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## Emissions and Emergence: a new index comparing relative contributions to climate change with relative climatic consequences

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## Emissions and Emergence: a new index comparing relative contributions to climate change with relative climatic consequences

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### Abstract

**We develop a new index which maps relative climate change contributions to relative emergent impacts of climate change. The index compares cumulative emissions data with patterns of signal-to-noise ratios (S/N) in regional temperature (Frame et al., 2017). The latter act as a proxy for a range of local climate impacts, so emergent patterns of this ratio provide an informative way of summarising the regional disparities of climate change impacts. Here we combine these with measures of regional/national contributions to climate change to develop an “emissions-emergence index” (EEI) linking regions’/countries’ contributions to climate change with the emergent regional impacts of climate change. The EEI is a simple but robust indicator which captures relative contributions to and regional impacts from climate change. We demonstrate the applicability of the EEI both for discussions of historical contributions and impacts, and for considering future relative contributions and impacts, and examine its utility in the context of existing related metrics. Finally, we show how future emissions pathways can either imply a growth or reduction of regional climate change inequalities depending on the type and compositions of socioeconomic development strategies.**

### Introduction

Many indices characterising aspects of climate change have been developed; most have attempted to address mitigation responsibilities by developing some line-of-sight regarding *contributions* to climate change, usually by consideration of past emissions (Agarwal and Narain, 1991, Heede, 2014) or through some allocation structure applied to future emissions (den Elzen et al., 2005, Botzen et al., 2008). In general, indices summarising the differential *impacts* of climate change have received a less attention, though in the last few years there has been increased attention to regional differences in the physical manifestation of future climate change. This is now becoming recognised as an emerging issue of climate equity and justice (Diffenbaugh and Scherer, 2011, Althor et al., 2016, Davis and Diffenbaugh, 2016, Green, 2016, Diffenbaugh and Burke, 2019).

In this paper we develop a new index which aims to capture regional variations both in contributions to climate change, and in the expected impacts. In doing so, the index captures more of the causal chain that characterises climate change (see Figure 1). Our approach compares emissions – a good proxy for contributions – against impacts of climate change as captured by emergent signal-to-noise (S/N) ratios in annual mean near-surface air temperature. The latter are a reasonable proxy for many important impacts. Figure 1 illustrates conceptually the emissions-emergence index as it spans the

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2  
3 cause-effect chain from socioeconomic drivers to climate damages. It identifies which regions (or  
4 countries) are polluting disproportionately compared their projected experience of climate changes.  
5

6 The index can be constructed in backward-looking or forward-looking modes. In the backward-  
7 looking mode, issues of current impacts can be assessed against contributions to date. In forward-  
8 looking mode, comparisons can be made between expected (regional) emissions under future  
9 emissions scenarios and expected emergent impacts. In the following examples we use the five  
10 Shared Socioeconomic pathways (SSPs) (Riahi et al., 2017) and alongside emergence patterns  
11 obtained from scenarios driven by the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) (Meinshausen  
12 et al., 2011) to illustrate the index's forward-looking properties, and then we use historical  
13 contributions (to date) and patterns of emergence to show differential contributions and impacts at  
14 a national level. Finally, we discuss the utility of EEI in the context of existing related metrics of  
15 climate change. We use the SSPs as driver of emissions, as these offer broad-based, regional  
16 storylines about regional socioeconomic development and associated emissions. We use the RCPs to  
17 drive the emergence patterns, since these drive global patterns of emerging climate change. The  
18 SSPs and RCPs were developed via a "parallel process" (Moss et al., 2010), such that an over-arching  
19 "scenario matrix architecture" sits over both processes. Readers should note that not all SSPs are  
20 compatible with all RCPs: in particular high fossil fuel SSPs are not compatible with low  
21 concentration pathways, and low fossil fuel trajectories are not compatible with high concentration  
22 pathways. Readers should consult (Riahi et al., 2017) for details.  
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## 27 **Inputs to the index**

### 28 *Contributions*

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31 Projected population and greenhouse gas emissions have been taken from all available Integrated  
32 Assessment Models (IAMs) for the five Shared Socioeconomic pathways (SSPs). Projected estimates  
33 of CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub> and N<sub>2</sub>O emissions and population are available for each of the five regions of interest  
34 for each decade from 2020 to 2090, alongside observed totals for the years between 1990 and 2010.  
35

36 To better estimate the climate effects of a portfolio of different greenhouse gases, in preference to  
37 the more customary global warming potentials, GWP<sub>100</sub>, we use GWP\* (Allen et al., 2016), since the  
38 latter provide a much better mapping between an emissions portfolio and surface temperature  
39 impacts (Allen et al., 2018). (The "star" in GWP\* is a reflection that GWP\* is not a "new" metric; it is  
40 in fact GWP<sub>100</sub> used in a way that gives a better mapping between emissions and temperature  
41 change.) GWP\*-weighted annual emissions rates are calculated using a GWP<sub>100</sub> weighted sum (IPCC-  
42 AR5 values) of the annual CO<sub>2</sub> emissions rate, the annual N<sub>2</sub>O emissions rate, and the rate of change  
43 in the annual CH<sub>4</sub> emissions rate multiplied by a time horizon factor of 100 years. We calculate the  
44 rate of change in the annual CH<sub>4</sub> emissions rate using the difference in annual emissions rate relative  
45 to those twenty years previously to reflect the timescales of CH<sub>4</sub>'s impact on global temperature.  
46  
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48  
49 CO<sub>2</sub>e\* emissions were then calculated for each of the nine decades between 2010 and 2090. The  
50 first 20 years of data (1990-2010) is used to calculate GWP\*-based estimates of CO<sub>2</sub>\*-equivalence.  
51 These projections of population and CO<sub>2</sub>e\* emissions are then summed over the nine decades for  
52 each region (respectively denoted as P<sub>i</sub> and C<sub>i</sub>) and for all five regions together (respectively denoted  
53 as P<sub>G</sub> and C<sub>G</sub>).  
54  
55

56 There are numerous ways of comparing relative contributions to climate change (Skeie et al., 2017),  
57 depending on which sectors and emission components are considered, which indicator of climate  
58 change is used, which time periods are chosen for emission and evaluation or responses and so on.  
59 Though many reasonable combinations are possible, some of these choices make more physical or  
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3 policy sense than others. For instance, accurately evaluating the role of long-lived and short-lived  
4 pollutants is important for a scientifically-accurate estimate of contribution to long-term warming  
5 (Allen et al., 2018). Also important are choices around baselines and reference periods, where  
6 different choices seem reasonable (Millar et al., 2017, Schurer et al., 2018, Millar et al., 2018); and  
7 while long baselines are conceptually attractive, uncertainty increases as we move backward in time,  
8 and it is not obvious how to treat the pre-independence emissions of previously colonized societies.  
9 People may disagree over some of these choices, but it is clear that some sets of choices more  
10 coherently map to the temperature target-based climate negotiation framework than others (Skeie  
11 et al., 2017). Additional innovations regarding the way contributions are assessed are left for future  
12 work, but may be important for some potential uses of the index (see *the value of climate indices*  
13 below).  
14  
15

### 16 17 *Emergent impacts*

18  
19 Following previously published methods (Hawkins and Sutton, 2012, Frame et al., 2017), we  
20 calculate S/N for near-surface air temperatures, using the CMIP5 simulations for the 25 models that  
21 ran each of RCP2.6, 4.5 and 8.5 scenarios, and presented relative to a baseline climate of 1986-2005  
22 (see also Supplementary Information). The 'signal' is diagnosed by calculating the global mean  
23 surface air temperature (SAT) and fitting a fourth-order polynomial (GMST) across the period 1950-  
24 2100. SATs at each gridpoint are regressed against this smoothed GMST to derive a smoothed  
25 gridpoint signal that is proportional to the global mean. The 1986-2005 mean is then removed from  
26 the smoothed gridpoint data to produce the change in temperature (S). The N term is the standard  
27 deviation of annual mean temperatures in the pre-industrial control simulations at each grid point.  
28 The S/N is calculated for each model independently.  
29  
30

31  
32 To calculate normalised S/N ratios for each of the five regions explicitly represented in the SSPs, and  
33 presented in figure 2, we first aggregate, for each model, S/N values averaged over the period 2086-  
34 95 for those grid cells which lie within the national boundaries of each of the five regions. We then  
35 calculate the mean S/N value for each aggregated region, and divide it by the mean S/N for all five  
36 regions aggregated together.  
37

38  
39 Previous studies investigating the increasing frequency and severity of extreme heat have shown  
40 similar spatial patterns of results to those represented by the S/N calculations used here. Examples  
41 have been demonstrated across annual (Diffenbaugh and Scherer, 2011, Mahlstein et al., 2011,  
42 Lehner and Stocker, 2015, Hawkins and Sutton, 2012), seasonal (Davis and Diffenbaugh, 2016,  
43 Mahlstein et al., 2011, Anderson, 2012, Anderson, 2011, Mueller et al., 2016), monthly (Mueller et  
44 al., 2016, Sippel et al., 2015, Coumou and Robinson, 2013) and daily (Fischer and Knutti, 2015,  
45 Fischer et al., 2014, Fischer et al., 2013, Pfahl et al., 2017, Luke J. Harrington et al., 2016, Andrew et  
46 al., 2015, Angéilil et al., 2017, Angéilil et al., 2016) timescales, as well as for a variety of heatwave  
47 metrics (Simone et al., 2016, Nicholas et al., 2017), with all studies sharing a common framing of  
48 climate change emergence in the context of pre-existing local variability.  
49

50  
51 This ranking of emergence correlates with several of the inputs to climate change vulnerability, as  
52 well as composite indicators captured by the ND-GAIN index (Notre Dame Global Adaptation  
53 Initiative) (Chen et al., 2015) (figure S29), so it seems reasonable to conclude that the emergence  
54 pattern reflects important climate change vulnerabilities. National averages can mask domestic  
55 heterogeneity, which may be significant (Green, 2016) – however, a positive correlation is found  
56 between the magnitude of sub-national income inequality (as measured with a Gini coefficient) and  
57 the severity of temperature emergence (figure S27b). In addition, a robust anti-correlation also  
58 exists between the magnitude of temperature emergence and metrics of both progress towards  
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achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, and per capita national incomes (figure S28b and figure S26b respectively). The focus on patterns of temperature-driven emergence is supported by previous results which highlight the links between increasing heat extremes and reduced crop yields (Lobell and Burke, 2008, Battisti and Naylor, 2009, Asseng et al., 2014, Liu et al., 2016, Lobell et al., 2011), as well as impacts on ectotherms (Deutsch et al., 2008), even if slow-emerging impacts, like changes to ecosystem zones (Mahlstein et al., 2011) and more-frequent precipitation extremes (Andrew et al., 2015), will not necessarily be well captured with a focus on temperature S/N ratios. Thus the emergence pattern does not capture all important dimensions of impacts, but it does capture many important ones, and as characterisation of the emergence of other variables develops (e.g. (Rojas et al., 2019, Zhang et al., 2018)) we can look to include these in future revisions. Significantly, spatial patterns similar to the emergence patterns we identify are also evident when comparing the temperature emergence literature with other climate vulnerability indices (Althor et al., 2016).

### Defining the emergence-emissions index

Attempts to index relative contributions usually stop at (functions of) shares of emissions or contributions to overall global mean warming or ocean heat content and sea level rise (den Elzen and Lucas, 2005), though they do sometimes consider regionalised impacts (Aamaas et al., 2017, Allen et al., 2016) and the heterogeneity of the responses. Indices of impacts, such as vulnerability indices, sometimes incorporate climate-relevant but not climate-specific information such as information about adaptive capacity, exposure to climate risks, or hazards, but they do not incorporate information regarding shares of emissions.

To quantify whether a region or country's fractional contribution to global GWP\* weighted emissions correlates with their expected relative climate emergence, we define the emergence-emissions index for a country or grouping of countries,  $i$ , as follows:

$$EEI_i = \left[ \frac{C_i P_G}{C_G P_i} \right] \div \frac{(S/N)_i}{(S/N)_G} \quad (1)$$

where  $C_G$ ,  $P_G$  and  $(S/N)_G$  denote the cumulative GWP\*-weighted GHG emissions ( $\text{CO}_2\text{-e}^*$ ), population and signal-to-noise ratio associated with the median citizen of the global population.

An EEI above (below) unity indicates the relative contribution of a country or group of countries to the causes of global mean warming is greater (less) than their relative future experience of climate emergence. The EEI goes beyond previous proposals to quantify historical carbon debts and credits (Gignac and Matthews, 2015, Fuglestvedt and Kallbekken, 2016, Otto et al., 2017, Skeie et al., 2017) (square bracket in Eq 1) to also incorporate expected spatial heterogeneity in the future climate change in a single index of climate change inequality. It therefore attempts to capture a quantity of substantial moral relevance: the extent to which those responsible for climate change experience the effects of climate change; and the extent to which those that experience the effects of climate change have contributed to the problem.

### Future contributions and future impacts

Figure 2a shows the S/N ratios, normalised relative to the global average, for five regions and three RCP scenarios, with regional aggregations following those used in the SSPs. The different forcing scenarios lead to very overall different levels of climate change, both in terms of temperature change above pre-industrial, and in terms of the S/N ratios expected by the end of the century

(Frame et al., 2017). However, when the S/N ratios are normalised relative to the global average S/N for each of those scenarios, a very consistent order of relative emergence becomes apparent across all three scenarios: the Middle East and Africa experiences the largest relative climate change, followed by Latin America and Asia, with the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and reforming economies experiencing slower relative climate change under all scenarios. Despite substantial model uncertainty in the S/N ratios, this general sequence in which regions experience emergence of the climate signal above pre-existing variability faster than others remains strongly robust, and is largely insensitive to the choice of model (Table S1). This lack of scenario uncertainty (Hawkins and Sutton, 2009) therefore suggests that normalized S/N ratios represent a socioeconomically robust variable with which to construct an overall measure of the distribution of important climate impacts.

In terms of assessing the relative roles of different forcing agents on temperatures, for illustration we use the SSP dataset, which implies using production emissions and using 2010 as the start date for counting emissions (choosing of a different start date would make a difference of a few percent to contributions to warming) (Skeie et al., 2017). The long-standing convention of using production emissions rather than consumption emissions (Davis and Caldeira, 2010) is noted, and this clearly matters for discussions about responsibility. With appropriate data inputs, the EEI could easily be tweaked to incorporate a consumption-based approach instead or, indeed, some hybrid partitioning between consumption and production. In line with recent research (Allen et al., 2016), we weight emissions by GWP\* because this is a better predictor of temperature development than is GWP (the basis of CO<sub>2</sub>-e emissions).

Figure 2b shows normalised cumulative CO<sub>2</sub>e\* emissions per capita between 2010 and 2090, for each of five regions resolved in the SSPs under a range of different IAMs. The width of the bars represents inter-IAM spread. Because different regions could follow different development pathways in the future (i.e. development more similar to different SSPs in different regions), we cannot make the same simple pairwise comparison regarding the constancy of the relative contribution to warming in the future that we make for normalized emergence.

In essence, the S/N or emergence elements of climate change are determined by global concentrations of GHG, and are largely insensitive to the national origin of emissions. On the other hand, contributions to climate change are determined by the national origin of emissions (at least insofar as nations provide the usual way of determining contributions). We can use estimates of past GHG emissions to determine contributions, but to estimate future scenarios we must consider the possible patterns of future GHG emissions. This is why it is sufficient to consider only global concentrations for emergence, but why we must resolve emissions at regional or national scale.

We can, however, examine the extent to which differing scenarios of future emissions indicate a reduction or exacerbation of existing differences in terms of emissions per capita. Some SSPs pull regions towards unity (i.e. relative emissions parity); others push them away from it. Most IAMs find that global SSP1, SSP2, or SSP5 trajectories imply a diminution of existing inequalities between the OECD and the rest of the world. The reasons are different in each case: in SSP1 the OECD countries take the lead in emissions reductions and decarbonise their economies much faster than economies elsewhere; by contrast, in the high carbon SSP3 and SSP5 worlds, OECD emissions revert towards the global per capita average because other regions catch up to the OECD's (high) levels. In the intermediate SSPs, emissions per capita inequalities remain high. Interestingly, under the mitigation-oriented SSP1 the Middle East and Africa actually exacerbates existing inequalities in terms of per capita emissions; if everyone mitigates then there is contraction, but no convergence, of relative responsibilities for climate change.

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3 There are of course important caveats, such as the limited number of IAMs with diverse abilities to  
4 represent energy-economy in different groups of countries. At more refined levels of aggregation –  
5 those at which national policies are set – the picture becomes more variegated. SSPs are indicative,  
6 rather than prescriptive, normative, or predictive. As the developers of SSPs have noted (O'Neill et  
7 al., 2014), “SSPs are only examples of the kinds of socioeconomic futures that can produce particular  
8 challenges to adaptation and mitigation”. In the normalisation we employ, we interpret the SSPs as  
9 place-holders for future emissions trajectories to illustrate the point that future fossil fuel emission  
10 use will have implications for the pattern of relative contributions to climate change.  
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12

13  
14 Combining the information from Figures 2a and 2b to define the EEI enables a novel method of  
15 expressing, relative to the global median, relative contributions to change, alongside the relative  
16 emergence of impacts (compared to a baseline local climate).  
17

### 18 *National level EEI performance*

19  
20 Figure 3 displays an estimate of historical EEIs for all countries with populations above one million  
21 people, comparing normalised cumulative GWP\* weighted emissions per capita for 1970-2012  
22 against normalised signal-to-noise ratios (using the average of all models across all RCP scenarios  
23 from figure 1a). Because the Emergence pattern is relatively insensitive to the amplitude of the  
24 forcing, the horizontal ordering of countries is relatively insensitive to whether the world follows a  
25 high or low emissions trajectory – because they are robust spatial patterns, and because we are  
26 normalising the emergence pattern to pick out national variations, it matters little whether we use  
27 emergence patterns to date or diagnose them from future forcing trajectories. EEI values range from  
28 as high as 8 – for slow-emerging and prosperous Northern European countries – to well below 1/100  
29 for populous low income countries, such as Burundi. There is also more diversity in the position of  
30 individual nations (Table S4), with Singapore and Malaysia being both disproportionate contributors  
31 to emissions and disproportionately impacted in terms of how fast their climates are changing.  
32 Collectively however, nearly all of the highest and lowest income nations exhibit EEI estimates above  
33 2 or below 1/2 respectively, with few exceptions.  
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### 37 **The utility of EEI in the context of other climate indices**

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39 This index has value in several ways.

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41 This index jointly considers both relative contributions and relative impacts, thus capturing and  
42 integrating two widely discussed ethical principles, prominent in the literature on climate ethics  
43 (Caney, 2005, Shue, 2014). First, through its connection to contributions the index connects to  
44 arguments which invoke the principle that the polluter should pay and which emphasize the  
45 importance of historical responsibility. Furthermore, we argue that by presenting emissions in a  
46 framework which incorporates an emission metric which provides greater environmental integrity in  
47 assessing the temperature implications of diverse greenhouse gas trajectories, the vertical axis of  
48 the EEI is superior to approaches that use more traditional interpretations of CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalence.  
49 Second, the EEI incorporates a measure of who is most vulnerable to climate change, and most  
50 exposed to its harms. By combining the two the EEI provides a fine-grained integrated measure of  
51 the extent to which some are imposing the costs of their policies and actions on others. It therefore  
52 gives us an account of who is *exporting* harm to others and who is bearing burdens that result from  
53 the emissions of others.  
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58 A second potential use of the EEI is in guiding debates about specific policy issues. Because it  
59 accounts for differential contributions as well as differential impacts, it could, for example, inform  
60 policy debates about who should resource adaptation costs. Similar logic would allow it to help

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3 guide future mitigation policies; and it can also inform views about loss and damage (Otto et al.,  
4 2017).

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6 These potential uses feature strongly in academic and policy conversations regarding climate  
7 change; and both potential uses should, as a matter of principle, capture elements from the top and  
8 bottom of the causal chain outlined in Figure 2, especially given the centrality of ideas surrounding  
9 common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the climate change regime  
10 complex.

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13 A third possible use of an adapted version of our index would be to alter the vertical axis to focus on  
14 abatement costs rather than contributions to climate change. This is relevant to ability to pay  
15 considerations, and could be potentially of value in investigating interest-based approaches to  
16 international environmental policy (Sprinz and Vahtoranta, 1994). Further work is underway to  
17 explore these potential links. The central point is that the joint index can be re-designed to include  
18 other important ethical considerations.

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21 More generally, conversations about the ethical dimensions of climate change ought to capture as  
22 much of the climate change causal chain as possible, since differences in the amplitude and speed of  
23 the emergence of local climate change are relevant ethical considerations; and predictable  
24 considerations, given the robustness of the relative emergence in figure 1a.

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27 At this point we should add that neither the EEI nor any other index is a sufficient input for debates  
28 about climate ethics, climate policy or loss and damage since important normative questions remain  
29 open. Two of the most important such questions pertain to: (1) integration with non-climate factors  
30 and (2) issues regarding relative contribution and relative impact for conversations regarding the  
31 scope of both international mitigation obligations and loss and damage.

32  
33 A common tendency of numerically precise emissions indices is that they treat emissions in isolation  
34 from other moral considerations regarding global or intergenerational justice. Even scientifically, this  
35 seems peremptory. A recent paper (Skeie et al., 2017) showed that there are several alternative but  
36 similarly reasonable ways of ascertaining the historical contributions of countries to climate change,  
37 even under the strongly restrictive assumption that historical per capita contribution to climate  
38 change is the sole factor considered. By focusing only on inputs to climate change, proponents of  
39 quantitative approaches to climate responsibilities tend, implicitly or explicitly, to focus narrowly on  
40 contribution to climate change; rather than to consider more fully the role of those emissions in a  
41 just world (Caney, 2012). But justice is not discharged exclusively or even primarily through  
42 emissions of greenhouse gases, and there are strong arguments against such “isolationist”  
43 approaches (Shue, 2014, Caney, 2012).

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47 There are also generic issues regarding the isolated use of climate indices pertaining to loss and  
48 damage. Given the large matrix of factors that contribute to vulnerability to climate change loss and  
49 damage – including socio-economic considerations such as pre-existing levels of vulnerability and  
50 poverty, and also whether there are resilient and accountable governance structures – it is far from  
51 obvious that per capita emissions ought to be the only factor in play.

52  
53  
54 Emissions-related, or abatement cost-based, indices should then be put in context. Their  
55 contribution is to give summary information regarding the climate component of a broader  
56 approach to distributional justice. However, even if they do not capture all the morally relevant  
57 information they do capture important factors whose importance is recognized by a wide variety of  
58 different ethical perspectives, and is affirmed in both the climate ethics literature (Gardiner et al.,  
59 2010), and in the UNFCCC (Article 3.1 and Article 4.1).

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
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3 Indices such as the EEI can, then, serve as useful and important summary inputs into a broader  
4 evaluation of climate policies, rather than sufficient and determinant prescriptions. Furthermore, to  
5 the extent that quantitative information is relevant to climate ethics and climate policy, it is  
6 important to focus on as long a segment of the causal chain as is possible. The EEI thus serves a  
7 valuable role. Furthermore, as argued above, the emergence index especially is a strikingly robust  
8 measure of local change, relative to that experienced by other people in other regions. Patterns of  
9 emergence in temperature response correlate well with many of the most significant direct impacts  
10 of climate change and, likely, many indirect impacts as well.  
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### 13 **Summary**

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15 With the introduction of the EEI, we have shown how unequal regional patterns of emergent climate  
16 impacts combine with regional disparities in the contributions towards global GHG emissions and  
17 global warming. These results illustrate how the pursuit of some SSPs by regional groups would  
18 imply a growth of climate change inequalities, while other combinations (particularly SSP1) would  
19 reduce it.  
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22 Most appeals to fairness in climate change make reference both to relative impacts and relative  
23 contributions (Shue, 2014, Caney, 2005, Gardiner et al., 2010). Emerging regional climate impacts (or  
24 potential damages) are distributed differently to contributions to climate change. The EEI quantifies  
25 this both up to present, and for different future pathways. We suggest that the ability to consider  
26 simultaneously both relative impacts and relative contributions can, potentially, offer a promising  
27 way to develop a more comprehensive quantitative basis on which to anchor discussions. This can  
28 be useful as an important element in evaluation of what can be fair and reasonable efforts to limit  
29 future warming under the Paris Agreement, as well as in the context of loss and damage.  
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Figure 1: Cause-effect chain from socioeconomic causes of emissions through to climate change and damages. Altered from (Fuglestedt et al., 2003). The grey box encompasses that segment of the causal chain that is considered in the joint emissions-emergence index. International and domestic factors that are not directly caused by climate change are shown in the arrows.




Figure 2: Panel (a) normalised impacts of climate change as represented by S/N ratios, for different regions and taken for the period 2086-2095 under different scenarios. Bars represent 5<sup>th</sup>-95<sup>th</sup> percentiles of a 25-model CMIP5 ensemble; circles show the median model response. Panel (b) represents normalised cumulative CO<sub>2</sub>e\* emissions per capita between 2010 and 2090, for each of five regions resolved in the SSPs under a range of different IAMs. Here, the diamonds show the mean of the IAMs; bars show the full range of model responses. MAF=Middle East and Africa, LAM=Latin America, ASIA=Asian countries not contained in other groups, OECD, REF=Reforming economies, a slightly outdated term for countries from the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.




Figure 3. Normalised, population-weighted S/N ratios (bottom axis) and normalised per capita GWP\* emissions for 130 countries with populations >1M. Lines of constant EEI are plotted as solid curves. Country acronyms and abbreviations are coloured by purchasing power parity gross national product (GNP-PPP) sourced from The World Bank. Countries experiencing stronger emergence are located towards the right of the plot. Countries contributing more, per capita, to climate change are located towards the top of the plot.

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