Relationship Between the Strength of Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation

Frank C Jones

A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political Science, Concentration European Governance.

Chapel Hill 2012

Approved by,

Robert Jenkins

Graeme Robertson

Milada Vachudova



Relationship Between the Strength of Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation by Frank C Jones is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/

ABSTRACT

FRANK C JONES: Relationship Between the Strength of Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation (Under the direction of Robert Jenkins)

This paper discusses the relationship between the strength of intellectual property rights and innovation. It is commonly held that increasing the strength of intellectual property rights will lead to increased innovation. However, this relationship cannot be infinite in nature, instead this paper explores the possibility of a parabolic or logarithmic relationship between these variables. The findings of this study are inconclusive with regard to this relationship, but there is strong evidence the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions cannot be used in place of country indicators when measuring their impact on innovation (GII) or the strength of intellectual property rights (IPR). Additionally, concrete finding in this area were hindered by lacking time series data for innovation and the strength of intellectual property rights. As these terms become better defined and studied, further study of this relationship should be possible with new data.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis may have my name on it, but it would not have been possible without the steadfast support and guidance of many people. Not the least of which are my parents, Frank Jones and Elizabeth Brummett, who instilled in me a thirst for knowledge from a young age. Additionally, my in-laws, Barbara and William Benedict, who poured over countless revisions to my papers. However, I am most grateful to my wife, Barbara Jones, who turned her life upside down just to follow my dreams.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES	vii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	viii
ABBREVIATIONS	ix
Introduction	1
Theory	2
Implications of Using Indexes and Ranked Variables	2
Definitions	5
Defining Innovation	5
Defining Intellectual Property Rights Protections	8
Strengthening of Intellectual Property Rights	9
Data and Methods	12
Global Innovation Index	13
International Property Rights Index	15
Hofstede Cultural Dimensions	16
Hypotheses and Research Questions	17
Country vs Hofstede	
OLS Models	21
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results	27
Conclusions	

Appendix 1 – Model Summaries	
Appendix 2 – Test of Assumptions	57
Normality	57
Correct specification	57
Exogeneity	57
Absence of Multicollinearity	64
Homoscedasticity	70
Nonautocorrelation	74
References	75

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Equations for Models A - D	18
Table 2: Country vs Hofstede Models	
Table 3: Country vs Hofstede F-Tests	18
Table 4: Country vs Hofstede ANOVA	18
Table 5: Equations for Models 1 - 14	21
Table 6: Models 1 - 14 ANOVA	21
Table 7: Models 1 - 14 F-Tests.	22
Table 8: Models 1 - 3 Variables of Interest.	22
Table 9: Model 4	22
Table 10: Model 5	22
Table 11: Model 6	23
Table 12: Model 7	23
Table 13: Model 8	23
Table 14: Model 9	23
Table 15: Model 2 Slope of IPR	24
Table 16: Model 5 Slope of IPR	25
Table 17: Model 8 Slope of IPR	

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Illustration 1: Distribution of the Variables	13
Illustration 2: Global Innovation Index	15
Illustration 3: Effects of Strength of IPR Protections on Innovation - Linear, Logarithmic, or Parabolic	28
Illustration 4: Distribution of the Variables	59
Illustration 5: Test of Autocorrelation in the Variables	76

ABBREVIATIONS

- GII The Global innovation Index (GII) created by INSEAD. This index measures the inputs and outputs of the innovation process and considers the tangible as well as intangible assets that are involved in the innovation process.
- IDV Individualism vs Collectivism, One of the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions which measures the propensity for a culture to be more individualistic or collectivist. Ranked on a scale of 1 (most collectivist) to 100 (most individualistic).
- IPR The primary independent variable of interest, taken from International Property Rights Index (IPRI). Specifically, a single component of this index, rankings for the Intellectual Property Rights Score.
- IVR Indulgence vs Restraint, One of the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions which measures the propensity for a culture to be more indulgent or restrained. Ranked on a scale of 1 (most restrained) to 100 (most indulgent).
- LTO Long-term Orientation vs Short-term Orientation, One of the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions which measures the propensity for a culture to be more long-term oriented or short-term orientated. Ranked on a scale of 1 (most short-term orientated) to 100 (most long-term orientated).
- MAS Masculinity vs Femininity, One of the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions which measures the propensity for a culture to be more masculine or feminine. Ranked on a scale of 1 (most feminine) to 100 (most masculine).
- PDI Power Distance Index, One of the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions which measures the propensity for a culture to be more or less accepting of differences in power distribution. Ranked on a scale of 1 (least accepting of differences in power distribution) to 100 (most accepting of differences in power distribution).
- UAI Uncertainty Avoidance Index, One of the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions which measures the propensity for a culture to be more likely to avoid uncertainty. Ranked on a scale of 1 (least likely to avoid uncertainty) to 100 (most likely to avoid uncertainty).

Introduction

Since its beginning in the United Kingdom during the eighteenth century, intellectual property rights protections have been consistently expanding. This is not to say they were more restricted prior to the passage of the Statute of Anne. On the contrary, full monopolistic rights over the publication and distribution of various works of art and literature were granted by the monarchy. This was the reason the Statute of Ann was created as a way to restrict these rights and allow artistic works to pass into the public domain. However, the restrictions which were put in place by the Statute of Anne in the UK, and later exported around the world, have been under constant attack by various rights holders seeking to strengthen the protection of their intellectual property rights. One of the strongest justifications given for this strengthening of intellectual property rights is the correlation with increased innovation. However, it is my hunch that strengthening intellectual property rights protections will only increase innovation to a certain extent. Once some threshold is reached, in terms of intellectual property rights protections, there will be a precipitous decline in innovation as access to the marketplace is disrupted. For this reason, I propose a parabolic relationship between strengthening intellectual property rights protections and innovation. However, the data and analysis from this study neither confirms nor rejects this possibility. Another model which would allow for property rights to increase to some extent before having little impact on innovation would be a logarithmic model. The data and analysis from this study also does not confirm nor reject the possibility of a logarithmic function.

While exploring this data I tested the hypothesis that country indicators could be substituted by the Hofsted Cultural Dimensions. The results show this is completely untrue and country indicators are significantly better indicators of both innovation and intellectual property rights protections than the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions.

Theory

It is my assertion that strengthening intellectual property rights protections will lead to greater innovation in some cases while reducing innovation in others. The reason for this is that strong intellectual property rights protections are needed to ensure that large-scale innovators will profit from their investment. Without intellectual property rights protections, it would be easier to copy the work of others rather than create innovative products. However, if intellectual property rights protections are too strong, the barriers to entry in the marketplace will discourage innovation. For this reason, when intellectual property rights protections are too strong there will be a decline in innovation. Of course it must be noted that some innovation will occur regardless of the strength of intellectual property rights protections. This is because some people will innovate regardless of profit (hobbyists) or legal implications (pirates).

Implications of Using Indexes and Ranked Variables

Although using an index can generate noise in a data set, it also helps to approximate variables which cannot be measured directly. This is the reason why the Organization for Economic and Community Development (OECD) and the United States Department of Commerce (DOC) have such complicated and multifaceted definitions of innovation as shown below. Researches of innovation have commonly used indexes to approximate the values of each facet of their definition of innovation and to create ranked comparisons between observations.

- In OECD's Oslo Manual, which provides guidelines for collecting and interpreting innovation data, innovation is defined as the implementation of products or production and delivery processes with new or significantly improved characteristics. The third edition of the Oslo Manual extends the definition to include new organizational methods in business practices, workplace organization, or external relations (OECD 2005).
- DOC defines innovation as the design, development, and implementation of new or altered products, services, processes, organizational structures, and business models to create value for the customer and financial returns for the firm practicing innovation (DOC 2008).

(Rose, S., Shipp, S., Lal, B., & Stone, A. (2009) p.2)

As the authors of "Frameworks for Measuring Innovation: Initial Approaches" point out, innovation is made up of tangible and intangible inputs. The tangible inputs, such as "information and communications technology infrastructure, production materials, production machinery, and facilities" (Rose, S., Shipp, S., Lal, B., & Stone, A. (2009) p.3) are more easily measured. On the other hand, the intangible inputs, such as "patents, databases, R&D progress, organizational processes, and the knowledge & skills of the labor force" (Rose, S., Shipp, S., Lal, B., & Stone, A. (2009) p.3) require individual indexes to approximate their value. These individual indexes are then weighted against one another and compiled into a composite index with the tangible inputs to create an innovation index. For this reason, a composite index is the best way to account for all the inputs of innovation and produce a quantitative figure for comparison between

observations.

Using a more specific industry index to measure innovation may provide a more precise measure of innovation within a specific industry. However, the lack of an industry specific index for the strength of intellectual property rights protection means this data cannot be used in this study. Additionally, an index used to measure innovation within one industry cannot necessarily be used to measure innovation in another industry. For example, innovation in science and technology is heavily determined by patent applications and holdings. Whereas the banking and fashion industries rely very little on patents as a measure of innovation. There is at least one organization, Britain's National Endowment for Science Technology and the Arts (NESTA), which is working to develop an index to assess the state of innovation within specific industries. (Beck, E. (2008) p.1) Their index is designed for modern service based industries, which rely heavily on intangible inputs, rather than the old standard which focused on tangible inputs of industrial economies. Unfortunately, they just launched a pilot version in November of 2009 and there is not nearly enough data to use this index in my study today. Measuring innovation and the strength of intellectual property rights protections are both very new topics of study, as such, they are both lacking in data sources. Those indexes which measure innovation within a specific industry tend to do so within a specific country as well. I have yet to find any industry specific index which is international in scope and different indexes within different countries are not comparable due to differences in model specification for each index.

This lack of available data for measuring innovation across countries has required

me to use a ranked variable for the measure of innovation in this study. This means that comparisons cannot be made between years in the panel since the results are relative to the rank of one country compared to the others in the study for a given year. Additionally, my dependent variable is not capable of taking on all possible values because it is ranked. This is because there can only be one country in first place, one in second, one in third, and so on. For this reason, the results are relative to the other countries in the study. For example, a one unit increase in the strength of intellectual property rights protections will result in some increase or decrease in innovation relative to the other countries in the study.

Definitions

This section will explain why it's hard to define these terms, who is working on them, and outline the current progress in defining innovation and intellectual property rights protections.

Defining Innovation

The topic of innovation is a very hot buzz word right now and there is no clear definition of this term, let alone a consensus on how it should be measured. There are several interesting projects currently working to develop better measurements of innovation, one of which proposes a custom index of innovation within each industry sector of interest. Although this may provide more accurate measures of innovation for the individual sectors, it does not provide for comparison between sectors.

The OECD has updated and adapted its definition of innovation over the years

from one restricted in scope to apply only to technological innovation to now include service industry innovations. The OECD defined innovation in 2005 as:

"An innovation is the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), a new process, a new marketing method, or a new organizational method in business practices, workplace organization, or external relations."

(OECD/EC, 2005, also known as the Oslo Manual 2005)

Then in 2010, the OECD updated their definition in include:

"consideration being given to extending the methodology to public sector innovation and social innovation so as to correspond to the reality of innovation today"

(OECD, 2010)

Similarly, the United Nations conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) defined

innovation in 2007 as:

"Innovation also occurs when a firm introduces a product or process to a country for the first time. It occurs when other firms imitate this pioneering firm. Moreover, it occurs when the initial or follower firms make minor improvements and adaptations to improve a product or production process, leading to productivity improvements. In short, innovation occurs through 'creative imitation'."

(UNCTAD, 2007, p. 6)

The working definition of innovation used in this paper is:

Innovation is the capacity and practice of expanding and developing resources and ideas within a specific field or region of interest. This can include the creation of a new product, streamlining a process, or the application of a new or existing conceptual model in a different way. This definition combines the updated definitions and recommendations of the OECD, the US DOC, and the UNCTAD into a single concise statement which addresses all areas of innovation. The inputs of the innovation process make up the capacity for innovation, while the practice of innovation deals with the outputs of the process. Innovation includes improving or expanding on the resources already available in addition to developing future resources. However, innovation doesn't only deal with tangible resources. The innovation process also requires some assessment of intangible resources in the form of intellectual property, education, skills, or other manifestations of ideas. Further, innovation is specific to a particular field or region. That is to say that a product or process may not be particularly novel, rather its application to a particular area may be the innovation. These ideas are further explained by the examples in the second part of the definition used by this paper.

It is particularly important to note the differences in innovation between industries as well as the methods used to protect such innovations. Within the fields of science and technology, patents tend to be the legal record used to secure ownership of an idea or process. However, the business world protects its innovative processes through the creation of private access databases, non-compete agreements, and other forms of safeguards against corporate espionage. Similarly, the fashion industry continually develops new trends and innovative designs in order to stay one step ahead of imitators and producers of knock off merchandise.

This study is looking to compare innovation between countries and therefore needs an index which forms a composite of multiple industries for comparison among several countries. The most appropriate index currently available is the Global innovation Index (GII) created by INSEAD. This index measures the inputs and outputs of the innovation process and considers the tangible as well as intangible assets that are involved in the innovation process. This index expands and builds upon the recommendations laid out in "Frameworks for Measuring Innovation: Initial Approaches" (Rose, S., Shipp, S., Lal, B., & Stone, A. (2009)).

Defining Intellectual Property Rights Protections

Intellectual property rights were created in the UK through the passage of the Statute of Anne in 1710. However, the concept of intellectual property and, more specifically, copyright has changed over the years.

"In the last three hundred years, we have come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in 1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade others from re- printing a book. In 1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go beyond that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of restrictions on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to perform, and so on." (Lessig, p83)

These rights were granted to ensure that individuals (people or corporations) who create new products or ideas should be permitted to benefit from those creations. This conception of intellectual property rights presumes that one individual has played a sufficient role in the creation of a product or idea such that they should be granted control over the use of that property. Legal guidelines are then setup to ensure some level of control over that property for some time allowing the rights holder to profit from their work. The strength of these intellectual property rights protections is then determined by the restrictiveness of these laws and the term of their application.

Strengthening of Intellectual Property Rights

Two of the more well known applications of past intellectual property rights law in the United States involves Walt Disney, Mickey Mouse, and the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. When speaking of these innovations in entertainment which were created by Walt Disney, Dr. Lessig states,

> "Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant. Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy, sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody, moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime." (Lessig, p24)

You see, Mickey Mouse was based on Steamboat Willie, as most people are aware. However, most people do not know that Steamboat Willie was created as a parody of the silent film "Steamboat Bill, Jr" which debuted first. "Steamboat Willie is a direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill, and both are built upon a common song as a source." (Lessig, p24) Furthermore, the invention of synchronized sound with silent films was originally created for the performance of "The Jazz Singer" and copied by Walt Disney. "Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream films of his day." (Lessig, p24) Today, international intellectual property rights laws have created a scenario in which, it is easier for competing telecommunication companies to buy patents and use them to keep competitors out of the market place, rather than develop superior technologies. This has lead to a vicious cycle of lawsuits between the largest companies in the information technology and telecommunications industries.

"One problem with nuclear attacks, even those of the metaphoric variety, is that the targets may retaliate with nukes of their own. That is precisely what has happened. For every Apple allegation, a rival has countered that Apple is not as uniquely innovative as Jobs liked to boast. To the contrary, Samsung, Motorola, and others insist that some of Apple's most valuable patents—such as those protecting the minimalist design of the iPhone and iPad—were never valid in the first place." (Barrett, p2)

Each side claims their intellectual property rights were violated when a competitor develops a product with similar characteristics to their own. Walt Disney would have never gotten away with developing the Mickey Mouse character which was so closely related to Steamboat Bill. Furthermore, rewriting the Grimm fairy tales while still using the same characters and titles would have never been allowed under today's intellectual property rights protections. This is due, in part, to the difference between the formal rights granted under current intellectual property rights law and the functional rights which can actually be exercised by innovators. Although a particular use of intellectual property may be strictly legal, there is still a swarm of lawyers at the ready to bring a lawsuit against anyone using the intellectual property owned by a major corporation for any reason they take offense to. This creates a schism between the formal rights laid out in the law and the functional rights exercised by the people. To highlight a future application of strengthening intellectual property rights protections, I'd like to introduce the topic of patenting DNA. "In a closely watched case, a federal appeals court ruled on [July 29, 2011] that genes can be patented, overturning a lower court decision that had shocked the biotechnology industry." (Pollack, p1) The argument was that DNA which is isolated from the body is "markedly different" from that which is inside the chromosomes in the body. This is the legal loophole being used to avoid complications with patenting human life.

"Critics say it is unethical to patent something that is part of the human body or the natural world. Some also say that the cost of testing might be reduced if companies did not hold testing monopolies because of their patents. Myriad, which holds the patents on the genes called BRCA1 and BRCA2 with the University of Utah Research Foundation, charges more than \$3,000 for its breast cancer risk test." (Pollack, p2)

We are rapidly entering a world of biotechnologies and the decisions we make regarding the application of intellectual property rights protections in these areas can have long reaching ramifications. As one of the judges in this case put it,

> "Judicial restraint is particularly important here because an entire industry developed in the decades since the Patent Office first granted patents to isolated DNA," Judge Moore wrote. "Disturbing the biotechnology industry's settled expectations now risks impeding, not promoting, innovation." (Pollack, p3)

We already allow biotechnology companies to hold patents on specific genes when they are removed from the body and the process used for testing those genes. This means that patients may be barred access to care, not because the facilities are not available, but due to a dispute over the ownership of the method used to diagnose and treat the patient.

The constant expansion of intellectual property rights protections, lengthening of term limits for patents, and the monopolistic control granted to patent holders causes a reduction in the number of participants in the marketplace. This is due to the restrictions imposed by the law in the form of reductions in formal rights and limitations placed on functional rights. As intellectual property rights are strengthened, fewer and fewer people are granted access to the raw materials of innovation, intellectual property found in the public domain and fair use.

Data and Methods

Data for innovation and the strength of intellectual property rights protections has been hard to come by and a review of the literature shows why. Both of these terms are extremely hard to define and even more complicated to measure. A working definition for innovation could be the propensity for generating new and profitable products or ideas. While a working definition for the strength of intellectual property rights protections could be the ability to secure and defend profits for the originators of innovative products or ideas. I have settled on the Global Innovation Index (GII) and the International Property Rights Index (IPRI) to measure each of these variables as they are the most frequently cited data sources used by other scholars studying innovation and property rights. This is combined with the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions Index to control for cultural differences in the conception of intellectual property and innovation.

After combining these data sets and removing countries and years for which data is not provided by all three of these indexes, I am left with a complete time series panel of eight variables for fifty-six countries over three years. Each of these variables, with the exception of GII, appear to be normally distributed around the mean which is required for ordinary least squared regression (OLS). Other assumptions of OLS include correct specification, exogeneity, absence of multicollinearity, homoscedasticity, and nonautocorrelation. For a summary of the tests performed for each of these assumptions, see Appendix 2. Since I am dealing with time series data, autocorrelation is expected.

	GII	IPR	PDI	IDV	MAS	UAI	LTO	IVR
Min.	-124.00	2.10	11.00	12.00	5.00	8.00	13.00	0.00
1st Qu.	-58.00	5.00	40.00	27.00	38.00	50.00	32.00	29.00
Median	-35.00	6.10	63.00	48.00	50.00	70.00	39.00	48.00
Mean	-39.95	6.30	57.95	48.33	49.29	66.80	49.46	47.20
3rd Qu.	-16.00	7.90	70.00	69.00	64.00	86.00	62.00	65.00
Max.	-1.00	8.70	104.00	91.00	110.00	112.00	88.00	100.00

Illustration 1: Distribution of the Variables

In exploring the question of a linear, parabolic, or logarithemic relationship between the strength of intellectual property rights protections and innovation I used OLS as well as random-effects models. This allowed me to calculate beta estimates and tscores for IPR, IPR², and log(IPR).

Global Innovation Index

The dependent variable for this study is taken from the Global Innovation Index (GII) and is comprised of eighty variables which are combined to create the index. These variables include general statistics, surveys, and other indexes. Due to changes in the model specification from 2010 to 2011, this variable is a ranked index. Using the actual index scores would have been preferred, however the changes have resulted in the inability to compare the scores from 2009 & 2010 with those of 2011. Therefore, the

scale is from 1 to the number of countries scored in a given year. Additionally, since this is a rank indicator, I had to invert the scores in order to calculate the proper slope in the models¹.

The global innovation index is comprised of two sub-indexes for innovation inputs and innovation outputs. Each of those sub indexes are built from a collection of other indicators, some of which are indexes themselves. Each pillar in a sub-index has a score calculated from its constituent variables using a weighted average. The value of each sub-index is calculated using a simple average of it's pillars. These sub-index values are then used to calculate the global innovation index using a simple average of the two sub-indexes. Additionally, an innovation efficiency index is calculated based on the ratio between the innovation input sub-index and the innovation output sub-index. (Global Innovation Index 2011, p.8)

¹ Given a ranked scale of 1 - 100, increasing down the scale actually decreases innovation. The simplest way to solve this is to invert the scale to be -1 - -100 in order to calculate the appropriate slope.



(Global Innovation Index 2011, p.8) Illustration 2: Global Innovation Index

International Property Rights Index

The primary independent variable of interest is taken from International Property Rights Index (IPRI). Specifically, I used a single component of this index, rankings for the Intellectual Property Rights Score. "The IPR component evaluates the protection of intellectual property. In addition to an opinion-based measure of the protection of IP, it assesses protection of two major forms of intellectual property rights (patents and copyrights) from de jure and de facto perspectives, respectively." (International Property Rights Index: 2011 Report) These are scored on a scale of 0 through 10 and then combined to create the Intellectual Property Rights component score.

Hofstede Cultural Dimensions

The remaining independent variables were taken from the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions Index. I am using this index to control for confounding variables which are caused by cultural differences that lead to variance in the conception of innovation, existence of intellectual property as an individual good, and the perceived utility of protecting such property. These variables include Power Distance Index (PDI), Individualism vs Collectivism (IDV), Masculinity vs Femininity (MAS), Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI), Long-term Orientation vs Short-term Orientation (LTO), and Indulgence vs Restraint (IVR). Each of these is scored on a scale of 1 – 100.

In order to test the ability of the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions good indicators of the strength of intellectual property rights, in addition to innovation, I used OLS and random-effects models. Specifically, models A through D and 10 through 14 address these questions directly. This will be demonstrated if the models using the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions are statistically significantly different from those using the country indicators, while also providing greater explanations for the variance in the dependent variable as evidenced by larger values for R-squared.

The question of the ability to use Hofstede Cultural Dimensions as better indicators of innovation than comparison with other countries was tested using OLS. For this question, models A through D are used. Model A uses only intellectual property rights protections (IPR) as its independent variable. Models B and C add to this first model by including the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions and country indicators, respectively. Model C, then includes both the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions and country indicators in addition to IPR as its independent variables. This allows me to compare the models and determine which provides the best fit as well as calculate an F-statistic to determine if there is any statistically significant difference between the models.

Hypotheses and Research Questions

Based on the theory I've outlined I expect to find a parabolic relationship between the strength of intellectual property rights protections and innovation. Additionally, I expect to find a positive relationship between individualism and the strength of intellectual property rights protections as well as innovation. Also, I suspect there will be stronger intellectual property rights protections in countries with high scores on the Power Distance Index (PDI), Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI), Long-term Orientation vs Short-term Orientation (LTO), and Indulgence vs Restraint (IVR). Lastly, I expect knowing the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions of a country is at least as significant in determining the level of innovation within that country than comparing the country to others. That is, my hypothesis suggests the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions will at least as statistically significant as country indicators when predicting innovation and intellectual property rights protections.

- 1. Are the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions an adequate substitute for country indicators for innovation?
- 2. Is the relationship between the strength of intellectual property rights protections and innovation linear, parabolic, or logarithmic?
- 3. Are the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions an adequate substitute for country indicators for the strength of intellectual property rights?

Country vs Hofstede

Model	Equation
	$GII = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * IPR + \varepsilon$
A	
	$GII = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * IPR + \beta_2 * PDI + \beta_3 * IDV + \beta_4 * MAS + \beta_5 * UAI + \beta_6 * LTO + \beta_7 + IVR + \varepsilon$
В	
	$GII = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * IPR + \beta_{2-58} * Country_{1-56} + \varepsilon$
C	
	$GII = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * IPR + \beta_2 * PDI + \beta_3 * IDV + \beta_4 * MAS + \beta_5 * UAI + \beta_6 * LTO + \beta_7 + IVR + \beta_{8-64} * Country_{1-56} + \varepsilon$
D	

Table 1: Equations for Models A - D

	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D
R-squared	0.7836	0.8652	0.9575	0.9575
Adj. R-squared	0.7822	0.8587	0.932	0.932
F-statistic	546.8	132.9	37.55	37.55
df	1 & 151	7 & 145	57 & 95	57 & 95
P-value	2.20E-016	2.20E-016	2.20E-016	2.20E-016

Table 2: Country vs Hofstede Models

	AvB	AvC	AvD	BvD	CvD
F-statistic	14.625091	6.942158	6.942158	4.127511	na
df	6 & 145	56 & 95	56 & 95	50 & 95	na
CritVal	2.1616	1.4668	1.4668	1.4837	na

Table 3: Country vs Hofstede F-Tests

	DVO	
30.3975	4.1275	na
2.20E-016	1.45E-009	na
	30.3975 2.20E-016	30.3975 4.1275 2.20E-016 1.45E-009

Table 4: Country vs Hofstede ANOVA

Table 2 shows that, although Model B does improve upon Model A by adding the

Hofstede Cultural Dimensions to the model, Model C and Model D account for much

more of the variance in innovation (GII) through the inclusion of the country indicators.

One indicator of this is the higher R-squared values for Model C and Model D when compared with Model B.

The calculated F-statistics in Table 3 further confirm that the models which include the country indicators account for a statistically significantly larger portion of the variance in GII. Comparing Model A with Model B shows a marked improvement by including the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions over the model relying only on the Intellectual Property Rights Index (IPR) data. This is also true of the comparison between Model A and Model C, which expands on the IPR data by including the country indicators. Furthermore, Model D, which includes both the country indicators and the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions, shows a marked improvement over Model A. In each case we reject the null hypothesis that the two models are equal in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the second model provides a better fit. This leads us to compare Model B, which includes the IPR data and the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions, with Model D, which expands upon the IPR data with the country indicators and the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions. This test shows that the model including the country indicators in addition to the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions is statistically significantly superior to the model lacking the country indicators. We now have evidence that the country indicators can explain more of the variance in GII, but we still need to test if the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions add anything to this analysis. For this reason, we compare Model C, the one using the IPR data and country indicators, with Model D, the one including the IPR data in addition to the country indicators and the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions. Since the Rsquared, Adjusted R-squared, F-statistic, degrees of freedom, and P-value for Model C is

identical to that of Model D, these models are identical with regard to the F-test. This shows that the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions account for no part of the variance in GII which is not already explained by the country indicators. This is due to multicollinearity between the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions and the country variables.

This is further tested using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) in Table 4. First, we see the comparison between Model A and Model B which shows that Model B is statistically significantly different from Model A. Looking back at the R-squared values from Table 2, we can conclude that Model B is superior to Model A with regard to explaining the variance in innovation (GII). Next, we have the comparison between Model B and Model C. This shows they are statistically significantly different, and another glance to Table 2 confirms that Model C provides the better fit when compared with Model B. Lastly, we look at Model C and Model D only to find they are identical with regard to ANOVA. Since the difference between these models is the inclusion of the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions in Model D and their exclusion in Model C, we can conclude the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions provide no additional explanation for the variance in GII which is not already covered by the country indicators. We can now answer my first research question and claim the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions are not an adequate substitute for country indicators for innovation. This is why the other models of GII used in this paper make use of the country indicators over the Hofstede Cultural Dimmensions.

20

OLS Models

Model	Equation
	$GII = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * IPR + \beta_{2-58} * Country_{1-56} + \varepsilon$
1	
	$GII = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * IPR + \beta_2 * IPR^2 + \beta_{3-59} * Country_{1-56} + \varepsilon$
2	
	$GII = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \log(IPR) + \beta_{2-58} * Country_{1-56} + \varepsilon$
3	
	$GII = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * IPR + \varepsilon$
4	Random Effects (Between Effects)
_	$GII = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * IPR + \beta_2 * IPR^2 + \varepsilon$
5	Random Effects (Between Effects)
0	$GII = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \log(IPR) + \varepsilon$
0	CII_B_B_B_#IPP_Lc
7	$OII - p_0 + p_1 + II K + \varepsilon$ Eixed Effects (Within Effects)
1	$CII = \beta + \beta + IDP + \beta + IDP^{2} + c$
8	$GH = p_0 + p_1 + H R + p_2 + H R + c$ Fixed Effects (Within Effects)
	$GII = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * IPR + \varepsilon$
9	Fixed Effects (Within Effects)
	$IPR = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * IDV + \varepsilon$
10	
	$IPR = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * PDI + \beta_2 * IDV + \beta_3 * LTO + \beta_4 * IVR + \varepsilon$
11	
	$IPR = \beta_0 + \beta_{1-56} * Country_{1-56} + \varepsilon$
12	
	$IPR = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * PDI + \beta_2 * IDV + \beta_3 * MAS + \beta_4 * UAI + \beta_5 * LTO + \beta_6 * IVR + \varepsilon$
13	
	$IPR = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * PDI + \beta_2 * IDV + \beta_3 * MAS + \beta_4 * UAI + \beta_5 * LTO + \beta_6 * IVR + \beta_{7-63} * Country_{1-56} + \varepsilon_{1-66} + \varepsilon_{1-66$
14	

Table 5:	Equations	for M	<i>lodels</i>	1 -	14
----------	-----------	-------	---------------	-----	----

	11: 12:						
F-statist	F-Tests	Fstat	dfNum	dfDen	CritVal	45.334	
P-value	1v2	1.5968674	1	94	3.9423033	20E-016	
Table 6	.1v3	Inf	0	95	NA		
	4v5	3.7317661	1	150	3.9042019		
	4v6	-Inf	0	151	NA		
	7v8	2.5481927	1	150	3.9042019		
	7v9	Inf	0	151	NA		
	10v11	17.5312	3	148	2.6657292		
	10v13	11.711926	5	146	2.2761691		
	11v13	2.463089	2	146	3.0580504		
	12v14	Inf	0	96	NA		
	13v14	45.334037	50	96	1.4823887		
			1	1	1	1	

Table 7: Models 1 - 14 F-Tests

Model	Coefficients	Estimate	Std. Error	T-value	Significance Level	P-value	95%	6 CI
1	IPR	10.4251	3.2421	3.216	**	99.94%	10.167463	10.682737
2	IPR	24.9026	11.9038	2.092	*	98.18%	23.956653	25.848547
2	I(IPR^2)	-1.2311	0.9742	-1.264		89.69%	-1.3085158	-1.1536842
3	log(IPR)	57.8105	15.9343	3.628	***	99.99%	56.544265	59.076735

Table 8: Models 1 - 3 Variables of Interest

Coefficients	Estimate	Std. Error	T-value	Significance Level	P-value	95% CI			
(Intercept)	-137.88438	6.04328	-22.816	***	100.00%	-138.36462	-137.40414		
IPR	15.52174	0.94948	16.348	***	100.00%	15.446289	15.597191		
	Signif. Codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1								
		Total	Sum of Squa	ares: 28769					
	Residual Sum of Squares: 9233.5								
R-Squared : 0.67906									
Adj. R-Squared : 0.67018									
F-statistic: 319.482 on 1 and 151 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16									

Table 9: Model 4

Coefficients	Estimate	Std. Error	T-value	Significance Level	P-value	95%	6 CI	
(Intercept)	-169.41553	18.54913	-9.1333	***	100.00%	-170.88955	-167.94151	
IPR	26.96314	6.442	4.1855	***	100.00%	26.45122	27.47506	
I(IPR^2)	-0.95363	0.53134	-1.7948		96.37%	-0.9958535	-0.9114065	
	Signif. Codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 Total Sum of Squares: 28963							
Residual Sum of Squares: 9069.7								
F-statistic: 164.502 on 2 and 150 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16								

Table 10: Model 5

Coefficients	Estimate	Std. Error	T-value	Significance Level	P-value	95%	6 CI	
(Intercept)	-194.6182	9.4406	-20.615	***	100.00%	-195.36841	-193.86799	
log(IPR)	85.822	5.2578	16.323	***	100.00%	85.404184	86.239816	
		Signif. Codes:	0 '***' 0.001 '*	*' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1				
		Tota	I Sum of Squa	ares: 28070				
		Resid	ual Sum of So	quares: 9026.8				
R-Squared : 0.67842								
Adj. R-Squared : 0.66955								
F-statistic: 318.56 on 1 and 151 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16								

Table 11: Model 6

Coefficients	Estimate	Std. Error	T-value	Significance Level	P-value	95% CI			
IPR	10.4251	3.2421	3.2155	**	99.93%	10.167463	10.682737		
	Signif. Codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1								
		Tota	al Sum of Squ	ares: 6208					
		Resid	ual Sum of So	quares: 5598.7					
R-Squared : 0.098155									
Adj. R-Squared : 0.060946									
F-statistic: 10.3396 on 1 and 95 DF, p-value: 0.00178									

Table 12: Model 7

Coefficients	Estimate	Std. Error	T-value	Significance Level	P-value	95%	ώ CI		
IPR	24.90258	11.90383	2.092	*	98.18%	23.95663	25.84853		
I(IPR^2)	-1.23109	0.97421	-1.2637		89.68%	-1.3085066	-1.1536734		
	Signif. Codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1								
		Tota	al Sum of Squ	ares: 6208					
	Residual Sum of Squares: 5505.1								
R-Squared : 0.11322									
Adj. R-Squared : 0.06956									
F-statistic: 6.00072 on 2 and 94 DF, p-value: 0.0035266									

Table 13: Model 8

Coefficients	Estimate	Std. Error	T-value	Significance Level	P-value	95%	ώ CI	
log(IPR)	57.81	15.934	3.628	***	99.99%	56.543789	59.076211	
	Signif. Codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.01 '.' 1							
		Tota	al Sum of Squ	ares: 6208				
		Resid	ual Sum of So	quares: 5452.5				
R-Squared : 0.12169								
Adj. R-Squared : 0.075561								
F-statistic: 13.1627 on 1 and 95 DF, p-value: 0.00046198								

Table 14: Model 9

Models 1 - 3, shown in table 8 (complete OLS models shown in Appendix 1), define the standard OLS model for a linear, parabolic, and logarithmic relationship between the strength of intellectual property right protections (IPR) and innovation (GII).

Model 1 suggests a one unit increase in IPR, on average, is associated with a 10.4251 unit increase in GII rank. This is a linear relationship and only valid within the range of the model which includes values of IPR from 2.1 - 8.7.

Model 2 is a little more difficult to explain since it is modeling a parabolic relationship. As such, the expected change in GII based on a one unit increase in IPR is not constant. This is caused by the non-constant slope of a parabola. For this reason, model 2 is best represented in a chart showing the slope of the line within various intervals of IPR.

IPR	Average	Slope
2-8	5	93.7355
9 – 15	12	121.5528
16 – 25	20.5	-6.866475
Tuble 15. Medel 2 Clause of I	ממ	

Table 15: Model 2 Slope of IPR

Within the range of IPR values between 2 - 8, the average here being 5, we expect to find a slope of 93.7355. That is, within this range, a one unit increase in IPR, on average, is associated with a 93.7355 unit increase in GII rank. The first range in table 15, 2 - 8, was selected to match the range within the data set used for this model. The next two ranges, 9 - 15 and 16 - 25, show the apex and negative slope of the parabola. Between IPR values of 9 - 15, the average being 12, we expect to find a one unit change in IPR to be, on average, associated with a 121.5528 unit increase in GII rank. However, the other side of the parabola lies within the range of IPR values of 16 - 25. Within this third range, a one unit increase in IPR would be, on average, associated with a 6.866475 decline in GII rank. The first range is based on the date used to calculate the model and is the only one supported by that data. The second and third ranges are predictions based on the model and are included for illustrative purposes.

Model 3 is the logarithmic model which can easily be interpreted using a trick of dividing the beta estimate by 100 (Studenmund, 2001). Therefore, model 3 holds that a 1% increase in IPR, on average, is associated with a 0.578% increase in GII rank.

Models 4 - 6 are used to test the random effects, sometimes referred to as between effects, of there models. These models are used to explore the result of differences in IPR scores between different states.

Model 4, the linear model, shows evidence that a one unit increase in IPR, on average, is associated with a 15.52174 unit increase in GII rank. Just a before, this is a linear relationship and only valid within the range of the model which includes values of IPR from 2.1 - 8.7. That is, for a given year and the set of countries used in the model, we can expect a one unit change in IPR between countries to be associated with a 15.52174 unit increase in GII rank.

Model 5, being the parabolic model, is associated with different change in GII depending on the value of IPR. This is best represented in the table below.

IPR	Average	Slope
2-8	5	110.97495
9-24	16.5	185.2660425
25 – 35	30	-49.3728
	תח	

 Table 16: Model 5 Slope of IPR

Within the first range of values, 2 - 8 (those used in the data set), we can expect a one unit increase in IPR to be associated with a 110.97495 unit increase in GII rank. Here too, we are modeling the difference between countries during a given year in the data set. The second range, 9 - 24, is predictive of extending the data and reaching the apex of the parabola. Within this second range we can expect a one unit increase in IPR to be associated with a 185.2660425 unit increase in GII rank, on average. Range three, 25 - 35, is associated with a 49.3728 unit decrease in GII rank, on average, for each one unit increase in IPR.

Model 6, the logarithmic model of the random effects in this data set, is best explained after dividing the beta estimate by 100, as noted above. This model claims a 1% increase in IPR is, on average, associated with a 0.858% increase in GII rank.

Models 7 - 9 test the fixed effects, also referred to as the within effects, of this data set. These models calculate the result of changes within the various countries in the data set over the years included.

Model 7 claims a one unit increase in IPR, on average, is associated with a 10.4251 unit increase in GII rank. This being a fixed effects model, this means that a one unit increase in IPR within a given country in the data set, on average, is associated with a 10.4251 unit increase in GII rank for that same country during the years of this study.

Model 8, the fixed effects parabolic model, here too, is best represented in a table.

IPR	Average	Slope
2 – 8	5	93.73565
9 – 24	16.5	75.7283175
25 – 35	30	-360.9036
	·	

 Table 17: Model 8 Slope of IPR

We can see that for the first range, 2 - 8, a one unit increase in IPR is, on average, associated with a 93.73565 unit increase in GII rank within the same country over the years of this study. The second range, 9 - 24, claims a one unit increase in IPR is, on average, associated with a 75.7283 unit increase in GII rank within the same country over the years of this study. Lastly, the third range, 25 - 35, shows the negative slope of the parabola. In this range, a one unit increase in IPR is associated, on average, with a 360.90 unit decrease in GII rank within the same country over the years of this study.

Model 9 is the logarithmic model of the fixed effects for this data set. It claims a 1% increase in IPR, on average, is associated with a 0.578% increase in GII rank.

Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results

As the results show (listed in the Models section above), my primary research question was not disproved by the results of this analysis. However, it was also not definitively shown to be true. It seems that there may be a linear, parabolic, or logarithmic relationship between the strength of intellectual property rights protections and innovation. As I had hoped, the model specifying a parabolic relationship does produce a smaller sum of squared errors which results in a larger R-squared. Additionally, the logarithmic function provides an even better visual fit. This means that a parabolic or logarithmic distribution visually appear to provide a better fit with the data, but neither are statistically significantly different from the linear model. This is shown in the first six F-Tests in table 7 on page 22. None of those tests reach the critical value which would be required for statistically significant differences between the linear, parabolic, and logarithmic models. Unfortunately, the visual differences, as shown in the graphs below (Illustration 3), are minimal and not statistically significant.
Effects of Strength of IPR Protections on Innovation



Strength of IPR Protections

Illustration 3: Effects of Strength of IPR Protections on Innovation - Linear, Logarithmic, or Parabolic

Conclusions

After carefully considering the literature on the topic of intellectual property rights protections and innovation, as well as the data from this paper, I have found no support for accepting or rejecting my theorized parabolic relationship between intellectual property rights and innovation. The models do not show any statistically significant difference between a linear, parabolic, or logarithmic explanation of the data. However, regardless of the shape of the relationship, there is a correlation between the strength of intellectual property rights (IPR) and innovation (GII). Additionally, further study of this topic using additional data as it becomes available may result in support for a linear, parabolic, or logarithmic relationship. Additional data will be available for the Global Innovation Index each year and, thanks to the new methodology used for this index, it will be comparable to last year's scores. This means data will be available to conduct this study without the limitations of a ranked indicator being used as the dependent variable.

This study has also shown that the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions are not a fitting substitute to country indicators with regard to innovation (GII) or intellectual property rights protections (IPR). Several models showed that, not only were the country indicators capable of explaining more of the variance in GII, the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions didn't add anything to the models beyond what was already covered by the country indicators.

Appendix 1 – Model Summaries

[1] "Model A"

Call:

 $lm(formula = GII \sim IPR, data = data)$

Residuals:

Min 1Q Median 3Q Max -35.054 -7.726 -0.720 6.588 33.946

Coefficients:

Residual standard error: 13.74 on 151 degrees of freedom Multiple R-squared: 0.7836, Adjusted R-squared: 0.7822 F-statistic: 546.8 on 1 and 151 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

[1] "Model B"

Call:

 $lm(formula = GII \sim IPR + PDI + IDV + MAS + UAI + LTO + IVR, data = data)$

Residuals:

Min 1Q Median 3Q Max -33.200 -7.739 -0.190 6.084 32.221 Coefficients:

```
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) -1.289e+02 8.285e+00 -15.554 < 2e-16 ***
IPR
         1.500e+01 9.422e-01 15.918 < 2e-16 ***
         4.471e-02 6.345e-02 0.705 0.482
PDI
IDV
        -4.149e-03 6.463e-02 -0.064 0.949
MAS
        -1.923e-01 4.427e-02 -4.345 2.60e-05 ***
UAI
        -1.743e-01 3.987e-02 -4.373 2.33e-05 ***
LTO
         2.845e-01 5.552e-02 5.124 9.39e-07 ***
        -2.035e-02 5.575e-02 -0.365 0.716
IVR
---
```

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

```
Residual standard error: 11.07 on 145 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.8652, Adjusted R-squared: 0.8587
F-statistic: 132.9 on 7 and 145 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
```

[1] "Model C"

Call: lm(formula = GII ~ IPR + Country, data = data)

Residuals:

Min	1Q M	edian	3Q]	Max
-20.9150	-3.0567	0.3758	2.6667	20.9150

Coefficients:

Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(> t)					
(Intercept)	-117.0617	16.63	48 -7.0)37 3.03e-1	0 ***
IPR	10.4251	3.2421	3.216	0.001780 *	**
CountryAustralia	a 12.98	01 12.	4751	1.040 0.30	0756

CountryAustria	13.5901 12.8350 1.059 0.292362
CountryBangladesh	-16.9798 10.9306 -1.553 0.123649
CountryBelgium	12.9518 12.6545 1.023 0.308674
CountryBrazil	3.7875 7.8461 0.483 0.630406
CountryBulgaria	7.8512 7.0992 1.106 0.271550
CountryCanada	23.3276 12.3858 1.883 0.062704.
CountryChile	17.6245 7.5705 2.328 0.022032 *
CountryChina	28.9362 7.6922 3.762 0.000292 ***
CountryColombia	-17.2055 7.1810 -2.396 0.018536 *
CountryCroatia	24.0850 7.7041 3.126 0.002349 **
CountryCzech Repu	ublic 18.5611 9.1543 2.028 0.045404 *
CountryDenmark	22.4626 13.6602 1.644 0.103403
CountryEl Salvador	-17.2237 7.9608 -2.164 0.033006 *
CountryEstonia	31.3337 7.4539 4.204 5.94e-05 ***
CountryFinland	20.1009 13.8462 1.452 0.149871
CountryFrance	13.0085 12.2969 1.058 0.292799
CountryGermany	20.1859 13.2910 1.519 0.132142
CountryGreece	-0.1697 7.9893 -0.021 0.983099
CountryHong Kong	39.8377 9.4382 4.221 5.57e-05 ***
CountryHungary	11.2136 9.2242 1.216 0.227123
CountryIndia	8.8087 7.1582 1.231 0.221518
CountryIndonesia	-5.9686 8.6808 -0.688 0.493402
CountryIran	-17.5537 9.9994 -1.755 0.082403 .
CountryIreland	17.3843 12.0319 1.445 0.151790
CountryItaly	10.1144 9.7331 1.039 0.301360
CountryJapan	17.2284 13.0166 1.324 0.188822
CountryLatvia	29.1063 7.7195 3.771 0.000283 ***
CountryLithuania	17.6528 7.4914 2.356 0.020507 *
CountryLuxembour	g 16.6326 12.5647 1.324 0.188758
CountryMalaysia	27.9012 7.7444 3.603 0.000503 ***
CountryMexico	-4.7021 7.0131 -0.670 0.504185

CountryMorocco	-24.7163	7.0181	-3.522 0.000661 ***
CountryNetherlands	21.1859	13.291	0 1.594 0.114256
CountryNew Zealand	17.356	0 12.20	82 1.422 0.158399
CountryNorway	21.7460	11.8569	1.834 0.069778 .
CountryPakistan -	22.9049	8.9183	-2.568 0.011778 *
CountryPeru -1	0.1387	8.1564 -1	1.243 0.216917
CountryPhilippines	-17.0000	7.6768	-2.214 0.029188 *
CountryPoland	4.1070	8.2057 0	0.501 0.617879
CountryPortugal	8.4194	9.8843	0.852 0.396470
CountryRomania	4.1137	7.2053	0.571 0.569399
CountryRussia	7.0213	7.6785 0	0.914 0.362820
CountrySerbia	7.7864	9.7421 0	.799 0.426136
CountrySingapore	28.6610	12.3858	2.314 0.022823 *
CountrySlovakia	15.0503	8.4387	1.783 0.077699 .
CountrySlovenia	27.6670	7.4539	3.712 0.000347 ***
CountrySpain 1	2.6960	10.1938	1.245 0.216021
CountrySweden	29.2426	12.9257	2.262 0.025954 *
CountrySwitzerland	27.5760	12.9257	7 2.133 0.035467 *
CountryThailand	17.1913	7.8142	2.200 0.030231 *
CountryTurkey	3.9362	7.0248	0.560 0.576569
CountryUnited States	22.1151	13.753	1 1.608 0.111152
CountryUruguay	-0.7304	7.0248	-0.104 0.917405
CountryVenezuela	-30.8624	9.0875	-3.396 0.000999 ***
CountryVietnam	18.0101	8.6064	2.093 0.039046 *

Residual standard error: 7.677 on 95 degrees of freedom Multiple R-squared: 0.9575, Adjusted R-squared: 0.932 F-statistic: 37.55 on 57 and 95 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

[1] "Model D"

Call:

lm(formula = GII ~ IPR + PDI + IDV + MAS + UAI + LTO + IVR + Country, data = data)

Residuals:

Min	1Q M	edian	3Q]	Max
-20.9150	-3.0567	0.3758	2.6667	20.9150

Coefficients: (6 not defined because of singularities)

Es	timate Std. Error t value Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	101.7823 128.5679 0.792 0.43053
IPR	10.4251 3.2421 3.216 0.00178 **
PDI	-5.4885 4.5788 -1.199 0.23363
IDV	-1.4346 1.4495 -0.990 0.32484
MAS	-4.0899 3.1612 -1.294 0.19888
UAI	-0.2643 0.1286 -2.055 0.04259 *
LTO	3.8487 3.4244 1.124 0.26388
IVR	4.6915 4.3379 1.082 0.28221
CountryAustralia	a -30.1229 20.5028 -1.469 0.14508
CountryAustria	-250.8662 228.4237 -1.098 0.27487
CountryBanglade	esh 198.0312 191.6338 1.033 0.30405
CountryBelgium	-78.8582 82.0361 -0.961 0.33886
CountryBrazil	-7.4849 11.9460 -0.627 0.53245
CountryBulgaria	61.6756 56.7469 1.087 0.27985
CountryCanada	-98.9134 86.3847 -1.145 0.25507
CountryChile	-123.5314 119.2425 -1.036 0.30285
CountryChina	108.2922 77.7537 1.393 0.16694
CountryColombi	a -6.1987 11.7805 -0.526 0.59999
CountryCroatia	59.9384 38.1357 1.572 0.11934

CountryCzech Republic 42.9847 33.9387 1.267 0.20842 CountryDenmark -383.0215 306.8759 -1.248 0.21505 CountryEl Salvador -152.6445 128.6443 -1.187 0.23836 CountryEstonia -134.0007 113.5628 -1.180 0.24096 CountryFinland -218.9794 178.5281 -1.227 0.22301 CountryFrance 0.1722 12.4997 0.014 0.98904 CountryGermany -130.4369 121.1558 -1.077 0.28438 CountryGreece 15.4649 14.1913 1.090 0.27858 CountryHong Kong 156.3380 121.5316 1.286 0.20143 CountryHungary 172.5251 142.4688 1.211 0.22891 CountryIndia 202.7823 184.0341 1.102 0.27330 CountryIndonesia 7.3005 19.6708 0.371 0.71136 CountryIran 90.6712 110.7080 0.819 0.41483 CountryIreland -57.3154 47.4945 -1.207 0.23051 CountryItaly 105.3197 92.9281 1.133 0.25992 CountryJapan 37.8771 36.8530 1.028 0.30666 CountryLatvia -120.9145 91.2248 -1.325 0.18820 CountryLithuania -180.3714 138.9677 -1.298 0.19745 CountryLuxembourg -182.6433 161.4679 -1.131 0.26084 CountryMalaysia 205.9608 158.5059 1.299 0.19696 CountryMexico 20.4933 8.1553 2.513 0.01366 * CountryMorocco 270.1931 268.7007 1.006 0.31718 CountryNetherlands -379.9472 316.1539 -1.202 0.23244 CountryNew Zealand -196.1157 166.7763 -1.176 0.24257 CountryNorway -274.7709 216.9523 -1.267 0.20843 CountryPakistan 110.7617 131.4578 0.843 0.40159 CountryPeru 27.9788 34.9760 0.800 0.42574 CountryPhilippines 298.4079 276.2360 1.080 0.28276 CountryPoland 248.5834 213.9217 1.162 0.24813 CountryPortugal 65.7759 58.8553 1.118 0.26656 CountryRomania 223.8727 193.8885 1.155 0.25113

CountryRussia	121.3262	102.5116	1.184	0.23955
CountrySerbia	165.5051	135.2921	1.223	0.22424
CountrySingapore	-49.8274	51.223	8 -0.97	3 0.33315
CountrySlovakia	477.2624	385.174	9 1.23	9 0.21837
CountrySlovenia	-75.5702	80.7158	-0.936	5 0.35152
CountrySpain	-16.7987	17.8785	-0.940	0.34980
CountrySweden	-459.4055	383.150	08 -1.1	99 0.23350
CountrySwitzerland	-199.931	0 192.07	95 -1.0	041 0.30057
CountryThailand	NA	NA	NA	NA
CountryTurkey	NA	NA	NA	NA
CountryUnited States	s NA	NA	NA	NA
CountryUruguay	NA	NA	NA	NA
CountryVenezuela	NA	NA	NA	NA
CountryVietnam	NA	NA	NA	NA

```
---
```

Signif. codes: 0 **** 0.001 *** 0.01 ** 0.05 .. 0.1 * 1

Residual standard error: 7.677 on 95 degrees of freedom Multiple R-squared: 0.9575, Adjusted R-squared: 0.932 F-statistic: 37.55 on 57 and 95 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

[1] "Model 1"

Call:

 $lm(formula = GII \sim IPR + Country, data = data)$

Residuals:

Min 1Q Median 3Q Max -20.9150 -3.0567 0.3758 2.6667 20.9150

Coefficients:

Est	imate Std. Error t value Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	-117.0617 16.6348 -7.037 3.03e-10 ***
IPR	10.4251 3.2421 3.216 0.001780 **
CountryAustralia	12.9801 12.4751 1.040 0.300756
CountryAustria	13.5901 12.8350 1.059 0.292362
CountryBanglade	sh -16.9798 10.9306 -1.553 0.123649
CountryBelgium	12.9518 12.6545 1.023 0.308674
CountryBrazil	3.7875 7.8461 0.483 0.630406
CountryBulgaria	7.8512 7.0992 1.106 0.271550
CountryCanada	23.3276 12.3858 1.883 0.062704.
CountryChile	17.6245 7.5705 2.328 0.022032 *
CountryChina	28.9362 7.6922 3.762 0.000292 ***
CountryColombia	a -17.2055 7.1810 -2.396 0.018536 *
CountryCroatia	24.0850 7.7041 3.126 0.002349 **
CountryCzech Re	epublic 18.5611 9.1543 2.028 0.045404 *
CountryDenmark	22.4626 13.6602 1.644 0.103403
CountryEl Salvad	lor -17.2237 7.9608 -2.164 0.033006 *
CountryEstonia	31.3337 7.4539 4.204 5.94e-05 ***
CountryFinland	20.1009 13.8462 1.452 0.149871
CountryFrance	13.0085 12.2969 1.058 0.292799
CountryGermany	20.1859 13.2910 1.519 0.132142
CountryGreece	-0.1697 7.9893 -0.021 0.983099
CountryHong Ko	ng 39.8377 9.4382 4.221 5.57e-05 ***
CountryHungary	11.2136 9.2242 1.216 0.227123
CountryIndia	8.8087 7.1582 1.231 0.221518
CountryIndonesia	a -5.9686 8.6808 -0.688 0.493402
CountryIran	-17.5537 9.9994 -1.755 0.082403 .
CountryIreland	17.3843 12.0319 1.445 0.151790
CountryItaly	10.1144 9.7331 1.039 0.301360
CountryJapan	17.2284 13.0166 1.324 0.188822
CountryLatvia	29.1063 7.7195 3.771 0.000283 ***

CountryLithuania	17.6528	7.4914	2.356 0.020507 *
CountryLuxembourg	16.632	6 12.564	47 1.324 0.188758
CountryMalaysia	27.9012	7.7444	3.603 0.000503 ***
CountryMexico	-4.7021	7.0131 -	-0.670 0.504185
CountryMorocco	-24.7163	7.0181	-3.522 0.000661 ***
CountryNetherlands	21.1859	13.2910) 1.594 0.114256
CountryNew Zealand	17.356	0 12.208	82 1.422 0.158399
CountryNorway	21.7460	11.8569	1.834 0.069778 .
CountryPakistan -	22.9049	8.9183	-2.568 0.011778 *
CountryPeru -1	0.1387	8.1564 -1	.243 0.216917
CountryPhilippines	-17.0000	7.6768	-2.214 0.029188 *
CountryPoland	4.1070	8.2057 (0.501 0.617879
CountryPortugal	8.4194	9.8843 (0.852 0.396470
CountryRomania	4.1137	7.2053	0.571 0.569399
CountryRussia	7.0213	7.6785 0	.914 0.362820
CountrySerbia	7.7864	9.7421 0	.799 0.426136
CountrySingapore	28.6610	12.3858	2.314 0.022823 *
CountrySlovakia	15.0503	8.4387	1.783 0.077699 .
CountrySlovenia	27.6670	7.4539	3.712 0.000347 ***
CountrySpain 1	2.6960	10.1938	1.245 0.216021
CountrySweden	29.2426	12.9257	2.262 0.025954 *
CountrySwitzerland	27.5760	12.9257	2.133 0.035467 *
CountryThailand	17.1913	7.8142	2.200 0.030231 *
CountryTurkey	3.9362	7.0248 0	0.560 0.576569
CountryUnited States	22.1151	13.753	1.608 0.111152
CountryUruguay	-0.7304	7.0248	-0.104 0.917405
CountryVenezuela	-30.8624	9.0875	-3.396 0.000999 ***
CountryVietnam	18.0101	8.6064	2.093 0.039046 *

Residual standard error: 7.677 on 95 degrees of freedom Multiple R-squared: 0.9575, Adjusted R-squared: 0.932 F-statistic: 37.55 on 57 and 95 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

[1] "Model 2"

Call:

 $lm(formula = GII \sim IPR + I(IPR^2) + Country, data = data)$

Residuals:

Min	1Q M	ledian	3Q	Max
-19.916	-2.962	0.000	2.650	19.916

Coefficients:

Estin	nate Std. Error t value Pr(> t)
(Intercept) -1	58.2916 36.5994 -4.325 3.80e-05 ***
IPR 24	.9026 11.9038 2.092 0.039136 *
I(IPR^2)	1.2311 0.9742 -1.264 0.209473
CountryAustralia	17.3742 12.9131 1.345 0.181710
CountryAustria	18.7048 13.4198 1.394 0.166659
CountryBangladesh	a -3.6793 15.1497 -0.243 0.808639
CountryBelgium	17.6938 13.1612 1.344 0.182058
CountryBrazil	2.8273 7.8584 0.360 0.719822
CountryBulgaria	7.1114 7.1012 1.001 0.319188
CountryCanada	27.5354 12.7882 2.153 0.033864 *
CountryChile	16.3939 7.6094 2.154 0.033763 *
CountryChina	28.6051 7.6726 3.728 0.000329 ***
CountryColombia	-18.1685 7.1990 -2.524 0.013288 *
CountryCroatia	24.6415 7.6927 3.203 0.001856 **
CountryCzech Rep	ublic 18.0249 9.1355 1.973 0.051427
CountryDenmark	29.3853 14.6781 2.002 0.048169 *

•

CountryEl Salvador	-15.0330	6 8.122	9 -1.851 0.067344 .
CountryEstonia	30.0940	7.4951	4.015 0.000119 ***
CountryFinland	27.4373	14.9741	1.832 0.070071 .
CountryFrance	17.0463	12.6680	1.346 0.181664
CountryGermany	26.3470	0 14.118	0 1.866 0.065132 .
CountryGreece	-1.4717	8.0307	-0.183 0.854993
CountryHong Kong	39.899	91 9.408	38 4.241 5.21e-05 ***
CountryHungary	10.7406	9.2030	1.167 0.246130
CountryIndia	7.9220	7.1702 1	.105 0.272048
CountryIndonesia	-0.7059	9.6037	-0.073 0.941566
CountryIran -	13.5613	10.4568 -	1.297 0.197844
CountryIreland	20.9125	12.3149	1.698 0.092790 .
CountryItaly 1	0.1659	9.7027 1	.048 0.297448
CountryJapan	22.7157	13.6832	1.660 0.100224
CountryLatvia	29.8387	7.7171	3.867 0.000203 ***
CountryLithuania	16.5092	7.5226	2.195 0.030655 *
CountryLuxembourg	21.22	12 13.04	11 1.627 0.107031
CountryMalaysia	26.5704	7.7917	3.410 0.000958 ***
CountryMexico	-4.9298	6.9935	-0.705 0.482607
CountryMorocco	-25.0039	6.9999	9 -3.572 0.000561 ***
CountryNetherlands	27.306	0 14.106	58 1.936 0.055915 .
CountryNew Zealand	1 21.21	57 12.54	1.691 0.094182 .
CountryNorway	24.9590	12.0902	2 2.064 0.041734 *
CountryPakistan	-16.9416	10.0652	-1.683 0.095656 .
CountryPeru	-6.9244	8.5195 -0	0.813 0.418405
CountryPhilippines	-17.0246	7.6528	3 -2.225 0.028500 *
CountryPoland	3.0085	8.2261	0.366 0.715387
CountryPortugal	8.6301	9.8548	0.876 0.383412
CountryRomania	3.2713	7.2137	0.453 0.651247
CountryRussia	7.1727	7.6554	0.937 0.351191
CountrySerbia	16.7129	12.0089	1.392 0.167296

CountrySingapore	32.9179	12.7984	2.572 0.011677 *	
CountrySlovakia	13.9584	8.4565	1.651 0.102155	
CountrySlovenia	26.4520	7.4926	3.530 0.000645 ***	k
CountrySpain	13.3319	10.1743	1.310 0.193272	
CountrySweden	34.6420	13.5753	2.552 0.012328 *	
CountrySwitzerland	32.8933	13.5550	2.427 0.017145 *	
CountryThailand	18.5664	7.8654	2.361 0.020316 *	
CountryTurkey	3.5641	7.0090 (0.508 0.612297	
CountryUnited States	29.2405	14.8243	3 1.972 0.051495.	
CountryUruguay	-1.0862	7.0085	-0.155 0.877166	
CountryVenezuela	-24.2885	10.4466	-2.325 0.022223 *	:
CountryVietnam	22.8260	9.3878	2.431 0.016934 *	

Residual standard error: 7.653 on 94 degrees of freedom Multiple R-squared: 0.9582, Adjusted R-squared: 0.9324 F-statistic: 37.16 on 58 and 94 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

[1] "Model 3"

Call: $lm(formula = GII \sim log(IPR) + Country, data = data)$

Residuals:

Min 1Q Median 3Q Max -19.950 -2.861 0.000 2.664 19.950

Coefficients:

Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) (Intercept) -157.7539 25.7165 -6.134 1.96e-08 ***

og(IPR) 57.8105 15.9343 3.628 0.000462 ***	
CountryAustralia 16.9736 10.6102 1.600 0.112975	
CountryAustria 18.0188 10.8111 1.667 0.098868.	
CountryBangladesh -1.9534 13.3878 -0.146 0.884302	
CountryBelgium 17.1585 10.7112 1.602 0.112494	
CountryBrazil 3.3228 7.7359 0.430 0.668506	
CountryBulgaria 7.4652 7.0047 1.066 0.289241	
CountryCanada 27.2100 10.5608 2.577 0.011520 *	
CountryChile 17.1883 7.4092 2.320 0.022490 *	
CountryChina 28.7578 7.5912 3.788 0.000266 ***	
CountryColombia -17.6839 7.0811 -2.497 0.014233 *	
CountryCroatia 24.4369 7.6057 3.213 0.001794 **	
CountryCzech Republic 19.0991 8.5763 2.227 0.028312 *	
CountryDenmark 27.9357 11.2584 2.481 0.014847 *	
CountryEl Salvador -15.6435 7.9184 -1.976 0.051102.	
CountryEstonia 30.8309 7.3170 4.214 5.72e-05 ***	
CountryFinland 25.8102 11.3585 2.272 0.025321 *	
CountryFrance 16.7857 10.5104 1.597 0.113574	
CountryGermany 25.2087 11.0552 2.280 0.024828 *	
CountryGreece -0.4805 7.7447 -0.062 0.950662	
CountryHong Kong 40.7797 8.7398 4.666 1.01e-05 ***	
CountryHungary 11.8093 8.6238 1.369 0.174107	
CountryIndia 8.3704 7.0589 1.186 0.238663	
CountryIndonesia -1.4385 8.9903 -0.160 0.873219	
CountryIran -14.4232 10.0572 -1.434 0.154822	
CountryIreland 20.8463 10.3603 2.012 0.047037 *	
CountryItaly 11.1557 8.9617 1.245 0.216260	
CountryJapan 21.8793 10.9116 2.005 0.047794 *	
CountryLatvia 29.5865 7.6236 3.881 0.000192 ***	
CountryLithuania 17.2434 7.3402 2.349 0.020886 *	
CountryLuxembourg 20.7400 10.6591 1.946 0.054639.	

CountryMalaysia	27.4724	7.5543	3.637 0.000449 ***
CountryMexico	-4.8432	6.9215	-0.700 0.485798
CountryMorocco	-24.8835	6.9264	-3.593 0.000521 ***
CountryNetherlands	26.1950	11.058	1 2.369 0.019867 *
CountryNew Zealand	21.025	1 10.46	08 2.010 0.047279 *
CountryNorway	25.0071	10.2593	2.438 0.016649 *
CountryPakistan	-17.7825	9.3237	-1.907 0.059512 .
CountryPeru -	7.5980	8.2019 -0	.926 0.356605
CountryPhilippines	-17.0246	7.5760	-2.247 0.026942 *
CountryPoland	4.0028	7.8969	0.507 0.613410
CountryPortugal	9.5932	9.0611	1.059 0.292411
CountryRomania	3.7577	7.0947	0.530 0.597594
CountryRussia	7.1216	7.5779 ().940 0.349707
CountrySerbia	16.3713	10.7894	1.517 0.132498
CountrySingapore	32.5612	10.5571	3.084 0.002672 **
CountrySlovakia	15.0319	8.0766	1.861 0.065813 .
CountrySlovenia	27.1820	7.3154	3.716 0.000342 ***
CountrySpain	14.1856	9.2552	1.533 0.128668
CountrySweden	33.8172	10.8539	3.116 0.002427 **
CountrySwitzerland	32.1215	10.860	0 2.958 0.003910 **
CountryThailand	18.1165	7.7325	2.343 0.021220 *
CountryTurkey	3.7192	6.9333	0.536 0.592918
CountryUnited States	27.7049	11.308	7 2.450 0.016122 *
CountryUruguay	-0.9324	6.9330	-0.134 0.893306
CountryVenezuela	-25.0787	9.6050	-2.611 0.010492 *
CountryVietnam	21.9539	8.8297	2.486 0.014651 *

Residual standard error: 7.576 on 95 degrees of freedom Multiple R-squared: 0.9586, Adjusted R-squared: 0.9338 F-statistic: 38.6 on 57 and 95 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

[1] "Model 4"Oneway (individual) effect Random Effect Model (Swamy-Arora's transformation)

Call:

plm(formula = GII ~ IPR, data = data, model = "random", index = "Country")

Unbalanced Panel: n=57, T=1-3, N=153

Effects:

var std.dev share idiosyncratic 58.933 7.677 0.308 individual 132.170 11.497 0.692 theta : Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. 0.4447 0.6403 0.6403 0.6249 0.6403 0.6403

Residuals :

Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. -21.2000 -3.9800 0.4770 0.0207 3.9500 25.6000

Coefficients :

Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) (Intercept) -137.88438 6.04328 -22.816 < 2.2e-16 *** IPR 15.52174 0.94948 16.348 < 2.2e-16 *** ---Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Total Sum of Squares: 28769

Residual Sum of Squares: 9233.5
R-Squared : 0.67906

Adj. R-Squared : 0.67018

F-statistic: 319.482 on 1 and 151 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16
[1] "Model 5"
Oneway (individual) effect Random Effect Model

(Swamy-Arora's transformation)

Call:

plm(formula = GII ~ IPR + I(IPR^2), data = data, model = "random", index = "Country")

Unbalanced Panel: n=57, T=1-3, N=153

Effects:

var std.dev share idiosyncratic 58.565 7.653 0.311

individual 129.967 11.400 0.689

theta :

Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. 0.4427 0.6386 0.6386 0.6232 0.6386 0.6386

Residuals :

Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. -21.8000 -3.8100 0.4640 -0.0023 4.0000 27.0000

Coefficients :

Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) (Intercept) -169.41553 18.54913 -9.1333 4.250e-16 *** IPR 26.96314 6.44200 4.1855 4.829e-05 *** I(IPR^2) -0.95363 0.53134 -1.7948 0.07471 .

Total Sum of Squares: 28963 Residual Sum of Squares: 9069.7 R-Squared : 0.68685 Adj. R-Squared : 0.67338 F-statistic: 164.502 on 2 and 150 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16 [1] "Model 6" Oneway (individual) effect Random Effect Model (Swamy-Arora's transformation)

Call:

plm(formula = GII ~ log(IPR), data = data, model = "random", index = "Country")

Unbalanced Panel: n=57, T=1-3, N=153

Effects:

var std.dev share idiosyncratic 57.395 7.576 0.3 individual 133.797 11.567 0.7 theta : Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. 0.4521 0.6463 0.6463 0.6311 0.6463 0.6463

Residuals :

Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. -23.200 -3.700 0.808 0.002 4.260 26.700

Coefficients :

Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) (Intercept) -194.6182 9.4406 -20.615 < 2.2e-16 *** log(IPR) 85.8220 5.2578 16.323 < 2.2e-16 *** ---Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 Total Sum of Squares: 28070 Residual Sum of Squares: 9026.8 R-Squared : 0.67842 Adj. R-Squared : 0.66955 F-statistic: 318.56 on 1 and 151 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16 [1] "Model 7"

Oneway (individual) effect Within Model

Call: plm(formula = GII ~ IPR, data = data, model = "within", index = "Country")

Unbalanced Panel: n=57, T=1-3, N=153

Residuals :

Min. 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max. -20.900 -3.060 0.376 2.670 20.900

Coefficients :

Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)

IPR 10.4251 3.2421 3.2155 0.00178 **

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Total Sum of Squares: 6208 Residual Sum of Squares: 5598.7 R-Squared : 0.098155
Adj. R-Squared : 0.060946
F-statistic: 10.3396 on 1 and 95 DF, p-value: 0.00178
[1] "Model 8"
Oneway (individual) effect Within Model

Call: plm(formula = GII ~ IPR + I(IPR^2), data = data, model = "within", index = "Country")

Unbalanced Panel: n=57, T=1-3, N=153

Residuals :

Min. 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max. -19.90 -2.96 0.00 2.65 19.90

Coefficients :

Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)

IPR 24.90258 11.90383 2.0920 0.03914 * I(IPR^2) -1.23109 0.97421 -1.2637 0.20947

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Total Sum of Squares: 6208 Residual Sum of Squares: 5505.1 R-Squared : 0.11322 Adj. R-Squared : 0.06956 F-statistic: 6.00072 on 2 and 94 DF, p-value: 0.0035266 [1] "Model 9" Oneway (individual) effect Within Model Call: plm(formula = GII ~ log(IPR), data = data, model = "within", index = "Country")

Unbalanced Panel: n=57, T=1-3, N=153

Residuals :

Min. 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max. -20.00 -2.86 0.00 2.66 20.00

Coefficients :

Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) log(IPR) 57.810 15.934 3.628 0.000462 ***

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' '1

Total Sum of Squares: 6208

Residual Sum of Squares: 5452.5

R-Squared : 0.12169

Adj. R-Squared : 0.075561

F-statistic: 13.1627 on 1 and 95 DF, p-value: 0.00046198

[1] "Model 10"

Call: lm(formula = IPR ~ IDV, data = data)

Residuals:

Min 1Q Median 3Q Max -3.0493 -0.8053 -0.0069 0.7548 3.4931

Coefficients:

Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) (Intercept) 3.749919 0.214877 17.45 <2e-16 *** IDV 0.052849 0.004023 13.14 <2e-16 *** ---Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 1.132 on 151 degrees of freedom Multiple R-squared: 0.5333, Adjusted R-squared: 0.5302 F-statistic: 172.5 on 1 and 151 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

[1] "Model 11"

Call: $lm(formula = IPR \sim PDI + IDV + LTO + IVR, data = data)$

Residuals:

Min 1Q Median 3Q Max -2.49167 -0.51740 -0.00753 0.45558 2.76477

Coefficients:

Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) (Intercept) 3.103231 0.619752 5.007 1.55e-06 *** PDI -0.015116 0.005212 -2.900 0.0043 ** IDV 0.036020 0.004863 7.406 9.13e-12 *** LTO 0.023273 0.004526 5.142 8.46e-07 *** IVR 0.025098 0.004474 5.609 9.70e-08 *** ---Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.9817 on 148 degrees of freedom Multiple R-squared: 0.6557, Adjusted R-squared: 0.6464 F-statistic: 70.45 on 4 and 148 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

[1] "Model 12"

Call:

 $lm(formula = IPR \sim Country, data = data)$

Residuals:

Min 1Q Median 3Q Max -0.60000 -0.10000 -0.03333 0.13333 0.70000

Coefficients:

Estim	nate Std. Error t value Pr(> t)
(Intercept) 4.8	850e+00 1.709e-01 28.382 < 2e-16 ***
CountryAustralia	3.183e+00 2.206e-01 14.430 < 2e-16 ***
CountryAustria	3.317e+00 2.206e-01 15.034 < 2e-16 ***
CountryBangladesh	-2.400e+00 2.417e-01 -9.931 < 2e-16 ***
CountryBelgium	3.250e+00 2.206e-01 14.732 < 2e-16 ***
CountryBrazil	5.000e-01 2.417e-01 2.069 0.041237 *
CountryBulgaria	3.500e-01 2.206e-01 1.587 0.115913
CountryCanada	3.150e+00 2.206e-01 14.279 < 2e-16 ***
CountryChile	8.833e-01 2.206e-01 4.004 0.000123 ***
CountryChina	1.500e-01 2.417e-01 0.621 0.536275
CountryColombia	4.833e-01 2.206e-01 2.191 0.030880 *
CountryCroatia	-2.000e-01 2.417e-01 -0.828 0.409957
CountryCzech Repu	blic 1.817e+00 2.206e-01 8.235 9.03e-13 ***
CountryDenmark	3.617e+00 2.206e-01 16.394 < 2e-16 ***
CountryEl Salvador	-6.500e-01 2.417e-01 -2.690 0.008435 **
CountryEstonia	7.833e-01 2.206e-01 3.551 0.000597 ***
CountryFinland	3.683e+00 2.206e-01 16.696 < 2e-16 ***
CountryFrance	3.117e+00 2.206e-01 14.127 < 2e-16 ***

CountryGermany 3.483e+00 2.206e-01 15.790 < 2e-16 ***
CountryGreece 1.183e+00 2.206e-01 5.364 5.62e-07 ***
CountryHong Kong 1.950e+00 2.206e-01 8.839 4.63e-14 ***
CountryHungary 1.850e+00 2.206e-01 8.386 4.31e-13 ***
CountryIndia 4.500e-01 2.206e-01 2.040 0.044118 *
CountryIndonesia -1.250e+00 2.417e-01 -5.172 1.26e-06 ***
CountryIran -1.050e+00 2.960e-01 -3.548 0.000604 ***
CountryIreland 3.017e+00 2.206e-01 13.674 < 2e-16 ***
CountryItaly 2.083e+00 2.206e-01 9.443 2.33e-15 ***
CountryJapan 3.383e+00 2.206e-01 15.336 < 2e-16 ***
CountryLatvia -2.500e-01 2.417e-01 -1.034 0.303509
CountryLithuania 8.167e-01 2.206e-01 3.702 0.000357 ***
CountryLuxembourg 3.217e+00 2.206e-01 14.581 < 2e-16 ***
CountryMalaysia 1.017e+00 2.206e-01 4.608 1.25e-05 ***
CountryMexico 8.333e-02 2.206e-01 0.378 0.706458
CountryMorocco 1.167e-01 2.206e-01 0.529 0.598140
CountryNetherlands 3.483e+00 2.206e-01 15.790 < 2e-16 ***
CountryNew Zealand 3.083e+00 2.206e-01 13.976 < 2e-16 ***
CountryNorway 2.950e+00 2.206e-01 13.372 < 2e-16 ***
CountryPakistan -1.400e+00 2.417e-01 -5.793 8.74e-08 ***
CountryPeru -8.500e-01 2.417e-01 -3.517 0.000668 ***
CountryPhilippines -1.439e-14 2.417e-01 0.000 1.000000
CountryPoland 1.317e+00 2.206e-01 5.968 4.02e-08 ***
CountryPortugal 2.150e+00 2.206e-01 9.746 5.23e-16 ***
CountryRomania 5.167e-01 2.206e-01 2.342 0.021248 *
CountryRussia -5.000e-02 2.417e-01 -0.207 0.836529
CountrySerbia -1.850e+00 2.417e-01 -7.655 1.51e-11 ***
CountrySingapore 3.150e+00 2.206e-01 14.279 < 2e-16 ***
CountrySlovakia 1.450e+00 2.206e-01 6.573 2.56e-09 ***
CountrySlovenia 7.833e-01 2.206e-01 3.551 0.000597 ***
CountrySpain 2.283e+00 2.206e-01 10.350 < 2e-16 ***

```
CountrySweden
                   3.350e+00 2.206e-01 15.185 < 2e-16 ***
                    3.350e+00 2.206e-01 15.185 < 2e-16 ***
CountrySwitzerland
CountryThailand
                   -4.500e-01 2.417e-01 -1.862 0.065652.
CountryTurkey
                   1.500e-01 2.206e-01 0.680 0.498184
CountryUnited States 3.650e+00 2.206e-01 16.545 < 2e-16 ***
                    1.500e-01 2.206e-01 0.680 0.498184
CountryUruguay
CountryVenezuela
                   -1.500e+00 2.417e-01 -6.207 1.37e-08 ***
CountryVietnam
                   -1.200e+00 2.417e-01 -4.966 2.97e-06 ***
___
```

```
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' '1
```

Residual standard error: 0.2417 on 96 degrees of freedom Multiple R-squared: 0.9865, Adjusted R-squared: 0.9786 F-statistic: 124.9 on 56 and 96 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

[1] "Model 13"

Call:

 $lm(formula = IPR \sim PDI + IDV + MAS + UAI + LTO + IVR, data = data)$

Residuals:

Min 1Q Median 3Q Max -2.32724 -0.55929 0.06527 0.48636 2.65392

Coefficients:

Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) (Intercept) 3.595251 0.664175 5.413 2.48e-07 *** PDI -0.016185 0.005411 -2.991 0.00326 ** IDV 0.034268 0.004918 6.968 1.02e-10 *** MAS 0.004587 0.003870 1.185 0.23786 UAI -0.006731 0.003457 -1.947 0.05347 .

LTO	0.022001	0.004524	4.863 2.96e-06 ***	
IVR	0.023849	0.004481	5.322 3.79e-07 ***	

Residual standard error: 0.9722 on 146 degrees of freedom Multiple R-squared: 0.6669, Adjusted R-squared: 0.6532 F-statistic: 48.72 on 6 and 146 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

[1] "Model 14"

Call:

lm(formula = IPR ~ PDI + IDV + MAS + UAI + LTO + IVR + Country, data = data)

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Ma	ax
-0.60000 -	0.100	00 -0.03333	0.13	333	0.70000

Coefficients: (6 not defined because of singularities)						
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(> t)						
(Intercept)	10.148364 3.912559 2.594 0.010978 *					
PDI -0	0.283162 0.141214 -2.005 0.047758 *					
IDV -	0.016810 0.045598 -0.369 0.713203					
MAS	-0.278933 0.095356 -2.925 0.004296 **					
UAI -	0.003468 0.004032 -0.860 0.391932					
LTO	0.233126 0.105141 2.217 0.028964 *					
IVR (0.332351 0.132278 2.513 0.013655 *					
CountryAustralia	-1.709135 0.621412 -2.750 0.007114 **					
CountryAustria	-10.589629 7.109125 -1.490 0.139612					
CountryBanglades	sh 13.236166 5.879457 2.251 0.026650 *					

CountryBelgium -5.054146 2.530465 -1.997 0.048621 * CountryBrazil -0.556439 0.371749 -1.497 0.137722 5.425974 1.698395 3.195 0.001894 ** CountryBulgaria CountryCanada -6.081724 2.647615 -2.297 0.023788 * CountryChile -7.907638 3.665984 -2.157 0.033500 * 8.095926 2.304012 3.514 0.000676 *** CountryChina CountryColombia 1.888698 0.316819 5.961 4.14e-08 *** CountryCroatia 2.672980 1.169109 2.286 0.024432 * CountryCzech Republic 3.832237 0.994226 3.854 0.000210 *** CountryDenmark -22.222156 9.390488 -2.366 0.019968 * CountryEl Salvador -9.698761 3.926902 -2.470 0.015283 * CountryEstonia -8.037916 3.479575 -2.310 0.023029 * CountryFinland -11.557624 5.494906 -2.103 0.038051 * CountryFrance -0.080678 0.393408 -0.205 0.837948 CountryGermany -4.786680 3.782585 -1.265 0.208772 CountryGreece 2.642346 0.356161 7.419 4.72e-11 *** CountryHong Kong 12.455917 3.608441 3.452 0.000829 *** CountryHungary 11.928080 4.316549 2.763 0.006859 ** CountryIndia 12.990318 5.639675 2.303 0.023415 * CountryIndonesia 1.687768 0.594798 2.838 0.005547 ** CountryIran 6.405119 3.423243 1.871 0.064381. CountryIreland -1.285521 1.489365 -0.863 0.390215 CountryItaly 7.814728 2.814563 2.777 0.006606 ** 6.492733 0.952261 6.818 8.16e-10 *** CountryJapan CountryLatvia -9.589993 2.699826 -3.552 0.000594 *** CountryLithuania -10.489179 4.241714 -2.473 0.015162 * CountryLuxembourg -9.088996 4.997671 -1.819 0.072083. CountryMalaysia 11.173462 4.857727 2.300 0.023606 * CountryMexico -0.076976 0.256611 -0.300 0.764848 CountryMorocco 18.859568 8.236819 2.290 0.024231 * -23.840575 9.650551 -2.470 0.015261 * CountryNetherlands

CountryNew Zealand	-10.9289	957 5.13	0283 -	-2.130 0	.035704 *
CountryNorway	-16.44434	1 6.6202	61 -2.	484 0.01	4727 *
CountryPakistan	11.643917	3.96400	2 2.9	37 0.004	1144 **
CountryPeru	3.143519	1.053269	2.985	5 0.0036	02 **
CountryPhilippines	19.607868	8 8.4625	46 2.	317 0.02	2628 *
CountryPoland	15.959100	6.53433	7 2.4	42 0.016	422 *
CountryPortugal	6.657137	1.72369	5 3.80	62 0.000	204 ***
CountryRomania	14.46482	4 5.9224	07 2.	442 0.01	6420 *
CountryRussia	6.482005	3.158541	2.05	2 0.0428	871 *
CountrySerbia	8.508527	4.169545	2.04	1 0.0440)33 *
CountrySingapore	0.485060	1.6117	73 0.3	801 0.76	4105
CountrySlovakia	30.077439	11.7303	45 2.3	564 0.01	1896 *
CountrySlovenia	-5.727831	2.47278	1 -2.3	16 0.022	2666 *
CountrySpain	0.182385	0.562510	0.32	4 0.7464	66
CountrySweden	-28.760685	5 11.6990	008 -2	.458 0.0	15748 *
CountrySwitzerland	-10.63788	6 5.948	417 -1	.788 0.0	76873 .
CountryThailand	NA	NA	NA	NA	
CountryTurkey	NA	NA	NA	NA	
CountryUnited States	NA	NA	NA	NA	
CountryUruguay	NA	NA	NA	NA	
CountryVenezuela	NA	NA	NA	NA	
CountryVietnam	NA	NA	NA	NA	

Residual standard error: 0.2417 on 96 degrees of freedom Multiple R-squared: 0.9865, Adjusted R-squared: 0.9786 F-statistic: 124.9 on 56 and 96 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16





Illustration 4: Distribution of the Variables

Correct specification

I am attempting to learn structural equation modeling as a way to provide support for correct model specification. However, I'm open to other suggestions for proving a model specification to be correct.

Exogeneity

One Sample t-test

data: modelA\$residuals

t = 0, df = 152, p-value = 1

alternative hypothesis: true mean is not equal to 0

95 percent confidence interval:

-2.187497 2.187497

sample estimates:

mean of x 1.104781e-16

One Sample t-test

data: modelB\$residuals t = 0, df = 152, p-value = 1 alternative hypothesis: true mean is not equal to 0 95 percent confidence interval: -1.726578 1.726578 sample estimates: mean of x 2.739276e-17

One Sample t-test

data: modelC\$residuals t = 0, df = 152, p-value = 1 alternative hypothesis: true mean is not equal to 0 95 percent confidence interval: -0.9693798 0.9693798 sample estimates: mean of x 3.083386e-17

One Sample t-test

data: modelD\$residuals t = 0, df = 152, p-value = 1 alternative hypothesis: true mean is not equal to 0 95 percent confidence interval: -0.9693798 0.9693798 sample estimates: mean of x 5.919602e-17

One Sample t-test

data: model1\$residuals t = 0, df = 152, p-value = 1 alternative hypothesis: true mean is not equal to 0 95 percent confidence interval: -0.9693798 0.9693798 sample estimates: mean of x 3.083386e-17

One Sample t-test

data: model2\$residuals t = 0, df = 152, p-value = 1 alternative hypothesis: true mean is not equal to 0 95 percent confidence interval: -0.9612493 0.9612493 sample estimates: mean of x 3.278401e-17

One Sample t-test

data: model3\$residuals t = 0, df = 152, p-value = 1 alternative hypothesis: true mean is not equal to 0 95 percent confidence interval: -0.9566455 0.9566455 sample estimates: mean of x 7.564755e-17

One Sample t-test

data: model4\$residuals t = 0.0329, df = 152, p-value = 0.9738 alternative hypothesis: true mean is not equal to 0 95 percent confidence interval: -1.224195 1.265597 sample estimates: mean of x 0.02070084

One Sample t-test

data: model5\$residuals
t = -0.0037, df = 152, p-value = 0.997
alternative hypothesis: true mean is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-1.236136 1.231491
sample estimates:

mean of x -0.002322427

One Sample t-test

data: model6\$residuals t = 0.0032, df = 152, p-value = 0.9974 alternative hypothesis: true mean is not equal to 0 95 percent confidence interval: -1.228881 1.232892 sample estimates: mean of x 0.002005224

One Sample t-test

data: model7\$residuals t = 0, df = 152, p-value = 1 alternative hypothesis: true mean is not equal to 0 95 percent confidence interval: -0.9693798 0.9693798 sample estimates: mean of x -6.693992e-16

One Sample t-test

data: model8\$residuals t = 0, df = 152, p-value = 1 alternative hypothesis: true mean is not equal to 0 95 percent confidence interval: -0.9612493 0.9612493 sample estimates: mean of x -6.631802e-16

One Sample t-test

data: model9\$residuals t = 0, df = 152, p-value = 1 alternative hypothesis: true mean is not equal to 0 95 percent confidence interval: -0.9566455 0.9566455 sample estimates: mean of x 2.363419e-17

One Sample t-test

data: model10\$residuals t = 0, df = 152, p-value = 1 alternative hypothesis: true mean is not equal to 0 95 percent confidence interval: -0.1801387 0.1801387 sample estimates: mean of x -3.130722e-18

One Sample t-test

data: model11\$residuals t = 0, df = 152, p-value = 1 alternative hypothesis: true mean is not equal to 0 95 percent confidence interval: -0.1547317 0.1547317 sample estimates: mean of x -1.496482e-17

One Sample t-test

data: model12\$residuals t = 0, df = 152, p-value = 1 alternative hypothesis: true mean is not equal to 0 95 percent confidence interval: -0.03067641 0.03067641 sample estimates: mean of x 1.964851e-18

One Sample t-test

data: model13\$residuals
t = 0, df = 152, p-value = 1
alternative hypothesis: true mean is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-0.1521855 0.1521855
sample estimates:
mean of x 5.925555e-18

One Sample t-test

data: model14\$residuals
t = 0, df = 152, p-value = 1
alternative hypothesis: true mean is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-0.03067641 0.03067641
sample estimates:
mean of x

7.989436e-18

Absence of Multicollinearity

Call:

lm(formula = IPR ~ PDI + IDV + MAS + UAI + LTO + IVR + GII, data = data)

Residuals:

Min 1Q Median 3Q Max -1.82134 -0.35142 -0.01457 0.43261 1.31867

Coefficients:

Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)

(Intercept) 6.773725 0.448922 15.089 < 2e-16 ***

PDI-0.0077870.003318-2.3470.020270 *IDV0.0126480.0032723.8650.000167 ***MAS0.0098260.0023664.1545.56e-05 ***UAI0.0049430.0022182.2290.027351 *

UAI 0.004943 0.002218 2.229 0.027331

LTO -0.004057 0.003191 -1.271 0.205600

```
IVR 0.009543 0.002858 3.339 0.001068 **
GII 0.042409 0.002664 15.918 < 2e-16 ***
---
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
```

Residual standard error: 0.5885 on 145 degrees of freedom Multiple R-squared: 0.8788, Adjusted R-squared: 0.8729 F-statistic: 150.1 on 7 and 145 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

Call:

 $lm(formula = PDI \sim IPR + IDV + MAS + UAI + LTO + IVR + GII, data = data)$

Residuals:

Min 1Q Median 3Q Max -43.295 -8.000 -1.371 7.375 35.580

Coefficients:

Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)(Intercept) 101.10488 15.56196 6.497 1.23e-09 *** IPR -4.70060 2.00268 -2.347 0.020270 * IDV -0.44188 0.07605 -5.810 3.80e-08 *** MAS 0.22578 0.05856 3.856 0.000173 *** UAI 0.02514 0.05537 0.454 0.650483 LTO $0.05132 \quad 0.07871 \quad 0.652 \ 0.515484$ IVR -0.09463 0.07244 -1.306 0.193504 GII 0.07632 0.10831 0.705 0.482154 ---

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' '1

Residual standard error: 14.46 on 145 degrees of freedom Multiple R-squared: 0.5678, Adjusted R-squared: 0.547 F-statistic: 27.22 on 7 and 145 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

Call:

 $lm(formula = IDV \sim PDI + IPR + MAS + UAI + LTO + IVR + GII, data = data)$

Residuals:

Min 1Q Median 3Q Max -35.072 -9.016 1.729 9.465 28.429

Coefficients:

Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)(Intercept) 30.543606 17.203948 1.775 0.077932. PDI -0.427380 0.073556 -5.810 3.8e-08 *** IPR 7.384618 1.910599 3.865 0.000167 *** MAS 0.077682 0.060122 1.292 0.198391 UAI 0.004911 0.054495 0.090 0.928324 LTO -0.029757 0.077486 -0.384 0.701514 -0.147485 0.070606 -2.089 0.038470 * IVR GII -0.006850 0.106702 -0.064 0.948898___

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' '1

Residual standard error: 14.22 on 145 degrees of freedom Multiple R-squared: 0.6293, Adjusted R-squared: 0.6114 F-statistic: 35.17 on 7 and 145 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

Call:

 $lm(formula = MAS \sim PDI + IDV + IPR + UAI + LTO + IVR + GII, data = data)$

Residuals:

Min 1Q Median 3Q Max -45.213 -12.747 0.258 12.565 41.399

Coefficients:

Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)(Intercept) -86.88732 22.76712 -3.816 0.000200 *** PDI 0.41189 0.10682 3.856 0.000173 *** IDV 0.14652 0.11340 1.292 0.198391 IPR 10.82113 2.60522 4.154 5.56e-05 *** UAI -0.04319 0.07476 -0.578 0.564364 LTO 0.24435 0.10452 2.338 0.020767 * IVR 0.08226 0.09818 0.838 0.403521 GII -0.59894 0.13785 -4.345 2.60e-05 *** ___

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' '1

Residual standard error: 19.53 on 145 degrees of freedom Multiple R-squared: 0.2125, Adjusted R-squared: 0.1745 F-statistic: 5.591 on 7 and 145 DF, p-value: 1.012e-05

Call:

 $lm(formula = UAI \sim PDI + IDV + MAS + IPR + LTO + IVR + GII, data = data)$

Residuals:

Min 1Q Median 3Q Max -51.895 -17.378 1.937 17.102 44.420

Coefficients:

Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) (Intercept) -10.93850 26.48414 -0.413 0.6802 PDI 0.05647 0.12437 0.454 0.6505

IDV	0.01140	0.12655 0.090 0.9283	
MAS	-0.05317	0.09204 -0.578 0.5644	
IPR	6.70200	3.00670 2.229 0.0274 *	
LTO	0.16616	0.11733 1.416 0.1589	
IVR	-0.01340	0.10919 -0.123 0.9025	
GII	-0.66832	0.15283 -4.373 2.33e-05 ***	
Signif. c	odes: 0 '**	*'0.001 `**'0.01 `*'0.05 `.'0.1 ` '	1

Residual standard error: 21.67 on 145 degrees of freedom Multiple R-squared: 0.1881, Adjusted R-squared: 0.1489 F-statistic: 4.8 on 7 and 145 DF, p-value: 6.975e-05

Call:

lm(formula = LTO ~ PDI + IDV + MAS + UAI + IPR + IVR + GII, data = data)

Residuals:

Min 1Q Median 3Q Max -31.84 -11.01 -0.55 11.95 33.17

Coefficients:

E	Estimate Std	l. Error t value Pr(> t)
(Intercep	ot) 97.48913	3 16.77681 5.811 3.79e-08 ***
PDI	0.05695	0.08736 0.652 0.5155
IDV	-0.03415	0.08891 -0.384 0.7015
MAS	0.14865	0.06359 2.338 0.0208 *
UAI	0.08211	0.05798 1.416 0.1589
IPR	-2.71788	2.13760 -1.271 0.2056
IVR	-0.50474	0.06431 -7.849 8.49e-13 ***
GII	0.53891	0.10517 5.124 9.39e-07 ***

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' '1

Residual standard error: 15.23 on 145 degrees of freedom Multiple R-squared: 0.5082, Adjusted R-squared: 0.4845 F-statistic: 21.41 on 7 and 145 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

Call:

 $lm(formula = IVR \sim PDI + IDV + MAS + UAI + LTO + IPR + GII, data = data)$

Residuals:

Min	1Q M	ledian	3Q	Max
-36.767	-8.687	0.030	6.768	46.784

Coefficients:

	Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(> t)
(Interce	pt) 41.776343 19.851787 2.104 0.03707 *
PDI	-0.122919 0.094094 -1.306 0.19350
IDV	-0.198069 0.094823 -2.089 0.03847 *
MAS	0.058566 0.069905 0.838 0.40352
UAI	-0.007749 0.063152 -0.123 0.90251
LTO	-0.590732 0.075266 -7.849 8.49e-13 ***
IPR	7.482647 2.240833 3.339 0.00107 **
GII	-0.045114 0.123598 -0.365 0.71564

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' '1

Residual standard error: 16.48 on 145 degrees of freedom Multiple R-squared: 0.465, Adjusted R-squared: 0.4392 F-statistic: 18.01 on 7 and 145 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

Call:

lm(formula = GII ~ PDI + IDV + MAS + UAI + LTO + IVR + IPR, data = data)

Residuals:

Min	1Q Median	3Q	Max
-33.200	-7.739 -0.190	6.084	32.221

Coefficients:

	Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(> t)
(Intercep	ot) -1.289e+02 8.285e+00 -15.554 < 2e-16 ***
PDI	4.471e-02 6.345e-02 0.705 0.482
IDV	-4.149e-03 6.463e-02 -0.064 0.949
MAS	-1.923e-01 4.427e-02 -4.345 2.60e-05 ***
UAI	-1.743e-01 3.987e-02 -4.373 2.33e-05 ***
LTO	2.845e-01 5.552e-02 5.124 9.39e-07 ***
IVR	-2.035e-02 5.575e-02 -0.365 0.716
IPR	1.500e+01 9.422e-01 15.918 < 2e-16 ***

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' '1

Residual standard error: 11.07 on 145 degrees of freedom Multiple R-squared: 0.8652, Adjusted R-squared: 0.8587 F-statistic: 132.9 on 7 and 145 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

Homoscedasticity

studentized Breusch-Pagan test

data: modelA BP = 34.4476, df = 1, p-value = 4.379e-09

studentized Breusch-Pagan test

data: modelB BP = 29.2808, df = 7, p-value = 0.0001286

studentized Breusch-Pagan test

data: modelC

BP = 130.0357, df = 57, p-value = 1.241e-07

studentized Breusch-Pagan test

data: modelD BP = 130.0357, df = 63, p-value = 1.439e-06

studentized Breusch-Pagan test

data: model1

BP = 130.0357, df = 57, p-value = 1.241e-07

studentized Breusch-Pagan test

data: model2 BP = 130.4453, df = 58, p-value = 1.693e-07

studentized Breusch-Pagan test

data: model3 BP = 130.0172, df = 57, p-value = 1.248e-07

studentized Breusch-Pagan test

data: model4 BP = 34.4476, df = 1, p-value = 4.379e-09

studentized Breusch-Pagan test

data: model5 BP = 32.6415, df = 2, p-value = 8.166e-08

studentized Breusch-Pagan test

data: model6

BP = 30.9399, df = 1, p-value = 2.661e-08

studentized Breusch-Pagan test

data: model7

BP = 34.4476, df = 1, p-value = 4.379e-09

studentized Breusch-Pagan test

data: model8 BP = 32.6415, df = 2, p-value = 8.166e-08 studentized Breusch-Pagan test

data: model9

BP = 30.9399, df = 1, p-value = 2.661e-08

studentized Breusch-Pagan test

data: model10 BP = 6.3069, df = 1, p-value = 0.01203

studentized Breusch-Pagan test

data: model11 BP = 22.0563, df = 4, p-value = 0.0001953

studentized Breusch-Pagan test

data: model12 BP = 97.9197, df = 56, p-value = 0.0004505

studentized Breusch-Pagan test

data: model13 BP = 25.9132, df = 6, p-value = 0.0002311 studentized Breusch-Pagan test

data: model14

BP = 97.9197, df = 62, p-value = 0.002465





Illustration 5: Test of Autocorrelation in the Variables

References

- Barrett, P. M. (2012, March 29). Apple's War on Android. Bloomberg Businessweek, pp. 1-13. Retrieved from http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-03-29/apple-swar-on-android
- Beck, E. (2008). How to Measure Innovation. Bloomberg Businessweek. Retrieved October 10, 2011, from http://www.businessweek.com/innovate/content/jul2008/id20080716_335504.htm

Global Innovation Index http://www.globalinnovationindex.org/gii/

International Property Rights Index http://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/

- Hofstede Cultural Dimensions http://www.geerthofstede.nl/culture/dimensions-ofnational-cultures.aspx
- Jackson, Kyle A., Marius Doksheim, Joseph Quesnel, Krishna Neupane, Marcos H.
 Ohlson, Martin Krause, and Nicole Alpert. International Property Rights Index:
 2011 Report. Rep. Washington, D.C: Americans for Tax Reform
 Foundation/Property Rights Alliance, 2011. Print.
- Lessig, L. (2006). Free Culture. Culture (p. 279). FeedBooks. Retrieved from http://www.feedbooks.com/book/2750/free-culture
- OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2010. Ministerial Report on the OECD Innovation Strategy: Key Findings. May 2010, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/28/45326349.pdf
- OECD and EC (European Commission). 2005. Oslo Manual: Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting Innovation Data, 3rd edition. Paris: OECD and Eurostat
- Pollack, A. (2011). Gene Patent in Cancer Test Upheld by Appeals Panel -NYTimes.com. New York Times. Retrieved December 30, 2011, from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/30/business/gene-patent-in-cancer-test-upheldby-appeals-panel.html

- Rose, S., Shipp, S., Lal, B., & Stone, A. (2009). Frameworks for Measuring Innovation : Initial Approaches. East. Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://www.athenaalliance.org/pdf/InnovationFrameworks-STPI.pdf
- Studenmund, A.H., 2001. Using Econometrics: A Practical Guide, fourth edition. Addison-Wesley, Boston.
- UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). 2007. The Least Developed Countries Report, 2007: Knowledge, Technological Learning and Innovation for Development. New York and Geneva: United Nations, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ldc2007_en.pdf