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Socioeconomic status connected imbalances in arable land size holding and utilization in smallholder farming in Zimbabwe: Implications for a sustainable rural development.

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9 Abstract

10 Access to land and other natural resources are key means of driving rural people out of abject 11 poverty. Inequalities in access to land and supportive services that ensure full utilization of land are therefore hurting in rural societies. This article enumerates and explain wealth-related imbalances in 12 land size holding and utilization in Zimbabwe's smallholder farming sector. It relies on cross-13 14 sectional household level data collected from 601 smallholder farming households randomly sampled from four districts. Disparities in land size holding and utilization are measured using the Erreygers 15 corrected concentration index. A decomposition exploration is performed to determine the 16 17 contributing factors to enumerated inequalities in land size holding and utilization. Results reveal a 18 pro-poor distribution of inequalities in low and very low arable land size holding and also in low land 19 utilization. Conversely, a pro-rich distribution of inequalities is observed in high land size holding and 20 high land utilization. Wealth-related inequalities are evident in both men and women farmer groups, youth and non-youth farmer groups and in different geographic regions. A decomposition analysis 21 22 show that observed inequalities in both land size holding and utilization are hugely explained by asset 23 wealth. Other factors including access to extension, age of farmer, fulltime-farming status and geographic location were also found to minimally explain measured inequalities. In conclusion, low 24 25 land size holding and low land utilization are phenomenon highly concentrated within the poorest 26 segments of society in Zimbabwe whilst high land size holding and utilization are found within the 27 more affluent population. Asset holding chiefly explain the disparities. Results suggest the need for decision makers in land allocation, distribution, re-distribution, and agrarian transformation in general, 28 29 to deliberately concentrate on the most vulnerable and poorer segments of society. Such will have far 30 reaching implications for rural transformation and development.

Key words: arable land holding; land utilization; socioeconomic disparities, corrected concentration
 index, smallholder farmer, Zimbabwe

33

34 **1. Introduction**

Land is a critical resource that can significantly transform livelihoods of rural dwellers in 35 developing countries. For instance, land is considered a central economic resource for development in 36 37 Zimbabwe and that is why it was considered for indigenization and economic empowerment since 1980 (Ruzivo Trust 2013). Further, Zimbabwe as a country is agro based with more than 80% of the 38 populace depending on agriculture for their livelihoods. Agriculture in Zimbabwe is a significant 39 40 contributor to the economy. Since the year 2010, agriculture has been contributing between 14% and 41 19.5% to the National Gross Domestic Product (Faostat 2015; Munhande et al. 2013; Mutambara et al. 42 2013). In addition to significant contribution to GDP the sector in the year 2010, accounted for more than 40% of the value of exports, 60% of raw materials to agro-industries, supported at least 70% of 43 44 the population in terms of livelihoods and contributed to about 66% to formal employment (both 45 direct and indirectly (CAADP 2010). Statistics show that Zimbabwe has about 39.6 million hectares of land area in total and about 40% (15.8 million ha) of that land area is used in agriculture (FAO 46 2012; Ruzivo Trust 2013). However, only 11% (4.3 million hectares) of the total land area can be 47 effectively used in agricultural production (arable land) (FAO 2012; Ruzivo Trust 2013). 48

49 The significance of agriculture to the economy and livelihoods make land access and utilization 50 key amongst smallholder producers in Zimbabwe. This is why the government have been much 51 concerned with land reform and redistribution programs since independence (1980) (Sithole 1996; 52 Juana and Mabugu 2005). In different parts of the world, land reforms have occurred in circumstances 53 where there were great social, economic, political inequalities in income and power agriculture (Pacione 1984). In Zimbabwe, land reform was meant to address inequitable land distribution, 54 55 unsustainable plus sub-optimal use of land and insecurity of land tenure (Scoones et al. 2011; Ministry of Lands and Agriculture 1999). As such, about 3.6 million hectares of land were acquired 56 and redistributed between the year 1980 and 2000 (Rugube and Chambati 2001). Further, and with the 57 58 same motive, the government embarked on a radical land reform in year 2000 often known as the Fast 59 Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) which acquired agricultural land from large scale white commercial farmers and gave it out to landless and other land-short indigenous black people who 60 were previously marginalized (Moyo 2011; Mujeyi et al. 2015; Sadomba 2011). Statistics show that 61 almost 200 thousand households benefited from the redistribution of more than 10 million hectares of 62 63 land formerly held by only about 4500 large scale white commercial farmers (Moyo 2011; Moyo and Chambati 2013). Resultantly, the agrarian reforms gave birth to a new crop of mostly family run 64 farms (Moyo and Yeros 2005; Sadomba 2013) which are predominantly resource poor (Makate et al. 65 2016). At present, almost 70% of farmers in the country are smallholders which make them the 66 majority of food producers. The pool of smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe include both Communal 67 68 farmers and the so-called A1 schemes (villagized arrangements and or small-self-contained 69 farms)(Scoones et al. 2011).

70 land reform programs have greatly reduced land holding and utilization inequalities in the country especially across racial lines. According to UNDP (2012) inequalities in landholding significantly 71 declined from about 0.6 Gini index before FTLRP to below 0.5 after the FTLRP. Despite, the noted 72 73 significant impacts of land redistribution programs in the past (i.e. slight decline in inequalities in land holding and in access to other related resources), little is known pertaining to the existence of wealth 74 75 or income-related disparities in land access and utilization in the smallholder farming sector (i.e. 76 communal and A1 farming schemes). Socioeconomic status (wealth or income) related disparities in 77 land access and utilization could still exist in the smallholder farming sector. This is plausible given that different factors have influenced implementation of the agrarian reforms for instance, 78 79 income/resource inequalities, and pressure from political groups influencing the FTLRP (Sadomba 80 2013). Specifically, literature point to the influence of various grievance groups particularly war veterans of the 1970 liberation struggle to implementation of the FTLRP (Sadomba 2011; Sadomba 81 2013). Also, Scoones (2011) stated that those with elite connections, resources and benefiting from 82 political patronage had higher odds of benefiting from the FTLR exercise. This may have led to 83 84 concentration of land holding in the hands of those with access to resources, with elite connections, liberation war veterans or other closely related groups. In addition, corruption in land deals, and other 85 factors could add to the factors contributing to disparities in land holding and access to related 86

resources. According to Mutondoro et al. (2016) corruption in land sector is common in Africa and is
largely associated with the rise of large scale land deals. Corruption in land administration and politics
also facilitates land grabbing (MacInnes 2012). Given the role of local leadership (i.e. chiefs and or
village headman) in land administration in rural Zimbabwe, it may be possible that corruption by the
local leaders in land administration could contribute to disparities in landholding.

In terms of utilization, farmers with access to land may fail to fully utilize it because of a number 92 93 of reasons. For instance, lack of capital, poverty, lack of farming time due to commitment in other off-94 farm activities (e.g. formal employment), lack of farming knowledge and other necessary farming 95 resources (Jayne et al. 2003; Moyo 2013; Rigg 2006). This again can impact on income/wealth related inequalities in society as it is likely that land under-utilizers may benefit less from the land and also 96 97 disadvantage potential beneficiaries (of land) along the value chain i.e. lost employment opportunities. 98 This again can further fuel income related inequalities in rural society in general. However, it may not 99 always be the case that land under-utilizers benefit less from land given the rise of informal land rental markets in the Zimbabwe's agrarian sector (Tatsvarei et al. 2018a; Tatsvarei et al. 2018b). 100 Recent studies confirm informal renting out and renting in of land by land reform beneficiaries 101 (Tatsvarei et al. 2018a; Tatsvarei et al. 2018b). In such cases, land owners may get additional income 102 103 through renting out land to other people.

104 Given this background, the study aims to explore the possibility of existence and extent of wealthrelated disparities in land size holding and utilization in Zimbabwe's smallholder farming sector. This 105 has been an understudied case as much focus by a few number of studies have dwelled on 106 inequalities in landholding across racial lines in the pre and post-colonial periods (see (Moyo 2013)). 107 108 Few studies for Zimbabwe have tried to explore wealth-related inequalities in land size holding and utilization and their main contributing factors in smallholder farming which now has most of 109 Zimbabwe's food producers. Literature on this subject and particularly for Zimbabwe is scarce but 110 emerging. For instance, a study by Moyo (2013) examined farmland holding and income inequalities 111 in southern Africa including Zimbabwe. The study relied on the Gini coefficient¹ to compute income 112 related inequalities in agricultural land holding and other key resources in southern African countries 113 including Zimbabwe. The study noted median levels of land concentration in southern African 114 countries such as Lesotho, Zambia and Botswana with Gini values of between 0.4 and 0.50. the rest of 115 116 southern African countries were reported to have Gini coefficients less than 0.4. For Zimbabwe, the Gini coefficient was very high before the fast track land reform with a Gini index of over 0.6. 117 however, this is said to be now estimated to be below 0.5 following the FTLRP (Moyo 2013; UNDP 118 119 2012). As much as the aforementioned study give a picture on income inequalities in land size holding in Southern Africa, it provides results at a very low resolution (larger scale) which may be a challenge 120 121 for local level policy makers. Further, the study did not touch on income inequalities in land 122 utilization and contributing factors to the income inequalities. Additionally, inequalities in land 123 holding and access to related farming resources have been linked to widening income inequalities in 124 the general populace. This is mainly related to accumulation of greater benefits by landowners and users from profits, and rents (Movo 2008). This highlights how negative inequalities in land holding 125 and other necessary farming resources can be in worsening the wealth gradient in the society. This 126 motivates undertaking of this study as results can inform policy on the possible channels that can be 127 128 taken to address socioeconomic status-related inequalities in land access and utilization in smallholder 129 farming for equity and sustainable agrarian transformation.

The study quantify and explain socioeconomic status (wealth)-related inequalities in land size
holding and utilization using the Erreygers (2009) corrected concentration index in Zimbabwe's
smallholder farming which is an understudied case.

¹ Gini coefficient is a statistical measure of inequality of a statistical distribution ranging from 0 (total equality) to 1 (maximum inequality), used in various disciplines to compare incomes or wealth.

133 The rest of the article is organized as follows: section two present the methodology followed by this article whilst sections three and four present results and discussions respectively. Section five 134 concludes the paper and give results implications and policy recommendations. 135

136 2. Methods

155

2.1. Measuring disparities in land size holding and utilization 137

138 As alluded earlier, the primary objective of this article is to measure and explain socioeconomic status-related inequalities in land size holding and utilization in smallholder farming in selected 139 districts of Zimbabwe. The study adopts the Erreygers (2009) corrected concentration index to 140 141 measure and explain inequalities in land size holding and utilization which is widely adopted in health research (O'donnell et al. 2008; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2000; Makate and Makate 2017). 142 143 According to Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2000) the concentration index measures the extent to 144 which an outcome (i.e. health outcome) is associated with inequality in a measure of socioeconomic status usually wealth or income. In the case of this article, the index will measure the extent to which 145 146 land size holding and utilization at household level is associated with household wealth inequality. The study relies mainly on explaining disparities in land size holding and utilization based on binary 147 148 indicator variables following other recent applications (Makate and Makate 2017; Ngandu et al. 2017). 149 The article follows recommendations suggested by Erreygers (2009) and apply the corrected version 150 of the concentration index. For more information on the merits of applying the corrected version of the concentration as opposed to the standard concentration index when outcome variables are binary 151 readers can refer to Wagstaff (2005) and Erreygers (2009). Algebraically the corrected concentration 152 index is expressed as follows: 153

154
$$E(L) = 8cov(L_i, W_i)$$

where
$$E(L)$$
 is the Erreygers corrected concentration index, L_i is the land size holding or land
utilization outcome of interest, W_i is the individual or respondent's relative rank in the household
wealth distribution. If statistically significant, the higher the value of $E(L)$, the larger the inequality

(1)

land

156 157 uality landholding or utilization. Positive (negative) values of E(L) indicate a pro-rich (pro-poor) 158 distribution in the outcome variable of interest in this case in land size holding and or land utilization. 159

160 To deduce significant inferences Wagstaff et al. (2003) suggested a way of decomposing the measured inequalities (i.e. inequalities in land size holding or land utilization) into their specific 161 determining components using the following linear equation: 162

163
$$L_i = \beta_0 + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \beta_k x_{ik} + \varepsilon_i$$
(2)

where L_i is the land size holding or land utilization measure, X is a vector of characteristics that are 164 likely determinants of land size holding and or utilization. Equation (2) is estimated using an ordinary 165 least square (OLS) regression model (van Doorslaer and Koolman 2004). From this point, we will 166 refer the corrected concentration index to simply the concentration index for simplicity. Results for 167 168 the concentration index were run at (i) full sample, (i) at district level, (iii) by gender of farmer and (iv) by farmer youth status. All the analysis is conducted in STATA software version 13.0 (Stata 2013). 169

170 2.2. Data used

This study uses cross-sectional household-level data collected during a survey that was done in 171 Zimbabwe and covered four districts (Goromonzi, Guruve, Mudzi and Wedza) between October and 172 173 December of 2011. The simple random sampling technique was used to select wards from a list of households obtained from the district extension office of each of the four districts. Within the selected 174 wards, the interviewed households were randomly chosen from households' lists provided by resident 175 176 agricultural extension officers. A total of 601 households; 175 from Goromonzi, 187 from Guruve, 177 120 from Mudzi and 119 from Wedza were then selected for the survey. Data collection was in the form of face-to-face administration of structured questionnaires. The surveys collected vital 178 179 information on several household and farm characteristics including land size holding, land utilization, 180 ownership of a number of assets kept by the household, crop and animal production, access to agricultural extension services etc. The data on asset holdings was extensively covered and it gathered 181 information on ownership of livestock, household goods (i.e. television, radio, bicycle etc.), farm 182 implements and other intermediate technologies (e.g. oxcart, planter, wheelbarrow, tractor, plough 183 etc.), household dwelling characteristics (such as floor, roof and wall material) and other common 184 assets (such as mobile phones). The study took advantage of such information in generating a 185 comprehensive wealth index variable for the household using Principal Components Analysis (PCA) 186 187 (Filmer and Pritchett 2001).

188 **2.3. Outcome variables**

189 2.3.1. Land size holding

190 Binary variables to characterise land size holding are derived from a continuous variable arable land size holding. The study defines very low and low arable land size holding as binary variables (1= 191 yes; 0=otherwise) indicating whether the smallholder farmer owns less than 0.5 and 1.0 hectares of 192 193 arable land respectively. More so, the study defines high and very high land size holding as binary variables (1= yes; 0=otherwise) indicating whether a smallholder farmer owns more than 3.0 and 194 195 more than 5.0 hectares of arable land respectively. Defining low and high arable land size holding at 196 two levels was done to ensure ease of robustness check on the results. More details on variable 197 definition are shown in table (2). Defining the different levels of land size holding are guided by the researcher's knowledge of smallholder farming land holding characteristics, sample arable land size 198 199 holding averages and literature pointing to average land size holdings in the southern African region and particularly Zimbabwe. According to Moyo (2013) average sizes of family farms in the southern 200 201 African region are fairly small and ranges between 1 and 3 hectares (Moyo 2013).

202 2.3.2. Land utilization

203 Land utilization is measured in two farming seasons 2009 and 2010. Binary variables for low and 204 high land utilization in two seasons are specified. Low (high) land utilization is defined as a binary variable with a value of (1) if the smallholder farmer cultivated less (more) than 0.5 (2.0) hectares of 205 land in a given season, and (0) otherwise. See table (2) on detailed descriptions of variable definitions 206 on land utilization. Definition of land utilization levels is mainly guided by average land use values in 207 208 the studied areas and the researcher's knowledge of the smallholder farming sector and their problems i.e. lack of access to credit, farming inputs and other necessary intermediate farming technologies 209 which may limit effective land utilization. 210

211 **2.4.** Explanatory variables used

The study relied on a number of variables mainly used in explaining dynamics in resource access 212 213 and use at farmer household level including Age gender marital status and education of household head, availability of labour (proxied by household size), main occupation of farmer, access to 214 extension services and wealth. The chosen explanatory variables could possibly explain observed 215 inequalities in land size holding and utilization in smallholder farming. For instance, age of the farmer 216 can proxy farming experience which is an important factor that influence farming decisions (Fischer 217 and Qaim 2012; Makate et al. 2018b) including land use. Gender is another important demographic 218 characteristic than can influence farming decisions. Women farmers for instance may not have the 219 same influence and resources to make crucial decisions relating to changing agricultural practices 220 221 (Murray et al. 2016; Quisumbing and Pandolfelli 2010) or land use patterns. Marital status reflects on the strength of the family system and can have knock-on effects on farming decisions including 222 223 technology adoption, productivity, land use (Makate et al. 2018a). Also, educated farmers are 224 expected to relate better farming decisions (e.g. effective land use, improved technology adoption) to betterment of their farming enterprise competitiveness and are more likely to be quick in making such 225 decisions. For instance, Upadhyay et al. (2003) reiterated that educated farmers relate technology 226 adoption with improvement of their farming activities and hence are more likely to take a shorter time 227 to adopt technologies (Makate et al. 2018a; Upadhyay et al. 2003). Availability of labour is also an 228 229 important determinant of farming decisions and land use. Households with more labour available may have higher affinity for owning or using larger land sizes unlike those with shortage of labour. 230

231 However, a negative influence of labour on land size holding and utilization can be expected in cases where family with many members engage in off-farm activities in order to gain extra income to ease 232 233 consumption pressures exerted by a larger family (Deressa et al. 2008). Also engaging in full-time farming by the household head may influence land holding and use decisions. Farmers into full-time 234 farming are expected to use larger tracts of land than part-time farmers who may not find time to fully 235 utilize larger tracts of the land. Access to agriculture extension is an important determinant of farming 236 237 decisions including land use (Anderson and Feder 2007). Also wealth itself can determine access to complementary resources by the farmer(Cunguara et al. 2011; Makate et al. 2018b) which again can 238 239 influence land holding and use decisions.

240 **2.5.** Measuring the household socioeconomic status using the wealth index

241 Studies in developing countries are increasingly using asset-based indices as measures of the socioeconomic status of the family given the difficulty associated with acquiring data on household 242 income or consumption (O'donnell et al. 2008). The study shadow this burgeoning literature and 243 244 compute the asset/wealth index as a proxy for household wealth using PCA (Filmer and Pritchett 2001). Several studies focusing on explaining disparities in health outcomes in low-income countries 245 246 have used the asset index as a measure of socioeconomic status (Gwatkin et al. 2007; Hajizadeh et al. 247 2014; Makate and Makate 2017; Ngandu et al. 2017). This asset index is computed based on the household's ownership of several household property, animals, and household dwelling 248 characteristics and is summarized in Table 1. For brevity, other output from PCA is omitted and only 249 250 the mean of the variables considered are shown (see Table 1).

Table 1: Principal components and summary statistics for the variables used to compute the smallholder farmer
 wealth index

| | | Statistics | |
|------------------------|--------|------------|-----------------|
| Variables | Mean | SD | Component score |
| Number of cattle | 2.411 | 3.417 | 0.238 |
| Owns draft cattle | 0.496 | 0.500 | 0.219 |
| Owns draft donkey | 0.025 | 0.156 | 0.057 |
| Owns sheep | 0.188 | 1.053 | 0.068 |
| Number of goats | 2.651 | 3.503 | 0.190 |
| Number of pigs | 0.316 | 1.404 | 0.030 |
| Number of chickens | 11.819 | 19.730 | 0.162 |
| Number of hoes | 5.408 | 3.504 | 0.215 |
| Owns a plough | 0.589 | 0.492 | 0.215 |
| Owns a tractor | 0.012 | 0.107 | 0.041 |
| Number of wheelbarrows | 0.544 | 0.596 | 0.243 |
| Owns a sprayer | 0.308 | 0.462 | 0.177 |
| Owns a planter | 0.020 | 0.140 | 0.037 |
| Owns an oxcart | 0.378 | 0.485 | 0.237 |
| Owns a hand cart | 0.005 | 0.071 | 0.051 |
| Owns a bicycle | 0.378 | 0.485 | 0.172 |
| Owns a car | 0.028 | 0.166 | 0.080 |
| Owns a truck | 0.010 | 0.099 | 0.043 |
| Owns a bike | 0.008 | 0.091 | 0.032 |
| Owns a cellphone | 0.784 | 0.412 | 0.167 |
| Owns a radio | 0.594 | 0.491 | 0.159 |
| Owns a television | 0.290 | 0.454 | 0.191 |
| Floor material type | | | |
| Mud | 0.296 | 0.457 | -0.271 |
| Cement | 0.686 | 0.465 | 0.275 |
| Tiles | 0.017 | 0.128 | -0.025 |
| Wall material type | | | |
| Mud | 0.085 | 0.279 | -0.077 |
| Cement bricks | 0.494 | 0.500 | 0.297 |
| Mud bricks | 0.421 | 0.494 | -0.257 |
| Roof material type | | | |
| Grass | 0.344 | 0.476 | -0.271 |

| Iron sheets | 0.143 | 0.350 | -0.010 |
|--------------|-------|-------|--------|
| Asbestos | 0.506 | 0.500 | 0.260 |
| Observations | 601 | | |

Notes: SD = Standard deviation; Component score is the overall contribution of the variable to the overall
 principal components score.


3. Results

3.1. Descriptive statistics

- 257 3.1.1. Outcome variables
- Presented in table 2 are means and standard deviations of all the outcome and explanatoryvariables used in the analysis stratified by district.
- 260 *a)* Land size holding

261 Average land size owned by the household is reported to be 1.42, 2.73, 2.98 and 2.46 hectares in Goromonzi, Guruve, Mudzi and Wedza districts respectively. For a clearer view on the distribution of 262 land size holding see figure 1. Results from the analysed sample show that low and very low land size 263 holding was most prevalent in Goromonzi district with 42.9% of the farmers owning less than one 264 265 hectare of arable land and about 13.1% of farmers owning less than 0.5 hectares of arable land. On the 266 other extreme, Mudzi district was reported to have the lowest average proportions of farmers with low (5.8%) and very low (0.8%) land size holding. Guruve and Wedza lie in between with almost similar 267 268 average proportions. Guruve and Wedza had about 1.6 and 3.4% of farmers with very low land size 269 holding respectively. Additionally, 8.6% and 11.8% of farmers in Guruve and Wedza were in the low 270 land size holding category respectively.

On the contrary, farmers in Guruve and Mudzi were reported to have high average proportions of representation in the high and very high land size holding categories. Results show about 6.4% and 10.8% proportions of farmers in Guruve and Mudzi are in the very high land size holding category respectively. Goromonzi and Wedza had only 1.1% and 3.4% representation in the same category. Similarly, in the high land size holding category, a similar trend is observed with Guruve and Mudzi district dominating representation in the category with about 33.2% and 29.2% of farmers respectively.



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
Figure 1: Box plot on household land size holding distribution by district. Land size ismeasured in hectares.

280 *b)* Land utilization

Results show that in 2009, more farmers from Guruve (18.2%) and Mudzi (17.5%) ploughed less than 0.5 hectares of their arable land. Proportions of farmers in the same category in Goromonzi and Wedza were slightly lower 12 and 10.1% respectively. On the other hand, almost similar proportions of farmers in the high land utilization category (more than 2 ha ploughed) are reported in Goromonzi (18.9%), Guruve (20.3%) and Mudzi (20%) in the same year 2009. Only in Wedza district where the average proportion is slightly different and lower (14.3%).

In 2010, almost a similar trend is observed in terms of land utilization. More farmers in Guruve (20.9%) and Mudzi (18.3%) ploughed less than 0.5 hectares of their arable land. Proportions of farmers in the same category are lower in Goromonzi (13.1%) and Wedza (9.2%). In terms of average proportion in the high land utilization category (farmers who ploughed more than 2 hectares of land) all the four districts had almost similar representation ranging from 17.1% in Goromonzi to 20.0% in Mudzi district.

Average total land utilization in Goromonzi, Guruve, Mudzi and Wedza in 2009 are reported to be 1.51, 1.49, 1.53 and 1.44 hectares respectively. In the 2010 season average land utilization figures remained almost the same as they are reported to be 1.42, 1.40, 1.47 and 1.44 hectares in Goromonzi, Guruve, Mudzi and Wedza respectively. Figure 2 compare the average household land size holding and the average land utilization levels in the two farming seasons 2009 and 2010 by district.



298

Figure 2: Arable land size owned, land utilized by the household in 2009 and 2010 shown by
district. 1=Goromonzi, 2=Guruve, 3=Mudzi and 4=Wedza district.

301

302 3.1.2. Explanatory variables

303 A number of explanatory variables were included in this study. Descriptive statistics report an 304 almost uniform average age of farmers across the four districts. Mean age of farmer was 51.3, 48.5, 52.2 and 55.5 years in Goromonzi, Guruve, Mudzi and Wedza respectively. More so, Goromonzi, 305 Mudzi and Wedza had youth representation rates at 13, 24, 14 & 12% respectively. Male 306 representation was almost similar across the four districts. Mean percent of male representation 307 308 ranged between 71.4% in Wedza and 78.6% in Guruve. Goromonzi and Mudzi had about 74.3 and 77.5% mean male representation proportions respectively. The majority of the household heads in 309 310 Mudzi (77.5%), Guruve (75.9%) and Goromonzi (75.4%) were married as at survey date. Slightly lower marriage rate of household heads is reported in Wedza (67.2%). In terms of education, 311 household heads in Guruve, Goromonzi, Mudzi and Wedza had respective mean proportions of 312 313 having attained at least secondary education as at survey date at 50.3, 48.0, 45.8 and 45.4%. Mean number of workers per household members (family size) was about 5 (members) across all districts. 314

Most surveyed farmers in all the districts indicated that their main trade was farming. The proportions reported ranged between 79.4% in Goromonzi and 96.7% in Mudzi. Minimum percent of recorded contact with agriculture extension workers was 53.7% in Guruve and the maximum recorded was 71.4% in Wedza district. Guruve and Mudzi reported almost similar mean proportions 62.6 and 60.0% respectively.

320 Table 2: Summary statistics of variables used in analysis by district

| Variable Description and | Goromonzi | Guruve | Mudzi | Wedza | Full |
|--------------------------|-----------|--------|-------|-------|--------|
| measurement | | | | | Sample |

| | | mean | mean | mean | mean | mean |
|----------------------------------|---|--------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Very_low_holding | Binary variable =1 if | 0.131 | 0.016 | 0.008 | 0.034 | 0.052 |
| | farmer owns less than 0.5 | | | | | |
| | hectares of arable land; 0 otherwise | | | | | |
| Low_holding | Binary variable =1 if | 0.429 | 0.086 | 0.058 | 0.118 | 0.186 |
| Low_holding | farmer owns less than 1 | 0.429 | 0.080 | 0.058 | 0.110 | 0.160 |
| | ha of land; 0 otherwise | | | | | |
| High_holding | Binary variable =1 if | 0.023 | 0.332 | 0.292 | 0.168 | 0.201 |
| ingn_norumg | farmer owns land more | 0.020 | 0.002 | 0.272 | 0.100 | 0.201 |
| | than 3 hectares of arable | | | | | |
| | land; 0 otherwise | | | | | |
| Very_high_holding | Binary variable =1 if | 0.011 | 0.064 | 0.108 | 0.034 | 0.052 |
| | farmer owns more than 5 | | | | | |
| | hectares of arable land; 0 | | | | | |
| | otherwise | | | | | |
| Low_utilization_09 | Binary variable=1 if | 0.120 | 0.182 | 0.175 | 0.101 | 0.146 |
| | farmer used less than 0.5 | | | | | |
| | hectares of arable land in | | | | | |
| | 2009; 0 otherwise | 0.100 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.1.42 | 0.40.4 |
| High_utilization_09 | Binary variable=1 if | 0.189 | 0.203 | 0.200 | 0.143 | 0.186 |
| | farmer used more than 2 | | | | | |
| | hectares of arable land in | | | | | |
| Low_utilization_10 | 2009; 0 otherwise Binary variable=1 if | 0.131 | 0.209 | 0.183 | 0.092 | 0.158 |
| Low_utilization_10 | farmer used less than 0.5 | 0.131 | 0.209 | 0.165 | 0.092 | 0.138 |
| | hectares of arable land in | | | | | |
| | 2010; 0 otherwise | | | | | |
| High_utilization_10 | Binary variable=1 if | 0.171 | 0.182 | 0.200 | 0.185 | 0.183 |
| 8 | farmer used more than 2 | | | | | 0.105 |
| | hectares of arable land in | | | | | |
| | 2010; 0 otherwise | | | | | |
| househ_landsize | Arable land size owned | 1.419 | 2.727 | 2.978 | 2.464 | 2.344 |
| | by the household | | | | | |
| Land_use_09 | Arable Land area used by | 1.507 | 1.488 | 1.529 | 1.438 | 1.492 |
| | the household in 2009 | | | | | |
| | season | | | | | |
| Land_use_10 | Arable land area used by | 1.424 | 1.395 | 1.472 | 1.440 | 1.428 |
| | the household in 2010 | | | | | |
| 1 1 | season | 51 200 | 10 502 | 50 102 | 55 A5 A | 51 401 |
| househ_age | Age of household head in | 51.309 | 48.503 | 52.183 | 55.454 | 51.431 |
| Youth | years as at survey date Proportion of youths | 0.131 | 0.241 | 0.142 | 0.118 | 0.165 |
| Touti | (Farmers age 35 and | 0.131 | 0.241 | 0.142 | 0.116 | 0.105 |
| | below) | | | | | |
| househ_male | Binary variable =1 if | 0.743 | 0.786 | 0.775 | 0.714 | 0.757 |
| nousen_mure | gender of household head | 017 12 | 0.700 | 0.770 | 0.711 | 0.151 |
| | is male; 0 otherwise | | | | | |
| househ_married | Binary variable =1 if | 0.754 | 0.759 | 0.775 | 0.672 | 0.744 |
| | Diffally valiable -1 If | | | | | |
| | household head is | | | | | |
| | • | | | | | |
| Household_size | household head is | 5.274 | 5.225 | 5.908 | 5.277 | 5.386 |
| Household_size educ_secondary | household head is married; 0 otherwise | | 5.225 0.503 | 5.908 0.458 | 5.277 0.454 | 5.386 0.478 |

| emp_farmer | at least secondary school; 0 otherwise Binary variable =1 if household's main occupation is farming; 0 otherwise | 0.794 | 0.898 | 0.967 | 0.832 | 0.869 |
|-----------------|---|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| agric_extension | Binary variable =1 if farmer has had contact with agricultural extension workers; 0 otherwise | 0.537 | 0.626 | 0.600 | 0.714 | 0.612 |
| asset_quintile1 | Binary variable =1 if farmer is in asset quintile 1 (poorest); 0 otherwise | 0.131 | 0.299 | 0.217 | 0.134 | 0.201 |
| asset_quintile2 | Binary variable =1 if farmer is in asset quintile 2; 0 otherwise | 0.200 | 0.246 | 0.142 | 0.185 | 0.200 |
| asset_quintile3 | Binary variable =1 if farmer is in asset quintile 3; 0 otherwise | 0.234 | 0.182 | 0.125 | 0.252 | 0.200 |
| asset_quintile4 | Binary variable =1 if farmer is in asset quintile 4; 0 otherwise | 0.194 | 0.144 | 0.283 | 0.210 | 0.200 |
| asset_quintile5 | Binary variable =1 if farmer is in asset quintile 5 (richest); 0 otherwise | 0.240 | 0.128 | 0.233 | 0.218 | 0.200 |
| Ν | | 175 | 187 | 120 | 119 | 601 |

321 Data Source: Data for this study comes from a survey of smallholder farming households in four 322 selected districts

322

323

Guruve and Mudzi had more than 20% each of their farmers represented in the poorest wealth
category (asset quintile 1). Goromonzi and Mudzi had however, lower proportions slightly above 13%.
On the other hand, Goromonzi was highly represented in the highest wealth category (asset quintile 5)
with 24% representation. Guruve and Wedza were also highly represented with 23.3 and 21.8%
respectively. Only Mudzi was lowly represented in the high wealth category with about 12.8%
representation.

330 3.2. Wealth-related disparities in land size holding and land utilization in selected 331 331 332 333 334 334 335 335 336 336 337 338 338 339 339 330 330 331 331 331 331 331 332 332 333 333 334 334 335 335 336 336 337 338 338 339 339 331 331 331 331 331 331 332 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 332 331 332 332 333 334 335 335 336 336 337 338 338 339 331

332 3.2.1. Full farmer sample results

333 Reported estimates in table 3 are concentration indices based on the Errevgers (2009) corrected 334 concentration index. Precisely, reported in the table are the indices and their respective standard errors given in parenthesis. Results show that wealth related inequalities in low land size holding (-0.133)335 and very low (-0.053) land size holding exist and are statistically significant at 1 and 10% levels 336 337 respectively and are mostly pro-poor. Precisely stated, observed inequalities in low and very low land 338 size holding exist and highly concentrated in the poorer smallholder farmers. On the other hand, results also show that the concentration index for high land size holding is positive and highly 339 significant at 1% implying that inequalities in high land size holding are highly concentrated within 340 the affluent groups of smallholder farmers. 341

Table 3: Wealth-related inequalities in Land size holding and land utilization level in

343 Zimbabwe's smallholder farming

| (Very low | (Low holding) | (High | (Very |
|-----------|---------------|----------|-------|
| holding) | - | holding) | high |

| | | | | | | | holding) | |
|--------------------------------------|----------------|---------|----------------|---------|----------------|---------|-------------|---------|
| | Coefficient | Standar | Coefficient | Standar | Coefficient | Standar | Coefficien | Standar |
| | | d error | | d error | | d error | t | d error |
| Concentratio n index | -0.053* | (0.020) | -0.133*** | (0.033) | 0.127*** | (0.038) | 0.018 | (0.021) |
| Number of | | | | | | | | |
| observations | 601 | | 601 | | 601 | | 601 | |
| | (Low | | (High | | (Low | | (High | |
| | utilization_09 | | Utilization_09 | | utilization_10 | | utilization | |
| |) | |) | |) | | 10) | |
| | Coefficient | Standar | Coefficient | Standar | Coefficient | Standar | Coefficien | Standar |
| | | d error | | d error | | d error | t | d error |
| Concentratio n index Number of | -0.190*** | (0.033) | 0.144*** | (0.034) | -0.232*** | (0.035) | 0.168*** | (0.033) |
| observations | 601 | | 601 | | 601 | | 601 | |

Notes: ***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.

345

Also, results in table 3 report pro-poor inequalities in low land utilization levels both in the years 2009 (-0.190) and 2010 (-0.232). The concentration indices are all negative and highly significant at 1%. Conversely, results report existence of a pro-rich distribution of inequalities in high land utilization levels both in 2009 (0.144) and 2010 (0.168). The concentration indices are both positive and highly significant at 1% level.

351 3.2.2. Heterogeneities of results by district of farmer residence

352 Table 4 show study results on wealth-related disparities in land size holding and utilization in smallholder farming by district of farmer. Only concentration indices for low land utilization, high 353 land utilization, low land utilization in 2010 and high land utilization in 2010 are reported in table 4. 354 Results show pro-poor distribution of inequalities low land size holding in Goromonzi district (CI= -355 0.385) significant at 1%. Concentration indices for the other three districts (Guruve, Wedza and 356 Mudzi) are shown not to be significant. Furthermore, results show that low land utilization is pro-poor 357 in Goromonzi, Guruve and Mudzi districts with concentration indices at -0.159 (significant at 5%); -358 359 0.324 (significant at 1%), and -0.286 (significant at 1%) respectively. Also, results communicate a pro-rich distribution of inequalities in high land size holding in Guruve (CI= 0.281) and Mudzi 360 361 (CI=0.319) both significant at 1%.

 ³⁶² Table 4: Wealth-related inequalities in land holding and utilization in selected districts of Zimbabwe

| | | Low holding | | High h | High holding | | Low utilization_10 | | zation 10 |
|-----------|--------|-------------|---------|---------------|--------------|-----------|--------------------|---------------|-----------|
| District | Counts | CI | Std.err | CI | Std.err | CI | Std.err | CI | Std.err |
| Goromonzi | 175 | -0.385*** | (0.075) | 0.059 | (0.030) | -0.159** | (0.060) | 0.098 | (0.057) |
| Guruve | 187 | -0.081 | (0.046) | 0.281^{***} | (0.076) | -0.324*** | (0.064) | 0.212^{***} | (0.060) |
| Mudzi | 120 | -0.075 | (0.051) | 0.319*** | (0.087) | -0.286*** | (0.083) | 0.206^{*} | (0.081) |
| Wedza | 119 | -0.130 | (0.070) | 0.013 | (0.087) | -0.065 | (0.061) | 0.185^{*} | (0.072) |

Notes: ***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level. Presented are the Erreygers (2009) corrected concentration indices with robust standard errors in parenthesis.

365 CI=Concentration Index; Std.err=Standard Error.

Likewise, results report pro-rich distribution of inequalities in high land utilization in 2010 in Guruve (CI=0.212), Mudzi (0.206) and Wedza (0.185). Results for Guruve, Mudzi and Wedza are significant at 1, 10 and 10% levels respectively. Overall results confirm existence of wealth-related inequalities in land size holding and utilization in smallholder farming in Zimbabwe which are slightly differentiated by geographic region.

372 3.2.3. Heterogeneities by Gender of Farmer

Further scrutinizing upshots by gender of farmer reveal that inequalities in land size holding and utilization are evident in both male and male farmer groups (Table 5). Precisely, results report pro-

³⁶⁶

poor inequalities in low land size holding in both male (CI= -0.109) and female (CI= -0.181) farmer

376 groups significant at 5%. Further, results show significant pro-poor distribution of inequalities in low

land utilization in both male (CI= -0.243) and female (CI= -0.202) farmer groups.

| | Low holding | | High holding | | Low | | High utilization 10 | |
|--------|-------------|--|--|---|---|--|--|--|
| | | | | | utilization | n_10 | | |
| Counts | CI | Std.err | CI | Std.err | CI | Std.err | CI | Std.err |
| 455 | -0.109** | (0.037) | 0.120** | (0.046) | -0.243*** | (0.039) | 0.158*** | (0.038) |
| 146 | -0.181** | (0.068) | 0.088 | (0.068) | -0.202^{*} | (0.079) | 0.169* | (0.067) |
| | 455 | Counts CI 455 -0.109** | Counts CI Std.err 455 -0.109** (0.037) | Counts CI Std.err CI 455 -0.109** (0.037) 0.120** | Counts CI Std.err CI Std.err 455 -0.109** (0.037) 0.120** (0.046) | Counts CI Std.err CI Std.err CI 455 -0.109** (0.037) 0.120** (0.046) -0.243*** | Counts CI Std.err CI Std.err CI Std.err 455 -0.109** (0.037) 0.120** (0.046) -0.243*** (0.039) | Counts CI Std.err CI Std.err CI Std.err CI 455 -0.109** (0.037) 0.120** (0.046) -0.243*** (0.039) 0.158*** |

378 Table 5: Wealth-related inequalities in land holding and utilization in Zimbabwe by gender

379 Notes: ***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level. Presented are the

380 Erreygers (2009) corrected concentration indices with robust standard errors in parenthesis.

381 CI=Concentration Index; Std.err=Standard Error.

Conversely, results show pro-rich distribution of inequalities in land size holding significant only in the male sub-sample (CI= 0.120). Also, results report pro-rich distribution of inequalities in high land utilization significant in both male (CI=0.158) and female (CI=0.169) sub-samples. Overall, results confirm existence of significant inequalities in land holding and utilization in smallholder farming in Zimbabwe in both male and female farming households.

388

389 3.2.4. Heterogeneities by farmer youth status

390 Table 6 show results on distribution of wealth-related inequalities in land size holding and utilization by farmer youth status. Results report significant pro-poor distribution of inequalities in 391 low land size holding amongst non-youthful farmers (older farmers) (CI=-0.146) significant at 1%. 392 Also, significant pro-poor inequalities in low land utilization in both youth (CI= -0.419) and 393 non-youth (CI= -0.184) farmer groups are reported. Consistently, results by farmer youth-status show 394 existence of significant pro-rich distribution of inequalities in high land holding in the non-youth 395 farmer group (CI=0.125) and high land utilization in both youth (CI=0.317) and non-youths 396 (CI=0.139). 397

Table 6: Wealth-related inequalities in land holding and utilization in Zimbabwe by youth status

| Youth Status | | Low hold | ling | High ho | lding | Low utiliz | ation_10 | High utiliz | ation 10 |
|-----------------|--------|----------|---------|--------------|---------|------------|----------|-------------|----------|
| Gender | Counts | CI | Std.err | CI | Std.err | CI | Std.err | CI | Std.err |
| Youth | 99 | -0.100 | (0.090) | 0.153 | (0.081) | -0.419*** | (0.096) | 0.317*** | (0.080) |
| Non- | 502 | - | (0.035) | 0.125^{**} | (0.043) | -0.184*** | (0.036) | 0.139*** | (0.037) |
| Youth | | 0.146*** | | | | | | | |

Notes: ***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level. Presented are the
 Erreygers (2009) corrected concentration indices with robust standard errors in parenthesis.

401 CI=Concentration Index; Std.err=Standard Error.

402

403 Overall, results confirm existence of socioeconomic status related inequalities in land size404 holding and utilization in both youth and non-youth farmer groups.

405 **3.3. Breakdown of wealth-related imbalances in land size holding and land utilization levels**

A decomposition analysis of the measured socioeconomic disparities in land size holding and utilization level in smallholder farming was done and the results are shown in table 8. The decomposition exercise allows us to measure the contribution of each explanatory variable to the measured inequalities in land holding and utilization. For brevity, only presented in this article are decomposition results for low land size holding, high land size holding, low land utilization in 2010 and high land utilization in 2010. The coefficient estimates from the OLS models estimated using equation (2) are shown in table 7. A positive (negative) x% contribution of variable X is to be

³⁸²

413 interpreted as follows: wealth-related land size holding or utilization inequality would, be x% lower

414 (higher) if variable X were equally distributed across the wealth range (population), or if variable X

| 415 | had a zero-land size holding or utilization level elasticity. |
|-----|---|
| | |

| | Low_hol | | High_hol | | Low_utilizati | | High_utilizati | |
|-------------|-----------|-------|--------------|-------|---------------|-------|----------------|-------|
| | ding | | ding | | on_10 | | on_10 | |
| househ_ag | 0.0026** | (0.00 | 0.0002 | (0.00 | 0.0007 | (0.00 | -0.0009 | (0.0 |
| e | | 09) | | 09) | | 09) | | 09) |
| househ_m | 0.0613 | (0.06 | 0.0127 | (0.05 | 0.0919 | (0.06 | 0.0397 | (0.0) |
| ale | | 06) | | 20) | | 38) | | 32) |
| househ_m | -0.0645 | (0.06 | 0.0649 | (0.05 | -0.0449 | (0.06 | 0.0064 | (0.0) |
| arried | | 16) | | 26) | | 26) | | 27) |
| Household | -0.0052 | (0.00 | 0.0157 | (0.00 | 0.0083 | (0.00 | 0.0063 | (0.0 |
| _size | | 68) | | 97) | | 82) | | 75) |
| educ_seco | 0.0407 | (0.02 | -0.0112 | (0.03 | -0.0135 | (0.03 | 0.0069 | (0.0 |
| ndary | | 98) | | 25) | | 00) | | 42) |
| emp_farm | -0.0271 | (0.04 | 0.0616 | (0.03 | 0.1056^{*} | (0.04 | 0.0377 | (0.0 |
| er | | 43) | | 64) | | 13) | | 24) |
| agric_exte | -0.0217 | (0.02 | 0.0653^{*} | (0.03 | 0.0616^{*} | (0.03 | -0.0086 | (0.0 |
| nsion | | 92) | | 02) | | 14) | | 04) |
| asset_quint | 0.0209 | (0.04 | 0.0419 | (0.04 | -0.0275 | (0.05 | 0.0532 | (0.0 |
| ile2 | | 82) | | 50) | | 49) | | 41) |
| asset_quint | 0.0167 | (0.04 | 0.0768 | (0.04 | -0.1890*** | (0.04 | 0.2506*** | (0.0 |
| ile3 | | 81) | | 65) | | 78) | | 58) |
| asset_quint | -0.0658 | (0.04 | 0.0892 | (0.04 | -0.1579** | (0.05 | 0.2398*** | (0.0 |
| ile4 | | 56) | | 97) | | 08) | | 67) |
| asset_quint | - | (0.04 | 0.1776*** | (0.05 | -0.2109*** | (0.04 | 0.1746*** | (0.0 |
| ile5 | 0.1995*** | 40) | | 33) | | 90) | | 42) |
| geo_goro | 0.3817*** | (0.04 | - | (0.03 | 0.0547 | (0.04 | -0.0230 | (0.0 |
| monzi | | 19) | 0.2590*** | 90) | | 04) | | 24) |
| geo_guruv | 0.0234 | (0.02 | 0.0591 | (0.04 | 0.0714 | (0.04 | 0.0201 | (0.0 |
| e | | 99) | | 86) | | 38) | | 18) |
| geo_wedza | 0.0517 | (0.03 | -0.1228* | (0.05 | -0.0044 | (0.04 | -0.0157 | (0.0) |
| | | 87) | | 17) | | 49) | | 71) |
| N | 601 | | 601 | | 601 | | 601 | |
| Mean of | 0.1853 | | 0.2003 | | 0.1586 | | 0.1803 | |
| the | | | | | | | | |
| dependent | | | | | | | | |
| variable | | | | | | | | |

416 Table 7: Coefficient estimates used for the decomposition analysis

417 Notes: ***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level. Reported are the

418 marginal probability effects and robust standard errors shown in parentheses. The reference categories are as

follows: Household wealth = 1 (poorest); and District = 1 (Mudzi). Coefficient is the linear regression

420 coefficients for the models examining the factors associated with land size holding and utilization in selected421 districts of Zimbabwe.

422

Results show that measured inequalities in low land size holding, high land size holding, low and high land utilization in 2010 are explained largely by asset wealth. Precisely, results reveal that measured disparities in low land size holding, high land size holding, low land utilization in 2010 and high land utilization in 2010 would have been 94.8, 82.9, 74.71 and 92.47% lower if wealth was equally distributed across the wealth range (smallholder farming population) respectively. More so, a number of other explanatory variables are found to minimally explain the measured wealth-related disparities in the outcome variables. For low land size holding, in addition to household wealth, household age (-6.14%), and Goromonzi district (-25.39) contributed minimally but significantly to measured inequalities. Precisely, results reveal that if the variable age had zero low land size holding elasticity, measured inequalities would have been worse by 6.14 %. Also, results reveal that if Goromonzi district (geographic location) had zero low land size holding elasticity wealth related low land size holding inequalities would have been 25.39% higher.

For high land size holding, results show that in addition to household wealth, access to agriculture extension services and geographic location significantly explains observed wealth-related inequalities in high land size holding. Precisely, results show that if access to extension was equally distributed across the wealth range (smallholder farming population), measured pro-rich inequalities in high land size holding would have been lower by 13.65%. Also, if geographic location had zero high land size holding elasticity, measured inequalities would have been higher by 28.49%.

Table 8: contributions of explanatory variables to overall concentration indices for land size holdingand land utilization

| | Low land size holding | | | High land size holding | | | Low land utilization 2010 | | | High land utilization 2010 | | |
|-------------|-----------------------|-----|------------|------------------------|----------|------------|---------------------------|----------|------------|----------------------------|---------|----------------|
| Variables | Contribu tion | % | sum med | Contribu tion | % | Sum med | Contribu tion | % | Sum med | Contribu tion | % | sum med |
| | 0.0095 | - | | 0.0008 | | | 0.0027 | - | | -0.0033 | - | |
| househ_ag | | 6.1 | | | 1.4 | | | 0.2 | | | 2.7 | |
| e _ 2 | | 4 | -6.14 | | 9 | 1.49 | | 7 | -0.27 | | 6 | -2.76 |
| | 0.0071 | - | | 0.0015 | | | 0.0106 | - | | 0.0046 | | |
| househ_ma | | 4.3 | | | 2.1 | | | 3.2 | | | 1.7 | |
| le | | 0 | -4.30 | | 6 | 2.16 | | 6 | -3.26 | | 2 | 1.72 |
| househ_ma | -0.0098 | 9.2 | | 0.0099 | 6.5 | | -0.0068 | 1.9 | | 0.0010 | 0.4 | |
| rried | | 5 | 9.25 | | 6 | 6.56 | | 3 | 1.93 | | 7 | 0.47 |
| | -0.0034 | 10. | | 0.0100 | | | 0.0053 | - | | 0.0040 | | |
| Household | | 53 | | | 8.6 | | | 3.0 | | | 1.2 | |
| size | | | 10.53 | | 6 | 8.66 | | 8 | -3.08 | | 5 | 1.25 |
| | 0.0059 | - | | -0.0017 | - | | -0.0020 | | | 0.0010 | | |
| educ_seco | | 3.3 | | | 2.3 | | | 1.8 | | | 0.4 | |
| ndary | | 3 | -3.33 | | 0 | -2.30 | | 5 | 1.85 | | 5 | 0.45 |
| | 0.0019 | - | | -0.0043 | - | | -0.0073 | | | -0.0026 | - | |
| emp_farme | | 0.2 | | | 2.3 | | | 4.1 | | | 2.7 | |
| r | | 4 | -0.24 | | 7 | -2.37 | | 6 | 4.16 | | 6 | -2.76 |
| | -0.0046 | 15. | | 0.0138 | | | 0.0130 | - | | -0.0018 | - | |
| agric_exte | | 42 | | | 13. | | | 4.2 | | | 1.8 | |
| nsion | | | 15.42 | | 65 | 13.65 | | 2 | -4.22 | | 9 | -1.89 |
| | -0.0065 | | | -0.0135 | - | | 0.0088 | - | | -0.0169 | - | |
| asset_quint | | 2.8 | | | 10. | | | 3.5 | | | 11. | |
| ile2 | | 1 | | | 60 | | | 6 | | | 16 | |
| | 0.0000 | - | | 0.0001 | | | -0.0003 | | | 0.0004 | | |
| asset_quint | | 10. | | | 1.1 | | | 1.2 | | | 0.1 | |
| ile3 | 0.0210 | 02 | | 0.0000 | 0 | | 0.0506 | 3 | | 0.0771 | 3 | |
| asset_quint | -0.0210 | 7.7 | | 0.0288 | 12. | | -0.0506 | 19. | | 0.0771 | 41. | |
| ile4 | | 7 | | | 89 | | 0.10.10 | 80 | | | 39 | |
| asset_quint | -0.1279 | 94. | 0475 | 0.1137 | 79. | 82.9 | -0.1349 | 57. | 74.71 | 0.1116 | 62. | 92.47 |
| ile5 | 0.0050 | 19 | 94.75 | 0.0055 | 51 | | 0.0054 | 24 | | 0.0000 | 11 | |
| | 0.0378 | - | | -0.0257 | - | | 0.0054 | - | | -0.0023 | - | |
| geo_gorom | | 25. | | | 12. | | | 3.3 | | | 2.3 | |
| onzi | 0.0054 | 39 | | 0.0126 | 21 | | 0.01.65 | 4 | | 0.0046 | 7 | |
| | -0.0054 | 4.0 | | -0.0136 | - | | -0.0165 | 0.1 | | -0.0046 | - | |
| geo_guruv | | 4.0 | | | 10. | | | 9.1 | | | 3.1 | |
| e | 0.0026 | 7 | | 0 0002 | 63 | | 0.0002 | 0 | 6.00 | 0.0011 | 6 | 7 10 |
| | 0.0036 | - | | -0.0086 | - | - | -0.0003 | 1.1 | 6.90 | -0.0011 | - 16 | -7.18 |
| | | 2.7 | - | | 5.6 5 | 28.49 | | 1.1 4 | | | 1.6 | |
| geo_wedza | -0.133*** | 1 | 24.03 | 0.127*** | 3 | | -0.232*** | 4 | | 0.168*** | 5 | |
| CI | -0.155 | | 8.09 | 0.127 | | 1774 | -0.232 | | 21.2 | 0.108 | | 10.00 |
| Residual | | | | | | 17.74 | | | | | | 18.23 81.77 |
| Total | | | 91.91 | | | 82.26 | | | 78.72 | | | 01./ |

444 Notes: ***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level The reference categories

445 are as follows: Household wealth = 1 (poorest); and District = 1 (Mudzi). Contribution = the absolute

446 contributions of explanatory variables to the concentration index; CI=Concentration index.

Further, in addition to household wealth, being a fulltime farmer and access to extension services significantly explains observed pro-poor inequalities in low land utilization in year 2010. Precisely, results reveal that, if all farmers were into full time farming observed pro-poor inequalities in low land utilization would have been lower by 4.16%. Also, if extension access was equally distributed amongst the smallholder farming population, observed pro-poor inequalities in low land utilization would have been higher by 4.22%.

453 **4. Discussions**

This article measured and explained wealth-related inequalities in arable land size holding (very 454 low, low, high and very high land holding), and arable land utilization in two agricultural farming 455 seasons 2009 & 2010 (low and high) using the corrected concentration index as suggested by 456 457 Erreygers (2009). Further, it attempted to ascertain factors explaining the measured inequalities in arable land size holding and utilization levels was performed. Cross-sectional data collected from 458 459 smallholder farming households from four selected districts in Zimbabwe was analysed. Results 460 reveal a pro-poor distribution of inequalities in low land size holding and low land utilization in smallholder farming. Wealth-related inequalities are evident in both men and women farmer groups, 461 youth and non-youth farmer groups and in different geographic regions. This implies that low arable 462 land size holding and low arable land utilization is highly concentrated within the poorest segments of 463 464 the smallholder farming population. A pro-poor distribution of inequalities in low land size holding 465 could be reflecting on the biases in land distribution at village level and that of it favouring the more affluent population. It is a common practice in Zimbabwe for villagers/farmers acquiring land through 466 local leadership Chiefs and or village headman, the affluent could be having huge advantages in 467 468 accessing more arable land unlike the less resourced. This is supported partly by findings from a study by Mutondoro et al. (2016) who concludes that corruption in land administration and politics is a 469 common practice in Africa and it facilitates land grabbing (MacInnes 2012). Local leadership can 470 assist the elite population in corrupt deals to access land at the expense of the poor which widens 471 inequalities in land holding. More so, given the benefits associated with land access and use (Moyo 472 473 2013) this can widen general income inequalities in society.

More so, a pro poor distribution in low land size utilization in smallholder farming can be 474 explained by the fact that, more affluent farmers are the ones with higher propensities to access the 475 much needed farming inputs and technologies and hence they can afford to use a larger proportion of 476 the arable land unlike the poorer farmers ceteris paribus. This is supported by literature that have 477 478 found wealth and or access to resources as important determinants of agricultural technologies adoption and resource use in agriculture (Feder et al. 1985; Feder and Umali 1993; Filmer and 479 Pritchett 2001; Mahapatra and Mitchell 2001; Makate et al. 2017; Mazvimavi and Twomlow 2009). 480 481 Precisely, unavailability of farming resources has been directly linked with putting low land area under cultivation. Related, the harsh macroeconomic environment in the country for the past two 482 decades could have contributed to impoverishment of the general populace particularly the rural 483 dwellers which then reduced their odds of affording the much needed farming inputs to plough much 484 485 of their arable land.

A pro-rich distribution of inequalities in high land size holding confirms the influence of wealth as 486 an important determinant for access to relatively large arable land size holding in smallholder farming. 487 488 The richer farming population have an upper hand in accessing larger arable land size holdings through purchase or renting in from other farmers willing to sell or rent out part of their land in order 489 to get additional income. This is a worrying development since such a move can widen 490 491 socioeconomic disparities in the smallholder farming population (making the rich richer and the poor 492 poorer). Land size holding is in itself a very critical resource, a major determinant of technologies 493 adoption on the farm (Feder et al. 1985; Feder and Umali 1993; Nkonya et al. 1997), a determinant of 494 credit access (Doss 2006) and hence an important determinant for income and wealth accumulation. Farmers who owns and use relatively larger land sizes at a particular point in time are therefore more 495

496 likely to reap more income benefits from it and hence improve on their wealth. According to Moyo (2008) the unequal distribution of agricultural land ownership is potentially one of the key sources of 497 498 income inequality in southern Africa as the shares of agricultural income realised by large land holders from profits and rents can be expected to be higher than the shares realised by workers (Moyo 499 2013). Also, a pro-rich distribution of inequalities in land utilization observed in this study confirms 500 the importance of farmer's wealth in determining the area of arable land he/she can cultivate in a 501 502 given season. Richer farmers have higher odds of putting more land under cultivation as compared to their less affluent counterparts. With relatively more wealth they can access and buy much needed 503 farming inputs and can put much of their land to productive use. Several studies have linked asset 504 505 wealth to access of innovative farming resources on a farm (Cunguara et al. 2011; Onu 2006; Makate et al. 2018b). 506

507 Decomposition analysis performed confirmed wealth as a chief contributor to measured disparities in land size holding and utilization level in smallholder farming. This imply that distribution of wealth 508 hugely explains land holding and use patterns in smallholder farming. However, other factors were 509 510 found to minimally contribute to the measured socioeconomic inequalities. For instance, age of farmer, access to extension services, full-time farming and geographical location were found to meaningfully 511 512 contribute to measured wealth related disparities in land size holding and utilization. Results point to the importance of age, full-time farming, access to extension services and geographic location in 513 514 explaining socioeconomic disparities in land size holding and utilization. Farmers from different age 515 groups are expected to have different conditions confronting them hence influencing their wealth 516 endowments differently. Access to extension services also influences several farming decisions including land use (Anderson and Feder 2007) which explains why access to extensions significantly 517 explain in high land size holding and low land utilization. More so, access to extension services can 518 positively influence land area put under cultivation and hence profits from it through its role as a very 519 520 reliable information source (Makate et al. 2018b). Further, full time farming determines commitment 521 to the economic activity(farming) which can explain arable land size utilization inequality. Also, geographic location reflects on differences in a number of other factors (e.g. climate, infrastructure) 522 523 which explains its significant contribution to explaining inequalities in land size holding and 524 utilization.

525 Overall, the study results point to the existence of socioeconomic disparities in arable land size 526 holding and land utilization in smallholder farming areas of Zimbabwe which are hugely explained by asset wealth. The study findings are in line with other studies that have analysed land concentration 527 and wealth-related inequalities. For instance, a study by Suu (2004) analysed disparities in land access, 528 529 land use rights and utilization in the Red River Delta and concluded that huge disparities exist. 530 However, the aforementioned study took a more qualitative than quantitative approach. In another related study, Moyo (2013) analysed farm land, asset holdings and income inequalities in a number of 531 southern African countries and found different patterns and levels of land concentration in studied 532 533 countries. It is important to note that the approaches used in the noted studies are very different from 534 the present analysis which is mainly focused on measuring and explaining wealth related inequalities in land size holding and utilization in smallholder farming in Zimbabwe. Further, this study gives 535 536 further scrutiny of inequalities by gender farmer youth status, and geographic location which is a 537 unique contribution to literature.

538 5. Conclusion, implication & recommendations for a sustainable rural development 539 5.1. Conclusion

540 In conclusion, the study points to the existence of pro-rich inequalities in high land size holding and high land utilization and pro-poor inequalities in low land size holding and utilization in 541 smallholder farming in Zimbabwe. In other words, low land size holding and utilization is highly 542 543 concentrated within the poorest segments of society whilst high land size holding and utilization is a phenomenon of the more affluent population. More so, household asset wealth was the most 544 545 important factor to explain disparities in land size holding and utilization. In addition, other household 546 socioeconomic variables such as age, full-time farming, access to extension, and geographic variables 547 also explained measured disparities. Results do not point to a conducive environment for a sustainable rural development. This is mainly because, inequalities in access to assets particularly land are known
to have negative implications for the rural population as their livelihoods are mainly land-based. What
then are the implications for a sustainable small-holder farmer led rural development in Zimbabwe?

551 **5.2. Implications and recommendations for a sustainable rural development**

Results of this study suggest the need for decision makers in land allocation, distribution, re-552 553 distribution and utilization, to deliberately concentrate on the most vulnerable and poorer segments of society. Also, deliberate policies targeting bringing underutilized land into full production and 554 reducing inequalities in landholdings will have far reaching implications for sustainable rural 555 556 development and transformation. Ensuring equitable land distribution in smallholder farming areas 557 will go a long way in improving agro-based livelihoods and in effectively reducing poverty. More so, 558 supporting programs for land holders to access inputs and other relevant technologies will also be key 559 in ensuring that more land is utilized and also in improving productivity, incomes and hence food 560 security.

Moreover, the supporting policies should be pro-poor and should ensure a conducive environment prevails for the poor to build their asset wealth. Also, infrastructure for transport, communications, markets and supportive services such as extension, and other necessary training are also vital. This will effect agricultural growth and reduce socioeconomic disparities in land utilization and overall income inequalities in society. This is highly possible since the odds of bettering rural land-based livelihoods are high if rural people gain access to land and effective supportive policies.

567 Overall, the fact that wealth and other household socioeconomic variables such as age, full-time 568 farming status access to extension and geographic location variables are found to be the main factors 569 explaining disparities in land holding and utilization in smallholder farming calls for the need of a 570 multi-sectoral approach to addressing these inequalities.

The study is however, without shortfalls. Analysis relied on cross-sectional household survey data which in itself, is associated with shortfalls. Related, it may be plausible that due to the cross-sectional nature of the data it may not clearly and precisely reveal the dynamics of land size holding and utilization in the studied regions. However, despite the noted concerns, the study provides invaluable and insightful findings on socioeconomic status-related imbalances in land holding and utilization, in Zimbabwe which is an understudied case in the empirical literature.

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