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26 Youth engagement · Education · England policy · Professional practice

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## 27 Introduction

28 Drawing on and analyzing existing theoretical and empirical research literature, this  
29 chapter explores the relationship between youth engagement and education in  
30 England, principally during the period 1998 to 2017. While the importance of  
31 youth engagement and education has formed a core part of policy and practice  
32 during this period, the relationship is one which has been characterized by different  
33 approaches at different times. These differing approaches have frequently been  
34 influenced by the particular agendas of key actors – including governments, repre-  
35 sentatives of nongovernmental organizations, and schools. In order to provide a  
36 foundation for the argument in this chapter, I make some general remarks about the  
37 meaning of key terms related to youth engagement, provide some contextual com-  
38 ments about recent political developments, and outline the history of educational  
39 initiatives relevant to youth engagement. The chapter then examines several issues  
40 that influence the ways in which young people's engagement is framed with refer-  
41 ences to levels of engagement, styles of engagement, and engines of engagement. I  
42 provide an overview of some of the research about young people's engagement in  
43 England (in amount and type) and the factors that are seen to be associated with such  
44 engagement. It is argued that while there is some clarity in understanding about the  
45 extent, nature, and cause of engagement, there are also some indications that  
46 research that has led to that understanding has been ignored through a party political  
47 process in which ideological considerations are emphasized. Finally, I discuss ways  
48 in which a positive relationship between youth engagement and education could be  
49 developed and conclude by raising some questions about what work in this area  
50 remains to be done.

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## 51 Background: The Meaning of Key Terms

52 In England, since about 2008, there has been less official interest in citizenship education  
53 than existed in the previous decade. The central government department responsible for  
54 education has devoted less time and energy to citizenship education (the ways in which  
55 that has happened and the reasons for it are discussed below). That said, there is  
56 nationally and internationally significant work still being done in this area. The contin-  
57 ued attention to young people's engagement with citizenship beyond official policies  
58 may be seen in initiatives taken by international bodies (e.g., Carnegie – see [http://  
59 carnegieendowment.org/specialprojects/civicresearchnetwork/](http://carnegieendowment.org/specialprojects/civicresearchnetwork/)), academia with recent  
60 issues of the journals *Citizenship Teaching and Learning* (Sears 2017), and the *Journal*  
61 *of Social Science Education* (Davies et al. 2014), and new networks (e.g., Partispace, see  
62 <http://partispace.eu/>). These various activities, in some ways, relate very positively to  
63 earlier government policy developments that were aimed at developing active citizen-  
64 ship (e.g., DfEE/QCA 1998 and [http://www.parliament.uk/citizenship-civic-engage-  
65 ment](http://www.parliament.uk/citizenship-civic-engagement)). However, it should be noted that much of the work in citizenship education  
66 and, more precisely, education that encourages understanding of contemporary society

67 and engagement in it, remains contested and controversial in England, as elsewhere. As  
68 such, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of key terms.

69 The quotation below gives an overarching sense of what is involved when  
70 engagement in contemporary society is referred to. According to Marquand  
71 (2004), engagement is:

72 ...a dimension of social life, with its own norms and decision rules... a set of activities, which  
73 can be (and historically has been) carried out by private individuals, private charities and  
74 even private firms as well as public agencies. It is symbiotically linked to the notion of public  
75 interest, in principle distinct from private interests; central to it are the values of citizenship,  
76 equity and service...It is ... a space for forms of human flourishing which cannot be bought in  
77 the market place or found in the tight-knit community of the clan or family. (p. 27)

78 Therefore, in short, engagement in general terms means participating in one's  
79 social communities beyond the immediate family. Of course, further clarification is  
80 needed about many things including, referring to the above quotation, the distinc-  
81 tions to be made between "public" and "private," and the meaning of "social life." It  
82 would be unwise to suggest that engagement does not occur within family or other  
83 personal groups and indeed those contexts are often the places where identity is  
84 given clearest expression through power-related interpersonal action.

85 One of the principal debates about the meaning of engagement is focused on  
86 location. In other words, there are questions about where one may take part, and,  
87 more generally, this raises issues about the boundaries between legally framed  
88 characterizations of engagement and affectively oriented perceptions of thinking  
89 and action. Some academics, such as Tarrow (2005), emphasize the significance of  
90 transnationalism, whereas Crick (2000, pp. 136, 137), for example, cites Hannah,  
91 Arendt, to assert that "a citizen is by definition a citizen among citizens of a country  
92 among countries." Furthermore, there are many contemporary contexts (e.g., Cata-  
93 lonia; Corsica) in which it is hard to identify the preferred formulation of the country  
94 in which one may take part. Indeed, such formulations are not always fixed, as the  
95 2014 referendum on Scottish independence and continuing discussion about the  
96 border between Northern Ireland and Eire shows within the UK context.

97 In reference to citizenship and engagement, these arguments about the role of  
98 place connect with discussions about the degree to which pluralistic societal coher-  
99 ence may be achieved. Much of the debate which manifested in educational policy  
100 documents about young people's engagement in England since the late 1990s has  
101 focused on engendering a sense of togetherness through:

102 a society in which there is a *common vision and sense of belonging* by all communities; a  
103 society in which the diversity of people's backgrounds and circumstances is appreciated and  
104 valued; a society in which similar life opportunities are available to all; and a society in  
105 which strong and positive relationships exist and continue to be developed in the workplace,  
106 in schools and in the wider community. (DCSF 2007, p. 3)

107 This said, some of these overarching goals as stated in policy documents tend to  
108 hide the different meanings of community within which engagement may occur.  
109 Annette, for example, has pointed to the different meanings of community:

110 as a place or neighbourhood ... as a normative ideal linked to respect, inclusion and  
111 solidarity ... as something based on a politics of identity and recognition of difference ...  
112 as a political ideal linked to participation, involvement and citizenship. (2003, p. 140)

113 It is important to recognize these different meanings in order to be able to make  
114 judgments about what sort of fundamental issues are at stake. Heater (1999, p. 77),  
115 for example, has explained that certain characterizations of community can mean  
116 something that is very challenging:

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117 Communitarianism extracts from the republican tradition the concentration on a feeling of  
118 community and a sense of duty, though omitting from its programme the strand of direct  
119 political participation and, some would argue, crucially, the central republican concern for  
120 freedom.

121 Of particular significance to my view of engagement are *political* issues. In this  
122 regard, the following definition can be viewed as particularly apt: "Youth activism  
123 refers to behaviour performed by adolescents and young adults with a political  
124 intent" Hart and Linkin Gullan (2010, p. 67). In order for the connection between  
125 youth activism and the political sphere/discourse to be considered meaningfully  
126 there is a need to give a fairly simple – but nevertheless dynamic – characterization  
127 of the terms "politics" and "citizens":

128 Politics then can simply be defined as the activity by which differing interests within a given  
129 unit of rule are conciliated by giving them a share in power in proportion to their importance  
130 to the welfare and the survival of the whole community. (Crick 1964 p. 21)

131 Citizens may be described in the following terms:

132 Individuals are citizens when they practise civic virtue and good citizenship, enjoy but do not  
133 exploit their civil and political rights, contribute to and receive social and economic benefits  
134 do not allow any sense of national identity to justify discrimination or stereotyping of others,  
135 experiences senses of non –exclusive multiple citizenship and, by their example, teach  
136 citizenship to others. (Heater and Oliver 1994, p. 6)

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137 A focus on politics allows for engagement to be centrally about power, to  
138 recognize the primacy of the individual in human rights discourses, to see the vital  
139 importance of groups acting in a range (geographically based and other) of diverse  
140 communities, to value the rights and responsibilities of a legally framed status of  
141 citizenship and to embrace the dynamism offered by considerations of politics in  
142 everyday contexts. The focus on politics allows for a helpfully precise characteriza-  
143 tion of what I think is important in engagement. Moreover, the risk of embracing too  
144 many things and achieving only a rather woolly sense of what engagement means

145 might well be avoided by interpreting all that we do through the lens of the  
146 fundamental concepts of politics.

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## 147 **Background: The English Political Context**

148 In the UK, successive Prime Ministers have consistently argued for young people to  
149 engage in society. (In the United Kingdom, certain legislative powers remain with  
150 the central UK Parliament, while others – such as education – are devolved to the  
151 Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly, and Northern Ireland. On these devolved  
152 powers, the central UK Parliament legislates for England.) During his period in  
153 office, Labour Prime Minister, Tony Blair (1997–2007), was committed to what he  
154 considered a communitarian approach. Broadly, this approach consisted of the  
155 attempt to steer a middle course between the excesses of both unfettered neoliberal-  
156 alism, with its commitment to solving everything through market forces, and certain  
157 forms of socialism in which opportunities for individual or private group-based  
158 activity were not encouraged or allowed. In this approach, Blair was influenced by  
159 sociologists, including Giddens (2000) and Etzioni (1995), who had also influenced  
160 other politicians including Clinton in the USA. A commitment to youth engagement  
161 and activism was also explicitly stated by Blair's successor as Labour Prime  
162 Minister, Gordon Brown (2007–2010), who argued that:

163 It is my ambition to create a country in which there is a clear expectation that all young  
164 people will undertake some service to their community, and where community service will  
165 become normal part of growing up. (Brown 2009)

166 Leader of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition (2010–2015) and Con-  
167 servative (2015–2016) governments, Prime Minister David Cameron seemed to  
168 continue, broadly, this approach, creating the *National Citizen Service* and also  
169 focusing on what he called “the Big Society” which, in part, was designed to engage  
170 people in their communities. According to Cameron:

171 The Big Society is about a huge culture change, where people, in their everyday lives, in  
172 their homes, in their neighbourhoods, in their workplace, don't always turn to officials, local  
173 authorities or central government for answers to the problems they face, but instead feel both  
174 free and powerful enough to help themselves and their own communities. (Cameron 2010)

175 It is possible that the intention for the Big Society was for citizens to feel free,  
176 able, and empowered to help their communities, but the Big Society also linked to  
177 the desire for a healthy economy (in that engaged people create wealth). The nature  
178 of the desired enterprise was of a particular type, while the sort of action Cameron  
179 was looking for was driven by certain agendas which had their limits. One agenda  
180 can be seen, for example, in certain reactions to the 2011 riots in English cities, as the  
181 following critique highlights:

182 Mr Cameron will also blame “children without fathers; schools without discipline; reward  
183 without effort; crime without punishment; rights without responsibilities; communities  
184 without control”.

185 Mending that “broken society”, Mr Cameron will say, is his fundamental aim in politics.  
186 (Kirkup et al. 2011)

187 The above indicates some of the challenges of, and different ways of framing,  
188 arguments for engagement. Successive governments in England have wanted to  
189 promote particular sorts of engagement that emerge from particular ideological  
190 perspectives. As has been suggested above, a broad-based communitarian agenda  
191 shaped the desire for youth engagement under Blair and Brown, but after the General  
192 Election of 2010, the agenda became more precisely focused on a political project in  
193 which young people’s action that was not contributing to established norms was not  
194 accepted.

195 The current Prime Minister (January 2018) Theresa May, while opposing votes at  
196 16, is also in favor of the more limited form of youth engagement which has framed  
197 government discourse since 2010:

198 people can get engaged in politics in a whole variety of ways and I would encourage young  
199 people to do so.

200 I think it is important young people watch politics, pay attention to politics, get to think  
201 about their own views and where possible start to get involved. (Stone 2017)

202 The hesitation and caution of May in suggesting young people think about things  
203 and “where possible start to get involved” mean that low-level traditionally framed  
204 actions to support established systems and processes are being promoted. The  
205 government’s position here is not an open-ended commitment to democratic engage-  
206 ment. One of the most obvious ways in which the more limited commitment to youth  
207 engagement can be seen is to consider politicians’ actions about perceived radical-  
208 ism. It is likely that the determination to achieve youth engagement in a society in  
209 which law and order is emphasized is connected to fears about the rise of perceived  
210 radical groups (Kyriacou et al. 2017). The complex relationship between engaged,  
211 cohesive, and inclusive democracy and attempts to achieve more precisely focused  
212 predetermined “good” actions is thrown sharply into relief by the above. While it  
213 would be naïve and simplistic to suggest that there are unsophisticated divisions  
214 between conservative and radical conceptions of engagement, what is evident from  
215 official sources in recent years is an emphasis on what is deemed as good behavior  
216 and an absence of encouragement for critique. Furthermore, unwanted behavior in  
217 the form of radicalization has been presented principally, and overly narrowly, as a  
218 concern with certain groups in society – particularly Muslims (Qurashi 2016).

219 The financial crisis since 2008 has been significant for changing attitudes and  
220 opportunities, and this has been particularly noticeable in European matters. Hoskins  
221 and Kerr (2012) note that:

222 the global economic and financial crisis . . . has been allied with a change in the political  
223 philosophy of governments across Europe in the past few years. This has seen more



224 governments favouring support for community activity, as opposed to conventional political  
225 participation, with a smaller perceived role for government in society overall. The combined  
226 consequence of the economic crisis and the smaller perceived role of the state have meant  
227 that the field of Participatory Citizenship has fallen from prominence as a policy priority at  
228 national and local level and, as a consequence, there has been much less funding for the  
229 whole domain including through national, local and private sector contributions. The strains  
230 of the cuts in funding have been noted within civil society across Europe and at the European  
231 level. (p. 8)

232 A significant feature of the current political landscape in England relates to the  
233 departure of the UK from the European Union. The sort of transnational citizenship  
234 that was narrowly rejected by voters in the 2016 referendum on membership of the  
235 European Union probably occurred in light of fears about migrants taking jobs and  
236 putting pressure on public services, as well as an attempt to take back control in a  
237 context where there was anger expressed against elites (see [https://ec.europa.eu/  
238 epale/en/blog/brexit-and-its-implications-citizenship-education-across-europe](https://ec.europa.eu/pale/en/blog/brexit-and-its-implications-citizenship-education-across-europe)). The  
239 populism that fed the Brexit campaign is, of course, clear evidence of a sort of  
240 engagement. And that campaign took place in the context of negative attitudes  
241 towards immigrants:

242 Existing evidence clearly shows high levels of opposition to immigration in the UK. In  
243 recent surveys, majorities of respondents think that there are too many migrants, that fewer  
244 migrants should be let in to the country, and that legal restrictions on immigration should be  
245 tighter. (Blinder and Allen 2016, p. 4)

246 The 31st NatCen Social Research British Social Attitudes survey was reported as  
247 indicating that “British attitudes harden towards immigrants” ([https://www.  
248 theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jun/17/immigration-british-attitudes-harden-benefits](https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jun/17/immigration-british-attitudes-harden-benefits))  
249 and the campaign itself saw allegations of xenophobia in, for example, the activities of  
250 the UK Independence Party and the murder of a member of parliament by a member  
251 of an extreme right wing group. This general picture is not necessarily to suggest that  
252 young people hold such views and take such actions. The fact that 71% of young  
253 people aged 18–25 in the UK voted to remain in the EU is perhaps an indication, first,  
254 of divisions in society and, second, about differences concerning to what outcomes  
255 societal engagement should lead.

---

## 256 Youth Activism in England: The Educational Context

257 Within England there have been many attempts historically to align youth engage-  
258 ment with their formal education. For example, the work of Henry Morris in the  
259 Cambridgeshire village colleges in the 1930s, the work of Leicestershire Community  
260 Colleges, and Eric Midwinter’s and others efforts to establish urban community  
261 schools, all illustrate an approach to education in which engagement in communities  
262 was promoted.

263 The types of education explicitly relevant to youth activism and engagement have  
264 seen extreme variations. The general neglect of an explicit approach prior to the  
265 1960s was followed in the 1970s by an emphasis on political literacy (skills and  
266 issues about politics in everyday life), a string of educations about and for peace, the  
267 globe, anti-sexism, anti-racism, and so on in the 1980s and promotions of youth  
268 volunteering in the early 1990s. The highly influential Final Report of the Advisory  
269 Group on Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools  
270 (known commonly as the Crick Report, 1998) which led to the statutory inclusion of  
271 Citizenship education in the National Curriculum for secondary (11–16-year olds)  
272 schools emphasized social and moral responsibility, political literacy, and commu-  
273 nity involvement. From 2010, there has been a return to civics, financial literacy,  
274 volunteering, and character in government discourses and policies on youth  
275 engagement.

276 Legislation has been passed to ensure that a version of professionally responsible  
277 engagement is maintained. Sections 406 and 407 of the 1996 Education Act insist on  
278 the duty to secure balanced treatment of political issues. The Equality Act 2010 AUG  
279 Advice for Schools and the Prevent Strategy (June 2011) (which sees British values  
280 as democracy; the rule of law; individual liberty and mutual respect; tolerance of  
281 those with different faiths and beliefs) are relevant. An official document on Pro-  
282 moting fundamental British values as part of spiritual, moral, social, and cultural  
283 education in schools (DfE 2014), as well as the School Inspection Handbook (Ofsted  
284 January 2015) carry significant guidance for schools and teachers. Teachers are  
285 required to insist on the sort of engagement that has been explained above: an  
286 opposition to perceived radicalization and a commitment to young people starting  
287 to get involved in a context which is influenced by anti-immigrant views.

288 Citizenship education is currently, in early 2018, part of the National Curriculum  
289 but there have been very recent dramatic changes. Up to 2014, there was a strong  
290 conceptual core (democracy and justice; rights and responsibilities; identities and  
291 diversity). The work was inspired by political literacy, emphasizing communities at  
292 local, national, and global levels and which is contemporary, public, participative,  
293 and reflective. The current National Curriculum for Citizenship (since September  
294 2014) emphasizes civics (knowledge of constitutional politics and the legal system),  
295 volunteering, and personal money management together with a nonstatutory char-  
296 acter education that highlights perseverance, resilience, and grit. This emphasis on  
297 character, which has been explored by Kisby (2017), may be part of a  
298 neo-conservative moral agenda. While character education may have positive poten-  
299 tial, there are reservations about its nature which are acknowledged in attempted  
300 rebuttals by its proponents (e.g., Kristjansson 2013). This moral agenda may also be  
301 connected with adult fear of young people (Halsey and White 2008). In addition, it  
302 has been argued on the basis of empirical research that increasing levels of mental  
303 health issues following the 2008 recession may make engagement more difficult  
304 (Katikireddi et al. 2017).

## 305 Levels, Styles and Engines of Engagement

306 The need to understand engagement (its levels and styles) is the subject of wide  
307 ranging debate, with many academics coining phrases and framing characterizations.  
308 Fallahzadeh (2016) has summarized a range of work such as “mundane citizenship”  
309 (Bakardjieva 2012), “self-actualizing citizen” (Bennett et al. 2011), “networking  
310 citizen” (Loader et al. 2014), “critical citizen” (Norris 1999), and “everyday-maker”  
311 (Bang and Sorensen 1999). These formulations are placed against overarching  
312 characterizations of engagement which make use of, for example, models of micro  
313 and macro participation. The micro emerges from the relationship between individ-  
314 ual citizens and the state in which, for example, engagement would be revealed by an  
315 individual parent approaching a teacher to request (or demand) help for their own  
316 child. The macro includes collective action, such as voting and trade union or  
317 pressure group activity. Either implicitly or explicitly, these models may connect  
318 with bonding capital (i.e., people with similar characteristics) and bridging capital  
319 (i.e., people with different characteristics) in the interests of promoting engagement.

320 It is not straightforward to identify the level of youth engagement in terms of civic  
321 action that is taking place. In part, this is because there is developmental disconti-  
322 nuity rather than a clear and simple process as people age (Sherrod et al. 2010). In  
323 other words, the nature of engagement may develop variously, and the meanings,  
324 interpretations, and perceptions about engagement may shift. There are also hard to  
325 interpret differences between people’s social capital. It has been argued that young  
326 people from lower socioeconomic backgrounds are less likely than others to engage  
327 in certain forms of civic action (Andrews 2009). Those with low levels of social  
328 capital are less likely than others to engage in established associational activity. High  
329 status charitable bodies, for example, may not be approached by young, working  
330 class men and women from some ethnic groups. Cremin et al. (2009) have empha-  
331 sized the key determinant of engagement as being “whether or not the young person  
332 has the knowledge, networks, and skills to be able to act upon a civic issue of  
333 concern”.

334 Of perhaps greater significance than the challenges of identifying clear patterns of  
335 engagement is the issue of the characterization of engagement itself. Many surveys  
336 take fairly crude measurements of engagement to indicate that approximately half or  
337 more of young people have experience of volunteering (see Davies et al. 2013 for a  
338 fuller exploration). However, this may include involvement in sports and exercise,  
339 hobbies and recreation, youth and children’s services, and health and social welfare,  
340 which may be regarded as not fitting easily alongside the political essence of civic  
341 engagement. Nevertheless, using a broad interpretation of engagement, there are  
342 positive indicators:

343 . . . many young people of all types and backgrounds are involved in informal voluntary and  
344 community action. Studies show around three quarters of young people have been involved  
345 in ‘constructive social participation’ through community networks, neighbourliness,  
346 campaigning or informal political action. (Gaskin 2004, p. iv)

347 And even when these activities are described with a little more precision, there  
348 exist some encouraging data for those who think that levels of youth engagement are  
349 positive, including that “42% of young people aged between 10 and 20 years  
350 participated in ‘meaningful social action’ in the UK – this is slightly broader than  
351 volunteering” (<http://www.ivr.org.uk/ivr-volunteering-stats/177-how-many-young-people-volunteer>,  
352 accessed 11 September 2016). However, perhaps the key challenge  
353 is to interpret these statements by knowing more precisely what is meant by  
354 “engagement,” “volunteering,” and “meaningful social action.” Perhaps, depending  
355 on one’s definition and preferred measurements, it is almost impossible not to engage  
356 in society. If that is the case, then survey data about engagement may merely indicate  
357 levels of acceptable, or social class defined, involvement. The possibility thus exists  
358 of unhelpful circularity in an exclusionary process (where, for example, working  
359 class people cannot be engaged in “real” activity). As such, when connections are  
360 made between engagement and health, life satisfaction and educational level, this  
361 may only be deemed to be a reasonable interpretation when engagement is seen as  
362 the effect of positive lifestyle rather than the cause.

363 What facilitates participation for young people in England? In addition to those  
364 factors already referred to above (perhaps especially distribution of social capital),  
365 evidence suggests that there are broad engines of engagement. There are general  
366 societal factors that help or hinder engagement. In their work outside the English  
367 context, but which is highly apt to it, Amnå and Zetterberg (2010) argue that there  
368 are various perspectives on what promotes involvement including modernization  
369 (as people become better off, they want more of a say in public affairs); the public  
370 institutional hypothesis (the design and performance of democratic systems may  
371 facilitate or hinder engagement); the social capital hypothesis (the connections  
372 between individuals facilitate or hinder engagement); and civic volunteerism (the  
373 resources – especially time and money – available to people determine their capacity  
374 to engage). Within these perspectives, there are significant trends that may explain  
375 engagement. For example, consumerism (including decisions to buy or not buy  
376 certain products and although dismissed by some as mere “clicktivism,” e.g.,  
377 <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/sep/24/clicktivism-changed-political-campaigns-38-degrees-change>)  
378 may be one of the major ways in which public expression occurs, and there are many NGOs which deliberately emphasize this  
379 approach.  
380

381 Engagement may emerge not from broad societal factors as above but in relation  
382 to the possibility of personality traits and emotion. In this sense, it is possible we  
383 have moved some way from resource mobilization theories in which money, com-  
384 munications, and public support are seen as key factors. Emotion in the identification  
385 of common enemies; establishment of personal relationships; and performance of  
386 group rituals are seen as significant (Edwards 2014). Russo and Amnå (2016)  
387 identify different personality traits and relate them to the likelihood of engagement.  
388 Briefly, and not necessarily applied to people in England, those who are agreeable  
389 and conscientious are perhaps less likely to take political action than those who are  
390 extravert and open to experience.

391 Several research projects including the National Foundation for Educational  
392 Research's Citizenship Education Longitudinal Study (see [https://www.nfer.ac.uk/  
393 research/projects/cels/](https://www.nfer.ac.uk/research/projects/cels/)) suggest that practical factors may be significant for individ-  
394 ual and group engagement. These include, peer group advocacy, publicizing oppor-  
395 tunities, an inclusive ethos, a welcoming physical environment, a willingness to deal  
396 realistically and honestly with issues that affect individuals and communities in  
397 contemporary society. In addition, youth workers who use high-level interpersonal  
398 skills to create a positive process of participation and maintaining realistic commit-  
399 ments for young people and the adults who work with them may determine the  
400 nature and amount of young people's engagement. There are mixed reactions to the  
401 motivational force of rewards (certificates, academic credit, work experience, salary,  
402 etc.), but it would seem potentially naively idealistic to ignore these matters (Davies  
403 et al. 2013).

404 For individual action there may be a range of facilitators. There are many (e.g.,  
405 Byram 2008) who focus on the achievement of language as an essential indicator not  
406 only of identification but also of likely action. Acquiring language aids the func-  
407 tional aspects of citizenship (completing tax returns is perhaps a rather mundane  
408 example). It affects identity (it may be the case that I am what and how I speak), and  
409 it has a powerful impact on skills and dispositions (advocacy and representation are  
410 just some of the things that are achieved through language). The Linguistic Ethnog-  
411 raphy Forum (see <http://lingethnog.org/>) is devoted to exploring these issues. These  
412 issues and possible processes and outcomes about language have particular explicit  
413 resonance in diverse communities (e.g., see Szczeppek et al. 2016) but are important  
414 in all communities insofar as language has instrumental value, is an aspect of culture  
415 into which and through which people are socialized, and is a form of social contract  
416 in which there are opportunities for democratic or other types of dialogue.

417 Social media are seen as having huge potential, but this is contested. There may  
418 be reservations about the positive potential for youth engagement (e.g., see Davies  
419 et al. 2012). Social media may not be available to all. Furthermore, it may be used in  
420 ways congruent with the development of democracy which may lead only to an  
421 emphasis on traditional teaching and learning styles. Despite the claims associated  
422 with social media use, there are strong critical accounts of what is happening to  
423 youth engagement as a result of new technology with some suggesting that less  
424 rather than more democracy is likely (e.g., Taplin 2017). Even in the context of  
425 widespread use, it is not apparent that the amount of usage is sufficient for social  
426 media to impact for all on global citizenship education. Therefore, there remains  
427 lingering questions regarding the ways in which social media are used as they may  
428 not necessarily be aligned with democratic citizenship and its educational potential is  
429 at the very least under-developed (Davies and Sant 2014).

430 Perhaps the most traditional form of civic engagement is voting. There have for  
431 many years been concerns expressed at low youth turnout at general elections. The  
432 debate in England has focused in recent years around the merits of allowing voting at  
433 16. There is uncertainty about the wisdom of lowering the voting age (Stone 2017).  
434 Some feel that in relation to attempts to increasing turnout young people may "grow  
435 into" voting and that, in any case, not voting does not necessarily imply


436 disengagement. Politicians may want young people to vote to secure short-term  
437 electoral advantage (and to weaken young people's rights to receive state support).  
438 There may be a novelty value that would soon disappear (increases in turnout have  
439 been followed by decreases in, for example, the Isle of Man and Austria). Voting at  
440 16 in light of rights held by young people in other spheres is seen by some as a  
441 spurious argument. For example, Russell (2014) sees those rights as "minimal,  
442 irrelevant, and diminishing," and he also claims that comparing young people in  
443 this context with women's campaigns for the vote or referring to changes to lifestyle  
444 regulation is inappropriate. What, however, seems clear is that the context for  
445 engagement is influenced by discussions over voting.

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### 446 **Making Explicit Connections Between Education and Youth** 447 **Engagement**

448 In general terms, there has been a strong connection made between education and an  
449 enriched civic culture. In their classic work that has been generally influential in  
450 many countries, Almond and Verba (1989 [1963]) suggest that:

451 educational attainment appears to have the most important demographic effect on political  
452 attitudes. Among the demographic variables usually investigated – sex, place of residence,  
453 occupation, income, age, and so on – none compares with the educational variable in the  
454 extent to which it seems to determine political attitudes. The uneducated man or the man  
455 with the limited education is a different political actor from the man who has achieved a  
456 higher level of education. (pp. 315–316)

457 There are distinctions regarding levels of education in relation to civic participa-  
458 tion. Campbell (2009) argues that an absolute level of one's own education (in other  
459 words, the value of education itself and not compared with that achieved by others)  
460 is relevant to membership in voluntary associations, institutional trust, and voting.  
461 But sorting (one's educational position relative to others) may also be important and  
462 when education is, at least in part, a status symbol this may be relevant to societies  
463 which experience political conflict. A cumulative effect (i.e., increases in the average  
464 level of education) is good for interpersonal trust and as a result a wide-based  
465 engagement may develop. Beyond these general considerations, there has been a  
466 large amount of research in England (complementing international studies) that  
467 make a clear connection between certain types of citizenship education and engage-  
468 ment (e.g., ed 2010). Whiteley's (2013) research, for example, shows that:

469 citizenship education had a positive impact on three key components of civic engagement:  
470 efficacy, political participation and political knowledge. This . . . is likely to help offset some  
471 of the trends in civic participation among young people which have shown a sharp decline in  
472 key activities like voting and voluntary activities over time. (p. 1)

473 Generally, education occurs when the two tenets of constructivism are met:  
474 "learning as an active process of constructing knowledge rather than [only] acquiring

475 it; and instruction is a process that involves supporting that construction rather than  
476 of [only] communicating knowledge” (Duffy and Cunningham 1996, p. 171). In  
477 order to apply that general insight to specific ideas and issues about citizenship  
478 education, it is interesting to look at research from the National Foundation for  
479 Education Research (<https://www.nfer.ac.uk/research/projects/cels/>) and reports  
480 from the Office for standards in education (OfSTED) ([https://www.gov.uk/govern  
481 ment/publications/citizenship-consolidated-a-survey-of-citizenship-in-schools](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/citizenship-consolidated-a-survey-of-citizenship-in-schools)).

482 Those reports suggest that effective citizenship education will be achieved by  
483 establishing a clear rationale and characterization of educational engagement widely  
484 understood by “teachers” and “learners,” through explicit and focused consideration  
485 of key concepts, with recognition that certain areas (government, politics, and voting  
486 as well as diversity, identity, and global issues) present difficulties for teachers and  
487 learners, and with an appreciation that while assessment is difficult, good work may  
488 be achieved through open discussion in a positive educational “climate.” There is  
489 less research on nonformal or informal forms of education for engagement but these  
490 surely are very relevant and worthy of further research. This means that despite all  
491 the very many debates in this field, we actually already know what to do and what  
492 not to do: education for engagement should not be narrowly academic, left to chance  
493 or constructed narrowly around morality (in the form of character education) or law  
494 (in the form of civics).

---

## 495 Conclusion

496 As in other countries, there are significant concerns and challenges about youth  
497 engagement and education in the English context. These challenges and concerns are  
498 long-standing. Since 2010 – a period which has witnessed the effects of the global  
499 financial crisis; General Elections in 2010, 2015, and 2017; and referenda about  
500 Scottish independence (2014) and membership of the European Union (2016) –  
501 England has experienced something of a revolution in education. Schools are now  
502 less supported by local government, have greater autonomy (e.g., most schools are  
503 now not required to follow the National Curriculum), and typically focus on a  
504 limited number of centrally imposed targets (principally maths, English, and science  
505 rather than citizenship). Officially, there is a perceived need for civic knowledge,  
506 greater discipline, and increased individual volunteering. Research and evidence  
507 from the schools’ inspectorate about the value of citizenship education for civic  
508 engagement has been rejected by the government. Although the House of Lords is  
509 currently looking into the possibilities of reviving the educational focus on civic  
510 engagement (see <http://www.parliament.uk/citizenship-civic-engagement>), it is  
511 unfortunate that citizenship education in England has been characterized as being  
512 party political – essentially Labour Party – property and it is unlikely currently to  
513 regain its former prominent position.

514 The difficulties in the policy context for connecting education and civic engage-  
515 ment are significant. In many ways, England is witnessing a return to the period in  
516 the mid-1990s before the Crick Report when much of the key work was left to

517 interested professional and funding bodies and individual academics. But that does  
518 not mean that little work is taking place. Internationally, the Council of Europe, the  
519 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ([http://carnegieendowment.org/  
520 specialprojects/civicsresearchnetwork/](http://carnegieendowment.org/specialprojects/civicsresearchnetwork/)), and Leverhulme (as evidenced by their sup-  
521 port for the project referred to in the acknowledgements below of this chapter) are  
522 promoting relevant work. There is a wealth of work in several countries taking place  
523 in which efforts are being made to understand the nature and types of engagement  
524 and their links with education. For example, Johnson and Morris (2010), Westheimer  
525 and Kahne (2004), and Veugelers (2007) divide citizens into the adapting citizen, the  
526 individualistic and/or the critical democratic citizen. There is exploration of the ways  
527 in which “new” technology may be shaped to provide the opportunities to move  
528 from the dutiful citizen to the self-actualizing citizen (Bennett 2008). In such a  
529 complex and contested field, interested parties need to continue to work to be clear  
530 about the meaning of key terms (while allowing for dynamic and flexible work). In  
531 addition, there is a need to pay attention to the context in which work takes place in  
532 order to review what seems to be relevant to the levels and types of engagement by  
533 young people and to see what is being done educationally, formally, and otherwise.

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## 534 Cross-References

- 535 ► [Education for youth civic and political activism in Australia](#)
- 536 ► [The development of active participation among youth in Singapore](#)
- 537 ► [Constructions of ‘youth’ and ‘activism’ in Lebanon](#)
- 538 ► [Young people’s civic activism in Hungary](#)
- 539 ► [Youth civic engagement learning and teaching in Canada](#)

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