

LUCRETIUS' *DE RERUM NATURA* AND SATIRE

T. H. M. Gellar-Goad

A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Classics.

Chapel Hill
2012

APPROVED BY:

James J. O'Hara, UNC-Chapel Hill, *advisor*

Jed W. Atkins, Duke University, *reader*

Sharon L. James, UNC-Chapel Hill, *reader*

Catherine C. Keane, Washington University in St. Louis, *reader*

James B. Rives, UNC-Chapel Hill, *reader*

© 2012
Theodore Harry McMillan Gellar-Goad
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

ABSTRACT

T. H. M. GELLAR-GOAD: Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura* and Satire

(Under the direction of James J. O'Hara)

This dissertation provides the first extended, systematic analysis of *De Rerum Natura* (*DRN*)'s engagement with the Graeco-Roman satiric traditions and argues that *DRN* plays an important part in the development of the Roman genre of satire. Chapter 1 treats key preliminaries to the topic: the prior scholarship on satire in *DRN*, the typology of ancient didactic, the poem's contexts (literary, philosophical, intellectual), the distinction between the "mode" of satire and the "genre" of satire, and methodology.

Chapter 2's first half develops a portrait of the satirist-figure in Graeco-Roman literature, in a synthesis of "satiric" poetry (works that employ the broader "mode" of satire, as opposed to works of the actual Roman genre of satire) and current scholarship on the topic: the satirist employs a personal voice of comic mockery from a self-contradictory position of moral superiority and social abjection. Chapter 2's second half evaluates how *DRN*'s speaker takes on the role of satirist both in familiar "diatribal" or "invective" passages (against the Presocratics in book 1, the fear of death in 3, love in 4) and in other passages less often connected with satire and comic mockery. Chapter 3 focuses on other features of *DRN*'s engagement with the satiric mode, particularly the formal characteristics of satire and the tensions between satire and didactic in both satiric

literature and *DRN*—which, as both chapters show, deserves inclusion in the category of “satiric literature.”

Chapter 4 turns to the Roman genre of satire. After examination of ancient definitions of the genre, the term *satura*, and the programmatic statements by later satirists about Lucilius, the chapter considers the thematic, stylistic, generic, and poetic connections between *DRN* and earlier Roman satire—not only Lucilius but also Ennius’ *Saturae*. Chapter 5 argues that *DRN* takes advantage of generic tropes in Roman satire; that Lucretius’ poem influences how the later satirists Horace, Persius, and Juvenal use such tropes; and that these satirists allude prominently to *DRN*. The chapter also argues that the ends of *DRN* books 2–6 are satires on Roman civic life. A general conclusion speculates on implications of the dissertation’s line of inquiry.

for Mom
you told me so

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I give thanks first and foremost to Jim O'Hara, my dissertation advisor, and to Christopher Polt, without whose advice and guidance this dissertation would not exist. For help with bibliography and with specific points, I am grateful to John Henkel, Michael Broder, Amy Richlin, Caroline Bishop, Serena Witzke, Jessica Westerhold, Cathy Keane, and Jeremy Gerlach and the rest of my spring 2011 Latin 204 class at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Patrick Dombrowski was an excellent sounding board for many of my ideas and arguments, and I drew on a great source of support and encouragement from D. C. A. Wiltshire, Elizabeth Greene, and Erika Zimmermann Damer. Thanks are due also to Sharon James, my M. A. thesis advisor (and member of my dissertation committee), who taught me that I could write a project of this length. The UNC Writing Center's dissertation boot camp was immeasurably valuable to me in making great headway on the project in the summer of 2011, and half of it would be missing without the continued countless hours spent writing alongside my dissertation boot camp buddy Cathay Liu.

My husband, Jake Gellar-Goad, has of course been very supportive, and has helped me figure out how to word some of the big and complex ideas contained herein; he also showed that I can be at my most productive in the lobby of a fast food restaurant in eastern North Carolina. Deepest gratitude goes to Jeffrey Beneker, who got me started with Latin twelve years ago, to Arum Park and Sydnor Roy, who both helped my path to

graduate study become successful, and finally to Zola Packman, who introduced me to Lucretius (“bless his heart!”) in the fall of 2003, and thus set me on the journey towards the profession of Classics.

PREFACE

All citations and quotes of Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura* are from the text of Rouse & Smith [1975]. I have modified that text's spelling conventions to replace lowercase V with the more accurate lowercase U, so that the adjective "sweet," for instance, is not *suavis* but *suavis*. For the fragments of the satires of Lucilius, I use the text of Charpin [1978–1991/2002–2003].

All translations are my own. When quoting modern scholarship in languages other than English, I have in most instances offered a paraphrase of the citation's basic argument.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: Introduction.....	1
The literary and cultural context of <i>DRN</i>	5
Satire: genre and mode.....	23
Methodological prolegomena.....	29
Overview of this study.....	32
CHAPTER 2: The Satirist-Figure in the Mode of Satire and <i>DRN</i>.....	35
The position of the speaker in Graeco-Roman satiric poetry.....	37
The satiric speaker and poetic mockery.....	38
Juvenal and the disenfranchisement of the satirist.....	45
Satirists and seriousness.....	50
The satirist's double audience.....	58
The satiric speaker position and the Lucretian <i>ego</i>	61
The Lucretian <i>ego</i> as comic speaker.....	63
Personal voice.....	79
The "high ground".....	87
Abjection.....	93
Mockery and blame in <i>DRN</i>	99
The speaker's justified indignation.....	113

Collusion: speaker, reader, addressee.....	123
Summary: <i>DRN</i> 's <i>ego</i> as satirist.....	131
Epilogue: <i>Natura Rerum</i> as satirist.....	133
CHAPTER 3: <i>DRN</i> and the Elements of the Satiric Mode.....	140
Irony and other features of satire.....	141
1. Object: prior offenses of the satiric target.....	141
2. Formal antecedent: prior model for satiric discourse.....	142
3. Humor: parody and irony.....	143
4. Ambiguity.....	146
<i>DRN</i> 's satiric traits.....	148
1. Object.....	148
2. Formal antecedent.....	152
3. Humor.....	154
4. Ambiguity.....	157
Poetic initiation.....	160
Didactic tension in satire.....	162
Satire's didactic pose.....	163
Conflict between teacher and satirist.....	171
Satire and didactic in <i>DRN</i>	176
Straw men.....	177
Dogma.....	180
Poetry vs. philosophy?.....	183
The teacher's transitoriness.....	188

Conclusion to chapters 2 and 3.....	193
CHAPTER 4: <i>DRN</i> and Earlier Roman Satire.....	198
Characteristics of Roman <i>satura</i> in <i>DRN</i>	201
Ennius' <i>Saturae</i> and <i>DRN</i>	207
<i>DRN</i> and Lucilius' satires.....	214
Conclusion to chapter 4.....	237
<i>DRN</i> and the locus of satire.....	239
CHAPTER 5: Generic Tropes and Civic Discourse in Roman Satire and <i>DRN</i>....	243
Satiric takes on philosophy, a philosophical take on satire.....	246
Persius 1.1, <i>DRN</i> , and Lucilius.....	250
Trouble at sea in <i>DRN</i> 2 and Juvenal poem 12.....	254
Lucretian <i>elementa</i> and satiric teaching.....	262
Food.....	267
Civic discourse.....	271
The book-endings of <i>DRN</i> : satires on civic life.....	278
Conclusion to chapter 5.....	286
<i>DRN</i> in the tradition of Roman <i>satura</i>	288
Masks and morality.....	290
CONCLUSION.....	294
Divided audiences in Catullus, Stephen Colbert, and <i>DRN</i>	301
WORKS CITED.....	306
APPENDIX 1: Concordance of Lucilian Fragments Cited in Chapter 4.....	374
APPENDIX 2: Additional Major <i>Topoi</i> of Roman Satire and <i>DRN</i>.....	376

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Throughout this dissertation, I use a few instances of shorthand for ease of reference. The abbreviation *DRN* is used to indicate Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*; in citations of texts from the satirists, *Serm.* refers to Horace's *Sermones*, and *Epist.* to his *Epistulae*. Citations to other works are spelled out in full. Journal abbreviations used in references and citations are listed at the beginning of the Works Cited list (pp. 306–307).

The satires of Lucilius are fragmentary, and have been numbered differently in four main editions. When I cite a fragment of Lucilius, I use C to refer to the numbering of the most recent and complete edition (with French translation and commentary), Charpin [1978–1991/2002–2003], M for the hallmark Teubner text and commentary of Marx [1904/1905], W for the *Loeb Classical Library* text and English translation of Warmington [1938], and K for the two-volume text and German translation of Krenkel [1970]. For example: “fr. 28.15C = 753M = 820W = 774K.” In chapter 4, I instead list these correspondences in an appendix.

The term *ego* refers to the constructed speaker of a literary work that stands as the “voice of the author” (see pp. 30–32, below) and is distinct from the poet. This distinction is analogous to the widely-adopted distinction in scholarship on Roman erotic elegy between poet (e.g., Ovid) and poet-lover (“Ovid”). Compare Fowler's use of “the poem” to refer to *DRN*'s speaker/voice [2000c: 148].

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

“A satirical writer can suffer no worse fate at the hands of posterity
than to be taken too seriously”
Powell [1999: 331]

“ ‘Serious’ is not the opposite of ‘satire.’
Satire is especially serious to the satirist”
Dupuy [2010]

gli autori nascondono di solito il travaglio della loro creazione
“authors usually hide the working of their creation”
Pirandello [1999/1921: 50]

“Clearly, satire is not for the faint-hearted.”
Rosen [2007: 267]

The aim of this study is to trace the place of Lucretius’ *De Rerum Natura* (henceforth *DRN*) along two paths of satire: first, the broad boulevard of satiric literature from the beginning of Greek poetry to the plays and essays of the modern West, and second, the narrower lane of Roman verse satire, *satira*, which begins with the middle Republican authors Ennius and Lucilius and ends in Juvenal’s satire, a product of the Flavian era. By examining how Lucretius’ poem employs the tools, techniques, and tactics of satire—

by evaluating those portions of *DRN* where the speaker behaves like a satirist—we can gain, I argue, a fuller, richer understanding of how the poem works and how its poetry and its purported philosophical program interact. Attention to the role of *DRN* in the more specific tradition of Roman verse satire demonstrates that Lucretius’ poem acts as a kind of detour on the highway, a swerve in the trajectory of Roman satire. *DRN*’s numerous satiric passages and frequently satiric speaker draw on the earlier Roman satire of Ennius and Lucilius, as I will show, and in turn *DRN* influences the later satiric verse of Horace, Persius, and even Juvenal. While *DRN* should not in my view be considered satire in and of itself, it is an important player in the Roman genre’s development.

This study builds on, extends, and revises the scant and basically outdated corpus of scholarship on satire in *DRN*. While earlier work, as well as the explicit satiric tone of several Lucretian passages (such as the section on love and sex that ends book 4), has contributed to the current scholarly consensus that the Lucretian *ego* is at times a forceful and capable satirist,¹ nevertheless the record of publications that actually unpack such claims is slim. At the end of the 19th century, Sellar remarked that “the generous scorn of Lucretius” shows an “affinity, in some elements of character, to the Roman satirists” [1881: 226] and listed a few allusions to Lucilian satire in *DRN* [249 n. 1], allusions that I discuss in chapter 4. Houghton simply surveys in brief the Lucretian corpus and picks out many instances where a passage “rings with satire” [1912: xxxvi] or is “shot through with satire” [xxxviii] or where “we hear the voice of the censorious satirist” [xxxv]. Murley’s short essay argues “that the bulk of satire in Lucretius is very considerable,

¹ Witness Hardie’s comment that “Lucretius is one of the great Roman satirists, in the diatribes against the fear of death and sexual infatuation in Books 3 and 4” [2007: 125].

comparable with the amount we have from Lucilius or Persius; and that he [Lucretius] may well for Horace have elevated the definition and tone of Roman satire” [1939: 395].

Waltz, who in 1949 compared *DRN* to the satiric works of literature ranging from *Ecclesiastes* to Voltaire, described *DRN*'s satire as the flipside of Lucretius' poetic genius, and as a spontaneous effect of the impassioned poet's temperament.² Lucretian satire, in other words, is for Waltz part of the Anti-Lucrèce of Patin [1900/1868], part of the enthused poetic instincts that fought against the author's coolly objective Epicurean intents and contributed to the inconsistent mire of philosophy and poetry that scholars used to find in *DRN*.³ For present-day readers of Lucretius' poem, however, this explanation is unsophisticated and insufficient. A similar position—one that is in my judgment similarly flawed—was staked out by Dudley, according to whom “Lucretius [holds] a position of importance in the development of Roman satire though, in a technical sense, he is not a satirist at all. Satire, for him, provided weapons which he was able to use at need” [1965: 129]. Dudley's claim is in essence that the author of *DRN* should be seen as an Epicurean evangelist who delved into satiric tropes and tradition only as a way to further his mission of conversion.

More recent work has dealt with *DRN*'s satiric aspects only in brief and in microcosm. Glazewski [1971: 88 n. 2], discussing the re-use in Horace *Serm.* 1.1 of the Lu-

² Waltz compares *DRN* to Pascal and Dante [1949: 78–80], Molière [93], *Ecclesiastes* [98], Voltaire [100], and Anatole France [103]. Satire as the other half of Lucretius' genius: “cette face, secondaire si l'on veut, mais non inférieure, du génie poétique de Lucrèce” [1949: 78]. Satire as a product of Lucretius' temperament: “[c]ette inclination à la satire est manifestement un effet spontané de son tempérament, de son tour d'esprit, et même de son tour d'imagination” [1949: 79].

³ For more modern evaluations of this hypothesis, see Toohey [1996: 103–107], Dalzell [1996: 41–44], O'Hara [2007: 64–69]. Bonelli [1979: 89] offers a view similar to Patin; see, *contra*, Konstan [2008/1973: 29 n. 6].

cretian imagery of the “dinner-guest full of life” (*DRN* 3.938: *plenus uitae conuiuia*, cf. my discussion at p. 269–271, below), echoes Houghton and Murley in his claims:

Lucretius’ effect on the Roman satiric genre in general is greater than that with which he is credited. Writing between Lucilius and Horace, he used the hexameter, which was to become the recognized metre of satire; he had a didactic purpose as did Horace; he treated as closely akin to his subject (which was primarily ethical) many of the contemporary themes of Roman satire on private life.

Kleve [1978] identifies a basis in the Epicurean tradition for the polemical refutation of opposing philosophers in *DRN* book 1 and elsewhere, while Brown cautions that much of *DRN*’s “satiric streak” [1983: 150 n. 26] is new, original to the poem. Sosin, in a consideration of Lucretian echoes in Persius 1.1–2, in passing describes the opening to *DRN* book 2 as a “satiric proem” and “a dense compilation from his [Lucretius’] own notebook on satire” [1999: 285], but the scope of Sosin’s study does not stretch to a wider view of the poem’s overall use of satire. Smith includes *DRN* under the rubric of “Latin satiric literature” [2005a: vii] and reads the satiric attack on love and sex at the end of book 4 into other passages throughout the whole poem [2005c]. And Schrijvers, who describes *DRN* as “framed by the theme of *pietas*” [2007: 57], links Lucretius’ poem with the satire of Lucilius, which “brought together Stoic virtue and *pietas*” [64].

Each of these prior studies of Lucretian satiric activity, so to speak, is useful but incomplete. They tend to leave the term “satire” undefined, or else identify it almost completely with the problematic category “diatribe” (on which see pp. 27–29, below). Similarly, they meander through the text of *DRN* in its order, not in a synoptic or analytic way, and often do so with more summary than critical assessment or interpretation. And the connections they make to earlier and later authors of Roman verse satire are rarely explicit. My work, then, offers a corrective in method and in content—beginning with a

conscious consideration of two types of satire, “mode” and “genre” (pp. 23–27, below). Previous scholarship has in combination mentioned many of the passages I will consider here and all of the obvious ones (e.g., the attack on the Presocratics in book 1, the refutation of the fear of death in book 3, the passage on love and sex in book 4, and the “anthropology” or account of human social development in book 5)—but I also offer satiric readings and satiric intertexts of lines previously undiscussed in this respect, most notably the “troubles at sea” opening to *DRN* book 2.⁴

The literary and cultural context of *DRN*

To begin, I address and dispense with certain questions regarding the background to and intellectual milieu of Lucretius’ poem. First among these is the matter of the date of *DRN*. An important distinction is that between “publication” date, or the time when a poem was first circulated among at least a small number of outsider readers, and composition date. While there is some agreement on the date of publication, with many scholars placing it in the mid-50s BCE, the date of composition is potentially much earlier, as Schrijvers cautions: “the cultural background of Lucretius’ poem is not the decade of the

⁴ My project may be compared in some ways to the evaluations of satiric content in other works of Latin literature from genres that are not satire, as for instance Greene’s assessment of Roman satire’s influence on and presence in Apuleius’ *Metamorphoses* [2008].

fifties, when the work was nearly finished, but the eighties and seventies, when the poem was conceived, planned, and in full progress.”⁵

As for the publication or initial circulation itself, the conventional wisdom has been 55 BCE, at the traditional date of Lucretius’ death, from the (unreliable) testimony of Donatus.⁶ Giancotti, based on the Lucretian *ego*’s call for peace in the poem’s opening invocation (1.29–43), recommended an earlier date for the work, 62 BCE, a year of relative domestic peace after the defeat of Catiline and his co-conspirators [1959: 145–148]. Hutchinson [2001], however, argues that the speaker’s reference to an “unsteady time in our fatherland” (*patriai tempore iniquo*, 1.41) suggests dating the poem to 49/48 BCE, at the outbreak of Roman civil war between Julius Caesar and Pompey the Great. Capasso [2003: 100] sees a much more limited circulation among a small circle of those interested in Hellenistic philosophy, in 54 BCE, the year of Cicero’s letter mentioning *Lucreti poemata*, “Lucretius’ poetic work” (*Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem* 2.9.3, cf. p. 23 n. 32, below), while Schrijvers claims (without substantiation) that *DRN* was published by Cicero circa 50–45 BCE [2007: 51], in an echo of Jerome’s comment (at *Chronicle* 171.3) that Cicero edited or published Lucretius’ poetry after Lucretius’ death in (as Jerome dates it) 51/50 BCE. Volk rejects Hutchinson’s claims and, in an argument from *DRN*’s proem,⁷

⁵ Schrijvers [2007: 50]. The composition of the poem’s frame (for *DRN*, its opening invocation of Venus) may provide some indication of when the poem is “set”: the speaker describes the circumstances of his composition, and by the process of what Volk calls “poetic simultaneity” [2002a: 6–24], the speaker “present[s] the illusion that the poem is being composed only as it evolves” [2010: 127].

⁶ This is the date accepted by, e.g., Sandbach [1940: 77] and Gillespie & Hardie [2007a: 325].

⁷ Volk [2010: 130]:

returns to conventional calls for a date of “the mid 50s, a time of great political uncertainty when internal peace at Rome was certainly endangered, but open civil war had not yet broken out” [2010: 131].

At any rate, the general consensus places *DRN* as a (final) product of roughly the 50s BCE, and thus, as Fowler points out, a work appearing during a troubled political climate: “the Catilinarian ‘conspiracy’ was less than a decade in the past when the poem was published, and...memories of it must inevitably have conditioned the poem’s reception” [1989: 140]. *DRN*, Fowler argues, is embedded in a political context and the reader may therefore justifiably find a political dimension to the work. As we will see in chapter 5, this backdrop of politics—and the Lucretian *ego*’s particular take on civic discourse—holds much in common with Roman satire from Lucilius onward.

The period in which *DRN* began to be circulated was a time not only of political turmoil but also of intense intellectual activity. Despite the Lucretian speaker’s claims to be the first to present Epicurus’ teachings in Latin,⁸ there is ample evidence for Epicurean

The logic of the proem’s argument...runs as follows. The inception and progress of the poem are contingent on Venus’ keeping Mars at bay; as Lucretius clearly says, his work could not proceed *patriai tempore iniquo*. However, *De rerum natura* clearly does exist and evolves without a hitch from the proem to the end of Book 6. What we therefore have to conclude is that its composition does not take place at a time of war—if at a time when the threat of war is clearly felt, since otherwise the invocation to Venus would be unnecessary.

⁸ As at, e.g., 5.335–337:

denique natura haec rerum ratioque repertast
nuper, et hanc primus cum primis ipse repertus
nunc ego sum in patrias qui possim uertere uoces.

Furthermore, this nature of things and this system of reasoning has only recently been discovered, and I myself have been discovered first

authors and philosophers at Rome and in Italy—who were writing and teaching in both Greek and Latin—during the 50s BCE and significantly earlier. There evidently was enough Epicureanism at Rome by the 2nd century BCE for it to have gained widespread favor (either among the whole citizenry in popularized form or among certain elements of the intellectual or aristocratic elite), penetrated the Roman social consciousness, and made the ruling class anxious about the philosophy’s civic implications—for in either 173 or 154 BCE, and again (according to Suetonius *De Grammaticis* 25.1) in 161 BCE, the philosopher-teachers of Epicureanism were expelled from Rome.⁹ The figure who looms large in contemporary testimonia for Roman Epicureanism is Amafinius, a man of uncertain date who (according to Cicero *Tusculan Disputations* 4.5–7) was the first philosopher to teach in Latin at Rome, and the first to produce written philosophical treatises in Latin, works that were immediately popular.¹⁰ In other words: there was indeed Epicu-

among/alongside the first [or “been discovered to be definitely the best”]
to be able to translate this system into the speech of our fatherland.

For the meaning of *primus cum primis* at 5.336, see Howe [1951: 59]: “the *primis cum primis* of Lucretius could mean ‘the first (in excellence) among the first (in times),’ as well as ‘definitely the best,’ the usual reading.”

According to the suggestions of Rouse & Smith [1975: 404–405 n. c *ad loc.*], the speaker of *DRN* does not refer here to Latin-language Epicurean predecessors because such authors’ “works were brief and dealt mainly with ethical doctrine,” while *DRN* “was the first...to give a detailed account of Epicurean physics.”

⁹ On the matter of the expulsion, see Ferrary [1988: 354] and Lévy [2003: 54–55]. On the testimony of Suetonius, see Garbarino [1973: 370–371]. According to Griffin, public teaching of philosophy may have been banned at Rome after 155 BCE [1989: 3].

¹⁰ Cf. Howe [1951: 57], and further: “[i]n the absence...of definite evidence to the contrary, it seems reasonable to regard Amafinius as a contemporary of Lucretius, and to assume that his followers were drawn from the municipia of Italy” [62]. Howe’s argument is “not entirely convincing” in the estimation of Rouse & Smith [1975: 405 n. c]. Regardless of the dating of Amafinius, Glazewski’s statement that *DRN* “was the first Epicurean philosophical work among the Romans” [1971: 85] is incorrect, since the Epicu-

rean philosophy in Latin before *DRN*, counter to the poem's own assertions. In fact, Sedley [1998: 140–141] points to a possible reference at *DRN* 4.181–182 to Catius and other authors who committed Epicurean principles to Latin prose prior to Lucretius' poem.¹¹

And Cicero, a contemporary of Lucretius and an author who himself provides a great deal of information about Epicurean philosophy, does not identify the author of *DRN* as the leading Roman Epicurean of his day, but rather a certain Velleius.¹² Among the corpus of texts that survive from antiquity, however, the most prominent Epicurean author of this period (besides the author of *DRN*) is Philodemus, whose philosophical texts in Greek make up a major portion of the library found at Herculaneum's Villa of the Papyri, while evidence that the man himself was particularly influential on some ele-

rean prose authors were themselves the first to produce philosophical works among the Romans.

See additionally Griffin [1989: 9]: “the Epicureans were the first school to present their doctrines in Latin in works which...were read all over Italy,” with citations [p. 9 n. 15] of Cicero *De Finibus* 2.44; *Tusculan Disputations* 4.6–7; *Epistulae ad Familiares* 15.6.1, 15.19.3; and multiple passages in *Epistulae ad Atticum*.

¹¹ “As the small song of the swan is better than that cacophony of cranes scattered in the celestial clouds of the southerly wind,” *paruus ut est cycni melior, ille gruum quam | clamor in aetheriis dispersus nubibus austri*, cf. p. 94, below. Note also Lévy's assertion that it was in the interests of *DRN*'s author to suppress mention of Amafinius and his ilk: “[l]’auteur du *De rerum natura*, en revanche, avait tout intérêt à ne pas mentionner cet encombrant prédécesseur [Amafinius], et cela peut contribuer à expliquer les passages dans lesquels il se présente comme le premier à exposer en latin la doctrine épicurienne” [2003: 52–53].

¹² Cicero *De Natura Deorum* 1.15, with Crawley [1963: 12]; note that Cicero's recognition of Velleius as the leading Epicurean may simply be for the purposes of Cicero's own dialogue. The relationship between *DRN* and Cicero's own works is complicated, since the Ciceronian corpus both predates and postdates Lucretius' poem. Fellini [1951] finds traces of Cicero's *De Consulatu Suo* in *DRN*; citing Pucci [1966: 72–75], Maslowski points out that Cicero's “*De republica* is the first dialogue in which traces of the poem can be detected” [1974: 74]; Andreoni [1979] defines *De Re Publica* as anti-Lucretius; and Lévy [2003: 53] finds Cicero complicit in an intentional and ill-willed suppression of *DRN* (“une occultation volontaire et malveillante du *De rerum natura*”).

ments of the Roman governing elite can be derived from his presence in Cicero's *In Pisonem*, where he appears as a ridiculous "house philosopher" to the degenerate Piso, whose property the Villa of the Papyri may have been.¹³

Fundamental to the issue of *DRN*'s intellectual and literary context is the basic question of how much in contact with it *DRN* is. Does the poem engage with contemporary poetic and philosophical trends, or is it completely ignorant or uninterested in them, focused instead solely on the original doctrines of Epicurus and on its poetic place not among the stylistic fads of the day but rather within the more ancient and enduring epic-didactic tradition? Both sides of this twofold question have been the subject of hot debate, and I am inclined to side with those scholars who argue that *DRN* is more involved in contemporary poetics and philosophy than a first reading of the poem might otherwise suggest to a modern reader. I will briefly survey each matter—first poetry, then philosophy—before moving on to the thornier question of *DRN*'s readership.

Besides Cicero and Philodemus, another important extant contemporary of *DRN* is Catullus, whose poetry constitutes a primary source of information on the *poetae noui* of this period, who pioneered a new style of Latin poetry based on Hellenistic Greek verse, particularly that of Callimachus. While most scholars do not go so far as Hahn, who links Catullus and Lucretius by their supposed "common Epicureanism" [1966:

¹³ On the importance of *In Pisonem* for reconstructing the status of Epicurean philosophy at Rome, see, e.g., Griffin [1989: 36]. On Philodemus' philosophy see, among many others in a growing body of scholarship, De Lacy [1941: 56–57], Asmis [1991b, 1995], Gigante [1992], Obbink [1995], and Fitzgerald et al. [2004]. For the possibility that a text of *DRN* itself was part of the Villa of the Papyri collection by the time of Vesuvius' eruption in 79 CE, see Kleve [1989, 1991], whose proposals to this effect have not however been universally accepted, cf. Capasso [2003: 85–101]. Regarding the influence of Philodemus on Horace's *Sermones* and *Epistulae*, see Armstrong [1993] and Kemp [2010].

138], it is possible to find certain noteworthy resemblances between the two poets, as Kenney points out [1970: 380], and perhaps even to see mockery of the Catullan poet-lover in the *exclusus amator*, the shut-out lover, of the Lucretian assault on sexual passion and foibles (*DRN* 4.1177).¹⁴ But more important is whether *DRN* draws, like Catullus' poetry does, on Hellenistic or Callimachean poetics. Epicurus was a Hellenistic philosopher, after all, and, as Kenney rhetorically asks, “[c]ould some one so steeped in Hellenistic philosophy have been oblivious of Hellenistic literature?” [1970: 369]. For Kenney, this answer was “no,” and many scholars agree with Kenney’s contention that *DRN* does engage in a significant way with Hellenistic poetics.¹⁵ Knox [1999], however, offers a minority dissent, suggesting that what Kenney takes to be Callimachean programmatic statements (such as the untouched fountains of the Muses at 1.927 = 4.2) are in fact merely poetic commonplaces available to a poet familiar only with Greek poetry from Homer to the end of the classical period.

Yet I would maintain that Kenney is correct to tie together the matter of poetry and the matter of philosophy. I see *DRN* as the product of an author who was familiar with poetic and philosophical traditions and trends alike. Although direct reference to Callimachus or another particular Hellenistic poet does not appear in the extant body of

¹⁴ Brown points out that the word *exclusus* “in amatory contexts is almost a technical term for the lover’s rejection,” not only in Roman elegy postdating *DRN* but also in the earlier Roman comedy of Plautus, Terence, and Afranius [1983: 298 *ad loc.*]. Brown additionally makes a number of connections in theme, sources, and content between *DRN*’s passage on love and sex and the poetry of Catullus [1983: 74, 132, 250, and especially 139–143], without taking a definitive stance on a direct relation [1983: 140–144]. Gale argues for direct influence in both directions, Catullus’ poetry on *DRN* and vice versa [2007: 69–70]; for an example of where Catullus arguably alludes to Lucretius, see Skinner [1976].

¹⁵ Gale, for instance, finds that the purple passage on the Lucretian *ego*’s poetic production (*DRN* 1.926–950 = 4.1–25) is “rich in Callimachean imagery” [1991: 421].

Epicurus' own writings, Epicurus and his followers did discuss poetry and its role in the idealized Epicurean society, and so we may judge that a poet preparing to write about the teachings of Epicurus—and claiming to derive his knowledge directly from that philosopher, not from any intermediary source—would consider it appropriate to be familiar as well with at least some of the poetic literature produced in the same language and in the same period. Ferrero [1949] furthermore draws extensive connections between *DRN* and the “new poetry,” the Neotericism contemporary with Lucretius, a literary movement that pulls from Hellenistic poetic sources and of which Catullus' own poetry was an important part. Finally, *DRN* can be shown to refer intertextually to a number of literary predecessors, from Ennius to Euripides: Gale [2007] is now the strongest statement of this position, and forcefully (and in my opinion persuasively) argues that *DRN* is as much in command of the poetic tradition that it inherits as are Vergil and Ovid.

Thus, in my view, *DRN* is in contact with Hellenistic poetics as well as Hellenistic philosophy, and likewise with contemporary Roman poetics as well as earlier Hellenistic poetry and philosophy. I also believe that *DRN* is in contact as well with contemporary philosophy—namely with the rivalry at Rome (and in Athens) between Epicureanism and Stoicism, another vexatious consideration in Lucretian scholarship. Although the philosophical fight was not merely between Stoics and Epicureans, but in fact between several competing schools of thought including Academics and Skeptics and Cynics, most scholarly attention has been directed specifically towards Epicureans and Stoics. The question is twofold: is the intellectual viewpoint of *DRN* isolated from contemporary Epicurean philosophy and based exclusively on the work of the master Epicurus himself?

And does *DRN* engage with Stoic philosophy even though there is no explicit reference in the poem to Stoicism or to named Stoic philosophers?

The long-held scholarly *communis opinio* was that the philosophical subject position given voice in *DRN* was that of a “lone wolf” secluded from contemporary Epicureans, but there has been a great number of dissenting perspectives, especially since the 1980s.¹⁶ On the one hand, as Sedley [1998: chh. 3–5] argues, *DRN* may be based primarily (or, in Sedley’s estimation, solely) on a single tract of Epicurus, namely *On Nature* (Περὶ φύσεως), to the exclusion of more recent developments by Epicurean philosophy postdating the school’s founder himself.¹⁷ On the other hand, it is possible to identify meaningful connections between *DRN* and the Epicurean philosophical activity in contemporary Campania—so Dorandi [1997]—and even the texts of Philodemus himself, as Kleve [1997] claims. I would posit simply that reliance principally on a seminal text of Epicurus does not prevent *DRN*’s making reference to more recent developments in Epicurean philosophy. At the same time, the present state of knowledge of Roman-era Italian Epicureanism may be too limited in scope for a conclusive answer to the question.

Where we do, I believe, find more certain evidence that *DRN* should not be considered a “lone wolf” text is in the issue of its treatment (or non-treatment) of the Stoics.

¹⁶ The term “lone wolf” is from Kenney [1971: 14]. Clay also has supported this perspective [1983: 196–197], as has Schrijvers [2007: 52], though it has been rejected to varying degrees by De Lacy [1948: 19, 23], Asmis [1982], Kleve [1989, 1991, 1997], Dorandi [1997], and Lévy [2003: 52–53], among others.

¹⁷ Though see Gottschalk [1996] for one example of where *DRN* itself appears to proffer an innovation to add to the philosophy of Epicurus, an example that Sedley attempts to refute [1998: 71 n. 47], in my view unpersuasively. Likewise see Clay [1983: 35, 169–191] on *DRN*’s philosophical originality and Konstan [2006: 599–600] on its limits; Rider offers persuasive evidence that the portrayal of animal sacrifice in *DRN* constitutes a rejection of Epicurean orthodoxy that views such sacrifice as a socially constructive good [2011: ch. 1].

Sedley rejects the persistent notion that *DRN* subtly or backhandedly addresses its Stoic opposition and finds unconvincing all prior proposals for Lucretian allusion to Stoicism [1998: ch. 3]. So, in Sedley’s formulation, Lucretius is an Epicurean “fundamentalist,” and since Epicurus himself did not respond to Stoics in *DRN*’s sole source-text Περὶ φύσεως, *DRN* therefore does not respond to Stoics either. Yet many other scholars writing both before and after Sedley have found allusions to elements of Stoic ideology in, for instance, the refutation of Heraclitus, the terms *inanis*, *stulti*, and *stolidi* (the latter two are possibly punning pointers to the name “Stoic”) in reference to the philosophically or scientifically misguided, and finally the gentle mockery of Heracles at *DRN* 5.23.¹⁸

Responding to Sedley, Campbell [1999] suggests, in my view profitably, that *DRN*’s “failure to become involved in detailed arguments with the Sceptics and Stoics over their attacks on Epicurean theory...may only indicate that there is little place for them in a cosmological didactic poem.” In other words, explicit squabbles with rival

¹⁸ Heraclitus: Bailey remarks that the Lucretian speaker “seems to have had in mind the Stoics more than Heraclitus himself” [1947: 711 *ad* 1.635–704]. The misguided *inanes* and so forth: cf. Piazzzi [2005: 28–30, 90–91]. Heracles: the proposition is made by Rouse & Smith [1975: 381 n. d *ad* 5.23]. Warren, speaking more generally, splits the Gordian knot by stating that “if our interests are primarily philosophical then Lucretius’ intent in writing a particular passage matters little...[W]e are at liberty to put Lucretius in discussion with Stoic philosophy ourselves” [2007: 24]. I am inclined to agree. I do not see *DRN* as the product of a “lone wolf” poet or a “lone wolf” philosopher, hence I consider it more productive to evaluate *DRN* embedded in its cultural (and literary and intellectual) context than to consider it in isolation.

So also would *DRN*’s readership have been at liberty to find Stoicism in the underbrush of Lucretius’ poem. As Warren continues, “[s]ome readers [of *DRN*] may miss the heated tone of inter-school debate of this period...But the *DRN* is not that kind of work” [2007: 24–25]. Warren additionally proposes that *DRN*’s attacks on three Presocratic philosophers serve as general refutations of three categories of philosophical approach, not merely particular invective against a specific Presocratic or a specific contemporary rival school such as the Stoics [2007: 26–28]. See further arguments for reading Stoics into the text by Packman [1975–1976], Asmis [1982], Brown [1983: 147 n. 9], Harrison [1990], Schmidt [1990], Lévy [1999], and Fowler [2000c].

schools may not fit well with the epic scope and high tone that *DRN*'s speaker adopts and affects, and so their absence from the poem can be taken as a sign not of ignorance of the Stoics or other rivals but rather of disdain or casual disregard for their intricacies.¹⁹ I would tentatively add that we may find some value in the notion that *DRN* in fact is deliberately ambiguous on the matter of engaging the Stoics—that this question is actually directed at the reader, and potentially complicates the reception of the Lucretian speaker's message.

Even more complicated and contentious is the last element of *DRN*'s intellectual context that I will take up: its readership, its intended audience. Here the issue divides into three sub-questions: is *DRN* a literarily learned or unlearned poem? What is the social status of the intended audience? And does *DRN* target someone completely unfamiliar with philosophy, or rather a reader with some degree of familiarity with Epicureanism specifically, or with the various philosophical traditions more generally? The first inquiry, concerning whether *DRN* is unlearned, I pass over, since I have already sided with scholars (such as O'Hara [1998: 70], Minyard [1985: 28 n. 14; 37; 78], or Gale [2007], for example) who find *DRN* to be very much in touch with contemporary literary trends against those like, e.g., Knox [1999: 276] who reject the idea that *DRN* is learned in the same respect as Catullus and other contemporary Neoterics.²⁰ To some extent, a more poetically learned *DRN* implies a more restrictive audience, since learned poetry calls for learned readers, but the content of *DRN* is not so obscured by stylistic refinement as to

¹⁹ Cf. also Griffin [1989: 13]: “[t]here is also ample evidence for Romans maintaining that philosophical problems and controversies should not be taken too seriously.”

²⁰ Cf. also Kenney's statement that “*D.R.N.* is a poem in the fullest sense: a literary production belonging in a literary tradition and written in a complete awareness of the laws and conventions shaping that tradition” [1971: 14].

prevent its comprehension and appreciation by readers unaware of the multiple poetic traditions with which the poem engages.

When it comes to the class or social status of the Romans who form the notional audience of *DRN*, two basic opinions have been expressed. First is the idea that, in Minyard's formulation, "the *De Rerum Natura* is nothing if not an oligarchic poem" [1985: 45]—that is, directed to the attention and concerns of the Roman aristocracy, the *nobiles*.²¹ The opposing opinion, expressed by, e.g., Howe [1948], is that *DRN* was designed to be inclusive of and appealing to a less-well educated group of *nouveau riche*—like Roman citizens who had made their fortunes as part of the Roman army or through trade, and who were not familiar already with Greek philosophies or with the Greek literary tradition more generally.²² Sedley, as well, posits a readership that knows some Greek but is not a part of the philhellenic literati of elite Rome [1999: 244], while Wiseman posited a Lucretius who was a wage-earner writing for a divided audience.²³

Now, at the most basic level, we can I believe say with certainty that *DRN*'s intended audience would have been restricted to a relatively small subsection of Roman society—namely, those who either could read (and afford access to a written copy of

²¹ So also Momigliano [1941: 151], Taylor [1949: 96], Maslowski [1974: 76], Cabisius [1979: 247], Dalzell [1982: 36; 1996: 46–51], Gale [1994a: 89], Schrijvers [2007: 62–63], and Crawley [1963: 5–6]:

The field of Epicureanism was universal. Lucretius' horizon was narrower. He restricted the field of his evangelistic mission to his own countrymen, and among his own countrymen mainly to the aristocracy. He had less need, and felt less obligation, to appeal to the masses.

²² Howe [1957] also proposes that *DRN* was written for readers in Roman *municipia*, towns outside Rome.

²³ Wiseman [1974], in a biographical essay received rather dismissively, cf., e.g., Betensky [1980].

DRN) or who would have been able to gain entry to a *recitatio* of the poem, if indeed such performances of Lucretius' work ever took place. But within this subset, I see neither a resolution to the question of whether the intended audience was broad or narrow, nor a conclusive way to identify a narrower stratum of audience—rich or otherwise, well-educated or fresh from the field of battle, philhellenic or novice to Greek culture. While certain bits of Lucretian imagery may seem targeted to an upper echelon of the Roman ruling class, as with the speaker's mention in book 2 of "looking out at your legions" (*tuas legiones...cum uideas*, 40–41), these are far fewer than the examples drawn from everyday life, like those involving puddles (1.305–310), flocks (2.317–322), and laundry (6.470–475), examples accessible to essentially all Roman readers. And at any rate the average (literate) soldier would have no difficulty imagining himself surveying a legion even if he himself were not a commander.

More important is whether *DRN* addresses philosophical novices, or those well-trained in philosophy already.²⁴ Kenney notes an apparent contradiction in the basic status of *DRN* as a literary poem that claims to teach the fundamental precepts of Epicurean philosophy: "Lucretius wrote for cultivated readers, who must be prepared to take a

²⁴ The nominal or explicit addressee/dedicatee of *DRN*, Memmius, seems to have possessed the land in Athens where Epicurus' own house had stood, fallen into disrepair by Memmius' own time—and Memmius evidently was planning to demolish the structural remains, either out of dislike for Epicurus' more lasting philosophical legacy or merely from a less sinister disinclination to allow potentially profitable real estate lie fallow as a historical relic, cf. Griffin [1989: 16–17 and n. 27].

If Memmius was in fact hostile to the concerns of the adherents of Epicurus, then his place in *DRN* is as a resisting reader (see Fetterley [1979] for the term) whom the narrator must sway or (as Mitsis [1993] and Volk [2002a: 81] argue) browbeat into an acceptance of Epicurean principles. I discuss Memmius as addressee of *DRN* in more detail in chapter 2 (pp. 123–127, below), and see also an additional note on Memmius in this chapter (p. 31 n. 49, below).

good deal of trouble if they are to follow him, yet his approach...is the same as that of more popular philosophers” [1971: 17]. For some scholars, the intended audience of *DRN* was to be familiar already with at least some aspects of Epicurus’ core scientific beliefs—as Crawley puts it, “Lucretius is difficult. His argument makes considerable demands on the reader” [1963: 17]. For many others, *DRN* targets a less well-educated audience, one aided by the poem’s didactic pose and framework.²⁵ Warren posits a reader who is philosophically undeclared, as yet uninitiated into the teachings of one particular school [2007: 31], while Reinhardt [2002: 292], building on Kleve [1979], states that “*DRN* presupposes a reader who is a complete novice in Epicurean philosophy.”

In O’Hara’s estimation, *DRN* does not suggest a learned Epicurean audience, one thoroughly knowledgeable in philosophy: “the more learned modern scholars become in respect to Epicureanism, the more removed their experience of the poem becomes from that of the ordinary Roman reader of the poem.”²⁶ This point emblemizes the issue at hand: who in fact was the “ordinary Roman reader” of *DRN*? I believe that the matter is too complex for easy resolution based on the poem’s didactic stance or explanations of Epicurean fundamentals. From these observations we can gather that *DRN* is not primarily designed as a treatise such as those of Philodemus, expanding or rethinking the Epicurean body of philosophy—but we can arrive at the same conclusion by observing that it is a poem, not a straightforward prose essay or a Platonic-style dialogue, the two predominant media for hardcore philosophy after the time of the Presocratics. Without better

²⁵ E.g., Howe [1948], Wallach [1976: 6], and Roggen [2008: 548].

²⁶ O’Hara [2007: 61]—and further, “[n]othing about the *De Rerum Natura* suggests that Lucretius is preaching to the choir” [*ibidem*]. Compare also the “ordinary reader” to which Dalzell on occasion appeals [1996: 61, e.g.].

evidence, we are left, in my estimation, with *aporia*, and I suggest we embrace it, and conceive of *DRN*'s intended readership broadly. There is value in Lucretius' poem for the learned and unlearned alike, both for the Epicurean expert and for the philosophical novice. The latter can learn about Epicurus and his philosophy, can be initiated into new poetic ground, can learn the path to the good life. The former can derive pleasure in an Epicurean epic, can trace the literary heritage of the poem's images and style, can enjoy watching the fictive internal audience of the didactic as it struggles towards Epicurean ἀταραξία, freedom from anxiety—just as the Epicurean enjoys seeing trouble at sea from the shore in *DRN* book 2.

What is at stake here is how we ought to respond to certain problems in the interpretation of the poem, specifically the distortions of rival philosophies (as in the refutation of the Presocratics in *DRN* book 1—see my discussion of *DRN*'s “straw man” arguments in ch. 3, pp. 177–180, below) and the occasional conflict between *DRN*'s account of Epicurean thought and other evidence for the contemporary state of Epicurean scholarship, conflicts that in Sedley's view prove that *DRN* is a product of Epicurean “fundamentalism” [again 1998: ch. 3]. If we take the poem's intended audience to be narrowly those new to Epicurean philosophy—those who have encountered neither the tough Greek of Philodemus nor the introductory Latin prose tracts of Amafinius, Catus, or others—then these distortions are unfair polemical tactics from an unreliable didact, and the discrepancies with contemporary Epicureanism are the work indeed of a fundamentalist, a lone wolf, or else an unserious philosopher. But if we include a wider range of philosophical backgrounds in the poem's desired readership, then the inconsistencies between what the poem says and what external testimonia show may be seen instead as

thought-provoking quirks, as an interpretive gap that draws the attentive and informed reader into active engagement with the poem's didactic plot, and calls attention as well to its very literariness, its purpose beyond being a mere primer on Epicureanism.²⁷

In other words, I suggest that *DRN* functions as more than one kind of didactic simultaneously. Effe schematized a typology of ancient didactic [1977: *passim*, esp. pp. 26–39] based on a poem's "Stoff," or nominal/express subject matter, and its "Thema," its true subject or theme.²⁸ Where Stoff and Thema are identical, the didactic is "ideal" or "sachbezogen," as in a standard modern Latin grammar textbook (or, in Effe's estimation, Manilius' *Astronomica*). Where a poem's Stoff is subordinated to a different or broader Thema—as in Vergil's *Georgics*, where scholarly consensus holds that the supposed poetic handbook on farming in fact carries an allegorical or metapoetic or otherwise metaphorical message greater in scale than agriculture alone—the term is "transparent." And when both Stoff and Thema are subordinate to concerns of style, aesthetics, or poetic art (as in Nicander's *Alexipharmaca*, a kind of poetic showpiece on the topic of snake venoms), the didactic is "formal."²⁹

Effe categorizes *DRN* as "sachbezogen," and Dalzell agrees: "the poem must be included in the class of didactic works which take their message seriously" [1996: 70].

²⁷ Cf. Dalzell's point that "[a] didactic poem always implies two kinds of reader: the immediate pupil to whom the poem is addressed and the true reader to whom this sophisticated kind of poetry will appeal" [1996: 50]. For the term "didactic plot," which refers to the development of the teaching scenario implied by a didactic poem's progression, see Fowler [2000a].

²⁸ As Volk [2002a: 4] points out, a major problem with this typology is its reliance, at least as originally formulated, on an assertion of the author's intention—and intentionality is a difficult thing to access from the text alone.

²⁹ Heath combines "sachbezogen" and "transparent" didactic into the category "final" didactic and renames "formal" didactic "purely formal" [1985: 254 n. 31].

Volk prefers to avoid questions of intention and adopts instead the “empirical” model [2002a: 41] of the 10th-century Peripatetic/pseudo-Aristotelian epitome called *Tractatus Coislianus*, which distinguishes between didactic (or παιδευτική) poetry that is “instructional” or “practical” (ὕφηγητική) and didactic that is “theoretical” (θεωρητική). Vergil’s *Georgics* would thus be “instructional,” as the subject of its didaxis is a “how-to” of farming, and *DRN*’s laying out of the Epicurean cosmological system would be “theoretical.” Whereas Dalzell, Effe, and many others focus on Lucretius’ poem as sachbezogen or ideal or theoretical or final didaxis—in other words, they take *DRN* as primarily a teaching text intended to persuade or convert its readers—I believe that the poem is just as much an instance of formal didactic, one whose purpose is artistic and poetic rather than simply to teach a praxis or a principle. Indeed, Lucretius’ Epicurean contemporary Philodemus himself viewed the didactic role of poetry as a formal one, too: “[t]hat poetry is only an *imitation* of didactic speech—not really didactic, but needing to *appear* to convey information of some kind—is a point on which Philodemus is prepared to insist in some detail.”³⁰

The all-inclusive target audience I advocate for *DRN* is similar to an audience that Cicero’s *ego* claims for his own literary and philosophical work, in contradistinction to the intended audience of the satirist Lucilius. According to Cicero’s *De Oratore*, “Gaius Lucilius, a learned and thoroughly sophisticated man, used to say that he wanted the things he’d written to be read neither by the very unlearned nor by the very learned, be-

³⁰ Armstrong [1993: 224; emphasis preserved]. Cf. Volk [2002a: 63], referring to *DRN*, Vergil’s *Georgics*, Ovid’s *Ars Amatoria* and *Remedia Amoris*, and Manilius’ *Astronomica*: “[o]n the whole, the Latin works in question, for all their poetic self-consciousness, do not show themselves to be particularly aware of being specifically didactic poetry,” and Toohey [1996: 2–5].

cause the one group would understand nothing, and the other group would perhaps understand more than he himself did” (2.25: *C. Lucilius, homo doctus et perurbanus, dicere solebat ea quae scriberet neque se ab indoctissimis neque a doctissimis legi uelle, quod alteri nihil intellegerent, alteri plus fortasse quam ipse*). This middle road is what *DRN*’s intended readership looks like if the audience is made up of novices, of those unfamiliar with Epicurean philosophy. The very unlearned cannot follow the sometimes difficult argumentation and concepts of the philosophy, and the very learned could find fault with the distortions and discrepancies I mentioned above.

By contrast, the Ciceronian speaker elsewhere describes to his interlocutor Brutus an intended audience wider than the kind that he described for Lucilius:

nec uero, ut noster Lucilius, recusabo, quo minus omnes mea legant. utinam essent ille Persius, Scipio uero et Rutilius multo etiam magis, quorum ille iudicium reformidans Tarentinis ait se et Consentinis et Siculis scribere. facete is quidem, sicut alia; sed neque tam docti tum erant, ad quorum iudicium elaboraret...ego autem quem timeam lectorem, cum ad te ne Graecis quidem cedentem in philosophia audeam scribere?

(*De Finibus* 1.7–8)

And indeed I will not, like our dear Lucilius, shrink back from having everyone read my writings. If only that Persius were around, and much more indeed Scipio and Rutilius, whose judgment he [Lucilius] feared and said instead he was writing for people in Tarentum and Consentia and Sicily. Of course he was speaking humorously, as elsewhere—but also people for whose judgment he was toiling were not so learned.... Yet I, whom should I fear as a reader, when I dare to write to you, a person second not even to the Greeks in philosophy?

For the late Republican author of philosophy and poetry, in this passage, the age is literate and sophisticated—sophisticated enough, by the way, to perceive that the Lucilian *ego* who claims to fear the judgment of learned men is not necessarily speaking in earnest—and a portion of Roman readers of the day can compete with Greeks in philosophi-

cal erudition.³¹ Cicero's speaker embraces the audience Lucilius picked for himself, but adds on the *doctissimi* as well. This broadly defined aspirational readership is what I believe is most profitable for the readership of *DRN*, the construction most productive for the interpretation of the poem on both literary and philosophical levels. And if indeed, as seems likely, the tantalizing reference to a certain Lucretius in one of Cicero's letters is in fact a valid testimonium for our poem,³² then we have evidence that one of the Romans most learned of all time in philosophy, Cicero himself, no novice to Epicurean doctrine, formed part of *DRN*'s original audience.

Satire: genre and mode

This study approaches Lucretian connections to satire from two angles: genre and mode. By "genre" I mean that I will pay careful attention to the interaction between *DRN* and the specific texts of the Roman genre of verse satire, Ennius and Lucilius through Juvenal. In Culler's formulation, "genres are not special varieties of language but sets of expectations which allow sentences of a language to become signs...in a second-order literary system. The same sentence can have a different meaning depending on the genre

³¹ I thank Caroline B. Bishop for drawing these two passages, and their connection to Cicero's own foray into didactic (*Aratea*), to my attention.

³² *Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem* 2.9.3: *Lucreti poemata, ut scribis, ita sunt multis luminibus ingenii, multae etiam artis*, "Lucretius' poetic work, just as you write, has many flashes of talent/genius/character, and also of great skill," with, among others, Sandbach [1940], Pizzani [1959: 38–40], and Clay [1969: 31–32].

in which it appears.”³³ Roman satire possesses a set of expectations of this kind, and Roman satire’s constituents are linked particularly by common and recurrent generic tropes, as we will see throughout chapter 5. Ancient boundaries of genre furthermore tended to be more firmly defined, with the *satura* of Juvenal and his predecessors standing distinct from, for instance, the epic of Vergil’s *Aeneid* or the bucolic of his *Eclogues*, even though all three use the same dactylic hexameter verse form. Whereas modern conceptions of genre, like that of Culler, can allow for a wide range of texts and characteristics to fall under a single rubric, for our purposes the “genre” of satire will remain fixed and closed.³⁴

By “satiric mode,” on the other hand, I refer to the less formally delimited set of satiric tools and techniques that characterizes satirists and satiric figures from Archilochus and Aristophanes to Jonathan Swift. Rosen, who discusses satiric figures in Homer, Callimachus, and a variety of other Greek and Roman poets, describes satire as “a fundamentally comic mode,” one based on humorous mockery and comedic attack [2007: 246–247]. The “mode” of satire consists both of the complex and often ambiguous subjectivity with which the satiric *ego* is constructed and also of the techniques and strategies exploited by poets of mockery. In this sense, the satiric mode is a set of tools that an

³³ Culler [1980: 116]. We might think, for instance, of how the epic Vergilian phrase “this is the task, this the toil” (*Aeneid* 6.129: *hoc opus, hic labor est*) is transfigured in meaning when placed in the elegiac/amatory pseudo-didactic context of Ovid’s *Ars Amatoria* (1.453).

³⁴ Rosen distinguishes between “inductive” and “deductive” conceptions of genre: inductive methods draw their definitions of a genre from specific texts, whereas a deductive approach searches for an abstraction that is “conceptually prior” to particular aspects of specific works [2007: 13]. Roman *satura*, therefore, is an inductively delineated genre, while my own project of investigating the connections between *DRN* and *satura* is, in these terms, deductive. Rosen discusses these issues further [2007: 13–14 and n. 17], with citations to relevant theoretical work on genre.

author uses to accomplish certain objectives within the larger work as a whole. Catullus, for example, is not a satirist *per se*, but his use of comic mockery—his occasional function as a satiric poet—plays part of his wider poetic program. Works that are not to be classified generically as satire can thus nevertheless use the mode of satire, and likewise the genre of satire frequently—but not always—employs the mode of satire.

I note that this distinction, which is what I will use for my inquiries in the following chapters, is not clear-cut or undisputed. In fact, the bibliography on whether satire generally (not only in Greek and Roman literature) should be considered a mode, a genre, or some other phenomenon is extensive and disunified.³⁵ Simpson posits a cross-temporal analysis of satire neither as a mode or as a genre but instead as a “discourse” or “discursive practice”—that is, “as a level of language organization that supersedes that of the sentence and...as a type of meaning potential that arises out of the interaction between text and context” [2003: 1]. This view of satire, in contradistinction to more conventional mechanisms of evaluation based on text types (genres) or stylistic registers (modes), encompasses a literary phenomenon wherein some aspect of the text’s cultural setting engenders “disapprobation” in the text’s “producer,” the satirist [8]. A variety of satiric events can fall under this conception of satire, even nonstandard texts or “everyday

³⁵ I offer a few representative examples. Satire as mode: Paulson [1967], Bloom & Bloom [1979], Griffin [1994], and Connery & Combe [1995b: 9]: “in general usage, ‘satire’ remains less an identifiable genre than a mode.” As genre: Frye [1957: 223–239, 309–314], Kernan [1959], and Guilhamet [1987]. Others reject the mode-or-genre debate in favor of a thematic approach—e.g., Carretta [1983] and Nokes [1987].

For an extensive annotated bibliography, see Lynch [1995], in addition to Nilsen [1987]. See also the overview provided by Simpson [2003: 51–53].

humour practices” [5], and a text’s engaging in the discourse of satire is not exclusive of engagement in other discourses [7].³⁶

When limited to ancient Greek and Roman works, satire is, in my estimation, somewhat easier to conceptualize, especially given the possibility of division between the broader category of mode and the more restrictive subset of Roman satire. The latter, the genre of *satira*, is not without complications—Freudenburg has called Roman satire an “anti-genre” [2001: 1, cf. pp. 26–27] and Habinek notes that “Roman satire describes itself as play more often than it describes itself as satire” [2005: 177], a fact that may indicate a functional rather than a generic view of *satira* among the satirists themselves. But we can see a qualitative distinction between what I am identifying as generic works of satire and other works that employ the mocking invective characteristic to the mode of satire but are not themselves part of the genre, as when for instance Horace makes a firm division between his *Epodes* and his satire (his *Sermones*):

denique non omnes eadem mirantur amantque;
carmine tu gaudes, hic delectatur iambis,
ille Bioneis sermonibus et sale nigro.
tres mihi conuiuiae prope dissentire uidetur,
poscentes uario multum diuersa palato.

(*Epist.* 2.2.58–62)

Furthermore, not everyone admires and loves the same things. *You* might enjoy (my) odes, *this* guy may take pleasure in (my) iam-bics, *that* guy perhaps in (my) conversation/satire and in (my) dark wit. It seems to me almost like three dinner companions having an argument, as they’re asking for quite different things because of their dissimilar tastes.³⁷

³⁶ For further discussion, see Simpson [2003: 69–110, 211–220].

³⁷ Cf. Brink [1982: *ad loc.*], Mankin [1987], and *Epist.* 1.19.23–34.

His *Epodes*, “iambics,” are separated from his *Sermones*, “conversations” or “satires,” not only in meter (epodic iambs as opposed to satire’s dactylic hexameters) but in taste, in nutritive or poetic content. Whereas some scholars writing previously on *DRN* and satire have looked at satire as a functional or modal phenomenon,³⁸ I will combine both approaches, and examine not only how *DRN* is “satiric” in its use of the satiric mode but also how it is affected by and itself affects the tradition of the Roman genre of *satura*.

Of what, then, does the genre of satire consist? The scholarly consensus includes the fragmentary corpus of Lucilius (2nd century BCE), the two books of *Sermones* by Horace (35–30 BCE), the six satires with preface of the Neronian author Persius (mid/late-1st century CE), and the hefty collection of Juvenal’s satires (early 2nd century CE).³⁹ Additionally, I side with those scholars who include before Lucilius the fragments of *Saturae* by Ennius. Although the poetry is very poorly understood on account of the paucity of lines surviving, it contains enough in common with Lucilius—and the generic rules of *satura* were in Ennius’ time non-existent—so that I believe it merits inclusion.⁴⁰ I remain agnostic on the suggestions by Flintoff that Naevius [1988] and Pacuvius [1990] may have written satire too, since at any rate there are not sufficient fragments of their potentially satiric works to enable serious consideration in this study.

A final note is in order here, on the matter of “diatribe.” This term has been applied by modern scholars to a purported Greek genre of popular philosophy—the rants

³⁸ Waltz, for example, states that for *DRN* satire is a medium, not an object: “[l]a satire pour Lucrèce n’est pas un but, un objet propre: c’est un moyen, mais c’est un moyen de choix, pour lequel il possède un don irrécusable” [1949: 102].

³⁹ I pass over for the purposes of this study the prosimetric satire of Varro (*Saturae Menippeae*, cf. p. 199 n. 2, below). And the satiric novel *Satyrica* of Petronius.

⁴⁰ I defend this decision more fully in chapter 4 (pp. 207–208 and n. 19, below).

and raves of so-called “street philosophers”—and is epitomized by Bion of Borysthenes.⁴¹ The concept of Greek philosophical diatribe has occasioned a sizable amount of comment by interpreters of *DRN*, particularly Vallette [1940], Lavagnini [1947], Ferrero [1949: 31–33, 136, 142], Conte [1965, 1966], and Kenney [1971: 17–20, 212]. Wallach explains the refutation of the fear of death, at *DRN* 3.830–1094, as “a diatribe in poetic form” [1976: 106] and argues at length for “diatribal” source for almost every aspect of this passage [1976: *passim*], and indeed the passage is now commonly invoked as a “diatribe on the fear of death.”⁴² But as the debate between Jocelyn and Gottschalk has indicated, the “genre” of diatribe is arguably illusory, the Greek term διατριβή means “way to spend time” or “discourse,” and so claims for a “diatribal” origin of *DRN*’s attack on fears of mortality are unfounded.⁴³ So also, more recently, has the connection between Roman satire and “diatribe” been reconsidered. Whereas the philosophical elements of Horace’s *Sermones* and Persius’ satire have previously been seen as signs of (or allusions to) street-philosopher’s diatribe, the picture is now more complicated, as is evident in Freudenburg’s point that both authors’ seeming links to diatribe are problematic: “[d]iatribe’s trappings, for Persius (much as they were for Horace), are a holdover and a

⁴¹ For the notion of diatribe as a Roman literary form, see Oltramare [1926].

⁴² E.g., Toohey [1996: 102], Armstrong [2004: 21], Hopkins [2007: 239], or Hardie [2007: 125], quoted at p. 2, above; cf. similarly the appellation “diatribe against love” for the end of *DRN* book 4 used by, e.g., Hamilton [1993: 249], or Fowler’s term for *DRN* 2.34–36, “the diatribe against luxury” [2002: 108 *ad loc.*].

⁴³ Jocelyn [1982, 1983]; Gottschalk [1982, 1983]. For a more nuanced take on *DRN* and allegedly “diatribal” elements than that of Wallach, see Piazzi [2005: 16–19].

tease, for it is exactly when those trappings are most prominent...that this poet shows himself the least diatribal of all satirists.”⁴⁴

Perhaps we might consider diatribe (like one meaning of διατριβή) a discourse instead of a genre, in line with Simpson’s discourse model of satire. Diatribe as we may perceive it in Bion or in Horace’s *Sermones* is not a genre in and of itself, nor a register or mode, but rather a discursive response of the speaker (or producer) to a certain stimulus in the speaker’s cultural context. This position, I add, accounts for the practical definition of the term “diatribe” in modern usage—a speech-act, a discursive event, that can arise in almost any text or context and can co-exist with other literary discourses. Regardless, what I believe we should take from the de-emphasis of diatribe’s influence on Lucretius’ poem and on the Roman satirists is an invitation to consider more closely aligned the “diatribal” or satiric elements of *DRN* and those of the Roman genre of satire. If they cannot be drawing from a non-existent genre as a common source, then perhaps they are, as I will argue in chapters 4 and 5, interacting with each other more significantly and more substantively than has to date been acknowledged.

Methodological prolegomena

Two of the specific methodologies that most significantly inform my approach in this study are intertextuality and reader-response theory, and I cite relevant methodologi-

⁴⁴ Freudenburg [2001: 188, cf. p. 7]. I treat in detail the attack on the fear of death of *DRN* book 3 in chapter 2 (pp. 103–104 and 133–139, below).

cal scholarship when using theoretical terminology or techniques throughout the chapters that follow. Important publications on *DRN* and these methods include Clay on “Lucretius and His Reader” [1983: 212–266] and Rumpf on Lucretian intertexts and allusion [2003: ch. 2]. Of note is the question of first and second readings of the poem. On the one hand, *DRN*’s surprising conclusion with the destructive plague of Athens can seem to invite the reader to revisit or reread the poem in part or in its entirety, as Segal has argued.⁴⁵ But on the other hand, the extent to which second readings of texts such as Lucretius’ were common, desired, or even possible in the ancient world is unclear, and the poem’s speaker presents it as one that is to educate the newcomer to Epicurean philosophy in an appealing literary format, not to reward the literati who take the time to read and reread and rehash the work. At different points, I believe, it is useful to view the work through the differing lenses of the first reader and the second reader:⁴⁶ just as there is value in considering how the poem may have operated for the philosophically advanced and the philosophically naïve historical reader, so also it is worthwhile to examine aspects of Lucretius’ verse both from the viewpoint of a fresh reader and from our own perspective, conditioned by multiple interactions with *DRN* and the other components of its intellectual constellation.

Throughout this study I refer not to what “Lucretius” does or says but to what the “Lucretian *ego*” or “*DRN*’s narrator” or “Lucretius’ speaker” does and says. In doing so, I embrace the interpretive framework currently in use for scholarship on Roman elegy,

⁴⁵ Segal [1990: ch. 10]. See my discussion of the end of *DRN* book 6 in chapter 3 (pp. 189–192, below).

⁴⁶ On the first- and second-reader subject positions, see Solomon [2004], cf. Winkler [1985: 10].

Roman satire, and Greek lyric, namely a distinct separation between author and speaker, such as between Propertius the elegist and “Propertius” the poet-lover who narrates Propertius’ elegies.⁴⁷ And I reject the traditional manner of conflating Lucretius the author of *DRN* with the unnamed speaker who advocates adoption of Epicurean philosophy, a conflation exemplified by the long-held and now-vitiated conception of a poetic “Anti-Lucretius” disrupting the philosophy of the Epicurean “Lucretius.”⁴⁸ My position is similar to Clay’s argument that “the distinction between [the historical] Gaius Memmius L. f. and the reader implied in the poem is crucial”⁴⁹—in both cases, the historical figure is kept separate from the fictional identity that plays an important role within the poem. Rosen discusses the difficulty of separating poet from persona in literary genres outside of drama (where the fact of the theater usually, but not always, makes clear that the speaker is not to be identified with the playwright), because the speaker’s eponymity with

⁴⁷ In elegy scholarship, take for instance the formulation “the Propertian poet-lover” used by, among others, Ross [2010/1975: 49], James [2003: 285 n. 56], and Debrohun [1994; 2003: 179]. In satire, consider the term “the Horatian *ego*” of, e.g., Smith [2006: 433]. And for the phrase “the lyric ‘I,’ ” see Calame [2001/1977: 255–258].

⁴⁸ The concept of an “Anti-Lucrèce chez Lucrèce” derives from Patin [1900/1868]. Compare also the conceptual slippage inherent in Waltz’ description of Lucretius himself as a passionate logician who idolizes his master Epicurus: “Lucrèce est un logicien passionné. Il est si ardemment convaincu de posséder grâce à son maître—et à son idole—Épicure la vérité sur la Nature des choses...” [1949: 79].

⁴⁹ Clay [1983: 213], continuing: “for it allows us, as readers of the poem, to abandon the enchantments of Clio for the instruction of Calliope...[and] to see Lucretius’ poem as part of an ancient poetic tradition” [*ibidem*], cf. also Rumpf [2003: 19] and, arguing against Clay’s firm separation, Mitsis [1993: 124 n. 21]: “[i]t is surely too simplistic merely to identify ‘Memmius’ with C. Memmius—but it would be equally odd for Lucretius to choose ‘Memmius’ as his addressee if he wished to avoid any slippage between his literary creation and historical reality.” Contrast Dalzell [1996: 51]: “[t]he character of Memmius in the *De rerum natura* is part of the fiction of the poem.” I return to Mitsis’ broader argument on the Memmius character in chapter 2 (pp. 123–127, below).

the author encourages identification of the one with the other.⁵⁰ Yet as careful and critical readers of Graeco-Roman poetry, as readers broadly aware of the poetic connections of antiquity—conventions that, as Rosen himself demonstrates [2007: ch. 7], dictated an awareness that a poet’s speaker should not be read onto the poet himself—we can and should, I believe, discuss *DRN* with the separation between Lucretius and Lucretian *ego* in place.

Overview of this study

The next four chapters fall into two groups: chapters 2 and 3 consider *DRN*’s use of the mode of satire, while chapters 4 and 5 address its relationship to the Roman verse genre. Chapter 2 focuses on the stance of the satirist, and the manifold ways in which *DRN*’s speaker adopts this stance. Satirists combine a claim of moral high ground with statements and implications that may undercut their supposed superiority—and so too, at times, does the Lucretian *ego*. Chapter 3 turns to the broader features of satire, especially the issue of didactic tension in satire. Most satire claims to offer instructions or advice, but in doing so well, satire (like other, more serious instantiations of didaxis) may sow the seeds of its own irrelevancy, as the satiric audience, once properly educated, will no longer need the teachings that satire advertises. At the same time, while engaging in supposedly straightforward moral didaxis, satire creates straw-man arguments to further its

⁵⁰ Rosen [2007: 220–223, 246], and also Rudd [1976: 175–181], Clay [1983: 212–225], and Volk [2002a: 10–13; 2010: 130].

goals, and thus can call into question the validity of what it advocates and what it disparages; this issue of satiric straw-man arguments can help explain why the Lucretian refutation of Presocratic philosophy, particularly that of Anaxagoras, distorts or even appears to “get wrong” the basic principles and arguments of the philosophies it targets (cf. pp. 19–20, above).

In chapter 4, I look back from Lucretius’ poem to its satiric predecessors, at the allusions in *DRN* to earlier Roman satire—not only Lucilius’ extensive fragments but also the few remains of Ennius’ *Saturae*. These allusions are relatively numerous and significant, and one of their primary functions is to enable the Lucretian *ego* to co-opt the poetic authority of both earlier authors as well as the high social status possessed by the Lucilian satirist-figure, a status required for unfettered satiric production at Rome. Chapter 5 by contrast primarily looks forward to the major surviving works of Roman *satura*, the verses of Horace, Persius, and Juvenal. *DRN* participates in the employment of many of the same generic tropes and *topoi* that are present in Roman satire and in some cases, I argue, affects Horace’s, Persius’, and Juvenal’s receptions of these commonplace topics. There is a generic interchange between philosophy and satire in Roman literature, and *DRN*’s philosophical takes on satire have substantial influence on later satire’s takes on philosophy.

A general conclusion wraps up my overall discussion and offers speculative suggestions about different kinds of potential audiences for the satiric element in Lucretius’ poem. Underpinning this study is an impression that *DRN* is more complicated, and thus less straightforwardly designed to convert the reader to Epicureanism or to stand unquestioned in the generic tradition of Greek and Roman epic, than it has seemed to be to ear-

lier scholars. In uncovering what I argue are systematic links between *DRN* and the mode and genre of satire, I do not make the simple claim that *DRN* is itself a work of satire, but neither do I accept wholesale the notion that the text of the poem gives voice directly to an author intending to advocate the philosophy of Epicurus to an audience both unfamiliar with and skeptical of the school's principles and precepts.

CHAPTER 2

The Satirist-Figure in the Mode of Satire and *DRN*

facit indignatio uersum
“Indignation makes the poetry...”
(Juvenal 1.79)

quod tamen a uera longe ratione repulsumst
“...which is nonetheless hurled far away from the true explanation.”
(*DRN* 1.880)

DRN engages more extensively with the mode and the genre of satire than has previously been recognized.¹ Although scholars have identified “satiric” elements of the poem, passages that sound “Lucilian” or that seem like “satire,”² there has not yet been a systematic survey of satire in the poem as a whole, rather than only in particular segments of the poem, like the attack on love and sex at the end of book 4. Moreover, studies of *DRN* and satire to date take for granted what “satiric” means, what satiric works do, and

¹ For the basic distinction between satire as mode and genre, see pp. 23–29, above.

² E.g., respectively, Murley [1939: 382–384, 386–390] and Dudley [1965], both discussed at pp. 2–5, above.

what characteristics the speakers of such works display. Scholars, in other words, have failed to set out explicitly how they define satire and satiric speech. In this chapter and the next, I pursue one building block of a more complete definition of satire and investigate the use, in Graeco-Roman poetry and in *DRN* specifically, of “satire” broadly construed, of satire in its capacity as a mode. In chapters 4 and 5, I investigate connections between *DRN* and the Roman genre of satire.

In each investigation, of satire as mode and as genre, we will consider two basic components: the satirist-figure and the shared textual and thematic characteristics that make up “satire.” It is possible to expand, refine, and complicate our understanding of the position of the speaker of *DRN* by comparing it to the position, as elucidated and analyzed in scholarship of the past decade or so, of the various *egos* of satiric works. As we will see, the Lucretian *ego* has much in common with the figure of the satirist, and this relationship should affect our reception of the text and our understanding of *DRN*’s readerships. The characteristics shared between *DRN*’s *ego* and the speaker-position of the Roman satirists will serve also as a starting point for investigation of the wider generic linkages between *DRN* and Roman satire in chapters 4 and 5. There are strong, pervasive connections between *DRN* and satiric works of Graeco-Roman literature, from poetics and matters of style to content and rhetorical approach. My study endeavors to situate the poem of Lucretius within the two satiric traditions, particularly in the satiric genealogy that can be traced from Ennius and Lucilius to Persius and Juvenal.

I begin with the broader notion of “satire” and move to the narrower: first the mode, then the Roman genre. Both paths entail synthesis of modern perspectives on the poetics and cultural work of ancient satiric literature, in order to paint a more unified pic-

ture of the satirist, and a clearer understanding of the dynamics of what we call “satire.” In this chapter, my inquiry will address three principal questions about the satiric speaker. First, how is the satirist characterized, and how does he (always he, almost without exception) characterize himself? Second, what does he do and say? Third, in what ways does he interact with others, and how does he position himself in relation to them? The results of these questions provide us with a synopsis of the ancient satirist that we can try to map onto *DRN*’s persona, in order to remark upon the overlaps and interrogate the discrepancies.

The scholarship on satiric elements in *DRN*, discussed in the introduction, regularly speaks about “satire” in unspecific ways, and sometimes without reference to the *ego* or “Lucretius the poet” in general. Such material thus often fits less with Roman satire than it does with the individual critics’ own notions of satire, and calls for reassessment of *DRN*’s broader use of the satiric mode. This reassessment forms the avenue of inquiry in chapter 3. Beyond the characteristics of the satirist, what constitutes satire? How can we more formally define the function of the satiric mode? In what passages does *DRN* employ such a mode, and can those satiric passages be seen to hold thematic weight in regard to the poem as a whole?

The position of the speaker in Graeco-Roman satiric poetry

Without restriction to particular authors or texts—without the limits of a genre, even a genre as slippery and self-problematizing as satire—the ways we conceive of the

satiric speaker can be unbounded and, consequently, vague. Some theorizing of the characteristics and techniques of the “satirist,” whomever we define the satirist to be, thus constitutes a necessary preliminary to this chapter’s undertaking. Satire, broadly construed, is productive of satirists: do we limit ourselves to those who explicitly call themselves satirists, like Juvenal or Jerry Seinfeld or Samuel Johnson, who defined satire expansively, as “a poem in which wickedness or folly is censured” [1768: *s.v.* “satire”], and who also himself wrote formal satire modeled on the works of Juvenal? Or do we instead take as a satirist the active initiator of any kind of “satiric” interaction, wherever one appears, be it Homer’s Odysseus or (at times³) Homer Simpson?

This wider sense of “satire” does not have a corresponding Greek or Roman term, since the Latin term *satira* is restricted to works of the specific genre that begins with Ennius and Lucilius. So we are left with the second option, the “satirist” as anyone who engages in satiric behavior. A defining quality of satiric behavior is mockery, especially comic mockery, and satiric poetry is thus poetry of aggression and personal attack. So any poetic work featuring such attacks presented in a comedic context can be considered satire, and the speaker of such a work can be considered a satirist.

The satiric speaker and poetic mockery

What unites satire across history is “aggressive criticism and ridicule of a victim or a target.” The speaker of satire is “a personalized comic voice, a poetic *ego* girded for

³ Cf. Janssen [2003].

verbal battle against a target.”⁴ This personal *ego* frequently adopts the identity of the author (e.g., Hipponax or Persius) and “employ[s] a subjective, putatively autobiographical, voice” that can lead a receptive reader to believe that the *ego* is not fictitious but real.⁵ An important effect of satire’s personal voice is the creation of a closeness between the speaker and the reader that the text constructs, and from such closeness there develops between speaker and reader a sense of collaboration against the target of the satiric mockery. A brief example: when the clever *ancilla* Pardalisca of Plautus’ *Casina* mocks the play’s other women characters in a private monologue delivered directly to the audience (775–779), she fosters an allegiance between herself and the play’s audience or readership. “[T]he satirist wants to establish himself in an intimate/collusive relationship with the audience, enlisting their sympathies for his cause and his stance of self-

⁴ Aggressive criticism and ridicule: Muecke [1985: 113]. Personalized comic voice: Rosen [2007: 3].

⁵ Rosen [2007: 246]; the book’s final chapter studies the often negative reception of Archilochus’ iambics and the pitfalls of autobiographical readings of satiric poetry. Autobiographical elements are in some works or passages de-emphasized; for instance, as Keane shows, Juvenal is “[t]he least autobiographical of the [Roman] satirists” [2002: 229–230]. Compare Barchiesi & Cucchiarelli: “Juvenal eliminates from his *Satires* all detailed references to his body and to his personal biography” [2005: 220], and Mayer [1989: 19]: “Like Persius, Juvenal does not use satire as a form of personal poetry.”

Rosen, however, maintains (in my view rightly) that “[s]atire always implies a personal voice, even when the form of presentation is oblique and appears distanced from an authorial *ego*” [2007: 68]. Cf. Eco [1992: 64] on “the intention of the text,” with Conte [1994], Hinds [1998: 47–51] on the idea that texts imply authorial subjectivity despite problems with the concept of authorial intent, and further Hinds [1998: 144]: “the self-fashioning, intention-bearing poet is a figure whom we ourselves read out from the text to test our readings in an interpretative move which is necessarily circular: yet the energy generated by this interpretative circulation is very real.” The problem of “intention” and classical texts is also discussed by Batstone [2005: 93–97], Farrell [2005], Porter [2005], and Kennedy [2005].

righteousness, and entertaining them with his humorous tropes.”⁶ The fictive reader takes part in the mockery by observing it,⁷ finds such mockery to be a source of comic entertainment, and thus becomes aligned with the satirist.

But in order for readers to appreciate and therefore go along with the mockery that they observe, the satirist must appear to be delivering his critical attacks from a position of some kind of moral superiority. A moral element is integral to satire and is a conventional part of what satire does.⁸ In Horace, for instance, the *ego* expresses his satiric objective as “telling the truth with a laugh” (*ridentem dicere uerum*, *Serm.* 1.1.24), a sentiment refigured in Persius as “grating on tender ears with biting truth” (*teneras mordaci radere uero | auriculas*, 1.107–108).⁹ “Truth,” in both cases, is a vague shorthand for uncovering the ills, flaws, hypocrisies that pervade the speaker’s poetic world. By finding

⁶ Rosen [2007: 71]. On the collusive aspect of the satirist-audience relationship throughout the history of satire, both ancient and modern, see Griffin [1994: 181–184], Bogel [2001: 13 and *passim*], Rosen [2007: 117 n. 1], and Simpson [2003: 85–90 and esp. 8]: the target of satire is “ex-colluded...not normally an ‘invited participant’ in the [satiric] discourse exchange, even though the target is what provides the initial impetus for satire.” Cf. also Griffin [1994: 167]: “We take pleasure in the witty re-creation of the satiric victim.”

⁷ Bogel describes this interaction between satirist, audience, and target of mockery in terms of a “triangle” [2002: 2]; so also Simpson [2003: 86].

⁸ Cf., e.g., Cloud [1989: 64]: “[t]he satirist purports to be a teacher of morality.” Moral improvement was a concern more broadly for Roman conceptions of poetry’s purpose, as Williams shows [1968: ch. 9].

⁹ For an analysis of how the programmatic statement in Persius poem 1 reconfigures those of Horace’s *Sermones*, see Keane [2006: 123]. Compare this programmatic statement to Persius 5.14–16: “[you, Persius, are] skilled at grating on failing character and skewering fault through clever play” (*pallentis radere mores | doctus et ingenio culpam defigere ludo*).

and telling “the truth,” it is claimed, the speaker can improve the moral situation of his world. In other words, this “truth”-telling is an essential function of satire.¹⁰

The moral stance alone, however, is not enough. Satirists must perform their moral stance in relation to—that is, in a status higher than—their targets. But often the satirist’s situation is presented in such a way that this superiority is uncertain or at risk. Bogel’s formulation of “the difference satire makes” is instructive here: “satirists identify in the world something or someone that is both unattractive and curiously or dangerously like them, or like the culture or subculture that they identify with...something, then, that is *not alien enough*” [2001: 41; emphasis preserved]. The act of satirizing is thus the making and reinforcing of difference or distance between satirist/society and not-alien-enough satiric object. This difference is otherness, and the target is to be scorned and spurned by the audience as repulsive, reprehensible, or (morally) base.¹¹ So for example the Horatian *ego* repeatedly works to differentiate the friendship to be had in Maecenas’ circle from, among others, grotesque buffoons (*Serm.* 1.5.51–69), class-conscious elites (1.6.49–55), and social ladder-climbing wannabes (1.9.42–53).¹² Aristophanes in *Birds* likewise uses a series of satiric caricatures to demarcate and exclude from his ideal πόλις the citizens whom he considers a threat to peace and tranquility. And Lucilius delegiti-

¹⁰ And not only of ancient satire. European authors of the late 19th century, for example, used satire in their moralizing critiques of their world, cf. Matz [2010: xiv]: “[s]atirical realism is a fundamentally moral kind of literature.”

¹¹ Mayer argues that Roman satire, in order to validate its own moral legitimacy, depends on the aristocracy: “[s]ociety is...the object of satire, but...a high-ranking portion of it sets the standard of behaviour and guarantees the satirist’s moral outlook as sound. The outlook is validated not because it is intellectually grounded...but because it is shared by the best people” [1989: 5].

¹² For a cautionary evaluation of continuity and contradiction within the poems of *Sermones* book 1, see Zetzel [1980: *passim*, esp. 69].

mizes his targets by placing them in the company of disgraceful and notoriously corrupt individuals.¹³

Righteousness indeed is integral to being a satirist, even if it is only self-righteousness. Because mockery without basis can fall flat with its audience—a blind man mocking a one-eyed woman because of her visual impairment is absurd, and American politicians who criticize “earmarks” that send funds to particular districts while they secure pork-barrel projects for their own constituencies descend into self-parody—the mocker must be deserving of the audience’s allegiance.¹⁴ As Plaza argues, “the satirist is not simply interested in deriding a particular object, but also has a separate interest in painting himself as a knight of justice” [2006: 56 n. 9]. The satirist needs to do so, I add, in order to command the allegiance with his readers that undergirds his moralistic, mocking critique. Hence the *ego* in Lucilius delivers his satire from the subject position of an independent Roman citizen whose poetic/satiric output is simply a product of his education and freedom of speech; hence the satiric “voice of the poet” in both Terence and

¹³ So Goldberg [2005: 160].

¹⁴ This is the premise of the joke at Juvenal 2.23–28:

loripedem rectus derideat, Aethiopem albus.
quis tulerit Gracchos de seditione querentes?
quis caelum terris non misceat et mare caelo
si fur displiceat Verri, homicida Miloni,
Clodius accuset moechos, Catilina Cethegum,
in tabulam Sullae si dicant discipuli tres?

It’s a straight-legged man who should be mocking a limping one, a white man who should be mocking an Ethiopian. Who could endure the Gracchi complaining about coups d’état? Who wouldn’t get the sky mixed up with the land, the sea with the sky, if Verres got bothered by a thief, Milo by a murderer, if Clodius took adulterers to court, or if Catiline hauled in Cethegus, or if Sulla’s three/triumviral students spoke against his proscription list?

Aristophanes presumes greater literary talent and quality than the literary critics and political opponents who comprise the targets of the satire. At its core, then, the self-righteousness of the satirist is a matter of poetic or literary authority.¹⁵ The figure that the reader is to favor should have claim to greater authority than the opposing entity does, and in situations of moral antagonism, such poetic authority arises out of the moral high ground.¹⁶

Indignation, specifically indignation at the target (as the satiric *ego* tends to claim), is the generative source of satire. Juvenal's phrasing, in the epigraph to this chapter, is archetypal: "indignation makes the poetry" (*facit indignatio uersum*, 1.79).¹⁷ Matz, arguing that the late 19th century fiction of Ibsen, Conrad, and others should be understood as a synthesis of realism and satire, identifies the basic traits of satire to be "[i]rreverent condemnation, scornful and profoundly angry censure" [2010: x]. Dessen points out Persius' adoption of "the pose of the angry young poet" in his first satire [1968: 18]—a pose that includes fiercely mocking his poetic contemporaries (1.1–7), their audiences (13–23), their poetic sensibilities (76–106), their literary critics (119–123), and people who themselves mock the Roman intelligentsia (123–134). Satirists'

¹⁵ Bogel, as well, finds the question of authority to "pass distancing—and necessary—judgments" a fundamental question for the identification and definition of the satirist [2001: 82].

¹⁶ Cf. Bakhtin [1984/1968: 12]: "The satirist whose laughter is negative places himself above the object of his mockery, he is opposed to it." Graf rejects this characterization as "too uniform" [2005: 204] because it does not work well for the *ego* of Horace's *Sermones*.

¹⁷ Rosen adds: "satirists generally do not present *themselves* as *gratuitously* rancorous or prone to excessive anger" [2007: 179; emphasis preserved], a modification of the conventional wisdom about satiric anger as represented by Anderson [1964], Bertman [1968], Bellandi [1973], Coffey [1976: 124], Wilson & Makowski [1990: 34], and Braund [1988, 1995, 1997], among others.

anger—whether genuine or artificially adopted—is, like their mockery itself, legitimate and justified.

Yet, often at the same time as they assert that their anger is justified and their moral authority is superior, satirists tend to claim a low social status or a degraded position in life, an autobiographical “fact” that serves to enhance their indignation and to attract increased audience sympathy. As Keane writes of *Serm.* 1.10.76–77, “temporary humiliation ironically gave Laberius the power to criticize; this ambiguous status is not unlike the posture that Horace takes when he styles himself a *mima*” [2006: 20].¹⁸ So the primary markers of a satirist’s position are “his stance of physical and emotional abjection and oppression, [and] the indignation against an antagonist that inspires comic mockery”¹⁹—what Plaza calls “mockery from below” [2006: 53–57], and what Hens identifies as a satiric trope, a “Topos der Satire” [1954: 161]. Such abjection and oppression may conflict with the self-righteousness integral to the satirist’s success—and on account of this conflict, Rosen suggests, the satirist becomes a humorous figure. Perhaps the best example of this point is the literary persona of Socrates, who is figured as ugly, destitute, and beleaguered by powerful enemies—in a word, abject—but who nonetheless is consistently portrayed (with notable exceptions, such as in Aristophanes’ *Clouds*) as ethically, morally, and intellectually sound and superior. The potential for humor in this oxymoronic juxtaposition of Socrates’ abjection and his righteousness is exploited in, for

¹⁸ Compare the account by Lee [2006] of the physical and social “humiliations” that reinforce the comic, satiric abjection of figures like Mark Twain, Richard Pryor, and Margaret Cho. As Griffin, writing on satire of all periods, puts it, “[g]reat satire...appears ironically to depend on some resistance to itself” [1994: 138].

¹⁹ Rosen [2007: 162]. Rosen does not explicitly discuss the abject as theorized in Douglas [1966], Kristeva [1982], or Creed [1993]; Rosen views his work as “not a book of high theory itself” [2007: 16].

instance, Persius poem 4.²⁰ We can also see this dynamic in action with the self-assured yet socially defenseless Horace-*ego* in *Serm.* 1.9 (where the satirist may himself be a version of the pest he has such difficulties escaping), and with the satirist-figure of Pope's *Epilogue to the Satires*.²¹ By this picture of satire, the reader derives entertainment both from the satirist's initial speech-act of mocking the target and from the discrepancy between the satirist's righteous self-aggrandizement and his abject indignation.

Juvenal and the disenfranchisement of the satirist

One possible trait of a satirist that calls for closer attention and modification is disenfranchisement. In his discussion of Naevolus in Juvenal poem 9—Virro's well-endowed but down-on-his-luck client, who serves as gigolo for both Virro and his wife and who critiques the patron-client system—Rosen takes the notion of the satirist's oppression further still. After arguing that Naevolus is not an “allegory...of the archetypal satirist” (as Braund suggests), but rather “a kind of ironized poetic alter-ego” for the Juvenalian satirist, Rosen states that “[t]he satirist, like Naevolus, is by definition always disenfranchised.”²² This assessment rings true for Juvenal in particular, who presents in his work, I suggest, a satiric poetics of disenfranchisement. Crystallized in the maxim “if

²⁰ On this satire, which is modeled on the pseudo-Platonic dialogue *Alcibiades I*, see, e.g., Henderson [1991], Hooley [1997: ch. 3], and Littlewood [2002].

²¹ Cf. Griffin [1994: 100]: “The two dialogues of Pope's *Epilogue to the Satires*...build the satirist into a hero or prophet, but they do not conclude without implicitly questioning the effectiveness of their own moral stance.” On *Serm.* 1.9, see Zetzel [1980: 71] and Henderson [1993], among others.

²² Allegory: Braund [1988: 170]. Juvenalian alter-ego: Rosen [2007: 225]. Naevolus disenfranchised: Rosen [2007: 230 n. 29], with Richlin [1992/1983]: 202. Cf. also Bellandi [1974], Winkler [1983: 125] (“self-satirization”), and Braund [1988: ch. 4].

you can take it, you *deserve* it” (*omnia ferre | si potes, et debes*, 5.1.170–171), disenfranchisement is the theme and emblem of the imperial age. At Rome, the citizens on the street (like the satirist himself²³) are thoroughly disenfranchised, subjected to those more powerful, whether they are patrons (as with Naevolus in poem 9) or thugs (3.288–301) or soldiers (3.247–248; poem 16) or the emperor (poem 4). The disenfranchisement constitutes a systemic failure, in all levels of society, from poetry (as in the opening literary-critical rant at 1.1–14) to the judiciary (Keane [2006: 94] points out that Juvenal’s works “bear witness to frequent failures of the legal system”).

The notion of a Juvenalian satiric poetics of disenfranchisement can fit well with Freudenburg’s assessment of the relationship between Juvenal’s satire and its historical context. Freudenburg posits that the text presents a failed attempt at Lucilian satire, delivered in the voice of an *ego* transfixed by an obsession with the Domitianic and Nero-nian past [2001: 242]. In the authoritarian Rome of the imperial period, there is no room for Lucilius’ *libertas*—his wanton, privileged, and aggressive freedom of speech—and so in Juvenal’s satire instead we see the disenfranchised satirist mocking the literary elite’s preoccupation, displayed particularly in the works of Tacitus and Pliny the Younger, with the traumas of bygone years.²⁴ At a time when self-righteous mockery with a moralizing

²³ Juvenal’s satirist portrays himself, as we might expect, in an abject, degraded position, with attention to nitty-gritty life in the City: he empathizes with the urban poor (*uestibulis abeunt ueteres lassique clientes*, “old, worn-out clients leave [their patrons’] doorways” bereft of the hope of some food from their patrons’ dole, 1.132), has his pal Umbricius take the reader on a vile and violent tour of Rome (poem 3), and frenetically notes the impending presence of “a Clytemnestra on every street” (*Clytemestram nullus non uicus habebit*, 6.656). Cf. Freudenburg [2001: 246], “the poor-man’s eye view...at street-level.”

²⁴ Yet Rosen [2007: 241 n. 41] argues against Freudenburg’s reading of Juvenal’s satires (especially poem 5) as concerning the failure of Lucilian satire in Juvenal’s own age. In

tone can get a person executed, or ordered to commit suicide, the Juvenalian *ego*, like those of Pliny and Tacitus, looks backwards, dispossessed of his civic entitlement to unfettered, unguarded speech.

Thematic disenfranchisement, however, does not well match other satirists that we may consider, both in and out of the genre of Roman satire. Both the Horatian and the Lucilian *egos* do frequently depict themselves as underdogs, particularly in Horace's *Sermones*, but we should not, as I see it, say that either is (again, in Rosen's terms) "by definition always disenfranchised." The satires of Lucilius—at least as they are portrayed in their reception by the later satirists—present a free-speaking citizen *par excellence*, an aristocratic male who not only enjoys the friendship of certain powerful political figures (as does the Horatian *ego*) but also has on his own the power and standing to say whatever he wishes to whomever he pleases.

Yes, the *ego* of Horace's *Sermones* often represents himself abjectly (as, for instance, in the pink-eye and wet dream of *Serm.* 1.5), and must contend with allegations that his poetic mockery is too harsh (e.g., *sunt quibus in satira uidear nimis acer*, "there are some people who think I'm too harsh in my *satira*," *Serm.* 2.1.1). Furthermore, in the second book of *Sermones*, the satirist hands the microphone over to a variety of interlocutors, many of whom mock or chastise him directly, and he even at times recedes deep into the background. But in the first book, particularly in the programmatic poems (*Serm.* 1.4, 1.6, 1.10) and in the other poems that touch upon the circle of Maecenas (*Serm.* 1.5, 1.9), we do not see a disenfranchised satirist. Instead, we find a speaker con-

doing so, Rosen also argues implicitly against Henderson—who suggests that we view Juvenal's "Satire as 'the *portrayal* of indignation' " [1989: 115] and who cites, in turn, Anderson [1982].

fidant in his upbringing and friendships (i.e., social status) as well as satisfied with his poetic prowess and satiric potential.²⁵

Disenfranchisement also does not fit cleanly with what can be reconstructed of Ennius' satires. Ennius' *ego* was not the acerbic attack-dog of Lucilian satire, but rather seems to have avoided both obscenity (Petersmann [1999: 289]) and personal attacks on others—in Witke's formulation, the Ennian satirist (unlike Lucilius' satirist) did not “embrace contemporary politics” [1970: 53]. In fact, Muecke links this difference in tone to the different social statuses of Ennius and Lucilius [2005: 42, cf. 40], since Lucilius is reported to have been an upper-class Roman citizen while Ennius identifies himself as a non-Roman immigrant who only gained citizenship thanks to influential friends in the City. It is in this identification, though, where I again see problems for the notion of persistent disenfranchisement in the figure of the satirist: the satirist does (eventually) gain citizenship, and he bases (what fragments survive of) his mockery not on moralizing indignation against others in a superior social or physical condition, but rather on his self-deprecating construction of his own *ego*.²⁶

A final point on the satirist's disenfranchisement: this supposition does not seem to hold constant even for one of Rosen's own prototypical satirist figures, the Homeric

²⁵ If not confident in his physical well-being (*Serm.* 1.5) or satisfied with chances for an uninterrupted stroll (*Serm.* 1.9). The lack of any mention in *Serm.* 1.5 of the political motivations for the journey to Brundisium may be a sign to the reader that the Horatian satirist is muzzled when it comes to Octavian and Antony. Cf., among others, Reckford [1999], as well as Frank [1920], Rudd [1974], Classen [1981], Ehlers [1985], Fedeli [1992], and Gowers [1993b]. The Horace-*ego* does stress that his father was a freedman (*Serm.* 1.6.6, 45, 46)—perhaps even, as Williams [1995] argues, stretching Horace's historical heritage to do so; cf. also Christes & Fülle [1996].

²⁶ Cf. Flintoff [1990: 586], “self-depiction—and self-denigration—have long been recognized as an important feature of early satire.”

Odysseus. In the cave of Polyphemus, Odysseus does find himself in an abject state, subordinate to the physical might of the Cyclops [2007: 123–141] and also back home on Ithaca while in disguise as a beggar, but in his altercation with Thersites in *Iliad* 2 [2007: 69–91], Odysseus holds social, satiric, and poetic authority far greater than does Thersites. Social authority: Odysseus is a leader of the Greeks, whereas Thersites at best is a kind of court jester (thus Thersites is the character whom readers might consider disenfranchised). Satiric authority: “Odysseus’s response [to Thersites’ heckling] is motivated by genuine anger” [2007: 90], and the poem presents this anger as justified.²⁷ Hence, Odysseus is like a true satirist, but Thersites falls short. Poetic authority: within the poem’s narrative, Odysseus comes out on top, by demonstrating his physical (and, in this epic, mythic, bellicose shame culture setting, his social) prowess. Odysseus may be a satirist, but he is, unlike the *ego* of Juvenal’s satires, not a disenfranchised one.

Disenfranchisement therefore can, but need not, be a part of the satirist’s claim of abjection. Compare, for instance, the satiric subject positions of the stand-up comedians George Carlin and Richard Pryor. Whereas Pryor stirred up scandal, controversy, and immense comic and commercial success by frankly but satirically discussing the racial inequities, discrimination, and disenfranchisement that he faced as a black man in America in the 1960s and 1970s, Carlin (who was white) based much of his satire instead on criticism of the entertainment industry in which he himself played an important part—and

²⁷ More broadly, Dobson [2003] explores the presence in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* of features of iambic poetry—including invective and mocking humor.

was perhaps the more able to do so because of the privilege and entitlement afforded white males in the western world.²⁸

Satirists and seriousness

It is worth answering another question about the satirist's characterization: is he serious? Does he mean what he says? Because of the realism of satire's fictitiousness—because of the personal self-presentation of the satiric *ego*—the reader may understand the satirist's words as spoken in earnest, may take him to be the moral didact he purports to be. The satirist's audience, that is, could be tempted to take his seriousness seriously. But we should be careful, because the satirist's moral, didactic pose may not be genuine, for the satirist is further characterized by recurrent “satiric *ponêria*” that generates comedy from scurrilous self-portrayal and language.²⁹ And this trait, this comic *πονηρία*,

²⁸ On Carlin's criticism of the media, see Zoglin [2008: 36–37, 126] and Sullivan [2010: 143–166], among others. On Pryor and racial inequality, see Vaidhyanathan [1998], Haggins [2007: ch. 1], Zoglin [2008: 41–42], Harris [2008], Bingham & Hernandez [2009: 337 and elsewhere], and especially Carpio [2008: ch. 2].

²⁹ Rosen [2007: 218]. Rosen defines *πονηρία* as “forays into scandalous diction, compromised self-representation, and other similarly comedic gestures” [2007: 218], and later [2007: 244 n. 1] refers to Whitman [1964] and Rosenbloom [2002] for semantic studies of *πονηρία*. On *πονηρία* as self-undercutting, see again Rosen [2007: 218]: “the poetry of mockery is a ‘closed’ fictional world that is rarely, if ever, what it purports to be. One moment it makes claims about its didactic purposes that seem serious enough; the next, it undermines them with its own stances of *ponêria*.”

For *πονηρία* in Aristophanic comedy, see Whitman [again 1964, especially ch. 2], Reckford [1987: 205], and O'Regan [1992: 158 n. 59]; compare the comic “badness” (*malitia*) of Plautus' clever protagonists, discussed by Petrone [1977], Chiarini [1979], Anderson [1993a: 92 and *passim*], and Polt [2010: ch. 3].

serves to undercut any credence in the satirist's seriousness and moral superiority.³⁰ Entertainment overtakes critique.

This tension between self-righteousness and *πονηρία* is, I believe, a pivotal conflict in the identity of the satiric *ego*. Notionally, satiric mockery has a positive goal beyond (mere?) entertainment or exposé, namely a goal of making the world a better place. Yet the satiric speaker's comic wickedness gets in the way, prevents the satirist from effecting the change he wishes to see. "The satirist represents himself as essentially doomed to be constantly on the attack, martyring himself, as it were, to the pursuit of some putative 'better world' in order to benefit all those who deserve it."³¹ The reason that lurks behind the satirist's baleful fate is, simply, the need to sustain his poetic material—for a utopia has no need of satire.³²

But this disingenuousness is not necessarily an ever-present feature of satire. In the idea of a satirist's self-avowed doom of perpetually mocking the corrupt, I see little

³⁰ Cf. Smith [2005d], on "self-defeating" sex advice in *Serm.* 1.2 and Juvenal poem 6, and both Freudenburg [1993: ch. 1] and Turpin [1998] on the Horace-*ego*'s failed philosophizing in *Sermones* book 1.

³¹ Rosen [2007: 180]. Cf. De Caro [2007: 62 n. 21], who argues that the poet-lover of Ovid's *Amores* is a satiric speaker, but that "all'innamorato non interessa affatto risanare la società." Compare also Smith's inquiry into the seriousness of Latin satiric commentary on gender from Plautus to Walter Map [2005b].

³² As Rosen asks, "what satirist *qua* satirist...would really want a world in which the things he once complained about are corrected?" [2007: 239].

There is a similar conflict in the world of Roman erotic elegy. The poet-lover needs obstacles between him and his beloved in order to generate material for his poetry. There can be no *paraclausithyron* without being an *exclusus amator*, Ovid's *praeceptor amoris* encourages *puellae* to mistreat their lovers in order to keep them coming back for more—*Ars Amatoria* 3.577–610, with Gibson [2003: 324 *ad loc.*]—and the genre is moreover predicated on an unbridgeable divide between the poet-lover's desire for free sex and his beloved's material needs, as James demonstrates [2003: 14, 42, 91, 98, 106, 200, 247 n. 53, and *passim*]. Cf. also, on Horace's versions of the *exclusus amator*, Cummings [2002].

room for the Horace-*ego* of certain parts of *Sermones*, for instance. The *ego* at the end of *Serm.* 1.4 looks ahead to a relaxed old age focused on self-improvement, not on attack:

mediocribus et quis
ignoscas uitiiis teneor. fortassis et istinc
largiter abstulerit longa aetas, liber amicus,
consilium proprium.

(*Serm.* 1.4.130–133)

I'm held captive by middling faults, the kind you could overlook.
Maybe I'll be pushed away from this position, for the most part, by
long life, a free-speaking friend, and my own advice.

In fact, the Horatian speaker here internalizes his moral observations and keeps silent,³³ while looking to the free speech of a friend, to (Lucilian?) *libertas*, for self-help advice. Far from issuing noisy, self-righteous criticisms of others' vices, the satirist in these lines takes a more cerebral, self-reflective stance. Moreover, in the programmatic opening to the second book of *Sermones*, the speaker renounces his intent to attack:

sed hic stilus haud petet ultro
quemquam animantem et me ueluti custodiet ensis
uagina tectus: quem cur destringere coner
tutus ab infestis latronibus? o pater et rex
Iuppiter, ut pereat positum robigine telum
nec quisquam noceat cupido mihi pacis!

(*Serm.* 2.1.39–44)

But: my stylus certainly won't be going after anyone alive, and it'll guard me like a sheathed sword. Why should I try to whip it out when I'm safe from dangerous bandits? Jupiter, king and father, I hope that my weapon is put to rest and falls apart with rust, and that nobody tries to hurt a peace-lover like me!

³³ Cf. *Serm.* 1.4.137–138: *haec ego mecum | compressis agito labris*, “I go over all this in my head, with my lips sealed.”

The pen is not mightier than the sword, but serves as a defensive weapon, in opposition to the sword of Lucilian satire.³⁴ Although this poem is full of irony and thus its contents are not to be read straightforwardly and uncritically, it does nevertheless contain important commentary about the Horatian persona's satiric positioning, and about his views on the uses of satire.³⁵ Hooley sees in *Serm.* 2.1 “an anti-program, a resignation from a certain kind of satiric writing” [2007: 68]. The phrase “certain kind” is key here. The satirist, while still elusive and ambiguous, nonetheless maps out a path for his satire by which he is not forever doomed to be on the attack.

The *ego* later (in *Serm.* 2.6) explicitly presents *satura* as a poetic form able to cover more subjects than mere attack, as a genre equally fit for talking about peaceful country life as it is for talking about the (urban) vices of humankind.³⁶ Within the poetic

³⁴ On the association of Lucilius with the sword: Freudenburg [2001: 7]—the *ego* is “unable to hoist Lucilius’ long-rusted sword,” and Juvenal 1.165, *ense...stricto...Lucilius ardens* (“Lucilius burning with his sword drawn”), with Freudenburg [2001: 243–245]. Freudenburg sees in *Sermones* a “satirist doomed to fail before he starts,” who nevertheless “can still bury a good amount of critical aggression under the surface of his poems” [2001: 7]. On the *topos* of the rusted weapon, see Catullus 64.42, with Gaisser [1995: 586–587] and Warden [1998: 404]; Vergil *Georgics* 1.495; Ovid *ex Ponto* 1.1.71; and Statius *Thebaid* 3.582. Freudenburg, citing *Serm.* 2.1.42–44, calls the poem “obsessed with satiric weaponry” [2010: 276].

Being doomed to fail, I point out, is different from being doomed to remain forever on the attack, and at any rate this satirist’s predestined failure does not preclude the genuineness of his aspirations for a life free from mockery-making.

³⁵ Scholars who see in *Serm.* 2.1 a serious literary critical discussion of satire—including Knoche [1975/1949: 51], Fraenkel [1957: 147], Williams [1968: 448], Coffey [1976: 82], and LaFleur [1981]—have been challenged by those who see the poem as completely ironic, e.g., Anderson [1984], Clauss [1985], Harrison [1987], and Rudd [1966: 128]. Freudenburg stakes out a more nuanced middle ground between pure program and pure posturing: “Horace exposes the satire’s real programmatic significance at the same time as he so obviously deflates his own character and the satire’s allegedly serious intent” [1990: 187].

³⁶ After making a prayer for protection and healthy flocks (*Serm.* 2.6.13–15), the speaker remarks, “Well, since I’ve gotten away from the city to my mountain refuge, what better

sensibilities of the Horatian speaker, moreover, there is not only a time for satiric mockery but also, I argue, a time for gentler, more inward-focused satire. *Serm.* 1.4 looks ahead from the time of open attack to the period of cease-fire, while the *ego* of *Sermones* book 2, himself claiming to have reached the second phase, relinquishes the role of satirist-on-the-offensive to a host of (often dominant) interlocutors.

Furthermore, in both Horace and Juvenal, I believe, we can find moments where the speaker genuinely wants the world to become a better place as a result of his satiric criticism. Juvenal first: the conclusion of poem 10 shows the *ego*, at least later in his poetic corpus, giving a bit of positive, constructive advice to the reader.³⁷ Mortals' prayers and wishes may not accomplish much, as the speaker has endeavored to demonstrate throughout the poem to this point, but there is hope, for two reasons. One—the gods will provide for humans (*pro iucundis aptissima quaeque dabunt di*, “the gods will give us not what we want but everything we need,” 10.349). Two—happiness is achievable: pray for physical and psychological health (*mens sana in corpore sano*, “a healthy mind in a healthy body,” 10.356), and you yourself can achieve a life of peace (*monstro quod ipse tibi possis dare; semita certe | tranquillae per uirtutem patet unica uitae*, “I’m pointing out what you can get on your own; the one path to a tranquil life is clearly accessed

than this to depict with my satire and my mundane muse?” (*Serm.* 2.6.16–17: *ergo ubi me in montes et in arcem ex urbe remoui, | quid prius inlustrem saturis musaque pedestri?*).

Examinations of this poem’s relation to the broader program of Horatian satire include Lyne [1995: 19–20], Reckford [1997], Oliensis [1998: 41–54], Fitzwilliam [1999], and Bowditch [2001: 142–154]. For a consideration of *Serm.* 2.7 as a “farewell to satire,” see Evans [1978: 311–312], but *contra* Sharland: “[r]ather than regarding this as a ‘farewell to satire’, I see it as a statement of what satire is *not* and what Horace will not allow it to become” [2009: 306 n. 93]. Oliensis shows how *Serm.* 2.8 serves as an effective conclusion to the Horace-*ego*’s role as satirist [1998: 57–63].

³⁷ On Juvenal poem 10—which is compared to *DRN* 3.1024–1052 by both Dudley [1965b: 116] and Kenney [1971: 232 *ad loc.*—see Fishelov [1990].

through excellence,” 10.363–364). Here, at least, we can see a satirist who desires, and looks forward to, a world where the Vanity of Human Wishes, as Johnson titles his imitation of Juvenal 10, has been corrected.³⁸

Again, the Horatian *ego* at times actively wants a world not only where the flaws he castigates are ameliorated, but also where satire and mockery are unnecessary, and I believe that the passages where the speaker’s desire is clearest are in his idealizing ruminations on the circle of Maecenas. *Est locus uni | cuique suus*, “everybody’s got his own right place,” the *ego* says to the fanboy (*Serm.* 1.9.51–52), in describing the lack of envy or malevolence in Maecenas’ coterie. Questions of status “do not bother” him there (*nil mi officit*, *Serm.* 1.9.50), and so satiric mockery would, it seems, be out of place. At the end of *Serm.* 1.3, not only does the *ego* portray himself as refraining from mockery, but he also envisions a life of pleasant (even Epicurean) friendship:

mihi dulces
ignoscent, siquid peccaro stultus, amici
inque uicem illorum patiar delicta libenter.

(*Serm.* 1.3.139–141)

My dear friends’ll overlook it if I stupidly make a mistake, and in
return I’ll gladly tolerate their faults.

No mockery—Lucilian, iambic, or otherwise—in these lines, as I understand them. Now, the Horace-*ego* is painting a picture for us here, an idealized picture of Maecenas’ circle that reflects the *ego*’s desire for a lack of interest in his own status (cf. Bowditch [2001: ch. 4], among others), so we should not take this to be a faithful representation of Roman reality at the time of the writing of *Serm.* book 2. But this is my point exactly: the

³⁸ So also Courtney [1980: 447] and Griffin [1994: 100]. Cf. Keane [2006: 4]: “[s]atirists...do not just describe, distort, and criticize social life. They claim to intervene in it as well—at least in an indirect manner.”

speaker's portrait is an aspirational one, a better (but still attainable) world that would obviate the need for satiric blame.

Similarly, the speaker in book 2, when he discusses his Sabine farm, presents it as a prayer granted (and then some) by the gods (*Serm.* 2.6.1–4), and further as a place free of the topics of satiric complaint (*Serm.* 2.6.6–13, 18–19: greed, jealousy, dissatisfaction, ambition, Rome's foul weather). For the *ego* of Horace's *Sermones*, there is life after satire, a place beyond anger, a home for country mice and Maecenas' friends: somewhere, the *ego* hopes, that will remain enduringly tranquil ("Son of Maia, I ask for nothing more, except that you make my gifts permanent," *Serm.* 2.6.4–5: *nil amplius oro, | Maia nate, nisi ut propria haec mihi munera faxis*).

Life after (mocking, modal) satire, perhaps; but not life without the genre of *satura*. The end of *Sermones* book 1 presents satire as the poetic option best suited to the *ego* for the current stage of his life—and one to which he was pushed under dream-orders from Romulus (*Serm.* 1.10.31–49). This whole concluding programmatic poem presents satire more as an artistic endeavor than as a critically moralistic one: we see poets and authors good and bad,³⁹ we are given advice on writing well,⁴⁰ we are taught about the

³⁹ Lucilius (*Serm.* 1.10.1–5, 48–71), Laberius (6), Old Comic poets (16–17), Catullus and Calvus (19), Pitholeon (22), Pedius Poplicola (28), Corvinus (29), the "overblown Alps-dweller" Furius (*turgidus Alpine*, 36), Fundanius (42), Pollio (42, 85), Varius (44, 81), Vergil (45, 81), Varro of Atax (46), Homer (52), Accius (53), Ennius (54), Cassius (62), Fannius (80), Valgius and Octavius (82), and Furnius (86).

⁴⁰ saepe stilum uertas, iterum quae digna legi sint
scripturus, neque te ut miretur turba labores,
contentus paucis lectoribus. an tua demens
uilibus in ludis dictari carmina malis?

(*Serm.* 1.10.72–75)

efficacy of humor,⁴¹ and we are informed of the *ego*'s own constructed audience, the non-senatorial literary elites: "as far as I'm concerned, it's enough that the *equites* applaud."⁴² The literary focus to his work, whereby satire (*satura*) extends beyond or even transcends satiric mockery, appears again in the second book of *Sermones*.⁴³

Yes, one could object that these passages to which I have pointed are common-places, or even that they are so banal as to be (self-)parodic. Perhaps so with Juvenal 10. In Horace's *Sermones*, however, I do not think that such is the case, because of the passages' wide diffusion across the two books,⁴⁴ because of the relative intratextual consistency of their tone, and because of the recurrent literary concerns that they voice. And I do not see in them, however brief and scattered they may be, the same persistent vehemence and haughty sanctimony that we see in other blame poets of ancient satiric verse.

If you're gonna write stuff that's worth reading again, you gotta use the other end of your stylus, don't try to make the crowd go wild for you—be satisfied with a few readers. Or are you out of your mind, would you rather your poems be recited in cheapass schools?

On this poem, see, e.g., Zetzel [1980] and Scodel [1987].

⁴¹ *Serm.* 10.15–16: "something silly usually skewers great things stronger and better than something shrill," *ridiculum acri | fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res*.

⁴² *Serm.* 1.10.76: *satis est equitem mihi plaudere*, presented as a quotation of the *mima* Arbuscula in the face of popular disapproval. Cf. *Serm.* 1.10.87–90: the speaker mentions "learned friends whom I'd like to laugh at this stuff—however good or bad it is—and I'll be sad if they like it less than I hope" (*doctos...amicos | ...quibus haec, sint qualiacumque, | adridere uelim, doliturus, si placeant spe | deterius nostra*).

⁴³ *Serm.* 2.1.28: "I like locking words in verse forms," *me pedibus delectat claudere uerba*; and *Serm.* 2.1.60: "whatever my living conditions, I'll keep writing," *quisquis erit uitae scribam color*. At the end of *Serm.* 1.4, the *ego* even threatens a forced conversion to satiric poetry like the conversions enacted on unwitting victims by Rome's Jewish population (or, rather, the *ego*'s prejudicial distortion of it).

⁴⁴ The passages from *Serm.* 1.10 and book 2 fall outside of the poems on which Freudenburg [1993: ch. 1] focuses for the speaker as *doctor ineptus* (in *Serm.* 1.1–4).

Or one might suggest that in these passages the speaker is not being satiric, is not functioning as a satirist-mocker, but rather as a more straightforward moralist or espouser of a certain ethical philosophy or literary critic. Inasmuch as the terms “mockery” and “satire” (satire as mode) are truly and wholly interchangeable, point taken. Yet this equation of the two words is insufficient for understanding the overall work of Ennius, Horace, Persius, and even Juvenal: the genre of Roman satire, as we will explore in chapters 4 and 5, is more than mere satiric mockery, but so also, I argue, there is more to the wider, modal category of satiric poetry than simple attack. The mode of satire is, in this respect, a combination of literary tools, devices, and styles that, though they may appear independently in non-satiric works, together comprise the satirist’s textual product.

The satirist’s double audience

I have been focusing so far on the figure of the satirist, but if we focus on the point of reception, we can see that—however we take this last point on the (non-)genuineness of the satirist’s desire for a better world—the satirist has a divided audience, between those who take his seriousness seriously and those who are cognizant of his ironically self-undercutting position, between those who “get it” and those who “don’t get it.” This divided audience is notional, since it may turn out that no one actually takes the satirist seriously, but the division is important to the satirist’s self-construction and to the formation of a collusive relationship between satiric speaker and audience (cf. p. 39, above). The “get it” crowd is the true focus of the satirist’s attention, and he must enable this crowd “to imagine that *some* people other than themselves will continue to regard him as an uncomplicated moralist, while they themselves remain free to laugh along with

his posing, preening, and ultimate elusiveness.”⁴⁵ This elusiveness is the kind of thing that has driven a great deal of scholarship over the years on questions about the “sincerity” of Juvenal, or Horace, in the content of their poetry.

Two examples of the divided audience, from modern American political media. On 31 January 2011, MSNBC’s *The Rachel Maddow Show* (2008–present) presented a report on right-wing criticisms of President Obama’s handling of developing civil unrest in Egypt, with particular emphasis on an essay by a certain Stephenson Billings that called upon Sarah Palin, the Republican nominee for the vice presidency in 2008, to push for an American invasion of Egypt. The essay, however, was part of a satiric website called *Christwire*, and Rachel Maddow was promptly mocked by other media outlets for her failure to pick up on the joke.⁴⁶ Maddow was in the “don’t get it” crowd, and took the Billings *ego* as the serious-minded, uncomplicated, moralizing social critic that he claimed to be. She fell for the realism generated by the satirist’s self-presentation. Those who pointed to Maddow’s misunderstanding of the satirist were in the “get it” crowd, and were able to laugh at both his bombast and her misapprehension.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Rosen [2007: 244]; emphasis preserved.

⁴⁶ For the essay, see Billings [2011a]. Examples of the more gentle mockery of Maddow are Hudson [2011] and MacNicol [2011], and Maddow herself quickly addressed the issue [2011], as did Billings [2011b]. Nor was her show the first media entity to take the satire seriously: Hudson details the bamboozlement of NBC Los Angeles [2010a] and *The Huffington Post* [2010b], cf. Oppenheimer [2010]; and Pasick notes that one *Christwire* contributor, Marie Jon, is in fact a right-wing religious columnist who evidently did not realize that she was submitting her contributions to a satire website [2010].

⁴⁷ Compare Hongo [2011]—comic mockery of the “don’t get it” portion of Facebook users who take articles published in *The Onion* as genuine news reporting, not satire. Compare *Onion-Like* [2011], which collects real-life headlines that sound like they belong in a satiric newspaper. Compare also the incident in September 2011 when an article in *The Onion* [2011] that described the United States Congress as literally taking schoolchildren hostage (a send-up of congressional partisanship and of the over-usage of the metaphor of

More complicated is the matter of the satiric *ego* of Comedy Central's news humor program *The Colbert Report* (2005–present). The persona, which is modeled primarily on Fox News political opinion host Bill O'Reilly, is an exaggerated, dimwitted, often self-undercutting advocate of right-wing political ideology, who engages in mockery of liberal policies and politics. He is akin to Homer's Thersites: a foolish character who tries, and fails, to play the role of a blame poet.⁴⁸ So, in broad strokes, the reader who "gets it" would understand Stephen Colbert to be using the *ego*, "Stephen Colbert," as the medium for a center-left satiric critique of right-wing ideology, while the hypothetical others who "don't get it" would take "Stephen Colbert" at something close to face value, as an outspoken advocate of far-right politics, and would be an object of laughter for the audience that understands that the *ego*'s seriousness is not serious.

These "others" are not hypothetical, in the case of *The Colbert Report*, however, and it is not immediately obvious that they are missing the joke. As LaMarre et al. have shown, some conservative viewers of the program claim that Stephen Colbert "genuinely mean[s] what he said" [2009: 212, cf. 223]. Moreover, these viewers tend to see the satiric pose of *The Colbert Report* as itself the joke—the *ego*, that is, provides the authentic ideology, while the apparent mockery of the foolhardy *ego* is in fact a way of poking fun

hostage-taking) prompted the Capitol Police in Washington, D. C., to undertake an official investigation: see Flock [2011] and Kleefeld [2011].

⁴⁸ In Rosen's estimation, "Thersites does not emulate the prototypical blame poet....Thersites can really only be regarded as the *target* within a *psogos*," i.e., act of mockery [2007: 77; emphasis preserved]. The *ego* of *The Colbert Report* often, in the process of mocking an opposing political viewpoint, is himself mocked by textual commentary that appears on screen during his recurring segment "The Wørd" (in the style of Bill O'Reilly's "Talking Points" segment). The producers who create the onscreen text thus play a role analogous to Odysseus, putting the would-be satirist in his proper (rather, his actual) place.

at liberal viewers who are the real “don’t get it” crowd.⁴⁹ The liberal viewer sees satiric *πονηρία* in the ridiculous bloviating of the Colbert character, while for conservative fans the *πονηρία* is that the Colbert character is being used to pull a fast one on the liberal viewer. In the words of *The Week* magazine, “So conservatives see a conservative? That just means Colbert is a talented satirist” [2009]. Here, perhaps, is a prime example of the “ultimate elusiveness” of the satirist, one whose poses appeal to two (or more) audiences, each believing that the other is a target of mockery. As Kuiper writes, “people seem more prone to perceive something as a satire if they already hold views which they feel the inferred author of the satire is trying to get them to adopt” [1985: 176].

The satiric speaker position and the Lucretian *ego*

The speaker of the satiric mode is a comic instigator of mockery or blame poetry. This mockery, delivered with a personalized voice, is prompted by justified indignation at some fault or flaw and is founded upon the speaker’s declarations of legitimacy or moral

⁴⁹ Gallagher & Brown, leaders of the anti-marriage rights lobbying interest National Organization for Marriage, commend Colbert’s conservative credentials and claim that he is a “double-agent, pretending to pretend to be a conservative” [2008]. In the study of La-Marre et al., conservative viewers considered Colbert to be “targeting liberals, but also...being conservative, Republican, and disliking liberals” [2009: 224]. A similar phenomenon has been observed by Vidmar & Rokeach [1974] in the case of the bigoted character Archie Bunker from the situation comedy *All in the Family* (1971–1979).

Those who see satire as not undercutting but reinforcing the legitimacy of its targets might point either to the fact that the animated television comedy *Family Guy* (1999–2002, 2005–present)—whose own opening credit sequence is modeled on that of *All the in Family*—often has the victims of its mockery record their own voices for the show, or to the fact that the musical parodies of Weird Al Yankovic are always released with the original artists’ permission.

superiority. Cutting against the self-righteous moral high ground claimed by the satirist is his abject status or living conditions. The speaker's façade of seriousness can be considered ironic by his narrative audience,⁵⁰ who laugh collusively at the target of the mockery, at the satirist's pomposity, and at the readers who take his seriousness seriously. Each of these traits, taken singly, may be found in a variety of other genres: so, for instance, there is a personalized voice in erotic elegy, humor in theatrical comedy, and a claim of the moral high ground in works of theology and straightforward philosophy. But, taken together, these traits make up the particular voice of the satirist.

To what extent, and in what passages, can we see *DRN*'s speaker as a satirist? Although the poem presents itself as a serious, even straightforward, artistic/philosophic undertaking, an evaluation of the poem's speaker from the framework detailed above shows him to have much in common with the satirist. The Lucretian speaker regularly creates comic situations, particularly in his scorn for incorrect accounts of the universe; furthermore, he employs mockery and blame to great effect in his rejection of erroneous philosophical principles and in his castigation of misguided moral hypocrisy. He repeatedly expresses indignation at the faults present in both flawed intellectual and ethical concepts, and through this indignation (and elsewhere) he claims the self-righteous high ground that satirists also claim. At the same time, the *ego* uses certain traits of the satiric speaker—a personal voice, combined with certain types of abjection (including linguistic abjection!)—in order to create a collusive relationship with the reader.

⁵⁰ I use the term “narrative audience” as it is used by, e.g., Rabinowitz [1977: 127], to indicate the hypothetical audience of the *ego*'s speech. It runs parallel to the equally hypothetical “authorial audience,” for whom the author (or “implied author”) rhetorically designs the text, with “certain assumptions about his readers' beliefs, knowledge, and familiarity with conventions” [1977: 126]—conventions such as blame poetry.

The moments in *DRN* where the *ego* speaks like a satirist are, unsurprisingly, clustered around passages often associated by scholars with invective or diatribe (although we saw in chapter 1 how the concept “diatribe” is problematic): the refutation of the Presocratic philosophers in book 1, the critiques of the fear of death in book 3 and of love in book 4, and so on. Yet these passages are not the only places where the speaker appears satiric, and we can see additional links between him and the satirist archetype throughout the text, even in the poem’s concluding passage on the plague in Athens.⁵¹ And, as we will see, the Lucretian persona is not the only speaker in *DRN* who can be satiric—the *Natura Rerum*, given voice near the end of book 3, should herself be seen as a satirist (pp. 133–139, below).

The Lucretian ego as comic speaker

Satirists are comic, and so is the speaker of *DRN* on many occasions. I proffer a few preliminary examples here, and deal with the principal examples of comic mockery and blame later (pp. 99–113, below). Not all humorous elements of the poem are part of mockery or blame specifically, but they still play a part in the speaker’s potential to be a satirist, because they develop his comic voice, which (as we have seen) is essential to the definition of the speaker of Graeco-Roman satiric poetry.⁵² Puns and other wordplay,

⁵¹ Cf. Waltz [1949: 79]: “ses démonstrations les plus géométriques alternent avec des explosions indignées dignes du plus fougueux pamphlétaire.” Note Waltz’ own clever *figura etymologica* on the concept of *indignatio*.

⁵² And because they can do important textual work beyond the purposes of pure satire: as Corbeill writes, “[j]okes become a means of ordering social realities” [1996: 6].

important features of *DRN*, can be sources of humor.⁵³ Likewise, the case can be made for significant connections between *DRN* and Graeco-Roman comic theater.⁵⁴ For our purposes, however, I will take “comedy” more broadly, as humor in general, wherever it appears in the poem.⁵⁵

I discuss here four principal ways in which *DRN*'s *ego* speaks with a comic voice, at the expense of the targets of his scorn. Particularly prominent is the use of humor in the *reductio ad absurdum* of erroneous philosophical beliefs, whether scientific or ethi-

⁵³ For the use of puns in Roman humor, see Corbeill [1996: ch. 2, especially 91–95] and, on Horace's *Sermones* specifically, Plaza [2006: 57–66]. According to Turpin, “[p]uns seem to have been specially important to Epicureans,” including Philodemus and Lucretius both [1998: 137]. Wordplay in *DRN* has been thoroughly evaluated by Snyder [1980], building on the “atomologies” (atomic etymologies) of Friedländer [1941], with additional observations by Brown [1984: xxxv–xxxix], Hinds [1987a], Ferguson [1987], Farrell [1988], West [1994: 98], O'Hara [1996: 54–55], Dionigi [2003, 2006], and Holmes [2005]; cf. Dalzell [1987], *contra*. For play in and out of *DRN* on Epicurus, ἐπίκουρος (“ally”), and *curro*, see Snyder [1980: 108], Frischer [1982: 275–276], Gale [1994a: 137], and O'Hara [1998]. Cf. also O'Hara's survey of the role of wordplay in Greece and Rome [1996: ch. 1].

For the role of puns in the discourse of satire, see Simpson [2003: 20–29]; for the importance of puns in the satire of the Marx Brothers, see Gardner [2009: 2].

⁵⁴ Connections to comedy: I suggest that the phrase *postscaenia uitae* (“life's behind-the-scenes,” *DRN* 4.1186) is a marker pointing to a broadly comedic/theatrical underpinning to the *ego*'s take on love and sex in the end of book 4. Indeed, the *exclusus amator* (“locked-out lover,” 4.1177) looks back to the weepy protagonists of Menandrian New Comedy and the Roman comedy of Plautus and Terence.

For further links between *DRN* and Plautus, see Rosivach [1980], Snyder [1980: 72–73, 78–79, 104, 113, 125, 139 n. 17, and 144–146], as well as my brief connections in pp. 70–74, below. Gale discusses connections between *DRN* and comedic theater more broadly [2007: 68–69], while Kenney notes the status of “[t]he lecture as a dramatic performance” in the Roman world [1971: 18 n. 4] and points to *homullis* (*DRN* 3.914) as comic diction [1971: 209 *ad loc.*].

⁵⁵ For a consideration of the concept “comic,” with reference to Aristotle, see Eco [1984]. Comedy, for Rosen, is simply “performed humor” [2007: 19] through which “laughter is represented rather than lived” [2007: 15]. Cf. also Samuel Johnson's *Rambler* 125, titled “The Difficulty of Defining Comedy,” in Murphy [1825: 217–219].

cal.⁵⁶ On occasion, too, the speaker employs funny examples to support his own positive argument or observation. Humorous scenes highlight the speaker's attack on ridiculous human behaviors, and we can detect comic aspects also in his mentions of language in book 1. A few passages now; more below.

Early in book 1, while marshalling evidence for the argument that no thing can arise from nothing, the speaker makes the claim that creation *ex nihilo* would result in an absurd chaos of procreation:

nam si de nilo fierent, ex omnibu' rebus
omne genus nasci posset, nil semine egeret.
e mare primum homines, e terra posset oriri
squamigerum genus et uolucres erumpere caelo;
armenta atque aliae pecudes, genus omne ferarum,
incerto partu culta ac deserta tenerent;
nec fructus idem arboribus constare solerent,
sed mutarentur: ferre omnes omnia possent.
(*DRN* 1.159–166)

So if things were to come from nothing, every breed could be produced out of everything—nothing would lack seed. First off, humans could arise from the sea, the scaly breed from the land, and birds could burst out [or “hatch”] from the sky. Cattle and the other flocks—the whole type of wild beasts—would with uncertain birth inhabit cultivated places and wilderness alike. And the same fruits wouldn't tend to grow on trees, but would change up: all the trees could produce everything.

⁵⁶ Waltz also identifies *reductio ad absurdum* as an important, even “natural” and “superabundant” feature of *DRN*'s satiric bearing [1949: 85, continuing through 89]:

La démonstration (ou la réfutation) par l'absurde, forme de raisonnement où la logique et l'esprit satirique se combinent et se fortifient mutuellement, est un des procédés le plus naturellement chers à Lucrèce....les raisonnements par l'absurde surabondent dans son poème.

See also Wallach [1976: 27, 31, 105 and n. 127, 107–108].

Humans from the sea, fish from the earth: such anomalies are laughable.⁵⁷ Merrill calls *mutarentur* at line 166 “inelegant metrically” [1907: *ad loc.*]—prosodic clunkiness that could foster a sense of the passage’s farcical goings-on. Solomon comments that, in this passage, the speaker ridicules “the plain childishness of ascribing intentionality to divine creators...through these humorous illustrations” [2004: 270]. The humor here moreover serves a polemical goal, of discrediting theories of hybrids in earlier philosophy.⁵⁸

The speaker kicks his humor into high gear when attacking the Presocratic philosopher Anaxagoras’ principle explanation of how the universe works, namely *ὁμοιομερία*, the concept that all things are made up of smaller particles of themselves. At the conclusion of the long invective against non-atomic accounts of the universe, he comically both highlights the idea’s Greekness and ridicules its basic principle of the recursiveness of matter:

nunc et Anaxagorae scrutemur homoeomerian.

.....
 principio, rerum quam dicit homoeomerian,
 ossa uidelicet e pauxillis atque minutis
 ossibus hic et de pauxillis atque minutis
 uisceribus uiscus gigni sanguenque creari
 sanguinis inter se multis coeuntibu’ guttis
 ex auri que putat micis consistere posse
 aurum et de terris terram concreescere paruis,
 ignibus ex ignis, umorem umoribus esse,
 cetera consimili fingit ratione putatque.

(*DRN* 1.830, 834–842)

⁵⁷ Leonard & Smith point to the specter of “horses, e.g., producing frogs” [1942: *ad* 164], while Duff remarks that “a cow might produce tiger cubs” and “you might find a tiger in your garden” [1962: *ad* 164, in the second quote following Bailey 1947: v. 2 *ad* 164].

⁵⁸ So Woolerton: “Lucretius’ reference to tree-mammal hybrids at 2.702–3 is designed to engage with and discredit a now lost passage of Empedocles, who raised the possibility of such hybrids. This fits well with Lucretius’ argumentative and poetic strategy” [2010: 257].

Now let's also look at Anaxagoras' ὁμοιομερία....First off, as for what he says is the ὁμοιομερία of things, surely this guy thinks bones are produced from little bitty bones; and guts from little bitty guts; and blood is created by many drops of blood coalescing among themselves; and gold can come about from bits of gold; and soil can grow from little soils; that fire is from fires; water from waters; the rest he imagines and thinks in a similar vein.

The passage is clearly marked as sarcasm by *uidelicet* at line 835, and by that point the reader has already twice come across the awkward and overlong transliterated accusative *homoeomerian*.⁵⁹ Greek words are rare in *DRN*, and as Sedley observes, “concentration of Greek words in a passage is exploited...to conjure up for the readers a Greek or an otherwise exotic context” [1999: 238]. The preservation of the Greek term is a conscious choice that marks Anaxagoras' precept as bizarre and off-base⁶⁰—as bizarre as merper-sons and landfish, as off-base as an apple growing on a grapevine. The term's repetition, combined with other repetitions throughout the passage—of words in polyptoton like *uis-*

⁵⁹ Sedley calls 830 “[a] leading contender for the title of Lucretius' worst line” [1999: 237]. Brown points out that 1.830–842 is “one of the most repetitive passages in Lucretius” [1983: 154], and suggests that “the sameness of expression emphasizes the universal applicability of the theory, and backs up the notion of material sameness (*homoeomeria*)” [1983: 153]. “Moreover, the theory of Anaxagoras is further prejudiced by a satirical tone, which owes much to repetition” [1983: 156]. See also West [1994: 125] and Piazzzi [2005: 52–58]. On the term ὁμοιομερία in the Greek doxographical tradition, see Lanza [1963].

On *DRN*'s philosophical polemics in general, see, e.g., Wallach [1976: 65–66, 91–108], Kleve [1978] and Piazzzi [2005: 12–16].

⁶⁰ Tatum shows that it is a choice: the *ego* “laments that the term cannot be translated into Latin. This is, of course, untrue; since Cicero succinctly translates the idea in *Acad.* 2.118...it was hardly beyond the poet's ingenuity to turn the Greek into a Latin hexameter” [1984: 183–184]. Sedley, discussing another Greek term left untranslated in *DRN* (ἄρμονία), claims that “the word's undisguised alienness to the Latin language is symptomatic of the concept's irrelevance” [1999: 237]. This mutual bizarreness of term and concept applies equally well to Anaxagorean ὁμοιομερία—and its alienness is enhanced by the unusual, Greek long I before the final A, with Greek accusative ending N.

ceribus uiscus (*DRN* 1.836) or *terris terram* (840),⁶¹ of grammatical constructions in zeugma (as at 841), and of entire lines (835 ≈ 836)—form a raucous scene of philosophical parody. The principle is shown to be, like the term itself and like the examples the Lucretian speaker uses to illustrate it, silly, clunky, and error-stricken.⁶² It becomes, simply put, a joke.

The comedy follows along with the *reductio ad absurdum*. In response to an anti-homoeomerotic objection, that materials producing different substances would need to have particles of those other things within them (1.859–874: so, for instance, wood would need to contain particles of fire), the speaker fields an Anaxagorean counter-argument⁶³—namely, that every thing has particles of everything else within itself, but takes its outward properties from the preponderant constituent (875–879). The speaker’s own counter-counter-argument further extends the absurdity of Anaxagoras’ position:

quod tamen a uera longe ratione repulsumst.
 conueniebat enim fruges quoque saepe, minaci
 robore cum saxi franguntur, mittere signum
 sanguinis aut aliquid, nostro quae corpore aluntur;
 cum lapidi in lapidem terimus, manare cruorem.
(*DRN* 1.880–884)

This is nonetheless hurled far away from the true explanation.⁶⁴
 For it was appropriate that grain also often, when cracked by a

⁶¹ Compare the threefold repetition of *ex alienigenis* at line-beginning in lines 865, 869, 872, and 874 (transposed before 873 by Rouse, following Diels).

⁶² Cf. Tatum: “The juxtaposition...of Anaxagoras’ jargon and Lucretius’ perfectly comprehensible exposition is sharp...Lucretius’ refusal to translate Anaxagoras’ terminology and his lengthy definition are an implied criticism” [1984: 184].

⁶³ I comment briefly on *DRN*’s use of interpolated questions like this one below (p. 129 n. 184).

⁶⁴ This line is one of *DRN*’s frequently repeated barb lines, which I consider below (p. 125 and nn. 172–173).

stone's threatening strength, give a sign of blood or something of the things which are nourished in our body—and that, when we wear upon a rock with a rock, blood flow out.

After the speaker raises and responds to a hypothetical counter-counter-counter-argument, the passage on ὁμοιομερία concludes with a picture of *primordia* laughing and crying (“it’ll happen that they chuckle, struck through with shaking laughter, and wet their faces and cheeks with salted tears,” *fiet uti risu tremulo concussa cachinnent | et lacrimis salsis umectent ora genasque*, 1.919–920, cf. 2.976–982). Designed to show the folly of supposing that perceptible phenomena are composed of smaller particles of themselves, these lines also highlight the satiric bite of the speaker’s comic bearing. The imagery here is funny and sublimely absurd. The atoms in this *reductio* are, evidently, the atoms that compose our speaker’s body—and they are supposed to be laughing because he is laughing at Anaxagoras, whose theory would suggest that a laughing person is made up of laughing particles. The atoms themselves hypothetically join in on the mockery of Anaxagoras and of the comic episode that his ὁμοιομερία entails.

The later books of *DRN* also include comedy in scenes of the rejection of philosophical explanations of the way things work, as we can see from three further examples. When arguing against the theory of vision according to which the eyes are portals to the mind (*animus*), the Lucretian speaker remarks that people who believe as much should go ahead and rip their eyes out, since doors (portals) are not bothered by anything and just get in the way of a clear view.⁶⁵ Similarly, he explicitly calls it laughable (*deridiculum*

⁶⁵ neque enim, qua cernimus ipsi,
ostia suscipiunt ullum reclusa laborem.
praeterea si pro foribus sunt lumina nostra,
iam magis exemptis oculis debere uidetur
cernere res animus sublatis postibus ipsis.

esse uidetur, 3.777) to think that the *animus/anima* enters the body from outside at the time of birth, for that would result in souls' struggling earnestly (*praeproperanter*, 779⁶⁶) against each other to make it into a body (778–782), unless by chance the souls had pre-arranged agreements on who gets which body (*foedera pacta*, 783⁶⁷). This image, like that of the laughing and crying atoms—and also like the image of dreams trained to dance before our sleeping eyes (4.792–793)—draws its humor from the personification of inanimate concepts, and in this respect is similar to Plautus' humorous treatment of deified abstracts, where the playwright pushes to the breaking point the Roman belief in numinous deities immanent in the world around them.⁶⁸

(*DRN* 3.365–369)

And opened doors that we ourselves look through don't undergo any toil.
 Moreover if our eyes are as portals, it seems like the mind ought to perceive things more with eyes removed, with the gates themselves taken away.

The speaker goes on to explicate the (in his view) correct theory of vision at 3.408–415.

⁶⁶ Snyder points out that the use in this line of *figura etymologica* (at *innumero numero*) “contributes to the sarcastic tone of an argument by *reductio ad absurdum*” [1980: 80].

⁶⁷ On the programmatic importance of the term *foedera (naturae)* in *DRN*, see Asmis [2008].

⁶⁸ Feeney calls these, appropriately for our current consideration, “personifications” [1998: 85]. See, for example, *Bacchides* 115–116, one character's invocation of “Love, Pleasure, Venus, Venusness, Rejoicement, Joking, Play, Speech, Kissykissy” (*Amor, Voluptas, Venus, Venustas, Gaudium, Iocus, Ludus, Sermo, Suavisaiatio*), which last personification is too much for the speaker's interlocutor, who challenges *an deus est ullus Suavisaiatio?* (“is there really any such god as Kissykissy?,” 120).

Personification is not solely a comic device—we need look only to the important role in Roman domestic and public religion of Pudicitia, the divine personification of (female) sexual self-control, cf. Langlands [2006: ch. 1]—but it is an effective tool for humor both in Plautus and in these passages of *DRN*. Compare Wallach's continuous consideration of personification and *prosopopoeia* as part of her survey of diatribal traits in *DRN* 3's attack on the fear of death [1976: 7, 33, 66–83, 91, 101, 107].

Finally, in the account of how lightning (*igniferum fulmen*) is not supernatural (6.379–422), the Lucretian *ego* unleashes a battery of rhetorical questions, from why lightning strikes the innocent rather than the guilty to how strikes occur in multiple directions/locations at the exact same time.⁶⁹ On the matter of lightning in uninhabited locations, the speaker asks if the gods who supposedly hurl it are merely practicing: “Or is it the case that they’re training their arms and strengthening up their muscles?” (*an tum bracchia consuescunt firmantque lacertos?*, 396). The notion that the immortal gods need to do pilates is hilarious and in fact specifically Aristophanic.⁷⁰ And it easily dis-

By creating an anthropomorphic image of spirits, dreams, and especially atoms (the impersonal, mechanical building blocks of the universe), *DRN*’s speaker is creating an absurdity—and an image that is inherently funny to humankind, cf. Wardenaar on American colonial literature [1975: 289–293]; Patten on modern American children’s popular culture [2009]; more generally, Buijzen & Valkenburg [2004] and Hurley et al. [2011: 155–157]; and, on humorous anthropomorphism in Homer, Schlesinger [1936: 24–25]. West, too, uses a comic tone when discussing personification in *DRN*: “Lucretius was an inveterate anthropomorphizer” [1994: 32], on which cf. also Reckford [1995: 32–33]; and, on the anthropomorphic atoms specifically, Kennedy [2002: 78].

⁶⁹ Rhetorical questions are, as Wallach demonstrates, “a favorite device of the diatribal style” [1976: 63], cf. Stork [1970: 92].

⁷⁰ Cf. Aristophanes *Clouds* 401: “but he [Zeus] hurls [lightning] at his own temple!” (ἀλλὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ γε νεὼν βάλλει). The commonplace of the randomness of lightning strikes, a *topos* that appears commonly enough in Greek and Latin literature after *DRN*—Pease [1977/1920–1923: 428 *ad* Cicero *De Divinatione* 2.44] cites Seneca *Quaestiones Naturales* 2.51, Pliny *Natural History* 2.113, Lucan 7.447–451, and Lucian *Iuppiter Confutatus* 16, while Geffcken [1907: 129] cites Lucian *Timon* 10—derives from Anaxagoras (see Diels [1912: 393 no. 84]), followed by Democritus (fr. 152, with Plutarch *Quaestiones Coniuvales* 665f and Guthrie [1962–1981: 425 n. 3]); cf. Geffcken [*ibidem*], Pease [*ibidem*], and O’Hara [1994: 387]. Meineck suggests that Anaximenes also lies behind the Aristophanic passage [2000: 107 *ad* 407].

DRN 6.396 is also connected intratextually to 2.1100–1104, where the speaker rejects the notion that gods hurl lightning because, if so, they would avoid striking their own temples or uninhabited places or innocent persons. The Lucretian take on lightning is alluded to by the Horace-*ego*, who states at *Serm.* 1.5.101–103 that he has learned that nature’s marvels are not caused by the anger of the gods, who live a life free from care (*deos securum agere aeuom*—a direct quotation, in fact, of *DRN* 5.82). Cf. also Persius 2.24–25 and Juvenal 3.145–146.

penses with the notion that lightning in the wilderness is hurled by some sentient being. What makes this image funny is the ascription of mundane human necessities to divine beings, not unlike the humor derived in Plautus' *Amphitruo* from a god's castigation by a woman who thinks he is her husband.

Furthermore, in his observations on the follies of human behavior, the speaker paints multiple portraits of funny foibles that reinforce his disparagement of romantic entanglements—as we can see from two examples, both in book 4, whose conclusion is an important satiric passage in *DRN* that I will consider in greater detail in chapter 3. First is a send-up of the costs of love during the speaker's attack on romantic love. Men, in vain, waste away physically and fiscally in pursuit of the object of their affections:

adde quod absumunt uiris pereuntque labore,
adde quod alterius sub nutu degitur aetas.
labitur interea res et Babylonica fiunt,
languent officia atque aegrotat fama uacillans.
unguenta et pulchra in pedibus Sicyonia rident;
scilicet, et grandes uiridi cum luce zmaragdi
auro includuntur, teriturque thalassina uestis
adsidue et ueneris sudorem exercita potat;
et bene parta patrum fiunt anademata, mitrae,
interdum in pallam atque Alidensia Ciaeque uertunt;
eximia ueste et uictu conuiuia, ludi,
pocula crebra, unguenta, coronae, sarta parantur—
nequiquam.

(*DRN* 4.1121–1133)

Add on that they consume their strength and waste away in toil,
add on that their youth is spent under another's authority. Mean-

Cf., on *DRN* 6.379–422, Houghton [1912: xxxv]: “Even the gods are not spared as subjects of satire by this able assailant...The whole passage is one of grandeur and is filled with keen satirizing of the gods,” and Waltz [1949: 100], who compares this passage to Voltaire. Hutchinson cites *DRN* 6.404–405, Cicero *De Diuinatione* 2.45, and Seneca *Quaestiones Naturales* 2.42.1 in support of the notion that “prose and poetry show a kindred intellectual energy, kindred stylistic devices and implicit and explicit interaction” [2009: 208 with 209 n. 30].

while their wealth collapses and becomes bedspreads from Babylon, obligations lie undone and reputation, tottering, grows ill. Pretty perfumed Sicyonian slippers laugh on her feet, hell yes they do!, and giant green emeralds with their light are set in gold, and the sea-colored clothing is attentively worn down and, well-trained, it drinks the sweat of sex; and the well-gotten gains of the fathers become headbands, ribbons, occasionally they turn into a cloak, and Alidensian and Coan silks; they arrange for banquets with top-notch attire and hors d'œuvres, for games, for frequent flagons, for perfumes, for wreathes, for garlands—in vain.

Two short, repetitive imperative clauses are followed by an almost absurdly long run-on sentence, capped off by a wry reversal at *nequiquam* (after which another sizeable sentence will follow). Wealth almost magically transforms into Babylonian duvets, as patrimony metamorphoses into fancy clothes. The abstracts *officia* and *fama* suffer from human ailments, while slippers, smiling (*rident*, 4.1125)⁷¹ on the beloved's feet, mock the lover's extravagance, and their derisive laughter is punctuated by the marker of sarcasm *scilicet*. A long list of symposiastic accessories are purchased, in zeugma. Most strikingly, expensive clothing “well-trained, drinks the sweat of sex” (*ueneris sudorem exercita potat*, 1128)—a jolting, provocative expression that makes explicit, perhaps even vulgar, the intent that lies beneath all the pricey trappings, an expression that comically sullies the efforts of lovers and the lengths to which they engage in these “elegiac expenditures.”⁷²

⁷¹ For *rideo* in mockery, see *OLD* s. v. *rideo* 1d; for the transferred sense (the primary meaning in the *DRN* passage here), see *OLD* s. v. *rideo* 3.

⁷² Barone [1978] discusses these expenditures in more detail; cf. also Rosivach [1980], and Brown's listing of parallels from Roman comedy and elsewhere [1987: 248–251 *ad loc.* and 255–256 *ad* 1124 (1123)]. Brown calls *Veneris sudorem exercita potat* at line 1128 “a masterly satirical stroke” [1987: 260 *ad loc.*]. Gale remarks that the speaker “satirizes the extravagance of the young lover in modern Rome” [1994a: 171].

In fact, these gifts—particularly the jewelry and the Coan silks—are precisely the kinds of gifts given by the poet-lovers of Roman elegy to their *doctae puellae* in the work of Propertius, Tibullus, and Ovid. This passage, in part, is tapping into the same comic tradition on which Roman erotic elegy draws, that of *comoedia palliata*. In the works of Plautus (prime examples are *Asinaria* and *Mostellaria*), in *DRN*'s passage on love in sex, and in the elegists alike, that is, we see the wasting of family fortune (*bene parta patrum*, 4.1129), lavish parties (*eximia ueste et uictu conuiuia*, 1131), slavish devotion to the beloved (*alterius sub nutu*, 1121), all for naught (*nequiquam*, 1133). We even get an *exclusus amator*!⁷³ Comedy, here, at the expense of the witless, senseless lover.⁷⁴

Next I point to the prominent passage, during the same discourse on love, where physical defects are paired with (often Greek) terms of endearment (4.1160–1170).⁷⁵ The girl who can't speak is called “modest,” the hateful burning gossip is called “Starlet” (*muta 'pudens' est; | at flagrans odiosa loquacula 'Lampadium' fit*, 1164–1165), and so forth. Again, men in love deceive themselves and act foolish—entertainingly so, as the

⁷³ *DRN* 4.1177—the only occurrence of this phrase in classical Latin—cf. Copley [1956] and p. 64 n. 54, above. For this passage in satire after *DRN*, see *Serm.* 2.3, Persius 5.161–174, Hooley [1997: 111–116], and Keane [2006: 24 and 147 n. 27].

⁷⁴ On *DRN* 4's debt to comedic theater, see Brown [1987: 135–136]; to love poetry, [1987: 139–143]. Smith places it the passage in the tradition of *dissuasio amoris* and adduces the parallels of New Comedy (particularly Plautus), Ovid *Remedia Amoris*, and Juvenal poem 6 [2005c: 72]—whose self-defeating satirist Smith discusses elsewhere [2005d].

⁷⁵ Dudley [1965b: 124–125] discusses the various proposals for this passage's literary origins. See also Lieberg [1962: 292–297], Barone [1978], Domenicucci [1981], and Brown [1987: 128–132, and 280–283 *ad loc.*], who mentions “the intriguing possibility that Lucretius' treatment of the *topos* was influenced by an epigram of Philodemus” [1987: 130 n. 75] and remarks that *DRN*'s “various sources of inspiration enable Lucretius to unite the roles of satirist and philosopher” [1987: 131]. I examine this passage's allusion to Lucilius in chapter 4 (pp. 208–221, below).

reader can chuckle at the inventive Graecisms and slang that the poor blokes use as a defense against seeing their girls how they really look.⁷⁶

The depiction of early human courtship in the “anthropology” of book 5 likewise includes comic elements, if not targeted mockery:

et Venus in siluis iungebat corpora amantum;
conciliabat enim uel mutua quamque cupido
uel uiolenta uiri uis atque impensa libido
uel pretium, glandes atque arbita uel pira lecta.

(DRN 5.962–965)

and Venus [or, reading *uenus*, “sex”] joined the bodies of lovers in the woods, because each woman became well-disposed either by requited desire or by vehement virile violence and excessive sex-drive or by a reward—acorns and redberries or specially chosen pears.

Besides the heavy alliteration with *uel uiolenta uiri uis* in line 964, the final line is the funny part. Leonard and Smith call *pira lecta* “[a]n amusing touch” [1942: *ad loc.*]. Moreover, gifts of choice produce are quaint, charming, and very different from the kinds of things contemporary lovers give, as exemplified by that passage on elegiac expenditures in the previous book. And the line also shows, tongue-in-cheek, the goal of the gifts in each era: Venus, *iunctio*, the satisfaction of *mutua cupido* or *impensa libido*.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Later incarnations of the theme show its affinity with satire: cf. Horace *Serm.* 1.2 with Hooley [2007: 38]; *Serm.* 1.3.38–75 with Canali [1988: 26–28] and Plaza [2006: 273–279]; Ovid *Amores* 2.4 with Rayor & Batstone [1995: *ad* 2.4.10]; Ovid *Ars Amatoria* 2.641–662 with Sommariva [1980] and Watson [1984]. Brown also adduces Ovid *Heroides* 4.73–74 and 15.31–42, Juvenal 8.30–38, Ausonius *Epigrams* 88, and Molière *Le Misanthrope* act 2 scene 5 [1987: 283 *ad* DRN 4.1160–1169]; and additionally Martial 10.68.5–6 and Juvenal 6.185–198 [1987: 281], with Boyancé [1956: 125–126]. Bettini compares Don Giovanni’s ability to “make the best of each and every item in the endless catalog of women’s imperfections” [1999/1992: 87].

⁷⁷ Additionally, Farrell sees in lines 1091–1095 an “ironic glance at...the Prometheus story” [1994: 91].

One more topic where the Lucretian *ego* acts as a comic speaker is, I believe, in the matter of language. In book 1, issues of language arise repeatedly, and are of great importance to the poem's programmatic statements. Tatum, for instance, remarks that "Lucretius' attitude is determined not on philosophical but on *linguistic* grounds" [1984: 180; emphasis preserved]. Within this discussion of linguistic grounds I find two points that can be taken comically. When addressing the false teachings of the Presocratic philosophers, *DRN*'s speaker introduces the famously lapidary Heraclitus as *clarus ob obscuram linguam magis inter inanis | quamde grauis inter Graios*, "a shining star on account of his murky tongue more among idiots than among grave Greeks."⁷⁸ By means of witty oxymoron reinforced with the sound repetition in *ob obscuram*, *inter inanis*, and *grauis...Graios*,⁷⁹ our speaker alleges that Heraclitus made it big not on the merit of his ideas but on the flashy opacity of his style, and that he is prominent not among serious

⁷⁸ *DRN* 1.639–640. Piazzì notes the intensity of the speaker's mocking attack on Heraclitus here: "contro Eraclito apre una polemica di inusitata virulenza" [2005: 85 *ad* 1.635–704]. On the polemic against Heraclitus, see, e.g., Bollack [1969], Capasso [1983], and Piazzì [2005: 25–42].

⁷⁹ And with a pun on *clarus* / Ἡράκλειτος: so Snyder [1980: 117–118]. Holtsmark [1968] sees a subtle reference to Epicurean atoms and void in the collocation of *s(t)olidi* (1.641) with *inanis*. Some scholars would see in these lines anti-Stoic polemic, cf. my discussion at pp. 12–15, above.

For the formulation *clarus ob obscuram linguam* in particular, compare the light-dark polemical dialectic in anti-Epicurean propaganda, discussed by De Lacy: "The contrast expressed...between light and virtue and glory on the one hand, and darkness and vice and obscurity on the other, is again a commonplace of the anti-Epicurean polemic" [1941: 54]. The Lucretian persona turns the tables! The light-dark dialectic in *DRN* is discussed as well by West [1994: 80–85] and Gale [1994a: 203–205]; Kollmann [1971] discusses *DRN*'s structural and stylistic imitation of Heraclitus and Empedocles in the passages criticizing each philosopher; and Piazzì points out that "l'*obscuritas* non è di per sé negativa" [2005: 90 *ad DRN* 1.639]. Cf. also Timpanaro [1960] and Piazzì [2006: 21–22].

scholars but with the dunces in the peanut gallery. The invective against Heraclitus⁸⁰ continues with the claim that his words are “painted with charming sound” (*levido...fucata sonore*, 1.644). Implausible synaesthesia—and an “outrageous metaphor...a clear parody of H.’s style.”⁸¹ As with the parody of Anaxagoras’ ὁμοιομερία, the speaker of *DRN* uses humor to detract from opposing philosophical world systems, but unlike the attack on Anaxagoras, the refutation of Heraclitus begins with the comic reduction of linguistic presentation. The philosopher’s bright reputation is ironic, drawn as it is from his lack of clarity.

I propose another moment of irony in the language-focused portions of the poem’s first book. Earlier in the book, the *ego* speaks of the difficulty of his undertaking:

nec me animi fallit Graiorum obscura reperta
difficile inlustrare Latinis uersibus esse,
multa nouis uerbis praesertim cum sit agendum
propter egestatem linguae et rerum nouitatem.

(*DRN* 1.136–139)

And it doesn’t escape my mind that it’s hard to make clear the murky discoveries of the Greeks in Latin poetry, particularly because in many cases it has to be done with new words, on account of the language’s poverty and the newness of the subject matter.

On the first read-through of *DRN*, these words may perhaps be taken at face value. But in the second reading—even on the first, for an attentive reader, or one well-informed on

⁸⁰ And it is an invective against Heraclitus as much as against his ideas: Waltz remarks that *DRN*’s speaker “ne sépare pas l’homme de la doctrine; il n’a, pour lui comme pour elle, que mépris hautain, qu’injurieuse ironie” [1949: 84]. See, further, Brown [1983: 146]: “Towards Heraclitus he adopts an aggressively satirical tone and deftly mocks his style, which he judges to be all show, devoid of content.”

⁸¹ Rouse & Smith [1975: 53 n. d], and further: “Moreover, *init...dux proelia* ironically hints at H.’s contention that ‘strife is right’ and ‘war is the father of all and king of all.’ ” Heraclitus is thus portrayed a comically overinflated figure, a fancy-talking general amid the battles of cosmic strife. On synaesthesia in Roman poetry, see Catrein [2003].

the philosophy of the day—the lines can, I argue, come across as ironic, even comical. To wit, the *egestas linguae* (cf. *sermonis egestas*, 1.832 and 3.260). The speaker does not actually struggle with his native language, but in fact uses its polysemy to poetic advantage, as Warren persuasively shows [2007: 22, underline added]:

In just a few lines of *DRN* 1, for example (1.54–61), he uses the terms *rerum primordia* ('first beginnings of things'), *materies* ('matter'), *genitalia corpora* ('productive bodies'), *semina rerum* ('seeds of things') and *corpora prima* ('first bodies'). Later books occasionally also use *corpuscula* ('little bodies') and *elementa* ('elements'). This range of terms belies any complaints of the lexical poverty of Latin and allows Lucretius to express the importance of atoms by noting the various roles they play as the fundamental existents, components, and material substance, for all other things.

I add that there is very little Greek present in the poem. The speaker has, contrary to claims of linguistic exigencies, found a Latin equivalent (or multiple equivalents) for each Greek term or concept that he wishes to discuss.⁸² The range of terms in *DRN* for atoms—none of which, we should note, is ἄτομοι⁸³—gives the lie as well to the *ego*'s

⁸² Except for the rare instances when he leaves a word untranslated to make a point, as is the case with ἄρμονία and ὁμοιομερία, the latter of which is discussed above.

⁸³ Despite the fact that other Latin authors use *atomus*. Most notable among them is Lucilius (fr. 28.15C = 753M = 820W = 774K; for these abbreviations, see p. xii, above), writing before Lucretius (a fragment that I discuss at pp. 215–216, below). Also: Cicero *De Finibus* 1.6.17, *De Natura Deorum* 1.54, and *De Fato* 22; Seneca *Quaestiones Naturales* 2.6.2; Quintilian *Institutio Oratoriae* 7.2.2. Lévy points out that, according to Cicero, Amafinius also used *corpusculum* rather than *atomus* [2003: 52], and Piazzini includes Catus as well [2005: 87 *ad DRN* 1.635]. Minyard highlights the fact that *DRN* does not transliterate as evidence of the poem's having goals beyond simple philosophical didaxis [1985: 45]:

Using the old Latin words in fact increased the difficulty of communication for Lucretius, a difficulty which would have been lessened had he simply imported the established Greek terms for his principal technical categories. Had his purpose been purely explanatory, didactic, and descriptive, purely philosophical, this is what he should have done.

claim that his task must be accomplished with new vocabulary. Instead, the terminology is in many cases exceedingly familiar: *res*, *semina*, *corpora*, and so on. It is not, then, so difficult to elucidate this topic in *Latini uersus*; there is in *DRN* no evidence of the *egestas linguae*; and the speaker has no demonstrated need of *noua uerba*.⁸⁴ The *rerum nouitas* is suspect to a knowledgeable reader, too, given the presence in Roman libraries of Amafinius' Latin adaptations of Epicurean texts (discussed at pp. 7–10, above). We might even see *jeu de mots* here on the term *res* as *DRN*'s term for both subject and atomic matter. These four lines are packed with such clever, intratextually allusive, ironic, playfully self-undercutting material as to elicit a knowing grin or chuckle from a careful (re-)reader.

Personal voice

The voice of the satirist is both personal-ized and persona-lized. Satirists speak from a first-person subject position, not from that of an impersonal, external observer. But they speak also from a constructed persona, from a mask (perhaps an eminently believable and convincing one) that embodies the shiftiness of the satirist's relationship to

⁸⁴ Cf. Wardy [1988: 126]: "Commentators have too easily accepted at face value Lucretius' excuse of the *patrii sermonis egestas*," and cf. also Fögen [2000: 61–76] and the citations I provide below (p. 158 n. 39). Contrast Minyard's passing reference to "the severely restricted Latin language" [1985: 75], Roggen's mention of *DRN*'s "coinages, necessary because of the *patrii sermonis egestas*" [2008: 548], and Crawley [1963: 4]: "No one can question his sincerity, when he speaks of the difficulties presented by the lack of an established vocabulary and idiom for his subject, by *patrii sermonis egestas*."

None of these Latin terms means "uncut thing," as does ἄτομος, but there is (at least in authors after Lucretius) a Latin term that does: *indiuuiduum*, with *corpus* or *principium* understood or explicit, in Cicero *De Finibus* 1.6.17, *De Natura Deorum* 1.23 and 1.71, *Academica* 2.17, *De Fato* 25, and elsewhere; Vitruvius 2.2.1; Manilius 1.128 (another Latin didactic poet also talking about the nature of the universe); and Gellius 5.15.8.

his audience and the ambiguity that often characterizes his satire. Although *DRN*, on a broad view, may seem to possess an impersonal narrator—expounding upon the composition of the cosmos, omniscient like the narrators of epic—in fact the speaker again and again provides the reader with personal references and anecdotes, as I will show. The constructed persona is closer to the *ego* of Hesiod’s *Works and Days* than to the *ego* of his *Theogony*. Though there is no feud with a brother like Perses in the background plot of *DRN*, there are in fact pre-existing relationships of great import to the Lucretian *ego*: namely, his discipleship of Epicurus, invoked particularly in the proem to book 3, and the connection to his patron-addressee Memmius, whose friendship the speaker desires (1.140–141).⁸⁵

DRN, I mean, is much more personalized than extant earlier epic, and thus the Lucretian speaker is arguably closer to a satirist than to an epic narrator.⁸⁶ Now in part,

⁸⁵ Clay [1983: 214], Donohue [1993: 120–121], and Volk [2002a: 79–82] in fact compare Memmius to Perses (cf. Gale [2005: 179], *contra*). Cf. Kenney [1971: 11], Keen [1985], and Cox [1969: 126; emphasis preserved]:

We may see in the underlying moral earnestness the origins of a *mood* [or, for our purposes, mode] which pervaded the later masterpieces of didactic poetry and was perhaps an essential element in their success as works of art: for poetry seems most easily to combine with a didactic purposes when teaching rises to *preaching*.

The identification of Memmius as the Lucretian persona’s patron is not completely certain: *DRN*’s speaker uses the term *amicitia* for the relationship he wants with Memmius (1.141), a term that can mean “political alliance”—so, e.g., Syme [1956: 12], Brunt [1965], and Ross [1969: 83]—and here is ambiguous or, in Gold’s words, “troubling” [1987: 53]. Scholars are divided on whether the persona is seeking patronage. Among the “yes” votes are Allen [1938: 178], Roller [1970], White [1978], Wiseman [1982], and Gold [1987: 51]. Those with doubts include Treggiari [1977], Kenney [1977], Williams [1982: 8], Clay [1983: 218–219], and Donohue [1993: 114–116].

⁸⁶ This is not, however, to say that the epic narrator is himself impersonal: see de Jong [2004/1987], arguing against the earlier *communis opinio* (represented by Fränkel [1976/1951], among many others) that Homer’s narrator was “objective,” cf. de Jong &

the speaker's personal voice is simply the one that leads us readers to think about what makes us all human. Each of us knows what it is like to see in our dreams the games we were playing when awake (4.973–983), to wet the bed (4.1026–1036), to see the sky reflected in puddles, to feel laundry that has dried in the sun (1.305–310, 6.617–618, 6.470–475). By conjuring such images, the *ego* taps into shared experiences to create the sense of a personal connection between philosophical doctrinarian (speaker) and amenable, even rapt pupil (reader).⁸⁷

This “we” voice is explicit in the *ego*'s early mention of the need to offer a material account of ghastly apparitions:

et quae res nobis uigilantibus obuia mentes
terrificet morbo adfectis somnoque sepultis,
cernere uti uideamur eos audireque coram,
morte obita quorum tellus amplectitur ossa.

(*DRN* 1.132–135)

And we must give an explanation concerning [*habenda* | *nobis est ratio*, 1.127–128] what thing gets in and terrifies our minds while we're kept awake affected by illness and while we're buried in sleep, such that we seem to see and hear plainly those whose bones, fallen in death, the earth embraces.

Nünlist [2004] and Ready [2011]. Rather, *DRN*'s narrator creates a relationship between narrator and narratee that is markedly different from what we can see in Homer, Apollonius, “the cool detachment characteristic of Hellenistic didactic” (as Gale [2005: 175] puts it), Ennius' *Annales*, and even Hesiod's *Works and Days*, which itself (as Tortorelli [2010] and others have examined) systematically engages with non-epic narrational modes.

Unlike the narrator of much epic poetry, that is, the Lucretian *ego* uses a rhetorical strategy of identifying with the reader to create a certain collusive closeness that is in many respects like the narratorial position of a satirist. For more on the relationship of *DRN*'s narrator to his audience, see Mitsis [1993], with my discussion below (pp. 123–127); Clay [1983: 213–217]; Segal [1990]; and my references below (p. 96 n. 116).

⁸⁷ Cf. Clay [1983: 223]: “To reach his reader, Lucretius must put himself in his place...This technique of *psychagogia* explains why...Lucretius professes to be his reader's fellow in fear.”

The speaker intimates to the reader that he himself is familiar with this phenomenon, that he has undergone similar experiences, that he knows what it is like to be so deep in sleep as to feel buried by it. Likewise, he perhaps offers the reader some degree of consolation in the conclusion of his rejection of the fear of death (3.1076–1089) by explicitly including himself among the number of those (all of us) who are fated to die. The first person plural personal pronoun appears twice, accompanied by no fewer than eight first person plural verbs.⁸⁸ The Lucretian speaker shares the changing cravings (*auemus...auemus*, 1082–1083), the uncertain end (*quiuue exitus instet*, 1086), and the inability to reduce the duration of death (*nec delibare ualemus*, 1088). “Finally, what such great ill desire for life coerces us so greatly to have fear amid uncertain dangers?” (*denique tanto opere in dubiis trepidare periculis | quae mala nos subigit uitai tanta cupido?*, 1076–1077). Not “you all,” not “fools,” not the *stolidi* or *inanes*, but us.⁸⁹ By speaking inclusively, by acknowledging a share in the common anxieties and concerns of humans, the speaker becomes more connected to the reader, his voice more personalized.

We can also find numerous passages in which *DRN*'s *ego* speaks to the reader from an “I” perspective, where an unmistakably personal voice is in action. Simple examples: “I’m now trying to talk about the matter itself” (*de re nunc ipsa dicere conor*, 6.668); “let me sing” the causes of celestial motion (*canamus*, a poetic plural, 5.509); and “I am scarcely led” to believe that commanders actually sent boars, bulls, or lions into battle (5.1341). The speaker further twice threatens to “chase after” or “hunt down” his

⁸⁸ *Nos* (1077), *nobis* (1086); *obeamus* (1079), *uersamur* and *insumus* (1080), *auemus* (1082 and 1083), *demimus* (1087), *ualemus* (1088), *possimus* (1089).

⁸⁹ Of course, the Lucretian speaker does often call people fools (cf. Mitsis [1993] and my discussion at pp. 123–127, below). But not here.

errant/erroneous narratee.⁹⁰ Such notional pursuit enlivens the speaker-reader relation and adds character to the speaker's persona.

In another moment of synaesthesia, the speaker almost casually links himself and the reader: *sex etiam aut septem loca uidi reddere uoces, | unam cum iaceres*, "I've seen places return even six or seven calls though you've only sent out one of your own" (4.577–578). The speech is colloquial, like two acquaintances exchanging fishing stories, and the switch from first to second person results in a sense of familiarity. Similarly, the *ego* relates that he has heard Sicily is a tourist hotspot (*regio uisendaque fertur*, 1.727) and that he himself has seen the power of magnetism at work in shows of Samothracian ironwork (*Samothracea ferrea uidi*, 6.1044).⁹¹

⁹⁰ 1.980, *hoc pacto sequar*; 2.983, *quippe sequar*.

⁹¹ Cf. Sedley [1999: 241 n. 36] on the echo-filled locales and magnetic tricks: "Given how sparing he is with them, I would take these autopsy claims seriously. When he has not witnessed something in person, Lucretius is ready to admit it: cf. his indication at 1.727 that he has never been to Sicily." Sedley continues, however, to claim that "[a] picture of Lucretius the seasoned Aegean tourist does not carry conviction, and should become still less plausible when we proceed to explore his wary attitude to things Greek" [1999: 241].

Sedley is not quite on target here. Though the speaker does have a wary attitude towards incorrect Greek philosophy, particularly in book 1, he nevertheless expresses great esteem for the Greek philosopher Epicurus (as in the proem to book 5) and the Greek city of Athens (as in the proem to book 6). And whether the historical Lucretius had traveled in Greece or not, the speaker is nonetheless constructed as having seen (or "seen") this Samothracian spectacle.

The scholarship on the matter of autopsy in Greek historiography is massive. Important examples include Schepens [1970, 1975, 1980], Armayor [1978, 1980], West [1985: 293–294], and Armayor [1985] with West [1987]. Marincola calls historians' claims of autopsy "authenticating devices" [1997: 83], and see Potter discusses the unreliable veracity of such claims [1999: 28]. The use of such reports in Homer is discussed by de Jong [2004/1987: 210–218]. On the use of *uidi(mus)* in didactic autopsy claims in Latin authors, see Thomas for such expressions in Vergil's *Georgics* [1988: *ad* 1.193 and 1.316–318]; Thomas [1992: 44–51] for autopsy and poetic memory at *Georgics* 4.116–148, cf. Perkell [1981: 170]; and Simpson [2001: 66–68] on autopsy in Horace. Accord-

One of the main avenues through which the speaker's personal voice develops is his (presentation of his) fondness for Epicurus. As the speaker says, "I follow in *his* footsteps while I thoroughly pursue [his?] philosophical principles and teach them with my writings" (*cuius ego ingressus uestigia dum rationes | persequor ac doceo dictis*, 5.55–56). A picture of an avid disciple, and a brief reiteration of the opening lines of book 3:

te sequor, o Graiae gentis decus, inque tuis nunc
ficta pedum pono pressis uestigia signis,
non ita certandi cupidus quam propter amorem
quod te imitari aueo.

(*DRN* 3.3–6)

I follow you, grace of the Greek race, and in your imprinted tracks
I now put the fixed steps of my feet, not so much eager to compete
as on account of love—because I want to copy you.

A personal voice indeed. And the effect of Epicurus' teachings on the persona—as he perceives that matter is handled across the whole void (*totum uideo per inane geri res*, 17), and as Epicurus causes a release from fear (*diffugiunt animi terrores*, 16)—is a kind of sublime experience: "a certain godlike pleasure takes me, and an awe/goosebumps" (*me...quaedam diuina uoluptas | percipit atque horror*, 28–29). The sense of affection that pupil (speaker) holds for instructor (Epicurus) is intense, and perhaps this affection is to be found as well in the relationship in *DRN* between reader (notionally a pupil) and speaker (now himself the instructor). As the Lucretian persona takes on the role of teacher—once more following in Epicurus' footsteps—and as the reader is placed in the position of student, depiction of the prior pedagogical interaction models for us the reader's response: namely enthusiastic embrace of the instructor and his ideas.

ing to Nisbet & Hubbard, *uidimus* at Horace *Odes* 1.2.13 is a "familiar rhetorical device" [1978: 15 *ad loc.*].

The format of the *ego*'s teaching—poetry—speaks to his personalized voice, as well. The proem to the fourth book (4.1–25 = 1.926–950), one of *DRN*'s poetic pinnacles, is replete with first-person syntax,⁹² as the *ego* details his poetic journeys and poetic pleasures. On the other side of the *topos* of *DRN*'s composition, the speaker also shares his poetic struggles in creating *DRN*. For instance, at the inception of his argument on the mortality of the *animus* and the *anima*, the speaker states, “I’ll proceed to set out long-sought poetry uncovered with sweet toil and worthy of your mode of life” (*conquisita diu dulcique reperta labore | digna tua pergam disponere carmina uita*, 3.419–420).⁹³ The speaker here presents himself sympathetically, as an artist devoted to his craft, undertaking significant yet rewarding efforts to achieve his poetic goal.⁹⁴

⁹² First-person verbs: *peragro* (4.1), *doceo* (6), *pergo* (7), *pango* (8), *uolui* (20), *possem* (24). First-person personal adjectives and pronouns: *meo* (4), *ego* (18), *nostram* (21), *uersibus in nostris* (24). For this passage’s “civic significance” see Minyard [1985: 57].

⁹³ Cf. the lines immediately following the first mention of the supposed *egestas linguae*:
 sed tua me uirtus tamen et sperata uoluptas
 suavis amicitiae quemuis efferre laborem
 suadet, et inducit noctes uigilare serenas.
 (*DRN* 1.140–142)

But your excellence and the hoped-for pleasure of sweet friendship nevertheless convinces me to endure to the end whatsoever toil, and leads me to stay awake through peaceful nights.

Lines 140–145 contain allusions to Callimachus *Epigrams* 27 (on Aratus and ἀγρουπνίη) and to Leonidas of Tarentum’s epigram on Aratus (*Greek Anthology* 9.25). On the connections of *noctes uigilare serenas* to Aratus and Callimachus, see Thomas [1979], Brown [1982: 83 and n. 34], Gale [1994a: 107 n. 41], and Henkel [2009: 16–18]; and further Henkel [forthcoming] on a similar allusion at Vergil *Georgics* 1.291–296.

⁹⁴ The *ego* also claims oracular authority (5.110–112), though an intratextual repetition here (5.111–112 = 1.738–739) may link our speaker with wrongheaded physicists like Empedocles and so may undercut the claim in book 5. He also claims to be the first able to translate the *reperta* of Epicurus into *patriae uoces* (5.336–337), irrespective of the work of Amafinius (cf. pp. 7–10, above). If the reader picks up on these observations and consequently considers the *ego* to be self-contradictory, perhaps we have here an instance

Poetry in fact comes to be an important defining feature of the speaker's personality⁹⁵—for when giving examples of how creatures dream of doing things to which they are habituated in waking life, the Lucretian *ego* says:

in somnis eadem plerumque uidemur obire:
.....
nos agere hoc autem et naturam quaerere rerum
semper et inuentam patriis exponere chartis.
(*DRN* 4.965, 969–970)

We often seem to go about doing the same things in our dreams...I meanwhile [seem] to do *this*, and to seek out the Nature of Things, and to explain it, once discovered, in mother-tongue writings.

As essential as pleading cases is to a lawyer (4.966) or battle is to a general (967), so essential to our speaker's identity is studying Epicurean philosophy and adapting it for Romans. An important facet of his personalized voice is a kind of self-identification with his poetry, as seen both in these lines and in such simple phrases as “many things have been set forth by me” (*sunt a me multa profecta*, 6.81). The speaker's personality is wrapped up in philosophic-poetic production,⁹⁶ and his persona pervades the poem, not only in the proems and purple passages but in the atomic argumentation, as well.

of the tension between the speaker's claims of the (in this case poetic) high ground and his satirist-like elusiveness, on which see my points below (pp. 99, 130, and 159).

⁹⁵ Volk remarks, “[i]n those passages where he refers to his own ongoing composition, he stresses his enjoyment, his pride in his achievement, and his intense concentration” [2010: 129, with citations in n. 7].

⁹⁶ See further Segal [1989: 201–204], who argues that *DRN* 1.102–126, 1.140–144, and 3.1024–1044 correct for the near-ecstatic poetic claims of 1.926–950 (= 4.1–25), so that “the poet's journey seems an ultimately more limited, more self-centered, and more narrowly emotional achievement” [1989: 204].

The “high ground”

A satirist’s voice is not merely personalized, but self-righteous and preening, as the satirist claims the moral high ground over his opponents, targets, and victims. It is because of his superior moral vantage point that the satirist can effectively assess the faults and shortcomings and baseness of others in his society. The personalized voice in *DRN*, too, is preening and self-righteous, for the *ego* (as I will show) claims moral, intellectual, and even poetic high ground as he expatiates on the nature of things and the path to an ataractic life. In *DRN* as in the whole tradition of Graeco-Roman satiric genres, these claims are often linked with the speaker’s use of mockery and indignation, both of which I treat separately below.

An ownership of the moral high ground is implicit in the *ego*’s stated goal of the poem—to share in Latin verse Epicurus’ scientific explanation of the cosmos, and thereby to demonstrate how to attain a life free from the fear of death, from ambition, and from other crippling anxieties. And such ownership is explicit in well-known excerpts like the *exemplum* of Iphigenia/Iphianassa in book 1, particularly in its closing moral, *tantum religio potuit suadere malorum* (“to such a height of ills has religion/superstition been able to push” humankind, 1.101). In moments like this one, the Lucretian speaker sets himself apart from and above those complicit in the object of his criticism, in this instance Agamemnon and all who engage in perverted ritual that has (according to our speaker) no bearing on the gods themselves.⁹⁷

⁹⁷ Cf. 1.44–49, the celebrated passage on the nature of the gods; for Epicurus on the nature of the gods, see, e.g., Konstan [2011] and Sedley [2011].

Two passages late in book 5 serve as important illustrations of the speaker's self-righteousness. 5.1117–1135 is an account of the vanity of human greed and ambition, and it includes an expression of the Epicurean principle “live hidden” (λάθε βιώσας). “It's much more preferable indeed to obey in peace than to want to guide the world in command and hold kingdoms” (*satius multo iam sit parere quietum | quam regere imperio res uelle et regna tenere*, 1127–1128). The speaker sets up a simple lifestyle withdrawn from public affairs—the kind of lifestyle he suggests that he himself lives—as the best kind of living.

Again, at 5.1194–1203, the speaker laments the plight of humans who believe that the gods have great power and great anger: “Unhappy human race, since it has imputed to the gods such deeds and has added on harsh wraths!” (*o genus infelix humanum, talia diuis | cum tribuit facta atque iras adiunxit acerbis!*, 1194–1195). Unhappy not simply because of their misconception of the nature of divinity, but rather because it has led to pain for us and our progeny (1196–1197: us and ours—the speaker once more includes himself!) and moreover results in an improper attempt to show *pietas* towards the gods (1197–1202). The Lucretian *ego* here places himself in the same position of moral, even religious superiority in which we see him telling the tale of Iphigenia (*DRN* 1.80–101). Unlike the uneducated masses, the speaker knows that it is false doctrine to think that the gods can be placated by ritual obeisances. But in the passage from book 5, he also makes a positive assertion about proper religious behavior. True *pietas*, he says, is not animal sacrifice and the rest, “but rather being able to observe everything with a becalmed mind”

(*sed mage placata posse omnia mente tueri*, 1203). True *pietas* is, in other words, behaving like an Epicurean—being like the speaker himself.⁹⁸

And the speaker is, in his turn, like Epicurus. We have examined his representation of his discipleship to Epicurus (p. 84, above), and how he claims in the proem of book 3 to follow Epicurus’ “imprinted tracks” (*signa pressa*, 3.4). In the proem to book 6, now, the speaker uses intratextual allusion to align himself with Epicurus’ moral high ground, the very high ground that the proem itself exalts. After describing Epicurus’ grand accomplishment of revealing the *summum bonum* (6.26) and the folly of an anxiety-filled life (33–34), he repeats a passage that has appeared multiple times before, in important sections describing his own philosophic-poetic program:

nam ueluti pueri trepidant atque omnia caecis
in tenebris metuunt, sic nos in luce timemus
interdum nil quae sunt metuenda magis quam
quae pueri in tenebris pauitant finguntque futura.
hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest
non radii solis nec lucida tela diei
discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque.

(*DRN* 6.35–41⁹⁹)

For just as boys tremble and fear everything in blind darknesses, so also do we from time to time frighten in the light at things that ought to be feared no more than what the boys in the darkness are afraid of and imagine is about to happen. This mental fright and darkness, then, must be dispelled not by the sun’s rays, nor the day’s bright shafts, but by the appearance and explanation of nature.

He then avers a causal relationship between the contents of the proem and the argument that follows.¹⁰⁰ By invoking himself as salutary didact immediately after representing

⁹⁸ Cf. Testard [1976] and Cottier [1999].

⁹⁹ 6.35–41 = 2.55–61 = 3.87–93; and also 6.39–41 = 1.146–148. I discuss these lines’ allusion to Lucilius in chapter 4 (pp. 228–230, below).

Epicurus in the same fashion, the speaker identifies with him, appropriates his moral authority—and his intellectual authority, as well.

The speaker of *DRN* repeatedly claims the intellectual high ground, over both his philosophical rivals (as with the invective against the Presocratics in book 1) and even at times his addressee. In fact, in the opening of book 2, he actually positions himself on literal (if metaphorical) high ground:

sed nil dulcius est bene quam munita tenere
edita doctrina sapientum templa serena,
despicere unde queas alios passimque uidere
errare atque uiam palantis quaerere uitae.

(*DRN* 2.7–10)

But nothing is sweeter than to hold the wise men’s well-defended precincts, lofty with placid teaching, wherefrom you could look down on the rest and see them all over, going astray and wandering as they seek life’s way.¹⁰¹

The speaker comes across as almost arrogant.¹⁰² Common folk are, to him, objects of observation, items for study or even amusement. The tone is moralistic, yes,¹⁰³ but the point

¹⁰⁰ “All the more, then, I’ll proceed to finish word-weaving what I’ve begun” (*quo magis inceptum pergam pertexere dictis*, 6.42).

¹⁰¹ I have translated *doctrina* as ablative of means with *edita*, and *serena* in agreement with *doctrina*. Alternatively, *doctrina* can be taken as ablative of means with *bene munita* instead and *serena* can agree with *templa* instead of *doctrina*. Rouse & Smith translate: “lofty sanctuaries serene, well fortified by the teachings of the wise” [1975: 95]. Fowler [2002: 54 *ad loc.*] puts *serena* “surely with *templa*, as both rhythm and sense suggest,” *contra* Flores [1965: 122].

¹⁰² Bailey finds “an unpleasant taste of egoism and even cruelty” in the *suaue mari magno* sentiment of book 2’s opening lines [1947: v. 2 p. 797]; Ernout & Robin refer to 2.1 as “cette exclamation égoïste” [1962/1925–1928: 203 *ad loc.*]; Nichols sees it as “selfish and anything but humanitarian” [1976: 62]. Fowler claims that “the consciousness of one’s own lack of pain [is] the main element” [2002: 39], cf. Boyancé [1963: 43] and Smith [2001: 35 n. 1]. Konstan points out antecedents in the Greek dramatists Sophocles and Archippus [2008/1973: 31–32], and demonstrates that the people in trouble at sea exemplify avoidable ills since, in the Roman worldview, the impetus for seafaring was greed [2008/1973: 33–37]. Morel adduces the parallel of Democritus fr. 191 [2000: 54,

is also one of intellectual superiority: note that the *templa* belong to the *sapientes*, and are marked by *doctrina*. The denizens of this lofty realm despise (or at least pity patronizingly—*despicere*¹⁰⁴) the outsiders (the Others, *alios*) for their *error*, because they cannot find the true path (*uia*). Their minds are the first part of the problem (*o miseris hominum mentes*, 2.14). Implicit in this passage, and the entire proem (2.1–61), is that the Lucretian speaker can show the reader how to walk along the *uia uitae*, and how to reach the *templa sapientum*; indeed, another iteration of the repeated passage just mentioned (here 2.55–61) states that the path is enlightenment through the study of “the appearance and explanation of nature.”¹⁰⁵

The satirist preens, and so does *DRN*'s speaker, particularly when it comes to his intellectual stature. His teachings are gifts, painstakingly prepared for the addressee:

quod superest, uacuas auris animumque sagacem
semotum a curis adhibe ueram ad rationem,
ne mea dona tibi studio disposta fideli,
intellecta prius quam sint, contempta relinquas.

(*DRN* 1.50–53)

60–61]. Cf. also Clay [1983: 65, 186, 219–220], Gale [2005: 180–181], and Konstan [2007]. I discuss and provide further citations in my discussion of the poem's very opening lines (p. 151, p. 155–157, and p. 155 n. 36, below).

¹⁰³ Bailey, for instance, notes that the proem “is interesting as containing Lucr.'s most explicit references to the moral theory of Epicurus” [1947: 794].

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Fowler [2002: 55 *ad loc.*]: “as well as the literal sense, there is an element of contempt...stronger than *contemno*.”

¹⁰⁵ Sedley points out that this phrase, *naturae species ratioque*, is the standard way in which *DRN* adapts the Greek philosophical term φυσιολογία, and that “in Lucretius' rendition it has lost all terminological technicality, and become a subtly descriptive formula for the poem's theme” [1999: 229]. See further Clay [1969, and 1983: 105–109], Long [1977, and 1997: 130], Duban [1982: 167], Thury [1987], Fowler [2002: 141–143 *ad loc.*], and Gale [2005: 184]. *Natura*, in this poem, is active as well as passive. On the term *natura* in *DRN*, see Merrill [1891].

As for what follows, apply to true reasoning your unoccupied ears and a wise mind removed from cares, so that you don't disdain and abandon my gifts—arranged for you with loyal enthusiasm—before they've been comprehended.

He portrays his literary output not only as a valuable gift (*mea dona*) but also an intellectual accomplishment (*studio disposta fideli*), one that requires careful attentiveness (*uacuas auris*), sagacity (*animumque sagacem*), and time (*intellecta prius quam sint*) simply to understand. He later describes his work as being (or as providing) *clara lumina* for the addressee (1.144).¹⁰⁶ And his intellectual capacity, he later says, is vast—even limitless, enough to supply didactic verse (or at least philosophical arguments) until he and the dedicatee Memmius have both died of old age.¹⁰⁷ So, relatively early in the first book of the poem, the picture develops of a speaker who is self-righteous about his moral

¹⁰⁶ Cf. 1.933–934 = 4.8–9: “I compose such clear songs about a murky subject,” *obscura de re tam lucida pango | carmina*.

¹⁰⁷ quod si pigraris paulumue recesseris ab re,
hoc tibi de plano possum promittere, Memmi:
usque adeo largos haustus e fontibu' magnis
lingua meo suaui diti de pectore fundet,
ut uerear ne tarda prius per membra senectus
serpat et in nobis uitai claustra resoluat,
quam tibi de quauis una re uersibus omnis
argumentorum sit copia missa per auris.

(*DRN* 1.410–417)

But if you'll've gotten lazy or pulled a bit away from the matter at hand, Memmius, I can plainly promise you this: my sweet tongue will pour out from my rich heart soooo-lavish drafts from giant springs that I'm afraid old age might sooner creep through our slow limbs and undo the gates of life in us, [sooner] than the whole supply of proofs concerning any one given thing has been sent into your ears by means of my poetry.

and intellectual superiority, and who can treat his addressee with outright condescension.¹⁰⁸

Abjection

In satiric poetry, self-righteous claims to the moral high ground are often paired with reference to or acknowledgement of the *ego*'s abject status or physical condition. In *DRN*, references to this sort of abjection are sparse and subtle, but are present nonetheless. The speaker's social status is linked with his relationship to Epicurus and the general social status of Epicureanism, his psychological and physical status is on occasion connected to the baser experiences of the human condition, and he professes (as I will suggest) a kind of linguistic abjection for his mother tongue.

The speaker tells us that he follows in Epicurus' footsteps, as we have seen, and he fleshes out his bond with Epicurus by comparing the two of them:

...te imitari aueo: quid enim contendat hirundo
cycnis, aut quidnam tremulis facere artibus haedi
consimile in cursu possint et fortis equi uis?
tu pater es, rerum inuentor, tu patria nobis
suppeditas praecepta, tuis ex, inclute, chartis,
floriferis ut apes in saltibus omnia libant,
omnia nos itidem depascimur aurea dicta.

(*DRN* 3.6–12)

[I follow in your footsteps because] I want to copy you—for how could a swallow compete with swans, how on earth could kids with wobbly legs do the same at running as the strong force of the horse? You are the father, the discoverer of the universe, you furnish us our paternal precepts; from your writings, you glorious man, we—just like bees in flowering glens sip on everything—we likewise feed off all your golden words.

¹⁰⁸ I consider the treatment of Memmius/addressee, and its interpretation by Mitsis [1993], at pp. 123–127, below, in connection with the speaker's satiric collusiveness.

Our speaker is the lowly swallow to Epicurus' gallant swan.¹⁰⁹ He is the baby goat just getting on its feet, while Epicurus is the mighty horse, mighty enough to merit an almost Homeric epic periphrasis.¹¹⁰ He is the son, the schoolboy. He is even a bee, feeding off of Epicurus' teachings.¹¹¹ The speaker of *DRN* positions himself thoroughly subordinate to the figure of Epicurus, using metaphors not only of social status but also of physical stature and comeliness.

The lifestyle of the Epicurean philosopher represents a sort of voluntary social abjection. The speaker's λάθε βιώσας sentiment cited previously (p. 88, above) shows the true follower of Epicurus in a position of silent obedience: "it's much more preferable

¹⁰⁹ Donohue calls this line "the most paradoxical compliment in *De Rerum Natura*" [1993: 148]. For Greek antecedents to the imagery in this passage, Brown [1997: 92 *ad* 3.6–8] cites Aristophanes *Frogs* 93 and 680 (swallows), and Theocritus 5.136–137 (swan song), while Kenney [1971: 75 *ad* 3.6–8] cites Pindar *Olympians* 2.87–88 (rival poets as ravens squawking at an eagle). Compare Vergil *Eclogues* 9.35–36: "for I don't yet seem to say things worthy of Varius or Cinna, but to squawk as a gander among keen-tuned swans," *nam neque adhuc Varius uideor nec dicere Cinna | digna, sed argutos inter strepere anser olores*. Donohue also provides an overview of swan-imagery in Graeco-Roman literature [1993: 18–29], and Papaioannou [2004] treats swan imagery in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*. Sedley points out *DRN*'s use here of the Graecism *cycnus* instead of the native Latin *olor* [1998: 57–58], and Kenney calls the swan imagery "quite explicitly Alexandrian" [1970: 371], though see *contra* Knox [1999] and p. 185 n. 89, below.

Hunter connects to Hellenistic poetic practice the images in *DRN* of both the honeyed cup [2006: 84, on *DRN* 1.933–950] and the development of professional poetry among early humankind [2006: 135, on 5.1444–1447].

¹¹⁰ And, later, a god: "it must be said, he was a god, a god!" (*dicendum est, deus ille fuit, deus*, 5.8)—an image that Sedley situates in a trend of near-religious loyalty to a school's founder that is present in much of Hellenistic philosophy [1989: 97].

¹¹¹ The image derives ultimately from Pindar, who refers to "the honey-voiced Muses" (μελίφθογγοι...Μοῖσαι, *Olympians* 6.21, among others). See Race [1997: 6], as well as Pausanias 9.23.2 and *Greek Anthology* 7.34, 16.305, all three with Ransome [2004/1937: 91–111]; and further, e.g., Norwood [1945: 124–126, 159, 170, 250] and Fogelmark [2002] (with White [2004], *contra*). Hughes [1993] examines the adoption of Pindar's bees by Milton and Shakespeare.

indeed to obey in peace” (*satius multo iam sit parere quietum*, 5.1127). Members of the Garden, we should note, are not merely downcast, but also outcasts. For, as Gordon demonstrates, “in the eyes of the dominant culture, there was something fundamentally unmanly about the Garden...[*DRN*] serves to confirm, rather than to challenge, the dominant culture’s suspicions about the deficient virility of the Epicurean male.”¹¹² I add another piece of evidence:

illud in his rebus uereor, ne forte rearis
 impia te rationis inire elementa uiamque
 indugredi sceleris. quod contra saepius illa
 religio peperit scelerosa atque impia facta.
(*DRN* 1.80–84)

In this matter I’m concerned about this—that perchance you’ll think you’re entering into the impious first-beginnings of philosophy and treading on a path of crime. But on the contrary, more often it is that superstition/religion that has birthed criminal and impious deeds.

The reader may think that philosophy is *impius*, the Lucretian speaker says, but actually *religio* is. The speaker presumes that his addressee will view philosophy (particularly

¹¹² Gordon [2002: 87]. Cf. Fowler [1989: 130]: “early Epicureanism...presupposes that its supporters will be a minority in a hostile world.”

Gordon’s argument is that the renunciation in book 4 of sex, love, and (most) marriages constitutes a “radical Epicurean critique of the Priapic [i.e., Roman] model of sexuality” [2002: 94]; and that the portrayals of Venus in Mars in the proem to book 1 are “subversive of more widely accepted Roman notions” of the divinities [2002: 101, cf. 101–104]. The poem’s satiric attacks—which are in fact “a social critique...[of] the paradigmatic Roman *uir*”—therefore confirm and even embrace as “salutary...the dominant culture’s complaint that the Garden was teaching men not to be men” [2002: 106].

There is a connection between *DRN* and Roman satire, here, as well. Gunderson, discussing the rhetoric and imagery of the body in satire—“satirework on the body,” as he calls it—poses and answers the fundamental question behind such body-talk: “what is the proper relationship between good men?...[T]here are no good men in satire. They are missing objects” [2005: 239]. Contrast Momigliano [1941: 157]: “the whole of Lucretius is a vigorous invitation to work and fight for high ideals. An atmosphere of magnanimous enthusiasm—so different from the *Λάθε βιώσας*.”

Epicurean philosophy?) with suspicion, as philosophy seems to have a reputation for being irreligious.¹¹³ The voice of the philosopher is constructed as an object of scorn in Roman eyes, even if such claims of Epicureanism's unpopularity are exaggerated.¹¹⁴

The philosopher-speaker of *DRN* claims to be scorned, and he claims to be afraid, as well. Afraid of what goes on in the sky, of what takes place after death, of what is mysterious or insufficiently explained:

nam ueluti pueri trepidant atque omnia caecis
in tenebris metuunt, sic nos in luce timemus
interdum nilo quae sunt metuenda magis quam
quae pueri in tenebris pauitant finguntque futura.

(*DRN* 2.55–58 = 3.87–90 = 6.35–38)

For just as boys tremble and fear everything in blind darknesses, so also do we from time to time frighten in the light at things that ought to be feared no more than what the boys in the darkness are afraid of and imagine is about to happen.

Again, the speaker (as part of this global “we”) is childlike, but here because of his admittedly unnecessary anxiety, not because of his filial esteem for Epicurus.¹¹⁵ When the speaker looks up with us (*suspiciamus*, 5.1204) at the sky, he, like us,¹¹⁶ is struck with a

¹¹³ Cf. Clay [1983: 221–222], and De Lacy [1941: 50]: “Epicureans were accused of impiety” because of their notion that the gods stand aloof from humankind.

¹¹⁴ So, for instance, Howe [1951: 59]: “it is hard to reconcile the Lucretian *volgus abhorret ab hac* (I, 945) with Cicero’s account [at *Tusculan Disputations* 4.5–7] of the popularity of Epicureanism after Amafinius,” cf. my discussion of Amafinius in chapter 1 (pp. 7–10, above).

¹¹⁵ Gale also points out the first-person plural *timemus* here as “striking” [2005: 181].

¹¹⁶ The speaker’s identification with “us,” with the reader, is part of a rhetorical strategy to make his argument more effective. Thus Segal [1990: 239]: “to overcome our denial of death, and thus bring the fears of it into the light where they can be dealt with therapeutically, Lucretius must make death real and present to us as a process”; O’Hara [2007: 62–69], particularly [2007: 62] on “Lucretius’ strategy for identifying with the reader, so as to be able to move the reader from his Roman religious beliefs, which Lucretius is going to suggest are wrong, towards Lucretius’ Greek, philosophical, Epicurean teachings,”

new *cura* in his “heart already crushed by other ills” (*aliis oppressa malis in pectora cura*, 1207)—namely, concern whether the celestial motions are controlled by divinities whom we must placate (1209–1217). This concern with the anger of the gods is one of the fundamental problems of human life that *DRN*’s speaker says he aims to correct, and he includes himself among the number of those affected by it, oppressed by it. The threat of divine punishment, in the *ego*’s view, causes people to live dejected lives, with a celestial sword of Damocles hanging over them.

So a life “crushed by ills” is an abject existence. And made worse by the hell on earth that the speaker creates out of ambition, greed, and the like, in an allegory of the underworld (3.978–1023). Again, first-person pronouns abound.¹¹⁷ The Lucretian *ego*, along with the reader, is implicated in the experience of the oppressive burden that the anxieties of social life (and the earthly punishments inflicted by powers and principalities, 1014–1022) bring, and the consequent psychological debasement that, according to his argument, afflicts us. “The life of idiots, finally, becomes Hellish” (*Acherusia fit stultorum denique uita*, 1023).

The speaker likewise counts himself in the number of the blameworthy when he criticizes humankind’s shift from simple pelts to fancy clothes:

tunc igitur pelles, nunc aurum et purpura curis
 exercent hominum uitam belloque fatigant;
 quo magis in nobis, ut opinor, culpa resedit.

.....

cf. Kleve [1966], Summers [1995], and Gale, who points to the “innovative” nature of the relationship between speaker and addressee in *DRN* [2005: 177 and *passim*]; also Clay [1983: 216]: “what is remarkable about this didactic poem is the effort its poet expends in attracting his reader to its argument.”

¹¹⁷ *DRN* 3.979, 992, 995, 1005 (*nobis* in all instances). First-person verbs at 1007 (*explemur*) and 1008 (*opinor*).

...at nos nil laedit ueste carere
purpurea atque auro signisque ingentibus apta,
dum plebeia tamen sit quae defendere possit.

(*DRN* 5.1423–1425, 1427–1429)

So *then* it was skins, *now* it's gold and purple vestments that trouble people's life with anxieties and wear them out with war—and as I see it, the blame lies all the more with us...But it doesn't hurt us any to go without purple clothing fit out with gold and giant decorations, provided that nevertheless there's commoner's clothing to be able to protect us.

We are at fault for overvaluing expensive accoutrements, and we come to no harm if we do not have them. The speaker is included in this criticism; he is part of the problem. His solution, sticking with plebeian garb, cloaks him (literally as well as metaphorically!) in reduced social stature.¹¹⁸

He claims his clothing is (or should be) poor, and so, he claims, is his language. The *ego* makes remarks, previously cited, concerning the *egestas linguae* in the opening of book 1 (p. 77, above), and returns to the notion in his introduction of the term *homoeomeria*: “and [it's a term that] the poverty of our mother-tongue speech doesn't grant us to say in our language” (*nec nostra dicere lingua | concedit nobis patrii sermonis egestas*, 1.831–832). Both times, he is feeding the reader a line, since (as I have noted) *DRN* has no trouble discussing complex philosophical principles in polysemous Latin

¹¹⁸ The *exemplum* in this passage additionally constructs both speaker and addressee as rich people of the leisure class: gold and purple is not part of a poor person's experience, or everyday concerns.

The speaker admits as well that he is, like everyone else, prone to false, flawed, or otherwise faulty judgments. When making deductions, he says, “and we ourselves bring ourselves into the delusion of deception” (*ac nos in fraudem induimus frustraminis ipsi*, 4.817). The pronouns *nos* and *ipsi* are very emphatic here, especially for first-person usages in *DRN*—and we can even take *nos...ipsi* to refer to the *ego* alone, since soon thereafter he says *auemus | te fugere* (4.822–823), an unambiguous use of the first-person plural in place of the first-person singular.

terms, and Cicero has no trouble explaining ὁμοιομεθρία in straightforward prose. Likewise with the *ego*'s complaint that "the poverty of the mother-tongue speech drags me unwilling" from explaining the interconnectedness of the four elements (*abstrahit inuitum patrii sermonis egestas*, 3.260).

But the line he is feeding the reader is, I believe, one of linguistic abjection. Latin, the speaker suggests, is inferior to Greek, as evidenced by its smaller vocabulary, and so an author of Latin verse is similarly diminished. According to the Lucretian persona, Greek is the prestige language of philosophy.¹¹⁹ The speaker's comments on language reflect his own abject status. And his disingenuousness in making such comments runs parallel to the essential ambiguity and elusiveness of the voice and situation of a satirist.

Mockery and blame in DRN

The hallmarks of the satirist, mockery and blame, occur again and again in *DRN*. An important character trait of *DRN*'s persona is his vigorous mocking and satiric blaming of his various targets.¹²⁰ The basic goal of the poem's didactic speaker is to show how to better one's life through a true account of the universe, and the rectification of

¹¹⁹ For Greek as a prestige language of intellectuals and aristocrats at Rome, see (among others) Kahane & Kahane [1979: 183–184], Kaimio [1979], Kahane [1986: 495], Sihler [1995: 12].

¹²⁰ See, e.g., Waltz [1949: 79]: "Il aime à railler, à ridiculiser sans ménagement ses adversaires philosophiques, ou le vulgum pecus des malheureux humains que n'a pas touchés la grâce épicurienne, ou la religion traditionnelle, avec ses rites et ses légendes absurdes." The *ego*'s attacks on his philosophical adversaries, on the unfortunate commonfolk who are subject to un-Epicurean anxieties, and on traditional religion are all included in my discussion here.

wrong beliefs and behaviors is thus implicit in his stated task. Oftentimes in *DRN* such correction is delivered in straightforward manner, without the derisive humor of mockery or the critical animus of blame. But the scornful comic voice of a satirist frequently arises in the text, most often in the mockery of incorrect suppositions, yet also when the speaker is inveighing against moral failings, when he engages in parody, and when the addressee finds himself in the speaker's crosshairs.

We can point generally to a plethora of instances in *DRN* where there is mockery of incorrect suppositions: mockery of the *uates* (1.102–106),¹²¹ of people who think that there is movement without the existence of a void (1.370–383), of ὁμοιομερῆα (1.830–858), of Democritus' notion of a one-to-one linkage between body and soul (3.370–395), of metempsychosis,¹²² of the idea that chimaerae could exist in the world's younger days (5.910), and of anyone who would seek an explanation of *fulmen* in *Tyrrhena carmina*, Etruscan texts (6.379–386).¹²³ We can also note explicit usage of the lexicon of blame and mockery—for example, *ridicula...ludibriaque* (2.47),¹²⁴ the sarcastic *scilicet* (3.641),

¹²¹ Cf. Waltz [1949: 82]: “Ce mot de *uates*...est à la fois méprisant et ironique,” and Ferrero [1949: 133].

¹²² 3.754–755: “for that thing people say—that a spirit, being immortal, is transformed by a change in body—is based on false reasoning” (*illud enim falsa fertur ratione, quod aiunt | immortalem animam mutato corpore flecti*). The speaker, in his twenty-second proof of the mortality of mind and spirit, points out the impossibility of the transmigration of souls from one body to another after death. Cf. Hardie [1913: 190–194] and Brown [1997: 179–180 *ad* 3.741–775].

¹²³ Waltz asserts that the speaker is mocking the Etruscan texts in his citation of them in these lines [1949: 101]. Cf. Hutchinson [2009: 208]: “we do not here find Lucretius directly confronting narrative epic (contrast 1.68–9)...A plurality of divinities wielding thunder (6.387–98) suggests Etruscan belief, not the world of epic (cf. Plin. HN 2.138).”

¹²⁴ Fowler remarks that the adjective *ridiculus* is comic and colloquial, found in Roman comedy and satire, but nowhere in epic, elegy, or tragedy [2002: 127 *ad loc.*].

deridiculum esse uidetur (3.776), *culpa* (5.1423–1435, and 2.181 = 5.199). We even see the goddess of love (or, more simply, sex) playing the part of mocker: “thus in love does Venus [or “sex”] mock/trick/play lovers with visions” (*sic in amore Venus* [or *uenus*] *simulacris ludit amantis*, 4.1101).

Let us consider three particular passages where *DRN*’s speaker mocks invalid ideas. First: the Lucretian *ego* makes quick work of refuting the Sceptics, in fewer than ten lines (4.469–477). He opens with a bit of mockery, and with an image close to the American colloquialism “he’s got his head up his ass”:

denique si nil sciri siquis putat, id quoque nescit
an sciri possit, quoniam nil scire fatetur.
hunc igitur contra mittam contendere causam,
qui capite ipse sua in statuit uestigia sese.

(*DRN* 4.469–472)

Furthermore, if someone adjudges that nothing is known, he also doesn’t know whether *that* can be known, since he admits to knowing nothing. So I’ll pass on going to court against this very guy who’s positioned himself with his head in his footprints [“where his feet should be”].

Comic repetition with *nil sciri...sciri...nil scire* followed by a comic image that metaphorically represents the ass-backwards epistemological hypotheses of the Sceptics’ philosophy. The final two lines quoted here are added value—they are not integral to the refutation of the erroneous philosophical principle.¹²⁵ They are what makes the passage mockery: they (literally) embody the error, they turn the one holding the faulty belief into

¹²⁵ Compare Waltz [1949: 85]: “aussitôt après la logique, l’imagination entre en scène et nous peint cette position des sceptiques d’une manière purement burlesque...qui ne contribue à transformer ces malheureux sceptiques en imbeciles, aussi déséquilibrés que prétentieux.”

a laughingstock by applying his internal (intellectual) failure into a physically absurd contortion.

My second example involves an image we have seen before. I have discussed (at p. 69, above) the passage in book 1 where the speaker uses the image of laughing and crying atoms to mock Anaxagoras. In book 2, he uses the same image to argue that atoms have no sense perception.¹²⁶ If they could feel, he argues sarcastically (note *scilicet*), then the logical conclusion is that “*obviously* they also cackle, concussed with shaky snickers, and sprinkle their faces and cheeks with bedewing tears” (*scilicet et risu tremulo concussa cachinnant et lacrimis spargunt rorantibus ora genasque*, 2.976–977). They will also dissertate *de rerum mixtura* (978) and research what their own *primordia* are (979).

After this mocking *reductio ad absurdum*, the Lucretian *ego* labels the idea under consideration for what (he wants us to think) it is: craziness. “If we perceive that these things are silly and mad, and if it is possible to laugh though we are not grown out of laughing particles,” we can see that we can have sensation though our bodies are composed of insensate matter (*si delira haec furiosaque cernimus esse, | et ridere potest non ex ridentibus auctus*, 985–986). At *delira* and especially *ridere*, the “we” of the poem—the speaker and his readership—converge with the laughing atoms, which previously laughed mockingly at the proponents of ὁμοιομερία (1.919–920). The laughter transforms from subject of scientific inquiry into tool for mockery of that subject.

¹²⁶ On *DRN*'s use of this repetition to reinforce the strength of its theories over particular phenomena, see Clay [1983: 195–196].

Third, early in book 3, the speaker takes on the fear of death and the twin griefs of ambition and greed (3.31–93). His entry point is the men who claim that death is preferable to a life of disgrace (41–45)—the same men who, if exiled,

et quocumque tamen miseri uenere parentant
et nigras mactant pecudes et manibu' diuis
inferias mittunt multoque in rebus acerbis
acrius aduertunt animos ad religionem.

(*DRN* 3.51–54)

nevertheless offer appeasement sacrifices wherever they go (those pathetic people!) and immolate black livestock and send death-offerings to the Ghost Gods and pay attention to religion/superstition more ardently in harsh circumstances.

In other words, these men are all talk and no action. They are blameworthy for their hypocrisy, their fear of death, and their obsequy to the dictates of *religio*; and so the speaker ridicules them, in four lines that can be understood as mock-epic.¹²⁷

The passage continues with the speaker's railing against "avarice and the blind lust for political office" (*auarities et honorum caeca cupido*, 3.59), a recurring theme of the poem. We see attacks on the greedy and the ambitious not only here, but also at 2.7–19, 3.995–1010 (in the allegorical interpretation of the torments of the underworld), and elsewhere. People who fall prey to these passions are allowing needless anxiety and disturbance into their lives.¹²⁸ They are, in short, foolish, and the speaker calls them such, at

¹²⁷ Cf. Kenney [1971: 82 *ad* 51–54]: the speaker's "scorn is accentuated by the alliteration in the verses and by the climactic position of *religionem*." Bailey compares Vergil *Aeneid* 6.153 [1947: 999 *ad DRN* 3.52] and elsewhere [1935: 284]; Kenney [1971: 82 *ad DRN* 3.52] compares Ovid *Fasti* 5.421 and Horace *Odes* 1.4.16; Brown [1997: 99 *ad DRN* 3.51–54] additionally compares *Serm.* 1.8.27.

¹²⁸ As Waltz points out, the raillery against human passions is where the Lucretian *ego*'s role as satirist is keenest and most intense: "l'intention satirique éclate bien davantage dans les passages du poème—qui abondent—où Lucrèce...raille les faiblesses et les passions du genre humain en général....sa satire se fait non seulement mordante, incisive,

the end of his underworld scene: “in this way, the life of idiots, finally, becomes Hellish” (*hic Acherusia fit stultorum denique uita*, once again 3.1023). On at least two other occasions, the speaker humorously calls attention to the limited intellectual capacity of the targets of his mockery, with the phrase “it’s possible to understand this [point of doctrine under consideration] from this [proof soon to follow] no matter how dull the mind” (*id licet hinc quamuis hebeti cognoscere corde*, 4.44 = 5.882, cf. Mitsis [1993] and pp. 123–127, below).

Mockery and blame of the moral failings of others is also prominent in *DRN*, as we will see from two examples. First, Lucretius’ speaker at the end of book 4 mocks lovers for a variety of reasons, among them because lovers themselves mock other lovers: “and they laugh at each other and encourage them to appease Venus on the grounds that they’re vexed by a loathsome love.”¹²⁹ The speaker has outsourced part of his satiric critique to a set of internal characters,¹³⁰ but their position as satirist is, as we might expect, paired with abjection—and an abjection that undercuts their own critique, since they themselves are lovers in the same situation as the ones they mock! “And often they (those poor people!) do not pay attention to / reflect on their own giant ills.”¹³¹ I believe

mais virulente, impitoyable, parfois tout à fait brutale” [1949: 89]. Cf. Waltz [1949: 99]: “cette dureté sarcastique à l’égard de l’humanité souffrante.”

¹²⁹ *DRN* 4.1157–1158: *atque alios alii inrident Veneremque suädent | ut placent, quoniam foedo adflicentur amore*. It may not be the best idea for them to try appeasing Venus, since she herself mocks lovers (*Venus...ludit amantis*, 4.1101, cf. p. 101, above). Waltz, in his discussion of book 4’s satire on love and sex, refers to “cette brutalité absurde des amants” [1949: 92].

¹³⁰ Cf. p. 47, above, as well as p. 129 n. 184.

¹³¹ *DRN* 4.1159: *nec sua respiciunt miseri mala maxima saepe*. Brown [1987: 280 *ad loc.*] compares this line to Semonides 7.112–114, Menander fr. 521, Cicero *Tusculan*

that the word *miseri* here, as with the exiled hypocrites who make sacrifice in order to stave off death in 3.51, is a signpost for the mockery in progress.¹³² By showing us would-be mockers—failed blame poets, like Rosen’s Thersites—the Lucretian persona both entertains us with the notion of a fool spitting into the wind (or of a pot calling a kettle dense) and reveals a double source of shame and blame for deluded, delusional lovers.

Our second example of mockery that targets a moral failing comes from the description of early humans during the “archaeology” of book 5. With a lack of technology and with the ignorance of evolutionary youth, these proto-humans often died on account of their lack of resources, in contrast to the decadence of the modern age:

tum penuria deinde cibi languentia leto
 membra dabat, contra nunc rerum copia mersat.
 illi imprudentes ipsi sibi saepe uenenum
 uergebant, nunc se perdunt sollertius ipsi.

(*DRN* 5.1007–1010)

At that time, then, a poverty of food gave their weakening limbs over to death, while on the other hand nowadays an abundance of things drowns [people]. *They* themselves often unknowingly poured poison for themselves—nowadays people themselves destroy themselves more cleverly.

Disputations 3.73, Catullus 22.21, Horace *Serm.* 2.3.299, Seneca *Dialogues* 4.28.8, Phaedrus 4.10, and Babrius 66.

¹³² The Lucretian speaker’s use of *miser* in respect to debased, ridiculed others can be compared to the Plautine lover’s use of the adjective to express his comic abjection: e.g., *Pseudolus* line 13 has the young lover Calidorus lamenting, “I’m super-duper sad ’n’ depressed, Pseudolus!,” *misere miser sum, Pseudole*.

Hinds [1998: 29–34] discusses the idiomatic phrase *me miserum* at Ovid *Amores* 1.1.25—with reference to the comic playwright Terence, among others—as a test case for his hypothesis that “there is no such thing as a wholly non-negotiable confluence” when trying to assess allusion in Roman poetry [1998: 34]; his discussion builds on that of McKeown [1987: *ad Amores* 1.1.25].

The sarcasm is potent in these lines, and particularly bitter in the last five-word phrase.¹³³ Modern folks' self-destructive behaviors are characterized as skillfulness, as a set of techniques that were perhaps developed alongside the other technologies that early humans lacked, like shipwrightry (5.1000–1006). The speaker presents them causing their own demise intentionally, even gleefully.

The mockery in *DRN* also extends to parodies (cf. pp. 154–157, below). During his assault on the fear of death, the speaker undertakes an extended parody of the sentimental commonplaces on the topic of death (3.884–930). First, a sample funeral oration and lamentations of mourners, identified by Kenney and others as satiric parody inserted more for tone and rhetorical effect than for logical relevancy.¹³⁴ Second, a sympotic context, and the *uita breuis, carpe diem*-like theme familiar from lyric verse and from later scenes in Roman satire (e.g., *Serm.* 1.1 and 2.6, with Freudenburg [2006] among others) and Petronius (as with the speeches of the freedmen during the dinner of Trimalchio). Martindale refers to the “strongly satirical setting” here in *DRN* [2005: 195], while Wallach points out its parodic elements.¹³⁵ The parodies here function in support of the

¹³³ Cf. Houghton [1912: xxxviii]: “Two fine satiric touches are here felt.” Dudley calls 5.1010: “a sudden twist” [1965b: 115].

¹³⁴ Parody: Waltz [1949: 96]; Wallach [1976: 51–55], with parallels in earlier Greek and Roman literature and inscriptions; and Kenney [1971: 206 *ad* 3.904–908]: “the speaker is made to express the feelings of the bereaved in unmistakably satirical terms.” For the relevancy of the attack on those who are overly concerned with funeral customs, see Kenney [1971: 202 *ad* 3.888–393]: *DRN* “develops it more because it offers an opportunity for a series of crushing sarcasms than because it was strictly relevant to his main argument.”

¹³⁵ Parody: Wallach [1976: 57], with parallels in other Graeco-Roman literature [1976: 56–59 and 56 n. 73]. On the sympotic lament in *DRN*, see Lattimore [1962: 172–177, 243–246], Martindale [2005: 194–197], Gale [2007: 68 n. 24], and West [1994: 29]: “these pathetic rhetorical figures...are meant as sarcastic caricatures of the mawkish cli-

satiric thrust of the Lucretian *ego*'s argument. In adopting and mocking these familiar, emotional expressions of grief and mortal anxiety, the speaker also mocks the underlying emotions themselves and thereby downplays their importance. Thus, the concerns over death are minimized, more to be laughed at by the “in-crowd” than to be objects of obsession.

The mockery here is gentler than, say, what we saw in the polemics against the Presocratic philosophers in book 1. Still satire, still satiric, but in a different satiric register. Satirists do not operate with full force at all times; some occasions call for brunt mockery and blame, while others call for subtle irony, and yet others for sardonic resignation. Graf—who argues for a multi-tiered conception of satiric tone in Roman satire, as I am arguing here for *DRN*—considers performativity and ritual in the Roman genre, and in so doing he finds connections between satiric mockery and Roman funeral rites [2005: 204 and *passim*]. Ultimately, he believes, “Roman satire appears as the literarization of fundamental social concerns and ways of behavior” [2005: 205].

It is in this respect that I believe we may see another, more tentative link between *DRN*'s mockery of mourners *et cetera* and satire. Not only does *DRN*, like satire (and much other Roman poetry, we might add), constitute a “literarization of fundamental social concerns,” but also *DRN* often enacts such literarization in ways very similar to satire. Both satire and *DRN* have an overriding moral or ethical bearing, as we have seen, and both, as we will see, couch the discussion of social concerns in a narratorial pose of didaxis. Furthermore, both claim to offer an ethical/moral corrective: for *DRN* in this

chés used by such *stulti* and *barbari*.” Cf. my discussion in chapter 5 of the image of the *conuiuia* at *DRN* 3.938–939 (pp. 269–271, below).

passage specifically, a refutation of the crushing fear of death, and for satire generally, a better world, a more tranquil society.¹³⁶

Back to parodies: the almost-hymnic praise of Epicurus in the proem to *DRN* 5 is arguably a parody of mythologists.¹³⁷ As well, the Lucretian speaker tells the tale of Phaethon (5.396–404) in elevated style, only to undercut it with a sarcastic (another *scilicet*, 405) attribution to “the old poets of the Greeks” (*ueteres Graium...poetae*, again 405)¹³⁸ and with a stock barb line of his, “this is too far removed from true reasoning” (*quod procul a uera nimis est ratione repulsum*, 406, cf. p. 125, below). In using parody for these passages, the Lucretian speaker is mocking the style of his targets; and by making fun of how they write, he suggests by extension that what they write is risible as well—not unlike his criticism of Heraclitus’ dicta on the basis of their style (discussed at p. 76, above). The blame of the target is implicit in the speaker’s send-up of the blame-worthy target’s literary encasement.

¹³⁶ Moral/ethical bearing: pp. 40–43, above. Didactic pose: pp. 163–171, below. Satire’s goal of tranquility: p. 142, below. I consider similar aspects of *DRN* in my discussions of the poem’s “civic satires” and of the Roman genre of satire’s “civic discourse” (pp. 271–286, below).

¹³⁷ West [1994: 28], Rouse & Smith [1975: 381 n. a]. The praise of Epicurus here is made in comparison to Hercules, a hero of special import to the Stoics, and so may constitute Lucretian engagement with the Stoic school; Kenney refers to “the deflation of the Stoic hero Hercules” [1970: 380], and Lévy claims that scholarly consensus accepts a reference here to the Stoics: “il est très communément admis qu’en comparant Épicure à Hercule, au bénéfice du philosophe, Lucrèce s’en prend aux Stoïciens, puisque pour ceux-ci le demi-dieu symbolisait le sage” [1999: 93]. Sedley argues that the Stoic embrace of Heracles as an “allegorized moral hero is a separate tradition” not in force until the 1st century CE [1998: 75 n. 62], but I do not find his claim persuasive. See also Chambert [1999].

¹³⁸ Cf. West [1994: 52–52], Rouse & Smith [1975: 409 n. c].

Another basic avenue for mockery in *DRN* is when the speaker in addition intermittently targets the addressee. Once more I offer two examples. Return to the first passage with crying and laughing *primordia* (cf. p. 69, above):

denique iam quaecumque in rebus cernis apertis
si fieri non posse putas, quin materiai
corpora consimili natura praedita fingas,
hac ratione tibi pereunt primordia rerum:
fiet uti risu tremulo concussa cachinent
et lacrimis salsis umectent ora genasque.

(*DRN* 1.914–920)

Finally, if you judge that whatever you see in manifest reality cannot come about without your imagining that the components of matter are gifted with a self-similar nature, by this reasoning the first-beginnings of things are destroyed for you— it'll happen that they chuckle, struck through with shaking laughter, and wet their faces and cheeks with salted¹³⁹ tears.

The criticism is of Anaxagoras' principle of ὁμοιομερία, but it is here not directed at Anaxagoras. It is directed at the addressee. The addressee is the one who judges (*putas*), who imagines (*fingas*), who loses the atoms (*tibi*)—and who finds himself, I suggest, the implicit object of the primordial guffaws. Again, the Lucretian *ego* engages in mockery by proxy, so to speak, as he puts before the reader an internal character (in fact, the insensate protagonists of *DRN*, the atoms themselves!) to satirize the target. Like the lovers mocking other lovers, the subject and stand-in satirist(s) bleed together, although in this case the proxy satirists do not undercut themselves, but rather elude the target's misunderstanding of nature. They dissolve into laughter just as the logical force of the ad-

¹³⁹ Or “witty” (*salsis*, cf. Catullus 12.4)?

dressee's Anaxagorean argument dissolves under the *ego's* rigorous intellectual scrutiny.¹⁴⁰

Finally, *DRN's* speaker has the addressee turn against himself, in a tirade that is put into the mouth of the addressee (3.1025–1052). Part of the invective combating the fear of death at the end of book 3, the tirade is introduced as a digression on what the addressee could say to himself during the Lucretian persona's deliberations about the fear of death,¹⁴¹ and represents the most extended instance in *DRN* of the interpolated interlocutor (see p. 129 n. 184, below). It is, moreover, thoroughly satiric.¹⁴² The self-lecture begins, "even good Ancus abandoned the light with his eyes, Ancus who was in many affairs better than you, wicked man!"¹⁴³ Through his use of *improbis*, another word with

¹⁴⁰ Their tears (*lacrimis salsis*, 1.920) form an intratextual link with the tears that *DRN's* Homer sheds in front of Ennius prior to expounding the Nature of Things (*lacrimas...salsas*, 1.125), and may suggest that the Ennius-Homer scene, too, is parodic. Kenney [1970: 374–375] seconds Ferrero's suggestion that the scene is one of Alexandrian-style polemic against Ennius [1949: 27, 51–57], and a similar suggestion is also made by Marconi [1961: 244–245]. Cf. Kenney [1970: 378]: "he [*DRN's* speaker] is throwing his great predecessor's own polemic in his teeth." Ferrero compares this scene to the critique of Lucilius and Plautus in Horace's *Sermones* [1949: 52]. See, *contra*, Boyancé [1963: 41 n. 2]. For parody of Ennius in *DRN* book 3, see Wallach [1976: 95–96].

¹⁴¹ "You could even yourself say this to yourself in the meantime," *hoc etiam tibi tute interdum dicere possis* (3.1024).

¹⁴² On this passage overall, see Wallach [1976: 91–100], who refers to its "definitely polemical tone" and sees it as derived from diatribe rather than consolatory literature [1976: 93], *pace* Stork [1970]. Cf. also Conte [1965] and Kenney [1971: 232 *ad* 3.1024–1052], who calls the lines "a harangue placed by a fresh variation in the mouth of the imaginary and typical individual to whom the consolation is directed. The argument is none the less effective because it is hackneyed; indeed it is because it is hackneyed that it is effective."

¹⁴³ *DRN* 3.1025–1026: *lumina sis oculis etiam bonus Ancu' reliquit, | qui melior multis quam tu fuit, improbe, rebus*. Line 1025 is a quotation from Ennius' *Annales*; Kenney calls it an imitation [1971: 233–234 *ad loc.*], while Wallach prefers to term it parody [1976: 95].

comic connotations, as well as through the amusing and perhaps Terentian *uigilans stertis* (at *DRN* 3.1048, quoted below),¹⁴⁴ the speaker signals that the addressee’s voice inserted here is the voice of a satiric mocker. Yet at the same time, since this very mocker (the addressee) is himself also the target of the mockery, he is labeled as worthless—he is made abject.

After mentioning the inevitability of death for even great figures like Xerxes (1029–1033), Scipio (1034–1035), Homer (1037–1038), Democritus (1039–1041), and Epicurus! (1042–1044), the ventriloquist-dummy addressee returns to his target, himself:

tu uero dubitabis et indignabere obire,
 mortua cui uita est prope iam uiuo atque uidenti,
 qui somno partem maiorem conteris aeuī
 et uigilans stertis nec somnia cernere cessas
 sollicitamque geris cassa formidine mentem
 nec reperire potes tibi quid sit saepe mali, cum
 ebrius urgeris multis miser undique curis
 atque animi incerto fluitans errore uagaris?

(*DRN* 3.1045–1052)

Will *you* indeed hesitate and become indignant [!] at having to die, you, living and breathing [“seeing”], whose life is nearly dead, you who waste the greater part of your age in sleep and snore while awake and don’t stop seeing dreams and carry around a mind tormented with empty fear and often cannot discover what’s wrong with you, when you’re beset—you poor drunk, you!—on all sides by many anxieties and you roam wavering in an uncertain wandering of the mind?

¹⁴⁴ *Improbis*: for instance, Plautus *Truculentus* 833: “he’s wicked from [because of] his character,” *ab ingenio improbus* (and also *improbus* once earlier at 832). Cf. my comment on Plautine (and Aristophanic) heroic badness (p. 50 n. 29, above).

Vigilans stertis: Kenney [1971: 237 *ad* 3.1048] adduces Terence *Eunuchus* 1079: “he’s a fathead, witless, slow, he snores night and day” (*fatuos est, insulsu’ tardu’, stertit noctes et dies*). Compare also Persius 3.58–59: “now you’re just snoring and your drooping head, joint loosened, jaws entirely unstitched, yawns yesterday away” (*stertis adhuc laxumque caput conpage soluta | oscitat hesternum dissutis undique malis*).

We can start with a quick rundown of the traits shared between this passage and the passages previously considered in this section. A forceful rhetorical question that heightens the passage's sense of blame, evident furthermore in formulations like *cassa formidine* and *animi incerto...errore*. A term related to the satiric persona, *indignabere*—indignation, which I discuss immediately below—akin to terms of blame (e.g., *culpa*) and mockery (e.g., *ludibria*). The topsy-turvy contradictions of dead life for a living man (*mortua uita...uiuo*)¹⁴⁵ and wakeful snoring (*uigilans stertis*), contradictions similar to the turnabout in ancient and modern self-destruction in book 5 or in the *primordia* and their laughter in book 1. Lastly, that recurring adjective *miser*, comic in tone and expressive of the target-*cum*-speaker's abjection.

What about the passage is new, and different from the speaker's own satiric voice? The indignation here, unlike the Lucretian *ego*'s justified indignation, is illegitimate—*indignabere* is one of two main verbs in the damning rhetorical question that comprises the passage and that expects a “no” answer. No, the addressee should not become indignant, for it is nonsensical to do so (and thus any such indignation is unjustified). *Miser*, in addition, is paired with *ebrius*, and the two thus augment the (semi-?) comic abjection of the poor man.

The addressee's speech (as the speaker composes it) turns him into a failed satirist. He may have indignation, but his is not justified indignation. He may mock and blame, but his target is himself. He is not merely a victim of abject living conditions (not merely *miser*, say) but also a debased body (*ebrius*) and mind (*uigilans stertis*; *sollici-*

¹⁴⁵ Compare, elsewhere in the same book, *mors aeterna* (3.1091) and *mortalem uitam mors...inmortalis ademit* (869).

tam...cassa formidine mentem). The addressee's intellect, as the Lucretian persona has him portray it, is debilitated: he cannot hope to understand why he is racked with worry (*nec reperire potes...*). The basis of the addressee's self-critique—that he is foolish to fear dying—is solid, but the delivery shows us an anti-fear satirist who fears death, who therefore lacks the moral high ground of a genuine, successful satirist. True satire eludes him.

The speaker's justified indignation

A satirist expresses indignation at some fault or flaw, indignation justified by the satirist's hold on moral high ground. When in *DRN* is the speaker indignant? During his invective against the fear of death, particularly, though his indignation there is not untempered by pity. The anxieties that this terror causes are the chief concern of the poem's speaker and a chief motivation (cf. 1.102–135) for his exposition of Epicurus' physical explanation of the universe.

We see this combination of indignancy and pity during the description of the plague in Athens that concludes *DRN*. The account of infected men who excised their own genitalia or limbs or eyes in hopes of avoiding death (6.1207–1212) wraps up with the comment “to such an extent did the sharp fear of death get into them.”¹⁴⁶ This closing line is gentler and less indignant than it could be, but it does not need to exude indigna-

¹⁴⁶ *DRN* 6.1212: *usque adeo mortis metus his incesserat acer*. Compare 3.79–84, where the speaker comments on the illogicalness and extremity of those who commit suicide because of their fear of death, with Wallach [1976: 65] and Hill [2004: ch. 3]. For the Epicurean take on suicide, see Epicurus *Letter to Meneoceus* 126, *Sententiae Vaticanae* 9; Cicero *De Finibus* 1.19.62, *Tusculan Disputations* 5.41.118; and, among others, Englert [1994: 67–98] and Cooper [1999: 515–541].

tion, since earlier lines demarcate the amputees as abject, emasculated half-humans: “they lived deprived by a knife of their manly parts, and many without hands and feet remained in life nevertheless.”¹⁴⁷ The fear that drives them to such extremes also makes them the “out” group, a set of Others that speaker and reader can critique and contemplate in tranquil health.

Shortly thereafter the Lucretian *ego* describes another effect of the fear of death, whereby frightened individuals “kept fleeing from going to visit their sick relatives” (*suos fugitabant uisere ad aegros*, 6.1238¹⁴⁸). The result?

uitai nimium cupidos mortisque timentis
poenibat paulo post turpi morte malaque,
desertos, opis expertis, incuria mactans.

(*DRN* 6.1239–1241¹⁴⁹)

¹⁴⁷ 6.1209–1211: *uiuabant ferro priuati parte uirili, | et manibus sine nonnulli pedibusque manebant | in uita tamen*, 1209–1211. Compare, in book 5, the deformed beings produced during the early phase of life on earth, with Campbell [2003: 103–109 *ad loc.*]:

multaque tum tellus etiam portenta creare
conatast mira facie membrisque coorta,
.....
orba pedum partim, manuum uiduata uicissim,
muta sine ore etiam, sine uoltu caeca reperta,
uinctaque membrorum per totum corpus adhaesu,
nec facere ut possent quicquam nec cedere quoquam
nec uitare malum nec sumere quod foret usus.

(*DRN* 5.837–838, 840–844)

At that time the earth also tried to create many monsters, arising with wondrous appearance and limbs...some deprived of feet, others in turn bereft of hands, some also silent without mouths, some found blind without a visage, and some constricted by adhesion of their limbs across their entire body, so that they could neither do anything nor go anywhere nor avoid ills nor get what they needed.

¹⁴⁸ In the numbering of Rouse & Smith [1975], 6.1239, as line 1245 is transposed to precede line 1237.

¹⁴⁹ In the numbering of Rouse & Smith [1975], 6.1240–1242.

Too desirous of life and too fearing of death, they soon afterwards endured the punishment of a base and bad death, deserted, without help, at the hands of slaughtering neglect.

Fear of death led to the neglect of attendance upon their loved ones, and that neglect in turn led to the specter of dying alone (neglected)—another source for the fear of death.¹⁵⁰ The fate of the negligent is melodramatized (in dantesque *legge del contrappasso* fashion, no less), yet it is also prejudiced by the moralistic word *nimum*. Again, a combination of minor indignation with an eye for the experience of the fearful; again, the fearful are marked as separate, outcast (*desertos, opis expertis*).

Now, full-on indignation appears throughout the work—as do humor, mockery, and a personalized voice. The next question, then, is what in *DRN* drives the speaker’s indignation at the flaws and faults that he decries. The answer is: the mind, the source of misjudgments and misinterpretations of sense data. In a passage in book 4, in the course of considering why shadows appear to follow us as we walk, the *ego* takes time to point out, “nonetheless we do not grant even a little bit that the eyes are deceived in this matter” (*nec tamen hic oculos falli concedimus hilum*, 4.379). Eyes are organs of sense-perception, the foundation of Epicurean epistemology.¹⁵¹ It is not our eyes or other senses but rather the flawed deductions that we often make from them that are the factor responsible for such deceptive “tricks of the eye” (our speaker would insist on “tricks of the mind”). Hence, “reason at last ought to decide, and eyes can’t recognize the nature of

¹⁵⁰ Compare the deaths of those animal species that could not find protection in others (namely, in humans: *praesidio nostro*, 5.874) during life’s beginnings (5.871–877), with Shelton [1995, 1996] and Spittler [: 23–24].

¹⁵¹ On sense-perception in Lucretius, see, e.g., Glidden [1979], Graver [1990], Rosenmeyer [1996], and Koenen [1997, 1999a, 1999b].

things,¹⁵² so don't ascribe this fault/ flaw of the mind to the eyes" (*animi demum ratio discernere debet, | nec possunt oculi naturam noscere rerum. | proinde animi uitium hoc oculis adfingere noli*, 384–386, cf. 462–468¹⁵³). The mind produces the fault.

Flaws extending beyond mere misinterpretation of sense-perception also derive from the intellect. We need think only of passages such as the invective against love and sex, where we see that our passions prevent us from thinking and acting rationally. The mind, again, produces the fault. Because it is not the senses that are culpable, but rather incorrect assessments that the mind makes on the basis of information provided by the senses, the mind is the source of satirically blameworthy flaws—and thus the critique of the intellect in *DRN* is tantamount to satiric attack. For the Lucretian speaker, the critique of beliefs, behaviors, and philosophical principles results in a satire of intellectual and social flaws, and such critique is, in essence, satiric critique. Accordingly, the critical, satiric indignation of *DRN*'s speaker falls into two broad categories, which we will

¹⁵² Or, if we want to wax metapoetic, "eyes can't recognize *The Nature of Things*!"

¹⁵³ cetera de genere hoc mirande multa uidemus,
quae uiolare fidem quasi sensibus omnia quaerunt—
nequiquam, quoniam pars horum maxima fallit
propter opinatus animi quos addimus ipsi,
pro uisis ut sint quae non sunt sensibu' uisa.
nam nil aegrius est quam res discernere apertas
ab dubiis, animus quas ab se protinus addit.
(*DRN* 4.462–468)

We see, bewilderingly, many other things of this sort, things which all seek to dishonor (so to speak) our loyalty to our senses—but they do so in vain, since the greatest part of these things tricks us because of the mind's suppositions that we ourselves add, so that things which have not been perceived through the senses are held as if so perceived. For nothing is more painful than to separate manifest things from uncertain things that the mind in and of itself adds straightaway.

now survey: academic indignation against faulty philosophical doctrines and, in particular, indignant moralizing about the flawed beliefs and behaviors of humankind.

We have seen how in book 1 Heraclitus (p. 76, above) and the other philosophers are the subjects of comic ridicule. Their philosophies are also the subjects of harsh, sometimes satiric criticism. One technique the Lucretian speaker uses is not so much indignation as critique justified on the basis of a scientific proof that he has just offered. For instance, after showing that all matter must be composed out of a varied collection of different types of atoms (1.628–634), the speaker states:

quapropter qui materiem rerum esse putarunt
ignem atque ex igni summam consistere solo,
magno opere a uera lapsi ratione uidentur.

(DRN 1.635–637)

Therefore those who have adjudged that the constituent material of the universe is fire and that the sum total is established out of fire alone appear to have slipped greatly from true reasoning.

The censure follows, rather than precedes, its basis. The indignation comes in later, at 1.690–704, where the *ego* throws his hands up in despair at the faultiness of Heraclitus' teaching. Heraclitus, he says, "himself fights against the senses on the basis of the senses and undermines them, the source of all belief" (*contra sensus ab sensibus ipse repugnat | et labefactat eos, unde omnia credita pendent*, 1.693–694). The speaker ends the section with three rhetorical questions,¹⁵⁴ a technique already familiar to us from passages of mockery previously discussed. And in the passage, he calls Heraclitus' claim "downright

¹⁵⁴ "So what can we turn to for proof? What can be more sure for us than our senses themselves, by which we pick out true and false things?" (*quo referemus enim? quid nobis certius ipsis sensibus esse potest, qui uera ac falsa notemus?*, 1.699–700). "Why should anyone take away everything and try to leave the nature of burning itself?" (*quare quisquam...omnia tollat | et uelit ardoris naturam linquere solam*, 701–702).

crazy” (*perdelirum*, 692), “both vacuous and crazy” (*cum uanum tum delirum*, 698), and “insanity” (*dementia*, 704¹⁵⁵). Not merely is Heraclitus blameworthy, but also he is mentally flawed—and he is more explicitly flawed than is the addressee, portrayed as *miser ebrius* in the self-directed tirade of 3.1025–1052.

More prevalent than indignant refutation of wrongheaded precepts (though there are more examples¹⁵⁶) is the speaker’s moralizing.¹⁵⁷ The speaker shows the reader his indignation in heated laments about the state of humankind, in snarky assaults on flawed behaviors, and in more broadly applied aphoristic aspersions on people’s moral faultiness. A sample lament: “oh, wretched [*miser* again!] are human minds, blind their hearts! In what kinds of shadows of life and in what great dangers is this whatever-it-is of an age lived out!” (*o miseram hominum mentes, o pectora caeca! | qualibus in tenebris uitae quantisque periculis | degitur hoc aevi quodcumque!*, 2.14–16).

Sample snarky assaults: the Lucretian *ego* has no problem with a person’s metaphorically calling the sea “Neptune” or grain “Ceres” or the earth “Mother of the Gods”

¹⁵⁵ The term *dementia*, appearing only here in *DRN*, may be drawn from the comic authors Plautus and Terence: cf. Piazzì [2005: 137 *ad loc.*].

¹⁵⁶ Elsewhere, for instance, *DRN*’s speaker hurls indignant (if indirect) criticism against Anaxagoras (2.865–930, with Rouse & Smith [1975: 164–165 n. a]), against Plato (and, with Rouse & Smith [1975: 185 n. c], perhaps the Stoics) for his allegorical espousal of a golden thread from the sky for the delivery of animals (2.1153–1156), and against Aristotelian (and, with Rouse & Smith [1975: 342–343 n. a], Stoic) teleological accounts of the development of limbs and the senses (4.833: “everything’s turned backwards in topsyturvy reasoning,” *omnia peruersa praepostera sunt ratione*).

¹⁵⁷ Waltz calls the speaker “implacable moraliste” [1949: 92]. Indeed, Fowler points out that the refutation of the moral flaws of worldly fears are ubiquitous: “[t]hroughout the purely physical sections of the work, the *De rerum natura* constantly insinuates arguments against its two main targets, the fear of the gods and of death” [2000c: 148]. The speaker’s moralizing extends to the end of the work; for moralizing in *DRN*’s account of the Athenian plague in late book 6, see Commager [1957: 107–109].

(2.655–659)—no problem, that is, “so long as he himself in reality still avoids infecting/tainting his mind with foul superstition/religion” (*dum uera re tamen ipse | religione animum turpi contingere parcat*, 659–660¹⁵⁸). Dreaded *religio* is “foul” or “base”—it is a source of abjection.¹⁵⁹ By indignantly shunning it and thus the debased lives of its unthinking devotees, the *ego*—who has preemptively justified his indignation by demonstrating that the gods have nothing to do with our concerns and that the earth is not really an animate/immanent entity (2.646–654¹⁶⁰)—stakes his claim to moral high ground. Also: during the attack on love and sex, the Lucretian *ego* accuses even the pretty women (*Veneres nostrae*) of physical repulsiveness¹⁶¹—they, too, have their “real-life behind-the-scenes” (*postscaenia uitae*, 4.1171–1187). The indignation is targeted at the women for trying to conceal their flawed corporeality, and at men for their uncritical obedience to their unchecked passions.

Sample aphoristic aspersion: “the human race is too desirous of hearers” (*humanum genus est auuidum nimis auricularum*, 4.594). The moralizing *nimis* appears once more, and an instinct to entertain or a wish to be heard is cast as avarice. But there is a

¹⁵⁸ 2.660 is the numbering of Rouse & Smith [1975] for 2.680, which has been transposed from its position in the manuscripts to follow 2.559.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. Clay [1983: 94–95, 151–152, 210–212, 217, 221–225] on *DRN* and religion.

¹⁶⁰ 2.646–651 = 1.44–49. The Stoics may be a target of these lines, according to Rouse & Smith [1975: 146–147 n. b], who also caution the reader to “[n]ote the emphatic wording of this important qualification” against the use of *religio turpis*. See my discussion of the Stoics issue at pp. 12–15, above.

¹⁶¹ Cf. Bakhtin [1984/1968: 306]: “the grotesque is always satire”; Griffin’s point that “[o]ne of the special features of satire is to give *form* to *deformity*” [1994: 167; emphasis preserved]; and Bloom [2009]. On the grotesque in Lucretius (and Catullus and the Alexandrian poets), see Ferrero [1949: 141–143]; on Juvenal and the grotesque, see Plaza [2006: 305–337]; on the grotesque in Roman satire generally, Miller [1998], and on satire in the post-classical period, Simpson [2003: 52, 129, 138–140].

potential here for irony, or for the possibility that the speaker is undercutting himself in making this pronouncement. For he himself is desirous of hearers: “I demand heedful ears and mind” (*attentas auris animumque reposco*, 6.920).¹⁶² Maybe the distinction is that the speaker demands specifically attentive ears and throws the mind in as well. The verb *reposco*, however, is nevertheless emphatic and markedly contradictory to the self-assured sanctimony of the aphorism at 4.594. If the speaker is among the number of people desirous of listeners, how is his indignation at people desirous of listeners justified? The answer, like many aspects of a satirist, eludes.

The opening of the sixth book homes in on Epicurus and his amelioration of troubled human society during his lifetime. According to *DRN*'s persona, Epicurus looked at lives racked with greed and anxiety and “perceived that the jar itself makes the flaw/fault, and that everything inside of it is ruined by the flaw/fault.”¹⁶³ The mind produces the fault. Epicurus, in response, “therefore scoured/cleansed their hearts with true-speaking speeches and established a limit to desire and fear” (*ueridicis igitur purgauit pectora dictis | et finem statuit cuppedinis atque timoris*, 24–25). Epicurus scoured the flaws and offered a means for the betterment of life, not unlike the *ego* of Horace's *Sermones* or the speaker at the end of Juvenal 10.¹⁶⁴ Moreover, in accomplishing his task, Epicurus—already deified in the proem of *DRN* 5—gains unassailable moral high ground. What is

¹⁶² Compare also earlier, 1.50–51: “summon to true reasoning unpreoccupied ears and an acute mind isolated from anxieties,” *uacuas auris animumque sagacem | semotum a curis adhibe ueram ad rationem*.

¹⁶³ 6.17–18: *intellegit...uitium uas efficere ipsum, | omniaque illius uitio corrupier intus*. On the imagery of the *uas* in *DRN* and its Greek antecedents—all non-Epicurean—see Görler [1997]. This image appears in a later satirist, Persius, at 3.20–24, with Keane [2006: 163 n. 72] and p. 265, below.

¹⁶⁴ Both discussed at pp. 51–58, above.

important here is that the Lucretian *ego* aligns himself with Epicurus (see p. 89, above) and thus also associates himself with the rough cleansing of intellectual faults—and justifies his own indignation at those who have failed to adopt the well-reasoned doctrines of Epicurus.

I come last to Iphigenia (or, for *DRN*, Iphianassa). This early passage (1.80–101), one of the most famous in *DRN*, paints a tragic portrait of the girl’s sacrifice, and a menacing one of the madness that drove her father to officiate it. The tone is heightened—tragic—throughout. The terms “foremost of the men” (*prima uirorum*, 86) and “fruitful and favorable” (*felix faustusque*, 100) are, in Gale’s words, “savagely ironic,” and could suggest that the speaker here “almost parodies” allegorical interpretations of the Iphigenia myth [1994a: 96]. We could add to the savage irony a troubling *figura etymologica* at *DRN* 1.98 (*casta inceste*) and the bitterness (*misera* yet again, though with not a comic but a tragic timbre here) of 93–94: “nor was it able to benefit the poor girl in such a time that she first had gifted the king with the name of father” (*nec miserae prodesse in tali tempore quibat | quod patrio princeps donarat nomine regem*). The story is furthermore bookended with nearly wrathful pronouncements on the moral turpitude of *religio*—here indistinguishable between “superstition” and “religion,” or between “religious belief” and “religious practice.” First bookend: “that *religio* has quite often generated criminal and impious deeds” (*saepius illa | religio peperit scelerosa atque impia facta*, 83–84). Note the force of *scelerosa atque impia*, the pejorative tone of the demonstrative *illa*. Second bookend: “to such a height of evils has *religio* been able to push” (*tantum religio potuit suadere malorum*, 101).

DRN's speaker performs for the reader a height of indignation to match the height of evils instigated by *religio*. In this instance, I believe that the speaker claims moral superiority through the very act of indignation itself. This is a situation where an observer, as it were, sees something wrong and speaks out against it.¹⁶⁵ The speech-act creates self-justification enough, and the value-laden terminology—*scelerosa*, *impia*, *turparunt* and *foede* at 85, *miseræ*, *sollemni* at 96, *claro* at 97, *casta inceste*, *felix faustusque*, and *tantum malorum*—allows the speaker to arrogate to himself a sense of moral rectitude conventionally linked with the religious practices and beliefs he is combating. The Lucretian *ego* is thus a blame poet in this passage, and his poetry is mockery.¹⁶⁶ But it is a bitter, heartrending mockery indeed.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁵ Even if the something in question happened centuries ago, or not at all—cf. Clay [1983: 217]: “Lucretius is careful to set in Greece and in a remote past both his philosophy and his account of the monstrous religion it overthrew. Yet both his *ratio* and his sense of the threats of *religio* are made Roman and present. “

¹⁶⁶ For links among the Iphigenia scene, the mourning cow who has lost her calf to sacrifice at *DRN* 2.352–365, and the writings of Empedocles, see Gale [1994a: 72; and 2000: 46–47]. For the issue of poetic anxiety over the cruelty of sacrifice in *DRN* and Vergil's *Georgics*, see Morgan [1999: 105–149] and Gale [2000: 101–112]. Elsewhere Gale, citing *DRN* 5.855–861 and 2.1161, writes: “a kind of partnership exists between man and domestic animals in Lucretius, and relations are generally cordial....The sacrifice of the calf in 2.352–66 is presented very much as a *perversion* of this relationship” [1991: 425; emphasis preserved].

¹⁶⁷ The place for smoking altars is not in our lives, but in our dreams, as the speaker shows two books later: “asleep we in dreams see altars breathe steam out and bear smoke on high” (*in somnis sopiti...cernimus alte | exhalare uaporem altaria ferreque fumum*, 3.431–432).

Collusion: speaker, reader, addressee

The final essential component of a satirist is his creation of a collusive relationship with his audience, his formation of an “in” crowd that includes the audience and excludes the objects of mockery and scornful laughter. In *Serm.* 1.4, for instance, the Horace-*ego* instructs the addressee to pick the satiric target, and thereby prompts the reader to ally with the satirist in the act of mockery.¹⁶⁸ At the very end of the same poem, the *ego* even threatens to coerce the addressee to join the “in” crowd, a gang of poets (1.4.138–143, with *poetarum...manus* at 141)—so the reader is given the choice either to collude with the satirist and his entourage or to risk becoming the target of satiric attack and subsequent forced conversion.

I will demonstrate that *DRN*'s speaker does collusively engage his readership, and that he occasionally points to a derisible group of outsiders. First, I address the complicated interrelationship in *DRN* of speaker, addressee, and reader. Mitsis has discussed a problem with how the speaker of *DRN* renders the interaction between himself and his addressee. In short, the speaker treats the addressee (whom Mitsis identifies as Memmius throughout) rather demeaningly. Indeed, Hahn, discussing the invocation of Venus, comments that “there is no hint of deep affection here or anywhere else on Lucretius’ part for Memmius” [1966: 137].

One of Mitsis’ prime examples is the wormwood passage (1.936–950), where the speaker compares his poetic adaptation of Epicurean philosophy to doctors who add honey to doses of wormwood for sick boys, to trick them into taking the lifesaving medi-

¹⁶⁸ 1.4.25: “pick anyone you want from the middle of the crowd—s/he’s suffering for greed or ’cause of pathetic ambition” (*quemuis media elige turba: | aut ob auaritiam aut misera ambitione laborat*).

cine. The adult audience of *DRN* is thus implicitly compared to children, Mitsis argues, so “why shouldn’t many readers come to the much more obvious conclusion that the poet is claiming to treat them as sick children, rather than as autonomous equals in search of commonly shared goals?”¹⁶⁹ This issue is exacerbated by *DRN*’s portrayal of children as weak and whiny creatures [1993: 116–117], and may represent “an air of condescension and treat[ment of] his readers as children” motivated by “specific rhetorical and didactic goals” [1993: 114].¹⁷⁰

In sum, according to Mitsis, the named addressee of *DRN*, Memmius, becomes the target of the speaker’s authoritarian positioning, and serves as a didactic fool (a νήπιος) who never catches on to what the speaker is trying to teach [1993: 123–124].¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁹ Mitsis [1993: 112], and further: “the poet, just as the doctor, must administer treatment as he sees fit” [1993: 114]. At the same time, however, I suggest that we, as adult readers, can be aware of the deception that the honey on the cup comprises, but our awareness of it does not mean that we see it as a bad thing, or that we do not still want, say, our ibuprofen to have a candy coating. Likewise, when it comes to the Lucretian speaker’s forewarning the reader about the supposedly bad-tasting medicine of philosophy, my take—that the doctor’s treatment of the boys does not necessarily reflect negatively on the *ego*’s treatment of the reader—again differs from Mitsis [1993: 120]: “[a]ny pediatrician, even one with an extremely robust god-complex, knows better than to explain to children in advance how bad the medicine is really going to taste or how she plans to trick them.” My point exactly: doctors may trick children with honey on the cup, but they do in fact tell adults ahead of time. We should be wary, furthermore, of pushing the simile too far. As Culler writes, “statements authors make about the process of composition are notoriously problematic” [1980: 105].

¹⁷⁰ This sort of treatment fits with *DRN*’s wider “system of connected imagery” and is in keeping with the poem’s generic predecessors Hesiod, Parmenides, and Empedocles [Mitsis 1993: 114].

¹⁷¹ Mitsis [1993: 123–124]. Memmius, therefore, is like Hesiod’s addressee Perses in *Works and Days*—so Tortorelli: “Hesiod explicitly figures Perses as his intellectual inferior” [2011: 166]. Cf. p. 80, above, and Rosen [2007: 232 n. 31]: “although this is obviously not, generically or formally speaking, a work of ‘satire,’ its didactic stance and authorial stance against a target, Perses, give much of it a satiric cast.” For satirical elements of Hesiod, see Hunt [1981], Nisbet [2004], and Tortorelli [2011: 34–45]. The Lu-

We see the speaker mocking the addressee again and again—not only with phrases of coercive argumentation of the type “you must admit that...” (*fateare necesse est* + indirect statement), “it must certainly be granted that...” (*certe...dandum est* + indirect statement), and “it’s idiocy to think that...” (*desipere est*),¹⁷² but also by calling the addressee flat wrong.¹⁷³ This mocking repetition constitutes a conscious, nontrivial phenomenon.¹⁷⁴

cretian persona, too, has a didactic stance, and a stance against the addressee—and so likewise, I believe, Memmius takes on a satiric cast.

Another view on Memmius (or “Memmius”), akin to Mitsis’ view, is that of Donohue, who also suggests that Memmius, as fictive reader, serves to allay the harshness of the attacks on the reader [1993: 117–118]. For the term “fictive reader,” which denotes the persona (implied by the text) that a real reader must adopt as part of the act of reading, see Ong [1977: 60]. The views of both Mitsis and Donohue are in part prefigured by Roller [1970].

¹⁷² *Fateare necesse(st)*: 2.1064, 3.513, 3.578, 3.677, 3.766, 4.216, 5.343, 5.376 (*necessumst confiteare*). *Certe...dandum est*: 2.1129. *Desipere(st)*: 3.800–805, 5.165, 5.1042. Of the phrase *desiperest*, Waltz remarks, “c’est un de ses refrains” [1949: 89]. Another example of coercive argumentation in *DRN* is the speaker’s use of the verb *finigo*: according to Leonard & Smith, it “[c]onnotes falsity” [1942: 213 *ad* 1.104], Lenaghan calls it “one of Lucretius’ favorite verbs for denoting futile or deliberately deceitful rationalization” [1967: 233 n. 41], and Brown calls the verb “palpably derogatory” [1983: 155].

¹⁷³ E.g., “you’ve wandered way off the path of true reasoning” if you disbelieve atomic motion (2.80–82: *aiius a uera longe ratione uagaris*). Similar examples at 1.370–383, 1.637, 1.659, 1.711, 1.880, 2.82, 2.174–176, 2.229, 2.645, 2.740, 3.105, 4.915, 4.931, 5.23, 5.406, 6.767, and 6.853. See Minyard [1978: 30–31] and Fowler [2002: 256 *ad* 2.176]; and cf. also Bailey [1947: 713 *ad* 1.635–637; 1008 *ad* 3.105], Clay [1983: 237], Costa [1984: 77 *ad* 5.405], Piazzzi [2005: 87–88 *ad* 1.637; 259 *ad* 1.880], and Gale [2009: 112 *ad* 5.23; 139 *ad* 5.406]. Piazzzi points out the general-purpose use of these lines in *DRN*, against any adversary: “[s]i tratta di una fraseologia tipica che Lucrezio applica a tutti coloro che seguono dottrine diverse da quella epicurea” [2005: 259 *ad* 1.880].

¹⁷⁴ Mitsis [1993: 127]: “Lucretius is not a poet afflicted with doubts and conflicting allegiances; rather he is employing a rhetorical strategy that deliberately exploits...responses from his readers.” Compare Gale [1994a: 57]: the speaker of *DRN* “self-consciously manipulates the literary expectations of his reader, who is to be ‘deceived not harmed’”—an image from the “honey on the cup” passage. Cf. Clay [1983: 212–225, and especially 185]: “Lucretius is constantly at pains to give his reader an overview of how the essential parts of his philosophy fit into a whole,” and my references above (p. 96 n. 116).

Compare also the explanation in *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (a text basically contemporary with *DRN*) of how to gain goodwill from the abuse of one’s adversaries:

The effect of the speaker's endlessly berating the addressee? The readers, as Mitsis writes, see him "attempting to deal with someone who embraces all the conventional and mistaken attitudes that the poet is out to eliminate....[I]t makes us more inclined to join his [the *ego*'s] side and take his point of view" [1993: 125–126]. The addressee comes off as ignorant¹⁷⁵ and thus becomes an undesirable associate for the reader.

The speaker enacts upon the reader a shift in alignment, from identifying with the addressee (Memmius, or "Memmius") to identifying with the Lucretian *ego* himself. We—or at least the implied reader¹⁷⁶—relinquish anything we have in common with Memmius and look upon him with the kind of enjoyment that an observer on the shore looks upon a ship in trouble at sea (*suaue mari magno* and so forth, the proem to *DRN* 2).¹⁷⁷ In other words, I would add, *DRN*'s didactic plot¹⁷⁸ moves the reader from addressee-aligned student to knowing collaborator of the speaker, collusively mocking the faults and shortcomings of others, the plot's objects of scorn. And we can detect this shift, subtly marked, in the text itself, for the speaker shifts from repeatedly insinuating

"goodwill will be obtained from the persona of our adversaries if we drive them into hatred, into ill will, into disdain" (*ab aduersariorum persona beniuolentia captabitur si eos in odium, in inuidiam, in contemptionem adducemus*, 1.8).

¹⁷⁵ Ignorant—and thus similar to Perses, and to the farmers in the *Georgics* who are "ignorant of the path" (*ignarosque uiae...agrestis*, 1.41). Gibson suggests that the appearance of ignorance is an unusual feature for (supposedly) didactic poetry before Ovid's *Ars Amatoria* [1998: 298].

¹⁷⁶ The term is from Iser [1978: 34], and refers to a hypothetical figure who anticipates the recipient of the text. The implied reader designates a network of response-inviting structures that impel the reader to grasp the text. Cf. p. 130 n. 186, below.

¹⁷⁷ Mitsis [1993: 126]: "whenever we come to the realization that we share beliefs with a *népios*, we are more likely to want to give them up."

¹⁷⁸ For the term, see Fowler [2000]. Compare also the "satiric plot" of Kernan [1959: 30–35; 1962b].

that the reader is an idiot (e.g., 2.740, *procul auius erras*, “you’re far and away mistaken”; and p. 125 n. 173, above) to including the reader among the “in” crowd of those who scrutinize the erroneousness of others: “*notice* how far away this has been pushed from true reasoning.”¹⁷⁹ A sign of Mitsis’ shift in the reader’s allegiance, yes, but also a sign of the Lucretian persona’s satiric collusiveness.

So this persona pulls the allegiance of the reader away from the addressee and towards himself. He takes it another step farther by including (or perhaps implicating) the reader in his line of reasoning and argumentation. Those now-familiar “we” statements draw the reader and speaker closer together, and make the revelation of the nature of things a joint project. While coercive argumentation like the lines introduced with *fateare necessest* (p. 125 n. 172, above) is part of the addressee’s browbeating, meted out by the *ego*, at the same time it makes the reader complicit in confirming the proof. Similarly, the potentially coercive (and at least patronizing) language of statements introduced by *nonne uides*¹⁸⁰ both presume the patent veracity of the speakers’s claims and simultaneously, ungenerous tone notwithstanding, involve the reader in the furthering of the argument.

¹⁷⁹ 6.767–768: *quod procul a uera quam sit ratione repulsum | percipe*. The imperative *percipe* is extremely emphatic, placed in enjambment after a near-exact repetition of a stock barb line in *DRN*—compare 5.405, *quod procul a uera nimis est ratione repulsum*. The only difference is the replacement of *nimis est* with *quam sit* to allow for the indirect question after *percipe*.

Further evidence for the shift: the *ego* says, with a third-person verb, that the kind of person who believes in the possibility of chimaerae “could babble out many similar things from his mouth” (*multa licet simili ratione effutiat ore*, 5.910). Clay traces the shift from Memmius to “[t]he reader by himself, for himself” [1983: 225]; Townend refers to the “fading” of Memmius [1978]. This notion of a shift is, we should note, not the only reader-position possible, and not the only possible reading of the poem.

¹⁸⁰ *DRN* 4.1286, 5.602, 5.646, and elsewhere; cf. Schiesaro [1990].

The *ego*'s incorporation of the reader in a shared philosophical undertaking produces kinder evidence, too, material that suggests a more optimistic opinion of the reader.¹⁸¹ The speaker “ask[s] all the more for attentive ears and mind” for his pending explanation of magnets (*quo magis attentas auris animumque reposco*, 6.920). He takes his reader to be a ready listener. The speaker introduces his note on how the body is weakened by long-lasting speech-giving with the words “nor does it escape you” (*nec te fallit*, 4.535). He takes his reader to be a keen observer. In his discussion of echoes, the speaker tells us, “once you’ve seen this [the dispersion of sound after hitting a surface], you yourself could supply an explanation to yourself and others” (*quae bene cum uideas, rationem reddere possis | tute tibi atque aliis*, 4.572–573). He takes his reader to be a quick learner.¹⁸² When presenting his argument on the mortality of the world, the speaker supplies a defense against charges of begging the question,¹⁸³ and when expounding the nature of Aetna the volcano, the speaker fields an objection interpolated by his (momen-

¹⁸¹ Here my argument is in line with Gale [2005], who, in an argument framed as being against that of Mitsis [1993] and others, considers the addressee “a positive model for the ideal reader, one who is actively and critically engaged with the poet’s teaching, who stands to benefit hugely from it” [2005: 179; emphasis preserved]. But where Gale sees a conflict between her reading and Mitsis’, I see two different levels of speaker-reader interaction: Mitsis identifies the problematic relationship between Lucretian *ego* and internal addressee (“Memmius” or otherwise), while Gale focuses on the relationship between implied author and authorial, expert, or (as she puts it) ideal reader. My point is that, where Gale sees the ideal reader’s apprehension of the *ego*-addressee interactions as an effective teaching tool, we can also detect a collusive relationship between satirist (Lucretian *ego*) and audience (expert reader) against satirized target (addressee).

¹⁸² Perhaps the reader has learned from the speaker’s dogged, near-“Socratic” instruction on the unboundedness of the universe—wherever “you” say the boundary is, “I’ll ask what finally happens with the spear” thrown outwards from that purported borderline (*quaeram quid telo denique fiat*, 1.981).

¹⁸³ 5.247–248: *illud in his rebus ne corripuisse rearis | me mihi*, “in order that you not think I’ve snatched this point up for me in these matters,” the point in question being the mortality of earth and fire.

tary) interlocutor.¹⁸⁴ He takes his reader to be a sharp critical thinker—at least after four books of scientific instruction! In the same section on Aetna, the speaker puts the task of discovery on the reader (6.647–654),¹⁸⁵ and in so doing makes clear the shared, even collusive nature of this Epicurean enterprise.

In satire, collusion of this sort enables the reader to laugh with the satirist at the people who do not pick up on the satiric comedy. *DRN* gives us an explicit glimpse of this “out”-group, during the invective against Heraclitus (see also p. 76, above):

omnia enim stolidi magis admirantur amantque
inuersis quae sub uerbis latitantia cernunt,
ueraque constituunt quae belle tangere possunt
auris et lepido quae sunt fucata sonore.

(*DRN* 1.641–644)

’Cause dullards more marvel at and just *adore* things they see hiding beneath topsy-turvy terms, and they establish to be true things that can touch their ears prettily and that have been painted with charming sound.

“[H]ere sounds the poet’s pride which looks down upon the learned,” says Houghton [1912: xxiv]. Heraclitus and his followers are *stolidi*. They are the “don’t get it” crowd.

¹⁸⁴ 6.673: *at nimis est ingens incendi turbidus ardor*, “but the stormy blaze of the fire is too gigantic!” On the contents of this objection, see Bollack [1978: 336–337] and Furley [1982: 38], *contra*.

It is not immediately clear who exactly the speaker of this objection, or of other objections raised by an interlocutor at 1.803, 1.897, and 3.356, is. Merrill [1907: *ad* 1.897] rejects an identification with Memmius; Leonard & Smith [1942: *ad* 1.803 and 1.897] suggest a student of the philosophers under attack in those lines; Bailey [1947: 739] refers to “the imaginary objector”; Lenaghan [1967: 232] says “probably...the student”; Townend claims that “the presence of an actual participant in the argument is intended to be kept in mind” [1978: 272]; and Solomon calls the objector “the uninitiate” [2004: 275 n. 42] who “is in need of constant distraction to resist slipping back into his old ways” [2004: 268]. Cf. p. 47 and p. 104, above.

¹⁸⁵ Cf. Clay [1983: 225], Gale [2005: 178], and the speaker’s promise, at the beginning of *DRN*, that readers themselves will “be able to recognize the rest” (*possis cognoscere cetera tute*, 1.403).

The ideal reader—the term, from Iser [1978: 30], refers to a hypothetical reader who is like an exact copy of the author, a useful construct for puzzling out difficult texts¹⁸⁶—has, by this point in the poem, adopted the principle that the universe consists of atoms and void, and will now side with the speaker against the faulty ideas of “those who have decided that the matter of the universe is fire” (*qui materiem rerum esse putarunt | ignem*, 1.635–636). We see the “don’t get it” *stolidi* again at 1.1068 (in a fragmentary passage, unfortunately) and once more in the formulation “certain people who are ignorant of matter” (*quidam...ignari materiai*, 2.167), this time in regards to the belief that gods created the world for humankind.

Lurking in these passages is the issue of the Stoics: whether *DRN* ignores or engages them (as I mentioned in the introduction, pp. 12–15, above). I proffer here a reading of the matter that can stand even with the scholarly debate in a state of aporia. I see our difficulty pinning the speaker down on the presence or absence of the Stoics in his invectives not just as a question about *DRN*’s grasp of intellectual history but also as a testament to the ultimate elusiveness of the speaker’s voice, akin to the satirist’s elusiveness, which is tied up with the collusive rapport that a satiric speaker forms with his audience. So Mitsis: “[i]n winking with the poet behind the back of the fool, we ourselves may be swallowing more of the poet’s medicine than we suspect” [1993: 128]. In *DRN* as in other Graeco-Roman satiric poetry, the reader becomes part of the “in” or “get it” crowd, mocking the “doesn’t get it” target (or, in *DRN*, addressee)—but this “becoming”

¹⁸⁶ The concept of the ideal reader is applied to Petronius *Satyricon* by Slater [1990] (and cf. Conte [1996] as well). Alternatively the reader here could be the “competent reader” of Culler [1980]. Cf. p. 126 n. 176, above.

is a manipulation of the reader by the speaker, and it implicates the reader in the speaker's satiric/didactic program.

Summary: *DRN's ego as satirist*

We have seen that the speaker of *DRN* takes up the pose or trappings of the satirist on many occasions. A major tool that he employs is comic *reductio ad absurdum*, while his verses are peppered with comedic words and the rare comedic scene. He is a character with a personalized voice, exploiting both the communal “we” statements about the global experiences of humankind and the speaker's discipular connection to Epicurus. This Lucretian persona preeningly and self-righteously claims the high ground on intellectual, moral, and even poetic levels. He makes disingenuous claims of abjection, perhaps most notably a sort of linguistic abjection. His mockery and blame consists mainly of the revelation of others' hypocrisy and folly, both intellectual and moral. He expresses (sometimes intense) indignation at flaws and faults of the mind, based on misjudgment of the senses or moral failings—whether the failing is a wish to be a respected storyteller (as with the ear-greedy humans at 5.594) or the sacrifice of your own daughter. This indignation is perhaps even an originating motive for the poem itself.¹⁸⁷ Finally, the *ego* sets up a collusive connection between himself and the reader: he constructs the addressee

¹⁸⁷ Kenney [1971: 19]: “it was precisely Lucretius' *indignatio* of what he had read and of what he saw and heard around him that motivated the writing of the *D.R.N.* in the first place.” Or in other words, “the *indignatio* makes the poetry” (*facit indignatio uersum*, Juvenal 1.79)!

(“Memmius”) as the out-group and pulls the reader towards himself in order to form the in-group that laughs at the satiric verses and at the addressee, who does not get the joke. Memmius himself, furthermore, is satirized.

So we can, with confidence, say that *DRN*’s persona frequently acts as a satirist, as a speaker in the mode of satire. But what about my claim that some satirists do in fact try to achieve the improved world that they claim as the object of their indignant critiques? Does *DRN*’s satiric poetry include such expectation of positive change? Absolutely. The Lucretian *ego* does try to make the world better.¹⁸⁸ He does make a positive suggestion on love.¹⁸⁹ He does believe that it is even possible to overcome the darker parts of human nature:

illud in his rebus uideo firmare potesse,
usque adeo naturarum uestigia linqui
paruola quae nequeat ratio depellere nobis,
ut nil inpediat dignam dis degere uitam.

(*DRN* 2.319–322)

This at least I see that I can assure you about in the midst of all these matters: so tiny are the tracks left by our natures, the kinds of tracks that reasoning can push away from us, that as a result it’s not at all a hassle to live a life fit for gods.

The speaker not only envisions a utopian life here on earth, but also guarantees our capability of realizing such a utopia. Inborn flaws can be conquered by *ratio*, specifically the *ratio* that the speaker himself wishes to divulge.

¹⁸⁸ Cf. Fowler [1989: 149]: “He is concerned with the state of Rome, but the solution is a personal one: everyone should become an Epicurean.”

¹⁸⁹ *DRN* 4.1191: “give in a little to human nature,” *humanis concedere rebus*. On this line, see, among others, Nussbaum [2009/1994: ch. 5], Hall [2000: 227–239], and Brown [1987: *ad loc.*].

The speaker not only is a part-time satirist, but also puts onstage for the reader a virtual parade of satirists. There are the lovers who mock each other at 4.1157–1158, the self-directed satiric rant about the addressee’s own fear of death at 3.1026–1052, the satire-like scouring of faults by Epicurus at 6.9–41. Now, the first two of the mini-parade are both failed satirists: the latter is explicitly criticizing himself and the former are undercutting themselves by attacking their matching counterparts. Epicurus is wildly successful, but does not play a true satirist (he is not, and does not claim to be, abject; he does not engage in comic mockery; he does not even speak directly to the addressee). There is one guest satirist in *DRN* who I will argue is successful, however.

Epilogue: *Natura Rerum* as satirist

The speaker of *DRN* acts as a satirist at times, particularly in his rejection of incorrect philosophies and of anxieties based on false beliefs about love and death. *DRN* has a second speaker, though, one given voice by the Lucretian *ego* towards the end of book 3 (lines 931–949, 955–962). This speaker is the Nature of Things herself, the *Natura Rerum*. In a soliloquy that the Lucretian persona has the reader imagine—an innovative one that does not have clear parallels in other Epicurean texts¹⁹⁰—she takes the addressee to task for fearing death.¹⁹¹ And *Natura Rerum* is, I argue, a satirist.¹⁹²

¹⁹⁰ Cf. Reinhardt [2002: 294]: “connections with extant Epicurean texts are comparatively loose.”

¹⁹¹ This passage merits more attention than it has received in Lucretian studies, as Reinhardt points out, calling it “a conspicuous climax” in the poem [2002: 294]. See Stork

Personalized voice? Check. Though the passage is brief and *Natura Rerum*'s attention is focused primarily on her addressee, she does make it somewhat personal. "Furthermore, there's nothing that *I* could devise or discover that could please you," *tibi praeterea quod machiner inueniamque, | quod placeat, nil est* (3.944–945). Inasmuch as she is the constitutor of the universe in which humans exist, *Natura Rerum* was already implicitly involved in the human problem she critiques; in these two lines, she inserts herself into the situation explicitly.

Comic mockery and blame? Check. *Natura Rerum* castigates the addressee with salvos like "you gratify yourself too much with sickly sorrows" (*nimis aegris | luctibus indulges*, 933–934) and "why are you looking to give yourself more trouble?" (*cur am-*

[1970] for connections to consolatory literature in this passage, Wallach [1976: 61–83] for connections to diatribe with Bion of Borysthenes Πενία (fr. 17 in Kindstrand [1976]), and cf. Rambaux [1980].

On the issue of *DRN*, Epicureanism, and the fear of death, see, among others, Fish [1998], Warren [2004: ch. 1], and Morrison [forthcoming]; and on *Natura Rerum* and *katábasis* in *DRN* book 3, see Reinhardt [2004].

¹⁹² *Pace* Waltz [1949: 97]: "La satire, ici, confine au drame; et c'est ce ton dramatique qui fait, dans le développement où elle s'insère, sa force démonstrative." Wallach, by contrast, argues that the passage is, like the rest of the attack on the fear of death in book 3, heavily indebted to diatribe [1976: 61–77, cf. Oltramare 1926: 111–112], and that the passage may even be a translation of Bion's *Penia* [1976: 63, 65].

Reinhardt undertakes a straight philosophical reading of *Natura Rerum*'s tirade, and argues that "the speech is meant to coerce the reader into an attitude about death... similar to that of the Epicurean sage, thus compensating for the fact that Lucretius cannot in his arguments rely on the reader's having already accepted the Epicurean theory of pleasure" [2002: 302]. This analysis is not inconsistent with my reading of these lines, since coercive argumentation is part and parcel of the satiric voice of *DRN*'s speakers (cf. p. 125, above, and my consideration of *Natura Rerum*'s collusiveness directly below). The interpretation I offer here does, however, provide a fuller explanation for *DRN*'s inclusion of this passage than Reinhardt's ultimate suggestion that *DRN* draws on diatribe here because it needed "an alternative method of inducing something like unperturbedness of the soul" because the poem does not explicitly expound the Epicurean theory of pleasure [2002: 304].

plius addere quaeris?, 940). Her language is colloquial.¹⁹³ She portrays the target of her mockery as never satisfied—“you always desire what you don’t have, you disdain what you do” (*semper aues quod abest, praesentia temnis*, 957)—in a satiric fashion similar to the satirist’s criticisms at the opening of Horace *Serm.* 1.1.¹⁹⁴ And she humorously de-mocks the target: “get them tears outta here, you great chasm, and quit your whining!” (*aufer abhinc lacrimas, baratre, et compesce querellas!*, 954¹⁹⁵). *Barathrum* (whence *DRN*’s *baratre*) is, I note, a word with comic connotations, and it appears as such in both Plautus and Horace;¹⁹⁶ and *Natura Rerum* employs comic language elsewhere, as well.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹³ Cf. Reinhardt [2002: 299]: “the context obviously is colloquial.”

¹⁹⁴ qui fit, Maecenas, ut nemo, quam sibi sortem
 seu ratio dederit seu fors obiecerit, illa
 contentus uiuat, laudet diuersa sequentis?
 (*Serm.* 1.1.1–3)

How is it, Maecenas, that nobody lives satisfied with his lot in life,
 whether reason gave it to ’im or chance threw it at ’im, and instead he
 praises the different things that the next guy has?

On this satiric/diatribal trope of μεμψιμοιρία, see, e.g., Keane [2007: 49–50] and, on the theme in *DRN*, Wallach [1976: 69–71, 73, 99].

¹⁹⁵ Line 955 in the renumbering of Rouse & Smith [1975].

¹⁹⁶ In Plautus’ *Curculio*, the *seruus* Palinurus tells the young lover Phaedromus to hasten his quasi-ritual offering of wine to the drunkard *ancilla* Leaena: “quick, pour [it] into this great pit here, hurry up and wash the gutter clean” (*effunde hoc cito in barathrum, prope | prolue cloacam*, 123–124). Horace’s *ego* calls a greedy person a *barathrum macelli*, a “great grocer’s chasm” (*Epist.* 1.5.31). Martial, too, uses the term comically: “a belch comes back up from the farthest-off chasm” of a disgusting glutton (*extremo ructus...redit a barathro*, 1.87.4) and the speaker elsewhere incredulously asks “what d’you, Baeticus the Castrated, got to do with a woman’s chasm?” (*quid cum femineo tibi, Baetice galle, barathro?*, 3.81.1).

Kenney discusses some difficulties with the word *baratre* in *DRN* [1971: 216–217 *ad* 3.955]; cf. Wallach [1976: 54, 71, 75, 95]. Compare also *Natura Rerum*’s use of *stulte* (3.939), with Wallach [1976: 66].

Justified indignation? Check. She uses four rhetorical questions (*DRN* 3.931–943) in her first speech alone, a rhetorical stance echoed by the Lucretian *ego* (950–951¹⁹⁸) immediately after her speech ends. We see her being both indignant and, again, funny at line 954. And the *ego* tells us that she is justified, waging a “just lawsuit” (*iustem litem*, 950), advocating a “true cause” (*ueram causam*, 951), and speaking “rightly, rightly!” (*iure, iure*, 963).¹⁹⁹ The satiric trope of abjection is present, as well, though here it is pushed onto the addressee, the target of the satiric attack, who weeps and wails (“you bemoan and bewail death,” *mortem congemis ac fles*, 934), wastes away unfulfilled (“having used up all life’s rewards, you wither,” *omnia perfunctus uitai praemia marces*, 956), and dies unhappy (“your life has slipped by incomplete and unsatisfying,” *imperfecta tibi elapsast ingrataque uita*, 958). The *ego* outright calls the victim of the second speech pathetic (*miser*, one of our watchwords, line 954).²⁰⁰

Collusion? Check. As with the Lucretian persona, we see with *Natura Rerum* harsh treatment of the addressee (the insulting vocatives *stulte* at 939 and *baratre* at 954)

¹⁹⁷ Cf. Kenney [1971: 212–213 *ad* 3.932 and 933]. Furthermore, the Lucretian *ego*’s introduction of *Natura Rerum* uses the Latin word *increpet* (3.932), as Reinhardt points out: “[h]er tone is described as strident” [2002: 296].

¹⁹⁸ In the numbering of Rouse & Smith [1975], 950–951 designates line 955 (transposed) followed by line 952.

¹⁹⁹ Reinhardt remarks that 3.931–977 is “stylized like a trial” and begins “a virtual κατάβασις being undertaken by the reader” through the end of the book: “to use the motif of a κατάβασις in a passage arguing against the existence of the underworld would of course be just another example of a typically Lucretian strategy” [2002: 300 n. 29]. A strategy, I add, that heightens the speaker (in this case, *Natura Rerum*)’s ambiguity—and so also a satirist’s strategy.

²⁰⁰ On the attack against the old man in *Natura Rerum*’s second speech, see Reinhardt [2002: 300 n. 26]: *DRN* “has not just taken over the traditional ‘butt’ known from diatribal literature, but has turned this butt into a quite sophisticated construct.”

that pushes the reader to identify not with the fool but with the satiric speaker. There is, as well, the same kind of implication of the reader in the argumentation process (the imperative *concede* paired with the coercive formulation *necessesst*, 962).²⁰¹ The Lucretian *ego*, following up on *Natura Rerum*'s invective, even puts self-criticism into the addressee's mouth (1024–1052, cf. p. 112, above)—he makes the addressee into an agent of his own (failed) satire. In addition, certain stylistic traits shared between *Natura Rerum* and *DRN*'s main speaker may suggest further an affiliation of the two as satiric speakers—she, like the *ego*, uses the imagery of the flawed *uas* (936–937) that crops up in *DRN* both before and after her speeches.²⁰² Moreover, her metaphor of “the dinner-guest full of life” (*plenus uitae conuiuia*, 938 cf. 960)—notable both for its (potentially generically significant) use of the term *satur* at 960 and for its connection to Horace's *conuiuia satur* at *Serm.* 1.1.119—reoccurs in the *ego*'s voice at 1004, where it is augmented with a kind of symposiastic *carpe diem* lament.²⁰³

So *Natura Rerum* of *DRN* 3 fits our model of the “modal” satirist.²⁰⁴ Brought on to criticize the moral and intellectual faultiness of the fear of death, she uses a personal

²⁰¹ Cf. Wallach [1967: 66]: “*Natura*...is not merely castigating the ‘stupid man’ for his ridiculous opinions, but she is also urging him to accept death without weeping or complaining, an approach which mitigates the negativism of pure polemic.”

²⁰² 3.793, 3.1003–1010, 6.20–21; cf. 3.440–444, 6.233. See p. 120, above.

²⁰³ Cf. p. 106, above. I return to the image of the *conuiuia* in chapter 5 (pp. 269–271, below).

²⁰⁴ And thus *Natura Rerum* does not fit well into the three main roles for women that Nugent identifies in *DRN*: “the generative and the (repulsive) erotic body, both of which can be finally reduced to a bad smell” [1994: 196], as well as “non-creator/non-producer, in the cultural realm” [1994: 201]. Though the role of interpolated satirist is not necessarily the most exalted role in the text, it is nevertheless a role of some importance, and aligned with the poem's authorial voice. Nugent does not discuss *Natura Rerum* in her article.

voice, comic mockery, justified indignation, and collusion with the reader to chastise her target, the addressee. Aligned with *DRN*'s main speaker, she is comparable to the guest-satirists of Juvenal (Laronia in poem 2,²⁰⁵ Umbricius in 3, and Naevolus in 9²⁰⁶)—satiric personas featured by the primary speaker to deliver a specific satiric sermon—more than to simple inset satirist-characters like Odysseus in *Iliad* 2 and *Odyssey* 9. We can also adduce the opening of Juvenal poem 1, which Freudenburg calls the complaint “of satire herself” [2001: 212], and the competing figures of Tragedy and Elegy in Ovid *Amores* 3.1.²⁰⁷

The difference, though, is that *Natura Rerum* is arguably a persona of high stature,²⁰⁸ whereas Laronia and Naevolus are both essentially prostitutes, and Umbricius is a disenfranchised and disgruntled (and perhaps bigoted and idiotic) émigré from Rome who laments about getting beaten up in the streets and the drudgeries of the poverty-stricken urban lifestyle.²⁰⁹ Thus while these other figures serve to debase the tone of the

²⁰⁵ For the affiliation of Laronia with the Juvenal-*ego*, see Wiesen [1989: 722] and Nappa [1998: 97–98]. The *ego* explicitly endorses Laronia by describing her as “singing true and evident things” (*uera ac manifesta canentem*, 2.64), cf. Nappa [1998: 101]. Cf. Henderson [1989: 118]: “Best to see ‘Laronia’ as marking another absence of women?”

²⁰⁶ According to Rosen, the Juvenal-*ego* “embrace[s] the character of Naevolus wholesale as a kind of ironized poetic alter-ego” [2007: 225, emphasis preserved], again *pace* Braund [1988] and others.

²⁰⁷ On *Amores* 3.1, see Thomas [1978], Cahoon [1985], Hinds [1987b: 11], Wyke [1990], Keith [1994], Myers [1996: 21], and Perkins [2011].

²⁰⁸ Though perhaps we could find some degree of abject status in *Natura Rerum*'s place in the poem's gender matrix. As Nugent shows, “in Lucretius' text, woman is indeed represented as close to nature, figured primarily as a maternal generative body” [1994: 204], and as the poem progresses nature becomes increasingly associated with disgust and destruction, cf. Anderson [1960: 5–11, 19–20] and Clay [1983: 87–95, 226–234].

²⁰⁹ Larmour remarks that “Umbricius is at the very least another example of the mutilated Roman male” [2005: 164].

poems in which they appear, and to take the Juvenal-*ego* down with them,²¹⁰ *Natura Rerum* adds a sense of greater authority to what the Lucretian persona has been trying to say in the conclusion to book 3.²¹¹ With the voice of the universe on his side, with the endorsement of Nature herself—artful/clever Nature! (*Natura daedala rerum*, 5.234)—the Lucretian *ego* carries more weight and can argue more persuasively against the fears of fools desperately clinging to mortal life.

²¹⁰ For Laronia, see Nappa [1998: 100]:

Laronia's very presence is an indication of baseness, and in this Satire, those being attacked tend to fall to the worst moral level mentioned alongside them....Juvenal cannot take the moral high ground here; those who profess to do so are under attack in this poem, and the poet must attack them without participating in the thing he denounces.

Cf. Henderson [1999b: 196]: “it is Roman culture that speaks through Laronia...And ‘Woman’ only *appears* to be granted a (strong and authoritative) voice so that you can know this is a joke-text.” See also Romano [1979: 82–83], Braund & Cloud [1981: 203–208], Anderson [1982: 209–221], Winkler [1983: 90–107], Konstan [1993], and especially Braund [1995].

For Naevolus, see Rosen [2007: 225], who focuses on the identification of Naevolus with the Juvenal-*ego*: “the Juvenalian satirist...must at some level *become* what he attacks, and...this form of satire demands that he invariably play the role of an abject, disempowered underdog.” Also Bellandi [1974], Braund [1988: 170], and Habinek [2005: 186].

Moodie [2012] advances an argument that the bully of Juvenal 3.278–301 should be considered a satirist—another comparandum for Lucretius' *Natura Rerum*.

²¹¹ Cf. Kenney [1971: 212]:

Epicurus had personified Nature even if he did not put words into her mouth....The hectoring tone and alliterative vehemence of Nature's harangue are characteristic of the diatribe style. But L. has far transcended his sources. His Nature is no mere anthropomorphic poetical figment: she exists in her own right, as representing the immutable and inexorable laws of the universe that form the subject of the poem....[I]t is not the arguments deployed by the poet, nor even the authority of Epicurus, but the very Sum of Things that stands there to convict the fool of his folly.

We could also, with Rouse & Smith, see the use of *Natura Rerum* as a way by which the speaker “tactfully avoids offending...readers” [1975: 261 n. b].

CHAPTER 3

DRN and the Elements of the Satiric Mode

“[I]t was, it seems, Lucretius who first harnessed the power of satire and applied it to the systematic exposure of error, folly, and superstition.”
Kenney [1971: 11]

Having studied the role of the satiric speaker in *DRN*, we can now turn our attention to a smaller set of characteristics subsidiary to the mode of satire. Parody and irony, ambivalence and ambiguity figure large in satiric works—and we will find ample evidence of these features in *DRN*, as well. One of the most important features of satire, beyond the persona and voice of the satirist-figure himself, is didacticism. Satiric poetry regularly evinces instructive intent. As I will discuss, one possible consequence is a friction between didactic and satiric impulses within poems of satire.

Irony and other features of satire

The preceding chapter has discussed what makes a speaker a satirist. Now: what, besides the presence of a satirist-figure, makes satire satire? According to Kuiper's phenomenological theory of the mode (not of ancient satire specifically), "the real essence of satire lies neither in its form nor its function but rather in the way both these are perceived" [1985: 171; cf. Kuiper 1984]. In other words, Kuiper endeavors to define satire through a description of the common, universal elements that it appears to hold across time and genre. On this perceptual basis, Kuiper ascribes to satire "three major characteristics": an object, an antecedent, and humor, to which we will add a fourth, ambiguity.¹

1. Object: prior offenses of the satiric target

First, according to Kuiper, a satire must have an object, namely a "state of affairs" about which the satire's "inferred creator" (i.e., the satirist) attempts to change the perceiver's opinion [1985: 172–173]. This state of affairs can be a vice, a particular human target, an event, and so forth. What is important here is the satirist's construction of a state of affairs that occurs or develops prior to satire's "poetic plot"—prior to the inception of the satire proper.² This satiric timeline furthermore provides moral justification for the satirist, who through the plot is cast not as initiator of aggression or blame but as righteous responder to some originary offense or shortcoming: "typically in satire, the

¹ Rudd views Roman satire in particular as a triangle composed of three "apices," namely attack, entertainment, and preaching [1986: 1]. Cf. also Griffin [1994: 99–101].

² For more on poetic plots, see Fowler [2000a] and Volk [2010: 127–128].

audience enters into the narrative well after the target's alleged misbehavior, with the result that the poem *seems* to be the one initiating the *psogos*.”³ By portraying the satirist as provoked by the target's unjust action or mindset or state of being, the satiric plot affirms his own righteousness and grants him the moral high ground over his victim.

This primordial and problematized state of affairs also implies a motivation within satire for change and improvement. Indeed, a “common feature of satire...is ultimate desire (however disingenuous and/or tacit) for tranquility, harmony, and peace.”⁴ The prior state of affairs—the object of satire—constitutes a life out of joint, a disordered society, an individual more consonant with the real world's dystopia than with the satirist's utopia. The act of satire, therefore, supposes to address the problem, to set things aright. In this respect, as I will soon relate in more detail, satire shares a common thread with didaxis.

2. Formal antecedent: prior model for satiric discourse

Second, a satire must have a model. In Kuiper's schema, “all satires have formal antecedents”—for instance, “the *Dunciad* could not be a satire without classical epic” [1985: 173]. This model, I would add, need not be an object of parody within the satire (though often there is at least some degree of formal parody). The antecedent could be, for example, one purely of genre (as Hipponax is for Callimachus' *Iamboi* or Lucilius for Horace, Persius, and Juvenal), of discourse (as courtroom altercations, linguistics, and

³ Rosen [2007: 89]. Emphases preserved. *Psogos* (ψόγος) is Rosen's preferred term for satiric blame. Fowler, I would point out, places *DRN* 2.24–28 as “part of a long tradition of the philosophic ψόγος” [2002: 96 *ad loc.*].

⁴ Rosen [2007: 179].

other elite entertainments to Lucilius⁵), or even of medium (e.g., dramatic dialogue in *Serm.* 2.7). Or the antecedent could be a hybrid, a subject of parody and generic predecessor but not the target itself of the satire.⁶ At its most basic, in other words, satire is a derivative product. It is built on the foundations of form (antecedent) and content (object of satiric critique), and its relationship to its antecedent is a prime way of establishing that it is, in fact, satire. We might almost say that the mode of satire is parasitic (parasatiric?), feeding its stylistic or culpatory content from its antecedent(s).⁷

3. Humor: parody and irony

Third, says Kuiper, satire must be humorous [1985: 173]. Humor is the most obvious element of satire,⁸ and we have already assessed how the satirist is a comic figure. Besides the speaker's comedy, I mention two other important aspects of satiric humor: the parody frequently attached to satire's antecedent, and irony. Irony is "surely satire's most conspicuous hallmark."⁹ Irony in, say, Persius poem 4 (a dialogue between Socrates and Alcibiades) lightens the poem's didactic drive, as Dessen has shown: "Socrates is

⁵ Cf. Gruen, who looks at Lucilius' satires as a response to the development and excesses of Roman aristocratic identity during the Republic [1992: ch. 7].

⁶ E.g., Weird Al Yankovic's "Syndicated Inc.," a musical parody of "Misery" by the group Soul Asylum, but moreover a satire of American television culture.

⁷ Or perhaps, to be more generous, symbiotic: for satire can well enrich and enliven a genre, discourse, or medium that it satirizes (read: in which it intervenes).

⁸ Cf. Simpson [2003: 1–7].

⁹ Rosen [2007: 267]. Cf. also Test [1991: ch. 9]; and Simpson [2003: 113–124] on parody and irony as "theoretical preliminaries" for a practicum of satire. Connery and Combe point out that "in the area of late modern and postmodern works...irony and, increasingly, parody are crucial characteristics" [1995b: 9].

primarily a critic whose most effective weapon is irony....[I]t serves to relieve the didactic tone of the Satire.”¹⁰ Irony indeed is a way for the audience to show its collusive alignment with the satiric speaker, by “getting” that the speaker’s statements are ironic and finding amusement in that irony.

Parody, whose origins derive from Greek literature, is an essential element of satire.¹¹ Aristophanes, for instance, employs parody repeatedly as a central tool in his plays.¹² Roman literature too is full of examples of satiric parody. Examples: Lucilius book 1 parodies Ennius *Annales* book 1, Horace *Serm.* 2.5 parodies Homer *Odyssey* 11, and Ovid *Metamorphoses* 13–14 parodies Vergil’s *Aeneid*. The poems *Culex* and *More-*

¹⁰ Dessen [1968: 62], and compare also [1968: 29]: “[t]he facetious wit of Persius’ persona succeeds in tempering his arrogance.” On the tension between comic and didactic urges in satire, see pp. 162–174, below.

¹¹ Cf., for instance, Homeric parody in the *Batrachomyomachia*, cf. Wölke [1978]; Schibli [1983], who publishes fragments of another parody (*The Battle of the Mice and the Weasels*); Olson & Sens [1999]; Sens [2006]; Kelly [2009]; and Acosta-Hughes et al. [2011]. Aristotle refers to a certain Hegemon of Thasos as “the first parodist,” <ὁ> τὰς παρωδίας ποιήσας πρῶτος (*Poetics* 1448a), while Atheneaeus relates that Polemon called Hipponax the inventor of parody (698b–c), cf. Hipponax fr. 126 and Rosen [2007: 155 n. 71]. On ancient parody in general, see Rose [1993]; on parody and iambic verse, Scodel [2010]. Määttä [2004], in a reassessment and modification of the analysis by Bryant [1998] of Terry Pratchett’s satiric fantasy novels, evaluates and problematizes theoretical work on parody and its interaction with the mode of satire by Hutcheon [1985], Rose [1993], Dentith [2000: 192–194] and Hoesterey [2001: 13–14].

¹² On parody and paratragedy in Aristophanic comedy, see, e.g., Rau [1967], Goldhill [1991: ch. 3] (though see, *contra*, Olson [1991], a highly acerbic review), Silk [1993], and Sidwell [2009: ch. 3 and p. 53]. Compare Arnott [1972] on parody in Euripides *Cyclops*. Simpson includes Aristophanes in the category of “Graeco-Roman satirists” [2003: 49]; on Aristophanes and satire, see Halliwell [1984] and Sommerstein [2004]. Parody and paratragedy are important as well to Menandrian New Comedy and the Roman comedy that adapts it: see, among others, Fraenkel [2007/1922: 50, 70, 104, 11, 254], Duckworth [1952: 103 n. 12, 146, 301, and elsewhere], Sheets [1983], Phillips [1984–1985], Manuwald [1999], and Scafoglio [2005].

tum, in the *Appendix Vergiliana*, are also arguably works of parody,¹³ while *Ars Poetica* may itself be a parody of literary criticism, and in Petronius' *Satyrice* the protagonist Eumolpus recites a poem on civil war (119–124) that may be serious or parody.¹⁴ According to Wallach, parody is a “diatribal trait” [1976: 36]; parody is natural as well for the Roman genre of satire.¹⁵ Satirists even parody other satirists: Juvenal poem 5, for instance, ends with a parody of Lucilian satire, according to Freudenburg [2001: 274–277].

Fundamental to Rosen's account of satiric humor is the idea that it derives from the observer's safety from harm—that is, from the satirist's formulation of a subject-space in which the audience feels itself insulated from the satiric act. “[H]umor arises precisely from the artificiality of the context and a consciousness that, however aggressive or transgressive a mimetic act may be, the participants and bystanders remain safe from physical or emotional harm” [2007: 56]. Satire, his argument goes, is mimetic, at least one degree removed from reality.¹⁶ Thus it takes place in an artificial, constructed

¹³ Cf. Ross [1975]. On Roman parody in general, see, e.g., Courtney [1962] and Cèbe [1966].

¹⁴ *Ars Poetica*: so Frischer [1991], though his proposition has been received with varying degrees of skepticism by, among others, Sacks [1992], Keyser [1992], O'Hara [1992], and Johnson [1993]; Harrison [2008] proposes that *Ars Poetica*, along with *Epist.* 2.1–2, may in fact have been a third book of *Sermones*. *Satyrice*: cf. Baldwin [1911: 13–22, 71–88], Zeitlin [1971], and Slater [1990: 18]; *Satyrice* “parodies an astonishingly wide range of other literature.” On Petronius' poems, see Connors [1998], Rimell [2002], and Setaioli [2011].

¹⁵ So Barchiesi & Cucchiarelli [2005: 208]: “Because it does not present itself as a fixed and separate literary form...satire enjoys ample freedom of movement. It can mimic the text it stands alongside, or parody it.”

¹⁶ Cf. Rosen [2007: 22]: “I assume that ‘poetry’ implies ‘fictionality.’ ” So also, on the mode of satire, Matz [2010: ix]: “satire must also be realistic, for it must persuade us that our failings are so entrenched in everyday life...that they need no embellishment or fantasy when transmuted to fiction”; and on Roman satire specifically, Barchiesi & Cucchiarelli [2005: 208], Keane [2006: 3 and 8], Gardner [2009: 9], and Cloud [1989: 53–

environment unlike the environment of the basis for satire's mimesis, namely real-world mockery with its non-literary, non-satiric aggression. With the risk of physical or social retaliation removed, the audience can collude with the satiric speaker in deriding the target of his mockery and blame.

4. Ambiguity

The complications that can follow along with satiric humor and the artificiality of satire's context together touch on another elemental characteristic of the mode of satire: ambiguity. Thus Thomson writes, "ambiguity and ambivalence have always been part of satire, as they have always been at the heart of parody and irony, satire's close relations" [1985: 112]. Irony's presence is notoriously difficult to confirm or discount, and this very difficulty is essential to irony's ability to generate humor. Parody, likewise, can be ambiguous. A parody may constitute an insult of the source material—or homage to it. Take the case of Weird Al Yankovic's 2011 song "Perform This Way," a parody of singer Lady Gaga's "Born This Way" (also 2011). The artist herself views the parody as an act of respect and recognition for her status as a musician—a "rite of passage" that is "empowering," according to Hiatt [2011]—while her manager, who initially refused to grant Lady Gaga's blessing to Yankovic's endeavor, evidently considered the parody an insult.¹⁷

54]: "Roman satirists, like their modern successors, are out to entertain...The joke's the thing, not actuality." In contrast, some theorists of satire of all periods, like Snyder [1991: 215 ad ch. 4 n. 1], arguing *contra* Guilhamet [1987], reject the notion that satire is mimetic and rhetorical; Knight, likewise, keeps satire distinct from mimesis [2004: 38–47]. On satire and "anti-mimetic aversion," see Bogel [2001: 52].

¹⁷ Yankovic [2011a, 2011b].

Altogether, satire itself can be hard for the observer to pin down with any conviction: in Kuiper's words, "it should be possible to be uncertain whether a particular instance...is satire or not" [1985: 177]. Satire's ambiguity is what makes the satirist elusive, what leads to the formation of a divided audience. The irony, parody, and ambivalence of satire allow readers to assume that there are people who get the joke and people who do not; to assign themselves to the "get it" in-group; and to laugh at the out-group. And to criticize the out-group, as Rosen suggests: "[w]hen someone comes along who wants to censor a satirist they are often accused by the satirist's fans and devotees of failing to understand what is really going on with such performances, failing to appreciate what we have come to call a poetics of satire" [2007: 247]. Censors and critics misunderstand satire. Rachel Maddow, as we saw in chapter 2 (p. 59, above), took the *Christwire* parody/satire website seriously; Casaubon mocked Isidorus for misunderstanding Roman satire; readers and interpreters of (for instance) Jonathan Swift, the Persian poet Hafiz, and the 16th-century French author Philibert de Vienne have mistakenly offered straightforward assessments of satiric passages in their authors; and the television and film satires by Sacha Baron Cohen, from *Da Ali G Show* to *Borat* and *Bruno*, are predicated on tricking viewers and participants into failing to "get it."¹⁸

¹⁸ Maddow: p. 59, above. Casaubon: "Good ol' Isidorus has been drinking from the dregs as usual," *e faece haurit Isidorus bonus, ut saepe* [1605/1973: 279]. Swift: so Louis [1981]. Hafiz: so Chenari [2005]. de Vienne: so Javitch [1971]. Cohen: Adelman [2007], Freedman [2009: 57, 164–165].

***DRN*'s satiric traits**

Our poem is certainly not a poem of satire exclusively, but, as I will now show, it engages with elements of the mode repeatedly and systematically. Sellar, one of the first scholars to remark on satirical traits of the poem, saw in *DRN* “the searching insight of a great satirist,” and in its satire the objective “not to make men seem objects of ridicule or scorn, but to restore them to the dignity which they had forfeited through weakness and ignorance.”¹⁹ Perhaps Sellar here is falling into a potential trap similar to that of taking a satirist’s moral posturing too seriously, of treating the Lucretian *ego* too generously and excusing the import and impact of his vitriol. But he touches on two important, sometimes countervailing tendencies of satire—the tendency towards ridicule and the drive to make the world a better place—that are operative not only in satire but also in *DRN*, as I will show. Chapter 2 has described numerous instances of satiric style, tone, or diction in *DRN*. This chapter treats representative examples relevant to the basic building blocks of satire, and afterwards considers a few other specific examples from *DRN*.

1. Object

We return to Kuiper’s major characteristics of satire, now with more details. First, satire has an object, a state of affairs to be satirized; the satirist enters the equation after the object’s alleged offense and ultimately wishes for social harmony. The core elements of *DRN*’s satiric invectives—the fear of death, the passions, misguided philosophies—are, we have seen, both recurrent across the work and persistent throughout the

¹⁹ Sellar [1881: 372–373]. See, *contra*, Waltz [1949: *passim*].

poem's satiric plot, from pre-poem background to beyond poem's end. One satiric object in particular, though, could be construed as the initial anataractic offense that prompts the Lucretian speaker's satiric response within the venue of *DRN: religio*.

Itself based (in the eyes of *DRN*'s persona) on the seemingly omnipresent fear of death, *religio* is a more concrete derivation from the more abstract mortal fears, and it leads to finite, blameworthy action. *Religio* was also, according to the speaker, the original provocation for Epicurus' inquiries into the nature of the universe (*DRN* 1.62–79). Waltz identifies book 1's early, "unforgettable" passage on *religio* (1.62–101) with the start of the poem's actual content and the start of its satire;²⁰ he also asserts that the passage sets the tone for the entire poem—a tone of indignation, no less.²¹ The originary offense is the existence and ills of *religio*, which thus is the object of *DRN*'s satire. The equation of *DRN*'s satiric object with Epicurus' own provocation both aligns the Lucretian *ego* with Epicurus and, I would argue, grants him Epicurus' intellectual and ethical authority. The *scelerosa atque impia facta* that *religio* has committed (1.83) provide the *ego* with the moral justification that is required for his indignation to be satirically successful.

²⁰ Waltz [1949: 80]: "[l]e tempérament satirique de Lucrèce éclate dès le début de son poème....[P]assés quelques vers qui annoncent le sujet du poème, l'entrée en matière, ex abrupto, est l'inoubliable et sinistre caricature de la Religion."

²¹ Waltz [1949: 81]: the verses "donnent la note fondamentale du poème. C'est sur le ton de l'indignation, d'une indignation farouche et débordante, que commence le poème; et ce ton se maintiendra." The epigram *tantum religio potuit suadere malorum!* (*DRN* 1.101) is followed, says Waltz, by irony most rash: "ce qui suit reste encore imprégné de la plus fiévreuse ironie" [*ibidem*]. At its conclusion, Waltz argues, the indignant tone yields (in the remainder of books 1 and 2) to gentler mockery of a polemical nature, in the refutation of the Presocratics and so forth: "à la diatribe initiale a succédé une douce et inoffensive moquerie. Et à partir de là il n'y en a plus guère de traces dans les deux premiers livres, sauf aux endroits où le théoricien cède de nouveau, incidemment, la place au polémiste." [1949: 83].

Religio is the initial (and recurrent²²) object of *DRN*'s satire, then. As we have seen, a satirist professes a desire for peace and tranquility, though he is possibly disingenuous in his profession. The Lucretian speaker, similarly, asks Venus for peace in troubled times in his initial proem, a hymnic invocation whose interpretation is complicated by its seeming inconsistency with the task of an Epicurean didactic poem and its seeming contradiction by the very Epicurean, almost atheistic lines (1.44–49) that, in the manuscript tradition at least, immediately follow the proem.²³ The key point of the invocation, as Volk highlights, is to enable the poet to write in peace, and his prayer for peace is evidently successful, since the poem has been written and we are reading it [2010: *passim*]. So we see, from the very beginning, the Lucretian *ego* seeking peace and tranquility, seeking an improvement in the social (or political) circumstances in which he begins his poetic production. And, like a satirist, the Lucretian *ego* expresses such a wish in a complicated, potentially self-undercutting way.

Let us return to Sellar's claim for the ultimate goal of *DRN*'s satire—i.e., to restore humans to their proper dignity (p. 148, above). This goal, combined with Sellar's allusion to the speaker's potentially scornful and derisive demeanor, encapsulates the presence in *DRN* of this basic satiric characteristic of a desire for peace and tranquility.

²² It appears throughout the poem, particularly at 6.379–422 (so Houghton [1912: xxxix]) and near the end of book 5, cf. Minyard [1985: 49]: “The civil allusions draw out the point at the beginning of the satirical comment at 1194–1203, for Lucretius started from the ridicule of the specific forms of *religio Romana*.” See also my discussion of *DRN*'s “civic satires” in chapter 5 (pp. 278–286, below).

²³ For important, sophisticated interpretations of *DRN*'s opening invocation of Venus, see Asmis [1982], Clay [1983: 82–110], Gale [1994a: 208–223; 2005: 185–188], Summers [1995], Sedley [1998: ch. 1], Farrell [2007: 87–88], O'Hara [2007: 57–64], and Garani [2007: 34–43].

Recuperating human dignity is a therapeutic purpose,²⁴ one that generates greater harmony and tranquility within humankind, but the techniques of satire that the Lucretian *ego* uses for this purpose are harsh enough to be able to undercut achievement of the goal itself.

We can see this juxtaposition also at the beginning of book 2, where the well-known and (I have suggested in chapter 2) satiric scene of watching from shore's safety the struggles of a storm-racked ship (an allegory for the anxieties and troubles of ambition, greed, and the like) is followed immediately by a peaceful scene of a pleasant streamside picnic:

gratius interdum neque natura ipsa requirit,
.....²⁵
cum tamen inter se prostrati in gramine molli
propter aquae riuum sub ramis arboris altae
non magnis opibus iucunde corpora currant,
praesertim cum tempestas adridet et anni
tempora conspergunt uiridantis floribus herbas.
(*DRN* 2.23, 29–33)

And Nature herself doesn't even ask now and again for something more gratifying...Just as long as people can lie down together in the soft grass beside a rivulet of water, beneath the branches of a tall tree, and can happily take care of their bodies (and not with great luxuries)—especially when the weather smiles down on them and the seasons of the year sprinkle the grasses with green-growing flowers.

The epitome of tranquility and harmony—the picture of an ideal day in the Garden of Epicurus (or perhaps the Roman Garden of Lucretius!)—follows a satire on the folly of

²⁴ And therapy is central to Nussbaum's account of our poem [2009/1994: chh. 5–7].

²⁵ The intervening lines (2.24–28) consist of conditional clauses expressing the idea that it is not necessary to surround oneself with expensive luxuries.

ambition, and is itself interrupted by another satire, on luxury.²⁶ Here, though, the attacks on the satiric object and the yearning for the satiric object's peaceful resolution reinforce each other, as the pain of one and the pleasure of the other are heightened by their collocation.

2. *Formal antecedent*

Satire also requires a formal antecedent, be it one of genre, medium, or discourse. I suggest that we can find in *DRN* at least one antecedent of each kind. Genre: *DRN* participates in the genre of Roman *satura*, as I demonstrate in chapters 4 and 5, and plays a part also in Roman epic.²⁷ Medium: poetry generally and hexameter specifically. *DRN* is novel as a work of expository philosophy written not in prose but in verse, while the use of the hexameter allows *DRN* to draw on the traditions of several key genres as part of the broader category of hexameter (as opposed to lyric/dramatic) poetry.²⁸

²⁶ Cf. Houghton [1912: xxxv]: “[2.]22–36 are especially to be noted as they satirize luxury, and again war, religion, pomp.”

²⁷ See, among others, Murley [1947], Hardie [1986: 193–219], Mayer [1990], Gale [1991: 415; 2005: 181–188], Keith [2000: 4–6, 17–18, 32–42, 108–111], and O’Hara [1998: 74]: “*De Rerum Natura* 1.1–135 is much concerned with Homer, Ennius, Lucretius’ relationship to Greco-Roman epic tradition, and his own role in memorializing the accomplishments of Epicurus.” Gale suggests “that Lucretius self-consciously sets out to revitalize the didactic tradition with a new infusion of ‘epic-ness’ ” [2005: 182]. Cf. also the phrasing “didactic epic” of Gale’s title *Lucretius and the Didactic Epic* [2001], a term labeled “unhelpful” by Volk [2002b], but also present earlier (as “epos didascalio”) in the Italian subtitle of *MD* 31, cf. Mitsis [1993]; Volk remarks that the didactic features of *DRN* “are so dominant and so obviously ‘didactic’ that it appears counter-intuitive to understand the poem rather as an example of the epic genre” [2002a: 69].

²⁸ On the (overhyped) conflict between Epicurean philosophy and poetry, see Wigodsky [1995] (*contra* Ronconi [1963], e.g.), Obbink [1996], Porter [1996], Sedley [1998: 43–46], Auvray-Assayas [2003], Holmes [2005: 527–528 and, for further citations, n. 3], and more generally all the essays in Obbink [1995]. On “poetry generally”, see my discussion of the “poetry vs. philosophy” debate in Lucretian scholarship (pp. 182–187, below).

And discourse: most notable for our purposes is *DRN*'s connection to the literary discourse or tradition of diatribe, discussed in more detail in my introduction (pp. 27–29). Scholars on *DRN* are quick to point out connections to diatribe: Anderson calls the passage beginning at 3.830 “satiric diatribe,” while Sosin points out that *DRN*'s “occasional predilection for satiric and Cynic/Bionic technique has been noted many times.”²⁹ This is not simple, flat engagement, however. *DRN* employs diatribe, I believe, as a discourse—and for specific, persuasive ends. According to Minyard, the Lucretian persona “uses the diatribe...in the way he used Iphigeneia and the quotation from the *Odyssey* at 3.19–22: the inherited literature, properly understood, contains evidence for the...truth of Epicureanism” [1985: 62]. The formal antecedent supports the philosophical goal. Diatribe “is made to confirm Epicureanism, to be an added proof of not only the necessity for some alternative but for *this* alternative.”³⁰ At the same time, the literary model situates the philosophical goal within its own literary tradition, and marks *DRN* (and its *ego*) as having a place in Graeco-Roman cultural inheritance.³¹

On “hexameter specifically,” see the metrical considerations in chapter 4 (pp. 202–203, below).

²⁹ Anderson [1993b: 167]; Sosin [1999: 62], with citations at n. 20, including Waltz [1949], Dudley [1965b], and Wallach [1976], whose title is *Lucretius and the Diatribe against the Fear of Death*.

³⁰ Minyard [1985: 62]; emphasis preserved.

³¹ Formal antecedents for *DRN* abound. Gale, for example, has examined at length the poem's connections to Euhemerism [1994a: *passim*, especially 75–80 and 195–200] and argues that *DRN* should be read as engaging with the epic tradition [1994a: 99–128], cf. Harrison [2002] and Henkel [2009: 179–180]. For an overview of *DRN*'s various models, see Gale [2007].

3. *Humor*

We have already evaluated humor in *DRN* to a great extent, so a few notices here will suffice. The two hallmarks of satiric humor, irony and parody, leave their tracks all across our poem. Kenney finds, in book 3 alone, no fewer than 12 passages featuring irony (including *reductio ad absurdum*) and 4 where parody is operative.³² Parody is essentially a passage-length source of humor,³³ while irony can operate on scales as small as a phoneme.³⁴ Brown, in his discussion of the invective against Anaxagorean ὁμοιομερία, refers to “the satirical nature of the whole passage which draws upon a large arsenal of techniques,” as *DRN*’s speaker “infus[es] irony and parody into his outline of and initial objections to the Anaxagorean theory” [1983: 152], cf. pp. 66–69, above.

³² Irony: *DRN* 3.367–369, 573–575, 612–614, 624–633, 665–666, 717, 727–728, 772–783, 888, 894–911 (so Kenney [1971: 203 *ad loc.*]: “the spirit of irony, rising at times to parody and overt mockery...pervades the argument”), 992–994, and 1089, all *apud* Kenney [1971: 252, s. v. “irony”]. Compare, again on book 3, Wallach [1976: 26–31, 106–107]. I point out that, among the many effects of repetition or iteration in *DRN*—on which see Schrijvers [1969: 370–376], Clay [1983: 183–185], Schiesaro [1994, 1996], Gale [1994b: 5–6], Erler [1998], Murgia [2000: 311], Reinhardt [2002: 303–304 n. 37], Hardie [2006], O’Hara [2007: 62], and, *contra*, Deufert [1996: 27–31]—there is also the potential for satiric irony, cf. Womble [1961: 537] on Horace and Dessen [1968: 13] on Persius.

Parody: 3.832–842, 894–899, 904–908, and 1012, *apud* Kenney [1971: 254, s. v. “parody”]; and Wallach [1976: 7, 28–40, 46–61, 95–96, 107–108]. Waltz furthermore points to irony in the passage beginning at 3.748 [1949: 88], West to parody of epic imagery at 5.15 [1994: 28], and Wallach notes parody “or at least satirical usage” of *uita breuis* statements in book 3 [1976: 57–58, cf. also 7–8, 28–29, 33–37, 49–54, 60–61, 108]. Cf. also my consideration of parody above (pp. 106–108).

³³ Although it can come down to the imitation of certain words or rhetorical techniques, as with the speaker’s parodic adoption of Anaxagoras’ (or perhaps Empedocles’) repetitive, polyptotic style—so Brown: “Lucretius deliberately borrowed a stylistic feature which he associated with the Presocratics in order to aid his satirical critique of the Presocratic Anaxagoras” [1983: 160]. Cf. also Tatum [1984].

³⁴ Cf. Sidwell [2009: 349] on λ, ρ, the verb τραυλίζειν, and (mis)pronunciation jokes in Aristophanes *Wasps* (line 45) and *Clouds* (868–873); and Culler [1988b].

Irony and parody on a broad view, here. But there are examples too of humor on the linguistic level. For Kenney and Waltz alike, alliteration can generate ironic (and thus satiric) humor, and Waltz additionally finds irony in *DRN*'s use of the Latin words *uates* and *diuinitus*.³⁵

From the *suaue mari magno* proem of book 2 mentioned just previously, we can also glean a bit more detail about satiric humor. We have seen that the humor of satire is dependent on the audience's sense of safety from the satiric aggression and the risk of the satirized object's aggressive retaliation. It is, I believe, just this sort of isolation that the *ego* shows us in this scene:³⁶

suaue, mari magno turbantibus aequora uentis,
 e terra magnum alterius spectare laborem;
 non quia uexari quemquamst iucunda uoluptas,
 sed quibus ipse malis careas quia cernere suaue est.
 suaue etiam belli certamina magna tueri
 per campos instructa tua sine parte pericli.

³⁵ Alliteration: Kenney writes on *DRN* 3.888 that “[t]he alliteration and word-play (*mālumst mālis*) strike a note of scornful irony that is sustained in what follows” [1971: 202 *ad loc.*], and Waltz observes alliteration's role in producing sarcasm: “alliterations...soulignent si bien l'intention sarcastique” [1949: 81]. On alliteration in *DRN* more generally, see Schön [1970], Petruzzello [1980], Dionigi [1992/1988: 52–54], and Piazzì [2005: 91–92 *ad* 1.641].

Waltz on *uates*: “[c]e mot de *uates*...est à la fois méprisant et ironique” [1949: 82]. On *diuinitus*: “[c]e bel adverbe *diuinitus* est, lui aussi, dans la bouche de Lucrèce, chargé de raillerie et d'ironie” [*ibidem*]. Waltz furthermore suggests undertones of tragedy in passages beginning at 2.1129 and 3.62—“[l]a satire, dans ces deux derniers textes, prend une couleur presque tragique”—but the tone is not strong enough to overwhelm the comic nature of the satiric passages as a whole [1949: 90].

For a theoretical account, not limited to the classical period, of linguistic-level humor in explanation of what satire is and does, see Simpson [2003: 16–29].

³⁶ Cf. Segal [1989], Gale [1994a: 211], and Porter [2007: 172]: “There is something sublime to the thought, which the physicist entertains as he stands...on the edge of a precipice looking down, safely detached, upon the turmoil below.” Lucretian sublimity, according to Porter, is an awareness of the *maiestas rerum* (at *DRN* 5.7) that “results from the sheer exhilaration that a glimpse of scientific truth affords” [2007: 169]. See also the scholarship on the proem to *DRN* 2 cited above (pp. 90–91 and n. 102).

(*DRN* 2.1–6)

Sweet it is, when the winds throw into uproar the waves on the great sea, to watch another's great struggle from the shore—not because it's a pleasant joy that someone is in trouble, but because it's sweet to understand the ills you're free from. Sweet it is as well to watch war's great contests arranged across the fields—without you having any part in the danger.

The soldiers and sailors placed in adversity in the passage, as subsequent lines make clear, are representative of those who have not adopted the true Epicurean school of physics and ethics. Thus these lines are showing us (metasatirically, perhaps?) how the objects of *DRN*'s satiric verses face a rough situation. The reader is, with the speaker, placed away from the sea, away from the battle: we have here exactly the kind of safety for the speaker and any reader who joins him that Rosen and others have brought up in their analyses of satire. The reader is safe from harm, and so can appreciate the satire, even if he does not find this passage funny or ironic.

It is ironic, though. Sosin, for one, calls the first 14 lines of book 2 a “satiric poem.”³⁷ Our viewpoint in the passage is one of satiric safety; but the Lucretian persona possesses and proffers a better one in the passage's second half. Nothing is sweeter than holding (*nil dulcius est bene quam...tenere*, 2.7)—as the persona holds and invites the reader to hold—the *edita doctrina sapientum templa serena*, “the wise men's well-defended precincts, lofty with placid teaching” (2.8), a fastness even more redoubtable than both the seashore in a storm and the lookout point away from the battlefield. With *edita*, with the loftiness of the speaker's stronghold from which to be removed and take

³⁷ Sosin [1999: 285]: the *ego* “delights in philosophy's lofty vantage, which affords a comfortable view down on all the strife, struggle and error of humankind below. This is precisely the rhetorical stance of the satirist, who dutifully notes humanity's every fault and vice.” Cf. Dudley [1965b: 216].

pleasure in the anxiety-ridden lives of others, we have a literalization of the satirist's metaphorical moral high ground.

I would further interpret this passage metapoetically (and metasatirically!). The observation of troubles at sea, in war, and in the wandering lives of non-Epicureans is a stand-in for the act of reading *DRN* itself.³⁸ In the process of reading *DRN*, just as in the action of these lines, the audience shares with the speaker the experience of looking down (in both physical and affective senses) upon the objects of satire, the soldiers and sailors and lovers and scaredy-cats and Presocratics and *stolidi* and those others who go astray and seek the road of wandering life (*alios...errare atque uiam palantis quaerere uitae*, 2.9–10). Consequently—since in this passage the *ego* describes such observations as a source of pleasure (*suaue, iucunda uoluptas, suaue* twice more, *dulcius*)—reading *DRN*, too, is thus a pleasure. For the Epicurean who reads the poem, the *stolidi* of book 1 and the unfortunate navigator of 2.2 are one and the same, and the insulated, superior subjectivity from which this reader placidly (and satirically) tracks their folly/plight is likewise the same. For readers not yet successful in the mastery of Epicurus' discipline, book 2's proem is a synecdochic model for the poem as a whole: the path to ἀταραξία that occupies the entirety of *DRN* is presented here in short-form.

4. Ambiguity

Satire, moreover, is ambiguous and ambivalent, and its critics and censors misunderstand it. To begin with, I offer two micro-level examples of ambiguity in book 3, both

³⁸ Compare Keane [2006: 107–108]: “Teaching and learning symbolize literary production and generic evolution.” Braund finds “metasatire” especially in the figure of Naevolus, in Juvenal poem 9 [2004b: 426].

proffered by Kenney. First, the description of the locales of Acheron in *DRN* is a bit muddled: “the ambiguity, and the inflated epicizing vocabulary, are no doubt designed to ridicule the vagueness and confusion of the underworld geography and popular superstitions in general” [1971: 230 *ad* 3.1012]. Style reflects moral content, and both depict a disordered, ambivalently constructed under-cosmos. Second, there is ambiguity involving the verb *ambigitur* itself, in a passage where the verb can mean “is the matter at hand” or, with a legal connotation, “is the issue of law facing the court.” It is uncertain from context which meaning is correct. “In view of L.’s use of legal phraseology elsewhere...the ambiguity may be deliberate” [1971: 242 *ad* 3.1074, with reference to 3.971].

From the smaller now to the larger. A defining characteristic of *DRN* is its complicated relationship to words, and its belying the speaker’s asseveration concerning the *egestas linguae*.³⁹ Latin’s smaller vocabulary resulted in an accretion of varied denotations and connotations for many words, and *DRN* takes full advantage of their semantic range. The polyvalence allows for puns and other wordplay, for sophisticated allegory, and for (on occasion satiric) ambiguity.⁴⁰

There is additionally a kind of philosophical ambivalence in *DRN*. In scientific matters where certainty was not feasibly attainable, Epicurean principles allowed for an

³⁹ Cf. Farrell [2001: 39–51]; Holmes [2005: 575–576], cf. Dionigi [1992/1988: 11–14]; and my discussion above (p. 77). Farrell, for instance, states, “[w]e tend to take Lucretius’ disclaimer about ‘poverty’ too literally, to interpret it simplistically, and to believe it in implicitly; but we should not. For that matter, we should be careful of assuming too easily that poverty does in fact connote inadequacy” [2001: 39].

⁴⁰ The text itself as it has survived, too, is in many places lacunose, crux-plagued, interpolated, or corrupt—a philologist’s version of ambiguity.

aporetic submission of reasonable alternative explanations.⁴¹ An example from *DRN*: 6.712–737 details four potential explanations for the estival swelling of the Nile, among them the influence of the etesian winds, a buildup of sand at the river-mouth, rain at the source, or melting snow. For the speaker of *DRN*, it is sufficient to give these hypotheses equal weight and equal exposure, to leave the question unsettled.⁴² This is a less slippery kind of ambiguity than the satirist’s hard-to-pin-down self-composition, but it is nevertheless intellectually evasive, and may contribute to the elusive nature of the (satiric) relationship between the speaker and his audience.

Finally, as we will see in detail below, there is potential for tension in *DRN* (as in satire) caused by ambiguity or ambivalence regarding the speaker’s role—over the conflict between comic-satiric interests and didactic goals. The basic question: “Is the *ego* satirist or didact, poet or philosopher?” These ambiguities can create confusion that results in censure of the satirist or his work. In *DRN*, the speaker apparently anticipates such misunderstanding and criticism, and attempts to forestall it: “perchance you’ll think you’re entering into the impious first-beginnings of philosophy and treading on a path of crime. But on the contrary, more often it is that superstition/religion that has birthed criminal and impious deeds” (1.80–84, with Latin text at p. 95, above). In the introduction to a bitter satire on the ills of *religio*, the *ego* tries to establish a disclaimer against accusations of impiety and concurrent attempts to silence him and his work. We could

⁴¹ Long & Sedley [1987: 95], with Epicurus *Letter to Pythocles* 85–88, *DRN* 5.509–533, and 6.703–711. Also Gale: “a plurality of explanations in accordance with the phenomena is preferable to...dogmatic assertions” [1994a: 18].

⁴² Cf. Hardie [2007: 117]: “Lucretius uses multiple alternative explanations of phenomena in conformity with Epicurean orthodoxy to reinforce materialist certainty,” and further Hardie [2009: ch. 7].

add as well a variety of long-held misapprehensions of *DRN* and its speaker-persona, from Jerome's story of the love potion onwards, as evidence for the uncertainty and ensuing hostility that the ambiguity of *DRN*'s (satiric) poetry can educe.

Poetic initiation

It is worth our while to consider briefly one last feature of the mode of satire and its potential for a place in *DRN*. Rosen argues that Callimachus *Iamboi* 4 “is essentially concerned with the question of ‘initiation’ into a world of poetic satire—who is ‘allowed’ access to it, who is capable of understanding it” [2007: 196]. Understanding or identifying irony, parody, and the other elements of satire can be quite difficult, and satires themselves are generally directed towards a more or less restricted, even exclusive, audience. The audience has responsibilities within the execution of satire, as well, for “[s]atire, if it is to be effective, requires an understanding on the part of his audience of an author’s standard of value and truth, the standard against which the object of satire is measured.”⁴³ The audience, in other words, must either already understand intrinsically the satirist and his poetic output—i.e., must be the authorial reader, a reader like the satirist himself—or must be taught the discourse, must be initiated into the mode. The issue of access to the poetic-satiric world runs parallel, I believe, to the notion of the “get it” and “don’t get it” crowds, of the serious-minded audience and the smaller, select collusive readership. Yet the idea of “initiation” suggests that these audiences are not immutably fixed, but rather

⁴³ Minyard [1985: 61], and continuing: “It does not depend on an agreement between author and audience about the validity of the standard, but it does need clear perception of what the standard is, if his comments are to be seen as satire, as anything more than a kind of floating bitterness.”

are able to gain entrance into the “get it” crowd, into the set of readers who are capable of understanding satire.

It is in this respect that I see an intersection between satire and the explicitly expressed objective of *DRN*. The goal of the work, the speaker tells us, is to persuade the addressee to relinquish his fear of death and his other anxieties so as to begin life anew as an ataractic disciple of Lucretius and Epicurus. The poem, I mean to say, self-presents as a poem of philosophical initiation. We have seen the extent and import of *DRN*'s use of the mode of satire; as a consequence, we are able to look for what shape satiric initiation might take in *DRN*. I believe that the act of siding with the mocking speaker over the objects of blame—particularly the Presocratics in book 1, the death-fearers in book 3, and the love-crazed in book 4—constitutes a sort of satiric initiation, as the reader recognizes the speaker as satirist and more importantly acknowledges that his satiric indignation is justified.

Besides, the poem's satiric initiation aids the process of philosophical initiation.⁴⁴ By correctly identifying the speaker's elusive irony, by negotiating his ambiguity, by adopting his stance against opposing positions, we undertake the journey from ignorance to indoctrination. Philosophical initiation, I would add, is for the most part a didactic goal, in *DRN* and in philosophical literature more generally. There is a crossroads in *DRN* of two initiation pathways, one satiric and one didactic. Give a man a satire, and you entertain him for a day; teach a man to satirize, and you give him tools for a better

⁴⁴ Compare Waltz, who argues that satire is just as much a means of persuasion as it is a means of refuting rival doctrines: “il se sert fort habillement de la satire tant comme moyen de persuasion à l'adresse de son lecteur que comme moyen de combat contre les adeptes d'autres doctrines ou les fidèles d'autres fois que la sienne” [1949: 79].

life.⁴⁵ In the remainder of this chapter, I will consider in greater detail the convergences and conflicts between satire and didact, first in the broadly defined satiric poetry of antiquity and then in *DRN* specifically.

Didactic tension in satire

Satire thus aims not only to attack and to entertain, but also to teach.⁴⁶ Keane analyzes the “didactic agenda” in the genre of Roman satire specifically [2006: ch. 4], and Rosen refers to “the didactic underpinnings” of the Graeco-Roman satiric mode as a whole [2007: 231]. Works that employ the mode of satire have, explicitly or implicitly, a goal of instruction and thus (often moral) improvement of the reader. On one level, this paedagogical impulse coincides neatly with the satirist’s supposed desire to make the world a better place (pp. 51–56, above). Part of changing society for the better is preparing others for change and showing them how to do so.

At the same time, however, we have seen that satire generally takes place in a distinct, isolated subjective space constructed by the satirist’s collusive relationship with his (double) audience—a space where satirist and reader of satire jointly disparage the sati-

⁴⁵ Cf. Rosen [again 2007: 196]: “In the end, the poem offers commentary not only on how to ‘do’ the iambus, but also on how to ‘be’ an audience for iambic satire.” By analogy I propose that *DRN* offers commentary not only on how to “do” Epicurean living and philosophical didaxis, but also on how to “be” an audience for didactic satire (or satiric didaxis).

⁴⁶ Cf. Keane [2006: 4]: “Satirists...do not just describe, distort, and criticize social life. They claim to intervene in it as well—at least in an indirect manner.”

rized object, or where satiric poet and reader of satiric poetry share amusement in appreciation of the self-undercutting critical persona of the satirist. Just as the satirist's stance of abjection can subvert his claims to moral high ground (cf. p. 44, above), so also the aggressive drive for comic mockery can undermine, or at least challenge, the educational goals of satire.

There is thus the possibility in satire for what I term "didactic tension."⁴⁷ The satirist's roles of teacher and of abject moralist sometimes intersect, but at other times they contradict and undercut each other, work at cross-purposes, or pull the satire in opposite directions. Whereas "a certain ruthless definiteness is essential in education,"⁴⁸ the satirist is fundamentally indefinite, ambiguous, and elusive. This potential for conflict between the multiple goals, expressed and implicit, can result in this didactic tension (akin to the tension between sanctimony and *πονηρία*, between self-righteousness and abjection: p. 50, above) that rises to the surface of the poetry.

Satire's didactic pose

Let us start by considering the didactic features of the mode of satire, and address tensions thereafter. According to Griffin, writing on satire both modern and ancient, "the satirist writes in order to discover, to explore, to survey, to attempt to clarify" [1994: 39]. In other words, satire can be seen as a process of investigation, of learning. Keane points out that satire has truck with the pose of didact, the role of a teacher. This pose, in turn,

⁴⁷ Cf. Keane [2006: 49]: "[s]atire can at once be uncomfortable and beneficial," and further: "Persius may be a dedicated healer of illness, or he may conjure suffering only to mock it" [2006: 62].

⁴⁸ Whitehead [1929: 36], quoted by Cahn [1986: 12].

“draws attention to the satiric text as a practical product offered to the outside world” [2006: 12]. Take two brief examples. First, the satirist’s didactic pose is made explicit, for example, early in Horace’s *Sermones*, with the (Lucretian) image of the students being given cookies in order to learn the alphabet.⁴⁹ Later in the same poem, in an admonishment to avoid extremes in living life, the speaker intimates his role as a teacher of morals: “when I prohibit you from becoming a money-grubber, I’m not ordering you to become a scamp and scoundrel” (*non ego auarum | cum ueto te, fieri uappam iubeo ac nebulonem*, 1.1.103–104). Second, the Persius-*ego* similarly refers to himself as the stern paternal uncle (*sapimus patruos*, 1.11), who was responsible for holding his nephew to high standards of moral conduct and social achievement,⁵⁰ and presents himself as a knowledgeable lecturer (in, e.g., poems 2 and 5).

The didactic pose of satire furthermore enables the satirist to co-opt his audience more effectively into the production of satire, since education functions as a mutual (though not egalitarian) dialectic between teacher and student.⁵¹ This very interaction between instructor and pupil also provides grounds for allusions to and adaptations from theatrical comedy—and indeed the satiric speaker of *Serm.* 1.1–4 may himself be seen as

⁴⁹ *Serm.* 1.1.24–26: “What stops me from telling the truth with a laugh?—Just like wheedling teachers at a certain point give boys cookies so they’ll be willing to learn their ABCs” (*ridentem dicere uerum | quid uetat? ut pueris olim dant crustula blandi | doctores, elementa uelint ut discere prima*). Cf., e.g., Rudd [1986: 11], and pp. 262–267, below.

⁵⁰ On the *patruus*, see Hallett [1984] and James [1998; 2003: 234–235].

⁵¹ So Keane [2006: 107]: “Horace’s initial pose as the teacher imparting lessons sets in motion a more realistic process of active participation by its internal audience.”

a self-undercutting *doctor ineptus* drawn from the Graeco-Roman stage.⁵² Satirists' claims to teach are mirrored on a structural level with the frequent use of dialogue, another way of co-opting the (internal) audience of satire. To name just a few: Aristophanes (the ἀγών in *Clouds* between Good and Bad Reasoning), Ennius,⁵³ Horace (*Serm.* 2.1), and Persius (poem 4), cf. Griffin [1994: 40].

So: poems of satire are tools for the reader, goods that will help the reader learn how to live life better or see the world as it really is. The satirist is not merely a critic but also a moralist and educator. In fact, as Rawson indicates in connection with drama, literature (especially comic literature) in the time of Lucretius served for many Romans as the basic fount of moral knowledge.⁵⁴ Hunter makes a similar observation in the case of Horace's *Sermones*, where the *ego* shares with his audience the quality and teachings that

⁵² So Freudenburg argues [1993: ch. 1], in my view persuasively (and see Turpin [1998] for a similar argument), though see, *contra*, Sharland [2009: 81–82]. Cf. Keane [2006: 136]: “[t]he struggles enacted between student and teacher figures, at least in Horace and Persius, evoke satire’s ancestor comedy, with its agonistic authorial postures and its stock characters.”

⁵³ A dialogue between *Mors* and *Vita* in Ennius’ *Saturae* is attested by Quintilian *Institutio Oratoria* 9.2.36, cf. Knoche [1975: 22].

⁵⁴ Rawson [1987: 79]: “for the poorer classes at least theatrical moralizing was, at all events in the second and early first centuries B.C., the chief source from which they drew not their moral conventions, but much of their capacity to articulate them.” Rawson also mentions that literature-based moral education was fundamental to Roman culture: “the very first work of Roman literature was probably a book of maxims, by Appius Claudius Caecus....[I]t may well have derived at least in part from a collection of Greek gnomes of dramatic origin” [1987: 86].

Compare Cicero’s comments in *Pro Archia* that the “precepts of many [authors] and much literature” have made him the man he is (*multorum praeceptis multisque literis*, 14) and that great men like Scipio and Cato (the Elder) would not have had interest in literary studies “if they weren’t at all helped by literature to find and foster excellence” (*si nihil ad percipiendam colendamque uirtutem litteris adiuuarentur*, 16), with, e.g., Porter [1990] and Berry [2004]. Keith [2000] examines the role of epic in the education of the Roman elite male.

he has received from his moral and literary predecessors, from his father (*Serm.* 1.4, with Leach [1981], and 1.6), from Lucilius (1.4, 1.10, 2.1), and from the poets of Old and New Greek Comedy (1.4, 1.10, 2.3.11–12). “Like all good poetry, the satires are a deterrent to vice, an encouragement to virtue and a preparation for philosophy” [1985: 490].

This observation need not be limited to the *Sermones* of Horace alone. It can be well applied also to other “good poetry”: the satires of Lucilius, Persius, and Juvenal, the *Iamboi* of Callimachus, and *DRN* can all on some level be conceived of as moral deterrents and philosophical preparation (cf. pp. 40–43 and n. 8, above). Nor is this observation solely modern, since Eratosthenes attests that “the ancients described poetry as a certain First Philosophy that leads us into life from youth and teaches us with pleasure character and emotion and action” (οἱ παλαιοὶ φιλοσοφίαν τινὰ λέγουσι πρώτην τὴν ποιητικὴν εἰσάγουσαν εἰς τὸν βίον ἡμᾶς ἐκ νέων καὶ διδάσκουσιν ἥθη καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις μεθ’ ἡδονῆς, quoted in Strabo 1.3).

Authors who write satire thus engage with a tradition of moralistic literary production, and can use the expectation of practical utility to their advantage.⁵⁵ Satirists sometimes exploit didactic expectations for the purposes of comic (satiric) mockery, as we can see from two short examples, each drawn from different moments when Horace’s *Sermones* engage specifically with our own *DRN*. *Serm.* 1.2 plays with the convention of protreptic/hortatory diatribe in its discussion of sexual misconduct; one such diatribal (and Lucretian) tool in particular is that of prosopopoeia, namely in this case a personification of the generic Roman male’s own penis (*mutō*, 1.2.69–71). Though a talking phal-

⁵⁵ So Hunter: “[s]uch a literary stance allows Horace the maximum freedom to include widely diverse material in his *sermones*; it was, in other words, just the stance he needed” [1985: 490].

lus may not immediately call to mind *DRN*'s prosopopoeia of *Natura Rerum* (on whom see pp. 133–139, above), the Horace-*ego* includes a pointer to the Lucretian personification by using the term *natura* itself as the subject of a verb immediately after the penis' speech.⁵⁶ Again, in *Serm.* 1.3, the satirist allows himself to become sidetracked by sex during his *DRN*-style anthropological account of the development of human society (*Serm.* 1.3.96–117), and this digression reveals the Horatian account to be a parody of *DRN*.⁵⁷ In both instances, the satiric *ego* of *Sermones* uses a didactic façade as a tool for engendering humor and adding weight to the satiric sexual invective.

That it is a characteristic of satire to take advantage of the expectations of utility attendant with the didactic pose is moreover evident from the opposing scholarly views—that is to say, the prevailing ambiguity—on the seriousness of didaxis and literary criticism not only in Horace's *Sermones* but also in his *Ars Poetica*.⁵⁸ But, at core, the didac-

⁵⁶ *Serm.* 1.2.72–73: “and how much better are the things that nature advises, rich in the help she has to offer—things that are diametrically opposed to *these* [i.e., your irrational and detrimental sexual proclivities]” (*at quanto meliora monet pugnancia istis | diues opis natura suae*).

⁵⁷ Parodic elements: *natura* here is powerless when it comes to justice (*Serm.* 1.3.112: “and Nature cannot separate the unjust from the just,” *nec natura potest iusto secernere iniquum*), much unlike the *Natura Rerum* in *DRN*. The advice in *DRN* to foster conception by copulating “in the custom of wild beasts” (*more ferarum*, 4.1264) becomes the circumstances for a quick death at the hands of a more powerful, sexually aggressive male (*Serm.* 1.3.109). We even see the Lucretian watchwords *ratio* and *fateare necessest* repurposed here (*Serm.* 1.3.115 and 111, respectively). For more on the connections between *Serm.* 1.3 and *DRN*, see, e.g., Reckford [1997], Harrison [2007c: 84–85], and Kemp [2009].

⁵⁸ A brief survey: Freudenburg takes *Serm.* 1.1–1.4 as parody [1993: ch. 1]. Both Rudd [1966: 118–124] and Freudenburg see the literary criticism in *Serm.* 1.10, on the other hand, as authentic, whereas Zetzel [1980: 63–64] and Goldberg [2005: 174–176 and 174 n. 74] argue that it is fictional and thus to be applied back onto the literary persona of the satirist himself. As Lowrie [1993] asks, in a critique of Freudenburg on this point, “what are the limits to the parodied persona?”

tic pose is a tool for the satirist to get his audience to side with him, to collude with him. Teachers have (moral, social, developmental) authority over their pupils⁵⁹ and so didactic posturing confers authority over readers upon the satirist. Such authority may be used to push readers into aligning themselves with the speaker against his opponent, or to grant weight to the satirist's arguments and precepts.

Sometimes this authority is used tendentiously. A recurrent element of satire is its biased, and even coercive, argumentation. Through the misrepresentation or non-presentation of alternate explanations or accounts of its targets' words and actions, satire tries to compel readers to admit its own version as the only acceptable account. As Rosen states: “[s]atirists tend towards a soapbox rhetoric, and have little interest in enter-

Frischer [1991] takes *Ars Poetica* to be parody, though his claims have been roundly rejected by some others (cf. p. 145, n. 14, above); Seeck [1995] considers *Ars Poetica* satiric; and Reitz [2005] describes it as a generic experiment that engages with satire, didactic, and other literary forms and modes. Harrison [2008] proposes that *Ars Poetica* is part of a third book of *Sermones*, a third book of Horatian satire.

⁵⁹ Cf. Horace *Epist.* 2.1.126–131:

os tenerum pueri balbumque poeta figurat,
torquet ab obscenis iam nunc sermonibus aurem,
mox etiam pectus praeceptis format amicis,
asperitatis et inuidiae corrector et irae,
recte facta refert, orientia tempora notis
instruit exemplis, inopem solatur et aegrum.

The poet shapes the boy's tender and babbling mouth; already now twists his ear away from vulgar conversations; soon even molds the heart with friendly teachings; corrects harshness and envy and wrath; righteously relates things that have happened; equips the rising generation with well-known examples; and comforts the boy when he [or “a person who”] is helpless and sick.

taining opposing points of view, so it often takes a considerable effort for an audience not to take their ranting at face value” [2007: x]. Satire, as I put it, creates straw men.⁶⁰

Targets of ancient satiric mockery are often not real targets, but caricatures, effigies that enable the ostentatious attack-display of satiric blame and mockery. For confirmation we need only look to four examples of the the figures that populate satiric texts. First is Thersites, the failed blame poet (in Rosen’s view) of the *Iliad*, whose ugliness, unruliness, and low social status prefigure and prejudice him as beneath and beholden to the aristocratic protagonists of the epic, particularly to his adversary (in *Iliad* book 2) King Odysseus⁶¹—in a society of καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοί, Thersites is pointedly neither, and

⁶⁰ Cf. Kenney (on *DRN* 3.894–899, where the speaker impersonates mourners of the recently deceased): “To put an argument to which you already know the answer into the mouth of a real or imagined adversary is one of the oldest of rhetorical devices; it was valued in diatribe and satire for its dramatic and enlivening potentialities” [1971: 203–204].

⁶¹ Take Homer’s description of Thersites, *Iliad* 2.212–223:

Θερσίτης δ’ ἔτι μῶνος ἀμετροεπῆς ἐκολῶα,
ὃς ἔπεα φρεσὶν ἦσιν ἄκοσμά τε πολλά τε ἦδη
μάψ, ἀτὰρ οὐ κατὰ κόσμον, ἐριζέμεναι βασιλεῦσιν,
ἀλλ’ ὅ τι οἱ εἴσαιτο γελοῖον Ἀργείοισιν
ἔμμεναι: αἰσχιστος δὲ ἀνήρ ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθε:
φολκὸς ἔην, χωλὸς δ’ ἕτερον πόδα: τῷ δέ οἱ ὄμω
κυρτῷ ἐπὶ στήθος συνοχωκότε: αὐτὰρ ὑπερθε
φοξὸς ἔην κεφαλῆν, ψεδνὴ δ’ ἐπενήνοθε λάχνη.
ἔχθιστος δ’ Ἀχιλῆϊ μάλιστ’ ἦν ἠδ’ Ὀδυσῆϊ:
τῷ γὰρ νεικείεσκε: τότε αὐτ’ Ἀγαμέμνονι δίω
ὀξέα κεκλήγων λέγ’ ὀνειδέα: τῷ δ’ ἄρ’ Ἀχαιοὶ
ἐκπάγλως κοτέοντο νεμέσσηθέν τ’ ἐνὶ θυμῷ.

[The rest of the soldiers gave in,] but Thersites still alone, measureless in speech, kept whining, Thersites who wantonly knew in his mind many disorderly words, and again knew how, behaving not at all in order, to start strife with kings—but whatever seemed fit to him would be a joke to the Argives. And he was the ugliest man who came to Troy: he was bow-legged, lame in one foot, his two shoulders, arched, contracted inwards upon his chest, and again above he was pointy-headed, and his hair grew

so is primed to take a dive in the unfair matchup between himself and the man of many turns. Second: Terence’s alleged rival Luscius Lanuvinus, constantly subjected to preemptive counter-invective in the prologues of Terence’s plays, though never himself appearing onstage and leaving no extra-textual traces in the historical record.⁶² Third, the Tigellius who appears in *Serm.* 1.2, 3, 4, and 10—already in Cicero a stereotype of the disreputable but influential musician⁶³—is introduced for the first time in *Sermones* with patently prejudicial language.⁶⁴ Finally, I point to the straw women who populate Juvenal poem 6. They are altogether preposterous, grotesquely exaggerated for the Juvenal-*ego*’s own purposes, which have more to do with himself than with the female gender that he

thin. And he was most especially hateful to Achilles and Odysseus—for he kept fighting with the two of them. But now instead, screaming, he spoke sharp reproaches against godlike Agamemnon, and then the Achaeans got terribly mad at him and held just indignation against him in their spirits.

Note that the Achaeans—the internal audience to this scene in the epic—already, before he has spoken, hate Thersites not just with *κόλος* but also with *νέμεσις*, justified indignation or wrath. Benardete, by referring to “a figuration of wickedness as self-evident as Thersites—the ugliest man who came to Troy,” equates Thersites’ appearance with his straw-man villainy [1991: 101]; compare Burke’s discussion of the Hegelian concept of “Thersitism” [1966: 110–111]. Cf. also Postlethwaite [1988], Thalmann [1988], Hooghe [1999], Stuurman [2004], and (for a Marxist interpretation) Rose [1988].

⁶² On Luscius Lanuvinus and the rhetoric of the prologues, see Ehrman [1985], Dér [1989], and Dombrowski [2010].

⁶³ See, e.g., *Epistulae ad Atticum* 13.49–51 and *Epistular ad Familiares* 7.24, with Syme [1986: 274].

⁶⁴ First, Tigellius has died before the poem’s beginning; but, moreover, his mourners are the dregs of society—“chorus-line prostitutes, drug-dealers, beggars, mimes, jokesters, that whole lot” (*ambubaiarum collegia, pharmacopolae, mendici, mimaе, balatrones, hoc genus omne*, 1.2.1–2). On Tigellius see, among others, Baldwin [1970], Scodel [1987: 200], Hooley [1999], and Miller [2007]. Similar to Tigellius is Crispinus in *Serm.* 1.1, 3, and 4, who is invoked in the very first line of Juvenal poem 4: *ecce iterum Crispinus, et est mihi saepe uocandus*, “look, here comes Crispinus again, and I gotta call on him pretty often.”

purports to be attacking in this satire.⁶⁵ The satirist's representations are in each case far from fair or balanced, but are rather designed to predispose the audience to agree with the satirist automatically.

Conflict between teacher and satirist

But the poetic metaphor of teaching brings with it a complication. As Keane writes, “[b]ecause teaching prompts change in individual students, satire’s didactic plot appears linear and finite, aiming ultimately toward the removal of the satirist” [2006: 120]. Good teachers-for-hire put themselves out of a job, or at least render their services unneeded by the very individuals who employ their services. In Keane’s estimation, “the narratives about teaching embedded in satire point up the transitory nature of the pedagogical—and so the satiric—career. Didactic and literary success for the author also means transformation into a completed text, which is fated to be critiqued” [2006: 12]. If satire achieves its goal of moral improvement in the world or in its readership, in other words, it loses its *raison d’être*.⁶⁶

That this phenomenon is a problem for satire is evident from my discussion of whether satirists truly want to achieve the utopia they present in their poetry (again pp. 51–56, above). If satiric critiques are successful, the opponents of satire are vanquished or silenced, the faults and flaws ameliorated, and satire must become something different,

⁶⁵ So Henderson [1989, 1999b], Gold [1994], and Warren [2005d]; cf. also Plaza [2006: 127–155].

⁶⁶ Compare the problem of success for the poet-lover in Roman elegy: the poetry is driven by the obstacles to successful elegiac liaison. See, e.g., Myerowitz [1985: ch. 4], as well as Fear’s suggestion that Ovid’s (poetic) success is correlated with the poet-lover’s (elegiac) failure [2000: 232].

beyond comic mockery and blame. Habinek contrasts Roman satire with political invective and legal action: while these forms of direct invective can “silence their opponents, depriving them of their *libertas*,” satire does not do so, because it “needs its playmates too much to destroy them.”⁶⁷

In fact, the “playmates” or targets of the mode of satire are frequently moral defects and shortcomings in belief or behavior that, fortunately for the continuance of satire, are not easily eliminated. Greed, ambition, lust, anger, hypocrisy will stick around even if a particular satiric poem is successful, even if a specific villain is cast down or cast out. These kinds of “playmates” form a central basis for satiric criticisms, and sustain the satiric mode.

But the two ends of moral betterment and continued satiric/poetic production can and do work at cross-purposes, which are in many cases left to the reader to comprehend and manage. “[T]he essential crux...of all satirical poetics,” according to Rosen, is “how an audience can reconcile a poem’s didactic pretense with all the transgressive impulses, whether dictional or thematic, that inevitably arise in its relentless drive toward comedy” [2007: 218]. The comic urge, so to speak, can cause the reader to call into question the satirist’s seriousness about his goal—and it is in fact this very crux of reconciling comedy and didactic that spurs the development of the “get it” audience, the people who believe that the point of the satiric poetry is not teaching or social amelioration but simply com-

⁶⁷ Habinek [2005: 182]. Rosen points out that Juvenal’s satire (specifically in poems 5 and 9) requires Virro to mistreat Naevolus and Trebius—otherwise, there is no comedy, and thus no satire [2007: 240]. Compare, again, the elegiac poet-lover’s need to keep around his opponents, from *custos* to *lena*, in order to perpetuate the motives for elegiac composition. On the necessity of the *lena* to the poet-lover, see Gutzwiller [1985] and Myers [1996].

edy at the expense of the “don’t get it” crowd that takes the satirist as a straightforward, serious teacher. As Henderson writes [1989: 90; emphasis preserved]:

whereas, on the whole, ‘Student Textbooks’ don’t usually invite...their readers to pick holes in their unargued prejudices— Sorry: judgments—, it could well be a standard feature of ‘Satire’ that you be expected to ask yourself continuously whether you agree, are supposed to agree, keep catching yourself agreeing, and so on (or whether you *dis*-agree, etc.).

For our purposes, replace “Student Textbooks” with didactic. Didaxis is supposed to be straightforward, fair, and consistent. Satire, on the other hand, is often complicated, prejudicial, and self-contradictory, so when satire applies to its frame a didactic façade, it is adopting a standard of veracity and trustworthiness that it does not generally merit. Satire, we might say, is thus using a kind of coercive argumentation against its readers, in an attempt to trick them into accepting the validity of the satiric critique; and those who are not tricked by it will pick up on the gaps, the tension between what satire is doing and what it is claiming to do (teach).

Rosen furthermore asserts that a basic theme of Juvenal poem 9 is how “comedy and didacticism are, in the end, if not antithetical to one another, then certainly in constant tension” [2007: 223]. Not antithetical, indeed—but the tension, whether constant or intermittent, moreover can itself be a tool for comedy and didactic alike. An unexpected joke from the instructor renders the student more available to instruction and perhaps more likely to remember the specific point to which the joke is tied; some of the most memorable comedy is that which teaches, as the Roman affection for Terence’s exploration of parenting illustrates.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ Cf. Cicero *De Senectute* 65 (on *Adelphoe*) and Horace *Serm.* 1.2.19–22 (on *Heauton Timoroumenos*).

Over all, though, we can say that there is a discord built into satiric poetry between the conflicting ends of amusement and education. First, the comic scenes and often scurrilous language that are so consistently present in ancient satire can call into question the legitimacy or seriousness of the *ego*'s purported paedagogical motivations. A simple formulation of this point might be that “*mirator cunni Cupiennius albi* (*Serm.* 1.2.36) is not appropriate language for the classroom.” While this statement is very reductive, it nonetheless touches on or even emblemizes the disconnect between the aims and methods of comedy and those of (moral) instruction.⁶⁹

This disconnect can indeed threaten to undermine the literary productivity of the satirist. Horace's *ego*, for instance, suggests at one point that his moral-didactic goal impedes his satiric-poetic success (and, I imagine, vice versa).⁷⁰ And in Persius poem 5, the satirist's protracted, seemingly earnest (even if diatribal) disquisition on hardline Stoicism (5.52–118) is followed up by a group of grotesque soldiers (“veiny centurions,” *uaricosi centuriones*, 189) who mock said disquisition. Their criticism of what the

⁶⁹ See, for instance, Goldberg's account of why Roman satire developed in the time of Lucilius: “[c]omedy too often rewards the ‘wrong’ actions. The virtues of real life become liabilities on the stage, while the more outrageous a character behaves, the greater his reward” [2005: 148].

⁷⁰ *Serm.* 1.4.22–25:

cum mea nemo
scripta legat uulgo recitare timentis ob hanc rem,
quod sunt quos genus hoc minime iuuat, utpote pluris
culpari dignos.

[Other poets are very successful,] though no one reads *my* writings, as I'm afraid to recite them publicly, for this reason: because there're people that don't much like this genre, since there're many people who [or “since many of them”] are themselves blameworthy.

speaker does in this satire finishes the poem, as well. These comic figures have the last word, which in turn detracts from the force and authority of the poem's message.

Additionally, humor and teaching can come into conflict in the figure of the satirist-didact himself. For although the pose of the abject underdog is funny, and it can enlist the audience's collusive allegiance, nevertheless someone who is playing a debased role such as this does not make for a very convincing teacher. When the speaker of Horace's *Sermones* makes (dubious) claims of psycho-social or intellectual abjection, he aligns himself more closely with the conventions of the satirist at the expense of his magisterial credibility.⁷¹ Persius' speaker, likewise, damages his paedagogical qualifications (the unspoken basis of his moral-philosophic explications elsewhere in his satires) when he shows himself to be the recipient of stern, critical lectures from a figure with greater intellectual poise or moral authority, as with his unnamed interlocutor in poem 3 and his mentor Cornutus at 5.1–51.⁷² If the teacher's methods, worldview, and moral principles are suspect—as these characters suggest that the Persius-*ego*'s are—then the teaching itself loses its authoritativeness and thus its efficacy.

⁷¹ Psycho-social abjection: at the end of his attack on sexual overindulgence at Rome, the *ego* himself takes on one of the roles he has been satirizing, that of adulterer caught by the husband's unexpected return home (*Serm.* 1.2.125–134). Intellectual abjection: cf. the *ego*'s (patently disingenuous) remark that “the gods did well in creating me with a puny pauper-mind that speaks rarely and in piddling quantities,” *di bene fecerunt, inopis me quodque pusilli \ finxerunt animi, raro et perpauca loquentis* (*Serm.* 1.4.17–18).

⁷² Compare also the lectures that the Horatian *ego* receives throughout *Sermones* book 2.

Satire and didactic in *DRN*

Satirists pose as teachers and thereby take advantage of a Graeco-Roman cultural tradition that holds poetry to be a primary means of moral edification. From this tradition they draw, and sometimes abuse, instructive authority. But at the same time, their humor—and their divided audience—can undercut their magisterial credibility. As well, the role of instructor is a transient one, since successful acts of teaching may obviate the reader's need for more teaching texts.

In *DRN*, the roles are reversed. The Lucretian *ego*, who presents himself as a didact,⁷³ at times poses as a satirist, a phenomenon that we have scrutinized at length. This adoption of a satiric persona, I believe, in effect fuses didactic and satiric authority.⁷⁴ The *ego* adds the satirist's moral (self-)righteousness to his own implicitly established credibility as a teacher.⁷⁵ Doing so legitimizes his often harsh, even arrogant tone, and his inexorable, quarrelsome style of argumentation.

⁷³ On *DRN* and the tradition of didactic, see Gale [2007: 68–69].

⁷⁴ Glazewski, in making the case that there is a greater link between *DRN* and satire than has generally been recognized, points out that *DRN* “had a didactic purpose as did Horace” [1971: 88 n. 2].

⁷⁵ His credibility is explicitly established, as well, for readers who accept his claims of poetic and didactic excellence, as for instance in the proem to book 4, repeated from late book 1 (cf. p. 85, above). On the passage, see, e.g., Gale [1994a: 47–50] and Clay [2003].

Straw men

The guise of a satirist explains the sometimes-contemptuous attitude in the speaker's refutations of opposing philosophical viewpoints. It also works to mask the true nature of *DRN*'s straw men. Throughout the text, explanations that run counter to the *ego*'s own Epicurean account of the universe are presented, often unfairly, and biased portraits of people who believe or behave contrary to his teachings are brought forth for ridicule. For example, the speaker mocks the notion (and thus implicitly those who believe) that animals were introduced to the earth via a golden thread suspended from the sky (cf. p. 118 n. 156, above), without describing or even noting the existence of the allegorical interpretation that some who hold the belief (including Plato) provide for it.

In similar fashion, the *mise en scène* of *Natura Rerum* at the end of book 3 (cf. pp. 133–139, above) constructs a second-person addressee who aggregates a remarkable number of negative, un-Epicurean traits into one fictionalized identity—a second-person identity, in other words, that does not allow to the addressee (or reader) anything of his (or her) own subjectivity. *Natura Rerum* satirizes a straw man figure, makes the “you” of her satire a caricature. And yet: her satiric bluster papers over this tendentious addressee-construction, and, to adapt Rosen writing on the satirist-figure more generally, “it takes considerable effort for an audience not to take [her] ranting at face value” [2007: x].

Now, chief among these straw men are the Presocratics, whom the Lucretian *ego* conjures, rejects, and mocks in the poem's first book. The critiques of Heraclitus and Anaxagoras are, as we have seen, satiric through and through. Part and parcel of this satiric invective is a skewed portrayal of the philosophers' doctrines. There is no mention, for instance, of the interpretive richness of Heraclitus' seemingly murky sayings, and the

reductio ad absurdum of Anaxagorean ὁμοιομεγεία is in many respects unfairly reductive.⁷⁶ The straw-man argument against the Presocratics is part of what Brown terms the “satirical strategy” of *DRN* [1983: 155]. By doing here what a satirist does, by becoming a satirist (if only for a few-score lines), the *ego* taps into the set of characteristics associated with the mode of satire and thus purveys an image of Heraclitus and Anaxagoras as debased, turpitudinous victims of satire.

At the same time, however, there is an important didactic point to the passage. As Brown writes, the *ego* “also wishes to convey a serious epistemological point about the limitations of arguing from the visible to the invisible” [1983: 152 n. 41]. I suggest that the potential for tension between earnest intellectual argumentation and humorous, satiric attack in this instance actually enhances the force of the argument, in predisposing the reader to spurn the principles of the Presocratics and adopt that which the *ego* advocates. Satiric strategy bolsters epistemological intent.⁷⁷

My account allows us to understand the philosophic invective, therefore, not as Lucretian error or isolation from the mainstream of contemporary philosophical inquiry and debate, but rather as part of *DRN*’s persistent, even systematic engagement with the mode of satire. A philosopher engaged in doxography—an innovator like Epicurus or even an honest but partisan heir to the tradition like Philodemus (or, elsewhere on the

⁷⁶ Cf. Brown [1983], Tatum [1984], Wardy [1988: 116–117, 125–127], and others, *contra* Eckman [1899: 43]: *DRN*’s “representation of the position of Anaxagoras is certainly a fair one.”

⁷⁷ As Warren writes after discussing the refutation of the Presocratics, the Lucretian *ego*’s “concerns are primarily didactic and therapeutic” [2007: 31], cf., again, Nussbaum [2009/1994].

philosophical spectrum, Cicero⁷⁸)—aims to expound opposing viewpoints well enough to be able to offer genuine, informed critique of those viewpoints’ intellectual weaknesses, although the presentation of these viewpoints may be polemical and may highlight the weaknesses more than is due. A satirist, on the other hand, unflinchingly distorts the facts in his favor, so that his cause seems inherently moral, seems obviously justified, and so that his straw-man opponents can become the targets of collusive blame and comic mockery shared between satirist and audience. *DRN* does not present Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, the Skeptics, and the rest in completely fair light because *DRN* is in these moments a satiric text, employing a larger-scale version of coercive argumentation to predispose the reader, placed by the text into the role of student, towards the speaker’s own beliefs and asseverations.⁷⁹ Thus any supposed “gaps” in *DRN* between actual philosophies and their representations in the text may perhaps in fact be not really gaps, but rather the footprints of satire.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ On Cicero’s doxography, see, e.g., McKirahan [1996]. For *DRN*’s own use of doxography, see, e.g., Rösler [1973: 50 and *passim*] and Piazzzi [2006: 12–15]. Piazzzi remarks on the contrast between Ciceronian doxography and *DRN*’s own “slealtà e faziosità argomentativa—che è l’opposto del *fair play* cui è improntato il dialogo platonico e ciceroniano” [2006: 17; emphasis preserved].

⁷⁹ Cf. Brown [1983: 150 n. 26]: “Lucretius advocates Epicureanism in the proselytizing spirit of a missionary, not like an objective scholar, so it is only natural to expect unfairness in his polemics.” Compare also Runia’s remark that Greek doxographers’ treatises “were grist for the Lucretian mill, because he could use their *diaereses* to make the right answers quite clear” [1997: 103]. Piazzzi refers to “la tendenza a stravolgere e banalizzare le dottrine avversarie,” particularly in *DRN*’s attack on Anaxagoras [2006: 16].

Dessen similarly points to a straw man-like use of Alcibiades in Persius poem 4: “Persius needs an obvious vice to satirize and so he introduces Alcibiades after he has entered politics and his corruption by the people has already begun” [1968: 62].

⁸⁰ Cf. Clay [1983: 238]: “In their [“some readers”] attachment to what is familiar and congenial in the world of *De rerum natura* they fill the poem with contradictions.”

Dogma

Another part of the satiric strategy is dogma. The essential foundation for the Lucretian persona's argument is the doctrine of Epicurus,⁸¹ and it is on this basis that he criticizes alternative or opposing physical theories. Furthermore, the speaker consistently recurs to certain Epicurean doctrinal standards—that the universe consists of matter and void, that the transformation of something is the death of that which existed before, that nothing can be created from nothing—when disproving his philosophical adversaries' standpoints. Thus Brown refers to “the dogmatic standpoint from which Lucretius criticizes the Presocratics”⁸² and remarks that “often in his treatment of the Presocratics, Lucretius falls back on a point of dogma which has been previously established” [1983: 156]. Through the assumption that Epicurus' first principles of natural philosophy (so to speak) are rock-solid Fact, the speaker is able to mock and satirize academic dissidents as unquestionably erroneous and misguided.

Dogma promotes a framework of didaxis in *DRN*, one that has an effect on the reader's reception of the work. Based dogmatically on fixed precepts of Epicurus in his consideration and rejection of countervailing philosophies, *DRN* establishes a master-teacher bond, anterior to the poem itself, between Epicurus and the Lucretian *ego*. This relationship is then in the course of the work applied by transference to *ego* and reader, as Warren explains: the “relationship of dogmatic master and accepting pupil...is a relationship which is replicated between Lucretius, now the instructor, and his readers” [2007:

⁸¹ Particularly Περί φύσεως (*On Nature*), cf. Sedley [1998: ch. 5].

⁸² Cf. Waltz' attribution to *DRN*'s speaker of “un tour d'esprit idéologique et dogmatique” [1949: 80].

31]. Dogmatic master and accepting pupil, indeed. Use of the straw-men Presocratics coerces the reader into following the speaker's critique unquestioningly, and the dogmatic standpoint that the speaker takes in the critique coerces the reader into accepting his disparagements and animadversions wholesale.

Yet we do not see here (or much elsewhere) a relentless drive toward comedy undercutting the didactic claims of satire. Although there are points in *DRN* where some modern readers have felt that serious philosophical argument is in fact undercut by affectation of comic style—take, for instance, the criticisms leveled upon portions of the refutation of the fear of death in book 3, or upon the invective against love and sex in book 4⁸³—the poem overall seems to manage successfully the twin impetus of teaching and entertaining. Tension between satiric and didactic impulses, yes, but not completely irresolvable tension. Both forces work to push the reader into a discipular position of acceptance, of susceptibility to the speaker's occasionally tendentious argumentation.

So it is in the case of the straw-men Presocratics. Of the Lucretian *ego*'s invective against them, Tatum comments, "Lucretius' approach is doxographical. The use of such a polemical doxography is hardly surprising, however, since it was a regular feature

⁸³ Book 3, e.g., Kenney: "This paragraph marks the point at which the diatribe-satirist...takes control of the argument" [1971: 199 *ad* 3.870–839]; and "the vividness and particularity of the illustration suggests that the influence of the diatribe here too predominates over Epicurean doctrine" [1971: 238 *ad* 3.1053–1075].

Book 4, e.g., Stearns [1936: 349] ("[i]ts violent spirit is quite un-Epicurean"), MacKendrick & Howe [1952: 171] (it is "savage"), Miner & Dearing [1969: 12] cited in Gillespie & Hardie [2007b: 12] (Dryden acknowledges its "Obscenity"), and Prosperi [2007: 216] (Speroni's prior enthusiasm for the passage metamorphosed into allegations of its impiety after Speroni himself was denounced to the Inquisition).

of Epicurean writing.”⁸⁴ Sedley, however, says that ancient accusations that Epicurus himself harshly abused his philosophical rivals are perhaps explained more by hostile anti-Epicurean propaganda than by Epicurus’ actual practice (and cf. Brown [1983: 150 n. 26] as well). Where Tatum writes “polemical,” then, we might well instead insert “satiric”: the traits of the anti-Presocratic invective that Tatum identifies as polemical are ones that we have considered under the rubric of the satirist (p. 67 nn. 60 and 62, and p. 76, above). At any rate, the point here is that the use of the mode of satire does not necessarily generate incontrovertible conflict with a poem’s didacticism.

Nor is it in absolute conflict with a didact’s poetry. Tatum again makes a claim of this type, while evaluating the persona’s defense of poetry as a legitimate medium for the transmission of Epicurean principles: “[t]he polemical doxography, a common feature of Epicurean writing and a traditional outlet for the Epicurean writer’s creativity, is exploited by Lucretius to make his case for Epicurean philosophical poetry” [1984: 189]. In other words, *DRN*’s adaptation of polemical doxography (by refiguring it as satiric invective) creates grounds for the justification of a poetic exposition of Epicurean ideology. It is possible to comprehend how such justification may have seemed necessary by looking at the longtime scholarly debate over the supposed opposition between poetry and philosophy in this poem.

⁸⁴ Tatum [1984: 178]. See further Edwards [1989]; Gale points to “[t]he polemical element present in Lucretius’ exploitation of the heroic epic tradition” [2005: 185]. Waltz states that philosophy is essentially linked with and supported by polemic: “[t]out philosophie, en effet, et tout disciple des philosophes, en même temps qu’il affirme sa propre conviction, est porté par état à la controverse, à la polémique doctrinale” [1949: 83]. The Lucretian *ego* is no exception, and brings polemic in line with satire: “l’attitude de Lucrèce est toujours celle du combat; son arme favorite, la moquerie méprisante; son ton, celui de la satire la plus acerbe” [*ibidem*].

Poetry vs. philosophy?

The debate is massive⁸⁵—we will merely skim its surface here—and the “poetry vs. philosophy” concept is in many ways the heir of the notion of “anti-Lucrèce chez Lu-crèce,” the famous formulation of Patin [1900/1868] whereby *DRN* reflects psychological vacillations within the historical Lucretius between rational espousal of Epicurus’ physics and passages of unsound, ecstatic emotion driven by the love potion that Jerome claims made Lucretius insane (and eventually killed him).⁸⁶ The poetry-philosophy line of reasoning, thankfully, tends to focus more on the text than on “Lucretius,” but it nevertheless consists of identifying places where the poetic tendencies in *DRN* override the poem’s philosophical program, or vice versa. It is worth consideration here because some of the resolutions for the poetry-philosophy “conflict” that have been provided in scholarship shed light on ways in which we can understand potential tensions between satire and didaxis.

⁸⁵ Fowler refers to “[t]he celebrated opposition between philosophy and poetry in the *De rerum natura*,” which in his view “can to an extent be rephrased in terms of an opposition between the differing reading practices of two interpretive communities” [2000c: 138]. The term “interpretive community” is from Fish [1976]; cf. the “superreader” of Riffaterre [1980]. On the supposed conflict between philosophy and poetry, see Asmis [1991a, 1991b, 1995], Fowler [1991: 237], Obbink [1995], Holmes [2005: 527 and n. 2], O’Hara [2007: 65–67], Barfield [2011], and especially Martindale [2005: 182–200], on philosophy and poetry in *DRN* and in its reception during the 19th and 20th centuries.

For a similar opposition between didactic poetry and didactic prose, see Philodemus *De Poematis* 5 and Strabo 1 (especially 1.2.3–6) with, among others, Mangoni [1988], Hutchinson [2009], and Sedley [1999: 233]: *DRN*’s speaker “was ready in principle simply to draw his imagery from the technical terminology of Greek Epicurean prose, but...such borrowings only survived if they could prove their independent worth in the context of Latin poetic imagery.” For one such technical term, see my comments on *naturae species ratioque* (p. 91 n. 105, above).

⁸⁶ Cf. also Clay [1983: 234–238], Johnson [2000: 123–127], and O’Hara [2007: 64–69].

West gives us an emblematic example, in regard to 4.528–534, where he takes issue with the speaker’s *exemplum* of hoarseness as proof of the corporeality of sound: “[j]udged as an exposition of a philosophical argument it is unsatisfactory...Pedagogically this is not as it should be. The pedagogue has been overborne by the poet” [1994: 42]. The assumption here is that poetic pleasure or art and scientific instruction are mutually exclusive—or at least, to repurpose Rosen, that poetry and philosophy are “if not antithetical to one another, then certainly in constant tension” [2007: 223]. Or again, Goar: “the poet in Lucretius occasionally overcomes the philosopher and the scientist” [1971: 76]. In Lucretius, as these scholars would have it, the poem’s speaker is divided into discrete personas, the poet and the philosopher and the scientist. The proponents of the “poetry vs. philosophy” reading of *DRN* prefer analytical reduction of the Lucretian *ego* into component parts rather than a unified, multivalent interpretation. The speaker cannot multitask; he must take off his thinking cap if he wants to put on his artist’s beret.⁸⁷

Now, the speaker himself claims that *DRN* is the first systematic expression of Epicurean philosophy in poetic form (cf. 1.926–934 = 4.1–9). And the extant evidence appears to bear him out: “in using poetry to expound Epicureanism he made a conscious and significant innovation in the Garden.”⁸⁸ *DRN*’s speaker defines himself as a philoso-

⁸⁷ Compare Minyard’s comment that “[a]nalysis and art are two fundamentally different and differing modes of knowing” [1985: 58], and O’Hara’s that “there is some soundness in the basic idea that there is a tension between the fervor of the poem and the claim that it is written in serenity” [2007: 65]. Cf. also Segal [1990: 46–47]; and Martindale’s overview of the history of this idea in the generation after Kant [2005: 182–190].

⁸⁸ Tatum [1984: 189]. Cf. Minyard [1985: 57]: “Lucretius added a literary dimension to Epicureanism, and in this he was novel both as an Epicurean and as a poet. To this point,

pher-poet, not a poet-philosopher—according to him, the locus of his genius is in the form, not the content. So also Warren: “[h]e himself makes clear that his innovations are confined to the method of expression of Epicurean ideas. In all philosophical matters he is merely following the path already worked by Epicurus’ footprints” [2007: 21]. Warren’s mention of Epicurus’ footprints is an allusion to *DRN* 5.55–56 (cited and translated at p. 84, above). We can thus on the one hand take these (Epicurus’) footprints to be philosophical footprints, the tracks of content, and on the other hand consider the footprints whose absence is highlighted in 1.926–927 = 4.1–2 (*auia Pieridum peragro loca nullius ante | trita solo*, “I wander along the pathless tracts of the Muses, places touched by no foot before”) to be poetic footprints, the trackless path of a verse adaptation of Epicurean philosophy.⁸⁹ If we do so, the apparent conflict between the statements “I walk where no one has before” (proem to book 4) and “I walk in tracks made by Epicurus” (proem to book 5) is resolved.

And yet the newness of *DRN* may not be poetic alone. In Schrijvers’ view, “[t]he propagandistic prologues of *De Rerum Natura* offer a somewhat simplified and popularized version of the philosophical teaching of pleasure” [2007: 61]. We could count this

there had been no poetic rendition of Epicurean doctrines.” Compare Sider [1987, 1995], Asmis [1995], and Janko [1995].

⁸⁹ Paratore & Pizzani [1960: 311–312] and Kenney [1970], among many others, connect this image to Alexandrian poetic *topoi*—cf. Paratore & Pizzani [1960: 310], Cupaiuolo [1966: 137–141], and Kenney [1970: 369–370]—and to Callimachus in particular. For connections between *DRN*, Philodemus, and the Neoterics in Rome, see Ferrero [1949], Neudling [1949], Minyard [1985: 28 and n. 14], and Armstrong [1995]. See also O’Hara [1998: 70]: “deliberate allusion or borrowing is consistent with Lucretian practice and with his apparently broad knowledge of Greek poetry.” Knox [1999] argues ardently that the footprints *DRN*’s speaker follows are indeed philosophical, and not Alexandrian or Callimachean poetic tracks. Schindler discusses this passage as part of *DRN*’s program of allegory [2000: 132–137, 146–148].

as an innovation—the adaptation of Epicurus’ teachings not only linguistically and poetically, into Latin and into verse, but also substantively, into a work accessible to an audience broader than the philosophic *literati* of Hellenistic Greece.⁹⁰

Moreover, the boundaries between philosophy and poetry, between instruction and entertainment, are not so finite as the simple “poetry vs. philosophy” (or “satire vs. didactic”) debate might suggest. For instance, Wallach points out that “the act of learning can be connected with pleasure, and one should not assume that a didactic work itself cannot be beautiful poetry” [1976: 116]. Learning can be pleasurable: it can embody the ethical principles that undergird *DRN*’s scientific explanations of the universe. And, in turn, teaching can be a thing of beauty: it is possible to present serious concepts and material in an aesthetically pleasing (!) manner.⁹¹ The two impulses can, and do, intermingle.

I believe that the alleged poetry-philosophy conundrum (that is, the tension between didactic and poetic imperatives) is thus no more unsolvable and no less manipulable for the speaker than is the potential for tension between didactic and satiric imperatives. At any rate, the “problem” of *DRN*’s use of poetry is extrinsic, not intrinsic, to the poem. In other words, the poem does not problematize its status as didactic poetry, but rather makes its very poeticism integral to the didactic plot’s success. Perhaps the best support for my contention is the honey on the cup simile of 1.936–950 (discussed at p. 123, above). Poetry, for the Lucretian speaker, is the tool by which he makes accessible,

⁹⁰ Though see my evaluation of the complex debate over *DRN*’s audience at pp. 15–23. I also note that the Lucretian speaker’s problematic claims of originality mirror Epicurus’ own claims of being an autodidact, on which see Erler [2011].

⁹¹ Compare my discussion of types of didactic at pp. 20–21.

palatable, comprehensible the contents and objectives of his didaxis. (Along these same lines, satire is the tool by which he makes appreciable and persuasive the philosophical and moral criticisms of his didaxis.) “In Lucretius, poetry and philosophy do not fight.”⁹²

Yet, as scholarship on *DRN* has shown, the utility of poetry is not limited to purple passages as might be suggested by the metaphor of the honeyed cup-rim, but instead poetic artfulness in fact pervades the work and is inextricably incorporated with philosophical argument. In the same way, the moral or ethical (we might say “satiric”) objectives of the poem are, as Fowler relates, constantly and deliberately at hand during the work’s discussions of physics:

Throughout the purely physical sections of the work, the *De rerum natura* constantly insinuates arguments against its two main targets, the fear of the gods and of death...the poem shows itself perfectly aware of the way in which its own meaning is constituted.⁹³

DRN, Fowler is arguing, exhibits an objectival heterogeneity that does not undercut but indeed reinforces its component purposes.

In this way we can perceive an integration of satire with didactic, because *DRN*’s targets, I argue—targets of moralizing blame and satiric mockery—are integrated with the poem’s more straightforward scientific doctrine. Didactic and satiric impulses coexist, mutually enhance the speaker’s aims; and the speaker’s interweaving of the two is

⁹² Wardy [1988: 128]. Cf. also Segal [1990] and, *contra*, Anderson [1993b: 169]; O’Hara [2007: 64–69], who does not completely endorse easy resolution of the problem; and Hardie on “the now orthodox version whereby the poet’s powers of empathy and imagistic association are working with rather than against the philosophical message” [1992: 299].

⁹³ Fowler [2000c: 148]. Fowler, whose study is focused on literary intertexts in *DRN*, favors “emphasis on the way in which they contribute to the master argument rather than on their potential for disruption” [2000c: 155]. Instead of conceding multiple personalities (“the poet” and “the philosopher”) to the poem’s *ego*, we can with Fowler look for a unified, more complex interpretation of the poem’s self-presentation.

intentional.⁹⁴ Thus Wardy writes, on 2.973–990,⁹⁵ “[t]his is satire, but not in lieu of argument” [1988: 128]. Two more examples: first, the mockery of the belief that motion can exist without void (*DRN* 1.370–383) is a step along the path of atoms and void that the speaker unfolds in the first book, a misconception that must be eliminated for the reader to understand properly the atomic theory of Epicurus. And second, after the acerbically satiric rhetorical questions in the first speech of *Natura Rerum* comes an important new take on *DRN*’s rejection of the fear of death (3.945–949, cf. pp. 133–139, above). In sum, whether the Lucretian persona is using satire to produce a straw man against which to argue (as we have seen previously) or is instead, as in these examples, fusing satiric attack with extended and legitimate argument, he successfully reconciles the (at times divergent) drives for education and entertainment of the reader.

The teacher’s transitoriness

I turn now to the issue in *DRN* of teaching’s transitory nature—the possibility that didactic success may close off the potential for continued didactic production, a modal

⁹⁴ Compare Waltz, who sees didactic intent behind all of *DRN*’s raillery: “jamais Lucrèce ne raille pour railler, mais bien toujours pour nous ouvrir les yeux et nous instruire; c’est dans le péril [we might say “le péril satirique”] et le malheur qu’il faut juger les homes” [1949: 95]. The satiric attacks, in turn, are strengthened by the work’s philosophical underpinnings, which keep the argument from becoming feeble: “[c]e ton combatif et ironique...pourrait, semble-t-il, affaiblir son argumentation, sans la forte armature dialectique dont il la soutient constamment” [1949: 103].

⁹⁵ In this passage the Lucretian *ego* suggests that atoms with sense-perception would exhibit laughter, tears, and infighting. Cf. 1.915–920, the *reductio ad absurdum* of ὁμοιομερία into laughing and crying atoms; this passage is discussed at pp. 69 and 109, above.

concern for satire (and a generic concern for Roman *satira*⁹⁶). Can such a concern, or the Lucretian speaker's response to it, be detected within his poem? We can well point to *DRN*'s infrequent but important references to poetic/didactic glory. Epicurus is, according to *DRN*'s speaker, metaphorically divine (*DRN* 5.8) and in possession of skywards-borne posthumous glory (6.7–9)—both because of his teachings. As for himself, the speaker seeks an *insignis corona* from the Muses (1.929 = 4.4) not singularly because of his poetic achievements (1.933–934 = 4.8–9) but also because of his moral-didactic accomplishment (1.931–932 = 4.6–7). Success of the didactic plot, therefore, brings with it tangible and sizeable rewards, despite the (perhaps inevitable) end of the teacher-student relation.

So the transience of didaxis is not in and of itself inherently or expressly problematic for didactic poetry, although it may be for satire. Perhaps even the seeming abruptness, and the doom and gloom, of *DRN*'s final, plague-ridden scene can be seen to include a tacit allusion to the end of the teaching relationship? That the plague scene can be read as a sort of final exam testing the reader's apprehension and adoption of the Epicurean anti-anxiety mindset has been suggested by, among others, Segal, who argues that the plague passage is the ultimate embodiment of the poem's teaching against the fear of death.⁹⁷ I would furthermore point out that we can consider the description of the plague

⁹⁶ Cf. Keane [2006: 113], on *Sermones* book 2: "The series of poems plays with the metaphor of satire as teaching by making Horace both redundant and vulnerable while his acquaintances make forays into didacticism and satire."

⁹⁷ Segal [1990: ch. 10], cf. Minadeo [1969: 30], Bright [1971], Johnson [2000: 31], and especially Commager [1957: 114]: "The architecture of the poem culminates here, as the various perceptions of man's folly unite in a final despairing integrity of vision." Maybe not so much despairing as exacting, or trying. See also Clay [1983: 225] and, *contra*, Porter [2003: 219–225] and [2007: 172]: "Scenes of natural disaster are fearful because

to be a joint intellectual inquiry between master (speaker) and disciple (reader), as evidenced by the speaker’s use of second-person verbs of observation—for instance, *DRN* 6.1163–1664, *nec nimio cuiquam posses ardore tueri | corporis in summo summam feruescere partem* (“and yet you couldn’t see the outermost part of anyone’s body feverish in excessive heat”).⁹⁸

This cooperative learning experience is not one simply of the history of epidemiology, as was *DRN*’s source passage in Thucydides, but one also of how best to live life and avoid the ills that anxiety produces. As Commager remarks, the Lucretian speaker “view[s] physical phenomena in moral or psychological terms” [1957: 105]. In fact, I believe, the speaker belabors the linking of ataractic moral allegory with the clinical symptomatology of the plague. Take a passage describing plague symptoms:

multaque praeterea mortis tum signa dabantur:
 perturbata animi mens in maerore metuque,
 triste supercilium, furiosus uoltus et acer,
 sollicitae porro pleneque sonoribus aures,
 creber spiritus aut ingens raroque coortus,
 sudorisque madens per collum splendidus umor,
 tenuia sputa minuta, croci contacta colore
 salsaque, per fauces rauca uix edita tussi.

(*DRN* 6.1182–1189)

Furthermore, many signs of death would then be provided: an intellect disordered amid the grief and fear of the mind, a gloomy expression, a wild and fierce countenance; additionally ears bothered and filled with sounds, hyperventilation or infrequent deep-seated gasps; and the sheening moisture of sweat dripping across

they portend the unimaginable...But for an atomist it can be a sublime sensation...All of Book 6 has this feel of a detached spectacle about it.” I have earlier touched on Lucretian sublimity (p. 155 n. 36, above); and cf. Conte’s “sublime reader” in *DRN* [1994: ch. 1] and, for Horace’s (sometimes ironic) reception of the Lucretian sublime, see Hardie [2009: ch. 6].

⁹⁸ Additionally: *posses...uidere* (6.1257) and *uideres* (1268).

the neck, thin bits of mucus, tinged with saffron hue and salty,
produced with difficulty through the pharynx by a hoarse cough.

The symptomatology is there: mental imbalance, tinnitus, respiratory difficulties, sweats, phlegm, tussiculation. But it is paired with, and preceded by, an account of the psychic symptoms much akin to the emotional complications that attend upon ambition, greed, lust, and the like earlier in *DRN*. Anxiety (*perturbata...mens*), mental anguish (*animi...in maerore*), fear (*metus*), madness (*furiosus uoltus*). The two lines of psychosomatic troubles overshadow—or at least help shape our reception of—the reader’s reception of the subsequent five lines on purely the disease’s somatic components.⁹⁹ We may even take away from this passage the implication that the physical manifestations of the disease are a result of the individuals’ lack of psychological/intellectual equilibrium—or that this lack heightens the effects and the emotional repercussions of somatic afflictions that could otherwise have been tolerable.¹⁰⁰

The plague is (subtly) marked as a closing lesson for the student of Epicureanism. The radical/acute divergence/variance between the Epicurean’s ataractic life and the typical plague victim’s manifestly anataractic death could represent the disciple’s final commitment either to the off-the-main-road path of Epicureanism, success, happiness, and independence or to an unenlightened life that is nasty, brutish, and short. However the student decides, the finality of the choice—coupled with both the finality of plague-borne death and the obvious finality of the poem’s conclusion (note the final word: *desereren-*

⁹⁹ Cf. Commager [1957: 105–107] on the novel diction and intratextual resonances of *anxius angor* at *DRN* 6.1158.

¹⁰⁰ Compare Rouse & Smith [1975: 579 n. a]: “[t]he truth is that the prospect of salvation and of a heaven on earth which Lucr. offers in the *DRN* shines with a brighter and stronger light on account of this dark and hellish picture of what life is like without the guidance of Epicurus.”

tur, 6.1286¹⁰¹)—amounts to the end of *DRN*'s didaxis. The didactic plot does not allow for a teacher-student relationship after the work is over; and yet, the didactic plot is successful,¹⁰² there is no problem with didaxis' transitory nature.

Finally, let us look at *DRN* through the lens of Habinek's claim that a concern of satire is keeping its playmates, its targets, around [2005: 182]. The Lucretian *ego*, too, hangs on to his targets. Things like the fear of death, lust and greed and ambition, misjudgments of sense-perception, and the idiotic *stolidi* serve well as perennial targets. They are not going away; the out-group, when it consists of characters with such basic human faults, is continually present.

The poem's didactic plot, in other words, provides for its self-replication. Both satire and protreptic philosophy like *DRN* have a vested interest in assuring their self-continuation—because their respective rhetorical stances (or poetic plots) have expiration dates, so to speak, built into them. The satiric poet is intrinsically concerned with further poetic production, and the didact, the teacher, the tutor always welcomes or even seeks out more students. And in a society as misguided, as flawed, as intellectually and morally abject as the one in which the Lucretian *ego* locates himself, his supply of recruits will never run dry.

¹⁰¹ Bockemüller & Martin both proposed moving *DRN* 6.1247–1251 to follow the last line (1286), according to Rouse & Smith [1975: 586–587 *ad* 6.1237/1245] and Fowler [1997] provides some stylistic support for the emendation. Cf. also Bright [1971], Kelly [1980], and Gale [1994a: 224 n. 69].

¹⁰² Volk states that the simple existence of *DRN* proves that the didactic plot it constructs has been successful [2010: 130].

Conclusion to chapters 2 and 3

The satirist in the Graeco-Roman mode of satire is comic, personalized, mocking, indignant, self-righteous yet socially abject, and collusive, as we saw in chapter 2. He (rarely she) addresses a divided or double audience, including those who take his critique of the target seriously and those who see themselves as part of the “in-group,” aware of the satirist’s game of self-contradictory stances. He can also, as I have argued, seek or desire actual improvement of the flaws and faults he chides, even if he portrays himself as disenfranchised (as with the Juvenal-*ego*) and even if such improvement could obviate the specific instantiation of his satiric verse. The discrepancies between high ground and abjection, between seriousness and comedy, and between need for the continuation of satire and genuine desire for a better world altogether generate the satirist’s characteristic ambivalence and fundamental elusiveness.

The speaker of *DRN* adopts each of these aspects of the satirist multiple times. His invective against the Presocratic philosophers Heraclitus and Anaxagoras is a particularly good example of comic, intellectually self-righteous mockery that uses *reductio ad absurdum*, coercive argumentation, and straw-man figures to refute the opposing ideologues’ viewpoints. His personalized voice makes disingenuous claims of linguistic abjection and is often expressed in collusive terms, linking speaker and addressee, speaker and reader through shared experiences—and, eventually, linking speaker and reader through shared contempt for the addressee (“Memmius”) and other satiric targets, who are often described with the pathetic, even comic epithet *miser*.

Satire's three main characteristics are an object or target that provokes the satire, a formal (generally literary) antecedent, and humor, particularly irony and parody. Ambiguity is another hallmark of satire—just like the elusiveness of the satirist. Occasionally, satire's ambiguity elicits criticism and censure from individuals who do not properly understand the mode's function.

Among the many targets of satire in *DRN*, I have identified the originary object as *religio*. For antecedents to *DRN*'s use of satire we can look to *satura* (genre), to hexameter poetry (medium/form), and particularly to the discourse of Graeco-Roman diatribe. Humor generated from irony and parody is evident throughout *DRN*, especially in (again and again) the anti-Presocratic invective. We can detect ambiguity and ambivalence in *DRN* on the level of specific words, description, linguistics, and even philosophical rationales for natural phenomena.

The proem to book 2, I argue, is emblematic of *DRN*'s relation to satire. It is ironic, and mockingly assigns blame to its target. It is ambiguous enough that some readers will misunderstand it, and hence react negatively to its contents. It criticizes the degraded experience of public/civic life in Roman society and thereby places the ἀταραξία of Epicureanism well above the toil and trouble of Roman business and politics. It can, further, be read metapoetically and metasatirically, as a note on the pleasure of reading *DRN* and its satire for an Epicurean audience.

A significant thematic puzzle of Graeco-Roman satiric poetry is the tension between satire proper and didactic. Satirists, that is to say, adopt the pose of a didact; at the same time, the comedic impetus underlying their satiric work creates the potential for conflict and discontinuity. Within the stance of didaxis, satire can and does exploit the

teacher's authority—satire, for example, creates straw men for targets of its blame. But the didactic pose also brings with it the fleeting nature of the teacher's role, a problem that pushes satirists to find ways to keep their playmates around.

In *DRN*, the possibility of tension between satire and didactic works the other way around: the didactic pose comes prior to the pose of a satirist. The speaker's adoption of this satiric persona fuses the satirist's moral high ground with a teacher's credibility, and thus inhibits the fictive addressee's ability to pick up on the various coercive techniques that the speaker employs, not least among them the straw-man arguments. Satire—*DRN*'s engagement with the mode of satire—helps us better understand why the summary and representation of opposing scientific viewpoints, particularly those of the Presocratics near the end of book 1, are skewed and unfair. In essence, the *ego*'s invective against the Presocratics is not merely polemical but also satiric doxography; his satiric mockery of targets like Anaxagoras comes from a dogmatic standpoint, which replicates between speaker and reader the same kind of master-pupil relationship that the speaker constructs between Epicurus and himself. Moreover, just as *DRN* amalgamates philosophy and poetry in a more comprehensive fashion than was granted by earlier generations of Lucretian scholarship, so also tension between didactic and satire is not overwhelmingly palpable in *DRN*.

In closing, I propose that the essential trait which, at core, puts *DRN* in line with the mode of satire is a concern with observation of the world and society. Both satire and didactic describe the world that their poetry inhabits; didactic additionally explains the world, while satire additionally judges it, criticizes the shortcomings of its denizens. *DRN* does both. Evaluation and censure sharpen the persuasiveness of an explanation;

explanation in turn advances justification for censure and evaluation. *DRN*, we could say, straddles the divide between philosophy and satire, and does so successfully by exploiting philosophy and satire's shared goals and affinities: adoption of didactic stances, exposure of and admonition against vice, and professed desire for moral betterment of reader or society.

My assertion is not that *DRN* "is" satire, any more than we would say that Aristophanes "is" satire on the basis of his satiric parodies. Rather, *DRN* uses the mode of satire for the numerous specific purposes that we have considered above. I would like to end by raising the question of a more general, underlying intent that may be operative in *DRN*'s engagement with the satiric mode. Does *DRN*'s speaker inhabit, so to speak, the satiric persona as a part of the process of the addressee's or reader's conversion to Epicurean ideology? In other words, does the serene *ego* whose stated goal is conversion adopt the satirist figure's subjectivity in a manner similar to how, say, he invokes Venus at the very beginning of the poem?

This *ego*, as Clay writes, "can transport himself into a world of beliefs that are entirely unlike his own" [1983: 238]. He can transfer himself into the mindset of someone who believes false explanations of reality—witness the in-depth, effective version of the Phaethon tale (*DRN* 5.396–404, with p. 108, above)—and he can turn himself into a satirist, whether through his own voice or that of the Nature of Things herself. The *ego*, however, is in this capability unlike others: "[t]here are, of course, some readers who cannot easily pass from their world to his."¹⁰³ Such is the very reason for the *ego*'s trans-

¹⁰³ Again Clay [1983: 238], and continuing: "[i]n their attachment to what is familiar and congenial in the world of *De rerum natura* they fill the poem with contradictions." See further O'Hara [2007: 66–67].

portations and transformations—to make his material more accessible and acceptable to his audience. Accessibility, in turn, is a crucial prerequisite for the audience’s successful conversion. So, perhaps, the smaller-scale fusion of satiric and didactic impulses in the text of *DRN* is matched on the long view by a global junction of satire and didactic, both laboring, on relatively equal footing, in the course of philosophical persuasion.

CHAPTER 4

DRN and Earlier Roman Satire

“Fragmentary though our knowledge of Lucilius is, enough survives to make the Lucretian borrowing unmistakable, and to suggest that it was even more ample than we can now substantiate.”

Dudley [1965: 122]

“Lucretius may be considered...as both orthodox and heterodox.”

Schrijvers [2007: 67]

In the preceding two chapters, we examined the mode of satire, its role in Graeco-Roman satiric poetry, and the uses of it on display in *DRN*. We turn now to the specific genre of satire, a Roman verse genre with which, I will argue, Lucretius’ poem engages in important ways. Over the course of this chapter and the next, I will make the case for *DRN*’s purposeful allusion to satiric verse and adoption of satire’s generic tropes; ultimately, I suggest, we should view *DRN* as influencing the development and trajectory of Roman satire, while not itself being a member proper of the genre. In this chapter, I consider *DRN*’s connections to earlier Roman satire, particularly to the surviving fragmentary corpus of Lucilius, and in the next chapter I will take up how *DRN*’s engagement

with the genre affects later satirists from Horace to Juvenal. Given the fragmentary nature of the corpus of satire before Lucretius' time, some suggestions of satire's influence on *DRN* must remain tentative, but it is worthwhile to catalogue possible allusions completely.

First, though, a few remarks are in order on the Latin term for the genre of Roman satire, *satura*—whence the English word “satire” is derived. Quintilian's description of the genre is cited most frequently: *satura quidem tota nostra est*, “satire indeed is entirely our own,” not taken over from Greek models.¹ Certain aspects of Roman satire can be found in earlier Greek poetry—*Serm.* 1.6 and 1.10.16–17 point to Old Comedy, and of course the Roman genre of satire makes use of the Graeco-Roman mode of satire²—but, at core, *satura* is a Roman innovation. Less often cited is the description of satire by the 4th-century grammarian Diomedes (*GLK* 1.485):

satyra dicitur carmen apud Romanos nunc quidem maledicum et ad carpenda hominum uitia archaeae comoediae caractere compositum, quale scripserunt Lucilius et Horatius et Persius. set olim carmen quod ex uariis poematibus constabat satyra uocabatur, quale scripserunt Pacuuius et Ennius.

¹ Quintilian *Institutio Oratoria* 10.1.93. Cf., among many others, van Rooy [1955] and Freudenburg [2005b: 2].

² Korus [1991] traces the development of Menippean satire—what he calls the only genre recognized as satiric in antiquity, “Die einzige Gattung, die in der Antike als satirisch anerkannt wurde, war die Menippeische Satire” [1991: 13]—from Homeric backgrounds through the now-lost works of Menippus into Latin and later Greek authors, namely Varro, Petronius, Apuleius, and Lucian. Kronenberg adduces the influence of Socratic dialogues (as transmitted both by Plato and by Xenophon) on Menippean satire [2009: 4] and argues that Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, Varro's *De Re Rustica*, and Vergil's *Georgics* should all be considered Menippean satire [2009: *passim*]. (In her argument for treating *Georgics* as satire [2009: chh. 6–7], Kronenberg treats *DRN* as a straightforward account or *ratio* of the universe's ordering based on scientific principles.) On Menippean satire, see also Kirk [1980], Relihan [1984, 1993], Kaplan [2000], Rimell [2005], and Weinbrot [2005]; and see Long [1978] for an account of the Greek “satirist” Timon of Phlius.

“Satire” is the term for a poetic form belonging to the Romans. Now, indeed, it is abusive, and put together for critiquing the flaws of people, in the style of Old Comedy, like the kind that Lucilius and Horace and Persius wrote. But previously a poem that consisted of various metrical forms was called “satire,” like the kind that Pacuvius and Ennius wrote.

Roman satire is thus a polymorphous genre, consisting of both poetry and prose, of multiple styles and registers, and of a variety of topics and subject matter. Besides the poems of Lucilius, Horace, Persius, and Juvenal—the four authors to whom the phrase “Roman satire” most often refers—*satura* encompasses the satiric prose works of Varro of Reate (his Menippean satires³) and the poetic medley titled *Saturae* by Ennius, and may arguably include Petronius’ mostly-prose *Satyrica* as well. This polyphony does justice to one of the ancient etymologies for the genre’s name: that the term derives from the *lanx satura*, a “full” or “mixed” dish, a kind of potpourri of different contents and flavors.⁴ I limit my discussion in this chapter to *DRN*’s connections to earlier verse satire: the scarce extant fragments of Ennius’ *Saturae* and the more plentiful ones of Lucilius. *DRN* alludes to both authors, as I will show, and to Lucilius specifically many times. These allusions, I argue, grant satiric, poetic, and even moral authority, standing, and heritage to the Lucretian *ego* in his critique of human foibles and of the flaws of Roman society.

³ On Varro’s *Satirarum Menippearum Libri CL*, see, e.g., Cèbe [1972], Hooley [2007: 2–5, 141–143], and Kronenberg [2009: 4–5, 85–87].

⁴ For more on the etymologies of *satura*, see, e.g., Knight [1990] and Rotstein [2010: 125–130, esp. 128 n. 57], and note Muecke’s point about the varied contents of the genre: “in practice Roman satire was not always necessarily ‘satiric’ in tone” [2005: 34].

Characteristics of Roman *satira* in *DRN*

Before diving into the satires of Ennius and Lucilius, it is worth considering the basic features of Roman verse satire in general and their presence in *DRN*. One of the most important such features is, simply put, the mode of satire, familiar to us from chapters 2 and 3. This mode is what makes Roman satire actually satire, what it holds in common at core with satiric literature from ancient Greece to modern-day America. But just as important as Roman satire's use of the mode of satire—that is, of the tools, techniques, and topics that form the arsenal of most satiric works—is when it does not use it. Not every moment of Lucilius, Horace, Persius, or Juvenal is properly “satire.” In each author, there are moments and passages devoted not to satiric attack or satiric humor but to non-satiric concerns (such as the function of language or the making of poetry) or to social and moral critique in a less satiric, more straightforward vein. *DRN*, too, as I have shown, uses the mode of satire substantially, but not exclusively, not all the time—just as Lucretius' poem also uses philosophical proofs and argumentation, but not exclusively or ubiquitously.

A second feature of Roman satire, one shared also by *DRN* and by Graeco-Roman satiric verse more broadly, is a didactic pose, the subject of extended discussion in chapter 3 (pp. 163–171, above). The satiric and the Lucretian *egos* both claim to be teachers, to instruct the readers (or the internal audience) for moral or intellectual or social betterment. Poetry, in Roman literate society, served an educatory purpose, as moral deterrent and as preparation for more sophisticated philosophical inquiry and cogitation—and yet both satire and *DRN* take advantage (sometimes similarly, sometimes in different ways)

of this expectation of utility attendant upon Roman poetry during the Republican period, and thus we see in satiric verse what I have termed didactic tension, between the stated instructional aims of the satirist-figure and the undercutting undercurrents of his characterization.

The didactic pose present in *DRN* and Roman satire alike may also, I suggest, help explain yet another trait of both corpora, namely their poetic meter. Although Ennius' *Saturae* and Lucilius' earlier works (the books numbered 26–30 by scholarly convention) use a variety of meters, especially iambics, trochaics, and hexameters, Lucilius' fifth book (30 in the conventional numbering) appears to settle on dactylic hexameter as the meter of choice, and all of Lucilius' subsequent work (books 1–25) uses the meter exclusively. The satires of Horace, Persius (besides his prologue), and Juvenal follow suit⁵—and so also *DRN*. Hexameter is the meter first and foremost of epic, a fact that Roman satirists exploit in their own poetics,⁶ but Homer's hexameters were followed by

⁵ Persius' prologue is not in hexameter but rather in choliambics: the prologic exception, perhaps, that proves the rule. Petronius' *Satyrical* includes poems in various meters, including (atrocious) hexameter and (botched) elegiac couplets; cf. Connors [1998]. Varro's Menippean satire was "mixed with a variety of poetic forms," according to the testimony of Quintilian (*Institutio Oratoria* 10.1.95: *carminum uarietate mixtum*). Martial, whose work is not generically speaking satire proper but does influence Juvenalian satire to great extent, writes primarily in elegiacs, choliambics, and hendecasyllables, following the epigrammatic model of Catullus.

⁶ Cf. Muecke [2005: 41]:

The hexameter itself was a suitable vehicle for what has been dubbed stylistic "mobility," the comic or ironic switch from one stylistic register to another, exploited by all the Roman verse satirists. Writing in this meter allowed them to adopt...the technical advances of the writers of serious hexameter poetry (epic, didactic), and to parody their style.

On Lucilius and epic in particular, see Christes [2001].

those of Hesiod, and later by those of several Presocratic philosophers, most notably Empedocles, who serves as an important poetic exemplar for *DRN*.⁷

Roman satire and Lucretian didactic both use hexameters: what I am proposing here is a relationship between the two that is more than coincidence and less than dependence.⁸ Lucilian satire may have settled on hexameter because while the hexameter's association with epic allowed for stylistic parody and play, its association with didactic reinforced the satiric didaxis or didactic pose. And, likewise, the association with hexameter that is one of the Lucilian corpus' foundational contributions to the genre offered *DRN* the built-in flexibility of tone and mood that we see in the Lucretian employment of satire. *DRN* exploits primarily the epic associations of the hexameter, but its role as the generic meter also of didactic and satire facilitates *DRN*'s shifts into a satiric register.

We saw in chapter 2 that the Lucretian speaker has a significant interest in matters of language, whether in issues of translation (as with the unrenderable Anaxagorean ὁμοιομερία: *DRN* 1.830 and pp. 66–69, above) or punning etymologies (p. 64 n. 53, above, cf. Snyder [1980] and the “atomologies” that Friedländer [1941] discusses), or even complaints about the supposed poverty of the Latin language (the *egestas linguae*: *DRN* 1.832 and pp. 77–79, above). Here, once more, I would point out a kinship be-

⁷ Sedley [1998: ch. 1]—modified by Garani [2007]—and Woolerton [2010], among others. And after Hesiod and the Presocratics, dactylic hexameter was the fixed meter of the didactic poets, as for instance Aratus and Cicero, who translated Aratus' *Phaenomena* not long before the composition of *DRN*.

⁸ Cf. Murley [1939: 381]: “Lucretius was in time between Lucilus and Horace, used the same language and what became the accepted metre of satire.” Kenney, commenting on *DRN* 3.1082, discusses metrical links between *DRN*, Lucilian satire, and comedy [1971: 243 *ad loc.*].

tween *DRN* and Roman satire, particularly that of Lucilius.⁹ Among the fragments of Lucilius are at least 38 pieces dealing with language and especially linguistics—grammar, orthography, pronunciation, and so forth.¹⁰ This kind of close attention to how language functions and is constructed runs closely parallel to *DRN*'s concentration on the relationship between letters and the (trans)formation of words, an analogy for elements and the formation of matter (as with *lignis* and *ignis*, wood and fire, *DRN* 1.907–914).

Matters of language arise occasionally in the later authors of Roman satire—for instance, the Horatian reference to the metrical impossibility of a certain toponym (*Serm.* 1.5.87: “[a place] that cannot be mentioned in [dactylic] verse,” *quod uersu dicere non est*)—but they are never so detailed or prominent as they seem to be in Lucilius’ satires and as they are in *DRN*. I suggest that repeated incorporation of linguistic commentary into Lucilius’ poetry in a sense paved the way for the inclusion of similar content in *DRN*: the presence of the subject in Lucilian satire made it a topic not only fruitful metaphorical terrain for the Lucretian speaker’s atomistic exposition but also germane to *DRN*’s didactic-epic-satiric hexameters.

Another important shared aspect of satire’s and *DRN*’s approach to language is the purposeful, non-incidentally use of Greek words. *DRN* avoids Greek transliterations, with certain pointed exceptions, such as the use of *homoeomeria* in the ridicule of Anax-

⁹ Cf. also Keulen’s analysis of Aulus Gellius’ satiric employment of philology [2009: 120–126]. On Lucilius’ literary criticism, see Koster [2001] and the citations provided by Goldberg [2005: 177].

¹⁰ Lucilius fr. 1.3, 9.4–21, 6.1 (with *Serm.* 1.5.87), 26.7, H.1, H.3, H.4, H.25, H.85, and H.174–185. All references to the text and numbering of the fragments of Lucilius in this chapter are to the edition of Charpin [1978–1991/2002–2003]; a concordance of citations is supplied in Appendix 1 (pp. 374–375, below). “H” in Charpin’s numbering refers to the body of Lucilian hexameters of uncertain book placement.

agorean natural philosophy in book 1.¹¹ Lucilian satire, on the other hand, embraces them, and the Lucilian *ego* even says he speaks “like a half-Greek,” *semigraece* (fr. 9.20.1). But his usage of Greek is intentional, not flippant, as Petersmann points out: the Lucilian *ego* is “open to the use of Greek, but he always has some special point to make; it is not there for show or because he cannot find a Latin equivalent” [1999: 289].¹² *DRN* here is like the satire of Lucilius, for the Lucretian *ego*’s use of Greek words serves particular ends, often (as we saw in chapter 2) to call attention to the strangeness of a concept like ὁμοιομερία. Horace’s speaker rejects Graecisms for reasons of poetic aesthetics, as did, evidently, Ennius’ *Saturae*.¹³ The Juvenalian satirist-figure’s primary use of Graecisms is in recriminating excessive Greek influence on Roman society.¹⁴ Like its satiric counterparts, then, Lucretius’ poem engages consciously with Greek vocabulary most often in order to point to the strangeness of the concept, behavior, or custom under consideration.

Besides language, *DRN* and satire (both that of Lucilius and of authors after *DRN*) treat many similar topics, themes, and tropes, as I discuss at length in chapter 5. At this point, I offer one more basic feature of Roman satire that we may see also in Lucretius’ poem. Satire is a poetry of fullness, of satiety—of being *satur*, “full” or “stuffed”—and it is also a poetry of potpourri, of miscellany, of the mixed plate (the *lanx satura*). Accord-

¹¹ *DRN* 1.830, 834, with pp. 66–69, above.

¹² Cf. also Goldberg [2005: 174 n. 73, with citations] and Rudd [1986: ch. 5].

¹³ Horace: cf. *Serm.* 1.10.20–35, with Oliensis [1998: 40]. Ennius: cf. Petersmann’s assertion that “Ennius...appears to have avoided the use of Greek” [1999: 289].

¹⁴ Cf. Colton [1971]. On Juvenalian satire’s use of Greek more broadly, see, e.g., Thiel [1901] and Serafini [1957: 365–371]. For the broader issue of the satirists’ use of Greek, see Chahoud [2004], and on Lucilius specifically, see Baier [2001].

ingly, satires from Ennius to Juvenal feature a wide variety of subject matter, juxtaposed with varying degrees of integration. In Ennius' 31 surviving fragments one can find grifters, gold-mining, gout, and gluttons, and the much larger Lucilian corpus includes items ranging from epic parody (the council of the gods in book 1) to travelogues (book 3's trip to Sicily, the model for *Serm.* 1.5's journey to Brundisium) to courtroom drama (book 2, cf. *Serm.* 1.7). This all-encompassing poetic menu, so to speak, is in my estimation an important part of satire's investment in human affairs, in representing and critiquing Roman life and society.

I see *DRN*, too, as containing in some related sense a poetics of fullness.¹⁵ Where satire is stuffed (often overstuffed; sometimes in *Sermones* "just enough-ed," cf. p. 269–271, below) with moral and sociopolitical humor, mockery, and critique—filled full to claim inclusion of all of society's foibles and faults¹⁶—Lucretius' poem brims with explanations, with rationales, with imagery, with refutations of flawed reasoning and failed accounts of the universe. And, like satire, *DRN*'s fullness serves as a way of implying that the poem encompasses a totality: in this case, the totality not only of the natural world (from *Venus gubernans* to plague, from atoms to magnets, with sex and death and evolution between) but also of human ethics and psychology. In poetic satiety, in approach to language, in didactic pretenses, in satiric mode, and in meter, then, *DRN* and the Roman genre of *satura* are kin, are linked by certain similar goals and intentions,

¹⁵ Compare also Murley's juxtaposition of Lucilian and Lucretian lines about fullness and a sated/satisfied life, Lucilius fr. 5.14 (cf. Epicurus fr. 473!) with *DRN* 3.938, 940–942, and 960 [1939: 383].

¹⁶ Cf. Juvenal 1.85–86: "whatever people do—vows, fear, anger, pleasure, joys, discussions—is the horse-feed of my little book" (*quidquid agunt homines, uotum, timor, ira, uoluptas, | gaudia, discursus, nostri farrago libelli est*).

traits that in some cases *DRN* may have derived from earlier Roman satire, to which we now turn.

Ennius' *Saturae* and *DRN*

The earliest extant Latin text that can be assigned to the category of “satire” is the paltry collection of Ennian fragments gathered under the rubric *Saturae*. Flintoff suggests that Ennius' *Saturae* may in fact have been a response to a similar set of satires by Pacuvius, and even proposes reclassifying a Pacuvian fragment (his self-epitaph) as part of these satires.¹⁷ Also attributed to Ennius are two poems on philosophical topics, *Epicharmus* and *Euhemerus*. Now, each of these poems (which remain in only a few fragments) seems to focus on a particular philosophical figure and on a particular body of philosophical thought—not without some levity or humor, perhaps—and so these works may have had some effect on *DRN*'s treatment of its particular philosophical figure, Epicurus, and his corresponding body of philosophical thought, as Ennius' *Annales* have demonstrably had an effect on *DRN*'s epic language and poetics.¹⁸ For our purposes, however, *satura* begins with Ennius' fragments—a few of which, I will argue, have in-

¹⁷ Flintoff [1990], arguing against the *communis opinio* as reflected in, e.g., Kenney [1982: 160–162]. The contents of the epitaph, which totals four lines altogether, do not contribute anything to augment our discussion here.

¹⁸ On epic language and poetics, see, for example, Gale [1994a: 59–62, 106–114; 2007] and Harrison [2002]. The figure of Ennius himself appears in Lucretius' poem (*DRN* 1.117–126), where he is said to have seen the specter of Homer, who “explain[s to him] the nature of things” (*rerum naturam expandere*, 126).

fluenced *DRN* at specific points. Though Ennius' *Saturae* is unlike the satire familiar from Horace and Juvenal in particular, I assert that it should nonetheless be considered part of the genre of verse *satura*, and it is categorized as “satire” both in Diomedes (cited above) and in Porphyrio (*ad Serm.* 1.10.47; *ad Epist.* 1.3).¹⁹

First and foremost is *Saturae* fr. 22²⁰: “it’s not my way to behave just as if a dog has bitten me” (*non est meum ac si me canis memorderit*). The Ennian speaker raises (and rejects) the image of a poet who is being attacked, who must adopt a pose of self-defensive aggression or attack—a self-defensive position that in later satirists becomes an important trope, as Keane shows [2006: 47, 79, and elsewhere]. I take this monostich as a programmatic statement that is key to Ennius’ satiric production: unlike the archetypal Roman satirist familiar from Lucilius, Persius, and the rest, the satirist figure who claims to be both subject to attack and himself goes on the attack like a biting dog (cf. Muecke [1985], among others), Ennius’ *ego* disclaims an aggressive or violently reactionary pose, although we should note that there is no extant evidence for what, if any, idea of the satirist-figure Ennius’ *ego* was making distinct from his own approach. Muecke [2005: 42, cf. 40] links the difference in tone between Ennius and Lucilius to differences in social status (Ennius as an immigrant in need of patronage, Lucilius as a wealthy and hence independent Roman insider²¹).

¹⁹ Cf. Hooley [2007: 173 n. 4]. Other modern scholars who include Ennius in the genre as well include Flintoff [1990] and Conte [1999: 114]. See Waszink [1972: 101–105] on the debate over the authorship of *Saturae*; Waszink himself argues that it is authentically Ennian but that its title should properly be *Satura*.

²⁰ All citations of Ennius’ *Saturae* refer to the text and numbering of Warmington [1935].

²¹ See, e.g., Raschke [1987].

Whatever the reason, the tone of Ennian *satura*, fr. 22 announces, will tend not to be biting, will be more blunted and controlled.²² This trait is one that I believe we see in *DRN* as well. Lucretius' *ego* is often satiric, as we saw in chapters 2 and 3, but his satiric passages tend to be good-natured—ultimately concerned, that is, with getting at the truth and discarding (and on occasion distorting) incorrect beliefs and practices, but generally not possessed of unbridled aggression and unflinching acerbic attack. In this respect, *DRN* is unlike Lucilian satire, which (at least according to the testimony of Lucilius' satiric heirs) revels, even wallows in its vehemence and no-holds-barred offensives against its targets.²³ And in this respect, I propose, *DRN* follows the earlier of its two surviving Roman satiric predecessors, Ennius' *Saturae* (as embodied here in fr. 22), by adopting its less belligerent bearing.

I would also point out a few places where *DRN*'s text itself sounds like certain fragments of *Saturae*. First, the asyndetic monostich of *Saturae* fr. 5—*resistant occur-*

²² And indeed, Ennius evidently avoids the obscenity present in Lucilian satire, according to Muecke [2005: 36–37].

²³ We see Lucilius' speaker on the attack or engaged in fierce mockery at, e.g., fr. 6.7, 14.8, 15.19, 17.2, 29.1, 29.21, and H.41. In Lucilius book 30 (the fifth in chronological order of composition), as part of what LaFleur calls “a programmatic poem” [1972: 1811 n. 61], we see the satirist-figure accused by an interlocutor of vicious attack: “and you break [me] in half by badmouthing me in many *sermones/satires*” (*et maledicendo in multis sermonibus differs*, fr. 30.18); “now, Gaius [Lucilius], since in turn you harm me/us by lashing” (*nunc, Gai, quoniam incilans nos laedis uicissim*, 30.20); “you're happy when you spread publicly these damn things about me in your *sermones/satires*” (*gaudes cum de me ista foris sermonibus differs*, 30.22); “why don't you just eviscerate me entirely, pluck me bare and burn me up, mock me and harass me?” (*quin totum purges, deuellas me atque deuras, | exultes <et> sollicites*, 30.25). On these lines, see Keane [2006: 45, 76]; compare, in the same book of Lucilius, fr. 30.9, 10, 17, 19, 21, 24, 28–30, 32.

But I note again that Lucilius' satire includes much more than satiric attack (cf. p. 201, above), as shown in the work of Baier [2001], Gärtner [2001], Koster [2001], Haß [2007], and numerous others. The title of Lucilius' satires may in fact have been *Sermones*; cf., e.g., Scholz [2000].

runt obstant obstringillant obagitant, “they stand nearby, they run up, they hinder and hamper and harass”—is matched by similar strings of asyndeton in *DRN*, such as with the motion of atoms or their formation of various kinds of matter, in analogy to letters’ composition of various kinds of words.²⁴ If we follow Warmington’s suggestion that the Ennian fragment refers to “busybodies” [1935: 385 *ad loc.*], then perhaps (though without more context for the fragment, we cannot say for certain) the Lucretian lines use reference (or even mere similarity) to Ennius’ asyndeton as a subtle means of characterizing the atoms themselves: the atoms go busily about their business, running up and colliding and parting just like the people described by the satiric fragment.

Moreover, with *Saturae* fr. 3–4, *contemplor | inde loci liquidas pilatasque aetheris oras* (“I gaze there, in that place, upon the limpid and dense shores of otherworldly flame”), we see the speaker transported outside the bounds of everyday mortals’ terrain, to a place of pensiveness and wonderment. The speaker sublimely beholds the almost supernatural majesty of the natural world, in what could be considered (if the fragment’s original context had survived) a comment on the poetics of Ennian *satura*. In Lucretius’ poem, too, we can find the speaker far removed from mundane affairs, in a locale of great natural beauty, on a meditative journey of poetic import: the “pathless

²⁴ Motion of atoms: *DRN* 2.725–727, *semina cum porro distent, differre necessust | interualla uias conexus pondera plagas | concursus motus* (“therefore since atoms are distinct from one another, it necessarily follows that there is a difference also in their distances, paths, junctures, weights, collisions, meetings, motions”), with similar lines at 1.633–634, 1.685, 2.1021, and 5.438–439.

Composition of matter and of words: *DRN* 2.1015–1016, *namque eadem caelum mare terras flumina solem | significant, eadem fruges arbusta animantis* (“because the same [letters] indicate the sky, the sea, the lands, the rivers, the sun; the same [letters indicate] grains, trees, animals”—and so also the various types of atoms make up the matter to which these words refer).

tracts of the Pierides” passage that appears late in book 1 and again as the proem to book 4 (cf. pp. 184–185, above):

auia Pieridum peragro loca nullius ante
trita solo. iuuat integros accedere fontis
atque haurire, iuuatque nouos decerpere flores
insignemque meo capiti petere inde coronam
unde prius nulli uelarint tempora Musae.

(*DRN* 1.926–930 = 4.1–5)

I wander through the pathless tracts of the Pierides, places not heretofore trodden by anyone’s footstep. It is pleasurable to approach untouched fountains and to drink from them, and it is pleasurable to pluck out fresh flowers and to seek a distinguished wreath for my head from here, wherefrom the Muses have never before crowned the temples of anyone.

Each poetic persona is located beyond normal experience, in a location (*inde loci* in *Saturae* and *auia...loca* in *DRN*) of remarkable sights to behold (the *aether* in *Saturae*, untouched springs and flora in *DRN*). The poet-speaker of *DRN* speaks of his wanderings as physical (*peragro*), but he refers metaphorically to the creative wanderings of his mind, in answer to the Ennian *contemplor*.²⁵ Both speakers come to their *loca* as observers, studying the phenomena of the universe in an undisturbed state.²⁶ In the “limpid and

²⁵ *DRN* uses the verb *contemplor* elsewhere, only twice, both times as an imperative (in the phrase *contemplator enim*, “just notice”) directed at the didactic addressee at the beginning of an example for the scientific concept under scrutiny (2.114, 6.189); the phrase *contemplator enim* is repurposed by the 18th-century British poet Isaac Hawkins Browne in his Latin poem *De Animi Immortalitate* (“On the Immortality of the Soul”): “just notice where the sun rises or sets” (*contemplator enim, quà sol oriturve caditve*), 2.203, *apud* Lettice [1795: 85].

²⁶ Compare as well the Lucretian *ego*’s experience upon seeing, thanks to Epicurus’ teachings, the “divine force/entity and the restful settlements” (*dium numen sedesque quietae*, at *DRN* 3.19, a pleasant locale separated from worldly concerns and from harsh weather):

his ibi me rebus quaedam diuina uoluptas
percipit atque horror, quod sic natura tua ui
tam manifesta patens ex omni parte relecta est.

dense shores of otherworldly/celestial flame” (*liquidas pilatasque aetheris oras*) of *Saturae* we may see a prefiguration of *DRN*’s “shores of light” (*luminis oras* at, e.g., *DRN* 2.577) and “waves of otherworldly/celestial flame” (*aetheris aestus* at, e.g., *DRN* 5.483).²⁷ Lucretius’ text, in this programmatically important (and prominently repeated) statement of its poetic positioning in the Graeco-Roman tradition, invokes (among other works²⁸) Ennius’ *Saturae*, I argue, and in doing so claims for the Lucretian speaker the mantle of contemplative, eclectic poet who engages in natural inquiry and assessment of philosophical systems, as did Ennius’ *Epicharmus*, *Euhemerus*, and evidently certain early portions of *Saturae*.

Finally, I turn to a portion of Ennius’ *Saturae* that survives not even in fragments but only in attestation, in a statement of Quintilian’s: *sed formas quoque fingimus saepe ut...Mortem et Vitam quas contendentes in satura tradidit Ennius* (“but we also often fashion personifications like Death and Life, whom Ennius has in his satire passed down

(*DRN* 3.28–30)

At that moment, because of these things, I am taken by a certain godlike pleasure and a shiver, because by your [Epicurus’] power Nature has been uncovered from all sides and is lying so plainly open.

On these lines, see, e.g., Schrijvers [1970].

²⁷ Cf. also Lucilius fr. 26.42: *ita uti quisque nostrum e bulga est matris in lucem editus*, translated and discussed at p. 217, below.

²⁸ Indeed, this passage in *DRN* has been shown to allude to Ennius’ *Annales*, as well. Bailey points out that *nouos...flores* (at *DRN* 1.928 = 4.3) is reminiscent of the praise of Ennius at *DRN* 1.117–126 [1947: 759 *ad* 1.928], and Harrison writes that this passage (1.926–930 = 4.1–5) “looks like an obvious piece of rivalry with Ennius; and perhaps there was a lost part of the opening scene of Ennius’ *Annales* in which the poet was given a garland” like the Lucretian speaker seeks at 1.929 = 4.4 [2002: 4]. See further p. 226 n. 52, below.

in competition,” *Institutio Oratoria* 9.2.36). The personified abstractions²⁹ of life and death are in oratorical or physical combat, perhaps on the model of the ἀγών of Old Comedy, such as those between Euripides and Aeschylus in Aristophanes’ *Frogs* or between Good Reasoning and Bad Reasoning in his *Clouds*. (Another model for *Saturae*’s contest between Life and Death may have been the diatribe of Poverty in the “popular philosopher” Bion of Borysthenes’ satiric writings.) The victor of the struggle between Life and Death in this portion of *Saturae* is unknown.

Here, I believe, Ennian satire provides a model for a specific Lucretian satiric character—namely *Natura Rerum*, the personified abstraction of nature, who appears during the text’s assault on the fear of death in book 3 and, as I have shown, plays the role of satirist in her two highly rhetorical speeches. Nature, in *DRN*, is the embodiment of the universe, the equivalent of the Ennian *Vita*, while Nature’s opponent is not Death *per se* but rather the fear of death. In *Natura Rerum*’s contest against Death, her goal is not to beat it (as perhaps may have been the goal of Life in the ἀγών in *Saturae*) but to make it as inconsequential to the narratee’s life as possible: *nil igitur mors est ad nos neque pertinet hilum* (“death/Death is therefore nothing to us, and does not matter one bit,” 3.830), as the Lucretian *ego* says well in advance of Nature’s first speech. By partly modeling this personification passage on the ἀγών between Life and Death in *Saturae*, Lucretius’ poem places the figure of Nature in a tradition of satiric arguers from Aristophanes to Ennius, picks up on possible popular-philosophy predecessors (if we count in the antece-

²⁹ For the concept, see Feeney [1998: 85] and p. 70–71 n. 68, above.

dent of Πενία in Bion³⁰), and positions *Natura Rerum* to claim victory over her opponent, the fear of death, in either a replication of Life's triumph over Death in Ennius' *Saturae* or a refutation of Life's vanquishment.

***DRN* and Lucilius' satires**

Where the fragments of Ennius' *Saturae* are few and the proposed Lucretian allusions to it tentative, the Lucilian corpus is much larger and its connections to *DRN* more substantial, its influence on the poem of Lucretius more demonstrable.³¹ I consider it important to note first of all that philosophy, like language, is a recurrent and thematic topic in Lucilius' satire, with many fragments evidencing philosophical subject matter and more than one set piece on philosophical topics, such as a philosophers' banquet.³² Frr. 26.64–66 contain an Epicurean-like account of sickness—humans consist of body and mind/spirit (*animus* or *anima*), illnesses of *animus* exhibit physical symptoms, and physi-

³⁰ Cf. Wallach [1976: 61–68]. Cf. also Kenney [1971: 212]: “in the satires of L[ucretius]’s great contemporary M. Terentius Varro we meet such personifications as Infamia, Veritas and Existimatio.”

³¹ I pass over the matter of a potential social connection between Lucilius and Lucretius themselves: Anderson draws a line from Gaius Memmius to Pompey [1963: 5, 10–12, 77–78] and from Pompey to Lucilius [1963: 12] and ultimately finds that “[i]t is not impossible...[that] Catullus and Lucretius belonged to this [conjectural] Pompeian literary circle” [1963: 86].

³² Lucilius frr. 28.11–15; cf. Horace *Serm.* 2.4. On the Lucilian philosophical fragments, see further Haß [2007: 76–89].

cal ailments impede the mind³³—and in subsequent books can be found other specific references to Epicurean philosophy in particular. At fr. 29.23, the addressee is urged to acknowledge the wisdom of avoiding the various passions, and is told that “when you recognize this you could lead a life without anxiety,” a life of Epicurean ἀταραξία (*cum cognoris uitam sine cura exigas*).

Moreover, fr. 28.15, a surviving part of the aforementioned philosopher’s banquet scene, has one speaker explicitly favoring or advocating the Epicurean accounts of vision and of matter during a debate or competition among rival philosophies: “I should like the simulacra/films/εἰδωλα and atoms of Epicurus to win out” (*eidola atque atomus uincere Epicuri uolam*). The fragmentedness of this line prevents any degree of certainty in identification of the speaker, whether it is the satirist-figure, a foolish interlocutor who serves as a buffoon (or even as the satirist’s target), a sagely lecturer such as Damasippus in *Serm.* 2.3, or simply one of a number of argumentative intellectuals. I would also point

³³ Lucilius fr. 26.64 (*principio physici omnes constare hominem ex anima et corpore | dicunt*, “first things first: all doctors/natural philosophers say that a person is made up of spirit and body”), cf. *DRN* 3.138–139 (*sed caput esse quasi et dominari in corpore toto | consilium quod nos animum mentemque uocamus*, “but [I say] that the head, so to speak, and that which dominates in all the body, is the faculty that we call the “spirit” and “the mind”); fr. 26.65 (*animo qui aegrotat, uidemus corpore hunc signum dare*, “we see the man who is sick in mind/spirit give an indication of this fact in his body”), cf. *DRN* 3.159–160 (*esse animam cum animo coniunctam, quae cum animi ui | percussast, exim corpus propellit et icit*, “[we can see] that the spirit has been conjoined with the mind, and when it has been struck by the mind’s power, it immediately strikes the body and drives it forward”); and fr. 26.66 (*tum doloribus confectum corpus animo obsistere*, “and then again [we see that] a body afflicted with ailments impedes the mind), cf. *DRN* 3.168–169 (*praeterea pariter fungi cum corpore et una | consentire animum nobis in corpore cernis*, “furthermore you notice that the mind/spirit in our body performs/suffers along with the body and senses the same things”) and 3.175–176 (*ergo corpoream naturam animi esse necessesst, | corporeis quoniam telis ictuque laborat*, “therefore the nature of the mind is necessarily bodily, since it [the mind] toils with bodily weapons and strikes”).

out the ambiguity of the idea of “winning out” (*uincere*). Does this mean that the speaker wants Epicurean philosophy to win the acclaim of the banquet attendees? To be the explanation of the universe that ends up being more factually correct? Or perhaps to be the philosophical school that eventually becomes dominant at Rome, given that in the time of Lucilius, Stoicism had not yet gained unquestioned majority acceptance among the educated elite, while Epicureanism held substantial popular appeal?³⁴

At any rate, this *eidola atque atomus* fragment evinces an interest in philosophy in general (and, on occasion, in Epicureanism in particular) that pervades the Lucilian corpus and, I believe, sets the stage for a lengthier, more detailed (and still at times quite satiric) poetic treatment of philosophy such as we see in *DRN*. Murley finds common philosophical ground between Lucilius fr. 14.8–9 and *DRN* 2.11, 2.47, and 5.1229; Lucilius fr. 26.58 (cf. fr. H.23.4–5) and *DRN* 3.207, 4.25, 5.1029, and 5.1048; and Lucilius fr. 26.37 and *DRN* 5.215 [1939: 387–388]. Philosophy and Roman satire are indeed related literary forms with important interconnections, as I will explain in greater focus in chapter 5 (pp. 246–267, below). I believe that Lucilius’ fragments are thus germane at the very least as literary background to Lucretius’ poem.

And there are in *DRN* noteworthy resemblances to certain extant parts of Lucilius’ satires. Lucilius fr. 1.1 (*aetheris et terrae genitabile quaerere tempus*, “to seek the fruitful/formative time of the celestial flame and the earth”) describes a task similar to one the

³⁴ Cf. pp. 7–15, above. Murley believes that “[t]he word order might more easily suggest: ‘O that I might refute (or surpass in achievement in the same line) the films and atoms of Epicurus’ ” [1939: 389]. I do not accept the rendering of *uincere* as “refute,” but if we interpret the line as a desire to “surpass in achievement” Epicurus’ philosophical accomplishments, I believe we should take the line to be in praise of Epicurean philosophy, as with my own initial proposed translations of the line.

Lucretian *ego* sets before himself, as we see in the description of the formative time of the earth and the *aether* at *DRN* 5.443–508. The fragment may also influence lines in *DRN* like *terreno corpore terra | crescit, et ignem ignes procudunt aethera aether* (“the earth grows from earthly body/atom/material, and fires bring forth fire, the celestial flame brings forth celestial flame,” 2.1114–1115). Note also that the section in which these lines appear begins with a reference to “the formative time of the cosmos” (*mundi tempus genitale*, 1105).³⁵ The Lucretian lines *cum primum in luminis oras | nixibus ex aluo matris natura profudit* (“when nature has first poured it [a newborn child] out with effort onto the shores of light from the mother’s womb,” 5.224–225) may be influenced by Lucilius fr. 26.42: *ita uti quisque nostrum e bulga est matris in lucem editus*, “just like each of us has been brought out into the light from mother’s bag/womb.”³⁶ The recurrent Lucretian play on life and death terms—*uita, mors, mortalis, immortalis*³⁷—is likewise of a piece with Lucilius fr. 27.42, *cum sciam nihil esse in uita proprium mortali datum* (“because/although I know that nothing in life has been granted to mortals as their own”), and the thought as well as the stylistic expression of the fragment is also found in *DRN*, since much of the text of Lucretius’ third book consists of arguments against the fear of death

³⁵ Cf. my earlier discussion of *aether* in Ennius *Saturae* fr. 3–4 (pp. 210–212, above).

³⁶ Though see also Ennius *Annales* fr. 114, *tu produxisti nos intra luminis oras* (“you [Romulus] have brought us forth within the shores of light”) and Empedocles fr. 20, in the numbering of Diels [1912], *πλάζεται ἄνδιχ’ ἕκαστα περὶ ῥηγγμῖνι βίωιο* (“split, they [parts of the body] wander separately along the shoreline of life”), with Williams [1983: 227]. Marx, commenting on the Lucilian fragment (119 in his numbering), also adduces the parallel of *DRN* 5.224–225 [1904/1905: *ad loc.*]. Murley [1939: 384] asserts that the line in *DRN* is “coarsely anticipated by Lucilius” and cites additionally fr. 3.14: *non peperit, uerum postica parte profudit* (“she didn’t give birth, but rather pushed it out the back end”).

³⁷ E.g., *DRN* 3.869: *mortalem uitam mors cum immortalis ademit*, “when immortal mortality has taken away mortal life.”

and against the attachment to material, perishable goods that tends to accompany such fears. Confirming the Lucretian references to Lucilian satire on this topic, semantically and conceptually even closer to fr. 27.42, is *DRN* 3.971: *uitaque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus usu* (“life is given to nobody as property-in-possession, but to everybody for usufruct”).³⁸

Perhaps most interesting for our current considerations is Lucilius fr. 17.2, a passage of quasi-parody of epic, with the satiric *ego* setting Homeric women’s epic epithets (καλλιπλόκαμος, καλλίσφυρος, κούρη) in contrast against grotesquerie like warts and bucktooth grins:

nunc censes καλλιπλόκαμον, καλλίσφυρον illam
 non licitum esse uterum atque etiam inguina tangere mammis?
 conpernem aut uaram fuisse Amphitryonis ἄκοιτιν
 Alcmenam, atque alias, Helenam ipsam denique—nolo
 dicere: tute uide atque disyllabon elige quoduis—
 κούρην eupatereiam aliquam rem insignem habuisse
 uerrucam, naeuum, rictum, dentem eminentulum unum?

Now do you think that it wasn’t okay for the famous Beautiful-Haired Beautiful-Ankled heroine to touch her belly or even her lady parts with her boobs? Or for Alcmena, the Spouse of Amphitryon, to have been knock-kneed or bow-legged, and so on and so forth, and even for Helen herself the—eh, I don’t wanna say it: you go and look and pick out whatever epic epithet you like—the Maiden with a Noble Father to have had some prominent feature, a wart, a mole, a wicked grin, buck teeth?

The speaker creates a bipolar opposition between conventional descriptors of epic women—based on their outstanding physical beauty—and the quotidian blemishes that could lie behind and between the lines of epic verse and the features that the epithets advertise. *DRN*, I propose, alludes to this Lucilian *mise en scène* (alongside *DRN*’s Greek

³⁸ This famous line is part of *Natura Rerum*’s speech—on which see my discussion in chapter 2 (pp. 133–139, above).

models, cited below) in its own famous latter-day dichotomization between ugly physical features and flattering epithets given to the women who suffer from them:

nigra “melichrus” est, inmunda et fetida “acosmos,”
caesia “Palladium,” neruosa et lignea “dorcas,”
paruula pumilio, “chariton mia,” “tota merum sal,”
magna atque inmanis “cataplexis plenaque honoris.”
balba loqui non quit—“traulizi”; muta “pudens” est;
at flagrans odiosa loquacula “Lampadium” fit;
“ischnon eromenion” tum fit, cum uiuere non quit
prae macie; “rhadine” uerost iam mortua tussi;
at tumida et mammosa “Ceres” est “ipsa ab Iaccho,”
simula “Silena ac saturast,” labeosa, “philema.”
cetera de genere hoc longum est si dicere coner.

(DRN 4.1160–1170)

A woman with a dark complexion is “honey-tanned,” a filthy dirty one’s “shabby chic,” one with gray glaucoma is “Lil’ Athena,” a woman who’s sinewy and wooden is “a gazelle,” a little dwarfette is “my charmlet,” “just pure wit,” a big giant lady is “a wonderment, full of dignity.” She’s a stutterer, she can’t talk—“her thpeech ith tho thophithticated.” A mute woman is “modest,” but a burning hateful gossipy diva becomes “Starlet,” and then when she’s too emaciated to live she becomes “lovably thin,” and for sure a woman on the verge of a coughing death is “slender”—but a chick with swollen big titties is “Ceres herself, from Iacchus,” a snub-nosed woman is “a woman Silenus, a woman satyr,” a big-lipped one’s “a kiss.” And it’d take a long time if I was gonna try to say the rest of the things of this type!

As we have seen, this passage functions as a mockery of the foolish beliefs of lovers, an important part of the satiric Lucretian speaker’s critique of human foibles and faults (pp. 74–75 above, with citations of relevant scholarship at p. 74 n. 75). But it is also an intertext with Lucilius fr. 17.2, as can be seen from the numerous similarities between the two passages.³⁹

³⁹ Dudley [1965: 125] adduces Lucilius fr. 6.7: *thaunomeno inquit balba, sororem | lanificam dici siccam atque abstemiam ubi audit*, “ ‘I’m shocked!,’ she stammered after she heard it said that her sister was ‘a sober and temperate wool-worker.’ ”

In both, untranslated Greek is used liberally, and refers to the lustrous terms for women's beauty (*καλλιπλόκαμος* and the like in the Lucilian lines, *acosmos* and the like in *DRN*), in stark contrast to the Latin terms for displeasing physical characteristics (for instance, the Lucilian *uerruca*, the Lucretian *macies*).⁴⁰ The bilingual verse in fact constitutes code-switching, as the Greek is elevated and laudatory, the Latin mundane and visceral.⁴¹ The language reflects the basic schtick of each passage, that there are two sides to women, the pretty and the ugly. *DRN* expands this core concept beyond the physicality of the Lucilian passage and into behavioral and social disgracefulnesses, which Lucilius' speaker may implicitly invoke with the social status term *κούρη eupatereia*, "Maiden with a Noble Father," an attractive attribute not of the physical body but of desirable lineage. Both passages likewise treat women as mere objects, and treat amatory discourse as fundamentally deceptive, in that it focuses on high points of idealized beauty to the neglect of corporeal realities. In each instance, the speaker has dissuasive motivations: he is trying to point out to his addressee what he sees as the truth about women's

⁴⁰ Lucilius' lines even include a transliterated Greek word, *eupatereiam*, like *DRN*'s Graecisms, which appear only in transliteration.

⁴¹ And both passages feature the same epic-like rhetorical gesture of an inability or hesitation to say all that can be said on the topic: compare the Lucilian *nolo | dicere* with the Lucretian *longum est si dicere coner*. Cf. Petersmann [1999: 300] on "ridiculous manifestations of 'code switching' for which there is a lot of evidence in Lucilius' *Satires*," as well as Brown [1987: 282 *ad loc.*]: "[i]n nearly every case a direct and usually derogatory Latin description, often drawn from vulgar speech and 'unpoetical' in the usual sense, is set against a fanciful Greek hypercorism."

Dudley points to "the piling-up of Greek names for the expensive presents and luxuries with which the [beloved] girl is surrounded" at *DRN* 4.1125–1137, compares the passage to Juvenal 3.67–68, and finds "Lucilian echoes": fr. H.11 with *DRN* 4.1125, fr. 2.13 with *DRN* 4.1129, and fr. 30.72 with *DRN* 4.1133–1137 [1965: 123–124]. So also Lucilius fr. 8.2 with *DRN* 4.1099–1100 [1965: 123].

bodies, so that the addressee does not become, like the satiric targets of *DRN*'s passage, a foolhardy lover subjected to the rule of his out-of-control passions.

There are other, earlier parallels for this passage—such as Plato *Republic* 474d–e, cited by Rouse & Smith [1975: 366 n. a], cf. Dudley [1965b: 124–125], plus Theocritus 10.24–37 (and 6.18–19) and Philaenis at *P.Oxy.*2891 fr. 3 col 2, both cited by Brown [1987: 280 *ad loc.*]—but, as we have just seen, there is pointed Lucilian allusion as well in these lines of Lucretius.⁴² An allusion to the earlier satirist here picks up on the Lucilius-*ego*'s discourse on the passions, on sex, and on self-control, a subject that forms the focus of the earliest, and arguably most important, portion of book 29 (fr. 29.1–31), and shows up in numerous places elsewhere. Such an allusion underscores the satiric content and satiric bite of the passage, and gives to Lucretius' speaker the poetic authority and moral credibility of Lucilius' satiric persona. Lucilian satire, I believe, furnishes *DRN* with an important model for satiric criticisms of the foolhardy and self-deceptive beliefs of men taken in by their passions and by their sexual zeal for pretty women—a model, that is, for a certain kind of bodily invective, so to speak.

This critique of the body in Lucilian and Lucretian verse is evident as well in the matter of nocturnal emissions. Take Lucilius fr. H.73: *perminxi lectum, inposui pede pel-*

⁴² Brown, citing Lucilius fr. 17.2, mentions in passing that “Lucilius’ satirical mockery of idealized heroines...contain[s] some similarities in style and conception to the Lucretius passage” [1987: 281 *ad loc.*], and that *DRN*'s “technique is highly satirical and may be indebted to Lucilius...Lucretius, however shows greater sophistication than Lucilius in his manipulation of the theme” [1987: 282 *ad loc.*], citing fr. 17.2 and also 1.12: *porro clinopodas lychnosque ut diximus semnos; | ante pedes lecti atque lucernas* (“moreover, [think about] how we’ve augustly called ‘trundle-masts’ and ‘incandescents’ what are really bedposts and lamps”).

libus labes, “I pissed/came⁴³ all over the bed, I got stains onto the skins with my ‘third leg.’” Lucretius’ text may be referring to this bed-wetting passage in its own pair of bed-wetting scenes:

<poti> saepe lacum propter si ac dolia curta
somno deuincti credunt se extollere uestem,
totius umorem saccatum corporis fundunt,
cum Babylo[n]ica magnifico splendore rigantur.

.....
ut quasi transactis saepe omnibus rebus profundant
fluminis ingentis fluctus uestemque cruentent.

(*DRN* 4.1026–1029, 1035–1036)⁴⁴

If (as often happens) in sleep drunk people think they’re hiking up their clothes next to a lake or some broken pots, they pour the liquid filtered from their whole body—that’s when the Babylonian bedcovers with their wondrous sheen are soaked...[And when they become sexually mature, they have erotic dreams,] so that with the job done, as it were, they often pour out giant streams of liquid and stain their clothes.

Although there are no direct verbal parallels, *cruentent* in *DRN* is a fair equivalent for Lucilius’ *inposui...labes*, and the more colloquial, vulgar *perminxi* would detract from the more clinical tone of the Lucretian passage. Without a larger context for Lucilius (the quotation of him, by Porphyrio on *Serm.* 1.6.22, serves to prove that the Romans of yesterday used to sleep in skins), the case is uncertain. But Lucretius’ speaker, in the con-

⁴³ Urination and ejaculation, urine and semen, can each be the referent of the verb *meio* in Latin, cf. Adams [1982: 142] and Kwintner [1992: 232]: “[u]rination often signifies ejaculation in Latin.” This denotative overlap is also present in Aristophanes, as Henderson demonstrates [1991/1975: 50]. For a similarly multivalent usage of *meiere* at Catullus 99.9 (*commictae spurca saliua lupae*), see O’Byrhim [2007: 143–144].

⁴⁴ The text printed here follows that of Brown [1994], who briefly mentions the Lucilius fragment [1994: 193]. Reckford discusses the Lucilius and Lucretius passages in proximate, yet separate, contexts, each in connection to Horace *Serm.* 1.5 [1999: 544, 544–545 n. 38].

text of the satirical invective against love and sex, picks up on the topic of bedwetting, a topic present in earlier extant Latin literature only in the satirist Lucilius.

A reference to Lucilius here would further enrich the Lucretian image of the soiled Babylonian bedcovers (*Babylonica magnifico splendore*, 4.1029).⁴⁵ Taken by itself, the fancy bedcovers covered in urine are almost oxymoronic, as the wealthy appointments are coated in base filth. With the Lucilius fragment in the background, however, we note moreover that the unadorned, rustic skins of the earlier author (*pelles*) have been replaced by Eastern finery in Lucretius, a shift marked by the appended descriptive ablative phrase that expands the mention of the bedcovers to take up almost an entire line. The straightforward (probably wine-induced) accident in Lucilius has become, in *DRN*, a subtle comment on the extravagance and decadence of contemporary Romans, who not only use expensive coverlets unnecessary for a people accustomed to using animal skins for a bed, but also ruin those coverlets with their drunken lack of urinary self-control or their lustful lack of sexual self-control.⁴⁶

In fact, the overlap in style and subject matter between *DRN* and Lucilian satire is consequential enough that certain fragments of poetry have—with perhaps the aid of the ambivalent scribal abbreviation “*Luc.*”—come down attributed to both authors in the manuscript tradition. Persius 1.1, *o curas hominum, o quantum est in rebus inane!* (“ah, the anxieties of humankind!, oh, how much void there is in the universe!”), has been as-

⁴⁵ Smith discusses another Lucretian instance of Babylonian splendor, *DRN* 4.1121–1124 (the “elegiac expenditures” scene, cf. pp. 72–74, above), in connection with Lucilian accounts of excessive luxury [2005c: 73–74].

⁴⁶ If we accept this Lucilius-*DRN* connection, we can add this Lucretian use of Lucilian dreams to the *somnia* of *DRN* 1.105, which O’Hara [1987] links to Lucilius fr. 15.18–19; cf. pp. 228–230, below.

signed to Lucilius by some scholarly readings of the scholiast on Persius, and it indeed appears (as part of book 1) in three major editions of his satires (fr. 1.2C = 9M = 2W). Other scholars, however, prefer to see Persius' opening line as an homage to *DRN*. The issue is complicated and, as I will argue in detail in the next chapter (pp. 250–254, below), it attests to the engagement of *DRN* with the tradition of Roman *satira* as well as *DRN*'s importance to that tradition's continued development.

Yet another fragment has been variously imputed to *DRN* or to Lucilius: *non mihi si linguae centum sint oraque centum | aenea uox*, “not if I had a hundred tongues and a hundred mouths, not if my vocal chords were made of bronze.” This sentiment, an instantiation of an important and allusive Graeco-Roman epic-satiric *topos*,⁴⁷ is said by Servius (commenting on Vergil *Georgics* 2.42 and *Aeneid* 6.625) to belong to Lucretius, and Lachmann [1850] uses it to supplement the lacuna after *DRN* 6.839.⁴⁸ But two major editors of the fragments of Lucilius suggest a different option. Marx [1904/1905] believes that it should properly be considered Lucilian, and Charpin [1978–1991/2002–2003: v. 3 p. 314 *ad loc.*] numbers it fr. D.21 (where “D” indicates that the lines are of dubious authenticity) while positing a source for it in Ennius. Again, as with the debate over Persius 1.1, I believe that we should take the uncertainty over the fragment's attribution as further evidence for *DRN*'s significant literary connection to and development of earlier Roman satire.

In verses about poetry and praise, as well, we may find echoes of Lucilius in the text of Lucretius' poem. An unknown object of praise in Lucilius fr. 13.11 (*unus modo*

⁴⁷ Cf. Hinds [1998: 34–47].

⁴⁸ See also Farrell [1991: 232 n. 56].

de multis qui ingenio sit, “just one out of many who was a man of real talent/genius”⁴⁹) and another in fr. 30.13 (*et uirtute tua et claris conducere cartis*, “to be of use / to bring together both by your excellence/courage and by your illustrious writings”) run parallel to Lucretian depictions of Epicurus: *genus humanum ingenio superauit* (3.1043: “he surpassed the human race in talent/genius”) and *tu, pater, es rerum inuentor, tu patria nobis | suppeditas praecepta, tuisque ex, inclute, chartis* (3.9–10: you, father, are the discoverer of things, you supply to us our paternal principles, from your writings, illustrious man...).⁵⁰ Charpin hesitantly associates fr. 30.13 with the epic of a certain Tuditanus [1978–1991/2002–2003: v. 3 pp. 205–206 *ad loc.*]. Perhaps Lucilian satire—whether praising an epic poet or some unknown other—furnished *DRN* with something lacking from most epic poetry, namely a model for fond praise of an intellectual heavyweight in a tone reverent but not fawning.

Even more closely related, I argue, are *DRN*’s “pathless tracts of the Pierides” passage (1.926–930 = 4.1–5, cited and translated at p. 211, above) and Lucilius fr. 30.1: *quantum haurire animus Musarum e fontibus gestit*, “how much/greatly my mind/spirit desires to drink from the springs of the Muses.”⁵¹ In both authors’ lines there are Muses

⁴⁹ Charpin sees fr. 13.11 as referring to an unremarkable, but decent, man [1978–1991/2002–2003: v. 2 p. 225], whereas I read it as referring to one man of remarkable *ingenium* out of the masses of people lacking it.

⁵⁰ Murley, citing Lucilius fr. 26.54 and *DRN* 5.10–12, remarks that “[b]oth Lucilius and Lucretius credit Epicurus with the salvation of” people wandering aimlessly through a life of error [1939: 389].

⁵¹ Charpin adduces, without further comment, the parallel of *DRN*, along with *Palatine Anthology* 7.55.5, Manilius 2.51–56, Propertius 3.35, and Juvenal 7.58 [1978–1991/2002–2003: v. 3 p. 200 *ad loc.*]. All the Latin authors Charpin cites are, I note, later than *DRN* as well as Lucilius’ satire. Chahoud also cites *DRN* without comment, along with Cicero *Pro Archia* 13 and *Epistulae ad Familiares* 10.3.4 [1998: 130, s. v. *haurio*].

(*Musae*: *DRN* 1.930 = 4.5), drinking from fountains (*haurire...e fontibus* in Lucilius, cf. *DRN* 1.927–928 = 4.2–3: *iuuat integros accedere fontis | atque haurire*, “it is pleasurable to approach untouched sources and to drink from them”), and a special place of poetic distinction implied by the speaker for himself.⁵² Once again, I would argue that a satiric intertext should be added to the models in other genres already adduced for these lines. Where the Lucilian narrator (perhaps the satirist-*ego*, perhaps a guest lecturer or interlocutor) expresses a desire for the sublime gift of divine inspiration from the font of the Muses, the Lucretian *ego* himself claims it as essentially a *fait accompli*. *DRN* develops and expands the Lucilian fragment (though there may originally have been more, now lost, to the scene in Lucilius’ intact poem) to enhance the Lucretian persona’s literary magnificence and accomplishment. And at the same time, I propose, *DRN* may metapoetically (intergenerically, even) refer to its heritage of Roman *satura*—Lucilian and (as we saw above) Ennian alike.

The poetry of Lucretius and of Roman satire are kindred in their primary narrators’ use of a didactic pose, and indeed *DRN*’s words and ways of encouraging and in-

⁵² This passage in *DRN* echoes an earlier part of the same poem, 1.118, where the speaker describes Ennius receiving a crown from Helicon (cf. pp. 238–239, below), a moment that itself is reminiscent of the proem to Ennius’ own *Annales*, cf. Waszink [1954: 250–251] and Brown [1982: 81]. The passage also runs parallel to certain lines of Callimachus, such as fr. 1.27–28 and *Hymns* 2.112, with Kenney [1970: 370] and, again Brown [1982: 81]. Knox [1999] argues against the conventional wisdom holding that *DRN* invokes Callimachean poetics in these lines. On the Lucretian passage (*DRN* 1.926–930 = 4.1–5), see, among others, Boyancé [1956: 57–68], Minadeo [1969: 42–43], Schrijvers [1970: 27–47], Rist [1972: ch. 6], Clay [1976: 210], and Gosling & Taylor [1982: chh. 18–20], in addition to the citations at p. 185 n. 89, above.

structuring the didactic addressee mirror similar expressions in Lucilius' corpus.⁵³ For example, Lucilius fr. 9.1 (*labora | discere, ne te res ipsa ac ratio ipsa refellat*, "work hard to learn so that the very matter and the very argument do not escape you") is analogous to *DRN* 1.370 (*illud in his rebus ne te deducere uero | possit, quod quidam fingunt, praecurrere cogor*, "I am forced to anticipate the following thing that certain individuals believe falsely, so that it not be able to draw you away from the truth in these matters"). Both the Lucilian and the Lucretian *egos* ask for or lay claim to the reader's attention: compare Lucilius fr. 27.3 (*rem cognoscas simul et dictis animum adtendas postulo*, "I ask that you understand the matter and at the same time turn your mind/attention to my words") with *DRN* 6.920 (*attentas auris animumque reposco*, "I ask for attentive ears and mind"), or Lucilius fr. 27.4 (*quodsi paulisper captare atque obseruare haec uolueris*, "but if in short you're willing to lay hold of and pay attention to these things") with *DRN* 1.948–949 (*si tibi forte animum tali ratione tenere | uersibus in nostris possem*, "but if I could perhaps in my poetry hold you attention on such a philosophical account").⁵⁴

Both speakers demand attentive audiences, and guarantee comprehension of their intellectual message provided that such attention is given amply. Meanwhile they portray their subject matter as tricky enough (the Lucilian *refellat* at fr. 9.1.2) that their didactic

⁵³ And this shared didactic pose is connected too to their shared poetic interest in matters of language, cf. Petersmann [1999: 310]: "Lucilius uses language as a means of satiric mockery in order to excite laughter as well as to instruct."

⁵⁴ Cf. also Lucilius fr. 29.73 (*praeterea ut nostris animos adtendere dictis | atque adhibere uelis*, "furthermore [I ask] that you be willing to pay and keep attention to my words"), with, e.g., *DRN* 1.50–51 (*uacuas auris animumque sagacem | semotum a curis adhibe ueram ad rationem*, "keep your unoccupied ears and keen mind/attention, removed from concerns, fixed on my true philosophical account") and 2.1023 (*nunc animum nobis adhibe ueram ad rationem*, "now keep your attention fixed on my true philosophical account"). Murley additionally compares Lucilius fr. 9.1 with *DRN* 1.623 and 6.468, and Lucilius fr. 27.3 with *DRN* 4.912 and 1.948–949 [1939: 390].

aid is necessary for the addressee’s successful understanding and eventual mastery of the material. Similarly, in Lucilian satire and *DRN* both we see the same kinds of lines used for introducing subsidiary arguments (Lucilius fr. 30.27: *hoc etiam accipe quod dico; nam pertinet ad rem*, “also listen to this next thing I’m saying, because it’s relevant to the matter”; *DRN* 6.939: *multas hoc pertinet ad res | noscere*, “knowing this [piece of information] is relevant to many matters”) and for returning to the primary subject matter after a digression (Lucilius fr. H.10: *nunc ad te redeo ut, quae res me impendet, agatur*, “now I return to you so that the matter incumbent upon me can be taken up”; *DRN* 5.780: *nunc redeo ad mundi nouitatem*, “now I return to the newness of the world”; *DRN* 5.91: *quod superest, ne te in promissis plura moremur*, “as for what’s left, so that I don’t delay you more in the promised/incumbent matters”).

It is possible that the convergences between the verses of Lucilius and Lucretius here are ones of diegetical commonplaces, rather than of direct borrowing from Lucilius by *DRN*.⁵⁵ Another aspect of these two texts’ shared didactic pose, however—namely, the imagery of little children, *pueri*, as a metaphor for the poetic educational process (a passage discussed also in chapter 2, pp. 89–90, above)—demonstrates an allusive relationship:

nam ueluti pueri trepidant atque omnia caecis
in tenebris metuunt, sic nos in luce timemus
interdum nil quae sunt metuenda magis quam
quae pueri in tenebris pauitant figuntque futura.
hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest
non radii solis nec lucida tela diei

⁵⁵ We should note, however, Hinds’ argument that many intertextual relationships commonly labeled “*topoi*” may in fact be allusions—to wit: “there are dangers of too easy an essentialism in such a firm distinction between allusion proper and participation in a *topos*” [1998: 34].

discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque.

(*DRN* 6.35–41⁵⁶)

For just as boys tremble and fear everything in blind darknesses, so also do we from time to time frighten in the light at things that ought to be feared no more than what the boys in the darkness are afraid of and imagine is about to happen. This mental fright and darkness, then, must be dispelled not by the sun's rays, nor the day's bright shafts, but by the appearance and explanation of nature.

DRN alludes here to Lucilius fr. 15.19, as Murley [1939: 382] and O'Hara [1987: 518]

both point out:

Terriculas, Lamias, Fauni quas Pompiliique
instituire Numae, tremit has, hic omnia ponit.
ut pueri infantes credunt signa omnia aena
uiuere et esse homines, sic isti somnia ficta
uera putant, credunt signis cor inesse in aenis.
pergula pictorum, ueri nihil, omnia ficta.

The Frighteners, the witch-demons whom the Faunuses and the Numa Pompiliuses introduced—these are what he fears, these are what he uses to determine everything. Like infant boys believe that all bronze statues live and are human, so also these kinds of people believe that false dreams are true, they believe that a heart exists inside bronze statues. It's a painters' studio, nothing real, everything invented.⁵⁷

The Lucretian passage picks up on the Lucilian *ut pueri*, *omnia*, and *nihil*, and *DRN*'s *trepidant* (plus, secondarily, *metuunt*, *timemus*, *metuenda*, *pauitant*, and *terrorem*) echoes the earlier satirist's *tremi*t. Moreover, *fingunt* at *DRN* 6.38 mirrors lines 4 and 6 of the Lucilian fragment. Whereas in Lucilius' verse the "invented/false dreams" (*somnia ficta*)

⁵⁶ 6.35–41 = 2.55–61 = 3.87–93; and also 6.39–41 = 1.146–148. Cf. also the other, perhaps more frequently cited, Lucretian *pueri* passage, where the speaker likens his poetic charm to the honey on the rim of the cup of wormwood that a doctor tries to give to a sick child: *DRN* 1.936–943 = 4.11–18.

⁵⁷ Cf. also the mystifying Lucilius fr. 19.7: *ut pueri infantes faciunt, mulierculam honestam*, "a noble/decent woman, as infant boys do..." Murley also points to *pueri* "in satiric comparison" at *Serm.* 1.125–126 and Juvenal 2.149–152 [1939: 384].

sit outside the *pueri* simile, in Lucretius' the ones who "invent/falsify" (*fingunt*) are the *pueri* themselves.

This change in *DRN* points to the paired opposites in each text: boys and adults, boyish fear and adult apprehension, statue-monsters or shadow-monsters and supernatural entities spoken of in myth and religious legend. In both Lucretius and Lucilius, the speaker possesses a rational, curative perspective, and epideictically attempts to dispel his audience's irrational fear of the supernatural or the divine by comparing such fear to the night terrors of children, the spooks and frights that we cast aside when we become adults. In this way, the Lucilian and Lucretian *egos* adopt the parent-like authority of a schoolteacher, pushing the adult narratees towards a fuller maturity of the mind. And Lucretius' lines gain an overtone of satiric cajolery, a subtle sense that the reader who disregards the speaker's *naturae species ratioque* is as foolish, pathetic, and blameworthy as the dimwit trembling before the *Terriculae* and the *Lamiae* of Lucilius.

So, as I have argued, *DRN* not only picks up on generic aspects of Roman satire and shares concerns and stylistic features of the genre's authors but also makes several allusions to the poetry of the father of the genre, Lucilius, in passages about poetry and praise, about the didactic process, about ugly physiques of much-vaunted women, and elsewhere. In closing, I turn my attention to a *topos* of thematic importance to both *DRN* and Lucilian satire, as well as to Roman literature in general: ambition and the health of contemporary society. First, Lucilius fr. H.41, a description of politicking in the Roman Forum:

nunc uero a mani ad noctem, festo atque profesto
totus item pariterque die populusque patresque
iactare indu foro se omnes, decedere nusquam,
uni se atque eidem studio omnes dedere et arti,

uerba dare ut caute possint, pugnare dolose,
blanditia certare, bonum simulare uirum se,
insidias facere ut si hostes sint omnibus omnes.

Now indeed from morning to night on workday and holiday likewise the whole populace and all the senators equally throw themselves about within the Forum, never do they leave it. All have given themselves over to one and the same pursuit and skill—namely that they be able safely to trick people, to fight trickily, to compete in sweet-talking, to pretend that they’re a good guy, to set traps as if everyone was everyone else’s enemy.

These lines carry a tone similar to that of two well-known Lucretian passages.⁵⁸ The first is *DRN*’s *exemplum* of Sisyphus in his “hell-on-earth” passage:

Sisyphus in uita quoque nobis ante oculos est,
qui petere a populo fasces saeuasque secures
imbibit et semper uictus tristisque recedit.
nam petere imperium, quod inanest nec datur umquam,
atque in eo semper durum sufferre laborem,
hoc est aduerso nixantem trudere monte
saxum, quod tamen <e> summo iam uertice rusum
uoluitur et plani raptim petit aequora campi.
(*DRN* 3.995–1002)

Sisyphus, too, is before our eyes, in life, as the one who conceives of seeking from the populace the *fasces* and the savage *secures*—and always goes home defeated and sad. Because seeking power, which is empty and is never granted, and furthermore always enduring harsh labor towards that end—*that’s* really struggling to push a rock uphill, which nevertheless already rolls back down from the peak and makes for the plains of the flat field at a run.

In Lucilius, we see Romans hustling around the Forum from dawn to dusk in an ignoble attempt to gain power or influence; in Lucretius, we see a Roman hustling (presumably in the Forum, since that is where one would seek the *fasces* from the people) all the time in an (undesirable because anxiety-inducing) attempt to gain power and influence, never with success.

⁵⁸ Connors argues that Lucilius’ Forum scene alludes to Ennius [2005: 131].

There are also, I argue, some verbal echoes in the Lucretian passage. Where in Lucilius there is an emphasis on the universality of the objective—everyone does it (*omnes, omnes, omnibus, omnes*)—there is in Lucretius an emphasis on its perpetuity (*semper, umquam, semper*). Likewise, the Lucilian power-grabbers never leave the Forum (*decedere nusquam*), and *DRN*'s never get what they seek there (*nec datur umquam*). The *studium...et ars* of Lucilius' fragment is answered in *DRN* by *durus...labor*, and both passages mention the struggle for power (the former: *certare*; the latter: *nixantem trudere*). Finally, Lucilius' speaker uses a military analogy (*pugnare; insidias facere ut si hostes sint*), which finds a parallel in *DRN* both with military imagery (*uictus; imperium*; and perhaps the *saeuae securae*) and with the mythical allegory of Sisyphus.

If we accept a Lucretian reference to Lucilius' satire here, the Epicurean critique of politics in the passage of *DRN* takes on an additional dimension, perhaps already in the background, but now drawn out by the intertext with Lucilius.⁵⁹ On the surface, the Lucretian *ego* decries political ambition because it is futile and brings nothing but grief (*semper uictus tristisque recedit*: you lose and go home sad), as does rolling a rock uphill. But by referring to the earlier satire on business in the Forum—an open declaration that forensic activity constitutes trickery and internecine strife—*DRN*'s speaker adds a “moral” concern (trickery of countrymen as if they were enemies), so to speak, to his “ethical” one (politics is difficult and prevents ἀταραξία; cf. Colman [2006], among others). Thus *uictus* gains an additional sense to it: you do not merely lose, you are in

⁵⁹ See Fowler [1989] for a broader discussion of *DRN* and politics, which my comments here supplement.

fact defeated (in a battle-like context) by a fellow-citizen (and by his ambush-like deception).

Even more than the Sisyphus scene, however, the proem to *DRN* book 2 (familiar to us from pp. 90–91 and 155–157, above) is redolent of this same scene from Lucilius fr.

H.41:

suaue etiam belli certamina magna tueri
per campos instructa tua sine parte pericli.⁶⁰
sed nil dulcius est bene quam munita tenere
edita doctrina sapientum templa serena,
despicere unde queas alios passimque uidere
errare atque uiam palantis quaerere uitae,
certare ingenio, contendere nobilitate,
noctes atque dies niti praestante labore
ad summas emergere opes rerumque potiri.
o miseras hominum mentes, o pectora caeca!

(*DRN* 2.5–14)

[In lines 1–4: it is pleasurable to watch trouble at sea from the safety of the shore, to know what anxieties you do not suffer.] It is also pleasurable to watch the great struggles of war, arrayed across the plains, without yourself having a share of the danger. But nothing is sweeter than to hold the wise men’s well-defended precincts, lofty with placid teaching, wherefrom you could look down on the rest and see them all over, going astray and wandering as they seek life’s way—competing in talent/character/pedigree, contesting in social status, striving during the nights and during the days with remarkable effort to climb up to the greatest levels of wealth and take power over things / the government / the world. Ah, the wretched minds of humankind!, oh, their unseeing hearts!

The verbal likenesses and parallels are many and significant.⁶¹ The ambitious wretches described in each vignette hustle day and night unceasingly (Lucilius line 1, *a mani ad*

⁶⁰ For lines 5 and 6, I follow the re-ordering of Rouse & Smith [1975].

⁶¹ Fowler notes the Lucilian passage as a parallel to *DRN* 2.10–13 and notes that “[Lucretius] in fact relates his description closely to the struggles of contemporary politics” [2002: 57–58 *ad loc*], cf. Wistrand [1979: 58]. Fowler also draws parallels [1989: 134 n. 63] between *DRN* 2.7–14 and not only this Lucilian scene but also Dio Chrysostom

noctem, and *DRN* 2.12, *noctes atque dies*). The setting is Roman and civic: the Lucilian *foro* (line 3) is the Roman Forum, the center of political life during the Republic, while the Lucretian *campos* (2.6), literally the fields of battle, may suggest the field of martial training at Rome, the Campus Martius (which is specifically invoked shortly thereafter, at *DRN* 2.40, and compare *campus* in the Sisyphus passage above, 3.1002, where Kenney [1971: 227 *ad loc.*] and others find explicit reference to the Campus Martius). *DRN*'s "wandering all about" (*passim...errare*, 2.9–10) matches the Lucilian "hurl themselves into the Forum" (*iactare indu foro se*, line 3) and "never go away anywhere" (*decedere nusquam*, again line 3). In both passages the verb *certare* is manifest and important (Lucilius' line 6; *DRN* 2.11), summarizing the basic theme of and critique by the speaker—and the ablatives paired with *certare* (Lucilian "sweet-talk," *blanditia*; Lucretian "talent," *ingenio*) could both be taken to refer to the art of rhetoric, the cornerstone of political success and advancement in Roman affairs.

The other verbs in the two authors' set pieces—all or predominantly infinitives, serving to give the action described a generalizing applicability—are likewise similar in meaning and force. Lucretian *contendere* (2.11) follows Lucilian *pugnare* (line 5), Lucretian "striving with outstanding effort" (*niti praestante labore*, 2.12) responds to Lucilian complete and singular dedication (*uni se atque eidem studio omnes dedere*, line 4), as does perhaps *DRN*'s *quaerere* (2.10). Moreover, each passage is rife with imagery of battle, to signify the vehemence of political contests. In the Lucilius fragment we find *pugnare* (line 5), *certare* (6), *insidias facere* (7), *hostes* (7 again), and perhaps even a vio-

13.13, Marcus Aurelius *Meditations* 7.48, Lucian *Charon* 15, Iamblichus *Protrepticus* p. 13, and, interestingly for our concerns here, Varro *Eumenides* and *Endymiones*, two works of Menippean satire.

lent subtext to *iactare...se* (3: as of warriors “throwing themselves” into battle rather than into the Forum). In *DRN* there appears the literal *belli certamina magna...per campos instructa* (2.5–6), the well-defended stronghold of philosophy (*munita*, 8), *certare* and *contendere* (11), and conquest (*potiri*, 13).

Another image of import to Lucilius’ fragment is trickery and deceit. The objects of the satirist’s scorn seek a particular kind of craftiness (*ars*, line 4), namely to be able to hoodwink cleverly (*uerba dare et caute possint*, 5), fight deceitfully (*pugnare dolose*, again line 5), use wheedling words (*blanditia*, 6) to get their way, set traps or stage ambushes (*insidias facere*, 7), and pretend falsely that they are righteous citizen men (*bonum simulare uirum se*, 6). This technology of the trickster, so to speak, is another possible interpretation of *DRN*’s *certare ingenio* (2.11); and in *contendere nobilitate* (on the same line) we might even go so far as to think that there is a reference to the Lucilian fragment’s allegation that the ambitious will lie in such a way as to seem to be good men—men of high status, men of *nobilitas* (again, Lucilius’ line 6: *bonum simulare uirum se*).⁶² All in all, I suggest, the Lucilian *ego* implicitly claims that this mode of business is impious, since the ambitious are active even on holidays (*festo atque profesto...die*, lines 1–2), and this moral concern is matched in *DRN*’s claims of the moral-philosophical high ground, the *templa* (2.8) whose potential for religious connotations may be activated by allusion to the fragment of Lucilius.⁶³

⁶² Other skeptical Lucilian assessments of *nobilitas* include fr. 6.18 and 26.6, cf. Murley [1939: 386], as well as perhaps fr. 3.7 and H.33, with Charpin [1978–1991/2002–2003: v. 3 p. 261 *ad fr.* H.33].

⁶³ I would also point out that *DRN* 2.14 sounds much like Persius 1.1 = Lucilius fr. 1.2, the topic of detailed consideration in my next chapter (pp. 250–254, below).

Beyond linkages between specific words, there are broader allusive resonances of the fragment in *DRN*'s second proem. Both offer a sort of bird's-eye perspective on the situation, with the ambitious represented almost as ants scurrying across the field of vision, busying about their tasks.⁶⁴ In Lucretius' text, the view from on high is literal, marked by *edita* (2.8), *despicere* and *uidere* (9), and *tueri* (5). Both passages communicate a moralizing indictment of political and economic ambition, and therefore constitute a rejection of the current state of statesmanship in Rome (whose poor moral standing is indicated, again, by the religious terms *festus* and *templa* in Lucilius and *DRN*, respectively). And in effecting this rejection, the speaker pointedly separates himself from the masses of politicians jockeying for wealth and power: the Lucilian-*ego*'s emphatic, and I would say sarcastic, "both the whole populace and the senators equally one and the same" (*totus item pariterque...populusque patresque*, line 2) segregates the critical speaker from Roman society as a whole, and so does the Lucretian *ego*'s "looking down upon the Others" (*despicere...alios*, 2.9) from the heights of the stronghold of philosophy.

A noteworthy divergence from its Lucilian source-text that *DRN* undertakes here is that it spells out explicitly the implications of its rejection of Roman politicking. What is unsaid (or unpreserved by the *testimonia*) in Lucilius is on display in *DRN*, specifically the serenity that follows forbearance from political life, the superiority that comes of the right kind of philosophical doctrine—and by contrast the misery and aimlessness (the *miseræ mentes* and *pectora caeca* of 2.14) that accompany a life of greed and sociopolitical ladder-climbing. By alluding to Lucilius' satire in a parable at the beginning of his

⁶⁴ Compare also Ennius *Saturae* fr. 5, mocking "busybodies," cf. p. 210, above.

second book, *DRN*'s speaker reinforces the civic message, and especially the Roman-ness, of his moral lesson. At the same time, by gesturing to his satiric predecessor, a reportedly well-respected and securely established member of the powerful ruling Roman citizen class, the Lucretian *ego* blunts the potentially controversial advocacy of self-seclusion from public life, a suggestion that is at its core anti-establishment and counter to traditional Republican *mores*.

Conclusion to chapter 4

DRN, we have seen, engages not only with the Graeco-Roman mode of satire, but also with the distinctly Roman genre of verse *satira*. Lucretius' poem alludes both to Ennius' *Saturae* and extensively to Lucilius' satires in language, in style, in content and in approach. Add to this the fundamental characteristics that *DRN* and Roman satire from Lucilius through Juvenal hold in common (like didactic pose and self-conscious relationship to Greek words and matters of linguistics), and we can with confidence assign to *DRN* an important place in the tradition of *satira*. Lucretius' text draws on the works of early Roman satire in programmatically important ways and places, and in turn influences, as we will see in the next chapter, the development of later satirists, from Horace onwards.

The most crucial effect of *DRN*'s numerous allusions to Ennian and Lucilian satire is, I judge, the co-optation of the various types of authority belonging to their speakers. Ennius' writing was perhaps the first of Latin literature to merge philosophical, po-

etic, and satiric content, and Lucilius' satiric verse likewise made ample use of philosophy, both as target and as subject matter. So while *DRN* derives its philosophical *bona fides* from the ultimate credibility and clout of Epicurus and his school of thought, by engaging with Lucilius and with Ennius' *Saturae* it adopts their poetic, satiric, and even moral legitimacy.

Lucretian allusion to *Saturae* reinforces Lucretian allusion to Ennius' *Annales*, and bolsters the Lucretian persona's claim to be an heir to Ennius' poetic legacy. Ennius himself appears at *DRN* 1.112–126, where he receives a crown from the Muses' mountain in recognition of his “everlasting poetry” (*aeternis...uersibus*, 121) and has a vision of Homer, who expounds to Ennius the nature of things (*rerum naturam expandere dictis*, 126)—making Ennius seem to be quite philosophical! These lines are book-ended by false visions (*somnia* at 1.105, cf. O'Hara [1987]; ghosts at 1.132–135), and allude to the opening of Ennius' *Annales*, where the poet-speaker describes his Homeric vision. They also follow the Lucretian *ego*'s mention of “the threats of the poets/priests” (*minis...uatum*, 109) as opposed to reason (*ratio*, 108), and so the passage both sets Ennius up as one of the false-speaking *uates* whom *DRN*'s speaker will refute and, as Paratore has argued, gestures to the Ennian *ego*'s own earlier dismissal of the poets who preceded him as *uates* [1939: 197]. Hardie, explaining *DRN*'s complicated take on the *uates* and ambiguous portrayal of Ennius in the proem to *DRN* book 1, points out that while the *uates* represent a misguided way of thinking about the world, nevertheless “they occupy a place as leaders and manipulators of society that Lucretius wishes to appropriate for himself, as the high priest [viz., *uates*] of Epicurean rationalism” [1986: 18]. While the figure of Ennius in *Annales* represents a potentially problematic exemplar of the empowered

class that claims authority both over religious matters and over the social domains (including religion) celebrated by epic, the Ennius of *Saturae* functions instead as a source of authority for *DRN*'s satiric poetics, as a source of authority for the kinds of philosophical criticism and refutation that forms the core of the Lucretian speaker's rejection of the authority of the *uates*.

With Lucilius in particular, the Lucretian *ego* claims for his own, via his allusions to the earlier satirist's poetry, a legitimizing forebear whose development of verse satire brought *satura* in line with (and in contact with) didactic and epic poetry, whose critiques of Roman social dysfunction and moral degeneration could serve as models for those of *DRN*, and whose unquestioned, high-ranking citizen status may have helped forestall the Roman reader's possible suspicion of the Lucretian speaker's own, often satiric anti-establishment criticisms. And in the case of the proem to *DRN* book 2, the evident continued failing of the *nobilitas* that is advertised by the Lucretian allusion to Lucilius fr. H.41 may in some sense justify the comparatively more extreme corrective measure that *DRN*'s speaker proposes (at, e.g., 2.20–39, within this same proem): an Epicurean withdrawal from social and political affairs into a modest, private, contemplative life of ἀταραξία.

***DRN* and the locus of satire**

Before proceeding to chapter 5, in which I consider the way in which *DRN* adopts, adapts, and influences subsequent satirists' uses of the generic tropes of Roman *satura*, I proffer a tentative suggestion regarding one part of *DRN*'s role in the development of the genre. In the works of each author of satire, what I term the locus of satire—

the focus of the brunt of its satiric critique, the main target of its satiric production—is different, sometimes dramatically so. Ennius’ *Saturae* and the satires of Lucilius, though both fragmentary, can nevertheless be seen to offer two different models for and approaches to satire. The locus of Ennian satire seems, as best as may be determined from its exiguous extant verses, internalized: not aggressive and biting (cf. *Saturae* fr. 22, translated and discussed at pp. 208–209, above) but turned inward, addressed to the poetic *ego*’s self (as in fr. 6, which begins with a direct address of “poet Ennius,” *Enni poeta*⁶⁵). In the much more copious, though no less fragmented, corpus of Lucilius, on the other hand, the primary target appears not to have been the self but rather specific targets, often members of the elite, such as Quintus Mucius Scaevola, satirized in a book-length trial scene (book 3). The satirist’s ability to exercise his satiric attack-speech and criticisms in so free a manner has been attributed to the author’s status as a wealthy, well-respected citizen male with powerful friends at Rome. Indeed, the brazenness and lack of restraint in Lucilian satire becomes a programmatic *topos* in later satirists, with the *ego* of Horace’s *Sermones* critiquing Lucilius’ “muddy” style (1.4.11) and the Juvenalian satirist-figure creating the vivid metaphor of Lucilius with sword drawn (1.165).⁶⁶

Yet Lucilius’ influence alone does not fully explain the locus of satire in Horace, Persius, and Juvenal. The satirist of *Sermones* directs his satire mostly at stock or at least stereotyped characters (examples: the discontented lawyers, farmers, and so forth in

⁶⁵ For interpretations of this fragment, see Jocelyn [1977] and Russo [2001].

⁶⁶ Freudenburg refers to the later satirists’ programmatic gestures of inadequacy in comparison to Lucilius their “Lucilius problem” [2001: 2–3, 18, 153–154, and elsewhere]; and the thematics of this problem are treated as well by many scholars, including Anderson [1982: 30–32], Harrison [1987: 48–49], Scodel [1987], Henderson [1999b: 174, 191], Powell [1999: 320], Goldberg [2005: 12, 175–176], Keane [2006: 12], and Rosen [2007: 14 n. 19].

Serm. 1.1, Tigellius the bad actor in 1.2, the *seruus callidus* Dauus in 2.7, the legacy-hunter in 2.5, the foolish know-it-all philosopher in 2.3), but also at himself (as with the speaker's physical ailments in *Serm* 1.5 and his potentially self-undercutting experience with a fanboy in 1.9). Persius' *ego* attacks the intelligentsia (e.g., the literary rant in poem 1) and sometimes himself (he is subjected to satirization in his capacity as a debased student—a member of the intelligentsia, we might add in poem 3). The targets of the Juvenalian satirist-figure are the past, grossly exaggerated, and stereotypes that are themselves grossly exaggerated and distorted in the extreme. In all three authors, the locus of satire is different from that of Lucilius: in Horace and Persius it is less controversial, less directed at figures of power, more introspective, and more literary, while in Juvenal, it is a shadow of Lucilian aggression, an overblown attack on the past by a satirist powerless to critique the present.

I suggest that part of this change in locus should be attributed to the influence of *DRN*. In Lucretius' poem, the locus of satire (when satire is in fact in use) is directed not at specific living authority figures but at foolish individuals—either specific figures from the past like the Presocratics, stock types and stereotypes like the lovers of book 4 and the overly ambitious of book 2's proem, or the fictive narratee who strays *longe a uera ratione* (cf. p. 125 n. 173, above) and, accordingly, wanders into false, faulty, blameworthy belief.⁶⁷ *DRN*, I believe, in a sense adapts the philosophical interests and satiric techniques of Lucilian *satura* by taking from Ennius' *Saturae* the toned-down, less aggressive bearing and thus creating a blended satiric approach. And in doing so, *DRN* blazes the

⁶⁷ Compare Anderson on the Menippean satires of Varro [1963: 70–71]: they “did not attack specific people, or even specific parties...[They contain] the persistent condemnation of...moral corruption rather than political degeneracy.”

trail for the more philosophical, more reserved satiric styles of Horace's and Persius' satires, as well as Juvenalian satire's greater focus on stereotyped characters and specters of the past.

CHAPTER 5

Generic Tropes and Civic Discourse in Roman Satire and *DRN*

“If satire is inquiry and provocation, it shares a boundary not (as we usually hear) with polemical rhetoric but with philosophical (and especially ethical) writing.”
Griffin [1994: 71]

“The ‘satiric tradition’ was never self-contained and self-perpetuating.”
Powell [1999: 315]

est modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines
“there’s a limit to things, there are furthermore fixed boundaries”
(*Serm.* 1.106)

rebus reddita certa | finis
“a fixed boundary has been supplied to things”
(*DRN* 2.512–513)

The satirist of Horace’s *Sermones* famously describes satire as “telling the truth with a laugh” (*ridentem dicere uerum*, 1.1.24). This is what the speaker of Lucretius’ poem does, too: he tells the reader the truth of the universe, often with laughter drawn from satiric mockery or a smirk caused by a subtle allusion to his satiric forebears.

(Sometimes the universe and its atoms and its Nature laugh at or attack the satiric target, too.) Chapters 2 and 3 showed that *DRN* and its *ego* systematically employ the mode of satire throughout the poem—particularly in the famous invectives against Presocratic philosophers in book 1, the fear of death in book 3, and love and sex in book 4—but also in passages small and large throughout the poem, including its ultimate conclusion with the scene of the plague in Athens. Chapter 4, in turn, covered *DRN*'s allusions to, derivations from, and affinities with the Roman satire that preceded it, especially that of Lucilius but also the smaller and more fragmentary work of Ennius.

In this chapter, I address the later satirists' reactions to Lucretius' poem. My starting point is the common ground that *DRN* shares with the Roman genre of satire—specifically, its canonical (and non-fragmentary) authors Horace, Persius, and Juvenal—from subject matter and *topoi* to style, themes, and interpretive problems. This common ground is substantial and it is not coincidental. *DRN*, I will argue, not only draws on Roman satire in important ways, but also plays a role in how the genre develops in subsequent generations. In this chapter I will present specific examples of allusion to and intertexts with *DRN* in the satirists after Lucretius' time, examples that previously have not been fully understood.

When it comes to subject matter, the poem of Lucretius and the works of the Roman satirists hold much in common, despite the seeming distance between atomic theory and, say, the casual “conversations” (*sermones*) of Horace's title. *DRN* presents itself as an account of the universe, and this universe includes human life with all its flaws and foibles: its hangups about mortality, its morbidity, its often unchecked and insalubrious sexuality. Murley, for instance, argues that *DRN*'s speaker “treat[s] as germane to his

subject (which was primarily ethical) many of the actual contemporary themes of Roman satire of private life” [1939: 381]. Satiric *topoi*, that is, have a noteworthy place in *DRN*.¹

I add that public life, too, comes under satiric scrutiny in both *DRN* and Roman satire.

So *DRN* makes use not only of the Graeco-Roman mode of satire, but also of the generic tropes of Roman *satura*. We traced in chapter 4 how some of the thematic elements of Lucilian and other early satire are picked up in *DRN*, and here we will consider also how *DRN* affects later Roman satire’s use of the genre’s satiric features. In what follows, I examine certain representative examples of *DRN*’s use of *topoi* important to Roman satire—the common threads of the satiric landscape, from food to philosophical ideas. The topical influence does not travel one way only, however. *DRN* itself, I argue, helps shape the way these tropes are handled in subsequent satire.

The menu of satiric topics is vast, the scholarship on it more so. I will focus here on three examples of import to Lucretius’ poem, namely philosophy, in which I look particularly at Persius poem 1, Juvenal poem 12, and satiric responses to *DRN*’s image of atoms as letters (*elementa*); food, especially the way satirists after *DRN* adapt the Lucretian figure of the *convivia*, the dinner-guest (*DRN* 3.938); and civic concerns. As part

¹ Murley finds (but does not discuss in detail) no fewer than 15 passages in *DRN* that he describes as “quite of a piece with what we know as the satire of the recognized satirists” [1939: 393, listed at n. 21]: 1.80–101, 1.635–644, 1.1021–1023, 2.11–58, 2.973–990, 2.1095–1104, 3.41–93, 3.870–1094, 4.469–521, 4.1121–1191, 5.195–234, 5.1007–1010, 5.1115–1135, 6.17–23, and 6.379–422. Sosin, likewise, finds in the proem to book 2 “a list of several of Roman satire’s principal commonplaces,” including aimless wanderers, corruption, ambition, and “somewhat questionable behavior” [1999: 285, with nn. 13–17]; cf. my discussion of this passage’s satiric bearing in chapter 3 (pp. 155–157, above). Houghton sees “[s]atire worthy of a Persius” at *DRN* 1.641–644 [1912: xxiv], a “fine satiric theme, man’s self-sufficiency” at 2.1038–1039 [1912: xxxv], and “the poet’s power at sketching in Juvenalian style” at 4.1141–1191 [1912: xxxvii]. Houghton’s point is that *DRN* at times exemplifies the stylistic and thematic tropes that are the hallmarks of Roman satire, from Lucilius to Juvenal.

of this last topic, I will argue that the ends to *DRN* books 2–6 are satires of Roman civic life. In doing so, I synthesize what many scholars have written about the satiric nature of Lucretian attacks on the fear of death in book 3, love and sex in book 4, and the history of human society in book 5 with novel claims about and new interpretation of the farmers who complain about their fields' diminished fertility at the end of book 2 and the scene of the Athenian plague in book 6.

In my considerations here, I pass over numerous significant satiric tropes that possess potentially quite fruitful linkages between *DRN* and satire. Most notable among them are verbal violence, city and country, animals, disease, sexuality/masculinity, anger, and the use of a persona.² At any rate, taken together, the three topics treated in this chapter amply show how *DRN* participates in the generic discourse of satire, and how later satire intertextually reacts to *DRN*'s participation.

Satiric takes on philosophy, a philosophical take on satire

Although the title of Mayer's contribution to the *Cambridge Companion to Roman Satire*, "Sleeping with the Enemy" [2005], playfully suggests that philosophy and satire are enemies, in fact philosophy and its discontents constitute a recurrent motif of satiric discourse. We have seen in chapter 4 how the progenitors of the Roman genre of satire concerned themselves with philosophy (pp. 214–216, above). The satirists after *DRN*, as well, are intimately connected to philosophy. Horace's *Sermones* repeatedly

² See Appendix 2 for relevant citations (pp. 376–380, below).

engage with the same Epicurean philosophy that *DRN* expounds, as has been shown amply by a number of scholars, including Ferri [1993], Oberhelman & Armstrong [1995], and Turpin [1998].³ Persius' satire presents itself as aligned in many ways with Stoicism, and the Juvenalian speaker adopts poses of "Democritean tranquillity" in poems 10–12, then undertakes a protracted, programmatic engagement with philosophical texts in poems 13–16.⁴ Keane suggests, in my view rightly, that we should "regard philosophical discourse...as a set of tools for which a satirist devises new uses, thereby engaging in a kind of philosophical inquiry that becomes a part of his own genre" [2007: 29]. For representative examples of how the satirists appropriate philosophy as part of their own satiric-philosophic inquiries, I point to Horace's Damasippus (*Serm.* 2.3), Persius' Socrates and Alcibiades (poem 4), and the explicit quotation in Juvenal of the Greek philosophical maxim γνῶθι σεαυτόν, "know thyself" (11.27). As Murley succinctly puts it, with reference to the philosopher-speaker of *DRN* and the Roman satirists, "as the philosopher is satirical, conversely the satirists are philosophical."⁵

³ Cf. also Giesecke [2000] and Hardie [2009: ch. 6].

⁴ Persius and Stoicism: e.g., La Penna [1995: 297–343], Howley [1997], Cuchiarelli [2005], and, *contra*, Henderson [1991]; Reckford [1962: 490–498] discusses how the Stoicism in Persius is neither wholly orthodox nor ubiquitous across the six satires, and Takács [2010] explores the idea, suggested in the *Vita Persii de Commentario Probi Valeri Sublata*, that Persius possessed a singularly complete collection of the Stoic Chrysippus' works. Cf. also Reckford [2009: 96–101] on Persius and "diatribe." The Juvenal-*ego's* "Democritean tranquillity": so Braund [2004: 23]; cf. also Anderson [1982: 340–361]. Philosophy in Juvenal poems 13–16: Keane [2007]; cf. also Highet [1949]. Highet [1951] includes consideration of Juvenal's reception of *DRN*.

⁵ Murley [1939: 387]. So we may, with some confidence, reject Mayer's earlier claim that the satirist in Persius' poetry "is the only satirist whose point of view is philosophically shaded" [1989: 15].

The satirists are still satirists, though, and thus much of their contact with philosophy is from a position of mockery. Stoics—the conventional opponents of the Epicureans in republican and imperial Rome, I note⁶—form a major portion of this mockery indeed. A few samples: *Serm.* 1.1.4 and 1.2.134 (Fabius the Stoic adulterer / adulterous Stoic), *Serm.* 1.3.124–139 (a Stoic fool trying to explain the Stoic aphorism that the philosopher/wise man is the best cobbler), *Serm.* 2.3.44 (an appearance by “Chrysippus’ Stoa and herd,” *Chrysippi porticus et grex*); Persius 5.86 (a “Stoic who’s had his ears washed out with biting vinegar,” *Stoicus hic aurem mordaci lotus aceto*); and Juvenal 2.64 (the *Stoicidae* flee from Laronia’s castigation), 3.116 (*Stoicus delator*, a Stoic snitch).⁷ The satirists pick on Stoics and show them to be no more removed from the baseness (e.g., shameful adultery) and disgustingness (the vinegar in Persius 5.86 was at least dealing with deep-set filth, if not treating an actual ear infection) of everyday life than is anyone else. The enduring popularity of Stoicism with Roman authors (e.g., Cicero, Vergil, Seneca, Lucan, and Musonius Rufus)⁸ may point towards a literary dimension to the Stoics satirized in Horace, Persius, and Juvenal. By debasing Stoics in their satire, the satirists attempt to undercut the claim or tone of lofty detachment or intel-

⁶ On the issue of whether *DRN* subtly argues against them or ignores them altogether—I side with those who believe the former—see my discussion in chapter 1 (pp. 12–15, above).

⁷ For the idea that the Caesar-character in Lucan’s *Bellum Ciuile* should himself be regarded as a Stoic fool, see George [1988]. On other satiric elements in Lucan’s poem, see Coffey [1996].

⁸ Cf., among others, Reydams-Schils [2005] and Long [2006: chh. 14–17]. For the complex matter of Vergil and the influence of Stoicism, see Edwards [1960], Horsfall [1976], Parker [1989], Putnam [1990], Gill [1997], Wright [1997], Stevens [2007], and Cairns [1989: 33]: “it is increasingly difficult to believe...in Virgil as committed to a single brand of philosophy.”

lectual sublimity that these authors bring to their works via adoption of Stoic stances and standpoints.⁹

Also particularly prominent in the satiric takes on philosophy—and particularly relevant for our considerations—is the frequent use in satire of atomistic imagery and other Epicurean elements, which I see as evidence of Lucretian influence on the satirists after *DRN*. Horace’s satires give us the solid and void in an erotic context,¹⁰ Philodemus on women and sex (*Serm.* 1.2.121), and Lucretian-style socioanthropology (*Serm.* 1.3, with Keane [2006: 52–54] and Harrison [2007c: 83–85], among others). In Persius, there is direct allusion to *DRN* on multiple occasions,¹¹ and there are also lines that, while perhaps not direct allusions, nevertheless have the flavor of *DRN*’s style, as with 5.52 (*mille hominum species et rerum discolor usu*, “there are a thousand types/appearances of humankind and [their?] enjoyment/profit/experience of things is different/disjointed”). Juvenal’s poetry includes figures and imagery familiar from *DRN* (Democritus and Heracli-

⁹ Epicureans are not immune to mockery in satire, either: see, e.g., Persius 3.77–85 (Centurions mocking the Epicurean-style principle of the conservation of matter) and Juvenal 13.123 (the satirist’s rejection of Epicurus who is “productive/rejoiceful among the plantlife of his tiny garden,” *exigui laetum plantaribus horti*). *Serm.* 1.1–3 present, according to Turpin, “an incompetent Epicurean” [1998: 127]; compare the *doctor ineptus* of *Serm.* 1.1–4 proposed by Freudenburg [1993: ch.1] and the *lector ineptus* that Keane [2007: 52] suggests for Juvenal poems 13–16.

¹⁰ *Serm.* 1.2.111–113:

nonne, cupidinibus statuatur natura modum quem,
quid latura sibi, quid sit dolitura negatum,
quaerere plus prodest et inane abscindere soldo?

Isn’t it more useful to inquire into the limit that Nature sets on desires, and what she’ll tolerate for herself, and what she’ll be pained by if it’s denied her—and in so inquiring, to divide the void from the solid?

¹¹ Persius 3.83–84 alludes to *DRN* 1.150, 1.248; and Persius 2.24–25, 6.3, and 6.61 also contain Lucretian references, as Spaeth argues [1942: 120–121]. And see directly below.

tus, laughter and tears), atomic expression (so 14.16–17: *animas seruorum et corpora nostra | materia constare putet paribusque elementis*, “[is a father who abuses the people he holds as slaves teaching savagery, or teaching that] he judges the spirits of slaves and our own bodies to be comprised of the same matter and equivalent elements?”), and even a philosophical maxim that would fit right into the Lucretian speaker’s assessment of *Natura Rerum*’s tirade (cf. pp. 133–139, above): “it’s never the case that Nature/nature says one thing and philosophy something else” (*numquam aliud natura, aliud sapientia dicit*, 14.321). *DRN* and the philosophy of Epicurus, as we can see from these examples, are an important part of the philosophic discourse that satire employs.¹²

Persius 1.1, DRN, and Lucilius

One of the most conspicuous allusions to *DRN* in Roman satire—one that I think has not been fully understood—is the opening line of Persius poem 1: *o curas hominum! o quantum est in rebus inane!* (“ah, the anxieties of humankind!, oh, how much void/emptiness there is in the universe!,” 1.1). On the surface, this line smacks of allusion to *DRN* (2.14: *o miseras hominum mentes! o pectora caeca!*, “ah, the wretched minds of humankind!, oh, their unseeing hearts!”; 1.330, 399, 511, 569, 658, 843, 5.365: *in rebus inane*), but the 9th-century CE compendium of scholia to Persius has occasioned debate among scholars as to whether the allusion is foremost to *DRN*, or if it should be taken instead as an invocation of Lucilius. Zetzel, for instance, states that “[w]e will never know for certain whether Persius was alluding to Lucilius or Lucretius in his open-

¹² For Epicurean aspects of Petronius’ *Satyrica*, see, e.g., Hight [1941] and Kragelund [1989].

ing verse” [1977: 42], while scholars have not found consensus on whether to include this line among the fragments of Lucilius.

The so-called *Commentum Cornuti in Persium* says, on Persius 1.2, that the poet “transferred this line from the first [book] of Lucilius” (*hunc uersum de Lucili primo transtulit*).¹³ Some scholars have argued that the comment should be taken to apply not to 1.2 but to 1.1, while others, including Bo [1991], prefer to see *Lucili* as a mistaken expansion of the abbreviation *Luc.*, which could refer to either Lucilius or Lucretius. Sosin [1999] summarizes the scholarly debate and offers his own solution: that 1.1 is indeed an allusion to *DRN*, that the scholiastic comment is correctly applied to 1.2, and that *de Lucili primo* refers neither to Lucretius nor to the satirist Lucilius but rather to Lucilius the addressee of Seneca’s *Epistulae Morales*, in the first book of which sentiments akin to the message of Persius 1.2 can be found.

The support for an allusion to *DRN* is strong, however—whether or not there is also an allusion to Lucilius.¹⁴ Hendrickson argues for a Lucretian echo in Persius 1.1, Sosin calls it “essential to Persius’ argument,” and both Zetzel and Sosin appeal to the meaningful connections between *DRN* and satire, between satire and philosophy.¹⁵

¹³ For the text of the *Commentum Cornuti*, see Clausen & Zetzel [2004] and Zetzel [2005].

¹⁴ Modern study of classical-era poetic reference has gotten away from intention—whether the author meant to make an allusion—towards a methodology that focuses on intertexts, on whether such references can be shown to exist. Cf., generally, Hinds [1997, 1998] and Edmunds [2001]. On the difficult issue of authorial intention in satirical texts (beyond solely classical texts), see Pfaff & Gibbs [1997].

¹⁵ Lucretian echo: Hendrickson [1928: 98–100]. Essential to the argument: Sosin [1999: 292]. On the connection between *DRN* and Persius’ satiric take on philosophy, Zetzel claims that “Persius...is interested in establishing himself as a philosophical poet no less than as a satirist in the Lucilian model” [1977: 41], while Sosin, speaking from the other side of the coin, writes, “[j]ust as Lucretius draws on elements of satire to express his phi-

Moreover, the systematic use in *DRN* of the mode of satire, and the poem's connection to earlier Roman satire (as we have seen in chapters 2–4) make reference to *DRN* in a programmatic way, or at least a positionally prominent way, not only possible but even reasonable.¹⁶

While I find Sosin's argument persuasive, and probably right, I do not think that we need answer with certainty the ultimate source of or inspiration for Persius 1.1. If we attribute the line as it appears in Persius to Lucilius¹⁷—who did engage with philosophy in important ways—then Lucretius alludes to Lucilius' verse at *DRN* 2.14, and Persius consequently invokes them both by quoting Lucilius and using the concomitant Lucretian intertexts as a part both of the thematic argument in poem 1 and of the broader “philosophical inquiry” throughout his six poems.¹⁸ In other words, *DRN* invokes Lucilius within the overarching process of generic engagement with satire (see my discussion of the sa-

losophic position, so Persius makes philosophy part of his satiric agenda” [1999: 287]. Powell's “re-examination” of the poem sidesteps analysis of this textual problem altogether [1992: 159].

¹⁶ Thus I would reject as too strongly worded Harvey's assertion that “an allusion to the *inventor* of satire is, at this point in the poem, infinitely more appropriate than an echo of Lucretius” [1981: 14; underline added]. Yet, by the same token, I would not accept the supposed improbability of a dual reference (to Lucilius, as well as to Lucretius) in Sosin's claim that “the reference at Persius 1.1 is clearly to Lucretius, and so a simultaneous second layer of reference to Lucilius is unlikely *a priori*” [1999: 284]. I find it almost equally plausible that Lucilius wrote the line as it appears in Persius 1.1.

¹⁷ Fowler thinks that “the words [of Persius 1.1] are probably Lucilian” [2002: 67 *ad DRN* 2.14–19], citing Bramble [1974: 67 n. 1].

¹⁸ This kind of allusion, whereby the alluding text invokes not only its immediate source (as I am arguing that Persius 1.1 invokes *DRN*) but also its source's source (as Persius invokes Lucilius), has been termed a “window reference” by Thomas [1986: 188–189] and a “double allusion” by McKeown [1987: 34–45]. For other instances of “window references” or double allusions in Latin poetry, see, e.g., Wheeler [1995: 99–100], Boyd [1992: 230–234; 2000: 67–68], O'Hara [2001: 383–384] Nappa [2002], and Smith [2005: 206 n. 20].

tiric leaning of the passage in which *DRN* 2.14 appears at pp. 155–157, above) and Persius invokes both Lucilius and Lucretius as satiric forebears, and acknowledges *DRN*'s own debt to Lucilius' satire.

If, on the other hand, we see the origin of Persius 1.1 in Lucretius' poetry itself, I assert that Persius programmatically invokes *DRN* as a satiric as well as philosophic predecessor and thus still shows the importance of *DRN*'s role to the development of Roman satire—an importance evidenced earlier, I add, by the pervasive Epicurean elements and specifically Lucretian passages of Horace's *Sermones*. Additionally, I would suggest that *DRN*'s satirical elements and influence on the poetics of Roman satire make a Lucretian allusion more relevant to Persius' project here than, say, a Stoic reference would be, despite the Stoic character of Persius' satiric program on the whole. By referring to Lucretius in his opening line, Persius shows the relevance of *DRN*, a philosophical poem that engages in important ways with satire, to his own poetic project, a book of satires that engage in important ways with philosophy.

In light of the connection to *DRN* in Persius' opening line, we may also consider another line in Persius' satire, 3.66: *discite et, o miseri, causas cognoscite rerum* ("learn, wretches, and comprehend the explanations for things"). Besides the speaker's adoption (with *discite*) of the didactic stance familiar to us from chapter 3 (pp. 162–176, above), I see in this line another invocation of *DRN* (with *causas cognoscite rerum*).¹⁹ And we

¹⁹ Note that *DRN* never in fact uses the phrase *causae rerum*; but Persius' line is a pastiche of Lucretian style, content, and vocabulary. We may think also of Vergil *Georgics* 2.490: *felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas* ("happy/lucky/successful is he who has been able to comprehend the explanations for things"). There has been a long-running debate over whether this Vergilian line is in fact an allusion to *DRN*. Miles argues that it is [1980: 154–155], and Dyson asserts that "[m]ost readers see a reference to Lucretius in

may—though this point is admittedly tenuous—think from Lucretian allusion at Persius 3.66 to the ur-allusion at Persius 1.1 to the source-text (*DRN* 2.14: *o miseris hominum mentes!* and so on), whereupon we could detect a vestige of *DRN* in the *o miseri* of Persius 3.66, as well. This instance of *miseri*, then, could connect with *DRN*'s repeated comic-satiric usage of *miser*.²⁰

Trouble at sea in DRN 2 and Juvenal poem 12

In Juvenal poem 12, there is in my view another connection to *DRN* that, although not previously discussed at length, may be of substantial thematic importance. This satire describes the troubles at sea, and subsequent safe homecoming, of the speaker's friend and apparent sea-going merchant Catullus, whose return to dry land unscathed (though bereft of the luxury goods he was transporting) occasions an extended (and *de rigueur* satiric) assault on *captatio*, legacy-hunting.²¹ The shipwreck scene in Juvenal poem 12

the line" [1997: 451, cf. 1994: 12–14], but Thomas [1988] argues against such a reference.

Gale sees both *DRN* and Hesiodic poetry in the background of the line [2000: 11]; and a Vergilian reference not to only *DRN* but also to the philosophical poetry of Empedocles is detected by P. Hardie [1986: 39 n. 17; 1998: 29, 31], Putnam [1979: 147], A. Hardie [2002: 205], and Nelis [2004]. I agree with the assessment of Farrell [1993]—“[t]he famous makarismos...is difficult not to take as an allusion to Lucretius—not necessarily to any particular line in Lucretius, but to his project of writing philosophical poetry”—and I would apply his comments to Persius 1.1, as well.

²⁰ I discuss this usage of *miser* in chapter 2 (pp. 104–105 and n. 132, above). For a connection between Persius poem 5 and the proem to *DRN* book 3, see La Bua [1997]; Tartari Chersoni [2003] points out metrical similarities between Persius and *DRN*.

²¹ On the satiric *topos* of *captatio*, see Schmid [1951], Mansbach [1982], and Kay [1985: 165–166], among others.

should, I will propose here, be read keeping in mind the scene of troubles at sea in the proem to *DRN* book 2.

Scholarly attention to Juvenal poem 12—which has received much less study than many of the other, particularly the earlier, satires of Juvenal—has tended to cluster around the thematic questions of friendship and greed, around textual cruxes, and around the connections to “higher” poetic genres (epic, elegy, lyric, and tragedy); only Highet and Ramage touch on linkages with philosophy to any substantial extent.²² Ramage calls poem 12 “a fusion of forms from prose and poetry” [1978: 222], Smith points out the shipwreck scene’s connection to declamatory commonplaces [1989: 292], and Littlewood surveys the storm-at-sea *topos* in Roman poetry [2007: 397 and n. 31].²³ The conven-

²² Issue of friendship: e.g., Helmbold [1956], Ramage [1978]; see, *contra*, Ronnick [1993a]. Greed: e.g., Adamietz [1983], Smith [1989], Larmour [2005], Gough [2008]; Ehlers sees the theme as the patron-client relationship, in particular what the appropriate role/behavior of a client is: “das angemessene und das unangemessene, das selbstlose und das eigennützige *officium* eines Klienten” [1996: 68]. Textual issues: Helmbold [1956], Kilpatrick [1971], LaFleur [1974], Jones [1982], Ronnick [1993b, 1995], Adkin [2004–2005, 2008]. Connection to “higher” genres: Littlewood [2007], Gough [2008: ch. 3]; cf. Cairns [2007/1972: 20–23]. Philosophy: Highet [1949], Ramage [1978: 237]. Additionally, Lindo [1974] notes that the later poems in the Juvenalian corpus can be compared with Horace’s *Epistulae*.

Ronnick, proffering what I would describe as a minority viewpoint, calls Juvenal poem 12 “a poem about *religio* in the broadest sense” and says the “protagonist is clearly some sort of egomaniacal, unrequited lover” [1993a: 7 and 9, respectively]. It has become almost a commonplace to quote—tendentiously, I note—Helmbold’s comment that “[t]he twelfth Satire is one of the strangest productions in Latin literature” [1956: 15], without contextualizing the quotation. Helmbold is arguing for widespread textual corruption, as a result of which the poem is in his view poetically inadequate, even incomprehensible.

²³ The speaker himself advertises the intertextuality of his *mise-en-scène* at 12.23–24: “if ever a poetic storm arises” (*si quando poetica surgit | tempestas*). In Romano’s words, “the satirist deliberately looks at reality through literature-coloured glasses and informs the reader that he is doing so” [1979: 175]; Larmour points out that “the satirist casts himself in the role of the presenter of a spectacle” with words like *ecce* at line 24 [2005: 151].

tional wisdom on the satire is that the speaker is cynical, that his purported friendship with Catullus is problematic or even undercut by Catullus' profit-focused profession, and that the poem's predominant feature is irony.²⁴

I would like to argue for our taking the shipwreck of Juvenal's poem as in one sense a Lucretian "*suaue mari magno*" scene.²⁵ The opening to *DRN* 2, as we have seen

Littlewood adduces Statius *Siluae* 1.4 as a model for Juvenal poem 12 [2007: 411–412]. Larmour [2005] compares Juvenal poem 12 to Catullus poem 63, discusses a reference to Valerius Flaccus *Argonautica* 292–312, and adduces the parallel of the roughly contemporaneous *Nauigium* of Lucian. Colton [1972] sees the poem as indebted to Martial's epigrams, while Smith contrasts it with Tacitus *Annales* 2.23 [1989: 292] and both Adamietz [1983] and Ehlers [1996: 61] liken it to parts of Horace's *Odes*. Ramage compares the poem's overarching theme to Cicero *De Amicitia* and Seneca *Epistulae Morales* [1978: 223].

Haenicke [1877] understood the satire to be an example of how such a storm scene should not be written. We can also look to the storm at Petronius *Satyrica* 115, with Conte [1996: 55–62], Connors [1998: 141–145], and Rimell [2002: 79–83]. On the shipwreck *topos* more broadly, see Huxley [1952].

²⁴ Representative assessments are from Smith—" [t]he narrator cynically shrugs off his friend's concern about his safety: if you are fool enough to risk a sea-voyage, this kind of thing is bound to happen" [1989: 291]—and from Littlewood: "[t]he satirist narrates the storm but with an irony that disassociates him from it. The mock-heroic pretension of the narration can be read rather as a reflection of the life style of Catullus" [2007: 397].

Larmour attributes the cynicism to us, the readers: "[w]e can only assume that Catullus' spectacular 'renunciation' is purely self-serving" [2005: 169]. Yes, sacrificing material goods to save one's own life is inherently self-serving, but so is the avoidance in the first place of seafaring on account of the dangers it presents. The course recommended by *DRN*'s speaker can be seen as self-serving, too. Konstan, however, undertakes to defend the Lucretian speaker's words against claims of malevolent *Schadenfreude*, like Bailey's description of the scene as "an almost cynical picture" [1947: 797], for example; nevertheless Fowler maintains that there is a "philosophical problem" in the conflict between the wise Epicurean's ἀταραξία and the "mental disturbance at another's fate" implicit in the act or emotion of pity [2002: 40 *ad DRN* 2.3–4].

Thus I would suggest that the "self-serving" aspect of Catullus' actions should not be taken to undercut the philosophic approval of his decisions. Perhaps the spectacle and heroicness of Catullus' casting his goods overboard can furthermore be attributed more to the satirist's dramatization than to Catullus' own motives—since, after all, it is the satirist-speaker who is narrating Catullus' story, not Catullus himself.

²⁵ To my knowledge, the only mention of the opening of *DRN* 2 in the scholarship on Juvenal poem 12 is by Larmour, who merely writes in passing, "Juvenal's satirical contem-

(pp. 90–91 and 155–157, above), has us with the speaker looking from the fortress of philosophy down upon the shipwreck (nowadays we might say “train wreck”) of a life that most people lead:

suaue, mari magno turbantibus aequora uentis,
e terra magnum alterius spectare laborem;
non quia uexari quemquamst iucunda uoluptas,
sed quibus ipse malis careas quia cernere suaue est.
(*DRN* 2.1–4)

Sweet it is, when the winds are thrashing the flats on the great sea, to watch from land the great difficulties of another. Not because there’s any mocking pleasure that someone’s in trouble, but because perceiving the kinds of problems you’re separated from is sweet.²⁶

This trouble at sea is a metaphor for ambition and, more pertinently for my considerations here, wealth.²⁷ Konstan, in fact, identifies the man in trouble at sea in *DRN*’s second proem as an “audacious trader whose unnatural greed lures him to incur the perils of the sea” [2008/1973: 35, cf. 2001: 34–48]; the Horatian merchant whose ship is in trouble and who wishes he were a soldier instead (*Serm.* 1.1.6–7 “the merchant, when the southern winds are buffeting his ship [says]: ‘being a soldier is better,’ ” *mercator nauim iactantibus Austris*: | ‘*militia est potior*’) may both allude to *DRN* 2.1–4 and provide support for Konstan’s claim. A few lines later, the Lucretian speaker makes clear that the trouble

plation of the follies and vices of Roman males, through the particular example of Catullus, is a transformation of the famous opening of Lucretius Book 2.1–4, with its detached, philosophical contemplation of the misfortunes of others” [2005: 145].

²⁶ Konstan suggests translating line 4 as “but because it is sweet to discern the kind of evils to which you yourself are not susceptible” [2008/1973: 34].

²⁷ Roy [forthcoming] also demonstrates that the Lucretian trouble at sea invokes the *Odyssey*, and argues that the Epicurean gaze upon the trouble at sea gestures metapoetically at the increased value of reading the *Odyssey* from the vantage point of the knowledge that *DRN* offers.

at sea is implicitly connected to the pursuit of money, when he says that people are struggling (like sailors on a rough sea) “to surface to the level of the highest riches and to take possession of things.”²⁸ The moralizing metaphor of life’s stormy sea, while not exclusive or even original to *DRN*, is in fact a common scene within the poem itself (and in Graeco-Roman literature more generally).²⁹

Catullus’ troubles on the ocean blue (12.17–61) are significantly more protracted and technically detailed than those of his anonymous Lucretian predecessors. The moral message of the first half of the poem, however, is basically the same as that of *DRN* 2.1–19. The Juvenal-*ego* even spells it out for us: “but who else, who in any part of the cosmos would really endeavor to offer up his head for silver and his safety for material goods?”³⁰ Grasping for wealth is stressful, risky, and even life-endangering. It is folly.

If the shipwreck scene here in Juvenal can be seen as his own Lucretian “*suaue mari magno*” moment, the poem’s satiric speaker thus takes on the role of the philosophically serene observer.³¹ Indeed, the speaker does find the occasion “sweet” in the very first line (*dulcior*, in place of the Lucretian *suaue*), explicitly on account of his friend’s

²⁸ 2.13: *ad summas emergere opes rerumque potiri*. I offer a slightly, but deliberately, tendentious rendering of the line, which is followed immediately by the *o miseris hominum mentes* interjection now familiar to us for its connection to Persius 1.1.

²⁹ We see vexatious waters in one form or another also at *DRN* 1.271–295, 2.552–559, 3.802–805, 4.1097–1104, 5.222–223 (a child castaway), 5.1000–1006, 5.1226–1235.

³⁰ 12.48–49: *sed quis nunc alius, qua mundi parte quis audet | argento praeferre caput rebusque salutem?* Ronnick finds these lines “ironic” [1993a: 10].

³¹ Highet even sees this poem as evidence for the Juvenal-*ego*’s adopting an Epicurean subject position in his thematic focus on friendship in this poem and others late in the corpus: “[o]f all the three main sects, it was only Epicureanism which paid so much attention to friendship...only Epicureanism that ranked friendship, as Juvenal does, above the ties of the family” [1949: 268].

survival and homecoming—but also, I believe, because he is an “earwitness” (so to speak) both to some of the ills from which he is safeguarded and to an excellent subject for satiric observation, inquiry, criticism, and moralizing. The added benefit in the Juvenalian passage is that the reader, along with the speaker, can genuinely find the shipwreck scene “sweet” because the frame narrative assures that Catullus made it out of his seaborne *magnus labor* unscathed.

Juvenal’s Catullus himself enhances the dialogue poem 12 has with *DRN*. Scholars writing on this satire have generally viewed with skepticism Catullus and his response to the sea-storm, and have consequently attributed a similar skepticism to the speaker’s perception of Catullus.³² While I would not say that such a perspective is incorrect, I do think that there is another way of looking at Catullus: he responded as he should have, not only given the exigencies of his situation but also considering the *DRN*-like scenario. In Lucretius’ poem, the seafarers are essentially passive, but in Juvenal’s, Catullus gets both action and speech: “ ‘pour overboard what’s mine,’ said Catullus, ‘—all of it.’ ”³³ Overboard go his luxury commodities, his basic goods (*res utiles*, 12.52), and even his

³² So Ramage [1978: 229], Smith [1989: 296], Littlewood [2007: 402]. Cf. also Larmour: “[w]e might expect that Catullus’ escape from the storm would offer proof (*testis*) of his manliness, but in fact it demonstrates the opposite.” Casting overboard the goods is “a display of *virtus* from all the wrong motivations and empty of all signification” [2005: 149–150].

³³ 12.37: ‘*fundite quae mea sunt*’ dicebat ‘*cuncta*’ Catullus. Smith sees *cuncta* as “comic” in its end position, and sees in *quae mea sunt* an allusion to Persius 5.113–114: “Persius, unlike Juvenal’s Catullus, scorns luxury items...as not being a ‘true part’ of the real human being” [1989: 293]. Adamietz views the line as determined and principled, forming a stark contrast with other greedy sailors who would put fortune before their own lives: “Sein Befehl...charakterisiert seine Entschlossenheit, er will restlos die Kostbarkeiten aufgeben...alle anderen außer Catull würden dem Vermögen den Vorrang geben vor der Rettung des eigenen Lebens, noch im Untergang daran festhalten” [1983: 240–241]. Ronnick calls Catullus’ casting things overboard “heroic” [1993: 10].

ship's mast.³⁴ This response is exactly what the Lucretian *ego* would want Catullus to do in such a situation. Better not to chase lucre across the waves. But in adverse circumstances, focus on (bail out, we could say) what matters—the minimum needed to sustain your life—and forget (or bail on) the rest.

Compare in *DRN* the passage shortly after book 2's *suaue mari magno* opening, on how illness lingers just as long regardless of the kind of coverings you have, rich or poor:

nec calidae citius decedunt corpore febres,
textilibus si in picturis ostroque rubenti
iacteris, quam si in plebeia ueste cubandum est.
(*DRN* 2.34–36)

And hot fevers don't go out of the body any faster if you're wrapped up in painted fabrics and reddish-purple cloth than if you've got to lie down in a commoner's cloak.

Again, luxuries are not needed, only the minimum for life's sustenance. These lines furthermore lead into a passage (2.37–53) that Konstan terms *DRN*'s “ironic satire on the notion that wealth or power can provide security against death” [2008/1973: 51]; and throughout this portion of the book's proem, in Fowler's words, “the useless riches are

³⁴ The divestment of goods is explicitly, and the severing of the mast (12.53–54) implicitly, compared to a beaver's supposed self-castration to escape death at the hands of *castoreum*-hunters (34–36): so Ramage [1978: 229 and n. 19], Smith [1989: 294], Littlewood [2007: 404], Adkin [2008: 130], and Larmour, who calls it “the ideological ‘ground zero’ which ties together the poem's complex interweaving of” themes and *topoi* [2005: 141]. Ehlers, rejecting outright this interpretation of the beaver-simile, argues that it misunderstands the fable and its function: “[e]s heißt die Fabel, das Gleichnis und seine Funktion mißzuverstehen, wenn hier jüngst von einer Art Selbstkastration des Catullus gesprochen wurde” [1996: 63]. In his reading, the beaver-simile is not a sign of greed-caused effeminacy, but rather a wisdom growing from an un-stereotypical, un-satire-like wisdom: “[w]äre Catullus so habgierig, wie ein topischer Kaufmann der Satire zu sein hat, wäre er natürlich mit dem Schiff untergegangen, ohne auch nur den geringsten Teil seines Besitzes zu opfern” [1996: 64]. Littlewood calls Ehlers' argument “perverse” [2007: 404 n. 49].

sneeringly mocked” [2002: 99 *ad* 2.27]. The quest for riches overseas is in vain, *DRN*’s speaker tells us, because it needlessly endangers you and the riches themselves do you no good when you are in distress. Juvenal poem 12 enacts this very lesson for the unfortunate Catullus.

Second-readers of this Juvenalian poem can furthermore contrast Juvenal 14.287–304, a shipwreck scene where the response is greedy—the wrong answer. I detect Lucretian echoes there, too, at 14.303–304: *tantis parta malis cura maiore metuque | seruuantur* (“things begotten at the expense of such misfortunes/ills are to be protected by means of greater anxiety and fear”). Juvenal’s Catullus in poem 12 made a bad decision by going out on the open sea in the first place, but when he ran into problems, he acted promptly and wisely. So *DRN*’s second proem, in my view, informs the moralistic plot of Juvenal poem 12’s first half. There is no direct allusion to Lucretius in the satire, yet the conundrum it investigates and the roles of detached, placid observer (the Juvenal-*ego*) and beleaguered seafarer (Catullus) all combine to invoke *DRN*’s *suaue mari magno*—and to extend it, to unpack its (Epicurean) implications. Juvenal’s poem effectively fuses the philosophic and satiric impulses already intertwined in *DRN*’s satiric opening to book 2.

I cited earlier (p. 247, above) Keane’s assertion that “philosophical discourse...[is] a set of tools for which a satirist devises new uses” and so forth.³⁵ Perhaps *DRN* “does” satire, and the satirists “do” philosophy in part because of the civic and moral concerns that they share, the subject of the second half of this chapter. Keane’s point is, in a sense, the mirror image of what I have argued for *DRN*’s use of the mode of

³⁵ Again, Keane [2007: 29]. Cf. Taiwo [2009].

satire in chapters 2–3. Satire of this kind, that is to say, is a set of tools that *DRN* adapts for use in its own (new) context. If we accept the second part of her point on Roman satire, therefore—that by adapting philosophy to their satiric context the satirists are employing a form of philosophical inquiry made native to the genre of satire—then, *mutatis mutandis*, we can say that *DRN* is engaging in a kind of satiric discourse that becomes a part of its own genre (or context). This point is, in brief, my argument for the current chapter: that by engaging not only with the techniques of the Graeco-Roman mode of satire but also with the generic tropes of the body of Roman literature called *satura*, Lucretius’ poem is importing satire into itself—*DRN* is doing and being a certain kind of satire.

Lucretian *elementa* and satiric teaching

Roman satirists after *DRN* reappropriate Lucretian imagery and the Lucretian speaker’s didactic pose for their own satiric ends. This reappropriation—and the ways the satirists differ in their reception of *DRN*—is perhaps most clearly on display in the case of the alphabet. The *elementa*, the “letters” of *DRN*, serve for the Lucretian speaker as illustrative metaphors for the atomic composition of matter. To wit:

quin etiam passim nostris in uersibus ipsis
multa elementa uides multis communia uerbis,
cum tamen inter se uersus ac uerba necessest
confiteare et re et sonitu distare sonanti.
tantum elementa queunt permutato ordine solo;
at rerum quae sunt primordia, plura adhibere
possunt unde queant uariae res quaeque creari.

(*DRN* 1.823–829)

Moreover, you see all across my verses themselves many elements/letters shared by many words, although you must still admit that the verses and words are among themselves distinct both in

content and in sounding noise. The elements/letters are capable of this much with a change to their order alone—but the elements that are the first-beginnings of matter can bring in more things from which all the various kinds of matter can be created.

A fixed set of letters can make up the countless variety of words just like the fixed types of atoms can combine into the innumerable kinds of extant matter.³⁶ Letters of the alphabet model atomic constituents of matter; words model reality.

The Horace-*ego* conjoins this Lucretian image with another, the simile of the honey on the cup (*DRN* 1.936–950 = 4.11–24):

praeterea, ne sic ut qui iocularia ridens

³⁶ Compare also *DRN* 2.688–699 (note that 1.823–825 = 2.688–690 and 1.826 ≈ 2.691):

quin etiam passim nostris in uersibus ipsis
multa elementa uides multis communia uerbis,
cum tamen inter se uersus ac uerba necesse est
confiteare alia ex aliis constare elementis;
non quo multa parum communis littera currat
aut nulla inter se duo sint ex omnibus isdem,
sed quia non uolgo paria omnibus omnia constant.
sic aliis in rebus item, communia multa
multarum rerum cum sint primordia, uerum
dissimili tamen inter se consistere summa
possunt; ut merito ex aliis constare feratur
humanum genus et fruges arbustaque laeta.

Moreover, you see all across my verses themselves many elements/letters shared by many words, although you must still admit that the verses and words are among themselves built each one from different [combinations of] letters—it's not that a common letter doesn't run through many [words], or that no two [words] are composed of all the same letters between themselves, but that generally not all [words] are built equal to all. So also likewise in other things, since many first-beginnings are common to many kinds of matter, but still they can come together in combinations varying among themselves. As a result, it's correctly reported that the human race and crops and fertile trees are made out of different [combinations].

On the atoms-as-letters simile, see, e.g., Minadeo [1969], Dalzell [1987], Thury [1987] and Volk [2002a: 85–86, 100–105].

percurram: quamquam ridentem dicere uerum
quid uetat? ut pueris olim dant crustula blandi
doctores, elementa uelint ut discere prima:
sed tamen amoto quaeramus seria ludo.

(*Serm.* 1.1.25–26)

Moreover, not to rush through like someone laughing at witticisms—although, what’s to prevent telling the truth while smiling? Like when sometimes wheedling/coaxing/charming teachers give cookies to boys, so that they’ll be willing to learn their ABCs [literally “their first elements”]: but, nevertheless, with play put away, let’s inquire into serious matters.

The Horatian *prima elementa* invoke the Lucretian letters we have just seen—and, as well, the *prima elementa* may call to mind the Lucretian *primordia* (“first-beginnings”), *principia* (“first-principles”), and *corpora prima* (“first bodies”), three of *DRN*’s other terms for atoms in addition to *elementa*. Likewise, the Horatian simile of teachers (*doctores*) persuading boys to learn possibly uninteresting material alludes to the Lucretian “honeyed cup” simile of doctors (*medentes*) tricking boys into drinking definitely unpalatable medicine—and the allusion picks up not only on the literal image within the simile but also on the simile’s application in *DRN*, since it is a simile for the Lucretian speaker’s use of poetry to make the possibly uninteresting material of Epicurean physics palatable. Horace’s speaker here justifies, on grounds of didactic benefit, his own blend of satiric moral critique with good-natured comic mockery.

Persius does not mention *elementa* specifically, but the chastising interlocutor (we might say “guest-satirist”) of Persius poem 3 does invoke the alphabet in order to make a moral-satiric point (“and the letter that has drawn apart its Samian branches has shown to you, too, its hill rising on the right edge,” *et tibi quae Samios diduxit littera ramos* | *sur-*

gentem dextro monstravit limite collem).³⁷ And the Persius-*ego* similarly adverts to Lucilius with mention of the letter R, the “canine letter,” in the programmatic satire (*canina | littera*, 1.109–110). The fate of the *elementa* in Juvenal’s later satire, where they are again explicitly mentioned (14.123: *sunt quaedam uitiorum elementa*, “there are certain basics/components of faults”), is grim: “[i]n Juvenal’s world, the *prima elementa* of children are vices.”³⁸ Each satirist adopts the Lucretian image and repurposes it for his own satire.

This example exhibits the satirists’ intertextual response to the satiric developments in *DRN*. More broadly, I would see the satirists’ incorporation of Epicureanism to be in some ways a similar comment on and reference to *DRN*. The connection between *DRN* or Epicureanism generally and Horace’s *Sermones* is quite complex, but I recall here the (often incompetent) Epicurean dialogue in *Serm.* 1.1–3,³⁹ showcased as well in, e.g., *Serm.* 2.2, 2.7, and 2.8.⁴⁰ Persius’ *ego* presents Epicureanism as risible, and also unsuccessful in correcting his flaws: in Persius’ third satire, the lazy student (the *ego*) is described as a leaking pot, a recurrent Lucretian image.⁴¹

³⁷ 3.56–57. The letter in question is the Greek upsilon, Y or (as written in Persius’ scenario) Υ, where adulthood offers a choice between the straight path of righteousness or the “hill” of vice. Cf. Braund’s explanation [2004a: 79 n. 15 *ad loc.*].

³⁸ Keane [2006: 135], with reference to Juvenal 14.208–209: “this [greed and vice] is what the hag-nannies teach our sons while they’re still toddlers, this is what all our daughters learn, before they learn their ABΓs” (*hoc monstrant uetulae pueris repentibus assae, | hoc discunt omnes ante alpha et beta puellae*).

³⁹ Cf. Turpin [1998].

⁴⁰ On 2.8, see Freudenburg [1995].

⁴¹ Persius 3.20–24, cf. Keane [2006: 163 n. 72] and my discussion in chapter 2 of the imagery of the *uas* in *DRN* (pp. 120–121 and n. 163, above).

Juvenal's satire stages the wholesale failure of the didact, the *grammaticus*, as part of what Keane calls "an aggressive move to reinvent this genre" of satire [2006: 128]—and this failure, too, I see as a response to *DRN*.⁴² If *DRN* is to be seen as a response to the political, social, and intellectual crises of the late Republic,⁴³ then the Juvenal-*ego*, from the vantage point of hindsight, calls the Lucretian persona's response a failure. "Juvenal's professional teachers are unable to teach, while his immoral characters proceed to spread their knowledge easily."⁴⁴ In the world of Juvenalian satire, in the Sin City / Savage City that Juvenal portrays, *DRN* is ineffectual, its civic message is a failure. And yet the Juvenal-*ego*'s own solution appears Epicurean. In poem 12, at least, separation from civic life is the answer: limited sacrifice, renouncement of wealth, and disavowal of the rough seas, politicized⁴⁵ and "civic-ized" through allusion to *DRN*.

⁴² The *grammaticus* figure appears at Juvenal 3.75–78, 6.434–456, and especially 7.215–243.

⁴³ Or, if we accept the argument of Flower [2010], the transitional period between the final legitimate form of the Republic and the beginning of the Augustan-era principate. On Lucretius' poem as such a response to crisis in the Roman state, see my discussion of civic discourse in *DRN* and Roman satire (pp. 271–286, below).

⁴⁴ Keane [2006: 133].

⁴⁵ Cf. Fowler [2002: 28 *ad DRN* 2.1–13]: "[a] stormy sea is an obvious symbol for disturbance in...political life, suggesting not merely violent agitation but also to some extent constraint and the inability to do what one wishes."

Food

Dining and consumption, food and feasting are of great generic importance to Roman satire, and to the post-classical satiric tradition that descends from Roman *satura*.⁴⁶ Indeed, at the beginning of chapter 4 (pp. 199–200, above) we pondered the possible etymological connections between food and the term *satura* itself. Citations of food in satire abound: *Serm.* 2.2, 2.4, 2.8; a peaceful dinner with Cornutus at Persius 5.44; Petronius' famous Dinner of Trimalchio scene; Juvenal poems 4, 5, 11. At Persius 2.42–43, the speaker states that lavish meals get in the way of prayers to the gods for good fortune; Juvenal poem 15 depicts the extreme in food (i.e., cannibalism) while the Juvenal-*ego* earlier asks *tantine iniuria cenae?*⁴⁷

The satiric *topos* of food holds links with Epicureanism and the satirists' reception of *DRN*, as well. *Serm.* 2.2's Ofellus, who advocates for simple meals, sounds like Epicurus' *Letter to Menoecus*, according to Hudson [1989: 75]. Freudenburg points out that the conclusion to the feast of Nasidienus (*Serm.* 2.8, the last poem in the last book of *Sermones*) echoes not only *Serm.* 1.4.116 and 2.4.45, but also *DRN* 1.25–26, 3.1070, and

⁴⁶ For Roman satire, see Gowers [1993a: ch. 3] and Hudson [1989, esp. 70]: “[f]or the satirists a useful criterion for judging a person’s moral quality was the amount of money and effort he devoted to thinking and talking about food and eating it.” Cf. also Plaza [2006: 78–80, 93–101, 108–110, 119, 164, 186, 294–296, 340–341] and Muecke [2005: 47]: “[t]he consumption and offering of food must be emphasized as one of satire’s enduring themes, and a rich source of tropes and self-reflexive metaphors.” On food in post-classical satire, see, e.g., Griffin [1994: 190–197].

⁴⁷ 5.9: “is the damage of a banquet worth so much?” Note the allusion to Vergil *Aeneid* 1.11: *tantaene animis caelestibus irae?* (“do such great wraths [or “does so much wrath”] exist in celestial spirits [i.e., in the minds of the gods]?”). Adkin identifies recurrent Vergilian parody in this satire [2004–2005: 286–290; 2008: 131–135].

5.1185. Thus there is “a connection between Nasidienus’ gastronomic studies and Epicurean natural science” [1995: 207 n. 1]. A technical-sounding Epicurean façade grants greater gravity to the dinner-host’s bloviation, while the Horatian *ego*’s linkage of the two could be seen as a debasement of the lofty precincts of Epicurean doctrine.

DRN, in contrast to satire, is not nearly so stuffed with food-talk. We get to see this victual principle in action earlier in the poem, when a pleasant picnic on a riverbank with a few friends is contrasted with the trappings of luxury (*DRN* 2.20–33, cf. pp. 150–152, above). And the motif comes up again in the Lucretian satiric “anthropology,” where early humans are satisfied with simple, easily gathered comestibles (5.937–952). The Lucretian speaker offers in book 4 what I consider a dispositive or conclusive take on food:

nec refert quicquam quo uictu corpus alatur,
dummodo quod capias concoctum didere possis
artubus et stomachi ualidum seruare tenorem.
(*DRN* 4.630–632)

And it doesn’t matter at all on what kind of sustenance the body is nourished, provided that the kind of thing you take is something you can digest and distribute through your limbs—and keep your stomach’s course strong.

Take what is at hand, in other words, as long as it is nutritious enough.⁴⁸ With one notable exception, these few moments essentially delimit the extent of *DRN*’s (dis)interest in food.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ And as long as it will not make you sick to your stomach, as is common in Roman satire: the death of a man who could not digest the fancy peacock meat he devoured (Juvenal 1.135–146) is emblematic of the gastrointestinal disasters of the genre.

⁴⁹ Minor mentions of food or eating do crop up elsewhere. Rouse & Smith identify 23 such instances [1975: 595, s. v. “food”], but do not cite either the “picnic scene” of book 2 or the early human diet in book 5.

The exception is itself another link to satire, namely the image of the *conuiuia* that appears twice in *DRN* book 3:⁵⁰

cur non ut plenus uitae conuiuia recedis
aequo animoque capis securam, stulte, quietem?
(*DRN* 3.938–939)

Why don't you be like the dinner-guest full of life and withdraw,
and enjoy a carefree repose with a level head, you fool?

sed quia semper aues quod abest, praesentia temnis,
inperfecta tibi elapsast ingrataque uita,
et nec opinanti mors ad caput adstitit ante
quam satur ac plenus possis discedere rerum.
(*DRN* 3.957–960)

But—because you always desire what you don't have, you disdain
what you do—your life has slipped by incomplete and unsatisfy-
ing, and death stands over your head, while you're unawares, be-
fore you were able to draw away satisfied and full of things/the
universe.

A person afraid of death is like a dinner-guest (*conuiuia*) who cannot get full, be satisfied,
or leave the banquet happy. In other words, such a person is like the gluttons of Roman
satire.⁵¹ Horace alludes to and appropriates for his own program this *conuiuia* at *Serm.*

DRN on food has not received much scholarly study; Fowler considers the role of
food and Epicurean pleasure theory in the Lucretian picnic scene [2002: 83–85 *ad* 2.20–
36], Shelton discusses the food supply as part of the “contract with animals” depicted in
DRN book 5's anthropology [1995: 116–118], and Gruber [2010] reads the honey in the
Lucretian “honeyed cup” simile (1.936–942 ≈ 4.11–17) as a salutary food that refers to
Plato *Laws* 2.659e–660a, a passage that compares poetry used to communicated healthy
ideas with tasty food containing nourishment for the ill.

⁵⁰ Cf. my discussion of *Natura Rerum*, who gives voice to the image, at the end of chapter
2 (pp. 133–139, above); cf. also the sympotic context of *DRN* 3.884–930 (with pp. 106–
108, above). On the image of the *conuiuia* in *DRN*, see, e.g., Stork [1970: 79 and n. 258],
Wallach [1976: 64–65, 71], Nussbaum [2009/1994: 211], and Reinhardt [2002: 296–
297]. There is also a dinner-guest at Bion fr. 68, in the numbering of Kindstrand [1976];
cf. Harrison [2007c: 82].

⁵¹ And possibly also like the parasites of Greek and Roman comedy, on which character
type see Gowers [1993a: 76–78], Damon [1997], and Tylawsky [2002].

1.1.117–119 and *Epist.* 2.2.214–216.⁵² Concluding his first act of satiric versification, the Horatian speaker remarks that it is rare to find people who end their life contented like Lucretian dinner-guests:

inde fit, ut raro, qui se uixisse beatum
dicat et exacto contentus tempore uita
cedat uti conuiuia satur, reperire queamus.

(*Serm.* 1.1.117–119)

And so it happens that we're rarely able to find someone who says he's lived happily/bountifully and who, pleased with the time he's spent, withdraws from life just like a satisfied dinner-guest.

Note the verbal echoes: *uita*, *conuiuia*, *satur* in both authors, Lucretian *recedis* and *discedere* answered by Horatian *cedat*, Lucretian *possis* by Horatian *queamus*, Lucretian *plenus...rerum* by Horatian *beatum*, Lucretian *elapsast...uita* by Horatian *exacto...tempore*, Lucretian *aequo animo* by Horatian *contentus*. The μεμψιμοιρία of *DRN*'s first line—the criticism of one's own lot in favor of another's, the “grass is greener” *topos*—may have inspired the μεμψιμοιρία with which *Serm.* 1.1 opens, where each professional wishes to exchange his profession for another's.⁵³ The Horace-*ego* then pivots, however, and says “enough” for his own opening poem (*iam satis est*, 1.1.120; *satis* here reverberates with *conuiuia satur* in the line previous). In satire, we might expect to be stuffed. The satirist of *Serm.* 1.1 has us just enough-ed. He, like Lucretius' *Natura Rerum* would want, knows when to let go.

⁵² Freudenburg argues that the image of the *conuiuia* is used in *Serm.* 1.1 to show that the poetry of *Sermones* is markedly unlike *DRN*, a six-book long epic [2001: 33–45]. Cf. also Glazewski [1971] and Munding [1996]. On the image in *Epist.* 2.2, see Dessen [1968: 81 and n. 19].

⁵³ On the *topos* of μεμψιμοιρία, see, e.g., Fraenkel [1957: 92–94] and Horace *Odes* 1.1.17 with Nisbet & Hubbard [1970: *ad loc.*]. On the programmatic intent of *Serm.* 1.1, see Dufallo [1999–2000].

We can also attribute to this nexus of imagery in *DRN* elements of other satiric dinner scenes. So, for example, the sympotic moment at *Serm.* 1.4.86–91, where we are shown a satirist making an ass of himself by telling the truth freely (as a *liber*) after drinking a bit too much wine (*Liber*, the Roman Dionysus). Juvenal’s food-plagued poem 5 synthesizes both *DRN*’s *conuiuia* and *Serm.* 1.4’s play on *liber*, I believe:

tu tibi liber homo et regis conuiuia uideris:
captum te nidore suae putat ille culinae,
nec male coniectat.

(Juvenal 5.161–163)

You seem to *yourself* to be a free man and a dinner-guest of His Majesty—and *he* adjudges you to be enslaved by the splendor of his own kitchen...and he ain’t far off.

Here the addressee’s status as dinner-guest is literal as well as metaphorical. At Virro’s feast, “you” think you are almost an equal, an honored guest, but Virro (throughout poem 5) proves otherwise by his treatment of you. He is king (*regis*, line 161), you are enslaved to him (*captum*, 162). Enslaved to your belly, as well, for you chase after the delights of the kitchen no matter the cost or indignity. Reading *DRN* 3.938–939 into this passage adds another level of metaphor: instead of contenting yourself (like a Lucretian *conuiuia satur*) with what is nutritious and readily available, you are insatiable, clinging to fancy foods and dear life, unsatisfied with what you have.

Civic discourse

One of the enduring characteristics of the Roman genre of satire is its involvement with Roman social and political life. Examples from Horace, Persius, and Juvenal

abound. *Serm.* 1.5 combines the lead-up to an event of great political magnitude (Maecenas' journey to Brundisium on Octavian's behalf to meet with Antony) with a sample of everyday social life (ball-playing, pink-eye, lazy ferrymen, prostitutes, and so forth). *Serm.* 1.7 puts a court of law on center stage, while Juvenal poem 4 focuses on the court of the emperor instead. These instances can be redoubled again and again, and they can likewise be matched with sweeping, even programmatic pronouncements on the state of the City of Rome: "Rome is in chaos" (*turbida Roma*, Persius 1.5), "Rome is wasteful/expensive" (*prodiga Roma*, Juvenal 7.138), "we inhabit a City for the most part propped up by a slight support" (*nos Urbem colimus tenui tibicine fultam | magna parte sui*, Juvenal 3.193–194).

In other words, as Muecke writes, satire's "characteristic flavor was Roman" [2005: 34]. The City, if not explicitly mentioned, looms large in the backdrop to the poems of Lucilius, Horace, Persius, and Juvenal—and of Lucretius, too, as we will see. The satirist is both a poet and a social actor, someone who claims a stake in the health and standing of Roman society. Henderson, writing on *Serm.* 1.9, speaks of the "excursions of the poet in the social domain" as an important feature of satire, figured in *Serm.* 1.9 by the Horace-*ego*'s pestered walk down the Sacra Via [1993: 80]. By treating topics like power relations between rich and poor, or government and the law, the poets of satire make such excursions a defining concern of the genre.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Satiric encounters with the law, for instance, comprise a recurrent, thorny topic: Horace's *Sermones* feature a courtroom battle of wits (1.7) and a "fanboy" who deserts his legal duties to pursue his ambitions of access to Maecenas (1.9), while the fragmentary Juvenal poem 16 sets up a lament about the preferential legal treatment afforded to soldiers. See, e.g., Cloud [1989], Henderson [1993], Mazurek [1997], and Keane [2006: ch. 3].

I consider more extensively here what Henderson terms the “civic discourse” of satire in Rome [again 1993: 69]. In my usage, civic discourse refers to the poetic treatment of the *topoi* of Roman social and political life (the workings of government and the governing elite, but also the faults and foibles of daily mundane existence), as well as to the moralizing satiric critique of problems with the way Roman aristocracy and society functions. Civic discourse, in essence, is made up of the poet’s excursions into the social domain. In Graf’s account, “Roman satire appears as the literarization of fundamental social concerns and ways of behavior” [2005: 205]. The issues of the City, citizenship, and the Roman state, transfigured into poetry, make up a crucial part of what Roman satire does.

Compare this identification of Roman satire as “literarization” of socio-political concerns with Rosen’s assertion that Graeco-Roman satiric verse (i.e., poetry employing the satiric mode) consists of poetic mimesis of everyday abuse and mockery [2007: 46].

In *DRN* book 3, the Lucretian speaker avows that *Natura Rerum* (on whom see pp. 133–139, above) is waging a “just lawsuit” and a “true legal action” (3.950–951: *iusta lis* and *uera causa*), and she herself proclaims in legalistic language that “life is given to nobody as property-in-possession, but to everybody for usufruct” (*uitaque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus usu*, 3.971); lawyers appear in *DRN*’s next book, where they have dreams of court cases, in an example of how we dream of what we are habituated to do (4.966). Fowler points out that *DRN* 3.48–54 includes phrases that “exactly pervert legal terminology” [1989: 136], but also that *DRN*’s account of the development of human government has a preference for (Roman-like) magistrates and laws over (un-Roman) kings [143]. Cf. the problems with this passage’s conflicting trends of progress and decline (from a mythic/epic Golden Age) over the course of time, as discussed by, e.g., Cole [1967: 26–45], Furley [1978], Andreoni [1979], Manuwald [1980], Farrell [1994], and Campbell [2003]; and cf. also the Lucretian speaker’s problematic assertion that the Punic Wars, a relic of the past, are of no importance to contemporary Romans (despite the Wars’ influence on both late Republican citizen identity and late Republican geopolitical pre-eminence), with, among others, Kenney [1971: 193], Furley [1986: 76–78], Mitsis [1988], Striker [1988], Nussbaum [2009/1994: 203 n. 1], and Lei [2007: 6–10, 30]. On *DRN* and the law generally, see Schiesaro [2007b], and cf. Campbell [2002].

Both categories handle in a stylized, poetic form some aspect of lived reality, often heavily exaggerated, stereotyped, or distorted. But what differentiates the Roman genre of satire from the wider tradition of Graeco-Roman satiric verse (of which the genre *satura* is an important part) is the genre's basic, though not all-encompassing, focus on civic life.⁵⁵ This focus is something that the post-Roman tradition of satire—both as mode and as genre—inherits from Roman *satura*. I point, for the sake of example (they are plentiful), to the political role of public mockery and literary libel in Stuart-era England, to the anti-Nazi satirical journal *Ulenspiegel* in American-occupied postwar Berlin, and to, perhaps most obviously, political cartoons.⁵⁶ And as Simpson points out, American legal precedent considers satire “a preeminent form of political debate.”⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Aristophanic Old Comedy stands as an important, perhaps exceptional, pre-Roman example of the use of satire in civic discourse: see, e.g., Sidwell [2009].

⁵⁶ Stuart-era England: Fox [1994], Croft [1995], Bellany [2001], McRae [2004], Cressy [2010: 33–37]. *Ulenspiegel*: Goldstein [2009: 110–125]. For an analysis of satire in political cartoons during the 2000s-era American “War on Terror,” see Steuter & Wills [2008: 106–125].

⁵⁷ Simpson [2003: 209]. The legal precedent to which Simpson refers is the 1987 decision of the United States Supreme Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in *The Diversity Action brought to the US District Court for the Western District of Virginia by the Reverend Jerry Falwell, Appellant, versus Larry C. Flynt, Hustler Magazine INC, Appellee*, popularly known as *The People v. Larry Flint*. The Court of Appeals' decision was subsequently upheld by the United States Supreme Court. On the rhetoric of political satire, see Simpson [2003: 107–108]. See also Griffin [1994: ch. 6].

Politics are also an important *topos* of both satire and *DRN*. Witness the assertion by Felgentreu et al. that apolitical satire is inconceivable: “[d]ie Satire als gänzlich unpolitisches Phänomen ist folglich schlechterdings nicht denkbar” [2009b: VIII]. In *Sermones*, politics stay behind the scenes, or rather the Horace-*ego* stays out of the mainstream of political life in the *ciuitas*. By contrast, in Juvenal we see outright statements about how degraded the politics of his age have become, e.g., the satire-length indictment of Roman patronage in poem 9. For politics in Horace's satire, see further Gowers [2009] and Schmitzer [2009]; for Juvenal, Mülke [2009], Fögen [2009], and cf. also Krenkel [2001] on Lucilius and contemporary change in sociopolitical values, and likewise Olshausen [2001] and Schäfer [2001]. Scholarship on politics in (and surrounding) *DRN* is plentiful: see, among others, Farrington [1939], Fellin [1951], Clarke [1956],

Roman satire mimes, or models, Rome's reality, and by doing so it can point out flaws and problems in Roman society. So also for Lucretius' poem, where moral and intellectual weaknesses are repeatedly, intensely, and often satirically exposed. In fact, in some of its most satiric passages, *DRN* adopts Roman satire's civic discourse in its own kind of civic satire, as we will see. From a certain perspective, additionally, the whole poem could be described as a "literarization" (to use Graf's term) of a specific social concern, namely the fear of death and the concomitant driving passions of lust, greed, and ambition. A literarization as well as a way to combat it: the Lucretian speaker offers not only concrete, positive steps towards a life free from anxiety but also a substantial monument of remarkable poetic value. *DRN* is not merely an antidote to the taractic excesses of political ambition and social appetites. It is also an indictment of those excesses, in a consciously literary context.

Of greater importance for our considerations here, however, are the more properly civic concerns of *DRN*. Lucretius' poem begins with a prayer to Venus for peace "in a troubled time for the fatherland" (*patriai tempore iniquo*, 1.41) so that "Memmius" can focus on the poem without "being absent from the commonwealth amid such happenings" (*talibus in rebus communi desse saluti*, 43); book 6 ends with a scene of civic decay and destruction, when Rome's predecessor Athens falls prey to the plague. From start to finish, and all along the way, *DRN* acknowledges and addresses society's ills, and proposes one overarching solution: Epicurean physics and ethics.

Roller [1970], Packman [1975–1976], Pianezzola [1977], Grimal [1978], Kleve [1978], Schmid [1978], Monti [1981], Wiseman [1982], Cabisiu [1984–1985], Zetzel [1998], Hutchinson [2001], Gordon [2002], Lévy [2003: 55], Long [2003: 196], Schiesaro [2007a], Belliotti [2009: 102–103], Volk [2010], and Fish [2011].

Minyard argues for a contrast in *DRN* between two “ways of dealing with the world, that of *ciuitas* and that of...Epicurus” [1985: 36]. In a period of civil discord and governmental crisis, he suggests, *DRN* describes the limitations of the traditional Roman state apparatus (*ciuitas*) and explores an alternative, the withdrawal from public life and politics. Accordingly, the poem “is made to emerge from the aim of civil order as the non-civic remedy for the errors and evil inherent in that order as the seeds of its own destruction” [*ibidem*]. *DRN* in his reading is a rejection of *ciuitas*—an attribution of Rome’s social problems to participation in its civic affairs—and an embrace of self-separation from the Roman *ciuitas* (Epicurus’ “live hidden,” λάθε βιώσας) as the only surefire way to solve the problems it causes.

I do not wholly agree with Minyard’s interpretation, which has been poorly received by some scholars (see p. 278 n. 60, below). Though I am persuaded by his basic point of a contrast in *DRN* between *ciuitas* and λάθε βιώσας—and I find convincing his interpretation of the ends of books 3–6 as satires of life in the Roman *ciuitas* (cf. pp. 278–286, below)—nonetheless Lucretius’ poem does not seem to me to present Roman civil order as inherently doomed to self-destruction. Instead, I believe, *DRN* both criticizes the Roman civil order for its glaring flaws and yet still from time to time engages constructively with Roman *ciuitas*. The relationship between the Lucretian speaker and Memmius, for example, plays out as a patron-client relationship, and the speaker portrays the extension of patronage as a good, as pleasurable (“the hoped-for pleasure of sweet [patron-client] friendship,” *sperata uoluptas | suavis amicitiae*, 1.140–141).⁵⁸ To adapt one

⁵⁸ Friendship, and its formalized political equivalent (patronage), hold great influence on much of Roman poetry, as attested by the work of Treggiari [1977], White [1978, 2007], Gold [1982, 1987], Saller [1982], Bowditch [2001], and Stroup [2010], among others. In

of *DRN*'s own medical analogies: the patient is ill, perhaps grievously so (and may require honey to mitigate the medicine's bitterness), but not terminal.⁵⁹

DRN is, in this way, again interconnected with Roman satire. As we will see below, satire too undertakes often-biting critique of the society of which it is a part, and on occasion advocates varying degrees of separation from it, but ultimately does not consistently reject the *ciuitas* altogether. We can think, for instance, of how the Horatian *ego* refrains from truly participating in public life, even while he is enmeshed in a circle of friends who are involved in the very summit of Roman politics. A good illustration of this point is *Serm.* 1.5, the journey with Maecenas and entourage to Brundisium for a meeting with Mark Antony, a poem that Freudenburg reads as the *ego*'s acknowledgement of his circumscribed role in civic affairs, a role unlike that of his Lucilian predecessor [2001: 51–58]. One of the characteristics of *DRN* that sets it apart from its Epicurean

satire, as Muecke writes, “[t]he need for the satirist to negotiate a delicate course between friends and enemies, inclusion and exclusion, made itself one of satire’s themes” [2005: 43]. Friendship, *amicitia*, was regularly a political term in Latin, and often specifically a reference to the patron-client relation: see Taylor [1949: 7–8], Hellegouarc’h [1963], Brunt [1965], Ross [1969: 80–95], Scullard [1973: 12], and Umbrico [2010: 64–67]. For friendship and patronage in Roman satire generally, see Rudd [1986: ch. 4] and Cuccioli [1990]; in Lucilius, Gärtner [2001] and Lefèvre [2001]; in Horace, McNeill [2001: ch. 1], and in Persius, Paladini [1936], Henderson [1991], and Reckford [2009: 108–118]. The satirist’s negotiation between inclusion and exclusion can be both literary—e.g., *Serm.* 1.10.74–76, or Persius 1.13, with Cucchiarelli [2009: 10–13], arguing against Coffey [1976: 104, 273 n. 44] and van Rooy [1965: 149]—and social (*Serm.* 1.9, Juvenal 6.214–225, for example).

Epicureans like *DRN*'s speaker valued friendship highly (on which see Long & Sedley [1985: 137–138], Farrington [1954], and Campbell [2008], among others), and Epicurus is said to have embraced as members of his Garden both enslaved persons (according to Diogenes Laertius 10.10) and immigrant metics, cf. Leiwo & Remes [1999]. On *DRN* 1.140–145, a passage filled with keywords for Epicurean pleasure, where *DRN*'s talk of friendship/patronage invokes and advances Epicurean ethical principles, see Allen [1938].

⁵⁹ Cf. Fowler [1989: 149]: *DRN*'s speaker “is concerned with the state of Rome, but the solution is a personal one: everyone should become an Epicurean.”

predecessors is its Roman-ness, its “characteristic flavor,” Roman (I quote Muecke [2005: 34] once more). By taking on this Roman flavor, *DRN* also takes on Roman civic concerns, as previously Lucilius’ satire had, and as (in a much-transformed way) Horace’s *Sermones* will.

The book-endings of DRN: satires on civic life

The most extended passages of satire in Lucretius’ poem—and some of the most important passages in the poem altogether—can be found at the ends of *DRN*’s individual books. The satiric elements of books 3 (fear of death), 4 (love and sex), and 5 (“anthropology” and human society) have been treated in detail throughout the previous chapters, but I will argue here that books 2 and 6 also conclude with satire, and furthermore that these satiric tableaux form a sort of backbone or capstone to *DRN*’s civic discourse, shared with Roman satire. Each book of Lucretius’ poem (besides the first) ends with what have been termed “satires on civic life” in Rome, each satire built on the scientific theories expounded in the book that it concludes.⁶⁰ Book 3’s inveighing against the fear of death rests on the book’s plethora of proofs for the mortality of the *anima*, book 4’s screed about the danger of romantic attachment follows logically from the earlier explanations of vision and the misjudgments that can be made based on the senses, book 5’s

⁶⁰ Minyard [1985: 53], who does not include book 2 under this rubric, and whose broader argument on the role of *DRN* in the intellectual and political environment of the late Republican period has not been well received. Nugent calls his argument “untenable,” for instance [1994: 188 n. 45], and Fowler calls it “extremely annoying” [1988: 215]. Yet both Nugent and Fowler direct their criticisms not at Minyard’s concept of civic satire in *DRN* but rather at his idiosyncratic and even in their view simplistic analysis of Rome’s intellectual climate. My concerns here, with satire and civic discourse in *DRN*, are not incompatible with an acceptance of their critiques.

satiric play with human history treats the final stage of the Lucretian speaker's examination of life's development on earth, and the finale's account of the Athenian plague exemplifies book 6's discussions on the nature and phenomenology of disease.

The two long satiric passages at the ends of books 3 and 4 have elicited the most discussion by far of satire in the poem. Hardie, for instance, calls the Lucretian *ego* "one of the great Roman satirists, in the diatribes against the fear of death and sexual infatuation in Books 3 and 4."⁶¹ Waltz remarks that book 3 is a treasure trove of satire, a "veritable mine de traits et de tableaux satiriques" [1949: 95]. Houghton calls the end of book 4 "this satire on the vanity of human love" [1912: xxxvii] and says that book 5 "is, as we should expect to find, shot through with satire" [xxxviii].⁶² Smith, discussing satiric elements of book 6's conclusion, states that "the depiction of the plague...climaxes in the death of a satiric foil to score a moral point," and compares *Serm.* 2.3.217–264 as well as Persius 3.107–109 [2005c: 88]. Additionally, the plague scene of *DRN* book 6 is preceded by a clinical, rational explanation of the disease (*ratio morborum*, 6.1138) that enables the competent reader to pick up on the subsequent satire.⁶³

Now, the suggestion that book 6's plague of Athens should be considered "satire" may initially seem startling or unfounded. Yet the scene does, I argue, include notable

⁶¹ Hardie [2007: 125]; likewise Waltz [1949: 91–92], Dudley [1965b], Kenney [1971], Wallach [1976], Segal [1990], and Gale [2007: 68].

⁶² On book 4's satire of love, see also Kleve [1969], Fitzgerald [1984], Brown [1987], Erler [2003], and Caston [2006]. For satiric components of book 5, Houghton [1912: xxxviii] cites as examples 5.39–56, 223–234, 828–836, 925–930, 999–1001, 1007–1010, and 1105–1457. On 5.1430–1435 specifically, Murgia makes the qualification that the Lucretian *ego* "is being satirical in this section; he is not being sarcastic" [2000: 312 n. 23].

⁶³ Cf. Minyard [1985: 60], and my consideration of the idea that book 6 is a "final exam" for an Epicurean convert-reader (p. 189–190 and n. 97, above).

features of the mode of satire, as described in chapter 2. As a whole, the Lucretian speaker's discussion of the plague amounts to chastisement of incorrect beliefs and behaviors, because the scientific inquiry into the aetiology and epidemiology of the disease are in essence a frame for the depiction of the fears, anxieties, and extreme behavior that characterized the non-atractic victims of the plague. This castigation of foolish reactions to the plague's horrors itself constitutes a stance of moral superiority. As with the "*suaue mari magno*" scenes of *DRN* book 2 and Juvenal poem 12, the atractic speaker (with, presumably, atractic readers alongside him) surveys the toils of an unenlightened life from a position of distance and of security: with the troubles at sea, a spatial distance, with the plague, the security of the passage of time, and in both scenarios, a philosophical reassurance that comes from intellectual aloofness and Epicurean withdrawal from mundane concerns.

There are also possible connections to earlier satiric moments within the poem. For instance, the description of the diseased who had body parts amputated in a vain attempt to save their own lives may remind us of the speaker's previous satiric descriptions of creatures missing limbs or people illogically harming themselves because of the fear of death:

et grauiter partim metuentes limina leti
uiuebant ferro priuati parte uirili,
et manibus sine nonnulli pedibusque manebant
in uita tamen, et perdebant lumina partim:
usque adeo mortis metus his incesserat acer.

(*DRN* 6.1208–1212)

And some of them, seriously fearing the doors of death, were to live on deprived of their genitalia, and many, though without hands and feet, lived on nonetheless, and some of them lost their eyes—to such extents did the sharp fear of death assail them.

This passage from the plague is comparable to the deformed, limb-deprived beings spawned during the early stages of earth's evolution in *DRN*'s satiric anthropology (5.837–844), and with the illogical suicides on account of the fear of death (3.79–84).⁶⁴ More importantly, the plague passage as a whole fits very neatly with the wider, and often satiric, civic discourse in *DRN*. The plague-stricken Athens can be viewed as an analogue for the troubled Roman *ciuitas*: the two cities are both, after all, the cultural and political capitals of empires powerful in their own time. The ravages of physical disease in Periclean Athens run parallel to the unhealthy psychological ravages of ambition, avarice, and all the rest in contemporary Rome—and the biting critique of Athenian citizen response to the contagion speaks to the difficulties the Roman citizenry faces in its own political-intellectual crisis.

The end of *DRN* book 2 should also, I contend, be taken as a satire on civic life. As the book's closing argument about the mortality and decay of the earth draws to a close, we are shown a pair of farmers who perceive a decline in the world's greatness and fertility:

iamque caput quassans grandis suspirat arator
 crebrius, incassum magnum cecidisse laborem,
 et cum tempora temporibus praesentia confert
 praeteritis, laudat fortunas saepe parentis.
 tristis item uetulae uitis sator atque <uietae>⁶⁵
 temporis incusat momen saeclumque fatigat,
 et crepat antiquum genus ut pietate repletum
 perfacile angustis tolerarit finibus aeuom,
 cum minor esset agri multo modus ante uiritim;
 nec tenet omnia paulatim tabescere et ire

⁶⁴ See also my earlier discussion of all three passages (pp. 113–115 and nn. 146–147, above).

⁶⁵ I print *uietae* in angle brackets to follow not Rouse & Smith but rather Bailey [1947: 982 *ad loc.*].

ad scopulum, spatio aetatis defessa uetusto.

(*DRN* 2.1164–1174)

And now the aged plowman shakes his head and sighs a bit more frequently about how his great toil has been wasted in vain, and when he compares with present times times past, he regularly praises his predecessors' lot. Likewise the gloomy cultivator of an elderly and shriveled vine criticizes the progress of time and carps on the age, and complains about how the old species, filled with dutifulness, would quite easily support life within narrow boundaries, even though the man-by-man measure of land was much smaller back then—and yet he [the viticulturist] doesn't get that everything decays bit by bit and goes to pieces, worn out by the ancient lapse of time.

The Lucretian persona describes the viticulturist's speech-acts with the same kinds of verbs he used to describe the later satiric speeches of *Natura Rerum* in book 3 (cf. pp. 133–139, above): the vine-worker's *incusat* and *fatigat* (2.1169) run parallel to Nature's subsequent *queratur*, *lamentetur*, and *inclamet*,⁶⁶ and his *crepat* (2.1170) is echoed by the *increpet* of Nature.⁶⁷

We have, here, I believe, two satirist-like figures, or perhaps proto-satirists, anticipating the satiric speaker *Natura Rerum* in book 3. Though these lines at the end of book 2 are not comic, they do otherwise fit in with one of the primary characteristics of a satiric speaker, the moralizing critique of contemporary faults; their agricultural failures could perhaps be taken as a claim of their abject status. They are witnesses of the decay and imperfection of the modern world. Again, as with the subsequent “civic satires” in *DRN* books 3–6, the satire at the end of the second book derives from and rounds off the

⁶⁶ *Queratur*: 3.953 (952 in the numbering of Rouse & Smith [1975]); *lamentetur*: 950 (953 in the numbering of Rouse & Smith); *inclamet*: 951 (954 in the numbering of Rouse & Smith).

⁶⁷ *DRN* 3.933; 3.951 (954 in the numbering of Rouse & Smith [1975]).

major philosophical argument that it follows, in this case the mortality and eventual decay of all things, even the earth, that are made up of eternally indivisible atoms.

The farmers' complaint betrays an anxiety about their very livelihood, dependent upon the land, an anxiety ultimately in conflict with Epicurean ἀταραξία. The decline in agricultural productivity stands in for the increasing problems of this troubled time for the Roman fatherland (*patriai tempore iniquo*, 1.41). These problems have spread into another area of civic life, agricultural hinterlands, a realm that, though perhaps physically peripheral to the urban concerns of *ciuitas*, nevertheless plays an important part in the composition of the Roman state.

These five satiric book-ends are, I say again, civic satires.⁶⁸ They are, that is, embedded in the cultural and social surroundings and assumptions of Republican Rome. First, the concerns over death and love and so forth that the Lucretian persona combats are in many ways all very Roman, from the funerary customs and the hell-on-earth that is political ambition to the question of the wife's conception and the cosmetic *cultus* of the *meretrix*.⁶⁹ Second, the passages offer a social critique, with mockery and blame as appropriate, in an apparent attempt at improving (Roman, civic) social life. Though Rome is not so explicitly present here in *DRN* as in the satires of Horace (e.g., *Serm.* 1.9) or Juvenal (e.g., poem 3), the City lies behind—and its citizens are the targets of—the satiric

⁶⁸ Cf. Gale [1994a: 228; emphasis added]: “[a]ll six books of the *DRN* (with the possible exception of book 5) end in darkness, with death and decay and *human folly*,” and see also Minadeo [1965] and Müller [1978].

⁶⁹ Funerary customs: *DRN* 3.870–893. Hell on earth: 3.978–1023. Wives and conception: 4.1263–1267. Cosmetic care of the body: e.g., 4.1185–1186. These passages are, I add as a corollary, realistic/mimetic.

critique, just as in the Lucilian satire on which *DRN* draws and as in the satiric tradition that follows and in many instances draws on *DRN* in turn.

These Lucretian civic satires furthermore take part in a symbiotic relationship with *DRN*'s broader philosophical program. Their effect is to advance *DRN*'s Epicurean message, and the Epicurean teaching likewise informs the reader that the passages are in fact satiric. “[T]he Epicurean narrative of nature is necessary for understanding the civic satire, and the civic satire lets the Epicurean natural narrative play a role in the contemporary intellectual crisis at Rome.”⁷⁰ Critics might find obscenity and be scandalized by it in the passage on love and sex in book 4, or take umbrage at *Natura Rerum*'s harsh words to the addressee in book 3, or be shocked and appalled by the poem's plague-ridden conclusion. But, I add, for the competent reader, the one who “gets” what the speaker is “up to,” who has comprehended not only the philosophic but also the satiric import of enjoyment in soldiers' and sailors' misfortunes, these passages are satire. The satires moreover link physics to ethics—Epicurean physics to the moral superiority of Epicurean ethics over at least some aspects of traditional Roman values—and thereby they make *DRN* relevant to Roman political and intellectual audiences. These satires on civic life are vital for *DRN*'s success.

We can thus see once more that satire is indispensable to *DRN*. The poem is indeed intrinsically dependent on satire, both in extended passages of satiric invective and in smaller satiric points sprinkled throughout the work. We can, for instance, link the civic satires with the poem's other important satiric episodes. For example, the *suaue*

⁷⁰ Minyard [1985: 61]. Cf. also Kenney [1971: 19]: “the satirical approach was suggested—indeed dictated—by the work in hand, the attack on folly, error and superstition.”

mari magno proem to book 2 (cf. pp. 155–157 and 233–237, above) is a passage that also exhibits a civic-minded approach, a passage that also places Epicurean *templa serena* above (geographically, morally, and intellectually) characteristically Roman endeavors like war, political competition (*certare ingenio, contendere nobilitate*, 2.11), and acquisition of wealth (*ad summas emergere opes rerumque potiri*, 2.13). And it is a passage picked up by a later satirist, Juvenal, for the theme of an entire poem (pp. 254–262, above).

So also with the invective against the Presocratics in late book 1, familiar to us from chapters 2 and 3, where *DRN*'s speaker satirizes earlier philosophers on account of their intellectual flaws and failures. By comprehending the error of these opposing worldviews, would-be Epicureans can better understand Epicurus' own worldview, and thus learn how to eschew worldly concerns and achieve ἀταραξία. The path to psychological serenity and ethical living, in other words, is through a proper understanding of the universe's material composition and thence of the irrelevance to our lives of death, passion, the gods, and the sufferings of this mortal coil. Problems in the social and the emotional can be corrected by intervention in the intellectual—and, therefore, intellectual polemic can amount to a moralistic civic satire.

So *DRN* places, in five programmatically important positions, extended satiric passages intrinsically engaged in the kind of satiric civic discourse that Lucretius' poem shares with the Roman genre of *satira*. As Belliotti writes, “[b]oth Cicero and Lucretius, contemporaries living in a time of political crisis, concluded that philosophy could explain and remedy Rome's social ills” [2009: 102]. And one significant means by which Lucretius' poem puts its message of Epicurean philosophy into direct contact with Ro-

man social and political problems is by ending every book in the poem (after the first) with civic-minded satiric sketches that invoke, critique, or reflect the institutions of Roman culture and the apparatus of Roman *ciuitas*. These passages not only tie a satiric bow around the scientific inquiries that precede them but also anchor the poem's broader systematic use of the satiric mode, a satiric voice, and the generic tropes of Roman satire.

Conclusion to chapter 5

Lucretius' *DRN* exploits several important *topoi* that it shares with Roman satire. These generic tropes include philosophy, food, and civic discourse. Philosophy and satire form a two-way street, as the philosophical poem *DRN* picks up on satiric techniques and topics, while satire not only mocks philosophers and prominently adopts atomistic imagery but also engages more fundamentally with philosophical questions and concerns, in a satiric-philosophic inquiry that underlies much of Horace's *Sermones* and Persius' poems alike. Persius 1.1 alludes to *DRN* 2.14 and thereby calls up *DRN* as both satiric and philosophic predecessor; Juvenal poem 12 contains an extended allusion, previously uncommented upon, to the proem to *DRN* book 2, and features a respectable Epicurean response by a character thrust into the second-party position of the *suaue mari magno* scene, the sailor in trouble at sea. Satiric reception and reappropriation of Lucretian *elementa*, and the satiric depiction of teaching, show the complications of didaxis in Augustan and imperial Rome.

The message about food—much more prominent in satire than in *DRN*—is, in both sets of poetry, to take what is enough, not to overload: e.g., *DRN* book 4, or the picnic passage in early book 2, and the end of *Serm.* 1.1, where the image of the *conuiuia* draws on and refigures an image from *DRN* book 3. Juvenal poem 5’s belly-enslaved client synthesizes the two. The City looms behind the poetry of Lucilius, Horace, Persius, Juvenal, and *DRN*. Lucretius’ poem and Roman satire share a civic discourse, touching on issues of citizenship, civic life, and the Roman state, the Roman *ciuitas*. This civic discourse is a literary exploration of sociopolitical concerns, and both *DRN* and satire not only identify problems but also offer solutions to them; in *DRN*, the solution is Epicurean natural and ethical philosophy.

I suggest that the civic discourse of satire, and of the satiric tracts of Lucretius’ poem, comprise a kind of σπουδαιογέλοιον, a poetic melange of humorous and serious elements that communicate a moralizing message.⁷¹ This phenomenon is evident most prominently in the satires on civic life, derived from and complementary to the Epicurean physics of *DRN*, that conclude books 2–6 of the poem and programmatically anchor the poem’s engagement with Graeco-Roman satire, both as mode and as genre. The combi-

⁷¹ The term σπουδαιογέλοιον is prefigured in Aristophanes—*Frogs* 391–392: πολλὰ μὲν γέλοιά μ’ εἰπεῖν, πολλὰ δὲ σπουδαῖα, “that I [may/should/do] say many funny things, but many serious things as well”—but was not in and of itself in use prior to Strabo (as Plaza [2006: 27–29 and esp. n. 65] argues). Cf. also Plato *Laws* 816d–e: “for without funny things, it is not possible to learn the serious things, if a man is going to be sensible in some way,” ἄνευ γὰρ γελοίων τὰ σπουδαῖα...μαθεῖν μὲν οὐ δυνατόν, εἰ μέλλει τι φρόνιμος ἔσεσθαι.

On the concept of σπουδαιογέλοιον, see Fiske [1920: 209 n. 1], Giangrande [1972: 15–19], Ercolani [2002], and Zimmermann [2005], who discusses σπουδαιογέλοιον in Aristophanes as a tool for social health (“sozialhygienische Funktion”). I have made an argument similar to Zimmermann’s, for the use of religious ritual in the comedy of Menander and Plautus: Gellar-Goad [2008: 180–181].

nation of all these concerns is, I suggest, particularly Roman. Consequently, we may see that *DRN*, an unusual innovation in the traditions of Epicurean philosophy and Roman poetry, joins Roman satire as “entirely ours,” entirely Roman, *tota nostra*.⁷²

DRN in the tradition of Roman satira

Lucretius’ poem is not properly a member of the genre of Roman satire, but it exerts, as we have seen, an important influence on later satire, and draws on earlier satire and satire’s generic tropes in important ways. As Kenney has written, “Lucretius not only produced a profoundly original poem; he also laid the foundations of a tradition of satirical writing that has flourished down to modern times” [1971: 15]. Like satire, *DRN*’s characteristic flavor is Roman, despite the Lucretian *ego*’s espousal and exposition of Greek philosophy. The speaker in fact presents his own work as a mixture of sublime and difficult, of high and low—akin to satire, which can be thought of as a literary “potpourri,” as we saw in chapter 4 (pp. 199–200), above. The satiric tropes, passages, themes, and techniques of *DRN* are integral to the poem. The text depends on them.

In chapter 4 we also saw that Lucretius’ poem adopts and adapts many aspects of Lucilian satire in its own satiric passages, and can thus in some respects be considered an heir to Lucilius’ satiric poetics and Lucilius’ poetic authority. I suggest that we should see *DRN* as a detour on the generic path of Roman satire, a by-way on the main road that leads from Lucilius to Horace’s *Sermones*, Persius, and Juvenal. Compared to Lucilius, the satiric attacks in *DRN* are significantly toned down, and dovetail with the sensibilities (and also subject matter) of much of Horatian satire. Compared to Lucilius, the satiric

⁷² From Quintilian *Institutio Oratoria* 10.1.93 (cited at p. 199 and n. 1, above).

attacks in *DRN* turn the gaze inward, in a more reflective way: the speech of *Natura Rerum* pushes readers to reevaluate their own perceptions of death, their own desires in life, and following the speech the Lucretian speaker puts words into the mouth of the reader, or at least of the fictive addressee. Persius adopts *DRN*'s inward-turned gaze as a characteristic of his own satire—satire that draws importantly on *DRN* and alludes to it in the programmatic first line of Persius' first poem. At the same time, as Kenney argues, Juvenal's satire owes to the "Lucretian amalgamation of genres [viz., diatribe and didactic epos]...the foundation of a new school of satirical writing in the 'high' or 'tragic' vein" [1971: 19–20].

DRN offers a source for specific influences on later satire, as well. We can think of the pervasive allusion to Lucretius' poem in *Sermones* book 1, and "the importance of the *DRN* for Horace's *Satires*" more generally.⁷³ We can also think of the Lucretian allusions and context in Persius 1.1 or Juvenal poem 12, as discussed above. Scholars have identified other satiric references to *DRN*: Dudley, for example, argues that Juvenal 6.460–473, on female cosmetics and *cultus*, imitates *DRN* 4.1185–1190, the unveiling of women's behind-the-scenes life, their *postscaenia uitae* [1965b: 125–126], while Kenney, commenting on *DRN* 3.1068–1069 ("so everyone runs away from himself, but sure enough, as it turns out, he can't hardly escape from his own self, so he sticks to himself unwillingly/thanklessly and hates himself," *hoc se quisque modo fugit, at quem scilicet, ut fit, | effugere haud potis est, ingratis haeret et odit*), points to the poem's "position near the source of the Roman tradition of diatribe satire" [1971: 240–241]. The passage in

⁷³ Hardie, discussing *Serm.* 1.1.25–26 [2007: 125, and 126 for additional references].

DRN book 4 on love and sex has even been shown to be an inspiration for parts of Ovid's erotic elegy.⁷⁴

Masks and morality

So, as we have seen, satire and *DRN* hold shared goals and affinities. They both critique vice. They both instruct, or claim to instruct, and use a didactic stance (whether a stance originating in the mode of satire or one originating in “formal” didactic, cf. p. 20, above). And they both purport to offer moral utility, to indicate a path towards moral betterment.

I would like to emphasize the connections here between satire, Lucretius' poem, and (Graeco-Roman) comedy more generally.⁷⁵ Redfield writes that “comedy is life-affirming” [2008: 13]. The comedies of Aristophanes and Menander, and to a certain ex-

⁷⁴ De Caro calls Ovid *Amores* 1.10.17–30 “predicatorio” and “satirico-morale,” and finds a possible allusion to *DRN* 4.1197–1208 [2007: 58]; Smith states that *Ars Amatoria* has a basic goal of manipulating women's behavior, a goal that “picks up on a theme from Lucretius *De rerum natura* 4” [2005b: 11]. Cf. also the “anti-Lucretian didactics” of Shulman [1981: *passim*, esp. 242]: Ovid *Ars Amatoria* and *Remedia Amoris* “boldly burlesque the dispassionate nature of the Epicurean philosopher and stress the limitations of reason in human nature by ironically echoing the precepts of the *De rerum natura*.”

⁷⁵ The theater is a literary ancestor of Roman satire, the authors of which (particularly the Horace-*ego*) regularly affirm themselves as heirs to the tradition of Aristophanic Old Comedy. On Lucilius and Aristophanes, see Zimmermann [2001]; on Lucilius and Roman comedy, Auhagen [2001]. For satire, comedy, and theater more generally, see, among others, Graf [2005: 192], Keane [2006: ch. 1], and Cucchiarelli [2009]. In *DRN* theater serves as a metaphor or an illustration for the speaker's moralizing discourse, as when the awnings or shade-curtains of theatrical spaces are mentioned in a discussion of the mechanisms of color (4.75–85) and of the generation of thunder's sound (6.108–113).

tent also those of Plautus,⁷⁶ enact the formation of a new or improved citizen society, through the resolution of familial crises, the creation of interfamilial ties through marriage, and the promised production of citizen children, the vehicle for the continuance of the *ciuitas*.⁷⁷ The comedies of Aristophanes and Menander, that is, affirm life. Satire, too, which in both Horace and Persius claims as its predecessor Greek Old Comedy, is in essence life-affirming. The people and bodies and social structures it depicts are regularly grotesque, corrupt, decaying, and downright cruel, but the expressed aims of the satirist are as life-affirming as the expressed purposes of the stock plots of New Comedy.

Epicureanism, too, is life-affirming: it is a philosophy whose basic *raison d'être* the question “what is the good life?,” and whose answer to that question is one that does not demand harsh asceticism or cynical rejection of social life or skepticism about intellectual knowledge and value judgments. Epicurean precepts encourage a self-initiated withdrawal from the harmful parts of life, without requiring total isolation from civic life. *DRN*, a poem of Epicurean philosophy that also draws substantially on comedy and satire, likewise affirms life. From the foibles of lovers to the faults of the Presocratics, Lucretius’ poem is intrinsically caught up in the ultimate shared trait of satire and its own Epicurean ideology: a comic affirmation of human life, both the good parts and the bad.

A final observation: satire is about removing masks and lifting veils. Lucilius’ satiric verse called out hypocrites and furtive criminals, Horace’s speaker reveals the truth with a laugh, Persius’ programmatic satire uncovers a truth so momentous (everyone in

⁷⁶ Terence, by contrast, dramatizes the social crises of the family that are encoded in the genre of New Comedy, and so I deliberately exclude him from my statement here. See, e.g., James [1998] and Gellar-Goad [forthcoming].

⁷⁷ Cf., e.g., Lape [2004].

Rome has ass' ears, 1.121) that the satirist must share it only with a hole in the ground, and Juvenal systematically unmask the decadence and the injustice of Rome in his age. So, also, with *DRN*'s Epicurean philosophy, both physical and ethical. The fictive narrative of Lucretius' poem goes through a revelatory process, in which the truths about the nature of the universe, and concomitant truths about human behaviors and human society, are imparted. And both *DRN* and satire have the goal of social/civic improvement, even though at times they go about it in much different ways.

Near the beginning of the third book of *DRN*, the Lucretian *ego* writes that many people do not match their actions to their words:

quo magis in dubiis hominem spectare periclis
conuenit aduersisque in rebus noscere qui sit;
nam uerae uoces tum demum pectore ab imo
eliciuntur et eripitur persona, manet res.

(*DRN* 3.55–58)

And so it's more appropriate to examine a man in uncertain dangers and to recognize what kind of person he is in unfavorable circumstances, because that's at last when his true voices are drawn out from the depths of his heart—and the mask is torn away, the thing remains.

The mask—the *persona* (line 58)—is removed, the true thing, the *res*, the subject of *DRN*'s whole inquiry, remains in plain view.⁷⁸ This unveiling or unmasking takes place *in dubiis periclis* (55) and *aduersis in rebus* (56), at times of peril, of adversity, like perhaps when one is having trouble at sea (and Juvenal poem 12 does show us the true mettle of “Catullus,” removes his mask of luxury trader, and shows us instead, I argue, a man with well-rooted values and even potentially Epicurean sensibilities). These lines from

⁷⁸ Navaud [2011: 207] discusses Montaigne's adaptation of the theatrical metaphor in these lines.

early in *DRN* book 3 capture the essence of satire, and the essence of the satiric poetics in *DRN*. Moreover, adopting a poetic persona in the way satire does, in the way *DRN* does, calls attention to the masks or personae that others wear. Just as news satire outlets like the online newspaper *The Onion* or the American television program *The Daily Show* use their façades as media outlets to satirize and critique the news media itself—to unmask their own uncritical, sensationalist, at times hypocritical façades—so also do the speakers of Roman satire, and of *DRN*, adopt an exaggerated, self-undercutting, at times offensive persona, to draw attention to the masks and veils that the unseemly or unjust or un-atractive elements of their own societies bear.

CONCLUSION

“[T]he two great symbols with which Lucretius begins and ends his poems are susceptible to many interpretations, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. I believe that this polyvalency is intentional, and that we should therefore admit any explanation which seems consistent with the text and with the poem as a whole.”
Gale [1994a: 209]

“Stop organizing life around the people who don’t get the joke.”
Maher [2011]

*plures post nostram memoriam
nascentes cum Lucretio uidebuntur
uelut coram de rerum natura disputare*
“Many men born beyond my time will seem
to discuss/argue with Lucretius openly,
as it were, about the Nature of Things.”
Vitruvius 9 pr. 17

This study has examined in systematic fashion how satire is important to Lucretius’ *De Rerum Natura* and how *DRN* is important to satire. The two traditions of classical satire—the mode of satire, a set of textual techniques that begin with archaic Greek poetry and extend into the modern world; and the Roman genre of satire, the *satura* of Ennius, Lucilius, Horace, Persius, and Juvenal—not only influence the literary and rhetorical functions of Lucretius’ poem but also are themselves affected by Lucretian

intervention into the traditions. Whereas a trend dominant in earlier Lucretian studies (yet still present in some contemporary scholarly voices) postulates a Lucretius disengaged from his literary milieu who struggles unsuccessfully to contain rival literary and philosophical impulses within a single unified work, I see instead a poet in command of his tradition and in control of his own poetic output, a poet with mastery and self-mastery akin to that of Vergil or Ovid. Towards this end, my work here has shown an author in command of a longstanding tradition of satiric poetry and a newer, fully Roman genre—an author whose output influences the development of that genre in profound ways.

In chapter 2 I drew a portrait of the satirist in the Graeco-Roman mode of satire. Satirists of all periods can be characterized by certain common traits, as scholarship on classical and modern literature shows: a personal voice or persona, the use of comic mockery, justified indignation that prompts criticism of some fault or flaw, a self-contradictory pose of social or literary abjection that is paired with claims of the moral high ground, and the tendency to foment a collusive relationship between satirist and audience, who join in laughter at both the satiric target and the act of satiric mockery. The result of the collusive relationship is a divided audience: an in-group and an out-group, readers of the satire who “get it” and readers who “don’t get it.” Lucretius’ primary speaker frequently adopts the pose of a satirist, and with it each of these characteristic traits. A major target for the Lucretian satirist is the multitude of incorrect beliefs and behaviors from which people who do not adhere to Epicurean philosophy suffer. Important examples include the refutation of the Presocratics in *DRN* book 1 and the attack on the foibles of erotically impassioned lovers in book 4. Through the speaker’s rough treatment of the poem’s nominal addressee—the doltish Memmius—the reader is pushed

into colluding with the speaker in his satiric mockery. The speaker's satire often supports his philosophical argumentation, particularly in the various instances of *reductio ad absurdum* of a rival philosophical explanation or reasoning, but on occasion threatens to undercut the speaker's own credibility as a fair-minded advocate of Epicurean doctrine. In book 3, the Lucretius depicts for us a personification of *Natura Rerum* herself—and she is a satirist. Her satiric mockery of those who are afraid of death, and her own grandeur as the entirety of material existence, lends a sense of greater authority to the arguments propounded by *DRN*'s main speaker. Through her, he carries more weight and can argue more persuasively (and more satirically) against his targets.

The components of the mode of satire are uniquely difficult to pin down, but in chapter 3 we focused on four main characteristics. Satire on an essential level possesses an object (the target or problem that generates the satiric impulse), a formal antecedent (a model for the discourse or format of the satire), humor (particularly irony and parody), and ambiguity, an elusiveness that fosters the aforementioned division of the satiric readership into “gets it” and “doesn't get it” crowds. *DRN*'s object in particular is *religio*, which is in some sense the source of the other problems and anxieties that the Lucretian *ego* combats. Formal antecedents for *DRN* include the genre of Roman *satura*, the medium of hexameter poetry, and what I have suggested is the “discourse” (rather than genre) of diatribe; *DRN* employs and exploits ambiguity on linguistic and philosophical levels, in a way that complicates a simple philosophical or literary reading of the poem. Satire as well generally tends to adopt a didactic pose, but one in which countervailing opinions or arguments are presented in a distorted way. In other words: satire creates straw men. These distortions reflect a basic tension in satire between didactic and comic

impulses and priorities. In Lucretius' poem, the Presocratic philosophers (especially Anaxagoras) are a perfect example of straw men, for the poem's speaker distorts their philosophies to make seem more ridiculous and less credible than perhaps they should seem. The tension between satire and didactic—which can be seen as analogous to tensions between poetry and philosophy—is not so prominent in *DRN*, where the didactic pose comes before the satiric. The Lucretian speaker maps the collusive satirist-audience relationship onto the preexisting didactic relation between teacher and student.

Chapters 4 and 5 turned from the satiric mode to the actual Roman genre of satire. In chapter 4, I traced a number of possible Lucretian allusions to Ennius' nearly nonexistent *Saturae*—perhaps most intriguingly, a connection between Lucretius' personification of *Natura Rerum* and the Ennian personification of Life in combat with Death. *DRN*'s allusions to the poetry of Lucilius, the founding father of Roman satire, are more numerous and more substantial, in line with the larger quantity of fragments surviving in the Lucilian corpus. In both instances, *DRN*'s gestures to earlier satire not only flag his own work as satiric in its own right but also grant to the Lucretian *ego* a kind of poetic and social authority and efficacy.

The fifth and final chapter considered the afterlife of Lucretian satire. Each of the major satirists after the appearance of *DRN*—Horace (in *Sermones*), Persius, Juvenal—makes a number of concrete and programmatically significant allusions to Lucretius, and each in his own way recasts *DRN*'s philosophic take on satire into a satiric take on philosophy. References to Lucretius' poem in *Sermones* are many, and well-discussed in Horatian scholarship; I focused on how the Horace-*ego* appropriates and repurposes Lucretian atoms/letters (*elementa*) for his own purposes, and is in turn followed by similar

satiric uses of the alphabet in Persius and Juvenal. The very first line of Persius poem 1, I suggested, is a “window reference” to Lucilius through an allusion to *DRN*. And Juvenal poem 12, I argued, enacts the Lucretian “*suaue mari magno*” scene upon the Juvenalian character Catullus, who, after getting himself into un-Epicurean troubles, nevertheless manages to react to them in an Epicurean way, by discarding all his luxury merchandise and even his trading ship’s mast in order to make it back to the safety of the shore. We also looked at a shared “civic discourse” between satire and *DRN*, and explored the endings of *DRN* books 2–6, endings that I believe are satires on Roman civic life (failed farming in book 2, politics and ambition in book 3, elegiac love in book 4, human social customs in book 5, and the breakdown of society in the face of plague in book 6).

A thread that has appeared throughout this study concerns a satiric interpretation of the proem to Lucretius’ second book, wherein the speaker claims that it is pleasurable to see troubles at sea, or battles, or the struggles of ambitious politicians, from a safe position of philosophical high ground. In chapter 2, we saw that this high ground is both intellectual and moral and shows the Lucretian *ego* modeling for the reader a satiric speaking position: like the audience of satire, the reader of *DRN* is invited to join the speaker in looking down with scorn upon the flawed and blameworthy victims of ambition and greed and the fear of death. Furthermore, this passage (as I pointed out in chapter 3) illustrates the safety and isolation offered by the satirist to his audience, safety that allows the audience to collude with the satirist in his mockery. I also offered a metapoetic, metasatiric reading of the proem, whereby the act of looking down upon the foibles of un-Epicurean people stands in for the act of reading *DRN*, which itself displays just

such foibles—and, just as it is “pleasurable” (*suaue, dulcius*) to look down upon these people, it is pleasurable to read *DRN*.

Chapter 4 discussed how the proem to *DRN* book 2, with its emphasis on the Epicurean ataractic pleasure of seeing from a position of carefree isolation, alludes to Lucilius fr. H.41, the description of ambitious Romans hustling and bustling through the Forum day and night.¹ This allusion draws out the moralizing overtones of Lucilius’ fragment, allows the Lucretian speaker to discuss explicitly the implications of the rejection of political ambitions (where the Lucilius-*ego* seems to have left such implications unsaid), reinforces the civic message of *DRN*, and grants the authority of an aristocratic Roman citizen (i.e., Lucilius) to the Epicurean’s advocacy of seclusion from public life. I proceeded in chapter 5 to discuss an allusion to Lucretius’ second proem in Juvenal poem 12: when Juvenal’s “Catullus” is shipwrecked, the Juvenalian satirist and his audience take on the subject position of the proem to *DRN* book 2, with Epicureans looking down upon others’ struggles at sea, and Catullus himself responds to his dire straits by ditching the luxury cargo unnecessary for sustaining an Epicurean life. Through this allusion, Juvenal poem 12 fuses more explicitly the satiric and philosophic content that is evident in the Lucretian proem.

What is missing from this study? Though I have considered in much detail *DRN*’s substantial and meaningful engagement both with the cross-temporal mode of satire and with the specific genre of Roman verse satire from Lucilius (and Ennius) through Juvenal—and thus given greater weight to statements such as Kenney’s claim that *DRN*

¹ H.41C = 1228–1234M = 1145–1151W = 1252–1258K. For these abbreviations, see p. xii, above.

“laid the foundations of a tradition of satirical writing that has flourished down to modern times” [1971: 15]—I have not considered the possible influence of satiric prose and prosimetric sources on Lucretian satire. Future extensions of my work here could also profitably examine the connections between *DRN* and the Menippean satire of Varro, as well as Greek antecedents (including Callimachus), both to Varro and to the “diatribe”-like passages of Lucretius’ own poem. Similarly, Lucretius’ contemporary Cicero is an author who engages in satiric invective and comic mockery (in his oratory, most notably in works like *Pro Caelio*, *Pro Archia*, and *In Pisonem*; and think also of his discussion of humor in *De Oratore* 2.217–290), in philosophical doxography (which occasionally includes the distortion of opposing or rival viewpoints), and in literary polemic. For instance, Cicero’s use of personification, as with the prosopopoeia of Appius Claudius Caecus (whom Cicero has inveigh against Clodius in *Pro Caelio*), may help augment our understanding of the *Natura Rerum* passage in Lucretius’ third book. More complex modern theories of satire, such as the “reception analysis” method of Johnson et al. [2010], may also be useful heuristic devices for enriching my discussion of satire and *DRN*.²

Furthermore, while I have considered specific allusions to *DRN* in Horace, Persius, and Juvenal, and more general interactions between *DRN*’s satiric philosophy and the Roman satirists’ often-philosophical satire, there is more work to be done on the satiric reception of Lucretius’ poem. There may be more Lucretian intertexts to be found in the later satirists, and likewise the inclusion of other satiric works (particularly Ovid’s

² One of the conclusions of Johnson et al., for instance, is “that viewers who ‘miss the joke’ may still ‘get the message’ ” [2010: 396], a conclusion that may have profound ramifications for my construct of the “get it” and “don’t get it” crowds.

Ars Amatoria) in these considerations can develop a more holistic picture of the role of *DRN* in the Roman satiric poetic tradition. One potentially major avenue of inquiry along these lines is the connection between Lucretian satire and Vergil's *Georgics*. Kronenberg situates *Georgics* in the tradition of Menippean satires (including, in her estimation, Varro's *De Re Rustica* and Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*) and views Vergil's poem as itself an instantiation of satire [2009: ch. 6]. While her study treats *DRN* essentially as what might be called a straight man, a more or less serious antecedent against which *Georgics* plays out its satire, my study's discussion of satire in *DRN* may support and extend her observations. *Georgics*' engagement with Lucretius' poem—which, like *Georgics* itself, a recent work of philosophical didactic poetry blended with satire³—may place Vergil's work not only in the tradition of (previously prose) Menippean satire, but also in the poetic tradition of satire, through Lucretius to Lucilius and Ennius.

Divided audiences in Catullus, Stephen Colbert, and *DRN*

A recurrent theme in the pictures of satire and of Lucretius' *DRN* that we have seen in this study is the matter of the divided audience, and I offer here in closing a glance at one way we might conceive of this divided audience in *DRN*. Satirists divide their readers or listeners into (at least) two groups: those who “get it” and those who “don't get it,” those who join the satirist in collusive laughter at the satirized target and

³ And, as Gale points out, “[i]n writing the *DRN*, Lucretius was to all intents and purposes reviving a dead genre,” one that had fallen out of favor, notwithstanding the didactic-style exercises of the Hellenistic poets Aratus and Nicander [1994a: 50].

those who reject the satiric mockery, those who undertake the satirist's poetic initiation and those who do not. The reader of a satiric work must choose one of two (or more) paths to follow as a reader. Often, the choice is unfair: to choose to side with the satirized over the satirizing is to choose to be mocked, or to be associated with something or somebody blameworthy. But the choice creates a divided audience, and can point attention to this very divide.

Let us consider briefly two unusual instances of divided audiences. First, take Catullus poem 56, given here in its entirety:

o rem ridiculam, Cato, et iocosam,
dignamque auribus et tuo cachinno!
ride quidquid amas, Cato, Catullum:
res et ridicula et nimis iocosa.
“deprendi modo pupulum puellae
trusantem; hunc ego, si placet Dionae,
pro telo rigida mea cecidi.”

Oh, Cato, what a hilarious and funny thing I've got for you, one worthy of your ears and your cackle! Laugh, Cato, to the extent that you love Catullus—the thing I've got for you's hilarious and just *too* funny: “I just now caught a schoolboy humping [his? my?] girlfriend...and, if it pleases Dione, I cut him down not with a weapon,⁴ but...with my *boner!*”

What is funny about this poem? The joke that the Catullus-*ego* promises is not particularly hilarious, and appears to be a straightforward sexual one-liner (three-liner, rather).⁵

But the poem is not merely the joke. The poem is the three-line joke with four lines of

⁴ The phrase “not with a weapon” renders the manuscript reading *pro telo* in the last line; if, with Housman [1931: 402] and others, we instead read *protelo* (a word attested at *DRN* 2.531 and 4.190), the last line would read: “I cut him down [put him in his place?] with my boner in a three-way row!” See further Quinn [1970: 255], Thomson [1997/1978: 340 *ad loc.*].

⁵ Cf. Tanner [1972: 506–507]: “there seems nothing in the situation which could be described as *ridicula* or *iocosa*.”

preface, a preface directed at a certain Cato. This “Cato” may (or may not⁶) be Cato the Younger, a contemporary of Catullus who was considered an extreme exemplar of strict traditional Roman morals. If so, I suggest, the poem is funny because it is a totally inappropriate joke for the addressee. Cato the Younger, or at least his severe public persona, would very much not appreciate such scandalous humor. The poem’s reader is given a choice between two audiences, between those who react merely to the joke—and find it either amusing or, with Cato, unsavory—and those who react to the larger circumstances presented in the poem, by joining with the Catullan speaker in laughing at not only the joke but also the fact that the speaker has (intentionally) addressed such a joke to such an incongruent recipient.⁷

This interpretation of Catullus poem 56 can be compared profitably to the appearance of satiric comedian Stephen Colbert at the 2006 White House Correspondents Dinner on invitation from the George W. Bush Administration and the White House Press Corps Association. As we saw in chapter 2 (pp. 60–61, above), different viewers of Colbert’s television show *The Colbert Report* perceive the objects of Colbert’s satiric mockery as either liberals or conservatives, depending on the viewers’ own political allegiances. Liberals see Colbert’s hyperbolic right-wing persona as mockery of conservative blowhards, and conservatives see Colbert as a satiric double agent, mocking liberals

⁶ Thomson points out that the Cato in the poem may be Valerius Cato, a poetic colleague of Catullus and a member of the Neoterics; and that Cato the Younger (according to the testimony of Plutarch *Cato Minor* 7) wrote iambics, which may make him a less unsuitable recipient than one might think [1997/1978: 339 *ad loc.*].

⁷ This point is derived from a discussion that I had about Catullus poem 56 with the students in my Latin 204 course in the spring of 2011; I thank in particular Jeremy Gerlach for his contribution to the discussion. Cf. also Clarke [2002: 171]: “Catullus write[s] the poem to offend Cato—and amuse his more worldly friends...Catullus’s address to the reader...[can] scandalize or amuse the viewer.”

while tricking them into believing that he is one himself. When the Bush Administration invited Colbert to host the Correspondents Dinner in 2006, it did so with the belief that his humor was in fact pro-conservative, as pointed out by LaMarre et al. [2009: 228]. Colbert proceeded to deliver the keynote address in character, with a viciously satiric “tribute” to the Bush Administration’s failures and flaws (in front of President George W. Bush himself), and scathing mockery of the press.

Colbert’s performance was not well received in the room itself, as attested by Cohen [2006b] and many others, but was an immediate success online, with more than 2.7 million views of the speech on YouTube within two days, according to the reporting of Cohen [2006a]. Though the Bush Administration officials and members of the press did not react warmly to Colbert’s speech, his regular television viewership—whom he calls the “Colbert Nation”—did. And the Colbert Nation was Colbert’s true audience: his performance was not for the Correspondents Dinner attendees, but rather they formed part of his performance for a wider audience, who joined with him in the satiric mockery of the Bush Administration officials and media potentates in the room. “Colbert wasn’t playing to the room...but to the wide audience of people who would later watch on the Internet. If anything, he was playing against the room—part of the frisson of his performance was the discomfort he generated in the audience.”⁸

This situation closely mirrors Catullus poem 56. In both instances, the satiric speaker delivers inappropriate jokes to a nominal audience that will not receive it well. The true audience derives humor both from the content and from the inappropriateness of the satirist’s delivery of such jokes to the immediate, nominal audience. The Catullus-

⁸ Poniewozik [2006].

ego makes a sex joke that will irritate Cato, and the readers laugh with the *ego* at Cato; the Colbert persona gives a speech that bothers members and supporters of the Bush Administration, and the Colbert Nation laughs with the persona at them. Cato, the Correspondents Dinner attendees, and the news reporters who described Colbert's performance as unsuccessful all fall into the "don't get it" crowd, the object of collusive laughter for the satirist and the "get it" crowd.

Lucretius' poem, we have seen, exploits just such a divided audience. Perhaps we can conceive of a "Lucretius Nation," a readership or audience already familiar with the philosophical doctrines and rivals of Epicureanism who can appreciate the satiric distortions of opposing viewpoints, a readership that sits with the Lucretian *ego* upon the secluded heights of philosophy and satirically peers down with Epicurean pleasure at the uninitiated, the un-ataractic, and the unhappy. Now, unlike Colbert's speech, *DRN* did not have two million people participating in the second, real audience's laughter at the mockery of the nominal, internal audience. But as Henderson writes, "what you learn from your teachers depends on the lesson *you* read them as teaching" [1989: 112; emphasis preserved], and readers of *DRN* are faced with multiple readings, by which readers can join *DRN*'s speaker in his satiric mockery of incorrect beliefs and behaviors, or can fail, or can reject his philosophical message—and his satire—entirely, and end up the target of the Lucretian *ego*'s mockery of anataractic non-Epicureans.

WORKS CITED

Abbreviations

AAntHung	<i>Acta antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae</i>
A&A	<i>Antike und Abendland</i>
ACD	<i>Acta classica Universitatis Scientiarum Debreceniensis</i>
AJP	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
AncSoc	<i>Ancient Society</i>
ANRW	<i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt</i>
A&R	<i>Atene e Roma</i> (n. s. = new series)
AS	<i>Approaches to Semiotics</i>
ASNP	<i>Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa.</i>
AU	<i>Der altsprachliche Unterricht</i>
BACAP	<i>Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy</i>
BAGB	<i>Bulletin de l'association Guillaume Budé</i>
BMCR	<i>Bryn Mawr Classical Review</i>
BStudLat	<i>Bollettino di studi latini</i>
BT	<i>Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana</i>
CA	<i>Classical Antiquity</i>
CB	<i>Classical Bulletin</i>
CErc	<i>Cronache ercolanesi</i>
CJ	<i>The Classical Journal</i>
CP	<i>Classical Philology</i>
CQ	<i>The Classical Quarterly</i> (n. s. = new series)
CR	<i>The Classical Review</i> (n. s. = new series)
CSCA	<i>California Studies in Classical Antiquity</i>
CW	<i>The Classical World</i>
EAL	<i>Early American Literature</i>
EMC	<i>Échos du monde classique / Classical News and Views</i>
G&R	<i>Greece & Rome</i>
HSCP	<i>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology</i>
ICS	<i>Illinois Classical Studies</i>
IJCT	<i>International Journal of the Classical Tradition</i>
JHS	<i>The Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
LAL	<i>Linguistic Approaches to Literature</i>
LCM	<i>Liverpool Classical Monthly</i>

LICS	<i>Leeds International Classical Studies</i>
MD	<i>Materiali e discussioni per l'analisi dei testi classici</i>
MKNAW	<i>Mededelingen der koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen (AL = Afdeling Letterkunde; n. s. = new series)</i>
OLD	<i>Oxford Latin Dictionary</i>
PBA	<i>Proceedings of the British Academy</i>
PCP	<i>Pacific Coast Philology</i>
PCPS	<i>Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society</i>
PLLS	<i>Papers of the Leeds International Latin Seminar</i>
PP	<i>La parola del passato</i>
PQ	<i>Philological Quarterly</i>
RAAN	<i>Rendiconti dell'Accademia di Archeologia Lettere e Belle Arti di Napoli</i>
RCCM	<i>Rivista di cultura classica e medioevale</i>
REA	<i>Revue des études anciennes</i>
REG	<i>Revue des études grecques</i>
REL	<i>Revue des études latines</i>
RES	<i>The Review of English Studies (n. s. = new series)</i>
RFIC	<i>Rivista di filosofia e di istruzione classica</i>
SCI	<i>Scripta Classica Israelica</i>
SIFC	<i>Studi italiani di filologia classica</i>
SO	<i>Symbolae Osloenses</i>
SPC	<i>Studies in Popular Culture</i>
StudClas	<i>Studi classici</i>
StudUrb	<i>Studi urbinati di storia, filosofia, e letteratura</i>
TAPA	<i>Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association</i> <i>Transactions of the American Philological Association (new title)</i>
TLS	<i>Times Literary Supplement</i>
YES	<i>The Yearbook of English Studies</i>
ZPE	<i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik</i>

Ableitinger, Doris, and Helmut Gugel, edd. 1970. *Festschrift Karl Vretska. Zum 70. Geburtstag am 18. Okt. 1970 überreicht von seinen Freunden u. Schülern.* Heidelberg: C. Winter.

Acosta-Hughes, Benjamin, Christophe Cusset, Yannick Durbec, and Didier Pralon, edd. 2011. *Homère revisité. Parodie et humour dans les réécritures homériques.* Besançon, France: Presses universitaires de Franche-Comté.

Adamietz, Joachim. 1983. "Juvenals 12. Satire." Woronoff [1983: 237–248].

Adams, James Noel. 1982. *The Latin Sexual Vocabulary.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

- Adams, James Noel, and Roland G. Mayer, edd. 1999. *Aspects of the Language of Latin Poetry*. PBA 93.
- Adelman, Rebecca A. 2007. “‘Respek’: Misunderstanding, Humor, and Ethnicity in *Da Ali G Show*.” Antrim [2007: 106–132].
- Adkin, Neil. 2004–2005. “Juvenalia Stylistica.” *ACD* 40–41: 279–290.
- Adkin, Neil. 2008. “Three Notes on Juvenal’s Twelfth Satire.” *Philologus* 152.1: 128–137.
- Algra, Keimpe A., Pieter Willem Van der Horst, and David T. Runia, edd. 1996. *Polyhistor: Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy Presented to Jaap Mansfeld on His Sixtieth Birthday*. Series: *Philosophia antiqua* 72. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
- Algra, Keimpe A., M. H. Koenen, and Piet H. Schrijvers, edd. 1997. *Lucretius and his Intellectual Background: Proceedings of the colloquium, Amsterdam, 26–28 June 1996*. North-Holland, Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences.
- Allen, D. S. 2003. “Angry bees, wasps, and jurors: the symbolic politics of ὄργη in Athens.” Braund & Most [2003: 76–98].
- Allen, Walter, Jr. 1938. “On the Friendship of Lucretius with Memmius.” *CP* 33: 167–181.
- Anderson, William Scovil. 1958. “Persius 1. 107–10.” *CQ* n. s. 8.3–4: 195–197.
- Anderson, William Scovil. 1960. “Discontinuity in Lucretian Symbolism.” *TAPA* 91: 1–29.
- Anderson, William Scovil. 1963. *Pompey, His Friends, and the Literature of the First Century B.C.* Series: *University of California Publications in Classical Philology* 19.1. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Anderson, William Scovil. 1964. *Anger in Juvenal and Seneca*. Series: *University of California Publications in Classical Philology* 19.3. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Anderson, William Scovil. 1982. *Essays on Roman Satire*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Anderson, William Scovil. 1984. “Ironic Preambles and Satiric Self-Definition in Horace *Satire* 2.1.” *PCP* 19.1–2: 35–42.

- Anderson, William Scovil. 1993a. *Barbarian Play: Plautus' Roman Comedy*. Series: *The Robson Classical Lectures* 1. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Anderson, William Scovil. 1993b. Review of Segal [1990]. *AJP* 114.1: 166–169.
- Andreoni, Emanuela. 1979. “Sul contrasto ideologico fra il *De re publica* di Cicerone e il poema di Lucrezio (La genesi della società civile).” *D’Anna* [1979: 281–321].
- Antrim, Nancy Mae, ed. 2007. *Seeking Identity: Language in Society*. Newcastle, United Kingdom: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Armayer, O. Kimball. 1978. “Did Herodotus Ever Go to the Black Sea?” *HSCP* 82: 45–62.
- Armayer, O. Kimball. 1980. “Sesostris and Herodotus’ Autopsy of Thrace, Colchis, Inland Asia Minor, and the Levant.” *HSCP* 84: 53–74.
- Armayer, O. Kimball. 1985. *Herodotus’ Autopsy of the Fayoum: Lake Moeris and the Labyrinth of Egypt*. Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben.
- Armstrong, David. 1993. “The Addressees of the *Ars poetica*: Herculaneum, the Pisones and Epicurean Protreptic.” *MD* 31 (Mega nepios: *Il destinatario nell’epos didascalio*): 185–230.
- Armstrong, David. 1995. “The Impossibility of Metathesis: Philodemus and Lucretius on Form and Content in Poetry.” *Obbink* [1995: 210–232].
- Armstrong, David. 2004. “All Things to All Men: Philodemus’ Model of Therapy and the Audience of *De Morte*.” *Fitzgerald et al.* [2004: 15–54].
- Arnott, W. Geoffrey. 1972. “Parody and Ambiguity in Euripides’ *Cyclops*.” *Hanslik et al.* [1972: 21–30].
- Asmis, Elizabeth. 1982. “Lucretius’ Venus and Stoic Zeus.” *Hermes* 110: 458–470.
- Asmis, Elizabeth. 1991a. “Epicurean Poetics.” *BACAP* 7: 63–93, 104–105.
- Asmis, Elizabeth. 1991b. “Philodemus’s Poetic Theory and *On the Good King According to Homer*.” *CA* 10.1: 1–45.
- Asmis, Elizabeth. 1995. “Epicurean Poetics.” *Obbink* [1995: 15–34].
- Asmis, Elizabeth. 2008. “Lucretius’ New World Order: Making a Pact with Nature.” *CQ* n. s. 58.1: 141–157.

- Asmis, Elizabeth. 2011. "The necessity of anger in Philodemus' *On Anger*." Fish & Sanders [2011: 152–182].
- Augoustakis, Antonios, and Ariana Traill, edd. Forthcoming. *A Companion to Terence*. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Auhagen, Ulrike. 2001. "Lucilius und die Komödie." Manuwald [2001: 9–23].
- Auvray-Assayas, Clara. 2003. "Lucrèce et Cicéron sur la poétique de la traduction: note au *De rerum natura* I, 116–145/I, 921–950." Monet [2003: 164–169].
- Baier, Thomas, ed. 1999. *Studien zu Plautus' Amphitruo*. Series: *ScriptOralia* 116. Tübingen: Gunter Narr.
- Baier, Thomas. 2001. "Lucilius und die griechischen Wörter." Manuwald [2001: 37–50].
- Bailey, Cyril. 1935. *Religion in Virgil*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bailey, Cyril. 1947. *Titi Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura*. 3 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Bakhtin, Mikhail. 1984 [1968]. *Rabelais and His World*. Hélène Iswolsky, trans. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.
- Bakker, Egbert J., Franco Montanari, and Antonios Rengakos, edd. 2006. *La poésie épique grecque. Métamorphoses d'un genre littéraire*. Series: *Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique* 52. Geneva: Fondation Hardt.
- Baldwin, Barry. 1970. "Horace on Sex." *AJP* 91.4: 460–465.
- Baldwin, Florence Theodora, ed. 1911. *The Bellum Civile of Petronius*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Barchiesi, Alessandro, and Andrea Cucchiarelli. 2005. "Satire and the poet: the body as self-referential symbol." Freudenburg [2005a: 207–223].
- Barfield, Raymond. 2011. *The Ancient Quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Barone, C. 1978. "Le spese e le illusioni degli amanti (Lucrezio IV, 1123–1130; 1160–69)." *StudUrb* 52: 79–87.
- Batstone, William W. 2005. "Interrogating Theory—Critiquing Practice: The Subject of Practice. Introduction." *Phoenix* 59.1–2: 92–97.

- Beacham, Richard C. 1991. *The Roman Theatre and Its Audience*. London: Routledge.
- Bellany, Alastair. 2001. "Libels in Action: Ritual, Subversion and the English Literary Underground, 1603–42." Harris [2001: 99–124].
- Belliotti, Raymond Angelo. 2009. *Roman Philosophy and the Good Life*. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books.
- Betensky, Aya. 1972. "The literary use of animals in Lucretius' *De rerum natura* and Virgil's *Georgics*." Ph. D. dissertation, University of Georgia.
- Betensky, Aya. 1980. "Lucretius and Love." *CW* 73.5: 291–299.
- Bettini, Maurizio. 1999 [1992]. *The Portrait of the Lover*. Laura Gibbs, trans. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Bellandi, Franco. 1973. "Poetica dell'*indignatio* e *sublime* satirico in Giovenale." *ASNP* Third Series 3.1: 5–94.
- Bellandi, Franco. 1974. "Naevolus cliens." *Maia*: 279–299.
- Benardete, Seth. 1991 [repr. 2009]. *The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy: Plato's Gorgias and Phaedrus*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Beretta, Marco, and Francesco Citti, edd. 2008. *Lucrezio, la natura e la scienza*. Series: *Biblioteca di Nuncius / Istituto e Museo di storia della scienza*, Firenze 66. Florence: Leo S. Olschki.
- Berry, Dominic H. 2004. "Literature and Persuasion in Cicero's *Pro Archia*." Powell & Paterson [2004: 291–311].
- Bertman, Stephen S. 1968. "Fire Symbolism in Juvenal's First Satire." *CJ* 63.6: 265–266.
- Billings, Stephenson. 2011a [28 January]. "As Egypt Descends in Chaos, Should Sarah Palin Support a US-Led Invasion?" *Christwire*. <http://christwire.org/2011/01/as-egypt-descends-in-chaos-should-sarah-palin-support-a-us-led-invasion/>
- Billings, Stephenson. 2011b [1 February]. "What the Liberal Media Can Learn From Rachel Maddow's Christwire Scandal." *Christwire*. <http://christwire.org/2011/02/what-the-liberal-media-can-learn-from-rachel-maddows-christwire-scandal/>
- Bingham, Shawn Chandler, and Alexander A. Hernandez. 2009. "'Laughing Matters': The Comedian as Social Observer, Teacher, and Conduit of the Sociological Perspective." *Teaching Sociology* 37.4: 335–352.

- Bloom, Edward A., and Lillian D. 1979. *Satire's Persuasive Art*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Bloom, Harold. "Volume Introduction." Hobby [2009: xv–xviii].
- Bo, Domenico. 1991. "Una vexatissima quaestio: Lucilio, Lucrezio e Persio I 1–2." Monaco [1991: 1095–1105].
- Bockemüller, Friedrich, ed. 1873–1874. *T. Lucreti Cari De rerum natura libri Sex*. Stade: Fr. Steudel.
- Bogel, Fredric V. 2001. *The Difference Satire Makes: Rhetoric and Reading from Jonson to Byron*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Bollack, Jean, and André Laks, edd. 1976. *Études sur l'épicurisme antique*. Series: *Cahiers de philologie* 1. Lille: *Publications de l'Université de Lille* III.
- Bollack, Mayotte. 1969. "Un désaccord de forme: Lucrèce et Héraclite." *Actes du congrès de l'Association Guillaume Budé* 8: 383–392.
- Bollack, Mayotte. 1978. *La Raison de Lucrèce: Constitution d'une poétique philosophique avec un essai d'interprétation de la critique lucrétienne*. Paris: Minuit.
- Bonazzi, Mauro, and Christoph Helmig, edd. 2007. *Platonic Stoicism—Stoic Platonism: The Dialogue between Platonism and Stoicism in Antiquity*. Series: *Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, De Wulf-Mansion Centre Series I* 39; *Diatribai (Turnhout): Colloquia in Ancient Philosophy* 3. Carlos Steel, gen. ed. Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press.
- Bonelli, Guido. 1979. *Aporie etiche in Epicuro*. Series: *Collections Latomus* 163. Brussels: Éditions Latomus.
- Borchert, Donald M., ed. 2006. *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 5. Detroit: Macmillan Reference.
- Bowditch, Phebe Lowell. 2001. *Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Boyancé, Pierre. 1956. "La connaissance du grec à Rome." *REL* 34: 111–131.
- Boyancé, Pierre. 1963. *Lucrèce et l'épicurisme*. Series: *Coll. Les grands penseurs*. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.

- Boyd, Barbara Weiden. 1992. "Virgil's Camilla and the Traditions of Catalogue and Ecphrasis (*Aeneid* 7.803–17)." *AJP* 113.2: 213–234.
- Boyd, Barbara Weiden. 2000. "Celabitur Auctor: The Crisis of Authority and Narrative Patterning in Ovid *Fasti* 5." *Phoenix* 54.1/2: 64–98.
- Bramble, J. C. 1974. *Persius and the Programmatic Satire: A Study in Form and Imagery*. Series: *Cambridge Classical Studies*. Moses I. Finley, E. J. Kenney, and G. E. L. Owen, gen. edd. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Branham, R. Bracht, and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé, edd. 1996. *The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Branham, R. Bracht. 1996. "Defacing the Currency: Diogenes' Rhetoric and the Invention of Cynicism." Branham & Goulet-Cazé [1996: 81–104].
- Braun, Maximilian, Andreas Haltenhoff, and Friz-Heiner Mutschler, edd. 2000. *Moribus antiquis res stat Romana: Römische Werte und römische Literatur im 3. und 2. Jh. v. Chr.* Series: *Beiträge zur Altertumskunde* 134. Michael Erler, Ernst Heitsch, Ludwig Koenen, Reinhold Merkelbach, and Clemens Zintzen, gen. edd. Munich: K. G. Saur.
- Braund, Susanna H. Morton. 1988. *Beyond Anger: A Study of Juvenal's Third Book of Satires*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Braund, Susanna H. Morton, ed. 1989a. *Satire and Society in Ancient Rome*. Series: *Exeter Studies in History*. Exeter: University of Exeter Press.
- Braund, Susanna H. Morton. 1989b. "City and Country in Roman Satire." Braund [1989a: 23–47].
- Braund, Susanna H. Morton. 1995. "A Woman's Voice? Laronia's Role in Juvenal *Satires* 2." Levick & Hawley [1995: 207–219].
- Braund, Susanna H. 1996. *The Roman Satirists and Their Masks*. Bristol: Bristol Classical Press.
- Braund, Susanna H. Morton. 1997. "A passion unconsolated? Grief and anger in Juvenal *Satire* 13." Braund & Gill [1997: 68–88].
- Braund, Susanna H. Morton, ed. 2004a. *Juvenal and Persius*. Series: *Loeb Classical Library* 91. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Braund, Susanna H. Morton. 2004b. "*Libertas* or *Licentia*? Freedom and Criticism in Roman Satire." Sluiter & Rosen [2004a: 409–428].

- Braund, Susanna H. Morton, and J. Duncan Cloud. 1981. "Juvenal: a diptych." *LCM* 6: 195–208.
- Braund, Susanna H. Morton, and Christopher Gill, edd. 1997. *The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Braund, Susanna H. Morton, and Glenn W. Most, edd. 2003. *Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen*. Series: *Yale Classical Studies* 32. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bright, David F. 1971. "The Plague and the Structure of the *De Rerum Natura*." *Latomus* 30: 607–632.
- Brink, C. O. 1982. *Horace on Poetry*, vol. 3: *Epistles Book II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brown, P. Michael, ed. 1984. *Lucretius De Rerum Natura I*. Series: *Bristol Latin Texts*. Bristol: Bristol Classical Press.
- Brown, P. Michael, ed. 1997. *Lucretius De Rerum Natura III*. Warminster, England: Aris & Phillips.
- Brown, Robert D. 1982. "Lucretius and Callimachus." *ICS* 7: 77–97.
- Brown, Robert D. 1983. "Lucretian Ridicule of Anaxagoras." *CQ* n. s. 33: 146–160.
- Brown, Robert D. 1987. *Lucretius on Love and Sex: A Commentary on De Rerum Natura IV, 1030–1287 with Prolegomena, Text, and Translation*. Series: *Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition* 15. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
- Brunt, P. A. 1965. "Amicitia in the Late Roman Republic." *PCPS* n. s. 11: 1–20.
- Bryant, Christopher. 1998. "Postmodern Parody in the *Discworld* novels of Terry Pratchett." B. A. dissertation, University of Plymouth.
<http://www.ie.lspace.org/books/analysis/christopher-bryant.html>
- Buijzen, Moniek, and Patti M. Valkenburg. 2004. "Developing a Typology of Humor in Audiovisual Media." *Media Psychology* 6.2: 147–167.
- Burke, Kenneth Duva. 1966. *Language as Symbolic Action*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Cabisius, Gail. 1979. "Lucretius' Statement of Poetic Intent." *Deroux* [1979: 239–248].
- Cabisius, Gail. 1984–1985. "Social Metaphor and the Atomic Cycle in Lucretius." *CJ* 80.2: 109–120.

- Cahn, Steven M. 1986. *Saints and Scamps: Ethics in Academia*. Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Cahoon, Leslie. 1985. "A Program for Betrayal: Ovidian *Nequitia* in *Amores* 1.1, 2.1 and 3.1." *Helios* 12: 29–39.
- Cairns, Francis. 1989. *Virgil's Augustan Epic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cairns, Francis. 2007 [1st ed. 1972]. *Generic Composition in Greek and Roman Poetry*. 2nd ed. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Michigan Classical Press.
- Calame, Claude. 2001 [1st ed. 1977]. *Choruses of Young Women in Ancient Greece: Their Morphology, Religious Role, and Social Functions*. Rev. ed. Derek Collins and Janice Orion, trans. Series: *Greek Studies*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Cameron, Averil, ed. 1990. *History as Text: The Writing of Ancient History*. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press.
- Campbell, Gordon L. 1999. Review of Sedley [1998]. *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* 1999.10.29. <http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/1999/1999-10-29.html>
- Campbell, Gordon L. 2000. "Zoogony and evolution in *Timaeus*, the Presocratics, Lucretius and Darwin." Wright [2000: 145–180].
- Campbell, Gordon L. 2002. "Lucretius 5.1011–27: the origins of justice and the Prisoner's Dilemma." *LICS* 1.3: 1–12.
- Campbell, Gordon L. 2003. *Lucretius on Creation and Evolution: A Commentary on De Rerum Natura Book Five, Lines 772–1104*. Series: *Oxford Classical Monographs*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Campbell, Gordon L. 2008. "'And bright was the flame of their friendship' (Empedocles B130): humans, animals, justice, and friendship, in Lucretius and Empedocles." *LICS* 7.4: 1–23.
- Canali, Luca. 1988. *Orazio: Anni fuggiaschi e stabilità di regime*. Series: *Horatiana. Collana di studi e testi 2*. Venosa, Italy: Edizioni Ossana Venosa.
- Capasso, Mario. 1983. "Epicureismo e Eraclito. Contributo alla ricostruzione della critica epicurea alla filosofia presocratica." Rossetti [1983: 423–457].
- Capasso, Mario. 2003. "Filodemo e Lucrezio. Due intellettuali nel *patriai tempus iniquum*." Monet [2003: 77–107].

- Carpio, Glenda. 2008. *Laughing Fit to Kill: Black Humor in the Fictions of Slavery*. Series: *The W. E. B. Du Bois Institute Series*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Carretta, Vincent. 1983. *The Snarling Muse: Verbal and Visual Political Satire from Pope to Churchill*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Carter, D. M. 2004. "Citizen Attribute, Negative Right: A Conceptual Difference Between Ancient and Modern Ideas of Freedom of Speech." Sluiter & Rosen [2004a: 197–220].
- Casaubon, Isaac. 1605 [repr. 1973]. *De satyrica Graecorum poesi et Romanorum satira*. Peter E. Medine, ed. Delmar, New York: Scholars' Fascimiles and Reprints.
- Castner, Catherine Jones. 1974. "Animal Imagery in Lucretius." Ph. D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
- Caston, Ruth Rothaus. 2006. "Love as Illness: Poets and Philosophers on Romantic Love." *CJ* 101.3: 271–298.
- Catrein, Christoph. 2003. *Vertauschte Sinne. Untersuchungen zur Synästhesie in der römischen Dichtung*. Series: *Beiträge zur Altertumskunde* 178. Munich: K. G. Saur.
- Cavarzere, Alberto, Antonio Aloni, and Alessandro Barchiesi. 2001. *Iambic Ideas: Essays on a Poetic Tradition from Archaic Greece to the Late Roman Empire*. Series: *Greek Studies: Interdisciplinary Approaches*. Gregory Nagy, gen. ed. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Cèbe, Jean-Pierre. 1966. *La caricature et la parodie dans le monde romain antique des origines à Juvenal*. Series: *Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome* 206. Paris: Éditions É. de Boccard.
- Cèbe, Jean-Pierre. 1972. *Varron, Satires ménippées: Édition, traduction et commentaire*, vol. 1. Rome: École française de Rome.
- Chahoud, Anna. 1998. *C. Lucilii reliquiarum Concordantiae*. Series: *Alpha–Omega: Reihe A, Lexika, Indizes; Konkordanzen zur klassischen Philologie* 185. Hildesheim: Olms-Weidmann.
- Chahoud, Anna. 2004. "The Roman Satirist Speaks Greek." *Classics Ireland* 11: 1–46.
- Chambert, Régine. 1999. "Hercule lucrétien et Hercule stoïcien. Évolution et complexité d'un mythe." Poignault [1999: 149–164].

- Charpin, François, ed. 1978–1991 [2nd ed. 2002–2003]. *Lucilius: Satires*. 3 vols. Series: *Collection des Universités de France, publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
- Chenari, Abdolamir A. A. 2005. “Satire in Hafiz’s Poetry.” *Journal of Human Sciences* 45–46: 39–51.
- Chiarini, Gioacchino. 1979. *La Recita: Plauto, la Farsa, la Festa*. Series: *Edizioni e saggi universitari di filologia classica* 25. Bologna: Pàtron.
- Christes, Johannes, and Gunnar Fülle. 1996. “*Causa fuit pater his*. Überlegungen zu Horaz, *sat.* 1, 6.” *Kludt* [1996: 37–56].
- Christes, Johannes. 2001. “Lucilius und das Epos.” *Manuwald* [2001: 51–62].
- Clarke, John R. 2002. “Look Who’s Laughing at Sex: Men and Women Viewers at the *Apodyterium* of the Suburban Baths at Pompeii.” *Fredrick* [2002: 149–182].
- Clarke, M. L. 1956 [repr. 1968]. *The Roman Mind: Studies in the History of Thought from Cicero to Marcus Aurelius*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Classen, Carl Joachim. 1981. “Die Kritik des Horaz an Lucilius in den *Satiren* I 4 und I 5.” *Hermes* 109: 339–360.
- Classen, Carl Joachim, ed. 1986. *Probleme der Lukrezforschung*. Series: *Olms Studien* 18. Hildesheim: Olms.
- Clausen, Wendell V., and James G. Zetzel, edd. 2004. *Commentum Cornuti in Persium*. Series: *BT*. Munich and Leipzig: K. G. Saur.
- Clauss, James Joseph. 1985. “Allusion and Structure in Horace Satire 2.1: The Callimachean Response.” *TAPA* 115: 197–206.
- Clauss, James Joseph, and Martine Cuypers, edd. 2010. *A Companion to Hellenistic Literature*. Series: *Blackwell Companions to the Ancient World* 50. Oxford: John Wiley and Sons.
- Clay, Diskin. 1969. “Greek *Physis* and Epicurean *Physiologia* (Lucretius 1.1–148).” *TAPA* 100: 31–47.
- Clay, Diskin. 1976. “The Sources of Lucretius’ Inspiration.” *Bollack & Laks* [1976: 203–227].
- Clay, Diskin. 1983. *Lucretius and Epicurus*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

- Clay, Diskin. 2003. "Lucretius' Honeyed Muse: The History and Meaning of a Simile." *Monet* [2003: 183–196].
- Cloud, J. Duncan. 1989. "Satirists and the Law." *Braund* [1989a: 49–67].
- Coffey, Michael. 1976. *Roman Satire*. London: Methuen.
- Coffey, Michael. 1996. "Generic Impropriety in the High Style: Satirical Themes in Seneca and Lucan." *Klodt* [1996: 81–94].
- Cohen, Noam. 2006a [8 May]. "A Comedian's Riff on Bush Prompts an E-Spat." *New York Times*. <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/08/technology/08colbert.html>
- Cohen, Noam. 2006b [22 May]. "That After-Dinner Speech Remains a Favorite Dish." *New York Times*. <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/22/business/media/22colbert.html>
- Cole, Thomas. 1967 [repr. 1990, 2000]. *Democritus and the Sources of Greek Anthropology*. Series: *Philological Monographs* 25. Columbus, Ohio: American Philological Association (Case Western Reserve University).
- Colman, John. 2006. "Science, politics, and poetry: A study of Lucretius' 'On the Nature of Things.'" Ph.D. dissertation, Boston College.
- Colton, Robert E. 1971. "Some Rare Words Used by Martial and Juvenal." *CJ* 67.1: 55–57.
- Colton, Robert E. 1972. "Echoes of Martial in Juvenal's Twelfth Satire." *Latomus* 31: 164–173.
- Commager, H. S., Jr. 1957. "Lucretius' Interpretation of the Plague." *HSCP* 62: 105–118.
- Connery, Brian A., and Kirk Combe, edd. 1995a. *Theorizing Satire: Essays in Literary Criticism*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Connery, Brian A., and Kirk Combe. 1995b. "Theorizing Satire: A Retrospective and Introduction." Connery and Combe [1995a: 1–17].
- Connors, Catherine. 1998. *Petronius the Poet: Verse and Literary Tradition in the Satyricon*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Connors, Catherine. 2005. "Epic allusion in Roman satire." *Freudenburg* [2005a: 123–145].

- Conte, Gian Biagio. 1965. "Il 'trionfo della morte' e la galleria dei grandi trapassati in Lucrezio III 1024–1053." *SIFC* 37: 114–132.
- Conte, Gian Biagio. 1966. "Υψος e diatriba nello stile di Lucrezio." *Maia* n. s. 18: 338–368.
- Conte, Gian Biagio. 1994. *Genres and Readers: Lucretius, Love Elegy, Pliny's Encyclopedia*. Glenn W. Most, trans. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Conte, Gian Biagio. 1996. *The Hidden Author: An Interpretation of Petronius' Satyricon*. Series: *Sather Classical Lectures* 60. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Conte, Gian Biagio. 1999 [1st ed. 1987]. *Latin Literature: A History*. Joseph B. Solodow, trans. Rev. ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Cooper, John M. 1999. *Reason and Emotion: Essays in Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Copley, Frank O. 1956. *Exclusus Amator: A Study in Latin Love Poetry*. Series: *Philological Monographs* 17. New York: American Philological Association.
- Corbeill, Anthony. 1996. *Controlling Laughter: Political Humor in the Late Roman Republic*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Corn, Alan M. 1975. "The Persona in the Fifth Book of Juvenal's Satires." Ph. D. dissertation, Ohio State University.
- Costa, C. D. N., ed. 1984. *Lucretius De Rerum Natura V*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cottier, Jean-François. 1999. "La piété de Lucrèce." Poignault [1999: 37–50].
- Courtney, Edward. 1962. "Parody and Literary Allusion in Menippean Satire." *Philologus* 106.1–2: 86–100.
- Courtney, Edward. 1980. *A Commentary on the Satires of Juvenal*. London: Athlone.
- Courtney, Edward, ed. 1993. *The Fragmentary Latin Poets*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cox, Alister. 1969. "Didactic poetry." Higginbotham [1969: 134–145].
- Crawley, L. W. A. 1963. *The Failure of Lucretius*. Series: *Classics Series* 5. Auckland: Dobbie.

- Creed, Barbara. 1993. *The Monstrous-Feminine: Film, feminism, psychoanalysis*. Series: *Popular Fiction Series*. London: Routledge.
- Cressy, David. 2010. *Dangerous Talk: Scandalous, Seditious, and Treasonable Speech in Pre-Modern England*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Croft, Pauline. 1995. "Libels, Popular Literacy and Public Opinion in Early Modern England." *Historical Research* 68: 266–285.
- Cucchiarelli, Andrea. 2005. "Speaking from Silence: The Stoic Paradoxes of Persius." Freudenburg [2005a: 62–80].
- Cucchiarelli, Andrea. 2009. "Old Frog Songs: Four Points on the Roman Aristophanes." *mediAzioni* 6: 1–22.
- Cuccioli, Rita. 1990. "The 'banquet' in Juvenal *Satire* 5." *PLILS* 6: 139–143.
- Culler, Jonathan. 1980. "Literary Competence." Tompkins [1978: 101–117].
- Culler, Jonathan, ed. 1988a. *On Puns*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Culler, Jonathan. 1988b. "The Call of the Phoneme." Culler [1988a: 1–16].
- Cummings, Michael S. 2002 [6 January]. "*Flaccus Exclusus*." Conference paper, 133rd Annual Meeting of the American Philological Association, Philadelphia. <http://www.scribd.com/doc/2365784/Michael-Cummings-Flaccus-exclusus-Horace-and-the-paraclausithyron>
- Cupaiuolo, Fabio. 1966. *Tra poesia e poetica: su alcuni aspetti culturali della poesia latina nell'età augustea*. Series: *Collana di studi latini* 15. Naples: Libreria Scientifica Editrice.
- Dalzell, Alexander. 1982. "Lucretius." Kenney & Clausen [1982: 33–55].
- Dalzell, Alexander. 1987. "Language and Atomic Theory in Lucretius." *Hermathena* 143: 19–28.
- Dalzell, Alexander. 1996. *The Criticism of Didactic Poetry: Essays on Lucretius, Virgil, and Ovid*. Series: *Robson Classical Lectures* 3. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Damon, Cynthia. 1997. *The Mask of the Parasite: A Pathology of Roman Patronage*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

- D'Anna, Giovanni, ed. 1979. *Studi di poesia latina in onore di Antonio Traglia*, vol. 1. Series: *Storia e letteratura. Raccolta di studi e testi* 146. Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura.
- Davis, Gregson, ed. 2010. *A Companion to Horace*. Series: *Blackwell Companions to the Ancient World*. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Debrohun, Jeri Blair. 1994. "Redressing Elegy's *Puella*: Propertius IV and the Rhetoric of Fashion." *JRS* 84: 41–63.
- Debrohun, Jeri Blair. 2003. *Roman Propertius and the Reinvention of Elegy*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
- De Caro, Antonio. 2007. "Il tema del dono e dello scambio negli *Amores*." Landolfi & Chinnici [2007: 53–83].
- de Jong, Irene J. F. 2004 [1st ed. 1987]. *Narrators and Focalizers: The Presentation of the Story in the Iliad*. 2nd ed. London: Bristol Classical Press.
- de Jong, Irene J. F., and René Nünlist, and Angus Bowie, edd. 2004a. *Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative*, vol. 1: *Narrators, Narratees, and Narratives in Ancient Greek Literature*. Series: *Supplements to Mnemosyne* 257. H. Pinkster, H. S. Versnel, Irene J. F. de Jong, and Piet H. Schrijvers, gen. edd. Leiden: Brill.
- de Jong, Irene J. F., and R. Nünlist. 2004. "Epilogue. Narrators, narratees, and narratives in ancient Greek literature." de Jong et al. [2004a: 545–554].
- De Lacy, Phillip. 1941. "Cicero's Invective against Piso." *TAPA* 72: 49–58.
- DeMaria, Robert, Jr., and Robert D. Brown, edd. 2007. *Classical Literature and Its Reception: An Anthology*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Dentith, Simon. 2000. *Parody*. London: Routledge.
- Depew, Mary, and Dirk Obbink, edd. 2000. *Matrices of Genre: Authors, Canons, and Society*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Dér, Katalin. 1989. "Terence and Luscius Lanuvinus." *AAntHung* 32: 283–297.
- Deroux, Carl, ed. 1979. *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History*, vol 1. Series: *Collections Latomus* 164. Brussels: Éditions Latomus.
- Dessen, Cynthia S. 1968 [2nd ed. 1996]. *The Satires of Persius: Iunctura Callidus Acri*. Series: *Illinois Studies in Language and Literature*. Champaign, Illinois: University of Illinois Press.

- Deufert, Marcus. 1996. *Pseudo-Lukrezisches im Lukrez: die unechten Verse in Lukrezens "De rerum natura."* Series: *Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte* 48. Berlin: de Gruyter.
- Diels, Hermann, ed. 1912. *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, griechisch und deutsch*, vol. 1. 3rd ed. Berlin: Weidmann.
- Diels, Hermann, ed. 1923. *T. Lucretius Carus, De Rerum Natura, Lateinisch und Deutsch*. Berlin: Weidmann.
- Dionigi, Ivano. 1992 [1st ed. 1988]. *Lucrezio: Le parole e le cose*. Bologna: Pàtron.
- Dionigi, Ivano. 2003. "Lucrezio ovvero la grammatica del cosmo." *Monet* [2003: 227–232].
- Dionigi, Ivano. 2006. "Lucretius, or the Grammar of the Cosmos." Beretta & Citti [2006: 27–34]. ≈ Dionigi [2003].
- Dobson, Nicholas Post. 2003. "Iambic Elements in Archaic Greek Epic." Ph. D. dissertation, University of Texas at Austin.
- Dombrowski, Patrick James. 2010. "Judicial Rhetoric and Theatrical Program in the Prologues of Terence." M. A. thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
- Domenicucci, Patrizio. 1981. "Lucrezio IV, 1160 sgg. e Alessi, fr. 98 Edmonds." *A&R* 26: 175–182.
- Donohue, Harold. 1993. *The Song of the Swan: Lucretius and the Influence of Callimachus*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America.
- Dorandi, Tiziano. 1997. "Lucrèce et les Épicuriens de Campanie." *Algra et al.* [1997: 35–48].
- Douglas, Mary. 1966 [repr. 2003]. *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo*. London: Routledge.
- Duban, Jeffrey M. 1982. "Venus, Epicurus and *Naturae Species Ratioque*." *AJP* 103: 165–167.
- Duckworth, George E. 1952 [repr. 1994]. *The Nature of Roman Comedy: A Study in Popular Entertainment*. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Dudley, Donald Reynolds., ed. 1965a. *Lucretius*. Series: *Studies in Latin Literature and Its Influence*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

- Dudley, Donald Reynolds. 1965b. "The Satiric Element in Lucretius." Dudley [1965a: 115–130].
- Dufallo, Basil. 1999–2000. "Satis/satura: Reconsidering the 'Programmatic Intent' of Horace's *Satires* 1.1." *CW* 93.6: 579–590.
- Duff, J. D., ed. 1962. *T. Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura liber primus*. Series: *Pitt Press Series*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dupuy, Tina. 2010 [28 December]. "Satire is Very Serious." <http://www.tinadupuy.com/column/satire-is-very-serious>
- DuQuesnay, I. M. Le M. 1984. "Horace and Maecenas: The propaganda value of *Sermones* 1." Woodman & West [1984: 19–58].
- Dyson [Hejduk], Julia T. 1994. "Georgics 2.503–12: The Temple's Shadow." *Vergilius* 40: 3–18.
- Dyson [Hejduk], Julia T. 1997. "Fluctus Irarum, Fluctus Curarum: Lucretian Religio in the *Aeneid*." *AJP* 118.3: 449–457.
- Eckman, George Peck. 1899. "Controversial Elements in Lucretius." Ph.D. thesis, New York University.
- Eco, Umberto. 1984. "The frames of comic 'freedom.'" Eco et al. [1984: 1–10].
- Eco, Umberto, V. V. Ivanov, and Monica Rector. 1984. *Carnival!* Thomas A. Sebeok, ed. Series: *AS* 64. Berlin: de Gruyter.
- Eco, Umberto, Richard Rorty, Jonathan Culler, and Christine Brooke-Rose. 1992. *Interpretation and overinterpretation*. Stefan Collini, ed. Series: *Tanner Lectures in Human Values*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Edmunds, Lowell. 2001. *Intertextuality and the Reading of Roman Poetry*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Edwards, Mark W. 1960. "The Expression of Stoic Ideas in the *Aeneid*." *Phoenix* 14.3: 151–165.
- Edwards, Mark J. 1989. "Lucretius, Empedocles and Epicurean Polemics." *A&A* 35: 104–115.
- Ehlers, Widu-Wolfgang. 1985. "Das 'Iter Brundisinum' des Horaz (*Serm.* 1,5)." *Hermes* 113: 69–83.

- Ehlers, Widu-Wolfgang. 1996. "Von Bibern und Menschen. Anmerkungen zur 12. Satire Juvenals." Klodt [1996: 57–73].
- Ehrman, R. K. 1985. "Terentian Prologues and the Parabases of Old Comedy." *Latomus* 44: 370–376.
- Englert, Walter G. 1994. "Stoics and Epicureans on the Nature of Suicide." *BACAP* 10: 67–98.
- Effe, Bernd. 1977. *Dichtung und Lehre. Untersuchungen zur Typologie des antiken Lehrgedichts*. Series: *Zetemata* 69. Munich: Beck.
- Ercolani, Andrea, ed. 2002. *Spoudaiogeloion. Form und Funktion der Verspottung in der aristophanischen Komödie*. Series: *Drama. Beiträge zum antiken Drama und seiner Rezeption* 11. Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler.
- Erler, Michael. 1998. "Einübung und Anverwandlung. Reflexe mündlicher Meditationstechnik in philosophischer Literatur der Kaiserzeit." Kullmann et al. [1998: 361–381].
- Erler, Michael. 2003. "*Exempla amoris*. Der epikureische Epilogismos als philosophischer Hintergrund der Diatribe gegen die Liebe in Lukrez *De rerum natura*." *Monet* [2003: 147–162].
- Erler, Michael. 2011. "Autodidact and student: on the relationship of authority and autonomy in Epicurus and the Epicurean tradition." *Fish & Sanders* [2011: 9–28].
- Ernout, A., and Léon Robin, edd. 1962 [1st ed. 1925–1928]. *Lucrèce, De rerum natura, commentaire exégétique et critique*. 3 vols. 2nd ed. Series: *Collection de commentaires d'auteurs anciens*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
- Evans, Harry B. "Horace, *Satires* 2.7: Saturnalia and Satire." *CJ* 73.4: 307–312.
- Farrell, Joseph A. 1988. "Lucretius, *DRN* 5.44 *insinuandum*." *CQ* 38: 179–185.
- Farrell, Joseph A. 1991. *Vergil's Georgics and the Traditions of Ancient Epic: The Art of Allusion in Literary History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Farrell, Joseph A. 1993. "Allusions, Delusions and Confusions: A Reply." *Electronic Antiquity* 1.6. <http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/EIAnt/V1N6/farrell.html>
- Farrell, Joseph A. 1994. "The Structure of Lucretius' 'Anthropology.'" *MD* 33: 81–95.

- Farrell, Joseph A. 2001. *Latin Language and Latin Culture from ancient to modern times*. Series: *Roman Literature and Its Contexts*. Denis C. Feeney and Stephen Hinds, gen. edd. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Farrell, Joseph A. 2005. "Intention and Intertext." *Phoenix* 59.1–2: 98–111.
- Farrell, Joseph A. 2007. "Lucretian architecture: the structure and argument of the *De rerum natura*." Gillespie & Hardie [2007: 76–91].
- Farrington, Benjamin. 1939. *Science and Politics in the Ancient World*. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Farrington, Benjamin. 1954. "Lucretius and Manilius on Friendship." *Hermathena* 83: 10–16.
- Fear, Trevor. 2000. "The Poet as Pimp: Elegiac Seduction in the Time of Augustus." *Arethusa* 33.2: 217–240.
- Fedeli, Paolo. 1992. "In viaggio con Orazio da Roma a Brindisi." *Aufidus* 17: 37–54.
- Feeney, Denis C. 1998. *Literature and Religion at Rome: Cultures, Contexts, and Beliefs*. Series: *Roman Literature and Its Contexts*. Denis C. Feeney and Stephen Hinds, gen. edd. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Feeney, Denis C. 2002. "*Vna cum scriptore meo*. Poetry, Principate and the Traditions of Literary History in the Epistle to Augustus." Woodman & Feeney [2002: 172–187].
- Felgentreu, Fritz, Felix Mundt, and Nils Rücker, edd. 2009a. *Per attentam Caesaris aurem: Satire—die unpolitische Gattung? Eine internationale Tagung an der Freien Universität Berlin vom 7. bis 8. März 2008*. Series: *Leipziger Studien zur klassischen Philologie* 5. Marcus Deufert, Ursula Gärtner, and Kurt Sier, gen. edd. Tübingen: Gunter Narr.
- Felgentreu, Fritz, Felix Mundt, and Nils Rücker. 2009b. "Einlietung." Felgentreu et al. [2009: VII–XII].
- Fellin, A. 1951. "Risonanze del *De consolatu meo* ciceroneano nel poema di Lucrezio." *RFIC* 29: 307–315.
- Ferguson, J. 1987. "Epicurean Language-Theory and Lucretian Practice." *LCM* 12: 100–105.
- Ferrary, Jean-Louis. 1988. "Cicéron et la dictature." Hinard [1988: 97–105].
- Ferrero, Leonardo. 1949. *Poetica nuova in Lucrezio*. Florence: La Nuova Italia.

- Ferri, Rolando. 1993. *I dispiaceri di un epicureo. Uno studio sulla poetica oraziana delle Epistole (con un capitolo su Persio)*. Series: *Biblioteca di Materiali e discussioni per l'analisi dei testi classici* 11. Pisa: Giardini.
- Fetterley, Judith. 1979. *The Resisting Reader: A Feminist Approach to American Fiction*. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.
- Fish, Jeffrey. 1998. "Is Death Nothing to Horace? A Brief Comparison with Philodemus and Lucretius." *CErc* 28: 97–102.
- Fish, Jeffrey. 2011. "Not all politicians are Sisyphus: what Roman Epicureans were taught about politics." *Fish & Sanders* [2011: 72–104].
- Fish, Jeffrey, and Kirk R. Sanders, edd. 2011. *Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fish, Stanley E. 1976. "Interpreting the *Variorum*." *Critical Inquiry* 2.3: 465–485.
- Fishelov, David. 1990. "The Vanity of the Reader's Wishes: Rereading Juvenal's *Satire* 10." *AJP* 111: 370–382.
- Fiske, George Converse. 1920. *Lucilius and Horace: A Study in the Classical Theory of Imitation*. Series: *University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature* 7. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Fitzgerald, John T., Dirk Obbink, and Glenn S. Holland, edd. 2004. *Philodemus and the New Testament World*. Series: *Supplements to Novum Testamentum* 111. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill.
- Fitzgerald, William. 1984. "Lucretius' Cure for Love in the *De Rerum Natura*." *CW* 78.2: 73–86.
- Fitzwilliam, Robert J. 1999. "Horace's SATIRE 2.6.5." *The Explicator* 58.1: 3–4.
- Flintoff, Everard. 1988. "Naevius and Roman Satire." *Latomus* 48: 593–603.
- Flintoff, Everard. 1990. "The Satires of Marcus Pacuvius." *Latomus* 49: 575–590.
- Flock, Elizabeth. 2011 [29 September]. "The Onion's tweets about Capitol gunfire prompt panic, mockery." *The Washington Post* *blogPOST*.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/the-onion-tweets-screams-and-gunfire--wheres-the-humor/2011/09/29/gIQASpCI7K_blog.html
- Flores, Enrico. 1965. "Note Lucreziane, I." *RAAN* 40: 117–140.

- Flower, Harriet I. 2010. *Roman Republics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Fogelmark, Staffan. 2002. "To Bee Or Not To Bee? Antipater A.P. 7, 34: A Mistaken Interpretation." *Eranos* 100: 128–136.
- Fögen, Thorsten. 2000. *Patrii sermonis egestas: Einstellungen lateinischer Autoren zu ihrer Muttersprache: ein Beitrag zum Sprachbewusstsein in der römischen Antike*. Munich: Saur.
- Fögen, Thorsten. 2009. "Flavius ultimus: Juvenals Auseinandersetzung mit der Zeit Domitians." Felgentreu et al. [2009b: 167–191].
- Foucault, Michel. 2001 [1st ed. 1985]. *Fearless Speech* [1st ed. *Discourse and Truth: The Problematization of Parrhesia*]. Joseph Pearson, ed. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e).
- Fowler, Don Paul. 1988. Review of Minyard [1985]. *JRS* 78: 215.
- Fowler, Don Paul. 1989. "Lucretius and Politics." Griffin & Barnes [1989: 120–150].
- Fowler, Don Paul. 1991. "Subject Reviews: Roman Literature." *G&R Second Series* 38.2: 235–247.
- Fowler, Don Paul. 2000a. "The Didactic Plot." Depew & Obbink [2000: 205–219].
- Fowler, Don Paul. 2000b. *Roman Constructions: Readings in Postmodern Latin*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fowler, Don Paul. 2000c. "Philosophy and Literature in Lucretian Intertextuality." Fowler [2000b: 138–155].
- Fowler, Don Paul. 2002. *Lucretius on Atomic Motion: A Commentary on De Rerum Natura Book Two, Lines 1–332*. Peta G. Fowler, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fowler, Peta G. 1997. "Lucretian Conclusions." Roberts et al. [1997: 112–138].
- Fox, Adam. 1994. "Ballads, Libels and Popular Ridicule in Jacobean England." *Past & Present* 145: 47–83.
- Frank, Tenney. 1920. "Heliodorus-Apollodorus: Horace *Serm.* i.5.2." *CP* 15.4: 393.
- Fränkel, Hermann Ferdinand. 1976 [1st ed. 1951]. *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums. Eine Geschichte der griechischen Epik, Lyrik und Prosa bis zur Mitte des fünften Jahrhunderts*. 3rd ed. Munich: C. H. Beck.

- Fraenkel, Eduard. 1947. *Horace*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fraenkel, Eduard. 2007 [1st ed. 1922]. *Plautine Elements in Plautus*. 2nd ed. Tomas Drevikovsky and Frances Muecke, transs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Frede, Dorothea, and Brad Inwood, edd. 2005. *Language and Learning: Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fredrick, David, ed. 2002. *The Roman Gaze: Vision, Power, and the Body*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Freedman, Leonard. 2009. *The Offensive Art: Political Satire and Its Censorship around the world from Beerbohm to Borat*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.
- Freudenburg, Kirk. 1990. "Horace's Satiric Program and the Language of Contemporary Theory in *Satires* 2.1." *AJP* 111.2: 187–203.
- Freudenburg, Kirk. 1993. *The Walking Muse: Horace on the Theory of Satire*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Freudenburg, Kirk. 1995. "Canidia at the Feast of Nasidienus (Hor. S. 2.8.95)." *TAPA* 125: 207–219.
- Freudenburg, Kirk. 1997. Review of Corbeill [1996]. *BMCR* 97.3.25. <http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/1997/97.03.25.html>
- Freudenburg, Kirk. 2001. *Satires of Rome: Threatening Poses from Lucilius to Juvenal*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Freudenburg, Kirk, ed. 2005a. *The Cambridge Companion to Roman Satire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Freudenburg, Kirk. 2005b. "Introduction: Roman satire." Freudenburg [2005a: 1–30].
- Freudenburg, Kirk. 2006. "Playing at Lyric's Boundaries: Dreaming Forward in Book Two of Horace's *Sermones*." *Dictynna* 3. <http://dictynna.revues.org/228>
- Freudenburg, Kirk. 2010. "*Horatius Anceps*: Persona and Self-revelation in Satire and Song." Davis [2010: 271–290].
- Friedländer, Paul. 1941. "Pattern of Sound and Atomistic Theory in Lucretius." *AJP* 62.1: 16–34.
- Frischer, Bernard. 1982. *The Sculpted Word: Epicureanism and Philosophical Recruitment in Ancient Greece*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Frischer, Bernard. 1991. *Shifting Paradigms: New Approaches to Horace's Ars Poetica*. Series: *American Classical Studies* 27. Atlanta: Scholars Press.
- Frye, Herman Northrop. 1957. *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Furley, David J. 1978. "Lucretius the Epicurean: On the History of Man." Gigon [1978: 1–27]. = Furley [1989: 206–222].
- Furley, David J. 1982. Review of Bollack [1978]. *Gnomon* 54.1: 36–39.
- Furley, David J. 1989. *Cosmic Problems: Essays on Greek and Roman Philosophy of Nature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gaisser, Julia Haig. "Threads in the Labyrinth: Competing Views and Voices in Catullus 64." *AJP* 116.4: 579–616.
- Gale, Monica R. 1991. "Man and Beast in Lucretius and the *Georgics*." *CQ* n. s. 41.2: 414–426.
- Gale, Monica R. 1994a [repr. 1996]. *Myth and Poetry in Lucretius*. Series: *Cambridge Classical Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gale, Monica R. 1994b. "Lucretius 4.1–25 and the Proems of the *De Rerum Natura*." *PCPS* 40: 1–17.
- Gale, Monica R. 2000. *Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gale, Monica R. 2001. *Lucretius and the Didactic Epic*. London: Bristol Classical Press.
- Gale, Monica R. 2005. "Avia Pieridum Loca: Tradition and Innovation in Lucretius." Horster & Reitz [2005: 175–191].
- Gale, Monica R. 2007. "Lucretius and previous poetic traditions." Gillespie & Hardie [2007a: 59–75].
- Gale, Monica R., ed. 2009. *Lucretius De Rerum Natura V*. Series: *Aris & Phillips Classical Texts*. Oxford: Oxbow.
- Gallagher, Maggie, and Brian Brown. 2008 [17 April]. "National Organization for Marriage to Stephen Colbert: 'Thank You!'" *NOM Latest News* press release. http://www.nationformarriage.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=omL2KeN0LzH&b=5075187&content_id={69697F70-CF62-4F65-8B91-8F1CF29C4607}¬oc=1

- Garani, Myrto. 2007. *Empedocles Redivivus: Poetry and Analogy in Lucretius*. Series: *Studies in Classics*. London: Routledge.
- Garbarino, Giovanna, ed. 1973. *Roma e la filosofia greca dalle origini alla fine del II° secolo a. C.* 2 vols. Turin: Paravia.
- Gardner, Martin A. 2009. *The Marx Brothers as Social Critics: Satire and Comic Nihilism in Their Films*. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland.
- Gärtner, Ursula. 2001. "Lucilius und die Freundschaft." *Manuwald* [2001: 90–110].
- Geffcken, Johannes. 1907. "Die ἀσέβεια des Anaxagoras." *Hermes* 42.1: 127–133.
- Geiger, Joseph. 2002. "A Quotation from Latin in Plutarch?" *CQ* n. s. 52.2: 632–634.
- Gellar-Goad, T. H. M. 2008. "Sacrifice and Ritual Imagery in Menander, Plautus, and Terence." M. A. thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
- Gellar-Goad, T. H. M. Forthcoming. "Religious Ritual and Family Dynamics in Terence." Augoustakis & Traill [forthcoming].
- George, David B. 1988. "Lucan's Caesar and Stoic οἰκείωσις Theory: The Stoic Fool." *TAPA* 118: 331–341.
- Giancotti, Francesco. 1959. *Il preludio di Lucrezio*. Series: *Biblioteca di Cultura Contemporanea* 63. Messina: G. D'Anna.
- Giangrande, Lawrence. 1972. *The Use of Spoudaiogeloion in Greek and Roman Literature*. Series: *Studies in Classical Literature* 6. The Hague: Mouton.
- Giannantoni, Gabriele, and Marcello Gigante, edd. 1996. *Epicureismo greco e romano. Atti del congresso internazionale, Napoli, 19–26 maggio 1993*. 2 vols. Series: *Elenchos. Collana di testi e studi sul pensiero antico* 25. Gabriele Giannantoni, gen. ed. Naples: Bibliopolis.
- Gibson, Roy K. 1998. "Meretrix or matrona? Stereotypes in Ovid, *Ars Amatoria* 3." *PLLS* 10: 295–312.
- Gibson, Roy K., ed. 2003. *Ovid Ars Amatoria Book 3*. Series: *Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries* 40. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Giesecke, Annette Lucia. 2000. *Atoms, Ataraxy, and Allusion: Cross-generic Imitation of the De Rerum Natura in Early Augustan Poetry*. Series: *Spoudasmata* 76. Hildesheim: Olms.

- Gigante, Marcello. 1992. "Filodemo e l'epigramma." *CErc* 22: 5–8.
- Gigon, Olof, ed. 1978. *Lucrece. Huit exposés suivis de discussions*. Series: *Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique* 24. Geneva: Fondation Hardt.
- Gill, Christopher. 1997. "Passion as Madness in Roman Poetry." Braund & Gill [1997: 213–241].
- Gillespie, Stuart, and Philip R. Hardie, edd. 2007a. *The Cambridge Companion to Lucretius*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gillespie, Stuart, and Philip R. Hardie, edd. 2007b. "Introduction." Gillespie & Hardie [2007a: 1–15].
- Glazewski, Johanna, Sr. 1971. "Plenus Vitae Conviva: A Lucretian Concept in Horace's *Satires*." *CB* 47.6: 85–88.
- Glidden, David K. 1979. "Sensus and Sense Perception in the *De Rerum Natura*." *CSCA* 12: 155–181.
- Goar, Robert J. 1971. "On the End of Lucretius' Fourth Book." *CB* 47: 75–77.
- Gold, Barbara K., ed. 1982. *Literary and Artistic Patronage in Ancient Rome*. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press.
- Gold, Barbara K. 1987. *Literary Patronage in Greece and Rome*. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press.
- Gold, Barbara K. 1994. "Humor in Juvenal's Sixth Satire: Is It Funny?" Jäkel & Timonen [1994: 95–111].
- Goldberg, Sander M. 2005. *Constructing Literature in the Roman Republic: Poetry and Its Reception*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goldhill, Simon. 1991. *The Poet's Voice: Essays on Poetics and Greek Literature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goldstein, Cora Sol. 2009. *Capturing the German Eye: American Visual Propaganda in Occupied Germany*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Gordon, Pamela. 2002. "Some Unseen Monster: Rereading Lucretius on Sex." Fredrick [2002: 86–109].
- Görler, Woldemar. 1997. "Storing up Past Pleasures: The Soul-Vessel-Metaphor in Lucretius and in his Greek Models." Algra et al. [1997: 193–207].

- Gosling, Justin Cyril Bertrand, and Christopher Charles Whiston Taylor. 1982. *The Greeks on Pleasure*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gottschalk, Hans B. 1982. "Diatribes Again." *LCM* 7: 91–92.
- Gottschalk, Hans B. 1983. "More on Διατριβαί." *LCM* 8: 91–92.
- Gottschalk, Hans B. 1996. "Philosophical Innovations in Lucretius?" Algra et al. [1996: 231–240].
- Gough, Spencer John. 2008. "Morality and Materialism: A Literary Analysis of Juvenal's Twelfth Satire." M. A. thesis, McMaster University.
<http://digitalcommons.mcmaster.ca/opensdissertations/5295>
- Gowers, Emily. 1993a. *The Loaded Table: Representations of Food in Classical Literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gowers, Emily. 1993b. "Horace, *Satires* 1.5: An Inconsequential Journey." *PCPS* 39: 48–66.
- Gowers, Emily. 2009. "Eupolitics: Horace, *Sermones* I, 4." Felgentreu et al. [2009: 85–98].
- Graf, Fritz. 2005. "Satire in a ritual context." Freudenburg [2005a: 192–206].
- Graver, Margaret. 1990. "The Eye of the Beholder: Perceptual Relativity in Lucretius." *Apeiron* 23: 91–116.
- Greene, Elizabeth M. 2008. "Social Commentary in the *Metamorphoses*: Apuleius' Play with Satire." Riess [2008: 175–194].
- Griffin, Dustin. 1994. *Satire: A Critical Reintroduction*. Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky.
- Griffin, Miriam T. 1989. "Philosophy, Politics, and Politicians at Rome." Griffin & Barnes [1989: 1–37].
- Griffin, Miriam T., and Jonathan Barnes, edd. 1989. *Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Griffith, John G. 1970. "The Ending of Juvenal's First Satire and Lucilius, Book XXX." *Hermes* 98: 56–72.
- Grimal, Pierre. 1978. "Le poème de Lucrèce en son temps." Gigon [1978: 233–270].

- Grishakova, Marina, and Markku Lehtimäki, edd. 2004. *Intertextuality and Intersemiosis*. Tartu, Estonia: Tartu University Press.
- Gruber, Gwendolyn M. 2010 [27 March]. "Eat, Sing, Philosophize: Salutary Foods and Poetry in Plato and Lucretius." Conference paper, 106th Annual Meeting of the Classical Association of the Middle West and South. Oklahoma City.
- Gruen, Erich S. 1992. *Culture and National Identity in Republican Rome*. Series: *Cornell Studies in Classical Philology* 52. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Guérin, Charles. 2009. *Persona: L'élaboration d'une notion rhétorique au Ier siècle av. J.-C.* 2 vols. Series: *Textes et traditions* 18. Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé, Richard Goulet, and Philippe Hoffmann, gen edd. Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin.
- Guilhamet, Leon. 1987. *Satire and the Transformation of Genre*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Gunderson, Erik. 2005. "The libidinal rhetoric of satire." Freudenburg [2005a: 224–240].
- Guthrie, William Keith Chambers. 1962–1981. *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. 2: *The Presocratic Tradition from Parmenides to Democritus*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gutzwiller, Kathryn J. 1985. "The Lover and the *Lena*: Propertius 4.5." *Ramus* 14: 105–115.
- Habib, Khalil M. 2009. "Empire and the Grotesque in Aristophanes' *The Birds*." Hobby [2009: 33–40].
- Habinek, Thomas. 2005. "Satire as aristocratic play." Freudenburg [2005a: 177–191].
- Haenicke, Otto. 1877. *Kritische Untersuchung über die Echtheit der 12. Satire von Juvenal*. Series: *Beilage zu dem Programm des Königlichen Pädagogiums zu Putbus*. Putbus: Druck August Dose.
- Haggins, Bambi. 2007. *Laughing Mad: The Black Comic Persona in Post-Soul America*. Piscataway, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.
- Hahn, E. Adelaide. 1966. "Lucretius' Prooemion with Reference to Sappho and Catullus." *CW* 60.4: 134–139.
- Hall, Ronald L. 2000. *The Human Embrace: The Love of Philosophy and the Philosophy of Love: Kierkegaard, Cavell, Nussbaum*. University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.

- Hallett, Judith Peller. 1984. *Fathers and Daughters in Roman Society: Women and the Elite Family*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Halliwell, Stephen. 1984. "Aristophanic Satire." *YES* 14: 6–20.
- Hamilton, Colin I. M. 1993. "Dido, Tityos and Prometheus." *CQ* n. s. 43.1: 249–254.
- Hanslik, Rudolf, Albin Lesky, and Hans Schwabl, edd. 1972. *Antidosis. Festschrift für Walther Kraus zum 70. Geburtstag*. Series: *Wiener Studien* 5. Vienna: Böhlau.
- Harder, Annette, Alasdair A. MacDonald, and Gerrit J. Reinink, edd. 2007. *Calliope's Classroom: Studies in Didactic Poetry from Antiquity to the Renaissance*. Leuven: Peeters.
- Hardie, Alex. 2002. "The *Georgics*, the Mysteries and the Muses at Rome." *PCPS* 48, 175–208.
- Hardie, Philip R. 1986. *Virgil's Aeneid: Cosmos and Imperium*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hardie, Philip R. 1992. "Review: Lucretius on the Fear of Death." Review of Segal [1990]. *CR* n. s. 42.2: 299–300.
- Hardie, Philip R. 1998. *Virgil*. Series: *Greece & Rome New Surveys in the Classics* 28. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hardie, Philip R. 2007. "Lucretius and later Latin literature in antiquity." Gillespie & Hardie [2007a: 111–127].
- Hardie, Philip R. 2008. "Lucretian multiple explanations and their reception in Latin didactic and epic." Beretta & Citti [2008: 69–96].
- Hardie, Philip R. 2009. *Lucretian Receptions: History, The Sublime, Knowledge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ≈ Hardie [2008].
- Hardie, Philip R., and Helen Moore, edd. 2010. *Classical Literary Careers and Their Reception*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hardie, W. R. 1913. "The Dream of Ennius." *CQ* 7.3: 188–195.
- Harris, Keith M. 2008. "'That Nigger's Crazy': Richard Pryor, Racial Performativity, Cultural Critique." McCluskey [2008: 23–38].
- Harris, Tim, ed. 2001. *The Politics of the Excluded, c. 1500–1850*. Series: *Themes in Focus*. Basingstoke, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Harrison, Geoffrey. 1987. "The Confessions of Lucilius (Horace *Sat.* 2.1.30–34): A Defense of Autobiographical Satire?" *CA* 6.1: 38–52.
- Harrison, Stephen J. 1990. "Lucretius, Euripides and the Philosophers." *CQ* n. s. 40: 195–198.
- Harrison, Stephen J., ed. 1995. *Homage to Horace: A Bimillenary Celebration*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harrison, Stephen J. 2002. "Ennius and the prologue to Lucretius *DRN* 1 (1.1–148)." *LICS* 1.4: 1–13.
- Harrison, Stephen J., ed. 2007a. *The Cambridge Companion to Horace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Harrison, Stephen J. 2007b. "Town and country." Harrison [2007a: 235–247].
- Harrison, Stephen J. 2007c. *Generic Enrichment in Vergil and Horace*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harrison, Stephen J., ed. 2007d. *A Companion to Latin Literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harrison, Stephen J. 2008. "Horace *Epistles* 2: The Last Horatian Book of *Sermones*?" *PLLS* 13: 173–186.
- Harvey, R. A. 1981. *A Commentary on Persius*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
- Haß, Karin. 2001. "Lucilius und die Frauen." Manuwald [2001: 111–120].
- Haß, Karin. 2007. *Lucilius und der Beginn der Persönlichkeitsdichtung in Rom*. Series: *Hermes Einzelschriften* 99. Siegmar Döpp, Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp, and Wolfgang Kullman, gen. edd. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
- Hellegouarc'h, Joseph. 1963. *Le Vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la République*. Series: *Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de l'Université de Lille* 11. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
- Helmbold, W. C. 1956. "Juvenal's Twelfth Satire." *CP* 51.1: 14–23.
- Henderson, Jeffrey. 1991 [1st ed. 1975]. *The Maculate Muse: Obscene Language in Attic Comedy*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Henderson, John G. W. 1989. "Not 'Women in Roman Satire' but 'When Satire Writes 'Woman.'" Braund [1989a: 89–125].

- Henderson, John G. W. 1991. "The Pupil as Teacher: Persius' Didactic Satire." *Ramus* 20: 123–148.
- Henderson, John G. W. 1993. "Be Alert (Your Country Needs Lerts): Horace, *Satires* 1.9." *PCPS* 39: 67–93.
- Henderson, John G. W. 1999a. *Writing down Rome: Satire, comedy, and other offences in Latin poetry*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Henderson, John G. W. 1999b. "Satire Writes Woman: *Gendersong*." Henderson [1999a: 173–201].
- Hendrickson, G. L. 1928. "The First Satire of Persius." *CP* 23: 97–112.
- Henkel, John H. 2009. "Writing Poems on Trees: Genre and Metapoetics in Vergil's *Eclogues* and *Georgics*." Ph. D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
- Henkel, John H. Forthcoming. "Nighttime Labor: A Metapoetic Vignette Alluding to Aratus at *Georgics* 1.291–296." *HSCP*.
- Henss, Dietrich. 1954. "Ist das Luciliusfragment 9 (Marx) echt?" *Philologus* 98: 159–161.
- Heyworth, S. J., Peta G. Fowler and Stephen J. Harrison, edd. 2007. *Classical Constructions: Papers in Memory of Don Fowler, Classicist and Epicurean*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hiatt, Brian. 2011 [9 June]. "Monster Goddess: Unicorns, Sex Dreams and the Freak Revolution: Deep inside the Unreal World of Lady Gaga." *Rolling Stone* 1132: 40–47.
- Higginbotham, John, ed. 1969. *Greek and Latin Literature: A Comparative Study*. London: Methuen.
- Highet, Gilbert. 1941. "Petronius the Moralist." *TAPA* 72: 176–194.
- Highet, Gilbert. 1949. "The Philosophy of Juvenal." *TAPA* 80: 254–270.
- Highet, Gilbert. 1951. "Juvenal's Bookcase." *AJP* 72: 369–394.
- Hill, Timothy D. 2004. *Ambitiosa Mors: Suicide and Self in Roman Thought and Literature*. Series: *Studies in Classics* 10. Dirk Obbink and Andrew Dyck, gen. edd. New York: Routledge.

- Hinard, François, ed. 1988. *Dictatures. Actes de la table ronde réunie à Paris les 27 et 28 février 1984*. Paris: de Boccard.
- Hinds, Stephen. 1987a. "Language at the Breaking Point: Lucretius 1.452." *CQ* n. s. 37: 450–453.
- Hinds, Stephen. 1987b. "Generalising about Ovid." *Ramus* 16: 4–31.
- Hinds, Stephen. 1997. "«Proemio al mezzo»: Allusion and the Limits of Interpretability." *MD* 39 (*Memoria, arte allusiva, intertestualità / Memory, Allusion, Intertextuality*): 113–122.
- Hinds, Stephen. 1998. *Allusion and intertext: Dynamics of appropriation in Roman poetry*. Series: *Roman Culture and Its Contexts*. Denis C. Feeney and Stephen Hinds, gen. edd. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hobby, Blake, ed. 2009. *The Grotesque*. Series: *Bloom's Literary Themes*. Harold Bloom, gen. ed. New York: Infobase.
- Hoesterey, Ingeborg. 1999. *Pastiche: Cultural Memory in Art, Film, Literature*. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.
- Holmes, Brooke. 2005. "Daedala Lingua: Crafted Speech in *De Rerum Natura*." *AJP* 126: 527–585.
- Holtsmark, Erling B. 1967. "On Lucretius 2.1–19." *TAPA* 98: 193–204.
- Holtsmark, Erling B. 1968. "Lucretius and the Fools." *CJ* 63: 260–261.
- Hongo, Hudson, ed. 2011. "Literally Unbelievable": *Stories from The Onion as interpreted by Facebook*. <http://literallyunbelievable.tumblr.com/>
- Hooghe, Marc. 1999. "The Rebuke of Thersites. Deliberative Democracy under Conditions of Inequality." *Acta Politica* 34.4: 287–301.
- Hooley, Daniel M. 1997. *The Knotted Thong: Structures of Mimesis in Persius*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
- Hooley, Daniel M. 1999. "Horace's Rud(e)-imentary Muse: *Sat.* 1.2." *Electronic Antiquity* 5.2. <http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/EIAnt/V5N2/hooley.html>
- Hooley, Daniel M. 2007. *Roman Satire*. Series: *Blackwell Introductions to the Classical World*. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell.
- Hopkins, David. 2007. Review of DeMaria & Brown [2007]. *Translation and Literature* 16: 236–240.

- Horsfall, Nicholas. 1976. "Virgil, History, and the Roman Tradition." *Prudentia* 8: 73–89.
- Horster, Marietta, and Christiane Reitz, edd. 2005. *Wissensvermittlung in dichterischer Gestalt*. Series: *Palingenesia. Schriftenreihe für Klassische Altertumswissenschaft* 85. Severin Koster, gen. ed. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
- Houghton, Herbert Pierrepont. 1912. "Lucretius as Satirist." *TAPA* 43: xxxiv–xxxix.
- Housman, A. E. 1931. "Praefanda." *Hermes* 66: 402–412. = Housman [2001].
- Housman, A. E. 2001. "Praefanda." Trans. James Jayo. *Arion* 9.2: 180–200. = Housman [1931].
- Howe, Herbert Marshall. 1948. "Three Groups of Roman Epicureans." *TAPA* 79: 341–342.
- Howe, Herbert Marshall. 1951. "Amafinius, Lucretius, and Cicero." *AJP* 72.1: 57–62.
- Howe, Herbert Marshall. 1957. "The *Religio* of Lucretius." *CJ* 52.7: 329–333.
- Hudson, John. 2010a [27 July]. "Christian Right Not Actually Angry with Bill Murray." *The Atlantic Wire*.
<http://www.theatlanticwire.com/opinions/view/opinion/Christian-Right-Not-Actually-Angry-with-Bill-Murray-4485>
- Hudson, John. 2010b [19 August]. "Satirical Christian Site Hoodwinks the *Huffington Post*." *The Atlantic Wire*.
<http://www.theatlanticwire.com/opinions/view/opinion/Satirical-Christian-Site-Hoodwinks-the-Huffington-Post-4766>
- Hudson, John. 2011 [1 February]. "Rachel Maddow and NBC Struggle With Satire." *The Atlantic Wire*.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/atlantic/20110201/cm_atlantic/rachelmaddowandnbcstrugglewithsatire6795
- Hudson, Nicola A. 1989. "Food in Roman Satire." Braund [1989a: 49–67].
- Hughes, Felicity A. 1993. "Milton, Shakespeare, Pindar and the Bees." *RES* n. s. 44.174: 220–230.
- Hunt, Russell. 1981. "Satiric Elements in Hesiod's *Works and Days*." *Helios* 8: 29–40.
- Hunter, Richard L. 1985. "Horace on Friendship and Free Speech." *Hermes* 113.4: 480–490.

- Hunter, Richard L. 2006. *The Shadow of Callimachus: Studies in the reception of Hellenistic poetry at Rome*. Series: *Roman Literature and Its Contexts*. Denis C. Feeney and Stephen Hinds, gen. edd. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hurley, Matthew M., Daniel C. Dennett, and Reginald B. Adams, Jr. 2011. *Inside Jokes: Using Humor to Reverse-Engineer the Mind*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Hutcheon, Linda. 1985. *A Theory of Parody: The Teachings of Twentieth Century Art Forms*. London: Methuen.
- Hutchinson, G. O. 2001. "The Date of *De Rerum Natura*." *CQ* n. s. 51: 150–162.
- Hutchinson, G. O. 2009. "Read the Instructions: Didactic Poetry and Didactic Prose." *CQ* n. s. 59.1: 196–211.
- Huxley, H. H. 1952. "Storm and Shipwreck in Roman Literature." *G&R* 21.63: 117–124.
- Iser, Wolfgang. 1978 [repr. 1980]. *The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response*. David Henry Wilson, trans. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Jäkel, Siegfried, and Asko Timonen, edd. 1994. *Laughter Down the Centuries*, vol 1. Series: *Turun Ylipoiston Julkaisuja. Sarja B, Humaniora* 208. Turku, Finland: Åbo Akademis Tryckeri.
- James, Sharon Lynn. 1998. "From Boys to Men: Rape and Developing Masculinity in Terence's *Hecyra* and *Eunuchus*." *Helios* 25: 31–47.
- James, Sharon Lynn. 2003. *Learned Girls and Male Persuasion: Gender and Reading in Roman Love Elegy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Janko, Richard. 1995. "Reconstructing Philodemus' *On Poems*." Obbink [1995: 69–96].
- Janssen, David A. 2003. "'Time to Lose Faith in Humanity': *The Simpsons*, *South Park*, and the Satiric Tradition." *SPC* 26.1: 27–36.
- Javitch, Daniel. 1971. "*The Philosopher of the Court: A French Satire Misunderstood*." *Comparative Literature* 23.2: 97–124.
- Jocelyn, Henry David. 1977. "Ennius *sat.* 6–7 Vahlen." *RFIC* 105: 131–151.
- Jocelyn, Henry David. 1982. "Diatribes and Sermons." *LCM* 7: 3–7.

- Jocelyn, Henry David. 1983. "Diatribes and the Greek Book-Title Διατριβαί." *LCM* 8: 89–91.
- Johnson, Ann, Esteban del Rio, and Alicia Kemmitt. 2010. "Missing the Joke: A Reception Analysis of Satirical Texts." *Communication, Culture & Critique* 3: 396–415.
- Johnson, Samuel. 1768. *A Dictionary of the English Language*. 3rd edition. Dublin: W. G. Jones.
- Johnson, Timothy J. 1993. Review of Frischer [1991]. *Religious Studies Review* 19.2: 162.
- Johnson, Walter Ralph. 2000. *Lucretius and the Modern World*. Series: *Classical Inter/faces*. London: Duckworth.
- Jones, F. M. A. 1982. "A Visual Pun at Juvenal 12.81." *LCM* 7: 140.
- Kahane, Henry, and Renée Kahane. 1979. "Decline and Survival of Western Prestige Languages." *Language* 55.1: 183–198.
- Kahane, Henry. 1986. "A Typology of the Prestige Language." *Language* 62.3: 495–508.
- Kaimio, Jorma. 1979. *The Romans and the Greek Language*. Series: *Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum* 64. Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica.
- Kaplan, Carter. 2000. *Critical Synoptics: Menippean Satire and the Analysis of Intellectual Mythology*. Madison, New Jersey: Farleigh Dickinson University Press.
- Kay, Nigel M. 1985. *Martial, Book XI: A Commentary*. London: Duckworth.
- Keane, Catherine. 2002. "Satiric Memories: Autobiography and the Construction of Genre." *CJ* 97.3: 215–231.
- Keane, Catherine. 2006. *Figuring Genre in Roman Satire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Keane, Catherine. 2007. "Philosophy into Satire: The Program of Juvenal's Fifth Book." *AJP* 128.1: 27–57.
- Keane, Catherine. 2010. "Persona and Satiric Career in Juvenal." *Hardie & Moore* [2010: 105–117].
- Keen, Ralph. 1985. "Lucretius and His Reader." *Apeiron* 19.1: 1–10.

- Keith, Alison M. 1994. “*Corpus Eroticum*: Elegiac Poetics and Elegiac *Puellae* in Ovid’s *Amores*.” *CW* 88.1: 27–40.
- Keith, Alison M. 2000. *Engendering Rome: Women in Latin Epic*. Series: *Roman Literature and Its Contexts*. Denis C. Feeney and Stephen Hinds, gen. edd. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kelly, Adrian. 2006. “Parodic Inconsistency: Some Problems in the *Batrakhomyomakhia*.” *JHS* 129: 45–51.
- Kemp, Jerome. 2009. “Irony and *Aequibilitas*: Horace, *Satires* 1.3.” *Dictynna* 6. <http://dictynna.revues.org/286>
- Kemp, Jerome. 2010. “Flattery and Frankness in Horace and Philodemus.” *G&R Second Series* 57.1: 65–76.
- Kennedy, Duncan F. 2002. *Rethinking Reality: Lucretius and the Textualization of Nature*. Series: *Studies in Literature and Science*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
- Kennedy, Duncan F. 2005. “Intention and the Subject of Interpretation: A Response.” *Phoenix* 59.1–2: 143–149.
- Kenney, E. J. 1962. “The First Satire of Juvenal.” *PCPS* n. s. 8: 29–40.
- Kenney, E. J. 1970. “Doctus Lucretius.” *Mnemosyne Fourth Series* 23.4: 366–392.
- Kenney, E. J. 1971. *Lucretius De Rerum Natura Book III*. Series: *Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kenney, E. J. 1977. *Lucretius*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kenney, E. J., and Wendell V., edd. 1982. *The Cambridge History of Classical Literature*, vol. 2: *Latin Literature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kernan, Alvin B. 1959. *The Cankered Muse: Satire of the English Renaissance*. Series: *Yale Studies in English* 142. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
- Kernan, Alvin B. 1962a. *Modern Satire*. Series: *Harbrace Sourcebooks*. New York: Brace & World.
- Kernan, Alvin B. 1962b. “A Theory of Satire.” Kernan [1962a: 164–178]. ≈ Kernan [1959: ch. 1].

- Keulen, Wytse. 2009. *Gellius the Satirist: Roman Cultural Authority in Attic Nights*. Series: *Mnemosyne Supplements: Monographs on Greek and Roman Language and Literature* 297. Leiden: Brill.
- Keyser, Paul. 1992. Review of Frischer [1991]. *BMCR* 03.02.09. <http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/1992/03.02.09.html>
- Kilpatrick, Ross S. 1971. "Two Notes on the Text of Juvenal: *Sat.* 12. 32 and 16. 18." *CP* 66.2: 114–115.
- Kindstrand, Jan Fredrik. 1976. *Bion of Borysthenes: a Collection of the Fragments with Introduction and Commentary*. Series: *Studia graeca Upsaliensia* 11. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell.
- Kirk, Eugene P. 1980. *Menippean Satire: An Annotated Catalogue of Texts and Criticism*. New York: Garland Publishing.
- Kivistö, Sari. 2009. *Medical Analogy in Latin Satire*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kleefeld, Eric. 2011 [29 September]. "The Onion Roils Capitol With Fictional Congress-Perpetrated Hostage Situation." *Talking Points Memo*. <http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2011/09/the-onion-roils-capitol-with-fictional-congress-perpetrated-hostage-situation.php>
- Kleve, Knut. 1966. "Lukrez und Venus (*De Rerum Natura* 1, 1–49)." *SO* 41: 86–94.
- Kleve, Knut. 1969. "Lucretèce, l'épicurisme et l'amour." *Actes du congrès de l'Association Guillaume Budé* 8: 376–383.
- Kleve, Knut. 1978. "The Philosophical Polemics in Lucretius." *Gigon* [1978: 39–75].
- Kleve, Knut. 1979. "What Kind of Work Did Lucretius Write?" *SO* 54: 81–85.
- Kleve, Knut. 1989. "Lucretius in Herculaneum." *CErc* 19: 5–27.
- Kleve, Knut. 1991. "Phoenix from the Ashes: Lucretius and Ennius in Herculaneum." *Øivind & Whittaker* [1991: 57–64].
- Kleve, Knut. 1997. "Lucretius and Philodemus." *Algra et al.* [1997: 49–66].
- Klodt, Claudia, ed. 1996. *Satura lanx: Festschrift für Werner A. Krenkel zum 70. Geburtstag*. Series: *Spudasmata* 62. Hildesheim: Olms.
- Knight, Charles A. 1990. "Imagination's Cerberus: Satire and the Metaphor of Genre." *PQ* 69.2: 131–151.

- Knight, Charles A. 2004. *The Literature of Satire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Knoche, Ulrich. 1975 [1st ed. 1949]. *Roman Satire*. Edwin S. Ramage, trans. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.
- Knox, Peter E. 1999. "Lucretius on the Narrow Road." *HSCP* 99: 275–287.
- Knox, Peter E., and Clive Foss, edd. 1998. *Style and Tradition: Studies in Honor of Wendell Clausen*. Series: *Beiträge zur Altertumskunde* 92. Stuttgart: Teubner.
- Koenen, Mieke H. 1997. "Lucretius' Olfactory Theory in *De rerum natura* IV." Algra et al. [1997: 163–177].
- Koenen, Mieke H. 1999a. "Lucretius' Explanation of Hearing." *Mnemosyne* Fourth Series 52: 434–463.
- Koenen, Mieke H. 1999b. "Some Aspects of Lucretius' Account of Hearing." Poignault [1999: 21–36].
- Kollmann, E. D. 1971. "Lucretius' Criticism of the Early Greek Philosophers." *StudClas* 13: 79–93.
- Konstan, David. 1993. "Sexuality and power in Juvenal's second Satire." *LCM* 18.1: 12–14.
- Konstan, David. 2001. *Pity Transformed*. Series: *Classical Inter/Faces*. London: Duckworth.
- Konstan, David. 2006. "Lucretius." Borchert [2006: 598–602].
- Konstan, David. 2007. *Lucrezio e la psicologia epicurea*. Milan: Vita e Pensiero.
- Konstan, David. 2008 [1st ed. 1973]. *A Life Worthy of the Gods: The Materialist Psychology of Epicurus*. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing. 1st ed. published as *Some Aspects of Epicurean Psychology*. Series: *Philosophia Antiqua* 25. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
- Konstan, David. 2011. "Epicurus on the gods." Fish & Sanders [2011: 53–71].
- Konstan, David, Diskin Clay, Clarence E. Glad, Johan C. Thom, and James Ware, edd. 1998 [repr. 2007]. *Philodemus: On Frank Criticism*. Series: *Society of Biblical Literature Texts and Translations* 43, *Graeco-Roman* 13. John T. Fitzgerald, gen. ed. Atlanta: Scholars Press.

- Korus, Kazimierz. 1991. *Die griechische Satire. Die theoretischen Grundlagen und ihre Anwendung auf Homers Epik*. Series: *Prace Historycznoliterackie 77*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe.
- Koster, Severin. 2001. "Lucilius und die Literarkritik." *Manuwald* [2001: 121–131].
- Kragelund, Patrick. 1989. "Epicurus, Priapus and the Dreams in Petronius." *CQ* n. s. 39.2: 436–450.
- Krenkel, Werner A., ed. 1970. *Lucilius: Satiren*. 2 vols. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
- Krenkel, Werner A. 2001. "Lucilius und der Wertewandel." *Manuwald* [2001: 132–138].
- Kristeva, Julia. 1982. *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection*. 1982. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Kronenberg, Leah. 2009. *Allegories of Farming from Greece and Rome: Philosophical Satire in Xenophon, Varro, and Vergil*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kuiper, Koenraad. 1984. "The Nature of Satire." *Poetics* 13.6: 459–473.
- Kuiper, Koenraad. 1985. "A Perceptual Theory of Satire." *Petr et al.* [1985: 171–179].
- Kullmann, Wolfgang, Jochen Althoff, and Markus Asper, edd. 1998. *Gattungen wissenschaftlicher Literatur in der Antike*. Series: *ScriptOralia 95*, *Altertumswissenschaftliche Reihe 22*. Tübingen: Gunter Narr.
- Kwintner, M. 1992. "Plautus *Pseudolus* 782: A Fullonius Assault." *CP* 87.3: 232–233.
- La Bua, Giuseppe. 1997. "La « laus Cornuti » nella V satira di Persio e Lucrezio *De rerum natura* III 1–30." *BStudLat* 27.1: 82–101.
- Lachmann, Karl, ed. 1850. *Lucretii De rerum natura libri VI*. Berlin.
- LaFleur, Richard A. 1974. "Catullus and Catulla in Juvenal." *Revue de philologie, de littérature et d'histoire anciennes* Third Series 48 = 100: 71–74.
- LaFleur, Richard A. 1981. "Horace and *Onomasti Komodein*: The Law of Satire." *ANRW* 2.31.3: 1790–1826.
- LaMarre, Heather L., Kristen D. Landreville, and Michael A. Beam. 2009. "The Irony of Satire: Political Ideology and the Motivation to See What You Want to See in *The Colbert Report*." *International Journal of Press/Politics* 14.2: 212–231.

- Landolfi, Luciano, and Valentina Chinnici, edd. 2007. *Teneri properentur amores: Riflessioni sull'intertestualità ovidiana. Gli Amores*. Bologna: Pàtron.
- Langlands, Rebecca. 2006. *Sexual Morality in Ancient Rome*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lanza, Diego. 1963. "Le omeomerie nella tradizione dossografica anassagorea." *PP* 18: 256–293.
- Lape, Susan. 2004. *Reproducing Athens: Menander's Comedy, Democratic Culture, and the Hellenistic City*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- La Penna, Antonio. 1996. *Da Lucrezio a Persio: Saggi, studi, note*. Mario Citroni, Emanuele Narducci, Alessandro Perutelli, edd. Series: *Saggi*. Milan: Sansoni.
- Larmour, David Henry James. 2005. "Lightening the Load: Castration, Money, and Masculinity in Juvenal's *Satire* 12." *Syllecta Classica* 16: 139–172.
- Larmour, David Henry James. 2012. "Juvenal's Plague of Satire." Conference paper, 143rd Annual Meeting of the American Philological Association, Philadelphia. http://apaclassics.org/index.php/annual_meeting/143rd_annual_meeting_abstracts/22.3.larmour/
- Larmour, David Henry James, and Diana Spencer, edd. 2007. *The Sites of Rome: Time, Space, Memory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lattimore, Richmond. 1962. *Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs*. Series: *Illinois Studies in Language and Literature* 5. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press.
- Lavagnini, Bruno. 1947. "Motivi diatribici in Lucrezio e Giovenale." *Athenaeum* n. s. 25: 83–88.
- Leach, Eleanor Winsor. 1981. "Horace's *Pater Optimus* and Terence's Demea: Autobiographical Fiction and Comedy in *Sermo* 1.4." *AJP* 92: 616–632.
- Lee, Judith Yaross. 2006. "Mark Twain as a Stand-up Comedian." *The Mark Twain Annual* 4.1: 3–23.
- Lefèvre, Eckard. 2001. "Lucilius und die Politik." *Manuwald* [2001: 139–149].
- Lehoux, Daryn, Andrew D. Morrison, and Alison R. Sharrock, edd. Forthcoming. *Lucretius: Poetry, Philosophy, Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lei, Kun. 2007. "Defending Lucretius' Symmetry Argument against the Fear of Death." M. A. thesis, Georgia State University.

- Leiwo, M., and P. Remes. 1999. "Partnership of Citizens and Metics: The Will of Epicurus." *CQ* n. s. 49.1: 161–166.
- Lenaghan, Lydia. 1967. "Lucretius 1.921–50." *TAPA* 98: 221–251.
- Leonard, William Ellery, and Stanley Barney Smith, edd. 1942 [repr. 1968, 2008]. *Lucretius: De Rerum Natura libri sex*. Milwaukee, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Lettice, John, trans. 1795. *The Immortality of the Soul: A Poem from the Latin of Isaac Hawkins Browne*. Cambridge: John Archdeacon and John Burges, Printers to the University. <http://books.google.com/books?id=c0TOAAAAMAAJ>
- Levick, Barbara, and Richard Hawley, edd. 1995. *Women in Antiquity: New Assessments*. London: Routledge.
- Lévy, Carlos. 1999. "Lucrèce et les Stoiciens." Poignault [1999: 87–98].
- Lévy, Carlos. 2003. "D'Amalfinius à Cicéron: quelques remarques sur la communication de L. Canfora." *Monet* [2003: 51–55].
- Lieberg, Godo. 1962. *Puella Divina: Die Gestalt der göttlichen Geliebten bei Catull im Zusammenhang der antiken Dichtung*. Amsterdam: Schippers.
- Lindo, Locksley I. 1974. "The Evolution of Juvenal's Later Satires." *CP* 69.1: 17–27.
- Littlewood, Cedric A. J. 2002. "Integer Ipse? Self-Knowledge and Self-Representation in Persius *Satires* 4." *Phoenix* 56.1–2: 56–83.
- Littlewood, Cedric A. J. 2007. "Poetry and Friendship in Juvenal's Twelfth Satire." *AJP* 128.3: 389–418.
- Long, A. A. 1977. "Chance and Natural Law in Epicureanism." *Phronesis* 22: 63–88.
- Long, A. A. 1978. "Timon of Phlius: Pyrrhonist and Satirist." *PCPS* 204: 68–91.
- Long, A. A. 1997. "Lucretius on Nature and the Epicurean Self." Algra et al. [1997: 125–139].
- Long, A. A. 2003. "Roman philosophy." Sedley [2003: 184–210].
- Long, A. A. 2006. *From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Long, A. A., and David N. Sedley. 1985. *The Hellenistic philosophers*, vol. 1: *Translations of the principal sources with philosophical commentary*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Louis, Frances Deutsch. 1981. *Swift's Anatomy of Misunderstanding: A Study of Swift's Epistemological Imagination in A Tale of a Tub and Gulliver's Travels*. Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes & Noble.
- Lowrie, Michèle. 1993. Review of Freudenburg [1993]. *BMCR* 04.03.05. <http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/1993/04.03.05.html>
- Lynch, Jack. 1995 [22 May]. "Augustan Satire: An Annotated Bibliography." <http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~jlynch/Biblio/satirebib.html>
- Lyne, R. O. A. M. 1995. *Horace: Behind the Public Poetry*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Määttä, Lauri. 2004. "Textual Shakespeare in Terry Pratchett's Parody." Grishakova & Lehtimäki [2004: 215–240].
- MacKendrick, Paul, and Herbert Marshall Howe, edd. 1952. *Classics in Translation*, vol. 2: *Latin Literature*. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press.
- MacNicol, Glynnis. 2011 [1 February]. "AMAZING: Rachel Maddow Falls For False Story Calling For Sarah Palin To Invade Egypt." *Business Insider: The Wire*. <http://www.businessinsider.com/lame-rachel-maddow-slams-sarah-palin-based-on-false-story-on-satirical-website-2011-2>
- Maddow, Rachel. 2011 [31 January]. Post on Twitter.com. <http://twitter.com/#%21/MaddowBlog/status/32296220705693697>
- Maher, Bill. 2011 [21 January]. *Real Time with Bill Maher*. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/21/rachel-maddow-bill-maher-olbermann_n_812515.html
- Mangoni, Cecilia. 1988. "Prosa e poesia nel V libro della *Poetica* di Filodemo." *CErc* 18: 127–138.
- Mankin, David. 1987. "Lucilius and Archilochus: Fragment 698 (Marx)." *AJP* 108.2: 405–408.
- Mansbach, Agnes Rhoda. 1982. "'*Captatio*': Myth and Reality." Ph. D. dissertation, Princeton University.
- Manuwald, Bernd. 1980. *Der Aufbau der lukrezischen Kulturentstehungslehre (De rerum natura 5. 925–1457)*. Series: *Akademie der Wissenschaften und der*

- Literatur Mainz, Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse*
3. Mainz: Franz Steiner.
- Manuwald, Gesine. 1999. "Tragödienelemente in Plautus' *Amphitruo*. Zeichen von Tragödienparodie oder Tragi-komödie?" *Baier* [1999: 177–202].
- Manuwald, Gesine, ed. 2001. *Der Satiriker Lucilius und seine Zeit*. Series: *Zetemata* 110. Munich: C. H. Beck.
- Marconi, Giampetro. 1961. "Il proemio degli *Annales* di Ennio." *RCCM* 3: 224–245.
- Marincola, John. 1997 [repr. 1999, 2003]. *Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Martin, Joseph, ed. 1969 [1st ed. 1934]. *T. Lucreti Cari de Rerum Natura libri sex*. 6th ed. Series: *BT*. Leipzig: Teubner.
- Martindale, Charles. 2005. *Latin Poetry and the Judgement of Taste: An Essay in Aesthetics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Marx, Friedrich, ed. 1904/1905. *C. Lucili Carminum Reliquiae*. 2 vols. Series: *BT*. Leipzig: Teubner.
- Maslowski, T. 1974. "The Chronology of Cicero's Anti-Epicureanism." *Eos* 62: 55–78.
- Matz, Aaron. 2010. *Satire in an Age of Realism*. Series: *Cambridge Studies in Nineteenth-Century Literature and Culture* 72. Gillian Beer, gen. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mayer, Roland G. 1989. "Friendship in the Satirists." *Braund* [1989a: 5–21].
- Mayer, Roland G. 1990. "The Epic of Lucretius." *PLLS* 6: 35–43.
- Mayer, Roland G. 2003. "Persona (I) Problems." *MD* 50: 55–80.
- Mayer, Roland G. 2005. "Sleeping with the Enemy: Satire and Philosophy." *Freudenburg* [2005a: 146–159].
- Mazurek, Tadeusz. 1997. "Legal Terminology in Horace's *Satires*." Ph. D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
- Mazzoni, Guido, ed. 1936. *Scritti per il XIX centenario dalla nascita di Persio*. Series: *Biblioteca della "Rassegna Volterrana"*, 3. Volterra: Accademia dei sepolti.
- McCluskey, Audrey Thomas, ed. 2008. *Richard Pryor: The Life and Legacy of a "Crazy" Black Man*. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.

- McGinn, Thomas A. J. 2001. "Satire and the Law: The Case of Horace." *PCPS* 47: 81–102.
- McKeown, James C. 1987. *Ovid, Amores: Text, Prolegomena, and Commentary*, vol. 2: *A Commentary on Book One*. Series: *ARCA, Classical and Medieval Texts, Papers and Monographs* 22. Liverpool: Francis Cairns Publications.
- McKirahan, Richard. 1996. "Epicurean Doxography in Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* Book I." Giannantoni & Gigante [1996: 865–878].
- McNeill, Randall L. B. 2001. *Horace: Image, Identity, and Audience*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- McRae, Andrew. 2004. *Literature, Satire, and the Early Stuart State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mechley, Braden Joseph. 1988. "Reading (with) the animals: Lucretius' creatures and his poetic program." Ph. D. dissertation, University of Washington.
- Meineck, Peter, trans. 2000. *Aristophanes Clouds*. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett.
- Merrill, William Augustus. 1891. "The Signification and Use of the Word *natura* by Lucretius." *TAPA* 22: xxxii–xxxv.
- Merrill, William Augustus, ed. 1907. *T. Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura libri sex*. Series: *Morris and Morgan's Latin Series*. New York: American Book Company.
- Milanese, Guido. 1989. *Lucida carmina. Comunicazione e scrittura da Epicuro a Lucrezio*. Series: *Biblioteca di Aevum Antiquum* 3. Milan: Vita e Pensiero.
- Miles, Gary B. 1980. *Vergil's Georgics: A New Interpretation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Miller, Paul Allen. 1998. "The Bodily Grotesque in Roman Satire: Images of Sterility." *Arethusa* 31.3: 257–283.
- Miller, Paul Allen. 2007. "'I Get Around': Sadism, Desire, and Metonymy on the Streets of Rome with Horace, Ovid, and Juvenal." Larmour & Spencer [2007: 138–167].
- Minadeo, Richard. 1969. *The Lyre of Science: Form and Meaning in Lucretius' De Rerum Natura*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

- Miner, Earl, and Vinton A. Dearing, edd. 1969. *The Works of John Dryden*, vol. 3: *Poems, 1685–1692*. Swedenberg, Hugh Thomas, Jr., gen. ed. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Minyard, John Douglas. 1978. *Mode and Value in the De rerum natura: A Study in Lucretius' Metrical Language*. Series: *Hermes, Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie. Einzelschriften* 39. Wiesbaden: Steiner.
- Minyard, John Douglas. 1985. *Lucretius and the Late Republic: An Essay in Roman Intellectual History*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
- Mitsis, Phillip. 1988. "Epicurus on Death and Duration." *BACAP* 4: 303–322.
- Mitsis, Phillip. 1993. "Committing Philosophy on the Reader: Didactic Coercion and Reader Autonomy in *De Rerum Natura*." *MD* 31 (*Mega nepios: Il destinatario nell'epos didascalio*): 111–128.
- Momigliano, Arnaldo. 1941. Review of Farrington [1939]. *JRS* 31: 149–157.
- Monaco 1991 = *Studi di filologia classica in onore di Giusta Monaco*, vol. 3: *Letteratura latina dall'età del basso impero*. Palermo: Università di Palermo, Facoltà di lettere e filosofia.
- Monet, Annick, ed. 2003. *Le jardin romain, épicurisme et poésie à Rome. Mélanges offerts à Mayotte Bollack*. Lille: Conseil Scientifique de l'Université Charles-de-Gaulle.
- Monti, R. C. 1981. "Lucretius on Greed, Political Ambition and Society: *de rerum natura* 3. 59–86." *Latomus* 40: 48–66.
- Moodie, Erin K. 2012. "The Bully as Satirist in Juvenal's Third Satire." *AJP* 133: 93–115.
- Morel, Pierre-Marie. 2000. *Atome et nécessité: Démocrite, Épicure, Lucrèce*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Morgan, Llewelyn. 1999. *Patterns of Redemption in Virgil's Georgics*. Series: *Cambridge Classical Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Morgan, Llewelyn. 2003 [14 November]. "Erasmus in Hanoi." *TLS* 5250: 14 = *The Brazen Nose* 37: 47–51.
- Morgan, Llewelyn. 2007. "Satire." Harrison [2007d: 174–188].
- Morrison, Andrew D. Forthcoming. "'Nil igitur mors est ad nos'? Iphianassa, the Athenian plague, and Epicurean views of death." Lehoux et al. [forthcoming].

http://manchester.academia.edu/AndrewMorrison/Papers/667226/Nil_igitur_mors_est_ad_nos_Iphianassa_the_Athenian_plague_and_Epicurean_views_of_death

- Muecke, Frances. 1985. "Cave Canem: The Satirist's Image." Petr et al. [1985: 113–122].
- Muecke, Frances. 2005. "Rome's first 'satirists': themes and genre in Ennius and Lucilius." Freudenburg [2005a: 33–47].
- Mülke, Markus. 2009. "Ein Satiriker und seine Stadt. Juvenals (politische?) Anspielungskunst in den Rahmenpartien der dritten Satire." Felgentreu et al. [2009: 148–166].
- Munding, Heinze. 1996. "Conviva satur. Nochmals zu Horaz, Sat. I 1, 108–121." *AU* 39.4–5: 131–132.
- Murgia, Charles E. 2000. "'The Most Desperate Textual Crux' in Lucretius—5.1442." *CP* 95.3: 304–317.
- Murley, Clyde. 1939. "Lucretius and the History of Satire." *TAPA* 70: 380–395.
- Murley, Clyde. 1947. "Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, Viewed as Epic." *TAPA* 78: 336–346.
- Murphy, Arthur, ed. 1825. *The Works of Samuel Johnson, LL.D.*, vol. 1. London: Jones.
- Myerowitz[-Levine], Molly. 1985. *Ovid's Games of Love*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
- Myers, K. Sara. 1996. "The Poet and the Procuress: The *Lena* in Latin Love Elegy." *JRS* 86: 1–21.
- Nappa, Christopher. 1998. "'Praetextati Mores': Juvenal's Second Satire." *Hermes* 126.1: 90–108.
- Nappa, Christopher. 2002. "Cold-Blooded Virgil: Bilingual Wordplay at *Georgics* 2.483–9." *CQ* n. s. 52.2: 617–620.
- Navaud, Guillaume. 2011. *Persona: Le theater comme métaphore théorique de Socrate à Shakespeare*. Series: *Travaux d'Humanisme et Renaissance* 478. Geneva: Droz.
- Nelis, Damien. 2004. "Georgics 2.458–542: Virgil, Aratus and Empedocles." *Dictynna* 1: 1–21. <http://dictynna.revues.org/161>

- Neudling, Chester Louis. 1949. "Epicureanism and the 'New Poets.'" *TAPA* 80: 429–430.
- Nichols, James H., Jr. 1976. *Epicurean Political Philosophy: The De Rerum Natura of Lucretius*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Nilsen, Don L. F. 1987. "A Survey of Satire Publications." *Studies in Contemporary Satire* 15: 16–22.
- Nisbet, Gideon. 2004. "Hesiod, *Works and Days*: A Didaxis of Deconstruction?" *G&R* second series 51.2: 147–163.
- Nisbet, Robin George Murdoch, and Margaret Hubbard. 1970. *A Commentary on Horace: Odes Book I*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nisbet, Robin George Murdoch, and Margaret Hubbard. 1978. *A Commentary on Horace: Odes Book II*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nokes, David. 1987. *Raillery and Rage: A Study of Eighteenth Century Satire*. Brighton, England: Harvester.
- Norwood, Gilbert. 1945. *Pindar*. Series: *Sather Classical Lectures* 19. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Nugent, S. Georgia. 1994. "Mater Matters: The Female in Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*." *Colby Quarterly* 30.3: 179–205.
- Nussbaum, Martha Craven. 2009 [1st ed. 1994]. *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Obbink, Dirk, ed. 1995. *Philodemus and Poetry: Poetic Theory and Practice in Lucretius, Philodemus, and Horace*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Obbink, Dirk. 1996. "Epicurus on the Origin of Poetry in Human History." Giannantoni & Gigante [1996: 683–700].
- Oberhelman, Steven, and David Armstrong. 1995. "Satire as Poetry and the Impossibility of Metathesis in Horace's *Satires*." Obbink [1995: 233–254].
- O'Bryhim, Shawn. 2007. "Catullus 23 as Roman Comedy." *TAPA* 137: 133–145.
- O'Hara, James J. 1987. "*Somnia ficta* in Lucretius and Lucilius." *CQ* n. s. 37: 517–519.
- O'Hara, James J. 1992. Review of Frischer [1991]. *CW* 86.1: 59–60.
- O'Hara, James J. 1994. Review of Courtney [1993]. *CP* 89.4: 384–391.

- O'Hara, James J. 1996. *True Names: Vergil and the Alexandrian Tradition of Etymological Wordplay*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
- O'Hara, James J. 1998. "Venus or the Muse as 'Ally' (Lucr. 1.24, Simon. Frag. Eleg. 11.20–22 W)." *CP* 93.1: 69–74.
- O'Hara, James J. 2001. "Callimachean Influence on Vergilian Etymological Wordplay." *CJ* 96.4: 369–400.
- O'Hara, James J. 2007. *Inconsistency in Roman Epic: Studies in Catullus, Lucretius, Vergil, Ovid and Lucan*. Series: *Roman Literature and Its Contexts*. Denis C. Feeney and Stephen Hinds, gen. edd. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Øivind, Andersen, and Hélène Whittaker, edd. 1991. *The Norwegian Institute at Athens: The First Five Lectures*. Series: *Papers from the Norwegian Institute at Athens* 1. Athens: Norwegian Institute at Athens.
- Oliensis, Ellen Sarah. 1998. *Horace and the Rhetoric of Authority*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Olshausen, Eckart. 2001. "Lucilius und seine Zeit." *Manuwald* [2001: 166–176].
- Olson, S. Douglas. 1991. Review of Goldhill [1991]. *BMCR* 02.05.09. <http://bmc.brynmaur.edu/1991/02.05.09.html>
- Olson, S. Douglas, and Alexander Sens. 1999. *Matro of Pitane and the Tradition of Epic Parody in the Fourth Century BCE*. Series: *American Philological Association Monographs* 44. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Oltramare, André. 1926. *Les origines de la diatribe romaine*. Lausanne: Payot.
- Ong, Walter J. 1977. *Interfaces of the Word: Studies in Evolution and Consciousness*. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Onion-Like Headlines in Real Life*. 2011. <http://onionlike.tumblr.com/>
- Oppenheimer, Mark. 2010 [3 September]. "A Niche of the Unreal in a World of Credulity." *The New York Times*. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/04/us/04beliefs.html>
- O'Regan, Daphne Elizabeth. 1992. *Rhetoric, Comedy, and the Violence of Language in Aristophanes' Clouds*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Packman, Zola Marie. 1975–1976. "Ethics and Allegory in the Proem of the Fifth Book of Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*." *CJ* 71: 206–212.

- Paladini, Virgilio. 1936. "Il Maestro di Persio." Mazzoni [1936: 49–78].
- Papaioannou, Sophia. 2004. "'Ut non [forma] cygnorum, sic albis proxima cygnis': Poetology, Epic Definition, and Swan Imagery in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*." *Phoenix* 58.1–2: 49–61.
- Paratore, Ettore. 1939. "Spunti lucreziani nelle *Georgiche*." *A&R* 20: 177–202.
- Paratore, Ettore, and Ubaldo Pizzani, edd. 1960. *Lucreti De rerum natura: locos praecipue notabiles collegit et illustravit Hector Paratore, commentariolo instruxit Hucbaldus Pizzani*. Rome: Edizioni dell' Ateneo.
- Parker, Grant. 1989. "The Divine Machinery of the *Aeneid*." *Akroterion* 34: 181–190.
- Pasick, Adam. 2010 [3 September]. "The Guys Behind *Christwire*, Creating Parody from 'Glenn Beck on Steroids.'" *New York Magazine Daily Intel*.
<http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2010/09/christwire.html>
- Patin, Henri Joseph Guillaume. 1900 [1st ed. 1868]. *Études sur la poésie latine*, vol. 1. 4th ed. Paris: Librairie Hachette et Compagnie.
- Patten, Fred. 2009. "The Allure of Anthropomorphism in *Animé* and *Manga*." *West* [2009: 41–52].
- Paulson, Ronald. 1967. *The Fictions of Satire*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Pease, Arthur Stanley, ed. 1977 [1920–1923]. *M. Tulli Ciceronis De Divinatione Libri Duo*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Perkell, Christine Godfrey. 1981. "Remarks on the Corycian Gardener in Virgil's Fourth *Georgic*." *TAPA* 111: 167–177.
- Perkins, Caroline A. 2011. "The Figure of Elegy in *Amores* 3.1: Elegy as *Puella*, Elegy as *Poeta*, *Puella* as *Poeta*." *CW* 104.3: 313–331.
- Perret, Jacques L. 1940. "L'amour de l'argent, l'ambition et la crainte de la mort (Lucrece, III, 59–86)." *Rand et al.* [1940: 277–284].
- Perrin, Yves, ed. 2010. *Neronia VIII. Bibliothèques, livres et culture écrite dans l'empire romain de César à Hadrien. Actes du VIII^e Colloque international de la SIEN (Paris, 2–4 octobre 2008)*. Series: *Collection Latomus* 327. Carl Deroux and Jacqueline Dumortier-Bibauw, gen. edd. Brussels: Éditions Latomus.

- Petersmann, Hubert. 1999. "The Language of Early Roman Satire: Its Function and Characteristics." Adams & Mayer [1999: 289–310].
- Petr, Pavel, David Roberts, and Philip John Thomson, edd. 1985. *Comic Relations: Studies in the Comic, Satire and Parody*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
- Petrone, Gianna. 1977. *Morale ed antimorale nel Plauto*. Palermo: Palumbo.
- PetruzzIELLO, Carla. 1980. "Allitterazioni intensive in Lucrezio." *Vichiana* n. s. 9: 301–317.
- Pfaff, Kerry L., and Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. 1997. "Authorial Intentions in Understanding Satirical Texts." *Poetics* 25: 45–70.
- Phillips, Jane E. 1984–1985. "Alcumena in the *Amphitruo* of Plautus: A Pregnant Lady Joke." *CJ* 80.2: 121–126.
- Pianezzola, Emilio. 1977. "Lucrezio: sopravvivenza e potere." *RCCM* 19: 609–624.
- PiaZZI, Lisa, ed. 2005. *Lucrezio e i Presocratici. Un commento a De rerum natura I, 635–920*. Series: *Testi e commenti* 1. Pisa: Edizioni della Normale.
- PiaZZI, Lisa. 2006. "Atomismo e polemica filosofica: Lucrezio e i Presocratici." Beretta & Citti [2006: 11–25].
- Pirandello, Luigi. 1999 [originally published 1921]. *Sei personaggi in cerca di autore*. Corrado Simioni, ed. LiberLiber.
http://www.liberliber.it/mediateca/libri/p/pirandello/sei_personaggi_in_cerca_d_autore/pdf/sei_pe_p.pdf
- Pizzani, Ubaldo. 1959. *Il problema del testo e della composizione del De rerum natura di Lucrezio*. Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo.
- Plaza, Maria. 2006. *The Function of Humour in Roman Verse Satire: Laughing and Lying*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Poignault, Rémy, ed. 1999. *Présence de Lucrèce. Actes du colloque tenu à Tours (3–5 décembre 1998)*. Tours: Centre de Recherches A. Piganiol.
- Polt, Christopher Brian. 2010. "Catullus and Roman Dramatic Literature." Ph. D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
- Poniewozik, James. 2006 [3 May]. "Stephen Colbert and the Death of 'The Room.'" *Time Entertainment*.
http://entertainment.time.com/2006/05/03/stephen_colbert_and_the_death/

- Porter, James I. 1996. "In Search of an Epicurean Aesthetics." Giannantoni & Gigante [1996: 611–628].
- Porter, James I. 2003. "Lucretius and the Poetics of Void." *Monet* [2003: 197–226].
- Porter, James I. 2005. "Foucault's Ascetic Ancients." *Phoenix* 59.1–2: 121–132.
- Porter, James I. 2007. "Lucretius and the sublime." Gillespie & Hardie [2007a: 167–184].
- Porter, William Malin. 1990. "Cicero's *Pro Archia* and the Responsibilities of Reading." *Rhetorica* 8.2: 137–152.
- Postlethwaite, Norman. 1988. "Thersites in the *Iliad*." *G&R Second Series* 35.2: 123–136.
- Potter, David Stone. 1999. *Literary Texts and the Roman Historian*. Series: *Approaching the Ancient World*. Richard Stoneman, gen. ed. London: Routledge.
- Powell, Jonathan G. F. 1992. "Persius' First Satire: A re-examination." Woodman & Powell [1992: 150–172].
- Powell, Jonathan G. F. 1999. "Stylistic Registers in Juvenal." Adams & Mayer [1999: 331–334].
- Powell, Jonathan G. F., and Jeremy Paterson, ed. 2004. *Cicero the Advocate*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Prosperi, Valentina. 2007. "Lucretius in the Italian Renaissance." Gillespie & Hardie [2007a: 214–226].
- Pucci, G. C. 1966. "Echi lucreziani in Cicerone." *SIFC* 38: 70–132.
- Putnam, Michael C. J. 1979. *Virgil's Poem of the Earth: Studies in the Georgics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Putnam, Michael C. J. 1990. "Anger, Blindness and Insight in Virgil's *Aeneid*." *Apeiron* 23.4 (*The Poetics of Therapy: Hellenistic Ethics in Its Rhetorical and Literary Context*, ed. Martha C. Nussbaum): 7–40.
- Quinn, K. F. 1970 [2nd ed. 1996]. *Catullus: The Poems*. London: Bristol Classical Press.
- Rabinowitz, Peter J. 1977. "Truth in Fiction: A Reexamination of Audiences." *Critical Inquiry* 4.1: 121–141.

- Race, William H. *Pindar*, vol. 1: *Olympian Odes, Pythian Odes*. Series: *Loeb Classical Library* 56. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Ramage, Edwin S. 1978. "Juvenal, Satire 12: On Friendship True and False." *ICS* 3: 221–237.
- Ramage, Edwin S. 1989. "Juvenal and the Establishment: Denigration of Predecessor in the *Satires*." *ANRW* 2.33.1: 640–707.
- Rambaux, C. 1980. "La logique de l'argumentation dans le *De rerum natura*, III, 830–1094." *REL* 58: 201–219.
- Rand, E. K., et al., edd. 1940. *Mélanges de philologie, de littérature et d'histoire anciennes offerts à Alfred Ernout*. Paris: Librairie C. Klincksieck.
- Ransome, Hilda M. 2004 [1937]. *The Sacred Bee in Ancient Times and Folklore*. Mineola, New York: Dover.
- Raschke, Wendy J. 1987. "Arma pro amico: Lucilian Satire at the Crisis of the Roman Republic." *Hermes* 115.3: 299–318.
- Rau, Peter. 1967. *Paratragodia, Untersuchung einer komischen Form des Aristophanes*. Series: *Zetemata* 45. Munich: Beck.
- Rawson, Elizabeth. 1987. "Speciosa Locis Morataque Recte." Whitby et al. [1987: 79–88].
- Rayor, Diane J., and William W. Batstone, edd. 1995. *Latin Lyric and Elegiac Poetry: An Anthology of New Translations*. New York: Garland.
- Ready, Jonathan L. 2011. *Character, Narrator, and Simile in the Iliad*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Reckford, Kenneth J. 1962. "Studies in Persius." *Hermes* 90: 476–504.
- Reckford, Kenneth J. 1987. *Aristophanes' Old-and-New Comedy*, vol. 1: *Six Essays in Perspective*. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press.
- Reckford, Kenneth J. 1995. "Recognizing Venus I: Aeneas Meets His Mother." *Arion* 3.2–3: 1–42.
- Reckford, Kenneth J. 1997. "Horatius: The Man and the Hour." *AJP* 118.4: 583–612.
- Reckford, Kenneth J. 1999. "Only a Wet Dream? Hope and Skepticism in Horace, Satire 1.5." *AJP* 120.4: 525–554.

- Reckford, Kenneth J. 2009. *Recognizing Persius*. Series: *Martin Classical Lectures*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Redfield, James. 2008 [13 April]. "Animal Sacrifice and Comedy." Conference paper, *The Centrality of Animal Sacrifice in Ancient Greek Religion: Ancient Reality or Modern Construct?* (Annual Meeting of the Mid-Western Consortium on Ancient Religion). Chris Faraone, Bruce Lincoln, and Fred Naiden, organizers. Chicago. <http://greekandlatin.osu.edu/news/yr2008/sacrifice.cfm>
- Reinhard, Udo, Klaus Sallmann, and Karl Heinz Chelius, edd. 1974. *Musa Iocosa: Arbeiten über Humor und Witz Komik und Komödie der Antike*. Andreas Thierfelder zum siebzigsten Geburtstag am 15. Juni 1973. Hildesheim, Germany: Olms.
- Reinhardt, Tobias. 2002. "The Speech of Nature in Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura* 3.931–71." *CQ* n. s. 52.1: 291–304.
- Reinhardt, Tobias. 2004. "Readers in the Underworld: Lucretius, *de Rerum Natura* 3.912–1075." *JRS* 94: 27–46.
- Reitz, Christiane. 2005. "Horaz' Literaturbriefe und die Lehrdichtung." Horster & Reitz [2005: 211–226].
- Relihan, Joel C. 1984. "On the Origin of 'Menippean Satire' as the Name of a Literary Genre." *CP* 79: 226–229.
- Relihan, Joel C. 1993. *Ancient Menippean Satire*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Reydams-Schils, Gretchen. 2005. *The Roman Stoics: Self, Responsibility, and Affection*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Richlin, Amy. 1992. *The Garden of Priapus: Sexuality and Aggression in Roman Humor*. 2nd ed [1st ed. 1983]. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rider, Zackary P. 2011. "Empedocles, Epicurus, and the Failure of Sacrifice in Lucretius." M. A. thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
- Riess, Werner, ed. 2008. *Paideia at Play: Learning and Wit in Apuleius*. Series: *Ancient Narrative Supplements* 11. Groningen: Barkhuis / Groningen University Library.
- Riffaterre, Michael. 1980. "Describing Poetic Structures: Two Approaches to Baudelaire's 'Les Chats.'" *Tompkins* [1980: 26–40].

- Rimell, Victoria. 2002. *Petronius and the Anatomy of Fiction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rimell, Victoria. 2005. "The Satiric Maze: Petronius, Satire, and the Novel." Freudenburg [2005a: 160–173].
- Rist, John M. 1972. *Epicurus: An Introduction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Roberts, Deborah H., Francis M. Dunn, and Don Paul Fowler. 1997. *Classical Closure: Reading the End in Greek and Latin Literature*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rocca-Serra, Guillaume. 2010. "Pas de chagrin pour les livres détruits...." Perrin [2010: 127–129].
- Roggen, Vibeke. 2008. "The Effects of Genre on the Value of Words: Didactic Poetry versus Satire." *CQ* n. s. 58.2: 547–564.
- Roller, Duane W. 1970. "Gaius Memmius: Patron of Lucretius." *CP* 65.4: 246–248.
- Romano, Alba Claudia. 1979. *Irony in Juvenal*. Series: *Altertumswissenschaftliche Texte und Studien* 7. Hildesheim: Olms.
- Ronconi, Alessandro. 1963. "Appunti di estetica epicurea." Università [1963: 7–25]. = Ronconi [1972: 64–90].
- Ronconi, Alessandro. 1972. *Interpretazioni letterarie nei classici*. Series: *Biblioteca del Saggiatore* 35. Florence: Le Monnier.
- Ronnick, Michele Valerie. 1993a. "Form and Meaning of Juvenal's Twelfth Satire." *Maia* 45: 7–10.
- Ronnick, Michele Valerie. 1993b. "Juvenal, *Sat.* 12.32: Catullus' Shipwreck." *Museum Helveticum* 50: 223–224.
- Ronnick, Michele Valerie. 1995. "Juvenal, *Satire* 12.81: *ubi est 'ibi'?*" *Scholia* 4: 105–107.
- Rose, Margaret A. 1993. *Parody: Ancient, Modern, and Post-Modern*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rose, Peter W. 1988. "Thersites and the Plural Voices of Homer." *Arethusa* 21: 5–25.
- Rosen, Ralph M. 1990. "Hipponax and the Homeric Odysseus." *Eikasmos* 1: 11–25.

- Rosen, Ralph M. 2007. *Making Mockery. The Poetics of Ancient Satire*. Series: *Classical Culture and Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rosen, Ralph M., and Victoria Baines. 2002. "‘I Am Whatever You Say I Am’: Satiric Program in Juvenal and Eminent." *Classical and Modern Literature* 22.2: 103–127.
- Rosenbloom, David. 2002. "From *Ponêros* to *Pharmakos*: Theater, Social Drama, and Revolution in Athens, 428–404 BCE." *CA* 21.2: 283–346.
- Rosenmeyer, Thomas. 1996. "Sensation and Taste in Lucretius." *SCI* 15: 135–151.
- Rosivach, Vincent J. 1980. "Lucretius 4.1123–40." *AJP* 101.4: 401–403.
- Rösler, Wolfgang. 1973. "Lukrez und die Vorsokratiker." *Hermes* 101: 48–64.
- Ross, David O., Jr. 1969. *Style and Tradition in Catullus*. Series: *Loeb Classical Monographs*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Ross, David O., Jr. 1975. "The *Culex* and *Moretum* as Post-Augustan Literary Parodies." *HSCP* 79: 235–263.
- Ross, David O., Jr. 2010 [1st ed. 1975]. *Backgrounds to Augustan Poetry: Gallus, Elegy and Rome*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rossetti, Livio, ed. 1983. *Atti del Symposium Heracliteum 1981*, vol. 1. Rome: Edizioni dell’Ateneo.
- Rotstein, Andrea. 2010. *The Idea of Iambos*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rouse, W. H. D., and Martin Ferguson Smith, ed. 1975. *Lucretius: De Rerum Natura*. Series: *Loeb Classical Library* 181. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Roy, Sydnor. Forthcoming. "Homeric Concerns: A Metapoetic Reading of Lucretius’ *DRN* 2.1–19." *CQ*.
- Rudd, Niall. 1966. *The Satires of Horace: A Critical Study*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rudd, Niall. 1974. "Die seltsame Reise nach Brundisium: Aufbau und Deutung der Horazsatire I,5." Reinhard & Sallmann [1974: 179–206].
- Rudd, Niall. 1976. *The Satires of Horace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Rudd, Niall. 1986. *Themes in Roman Satire*. Series: *Classical Life and Letters*. Hugh Lloyd-Jones, gen. ed. London: Duckworth.
- Rumpf, L. 2003. *Naturerkenntnis und Naturerfahrung. Zur Reflexion epikureischer Theorie bei Lukrez*. Series: *Zetemata* 116. Munich: C. H. Beck.
- Runia, David T. 1997. "Lucretius and Doxography." Algra et al. [1997: 93–103].
- Russo, Alessandro. 2001. "Iambic Presences in Ennius' *Saturae*." Cavarzere et al. [2001: 99–115].
- Sacks, Edward. 1992. Review of Frischer [1991]. *BMCR* 03.02.09. <http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/1992/03.02.09.html>
- Saller, Richard P. 1982 [repr. 2002]. *Personal patronage under the early Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sandbach, F. H. 1940. "*Lucreti Poemata* and the Poet's Death." *CR* 54.2: 72–77.
- Saylor, Charles F. 1972. "Man, Animal, and the Bestial in Lucretius." *CJ* 67.4: 306–316.
- Scafoglio, Giampiero. 2005. "Plautus and Ennius: A Note on Plautus, *Bacchides* 962–5." *CQ* n. s. 55.2: 632–638.
- Scarpata, Giuseppe. 1964. *Parrhesia. Storia del termine e delle sue traduzioni in latino*. Brescia: Paideia.
- Schäfer, Eckart. 2001. "Lucilius und die Stadt Rom." Manuwald [2001: 177–187].
- Schepens, Guido. 1970. "Éphore sur la valeur de l'autopsie (F. Gr. Hist. 70F110 = Polybe XII,27,7)." *AncSoc* 1: 163–182.
- Schepens, Guido. 1975. "L'idéal de l'information complète chez les historiens grecs." *REG* 88: 81–93.
- Schepens, Guido. 1980. *L' "autopsie" dans la méthode des historiens grecs du V^e siècle avant J.-C.* Series: *Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, Klasse der Letteren* 93. Brussels: Koninklijke Academie.
- Schibli, Hermann S. 1983. "Fragments of a Weasel and Mouse War." *ZPE* 53: 1–25.
- Schiesaro, Alessandro. 1994. "The palingenesis of *De rerum natura*." *PCPS* 40: 81–107.

- Schiesaro, Alessandro. 1996. "La 'palingenesi' nel *De rerum natura* (III 847–869)." Giannantoni & Gigante [1996: 795–804].
- Schiesaro, Alessandro. 2007a. "Lucretius and Roman politics and history." Gillespie & Hardie [2007a: 41–58].
- Schiesaro, Alessandro. 2007b. "Didaxis, Rhetoric and the Law in Lucretius." Heyworth et al. [2007: 63–90].
- Schindler, Claudia. 2000. *Untersuchungen zu den Gleichnissen im römischen Lehrgedicht. Lukrez, Vergil, Manilius*. Series: *Hypomnemata. Untersuchungen zur Antike und zu ihrem Nachleben* 129. Albrecht Dihle, Siegmund Döpp, Dorothea Frede, Hans-Joachim Gehrke, Hugh Lloyd-Jones, Günther Patzig, Christoph Riedweg, and Gisela Striker, gen edd. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- Schlegel, Catherine M. 2005. *Satire and the Threat of Speech: Horace's Satires Book 1*. Series: *Wisconsin Studies in Classics*. Patricia A. Rosenmeyer, gen. ed. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Schlesinger, Alfred C. 1936. "The Literary Necessity of Anthropomorphism." *CJ* 32.1: 19–26.
- Schmid, Dankwart. 1951. "Der Erbschleicher in der antiken Satire." Ph. D. dissertation, Universität Tübingen.
- Schmid, Wolfgang. 1978. "Lucretius ethicus." Gigon [1978: 123–165].
- Schmidt, Jürgen. 1990. *Lukrez, der Kepos und die Stoiker. Untersuchungen zur Schule Epikurs und zu den Quellen von De rerum natura*. Series: *Studien zur klassischen Philologie* 53. Frankfurt-am-Main: Peter Lang.
- Schmitzer, Ulrich. 2009. "Der Maecenaskreis macht einen Ausflug, oder: Wie Horaz die Politik zur Privatsache macht." Felgentreu et al. [2009: 99–115].
- Scholz, Udo W. 2000. "Die *sermones* des Lucilius." Braun et al. [2000: 217–234].
- Schön, Ilse. 1970. "Zur Alliteration bei Lukrez." Ableitinger & Gugel [1970: 382–399].
- Schrijvers, Piet H. 1969. "Éléments psychagogiques dans l'œuvre de Lucrèce." *Actes du congrès de l'Association Guillaume Budé* 8: 370–376. = Classen [1986: 375–381].
- Schrijvers, Piet H. 1970. *Horror ac divina voluptas. Études sur la poétique et la poésie de Lucrèce*. Amsterdam: Hakkert.

- Schrijvers, Piet H. 2007. "Propagandistic Strategies in Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*." Harder et al. [2007: 49–70].
- Scodel, Ruth. 1987. "Horace, Lucilius, and Callimachean Polemic." *HSCP* 91: 199–215.
- Scodel, Ruth. 2010. "Iambos and Parody." Clauss & Cuypers [2010: 251–266].
- Scullard, H. H. 1973 [1st ed. 1951]. *Roman Politics (220–150 B.C.)*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sedley, David N. 1989. "Philosophical Allegiance in the Greco-Roman World." Griffin & Barnes [1989: 97–119].
- Sedley, David N. 1998. *Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sedley, David N. 1999. "Lucretius' Use and Avoidance of Greek." Adams & Mayer [1999: 227–246]. = Sedley [1998: ch. 2].
- Sedley, David N., ed. 2003. *The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sedley, David N. 2011. "Epicurus' theological innatism." Fish & Sanders [2011: 29–52].
- Seeck, Gustav Adolf. 1995. "Eine satirische *Ars poetica* für Piso. Bemerkungen zu Form und Absicht von Horaz *epist.* 2,3." *A&A* 41: 142–160.
- Segal, Charles. 1989. "Poetic Immortality and the Fear of Death: The Second Proem of the *De Rerum Natura*." *HSCP* 92: 193–212.
- Segal, Charles. 1990. *Lucretius on Death and Anxiety: Poetry and Philosophy in De Rerum Natura*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Sellar, William Young. 1881. *The Roman Poets of the Republic*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Sens, Alexander. 2006. "τίπτε γένος τοῦμὸν ζητεῖς; The *Batrachomyomachia*, Hellenistic Epic Parody, and Early Epic." Bakker et al. [2006: 214–248].
- Serafini, Augusto. 1957. *Studio sulla satira di Giovenale*. Florence: F. Le Monnier.
- Setaioli, Aldo. 2011. *Arbitri Nugae: Petronius' Short Poems in the Satyrica*. Series: *Studien zur klassischen Philologie* 165. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

- Sharland, Suzanne. 2009. *Horace in Dialogue: Bakhtinian Readings in the Satires*. Bern: Peter Lang.
- Sharrock, Alison R. 2005. "The Philosopher and the Mother Cow: Towards a Gendered Reading of Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*." Zajko & Leonard [2005: 253–274].
- Sheets, George A. 1983. "Plautus and Early Roman Tragedy." *ICS* 8.2: 195–210.
- Shelton, Jo-Ann. 1995. "Contracts with Animals: Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*." *Between the Species* 11: 115–121.
- Shelton, Jo-Ann. 1996. "Lucretius on the Use and Abuse of Animals." *Eranos* 94: 48–64.
- Shulman, Jeff. 1981. "*Te Quoque Falle Tamen*: Ovid's Anti-Lucretian Didactics." *CJ* 76.3: 242–253.
- Sider, David. 1987. "The Love Poems of Philodemus." *AJP* 108: 310–324.
- Sider, David. 1995. "Epicurean Poetics: Response and Dialogue." Obbink [1995: 42–57].
- Sidwell, Keith. 2009. *Aristophanes the Democrat: The Politics of Satirical Comedy during the Peloponnesian War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sihler, Andrew L. 1995. *New Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Silk, Michael Stephen. 1993. "Aristophanic paratragedy." Sommerstein et al. [1993: 477–504].
- Simpson, Christopher. 2001. "*Teichoskopia* and *Autopatheia* in Horace *Odes* 1–3." *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire* 79.1: 65–68.
- Simpson, Paul. 2003. *On the Discourse of Satire: Towards a stylistic model of satirical humour*. Series: *LAL* 2. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Skinner, Marilyn B. 1976. "Iphigenia and Polyxena: A Lucretian Allusion in Catullus." *PCP* 11: 52–61.
- Skutsch, Otto, ed. 1972. *Ennius*. Series: *Entretiens Fondation Hardt* 17. Geneva: Fondation Hardt.
- Slater, Niall W. 1990. *Reading Petronius*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

- Sloane, David E. E., ed. 1998. *New Directions in American Humor*. Tuscaloosa, Alabama: University of Alabama Press.
- Sluiter, Ineke, and Ralph M. Rosen, edd. 2004a. *Free Speech in Classical Antiquity*. Series: *Supplements to Mnemosyne* 254.
- Sluiter, Ineke, and Ralph M. Rosen. 2004b. "General Introduction." Sluiter & Rosen [2004a: 1–20].
- Sluiter, Ineke. 2005. "Communicating Cynicism: Diogenes' Gangsta Rap." Frede & Inwood [2005: 139–163].
- Smith, Martin Ferguson, trans. 2001. *Lucretius: On the Nature of Things*. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett.
- Smith, Steven D. 2006. "Space and Beyond: A Review of Recent Scholarship on the Ancient Novels." *IJCT* 12.3: 421–438.
- Smith, Riggs Alden. 2005. *The Primacy of Vision in Virgil's Aeneid*. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press.
- Smith, Warren S., Jr. 1980. "Husband vs. Wife in Juvenal's Sixth Satire." *CW* 73.6: 323–332.
- Smith, Warren S., Jr. 1989. "Greed and Sacrifice in Juvenal's Twelfth Satire." *TAPA* 119: 287–298.
- Smith, Warren S., Jr., ed. 2005a. *Satiric Advice on Women and Marriage: From Plautus to Chaucer*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
- Smith, Warren S., Jr. 2005b. "Satiric Advice: Serious or Not?" Smith [2004a: 1–25].
- Smith, Warren S., Jr. 2005c. "'The Cold Cares of Venus': Lucretius and Anti-Marriage Literature." Smith [2004a: 71–91].
- Smith, Warren S., Jr. 2005d. "Advice on Sex by the Self-Defeating Satirists: Horace *Sermones* 1.2, Juvenal *Satire* 6, and Roman Satiric Writing." Smith [2004a: 111–128].
- Snyder, Jane McIntosh. 1980. *Puns and Poetry in Lucretius' De Rerum Natura*. Amsterdam: Grüner.
- Snyder, John. 1991. *Prospects of Power: Tragedy, Satire, the Essay, and the Theory of Genre*. Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky.

- Solomon, Daniel. 2004. "Lucretius' Progressive Revelation of Nature in *DRN* 1.149–502." *Phoenix* 58.3/4: 260–283.
- Sommariva, Grazia. 1980. "La parodia di Lucrezio nel *Ars* e nei *Remedia* ovidiani." *A&R* n. s. 25: 123–148.
- Sommerstein, Alan H., Stephen Halliwell, Jeffrey Henderson, and Bernhard Zimmerman, edd. 1993. *Tragedy, Comedy, and the Polis. Papers from the Greek Drama Conference, Nottingham, 18–20 July 1990*. Series: *Le Rane. Collana di studi e testi* 11. Bari: Levante.
- Sommerstein, Alan H. "Harassing the Satirist: The Alleged Attempts to Prosecute Aristophanes." Sluiter & Rosen [2004: 145–174].
- Sosin, Joshua D. 1999. "Lucretius, Seneca and Persius 1.1–2." *TAPA* 129: 281–299.
- Spaeth, John W., Jr. 1942. "Persius on Epicurus: A Note on *Satires* 3.83–84." *TAPA* 73: 119–122.
- Spittler, Janet E. 2008. *Animals in the Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles: The Wild Kingdom of Early Christian Literature*. Series: *Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament, 2. Reihe* 247. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
- Stearns, John B. 1936. "Epicurus and Lucretius on Love." *CJ* 31.6: 343–351.
- Steuter, Erin, and Deborah Wills. 2008. *At War with Metaphor: Media, Propaganda, and Racism in the War on Terror*. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books.
- Stevens, John. 2007. "Platonism and Stoicism in Vergil's *Aeneid*." Bonazzi & Helmig [2007: 87–107].
- Stork, Traudel. 1970. *Nil igitur mors est ad nos. Der Schlußteil des dritten Lukrezbuches und sein Verhältnis zur Konsolationsliteratur*. Series: *Habelts Dissertationsdrucke, Klassische Philologie* 9. Bonn: Rudolf Habelt.
- Striker, Gisela. 1988. Response to Mitsis [1988]. *BACAP* 4: 322–328.
- Stroup, Sarah Culpepper. 2010. *Catullus, Cicero, and a Society of Patrons: The Generation of the Text*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stuurman, Siep. 2004. "The Voice of Thersites: Reflections on the Origins of the Idea of Equality." *Journal of the History of Idea* 65.2: 171–189.
- Sullivan, James. 2010. *Seven Dirty Words: The Life and Crimes of George Carlin*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Da Capo Press.

- Summers, Kirk. 1995. "Lucretius and the Epicurean Tradition of Piety." *CP* 90.1: 32–57.
- Syme, Ronald. 1956 [1st ed. 1939]. *The Roman Revolution*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Syme, Ronald. 1986. "Three Ambivii." *CQ* n. s. 36.1: 271–276.
- Taiwo, Emmanuel Folorunso. 2009. "A Re-Reading of the Interface between Satire and Philosophy." *Lumina* 20.2: 1–15.
- Takács, László. 2010. "The Library of Persius." Perrin [2010: 330–338].
- Tanner, R. G. 1972. "Catullus LVI." *Hermes* 100.3: 506–508.
- Tartari Chersoni, Marinella. 2003. "Struttura e schema del verso delle « Satire » di Persio (per un'analisi dei « patterns » dei primi quattro piedi)." *BStudLat* 33.1: 27–60.
- Tatum, W. Jeffrey. 1984. "The Presocratics in Book One of Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*." *TAPA* 114: 177–189.
- Taylor, Lily Ross. 1949 [repr. 1961]. *Party Politics in the Age of Caesar*. Series: *Sather Classical Lectures* 22. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Test, George Austin. 1991. *Satire: Spirit and Art*. Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press.
- Testard, R. P. Maurice. 1976. "Les idées religieuses de Lucrèce." *BAGB* 3: 249–272.
- Thalman, William G. 1988. "Thersites: Comedy, Scapegoats, and Heroic Ideology in the *Iliad*." *TAPA* 118: 1–28.
- The Onion*. 2011 [29 September]. "Congress Takes Group Of Schoolchildren Hostage." <http://www.theonion.com/articles/congress-takes-group-of-schoolchildren-hostage.26207/>
- Thiel, Augustus. 1901. *Iuvenalis graecissans sive De vocibus graecis apud Iuvenalem*. Bratislava: Preuss & Juenger.
- Thomas, Richard F. 1978. "Ovid's Attempt at Tragedy (*AM*. 3.1.63–64)." *AJP* 99.4: 447–450.
- Thomas, Richard F. 1979. "New Comedy, Callimachus, and Roman Poetry." *HSCP* 83: 179–206.

- Thomas, Richard F. 1986. "Virgil's *Georgics* and the Art of Reference." *HSCP* 90: 171–198. = Thomas [1999: ch. 4].
- Thomas, Richard F. 1988. *Virgil, Georgics*. 2 vols. Series: *Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Thomas, Richard F. 1992. "The Old Man Revisited: Memory, Reference and Genre in Virg., *Georg.* 4, 116–48." *MD* 29: 35–70.
- Thomas, Richard F. 1999. *Reading Virgil and His Texts: Studies in Intertextuality*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
- Thomson, D. S. F., ed. 1997 [1st ed. 1978]. *Catullus*. 2nd ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Thomson, Philip John. 1985. "Satiric Strategies: Introduction." Petr et al. [1985: 111–112].
- Thury, Eva M. 1987. "Lucretius' Poem as a *Simulacrum* of the *Rerum Natura*." *AJP* 108.2: 270–294.
- Timpanaro, Sebastiano. 1960. "Lucrezio III, 1." *Philologus* 104: 147–149.
- Toher, Mark. 2005. "Tillius and Horace." *CQ* n. s. 55.1: 183–189.
- Tompkins, Jane P. 1980 [repr. 1994]. *Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Toohey, Peter. 1996. *Epic Lessons: An Introduction to Ancient Didactic Poetry*. London: Routledge.
- Tortorelli, William. 2011. "Lyric Wisdom: Alcaeus and the Tradition of Paraenetic Poetry." Ph. D. dissertation, Brown University.
- Townend, G. B. 1978. "The Fading of Memmius." *CQ* n. s. 28: 267–283.
- Treggiari, Susan M. 1977. "Intellectuals, Poets, and Their Patrons in the First Century B.C." *EMC* 21: 24–29.
- Tsouna, Voula. 2011. "Philodemus, Seneca and Plutarch on anger." Fish & Sanders [2011: 183–210].
- Turpin, William. 1998. "The Epicurean Parasite: Horace, *Satires* 1.1–3." *Ramus* 27: 127–140.

- Tylawski, Elizabeth Ivory. 2002. *Saturio's Inheritance: The Greek Ancestry of the Roman Comic Parasite*. Series: *Artists & Issues in the Theatre* 9. New York: Peter Lang.
- Università degli studi di Torino, Istituto di filologia classica Augusto Rostagni. 1963. *Miscellanea di studi alessandrini in memoria di Augusto Rostagni*. Turin: Bottega d'Erasmus.
- Vaidhyathan, Siva. "Now's the Time: The Richard Pryor Phenomenon and the Triumph of Black Culture." *Sloane* [1998: 40–50].
- Valette, Paul. 1940. "Lucretius et la diatribe." *REA* 42: 532–541.
- van der Blom, Henriette. 2010. "Historical *exempla* as tools of praise and blame in Ciceronian oratory." *Smith & Corvino* [2010: 69–81].
- van Rooy, C. A. 1955. "Quintilian X 1, 93 Once More." *Mnemosyne* Fourth Series 8.4: 305–310.
- van Rooy, C. A. 1965. *Studies in Classical Satire and Related Literary Theory*. Leiden: Brill.
- Vidmar, Neil, and Milton Rokeach. 1974. "Archie Bunker's Bigotry: A Study in Selective Perception and Exposure." *Journal of Communication* 24: 36–47.
- Volk, Katharina. 2002a. *The Poetics of Latin Didactic: Lucretius, Vergil, Ovid, Manilius*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Volk, Katharina. 2002b. Review of Gale [2001]. *BMCR* 2002.03.42. <http://bmc.brynmawr.edu/2002/2002-03-42.html>
- Volk, Katharina. 2010. "Lucretius' Prayer for Peace and the Date of *De Rerum Natura*." *CQ* n. s. 60.1: 127–131.
- Wallach, Barbara Price. 1976. *Lucretius and the Diatribe against the Fear of Death: De Rerum Natura III 830–1094*. Series: *Mnemosyne Supplement* 40. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
- Walters, J. 1998. "Making a Spectacle: Deviant Men, Invective, and Pleasure." *Arethusa* 31: 355–367.
- Waltz, René. 1949. "Lucretius satirique." *Lettres d'humanité* 8: 78–103.
- Warden, John. 1998. "Catullus 64: Structure and Meaning." *CJ* 93.4: 397–415.

- Wardenaar, Leslie A. 1975. "Humor in the Colonial Promotional Tract: Topics and Techniques." *EAL* 9.3: 286–300.
- Wardy, Robert. 1988. "Lucretius on What Atoms Are Not." *CP* 83.2: 112–128.
- Warmington, E. H., ed. 1935. *Remains of Old Latin*, vol. 1: *Ennius and Caecilius*. Series: *Loeb Classical Library*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Warmington, E. H., ed. 1938. *Remains of Old Latin*, vol. 3: *Lucilius, The Twelve Tables*. Series: *Loeb Classical Library*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Warren, James. 2001. "Lucretian *Palingenesis* Recycled." *CQ* n. s. 51.2: 499–508.
- Warren, James. 2004. *Facing Death: Epicurus and His Critics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Warren, James. 2007. "Lucretius and Greek philosophy." Gillespie & Hardie [2007a: 19–32].
- Waszink, Jan Hendrik. 1954. "Lucretius and Poetry." *MKNAW AL* n. s. 17: 243–257.
- Waszink, Jan Hendrik. 1972. "Problems Concerning the *Satura* of Ennius." Skutsch [1972: 99–137].
- Watson, Patricia. "Love as Civilizer: Ovid, *Ars Amatoria*, 2.467–92." *Latomus* 43: 389–395.
- The Week* magazine. 2009 [29 April]. "Taking Stephen Colbert seriously: Why conservatives think Comedy Central's faux right-wing blowhard secretly agrees with them." U.S. Opinion section.
<http://theweek.com/article/index/95917/taking-stephen-colbert-seriously>
- Weinbrot, Howard D. 2005. *Menippean Satire Reconsidered: From Antiquity to the Eighteenth Century*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- West, David Alexander. 1994 [1st ed. 1969]. *The Imagery and Poetry of Lucretius*. 2nd ed. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press.
- West, Mark I., ed. 2009. *The Japanification of Children's Popular Culture: From Godzilla to Miyazaki*. Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press.
- West, Stephanie. 1985. "Herodotus' Epigraphical Interests." *CQ* n. s. 35.2: 278–305.

- West, Stephanie. 1987. "Herodotean Autopsy." Review of Armayor [1985]. *CR* n. s. 37.1: 6–8.
- Wheeler, Stephen M. 1995. "*Imago Mundi*: Another View of the Creation in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*." *AJP* 116.1: 95–121.
- Whitby, Michael, Philip Hardie, and Marie Whitby. 1987. *Homo Viator: Classical Essays for John Bramble*. Bristol: Bristol Classical Press.
- White, Heather. 2004. "Pindar and the Bees: A Waspish Reply." *Myrtia* 19: 167–168.
- White, Peter. 1978. "Amicitia and the Profession of Poetry in Imperial Rome." *JRS* 68: 74–92.
- White, Peter. 2007. "Friendship, Patronage, and Horatian Sociopoetics." Harrison [2007a: 195–206].
- Whitehead, Alfred North. 1929 [repr. 1967]. *The Aims of Education and Other Essays*. New York: Macmillan.
- Whitman, Cedric H. 1964. *Aristophanes and the Comic Hero*. Series: *Martin Classical Lectures*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Wiesen, David S. 1989. "The Verbal Basis of Juvenal's Satiric Vision." *ANRW* 2.33.1: 708–733.
- Wigodsky, Michael. 1995. "The Alleged Impossibility of Philosophical Poetry." Obbink [1995: 58–68].
- Williams, Gordon Willis. 1968. *Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Williams, Gordon Willis. 1982. "Phases in Political Patronage of Literature in Rome." Gold [1982: 3–27].
- Williams, Gordon Willis. 1983. "Roman Poets as Literary Historians: Some Aspects of *Imitatio*." *ICS* 8.2: 211–237.
- Williams, Gordon Willis. 1995. "*Libertino patre natus*: True or False?" Harrison [1995: 296–313].
- Wilson, Katharina M., and Elizabeth M. Makowski. 1990. *Wicked Wyves and the Woes of Marriage: Misogamous Literature from Juvenal to Chaucer*. Series: *SUNY Series in Medieval Studies*. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.

- Winkler, Martin M. 1983. *The Persona in Three Satires of Juvenal*. Series: *Altertumswissenschaftliche Texte und Studien* 10. Hildesheim: Olms.
- Winkler, John J. 1985. *Auctor & Actor: A Narratological Reading of Apuleius' The Golden Ass*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Wirzsubski, Chaim. 1950. *Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and Early Principate*. Series: *Cambridge Classical Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wiseman, T. P. 1982. "Pete nobiles amicos: Poets and Patrons in Late Republican Rome." *Gold* [1982: 28–49].
- Wiseman, T. P. 1992. "Atoms and Elephants: Lucretius 2.522–40." *Woodman & Powell* [1992: 45–51].
- Wistrand, Erik Karl Hilding. 1979. *Caesar and Contemporary Roman Society*. Series: *Acta Regiae Societatis Scientiarum et Litterarum Gothoburgensis* 15. Göteborg, Sweden: Vetenskaps-och Vitterhets-samhället.
- Witke, Charles. 1970. *Latin Satire: The Structure of Persuasion*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
- Wölke, Hansjörg. 1978. *Untersuchungen zur Batrachomyomachie*. Series: *Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie* 100. Meisenheim am Glan: Hain.
- Womble, Hilburn. 1961. "Repetition and Irony: Horace, *Odes* 2.18." *TAPA* 92: 537–549.
- Woodman, Anthony John, and Denis C. Feeney, edd. 2002. *Traditions and Contexts in the Poetry of Horace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Woodman, Anthony John, and Jonathan G. F. Powell, edd. 1992. *Author and audience in Latin literature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Woodman, Anthony John, and David Alexander West, edd. 1984. *Poetry and Politics in the Age of Augustus*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Woolerton, Emma. 2010. "The Roots of Lucretius' Tree-Men, *De Rerum Natura* 2.702–3." *CQ* n. s. 60.1: 255–257.
- Woronoff, Michel, ed. 1983. *Hommages à Jean Cousin. Rencontres avec l'antiquité classique*. Series: *Langues, littératures et civilisations de l'Antiquité* 1, *Annales Littéraires de l'Université de Besançon* 273. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
- Wright, M. Rosemary. 1997. "Ferox virtus: Anger in Virgil's *Aeneid*." *Braund & Gill* [1997: 169–184].

- Wright, M. Rosemary, ed. 2000. *Reason and Necessity: Essays on Plato's Timaeus*. London: Duckworth and the Classical Press of Wales.
- Wyke, Maria. 1990. "Reading Female Flesh: *Amores* 3.1." Cameron [1990: 111–143].
- Yankovic, Al. 2011a [20 April]. "The Gaga Saga." *Al's Blog*.
<http://alyankovic.wordpress.com/the-gaga-saga/>
- Yankovic, Al. 2011b [20 April]. "Gaga Update!" *Al's Blog*.
<http://alyankovic.wordpress.com/2011/04/20/gaga-update/>
- Zeitlin, Froma I. 1971. "*Romanus Petronius: A Study of the Troiae halosis and the Bellum civile*." *Latomus* 30: 56–82.
- Zetzel, James E. G. 1977. "Lucilius, Lucretius, and Persius 1. 1." *CP* 72.1: 40–42.
- Zetzel, James E. G. 1980. "Horace's *Liber sermonum*: The Structure of Ambiguity." *Arethusa* 13: 59–77.
- Zetzel, James E. G. 1998. "*De re publica and De rerum natura*." Knox & Foss [1998: 232–249].
- Zetzel, James E. G. 2005. *Marginal Scholarship and Textual Deviance: The Commentum Cornuti and the Early Scholia on Persius*. London: Institute of Classical Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London.
- Zimmermann, Bernhard. 2001. "Lucilius und Aristophanes." Manuwald [2001: 188–196].
- Zimmermann, Bernhard. 2005. "Spoudaiogeloion: Poetik und Politik in den Komödien des Aristophanes." *Gymnasium* 112.6: 531–546.
- Zoglin, Richard. 2008. *Comedy at the Edge: How Stand-Up in the 1970s Changed America*. New York: Bloomsbury USA.

APPENDIX 1

CONCORDANCE OF LUCILIAN FRAGMENTS CITED IN CHAPTER 4

C = Charpin [1978–1991/2002–2003]

M = Marx [1904/1905]

W = Warmington [1983]

K = Krenkel [1970]

The symbol – indicates that the given fragment is not included (or not included as a numbered item) in the edition in question.

C	M	W	K	C	M	W	K
1.1	1	1	1	9.20	379–380	391–392	369–370
1.2	9	2	—	9.21	319	347	322
1.3	2	3–4	5	13.11	448	475	447
1.12	15–16	15–16	16–17	14.8	457–458	489–490	460–461
2.13	71	60	61	14.9	459–460	493–494	462–463
3.7	101	117	121	15.18	480–483	520–523	482–485
5.14	203–205	208–210	205–207	15.19	484–489	524–529	490–495
6.1	228–229	252–253	234–235	17.2	540–546	567–573	541–547
6.7	238–239	275–276	243–244	19.7	566	593	562
6.18	258–259	270–271	258–259	26.6	608	726	623
8.2	305	333	304	26.7	650	675	607
9.1	349–350	366–367	355–356	26.37	666	654	646
9.4	351	368	344	26.42	623	704	676
9.5	352–355	369–372	345–348	26.54	626	717	673
9.6	356	373	350	26.58	625	707	624
9.7	357	374	349	26.64	635–636	676–677	660–661
9.8	358–361	384–387	360–363	26.65	638	678	662
9.9	362–363	375–376	351–352	26.66	639	679	659
9.10	364–366	377–379	353–355	27.3	693	770	707
9.11	367–368	380–381	356–357	27.4	696	769	705
9.12	369–370	382–383	358–359	27.42	701	777	742
9.13	371	388	364	28.11	751	815	769
9.14	372	388	365	28.12	752	816	770
9.15	374	393	371	28.13	754	821	771
9.16	375–376	394–395	372–373	28.14	755–756	822–823	772–773
9.17	381	396	374	28.15	753	820	774
9.18	382	388	366	29.1	806–807	962	919–920
9.19	377–378	389–390	367–368	29.2	812	973	924

C	M	W	K
29.3	875	879	844
29.4	876	880	842
29.5	877	881	843
29.6	874	886	849
29.7	870–871	882–883	845–846
29.8	872–873	885	847–848
29.9	810	964	856
29.10	890	892	872
29.11	888–889	887–888	852–853
29.12	894	889	854
29.13	891–893	893–895	868–870
29.14	808–809	963	855, —
29.15	803	969	918
29.16	805	971	923
29.17	804	972	921
29.18	802	968	917
29.19	815	965	863
29.20	813–814	966–967	925–926
29.21	816	948	808
29.22	817	897	871
29.23	811	970	922
29.24	879	901	861
29.25	882	904	859
29.26	881	903	851
29.27	884–885	906	864–865
29.28	887	908	867
29.29	886	907	866
29.30	878	900	850
29.31	818–819	890–891	857–858
29.73	851–852	910–911	874–875
30.1	1008	1061	1064
30.9	1079	1008	1064
30.10	1080–1081	1009–1010	1088, 1073
30.13	1085	1013	1066
30.17	1020	1083	1063
30.18	1016	1086	1067

C	M	W	K
30.19	1014	1084	1065
30.20	1035	1075	1089
30.21	1021	1087	—
30.22	1015	1085	1090
30.24	1095–1096	1000–1001	1014, 1016
30.25	1037–1038	1088–1089	1093–1094
30.27	1032	1068	1105
30.28	1017	1078	1056
30.29	1026	1077	1052
30.30	1030	1069	1034
30.32	1033	1070	1044
30.72	1034	1071	1104
H.1	1100	397	1110
H.3	1294–1295	1257–1258	1310–1311
H.4	1215–1217	398–400	1238–1240
H.10	1227	1076	1251
H.11	1168	418	1188
H.23	1326–1338	1196–1208	1342–1354
H.25	1340	1271	1356
H.33	1197	1188	1219
H.41	1228–1234	1145–1151	1252–1258
H.73	1248	1183	1265
H.85	1130	232	1146
H.174	1099	—	1139
H.175	1110	—	1121
H.176	1112	—	1123
H.177	1300	—	1316
H.178	295	—	295
H.179	477	—	471
H.180	1127	—	1142
H.181	45	—	40
H.182	1137	—	1152
H.183	1143	—	1160
H.184	1156	—	1174
H.185	1184	—	1204
D.21	1364–1365	—	1383–1384

APPENDIX 2

ADDITIONAL MAJOR *TOPOI* OF ROMAN SATIRE AND *DRN*

At the beginning of chapter 5 I made a *praeteritio* of several important satiric tropes that are present in some form as well in *DRN* (p. 246, above). These tropes are verbal violence, city and country, animals, disease, sexuality/masculinity, anger, and the use of a persona. In this appendix I touch briefly on each, with citations to relevant scholarship.

Satire teems with verbal violence—language of attack. Emblematic are *Serm.* 1.7, the tale of the “regicide” of Rupilius Rex during legal proceedings by means of clever and incisive satiric attack, and the *iurgia* of Juvenal’s poems (e.g., 5.26, 6.268). See Henderson [1999b: 181, 197], Schlegel [2005], Keane [2006: ch. 2], and, on violence and rhetoric in Aristophanes’ *Clouds*, O’Regan [1992]. In *DRN*, we might think of the attack on the Presocratics, the vitriolic tirades in book 3 of *Natura Rerum* and the addressee (directed against himself), or the pervasive, collusive use of coercive argumentation throughout the poem—all discussed in chapter 2.

The Greek term for the exercise of free speech, often in an abusive or invective context, is *παρρησία*, on which see Diogenes of Laertius 6.69 (quoting Diogenes of Sinope), Scarpata [1964], Foucault [2001/1985], Sluiter & Rosen [2004b: 4–8], and Carter [2004: 199–202]. Philodemus, the Epicurean philosopher contemporary with Lucretius, wrote a treatise on this topic, titled *Περὶ Παρρησίας*, on which see, among others, Konstan et al. [1998] and Kemp [2010]; for *παρρησία* as a trait particularly associated with Cynic philosophers, see Branham [1996: 88] and Plaza [2006: 53–54], and for matters of

παρρησία in the first book of Horace’s *Epistulae*, see Feeney [2002: 182]. The Latin concept that corresponded to παρρησία was no less than *libertas*, and it was a marker of the Roman male’s independent citizen status: see Wirzsubski [1950], Hellegouarc’h [1963: 542–565], and Freudenberg [1997]. For courtroom oratory and abusive *libertas*, see Richlin [1992/1983: 96–104], Corbeill [1996], Geiger [2002], Habinek [2005: 182], and van der Bloom [2010]. The satirist Lucilius was particularly associated with *libertas*, not only by subsequent satirists but even by Cicero: see *Epistulae ad Familiares* 12.16.3, cf. Anderson [1963: 73], Beacham [1991: 158–160, 189–192], and *Epistulae ad Atticum* 6.3.7 with Morgan [2003, 2007: 177–178, 311 n. 101]. On issues of *libertas* in Horace, see DuQuesnay [1984: 37], Freudenburg [2001: 242–248], Feeney [2002: 172], Schlegel [2005: 47, 159 n. 13], Toher [2005: 188 and n. 18], and Hooley [2007: 38–39]; for comparative perspectives on *libertas* in Roman satire and American rap music, see Rosen & Baines [2002], Braund [2004b: 410–413, 421, 427], and Sluiter [2005].

For the dichotomy between city and country in Roman satire, see Dessen [1968: 22], Braund [1989b], and Harrison [2007b]. On the countryside, Epicureanism, and the reception of *DRN* in Horace’s *Epistulae*, see Ferri [1993: 81–131]. Important examples within the genre are *Serm.* 2.6 (city and country mouse), 2.7.28–29 (the grass is greener on the other side, whether living in the city or the country); Persius 1.70–75 (poets these days can’t depict the lush countryside, *rus saturum*), 6.12–17 (the satiric persona retreats to the countryside, where he is “safe from the commonfolk,” *securus uolgi*, 12); and Juvenal poems 3 (Umbricius’ retreat from the savage City to more rustic environs) and 11 (with its simple country-style feast in the city). In *DRN*, there is the “picnic passage” (2.20–33; see pp. 151–152, above), and likewise rustic early humankind 5.1392–1141

(note 5.1398: *agrestis...musa*). Two additional examples: at 4.580–594, satyrs and nymphs are thought by country bumpkins to inhabit places with much echoing (and to explain said echoes), and by contrast a more urban life at 6.548–551 has wagons shaking houses.

Animals are of symbolic importance both to Roman satire and to Lucretius' poem, as for instance the fable of the city and country mouse at *Serm.* 2.6.79–117, or the poignant image of the mother cow searching for her calf at *DRN* 2.352–366. On the literary usage of animals in *DRN*, see, e.g., Betensky [1972], Saylor [1972], Castner [1974], Mechley [1988], Gale [1991], Wiseman [1992], Shelton [1995, 1996], La Penna [1995: 32–48], Campbell [2000, 2008], and Sharrock [2006]. For satire's take on horses, see, among others, Powell [1992] and Freudenburg [2001: 59–61, 96–97], as well as, on "horse-feed" (*farrago*) and the "grain-pile" (*aceruus*), Freudenburg [2001: 248] and Rocca-Serra [2010: 129]. The snarling or biting dog is an iconic metasatiric evidence for the satirist, as at Persius 1.107–110, with Anderson [1958], Muecke [1985], and Knight [1990].

Disease is an important trope in Roman satire, a metaphor for the moral depravity of targets, for the poetry and persona of the satirist, for the irrational appetites of, say, the greedy person, and so forth. At *Serm.* 2.3.27–30, for instance, social ills are figured physically. See, among others, Dessen [1968: 43–44 n. 13, 47–48, 56], Bramble [1974: 35–39], Barchiesi & Cucchiarelli [2005], and (on Latin satire, both classical and post-classical) Kivistö [2009]. Bogel considers the metaphor in post-classical authors of satire as inoculation against disease [2001: 52–55, 120, 188, 244]. *DRN*, too, may use disease as a way of marking immoral or non-atractic beliefs and behaviors: so, for instance, the

speaker reminds us that a fever is the same whether we have fancy or poor coverings (2.34–36). Most prominent in *DRN*'s discourse on disease is the plague, which (as Commager [1957], Segal [1990], and others have argued) puts in focus the potential difficulty of maintaining Epicurean ἀταραξία amid the gravest of ills. Larmour [2012] traces connections in Juvenal poem 2 between plague and unmasculine behavior among elite Roman males.

Sexuality and masculinity are (like disease) each an enormous topic, both in *DRN* and in satire, and are topics where the poems have much in common, much not in common, and much that is part more broadly of Roman (and Greek) literary and cultural discourses of gender and sexuality. For satire, see, e.g., *Serm.* 1.2, 1.8; Persius 1.18, 20–21, and 87 (Rome and its literature are over-focused on reaching orgasm, literal and metaphorical), with Freudenburg [2001: 151–173]; and Juvenal poems 2, 6, and 9; with, e.g., Smith [1980], Rudd [1986: ch. 6], Henderson [1989], Richlin [1992/1983], and, on depravity, Henderson [1999b: 174, 187], Walters [1998], and Gunderson [2005] (cp. Miller [1998] on grotesque bodies in Roman satire, and Haß [2001] and Krenkel [2001: 132–133] on Lucilius and Roman values concerning gender and sexuality). For *DRN*, the most important passage is that on love and sex (4.1030–1287); cf., among others, Brown [1987], Nugent [1994], Nussbaum [2009/1994], and Gordon [2002].

Anger, and with it exaggeration and extremes, are of fundamental importance to satire, especially to understanding Juvenal's poetry. Sample passages: *Serm.* 1.3.76 (the flaw of anger, *uitium irae*), 1.3.136 (a Stoic fool explodes with rage), 2.2.97–98 (financial mismanagement causes your family to hate you, and you to hate yourself); Persius 1.12 (*sum petulanti splene*), 5.54–61 (extreme lifestyles are unfulfilling); Juvenal 1.79 (*facit*

indignatio uersum), and 6.647–649 (women’s anger, *ira*, pushes them off the deep end, like rocks in a landslide). Keane points out that Juvenal poems 13 and 15 thematically deal with anger and connect to Seneca’s *De Ira* [2007: 30, 34–35, 37 n. 23]. Cf. further, e.g., Muecke [1985: 113–114, 117; 2005: 34], Braund [1988; 1989b], Ramage [1989], Rosen [2007: 54, 224–225, 230 n. 27], Roggen [2008: 564], and my discussion of *indignatio* as an essential part of the satirist’s characterization (pp. 43–44, above). For anger and political satire in Aristophanes, see Allen [2003]. Although anger logically falls within the category of passionate emotions that can prevent Epicurean ἀταραξία, we have seen that there is a role for *indignation* in *DRN* (pp. 113–123, above), and Lucretius’ Epicurean contemporary Philodemus discussed the uses and problems of anger in his own tract *On Anger*, cf. Asmis [2011] and Tsouna [2011].

For the persona in satire, see, e.g., Dessen [1968: 93], Corn [1975], Henderson [1993: 69, 79, 86], Braund [1996], Powell [1999: 318 n. 8], Mayer [2003], and Keane [2006: 10, 32, 125–126; also 2010], as well as, more generally, Guérin [2009] and Navaud [2011]. An important part of the narratorial persona in satire is the autobiographical presentation, the claim to speak simply and sincerely: cf. Dessen [1968: 7], and my discussion of such presentation by satiric speakers and *DRN*’s speaker in chapter 2.