economic fabric. These trends tend to normalize what is essentially a very specific narrative when analyzing the globalization/urbanization nexus: a narrative that has arguably been informed by the experiences of a limited number of cities such as New York and London (see also Coe et al., 2010; McFarlane, 2008; Smith, 2007). As a result, ‘millions of people and hundreds of cities are dropped off the map’ (Robinson, 2002: 536). This exclusion is from two ‘maps’: (i) geographically, as a large number of cities located in the ‘Global South’ are missing from the research map; and (ii) conceptually, as the focus is on a narrow range of urban-economic processes (i.e. ‘advanced’ servicing of globalized production). This risks rendering ‘Other’ processes and cities as exceptions, being less relevant, or existing outside of a specific norm.

While we concur with the need to better understand the diversity of urban experiences and cities within the world economy, we argue that it is nonetheless possible to retain the gist of the world city literature for doing so. To this end, we propose to go back to John Friedmann’s original work (1986, 1995; see also Friedmann & Wolff, 1982). In our reading, the central project of the world city research agenda set out there can be understood as an attempt to interrogate the logic of global capitalism as it turns key cities across the world into its ‘basing points’. As such, the world city research agenda as initially conceived provides ample room for critical appraisals of urbanization process in the Global North and the Global South alike by accounting for cities’ embeddedness in the ‘new international division of labor’ (see also Lai, 2009; Sigler, 2016; Surborg, 2011). Put differently, processes of world city formation do not simply and only lead to the formation of a small group of cities functioning as the global command-and-control centers (which can be assessed based on the concentration of advanced producer services firms or global headquarters), but also to the emergence of cities and urban regions functioning as other forms of strategic sites in circuits of capital

accumulation (e.g. the rise of export processing zones in emerging economies). Indeed, an increasing number of studies under the world city banner recognize that different cities occupy different functional roles in the global economy, and that there is no need to dismiss this conceptual narrative because it would *de facto* ignore or be irrelevant ‘Other’ urban experiences (e.g. Bassens, Derudder, & Witlox, 2010; Indraprahasta & Derudder, 2017; Kleibert, 2017).

The central point here is to understand that the research agenda is not, or should not, be about *categorizing* which cities ‘are’ world or global cities (*end-state* disposition) but rather to detect whether *processes* of world city formation are taking place that may explain the urban form from that particular viewpoint (van Meeteren, Bassens, & Derudder, 2016: 299). We thus concur with Robinson’s (2006: 113) later vantage point that ‘a greater emphasis on process rather than assigning cities to a category would certainly enable the world cities approach to be more applicable to cities currently left off its maps’. Indeed, some researchers have emphasized that to arrive at a better understanding of the character and role of cities in the Global South, it is necessary to examine the historical legacies that a particular city carries into current rounds of globalization (King, 1990b; Pani, 2009; Zhang, 2015). Or as Armstrong and McGee (1985: 42) put it:

‘It is important to be aware of the global, historical context in which the urban systems of the Third World have evolved. This character and function of each city have corresponded to its specific relationship with different phases of global expansion, and in particular with the capitalist system as it has unfolded over the past two centuries. Every urban area, therefore, has its own pace and trajectory of development which flow from the interaction between its internal evolution and external forces.’

To date, however, there has been relatively little attention in the literature on how world cities – especially in the Global South – have come into being (Douglass, 2000; Olds & Yeung, 2004). With regard to cities’ long-term evolutionary process, although Friedmann’s seminal ‘The World City Hypothesis’ (1986) embodies a suggestion on the importance of the historical factor in co-producing

world cities, it does not systematically link the urbanization process of such cities to the broader political economic processes prior to the unfolding of the current form of globalization (see, however, Taylor, 1995). Accordingly, the world city literature has been criticized as it may – even if implicitly and unwantedly – suggest that the phenomenon of world cities and the global strategic roles these cities have assumed are a twentieth century novelty (King, 1990a, Mielants, 2017).

As noted by some, the global connections that co-define globalization are, however, not a new phenomenon: trends of global capital accumulation have continued and accelerated, mainly due to the rapid advancement of technologies, over the past centuries (Arrighi, 1994; Wallerstein, 1979). The current strategic roles played by major cities should, therefore, be conceived as more of an outcome of the historical continuity of their urban developmental processes across different phases of globalization that tend to exhibit a strong path-dependent nature (Kloosterman & Lambregts, 2007). A number of scholars put forward that, as a feature of a capitalist world-economy (i.e. fundamentally constructed around the international division of labor), the origins of many world cities in the West can be traced back to ‘the long sixteenth century’ that signposted the emergence of the first international division of labor (King, 1990a; Mielants, 2017). The current global prominence of Amsterdam, London, and New York, for instance, is strongly linked to the previous strategic position these assumed in the earlier rounds of capitalist world-system (Braudel, 1984; Wallerstein, 1984; see also Taylor, Hoyler, & Smith, 2012).

More studies are, nevertheless, needed to comprehend how the (global) centrality of major urban centers in the developing world has been co-produced by the historical accumulation of these cities’ global engagements long before the advent of contemporary globalization. In this respect, this paper aims to fill this empirical lacuna by drawing on the experience of the JMA, Indonesia. In our reading, King (1990a, 1990b, 2012) has perhaps provided the clearest argumentation for the relevance of such an analysis, noting that the genesis of many of today’s strategic sites in the developing nations was linked to the emergence of the European capitalist world-economy in the sixteenth century. That is, such central sites were originally imposed from the outside by the expansion of the European empires,

or what King (1990b) termed as ‘colonial cities’. Indeed, ‘colonial cities can be viewed as forerunners of what the contemporary capitalist world city would eventually become’ (King, 1990a: 38). Often originating in indigenous small port towns, these colonial cities were at the forefront of the introduction of new urban hierarchies, frequently leading to primate city growth (King, 1990a: 34; see also Berry, 1961; McGee, 1967). It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that many current strategic global sites in the post-colonial countries of Southeast Asia, including the JMA in Indonesia, are primate cities. This paper follows this particular line of argumentation as a starting point for retracing the historical continuity of the centrality of JMA in connecting what is now Indonesia to the rest of the world. The central point here is that the character and function of the JMA in the current stage of global economy can be better understood by referring to its long-term, path-dependent developmental trajectory that was arguably triggered by the European capitalist expansion. In doing so, this paper investigates the following two questions in particular: How has the JMA evolved across different phases of globalization? And how has the character and function of the JMA been (continuously) shaped and reshaped by the global and national political economic changes during different periods? In the following section, we investigate the transition of the JMA over roughly the past five centuries, from the moment of the rise of its centrality (i.e. imposed in the first place by the Dutch trading networks) to today being Indonesia’s key gateway to the global economy.

### **Tracing the long-term evolution of the Jakarta metropolitan area**

In our analysis, we use population estimates to sketch the evolution of the JMA’s economic prowess. Although a proxy at best, as Taylor, Hoyler, and Smith (2012) argue: economic growth and population growth have historically changed in tandem, in the sense that more dynamic cities create much (new) work, thus attracting incoming migrants at a larger scale. Although they also note that this tandem may be relevant only until the 1950s, we still can see its analytical purchase in present-day Indonesia. A number of studies concerning Indonesian urbanization, for instance, have shown that the largest metropolises in Indonesia in terms of population are also the country’s economic powerhouses (Jones, 2002; Rustiadi et al., 2015).



### *Pre-colonial era*

The commencing of Jakarta as both a port and an urban center can be traced back to a twelfth-century settlement named Sunda Kelapa (Cybriwsky & Ford, 2001). Together with Banten (before it later became the main port of a new kingdom of 'Banten Sultanate' established around 1527), Sunda Kelapa was the principal port of the Hindu Kingdom of Sunda (alternatively known as the Pajajaran Kingdom). As a port town, Sunda Kelapa attracted a large number of traders coming from across coastal areas of the Asian continent: Arabia, India, China, and other trading centers in Southeast Asia, including what is presently the Indonesian archipelago.

Although Sunda Kelapa was the main port of the Pajajaran Kingdom, it was still regarded as a small coastal town. It is important to note that the Pajajaran Kingdom itself was only one of many different kingdoms/sultanates that at that time ruled different regions within the Indonesian archipelago. At that time, there were broadly two types of cities that had existed for centuries (Reed, 1972; see also McGee, 1967). The first type is coastal cities, including Sunda Kelapa, which functioned as scattered commercial nodes in maritime network with trade linkages often reaching beyond Southeast Asian seas. Instead of wasting resources to extend urban authority beyond these centers, the political and economic policies of the indigenous rulers were mostly geared toward maintaining and making flourish overseas exchange. The second type are the sacred cities that served as capitals of extensive kingdoms, and were above all hubs of administrative activities. In contrast to the small port towns, the latter were usually located inland and were the largest urban settlements. Moreover, in comparison to other major port cities located within the Indonesian archipelago, such as Banten (or Bantam), Surabaya, and Makassar, Sunda Kelapa was relatively small in terms of its population (Reid, 1980). The status of Sunda Kelapa was later even downgraded after being seized by the Banten Sultanate on 22 June 1527, and this in parallel to the gradual downfall of the Pajajaran Kingdom (Blussé, 2013). Under the new authority, Sunda Kelapa was renamed as Jayakarta.

### *A long colonial phase*

The fourteenth century saw the beginning of the increase of international maritime traffic within and beyond Southeast Asia. One of the major underlying factors was the rise of the region's production of 'cash crops' for the international market and later the gradual arrival of Western merchants (Reed, 1972; Reid, 1980). This period (1450-1650) is also known as the 'long sixteenth century', which is seen as the rise of the capitalist world-economy (Wallerstein, 1974). The earliest years of this period were characterized by, among other things, European expansion into other continents: America, Africa, and Asia. The Portuguese armed merchants were the first European empire that arrived and developed a foothold in the Southeast Asian region. Their long-term goal was to ensure the monopoly of the world spice trade. In 1511 the Portuguese empire successfully conquered Malacca (now part of Malaysia); this port was then erected as its strategic base in Southeast Asia. This empire continued to expand its trading territory in the region, including to Sunda Kelapa (Cybriwsky & Ford, 2001).

However, it was not until the arrival of the 'Dutch East Indies Company or *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (VOC)' (which also brought military personnel and resources) that Sunda Kelapa (or Jayakarta) regained its prominence, becoming even more important than before. The VOC was the world's first formally listed public company and is often considered to be the first multinational company (MNC) in the world (Beugelsdijk et al., 2013: 394). Founded on 20 March 1602, the VOC's final goal was to secure the Dutch monopoly in Asian trade; the immediate project was, however, to break the Portuguese trading dominance in the Indonesian archipelago (Kehoe, 2015). At the global level, starting from this particular time until around the 1700s, the Dutch empire was seen as the core nation in the earliest form of the capitalist world-economy with Amsterdam assuming being the nerve center of this world-system (Kloosterman & Lambregts, 2007). This earliest round of global capitalist expansion was mainly fueled by mercantile activities: goods from different parts of the globe were traded through major port cities.

The Dutch empire established a foothold in Indonesia shortly after the VOC's establishment in Amsterdam. In particular, the VOC established its first Indonesian permanent trading post in Bantam

in 1603. The Banten Sultanate later granted permission to the VOC to build a warehouse on the east of Ciliwung River, Jayakarta. The warehousing area was particularly important for stocking and distributing goods entering into the West-East trade. Following the increasing power of the VOC and the escalating tension between the VOC and the Banten Sultanate, the Dutch multinational company planned to take full control over Jayakarta. After successfully razing Jayakarta to the ground, the VOC opened its first overseas headquarters in Jayakarta on 30 May 1619, and later renamed the city as Batavia. Batavia was chosen 'due more to strategic convenience than to the importance of the Java trade' (Dick, 2002: 15). In particular, this port city was at that time viewed to occupy the best location in the Indonesian archipelago for maritime communication (Murphey, 1957: 238).

The establishment of the VOC's headquarters in Batavia led to a fundamental reorientation of this city's development and urban trajectory. In this respect, Batavia's new function as the center for trade and administration of the VOC had led to its gradual prominence, not only within the Indonesian archipelago but also beyond. To sustain this function, supporting infrastructures were provided, such as shipyards, warehouses, a workmen's quarter, *etc.* At the same time, Batavia also functioned as a center for political decisions, a military stronghold, and an outpost of Western culture (Reed, 1972). During its early years as a 'global' port city, the population of Batavia was, relatively speaking, still far behind other important port cities in the Indonesian archipelago. It was estimated that Batavia had about 27,000 residents (1673), while the inhabitants of Surabaya and Makassar were already around 50,000-60,000 (1625) and 160,000 (1600), respectively (Reid, 1980; Silver, 2008). However, the population composition of Batavia exhibited its cosmopolitan nature: about 2,000 were Dutch, 3,000 were Chinese, 5,000 were Moors and Asian-born of Portuguese descent. Following the continuous expansion of the VOC's commercial area outside the Indonesian archipelago, marked by the establishment of trading ports in Galle (1640), Guangzhou or Canton (1720), and Bengal (1734), Batavia remained the center for administration and book-keeping of the VOC (Tanap, 2018). It is important to note, however, that since the primary interest of the VOC was to secure its commercial system spreading across Asia, the Dutch multinational company was not inclined to establish

numerous cities and towns (Reed, 1972). Therefore, in addition to Amsterdam, Batavia was mainly interconnected with trading posts and factories controlled by the VOC.

After the VOC's bankruptcy on 31 December 1799, the Dutch government took over the VOC and further expanded the company's previous territorial claims into a colony called the Dutch East Indies or the Netherlands Indies. Batavia had transformed from the company's regional headquarters into the capital city of the colony. The changing status of Batavia as a colonial capital city signposted the commencement of a shift in effective territorial authority from the indigenous cities in the interior to those located on the coast (Reed, 1972: 314). As such, Batavia gradually widened its role in terms of territorial control and networking, from trading posts to a broader set of towns and cities across the Indonesian archipelago. To accommodate its increasing complex and multifarious functions, starting from 1811, Batavia's territory had been expanded: for instance, by the transfer of governmental activities from Kota (around Sunda Kelapa port in now North Jakarta) to and the development of new residential areas in Weltevreden (now part of Central Jakarta) (Silver, 2008: 41). Under the colonial government, Batavia's economic preeminence within the Indonesian archipelago was further amplified. For example, Batavia was designated as the exclusive port for imports over other major ports in Java (Surabaya and Semarang) and later in outer Java (Makassar) (Houben, 2002: 70; Lindblad, 2002).

From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, Batavia witnessed a profound development progress not only because of its rising importance within the vast Indonesian archipelago, but also due to some notable changes in the world-system. Indeed, the period from 1870 to 1914 characterized the high water mark of the nineteenth century globalization. This was mainly prompted by the emergence of more open and liberalized economic regimes, new technological advancements (e.g. transportation, communication, and agriculture), the construction of the Suez and Panama Canals, and the diffusion of the industrial revolution in Western Europe and later in the United States. Combined, these aspects had led to a booming demand for raw materials and foreign markets (Ginsburg, 1955; Huff & Angeles, 2011). Batavia's function as a major gateway catering to the increasing West-East trade was

further strengthened, among other things by the construction of a new, more modern seaport 'Tanjung Priok', located about 11 km west of the old port of Sunda Kelapa. The population of Batavia started growing significantly during the period of economic liberalization that began in the 1870s. Later, as the export-oriented agricultural production declined, early twentieth-century industrial development flourished in Java and foreign (notably European and American) investors particularly established new (manufacturing) industries in Batavia (Dick, 2002: 160). The population of Batavia gradually outpaced that of other regional centers. In 1891, the population of Batavia (about 126,000) was roughly as large as that of Surabaya and about 50% larger than that of Semarang. By 1931, the population of the colonial capital was already 50% larger (around 533,000 residents) than that of Surabaya and about 150% larger than that of Semarang (Huff & Angeles, 2011).

Following the global economic crisis of the 1930s and the gradual waning of Dutch global political and economic power, the Indonesian archipelago fell into the Japanese occupation for a very brief but tumultuous period (1942-1945). Batavia remained the capital city of the new colony, but it was renamed Jakarta. Under the Japanese colonialization, the Indonesian economy was mobilized to support the Japanese interests in the Pacific War. The Japanese occupation further fueled the bitterness among the Indonesian people about the continued foreign dominance; Java, in particular, was impoverished (Dick, 2002: 163-167). However, during this period of heightened oppression, urban dwellers suffered least from the unrealistic requirements of the colonialist war machine. Large cities, such as Jakarta and Surabaya, therefore became places of hopes, including for refugees and beggars. Consequently, between 1940 and 1945, the population of Jakarta grew significantly from around 600,000 to about 850,000 (Dick, 2002: 167).

### *A proto-democratic state*

Indonesia declared its independence on 17 August 1945 and Jakarta was retained as the new country's capital city. The young Republic witnessed decades of authoritarian political systems, first under Soekarno's (1945-1966) and subsequently under Soeharto's (1967-1998) presidency. During both regimes Jakarta's urban transformation was largely cast in the context of national developmental

projects, strongly shaped by the rulers of the country. It is important to note that despite Indonesia's declaration of independence, the Dutch, along with the British, forces returned to Indonesia to reclaim their (ex-)colony. As a result, from 1945 to 1950, numerous battles and negotiations between the Indonesian and Dutch sides were occurring. Battles over West Irian (now Papua and West Papua Provinces) even continued into the early 1960s.

Following a period of battles and rehabilitation in the years after independence, Indonesia encountered economic turmoil as Soekarno's 'guided democracy' was accompanied by anti-Western sentiments. In the midst of the Cold War between the Western Capitalist Bloc and the Eastern Communist Bloc, Indonesia – under President Soekarno – played a central role in the post-colonial 'third world' global project that was dubbed the 'Non-Aligned Movement' (NAM). While the NAM was established in 1961 in Belgrade, its basic principles were indeed formulated and agreed based on a conference held in 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia. Despite the fact that this project was intended to be a non-aligned movement, Soekarno himself tended to favor socialism over capitalism as the latter politico-economic ideology was associated with the experience of (Western) imperial exploitation and colonialization (Weinstein, 1976). Accordingly, in 1965 Soekarno even withdrew Indonesia from the United Nations, and later the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as part of broader efforts to cut links with the capitalist world. In the wake of an invigorated spirit of nationalism, the Indonesian government also promulgated economic nationalization measures, including the takeover of many Dutch companies and tight government supervision of Western companies. However, there were two notable exceptions to these economic tendencies toward becoming more inward-looking: the gradual improvement of economic relations with Japan and the role of American capital in the oil industry (Dick, 2002). As a result of this economic turmoil, the manufacturing share of gross domestic product (GDP) fell back from about 12% in 1939 to less than 10% in 1960 (Booth, 1998: 88)

During Soekarno's presidency Jakarta's importance remained unchanged, but its development and urbanization trajectory were greatly reoriented. As a new nation-state, there was a strong tendency toward national identity-building that had in turn led to the disruption of the pre-existing patterns of

economic development imposed by the Dutch colonial government. Within this strong national identity-building (as well as tendencies toward socialism), Soekarno envisioned Jakarta to become the nation's beacon of rising power and a symbol of the nation's unity. Accordingly, '[Soekarno's] Jakarta was not to be a model for other cities in Indonesia, not least as they might become potential rivals. Instead, it had to be the center for other cities in the nation' (Kusno, 1997: 95). As a consequence, 'Jakarta was not to be replicated by other cities in Indonesia, but was rather to be privileged above them' (Kusno, 1997: 113). Having this privilege, Jakarta's urban transformation was directed by the president himself (Silver, 2008: 93). The ideological dimension of urban development was largely inscribed onto the built environment: modernist buildings, colossal statues, and symbolic layers (Salim & Kombaitan, 2009). This is still visible in the urban landscape, as for example the *Monumen Nasional* (Monas) or the National Monument which was built as one of Soekarno's ideological artifacts continues to be a central symbol for and in Jakarta. By 1960, up to half of Jakarta's budget came from the central government (Ford 1993: 378). As a corollary, although Indonesia was characterized by a period of economic uncertainty, Jakarta still attracted a lot of migrants coming from different regions across the country as there was a broadly shared belief that they were better off in Jakarta (Silver 2008: 92). These migrants were mainly absorbed into petty services or the informal sector. By 1961, the population of Jakarta (about 4.5 million) was almost three times larger than Surabaya, the country's second largest city (BPS, 1962).

Due to this prolonged economic crisis and the military uprising in 1965 that was allegedly masterminded by the Indonesian Communist Party, Soekarno was forced to step down. After Soeharto took office in 1967, Indonesia was reinserted into the world capitalist system and the country's economic vision became, therefore, once again reoriented. In contrast to Soekarno, who tended to maintain a close relationship with the communist block (mainly at the end of his reign), Soeharto was a pro-Western and pro-foreign investment leader. His vision for the young Republic emphasized economic development (Thee, 2002). Nonetheless, in geographical terms, Soeharto retained the vision of Jakarta being the nerve center of the country although that he extended Soekarno's vision on Jakarta's positionality from the nation's political symbol into the nation's political and economic

heartbeat in the era of a more open and gradually liberalized economy. As a result, the 1970s were a prosperous period for Indonesia from the perspective of mainstay economic indicators: new foreign investment, an oil boom, and a tourism boom (especially in Bali) (Ford, 1993). In this period, partial types of industrialization had also been (re-)introduced, including the development of some import-substitution industries. Benefiting from the Indonesian highly centralized political and economic system, Jakarta reaped large shares of the harvest of the country's economic progress. The national capital, therefore, developed even further in terms of economic progress, physical and spatial development, and incoming migration.

During Soeharto's authoritarian era, Jakarta's urban trajectory was reoriented in line with the country reconnecting with the capitalist world-economy. New measures were implemented, including the physical and socio-economic expansion beyond Jakarta's administrative boundaries. In particular, starting in the 1970s, efforts were taken to control immigration into and to distribute urban growth away from Jakarta. A notable effort was the implementation of a policy declaring the Indonesian capital as a 'closed city'. However, this plan failed as migrants disregarded the law in such large numbers that enforcement became impossible (Cybriwsky & Ford, 2001). Another important attempt was to deconcentrate the population and economic activities to Jakarta's outskirts by integrating the capital city with its surrounding areas called 'Bodetabek' (an acronym for Bogor-Depok-Tangerang-Bekasi) into a metropolitan system (i.e. the JMA or also known as 'Jabodetabek'). Accordingly, a first formal regional-based planning study was undertaken by the Ministry of Public Works in 1973 with technical assistance from the Dutch Physical Planning Agency (Silver, 2008: 117). Since then, further initiatives have been moderated by the central government, including the establishment of the Development Cooperation Body (*Badan Kerjasama Pembangunan* or BKSP) of the JMA, the improvement and the construction of major transportation networks connecting Jakarta with its surroundings, and the development of residential areas, knowledge complexes and economic centers in Jakarta's outskirts (Bodetabek). As a result, the population in the Bodetabek area grew faster overall, particularly since 1980 (Figure 1). On a metropolitan scale, the total population of the JMA already surpassed 11 million by 1980.






Figure 1. Population in Jakarta and Bodetabek, 1961-2010

Source: Based on BPS data (1962, 1972, 1981, 1991, 2001, 2011)

The second half of the 1980s saw another critical impetus for the urban trajectory of the JMA. Two conjoined forces, i.e. global industrial relocation, largely from its East Asian neighbors, and the promulgation of a set of liberalization measures moderated by the central government in the late 1980s, more firmly re-inserted the country into the contemporary capitalist world-economy. This East Asian industrial relocation was, in fact, part of a broader global economic restructuring in the 1970s, which was triggered by the crisis of global capitalism in the industrialized countries. This particular period has commonly been marked as the beginning of the contemporary form of globalization and ‘world city formation’. As a result of these global-regional-national forces, Indonesia saw a gradual economic transformation from a primary-sector-driven (oil and agriculture) economy toward more export-oriented manufacturing industries. Having been the country’s nerve center for so many years, and coupled with the spatially privileging policies promoted by Soeharto’s centralized regime, Jakarta (and later also its surroundings or Bodetabek) therefore again assumed the most central role in processes of global capital accumulation. The JMA became the most favorable landing place for global capital inflows, particularly in manufacturing industries (Indraprahasta, Derudder, & Koelemajj, 2018). For instance, the JMA captured more than 50% of cumulative foreign direct

investment (FDI) inflows to the country during 1990-1997, a period known as Indonesia's manufacturing boom (BKPM, 2015). The longstanding evolution of the Indonesian urban system in general and the JMA in particular had provided the basis for the JMA's becoming the strategic place in Indonesia in terms of centrality in global economic flows, heralding the start of processes of what we now call world city formation (Firman, 1998; Soegijoko, 1996). The globalization processes experienced by the JMA affected the Bodetabek area in particular, notably in terms of its population growth and urban-regional economic dynamics. Starting from the late 1980s, this area continues to outpace Jakarta in terms of population growth (Figure 1). Meanwhile, at the national scale, during 1961-2000 the JMA's primacy over the next largest metropolises continued to rise (Figure 2).




Figure 2. The JMA's population's dominance

Source: Analyzed from BPS (1962, 1972, 1981, 1991, 2001, 2011)

### ***'Reformasi 1998' and a new era of decentralization in Indonesia***

The 1997 Asian financial crisis that shook many East Asian countries, including Indonesia, turned out to be an important break for the economic growth that Indonesia had experienced since the early 1970s. The financial crisis had not only severely affected the country's economy; it also quickly spread into social and political life, including urban development (Firman, 1999a). While it was the

spin-off of the 'East Asian economic miracle' in the 1980s that had brought the JMA to play an important part in the global economic system, it was that same economic interconnection that, in turn, brought multi-dimensional crises to the metropolis. The fortune of the JMA was immediately in jeopardy, turning the metropolis from a 'world city' trajectory into a 'city of crisis' (Firman, 1999b): domestic and foreign investments into the JMA had declined substantially, many manufacturing and services firms had closed and laid off their workers, some transnational department stores (e.g. Walmart and JC Penney) went into bankruptcy, the market capitalization of Jakarta (now Indonesia) Stock Exchange had dropped significantly, and many (large) property projects came to a sudden stop.

The crisis triggered a series of student demonstrations in the Indonesian capital that turned into political chaos and social riots, forcing President Soeharto to resign from office after three decades in power. Subsequently, starting from 1998 Indonesia began a period of transition, an era known as *Reformasi* (reform). Following the demand for greater openness and (regional) equality, a series of radical democratization policies was drafted. One of these products was Law 22/1999 on Regional Administrations and Law 25/1999 on Inter-Government Financial Balance. These regulations marked a radical shift in Indonesian political and economic spheres from a highly centralized regime toward a more democratic and decentralized administrative system, in that local (municipal and district) governments now assumed larger political authority and financial capacity in steering urban/regional development. However, the earliest version of this decentralization system (*otonomi daerah*) was considered too ambitious, in the sense that local governments were able to carry out development policies without close consultation with central and provincial governmental administrations as well as their neighboring local governments (Hudalah, 2017). Even so, many local governments, including those of municipalities/districts in the JMA, had issued overlapping local ordinances (*peraturan daerah*) that have created more uncertainties for investors (Hadiz, 2004; Miller, 2013). Not surprisingly perhaps, domestic and foreign investments into the JMA and the economy as a whole remained sluggish during this period of time (Thee, 2003).

After about a decade of transition, the late 2000s saw some notable economic improvements across different parts of the country, including the JMA. In terms of the government sector, Indonesia entered a new phase in its move toward a more decentralized system through the declaration of Government Regulation 38/2007 in which the division of governmental responsibilities between central, provincial and local government were re(de)fin ed. In addition, the central government issued some key development plans, including the general projections of the JMA's development and its strategic positionality within the national territorial economy in the longer run (Indraprahasta, Derudder, & Koelemaij, 2018). As Indonesia's macro-economic foundations had been strengthened, the influx of FDI into the JMA started to grow again (Hudalah, 2017; Indraprahasta, Derudder, & Koelemaij, 2018). The country, as well as the JMA, has not been profoundly affected by the 2007-2008 global economic recession although it is commonly seen as the worst financial crisis after the Great Depression of the 1930s. Although the overall progress of decentralization has been considered to be patchy (Firman, 2008, 2009), there seems to be evidence of a slight economic deconcentration. This may imply that greater economic opportunities have been generated from and in other urban and regional centers outside the JMA (see also Salim & Kombaitan, 2009). As a case in point, incoming FDI into the country has continued to disperse (Figure 3): different kinds of economic sectors (e.g. mining, agriculture, tourism, low-tech manufacturing, *etc.*), notably in other localities outside the main island of Java, have been substantially developed with an increasing participation of foreign investors (Kuswanto, Hoen, & Holzacker, 2017; Yuniarto, 2014). As a result, although still showing its dominance, the growth of the JMA's urban primacy during 2000-2010 was relatively slower in comparison to the previous periods of time (Figure 2).




Figure 3. Geographical shift of incoming FDI (as percentage of total FDI inflow into Indonesia)

Source: Analyzed from BKPM (2018)

It is worth noting that, in spite of this trend toward dispersal, the JMA has retained its prominence in other facets, notably those that reflect its ‘world city-ness’ as per Friedmann (1986). For instance, the JMA has remained the hotspot for certain high value-added economic industries, particularly advanced producer services (APS) and hi-tech manufacturing industries (Indraprahasta, Derudder, & Koelemij, 2018). In particular, global APS firms (i.e. those listed in the databases of the Globalization and World Cities research network) operating in Indonesia place their national headquarters or national representative office in Jakarta; only 2 firms (i.e. Deutsche Bank and Ernst & Young) share their national main offices in two locations, i.e. Jakarta and Surabaya. Moreover, the JMA also hosts many, if not most, national headquarters of major (national and transnational) firms (Indraprahasta & Derudder, 2017). In terms of transportation networks, except for natural resources-based products (e.g. mining, oil, gas, and plywood)<sup>1</sup>, the JMA has retained its position as the country’s most strategic logistics hub. During most of the last decade (2000-2013), Tanjung Priok Seaport (Jakarta) consistently generated about three times larger values of export and around four to five times larger values of import than the country’s second largest seaport of Tanjung Perak

<sup>1</sup> These products are, in the most part, directly transported via a number of major entrepôts in the resource-rich island of Kalimantan (or also known as Borneo).

(Surabaya) (BPS, 2016). Taken together, therefore, it is clear that despite a changing governmental system that putatively favors decentralization, the JMA continues to be spatially privileged as ‘the focal location for the country’s most strategic national economic sectors (i.e. capital and technology-intensive industries), and most recently infrastructural urban megaprojects (i.e. transportation and communication projects)’ (Indraprahasta, Derudder, and Koelemaij, 2018: 60). Another relevant observation in this regard is that the Surabaya Stock Exchange (the second stock exchange in Indonesia after the Jakarta Stock Exchange) was officially merged with the Jakarta Stock Exchange (later renamed as the Indonesia Stock Exchange) on 30 October 2007. The Surabaya Stock Exchange was established in 1989 with the initial intention to support the development of capital markets in particular and of regional economies in general in the Eastern parts of Indonesia. This closure/merger has certainly lessened the capacity of Surabaya metropolitan area to become a competitor to the JMA, particularly in the capital and money markets.

### **Discussion and conclusions**

While this paper has above all explored the historical accumulation underlying the emergence and growth of the JMA into a strategic site of the global economy, the broader objective of this paper has been to contribute to a more nuanced and extended world city research agenda. Although we agree with calls for the need to further diversify this literature on a number of fronts, we do not believe there is an *a priori* need to provincialize the world city literature by underscoring its limits in terms of understanding specific urban processes and cities in the Global South. Instead, we propose to follow the call to practice of what Barnes and Sheppard (2010) have described as ‘engaged pluralism’ when doing world city research (see Hoyler & Harrison, 2017; van Meeteren, Derudder, & Bassens, 2016). As such, our intention has rather been to look for ‘trading zones’ based on constructive dialogue to bridge differences. In this respect, we argue that while cities in the Global North and Global South alike are indeed shaped by a range of similar processes within today’s capitalist global economy, regional, national and local variations in urban-economic and socio-spatial processes continue to exist and matter (see Derudder & Taylor, 2018; Krätke, 2014). Thus, cities follow different pathways toward globalization as the practices of capitalism have been adapted to fit different geographical and

historical contexts. Or, as put forward by Scott (2008: vi): ‘every historical version of capitalism is associated with distinctive types of cities, and vice versa’. It is therefore relevant to view ‘world’ or ‘global’ cities not as *end-products*, but as continuously reworked spatial expression of capitalist development and expansion.

Accordingly, and based on the discussion in this paper, the persistent prominence of the JMA as an industrial node within the global spatial division of labor as well as its centrality within Indonesia and beyond can be better understood by referring to its long-term evolution (Table 1). Here, the emergence and ensuing development of the JMA as a strategic site of the global economy can be linked to its initial formation as a colonial port that was created in the first place by the VOC. The character and function of the JMA in the current stage of global economy should therefore be seen as a product of a *path-dependent* evolutionary process of urbanization. Or, as put forward by Kloosterman and Lambregts (2007: 56): ‘Cities and urban systems mostly adapt to changes by adding new layers to the existing outlay [...] Only rarely do we see a more fundamental break, often provoked by an exogenous crisis’. Accordingly, while scholars (King, 2012; Kloosterman & Lambregts, 2007) argue that the origins of many world/global cities in the West are to be found in their imperial and colonial antecedents, a similar genealogy also applies to the JMA: not as the heartland of these colonial empires, but rather as the center of the colonized territory of such empires (cf. Armstrong & McGee, 1985; Frank, 1998).

This long-term evolutionary process should, however, look at the interplay between factors at the global, regional, and national scale so as to better grasp the underlying mechanism leading to the urban-economic dynamics of the JMA. In the context of the JMA, these factors played out differently across different historical periods, generating different urban economic trajectories and (global and national) functional roles for the metropolis. It can be also seen that the evolution of the JMA has not followed a simple linear path but also saw several ruptures and even setbacks. The latter can be, for instance, seen during the 1960s when the JMA cut its link to the (mainstream) global capitalist system and during the 1997-1998 East Asian economic calamity, affecting the JMA’s stages of transition and

its urban trajectory. More generally perhaps, owing to the dialectical relations between factors at the global, regional and national scales, the spatial manifestation of capitalist development and expansion has yielded varying types of (world) cities: post-industrial cities (based on financial and advanced producer services) in North America and Western Europe as well as industrial cities such as the case of cities from the ‘industrialization’s late-comers’ (including the JMA) and other types of cities based on different (global) economic profiles.

In terms of spatial expansion, the JMA has experienced a gradual transformation from a small port town of Sunda Kelapa to the capital city of Jakarta and later to the Jakarta metropolitan area. Moreover, after Indonesia’s independence, the JMA’s population dominance has continued to exhibit a rising trend, albeit with a slower growth rate since the decentralization era. As noted by Short and Pinet-Peralta (2009: 1264), ‘once primacy is established, while it may change its form, from city to city region primacy, it rarely disappears or even lessens substantially’. From this perspective, this paper lends additional currency to the earlier literature on urban primacy, notably those strands of that literature focusing on cities in the Global South: the (Western) colonial systems facilitated the birth and growth of primate cities by centralizing the administration of the colonized countries and by intensively developing the transportation and communication networks to support these cities’ function as (global) entrepôts. The economic significance of these primate cities has subsequently been further amplified by current rounds of globalization (coupled with post-colonial states’ intervention aiming at reaping benefits from the global flows of capital, knowledge, etc.), transforming these cities into – what Armstrong and McGee (1985) have described as – ‘theaters of accumulation’.

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Table 1. Historical framing of the JMA

		Pre-colonial era	Colonial era			Proto-democratic state		<i>Reformasi</i>
			VOC (pseudo-colonialization)	Dutch colonialization	Japanese colonialization	Soekarno presidency	Soeharto presidency	
Factors	Global landscape	Trade expansion (Eurasia and parts of Africa)	European (trade and military) expansion to Asia, Africa, and America	Nineteenth century globalization	World War II	Cold war: capitalism vs. communism	Global shift and the genesis of the NIDL	Intensified global integration and competition
	National landscape	Indonesian archipelago consisted of different kingdoms / sultanates	Indonesian archipelago consisted of different kingdoms / sultanates  Occupation of several port towns and production areas (agriculture)	Gradual efforts to formally colonialize the Indonesian archipelago: starting from Java and Sumatera to the eastern parts of the archipelago  The inception of Indonesian modern nationalism in the early 20 <sup>th</sup> century	Supporting the Japanese interest in the Pacific war	Post-colonial spirit of nationalism: socialism  Non-aligned 'third world' global project	Gradual economic liberalization  Authoritarian government	Gradual economic liberalization  Democratization and decentralization: greater opportunities for other cities and regions to tap into global capital flows
Implications	Character and function of the JMA	Small port town named Sunda Kelapa (later Jayakarta)	Headquarters of VOC named Batavia	Capital city of the colony named Batavia  Gradual spatial expansion from port area to its surrounding areas  Adding economic and administrative functions	Capital city of the colony named Jakarta  Economic and administrative functions	Capital city of a new independent nation named Jakarta  Symbol of power and unity of Indonesia	Capital city of an emerging economy  Economic heartbeat of Indonesia  Spatial expansion from Jakarta to its surrounding areas: the formation of the JMA or Jabodetabek	Capital city of a decentralizing nation  Economic heartbeat of Indonesia
	JMA within the national (urban) system	Urban system consisting of coastal cities and sacred cities (governmental and religious centers)	Gradual prominence of coastal cities (including Batavia) as economic centers	Establishing the development of Batavia as a primate city	Continuing the development of Jakarta as a primate city	Reinforcing the development of Jakarta as a primate city	Reinforcing the development of Jakarta (and its surrounding areas or Bodetabek) as a primate city	Spatially privileging the JMA as center for (hi-tech) manufacturing and services industries
	JMA within the global (urban) system	Commercial node within maritime networks	Entrepôt	Colonial outpost	Colonial outpost	Post-colonial node within the 'third world' global alliance	Key gateway to the global economy  Industrial node within the NIDL	Key gateway to the global economy  Industrial node within the NIDL