

IMPERIAL POWER AND LOCAL AUTONOMY IN GREEK GARRISON
COMMUNITIES: THE *PHROURARCHIA* AND THE *POLIS*

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ABSTRACT

Ryan M. Horne: “Imperial Power and Local Autonomy in Greek Garrison Communities: The *Phrourarchia* and the *Polis*.”
(Under the direction of Richard Talbert)

From controlling cities within the Athenian Empire in the 5th century BCE to maintaining isolated outposts on the border of the Parthian Empire in the 2nd century CE, the institution of the *phrourarchia* was a critical component of Greek civic and military identity. Despite its longevity and importance to the Greek world, the office has long been overlooked in scholarship. The only broad overview remains a brief article in the *Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* (1941), while subsequent work has largely viewed the office as an isolated or regional phenomenon without considering its broader social or historical role. There has yet to appear a comprehensive investigation of the *phrourarchia* and its effect upon political and social life.

My investigation addresses this deficiency. Focusing on the interplay of imperial power and civic identity, I argue that imperial powers used the *phrourarchia* to control local populations through ambiguous civic and military authority. Conversely, I show that a *phrourarchia* employed by smaller polities had clear, highly regulated legal and social constraints on its jurisdiction, remaining subordinate to local laws. I then examine the numerous strategies deployed by cities to navigate the complexities of the *phrourarchia*. In addition to the chapters of text, these findings are presented in a web-GIS application that for the first time places the *phrourarchia* within a broad geographic and temporal context.

For Grant and Logan

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS.....	xiv
INTRODUCTION	1
Modern Historiography.....	3
Scope, Sources, and Method.....	8
Organization.....	11
1 ANCIENT HISTORIANS AND <i>PHROURARCHOI</i>	15
1.1 Introduction.....	15
1.2 Terminology.....	17
1.3 Historical and Literary Background.....	22
1.4 Classical Authors.....	23
1.4.1 Herodotus and Thucydides	23
1.4.2 Xenophon.....	25
1.4.3 Plato	28
1.4.4 Classical Summary.....	29
1.5 The Hellenistic Era and Post-Classical Authors.....	31
1.5.1 Menander	35
1.5.2 Polybius.....	36

1.5.3	Diodorus.....	38
1.5.4	Dionysius of Halicarnassus.....	45
1.5.5	Strabo	47
1.5.6	Josephus	48
1.5.7	Plutarch	51
1.5.8	Arrian	54
1.5.9	Appian.....	56
1.5.10	Polyaenus	59
1.5.11	Cassius Dio	61
1.6	Conclusion.....	63
2	<i>PHROURARCHOI</i> , SPECIALIZATION, AND AMATEURISM	65
2.1	Introduction	65
2.2	Professional vs. Specialist.....	66
2.3	Mercenaries	71
2.4	Private Military Companies and the <i>Phrourarchia</i>	81
2.5	Amateur Hoplites	87
2.6	Local <i>Phrourarchoi</i> as Amateurs	88
2.7	Conclusion.....	91
3	IMPERIAL <i>PHROURARCHOI</i>	93
3.1	Introduction	93

3.2	Athens.....	94
3.3	Sparta.....	98
3.4	Syracuse	103
3.5	Imperial <i>Phrourarchoi</i> from Alexander to Rome.....	105
3.6	Alexander The Great	106
3.7	The <i>Diadochoi</i>	108
3.8	“Lesser” <i>Diadochoi</i>	108
3.9	Lysimachos.....	109
3.10	Antipatrids	109
3.11	Antigonids	112
3.12	Seleucids	116
3.13	Attalids.....	120
3.14	Egypt.....	121
3.15	The Decline of Imperial <i>Phrourarchoi</i>	134
3.16	Conclusion	136
4	LOCAL <i>PHROURARCHIAI</i>	138
4.1	Introduction	138
4.2	Teos	142
4.3	Priene.....	147
4.4	Miletus.....	155

4.5	Other <i>Phrouarchoi</i>	165
4.6	Conclusion.....	166
5	<i>PHROURARCHOI</i> , THE COMMUNITY, AND THE GARRISON STATE	168
5.1	Garrison State: Background	170
5.2	Economic Cost	174
5.3	Internal vs. External Security.....	180
5.4	Disloyalty and <i>Phrouarchoi</i>	189
5.5	<i>Phrouarchoi</i> as Occupiers.....	193
5.6	Personal Relationships and Occupation	196
5.7	Responses to Occupation: Accommodation, Subversion, and Resistance.....	199
5.7.1	Accommodation.....	199
5.7.2	Subversion.....	206
5.7.3	Resistance	210
5.8	Conclusion: A Garrison State on the Borderlands of Empire.....	215
	CONCLUSION.....	219
	APPENDIX 1: CNIDIAN <i>PHROURARCHOI</i>	225
	APPENDIX 2: SPARTAN <i>PHROURARCHOI</i> IN THEBES	229
	APPENDIX 3: MAPS.....	232
	APPENDIX 4: REGISTER OF NAMED <i>PHROURARCHOI</i>	245
	APPENDIX 5: ALL <i>PHROURAI</i> , <i>PHROURIA</i> , AND <i>PHROUROI</i>	260

APPENDIX 6: THE DIGITAL MAP OF <i>PHROURARCHOI</i>	315
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	317

INDEX OF TABLES

Table 1: Known <i>Phrourarchoi</i>	245
Table 2: Likely / Restored <i>Phrourarchoi</i>	257
Table 3: Possible <i>Phrourarchoi</i>	258
Table 4: Garrison Types	261
Table 5: All Garrison Commanders	262
Table 6: All Commanders of <i>Phrourai</i>	263
Table 7: All Commanders of <i>Phrouria</i>	265
Table 8: All Commanders of <i>Phrouroi</i>	265
Table 9: Register of All Garrisons	266

INDEX OF MAPS

Map 1: All <i>Phrourarchoi</i>	233
Map 2: Italy.....	234
Map 3: Greece.....	235
Map 4: West Asia Minor	236
Map 5: North West Asia Minor.....	237
Map 6: Central Asia Minor	238
Map 7: Mesopotamia	239
Map 8: Levant.....	240
Map 9: Egypt.....	241
Map 10: Cyprus and Crete	242
Map 11: All <i>Phrourarchoi</i> and Garrisons	243
Map 12: Origin of Egyptian <i>Phrourarchoi</i>	244

ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations for journals and ancient texts generally follow the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, or are otherwise easily identifiable.

<i>AbhBerlin</i>	<i>Abhandlungen der Berlinische Akademie.</i>
<i>AM</i>	<i>Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, Athenische Abteilung.</i>
<i>BNJ</i>	<i>Brill's New Jacoby.</i>
<i>CIG</i>	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum 1825-1860.</i>
<i>DNP</i>	Cancik, H., H. Schneider and A. von Pauly (edd.). 1996. <i>Der neue Pauly: Enzyklopädie der Antike</i> (Stuttgart).
<i>FD III</i>	<i>Fouilles de Delphes, III. Épigraphie 1929-1976.</i>
<i>FGrH</i>	Jacoby, F. 1923. <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> (Berlin).
<i>IAlex.Troas</i>	Ricl, M. 1997. <i>The Inscriptions of Alexandria Troas</i> (Bonn).
<i>I. Amyzon</i>	Robert, J., L. Robert 1983. <i>Fouilles d'Amyzon en Carie I: Exploration, histoire, monnaies et inscriptions</i> (Paris).
<i>I. Eph</i>	Wankel, H. et al. (edd.) 1981. <i>Die Inschriften von Ephesos</i> (Bonn).
<i>I. Erythrai</i>	Engelmann, H., R. Merkelbach. 1972. <i>Die Inschriften von Erythrai und Klazomenai.</i> (Bonn).
<i>I. Iasos</i>	Blümel, W. 1985. <i>Die Inschriften von Iasos</i> (Bonn).
<i>I. Kourion</i>	Mitford, T. 1971. <i>The Inscriptions of Kourion</i> (Philadelphia).
<i>I. Magnesia</i>	Kern, O. 1900. <i>Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Maeander</i> (Berlin).
<i>I. Milet</i>	Wiegand, T. 1906. <i>Milet : Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen und Untersuchungen seit dem Jahre 1899</i> (Leipzig; Berlin).
<i>I. Mylasa</i>	Blümel, W. 1987. <i>Die Inschriften von Mylasa</i> (Bonn).
<i>I. Priene</i>	Von Gaertringen, F. 1906. <i>Inschriften von Priene</i> (Berlin).
<i>I. Rhamnous</i>	Petrakos, B. 1999. <i>Ὁ Δήμος τοῦ Ραμνοῦντος</i> , 2 vols. (Athens).
<i>I. Smyrna</i>	Petzl, G. 1982. <i>Die Inschriften von Smyrna</i> (Bonn).
<i>IC III</i>	Guarducci, M. (ed.). 1942. <i>Inscriptiones Creticae</i> , Vol. 3, <i>Tituli Cretae Orientalis</i> (Rome).
<i>IG I²</i>	von Gaertringen, F. (ed.). 1924. <i>Inscriptiones Graecae I: Inscriptiones Atticae Euclidis anno (403/2) anteriores</i> , 2nd edn. (Berlin).
<i>IG I³</i>	Lewis D., L. Jeffery, E. Erxleben, K. Hallof (edd.). 1998. <i>Inscriptiones Graecae. Vol. I Inscriptiones Atticae Euclidis anno anteriores. Editio tertia</i> (Berlin).

- IG II*² Kirchner, J. (ed.). 1913–1940. *Inscriptiones Atticae Euclidis anno anteriores*. 4 vols. (Berlin).
- IG IV*^{2,1} von Gaertringen, F. (ed.). 1929 *Inscriptiones Graecae, IV. Inscriptiones Argolidis*. 2nd edn. Fasc. 1, *Inscriptiones Epidauri* (Berlin).
- IG IX*² Kern, O. 1908. *Inscriptiones Graecae, IX,2. Inscriptiones Thessaliae* (Berlin).
- IG XII*, 1 von Gaertringen, F. (ed.) 1895. *Inscriptiones Graecae, XII. Inscriptiones insularum maris Aegaei praeter Delum, 1. Inscriptiones Rhodi, Chalces, Carpathi cum Saro, Casi* (Berlin).
- Lindos II* Blinkenberg, C. 1941. *Lindos. Fouilles et recherches, 1902-1914*. Vol. II, *Inscriptions* (Berlin).
- LSJ* Liddell, H., Scott, R. and Jones, H. 1940. *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th Edition (Oxford).
- OGIS* Dittenberger, W. 1903–1905. *Orientalis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae* (Leipzig).
- PHI* *The Packard Humanities Institute Searchable Greek Inscriptions*.
- Philae* Bernand, A., E. Bernand. 1969. *Les Inscriptions grecques de Philae* (Paris).
- RE* A. Pauly, G. Wissowa, and W. Kroll, 1893– 1972. *Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, (Stuttgart).
- SB* *Sammelbuch griechischer Urkunden Aegypten*.
- SEG* *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*.
- SIG*³ Dittenberger, W. 1915–24. *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*. 3rd ed (Leipzig).
- Staatsverträge* Schmitt, H. 1969. *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums. Die Verträge der griechisch-römischen Welt von 338 bis 200 v. Chr.* (München).
- St. Pont.* III Anderson, C., F. Cumont, and H. Grégoire. 1910. *Studia Pontica III* (Brussels).
- Syll.*³ See *SIG*³.
- Thèbes à Syène* Bernand, A. 1989. *De Thèbes à Syène* (Paris).
- TLG* *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*

INTRODUCTION

The death of Lysimachos in 281 at the Battle of Korupedion proved devastating to the cohesion of his kingdom. Lysimachos had already alienated many of his subjects by executing Agathocles, his popular son and presumptive heir,¹ and without his physical presence, the territorial integrity of his nascent empire quickly began to unravel. In the midst of this chaos, the population of Heraclea Pontica, a Greek *polis* in western Asia Minor, seized the opportunity to rid themselves of royal domination. Spurned by the royal governor Herakleides, the citizens of the *polis* immediately turned to the *phourarchoi*, who were mercenaries in command of the royal garrison. The *phourarchoi* proved to be far more receptive to the pleas of the Heracleans, and the citizens

“...making agreements with the *phourarchoi*, which gave *isopoliteia* to them, and granted them the right to get the wages of which they had been deprived, seized Herakleides and kept him under guard for a time.”²

The actions of the *phourarchoi* in Heraclea were a unique case where imperial *phourarchoi* abandoned their posts and made common cause with the citizens of a *polis*. Most *phourarchoi* were unquestioned supporters of imperial might and loyal enforcers. *Phourarchoi* were used by Greco-Macedonian imperial states and small *poleis* for local concerns from the Classical age to the advent of the Roman Empire, and the institution was so ingrained into social and military life that some garrison commanders in the Parthian and

¹Strabo 13.4.1; Allen 1983, 9.

²FGrH 434 F 1.6: “... συνθήκας θέμενοι πρὸς τοὺς φρουράρχους οἱ πολῖται, αἱ τὴν τε ἰσοπολιτείαν αὐτοῖς ἔνεμον καὶ τοὺς μισθοὺς λαβεῖν ὧν ἐστέρηντο, συλλαμβάνουσι τὸν Ἡρακλείδην καὶ φυλαττόμενον εἶχον ἐπὶ χρόνον.” All translations are my own unless otherwise specified.

Byzantine empires still bore the title *phourarchos* hundreds of years after the end of the Hellenistic era.³

Phourarchoi were divided along military, economic, social, and political lines. Imperial *phourarchoi* were high-ranking officers, most of whom were mercenaries.⁴ These men sold their mastery of *polemike techne*, or military skill, and they were granted broad civic and military authority to support the dominance of imperial powers over local communities. Local *phourarchoi* were amateurs, who were elected or randomly chosen for their posts from a citizen body, and offered no particular *techne* to support their office.⁵ These men were more concerned with adherence to the laws (*nomos*) of their community than making a personal profit.

Although *phourarchoi* were known in the Classical and Roman eras, the Hellenistic period offers the most varied and complete picture of the office in imperial and local contexts. As a critical component of the garrison system of imperial states,⁶ the office was intimately intertwined with the military and administrative machinery of the Hellenistic world.

The subjects of Hellenistic monarchy and warfare are of perennial scholarly interest. There has been much work done on the form, logistics and tactics of Greek field armies from the Classical era to the end of the Hellenistic Age, especially on the militaries of Alexander the Great and the early Successor kingdoms. These topics are of some interest in popular culture. Films dealing with Greek warfare range from attempts to realistically depict the chaos of battle, like Oliver Stone's *Alexander* (2004), to fanciful hyper-stylized and

³*P. Dura* 20; Michael Critobulus *Historiae* 3.21.1, 3.22.6, 4.15.11, 4.16.9.

⁴See Chapters 2, 3, and 5.

⁵See Chapter 4.

⁶See Chapter 5 & Appendix 4.

historically inaccurate entertainment, best represented by *300* (2006) and its sequel, *300: Rise of an Empire* (2014). Military strategy surrounding the end of the Hellenistic world and the rise of Rome has been a mainstay in video games, perhaps best embodied by *Rome: Total War* (2004) and its sequel, *Total War: Rome II* (2013). However, in their quest for entertainment value, such media largely ignore *phourarchoi*.

Modern Historiography

Much foundational scholarship on military history in the ancient world is based on the “drums and trumpets” approach, which focuses on generals, famous individuals, and battlefield strategy.⁷ Such analysis became increasingly out of fashion with the rise of the “war and society” approach in the latter half of the twentieth century,⁸ and much recent scholarship in ancient military history owes a significant intellectual debt to John Keegan's groundbreaking work, *The Face of Battle*.⁹ Keegan largely eschewed traditional high-level analysis of strategy and tactics, and instead focused on the actual experience of combat from the perspective of a typical soldier. This highly influential study spawned the “face-of-battle” approach to military history, which was embraced by many ancient historians, perhaps most notably by Victor Davis Hanson's work, *The Western Way of War*.¹⁰ However, the merits and applications of the face-of-battle school have recently been questioned, reflecting a concern that some scholarship has turned into little more than historical wargaming.¹¹ Furthermore, the trend in some face-of-battle scholarship to create a “universal” soldier and combat

⁷Delbrück 1920; Fuller 1960, 69–305; Adcock 1962, 64–97; Pritchett 1974; Engels 1978; See Hanson 2007, 5–13 for a complete historiography.

⁸Brice 2014, xiii–xiv.

⁹Keegan 1976.

¹⁰Hanson 2000, esp. 135–218.

¹¹Wheeler 2011, 69–78.

experience often leaves little room for studying the mid-level institutions that influenced, practiced, and managed violence.¹² Such approaches, while offering a valuable corrective on earlier military history, provide little assistance in the study of a post such as the *phrourarchia*.

Given the mercenary status of many imperial *phrourarchoi*, this dissertation engages with studies on the prevalence and professionalism of soldiers for hire. The foundational studies of Herbert Parke and Guy Griffith remain the most comprehensive treatment of Greek mercenaries in any language.¹³ Matthew Trundle's work provides a valuable update to Parke,¹⁴ but further comprehensive treatments of Hellenistic mercenaries since Griffith remain rare.¹⁵ Instead, much scholarship has examined mercenaries at a high level, or focused on case studies and regional analysis, typified by work on Xenophon and the Ten Thousand.¹⁶ Outside of such studies, this dissertation engages with work on recent military phenomena, especially Private Military Companies, to provide comparanda to contextualize the complex relationship between *phrourarchoi*, imperial power, and occupied communities.

Although not a topic of as broad interest as Hellenistic warfare or mercenaries, there have been some limited studies on *phrourarchoi*, who have long been recognized as important officers in their own right.¹⁷ However, there has never been a systematic, comprehensive analysis of the office, from its Persian antecedents to its role in later Greek

¹²See Lynn 2003, 12–27; van Wees 2004, 1–2 for issues with this approach.

¹³Parke 1933; Griffith 1935.

¹⁴Trundle 2004; Trundle 2013.

¹⁵Rop 2013 does not contain any discussion of *phrourarchoi*, even in service to Persian monarchs.

¹⁶Lee 2007.

¹⁷Collitz et al. 1884, 293.

literature. The most extensive general study remains Heinz Kortenbeutel's 1941 article in *Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*.¹⁸ Although Kortenbeutel did admirable work in assembling the evidence concerning *phrourarchoi*, his contribution is not entirely comprehensive, and he only offers a perfunctory analysis of the position. He rejects later literary testimony as highly anachronistic and poorly reflective on the office, and he does not differentiate between *phrourarchoi* in an imperial or local context. Any detailed analysis of the impact of the position on society or Hellenistic communities is almost entirely missing. Furthermore, Kortenbeutel believed that the powers of the *phrourarchia* were purely military in nature, although he grants that the office held a form of limited civil authority in Erythrai.¹⁹

The first substantial attempt to expand on the gaps in Kortenbeutel's analysis is found in Marcel Launey's book, *Recherches sur les armées hellénistiques*. Although Launey treats the phenomenon of Hellenistic garrisons extensively,²⁰ the *phrourarchia* is not examined as an institution, and his focus on the Hellenistic world excludes treatment of the office in the Classical and Roman periods. Launey does address some elements of the *phrourarchoi* in a local setting,²¹ and this preliminary work was expanded by Guy Labarre, who focused solely on the independent garrisons of Hellenistic Asia Minor and viewed the *phrourarchia* as part of a broader military mobilization of independent *poleis*.²² Other treatments of *phrourarchoi* are scattered throughout studies on broader topics. While there has been attention paid in

¹⁸RE (1941) 773–81, s.v. “Phrourarchos”.

¹⁹See Chapter 3.

²⁰Launey 1987, 633–675.

²¹Ibid. , 1052–1058.

²²Labarre 2004, 237–244.

modern scholarship to garrisons, there is far less attention to the actual officers who commanded them, particularly the *phourarchos*.

Other studies have only examined the *phourarchia* within a specific historical or cultural context, notably within the Persian Empire,²³ Athens,²⁴ and most of all, Egypt.²⁵ Other works have simply mentioned *phourarchoi* in passing as a military post without further elaboration, occasionally in a highly anachronistic manner.²⁶ The treatment of *phourarchoi* in these studies is perfunctory at best, and none of these investigations has placed the *phourarchia* within a broader historical or cultural context.

As imperial *phourarchoi* represented a highly-skilled force of occupation, a sociological analysis of civil-military relations offers a fruitful line of inquiry. Some limited work has been done to apply this approach to the Greco-Macedonian officers and the Roman army,²⁷ but such efforts have had little broad appeal and have rarely addressed Greek institutions.

Professionalism in the military is an important component of the foundational studies of Samuel Huntington²⁸ and Morris Janowitz,²⁹ but their limited scope necessitates a reexamination of their assumptions and conclusions, especially in the consideration of *techné* and ancient specialization. Huntington argues that expertise, responsibility, and corporateness

²³Klinkott 2005, 287–295.

²⁴Buckler and Robinson 1912, 66; Podlecki 1998, 65.

²⁵Turner 1974, 242; Bagnall 1976, 49–52, 68, 123.

²⁶Högemann 1985, 59; Billows 1990, 280–281; Chaniotis 2005, 32, 43, 89–93; Zoepffel 2006, 512; Hoyo 2009, 112–113.

²⁷Naiden 2007, 35–60; Ward 2012.

²⁸Huntington 1957.

²⁹Janowitz 1971, 5–6.

are foundational to the conception of professionalism.³⁰ I submit that professionalism in the ancient world is an anachronism, and that *phourarchoi* and other highly trained individuals should be seen as specialists. This definition minimizes the importance of corporateness to *phourarchoi* and other ancient military professionals, who did not necessarily see themselves as a distinct, self-governing social group.³¹

Similarly, Harold Lasswell's conception of the “garrison state”³² is a useful tool for contextualizing the impact of constant warfare and military supremacy on civil society. A garrison state can be described as the presence of the following: a society where the specialists in violence are the most powerful group, marginalizing powerful business interests; extensive propaganda to support the ethos of the military elite; an economic focus on war production; centralized political authority; all citizens sharing equally the risks of violence; and a military elite who merge the skills of professional soldiers with civilian administrators.³³ There has been some work to bring this conceptual framework into pre-modern contexts, but on the whole the garrison-state model has failed to gain much traction in ancient studies.³⁴

What is needed is a study that spans the divide of theory and practice as related to officership in the Hellenistic world, and then applies this approach to *phourarchoi* and a garrison state. This dissertation fills such a gap. I argue that imperial *phourarchoi*, much like

³⁰Huntington 1957, 8–10.

³¹See Chapter 2.

³²Lasswell 1941, 455–468.

³³See Chapter 5 for a more extensive analysis of Lasswell's criteria; See also Lasswell 1941, 455–468.

³⁴Gouliamos and Kassimeris 2011, 12–13; Esman 2013, 5–6.

modern positions that mix military and civilian responsibility,³⁵ were specialists who used a *polemike techne* to support their employers. They both interfered with local politics and prevented armed resistance against imperial authority.³⁶

In contrast, independent communities who viewed local *phrourarchoi* as a magistracies subordinate to the law do not follow this model, and as such were communities that had garrisons without becoming garrison states. These *poleis* used amateur *phrourarchoi*, and did not have the all-encompassing military society of Hellenistic empires.³⁷

Scope, Sources, and Method

This investigation focuses on the independent Greek world in the eastern Mediterranean, roughly from Archaic Greece in the sixth century BCE to the early Roman Empire in the first century CE, with special attention paid to the reigns of Philip II, Alexander the Great, and the Hellenistic era from 331 to 30 BCE. The evidence for *phrourarchoi* over this long period is highly varied in quantity and quality. There is a wealth of epigraphical and papyrological information, although its uneven survival offers a more complete picture of Attica, Egypt, and south western Asia Minor, which is not necessarily representative of the *phrourarchia* throughout the entirety of the Greek world. Many *phrourarchoi* are known only from literary works. In this study any source relevant to the time period is taken into account, while later Byzantine and Roman historians who focused on events after the second century CE are largely set aside.

One reason for limiting the investigation in this way is the increasing divergence between authors of the Roman period and the realities of Greek military and administrative

³⁵Such as the French *Gendarmerie Nationale*; see Lioe 2010, 57; Anderson 2011, 319.

³⁶See Chapters 3 and 5.

³⁷See Chapters 4 and 5.

practice. Imperial *phrouarchoi* in a Greek context are unknown after 99 BCE, and local *phrouarchoi* disappear after 40 BCE, leaving later authors with little opportunity to engage directly with *phrouarchoi*. Although the use of *phrouarchos* survives in the Parthian and Byzantine Empires, the social, political, cultural, and military contexts are different enough that the rise of the Roman Empire serves as a convenient *terminus ante quem* for this investigation.

With such a broad swath of history under consideration, the quality of the literary sources varies tremendously. The majority of *phrouarchoi* in literature are found in authors who were far removed culturally and temporally from their subjects. While *phrouarchoi* are found in legal and epistolary papyri, and some *phrouarchoi* erected dedicatory inscriptions revealing their names and titles, there is no surviving literary source written by a *phrouarchos* that provides any details on the position. The historian and philosopher Philistus was at one point a *phrouarchos* in Syracuse,³⁸ but the surviving fragments of his work do not offer any insight into his office. Other authors, such as Xenophon and Polybius, wrote on their own military and political experiences, but they were unwilling to refer to other Greeks as *phrouarchoi*, and made great efforts to avoid the language of imperial authority in the world of independent *poleis*. Later authors, with their often complex relationships to Roman imperial power, proved far less resistant to such language, and in some cases even celebrated the role of the *phrouarchia* in maintaining Roman authority. The complexities of the ancient historiographical tradition are explored fully in Chapter One.

Outside of the literary record, this dissertation makes extensive use of papyri and

³⁸*FGrH* 556 T 5c.5 = Plut. *Dio.* 11.3.

epigraphical sources. Inscriptions offer a unique insight into the self-promotion and identity of *phrourarchoi* in their own words, offer a glimpse into the interactions of a *phrourarchos* and a community at the local level, and reveal issues that were important enough to the community to monumentalize in stone. Papyri, much cheaper than inscriptions and far more perishable, provide a window into the daily, low-level interactions of a *phrourarchos* and his assigned community. Largely restricted to Egypt, with occasional finds in Syria, the papyri used in this dissertation contain receipts, petitions for arrest, records of witness activity, and other daily tasks of local *phrourarchoi* which would otherwise be invisible.³⁹

Using all of these sources together, this dissertation presents a comprehensive study of the *phrourarchia* in the Greek world, from its first appearance under the Athenian alliance to its gradual decline under the early Roman Empire. As the source material rarely provides enough information to outline the life or even career of an individual *phrourarchos*, the evidence is aggregated to create a portrait of the office in imperial and local society.

Digital resources and techniques have played a key role in the creation of this dissertation. The combination of advances in historical geographic information systems (HGIS) with the maturing community surrounding linked open data in the ancient world has resulted in the creation of new tools and techniques for ancient studies, which are becoming increasingly invaluable for any investigation.⁴⁰ This dissertation uses resources created by the Pleiades Project, the Ancient World Mapping Center, and the Pelagios Project to locate and map the locations of garrisons and their commanders. These locations were then placed in a custom-made interactive mapping application that allows for a far more meaningful display

³⁹See Chapter 3.

⁴⁰Elliott and Gillies 2009; Dunn 2010; Elliott, Heath and Muccigrosso 2014.

of information, along with linkages to other projects, than anything attainable through traditional print maps.⁴¹

Organization

This dissertation is arranged topically rather than chronologically, a format which offers the best method for placing the scattered and often fragmentary sources in historical context. Chapter One explores the literary evidence for *phourarchoi*, and thus provides a literary context for the remainder of the discussion. Through an exhaustive mining of the evidence, this chapter demonstrates that the relationship of individual authors to imperial powers greatly affected their use of terminology. It shows that many Classical Greek authors took great pains to avoid using the term *phourarchos*, and couched their language of garrison and control in generic terminology. The chapter argues that later Greek authors, having lived through the end of the Hellenistic era and into the Roman Empire, more readily accepted the forms of control and subordination practiced by imperial power, and were willing to deploy the language of control and domination in their works.

Chapter Two builds on this literary analysis to engage with sociological constructions of professionalism and officership. It uses the Greek conception of *techne*, or skill, to argue that a definition other than professionalism is needed to categorize and examine the marked increase in the number and quality of Greek mercenary soldiers starting at the end of the fifth century. After offering such a definition, the chapter investigates the similarities between the mercenary *phourarchoi* employed by ancient imperial powers and Private Military Companies deployed by modern corporate and state actors, and argues that local *phourarchoi* were amateurs who were closely aligned with the Classical ideal of a citizen-

⁴¹See Becker, Horne and Talbert 2013 and Horne 2014 for the technical details of such work.

militia.

Chapters Three and Four examine the powers exercised by the *phrourarchia* in detail. Chapter Three covers *phrourarchoi* in chronological order, from the Athenian administration of Erythrai after 454 BCE⁴² to Menarnaios, *phrourarchos* of the Parthian king Arsaces, in 121 CE.⁴³ This chapter reveals that literature, papyri, and epigraphy present a remarkably consistent portrait of imperial *phrourarchoi*. These men wielded intentionally ambiguous powers to promote imperial authority at the expense of local freedom and autonomy. Although some regulations were enacted by imperial powers to restrain the behavior of their *phrourarchoi*, for the most part the specialization and *techne* of these mercenary officers allowed them to operate with a measure of independence and discretion that was not available to lesser ranks or individuals. These *phrourarchoi* operated without regard to the local *nomos* of their assignments, and there was no formal mechanism available for subject communities to address abuses of authority.

Chapter Four reveals that local *phrourarchoi* were bound by a completely different set of regulations and concerns from their imperial counterparts. By examining independent communities that possessed *phrourarchoi*, this chapter shows that local *phrourarchoi* were highly restricted by the laws of their communities. A local *phrourarchia* was a more strictly military assignment than its imperial counterpart, as independent *poleis* were unwilling to give the office any civil authority.

After Chapters One through Four establish the literary, institutional, and legal background of the *phrourarchia*, Chapter Five uses the lens of the “garrison state” to view

⁴²IG I³ 14.

⁴³P. Dura 20. See Chapter 3.

the relationship between the *phourarchia* and the surrounding community. This chapter builds upon recent expansions of this theory into less-developed countries, occupied areas, and premodern societies to argue that imperial *phourarchoi* were part of a Hellenistic system that closely resembled the all-powerful military society of a garrison state. A key component of the garrison state model is the predominance of military spending over civil expenditures, and this chapter demonstrates that *phourarchoi*, whatever their context, were extremely expensive for their employers. Such an expense was hardly justified by battlefield performance, as most *phourarchoi* were unable to hold their posts when faced with external threat. This chapter then argues that protection against external attack was not the primary focus of the *phourarchia*; much like the all-powerful military system of a garrison state,⁴⁴ imperial *phourarchoi* were primarily concerned with suppressing internal dissension. They applied their *techne* to maintaining order and supporting an imperial project of restricting the freedom and autonomy of subject communities. In contrast, due to their lack of specialization, limited *techne*, and support, the relationship between local *phourarchoi* and the *polis* was bound by a highly formalized system of rewards and punishment which was defined by local law.

The appendices also should be noted. The first draws upon the conclusions of this dissertation to argue that the mysterious *phourarchia* of Cnidus was an imperial office, as the *phourarchoi* here were heavily involved with the economic affairs of the *polis*. Appendix Two briefly covers the controversy surrounding Spartan garrison commanders at Thebes. Appendix Three is a collection of maps that illustrate the locations of all the *phourarchoi* addressed in this dissertation, including snapshots of the interactive

⁴⁴Lasswell 1941, 455–468.

applications built for this dissertation. Appendix Four is a register of all named *phourarchoi*, arranged alphabetically. It contains a brief description of each *phourarchos*, along with other information tangential to the overall argument of the dissertation. Appendix Five offers a listing of all *phourai* (garrisons), *phouria* (garrison fortresses), *phouroi* (garrison soldiers), and *phourarchoi* (garrison commanders) attested in Greek literature, papyri, and inscriptions up to the time of Cassius Dio. As this is a large amount of information, the entries are far less extensive than the register of *phourarchoi*, offering only the name of the location, the type of garrison present, the name and office of the commander where available, and relevant citation information. Finally, Appendix Six provides a brief overview of the digital component of this dissertation, which comprises an interactive mapping application.

1. ANCIENT HISTORIANS AND *PHROURARCHOI*

1.1 Introduction

During the second Macedonian war against Philip V, the Roman general Titus Quinctius Flamininus and his Greek allies met at Nicaea in 198 to discuss peace terms with Philip for ending the conflict. Greek representatives from the Attalids, Rhodians, Achaeans, and Aetolians all demanded that Philip remove his *phourai* (garrisons) from Greece.⁴⁵ When the monarch demurred, the issue was left to the judgement of the Roman senate.⁴⁶ In 197, ambassadors from the allied Greek cities and Philip arrived at Rome to present their concerns. The Greek delegation pleaded that

“...since Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias were ruled by Macedonia, for this reason the Greeks are unable to think of *eleutheria* (freedom). They said that it was very true when Philip himself said “these places are the fetters of Greece”. For the Peloponnesians are not able to breathe when there is a royal *phoura* (garrison) seated in Corinth, nor can the Locrians, Boeotians, and Phocians be courageous when Philip holds Chalcis and all of Euboea, nor can the Thessalians or Magnesians partake in *eleutheria* while Demetrias is held by Philip and the Macedonians.”⁴⁷

Some modern scholars have cast doubt on the practical capability of the “fetters” to secure Greece, and have argued that the Greeks' pleas were mainly propaganda caused more

⁴⁵Polyb. 18.2.

⁴⁶Ibid., 18.10.

⁴⁷Ibid., 18.11.5–10: “... διότι τῆς Χαλκίδος καὶ τοῦ Κορίνθου καὶ τῆς Δημητριάδος ὑπὸ τῷ Μακεδόνι ταπτομένων οὐχ οἶόν τε τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἔννοϊαν λαβεῖν ἐλευθερίας. ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς Φίλιππος εἶπε, τοῦτο καὶ λίαν ἀληθὲς ἔφασαν ὑπάρχειν: ὃς ἔφη τοὺς προειρημένους τόπους εἶναι πέδας Ἑλληνικὰς, ὀρθῶς ἀποφαινόμενος. οὔτε γὰρ Πελοποννησίους ἀναπνεῦσαι δυνατὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ βασιλικῆς φρουρᾶς ἐγκαθημένης, οὔτε Λοκροὺς καὶ Βοιωτοὺς καὶ Φωκέας θαρρῆσαι Φιλίππου Χαλκίδα κατέχοντος καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Εὐβοίαν, οὐδὲ μὴν Θετταλοὺς οὐδὲ Μάγνητας δυνατὸν ἐπαύρασθαι τῆς ἐλευθερίας οὐδέποτε, Δημητριάδα Φιλίππου κατέχοντος καὶ Μακεδόνων.” See Map 4 for locations.

by anti-Macedonian sentiment than geo-political reality.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, the Greek delegates did not deviate from the argument that royal *phourai*, especially in strategic areas, represented an existential threat to their sovereignty. The Roman senate, impressed with the Greeks' pleas, cut short the speeches of Philip's envoys, demanding to know if the monarch would agree to relinquish his *phourai*. Upon hearing that he had not given any specific instructions on that point (presumably as he wished to continue holding the positions), the senate terminated the discussion and prepared to continue the war.⁴⁹

The agreement of the Roman senate, the Greek states, and Philip as to the value of *phourai* underscores the importance of garrisons to Greek conceptions of freedom, autonomy, domination, and control. Garrisons were not only a locus of raw physical and political power, but were also a nexus of often competing rhetorical, intellectual, and social authority. *Phourai* and the *phourarchoi* who commanded them were amongst the primary sites of interaction between imperial powers and subject communities,⁵⁰ and could also serve as protectors of autonomy for states which enjoyed *de iure* or *de facto* independence.⁵¹

Such garrisons did not exist in an administrative vacuum. This chapter shows that the office of the *phourarchia* was singularly important to the functioning and command of garrisons, and the use of the *phourarchia* was not a generic designation that was uncritically chosen by most historical authors. They deployed the term *phourarchia* carefully in specific contexts, and remained internally consistent when doing so. There is also a noticeable divide

⁴⁸Seager 1981, 109; Eckstein 1987, 284; cf. Larsen 1965, 117; 127.

⁴⁹Polyb. 18.11.

⁵⁰*IG* XII, 1, 900; *Philae* 15; *Thèbes à Syène* 322, 242; Diod. Sic. 14.4.4; 14.53.5; 18.18.5; 18.37.4; 19.86.2; 20.45.2; Plut. *Phoc.* 31.1. See Appendix 4 for a complete list.

⁵¹*I. Priene* 4; 19; 20. See Appendix 4 for a complete list.

between a historian's views on imperialism and his use of *phourarchos*. As a reflection of their complex and sometimes contradictory attitudes towards imperialism, Classical historians were reluctant to apply the title of *phourarchos* to Greek magistrates. However, as historians increasingly supported Rome's imperial expansion and identified with the Roman Empire, they became content to apply the designation of *phourarchos* more generally to Greek magistrates. These claims are supported by an exhaustive examination of the different terminology surrounding garrisons and the use of *phourarchia* within the corpus of Greek literature.

This chapter argues that the relationship of an author to imperial power was a significant factor in his decision to use the term *phourarchos*. The chapter first investigates the terminology surrounding garrisons, then provides a historical background for Classical authors. It reveals that Classical authors were reluctant to use the title *phourarchos* in a historical setting, in large part due to their uncomfortable relationship with Greek imperialism. After examining each author who uses the term *phourarchos*, the chapter provides further background for the Hellenistic and Roman eras, before analyzing these later authors. It argues that, as authors became more acclimated to the Roman imperial system, they were more willing to use the term *phourarchos* in their writings.

1.2 Terminology

Ancient Greek terminology on the subject of fortifications and garrisons is expansive. For example, the term ἄκρα, *akra* (citadel), often located on the acropolis of a *polis*, could be a key component of a garrison, and is found in both literary⁵² and epigraphical⁵³ evidence.

⁵²Xen. *Cyr.* 8.6.1; Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.3, 3.16.9.

⁵³*I. Priene* 4, 21, 22; *CIG* 2614 = *OGIS* 1.20 = *SEG* 20.132 = *SEG* 31.1348.

The term χωρίον, *chorion*, which generally means place, could refer to a fortress, as could περιπόλιον, *peripolion*.⁵⁴ All of these words could refer also to concepts that were not strictly limited to garrisons or military pursuits, and as such are not the focus of this investigation. Specific martial terminology is well represented in Greek literature, although the wealth of examples presents many difficulties when focusing on garrisons and garrison commanders.

The terms φυλακή, *phulake*, and φύλαξ, *phulax*, are often translated in modern scholarship as “garrison” or “garrison forces”, creating a false equivalence with the more specific designation of φρουρά, *phroura* (garrison) or φρουρός, *phrouros* (garrison soldier).⁵⁵ Such conflation is also present in some ancient testimony,⁵⁶ and the phrase τὴν φυλακὴν τῶν φρουρίων, *phulake* of the *phouria*, or “protection of the garrisons”, is relatively well-attested in inscriptions.⁵⁷ However, *phulake* and *phroura* were distinct designations, as were *phulakes* and *phrouroi*. There is only one case in epigraphy where *phulakes* are found under the command of a *phourarchos* or in a *phourion*,⁵⁸ and there are no other instances in the papyrological or epigraphical record where *phulakes* are used interchangeably with *phrouroi*.⁵⁹

Although they are often associated with the general concept of a garrison, *phulakes* could

⁵⁴Xen. *Cyr.* 5.13; 7.4.1.

⁵⁵For example, see Polyb., 2.7.12: “...μηδέποτε δεῖν τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας ἰσχυροτέραν εἰσάγεσθαι φυλακὴν ἄλλως τε καὶ βαρβάρων, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἔκρινον ποιήσασθαι μνήμην.”; Paton 1922 translates the passage as: “...no people, if wise, should ever admit a *garrison* (emphasis mine) stronger than their own forces, especially if composed by barbarians.” Shuckburgh 1889: “...it is never wise to introduce a foreign *garrison* (emphasis mine), especially of barbarians, which is too strong to be controlled”.

⁵⁶*Suda*, s.v. Φρουρά; s.v. Φρουρεῖ.

⁵⁷*IG* II², 1285; 1288; 1299; 1303; 3467; *SEG* 3.91; 25.155; 41.73; 41.78; 41.86; 41.92; 43.25; 43.40; 49.138; 49.153; *I. Priene* 494 = *Syll.*³ 363 = *SEG* 37.882.

⁵⁸*Syll.*³ 599.

⁵⁹Due to its close adherence to local terminology and practice when compared to literary or historical works, data from epigraphy and papyri is given special consideration in this investigation.

guard anything inside or outside the urban area of a *polis*; they could be assigned to walls or specific areas of the fortifications, such as the gates, treasury, stores; they could keep the general peace, oversee prisoners, serve as bodyguards, or perform other military functions.⁶⁰ While many garrisons contained *phulakes*, the use of the latter does not strictly imply the presence of the former, especially when mercenaries or foreign allies were involved. This dissertation only addresses *phulakes* when they are associated with *phourarchoi*, *phouria*, or *phourai*.

Ἄρμωστής, *harmostes*, is another term which is often associated with garrisons. Although *harmostes* could be used on a limited basis as a generic term for a royal overseer,⁶¹ it primarily designated a Spartan governor over a foreign *polis*, who may have commanded troops and sometimes functioned in practice as a garrison commander.⁶² Due to this broad range of meanings, the post is discussed here only in its relation to *phouria*, *phourai*, and *phouroi*.

The office of στρατηγός, *strategos* (general), is another potential source of confusion. The *strategia* in Classical Athens is well understood, as is the political influence wielded by *stratego*i in the assembly.⁶³ As the powers and influence of these *stratego*i were broad, some scholars conflate their role with the *phourarchia*.⁶⁴ *Stratego*i are known to have commanded garrisons, although such postings were largely restricted to Hellenistic Attica and a scattering

⁶⁰Syll.³ 569; 633; *IG* XII, Suppl. 644; *IC* III, iv 9; Manganaro 1963, #18; *I. Priene* 19; 23; 108; Robert and Robert 1976 153–235; *SEG* 29.1136; Russell 1999, 11; 33.

⁶¹*Suda*, s.v. Ἄρμωσταί.

⁶²Parke 1930, 49–50; Hodkinson 1993, 152–161.

⁶³Hamel 1998, 12–14.

⁶⁴Højte 2009, 100–102.

of other locations.⁶⁵ Hellenistic *strategoï* were generally governors over larger regions, with powers that extended far beyond the administration and maintenance of garrisons. In many of these cases the office of the *strategia* was separate from, if not outright superior to, the *phrourarchia*.⁶⁶

By at least 306 in Asia Minor, the *strategia* became closely aligned with the conception of a Persian *satrap*,⁶⁷ although the exact extent of the responsibilities of *strategoï* here remains controversial.⁶⁸ However, within smaller communities by the Hellenistic period, the office of the *strategos* was increasingly disassociated from military roles, and was instead devoted to civil affairs. As a result, the *strategia* often exercised powers which overlapped with *archons* and other civil officials, rather than military ones.⁶⁹

Further precision is called for. This investigation focuses on the specific terminology surrounding the office of the *phrourarchia*⁷⁰ and the *phrourai*, *phrouria*, and *phrouroi* who supported it. These terms are related to the verb φρουρέω (*phroureo*), to watch, and retained their association with observation within a military setting.⁷¹ *Phroura* generally referred to a

⁶⁵SEG 31.120 = SEG 49.153 = *I. Rhamnous* II 49; SEG 43.25; SEG 43.40; SEG 24.154 = SEG 40.135 = SEG 44.59 = *I. Rhamnous* II 3; SEG 41.92 = *I. Rhamnous* II 38; SEG 15.113 = SEG 19.82 = SEG 25.158 = *I. Rhamnous* II 43; SEG 40.129 = SEG 43.31 = *I. Rhamnous* II 14; SEG 40.141 = *I. Rhamnous* II 47; SEG 41.86 = *I. Rhamnous* II 10. For non-Athenian examples see *IG*² 123, 1287; *Lindos* II 151; *Hdn.* 3.6.10; *App. Hann.* 7.43; *Diod. Sic.* 20.103.2; *Polyaenus, Strat.* 6.5. See Appendix 4 for a full list.

⁶⁶*FD* III 4:37; SEG 19.678 = SEG 37.984 & 987; *I. Priene* 4; Robert and Robert 1976, 153–235 = Sokolowski 1980, 103–106; SEG 26.1306, 30.1376; SEG 29.1613 = Landau 1966, 54–70 = Fischer 1979, 131–138; *Philae* 15, 20; *Thèbes à Syène* 242, 243, 302, 318, 320, 322; *P. Diosk.* 1, 6; *P. Dura* 20; *P. Gen.* 3.132; *P.Hib.* 2.233; *P. Tebt.* 1.6; *SB* 1 4512; *UPZ* 1.106, 1.107.

⁶⁷Bengston 1952, 96–118; cf. Lund 1992, 140–146 who argues that *strategoï* under Lysimachus were not regional governors and were instead officers concerned with temporary security measures.

⁶⁸Billows 1990, 273–277.

⁶⁹Shatzman 1991, 59; Dmitriev 2005, 232 n. 74.

⁷⁰The verb φρουραρχέω is extremely rare in literature of the period, with the only unambiguous reference in *Plut. Dio.* 11.

⁷¹LSJ s.v. φρουρά, φρουραρχέω, φρουρέω, φρουρός; Nankov 2009, 4.

garrison, its structures, or even a watch in an abstract sense. In contrast, a *phrourion* was a physical fortress and was generally a self-contained entity. A *phrourion* could be located in the very heart of a *polis* on the *akra*, on the borderlands of its *chora*, or anywhere in-between.⁷² The word had unquestioned military connotations, and the term is sometimes viewed as a synonym with *teichos* and its derivatives.⁷³

The men who served in a garrison were largely referred to as *phrouroi*, although *phroura* and the more generic designation of *phulakes* could be used on a limited basis.⁷⁴ These were used figuratively as well, and could reference a prison, bodyguards, or a general state of protection. Many Greek writers in the Roman Empire could use these terms anachronistically or imprecisely,⁷⁵ and this investigation treats such instances largely as a literary, not historical, phenomenon.

One of the most important magistracies associated with *phroura*, *phrouria*, and *phrouroi* was the office of the *phourarchia*, or garrison commander, which was held by men called *phourarchoi* (singular *phourarchos*). This study will show that, unlike more generic terms such as *archon*, *hegemon* or *strategos*,⁷⁶ *phourarchia* designated a unique office with specific authority. It was a position tasked with projecting power and maintaining control over recalcitrant populations, primarily through physical and political domination. Protection

⁷²See Appendix 4 for a listing of all instances of *phourarchoi*, *phourai*, *phouria*, and *phrouroi*.

⁷³Nielsen 2002, 50–54.

⁷⁴See Appendix 5 for a full list of all sources.

⁷⁵RE (1941) 773–81, s.v. “Phourarchos”; Reger 2004, 148.

⁷⁶Although what follows is not a definitive or edited list, for a sense of scale, the TLG contains 14,710 instances of *hegemon*, 23,457 instances of *archon*, and only 216 instances of *phourarchos* (along with all of their derivatives). These numbers are similar in other corpora: PHI lists 860 instances of *hegemon*, 2,500 of *archon*, and 116 of *phourarchos*; papyri.info contains 991 instances of *hegemon*, 2,579 for *archon*, and 31 for *phourarchos*; and at the time of this printing the SEG contains 303 instances of *hegemon*, 1,819 of *archon*, and 56 for *phourarchos*.

against external threats was an important function of the *phrourarchia*. Even in the autonomous *poleis* of Hellenistic Asia Minor *phrourarchoi* were mostly concerned with protecting the limited hegemony of a *polis* over its immediate *chora* and subordinate neighbors.⁷⁷

1.3 Historical and Literary Background

The majority of literary references to *phrourarchoi* are made by historical authors spanning from the fourth century BCE to the first century CE. Although the use of *phrourarchos* for any particular individual or position may vary among different authors, these sources are by and large internally consistent in solely referring to specific individuals as *phrourarchoi*. As shown below, the choice to label a magistracy as a *phrourarchia* was a conscious effort to avoid generic terminology like *hegemon*, *archon*, or *phulax*.

Due to the surviving historians' interests in larger historical trends, *phrourarchoi* who were appointed by minor powers for local offices are completely unknown in the literary record.⁷⁸ As a result, these authors present the *phrourarchia* only as an imperial office which used military powers to maintain foreign authority over a population or strategic area.⁷⁹ Classical authors often saw the *phrourarchia* in a negative light, and were reluctant to apply its terminology to a Greek magistracy. This conception gradually changed with the rise of the Roman Empire, after which the *phrourarchia* was increasingly viewed as merely another necessary office that supported Roman imperium. Such contentions are supported by examining each author in turn.

⁷⁷See Chapters 2, 3, and 4.

⁷⁸For these “local” *phrourarchoi* see Chapter 4.

⁷⁹See Chapter 3.

1.4 Classical Authors

1.4.1 Herodotus and Thucydides

Phroura and its variations first appear in Herodotus' *History*. Little is certain about Herodotus' life, but it is clear that he was born shortly before the Persian Wars in Halicarnassus, and spent the majority of his life in exile from the city, probably dying in the Athenian colony of Thurii in southern Italy in the 420s.⁸⁰ When referring to garrisons, Herodotus used the Ionian spelling *phroure*, a word occurring only three times in his work.⁸¹ Herodotus used the verb *phroureo* far more extensively, in contexts varying from physical garrisons to a general sense of guardianship over a place or person.⁸² In no case does he specify the name of a commander of a *phroura* or the commander of a *phroure*, nor does he mention any *phourarchoi*. Although the garrisons mentioned by Herodotus certainly had commanding officers, his choice to leave them unnamed does not allow for any significant conclusions to be drawn about the specific powers of commanders or their relationship to local communities.

* * * *

Phourarchoi are also entirely absent in Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War. He was from a wealthy and aristocratic background, with familial connections to Thracian royalty, and was born in Athenian territory before 454, possibly in the mid 460s.⁸³ Serving as an Athenian *strategos* in 424,⁸⁴ Thucydides was exiled for his poor performance against the

⁸⁰*DNP* sv. Herodotos.

⁸¹Hdt. 2.30.3; 6.26.1; 7.59.1.

⁸²See Appendix 4.

⁸³*DNP* sv. Thukydidēs.

⁸⁴Thuc. 5.26.

Spartans, and composed his work during his time abroad. *Phrourai* are found throughout his work, almost all with unidentified commanders.⁸⁵ When Thucydides does indicate the specific command structure of a garrison, he prefers the more generic designation of *archon*,⁸⁶ although he does place a *strategos* over an Athenian *phrourion* during Athens' siege of Mytilene in 428.⁸⁷ Although *phrourarchos* is epigraphically attested for the Athenian occupation of Erythrai in the 450s,⁸⁸ and Thucydides' appointment as a *strategos* assures his familiarity with Athenian military terminology, he does not use the term *phrourarchos*. Despite Athenian command over Erythrai and its territories, Thucydides refers to Sidussa and Pteleum in the territory of Erythrai as *teiche* (fortified places) without mentioning an officer or any Athenian command structure.⁸⁹

Although it is certainly possible that Thucydides does not mention *phrourarchoi* due to his focus on broader themes of the Peloponnesian War, he does identify the offices of *archons* and *stratego*i who commanded garrisons.⁹⁰ His choice not to mention *phrourarchoi* - since the office unquestionably existed in the Athenian Empire - deserves further exploration. Although Thucydides is sometimes considered a political realist *par excellence*,⁹¹ he is increasingly seen as a historian who grappled with the moral impact of empire.⁹² In this light,

⁸⁵See Appendix 4.

⁸⁶Thuc. 1.115.4-1.117.3; 4.57.1-5.

⁸⁷Ibid., 3.18.4.

⁸⁸*IG I² 10*; Kagan 1969, 98–100.

⁸⁹Thuc. 8.24.2: “...καὶ ἐκ Σιδούσσης καὶ ἐκ Πτελεοῦ, ἃ ἐν τῇ Ἐρυθραίᾳ εἶχον τεῖχη...”

⁹⁰Thuc. 1.115.4-1.117.3, 3.18.4, 4.53.2, 4.54.4, 4.57.1-5.

⁹¹Forde 1995, 147–149; Lendon 2006, 96; cf. Eckstein 2003, 773–774 who argues for a more nuanced approach to the influence of Thucydides on political realism.

⁹²Bagby 1994, 132–133; Crane 1998, 261; Williams 1998, 8; Foster 2010, 3; Riley 2000, 117–119.

Thucydides may have chosen to avoid the word *phrouarchos* and the unambiguously imperialistic connotations of the office. On the other hand, *archons*, and to a lesser extent *strategoï*, were offices that had authority outside of a purely military context, and differed from an office that was primarily concerned with the maintenance of garrisons and the outright subjugation of a local population. As such, these terms may have been a more palatable alternative to *phrouarchos*, but this reasoning remains highly speculative.

1.4.2 Xenophon

Thucydides' avoidance of the term *phrouarchos* is echoed by Xenophon, who was himself an aristocratic Athenian historian. His authorship of the *Cyropaedia* and *Anabasis* likely predates the late 360s, while the *Hellenica* was almost certainly completed in the early 350s, close to his death sometime after 354.⁹³ Xenophon did not apply *phrouarchia* to a Greek magistracy within a historical setting. The only *phrouarchoi* found under Greek administration in Xenophon occur in his Socratic dialogues, which are largely ahistorical in nature and concerned with metaphysical, not historical, inquiry.⁹⁴ One notable instance is found in the *Memorabilia*, when Socrates, describing a man led by the *nomos*, asks

“To whom would allies rather entrust the *hegemonia*, *phrouarchia*, or the *poleis*?”⁹⁵

This is almost certainly a reference to Greek *phrouarchoi*, as Socrates' rhetorical examples up to this point are placed entirely in a Greek cultural context. This passage shows that Xenophon assumed his audience to be familiar with the concept of the *phrouarchia*, even though he did not use the term to describe Greek garrison commanders in his own historical writing.

⁹³Higgins 1977, 128; Gray 1991, 228; Tuplin 1993, 195 n. 5.

⁹⁴Stadter 2012, 52.

⁹⁵Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.17: “τῷ δ’ ἂν μᾶλλον οἱ σύμμαχοι πιστεύσειαν ἢ ἡγεμονίαν ἢ φρουραρχίαν ἢ πόλεις;”

Instead, Xenophon's preference was to refer to Greek garrison commanders, regardless of political affiliation, by the Spartan term *harmostes*.⁹⁶ Such general usage of *harmostes*, with its strong Spartan connotations, is unique in historical literature. Xenophon's preference for the term may stem partially from his service with Spartan mercenaries in the famed Ten Thousand, or from his exile from Athens to Sparta, that resulted in his friendship with the Spartan king Agesilaus II and familiarity with the Spartan military.⁹⁷ His use of military terminology may have been influenced by this background and by his supposed pro-Spartan bias, although his unquestioned support of Sparta is a notion that has come under increasing attack in modern scholarship.⁹⁸

Xenophon certainly did not spare Spartan *harmostai* from criticism, and there are signs that he viewed the behavior of some with a degree of contempt.⁹⁹ As much as he chided Spartan shortcomings, he reserved most of his literary wrath for the excess of Athenian democratic imperialism, which he viewed as an abject failure. That being said, he certainly was not fundamentally opposed to imperial expansion.¹⁰⁰ *Phrourarchos*, with all of its symbolic force as a term of pure imperialism, was a word that Xenophon consciously avoided in favor of more generic terms like *harmostes*.

Beyond the Greek political orbit, Xenophon readily used *phrourarchos* to describe officials in the Persian Empire. His single overtly historical use the term described officers

⁹⁶Xen. *An.* 4.2.13; 5.5.20; 6.4.19; 6.6.13; 7.1.8; 7.2.6; 7.2.7; 7.2.12–13; 7.2.15; Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.13–14; 2.3.20; 2.3.21; 2.3.42; 2.4.4; 3.2.29; 4.2.5; 4.8.8; 5.4.13; 6.4.1–2; See also Michell 1952, 149–150.

⁹⁷Higgins 1977, 22–24.

⁹⁸Christesen 2006, 48; cf. Rice 1974, 164.

⁹⁹Tober 2010, 415 n. 22.

¹⁰⁰Tuplin 1993, 166–167; Pownall 2004, 179; Lendon 2006, 98; cf. Dillery 1995, 7; Jansen 2007, 207–282.

who served under Cyrus the Younger in Ionia in 401.¹⁰¹ These men acted as intermediaries between Cyrus and Peloponnesian mercenaries, and were likely Greek soldiers of fortune themselves.¹⁰² Xenophon also placed *phourarchoi* in the early Assyrian and Persian Empires, although the historical value of his analysis is now viewed with skepticism by many Achaemenid historians.¹⁰³ In these quasi-historical contexts, Xenophon stressed the subordination of the *phourarchos* to monarchy as well as the limited military authority of the office, together with its role in securing strategic locations.

Xenophon mentions an otherwise unknown *phourarchos* who commanded an important Assyrian *phourion* on the border with the Hyrcanians and the Sacians; he was targeted and overthrown by Cyrus the Great to secure the border for Persia.¹⁰⁴ Cyrus not only encountered *phourarchoi* on the outskirts of his kingdom; he placed them in the strategically critical city of Babylon, where

“...he wanted the *phourarchoi* in the *akrai* and the *chiliarchoi* of the *phulakes* throughout the *chora* to follow the orders of no one other than himself.”¹⁰⁵

As it is unlikely that Xenophon knew the correct Persian terminology for these military positions, his use of *phourarchos* in such cases is almost certainly an application of a Greek term to a somewhat similar Persian (or Assyrian) office.¹⁰⁶ In his writings there is no indication that a *phourarchos* had any independence or broad authority. Instead, Xenophon

¹⁰¹Xen. *An.* 1.1.6.

¹⁰²Trundle 2004, 45; 106; 109.

¹⁰³Christesen 2006, 48; Cook 1983, 21 goes as far as to state that looking for actual history in the *Cyropaedia* is a “losing battle..there is none...”

¹⁰⁴Xen. *Cyr.* 5.3.11, 5.3.17.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., 8.6.1–8.6.3: “...τοὺς μέντοι ἐν ταῖς ἄκραις φρουράρχους καὶ τοὺς χιλιάρχους τῶν κατὰ τὴν χώραν φυλακῶν οὐκ ἄλλου ἢ ἑαυτοῦ ἐβούλετο ἀκούειν...”

¹⁰⁶Jefremow 1995, 50–51.

believed that *phourarchoi* were subordinate to *satraps* or reported directly to the monarch; outside of rhetorical examples, he conceived of the *phourarchia* as an exclusively foreign military office in the east.

Xenophon presents a somewhat schizophrenic view of the *phourarchia* and its relationship to empire. The office was certainly an imperial posting, and the Greeks established their own garrisons, but only Persian and Assyrian commanders were given the title of *phourarchos* by Xenophon. Although Xenophon held a positive opinion of individual Persian rulers, like Cyrus the Great and Cyrus the Younger,¹⁰⁷ his usage of *phourarchos* perhaps points to a conscious decision, like that of Thucydides, to push the somewhat distasteful language of unchecked imperialism into a Persian context.

1.4.3 Plato

Plato, who lived c. 428/7 to 348/7,¹⁰⁸ provides one of the few theoretical treatments of the *phourarchia*. He attempted to grapple with the idea of an ideal Greek *polis*, and in his work *Laws* he described a society that would be more feasibly achievable than the utopia he envisioned in *The Republic*. Plato recognized that his ideal *polis* required dedicated protectors, and to this end he described the offices of *strategos* (general), *taxiarchos* (leader of a *taxis*, an infantry unit), *hipparchos* (leader of the cavalry), *phylarchos* (commander of the guards), *prytanos* (magistrate) and *astynomos* (urban official). Plato used these offices to form the urban core of his theoretical *polis*, while he assigned *agoranomoi* (rural officials) and the *phourarchoi* as custodians over the rest of the territory, presumably separate from the main urban foundations.

¹⁰⁷Tatum 1989, 91, 208.

¹⁰⁸*DNP* sv. Platon.

Plato limited the length of service for the *phrouarchos* to three years, and the office was subordinate to *agronomoi* in civic and judicial matters, only judging cases that were “less” (τῶν ἐλαττόνων) than those tried by an *agronomos*.¹⁰⁹ Perhaps because of his bitter political and personal rivalry with the Syracusan *phrouarchos* Philistos,¹¹⁰ Plato took great pains to remove the office from any position of authority within the urban confines of the *polis*. He viewed the *phrouarchia* as suitable for protection of outlying territories and minor internal civic responsibility, not as the instrument of imperial control and suppression that it had been in the Athenian Empire and the tyranny of Dionysius I. He conceptualized the office as restricted to citizens, thus avoiding the hated specter of foreign power imposed upon a recalcitrant population. Plato attempted to balance the defensive needs of a city with the fervent desire of a self-reliant *polis* for autonomy. There was no room in his analysis for mercenaries, auxiliaries, foreign forces, or any officers who did not embody the ideal of an amateur citizen-soldier.

1.4.4 Classical Summary

Xenophon's hesitation to use the term *phrouarchos* points to a broader distaste for it in Classical Greek historians. Xenophon, Herodotus, and Thucydides do not situate *phrouarchoi* within a purely Greek historical context, contrary to documents where the term is used, at least on a limited basis, in the context of Athenian administration over overseas territories.¹¹¹ Only Aeneas Tacticus, active in the 4th century before the expansion of Philip II,¹¹² uses the term in conjunction with a Greek magistrate. So little about Aeneas is certain

¹⁰⁹Pl. *Leg.* 6.760b-e, 8.843d.

¹¹⁰Sanders 2008, 11–12. See Chapter 3.

¹¹¹*IG* I² 10.

¹¹²Bengtson 1962, 458–459; Winterling 1991, 196.

that his stance, if any, on imperialism is unknown. Aeneas mentions a *phrouarchos* named Nikokles who, after the Athenian victory in the Battle of Naxos in 376,

“...[with] plots being made against him, closed the ramps, placed *phulakes* on the wall, and made patrols outside of the *polis* with dogs; for they were expecting treachery from outside [the *polis*].”¹¹³

Unfortunately, nothing further is known about this *phrouarchos*, but his posting on Naxos placed him well outside of the Greek mainland. In addition, he was preoccupied with the danger of internal dissidents assisting an enemy attack, which suggests external control over the *polis* and a degree of tension between the *phrouarchos* and the local population.

Classical authors were not necessarily concerned with micro-history or the intricacies of local administration if these did not substantially affect their narrative. They may have largely avoided using *phrouarchia* when dealing with Greek commanders, because few of them discussed the highly localized responsibilities of the office. Xenophon's use of *phrouarchos* to designate Persian officers and Aeneas' use of the term for Nikokles can be seen as indications of the limited scope of the office in comparison to Greek governors and magistrates, who had broader leeway in their authority. Furthermore, there seems to have been a notable hesitation to choose the term even in contexts where it certainly was in use, especially within the Athenian empire. This hesitation perhaps points to a broader discomfort with the imperialism supported and embodied by the position, as well as unease concerning interference with the legal apparatus of supposedly free Greek *poleis* by the *phrouarchia*. What is certain is that Classical authors viewed *phrouarchoi* as exclusively imperial officers,¹¹⁴ an essential quality of the post that remained unchanged into the Hellenistic

¹¹³Aen. Tact. 22.20: “...ἐπιβουλευόμενος ὁ φρούραρχος Νικοκλήϊς ἀναβάσεις κλειστάς ποιήσας κατέστησε φύλακας ἐπὶ τῷ τείχει, ἔξω δὲ τῆς πόλεως περιοδίας ἐποιεῖτο μετὰ κυνῶν: προσεδέχοντο γὰρ ἔξωθεν τινα ἐπιβουλήν.”

¹¹⁴See Chapter 3.

period.

1.5 The Hellenistic Era and Post-Classical Authors

The Hellenistic era marked a transition of power in the Greek world away from independent *poleis* to Greco-Macedonian monarchy. A key component of the ideology of Classical *poleis* was the rule of law, and with it the subordination of all citizens and magistracies to the *nomos* of an autonomous community which enjoyed some measure of local *eleutheria*.¹¹⁵ Following the defeat of a coalition of Greek cities by Philip II at the battle of Chaironeia in 338, the primacy of this vision of Greek liberty, and with it the primacy of the *polis* in the Greek political system, was diminished.¹¹⁶ Despite the abortive attempt of Athens and the Aetolians to regain their independence in the Lamian War following the death of Alexander the Great in 323,¹¹⁷ the world of the Greek *polis* had irrevocably fallen to Hellenistic monarchies.

This was a new era where Greco-Macedonian empires, not independent Greek *poleis*, became the most powerful political entities.¹¹⁸ The tenth century CE *Suda* contains perhaps the most succinct summary of Hellenistic administration, highlighting the difference between government by the laws of a community and that by a monarch:

“[1] “Kingship is unaccountable power.” Excellent men are not only free, they are also kings. For Kingship is unaccountable power which only the wise can support. [2] Neither nature nor justice gives kingships to men, but [kingships are given] to those who are able to lead an army and to conduct affairs sensibly, such as Philip [II] was, and the successors of Alexander [the Great].”¹¹⁹

¹¹⁵Thomas 2005, 42; Hansen 2002.

¹¹⁶Cawkwell 1996, 98–100.

¹¹⁷Diod. Sic. 18.12–15.

¹¹⁸Hammond 1993, 12.

¹¹⁹*Suda* s.v. Βασιλεία: “Βασιλεία ἐστὶν ἀνυπεύθυνος ἀρχή. οὐ μόνον δὲ ἐλευθέρους εἶναι τοὺς σπουδαίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ βασιλέας. ἢ γὰρ βασιλεία ἀρχὴ ἀνυπεύθυνος, ἥτις περὶ μόνους ἂν τοὺς σοφοὺς συσταίη. Βασιλεία. οὔτε φύσις οὔτε τὸ δίκαιον ἀποδίδουσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὰς βασιλείας, ἀλλὰ τοῖς δυναμένοις ἡγεῖσθαι στρατοπέδου καὶ χειρίζειν πράγματα νουνεχῶς: οἷος ἦν Φίλιππος καὶ οἱ διάδοχοι Ἀλεξάνδρου.” The first part of

In this assessment it is raw military power and administrative competence, not nature or justice, that is the defining characteristic of royal ideology in the Hellenistic world.

Hellenistic empires were “spear-won land”, or territory which was the personal property of the monarch due to the right of conquest.¹²⁰ This militaristic view was the foundation of royal ideology and was reflected in coinage, royal correspondence, and literature.¹²¹

Despite occasional bombastic royal claims, it must be stressed that monarchies did not have unquestioned power over local communities. Even though some scholars view Hellenistic governments as little more than tools of imperial exploitation,¹²² kings still had to take into account the internal politics and desires of supposedly subject cities in their kingdoms, lest they face defections, internal revolt, and the loss of revenue and communications. This concern led the monarchies to exercise a limited hegemony that required negotiation and appeasement as much as raw might.¹²³

Imperial *phrourarchoi* were instrumental components of this delicate balancing act. Hellenistic monarchies needed an institutional method to control and dominate their spear-won land, to suppress local dissent, to project imperial might, and even to modify the form of that power in a local context. Much as an Athenian *phrourarchos* held Erythrai, Hellenistic royalty increasingly turned to *phrourarchoi* to secure their conquests. Unlike previous armies

this definition originates from Diogenes Laertios 7.122.

¹²⁰Tarn 1913, 191; Mehl 1980, 173–212; Billows 1990, 135; Cohen 1995, 30; Holt 1999, 125; Mittag 2008, 41.

¹²¹Rocca 2008, 39; Portier-Young 2014, 51–52; cf. Tuplin 2014, 265 who argues for limited militaristic numismatic imagery.

¹²²Green 1990, xv.

¹²³Shiple 2000, 59; Lévêque 1999, 361; Ma 1999, 179–242; This argument can be taken too far; for example, McShane 1964 argues unconvincingly throughout his work that the Attalids were selfless defenders of Greek freedom. See the scathing review by Badian 1964, 105–106.

in the Classical world, garrison forces used by Hellenistic empires were largely composed of mercenaries who had little social or political connection with their assignments.¹²⁴ As a rule, such men were motivated more by profit than a sense of responsibility to a local community or *polis*. Thus, a symbiotic relationship developed in which garrisons and commanders increasingly looked to Hellenistic monarchs to provide and defend their social and economic status, while those same monarchs depended on *phrourarchoi* and *phrourai* to protect the integrity of their kingdoms.¹²⁵

Phrourarchoi are well attested in the papyrological and epigraphical record from the end of the Classical era to the mid-second century.¹²⁶ The importance of the office and its military character within Greco-Macedonian royal administration are indisputable. This fact was not lost on the ancient authors, who applied the term to Greek magistracies without the same hesitation or compunction as their classical counterparts. These historians understood the political shift from the primacy of the *polis* to monarchy, and their works by and large focus on the histories of Hellenistic royalty. Such authors thought that garrison commanders were not subordinate to the *nomos* of a Greek *polis*, but were instead subject to the whims of an imperial sovereign.¹²⁷

However, the Hellenistic era offers significant source difficulties, as after Xenophon there is a two-century gap in extant historical writing until Polybius, whose *Histories* end in 144.¹²⁸ The only contemporary surviving historical testimony is found in fragmentary papyri

¹²⁴Chaniotis 2002, 100.

¹²⁵See Chapter 3 for more on this relationship.

¹²⁶See Appendix 4.

¹²⁷See Chapters 3 and 5. These authors ignored local *phrourarchoi* who were subject to local law; see Chapter 4.

¹²⁸There are some rhetorical and literary examples from the period: Din. *In Demosthenem* 38-39; Men. *Epit.* 1094 & *Kolax C* 195-91.

and within quotations and paraphrases from later authors, who may not have always copied their source material with a high degree of accuracy.¹²⁹ Despite such issues, historians who treated the period, including Polybius, Diodorus, Plutarch, and Arrian, offer a wealth of material on the development of the *phourarchia*. Although they wrote extensively on Hellenistic history, they were themselves largely the products of an even later time and a different political order under the Roman Empire.

Much as Hellenistic monarchies overshadowed local Greek politics following the conquests and death of Alexander the Great, by the mid-second century the military power of the Roman Republic had eclipsed any potential rivals in the Greek world. If any doubt remained concerning undisputed Roman hegemony following Philip V's defeat at the battle of Cynoscephalae in 197,¹³⁰ the sack of Corinth in 146 firmly positioned Rome as the unquestioned major power in Greece.¹³¹ The dissolution of the Attalid Kingdom in 133 and the subsequent revolt of Aristonikos resulted in Roman annexation of a strategically vital portion of Asia Minor, and the inexorable process of direct Roman administration of the Greek east began in earnest.¹³²

The social, military, and economic dynamics of the Greek world were transformed by Roman administration.¹³³ This shift had a profound effect on the interests and literary styles of historians, most of whom lived under the sole dominion of Rome and could claim active

¹²⁹Walbank 1993, 13–20.

¹³⁰Polyb. 18.19–27; Livy, 33.7–24.

¹³¹Strabo 8.6.23; Paus. 7.16.4–10; Steel 2011, 9; Rosenstein 2012, 179–198.

¹³²Just. *Epit.* 36.4; Strabo 14.1.38; Raschke 1979, 82; Kallet-Marx 1996, 11–124; Kosmetatou 2005, 165.

¹³³Lamberton 2001, 60.

participation in the Empire's military, literary, and political life.¹³⁴ For later authors looking backwards, often favorably, through the twin shadows of Hellenistic monarchy and the Roman Empire, the role of *phrourarchoi* as agents of imperial power and domination was reaffirmed. Examining each of these authors in turn reveals that, perhaps paradoxically, the office of the *phrourarchia* became both more common and more respected in literature as the political independence of the *polis* dwindled into little more than a memory.

1.5.1 Menander

Menander was an Athenian citizen and playwright, most likely from an elite background; he lived in Athens between c. 342 and c. 290,¹³⁵ and thus in a *polis* that had lost its independence to Macedonian monarchs.¹³⁶ Unfortunately, most of his works are highly fragmentary, but what survives offers a glimpse into the impact of *phrourarchoi* on intellectual and popular culture. His *Kolax (Flatterer)* was a play likely about the competition over a *hetaira* (courtesan) between a soldier, accompanied by the eponymous flatterer, and a young man. At one point a speaker (questionably assigned as the male slave Daos, perhaps a servant to the young man)¹³⁷ issued a warning that flatterers

“...caused the destruction of all tyrants, all the great *hegemones*, the *satrap*, *phrourachos*, the *oikistes* (founder) of a settlement, and the *strategos*.”¹³⁸

Although this excerpt is at an uncertain point in a highly fragmentary play, and serves an unknown function within the plot, the terms used show that the *phrourarchos* was at least as

¹³⁴See below.

¹³⁵*DNP* sv. Menandros [4].

¹³⁶See Chapter 3.

¹³⁷Arnott 1979, 163.

¹³⁸Men. *Kol.* 90-94: “ὄσοι τύραννοι πάποθ’, ὅστις ἡγεμῶν | μέγας, σατράπης, φρούραρχος, οἰκιστῆς τόπου, | στρατηγός—οὐ [...] ἀλλὰ τοὺς τελέως λέγω | ἀπολωλότας—[νῦν τ]οῦτ’ ἀνήρηκεν μόνον, | οἱ κόλακες...”

familiar to the audience as these other officers, and was not out of place within the heavily militarized context of the play. In Menander's *Epitrepontes*, the character Onesimos states that

“...to each man the gods [have appointed] *tropos* (his character) as his *phrourarchos*.”¹³⁹

This use is certainly not connected to a purely military context, but is instead a use of the term to represent the control of *tropos* over an individual. The nuance here should not be understated: the use of *phrourarchos* over a more general term (such as *phulax*) implies a concept beyond simple protection. Menander reinforces this notion a few lines later, when Onesimos declares that *tropos* “is a god to us”, a statement certainly indicating a degree of dominance.¹⁴⁰ Although information on the precise status of a *phrourarchos* cannot be gleaned from Menander, it does emerge that he possessed at least a passing familiarity with the office and expected the same from his audience.

1.5.2 Polybius

Polybius was an active participant in the final days of the independent Macedonian kingdoms and federal *poleis* in Greece. Born c. 200 into a wealthy and politically connected family at Megalopolis, as a young man he seemed destined for a long political career, as revealed in his appointment as *hipparchos* (a deputy leader) of the Achaean League in 170/169. However, following the Roman victory in the battle of Pydna in 168 and the end of Macedon as an independent kingdom, Rome embarked on a campaign to relocate one thousand troublesome Greeks, including Polybius, to Italy to remove them from the local political scene and to serve as hostages. Far from suffering under exile, Polybius thrived in

¹³⁹Men. *Epit.* 1093-1094: “ἐκάστωι τὸν τρόπον συν[ώικισαν] φρούραρχον...”

¹⁴⁰Ibid., 1096: “οὐτός ἐσθ’ ἡμῖν θεός...”

Rome, eventually becoming a friend and mentor of Scipio Aemilianus and accompanying him on campaign.¹⁴¹

With his involvement in the Achaean and Roman military, Polybius was aware of importance of garrisons. There are 45 instances of garrisons in his work,¹⁴² but Polybius mentions the commanders for only two of them: an unnamed group of *epistatai* who commanded a group of *hegemones* under Ptolemy in opposition to Antiochus in Seleucia c. 219,¹⁴³ and an unnamed *phourarchos* under Antiochus at Perge in 189/188.¹⁴⁴

Although the *epistates* and the *phourarchos* both exercised authority over garrison forces, there were multiple *epistatai* who commanded multiple *hegemones* as subordinate officers, while the *phourarchos* in Perge was solely responsible for his assignment. The scale and importance of the locations were also radically different; Seleucia was a key to the entire region of Coele-Syria and an object of near-constant warfare,¹⁴⁵ while Perge occupied a much less critical position on the coast of Asia Minor. This *polis* was of so little significance that no one had bothered to inform the *phourarchos* that hostilities with Rome were finished.¹⁴⁶

Polybius, projecting a Greek conception of imperialism onto the Roman Republic,¹⁴⁷ had

¹⁴¹Polyb. 31.23–25; Walbank 1957, 1–6; Eckstein 1992, 405; Eckstein 1995, 7–9; Burton 2011, 70–75; Sommer 2013, 316.

¹⁴²Polyb. 2.41.10–14; 18.45.3–5; 20.6.2; 38.3.3. See Appendix 4 for a full list.

¹⁴³Ibid., 5.60.2; Walbank 1957, 586 is certainly correct that the expression “τοὺς ἐπιστάτας τῆς πόλεως” signifies the leaders of the garrison. The *hegemones* were subordinate officers and therefore not in overall command.

¹⁴⁴Polyb. 21.42.1–5; The passage largely escapes comment from Walbank; See Walbank 1979, 155.

¹⁴⁵Polyb. 5.58.

¹⁴⁶Ibid., 21.42.1–5; Ma 1999, 252–253; cf. Grainger 1995, 40 who argues that the *phourarchos* may have surrendered only due to the elimination of supporting *phourai*.

¹⁴⁷Richardson 1979, 10–11.

somewhat mixed emotions concerning the moral standing of Roman imperialism.¹⁴⁸ Much as in the earlier work of Thucydides and Xenophon, this attitude is reflected in his use of *phrouarchos*, which described a commander who was clearly opposed to Rome. Pointedly, Polybius only refers to a royal agent as *phrouarchos*, and he chooses not to identify any officers in the garrisons established by free Greek *poleis* and federal leagues like the author's native Achaia. For Polybius, the terminology surrounding the *phrouarchia* remained somewhat distasteful, even though he acknowledged the need for garrisons.

1.5.3 Diodorus

Polybius was the last of the Greek historians active in the world of independent Greek *poleis*. The next author under consideration, Diodorus, lived in a radically different political environment. Little is known concerning his life beyond his birth in the Sicilian town of Agyrium and the probable date for the composition of his *Historical Library* c. 56.¹⁴⁹ By then, Sicily had been a Roman province for nearly two centuries. The island had long been a battle-ground between various Greek states, tyrants, monarchs, Rome, and Carthage. Following the First Punic War, it was all but annexed by Rome, and by 227 the Roman republic installed the first *praetor* to govern the island directly.¹⁵⁰

Any assessment of Diodorus' value as a historical source must contend with the oft-repeated maxim that he was little more than a copyist, devoid of any real historical originality.¹⁵¹ His command of technical terminology has also been derided, and it has been

¹⁴⁸Walbank 1972, 181–182; cf. Baronowski 2011, 61–63 who believes that Polybius held a favorable view of Roman imperialism.

¹⁴⁹Sacks 1982, 434.

¹⁵⁰Livy 33.42.8; Finley 1979, 113–117; Prag 2013, 54; Serrati 2000, 109–112.

¹⁵¹Burton 1972, 1; cf. Sacks 1990, 3–7.

argued that, at least in reference to Alexander's campaigns,

“...on the occasions when he does mention something which is recognizably 'Macedonian' and 'technical', it is almost invariably incorrectly used.”¹⁵²

Such pronouncements have come under increased scrutiny however, and it can now be said that, at the very least, credit for much of the original analysis in the *Historical Library* should be given to Diodorus.¹⁵³ Although he was culturally Greek and his work betrays a marked preference for the local history of Sicily, he was in the vanguard of a new group of historians whose political development occurred under Roman power. He belonged to a world where Roman military might and control had all but swept away the remnants of Hellenistic empire, and Roman patronage had replaced the largess of independent *poleis* and Hellenistic kings.¹⁵⁴ Despite this change, Diodorus was far from being an unabashed supporter of Roman imperialism, and his work may reflect a slightly critical view of Roman expansion.¹⁵⁵

Although Diodorus was proud of his native Sicily and its place in history, he was not directly involved in resistance against Rome, nor did he serve in any grand military struggles. Thus, he was far less emotionally and personally involved with the exercise of imperial power than Xenophon and Polybius. Diodorus represents the beginning of a shift in the conception of the *phourarchia* into an office that was simply another component of an imperial administration.

As in most other sources, the vast majority of garrisons in Diodorus' work are not assigned to specific magistrates. For the commanders that are identified, the designation

¹⁵²Milns 1982, 123.

¹⁵³Sacks 1990, 5.

¹⁵⁴Mellor 1998, 7–10; Strootman 2008, 32; Priestley 2014, 48–50.

¹⁵⁵Sacks 1990, 117; 120–121.

phourarchos is used the most, followed by *hegemon*. There are only two instances of *stratego*i in command of garrisons: the Spartan Philo-phron as *strategos* guarding the Pelusium mouth of the Nile in 350/49, and Prepelaus as Cassander's *strategos* over Corinth in 303.¹⁵⁶

These officers aside, Diodorus provides one of the most extensive treatments of the *phourarchia* within a Greek context. Unlike earlier authors, he shows no compunction in naming Greeks as *phourarchoi*, and even departs from the language of previous historians when doing so. A prime example is his designation of the Spartan Tantalos as *phourarchos* over a detachment of Aeginetans in the *polis* of Thyrae in 424;¹⁵⁷ Thucydides had called him an *archon*.¹⁵⁸ Tantalos was not the sole Spartan *phourarchos*: Kallibios was another Spartiate who held the title when he was placed as the overseer of Athens in 404.¹⁵⁹ There is no indication that either man had authority or responsibilities outside the limited geographic scope of their assignments.¹⁶⁰

Diodorus' designation of Tantalos and Kallibios as *phourarchoi* does not indicate that he was unfamiliar with the use of *harmostes* for Spartan officers. In his work Clearchus was a *hegemon*,¹⁶¹ *harmostes*¹⁶² and *epistates*¹⁶³ in Byzantium in 408, and enjoyed such latitude in

¹⁵⁶Diod. Sic. 16.46.8, 16.49.2, 20.103.2.

¹⁵⁷Ibid., 12.65.7–9.

¹⁵⁸Thuc. 4.57.3: "...καὶ τὸν ἄρχοντα ὃς παρ' αὐτοῖς ἦν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, Τάνταλον τὸν Πατροκλέους..."

¹⁵⁹Diod. Sic. 14.4.4: "πεμπάντων φρουρὰν καὶ τὸν ταύτης ἡγησόμενον Καλλίβιον, τὸν μὲν φρούραρχον ἐξεθεράπευσαν δόροις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλανθρώποις οἱ τριάκοντα..." See Appendix 3 for more.

¹⁶⁰See Chapter 3.

¹⁶¹Diod. Sic. 13.40.6.

¹⁶²Ibid., 13.66.5: "Κλέαρχος ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ἄρμοστής..."

¹⁶³Ibid.: "...ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ τῆς πόλεως ἐπιστάτης ἀπῆλθε πρὸς Φαρνάβαζον..."

his position that the Spartans were forced to send an army to free the *polis* from his grasp.¹⁶⁴ Diodorus describes the Spartans ordering their general Lysander to establish “[positions] called *harmostai*” in their conquests,¹⁶⁵ including Thorax who was appointed by Lysander over Samos in 404.¹⁶⁶ Hippocrates was also called a *harmostes*, with the further explanation that

“Hippocrates was stationed in the *polis* as *hegemon*, which the Laconians call *harmostes*...”¹⁶⁷

In this case, Diodorus drew a parallel between *harmostes* and *hegemon*, not *harmostes* and *phourarchos*. He certainly viewed the office of the *hegemon* as a generic designation, as he uses it over 600 times in a wide variety of contexts.¹⁶⁸ Also, there is a notable division in his use of *phourarchos* or *harmostes* in a Spartan milieu. All of the Spartan *harmostai* are in overseas possessions, often close to non-Greek peoples, while Spartan *phourarchoi* are exclusively located in Greece proper. In all of these instances, Diodorus' use of *harmostes* occurs only within a Spartan context, in contrast to Xenophon, who used the term as a general description for Greek garrison commanders. The remainder of *phourarchoi* in Diodorus are royal appointees.

The first royal *phourarchos* encountered is Biton of Syracuse, who was appointed over Motye when Dionysius I seized the *polis* in 398.¹⁶⁹ Diodorus mentions other *phourarchoi* in

¹⁶⁴Ibid., 14.12.

¹⁶⁵Ibid., 14.10: “καταστήσαντες δὲ ναύαρχον Λύσανδρον, τούτῳ προσέταξαν ἐπιπορεύεσθαι τὰς πόλεις, ἐν ἑκάστη τοὺς παρ’ αὐτοῖς καλουμένους ἄρμοστὰς ἐγκαθιστάντα: ταῖς γὰρ δημοκρατίαις προσκόπτοντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι δι’ ὀλιγαρχίας ἐβούλοντο τὰς πόλεις διοικεῖσθαι.”

¹⁶⁶Ibid., 14.3.5: “...καὶ τῆς μὲν Σάμου Θώρακα τὸν Σπαρτιάτην ἄρμοστὴν κατέστησεν...”

¹⁶⁷Ibid., 13.66.2: “ὁ δ’ ἐν τῇ πόλει καθεσταμένος ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων Ἴπποκράτης ἡγεμὼν, ὃν οἱ Λάκωνες ἄρμοστὴν ἐκάλουν...”

¹⁶⁸With such a large number of occurrences, it is not profitable to list them all here.

¹⁶⁹Diod. Sic. 14.53.5: “μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα φύλακας τῆς πόλεως καταστήσας, Βίτωνα τὸν Συρακόσιον φρούραρχον

more extensive detail. In his narrative of the subjugation of Athens by Antipater, Diodorus is unusually explicit in describing the coercive nature of the *phrourarchia*. After the battle of Crannon and the defeat of the Athenians in 322, Antipater occupied Athens and modified its government into a wealth-based system where those with a worth of 2,000 or more drachmas would be in control of politics. This change was enforced by the presence of Menyllus as *phrourarchos*, who had express authority over the Athenian political system.¹⁷⁰ Diodorus recognized that the *phrourarchos* in Athens (and more generally, *phrourarchoi* under the Successors) represented imperial control and political interference with local communities. These *phrourarchoi* had the military backing of powerful monarchs, and were necessary to quell possible internal dissension in previously free Greek *poleis*.

Menyllus was not the only *phrourarchos* in Athens; in 307 a certain Dionysios was *phrourarchos* under Cassander, with his primary base of operations located in the Athenian port of Munychia.¹⁷¹ Although he mounted a spirited defense of Athens against Demetrius the Besieger, Dionysios was ultimately defeated and captured.¹⁷² He was not alone in his ineffective resistance against Demetrius, as Strombichos, the *phrourarchos* of Arcadian Orchomenus for Polyperchon, was defeated by the forces of the presumptive monarch in 303 and crucified outside of the *polis*.¹⁷³ A third *phrourarchos* who unsuccessfully defended his post was a Macedonian named Xenopeithes, who was overpowered by prisoners and thrown

ἀπέδειξε: τὸ δὲ πλεῖον μέρος ἐκ τῶν Σικελῶν ὑπῆρχεν. καὶ Λεπτίνην μὲν τὸν ναύαρχον μετὰ νεῶν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν ἐκέλευσεν παρατηρεῖν τὴν διάβασιν τῶν Καρχηδονίων, συνέταξε δ' αὐτῷ τὴν Αἴγισταν καὶ τὴν Ἐντελλαν πολιορκεῖν, καθάπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς πορθεῖν αὐτὰς ἐνεστήσατο.”

¹⁷⁰Ibid., 18.18.4–5.

¹⁷¹Ibid., 20.45.2: “...Διονύσιος ὁ καθεσταμένος ἐπὶ τῆς Μουνυχίας φρούραρχος καὶ Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς ἐπιμελητὴς τῆς πόλεως γεγενημένος ὑπὸ Κασάνδρου...”

¹⁷²Ibid., 20.45.7.

¹⁷³Ibid., 20.103.4: “...Στρομβίχον τὸν ὑπὸ Πολυπέρχοντος καθεσταμένον φρούραρχον...”

off of a cliff at an unspecified *phourion* in Asia Minor in 317.¹⁷⁴

In Diodorus, the city of Tyre was another site which had multiple *phourarchoi*. Archelaos, possibly appointed by Alexander the Great, was a Macedonian *phourarchos* here in 321/0.¹⁷⁵ A second *phourarchos* here was Andronicus, who held the office in c. 312.¹⁷⁶ He offered spirited resistance to Ptolemy, and following a mutiny of the soldiers in his post he was handed over to Ptolemy, who brought him into royal service.¹⁷⁷

All of these *phourarchoi* fully supported their monarch, and some even paid the ultimate price for their faithful service. These men functioned in a bureaucratic system of control that used the *phourarchia* to project imperial power on local communities. Despite their physical distance from the person of the king, there is no hint of any such *phourarchos* harboring ambition beyond the discharge of his duties.

Such loyal service was not the case for Nikanor. Placed as *phourarchos* in Athens in 319 by the orders of Cassander, he quickly proved himself to be a capable and decisive leader. One of his first actions was to build up a mercenary force in Munychia, which he used to secure the Piraeus through a surprise attack.¹⁷⁸ Later, alone amongst the *phourarchoi* in Diodorus, Nikanor is also found outside of the geographic confines of his ostensible post, when he took 100 ships to fight Kleitos, the admiral of Arrhidaeus, somewhere in the Propontis in 318.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁴Ibid., 19.16.1: “...Ξενοπείθη...τὸν φρούραρχον...”

¹⁷⁵Ibid., 18.37.4: “ὁ δὲ τῆς πόλεως ταύτης φρούραρχος Ἀρχέλαος, Μακεδῶν τὸ γένος...” ; Heckel 2006, s.v. “Archelaus [3]”.

¹⁷⁶Diod. Sic. 19.86.1: “...Ἀνδρόνικον τὸν φρούραρχον...”

¹⁷⁷Ibid., 19.86.2.

¹⁷⁸Ibid., 18.64.3–4.

¹⁷⁹Ibid., 18.72.3: “...Νικάνωρ ὁ τῆς Μουνυχίας φρούραρχος...”

Diodorus did not restrict himself to simply calling Nikanor a *phrouarchos*. In the prologue to Book 18 Nikanor is referred to as “*phrourounta Munychia*”, simply using the present participle of the verb *phroureo*.¹⁸⁰ He is also called a *nauarchos* of Cassander in the same passage,¹⁸¹ and is later described as simply holding Munychia.¹⁸² However, Diodorus normally refers to him as *phrouarchos*.¹⁸³

It may be tempting to see Diodorus as simply repeating whatever his sources used in referring to Nikanor. However, closer examination reveals that he used the terminology that accurately reflects the powers of each post held by Nikanor. Diodorus uses *nauarchos* only when Nikanor was in direct command of a fleet, and even then only in the prologue to book 18. The assignment may well have been temporary, as Nikanor returned to Athens following his naval duties.¹⁸⁴ Outside of that one naval command, Diodorus only describes Nikanor as a *phrouarchos* or, if the exact term is not used, as holding or guarding Munychia.

Seen as a group, the *phrouarchoi* in Diodorus conform to a broad pattern. They were agents of an imperial authority, they were placed over populations who were outside of the main seats of empire, their responsibilities were geographically limited, and in the discharge of their duties they were almost all only referred to as *phrouarchoi*. Although Diodorus' views on Roman imperialism are complex,¹⁸⁵ unlike earlier authors he divorces his use of *phrouarchia* from his opinion of Rome. For Diodorus, who had only known life under

¹⁸⁰Ibid., 18.p.1.69: “... και Νικάνορα τὸν φρουροῦντα τὴν Μουνυχίαν.”

¹⁸¹Ibid., 18.p.1.75: “... Νικάνορα τὸν Κασάνδρου ναύαρχον.”

¹⁸²Ibid., 18.64: “...Νικάνωρ ὁ τὴν Μουνυχίαν κατέχων...”

¹⁸³Ibid., 18.64, 18.68, 18.73.

¹⁸⁴See Chapter 3 and Appendix 4.

¹⁸⁵Sacks 1990, 117–121.

Roman rule, the *phrourarchia* was not the same politically uncomfortable institution as it had been for Xenophon or Polybius; instead, it was just another component of a morally ambiguous imperial system.

1.5.4 Dionysius of Halicarnassus

Very little is known concerning Dionysius of Halicarnassus' life, other than his birth at Halicarnassus, almost a century after it was annexed by Rome as part of the province of Asia,¹⁸⁶ and his arrival in Rome near the end of the civil wars in his twenties, c. 30/29.¹⁸⁷ Scholars often dismiss him as a third-rank historian, as his focus was more on literary composition than historical inquiry. He was a devoted partisan of Rome and Roman imperialism, even going so far as to claim Rome as an example for Greek *poleis* to follow.¹⁸⁸

Like most historians, Dionysius does not mention commanders for the majority of the garrisons in his work, and only names two of them, both as *phrourarchos*. The first, a Campanian mercenary named Decius, was left in command of 1,200 men at Rhegium in 280 to protect the city from external threats and to look after Roman interests. Dionysius uses the generic title of *hegemon* for him, but that designation quickly changes. Envy of the prosperity of the *polis* and its inhabitants, Decius and his men massacred the male citizens and seized the women, leading Dionysius to comment that “Decius, instead of a *phrourarchos*, had become the tyrant of Rhegium.”¹⁸⁹

The other *phrourarchos* in Dionysius is Thoenon. Despite fighting a civil war with Sosistratus (who is described as “holding the power” in Syracuse at the time), he combined

¹⁸⁶Polyb. 5.77; Livy 37.56; Flor. 35.30; Just. *Epit.* 36.4; Strabo 14.1.38; *Per.* 59.

¹⁸⁷*DNP* sv. Dionysios [18].

¹⁸⁸Dion. Hal. praef. 3; Grube 1965, 207–208; Schultze 1986, 121–122; Woolf 2005, 117.

¹⁸⁹Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 20.4.8: “Δέκιος δὲ ἀντὶ φρουράρχου τύραννος ἐγγέγονει τῆς Ῥηγίνων πόλεως...”

forces with his adversary and invited Pyrrhus into Syracuse in 287, in order to buttress its position against Carthaginian attacks.¹⁹⁰ Thoenon paid dearly for this invitation, as in 276

“Pyrrhus, seeing that many people were secretly hostile to him, brought *phourai* into the *poleis*, with using the excuse of the war against the Carthaginians; and seizing leading men from each *polis* he put them to death, falsely claiming that he discovered plots and betrayals; and among these was Thoenon the *phourarchos*, who it was agreed by all displayed the most eagerness and zeal for him [Pyrrhus] crossing over and the seizure of the island.”¹⁹¹

The *phourarchoi* in Dionysius of Halicarnassus were limited in the scale of their operations, but were still agents who supported a limited imperialism. Decius' position was a result of Roman interests in southern Italy. While his assignment was certainly due to Roman hegemony in the region, it was a form of imperialism that did not seek to annex the territory outright for the Republic. At first, Thoenon's position was similarly limited in geographic scope. He battled for control of Syracuse, not for holding an extra territorial possession for an imperial power. After the arrival of Pyrrhus, he resembled a “typical” imperial *phourarchos* by controlling Syracuse for the monarch. His subsequent execution leaves no doubt as to the superior party in that arrangement.

Dionysius did not condemn the *phourarchia* itself. His treatment of Decius' outrages underlines the difference between a *phourarchos* and a tyrant; such a distinction would hardly have been necessary if Dionysius assumed that the *phourarchia* was an inherently negative institution. Despite Thoenon's invitation to Pyrrhus, Dionysius reserves some praise for him, and clearly believes that he was innocent of the charges leveled against him.

¹⁹⁰Ibid., Excerpt 20.8: “είσαχθεις γάρ εις Συρακούσας υπό τε Σωσιστράτου του κρατουντος της πόλεως τότε και Θοίνωνος του φρουράρχου...”

¹⁹¹Ibid.: “αίσθόμενος δέ υπόυλως ήδη πολλούς προς έαυτόν έχοντας εις τε τας πόλεις φρουράς εισήγε, πρόφασιν ποιούμενος τόν από Καρχηδονίων πόλεμον, και τους επιφανεστάτους άνδρας έξ εκάστης πόλεως συλλαμβάνων απέκτεινεν, έπιβουλάς και προδοσίας εύρηκέναι ψευσάμενος. έν οίς ήν και Θοίνων ό φρούραρχος, ός υπό πάντων ώμολόγητο πλειστην σπουδήν και προθυμίαν εις τε την διάβασιν αυτώ και την παράληψιν της νήσου παρεσχήσθαι...”

1.5.5 Strabo

Little is known concerning Strabo's early life. What is certain is that he was born in the Pontic city of Amasia c. 64/63, nearly concurrently with the Roman annexation of the region and the creation of the province of Bithynia et Pontus.¹⁹² Strabo traveled to Rome relatively young, arriving there c. 44. His sole surviving work, the *Geography*, was composed during his there, where he also died shortly after 23 CE;¹⁹³ it offers a highly favorable view of the empire, praising the *Pax Romana* brought about by Augustus.¹⁹⁴ Strabo's treatment of the *phrourarchia* represents a limited return to the negative portrayal of the office. For him, it was still an imperial position, but one that was defined by its opposition to Rome.

Strabo only mentions two *phrourarchoi* in his works. Chronologically, the earliest *phrourarchos* mentioned by Strabo is the eunuch Bacchides, who held Sinope for Mithridates VI Eupator in 70 BCE. With the city under siege from the Roman consul Lucullus, Bacchides' mistreatment of the citizens caused Strabo to refer to him as becoming a tyrant over the city.¹⁹⁵ Strabo's use of *phrourarchos* here was not, at least in the case of the Pontic kingdom, a pure literary construction: *phrourarchoi* were a feature of Pontic administration, and are mentioned in dedicatory inscriptions and other literary works.¹⁹⁶ Even so, the kings of Pontus were not Greco-Macedonian monarchs themselves, and remained culturally

¹⁹²Marco 1979, 665–666.

¹⁹³Pothecary 1997, 235; Biraschi 2005, 82.

¹⁹⁴Strabo 6.4.2; Maas 2007, 68.

¹⁹⁵Strabo 12.3.11: “... καὶ τοῦ ἐγκαθημένου τυράννου...ὁ γὰρ ἐγκατασταθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως φρούραρχος Βακχίδης...”

¹⁹⁶*OGIS* 365 = *St.Pont.* III 94; *App. Mith.* 12.82; *FGrH*, 434 F 1 6.2; McGing 1986, 38–39; Hind 1994, 136–137. See chapter 5 for a full discussion.

separate from the main drivers of Hellenism.¹⁹⁷

The second *phrourarchos* in Strabo is a certain Ador, who caused the Armenian city of Artageras / Artagerk¹⁹⁸ to revolt against the Romans in 2/3 CE.¹⁹⁹ There is some controversy over Ador's actual position in Armenia, with debate centered on whether he was a former Parthian satrap or a powerful local dynast in his own right. What is clear is that he was only loosely allied to the Romans and enjoyed support from a local power base that was on the fringe of Roman control.²⁰⁰

In his treatment of these two *phrourarchoi*, Strabo reverts to the Classical conception of the office. Neither Ador nor Bacchides were under Greek *poleis*, Greco-Macedonian monarchs, or directly under the Romans; they were instead barbarians at the periphery of the Greco-Roman world. Both these men were opposed to the political order of the Romans, and resisted the encroachment of the empire into “their” territories. Given Strabo's highly favorable view of Roman imperialism²⁰¹ and the unfavorable image created of these barbarian *phrourarchoi*, his view of the office evidently departs from that taken by his contemporaries. Instead, he follows the assessment of his classical predecessors in placing the *phrourarchos* outside of the realm of the traditional Greek *polis* and operating in a morally compromised manner.

1.5.6 Josephus

Josephus was born into a priestly family (possibly one with connections to royalty

¹⁹⁷Marek 2009, 35.

¹⁹⁸Marquart 1896, 213.

¹⁹⁹Strabo 11.14.6: “Ἀρτάγειρα δὲ ἀπέστησε μὲν Ἄδων ὁ φρούραρχος, ἐξεῖλον δ’ οἱ Καίσαρος στρατηγοὶ πολιορκήσαντες πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ τὰ τεῖχη περιεῖλον.”

²⁰⁰Swan 2004, 130.

²⁰¹Strabo 6.4.2, 17.3.24; Maas 2007, 68; Isaac 2013, 237–238.

through his mother) in 37/38 CE, probably in Jerusalem.²⁰² His birth came thirty years after Rome annexed Judaea into the province of Syria, with procurators later sent to govern it from 6 CE.²⁰³ This control was to be far from uncontested: in 66-73 CE the so-called “Great Revolt” swept the area. Josephus initially took the side of the rebels and served as a commander of their resistance against Roman rule. After his surrender to the forces of Vespasian in 67 CE, he became an active partisan for the Romans, even assisting in the siege of Jerusalem and the suppression of Jewish dissidents. Following the end of the revolt, he spent the next 30 years at Rome until his death in 101 CE, where he composed his literary works.²⁰⁴

In Josephus, *phourarchos* is the most common designation for garrison commanders, and the office is not restricted to a Greek or Roman context. Chronologically, the first *phourarchos* encountered in his works is the Persian Babemesis: he held the office in Gaza during the city's opposition to Alexander the Great in 332 BCE, which led to its sack.²⁰⁵ *Phourarchoi* are next encountered in the Seleucid kingdom almost two centuries later. Josephus claims that in 161 BCE Bacchides was appointed as *phourarchos* over Jerusalem by Antiochus IV. In addition to a regime of fear and torture, Bacchides attempted to enforce Seleucid religious norms on the Jewish population. As a result, he was killed by Matthias, a son of Asamoneus from the city of Modein, triggering the first stages of the Maccabean Revolt.²⁰⁶ Josephus erred in representing Bacchides as the *phourarchos*, as he was certainly

²⁰²Joseph. *Vit.* 11; Thackeray 1929, 6–7.

²⁰³Thackeray 1929, 4–5.

²⁰⁴Price 2005, 101.

²⁰⁵Joseph. *AJ* 11.313: “...φρούραρχον ὄνομα Βαβημάσιν...”

²⁰⁶Joseph. *BJ* 1.36: “καὶ Βακχίδης ὁ πεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἀντιόχου φρούραρχος...”

not present in Judaea until later in the revolt, and therefore could not have been killed at its outbreak.²⁰⁷ Even so, Babemesis and Bacchides are two *phrourarchoi* who fit Josephus' broad conception of the office. Both supported imperial, not local interests, and they were willing to endanger local inhabitants in the pursuit of their duty.

Josephus treated Jewish *phrourarchoi* in the same manner. Pompey, after his intervention in the civil war between Hyrcanus II and Aristobulus II in 63,²⁰⁸ ordered Aristobulus to surrender his *phouria* and *phrourarchoi*, which caused Aristobulus to retreat to the relative safety of Jerusalem.²⁰⁹ The founder of the Herodian dynasty, Herod the Great, had multiple *phrourarchoi* in his kingdom. In 7, an unnamed *phrourarchos* in the *phourion* of Alexandrium was accused and tortured as being a possible accessory to Herod's sons in a plot against the king's life.²¹⁰

After the death of Herod, the Roman general Sabinus entered Jerusalem to secure the king's palace in c. 4 BCE. He then sent for Judaeans *phrourarchoi*, previously under Herod or his sons,²¹¹ to give an account for themselves. Some refused and continued to be faithful to Herod's son Archelaus under the pretext that they were preserving their assignments for Rome. These *phrourarchoi* are also referred to as *phulakes* in the same passage,²¹² which is likely an expanded use of *phulax* and not an “official” designation of their office. Finally, Josephus also describes Roman officers as *phrourarchoi*. He says that in 41-54 CE there was

²⁰⁷Gera 1998, 276.

²⁰⁸See DeSilva 2014, 457–459 for a summary.

²⁰⁹Joseph. *AJ* 14.52; *BJ* 1.137.

²¹⁰Joseph. *AJ* 16.317; *BJ* 1.526.

²¹¹Joseph. *AJ* 17.223: “...μεταπέμψας δὲ τοὺς φρουράρχους...”; *BJ* 2.18: “...τούς τε φρουράρχους...”

²¹²Joseph. *AJ* 17.223: “οὐ μὴν οἱ φύλακες ἐν ὀλίγῳ τὰς Ἀρχελαίου ἐπιστολάς ἐποιοῦντο...”

a Roman *phrourarchos* in Jerusalem, who is further described as the *phrourarchos* of the *graphophulakes*, or commander of the treasurers of the temple.²¹³ There is little doubt that these Roman *phrourarchoi*, located near the temple, were present to enforce Roman, not local, interests.

Given Josephus' focus on Judaea and its surrounding regions, all the *phrourarchoi* in his works were products of imperial rule. His attitudes towards imperialism matched those of the later Second Sophistic movement,²¹⁴ which largely embraced Roman imperialism while celebrating an idealized Greek past.²¹⁵ This is the attitude found in Josephus' treatment of *phrourarchoi*: although agents of imperial control, they were not intrinsically opposed to his own social and political values. Although Bacchides behaved in a tyrannical manner and the unnamed *phrourarchos* in Alexandria was prepared to betray Herod, most *phrourarchoi* in Josephus are little more than imperial functionaries who faithfully held their assignments.

1.5.7 Plutarch

Plutarch was born in Chaeronea around 50 CE, when Greece had already been under the dominion of Rome for some two centuries. All that remained of the violent resistance of Greek *poleis* to Roman rule was a memory; for Plutarch and many members of the social elite, this era of the Roman Empire was relatively peaceful.²¹⁶ Plutarch, as a Roman citizen, traveled to Rome, but there is no evidence that he had an active military life or a career in the emperor's service. Greece remained his home, and he continued writing there until his death

²¹³Ibid., 15.408, 18.93, 18.94, 18.95.

²¹⁴Mason 2005, 75–76.

²¹⁵Alcock 2001, 329–331.

²¹⁶Lamberton 2001, 1–2.

slightly before 125 CE.²¹⁷

Despite Plutarch's extensive writings, only his *Parallel Lives* contain mentions of *phourarchoi*. His *Lives* did not follow standard historiographical norms: his project was moralistic, and was an attempt to create a cultural mythology that celebrated and elevated the Greek past to make it worthy of comparison to the Roman present.²¹⁸

Plutarch uses the term *phourarchos* sparingly and somewhat inconsistently. He states that on the death of Antipater in 319,

“...Cassander straightaway formed [his own] faction, seizing the government, and swiftly sent Nikanor [to be] the successor of the *phourarchia* from Menyllus, ordering him to take Munychia before the death of Anipater became known.”²¹⁹

Although Nikanor is called the *diadachos* (successor) of Menyllus in the *phourarchia*, Plutarch does not specifically refer to either man as a *phourarchos*, and instead says that

“...the Macedonian *phoura* [was] in Athens and Menyllus [served] as *hegemon*, an equitable man and a friend of Phocion.”²²⁰

Plutarch is more precise for other garrison commanders in his works. One famous *phourarchos* in his *Life of Dion* is the philosopher Philistos, who was an unabashed supporter of the tyranny of Dionysios I and II at Syracuse, “...and for a long time was *phourarchos* of the *akra*.”²²¹ Plutarch also mentions several otherwise anonymous *phourarchoi* in his writings. After the Greek general Eumenes gained control of Cappadocia c. 321, he entrusted the region to an unknown number of *phourarchoi* drawn from his

²¹⁷DNP sv. Plutarchos [2].

²¹⁸Lamberton 2001, 69.

²¹⁹Plut. *Phoc.* 31.1: “...εὐθὺς διαναστάς ὁ Κάσανδρος καὶ προκαταλαμβάνων τὰ πράγματα πέμπει κατὰ τάχος Νικάνορα τῷ Μενύλλῳ διάδοχον τῆς φρουραρχίας, πρὶν ἔκδηλον τὸν Αντιπάτρου θάνατον γενέσθαι κελεύσας τὴν Μουνυχίαν παραλαβεῖν.”

²²⁰Ibid., 28: “...φρουρὰν Μακεδόνων Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Μένυλλον ἡγεμόνα, τῶν ἐπιεικῶν τινα καὶ τοῦ Φωκίου ἐπιτηδείων...”

²²¹Plut. *Dio.* 11.3: “...καὶ τὴν ἄκραν διεφύλαξε φρουραρχῶν ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον”

philoi.²²² In c. 243 when Aratus tried to sail to Egypt to secure support from Ptolemy, his ship ran ashore near Andrias.²²³ The area was under the power of Antigonos and was secured by a number of *phulakes*, as well as a *phrourarchos*, who claimed Aratus' ship as a prize of war.²²⁴

Plutarch applies the term *phrourarchia* inconsistently, which is probably a reflection of both his training and the overall aims of his project. He was less interested in military details or in aspects of local political administration which did not in some manner elucidate the character of his subjects. Thus, it should come as no surprise that he fails to provide the same level of detail as other authors.

That being said, Plutarch still places the *phrourarchia* within the same broad cultural context as other authors. His *phrourarchoi* were direct appointees of Greco-Macedonian monarchs, presumptive monarchs, or tyrants, and they controlled subservient *poleis* for the monarchs in question. The unknown series of fortresses under the *phrourarchoi* of Eumenes were - much like the series of *phrouria* later under Mithridates - tools to pacify and secure the region rather than to provide extensive support against external threats. So too were the offices occupied by Menyllus and Philistos, who both suppressed a local population for an extra-legal political order.

On balance, Plutarch viewed Roman imperialism as a positive force, although he still championed the glories of an independent Greek past and acknowledged the limits of advancement open to the Greek elite.²²⁵ He viewed the *phrourarchia* in much the same way

²²²Plut. *Eum.* 3.7.

²²³Although the text reads Ἀδρίας, it has long been suspected as corrupt. The generally accepted reading is now Ἀνδρίας, which is found in the North Cyclades. See Porter 1930, 305.

²²⁴Plut. *Arat.* 12.2–3.

²²⁵Erskine 2010, 54.

as Diodorus: it was not so much a negative enforcer of imperial might, but instead a neutral, even positive, arbiter of empire.

1.5.8 Arrian

This conceptual shift of Greek *phourarchoi* into a common feature of imperial administration is apparent in the works of Arrian, born in the late first century CE into a wealthy Greek family of Nicomedia. He became a well-respected politician and writer, and held some of the highest positions in the Roman Empire, including the consulship in the late 120s CE and in 132-137 the governorship of Cappadocia, where he proved his military abilities by fighting off an invasion of barbarian Alanoi.²²⁶

Although Arrian did have some difficulty in translating Latin military vocabulary into Greek,²²⁷ it is certain that he had a working familiarity with Greek technical terminology,²²⁸ he wrote extensively on Greek military formations and tactics,²²⁹ and was styled as a “...most pious and just *hegemon*” during his governorship of Cappadocia.²³⁰ In all of Arrian's writings, *phourarchoi* are only found in his treatment of Alexander's campaigns. Likely composing his *Alexander's Anabasis* in mid second century CE, Arrian mentioned *phourarchoi* within both the Persian Empire and the ad hoc administrative structures established by Alexander the Great following his conquests.

The earliest *phourarchos* encountered in Arrian is Mithrenes, the Persian *phourarchos* in Sardis who, following Alexander's victory at Granicus river in 334 BCE, joined the

²²⁶Syme 1982, 181–183; Bosworth 1977, 217–218; Mensch and Romm 2012, 417–481.

²²⁷Busetto 2013, 230.

²²⁸See Arr. *Tac.* 1.2-3.

²²⁹Bosworth 1993, 253–272.

²³⁰Baz 2007, 123 ll. 3-6: “...ἐῶσεβέστατον καὶ δίκαιότατον ἡγεμόνα.”

leading men of Sardis in surrendering the city to Alexander,²³¹ thus sparing it from a protracted siege and destruction. Mithrenes was not the only *phourarchos* appointed by the Persians; in 333, the Persian generals Pharnabazus and Autophradates installed a Greek mercenary named Lycomedes as *phourarchos* of Mytilene following the death of Memnon and the city's capture.²³²

After Mithrenes and Lycomedes, all the *phourarchoi* in Arrian are appointed by Alexander himself, and prove to be a mix of Persian and Greco-Macedonian soldiers. After taking Susa in 331, Alexander left behind the Persian Abulites as *satrap* of Susiana, Mazarus, one of the Companions as *phourarchos* of the *akra* of Susa, and Archelaus son of Theodorus as *strategos*.²³³ Later in the same year, Alexander secured his conquests in Egypt by appointing as *phourarchoi* Pantaleon of Pydna at Memphis, and Polemon of Pella, at Pelusium, under the *nomarch* of Egypt.²³⁴ Alexander did not restrict the appointment of *phourarchoi* to major urban centers. An unnamed *phourarchos* active in Bactria in 328 was taken prisoner after his forces were destroyed by Spitamenes in a routine patrol.²³⁵

In Arrian, the majority of the *phourarchoi* were appointed on an ad hoc basis as the military needs of the time dictated. Only Mithrenes held his position prior to Alexander's campaigns; the remaining *phourarchoi*, both Persian and Macedonian, were placed as a result of conquest. Furthermore, none of the *phourarchoi* except Mithrenes (and possibly the

²³¹Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.3: “...Μιθρήνης τε ὁ φρούραρχος τῆς ἀκροπόλεως...”

²³²Ibid., 2.1.5: “...καὶ φρούραρχον ἐπ’ αὐτῇ Λυκομήδην Ῥόδιον, καὶ τύραννον ἐγκατέστησαν τῇ πόλει Διογένην...”

²³³Ibid., 3.16.9: “... καταλιπὼν σατράπην μὲν τῆς Σουσιανῆς Ἀβουλίτην ἄνδρα Πέρσην, φρούραρχον δὲ ἐν τῇ ἄκρᾳ τῶν Σούσων Μάζαρον τῶν ἐταίρων καὶ στρατηγὸν Ἀρχέλαον τὸν Θεοδώρου...”

²³⁴Ibid., 3.5.3: “φρουράρχους δὲ τῶν ἐταίρων ἐν Μέμφει μὲν Πανταλέοντα κατέστησε τὸν Πυδναῖον, ἐν Πηλουσίῳ δὲ Πολέμωνα τὸν Μεγακλέους Πελλαῖον...”

²³⁵Ibid., 4.16.5.

unnamed Bactrian one) had uncontested control over their assignments; they were all subordinate to other offices, and were responsible for no more than a limited geographic area.

As he was proud of his imperial service, there is little to suggest that Arrian was opposed to imperialism, especially in a Roman context. His treatment of the *phrourarchia* reflects this attitude: the office was an imperial, military assignment, but one that was largely military, with civic responsibilities being given to other administrative posts. Arrian saw Alexander's *phrourarchoi* as temporary administrators responsible for securing and pacifying newly conquered regions, rather than as officials installed for extended civilian governorship or other such roles. There is no evidence of a negative conception of the *phrourarchia* in Arrian, as the office is presented as simply a tool of imperial administration.

1.5.9 Appian

Appian was born in Alexandria into a wealthy family not long before 100 CE. He was politically successful, and achieved the highest civil office in his native city. He likely moved to Rome in his thirties, where he entered into the highest social and elite circles, and may have served as a procurator. He likely composed his *Roman History* late in life; he died sometime around 165 CE.²³⁶

Much like Diodorus, Appian is often seen by scholars as a compiler of middling, if not inept, ability.²³⁷ His use of official terminology is often seen as unreliable and does not always correspond with the correct Latin titles,²³⁸ although there are some indications that he had at least a rudimentary knowledge of battlefield tactics and strategy.²³⁹ Although he

²³⁶Šašel Kos 2005, 19–24.

²³⁷Bucher 2000, 411–413; Šašel Kos 2005.

²³⁸Griffith 1935, 189 n.3; Luce 1961, 21.

²³⁹Lendon 1999, 282; 321.

focused primarily on Roman history, of all the authors treated in this study he mentions *phrourarchoi* the most often. Even so, his use of *phrourarchos*, especially in a non-Greek context, is more of a literary conceit than a historical fact. He inconsistently translates Latin terms into Greek, especially in the case of Roman magistrates who held military functions.²⁴⁰ What Appian offers, however, is an insight into the continued importance of the *phrourarchia* to a Greek speaking audience's conception of garrisons. Appian did not stray far from the vision of the *phrourarchia* as an imperial office on the borderlands of empire, and he did not hesitate to apply the title of *phrourarchos* to garrison commanders.

The first *phrourarchos* encountered in Appian is Decius, who is also referred to as a *hegemon* of Roman soldiers in Rhegium. As previously stated, with reference to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, he joined his men in slaughtering the inhabitants of the city and seizing power in 280 BCE. Appian follows Dionysius in remarking that “Decius was then a tyrant instead of a *phrourarchos*.”²⁴¹ He is not the only Roman *phrourarchos* whom Appian designates as a *hegemon*; in 212 an unspecified Roman *hegemon* of the *phroura* held Metapontum.²⁴² Later in that year Appian refers to the same officer as a *phrourarchos* when the population of the city rebelled against him and his support for Rome.²⁴³ The equivalence of *phrourarchos* and *hegemon* in these passages is hardly an issue. There was not a Latin term exactly analogous to *phrourarchos*, and *hegemon* was generic enough to serve adequately for *phrourarchos*.

The remaining *phrourarchoi* in Appian do not have any other designation. Livius was a

²⁴⁰Luce 1961, 21.

²⁴¹App. *Sam.* 3.9.1: “καὶ Δέκιος μὲν ἀντὶ φρουράρχου τύραννος ἦν...”

²⁴²App. *Hann.* 7.36.2.

²⁴³*Ibid.*, 7.6.35.

Roman *phourarchos* in Tarentum in 212 when his supposed friend Cononeus, a citizen of the city, betrayed it to Hannibal. Although Hannibal took the city, Livius was able to retreat to the *acropolis* with 5,000 Roman survivors, where he held out for the duration of the war.²⁴⁴

The Carthaginian forces in Tarentum were themselves partially led by a *phourarchos*: a Carthaginian named Carthalo garrisoned (*phoureo*) the *polis* in 208, and had at his disposal a number of Bruttian mercenaries who were led by an unnamed *phourarchos*.²⁴⁵

Hannibal established a further Carthaginian *phourarchos* in Tisia, who was betrayed by a local Roman sympathizer in 210. Although the Romans were able to establish a number of *phouroi* in the community, the approach of Hannibal so terrified the Roman soldiers that they fled to Rhegium, leaving the citizens to surrender themselves to the Carthaginian general.²⁴⁶ In Appian, Hannibal is not the only Roman enemy to use *phourarchoi*. An indeterminate number of *phourarchoi* loyal to Mithridates in 71 “went over to Lucullus in crowds, all but a few” after Mithridates ordered the death of his sisters, wives, and concubines.²⁴⁷

The Romans also had a number of *phourarchoi* in addition to Decius and the *phourarchos* in Metapontum. In 108 Turpilius, a Roman citizen, was the *phourarchos* of Vacca. He was killed with the entire *boule* of the town by Metellus due to scheming with Rome's enemy Jugurtha.²⁴⁸ In 48 Minucius was the *phourarchos* of a *phouria* before the

²⁴⁴Ibid., 7.32–33.

²⁴⁵Ibid., 7.8.49.

²⁴⁶Ibid., 7.7.44.

²⁴⁷App. *Mith.* 12.82: “... οἱ φρούραρχοι τοῦ Μιθριδάτου...”

²⁴⁸App. *Num.* 8.2.3: “...τὸν φρούραρχον Τουρπίλιον, ἄνδρα Ῥωμαῖον...”

battle of Dyrrachium,²⁴⁹ this usage is a rare example of a *phrourarchos* outside of a major population center. Finally, in the same year there was a Roman *phrourarchos* in Oricum and another named Straberius in Apollonia, who were forced by the inhabitants of those communities to open their gates to Julius Caesar.²⁵⁰

Although Appian was devoted to the Roman Empire of his own time, he was not beyond criticizing the excesses of its imperialism in the past.²⁵¹ Despite this reflective quality, he, like most authors who shared a positive assessment of Rome, presented the institution of the *phrourarchia* in a morally neutral manner. However, Appian's occasional confusion over the term highlights the difficulties in using the terminology surrounding a Greek office within a Roman context. Although he understood that the *phrourarchia* was an imperial office with military powers, he did not use the term consistently in the same manner as previous authors.

1.5.10 Polyaeus

Polyaeus was born c. 100 CE in the Roman province of Bithynia, and was active in Roman courts around 161.²⁵² He was a rhetorician who wrote *Stratagems*, a collection of military anecdotes, to assist the campaigns of Lucius Verus in the early 160s. Polyaeus did not necessarily aim for historical accuracy, and he sometimes reflects unreliable military terminology and information, although he often faithfully reproduces the technical vocabulary of his sources.²⁵³

The *phrourarchoi* found in Polyaeus are all imperial appointees who controlled local

²⁴⁹ App. *B. Civ.* 2.9.60: “... τοῦ φρουράρχου Μινουκίου...”

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 2.8.54.

²⁵¹ Swain 1996, 249–253; Adler 2013, 301–302.

²⁵² Krentz and Wheeler 1994, ix–xi.

²⁵³ Burstein 1976, 128 n. 40; Campbell 1987, 15; Jordan 2000, 84 n. 27; Campbell 2004, 45.

populations for the benefit of a foreign power, both Greek and barbarian. In c. 400 BCE we hear of a Persian *phrourarchos* over an unspecified *phrourion* in Asia who was tricked and executed by the Spartan Thibron.²⁵⁴ A second anonymous Persian *phrourarchos*, said to be under the leadership of Ariobarzanes in 362, was besieged by another Persian *satrap* named Autophradates at the city of Adramyttium. Ariobarzanes ordered the *phrourarchos* of Pteleus to pretend to betray his garrison to Autophradates, who believed the ruse and sent ships to Pteleus, diminishing the besieging forces.²⁵⁵ These *phrourarchoi* likely had Persian titles otherwise unknown to Polyaeus, who, following the earlier lead of Xenophon, substituted Greek terminology for Persian offices. Nonetheless, the behavior and assignments of these officers neatly parallel the earlier Hellenistic conception of the *phrourarchia*.

The remainder of *phrourarchoi* mentioned in Polyaeus are found in a Greek context. There was a Spartan *phrourarchos* in Epidaurus when it was attacked by Iphicrates,²⁵⁶ possibly c. 372-371.²⁵⁷ Another Spartan overseeing a foreign possession is found in Thebes, where the unnamed *phrourarchos* was killed by Pelopidas and other Thebans in a successful revolt against Spartan power.²⁵⁸ Finally, a Spartan *phrourarchos* named Alexandros was stationed in Aeolis, where he held local dignitaries for ransom.²⁵⁹

The remaining two *phrourarchoi* in the *Stratagemas* are from later periods. In 302

²⁵⁴Polyaeus, *Strat.* 2.19; Polyaeus, *Excerpta Polyaei.* 54.8.

²⁵⁵Polyaeus, *Strat.* 7.26.6.

²⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 3.9.48.

²⁵⁷Underhill 1900, 234.

²⁵⁸Polyaeus, *Strat.* 2.4.3.

²⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 6.10.

Demetrius gained Ephesus,²⁶⁰ and a year later left a Macedonian²⁶¹ named Diodorus as *phrourarchos* over the *polis*. The latter saw an opportunity to use the situation for personal enrichment, and entered into negotiations to betray the city to Lysimachus for 50 talents. Demetrius discovered the plan and set an ambush in the harbor, killing the disloyal *phrourarchos*.²⁶²

The sole Roman *phrourarchos* found in Polyaeus is Pinarius, who was stationed at Enna in Sicily.²⁶³ *Phrourarchos* was likely not his official title: Livy refers to him as a *praefectus*,²⁶⁴ which is almost certainly more accurate. Pinarius, discovering that the citizens of Enna were about defect from the Romans, lured them into a theater and slaughtered them.²⁶⁵ In Rome, his behavior was met with far from universal acclaim by the Senate, which saw the necessity of his actions but was taken aback by his methods.²⁶⁶

1.5.11 Cassius Dio

Cassius Dio was born c. 164 CE in Nicaea, and by 180 was in residence at Rome. He had an illustrious career, including holding the consulship, before retiring to Nicaea in 229.²⁶⁷ Despite his origins, he identified more with Roman culture and traditions than Greek ones,

²⁶⁰Griffith 1935, 59; Lund 1992, 14; Champion 2014, 157.

²⁶¹O’Neil 2003, 512.

²⁶²Polyaeus, *Strat.* 4.7.4.

²⁶³*Ibid.*, 8.21.1

²⁶⁴Livy, 24.37.2–3: “Henna excelso loco ac praerupto undique sita, cum loco inexpugnabilis erat, tum praesidium in arce validum praefectumque praesidii haud sane opportunum insidiantibus habebat. L. Pinarius erat...”

²⁶⁵Polyaeus, *Strat.* 8.21.

²⁶⁶Solodow 1979, 260. cf. l’Hoir 1990, 227–228 n. 18 who argues that Pinarius’ actions were seen in a more favorable light.

²⁶⁷Swan 2004, 1–3.

and his writing owes much to Roman history.²⁶⁸ The majority of the surviving portions of his vast work span the transition from the principate to the Empire, covering the Roman Empire from 68 BCE to 47 CE.²⁶⁹ As a result he only partially covers the end of the Hellenistic era, and his focus on Rome deemphasizes events outside his narrative focus. His writing betrays a limited understanding of military tactics and strategy, which may explain why his grasp of military vocabulary seems lacking.²⁷⁰

Due to the focus on the Roman Empire, it should come as little surprise that almost all the *phourarchoi* in Dio's work occur within a Roman context, even though they must have had official Latin, not Greek, titles. The earliest *phourarchos* in time is once again Decius, the duplicitous commander of a Roman mercenary contingent in Rhegium.²⁷¹ Dio describes another treasonous Roman *phourarchos*, an unnamed individual who handed over his *phourion* near the Po valley to Hannibal for an unspecified bribe.²⁷² A third Roman *phourarchos* was far more trustworthy: in 7/8 CE Manius Ennius is described as the *phourarchos* of Siscia, who remained loyal to Augustus during the Illyrian revolt of 6-9 CE.²⁷³

Although Dio's use of *phourarchos* for Roman posts is a departure from that of earlier historians, he still locates the office on the borderlands of the empire, and he also mentions “barbarian” *phourarchoi*. These include an unnamed Parthian in Adenystrae, a fortress

²⁶⁸Aalders 1986, 283; Kemezis 2014, 92–93.

²⁶⁹Although originally covering c. 1200 BCE to 229 CE, the vast majority of Cassius Dio's work is now lost. See Dihle 1994, 348.

²⁷⁰Reinhold 1986, 213.

²⁷¹Cass. Dio 9.40.11: “Ὅτι ὁ Δέκιος ὁ φρούραρχος τοῦς Ῥηγίνους...”

²⁷²Ibid., 14.57.6.

²⁷³Ibid., 55.33.2: “... Μάνιον Ἐννιον φρούραρχον Σισκίας ...”

located in modern Iraq which was captured by Trajan in 115 CE. A Roman centurion named Sentius, who had served as an envoy, escaped confinement and killed this *phrourarchos*, opening the gates of the fortress for the Romans.²⁷⁴ Much earlier, an unnamed *phrourarchos* in Locri may have been a Carthaginian; there in 204 BCE

“...[news] came to him [Scipio] that some [citizens] of Locri were about to give up the *polis*. For after they denounced the *phrourarchos* and obtained no decision from Hannibal, they turned to the Romans.”²⁷⁵

Although he disapproved of certain individual emperors, Dio was hardly opposed to Roman imperialism, and considered himself an inheritor of a culture of Roman elites stretching back to the Republic.²⁷⁶ Although he was one of the last extant historians to use the term *phrourarchos*,²⁷⁷ his conception of the term was not notably different from that of his predecessors.

1.6 Conclusion

All the sources under consideration here envisioned the *phrourarchia* as having three major characteristics: it was often located at the fringes of Empire, it was a military assignment, and it supported the interests of an imperial power. The scale and composition of the *phrourarchia*, and even who could be considered as *phrourarchoi* may have been matters of contention, but there was broad agreement about the fundamental nature of the office.

The literary sources reveal a transition in how the *phrourarchia* was viewed, at least within literary circles. Xenophon declined to apply the term to Greek officers, and the

²⁷⁴Ibid., 68.22; Longden 1931, 11; Lightfoot 1990, 118; Bennett 1997, 201; Dando-Collins 2010, 111.

²⁷⁵Cass. Dio 17.56.61: “αὐτῷ ἐκ Ῥηγίου ἤκε τὴν πόλιν τὴν τῶν Λοκρῶν τινας προδώσειν. τοῦ γὰρ φρουράρχου καταβοήσαντες καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἐκδικίας παρὰ τοῦ Ἀννίβου τυχόντες πρὸς τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἀπέκλιναν...”

²⁷⁶Kemezis 2014, 148–149.

²⁷⁷Sources like the *Suda* often had a more lexical than historical interest and are not widely considered to have the same literary aims as ancient historians.

phrourarchoi in Polybius and Strabo were by and large individuals who were despised and feared. For other, later authors, the *phrourarchia* gradually lost this stigma, and became merely another administrative post that supported imperial authority. The spread of the *Pax Romana* and the involvement of Greek authors within Roman literary and military circles hastened this transition, as Roman military might, social organization, and political life swept away the older systems of the *polis* and Hellenistic monarchy. As authors embraced Roman imperialism, they more readily used the term *phrourarchos* to describe garrison commanders. Within the writings of Arrian, Appian, Polyaeus, and Cassius Dio, the *phrourarchia*, seen in the classical period as an essential yet somewhat problematic office, had developed into an office devoid of any negative social, intellectual, or cultural connotations.

For the most part, these historians place *phrourarchoi* on the borders of empire, and make a concerted effort to distinguish the post from *archons*, *harmostai*, *hegemones*, *stratego*i, and other offices; they do not stray from the conception of the *phrourarchia* as an imperial posting. They conceive of the *phrourarchia* as an office that was often filled by mercenaries or other specialists, who were far different from the amateurs of Classical Greek warfare. This said, several cultural assumptions concerning professionalism and mercenary service are not explicitly addressed by these historians: an examination of them forms the basis for the following chapter.

2 PHROURARCHOI, SPECIALIZATION, AND AMATEURISM

2.1 Introduction

Many investigations into the ancient Greek military begin with the assumption that mercenary soldiers were skilled professionals, separate from the mass of amateur hoplites fielded by civic militias.²⁷⁸ Despite such sweeping claims, little work has been done to define exactly what is meant by amateur and professional, and very few scholars have attempted to grapple with the sociological and historical implications of professionalism and mercenary service in the ancient world.

This chapter examines the debate surrounding professionalism, its application to military officers, and the challenges of relating this concept to militaries in the ancient world. I argue that the term professional is largely anachronistic when applied to the ancient Greece, and that mercenaries, *phrouarchoi*, and other skilled individuals should instead be referred to as specialists. I then show that imperial *phrouarchoi* sold their military skill, or *polemike techne*, which places the *phrouarchia* within a broader discussion of ancient mercenary service. Next, I discuss how modern private military and security companies (PMCs) have much in common in terms of recruitment, relationship to legitimate authority, powers, and motivations with imperial *phrouarchoi*. By contrast, local *phrouarchoi* were amateurs, who were closely aligned with a “democratic” conception of officeholding and military service. It must be noted at the outset that the discussion largely excludes naval officership, as such

²⁷⁸Parke 1933, 1; Adcock 1962, 19; McKechnie 1989, 93.

postings rarely fell under the purview of the *phrourarchia* or garrison forces in general.²⁷⁹

Instead, what follows will focus exclusively on Greco-Macedonian land armies and garrison forces.

2.2 Professional vs. Specialist

In the discussion of ancient mercenary service, and by extension the practice of garrisoning, many scholars uncritically draw a distinction between the amateurism of Classical Greek militias on the one hand, and what are often considered “professional” armies of Sparta and later Hellenistic monarchs on the other.²⁸⁰ Herbert Parke's foundational study of Greek mercenaries explicitly states these assumptions:

“The mercenary was a professional; and ultimately the professional ousted the amateur from all important warfare.”²⁸¹

Parke's statement touches on the contentious subjects of professionalization, the privatization of violence, and the role of a polity in policing its own internal security. However, just what is meant by “professional”, especially as the designation relates to the institution of the *phrourarchia* and the near constant state of warfare that permeated Greek civic life?

The definition and application of professionalism have been the subject of intense sociological debate. One persistent issue is that many investigations into professionalism are fundamentally tied to specific case studies or particular trades, and are therefore not generally applicable to a broad conceptualization of professionalism across multiple social or

²⁷⁹ A notable exception was the temporary assignment of Nikanor to the position of *nauarchos*. See Diod. Sic. 18 prol. 1.75; For the importance of naval officers see Naiden 2009, 739–741.

²⁸⁰ Naiden 2009, 742 provides one of the few cautionary voices against such uncritical use. Outside of mainland Greece, Ward 2012, 124–171 examines the concept of professionalism in relation to Roman centurions.

²⁸¹ Parke 1933, 1.

chronological contexts.²⁸² As such, military sociologists and historians have struggled with defining professionalism, especially its applicability to the relationship of military officers to a democratic society.²⁸³ The importance of military officers to both civil-military relations and combat effectiveness cannot be overstated, as ancient and modern officers corps were not solely military bodies, but were instead intimately intertwined with civil society and the political process.²⁸⁴

The status of officers is of paramount interest in modern conceptions of military professionalism. In his foundational work on civil-military relations,²⁸⁵ Samuel Huntington defines three characteristics of professionalism: expertise, or the combination of knowledge and skill in a specific area; responsibility, or the practice of expertise in a social context in a manner beneficial to society at large; and corporateness, a sense of separation from the general public and a shared sense of belonging to a greater unity.²⁸⁶ Huntington also provides one of the most succinct definitions of an officer's skill, which he terms "the management of violence."²⁸⁷ Huntington's views were expanded by Morris Janowitz, who emphasized the extensive training necessary for an individual to matriculate into professional status. Janowitz also stressed the importance of group identity and administration, and pointedly declared that the rise of professionalism coincided with the "decline of the gentleman amateur" in

²⁸²Cogan 1955, 105.

²⁸³Abrahamsson 1972, 12.

²⁸⁴Naiden 2007, 36.

²⁸⁵Snider et al. 1999, 7–10; Krahnmann 2008, 252.

²⁸⁶Huntington 1957, 8–10.

²⁸⁷*Ibid.*, 15.

warfare.²⁸⁸

The ideas of Huntington and Janowitz have been highly influential in examinations of civil-military relations. Much subsequent work focuses on the study of military professionalism, social control, and the internal relationships within the officer corps and its relationship to civilian and external power, especially within democratic states.²⁸⁹ Central to such studies is the conception of how institutions, specifically military officers, serve the interests and reflect the values of the community writ large, often focusing on the institutional aspects of the officer corps and its relationship to market forces and principles within the specific historical context of the pre- and post-Cold War United States.²⁹⁰ Despite their prevalence, such studies have come under recent criticism for avoiding the difficulties surrounding the definition of a profession in favor of an institutional model of officership.²⁹¹

As a result, there have been attempts to further refine the definition of military professionalism by greatly enlarging the role of patriotism in the conduct and administration of officers.²⁹² These studies argue that a sense of duty to the state as an abstract entity is the single most important consideration for military professionals, with the development of expertise through extensive training and institutionalism as important, yet still secondary, concerns.²⁹³ It is argued that such an emphasis on duty reduces the necessity of a separate corporate identity, and professionals see themselves as answering a “calling”, which are

²⁸⁸Janowitz 1971, 5–6.

²⁸⁹Harries-Jenkins and Moskos 1981, 11.

²⁹⁰Moskos 1977, 42–43.

²⁹¹Sørensen 1994, 607.

²⁹²Szászdi 2008, 98; Wingate 2013, 2.

²⁹³Krahmann 2008, 252–253.

concepts not commonly associated with the ancient world.²⁹⁴

However, it can be argued that the Spartan military contained most of the elements common to a professional organization, even when the restrictive definitions of Huntington and Janowitz are used. The Spartans considered themselves as part of a corporate body (the *polis*), and their extensive training and testing from the age of seven granted them entrance to the exclusive group of the *homoioi*, or equals, who fought in the Spartan *phalanx*.²⁹⁵ Spartan officers commanded detachments ranging from eight to five thousand men, highlighting the institutional strength of the Spartan army.²⁹⁶ The Spartans were proud of their adherence to their *nomos* and service to Sparta, as reflected in the famous epitaph of Leonidas and his men: “Stranger, tell the Spartans that here we lie, obedient to their commands.”²⁹⁷ The Spartans were unquestioned experts in warfare, and even individual Spartan officers could prove decisive when deployed against an opponent. In 414, the dispatch of a lone Spartan *archon* named Gylippus rendered enough assistance to Syracuse that the course of the Athenian siege was reversed, resulting in the wholesale destruction of the Athenian expedition.²⁹⁸

The skill of the Spartans in war was certainly recognized by other Greeks. When describing the conduct of religious rituals and dispatch of royal orders by Spartan Kings, Xenophon states:

“So, seeing these things you would think that all others are incompetent in the affairs of soldiering, and the Spartans are the only ones who are *technitai* in war.”²⁹⁹

²⁹⁴Sørensen 1994, 609.

²⁹⁵Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.5; Cartledge 1977, 27.

²⁹⁶Naiden 2007, 45–49.

²⁹⁷Hdt. 7.228: “ὅ ξεῖν’, ἀγγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅτι τῆδε κείμεθα τοῖς κείνων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι.”

²⁹⁸Thuc. 6.93 –7.81.

²⁹⁹Xen *Lac.* 13.5: “ὥστε ὁρῶν ταῦτα ἠγήσαιο ἂν τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους αὐτοσχεδιαστὰς εἶναι τῶν στρατιωτικῶν, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ μόνους τῷ ὄντι τεχνίτας τῶν πολεμικῶν.”

Xenophon's passage is part of a broader recognition amongst Greek authors that expertise and knowledge of warfare formed a *polemike techne*,³⁰⁰ often translated as skill in (or art of) war, which could be wielded by individuals or a *polis* as a whole. *Techne*, in its most basic form, is the combination of expertise and acquired skill towards a practical application.³⁰¹ Although Plato argued extensively that a true *techne* existed for the benefit of people other than its practitioner, and thus had a “higher calling”,³⁰² his theorizations on the subject were not generally applicable to economic, social, or military pursuits. Instead, for most ancient Greeks, a *techne* was conceived of as a learnable, teachable, and marketable skill that could be applied to any number of pursuits and occupations, many of which do not fit the strict sociological definitions of professionalism.³⁰³

Imperial *phourarchoi* certainly had a *polemike techne*, which they used to command *phouroi*, maintain *phouria*, and secure imperial interests in domestic and foreign settings.³⁰⁴ However, there is no indication that these men viewed themselves as members of a fraternity of professionals, answered a “higher calling”, or belonged to an identifiable political group. Outside of social and religious bonds to the *polis* and the unique Spartan system, in an ancient context the idea of corporate identity or abstract duty to a political entity is largely an anachronism. It has been argued that the Greeks lived in a world without the conception of

³⁰⁰Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.26, 1.6.41, 1.16.3, 8.1.37; *Oec.* 4.4; *Mem.* 2.1.28; *Pl. Prt.* 322b; *Resp.* 2.374b, 7.522c; *Plt.* 304e–305a; *Leg.* 1.639, 3.679; *Plut. Phil.* 14.9; See also Lendon 2005, 113.

³⁰¹Heinimann 1961, 105; Roochnik 1998, xi states that *techne* can be variously defined as a “..skill, art, craft, expertise, profession, science, knowledge, [or] technical knowledge...”

³⁰²*Pl. Resp.*, 1.341d–1.342e.

³⁰³Heinimann 1961, 106; Lendon 2005, 109–110.

³⁰⁴See Chapters 3 and 5.

nationalism,³⁰⁵ and as a result ideological adherence to a community larger than a *polis* was mostly unknown.³⁰⁶

It has also been argued that an officer corps was an institution with a distinct past, and not necessarily primarily focused on suppressing populations and creating policy.³⁰⁷ If this assessment is accepted, then most imperial *phourarchoi* fall outside of its scope; the imperial *phourarchia* was fundamentally a suppressive institution that was created almost *ex nihilo* by Hellenistic monarchs and in many cases held great influence over political affairs within their assignments.³⁰⁸ Thus, *phourarchoi*, along with other men who sold their *polemike techne*, were strictly speaking mercenary specialists, not professionals.

2.3 Mercenaries

Modern commentators have struggled with the definition of a mercenary, especially with the rise of PMCs and the increasingly complex relationship of state security and private enterprise. Useful here is the definition of mercenary used by the United Nations, which builds upon the definition contained in the Geneva convention.³⁰⁹ The UN's International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries defines mercenaries as:

“...any person who:
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
(b) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that party;

³⁰⁵At least as understood by modern definitions; See Anderson 2006, 37–111.

³⁰⁶Trundle 1998, 2; cf. Hadas 1950, 131–134 who sees the survival of some communal traditions and identities, especially within a Jewish context, under Hellenistic and Roman imperialism.

³⁰⁷Naiden 2007, 38.

³⁰⁸See Chapter 5.

³⁰⁹International Committee of the Red Cross 1977.

- (c) Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the conflict;
- (d) Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and
- (e) Has not been sent by a State which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.

2. A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation:

- (a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in a concerted act of violence aimed at:
 - (i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the constitutional order of a State; or
 - (ii) Undermining the territorial integrity of a State;
- (b) Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for significant private gain and is prompted by the promise or payment of material compensation;
- (c) Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which such an act is directed;
- (d) Has not been sent by a State on official duty; and
- (e) Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose territory the act is undertaken.”³¹⁰

The text of this treaty is foundational to the analysis and theorizing of mercenaries in the modern world, and sometimes even appears in discussions of pre-modern societies.³¹¹ Such application is not without pitfalls. These definitions are so narrow that modern prosecution of mercenaries is largely considered “unworkable”.³¹² Doug Brooks, president of the International Peace Operations Association, a trade association representing PMCs,³¹³ has joked that:

“...if anyone’s ever convicted of being a mercenary under the U.N. law, they should be shot and their lawyer should be shot with them because they were incompetent.”³¹⁴

Such difficulties lead many modern commentators, and PMC representatives, to create distinctions between military contractors, professional soldiers, and mercenaries. Such discussions often refer back to the ideals of professionalism expounded by Huntington and

³¹⁰UN General Assembly 1989, Article 1.

³¹¹Trundle 2004, 22.

³¹²Kinsey 2006, 19.

³¹³Creutz 2013, 178–180.

³¹⁴Bicanic and Bourque 2006.

Janowitz, and emphasize collective identity and the duty of a professional to a state as opposed to the profit motivation of a mercenary, who is hired and paid simply to exercise a skill.³¹⁵ Such theorizing raises some of the same issues exposed by narrow definitions of professionalism and officership. Consequently a more expansive and comprehensive view of mercenary employment is needed. Uwe Steinhoff's definition of mercenary is most useful here:

“A *mercenary* [emphasis original] is a person who is contracted to provide military services to groups other than his own (in terms of nation, ethnic group, class etc.) and is ready to deliver this service even if this involves taking part in hostilities. Which groups are relevant depends on the nature of the conflict.”³¹⁶

This definition almost perfectly describes Greeks who sold their *polemike techne* throughout antiquity. Such men were variously styled as *epikouroi* (fighters-alongside or helpers); *xenoi* (foreigners); or *misthophoroi* (wage-earners).³¹⁷ All of these terms reveal some basic cultural assumptions concerning a typical Greek mercenary: he was parallel to, not part of, the forces of a *polis* (*epikouros*); he was not a citizen of the community (*xenos*); and finally, he earned a wage for the sale of his skill (*misthophoros*).

Nevertheless, correctly distinguishing between mercenaries and other soldiers is not always easy. In Archaic Greece it was somewhat difficult to separate mercenaries from volunteers, as much military organization was based on bonds of friendship, reciprocity, and obligations,³¹⁸ which could often be indistinguishable from purely mercenary activity.³¹⁹

³¹⁵Krahmann 2008, 254–256.

³¹⁶Steinhoff 2008, 28.

³¹⁷Trundle 2004, 4–5.

³¹⁸The struggle of Agamemnon throughout the *Iliad* to assert his authority is a perfect example of the limitations of such a system. See Hammer 1997, 1–4; Hammer 2002, 82–83; Barker 2009, 53–66; Furedi 2013, 16–24.

³¹⁹van Wees 2004, 72.

Nevertheless, the Greeks were aware of the vast difference between mercenaries and the amateur citizen-hoplites of a *polis*. The realities of mercenary service, and the dependency of the mercenary on his skills at war to provide sustenance were described by the archaic poet Archilochus, who, if he was not a mercenary himself, adopted the literary persona of one:³²⁰

“In my spear is my kneaded barley-bread; in my spear is Ismarian wine; I drink leaning on my spear.”³²¹

Archilochus' mercenary was far removed from preserving his crops against invaders or defying outsiders trampling on the *chora* of his home *polis*.³²² Instead, the poet underscores that a mercenary procured the necessities of life through the application of military skill. This focus on basic necessities illustrates that structural poverty was a leading motivator for mercenary service,³²³ and a successful mercenary who sold his *techne* and survived could, at the very least, manage a subsistence living for his efforts instead of facing possible starvation from failed agricultural pursuits. For such men, selling their *techne* as mercenaries was a wholly unremarkable, everyday means of earning a living.³²⁴

Mass hiring of a unit, while not unknown, was rare during the Archaic period. The only known group of Greek mercenaries who fought as a significant unit was a collection of 30,000 Greeks from Asia Minor who were incorporated into the army of Psameticus in Egypt.³²⁵ For the most part, mercenary service in the Greek world prior to the fifth century was an individual pursuit. However, by the late fifth and early fourth centuries, there was a

³²⁰Miller 1994, 9–36.

³²¹Archil. fr. 2 (West): “ἐν δορὶ μὲν μοι μᾶζα μεμαγμένη, ἐν δορὶ δ’ οἶνος Ἴσμαρικός· πίνω δ’ ἐν δορὶ κεκλιμένος.”

³²²Hanson 2000, 5.

³²³Miller 1984, 153; Luraghi 2006, 22.

³²⁴Miller 1984, 159.

³²⁵Hdt. 2.152–4; Diod. Sic. 1.66.12, 67.1–3, 68.5; Russell 1942, 103; Trundle 2004, 44.

significant increase in the number of mercenaries, both individually and as units, operating in the Greek world as a direct result of the Peloponnesian War.³²⁶ Often operating as units with specialized skills, such as light-armed *peltasts*,³²⁷ these forces proved their value when combined with traditional hoplite formations.

The use of extensive military units and specialized soldiers is best embodied by the famous Ten Thousand, a mercenary unit *par excellence*.³²⁸ It is best known from Xenophon's autobiographical work *Anabasis*, an account that covers the retreat of the Ten Thousand across Persian Anatolia following the battle of Cunaxa in 401. Despite winning the battle, the employer of the Ten Thousand, Cyrus the younger, was killed, leaving the Greek forces to march out of Asia Minor on their own.³²⁹ After the execution of their top commanders by the Persians, the Greeks voted new leaders to guide them out of an increasingly dangerous situation.

Xenophon's account does not pass any moral judgements on mercenaries, presumably since he himself was one. It does reveal the increasing effectiveness of highly skilled troops, as the Ten Thousand were able to crush their opposition and fight their way from modern-day central Iraq to the shores of the Black Sea. Xenophon's account also shows the increasing use of Greek mercenaries as garrison forces, notably by the Persian monarchy, to suppress and control subject Greek populations, including the presence of *phourarchoi*, who were employed by Cyrus, in Greek *poleis*.³³⁰

³²⁶Miller 1984, 154–159; Santosuosso 1997, 87–89; English 2012, 37–53; Trundle 2013, 340–341.

³²⁷Thuc. 2.29.5, 4.129.2, 5.6.4, 7.27.1.

³²⁸Lee 2007, 43–79.

³²⁹Xen. *An.* 1.8.28.

³³⁰*Ibid.*, 1.1.6.

Xenophon is somewhat coy when discussing the motivations of the Ten Thousand, and he attempts to deny that commercial gain was the sole motivation for the mercenaries' sale of their skills:

“For most of the soldiers had sailed out [from Greece] for this expedition for pay, not because their necessities were scant, but because they had heard of the virtue of Cyrus; some led [other] men, some spent their own money, and others had fled their fathers and mothers, or left behind children, so as to procure money and bring it back to them, as they heard that the other people who served with Cyrus had experienced many good things. Being men of this sort, they yearned to return safely to Greece.”³³¹

Men like Xenophon could be motivated to become mercenaries to seek adventure, social advancement, or the fulfillment of social obligations, with economic rewards as only a secondary motivation.³³² However, Xenophon's idealization of the Ten Thousand has been viewed as a gross simplification of the economic reality of mercenary service and a refusal to admit that both the mercenaries and Cyrus were engaging in what amounted to little more than an economic transaction,³³³ which is clearly demonstrated when the Ten Thousand, suspicious of Cyrus' true objectives, nearly mutinied and only continued the expedition after the promise of increased pay.³³⁴

Other Greek writers were more forthcoming when addressing motivation for mercenary service. Isocrates, a fourth century rhetorician, stated that

“..many people, due to the lack of daily [necessities], being compelled to serve as

³³¹Ibid., 6.4.8: “τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι ἦσαν οὐ σπάνει βίου ἐκπελευκότες ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν μισθοφορὰν, ἀλλὰ τὴν Κύρου ἀρετὴν ἀκούοντες, οἱ μὲν καὶ ἄνδρας ἄγοντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ προσανηλωκότες χρήματα, καὶ τούτων ἕτεροι ἀποδεδρακότες πατέρας καὶ μητέρας, οἱ δὲ καὶ τέκνα καταλιπόντες ὡς χρήματ' αὐτοῖς κτησάμενοι ἤξοντες πάλιν, ἀκούοντες καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς παρὰ Κύρῳ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ πράττειν. τοιοῦτοι ὄντες ἐπόθουν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα σφύζεσθαι.”

³³²van Wees 2004, 40–41.

³³³Sage 1996, 153; Tamiolaki 2012, 574 n.42.

³³⁴Xen. *An.* 1.3.1–1.3.21.

mercenaries, are being killed, fighting for the enemy against their friends.”³³⁵

Isocrates' statement is an unambiguous and unflattering reference to mercenary service; the Greeks in question became mercenaries due to the lack of basic necessities and crushing poverty. For mercenaries, personal ties, critically important to the conduct of warfare in the Archaic age, were reduced to the point that the contract between the fighter and a paymaster was the paramount concern.³³⁶

Although mercenaries, both as individuals and in groups, were increasingly deployed by *poleis* in the fifth and fourth centuries, Greek theoreticians and intellectuals were often disdainful of such men. Aeneas Tacticus certainly preferred citizen militias to mercenary soldiers, but he was enough of a pragmatist to recognize the value of mercenaries as increasingly specialized and proficient troops. He viewed mercenaries as a necessary evil in the chaotic world of Greek warfare, one that increasingly marginalized the amateur citizen-soldier of the *polis* in favor of skilled mercenaries. Indicative of Aeneas' attitude is his warning to any Greek *polis* that employed mercenaries in defense of a siege:

“For those who decide to employ mercenaries, it is always necessary to have over the mercenaries armed citizens who are more numerous and powerful than them; if not, then they and their *polis* will be under [the power of] the mercenaries.”³³⁷

Aeneas' assessment is part of a wider view that mercenaries were less than desirable for the defense of independent cities, due to their unreliability and their economic, not social, motives.³³⁸ Such misgivings continued despite the accelerated trend of mercenary service

³³⁵Isoc. *Paneg.* 168: “..πολλοὺς δὲ δι’ ἔνδειαν τῶν καθ’ ἡμέραν ἐπικουρεῖν ἀναγκαζομένους ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τοῖς φίλοις μαχομένους ἀποθνήσκειν.”

³³⁶van Wees 2004, 74.

³³⁷Aen. Tact. 12.2–3: “τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ μετὰ ξένων μισθοφόρων μέλλοντάς τι πράσσειν ἀεὶ χρή ὑπερέχειν πλήθει καὶ δυνάμει τοὺς ἐπαγομένους πολίτας τῶν ξένων: εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπ’ ἐκείνοις γίνονται αὐτοὶ τε καὶ ἡ πόλις.”

³³⁸Ober 2015, 309–310.

after the conquests of Alexander the Great and the wars of the Successors. Although mercenary soldiers increasingly proved their value on the battlefield, there was still a preoccupation with their reliability and suitability for protecting the interests of the *polis*, which is reflected in the reluctance of many independent *poleis* to appoint *phourarchoi* from anyone other than their own native-born or naturalized citizens.³³⁹

Such reluctance was not shared by Hellenistic monarchs, who recognized the utility of highly skilled mercenaries. In 318, Eumenes, a former secretary of Alexander the Great, used mercenaries in an attempt to secure his military and political position. Eumenes

“...mobilizing the most suitable members of his *philoï* and giving them abundant funds, he sent them out, having set remarkably [large] wages. Some of them going straightaway into Pisidia, Lycia and the adjacent [regions], carefully enrolled foreign troops (mercenaries) there; others travelled in Cilicia, others through Coele Syria and Phoenicia, and some to the *poleis* in Cyprus. As the news of the mercenary recruitment and the remarkable wages spread widely, many, even from Greek *poleis*, willingly met [with the recruiters] and were enrolled for the expedition. In a short time more than 10,000 foot soldiers and 2,000 cavalry soldiers were brought together, separately from the Silver Shields [an elite group of foot soldiers] and those who were around Eumenes.”³⁴⁰

Eumenes' recruitment drive shows the increasing reliance of Hellenistic generals and imperial powers on the recruitment of effective mercenary forces. Competition for military specialists was so keen that the rewards for mercenary service could even be championed by court poets. Theocritus praised his patron, Ptolemy I,³⁴¹ by stating

“Thus, if it seems necessary to you to go abroad [as a mercenary], Ptolemy is the best *misthodontes* (paymaster) for a free man.”³⁴²

³³⁹See Chapters 4 and 5.

³⁴⁰Diod. Sic. 18.61.4–5: “προχειρισάμενος δὲ τῶν φίλων τοὺς εὐθετωτάτους καὶ δούς χρήματα δαψιλῆ πρὸς τὴν ξενολογίαν ἐξέπεμψεν ὀρίσας ἀξιολόγους μισθοῦς. εὐθὺς δ' οἱ μὲν εἰς τὴν Πισιδικὴν καὶ Λυκίαν καὶ τὴν πλησιόχωρον παρελθόντες ἐξενολόγουν ἐπιμελῶς, οἱ δὲ τὴν Κιλικίαν ἐπεπορεύοντο, ἄλλοι δὲ τὴν Κοίλην Συρίαν καὶ Φοινίκην, τινὲς δὲ τὰς ἐν τῇ Κύπρῳ πόλεις. διαβηθεΐσης δὲ τῆς ξενολογίας καὶ τῆς μισθοφορᾶς ἀξιολόγου προκειμένης πολλοὶ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τῆς Ἑλλάδος πόλεων ἐθελοντι κατήντων καὶ πρὸς τὴν στρατείαν ἀπεγράφοντο. ἐν ὀλίγῳ δὲ χρόνῳ συνήχθησαν περὶ μὲν πλείους τῶν μυρίων, ἵππεις δὲ δισχίλιοι χωρὶς τῶν ἀργυρασπίδων καὶ τῶν μετ' Εὐμενοῦς κατηντηκῶτων.”

³⁴¹Burton 1992, 239–242.

³⁴²Theoc. *Id.* 14 ll. 58–59: “εἰ δ' οὕτως ἄρα τοι δοκεῖ ὄστ' ἀποδαμῆν, μισθοδότης Πτολεμαῖος ἐλευθέρῳ οἷος ἄριστος.”

A number of *phrouarchoi* seemingly followed the advice of Theocritus. Although no document survives in which an imperial *phrouarchos* outlines his motivations for service or explicitly mentions compensation for the post, amateur *phrouarchoi* were paid for their services.³⁴³ Hellenistic monarchs, given their reliance on mercenaries for their armed forces and the competitive market for such men,³⁴⁴ could hardly be expected to do otherwise.

It is also clear that imperial *phrouarchoi* of a known origin did not typically come from territory that was directly controlled by their employers or had extensive social ties to the monarchy prior to their service.³⁴⁵ The Hellenistic period provides evidence for the foreign origin of many *phrouarchoi*. In Ptolemaic Egypt, *phrouarchoi* are known from Apollonia,³⁴⁶ Argos,³⁴⁷ Boeotia,³⁴⁸ Epidamnos,³⁴⁹ Macedonia,³⁵⁰ Pergamum,³⁵¹ Phaselis,³⁵² Rome,³⁵³ and Thessaly,³⁵⁴ and many more may have come from outside the boundaries of the kingdom. The origins of some Ptolemaic *phrouarchoi* assigned to outlying territories are

³⁴³See Chapter 5.

³⁴⁴Chaniotis 2002, 100.

³⁴⁵See Map 12.

³⁴⁶*AbhBerlin* (1937.6) 3-63 = *SB* 5,2 (1938) 8066, col. 2.

³⁴⁷*Philae* 13.

³⁴⁸*Thèbes à Syène* 242.

³⁴⁹*IC* III iv 14; *Thèbes à Syène* 318.

³⁵⁰*Thèbes à Syène* 243.

³⁵¹*OGIS* 111 = *Thèbes à Syène* 302.

³⁵²*Thèbes à Syène* 320.

³⁵³*IC* III iv 18.

³⁵⁴*Thèbes à Syène* 314.

also known; Pandaros from Herakleia was *phrourarchos* in Xanthos in 260/259.³⁵⁵ Due to their diverse origins from outside imperial kingdoms, the certainty of some form of payment for *phrourarchoi*, and the ubiquity of mercenaries in royal service, it is probable that many, if not most, imperial *phrourarchoi* were indeed mercenaries themselves.

However, there were some differences in the recruitment of imperial *phrourarchoi* and individual soldiers, at least for critical assignments. Eumenes' appointment of *phrourarchoi* drew on the important resource of his *philoï*, a group that was vital to the administration of Hellenistic empires. Originally consisting of the close circle of friends and advisors around an individual, under Antigonos *philoï* grew into functionaries who performed an array of military and diplomatic tasks, and who could hail from locations outside the kingdom.³⁵⁶ This model was widely adopted by other Successors, and the *philoï* of a monarch rapidly became one of the most important administrative bodies in the Hellenistic world. However, *philoï* were never a strictly formalized order, and the social dynamics of the group were based on face-to-face interactions, not on rank, training, or other social structures. As a result, *philoï* were never a unified or single social-group outside of a Hellenistic court, and admittance to their ranks was based on a personal relationship with the monarch.³⁵⁷

The *philoï* of a monarch could provide fertile ground for selecting *phrourarchoi*. After Eumenes gained control of Cappadocia in 321, he entrusted his temporary conquests to an unknown number of *phrourarchoi* drawn from his *philoï*;³⁵⁸ in Egypt, some *phrourarchoi*

³⁵⁵Robert and Robert 1983, #4.

³⁵⁶Billows 1990, 248–249.

³⁵⁷Strootman 2008, 31–32; Strootman 2014, 95–120.

³⁵⁸Plut. *Eum.* 3.7: “...καί τὰς μὲν πόλεις τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ φίλοις παρέδωκε, καί φρουράρχους ἐγκατέστησε καί δικαστὰς ἀπέλυε καί διοικητὰς οὓς ἐβούλετο...”; cf. Herman 1987, 112 who doubts the veracity of Plutarch.

also held the title *philos*. Other *phrourarchoi*, although not explicitly among a monarch's *philoï*, were nevertheless close to the king. Alexander the Great may have directly placed *phrourarchoi* in important assignments,³⁵⁹ as did Polyperchon,³⁶⁰ and possibly Antigonos.³⁶¹ Antipater hand-picked Menyllus as the *phrourarchos* over Athens,³⁶² and his replacement Nikanor was directly established by Cassander.³⁶³ *Philoï* could have started as mercenaries, and some could even switch sides, like Andronikos, the *phrourarchos* of Tyre, who in 312 was brought into Ptolemy's *philoï* despite previously serving under Antigonos and Demetrius.³⁶⁴

Although many *phrourarchoi* were mercenaries who oversaw military posts, most are not known to have directly engaged in combat,³⁶⁵ but were instead preoccupied with the maintenance of a *phroura* / *phrourion*, oversight of the *phrouroi* at their posts,³⁶⁶ and the exercise of broad civic powers.³⁶⁷ Viewed in this light, the office of the *phrourarchia* is loosely analogous with the modern conception of Private Military Companies.

2.4 Private Military Companies and the *Phrourarchia*

Much modern work on mercenaries has been influenced by the increasing state use of

³⁵⁹Arr. *Anab.* 3.5.3, 3.16.9.

³⁶⁰Diod. Sic. 20.103.4.

³⁶¹Ibid., 19.86.1.

³⁶²Ibid., 14.4.4.

³⁶³Plut. *Phoc.* 31.1.

³⁶⁴Diod. Sic. 19.86.1–3.

³⁶⁵See Chapter 5.

³⁶⁶*P. Diosk.* 14; Polyaeus, *Strat.* 2.19; Müller 2010, 428; See Chapters 3 & 4.

³⁶⁷See Chapter 3.

private military companies, contractors, and security organizations (PMCs).³⁶⁸ Defining PMCs can be a difficult task, as most PMC companies take great pains to distance themselves from being considered mercenaries.³⁶⁹ Some theorists follow this lead, and draw a distinction between employment of corporate entities by the state for the support of strategic objectives as opposed to personal employment on a more limited basis.³⁷⁰

However, much theorizing on PMCs explicitly refers to the organizations and their employees as mercenaries,³⁷¹ some going as far as to label PMCs as “corporate dogs of war”, who are especially employed in low-intensity conflicts for corporate or state interests at the margins of their authority.³⁷² PMCs, generally conceived, offer a range of services for financial compensation, including logistics, training, and security, up to what can be described as “private armies” which actively engage in combat operations on behalf of their clients.³⁷³

Fundamentally, PMCs are specialists in the procurement, use, and threatened use of violence for monetary compensation. They may be specifically contracted to engage in offensive military operations or to serve as a security presence for low-intensity or non-combat roles. Such organizations are mercenary, and are motivated by profit more than by an allegiance to a state or closely held ideals. Despite their mercenary status, PMCs can directly

³⁶⁸The terminology surrounding these entities is still in flux. Singer 2003, 8 refers to these organizations as privatized [sic] military firms (PMFs); Alexandra, Baker and Caparini 2008, 1 refers to them as private military and security companies (PMSCs); Kinsey 2006, 1 calls them private military companies (PMCs) as does Ortiz 2010, ix. This investigation will use PMC as the preferred designation.

³⁶⁹Steinhoff 2008, 19.

³⁷⁰Mockaitis 2014, 8.

³⁷¹Leander 2005, 806; Alexandra, Baker and Caparini 2008, 3.

³⁷²Musah and Fayemi 2000, 1–2; Colás and Mabee 2010, 1.

³⁷³Ortiz 2007, 56–60.

serve the interests of a state, and even take on responsibilities and powers that are indistinguishable from those performed by state actors and organizations like the military or bureaucrats, which allows for a comparison of PMCs' expertise in violence, the military, and impact on local communities with that of imperial *phourarchoi*.

PMCs are seen as a somewhat new phenomenon, emerging as significant and highly influential security actors only after the end of the Cold War, although they were employed by states earlier in the 20th century on a limited basis for training exercises and logistical purposes.³⁷⁴ Their growing use by the United States in the “War on Terror” in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other locations for increasingly direct military operations is contrary to a longstanding national preference for the deployment of regular military forces; it was possible as late as 1985 to claim, without irony, that the United States had never before openly deployed mercenaries to directly engage in armed conflicts.³⁷⁵

Currently, PMCs take on many responsibilities that were traditionally the role of governments, especially in the area of security and the use of violence.³⁷⁶ In order to carry out these roles, PMCs depend on trained personnel, who deploy their various skills based on a contract. Roles can range from military logistics³⁷⁷ and bodyguards,³⁷⁸ to outright combat operations, although PMCs operating openly in this last category are rare.³⁷⁹ Although most PMCs do not directly serve as garrison soldiers, they are heavily involved with logistical

³⁷⁴Kinsey 2006, 1; Gardner 2007, 346.

³⁷⁵Mockler 1987, 5.

³⁷⁶Kinsey 2006, 2.

³⁷⁷Krishnan 2008, 113–120.

³⁷⁸Mahajan 2003, 156–157.

³⁷⁹Percy 2007, 11–12.

support and base security for traditional military forces, and certainly serve the interests of garrisoning powers.³⁸⁰

As PMCs increasingly take on roles that were the exclusive domain of modern nation-states, some theorists have equated the rise of private security, which is viewed as an illegitimate actor, with an erosion of state security and control and a merger of the public and private spheres.³⁸¹ Such work views the contracting of PMCs by corporations operating with weak central governments, like some African states, as a critical threat to local self-determination and sovereignty, especially given the wide latitude and lax oversight enjoyed by many PMCs.³⁸²

A similar overshadowing of traditional government roles can be seen in the use of imperial *phourarchoi* from the Classical to Hellenistic periods. Although the *phourarchia* was a suppressive institution that projected imperial power over a local community,³⁸³ Classical *phourarchoi* were still citizens of a *polis*, who were sent under civic authority to safeguard the community's interests abroad. The Athenian empire sent Athenian citizens as *phourarchoi* over Erythrai, and Spartan *phourarchoi* were Spartan citizens dispatched by the *polis*. In these cases the *polis* looked to its own citizens and operated within its own authority to establish *phourarchoi*, without any hint of private contracting or market considerations.

However, many imperial *phourarchoi* in the Hellenistic period were undoubtedly

³⁸⁰Krahmann 2010, 2.

³⁸¹Abrahamsen and Williams 2010, 214–215; Owens 2010, 16.

³⁸²Vines 2000, 188.

³⁸³See Chapter 5.

mercenaries, yet they still occupied posts that were traditionally in the “public” domain of the *polis*. They were not regular members of an imperial army, and were instead contracted to apply their skills in roles that had previously fallen to public office and oversight,³⁸⁴ like Antipater's assignment of the *phrourarchos* Menyllus to interfere with the local political process at Athens.³⁸⁵ Seleucid and Egyptian *phrourarchoi* were intimately involved with local judicial matters,³⁸⁶ and Mithridates appointed Bacchides as *phrourarchos* over Sinope to suppress any attempts at revolt.³⁸⁷ Such interference could only undermine the sovereignty of a dependent *polis*.

Although they sometimes operated in service to a state, such examples show how the Hellenistic conception of “spear-won land”, or territory which was the personal property of the monarch due to the right of conquest, influenced the actions of a *phrourarchos*.³⁸⁸ For these monarchs, the use of a *phrourarchos* can be seen as an effort to control his own property, through the use or threat of force. Such an attitude has a striking parallel when examining PMC authority, which is often seen as derived from their function as agents at the behest of entities, state or otherwise, that control or own property.³⁸⁹

Effective civilian oversight resulting in prosecution of criminal conduct by the employees of PMCs is difficult. To take just a few glaring examples, between 2003 and 2007, there were at least 54 cases of sexual abuse of children by United States PMC employees

³⁸⁴See Chapter 3.

³⁸⁵Diod. Sic. 18.18.5.

³⁸⁶*SEG* 29:1613 = Landau 1966, 54–70 = Fischer 1979, 131–138. *P. Diosk.* 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9; *P. Tor. Choach.* 8; See Chapter 3.

³⁸⁷Strabo 12.3.11.

³⁸⁸Tarn 1913, 191; Mehl 1980, 173–212; Billows 1990, 135; Cohen 1995, 30; Holt 1999, 125; Mittag 2008, 41.

³⁸⁹Leander 2005, 805; Abrahamsen and Williams 2010, 220.

associated with DynCorp; as of April 7, 2015 there has not been a single arrest or any movement to prosecution.³⁹⁰ DynCorp employees were also involved with a human sex-trafficking ring in Bosnia in 1999, which never resulted in legal penalties for the individuals involved.³⁹¹ This is not to say that PMCs are completely immune from prosecution: in October 2014 former employees of Blackwater were found guilty of the unjustified killing of 17 Iraqi civilians in a United States court.³⁹² However, the fact remains that effective consequences for PMC malfeasance are still extremely rare.

Imperial *phourarchoi* were similarly insulated from negative repercussions for their actions, and in some cases excesses against the population were seen as necessary. In 404 the Spartan *phourarchos* Kallibios attempted to strike the Athenian wrestler Autolykos, and although he was thrown to the ground for his attempt, he suffered no consequences beyond wounded pride and a verbal reprimand from the Spartan *strategos* Lysander.³⁹³ Some *phourarchoi*, like Bacchides, committed grievous atrocities against the local population without suffering any repercussions; indeed they had the tacit support of their employers.³⁹⁴

Despite the similarities between PMCs and *phourarchoi*, there are important differences between the two. PMCs are multi-national corporations that control resources proportionally greater than anything available to most ancient people, while *phourarchoi* were individuals who were seemingly recruited on a case-by-case basis. Employees of PMCs contract with a PMC and not directly with a government, while many *phourarchoi* depended on personal

³⁹⁰Comisión Histórica del Conflicto y sus Víctimas 2015, 48–49; Grandin 2015.

³⁹¹Isenberg 2010; Bolkovac and Lynn 2011, 43–220.

³⁹²Pandey 2015.

³⁹³Plut. *Lys.* 15.5.

³⁹⁴Strabo 12.3.11.

relationships with the monarchs themselves. Despite differences in the scale of their operations and nature of employment, the political status and military responsibilities of *phourarchoi* have more in common with PMCs than with individual mercenaries or the amateur forces of independent Greek *poleis*.

2.5 Amateur Hoplites

Ancient Greece was comprised of a multiplicity of small, independent polities, which waged near constant warfare for political, economic, or social advantage.³⁹⁵ By almost any definition of professionalism, most citizen-militias of Classical Greek *poleis* (with the notable exception of Sparta) were amateur organizations.³⁹⁶ These militias were composed of men of moderate means who largely supported themselves through agrarian production on small plots scattered throughout the territory of the *polis*; agriculture, alongside warfare, occupied the majority of their time.³⁹⁷ Such amateurism was possible due to the preferred fighting style of Greek *poleis*, which was dominated by the heavy infantry of the Greek *hoplite* arranged shoulder-to-shoulder in a tight *phalanx* formation. Tactics mostly consisted of crashing headlong into an opposing force, and relying on shock and close-quarters fighting. Effective military participation, relying more on personal courage and unit cohesion than tactics or expertise, did not require specialized training or constant drilling.³⁹⁸

With such basic tactics, command of hoplite armies was equally amateur. The general, or *strategos*, in most traditional Greek *phalanxes* was a citizen himself, who would go back to

³⁹⁵Eckstein 2005, 81.

³⁹⁶Trundle 1998, 1.

³⁹⁷Foxhall 1993, 134–137; Lynn 2003, 10; Eckstein 2005, 483.

³⁹⁸Hanson 2000, 27–39; van Wees 2004, 87–88; Lendon 2005, 41–47. Such contentions are not without debate; see Fagan and Trundle 2010, 10; See Fagan 2010, 84 n. 10 for recent bibliography.

the ranks as a regular hoplite after his term of command had expired.³⁹⁹ In the case of Athens, *strategoï* were men elected to a position that could be held multiple times. The dominance of Pericles from 443-429 proved that the office was as much about domestic politics as it was about waging war.⁴⁰⁰ Even imperial *phrourarchoi* in the classical period were not exempt from the amateur model. If the Athenian *phrourarchos* in Erythrai⁴⁰¹ was similar to standard offices in Athens,⁴⁰² then the post was selected by lot or sortition; although still an imperial assignment, it was not a highly specialized position.

2.6 Local *Phrourarchoi* as Amateurs

In contrast to the skilled mercenary officers of the imperial *phrourarchia*, local *phrourarchoi* were amateurs who owed more to the conception and ideology of Classical citizen-militias than the changing military and political context of the Hellenistic age. Links among citizenship, service, and the lack of professional identity, along with the merger of political, social, and military roles, are characteristics of most citizen-soldiers.⁴⁰³ By this definition, local *phrourarchoi* were anything but professionals. They had no specialized *techne* to sell to their *poleis*. A local *phrourarchia* certainly was not a higher calling or a vocation, and the presence of strict term limits and constitutional restrictions on the authority of the *phrourarchia* prevented the office from becoming the domain of vested interests.⁴⁰⁴

The *phrourarchia* at Teos provides the best example of such limitations. The most

³⁹⁹Hanson 2000, 110.

⁴⁰⁰Patriquin 2015, 29–30.

⁴⁰¹*SEG* 31.5 = *SEG* 34.5 = *IG* I³, 14.

⁴⁰²Nease 1949, 109. Sinclair 1988, 450; Lendon 2010, 24.

⁴⁰³Krahmann 2008, 251.

⁴⁰⁴See Chapters 4 and 5.

relevant laws restricted the office for a period of just four months once every five years to rich citizens who were over thirty years old.⁴⁰⁵ Such restrictions made it impossible to build an effective, standing, professional force of *phrouarchoi*, or for individual office holders to gain a *polemike techne*.

The use of amateur *phrouarchoi* was, in many ways, a refusal by the local community to fully embrace (or perhaps even grasp) the fundamental shifts in warfare which occurred in the Hellenistic period. Independent *poleis* did not compete with imperial states to recruit or attract mercenary *phrouarchoi*; for example, the *polis* of Miletus specifically banned Cretan mercenaries in the employ of the *polis* from standing for the *phrouarchia* until they had been naturalized as citizens for 20 years. This period was twice that prescribed for new citizens who had not originated as mercenaries to stand for the *phrouarchia*.⁴⁰⁶ Although the *polis* recognized and appreciated the Cretan mercenaries' *techne* in war, it was cautious about employing that *techne* in the *phrouarchia*. Miletus' reluctance to choose naturalized mercenaries as *phrouarchoi* also recalls Aeneas Tacticus' earlier misgivings about employing mercenaries in critical defensive positions.

Such restrictions may belie a longing for the notion of a “free” Greek citizen-soldier. Most individual *poleis* could not hope to mount an effective resistance against Hellenistic monarchs, and so a *phrouarchos* mounting a practical defense against such external threats was a secondary concern.⁴⁰⁷ A *polis* could therefore safely assign an amateur to a *phrouion* or *phroura* without incurring any significant tactical or strategic risk, or incurring the

⁴⁰⁵Robert and Robert 1976, 153–235 = Sokolowski 1980, 103–106; *SEG* 26.1306; *SEG* 30.1376 ll. 8-16. See Chapter 3.

⁴⁰⁶*SEG* 29.1136, ll.65-66: “...λαγχ[ανέτ[ω]σαν δὲ φυλακὴν καὶ φρουραρχίαν ἐτῶν παρελ[θόντων εἴ]κοσι...”

⁴⁰⁷See Chapter 5.

expense of mercenary *phrouarchos*.

Assignment as a *phrouarchos* was anything but a higher calling. A rich citizen of Priene named Apellis spent fourteen years as a *grammateus* personally funding the expenses of other citizens who held the offices of the *strategoï*, the *nomophulakes*, and the *timouchos*,⁴⁰⁸ leaving him “...longing to become *phrouarchos* after being discharged from the [office of] the *grammateus*.”⁴⁰⁹ Such a wish was not due to civic pride, zeal for command, or the desire to assist the *polis* or to deploy a *techne*; rather Apellis desired a civic position which may have required less material outlay and fiscal responsibility than his previous assignment. The *phrouarchia* was not an office for which Apellis stressed his suitability or *techne*. Nevertheless, the citizens of Priene were not concerned with the amateur status of Apellis, as he was eventually chosen by the *demos* as *phrouarchos*.⁴¹⁰

Local *phrouarchoi* were certainly paid for their time, but this is not the sole criterion for professionalism. The inscription from Teos reveals that a *phrouarchos* received four times the daily pay of the *phrouroi* under his command; although this compensation was significantly higher, the amount was still too small to have been attractive to most mercenary officers, even if Teos would hire them. The Teian inscription also shows that, unlike imperial *phrouarchoi*, a local *phrouarchos* could be selected and dispatched with a distinct unit of troops. At the beginning of his term the *phrouarchos* was sent with a fresh unit of men for four months; they arrived, lived, and departed as a distinct unit under his command and

⁴⁰⁸I. Priene 4 ll. 16-19: “...τούτων δὲ δεκατέτταρα ἔτη τὴν τοῖς στρατηγοῖς | γραμματεῖαν λελητούργηκε δωρεὰν καὶ τοῦ ἀνα|λάματος τοῦ γινομένου[ν ἐκ τῶν] νόμων τῶι τῶν νομο|φυλάκῳ...”

⁴⁰⁹Ibid., ll.21-22: “καὶ [ἐπιθ]υ[μ]εῖμ παραλυθεὶς τῆς | γραμματείας [φρουραρχ]ο[ς] γενέσθαι...”

⁴¹⁰Ibid.

authority to pay their wages.⁴¹¹

With their refusal or inability to consider mercenaries as *phourarchoi*, independent *poleis* could not rely upon the knowledge and *techne* of an experienced commander to conduct the affairs of a *phoura* or *phourion* without supervision. These communities relied upon the *nomos* to restrain their *phourarchoi*, even legislating that it was necessary for a *phourarchos* to physically remain in his post for the duration of his assignment.⁴¹²

2.7 Conclusion

Although they shared the same name and some general responsibilities, there was little in common between the specialized office of an imperial *phourarchia* and the amateur magistracy of a local *phourarchos*. The powers, outlooks, and motivations surrounding the offices differed fundamentally. The wide-ranging powers and responsibilities of imperial *phourarchoi* called for considerable competence and judgement, and required extensive use of *polemike techne*. Imperial *phourarchoi* could count on continued employment, and even promotion,⁴¹³ if they served effectively.

In contrast, local *phourarchoi*, with their restricted powers and limited assignments, had their duty defined by the local *nomos*; an amateur could safely conduct these affairs because the requirements, regulations, and nature of the assignment were clearly spelled out beforehand. Even in the Hellenistic period, a local *phourarchos*, like his Classical predecessors, did not possess or cultivate *polemike techne*. Instead, the *phourarchia* was simply a military magistracy that served the interests of the *polis* without placing an undue strain on its holder.

⁴¹¹Robert and Robert 1976, 153–235 = Sokolowski 1980, 103–106; *SEG* 26.1306; *SEG* 30.1376.

⁴¹²See Chapter 4.

⁴¹³See Chapter 3.

The bifurcation of the *phourarchia* into imperial and local offices, coupled with the broad conceptions of professionalism, officership, and mercenary service outlined here, are powerful analytical tools which inform the remainder of this investigation. Chapters Three and Four will show how the specialist/amateur dichotomy manifested itself in the specific powers wielded by *phourarchoi*, and Chapter Five will show how the imperial *phourarchia* assisted Hellenistic monarchs in creating a political, social, and military system that resembles a modern conception of the garrison state.⁴¹⁴

⁴¹⁴Lasswell 1941, 455–468.

3 IMPERIAL *PHROURARCHOI*

“...[the Athenians] were compelled to accept Menyllus as *phrouarchos* and a *phroura*, its purpose being to keep anyone from making revolutionary changes.”⁴¹⁵

3.1 Introduction

This short quote by the first century historian Diodorus,⁴¹⁶ addressing Antipater's imposition of a foreign garrison in Athens in 322, is a typical representation of an imperial *phrouarchos*. As a *phrouarchos*, Menyllus was an agent of control and suppression, a constant reminder of the subservient status of the Athenians to the might of Antipater, and an enforcer who restricted Athens' independence and local autonomy.

Imperial powers, from the expansive cities of Classical Athens and Sparta to the great Hellenistic monarchies, were characterized by their military ethos, lust for expansion, and suppression of local autonomy. *Phrouarchoi* were a critical component of these policies, and they served as an interface between imperial power and subject communities.

Phrouarchoi are mostly found within a military context, where a *phroura* or *phrourion* provided the physical bedrock of its power. In addition to their military jurisdiction, imperial *phrouarchoi* generally held a measure of civic authority separate from the political order of a subject *polis*. As the Hellenistic age progressed, the specifics of these powers were increasingly left ambiguous, which allowed the *phrouarchia* to support an imperial regime with minimal constitutional hindrances, until the expansion of Rome rendered the presence

⁴¹⁵Diod. Sic. 18.18.5: “...φρούραρχον δὲ Μένυλλον καὶ φρουρὰν ἠναγκάσθησαν δέξασθαι τὴν οὐκ ἐπιτρέψουσιν οὐδενὶ νεωτερίζειν...”

⁴¹⁶Sacks 1982, 434.

of imperial *phrourarchoi* moot.

This chapter examines the specific powers exercised by imperial *phrourarchoi*. Beginning with the first attested *phrourarchia* in Erythrai, it proceeds to discuss all known Classical *phrourarchoi* before addressing Hellenistic *phrourarchoi*, who occupy the bulk of the discussion. This chapter argues that imperial *phrourarchoi* had ill-defined powers, and exercised both military and civic authority, especially in Egypt.

3.2 Athens

An Athenian decree regulating the political situation in Erythrai,⁴¹⁷ dating to 453/2,⁴¹⁸ is the first epigraphical attestation of any *phrourarchia*, and it highlights the intersection of military and civil authority in an imperial context. Although the original stone is now lost and the inscription only exists in copies, there is no scholarly controversy about the presence of an Athenian *phrourarchos* in the *polis*.⁴¹⁹

The decree was likely the Athenian response to an Erythraian revolt, one possibly led by a local tyrant who enjoyed Persian backing, following Athens' defeat in Egypt c. 454.⁴²⁰ Athenian officials, a *phrourarchos* and at least one *episkopos* (overseer),⁴²¹ were sent by the Athenians to preside over the creation of a new constitution at Erythrai. After the initial *boule* (executive council) was selected by lot, the inscription states that the

⁴¹⁷See Map 4.

⁴¹⁸*SEG* 34.5 = IG I³, 14 = *SEG* 31.5 = Mattingly 1984, 344–346; See Highby 1936, 1–33 for general background and a reconstruction of the decree, who argues for a date in the 460s due to paleographic reasons; See Meritt 1937, 360 for arguments against Highby's interpretation of the letter forms; Rhodes 2008, 504–506 accepts a date in the late 450s.

⁴¹⁹Meiggs 1943, 23.

⁴²⁰Thuc. 1.110; Kagan 1969, 98–99; Meiggs 1943, 22; cf. Highby 1936, 1–33 who argues for more local authority.

⁴²¹Balcer 1976, 259 believes there were at least two *episkopoi*.

“...the *episkopos* and the *phourarchos* will oversee the establishment of the current *boule*, and in the future the *boule* and the *phourarchos* [will do so], [no] less than thirty days before the *boule* leaves office.”⁴²²

At Erythrai the Athenian *episkopos* was an interim office, whose authority was restricted to supervising the lot that selected the initial *boule*. There is no deviation from the position's typical function as a temporary overseer over new Athenian settlements and the reorganization of allied constitutions within the Athenian Empire.⁴²³

In contrast, the *phourarchos* was a permanent foreign military presence which remained at Erythrai and influenced the political life of the subject *polis*.⁴²⁴ Although the *boule* was selected by lots in Erythrai itself, oversight by the *phourarchos*, and the presence of armed Athenians *phouroi*,⁴²⁵ strongly suggests Athenian supervision,⁴²⁶ if not outright control,⁴²⁷ of the proceedings. At the very least the presence of Athenian soldiers was a strong reminder of who actually held the ultimate authority in Erythrai.

A major concern of the Athenian *demos* was the potential return of Erythraian exiles, who were possibly the supporters of a former tyrant.⁴²⁸ The *boule* swore that

“...[I will not] take back the exiles, nor... will I be persuaded to do so by anyone else, [specifically] the exiles who fled to the Medes, without [the permission] of the *boule* of the Athenians and the people, nor of those who remain here will I exile [anyone] without [the permission] of the *boule* of the Athenians and the [Athenian] people...”⁴²⁹

⁴²²*IG I³*, 14, ll. 13–16: “...δ]ὲ καὶ κατασ[τ]ῆσαι [τ]ῆν μὲν ν[ῦν] βολὴν [τ]ῶς [ἐπισκ][ό]πος καὶ [τὸν] φρ[ό]ραρχον, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν τῆν βολὴν καὶ τὸν [φρ[ό]ρ]αρχον, μὲ ὄλε[ζ]ον ἔ [τ]ριάκοντα ἐμ[έ]ρας π[ρ]ὶν ἐχσιέναι [τὴν βολ]ῆν...”

⁴²³Balcer 1977, 252.

⁴²⁴Highby 1936, 19; Nease 1949, 105.

⁴²⁵*Ibid.*, ll. 42 & 46. The context is unclear, but the presence of a *phouroi* is certain.

⁴²⁶Balcer 1976, 259.

⁴²⁷Kagan 1969, 98–100.

⁴²⁸See Forsdyke 2005, 207 for the importance of exiles.

⁴²⁹*IG I³* 14 ll. 26–29: “...τὸν φ[υγάδ]ον [κατ]αδέχομαι οὐδ[ὲ] ἓνα οὔτ’ ————— ||[ἄλλο]ι

This decree had the effect of moderating politics at Erythrai, ensuring that any sentences of exile or expulsion followed a clear judicial process.⁴³⁰ Such interference with the exiles' return was not just a political matter, but was also Athenian intrusion into a religious exercise, as it was highly likely that returning exiles would come as suppliants.⁴³¹ Such a level of Athenian interference may have been viewed as intolerable, but the presence of the *phourarchos* and the *phouroi* enforced compliance. This excerpt also shows the practical limits placed on the authority of the *phourarchos* by Athens, as the *boule* in Erythrai could not simply petition the Athenian *phourarchos* to allow specific exiles back; such a request had to be addressed to the Athenian *boule* and *demos* directly.

Another inscription related to this decree⁴³² further stipulates that it was necessary

“...to record these things and set up the oath on stone, and the oath of the *boule* in the *polis* [on the acropolis], and the *phourarchos* shall inscribe the same at Erythrai on the acropolis...”⁴³³

This stele, in addition to the physical presence of the *phoura* and the *phourarchos*, was a constant reminder to the Erythraians of their subservient status and the unquestioned domination of the Athenians. In this case, they made no effort to disguise the language of the decree or to make the presence of the *phourarchos* more tolerable to the local population; instead they celebrated the institution in the most conspicuous location in the cowed *polis*,

πεῖσο[μ]α[ι τὸν ἐς] Μέδος φε[υ]γ[ό]ν[το]ν ἄνευ τε[ς] β[ο]λ[ε]ς τε[ς] [[Αθε]ναίων καὶ τὸ [δ]έμο [ο]ὔδὲ τὸν μενόντων ἐχσελο[ᾶ]ν[ε]υ] τε[ς] β[ο]λ[ε]ς τε[ς] Ἀθηναίων καὶ [τὸ] δέμο [ο]ὔδὲ τὸν μενόντων ἐχσελο[ᾶ]ν[ε]υ] τε[ς] β[ο]λ[ε]ς τε[ς] Ἀθηναίων καὶ [τὸ] δέμο...”

⁴³⁰Forsdyke 2005, 208–209.

⁴³¹Naiden 2006, 384.

⁴³²Woodhead 1997, 5.

⁴³³*IG I³ 15 ll. 42–45*: “ἀναγράφσαι δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τὸν ὄ[[ρ]κον ἐ[ν] λι[θ]ῖνι στέλει [καὶ τὸν ὄρκον τὸν τε[ς] βολε[ς] ἐμ πόλ]λει, Ἐ[ρ]υθ[ρ]ῶ[σ]ι δὲ ἐν τεῖ ἀκρ[οπό]λει τὸν φροράρχον ἀναγράφσαι[ι]...”

which served as a glaring reminder of Athenian control and dominance.⁴³⁴

The *phrourarchos* and the *phrourion* in Erythrai were directly answerable to an external power and were in no way placed under local administration. The *phrourarchos* was an Athenian officer in a foreign *polis*, and played an important supervisory role in the new political order. The emphasis of the decree is on internal governance and the obligations of Erythrai to Athens, not on the responsibility of Athens as a defender of Erythraian interests or of the *polis* itself. Although the decree did outline some civic powers of the *phrourarchos*, these were intentionally left vague. Even though the *boule* was selected by lot, the power of the *phrourarchos*, in conjunction with the *boule* to “establish” a new *boule* after each election could be interpreted to support Athenian interests, and there was little the Erythraians could effectively do in opposition to Athenian dominance.

Although no information survives on the selection process of the Athenian *phrourarchos* at Erythrai, a near contemporary inscription from c. 450⁴³⁵ is believed to reflect another, unidentified *polis* that was under an Athenian *phrourarchos*.⁴³⁶ This highly fragmentary inscription mentions a *phrourarchos*⁴³⁷ in addition to the *boule* and *acropolis*.⁴³⁸ There is also a reference to 30 years,⁴³⁹ which could be the age requirement for holding the *phrourarchia*. It is possible that such a requirement was a general feature of the Athenian *phrourarchia*, but such a hypothesis remains highly speculative.

⁴³⁴See Thomas 1994, 43–44 for comparanda.

⁴³⁵Woodhead 1997, 4–5.

⁴³⁶Meritt 1945, 82–83 First thought this inscription was related to Erythrai; He withdrew this assignment in Meritt 1946, 246–248; See also Woodhead 1997, 5.

⁴³⁷*IG I³* 16 ll. 8: “[φ]ρόραρχον...”, ll. 11: “φρόραρχον...”, ll.12: “...φρό[ραρχον...”

⁴³⁸*Ibid.*, ll. 7, 10.

⁴³⁹*Ibid.*, ll. 12–13: “τ]ριάκοντα ἔ[τε γεγονότας?...”

3.3 Sparta

Athens was certainly not the only classical Greek power that used the *phourarchia* to further its own interests. Spartan *phourarchoi* were found throughout fifth and fourth centuries in a number of *poleis* supporting Spartan allies or administering Spartan conquests.⁴⁴⁰ Despite the vast social and political differences between Athens and Sparta, the *phourarchoi* employed by the *poleis* were extremely similar in form and function.

3.3.1 Athens Under Sparta

After Sparta's victory over Athens in the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans appointed Kallibios as *phourarchos* over Athens in 404 at the explicit request of the Thirty,⁴⁴¹ an oligarchic board that was “elected” by the Athenians with the support of the Spartan Lysander.⁴⁴² The Spartans sent the *phourarchos* Kallibios, also referred to as a *hegemon* and *harmostes*, along with 700 troops, to garrison the *acropolis*.⁴⁴³ His presence, with the Peloponnesian forces under his command, allowed the Thirty to perform outrages against the Athenians with impunity. Kallibios later supported the oligarchic regime of the Ten, a board elected after the defeat of the Thirty in 403, in their struggles against supporters of Athenian democracy.⁴⁴⁴

Even with the unquestioned military dominance of Sparta, there was some limited

⁴⁴⁰Also, the Spartan office of *harmostes* was equivalent to a *phourarchos*. See *Lexica Segueriana*, a. 211.8 and Balcer 1976, 267–268. See Chapter 1 for a full analysis of the terminology. For purposes of this discussion only Spartans who are referred to explicitly as a *phourarchos* will be examined.

⁴⁴¹Diod. Sic. 14.4.4: “...πεμψάντων φρουρὰν καὶ τὸν ταύτης ἡγησόμενον Καλλιβίον, τὸν μὲν φρουράρχον ἐξεθεράπευσαν δώροις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλανθρώποις οἱ τριάκοντα...”

⁴⁴²Stem 2003, 18–19.

⁴⁴³Arist. [*Ath. Pol.*] 37.2: “ὧν ἀκούσαντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Καλλιβίον ἀπέστειλαν ἄρμοστὴν καὶ στρατιώτας ὡς ἑπτακοσίους, οἱ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ἐλθόντες ἐφρούρουν.” ; Xen. *Hell.*, 2.3.14: “ὁ δὲ πεισθεὶς τοὺς τε φρουροὺς καὶ Καλλιβίον ἄρμοστὴν συνέπραξεν αὐτοῖς πεμφθῆναι.”

⁴⁴⁴Arist. [*Ath. Pol.*] 38.

cultural guidance for the behavior of this *phrourarchos* towards Athenian citizens. Plutarch relates that Kallibios raised his staff to strike the wrestler Autolykos, but was thrown to the ground by him instead. Following the incident, Lysander chided the enraged Kallibios, stating “that he [Kallibios] did not know how to rule free men.”⁴⁴⁵

The reaction of Lysander to Kallibios' arrogance is telling. Although the Spartans were, in essence, restricting the political and military *eleutheria* of the Athenians, there were still cultural assumptions and restrictions, clearly understood by Lysander, which in principle governed the actions of a *phrourarchos*. Summary physical violence, at least on a personal level, was not tolerated against a “free” citizen. Kallibios was either unaware of these assumptions or simply did not care, and instead preferred to behave in an autocratic manner which the Athenians found unacceptable.⁴⁴⁶

This being said, Kallibios suffered no penalty for his breach of conduct beyond a verbal reprimand from Lysander. Although there was a standard of behavior for the *phrourarchos*, there was no mechanism, constitutional or otherwise, that allowed the Athenians to address transgressions. The power to control or censure the *phrourarchos* lay solely with the Spartans, and limits on his authority were set by the ability of Spartan soldiers to inspire fear and compliance, vividly illustrated by the Thirty's occupation of Eleusis and the seizure of its citizens with the full support of the Spartan *phroura*.⁴⁴⁷

It was Autolykos, not Kallibios, who was punished for the behavior of the *phrourarchos*. The Thirty executed Autolykos to flatter Kallibios, although this was certainly an extra-legal

⁴⁴⁵Plut. *Lys.* 15.5: “...ὁ Λύσανδρος, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνεπετίμησε, φήσας αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐπίστασθαι ἐλευθέρων ἄρχειν.”

⁴⁴⁶The parallel with Pausanias' behavior to the Greek allies in the Persian Wars is striking; see Thuc. 1.95.

⁴⁴⁷Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.8–10.

murder which was not ordered or condoned by the Athenian *demos*.⁴⁴⁸ Furthermore, the Thirty's actions reinforce the notion that the Spartan *phrourarchos* existed outside of their direct control, as they would have had little incentive to flatter a subordinate who owed his power to them.

Neither Kallibios nor the Spartan *phrourarchia* lasted long in Athens. After the victory of Athenian democrats at the battle of Munychia in 403, the retreat of the Thirty to Eleusis, and the election of the Ten, Lysander arranged for a loan of one hundred talents to his supporters in Athens. This money was offered with the stipulation that Lysander himself would be *harmostes* and his brother Libys would be *nauarchos* to continue the fight against Athenian democrats.⁴⁴⁹ The *phrourarchia* may have been made redundant by these appointments, as Lysander certainly commanded larger forces than the *phrourarchos* had at his disposal. Later in 403, following a battle against the democrats of the Piraeus and negotiations between the rival Athenian factions and the Spartans, Spartan forces (including the *phrouroi*) finally departed Athens for good, with their departure as much a product of internal division between Lysander and the Spartan king as it was of Athenian opposition.⁴⁵⁰ Presumably Kallibios, if he was not already recalled by the time Lysander took command, was among those who left.

The Spartan *phrourarchos* had no defined constitutional role in Athens, and was instituted for the sole benefit of the Spartans. Although the *phrourarchia* under Kallibios and

⁴⁴⁸Plut. *Lys.* 15.5; cf. Diod. Sic. 14.5.7 where no motive is given for the execution of Autolykos beyond his outspoken political views.

⁴⁴⁹Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.28; cf. Diod. Sic. 14.33.5 where Lysander simply leads (ἄρχω) Spartan forces consisting of 40 warships and 1000 soldiers for the Ten: "... ἀποδείξαντες ἀπὸ Λακεδαίμονος τετταράκοντα ναῦς μετεπέμψαντο καὶ στρατιώτας χιλίους, ὧν ἦρχε Λύσανδρος."

⁴⁵⁰Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.32; Diod. Sic. 14.33.1.

the appointment of Lysander as *harmostes* differed in scale, they were roughly analogous in form: they deployed force or the threat of using force to enforce Spartan interests against the Athenian *demos*. The *harmostes* or *phrouarchos* was, for all intents and purposes, the same suppressive tool of foreign political domination over Athens.

3.3.2 Thebes Under Sparta

Athens was not alone in chafing under Spartan authority. In 382 Thebes fell under the power of the Spartans due to the seizure of the Cadmeia, the central hill in Thebes, by the Spartan commander Phoebidas at the behest of an oligarchic Theban faction led by Leontidas.⁴⁵¹ Despite their recall and censure of Phoebidas,⁴⁵² the Spartans retained control of the Cadmeia, and by 379 an unnamed Spartan *phrouarchos* commanded Spartan *phrouroi* living on the hill.⁴⁵³ The exact structure and fate of the Spartan garrison in Thebes are a controversial matter,⁴⁵⁴ but what is certain is that in 379/378 Theban revolutionaries ultimately required Athenian assistance to remove Spartan forces from the Cadmeia, and at least one Spartan commander was severely punished for his failure to hold the position.⁴⁵⁵

Theban citizens balked at the imposition of the *phrouarchia*, but were unable to check its power through legal or constitutional means, as the office was answerable only to Sparta. In his analysis of the situation, Plutarch went so far as to state that

“...but for the Thebans, having lost their ancestral constitution and having been enslaved by Archias and Leontidas, there was no possibility of hope for any deliverance from the tyranny, which they saw was guarded by the hegemony of the Spartans, and it was unable

⁴⁵¹Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.25–33; Plut. *Pel.* 5.2–3; Diod. Sic. 15.20.1–2; Hack 1978, 222–226.

⁴⁵²Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.32; Diod. Sic. 15.20; Plut. *Pel.* 6; Nep. *Pelopidas* 1.

⁴⁵³Polyaenus, *Strat.* 2.4.3.1: “Θήβας ἐφύλασσε φρουρὰ Λακωνικῆ, καὶ φρούραρχος ἐπὶ τῆς Καδμείας ἐτέτακτο”; Rice 1975, 97.

⁴⁵⁴See Appendix II.

⁴⁵⁵Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.4–13; Din. 39.5–6; Diod. Sic. 15.27; Polyaenus, *Strat.* 2.4.3.

to be abolished, unless someone should stop them ruling the land and sea.⁴⁵⁶

Plutarch understood that an imperial *phrourarchia* derived its power from the physical domination of a *polis*, and that there was little a community could do in opposition. The Thebans were incapable of overthrowing a Spartan *phrourarchos* under their own power and required Athenian intervention to finally rid themselves of its control.

3.3.3 Other Spartan *Phrourarchoi*

Spartan *phrourarchoi* could control both wide geographical regions and smaller *poleis*. Alexander, a Spartan *phrourarchos* in Aeolis, was able to organize a festival for the Aeolians in 392/1.⁴⁵⁷ Here, using his own troops supplemented by barbarian mercenaries, he seized all of the attendants. After accepting a ransom for their release, he handed over the Aeolian *chora* to the Spartan Thibron and left.⁴⁵⁸ There was a clear military component to Alexander's power, and he also played some role in Aeolian society, as he was able to organize a festival attended by a significant and economically elite audience.

Other Spartan *phrourarchoi* are little more than names. An unidentified Spartan *phrourarchos* was defeated in battle after pursuing Iphicrates near Epidaurus c. 371,⁴⁵⁹ Tantalos was *phrourarchos* in the allied *polis* of Thyreae in 424,⁴⁶⁰ and Nikokles, *phrourarchos* over Naxos in 376, was at least allied to the Spartans if he was not one

⁴⁵⁶Plut. *Pel.* 6.1–2: “...τοῖς δὲ Θηβαίοις τὴν πάτριον ἀποβεβληκόσι πολιτείαν καὶ καταδεδουλωμένοις ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ Ἀρχίαν καὶ Λεοντίδαν οὐδὲ ἐλπίσαι περιττὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν τινα τῆς τυραννίδος, ἣν ἐώρων τῇ Σπαρτιατῶν δορυφορουμένην ἡγεμονία καὶ καταλυθῆναι μὴ δυναμένην, εἰ μὴ τις ἄρα παύσειε κάκείνους γῆς καὶ θαλάττης ἄρχοντας...”

⁴⁵⁷Parke 1930, 68.

⁴⁵⁸Polyaenus, *Strat.* 6.10 Thibron is never explicitly referred to as a *phrourarchos*.

⁴⁵⁹Ibid., 3.9.48; Polyaenus, *Excerpta Polyaei.* 19.2.

⁴⁶⁰Diod. Sic. 12.65.8–9.

himself.⁴⁶¹

Spartan *phrourarchoi*, either in support of allies or imposed upon recalcitrant *poleis*, were beholden only to the Spartan authorities. They existed outside of the legal framework of a local community, and there was no mechanism to check the power of a Spartan *phrourarchos*. In Athens and Thebes Spartan *phrourarchoi* were nakedly suppressive, and they restricted the *eleutheria* of these communities to benefit Spartan interests.

3.4 Syracuse⁴⁶²

Further west, *phrourarchoi* are known in Syracuse beginning under the tyranny of Dionysius I. In 398 Dionysius seized Motye and placed Biton of Syracuse as the *phrourarchos* over the city. The *nauarchos* Leptines was also assigned to the *polis* with 120 ships and given responsibility for continuing the sieges of Segesta and Entella.⁴⁶³ This situation was temporary, as Motye was later besieged and captured by Carthaginian forces led by Himilcon the next year.⁴⁶⁴ Presumably Biton was still at his post as *phrourarchos* at that point, although his fate after 398 is unknown.

This situation reveals a distinction between the *phrourarchia*, the *nauarchia*, and the different spheres of action assigned to each post. Beyond the obvious foci on land and sea operations, where the offices diverged was the responsibility of the *nauarchos* to continue the sieges of Segesta and Entella, moving his sphere of operations beyond the physical confines of Motye and its surrounding waters. The office of the *nauarchia* is unquestionably the more

⁴⁶¹Aen. Tact. 22.20 See entry in the Register for a full discussion.

⁴⁶²See Map 2.

⁴⁶³Diod. Sic. 14.53.5: “μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα φύλακας τῆς πόλεως καταστήσας, Βίτωνά τὸν Συρακόσιον φρούραρχον ἀπέδειξε: τὸ δὲ πλεῖον μέρος ἐκ τῶν Σικελῶν ὑπῆρχεν. καὶ Λεπτίνην μὲν τὸν ναύαρχον μετὰ νεῶν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν ἐκέλευσεν παρατηρεῖν τὴν διάβασιν τῶν Καρχηδονίων, συνέταξε δ’ αὐτῷ τὴν Αἴγεσταν καὶ τὴν Ἐντελλαν πολιορκεῖν, καθάπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς πορθεῖν αὐτὰς ἐνεστήσατο.”

⁴⁶⁴Ibid., 14.55.4.

powerful position, holding both offensive and defensive responsibilities, unlike the more restricted and locally focused *phrourarchia*. As Motye was a major Carthaginian colony and military base,⁴⁶⁵ it seems logical that the *phrourarchia* and *nauarchia* were impositions on its normal constitutional framework.

3.4.1 The Akra of Syracuse

This is not to say that individuals holding the *phrourarchia* were unable to exert considerable influence on Syracusan politics. In Syracuse itself the philosopher Philistos, politically active from 408 to his death in 356 (with a period of exile from 386-366),⁴⁶⁶ was a firm supporter of the tyranny of Dionysios I and his son, Dionysios II. Philistos “for a long time” was *phrourarchos* of the strategically critical *akra* in Syracuse.⁴⁶⁷ Some scholars go so far as to call him “the great defender of the Dionysian tyranny”,⁴⁶⁸ and claim that during the Dionysian tyranny the *phrourarchia* was second in importance only to the *nauarchos*, with the *phrourarchos* of the Syracusan *akra* holding the preeminent *phrourarchia*.⁴⁶⁹

It is difficult to support such an assertion, however, or to know the extent of the *phrourarchia* under Philistos, as he possessed a wide latitude of responsibility that was primarily based upon his support and personal relationship with the tyrants. His social and political status was most analogous to that of Hellenistic *philoï*, where familial, personal, and political relationships could translate into powerful political capital. His appointment as

⁴⁶⁵Servadio 2000, 5; Isserlin and Taylor 1974, 3.

⁴⁶⁶[*Plato epistle*]ep. 8.353b; Plut. *Dion* 3.2; cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1306A,1; Diod. Sic. 13.91.4 = *FGrH* 3b, 556, T. 3a; Sanders 2008, 11–15.

⁴⁶⁷*FGrH* 556 T 5c.5: “ὁ γὰρ δὴ Φίλιστος ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε τῆι τυραννίδι καθισταμένη προθυμότατον ἑαυτὸν παρέσχε, καὶ τὴν ἄκραν διεφύλαξε φρουραρχῶν ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον.”; Plut. *Dio.* 11.3: “...καὶ τὴν ἄκραν διεφύλαξε φρουραρχῶν ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον...”

⁴⁶⁸Sanders 2008, 14.

⁴⁶⁹Freeman 1891, 215; Sanders 2008, 12 for the importance of his position generally.

phourarchos suggests that he oversaw the security of the *polis* in some manner.⁴⁷⁰ In addition to his official duties, Philistos led a significant political faction and held great influence at the court of Dionysios II.⁴⁷¹

Philistos' position was not limited to the *akra* of Syracuse. In 356 he commanded a Syracusan fleet which engaged the party of Dion, although it is far from clear if he still held the title of *phourarchos* at the time.⁴⁷² Whatever his rank, Philistos was defeated and killed in a naval engagement, and his body was mocked and dragged through the streets following the battle, highlighting the hatred that Syracusan citizens harbored against their former *phourarchos*.⁴⁷³

Philistos' status reveals how mercurial appointments under an imperial power could be. He held the *phourarchia* of the *akra* at the whim of the tyrant; when Dionysios I grew weary of him, he was deprived of his authority and exiled.⁴⁷⁴ Philistos later regained his position due to his relationship with Dionysios II, despite his previous autocratic and unpopular treatment of Syracusan citizens. Philistos, like other imperial *phourarchoi*, was selected and retained based on little more than his support and relationship with the source of imperial power.

3.5 Imperial *Phourarchoi* from Alexander to Rome

Alexander the Great's conquest of the Persian Empire ushered in a new era for imperial *phourarchoi*, who now fell exclusively under the aegis of individual Greco-Macedonian

⁴⁷⁰Caven 1990, 227.

⁴⁷¹Plut. *Dio.* 13-14.

⁴⁷²Ibid., 25, 35.

⁴⁷³Ibid., 35.

⁴⁷⁴See Sanders 2008, 11 for a complete bibliography of the incident.

monarchs, whose ideology was largely defined by military power and personal authority.⁴⁷⁵ These rulers used diplomacy and military might in competition with local powers to create and sustain the complex web of intellectual, economic, diplomatic, cultural, and social networks that defined the Hellenistic world.⁴⁷⁶

The *phrourarchia* was a key component of this strategy, Straddling the line between civil and military authority, Hellenistic monarchs used imperial *phrourarchoi* to project their power and authority over local populations, and continued to intentionally blur the differences between the civil and military responsibilities of the office. These *phrourarchoi* owed their position entirely to royal favor, with the most important postings going to the elite group of *philoï*, or “friends” of the monarch. Less critical positions were generally filled by mercenaries, who owed their social prestige and continuing financial gain to the crown.

3.6 Alexander The Great

After conquering the Persian Empire, Alexander faced the difficult prospect of governing his conquests, a need which he generally met by using (with slight modifications) preexisting Persian administration.⁴⁷⁷ When Alexander took Egypt in 331, he appointed two Egyptians, Doloaspis and Petisis as *nomarchoi* (governors), dividing the country in two; Petisis declined the appointment, leaving Doloaspis as the sole *nomarchos*. Alexander then made Pantaleon *phrourarchos* at Memphis and Polemon *phrourarchos* at Pelusium⁴⁷⁸, and assigned Lycidas as *archon* of the *xenoi* (commander of the mercenaries). Eugnostos became *grammateus* (secretary in charge of the mercenaries), with Aeschylus and Ehippus serving as *episkopoi*

⁴⁷⁵Chaniotis 2005, 13.

⁴⁷⁶Ager and Faber 2013, 129; Eckstein 2013, 133; Eckstein 2006, 1.

⁴⁷⁷Worthington 2010, 125; Badian 1965, 170–174; cf. Fuller 1960, 268.

⁴⁷⁸See Map 9.

(overseers).⁴⁷⁹ After taking Susa later in the same year, Alexander left behind Abulites, a Persian, as satrap of Susiana, Mazarus⁴⁸⁰ as *phrourarchos* of the *akra* of Susa, and Archelaus as *strategos*.⁴⁸¹ A final *phrourarchos* is known from Bactria, although little is known about him beyond his defeat in 328 at the hands of Spitamenes.⁴⁸²

Despite some scholarly efforts to collapse the difference between distinct offices in Arrian's account,⁴⁸³ *phrourarchoi* are notably distinct from *stratego*i and other offices.⁴⁸⁴ As it was highly unlikely that the title of *phrourarchos* was bestowed as a matter of course on the commander of every *phrouria*,⁴⁸⁵ and as Arrian stressed that *phrourarchoi* were appointed by Alexander himself (perhaps through the subordinate officers), the office was clearly a position of significant authority. Moreover, as in the case of the unknown Bactrian *phrourarchos* in a posting which was likely to involve considerable military action, its responsibilities were separate from those of the *stratego*i.

In short, given Alexander's conscious emulation of Persian administrative practices,⁴⁸⁶ it is apparent that his *phrourarchoi* continued to serve a dual role as protectors of their assignments and overseers of other administrative posts including *satraps*, *nomarchoi*, and *episkopoi*. These postings were answerable to the monarch alone, and were not under any

⁴⁷⁹Arr. *Anab.* 3.5.3: “φρουράρχους δὲ τῶν ἐταίρων ἐν Μέμφει μὲν Πανταλέοντα κατέστησε τὸν Πυθωναῖον, ἐν Πηλουσίῳ δὲ Πολέμωνα τὸν Μεγακλέους Πελλαῖον...”

⁴⁸⁰This name may have been a mistake for a Macedonian officer.

⁴⁸¹Arr. *Anab.* 3.16.9: “... καταλιπὼν σατράπην μὲν τῆς Σουσιανῆς Ἀβουλίτην ἄνδρα Πέρσην, φρούραρχον δὲ ἐν τῇ ἄκρᾳ τῶν Σούσων Μάζαρον τῶν ἐταίρων καὶ στρατηγὸν Ἀρχέλαον τὸν Θεοδώρου...”

⁴⁸²*Ibid.*, 4.16.5.

⁴⁸³Jefremow 1995, 52; cf. Fuller 1960, 48–52.

⁴⁸⁴Arr. *Anab.* 3.16.9.

⁴⁸⁵Jefremow 1995, 51. See Appendix 5 for the diversity of titles in *phrourai*.

⁴⁸⁶Engels 1978, 9, 41.

form of local authority.

3.7 The *Diadochoi*

Imperial *phourarchoi* are found extensively in the administration of the *Diadochoi* (Successors) following the death of Alexander in 323. All of the Successor kingdoms used *phourarchoi* to some extent, and these men supervised a critical point of contact between subject populations and royal authority. Like all of the *phourarchoi* examined thus far, these officials owed their position entirely to the imperial power. Drawn from the inner circle of royal *philoï* or serving as mercenaries, they continued to exercise military authority while dominating and interfering with civic administration, despite not being subject to local laws themselves.

3.8 “Lesser” *Diadochoi*

After Eumenes gained control of Cappadocia in 321, he entrusted his temporary conquests to an unknown number of *phourarchoi* drawn from his *philoï*.⁴⁸⁷ With the exception of his fortified refuge of Nora, Eumenes' possessions eventually fell to the might of Antigonos in the spring of 319.⁴⁸⁸

In 303, Polyperchon appointed Strombichos as *phourarchos* over Arcadian Orchomenus.⁴⁸⁹ Unfortunately for Strombichos, Polyperchon was not a particularly powerful or effective ruler, and Demetrius quickly placed Orchomenus under siege. Strombichos remained loyal to Polyperchon, and resorted to insulting Demetrius when the latter asked for the surrender of the *polis*. This intransigence cost the *phourarchos* dearly, as Demetrius later

⁴⁸⁷Plut. *Eum.* 3.7: “...καί τὰς μὲν πόλεις τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ φίλοις παρέδωκε, καί φρουράρχους ἐγκατέστησε καὶ δικαστὰς ἀπέλιπε καὶ διοικητὰς οὐς ἐβούλετο...”

⁴⁸⁸Anson 1977, 251.

⁴⁸⁹Diod. Sic. 20.103.4: “...Στρόμβιχον τὸν ὑπὸ Πολυπέρχοντος καθεσταμένον φρούραρχον...”

crucified him and 80 other leaders after the city fell.⁴⁹⁰

3.9 Lysimachos

Lysimachos used *phrourarchoi* to administer his conquests. Memnon, a local historian from Heraclea Pontica (*fl.* 1st or 2nd century CE)⁴⁹¹, relates that by 284/283 Lysimachos left the city under the command of a certain Herakleides, who was appointed due to the support of Arsinoe, Lysimachos' wife.⁴⁹² After the death of Lysimachos in 281, Herakleides refused to pay the *phrourarchoi* who supported his position; they then joined with the local population in arresting Herakleides and restoring the autonomy of the community.⁴⁹³

3.10 Antipatrids

During its brief existence from the activities of Antipater after the Battle of Crannon in 322 to the defeat of Alexander by Demetrius I in 294, the Antipatrid dynasty made the possession and security of Athens a centerpiece of their foreign policy. In 322 Antipater, forcing the Athenians to surrender to his superior forces after Crannon, modified the Athenian government to a wealth-based system where only those with a worth of 2,000 or more drachmas participated in the government.⁴⁹⁴ In addition, the Athenians were

“...compelled to accept Menyllus as *phrourarchos* and a *phroura*, its purpose being to keep anyone from making revolutionary changes.”⁴⁹⁵

Menyllus proved to be a mild *phrourarchos*, and he prevented the troops of the *phroura* from doing any harm to the *polis*, possibly due to his friendship with the Athenian statesman

⁴⁹⁰Ibid., 20.103.6.

⁴⁹¹Burstein 1976, 3.

⁴⁹²Ibid., 86–87; Meadows 2012, 129–130.

⁴⁹³*FGrH* 434 F1. See Chapter 5 for a full analysis.

⁴⁹⁴Diod. Sic. 18.18.4.

⁴⁹⁵Diod. Sic. 18.18.5: “...φρούραρχον δὲ Μένυλλον καὶ φρουρὰν ἠναγκάσθησαν δεῖξασθαι τὴν οὐκ ἐπιτρέψουσιν οὐδενὶ νεωτερίζειν...”

Phocion.⁴⁹⁶ Menyllus served at the pleasure of the Antipatrid monarchy, and upon the death of Antipater in 319, the new king Cassander quickly replaced him with Nikanor.

Upon his appointment, Nikanor established his primary base of operations on the fortified hill of Munychia.⁴⁹⁷ The Athenians hoped that he would follow the lead of his predecessor in respecting the *polis*, and Phocion even convinced him to hold games at his own expense.⁴⁹⁸ Such munificence proved fleeting. When Polyperchon, supported by Olympias, attempted to bring the Athenians to his side with an edict promising freedom later in 319,⁴⁹⁹ Nikanor remained steadfastly loyal to Cassander. Nikanor eventually hired mercenaries and took the Piraeus by stealth,⁵⁰⁰ narrowly avoiding capture by Derkyllus, the Athenian *strategos* of the *chora*.⁵⁰¹

Confronted by the Athenians to atone for his actions, repatriate the Piraeus, and grant the city autonomy,

“Nikanor gave an answer [that] they should send an embassy to Cassander, for as he was appointed as *phourarchos* by him he had absolutely no authority to act independently.”⁵⁰²

Although this was a blatant attempt to deflect the culpability of his actions onto the king,

⁴⁹⁶Plut. *Phoc.* 28.4: “ἡ μὲν οὖν φρουρὰ διὰ Μένυλλον οὐδὲν ἠνίασε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους...”

⁴⁹⁷Ibid., 31.1: “ἐπεὶ δὲ Ἀντίπατρος ἀποδείξας Πολυσπέρχοντα στρατηγόν, Κάσανδρον δὲ χίλιαρχον, ἐξέλιπεν, εὐθὺς διαναστὰς ὁ Κάσανδρος καὶ προκαταλαμβάνων τὰ πράγματα πέμπει κατὰ τάχος Νικάνορα τῷ Μενύλλῳ διάδοχον τῆς φρουραρχίας, πρὶν ἔκδηλον τὸν Ἀντιπάτρου θάνατον γενέσθαι κελεύσας τὴν Μουνυχίαν παραλαβεῖν.”; Diod. Sic. 18.64: “...Νικάνωρ ὁ τὴν Μουνυχίαν κατέχων...” Polynaëus *Strat.* 4.11.2: “...Νικάνορα φρουροῦντα τὴν Μουνυχίαν...”; cf. Nep. *Pho.* 2.4.3, where he is referred to as a *praefect* of Cassander: “...Cassandri praefectum...”

⁴⁹⁸Plut. *Phoc.* 31.1-2.

⁴⁹⁹Diod. Sic. 18.56.1-8; Plut. *Phoc.* 32.1; Billows 1990, 198.

⁵⁰⁰Plut. *Phoc.* 31.4; Nep. *Pho.* 2.4-5.

⁵⁰¹Plut. *Phoc.* 32.1; For Phocion’s involvement in warning Nikanor about the arrest see Bayliss 2011, 142-143.

⁵⁰²Diod. Sic. 18.64.6: “ὁ δὲ Νικάνωρ ἀποκρίσεις ἔδωκε πρεσβεῦειν αὐτοὺς πρὸς Κάσανδρον· ὑπ’ ἐκείνου γὰρ καθεσταμένον φρούραρχον μηδαμῶς ἔχειν ἐξουσίαν ἰδιοπραγεῖν.”

Nikanor's reply made logical and legal sense. The *phrourarchia* was indeed entirely dependent upon the monarch for its position, and in principle could not operate contrary to his wishes. Furthermore, Cassander did not censure Nikanor for his initiative in taking the Piraeus, and so it can be inferred that he approved of Nikanor's actions. Nikanor remained *phrourarchos*, and the Athenians were unable to take any practical steps against him.

The only recourse for the Athenians was direct confrontation with the *phrourarchos*, which proved impossible after his seizure of the Piraeus. The Athenians still held out hope for rescue by Polyperchon and Olympias, who continued to offer the promise of *eleutheria*. In 318 Kleitos, the *nauarchos* of Polyperchon, sailed into the Hellespont and obtained the allegiance of cities around the Propontis along with the army of Arrhidaeus. Cassander sent Nikanor, commanding the entire fleet, to the region in opposition, where he eventually defeated Kleitos. Once again Nikanor is explicitly called the *phrourarchos* of Munychia, although it appears as if his office has much wider strategic and tactical importance, as he was unquestionably away from Attica when the naval battle was fought.⁵⁰³ After this engagement the Athenians realized they were utterly powerless to remove the Macedonian *phroura*, as they had failed to do so even with the tacit support of Polyperchon and Olympias. Coming to terms with Cassander, the Athenian Demetrius of Phalerum was chosen as *epimeletes* (governor) over the *polis* while Nikanor remained in his position as *phrourarchos*.⁵⁰⁴

Partially as a result of his victory over Kleitos, Cassander began to harbor suspicions concerning the true loyalty of his *phrourarchos*, who was exhibiting signs that he was aiming

⁵⁰³Ibid.,: “...Νικάνωρ ὁ τῆς Μουνυχίας φρούραρχος...”

⁵⁰⁴Ibid.,: “... καταστήσαι δ’ ἐπιμελητὴν τῆς πόλεως ἓνα ἄνδρα Ἀθηναῖον ὃν ἂν δόξῃ Κασάνδρω: καὶ ἦρέθη Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς...”

for independence, or possibly contemplating his own claim to the Macedonian throne. Nikanor was arrested, condemned, and executed by Cassander in 317, although it was a difficult and secretive operation due to Nikanor's entrenchment in Athens.⁵⁰⁵

Nikanor's tenure vividly illustrates the power and potential danger of an imperial *phourarchos*. He owed his position entirely to Cassander, and he was necessary for retaining control of Athens in the face of concerted efforts by the *demos*, Polyperchon, and Olympias for its *eleutheria*. At the same time, Nikanor proved difficult to control, and Cassander had him executed as soon as he felt that his *phourarchos* was in danger of exceeding his allotted authority.

3.11 Antigonids

Few *phourarchoi* are directly known under the Antigonids, but the dynasty provides one of the most detailed documents outlining the responsibilities of the office within a *phoura*. This inscription, written c. 200 and extant in two different copies from Chalcis and Kynos, is the much discussed *diagramma* of Philip V. A *diagramma* was a unique method of correspondence, mostly found within Hellenistic royal communication,⁵⁰⁶ and generally signified a decree that was intended to be monumentalized and not treated as a normal letter.⁵⁰⁷ By using this form of address, Philip revealed both the personal interest he held in the administration of his *phourai* and the critical importance of these posts to the monarchy. Its survival in two copies, and its likely wider distribution, suggests that the regulations were applicable to most, if not all, *phourarchoi* under Philip V.⁵⁰⁸

⁵⁰⁵Diod. Sic. 18.75.1; Bosworth 1994, 57.

⁵⁰⁶Gawlinski 2012, 1.

⁵⁰⁷Bikerman 1938, 298.

⁵⁰⁸Welles 1938, 254.

The ostensible purpose of the edict was to regulate the responsibilities of the *oikonomoi* in the *phouria* of the kingdom. *Oikonomoi* were generally financial administrators under Philip V, and they may have had so many responsibilities that subordinate agents, or *cheiristai*, were required to supplement their duties.⁵⁰⁹ Beyond the treatment of the *oikonomoi* and *cheiristai*, the inscription illuminates the scope of the powers of the *phourarchia* within the confines of a *phourion* and its relationship to other offices. After some introductory material, the *diagramma* instructs the *oikonomoi* to measure and weigh the stores of the *phouria*. Afterwards, they were required to

“...remeasure and reweigh whatever is there already, with the *phourarchoi* being present, so that the *phourarchoi* may understand what there is.”⁵¹⁰

In addition, the *phourarchoi* had the responsibility to

“...seal the chambers, so that nothing might be taken away from the stores unless they believe [that] something becoming old has become useless. This shall be taken away when an equal amount [of what was removed] has been brought up.”⁵¹¹

The next unambiguous reference to *phourarchoi* clearly states that *phourarchoi* had to be present before the *oikonomos* or his agents broke the seals for the stores.⁵¹² This requirement implies that a *phourarchos*, not an *oikonomos*, was the ultimate authority for storage and supplies in the *phourion*, and stresses the importance of an accurate accounting of supplies to the *phourarchos* and his role in observing the actions of other royal officers.

The *diagramma* established strict penalties for non-compliance for both the *phourarchoi*

⁵⁰⁹Goodrich 2012, 43–45.

⁵¹⁰*IG XII, Suppl. 644 II.4–7*: “ἀνα|μετρησάτωσαν παρόντων τῶν φρουράρχων, | ὧν δὲ σταθμός, ἀναστησάτωσαν, ὅπως καὶ | οἱ φρούραρχοι παρακολουθῶσιν ὅσα ὑπάρχει.”

⁵¹¹*Ibid.*, II.10-15 “...δὲ τὰ οἰκήματα οἱ φρού|ραρχοι καὶ φροντιζέτωσαν, ὅπως μηθὲν ἐ|κ τῆς παραθέσεως ἀφαιρῆται ἐὰμ μὴ τι|να παλαιούμενα δοκῆι ἀχρειοῦσθαι. ταῦ|τα δὲ αἰρέσθω ὅταν τὸ ἴσον πλῆθος προα|ναχθῆι. ”

⁵¹²*Ibid.*, II.27-28: “...ἐὰν δέ τινες τῶν οἰκονό|μων ἢ τῶν διὰ τῶν οἰκονόμων ἢ τὰς σφραγι|δας ἀφέλωσιν ἄνευ τῶν φρουράρχων...”

and the *oikonomoi*. If the *phrourarchoi*

“...should neglect the protection of the stores, if they willingly give them to others, [or] if they themselves should take [the stores], they will be liable for whatever judgement the king has [against] them.”⁵¹³

Such judgement could be harsh. The *phrourarchos* was liable to report any malfeasance on the part of the *oikonomoi*, and if he failed to do so and someone else first informed the king, the *phrourarchos* was subject to a fine of 6,000 drachmas,⁵¹⁴ or a talent. Although the personal fortunes of Philip's *phrourarchoi* are unknown, such a fine would have represented one quarter of the minimum qualifying estate for the holder of the third-century Tean *phrourarchos* in Kyrbissos.⁵¹⁵ To put this fine in perspective (although a *phrourarchos* was certainly paid far more than a typical soldier), an average mercenary under Philip V received approximately 85 obols per month;⁵¹⁶ at six obols to a drachma, this fine represented over 35 years of wages. By setting such an imposing financial penalty, Philip sent an unambiguous and unmistakable message underscoring the importance of a *phrourarchos'* responsibilities.

The placement of the decree, which fell under the authority of the *oikonomos*, is also a matter of interest. Each of the *oikonomoi* was required to “...write this *diagramma* on a stele in the most conspicuous place in the *phrourion*.”⁵¹⁷ The *diagramma* was intended to be observed, digested, and omnipresent in the daily activities of the royal forces, serving as a

⁵¹³Ibid., ll. 34-38: “οἱ δὲ φρουράρχοι ἂν τε ὀλιωρήσωσιν τῆς φυλακῆς | τῶν παρακειμένων, ἂν τε ἐκόντες προῶνται ἑτέροις, ἂν τε αὐτοὶ λάβωσιν, ἔνοχοι ἔσονται, ὧν ἂν ὁ βασιλεὺς αὐτῶν καταγῶνι.”

⁵¹⁴Ibid., ll.38-46: “ὅτι δ’ ἂμ μὴ ποιήσωσιν οἱ οἰκονόμοι τῶν γε | γραμμένων ἐν τούτῳ τῷ διαγράμματι, | γραφέτω τῷ βασιλεῖ παραχρῆμα ὁ φρουράρχος ὁ τεταγμένος, ἐν ᾧ ἂν τόπω ἢ τὸ ὀλιωρούμενον, ὅπως ὁ βασιλεὺς διαγῶνι περὶ | τοῦ ὀλιωρήσαντος, τίνος ἄξιός ἐστιν ἐπιτιμῆσεως. ἂν δὲ μὴ ἐπιστείλη, ἀλλὰ πρότερον | ὁ βασιλεὺς παρ’ ἑτέρου πύθηται, πραχθήσεται | ζημίαν δραχμᾶς ἑξακισχιλίας.”

⁵¹⁵Robert and Robert 1976, ll. 8–11: “ἀποδείκνυσθαι δὲ καὶ φ[ρουρ]αρχο[ν] εἰς Κυρβισσὸν μὴ νεώτερον τριήκοντα ἐτέων κατὰ τετρά[μη]ν[ον] ᾧ ἐστὶ τίμημα γῆς καὶ οἰκίας ἐλεύθερον τεσσέρων τάλαν[των]...”

⁵¹⁶Griffith 1935, 305.

⁵¹⁷IG XII, Suppl. 644 ll. 46-50: “τὸ δὲ διάγραμμα τοῦτο ἕκαστος τῶν οἰκονόμων ἀναγράφας εἰς στήλην στησάτω ἐν τῷ ἐπιφανεῖ στάτῳ τῷ φρουρίου...”

reminder of the duties of the royal offices and the penalties of non-compliance.

The duties of the *phourarchoi* in the *diagramma* are closely tied to oversight; the *phourarchos* was to observe the actions of the *oikonomos* and report any transgressions directly to the king. This responsibility was intimately connected to the wellbeing and upkeep of a *phourion* in general. The emphasis on the security and replenishment of the material assets of the *phourion* highlights Philip's concern over the continued unobstructed operations of his *phouria*.

The use of *phourarchos* in the inscription reveals that the Macedonian monarchy was not adverse to using the term, at least in a document that was primarily intended for internal consumption. The focus of the *phourarchia* on the day-to-day functioning and infrastructure of a *phourion* is clear, although it was the *oikonomos* and his subordinates, not the *phourarchos*, who were responsible for sowing, gathering, and maintaining the provisions of the *phourion*. This is hardly surprising, as the *phourarchos* and *phouroi* were hired for their *techne* in war, not farming. The role of the Macedonian *phourarchos* was tied to the specific, physical location of the *phourion* itself more than the outlying areas or the physical acquisition of provisions.

In his analysis, Bradford Welles highlights the shift in the *diagramma* from *phourarchoi* to *phourarchos* and *oikonomoi* to *oikonomos*, seeing it as indicative of a wide distribution of the *diagramma* and further evidence that there was only a single *phourarchos* and *oikonomos* in any given *phourion*.⁵¹⁸ Welles' arguments are compelling, and there is every reason to believe that the regulations of this *diagramma* applied generally to all *phourarchoi* under Philip V.

⁵¹⁸Welles 1938, 254.

This is not to say that the *phrourarchoi* under Philip had no role in civic administration. Chalchis was one of the famous “fettens of Greece” along with Corinth and Demetrias, and the suppression of these *poleis* was a critical component of Macedonian domination and control over Greece.⁵¹⁹ Much like the *phrourarchia* under Lysimachus, the position under Philip V ultimately supported the amputation of local autonomy in the form of an extra-constitutional garrison that answered only to the monarch.

3.12 Seleucids⁵²⁰

Further east, *phrourarchoi* were a feature of Seleucid administration, although their exact powers are hard to define. A decree, issued in the 240s after Samos was reconquered by the Seleucids,⁵²¹ honored Boulagoras son of Alexis. Boulagoras, while providing “many services, both to the people in general and in particular to rather many citizens”,⁵²² played a critical role in securing property that had been taken by agents of either Antiochus II⁵²³ or the presumptive monarch Antiochus Hierax.⁵²⁴ After going to Ephesus and then following Antiochus to Sardis, Boulagoras found himself in a delicate situation, as

“...having opposed in the embassy the most honored of Antiochus' *philo*i who happened to hold the confiscated [property].”⁵²⁵

These *philo*i undoubtedly possessed great social and political capital, as *philo*i in the

⁵¹⁹Polyb. 18.11.4–5: “... διότι τῆς Χαλκίδος καὶ τοῦ Κορίνθου καὶ τῆς Δημητριάδος ὑπὸ τῶ Μακεδόνι ταττομένων... τόπους εἶναι πέδας Ἑλληνικάς...”

⁵²⁰See Maps 4 & 5.

⁵²¹Aperghis 2004, 274.

⁵²²AM 1919, 25-29, #13 ll. 2-3: “...πολλὰς χρείας παρεισημένος κοινῆι τε τῶι δήμωι καὶ ἰδίαι πλείοσι | τῶν πολιτῶν...”

⁵²³Aperghis 2004, 273.

⁵²⁴Shiple 2000, 98; See Marcelle 2010, 196 for Hierax’s use of coinage and other efforts to project royal legitimacy.

⁵²⁵IG XII, 6 1:11 = AM 1919, 25-29 #13 = SEG 1.366 ll.12-13: “...φιλοτιμίαν ἀντικαταστάς ἐν τῆι | πρεσβείαι τοῖς ἐνδοξοτάτοις τῶν Ἀν[τι]όχου φίλων οἱ ἐτύχανον ἔχοντες τὰ αἰτήσι<μ>α...”

Seleucid court were second in rank only to relatives of the monarch.⁵²⁶ The prestige of these men may explain why the Samians petitioned the king directly, instead of through intermediaries. Despite the property being held by his *philoι*, Antiochus ruled in favor of Samos, and Boulagoras

“...carried home letters concerning these matters from Antiochus to our *polis* and to the *phrourarchos* appointed by him in Anaia and to the *dioiketes* (administrator / treasurer), because of which those who had been deprived [of their property] regained possession of their own [property], and after this time no one appointed by Antiochus attempted to confiscate the possessions of the citizens again.”⁵²⁷

The dispatch of these letters to the *phrourarchos* and *dioiketes* is a crucial point. It was not enough for Antiochus to declare that his *philoι* had no rights to the property in question; he took the extra step, likely at the request of the Samians, to draft his decision and send letters detailing his decision to his agents in the area. These representatives of the king enforced the precedent established by Antiochus' ruling, as the Samians noted that no other royal appointees attempted to confiscate Samian land afterwards. The *phrourarchos*, as the local agent of royal power, was critical to the enforcement and continued success of Antiochus' decree.

A dossier of letters, written c. 199-195 by Antiochus III to the *strategos* and *archiereus* Ptolemaios,⁵²⁸ further highlights the role of *phrourarchoi* in the Seleucid legal system. This dossier grew out of the takeover of Palestine from the Ptolemies by Antiochus III in the 190s,⁵²⁹ and offers a glimpse into the administration of a liminal frontier which was under

⁵²⁶Strootman 2008, 31; Dreyer 2011, 48.

⁵²⁷*IG XII*, 6 1:11 = *AM* 1919, 25-29 #13 = *SEG* 1 366 ll.15-20: “...καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐκόμισεν ἐπιστολάς | [π]αρ’ Ἀντιόχου πρὸς τε τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἐν Ἀναίαις ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ | [τ]εταγμένον φρούραρχον καὶ πρὸς τὸν διοικητὴν, δι’ ὧν οἱ τε τότε ἀφαι[ρ]εθέντες ἐγκρατεῖς ἐγένοντο τῶν ἰδίων καὶ εἰς τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα χρόνον | οὐθεὶς ἐνεχείρησεν οὐκέτι τῶν παρ’ Ἀντιόχου τασσομένων αἰτεῖσθαι τὰ | τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπάρχοντα...”

⁵²⁸*SEG* 29.1613 = Landau 1966, 54–70 = Fischer 1979, 131–138.

⁵²⁹Aperghis 2004, 269–270.

constant military threat from the Ptolemies. In a highly fragmentary section relating to disputes in Syria and Phoenicia, Antiochus ordered his subordinates to cooperate with the *strategoï*, and emphasized that

“...the *phourarchoi* and those appointed over the [local] districts are not to overlook in any way the transgressors(?)...”⁵³⁰

Although the details of these disputes, and the nature of the transgressors is completely obscure, it is indisputable that the *phourarchia* was involved in the administration of royal justice in the area. The relationship between the *phourarchoi* and the local *strategos* deserves some exploration. It has been argued that the *phourarchoi* were not under the control of the *strategos*, as the direct involvement of the king was necessary to ensure their cooperation.⁵³¹ The need for royal intervention is understandable, as *strategoï* were closely tied to both the field army and local civic governments, while the *phourarchia* existed in a space outside of the traditional legal framework of the *polis* and military. Much like the Anaian *phourarchos* in the 240s, the *phourarchoi* in Syria and Phoenicia were expressly under the authority of the king, and answered only to him, not to a *strategos* or other official.⁵³²

Such loyalty and deference to royal authority could be taken to near-absurd lengths. In 189/188, during the concluding peace talks following the Syrian War between Rome and Antiochus, it was brought to the attention of the Roman consul Gnaeus Manlius Vulso that the *phourarchos* of Perge remained at his post, although the area was supposed to have been

⁵³⁰SEG 29:1613 = Landau 1966, 54–70 = Fischer 1979, 131–138 ll. D. 15-16: “... , τοὺς δ[ὲ] φρουράρχους [καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν τόπων τεταγμένους] μὴ περι[ιδεῖν] [κατὰ] μῆθ[ε]να τρόπον τοῦς παραβ[αίνοντα]ς(?) □”

⁵³¹Aperghis 2004, 271.

⁵³²Ma 1999, 253.

evacuated by Antiochus III.⁵³³

What unfolded next is revealing:

“He [Gnaeus Manlius Vulso], learning that the *phrourarchos* appointed by Antiochus over Perge was not leaving the *phroura*, nor was he departing the *polis*, rushed to Perge with his forces. Having come near the *polis*, he was met by the one appointed over the *phroura* (the *phrourarchos*), who asked him (Manlius) not to condemn him without [hearing] a counter argument, as he was performing part of his duty. For he was guarding the city that he had received from Antiochus in trust, until what he should do [next] was made clear from the man who had put that trust in him; but until now simply nothing had been made clear to him by anyone. He then asked for thirty days grace to send to and ask the king what he should do...and after a few days he learned [the answer] and surrendered the town.”⁵³⁴

The actions of this *phrourarchos* in Perge vividly illustrate the position of the office within the administration of the Seleucid kingdom. Despite facing the overwhelming military might of the Romans, this *phrourarchos* deferred to the king, as he was unwilling or unable to make decisions concerning his post under his own authority. It is unlikely that he was simply stalling for time, as the defeat of Antiochus was total,⁵³⁵ leaving no hope for a friendly relief force to break a potential Roman siege. The *phrourarchos* was genuinely concerned with discharging the duties of his office, no matter how hopeless his general situation became.

Notably absent from this account is any consideration of the attitudes or wishes of Perge's population. Neither the *phrourarchos* nor Manlius appealed to the local citizenry, but instead focused entirely on royal instructions. The Romans, along with the *phrourarchos*,

⁵³³Polyb. 21.42.1–5; Ma 1999, 252–253; cf. Grainger 1995, 40 who argues that the *phrourarchos* may have surrendered only due to the elimination of supporting *phrourai*.

⁵³⁴Polyb. 21.42.1–5: “Αὐτὸς δὲ πυνθανόμενος τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς Πέργης καθεσταμένον ὑπ’ Ἀντιόχου φρούραρχον οὔτε τὴν φρουρὰν ἐξάγειν οὔτ’ αὐτὸν ἐκχωρεῖν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ὥρμησε μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως ἐπὶ τὴν Πέργην. ἐγγίζοντος δ’ αὐτοῦ τῆ πόλει, παρὴν ἀπαντῶν ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τῆς φρουρᾶς, ἀξιῶν καὶ δεόμενος μὴ προκαταγινώσκειν αὐτοῦ· ποιεῖν γὰρ ἔν τι τῶν καθηκόντων· παραλαβὼν γὰρ ἐν πίστει παρ’ Ἀντιόχου τὴν πόλιν τηρεῖν ἔφη ταύτην, ἕως ἂν διασαφηθῆ ἄλλιν παρὰ τοῦ πιστεύσαντος τί δεῖ ποιεῖν· μέχρι δὲ τοῦ νῦν ἀπλῶς οὐδὲν αὐτῷ παρ’ οὐδενὸς ἀποδεδηλώσθαι. διόπερ ἡξίου τριάκονθ’ ἡμέρας χάριν τοῦ διαπεμψάμενος ἐρέσθαι τὸν βασιλέα τί δεῖ πράττειν...καὶ μετὰ τινος ἡμέρας πυθόμενος παρέδωκε τὴν πόλιν.”

⁵³⁵Ma 1999, 245–253.

understood that Seleucid *phourarchoi* were subject to royal, not local, authority.

3.13 Attalids

The sole mention of a *phourarchos* under the Attalids is in an inscription from a small *phourion* in modern Yüntdağ,⁵³⁶ erected by the *phourarchos* Demetrius in the first half of the second century.⁵³⁷ Demetrius likely served under Eumenes II, and certainly was in his post following the dramatic expansion of the Attalid kingdom after the defeat of Antiochus III and the treaty of Apamea in 188.⁵³⁸ In this dedication Demetrius is described as “...*phourarchos* and founder of a *hieron* (shrine).”⁵³⁹ Demetrius himself was probably of Thracian descent, judging by the name of his father (Seuthes),⁵⁴⁰ which most likely indicates that he was a foreign mercenary in Attalid service. The inscription names a number of men who were part of a religious association of Asklepios with Demetrius at the head, and it is suggested by Helmut Müller that the association may have been entirely recruited from the *phouroi* of the post. In his view, their participation may have been in principle voluntary, but was socially necessary.⁵⁴¹

A *phourion* located near the find-spot of the inscription is little more than a fortified tower on the peak of a hill which could only hold a limited number of defenders. The small size of the location, the limited number of soldiers, and the visual connection of the

⁵³⁶See Map 4 and Map 5.

⁵³⁷Müller 2010: “Επι Δημητρίου φρου|ράρχου τοῦ κτίσαν|τος τὸ ἱερόν ν ἀγαθῆ| τύχη ν συνῆλθον οἱ πρ|ῶτοι Ἀσκληπιασταί·| Δημήτριος Σεύθου,| Μικαδίων Ἀρισταγόρου,| Μητρόδωρος Ἄφ(?)άρου,| Ἀσκληπιάδης Γλαυκίου,| Μητροφάνης Ἀρτεμιδώ|ρου, Μακεδὼν Ἀνδρέσ|του, Νικάνωρ Μικαδίωνος,| Ἀρτέμων Ἀθηναίου,| Ἡρακλείδης Βακχίου,| Κάλας Γλαυκίου| Ἀπολλώνιος Δημητρί| Σ(?)ώνικος Ἀριστοκράτου,| Ἀριστογένης Διονυσοδώ|ρου, Ἀγήνωρ Βακχίου,| Πυρρίας Δημέου.”

⁵³⁸Polyb. 21.45; Livy, 38.39; Magie 1950, 958–959; Müller 2010, 429–430.

⁵³⁹Müller 2010, ll. 1–3.

⁵⁴⁰Ibid., 429 – 430.

⁵⁴¹Ibid., 435.

phrourion to the *acropolis* of Pergamum strongly suggest that this location was not a settlement or significant fortress, but rather an observation post with limited patrol and policing powers.⁵⁴²

3.14 Egypt⁵⁴³

Ptolemaic Egypt provides the most extensive evidence of imperial *phrourarchoi*. The wealth of epigraphy, papyri, and literature should be viewed within the context of the Ptolemaic Empire and its unique political and social setting. Instead of the prevalence of firmly established Greek communities in Greece and Asia Minor, with their long traditions of Greek laws, customs, and military organization, Ptolemaic Egypt was, in essence, a land occupied by a foreign elite who relied on military superiority and royal patronage to secure their social and legal position.⁵⁴⁴ The *phrourarchoi* employed by the monarchy, mostly consisting of mercenaries, had expansive civil powers in addition to their military responsibilities, yet they were still answerable only to the monarchy.

3.14.1 Amyzon and Xanthos

The first attested mention of a *phrourarchos* under the Ptolemies is outside Egypt itself, and is found in a third-century inscription⁵⁴⁵ from the *polis* of Amyzon in Caria, which was an overseas possession of the dynasty.⁵⁴⁶ The fragmentary inscription mentions an Akarnanian who was appointed as *phrourarchos* by the king.⁵⁴⁷ This *phrourarchos* may have

⁵⁴²Ibid., 436.

⁵⁴³See Maps 8-10.

⁵⁴⁴Adler 2004, 18–22; Green 1990, 192

⁵⁴⁵Robert and Robert 1983, #4, ll. 2–3: “...ἔδ[οξε]ν Ἀμυζωνεῦσιν· κ[υ]ρίας ἐκκλησίας γενομένης...”

⁵⁴⁶See Map 4.

⁵⁴⁷Robert and Robert 1983, #4 ll. 5-6: “...Ἀκα[ρ]νᾶν [κ]ατασταθεῖς [ὑ]πὸ τοῦ | [β]ασιλέως [φρ]οῦραρχος...”

been responsible for guarding nearby mountains in addition to controlling the *polis* itself.⁵⁴⁸

Although the actual mention of the Ptolemies as the establishers of the *phrourarchia* is a restoration, it is one that has gone without significant scholarly challenge.⁵⁴⁹

The *polis* praised the *phrourarchos* as a “noble and good man who accomplished many and great things...”, even though he owed his position to Ptolemy and not to the consent of the local community.⁵⁵⁰ Although it is possible that the *polis* intended the honor to influence new *phrourarchoi* by reflecting rewards that a mild *phrourarchos* could receive from the citizens, it also raises the intriguing possibility that this particular *phrourarchos* remained in Amyzon following his term, where he could enjoy the honor in person. Whatever the case, the *phrourarchia* in Amyzon was firmly under the orders of the monarchy instead of the *polis*. Royal power was solely responsible for the appointment of the *phrourarchia*, and the *polis* relied on social, not legal, pressure to influence the *phrourarchos*.

Amyzon was certainly not the only overseas possession of the Ptolemies that was overseen by a *phrourarchos*. A decree from Xanthos, passed in December 260 / January 259 in the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphos, honors the *phrourarchos* Pandaros. The formula of the inscription closely follows that of Amyzon, although here the *polis* and the *archons* of Xanthos are responsible for the decree instead of the *ekklesia*.⁵⁵¹

The Amyzonians and Xanthians found it expedient to honor their *phrourarchoi*, perhaps to flatter the Ptolemies, to curry favor with the *phrourarchos* himself, or to offer an example

⁵⁴⁸Piejko 1985, 609 ll. 7: “[ὄρους]” which is compared to the ὄροφυλάκου in Amyzon 2, l. 5.

⁵⁴⁹Robert and Robert 1983, #4 ll 6–7: “...[κ]ατασταθεῖς [ὑ]πὸ τοῦ [β]ασιλέως [φρ]οῦραρχος”; cf. Piejko 1985, 609 who departs from the caution of the Roberts and reconstructs ll. 1-2: “[Βασιλεύοντος Πτολεμαίου τοῦ Πτολε] [μα]ίου [καὶ τ]οῦ [Πτο]λε[μαίου (ἔτους)...].”

⁵⁵⁰Ibid., ll. 8-10: “...ἀνὴρ καλὸς καὶ [γ]αθὸς [ὄν δια]τ[ε]λεῖ κ[αὶ] πολλ[ά]ς καὶ |μεγάλ[ας χρεῖα]ς...”; See chapter 4 for the language used by local communities for local *phrourarchoi*.

⁵⁵¹Ibid. ll. 1-2: “ἔδοξεν Ξανθίων τῆ[ι] πόλε[ι] | καὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσιν.”

of the rewards in store for future holders of the post if they behaved generously to the city. Such praise on the part of a *polis* does not obscure the reality that the monarchy, not the local community, was the ultimate power over the *phourarchia*.

3.14.2 Island Phourarchoi⁵⁵²

Phourarchoi could make dedications themselves in subject communities. Shortly after 294,⁵⁵³ the *phourarchos* Poseidippos, along with a man named Boiskos and other unspecified *synhegemones* (fellow officers), erected a statue of Berenike, wife of Ptolemy I, near Kition in Cyprus. Poseidippos was “*phourarchos* over [Idalion?] and Kition...”⁵⁵⁴ and most likely owed the establishment of his post to Ptolemaic expansion in Cyprus following the dissolution of the Phoenician monarchy in 311.⁵⁵⁵ Although Poseidippos' role in the *poleis* is unknown, the possibility that he was *phourarchos* over two *poleis* suggests that Ptolemaic *phourarchoi* could control multiple communities, and be assigned over a particular region instead of a single *polis*.⁵⁵⁶

An Illyrian named Philotas, originally from Epidamnus, made a dedication in Itanos on Crete sometime after 145.⁵⁵⁷ In it Philotas describes himself as “one of the first *philois*,

⁵⁵²See Maps 10 and 4.

⁵⁵³Bagnall 1976, 49.

⁵⁵⁴*CIG* 2614 = *OGIS* 1.20 = *SEG* 20.132 = *SEG* 31.1348 = Mitford 1961, 127 n.14 ll.2-3: “...Ποσειδίππος φρουραρχο[ς κατ’ Ἰδάλων]? | καὶ κατὰ Κίτιον...”; Bagnall 1976, 63, 76 accepts Mitford’s restoration. He also argues that Idalion was a possession of Kition; cf. *OGIS* 1.20 where the restoration reads “Ποσειδίππος φρουραρχο[ς καὶ ἡγεμῶν τῶν ἐπὶ] [τῆς ἄκρας(?)] | καὶ κατὰ Κίτιον...”

⁵⁵⁵Mitford 1961, 127 n.142.

⁵⁵⁶See also *Thèbes à Syène* 320 where in 116 Nestor was *phourarchos* of Syene, Elephantine and Philae: “..Νέστω[ρ] Μελανίπ[ου] Φασηλίτης | τῶν ἀρχισωματοφυλάκων ὁ καθεσταμένος | ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τῆ φρουρ[α]ρχία Συήνης καὶ Ἐλεφαντίνης καὶ Φιλῶ[ν]...”

⁵⁵⁷Earlier dating which placed this decree between 205 and 281 can no longer be sustained; See Chaniotis 2002, 109.

chiliarchos, and a *phourarchos*.”⁵⁵⁸ Later, between 139 and 120, the same man placed another dedicatory inscription to the Egyptian gods in Philai, near the southernmost point of Ptolemaic control in Egypt.⁵⁵⁹ In this heavily restored inscription Philotas made a dedication

“on behalf of Parthenios...[a *syngenes* (a court rank)] and *auto[krator?]* (commander) of the *strategos* in the [Thebaid?⁵⁶⁰ by Philota]s, son of Genthios [from Epidamnus?], one of the first [*philo*i and *phourarcho*]s.”⁵⁶¹

Philotas held a *phourarchia* in two vastly separate geographical locations at different times, although both were on the very borders of imperial control. Even if the reconstruction of his office in Philai is incorrect, Philotas obviously did not settle in Crete, and his mobility, coupled with his Illyrian origin, indicates that he was a mercenary with an extremely successful career in Ptolemaic service.

Ptolemaic *phourarchoi* in overseas territories did not just come from the Greek world, as is illustrated by the case of Lucius, son of Gaius, a Roman mercenary *phourarchos* who dedicated a water feature and nymphaeum to King Ptolemy Philopater and Queen Arsinoe in Itanos at some point between 244 and 209.⁵⁶²

3.14.3 Domestic Inscriptions

The Ptolemies made extensive use of *phourarchoi* within Egypt itself. Many of these men are little more than names, occasionally appearing in dedications with other members of their *phoura*.⁵⁶³ Others are much better known. The *phourarchos* Herodes made a

⁵⁵⁸IC III, iv 14 ll. 1-7: “Φιλώτας | Γενθίου | Ἐπιδάμνιος | τῶν πρώτων | φίλων καὶ χιλί|αρχος καὶ φρούραρχος...”

⁵⁵⁹See Map 9.

⁵⁶⁰Near Thebes.

⁵⁶¹*Thèbes à Syène* 318 ll. 7-12: “...ὕπερ Πα]ρθενίου | [□□□□ τοῦ συγγενοῦς κ]αὶ αὐτο[κράτορος(?)] στρατηγο]ῦ τῆς | [Θηβαίδος(?)] Φιλώτα]ς Γενθίου | [Ἐπιδάμνιος(?) τῶν] πρώτων | [φίλων καὶ φρούραρχο(?)]ς.”

⁵⁶²IC III iv 18: “βασιλεῖ Πτολεμαῖω Φιλοπάτορι | καὶ βασιλίσσηι Ἀρσινόηι | τὸ ὕδρευμα καὶ τὸ Νυμφαῖον | Λεύκιος Γαίου Ῥωμαῖος φρουράρχων.”

⁵⁶³Some inscriptions offer little more than names and office titles; See *Thèbes à Syène* 242; *Philae* 15; Preisigke

dedication c. 152-145 during the reign of Ptolemy VI:

“...on behalf of Boethos son of Nikostratos, Chrysaorian,⁵⁶⁴ the *archisomatophylax*, *strategos*, and *ktistes* (founder) of the *poleis* of Philometoris and Cleopatra in Triakontaschoinos,⁵⁶⁵ on account of goodwill that he continues to have for the king and queen and their children, Herodes, son of Demophon, of Pergamum, one of the *diadochoi*, *hegemon* of the men, *phourarchos* of Syene, *gerrophulax* (leader of soldiers carrying wicker-work shields), *tetagmenos* (appointed over) the upper territories, prophet of Chnoubis, and *archistolistes* (chief temple attendant) of the shrines in Elephantine, Abaton, and Philai...”⁵⁶⁶

Herodes reappears later in another inscription, dated c. 143-142, as *archisomatophulax* and *strategos* in Syene, indicating his rise through the ranks and promotion beyond the *phourarchia*.⁵⁶⁷ The *phourarchia* held by Herodes, located near the border of Egypt,⁵⁶⁸ was the focal point of Ptolemaic control of the region, and was a post that could be combined with local religious offices.⁵⁶⁹ Despite these connections, it is not certain if the ruler cult in the area was solely the result of imperial sponsorship, or if it originated from the soldiers themselves.⁵⁷⁰ What is known is that the *phourarchia* played an important role in the social fabric of the area, and its holder could move among religious, military, and civil spheres with ease.

1915, #599; #1104; Preisigke 1938, 5,2 8066; Sakkelion 1862, # 238; Bent and Gardner 1886, 144; Manganaro 1963, 21 B; *SEG*, 18, 388.

⁵⁶⁴A city in Caria.

⁵⁶⁵A region between the First and Second Cataracts. See Török 2009, 384.

⁵⁶⁶*OGIS* 111 = *Thèbes à Syène* 302 ll. 7-20: “...ὕπερ Βοήθου τοῦ Νικοστράτου | Χρυσασορέως, τοῦ ἀρχισωματοφύλακος | καὶ στρατηγοῦ καὶ [κτί]στου τῶν ἐν τῆ[ι] | Τριακοντασχοίνωι πόλεων Φιλομητορίδ[ος] | καὶ Κλεοπάτρας, εὐ[ν]οίας ἔνε[κ]εν | ἧς ἔχων διατελ[εῖ] πρ[ό]ς τε τὸν βασιλέα | καὶ τὴν βασίλισσαν κ[αὶ] τὰ τέκνα α]ὔτων, | Ἡρώιδης Δημοφῶντος Περ[γα]μηνός | τῶν διαδό[χων] καὶ ἡγεμῶν ἐ[π’] ἀ[ν]δρῶν | καὶ φρούραρχος Σνήνης [καὶ γερρ]οφύλαξ | καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄνω τόπων [τεταγμένος] καὶ | προφήτης τοῦ Χν[οῦ]βεως] κ[αὶ] ἀρχ[ι]στολιστ[ῆ]ς | τῶν ἐν Ἐλεφαντίνῃ [καὶ Ἀβάτῳ] καὶ Φίλαις | ἱερῶν...”

⁵⁶⁷*Thèbes à Syène* 303 = *OGIS*, 130 ll. 1-6: “...Ἡρώιδης Δημοφῶντος | Βερενικεῦς, ὁ ἀρχισωματοφύλαξ καὶ στρατηγός, | καὶ οἱ συνάγοντες ἐν Σήτει τῆι τοῦ Διονύσου | νήσωι βασιλισται ὧν τὰ ὀνόματα ὑπόκειται...”

⁵⁶⁸See Map 9.

⁵⁶⁹Török 2009, 404–405.

⁵⁷⁰See Fishwick 1987, 11–17 for general differences between the two cult types.

Nestor, originally from Phaselis, was another *phourarchos* in Philae who made a dedication in 116

“...on behalf of Athenaios, a *syngenes* and *strategos* over Elephantine [by] Nestor, son of Melanippos, Phaselite, a member of the *archisomatophylakes*, appointed by him [Athenaios] to the *phourarchia* of Syene, Elephantine and Philae and the *gerrophulakia* and to the *strategia* of his nome”.⁵⁷¹

The relationship between Athenaios and Nestor is a matter of interest. It has been argued that Athenaios commanded the *phoura* of Syene and the *gerrophulakes*, and that he appointed Nestor as his deputy. Key to this argument is the difference between a *strategos* and being appointed to the *strategia*, which may point to Nestor gaining further responsibility, perhaps as a first step to becoming a *strategos* in his own right.⁵⁷² This is an intriguing possibility, and would mean that both Nestor and Herodes followed a similar career trajectory: they were mercenaries who obtained the office of *phourarchos*, and then were promoted to be *strategos* in the same area. Even if this is not the case, both Nestor and Herodes owed their position to the political machinery of the Ptolemaic monarchy, and strove to flatter their superiors by making dedications to the gods on their behalf. The local *poleis* were only present in these inscriptions to advertise the power and position of the *strategos* and *phourarchos*.

This marginalization of local civilian populations in favor of military settlers and soldiers is commonplace in inscriptions. A dedication from Philai c. 115 states that [...]aios, son of Ammonios, was *phourarchos* of the area for forty-two years and his behavior was

“...blameless to the *katoikoi* and likewise also to the *xenoi* temporarily

⁵⁷¹*Thèbes à Syène* 320: “...ὑπὲρ Ἀθηναίου | [τ]οῦ συγγενοῦς [καὶ στρατηγοῦ] [τοῦ περὶ] Ἐλεφαντίνην Νέστω[ρ] Μελανίπ[ου] Φασηλίτης | τῶν ἀρχισωματοφυλάκων ὁ καθεσταμένος | ὑπὸ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τῆι φρουρ[α]ρχίαι Συήνης καὶ Ἐλεφαντίνης καὶ Φιλῶ[ν] καὶ γερροφυλακίαι | καὶ πρὸς τῆι στρατηγί[α]ι τοῦ αὐτοῦ νομοῦ.”

⁵⁷²Mooren 1980, 263.

residing there, and having received praise in the presence of the *strategos*...”⁵⁷³

The *katoikoi* and *xenoi* in this inscription are unspecified, but general information about these categories helps to elucidate the *phourarchia* in Philai. *Katoikoi* were generally Greek soldier-settlers: they received allotments of land in return for acting as a reserve source of manpower, and occupied a higher social position than mere *phulakes*.⁵⁷⁴ *Xenoi* could be a catch-all term for foreigners, but was most often used for foreign mercenaries who served within the *phouria* of Egypt or in other military postings.⁵⁷⁵ The stress on the temporary nature of their residence (*parepidemos*), their prominence in the inscription, and the association with *katoikoi* all reinforce the conclusion that this group was composed of mercenaries and not resident aliens or other foreigners. If these *katoikoi* and *xenoi* were typical for Egypt, [...]aios would have operated within a military milieu, dealing with reserve-settlers, foreign mercenaries, and local *stratego*i.

3.14.4 Dioskourides the *Phourarchos*

After the 250s, Ptolemaic *phourarchoi* appear in legal proceedings and correspondence in increasing numbers in Egypt and Ptolemaic Syria.⁵⁷⁶ Nearly a century later, the most extensive documentation concerning *phourarchoi* can be found in the second-century dossier of Dioskourides, *phourarchos* of Herakleopolis, who is known from no fewer than eighteen papyri.⁵⁷⁷

⁵⁷³*Thèbes à Syène* 322: “...καὶ ἀνέγκλητος γεγρονῶς τοῖς | ἐνταῦθα κατοικοῦσι ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς | παρεπιδημοῦσι ξένοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς τῶν | στρατηγῶν παρουσίαις ἐπαίνου τετευχῶς ...”

⁵⁷⁴Bauschatz 2013, 288.

⁵⁷⁵Fischer-Bovet 2014, 119.

⁵⁷⁶Some are little more than fragmentary accounts or names – see *P. Cair. Zen.* 4 59573 & *P. Hib.* 2 233.

⁵⁷⁷Cowey, Maresch and Barnes 2003, v.

Unlike the congratulatory language found in dedications, this dossier reveals the intimate connections of Ptolemaic *phourarchoi* with the legal, civil, and military administration. The dossier also offers a rare glimpse into the personal life of a *phourarchos*, as one papyrus reveals that Dioskourides served as the guarantor of a lease undertaken by his sister, over whom he was a legal guardian.⁵⁷⁸ The proceedings were witnessed by a number of military personnel, including a member of the *phoura* in Herakleopolis and various foot-soldiers.⁵⁷⁹

The bulk of the remaining papyri deal with legal matters. In one letter Dioskourides was petitioned by a foot-soldier named Theon, son of Theon, concerning an assault committed by another soldier named Jason from the same unit.⁵⁸⁰ Although Dioskourides was not directly involved in the proceedings, Theon then asked the *phourarchos* to “place my report in the legal records”.⁵⁸¹ The petitioner clearly felt that the incident needed to be documented, revealing that the official dossier of a *phourarchos* could carry significant legal weight, at least from the viewpoint of petitioners.

The authority to arrest and detain individuals is commonly described in the dossier. A wine-seller named Petechon wanted the arrest of another wine-seller named Stotoetis until the payment of a large debt and promissory note was resolved,⁵⁸² asking Dioskourides

“...if it seems [justified], to arrange to secure him [Stotoetis] until he makes restitution to me”.⁵⁸³

⁵⁷⁸*P. Diosk.* 18 ll. 5-6: “ἐμίσθωσεν [Κ]ασσάνδρα Δημοκράτου ἀστὴ μετὰ κυρίου | τοῦ ἑαυτῆς ἀδελφοῦ [Διο]σκουρίδου ἡγεμόνος ἐπ’ ἀνδρῶν καὶ φρουράρχου...”

⁵⁷⁹*Ibid.*, 42-44: “...μάρτυρες Ἡρακλείδη[σ]. . . α. . . εἶδον Μακε[δ]ῶν | τάγματος τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄρμ[ο]υ φρουρῶν Ἀπολλώνιος Δαβρέας Ἡρώ[δ]ης | Ἀμμώνιος Θεών οἱ πέντε [Μα]κέδονος τῶν Πτολεμαίου πεζῶν...”; See *P.Haun*.II col. 2; See sb.1.4512 for another example.

⁵⁸⁰*P. Diosk.* 1 ll.3-5: “...Θέωνος τοῦ Θεώνος [Κυρ]ηναίου τῶν Ἑρμοτίμου | καὶ Μελεάγρου πεζῶν.”

⁵⁸¹*Ibid.* ll. 34-36: “...ἀξιῶ καταχωρίσαι μου τὸ | προσαγγελμα καὶ παρὰ σοὶ | ἐν χρηματισμῶι..”

⁵⁸²*P. Diosk.* 8.

⁵⁸³*Ibid.* ll. 14-17: “ἐὰν φαίνεται, | συντάξαι [ἀ]σφαλίσασθαι αὐτὸν μέχρι τοῦ τὴν ἀπόδοσίν [μ]οι αὐτὸν πήσασθαι.”

A woman named Kleo, after her slave Thermuthis / Aphrodisia was captured trying to run away, asked the *phrouarchos* to

“...secure [the slave] in the *phulake* (guard post) until my husband Peleus comes here...”⁵⁸⁴

In a heavily fragmentary papyrus, a member of a ship's crew, also named Dioskourides, was involved in a monetary dispute with a man named Petophoias. This second Dioskourides petitioned the *phrouarchos* to “arrange to secure him [Petophoias]” until the miscreant returned the money with interest.⁵⁸⁵ The problems of this hapless sailor went beyond debt collection, as he was later assaulted by his brother Horos. Dioskourides responded by again petitioning the *phrouarchos*, asking him

“...if it appears [justified], to summon him (Horos), to make an investigation, and to make provisions to ready a suitable punishment.”⁵⁸⁶

A soldier who was directly under the *phrouarchos*, Ammonius the son of Nikias,⁵⁸⁷ after not receiving money owed to him by a *hyperetas* (paymaster) named Ptolemy, petitioned the *phrouarchos*

“...if it appears [justified], to summon him (Ptolemy), [and] to compel him to give me what is additionally owed, and to give to me [what remains] from the full [contract] in whatever manner is customary.”⁵⁸⁸

Heraklides, son of Hestiodoros, *hegemon* outside the *taxis* (a file of soldiers),⁵⁸⁹ in an

⁵⁸⁴*P. Diosk.* 9 ll. 11-15: “...ἀσφαλισθῆναι | ἐν τῇ φυλακῇ μέχρι τοῦ | παραγενόμενον Πηλέα | τὸν ἄνδρα μου καὶ παρα[[λαβό]ν[τα α.]ὐτὴν...”; There are other papyri where the circumstances are much less clear- see *P. Diosk.* 11 & *P. Diosk.* 12.

⁵⁸⁵*P. Diosk.* 3 ll. 18-20: “...[σ]υν[τ]άξι ἀσφαλίσασθαι | α[ὐ]τὸν μέχρι τοῦ...”

⁵⁸⁶*P. Diosk.* 7 ll. 18-24: “...ἐὰν φαίνῃται, συντάξι μετα|πεμψάμενον τοῦτον| ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ προνοηθῆναι ὡς τεύξεται| τῆς ἀρμοζούσης ἐπι|πλήξε[ω]ς.”

⁵⁸⁷*Ibid.*, ll.3-4: “...ὕπὸ σὲ τεταγμένων | σ[τ]ρατιωτῶν.”

⁵⁸⁸*P. Diosk.* 2 ll. 14-21: “ἐὰν φαίνῃται, | [π]ροσκαλεσά|μενον αὐτὸν ἀναγκά|[σ]αι ἀποδοῦναι μοι τὸ προσοφειλόμενον καὶ εἰς τὸ λοιπὸν | [σ]υντάξι ἀποδιδόναι | [μοι] ἐκ πλήρους καθό|τι εἴθισται.”

⁵⁸⁹*P. Diosk.* 4 ll. 2-3: “...ἡγεμόνος τῶν | ἔξω τάξε[ω]ς...”

effort to see the former *grammateus* (secretary) Antipater detained for embezzlement, asked the *phourarchos* to

“...arrange to take and to secure him (Antipater) until Dionysios, the *epistates* (administrator) of the *phulakes* (police officials) arrives, so that he [after] taking part [can] send for *dioiketes* (administrator)...”⁵⁹⁰

One of the more illuminating letters concerning the arrest powers of the *phourarchos* focuses on the aftermath of a drunken brawl at the entrance to the port of Herakleopolis.⁵⁹¹

Two of those involved wrote a letter of complaint to the local *strategos* and sent a copy to Dioskourides. The letter begins

“To Dioskourides, *hegemon* and *phourarchos*, from Artemidoros and Protarchos sons of Artermidoros, Dorians, we delivered to Teres, a member of the *philoι* and *strategoι*, a copy [of the note] attached below. We therefore also ask you to take care concerning that which is set forth in it [the note]. For when this is done we will partake in your benevolence. With good fortune.”⁵⁹²

The letter then outlines the attack suffered by the siblings at the hands of a group of “drunks”, which included men named Andronikos, Koson, and Thymoleon. The disturbance, coupled with the brothers' cries for help, quickly attracted the attention of bystanders, and a woman named Ammonia even ruined some of the clothing worn by Artemidoros and Protarchos. The tumult soon attracted the attention of the authorities, and Koson and Thymoleon were carried off to the *phourarchos*.⁵⁹³

The letter later clarifies the arrest process, when the brothers state

“...after this, [Koson and Thymoleon], as explained [above], were brought to Epimachos,

⁵⁹⁰Ibid. 16-20: “...συντάξει παραλαβόντας | αὐτοὺς ἀσφαλίσασθαι μέχρι τοῦ Διονύσιον τὸν | ἐπιστάτην [τῶν] φυλακῶν παραγενέσθαι ὅπως | μεταλαβὼν αὐτοὺς ἐκπέμψῃ πρὸς τὸν διοικ[ητήν]....”

⁵⁹¹*P. Diosk.6.*

⁵⁹²Ibid., ll.1-6: “Διοσκ[ουρίδει] ἡγεμόνι καὶ φρουράρχωι | παρὰ Ἀρ[τεμιδώρ]ου καὶ Πρωτάρχου τῶν Ἀρτεμιδώρου Δωριέων | οὗ ἐπιδ[εδώκ]αμεν ὑπομνήματος Τήρη τῶν φίλων καὶ στρα[τηγῶι] ὑπ[ό]κειται τὸ ἀντίγραφον. ἀξιοῦμεν οὖν καὶ σὲ προνοηθῆναι | περὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῶι δεδηλομένων· τούτου γὰρ γενομένου | τευξόμεθα φιλανθρωπίας. Εὐτύχει.”

⁵⁹³Ibid., ll. 22-23: “...τε τοῦ Κόσωνα ὄντες | καὶ Θυμολέ<ον>τος ἀγωγῆς ἐπὶ τὸν φρούραρχον...”

the subordinate of the *phrourarchos*...⁵⁹⁴

The arrest of Koson and Thymoleon did little to satisfy Artemidoros and Protarchus. They suspected that a certain Apollonios, son of Heraclides, instigated the brawl due to a lawsuit involving him, his wife, and Protarchos. The brothers then end the letter with a typical request for arrest, asking

“...if it appears [justified], to see to it that those men mentioned above, and Ammonia, are secured, and this note be sent to Nikanor and Archianax⁵⁹⁵, so that from this we might urge them to make a fitting assessment. For this being done, we will receive support. With good fortune.”⁵⁹⁶

As shown in this letter, the *phrourarchos* and his command were expected to react quickly to civil disturbances, and to serve as a quasi-gendarmerie in the port. Dioskourides' subordinates, like Epimachos, had the authority to detain troublemakers on the spot. These individuals were then brought before the *phrourarchos*,⁵⁹⁷ who likely conducted a preliminary hearing in the relative safety of the *phrourion*. The *phrourarchos* could also confine suspects after the fact, as Artemidoros and Protarchos expressly asked for the apprehension of a number of people who had initially escaped arrest.

The end of the letter requesting the arrest of individuals, although addressed to the *strategos*, most likely fell under the authority of the *phrourarchos*. In most of Dioskourides' dossier, the petitioners directly asked the *phrourarchos* to summon or arrange for the detention of their legal opponent. The request of Artemidoros and Protarchos for the *phrourarchos* to “take care concerning that which is set forth” in their letter, specifically their

⁵⁹⁴Ibid., ll. 27-28: “...μετὰ δὲ τὸ | παραδοθῆναι τοὺς διασαφουμένους | Ἐπιμάχῳ τῷ παρὰ τοῦ φρουράρχου...”

⁵⁹⁵These oversaw the lawsuit with Apollonios.

⁵⁹⁶*P. Diosk.* 6 ll. 42-50: “...ἀξιοῦμεν ἐὰν φαίνηται προνοηθῆναι ὡς οἱ μὲν διασαφούμενοι καὶ ἡ Ἀμμωνία ἀσφαλισθήσονται, τὸ δὲ ὑπόμνημα ἀναπεμφθῆναι ἐπὶ Νικάνορα | καὶ Ἀρχεάνακτα ὅπως καὶ ἀπ[ὸ] τούτου | ὀρμηθέντες ποιησομεθα τὸν προσήκοντα λόγον. | τούτου γὰρ γενομένου τευξόμεθα | ἀντιλήψεως. | ——— | εὐτυχεῖτε.”

⁵⁹⁷Ibid., ll. 22-23.

request for arrest, suggests that the *phourarchos* would be similarly involved in the apprehension and detention of Apollonios and his associates.

Dioskourides was not the only *phourarchos* to exercise such powers. In 126 near Thebes, petitioners sought redress for a business deal, and requested that the *phourarchos* Antiphanes review the charges.⁵⁹⁸ In 50/49 a petitioner in Herakleopolis requested that a *strategos* (implied but not explicitly mentioned)⁵⁹⁹

“...if it appears [justified] to you, to arrange to write to the *phourarchos* Adrastos to bring the accused before you so that he may be compelled to restore what is due...”⁶⁰⁰

The bottom of the document further records that an unspecified *grammateus* was instructed, presumably by the *strategos*, to write to the *phourarchos* concerning the case.⁶⁰¹

All of these *phourarchoi* were heavily involved in resolving conflicts over money or other property, maintaining order, arresting criminals, and conducting investigations. At the same time there was a heavy presence of military forces in the area, including *phouroi* and other foot-soldiers under the influence or control of the *phourarchia*,⁶⁰² which provides strong evidence that the position retained its military character and purpose, as can only be expected.

These *phourarchoi*, in addition to their military powers, addressed such mundane civil actions as adjudicating fights between brothers. Local citizens unhesitatingly petitioned

⁵⁹⁸*P. Tor. Choach.* 8 A ll.36-41 “...χη]ματισ[τάς, ὧν ει[σαγωγεὺς Ἀμ[μώνιος], | ὅπως χρηματίσαντες [αὐτήν] | εις κρίσιν καὶ μεταπεμψά[μενο]ι τοὺς | ἐγκαλουμένους δι’ Ἀγτιφάνου φρουράρχου | ἐπισκέψονται,” B ll. 35-39: “...χηματιστά[ς], | ὧν εισαγωγεὺς Ἀμμώνιος, ὅπως χημα[τίσαντες αὐτήν] εις κρίσιν καὶ μετα[πεμψάμενοι] τοὺς [ἐ]γκαλουμένους | δι’ Ἀντιφάνου φρο[υ]ράρχου ἐπισκέψωντα...”

⁵⁹⁹Bauschatz 2013, 132, 212.

⁶⁰⁰*BGU* 8 1844 ll. 21-23: “ἀξιοῦμεν ἐὰν φαίνεται | συντάξαι γράψαι Ἀδράστοι φρουράρχ[χ]οι τὸν | ἐγκαλουμένο καταστήσαι ἐπὶ σέ ὅπως ἐπα|ναγκασ[θ]ῆ ἀποκαταστήσαι...”

⁶⁰¹*Ibid.*, ll. 29-30: τοῖς γρ(αμματεῦσι) (ἔτους) γ...() | γρ(άψατε) τῷ φρο(υράρχῳ) παραγγελ(ῆναι) καταστή(σαι)”.

⁶⁰²*Ibid.*, ll. 42-44: “...μάρτυρες Ἡρακλειδη[σ]. . . α. . . εἰδον Μακε[δ]ῶν | τάγματος τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄρμ[ο]υ φρουρῶν Ἀπολλώνιος Δαβρέας Ἡρώ[δ]ης | Ἀμμώνιος Θέων οἱ πέντε [Μα]κέδονος τῶν Πτολεμαίου πεζῶν...”

phourarchoi to resolve any conflict, no matter how trivial, which they believed fell under their jurisdiction. Even with this heavy civic involvement, the *phourarchoi* remained royal agents under crown authority and there is no indication that a local community played any part in their selection.

3.14.5 Other Egyptian *Phourarchoi* Found in Papyri

This involvement with legal concerns is echoed in other documents relating to *phourarchoi*, and could even originate from the monarchs themselves. In a decree from 139 Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II directly addresses the *phourarchoi* in Krokodilopolis along with various other officials. At issue is the revenue from temple lands, payment for temple officials and the inviolability of temple lands, along with the removal of unauthorized users. The officials were to permit no one to disturb the tax exemptions and revenues of the priests, an order that the *phourarchia*, with its relationship to temple lands in general, could carry out.⁶⁰³

Many of the *phourarchoi* in papyri remain little more than names. In the middle of the 2nd century, a *phourarchos* was an addressee in a fragmentary letter concerning wheat taxes in Herakleopols;⁶⁰⁴ another second century papyrus, found in the dossier of Dioskourides, mentions the *phourarchos* Hieron in a dispute over the ownership of a jacket.⁶⁰⁵

Phourarchoi and their subordinates could also be involved in legal issues between *poleis*, as

⁶⁰³*P. Tebt.* 1.6 ll. 1.12-16: “[βασιλεὺς Πτολεμαῖος καὶ βασιλισ]σα Κλεοπάτρα | ἡ ἀδελφὴ καὶ βασίλισσα | [Κλεοπάτρα ἡ γυνὴ τοῖς στρατη]γοῖς καὶ τοῖς φρουράρχοις καὶ τοῖς | [ἐπιστάταις τῶν φυλακῶν κ]αὶ ἀρχιφυλακίταις καὶ ἐπιμεληταῖς | [καὶ οἰκονόμοις καὶ βασιλικῶν γ]ραμματεῦσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς | [τὰ βασιλικά πραγματευομένοις] χαίρειν.”

⁶⁰⁴*P. Gen.* 3.132 l. 1-5: “[. . . .]ης τῶι στρατηγῶ[ι τοῦ Ἡρακλεοπολίτου καὶ τῶι φρουράρχῳ καὶ τ]ῶι ἐπιστάτῃ | [τῶν φυ]λακῶν καὶ τῶι γ[ομάρχῃ καὶ τῶι ἐπὶ τῶν προσόδων κα]ὶ τῶι οἰκονόμῳ | [κ]αὶ τῶι βασιλικῶι γραμμα[τεῖ καὶ τῶι ἀντιγραφῆ καὶ τοῖς τοπάρχαις] καὶ τοπογραμ[μα-] | [τεῦσι] καὶ κωμάρχαις καὶ [ἰ] κωμογραμματεῦσι καὶ τῶι ἀρχιφυλακίτ]ῃ καὶ φυλακίταις | [κ]αὶ γεωργοῖς καὶ τοῖς [ἄ]λλοις τὰ βασιλικά πραγματευομένοις χαίρειν.”

⁶⁰⁵*P. Diosk.* 12 ll.1: “Ἰέρωνι τῶν διαδόχων καὶ φρουράρχωι...”

revealed by a boundary dispute in 181 which mentions “...Demetrius the *phourarchos* and his *hyperetes* (subordinate) Asklepiados” in Krokodilopolis.⁶⁰⁶

3.14.6 Egypt: Summary

Ptolemaic *phourarchoi*, most of them mercenary soldiers,⁶⁰⁷ were deeply involved in the social and political systems of their assignments. Although they could be petitioned to act in local civil matters, these *phourarchoi* received their orders from a *strategos* or directly from the king. They controlled critical areas at the boundaries of the kingdom in addition to maintaining order in Greco-Macedonian settlements in the heartland of Egypt, all for the direct benefit of the monarchy. These *phourarchoi* were deeply involved in matters of local administration, and wielded arrest and detention powers over Greco-Macedonian citizens. There is no indication that the appointments of *phourarchoi* were influenced by these local communities; control over the *phourarchia* remained the dominion of the Ptolemies.

3.15 The Decline of Imperial *Phourarchoi*

In the face of growing Roman power in the first century, Greek imperial *phourarchoi* gradually disappear from the historical record. The last significant document that addresses the office within a Greek context is a heavily restored mention in the so-called “piracy” law of 99, which exists in an example from Delphi and a more careless copy discovered at Cnidus.⁶⁰⁸ The document briefly mentions *archons* and *phourarchoi*⁶⁰⁹ who were appointed by the king in Cyprus, the king in Alexandria and Egypt, the king of Cyrene, and the kings

⁶⁰⁶*P. Grenf.* 1.11.11-13: “...ἐν Κ]ροκοδίλων [πόλ]ει | [παρόντ]ος Δη[μητρί]ου τοῦ φρο[υράρ]χου, Ασκληπιάδου | [ὑπηρέ]του...”; For further examples see *P.Rain.Cent.* 45, 46; *UPZ* 1.107.

⁶⁰⁷Spyridakis 1969, 43–44.

⁶⁰⁸Hassall, Crawford and Reynolds 1974, 196; Sumner 1978, 223.

⁶⁰⁹*FD* III 4.37[2] = *SEG* 3.378 ll. 11: “[...οἱ ἄρχοντες ἢ φρούραρχοι, οὓς κ]αταστήσουσιν...”

ruling in Syria.⁶¹⁰ This document shows that the Romans recognized that *phourarchoi* were a feature of royal administration, and the holders of the office were expected to have at least enough power to deny safe anchorage to marauding pirates.

After this date, *phourarchoi* are only found at the margins of the Greek world. The Pontic king Mithridates used the *phourarchia* to secure Heraclea Pontica after conquering it in 73. He installed a garrison of 4,000 men commanded by the Galatian mercenary Konnakorix under the pretext that they would defend the city against the Romans.⁶¹¹

Three years later Mithridates appointed his faithful eunuch Bacchides as *phourarchos* over Sinope, who

“...always suspecting some betrayal from those within [the city] was torturing and slaughtering many citizens, and he made the people grow weary of defending themselves nobly or making an agreement to surrender.”⁶¹²

There is no question that the *phourarchoi* under Mithridates interfered with, and suppressed, the populations of Heraclea Pontica and Sinope for his sole benefit. Konnakorix and Bacchides showed little regard for the welfare of the citizens under their power, and were concerned only with the maintenance of crown authority in their posts. The final instance of an imperial *phourarchos* is found in the Parthian Empire. A papyrus dating to 121 C.E.,⁶¹³ during the reign of the Parthian king Arsaces, mentions the *phourarchos* Menarnaios, who

⁶¹⁰Ibid. II. 7-10: “...Κύπριοι βασιλεύοντα καὶ πρὸς τὸν βασιλ[έα τὸν | ἐν Ἀλε]ξανδρεία καὶ Αἰγύπ[τωι βασιλεύοντα καὶ πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα τὸν ἐν Κυ]ρήνη βασιλεύοντα καὶ πρ[ὸ]ς τοὺς | βασιλεῖς τοὺς ἐν Συρία βασιλευον[τας...”

⁶¹¹*FGrH* 434 F 1 6.2: “τῆι ἐπαύριον δὲ συγκαλέσας τὸ πλῆθος ὁ βασιλεύς, καὶ φίλοις δεξιωσάμενος λόγοις, καὶ τὴν εὐνοίαν πρὸς αὐτὸν παραινέσας σώζειν, τετρακισχιλίους τε φρουροὺς ἐγκαταστήσας καὶ φρούραρχον Κοννακόρηκα, προφάσει τοῦ εἶ Ῥωμαῖοι βουλευθεῖεν ἐπιβουλεύειν, τῆς πόλεως ἐκείνους ὑπερμαχεῖν καὶ σωτήρας εἶναι τῶν ἐνοικούντων, εἶτα δὲ καὶ χρήματα διανείμας τοῖς ἐν αὐτῇ, μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς ἐν τέλει, ἐπὶ τῆς Σινώπης ἐξέπλευσεν.”

⁶¹²Strabo 12.3.11: “ὁ γὰρ ἐγκατασταθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως φρούραρχος Βακχίδης ὑπονοῶν αἰεὶ τινα προδοσίαν ἐκ τῶν ἔνδοθεν καὶ πολλὰς αἰκίας καὶ σφαγὰς ποιῶν, ἀπαγορευσαὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐποίησε πρὸς ἄμφω μῆτ’ ἀμύνασθαι δυναμένους γενναίως μῆτε προσθέσθαι κατὰ συμβάσεις.”

⁶¹³Rostovtzeff and Welles 1930, 165.

was also a member of the first *philo*i and honored as *somatophylax*.⁶¹⁴ He seemingly had civil and military jurisdiction at least over the village of Paliga,⁶¹⁵ and did not have an official position in the city of Doura itself, unless he held an appointment with unique and irrecoverable responsibilities.⁶¹⁶

Mithridates and Arsaces were not Greek rulers themselves, and although they operated within the social orbit of the Greek world, they were certainly divorced from the political and legal structures built by the Successors. The title held by Menarnaios grew from a rich cultural and social memory of the *phourarchos*, even if the political system of the Parthians, and his exact powers, had little to do with their Greek namesakes.⁶¹⁷

3.16 Conclusion

By the close of the second century CE, the office of the *phourarchia* had been a fixture in the Greek world for half a millennium. Although the particulars of the office were varied, the legal framework of the position remained consistent in an imperial context. Imperial appointments were made with little, if any, consultation with a subject community, and the office holder himself did not have to meet specific criteria beyond his usefulness to the imperial power.

Phourarchoi under imperial powers were military officers outside of local jurisdictions, who practiced civil powers that were generally ill-defined. Such ambiguity served their interests, as the *phourarchia* was not bound by local constitutional limits to its authority.

⁶¹⁴*P. Dura. 20*: “βασιλευόντος βασιλέως βασιλέων Ἀρσάκου εὐεργέτου, δικαίου, ἐπιφανοῦς καὶ φιλέλληνος, ἔτους τξη ὡς ὁ βασιλεὺς βασιλ[έων] | ἄγει, ὡς δὲ πρότερον [υ]λβ, μηνὸς Δαισίου ἕκτη ἑπ’ εἰκάδι, ἐν Παλίγαι κώμῃ τῆς περὶ Ἰάρδαν ὑπαρχείας, ἐπὶ Μητολβαίσιςα Μην [.] | τοσδε, ου τοῦ Μηναρναίου, φρ[ουρά]ρχου καὶ τῶν πρώτων καὶ προτιμωμένων φίλων καὶ τῶν σωματοφυλάκων, καὶ τ[ῶν] | ὑπογε[γρ]αμμένων μα[ρτύρ]ων.”

⁶¹⁵See Map 7.

⁶¹⁶Rostovtzeff and Welles 1930, 171.

⁶¹⁷Lukonin 1983, 717.

Phrourarchoi were not necessarily limited to a single location, and they could be called on to serve in the navy, hold multiple *phrourarchiai*, or to move between *poleis* as needed.

Additionally, the *phrourarchia* was not solely restricted to populous areas. Isolated fortresses could also fall under the administration of a *phrourarchos*; such postings were critical components of the system of observation, control, and exploitation practiced by imperial powers.

Imperial *phrourarchoi* were often mercenaries with no connection to the local community. Term limits were unknown. These officers could have lengthy careers so long as they supported the interests of the imperial power. Although *phrourarchoi* could be rewarded with citizenship in a *polis*, they were by and large a skilled corps of officials⁶¹⁸ whose positions were completely reliant upon crown authority and military dominance.

This expansive power is in sharp contrast to Hellenistic *phrourarchoi* in smaller communities, who held strictly military posts without any indication of civil authority. Unlike the imperial *phrourarchoi* explored here, individual communities bound their *phrourarchoi* legally, geographically, and temporally, as the office both secured and threatened local *eleutheria* with its hold over communal fortifications. These local *phrourarchoi*, and the marked difference in their social, legal, and military contexts from their imperial counterparts, are the focus of the following chapter.

⁶¹⁸See Chapter 2.

4 LOCAL PHROURARCHIAI

“...(Prienian exiles) took refuge together in Karion, since one of the citizens was *phrouarchos*, and that the *phrouarchos* and the *phulakes* were all killed, because they chose [the side of] the tyrant..”⁶¹⁹

“...[the *phrouroi* and the *demos*] called on them (the *phrouarchos* Helikon son of Laomedon and his son) to protect the *akra* (Telonia) carefully, since they believe that there is nothing more [important] to the Greeks than freedom...”⁶²⁰

4.1 Introduction

These passages, referring to the *polis* of Priene near the end of the third century, demonstrate two competing realities of local *phrouarchoi*. The *phrouarchos* in Karion supported the extra-constitutional power of a tyrant, and was a serious threat to the *eleutheria* (freedom) of the *polis*. A citizen of Priene himself, this unnamed *phrouarchos* paid the ultimate price for his rejection of the community's *nomos* (law). In contrast, Helikon, the *phrouarchos* on the *akra* of Telonia on Priene, successfully oversaw a critical bastion of local defense which was explicitly tied to the *eleutheria* of the community. He faithfully discharged his duty, and his conduct was rewarded and celebrated by the citizens of Priene.⁶²¹

Priene was one of the quasi-independent *poleis* of Hellenistic Asia Minor, a member of a broad range of communities that were under constant threat from the aggressive and expansive Hellenistic empires of the Ptolemies, Seleucids, and Attalids. Politically,

⁶¹⁹Magnetto 2008, II. 87–90: “[... ἐπὶ στεφαναφόρου Μακαρέως] | [τοῦ μ]ετὰ Ἀθηναγόραν συμφυγεῖν εἰς τὸ Κ[άρι]ον, φρουραρχοῦν|[τος ἐν]θὸς τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ τὸν τε φρούραρχ[ο]ν καὶ τοὺς φύλα|[κας] διὰ τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι τὰ τοῦ τυράννου πάντα διαφθε<τ>ρα...”

⁶²⁰*I. Priene* 19 II. 17-20: “... παρακαλ[ῶ]ν αὐτοὺς [τηρε]ῖν [τὴν] | [ἄκρ]αν ἐπιμελῶς, λογιζομένους ὡς οὐθῆ[ν] | [με]ῖζόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις Ἑλλησιν τῆς ἐ|[λε]υθερίας...”

⁶²¹See below.

Hellenistic Asia Minor was defined by a multi-polar system lacking any central governing authority to regulate relations among the communities of the region; the system created a political reality based on violence and the threat of violence due to competition for security, position, and survival.⁶²² This uncertainty was mirrored by an unstable domestic situation and crippling *stasis* (internal conflict) that plagued many Greek *poleis*.⁶²³

In this complex and often chaotic situation, some *poleis* entrusted the protection of their *eleutheria* and autonomy to *phrourarchoi*, often placing the commanders within the very heart of local defenses. At the same time, these *poleis* were well aware of the threat posed by a *phrourarchos* who placed political factionalism or personal gain above the community's *eleutheria*. To mitigate this danger, the *phrourarchia* in these smaller communities did not blend civil and military powers, and instead remained solely focused on the physical security of the *polis* and its territorial possessions.

All of these local *phrourarchiai* shared the same general characteristics. They were established and selected by the *demos*, exercised only military authority, and were required to adhere strictly to the *nomos* of the community. Complete subordination to local law, not imperial mandate, was the single most important difference between imperial and local *phrourarchoi*. A *phrourarchia* which had defined legal limitations and responsibilities was largely foreign to imperial states, which typically treated the office as a tool of political and social domination.⁶²⁴

The cities of Hellenistic Asia Minor were very aware of imperial *phrourarchoi*, and some *poleis* even used the institution in their own, locally limited imperialism and hegemony over

⁶²²Eckstein 2006, 1–13; Fernoux 2004, 119.

⁶²³Hansen 2006, 125–126; Manicas 1982, 680.

⁶²⁴See Chapter 2.

smaller communities.⁶²⁵ Even in this context, the *phrourarchia* remained under the *nomos* of the *polis*, retained its military focus, and did not possess any civic powers or authority against the subject community.⁶²⁶ Outside of these powerful *poleis*, the independence and autonomy of most Greek cities were limited by their more powerful neighbors, and they could be absorbed, attacked, or otherwise suppressed by Hellenistic monarchs. This is not to say that such *poleis* were necessarily passive victims of imperialism, as there was a complex system of language, exchange, obligation, and benefaction that defined the relationship of the monarchy to Greco-Macedonian communities. A monarch could be accommodated, resisted or even subverted by a “subject” *polis*.⁶²⁷

One strategy used by these *poleis* to retain their autonomy against imperial encroachment was political merger through the mechanisms of *sympoliteia* and *synoikismos*; these could provide the impetus for establishing a new *phrourarchia*. *Synoikismos* was the combination of multiple communities into one center from settlements which were poorly defended and geographically scattered.⁶²⁸ Although the phenomenon of *sympoliteia* throughout Greek history has still to be examined in a comprehensive study,⁶²⁹ in the Hellenistic world it was generally related to either a federal union or a merger of two small communities, a development which sometimes led to the absorption of one of the *poleis* by the other.⁶³⁰ As a result of such a union, the different communities generally shared public worship, along with

⁶²⁵Eckstein 2006, 91–93.

⁶²⁶See below.

⁶²⁷See Chapter 5.

⁶²⁸Welles 1934, #3 & #4 = *Syll.*³ 344; Reger 1997, 468.

⁶²⁹Reger 2004, 146.

⁶³⁰Robert and Robert 1976; Maier 1959, #74 = *SEG* 19.678 = *SEG* 37.984 & 987; Pascual 2007, 177; Reger 2004, 148.

political and judicial institutions.⁶³¹ It was not necessarily a benign arrangement, as some *sympoliteiai* could serve as cover for outright annexation of a smaller community by a more powerful *polis*.⁶³² These arrangements were notably paralleled to some extent in treaties of *isopoliteia*, wherein citizens from different communities enjoyed equal citizenship rights (similar to a *sympoliteia*), but did not move *en masse* into one of the communities over the other.⁶³³ *Isopoliteiai* were often made by two autonomous communities of somewhat equal size and importance, although the agreements could originate from the dominance of one city over another.⁶³⁴

In most of these mergers, the protection of the *polis* was of paramount concern. The *phrourarchia* was - much like the political unions themselves - a component of local security against imperial annexation. At the same time, the dominant *polis* could use *phrourarchoi* as tools of micro-imperialism and a method of control over a smaller and less powerful polity.⁶³⁵ The inherent contradictions of the *phrourarchia* are nowhere more clearly apparent than in these political arrangements.

Whatever the reason for their existence, the *phrourarchoi* in these smaller communities never lost their military focus. As the advent of Roman power in Asia Minor rendered the protection of major urban areas redundant, *phrourarchoi* were no longer found within the center of *poleis* themselves. Instead, they remained in the external possessions of *poleis*, where they continued to protect their assets from pirates, brigandage, and other small-scale

⁶³¹Syll³ 633 (l. 65) = SEG 34.1173 = SEG 37.984; Pascual 2007, 183.

⁶³²Fernoux 2004, 133.

⁶³³Gruen 1984, 70.

⁶³⁴*Milet*. I. 3. 136, 137, 141, 146; Fernoux 2004, 130.

⁶³⁵See below.

threats. The similar form and function of local *phrouarchoi* is revealed by examining *poleis* individually. Despite some minor variations, all local *phrouarchoi* remained subordinate to the community's *nomos*, were recruited from local or naturalized citizens, and only held limited military authority.⁶³⁶

4.2 Teos

The history of Teos in the Hellenistic period is unknown in any meaningful detail,⁶³⁷ although some general trends can be identified. Near the end of the fourth century (c. 304 – 302), Teos and the nearby *polis* of Klazomenai may have been involved in a boundary dispute that was adjudicated by judges from Kos, possibly with the oversight of Antigonos I.⁶³⁸ Another significant event was the proposed *synoikismos* between Teos and Lebedos, which was instigated by Antigonos in c. 306-302.⁶³⁹ Although he took some pains to appear as a neutral arbiter, it is evident that he controlled the proceedings, which had the potential to erase the unique civic identity of each community.⁶⁴⁰ There is significant disagreement as to the success of this proposal, with some scholars arguing that it was partially successful, although the majority opinion is that the *synoikismos* was never implemented.⁶⁴¹

Whatever the outcome of the *synoikismos* between Teos and Lebedos, at some point in the third century Teos absorbed the neighboring community of Kyrbissos through the mechanism of *sympoliteia*. In this agreement, the Kyrbissians remained settled around their

⁶³⁶Imperial *phrouarchoi* had a very different relationship with local law; see Chapter 3 and Chapter 5

⁶³⁷Robert and Robert 1976, 160.

⁶³⁸Segre 1993, 174 = *SEG* 28.697; Wehrli 1968, 87–89; Ager 1991, 93.

⁶³⁹Welles 1934, 3 & 4 = *Syll.*³ 344.

⁶⁴⁰Ager 1998, 6–9; Walbank 1993, 136–137; Bevan 1902, 114–115; Kosmin 2014, 336 n. 6.

⁶⁴¹Ager 1998, 10–12.

acropolis and *phourion* instead of physically relocating to Teos.⁶⁴² The exact political status of Teos itself at the time is unclear: it could have been quasi-independent, or under the sway of one of the Hellenistic monarchies (indeed Antiochus and Teos may have been associated as early as 204).⁶⁴³ Whatever the status of Teos, it was the dominant partner in the *sympoliteia*, and it was Teos that was responsible for the defense of Kyrbissos. The treaty began with reciprocal oaths:

“...those citizens in the *polis* (Teos) swear that they will not utterly destroy Kyrbissos nor permit another according to [their] power [to do the same] nor abandon any of the citizens who are *katoikoi* in Kyrbissos: and the *katoikoi* in Kyrbissos too swear that they will not abandon the *phourarchos* who is sent by the *demos* and will guard carefully the fortress for the *polis*...”⁶⁴⁴

The particulars of these oaths were critically important, as they were repeated nearly word for word later in the inscription with some additional responsibilities for the citizens of Kyrbissos:

“...that the oath of those living in the *polis* be as follows: I will not utterly destroy Kyrbissos nor permit another according to [my] power [to do the same] nor abandon any of the citizens who are *katoikoi* in Kyrbissos...of the *katoikoi* in Kyrbissos: I will not leave behind the *phourarchos* who is sent by the *demos* from the *polis*, and I will guard carefully the *chorion* for the *polis*, and if I know that someone is plotting against the *chorion* or the *phourarchos* I will make it known to the *polis* and the *phourarchos*, and I will not give up [the *chorion*] according to my power, and I will do what the *phourarchos* commands in regards the protection of the *chorion* and the *chora*...”⁶⁴⁵

⁶⁴²Robert and Robert 1976, 153–235 = Sokolowski 1980, 103–106 = *SEG* 26.1306 = *SEG* 30.1376.

⁶⁴³*SEG* 41.1003; Chaniotis 2005, 73; Errington 1989, 283; Robert and Robert 1976, 156–160 & 191–192.

⁶⁴⁴Robert and Robert 1976, 2-7: “...ὁμο[ό]σαι [τ]οὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει[ι πο]||[λίτας μὴ κα]τασκάψειν Κυρβισσὸν μηδ’ ἐτέρω[ι] ἐπιτρέψειν κα[τὰ] | [δύναμιν μη]δ’ ἐγκαταλίπειν μηθένα τῶν πολιτῶν τῶν ἐγ Κυρβισσῶ[ι] | [κατοικούν]των· ὁμοσαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐγ Κυρβισσῶι κατοικούντας [μὴ] | [ἐγκαταλείψ]ειν τὸν φρουραρχὸν τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἀποστελλόμενον | [καὶ διαφ]υλάξειν τὸ χωρίον τῇ πόλει...”

⁶⁴⁵*Ibid.*, ll. 42-50: “...τὸ[ν δὲ] | [ὄ]ρκον εἶναι τῶμ μὲν ἐ[ν] τῇ[ι] πόλει οἰκούντων τόνδε· οὐ κατασκάψω | [Κυρ]βισσὸν οὐδ’ ἐτέρωι ἐπιτρέψ[ω] [κ]α[τὰ] δὲ δύναμιν τὴν ἐμὴν οὐδ’ ἐγ[κ]α[ταλ]είψω τῶμ πολιτῶν τῶν ἐγ [Κυρβισσῶι] κατοικούντων οὐθένα...|τῶν δὲ ἐγ Κυρβ[ι]σσ[ῶι] κατοικούντων· οὐ[κ] | [ἐγ]καταλί[ψω] τ[ὸ]μ φρουραρχ[ὸν] τὸν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἀ[πο]στελλόμενον καὶ διαφυλάξω [τ]ὸ χω[ρί]ον τῇ πόλει καὶ ἂν [εἰδῶ] | [τινα] ἐπιβουλευόντα τῷ χωρίω ἢ τῷ φρου[ρ]άρχω δηλώσω τῇ[ι] | [πόλει] καὶ τῷ φρουράρχ[ῳ] καὶ οὐκ [ἐπ]ιτρέψω κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν ἐ[μ]ή[ν] καὶ ὅ τι ἂν ὁ φρουραρχος παραγ[γ]ε[ῖ]μι ποιήσω ὅσα εἰς φυλ[ακ]ή[ν] | [τοῦ] χω[ρί]ου καὶ τῆς χώρας...”

Like the citizens of Teos and Kyrbissos, the *phourarchos* and the *phouroi* also had to swear an oath:

“...the *phourarchos* and the *phouroi* before being dispatched will swear in the *agora* that they will give back and guard well the *chorion* for the *polis*; They will also swear the customary oath; the *strategoï* and the *timouchoi* will administer their oaths.”⁶⁴⁶

These oaths address some critically important points for the relationship between the communities and the powers of the *phourarchos*. First, the Teans swear that they will not destroy Kyrbissos or abandon the citizens there, cementing Tean primacy in the defense of the fortress at Kyrbissos. The Teans also indicate that the *phourarchia* was solely intended to guard the *chora* of the community, as they limited the commands that a *phourarchos* could issue to the citizens of Kyrbissos to matters that concerned the maintenance and protection of the fortress and the *chora*. Outside of these strictly defined areas, there is no indication that the *phourarchos* exercised any authority.

Although the *phourarchia* in this treaty was a defensive institution that oversaw the protection of Kyrbissos, it worked primarily for the interests of Teos. The Teans and the Kyrbissians shared responsibility for the protection of the fortress, but the oaths of the Teans, the *phourarchos*, and the *phouroi* explicitly state that the *phourarchia* was intended to guard the fortress for the benefit of the *polis* of Teos itself.

The possible implications of this unequal merger were not lost on the Teans. The oath required the Kyrbissians to assist in the defense of the fortress, to report any plots against the *phourarchos*, not to hand over the location to another party, and to follow the commands of the *phourarchos* which were related to security. The Teans obviously thought that the citizens of Kyrbissos might resent the imposition of the *phourarchos* or of Tean *katoikoi*,

⁶⁴⁶Ibid., ll. 34-39: “...[τὸν] δὲ φρούραρχον [καὶ] | τοὺς φρουροὺς περι[ν] ἀποστέλλ[ε]σθαι ὁ[μνύν]αι [ἐν] τῇ ἀγορᾷ | ἢ μὴν ἀποδώσειν καὶ δι[ι]αφυλάξειν τῇ πε[ρί] τὸ χωρίον· ἐπομύναι δ[ε] | [τ]ὸν νόμιμον ὄρκον· ὀρκισάντων δὲ αὐτ[οὺς] οἱ τε στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ τιμ[ο]χ[ο]οί...”

and that this unrest could lead to a revolt against Teos.⁶⁴⁷ Through the mechanism of religious obligation and oaths, the Teans took steps to ensure the compliance of the smaller community.

Although the *phourarchia* primarily supported Tean interests, it was still bound by regulations, including basic eligibility to stand for the office. The requirements for a presumptive office holder were clearly spelled out:

“A *phourarchos* will be appointed for Kyrbissos who is no younger than thirty years old for a term of four months, whose property valuation, of land and house, is four talents...”⁶⁴⁸

These requirements ensured that any prospective *phourarchos* had deep-seated ties to the community, which he would be reluctant to sever. He had to own property that met a minimum value of four talents, an enormous sum that far exceeded the reach of a typical wage-earner.⁶⁴⁹ Such requirements ensured that the *phourarchia* was the exclusive purview of the economic elite and inaccessible to the vast majority of the citizens.⁶⁵⁰ In addition, there was a further stipulation that the *phourarchos* would not have held the post within the past five years,⁶⁵¹ which prevented an individual *phourarchos* from accruing a large power base in Kyrbissos.

Despite the wealth restriction, the *phourarchia* in Teos was fundamentally a democratic position which was voted on by the assembly. The process was itself subject to the *nomos* of the community:

“Any citizen wishing to nominate swears in the assembly: The oath shall be: I will

⁶⁴⁷Chaniotis 2002, 104; Chaniotis 2005, 92–93.

⁶⁴⁸Robert and Robert 1976 153–235 = Sokolowski 1980, 103–106 = *SEG* 26.1306 = *SEG* 30.1376 ll. 8-11: “ἀποδείκνυσθαι δὲ καὶ φ[ροῦ]||[ραρχο]ν εἰς Κυρβισσὸν μὴ νεώτερον τριήκοντα ἐτέων κατὰ τετρά[μη]|| [νον ὧ] ἐστὶ τίμημα γῆς καὶ οἰκίας ἐλεύθερον τεσσέρων ταλάν[των]...”

⁶⁴⁹Chaniotis 2005, 116; Griffith 1935, 305–310.

⁶⁵⁰See Chapter 5 for further analysis.

⁶⁵¹*Ibid.*, ll. 16.

nominate as *phourarchos* in Kyrbissos someone who I think will best and most justly see to the protection of the *chorion* and the guarding of the *chorion* for the *polis*...”⁶⁵²

A potential *phourarchos* therefore had to meet strict eligibility requirements and to go through a nomination process in the assembly, all in accordance with the *nomos* of the community. *Phourarchoi* who served under imperial powers were appointed quite differently: the mechanisms of their appointment were either obscure or at the whim of a monarch. Also unlike the case of imperial *phourarchoi*, whose position and powers were seldom defined explicitly, the Teans clearly laid out the basic responsibilities of the post and the forces under the command of their *phourarchos*:

“...the *phourarchos* will have no less than twenty of the citizens as *phouroi* and three dogs; the *polis*, purchasing the dogs, will hand them over to the *phourarchos*; the *phourarchos* will maintain the dogs...”⁶⁵³

Although the force of Teans at Kyrbissos was small, the *phourarchia* and the *phouroi* were all citizens, and were not mercenaries or other foreigners. In addition to tending to the guard-dogs, the *phourarchos* was in a position of authority over his fellow Tean citizens. The *phourarchos* was not at liberty to deal with the *phouroi* as he wished, as his actions against his fellow citizens were limited:

“...if someone [of the *phouroi*] is undisciplined or does not listen to the *phourarchos*, it shall be possible for the *phourarchos* to bind and discharge him...”⁶⁵⁴

The *phourarchos* could only physically restrain a trouble-maker and discharge him from

⁶⁵²Robert and Robert 1976, 153–235 = Sokolowski 1980, 103–106 = *SEG* 26.1306 = *SEG* 30.1376, ll. 11-14: “...κατά]ρχειν δὲ τὸμ βουλόμενον τῶμ πολιτῶν ὀμνύντα ἐν τῆι ἐκκλη|[σίαι· ὁ] δὲ ὄρκος ἔστω· κατάρξω φρουραρχον εἰς Κυρβισσὸν ὅστις μο[ι] | [ἄν δόξη] ἄριστα καὶ δικαιοτάτα ἐπιμελέσει[σ]θαι τῆς φυλακῆς τοῦ χωρί[ου] καὶ διαφυλάξειν τὸ χωρίον τῆι πόλει...”

⁶⁵³*Ibid.*, ll. 18-21: “...φρ[ου]ροὺς δ’ ἔχειν τὸ[μ] φρο[ύ]ραρχον μ]ἢ ἐλάττους ἢ εἴκοσι τῶμ πολιτῶν καὶ | κυνὰς τρεῖς· τοὺς δὲ κυνὰς [π]ριαμένην παραδοῦναι τῶι φρουράρχω[ι] | τῆμ πόλιν· τρέφειν [δὲ] τοὺς κυνὰς τὸμ [φ]ρούραρχον...”

⁶⁵⁴*Ibid.* ll. 31-33: “...ἐὰν δ]έ τις [ἀ]τάκτη ἢ μὴ πε[ι] | [θ]άρχηι τοῦ φρουράρχο[υ], ἐ[ξ]ε]ῖναι [τῶι φρ]ουράρχωι καὶ καταδεῖν κα[ι] | ἀπόμισθον ποιῆσαι...”

the *phourion*. Unlike in Ptolemaic Egypt,⁶⁵⁵ there were no further policing powers or interference with local administration given to the *phourarchos*. The position was to be solely focused on the functioning of the *phourion* and the discipline of the *phouroi*. It possessed no direct authority to interfere with the day-to-day lives of the citizens of Kyrbissos.⁶⁵⁶ The *polis* was gravely concerned with the danger of a *phourarchos* who remained in Kyrbissos after the term of his service expired, and instituted severe penalties, including the loss of life and property, for any *phourarchos* who dared to hold the fortress past his term.⁶⁵⁷

4.3 Priene

Another important glimpse into the workings of the *phourarchia* is found in Priene, a *polis* physically dominated by the acropolis of Teloneia. Priene enjoyed freedom from tribute and autonomy for most of the third century,⁶⁵⁸ an independence which was supported by the permanent presence of Prienian citizen-soldiers on Teloneia.⁶⁵⁹

A defining event in the early Hellenistic history of Priene, although poorly documented and understood, was the tyranny of Hieron, a native of the city. After the battle of Ipsos in 301, he seized power there before Lysimachos was able to assert his complete control over Ionia,⁶⁶⁰ although Hieron kept the *polis* politically aligned with Lysimachos.⁶⁶¹ Hieron's

⁶⁵⁵See Chapter 3.

⁶⁵⁶There still could be an implied threat and indirect interference from the mere presence of *phouroi* and a *phourion*; see Chapter 5.

⁶⁵⁷*Ibid.* II. 22-27: “...ὅς δ’ ἂν παραλαβὼν | τὸ χωρίον μὴ παραδῶ[ι τ]ῶι φρουράρχω[ι] τῶ[ι] ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀποσ[τελ]λομένωι ἀεὶ καθ’ ἐκάστην τετράμη[νο]ν, φ[ε]ύγειν τε αὐτὸν ἄραιον | ἐκ Τέω καὶ ἐξ Ἀβδήρων καὶ ἐκ τῆς χώρας καὶ τῆς Τηίων καὶ τῆς Ἀβδηρ[ι]τῶν καὶ τὰ ὄντα αὐτοῦ δη[μό]σια εἶ[ν]αι, καὶ ὅς ἂν ἀποκτείνῃ αὐτὸν μ[ὴ] | μισρὸς ἔστω· ἐὰν δὲ μαχόμενος [ἀποθάνῃ, ὑπάρχ]ε[ι]ν αὐτοῦ δημόσια τὰ ὄν[τα]...”; See Chapter 5.

⁶⁵⁸Hicks 1883, 239–240.

⁶⁵⁹Asboeck 1913, 122; cf. Couvenhes 2004, 81.

⁶⁶⁰Teegarden 2014, 154.

regime was difficult for the Prienians; Pausanias relates that the citizens “were maltreated” at the hands of the tyrant.⁶⁶² The unbearable situation caused many Prienians to flee the *polis*; some went to the *phrourion* of Charax in the territory of Ephesus, where they received material support from Ephesus itself.⁶⁶³ Others went to the *phrourion* of Karion, situated in the region of Dryoussa on the border of Priene and Samos.⁶⁶⁴ Hieron's ultimate fate is unknown, but he seems to have been overthrown in 299/98, with Priene's democracy then restored.⁶⁶⁵

A much later inscription, dated to 196-192, casts some light on this unsettled time.⁶⁶⁶ At this later date, Priene and Samos disputed the ownership of Karion in a case adjudicated by Rhodian judges. To support their claim of possession, Priene presented as evidence the history of their involvement in Karion, stating that

“...that [during the period of the *stephanophoros* of Makareos], the successor of Athenagoras (during the tyranny of Hieron), they took refuge together in Karion, since one of the citizens was *phrourarchos*, and that the *phrourarchos* and the *phulakes* were all killed, because they chose [the side of] the tyrant...”⁶⁶⁷

Some scholars have viewed this report as evidence of a direct attack against Karion by

⁶⁶¹Jouguet and Dobie 1928, 351.

⁶⁶²Paus. 7.2.10: “Πριηνεῖς ...καὶ ὕστερον ὑπὸ Ἱέρωνος ἀνδρὸς ἐπιχωρίου κακωθέντες...”

⁶⁶³Heberdey 1899, 47–48 = *I. Priene* 494; Heberdey, Niemann and Wilberg 1912, #1 = *Syll.*³ 363; Holleaux 1916, 29–45 = *I. Eph.* 2001 = *SEG* 32.1127 = Migeotte 1984, 89 = *SEG* 37.882; Habicht 1985, 84.

⁶⁶⁴This was part of a territory on the mainland of Asia Minor which was often controlled by Samos. See Shipley 1987, 31-37; Mignetto 2008, 9.

⁶⁶⁵Jouguet and Dobie 1928, 351–352; Habicht 1985, 84; Chaniotis 2008, 117.

⁶⁶⁶Kerameus 1880, 339 #10A = Newton, Hicks and Hirschfeld 1874, 403 & 408 = *I. Priene* 37 & 38 = *Syll.*³ 599 = *SEG* 4.474 = Migeotte 1984, #92 = Shipley 1987, 29 n. 31, 34, 50 = *SEG* 37.876.

⁶⁶⁷Mignetto 2008, ll. 87–90: “[... ἐπὶ στεφαναφόρου Μακαρέως] | [τοῦ μ]ετὰ Ἀθηναγόραν συμφυγεῖν εἰς τὸ Κ[άρι]ον, φρουραρχοῦν[τος ἐν]ός τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ τὸν τε φρουραρχ[ο]ν καὶ τοὺς φύλα[[κας] διὰ τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι τὰ τοῦ τυράννου πάντα διαφθε<τ>ραι...”

Priean exiles.⁶⁶⁸ This interpretation is not supported by the text, however, as the inscription only indicates that the citizens took refuge together in the *phourion*, and then killed the *phourarchos* and the *phulakes*. There is no explicit statement that the exiles directly assaulted the location.

The importance of the *phourion* here is obvious. It could serve as a rallying point for Priean exiles, and was the subject of intense debate between Priene and Samos because of its location at the border between the two *poleis*. The *phourarchia* within Karion is much less understood, although it proved insufficient to contain Priean exiles. This is a unique instance where the citizens of a *polis* were able to overcome a local *phourarchos* without significant outside intervention, although the Ephesians may have provided some support to the exiles as they did at Charax.⁶⁶⁹ It is possible that the *phourarchos* fell victim to Prieanians who were already housed within the *phourion*; this was how Xenopeithes, *phourarchos* under Antigonos, was overpowered and killed by a small band of escaped prisoners in 317.⁶⁷⁰ Whatever method the Priean exiles used to overcome the *phourarchos*, they felt that he, along with his *phulakes*, constituted a material threat to their *eleutheria* and had to be eliminated.

Even so, the fate of the *phourarchos* of Karion was exceptional. For the most part, the Prieanians lavishly praised their *phourarchoi*, especially the overseers of Teloneia. Such celebration can be seen in an honorary decree proposed by the *phouroi* in Teloneia in the second half of the third century for their *phourarchos*, Helikon son of Laomedon.⁶⁷¹ Helikon,

⁶⁶⁸Chaniotis 2008, 117.

⁶⁶⁹See Chapter 5 for an analysis of the relationships and conflicts between *phourarchoi* and *poleis*.

⁶⁷⁰Diod. Sic. 19.16.1

⁶⁷¹*I. Priene* 19 and p. 308 ll. 29: “οἱ φρουροὶ οἱ ἐν Τηλωνήα[ι]...[Ἐλ]ικῶν Λεωμέδοντος ἀποδειχθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ

apparently the great grandson of another Laomedon (who was a Persian satrap in Syria in 323/320),⁶⁷² received praise for his just behavior and his custodianship over the *akra*:

“...since Helikon son of Laomedon, having been chosen by the *demos* as *phourarchos* in Teloneia, and having been *phourarchos* in the first four months of the *stephanophoros* of Protarchos, exercised all care and zeal for safety of the *phulake* himself so that it was in good order, making the rounds again, and his son in turn having a hand for the sake of the security of the *phourion*, and he provided for the *phouroi* in other [respects]...”⁶⁷³

This inscription, although not directly addressing the regulations of the *phourarchia* in the same manner as the treaty between Teos and Kybrissos, offers a detailed view into the workings of the office and the concerns of the *polis*. The inscription reveals that the term of office was four months, in this case at the beginning of the *stephanophoros* of Protarchos, the eponymous official of the year.⁶⁷⁴ Furthermore, Helikon had already left his position at the time of the inscription and relinquished the *phourarchia* to his successor without incident. This was not the first time that Helikon held the position, although it is impossible to know what the interval was between his postings.

Although it is a minor point in the inscription, the selection of the *phourarchos* is a matter of interest. The *phulakes* state that Helikon was “...chosen by the *demos* as *phourarchos* in Teloneia...”⁶⁷⁵ Thus, his particular election as *phourarchos* was specifically for Teloneia itself, and was not a random assignment.⁶⁷⁶

vacat [δή]μου φρούραρχος...”; see also Hicks 1883, 238

⁶⁷²Hiller von Gaertringen et al. 1906, 27; Grainger 1997, 359.

⁶⁷³*I. Priene* 19 and p. 308, ll. 4-13: “...ἐπειδὴ vacat | [Ἐλ]ικῶν Λεωμέδοντος ἀποδειχθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ vacat | [δή]μου φρούραρχος εἰς Τηλώνησαν καὶ φρουραρχή[[σα]ς ἐπὶ στεφανηφόρου Πρωτάρχου τὴν πρώτην | [τ]ετράμηνον τῆς τε φυλακῆς πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλει[[α]ν καὶ σπουδὴν ἐποιήσατο, ὅπως ἂν εὐτακτῆ|ται, ἐφοδεύων αὐτὸς καὶ πάλιν τοῦ υἱοῦ δια [[λα]]| λαβόντος ἔνεκεν τῆς ἀσφαλείας τοῦ φρουρι[[ου],] καὶ τῶμ φρουρῶν προενόησεν ἔν τε τοῖς ἄλλ[[λ]οις...”

⁶⁷⁴Dmitriev 2005, 82; Sherk 1992, 242

⁶⁷⁵*I. Priene* 19, ll. 5-6.

⁶⁷⁶cf. Baker 2001, 69 who believes that *phourarchoi* in Miletus were elected as a group then randomly assigned

Helikon's powers as *phrouarchos* were restricted to matters directly concerning the *phourion* and the *phrouoi*, and he seems to have been preoccupied with patrolling and ensuring the smooth functioning of the *akra*. His powers were strictly military; the inscription does not mention any other duties or responsibilities of the office outside of the *akra* of Teloneia.

This inscription also provides the most explicit justification for the presence of a *phourarchia* in an independent *polis*:

“... [they] called on them to protect the *akra* carefully, since they believe that there is nothing more [important] to Greeks than *eleutheria*...”⁶⁷⁷

The *phrouoi* declared that the *akra* was intertwined with the *eleutheria* of the community, and it was up to the *phourarchos* to protect the *akra* against any and all threats. The *akra* and the *phourarchia* did not just protect the *chora* and the physical property of the *polis*, but they guarded the very existence of the *eleutheria* that defined the community. The *phulakes* on Teloneia, and by extension the *demos*, celebrated the critical role that the *phourarchia* played in the preservation of their community.⁶⁷⁸

* * * * *

Although the socio-economic status of Helikon is irrecoverable, our knowledge of other Prienian *phourarchoi* reveals that the institution was dominated by the city's elite. A certain Nymphon enjoyed a long career in public service in Priene, including his appointment to the *phourarchia*. In a decree dating to 277 and apparently before he was *phourarchos*, he was

to their posts.

⁶⁷⁷I. Priene 19, ll. 17-20.

⁶⁷⁸Helikon was not the only *phourarchos* to be honored directly by citizens in Teloneia. In a heavily fragmentary inscription from the 2nd or 3rd centuries, the (restored) *phrouoi* in Teloneia dedicated an inscription to their *phourarchos* Thrasyboulos son of Thrasyboulos (I. Priene 252). The inscription is so fragmentary that nothing more can be said about the *phourarchos*.

honored for being a benefactor of the *polis*; unfortunately no details are given in what survives of the inscription.⁶⁷⁹ The mere fact that Nymphon was honored for his benefactions indicates that he was a man of significant social and economic status within the community.⁶⁸⁰ Nymphon is next mentioned in a decree from c. 266, where he was honored by the *demos* for his actions at the expiry of his term as *phourarchos*. The inscription reveals that he was

“...having been chosen as *phourarchos* of the *akra* by the *demos* and having remained for the entire time in the *phourion* according to the *nomos* and having carefully and honorably guarded [the *phourion*] with the *phouroi*, he handed it over to the *demos* according to as he received [it]...”⁶⁸¹

A third inscription mentions Nymphon as holding the *phourarchia* again, dated to 262.⁶⁸² In it,

“...since Nymphon having been previously elected as a *phourarchos* over the *akra* by the *demos*, having carefully and justly guarded [the *akra*] with the *phouroi*, gave it back to the *demos* according to how he received it, and again having been chosen a second time [as] *phourarchos* by the *demos* over the *akra*, he remained there the entire time according to the *nomos*, and gave [the *phourion*] back to the *demos*...”⁶⁸³

In both inscriptions, Nymphon was specifically honored for remaining in his post for the duration of his assignment. This was a critical concern of a community, as local *phourarchoi*

⁶⁷⁹*I. Priene* 20, ll. 1-4: “...[ὅπως δὲ πάντες εἰδῶ][σιν, ὅτι οἱ καλῶς κ]αὶ φιλοτίμως τ[ὴν πόλιν εὐεργε]τ[ήσ]αντες ε[ἶς] ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον [μνημονεύων]ται...”

⁶⁸⁰*Euergetism* (benefaction) was largely the exclusive domain of the elite. See Reden 2010, 177 and Zuiderhoek 2011, 185.

⁶⁸¹*I. Priene* 21, ll. 11-15: “...φρουράρχος ἀποδειχθεὶς τῆς ἄ[κρας] | ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου διέμεινέ τε πάντα τὸν χρόνον ἐν τῷ φρουρίῳ κατὰ τὸν νόμον καὶ ἐπιμελῶς καὶ φιλοτίμως διαφυλάξας μετὰ τῶν φρουρῶν παρέδωκε τῷ δήμῳ καθότι καὶ παρέλαβεν...”

⁶⁸²Hicks 1883, 237–242 = *I. Priene* 22 = Holleaux 1907, 383.

⁶⁸³*I. Priene* 22, ll. 3-11: “ἐπειδὴ Νύμφων[ν] | [Π]ρωτάρχου πρότερόν τε φρούραρχος ἀποδει[χ]θεὶς τῆς ἄκρας ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἐπιμελῶς τε καὶ δι[κ]α[τ]ίως διαφυλάξας μετὰ τῶν φρουρῶν παρέδω[κεν] αὐ[τὴν] τῷ δήμῳ καθότι καὶ παρέλαβεν, καὶ π[ά]λιν τὸ δεῦτερον ἀποδειχθεὶς φρούραρχος ὑπὸ τοῦ | [δήμου] τῆς ἄκρας διέμεινέ τε πάντα τὸν χρόνον | [ἐν τῷ φρ]ουρίῳ κατὰ τὸν νόμον καὶ παρέδωκεν τῷ | [δήμῳ]...”

were hardly expected to have an eventful tenure in office,⁶⁸⁴ and a *phrouarchos* who became slack or too restive could pose a significant threat to the territorial integrity of a *polis* if he abandoned his post. Although it was necessary for a *phrouarchos* to remain at his assignment, it was critically necessary for a *phrouarchos* to leave at the end of his tenure, and the decree reveals that Helikon did so without any problems or complaint at the expiry of his term. Much like Helikon, the decrees reveal that he was twice chosen by the *demos*, indicating that he was specifically elected for the *phrouarchia* over Telonia.

Unlike the decree celebrating his euergetism, these decrees emphasize Nymphon's military duties and adherence to the law, not his wealth. There is no evidence that he was required to meet substantial expenses while in office, other than a vague reference to furnishing unspecified supplies for the *phrouroi*. Instead, the decree celebrates his performance of two key duties of the *phrouarchia*: guardianship of the *akra* and adherence to the *nomos*.

Apellis son of Nikophontos was another Prienian *phrouarchos*; several inscriptions reveal that he had a long and successful career in public office. It emerges first that he held the position of *grammateus* (secretary) for two decades; for fourteen of those years he personally covered the expenses of the *strategoï*, the *nomophulakes*, and the *timouchos*.⁶⁸⁵ Apellis was clearly an elite citizen of Priene, as it is unlikely that he would be able to cover such expenses for so long if he did not have a substantial source of income and independent wealth. At the end of his term Apellis did not wish to withdraw entirely from civic life in Priene: a restored section of the text indicates that he was “...now that he has been released

⁶⁸⁴See Chapter 5.

⁶⁸⁵*I. Priene* 4 ll. 16-19.

from the [office of] the *grammateus*, he is longing to become *phourarchos*.⁶⁸⁶

A second decree from Priene reveals that Apellis got his wish; he

“...was selected as *phourarchos* in the *akra* of Telonia, carefully guarded the tower, and gave [it] back to the *demos*...”⁶⁸⁷

There is no indication in this inscription that the *phourarchia* required a substantial outlay of funds from Apellis, or that his assignment was anything other than a military posting. Apellis, much like Nymphon, was praised for giving back to the *demos* the *phourarchia* and the *phourion* at the expiry of his term. This is further evidence that the act of relinquishing the *phourarchia* without incident was - in addition to physically protecting the *akra* - one of the most important functions of a *phourarchos*.

A certain Bias, honored in a third century decree, must have been another Prienian *phourarchos*. Although his official position is not revealed in what remains of the inscription, he was praised in the same manner as other *phourarchoi*:

“...from the beginning continually remained in the *phourion*, managing everything without blemish and justly as set down in the law, and he paid close attention to the guarding of the *phourion*...”⁶⁸⁸

The decrees honoring Apellis, Bias, Nymphon, and Helikon refer to similar powers of the *phourarchia* and the regulations governing the office. The nearly identical language honoring these men suggests the use of standardized honors given to exemplary *phourarchoi* at the expiry of their term, and stresses two key duties of the *phourarchia*: unwavering adherence to the *nomos* of Priene and physical guardianship of the *phourion*. All of the powers and regulations governing Prienian *phourarchoi* derive from these two concerns, so

⁶⁸⁶Ibid., ll.21-22: “καὶ [ἐπιθ]υ[μ]εῖμ παραλυθεὶς τῆς | γραμματείας [φρουραρχ]ο[ς] γενέσθαι...”

⁶⁸⁷Ibid., ll. 50-53: “...ἐπειδὴ Ἄπελλις Νικοφῶντος φρούραρχ[ος] ἀ[ί]ρεθεις τ[ῆ]ς ἄκρας τῆς ἐν Τηλωνείαι καλῶς καὶ φιλοτίμως διεφύλα[ξε] τὸμ [π]ύργ[ου] καὶ ἀπέδωκε τῶι δήμωι...”

⁶⁸⁸I. Priene 23, ll. 5-8: “...διετέ]λεσεν ἐν τῶι φρουρίωι, διοικῶν | [πάντα καθαρῶς καὶ δικαίως καθάπε]ρ οἱ νόμοι συντάσσουσιν, περι | [πλείστου ποιούμενος τό τε διαφ]υλάξαι τὸ φρούριον...”

the singular importance of compliance to the *nomos* cannot be overstated. Unlike their imperial contemporaries who were largely unchecked by the *nomos* of a community,⁶⁸⁹ *phrourarchoi* in Priene held an explicitly defined constitutional position. It was the responsibility of the *demos* to appoint the *phrourarchos*, presumably through some form of election. The *phrourarchia* itself was a fixed-term appointment that existed for the sole purpose of defending a *phrourion*, and had no broader civil role or authority. The subordination of the *phrourarchia* to the *nomos* bound the *phrourarchos* to remain in the *phrourion*, then to surrender his authority and the *akra* to the *demos* at the end of his term.⁶⁹⁰

The institution of the *phrourarchia* in Telonia protected the citadel of the city and the heart of Prienian defenses. With such an important role in the preservation of the *eleutheria* and civic order of community, and bitter experience of the rogue *phrourarchos* in Karion, it is no wonder that the position of the *phrourarchia* was limited by the *nomos* of Priene.

4.4 Miletus

There is extensive documentation concerning the history and institutions of Miletus in the Hellenistic period, but it is only after the turn of the third century that detailed information emerges concerning the relationship of the *polis* to imperial and foreign powers. Miletus may have been left with a degree of autonomy by Antiochus III after his campaigning in 197/6, and it seems to have become an Attalid possession as a result of the Peace of Apamea in 188.⁶⁹¹ By 169, Miletus actively demonstrated its loyalty to Rome by

⁶⁸⁹See Chapter 3.

⁶⁹⁰*I. Priene* 252, ll.3-6; ll.3-5; *I. Priene* 22, ll. 8-9; *I. Priene* 21, ll.10-12; ll. 50-52; *I. Priene* 19, ll. 20-21.

⁶⁹¹Hansen 1971, 95–96; Rubensohn 1988, 145; Ma 1999, 282–283; cf. Magie 1950, 958 n.75 and le Rider 1974, 200 who believe that Miletus was autonomous; cf. Hermann 2001, 109–112 who argues that Miletus was free but followed the political lead of Rhodes.

supporting the war against Perseus,⁶⁹² and it was absorbed into the Roman province of Asia after 129, following the dissolution of the Attalid kingdom in 133.⁶⁹³ Whatever the political status of Miletus, it enjoyed minimal interference from royal administration, and had an active foreign policy.⁶⁹⁴ A key component of the relationships between Miletus and other *poleis* was the judicious use of *sympoliteia* and *isopoliteia*. This was not just a Hellenistic phenomenon, as Miletus had entered into an agreement similar to *isopoliteia*⁶⁹⁵ with Olbia, a colony on the north shore of the Black Sea, possibly after the battle of Mykale in 479.⁶⁹⁶

In a decree from 212/ 211 or possibly from 218/217,⁶⁹⁷ Miletus praised Seleucia Tralles and granted it *isopoliteia*, sharing citizenship, property rights, and other arrangements. The Milesian *phourarchia* was also addressed by the agreement:

“Those who enter the *politeia*, in respect to citizenship, shall have share in everything else immediately, except the *phulake* and *phourarchia*, [which are] chosen by lot, until ten years elapse after each allotment [to a tribe].”⁶⁹⁸

An identical clause is also found in the treaty of *isopoliteia* between Miletus and Mylasa in 209 / 8.⁶⁹⁹ Both of these treaties reveal the mechanism for selecting the *phourarchos* at Miletus, and the importance of the position to the *polis*. Much like the *phourarchiai* in Kybrissos and Priene, the *phourarchos* was a citizen of the *polis* and was chosen through an

⁶⁹²Livy, 43.6.4–6; Gruen 1975, 71.

⁶⁹³Polyb. 5.77; Livy, 37.56; Flor. 35.30; Just. *Epit.* 36.4; Strabo 14.1.38; *Per.* 59.

⁶⁹⁴Dmitriev 2005, 64–76.

⁶⁹⁵Graham 1964, 98–110; Ehrhardt 1983, 233–241; Gorman 2002, 181–191.

⁶⁹⁶Pascual 2006, 335; Gorman 2002, 187–189.

⁶⁹⁷See Fernoux 2004, 117 for the dating controversy.

⁶⁹⁸*Staatsverträge* III 537I = *SEG* 37.982, ll. 29-31: “τοὺς δὲ προσιόντας πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν τῶν μὲν ἄλλων παρα|χρῆμα μετέχειν πάντων, φυλακὴν δὲ καὶ φρουραρχίαν συγκληροῦσθαι διελ|θόντων ἐτῶν δέκα ἀφ’ ἐκάστης ἐπικληρώσεως.”

⁶⁹⁹*Staatsverträge* III 539I = *I. Mylasa* II T51.A, ll. 39-40: “..φυλακὴν δὲ καὶ φρουραρχίαν συγκληροῦσθαι διελθόντων ἐτῶν δέκα ἀφ’ ἐκάστης ἐπικληρώσεως...”

established political process. Unlike in these other *poleis*, however, the Milesian *phrouarchia* was not directly elected by the *demos*, but was instead chosen by lot.

Selection by lot was itself highly associated with democratic trends, especially in emulation of Athens, where sortition helped to broaden the geographic and economic composition of office-holding.⁷⁰⁰ It has been argued that the use of the lot in Miletus occurred at the time of assignment to a particular fortress, and that the lot was not necessarily used in the selection of *phrouarchoi* from the citizen body.⁷⁰¹ This argument remains purely speculative, but it seems likely that there was some method of screening out unfit candidates from taking the office, as the *phrouarchia* was an important office in the *polis*.⁷⁰² As Miletus lacked a *strategos* in the period,⁷⁰³ the *phrouarchia* fulfilled a critical role in the military system of Miletus, and it simply could not be trusted to individuals without proven loyalty to the *polis*.

This importance is underscored by the refusal to allow the citizens of Tralles or Mylasa to stand for the *phrouarchia* until a decade had passed following their allotment to a tribe. The Milesians evidently believed that this delay was necessary to ensure that any potential *phrouarchos* was firmly attached to the *polis* of Miletus.⁷⁰⁴ A similar precaution is found in an inscription granting Cretan mercenaries citizenship status in Miletus in 232. They were settled with their families in the territory of Hybandis, in order to secure it against

⁷⁰⁰Taylor 2007, 338.

⁷⁰¹Baker 2001, 69.

⁷⁰²Labarre 2004, 239.

⁷⁰³Some scholars assume that the *heiremenoi*, who were high-ranking police officials, took up an executive role analogous to the *stratego*i. See Schehl 1951, 18–19; Dmitriev 2005, 71–72.

⁷⁰⁴Baker 2001, 68.

encroachment from Magnesia.⁷⁰⁵ The *isopoliteia* between the mercenaries and Miletus was framed in similar terms to other Milesian treaties, but in this instance the prohibition against the selection of new citizens for the *phrourarchia* and *phulake* was twenty years instead of the standard ten.⁷⁰⁶ Although there was a long relationship between Miletus and Cretan mercenaries,⁷⁰⁷ the Milesians wanted to ensure the loyalty of the former soldiers before entrusting them with important offices and the defense of the city itself.

Another treaty of *isopoliteia* resulted from more unsettled political circumstances. Miletus and Heraclea ad Latmum, previously allied against Magnesia c. 196,⁷⁰⁸ entered into a war c. 186 / 185 (or possibly in the 190s), which was concluded with a treaty of *isopoliteia* shortly after the end of hostilities.⁷⁰⁹ Arising from conflict, this treaty extensively addresses the physical security of the *poleis* and the need for reciprocal defense:

“If someone goes on the offensive against the *polis* or the *chora* or the *phrouria* of the Milesians, or destroys the public revenue of the Milesians, the Heracleotes will aid the Milesians with all of their might; Likewise also, if someone goes on the offensive against the *polis* of the Heracleotes or *chora* or *phrouria* or destroys the public revenue of the Heracleotes, the Milesians will aid the Heracleotes with all of their might.”⁷¹⁰

The safety of the *phrouria*, along with the property and *chora* of both *poleis*, was a matter of explicit concern. Each city expected the full cooperation of the other to preserve its own territory, and each retained its own institutions, *phrouria*, and associated *chora*.

⁷⁰⁵Chaniotis 2002, 100.

⁷⁰⁶*SEG* 29.1136, ll.65-66: “...λαγχ[ι]ανέτ[ω]σαν δὲ φυλακὴν καὶ φρουραρχίαν ἐτῶν παρελ[θόντων εἴ]κοσι...”

⁷⁰⁷Launey 1987, 659–664.

⁷⁰⁸*SIG*³ 588.

⁷⁰⁹*Syll.*³ 633 (l. 65) = *SEG* 34.1173 = *SEG* 37.984; Errington 1989, 282; For dating see Fernoux 2004, 125.

⁷¹⁰*Ibid.*, ll. 39-43: “ἐὰν δὲ τις ἦ πολέμιος ἐπὶ πόλιν ἢ χώραν ἢ φρούρια τὰ Μιλησίων ἢ τὰς προσόδους αὐτῶν καταλύῃ τὰς Μιλησίων, βοηθεῖν | Ἡρακλεώτας Μιλησίοις παντὶ σθένει· κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἐὰν τις ἦ πολέμιος ἐπὶ τὴν Ἡρακλεω[τῶν] πόλιν ἢ χώραν ἢ φρούρια ἢ τὰς προσόδους αὐτῶν καταλύῃ, βοηθεῖν Μιλησίουσ | Ἡρακλε[ω]ταῖς παντὶ σθένει.”

There was at least a theoretical equality in the two citizen bodies, and much as in its previous treaties of *isopoliteia*, Miletus allowed citizens from Heraclea to stand for military offices after a waiting period:

“There shall be immediately for them a share in all remaining affairs, but that there shall be a share for them in the *phourarchia* and the *phulake* over the *polis* and the *phourike* (guard-duty) to those remaining (in Miletus), [until] ten years have passed, after whatever time each man has been allotted (to a tribe); and other matters concerning the lot in the selection of magistrates will be done according to the law of the *boule*.”⁷¹¹

In contrast to the practice of *isopoliteia*, in a decree from c. 187/6⁷¹² Miletus and Pidasia entered into a *sympoliteia*, in which Pidasia was absorbed by Miletus.⁷¹³ This caused Pidasia to lose its political autonomy, yet theoretically its citizens shared equal rights with Milesians at Miletus. It is clear that some social and economic concessions were given to the Pidasians, but Miletus was by far the more important entity in the agreement.⁷¹⁴ Despite the unequal nature of the union, the idea seems to have originated from the Pidasians themselves as a direct result of the local unrest following the campaigns of Philip V and Antiochus III in c. 185, or possibly as a response to aggressive territorial encroachment from Heraclea.⁷¹⁵ As in other treaties concluded by Miletus, there were specific regulations governing the *phourarchia*, although they differed fundamentally from the other treaties of *isopoliteia*:

“...[It is decided] by the Milesians to send into Pidasia out of the citizens [of Miletus] a *phourarchos* and *phouroi* chosen by lot, however many [*phouroi*] as appear to be sufficient, and they see to it that the walls are restored and remain in the *chora*, and they take charge of the *phulake*, [in] whatever manner they judge to be advantageous...”⁷¹⁶

⁷¹¹Ibid., ll. 50-52: “εἶναι δὲ αὐτοῖς τῶν μὲν λοιπῶν πάντων παραχρῆμα τὴν μετουσίαν, φρο[υ]ραρχίας δὲ καὶ φυλακῆς τῆς κατὰ πόλιν καὶ φρουρικῆς μετεῖναι αὐτοῖς διελθόντων | ἐτῶν δέκα, ἀφ’ οὗ ἂν ἕκαστοι ἐπικληρωθῶσιν · τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τὰ περὶ τὸν κλῆρον τὸν ἐν ἀρχαιρεσ[ί]αις ὑπάρχειν κατὰ τὸν βουλευτικὸν νόμον.”

⁷¹²SEG 19.678 = SEG 37.984 & 987; see Reger 2004, 156 for bibliography on the dating controversy.

⁷¹³Cook 1961, 91–93; Robert 1962, 55; Wörle 2003, 1366.

⁷¹⁴Pimouguet 1995, 94; 160. Chaniotis 2002, 99.

⁷¹⁵Ager 1996, 278–279; Gauthier 2001, 121–127; Migeotte 2001, 129; Wörle 2003, 1368; Pascual 2007, 179.

⁷¹⁶SEG 19.678 = SEG 37.984 & 987, ll. 15 -18: “...πέμπειν δὲ Μιλησίους εἰς Πίδασα τὸν λαχόντα τῶν πολιτῶν | φρούραρχον καὶ φρουρούς, ὅσους ἂν ἱκανοὺς εἶναι φαίνεται, καὶ προνοεῖν, ὅπως | τὰ τεῖχη ἐπισκευάζεται καὶ

This was a radical departure in focus, powers, and geography for the Milesian *phourarchos*. What immediately sets this *phourarchia* and *phouroi* apart from those in other Milesian decrees is the physical and legal separation between the *phourarchos* and the *polis*. Instead of restricting the ability of new citizens to participate in the *phourarchia* in Miletus for a set period of time, this *phourarchos* was actively sent by the Milesians into Pidasas for the express purpose of attending to military matters, without any mechanism for consultation from the Pidasians themselves. Although this inscription does not elucidate any further civil powers of the *phourarchos*, it was a markedly different position from the *phourarchia* in the Milesian treaties of *isopoliteia*.⁷¹⁷ There was no attempt to grant Pidasians access to the *phourarchia* of Miletus in the treaty, and the office within Pidasas itself was seemingly reserved exclusively for Milesian citizens who lived outside of Pidasas.

Also instructive is the opening portion of the decree, which reads in part

“With good fortune. In the *stephanophoros* of Pasikles in the month of Anthesterion, the Milesians and Pidasians agreed and concluded; On the behalf of the Milesian *demos*: The *prytaneis* and those chosen for the *phulake* and the appointed *synedroi*...”⁷¹⁸

The phrase “οἱ εἰρημένοι ἐπὶ τῆι φυλακῆι” has been translated by Jeremy LaBuff as “those chosen for the garrison”,⁷¹⁹ but this translation obscures the differences between *phulake*, *phouroi*, and the *phourarchos*, all of which are distinct terms in other Milesian treaties. Although the meaning of these terms is similar, the actual offices involved are quite

κατὰ χάραν μένηι, καὶ τῆς φυλακῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καθότι ἂν κρίνωσι συμφέρειν...”

⁷¹⁷See Reger 2004, esp. 156-162 for differences between the phenomena.

⁷¹⁸SEG 19.678 = SEG 37.984 & 987, ll. 1-4: “ἀγαθῆι τύχηι. ἐπὶ στεφανηφόρου Πασικλείου μηνὸς Ἀνθεστηριῶνος | τάδε ὡμολόγησαν καὶ συνέθεντο Μιλήσιοι καὶ Πιδασεῖς, ὑπὲρ μὲν τοῦ | δήμου τοῦ Μιλησίων οἱ πρυτάνεις καὶ οἱ εἰρημένοι ἐπὶ τῆι φυλακῆι καὶ οἱ ἀποδειχθέντες σύνεδροι...”

⁷¹⁹LaBuff 2010, 282.

distinct, and are specified as such in the other Milesian decrees, where the *phulake*, and especially the *heiremenoi epi tei phulake*, held responsibilities that were similar to *strategoï* and were not associated with *phourarchoi*.⁷²⁰

From the Milesian perspective, the *phourarchia* in Pidasas was only concerned with furthering the interests of the Milesians, not the Pidasans. Although this bias echoed the focus of imperial *phourarchoi*, the Milesians nevertheless legally limited the powers of the *phourarchos* to purely military concerns. Despite conducting its own “mini-imperialism”, Miletus did not grant its *phourarchoi* an active role in civic life beyond the maintenance of the walls and the physical guardianship of the *polis*.

4.4.1 Milesian Imperialism: Lepsia and Leros

Pidasas was not the only subject community of Miletus. The islands of Lepsia and Leros were its possessions,⁷²¹ and their ties to Miletus and dependency on it were strengthened by the growth of communication - and trade - networks and the imposition of Milesian *phourarchoi*.⁷²² Despite the dominance of Miletus, Leros and Lepsia possessed their own assemblies, managed their own affairs, and had their own decrees, judges, and cults.⁷²³

It has been argued that Miletus and Leros had a “special” relationship beyond mere domination.⁷²⁴ Leros may once have served as a fortified refuge for Milesians fleeing an anti-Athenian revolt, although the affair was settled by 427/6.⁷²⁵ Leros certainly had an extensive

⁷²⁰Dmitriev 2005, 71–76.

⁷²¹Manganaro 1963, 294; Piérart 1985, 282.

⁷²²Pimouguet 1995, 97.

⁷²³Piérart 1985, 282.

⁷²⁴Constantakopoulou 2011, 229–231.

⁷²⁵Benson 1963, 48.

array of fortifications, but it is impossible to recover any Milesian construction or improvements exclusive to the Hellenistic period.⁷²⁶

The *phrourarchia* in Leros is poorly understood. In a highly fragmentary and heavily restored inscription erected at some point between the third and second centuries, a certain Apollonios was *phrourarchos* over the island.⁷²⁷ Although the beginning of the inscription is lost, there is a strong probability that it records a decree issued by the Lerisians and the *katoikoi* living in Leros instead of Miletus.⁷²⁸ The decree honors a certain Apollonios for his good behavior and concern for the *katoikoi*,⁷²⁹ and although the decree is incomplete and highly fragmentary, there is little indication that his authority expanded beyond obvious military concerns.

There is some indication that *phrourarchoi* could remain settled in Leros beyond the term of their office. A fragmentary inscription reveals that in the first century an unnamed man who had held the offices of *kosmopolis* and *phrourarchos* was interred with his wife and family on the island. He was referred to as the “*phrourarchos* of the Milesians,”⁷³⁰ indicating the importance of Miletus, not Leros, to his identity.

To turn to Lepsia, again its relationship to Miletus is poorly understood. The island, along with Leros and Patmos, was a subject community of Miletus throughout antiquity.⁷³¹

⁷²⁶Ibid., 1–30, 49.

⁷²⁷Manganaro 1963, #3, ll.3: The restoration “...[Ἀπολλώνιος — φρούρ]αρχος...” has not been significantly challenged.

⁷²⁸Ibid., 307.

⁷²⁹ Ibid., #3, ll. 2-8: “ἐπειδὴ | [Ἀπολλώνιος — φρούρ]αρχος πρὸς ἡμᾶς | [πάντας εὖνους καὶ πρόθυμ]ος τὸν τε προγεγ[ραμμένον χρόνον διετέλεσ]ε, καὶ ἀκολούθως | [τῆι τῶν πολιτῶν προαιρέσε]ι τῆς περὶ τὸ χωρί[ον ἀσφαλείας πρόνοιαν πο]ιεῖται τὴν τε πά[σαν ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν ἐν Λέρωι] κατοικούντων...”

⁷³⁰ CIG 2263 = Manganaro 1963, #14 & 15 ll.1-2: “ἀγαθῆι τύχηι. ἡ σόρος [— κοσμο]πόλεως τὸ β’ καὶ φρου|<ρ>αρχήσαντος τῶν Μιλ[ησίων...”

⁷³¹Thonemann 2011, 283.

There is evidence of a Hellenistic fortress commanding the harbor, which was likely the seat of the Milesian *phrouarchos* on the island.⁷³² By the Hellenistic era, most of the island's inhabitants were probably Milesian citizens who lived in the immediate vicinity of the fortress.⁷³³ In 169 the *phrouarchos* Timotheos was honored by Milesian *katoikoi* living in Lepsia:⁷³⁴

“Since Timotheos son of Aretos having been *phrouarchos* in the year of the *stephanophoriate* of Eukratos, well and justly saw to the guardianship over the *chorion* and provided for the other affairs connected with the *phrouarchia* profitably and well, and gave himself to the citizen *katoikoi* in Lepsia both in general and individually without reproach...”⁷³⁵

Timotheos was praised for taking control of guarding the fortress and conducting the affairs of the *phrouarchia*, which were both military operations. Although the decree does not define what Timotheos provided to the *katoikoi* in Lepsia, it does connect his actions to the affairs of the *phrouarchia*. The clause “Timotheos son of Aretos was *phrouarchos* in the year of the *stephanophoros* of Eukratos” indicates that the *phrouarchia* was temporally bound to the year of Eukratos' term. Although it is not explicitly stated that the position lasted for the entire year, it seems likely that a shorter term would have been mentioned if it applied to the *phrouarchia*, much like the mention of a four month term in Kybrissos and Priene.⁷³⁶ It is therefore possible that, at the very least in this Milesian possession, the *phrouarchia*

⁷³²Bent and Gardner 1886, 144.

⁷³³Bean and Cook 1957, 136–137.

⁷³⁴Manganaro 1963, #18, ll. 1-2.

⁷³⁵Ibid., ll.4-12: “ἐπειδὴ Τιμόθεος Ἀρήτου γεν[ό]μενος φρούραρχος ἐν τῷ ἐνιαυτῷ | τῷ ἐπὶ στεφανηφόρου Εὐκράτου καλῶς καὶ δικαίως τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ χωρίον [φ]υλακῆ[ς] | ἐπεμελήθη καὶ τῶν [ἄλ]λων τῶν ἀνηκόντων εἰς τὴν φρουραρχίαν ἀξίως καὶ συν|φερόντως προενόησε, τῶν τε πολιτῶν | τοῖς κατοικοῦσι[v] ἐν Λεψία καὶ κοινῆι κα[ὶ] | ἰδίαι ἀγέγκλητοῦ ἑαυτὸν παρέσχετο...”

⁷³⁶Robert and Robert 1976, 153–235 = Sokolowski 1980, 103–106; *SEG* 26.1306; *SEG* 30.1376, ll. 8-11; *I. Priene* 19 and p. 308.

could be assigned for an entire calendar year.⁷³⁷

Other *phourarchoi* from Lepsia include Artemidoros son of Artemidoros, who is mentioned in an inscription dating from c. 70/ 69,⁷³⁸ and Dionysios son of Eirenios, who is known in an inscription from c. 41/0.⁷³⁹ Dionysios is referred to as “*phourarchos* over the island”,⁷⁴⁰ an indication that the *phourarchia*'s responsibilities were not constricted by the walls of a *phourion*. The *phourarchiai* of Artemidoros and Dionysios date to well after the establishment of the Roman province of Asia in 129, indicating that the Milesians continued the institution even after the *polis* fell under the dominion of Rome.⁷⁴¹ Furthermore, Dionysios' tenure as *phourarchos* followed the passage of the *Lex Gabinia* and Pompey's successful campaign against Mediterranean piracy in 67⁷⁴² and the passage of the customs law of Asia in 62.⁷⁴³ Despite the unquestioned Roman supremacy and the suppression of Mediterranean piracy, the Milesians still felt that it was necessary to dispatch a *phourarchos* to secure Lepsia. There is no indication that the *phourarchia* had lost its military nature and turned into a purely civic office. Instead, it reflected the recognition by Miletus that it was the responsibility of the *polis*, not of a distant imperial power, to physically protect its external interests.

⁷³⁷Manganaro 1963, 295.

⁷³⁸Sakkelion 1890 col. 221 = Manganaro 1963, 22B.

⁷³⁹Sakkelion 1862, col. 265–266; Bent and Gardner 1886, 144 = *SEG* 18, 388 = Manganaro 1963, # 21B

⁷⁴⁰*Ibid.*, ll.3-5: “...φρούραρχος τῆς νήσους Διονύσιος Εἰρηγίου...”

⁷⁴¹Rigsby 1988, 138; Gorman 2001, 242; cf. Nawotka 1999, 177 n.20 who believes that Miletus was a “free city” and outside the jurisdiction of Rome until it supported Mithridates IV.

⁷⁴²Cass. Dio 36.21–37; Plut. *Pomp.* 25–27; App. *Mith.* 92–96; De Souza 1999, 149–178.

⁷⁴³Cottier and Corbier 2008, 2 & 34, ll.25.

4.4.2 Miletus: Conclusion

Although Miletus was often under the authority of imperial powers, it nevertheless retained the right to appoint its own *phrourarchoi* over the city and its possessions. The essential differences between an imperial and a local *phrourarchia* remained strong in Miletus: it was the *demos*, not an external power, that established a *phrourarchia* subordinate to the *nomos* of the community.

Even when Miletus exercised “mini” imperialism over Pidasa, Lepsia, and Leros, its *phrourarchoi* did not hold any authority beyond their strictly defined military responsibilities. With a selection process controlled by the *demos*, limited terms of office, strictly regulated powers, and a well-defined role, the Milesian *phrourarchia* was clearly similar in form, function, and intent to its counterparts at Teos and Priene.

4.5 Other *Phrourarchoi*

Several other *poleis* are known to have used *phrourarchoi*, but these positions are far less well understood than those at Teos, Priene, and Miletus. At an unspecified time during the Hellenistic period, a certain Protagorides was a *phrourarchos* in Daskyleion in Mysia and made a dedication to Apollo and Asklepios.⁷⁴⁴ The presence of an eponymous *hipparchos* is a strong indication that Daskyleion was absorbed by Kyzikos at the time, as no other city is known to have an eponymous *hipparchos*.⁷⁴⁵

In the third century, a *phrourarchia* is mentioned in regulations concerning the *polemarchoi* in Magnesia, where the office shares an unspecified connection with the

⁷⁴⁴Robert and Robert 1976, 232–235 = *SEG* 26.1336: “Πρωταγορίδ[η]ς Ἐκαταίου | φρουραρχήσα[ς ἐ]πὶ Διὸς ἱππαρχέω | Ἀπόλλωνι καὶ Ἀσκληπιῶι | χαριστήριον.”

⁷⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 235; Sherk 1991, 247 n. 100; Labarre 2004, 234.

hegemones.⁷⁴⁶ Although details are lacking, the separation between the *phrourarchos*, *hegemon* (or possibly *hegemones*), and the *polemarchoi* indicates that each office possessed a different set of responsibilities within the *polis*, and that each was a distinct position.

4.6 Conclusion

From the body of evidence above, limited as it is, unlike *phrourarchoi* under Hellenistic monarchs, those in smaller communities were bound by a clear legal apparatus, and were part of the constitutional framework of the *polis*. The martial language of the inscriptions, presence of *phrouroi*, and the emphasis on observation, readiness, and the staunch defense of the *polis* in the face of enemies all attest that the position was a military assignment, but one that was still modeled on civil magistracies.

There were term limits on the office, with a period of several months being the norm. *Poleis* ensured that their own citizens were *phrourarchoi*, especially on the strategically important *akra* within the walls of the *polis* itself. *Phrourarchoi* in these communities evidently came from the elite and were required to own a substantial amount of property to qualify for the office. Interestingly, such a critical office could, at least in Miletus, be filled by lot; other *poleis*, such as Teos, required the nomination of a candidate in the assembly. Unlike some imperial *phrourarchoi* which depended upon a personal relationship to a monarch, the selection process of the position in local communities was a highly regulated legal affair.

Whatever the means of selection for the *phrourarchia*, most *poleis* took great pains to

⁷⁴⁶*I. Magnesia* 14: “[στεφανηφοροῦντ]ος Χαροπίν<ο>υ τοῦ | Δημ[— μηνὸς —] | [...c.10... φυλ]ῆς προεδρευούσης Διάδος [— γραμματεῦντος τῆι] | [...c.14....βουλῆι —ίπ]που τοῦ Ἡγησίππου νομηνίαί ἐν [νομαΐαι ἐκκλησίαι· προ][έδρων ἐπισ]τατοῦντος Κλεάνακτος τοῦ Κλεάνακ[τος· —] | [νόμον εἰσήνεγκ]αν? οἱ νομοθέται Ἡγήσιππος Ἡγησίππο[υ —] | [...c.14....] Σίνδρωνος, ὃν δεῖ καταχωρισθῆναι | [εἰς τὸν νόμον] τὸν πολεμαρχικόν· | [ὅπως ἂν? μηδεὶς τῶν ἀστῶν μ]ηδὲ τῶν ξένων τῶν κατοικούντων περὶ[—] | [—] βασιλέων υἱοῦς ἢ ἀδελφοὺς ἢ προσή[κοντας —] | [—]ς ἢ φρουράρχους ἢ ἡγεμό[νας —]”

ensure that their *phrouarchoi*, once chosen, remained in their assignment. Unlike the Hellenistic monarchies or classical empires, individual communities bound their *phrouarchoi* legally, geographically, and temporally, as the office both secured and threatened local *eleutheria* with its hold over the vital fortifications of a community. Even after Roman expansion in the east, the local *phrouarchiai* of Asia Minor retained a consistent form: they were established and selected by the *demos* of the community, only exercised military authority, and remained subordinate to the *nomos* of the *polis*.

5 PHROURARCHOI, THE COMMUNITY, AND THE GARRISON STATE

In 196, following Rome's victory over Philip V at Cynoscephalae, the Roman consul Titus Quinctius Flaminius stood before his assembled Greek allies at the Isthmian games. The mood of the Greek spectators was a mixture of jubilation and apprehension; with Philip falling to Rome, all eyes were on the Roman Republic's treatment of its allies. Would the Republic honor its rhetoric and support Greek *eleutheria* and autonomy, or would it replace Philip's garrisons with its own? This question was soon answered. At the games,

“...the stadium being full of people, Flaminius gave a signal for silence by a war-trumpet, and he ordered the herald to announce: “The people of the Romans, the council (senate), and Flaminius the *strategos*, having gone to war against the Macedonians and king Philip, leave Greece *aphrouretos* (ungarrisoned) and *aphorologetos* (free from tribute), to use its own customs and *nomoi* (laws).” A great shouting and joy having arisen, there was a very happy tumult, and one group after another summoned the herald to announce [the proclamation] to them. They threw crowns and ribbons on the *strategos*, and voted [to make] statues [of him] in their *poleis*. They sent ambassadors with golden crowns to the Capitol [at Rome] who expressed their delight, and inscribed [themselves] as allies of the Romans.”⁷⁴⁷

The Greeks had reason to celebrate. *Phourai* were seen as repressive forces that prevented local communities from enjoying *eleutheria*. Philip had reinforced *phourai* in strategic locations in Greece, and these so-called “fetters” were a major *casus belli* for the Greeks.⁷⁴⁸ Despite the rhetorical attention paid to the cause of Greek *eleutheria*, Roman

⁷⁴⁷ App. *Mac.* 9.9.4: “...πληθύνοντος τοῦ σταδίου, σιωπὴν τε ἐσήμηνεν ὑπὸ σάλπιγγι, καὶ τὸν κήρυκα ἀνειπεῖν ἐκέλευσεν· “ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ῥωμαίων καὶ ἡ σύγκλητος καὶ Φλαμίνιος ὁ στρατηγός, Μακεδόνας καὶ βασιλέα Φίλιππον ἐκπολεμήσαντες, ἀφιᾶσι τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἀφρούρητον ἀφορολόγητον ἰδίους ἤθεσι καὶ νόμοις χρῆσθαι.” πολλῆς δ’ ἐπὶ τούτῳ βοῆς καὶ χαρᾶς γενομένης θόρυβος ἥδιστος ἦν, ἐτέρων μεθ’ ἐτέρους τὸν κήρυκα καὶ παρὰ σφᾶς ἀνειπεῖν μετακαλούντων. στεφάνους τε καὶ ταινίας ἐπέβαλλον τῷ στρατηγῷ, καὶ ἀνδριάντας ἐψηφίζοντο κατὰ πόλεις. πρέσβεις τε μετὰ χρυσῶν στεφάνων ἐπέμπον ἐς τὸ Καπιτώλιον, οἱ χάριν ὠμολόγουν, καὶ ἐς τοὺς Ῥωμαίων συμμάχους ἀνεγράφοντο.”

⁷⁴⁸ Polyb. 18.11.5–10.

largess proved fleeting. The battle of Pydna in 168 and the sack of Corinth in 146 were followed by the formation of the province of Achaia, a step which soon ushered in an era of direct Roman dominion over Greece.⁷⁴⁹

Maintaining a *phrourarchia* was an expensive proposition for local communities and imperial powers. In any setting, *phrourarchoi* were not expected or equipped to actively engage in extensive combat or offensive military operations. As a result, independent *poleis* used *phrourarchoi* to provide a passive reassurance of security, and to promote the interests of the *polis* within a legal framework.⁷⁵⁰ In contrast, imperial *phrourarchoi* were suppressive officers who were used to project imperial power against an often unwilling population in a manner similar to the modern conception of a garrison state. Imperial *phrourarchoi* and *phrouroi* often had a contentious relationship with both subject populations and imperial powers, a hostility which could lead to unrestrained violence against a local community or outright rebellion against a monarch. However, most *phrourarchoi* remained loyal, and employed various forms of domination over local populations. In turn, Greek *poleis* adopted various strategies to accommodate, resist, and even subvert the garrison apparatus placed over them.

This chapter first examines the concept of the garrison state, and uses its theoretical framework to explore the relationships between *phrourarchoi* and communities. It next discusses the economic costs of maintaining a *phrourarchia*, and then addresses the military record of *phrourarchoi*. I argue that defense against outside enemies was a secondary concern of imperial powers which employed *phrourarchoi*, and that the primary purpose of

⁷⁴⁹Ibid., 31.23–25; Walbank 1957, 1–6; Eckstein 1995, 7–9; Burton 2011, 70–75.

⁷⁵⁰See below and Chapter 4.

the office was for internal security. Both imperial and local powers viewed the *phrourarchia* as a means of reassurance and a benefit to the community for internal security; they did not equip or intend for *phrourarchoi* to engage in protracted combat. Finally, the chapter will examine how *poleis* accommodated, subverted, or resisted the imposition of *phrourarchoi* in their communities.

5.1 Garrison State: Background

Given the military ideology of Hellenistic kingship and an environment of near ubiquitous war,⁷⁵¹ the Hellenistic period echoes, in ideology and governance if not in technology and political organization, Harold Lasswell's influential conception of a garrison state. Although primarily an attempt to predict the future instead of analyze the past, and originally limited by a focus on the internal development of a democratic state, Lasswell's work has been highly influential in early-modern to modern studies. Some scholars have also used it in passing as a characterization of ancient states, especially Sparta,⁷⁵² but have not attempted any detailed analysis of its implications for the wider Greek world.⁷⁵³

Needless to say, there are fundamental differences between the organization, structure, and political viewpoints of the ancient Greek world and the pre-World War II international system that influenced Lasswell's theory, which makes his conceptualization of a garrison state a more appropriate as a loose analogy instead of a strict model for the ancient world.

The conception of nationalism was far different in the ancient world and modern Europe, a factor that further complicates an uncritical use of this model.⁷⁵⁴ Even so, Lasswell admits

⁷⁵¹See Chapter 1.

⁷⁵²Gouliamos and Kassimeris 2011, 12–13; Esman 2013, 5–6.

⁷⁵³Hui 2005, 47–48. Murinson 2009, 13.

⁷⁵⁴At least as understood by modern definitions; See Anderson 2006, 37–111.

that his analysis is not “...something wholly new under the sun”,⁷⁵⁵ and his framework has been used with great effect to examine less technologically driven societies.⁷⁵⁶ Such work underscores the usefulness of the garrison state model to describe the relationship between imperial *phrourarchoi* and subordinate communities.

In his analysis, Lasswell defines the garrison state as a society where the specialists in violence are the most powerful group. His main criteria for the emergence of a garrison state can be broken down as follows: The garrison state is a movement to the unquestioned dominance of specialists of violence; symbols in the form of propaganda manipulate the morale and conceptions of the public; unemployment is almost unknown due to economic focus on the production of war materials; political authority is dictatorial and centralized; the dangers of war will be more equally distributed to affect all citizens. Lasswell saw the garrison state as a construct that would likely overtake the societies of his day, although he admitted that such a transition was not certain.⁷⁵⁷

Some of these criteria have already been dealt with at length elsewhere in this dissertation. Propaganda, from coins, inscriptions, and literature extolling the military virtues of Hellenistic rulers was extensive, inescapable, and sophisticated.⁷⁵⁸ The requirement that specialists in violence receive training in areas that were traditionally civilian in scope is applicable to the broad skills that were expected from the Greco-Macedonian ruling elite.⁷⁵⁹ This is especially true for administrative skill, which was a critical competency for imperial

⁷⁵⁵Lasswell 1941, 457.

⁷⁵⁶Janowitz 1988, 16, 80; Stanley 1996, 47; Moon 1997, 126; Grossman 2001, 109–110; Schiff 2008, 29–30; cf. Huntington 1957, 345–350 for a critique of Lasswell.

⁷⁵⁷Lasswell 1941, 455–468.

⁷⁵⁸See Chapter 1.

⁷⁵⁹Lasswell 1941, 457–458.

phourarchoi.⁷⁶⁰ These men were military elites, and the ideology and administration of Hellenistic empires were dominated by men who had both a *polemike techne* and civic powers.⁷⁶¹

Lasswell's discussion about the dwindling power of democratic organs in a garrison state to some degree recalls the reality of the Hellenistic world.⁷⁶² Although Hellenistic polities did have functioning democracies for issues close to home, the practical reach of foreign policy for subject communities was firmly under the autocratic control of Hellenistic royalty. If we return once again to the example of Antigonos' garrison in Athens, this function is explicit:

“...[the Athenians] were compelled to accept Menyllus as *phourarchos* and a *phoura*, its purpose being to keep anyone from making revolutionary changes.”⁷⁶³

At first glance some of Lasswell's criteria are not applicable to the ancient world.

Lasswell's theories are focused on the internal development of a society, and as such he does not address foreign armies of occupation or garrisons from external sources. However, most Hellenistic monarchs would not view the imposition of garrisons over their claimed territory as forces of occupation, but instead as internal security over their own spear-won land.⁷⁶⁴ From their perspective, especially in Egypt, many garrisons were internal, not external, methods of control.

Lasswell's vision of the necessity of technological innovation to the development of a garrison state also seems insurmountable, as it has long been thought that technological

⁷⁶⁰See Chapters 2 and 3.

⁷⁶¹See Chapters 1, 2, and 3.

⁷⁶²Lasswell 1941, 461–462.

⁷⁶³Diod. Sic. 18.18.5: “...φρούραρχον δὲ Μένυλλον καὶ φρουρὰν ἠναγκάσθησαν δέξασθαι τὴν οὐκ ἐπιτρέψουσιν οὐδενὶ νεωτερίζειν...”

⁷⁶⁴Ma 1999, 107-178; See Chapter 1.

progress in the ancient world moved at a glacial pace.⁷⁶⁵ However, technological innovations that were started under Philip II and Alexander the Great, especially in the prosecution of siege warfare, continued into the Hellenistic age.⁷⁶⁶ These advancements in siege warfare ensured that starvation, deprivation, disease, and destruction were dangers to be borne by all inhabitants of a *polis*.⁷⁶⁷ As a result, Lasswell's contention that technological developments brought with them increased risks to the civilian population is applicable to siege warfare in the Greek world.⁷⁶⁸ Even in the Classical era the threat to all inhabitants of a captured *polis* - what Lasswell termed the “universal fear” of civilian suffering due to warfare -⁷⁶⁹ was recognized. This recognition was based on bitter experience, as Greek history is rife with examples of near-universal slaughter or slavery following the sack of a *polis*.⁷⁷⁰ Aeneas Tacticus, in the introduction to his work, flatly states that a city under siege contained

“...those who are about to run risks on behalf of the greatest things: shrines, country, parents, children, and everything else.”⁷⁷¹

This is not to say that Lasswell's ideas are a perfect fit for the garrison communities of the ancient world. For example, despite his view that there was no room for private groups to operate outside of state control in a garrison community,⁷⁷² voluntary associations were well

⁷⁶⁵Walbank 1993, 190-197.

⁷⁶⁶Cuomo 2007, 41-76.

⁷⁶⁷Strauss 2007, 240; Lee 2010, 159; Wheeler 2011, 93-94.

⁷⁶⁸Lasswell 1941, 459. This did not mean that the outcomes of sieges were a forgone conclusion; see Demetrius' famous failure to capture Rhodes in 305-304 in Diod. Sic. 21.81-88, 91-100 and Plut. *Demetr.* 21-22.

⁷⁶⁹Lasswell 1941, 459.

⁷⁷⁰The destruction of Mycalessus is a particularly striking example; see Thuc. 7.29-30.

⁷⁷¹Aen. Tact. praef. 2: “...τοῖς δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν μεγίστων μέλλουσι κινδυνεύειν, ἱερῶν καὶ πατρίδος καὶ γονέων καὶ τέκνων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων...”

⁷⁷²Lasswell 1941, 462-463.

known in ancient times, even in *poleis* under foreign domination.⁷⁷³ Hellenistic monarchies were certainly not democratic institutions in any sense,⁷⁷⁴ and although royal garrisons could be viewed as instruments of internal control, many *poleis* would have seen them as unwelcome impositions of foreign power.⁷⁷⁵ Nevertheless, despite these differences, the garrison state remains a useful framework for describing general features of a heavily militarized society.

The issue of economics brings some of these issues to the forefront. Lasswell's idea that the economic pyramid would be somewhat flattened, and universal employment would be obtained with a centralized system of production,⁷⁷⁶ were not features of any ancient economy. Although the nature and form of ancient economies are highly controversial, there were certainly elites who wielded enormous economic power. Moreover, dissatisfaction with economic inequality had the potential to be socially explosive. Looking past these issues to examine military expenditures in a broad manner, it is apparent however that *phourarchoi* and *phourai* were drains on the economic systems of the Hellenistic world. Just how much impact these expenses had is the focus of the next section.

5.2 Economic Cost

In examining the relationship between *phourarchoi* and a local community, it is worthwhile to discuss first the monetary cost of the *phourarchia*. As was typical for Greek soldiers, *phourarchoi* and *phouroi* did not work for free.⁷⁷⁷ Greek citizens had long

⁷⁷³Fisher 1988, 1191–1195; Kloppenborg 1996, 16-30; Gillihan 2012, 47–48.

⁷⁷⁴See Chapter 1.

⁷⁷⁵See Chapter 3.

⁷⁷⁶Lasswell 1941, 463.

⁷⁷⁷Pritchard 2014, 13–16; cf. Hansen 1979 who believes that Athenian *archai* in the Classical period uniquely did not receive compensation.

received payment while on campaign, and the increasing prevalence of specialized soldiers and mercenaries in the Hellenistic era brought the question of compensation to the forefront of civil and military relations. That being said, specific wage information for mercenary employment is sorely lacking.

Some wage information is recoverable, however. The *polis* of Teos provides the sole surviving accounting for the cost of a *phourarchos* and a complement of *phouroi*. In regulations concerning the third-century Tean *phourarchos*, the *polis* explicitly lays out the daily compensation for garrison duty:

“The pay shall be given to him [the *phourarchos*], according to the laws, every four months by the *tamiai* (treasurers) whenever he sets out for the *chorion*; the pay for the *phourarchos* shall be four Alexander *drachmas* [per day], and for each of the *phouroi* one Alexander *drachma* [per day].”⁷⁷⁸

As there was a minimum of 20 *phouroi* at this post,⁷⁷⁹ at least 24 *drachmas* a day were needed to pay them. This comes to 8,760 *drachmas*,⁷⁸⁰ or nearly 1.5 talents a year to maintain a single *phourion* and its small complement of 21 men. This total does not even take into account the cost of the fortification itself, provisions for the men, or any maintenance of the walls; to put such costs in perspective, the construction of a single tower in the Hellenistic period could cost more than 200,000 *drachmas*.⁷⁸¹

The decree states that the *phourarchos* was given the total amount beforehand, so the money most likely originated from the treasury and was not extracted directly from the local

⁷⁷⁸Robert and Robert 1976, 153–235 = Sokolowski 1980, 103–106; *SEG* 26.1306; *SEG* 30.1376. ll. 27-31: “διδόναι | δὲ αὐτῶι τὸμ μισθὸν τὸν [ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐκάστου τε]τραμήνου τοὺς ταμ[ίας ἐ]πάναγκον ὅταν πορεύηται [εἰ]ς τὸ [χωρίον· μ]ισθὸν δὲ εἶναι τῶ[ι μὲν] | φρουράρχωι τεσσέρας δραχμ[ίας] ἀ[λεξ]ανδρε[ίας,] τῶν δὲ φρουρῶ[ν] | ἐκάστωι δραχμῆν ἀλε[ξ]ανδρ[εῖαν] μίαν.”

⁷⁷⁹Robert and Robert 1976. See Chapter 3.

⁷⁸⁰Chaniotis 2005, 116.

⁷⁸¹*Ibid.*

population. As the Roberts point out in their analysis of the decree, such an arrangement helped to maintain the position and authority of the *phrourarchos* over the *phrouroi*. It prevented the officeholder from forming economic contacts or alliances to procure funds while in Kybrissos, conduct which could have been detrimental to the security of the *phourion*.⁷⁸²

To quantify the economic impact of maintaining the *phourion* in Kybrissos is difficult. We do not know how many *phrourarchoi*, *phrouroi*, and *phouria* were maintained by Teos at any given time, and the tax revenue of the *polis* is currently unquantifiable. In contrast, Miletus is known to have had at least four active *phrourarchoi* in the Hellenistic period: one within the *polis* itself,⁷⁸³ and others at Pidasia, Leros, and Lepisia.⁷⁸⁴ If the expense of the Tean *phrourarchos* truly was typical,⁷⁸⁵ and the Milesian *phrourarchoi* were active around the same time, maintaining these positions would require an outlay of 52,560 *drachmas*, or nearly six talents a year; this is just to maintain four *phouria*, each with a complement of no more than twenty-one men.

The coinage of Miletus (better understood and studied than that of Teos) helps to place such costs in perspective. In the period immediately prior to that focused on here, Miletus functioned as an imperial mint under the Seleucid Empire from c. 325 – 294. It produced the following quantities of unique obverse dies: 58 *staters*, 33 *tetradrachmas*, and 152

⁷⁸²Robert and Robert 1976, 215.

⁷⁸³*Staatsverträge* III 539I = *I. Mylasa* II T51.A; *SIG*³ 588; *SIG*³ 633 = *SEG* 34.1173 = *SEG* 37.984; See Chapter 3.

⁷⁸⁴Manganaro 1963 #18; Sakkalion 1890 col. 221 = Manganaro 1963, #22B; Sakkalion 1862 col. 265-266 = Brent and Gardner 1886, 144 = *SEG* 18, 388 = Manganaro 1963, #21B.

⁷⁸⁵Robert and Robert 1976 216; Fischer-Bovet 2014, 73–74.

drachmas.⁷⁸⁶ As the silver stater weighed ~ 2 *drachmas* and a *tetradrachma* ~ 4 *drachmas*,⁷⁸⁷ Miletus produced a total amount of coinage equivalent to ~ 400 obverse *drachma* dies. Assuming an average of 10,000 coins produced per die,⁷⁸⁸ this leads to a total production of 4,000,000 *drachmas* over 31 years. Although the minting was unlikely to have been spread evenly throughout the period, we may note that such production averages 129,032 *drachmas* a year. Thus, the pay for the known *phourai* of Miletus would represent ~41% of average yearly production of its mint.

Even further precision is possible. If we focus on the major periods of Milesian coinage first identified in the work of Barbara Deppert-Lippitz and later refined by Philip Kinns, we find that periods V (c. 225-195) and VI (c. 175-86) are the closest to the presence of Milesian *phourarchoi*.⁷⁸⁹ These periods correspond to an increased level of Milesian autonomy, if not outright independence, by 197/6, which was quickly followed by Attalid domination in 188.⁷⁹⁰ Throughout this period, Miletus no longer functioned as an imperial mint, as it did not issue any Attalid *cistophoroi* or Alexander *tetradrachmas*, which were a fundamental requirement of Attalid imperial coinage.⁷⁹¹

This change in status is reflected in the far less extensive coinage minted by the *polis*. In terms of production, Deppert-Lippitz identified unique obverse dies for 42 *drachmas*, 37

⁷⁸⁶Thompson 1983, 65.

⁷⁸⁷See *Ibid.*, 43–65 for weights.

⁷⁸⁸Mørkholm, Grierson and Westermarck 1991, 16.

⁷⁸⁹Deppert-Lippitz 1984, 93–117; Kinns 1986, 235.

⁷⁹⁰Hansen 1971, 95–96; Rubinsohn 1988, 145; Ma 1999, 282–283; cf. Magie 1950, 958 n.75 and Le Rider 1974, 200 who believe that Miletus was autonomous; cf. Hermann 2001, 109–112 who argues that Miletus was free, but followed the political lead of Rhodes.

⁷⁹¹Hill 1906, 139; Kleiner and Noe 1977, 10; Le Rider 1989, 178; Lorber and Hoover 2003, 63; Meadows 2009, 77–78; Meadows 2013, 35.

hemidrachmas ($\frac{1}{2}$ a drachma's weight) and 8 *tetradrachmas* for periods V and VI,⁷⁹² to which must be added 31 *drachmas*, 39 *hemidrachmas*, 1 *tetradrachma*, and 1 *didrachma* (with a weight equivalent to 2 *drachmas*) identified by Kinns,⁷⁹³ resulting in an equivalent total of 149 *drachma* obverses. Once again assuming an average of 10,000 strikes per die, this accounting yields 1,490,000 *drachmas* total over a 139 year span, or ~10,719 *drachmas* per year, far short of the 52,560 *drachmas* consumed by four *phrouria* and only barely covering the cost of a single *phourarchos* and his men. So, despite the fact that Miletus certainly collected revenues that fell outside the production of its mint, the substantial cost of garrisons cannot be overstated. Even when Miletus functioned as an imperial mint, the cost of *phrouria* would have been significant; for a minor independent *polis*, the expense of even a single *phourion* is striking. As it is doubtful that Miletus paid its soldiers exclusively in locally minted coinage, this quantification only offers a sense of scale for the expense of a *phourarchos* and a *phourion*, which was certainly significant for the community.

Although the *phourarchoi* from Teos and Miletus were local citizen-amateurs, for imperial powers the cost of *phourarchoi* was even more substantial. It is impossible to determine the exact daily rate for mercenary service under the Successors, but it appears that by the third century mercenaries and citizen-soldiers had achieved a rough parity in pay, which was close to 1 *drachma* a day.⁷⁹⁴ The Successors could hardly pay their men and officers less than that amount; otherwise the mercenaries could seek higher pay elsewhere or even mutiny, as Attalid forces did at Philateria and Attalea at some date between 263 and

⁷⁹²Deppert-Lippitz 1984, 165–186.

⁷⁹³Kinns 1998, 175–183; Ashton and Kinns 2003, 16–26.

⁷⁹⁴Griffith 1935, 300–308.

241.⁷⁹⁵

Using Teos as a rough guide, some scholars have estimated a total cost for all of the garrison forces in the Ptolemaic empire at 1,200 *talents* a year.⁷⁹⁶ The outlay was hardly less for other Hellenistic kingdoms. Strombichos, who was *phrouarchos* in Arcadian Orchomenus under Polyperchon, commanded at least 2,000 mercenaries.⁷⁹⁷ Their pay would call for 731,460 *drachmas*, or nearly 122 *talents*, a year. Ten *phourai* on this scale would equal the entire estimated cost of all Ptolemaic garrisons. Even if the Successors only resorted to such numbers in critical locations, the costs are still enormous. If Philip V restricted himself to only posting 2,000 *phouroi* in each of the three “fettors” of Greece, he would spend at least 366 *talents* a year in base pay, not counting the possibly higher salary that could be demanded by a *phourarchos* overseeing such critical locations and large detachments of soldiers.

Even small *phouria* were an expensive proposition for Hellenistic monarchs. If, as Helmut Müller claims, Attalid worshipers at a shrine in Yüntdağ really were recruited from the *phouroi* in the same location,⁷⁹⁸ then the post had at least thirteen *phouroi* and one *phourarchos*, which would have entailed a yearly minimum expenditure of 6,205 *drachmas*, or just over one *talent*. The importance of *phourarchoi* and other military expenditures on the economy of Greek empires parallels the preeminence of military production and expenditures in a typical garrison state, and the exceedingly large outlay of funds necessary

⁷⁹⁵OGIS 266.

⁷⁹⁶Fischer-Bovet 2014, 73–74.

⁷⁹⁷Diod. Sic. 20.103.5–7. As 2,000 mercenaries were captured alive, the actual number of garrison forces was certainly higher.

⁷⁹⁸Müller 2010, 435; See Chapter 3.

to maintain *phourai* was proverbial.⁷⁹⁹ According to the *Suda*, a common saying was

“To garrison or to be rich: [this saying] concerns those who are aiming to make a profit. For when the Athenians established *phourai* over the islanders, they setup high wages for those who were *phulakes*, to be supplied by the islanders themselves. On account then of [the *phouroi*] being exempt from taxes and living sluggishly from the [work] of others, the saying is that it is necessary for someone either to be rich or to garrison.”⁸⁰⁰

Simply put, this proverb confirms that maintaining a garrison required substantial outlay.

Phouroi and the *phourarchoi* who commanded them were costly investments which could impose strain on even the most fiscally healthy community. In the proverb Athens, by shifting the fiscal responsibility for maintaining *phourai* to its subject communities, gained the benefits of garrisoning without incurring its expenses. Such options were not readily available for smaller communities or imperial powers that maintained isolated fortresses on their frontiers. These garrisons had to be directly funded by the powers that maintained them, and it is worth exploring exactly what these powers could expect as a return.

5.3 Internal vs. External Security

An examination into the military effectiveness of *phourarchoi* shows that *phourarchoi* were not typically expected to serve as a proactive military force, and were instead intended to maintain internal security and to project a sense of control over their postings. For the empires of the Hellenistic world, *phourarchoi* protected the personal, military, and fiscal interests of the monarch, while in smaller *poleis* *phourarchoi* were viewed as important officers who reinforced a community's *eleutheria*.⁸⁰¹

Although it has been argued that one of the primary duties of *phourarchoi* was to secure

⁷⁹⁹Lasswell 1941, 464-466.

⁸⁰⁰*Suda* s.v. Φρουρεῖν ἢ πλουτεῖν: “Φρουρεῖν ἢ πλουτεῖν: ἐπὶ τῶν κερδαίνειν ἐφιεμένων: Ἀθηναῖοι γὰρ φρουραῖς διαλαβόντες τοὺς νησιώτας μισθοὺς ἔταξαν μεγάλους τοῖς φυλάσσουσιν ὑπ’ αὐτῶν χορηγεῖσθαι τῶν νησιωτῶν. δι’ ἀτέλειαν οὖν καὶ τὸ ἀταλαιπώρως ἐκ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ζῆν εἰρῆσθαι, ὡς δέον ἢ πλουτεῖν τινα ἢ φρουρεῖν.”

⁸⁰¹*I. Priene*, 19.

the territorial possessions of a *polis*,⁸⁰² they were ill-equipped to deal with significant external threats. The armies of Hellenistic monarchies typically contained at least 30,000 fighting men,⁸⁰³ against which small units of soldiers at an isolated post, like twenty *phrouroi* at Teos, could only offer token resistance. Even the strongest imperial *phourarchos* could hardly expect to command forces that could withstand a protracted siege or direct assault.

Despite their obvious disadvantages against a fully supplied army, many *phourarchoi* surprisingly remained at their posts and vigorously defended their assignments against overwhelming odds, even in the classical era. In 424, the Athenian *strategos* Nicias attacked Spartan allies and possessions in the Peloponnese:

“Thyrea, which lies on the border between Laconia and Argolis, he [Nicias] took by siege, reduced [the inhabitants] to utter slavery, and razed [the *polis*] to the ground. The Aeginetan *katoikoi* and the Spartan *phourarchos* Tantalos he captured alive and carried [them] off to Athens. The Athenians bound Tantalos with fetters and guarded him with the other captives and the Aeginetans.”⁸⁰⁴

Unfortunately for Thyrea and its Aeginetan defenders, the *phourarchos*⁸⁰⁵ Tantalos proved unable to secure the city from Athenian attack. The fortifications of the city were unfinished,⁸⁰⁶ which may have led Spartan soldiers under his command to retreat inland and leave the *phourarchos* to his fate.⁸⁰⁷ However, even with this detachment of Spartan forces, it is doubtful that Tantalos would have been able to mount an effective resistance against the

⁸⁰²Labarre 2004, 221–222; Dmitriev 2005, 19.

⁸⁰³Roth 2007, 379.

⁸⁰⁴Diod. Sic. 12.65.9: “καὶ Θυρέας μὲν κειμένας ἐν τοῖς μεθορίοις τῆς Λακωνικῆς καὶ τῆς Ἀργείας ἐκπολιορκήσας ἐξηνδραποδίσαστο καὶ κατέσκαψε, τοὺς δ’ ἐν αὐτῇ κατοικοῦντας Αἰγινήτας καὶ τὸν φρούραρχον Τάνταλον Σπαρτιάτην ζωγρήσας ἀπήγαγεν εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν μὲν Τάνταλον δῆσαντες ἐφύλαττον μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων αἰχμαλώτων καὶ τοὺς Αἰγινήτας.”

⁸⁰⁵cf. Thuc. 4.57 who refers to Tantalos as an *archon*: “... καὶ τὸν ἄρχοντα ὃς παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἦν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, Τάνταλον τὸν Πατροκλέους...”

⁸⁰⁶Ibid., 4.57.

⁸⁰⁷Ibid., 4.57.2–3; Kagan 1974, 264.

Athenian assault, as Nikias commanded 60 ships, 2,000 hoplites, and an indeterminate number of cavalry and allied forces.⁸⁰⁸

Many Hellenistic *phourarchoi* similarly faced impossible odds. Babemesis was *phourarchos* in Gaza in 322 when Alexander the Great besieged the city.⁸⁰⁹ After offering spirited resistance Gaza finally fell to Alexander, who strung Babemesis to his chariot, imitating Achilles' treatment of Hector.⁸¹⁰ The affront to Alexander's authority represented by Babemesis had to be dealt with in a public manner, both to intimidate any other challengers and to reaffirm Alexander's dominion over his conquests. With his brutal treatment of Babemesis, Alexander sent a message, heavily laden with symbolism from the *Iliad*, that opposition to his rule would not be tolerated.

Even Alexander's own *phourarchoi* could be overcome. In 328, a *phourarchos* in command of a fortress under Alexander in Bactria was defeated and captured by Spitamenes after a direct assault against the fortifications.⁸¹¹ Little more is known about this incident, but it does highlight the vulnerability of an isolated *phourarchos* at the edges of empire.

Although infamously and ironically named for his failed siege against Rhodes,⁸¹² Demetrius “the besieger” proved effective against the *phourarchoi* of the Successors. His assault against Athens is notable for its illustration of the complex dynamics between an imperial *phourarchos* and a civilian overseer. After taking Peiraeus

“...Dionysius the *phourarchos* fled into Munychia, and Demetrius of Phalerum withdrew into the city. On the next day he [Demetrius of Phalerum] was sent with other

⁸⁰⁸Thuc. 4.53.

⁸⁰⁹Joseph. *AJ*, 11.313.

⁸¹⁰Curt. 4.4.29.

⁸¹¹Arr. *Anab.* 4.16.5.

⁸¹²Diod. Sic. 21.81–88, 91–100; Plut. *Demetr.* 21–22.

ambassadors by the *demos* to Demetrius [the Besieger] to discuss the autonomy [of Athens] and his own security, and happening to get an escort [out of the city] he gave up [his position] over Athens and fled into Thebes, then later to Ptolemy in Egypt...then the *demos* of the Athenians, having preserved their freedom, voted honors to those responsible for their autonomy. Then Demetrius [the Besieger] setting up the stone throwers and other [siege] machines and missiles struck against Munychia by land and by sea. The men stoutly guarded themselves within the walls, as Dionysius had [as an advantage] difficult ground and the height of the place, since Munychia was strong not only by nature but also from the walls which had been prepared, but against this defense Demetrius had many more soldiers and an advantage in equipment. Finally, after two days of unbroken siege, the *phrouroi* [of Munychia] were wounded by catapults and stone-throwers, and did not have substitutes, and those soldiers with Demetrius were fighting in relays and were always fresh; then, after the wall had been stripped by the stone-throwers, [Demetrius' forces] fell upon Munychia and compelled the *phrouroi* to set down their weapons, and he took the *phourarchos* Dionysius alive.”⁸¹³

Dionysius put up stubborn resistance. However, after the initial assault he did not receive any assistance from the civilian leader of Cassander's administration, who instead made a separate peace with Demetrius the besieger and fled to Egypt. The difference between the reactions of Demetrius of Phalerum and Dionysius may have stemmed from the different scope of their assignments. Charged with administering Athens, Demetrius of Phalerum felt he had the authority to enter negotiations with the Athenians and Demetrius the besieger about the status of the *polis*. Dionysius seems to have had no such latitude; his only option was to retreat to the fortified hill of Munychia and to hold out as best he could. For Dionysius, despite his advantages in position and fortifications, the military situation was hopeless, yet he still resisted for two days after a direct assault began against his position. The penalty, if

⁸¹³Diod. Sic. 20.45: “...τῶν δ’ ἔνδον Διονύσιος μὲν ὁ φρούραρχος εἰς τὴν Μουνυχίαν συνέφυγε, Δημήτριος δ’ ὁ Φαληρεὺς ἀπεχώρησεν εἰς ἄστυ. τῆ δ’ ὑστεραία πεμφοθεῖς μεθ’ ἑτέρων πρεσβευτῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου πρὸς Δημήτριον καὶ περὶ τῆς αὐτονομίας διαλεχθεὶς καὶ τῆς ἰδίας ἀσφαλείας ἔτυχε παραπομπῆς καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀπογινώσκων ἔφυγεν εἰς τὰς Θήβας, ὕστερον δὲ πρὸς Πτολεμαῖον εἰς Αἴγυπτον... ὁ δὲ δῆμος τῶν Ἀθηναίων κομισάμενος τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐνηφίσαστο τιμὰς τοῖς αἰτίοις τῆς αὐτονομίας. Δημήτριος δ’ ἐπιστήσας τοὺς πετροβόλους καὶ τὰς ἄλλας μηχανὰς καὶ τὰ βέλη προσέβαλλε τῆ Μουνυχία καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν. ἀμυνομένων δὲ τῶν ἔνδον ἀπὸ τῶν τειχῶν εὐρώστως συνέβαινε τοὺς μὲν περὶ Διονύσιον προέχειν ταῖς δυσχωρίαις καὶ ταῖς τῶν τόπων ὑπεροχαῖς, οὐσης τῆς Μουνυχίας ὀχυρᾶς οὐ μόνον ἐκ φύσεως ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς τῶν τειχῶν κατασκευαῖς, τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν Δημήτριον τῶ τε πλήθει τῶν στρατιωτῶν πολλαπλασίους εἶναι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς πολλὰ πλεονεκτεῖν. τέλος δ’ ἐπὶ δύο ἡμέρας συνεχῶς τῆς πολιορκίας γινομένης οἱ μὲν φρουροὶ τοῖς καταπέλαις καὶ πετροβόλοις συντιτρωσκόμενοι καὶ διαδόχους οὐκ ἔχοντες ἠλαττοῦντο, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Δημήτριον ἐκ διαδοχῆς κινδυνεύοντες καὶ νεαλεῖς ἀεὶ γινόμενοι, διὰ τῶν πετροβόλων ἐρημωθέντος τοῦ τείχους, ἐνέπεσον εἰς τὴν Μουνυχίαν καὶ τοὺς μὲν φρουροὺς ἠνάγκασαν θέσθαι τὰ ὄπλα, τὸν δὲ φρούραρχον Διονύσιον ἐξώγησαν.”

any, incurred by Dionysius for his resistance to Demetrius is uncertain, as he disappears from the historical record after his capture.

The fate of Strombichos, another *phourarchos* who fell to Demetrius, is known. After taking Corinth and moving his forces into Achaia in 303, Demetrius

“..campaigning against Arcadian Orchomenus, ordered Strombichos, the man commanding the *phoura*, to hand over the *polis*. [Strombichos] did not hand over [the *polis*] but instead slanderously heaped abuses against [Demetrius] from atop the wall; the king brought up [siege] machines, threw down the walls, and took the *polis* by force. Then Strombichos, who had been established as *phourarchos* by Polyperchon, along with eighty others who were hostile to [Demetrius], were crucified before the *polis*; but having captured 2,000 mercenaries, [Demetrius] mixed them with his own army. After the conquest of this *polis*, those holding nearby *phouria*, believing it was not possible to flee the power of the king, handed over their *choria* to him. Likewise those who were guarding the *poleis*, as Cassander, Prepelous, and Polyperchon were not rescuing them, and [since] Demetrius was nearby with a great force and bringing [siege] machines, they voluntarily left [their assignments].”⁸¹⁴

Whatever his motive for crucifying Strombichos - whether an emotional response to avenge personal insults or a more calculated move to quell surrounding *phourarchoi* - Demetrius' savagery had a chilling effect on any further opposition. Any penalties that other Successors had in store for *phourarchoi* who surrendered their assignments were outweighed by the gruesome punishment meted out to Strombichos. Much like Alexander had done with Babemesis, Demetrius' public and brutal treatment of Strombichos sent a clear message that resistance was a suicidal proposition, and recalcitrant *phourarchoi* and their supporters would be severely punished.

Direct assault and intimidation were not the only dangers faced by *phourarchoi*, as their

⁸¹⁴Ibid., 20.103.5-7: “...ἐπ’ Ὀρχομενὸν τῆς Ἀρκαδίας στρατεύσας ἐκέλευσε τῷ τῆς φρουρᾶς ἀφηγουμένῳ Στρομβίχῳ παραδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν. οὐ προσέχοντος δ’ αὐτοῦ τοῖς λόγοις ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὰ λοιδοροῦντος ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους βλασφημῶς προσαγαγῶν μηχανὰς ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ καταβαλὼν τὰ τείχη κατὰ κράτος εἴλε τὴν πόλιν. τὸν μὲν οὖν Στρόμβιχον τὸν ὑπὸ Πολυπέρχοντος καθεσταμένον φρουράρχον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἀλλοτρίως διατεθέντων πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰς ὀγδοήκοντα πρὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀνεσταύρωσε, τῶν δ’ ἄλλων μισθοφόρων ἔλῶν εἰς δισχιλίους κατέμιξε τοῖς ἰδίοις στρατιώταις. μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἄλωσιν ταύτης τῆς πόλεως οἱ σύνεγγυς τὰ φρούρια κατέχοντες, ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν τὸ διαφυγεῖν τὴν βίαν τοῦ βασιλέως, παρέδωκαν αὐτῷ τὰ χωρία. ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ οἱ τὰς πόλεις φρουροῦντες, τῶν μὲν περὶ Κάσανδρον καὶ Πρεπέλαον καὶ Πολυπέρχοντα μὴ βοηθούτων τοῦ δὲ Δημητρίου μετὰ μεγάλης δυνάμεως καὶ μηχανῶν ὑπεραγουσῶν προσιόντος, ἐκουσίως ἐξεχώρουν.”

positions could also be undermined by infiltration or deceit. Furthermore, *phourarchoi* who ventured beyond their assignments were vulnerable to ambush or strategic trickery. An unnamed Spartan *phourarchos* stationed near Epidaurus in 371 left the walls of his fort to fight the Athenian general Iphicrates in open-field combat. The latter surrounded his Spartan opponent, winning the battle; the subsequent fate of the *phourarchos* is unknown.⁸¹⁵

Infiltration was a constant danger for *phourarchoi* who remained at their posts.

Xenophon states that a eunuch named Gadatas was admitted into a *phourion* commanded by an Assyrian *phourarchos*, where

“Finally, he was trusted and came into the *phourion* as an ally. In the meantime, he assisted the *phourarchos* as much as he was able; but when Cyrus came, he [Gadatas] sized the *chorion*; he used Cyrus' men whom he had taken prisoner”.⁸¹⁶

This incident also shows some of the practical limits of a *phourarchos'* power. Although the unnamed *phourarchos* had incarcerated Cyrus' men, he was unable to effectively control them, stop their release, or ensure that his own internal security was sufficient to prevent betrayal from within the *phourion*.

There are other instances of infiltration and trickery overcoming *phourarchoi*. Around 400, the Spartan commander

“Thibron, when he was besieging a *chorion* in Asia, persuaded the *phourarchos* to come to meet him for a truce; Thibron swore that if they should not be successful, he would place him back in the *phourion*. [The *phourarchos*] came out, and they began talking; then the *phulakes* of the *phourion* started relaxing [their duties] because they had hope [for a truce]. At that time Thibron's men took the *chorion* by force. Thibron then led the *phourarchos* back into the *chorion* according to his oath, and placing him there he ordered him to be executed.”⁸¹⁷

⁸¹⁵Polyaenus, *Strat.* 3.9.48.

⁸¹⁶Xen. *Cyr.* 5.3.17: “τέλος δὲ πιστευθεὶς ὡς βοηθὸς εἰσέρχεται εἰς τὸ φρούριον: καὶ τέως μὲν συμπαρεσκεύαζεν ὃ τι δύναίτο τῷ φρουράρχῳ: ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ Κύρος ἦλθε, καταλαμβάνει τὸ χωρίον συνεργοῦς ποιησάμενος καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τοῦ Κύρου αἰχμαλώτους.”

⁸¹⁷Polyaenus, *Strat.* 2.19: “Θίβρων ἐν Ἀσίᾳ χωρίον πολιορκῶν τὸν φρούραρχον ἔπεισεν ἐπὶ συνθήκας προελθεῖν ὁμόσας, εἰ μὴ συντιθοῖντο, πάλιν αὐτὸν εἰς τὸ φρούριον καταστήσειν. ὁ μὲν προῆλθε καὶ λόγων ἐκοινώνησεν· οἱ δὲ τοῦ φρουρίου φύλακες διαλύσεως ἐλπίδι ῥαθυμὸν τερὸν εἶχον. ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τούτῳ προσβαλόντες οἱ Θιβρώνειοι κατὰ κράτος αἰροῦσι τὸ χωρίον. Θίβρων δὲ τὸν φρούραρχον εἰς τὸ χωρίον ἀγαγὼν πάλιν κατὰ τοὺς

This account raises several points about the command of a *phourion*. The *phourarchos* was willing to negotiate directly with his attacker without any indication that he had secured royal permission to do so. Also notable is the attitude of the *phulakes*. These men apparently shared their commander's somewhat relaxed assessment of the situation, and their “hope” for a truce indicates their belief in the practicality and acceptability of surrendering the *phourion* instead of resisting the Spartans. This may have been typical behavior on the part of isolated *phourarchoi*, who may not have had reliable communications with their employers, especially when they were besieged.

On occasion, a once-loyal *phourarchos* could be betrayed by dissent from within his own forces, who could surrender the position to the enemy. When Ptolemy encamped near Tyre in 312,

“...he summoned Andronikos the *phourarchos* to hand over the *polis*, and Ptolemy offered him gifts and abundant honors. [Andronikos] said that he would in no manner give up the trust bestowed on him by Antigonos and Demetrius, and he vulgarly abused Ptolemy. Afterwards, with his soldiers in revolt, he was thrown out of Tyre and came under the power [of Ptolemy]. He expected to suffer vengeance on account both of insulting [Ptolemy] and his refusal to hand over Tyre. Not only did Ptolemy not bear him ill-will, but he gave him gifts and kept him nearby [at court], making him one of his *philoï* and giving him a position of honor.”⁸¹⁸

Although details are lacking, Andronikos' resistance to Ptolemy evidently caused his soldiers to turn against him. This seems to be an extraordinarily rare occurrence; for the most part, the soldiers of a *phoura* or *phourion* followed the lead of their officers. Even rebellious *phourarchoi* implicitly trusted the men under their command to follow their

ὄρκους προσέταξεν αὐτὸν ἔνδον ἀναιρεθῆναι.”

⁸¹⁸Diod. Sic. 19.86.1–3: “...παρεκάλεσεν Ἀνδρόνικον τὸν φρούραρχον παραδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν καὶ δωρεὰς τε καὶ τιμὰς ἀδράς ἐπιγγεῖλατο δοῦναι. ὁ δὲ φήσας μηδενὶ τρόπῳ προδώσειν τὴν δεδομένην ὑπ’ Ἀντιγόνου καὶ Δημητρίου πίστιν, ἐλοιδόρησε φορτικῶς τὸν Πτολεμαῖον. ὕστερον δὲ στασιασάντων τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἔκπεσῶν ἐκ Τύρου καὶ γενόμενος ὑποχείριος προσεδόκα μὲν τιμωρίας τεύξεσθαι διὰ τε τὴν γενομένην λοιδορίαν καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ βεβουλήσθαι τὴν Τύρον παραδοῦναι· οὐ μὴν ὁ γε Πτολεμαῖος ἐμνησικάκησεν, ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον δοῦς δωρεὰς εἶχε περὶ αὐτόν, ἓνα τῶν φίλων ποιησάμενος καὶ πρόαγον ἐντίμως.”

orders, as a *phourarchos* (or indeed any military commander) could hardly be successful if a significant body of *phouroi* opposed his plans. The break between Andronikos and his men was triggered by the arrival of Ptolemy; it remains an open question whether there was already a rift between the *phourarchos* and the *phouroi* before the arrival of Ptolemy's army.

Sometimes *phourarchoi* could surrender their posts to spare themselves and their men from prolonged siege or sack. In 334, after his overwhelming victory at the Granicus river, Alexander received the surrender of Mithrenes, *phourarchos* of the *acropolis* in Sardis.⁸¹⁹ Mithrenes had little hope of relief from the Persians, and he may have been as motivated by concern for preserving the *polis* as he was for his own personal safety.

Phourarchoi who successfully withstood assault are exceedingly rare. The only potential case, it seems, occurs in a second-century inscription connected with Chrysa and Hamaxitos. This decree praises the actions of an unnamed *phourarchos* in the face of unspecified enemies:⁸²⁰

“... against those [who were] behaving treacherously towards the [--], he exerted every effort and energy, and for the *polis* he carefully guarded the *phourion* [which remained] unravaged, and against the enemy he served as *phourarchos* carefully and justly...”⁸²¹

Although the nature of the defense and the hostilities remain unknown from the inscription, there is some suggestion that the conflict may have been connected to the campaigns of Antiochus III in 197.⁸²² Specifics of the engagement are irrecoverable. Both Chrysa and Hamaxitos were small communities located in the *chora* of Alexandria Troas,

⁸¹⁹ Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.3.

⁸²⁰ Ricl 1997, 97.

⁸²¹ SEG 4.671 = *IAlex.Troas* 4 ll.1-6: “...πρα]ξικοπούντων κατὰ τὸ [— —, τὴν πᾶσαν ἐπιμέ] <λ>ειαν καὶ φιλοπονίαν [εἰσενεγκάμενος, τῆι τε] | πόλει διετήρησε τὸ φρο[ύριον ἀπόρθητον, καὶ κατὰ] | το<λ>έμους ἐφρο[υράρχησεν ἐπιμελῶς καὶ δι]καίως...”

⁸²² Ricl 1997, 99 note 60.

which was itself under Lysimachos following the battle of Ipsos in 301, then later under the Seleucid Empire after the battle of Corupedium in 281.⁸²³ By 226 Alexandria Troas, and by extension Chrysa and Hamaxitos, seem to have enjoyed a measure of independence, and Alexandria Troas may have joined a coalition of independent Greek *poleis* in active resistance against the encroachment of Antiochus III in 196.⁸²⁴ Given the subordinate status of Chrysa and Hamaxitos, it is hardly conceivable that this unspecified *phrourarchos* commanded a force that could have offered significant opposition to the army of Antiochus III on its own. The decree does not mention the *phrourarchos* proactively conducting military operations, but instead only states that the *phrourion* remained unravaged and the *phrourarchos* served “against the enemy”. Therefore, it is possible that the forces under him did not engage in direct combat, and that this inscription offers little more than standard language in praise of a *phrourarchos* at the end of his term during a time of general unrest.

A remarkable aspect of the conflicts described above was the willingness of *phrourarchoi* to remain in their posts, in defiance of the great odds stacked against them. Despite the obvious imbalance between their forces and the armies of rulers like Alexander the Great, many *phrourarchoi* refused to surrender their assignments without a costly fight. Despite these examples of unshakable loyalty, *phrouria* and *phrourarchoi* could rise in opposition against their employer and *polis*, often with disastrous consequences. As a result, many imperial powers moved swiftly to quell any possibility of revolt, often deploying the same grisly symbolism and public displays of punishment that were used against obstructive *phrourarchoi*.

⁸²³Cohen 1995, 145.

⁸²⁴Ma 2000, 49, 89.

5.4 Disloyalty and *Phrourarchoi*

There were two main options available to imperial powers which questioned the loyalty of their *phrourarchoi*. The simpler choice was the dispatch of an armed force to quell a potential rebellion, or for a monarch himself to see to the physical seizure and condemnation of a troublesome commander. In 7 BCE, an unnamed *phrourarchos* in the *phrourion* of Alexandria was suspected of being a possible accomplice with Herod's sons in a plot to overthrow the king.⁸²⁵ Herod's actions were swift and uncompromising:

“Herod then had the *phrourarchos* tortured, but he heard nothing from him concerning the allegations [of the plot].”⁸²⁶

Even though this *phrourarchos* did not provide any information, Herod's actions show how seriously he took the allegiance of his *phrourarchoi*. Even a hint of disloyalty necessitated swift action and the reaffirmation of imperial power and authority against the physical body of the *phrourarchos*.

Phrourarchoi in the Roman world could also pay the ultimate penalty for disloyalty. In

108

“Metellus killed the entire *boule* of Vacca, because they handed over the *phroura* to Jugurtha, and [he also killed] the *phrourarchos* Turpilius, a Roman citizen, because he had surrendered to the enemy in suspicious circumstances.”⁸²⁷

The *boule* of Vacca seems to have been the instigator of the city's defection to Jugurtha, although Turpilius' loyalty to Rome was also suspect. Metellus took no chances with the *phrourarchos*, whose execution may have had as much to do with projecting an image of

⁸²⁵Joseph. *AJ* 16.317; Joseph *BJ* 1.26.1–3.

⁸²⁶Joseph. *BJ* 1.26.3: “βασανίσας δὲ τὸν φρούραρχον Ἡρώδης οὐδὲν ἤκουσεν οὐδὲ παρ’ ἐκείνου τῶν διαβεβλημένων.”

⁸²⁷App. *Num.* 8.2.3: “Ὅτι Μέτελλος Βαγαίων ἀνήρει τὴν βουλὴν ὅλην ὡς τὴν φρουρὰν προδόντας Ἰογόρθα, καὶ τὸν φρούραρχον Τουρπίλιον, ἄνδρα Ῥωμαῖον οὐκ ἀνυπόπτως ἑαυτὸν ἐγχειρίσαντα τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἐπαπκέτεινε τῇ βουλῇ.”

strength and Roman discipline as it did with punishing the transgressions of a garrison commander.

The direct approach of physical confrontation with a *phrourarchos* could pose significant risks. In principle, if a *phrourarchos* suspected his imminent arrest or execution he could switch his loyalties to another monarch, spurned heir, or outright rebel against imperial authority. As a result, it was often more advantageous for a monarch to trap or assassinate a wayward *phrourarchos*. One case of a potentially disloyal *phrourarchos* was Nikanor, who held the position in Athens under Cassander in 319. Following a naval victory in 317, Nikanor was “swollen [with pride] and presumptuous,”⁸²⁸ causing Cassander to harbor suspicions that he was growing too powerful and developing dangerous ambitions. Nikanor was securely ensconced within his fortifications in Munychia, making his removal by overt force far too dangerous. As a result Cassander tricked Nikanor into a meeting, where he had a small detachment of royal spearmen waiting to arrest the wayward *phrourarchos*. After Nikanor's arrest,

“Cassander then on the spot summoned an *ekklesia* (assembly), and permitted those who so wished to accuse Nikanor. While the accusations were being made, Cassander seized Munychia. The *ekklesia* condemned Nikanor to death, who was accused of many illegal acts.”⁸²⁹

Although Cassander in all likelihood had little doubt that the *ekklesia* would vote in the “correct” manner, he still secured Munychia with his own, unquestionably loyal troops. Notably, the charges leveled against Nikanor included illegal (*paranomos*) acts. By definition, an imperial *phrourarchia* was an extra-constitutional office, so to press charges against

⁸²⁸Diod. Sic. 18.75.1: “...αὐτὸν ὄγκου πλήρη καὶ πεφρονηματισμένον...”

⁸²⁹Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.11.2: “Κάσσανδρος δὲ παραχρῆμα συνήγαγεν ἐκκλησίαν καὶ τοῖς βουλομένοις κατηγορήσαι Νικάνορος ἐπέτρεψεν. παρὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τῆς κατηγορίας τὴν Μουνυχίαν ἀνεχειρώσατο. Νικάνορος ἀδεῶς πολλὰ δράσαντος παρανόμως θάνατον ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκκλησίας κατεψηφίσαντο.”

Nikanor makes little legal sense, as the monarchy itself was an infringement against the *nomos* of a free Greek community.⁸³⁰ Cassander may have used Nikanor's trial to shift some of the blame for his own suppression of Athens' *eleutheria* onto Nikanor's real or imagined excesses. The *ekklesia* could have comprised Cassander's Athenian partisans, or have been solely composed of his Macedonian forces,⁸³¹ which would render the issue of adherence to the Athenian *nomos* moot. Such an assembly would also provide Cassander political cover against any of Nikanor's remaining partisans, as the monarch could claim that Nikanor's punishment was legally proper and decided by the *ekklesia*.

Cassander was not the only king who chose trickery to remove a potentially troublesome *phrourarchos*. In 301 the *phrourarchos* Diodorus sought to betray the *polis* of Ephesus to Lysimachos for 50 talents. This potential treason placed Demetrius in a difficult tactical position, which he rapidly took steps to alleviate:

“... he sailed in with Nikanor [not the Athenian *phrourarchos*] on a single ship into the harbor of Ephesus. Then Demetrius concealed himself in the hollow of the ship; Nikanor appeared, and summoned Diodorus as if to discuss with him disbanding part of Diodorus' forces. Diodorus believed that Nikanor was alone, and immediately sailed up to him in a light ship. When Diodorus was close, Demetrius sprung from the hollow of the ship, and sank [Diodorus'] ship with all its men; those who tried to swim away were captured, Demetrius possessed Ephesus [again], and the plot was thwarted.”⁸³²

Demetrius' actions were necessary due to the entrenchment of his *phrourarchos* in a strategically critical *polis*. Although Demetrius could conceivably besiege his own possession to remove the wayward *phrourarchos*, he thought it better to remove Diodorus

⁸³⁰See Chapters 1 & 2.

⁸³¹Anson 2008, 146.

⁸³²Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.7.4: “...αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπὶ μιᾷ πλέων καὶ Νικάνωρα προσλαβὼν ἔπλει πρὸς τὸν λιμένα τῆς Ἐφέσου. ὁ μὲν Δημήτριος ἐν κοίλῃ νηὶ κατεκέκρυπτο· φανερῶς δὲ ὁ Νικάνωρ ἐκάλει τὸν Διδώρον ὡς διαλεξόμενος αὐτῷ περὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν, ὅπως ἀσφαλῶς αὐτοῖς ἀπελθεῖν ἐπιτρέψειεν. ὁ δὲ ὑπολαβὼν ἤκειν τὸν Νικάνωρα μόνον ἐπιβὰς ἐπικώπου κέλητος ἔτοιμος ἦν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς συνθήκας. ὡς δὲ ἐγγύς ἦν, ἐκ νεῶς κοίλης ἀναπηδήσας Δημήτριος τὸν μὲν κέλητα κατέδυσεν αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσι, τοὺς δ' ἀπονηξάμενους συνέλαβε, τὴν δ' Ἐφεσον κατέσχε τὸν προδιδόντα φθάσας.”

through deceit. The removal of the *phrourarchos* and his supporters in a single small boat was sufficient to quell any other difficulties in the *polis*, as there is no indication of further unrest.

Beyond monetary gain, some *phrourarchoi* could turn against their employers for personal or political reasons. In 71 *phrourarchoi* loyal to Mithridates defected to the Roman Lucullus after Mithridates ordered the death of his own sisters, wives, and concubines.⁸³³ These *phrourarchoi*, either seeing the end of effective military resistance to Rome, or perhaps out of disgust at Mithridates' treatment of his relatives, were no longer loyal to the Pontic king. This was hardly the first time that court intrigues cost a Hellenistic monarch control over fortifications. In 283 Philetairos switched allegiance and transferred the *polis* of Pergamum from Lysimachos to Seleucus due to the plotting of Lysimachos' wife Arsinoë, which led to the execution of Agathocles, Lysimachos' popular son and presumptive heir.⁸³⁴

Another *phrourarchos* from a Roman context demonstrates the damage that a *phrourarchos* was capable of. In 2/3 CE, Ador / Adon, an Armenian *phrourarchos*, caused the city of Artageras / Aratgeria to revolt from Rome. Augustus' nephew Gaius was severely wounded in an ambush led by Ador.⁸³⁵ This wound eventually led to Gaius' death, which disrupted Augustus' plans for imperial succession.⁸³⁶ More immediately, the rebellion led to a long siege which resulted in the destruction of the city's walls by the victorious Romans.⁸³⁷

⁸³³App. *Mith.* 12.82.

⁸³⁴Strabo 13.4.1; Allen 1983, 9.

⁸³⁵Vel. 2.102.2.

⁸³⁶Severy 2003, 178.

⁸³⁷Strabo 11.14.6.

5.5 *Phrourarchoi* as Occupiers

That *phrourarchoi* were hardly intended to mount substantial opposition against external armies, and that even the smallest *phrourion* represented a high expense, may suggest that the *phrourarchia* was an ineffective military institution as well as a significant drain on a community's financial resources for little practical gain. It is natural to ask therefore why Hellenistic monarchies and independent *poleis* were prepared to incur such expense and to run the risk of assigning potentially rebellious *phrourarchoi* to isolated posts which were often far from major settlements. The fact is that, on the whole, *phrourarchoi* were not intended to maintain fortresses against external threats which went beyond brigandage or low-intensity conflict. Rather, the office was typically concerned with quashing internal dissent, maintaining an elite power structure, and projecting authority on an already conquered population.

Despite their focus on control, some *phrourarchoi* could behave in a manner that was detrimental to a local population yet still maintain the tolerance, if not outright support, of their imperial masters. Alexander, the Spartan *phrourarchos* of the Aeolian *chora* in 392/1, used the opportunity of a festival to seize the participants and then to demand ransom for their release. After this money was paid, the *phrourarchos* left, without any censure from Sparta itself.⁸³⁸ There was little that the Aeolians could do against such actions except to pay Alexander for their citizens' release and to hope for better treatment from Thibron, Alexander's Spartan successor.

In 376 the *phrourarchos* Nikokles, following the defeat of his Spartan allies by the Athenians in a naval engagement, closed the ramps to the gates of Naxos, posted guards on

⁸³⁸Polyaenus, *Strat.* 6.10.1.

the walls and began patrols around the *polis* with dogs. These patrols were as much to watch for internal subterfuge as for external assault, as Nikokles expected internal dissenters to join with the victorious Athenians.⁸³⁹ His concerns were focused on the danger from the inhabitants of the *polis* rather than the external threat posed by the battle; the plots against him and his patrols around the *polis* illustrate the difficulties that a *phrouarchos* might face in maintaining control.

Much like the imperial states that employed them, *phrouarchoi* could resort to summary violence to buttress their position, although such actions are generally found outside of Greek contexts. Decius, the Roman *phrouarchos* of Rhegium in 280, conspired with his *phrouroi* to seize the city for their own benefit.⁸⁴⁰ After falsely accusing the citizens of plotting to side with Pyrrhus, Decius and his forces killed all of the men in the city, leaving him to reign as a tyrant in the decimated community.⁸⁴¹ Although he earned the wrath of Rome for his behavior, his actions underline his complete control over the local population. His domination of the *polis* was total, as the Rhegians proved quite incapable of mounting an active resistance against him and his forces.

In 214 the Ennaeans, seeking to renounce their alliance with the Romans, demanded the keys to the gates of the *polis* from the *phrouarchos* Pinarius. Promising to obey the citizens if they voted on the decree, Pinarius hid troops on the *acropolis* and around the theater, and following the vote

“...when the *phrouarchos* signaled, the *stratitotai*, some shooting their weapons from above, and others coming through the passages [of the theater] and drawing out their swords, cut down the *demos*. One after another, the

⁸³⁹Aen. Tact. 22.20.

⁸⁴⁰Cass. Dio 9.40.11.

⁸⁴¹Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 20.4.8.

people fell in heaps, all except a few, who let themselves down from the walls or escaped through underground tunnels unseen.”⁸⁴²

By springing this bloody trap, Pinarius suppressed Enna's revolt. Although such actions reduced the local population, the strategic importance of the location, and the loyalty of the garrison to Rome, remained intact. As in other instances, it was the geographical importance of the post, not the status of the local population, that primarily concerned the *phrourarchos*. Adherence to the wishes of the imperial power took primacy over the welfare of the Ennaeans. Both Decius and Pinarius deployed used a system of violent compulsion to force compliance, which is a mentality within garrison states characterized by Lasswell as “to obey or die”.⁸⁴³

However, the domination of a *polis* and the enforcement of imperial control did not necessarily have to take the form of violent and public displays of collective punishment. In 322 Antigonos placed Menyllus as *phrourarchos* over Athens, with very specific instructions to prevent political changes.⁸⁴⁴ Although Menyllus proved to be a mild *phrourarchos*,⁸⁴⁵ he still exercised complete control over the military and political life of Athens. Nikanor, Menyllus' replacement, was far more direct and uncompromising. Despite concerted Athenian resistance, including his near-arrest at the hands of the Athenian *strategos* Dercyllus,⁸⁴⁶ Nikanor infiltrated mercenaries into the Piraeus and successfully resisted

⁸⁴²Polyaenus, *Strat.* 8.21: “...τοῦ δὲ φρουράρχου σημήναντος οἱ στρατιῶται οἱ μὲν ἄνωθεν ἀφιέντες τὰ βέλη, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὰς διόδους προσπεσόντες καὶ σπασάμενοι τὰς μαχαίρας τὸν δῆμον κατέκοψαν, ὥστε σωρηδὸν ἐπ’ ἀλλήλοις ἐπιπτον ἅπαντες πλὴν ὀλίγων, ὅσοι κατὰ τῶν τειχῶν αὐτοὺς καθῆκαν ἢ δι’ ὑπονόμων ἔλαθον ἐκπεσόντες.”

⁸⁴³Lasswell 1941, 459.

⁸⁴⁴Diod. Sic. 18.18.5.

⁸⁴⁵Plut. *Phoc.* 28.4.

⁸⁴⁶Ibid., 32.3.

Athenian efforts to dislodge him from his position.⁸⁴⁷ His control over the *polis* was complete, although he did share command with the Athenian Demetrius of Phalerum, who was chosen as *epimeletes*,⁸⁴⁸ until Nikanor was later removed and executed by Cassander.

5.6 Personal Relationships and Occupation

Investigation into the social relationships between garrisons and native populations often necessitates an expansive definition of “garrison” beyond the terminology of *phourarchos*, *phoura*, *phouria*, and *phouroi*.⁸⁴⁹ Unfortunately, our sources are almost silent concerning these relationships. A little insight does come from a Roman context. In 209, the Carthaginian Carthalo commanded the *phoura* of Tarentum, and as he was short of troops he employed Bruttian mercenaries and their *phourarchos*:

“Then Carthalo, with few Carthaginian forces present, had taken Bruttians into the *phoura*. The *phourarchos* of the Bruttians was in love with a woman whose brother was a soldier with the Romans. The latter was able, through his sister, to have the *phourarchos* surrender to the Romans, who brought up [siege] machines to the [section of the] walls guarded by [the *phourarchos*].”⁸⁵⁰

There was little that Carthalo could do to counteract the actions of the Bruttian *phourarchos*, who commanded a significant detachment of the garrison forces as well as a strategically critical stretch of walls of the *polis*. Equally, Carthalo could hardly prevent his *phourarchos* from forming emotional attachments; certainly there is no indication of any prohibition against social contact.

If nothing else, this story illustrates an avenue of resistance and response to imperial

⁸⁴⁷Ibid., 31.5; Nep. *Phoc.* 2.4-5

⁸⁴⁸Diod. Sic. 18.64.6.

⁸⁴⁹Chaniotis 2002, 110–113.

⁸⁵⁰App. *Hann.* 8.49: “ὁ δὲ Καρθάλων, ὀλίγων Καρχηδονίων παρόντων, Βρεττίους ἐς τὴν φουρὰν προσέλαβεν. τῶν δὲ Βρεττίων ὁ φουράρχος ἦρα γυναικός, ἧς ἀδελφὸς ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίοις στρατευόμενος ἐπραξέε διὰ τῆς ἀδελφῆς τὸν φουράρχον ἐνδοῦναι Ῥωμαίοις, ἐπάγουσι τὰς μηχανὰς ἢ τοῦ τείχους αὐτὸς ἐφρούρει.”

power open to women. However, such roles were rarely available to women who suffered under *phrourai*. A fragment from Eupolis' play *Poleis* vividly indicates the nature of certain routine relationships likely to be formed between an individual *phrouros* and local citizens:

“Indeed, when I was a *phrouros* in that city [Cyzicus], I used to screw a woman, and a boy, and an old man for a small coin...”⁸⁵¹

This fragment from Old Comedy shows one avenue of interaction between *phrouroi* and locals; namely the purchase of sex. In many similar instances such power dynamics left the most vulnerable members of a society nearly defenseless against abuse and exploitation.⁸⁵² We hear of sexual unions between *phrouroi* and locals that were anything but consensual; the actions of Decius and his *phrouroi* against the women of Rhegium confirm the horrors that might be perpetrated against a subject community.⁸⁵³

Such incidents underscore the social and cultural divide between the forces of a *phroura* and a local community. Although some *phrouroi* did consort with local elites,⁸⁵⁴ outside of sexual relationships and limited economic transactions many *phrouroi* may have preferred to socialize primarily within their own small groups.⁸⁵⁵ In inscriptions, most individual *phrouroi* are mentioned as part of a distinct and coherent small unit,⁸⁵⁶ highlighting the enduring strength of the military organization and corporate identity within the social life of a *phroura*.

⁸⁵¹Eup. 247: “...ἐν τῆδε τοίνυν τῆ πόλει φρουρῶν <ἐγώ> ποτ’ αὐτὸς γυναῖκ’ ἐκίνουν κολλύβου καὶ παῖδα καὶ γέροντα...”

⁸⁵²Vickers 1993, 21–23; Moon 1997, 49–50; Goldstein 2001, 332–349; Blanchard 2003, 1297–1298.

⁸⁵³Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 20.4.8.

⁸⁵⁴Plut. *Phoc.* 28.4; Diod. Sic. 20.103.5–7.

⁸⁵⁵Chaniotis 2002, 112–113.

⁸⁵⁶For a selection of examples see *IG* II² 123, 1299, 1303; *IG* IX, 2 1059, 1060, 1061, 1062, 1063; *IG* XII Suppl. 429; *I. Priene* 19, 21, 22, 108, 252; *OGIS* 266; Breccia 1911, # 44a; Reinmuth 1971, #15; Helly 1973, #148, 149; Bernard 1999, #4, 6.

Although eating arrangements in *phrourai* are unknown, the emphasis that imperial powers placed on the costs of grain to soldiers,⁸⁵⁷ maintenance of stores of grain in *phrourai*,⁸⁵⁸ and the requirement by independent *poleis* for soldiers to remain at their posts,⁸⁵⁹ indicates that the *phrouroi* typically lived and ate within the walls of their *phroura* or *phourion*. The organization of daily life and meals could have taken the form of small, informal messes like the *suskenai* of citizen-hoplite armies and Xenophon's Ten Thousand,⁸⁶⁰ or perhaps there were more formalized and regulated groupings like Spartan *sussitia*, which required monetary contributions from members.⁸⁶¹

Phrouroi certainly retained their cohesion within religious contexts,⁸⁶² further showing that military organization permeated every facet of their social life. The propagation of foreign cults and religious feeling by *phourarchoi* and *phrouroi* is well attested in the epigraphical record, especially from Egyptian contexts.⁸⁶³ Differing religious practices and the worship of foreign gods were further areas where the connections among *phrouroi* were significantly stronger than that between the soldiers and the local population, a difference which could create tension between the two groups.

The social and religious groupings of *phrouroi* certainly formed strong and enduring bonds among the garrison soldiers beyond their military organization. Small units of soldiers,

⁸⁵⁷OGIS 266.

⁸⁵⁸IG XII, Suppl. 644 ll.4–15.

⁸⁵⁹Robert and Robert 1976.

⁸⁶⁰Lee 2007, 96–103.

⁸⁶¹Cartledge 1987, 427–8; Lee 2007, 97; Gillihan 2012, 344–346.

⁸⁶²Müller 2010, 435.

⁸⁶³*Thèbes à Syène* 242, 243, 320; IC III.iv.14; IG XII,1 900; OGIS 111; *Thèbes à Syène* 303 = SB 5.8394 = OGIS 130; Robert and Robert 1976, 232–235 = SEG 26.1336.

be they *phrouroi*, Greek hoplites in the field,⁸⁶⁴ or some other formation, were powerful social organizations that fostered cohesion, corporate identity, and combat effectiveness.⁸⁶⁵ The men of a *phroura* lived, ate, worshiped, and occasionally fought as a unit, and as such formed strong, enduring bonds which overshadowed connections with the local community. Such separation reinforced the contrast between a *polis* and *phroura*, and influenced the actions of a subject community when faced with the establishment of a garrison.⁸⁶⁶

5.7 Responses to Occupation: Accommodation, Subversion, and Resistance

When faced with the imposition of a *phroura*, communities had three broad choices: they could accommodate the *phourarchos* and the *phrouroi*, an attitude which carried the least risk of outright sack or destruction. Or, a *polis* could (perhaps grudgingly) acquiesce to the imposition of a *phourarchos* and a *phroura*, and then attempt to subvert its loyalty. Alternatively, a *polis* could actively resist, with potentially dire consequences for the *demos*. Each possibility will be examined in turn below.

5.7.1 Accommodation

Accommodation was by far the most common strategy. Most *poleis*, while opposed to placement under a foreign *phroura* in principle, showed little signs of actively resisting imperial will. The *polis* of Erythrai after 454 seems to have at least grudgingly accommodated the imposition of an Athenian *phourarchos* and his direct interference with the local political system;⁸⁶⁷ there is no indication in the sources that the *polis* attempted to

⁸⁶⁴Lee 2007, 90–92.

⁸⁶⁵MacCoun and Hix 1993, 137; Goldstein 2001, 195–199.

⁸⁶⁶Cf. Wheeler 2011, 101 who warns against seeing a “total institution” model that presents a social and religious isolation of the military from a subject population.

⁸⁶⁷*IG I*³ 14.

revolt or to remove the *phourarchos* of its own accord.

Equally, although the Syracusans celebrated the death of Philistos,⁸⁶⁸ there is no evidence that any member of the *polis* actively resisted him when he served as *phourarchos* in the *akra* of the city during the tyranny of Dionysios I.⁸⁶⁹ The same lack of local opposition is also seen in Arrian's treatment of Alexander the Great, where there is no indication that the *phourarchoi* of Memphis, Pelusium,⁸⁷⁰ Susa,⁸⁷¹ and Bactria⁸⁷² were opposed by their subject communities.

The situation was similar under the Successors. Eumenes evidently experienced no internal difficulties with his *phourarchoi* in Cappadocia in 321,⁸⁷³ and some local elites in Arcadian Orchomenus appeared to ally with Strombichos, who was *phourarchos* under Polyperchon in 303.⁸⁷⁴ Although the Greeks expressed nothing but disdain and hostility towards Philip V and his “fettters”, there is again no indication of revolts or active military opposition from the communities that housed *phourai*,⁸⁷⁵ and there are even some hints of local cooperation and economic exchange.⁸⁷⁶

Greek communities in Ptolemaic Egypt also accommodated imperial *phourarchoi*. These officers were tasked with keeping Greco-Macedonian settlers and native Egyptian

⁸⁶⁸Plut. *Dion.* 35.

⁸⁶⁹*FGrH* 556 T 5c.5.

⁸⁷⁰See Map 9.

⁸⁷¹Arr. *Anab.* 3.16.9.

⁸⁷²*Ibid.*, 4.16.5.

⁸⁷³Plut. *Eum.* 3.7.

⁸⁷⁴Diod. Sic. 20.103.5–7.

⁸⁷⁵Polyb. 18.11.5–10.

⁸⁷⁶*IG* XII, Suppl. 644.

subjects in line,⁸⁷⁷ but their coercive authority primarily focused on criminal and civil disputes instead of general suppression. Ptolemaic *phourarchoi* seemingly had no more than limited authority to inflict corporal punishment or outright violence against the local population beyond incarceration for specific offenses,⁸⁷⁸ and therefore functioned as a kind of *gendarmerie* over their assignments. The population of many Egyptian communities petitioned *phourarchoi* and other officers to intervene in legal matters, which highlights the necessity for a petitioner to proactively pursue justice.⁸⁷⁹ This requirement for citizens to appeal personally to an officer is a feature of most garrison states, where direct petitioning is one of the few methods available for non-elite individuals who wish to interact with legal authority.⁸⁸⁰

5.7.1.1 Local *Phourarchoi* and the *Polis*

For independent *poleis* which drew *phourarchoi* from the *demos*, the issue of accommodation was largely irrelevant, as they assigned the *phourarchos* to his post and very clearly limited the power of the *phourarchia* by law.⁸⁸¹ Thus, these *poleis* used a carrot-and stick approach, balancing honors, tangible rewards, and the threat of loss of life and property to control *phourarchoi*. Indeed, most of the known inscriptions concerning rewards and honors for them are from local contexts.

Such rewards given by smaller *poleis* largely used similar language, and resemble honors given to other benefactors of the community. Most often these rewards took the form of civic

⁸⁷⁷ *Thèbes à Syène* 322.

⁸⁷⁸ *P. Diosk.* 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9; *P. Tor. Choach.* 8; See Chapter 3.

⁸⁷⁹ See Chapter 3.

⁸⁸⁰ Lasswell 1941, 461-462.

⁸⁸¹ See Chapter 3.

crowns, dedicatory inscriptions, and the proclamation of honors in the theater or other highly visible public spaces. In 327-324, the *polis* of Priene honored a *phrourarchos* named Apellis for his service to the *polis*. In the decree it was

“...decided by the *boule* and the *demos*: To praise Apellis and to crown him with a golden crown according to the law, and to announce [this] in the theater at the Dionysia because of his excellence and love of honor which he always has for the *demos*...”⁸⁸²

The phrase ἐκ τοῦ νόμου indicates that there was a legal mechanism for honoring *phrourarchoi* for their service, one which apparently governed the nature of the reward that could be bestowed on them. This is a common feature of such inscriptions, and as such was a formalized method for rewarding crowns to successful magistrates. Such regulation left little room for ambiguity in the relationship between the *phrourarchos* and the *polis*. The citizen-amateur office-holder could expect the *polis* to bestow an award on the successful completion of his assignment, and the *polis* could rely upon the *nomos* to establish clear guidelines as to the amount and nature of rewards for faithful service.

Similar guidelines found in the *nomos* concerning rewards were judiciously followed by the Prienians, and there seems to have been no obstacle to the award of crowns and assorted honors to *phrourarchoi* here who held the office multiple times. In c. 266 the *boule* and *demos* honored the *phrourarchos* Nymphon, decreeing that it was

“...decided by the *boule* and the *demos*: To commend Nymphon and to crown him with a golden crown and to announce the crown...”⁸⁸³

A second inscription honoring Nymphon from c. 262 reveals the heavily standardized nature of civic rewards for the *phrourarchos*:

⁸⁸²*I. Priene* 4 ll. 52-55: “...δεδοχθαι τῆι βουλῆ[ι] | κ[α]ι [τῶ]ι δήμωι· ἐπαινέσαι τε Ἄπελλιγ καὶ στεφανῶσαι στεφάνωι χρ[υ]σέωι | τῶι ἐκ το[ῦ] νόμο[υ] καὶ ἀ[ν]αγγεῖλαι τοῖς Δι[ο]νυσίοις ἐν τῶι θεάτρωι ἀρετῆς ἐν[ε]κ[α] [κ]αὶ φιλοτιμίας ἦν [ἔ]χ[ω]ν δια[τ]ελεῖ εἰς τὸν δῆμον...”

⁸⁸³*I. Priene* 21, ll. 16-18: “...δεδοχθαι τῆι βουλῆι καὶ τῶι δήμωι· ἐπηνῆισθαι τε Νύμφωνα καὶ στεφανῶσαι αὐτὸν | στεφάνωι χρυσεῶι καὶ ἀναγγεῖλαι τὸν στέφανον...”

“...decided by the *boule* and the *demoi*: To crown Nymphon, son of Protarchos with a golden crown at the next Dionysia, at the competition of the tragedies, according to the law...”⁸⁸⁴

Once again, the phrase ἐκ τοῦ νόμου appears, underlying the formalized nature of the *phourarchia*'s civic honors. The *demoi* of Priene was preoccupied with adherence to the *nomos* and the due reward to *phourarchoi*. Nymphon was certainly not the only Prienian *phourarchos* to receive multiple honors from the *polis*. At some point in the third century an inscription honoring Helikon's service to the *polis* of Priene, erected by the *phouroi* in the *akra*, states that

“[Helikon] was chosen by the *demoi* as *phourarchos* twice, and he commanded worthily, and his leadership [of the *phouroi*] was visible [to all]; the *phouroi* commended him and crowned him with golden crowns.”⁸⁸⁵

Later in the same decree, the *phouroi* once again honor Helikon's service, as:

“[This is] decreed by the *phouroi*: To praise Helikon son of Leomedes because of his virtue and goodwill [which he has] for us and the other citizens; and to crown him with a golden crown worth ten [gold staters]...”⁸⁸⁶

These honors were meant not only to recognize the behavior of the *phourarchos* towards the *phouroi*, but also to serve as a public demonstration of the good will and generosity of the *polis*, as such decrees were publicly displayed and immortalized on a stone stele.⁸⁸⁷ The *phouroi* in the heights of Telonia were clearly impressed with the behavior of some of their *phourarchoi*, whose service to the *polis* was amply recognized with monetary rewards and social honors. These rewards were instituted not just to praise the excellence of a

⁸⁸⁴*I. Priene* 22, ll. 14-17: “...δεδοχθαι τῆι βουλῆι | [καὶ τῶι δήμῳ· στεφ]ανῶσαι Νύμφωνα Πρωτάρχου | [τοῖς πρώτοις Διονυ]σίῳ[ι]ς τῶι ἀγῶνι τῶν τραγω[ι]ῶν χρυσέῳι στεφάν]ῳι τῶι ἐκ τοῦ νόμου...”

⁸⁸⁵*I. Priene* 19 + p. 308, ll. 20-24: “πρότ[ε]ρόν τε ἀποδειχθεὶς ὑπὸ | [το]ῦ δήμου φρού[ρα]ρχος δις καὶ ἄρξας ἀξί[ως] ἑαυτοῦ τε κα[ὶ] τῶν ἀποδειξάντων | [ἐσ]τεφανώθη ὑπὸ τῶν φρουρῶν ἐπαιν[ε]ῖς χρυσέοις στεφάνοις.”

⁸⁸⁶*Ibid.*, ll. 33-38: “...δεδοχθαι τοῖς φρου[ρο]ῖς· ἐπηνῆσθαι Ἑλικῶντα Λεωμέδοντο[ς] | [ἀρ]ετῆς ἕνεκεν καὶ εὐνοίας τῆς εἰς αὐ[τοῦ]ς τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας, καὶ | [στ]εφανῶσαι αὐτὸν χρυσέῳι στεφά[νω]ι ἀπὸ χρυσῶν δέκα...”

⁸⁸⁷*Ibid.*, ll. 44-56.

phourarchos, despite the utility of his actions for the *polis*. The extensive attention paid to public display of the decrees, coupled with the express desire of the *polis* to have its actions recognized, shows that the community was quick to advertise not only the correct behavior exhibited by a *phourarchos*, but also its generosity in rewarding citizens who provided material benefits to the community. By doing so, the *polis* praised itself and publicly reaffirmed its control over the *phourarchia*.

Other *poleis* honored their *phourarchoi* in a similar manner. Between the third and second centuries Leros recognized the Milesian *phourarchos* Apollonios by decreeing that

“...[it is] decided by the Lersian *katoikoi* in Leros: to honor Apollonios and to crown him because he is a good and noble man...”⁸⁸⁸

Although the material of the crown is unspecified, it was likely the same kind of golden crown assigned to other *phourarchoi*. In c. 169, Milesian *demos* and *katoikoi* living in Lepsia⁸⁸⁹ recognized the *phourarchos* Timotheos in the following manner:

“It is decided by the *demos*⁸⁹⁰ to commend [the *phourarchos*] Timotheos due to his excellence and because of the goodwill he has displayed for the *demos* of the Lepsians, and because of the care he has shown to the *demos*, to crown him with a golden crown [made] from ten golden Alexanders [coins]...”⁸⁹¹

Poleis could also reward a *phourarchos* for exemplary military service. An otherwise unknown second century *phourarchos*, who was stationed in a *phourion* near Chrysa and Hamaxitos,⁸⁹² was honored by the people of Chrysa, who voted “...to make him a citizen in

⁸⁸⁸Manganaro 1963, #3 ll. 17-19: “δεδοχθαι Λερίοις τοῖς κατοικοῦσιν ἐν Λέρῳ ἐπιτηνῆσθαι μὲν Ἀπολλώνιον καὶ στεφανῶσαι αὐτὸν | [— καλοκαγαθίας ἔνεκεν]...”

⁸⁸⁹Manganaro 1963, #18 ll.1-2: “ἔδοξε Μιλησίων τοῖς κατοικοῦσιν ἐν Λ[ε]ψία”. Lepsia was a dependent community of Miletus that had Milesian settlers in the *demos*. See Thonemann 2011, 283 and Chapter 2.

⁸⁹⁰This *demos* almost certainly includes Milesian *katoikoi*.

⁸⁹¹Manganaro 1963, #18 ll. 16-22: “...δεδοχθαι τῶν | [δῆ]μοι ἐπιτηνῆσθαι Τιμόθεον ἀρετῆς ἔνεκ[ε]ν [κα]ὶ [τῆς] φ[α]ιν[ο]μένης ἧς ἔσχεν εὐνοίας εἰς | τὸν δῆ[μ]ο[ν] τῶν Λ[ε]ψιέων καὶ εἶναι αὐτὸν ἐν ἐπιμ[ε]λλ[ε]ίαι παρὰ τῶν | δῆμοι, στεφανῶσαι δὲ αὐτὸν | [χρυσῶ]ν [σ]τε[φ]άνων ἀπὸ χρυσῶν Ἀλεξανδρε[ῖ]ων δέ[κα]...”

⁸⁹²See above.

Chrysa and to crown him with a golden crown...⁸⁹³ The reward offered by Chrysa indicates that the *phourarchos* was not a citizen of the *polis*, but nothing else concerning his political status is certain. He could have been dispatched from an imperial power, Alexandria Troas, or he could have owed his position to one of the local communities, much like Milesian *phourarchoi* at Pidasia, Leros, and Lepisia.⁸⁹⁴

Balanced against a system of rewards, *poleis* could also rely on the *nomos* to establish severe penalties for *phourarchoi* who overstepped their authority. A treaty between Teos and Kyrbissos clearly illustrates the consequences for non-compliant *phourarchoi*:

“Whoever, having taken the *chorion*, does not hand it over to the *phourarchos* sent by the *polis* always after each four month [period], shall be exiled and cursed from Teos and from Abdera and from the *chora* of the Teans and the Abderites, and his possessions shall be public, and whoever kills him, shall not be defiled: if he (the *phourarchos*) dies fighting, his possessions shall be public.”⁸⁹⁵

After the expiry of his four-month limited term, the *phourarchos* was required to vacate the *phourion*, under penalty of exile and potentially death. At the very least, a *phourarchos* who refused to relinquish his post could automatically lose all of his substantial property at Teos, and would no longer be welcome within the lands of the *polis* or its colony of Abdera.⁸⁹⁶ In addition, by removing any religious penalties associated with homicide,⁸⁹⁷ the Teans sanctioned the killing of a wayward *phourarchos*. Although the historical record offers no example of these penalties being carried out, the Teans made the importance of the

⁸⁹³*RevEpigr* 2,1914,43 ll. 7-8: “...ἐν Χρυσῇ πολείτας [ἐπιηνηκέσαι — — — — — και ἐστε]φανωκέσαι αὐτὸν χρυσῶι στεφάνωι...”

⁸⁹⁴See Chapter 4.

⁸⁹⁵Robert and Robert 1976 ll. 22-27: “...ὃς δ’ ἂν παραλαβὼν | τὸ χωρίον μὴ παραδῶ[ι τ]ῶι φρουράρχω[ι] τῶ[ι] ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀποσ[τελ]λομένωι ἀεὶ καθ’ ἐκάστην τετράμη[νο]ν, φ[ε]ύγειν τε αὐτὸν ἀραιὸν | ἐκ Τέω και ἐξ Ἀβδήρων και ἐκ τῆς χώρας και τῆς Τηίων και τῆς Ἀβδηρ[ι]τῶν και τὰ ὄντα αὐτοῦ δη[μό]σια εἶ[ν]αι, και ὃς ἂν ἀποκτείνῃ αὐτὸν μ[ὴ] |μαρὸς ἔστω· ἐὰν δὲ μαχόμενος [ἀποθάνῃ, ὑπάρχ]ε[ι]ν αὐτοῦ δημόσια τὰ ὄν[τα]...”

⁸⁹⁶See Graham 1992, 53–59 for comparanda in other decrees of Teos.

⁸⁹⁷Blickman 1986, 193–194; Bendlin 2010, 184–187.

nomos, and the potential consequences of unacceptable behavior, clear to their *phrourarchoi*.

Independent *poleis* may have had little use for the abilities of the *phrourarchia* to suppress local populations, but the system of rewards and punishments illustrates the enormous value that these communities clearly placed in the office. Independent *poleis* evidently valued a sense of control and security against small-scale threats, which they stressed by emphasizing the need for *phrourarchoi* to physically remain in their assignments and not proactively seek combat, leave uneventful postings due to boredom, or otherwise compromise their positions.⁸⁹⁸

5.7.2 Subversion

Unlike communities that established local *phrourarchoi*, subject *poleis* that wished to influence the attitude of a *phrourarchos* or monarch had limited options. As stated previously, they could directly petition the *phrourarchos* or monarch, at least on an individual basis. Often, the *poleis* in question resorted to civic honors, including golden crowns, statues, and dedicatory inscriptions, to express their gratitude to a *phrourarchos* who behaved mildly or “justly” toward the *polis*. The line between accommodation and subversion is blurred in these instances. Subject *poleis* could have legitimately held individual *phrourarchoi* in high esteem, or they could have knowingly tried to influence future *phrourarchoi* by publicly heaping lavish praises and honors on predecessors who had benefitted the community.

Some imperial *phrourarchoi* received civic honors which are not fully recoverable due to damaged or fragmentary inscriptions. In the third-century, the *polis* of Amyzon honored an Akarnanian Ptolemaic *phrourarchos* at the end of his term as he was a “noble and good man

⁸⁹⁸See Chapter 4.

who accomplished many and great things....”⁸⁹⁹ His relationship to the *polis*, and his presence in the city when he received the honors, are unclear.⁹⁰⁰ What is certain is that the Amyzonians undertook the expense to honor this *phrourarchos*, either in an attempt to influence future *phrourarchoi* or as a genuine offering of thanks for mild treatment.

Kourion honored a *phrourarchos* sent by Ptolemy to govern the city in c. 235. Kourion gave the *phrourarchos* “...and his descendants [the right] to be a citizen and a benefactor...” in the *polis*.⁹⁰¹ In this instance the *demos* was willing to extend the very real rights and privileges of citizenship to the descendants of the *phrourarchos*, although it is impossible to know if the *phrourarchos* or his descendants actually settled in the *polis* or lived in other Ptolemaic postings.

Pandaros, another Ptolemaic *phrourarchos* who was stationed over Xanthos, received extensive local honors. In an inscription dated to December 260 / January 259, it was

“Decided by the Xanthians: to commend Pandaros for [his attitude] he has for it, and for him being a *proxenos* and benefactor of the *polis*; for citizenship to be given to him and his descendants: for him to have a share in all of the remaining things that Xanthians have a share; for him to have a right of entry and exit from the harbor in peace and in war, and have inviolability and neutrality, so that all may see that the *polis* remember known for all time the services and the even greater favors repaid to the benefactors. This decree will be inscribed by the *archons* and set in the shrine of Leto.”⁹⁰²

What practical opportunity Pandaros or his descendants might have had to exercise these

⁸⁹⁹Robert and Robert 1983, 4 ll. 8-10: “...ἀνήρ καλὸς καὶ [[γ]αθὸς [ὦν δια]τ[ε]λεῖ κ[αί] πολλ[ὰ]ς καὶ |μεγάλ[ας] χρεῖα[ς]...”

⁹⁰⁰See Chapter 2.

⁹⁰¹I. Kourion 32 ll. 14-16: “...εἶναι ἀ[π]τὸν π[ο]λ[ι]τ[ῆ]ν καὶ εὐεργέτην καὶ τοῦς | [ἐκγόνους] αὐτ[οῦ]...”

⁹⁰²Robert and Robert 1983, #4 ll. 9-23: “...δεδοχθαι | Ξανθίοις · εἰνέσαι τε Πάνδαρον ἐπὶ τῆι εἰς Ξανθίους αἰρέσει καὶ εἶναι αὐτὸν πρόχρονον καὶ εὐεργέτην τῆς Ξανθίων πόλεως · δεδοσθαι δὲ αὐτῶι καὶ | πολιτείαν αὐτῶι καὶ ἐκγόνους · μετέχειν δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν πάντων ὧν Ξανθιοὶ μετέχουσιν · εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶι εἰσπλουν καὶ ἔκπλουν ἐν εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἐμ πολέμῳ ἀσυ[λ]εῖ καὶ ἀσπονδεῖ, ἵνα πάντες εἰδῶσι ὅτι ἡ πόλις ἢ Ξανθίων ὑφ’ ὧν ἂν τυ|νχάνῃ πασχούσα ἀγαθὸν δύναται[ι] τὰς εὐεργεσίας καταμνημονεῖν εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον καὶ | τὰς χάριτας πολλῶι μείζους ἀνταποδιδόναι τοῖς | αὐτῆς εὐεργέταις · ἀναγράψαι δὲ τὸ ψήφισμα | τοῦτο τοῦς ἄρχοντας καὶ ἀναθεῖναι εἰς τὸ | ἱερὸν τῆς Λητοῦς.”

privileges is an open question. Some Ptolemaic *phrourarchoi* are known to have moved assignments, and they could even hold the post at locations that were on opposite sides of the empire. Although this kind of decree does offer tangible benefits and rights, and the *phrourarchos* and his descendants could legally exercise those rights at their own discretion, the genuine opportunity to do so, especially if they were transferred to different Ptolemaic holdings like other *phrourarchoi*,⁹⁰³ is a matter of some doubt.

Nevertheless, Xanthos put great emphasis on the public display of these honors, indicating concern for both internal and external assessment of their actions. The placement of the decree in a public shrine served as an ever-present reminder of both the benefits bestowed on Pandaros and the responsibilities of the *polis* to its former *phrourarchos*. The emphasis on the display “so that all may see...for all time” matches the attention that imperial states gave to the public chastisement of disloyal *phrourarchoi* and hostile *poleis*. As the option to make a negative example of an imperial *phrourarchos* was denied to subject communities like Xanthos, such *poleis* turned to the public display of positive rewards and praises to affirm a political and social position. These communities could not subject imperial *phrourarchoi* to their own *nomos*, so instead they used the public display of honors and rewards as an attempt to influence imperial officers.

Although evidence from the major kingdoms of the Hellenistic world is scant, there is no doubt that the judicious use of honors, rights, and financial rewards could on rare occasions be enough to convince *phrourarchoi* to transfer their loyalties to the local community. Perhaps the best example of such subversion comes from the *polis* of Heraclea Pontica. By 284/283 Lysimachos had left it under the command of a certain Herakleides, who was

⁹⁰³IC III, iv 14; *Thèbes à Syène* 318. See Chapter 2.

appointed due to the support of Arsinoë, the monarch's wife.⁹⁰⁴ Herakleides' official title is not given, but what is known is that he ruled the *polis* as a tyrant, alienating the citizenry.⁹⁰⁵ After Lysimachos' death in 281 at the Battle of Korupedion, the population attempted to persuade Herakleides to leave the *polis*, thereby restoring its *eleutheria*.⁹⁰⁶ His refusal and subsequent punishment of some petitioners spurred the citizens who

“...making agreements with the *phrouarchoi*, which gave *isopoliteia* to them, and granted them the right to get the wages of which they had been deprived; seized Herakleides and kept him under guard for a time.”⁹⁰⁷

After this success, the jubilant citizens went so far as to tear down the walls of the acropolis to its foundations, removing this symbol of their previous domination.⁹⁰⁸

This passage, originally from Memnon, is a rare glimpse into the perspective of a subject community under a *phrouarchia* outside of a major center in Greece. The *phrouarchia* under Lysimachus was evidently not held by a single man, as the citizens made a pact with the *phrouarchoi*, the plural form indicating that more than one individual held such a position. It is unclear from the passage whether the *phrouarchoi* split command over a single *phroura*, or if there were multiple *phourai* in the territory of the *polis*. Whatever the case, the Heracleans sought the full cooperation of all the *phrouarchoi* to accomplish Herakleides' removal.

The offer of *isopoliteia* reveals that these *phrouarchoi* were not citizens of the *polis*.

Thus, they were likely mercenaries in the service of Lysimachus, and their social and

⁹⁰⁴Burstein 1976, 86–87; Meadows 2012, 129–130.

⁹⁰⁵*FGrH*, 434 F 1.5.5.

⁹⁰⁶*Ibid.* 1.6.2: “Προσήλθον οὖν πρότερον Ἡρακλείδῃ, πείθοντες αὐτὸν μὲν ἐκχωρεῖν τῆς πόλεως, οὐκ ἀπαθῆ κακῶν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ λαμπροῖς δώροις ἐφοδιαζόμενον, ἐφ’ ᾧ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐκείνους ἀναλαβεῖν.”

⁹⁰⁷*FGrH* 434 F1: “... συνθήκας θέμενοι πρὸς τοὺς φρουράρχους οἱ πολῖται, αἱ τὴν τε ἰσοπολιτείαν αὐτοῖς ἔνεμον καὶ τοὺς μισθοὺς λαβεῖν ὧν ἐστέρηγντο, συλλαμβάνουσι τὸν Ἡρακλείδην καὶ φυλαττόμενον εἶχον ἐπὶ χρόνον.”

⁹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, “...τῆς τε ἀκροπόλεως μέχρις ἐδάφους τὰ τείχη κατέβαλον...”

economic position was dependent upon imperial largess, which had come to an end. This situation was recognized by the Heracleans, who skillfully used the now ambiguous status of the formerly imperial *phourarchoi* to the advantage of the *polis*.

Heraclea's grant of *isopoliteia* instead of outright citizenship is striking. *Isopoliteia* generally denoted equal citizenship rights between two distinct communities, which did not necessarily entail the physical movement or resettlement of citizens.⁹⁰⁹ Although the *phourarchoi* in question were physically present at Heraclea, the offer of *isopoliteia* shows that the *polis* took great pains to reassure them that their legal rights would be applicable even if they left the city, and that they could simultaneously retain whatever status they held in their home communities. The offer of *isopoliteia* may have been a calculated and somewhat backhanded way for Heraclea to entice the cooperation of the *phourarchoi* by extending legal rights and protections, while subtly encouraging their departure from the *polis* by emphasizing the portability of those same rights and privileges.

Seen in this light, even though the *demos* of Heraclea was willing to subvert imperial *phourarchoi*, the *polis* was still somewhat wary of the officers' loyalty and presence in their community. The *polis* celebrated the removal of Herakleides by tearing his fortifications to the ground; the continued presence of *phourarchoi*, who were expensive to employ and no longer oversaw a defensible *phourion*, could present a fiscal and political liability for the *polis*.

5.7.3 Resistance

Both before and after the imposition of a garrison, many *poleis* tried varying degrees of resistance against monarchical encroachment. The most effective method for a *polis* to avoid

⁹⁰⁹*Milet.* I. 3. 136, 137, 141, 146; Gruen 1984, 70; Fernoux 2004, 130.

a *phroura* altogether was to negotiate with an imperial power before one was even established. In an inscription from 378/377 outlining the formation of the second Athenian league, the Athenian allies, having previously suffered under Athenian *phourarchoi* and other administrators, ensured that this new alliance would be fundamentally different. For a Greek *polis* not subject to the Persian king, their admission into the Athenian alliance

“... it should be possible, being free (*eleutheros*) and autonomous, being governed under whatever government they wish, not admitting any *phroura* nor receiving an *archon*, nor paying tribute...”⁹¹⁰

Although the second Athenian league rapidly abandoned such lofty principles, the sentiment against foreign *phourai*, *archons*, and by extension *phourarchoi* was strong. Bitter experience had shown the incompatibility of the traditional concepts of freedom and autonomy with the imposition of foreign *phourai*.

This preoccupation with *eleutheria* and autonomy carried over into the Hellenistic era, where the term ἀφρουρέω, *aphroureo* (ungarrisoned), was increasingly used in treaties outlining the legal relationship between subject communities and imperial powers.⁹¹¹ As part of the complex rhetorical, legal, and military relationship between small *poleis* and imperial powers, such treaties were perhaps the most effective method for a community to remain without a foreign *phroura*. Although there was no concept of international law, or any practical way for a *polis* to force an imperial power to comply with agreements, the inclusion of such language in treaties at least tried to ensure that *poleis* could remain under their own *nomos* and free from direct external domination.

When negotiations failed, or were viewed as impractical or unnecessary by an imperial

⁹¹⁰IG II² 43 ll. 18-23: “...ἐξεῖναι ἀν[τ]ῶ[ι] ἐλευθέρ[ω]ι ὄντι καὶ αὐτονόμωι, πολι[τ]ευομέν[ω]ι πολιτείαν ἦν ἂν βόληται μῆτε [φορο]ῦν εἰσδεχομένωι μῆτε ἄρχοντα | ὑπο[δεχ]ομένωι μῆτε φόρον φέροντι...”

⁹¹¹IG IV²,1 70 = SEG 11.401 = IG IV²,1 59; *I. Iasos* 2; *I. Smyrna* 576; SEG 37.1003; Chaniotis 2002, 101; Dmitriev 2011, 103, 125, 154, 210, 230, 276.

power, smaller communities were left with few options. Because few *poleis* were able to resist the military might of the Successors,⁹¹² many communities quickly found themselves under the dominion of a *phrourarchos*. This is not to say that a community was completely powerless against a *phrourarchos*, even one who was a foreigner in the *polis*, but instances of active and successful resistance against imperial *phrourarchoi* are extremely rare.

Although prior to the Hellenistic period, Athens provides one of the few examples of a *polis* overcoming a *phrourarchos* on its own terms. In 403, during the *phrourarchia* of the Spartan Kallibios, the Spartan general Lysander was appointed as *harmostes* and his brother Libys as *nauarchos* to shore up crumbling Spartan control.⁹¹³ Following these appointments, the Spartan-backed oligarchs in Athens were defeated by Athenian democrats based in the Piraeus. Wracked by internal dissension and political maneuvering within their own forces, the Spartans (including the *phrouroi*) departed Athens without further incident.⁹¹⁴ Had the Spartans been able to remain unified against the Athenians, such an overthrow might not have been possible.

Only rarely could smaller *poleis* overcome a *phrourarchos*. During the tyranny of Hierion in Priene (301-298),

“...[the citizens of Priene] took refuge together in Karion, [where] one of the citizens was *phrourarchos*, and the *phrourarchos* and the *phulakes* were killed because they all chose [the side of] the tyrant...”⁹¹⁵

⁹¹²Rhodes is the most notable example; See Diod. Sic. 21.81–88, 91–100 and Plut. *Demetr.* 21–22.

⁹¹³Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.28; This appointment may have made the *phrourarchia* redundant. cf. Diod. Sic. 14.33.5 where Lysander simply leads (ἄρχω) Spartan forces consisting of 40 warships and 1000 soldiers for the Ten: “... ἀποδείξαντες ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμόνος τετταράκοντα ναῦς μετεπέμψαντο καὶ στρατιώτας χιλίους, ὧν ἦρχε Λύσανδρος.”

⁹¹⁴Xen. *Hell.*, 2.4.32; Diod. Sic., 14.33.1.

⁹¹⁵Magnetto 2008, ll. 67-69: “...συμφυγεῖν εἰς τὸ Κ[άρι]ον, φρουραρχοῦν[τος ἐν]ός τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ τὸν τε φρούραρχον καὶ τοὺς φύλακας διὰ τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι τὰ τοῦ τυράννου πάντα διαφθε<ρ>ραι...”

This is a unique instance where the citizens of a small Greek *polis* were able to overcome a *phrourarchos* without significant outside intervention (although it is possible that the Ephesians may have provided some support to the exiles, as they had for Prienian refugees at the *phrourion* of Charax).⁹¹⁶ However, this incident occurred within the context of a civil war against a local tyrant, which was a far different situation from active resistance against an imperial power.

For the most part, communities that successfully overthrew imperial *phrourarchoi* received extensive outside assistance. In 379 the Theban Pelopidas, disguised as a woman, infiltrated a festival of Aphrodite on the Cadmeia and slew the Spartan *phrourarchos* after receiving substantial Athenian aid. The Spartans sent an army to reclaim the *phoura*, but the presence of Athenian forces near Thebes prevented Spartan interference and preserved Pelopidas' "liberation" of the *polis*.⁹¹⁷

Smaller communities took great risks by engaging in open rebellion, as imperial responses to overt resistance could be harsh. After fleeing from a naval defeat against the Carthaginians, in 276 Pyrrhus

“...punished the Western [Italian] Locrians, who, because of outrages committed against them, had killed his *phoura* and *phrourarchos*. Pyrrhus savagely and vindictively killed them and plundered [their city], he did not even spare the [temple] offerings of Proserpina...”⁹¹⁸

Not even religious scruples, which in principle protected the earthly property of Greek gods in Greek conflicts,⁹¹⁹ could spare the Locrians from Pyrrhus' wrath. By killing the

⁹¹⁶See Chapter 4 for an analysis of the relationships and conflicts between *phrourarchoi* and *poleis*.

⁹¹⁷Polyaenus, *Strat.* 2.4.3; Din. 39.5–6; Diod. Sic. 15.27; Plut. *Pel.* 6.1–6.2.

⁹¹⁸App. *Sam.* 3.12.1: “... ἐτίμητο Λοκρούς τοὺς ἐπιζεφυρίους, ὅτι φρουρὰν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν φρούραρχον αὐτῆς, ὑβρίσαντας ἐς αὐτοὺς, ἀνηρήκεσαν. ὡμῶς δ’ αὐτοὺς καὶ πικρῶς κτείνων τε καὶ συλῶν ὁ Πύρρος οὐδὲ τῶν ἀναθημάτων τῆς Περσεφόνης ἀπέσχετο...”

⁹¹⁹Gauthier 1972, 226; Sinn 1993, 72; Rigsby 1996, 3–4; van Wees 2004, 232; Lanni 2008, 469–470, 477.

population and plundering the temple, he sent an unambiguous message that resistance against his *phrourarchoi* would not be tolerated. Even though he later regretted his excesses against the temple,⁹²⁰ his treatment of the Locrians was a public reaffirmation of his dominance over the area, much like Alexander and Demetrius had used the punishment of *phrourarchoi* to stress their power.

Outside of the Greek world, active resistance against *phrourarchoi* was more common, although care must be taken when looking at these examples due the different cultural and historical contexts.⁹²¹ In 212, the population of Metapontum rebelled against their Roman *phrourarchos* and *hegemon* when he went to Tarentum to assist Livius, another Roman *phrourarchos*. The city rose in revolt, killing the Roman forces left behind, and then defected to Hannibal.⁹²²

Sometimes active resistance only led to temporary relief. In 210 a citizen of Tisia befriended and then killed the Punic *phrourarchos* over the city; Hannibal later recaptured it, killed the defectors, and installed a new garrison.⁹²³ Even in a Roman context, outright and lasting success against a *phrourarchos* was rare. In 43 BCE during the civil wars:

“...the *phrourarchos* of Oricum, being ordered by those within the walls not to hinder the entrance of a Roman *hypatos* (consul), handed over the keys [of the city] to Caesar, and remained with him, being thought worthy of honor...from Oricum Caesar hurried to Apollonia, and the Apollonians received him; and the *phrourarchos* Straberius fled from the *polis*.”⁹²⁴

⁹²⁰ App. *Sam.* 3.12.2.

⁹²¹ See Chapter 1.

⁹²² App. *Hannib.* 6.35.

⁹²³ *Ibid.*, 7.44.

⁹²⁴ App. *B. Civ.* 8.45: “...ὁ φρούραρχος ὁ τῆς Ὀρίκου, τῶν ἔνδον αὐτῷ προειπόντων οὐ κωλύσειν ἐπιόντα Ῥωμαίων ὑπατον, τάς τε κλεῖς παρέδωκε τῷ Καίσαρι καὶ παρ’ αὐτῷ κατέμεινε τιμῆς ἀξιούμενος...ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς Ὀρίκου Καῖσαρ ἐς Ἀπολλωνίαν ἠπειγέτο· καὶ τῶν Ἀπολλωνιατῶν αὐτὸν δεχομένων, Σταβέριος ὁ φρούραρχος ἐξέλιπε τὴν πόλιν.”

In both of these cases the inhabitants of a city were able to influence the behavior of the *phrourarchos*. However, the context of both instances is Roman, and thus it may not reflect the situation of *phrourarchoi* in the Greek world.⁹²⁵ Furthermore, the *phrourarchoi* at Oricum and Apollonia were Romans who oversaw Roman territory; they were involved in a civil war, and did not actively resist enemy encroachment.

5.8 Conclusion: A Garrison State on the Borderlands of Empire

Somewhat surprisingly, the best indication of hostility between *poleis* and *phrourarchoi* comes not from the Greco-Macedonian settlements of western Asia Minor, but from the somewhat Hellenized mixture of Greek settlers, native populations, and Iranian monarchs found in the kingdom of Pontus. The borderland frontier between Pontus, the Successor kingdoms, and eventually Rome was a region defined by multiple cultural, political, ethnic, and linguistic exchanges which created fluid local identities. Small communities could potentially play rivals against one another while negotiating for better treatment and privileges than they would otherwise secure in less contested regions.⁹²⁶

This being said, Pontic monarchs, much like the Successors, still relied heavily upon military might to secure their political supremacy over local populations. In order to lessen the difficulty in controlling quasi-independent *poleis*, the Pontic king Mithridates organized his realm around *phrourai*, not *poleis*. This system relied on the security of royal fortresses and garrisons to administer the kingdom, an approach which led to an increase in the economic importance and population of fortresses at the expense of traditional *poleis*.⁹²⁷

⁹²⁵See Chapter 1.

⁹²⁶Adelman and Aron 1999, 814–817; Boozer 2013, 275; cf. Wunder and Hämäläinen 1999, 1229–1234 for caution on this approach.

⁹²⁷Højte 2009, 102–105.

Although the *strategos* may have had a more expansive regional role,⁹²⁸ *phourarchoi* were restricted to a limited area, such as a village, city, or other single location. Some scholars contend that in the Pontic kingdom the roles of the *strategos* and *phourarchos* often overlapped, and that there was no significant distinction between the posts.⁹²⁹ However, an examination of the surviving evidence leads me to an opposite conclusion. *Phourarchoi* are attested epigraphically as a distinct office in the Pontic city of Amaseia by c. 190-170,⁹³⁰ and were heavily used under Mithridates VI, who reigned c. 120-63.⁹³¹ In all of these instances the authority of the *phourarchos* seems restricted to a single community, and they did not have the expansive authority of *strategoí*.

Mithridates deployed *phourarchoi* to secure Heraclea Pontica after conquering the *polis* in 73. He then installed a garrison of 4,000 men commanded by the Galatian mercenary Konnakorex, claiming that they would defend the city against the Romans.⁹³² Yet Konnakorex and his soldiers soon proved the hollow nature of this claim. When the city was besieged by the Roman general Cotta in 70, the city fell in desperate circumstances:

“When the enemy fell upon the city, they had no less grief from those inside; for the *phouroi*, not satisfied with what the citizens were living through, beating the citizens, ordered them under constraint to furnish things that were not easy for them. Much more cruel than the *phouroi* was Konnakorex, who was set over them: he did not prevent violence from those under his authority, but encouraged it.”⁹³³

⁹²⁸Gavrilov 2009, 334–336; Højte 2009, 99–102

⁹²⁹Højte 2009, 100–102.

⁹³⁰*St. Pont.* III 94: “ὕπὲρ βασιλέως | Φαρνάκου | [Μη]τρόδωρος | [...]ίου φρουραρ[χί]σας [τὸ]ν βω[μ]ὸν καὶ [τ]ὸν | ἀνθεῶνα | θεοῖς.”

⁹³¹See below.

⁹³²*FGrH* 434 F 1 6.2: “τῆι ἐπαύριον δὲ συγκαλέσας τὸ πλῆθος ὁ βασιλεύς, καὶ φίλοις δεξιωσάμενος λόγους, καὶ τὴν εὐνοίαν πρὸς αὐτὸν παραινέσας σώζειν, τετρακισχιλίους τε φρουροὺς ἐγκαταστήσας καὶ φρούραρχον Κοννακόρηκα, προφάσει τοῦ εἶ Ῥωμαῖοι βουλευθεῖεν ἐπιβουλεύειν, τῆς πόλεως ἐκείνους ὑπερμαχεῖν καὶ σωτήρας εἶναι τῶν ἐνοικούντων, εἶτα δὲ καὶ χρήματα διανείμας τοῖς ἐν αὐτῆι, μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς ἐν τέλει, ἐπὶ τῆς Σινώπης ἐξέπλευσεν.”

⁹³³*Ibid.*, 1 34.4: “τῶν δὲ πολεμίων ἐπικειμένων τῆι πόλει, οὐ πολὺ ἔλαττον αὐτῆι τὰ λυποῦντα ἔνδον ἐπετίθετο·

Konnakorex did not stop there. When the situation became increasingly hopeless, he joined his fellow *phourarchos* Demopheles to surrender the city to the Roman generals Triarius and Cotta against the wishes of the citizens.⁹³⁴

In the same year, Mithridates appointed his faithful eunuch Bacchides as *phourarchos* over Sinope. Bacchides proved to be a harsh *phourarchos*:

“...always suspecting some betrayal from those within [the city] he had tortured and slaughtered many citizens, and prevented the citizens from defending themselves nobly or from making an agreement [with the Romans] to hand over [the *polis*].”⁹³⁵

Konnakorex and Bacchides showed little regard for the welfare of the citizens under their power; they were concerned only with the maintenance of crown authority in their posts and their own personal safety. Other *phourarchoi*, too, were die-hard royalists who did not abandon Mithridates until he ordered the deaths of his close relatives.⁹³⁶

Despite their placement at the limits of the Greco-Macedonian world, Pontic *phourarchoi* under Mithridates offer a near-textbook example of an ancient garrison state. Mithridates, much like other monarchs, based his ideology on militarism and self-interest.⁹³⁷ Local concerns and democratic processes were of little concern to his *phourarchoi*, who applied their *polemike techne* to the maintenance of a political system based on military domination. The citizens of Heraclea and Sinope were under just as much, if not more,

οὐ γὰρ ἠρκοῦντο οἱ φρουροὶ οἷς διέζη τὸ δημοτικόν, τύπτοντες δὲ τοὺς πολίτας χορηγεῖν ἂ μὴ ῥάϊον ἦν αὐτοῖς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐκέλευον. καὶ τῶν φρουρῶν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἦν χαλεπώτερος ὁ ἐφεσθηκὼς αὐτῶν Κοννακόρηξ, οὐκ ἀπείργων ἀλλ’ ἐπιτρέπων τοῖς ὑπὸ χεῖρα τὴν βίαν. ”

⁹³⁴Ibid., 1 35.1-5.

⁹³⁵Strabo 12.3.11: “...ὑπονοῶν ἀεὶ τινα προδοσίαν ἐκ τῶν ἔνδοθεν καὶ πολλὰς αἰκίας καὶ σφαγὰς ποιῶν, ἀπαγορεῦσαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐποίησε πρὸς ἄμφω μὴτ’ ἀμύνασθαι δυναμένους γενναίως μῆτε προσθέσθαι κατὰ συμβάσεις.”

⁹³⁶App. *Mith.* 12.82.

⁹³⁷Shayegan 2011, 309.

danger as the soldiers within their walls, and their plight was of little concern to the *phourarchoi* who dominated their communities. These *phourarchoi* perfectly encapsulate the relationship between imperial *phourarchoi* and subject communities, one based on the public display of power and violence.

CONCLUSION

In a broad sense, this dissertation has examined the *phourarchia* as an institution that supported the internal security of Greek communities through a position of command over garrisons and their forces. Although the role of garrisons in securing both imperial and local objectives is appreciated in modern scholarship, there has been little effort to explore their interaction with local populations. In particular, no systematic attempt to investigate the *phourarchia* as an institution has been made, despite its prevalence from the Classical Era to the rise of the Roman Empire. This is especially noticeable in the Hellenistic world, where fragmented treatment and local investigations provide an incomplete picture of the office and its relationship to authority.

The different values and assumptions of power systems in the Hellenistic world, from the “spear-won” personal property of monarchs to the democratic systems of quasi-independent *poleis*, shaped and radically altered the institution of the *phourarchia* to fit particular needs. When *phourarchoi* were employed by an imperial power, they maintained that power's control, often to the detriment of the subject community. In contrast, garrisons deployed by a local community served as physical and symbolic security for freedom and independence, and the local *phourarchoi* who commanded them were expected to adhere strictly to the *nomos* of the community.

As the evidence for the *phourarchia* is often fragmentary and scattered throughout different cultural contexts over a long period, my investigation has, by necessity, been broad in scope. Most ancient authors were not concerned with the minutiae of smaller, isolated

garrisons, and as a result there exists no surviving systematic ancient treatment of the office, its responsibilities, or its development. However, a thorough examination of the evidence reveals that the rule of imperial powers over independent *poleis* had a profound impact on the literary understanding of the *phourarchia*. Classical authors were extremely reluctant to apply the term *phourarchos* to Greek officers, and preferred more generic designations to mask the imperial nature of the office.

Following the rule of Alexander the Great, the domination of the Greek world by Macedonian kingdoms, and the rise of Roman hegemony in the East, ancient authors were increasingly absorbed within imperial systems. The spread of *Pax Romana* brought with it elite citizens who held more accepting attitudes towards empire, which were reflected in literary treatment of *phourarchoi*. Despite the heavy proportion of mercenary soldiers within their ranks, *phourarchoi* were no longer viewed as an uncomfortable and problematic excess of the *polis* system. Instead, they were increasingly tolerated and even celebrated by ancient authors, who came to appreciate their role in securing imperial projects.

The surviving evidence, limited though it is, allows for the construction of a sociological and historical portrait of the heavily mercenary imperial *phourarchia* as a specialization. Although much work has been done on the presence of mercenaries in Hellenistic empires and in Greek warfare, to date little attention has been given to the theoretical implications of professionalism and its relation to the sale of military expertise. My contention is that long-held assumptions about professionalism and mercenary service need to be reexamined. I show that ancient mercenaries and specialized soldiers offered their employers a *polemike techne*, whether in a field army, garrison, or some other assignment. Imperial *phourarchoi* were not just military officers who oversaw a garrison; much like modern Private Military

Companies, they held civic and military authority that blurred the line between private and public spheres.

There were no such requirements or considerations for the *phourarchia* of a local community, which required no particular *techne*. Local *phourarchoi* were elected or chosen by the citizens of the *polis* on a limited basis, and were barred from any interference with the functions of government or with activities not immediately related to their assignments. These men were strictly amateurs, who did not approach the *phourarchia* as a calling or a job, but viewed it instead as a civic duty to uphold the *nomos* of their community. As paradoxical as it may seem, such men held a more “purely” military post than their imperial counterparts, as they were restricted from any official actions that fell outside the immediate security of their assignment.

Chapters Three and Four show how the division between the *techne* of imperial officers and the amateur status of local *phourarchoi* was reflected in the powers of the *phourarchia*. *Phourarchoi* under imperial authority fell outside the *nomos* of a subject community, and had generally ill-defined powers. Although imperial regimes could regulate some aspects of the garrisons overseen by *phourarchoi*, their *polemike techne* reduced the need for detailed interference in the daily operation of a garrison. The ephemeral nature of regulations allowed imperial *phourarchoi* to support imperial power and to react to changing situations without being bound by strict oversight or local *nomos*. Outside of heavily populated areas, imperial *phourarchoi* served as a valuable component in the system of exploitation, observation, and internal control that sustained Hellenistic monarchy.

Amateur *phourarchoi* in quasi-independent communities dramatically differed in form and function from their imperial counterparts. In the multi-polar Hellenistic world, small

poleis were unable to compete economically or militarily with the major imperial polities that surrounded them. Even so, strong fortifications and garrisons were viewed as a fundamental requirement of a free and autonomous community. Despite the physical and symbolic importance of the *phrourarchia*, local communities followed the Classical model of amateur officers and soldiers, with the only qualifications for office being citizenship in the *polis* and ownership of substantial property, not the possession of a *polemike techne*. The lack of professionalism was combined with a fear of the office's potential, hence extensive regulation by the *nomos* of the community.

The divergence of powers and specialization between imperial and local *phrourarchoi* had a profound influence on the relationship of the office with a local community. In Chapter Five I argue that a broader view of Harold Lasswell's foundational concept of the “garrison state” offers a valuable theoretical framework in which to place these relations. Imperial *phrourarchoi*, with their suppression of local democracies, *polemike techne*, and capacity to impose suffering on all citizens in a *polis* unquestionably supported a broader system of power and control that fits the pattern of a “garrison state”. Local *phrourarchoi* fell far outside this framework, and were instead somewhat closer to a democratic ideal where the military was merely one component in the larger arena of a civil society.

One of the major components of any “garrison state” is the dominance of military expenditure in the economy, a feature clearly reflected in the expense of a *phrourarchia*. The maintenance even of a small *phrourarchia* and comprising less than two dozen soldiers was an expensive commitment liable to strain the financial resources of all but the most fiscally secure *poleis*. The numerous garrisons established by imperial powers, with thousands of soldiers and well-paid *phrourarchoi*, were an enormously expensive proposition that further

reinforced Hellenistic militarism.

The fact that *phrouarchoi* were not intended to fight external foes hardly detracts from the usefulness of the *phrouarchia* within a garrison state: the mere threat of violence and the specter of an external enemy were sufficient grounds to justify a position that was preoccupied with the maintenance of internal control. The relationships among imperial *phrouarchoi*, subject communities, and imperial powers were concerned with violence, the threat of violence, and the public application and display of power, conduct which fell under the highly developed *techne* of the *phrouarchos*. The limited social interaction between *phrouarchoi* and subject communities did little to reduce the willingness of *phrouarchoi* to deploy often brutal tactics to control their assignments, while the overwhelming military dominance of imperial powers prevented most acts of overt resistance.

In contrast to imperial preoccupation with the maintenance of domination and control, independent communities defined their relationship with *phrouarchoi* within the context of the local *nomos*. These *poleis* required strict adherence to the law, which created a defined system of rewards and punishments that governed the behavior of *phrouarchoi*. Given their amateur status, local *phrouarchoi* were expected to value their membership in the community above their status as a *phrouarchos*, and the relationship of the office with the *polis* hardly deviated from that of a typical military magistracy.

My study has touched on many different aspects of Greek military studies and Hellenistic administrative practices, some of which could benefit from further attention. The *phrouarchia* was just one component of a broad-ranging system of garrisons and domination practiced by imperial powers. To fully address the whole system of local control, there is a need to examine *strategoï*, *hegemones*, *archons*, *phulakes*, and other offices within the

context of garrisons and civil administration. Similarly, the more expansive terminology surrounding garrisons and fortifications needs to be cataloged and examined; the catalog provided by this dissertation at least provides a starting point for such investigations.

Comparative studies could also be done, especially with garrison communities in the early modern period. Further work could also be done to expand the social connections and networks of the garrison forces themselves, separate from the local community. Although some tentative first steps have been taken in this regard, modern tools and techniques, especially in network analysis, could provide extraordinarily valuable new insights into how ancient garrison forces moved through social, geographic, and economic space.

APPENDIX 1: CNIDIAN *PHROURARCHOI*

The presence of *phrouarchoi* in Cnidus is critical to understanding the political status of the *polis* during the Hellenistic period. However, the office is only attested in wine *amphora* stamps, which are primarily found at Athens.⁹³⁸ Cnidian *phrouarchoi* do not otherwise appear in literary or inscriptional evidence.⁹³⁹ As a source of information, the stamps have been described as simple and monotonous, conforming to a basic template. They contain the name of a magistrate with the title of either *damiurgos* or *phrouarchos*, and in some instances the name of the fabricator and an ethnic indicator.⁹⁴⁰ A stamp of Agathokles is a typical example: “Ἐπὶ Φρουρ[άρ]χου Ἀγαθοκλ[εῦς]”⁹⁴¹, “In the time of/under the authority of the *phrouarchos* Agathokles.” Although Cnidian *amphora* stamps contain a significant number of known *phrouarchoi*,⁹⁴² their use for defining the political status of Cnidus remains highly controversial. With such little information, it is necessary to turn to historical context and other comparanda to examine the office.

Found within secure archaeological contexts in the Athenian Agora, amphora stamps from Cnidus and Rhodes can be dated to the second century BCE. More specifically, the period of the *phrouarchia* in Cnidus occurs over approximately 20 years, where *phrouarchoi* appear on Cnidian *amphora* stamps in addition to, or replacing, other magistrates. In addition, the amphoras themselves seem to be made of a Rhodian clay, and

⁹³⁸Koehler and Matheson 2004, 163.

⁹³⁹Ibid., 165.

⁹⁴⁰Jefremow 1995, 25–26.

⁹⁴¹Dumont 1872, 126 #6.

⁹⁴²See Appendices 4 and 5.

the design of the jars themselves follow Rhodian, not Cnidian, aesthetics.⁹⁴³ Following this evidence, the most logical chronological period for the *phrourarchia* is the increase of Rhodian territory on the mainland of Asia Minor beginning with the Peace of Apamea in 188 and ending with the rise of Delos as a free port accompanied by the loss of Rhodian control in Caria and Lycia c. 166.⁹⁴⁴ After this period, Cnidian amphora stamps revert to a previous pattern of one name, sometimes holding the office of the *damiurgos*, along with the fabricant of the jar.⁹⁴⁵

Despite the suggestion of Rhodian control, the political status of Cnidus after the Peace of Apamea, and by extension the nature of the Cnidian *phrourarchia*, are highly problematic.⁹⁴⁶ In his 1995 study of amphora stamps, Nikolai Jefremow observed that, with the exception of a portion of an article by the Roberts and an entry in *RE*, there was no study of the position and placement of the *phrourarchos* within the administrative structure of Cnidus, and one would be fruitless due to the paucity of sources.⁹⁴⁷ Some scholars see *phrourarchoi* as evidence of Rhodian control over Cnidus, with the *phrourarchoi* as mercenary leaders placed in a rotating office by Rhodes; however, this claim has been increasingly rejected by other scholars, largely based on the names of the *phrourarchoi*, 45% of which are attested elsewhere at Cnidus and not at Rhodes.⁹⁴⁸ Another argument for Cnidian autonomy is the observation that Cnidus seemingly never paid tribute to the

⁹⁴³Koehler and Matheson 2004, 166-167.

⁹⁴⁴Ibid., 164–167; Jefremow 1995, 6.

⁹⁴⁵Koehler and Matheson 2004, 166-167.

⁹⁴⁶Jefremow 1995, 43.

⁹⁴⁷Ibid., 50.

⁹⁴⁸Koehler and Matheson 2004, 167-168; cf. Fraser and Bean 1954, 93–94.

Seleucids or the Attalids, and took the side of a coalition against Antiochus prior to 188, which is the kind of behavior expected from a free *polis*.⁹⁴⁹

Even so, my broader investigation of *phrourarchoi* strongly suggests that the period of the *phrourarchia* in Cnidus was indeed the result of Rhodian imperial might. Local *phrourarchoi* in the Hellenistic age only wielded purely military powers, and their possible involvement with economic matters, or their elevation to an eponymous magistrate, would have been an anathema to most *poleis*. The Cnidian *phrourarchia* was seemingly tied to the Rhodian economic, political, and military interests in the region, and was therefore most likely an imperial, not local, *phrourarchia*. The striking number of Cnidian *phrourarchoi* most likely indicate that the office had strict term limits; such limits did not prevent the *polis* of Rhodes from placing restraints on its own *phrourarchoi* while simultaneously controlling Cnidus. The copying of Rhodian amphora designs and clay strongly suggest extensive Rhodian influence, and the length of the *phrourarchia* fits almost precisely to the expansion of Rhodes after 188.

The onomastic evidence does present some difficulties with this reconstruction. It was rare for imperial *phrourarchoi* to be recruited from within a subject community, but it is possible that Rhodes found some willing partners in Cnidus, or turned to Greeks from surrounding settlements who were ethnically related to the Cnidians. It must be remembered that Cnidian names account for less than half of the known *phrourarchoi* at Cnidus, so the majority of *phrourarchoi* may still have origins outside of the community.

Unfortunately, so little is known about the *phrourarchia* on Cnidus that any analysis into the office remains speculative. The *phrourarchia* in Cnidus, although it contains the largest

⁹⁴⁹See also Magie 1950, 958 n. 75.

number of *phourarchoi* from any context, remains an elusive and mysterious institution which was connected in some manner to wine and amphora production.

APPENDIX 2: SPARTAN *PHROURARCHOI* IN THEBES

Spartan officers in Thebes illustrate of some difficulties in analyzing the terminology surrounding *phourarchoi*, *harmostai*, and other officers in a Spartan context. In 382 Thebes fell under the power of a Spartan garrison in the Cadmeia due to the actions of the Spartan commander Phoebidas and a Theban faction led by Leontiades.⁹⁵⁰ Despite their recall and censure of Phoebidas,⁹⁵¹ the Spartans retained control of this garrison; *Polyaenus* states that an unnamed Spartan *phourarchos* was in this post by 379.⁹⁵²

His fate, and indeed the number of Spartan officers in command, is a matter of some controversy. The closest author to the events, Xenophon, states that Theban exiles, led by Phillidas, disguised themselves as *hetairai* and killed the Theban *polemarchoi* who were supporters of the Spartans.⁹⁵³ The exiles assaulted the Cadmeia and were eventually joined by Athenian forces. The Spartan commander, here referred to as *harmostes*, sent to Sparta for assistance, but then abandoned the *acropolis* under truce when it became clear that his position was untenable. The Athenians attempted to rescue some of the Theban collaborators who were singled out for punishment by their countrymen, but they were not entirely successful.⁹⁵⁴ The defeated *harmostes* was later executed by the Spartans for his loss of Thebes and his failure to wait for a relief force.⁹⁵⁵

In his speech against Demosthenes given in 324, Dinarchus touched on the attacks made

⁹⁵⁰Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.25-331-36; Plut. *Pel.* 5.2-3; Diod. Sic. 15.20.1-2.

⁹⁵¹Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.32; Diod. Sic. 15.20; Plut. *Pel.*6; Nepos, *Pel.*1.

⁹⁵²Polyaenus *Strat.* 2.4.3: “Θήβας ἐφύλασσε φρουρὰ Λακωνικῆ, καὶ φρούραρχος ἐπὶ τῆς Καδμείας ἐτέτακτο.”

⁹⁵³Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.4.

⁹⁵⁴Ibid. 5.4.10.

⁹⁵⁵Ibid. 5.4.13: “ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα ἐπύθοντο οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τὸν μὲν ἀρμοστήν τὸν ἐγκαταλιπόντα τὴν ἀκρόπολιν καὶ οὐκ ἀναμείναντα τὴν βοήθειαν ἀπέκτειναν, φρουρὰν δὲ φαίνουσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς Θηβαίους.”

by Theban exiles with Athenian backing in 379, which resulted in the expulsion of the Spartan commander, called a *phourarchos* by him, and freedom for Thebes.⁹⁵⁶ Separated from the events by five decades, Dinarchus largely agrees with the broad outlines of Xenophon's description, including the presence of a single Spartan commander.

Diodorus' account differs significantly. In it, the Theban exiles received Athenian support from the beginning of their plot, infiltrated the *polis*, killed the pro-Spartan faction, then gathered the citizens of Thebes and their Athenian allies together for an attack against the Spartan *phoura*. Commanded by Spartan *hegemones* (so termed by Diodorus), the soldiers of the *phoura* initially resisted, but their stand collapsed due to inadequate provisions and internal dissension between the Spartans and their allies.⁹⁵⁷ The Spartan soldiers eventually retreated under terms, but two of the *hegemones* of the *phoura* were tried and executed by the Spartans for their failure to hold their position, and the third was heavily fined.⁹⁵⁸

The account of Polyaeus differs markedly from those of Diodorus, Dinarchus, and Xenophon. In it, an unnamed Spartan *phourarchos* participated in a religious ritual by bringing a group of *hetairai* into the Cadmeia; he was then killed there by the Theban Pelopidas (who had donned a disguise and infiltrated the group).⁹⁵⁹ A much later source than Xenophon, Diodorus, and Dinarchus (with a likely *terminus ante quem* of 166 CE),⁹⁶⁰ Polyaeus provides some anecdotes which are otherwise unknown, but his veracity as a

⁹⁵⁶Din. 39.5-6: "... ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐξεβλήθη ὁ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων φρούραρχος, ἠλευθέρωντο Θηβαῖοι..."

⁹⁵⁷Diod. Sic. 15.27: "οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ Καδμεΐᾳ φρουροῦντες παρακληθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν ἡγεμόνων εὐρώστως ἡμύοντο τοὺς πολεμίους, ἐλπίζοντες συντόμως ἥξειν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μετὰ μεγάλης δυνάμεως."

⁹⁵⁸Ibid.: "οὓς δὲ ἡγεμόνας τῆς φρουρᾶς τρεῖς ὄντας μετέστησαν εἰς κρίσιν, καὶ τοὺς μὲν δύο κατεδίκασαν θανάτῳ, τὸν μὲντοι τρίτον τοσοῦτῳ πλήθει χρημάτων, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ τοσαῦτα χρήματα ἐκτίσαι."

⁹⁵⁹Polyaeus *Strat.* 2.4.3.

⁹⁶⁰Wheeler 2010, 9.

source has been increasingly called into question.⁹⁶¹

The broad agreement between the two sources closest to the events, Xenophon and Dinarchus, offers the best solution to the problem of the Spartan command structure in Thebes: a single *harmostes*, later referred to as a *phrouarchos* by Dinarchus and Polyaeus, was in overall command of the *phroua*. He was driven from his post by Theban and Athenian assault, and his failure to hold his position led to his eventual execution by the Spartans.

Xenophon's familiarity with the Spartan system perhaps led him to use *harmostes* when mentioning the commander, although he used the term generally to describe Greek garrison commanders who had no connection to Sparta.⁹⁶² Diodorus, who was familiar with *harmostes* used the term *hegemon* instead, which is hardly surprising as he explicitly states that the offices were equivalent.⁹⁶³ In contrast, Dinarchus and Polyaeus used *phrouarchos*. However, Dinarchus was interested in rhetorical effect and Polyaeus was far removed from his subject, making their use of technical language suspect. Given the heavy use of *harmostes* in Spartan assignments,⁹⁶⁴ the Spartan commander was almost certainly styled a *harmostes*, not a *phrouarchos*, by the Spartans themselves.

⁹⁶¹Ibid., 39.


⁹⁶²See Chapter 1.


⁹⁶³Diod. Sic. 13.66.2: “ὁ δ’ ἐν τῇ πόλει καθεσταμένος ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων Ἴπποκράτης ἡγεμών, ὃν οἱ Λάκωνες ἀρμοστήν ἐκάλουν...”; See Chapter 1.


⁹⁶⁴See Chapter 1 and Appendix 5.


APPENDIX 3: MAPS⁹⁶⁵


⁹⁶⁵All maps by the author unless otherwise specified.



















Map 8: Levant






Map 10: Cyprus and Crete







APPENDIX 4: REGISTER OF NAMED *PHROURARCHOI*

Table 1: Known Phourarchoi

Name	Date	Location	Notes
[...]aios	115	Philai	<i>Phourarchos</i> with a long career. ⁹⁶⁶
Ador	2/3 CE	Artageras / Artagerk	Ador ⁹⁶⁷ is likely a spelling variant of Addon, also known as Addus ⁹⁶⁸ and Donnes. ⁹⁶⁹
Adrastos	50 – 49	Herakleopolites nomos	Involved with civil disagreement. ⁹⁷⁰
Agathokles	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ⁹⁷¹
Agestatos	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ⁹⁷²
Agias	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ⁹⁷³
Agon	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps and is currently unpublished. ⁹⁷⁴
Alexander	392/1 ⁹⁷⁵	Aeolis	There have been some attempts to claim that he held the title of <i>harmostes</i> in addition to <i>phourarchos</i> , ⁹⁷⁶ making him Thibron's official predecessor. ⁹⁷⁷ If this is the case, then the order of Spartan <i>harmostes</i> in Aeolis would be Agesilaus, Euxenus, Philopedias, Alexander, then Thibron. ⁹⁷⁸

⁹⁶⁶*Thèbes à Syène* 322: “[— — — — —]αιος Ἀμμωνίου | τῶν διαδόχων φρουραρχ[ῶ]ν τὸν τόπον | ἔτη μβ' καὶ ἀνέγκλητος γεγονώς τοῖς | ἐνταῦθα κατοικοῦσι ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς | παρεπιδημοῦσι ξένοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς τῶν | στρατηγῶν παρουσίαις ἐπαίνου τετευχώς | καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ γενομένῃ τοῦ κυρίου βασιλείως | θεοῦ Φιλομήτορος Σωτήρος τοῦ β' (ἔτους) | ἐφόδῳ ἐπισημασίας τετευχώς, | εὐχὴν καὶ χαριστήρια.”

⁹⁶⁷Strabo, 11.14.6.

⁹⁶⁸Vell. Pat. 2.102.2: “Armeniam deinde Gaius ingressus prima parte introitus rem prospere gessit; mox in conloquio, cui se temere crediderat, circa Artageram graviter a quodam, nomine Adduo, vulneratus, ex eo ut corpus minus habile, ita animum minus utilem rei publicae habere coepit.”

⁹⁶⁹Flor. 2.32.44: “Quippe Dones, quem rex Artageris praefecerat, simulata proditione adortus virum intentum libello, quem ut thensaurorum rationes continentem ipse porrexerat, stricto repente ferro subiit...”

⁹⁷⁰*BGU* 8.1844 ll. 21-23: “ἀξιοῦμεν ἐὰν φαίνεται |συγγράξαι γράψαι Ἀδράστῳι φρουράρχ[χ]οι τὸν | ἐγκαλουμένο καταστήσαι ἐπὶ σέ ὅπως ἐπα|ναγκασ[θ]ῆ ἀποκαταστήσαι...”; ll. 29-30: τοῖς γρ(αμματεῦσι) (ἔτους) γ . . . () | γρ(άψατε) τῷ φρο(υράρχῳ) παραγγελ(ῆναι) καταστή(σαι)”.

⁹⁷¹Dumont 1872, 126 #6: “Ἐπὶ Φρουρ[άρ]χου| Ἀγαθοκλ[εῦς]”, #7: “[Φρ]ουράρχου | [Ἀγ]αθοκλεῦς.”, p. 138 #67: “[Φρο]υράρχου | [Ἀγαθο]κλεῦς. Grace 1985, 32.

⁹⁷²Dumont 1872, 127 #8: Φρουράρχου | Ἀγεστάτου.

⁹⁷³*Ibid.*, 139 #73: “Ἐπὶ δαμιου[ρ]γοῦ Δεξιφρο[δ]νευς Φρού|ραρχου Ἀγία.”

⁹⁷⁴Fraser and Matthews 1987, s.v. Ἄγων.

⁹⁷⁵Parke 1930, 68.

⁹⁷⁶Polyaenus, *Strat.* 6.10.1: “Ἀλέξανδρος φρούραρχος τῶν περὶ τὴν Αἰολίδα χωρίων...”

Name	Date	Location	Notes
Ameinias	4 th Century	Thebes Mykale	Either dedicated or was the honored by an inscription, where he is simply listed as <i>phourarchesas</i> . ⁹⁷⁹
Andronicus	c. 312	Tyre	Andronicus seems to have served under Antigonos at the siege of Tyre in 315, with command over 3,000 soldiers ⁹⁸⁰ and was probably the Andronicus of Olynthus, who was assigned by Antigonos as one of Demetrius counselors c. 314. ⁹⁸¹ He is next found as <i>phourarchos</i> in Tyre c. 312. ⁹⁸²
Antandros	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ⁹⁸³
Antiphanes	Sep 24 - Oct 23, 127	Thebes (Egypt)	He played a role in the local judicial apparatus. ⁹⁸⁴
Apellis	c. 332-326 ⁹⁸⁵	Priene	He is known from several decrees from Priene. ⁹⁸⁶
Apollonios [1]	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ⁹⁸⁷
Apollonios [2]	188-167	Cnidus	This Apollonios is identified as the son of Aristides and is only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps found in Hermopolis Magna. It is possible that he is identical to Apollonios [1], although there is not enough information to be sure either way. ⁹⁸⁸

⁹⁷⁷Parke 1930, 68.

⁹⁷⁸Thibron is never explicitly referred to as a *harmostes*, but his title seems likely from the scope of his powers and authority.

⁹⁷⁹*I. Priene*, 365: “Ἀμεινίας |Θεμιστοκλέο<υ>ς |φρουραρχήσας.”

⁹⁸⁰Diod. Sic. 19.59.

⁹⁸¹Ibid., 19.69.

⁹⁸²Ibid., 19.86.1: “...Ἀνδρόνικον τὸν φρούραρχον...”

⁹⁸³Eiring and Lund 2004, 66.

⁹⁸⁴*P. Tor. Choach*. 8 A ll. 49-41 “...καὶ μεταπεμψά[μενο]ι τοὺς | ἐγκαλουμένους δι’ Ἀντιφάνου φρουράρχου | ἐπισκέψονται”, B ll.37-39: “καὶ μετα|πεμψάμενοι τοὺς [ἐ]γκαλουμένους | δι’ Αντιφάνου φρο[υρ]άρχου | ἐπισκέψονται...”

⁹⁸⁵Dmitriev 2005, 76–88 for a full discussion on the dating of Prienean decrees.

⁹⁸⁶*I. Priene* 4 ll. 16-19: “...τούτων δὲ δεκατέτταρα ἔτη τὴν τοῖς στρατηγοῖς | γραμματεῖαν λεληιτοῦργηκε δωρεὰν καὶ τοῦ ἀναλματος τοῦ γινομένο[υ ἐκ τῶν] νόμων τῶι τῶν νομο|φυλάκωγ...”; Ibid. ll. 50-53: “...ἐπειδὴ Ἄπελλις Νικοφῶντος φρουραρχ[ος] α[ἰρ]εθεὶς τ[ῆ]ς ἄκρας τῆς ἐν Τηλωνείαι καλῶς καὶ φιλοτίμως διεφύλα[ξε] τὸμ [π]ύργ[ο]ν καὶ ἀπέδωκε τῶι δήμωι, ἀγαθῆι τύχηι δεδόχθαι τῆι βουλῆ[ι] κ[α]ὶ [τῶ]ι δήμωι...”

⁹⁸⁷Dumont 1872, 138 #70: “[Ἀπολ]λον[ί]ου ? | [Φρ]ου[ρ]άρχου?”

⁹⁸⁸*SEG* 18:677,b(14): “[Κνίδιον] | Ἀπολλωνίου | Ἀρισσιδῆ[ς] | Φρου<ρ>άρχου.”

Name	Date	Location	Notes
Apollonios [3]	c. 135	Philai	He made a dedication in Ptolemaic Egypt. ⁹⁸⁹ The second part of the inscription is almost certainly an unrelated text, and so is not discussed here. ⁹⁹⁰
Archelaos	321/0	Tyre	Possibly appointed by Alexander the Great. ⁹⁹¹ Although nothing more can be said about his time or powers at Tyre, he may have been the same Archelaos who Demetrius left in command of the siege of Babylon in 310. ⁹⁹²
Aristion	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ⁹⁹³
Aristratos	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ⁹⁹⁴
Artemidoros	70	Lepsia	He either dedicated, or was the recipient of an honorary inscription. ⁹⁹⁵
Asklepiada or Askapiada	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps, with an imprecise knowledge of his full name. ⁹⁹⁶
Asklepiades	135/4-131	Elephantine island	Dedicated a monument. ⁹⁹⁷
Asklepiodoros	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ⁹⁹⁸
Babemesis / Batis	332	Gaza	Listed by Josephus without further elaboration as <i>phourarchos</i> of Gaza. ⁹⁹⁹ He seems to be the eunuch Batis who is mentioned by Curtius ¹⁰⁰⁰ and Arrian. ¹⁰⁰¹

⁹⁸⁹*Philae* 15.

⁹⁹⁰Bernand and Bernand 1969, 141.

⁹⁹¹Diod. Sic. 18.37.4: “ὁ δὲ τῆς πόλεως ταύτης φρούραρχος Ἀρχέλαος, Μακεδὼν τὸ γένος...” ; Heckel 2006, s.v. “Archelaus [3]”.

⁹⁹²Diod. Sic., 19.100.7; Billows 1990, 371.

⁹⁹³Eiring and Lund 2004, 66.

⁹⁹⁴Dumont 1872, 127 #10: “Φρουράρχου | Ἀριστράτου”

⁹⁹⁵Sakkelion 1890 col. 221 = Manganaro 1963, 22B.

⁹⁹⁶Ibid., # 12: “Ἐπὶ Φρουρά[[ρ]χου Ἀσκληπιιάδα or Ἀσκληπιιάδα”.

⁹⁹⁷*Thèbes à Syène* 243: “... Ἀσκληπιιάδης | Ἀμμωνίου Μακεδὼν τῶ<v> διαδόχων καὶ φρούραρχος | Ἐλεφαντίνης.”

⁹⁹⁸Dumont 1872, 127 #11: “Ἐπὶ Φρουρά|ρχου Ἀσκλη|πιιοδώρου”.

⁹⁹⁹Joseph. *AJ*, 11.313: “...φρούραρχον ὄνομα Βαβημάσιν...”

¹⁰⁰⁰Curt. 4.4.7: “Praerat urbi Betis eximiae in regem suum fidei modicoque praesidio muros ingentis operis tuebatur.”

¹⁰⁰¹Arr. *Anab.* 2.25.4: “...εὐνοῦχος δὲ τις, ᾧ ὄνομα ἦν Βάτις, κρατῶν τῆς Γαζαίων πόλεω...” ; Heckel 2006, 71 s.v. Batis.

Name	Date	Location	Notes
Bacchides [1]	70	Sinope	Appointed by Mithridates. ¹⁰⁰² He later served Mithridates by assisting the king's female relatives to commit suicide on his orders. ¹⁰⁰³
Biton	398	Motye	Appointed by Dionysius I. ¹⁰⁰⁴ Presumably Biton was still at his post the next year when Motye was captured by Carthaginian forces led by Himilcon. ¹⁰⁰⁵
Boularchida	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹⁰⁰⁶
Chaireas	163-145	Elephantine island	Dedicated an altar. ¹⁰⁰⁷
[Damokr]ate[us]	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹⁰⁰⁸
Dekios / Decius	280-271	Rhegium	Placed by the Romans, he later became a tyrant. ¹⁰⁰⁹ After losing his eyesight to a vengeful Rhegian doctor, Decius killed himself in a Roman prison before he could be executed. ¹⁰¹⁰
Demetrius [1]	First half of the 2 nd century	Ancient name unknown; near Modern Yüntdağ	Demetrius is known from an inscription that he erected in a small Attalid <i>phrourion</i> here. ¹⁰¹¹ His father's name (Seuthos) suggests Thracian descent. He likely served under Eumenes II, although Attalos II cannot be ruled out. ¹⁰¹²
Demetrius [2]	27 Aug. 181	Krokodilopolis	Mentioned in a papyrus, and was possibly involved with judicial proceedings. ¹⁰¹³

¹⁰⁰²Strabo 12.3.11: "...ὕπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως φρούραρχος Βακχίδης..."

¹⁰⁰³Plut. *Luc.* 18.2-4.

¹⁰⁰⁴Diod. Sic. 14.53.5: "μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα φύλακας τῆς πόλεως καταστήσας, Βίτωνά τὸν Συρακόσιον φρούραρχον ἀπέδειξε: τὸ δὲ πλεῖον μέρος ἐκ τῶν Σικελῶν ὑπῆρχεν. καὶ Λεπτίνην μὲν τὸν ναύαρχον μετὰ νεῶν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν ἐκέλευσεν παρατηρεῖν τὴν διάβασιν τῶν Καρχηδονίων, συνέταξε δ' αὐτῷ τὴν Αἴγεσταν καὶ τὴν Ἐντελλαν πολιορκεῖν, καθάπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς πορθεῖν αὐτὰς ἐνεστήσατο."

¹⁰⁰⁵Ibid., 14.55.4

¹⁰⁰⁶Dumont 1872, 128 #13: "Φρο[υρά]ρχου | Βούλαρχίδα".

¹⁰⁰⁷*Thèbes à Syène* 242: II.3-5: "...ὕπὲρ Βοήθου τοῦ Νικοστράτου Χρυσαιορέως τοῦ ἀρχισωματοφύλακος καὶ | στρατηγοῦ τὸν βωμὸν Χαϊρέας Μέλανος Βοιώτιος φρούραρχος | Ἐλεφαντίνης."

¹⁰⁰⁸Dumont 1872, 137 #62: "Φρουρά[ρχου] | [Δαμοκρ]άτε[υς]?"

¹⁰⁰⁹Cass. Dio 9.40.11: "Ὅτι ὁ Δέκιος ὁ φρούραρχος τοὺς Ῥηγίνους..."; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 20.4.8: "Δέκιος δὲ ἀντὶ φρουράρχου τύραννος ἐγεγόνει τῆς Ῥηγίνων πόλεως..."; App. *Sam.* 3.9.1: "καὶ Δέκιος μὲν ἀντὶ φρουράρχου τύραννος ἦν..."

¹⁰¹⁰Fisher 2014, 124.

¹⁰¹¹Müller 2010, 428.

¹⁰¹²Ibid., 429 – 430.

¹⁰¹³*Chr. Mitt.* 32 = *P. Grenf.* 1.11 II. 1.10-12: "[τοῦ δὲ] Πεχύτ[ου][γρ]άψαντός σο[ι διὰ] τῆς ὑποκειμένης [[ἐπιστο]λῆς κ[ατασ]τάντας [ἐν Κ]ροκοδίλων [πόλ]ει [[παρόντ]ος Δη[μητρί]ου τοῦ φρο[υρά]ρχου...", 2.10: "...συνπαρόντος Δημητρίου τοῦ φρουράρχου..."

Name	Date	Location	Notes
Demopheles	70	Heraclea Pontica	Appointed following the death of Lamachos from the plague. ¹⁰¹⁴
Diodorus	301	Ephesus	Appointed by Demetrius, whom he later tried to betray. ¹⁰¹⁵
[Dio]g[enes]	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹⁰¹⁶
Dionysios [1]	314-307	Athens	He is first found as <i>phourarchos</i> when he assisted Cassander by dispatching twenty ships from Athens to Lemnos. ¹⁰¹⁷ Later he mounted an unsuccessful defense of Athens against Demetrius of Phalerum. ¹⁰¹⁸
Dionysios [2]	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹⁰¹⁹
Dionysios [3]	41-40	Lepsia	Mentioned in the dedication of an altar at Lepsia. ¹⁰²⁰
[Dioph]antos	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹⁰²¹
Dioskourides	2 nd Century	Herakleopolis	Dioskourides is known from no less than eighteen papyri. ¹⁰²² His archive provides a unique look into the daily concerns of a <i>phourarchos</i> , ¹⁰²³ and is dominated by legal matters, including the discipline of the <i>phoura</i> . ¹⁰²⁴
Epigenes	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹⁰²⁵
Epikrates	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹⁰²⁶
Epinikidas	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹⁰²⁷

¹⁰¹⁴FGrH 434 F 1 35.1-5.

¹⁰¹⁵Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.7.4.1: “Δημήτριος Διοδώρω φρουράρχω τὴν Ἐφεσον παραδοῦς ἔπλευσεν ἐπὶ Καρία.”

¹⁰¹⁶Dumont 1872, 136 # 61: “Φρουράρχου | Κ[νιδίου Διο]γ[ένους]?”

¹⁰¹⁷Diod. Sic. 19.68.3.

¹⁰¹⁸Ibid., 20.45.2–5.

¹⁰¹⁹Dumont 1872, 128 #: “Φρουράρχου | Διονυσίου”; n. 15: “Φρ[ουράρχος] | Διο[ν]ύσιος”; 138 # 71: “Φρουράρχου Διο]νυσ[ίου].”

¹⁰²⁰Sakkelion 1862, col. 265–266; Bent and Gardner 1886, 144 = SEG 18.388 = Manganaro 1963, # 21B

¹⁰²¹Dumont 1872, 136 #59: “Φρουράρχου | [Διοφ]άντου?”

¹⁰²²Cowey, Maresch and Barnes 2003, v.

¹⁰²³*P. Diosk.* 18.

¹⁰²⁴*P. Diosk.* 1 ll.3-5. See Chapter 3.

¹⁰²⁵Dumont 1872, 128 #16: “Φρουράρχου | Ἐπιγέν[ους].”; Nicolaou 2005, #746: “[φρου]ράρχου | Ἐπιγένους.”; SEG 26.1135 = SEG 53.1057; SEG 55.1039bis: “ἐπὶ φρουράρχου Ἐπιγένους Ἀριστ[— —].”

¹⁰²⁶Dumont 1872, 128–129 #17: “Φρουράρχου | Ἐπικράτους.”; #18: “Φρουράρχου | Ἐπικράτ[ους].”; #19: “[Φ]ρουράρχου | Ἐπικ[ρ]άτ[ε]υ[ς].”; #20: “Φρ[ου]ράρχου | Ἐπικράτ[ε]υ[ς].”; #21: “Φρουράρχου | Ἐπικράτ[ε]υ[ς].”. Dumont notes the significant difference in appearance in the seal of #20, although he believes there is no reason to suspect that it was produced at a different time.

Name	Date	Location	Notes
Ermokrates	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹⁰²⁸
Ermokratippos	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹⁰²⁹
Eukration	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹⁰³⁰
Euphron	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹⁰³¹
Helikon	Second half of the third century	Priene	The <i>phrouroi</i> in Priene issued an honorary decree for him; he served as <i>phourarchos</i> at least twice. ¹⁰³²
Herodes	c. 152-145	Syene	Originating from Pergamum, Herodes served as a mercenary <i>phourarchos</i> under Ptolemy VI. ¹⁰³³ He reappears in another inscription, dated c. 143-142, revealing his promotion to <i>archisomatophulax</i> and <i>strategos</i> in Syene. ¹⁰³⁴
Hieron	Second century	Herakleopolite nome	Addressed as one of the <i>diadochoi</i> and a <i>phourarchos</i> in a fragmentary letter concerning a dispute over the ownership of a jacket. ¹⁰³⁵
Hippocrates	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹⁰³⁶
Kallibios	404	Athens	Sent by the Spartans as the <i>phourarchos</i> of Athens at the request of the Thirty. ¹⁰³⁷ He is also called a <i>harmostes</i> , and controlled 700 soldiers who garrisoned the <i>acropolis</i> . ¹⁰³⁸

¹⁰²⁷Eiring and Lund 2004, 66.

¹⁰²⁸Dumont 1872, 129–130 #22: “Φρουράρχου | Ἐρμοκράτεως”; #23: “Φρου<ρ>άρχου | Ἐρμοκράτεως”

¹⁰²⁹Ibid., 130 #24: “Φρουράρχου | Ἐρμ[ο]κρατ[ι]πο<υ>.”

¹⁰³⁰Eiring and Lund 2004, 66.

¹⁰³¹Eiring and Lund 2004, 66.

¹⁰³²I. Priene 19.

¹⁰³³OGIS 111 = *Thèbes à Syène* 302 ll. 7-20: “...ὕπερ Βοήθου τοῦ Νικοστράτου | Χρυσσαορέως, τοῦ ἀρχισωματοφύλακος | καὶ στρατηγοῦ καὶ [κτί]στου τῶν ἐν τῆ[ι] | Τριακοντασχοίνωι πόλεων Φιλομητορίδ[ος] | καὶ Κλεοπάτρας, εὐ[ν]οίας ἔνε[κ]εν | ἧς ἔχων διατελ[εῖ] πρ[ό]ς τε τὸν βασιλέα | καὶ τὴν βασίλισσαν κ[αὶ] τὰ τέκνα α]ὐτῶν, | Ἡρώιδης Δημοφῶντος Περ[γα]μηνός | τῶν διαδό[χ]ων καὶ ἡγεμῶν ἐ[π’] ἀνδρῶν | καὶ φρούραρχος Συήνης [καὶ γερρ]οφύλαξ | καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄνω τόπων [τεταγμέν]ος | καὶ προφήτης τοῦ Χν[οῦ]βως] κ[αὶ ἀρχ]ιστολιστ[ῆ]ς | τῶν ἐν Ἐλεφαντίνῃ [καὶ Ἀβάτωι] καὶ Φύλαις | ἱερῶν...”

¹⁰³⁴*Thèbes à Syène* 303 = OGIS 130 ll. 1-6: “...Ἡρώιδης Δημοφῶντος | Βερενικεῦς, ὁ ἀρχισωματοφύλαξ καὶ στρατηγός, | καὶ οἱ συνάγοντες ἐν Σήτει τῆι τοῦ Διονύσου | νῆσωι βασιλισται ὧν τὰ ὀνόματα ὑπόκειται...”

¹⁰³⁵P. Diosk.12 ll.1: “Ἱέρωνι τῶν διαδόχων καὶ φρουράρχωι...”

¹⁰³⁶Dumont 1872, 131#29: “[Φ]ρουράρχου | [Ἰπ]ποκράτεως.”

¹⁰³⁷Diod. Sic. 14.4.4: “...πεμψάντων φρουρὰν καὶ τὸν ταύτης ἡγησόμενον Καλλίβιον, τὸν μὲν φρούραρχον ἐξεθεράπευσαν δόροις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλανθρώποις οἱ τριάκοντα...”

¹⁰³⁸Arist. [*Ath. Pol.*] 37.2: “ὧν ἀκούσαντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Καλλίβιον ἀπέστειλαν ἄρμωστίην καὶ στρατιώτας

Name	Date	Location	Notes
Kleandrida	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹⁰³⁹
Kleon	205-180	Philae	A dedication of a temple mentions him as <i>hegemon</i> and <i>phourarchos</i> . ¹⁰⁴⁰
Kleupolis	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹⁰⁴¹
Konnakorex	73	Heraclea Pontica	Appointed by Mithridates. ¹⁰⁴²
Kratides	c. 1 st Century	Unknown	A fragmentary papyrus preserves only his name and office. ¹⁰⁴³
Kyprothemis	c. 370	Samos	Appointed by Tigranes, the <i>hyparchos</i> of Artaxerxes II. ¹⁰⁴⁴ Demosthenes mentions that Samos was garrisoned by him. ¹⁰⁴⁵
Kyrthaios	279-243	Troizen	A Macedonian, he made a dedication along with <i>phrouroi</i> from Troizen. ¹⁰⁴⁶
Livius	212	Tarentum	A Roman, he was <i>phourarchos</i> in Tarentum when Cononeus betrayed the city to Hannibal. ¹⁰⁴⁷
Lucius	244-209	Itanos	Roman mercenary <i>phourarchos</i> who dedicated a cistern. ¹⁰⁴⁸
Lycomedes	333	Mytilene	Installed by the Persians Pharnabazus and Autophradates. ¹⁰⁴⁹
Manius Ennius	7/8 CE	Siscia	Described as the <i>phourarchos</i> with no further elaboration. ¹⁰⁵⁰

ὡς ἑπτακοσίους, οἱ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ἐλθόντες ἐφρούρουν.”; Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.14: “ὁ δὲ πεισθεὶς τοὺς τε φρουροὺς καὶ Καλλιβιον ἄρμωστίην συνέπραξεν αὐτοῖς πεμφθῆναι.”

¹⁰³⁹Dumont 1872, 131 #30: “Φρουράρχου | Κλεαν[δρί]δα”; #31: “Φρουράρχου | Κλεανδρίδα.”; possibly #32: “Φρουράρχου | Κλεανδρ[ίδα]? Or Κλεάνδρου.”

¹⁰⁴⁰*Thèbes à Syène* 314: “...Κλέων Διογένους Θεσσαλὸς ν ἡγεμὼν | καὶ φρούραρχος Φιλῶν...”

¹⁰⁴¹Dumont 1872, 131 #34: “Φρουράρχου | Κλευ[π]όλιος.”; #35: “Φρουράρχου | Κλευπόλιος.”

¹⁰⁴²*FGrH* 434 F 1 6.2.

¹⁰⁴³sb.5.8009 = HGV SB 5 8009 ll.1 “[K(?)]ρατίδαι φρουράρχωι...”

¹⁰⁴⁴*Suda*, s.v. Κυπρόθεμις: “Κυπρόθεμις: ὄνομα κύριον: ὄν κατέστησε Τιγράνης φρούραρχον Σάμου, βασιλέως ὕπαρχος.”; Shipley 1987, 136–137.

¹⁰⁴⁵Demosthenes, *On the Liberty of the Rhodians* 9: “Σάμον δὲ φρουρουμένην ὑπὸ Κυπροθέμιδος”

¹⁰⁴⁶*IG* IV 769.

¹⁰⁴⁷*App. Hann.* 6.32.3: “... τῷ φρουράρχῳ Λιουίῳ...”

¹⁰⁴⁸*IC* III iv 18: “βασιλεῖ Πτολεμαίῳ Φιλοπάτορι | καὶ βασιλίσσηι Ἀρσινόη | τὸ ὕδρευμα καὶ τὸ Νυμφαῖον | Λεύκιος Γαῖος Ῥωμαῖος φρουράρχων.”

¹⁰⁴⁹*Arr. Anab.* 2.1.5: “...καὶ φρούραρχον ἐπ’ αὐτῇ Λυκομήδην Ῥόδιον, καὶ τύραννον ἐγκατέστησαν τῇ πόλει Διογένην...”

¹⁰⁵⁰*Cass. Dio* 55.33.2: “... Μάνιον Ἐννιον φρούραρχον Σισκίας ...”

Name	Date	Location	Notes
Mazarus	331	Susa	A companion of Alexander, who was left as <i>phourarchos</i> after the capture Susa. ¹⁰⁵¹
Megasthenes	186-182	Diospolis Magna	He is mentioned in a document along with various other officials in 186. ¹⁰⁵² Four years later, he served as a witness for an auction of a house, along with many other officers. As the sale took place in Diospolis Magna, he was presumably <i>phourarchos</i> there. ¹⁰⁵³
Menarnaios	28-29 June 121 CE ¹⁰⁵⁴	Paliga	He served in the reign of the Parthian king Arsaces. ¹⁰⁵⁵ He seemingly had jurisdiction at least over the village Paliga, which Rostovtzeff and Welles believed to be a fortress at the border. ¹⁰⁵⁶
Menekrates	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹⁰⁵⁷
Menippos	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹⁰⁵⁸
Menyllos	322	Athens	Placed by Antipater. ¹⁰⁵⁹ He is also mentioned by Plutarch, although he is not listed as a <i>phourarchos</i> but as <i>hegemon</i> of the Macedonian <i>phrouros</i> . ¹⁰⁶⁰ After the death of Antipater, Cassander sent Nikanor to replace him. ¹⁰⁶¹
[Me]trodoros	c. 190-170	Amaseia	As <i>phourarchos</i> [Me]trodoros dedicated an altar and flower-bed to the gods for king Pharnakos. ¹⁰⁶²

¹⁰⁵¹ Arr. *Anab.* 3.16.9: “... καταλιπὼν σατράπην μὲν τῆς Σουσιανῆς Ἀβουλίτην ἄνδρα Πέρσην, φρουράρχον δὲ ἐν τῇ ἄκρᾳ τῶν Σούσων Μάζαρον τῶν ἐταίρων καὶ στρατηγὸν Ἀρχέλαον τὸν Θεοδώρου...”

¹⁰⁵² SB 1 4512 A = SB 1 4512 B ll. 11: “...Μεγασθέ]νους φρουράρχου...”

¹⁰⁵³ P. Haun. 1.11 col. 2 ll.4-7: “... τῆς προτεθείσης εἰς πρᾶσιν ἐν Διὸς πόλει τῆι μεγάλῃ ἔτους κγ Χοίαχ κη | διὰ Πτολεμαίου τοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Θηβαίδα καὶ Θέωνος τοῦ βασιλικοῦ γραμματέως | συναπόντων καὶ αὐτοῦ Διονυσίου καὶ Ἀρνούφιου τοῦ τοπογραμμάτεως καὶ Ἰμούθου κωμογράφου (αμματέως), | Μεγισθένους φρουράρχου, Λίχα ἀρχιφυλακίτου, Ἀριστογένους τῶν μεθ’ Ἰπάλου ἡγεμόνων, Ἰασίβιος...”

¹⁰⁵⁴ Rostovtzeff and Welles 1930, 165.

¹⁰⁵⁵ P. Dura 20: “βασιλεύοντος βασιλέως βασιλέων Ἀρσάκου εὐεργέτου, δικαίου, ἐπιφανοῦς καὶ φιλέλληνος, ἔτους τξη ὡς ὁ βασιλεὺς βασιλ[έων] | ἄγει, ὡς δὲ πρότερον [υ]λβ, μηνὸς Δαισίου ἕκτηι ἐπ’ εἰκάδι, ἐν Παλίγαι κώμῃ τῆς περὶ Ἰάρδαν ὑπαρχείας, ἐπὶ Μητολβαίσιςσᾳ Μην. [] | τοσδε. ου τοῦ Μηναρναίου, φρ[ουρά]ρχου καὶ τῶν πρώτων καὶ προτιμωμένων φίλων καὶ τῶν σωματοφυλάκων, καὶ τ[ῶν] | ὑπογε[γρ]αμμένων μα[ρτύρ]ων”

¹⁰⁵⁶ Rostovtzeff and Welles 1930, 171.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Eiring and Lund 2004, 66.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Dumont 1872, 132 #36: “Ἐπὶ Μενίππου | Κνι<δίων> Φρουράρχ[χ]ου.”; possibly #37: “Ἐπὶ Φρουράρχου | Μεν...”

¹⁰⁵⁹ Diod. Sic. 18.18.4–5.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Plut. *Phoc.* 28.1.

¹⁰⁶¹ Ibid., 31.1.

¹⁰⁶² St. Pont. III 94: “ὑπὲρ βασιλέως | Φαρνάκου | [Μη]τρόδωρος | [...]ου φρουραρχ[χ]ήσας [τὸ]ν βω[μ]ὸν καὶ [τ]ὸν | ἀνθεῶνα | θεοῖς.”

Name	Date	Location	Notes
Mithrenes	334	Sardis	<i>Phrourarchos</i> of the <i>acropolis</i> in Sardis who, along with the city's leading men, surrendered to Alexander the Great. ¹⁰⁶³
Minucius	48	Near Dyrrachium	Minucius was a <i>phrourarchos</i> under Caesar before the battle of Dyrrachium. ¹⁰⁶⁴
Mnasis	145 – 143	Philai	In the dedication base of a statue, ¹⁰⁶⁵ Mnasis is honored and described as a member of the <i>didachoi</i> , a <i>hipparchos</i> over the men, a member of the those of the <i>epitagma</i> , and <i>phrourarchos</i> . ¹⁰⁶⁶
Moschos	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹⁰⁶⁷
Nestor	116	Syene, Elephantine and Philai	<i>Phrourarchos</i> of Syene, Elephantine and Philai; <i>gerrophylax</i> and <i>strategos</i> of the <i>nome</i> ; he dedicated part of a temple on the island of Philai. ¹⁰⁶⁸
Nikanor	319 ¹⁰⁶⁹	Athens	Nikanor has several titles in different sources. He held ¹⁰⁷⁰ and garrisoned Munychia, and was also <i>phrourarchos</i> there. ¹⁰⁷¹ He is also referred to as <i>praefectus</i> of Cassander by Nepos. ¹⁰⁷² There has been recent arguments that equate him with Nikanor of Statgeria, the nephew of Aristotle, ¹⁰⁷³ against older views that he was the adopted son of Aristotle. ¹⁰⁷⁴ Waldemar Heckel's argument that Nikanor was the son of a relatively undistinguished agent of Antigonos is the most convincing reconstruction of his origin. ¹⁰⁷⁵

¹⁰⁶³Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.3: “...Μιθρήνης τε ὁ φρούραρχος τῆς ἀκροπόλεως...”

¹⁰⁶⁴App. *B. Civ.* 2.9.60: “... τοῦ φρουράρχου Μινουκίου...”

¹⁰⁶⁵*Philae* 13.

¹⁰⁶⁶*Ibid.*, ll.7-10: “...Μνᾶσις Διονυσίου Ἀργεῖος | τῶν διαδόχων καὶ ἱπάρχης | ἐπ’ ἀνδρῶν καὶ τῶν τοῦ ἐπιτάγματος | καὶ φρούραρχος Φιλῶν.”

¹⁰⁶⁷Eiring and Lund 2004, 66.

¹⁰⁶⁸*Thèbes à Syène* 320: “...Νέστω[ρ] Μελανίπ[ου] Φασηλίτης | τῶν ἀρχισωματοφυλάκων ὁ καθεσταμένος | ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τῆ φρουρ[α]ρχία Συήνης καὶ [Ἐλεφαντίνης καὶ Φιλῶ]ν] καὶ γεροφυλακία | καὶ πρὸς τῆ στρατηγί[α]ι τοῦ αὐτοῦ νομοῦ.”

¹⁰⁶⁹Bosworth 1994, 57.

¹⁰⁷⁰Diod. Sic. 18.64.1: “...Νικάνωρ ὁ τὴν Μουνυχίαν κατέχων...”

¹⁰⁷¹Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.11.2: “...Νικάνωρα φρουροῦντα τὴν Μουνυχίαν...”; Plut. *Phoc.* 31.1: “ὁ Κάσανδρος καὶ προκαταλαμβάνων τὰ πράγματα πέμπει κατὰ τάχος Νικάνωρα τῷ Μενύλλῳ διάδοχον τῆς φρουραρχίας...”. See Chapter 2.

¹⁰⁷²Nep. *Pho.* 2.4.3: “...Cassandri praefectum”

¹⁰⁷³Bosworth 1994, 59; Heckel 2007, 402

¹⁰⁷⁴Ferguson 1911, 28 n. 4.

¹⁰⁷⁵Heckel 2007, 410

Name	Date	Location	Notes
Nikokles	376	Naxos	An otherwise unknown <i>phourarchos</i> in Naxos, ¹⁰⁷⁶ not to be confused with Nikokles, the king of Salamis in Cyprus. ¹⁰⁷⁷
Nymphon	266	Priene	Nymphon had a long and varied career at Priene. In a first decree, dating to 277, he was honored for being a benefactor of the <i>polis</i> . ¹⁰⁷⁸ He is next mentioned in a decree from c. 266, in which the <i>demos</i> honors him for his actions at the expiry of his term as <i>phourarchos</i> . ¹⁰⁷⁹ A third inscription mentioning him as <i>phourarchos</i> is dated to 262. ¹⁰⁸⁰
Olympiodoros	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹⁰⁸¹
[O]nesionos	2 nd Century	Korassiai	Mentioned on a pedimental stele in the <i>akropolis</i> . It seems that another official (name not preserved, patronymic begins with Π) has the title of <i>archon</i> of the <i>stratiotoi</i> , so there is some differentiation in offices. ¹⁰⁸²
Pandaros	December 260- January 259	Xanthos	Served during the reign of Ptolemy II Philadelphus. ¹⁰⁸³
Pantaleon	331	Memphis	Appointed by Alexander the Great. ¹⁰⁸⁴
Peisistratos	c. 200	Plimiri	He made a dedication to Athena Lindia. ¹⁰⁸⁵
Philarchida	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹⁰⁸⁶
Philistos	405-356	Syracuse	Historian, philosopher, supporter of Dionysius I, and “for a long time” <i>phourarchos</i> of the <i>akra</i> at Syracuse. ¹⁰⁸⁷

¹⁰⁷⁶Aen. Tact. 22.20.

¹⁰⁷⁷Whitehead 2001, 157–158; cf. Köchly and Rüstow 1853, 78 no. 22.8 who believe he was operating out of Kítios and was indeed the king of Salamis.

¹⁰⁷⁸*I. Priene* 20.

¹⁰⁷⁹*I. Priene* 21.

¹⁰⁸⁰Hicks, *JHS* 4, 1883, 237-242 = *I. Priene* 22 = Holleaux, *BCH* 31, 1907, 383.

¹⁰⁸¹Eiring and Lund 2004, 66.

¹⁰⁸²*IG* XII,6 2.1204.

¹⁰⁸³Robert and Robert 1983, 126 #4 A.

¹⁰⁸⁴Arr. *Anab.* 3.5.3: “φρουράρχους δὲ τῶν ἐταίρων ἐν Μέμφει μὲν Πανταλέοντα κατέστησε τὸν Πυδναῖον, ἐν Πηλοσίῳ δὲ Πολέμωνα τὸν Μεγακλέους Πελλαῖον...”

¹⁰⁸⁵*IG* XII,1 900: “Πεισίστρατος | Εὐφράνορος | φρου[ρ]αρχή[σας] | Ἀθάναι Λινδίαί.”

¹⁰⁸⁶Dumont 1872, 136 #58: “Φρουράρχου | [Φιλ]αρχίδα.”

¹⁰⁸⁷*FGrH* 556 T 5c.5: “ὁ γὰρ δὴ Φίλιστος ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε τῆι τυραννίδι καθισταμένηι προθυμότατον ἑαυτὸν παρέσχε, καὶ τὴν ἄκραν διεφύλαξε φρουραρχῶν ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον.”

Name	Date	Location	Notes
Philophronos	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹⁰⁸⁸
Philotas	145, c.139-120	Itanos (Crete) and Philai (Egypt)	In his dedication to Zeus Soter and Tyche Protogenos, he describes himself as among the first <i>philoι</i> , a <i>chiliarchos</i> , and a <i>phourarchos</i> . ¹⁰⁸⁹ Later, he placed another dedicatory inscription at Philai c. 139-120 where he still evidently stylizes himself <i>phrouarchos</i> (heavily restored). ¹⁰⁹⁰
Phltheida	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹⁰⁹¹
Pinarius	214	(H)enna	He crushed an anti-Roman revolt. ¹⁰⁹²
Polemon	331	Pelusium	Assigned as <i>phourarchos</i> here by Alexander the Great. ¹⁰⁹³
Poseidippos	c. 246-221	Kition and Idalion(?)	<i>Phourarchos</i> and (restored) <i>hegemon</i> of the <i>akra</i> , who with others set up a statute of Berenike, wife of Ptolemy III. ¹⁰⁹⁴ In some restorations he is <i>phourarchos</i> over Kition only, while others include Idalion. ¹⁰⁹⁵
Protagorides	Hellenistic Period	Daskyleion (Mysia)	<i>Phourarchos</i> here when “Zeus was <i>hipparchos</i> .” The Roberts argued from the mention of the <i>hipparchos</i> that Daskyleion was absorbed by Cyzicus at the time, as no other city had an eponymous <i>hipparchos</i> . ¹⁰⁹⁶
P[t?]olemaios	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹⁰⁹⁷ Why Dumont has differentiated this name from Polemaios (below) is unclear.
Polemaios	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹⁰⁹⁸

¹⁰⁸⁸Dumont 1872, 132–133 #40: “Φρουράρχου; #41: “Φρουράρχου | Φιλόφρονος.”; #42: “[Φρου]ράρχου | Φιλόφρονο[ς].”; #43: “[Φ]ρουρά[ρχου] | [Φι]λόφρο[νο]ς.”; 137 #63: “[Φρο]υράρχου | [Φιλ]όφρονος?”; #64: “[Φ]ρουράρχου | Φιλόφρο[νο]ς.”

¹⁰⁸⁹IC III.iv.14, ll. 1-7: “Φιλώτας|Γενθίου |Επιδάμνιος |τῶν πρώτων |φίλων καὶ χιλί-|αρχος καὶ φρούραρ-|χος...”

¹⁰⁹⁰*Thèbes à Syène* 318: “[...τοῦ συγγενοῦς κ]αὶ αὐτο-|[κράτορος(?)] στρατηγο]ῦ τῆς|[Θηβαίδος(?)] Φιλώτα]ς Γενθίου|[— — — — — τῶν] πρώτων |[φίλων καὶ φρούραρχο]ς.”

¹⁰⁹¹Dumont 1872, 133 #44.

¹⁰⁹²Polyaenus, *Strat.* 8.21.1.

¹⁰⁹³Arr. *Anab.* 3.5.3: “φρουράρχους δὲ τῶν ἑταίρων ἐν Μέμφει μὲν Πανταλέοντα κατέστησε τὸν Πυδναῖον, ἐν Πηλουσίῳ δὲ Πολέμονα τὸν Μεγακλέους Πελλαῖον...”

¹⁰⁹⁴CIG 2614 = OGIS 1.20 = SEG 20.132 = SEG 31.1348: “[βασιλίσσαν Β]ερενίκην τὴν βασιλέως Πτολεμαῖο[υ τοῦ Πτολεμαίου] |[ἀδελφὴν καὶ γ]υναῖκα Ποσειδίππος φρουράρχο[ς καὶ ἡγεμῶν τῶν ἐπι]|[τῆς ἄκρας(?)] καὶ κατὰ Κίτιον καὶ Βοῖσκος καὶ οἱ <σ>υνηγεμ<ό>ν[ες].”

¹⁰⁹⁵Bagnall 1976, 49.

¹⁰⁹⁶Robert and Robert 1976, 232–235: “Πρωταγορίδ[η]ς Ἑκαταίου | φρουραρχήσα[ς ἐ]πι Διὸς ἰππαρχ[έω] | Ἀπόλλωνι καὶ Ἀσκληπιῶι | χαριστήριον.”

¹⁰⁹⁷Dumont 1872, 132 #38: “Φρουράρχου | Π[τ?]ολεμαίου.”

¹⁰⁹⁸Ibid. #39: “Φρουράρχου | Πολεμαίου.”

Name	Date	Location	Notes
Rhodokleios	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹⁰⁹⁹
Straberius	48	Apollonia	He abandoned his post at the approach of Julius Caesar. ¹¹⁰⁰
Strombichos	303	Arcadian Orchomenus	Appointed by Polyperchon. ¹¹⁰¹
Tantalos	424	Thyrea	Spartan <i>phourarchos</i> taken to Athens as a prisoner after Thyrea was taken by Nicias. ¹¹⁰² Thucydides refers to him as <i>archon</i> . ¹¹⁰³
Tauriskos	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹¹⁰⁴
Thelote	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹¹⁰⁵
Theudosios	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹¹⁰⁶
Theudotos	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹¹⁰⁷
Thoinon	278-276 (?)	Syracuse	According to the <i>Suda</i> , <i>phourarchos</i> of Syracuse. ¹¹⁰⁸ He was later killed by Pyrrhus, who falsely alleged that the <i>phourarchos</i> was engaged in plots against him. ¹¹⁰⁹ He is termed a <i>hegemonikos</i> by Plutarch, whose account matches that in the <i>Suda</i> . ¹¹¹⁰
Thrasikles	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹⁹Ibid., 134 #49.

¹¹⁰⁰App. B. Civ. 2.8.54: “... Σταβέριος ὁ φρούραρχος ...”

¹¹⁰¹Diod. Sic. 20.103.4: “...Στρόμβιχον τὸν ὑπὸ Πολυπέρχοντος καθεσταμένον φρούραρχον...”

¹¹⁰²Ibid., 12.65.8-9: “... τοὺς δ’ ἐν αὐτῇ κατοικοῦντας Αἰγινήτας καὶ τὸν φρούραρχον Τάνταλον Σπαρτιάτην ζογρήσας ἀπήγαγεν εἰς τὰς Αθήνας...”

¹¹⁰³Thuc. 4.57: “... καὶ τὸν ἄρχοντα ὃς παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἦν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, Τάνταλον τὸν Πατροκλέους...”

¹¹⁰⁴Eiring and Lund 2004, 66.

¹¹⁰⁵Dumont 1872, 130 #26: “Φρ[ο]υράρ[χου] Θελώτη | Φρ[ο]υράρ[χος] Θελώτη[ς]? Θενώτης.”

¹¹⁰⁶Ibid. #27: “Ἐπὶ Φρουράρ<χου>| Θεοδοσίῳ Κνιδίῳ.”

¹¹⁰⁷Ibid. #25: “Θευδότου Φρουράρχου”

¹¹⁰⁸*Suda*, sv. Πύρρος: “ἔσαχθεις γὰρ ἐς Συρακούσας ὑπὸ τε Σωσιστράτου κρατοῦντος τῆς πόλεως τότε καὶ Θεοίνωνος τοῦ φρουράρχου...”; Ibid., s.v. Θεοίνωνος: “Θοίνωνος, φρουράρχου Συρακουσίου.”

¹¹⁰⁹Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 20.8.3: “...εὐρηκεῖν ψευδόμενος· ἐν οἷς ἦν καὶ Θεοίνων ὁ φρούραρχος, ὃς ὑπὸ πάντων ὁμολόγητο πλείστην σπουδὴν καὶ προθυμίαν εἰς τε τὴν διάβασιν αὐτῶ καὶ τὴν ...”

¹¹¹⁰Plut. *Pyrrh.* 23.4: “οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὡς ἀναγκαῖα συνεχώρουν, καίπερ δυσφοροῦντες· ἐπεὶ δὲ Θεοίνωνα καὶ Σωσίστρατον, ἄνδρας ἡγεμονικούς ἐν Συρακούσαις, οἱ πρῶτοι μὲν αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν ἔπεισαν εἰς Σικελίαν, ἐλθόντι δὲ τὴν πόλιν εὐθύς ἐνεχείρισαν καὶ πλείστα συγκατεργάσαντο τῶν Σικελικῶν, μῆτε ἄγειν σὺν αὐτῶ μῆτε ἀπολείπειν βουλόμενος ἐν ὑποψίαις εἶχε, καὶ Σωσίστρατος μὲν ἀπέστη φοβηθεὶς, Θεοίνωνα δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ φρονεῖν αἰτιασάμενος ἀπέκτεινεν...”

¹¹¹¹Dumont 1872, 131 #28: “Φρουράρ[χου] | Θρασικλεῦ<ς>.”

Name	Date	Location	Notes
Timokles	2 nd century	Hermoupolis Magna	Described as “one of the first”, a <i>hegemon</i> of the men, and a <i>phourarchos</i> in a list of garrison members. ¹¹¹²
Timokrates	221/220	Epidauros (?)	Attested in a list of soldiers in a dedication at the Asklepieion of Epidauros. ¹¹¹³
Timonos	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹¹¹⁴
Timophonos	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹¹¹⁵
Timotheos [1]	169	Lepsia	Honored by Milesian <i>katoikoi</i> in Lepsia in a decree. ¹¹¹⁶
Timotheos [2]	188-167	Cnidus	Only known from Cnidian <i>amphora</i> stamps. ¹¹¹⁷
Turpilius	108	Vacca	<i>Phourarchos</i> of Vacca and a Roman citizen. He was killed with the entire <i>boule</i> of the town by Metellus after they handed the <i>phoura</i> to Jugurtha and fell back under Roman rule. ¹¹¹⁸
Xenopeithes	317	Asia Minor	He was appointed over an unknown fortress in Asia Minor. ¹¹¹⁹

Table 2: Likely / Restored Phourarchoi

Name	Date	Location	Notes
... Akarnian	3 rd Century	Amyzon	The Amyzonian <i>ekklesia</i> ¹¹²⁰ decreed honors to a certain Arkanian <i>phourarchos</i> , ¹¹²¹ whose position was almost certainly established by a Ptolemy. ¹¹²²

¹¹¹²BSAAlex 10 (1908) 187-195 = SB 1 (1915) 599 1.37-38: “...καὶ τῶν πρότερον|μετὰ Δρύτωνος· ἡγεμῶν|ἐπ’ ἀνδρῶν καὶ φρούραρχος| Τιμοκλῆς Τιμοκλέους...”

¹¹¹³IG IV², 1 42.

¹¹¹⁴Dumont 1872, 133 #46.

¹¹¹⁵Ibid., 134 #47; #48.

¹¹¹⁶IsolMil 18: “ἔδοξε Μιλησίων τοῖς κατοικοῦσιν | ἐν Λ[ε]ψίαι... Τιμόθεος Ἀρήτου γεν-|μενος φρούραρχος...”

¹¹¹⁷Dumont 1872, 133 #45.

¹¹¹⁸App. Num. 8.2.3: “Ὅτι Μέτελλος Βαγαίων ἀνήρει τὴν βουλὴν ὅλην ὡς τὴν φρουρὰν προδόντας Ἰογόρθα, καὶ τὸν φρούραρχον Τουρπίλιον, ἄνδρα Ῥωμαίων οὐκ ἀνυπόπτως ἑαυτὸν ἐγχειρίσαντα τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἐπαπκέτεινε τῇ βουλῇ.”

¹¹¹⁹Diod. Sic. 19.16.1: “...Ξενοπειθη...τὸν φρούραρχον...”

¹¹²⁰Robert and Robert 1983, #4, ll. 2–3: “ (...ἔδ[ο]ξεν Ἀμυ-|ζονεῦσιν· κ[υ]ρίας ἐκκλησίας γενο-|μένης)”

¹¹²¹cf. Piejko 1985, 609 #4 who suggests this reconstruction: “...Τ[ίμων] | Ἀ[μα]δ[όκου] | Ἀκα[ρ]νᾶν”

¹¹²²Robert and Robert 1983, #4 ll. 6–7: “...[κ]ατασταθεῖς [ύ]πὸ τοῦ [β]ασιλέως [φρ]ούραρχος”; cf. Piejko 1985, 609 who departs from the caution of the Roberts and reconstructs L. 1-2: “[Βασιλεῦντος Πτολεμαίου

Name	Date	Location	Notes
Apollonios	3 rd - 2 nd century	Leros	Only the <i>-archos</i> portion of his title remains. ¹¹²³
Herakleides	25 January 78	Hermoupolis Magna	A restoration describes him as a member of the first <i>philo</i> i and <i>hegemon</i> and <i>phrou</i> archos in Hermoupolis Magna (modern El Ashmūnein). ¹¹²⁴
Kleandros	188-167	Cnidus	This reconstruction names a possible <i>phrou</i> archos. Dumont was unsure of the correct reading. ¹¹²⁵
Thra[sy]boulos	3 rd - 2 nd century	Priene	The <i>phrou</i> oi in Teloneia dedicated an inscription to their him. His listing is placed here as the title is strictly speaking a reconstruction, as his name. ¹¹²⁶

Table 3: Possible *Phrou*archoi

Name	Date	Location	Notes
Bacchides [2]	167	Unspecified	Josephus relates that he was appointed by Antiochos IV over unspecified areas and was killed by Matthias. ¹¹²⁷ However, he was present in Judea later in the revolt, and could not have been killed at its outbreak. ¹¹²⁸ Therefore, his status as <i>phrou</i> archos is suspect.
Bias	3 rd century	Priene	In this heavily restored and fragmentary inscription the word <i>phrou</i> archos does not appear. The decree's stress on his behavior according to the <i>nomos</i> , and the fact that he remained in the <i>phrou</i> ion for the duration of his assignment, ¹¹²⁹ are strikingly parallel to other Prienian decrees. Although his official position is not spelled out in what remains in the decree, it is extremely unlikely that it deviated from the typical praise of a <i>phrou</i> archos.

τοῦ Πτολε]-[μα]ίου [καὶ τ]οῦ [Πτο]λε[μαίου (ἔτους)...].

¹¹²³ *IsolMil* 3 ll. 3: “[Ἀπολλώνιος — φρούρ]αρχος...”

¹¹²⁴ *AbhBerlin* (1937.6) 3-63 = *SB* 5,2 (1938) 8066, col. 2 ll. 77: “..Ἡρακλείδης Ἀπολλωνίου|τῶν (πρώτων) φίλων καὶ ἡ(γ)ε(μῶν) καὶ φ(ρούραρχος)...”

¹¹²⁵ Dumont 1872, 131 #32: “Φρουράρχου | Κλεανδρ[ίδα]? Or Κλεάνδρου.”; #33: “Φρουράρχου | Κλέ[ανδρ]ος?”

¹¹²⁶ *I Priene* 252.

¹¹²⁷ Joseph. *BJ* 1.36: “καὶ Βακχίδης ὁ πεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἀντιόχου φρούραρχος...”

¹¹²⁸ Gera 1998, 276.

¹¹²⁹ *I Priene* 23: ll. 4-10: “[— διὰ πάντα] τὸν χρόνον ἐν ᾧ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐ[τῶν εἶχε — διαμένων διετέ]λεσεν ἐν τῷ φρουρίῳ, διοικῶν | [πάντα καθαρῶς καὶ δικαίως καθάπε]ρ οἱ νόμοι συντάσσουσιν, περὶ | [πλείστου ποιούμενος τὸ τε διαφ]υλάξαι τὸ φρούριον καὶ πρὸς τε|[— τῶν ἄ]λλων πολιτῶν ἐν τούτοις καθ[.] | [— ἀνέγ]κλητος γενέσθαι...”

Name	Date	Location	Notes
Diogenes	229	Athens	Diogenes is described as guardian (<i>phroura</i>) of Peiraeus. ¹¹³⁰ He is later described as “over the <i>phroura</i> ” (ἐπὶ τῆς φρουρᾶς), when he was persuaded to give up the Peiraeus, Munychia, Salamis, and Sunium to the Athenians for 150 talents. ¹¹³¹ His exact position is unclear, although it is possible that he was a <i>phrouarchos</i> .
Herakleides	294	Athens	He is listed as an Athenian <i>phrouarchos</i> by Kortenbeutel, following Beloch, ¹¹³² There is no ancient testimony to this title; Polyaeus describes Herakleides solely as a <i>phulax</i> of the Athenians who was appointed by Cassander in 294. ¹¹³³
(...s), Sidonian <i>phrouarchos</i> in Kourion	c. 235	Kourion	A Sidonian who was (restored) <i>phrouarchos</i> over the <i>polis</i> ¹¹³⁴ was honored by the <i>boule</i> of Kourion on Cyprus. However, there is some argument over the restoration and his official title. ¹¹³⁵

¹¹³⁰Plut. *Arat.* 34.1-2: “... ὁ μὲν τὸν Πειραιᾶ φρουρῶν Διογένης...”

¹¹³¹Ibid., 34.4: “... καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς φρουρᾶς Διογένη συνέπεισεν ἀποδοῦναι τὸν τε Πειραιᾶ καὶ τὴν Μουνυχίαν καὶ τὴν Σαλαμίνα καὶ τὸ Σούνιον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπὶ πενήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν ταλάντοις...”

¹¹³²RE (1941) 773–81, s.v. “Phrouarchos”.

¹¹³³Polyaeus, *Strat.* 5.17.1–2: “Δημήτριος Ἡρακλείδην φύλακα τῶν Ἀθηνῶν συντάξας αὐτὸς μὲν ἦν περὶ τὴν Λυδίαν.”

¹¹³⁴Mitford 1971, #32: “...[ὁ δεῖνα — — —]ς Σιδώνιος, [ὁ γενόμενος ἐπ]ὶ τῆς πόλεως [φρουραρχος]...”

¹¹³⁵Bagnall 1976, 50.

APPENDIX 5: ALL *PHROURAI*, *PHROURIA*, AND *PHROUROI*

Only select portions of the literary and epigraphical record survive from antiquity. Hence, the following summary should only be taken to describe and quantify the current state of the evidence, and not be taken as a study or inventory of every structure known to archaeology as a potential lookout, guard post, or stronghold. With this caution, a clear picture of the role of garrisons and the unique importance of the *phourarchia* to civic and military administration emerges.

My investigation has gathered over 2,500 uses of garrison terminology that are historically or culturally relevant.¹¹³⁶ Entries where an author mentions the same location with the same language are combined (i.e. Josephus' designation of Masada as a *phourion*¹¹³⁷ was treated as one record, while his use of *phoura*¹¹³⁸ was treated as a separate entry). This list was then used to generate the statistics discussed below. Separate statistics were run after removing classical historians and authors who focused almost exclusively on Rome (referred to hereafter as “Hellenistic” instances).¹¹³⁹ Finally, a third subset was created consisting solely of papyri and epigraphy, in order to view local administration outside the focus of ancient historians. In all of these cases only specific mentions of *phourai*, *phouria*, and *phouroi* were counted, and only commanders who appeared in the same document or nearby passages were assigned to each garrison.

Phourarchoi, *phourai*, *phouria*, and *phouroi* were scattered throughout the Greek-

¹¹³⁶This “raw” list is available from the dissertation's website.

¹¹³⁷Joseph *AJ*, 14.396; 15.203; *BJ*, 1.237; 1.264; 1.267; 1.269; 1.281; 1.282; 1.287; 2.408; 4.398; 4.405; 4.505; 4.508; 7.252; 7.276; 7.277; 7.279; 7.285; 7.289; 7.294; 7.297; 7.300; 7.331; 7.335; 7.407.

¹¹³⁸Joseph *AJ*, 14.296.

¹¹³⁹Although the texts under consideration did address a broad swath of history (especially sources like the *Suda*), their interest in Hellenistic history allows them to be aggregated as a group for this discussion.

speaking world, but there were particularly heavy concentrations in Greece, Western Asia Minor, Sicily, Rome, and Judea. The distribution is in large part due to the bias and interest of the literary sources, and the heavy use of the term by authors who primarily wrote on the Roman Empire, especially Cassius Dio and Appian.¹¹⁴⁰

Named commanders are unknown for the vast majority of *phrourai*, *phrouria*, and *phrouroi*. This lack of detail likely reflects the broad historical and narrative interests ancient authors, who generally did not address the minutiae of local administration for locations that were only peripherally related to larger historical events. Of the 1,430 cases of garrisons collected by this study, the evidence is insufficient to determine a commander's official title with any reasonable accuracy for 1,212 instances, or ~85% of the total. The remaining 164 cases were commanded by 39 unique offices. Of these, the *phrouarchia* was by far the predominant magistracy, representing ~ 25% of known garrison commanders.

Table 4: Garrison Types

Type	Instances	“Hellenistic” Instances
<i>akra</i>	1	1
<i>chorion</i>	1	1
<i>nesos (island)</i>	1	1
<i>phroura (?)</i>	1	1
<i>phroureo</i>	1	1
<i>phulake</i>	1	1
<i>teichos</i>	1	-
<i>chora</i>	2	2
<i>phourion (?)</i>	2	2
<i>polis</i>	7	3
<i>phrouros</i>	12	8

¹¹⁴⁰For an interactive map, see http://awmc.unc.edu/awmc/applications/snagg_test/

Type	Instances	“Hellenistic” Instances
<i>phrourion</i>	15	12
<i>phroura</i>	17	12
<i>unspecified</i>	150	138
Total	212	183

Table 5: All Garrison Commanders

Commander	Instances	“Hellenistic” Instances	Papyri and Inscriptions
<i>apoleipo</i>	1	1	-
<i>archo</i>	1	-	-
<i>archiphrouros</i>	1	1	1
<i>archon (?)</i>	1	1	1
<i>archon of the engineers</i>	1	1	-
<i>boeotarch</i>	1	1	-
<i>chiliarchos</i>	1	1	-
<i>echon phrouon</i>	1	-	-
<i>epitetagmenos</i>	1	1	-
<i>epitrepo</i>	1	1	-
<i>hegeomai</i>	1	-	-
<i>hekatonarchos</i>	1	-	-
<i>hyparchos</i>	1	1	-
<i>hyparchos (?)</i>	1	1	1
<i>katechon</i>	1	1	-
<i>kosmetes</i>	1	1	-
<i>meta</i>	1	-	-
<i>of the phroura</i>	1	1	-
<i>of the phrouroi</i>	1	1	-
<i>paraphulatto</i>	1	1	-
<i>phroura</i>	1	1	-
<i>phroureo</i>	1	1	-
<i>phrouros</i>	1	1	-
<i>phulakes</i>	1	-	-

Commander	Instances	“Hellenistic” Instances	Papyri and Inscriptions
<i>proistemi</i>	1	1	-
<i>strategos (?)</i>	1	1	1
<i>stratiarchos (?)</i>	1	1	1
<i>tachthenta</i>	1	1	-
<i>Taxiarchos</i>	1	1	-
<i>tetagmenos epi phroura</i>	1	1	-
unspecified – maybe <i>archisomatophulax</i>	1	1	1
unspecified; <i>archon</i> if under athenians	1	1	1
unspecified; possibly a <i>strategos (?)</i>	1	1	1
<i>epimeleomai</i> over the <i>phroura</i>	2	2	-
<i>kytherodikes arche</i>	2	-	-
<i>phourarchos (?)</i>	2	2	-
<i>tetagmenos</i>	2	2	1
<i>epi phroura</i>	4	4	-
<i>polemarchos</i>	4	1	-
<i>epi</i>	5	5	5
<i>echo</i>	7	2	-
<i>hegemon</i>	26	-	6
<i>archon</i>	21	13	3
<i>harmostes</i>	22	16	-
<i>strategos</i>	34	31	25
<i>phourarchos</i>	54	42	20
unspecified	1212	815	110
Total	1430	979	178

Table 6: All Commanders of Phourai

Commander	Instances	“Hellenistic” Instances	Papyri and Inscriptions
<i>archo</i>	1	-	-

<i>Commander</i>	Instances	“Hellenistic” Instances	Papyri and Inscriptions
<i>archon of the engineers</i>	1	1	-
<i>boeotarch</i>	1	1	-
<i>chiliarchos</i>	1	1	-
<i>echon phrouon</i>	1	1	-
<i>epimeleomai over the phroua</i>	1	1	-
<i>epitagmenos</i>	1	1	-
<i>epitrepo</i>	1	1	-
<i>hegemon; tyrannous instead of a phourarchos</i>	1	-	-
<i>hekatonarchos</i>	1	-	-
<i>hyparchos</i>	1	1	-
<i>of the phroua</i>	1	1	-
<i>of the phrouoi</i>	1	1	-
<i>paraphulatto</i>	1	1	-
<i>philosopher; strategos</i>	1	--	-
<i>phroua</i>	1	1	-
<i>phourarchos and hegemon</i>	1		-
<i>tachthenta</i>	1	1	-
<i>taxiarchos</i>	1	1	-
<i>tetagmenos</i>	1	1	1
<i>tetagmenos epi phroua</i>	1	1	-
<i>unspecified; archon if under athenians</i>	1	1	1
<i>kytherodikes arche</i>	2	-	-
<i>phourarchos (?)</i>	2	2	-
<i>echo</i>	3	1	-
<i>epi phroua</i>	4	4	-
<i>polemarchos</i>	4	-	-
<i>strategos</i>	6	5	1
<i>archon</i>	11	5	2
<i>hegemon</i>	16	15	1

<i>Commander</i>	Instances	“Hellenistic” Instances	Papyri and Inscriptions
<i>phrourarchos</i>	17	13	1
<i>harmostes</i>	20	15	-
unspecified	551	355	17
Total	658	433	24

Table 7: All Commanders of Phrouria

Commander	Instances	“Hellenistic” Instances	Papyri and Inscriptions
<i>epimeleomai over the phrouria</i>	1	1	-
<i>hegemon</i>	1	1	-
<i>katechon</i>	1	1	-
<i>strategos (?)</i>	1	1	1
<i>strategos and archisomatophulakos</i>	1	1	-
<i>tetagmenos</i>	1	1	-
unspecified – <i>maybe archisomatophulax</i>	1	1	-
<i>echo</i>	2	1	-
<i>archon</i>	5	4	1
<i>epi</i>	5	5	5
<i>phrourarchos</i>	15	12	6
<i>strategos</i>	24	24	23
unspecified	453	343	68
Total	511	395	104

Table 8: All Commanders of Phrouroi

Commander	Instances	“Hellenistic” Instances	Papyri and Inscriptions
<i>archiphrouros</i>	1	1	1
<i>archon (?)</i>	1	1	1
<i>harmostes</i>	1	-	-
<i>hegemon</i>	1	1	-
<i>meta</i>	1	-	-

Commander	Instances	“Hellenistic” Instances	Papyri and Inscriptions
<i>phrouros</i>	1	1	-
<i>phulakes</i>	1	-	-
<i>strategos</i>	1	1	1
<i>stratiarchos (?)</i>	1	1	1
<i>unspecified; possibly a strategos (?)</i>	1	1	-
<i>echo</i>	2	-	-
<i>archon</i>	5	4	-
<i>phrouarchos</i>	12	8	6
unspecified	101	58	20
Total	130	77	30

The evidence cannot hope to be comprehensive, limited as it is by the survival of source material and the large number of unknown commanders. However, what remains unambiguously reveals that the *phrouarchia* was heavily involved with the administration of garrisons. The final table in this appendix lists all *phrouarchoi*, *phrourai*, *phrouria*, and *phrouroi*. The titles are taken from the locations most closely associated with each entry, and follow the *Barrington Atlas* and Pleiades naming conventions. This table has been condensed for legibility; all entries to a related place, regardless of source, are placed in one entry. A new entry is made for each change in place, type, commander, or commander name. A searchable version of this table, with each entry individual instance of a garrison or commander as an individual row, is available on the mapping application website.

Table 9: Register of All Garrisons

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
(As)Syria	<i>phroureo</i>			Xen. <i>Cyrop.</i> 6.1.17

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
————	<i>phrourion</i>	<i>phrourarchos</i>		Xen. <i>Cyrop.</i> 5.3.11-17, 5.3.22.26
————	<i>phrourion</i>			Xen. <i>Cyrop.</i> 1.4.16-17 5.3.11-12, 6.1.16
(H)Enna	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 22.10.1, 23.9.5, 36.4.3
————	unspecified	<i>phrourarchos</i>	Pinarius	Polyaenus, <i>Strat.</i> 8.21
(I)Tucci	<i>phroura</i>			App. <i>Hisp.</i> 11.66
(S)Tymphaia	<i>phroura</i>			Plut. <i>Pyrrh.</i> 6.2-3
Abai	<i>phrourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 16.58.4
Abdera	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 15.36.4
Abydos	<i>phroura</i>			Plb. 18.44.4
————	<i>phrouros</i>			<i>BNJ</i> 171 F 9 = <i>BNJ</i> 84 F 9
Acarmania	<i>phroura</i>			Plut. <i>Pyrrh.</i> 6.2-3
Achaea	<i>phroura</i>			Plb. 2.41.10-14; Plut. <i>Arat.</i> 38 = <i>FGrH</i> 81 F 52
Actium Pr.	<i>phroura</i>			Cass. Dio. 50.15.1
Adiabene	<i>phrourion</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 20.85
Aeclanum	<i>phrourion</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 16.6 (excerpt)
Aegae	<i>phroura</i>			Plut. <i>Pyrrh.</i> 26.6
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Cass. Dio 47.30
Aegaeum Mare	<i>phroura</i>	<i>harmostes</i>		Dem. <i>De cor.</i> 96
————	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 11.44.2
Aegina (island)	<i>phroura</i>	<i>harmostes</i>		Dem. <i>De cor.</i> 96
————	<i>phrourion</i>			Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 5.1.5
Aegithallus	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 24.1.11
Aegys, Unspecified Phrouria Near	<i>phrourion</i>			Plb. 2.54.3
Aelana/Aila	<i>phroura</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 9.218
————	<i>phrourion</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 9.245
Aeolis	<i>chora</i>	<i>phrourarchos</i>	Alexander	Polyaenus, <i>Strat.</i> 6.10.1
————	<i>phroura</i>			Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 3.1.15
Aetolia	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 18.24.2
Agyrium	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 22.2.3
Aigion	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 19.66.3-4; Plb. 2.41.14

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>		<i>Archiv für Papyrusforschung und verwandte Gebiete</i> 13, (1939) 18.7
Aigioplanktos/Geran(e)ia M.	<i>phroura</i>			Thuc. 1.107.3
Aigys	<i>phrourion</i>			Strabo 8.5.4 = <i>BNJ</i> 70 F 117
Ainos	<i>phroura</i>			Dem. [su] <i>In Theocrinem</i> 38.7; Plb. 22.11.4
Ake/Ptolemais	<i>phroura</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 13.353
Alabanda/Antiocheia Chrysaoron	<i>phrouros</i>			Cass. Dio. 48.26.4
Alba Fucens	<i>phroura</i>			Strabo 5.3.13; Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 3.28.6
Alba Longa	<i>phroura</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 1.79-84.2 = <i>BNJ</i> 809 F 4b
————	<i>phroureo</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 1.82.3, 1.83.4, 3.28.6
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Plut. <i>Rom.</i> 3-8 = <i>BNJ</i> 820 F 1
Alexandria	<i>phroura</i>			Strab 2.3.4 = <i>FGrH</i> 2206 T 1
————	<i>phroureo</i>			Strabo 11.14.15
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>		<i>FD</i> III 4:37 = <i>SEG</i> 1.161 = <i>SEG</i> 3.378 = <i>BCH</i> 28.1924.58
Alisontia fl.	<i>phrourion</i>			Cass. Dio 54.33.4
Alpes M.	<i>phroura</i>	<i>strategos</i>		Hdn. 3.6.10
————	<i>phrourion</i>			<i>Suda</i> s.v. Ἄλπειον
Amaseia	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	[Me]trodoros	<i>St. Pont.</i> III 94
Amathous	<i>phrourion;</i> <i>eurma</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 1.86-89
Ambracia	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 12.60.6, 17.1.3, 17.3.3, Plut. <i>Pyrrh.</i> 6.2-3
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Thuc. 4.42.3
Ameselon	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 22.13.1
Amman/Philadelpheia	<i>phrourion</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 15.148; Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 1.380
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>		<i>P. Cair. Zen.</i> 4.59573
Ampheia	<i>phroura</i>			Paus. 4.7.3
Amphipolis	<i>phrourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 12.32.3
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>		<i>SEG</i> 35.705
Amyzon/Mydon	<i>phrourion</i>	<i>phrouarchos</i>Aka[r]nan	Robert and Robert 1983, #4

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Anaia	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>		<i>IG XII,6 1:11 = AM 44 (1919) 25, 13 = SEG 1.366</i>
Anchialus	<i>phourion</i>			<i>IGBulg I² 388(2)</i>
Ancyra	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 12.5.2
Andetrium	<i>phourion</i>			Cass. Dio 56.12.4, 56.14.7
Andros	<i>phoura</i>			Diod. Sic. 20.37.1; Plut. <i>Per.</i> 11.5
————	<i>phrouros</i>	<i>strategos</i>		<i>IG II² 123</i>
Anio (river)	<i>phourion</i>			Dion. Hal. 3.65.2
Antandros	<i>phoura</i>			Thuc. 8.108.1; Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 1.1.26, 4.8.35; Diod. Sic. 12.72.3, 13.42.4
Anticragus	<i>phourion</i>			App. Mith. 14.96
Antiochia/Theoupolis	<i>emphroureo</i>			Cass. Dio. 47.30
Antium	<i>phoura</i>			App. <i>B Civ.</i> 1.8.69
————	<i>phourion</i>			Dion. Hal. 9.58.8, 9.56.6, 10.44.2
Aornos	<i>phoura</i>	<i>epimeleomai over the phoura</i>		Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 4.30.4
Apamea	<i>phrouros</i>			Cass. Dio. 48.25.2
Aphidna	<i>phourion</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Nikomachos	<i>PAE 1990[1993].21,1 = SEG 41.90 = BE 1995.236 = BE 1997.223 = I. Rhamnous II 32</i>
Apollonia	<i>phoura</i>			Diod. Sic. 19.89; Cass. Dio 41.45.1
————	<i>polis</i>	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Straberius	App. <i>B Civ.</i> 2.8.54
Aquae Sextiae	<i>phoura</i>			Strabo 4.1.5
Aquileia	<i>phoura</i>			Hdn. 8.3.1; 8.3.3
Arabia	<i>phoura</i>			Cass. Dio. 37.15.2
————	<i>phourion</i>			Cass. Dio 37.15.2 = <i>FGrH</i> 737 F 19c
Arabicus Sinus/Erythr(ae)um/Rubrum Mare	<i>phoura</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 9.217
————	<i>phourion</i>			<i>OGIS 701 = IGRR 1.1142 = SB 5.8908</i>
Aragos fl.	<i>phoura</i>			Strabo 11.3.5
Arbela/Arba-ilu	<i>teichos</i>	<i>phrouarchos</i>		Cass. Dio <i>ep.</i> 68.22.3
Arcadia	<i>phoura</i>			Plb. 2.54.3

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
————	<i>phourion</i>			App. <i>Syr.</i> 7.41
Arduba	<i>phourion</i>			Cass. Dio 56.15.3
Argos	<i>phoura</i>	<i>hegemon</i>	Cleomenes	Plut. <i>Cleom.</i> 17.5
————	<i>phoura</i>			Plut. <i>Cleom.</i> 20.4, 21.2; Plut. <i>Demetr.</i> 25.2; Paus. 2.23.7
Argos Hippium/Arpi/Argyripa	<i>phoura</i>			App. <i>Hann.</i> 6.5.31
Ariminum	<i>phoura</i>			Strabo 5.2.9
————	<i>phourion</i>			App. <i>B Civ.</i> 2.5.35
Aristobathra/Orobatis	<i>phoura</i>			Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 4.28.4-5
Arkesine	<i>phouros</i>			<i>IG XII,7</i> 5
Armaziskhevi	<i>phourion</i>			Cass. Dio 37.1.5
Armenia	<i>phoura</i>			Plut. <i>Pomp.</i> 33.2; <i>Suda</i> sv. Μάρτιος
————	<i>phoura</i>		Afranius	Plut. <i>Pomp.</i> 34.1
————	<i>phourion</i>			Cass. Dio 49.39.5; <i>Suda</i> sv. Δυσέμβολος
Armenia Minor	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 12.3.28; Plut. <i>Luc.</i> 19.1
Arsamus (Near the tigris)	<i>phourion</i>		Erythrai	Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 20.80
Artageras / Artagerk	<i>phoura (?)</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>	Ador / Adon	Strabo 11.14.6
Ashqelon/Ascalon	<i>phoura</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 3.12
Asia	<i>phoura</i>	<i>harmostes</i>	Euxenus	Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 4.2.5
————	<i>phoura</i>			Diod. Sic. 11.60.1
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>		Polyaenus, <i>Strat.</i> 2.19; Polyaenus, <i>Excerpt</i> 39.3, 54.8
————	<i>phourion</i>			Plut. <i>Pomp.</i> 45.2
————	<i>phourion</i>			<i>SEG</i> 46:1088
————	<i>phourion</i>		Cacus	Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 1.42.3
————	<i>phouros</i>			Polyaenus, <i>Strat.</i> 4.6.15
Asia Minor	<i>phoura</i>			Isocrates <i>Panegyricus</i> , 163; Hdn. 3.3.7
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>	Xenopeithes	Diod. Sic. 19.16.1
————	<i>phouros</i>	<i>echo</i>	Marcus Aemilius Lepidus	Cass. Dio 19 (Zonaras 9, 20.)
Asine	<i>phoura</i>	<i>polemarchos</i>	Geranor	Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 7.1.25

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
At(h)esis fl.	<i>phourion</i>			Plut. <i>Mar.</i> 23.2, 23.6
Atalante Ins.	<i>phourion</i>			Thuc. 3.89.4
Athamania	<i>phoura</i>			App. <i>Syr.</i> 4.17
Athenae	<i>phoura</i>	<i>archon</i>	Menyllus	Plut. <i>Regum</i> 50
————	<i>phoura</i>	<i>harmostes</i>	Kallibos	Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 2.3.13-14, 2.3.20, 2.3.21, 2.3.42, 2.4.4; Plut. <i>Lys.</i> 15.5
————	<i>phoura</i>	<i>hegemon</i>	Menyllus	Plut. <i>Phoc.</i> 27.4, 27.5, 28.1, 28.4, 30.4; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 188 F 14
————	<i>phoura</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>	Kallibios	Diod. Sic. 14.4.4
————	<i>phoura</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>	Menyllos	Diod. Sic. 18.18.5; Plut. <i>Phoc.</i> 28.1
————	<i>phoura</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>	Nikanor	Diod. Sic. 18.64.6, 18.75.1
————	<i>phoura</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 21.1.3; App. <i>Mith.</i> 6.39; App. <i>Pun.</i> 12.87; Paus. 1.25.5, 1.25.8. 3.6.6, 7.10.4; Plut. <i>Comp. Agis. Cleom.</i> 38 = <i>FGrH</i> 231 F 4b.4; <i>FGrH</i> 244 F 44; Plut. <i>Demetr.</i> 34.5; Isoc. <i>De pace</i> 92; <i>SEG</i> 45.92[1] = <i>IG</i> II ² 550 = <i>SEG</i> 44.1736
————	<i>phoura</i>		Kallibos	Aeschin. <i>De falsa legatione</i> 77, 176.4
————	<i>phoura</i>		Menyllus or Nikanor	Plut. <i>Per.</i> 12.5; Plut. <i>Cleom.</i> 16.4; Plut. <i>Demetr.</i> 8.3-5, 10.1, 24.5; Plut. <i>Dem.</i> 28.1; Paus. 1.25.5
————	<i>phoureo</i>	<i>harmostes</i>	Kallibos	Arist. [<i>Ath. Pol.</i>] 38.2
————	<i>phoureo</i>	<i>kosmetes</i>		Arist. [<i>Ath. Pol.</i>] 42.3-5
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>archon</i>		Arist. [<i>Ath. Pol.</i>] 30.2
————	<i>phourion</i>			Dem. <i>In Midiam</i> 193; App. <i>Mith.</i> 5.35; Thuc. 2.13.6; 7.28.2; <i>IG</i> II ² 732 = <i>SEG</i> 24.128 = <i>SEG</i> 33.120; <i>IG</i> II ² 1030; <i>IG</i> II ² 886 = <i>SEG</i> 16.78; <i>IG</i> II ² 1029; <i>IG</i> II ² 657; <i>IG</i> II ² 834; <i>SIG</i> ³ 654A
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Thuc. 2.13.7
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Plut. <i>Per.</i> 12; Arist. [<i>Ath. Pol.</i>] 24.1-3, 62.1.
————	<i>phrouros</i>		Periccles	Diod. Sic. 12.38.1- 41.1 = <i>BNJ</i> 70 F 196

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Nikanor	Plut. <i>Phoc.</i> 31.1; Diod. Sic. 18.64.1; Polyaeus, <i>Strat.</i> 4.11.2; Nep. <i>Pho.</i> 2.4.3
Athroula/Laththa	<i>phroua</i>			Strabo 16.4.22 = <i>BNJ</i> 677 F 6a.24
Attica	<i>phroua</i>			Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 7.4.4; Diod. Sic. 12.6.1, 12.42.6; Lysias, <i>Against Eratosthenes</i> 40; Dem. <i>De falsa legatione</i> 125; <i>IG</i> II ² 1006; <i>IG</i> II ² 1028; <i>Arch.Eph.</i> 1918.73-100,95-97 = Reinmuth, <i>Ephobic Inscrs.</i> 15
Automalax	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 17.3.20
Babylon	<i>phroua</i>			Plut. <i>Demetr.</i> 7.2
————	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 17.1.30
————	<i>phrouros</i>	<i>phrouarchos</i>		Xen. <i>Cyrop.</i> 7.5.34, 7.5.69, 8.6.1
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>		Xen. <i>Cyrop.</i> 7.5.34; 8.6.1
Babylsa	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 11.14.6
Bactria	<i>phourion</i>	<i>phrouarchos</i>		Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 4.16.4-5
Baetica	<i>phroureo</i>			App. <i>Hisp.</i> 12.68
Bargylia	<i>phroua</i>			Plb. 18.2.3; 18.44.4
Basgoedariza	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 12.3.28
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 4.130
Bathyra	<i>phrouion; kome</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 17.26
Beioubaitha	<i>phourion</i>			<i>Suda</i> sv. Σάπειρ
Belgae	<i>phroua</i>			Cass. Dio 40.43.3
Belmina	<i>phourion</i>			Plb. 2.54.3
Belzedek	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 3.27
Beneventum/Maleventum	<i>phroua</i>			App. <i>Hann.</i> 6.37
Beth Zur/Bethsoura	<i>phroua</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> ; 13.42 13.155-157, 12.377, 13.155, 13.157; 1 Maccabees 6.50; 11.65-66, 14.33
————	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 13.42; 12.326; 2 Maccabees 13.19
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 13.155-157
Bethalaga	<i>phroureo</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 13.27
Bethel	<i>phroua</i>			1 Maccabees 9.51

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Bethela	<i>phrouros</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 4.551
Bethoron Katotera	<i>phroura</i>			1 Maccabees 9.51
Bethsaida	<i>phroura</i>			Joseph. <i>Vit.</i> 398
Bibracte	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 4.3.2
Blaundos/ Blados	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 13.104.6
Boeotia	<i>phroura</i>	<i>harmostes</i>		Dem. <i>De cor.</i> 96
————	<i>phroura</i>	<i>harmostes</i>	Hieronymus	Plut. <i>Demetr.</i> 39.3—7 = <i>FGrH</i> 154 T 8
————	<i>phroura</i>			Plb. 20.6.2; Isocrates, <i>Plataicus</i> 1
Borysthenes/Olbia	<i>phroura</i>			Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 6.5.24
Bosphorus	<i>phroureo</i>			Polyaenus, <i>Strat.</i> 8.55
————	<i>phourion</i>			App. <i>Mith.</i> 16.107
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Cass. Dio 37.14.3
Boubastis	<i>phroureo</i>			Diod. Sic. 16.49.7
Boutheine, Arabia	<i>phourion</i>			<i>LBW</i> 3.2129 = <i>RB</i> 41 (1932) 409, 38
Breuci	<i>phourion</i>			Cass. Dio 55.34.5
Brundisium/Brentesion	<i>phroura</i>			App. <i>B Civ.</i> 5.6.56
————	<i>phourion</i>			App. <i>B Civ.</i> 5.6.56
Bruttii	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 21.8.1; App. <i>Hann.</i> 9.57
Budorus / Boudaron	<i>phourion</i>			Thuc. 2.94 = <i>BNJ</i> 70 F 198
Byzantium	<i>phroura</i>			Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 2.2.1
————	<i>phourion</i>			Plb. 4.52.7, 4.52.8
Caere	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 20.44.9
Callatis	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 19.73.1-2
Calydon	<i>phroureo</i>			Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 4.6.1; Diod. Sic. 15.75.2
Cameria	<i>phroura</i>		Romulus	Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 2.54.2
Camicus	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 23.9.5
————	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 23.9.5
Campania	<i>phroura</i>	<i>echo</i>	Tiberius Claudius Nero	Cass. Dio 48.15.3
————	<i>phroura</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 15.3.11-12
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 15.3.3-4; 15.3.5

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Canusium	<i>phroura</i>			Cass. Dio. 15 (Zonaras 9, 2)
Cappadocia	<i>phroura</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>		Plut. <i>Eum.</i> 3.7
————	<i>phroura</i>			<i>FGrH</i> 434 F 1 27.2
————	<i>phourion</i>			App. <i>Mith.</i> 9.66
Capua	<i>phroura</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Hanno and Bostar	App. <i>Hann.</i> 7.43
————	<i>phroura</i>			App. <i>Hann.</i> 7.43
Caria	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 11.60.4
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Xen. <i>Cyrop.</i> 7.4.7
Carthago	<i>phroura</i>			App. <i>Pun.</i> 8.54, 10.70
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>echo</i>	Bithias	Cass. Dio 21 (Zonaras 9, 29–30)
————	<i>phourion</i>			App. <i>Pun.</i> 14.100, 15.101; Cass. Dio 21 (Zonaras 9, 27.)
————	<i>phourion</i>		Hasdrubal	Cass. Dio 21 (Zonaras 9, 27)
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Cass. Dio 21 (Zonaras 9, 29)
Carthago Nova/Col. Urbs Iulia	<i>phroura</i>			App. <i>Hisp.</i> 5.24, 7.36
Casiana	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 16.2.10
Castulo	<i>phroureo</i>			App. <i>Hisp.</i> 6.32
Castulo	<i>phrouros</i>			App. <i>Hisp.</i> 6.32
Cataracta	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 20.26.4
Cauca	<i>phroura</i>			App. <i>Hisp.</i> 9.51-52
Caunus	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 20.27.1-2; Plb. 30.21.3-5; <i>P Ox.</i> 842 = <i>FGrH</i> 66 F 1
Centuripae	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 20.56.3
————	<i>phroureo</i>	<i>proistemi</i>		Diod. Sic. 19.103.3
Cephalania Ins.	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 14.34.2
Cephaloedium	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 14.56.2, 20.77.3, 20.79.4
Chalcedon	<i>phroura</i>	<i>harmostes</i>	Hippocrates	Plut. <i>Alc.</i> 29.3; 30.1
————	<i>phroura</i>			Xen. <i>Anab.</i> 7.1.20; Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 2.2.1
————	<i>phroureo</i>			Aen. Tact. 12.3
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Aen. Tact. 12.3

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Chalcis	<i>phroura</i>			Plut. <i>Flam.</i> 10.1-2, 12.2; Plb. 18.45.3-5, 38.3.3; App. <i>Mac.</i> 8; Paus. 7.7.6
————	<i>phroureo</i>	<i>apoleipo</i>		Diod. Sic. 19.77.3-6; 19.78.2
————	<i>phroureo</i>			Diod. Sic. 20.100.6
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>		<i>IG XII</i> , Suppl. 644
Chaldaeia	<i>phourion</i>	<i>archon</i>		Xen. <i>Cyrop.</i> 3.2.1, 3.2.4, 3.2.11, 3.2.24, 3.3.1
Charax	<i>phroura</i>			2 Maccabees 12.18.2
Charax/Charakipolis	<i>phourion</i>			<i>IPriene</i> 494 = <i>IEph</i> 2001 = <i>SEG</i> 32.1127 = <i>SEG</i> 37.882
Chersonesos	<i>phroura</i>			<i>IosPE P</i> 418 = <i>IosPE I</i> 195; Plut. <i>Per.</i> 11.5
————	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 7.4.7, 17.1.14; App. <i>Mith.</i> 16.108-109
————	<i>phrouros</i>			<i>IosPE P</i> 404 = <i>CIL III</i> 13750
Chios	<i>phroura</i>			Hdt. 6.26.1; Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 2.13.4; Diod. Sic. 14.84.3
————	<i>phourion</i>			App. <i>Mith.</i> 7.46
Chryse	<i>phourion</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>		<i>RevEpigr</i> 2,1914,43 = <i>IMT SuedlTroas</i> 568
Chrysopolis	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 13.64.2
Cilicia	<i>phroureo</i>			Hdt. 3.90
————	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 17.27.7; Strabo 10.4.9; App. <i>Mith.</i> 14.92; 14.96
Cithaeron M.	<i>phroura</i>	<i>boeotarch</i>	Brachyllides	Paus. 9.13.7
Clastidium	<i>phroura</i>			Plb. 3.69.2
Cnidinium	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 14.99.3
Cnidus	<i>phrouros</i>			Thuc. 8.109.1
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Agathokles	Dumont 1872, 126 #6
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Agestatos	Dumont 1872, 127 #8
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Agestratos	Eiring and Lund 2004, 66
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Agias	Dumont 1872, 139 #73
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Agon	Fraser and Matthews 1987, s.v. Ἄγων
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Antandros	Eiring and Lund 2004, 66
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Apollonios	<i>SEG</i> 18.677,b(14)
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Apollonios	Dumont 1872, 138#70

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Aristion	Eiring and Lund 2004, 66
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Aristratos	Dumont 1872, 127 #10
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Asklepiada or Askapiada	Dumont 1872, 127 #12
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Asklepiodoros	Dumont 1872, 127 #11
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Boularchida	Dumont 1872, 128 #13
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	[Damokr]ate[us]	Dumont 1872, 137 #62
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	[Dio]g[enes]	Dumont 1872, 136 #61
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Dionysios	Dumont 1872, 128 #14
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	[Dioph]antos	Dumont 1872, 136 #59
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Epigenes	<i>Paphos</i> V 746
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Epigenes	Dumont 1872, 128 #16
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Epikrates	Dumont 1872, 128–129 #17
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Epinikidas	Eiring and Lund 2004, 66
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Ermokrates	Dumont 1872, 129–130 #22
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Ermokratippos	Dumont 1872, 130 #24
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Eukration	Eiring and Lund 2004, 66
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Euphron	Eiring and Lund 2004, 66
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Hippocrates	Dumont 1872, 131 #29
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Kleandrida	Dumont 1872, 131 #30
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Kleupolis	Dumont 1872, 131 #34
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Menekrates	Eiring and Lund 2004, 66
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Menippos	Dumont 1872, 132 #36
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Moschos	Eiring and Lund 2004, 66
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Olympiodoros	Eiring and Lund 2004, 66
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	P[t?]olemaios	Dumont 1872, 132 #38
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Philarchidia	Dumont 1872, 136 #58
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Philophronos	Dumont 1872, 132–133 #40
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Phltheida	Dumont 1872, 133 #44
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Polemaios	Dumont 1872, 132 #39
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Rhodokleos	Dumont 1872, 134 #49
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Tauriskos	Eiring and Lund 2004, 66
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Thelote	Dumont 1872, 130 #26

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
_____	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Theudosios	Dumont 1872, 130 #27
_____	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Theudotos	Dumont 1872, 130 #25
_____	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Thrasikles	Dumont 1872, 131 #28
_____	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Timonos	Dumont 1872, 133 #46
_____	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Timophonos	Dumont 1872, 134 #47
_____	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Timotheou	Dumont 1872, 133 #45
Collatia	<i>phroua</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 3.50.3
Colophon/Colophon ad Mare/Notion	<i>phourion</i>			<i>Preatti XI Congr.</i> , 1997.175-179 [2] w/ Handout
Coras	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 16.4.9
Corbio	<i>phroua</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 6.3.1, 10.26.2-4
Corcyra	<i>emphroureo</i>			Cass. Dio. 50.12.2
_____	<i>phroua</i>	<i>echon phrouon</i>	Chares	Aen. Tac. 11.13-14
_____	<i>phroua</i>			Plb. 2.10.8, 2.11.5; Plut. <i>Pyrrh.</i> 10.5; Diod. Sic. 20.104.4
_____	<i>phourion</i>			<i>IG IX,1</i> 684
Corinthus/Korinthos	<i>phroua</i>	<i>philosopher; strategos</i>	Persaeus; Archelaus	Polyaenus, <i>Strat.</i> 6.5
_____	<i>phroua</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Prepelas	Diod. Sic. 20.103.2
_____	<i>phroua</i>	<i>tachthenta</i>	Persaeus	Paus. 7.8.3
_____	<i>phroua</i>	<i>tetagmenos epi phroua</i>	Persaeus	Paus. 2.8.4 = <i>FGrH</i> 584 T 5a;
_____	<i>phroua</i>			Plut. <i>Arat.</i> 16.2, 16.4-5, 18.2-3; Plut. <i>Cleom.</i> 19.2, 21.3; Plut. <i>Demetr.</i> 15.1-.3, 25.2; Plut. <i>Flam.</i> 10.1-2; Plut. <i>Arat.</i> 18, 40.4; App. <i>Mac.</i> 8; Diod. Sic. 19.63.4, 20.37.2, 20.103.2; Paus. 7.7.6, 7.8.1; Plb. 18.11.6, 18.45.3-5, 38.3.3; Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 4.4.14, 5.1.34, 7.4.4
_____	<i>phroureo</i>			Diod. Sic. 19.74.2
_____	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 19.63.4; Plut. <i>Arat.</i> 18.2-3, 22.6, 24.1
Cossyra	<i>phroua</i>			Plb. 3.96.7
Cossyra Ins.	<i>phroua</i>			Cass. Dio 11 (Zonaras 8, 14); App. <i>B Civ.</i> 5.11.97
Cotiaion	<i>phourion</i>			<i>FGrH</i> 156 F 109

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Cragus M.	<i>phrourion</i>			App. <i>Mith.</i> 14.96
Cremera (river)	<i>phroura</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 9.59.1
————	<i>phroureo</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 9.16.3
————	<i>phrourion</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 9.15.4-5, 9.15.4-5, 9.15.4-5, 9.18.3-4, 9.18.3-4, 9.19.3-9.20.1, 9.19.3-9.20.1, 9.19.5, 9.21.1-3, 9.22.2, 9.22.5, 9.23.1
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 9.15.5; 9.18.3
Crimea	<i>phrourion</i>			App. <i>Mith.</i> 16.111
Croto(n)	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 21.4.1
————	<i>phrourion</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 1.20.4
Crustumerium	<i>phrourion</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 6.35.4
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 6.35.4
Ctenus Harbor	<i>phroura</i>			Strabo 7.4.7
Cumae/Kyme (Campanian)	<i>phroureo</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 7.3.4
Cypros, at Jericho	<i>phroura</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 2.484-485
————	<i>phrourion</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 1.41, 1.407, 2.484-485
Cyprus (island)	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 11.44.2, 20.53.1
————	unspecified	<i>phrourarchos</i>		<i>FD</i> III 4:37 = <i>SEG</i> 1.161 = <i>SEG</i> 3.378 = <i>BCH</i> 28.1924.58
Cypsela	<i>phroura</i>			Thuc. 5.33.1
Cyrene	<i>phroura</i>		friends of Magas	Polyaenus, <i>Strat.</i> 2.28.1
————	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 19.79.1
————	<i>phrouros</i>			<i>SEG</i> 18.726
————	unspecified	<i>phrourarchos</i>		<i>FD</i> III 4:37 = <i>SEG</i> 1.161 = <i>SEG</i> 3.378 = <i>BCH</i> 28.1924.58
Cyropolis/Kyra	<i>phroura</i>			Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 4.3.4-5
Cythera Ins.	<i>phroura</i>	<i>kytherodikas arche</i>		Thuc. 4.53.2, 4.54.4
Cyzicus	<i>phrourion</i>			Plut. <i>Luc.</i> 11.2
————	unspecified	<i>phrourarchos</i>	Protagroides	<i>SEG</i> 26.1336
D(o)ura/Europos	unspecified	<i>phrourarchos</i>		<i>P. Dura.</i> 20
Dadasa	<i>phrourion</i>			Cass. Dio 36.12.2

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Dalmatia	<i>phroura</i>			Cass. Dio 55.34.6-7
Damascus	<i>phroura</i>			1 Paralipomenon 18.6
Danuvius/Istros/Hister fl.	<i>phroura</i>			Hdn. 2.9.1
————	<i>phroura</i>			Hdt. 4.128; Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 7.90
Daphnai	<i>phroureo</i>			Hdt. 2.30.3
Dardanos	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 13.45.4
Daskyleion	<i>phroura</i>			Arr, <i>Anab.</i> 1.17.2
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Protagorides	<i>SEG</i> 26.1336
Dasmenda/[Dasmendron]	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 12.2.10
Dathema	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 12.330; 337
Dekeleia	<i>phroura</i>			Thuc. 7.27.3, 7.27.4, 8.71
————	<i>phourion</i>			Paus. 3.8.6; Diod. Sic. 13.9.2
Delion	<i>phroura</i>			Thuc. 4.100.5; Diod. Sic. 12.70.6
Delos	<i>phroura</i>			Paus. 8.33.2
Delphinion	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 13.76.3-4
Demetrias	<i>phroura</i>			App. <i>Mac.</i> 8
Dimalion	<i>phroura</i>			Plb. 3.18.1
Diocaesarea	<i>phroura</i>			<i>MAMA</i> 3 62
Diospolis Magna/Thebai	<i>phourion</i>			<i>O.Leid.</i> 31; <i>P.Amh.</i> 2.31
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Antiphanes	<i>P. Tor. Choach.</i> 8
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Megisthenes	<i>P.Haun.</i> II col. 2
Dobunni	<i>phroura</i>			Cass. Dio 60.20.2
Dodekaschoinos	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Herodes	<i>SB</i> 1:1918
Dor(a)	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 13.223
Doriskos	<i>phroura</i>			Hdt. 7.59
Dothaein	<i>phroura</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 9.54
Durius fl.	<i>phourion</i>			App. <i>Hisp.</i> 15.91
Dyme	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 19.66.4-6
————	<i>phroureo</i>			Diod. Sic. 15.75.2
————	<i>phourion</i>			Plb. 4.59.4, 4.60.1, 4.83.1-5
Dyrr(h)achium/Epidamnoss	<i>phroura</i>			Thuc. 1.26.2-4, 1.28.2; Diod. Sic. 12.30.4, 19.67.7
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Minucius	App. <i>B Civ.</i> 2.9.60-61

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Ecetra	<i>phroura</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 6.32.1
Edom	<i>phroura</i>			1 Paralipomenon 18.13
Egypt	<i>phroura</i>			Strabo 17.1.53; Manetho (Epitome) 7; <i>P. Oxy.</i> 2820 = <i>BNJ</i> 677 F 9; Joseph. <i>Contra Apionem</i> 1.74-92 = <i>BNJ</i> 609 F 8; Cass. Dio 50.15.1
_____	<i>phroureo</i>			Diod. Sic. 16.49.7; <i>BNJ</i> 673 F 153d
_____	<i>phrouri(?)</i>			<i>P. Stras.</i> 8.702
_____	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 16.49.8, 16.52.7; Plb. 15.25.17; Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 12.46, 12.8; <i>BNJ</i> 264 F 22 = Joseph., <i>Contra Apionem</i> 2.42, 44, 77; <i>P. Rein.</i> 2.97; <i>BGU</i> 6.1215
_____	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>		<i>FD</i> III 4:37 = <i>SEG</i> 1.161 = <i>SEG</i> 3.378 = <i>BCH</i> 28.1924.58; <i>P. Rain. Cent.</i> 45; <i>P.Hib.</i> 2.233
_____	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Kratides	<i>SB.</i> 5.8009
Elateia	<i>phroura</i>			Aeschines, <i>In Ctesiphontem</i> 140
_____	unspecified	<i>archiphrouros</i>		<i>SEG</i> 16.381; <i>SEG</i> 51.725; <i>SEG</i> 28.505,h = <i>IG</i> IX,2 1057, ll. 1-5; <i>SEG</i> 33.470 = <i>IG</i> IX,2 1057, ll. 1-5; <i>RPh</i> (1911) 129,32 = <i>SEG</i> 51.726; <i>SEG</i> 17.299 = <i>RhM</i> 101 (1958) 337, 2; <i>SEG</i> 17.300 = <i>RhM</i> 101 (1958) 338, 3; <i>SEG</i> 23.444 = <i>REA</i> 66 (1964) 316, 1; <i>IG</i> IX,2 1060, 1061, 1062, 1064.
_____	unspecified	<i>archiphrouros</i>	Asandros	<i>SEG</i> 23.445 = <i>REA</i> 66 (1964) 318, 2
Elauia	<i>phourion</i>			<i>FGrH</i> 556 F 8
Elephantine	<i>phroureo</i>			Hdt. 2.30.3; <i>BGU</i> 6 1467
_____	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Asklepiades	<i>Thèbes à Syène</i> 243
_____	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Chaireas	<i>Thèbes à Syène</i> 242
_____	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Nestor	<i>Thèbes à Syène</i> 320
Eleusis	<i>phroura</i>	<i>archon</i>		<i>IG</i> II ² 1303 = <i>SEG</i> 25.157
_____	<i>phourion</i>	<i>archon</i>		<i>IG</i> II ² 1285 = <i>SEG</i> 3.123; <i>SEG</i> 32.154

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
————	<i>phrourion</i>	<i>epi</i>	Dicaearchos; Apollonios	<i>BCH</i> 54.1930.268 = <i>SEG</i> 25.155 = <i>I. Rhamnous</i> II 17
————	<i>phrourion</i>	<i>strategos</i>		<i>IG</i> II ² 1287
————	<i>phrourion</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Aristophanes	<i>IG</i> II ² 1299 = <i>SEG</i> 3.124; <i>SEG</i> 19.122
————	<i>phrourion</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Demainetos	<i>IG</i> II ² 1304
Elis	<i>phrourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 14.17.8, 14.17.12
Emmaus/Nicopolis	<i>phroura</i>			1 Maccabees 9.51
Enattaros	<i>phroura</i> (?)			Diod. Sic. 23.18.5
Enattaros (?)	<i>phrourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 23.18.5
Ephesus/Arsinoe(ia)	<i>phroura</i>	<i>hyparchos</i>	Philoxenus	Polyaenus, <i>Strat.</i> 6.49
————	<i>phroura</i>			Arr, <i>Anab.</i> 1.17.9
————	unspecified	<i>phrourarchos</i>	Diodorus	Polyaenus, <i>Strat.</i> 4.7.4.1
Ephraim/Apheraima	<i>phrouros</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 4.551
Epidauros	<i>chora</i>	<i>phrourarchos</i>		Polyaenus, <i>Strat.</i> 3.9.48; Polyaenus <i>Excerpt</i> 19.2
————	<i>phroura</i>			Thuc. 5.56.1, 5.75, 5.80.3; Diod. Sic. 15.69.1
————	<i>phrourion</i>			Thuc. 5.80.3
————	<i>phrouros</i>			<i>IG</i> IV ² ,1 4; <i>IG</i> IV ² ,1 2
————	unspecified	<i>phrourarchos</i>	Timokrates	<i>IG</i> IV ² ,1 42
Epieikeia/Epieikia	<i>phrourion</i>			Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 4.4.13; 4.5.19
Epipolai	<i>phrourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 13.11.3
Epirus	<i>phroura</i>	<i>Taxiarchos</i>		Plut. <i>Aem.</i> 29.2-3
Epitalion	<i>phrouros</i>	<i>harmostes</i>	Lysippus	Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 3.2.29
Eporedia	<i>phroura</i>			Strabo 4.6.7
Eretria	<i>phroura</i>			Paus. 7.8.1; Plb. 18.45.3-5; <i>IG</i> XII,9 192
————	<i>phroureo</i>			Paus. 7.8.1
Erythrai	unspecified	<i>phrourarchos</i>		<i>IG</i> F ² ,10
Eryx	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 22.10.3, 24.1.11
Ethiopia	<i>phroura</i>			Cass. Dio 54.5.5-6
Euboea in Sicily	<i>phrourion</i>			Strabo 10.1.15
Euboea Ins.	<i>phroura</i>	<i>harmostes</i>		Dem. <i>De cor.</i> 96
————	<i>phroureo</i>			Thuc. 8.74.2
Eukarpia, Sicily	<i>phrourion</i>			<i>FGrH</i> 566 F 24b

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Eupatorium (?)	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 7.4.7
Euphrates fl.	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 11.14.6
Europos/Euromos/Philippoi	<i>phoura</i>			Plb. 18.2.3, 18.44.4
Felsina/Bononia	<i>phrouros</i>			Cass. Dio 46.36.3
Fidenae	<i>phoura</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 2.54.3, 2.55.3, 3.40.3, 3.57.2, 3.58.3-4, 50.60.1,-2, 5.61.2
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 5.43.2, 3.58.3-4, 5.61.4
Furfane	<i>phoura</i>			Diod. Sic. 20.26.4
Gabii	<i>phoura</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 4.54.1
Gala(a)ditis	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 12.336
Galatia	<i>phoura</i>			App. <i>Mith.</i> 7.46
————	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 12.5.2
Galilaea	<i>phoura</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 14.298; <i>BJ</i> 1.210; 1.303
————	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 14.414; <i>BJ</i> 1.316, 1.330, 4.1
Gallia	<i>phoura</i>			Plut. <i>Ant.</i> 18.4; Cass. Dio 40.43.3
————	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 25.13.1; Polyaeus, <i>Strat.</i> 8.23.8
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Cass. Dio 40.4; Polyaeus, <i>Strat.</i> 8.23.8
Gamala	<i>phourion</i>	<i>archon</i>	Demetrius	Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 1.105
————	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 13.394; Joseph. <i>Vit.</i> 47, 58-61, 114, 179, 183, 398
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 4.12; 72
Gangra	<i>phourion</i> / <i>polismatios</i>			Strabo 12.3.41
Gargaza	<i>phoura</i>			Diod. Sic. 20.24.1
Garizein M.	<i>phoura</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 3.312
Garsaura/Col. Claudia Archelais/Koloneia	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 12.6.1
Gaurion	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 13.69.4-5
Gaza	<i>phoura</i>			Diod. Sic. 19.59.3
————	<i>phoureo</i>			Diod. Sic. 17.48.7
————	<i>phourion</i>			Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 2.27.7

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
————	<i>polis</i>	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Babemesis / Batis	Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 11.313
Gazara	<i>phourion</i>	<i>echo</i>	Chaereas	2 Maccabees 10.32-38
Gela	<i>phoura</i>		Dexippus	Diod. Sic. 13.93.2, 19.107.3
Gemella	<i>phroureo</i>			App. <i>Hisp.</i> 12.68
Gerasa/Antiochia ad Chrysorhoam	<i>phoura</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 1.104
Gergovia	<i>periphroureo</i>			Cass. Dio 40.36.1
————	<i>phourion</i>			Cass. Dio 40.36.1
Germania	<i>phroureo</i>			Cass. Dio 61.24.1
Gibeah	<i>phoura</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 6.95-96
————	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 6.95-96
Gischala	<i>phoura</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 4.120, 7.4.120, 4.113
Gomphoi	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 9.5.17
Gonnoi	<i>phrouros</i>	<i>archiphrouros</i>	Asandros	<i>ArchEph</i> (1911) 125, 52; <i>ArchEph</i> (1911) 123, 51; <i>ArchEph</i> (1914) 18, 223
————	<i>phrouros</i>			<i>ArchEph</i> (1914) 18, 223; <i>ArchEph</i> (1911) 125, 52
————	unspecified	<i>archiphrouros</i>		<i>AE</i> (1914) 15,214 = <i>SEG</i> 51.710,A
Gophna	<i>phoura</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 5.51
Gorbeus	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 12.5.3
Hadid/Ad(d)ida	<i>phrouros</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 4.486-487
Halasarna	<i>phourion</i>			<i>Syll.</i> ³ 569
Halex? fl.	<i>phourion</i>			Thuc. 3.115.6
Halonnesos Ins.	<i>phoura</i>			[Dem.] <i>Philip's Letter</i> 13
————	<i>phrouros</i>			[Dem.] <i>Philip's Letter</i> 12– <i>FGrH</i> 72 F 41.12
Heliopolis	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 7.427
Hellas	<i>phoura</i>	<i>harmostes</i>		Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 6.4.1-2; Paus. 8.52.4

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
_____	<i>phroura</i>			Isoc. <i>Areopagiticus</i> 65; Isoc. <i>De pace</i> 16; Dem. <i>De cor.</i> 182; Suda sv. Φρουρεῖν ἢ πλουτεῖν; Plb.7.12, 9. 29. 6, 38.3.3; Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 7.4.4; App. Mac. 9.9.3; App. <i>Mith.</i> 8.55; Cass. Dio 19 (Zonaras 9, 18.), 41.45.1; Diod. Sic. 12.40.4, 14.84.4, 15.5.1, 15.38.1-2, 18.10.2, 18.52.6, 18.55.2, 20.19.3-5, 19.85.5; IG XII,9 212; Paus. 7.8.7, 7.10.4; Plut. <i>Comp. of Demetrius and Antony</i> 2.2; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 177 D.4, 774 B-C; Plut. <i>Amatoriae</i> 3; Plut. <i>Demetr.</i> 31.1, 33.1; Plut. <i>Flam.</i> 5.6; Plut. <i>Pyrrh.</i> 13.5
_____	<i>phroureo</i>			Isoc, <i>Areopagiticus</i> 65; Isoc <i>De pace</i> 92
_____	<i>phourion</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Chabrias	Dem. <i>Lept.</i> 78
_____	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 13.52.3, 18.52.4
_____	<i>phourion</i>			IG II ² 236; IG IV ² ,1 68; App. <i>B Civ.</i> 2.8.49; App. <i>Mith.</i> 8.55; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 178 B 14
_____	<i>phrouros</i>			Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 2.2.2, 6.4.1
_____	<i>polis</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>		IG I ³ 16
Hellespontus	<i>phroura</i>			Plut. <i>Phoc.</i> 14.5; Diod. Sic. 18.51.1, 18.52.6-8
_____	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 20.19.2
Heraclea	<i>phroura</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>	Konnarex	<i>FGrH</i> 434 F 1 34.2, 34.9, 35.3
_____	<i>phroureo</i>			<i>FGrH</i> 1012 F 5
_____	<i>phourion</i>			<i>FGrH</i> 1012 F 5
_____	<i>phrouros</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>	Konnarex	<i>FGrH</i> 434 F 1 29.4, 32.2, 34.4
_____	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>		<i>FGrH</i> 434 F 1 6.2
_____	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Demopheles	<i>FGrH</i> 434 F 1 35.1
Heraclea ad Latmum/Pleistarcheia	<i>phourion</i>			<i>Syll.</i> ³ 633 = <i>SEG</i> 34.1173 = <i>SEG</i> 37.984
Heraclea Minoa	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 22.10.2
Heraeum, near Epidaurus	<i>phroura</i>			Thuc. 5.75.6
Herakleopolites Nomos	<i>phroura</i>	<i>phourarchos & hegemon</i>	Dioskourides	<i>P. Diosk.</i> 18

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
————	<i>phourion</i> (?)	<i>phourarchos</i>	Dioskourides	<i>P. Diosk.</i> 2, 14
————	<i>phourion</i> (?)	<i>phourarchos & hegemon</i>	Dioskourides	<i>P. Diosk.</i> 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 16
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>		<i>P. Gen.</i> 3.132
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Dioskourides	<i>P. Diosk.</i> 2
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Hieron	<i>P. Diosk.</i> 12
Heraklies, near Ambrakia and Charadros	<i>phourion</i>			<i>SEG</i> 34.586 = <i>BCH</i> 109 (1985) 499-544; 753-757
Herbessos?	<i>phoura</i>			Diod. Sic. 20.31.5
Herculaneum	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 5.4.8
Herkte	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 23.20.1
Hermion(e)	<i>phouros</i>			<i>IG</i> IV 695
Hermionthis	<i>phourion</i>			<i>Chr. Wilck.</i> 11
Hermopolis Magna/Schmun	<i>phoura</i>			<i>SB.</i> 20.15036
————	<i>phourion</i>			<i>BGU</i> 3.1002
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Herakleides	<i>AbhBerlin</i> (1937.6) 3-63 = <i>SB</i> 5,2 (1938) 8066
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Timokles	<i>BSAAlex</i> 10 (1908) 187-195 = <i>SB</i> 1 (1915) 599
Herodeion	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 15.323-325; Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 1.419; 7.163
————	<i>phouros; eruma</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 4.518
Hestiaiotis	<i>phoura</i>			Diod. Sic. 15.30.5
Hiera Nesos	<i>phourion</i>	<i>archisomatophulax</i> (?)		<i>P. Hels.</i> 1.6
Hiera/Maritima Ins.	<i>phoura</i>			App. <i>B Civ.</i> 5.11.105
Hierakonpolis	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Ptolemaios	<i>SB</i> 1.1104
Hierasykaminos	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Herodes	<i>SB</i> 1.1918
Hierichous	<i>phoura</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 5.195, 14.411; Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 1.302; 1 Maccabees 9.51
————	<i>phoureo</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 5.69
————	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 13.233; Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 1.57
————	<i>phouros</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 4.486-487
Himera	<i>phoura</i>			Aen. Tact. 10.22
Himeras fl.	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 19.108.1
Hippana	<i>phoura</i>			Diod. Sic. 23.9.5

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Hispalis/Col. Romula	<i>phroura</i>			Cass. Dio 43.39.2-3
Hispania	<i>phroura</i>			App. <i>Hisp.</i> 7.38
————	<i>phourion</i>			App. <i>Hisp.</i> 7.34, 7.38, 13.81
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Cass. Dio. 54.11.3
Hybla Gereatis	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 14.7.7, 14.14.2, 14.58.2
Hydara	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 12.3.28 = <i>BNJ</i> 188 F 7
Hydaspes/Bidaspes (river)	<i>phroura</i>	<i>hegemon</i>		Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 5.9.1
Hydatos Potamoi/Seleukeia Pieria	<i>phroura</i>	<i>epistates</i>		Plb. 5.58.10-60.10
————	<i>phroura</i>			Plb. 5.58.10
————	<i>phroureo</i>			Plb. 5.58.5
————	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 16.2.3
Hydrous	<i>phourion</i>			<i>FGrH</i> 115 F 191
Hydroussa/Hydrea Ins.	<i>phulake</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>		Plut. <i>Arat.</i> 12.2-3
Hykkara?	<i>phourion</i>			<i>FGrH</i> 244 F 8, 566 F 24a, 556 F 4; <i>BNJ</i> 572 F 1
Hysiai	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 12.81.1
Iamneia	<i>phrouros</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 4.130
Iasos	<i>phroura</i>			Plb. 18.2.3, 18.44.4
Iasos	<i>phroureo</i>			<i>Ilasos</i> 4
Icizari	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 12.3.38
Idalion	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Poseidippos	<i>CIG</i> 2614 = <i>OGIS</i> 1.20 = <i>AJArch</i> 65 (1961) 127, n. 142
Idumaea	<i>emphrourous</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 2.654
————	<i>phroura</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 7.109; 8.203
————	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 4.446
Idyma	<i>phourion</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Nikagoras	<i>Lindos</i> II 15 = <i>IG</i> XII,1 1036
Ierusalem/Hierosolyma/Col. Aelia Capitolina	<i>phroura</i>	<i>hegemon</i>	Julius	Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 15.73
————	<i>phroura</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>	Bacchides	Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 1.35-39
————	<i>phroura</i>	<i>phourarchos</i> (?)		Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 12.362-365; Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 1.39, 2.19
————	<i>phroura</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Piso	Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 1.142

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
_____	<i>phroura</i>			1 Esdras 4.56; Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 12.252, 13.40, 13.42, 13.52, 13.121, 13.182, 13.216-217, 14.59, 14.278, 15.72-73, 17.299; Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 1.46, 1.50, 2.262, 2.332, 2.79, 4.295, 5.267-268, 5.338, 5.347, 5.437, 5.508-511, 6.382; Joseph. <i>Vit.</i> 422
_____	<i>phroureo</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 1.10
_____	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 10.46, 11.97, 13.42, 13.427, 15.248, 15.292, 17.257, 18.9, 20.6, 20.110; Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 1.118 1.401, 2.46, 2.53, 2.329, 5.137, 2.404, 2.430, 2.545, 5.508-511, 5.246, 6.122, 6.240, 6.377, 6.410 7.1-2, 7.375; Joseph. <i>Vit.</i> 21
_____	<i>phrouros</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 4.207, 6.251
_____	<i>phrouros</i>	<i>phrouros</i>	Phasael	Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 1.224
_____	<i>phrouros</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 12.133, 12.139, 13.182, 12.362-365; Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 2.430, 4.236, 5.482, 6.60, 6.68 6.158 6.382, 6.397, 6.402, 7.2; <i>Suda</i> sv. Ὀζίασ; Cass. Dio. 49.22.3
_____	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>		Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 15.408, 18.93 – 95; Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 2.18
Ietas	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 23.18.5
_____	<i>phourion</i>			<i>FGrH</i> 556 F 25
Ilium/Troia	<i>phroura</i>			Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 3.1.16; Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 1.46.1
_____	<i>phroureo</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 1.46.1
_____	<i>phourion</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 1.47.3-4
Illyricum	<i>phourion</i>			<i>Suda</i> sv. Ὀρμητήριον
Imbros	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 20.46.3-4
_____	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 14.2.3
India	<i>phroura</i>			Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 5.24.8; 6.17.1
_____	<i>phourion</i>	<i>archon</i>	Menander	Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 57.3
Ionia	<i>polis</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>		Xen. <i>Anab.</i> 1.1.6
Ionium Mare	<i>phroureo</i>		Marcus Bibulus	Cass Dio 41.44.3

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Ioppe	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 19.59.3; Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 13.180; 13.92; 14.250; Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 2.507-509; 1 Maccabees 10.75; 12.34
_____	<i>phroureo</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 3.430
Iotapata	<i>phroura</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 3.180; 3.343
_____	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>Vit.</i> 350-351, 336-367 = <i>BNJ</i> 734 T 5f.350
_____	<i>phrouros</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 3.192, 3.205
Isbouros/Triocala fl.	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 36.7.2
Italia	<i>phroura</i>			Cass. Dio 11 (Zonaras 8, 10.)
_____	<i>phroura</i>			Hdn. 8.5.5; Plut. <i>Per.</i> 11.5; App. <i>B Civ.</i> 1.6.49, 1.10.87, 1.11.96, 1.8.69, 2.19.140, 5.12.109, 5.8.72, 5.8.74; App. <i>Hann.</i> 9.58; Cass. Dio 48.45.7, 9 (Zonaras 8, 3), 41.4.2, 41.9.7, 42.37, 48.20.3; Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 4.54.1, 8.82.3
_____	<i>phroureo</i>			Cass. Dio 9 (Zonaras 8, 4.), 11 (Zonaras 8, 14); App. <i>B Civ.</i> 1.11.95
_____	<i>phourion</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>		Cass. Dio 14 (Zonaras 8, 24)
_____	<i>phourion</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 9.58.2; 9.69.4
_____	<i>phourion</i>			Hdn. 2.11.5; App. <i>B Civ.</i> 1.1.7, 5.9.80; Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 6.64.3, 8.13.2, 8.79.2, 9.9.8, 9.20.3-21.1, 9.57.2, 10.15.5, 10.16.4, 10.17.7
_____	<i>phrouros</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 1.44.2, 1.45.2
Italium	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 24.6.1
Itanos	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Lucius Gaios	<i>IC</i> III iv 18
_____	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Philotas	<i>IC</i> III.iv.14
Judaea	<i>phroura</i>	<i>hegemon</i>		Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 8.247
_____	<i>phroura</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 5.183, 6.96-97, 7.323, 8.246-247, 13.22, 13.246-247; 1 Maccabees 14.33
_____	<i>phroura</i>		Anan	<i>Suda</i> sv. Ζηλωταί
_____	<i>phroureo</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 14.296

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>		Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 1.137
————	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 9.219, 10.109, 13.42, 13.53, 13.57, 13.133, 13.180, 13.415, 13.423, 14.249, 15.231; Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 1.237, 4.442, 7.370; Joseph. <i>Vit.</i> 351, 336-367 = <i>BNJ</i> 734 T 5f.350
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 13.133; Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 2.41; 4.135
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>		Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 14.52, 17.223; Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 1.137
Kabeira/Neocaesarea/Diospolis/Sebaste/Hadriane	<i>phourion</i>			Plut. <i>Luc.</i> 15.3, 18.1
Kainepolis	<i>phoura</i>			Cass. Dio. 71.1.3
Kainon	<i>phourion</i>			Plut. <i>Pomp.</i> 37.1 = <i>FGrH</i> 188 F 1
Kallidromon	<i>phoura</i>			Plut. <i>Marcus Cato</i> 13.7
Kalymna Ins.	<i>phourion</i>			<i>SEG</i> 46.1082
Kamelonteichos	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 18.33.6
Kardia/Lysimacheia	<i>phourion</i>			<i>SEG</i> 38.603 = <i>IK</i> 3,45(B)
Katane/Catina	<i>phoura</i>			Diod. Sic. 14.15.1
Kebren	<i>phoura</i>			Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 3.1.20
————	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 13.1.47
Kekryphaleia Ins.	<i>phrouros</i>			<i>IG</i> IV 194
Keos (island)	<i>phoura</i>	<i>harmostes</i>		Dem. <i>De cor.</i> 96
Kimiata	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 12.3.41
Kingdom of Pergamum, Unspecified Phourion	<i>phourion</i>			<i>IvP</i> II p.507
Kirra	<i>phoura</i>			Paus. 10.37.7
Kition	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Poseidippos	<i>CIG</i> 2614 = <i>OGIS</i> 1.20 = <i>AJArch</i> 65 (1961) 127, n. 142 = <i>SEG</i> 20.132 = <i>SEG</i> 31.1348
Klazomenai	<i>phoura</i>	<i>archon</i>		<i>IG</i> II ² 28
Kokylion?	<i>phoura</i>			Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 3.1.16
Korakesion	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 14.5.2
Koropassos	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 12.6.1
Korsiai Inss.	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	[O]nesionos	<i>IG</i> XII,6 2:1204

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Kotyora	<i>phroura</i>			Thuc. 4.56.1; Xen. <i>Anab.</i> 5.5.20
Krannon/Ephyra	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 15.61.5; Polyaeus, <i>Strat.</i> 2.34
Krenides/Philippi/Col. Augusta Iulia Philippensis	<i>phroua</i>			Plut. <i>Brut.</i> 42.9
————	<i>phrouion</i>			App. <i>B Civ.</i> 4.14.107, 109, 4.16.121, 4.16.129, 4.17.135
Krisa	<i>phroua</i>			<i>Suda</i> sv. Σόλων
Krokodilopolis/Terkythis	<i>phroureo</i>			<i>P. Bad.</i> 2.9
————	<i>phrouion</i>			<i>SB.</i> 1.428
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Demetrius	<i>P. Grenf.</i> 1 11
Krommyon	<i>phroua</i>			Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 4.4.13; 4.5.19
————	<i>phrouion</i>			Diod. Sic. 12.65.7
Kromnos	<i>phroua</i>			Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 7.4.20-25, 7.4.26-27
Kyinda	<i>phrouion</i>	<i>tetagmenos</i>		Diod. Sic. 18.62.2
Kyllandos	<i>phrouion</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Nikagoras	<i>Lindos</i> II 151 = <i>syll.</i> 586 = <i>IG</i> XII,1 1036
Kyllene M.	<i>phroureo</i>			Diod. Sic. 19.87.3
————	<i>phrouion</i>			Diod. Sic. 19.66.3
Kynos	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>		<i>SEG</i> 51.640bis
Kype	<i>phrouion</i>			<i>FGrH</i> 556 F 25
Kyrbissos	<i>phrouros</i>	<i>phrouarchos</i>		Robert and Robert 1976 153–235 = Sokolowski 1980, 103–106 = <i>SEG</i> 26.1306 = <i>SEG</i> 30.1376
Kythera	<i>phroua</i>	<i>harmostes</i>	Nicophemus	Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 4.8.8
————	<i>phroua</i>			Diod. Sic. 12.65.7-8, 14.84.5
Labdalum	<i>phrouion</i>			Thuc. 6.97.5, 7.3.4
Labraunda	<i>phrouion</i>			<i>BE</i> 1970:546 = Roesch, <i>RA</i> 1971, 54 = Habicht, <i>Gnomon</i> 44, 1972, 165 = <i>BE</i> 1972:419,422
Lacedaemon/Laconia	<i>phroua</i>	<i>echo</i>		Thuc. 2.25.2
————	<i>phroua</i>			Thuc. 4.55.1, 4.56-57.2; Paus. 7.13.5-6; Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 6.5.24
Lagaria	<i>phrouion</i>			Strabo 6.1.14
Langon	<i>phroua</i>			Plut. <i>Cleom.</i> 14.2

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Lanuvium	<i>phroura</i>			App. <i>B Civ.</i> 1.8.69
Larisa	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 19.89; 20.110.2
Larissa	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 15.61.4-5; 15.67.4
————	<i>phroureo</i>			Diod. Sic. 15.67.5
Lasion	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 14.17.8; 14.17.12
Latios	<i>phourion</i>			<i>IC I xvi 5</i> ,app.cr. = <i>CIG</i> 2554 61,B1
Latium	<i>phourion</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 3.51.3, 3.52.3, 3.39.2
Lato	<i>phourion</i>			<i>SEG</i> 46.1229
Lavinium	<i>phourion</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 1.65.4, 8.21.3
Lechaion	<i>phroura</i>	<i>polemarchos</i>		Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 4.5.11
————	<i>phroureo</i>			Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 4.5.19
Lecythus	<i>phourion</i>			Thuc. 4.113
Leontini	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 12.54.7, 13.95.3, 22.8.5
————	<i>polis</i>			Diod. Sic. 13.95.3
Lepreon	<i>phroura</i>			Thuc. 5.31.4-5
Lepsia	<i>chorion</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>	Timotheos	<i>IIsolMil</i> 18
————	<i>nesos (island)</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>	Dionysios	<i>IIsolMil</i> 21B
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Artemidoros	<i>IIsolMil</i> 22B
Lepti Minus	<i>phroura</i>			Plb. 1.87.8
Leros	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Apollonios	<i>IIsolMil</i> 3
Leucas	<i>phrouros</i>			Thuc. 4.42.3
Leucas Ins.	<i>phourion</i>			<i>IG IX</i> ,1 53
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Thuc. 3.93.3
Leuke	<i>phourion</i>			<i>CIG</i> 2561b = <i>I Magnesia</i> 105 + p. 296 = <i>IGRR I</i> 1021 = <i>Itanos</i> 9
Leuke Kome?/Onne?	<i>phourion</i>			<i>JCV</i> 2036 F 1
Leukopyrgites or Tertonepa in ermopolites Nomos	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Aristaion (?)	<i>BGU</i> 6.1219
Leuktron	<i>phroura</i>			Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 6.5.24
Libussa	<i>phourion</i>			<i>FGrH</i> 273 F 125
Libya	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 23.15.7

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Lilaia	<i>phroura</i>			Paus. 10.33.3; <i>AM</i> 67.1942.262,9 = <i>BCH</i> 80.1956.593
Lilybaeum	<i>phroura</i>			App. <i>B Civ.</i> 2.14.95
Lingos	<i>phourion</i>			<i>FGrH</i> 244 F 11
Lipara (settlement)	<i>phroura</i>			App. <i>B Civ.</i> 5.11.97
Locri	<i>phroura</i>			App. <i>Hann.</i> 9.55; Strabo 6.1.8
Locris Opuntia	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 19.78.5
Locris Ozolia	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 14.34.2; 16.25.2
Lokroi Epizephyrioi	<i>phroura</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>		App. Sam. 1
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>		App. Sam. 1, 12. 1; Cass. Dio 10 (Zonaras 8, 6.), 17 (Zonaras 9, 11.)
Longula	<i>phroura</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 6.91.3
————	<i>phourion</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 8.85.4-8.86.7
Loryma	<i>phourion</i>			App. <i>B Civ.</i> 4.9.72
Loutia	<i>phroura</i>			App. <i>Hisp.</i> 15.94
Lusitani	<i>paraphroureo</i>			Strabo 3.4.20
————	<i>phroura</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 2.375
Lydia (province)	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 12.149
Lysimacheia	<i>phroura</i>			Plb. 18.3.12
Macedonia	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 12.50.5; Plut. <i>Aem.</i> 8.7; Cass. Dio. 18 (Zonaras 9, 15.)
————	<i>phrouros</i>			<i>Syll.</i> ³ 700
Machairous	<i>phroura</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 2.485-486
————	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 18.119; Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 1.167, 1.173, 2.485-486, 7.164-170, 7.171, 7.192, 7.196, 7.202, 7.205, 7.209
Maeetian lake	<i>phroureo</i>			Hdt. 4.133
Magdala/Taricheai	<i>phroura</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 3.498; 3.505
Magnesia ad Maeandrum/Leukophrys	<i>phourion</i>			<i>Milet</i> I 3, 148
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>		<i>IMagnesia</i> 14
Magnesia ad Sipylum	<i>phroura</i>			Plut. <i>Flam.</i> 12.2; Plut. <i>Pel.</i> 31.1; 35.2
Maionia/Mysia	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 14.1.38

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Malia	<i>phroura</i>			App. <i>Hisp.</i> 13.77
_____	<i>phroureo</i>			App. <i>Hisp.</i> 13.77
Mantineia/Antigoneia	<i>phroura</i>			Plut. <i>Arat.</i> 36.2; Plut. <i>Cleom.</i> 14.1
Marakanda	<i>phroura</i>			Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 4.5.2
Maroneia	<i>phroura</i>			Plb. 22.11.4
Masada	<i>phroura</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 14.296; Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 2.408; 7.276
_____	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 14.396, 15.203; Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 1.237, 1.264, 267, 1.269, 1.281, 1.282, 1.287, 2.408, 4.398, 405, 4.505, 508, 7.252, 276, 277, 279, 285, 289, 294, 297, 300, 331, 335, 407
Massaka	<i>phourion</i>			Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 4.28.4-5
Massyli	<i>phourion</i>			Plut. <i>Mor.</i> (311) 23 = <i>BNJ</i> 763 F 1
Mazaka/Eusebeia/Caesarea	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 12.2.9
Mazara	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. <i>Sic.</i> 23.9.4
Mecyberna	<i>phroura</i>			Thuc. 5.39.1; Diod. <i>Sic.</i> 12.77.5
Media/Mad(aya)	<i>phourion</i>			Xen. <i>Cyrop.</i> 6.1.10; 5.5.24
Megalia	<i>phrouros</i>			Cass. Dio 21 (Zonaras 9, 29)
Megalopolis	<i>phroura</i>			Plut. <i>Cleom.</i> 23.4
Megara	<i>phroura</i>	<i>archon</i>		Paus. 7.15.8
_____	<i>phroura</i>	<i>harmostes</i>		Dem. <i>De cor.</i> 96
_____	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. <i>Sic.</i> 20.46.3-4
_____	<i>phroura</i>			Plut. <i>Demetr.</i> 9.2, 9.5; Thuc. 1.103.4; Diod. <i>Sic.</i> 12.66.3
_____	<i>phrouros</i>			Thuc. 1.114.1; 6.75.1
Melie/Karion	<i>phourion</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>		<i>CIG</i> 2905.1-5 = <i>I. Priene</i> 37 + 38 = <i>Syll.</i> ³ 599
Memnonia	<i>phourion</i>			<i>UPZ</i> 2.180 = <i>P. Paris.</i> 5
Memphis	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>		<i>UPZ</i> 1.107; <i>UPZ</i> 1.106; <i>P. Tebt.</i> 1.6
_____	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Pantaleon	Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 3.5.3 = <i>FGrH</i> 126 T 2
Mende	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. <i>Sic.</i> 12.72.7
Mendesios fl.	<i>phroureo</i>			Diod. <i>Sic.</i> 15.42.5

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
————	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 15.42.5
Mesopotamia	<i>phoura</i>			Plut. <i>Crass.</i> 17.4; 18.2; 20.2
————	<i>phourion</i>			Cass. Dio 40.13.1; Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 18.338
Messene	<i>phoura</i>			Paus. 4.29.4; Plb. 7.12.5-7
————	<i>phourion</i>			Plb. 1.15.2 = <i>BNJ</i> 174 F 2 = 1-12
————	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 14.57.5-6; 19.65.1; 19.65.5
Messenia	<i>phoureo</i>			Diod. Sic. 19.64.1
Metachoios	<i>phourion</i>			<i>FGrH</i> 70 F 94b; <i>FGrH</i> 324 F 29
Metapontum	<i>phoura</i>	<i>hegemon</i>		App. <i>Hann.</i> 6.33
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>		App. <i>Hann.</i> 6.35
Methana/Arsinoe	<i>phourion</i>			Thuc. 4.45.2
Methone/Mothone	<i>phoura</i>			Thuc. 2.25.2
————	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 12.65.7
Methymna	<i>phoura</i>			Diod. Sic. 13.76.5
————	<i>phoureo</i>			Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 1.6.13-15
Metropolis	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 9.5.17; <i>SEG</i> 38:448; <i>AD</i> 36 B (1981) 254
Metulum	<i>phoura</i>			App. <i>Ill.</i> 4.21
————	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 16.4.9
————	<i>phouros</i>			Cass. Dio. 49.35.3
Miletus	<i>phoura</i>	<i>epitrepo</i>	Hegesistratus	Arr, <i>Anab.</i> 1.18.3
————	<i>phoura</i>			<i>IG</i> I ³ 21
————	<i>phoureo</i>			Diod. Sic. 19.75.4
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>		<i>SEG</i> 29.1136
————	<i>phourion</i>			Thuc. 8.84.4-8.85.2; <i>Syll.</i> ³ 633 = <i>SEG</i> 34.1173 = <i>SEG</i> 37.984.
————	<i>phouros</i>			Thuc. 8.109.1
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>		<i>Staatsverträge</i> III 537I = <i>SEG</i> 37.982; <i>Staatsverträge</i> III 539I = <i>I Mylasa</i> II T51.A; <i>Syll.</i> ³ 633 = <i>SEG</i> 34.1173 = <i>SEG</i> 37.984; <i>IIsolMil</i> 14, 15;
Minoa Ins.	<i>phoura</i>			Thuc. 3.51.1, 4.68.2
————	<i>phourion</i>			Thuc. 3.51; Strabo 8.6.1

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Mithridation	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 12.5.2
Moab	<i>phoura</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 9.43
Moeris L.	<i>phoureo</i>			<i>P. Tebt.</i> 1.92, 4.1102
Motya	<i>phourion</i>			<i>BNJ</i> 1 F 76; <i>FGrH</i> 556 F 64
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Biton	Diod. Sic. 14.53.5
Motylai	<i>phourion</i>			<i>FGrH</i> 556 F 22
Motyum	<i>phoura</i>			Diod. Sic. 11.91.1; 11.91.4
Munychia	<i>phoura</i>	<i>epi phoura</i>	Diogenes	Plut. <i>Arat.</i> 34.4
————	<i>phoura</i>	<i>epitetagmenos</i>	Dionysios	<i>Suda</i> sv. Δημήτριος
————	<i>phoura</i>	<i>hegemon</i>	Menyllus	Plut. <i>Phoc.</i> 27.4, 28.1-4, 30.4
————	<i>phoura</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>	Nikanor	Diod. Sic. 18.64.2, 18.65.4, 18.66.2, 18.68.1, 18.72.3, 18.74.1
————	<i>phoura</i>			<i>IG</i> II ² 466; Diod. Sic. 18.48.1; Plut. <i>Dem.</i> 8.3, 10.1, 28.1; Plut. <i>Phoc.</i> 27.3; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 10
————	<i>phoura</i>		Menyllus or Nikanor	Paus. 1.25.5, 1.29.13
————	<i>phoura</i>		Nikanor	Polyaenus, <i>Strat.</i> 4.11.2
————	<i>phoureo</i>	<i>phoureo</i>	Nikanor	Diod. Sic. 18.P
————	<i>phoureo</i>			Arist. [<i>Ath. Pol.</i>] 42.3-5
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>	Nikanor	Diod. Sic. 18.68.2
————	<i>phourion</i>			Plut. <i>Demetr.</i> 8.3.5; 10.1
————	<i>phouros</i>	<i>archon</i>	Diogenes	Paus. 2.8.6
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Dionysius	Diod. Sic. 20.45.2
Mycale M.	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Ameinias	<i>I. Priene</i> , 365
Mylae	<i>phoura</i>			Thuc. 3.90.2; App. <i>B Civ.</i> 5.12.115; 5.12.116
————	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 12.54.5; 19.65.3
Mylasa	<i>phoura</i>			<i>ILabraunda</i> 8 = <i>BE</i> 1970:549 (l. 20, 24)
————	<i>phouros</i>			Cass. Dio. 48.26.4
Myrina	<i>phoura</i>			<i>IG</i> II ² 550 = <i>SEG</i> 19:59
Myrina/Sebastopolis	<i>phoura</i>			Plb. 18.44.4
Myrtonion	<i>phourion</i>			<i>FGrH</i> 72 F 14; <i>Suda</i> sv. Μυρτόνιον
Mytilene	<i>phoura</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>	Lycomedes	Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 2.1.5

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
_____	<i>phroura</i>			Thuc. 8.100.3
_____	<i>phourion</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Paches	Thuc. 3.18.4
_____	<i>phrouros</i>			<i>IG</i> II ² 213
Myttistraton	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 23.9.4; <i>FGrH</i> 556 F 39
Nain	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 4.512
Napata	<i>phroura</i>			Cass. Dio 54.5.4 = BNJ 673 F 163e
_____	<i>phroura</i>		Petronius	Cass. Dio. 54.5.5
_____	<i>phrouros</i>			Cass. Dio 54.5.4 = BNJ 673 F 163e
Napita	<i>phroua</i>			Solomonik, <i>Ella I. Novye epigraficheskie pamiatniki Khersonesa I-II</i> . Kiev 1964 and 1973 # 1
Naulochos	<i>phroura</i>			App. <i>B Civ.</i> 5.12.115, 5.12.116
Naupactus	<i>phroura</i>	<i>archon</i>	Pausanias	<i>Suda</i> s.v. φρουρήσεις ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ = <i>FGrH</i> 115 F 235a; <i>FGrH</i> 115 F 235b
_____	<i>phroura</i>	<i>hegemon</i>	Timon	Paus. 6.16.2
_____	<i>phroura</i>			Thuc. 2.80.4, 2.83.2
_____	<i>phroureo</i>			Diod. Sic. 15.75.2
_____	<i>phouridon</i>			Thuc. 4.13.3
_____	<i>phrouros</i>			<i>Suda</i> s.v. φρουρήσεις ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ = <i>FGrH</i> 115 F 235a; <i>FGrH</i> 115 F 235b
Naxos	<i>phroura</i>			Plut. <i>Per.</i> 11.5
_____	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Nikokles	Aen. Tact. 22.20
Nea	<i>phourion</i>			<i>Suda</i> sv. Νέα
Neandria	<i>phroura</i>			Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 3.1.16
_____	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 13.1.47
Neapolis	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 7.4.7
Nepheris	<i>phroura</i>			App. <i>Pun.</i> 18.126
_____	<i>phourion</i>			App. <i>Pun.</i> 15.102
Nerikon	<i>phroura</i>			Thuc. 3.7.4; 3.7.6
Nikaia	<i>phroura</i>			<i>FGrH</i> 434 F 1 28.8
_____	<i>phroureo</i>			<i>FGrH</i> 434 F 1 28.8
Nilus (river)	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 16.4.8

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Nisaia	<i>phroura</i>	<i>tetagmenos</i>	...-poils	RA 6 (1917) 49,30
————	<i>phroura</i>			Thuc. 4.66.4, 4.100.1; App. <i>Mith.</i> 11.77; Hdn. 3.2.10; Dem. <i>In epistulam Philippi</i> [Sp.]. 4.4
————	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 9.4.13
Nisibis/Antiochia	<i>phrouros</i>	<i>phulakes</i>	brother of Tigranes	Cass. Dio 36.6-7.2
Nora/Neroassos	<i>phroura</i>			Plut. <i>Eum.</i> 11.1
————	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 18.41.2 – 6, 18.52.4; 18.53.7, 18.58.1
Noviodunum	<i>phrouros</i>			Cass. Dio 40.38.2
Numantia	<i>phourion</i>			App. <i>Hisp.</i> 15.90-92
Nursia	<i>phroura</i>			Cass. Dio 48.13.2
Nymphaion	<i>phourion</i>			App. <i>Mith.</i> 16.108-109
Oasis Magna/Thebaidos	<i>phourion</i>			<i>P. Gen.</i> 3.128
Obo / Obolcola	<i>phroureo</i>			App. <i>Hisp.</i> 12.68
Oeum	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 1.3.20 = <i>FGrH</i> 85 F 6
Oeum, in Sciritis	<i>phrouros</i>	<i>echo</i>	Ischolaos	Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 6.5.24
Oiniadai	<i>phroura</i>			Paus. 4.25.4-9
Oinoe/‘Caena’	<i>phroura</i>			Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 4.5.19
————	<i>phourion</i>			Thuc. 2.18.2; Strabo 8.6.22
Olane	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 11.14.6
Olous	<i>phourion</i>			H. van Effenterre, <i>La Crète et le monde grec</i> (1948) 230-234 = <i>SEG</i> 23.548
Olygyrtos M.	<i>phroura</i>			Plut. <i>Cleom.</i> 26.3
Olympia	<i>phroura</i>			Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 7.4.14, 7.4.28
Olympieion	<i>phourion</i>			Thuc. 6.75.1
Olympus M.	<i>phroura</i>			Cass. Dio. 20 (Zonaras 9, 23)
Olympus/Hadrianopolis	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 14.5.7
Olynthos	<i>phourion</i>			Dem. <i>De cor.</i> 264
Oneum	<i>phroura</i>			Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 7.2.5; Polyaeus, <i>Strat.</i> 2.3.9; Polyaeus, <i>Excerpt</i> 25.2
Opous	<i>phroura</i>			<i>FD</i> III 4:463
Ora	<i>phourion</i>			Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 4.28.4-5

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Orchomenos	<i>phroura</i>	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Strombichos	Diod. Sic. 20.103.4; 20.103.5
_____	<i>phroura</i>			Plut. <i>Arat.</i> 45.1; Plb. 4.6.7; Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 5.1.29; Diod. Sic. 19.63.5
_____	<i>phourion</i>	<i>katechon</i>		Diod. Sic. 20.103.7
_____	<i>phroura</i>			Plut. <i>Pel.</i> 16.2
_____	<i>phroureo</i>			Diod. Sic. 15.37.1
Oreos	<i>phroura</i>			Plb. 18.45.3-5
Orikon	<i>phroura</i>			Cass. Dio 41.45.1; App. <i>B</i> <i>Civ.</i> 2.8.56
_____	<i>polis</i>	<i>phrouarchos</i>		App. <i>B Civ.</i> 2.8.54
Oriza/Oruba/Oresa	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 14.400
Orneai	<i>phrouros</i>			Diod. Sic. 12.81.4-5
Oropos	<i>emphroureo</i>			Thuc. 8.60.1
_____	<i>phroura</i>			Paus. 7.11.4-8
_____	<i>phourion</i>			<i>ArchEph</i> (1925/26) 11, 129 cr. 16.1; <i>Epigr. tou Oropou</i> 302
_____	<i>phrouros</i>			<i>Epigr. tou Oropou</i> 353; <i>ArchEph</i> (1918) 73, 95-97
_____	<i>phrouros</i>	<i>possibly a strategos</i>		<i>Epigr. tou Oropou</i> 433; <i>ArchEph</i> (1925/26) 11, 129
Ouera	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 11.13.3 = <i>BNJ</i> 197 F 1
Oxyrhynchus/Pemje	<i>phourion</i>			SB. 20 14285
Pagai	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 8.6.22
Palakion/Placia	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 7.4.7
Palmyra	<i>phourion</i>			<i>FGrH</i> 675 F 11
Pamphia	<i>phroura</i>			Plb. 5.8
Pan(h)ormus	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 23.18.5
Panakton	<i>phroura</i>			Plut. <i>Demetr.</i> 23.2; Dem. <i>De</i> <i>cor.</i> 326; Dem. <i>In Cononem</i> 3.1
_____	<i>phourion</i>	<i>epi</i>	Dicaiarchos; Apollonios	<i>BCH</i> 54.1930.268 = <i>SEG</i> 25.155 = <i>I. Rhamnous</i> II 17
_____	<i>phourion</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Aristophanes	<i>IG</i> II ² 1299 = <i>SEG</i> 3.124; <i>SEG</i> 19.122
_____	<i>phourion</i>			<i>FGrH</i> 324 F 9
Pandusia	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 6.1.5

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Panopeos/Phanotis	<i>phroura</i>			Paus. 10.4
Papa	<i>phrouros</i>			SB. 18 13304
Parauaea	<i>phroura</i>			Plut. <i>Pyrrh.</i> 6.2-3
Paros	<i>phroura</i>			Isoc. <i>Aegineticus</i> 18-19
————	<i>phroureo</i>			Isoc. <i>Aegineticus</i> 19
Parrasia	<i>phroura</i>			Thuc. 5.33.2
Pathyris/Aphroditopolis	<i>phourion</i>			<i>P. Petr.</i> 2.1
Patra(e)	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic 19.66.3
Pedasa	<i>phroura</i>			Plb. 18.44.4
Peiraeus/Piraeus	<i>phroura</i>	<i>epi phroura</i>	Diogenes	Plut. <i>Arat.</i> 34.4
————	<i>phroura</i>	of the <i>phroura</i>	Diogenes	Plut. <i>Arat.</i> 34.2
————	<i>phroura</i>		Menyllus or Nikanor	Paus. 1.25.5, 1.29.10, 1.29.13
————	<i>phrouros</i>	<i>archon</i>	Diogenes	Paus. 2.8.6
Pelinna(ion)?	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 9.5.17
Pelion M.	<i>phroura</i>			Paus. 7.7.6
Pellene	<i>phroura</i>	<i>archon</i>		Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 7.2.11
————	<i>phroureo</i>			Plut. <i>Cleom.</i> 17.3
————	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 8.7.5
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Diod. Sic. 15.67.2
Peloponnesus	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 19.74.2, 19.64.2; Plut. <i>Arat.</i> 38 = <i>FGrH</i> 81 F 52
————	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 12.42.7; 12.43.1
Pelorus/Regium Pr.	<i>phroura</i>			App. <i>B Civ.</i> 5.12.115; 5.12.116
Pelusium	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 16.48.3; Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 1.175
————	<i>phroura</i>			Plut. <i>Ant.</i> 3.4; 3.7; 4.4
————	<i>phroureo</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Philophron	Diod. Sic. 16.46.8; 16.49.2
————	<i>phroureo</i>			Cass. Dio 42.41.3
————	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 16.47.4; 16.49.3-4
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Plut. <i>Ant.</i> 4.4
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Polemon	Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 3.5.3
Pergamum	<i>phourion</i>			<i>OGIS</i> 338

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Perge	<i>phroura</i>	<i>phrouarchos</i>		Plb. 21.42.1
Perinthus/Heraclea	<i>phroura</i>			Plb. 18.44.4
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Arist. [<i>Oec.</i>] 2.2.1351a
Persia	<i>phroureo</i>			Xen. <i>Cyrop</i> 8.8.20
————	<i>phourion</i>			<i>FGrH</i> 679 F 3; Xen. <i>Cyrop.</i> 2.4.17-18; Xen. <i>Oec</i> 4.6
————	<i>phrouros</i>	<i>phrouarchos</i>		Xen. <i>Cyrop</i> 8.6.3
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>		Xen. <i>Oec</i> 4.7-12; Xen. <i>Cyrop.</i> 8.6.3
————	<i>phroura</i>			App. <i>B Civ.</i> 5.5.48
Pessinous/Iustinianoupolis	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 12.5.2
Petra, “The Rock” In Lycia	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 17.27.7-28
Peukelaotis/Kaspatyros?	<i>phroura</i>	<i>hegemon</i>	Philippus	Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 4.28.6
Phalarium	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 19.108.2
Pharathon	<i>phroura</i>			1 Maccabees 9.51
Pharos	<i>phroura</i>			Strabo 17.1.19
Pharsalus	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 14.82.6
————	<i>phourion</i>			App. <i>B Civ.</i> 2.10.66
Phaselis	<i>phourion</i>			Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 1.24.6
Pherai	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 20.110.3; Demosthenes [sp] <i>On Halonnesus</i> 32
Phigaleia	<i>phroura</i>			Paus. 8.39.4-5
Philae	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	[...]aios	<i>Thèbes à Syène</i> 322
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Apollonios	<i>Philae</i> 15
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Apollonios?	<i>Philae</i> 20
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Kleon	<i>Thèbes à Syène</i> 314
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Mnasis	<i>Philae</i> 13
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Nestor	<i>Thèbes à Syène</i> 320
————	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Philotas	<i>Thèbes à Syène</i> 318 = <i>I.Epidamnos</i> T 519
Philippopolis/Trimontium	<i>phroura</i>			Plb. 23.8.6
Philoteria	<i>phroura</i>			Polyb. 5.70.6
Phlius	<i>phroura</i>			Plut. <i>Arat.</i> 39.4; Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 5.3.25; 7.2.6

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
————	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 15.40.5
Phocaea	<i>phoura</i>			Hdt. 1.165; 7.217
Phocis	<i>phoura</i>			App. <i>Mac.</i> 8; Plb. 18.10.4
————	<i>phoura</i>			Dem. <i>De cor.</i> 39; Diod. Sic. 19.78.3; 19.78.5
Phoenice	<i>emphrouros</i>			Diod. Sic. 18.43.2
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>		<i>IEJ</i> 16 (1966) 54-70 = <i>BE</i> (1970) 627 = <i>ZPE</i> 33 (1979) 131-138
Phoinix M.	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 14.2.4
Phrygia	<i>phoura</i>			Xen. <i>Cyrop.</i> 7.4.12
————	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 12.149
Phthiotis	<i>phoura</i>			Plut. <i>Pel.</i> 31.1; 35.2
Phyle	<i>phoura</i>			Plut. <i>Demetr.</i> 23.2
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Aristophanes	<i>IG</i> II ² 1299 = <i>SEG</i> 3.124; <i>SEG</i> 19.122
————	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 14.32.2; <i>Suda</i> sv. Φυλή
Pidasia	<i>phrouros</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>		<i>SEG</i> 19.678 = <i>SEG</i> 37.984, 987.
Pimolisa	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 12.3.40
Pisidia	<i>phourion</i>			Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 1.28.8; Diod. Sic. 18.46.1
Pistiros	<i>phourema</i>			<i>SEG</i> 43.486
Pisye	<i>phourion</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Nikagoras	Lindos II 151
Pitane	<i>phoura</i>			Polyaenus, <i>Strat.</i> 2.1.14
Pityoussa/Lampsacus	<i>phoura</i>			Diod. Sic. 13.104.8
Pityussae Inss.	<i>phoura</i>			Plut. <i>Sert.</i> 7.3
Plarasa	<i>phoura</i>			<i>SEG</i> 32.1097
Plataea	<i>periphroureo</i>			Thuc. 3.21.4
————	<i>phoura</i>	<i>harmostes</i>		Isocrates, <i>Plataicus</i> 13
————	<i>phoura</i>			Thuc. 2.6.4
Plemmyrion	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 14.63.3
Plesticê / Plistica or Postia	<i>phoura</i>			Diod. Sic. 19.72.3
Plimri	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Euphranoros	<i>IG</i> XII,1 900
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Peisistratos	<i>IG</i> XII,1 900

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Polichna	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 14.72.3
Pontus	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 12.3.33; Plut. <i>Pomp.</i> 36.3; Polyaeus, <i>Strat.</i> 7.29.1; App. <i>Mith.</i> 15.99
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>		App. <i>Mith.</i> 12.82
Pontus Euxinus	<i>phoura</i>			Plut. <i>Pomp.</i> 34.5
————	<i>phourion</i>			App. <i>Mith.</i> 16.108-109
Poseidon	<i>phourion</i>			<i>Chr. Wilck.</i> 1 = <i>P. Petr.</i> 3 74 (a) = <i>P. Petr.</i> 2.45 = <i>BNJ</i> 160 F 1
Poteidaia/Kassandraia	<i>phoura</i>			Diod. Sic. 16.8.5; Thuc. 1.64.1; 3.17.3
————	<i>phouros</i>			Polyaeus, <i>Strat.</i> 4.6.18
Praeneste	<i>phourion</i>			App. <i>B Civ.</i> 1.10.90
Premnis	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 17.1.54 = <i>BNJ</i> 673 F 163a
Priene/'Lince'?	<i>phoura</i>			<i>SEG</i> 30.1358 = <i>SEG</i> 37.993.
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>	Nymphon	<i>IPriene</i> 21; <i>IPriene</i> 22
————	<i>phouros</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>	Helikon	<i>IPriene</i> 19 and p. 308
————	<i>phouros</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>	Nymphon	<i>IPriene</i> 22
————	<i>phouros</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>	Thra[<i>sy</i>]boulos	<i>IPriene</i> 252
————	<i>phouros</i>			<i>SEG</i> 30.1358 = <i>SEG</i> 37.993; <i>IPriene</i> 108 and p. 310
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Apellis	<i>IPriene</i> 4
————	unspecified	<i>Phourarchos</i> (?)	Bias	<i>IPriene</i> 23
Promona	<i>phourion</i>			App. <i>Ill.</i> 5.25
Prusias ad Mare/Kios	<i>phouros</i>			<i>IK Kios</i> 2 = Corsten, Thomas. <i>Die Inschriften von Kios. «Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien»</i> , 29. Bonn 1985
Pteleus	<i>phoura</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>		Polyaeus, <i>Strat.</i> 7.26
Pylos/Koryphasion	<i>phoura</i>			Diod. Sic. 13.64.5; Polyaeus, <i>Strat.</i> 3.1
————	<i>phoureo</i>			Diod. Sic. 12.63.5
————	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 8.3.21; Diod. Sic. 13.64.5
Pyrenaei M.	<i>phoura</i>			Cass. Dio 41.20.2
Ragaba	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 13.399; 405

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Raphon/Raphana	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 16.283
Remi	<i>phoura</i>			Cass. Dio. 39.1.3
Rhamnous	<i>phoura</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Apollodoros	<i>SEG</i> 3.122
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>epi</i>	Apollonios	<i>PAE</i> 1991[1994].35,10 = <i>SEG</i> 43.29; <i>SEG</i> 49.138 = <i>I. Rhamnous</i> II 2
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>epi</i>	Dicaiarchos; Apollonios	<i>BCH</i> 54.1930.268 = <i>SEG</i> 25.155 = <i>I. Rhamnous</i> II 17
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>strategos</i>		<i>PAE</i> 1990[1993].32,18 = <i>SEG</i> 41.76 = <i>I. Rhamnous</i> II 16
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Diomedes	<i>PAE</i> 1985[1990].25,6 = <i>SEG</i> 40.129; <i>SEG</i> 43.31 = <i>I. Rhamnous</i> II 14
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Diomedes(ous ?)	<i>PAE</i> 1991[1994].24,1 = <i>SEG</i> 43.25; <i>BE</i> 1997.216
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Epichares	<i>SEG</i> 24.154; <i>SEG</i> 40.135; <i>SEG</i> 44.59 = <i>I. Rhamnous</i> II 3
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Gorgippos	<i>SEG</i> 43:40 = <i>PAAH</i> 1991[1994].34,8
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Lakes	<i>PAE</i> 1986[1990].13,1 = <i>SEG</i> 40.141 = <i>I. Rhamnous</i> II 47
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Mneseides	<i>IG</i> II ² 1309 = <i>SEG</i> 43.43; <i>BE</i> 1997.221; <i>I. Rhamnous</i> II 50
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Telesippos	<i>AM</i> 59.1934.41 = <i>SEG</i> 41.92 = <i>I. Rhamnous</i> II 38
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Thestimos	<i>PAE</i> 1979[1981].24,2 = <i>SEG</i> 31.120; <i>SEG</i> 49.153 = <i>I. Rhamnous</i> II 49
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Thestimos	<i>ArchEph</i> (1953/54) 126,2 = <i>SEG</i> 15.113; <i>SEG</i> 19.82; <i>SEG</i> 25.158 = <i>I. Rhamnous</i> II 43
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Thoukritos	<i>PAE</i> 1989[1992].34,16 = <i>SEG</i> 41.86 = <i>I. Rhamnous</i> II 10
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>strategos</i> (?)	Philotheos	<i>PAE</i> 1989[1992].28,14 = <i>SEG</i> 41.87 = <i>I. Rhamnous</i> II 20

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
_____	<i>phourion</i>			<i>PAE</i> 1990[1993].26,5 = <i>SEG</i> 41.73 = <i>SEG</i> 49.140 = <i>I. Rhamnous</i> II 73; <i>ArchEph</i> (1979) 72,28 = <i>SEG</i> 31.112 = <i>SEG</i> 49.157 = <i>I. Rhamnous</i> II 57; <i>PAE</i> 1984[1988].207,136 = <i>Gnomon</i> 60.1988.226,7 = <i>SEG</i> 38.125 = <i>I. Rhamnous</i> II 4; <i>PAE</i> 1986[1990].15,3 = <i>SEG</i> 40.139 = <i>I. Rhamnous</i> II 29; <i>PAE</i> 1990[1993].27,7 = <i>SEG</i> 41.78 = <i>I. Rhamnous</i> II 65; <i>PAE</i> 1958.35 = <i>SEG</i> 22.128 = <i>SEG</i> 28.107, BE 1966.182 = <i>I. Rhamnous</i> II 26; <i>AEph</i> 1953.123
_____	<i>phourion</i>		Endios	<i>IG</i> II ² 3467 = <i>SEG</i> 49.144 = <i>I. Rhamnous</i> II 9
Rhegion/Regium	<i>phoura</i>	<i>chiliarchos</i>	Decius	Diod. Sic. 22.1.3
_____	<i>phoura</i>	<i>hegemon</i>	Decius	Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 20.5.2
_____	<i>phoura</i>	<i>hegemon; tyrannous instead of a phourarchos</i>	Decius	App. <i>Sam.</i> 9.1
_____	<i>phoura</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>	Decius	App. <i>Sam.</i> 1; Cass. Dio 9.40.11; Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 20.4.8
_____	<i>phoura</i>			Diod. Sic. 16.45.9; Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 20.4.4; 20.16.1; Strabo 6.1.6
_____	<i>phoureo</i>			Diod. Sic. 16.45.9
_____	<i>phouros</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 20.6.4
_____	unspecified	<i>hegemoai</i>	Decius	Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 20.4.2
Rhenus fl.	<i>phoura</i>			Hdn. 2.9.1, 7.1.7; Cass. Dio 39.1.3
_____	<i>phourion</i>			Cass. Dio 40.32.2
Rhesa	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 1.294
Rhodos Ins.	<i>phoura</i>			App. <i>B Civ.</i> 4.9.74, 5.1.2; Diod. Sic. 18.8.1
_____	<i>phourion</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Nikagoras	<i>Lindos</i> II 151
_____	<i>phourion</i>			<i>SEG</i> 49.1072 = <i>Lindos</i> II 160, l. 4
Roma	<i>phoura</i>	<i>hekatonarchos</i>		Cass. Dio 7 (Zonaras 7, 23.). 37.35.4

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
_____	<i>phroura</i>			App. <i>B Civ.</i> 1.7.59; App. <i>Hann.</i> 6.39; Hdn. 2.5.3, 2.5.9, 7.3.6, 7.12.1, 8.7.7; Cass. Dio 37.31.3 46.44.5 48.13.5 61.42.2; Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 2.37.1, 5.26.1, 21.24.1
_____	<i>phroura</i>		Romulus	<i>Suda</i> sv. Σευνάτορες
_____	<i>phroureo</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 5.57.2; 5.75.4; 6.46.2; 6.5.3; 8.65.3; 9.49.5; 11.33.5
_____	<i>phrourion</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 2.38.4 = <i>FGrH</i> 809 F6, 2.39.1, 2.41.1, 2.43.1, 2.40.3, 3.40.3, 3.65.2, 4.54.1, 5.22.1, 5.44.1, 5.45.3, 6.2.2, 6.46.3-47.1, 6.68.1, 8.16.1, 8.17.5, 9.56.2, 10.15.2, 10.15.3, 10.16.2, 11.24.1, 13.8.2; Hdn. 6.7.5
_____	<i>phrouros</i>			Cass. Dio 55.24.6, 11.37.2; Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 9.15.1
Roman Empire	<i>phroura</i>			Plut. <i>Caes.</i> 17.3; App. <i>Hann.</i> 6.34
_____	<i>phrourion</i>			<i>Suda</i> sv. Ἐσχατιά
Rome, Aventine	<i>phroura</i>		Romulus	Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 2.37.1
Rome, Capitoline	<i>phroura</i>	<i>hegemon</i>	Tarpeius	Plut. <i>Rom.</i> 17.2 = <i>FGrH</i> 275 F 24
_____	<i>phroura</i>			Cass. Dio 37.35.3; 37.35.4
_____	<i>phroura</i>		Brennus	Plut. <i>Cam.</i> 22.4
_____	<i>phroureo</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 12.2.3
_____	<i>phrourion</i>	<i>hegemon</i>	Tarpeius	Plut. <i>Rom.</i> 8.2
_____	<i>phrourion</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 2.37.1, 2.38.4 = <i>FGrH</i> 809F6, 2.39.1, 2.39.2, 2.39.3, 2.41.1, 11.4.4, 13.9.4
Rome, Janiculum	<i>phroura</i>			App. <i>B Civ.</i> 3.13.91; Cass. Dio 46.44.5; Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 3.45.1, 5.23.3
_____	<i>phroureo</i>			Cass. Dio 37.28.2-3
_____	<i>phrourion</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 9.26.6; 9.27.8; 9.30.4
Rome, Palantine	<i>phroura</i>		Romulus	Dion. Hal. 2.37.1
Saguntum/Arse	<i>phroura</i>			App. <i>Hisp.</i> 4.19
_____	<i>phrourion</i>			App. <i>Hisp.</i> 2.10-12

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Sagylion	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 12.3.38
Sal(a)pia(i)/Salinae	<i>phoura</i>			Cass. Dio 16 (Zonaras 9, 7–8); App. <i>Hann.</i> 7.45–47
Salamis Ins.	<i>phoura</i>	<i>epi phoura</i>	Diogenes	Plut. <i>Arat.</i> 34.4
————	<i>phoura</i>			Diod. Sic. 12.44.1
————	<i>phourion</i>			Thuc. 2.93.4; Diod. Sic. 20.47.3
————	<i>phrouros</i>	<i>archon</i>	Diogenes	Paus. 2.8.6
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Diod. Sic. 12.49.5
Salassi	<i>phoura</i>			App. Ill. 4.17–18
Salernum	<i>phoura</i>			Strabo 5.4.13
Samaria	<i>phoura</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 3.309
Samaria/Sebaste	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 15.298
Samnium	<i>phoura</i>	<i>archo</i>	Nicomachus	Cass. Dio 10 (Zonaras 8, 6)
————	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 19.10.1
Samos (island)	<i>phoura</i>	<i>archon</i>		Thuc. 1.115.4–1.117.3; Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 2.3.7
————	<i>phoureo</i>		Kyprothemis	Dem. <i>De Rhodiorum libertate</i> 9
————	<i>phrouros</i>	<i>archon</i>		Thuc. 1.115.4–1.117.3
————	<i>phrouros</i>	<i>archon (?)</i>		<i>IG</i> XII,6 1:254 = <i>AM</i> 51 (1926) 34, 4 = <i>SEG</i> 45.1160
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Kyprothemis	<i>Suda</i> , s.v. Κυπρόθεμις
Sarapanis	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 11.3.4
Sardinia Ins.	<i>phoura</i>			App. <i>B Civ.</i> 2.8.54
Sardis/Hyde?	<i>phrouros</i>			Xen. <i>Cyrop.</i> 7.2.3
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Mithrenes	Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 1.17.3; 1.17.3
Sartaba/Alexandreion	<i>phoura</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>		Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 15.203; 16.317
————	<i>phoureo</i>			Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 1.164
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>		Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 16.317–318; Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 1.526–529
————	<i>phourion</i>		Aristobulus	Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 1.134; 1.165; 1.551
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 15.204
Sasanda	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 14.79.4
Scyrus Ins.	<i>phoura</i>			Diod. Sic. 20.103.4
Scythia Minor	<i>phourion</i>			Cass. Dio 51.26.2

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Scythopolis/Nysa	<i>phroura</i>			Plb. 5.70.1-6
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>		SEG 29:1613 l. D
Segestica/Siscia	<i>phroura</i>			App. III. 4.23; 4.24
————	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 7.5.2
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Manius Ennius	Cass. Dio 55.33.2
Seiis (?)	<i>phourion</i>			<i>P. Ryl.</i> 2.374
Sely(m)bria/Eudoxiopolis	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 13.66.4
Selymbria	<i>phroura</i>			Plut. <i>Alc.</i> 30.5
Sentinum	<i>phroura</i>		Gaius Furnius	Cass. Dio 48.13.6
Sepphoris/Diocaesarea	<i>phroura</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 14.415; Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 3.31; 3.34; Joseph. <i>Vit.</i> 347
Sestos	<i>phroura</i>	<i>of the phouroi</i>	Theodorus	Polyaenus, <i>Strat.</i> 1.37
————	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 11.37.5
————	<i>phourion</i>			Thuc. 8.62.3
Shusha(n)/Susa/Seleucia ad Eulaeum/Shush-i er-Kar	<i>phrouros</i>	<i>stratiarchos (?)</i>		<i>CRAI</i> 1931.238-250; <i>SEG</i> 7.13
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Mazarus	Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 3.16.9
Sicilia (island)	<i>phroura</i>			App. <i>B Civ.</i> 2.8.54, 5.11.97, 5.12.115, 5.12.122, App. <i>Sam.</i> 1, 2.1; Diod. Sic. 20.77.1; Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 20.8.7; Thuc. 6.88.5
————	<i>phroureo</i>			Cass. Dio 11 (Zonaras 8, 9.)
————	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 11.91.3, 16.13.1, 19.102.8, 19.107.1, 19.110.3, 20.32.2, 20.90.2, 36.3.5; Polyaenus, <i>Strat.</i> 5.2.9; Diod. Sic. 19.107.3; App. <i>B Civ.</i> 5.13.123, 5.13.125; Cass. Dio. 12 (Zonaras 8, 16–17)
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Polyaenus, <i>Strat.</i> 5.2.9
————	<i>polis</i>			Polyaenus, <i>Strat.</i> 5.2.20
Sicyon/Demetrias	<i>phroura</i>	<i>archon</i>		Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 7.2.11
————	<i>phroura</i>	<i>polemarchos</i>	Praxitas	Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 4.4.7; 4.4.13; 4.4.14; 4.5.19
————	<i>phroura</i>	<i>strategos</i>	Cleonides	Plut. <i>Demetr.</i> 15.1; 15.2
————	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 20.37.2; <i>IG II²</i> 448

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
_____	<i>phroureo</i>			Diod. Sic. 19.74.2; 20.102
_____	<i>phrouros</i>			Diod. Sic. 20.102
Side	<i>phroura</i>			Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 1.26.5
Sigeion	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 20.107.2
Signia	<i>phourion</i>			Dion. <i>Hal.</i> 5.20.1, 5.58.1-4
_____	<i>phrouros</i>			Dion. <i>Hal.</i> 5.58.4
Silvium	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 20.80.1-2
Simorex	<i>phourion</i>			App. <i>Mith.</i> 15.101
Sinoria/Baiberdon	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 12.3.28
Skepsis	<i>phrouros</i>			Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 3.1.21
Skione	<i>phroura</i>			Thuc. 5.2.2
_____	<i>phrouros</i>			Diod. Sic. 12.72.7; 12.72.10
Skiritis	<i>phroura</i>	<i>paraphulatto</i>	Ischolas	Diod. Sic. 15.64.2
Skry (around Memphis ?)	<i>phourion</i>			<i>BGU</i> 6.1216
Sogdiana	<i>phroura</i>			Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 4.17.4
Soknopaïou Nesos	<i>phroureo</i>	<i>hyparchos (?)</i>		<i>P.Amh.</i> 2.43
_____	<i>phrouros</i>			<i>P. Tebt.</i> 3.2.856
Soloi/Pompeiopolis	<i>phroura</i>	<i>phroura</i>		Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 2.5.5
Solous	<i>phroura (?)</i>			Diod. Sic. 23.18.5
_____	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 23.18.5
Sophene	<i>phourion</i>			Cass. Dio 36.53.4; Plut. <i>Luc.</i> 24.8
Sounion	<i>phroura</i>	<i>epi phroura</i>	Diogenes	Plut. <i>Arat.</i> 34.4
_____	<i>phourion</i>	<i>epi</i>		<i>IG</i> II ² 1260 = <i>SEG</i> 19:120; <i>SEG</i> 25:150; <i>SEG</i> 34:109
_____	<i>phourion</i>	<i>strategos</i>		<i>IG</i> II ² 1281
_____	<i>phrouros</i>	<i>archon</i>	Diogenes	Paus. 2.8.6
Sparta	<i>phroura</i>			<i>Suda</i> sv. Νικίας
_____	<i>phroura</i>			Thuc. 5.64.3, 5.64.4; Diod. Sic. 14.82.4; Polyaeus, <i>Strat.</i> 2.1.29; <i>Suda</i> s.v. Φρουρά
Stoichades (islands)	<i>phroura</i>			Strabo 4.1.10
Stratonikeia	<i>phroura</i>			App. <i>Mith.</i> 3.21; Plb. 30.21.3-5
Stratonos Pyrgos/Caesarea	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 15.293

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Stratos	<i>phroura</i>			Thuc. 3.106.1
Syagros? Pr.	<i>phourion</i>			<i>JCV</i> 2036 F 1
Sybaris/Thurii/Copia	<i>phroura</i>			App. <i>Sam.</i> 1; App. <i>Hann.</i> 9.57; Plut. <i>Per.</i> 11
————	<i>phrouros</i>			App. <i>Sam.</i> 3.7.1; Arist. <i>Pol.</i> 5.6.1307a – 1307b
Syene	<i>phroura</i>			Strabo 17.1.12, 17.1.48, 17.1.54
————	<i>phroureo</i>			Strabo 17.1.53 = <i>BNJ</i> 673 F 81, 17.1.54 = <i>BNJ</i> F 163a
————	<i>phourion</i>	<i>strategos and archisomatophulakos</i>	Santhobithys	<i>BGU</i> 6.1247
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Herodes	<i>OGIS</i> 111 = <i>Thèbes à Syène</i> 302
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Nestor	<i>Thèbes à Syène</i> 320
Sykyrion	unspecified	<i>archiphrouros</i>		<i>IG</i> IX,2 1059
Syllium	<i>phroura</i>			Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 1.26.5
Symphorion	<i>phrouros</i>			Cass. Dio 37.7.5
Syracusae/Syrakousai	<i>akra</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>	Philistos	Plut. <i>Dion</i> 11.3 = <i>FGrH</i> 556 T 5c.5, 11.5
————	<i>phroura</i>			Thuc. 6.45.1, 7.60.2; Diod. Sic. 11.68.5; Plut. <i>Tim.</i> 17.4; Plut. <i>Dion</i> 28.2
————	<i>phroura</i>		Nikias	Thuc. 7.4.3
————	<i>phroureo</i>			Thuc. 7.60.2
————	<i>phourion</i>			Thuc. 7.4.5, 7.24.2; Diod. Sic. 13.9.4-5, 14.58.1, 14.63.3, 16.69.4, 16.70.4, 14.72.3-4, 20.56.2; Plut. <i>Tim.</i> 22.6
————	<i>polis</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>	Thoneon	Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 20.8.1, 20.8.7
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Thoinon	<i>Suda</i> sv. Πύρρος, sv. Θοίνωνος
Syria	<i>phroura</i>			Cass. Dio <i>ep.</i> 37.15.3; 62.20.3; App. <i>Syr.</i> 9.52-53; 1 Maccabees 11.3.2; Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 7.104, 14.298
————	<i>phroureo</i>	<i>hegeomai</i>	Saxa	Cass. Dio. 48.25.2
————	<i>phourion</i>			Xen. <i>Cyrop.</i> 5.4.51, 5.5.1; Diod. Sic. 30.16.1

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
_____	unspecified	<i>phrouarchos</i>		<i>IEJ</i> 16 (1966) 54-70 = <i>BE</i> (1970) 627, (1971) 73, (1974) 642-642a = <i>ZPE</i> 33 (1979) 131-138; <i>FD</i> III 4:37 = <i>SEG</i> 1.161 = <i>SEG</i> 3.378 = <i>BCH</i> 28.1924.58
Tanagra	<i>phroua</i>	<i>harmostes</i>		Dem. <i>De cor.</i> 96
Tanais (river)	<i>phourion</i>			Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 4.1.4
Taras/Tarentum/Neptunia	<i>phroua</i>	<i>hegemon</i>		Plut. <i>Fabius Maximus</i> 21.1
_____	<i>phroua</i>	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Carthalo	App. <i>Hann.</i> 8.49
_____	<i>phroua</i>	<i>phrouarchos</i>	Livius	App. <i>Hann.</i> 6.32.3
_____	<i>phroua</i>			App. <i>Sam.</i> 1; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 195 F 5-6; Plut. <i>Pyrrh.</i> 22.3; Plb. 8.31; Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 19.9.2; Plut. <i>Regum</i> 75
_____	<i>phroua</i>		Marcus Livius	Plut. <i>Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata</i> [Sp.?] (172b–208a) 195.F.4
_____	<i>phroua</i>		Milo	Cass. Dio 9 (Zonaras 8, 2), 10 (Zonaras 8, 6)
_____	<i>phroureo</i>		Marcus Livius	Plut. <i>Fabius Maximus</i> 23.3
_____	<i>phourion</i>			Cass. Dio. 9 (Zonaras 8, 2.)
_____	<i>phrouros</i>	<i>phrouarchos</i>		App. <i>Hann.</i> 6.34
Tarsus/Antiochia ad Cydnum	<i>phourion</i>			Cass. Dio 47.31
Tauromenium	<i>phroua</i>			App. <i>B Civ.</i> 5.12.109
_____	<i>phourion</i>			Polyaenus, <i>Strat.</i> 5.3.6
Taurus M.	<i>phroua</i>			Cass. Dio. <i>ep.</i> 62.21.1; Hdn. 3.2.10; 3.3.7-8
_____	<i>phourion</i>			Plut. <i>Pomp.</i> 28.1
Tavium	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 12.5.2
Taxila	<i>phroua</i>			Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 5.8.3
Techtho	<i>phourion</i>			<i>P. Stras.</i> 2.103, 2.104
Tegeatis, Pass Near	<i>phroua</i>	<i>hegemon</i>	Alexander	Diod. Sic. 15.64.2
_____	<i>phrouros</i>	<i>hegemon</i>	Alexander	Diod. Sic. 15.64.2
Teichious	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 9.4.13
Tell Taban/[Tabite]/Thebet(h) a?	<i>phourion</i>			<i>FGrH</i> 156 F 41
Tempe	<i>phroureo</i>			Cass. Dio 220 (Zonaras 9, 22–23)

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Tephon	<i>phroura</i>			1 Maccabees 9.51
Tergeste	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 5.1.9
Thasos	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 13.72.1; Dem. 20 59
_____	<i>phrouros</i>			<i>IG XII, Suppl. 429; IG XII, Suppl. 430</i>
Thebai/Thebae	<i>emphroureo</i>			Diod. Sic. 15.23.4
_____	<i>phroura</i>			Paus. 9.1.8; 9.6.5
_____	<i>phroura</i>	<i>archon</i>		Plut. <i>Pel.</i> 14.4
_____	<i>phroura</i>	<i>harmostes</i>		Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 5.4.13; Isoc., <i>Plataicus</i> 13; 14.19; Plut. <i>Pel.</i> 13.6.3
_____	<i>phroura</i>	<i>hegemon</i>		Diod. Sic. 15.20.2-3; 15.27.3
_____	<i>phroura</i>	<i>hegemon</i>	Philotas	Diod. Sic. 17.1.7; 17.3.4; 17.8.7
_____	<i>phroura</i>	<i>polemarchos</i>	Archias; Leontidas	Plut. <i>Ages.</i> 24.1
_____	<i>phroura</i>			<i>IG XII,5 444; Plut. Comp. Agis. Cleom.</i> 40 = <i>FGrH</i> 231 F 6.2; Plut. <i>Amatoriae</i> 3; Plut. <i>De Genio</i> 17; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 576 A, 586 E, 774 B-C; Plut. <i>Dem.</i> 9.2, 23.1; Plut. <i>Pel.</i> 6.1, 7.1, 12.4; Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 1.7.10, 1.9.9; Diod. Sic. 16.87.3, 17.1.4, 17.8.3, 19.78.5, 19.78.5, 20.110.3; Demades <i>On The Twelve Years</i> 13; Plb. 4.27.4
_____	<i>phroura</i>		Phoebidas	Polyaenus, <i>Strat.</i> 2.3.1
_____	<i>phroureo</i>	<i>hegemon</i>		Diod. Sic. 15.27.1; 15.25.1-3
_____	<i>phroureo</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>		Din. <i>In Demosthenem</i> 38-39
_____	<i>phroureo</i>			Diod. Sic. 17.12.5; Plut. <i>Pel.</i> 7.1; Hyp. <i>Funeral Speech</i> 17; Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 1.7.10
_____	<i>phrouros</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>		Polyaenus, <i>Strat.</i> 2.4.3.1
_____	<i>phrouros</i>			Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 12.5
Thebais	<i>phroura</i>			Strabo 17.1.54
_____	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Megisthenes	<i>Chr. Wilck.</i> 162 = <i>BGU</i> 3 992; <i>P. Haun.</i> 1.11
Theodosia	<i>phourion</i>			App. <i>Mith.</i> 16.108-109
Theoprosopon	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 16.2.18

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Thermae Himeraeae	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 20.56.3, 20.77.3, 20.79.4
Thermopylae	<i>phroura</i>			Paus. 10.20.2; Dem. <i>Philippica</i> 3. 32
————	<i>phroureo</i>			Cass. Dio 19 (Zonaras 9,19.)
Thespiiai	<i>phroura</i>	<i>echo</i>	Phoebidas	Diod. Sic. 15.32.2-15.33.6
Thessalia	<i>phroura</i>			Plut. <i>Pyrrh.</i> 12.5; Dem. <i>De falsa legatione</i> 260
Tholon	<i>phroureo</i>			App. <i>Pun.</i> 3.18
Thracia	<i>phroura</i>			App. <i>Syr.</i> 1.2; Plut. <i>Per.</i> 11.5; Plut. <i>Flam.</i> 12.1; Plb. 23.3.1; 23.8.1; Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 5.2.24; Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 2.369
————	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 21.12.3
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Thuc. 4.7.1
Thyrea	<i>phroura</i>	<i>archon</i>	Tantalus	Thuc. 4.57.1-5
————	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Tantalus	Diod. Sic. 12.65.9
Tigranocerta/Cholimma/Chlomaron	<i>phourion</i>			<i>Suda</i> sv. Φρούριον, sv. Ἀπεπόνου, sv. Χλομάρων; App. <i>Mith.</i> 12.84-85
Tigris/Diglitus (river)	<i>phourion</i>			Cass. Dio 40.14.1
Timnah	<i>phroura</i>			1 Maccabees 9.51
Tisia, In Bruttium	<i>phroura</i>			App. <i>Hann.</i> 7.44
————	<i>phrouros</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>		App. <i>Hann.</i> 7.44
Tithorea/Neon	<i>phourion</i>			Plut. <i>Sull.</i> 14.4; 15
Tolosa	<i>phrouros</i>			Cass. Dio 37.90
Tomisa	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 12.2.1
Torone	<i>emphrourontas</i>			Thuc. 4.110.2
————	<i>phroura</i>			Diod. Sic. 12.73.3
————	<i>phrouros</i>			Thuc. 4.110.2
Touphion	<i>phourion</i>			<i>VBP</i> 2 14
Trachis/Herakleia	<i>phroura</i>			Paus. 10.22.13
————	<i>phroura</i>		Telesarchus	Paus. 10.22.1; 10.22.11
————	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 9.4.13
Trachon(itis)	<i>phroura</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 16.292
Trikaranon M.	<i>phroura</i>			Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 7.4.11
————	<i>phourion</i>			<i>FGrH</i> 115 F 239; <i>Suda</i> sv. Τρικάρανον

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
Trikka	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 9.5.17
Trinasos	<i>phourion</i>			Paus. 3.22.3
Triopion	<i>phoura</i>			Thuc. 8.35.3
Troizen	<i>phoura</i>	<i>harmostes</i>		Polyaenus, <i>Strat.</i> 2.29.1
_____	<i>phoura</i>			Diod. Sic. 15.69.1
_____	<i>phrouros</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>	Kyrthaios	<i>IG IV 769</i>
Tunis	<i>phourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 20.39.4-5
Tuscia et Umbria	<i>phourion</i>			Plut. <i>Cam.</i> 2.5
Tusculum	<i>phourion</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 10.20.7
_____	<i>phrouros</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 9.71.3; 10.20.7
Tyndaris	<i>phoura</i>			App. <i>B Civ.</i> 5.12.109
_____	<i>phoura (?)</i>			Diod. Sic. 23.18.5
Tyrus	<i>phoura</i>			Diod. Sic. 19.61.5
_____	<i>polis</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>	Andronicus	Diod. Sic. 19.86.2
_____	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Archelaos	Diod. Sic. 18.37.4
Utica	<i>phoura</i>			Plut. <i>Cat. Mai.</i> 58.2
_____	<i>phoureo</i>			Cass. Dio 42.57.5, 42.58.2
Vaga	<i>phoura</i>	<i>archon of the engineers</i>	Turpillius	Plut. <i>Mar.</i> 8.1
_____	<i>phoura</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>	Turpilus	App. <i>Num.</i> 3
Varkana/Hyrcania/Gurgan	<i>phourion</i>			Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 15.366; Joseph. <i>BJ</i> 1.167
Veii	<i>phourion</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 9.14.4, 9.16.2
Venetia	<i>phoureo</i>			Cass. Dio 39.40.3
Vera	<i>phourion</i>			Strabo 11.13.3
Verrugo	<i>phoura</i>			Diod. Sic. 14.11.6
Volsci	<i>phoureo</i>			Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 6.43.1
Xanthos	<i>phoura</i>			Diod. Sic. 20.27.1
_____	unspecified	<i>phourarchos</i>	Pandaros	Robert and Robert 1983, 126 #4 A
Yüntdağ (modern name)	<i>phourion</i>	<i>phourarchos</i>	Demetrius	Müller 2010, 428
Zancle/Messana	<i>phoura</i>			Cass. Dio 11 (Zonaras 8, 9.); Paus. 4.7.2; 4.9.1
_____	<i>phoureo</i>			Cass. Dio 9 (Zonaras 8, 2.)

Location	Type	Commander	Commander's Name	Source(s)
_____	<i>phrourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 22.13.1; Plut. <i>Pyrrh.</i> 23.1
_____	<i>phrouros</i>	<i>meta</i>	Demoteles	Thuc. 4.25.11
Zarex/Zaret(h)ra	<i>phrourion</i>			Plut. <i>Phoc.</i> 13.4
Zeleia	<i>phrourion</i>			<i>FGrH</i> 474 F 3 = Steph. Byz. s. v. Ζέλεια
Zereia/Zeira	<i>phrourion</i>			Diod. Sic. 16.52.9

APPENDIX 6: THE DIGITAL MAP OF *PHROURARCHOI*

A key component of this dissertation is the creation of a digital mapping application.¹¹⁴¹

This application draws heavily on the work of the Pleiades Project and the Ancient World Mapping Center, and interfaces with the wider linked data community through the Pelagios project. The background is based on a set of tiles derived from the Ancient World Mapping Center's efforts to digitize and enhance the coverage of the *Barrington Atlas*,¹¹⁴² The underlying data is available under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license, while the code is released under GPL v3.

The mapping application is fully integrated with the larger ancient world linked data community through the use of 5-star data and stable URI principles.¹¹⁴³ The software is a custom application which is built on OpenLayers and DataTables, with a PostGIS backend. The map tiles are hosted by MapBox, with the support of ISAW at NYU. Every location mentioned in this dissertation was cataloged and aligned with Pleiades identifiers by hand, as transliterations, Greek text, and multiple locations with the same name created enormous difficulties with automated matching. Every *phrouarchos* was then placed in a database, given a unique identifier, and then matched with a relevant location. In instances where a given location was not in Pleiades, the *phrouarchos* was placed in a nearby location or in a larger region (i.e. if the location is not in Pleiades but is known to be within the confines of Judaea, the *phrouarchos* was matched to Judaea itself). All of these instances were flagged in the database, so as Pleiades expands its coverage the location data will be able to adjust

¹¹⁴¹http://awmc.unc.edu/awmc/applications/snagg_test

¹¹⁴²Talbert 2000.

¹¹⁴³Berners-Lee 1998; Berners-Lee 2007.

automatically. The final data was matched with the coordinate information provided by Pleiades, then exported as a .kml file, to allow for quick access without unduly querying the database.

In addition to locating all garrisons (orange circles) and their commanders (white circles) by default, the map offers a visual representation of the density of garrisons as found in the source material. This marking quickly highlights fiercely contested areas, and shows the near ubiquitous presence of garrisons, especially in coastal communities. This marking also highlights how the source material offers little detail concerning *phourarchoi* outside of Egypt, Greece, and Western Asia Minor.

In addition to a searchable database, every location on the map is clickable. A click generates a popup on the map which provides the type of location, the commanding officer, the name of the officer when known, and relevant citation information. The window also allows for further exploration by linking to Pleiades¹¹⁴⁴ and the Pelagios network,¹¹⁴⁵ which allows a user to browse coins, texts, and other resources provided by dozens of partner projects. By presenting a seamless, interactive map, this application provides a level of visualization, customization, and interaction which is otherwise impossible with traditional media.

¹¹⁴⁴<http://pleiades.stoa.org>

¹¹⁴⁵<http://pelagios.dme.ait.ac.at>

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