

GENERATING A QUALITY PEACE: NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS AND GOVERNMENT
RESPECT FOR RIGHTS IN THE WAKE OF CIVIL WAR

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ABSTRACT

Lindsay Reid: Generating a Quality Peace: Negotiated Settlements and Government Respect for Rights in the Wake of Civil War
(Under the direction of Mark J.C. Crescenzi)

How can a quality peace be established in the wake of civil war? What role do peace agreements play in shaping what peace looks like following the resolution of civil war? This dissertation builds and tests a theory of how peace agreements and their contents influence the quality of post-conflict peace. Moving beyond negative or minimalist definitions of peace, I define a quality peace as one that is politically inclusive in nature. Specifically, I focus on two key components of a quality peace within this work: women's political rights and the political rights of societies more broadly. I argue that peace agreements both constrain and incentivize actors to commit to more politically inclusive outcomes. As such, I assess the extent to which peace agreements not only end war but go on to create a peace that is meaningful for those living in post-conflict societies.

I identify two characteristics of peace agreements, their gender-specificity and context-specificity, and argue that these characteristics influence progress made toward women's political rights and broader political inclusivity, respectively. Peace agreements, through their language, lay the framework for the structures, behaviors, and norms of the post-conflict state; their content, through direct and indirect mechanisms identified within this dissertation, influence progress toward a quality peace. I quantitatively test the theoretical expectations on a set of civil war peace agreements signed between 1981 and 2011 using new data that I have collected on the gender-specificity and context-specificity of agreements. I also present a number of case illustrations to assess the plausibility of the mechanisms identified herein. In sum, this dissertation contributes strong evidence that peace agreements play a unique role in shaping post-conflict societies, and it offers new data to strengthen understanding of when and through which mechanisms peace agreements shape both the end of violence as well as the consolidation of peace.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

...[T]he view that one cannot meaningfully work for both absence of personal violence and for social justice can also be seen as essentially pessimistic, as some sort of intellectual and moral capitulationism... [O]nce the double goal has been stated – that peace research is concerned with the conditions for promoting both aspects of peace – there is no reason to believe that the future will not bring us richer concepts and more forms of social action that combine absence of personal violence with [a] fight against social injustice... There are more than enough people willing to sacrifice one for the other – it is by aiming for both that peace research can make a real contribution.

– Johan Galtung in “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” 1969¹

The 2002 signing of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding by the military commanders of UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) as well as the Government of Angola has been durable and successful in preventing the recurrence of civil war in Angola. The case of Angola, though, reveals that conflict resolution must strive for more; in Angola, while war is over, structural violence continues to manifest itself through social injustice and inequality. Galtung (1969) writes that “Within this region [of peace] a tremendous amount of variation is still possible, making an orientation in favor of peace compatible with a number of ideologies outlining other aspects of social orders” (168). Galtung thus posits that while peace is indeed the absence of violence, peace itself comes in many forms. While the Luena Memorandum of Understanding put an end to the violence that had endured for almost

¹Galtung (1969, 186); Galtung writes that violence is present “when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations” (168). He goes on to identify personal violence as the type of violence specifically used by one person to directly harm another, and structural violence as violence that occurs because it is built into the structure of society and leads to unequal power and unequal life chances (170–171).

three decades, an accomplishment that cannot and should not be understated, the peace emerging from the agreement remained void of political, social, and economic opportunity or growth.

Since emerging from its lengthy civil war, Angola has been plagued by political, social, and economic struggles. The current president, Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, has been in power since 1979. According to the Polity IV Country Report on Angola from 2010, the opposition (UNITA) has accused the Dos Santos government of destroying democracy in the country (Marshall, Gurr and Jagers, 2010). In 2010 revisions to the country's constitution, presidential elections were abolished; instead, the president is now elected by the majority party in the legislature. At the same time, political freedoms are restricted across the country, rendering political participation minimal. Gender disparities also plague Angola and offer indication that peace is elusive for Angolan society. Women in Angola formed a number of organizations during the country's civil war. As early as 1962, the Organization of Angolan Women (OMA) was created as the women's wing of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA); in 1973, the Independent League for Angolan Women (LIMA) was created as the women's wing of UNITA. While women's roles and importance varied throughout the conflict,² women remained active in various political and social capacities. Following the signing of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding, however, the vast majority of Angolan women were left out of all direct benefits set forth in the agreement. Angola has avoided war recurrence since 2002, yet peace remains one that is marked by inequality, injustice, and structural violence. In sum, Angola is in a state of peace (as defined by the absence of war), but the country has a long way to go to consolidate a meaningful and just peace.

Liberia experienced two deadly episodes of civil war spurred by the Liberian government's highly exclusionary and corrupt practices. Indeed, the pre-war and interwar governments monopolized political and economic power amongst a small class of elites. Following the second civil war, which began in 2000, Liberians put a durable end to their conflict with the signing of the Accra Peace Agreement in 2003. Members of the Government of Liberia, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), and the Movement for Reconciliation and Democracy (MODEL) committed to negotiations and reached an agreement to bring a durable end to Liberia's war. In contrast to the case of Angola,

²OMA played an active role in supporting the MPLA and had an estimated 1.8 million members nationwide by 1983. LIMA, on the other hand, had few ties to the UNITA leadership as male leaders of the group feared repercussions of being too closely associated with women.

Liberia offers indication that countries can and should strive for a higher quality peace in the post-conflict period. While Liberia still faces a number of challenges stemming from issues such as poor infrastructure, governmental corruption, and sexual violence, it has nonetheless been able to achieve some of the very structures of justice and opportunity that Galtung described in his 1969 writing.

In the aftermath of civil war, Liberia has made positive strides toward inclusivity and opportunity for many of its citizens. For example, the political activities of Liberians have been marked by greater security and greater access. All significant groups, according to one account, have at least some access to political power. President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who was elected in 2006 following the post-conflict transitional period, has supported a Constitutional Review Committee which aims to increase the participation of political parties, civil society groups and other groups within the political life of the state (UN News Centre, 2013). Women, in particular, have gained a greater voice in Liberian politics. Thus, Liberia has made strides toward a peace that is not only defined as the absence of personal violence, but one that has greatly reduced structural violence as well. The legal and normative structures of the state have made important progress toward a more inclusive and secure state; indeed, the post-conflict environment in Liberia is one that is at the same time more meaningful and more hopeful for many in society.

The preceding glance at Angola and Liberia illustrates that post-conflict states are far from a homogenous group. The term post-conflict itself contains within it a vast array of human outcomes and realities, some positive and some negative. Whereas many post-conflict states have, like Angola, been unable to move toward more positive dimensions of peace, countries such as Liberia have established institutions and practices of inclusivity and opportunity. What accounts for the variation in what peace actually looks like in post-conflict states? Perhaps more pointedly, how can civil wars be resolved in ways that not only end war but also create a positive and meaningful peace? Peace is not established when violence ends. Civil wars continue to inflict harm and suffering on populations even after the fighting stops. Galtung (1969) challenges peace makers and peace researchers to strive for more, to strive for the creation of a peace that not only ends violence but also establishes structures of social justice and equality. Within the framework that I develop, I argue that civil war resolution truly becomes successful when a *quality peace* is established, or a peace that is both secure and politically inclusive in opportunity. The goal of this dissertation is to evaluate the possibility of generating structures of justice

and equality in post-conflict societies. Indeed, the goal is to grapple with how peace can be made meaningful for those living in post-conflict societies. How, truly, can countries be guided out of the conflict trap and move beyond the legacy of war?

A great disconnect exists between policymaking goals and scholarship on civil war resolution. While scholarship on conflict resolution strives to measure determinants that end violence (either in the short- or long-term), the policymaking community has been calling for, as United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated in 1992, more “comprehensive efforts to...consolidate peace.”³ Ending war is the necessary first step in the search for peace, but it is only the beginning of the journey and it is insufficient for the consolidation of peace. This dissertation tackles the concept of quality peace and explores mechanisms through which the international community can work to increase the quality of peace in the wake of civil war.

Within this dissertation, I build a theoretical framework and test the extent to which peace agreements, in particular, influence the quality of peace following civil war. Specifically, I argue that the contents of peace agreements shape the post-conflict peace through institutional constraints and incentives. Peace agreements’ contents constrain actors to new institutions and policies while also incentivizing new behaviors, attitudes, and norms within societies. In the case of Liberia, the 2003 Accra Peace Agreement incentivized inclusivity while also constraining actors from perpetuating exclusionary policies. Through direct and indirect mechanisms, the specific content of peace agreements helps to guide countries away from a legacy of war.

In particular, the chapters of this dissertation focus on two distinct applications of the aforementioned theory. First, I posit that gender-specific peace agreements influence inclusivity and rights for women in the post-conflict period, leading to tangible improvements in the quality of peace. Second, I argue that the context-specificity of peace agreements shapes levels of political protections within post-conflict societies.⁴ Across both sections, I contribute new data on the contents of peace agreements; beyond using this data for the research questions herein, the data on the gender-specificity and context-specificity of peace agreements can be applied to a number of questions about conflict resolution

³From “And Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping,” 31 January 1992.

⁴I define gender-specific agreements as those agreements that include provisions for women’s rights and context-specificity as the extent to which peace agreements address the causes of conflict. More details can be found below.

processes and post-conflict outcomes. In sum, this dissertation contributes strong evidence that peace agreements are instrumental in shaping the environments within post-conflict societies, and it offers new data to strengthen understanding of when and through which mechanisms peace agreements shape both the end of violence as well as the consolidation of a quality peace.

Puzzle and Motivations

Why are some countries, such as Liberia, able to make strides toward a higher quality peace while others, like Angola, remain plagued by widespread structural violence? In other words, what can peace-makers do to achieve Galtung's calls for promoting both negative and positive dimensions of peace? The research presented here focuses on peace agreements as defining tools in achieving a peace that is both durable and meaningful. Peace agreements, documents that are crafted by both domestic and international actors to lead countries out of war, are roadmaps for the post-conflict realities that states will face. As former U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali pointedly states, international efforts to guide countries out of the grips of civil war require extensive attention to identify and strengthen structures that facilitate the consolidation of peace. Moreover, he states that peace agreements themselves can be harnessed as mechanisms to advance and consolidate peace in the post-conflict period. Peace agreements, in this account, can be crafted to not only end violence but also establish institutions that foster political, social, and economic opportunity for populations emerging from war.

In spite of all that is known about peace agreements and the resolution of civil war, the negotiated settlement of civil wars often seems destined for failure. Negotiated settlements such as the 1993 Arusha Accords, signed to end the Rwandan civil war, and the 1994 Lusaka Protocol in Angola did little to end the long-running and violent conflicts that plagued those states. In Rwanda, a genocide resulting in the deaths of an estimated 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus occurred just months after the signing of the agreement. While the country has only experienced minor levels of physical violence over the past several years, key political, social, and economic challenges remain as the country moves further along the path to peace. In Angola, in spite of the comprehensiveness of the Lusaka Protocol, war resumed across the country soon after its signing. Why do so many civil war peace agreements fail to put a lasting end to violence? While the normative goal in negotiating settlements to end civil war is to end to violence and prevent future human suffering, many agreements are designed in short-sighted ways. If

the goal is the creation of a long-lasting peace in the wake of civil war, why do so many agreements lack the mechanisms necessary to build not only a durable, but also a self-enforcing and equitable peace?

A key shortcoming within peace efforts and within extant work on civil war resolution can be identified in policy-makers' and scholars' visions of conflict resolution success. At the most basic level, civil war resolution success is often marked by the signing of an agreement, whether it be a ceasefire or a more comprehensive peace agreement. More "advanced" definitions of resolution success measure the concept as the creation of a durable peace. A subset of this more advanced definition imply that civil wars have been successfully resolved if the subsequent peace lasts a set number of years. Another subset of these studies posit that the longer lasting peace is following a civil war, the more successful the resolution process has been. While these conceptualizations of civil war resolution success have generated much knowledge and contributed important insights into the civil war resolution process, they are all plagued by a common flaw. Each of these definitions of successful civil war resolution assume peace to mean the absence of violence at levels associated with war. If violence is occurring but does not reach the 1,000 battle-death threshold, is that really peace? As Galtung (1969) identifies, these definitions of success rely on the idea of a negative peace, or a peace that is defined by the absence of personal violence.

Crocker and Hampson (1996) reiterate, however, that success can and should be measured in a number of ways when studying conflict resolution. They write:

In some circumstances, success can legitimately be defined as the avoidance of major setbacks or disasters. In others, success may mean a marginal improvement in stabilizing, containing, and checking the human price and territorial spread of a volatile struggle. Finally, success may entail constructing building blocks for a settlement or even obtaining full implementation, complete with resolution of the underlying issues (Crocker and Hampson, 1996, 62).

At present, defining success as the signing of an agreement or the creation of a lasting peace aligns with the first two components of success that Crocker and Hampson identify. What is needed, is the exploration of the third dimension of success, a systematic and empirical effort to assess how success in conflict resolution is not only the cessation of war but also the creation and consolidation of a quality peace.

Why, more specifically, are current definitions of civil war success not enough? What are the implications of continuing to measure success as has been done in the past? If scholars and policy-makers do not conceptualize success in longer-term or more nuanced ways, they will remain bound to processes that end violence but stop short of creating political environments that provide broader forms of personal security. By relying on short-term and/or minimalist definitions of success, scholars are identifying ways to avoid war recurrence but they are not identifying ways to create a sustainable and self-enforcing quality peace. Current work offers a vast number of recommendations to increase the likelihood that a negotiated settlement will put an end to war, but it does not adequately say how negotiated settlements generate peace. The factors that end war are not necessarily sufficient to create peace; ending war is but the first step of many needed to create peace. This dissertation focuses on what happens when war ends and how the settlement process shapes positive peaceful outcomes.

Of course, the distinction between the end of war and the creation of peace is not entirely new but it has yet to be studied in a rigorous way. Galtung (1969), for example, discusses definitions of peace and violence and writes of the concepts of negative and positive peace. Negative peace, which captures the current conceptualization of successful civil war resolution, is simply the absence of personal violence. Positive peace, on the other hand, describes a state that is free from structural violence as well. A positive peace relies on concepts such as social justice and a more egalitarian distribution of power, resources, and opportunity. As an example, Galtung (1969) writes: “if people are starving when this is objectively avoidable, then violence is committed, regardless of whether there is a clear subject-action-object relation” (171). Empirical work within political science needs to pay more focus to this idea of a positive peace or, to use the term that will appear throughout this work, the quality of the peace. If the ways currently identified to resolve civil wars merely create a negative peace but do nothing in terms of social, economic, and political justice, then scholars and practitioners are missing a key component in long-term, durable civil war resolution. Peace research, as Galtung wrote nearly half a century ago, must strive for more.

Current definitions of resolution success may help explain why numerous peace agreements and negotiated settlements are so prone to failure. Scholars and policy-makers have identified a number of key mechanisms that minimize the risk of war recurrence in the immediate wake of conflict, but they have done little to explore the type of peace that is created. The Sudanese Comprehensive Peace

Agreement, for example, ended violence at levels associated with war between the government's forces and the SPLM/A, but it did not create a peace that spread to all groups in the country nor did it generate a stability amenable to economic growth, political and social inclusivity, or general human development and security. As such, I have tasked myself with generating a better understanding of the quality of peace emerging from civil war resolution and the ways in which such a quality peace can be achieved. How can civil wars be resolved and peace agreements be designed so as to create a quality peace that is more than the absence of war? Ending war, although essential, should not be seen as the end game. Giving attention to the quality of peace is a necessary second step in helping societies truly escape the grips of civil war.

While much research has been done to investigate how peace is reached following civil wars, much less is known about the nature or quality of peace emerging from civil conflicts. Many countries are stuck in a conflict trap, experiencing recurring instability and civil war. Are there shortcomings in the civil war resolution process and ensuing peace that preclude lasting peace and leave countries in the conflict trap? I argue that the *quality* of post-conflict peace is a crucial component in preventing recurring conflict. Peace is not peaceful for some; although the physical fighting may end in countries recovering from civil war, many post-civil war societies still experience ongoing conflict and struggle. The main research question I seek to explore, then, is how a high-quality peace can be established following a civil war. In approaching this question, I am pushing further than previous studies of civil war resolution. By answering these questions and creating this extension of the civil war resolution literature, I hope to generate a more nuanced understanding of what a quality peace is and how, in practice, a quality peace can be created. In sum, this work explores the way in which the post-civil war peace can become more peaceful for those people who are living in countries recovering from the atrocities of civil war.

Definitions and Overview of a Quality Peace

With the puzzle now established and the motivations for studying the quality of post-civil war peace outlined, I now turn to address the definition of a quality peace. In the broadest sense, a quality peace is a peace that is politically, economically, and socially inclusive in nature. In other words, it is one that is not marked by systematic exclusions, discriminations, or violence based on gender, race, ethnicity, religion, social class, or political leaning. Within the empirical chapters that follow, the quality of peace is more

specifically defined as the extent to which the majority of citizens in a country enjoy basic political rights and freedoms.⁵ In his own work on political inclusion and civil war recurrence, Call (2012) defines political inclusion as the opposite of exclusion, or more specifically, “behavior that does not exclude former parties...from access to state positions in ways contrary to their expectations” (39). I extend Call’s definition in that I do not exclusively focus on warring parties. Instead, the dependent variable of interest within this dissertation is one that looks at political inclusion as the extent to which groups in society can securely exercise political voice and access positions of political power. As countries move toward greater political inclusion, they are making strides away from the legacy of war toward a higher quality peace.

Before proceeding further, I must emphasize that a quality peace has many dimensions; a quality peace encompasses the entirety of positive peace and social justice outlined by Galtung (1969). I choose to focus on the political dimensions of a quality peace for the following reasons: (1) political inclusion and exclusion shape the stability and legitimacy of the post-conflict state and are thus a crucial pillar of quality peace, and (2) most peace settlements are themselves focused on political goals and reforms so one would expect that, if peace agreements influence the quality of peace, their effects should manifest themselves first and foremost in the political life of the state. Future work on quality of post-conflict peace must, undoubtedly, investigate the economic and social dimensions of quality peace.⁶ As the field of peace research moves beyond definitions of peace that rely on the negative conception of peace, research must strive to broaden the scope of quality peace so as to better understand the many pathways through which countries can be guided out of the conflict trap.

The quality of peace is not only important in that a high quality peace takes countries out of the grips of the conflict trap; a high quality peace also brings benefits to the people on the ground who have lived through the destruction of war. Ending violence brings relief to those who have survived a civil war, a relief whose importance cannot be adequately captured in words. But as days, months, or even years pass without the quality of peace improving, people become disillusioned and dissatisfied;

⁵At the same time, I want to emphasize that I do not intend to conflate quality of peace with democracy, per se. As will be discussed in later chapters, prescribing democratic institutions as a one-size-fits-all solution can be both dangerous and destabilizing. While a quality peace may be democratic, it need not be.

⁶For example, any number of the following measures could also serve as indicators for the quality of peace and represent a more positive way to define conflict resolution success: socioeconomic (in)equality, educational opportunities, health care provisions, level of corruption, rule of law, access to justice, and basic infrastructure.

peace is not peaceful for many if the political, social, and economic situation does not improve for most of the population. Systematic political exclusion, corruption, and insecurity do not qualify as war recurrence and therefore they would go unnoticed by Correlates of War or UCDP databases. They do qualify, however, as a form of violence against a population (Galtung, 1969). Although countries such as Angola, Sudan, and Côte d'Ivoire are no longer at war, peace remains elusive.

Literature

In what follows, I discuss extant literature falling under two broad categories. First, I focus on what is known about negotiated settlements and their role in ending violence. In general, work on negotiated settlements has focused on two key components of civil war peace agreements. Research has found that both third-party enforcement as well as power-sharing institutions contribute to the successful and durable resolution of civil wars. Second, I present the very limited work that has thus far been done regarding the quality of post-conflict peace. Perhaps more accurately, I highlight how a number of scholars have suggested that the quality of peace is a crucial dimension of civil war resolution, but that little systematic work has been done to pursue such research. I emphasize in this section, as I have previously, that more work must be done to extend the bounds of current definitions of civil war resolution success. If scholars and practitioners want to strive to end both personal violence and structural violence, then greater focus must be placed on the means to establish a quality peace.

Resolving Civil War Through Negotiated Settlement

Negotiated settlements are incredibly difficult to achieve and even more difficult to sustain. Of the 65 civil wars that were fought between 1900 and 1989, only 11 were resolved through negotiation. Moreover, only one-third of negotiated settlements of “so called ‘identity’ civil wars” have resulted in a lasting peace (Crocker and Hampson, 1996, 55). A more recent study by Walter (2002) finds that 62 percent of all negotiations that occurred between 1940 and 1992 resulted in a signed bargain however only half of these bargains were actually enforced and implemented. The most dire challenge, then, is not necessarily getting disputants to the negotiating table or even getting disputants to sign an agreement. Instead, Walter (2002) and others recognize that the most difficult phase of civil war resolution is the implementation of agreements and the subsequent creation of a sustainable and durable peace. To

this, I add that another challenge is not only creating agreements and peace processes that create a durable end to war; agreements and peace processes must also be concerned with creating a quality peace that extends basic political rights and freedoms to all portions of society and that is inclusive of underrepresented segments of the population.

Given that peace agreements have a less-than-stellar history as a mechanism for ending wars, do such negotiated settlements matter and if so, how? Fortna (2003), looking at interstate wars, finds evidence that agreements are more than just scraps of paper. Scholars and practitioners alike cannot write off negotiated settlements as a means for resolving conflict. Works by the likes of Walter (2002), Fortna (2003), and Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) thus confirm that the content of peace agreements matters greatly. When agreements include specific mechanisms such third-party guarantees or specific institutional arrangements, the agreement will render a durable peace more likely. The research on peace agreements, then, has moved from whether or not peace agreements work at all to a more nuanced analysis of how they work and what conditions increase their likelihood of success in the long term.

Research on peace agreements and peace implementation has emphasized the unparalleled importance of giving attention to the mechanisms embedded within peace agreements. Much work has focused on the importance of revising the security and military environment in the wake of civil war (see e.g. Stedman, 2002; Mattes, 2008; Mattes and Savun, 2009, 2010; Walter, 2002). Crocker and Hampson (1996) posit that “a well-led implementation can transform the climate that develops among the parties, making possible compromises and deals that would have been unthinkable before the settlement” (57). Similarly, Hampson (1996) asserts: “For peace settlements to succeed third parties must entrench and institutionalize their role...” (23). Why should agreements be sure to include provisions for verification or enforcement by third parties? Most prominently, Walter (2002) posits that third-party security guarantees serve as a promise that the third party will intervene if one group decides to renege on a bargain and take advantage of its opponent. Thus, the third party serves to mitigate commitment problems and reduce incentives of belligerents to renege on their agreement.⁷ More broadly, third parties

⁷While I do not dispute the importance of third-party enforcement, I do push back on Walter’s assertion that the resolution of the underlying issues of a conflict is not sufficient to convince combatants to accept and implement a peace agreement. As an agreement addresses more of the disputants’ grievances and establishes a web of institutions to consolidate peace in the post-conflict period, the likelihood of implementation will also increase. My claim finds some support in the literature (see e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, 2007; Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild, 2001; Sisk, 1996). In fact, Mason and Fett (1996) find no evidence that international intervention increases the likelihood of a negotiated settlement of civil war. However, Mason and Fett (1996) concede that this finding is “surprising, given the pervasiveness with which outside intervention is mentioned in

“verify and monitor compliance with an agreement, provide security for combatants..., and reduce incentives to cheat” (Walter, 2009, 255). Outside parties can actually serve to “manipulat[e] the utility function of combatants,” a process which renders fighting or war recurrence to be a less attractive option (Addison and Murshed, 2002, 499). Mattes and Savun (2009) refer to such third-party guarantees as a fear-reducing provision in that third-party guarantees “are designed to reduce belligerents’ insecurity and fear about future actions of their adversary” (740). Moreover, monitoring and enforcement by third-parties can reduce uncertainty and thus mitigate the information asymmetries which often lead to civil war recurrence (Mattes and Savun, 2010).

On the other hand, a broad line of research has also argued that the institutional arrangements set forth in agreements matter for the probability of conflict resolution success; power-sharing institutions have been flagged as a crucial component to rebuild peace in divided societies (see e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, 2007; Walter, 2002; Mattes and Savun, 2009). For durable peace, a civil war settlement must be generated in a way that includes new or revised institutions that reduce the security fears of disputants. The most common institutional focus is on power-sharing institutions, or institutions that offer guarantees that all groups control some share of political, economic, territorial and/or military power. Using the model of consociational democracy as a foundation (see Lijphart, 1969), the literature on power-sharing generally argues that the institutional distribution of power between former belligerents has clear and important implications for the trajectory of civil war resolution. As Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) suggest, power-sharing and power-dividing institutions offer “an opportunity for former combatants autonomously to overcome mutual distrust and lay the foundations for an enduring peace” (92). Beyond assuaging mutual distrust, Mattes and Savun (2009) emphasize that power-sharing provisions, by ensuring that no group single-handedly controls the government or security forces, reduce the fear of former belligerents. Such institutions signal to disputants that they will not become victims of systematic discrimination, exclusion, or violence. The very willingness of an agreement’s signatories to endure and enforce the implementation of power-sharing institutions entails costs that signal the peaceful intentions of disputants (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, 2007).⁸

the literature as a determinant of civil war outcomes” (561). The non-finding could be indicative that international intervention is not a necessary component of civil war resolution; on the other hand, the non-finding could be a by-product of a mediocre measure. In certain cases, then, third-party enforcement may not be a necessary condition for the successful resolution of war.

⁸While recognizing the importance of power-sharing provisions, Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) assert that not all power-sharing is

Beyond the formula of third-party guarantees and power-sharing institutions identified above, I suggest that greater attention must be given to the contextual needs of the disputants and the civil war environment. While power-sharing and third-party guarantees are two examples of provisions that tend to increase the durability of settlements, their utility varies from case to case. Werner and Yuen (2005), in this vein, do not argue in favor in any particular institutional arrangements per se; instead, they posit that the arrangements of a negotiated settlement must “reflect broadly the belligerents’ convergent expectations about the military consequences of no agreement” (2005, 262). In other words, Werner and Yuen argue that certain agreements are vulnerable to failure as belligerents update their beliefs post-agreement and conclude that renewed fighting would create greater gains than remaining at peace. Agreements, then, must be designed to mitigate the danger of such revisions to belligerents’ beliefs. Agreements must address the underlying causes of conflict and reflect the distribution of power of the disputants in a way that both minimizes the utility of war in comparison to peace and creates costs for renegeing on the settlement.

A peace agreement can serve many functions, as highlighted above, ranging from providing information and reducing uncertainty to increasing the likelihood of commitment to peace. Negotiated settlements hold the potential to alter the incentives of disputants, put an end to conflict, and as I will explore in more detail, lay the foundations for a quality peace. With that said, agreements are not a panacea to conflict – they are but one component of a web of mechanisms that contribute to the generation of a quality peace. In the following section, I engage the limited body of work that has thus far pushed beyond negative conceptions of peace.

The Quality of Post-Conflict Peace

Above, the discussion of negotiated settlements suggests two key findings. For civil war resolution to be “successful,” settlements should include provisions for different types of power-sharing institutions and assurances of third-party monitoring and enforcement. A key area that warrants greater research

created equally; military and territorial power-sharing generate more durable peace but the implementation of political power-sharing provisions does not necessarily increase prospects for a self-enforcing peace. The authors argue that the underlying mechanisms behind this dynamic revolve around the costs of implementing different types of power-sharing. Because military and territorial pacts entail such high costs and great concessions, they serve as stronger signals of a commitment to peace. The work by Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) indicates the need for a more nuanced understanding of the contents of peace agreements and how different provisions have the potential to influence the prospects for peace in very different ways. Even power-sharing, then, cannot be treated as a one-size-fits-all solution for civil conflicts.

Table 1.1: A Sample of Studies of Civil War Resolution and their Measures of Success

Study	Dependent Variable	Explanatory Variables	Definition of War
Mason and Fett (1996)	Negotiated settlement	War duration and prob. of victory	COW
Hartzell (1999)	Peace endures at least 5 years	Settlement institutionalization	COW
Walter (2002)	“Peace Process” (categorical)	Third-party enforcement and power-sharing	COW
Hartzell and Hoddie (2003)	Peace duration in months	Power-sharing	COW
Jarstad and Nilsson (2008)	Peace duration in years	Military pacts and territorial pacts	UCDP
Mattes and Savun (2009)	Peace duration in months	Political power-sharing, third-party guarantees, and cost-increasing provisions	COW & UCDP (1,000+ BDs/yr)
Mattes and Savun (2010)	Peace duration in months	Uncertainty-reducing provisions (includes third-party monitoring)	COW
Nilsson (2012)	Peace duration in years	Civil society inclusion	UCDP

is how peace agreements and their contents influence not only the end of war but also the quality of peace. Table 1.1 provides an overview of the definitions of successful resolution as found in a number of prominent studies of civil war resolution. Most of the studies’ dependent variable – successful resolution of civil war – is operationalized as the duration of peace, either in months or in years. As I have stated already, though, these studies are measuring success as the absence of war recurrence, a negative peace. They do not consider the nature of the peace following conflict; in other words, extant work does not consider the quality of peace in their measures of success. Of course, this is not a flaw of existing studies; it is undoubtedly important to understand when and how wars can be ended. On the other hand, it is equally or perhaps more important to understand how peace can be consolidated and a quality peace can be established so as to truly remove countries from the grips of civil war. A pessimist would contend that in most countries recovering from civil war all one can hope for is the avoidance of violence. If that is all one hopes for, however, that is all one gets. Places such as Northern Ireland and South Africa still struggle with the legacies of violent conflict yet they have moved beyond the shadow of conflict to achieve a more inclusive and higher quality peace. These societies and others that are on the trajectory away from civil war demonstrate that the quality of the peace post-conflict is a measure of success worth striving for.

Of course, the United Nations has already recognized the need to think about the nature or quality

of peace. Moreover, the UN has repeatedly emphasized that the creation of a quality peace will, beyond improving the lives of those within post-conflict societies, reduce the likelihood of violence in the long-run. A United Nations Security Council (2001) Presidential Statement on peacebuilding posits:

The Security Council recognizes that peacebuilding is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or the continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, development, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms. This requires short- and long-term actions tailored to address the particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or emerging from it. These actions should focus on fostering sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law and the promotion of a culture of peace and nonviolence (UNSC, 2001).

Policymakers at the international level, then, have recognized the need to address inequalities, generate a respect for human rights, and create institutions that promote “a culture of peace.” Empirical work in political science, however, has been slow to integrate these recommendations. The preponderance of work on civil war resolution focuses on ending violence. This dissertation takes a big step to engage the call of the United Nations by considering how to achieve a quality peace that is socially, politically, and economically inclusive in nature.

Limited scholarly work has considered the quality of post-conflict peace and its importance for civil war resolution. Crocker and Hampson (1996) concur with the works discussed above regarding the importance of strong, well-crafted political institutions and third-party oversight; they also, however, recognize the need to consider the nature of the post-conflict environment. They write: “Without peace there can be no justice. Without justice, democratic institutions, and the rule of law, the peace itself will not last” (Crocker and Hampson, 1996, 68). For peace to be sustained, then, it is necessary to strive for more than a negative peace. Call and Cousens (2008) reiterate this point, writing that a significant number of armed conflicts relapse to war, and many ‘new’ wars occur in countries that have failed to consolidate peace. Call (2012), in seeking to assess why peace fails in post-civil war societies, identifies a key variable that plays a causal role in civil war recurrence: political exclusion (even more so than social and economic factors). Political inclusion, he writes, does not have to be in the form of power-sharing; whatever form it comes in, political inclusion contributes to the consolidation of peace. Walter

(2004), as well, cites political variables as mitigating the risk of conflict recurrence. She finds that higher quality of life and greater access to political participation do decrease the likelihood of civil war recurrence. Additionally, she demonstrates that countries with higher levels of economic well-being and more open political systems are, again, less likely to face civil war recurrence. The need to think beyond the cessation of violence to the ways in which a quality peace can be established and consolidated is thus evident.

Beyond political and economic aspects that influence the quality of post-conflict peace, scholars have also pointed to human rights protections as a key goal in peace processes. Crocker and Hampson (1996) point out that third parties involved in peace processes can and should help to promote new norms and codes of conduct in post-conflict societies. They write that both economic and social reconstruction are essential in pursuit of successful peace processes. Their work provides initial support for the need to look more deeply into the quality of peace, broadly defined, in studies of civil war resolution. Stedman (2001), without using the term quality, gets at the quality of peace issue and confirms the importance of human rights in consolidating a quality peace. He posits: “Two low-cost opportunities that should be pursued during implementation are civilian security, through police and judicial reform, and local capacity-building for human rights and reconciliation” (3). Why, though, are such security and human rights mechanisms important, if not to end conflict? Stedman (2001) continues on to state: “Although the study did not identify a single case where a failure to pursue these opportunities undermined implementation, it found that the potential long-term benefits of security reform and local capacity-building for peace building warrant the relatively inexpensive investments that such measures require” (3). Certain policies are not necessary to end conflict, but they are necessary to bolster the quality of the peace. In sum, peace agreements that are aimed not only at ending war but at strengthening the quality of the peace must include these “extra” policies of human rights, security, and inclusivity, even though they are not in and of themselves necessary to stop the fighting.

Within the past couple of years, an increasing focus within peace research has turned to the quality of peace. Wallensteen (2015) asserts that, in the absence of dignity, a country has not achieved a quality peace, but has only reached a postwar period. The end of violence does not directly translate to the creation of peace. Wallensteen (2015) goes on to write:

The negative formulation [of peace] has the advantage of being clear, easy to understand,

and even to measure universally over time and space. But the postwar situation may still be unsatisfactory in other respects... Thus the quality of the relationships is of importance. Equity may mean deliberate redistribution of resources from rich to poor, for the purpose of improving quality of life for the latter... It may serve to reduce ostentatious inequalities in society that otherwise may prompt opposition (16-17).

Wallensteen thus captures the necessity of pushing beyond negative conceptions of peace. Both researchers and policymakers must keep in mind the dignity, equity, and security of all people as they seek to achieve settlements to conflict.

Although scholarship is beginning to catch up to calls by the international community to focus on not only peace but quality peaceful outcomes, much more research is needed to better understand the sources of a quality peace. In particular, this dissertation analyzes how peace processes and their content influence the quality of peace. In the next section, I present an overview of the theory. Peace agreements, I argue, are quasi-constitutional documents (Bell, 2006) and as such, they establish the legal framework for the post-conflict state. I thus expect the contents of peace agreements to directly and indirectly shape what peace looks like for those living in post-conflict societies. Beyond ending violence, the contents of peace agreements have tangible effects on what peace looks like for those in post-conflict societies. The policy implications of the theory and findings herein, while complementary to extant works on civil war resolution, are important on their own for they show that actors can increase the likelihood of achieving a quality peace if they pay close attention to the contents and substance of negotiated settlements.

Theory

Thus far, I have addressed what is meant by the quality of peace, why its study is important in moving forward scholarly understanding of civil war resolution, and how extant work has yet to achieve any systematic study of quality peace.⁹ This section presents the theoretical framework of this dissertation, a framework which identifies peace agreements as instrumental in shaping the quality of peace. First, I further discuss what is meant by the quality of peace and why, in a global sense, a deeper understanding of peace (beyond the cessation of violence) matters for theories of war and peace. Second, I consider the

⁹With the exception of Wallensteen (2015).

ways in which the quality of peace can be bolstered, and I give specific attention to how peace processes and agreements influence the quality of peace. Whereas countless theories of war exist, a more nuanced theory of peace – specifically, the quality of peace – will generate much new insight into the occurrence and consolidation of peace following civil war.

The establishment of a quality peace represents a move by a formerly war-torn country away from the grips of war. It demonstrates that peace, in a positive sense, is consolidating or consolidated. It represents a deeper goal, one that does not stop at the cessation of violence but pursues opportunity and protection for broad portions of a population. I define the quality of peace as the extent to which the majority of a population enjoys basic political rights as well as the extent to which historically excluded and underrepresented groups such as women and minorities are free from systematic political exclusions in the wake of conflict. Quality peace, then, is taken to be a positive formulation of peace in this framework, to use the words of Galtung (1969). I do not reject the extant notions of civil war resolution success that rest on negative conceptualizations of peace. I do, however, posit that scholars and policymakers must consider a wider, or loftier, definition of peace when considering how best to guide countries away from civil war.

Generating a new definition of conflict resolution success is crucial for longer term solutions to conflict. Civil wars are deadly and violent in a physical sense, but they also wreak havoc on country's infrastructures, economies, educational resources, political systems, and other basic institutions and opportunity structures. The resolution of wars, then, requires actors to not only end violence but also address the institutional and structural damage of war. War does not end when the violence ends; war ends when society has achieved peace. Little is known about how peace processes can be shaped to generate institutions and structures that bolster the quality of peace. The following discusses the theoretical framework for the study of a quality peace.

Crafting a Quality Peace

In building a theory of quality peace, I consider how the resolution of conflict influences the nature of the post-conflict environment. I focus on how international and domestic actors can influence the nature of peace in the wake of civil war through the crafting of peace agreements. The focus on peace agreements has been chosen for a number of reasons including but not limited to: (1) Much work in

political science identifies international peace efforts and actors as highly influential players in conflict resolution; (2) From a policymaking perspective, identifying pathways through which international actors can bolster the quality of peace is practical and prudent; (3) Peace agreements come in many different shapes and sizes, and this variation is likely to have implications for the nature of peace in the wake of war; and (4) Peace agreements are the most tangible byproduct of the overall formal peace process. Existing works on civil war resolution focus on the ways to end violence at levels associated with war.¹⁰ What is less known, though, is how common techniques of civil war resolution influence the nature or quality of post-conflict peace. What can practitioners and peacemakers do throughout the peace process to increase the quality of peace in addition to generating a sustainable negative peace? Do comprehensive peace agreements or power-sharing arrangements, for example, sow the seeds for positive aspects of peace such as human rights protections or political opportunity?

The theoretical focus of this dissertation is thus on one tangible component of peace processes, the peace agreements themselves. I consider how peace agreements can be crafted by international and domestic actors to lay the foundations for a quality peace. Based on existing work, it is unsurprising to state that peace agreements can help disputants overcome the bargaining failures that lead to war and war recurrence. Within this dissertation I assess peace agreements along two main dimensions: gender-specificity and context-specificity.¹¹ Gender-specificity and context-specificity are two avenues through which peace agreements can create a more inclusive, just, and meaningful peace. These two typologies need not be mutually exclusive; indeed, the agreements which lay the strongest foundations for quality peace are likely to be gender-specific and context-specific. Gender-specific agreements contain provisions for the protection of women's rights and/or clauses for gender equality. Context-specific agreements are those agreements that address the main grievances of the disputants. In other words, a context-specific agreement is one that is designed to meet the unique needs of disputants.¹² The greater

¹⁰In so doing, the political science literature has identified key determinants of civil war resolution, some short- and some long-term. Ceasefires and third-party mediation efforts, for example, tend to put an end to conflict, at least in a short-term way. Power-sharing arrangements and third-party enforcement, on the other hand, increase the likelihood of a durable end to war. International actors, then, play a clear role in both short- and long-term solutions to violence.

¹¹This dissertation focuses on these two dimensions, because I argue that they hold the greatest capacity to shape levels of political inclusivity and opportunity following civil war. In future research on quality of peace, scholars may choose to focus on other peace agreement dimensions as are appropriate given their particular focus within quality of peace outcomes.

¹²An agreement that is inclusive and contextual need not be comprehensive, but comprehensive agreements are more likely to address these elements than partial agreements or ceasefires. With that being said, a partial agreement that clearly outlines

the gender- and context-specificity of peace agreements, the more likely they are to lead actors' toward higher quality peaceful outcomes.

I address the two aforementioned dimensions of peace agreements in turn in the following sections. I argue that the contents of peace agreements are not only important for putting an end to conflict but they have strong implications for the quality of peace as well. Just as peace agreements render peace more durable when crafted in an appropriate manner, I argue that peace agreements can also be crafted in ways so as to increase the quality of peace in the wake of war. Peace agreements are quasi-constitutional documents that lay the framework or roadmap for the institutions and practices of the post-conflict state (Bell, 2006). In the transformative period that occurs during and after civil war, the legal provisions of the peace agreement have the power to set in motion the transformation of institutions or to reinforce the status quo. If actors and policymakers are striving for higher quality peaceful outcomes, they must take advantage of the opening for change and shape peace agreements accordingly. Peace agreements serve as a type of commitment mechanism, and they incentivize and constrain actors' behavior in the post-conflict period. I expand upon these mechanisms throughout the chapters of this dissertation.¹³ When peace agreements include provisions that provide protections for women or address grievances of the disputants, the agreements not only lay the foundation necessary to improve the quality of post-conflict peace but they also tie the hands of signatories and future leaders to higher quality and more inclusive outcomes.

Gender-Specific Peace Agreements

Gender-specific agreements are defined as those peace agreements which make specific references to protections for women in the post-conflict period. Slowly – but increasingly – scholars and policymakers have been shining a spotlight on the role of women in the peace process, either as mediators or political

women's rights and addresses one of the key grievances of the disputants may be more effective at generating a quality peace than a comprehensive agreement that does none of the above. I have taken time to point this distinction out so as to be clear that my analysis is not restricted to comprehensive agreements; I want to be as inclusive as possible so as to be able to truly assess the variations in agreements and the implications of these variations.

¹³While I am only looking at two dimensions of peace agreements, I expect the theoretical mechanisms linking peace agreements to the quality of peace to be similar across many issue areas. Specifically, I expect peace agreements to constrain actors' behavior and to also incentivize changes in behavior (whether the incentives be through norms shifts, empowerment, or more material and/or political incentives). Thus, extensions of this work should build upon the theoretical framework presented here.

actors who help pave the path for peace following civil war. A growing corpus of work identifies gender inequality as being associated with higher likelihoods of violent conflict, at both the inter- and intra-state levels (e.g., Caprioli, 2005). Women's equality and women's inclusion in peace processes, then, is more than a moral good but a step that holds tangible implications for decisions of conflict and cooperation. I argue, in this vein, that the inclusion of protections for women's rights in an agreement is a crucial step in establishing a quality peace. Not only does the inclusion of women's rights signal some level of commitment to change, but it also opens the door for new actors to become involved and invested in consolidating peace through political, social, and economic means. Because a quality peace is, for purposes of this research, defined as a peace that is politically inclusive and one that protects the rights of *all groups* of the population, it is rather self-evident that a gender-sensitive peace agreement will lead to a higher quality peace.

Why, more specifically, are women's rights important for a quality peace? Perhaps the more blunt version of this question is simply: why care about women's rights? In countries torn apart by years of civil war, why should time be spent investing in women's rights? First, civil wars kill disproportionate numbers of men; women are often needed in post-conflict societies to fill the roles that men formerly held. At the same time, though, women rarely are extended the rights, privileges, or empowerment required to move up in society or to assume roles of political power. In short, it is prudent to extend rights to women so that they may perform more functions outside of the home and be more productive members of society. Second, women have a lot to offer. In places such as Liberia, a women's peace movement was instrumental in encouraging and shaping the peace process in 2003. Women have the potential to be agents for peace. When war ends, women must be granted equal political, social, and economic rights so that they may continue to exercise their influence. In the case of Liberia, women played an active role in the peace process yet still struggle for political and economic equality, in particular, in the post-conflict period. While the country has a female president, there are still many changes to be made in the search for a higher quality peace.

In the real world, has the inclusion of women's rights, for example, bolstered the inclusivity and opportunity for women in the wake of conflict? The Accra Peace Agreement for Liberia, signed in 2003, was inclusive in its contents, containing protections for both women's and human rights and detailed timelines for implementation and mechanisms to verify the agreement's implementation. While Liberia

is still on the long and arduous path out of the conflict trap over a decade later, the society is marked by some dimensions of a quality peace. Women, particularly President Sirleaf, have achieved positions of influence in politics. Elections have proceeded freely and fairly, according to the international community, in both 2005 and 2011; the 2011 elections were held without direct involvement of international actors, rendering their transparency and legitimacy an ever greater success. While much more needs to be done to provide basic services to Liberians and generate greater economic opportunities, the country does seem to be on the path to a higher quality peace through the more inclusive nature of peace in the wake of the Accra Peace Agreement.

Overall, the gender-specificity of peace agreements is likely to have serious implications for the nature and quality of post-conflict peace. Agreements that address the belligerents' grievances and provide protections for women's rights will do more than end violence; they will create a quality peace that is more politically, economically, and socially inclusive. Specifically, I argue that gender-specific peace agreements influence women's political rights through three mechanisms, one direct and two indirect. Directly, gender-specific peace agreements hold the potential to tie actors' hands to change. In other words, the gender-specific language of peace agreements directly translates into changes in laws and practices toward women in post-conflict states. The words within the peace agreement render it more difficult for actors to renege on their commitment. Similarly, the provisions within the agreement may make it less politically costly to adopt potentially unpopular changes. As such, gender-specific peace agreements have led to direct and positive improvements in the status of women in countries such as Burundi, where the gender-specific language of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement appeared in the country's post-conflict constitution.

The indirect mechanisms, on the other hand, posit that peace agreements generate norms shifts as well as positive externalities in the form of women's empowerment. By having gender-specific language within peace agreements, the peace process changes the way women and women's roles are perceived. Indeed, the presence of women's rights within such an important document indicates that women have been legitimized as actors within society (particularly in comparison to antebellum perceptions of women). In South Africa, evidence indicates a strong shift in perceptions of women's roles following the adoption of a number of gender-specific peace agreements in the early 1990s. Beyond

spurring norms shifts, I also argue that gender-specific peace agreements may have positive externalities in that they empower women and other groups to push for greater inclusion. Because women's rights appear within an agreement, women's groups, international observers, or civil society groups will be empowered to hold leaders accountable. Moreover, their voices will be legitimized by the agreement's text. In Liberia, for example, women's groups were empowered to push for change and hold leaders accountable to the promises that they made within the Accra Peace Agreement. Through the three preceding mechanisms, I expect that women's rights are more likely to improve following the signing of a gender-specific peace agreement than following an agreement that is devoid of women's rights.

Context-Specific Agreements

Context-specific agreements are those that include provisions that directly address the grievances of disputants. Peace agreements vary greatly in their character; whereas some follow what seems like a barebones formula to demobilize and separate forces, others go into great detail regarding political, social, economic, and military plans for the post-conflict period. Additionally, settlements vary in the extent to which they reflect the needs and preferences of belligerents, ranging from one-size-fits-all solutions to highly specific plans for resolving the particular conflict. I argue that agreements that address the underlying grievances that contributed to conflict onset will be more successful than those agreements that address few or none of the belligerents' grievances. By addressing the grievances of belligerents, these agreements will not only be more successful in the traditional sense – in the sense that they reduce the likelihood of war recurrence – but they will also be successful by contributing to a higher quality peace.

How might context-specific agreements influence the likelihood of conflict resolution success? The grievances that spur conflict vary greatly from case to case. Some civil wars such as the ones in East Timor and Aceh were largely territorial in nature; the key grievances of belligerents revolved around a desire for territorial autonomy and self-rule. Other civil wars tend to be driven by economic and political exclusion and a fight over national power, such as those conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi, and Djibouti. When agreements are tailored to address the needs of the disputants as opposed to placing a one-size-fits-all solution on a conflict, whether it be driven by territorial autonomy or political exclusion,

they increase the benefits felt by disputants and render renegeing a less attractive option. An agreement that, in short, solves the most pressing problems for the warring parties generates benefits for complying and costs to renegeing; war becomes a less attractive option.

While grievances evolve over time, I argue that it is crucial that an agreement address the original causes of conflict. By including provisions that seek to remedy the underlying causes of conflict, peace agreements can minimize the likelihood of commitment problems and reduce the incentives of disputants to renege on the agreement. As such, contextual agreements help overcome commitment problems that plague conflict resolution. Thus, the relationship between contextual agreements and the generation of a negative peace seems quite evident. A settlement that is sensitive to the context of the conflict and the specific grievances of the belligerents, however, is also expected to bolster the quality of peace post-conflict. Such agreements will not only end conflict and stop the violence, but they will also tend to generate a peace that is more inclusive in nature and more sensitive to the rights of various societal groups.

The specific mechanisms linking context-specific agreements to a higher quality peace fall into two main categories: constraints and (dis)incentives. Peace agreements create a web of new political, economic, social, and security structures; by creating a new state apparatus, the agreements greatly limit actors' behavior and the amount of power any single actor or group can wield. As such, the webs of new institutions created by context-specific peace agreements inhibit continued exclusions or unjust policies, and limit the extent to which actors can deviate from new structures. In Northern Ireland, a society which struggles daily with divisions and legacies of conflict, new institutions laid forth in the Good Friday Agreement have constrained any single group from taking a monopoly of power.

Context-specific peace agreements also disincentivize the perpetuation of structural violence, injustice, and exclusion. Actors who have signed context-specific peace agreements will be more likely to choose strategies that work within the new political system; the perpetuation of exclusion and structural violence may actually impose greater political costs than would the opening of the political system. By addressing the causes of conflict, actors have little reason to deviate from the new status quo; there is little remaining uncertainty about the distribution of power and resources or the extent to which groups can access state power. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, there is evidence that President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf of Liberia made efforts to maintain a fair and just system, so as to avoid angering opponents

and/or spurring a return to war.

Roadmap

The following study of the quality of peace proceeds with a combination of quantitative chapters and qualitative case illustrations. The next two chapters, Chapters 2 and 3, focus on the question of women's rights as one key component of quality peace. Specifically, the chapters assess the role that gender-specific peace agreements play in spurring improvements in women's rights. Chapter 2 further develops the causal mechanisms that lead gender-specific peace agreements to improve women's rights. The chapter then presents a quantitative analysis of civil war peace agreements that were signed between the years 1981 and 2011 (Högbladh, 2011). The results offer strong support for the hypothesized relationship: peace agreements that include provisions for women's rights do indeed work. Chapter 3 looks at the cases of Burundi, Liberia, South Africa, and Angola to further assess the plausibility of the causal mechanisms proposed herein. While not intended to be a test of the theory, Chapter 3 reaffirms the links between gender-specific peace agreements and women's rights improvements and illustrates that the relationship exists through a number of causal pathways, both direct and indirect.

Chapters 4 and 5 shift focus away from women's rights to political rights more broadly. In particular, I assess how context-specific peace agreement lead to improvements in the political rights and opportunities within post-conflict states. In Chapter 4, I further discuss extant literature and the causal mechanisms that render context-specific peace agreements more likely to generate rights improvements. The chapter quantitatively tests the expectations on the same universe of peace agreements as is included in Chapter 2. I find that the context-specificity of peace agreements positively and statistically significantly influences political rights in post-conflict periods. Chapter 5 presents the cases of Burundi, Liberia, and Côte d'Ivoire to illustrate the causal mechanisms and further investigate the role peace agreements play in shaping the quality of peace. Taken together, the four substantive chapters that follow offer strong indication that peace agreements are tools that can be used to shape and construct a higher quality peace. The words on paper matter for the post-conflict period; as domestic and international actors strive to achieve the goals laid forth by Galtung (1969), they can and should embrace the transformative power of peace agreements. The final chapter of the document will thus conclude with a discussion regarding the implications of this research, plans for future research, and immediate policy implications.

CHAPTER 2

PEACE AGREEMENTS AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

No society will know peace if it leaves half its population behind. Women's voices are a critical part of coming to terms with the past by investing in a shared future that rejects conflict and promotes dignity. Women have been subjected to rape and sexual violence as tactics of war. Now we must enlist and empower them as agents of peace.

– John Kerry and William Hague¹

Following the resolution of civil wars in countries such as Liberia and Burundi, women became more active members in the political life of their respective states. Liberia elected a female head of state, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, to lead it through its post-conflict reconstruction, while in Burundi, women have been guaranteed seats and representation across many dimensions of politics. While the conclusion of civil wars provides a clear opportunity to revise the status quo, such improvements in women's rights should not be treated as inevitable. What spurred countries such as Liberia and Burundi to take strides toward greater gender equality? Why, on the other hand, were women largely excluded from the post-conflict political apparatus in countries such as Angola? As John Kerry and William Hague note above, societies are not at peace when they exclude fifty percent of the population. Johan Galtung (1969) identifies widespread exclusion, repression, and inequality as forms of structural violence and as societal ills that inhibit the achievement of peace. Peace, he notes, cannot truly take hold when portions of society remain excluded and marginalized. The perpetuation of structural violence and inequality, particularly with respect to gender, reinforces conflict and renders peace more fragile (Caprioli, 2005); the goal of gender equality, then, is more than a normative goal but also one that brings tangible benefits to societies as a whole. With this in mind, this chapter assesses the conditions under which women

¹From "Preventing Sexual Violence Is a National Security Imperative," 25 February 2014. See: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/johnkerry/preventing-sexual-violenc_b_4856070.html

experience greater equality in post-conflict societies. Women's equality is a key step in establishing a quality peace and guiding countries on the path away from war.

To gain an understanding of how a quality peace can take hold and how, more specifically, women's rights might improve, I focus on the role peace agreements play in shaping peace. While much is known about how agreements may be crafted to end violence at levels associated with war, more needs to be done to understand the implications of peace processes for the post-conflict environment. Peace agreements, as quasi-constitutional documents, have the potential to lay the framework for the political, social, and economic structures of the post-conflict period. Do peace agreements, however, actually work beyond ending war? Do they tie actors' hands to new policies so as to generate a higher quality peace post-conflict? In answering these questions, this chapter considers one component of post-conflict quality of peace: women's political rights. For the purposes of this chapter, then, I focus on quality peace as the extent to which women experience freedom from discrimination and equal access to political opportunities in the post-conflict environment.² Women's political rights are an important dimension of the post-conflict environment, even if only one piece of the puzzle. By extending rights to women, actors in the peace process generate the foundations for a more open, inclusive, and secure post-conflict environment.

In what follows, I first engage extant work on civil war resolution and peace agreements. I highlight that the study of civil war resolution would benefit greatly from a better understanding of how peace processes influence the quality of peace following war. Moreover, I discuss how existing work on gender and conflict has shown that women's rights are instrumental in creating more peaceful societies. Second, I develop a theoretical framework of peace agreements and argue that they not only tie actors' hands to change but that they also generate externalities that diffuse into the post-conflict society. In particular, I hypothesize that peace agreements that are gender-sensitive in nature will generate positive outcomes for women's post-conflict political rights. Rather than scraps of paper, the theory herein argues that the contents of peace agreements shape post-conflict structures. I quantitatively test this expectation using the universe of peace agreements from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Högbladh, 2011).

²Of course, a quality peace is a phenomenon that encompasses a broad number of dimensions, ranging across political, economic, and social realms. In other parts of my dissertation, I also assess the extent to which peace processes lay the foundations for greater respect for human rights more broadly. Future work should also address how post-conflict societies can build infrastructures, improve human health, and reduce socioeconomic inequality, to name a couple other examples of quality of peace indicators.

My findings speak to the ongoing push by the United Nations and others to conduct peace processes in ways that are more inclusive of women. Indeed, peace agreements that contain specific provisions for women's rights do actually work to generate more inclusive outcomes following conflict. I conclude with a number of extensions of this research as well as policy implications of the paper's findings.

Civil War Resolution, Quality Peace, and Women's Empowerment: What We Know

Thus far, little systematic empirical work has been done to explore the sources and foundations of a quality peace. Below, I present an overview of work on civil war settlements, quality of peace, and women and conflict. I highlight that while scholarship has shown that peace agreements and their contents matter for putting an end to war, little is known regarding how peace agreements influence the post-conflict environment.³ I argue that more must be done to bridge the work on civil war settlements and quality of peace indicators such as human rights and women's rights. It is time to know how the substance of peace agreements shapes the resolution process beyond the cessation of violence. I emphasize the need to better understand the long-term implications of peace processes for the post-conflict environment and women's post-conflict political rights, in particular.

Negotiated Settlements and Negative Peace

The settlement of civil wars is a process wrought by uncertainty and instability. An increasing number of civil wars end through negotiated settlement; nonetheless, negotiated settlements have an inconsistent history as a mechanism for resolving wars. To what extent, then, are peace agreements an important focal point for the resolution of civil wars? I argue that peace agreements can and do lay the foundations for a higher quality peace, and more specifically, I posit that gender provisions within peace agreements create tangible benefits for women's empowerment following conflict. Indeed, a long history of research on war settlements has suggested that agreements are more than "scraps of paper," and that "their content affects whether peace lasts or war resumes" (Fortna, 2003, 365). The research on peace agreements has moved from whether or not peace agreements and negotiated settlements work at

³Empirical work, however, is moving towards a focus on civil war settlements and quality of peace indicators. Hartzell and Hoddie (2015), for example, investigate how power-sharing provisions within the settlement process influence the likelihood that democratic institutions take root.

all to a more nuanced analysis of how they work and what conditions increase their likelihood of success in both the short and long term.⁴

While past works on civil war resolution focus on success as the end of war, I build upon this research to develop a framework for how peace agreements generate more positive conceptions of peace. A peace agreement works to reduce uncertainty and increase actors' commitment to peaceful outcomes. I also argue that the content of peace agreements shapes not only the achievement of negative peace but also the extent to which a quality peace takes hold. In the following section, I review current works on quality peace and human rights, more broadly, to understand the role peace agreements might play in influencing these outcomes. The following section identifies political inclusivity and human rights as two key dimensions for the consolidation of peace; moreover, the works discussed in the following section identify the specific legal structures of agreements as one mechanism for facilitating improvements in political and human rights.

Civil Wars and a Quality Peace

Research on civil wars and their resolution, by and large, operationalizes resolution success as the absence of war and/or the duration of peace. These studies, then, measure success as the absence of war, a negative conception of peace. They do not consider, as this dissertation does, the nature of peace or the extent to which the peace that is established is meaningful for those living in post-conflict societies. As I have already stated, this is not a shortcoming or flaw of existing work; understanding the factors that lead to a negative peace is crucial in hopes of ending the death and destruction of civil war. At the same time, however, it is equally important to expend resources on identifying the factors that lead to a quality peace. In other words, research must now focus on how to create peace after the end of war. Post-conflict societies vary dramatically in their treatment of political, economic, and social rights; whereas some have made strides toward more inclusive systems, others remain marked by widespread injustices, inequalities, and structural violence. What accounts for these differences? What mechanisms exist to generate a higher quality peace in the wake of conflict?

⁴According to a number of studies, third party enforcement is a necessary condition in generating more durable peaceful outcomes (see e.g. Stedman, 2002; Mattes, 2008; Mattes and Savun, 2009, 2010; Fortna, 2003; Walter, 2002). Research has also shown that peace agreements that generate power-sharing institutions are more durable than those agreements without power sharing provisions (see e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, 2007; Walter, 2002; Mattes and Savun, 2009).

A number of studies focus on political-institutional mechanisms that influence the longevity and nature of peace following civil war. Call (2012), for example, writes that political exclusion inhibits the consolidation of peace. Inclusion, he argues, can come in any number of forms, but regardless of the form, inclusion is a necessary component to escape the conflict trap. Nilsson and Kovacs (2005) write that political instability and lack of good governance undermine the success of peace in many post-conflict states. Munck and Kumar (1995) identify the inclusiveness of parties to the peace process as a key factor in achieving successful peace outcomes in El Salvador, for example, as opposed to in Cambodia. To achieve truly peaceful civil war resolution, then, countries must move toward greater political inclusivity, stability, and more responsive and responsible governance. In addition to domestic actors and institutions, Crocker and Hampson (1996) argue that international actors involved in peace processes should promote new norms and institutions in post-conflict societies, particularly in the area of human rights.

While not solely focusing on countries that have experienced civil wars, research on human rights also suggests how domestic and international actors may contribute to higher quality peace post-conflict. In particular, the works on international laws offer insight into how peace agreements – legal documents themselves crafted most frequently by international and domestic actors – influence human rights, and women’s rights more specifically. Both Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2007) and Neumayer (2005), for example, find that human rights treaties are ineffective at changing state behavior. Such findings are critical of human rights treaties insofar as these documents hold little formal capacity to enforce their provisions (because, according to Hafner-Burton (2005), they lack the coercive influence that is necessary to push change). Lutz and Sikkink (2000), however, are more optimistic in their assessment of the effects of human rights law; they write that human rights norms tend to be implemented through a wide array of “judicial, quasi-judicial, and political channels.” They continue on to say that “the enforcement of international norms through multiple legal and political mechanisms successfully influences human rights behavior...” (654). Following from the work by Lutz and Sikkink (2000), I posit that peace agreements are a legal-political mechanism that may spur change in baseline levels of human rights and women’s rights, more specifically.

Women's Inclusion in War and Peace

A focus on women's rights is particularly important for any study of a quality peace. Gender equality and inequality shape a broad spectrum of human health and well-being metrics, economic outcomes, and political stability. Moreover, gender inequality is associated with societies that are more prone to conflict and are more violent in nature. Research has identified a link between gender inequality and war; on average, countries marked by higher levels of gender inequality are more likely to be involved in both inter- and intrastate conflicts (Tessler and Warriner, 1997; Caprioli, 2000, 2003, 2005). Caprioli (2005) writes that Galtung's theory of structural violence can be readily applied to the violence and marginalization experienced by women in many, if not all, states. Gender inequality is itself a manifestation of structural violence and is thus antithetical to peace. Indeed, Caprioli asserts that gender relations are marked by exploitation in terms of "highly differential possibilities for personal development," processes of socialization that reinforce exploitation and violence, inequality in access to political roles, and gendered hierarchies that promote male domination and female subordination (Caprioli, 2005, 164). Gender inequality and "the malignant norms of domination and subordination" reinforce structural violence, systems of exploitation and repression, and thus breed a worldview that is competitive rather than cooperative (Caprioli, 2005, 165). The structural violence within societies creates systems where violence on intrastate and interstate levels becomes justifiable. To achieve a sustainable and higher quality peace, countries must "overcome[e] social relations of domination and subordination" (Tickner, 1992, 128).

In a recent study on female participation and the success of civil war resolution, Demeritt, Nichols and Kelly (2014) find that improvements in women's participation following conflict reduce the risk of civil war relapse. The authors write that "civil war reinforces and may exacerbate women's marginalization" while at the same time, the end of civil war brings a "breakdown in status quo traditions, morals, customs, and community" (Demeritt, Nichols and Kelly, 2014, 347). As such, the post-conflict reconstruction period is a time in which gender norms and roles can be revised and improved. When (if) women are given the opportunity to exert an inherent pacific influence, the likelihood of war recurrence is decreased. When, however, women are pushed to the outskirts of the economic, social, and political life of the state, the resulting "male-dominated environment leads to more war" (Demeritt, Nichols and

Kelly, 2014, 362). The aforementioned studies make clear, then, that gender inequality does more than harm the women and men within societies, and it does more than harm domestic health, economic, and social outcomes. Gender inequality and the structural violence within societies lead not only to higher likelihood of war but also to a higher likelihood of war recurrence. As such, policymakers and scholars alike have placed an increased focus on integrating women into peace processes and empowering them as agents of peacebuilding.

A growing body of research on gender and civil war resolution corroborates that “the success of post-conflict reconstruction can be seen as dependent on the inclusion of women and the pursuit of gender equity” (Hudson, 2009, 288).⁵ For example, United Nations peacekeeping operations are more successful at establishing peace in countries where women’s empowerment is relatively high (Gizelis, 2009). Hudson (2009) advocates for the empowerment of women’s groups to build capacity at the local level to match gendered processes at the national level. Gizelis (2011) further asserts that women’s status has a direct and independent effect on post-conflict reconstruction; like Hudson (2009), Gizelis (2011) cites the efficacy of local mechanisms of empowerment. While women’s organization do not always have access to state power, women in places such as Liberia have been able to mobilize local processes of peace and reconciliation.

Ellerby (2013) focuses on peace agreements and assesses the extent to which UN Security Council Resolution 1325 has led to the (en)gendering of negotiations, agreements, and peacebuilding processes. Like the framework used within this dissertation, Ellerby identifies that peace agreements are a road map for peacebuilding efforts. By looking at the gender provisions within agreements, she concludes that there is not yet a unified approach to women’s security or women’s empowerment. She writes that beyond empowering women as political decisions makers, agreements must also create stable institutions and must offer “an explicit recognition of [women’s] already essential participation in maintaining day-to-day life” (Ellerby, 2013, 452). After a closer analysis of Sudan’s peace processes, Ellerby concludes that “women’s physical presence at formal talks is not enough to guarantee (en)gendered security, especially when there are norms and strategies used to marginalize their activities and ideas” (Ellerby, 2013, 456). Ellerby’s research as well as the aforementioned works illustrate that the institutionalization

⁵Interestingly, Hudson (2009) writes that peacebuilders and scholars alike must be cautious to treat women and their empowerment as a one-size-fits-all process. While recognizing the strategic and normative importance of gender equality, she also states that context and local support is key.

of gender equality and female empowerment are essential components of conflict prevention and peace consolidation. To empower women and to create a more inclusive society helps countries move beyond a negative peace. In what follows, I build a theory and test the extent to which gender-specific peace agreements lead to tangible improvements in women's rights.

With the aforementioned literature on peace agreements, quality peace, and women's empowerment in mind, I move forward to build a theory that focuses on how peace agreements may lay the foundations for improvements in women's rights. Importantly, I move forward with skepticism. Peace agreements are not a panacea for civil war; moreover, the human rights literature offers a number of reasons to question the extent to which pieces of paper can alter respect for rights. With this skepticism in mind, I nevertheless maintain the argument that peace agreements and their contents have important implications for the conflict resolution process. Ellerby's (2013) analysis of Sudan suggests as much. I also maintain that political inclusion is a key component of a higher quality peace. Civil wars and their resolution represent times of major change for societies. This process of change and recovery may be particularly conducive to new political, social, and economic structures. Civil wars and their resolution, then, may create the necessary opening through which women's rights may improve in the post-conflict period.

Theory: Peace Agreements as “Quasi-Constitutional” Documents

To what extent can the negotiated settlement of civil war have a positive impact on the quality of peace post-conflict? How can the nature of peace agreements increase the extent to which governments respect women's rights in the aftermath of conflict? A quality peace does not come about spontaneously; the destruction and destabilization created by civil war, however, generates a situation in which the status quo can change. Bell and O'Rourke (2007) contend: “Peace agreements document a constitutional ‘big bang’ providing for radical overhaul of political and legal institutions to an extent rarely found [elsewhere]” (295-296). Civil wars do not create a “big bang” in that existing structures change overnight; they do, however, create a situation in which – through transformative peace processes – existing institutions can be totally restructured and revised. The opening for change following a civil war creates a situation which is, in some ways, quite malleable. While a change from pre-conflict institutions and

norms is not guaranteed, the trajectory of the peace process⁶ has the capacity to shape and shift the ways in which governments accord and protect rights in the post-conflict environment. As such, I consider the formal ways in which actors (both domestic and external) can commit to more inclusive outcomes in the wake of war. In particular, I consider how peace agreements, as manifestations of this domestic and international peace collaboration, can serve as contracts to implement change.

Using the terminology of Bell and O'Rourke (2007), I argue that peace agreements and their effects on society can be theorized through a "quasi-constitutional" lens (306). As a quasi-constitutional document, a peace agreement "typically aim[s] to establish or extend a ceasefire by linking the ceasefire to new political and legal structures, through what is essentially a constitutional framework or 'power map' for the state" (Bell and O'Rourke, 2007, 293). Thus, conceptualizing of peace agreements as quasi-constitutional documents is to assert that peace agreements create a framework or map for the post-conflict state; peace agreements, in other words, lay out (to greater or lesser extents) the rules, institutions, and norms that are to be set up. Situating my research question and theory within the framework of bargaining theories of war, I posit that through their quasi-constitutional nature peace agreements are able to constrain and shape actors' behaviors. Peace agreements, then, are contracts that create incentives for compliance and structures that tie actors' hands to change. By including specific provisions, those crafting peace agreements will be able to commit actors to higher quality peaceful outcomes. In the following, I elaborate on the specific mechanisms through which gender-specific peace agreements lead to greater respect for women's rights in the aftermath of civil war.

Women's Rights Guarantees in Peace Agreements

Peace agreements are gender-specific to the extent that they contain direct references to protections and rights for women in the post-conflict period. A growing focus has been placed, for example, on the need to include women in every stage of the peace process; this call, by the United Nations and others, is clear in stating that all processes and agreements must be gender-inclusive and gender-sensitive. The framework and analysis of this chapter assesses the extent to which these calls actually work and the

⁶The term peace process here is used to refer to the period of formal negotiations and their outcome. Undoubtedly, the peace process in a civil war is open-ended and in some ways synonymous with the concept of bargaining, which is ongoing before, during, and after conflicts. Given information constraints, however, I restrict my theory and analyses to the formal negotiation processes.

extent to which they lead to benefits for women's equality. A number of peace agreements, such as the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi which was signed in 2000,⁷ contain provisions for the protection and/or extension of rights to women. The agreement states:

Women's advancement, and their equality with men, are one aspect of human rights – one that is a condition for social justice and essential to building a viable, just and developed society. The empowerment of women is an essential prerequisite for the political, social, economic, cultural and ecological security of the entire population. Equality between the sexes does much to enhance the well-being of women, men, girls and boys, and is indispensable for achieving people-centred sustainable development. The Government should pay special attention to the status of women and combat all discrimination against them.⁸

Specific provisions for inclusivity such as the one seen above will, I argue, will render peace agreements more likely to contribute to quality peace in the aftermath of conflict. This effect occurs through three mechanisms, one direct and two indirect. The direct mechanism linking gender-specific agreements to a higher quality peace comes from their precision; more precise calls for inclusion of women render conflict actors' less likely to renege and more likely to commit to rights extensions. Political actors in Burundi, then, were tying their hands to a more gender-inclusive outcome by including specific provisions for women's rights within the agreement. Indirectly, inclusive agreements may lead to rights improvements through one (or both) of the two following mechanisms: (1) positive externalities; and/or (2) norms shifts. I explain these three mechanisms in greater detail in the following paragraphs.⁹

Gender-specific peace agreements will have a direct and positive effect on women's rights extensions, because they increase actors' level of commitment. In short, the specific nature of agreements and the institutions which they create tie actors' hands to change. Because gender inclusivity is explicitly enumerated on paper, former disputants will have a harder time deviating from expected reforms. In the

⁷Source: <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/minority-rights-arusha-peace-and-reconciliation-agreement-burundi>

⁸Source: Found within the full text of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (Högbladh, 2011).

⁹I also want to note that these mechanisms need not be mutually exclusive. In some cases, direct legal changes may be accompanied by mechanisms of empowerment, for example. In other cases, only one mechanism may be at work. Future work should do more to identify the causal process and pinpoint the sequencing and existence of various mechanisms. At this point, however, I argue that the mechanisms at work, while falling within three main families, are shaped by the specific dynamics of each case.

context of national constitutions, Davenport (1996) argues that specific mentions to rights in domestic legal documents has a strong and positive effect on government respect for human rights. He explains, however, that “It is readily apparent...that not all constitutions discuss political and civil rights or do so to the same degree. These differences might account for variations in state practices” (Davenport, 1996, 631). There are differences in the extent to which peace agreements tie governments’ hands to rights extensions. For example, of the 34 agreements in the Peace Accords Matrix, only 7 of these contain specific provisions for women’s rights (Joshi and Darby, 2013). That subset of agreements, however, should generate a higher quality peace by tying hands of actors and increasing their level of commitment to the agreement’s framework. New rules, institutions, and norms regarding women’s rights that are included in peace agreements limit actors’ ability to deviate.

As evidence of the direct mechanism, I return to the case of Burundi, a case which will be further explicated in Chapter 3. In Burundi, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement which was signed in 2000 contained specific references to women’s rights and gender equality. The agreement’s text vis-à-vis women was then directly included in the country’s post-conflict constitution. In Burundi, the same actors who excluded women from the negotiating table then complied with the provisions for women’s rights protections within the agreement. Thus, I argue that the peace agreement itself generated a commitment mechanism; with women’s rights provisions within the agreement, actors became less likely to renege.¹⁰ Political leaders in Burundi, constrained by their promises in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, revised and implemented post-conflict institutions to reflect the peace agreement. Recognizing, however, that leaders may not always remain truly committed to the provisions of peace agreements, I also identify two indirect causal pathways through which gender-specific peace agreements can lead to improvements in women’s post-conflict rights.

Indirectly, gender-specific peace agreements contribute to tangible gains for women’s rights by generating positive externalities in post-conflict societies. Specifically, I argue that gender-specific peace agreements create positive externalities in that they empower societal actors to push for change. Women’s groups, civil society actors, and other groups, knowing that women’s rights were considered

¹⁰This process could be further explained in a number of ways. On the one hand, actors’ commitment levels to gender-inclusivity may have increased because they would face greater costs for backing down than for following through on the agreement. On the other hand, actors might find rights extensions less costly following a gender-specific agreement, because they can deflect any opposition by blaming the agreement or even the third-parties that helped to negotiate the agreement.

and formalized within the context of the peace agreement, may feel empowered to push for rights. Peace agreements that include women's rights within them both legitimize women as political actors and legitimize advocates' demands for greater inclusivity. For example, in the case of Liberia, actors were slow to follow through on promises for improvements in women's political rights following the signing of the Accra Peace Agreement in 2003. However, knowing that women's rights protections were outlined within the agreement, women's groups felt as if they had a legal footing to stand on and a legitimate reason to push for change. Thus, in Liberia women were further empowered to hold actors accountable and push for improvements in women's rights, because the peace agreement legitimized their voice and their role in the political life of the state.

Finally, I posit that gender-specific peace agreements spur norms shifts within societies. Hafner-Burton (2005) discusses how persuasion, defined as the attempt to teach actors new ideas or socialize actors to believe and respect new sets of norms, is one mechanism through which government respect for human rights can be altered. Lutz and Sikkink (2000) also point to the role of changing norms in conjunction with revised legal frameworks as means to improve respect for human rights. In a similar vein, I argue that peace agreements shape the ways in which actors view what is normatively and politically right.¹¹ By discussing women's rights within peace negotiations and codifying the rights within the peace agreement, the conflict actors and negotiators signal that they view women as having sufficient legitimacy to warrant attention. Simply put, the legitimization of women within a peace agreement signals to society more broadly that women can and should be treated as relevant and capable political actors. In the case of South Africa which will be discussed in the following chapter, the Interim Constitution of 1993 spurred a noticeable shift in the ways in which women's roles were perceived by South Africans. The direct and indirect processes described above will facilitate improvements in women's rights following the signing of gender-specific peace agreements.

Through both direct and indirect means, I hypothesize:

Hypothesis: Peace agreements that are gender-inclusive in nature are expected to have a

¹¹Hafner-Burton (2005) is clear in stating that persuasion alone may not provide strong enough incentives to change actors' behavior; instead, she points to the power of coercion in attempts to alter governments' respect for human rights. Lutz and Sikkink (2000) emphasize, however, the dual role of coercive legal frameworks in conjunction with the persuasion of norms cascades. Coercive legal frameworks alone may do little, according to Lutz and Sikkink (2000).

positive effect on government’s respect for women’s rights following civil war when compared to those peace agreements that are not gender-inclusive.

Table 2.1 provides a sample of civil war peace agreements, all of which contain specific provisions for extending rights to women and building gender equality in the post-conflict period. Within the universe of agreement cases where gender provisions are included (26 in total in the UCDP Peace Agreement Database), nineteen contributed to an increase in government respect for women’s political rights following conflict. In other words, in just over 73 percent of peace agreements with gender provisions, actors actually follow through on their commitments. On the other hand, women’s rights

Table 2.1: Peace Agreements and Women’s Post-Conflict Political Rights (Select Examples)

Agreement Name	Post-Conflict Women’s Rights Increase
Agreement for a Firm and Lasting Peace (Guatemala, 1996)	yes
Good Friday Agreement (United Kingdom, 1998)	yes
Accra Peace Agreement (Liberia, 2003)	yes
Abuja Ceasefire Agreement (Sierra Leone, 2000)	yes
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (Burundi, 2000)	yes
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Nepal, 2006)	yes
Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord (Bangladesh, 1997)	no
Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Sudan, 2005)	no
Note: Examples of peace agreements which include gender provisions.	

improvements occurred in only 41 percent of cases when gender provisions were not included in agreements.¹² As mentioned already, civil wars create an opening for change. Peace agreements, however, can increase the likelihood of change and shape the direction of that change. By generating a specific roadmap for the post-conflict period, peace agreements can spur greater respect for women's rights. Women, in places such as Guatemala, Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, and Burundi all benefited from the gender-awareness and rights-extensions granted to them within their countries' peace processes.

Research Design

I test my expectations regarding peace agreements and women's post-conflict political rights using the universe of cases identified within the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme Peace Agreements Database (UCDP PAD) (Högbladh, 2011). The UCDP PAD contains approximately 200 peace agreements (including peace process agreements, partial agreements, and comprehensive agreements) signed between at least two of the primary warring parties to a conflict between the years 1975 and 2011. Because my theory relies on peace agreements' quasi-constitutional nature, the main legal-political causal mechanisms linking agreements to rights improvements cannot take root unless peace agreements survive, so to speak.¹³ Therefore, I limit my universe of cases to those peace agreements that have not ended. A peace agreement ends, according to the UCDP PAD, when one of the primary parties is no longer party to the agreement; an agreement that "ends" cannot be implemented.¹⁴ Because of limited data availability on my main dependent variable of interest, women's post-conflict political rights (Cingranelli, Richards and Clay, 2014), the time period of my analysis is further restricted to the 1981-2011 period. My unit of analysis is the peace agreement within a civil war dyad.¹⁵

¹²These numbers are derived from the universe of cases where the peace agreement, according to Högbladh (2011), did not end.

¹³In an extension of this chapter, however, I will investigate how gendered agreements fare in their durability.

¹⁴While I take this step for theoretical reasons, I still run the analyses on all cases (regardless of whether or not the agreements ended). On a theoretical level, an agreement that has ended may still generate norms shifts, although it is less likely to create a legal framework that ties actors' hands to change. The results are robust to either analysis. Again, this is an issue I will explore in more detail in future extensions of this dissertation.

¹⁵For purposes of this dissertation, I make the simplifying assumption of coding peace agreements as independent units of analysis. Of course, I recognize that several civil wars have a succession of peace agreements that cumulatively contribute to the settlement of conflict. In future revisions of my research on peace processes and the quality of peace, then, I plan to aggregate the data to the peace process-level.

Dependent Variable

I use two dependent variables, both measuring the improvement in women's political rights in the post-conflict period. To code each of the dependent variables, I use the women's political rights data from the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset (CIRI) (Cingranelli, Richards and Clay, 2014). CIRI codes a categorical variable on governments' respect for women's political rights. The variable captures government practices and national laws designed to protect the following political rights: the right to vote, the right to run for political office, the right to hold elected and appointed government positions, the right to join political parties, and the right to petition government officials. The CIRI women's political rights variable is coded from 0 to 3, where 0 represents no rights and high levels of restrictions by governments while 3 indicates a society that has political equality guaranteed by law and in practice.

The first dependent variable, *rights improvements (any)*, captures whether or not women's political rights improved as a result of a peace agreement at any time during the five years following either the signing of an agreement or the end of civil war, whichever is later. The variable is coded as 1 if governments' respect for women's political rights is higher following an agreement than it was prior to the civil war.¹⁶ If women's political rights do not improve in the five years following an agreement, I code the dependent variable as 0. The coding of the quality of peace indicators is thus relative to the realities on the ground rather than an absolute comparison across countries.

Second, I generate another dependent variable in hopes of providing a tougher test of my hypothesis. The dichotomous variable, *durable rights improvements*, is coded as 1 if the improvement in government respect for women's political rights is durable for the entire five year window following conflict.¹⁷ If the level of women's political rights does not maintain a durable improvement over pre-conflict levels of women's rights, the variable is coded as 0. This dependent variable is important insofar as initial improvements in women's rights may quickly fade as societies move further away from the signing of

¹⁶I look at the five-year time scope because changes in political rights may take some time to take hold. I have coded the variable in alternative ways, to capture both immediate changes following conflict as well as durable improvements to women's rights in the post-conflict period. The results are robust across specifications. I judge improvements based on a comparison with the pre-war period, because pre-war levels are a better indication of a society's rights and opportunities than those levels during a civil war. Moreover, many cases do not have data recorded for years while they are at war.

¹⁷Or the signing of an agreement, whichever is later.

a peace agreement. If peace agreements lead only to a temporary spike in women's rights, the first dependent variable of this study may provide falsely positive findings. If, on the other hand, peace agreements actually do institutionalize change within societies, I expect gender provisions within an agreement to have a positive and statistically significant effect on each of the two main dependent variables.

Initially, given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables, I ran the analyses using logistic regression models. The results, however, have the potential to be biased by endogeneity. In other words, the same factors that are contributing to women's political rights improvements in the post-conflict period may also be contributing to the likelihood that agreements will be crafted in a gender-sensitive manner. If unobserved variables are simultaneously influencing the gender-inclusivity of peace agreements as well as the improvements in women's post-conflict rights, then I cannot accurately attribute women's post-conflict rights improvements to peace agreements. To deal with the potential for endogeneity, I rely on a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model.¹⁸ The bivariate probit model simultaneously estimates two equations of univariate probit models – the occurrence of rights improvements for women in the aftermath of civil war (outcome equation) and the presence of gender protections with peace agreements (selection equation). Bivariate probit models correct for correlation in the random error terms of each equation.¹⁹ The model, then, allows me to attribute any improvements in women's post-conflict political rights to the gender provisions in peace agreements.²⁰ Below, I discuss the variables used in each stage of the model.

Explanatory Variable and Controls

The outcome equation estimates the factors that affect the likelihood of improvements to women's political rights following conflict. The primary explanatory variable in this study is the inclusion of women's rights protections in peace agreements. For each peace agreement within the UCDP PAD, I have read the text of the agreement to determine whether or not women's rights were referenced

¹⁸This technique is common within works on conflict resolution (see e.g. Beardsley, 2008; Gartner, 2011, 2014; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2015; Reid, 2015).

¹⁹For a thorough, applied discussion of seemingly unrelated bivariate probit models, see Hartzell and Hoddie (2015).

²⁰To help account for the non-independence between peace agreements within the same conflict episode, I cluster standard errors by peace process.

within the agreement. For example, Liberia's 2003 Accra Peace Agreement guaranteed women spots in a Governance Reform Commission, the National Elections Commission, as well as the National Transitional Legislative Assembly. The agreement goes on to state that parties must reflect national and gender balance in all elective and non-elective appointments. Such language offers clearly defined political rights for women in the post-conflict period. For agreements that include references to women's rights and gender issues, I code the primary explanatory variable as 1. If gender is not mentioned in any way in an agreement, the variable for gender-inclusivity is coded as 0.²¹

In the outcome equation, I control for a number of variables that may also influence the likelihood that governments' respect for women's rights will improve following civil war. To control for attributes of the conflict, I include a variable for conflict duration. This variable measures how long, in months, a conflict lasted; I derive data for the variable from UCDP's conflict termination database (Kreutz, 2010). Longer conflicts may generate greater openings for women following conflict insofar as the toll wrought on society requires the involvement of all members to rebuild. Second, I control for the presence of peacekeeping operations (Högbladh, 2011). I expect peacekeepers to, at a very minimum, provide sufficient external pressure so as to prevent gross violations in women's rights. Third, I control for the average global level of women's political rights in the year that the agreement was signed or that the conflict terminated, whichever was later (Cingranelli, Richards and Clay, 2014). Fourth, I control for a state's GDP per capita (log value, lagged); wealthier, more developed countries are expected to, on average, have greater respect for women's rights (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2009). Finally, I control for whether or not the agreement occurred following UNSCR 1325. Signed in 2000, the resolution pushed for gender sensitive peace processes and greater inclusion of women at every stage of the peace process.

In the selection equation, the dependent variable is the dichotomous gender provisions variable as described above. I control for the same variables as are present in the outcome equation: war duration, peacekeeping operations, global levels of women's political rights, GDP per capita, and post-UNSCR 1325. I expect each of these variables to increase the likelihood that women's rights provisions will be

²¹There is some variation in the specificity and count of gender protections embedded within peace agreements. I have run the models with several alternative codings of the independent variable. For example, one alternative is to use a count variable of the number of provisions for women (ranging from 0 to 3; social, political, and/or economic). The results are robust to alternative forms.

included in peace agreements. In addition to these variables, I also employ an instrumental variable. In estimating seemingly unrelated bivariate probit models, one must include in the selection equation a variable that is excluded from the outcome equation. As applied to this research, I must identify a variable that I expect to influence the likelihood of a gender-specific peace agreement, but that I do not expect to affect the levels of rights accorded to women following war. In this vein, I use the number of third-party female signatories to the agreement as my instrumental variable. Third-party female signatories should increase the likelihood that women's provisions will be discussed at the negotiating table and be codified in agreements. I expect female third-party signatories to increase the perception of a gendered peace process; additionally, they may be representative of the international community's push for gender-sensitive peace processes. On the other hand, I do not expect third-party female signatories to have any effect on the likelihood that women's rights will improve following conflict. Third party female signatories are not indicative of women's rights on a domestic level; in fact, third party female signatories show up in cases ranging from Northern Ireland to Liberia to Afghanistan. As Ellerby (2013) notes, women's physical presence is often insufficient to guarantee real strides toward gender equality.²² I coded data on female signatories to agreements as I was reading the peace agreements in the UCDP PAD. The measure is a count variable that ranges from 0 to 11.

Results

Before presenting and discussing the results of the seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model, I show the bivariate relationship between gender-specific peace agreements and improvements in government respect for women's political rights following civil war. Figure 2.1 displays a statistically significant correlation between the two variables in the absence of any controls ($\chi^2 = 6.6193$; $\Pr(\chi^2) = .010$). Approximately 64 percent of gender-specific peace agreements lead to improvements in government's respect for women's political rights. On the other hand, only 41 percent of non-gender-specific peace agreements lead to women's rights improvements. This first look confirms the prior discussion of civil war resolution processes. Civil wars and their resolution create an opening for change; thus, women's

²²Alternatively, I would expect female signatories from either the government or rebel side to correlate with rights improvements post-conflict, because they represent a society that is open to some level of gender equality or women's involvement in the political life of a country.

rights and other indicators of inclusivity hold the possibility to improve during this process of transformation. The cross-tabulation makes clear, however, that peace agreements' contents shape the trajectory of that change and can increase the likelihood that countries get on the path toward a higher quality peace.




Figure 2.1: Gender-Specific Peace Agreements and Improvements in Women’s Political Rights

Moving beyond the simple bivariate analysis, Table 2.2 presents the results of the seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model. Models 1 and 2 provide the first-cut analysis which examines whether or not gender-sensitive peace agreements generate improvements to government respect for women’s political rights at any point in the five years following conflict. In Models 3 and 4, I test the extent to which women’s protections in peace agreements have durable effects on women’s rights improvements following conflict. The outcome equations are presented in the top of the table, while the selection equations are at the bottom. In each of the models the ρ term for the bivariate probit model is approaching -1 and is significant at the .01 level. The significant ρ term indicates that the random errors of each equation are indeed correlated and that regular logistic or probit regression estimation would likely produce biased results; thus, the seemingly unrelated bivariate probit is the appropriate model choice given the theory

Table 2.2: Seemingly Unrelated Bivariate Probit: Peace Agreements and Women's Rights

	DV: Rights Improvements (Any)		DV: Rights Improve. (Durable)	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Outcome Equation				
Gender Provisions	1.9554*** (0.3994)	2.6900*** (0.5332)	1.8980*** (0.3415)	1.6862*** (0.2740)
Conflict Duration		0.0032 (0.0026)		0.0093** (0.0039)
PKO		0.3760 (0.4308)		0.1216 (0.5703)
Global Levels of Women's Political Rights		-0.5758 (3.6861)		3.2085 (3.5568)
GDPpc (lag, log)		0.0308 (0.2434)		-0.6206** (0.3076)
Post-UNSCR 1325		0.7180 (0.9255)		-0.4579 (0.9229)
Selection Equation				
Conflict Duration		0.0056*** (0.0019)		0.0086*** (0.0029)
PKO		0.1128 (0.3091)		0.1166 (0.3412)
Global Levels of Women's Political Rights		6.2104** (2.7190)		14.9630*** (3.8512)
GDPpc (lag, log)		-0.2042 (0.2468)		-0.6616* (0.3401)
Post-UNSCR 1325		-0.4331 (0.8491)		-2.4986*** (0.7943)
Third-party Female Signatories	0.1150*** (0.0323)	0.0557* (0.0315)	0.1347*** (0.0369)	0.0763*** (0.0247)
<i>N</i>	105	78	100	73
χ^2	10.6406***	267.146***	155.708***	8555.65***
Standard errors in parentheses; Significance levels: *** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .1$				

and data.

The results in Model 1 offer support for the main hypothesis of the paper; without any control variables, gender provisions have a positive and statistically significant effect on the likelihood that government respect for women's political rights will improve following conflict. As expected, third-party female signatories increase the likelihood that peace agreements will be crafted to include gender

provisions. Model 2 adds all control variables. With control variables included in the model, gender provisions maintain their positive and statistically significant effect on women's post-conflict political rights. Gender provisions has a coefficient of 2.690 and is significant at the $p < .01$ -level. The duration of conflict, the presence of peacekeepers, and agreements that were signed following UNSCR 1325 also have a positive effect on women's rights. Global levels of women's rights as well as a country's levels of economic development have negatively signed coefficients. The control variables in the outcome equation, however, do not reach traditional levels of statistical significance.

In the selection equation of Model 2, the instrumental variable, female third-party signatories has a positive and statistically significant effect on the likelihood that gender provisions will be included in an agreement. Agreements that are signed following longer conflicts and that are signed in a global environment of higher women's rights tend to also have a positive effect on the generation of gendered peace agreements ($p < .01$ and $p < .05$, respectively). On the other hand, a peacekeeping presence and a country's GDP per capita do not have distinguishable effects on the gendered nature of peace agreements. Taken as a whole, Model 2 offers support for the assertion that the contents of peace agreements matters; if women's rights are specifically enumerated in peace agreements, the political environment for women following conflict will be more open. This result holds in spite of endogeneity concerns.

Models 3 and 4 assess whether or not gendered peace agreements also increase the likelihood of durable improvements to women's political rights following conflict. In the absence of controls, Model 3 shows that gender provisions do have a positive and statistically significant effects on the likelihood that women's rights improvements will be durable for the five years following conflict. Model 4 presents the results with all control variables. In the outcome equation, gender provisions maintain a positive and statistically significant effect on women's post-conflict political rights (coefficient = 1.686, $p < .01$). Gendered peace agreements, then, not only generate benefits for women post-conflict, but they also create sustainable improvements for women's political rights. This indicates that peace agreements and their contents are not fleeting; mediators and other actors at the negotiating table must be aware that peace agreements can create the foundation for durable changes to the quality of post-conflict peace.

Turning to the control variables in Model 4, war duration and a nation's economic development each have statistically significant effects on women's post-conflict rights; longer wars increase the likelihood

that women's rights will improve in a durable manner whereas increases in a nation's levels of economic development decrease the likelihood that women's rights will improve in a durable war.²³ Peacekeepers and global levels of women's political rights also have a positive effect on the durable increase in women's political rights, however these effects do not attain statistical significance. Finally, agreements that are signed in the post-UNSCR 1325 period are less likely to experience a durable increase in women's political rights; this finding is not statistically significantly different than zero.

The results of the selection stage in Model 4 are similar to those found in Model 2. The instrumental variable, female third party signatories, has a positive and statistically significant effect on gender provisions in peace agreements. With respect to the control variables, agreements signed following the adoption of UNSCR 1325 as well as agreements signed in wealthier countries are less likely to contain gender provisions ($p < .01$ and $p < .1$, respectively).²⁴ As global levels of women's political rights, on the other hand, increase so too does the likelihood that women's rights protections will make their way onto the pages of a peace agreement. The presence of peacekeepers does not have a statistically significant effect on the presence of gender provisions in peace agreements. Across all models, then, the results of my analyses indicate that the content of peace agreements matters. Peace agreements, as quasi-constitutional documents, can tie actors hands to new policies and they can open the doors for greater opportunity for particular groups following conflict. Moreover, it is possible that the gender awareness generated at the negotiating table generates positive externalities for women following conflict.

To assess the substantive effects of gender provisions within agreements, I calculate the predicted probability of achieving improvements in women's political rights following conflict. In particular, I assess the substantive effects of achieving a durable increase in women's political rights following conflict. Taking endogeneity concerns into account, the substantive effects of the results, shown in Figure 2.2, are quite striking. In cases where gender provisions are absent from peace agreements, the likelihood of women's political rights improvements in the wake of conflict is approximately 25 percent.

²³This finding is not expected and is one that I would like to explore more fully. One possible scenario, however, is that wealthier countries may feel less pressure or be less willing to make major changes to their political system.

²⁴The UNSCR 1325 finding, in particular, is important albeit unsettling for the increasing focus on gender by the international community. While more research needs to be done on this topic, this offers indication that the UN and other actors must do more if they truly want to increase women's representation in peace processes.

This number, of course, is not surprising insofar as one would expect civil wars to generate openings for change in and of themselves. More importantly, however, the probability of durable rights improvements in cases where gender provisions are present in an agreement is close to 85 percent.²⁵ Gender-specific peace agreements, then, work most of the time. As the theory predicts, agreements tie actors hands to new policies, generate new norms for gender relations within countries, and empower groups to push for change. While change is not assured, peace agreements can serve as strong foundations for a more inclusive political environment following conflict. Conflict actors and third parties, then, must be cognizant of the role they play not only in ending violence but in shaping the very nature of peace.




Figure 2.2: Predicted Probability of Improvements in Women's Political Rights

Robustness Checks

A number of questions regarding alternative explanations remain. While I delve further into the sources and effects of gender-specific peace agreements in the following chapter, I do include a couple of analyses here for purposes of assuaging concerns about alternative causal pathways. The results for

²⁵All other variables are held either at their mean (continuous variables) or modal (dichotomous variables) values.

the following can be found in Appendix 1. A first question that arises is whether or not the type of agreement influences the quality of peace. Extant research indicates that comprehensive agreements are the most durable; as such, one might suspect that comprehensive agreements, through their stability, lay the foundations for more inclusive outcomes as well. This line of questioning would posit that women's rights provisions are not the sole pathway to improvements in women's rights and that comprehensive agreements revise the status quo sufficiently so as to bring diffuse benefits to marginalized groups such as women. Table A.1 presents the results of a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit analysis. I add a dichotomous variable for comprehensive agreements in each stage of the model; the variable is coded 1 for those agreements that are comprehensive in nature and 0 for those agreements that are either partial or process. The results indicate that comprehensive agreements do have a positive and statistically significant effect on the presence of gender provisions within agreements. Comprehensive agreements are more likely than other agreements to contain protections for women's rights within them. On the other hand, comprehensive agreements do not have a distinguishable effect on the likelihood of rights improvements for women; while the coefficient for comprehensive agreements illustrates a negative effect, the variable is not statistically significant in the outcome equation. The results thus confirm the importance of specific gender provisions; the words on paper increase the commitment of actors and generate indirect processes of women's empowerment.

Second, one may question the extent to which third party observers create situations in which women's rights are more likely to improve. The international spotlight, for example, may reduce the possibility of perpetuating exclusionary practices and may increase the likelihood that women gain a voice in, at the very least, the political life of the state. The variable for United Nations peacekeeping does not attain statistical significance in the main model (Table 2.2); indeed, while peacekeepers have a positive effect on both the inclusion of gender-specific provisions within the agreement as well as on the likelihood that rights will improve, the effects do not reach statistical significance. A glance at the bivariate relationships between peacekeeping and both gender provisions as well as improvements in women's rights confirms the results of the more advanced analyses. Tables A.2 and A.3 illustrate that there is no clear relationship between peacekeeping and gender-specific agreements or improvements in women's rights, respectively. While I posit that third-party observers should be embraced as tools to increase accountability and improve prospects of agreement implementation, they are insufficient to

generate tangible benefits for women's rights.²⁶

Discussion and Conclusion

Can peace agreements lay the groundwork for a higher quality peace following conflict? This current research approaches one piece of this puzzle by analyzing the role peace agreements play in shaping women's political rights following conflict. When peace agreements such as the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi or the Lomé Peace Agreement for Sierra Leone include women's rights provisions in their texts, does it work to generate improvements in gender relations in society? In Sierra Leone, for example, conflict actors agreed: "Given that women have been particularly victimized during the war, special attention shall be accorded to their needs and potentials in formulating and implementing national rehabilitation, reconstruction and development programmes, to enable them to play a central role in the moral, social and physical reconstruction of Sierra Leone" (Högbladh, 2011) The theoretical framework developed in this dissertation argues that such statements matter within peace agreements. They generate incentives and constraints on actors' behavior, empower groups to push for change, and may even spur norms shifts within societies. As such, I argue that agreements that include gender-specific provisions generate positive effects for women's rights in the aftermath of conflict.

My findings suggest that the contents of peace agreements play an unique role in shaping the political environment for women following conflict. In particular, I find that gender-sensitive peace agreements increase the likelihood of improvements to government respect for women's political rights. Of course, CIRI's women's political rights measure focuses on but one aspect of women's rights. One may even argue that improvements in political rights may be the easiest or fastest area for rights to be extended. As such, I plan to extend this research to consider other women's rights measures. In the following chapter, within the case illustrations of Burundi, Liberia, South Africa, and Angola, I also discuss broader gender equality metrics beyond CIRI's strict conception of women's political rights.

The policy implications stemming from this research are two-fold. First and foremost, it offers support for the international community's push for more gender-sensitive and gender-inclusive peace

²⁶I have also explored running models that take into account a possible interaction effect between third-party enforcers and gender provisions; the small number of observations, however, limit the possibilities for such analyses. Initial models do suggest, however, that gender provisions have an independent effect on women's rights.

processes. The United Nations, in particular, has gone to great lengths to encourage women's inclusion in all stages of conflict resolution. This paper's findings speak to one component of the resolution process: peace agreements. The results indicate that a gendered approach to peace agreements spurs benefits for women following conflict. The words on paper matter and can be used as a tool to inspire improvements in women's rights. Of course, the number of peace agreements that include women's rights as provisions is still quite small. More must be done, then, to continue to approach peace as a gender-inclusive process. In so doing, the international community and conflict actors can increase the chances of a more open and equal environment following conflict.

Second, my work offers further support for the assertion that the content of peace agreements matters. More importantly, though, I show that the content of agreement has implications beyond the cessation of war; agreements shape the trajectory of the post-conflict environment. Therefore, when crafting agreements, actors must be aware that the words within the peace agreement matter beyond the end of the conflict. The language and provisions within peace agreements hold potential to make a path for new social, political, and economic structures. The international community, then, should continue to pursue peace processes in a way that is not only focused on ending war, but also in a way that is forward-thinking with respect to the quality of peace.

CHAPTER 3

PEACE AGREEMENTS AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS: CASE ILLUSTRATIONS

The empowerment of women is an essential prerequisite for the political, social, economic, cultural and ecological security of the entire population. // Equality between the sexes does much to enhance the well-being of women, men, girls and boys, and is indispensable for achieving people-centred sustainable development. // The Government should pay special attention to the status of women and combat all discrimination against them.

– Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (2000)

Since 1975, forty-eight of some two-hundred civil war peace agreements contain references to women's rights and gender equality.¹ Agreements such as the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi set forth specific goals and steps to be taken to improve women's standing in the political, economic, and social lives of their country. Given that efforts on gender equality and women's empowerment by the United Nations have often been viewed as cheap talk rather than genuine commitment,² it is only right to question the strength of such provisions within peace agreements. Are peace agreements effective mechanisms for generating a quality peace in the aftermath of civil war? Following the widespread destruction and death of civil war, can negotiated settlements not only end war but also create a peace that is meaningful?

The right of women to freely and equally enter into the political life of a country is a fundamental dimension of a quality peace. When a country protects and extends rights to women, that country is extending dignity and voice to half of the population. Such a move, as noted by Inglehart, Norris and

¹Based on the coding I have done by reading all peace agreements in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Peace Agreement Database (Högbladh, 2011). These numbers are from the universe of cases regardless of if the agreement ended or not.

²United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions on women, peace, and security have been largely viewed as "show." In spite of positive intentions, peace practitioners and scholars have found little evidence for their efficacy in improving women's status during and after conflicts.

Welzel (2002), improves the quality of life and strength/legitimacy of democratic governance within a country. Research by Caprioli (2005) points to structural violence in the form of gender inequality as a key predictor of intrastate instability and conflict. Wallensteen (2015) asserts that women are a significant resource for building peace in war torn societies. When women continue to be repressed and marginalized, countries remain trapped in a cycle of exclusion and structural violence. In sum, I focus on women's rights to gauge the extent to which countries have not only ended personal violence but also the structural violence that marginalizes large portions of society and undermines prospects for peace (Galtung, 1969).

The quantitative analysis presented within Chapter 2 begins to answer the aforementioned questions. In particular, Chapter 2 gains traction on whether or not the content of peace agreements matters for what peace looks like following conflict. We know, from existing works on peace agreements, that the content of agreements matters for the durability of peace (See, e.g. Walter, 2002; Fortna, 2003; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Mattes and Savun, 2009). Building upon these works and others, I have argued that the content of agreements shapes the extent to which societies make strides toward a more positive or quality peace following war. The quantitative results in the previous chapter confirm that women's rights protections within agreements work; when peace agreements contain provisions to protect and extend rights to women, the likelihood of improvements to women's post-conflict political rights increases. While the resolution of civil war on its own provides an opening for change, gender-specific peace agreements greatly increase the likelihood that women will benefit from the waves of change.

I argue that the causal pathways linking gender-specific peace agreements to improvements in women's rights are multifaceted and complex. In brief, the causal mechanisms cannot be reduced to a single story; instead, peace agreements set in motion a number of social, legal, and psychological processes that all hold the potential to influence the post-conflict period. I categorize the causal mechanisms within three categories, one direct and two indirect. The direct mechanism, I argue, stems from the precision of language within peace agreements. Through precise references to women's rights and/or gender equality, peace agreements tie actors' hands to change. In other words, the legal precision renders deviations from the agreements more difficult. With clarity and specificity of language, actors will be less able to deviate; specificity of language is a form of accountability, and actors can be held accountable if they do not comply.

Alternatively, I also recognize that peace agreements set in motion indirect processes that nonetheless lead to tangible benefits for women. Peace agreements, depending on their contents, hold the potential to (1) generate positive externalities in the form of women's empowerment, and (2) spur norms shifts in gender relations within societies. Gender-specific provisions lead to positive externalities for women's post-conflict rights by empowering women and other actors to push for change. Because women's groups know that rights have been extended within agreements, they will be able to hold leaders accountable to change. Gender-specific peace agreements also facilitate norms shifts by changing how women and their roles are perceived. If gender enters the agenda of peace processes, that serves as a signal to warring parties and to society as a whole that women's voices matter and that women can be legitimate political actors.

This chapter delves into a number of case illustrations to assess the plausibility of the causal story. Tarrow (2010) emphasizes the important of bridging quantitative and qualitative work, writing:

...a single minded adherence to *either* quantitative or qualitative approaches straightjackets scientific progress. Whenever possible, we should use qualitative data to interpret quantitative findings, to get inside the processes underlying decision outcomes, and to investigate the reasons for the tipping points in historical time-series (Tarrow, 2010, 109).

As I proceed with qualitative accounts of Liberia, Burundi, South Africa, and Angola, I seek to highlight the causal processes set in motion by peace agreements. More broadly, this chapter answers the following questions through the qualitative analysis: First, how do gender-specific peace agreements change the incentives and behavior of actors in the post-conflict period? Which mechanisms appear to be at work in each case? Second, are peace agreements the impetus for changing gender relations, or do some underlying societal factors instead contribute to improvements (or lack thereof) in women's rights? This second question focuses on the issue of causal identification: how can we be certain that peace agreements are the drivers of change rather than some other endogenous processes? A serious consideration of these questions is necessary to illustrate the utility and scope of peace agreements' effects. While I do not view peace agreements as a panacea to societal ills nor do I view them as the only tool for shaping the quality of peace, I do argue that peacemakers must be cognizant of agreements' potential power. Peace agreements should not only be seen as tools to end war, but they should also be

recognized for their capacity to outline a new legal/political framework for post-conflict societies.³

A Note on Case Selection

The goal of this chapter in both selecting and analyzing specific cases is to better assess the causal processes linking gender-specific peace agreements to changes in women's rights following conflict. The proposed causal mechanisms discussed above are varied; while the quantitative analysis in the second chapter of this dissertation offers strong support for the hypothesized relationship, it is unable to speak to the plausibility of each specific causal story. I therefore turn to a more in-depth analysis of four cases make observations about context, process, and mechanisms. By focusing on causal-process observations rather than data-set observations, this chapter eschews "breadth of coverage" for "depth of insight" (Collier, Brady and Seawright, 2010a, 24). The four cases chosen herein – Angola, Burundi, Liberia, and South Africa – offer depth of insight into the causal processes at work. As Collier, Brady and Seawright (2010b) write, "A small number of causal-process observations, that seek to uncover critical turning points or moments of decision making, can play a valuable role in causal inference. Making an inference from a smoking gun does not require a large N in any traditional sense" (196). With a focus on causal process observations, this chapter strengthens the inferences already set forth throughout the quantitative analysis.

Before moving to the specific cases, I will briefly discuss the logic of case selection. I have chosen four cases that exhibit variation across both the independent and dependent variables. While the cases of Burundi, Liberia, and South Africa are cases where gender-specific peace agreements contributed to improvements in women's post-conflict political rights, the case of Angola demonstrates how the lack of gender protections within agreements may inhibit improvements in women's rights. Moreover, the cases of Burundi, Liberia, and South Africa offer a variety of dialogues regarding causal process. These cases each demonstrate different causal process observations which allow me to assess the mechanisms at work. The Burundian cases illustrates the direct mechanism at work: the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement led to direct policy changes within the country's post-conflict laws. Liberia and South Africa, on the other hand, each illustrate how peace agreements have indirect effects on gender

³See Bell and O'Rourke (2007) for an elaboration on the quasi-constitutional nature of peace agreements.

relations, through positive externalities and norms shifts, respectively.

Beyond choosing the cases for their variation on both explanatory and outcome variables, I have also chosen the cases of Angola, Burundi, Liberia, and South Africa to minimize variance in confounding factors. In choosing these cases, I take into consideration the following variables: culture/region, pre-war levels of women's rights, women's role in the conflict and peace process, and time period. By choosing all Sub-Saharan African countries, I minimize variance caused by regional and/or cultural differences in the status of women.⁴ Although within the same region, the chosen cases do exhibit variance in the extent to which women experienced political rights in the period prior to conflict (Cingranelli, Richards and Clay, 2014). Women were completely excluded in pre-conflict South Africa.⁵ In pre-conflict Liberia, women's rights were guaranteed by law but severely limited in practice. Given traditional gender roles, then, we may expect little from those two countries' peace processes. On the other hand, in both Angola and Burundi, women were moderately involved in the political life of the pre-conflict state. As such, improvements should face less resistance. In all cases, I want to point out that improvements in women's rights should never be assumed to be inevitable. I argue that women's empowerment is not a phenomenon that just happens. Instead, gender equality is a goal that societies and political actors must work toward and spur through political processes.

The cases also exhibit variance on a potential alternative explanatory variable: women's involvement as both fighters and advocates for peace. An essential question to ask when analyzing the causal relationships and findings put forth in the quantitative analyses is as follows: are peace agreements the drivers of change in gender relations or does women's involvement in the conflict or peace process lead to tangible gains for women following conflict? In other words, are the observed effects driven by legal mechanisms or by the presence of powerful female actors in society? While these questions warrant in depth research in their own right, I have chosen cases to account for concerns about endogenous treatment effects. For example, Angola had a number of female fighters throughout the country's conflict, a

⁴I want to emphasize that I am only claiming to minimize the variance; I am by no means claiming that there is not within-region variation in the status of women. Moreover, when I say that there are variances in the treatment of women by culture, this is not to offer a free-pass to gender-based discrimination or violence. Galtung (1990), for example, is quite clear in stating that cultural violence – structural and/or personal violence justified by cultural norms – is still violence.

⁵According to the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Database, women's political rights were restricted by law and in practice. With a score of zero, South African women had no political rights under law and/or the country had laws to prohibit women's participation in government, the political process, or public life (Cingranelli, Richards and Clay, 2014).

signal of an active and (at least somewhat) empowered women's role. Yet, Angolan women saw their rights ignored in the peace processes of that country and as a result, they experienced no improvement in their status following conflict. Liberia, as well, had an active women's movement throughout the conflict; that country, however, saw women's rights codified in the Accra Peace Agreement and increasingly respected following conflict. Just a brief discussion of two cases, then, offers indication that peace agreements, rather than women's involvement in the conflict or peace process, lead to improvements in women's post-conflict rights.⁶ I will discuss these questions, however, in more detail in the case illustrations below.

Finally, the chosen cases exhibit variance across time periods. In particular, I want to account for the potential counter-explanation that increasing pressure by the international community in the post-UNSCR 1325 world has led to both an increase in gender-sensitive peace agreements as well as an increase in the likelihood that women's rights will actually improve following conflict. One of my positive cases, South Africa, was crafted, signed, and implemented in the early 1990s prior to the "Women, Peace, and Security" time period. On the other hand, Angola's Luena Memorandum of Understanding was signed and implemented in the post-UNSCR 1325 period, a time when peace practitioners and peace agreements were expected to look at peace through a gendered lens. Again, I recognize the importance in accounting for the potential confounding effects of international pressure. Ultimately, however, I argue that the peace agreements themselves are the drivers of changes in gender relations. I now turn to the qualitative accounts of the civil wars, peace processes, and post-conflict gender relations in Angola, Burundi, Liberia, and South Africa to assess causal mechanisms and the true role of peace agreements in shaping a quality peace.

Qualitative Illustrations

With the case selection process now outlined, I turn to an analysis of each of the cases. I provide historical context of the conflict, the peace process, and the resulting peace for each case. Throughout,

⁶There are several cases in my dataset in which women held a seat at the negotiating table, but the peace agreement did not include women's rights provisions. In turn, the cases of Guinea-Bissau, Uganda, Papua New Guinea, and the Philippines saw initial conditions that should have been favorable for both a gender-specific peace agreement and the improvement of women's rights. Because women's rights were not legally specified within the peace agreements, however, women's rights saw no improvements following those conflicts.

I assess the role of the peace agreement(s) and consider how the presence or absence of gender specific provisions led to shifts in women's post-conflict political rights. I begin with the case of Burundi, a case in which the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement directly led to a shift in the country's laws and protections for women. The second and third cases, Liberia and South Africa, illustrate the two indirect mechanisms. In Liberia, the Accra Peace Agreement generated positive externalities by empowering Liberian women to push leaders to extend greater rights to women. South Africa, on the other hand, saw a shift in norms in the post-conflict period; societal opinions toward women became more favorable following the signing of the Interim Constitution in 1993. Angola serves as the final case. In Angola, a series of peace agreements maintained a narrow focus on the military dimensions of conflict, leaving gender and other societal questions unanswered. As such, the case of Angola illustrates how the absence of women's rights in peace agreements may serve as a roadblock in the development of a more gender egalitarian society. The cases demonstrate that the peace process is an opportunity to generate change and that peace agreements, through a variety of causal pathways, hold the potential to shape the nature of post-conflict societies.

Tying Hands: The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi

Civil war and violence has engulfed Burundi for much of the country's post-colonial period. Under the control of German and later Belgian colonizers, Burundian society transitioned into one that was marked by systematic division, exclusion, and repression. Much as they did in neighboring Rwanda, German and Belgian colonizers exploited and exacerbated ethnic differences in Burundian society. Specifically, colonizers placed power in the hands of the minority Tutsi group, leaving the majority Hutu population in marginal roles, at best.⁷ In contrast to Rwanda, however, the Tutsi minority retained a stronghold on power when the country gained independence from Belgium in 1962 (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2016). Following independence, the government, under Tutsi leadership, systematically excluded Hutus from the political and economic life of the state (Sambanis, 2004). A 1965 coup attempt was swiftly put down, but nonetheless catalyzed high levels of violence against the Hutu population. During both the 1970s and the 1980s, the government perpetrated large-scale Hutu massacres. By the

⁷Tutsis made up approximately ten to fourteen percent of Burundi's population, while Hutus hold a large majority with 85 to 90 percent of the population. The country is also home to a very small proportion of Twa.

early 1990s, a number of Hutu militant groups rebelled against the minority Tutsi government, leading to almost two decades of civil conflict (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2016).⁸

In the years leading up to and during the conflict in Burundi, women's social status was subordinated through a system of patriarchal norms and laws (Falch, 2010). For example, Burundian women faced discriminatory inheritance laws, and although not legally limited, the experiences and opportunities of women in the political and economic life of the state were greatly unequal to their male counterparts (United States Department of State, 1999). Falch (2010) notes that women were the most disproportionately affected group during the country's civil war: "Targeted for their role in reproducing the ethnic group to which they belonged, women and girls were subjected to rape and other forms of sexual abuse" by all sides of the conflict (Falch, 2010, 9).

In spite of the obstacles and violence that systematically repressed women, Burundi's female population exerted efforts to gain a stronger and more equal voice in society. During and following the conflict, an increasing number of women – out of necessity – adopted new roles in both private and public spheres, as both heads of household and as grassroots activists. According to Anderson (2015), Burundi's women responded publicly to the conflict in 1993, forming non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that bridged the country's ethnic divide with a goal of working toward peace.

Although women's involvement in politics was on an upward trajectory leading up to the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, their continued success and empowerment was not inevitable. Women in Burundi faced daily discrimination, both through legal limitations and through practices that marginalized and stifled their voices. As late as 1999, the year prior to the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, the United States Department of State identified women as underrepresented in government and political life and as victims of discriminatory social, security, and educational practices (United States Department of State, 1999). Even with the proliferation of women's organizations, women's status remained largely marginal. When negotiators met to organize peace talks in Arusha, Tanzania, they granted seats to a vast array of civil society groups but decided

⁸According to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, the conflict varied in intensity between 1991 and 2009, at times qualifying as a minor conflict (25+ battle deaths) and other times reaching levels of full-scale war (1,000+ battle deaths). In total, it is estimated that the conflict caused the deaths of over 300,000 people and the displacement of another 1.3 million (Sullivan, 2005).

to exclude women's groups (UN Women, 2012).⁹ Indeed, while women's involvement in political life increased throughout the 1990s, negotiators argued that "no group could claim to represent women or speak on behalf of all Burundian women" (UN Women, 2012, 10). If key actors in Burundian society remained resistant to women's empowerment as late as 1998 and 1999, then what caused the shift in legal protections for women and an increase in women's political opportunity? In the following sections, I analyze the contents of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi and assess the extent to which the peace agreement served as an impetus for real and positive change in Burundi's gender relations. I then move on to consider the strength of the causal process observations as well as the plausibility of alternative explanations.

Women's Rights Within the Peace Agreement

Burundi serves as an example of a case where gender protections and provisions within the peace agreement led directly to a change in government policies toward women. Specifically, I argue that the peace agreement tied actors' hands to change and increased the probability that actors would respect and/or protect women's rights in the post-conflict period. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, through its quite extensive and specific references to women's rights, changed the political incentives of actors such that they extended greater rights to women following conflict. As evidenced through the make-up of the negotiating table and the signatories of the agreement – which were all male – Burundi's women faced discriminatory and exclusionary practices. The peace agreement, however, set forth a new framework for post-conflict gender relations which became legally codified in the post-conflict state apparatus.

What reforms, specifically, are present in the final draft of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi? Although the negotiators did not concede on every point raised by female observers or the concurrently occurring All-Party Burundi Women's Peace Conference, the final agreement is perhaps the most thorough example of a gender-specific peace agreement. For example, the agreement grants "Equal opportunities of access to [public administration] for all men and women through

⁹The exclusion, although only temporary, is indicative of the prevailing systems of marginalization and repression of women in Burundi.

strict respect for, or the introduction of, laws and regulations governing the recruitment of State personnel and the staff of public and parastatal enterprises, as well as through transparency of competitive entrance examinations” (p. 19). The agreement also enumerates (1) equal access to education (p. 19); (2) judicial reforms to correct gender imbalances (p. 20); (3) an adherence to CEDAW, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (p. 26); and (4) freedom of marriage (p. 26), property rights (p.27), and protection for female-headed households (p. 80). The agreement does not, however, grant women guarantees for specific thresholds of involvement. The ambiguity of some of the language thus reiterates the resistance to change demonstrated by conflict actors.

Beyond the provisions included in the main body of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, the agreement also includes an Annex with further details on the political, economic, and social laws and practices to be implemented following the conflict. Perhaps driven by the pressure of domestic and international actors, the Annex includes the question: “Why the advancement of women?” Within this section, the agreement states:

Burundian women have suffered greatly from the various crises that have taken place in the country from independence to the present. Thousands of women have been widowed and traumatized. Their property has been looted and their children, have dropped out of school. Fearing for their lives, some of their husbands have fled the country, abandoning them with little or no means of survival. Over half of the refugees and sinistrés are women and children for whom the future looks bleak. This situation has had dire consequences for the lives of children: some have become orphans, vagrants and street children. Their quality of life has deteriorated considerably (Chapter 2.5.2.1; Page 122).

Spurred by the hardships of women described in the preceding statement, the Annex also provides a list of “tangible” steps conflict actors have agreed to take in order to further the advancement of women. These steps can be found in Table 3.1.

Effects of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement

The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, which was signed in 2000, provides an extensive set of goals and responsibilities for gender relations in the post-conflict period. While

Table 3.1: Annex to the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, Chapter 2.5.2.2

	Tangible actions for the advancement of women:
(a)	Women must be included in all management bodies established as part of the reconstruction process;
(b)	Women must be made aware of national reconciliation activities and must be mobilized to take part in them. Women must be promoted as peace mediators;
(c)	Meetings between women in Burundi and women of the diaspora should be held so that they can exchange ideas about their respective problems and the future of the country;
(d)	Women and children who find themselves in the special position of heads of household must be taken into account. The entitlements of those widowed and orphaned by Burundi's various crises must be restored;
(e)	A body should be established to identify women's problems in the context of the Burundian crisis and suggest appropriate solutions to the Government;
(f)	Legislation on women's inheritance rights must be drafted, adopted and promulgated;
(g)	Destroyed homes must be rebuilt for homeless women;
(h)	Help should be provided to women to engage in income-generating activities;
(i)	Counselling, training and assistance with reintegration should be provided to girls and women who have been subjected to sexual abuse and forced marriages during and after the crisis.

progress still remains slow, the case of Burundi illustrates the hypothesized relationship, that a gender-specific peace agreement will lead to the increase in the relative quality of peace in terms of women's opportunity and inclusivity. As evidence of initial progress, one can look to the transitional government that was installed in 2001. Women held 15.3% of ministerial positions, 9.1% of seats in the National Assembly, and 18.5% of seats in the Senate (Falch, 2010). These numbers, while still low, are an improvement over the single cabinet position held by a woman earlier in the country's history (and that position was as Minister of Women, Welfare, and Social Affairs) (United States Department of State, 1999).

The more apparent evidence of the efficacy of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement

came, however, when the country adopted a new constitution in 2005. The Constitution directly reaffirmed the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (and thus its goals and provisions for women). Moreover, the Constitution “stipulated that there should be a minimum of 30% female representation in the government, the National Assembly and the Senate (Article 129, 164, 180), [and] also included provisions regarding party lists for elections, requiring that at least one of every four candidates should be a woman” (Falch, 2010, 12). By the time elections occurred during the summer of 2005, the number of women in political power had further increased over the levels of 2001, achieving over 30 percent of seats in the National Assembly, Senate, and cabinet positions. Throughout the post-conflict period, Burundi’s government guaranteed women’s political rights both in law and in practice; according to the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Database, Burundi moved from a score of 2 prior to conflict to a score of 3 following the signing of the Arusha Agreement, where three is the best possible score according to their coding (Cingranelli, Richards and Clay, 2014). The agreement, through its gender-specific provisions, set in motion a series of events that improved women’s political status in Burundian society. While there is still progress to be made toward gender equality, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement and its direct reaffirmation within the Constitution indicate the legal potential of peace agreements.

Comments on Causality and Confounders

From the above accounts of the contents of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement and the status of gender relations in the post-conflict period, I argue that the contents of the peace agreement played a driving role in facilitating change. The peace agreement led, through its gender-aware language, to a higher quality peace. Although I will address this more fully below, I argue that it was the agreement – as opposed to the presence of a women’s peace movement – that served as the immediate impetus for change.¹⁰ Moreover, the evidence suggests that the causal mechanism at play within the case of Burundi was the direct mechanism; the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement led to specific legal commitments by actors to extend rights to women in the post-conflict period.

To identify the causal process, I have presented information on both the main explanatory variable,

¹⁰At the same time, however, the women’s movement was fundamental in attracting the international attention of UNIFEM and placing constant pressure on conflict actors at the negotiating table.

gender-specific peace agreement, and the dependent variable, improvements in women's post-conflict rights. By considering the language of the agreement and the processes of change following the conflict, it is apparent that the language of the peace agreement played a formative role in levels of women's rights following conflict. In the peace agreement, women were promised "equal opportunities of access to [public administration]" and political roles. Following the conflict, women experienced a modest but immediate increase in their representation across branches of government. Political actors in Burundi, still predominantly men, then went on to codify the gender provisions of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement into law. The Constitution of 2005 reaffirms the agreement and further guarantees women access to executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Women are guaranteed spots on party lists and in national governmental positions. Through its language, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement laid the legal-political framework for the country's post-conflict constitution. While I cannot comment on the counterfactual – the extent to which the Constitution would have had so many protections for women in the absence of the Arusha Agreement – I can comment on the parallels between the two documents. In spite of resistance by male actors in society (at the negotiating table and following negotiations), the same gendered language of the Arusha Agreement appeared in the Constitution. Actors tied their hands to change, and these changes were evident in the Constitution of 2005. Moreover, the potential domestic and/or international costs of renegeing decreased incentives to back down or expend energy undermining the provisions of the Arusha Agreement.

Alternatively – or perhaps complementarily – the analysis of the events leading up to and during the peace process in Burundi allows me to identify an additional causal process at work. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, in addition to directly shaping the legal status and opportunities for women, also created positive externalities in the form of greater female empowerment. As aforementioned, Burundi was home to a growing number of women's NGOs who were working for peace and for a greater voice in the country's politics. Following the Arusha Agreement, women "continued to pressure for increased women's political representation...and the calls for guaranteed representation in decision-making bodies were eventually accepted and incorporated into the new post-transitional Constitution" (Falch, 2010, 11). Therefore, while the gendered language of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement led to direct legal changes in the post-conflict period, the extent of those changes may be explained by the empowerment of female actors to continue their push for change.

The final proposed causal pathway in Chapter 3, norms shifts, does not seem to be at work in the case of Burundi. Many male politicians and party leaders remain resistant to women's voices and even threaten women who become too outspoken (Falch, 2010). Therefore, while both in law and in practice women's rights have improved and women's groups have continued to push for greater equality, predominant perceptions toward gender remain unequal and patriarchal.

While I have identified the causal processes linking gender-sensitive peace agreements to improvements in women's rights, I expect a number of questions to remain with respect to confounding variables. Specifically, the question comes to mind regarding how women's groups or female negotiators may have served as agents for change. Was it the peace agreement driving changes in women's rights, or was the growing women's movement the true driver for change? I argue that while the women's movement was instrumental in placing ongoing pressure on conflict actors, their efforts were insufficient to guarantee change in the post-conflict period. The agreement was a necessary component to ensure that the dreams and goals of the women's movement became reality in the post-conflict period.

Falch (2010) writes that "notable changes in women's political role[s] were initiated during the peace negotiations, which took place in Arusha, Tanzania, between 1998 and 2000" (10). Women's NGOs worked tirelessly for peace in Burundi. Time and again, however, women were excluded or dismissed from the formal peace processes (Anderson, 2015). Although initially excluded, women were eventually granted the role of observer. Through this role, women exerted some influence over the peace process. Burundian women were able to remain aware of all progress, liaise between negotiators and women's groups, and lobby for women's rights to be included within the agreement. With the help of the United Nations, (UNIFEM, specifically) an All-Party Burundi Women's Peace Conference met in 2000 and occurred parallel to the negotiations in Arusha. The conference resulted in a declaration urging warring parties (read, male negotiators) "to adopt a gender perspective in all issues raised during the talks, and to guarantee women 30% representation" in all branches of government (Falch, 2010, 11). While many of the demands made by women were ultimately met through ongoing pressure following the signing of the agreement, the male negotiators refused to guarantee a particular level of women's representation in decision-making bodies.

Anderson (2010) points out that negotiating parties rejected women's demands for a seat at the table,

arguing that women had no right to participate in talks given their limited representation in political bodies at the time. In reaction to demands for quotas and/or specific levels of representation, the negotiators “adamantly argued that there were insufficient qualified women to hold political office” (Falch, 2010, 11). The predominant attitude by male political actors in Burundi, it seems, was one in which women held a subordinate role. Based on the accounts of the atmosphere during the Arusha peace process, I argue that Burundi was not initially a candidate for improvements in women’s rights. Key conflict actors were hesitant/resistant to women’s political involvement, and therefore the country faced clear obstacles on the path to a higher quality peace. Although women’s groups were influencing the agenda, many of their efforts were falling on deaf ears.

The preceding suggests that while women’s voices were loud throughout the peace process, they were not always taken seriously by those at the negotiating table. The question I must still address, however, is the extent to which the processes of improvements in the quality of peace were driven by societal groups or by the peace agreement. If pressure by women’s groups drove the presence of gender-specific provisions within the peace agreement, then is it still possible to identify the peace agreement as the driver of causal processes? The sources of women’s rights provisions within the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement stem from both domestic pressure and international focus. According to Anderson (2015), “women’s rights were included in the Arusha Accords largely because of the interventions of UNIFEM” (74).¹¹ Based on prevailing sexist and exclusionary norms and perceptions by conflict actors, I argue that the women’s movement would have been insufficient to secure change in the absence of legal provisions within the agreement. The legal, quasi-constitutional status of the peace agreement was necessary to ensure an improvement in women’s rights.¹²

Admittedly, the case of Burundi renders it difficult to completely untangle the effects of women’s groups on post-conflict rights from the effects of peace agreements on post-conflict rights. I am the

¹¹ Anderson (2015) goes on to recognize, though, that while UNIFEM was essential in getting conflict actors to take women’s rights seriously, UNIFEM may not have been able to exert any pressure if there were not also well-organized women’s groups within the country. This highlights an issue I will discuss below with regards to causality: the causal process is highly complex, and many times, unique to a specific case.

¹² Would the peace agreement have been so thorough in its provisions for women in the absence of international pressure and/or the women’s movement? Perhaps not. My hypothesis, however, is about the effects of gendered peace agreements; regardless of their source, I expect peace agreements to lead to an increase in the quality of peace. Peace agreements, in many ways, should be seen as tools for women’s movements and international actors to codify their goals. Without such legal assurances within agreements, the calls of women’s groups and international actors will remain talk rather than reality.

first to recognize the potential for endogenous effects. While women actively pressured conflict actors to engage issues of gender, women were left marginalized from the peace process. Would women's rights have improved in Burundi in the absence of a gender-specific peace agreement? Would a vibrant women's movement be sufficient to spur change? I argue that women's presence in civil society or in negotiations cannot be taken as a sign that improvements in women's rights following conflict are inevitable. A vibrant women's movement is not sufficient to lead to legal changes for women's status in society. The evidence from Burundi suggests the utility in codifying women's rights into a legal document. While the male negotiators still viewed women as marginal and lacking political power, the presence of women's rights in the agreement tied leaders' hands to change. The effects of the peace agreement are directly evident in the post-conflict constitution for Burundi.

Assessing the causal process in Burundi illustrates the direct power of peace agreements and their provisions. At the same time, however, it highlights the complexities of the peace process. I do not want to assert that women's groups play no role; to the contrary, I would argue that this question warrants further systematic research. I will state, however, that the effects of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement are clear. The agreement was reaffirmed by the country's constitution, thus solidifying an improved status for women in the post-conflict society.

Conclusions

The post-conflict status of women is not perfect in Burundi. Although women hold a more visible and prominent role in the country's politics, they still experience exclusion from key decision making processes. For example, a female member of the legislature explained: "decisions in political parties are usually taken by a small group of men behind closed doors, and women have to wait for their male leadership to take its decisions before voting in the Parliament" (Falch, 2010, 14). The lesson to be taken, then, is that in many cases, peace agreements may generate legal changes but they do not always generate drastic or immediate changes in attitudes toward women. Hopefully, with continued political involvement and ongoing activity by women's groups, gender relations will further improve within Burundi. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement helped spur a shift in Burundian society; while women were not even granted a seat at the table in 2000, women now make up more than thirty percent of many national government positions. Even though women are still excluded from

leadership roles through explicit and implicit biases, their role is one that is much improved over pre-conflict realities. A peace agreement is not a magic bullet for exclusions, bias, and repression, but the case of Burundi also illustrates that the positive effects of the peace agreement cannot be brushed aside or diminished.

Positive Externalities: Liberian Women Empowered to Push for Change

Africa's first republic, Liberia has been a free and independent state since 1847. From its earliest years, however, the political, social, and economic structures of the country were marked by marginalization and exclusion. Americo-Liberians, a group of freed American slaves and free-born blacks from the United States, made up a small (approximately five percent of the population) but elite group who governed the country. The indigenous populations were heavily marginalized and excluded from political and economic life in the state (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2016). Tensions came to a head in the 1970s as economic struggles struck the country. In 1980, a coup led by Samuel Doe overthrew the minority-ruled government, with Doe declaring a desire to liberate the masses from poverty. Doe's time in power did little, however, to improve the lives of indigenous Liberians; indeed, Doe continued to exploit the natural resources of the country and funnel resources to the elites (Paris, 2004).

In 1989, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), under command of Charles Taylor, entered into Liberia to oust Doe from power. By 1990, rebel forces had taken Monrovia and killed Doe. The fighting, however, would continue until 1995, with numerous rebel groups fighting across the country to gain control of national power and resources. In 1996, warring factions signed the Abuja II Peace Agreement, paving the way for elections and new leadership within Liberia. The years following the resolution of this first conflict episode were unstable and uncertain; Charles Taylor was elected president, but low-levels of fighting continued throughout the country. During this time, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) began mobilizing. In 2000, full-scale war had once again erupted between LURD and the forces of Charles Taylor's government (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2016). The Liberian civil wars are ones which truly affected all members of society. In the first episode of conflict alone, from 1990 to 1997, an estimated ten percent of the country's pre-war population of 2.5 million people died, one-third became refugees, and the vast majority of others were displaced (Paris, 2004).

What was the role and status of Liberian women prior to and during the country's civil war? Fuest (2008) writes that Liberian women were subjected to traditional gender roles of child rearing, domestic work, and food production. As a patriarchal and conservative society, Liberian women took a secondary role to men in all dimensions of life (Aning, 1998). Women experienced limited access to public political roles, although on the local level women were able to exert greater voice as female chiefs and elders. While women did hold ministerial positions under the rule of President Tolbert (1971-1980), the status of their political rights remained quite restricted in practice at the start of the country's civil war (Fuest, 2008). According to Cingranelli, Richards and Clay (2014), Liberia earned a score of one for women's political rights in 1989, a score which represents a country in which political equality is guaranteed by law but severely limited in practice.

In spite of Liberian women's limited political role in the years leading up to conflict, the Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET) began to mobilize women as agents for peace as early as 1991 (Bekoe and Parajon, 2007). Women's peace efforts intensified following the resumption of civil war in Liberia in 2000. Together with the Mano River Women's Peace Network and other women's groups, WIPNET pushed for peace during negotiations in Accra, Ghana (UN Women, 2012). Like the case of Burundi, women's groups were excluded from the negotiating table and instead given the status of permanent observers to the peace process. Still marginalized in Liberian society, then, women had a ways to go before achieving equality of political opportunity in Liberia. In what follows, I discuss the extent to which the peace agreements in Liberia contained provisions for women's rights. I go on to address whether or not these provisions contributed to improvements in women's post-conflict rights, and if so, how.

Women's Rights Within Liberian Peace Agreements

Provisions for women's rights made an appearance in both of Liberia's comprehensive peace agreements, the Abuja II Peace Agreement in 1996 as well as the Accra Peace Agreement in 2003. The first major (and moderately "successful") peace agreement to end conflict was signed in 1996. This agreement, the Abuja II Peace Agreement – in conjunction with its predecessor, the first Abuja Agreement – laid forth plans for a transitional government. The Abuja II Peace Agreement guaranteed a woman,

Ruth Perry, the position of Chairwoman of the Transitional Council.¹³ While the agreement does not extend rights to women as a whole, it does represent a slight shift in gender relations. By promising the role of Chairwoman of the Transitional Council to Ruth Perry, who would go on to head the transitional government until Charles Taylor's election in 1997, the agreement signals that women have the capacity to be influential political leaders. At the same time, the agreement systematically ignores wider calls for a more inclusive political system.

The Accra Agreement, which was signed in 2003, filled many of the gaps that were present in the earlier peace agreements in Liberia. The agreement reaffirmed the need for a transitional power sharing government, it restructured the security forces in Liberia, and contained specific provisions to ensure that former warring factions would have a role in the transitional government. Beyond inclusion of former warring parties, the agreement also reserved spots in the transitional government for civil society groups and special interest groups. Within the agreement, women are guaranteed spots in a Governance Reform Commission as well as on the National Elections Commission and the National Transitional Legislative Assembly. Specifically, the Accra Peace Agreement includes the following provisions:

The NTGL, in formulating and implementing programs for national rehabilitation, reconstruction and development, for the moral, social and physical reconstruction of Liberia in the post-conflict period, shall ensure that the needs and potentials of the war victims are taken into account and that gender balance is maintained in apportioning responsibilities for program implementation (Article XXXI)

Under the NTGL, all new judicial appointments shall be made by the Chairman of the NTGL and approved by the NTLA. Nominations for such judicial appointments shall be based on a shortlist of candidates for each position recommended by the National Bar Association, including the female lawyers (Article XXVII)

The [Governance Reform] Commission shall be established as an independent Commission with seven (7) permanent members appointed by the Chairman and confirmed by the

¹³It is important to note, however, the shortcomings in this agreement. Charles Call, for example, notes that this agreement ultimately failed the Liberian people insofar as it did not sufficiently extend political inclusion to all politically relevant actors (Call, 2012). Charles Taylor was able to consolidate power amongst his own elites, leading to de facto exclusion of other groups.

NTLA, from a list provided by civil society organizations. It shall have a chairperson who must be from civil society. Its membership shall include women. (Article XVI)

While not nearly as extensive as those rights provided in the case of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, the Accra Peace Agreement nonetheless makes efforts to build a post-conflict political system that is more gender-balanced. Moreover, the agreement went much further than previous agreements in Liberia. Even if references to women's involvement in the political process are "thin" or limited, I argue that they will still hold implications for the post-conflict quality of peace. In the following section, I discuss the extent to which both the Abuja II Peace Agreement and the Accra Peace Agreement led to changes in women's post-conflict political rights.

Effects of the Accra Peace Agreement

Did either of the aforementioned peace agreements generate positive shifts for the status of women in Liberia? The Abuja II Peace Agreement was quite limited in its extension of rights to women; indeed, the agreement is better characterized as extending rights to *a woman* rather than to women as a whole. As noted previously, however, by placing a woman in a prominent governmental position, the peace agreement does lay the foundation for changing perceptions of and roles for women. Following its signing, the Abuja II Agreement was implemented, and Ruth Perry became the first female African to serve as head of state. According to Cingranelli, Richards and Clay (2014), Liberia transitioned from a score of 1 prior to conflict to a score of 2 in the aftermath of the Abuja II Peace Agreement. News reports from the time period indicate that Perry did not seek the position (Rupert, 1997), and she revealed in an interview that "the proposition frightened [her] a bit" (Tostevin, 1996). Under pressure from women's groups, the rebel factions who chose Perry did so because she was politically credible, having served in Liberia's Senate in the 1980s, but also because she seemed to represent no danger to the warlords, since she had never been part of the conflict (Rupert, 1997). Regardless the circumstances surrounding her rise to power, Perry was committed to running the country with strength and pursuing efforts to consolidate peace. Adams (2008) characterizes Perry's appointment as "an important victory for women peace activists in Liberia" (476). One can argue, even, that her appointment helped to further empower and embolden the women's movement to continue their peace efforts in the subsequent conflict episode.

While the gendered context and effects of the Abuja II Peace Agreement were relatively limited, the




Figure 3.1: Women’s Civil Liberties, Liberia 1980-2014

Accra Peace Agreement went further in outlining the need for a gender balance in the state’s political institutions. To what extent did the Accra Peace Agreement continue the process of change in Liberian society? Did the agreement slow or reverse processes of gender empowerment, or did it serve as a springboard to further improve Liberian women’s rights? The initial evidence from post-2003 Liberia indicates that the Accra Peace Agreement, as hypothesized, spurred improvements in women’s post-conflict political rights. According to Cingranelli, Richards and Clay (2014), prior to the second conflict episode in Liberia, women’s rights stood at moderate levels; women were guaranteed political rights legally but their rights were restricted in practice. Following the signing of the Accra Peace Agreement in 2003, women’s rights improved to a score of 3.¹⁴ The political rights of women, then, shifted from legally respected but marginalized in practice to being respected both in law and in practice. Women began to engage more fully in national politics, and by 2005, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf became the first female elected head of state in the region.

Of course, one should be careful to infer from the election of a female head of state that Liberia

¹⁴Here, I must note that the shift was not immediate; the transition from 2 to 3 occurred after a couple of years, largely because the transitional period following the conflict took time. Once the legal-political structures outlined in the agreement took hold, government respect for women’s rights improved.

had overcome its gender biases and exclusions. To what extent did the post-conflict political rights of women reflect a “gender balance” as is called for in the Accra Peace Agreement? Like Burundi, many male leaders and former conflict actors in Liberia remained resistant to greater change. Adams (2008) writes that many key actors and legislators in the transitional government were opposed to electoral quotas for women. A proposed bill in December 2004 that would have implemented quotas failed to pass, and although a bill was finally approved in 2005, members of the Liberian National Elections Commission refused to enforce the new law. While on the one hand the majority of Liberian leaders seemed to not take calls for “gender balance” seriously, on the other hand women continued to use their voices to push for real change.

The transitional institutions following the signing of the Accra Peace Agreement left much to be desired, but the peace agreement did nevertheless generate an opening and a platform through which women’s groups could continue to push for greater rights and representation. Data from Coppedge et al. (2015) illustrates a sharp improvement in women’s broader civil liberties following the signing of the Accra Peace Agreement. Figure 3.1 presents levels of women’s civil liberties in Liberia from 1980 to 2014. The rating, ranging from 0 to 1, measures the extent to which women have the ability to make meaningful decisions in their lives; more specifically, the measure includes information on freedom of domestic movement, the right to private property, freedom from forced labor, and access to justice. Beyond political rights, then, there has been a clear improvement in women’s rights in comparison to pre-conflict levels. The following section goes on to assess the extent to which the peace agreements themselves spurred improvements in women’s standing.

Comments on Causality and Confounders

To explore and assess the validity of the causal processes at work in Liberia I consider the underlying assumption that it was the peace agreements – rather than some other variable – that spurred improvements in Liberian women’s political rights. In the case of both of the peace agreements that include gender provisions, I argue that one primary causal mechanism was at work: positive externalities. In other words, the peace agreements in Liberia generated positive externalities by further empowering the women’s movements in Liberia. At the same time, the peace agreements also offered legal legitimacy and political opening for women’s calls for equality. As Fuest (2008) writes, the war in Liberia

may, in spite of all of its hardships and horrors, have increased the legitimacy of women's claims to political participation. From an interview, Fuest (2008) learns: "the war has made an enabling atmosphere for women to strive for leadership" (202). As I have noted throughout this dissertation, war generates an opening for change by destabilizing and often destroying the status quo. This opening does not, however, guarantee change. Instead, the structures and systems of power that are generated in the post-conflict period are dependent on the legal-political framework developed during a country's peace processes. The civil war and the development of a strong women's movement created powerful initial conditions for improvements in women's post-conflict rights, but the peace agreements served as a step that codified efforts to establish a more gender balanced society.

With the opening for change created by the peace process and the gender-aware foundations generated within the Accra Peace Agreement, women made their voices heard in the post-2003 transition period. Women's groups used the language and provisions of the Accra Peace Agreement as justifications to push for greater political access. In the year following the signing of the Accra Peace Agreement, seeing little change being made, Liberian women called for a minimum 30 percent electoral quotas and for 30 percent representation for women in decision-making positions within parties (Dukuly, 2004). Women – aware of and empowered by the agreement's provisions for gender balance – sought to hold leaders of the transitional government accountable. Because leaders were not initially following through with the outlined reforms, women seized the opportunity to push for change. Women's groups and other political actors took advantage of both the opening for change as well as the legal framework outlined within the Accra Peace Agreement.

I have thus far argued that the Accra Peace Agreement, in particular, set in motion an improvement in women's political rights. Specifically, I argue that the agreement generated these improvements indirectly, by creating positive externalities that led empowered women to push for change. The agreement gave increased legitimacy to women's cause and made it more likely that political leaders would follow through on more gender-balanced policies.

Like the case of Burundi, however, the Liberian case presents the possibility of an alternative causal pathway: a vibrant women's movement. As with the case of Burundi, I recognize the importance of the women's movement in shaping the agenda for the peace processes. As early as 1993, women's groups became involved in mobilizing for peace in Liberia. Groups such as WIPNET and the Mano River

Women's Peace Network pushed conflict actors to the negotiating table and implored warring factions to take negotiations seriously.¹⁵ Although largely excluded from the table, Liberian women lobbied for the appointment of Ruth Perry as Chair(wo)man of the transitional government and they made sure that gender was on the agenda during the Accra peace negotiations. Hayner (2007) writes: "Every day, between 150 and 200 refugee women arrived at the hotel where the [Accra peace] talks were being held. Women activists also sought out family members of rebel leaders, including the mother of one, to attend the talks and make a personal plea to stop the shelling of Monrovia" (12). Indeed, without women's involvement, outside observers are skeptical that gender-specific provisions would have been included in the Accra Peace Agreement: "[The gender balance provisions] cannot be ascribed to inspiration from the warlords at the negotiating tables; they are to be credited to influential women's organizations lobbying to some extent successfully against odds of formal exclusion for female representation in the peace-building process" (Fuest, 2008, 214). At the same time, women's organizations were only granted the status of observers, a decision which reiterates conflict actors' perceptions of women as marginal and subordinate.

To what extent does the instrumental and influential role of Liberian women's movements undermine causal claims with respect to the peace agreements? As with the case of Burundi – and perhaps even more so – the case of Liberia illustrates the complexity of analyzing the peace process. While I cannot claim, based on this case illustration, that the gender-specific peace agreements were the sole cause of improvements in post-conflict political rights for women, I can assert that the peace agreements made a difference. The primary goal of the case analysis is to assess the plausibility of causal mechanisms. The evidence indicates that the women's movement in Liberia was empowered and legitimized by both the Abuja II Peace Agreement and the Accra Peace Agreement. The agreements, through indirect mechanisms, empowered women to continue to push for equality and to hold actors accountable. The peace agreements legitimized women's voices in a way that would not have happened in the absence of the peace agreement. In sum, the peace agreements served as a critical component in shifting gender discussions from rhetoric to reality.

¹⁵Aning (1998) writes that women were also instrumental as conflict actors as well, serving in intelligence and managerial roles. In spite of their roles both as mobilizers for war and for peace, women were given few official roles during the peace negotiations.

Conclusions

A number of lessons become evident by looking at the case of Liberia. First, the case illustrates the plausibility of one of the proposed indirect causal mechanisms: positive externalities. Although women's groups pushed for peace as early as 1993, their efforts redoubled following the Abuja II Peace Agreement and remained persistent even after the signing of the Accra Peace Agreement. The peace agreements, one of which named a woman head of the transitional government and the second of which called for gender balance in all aspects of political life, increased the legitimacy of women's calls for equality and set legal precedent for increased equality. Admittedly, I cannot completely rule out the alternative explanation that purports peace agreements to be scraps of paper and women's movements to be the driver of rights improvements. However, I can identify the implementation of gender-specific peace agreements as key moments in which the legal standing of women improved in Liberia.

Second, the case of Liberia reaffirms the positive role that women's movements play throughout peace processes. By arguing that peace agreements spur changes in women's rights, I am not arguing that international and domestic actors should ignore the capacity of grassroots women's organizations. Indeed, the case of Liberia offers indication that the interaction of a vibrant women's movement alongside gender-specific peace agreements leads to success. At the same time, I emphasize the importance that the legal codification of women's rights holds. The cases of Uganda and Papua New Guinea, for example, both had vibrant women's movements at many different levels¹⁶; because women's rights were not codified in the agreements, however, women's rights remained stagnant in those societies. Peace agreements set forth a new legal-political framework for the post-conflict period; by including women's rights in that framework, a peace agreement legitimizes women as stakeholders.

Third, the Liberian case contrasts significantly from Burundi in the language of the peace agreements. In contrast to the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi which is quite extensive and detailed in its provisions for women's rights, the Abuja II Peace Agreement and the Accra Peace Agreement are "thin" or superficial in nature. Nonetheless, these two Liberian peace agreements set in motion or amplified processes of change. As such, policymakers and negotiators should keep in mind that even small provisions have potential to make a difference. While more detailed frameworks

¹⁶See: <http://www.c-r.org/accord/women-and-peacebuilding-insight>

for women's rights are ideal for both legal and normative reasons, all efforts should be made to include some references to women's rights. By knowing their rights are included within an agreement, women's groups will be empowered to push for change and be more legitimized in holding actors accountable.

Norms Shifts: Changing Perceptions of Women in South Africa

The Dutch settled the territory that would become South Africa in 1652. The British, however, began claiming parts of the territory in 1806 and throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, expanded their control of South Africa. The Union of South Africa was created in 1910; by 1961, however, the Republic of South Africa gained independence and fully separated itself from the United Kingdom (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2016). Both during and following colonial rule, South Africa was marked by widespread exclusion and structural violence along racial and cultural lines. The "apartheid" regime, which was formally created in 1948, created an "oligarchic society organized around extreme social, economic, and political inequality enshrined in a tripartite racial structure that privileged the White minority at the expense of the black majority" (Waylen, 2007, 526). The National Party (NP) led a Whites-only parliament in which any opposition was severely restricted.

Extreme political disenfranchisement coupled with economic and social exclusion led to the creation of opposition groups, particularly amongst the country's black population. Groups such as the African National Congress (ANC) initially led campaigns of civil disobedience but soon faced violent repression from South Africa's government. The ongoing patterns of conflict and violence in the country thus escalated into a war lasting from 1981 to 1988. In the early 1990s, the government under the NP began to negotiate with the ANC for a transition to a democratic government; the transitional period, however, was marked by large-scale violence as groups and political parties clashed for power in the transitional period. The transition to democratic rule in South Africa finally occurred with the accession to power of the ANC in 1994 (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2016).

To assess the extent to which women were – or were not – included in the political, economic, and social life of the South African state, Waylen (2007) writes that one must consider the racial divisions in the country. Under apartheid, white women were given the right to vote but were nonetheless discriminated against in comparison to the status of white men. Within the black majority, women were subject to customary law, which "technically denied them adult status" (Waylen, 2007, 526). Kadalie (1995)

notes that majority of black women were unemployed and lived in impoverished rural areas, whereas white women had greater access to jobs and lived in more developed urban areas. Like women in the other cases considered in this analysis, however, South African women began mobilizing early on to challenge inequalities and to combat increasing violence in their country.

Women from all races organized to fight apartheid; indeed, their influence endured throughout the country's transition to democracy. Women were permitted as full members of the ANC beginning in 1943 and went on to form the ANC Women's League (ANCWL) (Geisler, 2000). Women were also integrated into the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the armed wing of the ANC. Although women comprised 20 percent of the MK's ranks by 1989, they were never granted access to commanding or leading roles. Through its continued efforts, the ANCWL facilitated the formation of the Women's National Coalition (WNC). Formed in April 1992, the WNC included 92 national organizations ranging from political parties, rural organizations, and religious and professional groups. Geisler (2000) notes that the WNC helped to inform the Bill of Rights and served as an inspiration for women's movements in countries across the region. While women's groups had thus made strides in the period leading up to the peace agreements, their rights were still restricted both in law and in practice (Cingranelli, Richards and Clay, 2014). As such, the peace process was an opening in which groups were able to enumerate and consolidate rights for women.

Women's Rights Within the Interim Constitution

A series of peace agreements to end the outstanding conflict and violence in South Africa commenced with the signing of the Groote Schuur Minute on May 4, 1990 (Högbladh, 2011). As a peace process agreement, the Groote Schuur Minute set in motion a series of negotiations which would eventually include the signing of the Pretoria Minute, the CODESA Declaration of Intent, the Record of Understanding, and finally, the Interim Constitution which was signed at the end of 1993. Of the preceding peace agreements, both the CODESA Declaration of Intent and the Interim Constitution contained specific provisions for women's rights.

The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) brought together 238 delegates from 19 political parties alongside nearly 1,000 international observers. Of those 238 delegates, women comprised approximately five percent of the group (Barnes and De Klerk, 2002). Barnes and De Klerk

(2002) note that Helen Suzman, a parliamentary “veteran,” pointed out the gender imbalance by drawing the spotlight to “the parallels between gender discrimination and racism” (27). As a result, parties began to make a stronger effort to increase gender representation. On paper, the CODESA Declaration of Intent began the process of reshaping South Africa into a state that would be free from both racial and gender-based discrimination. The agreement, which was signed on December 20, 1991, contains the following:

To bring about an undivided South Africa with one nation sharing a common citizenship, patriotism and loyalty, pursuing amidst our diversity, freedom, equality and security for all irrespective of race, color, sex or creed; a country free from apartheid or any other form of discrimination or domination.

To set in motion the process of drawing up and establishing a constitution that will ensure, inter alia: (a) that South Africa will be a united, democratic, non-racial and non-sexist state...

As the preceding text makes clear, the language to extend rights to women is thin within the CODESA agreement. Instead of extending specific rights and protections to women, the CODESA Declaration of Intent functioned to set the agenda for a new South African state which would be non-sexist and non-discriminatory. By setting the agenda, however, this first gender-sensitive peace agreement laid a foundation for more specific provisions in following agreements. Although the CODESA talks collapsed by June 1992, gender equality had effectively been established as a fundamental component of a new South African state.

The next agreement to contain provisions for women’s rights in South Africa was the Interim Constitution, which was signed on November 18, 1993. A Multiparty Negotiating Process (MPNP), attended by 208 delegates from 26 political groups, worked to resolve the country’s incompatibilities and draft a plan for a transition to democratic governance. More fully than the CODESA negotiations, the Interim Constitution addressed the need to extend and protect women’s rights. Specifically, the Interim Constitution states:

No person shall be unfairly discriminated against, directly or indirectly, and, without derogating from the generality of this provision, on one or more of the following grounds in

particular: race, gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture or language (Chapter 3, Section 8.2).

(1) There shall be a Commission on Gender Equality, which shall consist of a chairperson and such number of members as may be determined by an Act of Parliament; (2) The Commission shall consist of persons who are fit and proper for appointment, South African citizens and broadly representative of the South African community; (3) The object of the Commission shall be to promote gender equality and to advise and to make recommendation to Parliament or any other legislature with regard to any laws or proposed legislation which affects gender equality and the status of women (Chapter 8, Section 119.1-3)

The Interim Constitution thus used a rhetoric which tied actors' hands to change and signaled a shift in the role of women in South African society. As a quasi-constitutional document, the Interim Constitution demonstrated the intent of conflict actors and political parties to set up a gender-inclusive political system following the post-conflict period.

Effects of the South Africa's Peace Agreements

To what extent did the gender-specific peace agreements in South Africa work to inspire change in the country's gender relations? A comparison of women's rights prior to the conflict in South Africa to rights levels following the signing of the peace agreements signals a notable shift. According to Cingranelli, Richards and Clay (2014), women's pre-conflict rights in South Africa were virtually non-existent. In the early 1980s, CIRI codes women's political rights as zero: restricted by both law and practice. By 1994, however, the year following the signing of the Interim Constitution, women's political rights had improved such that they received a score of 2. In 1996, with the shift from the Interim Constitution to the country's new constitution, government respect for women's political rights further improved to a score of 3, a score which is representative of a situation in which rights are protected by law and respected in practice (Cingranelli, Richards and Clay, 2014). The progression of women's rights from fully restricted to widely respected demonstrates the immense changes that can be ushered in during periods of civil war and post-conflict transition. As I have already noted, however, such improvements in women's rights were not inevitable. Instead, they required the efforts of many actors and

the legal protections codified by the country's peace agreements.

Qualitative accounts of women's rights in South Africa also offer support that women's rights improved vastly in the years following the signing of the peace agreements. Waylen (2007) writes: "Women's descriptive and substantive representation were improved by the adoption of a new constitution with gender equality enshrined within it, the establishment of a package of state women's machineries (SWMs)... and policy outcomes such as more progressive laws on domestic violence and reproductive rights" (522).¹⁷ Following the country's 1994 elections, 111 women entered into parliament (Geisler, 2000). Seidman (1999) describes the post-conflict transitional period as one in which perceptions of gender equality were redefined and one which led to the establishment of more equal political institutions.

Women's rights undoubtedly improved in the post-conflict period. Data from Coppedge et al. (2015) indicates that improvements in women's rights moved beyond political participation and political rights. Figure 3.2 shows the progression of women's civil liberties in South Africa over the time period, 1980-2014. Women's civil liberties – a function of movement rights, property rights, labor rights, and access to justice – experienced a drastic increase around 1993. Thus, women not only gained political voice but also gained broader access to civil liberties. As the preceding accounts suggest, women experienced a marked improvement in rights and protections in the aftermath of the Interim Constitution and the preceding peace processes. In the following section, I assess the plausibility of identifying the country's gender-specific peace agreements as a driving causal force behind these improvements in women's rights and opportunities.

An Analysis of Causality and Alternative Explanations

I argue that the South African case illustrates the plausibility of two key mechanisms: tying hands (direct mechanism) and norms shifts (indirect mechanism). Through their calls for a non-sexist and non-discriminatory state, gender protections, and the creation of a Commission on Gender Equality, both the CODESA Declaration of Intent and the Interim Constitution facilitated a society that was more open and inclusive for women. Because I have already discussed the plausibility of the direct mechanism

¹⁷Waylen (2007) contrasts this to cases in Latin America and Central Europe where constitutions remained unchanged (i.e. the legal framework for the state remained the same).




Figure 3.2: Women’s Civil Liberties in South Africa, 1980-2014

with the case of Burundi, I will only engage this point here briefly. I then turn to data from the World Values Survey to illustrate how South Africa’s gender-specific agreements spurred major shifts in norms and perceptions of women’s roles.

With respect to the direct mechanism, tying hands, I look for evidence of peace agreements’ provisions entering into the laws of the post-conflict society. As Waylen (2007) notes, the period following the signing of the Interim Constitution, in particular, saw a the creation of a network of policies and laws to support women’s rights. Perhaps most importantly, the language and gendered goals of the Interim Constitution directly entered into a post-conflict Constitution that was considered exceptional in its protections for women’s rights (Waylen, 2007). For example, the Commission on Gender Equality, which was enumerated in Chapter 8, Section 119 of the Interim Constitution was then institutionalized by Act 39 in 1996. The body still functions today to monitor government policies and practices, investigate inequality in the private and public sector, and monitor compliance with international conventions, among other duties.¹⁸

¹⁸See the webpage of the Commission for Gender Equality: <http://cge.org.za/functions/>.

Beyond leading to direct policy changes in the post-conflict period, the South African case illustrates the role peace agreements can play in altering the gender norms and perceptions in society. In brief, the gender-specific peace agreements changed how women's roles were perceived in South African society. In this vein, Seidman (1999) asserts that the explicitly gendered democratization process and the gendered nature of the interim constitution, in particular, "affected the character of democracy and citizenship, with important implications for men and women's participation in the public arena" (289). Through gender-specific language and by carving a clear role for women in the political, social, and economic life of the state, the peace agreements changed the realm of possibilities for women. Additionally, the peace agreements changed the realm of what was seen as possible for women by society at large. When society perceives women to be legitimate and equal members, then the overall quality of peace will improve as well.

To better assess the extent to which perceptions of women truly changed in South African society, I turn to the World Values Survey (World Values Survey, 2014*a,b*). In both 1990 and 1996, the survey asked a random sample of South Africans the following question: "Do you agree or disagree with the following statement?: When jobs are scarce men should have more right to a job than women."¹⁹ See Figures 3.3 and 3.4 for a summary of responses. In 1990, shown in Figure 3.3, close to 45 percent of all respondents agreed that men should be favored for jobs in tough economic times. Only 20 percent of respondents disagreed. At the most basic level, such responses represent a society in which women's economic role is seen as subordinate. Indeed, the responses represent a society in which women are seen as secondary or marginal members. By 1996, however, following the signing of a series of gender-sensitive agreements, the responses given by South Africans are markedly different. As Figure 3.4 shows, in 1996 only 35 percent of respondents agreed with the same statement and almost 50 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement. Therefore, by 1996, almost half of respondents held the view that men should not be favored for employment positions. Such a shift signals that the perceptions of women's roles had changed. Whereas women were widely seen as subordinate to men in 1990, the 1996 survey represents a society in which women were seen to be deserving of more equal roles.

¹⁹In 1990, the question was asked to 2,736 people of which 48.1 percent (1,316) were male, 51.9 percent (1,420) were female, 63.9 percent (1,749) were black, 21.5 percent (590) were white, and 14.5 percent (417) identified as a difference ethnicity. In 1996, the question was asked to 2,935 individuals of which 47.6 percent (1,398) were male, 52.4 percent (1,537) were female, 73.3 percent (2,151) were black, 15.8 percent (463) were white, 8.4 percent (245) were colored, and 2.6 percent (75) were Indian.

Poll: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.




Figure 3.3: Gender Perceptions in South Africa, 1990




Figure 3.4: Gender Perceptions in South Africa, 1996

As with the previous cases, I assert that the South African case illustrates the plausibility of the proposed causal mechanisms. The peace agreements in South Africa both tied actors' hands to policy changes and spurred a norms shift with respect to gender roles. Nevertheless, I recognize the presence of potential confounding variables. Similar to the other cases included in this analysis, South Africa was home to a vibrant women's movement. The South African case, however, is unique in that women actually held a fairly large number of seats at the negotiating table.²⁰ Barnes and De Klerk (2002) write that during the MPNP, which was tasked at drafting the Interim Constitution, the Negotiating Council was composed of two delegates from each of the 26 parties involved. At least one of each set of delegates was required to be a woman.

Although women's movements and female delegates were active particularly in the crafting of the Interim Constitution, their presence as serious political actors was doubted by many. Geisler (2000) offers an overview of headlines from the media, including the following examples:

“Women do have a place in the struggle – it's behind typewriters”

“Women's League: Giving a voice to the powerless, mute and exploited or... the *koeksuster tannies* of the ANC?”²¹

At the same time, the ANC – the party that would go on to rule in the post-transition period – was quite supportive of the women's agenda. According to Waylen (2007), “the nature of the ANC as a left-wing party committed to equality based on equal citizenship for all made it easier for feminists within it to get gender issues incorporated into ANC policy and get ANC support within negotiations, but not without some struggles” (532). The strength and persistence of the women's movement had undoubted implications for the agenda, but as I note in the following paragraph, women's progress should not be treated as inevitable or purely as a byproduct of women's involvement in peace processes.

To what extent can I attribute women's rights improvements after conflict to the peace agreement versus the women's movement? I argue that the peace agreements in South Africa certainly were shaped by persistent pressure by women's groups, but I also take the stance that women's mobilization on its

²⁰Currently, however, the case of South Africa's coding of female signatories within my own dataset is missing, because the peace agreements do not indicate names of the signatories. Greater research must be done to more accurately know who was at the table, in what capacity were they at the table, and to what extent were their voices respected or marginalized.

²¹*Koeksuster tannies* seems to translate roughly to a demeaning term for older women.

own does not guarantee that women's rights would improve more broadly in South African society (Waylen, 2007). Waylen (2007) indicates that "the constitution acted as an important enabling framework in a number of areas contributing to substantial legal changes in women's civil and political rights" (538). The codification of women's rights within the country's peace agreements legitimized an agenda of gender equality, making it more likely that predominantly male politicians would keep their word and making it more likely that women would be perceived as equal actors within society. Geisler (2000) provides a striking comparison to drive home this point. She writes of the "missed opportunity" of the transitional period in Zimbabwe; despite women's involvement in the Zimbabwean transitional period, women experienced little improvement because their goals were not addressed or codified during that time. As will be shown with the Angolan case as well, a strong network of women's groups are insufficient to secure gains if women's rights are left out of key transitional documents, peace agreements.²²

Conclusions

The above analysis offers further support for the theory presented in the second chapter of this dissertation. When peace agreements include provisions for women's rights, they set in motion processes of change for gender relations within society. In the South African case, the CODESA Declaration of Intent and the Interim Constitution directly shaped the nature of post-conflict laws and contributed to changing perceptions towards women. Survey data from South Africa reveals strong shifts in gender perceptions; I argue that gender empowerment during the peace process demonstrated that women were influential and worthy of equal treatment. Taken together with the cases of Burundi and Liberia, the three cases illustrate the plausibility of both the direct and indirect causal linkages between gender-specific peace agreements and women's post-conflict rights.

Although the above illustration supports the plausibility of the causal mechanisms, the case of South Africa also raises the question of alternative explanations. In particular, it leads me to question whether post-conflict improvements in women's rights are a result of strong women's movements or a result of the language within peace agreements. Like Burundi and Liberia, women mobilized both to improve

²²In further extensions of this research, I also plan to assess the role of international pressure or spotlight on shaping gender provisions within agreements. South Africa – after years of international condemnation under apartheid – was particularly scrutinized during the transitional period. To what extent, then, did pressure by international actors such as the UN drive both the strength of women's movements and the gendered nature of the peace agreements?

their status and to push for peace. Unlike those cases, South African women were granted a large number of seats at the negotiating table, particularly in the negotiations for the Interim Constitution. Qualitative accounts from South Africa, however, indicate that their presence may not have been sufficient to secure improvements in women's rights. The gender provisions within the peace agreements – which were themselves a function of domestic women's pressure, international pressure, a reaction to apartheid, and the anti-sexism stance of the ANC – legitimized calls for women's empowerment. Beyond legitimization, the peace agreements also ensured that anti-sexist rhetoric translated into tangible gains. As with the other cases, then, I argue that gender-specific peace agreements are a necessary step to secure tangible improvements in women's rights. In the following section, I present the case of Angola, a case that supports the assertion that a women's movement is insufficient to secure improvements in women's rights following conflict. Even though Angola had women actively involved in all stages of the conflict, the peace agreements did not adopt gender-specific language and thus did not set in motion processes of change.

Missing a Seat at the Table: Women's Exclusion in Angola

Like the cases of Burundi and South Africa, Angola has a long colonial history, having been colonized by the Portuguese. Although they arrived as traders and explorers as early as 1483, the Portuguese colonial regime was not consolidated until the early 20th century. The Portuguese pursued policies of racial and cultural discrimination which in turn exacerbated social tensions and mistrust. After the Portuguese colonial regime led a violent and bloody repression of a protest in the northern part of the country, a strong and more organized wave of nationalism swept across Angola (Meijer and Birmingham, 2004). Beginning in 1961, anti-colonial sentiment led to the creation of several, rival pro-independence groups: the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2016). Although war ensued between the Angolan nationalist groups and the Portuguese colonial regime, little progress toward an independent Angolan state was made until a military coup ended the Salazar regime in Portugal and in turn ended the country's colonial ambitions (Pearce, 2012; Meijer and Birmingham, 2004).

Angola officially gained its independence in 1975, however the country was already deeply entrenched in a brutal civil war. The MPLA, a Marxist-inspired group, installed Agostinho Neto as Angola's first president and formed a one-party regime (Meijer and Birmingham, 2004). From the very beginning, however, the new government in Angola faced challenges from the FNLA as well as UNITA. Like many other colonial societies, Portuguese colonial rule generated the creation of a small elite who enjoyed elevated rights at the expense of the vast majority of Angolans. Throughout the 1970s, rule in Angola was marked by corruption and repression. In 1979, José Eduardo dos Santos became the country's president following the death of Neto. By the late 1980s, the Angolan conflict had once again reached a stalemate and by 1991, the MPLA-dominated government and UNITA signed the Bicesse Accords (Pearce, 2012). Following the peace agreement, the international community organized elections. When UNITA's Jonas Savimbi failed to gain power, he rejected the election results (in which dos Santos won) and returned the country to war. The following war was brutal and despite numerous peace efforts including the Lusaka Protocol in 1994, Savimbi was unwilling to commit to a military settlement. Fighting thus continued until the Luena Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 2002.

In spite of the enduring legacy of colonial repression and civil war violence, women in Angola made great efforts to mobilize politically. The state-run apparatus of the MPLA held many party-based opportunities for women's participation in party activities (Pearce, 2012). In 1962, in fact, the Organization of Angolan Women (OMA) was established as the women's wing of the MPLA; OMA played an active and crucial role in the guerrilla forces throughout the country's conflicts. It is also worth pointing out that OMA was not a marginal group. Estimates indicate that the group had as many as 1.8 million registered members by 1983 (Ducados, 2004). In 1973, the Independent League for Angolan Women (LIMA) was created as the women's wing of UNITA. As members of LIMA, women were trained as political activists, tasked with mobilizing youth to join the armed conflict, and responsible for transporting materials to men on the front lines (Ducados, 2004).

Although data is limited, human rights data collected by Cingranelli, Richards and Clay (2014) indicates that Angolan women's political rights were legally protected, although restricted somewhat in practice. CIRI's score of two for Angola, however, indicates a relatively open political environment for women. According to Ducados (2004), OMA fought hard and succeeded in introducing and implementing extensive social rights for women including right to consensual marriage and free family

planning. The conditions, then, should have been conducive and open for women's voices to be heard and for women's rights to be further improved through the country's peace processes. Because women's rights were not codified in the peace agreements, however, Angolan women's rights remained stagnant. The legal-political framework for the post-conflict state excluded any reference to women, and as such, women's rights remained marginalized.

Comments on Gender within Angolan Peace Efforts

Angola saw a series of peace agreements beginning with the Bicesse Agreement in 1991, the Lusaka Protocol in 1994, and the Memorandum of Understanding which finally put an end to the conflict in 2002. Unlike the peace agreements of Burundi, Liberia, and South Africa, however, women's rights were excluded from the texts of the agreements. Instead, the agreements remained myopically focused on military issues, leaving aside many societal questions that would be foundational for a higher quality peace. For example, the text of the Lusaka Protocol remained focused on reintegrating UNITA into the political life of the state. The agreement, specifically, dedicated two sections to "military issues," another to the police, one to national reconciliation and one to the completion of the electoral process. While the agreement speaks of tolerance, coexistence, and respect, no explicit reference is made to women. The Lusaka Protocol ultimately failed to end Angola's conflict.

With the death of UNITA's Jonas Savimbi in 2002, the warring parties agreed to the Luena Memorandum of Understanding. Like the Lusaka Protocol, the Memorandum of Understanding calls for the decentralization of power, the reintegration of UNITA into the legislature and other bodies of government, and free and fair elections. Once again, the peace agreement is focused on military and security issues at the expense of steps toward inclusion. While military and security incompatibilities must undoubtedly be resolved to end a civil war, the agreement does little to address the blatant divisions and inequalities in Angolan society as a whole. Women, who were actively involved in the conflict in groups such as LIMA and OMA, were excluded from the peace process, and the resulting peace agreements are void of gender-specific language.

Effects of the Peace Agreements

The singular focus on a military solution to the conflict had detrimental effects on Angolan society more broadly. While the war stopped and thus a negative peace took hold, a step that cannot be diminished, the peace agreement was crafted in ways that did not consider more positive dimensions of peace. By leaving out women's rights, the peace agreement did not set in motion processes of change. The agreement did not tie conflict actors' hands to gender equality, did not generate positive externalities or empowerment, nor did it spur a shift in gender norms. Donald Steinberg, deputy president for policy of the International Crisis Group cites Angola as a cautionary tale of what happens when women are excluded from the peace process. He goes as far as saying that "a peace agreement that fails to address gender is, in itself, discriminatory against women – and less likely to be successful" (Ackerman, 2009, 87). Moreover, Ackerman (2009) states that peace agreements and peace processes that exclude women create situations in which "issues like internal displacement, sexual violence, government abuse, and the rebuilding of social services are not at the forefront of the discussion, or not discussed at all" (87). Excluding women not only inhibits improvements in gender equality, but may also have detrimental effects for other aspects of states' political, social, and economic structures.

Considering Alternative Explanations

Angola, as a case illustration, reveals the missed opportunity, so to speak, that occurs when peace agreements do not make reference to women's rights. While the agreements such as the Lusaka Protocol and the Luena Memorandum of Understanding did not necessarily make life worse for women, they failed to make the most out of changing legal, political, and normative frameworks. Rather than redefining the role of women in Angolan society to better reflect the country's vibrant women's movements, the agreements focused on the most proximate issues to the conflict. The case of Angola cannot prove that peace agreements cause improvements in women's rights, but it can illustrate that absent the spark or without the motivation, women's rights tend not to change.

The case of Angola is particularly striking for the ways in which it also speaks to the primary competing explanation for improvements in women's rights. In the presentation of the causal processes in Burundi, Liberia, and South Africa, the causal processes were complicated by the presence of strong

women's movements. In Angola, like the three aforementioned cases, however, women's movements were both active and influential. According to Ducados (2004), Angolan women's groups were active politically, "in constant negotiation with the political leadership, lobbying for their concerns to be taken seriously by policy-makers and government officials. In the past, OMA played a decisive role as a policy-driven outfit dedicated to fighting for the improvement of women's legal status as well as their economic empowerment, and above all, the integration of women's issues into mainstream policies" (60). As noted above, both LIMA and OMA were heavily involved in mobilization and coordination during the conflict. In many ways, their structures were more entrenched and longer-lived than the women's movements in either Liberia or Burundi.

To what extent were women involved in the peace process? Like Burundi and Liberia, women were largely excluded during peace negotiations and peace building. At the same time, women's groups did push for peace at several points in time. On the other hand, Ducados (2004) describes the women's peace movements as poorly organized and unable to represent women at the grassroots level. One could thus argue that women's rights have not improved in Angola because women have not worked hard enough or have not mobilized effectively enough. I assert, however, that the underlying likelihood for improvements in women's rights is similar across the cases of Burundi, Liberia, and Angola. In particular, the cases of Burundi and Angola have similarities; both cases started with fairly elevated levels of women's rights according to Cingranelli, Richards and Clay (2014) and both had strong women's movements that were then excluded from the peace process. While Burundian women seem to have mobilized more fully for peace, Angolan women had a wider network of roles and duties during the conflict. With a baseline openness to women's rights and women's movements, I would have expected both Angola and Burundi to be possible candidates for greater women's empowerment. Whereas in Burundi the peace agreement outlined a gender-aware post-conflict framework, the Angolan peace agreements ignored gender issues. By missing the opportunity to spur change, the Angolan peace agreements failed to do what the Burundian and Liberian peace agreements did: lay forth a framework for a higher quality peace.

Conclusions

In Angola, conflict actors and peacemakers failed to capitalize on the opening for change. Civil wars create the possibility to revise the status quo, but this change does not necessarily come about spontaneously. In those cases like Angola, where women's rights do not enter into the plan for the post-conflict state, gender relations are unlikely to change. Indeed, some even assert that the absence of gender provisions does harm to societies (Ackerman, 2009). The Angolan peace process – through its singularly-focused agreements – reiterated structural violence (Galtung, 1969). The agreements allowed inequalities to continue; instead of embracing and empowering the already well-organized women's groups, the agreement paid no attention to women's role in the political future of the state.

Conclusion: Lessons and Limits of the Case Illustrations

The cases of Burundi, Liberia, South Africa, and Angola illustrate the effects of gender-specific peace agreements. In the same vein as past works on peace agreements, the analysis herein indicates that peace agreements are more than just scraps of paper. Their contents matter for the extent to which a higher quality peace takes hold following conflict. As quasi-constitutional documents, peace agreements set forth a road map for the post-conflict state; indeed, their contents shape the legal, political, and normative conditions of post-conflict societies. As such, peace makers and conflict actors must be cognizant of the possibilities present during the peace process. Depending on the situation, they must seize the opportunity for change and craft a settlement that not only establishes a negative peace but also builds a more positive peace.

Burundi was a society in which women faced a number of discriminatory political, economic, and social practices. Their political representation was quite low in the pre-conflict period, but their rights were, at least, protected legally. In spite of a vibrant women's movement and moderate levels of women's rights prior to the peace process, women were not granted seats at the negotiating table.²³ The enumeration of extensive rights and protections within the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, however, contributed directly to changes in the country's post-conflict legal structures. Through these

²³Instead, the United Nations helped to facilitate a parallel women's peace conference which then made efforts to shape the agenda.

changes, Burundian women have had greater access to political power and have been able to hold more influence in post-conflict politics.

In Liberia, even more so than Burundi, women's political rights were restricted prior to the country's civil wars. The conflict and the subsequent transitional period thus provided an opening for changes to the discriminatory status quo. As in the other cases that I have included in this analysis, Liberian women mobilized early on as both actors in the conflict and later, as agents of peace, but they remained marginalized from key negotiating roles. Nonetheless, the peace agreements in Liberia took on a gender-specific nature and had noticeable effects on the post-conflict quality of peace. Specifically, the Accra Agreement further empowered women and legitimized their voices. Women continued to push for change in the post-conflict period, and their calls were met, largely because the Accra Agreement granted legitimacy to their mission. The case of Liberia thus illustrates that peace agreements can indirectly change gender relations by empowering women's groups to hold leaders accountable.

South Africa illustrates the third and final causal mechanism identified in the second chapter of this dissertation. Women's rights were severely restricted both legally and in practice in the pre-conflict period. South Africa, on many levels, functioned as an extreme case of discrimination and exclusion on both racial and gender dimensions. In spite of severe rights restrictions, women began to mobilize to push for peace and for a voice in South Africa. Unlike the cases of Liberia and Burundi, women were granted a large number of seats at the negotiating table. However, qualitative accounts confirm that improvements in women's rights should not be treated as inevitable. Instead, the case of South Africa illustrates the power that comes from institutionalizing rights within peace agreements. The gender-specific nature of the Interim Constitution, in particular, tied actors' hands to extend rights to women and it spurred changes in gender norms.

The final case that I have included is that of Angola, a case in which women's rights remained absent from the country's peace agreements. As with the previous cases, Angolan women were actively involved in the country's conflict; perhaps more fully than the other cases, women were integrated into political parties and into the political life of the state. However, the peace processes took on a singular focus on military and security issues. Actors thus failed to capitalize on the opening for change. Although Angola should have been an "easy" case for improvements in women's rights, women's rights remained stagnant because gender was not part of the discussion during peace talks. By marginalizing

women during the peace process (by excluding them from the table and by excluding gender provisions from the peace agreements), Angola laid a framework for a post-conflict society in which women would be marginalized. The case of Angola illustrates that a vibrant women's movement is not sufficient to achieve change; without a legal framework to protect and extend rights for women, little will change in the post-conflict period.

With the four case illustrations included in this chapter, I have shown that the proposed causal mechanisms are plausible. At the same time, I have unveiled a number of questions that warrant further research. First and foremost, it will be necessary in future work to more fully explore the dynamics of women's movements, gendered peace processes, and subsequent gender relations in the post-conflict period. The cases included here demonstrate that women, depending on the case, hold roles as conflict actors, as advocates for peace, as negotiators, and/or as agents of change following conflict. At this point, however, very little cross-national data exists to encapsulate the full range of women's roles in times of war and peace. For example, I currently have data on female signatories to peace agreements, but this – as I have learned through the cases of Liberia, Burundi, and South Africa – is insufficient to proxy the strength and reach of women's movements. As such, future extensions of this work will collect more comprehensive data on how women are involved in civil wars and peace processes. With that information, I will be able to develop a more holistic understanding of how women's rights appear on the agenda of peace processes, under what conditions these rights are codified within agreements, and through which mechanisms agreements translate to tangible post-conflict gains.

CHAPTER 4

CONTEXT-SPECIFIC PEACE AGREEMENTS: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Peacemaking...to be truly successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people. Through agreements ending civil strife, these may include... advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.

– UN Sec. Gen. Boutros Boutros-Ghali¹

Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation shift from a focus on women's rights to another dimension of a quality peace: the political rights and inclusivity of societies more broadly. Former United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali emphasized, in 1992, that countries must focus on political rights and participation as they are on the road to the consolidation of peace following civil war. Inclusivity of opportunity, to Boutros-Ghali, is part of achieving higher levels of well-being among populations. To Galtung (1969), as well, violence may continue even when war concludes. He argues that violence continues when “the structure deprives [members of society] of chances to organize and bring their power to bear against the topdogs, as voting power, bargaining power, striking power, violent power – partly because they are atomized and disintegrated, partly because they are overawed by all the authority the topdogs present” (1969, 177). In systems, however, where citizens are free from government repression and able to exercise political power, peace takes hold. In a country like Côte d'Ivoire, widespread exclusion and violent repression has tarnished the country's post-conflict political processes. While the country is at peace, according to conventional or negative definitions of the term, government leaders regularly use repressive tactics to marginalize and subdue opposition parties and members of minority

¹From “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping,” 31 January 1992. See: <http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/report-un-secretary-general-agenda-peace/p23439>

groups. On the other hand, countries such as Liberia have been able to achieve more open and inclusive political systems. As a whole, most if not all groups have some access to political power in Liberia and feel relatively safe in their capacity to exercise political voice. What might account for the variation across these two cases? Why, in the case of Côte d'Ivoire, has exclusion and structural violence remained the dominant norm, while in Liberia most groups have gained access to political opportunity and inclusion?

Utilizing the framework laid forth throughout my research, I argue that the content of peace agreements shapes the extent to which societies move toward a higher quality peace. That is, I argue that peace agreements hold the potential to reduce levels of political repression and improve political opportunity for members of post-conflict societies. In particular, I expect peace agreements that are designed with context in mind – those peace agreements that are crafted to address the underlying causes of conflict – will change incentives for actors in post-conflict societies. In brief, repression is wielded as a tool of often insecure and uncertain leaders as they seek to consolidate their grips on power. Peace agreements may disincentivize repression by providing political power through alternative means and by reducing the insecurity groups feel with their hold on power.

This chapter of the dissertation proceeds as follows. First, I present a brief overview of the literature and place specific focus on the extent to which the contents of negotiated settlements influence the post-conflict period. Second, I outline the theoretical argument to explain how context-specific peace agreements create an environment that is conducive for a peace that is both politically inclusive and secure. I then present a quantitative analysis of my expectations using data on all civil war peace agreements from 1981 to 2011. My findings offer strong support for the hypothesized relationship. By addressing the causes of conflict, context-specific peace agreements lead to improvements in levels of repression and political rights following conflict. In sum, the findings offer further support for the assertion herein that the contents of peace agreements have meaningful implications for the quality of post-civil war peace.

Negotiated Settlements and the Resolution of Grievances

Within this section, I discuss some of the key findings on civil war peace agreements and their effects. Peace agreements are an increasingly common tool to resolve civil wars. Yet, with nearly half

of negotiated settlements failing to put a meaningful end to conflict, questions still persist regarding how to end civil war in durable or meaningful ways (Walter, 2002). To what extent, then, do peace agreements truly matter and if so, how? Fortna (2003) emphasizes that the contents of peace agreements shape the prospects for the success or failure of conflict resolution attempts. Walter (2002) frames the research on agreements in terms of credible commitment theory, writing that “even if combatants reach a mutually agreeable bargain they will not implement its terms unless credible guarantees on the terms of the treaty are included” (8). When an agreement includes specific mechanisms such as withdrawal of forces, third-party guarantees, and other dispute resolution procedures, the agreement will tend to lead to a more durable peace. We, as a field, thus know that peace agreements can put an end to war, but their long-term success depends on their contents and provisions.

As I highlight throughout my own research on peace agreements and the quality of post-conflict peace, few systematic empirical analyses have been done to explore the sources and foundations of a quality peace.² Instead, researchers have focused on theorizing and testing the sources of negotiated settlements as well as the extent to which these settlements generate durable peaceful outcomes as defined by the absence of war. In other words, a rich body of literature exists on the means through which civil war violence ends, but much less is known regarding how to consolidate peace. Below, I present an overview of extant work on the negotiated end to civil war. Most importantly, however, I emphasize the need to better understand the long-term implications of peace processes for the post-conflict environment.

Resolving Civil War Through Negotiated Settlement

Extant work on negotiated settlements and their effects has focused on identifying strategies to achieve a durable peace following civil war. At the most basic level, the findings fall within two categories. First, third party enforcement mechanisms such as peacekeepers or observer missions greatly increase the probability that a durable peace will take hold in the wake of conflict. Third parties reduce insecurity by assuaging problems of credible commitment and increasing the information available to disputants. Second, particular institutional designs lead to a more durable settlement; power sharing,

²As noted earlier, however, empirical work is moving towards a focus on civil war settlements and quality of peace indicators. Hartzell and Hoddie (2015), for example, investigate how power-sharing provisions within the settlement process influence the likelihood that democratic institutions take root. Wallensteen (2015) considers how war outcomes shape the quality of peace.

more specifically, reduces fear among former warring factions, decreases the probability of continued exclusion, and enhances parties' willingness to become stakeholders in the post-conflict period. I review these two lines of work briefly below. I also highlight, however, that one must be careful to make one-size-fits-all prescriptions to civil war resolution processes. Thus, I also consider the extent to which addressing the grievances specific to a conflict is an effective conflict management strategy.

Third party enforcement is, according to many studies, a necessary condition in generating more durable peaceful outcomes (see e.g. Stedman, 2002; Mattes, 2008; Mattes and Savun, 2009, 2010; Walter, 2002). Third parties are crucial in guiding disputants through the implementation phase of civil war resolution; they limit the possibility of cheating or deviations from the settlement's terms. Third-party security guarantees serve as a promise that the third party will intervene if one group decides to renege on a bargain (Walter, 2002). Third parties thus reduce fears and concerns about cheating. Mattes and Savun (2009) write that third party guarantees are a fear-reducing provision, and that they reduce both insecurities and uncertainties endemic in post-conflict societies. Within the framework of bargaining models of war, third parties manipulate the utility function of combatants such that peace becomes a more attractive option than continued fighting (Addison and Murshed, 2002, 499). Thus, third parties are able to mitigate commitment problems and incentivize actors to comply with negotiated settlements.

Of course, research has also indicated that third party enforcement is not a panacea for civil war resolution. Hartzell (1999), while recognizing that third-party actors may be able to reduce the likelihood of conflict recurrence, cautions: "in an age when the ability and willingness of third-party actors such as the United States to make long-term commitments are increasingly being called into question, reliance on such a strategy for stopping civil conflicts seems increasingly precarious" (20). Beyond the questionable political will of third parties mentioned by Hartzell (1999) and Fortna (2004a), Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) present a second reason to be skeptical of the ability of third parties to end civil war: third parties have highly variable capacities and powers. Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) write, then, that "there are genuine reasons to doubt that peacekeepers will have the omniscient powers that Walter ascribes them" (91). While not intended to dismiss the importance of third-party enforcement and verification mechanisms, the literature highlights the need to look beyond third parties to investigate other key pathways to durable civil war settlement.

A second key finding in works on the civil war resolution process focuses on domestic institutional

design. Research has shown that peace agreements that generate power-sharing institutions are more durable than those agreements without power sharing provisions (see e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, 2007; Walter, 2002; Mattes and Savun, 2009). Mattes and Savun (2009) emphasize that power-sharing provisions reduce fear amongst former disputants, because they ensure that no group single-handedly controls the government or security forces. Power-sharing institutions signal to disputants that they have a share of the pie and that they will not become victims of systematic discrimination, exclusion, or violence. The costs associated with power-sharing also serve to strengthen the commitments of former disputants. The very willingness of an agreement's signatories to endure and enforce the implementation of power-sharing institutions serves as a costly signal of peaceful intentions (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, 2007).

Taken together, the research on third-party guarantees and power-sharing institutions offers strong indication that the content of peace agreements matters for the civil war resolution process. A peace agreement can serve many functions ranging from reducing uncertainty and fear to increasing the likelihood that actors are truly committed to peace. Negotiated settlements hold the potential to alter the incentives of disputants and put an end to conflict. Indeed, peace agreements are key tools in building a durable peace following civil war. The question remains, however, regarding how peace agreements influence more positive conceptions of peace. Can peace agreements lead to improvements in the quality of peace?

Research has also found, however, that practitioners and scholars alike must be cautious not to prescribe a one-size-fits-all solution to all civil wars. Indeed, work by Roland Paris (1997; 2004) points to the dangers of placing an overemphasis on political and economic liberalization following civil war. While power sharing, democratization, and economic liberalization are appropriate in many cases, their ubiquitous application to resolution processes runs the risk of introducing new instabilities into fragile societies. To what extent have researchers heeded this advice? To what extent can and should peace processes focus on the specific needs and grievances of disputants? In the following section, I discuss the research on grievances and peace agreements. I then consider how peace agreements that are crafted to address the context-specific needs of a conflict and its actors are best-equipped to generate a quality peace following conflict.

Peace Agreements as a Means to Address Grievances

A number of works have considered the extent to which the context-specificity of peace agreements – or the extent to which agreements resolve the causes of conflict – leads to a more durable peace. While the evidence is mixed, the theoretical expectations reinforce Paris’ calls to generate settlements to match the needs of a conflict and its actors (1997; 2002; 2004). By addressing the causes of conflict, more specific agreements have been found to reduce incentives to return to war. Work on comprehensive agreements, for example, agreements that are often defined as addressing the needs and incompatibilities of the disputants, are found to be the most durable form of settlement. Fortna (2004*b*) argues that the more specific or more comprehensive an agreement is, the less likely signatories will be to renege. Comprehensive agreements, within her framework, raise the costs of renegeing, reduce uncertainty about intentions and actions through specificity, and establish measures to check compliance. Werner and Yuen (2005) similarly find evidence that “the strength of the agreement significantly reduces the risk that ceasefires fail” (276). By reducing security fears and rendering peace a more beneficial outcome than renewed conflict, more comprehensive agreements lead to a peace that is more durable.³ Negotiated settlements, while precarious, may be crafted to generate a lasting peace.⁴

As noted, however, the finding that comprehensive peace agreements lead to a more durable peace is contested across studies. DeRouen, Lea and Wallensteen (2009), for example, find that “agreement comprehensiveness is in the expected direction [reduces likelihood of peace failure] but not significant. We cannot confirm that specifically addressing the root cause of the fighting leads to longer agreements” (382). Werner (1999), as well, finds little evidence that resolving the issues that led to conflict generates more durable peaceful outcomes.⁵ Finally, Call and Cousens (2008) are critical of defining success through overly ambitious metrics. They write that while addressing the “root causes” of conflict may be “philosophically appealing,” it is “unhelpful for practitioners” (7).⁶

³See, also: Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001); Mattes and Savun (2010).

⁴While her analysis is not specifically focused on comprehensive peace agreements, Reid’s (2015) study on civil war mediation finds that comprehensive peace agreements have a positive and statistically significant effect on the durability of peace.

⁵I would argue, however, that her measures of issue resolution do not directly measure whether or not the causes of conflict were resolved. She relies on dummy variables for (1) imposed settlements, (2) mediation attempts, (3) territorial disputes, and (4) military stalemates to deduce issue resolution.

⁶Call (2008), however, goes on to note: “To the extent that root causes are specific to a society, then this standard makes more

Two points warrant noting before transitioning to the theoretical framework of this chapter. First, none of the aforementioned studies consider the effect addressing the root causes of conflict has on the quality of post-conflict peace. While they find, more often than not, that comprehensive agreements reduce the likelihood of conflict recurrence, they do not speak to the type of peace that ensues. Just like addressing the causes of conflict alters incentives so as to generate a more durable peace, I also expect such a process renders actors more likely to commit to greater levels of political openness and opportunity.

Second, and importantly, there is an uneven application of the terms *comprehensive agreements*, *specificity of agreements*, and *full agreements* throughout the aforementioned literature. While some analyses identify full agreements as those that address the entire incompatibility, and comprehensive as those that include all relevant actors (e.g. Högbladh, 2011), others focus more on specificity or the presence of certain provisions within an agreement (for example, the literature on power sharing or third party commitments). I proceed with an agnostic view toward the type or level of peace agreement. Instead, my research is purely focused on the type of provisions within the peace agreement and the extent to which those provisions address the causes of each specific conflict. This allows flexibility and recognizes that there are many tools available to peacemakers and conflict actors to resolve their differences.

The question of peace agreement design is both challenging and important; I seek to add to the wealth of knowledge already in existence. Moreover, I seek to push current understanding of peace agreements to a new area: how do peace agreements and the nature of civil war settlements influence the quality of post-conflict peace? To what extent can agreements shape the quality of peace in the aftermath of conflict? Beyond committing actors to peace, can peace agreements also commit actors to outcomes of political inclusivity, for example?

A Theory of Context-Specific Peace Agreements and Quality Peace

As part of the broader research on the quality of peace, I focus on peace agreements as one mechanism to generate a peace that is more meaningful and more inclusive of all members of society. In

sense. Addressing the causes of conflict, rather than the symptoms would logically reduce the chances of war recurrence” (190).

the second chapter, my quantitative analyses support my theoretical expectations: the content of peace agreements contribute to an increased respect for women's political rights. What, though, of a question on political rights more broadly? To what extent do peace agreements create a peace that is politically secure and inclusive for all members of society regardless of identity? Building upon past research that emphasizes the importance of peace agreement language, my theory assumes that the words on paper matter. The very content of the agreement holds meaning and outlines a legal framework for the post-conflict society. This framework, I argue, changes actors' preferences and thus creates a higher quality peace.

The following theoretical framework addresses the causal mechanisms linking peace agreements to changes in the quality of peace. First, I summarize the general theoretical expectations bridging peace agreements and their contents to a higher quality peace. Second, I delve into the specific mechanisms that link context-specific agreements to greater respect for political rights. Repression and exclusion are, at times, both strategic and advantageous political decisions. How, then, might peace agreements change the strategic calculations of actors so as to make these practices less appealing? In particular, I argue that by addressing the causes of conflict, context-specific peace agreement change the incentives of actors and create institutional constraints. As such, those in power are less willing and less able to resort to repressive practices, political violence, and exclusion.

Peace Agreements' Enduring Effects

The creation and consolidation of a quality peace is not guaranteed following civil war; the destruction and destabilization created by civil war, however, generates a situation in which the status quo can change. Entire societies and countries are ravaged by war, and countries are left to rebuild in the aftermath. This opening for change creates a situation which is, in some ways, quite malleable. I argue that the trajectory of the peace process⁷ has the capacity to shape and shift the ways in which rights are accorded and protected in the post-conflict environment. Bell and O'Rourke (2007) point to peace agreements as a tangible representation of the transformations and revisions that occur at the

⁷The term peace process here is used to refer to the period of formal negotiations and their outcome. Undoubtedly, the peace process in a civil war is open-ended and in some ways synonymous with the concept of bargaining, which is ongoing before, during, and after conflicts. Given information constraints, however, I restrict my theory and analyses to the formal negotiation processes.

end of a civil war. As noted earlier, Bell and O'Rourke (2007) further identify peace agreements as quasi-constitutional documents, or documents that map out the power structures of the post-conflict state. Within this chapter as in this dissertation as a whole, I look to the political-legal framework or roadmap of peace agreements, and I argue that this framework is a key mechanism that spurs and shapes the likelihood of post-conflict progress toward a higher quality peace.

How might peace agreements generate a situation in which rights and inclusivity improve in the aftermath of civil war? Peace agreements, in their quasi-constitutional nature, have potential to create a framework of legal rules and institutions. While peace agreements vary greatly in their content and specificity, an issue which will be explored shortly, many peace agreements include in them legal frameworks and specific plans for the post-conflict period. As Abbott and Snidal (2000) write: "Legal rules and institutions operate both by changing material incentives and by modifying understandings, standards of behavior, and identities. In particular, they invoke doctrines and institutions that facilitate enforcement as well as social norms of obedience to law" (425). Similarly, I posit that peace agreements catalyze and incentivize changes to the status quo. Through legal as well as normative shifts that are generated through the peace process, peace agreements themselves revise extant laws and standards of behavior.

In the civil war and conflict resolution context, Roeder (2010) indicates that institutions generated during peace processes hold the potential to be permanent and to influence actors' behaviors for the foreseeable post-conflict period. Peace agreements, by outlining institutions and a framework for a transition to peace, serve as an impetus to processes that revise pre-conflict and war-time realities. Peace agreement signatories may perceive incentives to follow through on provisions that are clearly outlined in agreements.⁸ When war is more costly than peace, leaders will be incentivized to follow through on the terms of peace agreements.

In addition to incentives, peace agreements also constrain the behavior of former conflict actors following conflict. On the most basic level, peace agreements influence the quality of peace in the wake of civil war by tying actors' hands to particular policies or reforms. Through institutional and legal constraints, peace agreements promote a higher quality peace by limiting the extent to which

⁸Similarly, reforms that are achieved through the peace process may be less costly vis-à-vis the domestic audience than those reforms that are developed through entirely domestic processes. Leaders may be able to "blame" unpopular reforms on external actors.

governments and other actors can continue to pursue policies of exclusion or repression. The extent to which peace agreements create incentives for compliance and tie hands of actors is likely dependent on the specific provisions of peace agreements themselves. Cross (1999) engages the role that law and constitutional provisions play in shaping human rights protections. His work posits that precision or specificity of provisions tend to generate stronger signals about what the post-conflict environment must look like. Through precision, Bell (2006) posits that peace agreements can “facilitate compliance by imparting clarity regarding implementation and breach, which enhances their normative ‘compliance pull’” (395). I similarly argue that the more precise agreements are, the less willing and able belligerents will be to renege on particular agreement goals and commitments.

An Application to Political Rights

How do peace agreements influence political rights in the aftermath of civil war? In particular, why do context-specific peace agreements, those that address the underlying causes of conflict, generate positive effects for levels of political inclusivity following conflict? Post-conflict societies are at a high risk for repression, continued human rights violations, and political exclusions; these risks stem from ongoing insecurities and struggles for power. I recognize that while these risks do not change overnight, there is an opportunity for change in the post-conflict period. Civil wars generate an opening to revise the status quo. The language of peace agreements shapes the trajectory and extent of changes following conflict. Peace agreements and the institutions which they put in place, I argue, generate incentives and constraints that alter the political and security environment following conflict. In the following paragraphs, I engage how context-specific agreements incentivize and constrain actors to commit to opening political systems.

First, context-specific peace agreements incentivize shifts in levels of repression and political inclusion. More accurately, I argue that context-specific agreements create positive incentives and negative incentives (or disincentives) that shape the quality of peace. As a means of addressing the grievances of disputants or the underlying causes of conflict, peace agreements create new political, economic, and social institutions for the post-conflict period. The new institutions, which are more often than not democratic in nature, decrease the costs actors face in opening the political system. Indeed, political elites may find it advantageous to open the political process and refrain from political violence; doing

so builds legitimacy for elites and provides an opportunity to garner support. New and reformed institutions likely reward those who follow the rules of the game; whether through domestic or international pressure, compliance with new and more open institutions creates tangible benefits for former conflict actors.

On the flip side, context-specific peace agreements create a web of disincentives that discourage continued or increased violations of human rights and political freedoms. In dealing with the causes of conflict, context-specific peace agreements often include either the division or sharing of power politically, economically, or territorially.⁹ Beyond divisions or sharing of power, context-specific agreements also contain a plethora of other political, economic, social, and territorial reforms. As such, the lines of power distribution tend to be clearer in the post-agreement period than prior to the conflict; the clarity only increases as agreements are better-designed to address the specific conflict at hand. Leaders, while still incentivized by a desire to obtain and amass power, are less vulnerable and therefore less likely to resort to repression as a means to an end. Davenport (2007) writes that democratic institutions increase the costs of repression. Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001) write: “when the state is dominated by a single group or coalition of groups and acts aggressively toward out-group interests, exploiting and repressing their politically disadvantaged peoples, [the state]...itself can become the source of manifest grievances and opposition” (2001, 185). New (or newly empowered) political actors will be incentivized to consolidate power within the new political system as opposed to turning to repression and exclusion, which would in turn jeopardize leaders’ hold on power.

Wallensteen (2015), focusing on the foundations of a quality peace, writes: “The idea is that actors will always have choices and when the strength of structures are such that they cannot break out will they also remain within the framework... If all (or most) actors benefit from the new institutional arrangements, then there is less incentive for challenging them, not the least as the actors may fear to become more isolated and marginalized” (26). Political repression, then, risks destabilizing the newly approved status quo. Indeed, in a fragile post-conflict period, repression and widespread exclusion risks leading to a recurrence of conflict. When agreements are crafted to address the underlying causes of

⁹Power sharing, however, is ubiquitous in post-conflict settlements and not always appropriate. While having clear and positive effects on the duration of peace, its application is not sufficient to also generate higher quality peaceful outcomes. Moreover, this is not purely a story of democratization or liberalization, although the two go hand in hand with peace agreements. Roland Paris 1997; 2004 has cautioned against an overemphasis on political liberalization; in many ways, his work recognizes the need to pay attention to context, a goal which I follow here.

conflict, political actors will have more to gain from compliance than they will from renegeing.¹⁰ In the next chapter, I offer as evidence for the (dis)incentives mechanism the case of Liberia. President Sirleaf, in the period following the signing of the Accra Peace Agreement, made moves toward greater political openness; she justified said policies by stating that she would prefer political openness to a return to war.

Perhaps the disincentives put in place by context-specific peace agreements are best described by considering what happens when peace agreements do not fully address the grievances of the disputants. In cases where peace agreements take on a one-size-fits-all structure or only tangentially cater to the causes of conflict, the division of power and resources remains uncertain in the post-conflict period. Actors on one or all sides of the conflict find their demands and concerns only partially met. As such, political actors may resort to exclusion and/or repression to consolidate their hold on power and resources. Ongoing repression and exclusion will be necessary to achieve actors' goals, and may even be perceived as a necessary step toward building a more secure society. At the most basic level, civil wars that end unresolved may lead governments to use preemptive repression in order to make "it more difficult for the [opposition] group to act" (Danneman and Ritter, 2014, 258). The case of Côte d'Ivoire, which will be explicated in Chapter 5, drives home Danneman and Ritter's point. When civil wars and their resolution are characterized by a struggle for power and a struggle to revise or protect the status quo, only those agreements that recognize the contextual specificities of a conflict will have the capacity to shift conflictual relations to more cooperative ones.

Having now established an understanding of the positive and negative incentives linking context-specific agreements to a higher quality peace, I now turn to consider the extent to which these agreements constrain actors so as to lay the foundations for greater respect for political rights. When I state that context-specific peace agreements constrain the behavior of actors in the post-conflict period, I mean that peace agreements hold the potential to institutionalize concrete mechanisms that punish or inhibit rights violations. These concrete mechanisms include but are not limited to reformed justice and security systems, elections, power sharing institutions, and/or checks and balances on power (to limit executive

¹⁰I do recognize that spoilers, or those unhappy with the new status quo created by the peace agreement, may have an interest in destabilizing the political process. These groups, however, tend to be peripheral to the government. Because I am focused on the way in which the peace agreement alters the extent to which the government represses and excludes its citizens, I am leaving spoilers out of the discussion.

control, for example). In other words, context-specific agreements may, at the most basic level, prevent the possibility of widespread rights violations. Beyond incentives/disincentives to better respect human rights, peace agreements may limit the range of available options to an actor; repression and political exclusion become unfeasible or impossible strategies.

Another constraint on the ability and will of actors to repress and exclude is driven by international attention on post-conflict societies. A so-called “spotlight effect” places pressure on actors to limit violence, limit exclusion, and exhibit a level of commitment to the peace process. Peace agreements are almost exclusively products of an international process to bring peace to conflict-ridden states. Therefore, peace agreements almost always carry with them a focus on the state and on actors within the state. Agreements that are particularly context-specific in nature generate an acute sense of oversight and commitment by international actors. Whether perceived or actual, actors shape their behavior so as to garner positive/neutral international attention (possibility of rewards) as opposed to negative international attention (possibility of sanctions/punishment). If actors believe they are under international spotlight and believe that they are being judged by their progress on agreement implementation, they may shape their behavior so as to send a positive signal. In short, international pressure holds actors accountable directly and indirectly.

The preceding discussion offers insight into a number of causal pathways linking context-specific agreements to greater respect for political rights following civil wars. The causal processes identified herein are complex and multifaceted; because the civil war resolution process is long, wrought with challenges, and shaped by social processes, it is counterproductive to settle on a singular causal pathway. As such, I theorize that context-specific agreements lead to tangible benefits for the inclusivity and security of post-conflict societies due to both incentives and constraints. Context-specific agreements incentivize actors to take advantage of new political structures; newly created political openings disincentivize actors to threaten or undermine the post-conflict political environment. Moreover, context-specific peace agreements constrain actors and reduce political exclusions by institutionally preventing rights abuses and by strengthening the international spotlight effect. Through both positive and negative pathways, I thus hypothesize:

Hypothesis: As the context-specificity of peace agreements increases, I expect government respect for political rights to increase as well.

Research Design

To test my expectations regarding peace agreements and government respect for political rights, I use the universe of civil war settlement cases identified within the UCDP Peace Agreements Database (Högbladh, 2011). In total, the UCDP Peace Agreements Database (PAD) provides 196 peace agreements (including peace process agreements, partial agreements, and comprehensive agreements) signed between at least two warring parties within civil wars between the years 1975 and 2011. I further subset the dataset to include only the universe of peace agreements that have not ended. A peace agreement ends, according to the UCDP PAD, when one of the primary parties is no longer party to the agreement. I take this step to reflect the expected causal mechanisms, all of which rely on the quasi-constitutional nature of peace agreements. In short, a peace agreement that has ended cannot legitimately alter the political-legal framework of the state. Finally, because of limited data availability on a number of my measures of quality peace, my dataset is restricted to the 1981-2011 time period. My unit of analysis is the peace agreement within a civil war dyad.

Dependent Variable

The present study focuses on the extent to which peace agreements generate improvements in the quality of peace following conflict. The dependent variable, therefore, measures whether or not the quality of peace increases following conflict. For purposes of this section, I define the quality of peace using levels of repression. Repression, although a negative metric of political inclusivity, proxies the openness and opportunity within a country's political system. Moreover, repression proxies the extent to which all members of society are safe to engage in the political life of the state. Data on political repression comes from the Political Terror Scale (PTS) (Gibney et al., 2015). The Political Terror Scale codes data from yearly Amnesty International reports, the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, and Human Rights Watch's World Reports. The goal of the PTS is to measure levels of political violence and terror; the data range from a score of 1 to a score of 5. A score of 1 represents a country that is "under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare" whereas a score of 5 represents a country where "terror has been expanded to the whole population [and where] leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with

which they pursue personal or ideological goals” (Gibney et al., 2015). In between the extremes, the scores represent varying degrees of political imprisonment, torture, and civil/political rights violations.¹¹

Specifically, to assess whether or not context-specific peace agreement generate positive effects for political rights within post-conflict societies, I code two dependent variables. The first dependent variables measures whether or not countries experienced an improvement in levels of political repression in the year immediately following the signing of the agreement. In other words, do levels of political rights and protections improve in the immediate aftermath of conflict? Because the coding of PTS is from 1 to 5 where 5 represents widespread exclusion and torture and 1 represents a society that is secure under the rule of law, I look for improvements (or reductions) in states’ PTS scores. I code the variable, *Rights Improvements: Immediate*, as 1 if the PTS score improves in the year following the signing of the agreement as compared to the pre-conflict score. The variable is coded 0 if there is either no improvement or levels of repression worsen in the year following the signing of the agreement.¹²

As a stricter test of the potential benefits of context-specific peace agreements, I also code a dependent variable to capture durable rights improvements. Do context-specific agreements not only lead to lower levels of repression, but also enduring improvements in political rights? The variable, *Rights Improvements: Durable*, is coded 1 for those cases where rights improvements occur in year one following the signing of the agreement and endure through year three. I code cases as 0 if rights improvements do not occur or do not endure for the three year period following the signing of a peace agreement. The second dependent variable is crucial in gauging whether peace agreements’ effects are fleeting or more durable in nature.¹³ Given the dichotomous nature of each dependent variable, I run my analyses using

¹¹In both the pre- and post-conflict periods in my dataset, the universe of cases take on the full range of values of the PTS score. The mean PTS score in pre-conflict societies is 3.6.

¹²I code the dependent variables to account for context; in other words, the coding takes into account the baseline levels of political rights and opportunities existing within societies. This coding is justified given that the quality of peace is a relative concept. Quality of peace is not, I argue, absolute; one cannot compare the quality of peace or the possible progress toward a quality peace in Northern Ireland to that in South Africa or Liberia. The coding takes into account that progress is relative to the realities on the ground.

¹³In a future extension of this paper, I plan to code the dependent variable – political rights and opportunities – using both a high- and low-bar, so to speak. The low-bar for quality of peace improvements is measured by repression levels. I argue, however, that while stating that levels of repression improve is a crucial step, it also represents negative or minimalist progress toward quality peace. A high-bar measure, on the other hand, would set a stricter metric for quality peace. For the high-bar measure, I plan to use the Varieties of Democracy Dataset’s (Coppedge et al., 2015) variable: “Power distributed by social group.” This variable measures the extent to which political power is monopolized or dispersed across social groups within societies.

logistic regression, and I cluster the standard errors according to the peace process.

Explanatory Variable and Controls

The primary independent variable of interest in this study is the extent to which peace agreements address the underlying causes of conflict. I label this characteristic of peace agreements as the context-specificity of the agreements. I argue that context-specific peace agreements lay the foundations for a higher quality peace than those that are less context-specific by changing incentives of political leaders and constraining exclusionary and/or repressive behavior. In the following, I describe the coding of context-specificity, a process that proceeds in a number of steps. First, I identify the causes of conflict for each conflict within my dataset. Data on the causes of conflict is found by reading Conflict Barometer yearly reports (HIIK, 2015).¹⁴ The causes of conflict fall into the following categories: secession, autonomy, ideology/national power, and natural resources. Several conflicts are driven by multiple causes; I code those conflicts accordingly rather than restricting my coding to only one cause per conflict. After coding the causes of conflict, I then identify the extent to which peace agreement provisions address the very grievances that led to conflict onset. See Figure A.1 in Appendix 2 for details on this process. I must note that it is both possible and common to partially address the causes of conflict; my coding recognizes this and thus focuses on generating a continuous measure of the *extent* to which a peace agreement is context-specific.¹⁵

After coding the causes of each conflict and the solutions embodied within peace agreements, I then aggregate the information into a measure of context-specificity. The continuous variable *percent_address*, measures how fully a peace agreement addresses the causes of conflict. Specifically, the variable is calculated by counting the total number of peace agreement provisions focused on grievance-resolution and divides that number by the total number of provisions that it would take to fully address

¹⁴I cross-verify the causes of conflict using the Minorities at Risk database (MAR, 2009). I also rely on UCDP's country reports for cross-verification and information on those cases not found within the time frame of the Conflict Barometer (1992-present).

¹⁵For example, in those conflicts that are driven by secessionist aspirations, peace agreements may fully address the cause of conflict by giving conflict actors the right to an independence referendum or the right to self-determination. An agreement may partially address the grievances of secessionist movements by taking steps toward federalism, political decentralization, and/or territorial power sharing.

the causes of the conflict. The resulting score for context-specificity ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 represents peace agreements that are quite shallow in nature while 1 represents agreements whose design specifically meets the needs and concerns of warring parties.¹⁶ For descriptive statistics on context-specificity, see Table 4.1.¹⁷

Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Context-Specificity by Peace Agreement Type

Type of Agreement	Mean (S.D.)	Min.	Max.
Comprehensive	0.812 (.228)	.33	1
Partial	0.449 (.344)	0	1
Process	0.099 (.189)	0	.66

In the quantitative analyses, I control for a number of variables that are also expected to influence the extent to which a quality peace takes hold in the post-conflict period. First, I control for whether or not the agreement signed was comprehensive. As noted earlier, comprehensive agreements are, on average, expected to be more durable. Their very categorization is based upon addressing the grievances of disputants. While comprehensive peace agreements are often treated as the most successful form of peace agreement, I note that they still vary quite extensively in the extent to which they address the causes of conflict. Within my sample of cases, for example, comprehensive agreements have a mean value of .81 for context-specificity. Thus, my analyses do not assume that comprehensive agreements are “better” than partial or process agreements; indeed, my theoretical expectations simply rely on how peace agreements are crafted to recognize and resolve causes of conflict. Data on the type of agreements is provided by the UCDP PAD (Högbladh, 2011). The variable is dichotomous and coded as 1 if the agreement is comprehensive.¹⁸

Beyond controlling for the agreement type, I also control for whether or not the peace agreement included promises for peacekeeping forces. Again this variable is dichotomous and derived from the UCDP PAD dataset. I expect peacekeeping promises to enhance the theorized spotlight effect and thus

¹⁶The mean value for the context-specificity is .493.

¹⁷Descriptive statistics are on the sub-sample of cases that are actually in my regression analyses.

¹⁸UCDP labels such agreements as full agreements, those in which one or more dyad agree to settle the whole incompatibility.

lead to improvements in political rights; with peacekeepers either promised or present, domestic actors will be less willing and less able to resort to political repression. Third, I control for a state's regime type in the time period following the signing of the agreement using a lagged version of Polity scores (Jagers and Marshall, 2000). I expect more democratic societies, those with higher Polity scores, to experience lower levels of repression. Countries with mid-range or more democratic regimes should be more likely to see improvements toward a higher quality peace than those countries with more closed political systems. Fourth, I control for a state's GDP per capita (log value, lagged) to gauge the level of development, economic opportunity, and openness of the society (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2009). Fifth, I control for whether or not the peace agreements include power-sharing institutions. The variable used in the analyses is a count variable of the number of power-sharing institutions; the values range from 0 to 4 and count for the presence of political, economic, military, and/or territorial power sharing. Data on power sharing comes from Ottmann and Vüllers (2014) Power Sharing Event Dataset (PSED). As the number of power sharing institutions increase, I anticipate the web of institutional constraints to be such that actors will resort to repressive practices less frequently. Finally, to account for the potential of improvement in levels of repression, I control for countries' PTS scores prior to conflict.

Results

Table 4.2 presents the full set of results of the logistic regression analyses. Models 1 through 3 provide an "easy" or short-term test of the effects of context-specific agreements. Models 4 through 6, on the other hand, present the results for the harder test: are the effects of context-specific peace agreements durable in the post-conflict period? Within both sets of analyses, I run three models: one that assesses the effects of both context-specificity and comprehensive agreements, one that looks solely at context-specific agreements, and a final one that only measures the effects of comprehensive agreements. These steps are taken to assuage concerns regarding which type of peace agreement is driving the effects on the post-conflict political environment.

Across the set of model specifications, my analyses lend support for the paper's main hypothesis. As the context-specificity of peace agreements increases – as agreements more fully address the causes of conflict – the likelihood of an improvement in governments' respect for political rights also increases. Thus, context-specific agreements lay the foundations for a higher quality peace, as measured by levels

Table 4.2: Logistic Regression: Peace Agreements and Government Respect for Political Rights

	DV: Rights Improve. (Immediate)			DV: Rights Improve. (Durable)		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Context-Specificity	2.354*	2.424**		3.394**	3.460**	
	(1.285)	(1.211)		(1.487)	(1.415)	
Comp. Agreement	0.133		0.544	0.127		0.688
	(0.851)		(0.757)	(0.907)		(0.807)
PKO	0.788	0.807	0.392	0.589	0.612	0.063
	(1.008)	(1.003)	(0.932)	(1.080)	(1.068)	(0.977)
Polity (lagged)	0.022	0.023	0.050	-.102	-0.101	-0.046
	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.074)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.080)
GDPpc (lag, log)	0.356	0.358	0.073	0.997*	0.999*	0.482
	(0.430)	(0.431)	(0.385)	(0.521)	(0.522)	(0.416)
Power Sharing	-0.825*	-0.811*	-0.444	-0.969*	-0.956*	-0.358
	(0.616)	(0.439)	(0.377)	(0.531)	(0.523)	(0.395))
Pre-War Rights	3.326***	3.317***	3.167***	4.783***	4.766***	4.215***
	(0.786)	(0.780)	(0.735)	(1.261)	(1.252)	(1.089)
Intercept	-16.413***	-16.399***	-12.912***	-27.595***	-27.553***	-20.426***
	(5.245)	(5.238)	(4.406)	(7.940)	(7.923)	(5.975)
N	110	110	112	111	111	113
R-Squared	0.556	0.556	0.528	0.614	0.613	0.569

Standard errors in parentheses; Significance levels: *** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .1$

of repression. When looking at Models 1 and 2, context-specificity has a positive and statistically significant effects on the likelihood of rights improvements in the year following the signing of the agreement; the effect is significant at the $p < .1$ and $p < .05$ levels, respectively. Comprehensive agreements, while positively signed, do not have a distinguishable effect on levels of political repression. Peacekeeping operations, a country's regime type, and its level of development do not reach statistical significance. Somewhat surprisingly, the coefficients for power sharing are both negative and statistically significant and the .1-level in Models 1 and 2. The effect disappears in Model 3. While the results are certainly not strong or consistent enough to offer a condemnation of power sharing, they may speak to the fact that power sharing is not always the right tool for the job at hand. More is not always better. In fact, the results may indicate that peace agreements will be more successful when crafted to fit the context at hand, rather than placing a one-size-fits-all solution on a peace process. Finally, Models 1 through 3 indicate that for every one unit increase in a country's pre-war PTS score, the log-odds of a rights improvement following conflict increase.




Figure 4.1: Substantive Effects of Context-Specific Agreements

Context-specific agreements have positive effects in the immediate aftermath of conflict, but does this improvement endure at all? Models 4 and 5 show that as the context-specificity of peace agreements increases, the likelihood of a country experiencing a durable improvement in political rights also increases. The effect within these models reaches statistical significance at the $p < .05$ -level. The effects of the control variables in Models 4 through 6 are quite similar to those in Models 1 through 3. Perhaps as expected, in Models 4 and 5, a country's level of economic growth has a positive and statistically significant effect on the probability of rights improvements.

I now turn to a discussion of the substantive effects of the results. While the logistic regression results offer support for my hypothesis, I am interested to determine the magnitude of the effects of context-specific agreements. To assess substantive effects, I calculate the predicted probability of achieving a lasting improvement in PTS scores. In other words, what is the probability that a peace agreement will generate tangible and lasting improvements in a country's level of political rights and securities? Figure 4.1 presents the results in the form of a predicted probability plot. All calculations are

done while holding continuous variables at their mean value and dichotomous or categorical variables at their modal value. As context-specificity ranges from its minimum value, 0, to its maximum value, 1, the predicted probability of an improvement in the PTS score ranges from approximately 15 percent to just over 80 percent. Peace agreements that fully address the causes of conflict thus have clear and tangible benefits for post-conflict societies. Figure 4.1 also offers another lesson: the marginal benefit of addressing grievances increases at a fairly constant rate. Even those agreements that only partially address the causes of conflict increase the probability that a higher quality peace will take hold. As such, policymakers and peace practitioners must strive to be aware of context and to the specific needs of the conflict at hand.

Discussion and Conclusion

The goal of this dissertation is to ascertain the role peace agreements play in generating a higher quality peace. In so doing, my work moves the discussion beyond negative conceptions of peace. Instead, I focus on understanding how to establish or lay the framework for a peace that is meaningful, secure, and open to all those living in post-conflict societies. In earlier chapters, my research has shown that peace agreements – when crafted to include specific protections for women – facilitate the process of societies becoming more welcoming and open to women’s political participation. This chapter further offers support for the assertion that peace agreements shape the nature of post-conflict peace. While shifting gears from a focus on women’s rights, specifically, to a broader focus on the political rights and protections for a society as a whole, the lessons to be learned remain similar. The content of peace agreements matters. In crafting agreements, then, actors must be aware that they are building the structures, institutions, and norms that will condition life following conflict.

Specifically, the analyses of this chapter support the hypothesized relationship. Within this paper, I argue that context-specific peace agreements – those that are designed to remedy the causes of conflict – will lead to a higher quality peace. I argue that context-specificity, through the creation of new institutions and checks in society, incentivizes following the new rules of the game, disincentivizes destabilizing the new status quo, and constrains actors’ capacity to continue to resort to repressive and exclusionary practices. By addressing context rather than taking the form of a one-size-fits-all solution to conflict, peace agreements truly change the perception and reality of what is possible in post-conflict

society. The results herein support the theoretical expectations: as the context-specificity of agreements increases, the likelihood of rights improvements increases as well.

At the most basic level, then, the analysis further confirms that peace agreements are more than just scraps of paper. Their contents matter and hold important implications for life following conflict. The juxtaposition in the effects of context-specific peace agreements versus comprehensive peace agreements serves as a particularly striking lesson. As Paris (1997, 2002, 2004) has written time and time again, one-size-fits-all processes of democratization and liberalization are not always appropriate in the immediate aftermath of conflict. I build on his warnings to emphasize that peace processes must be designed to match the needs of the conflict and the disputants. It is my hope that the new measure and theory of context-specific peace agreements developed within this chapter further shine light on the need to be cognizant of context. Of course mediators and peace practitioners will strive for democracy, political openness, and economic growth; I do not frown upon these goals per se. Instead, I argue that there must be a greater awareness. The tangible benefits for the quality of peace when context is taken into account are, according to this study, quite large.

Future extensions of this work will focus on analyzing the sources and determinants of context-specific peace agreements. When are mediators, former warring parties, and other actors able to come together to truly discuss and resolve the causes of conflict? When, on the other hand, are peace agreements purposefully crafted in a piecemeal fashion, to only address one or two issues? Finally, when are agreements simply used as a delay tactic and thus inclusive of very little substance? Throughout my work, I am ever-aware of these pressing questions and conscious of their capacity to shape (or skew) any large-N empirical analysis. As such, I plan to address these questions and potentially larger issues of endogeneity through both case work and more rigorous empirical analyses. In the following chapter, I build upon this theoretical discussion and quantitative analysis to further explore the real experiences of civil war resolution. I turn to the cases of Burundi, Liberia, and Côte d'Ivoire to better explicate causal mechanisms and to draw conclusions about both the sources and the effects of context-specific peace agreements.

CHAPTER 5

CONTEXT-SPECIFIC PEACE AGREEMENTS: CASE ILLUSTRATIONS

Our collective challenge is to address the immediate priorities for peace consolidation, in such a way that it also promotes a holistic approach to the requirements for sustainable peace. We must invest generously in critical national capacities to ensure that peace is sustainable. Viable states require local institutions capable of delivering basic services and providing security, justice and political stability.

– U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, June 23, 2008¹

Peace consolidation is a process that must focus on the immediate goal of ending war while also taking steps to institutionalize positive dimensions of peace. In particular, the creation and consolidation of a quality peace necessitates a focus on processes and institutions of inclusivity and political opportunity. While there are many tools at peacemakers' disposal to achieve the consolidation of quality peace, I posit that those strategies that are most successful are those that focus on context. In other words, peacemakers, to be truly successful, must focus on the causes of conflict and needs of the conflict actors within the situation at hand. With a specific focus on peace agreements, I argue that agreements are best-equipped to achieve the goals of security, inclusivity, and opportunity when they take context into account. To this end, the quantitative analysis in Chapter 4 confirms that context-specific peace agreements lead to improvements in the quality of post-conflict peace. This chapter seeks to further examine the underlying causal processes to strengthen both the academic and policy-implications related to context-specific peacebuilding.

In examining the toolset available to peacemakers, works by Mukherjee (2006) and Tull and Mehler

¹Statement made in his remarks at the closing meeting of the Second Session of the Peacebuilding Commission (http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=272)

(2005) assert that even the most successful conflict resolution tools, such as power sharing, are not appropriate for every context. The ubiquitous use of power sharing, political liberalization, and economic liberalization – as I have discussed in the previous chapter – may render peace fragile and prone to collapse. Call and Cousens (2008) capture the heart of this argument when they write: “External actors need to understand the history, politics, and cultures of the countries in which they are attempting to ‘build peace,’ whether societies are emerging from statelessness, institutionalized authoritarian regimes, or highly informal predatory states” (14). The authors go on to assert that “Without understanding something about how state-society relations have evolved, how war may have changed things, or who has power and how power works, any generic peacebuilding strategy is likely to be a poor fit” (Call and Cousens, 2008, 14). Peace fails to take hold far too often; by designing settlements that fit the needs and grievances of specific cases, I argue that actors will be better able to help countries remove themselves from the conflict trap.

Why, specifically, does context matter, and how does an attention to context help countries out of the conflict trap? Why are peace agreements that are crafted to fit the conflict context more likely to contribute to a higher quality peace? Throughout the preceding chapters, I have argued that peace agreements both constrain and incentivize behavior. With respect to context-specific peace agreements and their effects on political opportunity following conflict, I argue that the agreements work through these same two causal mechanisms: constraints and (dis)incentives. First, peace agreements create a new system of political, economic, and social institutions; in short, they create a completely new or revised state apparatus that limits actors’ behaviors and prevents extreme deviations from working within the new political system. Context-specific agreements, in particular, create an extensive web of institutions that are intentionally chosen to match the needs of the conflict at hand. In Burundi, for example, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement set up an extensive network of new political, economic, and security institutions that limited actors’ capacity to consolidate and abuse power.

Second, peace agreements have the capacity to disincentivize repression by rewarding those who work within the new political system. Specifically, I argue that context-specific peace agreements alter the incentives of actors by creating a system that takes into account the very grievances and incompatibilities that led to violent conflict in the first place. Rather than using repression and exclusion as tools to further amass power, actors who have signed context-specific peace agreements will, on average, be

more likely to choose strategies that work within the new political system. Mason et al. (2011), for example, highlight how repression and exclusion are not politically “smart” in that they can lead to future rebellion.² Assuming actors’ grievances were sufficiently addressed in a peace agreement, there is little incentive to repress and destabilize the new status quo.³ On the other hand, one might consider that conflicts that are resolved using one-size-fits-all solutions may leave actors with both uncertainty and a belief that they could gain more through violence, exclusion, and repression. There is some evidence from the case of Liberia that President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf wanted to ensure that the opposition perceived the system to be fair and just, so as to avoid a return to war. Political inclusion was, in the Liberian case, more strategically beneficial than exclusion or repression.

The causal processes that I have identified find parallels in other works on civil war resolution.⁴ For example, recent work by Barbara Walter (2015) identifies the quality of governance as a key determinant for a peace that is durable. While her research is distinct from my own in that it focuses on (1) the durability of a negative peace and (2) quality governance as an independent variable rather than the outcome of interest, she highlights a number of key effects of institutions. She identifies, in particular, how institutions create multiple avenues for political interactions; violence no longer needs to be the pathway through which bargaining occurs. In my own work, I similarly argue that context-specific peace agreements lay forth institutions that shift the focus of political interactions from violence to non-violence, from exclusion to a greater degree of inclusion.

This chapter provides a deeper consideration of the causal processes discussed above. To this end, I have chosen to present three case illustrations: Liberia, Burundi, and Côte d’Ivoire. The cases are not intended to prove or disprove the theory; instead, they are intended to complement the quantitative analysis in Chapter 4 and illustrate the plausibility of the causal story. In the following section, I will briefly discuss the process of case selection. Then, I will present the three cases. In each case, I focus on the extent to which the peace agreements within these countries were designed with context in mind. In the cases of both Liberia and Burundi, the key peace agreements fully addressed the grievances of the

²Gurses and Rost (2013) also find that political and economic exclusion of ethnic groups increases the chances of conflict recurrence.

³Mason et al. (2011) highlight an area to further investigate: that military power sharing, in particular, will reduce repression levels.

⁴For a full review of the theoretical foundations of this work, see earlier chapters.

disputants; in other words, they were context-specific. On the other hand, the Ivorian case illustrates the negative consequences of pushing a peace agreement that does not pay sufficient attention to context. While the cases of Burundi and Liberia have taken strides toward a higher quality peace, violence has remained a tool of political interaction in Côte d'Ivoire.

Case Selection

The cases presented in this chapter have been chosen to illustrate the constraining and incentivizing mechanisms linking agreement context-specificity to post-conflict political inclusivity. The cases of Liberia, Burundi, and Côte d'Ivoire vary on key explanatory and outcome variables while also controlling for alternative explanations. Each of the three cases is a case of civil war in Sub-Saharan Africa and all three stem from disputes over national power. While Burundi has strong ethnic components and the civil war in Côte d'Ivoire was partially driven by the consequences of the discriminatory policies of *Ivoirité*, the conflict in Liberia was not organized or motivated by ethnic divisions. Burundi has long been one of the most impoverished nations in Africa whereas Côte d'Ivoire was a model of prosperity and stability for three decades following independence from France. Each country within this chapter faced distinct challenges and upheavals as their political systems liberalized.

While I do not claim that the conflicts were identical in nature, I do emphasize that each of the three faced distinct challenges in moving toward a higher quality peace. Liberia experienced two deadly episodes of civil war with a failed attempt at peace in the interim. Burundi's ethnic tensions and exclusionary policies erupted into ethnic violence at several points throughout the country's history. Yet, both Liberia and Burundi have moved toward a higher quality peace by reducing levels of repression and increasing those who hold a stake in the national political discourse. On the other hand, the relative success and prosperity of Côte d'Ivoire did not carry over into the country's post-conflict period. Following a peace agreement that left the actors' incompatibilities unresolved, actors resorted to violence and intimidation as a means to practice politics. In Liberia and Burundi, post-conflict bargaining and political interaction has (for the most part) occurred through non-violent and more inclusive means.

The following cases also control for one alternative explanation: that international involvement or third-party guarantees are sufficient to achieve a higher quality peace. In all three cases, international

contingents and the United Nations, in particular, were present to monitor and enforce the peace agreement. While third parties seem to bolster the quality of peace by serving as a constraining force in Liberia and Burundi, they were unable to maintain peaceful political interactions in Côte d'Ivoire. The question of third parties' role in promoting higher quality peaceful outcomes is one that warrants further attention, but I postulate that third parties' ability to instill a quality peace is only as strong as the legal framework that they are standing upon. They cannot achieve a higher quality peace if a peace agreement does not strive for and codify steps toward a higher quality peace.⁵

Qualitative Illustrations

In the following sections, I present the cases of Liberia, Burundi, and Côte d'Ivoire. Liberia and Burundi, although still facing serious obstacles on their paths away from war, have made strides toward greater political inclusivity and opportunity. Côte d'Ivoire, on the other hand, has seen its post-conflict political environment marred by violence and intimidation. To what extent did the peace agreements shape each country's progress toward or away from a more inclusive and higher quality peace? I begin each section by analyzing the causes of conflict and considering the context in which civil war began. I then discuss the extent to which the peace agreements of the countries – the Abuja II Agreement and the Accra Peace Agreement in Liberia, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, and the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement in Côte d'Ivoire – were context-specific. Next, I discuss the extent to which the peace agreements did, or did not, spur the proposed causal processes of incentives and constraints. Finally, I conclude each country's analysis with thoughts for future research and implications for the broader theory within this dissertation.

⁵I also would like to control for power sharing as an alternative mechanism. In both cases of success, power sharing institutions are entrenched in the peace agreements. In Côte d'Ivoire, power sharing attempts had previously failed and the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement called for sharing of power between Alassane Ouattara and Guillaume Soro. While the presence of power sharing in all three cases may say that it is insufficient for higher quality peaceful outcomes, I also want to note that there is significant variation in the specificity of the conflicts' power sharing provisions. Moreover, because power sharing is used so commonly, it may be hard to test its effects on the quality of peace. A more important question for future research, then, is when and where power sharing is appropriate or when, in other words, does it fit the context.

Liberia

From Liberia's earliest years, the the country's political and economic power structures were marked by inequality and exploitation. Americo-Liberians, while only comprising five percent of the population, formed a small but elite ruling class (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2016). Decades of exclusion and inequality spurred increasing conflict by the 1970s. While Samuel Doe led a coup in 1980 to overthrow the minority-ruled government, Liberians saw little improvement in their political or economic opportunities. In spite of rhetoric which promised to "release [Liberians] from the chains of oppression," Doe continued to exploit the country's natural resources and rely on intimidation to maintain power (Kandeh, 1996, 392). According to accounts from the time, Doe's time in power was characterized by "sustained levels of brutality, dramatic economic decline, political immobilization, and purges of real or imagined enemies" (Sesay, 1996, 36). Any threats against the government – real or perceived – were quickly eliminated, or more bluntly, executed.

When the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, launched an offensive against Doe's government and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), Doe's hold on power began to crumble. In 1990, he was captured and killed by opposition forces; Liberia descended into its first bloody episode of civil war (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2016). Following the signing of the Abuja II Peace Agreement in 1996, levels of political exclusion and repression only worsened in the interwar years from 1996 to 2000. Charles Taylor was elected president in 1997, and according to United States State Department Reports, Taylor's regime continued the exploitation of natural resources for personal benefit and to blatantly violate human rights in the form of killing, torture, and arbitrary detention. During this time period, Liberian governance was marked by intimidation, fear, and violence.⁶ By 2000, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) mobilized to fight Taylor's regime, thus sparking Liberia's second civil war which would last until the signing of the Accra Peace Agreement in 2003.

Liberia's conflicts were, primarily, driven by a fight for national power. In the first episode of conflict, the NPFL fought to end Doe's regime; the second episode of conflict was then driven by Liberians who sought to overthrow Charles Taylor's stronghold on power. Political exclusion and a

⁶<http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/254.htm>

dissatisfaction with government leadership and policies drove opposition forces to mobilize and fight. Any solution to Liberia's conflicts, then, would need to be focused on establishing means to distribute control in ways that reflect balances of power and the needs of previously excluded groups. In the following sections, I consider the extent to which Liberia's peace agreements were crafted to address the underlying causes of conflict. In particular, given the incompatibilities over control of national power, I examine the extent to which the peace agreements in Liberia's conflict focused on revising and restructuring the state's political institutions. I show that the Accra Peace Agreement, unlike Liberia's first attempt at peace in 1996 (with the Abuja Agreements), fully addressed the incompatibilities leading to conflict. As such, I argue that the Accra Peace Agreement both constrained actors and changed incentives so as to make repression a less attractive strategy.

Liberia's Peace Agreements

Liberia has seen at least thirteen peace agreements since 1990, according to UCDP's Peace Agreement Database (Högbladh, 2011). Within this analysis, I focus on two agreements in particular: (1) the Abuja II Agreement of 1996, and (2) the Accra Peace Agreement of 2003. Whereas the former only partially addressed the causes of conflict, the latter laid out an extensive framework to revise national governance structures. After presenting an overview of the agreements' provisions below, I will argue that the context-specific nature of the Accra Peace Agreement, in particular, laid the foundations for a more inclusive and secure peace in Liberia.

Signed to end the country's first episode of civil war, the Abuja II Agreement reiterated and sought to reinstate the failed Abuja Agreement from the previous year. The Abuja Agreements were significant in that they did outline a certain degree of power sharing. For example, the Abuja Agreement of 1995 states: "The Parties agree that during the transitional period leading to the inauguration of an elected government, the executive powers of the Republic of Liberia shall be vested in a six-member Council of State" to be made up of members of the NPLF (Charles Taylor), ULIMO, and other groups (Part II, Section A.i). In spite of the sharing of political power within a transitional government that was designed to last no more than one year, the agreement did nothing to institutionalize an inclusive political system. Indeed, although the Abuja II Peace agreement was implemented, Charles Taylor was elected president in 1997 and all progress to inclusivity or security was stopped. In many ways the language

and provisions of the Abuja Agreements were boilerplate; Liberia did need mechanisms to share power across groups who were competing for control of the national government, but it needed more than the Abuja Agreements provided. The Abuja Agreements constructed an executive council that shared power amongst warlords and key conflict actors. On the other hand, the Accra Peace Agreement shared power across different regions, civil society groups, political parties, and business organizations.⁷

The Accra Peace Agreement of 2003, by looking more broadly at the power distribution within Liberian society as opposed to solely amongst elites, was much more extensive in addressing disputes over national power. In its sections on governance reform and the transitional government's structure, the Accra Peace Agreement promised "a national and regional balance in appointments" (Article XVI) in order to "reflect a broad spectrum of the Liberian society" (Article XXIV). More specifically, the National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA) was to have "a maximum of Seventy-six (76) members who shall come from the following entities: (a) each of the fifteen counties; (b) the present Government of Liberia, the LURD, MODEL, the Political Parties, Civil Society and Interest Groups including the National Bar Association, the Liberian Business Organizations, Women Organizations, Trade Unions, Teachers Union, Refugees, the Liberians in the Diaspora/America and the Youth" (Article XXIV). The Cabinet, as well, was to be established in such a way that would reflect a broad cross-section of Liberian society (Article XXVI). The Accra Peace Agreement, then, went to great lengths to distribute national power and increase the number of voices and stakeholders in Liberian government. In a conflict driven by disputes over national power, then, the Accra Peace Agreement created a web of institutions to divide and share power across multiple groups.

Based on the theoretical expectations outlined in the previous chapter, I argue that the new institutions and power structures created within the Accra Peace Agreement both incentivize greater political inclusion and constrain actors from continuing exclusionary practices. Moreover, the agreement fostered an environment of greater trust by dispersing power and by generating a system of checks and balances. In this new political environment in which actors' grievances were addressed, my theoretical expectations would predict that political rights and political security will improve. In the next section, I discuss the state of political rights in post-conflict Liberia before more fully delving into the causal

⁷Future extensions of this research may want to build a more nuanced measure of context-specificity, because the current coding does not fully capture the difference between elite-focused power sharing versus promises to be inclusive of broader portions of society.

mechanisms at work in this case.

Political Inclusion and Repression in Post-Conflict Liberia

To what extent, if at all, did political rights and protections improve in the aftermath of both the Abuja Peace Agreements and the Accra Peace Agreement? Did they, as hypothesized, lead to the establishment of a more inclusive environment? While both agreements contained certain steps toward a more inclusive political environment and thus made efforts to resolve the causes of conflict, the Accra Peace Agreement went much further in extending an inclusive peace to more members of society. A brief look at the political environment following each agreement provides evidence for the theoretical expectations.

After the signing of the Abuja II Peace Agreement in 1996, levels of political repression and terror soon worsened. By 1999, repression spiked to its worst possible levels. According to the Political Terror Scale, Liberia's score of 5 represents a country in which "terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limited on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals" (Gibney et al., 2015). Indeed, Charles Taylor's reign following the second Abuja Peace Agreement was marked by some of the worst levels of exclusion and repression. One must ask to what extent the peace process in 1996 failed to clearly delineate power structures and create checks on power. Beyond repression levels, other metrics of political rights and inclusions saw a dramatic decline following the Abuja II Peace Agreement as well. In the aftermath of this first peace process, political power remained monopolized by a small number of social groups who represented a minority of the population (Coppedge et al., 2015). The peace agreement which was limited in its inclusion of societal actors thus generated an environment in which exclusion remained the norm.

The Accra Peace Agreement, in contrast to the Abuja II Agreement, set Liberian political life on a different – and more inclusive – trajectory. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the Accra Peace Agreement, repression levels dropped dramatically. In the three years following the Accra Peace Agreement, society remained marked by extensive political imprisonment, political violence, and lengthy political detentions, but this was a clear improvement over an environment of widespread torture, rights violations, and terror. By 2008, Liberia had achieved an even more secure and open political system in which political imprisonment was quite limited and torture was rare (Gibney et al., 2015). On a

more positive level, Liberian political inclusivity improved in terms of which groups were able to access power. According to the Varieties of Democracy data on power distribution, the post-Accra period in Liberia was a political environment in which “either all social groups possess some political power, with some groups having more power than others; or different social groups alternate in power... but all significant groups have a turn at the seat of power” (Coppedge et al., 2015). Figure 5.1 shows the progression of distribution of political power by social group, according to Coppedge et al. (2015). A score of 0 indicates political power that is totally monopolized by one social group that represents a minority of the population and a score of 4 is indicative of a society in which all social groups have roughly equal political power.




Figure 5.1: To what extent is power distributed according to social groups? (Liberia, 1980-2013)

Comments on Causality

In analyzing how Liberia’s peace agreement did or did not lay the foundations for a higher quality peace, it is crucial to remember that any progress toward a quality peace in 1996 or 2003 was not inevitable. While there was an opening for change in both time periods, the peace agreements played

a role in shaping the direction of that change. Nilsson and Kovacs (2005) warn, for example, that “Liberia’s previously poor democratic record and lack of good governance, in combination with the fragility of the current political system and the inexperience of the new administration, constitutes a pertinent threat to the peace process” (397). Nevertheless, Liberia in the post-2003 period has been able to make strides toward greater inclusivity and opportunity. Indeed, Nilsson and Kovacs (2005) as well as Call (2012) contrast the Accra Peace Agreement with previous peace processes in terms of its scope, inclusivity, and potential for progress. Call (2012) writes that a main difference in determining the success or lack thereof when looking at the Abuja II Agreement and the Accra Peace Agreement is the extent to which the agreements integrated all key political actors. The political environment following the Accra Peace Agreement has remained more secure and more open; while not the only driver, it is important to recognize the ways in which the Accra Peace Agreement addressed the causes of the Liberian conflict and generated a higher quality peace.

Specifically, evidence from post-2003 Liberia illustrates that the Accra Peace Agreement created both incentives and constraints which ultimately facilitated a more open and inclusive political system. With respect to incentivizing a more open and inclusive political system, I argue that the context-specificity of the Accra Peace Agreement created an environment in which peace became a more attractive option than continued fighting. In terms of the bargaining framework, by addressing the causes of conflict, the Accra Peace Agreement created a distribution of power to which actors were committed and which made actors adverse to disrupting the new status quo.

The following example contrasts Charles Taylor’s behavior in the post-Abuja II period to that of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in the post-Accra period. After the elections in 1997 which brought Charles Taylor to power, Taylor launched a campaign of violence, terror, and repression against political opponents. Given the uncertainty that remained following the 1996 peace processes (where the causes of conflict were not fully addressed), Taylor viewed exclusion and violence as strategically necessary to maintain power. On the other hand, the specificities of the Accra Peace Agreement in 2003 disincentivized Johnson-Sirleaf from taking part in similar behavior. Indeed, according to Nilsson and Kovacs (2005), Johnson-Sirleaf “promised a government of inclusion” and “asserted that no member of the new Liberia shall ever again feel so excluded that they are to resort to violence” (407). I argue that President Sirleaf was a rational political actor who was committed first and foremost to maintaining and consolidating

power; however, she calculated that the most effective strategy toward this goal was to work within a more open and inclusive political system. She did not want to risk behavior that would lead to renewed conflict or that would jeopardize her power. In other words, while violence and repression appeared to be the best strategy available to Taylor in his quest for power, non-violence and inclusion was the optimal strategy for Johnson-Sirleaf. The political structures put in place by the Accra Peace Agreement decreased insecurity, decreased incentives to renege, and thus increased Johnson-Sirleaf's ability to lead a more open political system.

In addition to incentives, the Accra Peace Agreement created greater constraints on conflict actors and political leaders, constraints that have limited opportunities for continued exclusion. Most simply, by spreading power across not only political parties but also to civil society groups, the Accra Peace Agreement institutionalized structures of greater political inclusivity. Unless conflict actors totally shirked on agreement commitments, the agreement laid the legal framework for a peace that was more inclusive in nature. While progress remains slow, the current government has committed efforts to form a Constitution Review Committee in order to remedy existing constitutional provisions that have further perpetuated underlying tensions in Liberian society (UN News Centre, 2013). The Committee presented a plan to President Sirleaf that emphasizes the participation of political parties, traditional leaders, women's groups and other groups and encourages the revision of the 1986 Constitution to reflect the country's new circumstances (United Nations Development Program, 2015).

Finally, one can point to the international spotlight that accompanied the Accra Peace Agreement as a constraint mechanism that tied actors' hands to more inclusive practices. The peace agreement called for the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to lead a multinational peacekeeping force to preserve the peace and help monitor peace agreement implementation. In addition, a United Nations peacekeeping operation, UNMIL, led the oversight of many implementation processes. With international actors present and committed to the terms of the agreement, leaders were restricted in their capacity to pursue exclusionary or blatantly repressive policies. In brief, actors were less likely to renege on their commitment to new and non-violent political institutions in the presence of third-party enforcers.

Nilsson and Kovacs (2005) write that international peacekeepers were critical in providing security

and implementation oversight. Indeed, the authors go on to state: “The extensive international commitment to peace in Liberia is one of the factors that most evidently differs between the current peace process and the one that ended the first civil war in 1996...” (Nilsson and Kovacs, 2005, 403). It is crucial to point out, however, that the constraints of international actors alone are likely insufficient to generate a quality peace.⁸ Instead, international actors are able to constrain actors’ insofar as they have a legal-institutional framework to do so. In other words, the peace agreements shape the realm of what is possible for third parties to implement, but third parties are unlikely to arrive at quality peace outcomes on their own. Because the Accra Peace Agreement was context-specific and dealt with the necessary political incompatibilities so thoroughly, international actors had a strong footing on which to hold actors to their commitment.

Lessons from Liberia

Liberia, like the vast majority of post-conflict societies, has a long way to go. For example, a United Nations report from 2013 points to the ongoing challenges of deep cleavages and political opportunity in Liberia.⁹ Moreover, the preceding account focuses solely on progress toward political inclusivity and says little about the ongoing corruption and economic challenges facing Liberian society. At the same time, however, the Accra Peace Agreement laid a foundation for a peace that is more inclusive and secure than it may have been. In the period of transformation that was occurring at the end of Liberia’s second civil war, the Accra Peace Agreement pushed Liberia down the road toward a higher quality peace rather than a road toward continued exclusions, exploitation, and violence.

The case of Liberia does illustrate how context-specific peace agreements such as the Accra Peace Agreement can lay the foundation for more politically inclusive and secure system by incentivizing and constraining political actors. President Sirleaf made statements which illustrated how she prioritized inclusion and respect for the political process so as to avoid the recurrence of war. Because the Accra Peace Agreement addressed the underlying causes of conflict, political actors felt secure working within the new institutional framework rather than resorting to violence to gain more power. International actors

⁸This is a question that I have explored empirically, and have thus far found little evidence that peacekeeping, on its own, generates higher quality peaceful outcomes. I want to emphasize, however, that the links between third-party enforcement and quality peace require greater attention both theoretically and empirically.

⁹<http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10958.doc.htm>

such as ECOMOG and UNMIL led implementation oversight so as to tie actors' hands to the provisions set forth within the Accra Peace Agreement.

Nonetheless, the Liberian case highlights the need for further research in a number of areas. First, the difference between the Abuja II Agreement and the Accra Agreement illustrate the importance of understanding which conflict actors should gain a seat at the table and which actors should gain positions in post-conflict governments. Indeed, similar to the lessons from the Angolan case in Chapter 3, the peace processes leading to the signing of the Abuja II Peace Agreement in 1996 were largely focused on conflict actors and military solutions. While they contained mechanisms to share power, they did not include a broad cross-section of Liberian society. On the other hand, in addressing the causes of conflict through a series of institutional mechanisms, the Accra Peace Agreement focused on the role of many different groups in Liberia. The aforementioned discussion thus suggests that it may be insufficient to cater to a small number of conflict actors. Instead, peace agreements may be best-positioned to contribute to a higher quality peace when they not only address the causes of conflict but also give roles to a diverse set of societal actors.

Second, the case illustration of Liberia demonstrates the need to better understand the role of third party actors. While third parties are deemed a necessary condition in achieving a durable peace¹⁰, less is known about their role in consolidating a higher quality peace. The theory herein suggests that third parties can be instrumental in holding actors accountable to the extensive promises of context-specific agreements. More, however, must be done to assess which types of third parties are most beneficial and when, for instance, a dependence on third parties actually weakens states' ability to institutionalize a quality peace.

Finally, and perhaps the question which warrants the most attention is the question of the causes or sources of context-specific agreements. Why, specifically, were negotiators and conflict actors in Liberia able to achieve a context-specific peace agreement in 2003 when they were unable to find such success in 1996? There are a number of explanations that warrant future research, including but not limited to: (1) the make-up and leverage of mediation teams, (2) the inclusivity of conflict actors, and (3) the stage of the conflict in terms of power distribution. A related question for Liberia, in particular, revolves around the extent to which actors used lessons from Abuja's failure to craft a stronger settlement in 2003. Peace

¹⁰See, e.g.: Walter (2002); Fortna (2004a)

processes are long and dynamic; peace agreements are but one manifestation of the process. While more research must be done to understand the multiple steps toward peace, the case of Liberia illustrates the role that a peace agreement can have in shaping the trajectory of peace.

Burundi

The causes of conflict in Burundi, like the Liberian case, stem from disputes over national power. Burundian society was shaped by divisions that had their roots in colonial times; Belgian colonizers entrenched power within the hands of the Tutsi minority while the Hutu majority remained excluded and marginalized. Tutsis, who made up only ten to fourteen percent of the population, maintained a hold on power in the post-independence period through violent and repressive military regimes. Although Burundi took steps toward democratization and political liberalization in 1990, ethnic divisions, distrust, and ongoing political uncertainty led conflict to erupt in 1993. The causes of conflict, in short, stem from entrenched and oftentimes violent divisions within Burundian society and the subsequent dispute over who should control the national government.

During the long period of exclusion and leading up to the the civil war that began in 1993, political elites ruled through the regular use of intimidation, fear, and repression. Any solutions to the civil war in Burundi, then, would need to institutionalize non-violent political processes and place checks on incentives and decisions to use violence against the population. In spite of the challenges and divisions driving this dispute over national power, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi was context-specific in that it laid out a framework that was designed to mitigate and reduce the tensions revolving around access to state power. The context-specific peace agreement in Burundi put in place institutional constraints and also changed the incentives for actors. In so doing, the agreement created a political environment that was both more secure and more inclusive in nature than what existed prior to the country's civil war. In the next sections, I discuss the provisions of the peace agreement, the extent to which rights improved following the conflict, and the plausibility of identifying a causal link between the context-specificity of the agreement and post-conflict rights levels. At the same time, the case of Burundi is also interesting in that it is on the verge of collapse at the time of this writing. While Burundi illustrates the fragility of post-conflict societies, it nonetheless shows how peace agreements can generate improvements in levels of repression and exclusion.

Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi

In the period leading up to Burundi's civil war, the country's ethnic cleavages served as the underpinnings of extreme exclusion, intermittent violence, and repressive policies. Indeed, as the country took destabilizing steps toward democratization in the early 1990s, Hutus and Tutsis sparred over control of national power. A context-specific solution to the Burundian civil war, then, requires a focus on not only the distribution of power within Burundi but the sensitivity to entrenched ethnic differences.¹¹ The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, which was signed by all main conflict actors in 2000,¹² offered the context-specific solution that Burundi needed at the time. By providing nuanced and contextual solutions to the causes of conflict, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation agreement created an environment in which key actors were incentivized to respect political rights and constrained from continuing political violence and repression.

How, in particular, did the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement address the causes of civil war in Burundi and thus lay the framework for a higher quality peace? According to the UCDP Peace Agreement Database, the agreement included: (1) reforming the armed and security forces to follow an ethnic quota; (2) the creation of a power-sharing transitional government; (3) a Senate that would be elected on an ethnic basis; and (4) a number of mechanisms to ensure that at no level could one political party or one ethnic group achieve total domination (Högbladh, 2011). The agreement was thus sensitive to the fact that Burundi had been marked by the domination of a single group and the use of overt violence as a tool of political power. By outlining the role different groups would and could play on numerous governmental and societal levels, the Arusha Agreement placed checks on the power of any one group.

The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation was written with a distinct awareness to the country's ethnic cleavages. Chapter 1 of the peace agreement details the historical causes of Burundi's civil war. The

¹¹While I say entrenched ethnic differences, I want to emphasize that the categorization of Burundians as Hutus or Tutsis had origins not in ethnic differences but in historical manipulation by colonial powers.

¹²The agreement was initially denounced by the CNDD-FDD (Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie) and the FNL (Forces Nationales de Libération); these two parties nonetheless agreed to later reiterations of the agreement. This uncertainty with respect to commitment by some key actors provides an even tougher test of the theory, however.

agreement explains that ethnic cleavages were not always present in Burundi,¹³ but that the German and Belgian colonizers instilled deep divisions within society:

The colonial administration, first German and then Belgian under a League of Nations mandate and United Nations trusteeship, played a decisive role in the heightening of frustrations among the Bahutu, the Batutsi and the Batwa, and in the divisions which led to ethnic tensions.

In the context of a strategy of “divide and rule”, the colonial administration injected and imposed a caricatured, racist vision of Burundian society, accompanied by prejudices and clichés relating to morphological considerations designed to set the different components of Burundi’s population against one another on the basis of physical characteristics and character traits (Chapter 1, Article 2).

In addition to addressing the historical roots of conflict, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement acknowledges that “The conflict is fundamentally political, with extremely important ethnic divisions; It stems from a struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in power” (Chapter 1, Article 4; “Nature of the Burundi Conflict”). The agreement is thus quite specific and contextual in outlining the causes of conflict before moving to the solutions to the country’s civil war.

As a key solution to the country’s civil war, the peace agreement ensured “a reorganization of the State institutions to make them capable of integrating and reassuring all the ethnic components of Burundian society” (Chapter 2, Article 5). Moreover, the parties agreed to the “banning of all political or other associations advocating ethnic, regional, religious or gender discrimination or ideas contrary to national unity” (Chapter 2, Article 7). In sum, the peace agreement not only required parties to recognize the causes of conflict, but it also promoted solutions that were designed with the conflict’s context in mind. While power sharing was a key component of the solution to the dispute over national power, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement also took the necessary steps to address the social and historical ethnic tensions in society. Much of the agreed-upon language focused on unity, equal opportunity, and inclusivity for all Burundians regardless of ethnicity. The framework used within this dissertation argues that the words of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement had real and tangible implications

¹³Chapter 1, Article 1

for the political structures and behaviors of the state following conflict. By catering so specifically to the causes of conflict, the agreement increased the extent to which actors were committed (by desire or obligation) to a more secure and open political system.

Political Inclusion and Repression in Post-Conflict Burundi

Burundi has faced ongoing instability and uncertainty in its post-conflict period. Nonetheless, the country has made strides toward a higher quality peace. UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN office in Burundi, Karin Landgren, states of Burundi: “for a country still recovering from years of conflict, Burundi is to be commended for the relative political freedoms it has entrenched in its post-transition constitution” (UN News Centre, 2011). Burundi has thus made relative progress toward a more secure, open, and inclusive political system in the aftermath of its civil war. While progress is still needed to further consolidate the peace, the country’s political inclusiveness has improved in the wake of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement.

Following the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, levels of repression and political violence soon improved. Prior to Burundi’s civil war, levels of political repression spiked to their worst possible level according to Gibney et al. (2015). A 1992 report from Amnesty International states that “The most conspicuous of these human rights violations are periodic mass extrajudicial executions which have been perpetrated against members of the majority Hutu ethnic group by members of security forces” (Amnesty International, 1992). The report goes on to identify widespread violence, torture, killing, and indefinite detentions as tools used by the government of Pierre Buyoya to target the country’s Hutu majority.

Following the conflict in Burundi, however, practices by the government and security forces transitioned away from violence and intimidation to greater openness. According to the PTS, levels of political violence improved to a score of 3; while still marked by some intimidation and insecurity, the vast majority of Burundians were no longer subject government terror and intimidation. A United States State Department Human Rights Report on Burundi from 2007 states: “Neither the government nor its agents committed any politically motivated killings; however, security forces killed civilians during the year, although there were fewer such incidents than in the previous year (see section 1.g.). Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports of summary executions or killings of civilians in reprisal for

rebel attacks or for suspected collaboration with rebel forces (Section 1a)” (United States Department of State, 2007). The report goes on to confirm that the country experienced no politically motivated disappearances or kidnappings (Section 1b). Using a negative or thin metric of political rights, then, Burundi made clear improvements toward a higher quality peace.




Figure 5.2: To what extent is the ideal of egalitarian democracy achieved? (Burundi, 1980-2014)

To what extent, though, did the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement facilitate a move toward more positive dimensions of political rights? Beyond improvements in repression levels, did the government of Burundi extend political rights and opportunities to all members of society? Admitting that “the way out of past violence is long and difficult,” Karin Landgren also asserted that the legal framework in post-conflict Burundi “will ensure that there is no narrowing of the political space...[or] harassment of civil society” (UN News Centre, 2011). A cursory look at the measure of egalitarian access to politics from the Varieties of Democracy Project illustrates the political opening that has taken place in Burundi. The data in Figure 5.2 reflect the extent to which political power is distributed across social groups (class, sex, religion, and ethnicity). According to Coppedge et al. (2015), “this perspective on democracy emphasizes that a formal guarantee of political rights and civil liberties are not always sufficient for political equality.” The measure is thus taking into account the practices as well as the

policies of inclusivity. Burundi saw a quick spike in inclusivity immediately prior to the conflict, as the government attempted to move toward democracy. In the aftermath of the peace processes that were in large part shaped by the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, one can see another improvement in inclusivity. Burundi, on average, had been accustomed to a high concentration of power with the Tutsi elites, but the peace process that ended the civil war helped the country move toward a more inclusive political system.

Causal Process in Burundi

Burundi experienced clear improvements in political inclusivity and political protections following the conclusion of its civil war. I argue that the nature and contents of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement helped direct the country from an exclusionary and violent political space to one that would be more open. The civil war in Burundi began a period of transition and a break from the status quo; the peace processes as manifested by the Arusha Agreement shaped the direction of that transition. In other words, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, through its context-specificity, led the country and its actors on a path toward more inclusive political processes. In the following paragraphs, I consider the plausibility of a number of causal mechanisms and offer a number of pieces of evidence that illustrate the causal linkages.

The theoretical mechanisms laid forth in Chapter 4 include the ways in which context-specific peace agreements incentivize and constrain actors in the post-conflict period. The case of Burundi serves to illustrate the constraining role of context-specific peace agreements; specifically, the agreement created domestic institutions as well as international spotlight effects which tied actors' hands and prevented them from resorting to widespread repression and exclusion. There are reasons to believe, however, that the Arusha peace processes did not sufficiently or durably change the incentives of all conflict actors. This cautionary note is a point which I will consider in the next section.

The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement and subsequent reaffirmations of the agreement, evidence indicates, constrained actors and limited their ability to continue exclusionary and/or politically violent practices. In simple terms, the agreement legally constrained actors to more inclusive practices. For evidence of the constraint mechanism, I first look to see the extent to which the provisions of the peace agreement were translated into the permanent legal apparatus of the state. A number of the legal

changes put in place include the strict sharing of power across ethnic groups and political parties. For example, Curtis describes the political structures of the post-conflict state: “Each political party must present a blocked list of electoral candidates, in which not more than two out of every three candidates can be from the same ethnic group. At least one out of every four candidates on the list must be a woman” (Curtis, 2013, 87). Burundi also has a President and two Vice-Presidents, who must belong to different ethnic groups and political parties. These provisions were not only outlined in the Arusha Accords to address the incompatibilities that led to conflict, but they also became realities in the post-conflict state.

Beyond domestic institutional constraints, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement and subsequent peace agreements carried with them an international spotlight. The international attention, at a very minimum, reduced actors’ capacity and will to blatantly violate political rights. Moreover, the international involvement limited the possibility that actors would renege on their commitment to certain inclusive practices. The Arusha Agreement itself calls for the agreement to be observed and implemented with the assistance of the United Nations, the Organization for African Unity (OAU), and a Regional Peace Initiative for Burundi (Högbladh, 2011). In 2004, the United Nations operation in Burundi (ONUB) was officially set up to keep a close watch on peace implementation efforts and to lead national reconciliation efforts (Sullivan, 2005).

Reflections on the Burundian Case

The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement which was signed in 2000 was highly context-specific in nature in that it attempted to resolve ethnically-driven disputes over national power. The agreement went to great lengths to outline new institutional rules and structures that would create a more secure system; in so doing, the agreement directly constrained actors to more inclusive political outcomes. The process is reflected in the relative improvements in political rights that Burundi has experienced in the aftermath of conflict. With that said, however, evidence also questions the extent to which the peace agreement changed the prevailing incentives of actors. While key political players were constrained to more inclusive outcomes by the agreement, the underlying perceptions of ethnic and societal divisions remained in place. The disconnect, then, between constraints and incentives may – with further research – help explain the ongoing struggles and episodic violence Burundi has faced in

recent years.

Daley (2006), for example, points to the fact that the Arusha Agreement corrected the ethnic imbalance amongst elites but left “intact the contradictions within the society” (659). The agreement, while sensitive to the causes of conflict and the role of ethnicity in overcoming conflict, according to Daley failed to move Burundi away from ethnic categorizations. In fact, Daley writes that “the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, in seeking to correct ethnic imbalance in government, officially, institutionalized ethnicity as a criterion for participation in the state” (Daley, 2006). While the agreement created the structures for a more open and inclusive political system, it may have also perpetuated or exacerbated ethnic tensions. A serious consideration of these claims thus indicates that context-specificity (addressing the causes of conflict) must focus equally on institutional constraints *and* incentives for inclusivity. In this respect, I can contrast the case of Burundi with that of Liberia, which set up structures which incentivized actors to build bridges both across political elites but also across different sects of society.¹⁴

Falch (2008) and Sullivan (2005) argue that another key shortcoming of Burundi’s peace processes was that main conflict actors were often excluded from negotiations. According to Falch, the exclusion of rebel groups increased incentives of spoilers to undermine peace efforts. In the wake of the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, for example, the CNDD-FDD and the FNL continued fighting. The agreement and subsequent agreements, then, although context-specific in nature, struggled to change incentives and generate the trust necessary to consolidate a truly inclusive peace. Curtis (2013) argues that while power sharing and political inclusivity is quite extensive in Burundi, a fact that makes liberal peacebuilders hail the country as an example of success, he notes that this does not capture the entire story. Instead, he argues that post-Arusha Burundi is marked by violence, intimidation, and militarization. In spite of criticisms leveled by Curtis (2013), he acknowledges that “Burundi is a safer place in 2012 than it was at the beginning of the Arusha process in 1998 or at the time of the Convention of Government in 1994” (90). Moreover, he recognizes that it is, at least, more successful than its counterparts in places such as Democratic Republic of Congo and Côte d’Ivoire.

¹⁴Daley (2006) writes of Burundi: “This exclusion of civil society representatives from actively participating in the peace process reinforced the idea that peacemaking is solely the prerogative of political parties, rebel movements and men. In this respect, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement promoted an elitist and ethnicized politics of the state and failed to conceptualise a more inclusive politics that give the agency a multiple-voiced Burundi political community” (676).

The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement and subsequent agreements in Burundi have had clear shortcomings. They do not sufficiently incentivize actors to move beyond ethnic divisions but instead have made ethnicity a key component of the state's power distribution. As such, they have not fully changed the incentives or trust structures of all actors. At the same time, however, the agreements are quite extensive in their efforts to address the causes of conflict and redistribute access to national power. Evidence suggests that the legal framework of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement constrained actors such that a more open and inclusive system has taken hold. Burundi, in spite of its progress, nonetheless has a long way to go to achieve a truly secure and open political system.

Côte d'Ivoire

Côte d'Ivoire was, for decades, a model of success and economic prosperity in a region that was rife with conflict. Following independence from France in 1960, Côte d'Ivoire was led by a single political party (Parti démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire, or PDCI) under the leadership of President Félix Houphouët-Boigny. During Houphouët-Boigny's tenure in power, Côte d'Ivoire grew to become the wealthiest country in West Africa and one of the most robust economies on the continent. Migrant workers from nearby states joined the country's estimated 60 ethnic groups; by the 1990s, migrant workers made up approximately one-third of the population of Côte d'Ivoire (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2016). Between 1960 and the early 1990s, the single-party Ivorian state failed to institutionalize a transparent or democratic government (Bah, 2010). Nevertheless, the security and rights of individuals were largely respected; political intimidation and violence were rare. As Houphouët-Boigny began to open and liberalize the political environment in 1990, however, tensions across groups and within Ivorian society rose.

Following the death of Houphouët-Boigny in 1993, the country's "less savvy politicians exploited ethnic and nationalist sentiments," drawing distinctions based on the concept of *Ivoirité* (Bah, 2010, 601). The new nationalist political platform made a distinction between indigenous Ivorians and those who had immigrant ancestry. As a result of the institutionalization of the restrictive citizenship code, large portions of Ivorian society became excluded from political opportunities. In addition to the

marginalization of the country's immigrant community, many Ivorians from the predominantly Muslim north of the country could no longer access political or economic power.¹⁵ Following a coup in 1999, the breakdown of state authority and political stability became apparent. In 2002, three rebel groups emerged to attempt to overthrow then-president Laurent Gbagbo. The conflict in Côte d'Ivoire, then, is above all else a conflict that was driven by disputes of national power and disputes over which portions of Ivorian society should have access to that power.

Côte d'Ivoire, like the cases of Liberia and Burundi, experienced a conflict over control of national power. Although not distinctly ethnic in nature, the civil war in Côte d'Ivoire had strong foundations in disputes over citizenship rights and what it meant to be Ivorian. In the following sections, I assess the extent to which one of the comprehensive peace agreements in Côte d'Ivoire, the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement of 2007, addressed the causes of the conflict. Because the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement left components of the conflict's incompatibilities unsettled, it limited the country's capacity to make strides toward a higher quality peace. In other words, because the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement did not fully fit the context at hand, the post-agreement period remained marked by insecurity, uncertainty, and exclusion. Although civil war and its resolution is a transformative period, positive progress cannot be taken for granted. The case of Côte d'Ivoire illustrates the dangers of promoting agreements that do not fit the specific context and further emphasizes the argument that the content of peace agreements has lasting implications for post-conflict societies.

Ouagadougou Peace Agreement

The Ouagadougou Peace Agreement was one of the last in a series of efforts to bring an end to civil war in Côte d'Ivoire. Signed in 2007 by the government and the Forces Nouvelles (FN), the Ouagadougou Agreement "departed from the peace formula devised in [earlier agreements] and marked a monumental shift in the peace process. In contrast to all the other agreements, the Ouagadougou Agreement was spearheaded by Ivorians" (Bah, 2010, 610).¹⁶ Observers and negotiators had reason to be optimistic about this agreement, in particular. On the other hand, the agreement did not fully address the causes of the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire, an obstacle that I argue has undermined progress to a more

¹⁵See Bah (2010) for a more detailed discussion of the concept and consequences of Ivoirité.

¹⁶The Ouagadougou peace process was, however, mediated by President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso.

inclusive and open peace in the country.

From a positive or optimistic perspective, the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement did address several important incompatibilities and dimensions of the Ivorian conflict. Bah (2010) praises the agreement as making much greater progress than prior peace agreements in the country in that it addressed citizenship issues and military issues. Article 1 of the Ouagadougou Agreement recognizes “the identification of the Ivorian and foreign populations living in Côte d’Ivoire [as] a major issue” and a “source of conflicts.” The agreement thus goes on to explicate revised processes to ensure that citizenship laws do not explicitly or implicitly exclude certain groups of Ivorians.

Beyond addressing identity issues which were divisive in the pre-conflict and conflict period, the agreement also calls for electoral reforms. Högladh (2011) indicates: “Regarding the incompatibility the agreement provided for the organisation of open and transparent presidential elections to be held after the conclusion of the identification and registration process of eligible voters. Until the elections a government of transition would administrate the country.” The two main mechanisms that were included to address the causes of conflict were: (1) reforms to citizenship rules, and (2) electoral reforms and the occurrence of free, fair, and transparent elections.

While identity, elections, and demobilization issues are highly important and appropriate steps for the Ivorian conflict, the provisions of the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement do not fully address the cause of conflict: the distribution of power within the state. The components of the agreement do little to explicitly outline new political, economic, or social structures that would govern the post-conflict state. The first supplement to the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement did elaborate that the leader of the Forces Nouvelles, Guillaume Soro, would hold the post of Prime Minister; the agreement stipulated, however, that Soro would not be able to run for office in the post-conflict presidential elections. The Ouagadougou Agreement and its supplements did little to outline or implement long term plans for the Ivorian state. If a peace agreement is a quasi-constitutional document that sets the legal framework for the post-conflict state, the Ouagadougou Agreement left many parts of the framework unanswered. Given the uncertainties and questions surrounding the political structures of the state, I argue that the agreement failed to set Côte d’Ivoire on a path to a higher quality peace.

Ouagadougou Peace Agreement: A Missed Opportunity?

Levels of political violence and repression were quite limited under the rule of President Houphouët-Boigny (Gibney et al., 2015). During the 1990s, however, repression and political violence became more commonplace – although not widespread – and large portions of the Ivorian population were marginalized from political life due to their apparent lack of *Ivoirité*. What effects did the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement have on the political rights and opportunities of the average Ivorian? In other words, how did the provisions of the agreement shape the quality of peace in Côte d’Ivoire?

The Ouagadougou Peace Agreement was signed at a moment where there “was a clear sense of war fatigue among the masses and realization by the elite that outright military victory was elusive” (Bah, 2010, 609). The agreement occurred at a moment when conflict actors were ready to settle the dispute, yet the agreement missed the opportunity to fully resolve the conflict’s incompatibilities. According to accounts by Bah (2010), the peace process was based on an assumed mutual trust and understanding of each other’s intentions. However, the absence of a legal framework to address the state’s power distribution undermined any perceived success. The arrangement of Gbagbo as president and Soro as prime minister did satisfy the power aspirations of the two leaders, but it did not address power struggles more broadly. More importantly, it left assumed that the sharing of power across groups would follow naturally from the current arrangement.

In the years following the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement, violence around the transitional political processes has been common. The elections that were promised in the peace agreement took place in 2010 and were marred by violence and intimidation. According to Bellamy and Williams (2011):

Disputes about citizenship and ethnicity resurfaced; both sides used violence and intimidation, and dozens were killed in pre-election violence. Using this as a pretext, Gbagbo imposed a curfew during the election. When Ouattara’s supporters in Abidjan took to the streets to oppose the move, security forces opened fire, killing five people and injuring many others (832).

Reports also surfaced in Côte d’Ivoire of suspected mass graves. President Laurant Gbagbo, although

he suffered an apparent electoral defeat to Alassane Ouattara, prevented the dissemination of the election results, accused the predominantly Muslim north of vote rigging, and continued a spree of violence against demonstrators, northern Muslims and members of the immigrant community (Bellamy and Williams, 2011). By 2011, the United Nations had documented as many as 1,000 civilian deaths (Straus, 2011).

Because the agreement did not fully delineate actors' access to state power, it left insecurities unresolved. Actors – even the leaders who had been satisfied at the time with the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement – saw violence as a necessary tool to achieve the consolidation of power. The agreement had failed to incentivize a commitment to peace as opposed to violence. Additionally, the agreement failed to set up the institutions necessary to constrain actors to non-violent political interactions. Although the agreement did carry with it international spotlight in the form of United Nations observers, the third party presence was insufficient to keep Côte d'Ivoire on the path to a quality peace. In the absence of a legal framework that incentivizes inclusion and constrains actors from violence, the optimal strategy to access power may be violence. As such, it is crucial for peace agreements to meet the contextual needs of the conflict and its actors; the distribution of power and access to political opportunity should not, in a civil war driven by national power, be left unaddressed.

Lessons from Côte d'Ivoire

In many ways, Côte d'Ivoire should have been a relatively easy case to achieve a context-specific peace agreement that paved the way for a higher quality peace. Because the country was a beacon of stability and prosperity for so long, one might have expected the country to have the capacity to overcome violence and commit to peace. The peace process in Côte d'Ivoire, however, failed to fully address the underlying incompatibilities that led to conflict onset. In a conflict spurred by disputes over access to national political power, the Ouagadougou Agreement only went so far as to establish elections and name an opposition leader as Prime Minister. In short, the agreement lacked a long-term plan to address questions about access to power. I argue that this lack of context-specificity did little to incentivize or constrain actors to peaceful and politically inclusive outcomes. Instead, the lingering questions and insecurities created a situation in which political violence, intimidation, and exclusion remained the only tools available to maintain a hold on power. The case of Côte d'Ivoire thus emphasizes

the importance of focusing on context and using the peace agreement as a legal framework to increase security and inclusivity in the post-conflict state.

Discussion and Conclusions

This chapter had presented the cases of Liberia, Burundi, and Côte d'Ivoire to illustrate the causal linkages between peace agreements and post-conflict levels of political inclusivity. Specifically, I have argued and the cases have shown that as peace agreements increase in their context-specificity, they are more likely to generate more inclusive and secure political systems. In Liberia and Burundi, the context-specificity of the Accra Peace Agreement and Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, respectively, increased the perceived security of actors such that they were incentivized and constrained to commit to more inclusive systems. In Côte d'Ivoire, on the other hand, the agreement left key incompatibilities unaddressed. As such, leaders remained insecure in their access to power; when post-conflict elections took place, violence and intimidation marred the country's peace efforts. The case illustrations reiterate that peace agreements, when they are crafted to fit the context at hand, help increase security and move countries toward a higher quality peace.

The cases herein also illustrate the challenges in capturing “soft” causal mechanisms such as actors' incentives. Indeed, in researching the effects of the peace agreements in Liberia and Burundi, it remained challenging to identify the incentives of actors to use inclusive or exclusive policies. While the use of inclusion and exclusion are clear strategic choices based on perceptions of security and power, actors rarely make statements to that effect. To be clear, I am confident that the chosen cases illustrate the causal processes identified in this dissertation; at the same time, however, I recognize the need for deeper analysis such as interviews to truly gauge the ways in which agreements altered the behavior of conflict actors and political leaders.

Future extensions of both this chapter and the preceding quantitative chapter must also grapple with the possibility that grievances are not static. The evolution of grievances, incompatibilities, and goals of disputants are, in fact, likely to change over time. Thus, further analyses may want to analyze statements of conflict actors and updates to the distribution of power to gain a more nuanced understanding of how peace agreements and their contents must evolve. Nevertheless, the present research is significant in that it provides the necessary first step to recognize that context matters. More importantly, it highlights

the dangers of peace processes that fail to fully address context.

Finally, Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation offer important policy implications to peacemakers such as the United Nations and other mediators. Conflict resolution and post-conflict development is a time of uncertainty; oftentimes, leading international actors, in their efforts to help post-conflict societies, impose one-size-fits-all policies of democratization and economic liberalization. What this research has found, however, is that actors must not impose such solutions. Instead, mediators, peacekeepers, and peace builders must strive to find solutions to fit the context at hand. The research on mediation by Reid (2015) comes to similar conclusions with respect to local knowledge. While one-size-fits-all solutions may be “easy” and may work in some locations, the international community has witnessed too many failures of peace building to continue such policies. With a focus on context, peace processes may be able to not only end war but establish a meaningful, inclusive, and secure peace.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

How can a quality peace be established in the aftermath of civil war? To what extent is it possible to not only end violence but create a peace that is meaningful for those living in post-conflict societies? To begin to answer these questions, this dissertation focuses on peace agreements as tools that condition the extent to which a higher quality peace can be achieved. The preceding chapters develop a theoretical framework for how peace agreements influence the quality of post-conflict peace, as defined by levels of political inclusivity and opportunity. Within this dissertation I present two distinct empirical applications of this theoretical framework, the first of which focuses on women's rights and the second of which assesses levels of political inclusivity and security more broadly. Throughout, I endeavor to better understand how peace processes shape what life looks like following civil war. The research presented here offers strong indication that the words within peace agreements matter and that they play a key role in shaping, at the very least, the political rights and opportunities accorded to citizens in the wake of war.

Peace agreements, I have argued, are quasi-constitutional in nature.¹ The implications of their legal status mean that agreements lay forth the political, economic, social, and security structures for the post-conflict state. Their contents serve as a framework for the institutions that are to be created, revised, or reinforced following civil war. As such, peace agreements have the capacity to spur a number of processes that lead to tangible improvements in the quality of peace. Beyond ending war, peace agreements also have the capacity to build peace. Peace agreements, as tangible manifestations of the peace process, set the tone for post-conflict structures. Most simply, they change the incentives and constraints faced by actors. Through a number of mechanisms, which I will summarize below, the

¹Based on work by Bell (2006).

content of peace agreements has the capacity to commit actors to more inclusive outcomes and to render exclusion, repression, and rights violations less attractive options.

The second chapter of this dissertation assesses the role of peace agreements in shaping the quality of peace by focusing on one specific component of a quality peace: women's rights. I ask whether or not the inclusion of women's rights provisions within peace agreements leads to tangible improvements in the status of women following conflict. The question of women's rights and gender equality is a crucial component of the quality peace in that women's empowerment is seen as a mechanism through which societies can achieve a plethora of successful economic, social, political, and health outcomes. In Chapter 2, I posit that gender-specific peace agreements have the capacity to influence women's rights through the three following mechanisms: (1) tying hands; (2) shifting norms; and/or (3) positive externalities. The quantitative analysis of peace agreements signed between the years 1981 and 2011 offers strong support for the hypothesized relationship. The probability of rights improvements for women following the signing of a gender-specific peace agreement is over 80 percent. Through both direct and indirect processes, gender-specific peace agreements are shown to have positive effects on women's rights.

Chapter 3 presents four case illustrations to further investigate the causal mechanisms and the plausibility of the causal processes established in the second chapter. The cases of Burundi, Liberia, South Africa, and Angola provide further support for the large-N analysis while also uncovering a number of questions for future research. Burundi, particularly the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement that was signed in 2000, illustrates the direct causal mechanism; specifically, the Arusha Agreement shows how gender provisions within the agreement tie actors' hands to change. The provisions of the agreement directly manifested themselves in the country's post-conflict laws and women experienced improvements in their political rights. In Liberia, the Accra Peace Agreement of 2003 generated positive externalities insofar as it empowered women's groups to push for greater rights following conflict. With the legal footing of the peace agreement to stand on, women were able to legitimately push political leaders to extend greater rights to women. The final positive case – South Africa – is illustrative of a peace agreement spurring norms shifts. The signing of the Interim Constitution in 1993 was soon after followed by a noticeable change in perceptions of women. Arguably, the peace agreements in South

Africa, through their gender-specific language, helped to legitimize women as worthy and capable political actors. Lastly, the third chapter concludes with an analysis of the Angolan case. Although women played an active role in the country's civil war, the peace agreements in Angola were void of women's rights protections. As such, the Angolan peace process was a missed opportunity; while civil wars carry with them the winds of change, positive progress may not be guaranteed unless peace agreements are crafted with such positive goals in mind.

In Chapter 4, I shifted the focus from women's rights to the question of how peace agreements may influence political rights and protections more broadly. In this vein, I focus on one dimension of peace agreements, context-specificity, and argue that the context-specificity of agreements shapes the ways in which rights are accorded and respected following conflict. Context-specificity is defined as the extent to which peace agreements address the underlying causes of conflict. Thus, this chapter contributes to the literature by not only pushing a focus on positive dimensions of peace, but also by recognizing the importance of moving beyond "one-size-fits-all" solutions to conflict. By catering to the specific needs of the disputants and the specific causes of conflict, peace agreements incentivize greater inclusivity and constrain against rights abuses. The quantitative analysis confirms that as the context-specificity of agreements increases, so too do rights protections. While focused on a different dimension of quality peace, Chapter 4 confirms the findings and implications of Chapters 2 and 3: the contents of peace agreements matter for what peace looks like in post-conflict societies. Beyond ending violence, peace agreements also shape the nature of peace in the aftermath of war.

The final substantive chapter of this dissertation assesses three cases – Burundi, Liberia, and Côte d'Ivoire – in order to better understand the causal processes linking context-specific peace agreements to changes in the quality of peace. While Burundi and Liberia still face distinct political, economic, and social obstacles as they move further away from their histories of civil war, the two countries have experienced improvements in the quality of peace following civil war. Indeed, in each case, political protections have improved relative to what they were prior to conflict. In Burundi, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement put in place a web of institutions that constrained leaders' capacity to pursue blatantly exclusionary or abusive practices. Moreover, by creating institutions appropriate for the particular case, actors felt secure to work within the new political system as opposed to destabilizing the new system. In Liberia, the Accra Peace Agreement of 2003 achieved what the Abuja II Peace

Agreement of 1996 could not: the agreement addressed the underlying causes of conflict. The Accra Agreement, then, not only prevented a return to war, but it has also incentivized actors to work within the new system and respect the rights of ordinary citizens. In Côte d'Ivoire, on the other hand, the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement failed to fully address the disputes over national power that drove the country's conflict. As such, in the aftermath of civil war, political leaders have continued to resort to violence, exclusion, and intimidation as a means to achieve their goals. While the cases presented in Chapters 3 and 5 are not intended to be tests of the this dissertation's theory, they do illustrate the key role peace agreements play in shaping the direction of countries' paths toward peace.

Taken as a whole, this dissertation not only shows that higher quality peaceful outcomes are possible, but also that peace agreements are tools that the international community and domestic actors can use to shape the nature of post-conflict peace. As Galtung (1969) stated, peace is much more than the absence of violence; indeed, peace requires progress that extends justice, dignity, and opportunity for all members of society. With this in mind, peace agreements must be crafted to not only achieve negative peace, as defined by the absence of war, but also positive or quality peaceful outcomes. The words on paper matter and should be embraced as one important instrument when guiding countries out of the conflict trap. By focusing on two dimensions of peace agreements – gender-specificity and context-specificity – I have shown that the contents of peace agreements can have transformative effects. They influence the direction of progress following conflict and help to determine whether or not peace truly will be peaceful for the majority of citizens following civil war. In the following two sections, I address questions and concerns for future research as well as the policy implications of this research.

Future Research

How can countries get on a path to a higher quality peace? Why have countries such as Liberia and Burundi achieved more open and inclusive societies vis-à-vis pre-conflict realities, while Angola and Côte d'Ivoire, for example, remain bound to negative conceptions of peace? The research within this dissertation builds a theory of how one component of peace processes, peace agreements, contributes to the creation of higher quality peaceful outcomes. In particular, I focus on the processes through which societies achieve greater gender inclusivity and greater respect for political rights more broadly. The preceding theory and analyses offer a strong contribution insofar as they show that a higher quality

peace is possible, especially when peace agreements lay the legal framework with such an end in mind. Nonetheless, the work presented here will serve as a springboard for future research on the determinants of a quality peace.

Different Stages of Peace Processes

In developing the theory and empirical analyses of Chapters 2 and 4 and further investigating specific cases in Chapters 3 and 5, I was struck by a number of new questions and avenues for future research. I identify one broad set of questions as those questions about the peace process. The focus of this dissertation has been on peace agreements and their influence on the quality of peace. Peace agreements, while instrumental, are but one component of the broader peace process that occurs during and after civil wars. The interactions leading up to the peaceful resolution of civil war are all part of the broader bargaining process that occurs between actors. Bargaining thus proceeds throughout the fighting itself, the various negotiation attempts prior to the signing of an agreement, the interaction with third-party mediators, the “successful” negotiations that lead to ceasefires and more comprehensive peace agreements, and the implementation processes of agreements. The quality of peace is shaped at every level – from the time of fighting to the last successful resolution attempt. I must emphasize that in raising the following questions, I do not seek to call into doubt the findings with respect to peace agreements; in fact, peace agreements seem to be a dominant factor in shaping post-war outcomes. I also recognize, however, that they are not the *only* factor. I consider specific implications and extensions inspired by the complexity of peace processes in the following paragraphs.

One piece of the broader conceptualization of peace processes and the quality of peace involves further considering the effects of different types of settlements, specifically military victories versus negotiated settlements. I expect that a military victory could have effects that cut two ways. On the one hand, military victories concentrate power in the hands of one group; with the opposition entirely defeated, there may be no strategic incentive to implement inclusive policies or revise status quo institutions. Of course, this relationship may depend on who wins, rebels or government forces.² On the other hand, military victories could actually facilitate political inclusion of formerly marginalized

²When the government wins, I expect a reinforcement of status quo policies, while a rebel victory may bring in greater changes as the rebel group was seeking to revise the pre-conflict power structures of the state.

groups, because the victors will feel secure in their new role. By militarily defeating the opposition, the government has eliminated violent threats. Wallensteen (2015) has taken steps to research this relationship. Based on the theory presented here, I suspect the former causal story to hold more weight: that military victories reduce incentives to implement inclusive policies. Civil war resolution is a transformative period that can be shaped by the nature of the negotiated settlement; a military victory, by the government in particular, will inhibit any dramatic revisions of status quo policies and institutions.

Beyond contrasting the effects of military victories versus negotiated settlements, future extensions of this work on quality peace and its determinants must model the processes leading up to the signing of peace agreements. Peace agreements themselves reveal a good deal of information about the nature, goals, and intentions of a peace process. At the same time, future work will want to address the following questions: (1) who has a seat at the negotiating table and how does this influence both the contents of peace agreements but also the likelihood that quality peace takes root?; (2) what strategies and attributes of mediators and third-party actors increase the likelihood of a quality peace?; (3) how does the power balance of the combatants influence their openness toward inclusive post-conflict policies?; and (4) to what extent does the presence of third-party enforcers such as United Nations peacekeepers increase the commitment of actors to more inclusive and higher-quality policies? Importantly, the common goal of these questions is to better understand how domestic and international actors interact to influence the quality of post-conflict peace. I do not expect that there is a one-size-fits-all formula to achieve a quality peace. However, by answering the preceding questions, I will be better equipped to assess the pathways through which a quality peace is established and which tools are appropriate given the particular context of various cases.

A specific example of the need to model the various stages of a peace process stems from the chapters on women's rights. The empirical analysis presented in Chapter 2 takes into account the likely endogenous treatment effects; in other words, I do account for the fact that the processes influencing improvements in women's post-conflict rights may also be causing gender provisions to appear in peace agreements. While I am confident, then, in the strength of my findings and the policy implications that follow, I believe more work must be done. The case illustrations of Chapter 3 suggest that the presence or absence of a women's movement, female negotiators, and/or United Nations pressure all may

influence the extent to which women's rights exist within peace agreements.³ Increasingly, researchers are collecting data on and analyzing the effects of female fighters and female negotiators. Together, then, this line of research must address how to translate women's involvement in earlier stages of the conflict and negotiations to more permanent empowerment following conflict. My findings suggest that gender-specific agreements are effective in this respect. In addition, the research must investigate the processes through which women and other underrepresented groups can be empowered even in those cases in which such groups were excluded both prior to and during the conflict.

Similarly, work on context-specific peace agreements and quality of peace would also benefit from an investigation of the sources of context-specific agreements. Assuming, as the results indicate, that context-specific peace agreements lead to improvements in human rights and political opportunity, future work must identify the ways in which context-specific agreements come about. What, in other words, can actors do to better address the causes of conflicts and to resolve the contextual needs of specific cases? An immediate avenue for research involves drawing from my own work on mediation leverage (Reid, 2015) and Menninga's (2015) work on multiparty mediation to construct a theory of how mediators, in particular, shape the contents of peace agreements. Again, the future extensions of this dissertation are driven by a need to better understand how civil wars can be successfully resolved in ways that not only end violence but create quality peace. A key component toward this end is constructing a more complete story of how various stages of a peace process shape prospects for a higher quality peace.

Extending Definitions of a Quality Peace

A second task for future research is to consider additional dimensions of a quality peace. I define a quality peace as one that offers political, economic, and social inclusion for all members of a society. The research presented here focuses on two important components of that definition: women's political rights and the political rights and opportunities of society more broadly. First and foremost, I plan to extend the analyses of Chapters 2 and 3 to include other dimensions of women's rights. To institutionalize political inclusivity for women in both law and in practice is essential. Beyond granting women a voice

³At the same time, the contrasting case of Angola demonstrates that a vibrant presence of female fighters is insufficient to push women's rights onto the agenda of a peace process or to guarantee rights improvements following civil war.

in the political life of the state, political protections may also set forth longer term changes in women's political, economic, and social roles. At the same time, women's political rights may be the "easiest" realm to make progress. While the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland extended political rights to women, it has not remedied ongoing personal violence experienced by many women in the region.⁴ Similarly, while Liberia has a female head of state, female empowerment has not necessarily taken root within all levels in the country. Beyond women's political rights, then, future research will ask how peace processes influence women's economic and social roles as well.⁵

Additionally, in extensions of Chapter 4, I plan to build upon existing (and admittedly negative) operationalizations of political rights. At present, I find that increases in the context-specificity of peace agreements improves the likelihood that governments will treat their citizens better in the aftermath of war. Specifically, the findings suggest that context-specificity leads to reductions in repression levels when compared to pre-conflict levels. As such, I have concluded that context-specific agreements lead to more open and secure political systems. At the same time, levels of repression are a "negative" conceptualization of rights; reductions in political intimidation and violence are essential, but in striving for a higher quality peace, we must also strive for more. As I stated earlier in this work, if researchers and policymakers only strive for a negative peace, then perhaps that is all that they will get. Future extensions will rely on more positive dimensions of political inclusivity to better gauge the extent to which all groups within society have equal access to political protections and opportunities.⁶

Beyond the extensions listed above, research on the quality of post-conflict peace should consider how peace processes help or inhibit the establishment of inclusive economic and social policies and practices. The establishment of inclusion of opportunity is a tall task and involves a focus on many slow-moving processes. Although returns on efforts might not be immediate (in education levels, for example, or access to equal employment), it is nonetheless crucial for domestic actors, international negotiators, and third-party implementation efforts to consider both the short- and long-term processes that guide countries out of the conflict trap.

⁴Based on accounts from participants in the Women, Peace, and Power Sharing Conference hosted by Queen's University, Belfast, Northern Ireland, November 2015.

⁵A key limitation in extending beyond political rights, however, has been a lack of available data.

⁶A fruitful avenue for said extension is the latest release of the Varieties of Democracy data (Coppedge et al., 2015).

Policy Implications

What can policymakers learn from this research? The implications of the theory and findings on the quality of post-conflict peace are quite straight forward: peace agreements matter and their contents shape what peace looks like following civil war. The end of a civil war is a transformative time and a time in which actors have the potential to change the status quo; positive progress however is not assured. Actors need to think fully about the implications of the words on paper. The contents of the peace agreements included in this study – a comprehensive set of civil war peace agreements signed between 1981 and 2011 – have had clear implications for the nature of peace in their respective states. Peace agreements such as the Accra Peace Agreement in Liberia empowered societal actors to hold leaders accountable and discouraged leaders from continuing blatantly exclusionary practices. To say that policymakers must focus more on the substance of negotiations is perhaps an obvious statement, but it remains truer now than ever before.

The first two substantive chapters focus on gender-specific peace agreements and women's post-conflict rights, and the chapters' findings add fuel and legitimacy for the United Nations' calls for gender-inclusive peace processes. Since 2000 and the signing of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 on "Women, Peace, and Security," the United Nations has pursued an agenda of women's empowerment and women's involvement in peace processes. The U.N.'s efforts, however, have been called into question as women are still largely marginalized or altogether excluded from peace negotiations. While I do not disagree with those who question the efficacy of UNSCR 1325, I do want to emphasize that small steps can have meaningful results. Put simply, the inclusion of gender-specific provisions in an agreement can lead to tangible benefits for women's rights. It is but one piece of the larger effort to establish equality of the sexes, but it is a step forward nonetheless. Thus, even when women are not secured a seat at the table, the actors who do have a voice (third-parties, conflict actors, civil society groups, etc.) must ensure that women's rights are on the agenda. Indeed, this is an avenue that mediators and other third-parties should focus on as a means of creating the foundations for a higher quality peace.

A second set of policy implications arise from the analysis on context-specific peace agreements. The findings suggest that negotiators must pay greater attention to the context in which they are working.

This goal involves understanding the causes of conflict, the evolving needs of the disputants, and past successes or failures of resolution attempts. By focusing on the context and designing a solution to fit the situation at hand, negotiators are setting a country on a path to a higher quality peace. While I am not the first to make such a statement, I want to reiterate the dangers of one-size-fits-all solutions. By ignoring the context in which the conflict and its resolution are occurring, actors risk missing a chance at a quality peace and perhaps worse, they risk setting a country on the path toward renewed violence. The policy implications arising from Chapters 4 and 5 indicate that peace agreements must be crafted in ways that are context-specific, but they further suggest that negotiating teams should be chosen to fit the situation as well. By paying attention to context rather than imposing one-size-fits-all solutions, the outlook for post-conflict societies and the people living within them is much more hopeful.

The goal of all conflict resolution efforts must, first and foremost, be to end war. At the same time, the end of war does not guarantee the end of violence; injustice, exclusion, and marginalization of groups perpetuates structures of violence in post-conflict societies. Thus, conflict resolution efforts must focus on not only ending war but also establishing a peace that is free from systematic exclusions and injustices. My research has found that peace agreements are important tools in striving toward and shaping a higher quality peace. Post-conflict societies can and should work toward higher quality outcomes; marginalized groups should continue to push for greater inclusion at every level. By working together, domestic and international actors have the capacity to create a peace that is meaningful for all groups within society.

Of course, the research, future work, and policy prescriptions that I have laid forth are not without obstacles. The obstacles, however, should not prevent researchers and policymakers alike from striving for a better understanding of the context in which civil wars are successfully resolved. The research herein strives for more inclusive and meaningful definitions of peace, a peace that takes into account the dignity of those in post-conflict states. Anne-Marie Slaughter, in writing about UN reforms, sums up many of the sentiments put forth in this and other work on quality peace:

As human beings, we all seek to live our lives in dignity, free from fear and from want. We need not be guaranteed prosperity, but at least the health and education necessary to strive for it. We cannot be guaranteed long lives, but at least that our government will not try to murder us and will do its utmost to prevent our fellow citizens from doing so. We should

not be guaranteed equal esteem of our fellow human beings, but at least equal respect, the promise that neither politicians nor ethnic or religious leaders can declare any group, class, or nation less than human (Slaughter, 2005).

My research and findings indicate that peace agreements are key tools for establishing greater respect for humanity. They are not, of course, a panacea nor do they establish some utopian version of respect, dignity, and equality. Yet, peace agreements, as one piece of a broader process, help societies find the pathways that take them toward greater human security and a higher quality peace.

APPENDIX 1

Table A.1: Robustness Check: Controlling for Comprehensive Agreements

	DV: Rights Improvements (Durable)	
	Model 1	Model 2
Outcome Equation		
Gender Provisions	1.8980** (0.3415)	1.9033** (0.4952)
Comprehensive		-0.9089 (0.5663)
Conflict Duration		0.0095* (0.0039)
PKO		0.4593 (0.4207)
Women's Political Rights (Global)		1.9084 (2.7002)
GDPpc (lag, log)		-0.5141 (0.3503)
Selection Equation		
Conflict Duration		0.0103** (0.0027)
Comprehensive		1.0961** (0.3602)
PKO		-0.4593 (0.4207)
Women's Political Rights (Global)		16.4747 ** (4.2171)
GDPpc (lag, log)		-0.9461* (0.3401)
Post-UNSCR 1325		-2.9890** (1.0298)
Third-party Female Signatories	0.1347** (0.0369)	0.0803** (0.0188)
<i>N</i>	100	73
χ^2	155.803**	316.541**
Significance level: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$		

Table A.2: Peacekeeping Operations and Gender-Specific Peace Agreements

	No Peacekeeping	Peacekeeping	
No Gender Provisions	72	18	90
Gender Provisions	24	5	29
	96	23	119
$\chi^2 = 0.1070$; $\text{Pr}(\chi^2) = .744$			

Table A.3: Peacekeeping Operations and Women's Rights Improvements

	No Peacekeeping	Peacekeeping	
No Rights Improvements	59	14	73
Rights Improvements	35	6	41
	94	20	114
$\chi^2 = 0.3747$; $\text{Pr}(\chi^2) = .540$			

APPENDIX 2

Grievance	Solution	Variables from UCDP:
Secession	<p>(1) Grievance coded as fully addressed if agreement includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Independence referendum, or • Right of self-determination <p>(1/2) Grievance coded as partially addressed if agreement includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decentralization/federalism, and/or • Territorial power-sharing <p>(0) Not addressed</p>	<p>Full if:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ind=1 and/or Ref=1 <p>Partial if:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fed=1, Aut=1, and/or Shaloc=1 (and Ind=0/Ref=0) <p>Not addressed = 0</p>
Autonomy	<p>(1) Fully addressed if:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decentralization/federalism, or • Territorial power-sharing <p>(0) Not addressed</p>	<p>Full if:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fed=1, Aut=1, and/or Shaloc=1 (or Ind=1/Ref=1) <p>Not addressed = 0</p>
Ideology/National Power	<p>(1) Fully addressed if agreement includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Power-sharing/transitional government; <p>(2/3) High partial if agreement includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3 or more of electoral, executive, judicial, and legislative reforms <p>(1/3) Low partial if agreement includes only:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • constitutional changes • or 1 or 2 of electoral, executive, judicial, and legislative reforms <p>(0) - Not addressed</p>	<p>Full if:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shagov=1 and/or Interim=1 <p>Partial (high and low):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Self-coding <p>Not addressed = 0</p>
Control of resources	<p>(1) Fully addressed if agreement includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Natural resource usage • Land ownership rights <p>(0) Not addressed</p>	Self-coding

Figure A.1: Coding of Context-Specificity of Peace Agreements

Table A.4: Peace Agreements and Post-Conflict Repression (Select Examples)

Agreement Name	Context-Specificity	Repression Decreases
Accra Peace Agreement (Liberia, 2003)	1.00	Yes
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (Burundi, 2000)	1.00	Yes
Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord (Bangladesh, 1997)	1.00	Yes
Agreement for a Firm and Lasting Peace (Guatemala, 1996)	0.66	Yes
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Nepal, 2006)	1.00	No
Memorandum of Understanding (Angola, 2002)	0.50	No
Yebibou Agreement (Chad, 2005)	0.33	No
Note: By repression decreases I mean the DV is coded as 1.		

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