

DISSATISFIED VOTERS AND NO ALTERNATIVE: THE UNCHALLENGED POSITION  
OF POLITICAL ELITES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

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## **ABSTRACT**

Ashley Hooper: Dissatisfied Voters and No Alternative: The Unchallenged Position of Political Elites in Bosnia and Herzegovina  
(Under the direction of Milada Vachudova)

In February 2014, violent protests erupted in Tuzla and quickly spread to multiple other Bosnian cities, including Mostar and Sarajevo. Initially, the protests were labeled as the “Bosnian Spring,” a term used to describe a state that is undergoing revolutionary change; however, this term was used prematurely in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and by April the protest movement had completely lost momentum. The cause for dissatisfaction among citizens was driven by nearly a decade of political stagnation. The lack of political progression can largely be attributed to the legacy of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which brought an end to the ethnically driven atrocities. However, the agreement also formed a uniquely complicated governmental structure based on ethnicity—providing a political framework in which elites are able to evade accountability. Political competition has been greatly decreased by the continued presence of wartime-ethno parties, which dominate the political discourse—perpetuating fear and mistrust among the electorate. I argue that there is a crisis of democratization halting the political progression and European integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina caused by a lack of both political accountability and competition.

To my parents, who have supported and encouraged me to explore the world. I am so grateful for everything you have done for me.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina or Bosnia
DPA	Dayton Peace Agreement
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
EU	European Union
FBiH	The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
HDZ	Croatian Democratic Union Party
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OHR	Office of the High Representative
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
RS	Republika Srpska
SAA	Stabilization and Association Agreement
SDA	Party of Democratic Action
SDP	Social Democratic Party
SDS	Serb Democratic Party
SNSD	Alliance of Independent Social Democrats
SPS	Social Party of Serbia

## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

After the horrors of World War II, it is difficult to understand that civil wars and ethnic cleansing ravaged the Balkan region for nearly ten years in the 1990s. Today, Balkan countries such as Slovenia and Croatia have already earned their place as European Union (EU) member states. While the “carrot” of EU membership helped foster democratization in Central and Eastern Europe in the years following the collapse of communism in 1989, it has not brought critical economic and political reform to Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter BiH or Bosnia). The Dayton Peace Agreement may have ended the bloodshed in BiH, but the complicated institutions in place due to the agreement, which include a tripartite presidency, bicameral legislature, and a weak constitutional court, have yet to pass much needed reform. Despite the presence of European institutions in BiH and the relative success of its neighbors Croatia and now Serbia in the EU pre-accession process, the progress of Bosnia and Herzegovina toward the EU has been slow and difficult.

One reason for the lack of EU leverage in BiH is the fact that the Stabilization and Associate Agreement (SAA) has still not come into force. The EU has insisted that before the SAA can be implemented, Bosnia’s ruling elites must agree to constitutional reform that amends the discriminatory provisions recognized in the *Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina* case. The consequence of this non-compliance by BiH is that the SAA has not yet entered into force even though it has been ratified by all EU member states. The European Council has blocked the



entrance of BiH until the set conditions are met to involve all ethnic minorities groups into the political system (McCrudden and O'Leary 2013). The lack of political accountability has brought the wheels of political action to a halt—leading to a severely slow progression of the state toward EU accession. In this thesis I explore the cause of such poor democratic governance in BiH. Why has the leverage of the EU been unsuccessful in bringing about political change in BiH? Why are political elites in BiH not held accountable for Bosnia's poor performance by the voters?

I argue in this thesis that while BiH may have free elections, they are not fair and do not allow for the critical political competition needed to foster a healthy democracy and ensure good governance—perpetuating the cycle of stagnation without political accountability. The Dayton structure and its institutions have greatly contributed to this democratic disconnect, hindering accountability in BiH. Since 2005, the political structure in BiH has become increasingly unstable because the international community deemed the state of BiH to be “safe” enough to return power to the elites and those leaders were given ownership of the future of BiH. This decision gave domestic elites power over reform and the Euro-Atlantic integration, but working within the dysfunctional framework of Dayton (Bassuener and Weber 2014, 2).

The international community hoped that Bosnian elites would work in the interest of both citizens and the state under the incentive structure created by the Dayton institutions, but this optimism was greatly misplaced, giving the elected elites an opportunity to form a political monopoly—which can be seen in the case of Milorad Dodik and his ascension to leadership in Republika Srpska (RS) and Zlatko Lagumdžija in the Federation (FBiH). In this thesis I show that this political monopoly provided an environment in which the ethno-nationalist parties dominate the political discourse with a focus on ethnic tension, while vaguely mentioning critical

economic and social issues without any concrete policy prescriptions. A lack of competition ensures that these parties remain in power because there is no viable alternative for citizens to replace them with (“NDI Assessment Report” 2009, 6).

While popular support of the EU is clear among the citizens of BiH, there is a complete lack of motivation on the part of political elites to implement reforms. I show that leaders of both Republika Srpska and the Federation often use ethnically driven rhetoric and fear to gain votes within their prospective constituent group. Ethnic paranoia dominates the greater political conversation in BiH taking the place of more important matters, such as implementing the costly reforms needed to move BiH closer to the EU, corruption and police reform as an example. Many of these political elites have benefited from the corrupt and stagnated political system that is currently in place—furthering their distaste of reform. The leaders acknowledge EU accession as an important goal, but their constituencies have yet to punish them for “dragging their feet” (Vachudova 2014). While the elites have benefited from the status quo, the majority of Bosnian citizens live in a state of poverty, with one-fourth of adult workers and two-thirds of youth workers unemployed, and without hope that their government will make beneficial changes to improve the current state of BiH (“Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress Report” 2014, 27).

I use Burton, Gunther, and Higley’s work on democratic consolidation to place BiH in the democratic regime type of unconsolidated democracy. This theory provides a useful lens for us to compare BiH with its neighbor Serbia. It helps us understand why BiH is a special case within the Balkan region and why it has remained stagnate, while its neighbors continue to progress. Milada Vachudova’s work on transition in Central and Eastern Europe helps us to examine the causes for the lack of EU leverage in BiH. We can understand the reason that the passive EU “carrot” has failed to instigate change in BiH.

The rest of this thesis is divided into seven parts. In the first part, I discuss the historical context of the Yugoslav wars pertaining to BiH. In the second part, I look at the labyrinthine Dayton-structure and its consequence on the poor governing ability of BiH. In the third part, I investigate the legacy of wartime ethnic parties and their legacy within the contemporary political sphere. In the fourth part, I show the negative consequences of patronage and informal institutions, which contribute to unclear political accountability and a lack of transparency. In the fifth part, I explain why the difficulties faced by the international community, especially the EU, in gaining political leverage in BiH are a function of poor competition and extensive patronage structures. In the sixth part, I compare the behavior of elites in BiH and Serbia and I explore how this behavior has evolved in the post-war era. In the seventh section, I apply Burton, Gunther, and Higley's "unconsolidated regime type" to BiH and Serbia to the understand divergence of neighboring states—the cause for stagnation in BiH and measurable progression in Serbia.

## **CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND**

The purpose of this section is to provide a historical context for the current political setting in BiH, referring to the legacy of war and the special case of state building through the Dayton Peace Agreement. The war in Bosnia paved the way for the patronage networks that continue to capture Bosnian politics today.

The war in Bosnia was a result of the dissolution of Yugoslavia—beginning with the secessions of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991. Located in the heart of Yugoslavia, BiH was (and remains today) the most ethnically diverse of the Yugoslav republics, which would fuel the violent power struggle between these groups in the wake of independence. A referendum regarding independence was held in BiH between February 27 and March 1, 1992, which revealed the overwhelming popular support for independence from Yugoslavia; however, the referendum was met by a Serb boycott. As a response to the decision of independence from Yugoslavia, the Bosnian Serbs declared the Serbian Republic of Bosnia on March 27, 1992—which declared two-thirds of the territory in the greater Bosnian state (OSCE 1992, 2). Bosnian Croat politicians also declared their own region known as Herceg-Bosna with the hopes of eventually joining with Croatia. Bosnian Serb militias, with assistance from the Yugoslav military (controlled by Serbia and Montenegro), moved to grab as much territory as possible in BiH, despite the sanctions and international arms embargo against Serbia (2).

Violence between Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and Bosnian Croats was concentrated near the city of Mostar, but this fighting was greatly reduced by the Washington Agreement, which was the basis for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in BiH today. The Washington Agreement allied the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croat forces against the Bosnian Serbs. This alliance allowed the Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks to reclaim significant amounts of territory (International Crisis Group 1997, 15). Violent war crimes were committed by all three groups in BiH and the balance of both power and territory can be seen through the two-entity structure decided in 1995 during the Dayton negotiations—one entity comprising Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks, due to their alliance, and another entity for Bosnian Serbs. State building in BiH after the war was a nearly impossible task because of the complicated nature of the war itself. The war began due to Bosnian Serbs and although ethnic cleansing occurred on all sides, it was the aggression against the Bosniaks by the Bosnian Serbs that led to the most deaths, culminating in Srebrenica. If the new state did not provide a secure balance of power between the three groups there was a deep fear of further violence shared by all sides of the conflict (15).

The main purpose of the Dayton Peace Agreement was to promote peace and stability in BiH after three-and-a-half-years of ethnic cleansing and warfare. The agreement was brokered on November 21, 1995 in Dayton, Ohio on American soil and later signed a month later in France (Bose 2002, 2). The negotiations between the leaders of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia, were overseen by the US State Department—meaning that the influence of the international community in the rebuilding of the Bosnian state would be of the utmost importance. The peace negotiations were both international and regional in nature, as the leaders of the former Yugoslavian states; Serbia, Croatia and BiH, were involved in its conception. The so-called peace treaty was signed under the same regional sentiments that drove the area to war (Bose

2006, 327). The focus of regionalism would have a paramount impact on the future governance of BiH for years to come.

### **CHAPTER 3: DAYTON DISCONNECT**

In this section I show how the Dayton Peace Agreement has formed a complicated system that undermines political accountability in Bosnian politics today—creating an impasse; reform of the institutions is almost impossible.

The new Dayton structure of BiH was set up in a bipolar fashion. Two entities of Republika Srpska, led by the Bosnian Serbs, and the Federation made up of Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and Bosnian Croats now formed the state of BiH. These two factions were met with difficulty from the beginning. Many prominent Bosniak politicians spoke out against the existence of the semi-independent RS because they considered it to be “an illegitimate entity carved out using ethnic cleansing, and asked for its abolition (Belloni 2009, 355). Furthering the frustrations of many Bosniaks was the absorption of Srebrenica, a city in which 7,000 Bosniak men and boys were murdered by Serbian forces, into Republika Srpska, the Bosnian Serb entity of BiH (McRobie 2014).

Many argue that the very structure of the BiH government and legislative decision-making that was created through Dayton has created de-facto ethnically exclusive politics. The three-member rotating presidency exaggerates the ethno-politics because each major ethnic group votes for one representative. Citizens of Republika Srpska vote for a Serb member, while citizens of the Federation vote for a Bosniak and Croat seat. This system reaffirms ethnic

allegiance and the “notion among voters that they should only vote for their own kind” (“NDI Assessment Report” 2009, 4).

The Bosnian state has been described as a consociational confederation—a model of government championed by Arend Lijphart and prescribed specifically for divided societies in which the power of the state rests with larger groups, rather than to individual citizens (Bose 2006, 326). The dichotomous and confederal character of BiH has led to a radically decentralized formation of the state. The consociational aspects of the Dayton Agreement require “political elites to share power, in addition to prescribing proportionality in government and guaranteeing mutual veto rights and communal autonomy” (Belloni 2009, 359).

The consociational tendency of the Bosnian government has created a complex institutional structure composed of 11 parliaments and cabinets of ministers, including one at the Federation level and 10 at the cantonal level (Vachudova 2014). BiH is composed of

[...] one state, two entities, three peoples, an estimated 3.9 millions citizens, and five layers of governance led by 14 prime ministers and governments, making Bosnia the state with the highest number of presidents, prime ministers, and ministers per capita in the entire world (Belloni 2009, 359).

The labyrinthine structure of BiH has led to a deadlock among the various ethnic groups and the impossibility of movement towards the EU.

One of the most important tools of these ethno-nationalist parties within the Dayton structure of BiH is the easy access to veto points. These readily available veto points have allowed the political elites of ethno-nationalist parties to halt the legislative process and any movement toward implementing EU-friendly reforms—making an electoral turnover the only option to bring about change. The most prevalent veto point, known as the vital interest veto, allows any of the represented ethnic groups (Serb, Croat, Bosniak) to veto laws almost unilaterally at the state level and in the courts (“NDI Assessment Report” 2009, 5; Bahtic-



Kunrath 2011, 902). Despite the legislative stalemate that has plagued BiH since the end of the war, these wartime parties remain in a position of power—still gaining votes. Even new parties have often turned from moderate stances to more nationalist, identity-based strategies to gain votes and remain in power. Both the SDP (Social Democratic Party) of FBiH and the SDS (Serb Democratic Party) of RS follow this pattern toward an ethnically centered political focus.

Why have the citizens of BiH continued to vote for political leaders that do not initiate change? Why do they not just “throw out the bums” as Grigore Pop-Eleches has so eloquently stated (2010, 236)? The reality of the political sphere in BiH is that no real alternative exists for the electorate. It is not possible to “throw out the bums” because there is no one to elect in their place. In a country in which unemployment and poverty are rampant, elites have “siphoned off money in myriad ways, including bloated salaries, inflated state contracts, corrupt privatization deals, and assets stripped from idle factories” (Vachudova 2014). Despite the difficult state of BiH, the lack of an organized opposition has allowed these political elites to enjoy a position of power without the threat of voter rejection.

## CHAPTER 4: ETHNO-POLITICS IN BiH

The purpose of this section is to examine the wartime ethno-parties in BiH and why moderate parties and political leaders often turn to ethnic nationalism. I look at the specific cases of Milorad Dodik of the SDS and Zlatko Lagumdžija of the SDP. I argue that ethno-nationalist rhetoric is the main tool used by political elites to incite both fear and mistrust within the electorate in order to maintain power.

The recent war past of BiH has become a useful tool of elites to dominate the public sphere with both ethnically driven sentiment and chauvinistic discrimination. These ethnic divisions are deeply ingrained in the everyday lives of citizens as described by Ramo Atajic,

Everything—from the greeting you use to the dialect you speak and the newspaper in your coat pocket—is judged, commented upon and categorized in terms of an omnipresent, mythicized ‘ethnicity.’ Under such circumstances, defining oneself as a citizen of the BiH state is tantamount to a betrayal of one’s national identity (Brljavac 2011).

While ethnic nationalism always existed during the existence of Yugoslavia, any organized movements were crushed and forced into the background. After the death of Tito in 1980, the once unacceptable ethnic rhetoric of “us” and “them” finally had the space to grow without restraint. Although citizens of all ethnic groups lived in peace living and working side-by-side, ethno-nationalists used ancient fears to gain societal distrust of the “others.” This ethnic tension would ultimately lead to ethnically based violence in the Balkans. The fear and exclusion that ethno-nationalist elites and hard-liners have implemented in Bosnian politics today uses the

memory of the recent war as a valuable scare tactic to further deepen ethnic divisions in society in order to monopolize power (Franovic 2008, 29).

Early ethno-nationalist parties including the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), Party of Democratic Action (SDA) representing the Bosniaks, and the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) emerged as the main political giants in the wake of the war, using these societal divisions to their advantage to gain wider support. Their success can be traced to their ability to consolidate organizational power during the war between 1992 and 1995—each representing one of the three ethnic groups involved. While the HDZ was closely linked to the political leanings of Croatia’s Tudjman and SDS was linked to Serbia’s president Milosevic, the Bosniak SDA was the only one of the three ethnic parties that lacked an “ethnic adjective in its name; however, the political programme of the party stated that SDA was ‘a political alliance of Yugoslav citizens who belong to the Muslim cultural-historical sphere’” (Halilovich 2013, 65). Prominent positions during wartime gave them an edge over the new parties and legitimacy among their ethnic kin (Manning 2007, 264). In the post-Dayton era these parties were able to enjoy the position of incumbents despite the pressure of the international community to oversee the election of new officials to the Bosnian government according to the terms of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) were charged with the mission to recruit and vet candidates appropriate for the new post-war environment based on their internationally accepted profiles. Officials of the SDS, SDA and HDZ actively blocked the provisions of the DPA and were subject to removal by these external actors (263).

Party officials resented the invasive presence of external actors within their domestic politics. Each dealt with their alleged reform in differing ways. While the strategy of attracting

votes was affected by the influence of the OHR, both parties were able to maintain legitimate positions due to their resource advantages and organization in comparison to the newer post-war parties. Although the initial domination of these parties was not possible due to the peace provisions and international oversight, their position within Bosnian politics was cemented after a hasty election encouraged by the United States in 1996. The new opposition parties were unable to provide a challenge to the old political elite because they were unable to organize themselves to compete with the resources possessed by the wartime parties (263).

The use of ethnic fear and scapegoating as politically useful tactics can be seen in the political career of Milorad Dodik. Dodik arrived on the political scene during the first multiparty elections in 1990 as a member of parliament of the Reformist party. Shortly before the outbreak of war, he left parliament and joined the newly formed RS National Assembly. Just after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement his independently formed club of MPs transformed into the Independent Members of Parliament Caucus. This would then become the core of the Party of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) and the only challenge to Karadzic's mono-ethnic SDS—touting a more multi-ethnic approach. After merging with the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, Dodik became the majority leader in the national assembly (Weber 2014, 101).

Even though Dodik lost power to the SDS in 2001, he became the only viable option for the West because of his more moderate platform during the power shift in 2006 when the international community returned political sovereignty back to BiH. His once moderate policies were now replaced with both Serb nationalist rhetoric and social populism, while also combining a pro-EU stance. However, his support for European integration would dissipate with time. A fair assumption to explain Dodik's sudden use of more nationalist rhetoric is the lost election of

2001. For him, it became clear that it is more politically lucrative to be nationalist than moderate (Bjelajac 2012).

Now turning to the Federation, the SDP was the largest opposition party to the ethnic three-party coalition by merging with the Reformist party following the end of the war. The legacy of Tito's slogan, "Brotherhood and Unity," greatly influenced the political standing of the SDP—a party that strived to rise above ethnic divisions. The ethnic tolerance of the SDP changed under the leadership of Zlatko Lagumdžija, who seemingly "sold out [the party] to the dark forces that want to bring about Bosnia's final dissolution and plunge the country back into fratricide" (Stuebner 2012). The SDP strayed from its original political track following the 2010 election in which the SDP replaced the SDA as the strongest party at the state level and largest parliamentary group in the Federation (Weber 2014, 103).

While the original reform policies were geared toward furthering EU-integration, Lagumdžija abandoned these plans after RS leaders' expressed vehement opposition to this plan (103). His inappropriate use of proportional ethnic representation as a response to the Sejdic-Finci case coupled with the "dismantling of the governing coalition in favour of highly questionable political alliances," resulted in the alienation of many within the SDP itself—most notably the resignation of Zeljko Komsic, the Croat member of the State Presidency (Stuebner 2012). Lagumdžija is responsible for ending the coalition of the SDP and the Bosniak SDA for opposing an SDP-supported draft budget that would allegedly weaken the central state, while strengthening the entities. The SDA also rejected the draft legislation proposed by the SDP "designed to bring police and state television in Bosnia's Federation entity under political (i.e. Lagumdžija's) control, by eliminating independent, non-partisan supervisory boards" (Stuebner

2012). As with Dodik and SDS, Lagumdzija clearly displayed dictatorial-like behavior within his party. Hopes for a more moderate major party in BiH were quickly dashed.

## **CHAPTER 5: PARTY PATRONAGE**

In this section I show the role of patronage in causing the political and socioeconomic stagnation of Bosnia, and in dooming the 2014 protests for better governance. The quality of democracy itself has been weakened by the persistence of informal institutions, which often act as the negotiating partner for international actors—making political accountability difficult due to backroom deals. I argue that patronage networks encourage citizens to vote for the status quo due to corrupt influence—resulting in a manipulated form of democracy.

A complex web of corruption and patronage has allowed political elites to wield an enormous amount of influence on the economy. Until the protests of 2014, the Bosnian population remained passive despite widespread discontent with elected officials. Much of the dissatisfaction is due to the strong degree of nepotism tainting employment options, especially jobs within the bloated civil service sector—leading voters that fear uncertainty to be “investing in the status quo” (Vachudova 2014). Party leaders often exert influence through subordinates throughout all levels of government and in turn these connections are used to manipulate where money is allocated. It can be difficult or even impossible to “get permits to buy property, build or expand a structure or start a company without a political blessing or bribe” (International Crisis Group 2014, 13). Citizens vote for these parties because they control jobs: the threat of losing job security causes people to vote for the status quo (Bieber 2014; Hronesova 2014). The combination of ethnicity and patronage networks make the situation in BiH especially difficult.

Both the political and economic elites of BiH have had decades to tighten their hold on the economy and the state—ending this cycle has proved to be a daunting task. Any efforts to build a more transparent government that is sensitive to the needs of its citizens have been met with opposition by the government officials themselves. The officials in power that stand to lose the most if reform is initiated. The international community does not have the authority to force elected officials to behave in a certain way so they politely ask the officials to do what is morally right,

Please abandon, if not betray, your constituencies' most cherished nationalist issues; adopt reforms that will dissolve the patronage networks on which your tenure depends; reduce corruption and with it your personal net worth; and adopt rule-of-law policies that will lead your allies' arrest and imprisonment and put your own liberty at risk. In return, after unspecified (but long) time, whoever is in office—probably not you—will lead your country into the EU (International Crisis Group 2014, 15).

In order to understand exactly how political elites are able to evade accountability by the voters we must first understand the role so-called “political communities,” which drive the political discourse. BiH is composed of three major ethnic group or “constituent peoples,” while at the same time divided into three separate “political communities.” These specific communities are aligned with certain political institutions that represent it—each centered in a different city. The largest community is composed of Bosnian patriots loyal to the state of BiH in Sarajevo and supports a functioning national government, although they may disagree on the specific prescription to achieve this goal. The second community looks to Banja Luka and supports the entity level of RS above all. This community shares the main goal of independence for RS from the greater Bosnian state. The last and smallest community looks to Mostar with the hope of a self-governing body for primarily Croat territory in BiH (International Crisis Group 2014, 6).



While the constituent peoples are divided on more ethnic lines, the political communities are separated in a civic sense. Although most ethnic groups correspond to a certain community (Bosniaks to Sarajevo, Serbs to Banja Luka, Croats to Mostar), there is a minority of each ethnic group that acts as an exception and does not follow the ethnically-assigned political community. An example would be Croat state presidency member Zeljko Komsic, who is also known as the presidency's "second Bosniak member" because he is a supporter of the greater Bosnian state as opposed to the Croat self-governing project (International Crisis Group 2014, 8). Each of these communities encompasses political parties that share the same project goals, control civil society organizations, as well as patron-client networks. While some multi-ethnic parties exist in BiH, they cannot cross the invisible line between the project goals of political communities since these communities have monopolized the political climate (8).

The "Sextet" is an informal group that is typically composed of leaders from the two largest parties in each political community. This group has been the traditional preferred partner of international actors to negotiate with and forge backroom deals (Bassuener and Weber 2014, 3). The democratic deficit and lack of political accountability lies in the fact that the group self-selects members within the "Sextet" itself. Driven by the goals of both their prospective parties and communities, the "Sextet" often acts in self-serving manner—ignoring the desires of electorate. Dissatisfied voters, unable to vote for "Sextet" members, then hold the political parties responsible for the problems plaguing BiH, but do not have an alternative. While informal institutions can be useful by facilitating coordination of formal institutions through personal contacts, these informal groups are often plagued with corruption, clientelism, particularism, and nepotism which can "seriously undermine formal institutional capacity" (Marcic 2014, 5). This exclusive group of six (and sometimes seven) wields an enormous

amount of power without accountability by dividing “control over public utilities, privatization, concession, state-owned banks, government tenders, and other sources of revenue and patronage” (International Crisis Group 2014, 12).

In February 2014, BiH was engulfed in fierce political protests that were a result of the intense collective frustration among Bosnian citizens toward a dysfunctional government. The protests presented BiH with the opportunity to form an organized opposition and initiate political change, but the movement lost steam in a matter of months and the same political elites are still in power. The established plenums (people’s assembly) were exceedingly diverse and without any “clear chain of command or prevailing political or ideological agenda” (Jukic and Latal 2015). This grassroots collective actively met to discuss their demands for political change and were initially hailed by the international community as a positive sign of democratic progress. Plenums were organized in twenty different locations and attempted to coordinate the protest movement, however, the numbers of the plenums dwindled quickly within the following weeks of the initial February protests. Many plenum members have blamed the failure of the protests on individuals hoping to use the movement for their own personal interests and self-gain (Jukic and Latal 2015).

Another cause that hindered the protest was the decision by many of the plenums to reject working with opposition parties or local NGOs, which did not allow for a more widespread channel of communication and influence on policy-makers. While the fact that such vigorous protests reveal citizens’ dissatisfaction, it also reveals the lethargic state of Bosnian civil society because these protests were not able to bring about any real measurable change in the October elections. Voters have adapted to the system of corruption that prevails in BiH and the ethnic parties remain unchallenged by a more legitimate option (Keil 2014).

Working within a bureaucratic monster allows leaders to often scapegoat the system itself. While they often champion domestic change directed at unemployment and the economy, a lack of results can be conveniently blamed on a lack of state coordination (Lasheras 2014).

BiH is the victim of

[...] state capture by private interests subjugating the public good, bloated bureaucracies devouring public funds while impairing, rather than providing adequate government services, privatized media masquerading as independent, and the near complete absence of social capital, understood as relations among strangers that are characterized by trust and cooperation” (“NDI Assessment Report” 2009, 6).

Although EU membership is a notion that is supported by the vast majority of BiH citizens, the highest echelon of the political sphere blocks any movement toward the reform that is needed.

In this section I have shown the role of patronage and informal institutions in distorting the political discourse in BiH by lessening accountability and the possibility of competition. I now turn to the problematic role of international actors, specifically the EU, in changing domestic politics in BiH.

## CHAPTER 6: LEVERAGE LOST?

In this section I show the difficulty faced by the EU in instigating political change in BiH. This difficulty is due in large part to requirement of BiH to comply with the *Sejdic-Finci* ruling as part of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA)—a decision that has greatly decreased the effectiveness of internationally driven domestic change.

The power of EU leverage has successfully played a role in past democratic transitions; however, the effectiveness of EU influence has dwindled in the case of BiH. Passive leverage is defined as the attraction of the EU to states based on both the political and economic benefits of membership. Furthering the willingness of states to join the EU are the negative consequences that result from exclusion (Vachudova 2005, 65). While the passive leverage of the EU was a catalyst for domestic change in many Central and Eastern European countries after 1989, the “carrot” of EU membership has not initiated the domestic change needed to move BiH closer toward European integration. The political and economic benefits of membership, although attractive, have been repeatedly blocked by political elites benefiting from the broken system in place.

Furthering the difficulty of international leverage is the controversy surrounding the Bosnian constitution, which the EU has argued violates human rights. Although the Dayton Peace Agreement created a consociational government structure based on the ethnic groups of Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosniaks, other possible minorities were forgotten during

the process. The Constitution labels the three main groups of BiH as “constituent peoples,” meaning they are solely entitled to the right to run for the House of Peoples (the second chamber of the State Parliament) and the Presidency (the collective Head of State). The “others,” or people that are not affiliated with these three groups, do not have the right to run for either of these posts (“Case of Sedjic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina” 2009). The constitutional alienation of the “others” became the focus of a court case known as *Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina*, in which members of both the Roma and Jewish communities challenged their exclusion to participate in the political positions of both the House of Peoples and the Presidency. This case became the primary threat against the constitution set up by the Dayton Peace agreement.

The case was brought to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which ruled in 2009 that BiH must amend its constitution in order to eliminate ethnic discrimination in both the presidency and House of Peoples—making these changes a requirement of the SAA (“World Report 2012: Bosnia and Herzegovina”). Although BiH had ratified the SAA in 2008, committing itself to addressing the European Partnership priorities, the ruling of *Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina* was not implemented. The ruling itself has become a convenient tool for elites to stall the process of amending the constitution and blame the EU for this requirement. While some argue that the lack of implementation was based on a lack of political will to do so, others point to the fragility of the government (“NDI Assessment Report” 2009, 11). After the elections in the fall of 2010, it took fourteen months to form a coalition government, and by May 2011, only six months later, the coalition collapsed—making any further progress toward reform nearly impossible (McCrudden and O’Leary 2013).

The EU has come under harsh criticism for its requirement of BiH to comply with the *Sejdic-Finci* ruling due to the fact that many current member states are not in compliance with the ECHR. It has been argued in a recent report by the European Stability Initiative that this requirement was a mistake outright because it does not allow BiH a functioning SAA and would have provided the EU a better position to push for domestic accountability and reform in BiH, while also giving Bosnian citizens a greater stake in the European integration process (2). By linking the ruling to the future prospect of membership the EU is in danger of weakening both the “sociological output legitimacy of the ECHR in Bosnia, but may further weaken the Court’s legitimacy elsewhere... because a court that is disobeyed begins to lose its credibility” (McCrudden and O’Leary 2013). In short, the SAA has given the EU less leverage in BiH and made EU membership a only distant possibility.

While EU membership is popular among the Bosnian electorate, there is an utter lack of political will to initiate the reforms required. Many political elites are quick to use pro-EU rhetoric to gain votes, but there is no sincere progression toward that goal (“NDI Assessment Report” 2009, 10). Although voters may support European integration, ethnic paranoia supersedes other policy areas. Voters feel pressured to support the party representing their ethno-national group in order to rally against the demands of the others. To vote for a more moderate party would risk sacrificing support and protection for the ethnic group—“People opt for the devil they know than the devil they don’t” (Hronesova 2014). The dysfunctional SAA also adds to difficulty of the EU to encourage domestic reform by requiring the ruling of *Sejdic-Finci*—a ruling that is not even respected by current member states. The government is too fragile to make the immense constitutional changes required by the ruling and such a change could ultimately cause the government to collapse. BiH has simply not respected the ruling of

the court—questioning the legitimacy of the court itself and the leverage of the EU (Vachudova 2014). In this section I have shown the difficulty facing the EU in terms of inciting change within domestic politics in BiH and the role of a dysfunctional SAA in halting political progress.

## CHAPTER 7: NEIGHBORHOOD CONTEXT

The purpose of this section is to examine the post-war transition of Serbia in order to understand BiH as a special case within the Balkans (which I compare in the next section “Crisis of Democratization”). Although Serbia initially experienced an illiberal transition following the fall of Milosevic in 2000, more functional democratic institutions have allowed the Serbian electorate to hold the political elite more accountable.

By the autumn of 2000, the people of Serbia were sick of the Milosevic regime and a decade of war. Amid massive protests with over a million people in Belgrade calling for him to accept defeat in the September election, Milosevic stepped down and on September 24, 2000. Vojislav Kostunica, leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), became the new president of Serbia (Ker-Lindsay 2009, 17). Although Milosevic was no longer in power, the new government faced institutional structures that were organized in the Milosevic-era making reforms a daunting task. During the parliamentary elections in December 2000, Zoran Djindjic, the leader of the Democratic Party (DS) became the new Prime Minister of Serbia (17). Both Kostunica and Djindjic had very differing views concerning the future of Serbia, making the political atmosphere in the post-Milosevic era exceedingly polarized and complicated.

The framework of illiberal states provides a useful lens to begin to understand the difficulties faced by Serbia (and I will later show with BiH) after ten years of war and ethnic nationalist sentiment. In *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration After*



*Communism*, Vachudova analyzes Central and Eastern European countries and their patterns of transition in the wake of communism. While some countries such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic (which Vachudova refers to as liberal states), benefited from a strong political opposition after the fall of the Wall and a fervent desire to reform economically, other countries choose a different path. The illiberal states of Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia not only restricted political competition and the political arena, but also used fear to discourage economic reform (25-59).

The new government of Serbia faced many obstacles from the moment Kostunica and Djindjic took office. While the new government was being formed “remnants of the Milosevic regime used the transition period to infiltrate the ranks of the new authorities or to preserve their positions in instances where the new authorities were slow to act” (Milic 2012, 160). The President and the Prime Minister had very different visions for the future of Serbia. While Prime Minister Djindjic was pro-Western, favored EU-accession, cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), joining NATO, and did not favor a hardline approach to relations with Kosovo, President Kostunica was against any type of compromise on the Kosovo issue, against NATO and EU membership, and refused to cooperate with the ICTY (160). Kostunica actually advocated for closer political and economic ties with Russia, rather than the EU.

If Serbia was looking to the EU, there was much work to be done to prepare for membership. The first requirement for Serbia was the normalization of relations with Kosovo and after ten years of wars that were ethnically driven, this would be difficult task. The second requirement of the EU for Serbian accession, particularly pushed by the Netherlands, was the extradition of all war criminals to be tried by the ICTY. This proved to be a difficult task

directly after the war because of “the prospect of arresting and delivering considerable numbers of sitting officials in the police, army and intelligence services” (160).

The future of Serbia was questionable. Kostunica, a nationalist social conservative, attracted more widespread support than Djindjic making his movement toward reform difficult. In 2001, after the arrest of Nebojsa Pavkovic and his transfer to the ICTY, Kostunica and his party broke with the current coalition because he vehemently disagreed with the cooperation that Djindjic advocated with the ICTY. Kostunica’s party then began to accept members of Milosevic’s old party, the Social Party of Serbia (SPS). Many of the political elites and organized crime groups benefited from the current state of corruption, which did not make Djindjic very popular. On March 12, 2003 the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic was planned and carried out by members of the JSO (Special Operations Unit), “an elite special unit of the Serbian Service of State Security, as well as members of organized criminal groups and officials in the civilian intelligence agency” (2012, 161). Now that Djindjic was gone any movement toward EU accession was halted and in many ways reversed. Kostunica began to appoint many of Milosevic’s former officials and clamp down on state media, although not to the level of Milosevic (“Kostunica: Serbia’s Quiet Nationalist” 2013). While under the leadership of Kostunica, the intricate web of the state, crime, and corruption continued and nationalism surrounding the “Kosovo problem” remained in the political discourse.

Any progress that Djindjic was able to accomplish before his death seemed to be erased during the March 2004 riots that resulted in the worst fighting since 1999. Despite the reemergence of violence, direct talks between Kosovo and Serbia began in February 2006 in Vienna to discuss decentralization. Although the atmosphere during the meetings was cordial, no breakthroughs were made. At the same time the EU was beginning to become impatient with

Serbia for refusing to turn over General Ratko Mladic to the ICTY. The EU gave Serbia a month to give up Mladic or face suspension of the next round of talks to begin in April to discuss the SAA, an agreement to normalize relations between both Kosovo and Serbia (Ker-Lindsay 2009, 33).

Despite Kostunica's attempts to rewrite the constitution to reaffirm the claim of Serbia to Kosovo, the Kosovars declared their independence on February 17, 2008. Immediately rejected by the Serbian government, Kostunica promised to annul this "false state." He made a national address in which he publically denounced the independence of Kosovo and to withdraw ambassadors from all countries that recognized Kosovo as a state. Due to the US's quick recognition of Kosovo, the US embassy in Belgrade became a gathering place for angry Serbs to voice their distaste of that decision (Phillips 2012, 183).

Even though there was a clear public rejection of the independence of Kosovo in Serbia, by May 2008 Tadic's "coalition 'Serbia for Europe' achieved 39 percent and declared itself the winner of the elections" (Stahl 2013, 461). The pro-EU party gained 6 percent of the vote from the center party of Kostunica. This was considered to be a great success for the Serbian government and their desire to join the EU. However, the pro-EU party did not hold the majority in parliament and formed a government with the Socialists—the party of Milosevic. But, because the socialist party was the junior partner of the EU-party, it guaranteed a check on the socialists and kept Serbia on track for EU accession (461). The same year President Tadic signed the SAA, but it would not be ratified until the remaining war criminals, Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, were turned over to the ICTY, ("Serbia and EU sign Pact on Ties" 2008). Despite the disapproval Serbia had toward the independence of Kosovo, Serbia applied for EU membership in 2009. Two important deals were brokered between Serbia and the EU—"a free

trade agreement between the EU and Belgrade, and the waiver on 19 December of the visa obligation for its nationals wishing to enter the Schengen area” (“EU/Serbia: Serbia Applies for EU Membership” 2013). In order to become a EU member, the state must normalize the difficult relations with Kosovo. The passive leverage of the EU has enticed Serbia to make changes to its system and finally overcome its late illiberal political transition.

By 2011, both Mladic and Karadzic were turned over to the ICTY and the EU was satisfied with the cooperation of the Serbian government, leading to more positive talks of candidacy status. But the issue of northern Kosovo has proved to be an increasingly difficult area to normalize due to the large Serbian minority that lives among the Albanian majority. While negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia have made great strides toward normalization and a harmonious coexistence, there is still much work to be done. There was a referendum in February 2012 in northern Kosovo that asked if the region recognized the Kosovar government, which in Ulrike Lunacek’s view was entirely counterproductive for the dialogue between the two governments (2012, 152). However, the passive leverage of the EU has led both sides to agree that it is in their best interest to jointly manage their border to promote peace between the Serbs and Albanians in northern Kosovo (“EU Leaders Grant Serbia Candidate Status” 2013)

Despite some set backs, by October of 2012 Pristina and Belgrade agreed to not block the others aspirations for EU membership (“EU Enlargement Commissioner Urges the Implementation of Kosovo-Serbia Agreement” 2012). In April of 2013, Serbian Prime Minister Ivica Dacic and Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaci met in Brussels to discuss the further normalization of relations between the two countries. This historic meeting, mediated by High Representative Catherine Ashton, dealt with the question of northern Kosovo. The ethnic Serbs in the region were granted their own police and appeal court, but no further autonomy was given

to the region (“Serbia and Kosovo reach EU-Brokered Landmark Accord” 2013). Although Serbia still will not recognize the independence of Kosovo, the fact that both leaders would negotiate terms with one another shows an incredible progression from the overwhelmingly difficult and violent reactions of the past. Prime Minister Thaci said, “This agreement will help us heal the wounds of the past if we have the wisdom and the knowledge to implement it in practice” (“Serbia and Kosovo reach EU-Brokered Landmark Accord” 2013). Due to the clear improving relations of Serbia and Kosovo, Serbia was able to begin EU membership talks by January 2014 on the condition that relations remain stable. I will now turn to the differing levels of democratization in the years following the war to compare Serbia and BiH.

## CHAPTER 8: CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIZATION

In this section, I compare BiH and Serbia in order to illustrate the uniquely dysfunctional political situation in BiH. I examine the divergence of these two states—relative progression of Serbia toward the EU and stagnation in BiH through the theoretical framework of democratic consolidation.

To understand the complicated nature of democracy in both Serbia and BiH and the divergence of these states in their progression toward the EU, we must look at these former Yugoslav states as unconsolidated democracies. Burton, Gunther, and Higley provide democratic regime types, which help us to contextualize the cases of BiH and Serbia as “unconsolidated democracy regime” types (5). Burton, Gunther, and Higley distinguish a consolidated democracy as the ideal type, encompassing healthy democracies in the Western world. Consolidated democracies encompass both elite and mass characteristics, which include: a sense of consensus among elites and factions about the “rules and codes of political conduct and the worth of political institutions, and they are unified structurally by extensive formal and informal networks they enable them to influence decision making and thereby defend and promote their factional interests peacefully” (4). Second, there is a clear participation of the masses in elections and other political procedures essential to democratic development. Third, there are no excluded groups in these procedures or obstacles to the expression of discontent through protests or demonstrations. Western European democracy regimes would be considered

consolidated democracy types, although a perfect state of democracy is impossible to achieve (4).

The second democratic regime type is known as an unconsolidated democracy and I argue most applies to BiH and Serbia. This regime type can be defined as the absence or greatly reduced extent of the elite or mass aspects of consolidated democracy (5). In this type, the framework of democratic procedures exist and there is the possibility of mass participation, however, there is no consensus among the elites regarding the democratic rules of the political sphere. In this type elites are often not unified, do not have “traffic with one another,” and are exceedingly distrustful of those outside of their political niche (5). Often this regime type coincides with the sudden collapse or overthrow of an authoritarian regime—a shared history of both Serbia and BiH originating from the sudden break up of the former Yugoslavia.

After the referendum on the independence of Montenegro in 2006, Serbia continued as an independent state and successor of the State Union. Constitutional reform in the same year declared Serbia a unitary state with two autonomous provinces, however the question of the “constitutional and factual status” of Kosovo has remained a polarizing issue in the parliament and in Serbia as a whole (Orlovic, Loncar, Banovic, and Vujovic 2012, 279). The influence of the EU on the domestic policies of Serbia has been the main driving force of the slow normalization of relations with Kosovo. While the rivalry between the reformists, led by Djindjic and anti-reformists, led by Kostunica would often “encroach upon fundamental democratic rules” in the years following Milosevic’s exit, The carrot of EU membership and the expectation of voters to move toward that goal have moved the political sphere from disunified to a more consensually unified elite (Antonic 2003). Although there is still much work to be done, Serbia is slowly moving toward consolidation.

The unconsolidated aspects of BiH's democratic regime have been greatly influenced by the unique governmental framework in place. The constitution has enabled the polity to take the form of "constitutional patriotism" and deepened the "ethnicification of politics"—leading to ethno-democracy (Orlovic, Loncar, Banovic, and Vujovic 2012, 280). The role of ethnicity, and religion to an extent, has led to a lack of political consensus among political elites. While the Annex 4 of the DPA has set up democratic institutions and provided citizens with a seemingly functional governmental structure, the structure itself has proved to be too complicated—making political accountability a difficult goal to achieve. While Serbia has made strides toward consensual unification, BiH has lagged behind and the political elite remain fragmented.

Both BiH and Serbia, lacking any organized opposition following the Dayton Peace Agreement and the end of the war, turned to ethnic-nationalist parties to lead the new state. Ethnic nationalism prevailed following transition because moderate rivals are weak and "the rulers may use the levers of power to keep them weak"—using both institutional and financial advantages for political domination (Vachudova 2005, 160). Much like the illiberal states following revolutions of 1989, both states were unable to reform politically or economically due to the election of corrupt elites, who benefited from the use of wartime rhetoric to distract their constituencies from the actual changes needed to rebuild the state ("NDI Assessment Report" 2009, 3; Slavkovic 2005). The complex Dayton governmental structure in place in BiH encourages political stagnation and the inability of the EU's passive leverage to have a significant impact on a movement toward reform and elite consensus by not providing a system in which voters can hold the political elites responsible at the ballot box for their performance. Serbian voters have benefited from a more active civil society that has a more democratically



legitimate system to “kick out the bums” if the elites fail to perform, for example with the rejection of ethnically based parties for more EU-friendly elites.

The process of democratization in BiH has been a difficult one and the protests of 2014 were a symptom of the prevailing democratic deficit. Bosnians themselves often feel alienated from the decision-making process and unrepresented by the state: “Bosnians are unequal before the law, and they know it. Exercise of the legal rights to repossess property or to reclaim a job too often depends on an individual’s national identity—or that of the judge before she or he appears” (International Crisis Group 2002, i). The noncompetitive nature of the political system allows the government to remain in power due to the support of a select few, who then receive redistributed income from the majority of voters as a reward. Once transfers are made to both economic and political resources, the elite have guaranteed their political survival due to the “narrow but influential interest groups keeping it in power” (Vachudova 2005, 15).

A passive civil society and lack of measureable democratic participation reveals a disconnect between democratic values and Bosnian society. Citizens lack an awareness of democratic procedures and the roots of democracy have yet to take hold. The historically authoritarian nature and lower quality of democratic experience during the last two decades have produced a democratically uneducated citizenry. A top-down approach toward democracy coupled with a complicated governmental structure without clear lines of responsibility and accountability have attributed to the failure of Bosnian democratization and the authoritarian temptation (European Stability Initiative 2004, 22).

While the lack of an active electorate makes the process of democratization difficult, the election process itself has proved to be more damaging. Elections in BiH give the impression of being both free and fair and there are enough citizens to participate to give the institutions a

democratic mandate, however, the lack of competition within the political sphere undermines the movement toward a more functional democracy (Chandler 2000, 81). Without the threat of political turnover, there is no realistic incentive system to ensure that elites “play by the democratic rules” (Vachudova 2005, 15). The inability of BiH to foster a free political market that responds to the wishes of the people, instead ethno-nationalist discourse dominates the political conversation and stagnation continues. In this section I have compared the level of democracy of BiH and Serbia—neighboring states that have experienced differing levels of progression in the post-war era.

## CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION

Why do Bosnia's voters continue to elect the same politicians when there is no measurable political change? In this thesis I argue that the dominance of ethno-nationalism allows politicians to use fear and mistrust to distract citizens from electing officials to instigate progressive change. Popular dissatisfaction with the performance of the political elite was illustrated by the fierce 2014 protests. I have explored how the governmental system in BiH does not allow for true accountability of elites due to its complicated structure and the problematic nature of the ethnically based system. This governmental structure does not allow for the healthy emergence of political opposition and therefore competition. BiH is composed of three electoral spheres based on ethnic identity and a corresponding ethno-nationalist party in turn dominates each electoral entity. Elites enjoy a position of power without the threat of voter rejection because there is no other viable choice for citizens to replace them with. The project director for "Nations in Transit" at Freedom House, Sylvana Habdank-Kolaczowska, best described the continuing political stalemate in BiH as the "Poster child, the warning, for dysfunctional governance" (Blua 2014).

To contextualize BiH within the Balkan region, I examined the democratic transitions of BiH and Serbia. I argued that both former Yugoslav-states could be defined as unconsolidated democratic regimes, using the work of Burton, Gunther, and Higley. By comparing these two historically connected states we can begin to understand why BiH has continued to lag behind,

while Serbia has made substantial progress toward the EU by gaining more elite consensus. The key differences between these two states are the Dayton legacy, which has continued make progress a difficult goal to achieve and the diverse ethnic make-up of BiH, which has led to the complication of power sharing.

The international intervention in BiH following the war has cemented a top-down approach to democratization and has not produced the natural progression that was expected two decades prior during the signing of the DPA in 1995. This has led to the failure of the passive leverage of the EU, which fostered democratic change in Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union, and BiH remains in a stalemate unable to progress. While the recent UK-German initiative to promote reform and development represents a renewed interest in the future of BiH, the affects of this new policy have yet to be seen (Jukic 2014). Until any measurable changes can be implemented to increase the fairness of the political sphere the political elites will remain in power and the citizens of BiH will remain powerless—without the tools to “kick out the bums.”

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