

REDEFINING THE “ENGAGÉ”: INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY AND THE FRENCH
EXTREME RIGHT, 1898-1968

Sarah E. Shurts

A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History.

Chapel Hill
2007

Approved by:

Dr. Donald Reid

Dr. Lloyd Kramer

Dr. Jay Smith

Dr. Paul Mazgaj

Dr. Christopher Browning

ABSTRACT

SARAH E. SHURTS: Redefining the Engagé: Intellectual Identity and the French Extreme Right, 1898-1968
(Under the direction of Donald Reid.)

Intellectual historians today continue to treat French intellectual history as the study of the figures, institutions, and ideas of the Left. This approach ignores the presence of self-identified intellectuals of the Right who conceived of their values, role, communities, and their very identity as intellectuals, differently than those on the Left. By basing discussions of intellectual life on only one of two existing models, historians have done a disservice to the field. This study examines the construction of an alternative intellectual identity by the engaged thinkers of the extreme Right in France between 1898 and 1968. The work of self-proclaimed right-wing intellectuals Maurice Barrès, Ferdinand Brunetière, Henri Massis, Charles Maurras, Abel Bonnard, Ramon Fernandez, Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, Alphonse de Châteaubriant, Maurice Bardèche, Jacques Laurent, and Alain de Benoist is used to trace this process of identity construction. From these case studies, it becomes apparent that throughout the twentieth century, intellectuals of the Right felt excluded from the cultural and political world by what they believed to be a hegemonic Left. This exclusion was not entirely a matter of perception, however, since the Left appreciated the authority of the role of the intellectual and worked to secure the concept for their own camp and to label the Right “anti-intellectual.” The Right’s resentment of this marginalization would become central to their construction of a new type of intellectual identity. In their struggle to legitimize their own

vision of intellectual values, socio-professional communities, and experience while differentiating it from that constructed on the Left, they were attempting to redefine the concept of the intellectual according to their own perspective. This study attempts to bring the self-identified intellectuals of the extreme Right back into the narrative of intellectual history. It also reveals the century-long struggle waged over the conceptualization of the intellectual between the Left and Right. While the model constructed by the Left has become synonymous today with the image of the intellectual, it was not the only version of intellectual identity throughout the century. It should, therefore, not be the only version considered in the narrative of French intellectual history.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am extremely grateful to have had the support of many excellent professors, friends, and family members throughout my graduate career. My initial foray into graduate studies was intended as more of a diversion than a professional path. I would not have continued on to earn my Ph.D. had it not been for the encouragement of several professors at UNC-Greensboro and the support of my advisor there, Dr. Paul Mazgaj. During my years at UNC-Chapel Hill, I have had the privilege of working with many exceptional historians and professors who have each helped to make me a better researcher, writer, and teacher. None have had as much influence on my work as the professors who agreed to serve on my dissertation committee. I would like to thank Dr. Lloyd Kramer who gave me new insight into the study of intellectuals and introduced me to the Intellectual history seminars at the National Humanities Center. Dr. Jay Smith served as my surrogate advisor during my first year at UNC-Chapel Hill and introduced me to the idea of identity construction. I would also like to thank both Dr. Kramer and Dr. Smith for their many letters of support for various grants and job applications. Dr. Christopher Browning nurtured my study of fascism and helped me to refine my arguments on collective identity in a writing seminar. And Dr. Mazgaj continued to provide encouragement and advice long after I left UNCG and shared his own research and publications with me. Most of all, however, I wish to thank Dr. Don Reid, my advisor at UNC-Chapel Hill, for his tireless advocacy of my work, his thoughtful critique of my writing and ideas, and his unending patience during the dissertation process. My every question or concern was answered with an immediate email, chapters were read

and critiqued with amazing promptness, and a month did not pass without suggestions for reading, new angles of research, or ideas for improvement. I would not have applied for the UNC completion grant without his urging or received the Lurcy without his letters of support. A few lines of acknowledgment will never adequately express my gratitude for his guidance and his enthusiasm. He has helped me to become the best historian that I can and has provided a model of the professor and advisor that I one day hope to become.

I would like to thank my friends and colleagues at UNC-Chapel Hill, particularly Bethany Keenan, Pam Lach, and Ben Pearson for their interest in my work and their thoughtful critique of my ideas. I would also like to express my love and gratitude to my family. William and Mary Shurts, Charles and Ruth Bishop, Erin and Brian Karl, David, Kelley, Philip, Bethany, and Kate Hovis have all supported me during my entire graduate career. Most of all, however, I want to thank my husband Matt. Through the eight years of my graduate school endeavors, he has been my strength. He has found time in his busy schedule to take care of our beautiful son Nathan so that I could make final revisions, has patiently listened to my ideas, and has always been willing to drop his own work to help me with mine. His steadfast devotion and his desire to help me accomplish my dreams remind me each day of how lucky I am to be his wife.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section	Page
I. INTRODUCTION	1
The Historiographical Problem.....	4
The Historical Conflict.....	14
Key Concepts: The Intellectual.....	20
Identity	26
The Right.....	30
Structure of the Study.....	35
II. THE DREYFUS AFFAIR, 1898-1902.....	39
1. LEFT-WING INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY DURING THE DREYFUS AFFAIR: DREYFUSARD INTELLECTUAL VALUES.....	44
Dreyfusard Intellectual Communities and Networks.....	50
The Dreyfusard Intellectual Experience.....	57
The Dreyfusard Intellectual Model.....	61
2. THE INTELLECTUALS OF THE ANTI-DREYFUSARD RIGHT: THE CASE OF MAURICE BARRÈS.....	62
Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy.....	65
Differentiation of Intellectual Values: National Relativism and <i>Enracinement</i>	72
Realism and Anti-Rationalism.....	77

	Collectivism and National Socialism.....	80
	Barrès and the Right-Wing Intellectual Model.....	83
3.	THE INTELLECTUALS OF THE ANTI-DREYFUSARD RIGHT: THE CASE OF FERDINAND BRUNETIÈRE.....	85
	Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment and the Struggle for Legitimacy.....	88
	Differentiation of Intellectual Values: Collectivism and Anti-Individualism.....	95
	Realism and Anti-Rationalism.....	100
	Nationalism and National Socialism.....	103
	Brunetière and the Right-Wing Intellectual Model.....	106
4.	THE WORLD OF THE ANTI-DREYFUSARD RIGHT: COMMUNITIES, NETWORKS, AND THE INTELLECTUAL EXPERIENCE.....	109
	The Anti-Dreyfusard Intellectual Experience.....	120
	The Right-Wing Intellectual Model During the Dreyfus Affair.....	124
III.	THE NOUVELLE SORBONNE AND THE INTERNATIONAL THREAT: 1910-1920.....	126
5.	LEFT-WING INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY DURING THE NOUVELLE SORBONNE AND WORLD WAR I ERA.....	132
	Reformist Intellectual Communities and Networks.....	143
	The Leftist Intellectual Experience.....	149
	The Reformist Intellectual Model.....	153
6.	THE INTELLECTUALS OF THE TRADITIONALIST RIGHT: THE CASE OF HENRI MASSIS.....	154
	Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment and the Struggle for Legitimacy.....	157

	Differentiation of Intellectual Values: Classicism and Elitism.....	164
	Realism	168
	Nationalism and Defense of Western Civilization.....	171
	Massis and the Right-wing Intellectual Model.....	175
7.	THE INTELLECTUALS OF THE TRADITIONALIST RIGHT: THE CASE OF CHARLES MAURRAS.....	177
	Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy.....	180
	Differentiation of Intellectual Values: Realism and Royalism.....	187
	Classicism and Traditionalism.....	193
	Patriotism and Nationalism.....	196
	Maurras and the Right-wing Intellectual Model.....	200
8.	THE WORLD OF THE TRADITIONALIST RIGHT: COMMUNITIES, NETWORKS, AND THE INTELLECTUAL EXPERIENCE.....	202
	The Right-Wing Intellectual Experience.....	210
	The Right-Wing Intellectual Model During the Nouvelle Sorbonne Debates.....	216
IV.	THE RISE OF INTERNATIONAL FASCISM AND COMMUNISM: 1930-1939	218
9.	LEFT-WING INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY DURING THE 1930S: ANTI-FASCIST INTELLECTUAL VALUES.....	223
	Anti-Fascist Intellectual Communities and Networks.....	231
	The Anti-Fascist Intellectual Experience.....	239
	The Anti-Fascist Intellectual Model.....	242
10.	RIGHT WING INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY IN THE 1930S:	

THE CASE OF ABEL BONNARD.....	244
Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy.....	247
Differentiation of Intellectual Values: Realism.....	255
Elitism and Anti-Egalitarianism.....	260
Decadence and Renewal.....	264
Franco-German Rapprochement.....	267
Bonnard and the Right-Wing Intellectual Model.....	269
11. RIGHT-WING INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY IN THE 1930S: THE CASE OF RAMON FERNANDEZ.....	271
Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment and the Struggle for Legitimacy.....	274
Differentiation of Intellectual Values: Class cooperation and Anti-communism	280
Realism	285
Necessity of an Elite and a “Chef”.....	288
Nationalist Man and Nationalism.....	291
Fernandez and the Right-Wing Intellectual Model.....	293
12. THE INTELLECTUAL WORLD OF THE 1930S RIGHT: COMMUNITIES, NETWORKS, AND THE INTELLECTUAL EXPERIENCE.....	295
The 1930s Right-Wing Intellectual Experience.....	305
The Right-Wing Intellectual Model During the 1930s.....	310
V. THE OCCUPATION, 1940-1944.....	312
13. LEFT-WING INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY DURING THE OCCUPATION: RESISTOR INTELLECTUAL VALUES.....	317
The Intellectual World of the Left: Communities, Networks and the	

Intellectual Experience.....	326
The Resistance Intellectual Experience.....	332
The Resistance Intellectual Model.....	336
14. INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY AND THE COLLABORATIONIST RIGHT: THE CASE OF PIERRE DRIEU LA ROCHELLE.....	338
Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy.....	341
Differentiation of Intellectual Values: Realism and “the Body”.....	348
Europeanism	355
Anti-Communism and Opposition to the Allies.....	359
Drieu and the Right-Wing Intellectual Model.....	363
15. INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY AND THE COLLABORATIONIST RIGHT: THE CASE OF ALPHONSE DE CHÂTEAUBRIANT.....	365
Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy.....	368
Differentiation of Intellectual Values: The Fascist Complete Man.....	375
Franco-German Collaboration.....	378
Intellectual Realism.....	382
Châteaubriant and the Right-Wing Intellectual Model.....	387
16. THE WORLD OF THE COLLABORATIONIST RIGHT: COMMUNITIES, NETWORKS, AND THE INTELLECTUAL EXPERIENCE	389
The Collaborationist Intellectual Experience.....	397
The Right-Wing Intellectual Model During the Occupation.....	402
VI. THE POST-WAR, 1945-1967.....	404
17. LEFT-WING INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY DURING THE	

POST-WAR: REPUBLICAN AND EXTREME LEFT VALUES	409
The Intellectual World of the Left: Communities, Networks, and Intellectual Practice.....	419
The Post-War Intellectual Experience.....	426
The Left-Wing Intellectual Model.....	430
18. INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY AND THE POST-WAR EXTREME RIGHT: THE CASE OF MAURICE BARDÈCHE.....	432
Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy.....	435
Differentiation of Intellectual Values: Political Realism.....	443
Negationism.....	448
Europeanism and Neo-fascism.....	451
Colonialism and Racism.....	455
Bardèche and the Right-Wing Intellectual Model.....	458
19. INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY AND THE POSTWAR EXTREME RIGHT: THE CASE OF JACQUES LAURENT.....	460
Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy.....	464
Differentiation of Intellectual Values: Intellectual Engagement.....	471
Colonialism	476
Memories of Vichy and Occupation.....	481
Laurent and the Right-Wing Intellectual Model.....	485
20. THE INTELLECTUAL WORLD OF THE POSTWAR RIGHT: COMMUNITIES, NETWORKS, AND THE INTELLECTUAL EXPERIENCE	486
The Post-War Right-Wing Intellectual Experience.....	495

	The Right-Wing Intellectual Model During the Post-War Decades.....	499
VII.	CONCLUSION: ALAIN DE BENOIST AND THE NEW MODEL OF INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY.....	501
	Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy.....	505
	Rejection of Universalism and Egalitarianism in Favor of a Right to Difference.....	512
	Intellectual Realism.....	517
	Anti-Jacobin Nationalism.....	519
	Communities, Networks, and the Intellectual Experience.....	521
	The Right-Wing Intellectual Model.....	527
	BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	541

SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

In 1944, Drieu la Rochelle proclaimed defensively, “I acted perfectly consciously... according to the idea that I had formed of the duties of the intellectual.”¹ Although it is a seemingly simple statement, he was in fact making a complex claim about his identity and what he considered to be the preconceptions of his society. First apparent is his self-identification with the empowering title, role, and duties of the politically engaged thinker or “intellectual.” Then there is his suggestion that this identity of the “intellectual” is one that could be conceptualized in different ways based on the “idea” that one had of the duties. And finally, there is the underlying tone of resentment, frustration, and defensive pride indicating he expected his self-identification to be refused by a society preconditioned to recognize only one model of this identity. Drieu’s struggle to define himself as an intellectual according to his own, distinctive ideas of intellectual identity was not an anomaly. It was emblematic of a century-long struggle for legitimacy by a large segment of the French intellectual milieu that believed its political opponents had effectively excluded it from the empowering status of the “intellectuel.” His statement indicates, therefore, an unexplored historical conflict in the intellectual community between two competing concepts of intellectual identity.

Drieu’s suggestion that there was more than one concept of intellectual identity also challenges the current historiography. For scholars of French intellectual life, the models of the intellectual have ranged from Zola to Benda to Sartre but they have all shared a common premise: to be an intellectual was, “to be on the Left.”² In a survey of the field, it quickly becomes apparent that,

¹ Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, *Secret Journal*, trans. Alastair Hamilton (New York: H. Fertig, 1973), 70.

² Jeremy Jennings, “Intellectuals and Political Culture,” *The European Legacy* 5, no. 6 (2000), 787.

for most intellectual historians, “the terms *intellectuel* and *intellectuel de gauche* are often taken for synonyms,”³ while, as a correlate to this rule, “anti-intellectual” has been applied with consistency to the figures and ideas of the Right. This complacency becomes problematic, however, when one recognizes that Drieu la Rochelle was a self-identified intellectual of the extreme Right.

This study, therefore, has a dual aim. It argues that the history of intellectual engagement and debate from the Dreyfus Affair to the modern day can be seen as a series of struggles between the engaged thinkers of the Left and the Right. These engaged thinkers struggled to define and monopolize the empowering concept of the intellectual according to their own, fundamentally opposed, social and cultural values and their own distinctive experience of intellectual life. The intellectual Left, and its concept of the intellectual, emerged from these struggles increasingly hegemonic while the Right, and its alternative concept, emerged increasingly ostracized, resentful, alienated, and separatist. This mounting isolation of the intellectual Right from what would come to be seen as the intellectual mainstream would be in part a result of the Left’s successful efforts to exclude them and in part a result of their own withdrawal and radicalization in the face of this rejection. The vicious cycle of rejection, resentment, and self-imposed alienation would, by the post-war era, contribute to the radicalization and separatism of the extreme Right and the shrinking of its audiences. Because of this, it is virtually impossible today for historians to construct an image of “the intellectual” outside of the left-wing values, programs, and thinkers that have dominated the concept, or to see their opponents on the Right as anything but “anti-intellectual.”

The second aim of the study will be to challenge this tendency among intellectual historians to think “intellectual of the Left” when they write “intellectual” and, as a result, to treat French intellectual history as the study of the figures, institutions, and ideas of the Left. Throughout the twentieth century, there were two very different understandings of what it meant to “be an intellectual,” including the relationship that intellectuals had to government and society, the values, worldviews, and programs that they supported, and the types of communities and experiences that

³ Michel Winock, *Le siècle des intellectuels* (Paris: Seuil, 1997), 612.

defined them. The current approach to intellectual history only acknowledges one of these models of identity: a model created by the engaged Left that cannot explain the engaged thinker of the Right. This study will explore the concept of intellectual identity developed on the Right and propose a new model of intellectual identity that inserts this previously excluded right-wing engagé into the historical narrative of the French intellectual.

This study is an attempt to understand and analyze, without approbation or condemnation, the historical phenomenon that is the intellectual of the Right. It is important to clarify, therefore, that the approach to “the intellectual” used in this study does not invest the term with any special moral quality nor grant the role any particular relationship to the “Truth.” Being an intellectual, according to parameters borrowed from Jean-Francois Sirinelli and Michel Trebitsch, requires only that the thinker utilize his cultural capital in order to sway opinion in public affairs according to his own set of values and ideas.⁴ Identifying the engaged thinkers of the Right as “legitimate intellectuals,” therefore, does not imply legitimization of their values or give moral credence to their ideas. It is simply a recognition of the role they played in French affairs; a recognition that thinkers on the Right as well as the Left had cultural capital, that they engaged this authority in the nation’s political debates, and that they wielded significant influence over public opinion and political affairs. During some periods, the extreme Right enjoyed enormous audiences and circulations and at others had only a limited following. But regardless of the size of their public, the Right provided an important and continuous counterpoint to the intellectual Left for the French public. Because of this, whether historians approve of the nature of their ideas or not, the extreme Right cannot continue to be ignored in the historical narrative of the intellectual.

⁴ The definitions of the intellectual constructed by Sirinelli and Trebitsch are explored in more depth later in the introduction.

The Historiographical Problem

The practice of intellectual history has evolved over the years from a history of ideas and great thinkers to a broad-ranging discipline that incorporates advances in social and cultural history, psychology, literary criticism, and gender studies. One of the building blocks of the discipline, however, the concept of the person, role, and values of the intellectual, has not benefited from a similar evolution. The definition and understanding of the intellectual as a historical actor and, from this, the basic narrative of intellectual engagement over the century, has been accepted as a known quantity. As a basic social category, intellectuals are writers, thinkers, or “consummators of an ideology” who engage their art in support of a socio-political cause.⁵ But for the vast majority of historians, “intellectual” also carries deeply engrained connotations that tie it to the engaged thinkers of the liberal Republic and extreme Left. “Intellectuals in France,” Jeremy Jennings has summarized, “have sought to shape the political values and culture that have informed politics” and have done so either as “the ‘universal’ intellectual described by Julien Benda or the ‘committed’ intellectual defined by Sartre. Sartre in fact embodied this model. It was to be engaged, to be on the Left.”⁶

For these historians, whether he is a defender of the Republic or a Marxist fellow-traveler, the intellectual is a “child of the Enlightenment”⁷ who upholds the Jacobin concept of citizenship, the ideals of egalitarianism and progress, and the promise of social revolution. He is a universalist, an internationalist, a socialist, who translates the abstract, absolute truths of the universe into idealistic theories for implementation in society. Jean-Francois Lyotard famously determined, in his assessment of the decline of the intellectual, that intellectuals are those whose “ambition since the philosophes of

⁵ Jean-François Sirinelli and Pascal Ory, *Les intellectuels en France; de l’Affaire Dreyfus à nos jours* (Paris: A Colin, 1986), 10.

⁶ Jennings, “Intellectuals and Political Culture,” 787.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 781.

the eighteenth century has been to think and incarnate the universal.”⁸ The Right’s adamant rejection of universalism, abstraction, Enlightenment principles, internationalism, social revolution, and the Jacobin image of the nation clearly place it outside of this dominant definition of intellectual values and identity and make it, by default, “anti-intellectual.” As Zeev Sternhell concluded in his survey of modern French intellectual life, while the intellectuals of the twentieth century could be identified by their devotion to the “spirit of the Enlightenment,” “the anti-intellectual intellectuals revolted against the rational tradition of the Enlightenment” and against “its Marxist, Socialist, and liberal manifestations.”⁹

This tendency to conflate the intellectual with the ideas and values of the Left occurs even in the social histories which tend to ignore differences in intellectual values. The intellectual is defined for these historians by engagement in certain causes, participation in certain organizations, and adherence to certain socio-professional networks. When an example of the “intellectual” as a social category is sought in these works, it is among the Dreyfusards, republican *universitaires*, writers for *Nouvelle Revue Française*, resisters, communist sympathizers, or regulars at Deux Magots that it is found, never among the anti-Dreyfusards, writers for *Action Française*, collaborationists, fascist sympathizers, or Sept Couleurs writers.

It is clear that historians who consider the phenomenon of intellectual engagement from the Dreyfus Affair to the postwar era have a preconceived notion of what it means to be an intellectual and their narratives of the history of engagement reveal this bias. Whether intentionally or not, these narratives exclude the intellectual of the Right in two effective ways. The first is to ignore the presence of the Right by focusing the narrative on the figures, organizations, and engagement of the

⁸ Winock, *Le siècle*, 608. Therefore, according to Lyotard and others like Bernard Henri Levy, the declining belief in universals in recent years has led to the decline in intellectuals. Jeremy Jennings, “1898-1998: From Zola’s ‘J’accuse’ to the Death of the Intellectual,” *The European Legacy* 5 no. 6 (International Society for the Study of European Ideas, 2000), 829.

⁹ Zeev Sternhell, *The Intellectual Revolt Against Liberal Democracy, 1870-1945* (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1996), 104.

intellectual Center and Left. The second is to present the intellectual debates between Right and Left as a conflict between “the intellectuals” and the “anti-intellectuals.” Even when anti-intellectualism is not directly attributed to the Right, it is implied by the focus on the non-intellectual components of the right-wing opposition. When the Right is explored in these latter studies, it is the political parties, leagues, or street gangs, from the Anti-Dreyfusard Ligue des Patriotes to the interwar Croix de Feu to the postwar Front National, that are analyzed, not the organizations of right-wing academics, writers, and thinkers. In contrast, when the Left is discussed, the intellectual organizations are the central focus. Both of these strategies, whether employed consciously or not by the historian, have effectively removed the intellectual of the Right from the history of intellectual engagement. The following brief survey of the treatment of intellectual history from the Dreyfus Affair to the postwar reveals the imbalance that has resulted.

Most historical narratives of the birth of the intellectual as social guide and political commentator during the Dreyfus Affair clearly find the intellectual to exist exclusively on the side of the Dreyfusard Left. David Drake begins one survey of intellectual life saying, “The term intellectual... was popularized in France at the time of the Dreyfus Affair. It was used to refer to those men of letters... and members of the university who lent their prestige to the call for the release of Alfred Dreyfus.”¹⁰ While Christophe Charle ends his work by concluding, “On the level of professional ethic, the Dreyfusard intellectuals, in their search for Truth, remain the models for today.”¹¹ Because of this determination of intellectual identity, the intellectual history of the Dreyfus Affair has been written as the history of the Dreyfusards. Attention is focused first on Zola’s open letter in *L’Aurore* and on the petitions in favor of a retrial that it sparked. Care is taken to mention that it is Clemenceau, editor of *L’Aurore*, who first uses the term *intellectuel* to identify the Dreyfusards,

¹⁰ David Drake, *Intellectuals and Politics in Post-War France* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 1.

¹¹ Christophe Charle, *Naissance des “intellectuels,” 1880-1900* (Paris: Minuit, 1990), 234.

but few acknowledge that it was the anti-Dreyfusard Barrès who actually popularized it.¹² In general, the historical category of the intellectual is conflated with the Dreyfusard's self-identification as the defender of the abstract, Enlightenment ideals and the Rights of Man.¹³

The model of the intellectual in these histories of the Dreyfus Affair is the universalist defender of Truth, individual rights, and Justice presented in Julien Benda's *La Trahison des clercs*. It is important to note here that Benda's treasonous cleric was not the responsible engaged thinker of the Left who engaged in the name of universal values, but rather Barrès, Maurras, and the right-wing writers who defended the anti-intellectual "passions" of nationalism, anti-internationalism, "anti-semitism, capitalism, and anti-democratism."¹⁴ The primary figures in these historical narratives are Emile Zola, Anatole France, Emile Duclaux and the other Dreyfusards. In his study of intellectuals over the century, it is the Dreyfusard character M. Bergeret¹⁵ that Michel Winock describes as, "nearly a half-century before Sartre, the model of the engaged writer."¹⁶ When the intellectuals are discussed as a collectivity, it is the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme, signers of *L'Aurore* petitions, and other Dreyfusard organizations that are explored.¹⁷ Although Barrès, Maurras, Brunetière and others of the Right are occasionally mentioned as opponents to these intellectuals, they are ignored in all discussions of the elite category.¹⁸

¹² Interestingly, Barrès would popularize the term *intellectuel* but his use of it was intended to be pejorative. The Dreyfusards accepted the term despite its initial connotations and quickly convinced the public that all the traits that Barrès accused the intellectual of having were, in fact, positive attributes.

¹³ Robert Holub, "It's Academic: Intellectual Responsibility and the Rise of Neo-Mandarinism," in *Responsibility and Commitment*, 22-34 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1996), 26.

¹⁴ Julien Benda, *La Trahison des clercs* (Paris: Grasset, 1956), 18-35.

¹⁵ From Anatole France's novel *Monsieur Bergeret à Paris*.

¹⁶ Winock, *Le siècle des intellectuels*, 67.

¹⁷ H. L. Wesseling, *Certain Ideas of France: Essays on French History and Civilization* (London: Greenwood Press, 2002), 64.

¹⁸ Although Maurras and the Action Française are usually given the historical attention that their impact on the pre-World War I and interwar intellectual world demands, they are still seen as an anomaly. Rather than showing the AF intellectuals as "the statistical majority and ideologically dominant" force that they

In fact, most of the attention paid to the Anti-Dreyfusard Right is for its refusal to engage and its rejection of the term intellectual. Although the Anti-Dreyfusard camp would claim equal rights to the title and role of the intellectual within a year of “J’accuse,” historians rarely if ever acknowledge this change of heart.¹⁹ Even had they claimed the title from the beginning, the oppositional values of the anti-Dreyfusards would still have earned them the immediate categorization of “anti-intellectual.” Michel Winock, for example, declares that since, “the literary Right including Barrès, Brunetière, and Maurras expressed the anti-intellectualist demand for *enracinement* against the universalism of the intellectuals...one understands why, afterwards, the terms *intellectuel* and *intellectuel de gauche* are often taken for synonyms.”²⁰ In discussing the origins of the phenomenon of anti-intellectualism, Pascal Balmand writes that the “explicitly anti-intellectualist position” is that of the thinkers who engage “against the Dreyfusard petitions.”²¹ His argument is that the anti-Dreyfusards refused the universalism and abstract rationalism of the intellectual Left in favor of national relativism and realism. “One sees here,” he concludes of this anti-Dreyfusard value system, “the quasi-totality of the ingredients of anti-intellectualism.”²² Historians therefore take from the Dreyfusard intellectuals their first and most enduring model of intellectual identity while conversely portraying the Anti-Dreyfusard as the quintessential anti-intellectualist.

This historiographical tendency continues in discussions of the intellectuals of the early 1900s and World War I. The history of the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates is presented as the conflict

were in the interwar years, Sirinelli and Ory, *Les Intellectuels en France*, 41., most general intellectual histories tend to isolate discussion of the AF under a sub-title or separate chapter and to explore their intellectual world and views only to the extent necessary to show them as opponents of the intellectual Left. And, to remind readers of the unsuitability of the AF thinkers for the category of intellectual, these discussions usually end with a reminder of the AF’s fascist sympathies and later collaboration.

¹⁹ For example, see the description of Barrès and Brunetière’s opposition to the term in Stephen T. Leonard’s “Introduction” in *Intellectuals and Public Life: Between Radicalism and Reform*, ed. Leon Fink, Stephen T. Leonard, Donald M. Reid (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 10.

²⁰ Winock, *Le siècle des intellectuels*, 612.

²¹ Pascal Balmand, “L’anti-intellectualisme dans la culture politique française,” *Vingtième Siècle* 36 (1992), 35.

²² *Ibid.*, 35.

between the intellectuals, who are the socialist and republican proponents of the desirable ideals of democratized education, scientific progress, and international intellectual exchange, and the anti-intellectuals, the conservative, royalist defenders of social elitism, backward traditionalism, and intellectual xenophobia.²³ Much attention is admittedly paid to the right-wing “Agathon” who initiated the debates over educational reform, but his position is ultimately deplored as reactionary, closed minded, and Germanophobic. The dominant image of the intellectual is instead the left-wing university reformers from Gabriel Monod to Emile Durkheim. In histories of this period, the most persistent narrative is of the betrayal by the universalist intellectual during the Union Sacrée and his post-World War I redemption. Romain Rolland and *Au-dessus de la mêlée* are therefore given great attention in these analyses despite the fact that, in reality, Rolland was marginalized by his peers. Most analyses of the war-time intellectuals agree that “the intellectual” was frightened into an uncharacteristic, anti-intellectual nationalism and traditionalism during the war, but returned to his rightful responsibilities of universalism and internationalism soon afterward. In this way, historians continue to portray Benda’s left-wing universalist as the model that all intellectuals strove to emulate during the years surrounding World War I. Their narrative implies the behavior of the intellectuals of the Right, who supported continued intellectual mobilization after the war, was anti-intellectual.

Benda’s “universalist” intellectual model remains a powerful image for historians well beyond their discussion of the Dreyfus Affair, Nouvelle Sorbonne, and World War I intellectuals. However, they increasingly merge it with the left-wing model of the committed, anti-fascist intellectual that first emerges in the Popular Front and will later be embodied by Sartre. In one example of this merger, Winock writes of the new committed intellectual, the “clerc of Benda found himself anew bound to intervene” in the Popular Front crusades since anti-fascist commitment concerned “as in the time of Dreyfusism, putting oneself in the service of universal values against the

²³ Martha Hanna’s *The Mobilization of Intellect: French Scholars and Writers During the Great War* breaks this mold somewhat by showing the broad appeal of the intellectual Right’s cultural values during the war while emphasizing the underlying differences between the Left and Right. Even she, however, identifies the Right as the “counter-intelligentsia.”

menace of particular, nationalist, racist passions.”²⁴ For narratives of interwar engagement, intellectual identity is derived from the Popular Front intellectuals of the *NRF*, *CVIA*, and *AEAR* like Gide, Malraux, and Nizan and is inextricable from the new essential intellectual value of antifascism. “The focus,” Paul Mazgaj writes of this historiographical tendency, “has been almost exclusively on the anti-fascist Left- so much so that the origins of intellectual engagement have come to be virtually equated with the individuals, organizations, and publications surrounding the Popular Front.”²⁵ Being an intellectual, according to most historians of the interwar period and the Occupation, means being an opponent of fascism and its morally repugnant values. It is difficult for scholars today to reconcile the values and worldviews of fascism with rational, educated thought, so the concept of an extreme-Right or fascist intellectual is unfathomable. Richard Golsan, for example, complains that the lack of critical reflection on the work of Drieu la Rochelle is “because Drieu was an artist, intellectual, AND fascist which poses problems for the [American] critic for whom, traditionally, there exists a discrepancy/gulf, or to say it better, an insurmountable abyss between art and culture on one hand and fascism on the other.”²⁶ Because of this, histories of the interwar intellectual tend to focus primarily on the anti-fascist republican, socialist, and communist intellectuals of the Left and ignore their counterparts on the Right. However, the large audiences that supported the extensive extreme Right publications and organizations is a reminder that, although historians today find an abyss between fascism and culture, fascist intellectuals not only engaged, they wielded significant influence over public opinion in the 1930s and provided an authoritative opposition to the intellectual Left.

Representatives of the extreme Right like Robert Brasillach and Drieu la Rochelle can seldom be completely ignored in the intellectual narrative of the interwar because of their notoriety. Instead,

²⁴ Winock, *Le siècle des intellectuels*, 613.

²⁵ Paul Mazgaj, “Engagement and the French Nationalist Right: The Case of the Jeune Droite,” *European History Quarterly* 32, no. 2 (2002), 207.

²⁶ Richard Golsan, “Drieu la Rochelle aux Etats-Unis: Entre l’Esthétique et le Fascisme” in *Drieu la Rochelle; Ecrivain et Intellectuel: actes du colloque international* (Paris: Presses de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, 1995), 65.

they are presented as anti-intellectual counter-examples to the anti-fascist intellectual or as aberrations in the fabric of intellectual society.²⁷ Balmand makes the association of anti-intellectualism with the interwar extreme Right quite clear by claiming that during these years it was right-wing thinkers Drieu la Rochelle, Péguy, Céline, and the movements like the Croix de Feu, the PPF of Doriot and others “close to fascism in the 1930s” which “integrate into their ideology a strongly marked anti-intellectualist component.”²⁸ He claims to reveal Drieu’s clear anti-intellectualism by quoting a line from *Chronique Politique* where Drieu wrote, “European statistics pronounce a crushing condemnation against the physical administration of the French nation by the old world gagged with intellectuals of the Left.”²⁹ Balmand wants readers to focus on the word “intellectuals” in this sentence in order to make Drieu an anti-intellectualist. But Drieu, like many on the Right, in fact desired the title and role of the intellectual. It was the values, programs, and organizations attached to it by the Left that he rejected. He is revealed to be not an anti-intellectualist but rather an opponent of the intellectual model created by the Left when the phrase is completed to read “intellectuals *of the Left*.”

The inclination to write the history of intellectuals according to the perspective of the intellectual Left reaches its peak in discussions of the Occupation and postwar era. Intellectual life during the occupation is usually presented as the struggle of certain anti-fascists to write under censorship or from exile, the formation of an intellectual Resistance around the CNE, or the treason and subsequent decline of once respected intellectual outlets such as the *NRF* and the Sorbonne under collaborationist control. But, because the only authorized intellectual expression during the occupation was by the collaborationists, it is impossible to ignore the presence of the intellectual

²⁷ For example, Robert Soucy, *Fascist Intellectual: Drieu la Rochelle* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), or Alice Kaplan, *Reproductions of Banality : fascism, literature, and French intellectual life* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), or Michel Laval, *Brasillach, ou La trahison du clerc* (Paris: Hachette, 1992).

²⁸ Balmand, “L’anti-intellectualisme,” 36-7.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 38.

extreme Right during the period. Instead, historians, like Shlomo Sand, delegitimize the collaborationists and present them as pseudo-intellectuals, modern day “grub street” hacks who can only rise to prominence when the legitimate intellectual Left is suppressed.³⁰ The aforementioned inability to reconcile fascism with intellectual responsibility is amplified when historians consider the abyss between the left-wing values, which are seen as in keeping with French intellectual traditions, and collaborationism, which is seen as its antithesis. “In contrast to republicanism or communism,” Sand notes, “the presence of fascism and nazism in French culture is considered a deformation of its national self-identity.”³¹ This is made quite clear by resistance to the idea of a native French fascism from both contemporaries of the interwar and occupation periods and from many historians.³² It follows easily, therefore, that writers and thinkers who promoted these ideologies were a deformation of the French intellectual. Historian Marie Balvet expresses this assumed incompatibility of collaborationism and intellectual identity in the introductory warning to readers, “fascist doctrine signifies the negation of all thought, of all culture,” while Alice Kaplan simply summarizes the work of Drieu la Rochelle saying, “it is nauseating.”³³ Collaborationism and French fascism have irreparably damaged the ability of scholars, even half a century later, to view the extreme Right thinkers of the interwar and occupation as legitimate intellectuals. And, to a lesser extent, accusation of pre-fascism or neo-fascism has also affected interpretations of the intellectual Right as early as Dreyfus Affair and as late as the modern day. Yet, once again, if historians can appreciate the intellectual as a category derived from one’s role in French affairs and practice of political

³⁰ Shlomo Sand, “The Croix de Feu and fascism : a foreign thesis obstinately maintained,” in *The Development of the Radical Right in France from Boulanger to Le Pen*, ed. Edward J. Arnold (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 95.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 96.

³² ie Sartre’s “Qu’est ce que la littérature?” in the immediate postwar, and the argument of René Rémond and others against the possibility of French fascism which, despite the work on French fascism by Zeev Sternhell, Robert Soucy, and David Carroll, still influences historiography on fascism.

³³ Golsan, “Drieu la Rochelle aux Etats-Unis,” 71-4.

engagement, scholarly opposition to fascism and collaboration should not prove a barrier to analyzing and understanding the engaged thinkers of the extreme Right as intellectuals.

The relative silence of the defeated and purged intellectual Right during the postwar era is made absolute in its historical retelling. For historians of the postwar, the intellectual landscape is dominated by the figure of Sartre and his camp around *Les Temps modernes* while Camus, Aragon, and the PCF intellectuals take secondary, though still important, places. The history of the intellectual of the post-war is consistently presented as the rise and decline of the CNE, the emergence of *Les Temps modernes*, the faltering of intellectual commitment to the USSR after 1956, the subsequent transfer of allegiance to China and Cuba, and the return to Enlightenment roots in the crusade against colonialism in Algeria and Vietnam. When the intellectual opposition to the communist and Sartrian camps is considered in these narratives, it is the liberal Aron and the republican, pro-American, capitalist, and anti-colonialist representation of the intellectual that is presented, not the writers of the extreme Right and their representation. It is true that many histories of the postwar critique the intellectual extreme Left for its commitment to communism and support for the USSR despite revelations of Stalinist suppression. What is important for this study, however, is not the historian's disapprobation of the intellectual extreme Left but the fact that the intellectuals of the Left, even when considered irresponsible, are still considered the only representatives of intellectual engagement during these periods. The existence of intellectuals of the extreme Right in the postwar is seldom even considered a possibility. Even James LeSueur's discussion of the intellectual support for French Algeria draws its image of the oppositional intellectual from Camus, Soustelle, and others previously aligned on the French Left, rather than the anti-colonialist writers of the extreme Right.³⁴ It is clear, therefore, that for the historian of the postwar intellectual, the important debates that redefine

³⁴ James D. LeSueur, *Uncivil War: Intellectuals and Identity Politics during the decolonization of Algeria* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 4-6.

intellectual identity after the occupation are held internally among engagés of the Republic and extreme Left.³⁵

The tendency among historians of intellectuals has therefore been to either ignore the existence of engaged thinkers on the extreme Right or to present their ideas and organizations as “anti-intellectual.” This tendency is not necessarily calculated or even intentional. It is simply an automatic omission, an engrained preconception among historians of what it means to be an intellectual. The identity of the intellectual has been drawn from the Left’s concept of intellectual values, roles, responsibilities, professional trajectories, organizations, causes, and experiences that have been hegemonic over the century. The hegemony has been so complete that today it is virtually impossible to picture the intellectual outside of its confines. Because the identity of the intellectual has been preconceived in this way, intellectual history has been written as the story of the engagement of the intellectual Left while the intellectual Right has been, at best, underrepresented. This, however, was not the historical experience. There were self-identified intellectuals of the extreme Right who, like those of the Left, chose to engage their name, talents, and work in public affairs. They were not opposed to the title, role or responsibility of the public intellectual but only to the associations that had been conflated with intellectual identity by the Left, associations that did not correspond to the Right’s understanding of what it meant to be an intellectual.

The Historical Conflict

The concern with defining intellectual identity and creating a model of intellectual engagement is not, therefore, simply an academic question or an historian’s quarrel. It was a concern that consumed the intellectuals themselves. The role and responsibility of the intellectual was one that conferred status, authority, legitimacy, and political influence in twentieth-century France. The ability

³⁵ LeSueur shows that the debates of the 1960s over who could be considered an intellectual were meant to determine if the intellectuals previously accepted as “of the Left,” like Camus, who were now promoting French Algeria could still be considered intellectuals. There was no thought at the time of according this consideration to the extreme-Right. LeSueur and other historians of the post-war have simply continued this trend.

to monopolize and control this identity as France's intellectual, cultural, and moral guides was therefore highly contested over the century. Because the intellectual Left took an early and substantial lead in this contest, defining the intellectual according to their own, alternative, right-wing conceptualization became a particular obsession among the engaged thinkers of the extreme Right. Woven in the fabric of intellectual debates over the century, particularly on the part of the Right, is the underlying struggle to control what it meant to be an intellectual: what relationship the intellectual has to government, society, and particular institutions like the university, what set of political, social, and intellectual values an intellectual engages to defend, and what trajectories, communities, and experiences make one an intellectual. This century-long struggle to dictate the model of intellectual identity, particularly on the part of the extreme Right, has not received the attention of intellectual historians. Exploring the motivation, process, and result of this struggle to define a right-wing model of intellectual identity is therefore a central component of this study. It finds that during each crisis period over the century, when intellectuals felt themselves called to engage, this right-wing struggle to define true intellectual identity would follow a certain pattern: perceived exclusion, resentment, legitimization and differentiation, segregation, and, finally, alienation. These stages of their struggle would in turn become essential to their concept of the experience and identity of the true, right-wing intellectual.

In 1898 when Zola and Clemenceau first outlined the fundamental program of the intellectual, the academics and men of letters of the Right intentionally excluded themselves from its company. For a full year, the Left gained increasing public influence by claiming their education, intelligence, and understanding of universal truths qualified them to direct public opinion in all matters cultural, moral, and socio-political. By 1899, when the Right decided to engage, the Left had effectively dominated public perception of intellectual values, causes, responsibilities and identity. Its intellectuals reinforced their monopoly by instructing the public, as Jaures would, that "intellectuals

of the Right have no right to the title of *intellectuel*.”³⁶ From this point on, the Right perceived itself decidedly, and no longer happily, excluded from the general concept of the intellectual guide. After 1898, the intellectual Right would identify itself as the excluded, ostracized, minority whose role was opposition to the mainstream, dominant intellectual and political world.

With each successive crisis in French affairs, the intellectuals of the Right believed themselves increasingly ostracized from intellectual influence. They perceived their values and their presence to be marginalized in the university system and ensured their marginalization in reality by turning away from this professional path in ever-greater numbers. They also increasingly saw a left-wing hegemony in political affairs. Whether real, as in the case of the Popular Front and Liberation government, or imagined, the intellectual Right believed it was opposed by a united bloc of the center Republicans and extreme Left socialists or communists. The Right saw itself as excluded from mainstream politics, intellectual institutions, and the very identification and influence of the intellectual guide by what it believed was a hegemonic left-leaning bloc. Rather than protest first two ostracisms, the intellectual of the Right incorporated them into his model of true intellectual identity. The true intellectual would always work outside and in opposition to the existing Republican government and would be prominent outside the narrow confines of the sterile university. Exclusion from the role of intellectual guide, however, was not tolerable. Their reaction was one of frustration and profound resentment of the hegemony of the Left.³⁷

The result of the Right’s resentment and irritation with the dominance of the Left would be their crusade to legitimize an alternative, right-wing intellectual identity outside of, opposed to, and clearly differentiated from the dominant identity of the Left. This onus on the Right to first legitimize and lend authority to their position as intellectuals before ever entering into the political fray would give them a very different mentality of engagement from the intellectual of the Left who had no such insecurities. Engagement for the Right involved not just commentary on a public issue, but also a

³⁶ Charle, *Naissance des “intellectuels,”* 163.

concerted campaign to claim the title and role of the “intellectual,” delegitimize the Left as a viable representative of French culture and intelligence, and market their own, alternative values, worldviews, and programs as those most conducive to French intellectual life. Vocal anti-Dreyfusard Ferdinand Brunetière would be one of the first to express his resentment and attempt to legitimize the Right by writing in 1898, “It has irritated us to hear it said that all the men of study and thought, all the intellectuals, were on the same side. This is not true and we are proof of it. It is necessary to show that intelligence... did not take part in the abominable campaign [of the Dreyfusard intellectuals] against the army.”³⁸ Claiming the title and role of intellectual while simultaneously delegitimizing the dominant, left-wing image of this identity required that the intellectual of the Right clearly differentiate his own sense of role, responsibility, values, and identity from those condemned on the Left.

Differentiating the values and worldviews of the Right from those of the Left would be an evident priority in all of the engaged work of the intellectual Right throughout the century. The Left was accused of unfairly and unrealistically claiming to speak for the universal, to grasp absolute truths, and to incarnate the international citizen of the world. Instead, the intellectual Right proposed the more realistic, if less awe-inspiring, role of speaking for the French nation, revealing its particular, relative truths, and representing the intelligence of True France. To left-wing responsibility of developing utopian theories they opposed political Realism and practical reform, against the Left’s vision for France of egalitarianism, democracy, and social revolution they presented a France of hierarchy, elitism, meritorious leadership, and social order. Over the century, the political programs and platforms of the extreme Right would evolve, but the intellectual values and worldviews that inspired them would always be presented as distinctive, opposed, and extremely different alternatives to the values of the Left.

The Right’s struggle to differentiate the values and worldviews that it associated with intellectual responsibility from those attached to it on the Left would contribute to a parallel

³⁸ Ferdinand Brunetière, *Après le Procès; réponse à quelques ‘intellectuels’* (Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1898).

segregation of the intellectual community over time. Before the Dreyfus Affair, men of letters and journalists of different political persuasion often found themselves writing for the same revues, teaching in the same institutions, and sharing the same socio-professional network of mentors, friends, and colleagues. As intellectual engagement and political involvement increasingly polarized the intellectual community, however, these cross-political environments became more and more rare.

Although the intellectuals of the extreme Right and Left might still participate in the same basic intellectual practices, from writing in revues to teaching students to signing petitions, the collective experience of these practices and, therefore, of daily intellectual life, became increasingly segregated and differentiated. Revues and journals became organs of engaged thought for either the extreme Right or extreme Left where intellectuals' values and political positions were reinforced and radicalized. Even revues like the *NRF* that attempted to remain above the polarizing fray would eventually take a political stance and begin to exclude those writers who did not toe the political line. The university increasingly became a bastion of republican, socialist, and later communist intellectuals while the educators on the Right created alternative, right-wing dominated institutions to mentor the next generation. Social and professional networks, spaces of sociability and intellectual communities from petitions to cafes, and even private friendships showed increasing signs of a left-right divide.³⁹ As the collective spaces and experience of intellectual life became ever more polarized and segregated, the individual intellectual's concept of his collective identity as a member of the genus "intellectual" would too.

From the Dreyfus Affair to the post-modern era, the intellectuals of the Right perceived themselves to be excluded and ostracized from the political and, more importantly, the intellectual life and leadership of France. Their reaction was one of resentment and frustration against the dominant Left. In their resentment, they struggled to redefine true, legitimate intellectual identity according to their own, alternative intellectual values and communities and to clearly differentiate and even

³⁹ Friendships that crossed political divides like that of Romain Rolland and Alphonse de Châteaubriant did exist but are remarkable, and remarked upon, for their peculiarity. Even these friendships showed the strain of conflicting political passions and intellectual values in private letters.

physically separate these from the Left. The result of this pattern of exclusion, resentment, differentiation, and segregation, however, has been not a newfound right-wing monopoly over the definition and conceptualization of the intellectual. Instead, it has resulted in their self-imposed alienation from mainstream, Left-dominated intellectual life. In their effort to distinguish themselves from the intellectuals of the Left, they have created a vicious cycle in which they sense themselves excluded, react by differentiating and isolating themselves, and find themselves increasingly marginalized and alienated. This has, in the end, adversely affected both their ability to communicate effectively with the mainstream public and their recognition by contemporaries and historians as intellectuals.

The two aims of this study are therefore intertwined. The historiographical tendency to exclude the intellectual of the Right today is a result of the Left's century-long success in monopolizing the concept and also of the Right's self-imposed isolation. By revealing the historical struggle that the Right waged to be recognized as intellectuals, it seeks to expose and challenge the tendency among intellectual historians today to treat the *intellectuel de droite* as a contradiction in terms. The struggle to monopolize the concept of the intellectual and the right-wing effort to construct its own, alternative model of intellectual identity would peak at certain points over the century when intellectuals of the Left and Right perceived France to be in crisis and to need intellectual guidance. For each of these periods of conflict, the study explores the perception of left-wing dominance, the resentment of this hegemony felt by the Right, the struggle to legitimize their own values and worldviews while differentiating them from those of the Left, and the resulting division and segregation of the intellectual community. From this pattern of identity construction, the study will develop a new model of right-wing intellectual identity. But, before considering how the chapters will be structured in more detail, it is necessary to explain how three essential concepts will be understood for the purposes of this study: the intellectual, identity, and the Right.

Key Concepts: The “Intellectual”

The very premise of this study is that the definition of the intellectual is one that has been contested over the century and that remains a flawed category of analysis in the current historiography. The purpose is, therefore, to construct a new, right-wing model of intellectual identity and a more accurate picture of the intellectual community as a whole. To construct this model, however, some basic parameters of the intellectual as an historical actor are necessary. There are several existing approaches the intellectual that provide this starting point for discussion and that do not *a priori* exclude the concept of a right-wing intellectual.

In historical scholarship, intellectuals have been categorized and defined as universalists and particularists, organic and traditional, legislators and interpreters, critics and experts, producers and mediators, and as teachers, writers, and celebrities to name only a few.⁴⁰ As a general rule, the categorizations and definitions tend to be either ideological or sociological in nature. The first considers the intellectual as a product of his political and cultural values and ideas and leads to definitions like “child of the Enlightenment,” “universalists,” and “special custodians of abstract ideas like reason and justice and truth.”⁴¹ This approach has produced the definitions that most clearly exclude the intellectual of the Right. This does not mean, however, that a values-based approach is not useful for defining the intellectual of the Right if the ideas and values associated with the intellectual can be disassociated from the Left.

The second approach defines the intellectual by his role in society, his behaviors, and his relation to power. This latter approach often borrows from Bourdieu’s sociology of knowledge to

⁴⁰ Winock, *Dictionnaire*, 15; Antonio Gramsci, *The Prison Notebooks* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); Zygmunt Bauman, *Legislators and interpreters: on modernity, post-modernity, and intellectuals* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Lloyd Kramer, “Habermas, Foucault, and the legacy of enlightenment intellectuals” in *Intellectuals and Public Life: Between Radicalism and Reform*, ed. Leon Fink, Stephen T. Leonard, Donald M. Reid (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Jean-François Sirinelli and Pascal Ory, *Les intellectuels en France; de l’Affaire Dreyfus à nos jours* (Paris: A Colin, 1986); Régis Debray, *Teachers, writers, celebrities : the intellectuals of modern France* tr. David Macey (London: NLB, 1981).

⁴¹ The last is from Stephen T. Leonard, *Intellectuals and Public Life*, 15. Leonard is quoting Lewis Coser’s concept of the intellectual from *Men of Ideas: a Sociologists View* (New York, 1965).

consider the intellectual as a product of his habitus and as a being struggling to monopolize power over cultural legitimacy.⁴² These sociological studies have considered the intellectual as a product of his relationship to institutions and proximity to professional power,⁴³ connections to the Republican government or the social elite,⁴⁴ and placement within certain academic disciplines.⁴⁵ They have led to differentiations between the organic and traditional intellectuals and between the terms *intelligentsia* and *intellectual* as well as to categorizations based on the intellectual's role and behavior. Because these definitions are based on the role of the intellectual to intervene in public affairs rather than on a particular set of values, they do not automatically exclude engaged thinkers of the Right. Therefore, it is one such "value-free" approach utilized by French intellectual scholars Pascal Ory and Jean-François Sirinelli, that will provide the basic definition of an intellectual for this study.⁴⁶

In contrast to the majority of their contemporaries, Jean-François Sirinelli and Pascal Ory have been instrumental in developing a concept of the intellectual that recognizes the existence of intellectuals of the Right. Several chapters in *Les Intellectuels en France; de l'Affaire Dreyfus a nos jours* are devoted to right-wing intellectual organizations and engagés, and their overall approach to the narrative of intellectual history appreciates the importance of including the intellectual Right. Sirinelli's later study of the war of petitions between Left and Right, *Intellectuels et passions française; manifestes et petitions au XXe siècle*, continued this balanced appraisal of intellectual

⁴² Pierre Bourdieu, *Homo Academicus*, trans. Peter Collier (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988).

⁴³ Gisele Sapiro, *La Guerre des écrivains; 1940-1953* (Paris: Fayard, 1999).

⁴⁴ Fritz Ringer, *Fields of Knowledge: French academic culture in comparative perspective, 1890-1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

⁴⁵ Charle, *Naissance des "intellectuals,"* 147-8.

⁴⁶ Although there are others whose sociological definitions would be useful for this study, I prefer to use the work of Sirinelli and Ory since it specifically focuses on French intellectuals.

engagement.⁴⁷ The definition used in these works to determine who can be considered an intellectual is found in Pascal Ory's *Qu'est-ce qu'un intellectuel?* which says, "The intellectual is the man of culture put in the situation of the man of politics. He belongs to one of the great universes of culture: creation or mediation."⁴⁸ In this way both the artists, writers, and scientists who produce culture and the *universitaires* and critics who mediate or comment on it are considered intellectuals.⁴⁹

Essential to their definition, and of great importance for this study, is the understanding that the intellectual is not defined by his social placement or his political values but by his action: "he is not defined by what he is but by what he does, i.e. a certain type of intervention in a certain place; la cite." "The intellectual," he explains, "will be political in that which he intervenes- civic debates, city planning, etc when he proposes a choice of society to his contemporaries in the name of cultural choice."⁵⁰ From this it can be concluded that the intellectual is necessarily engaged and that "engaged intellectual" is redundant. A writer or savant who does not lend his name, prestige, and work to the debate on political or social affairs is a "philosopher" rather than an "intellectual." On the other extreme, a writer or savant who takes political office can also not be considered an intellectual but only a politician or civil servant.⁵¹ Therefore, according to this basic definition, writers and savants who intervened in public debates without taking office, whether their political affiliation was to Left, Center, or Right, must be considered intellectuals.

A quick addition to this basic definition is made by Michel Winock who notes that it does not suffice for a writer to simply enter the field of public action or to make appeal to public opinion to

⁴⁷ Similarly, his three volume collection *Histoire des Droites en France* does not exclude or predetermine as "anti-intellectual" the values and organizations of the extreme Right from its discussion of the culture of the Right.

⁴⁸ In his work with Sirinelli, Ory would expand his definition of the intellectual to specify that the intellectual is "a producer or consummator of an ideology" as well as a "producer" and "mediator" of culture.

⁴⁹ Pascal Ory, "Qu'est-ce qu'un intellectuel?," in *Dernières questions aux intellectuels : et quatre essais pour y répondre*, ed. Pascal Ory (Paris: Oliver Orban, 1990), 25.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 25.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 27.

merit the name intellectual. It is also necessary to capitalize intentionally on the celebrity earned in another domain. This earned prestige in their respective literary or scientific disciplines is what Winock says causes intellectuals to believe they have the right to speak in the name of the public good and causes the average citizen to grant them this prerogative. An intellectual, he summarizes, is not just a signer of a petition but one who proposes to society an analysis, a direction, a morality that his previous work and education seems to qualify him to elaborate.⁵² Along similar lines, Manon Brunet and Pierre Lanthier have specifically introduced the concept of social influence to the definition of the intellectual. They argue that it is essential to the intellectual's identity that he not simply intervene, but that he actively seek to build support for his position among the greater public. They say "the intellectual is one who, without proclamation of his title, affirms publicly his ideas while seeking to rally the greatest number of citizens to his cause, in the name of the safeguarding of national identity."⁵³ This requirement that the intellectual feel a responsibility for gaining legitimacy and social authority for an intellectual position is essential to understanding the right-wing's struggle to reverse left-wing dominance. By claiming the title of *intellectuel*, the right-wing thinkers are demanding both the authority and responsibility to sway public opinion.

Closely connected to these stipulations by Winock, Brunet, and Lanthier is a final requirement clarified by Jeremy Jennings and Herman Lebovics: the intellectual claims the power to speak in the name of "True France." Jennings listed three preconditions for the model of the intellectual. The intellectual had autonomy, was granted status by society, and "spoke for France." Unfortunately, Jennings continued by specifying only the Dreyfusard vision of France, "the France of the Enlightenment and of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. Their France spoke

⁵² Michel Winock and Jacques Julliard, *Dictionnaire des intellectuels français: les personnes, les lieux, les moments* (Paris: Seuil, 1996) 15.

⁵³ Manon Brunet and Pierre Lanthier, "L'intellectuel et son milieu," in *L'Inscription sociale de l'intellectuel*, ed. Manon Brunet and Pierre Lanthier (Paris: Presses de l'Université Laval, 2000), 16.

and proclaimed a universal Truth.”⁵⁴ But, he does admit that there were “competing conceptions of France” and that the anti-Dreyfusards had their own vision. Herman Lebovics explains that, among intellectuals, these competing conceptions of France led to “combats between Left and Right for the right to speak on behalf of ‘True France.’”⁵⁵ While the Left claimed to speak for the universal, international values associated with France since the Revolution, the Right claimed to be the “sole representatives of the French heritage” and to speak for French national values which were vital for maintaining French identity and defending against foreign influence.⁵⁶ Right-wing conceptions of an ‘essential’ France, the “pays reel” based on blood, soil, religion, language, and shared history and tradition were pitted against those on the Republican center and Left of a civic French nation based on the documents and ideals of the Republic and the French Revolution.⁵⁷ The struggle to monopolize the authority of the intellectual was therefore in part a struggle between Left and Right to determine whose vision of France would prevail.

There are two final parameters for the use of the term “intellectual” in this study. First, although Venita Datta has made convincing arguments for the extension of the birth of the intellectual to the mid 1890s and several historians, including Shlomo Sand, have urged readers to consider Voltaire or Auguste Comte intellectuals, the majority of historians have agreed that the Dreyfus Affair of 1898 is the date for the birth of the modern intellectual.⁵⁸ Although Voltaire and others may have engaged their work independently for a specific social cause, it is not until the Dreyfus Affair that writers and savants exercise, all at the same time, the right to public critique, the right to

⁵⁴ Jennings, “1898-1998,” 831.

⁵⁵ Herman Lebovics, *True France: the wars over cultural identity, 1900-1945* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), xiv.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, xiii.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 137.

⁵⁸ Venita Datta, *Birth of a National Icon: the literary avant garde and the origins of the intellectual in France* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999); Shlomo Sand. “Images of the Intellectual in France,” in *Intellectuals in twentieth-century France: Mandarins and Samurais*, ed. Jeremy Jennings (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992).

symbolic power drawn from their titles and educations, and the right to league themselves to give their protest more force.⁵⁹ It is also not until 1898 that the term “intellectuel” is found beyond literary circles and is popularized to the extent that it begins to appear in common language dictionaries.⁶⁰ It is therefore with the Dreyfus Affair and the first debates over who can be attributed the title of ‘intellectual’ and who must suffer the name ‘anti-intellectual’ that this study will begin. Secondly, although Nicole Racine’s article “Intellectuelles” argues for the inclusion of female intellectuals,⁶¹ this study will maintain the masculine form of the noun. In the debates over intellectual identity, the contribution of female *intellectuelles* was negligible.⁶² Also, despite the association of the extreme Right, particularly during the interwar and occupation, with the homosocial and misogynistic elements of fascism, there is little evidence that the intellectual Right was any less inclusive of females than the intellectual Left.⁶³ Because gender was not an issue in the construction of right-wing intellectual identity, it is not of interest for this study.

According to these initial parameters, an “intellectual” is one who, as early as the Dreyfus Affair, engaged his earned prestige from literary, journalistic, or academic professional life in debates on political and social issues outside his immediate expertise. The intellectual assumed the authority to intervene because of his education and intelligence and believed he spoke in the name of True France. With this definition, it is quite possible to identify a large number of “intellectuals” on the extreme Right over the century. Such a definition does not, however, provide a very detailed tool for analysis and tends to provide only a vague picture of intellectuals that does not correspond to their

⁵⁹ Charle, *Naissance des “intellectuals,”* 8.

⁶⁰ Winock and Julliard, *Dictionnaire*, 15.

⁶¹ Nicole Racine, “Intellectuels,” in *L’histoire des intellectuels aujourd’hui*, ed. Michel Leymarie and Jean-François Sirinelli (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2003).

⁶² David Drake has attributed the general absence of engaged female intellectuals to the political restrictions on women throughout much of the twentieth-century. Even today, he writes, females are “largely absent” from the intellectual milieu. This absence was even more apparent in the debates over intellectual identity. Drake, *Intellectuals and Politics*, 5.

⁶³ For every left-wing Simone Weil or Simone de Beauvoir, there was an equally engaged, if perhaps less well known, Annie Jamet or Suzanne Labin on the extreme Right.

own complex self-identifications. In particular, it tends to group together intellectuals of the Left and Right based on their shared behaviors and to ignore the divisions they identified as clearly separating them.

Sociological methodologies and their resulting definitions of the intellectual are therefore excellent for initial categorization but not for further conceptualization of the intellectual. As Leonard has concluded, “the sociological approach achieved nothing so much as the verification of the difficulty of carving out a definition of intellectuals that makes no reference to the moral purposes and epistemic contents of the life of the mind.”⁶⁴ For a more complex understanding of intellectual identity, it is necessary to add some assessment of intellectual values, ideas, and worldviews to the foundation proposed by Ory and Sirinelli. For the purpose of this study, intellectual identity will be considered a product both of the social role, responsibility, and behaviors associated with engagement and of the intellectual, cultural, social and political values and ideas that drove this engagement.

Identity

The second concept used in this study that requires clarification, therefore, is that of identity and identity construction. The model of right-wing intellectual identity will be based on two contributing aspects: the personal identity of the individual intellectual and the collective identity of the community to which the intellectual sensed himself to belong. The first is formed by private reflection on ideas, values, personal responsibility, and purpose. The second is constructed by the individual’s identification with the values, ideas, actions and engagements of a larger group. The individual, therefore, conceives of himself as a composite of his social behaviors, associations, and experiences and of his values, ideas, and ideological affiliations. The individual nature of intellectual work, particularly for writers, has led scholars to consider the personal identity of intellectuals,

⁶⁴ Leonard, “Introduction,” 12.

whether through biographies or literary critiques, more readily than their collective identity. This second component, therefore, deserves some elaboration.

Social Identity theory explains that “our sense of who we are comes from two different but equally important aspects, “the personal identity component that is based on individual experience and thought and the social identity component which is based on participation in social networks and groups.”⁶⁵ The social or collective component allows any group with which the individual associates and identifies himself to become part of his concept of self. Searle-White justifies this integration saying, “group identities are not something separate from us...that we can put on and take off. When we categorize ourselves into a group, in a sense, that group becomes part of us as well as creating the perception of a connection to other members.”⁶⁶ Whether these groups are real and provide tangible interaction with others like committees and revue équipes, or are “imagined” communities where the group extends beyond the scope of physical interaction like petitions and international organizations, they all provide a sense of collective identity. This relational aspect of identity not only creates positive associations or “in groups” with like-minded peers, it also creates negative associations with the “out groups” who are seen as the “other.” Intellectuals on the Right gathered together in socio-professional and intellectual communities in order to find support and reinforcement for their alternative ideas, create mentoring relationships, interact socially, and amplify the effectiveness of their individual engagements. The more actively they identified with these separate right-wing communities, the more they found themselves to be different from the “out group” communities of intellectuals on the Left and Center.

The importance of this collective identity has been a focal point in the work of Sirinelli on the *lieux* and *reseaux* of intellectual sociability. According to Sirinelli, the structures of sociability where intellectuals gathered in their daily lives, from revue teams and publishing houses to educational

⁶⁵ Joshua Searle-White, *The Psychology of Nationalism* (New York: Palgrave Publishers, 2001), 50.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 51.

faculties, salons, *khagneux*, and even generations led to the creation of different groups of intellectuals who shared the same vocabulary, ideas, values, and worldviews. The shared behaviors and values within these organizations gave these groups their own identity in relation to the rest of society and created the sort of “in” and “out” groups discussed by Searl-White.⁶⁷ These studies by Sirinelli have been invaluable to the understanding of intellectual collective identity, and his concept of *lieux* and *reseaux* of sociability will be an important part of this study. Sirinelli’s approach, however, tends to ignore the important political divisions within his larger communities of intellectuals that further separated them. As the work of both Diane Rubenstein and Robert Smith have pointed out, although members of a certain class at the ENS or a certain generation may have felt a sense of connection, it did not prevent them from identifying more strongly with those in other generations or classes who shared similar socio-political values and engagements.⁶⁸ Like the other previously mentioned sociological categorizations, these structures of sociability remain vague tools for discussing identity because they do not take account of the important component of intellectual values and ideas. This weakness in Sirinelli’s approach to collective identity has been addressed by Michel Trebitsch and Philippe Dujardin. It is their approach to collective identity construction that will most heavily influence this study.

Trebitsch has criticized Sirinelli for being so eager to not “reduce the history of intellectuals to a piece of the larger political history” by dividing them automatically by political affiliation, that he “puts left and right intellectuals on the same level simply because they share identical structures of

⁶⁷ For example, Jean-François Sirinelli, “Les Khagneux et Normaliens des années 1920; un rameau de la generation de 1905,” in *Generations Intellectuelles: Effets d’âge et phenomenes de generation dans le milieu intellectuel francais* (Paris: Fayard, 1987); Jean-Francois Sirinelli, “Concept of an Intellectual Generation” in *Intellectuals in twentieth-century France: Mandarins and Samurais*, ed. Jeremy Jennings (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992).

⁶⁸ Robert Smith, *The Ecole Normale Supérieure and the Third Republic* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982); Diane Rubenstein, *What’s Left: The Ecole Normale Supérieure and the Right* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990).

sociability like cercles, revues, and cafés.”⁶⁹ For Trebitsch, histories of intellectuals that only consider the question of values as secondary, preferring instead a pure description of behavior and engagement of the individual within a collective, are ill founded. Relational practices like socializing within a certain group are always founded on adherence to common values which “determine a specific sociability where the established relationships are always primarily in rapport with those values.”⁷⁰ Dujardin continues in this vein warning that the tool of sociability can lead historians to ignore personal identities and a more complex sense of connection in favor of broad categorizations of intellectual identity based on a shared space or type of behavior.⁷¹ Identifying intellectual communities without the context of their political currents of thought ends up “confounding” the very different intellectual identities of the Left and Right that “their modes of sociability [alone] are not able to differentiate.”⁷² Trebitsch and Dujardin therefore provide strong justification for considering not only the sociological divisions within the collective intellectual identity but also the intellectual or value-based divisions between Left and Right that contribute to a more nuanced identity.

This study will approach identity in two ways in order to account for both the individual and collective components of identity and the intellectual and sociological aspects of intellectual life. First, a view of the intellectual of the Right will be drawn from the individual statements, writings, and reflections of representative right-wing thinkers. Special attention will be given to their own definitions of what it meant to be an intellectual and the values and worldviews they believed the “intellectual” should defend. Secondly, the intellectual of the Right will be viewed as a collective through the groups, movements, organizations and organs with which he identified. These politically segregated communities of like-minded thinkers provided not only support, outlets for engagement,

⁶⁹ Michel Trebitsch, *Sociabilités Intellectuelles: lieux, milieux, réseaux*, ed. Michel Trebitsch and Nicole Racine (Paris: Institut d'histoire du temps présent, 1992), 18.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 22.

⁷¹ Ibid., 23.

⁷² Ibid., 23.

and social interaction for members, they also reinforced a sense of separation, differentiation and alienation in intellectual values. Since it is the purpose of this study to identify those elements that distinguished the intellectual identity, both personal and collective, of the Right from that of the Center and Left, it is also important to clarify how this study will define the Right.

The Right

It is necessary to clarify how the term “Right” will be used and who will be considered “of the Right.” To some extent, this study is as much an effort to define the ideological extreme Right as it is to define the intellectual. The engaged thinkers of the Right and Left played a large part in the construction and translation of the political ideologies to which they adhered. The values and worldviews that the intellectuals of the Right believed differentiated them from the Left were therefore also essential to their definition of what it meant to be “dits à droite.” Because of this, the exploration of right-wing intellectual identity construction in this study will reveal as much about right-wing identity as it does about intellectual identity. The model developed at the conclusion of the study to understand the intellectual of the Right will also, therefore, provide some insight into the world of the extreme Right. However, the focus of the study will remain on the intellectual. The rank and file political Right of the non-intellectual leagues, organizations, political parties, and youth groups will be mentioned only when they influence or interact with the intellectual groups or are necessary as context for the intellectual community.

Although this study will focus on the intellectuals at the extreme ends of the political spectrum, it is important to recognize that historians have tended to ignore the ideological Right as a whole. Sirinelli has noted, in his three volume set *Histoire des Droites en France*, that the study of the political Right as a cultural and socio-political phenomenon has been sadly under-represented. He suggests that the term “droite” does not have the same connotation, the same “affective charge as the Left in our political life. There has been a sort of semantic ostracism against the Right. Added to this inequality of connotations is the problem of a differential memory. Our national memory has a center

of gravity placed on the left and this disequilibrium is no longer without effect on the depth and composition of material...with which the historian must work. If these constitute obstacles to the study of our political life, they also constitute its justification.”⁷³

Those few studies that have explored the world of the Right have tended to approach it in two ways. The first is to view the extreme Right before 1940 as “pre-fascist” or “proto-fascist” and the right-wing after it as “neo-fascist.” This approach, identifiable in the work of Robert Soucy and Zeev Sternhell among others, looks at the disparate right-wing groups and ideologies from the anti-Dreyfusards to the Action Française with the goal of finding continuities in right-wing thought that prepare for fascism and collaboration. Christophe Prochasson has even felt the need to warn these historians to be careful about claiming pre-fascist ideologies in a time where fascism did not yet even exist.⁷⁴ The second approach is to divide the Right into three or four “types” whose identity remains stable over the century. René Rémond created three divisions of the Right in his 1966 work: the Ultras, the Orleanists, and the Bonapartist/ Nationalists.⁷⁵ Michel Winock claims that between the Boulangism of the 1880s and the Dreyfus Affair four separate Rights developed whose identities remained continuous until the end of World War II. Two were anti-parliamentarian, one mixed populism with nationalism, and the last looked to monarchism. He argues that these account for all the movements of the pre-1945 era.⁷⁶ Such categorizations and general genealogies of the Right are important, Winock claims, because the “contagion” of the Right does not limit itself to a certain social class, it remains a “latent danger in all French political life” and must therefore be recognized

⁷³ Jean-Francois Sirinelli, *Histoire des Droites en France*, vol. 3 *Sensibilités* (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), 841-2.

⁷⁴ Christophe Prochasson, “Elusive Fascism: Reflections on the French Extreme Right at the End of the 19th Century,” in *The Development of the Radical Right in France: From Boulanger to Le Pen*, ed. Edward J. Arnold (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 70.

⁷⁵ René Rémond, *The Right-Wing in France from 1815 to de Gaulle* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966).

⁷⁶ Michel Winock, “Genealogie des droites, 1789-1939” in *La Droite depuis 1789; les hommes, les idées, les réseaux*, ed. Michel Winock (Paris: Seuil, 1995).

by its hereditary traits.⁷⁷ Both of these approaches to the Right tend to interpret the political values of the extreme Right as negations of existing, positive left-wing values. They define the Right by its anti-republicanism, anti-communism, and anti-Semitism and suggest it has no positive doctrine, political values, or worldviews distinct from its rejection of the Left.

In contrast to these approaches, this study will explore the possibility of continuities in right-wing intellectual values over the century but will not predetermine that the progression culminates in fascism. It shows the Right as an ideology of positive action and independent ideas, not just negative reaction. And it considers the Right to be a diverse body of thought with intellectual representatives that defy categorization in three or four ideological lineages. It therefore explores a range of intellectuals of the Right and a full spectrum of right-wing organizations without seeking to identify each with a nineteenth-century political origin. The only group considered “of the Right” that will not be represented in the study is the conservative, moderate Republicans.

Instead, when used in this study, the designation “right-wing” will refer only to the extreme pole of the political spectrum rather than the moderates and conservatives of the republican Center. Since the dominant, mainstream concept of the intellectual was one that arose from the Dreyfusard camp, it was built and refined around the universalist, revolutionary, enlightenment principles shared by both the extremists of the Left and the republicans, both liberals and conservatives, of the Center. The alternative, opposing concept of the intellectual created on the extreme Right would reject these foundations in favor of an anti-parliamentarian and anti-republican set of political values. Because the conservatives and moderates continued to cooperate with the institutions of democracy and republicanism rather than reacting against them, they would not participate in this alternative intellectual identity construction. Since it would be the extremists of the Right who would lead the challenge against the dominant, mainstream understanding of intellectual identity, it is the extremists that will be intended when “right-wing” intellectuals are mentioned in this study.

⁷⁷ Michel Winock, *Histoire de l'extrême droite en France* (Paris: Seuil, 1993), 7.

Conservative republicans are also excluded from this discussion of the “right-wing” because the question of identity construction is one that deals with perception as much as reality. Whether in reality the conservatives and moderates should be considered right-wing or not, the intellectual extreme Right that led the reconceptualization of intellectual identity perceived itself as distinct from the republican Right as it did from the extreme Left. Although they might be designated “of the Right” by historians and their contemporaries on the Left, republicans, like Aron and the Gaullists, were considered “of the Left” by the more extreme thinkers of the Right. In the Cartel des gauches, the Popular Front, and the Resistance government, the intellectual of the Right perceived that the Republic, and all those conservatives or moderates who were aligned with it, was allied in a bloc with the socialist or communist Left. And in the university, journalism, and the public debates over intellectual responsibility and values, they perceived the republicans to be firmly ensconced in the mainstream values that dominated and monopolized the intellectual world. Far from being included in their concept of an alternative right-wing intellectual identity, therefore, these conservatives and moderates were classed along with the extremists of the socialist and communist Left as the mainstream hegemons.

The definition of the Right used for this study is also a relational and relative one. In its simplest form, to be “of the Right” in this study means being neither “of the republican Center” nor “of the Left.” As one historian has theorized, Left and Right are defined by their mirror image, “mutual relationship” to one another and by their “common effort of differentiation” from one another.⁷⁸ They are not absolute entities and so, while they may evidence continuities in their manifestations over the century, they can also evolve. For example, the nationalism and anti-Semitism identified as values of the Left during the nineteenth century would shift at the turn of the century to become defining values of the Right.⁷⁹ But the shift was only possible due to a

⁷⁸ Sirinelli, *Histoire des Droites en France*, vol. 3, 760.

⁷⁹ David Drake, *French Intellectuals and Politics from the Dreyfus Affair to the Occupation* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 26; Jeremy Jennings, “Anti-Semitic Discourse in Dreyfus-Affair France,” in

corresponding shift of values on the Left that allowed the two political camps to remain each others' foil.

The image of a mirror for understanding the Right is valuable in another sense. There are many convincing arguments for relinquishing the extreme Left-Right division in favor of a division between the moderate Center and the extremist periphery. This perspective is often supported by evidence that former communists and left-wing extremists like Doriot and Deat freely "crossed over" into the right-wing fascist camps of the interwar. However, these political migrations from one extreme to another required a corresponding reprioritization of intellectual values and a new approach to political and intellectual life beyond a simple shift from anti-fascism to anti-communism.⁸⁰ This study will therefore maintain that there is "an invisible but insurmountable line" of demarcation between the intellectual Left and Right that prevents its conflation. This line divides what Alain-Gerard Slama calls "specific political temperaments." He argues that, after reading the work of numerous writers on the Right, he has found psychological, intellectual and moral dispositions which clearly distinguish them from the Left.⁸¹ These distinctive temperaments would contribute to distinctive and opposing concepts of intellectual identity on the extreme Right and Left that cannot be conflated into an extremist versus centrist division.

In this study, therefore, "the Right" is seen as a political and intellectual temperament that incorporates a diverse group of movements and programs that cannot all be associated with fascism. It has certain continuities in values and behaviors over the century, but it is also a fluid category that

The Development of the Radical Right in France: From Boulanger to Le Pen, ed., Edward J. Arnold (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 19.

⁸⁰ For example a new focus on national relativism rather than international universalism, a new discourse of realism, and a new interest in the formation of a social and intellectual elite and the discovery of a chef rather than leadership by the people.

⁸¹ Slama says the Right and Left have different "orientations of the spirit" which reflect their specific historical memories and their particular exercise of reason. They have different responses to the basic philosophical questions of man and society despite their common source in the philosophes, and even when they seek the same ends, such as rights for Algerians, they do so with different visions of its accomplishment. Alain-Gerard Slama, "Portrait d'un homme de droite; litterature et politique," in Sirinelli, *Histoire des Droites en France*, 794-6.

has evolved, shifting its priorities to mirror corresponding shifts in the values of the Left. Finally, it identifies itself as a collective distinct from both the moderates of the Republican Center and the extreme Left which it most often believes to be operating as a bloc against it. The intellectual and social values, worldviews, programs, and organizations that defined what it meant to be “of the Right” will be identified over the course of the study along with the intellectuals’ definition of intellectual identity. With these essential concepts of the Right, Identity construction, and the Intellectual clarified, it remains to consider the overall structure of the chapters in this study.

Structure of the Study

Intellectuals felt called to engage their work throughout the century, but it is during periods when they perceived France to be in crisis and seeking direction that they were most eager to restrict and define who could lay claim to the authority of the intellectual guide. These periods were politically divisive for all, but they dramatically polarized the intellectual community who saw France’s moral, cultural, and intellectual future to be at stake in each crisis. It is during these periods that the nature of intellectual identity: its values, responsibilities, behaviors, and proper affiliations became the subject of intense reflection and debate on both the Left and Right. This study is divided into five sections that correspond to five periods of perceived crisis in French society when intellectuals felt called upon to engage and to monopolize the role of intellectual guide for their cause. The first crisis is that of the Dreyfus Affair, from 1898-1902, when the title and role of intellectual first became a cause of conflict between the Left and Right. The second crisis, from 1910-1920, is the Nouvelle Sorbonne debate over the Republic’s reform to the educational system and the subsequent division over international relations before and after World War I. The third period of crisis is the interwar reaction to the rise of fascism and communism from 1933-1939. The fourth period is the crisis of German occupation from 1940-1944 and the divisive choices of collaboration or resistance. The final period is the post-war struggle from 1945 to 1968 to redefine France’s place in the world and answer new questions about communism, colonialism, racism, and the Republic.

After a brief introduction to the particular time period and the important political, social, and intellectual issues at stake, each of these larger sections will be divided into four chapters. The first of the four chapters considers the position of the intellectual Left at the time. It notes the intellectual spokesmen of the republican Center and the extreme Left who played a prominent role in the debates of the time and who led the struggle to control the image of the intellectual. It also considers the values that united these republican and extreme Left *engagés* as the dominant intellectuals while excluding the Right. Finally, it explores the significant intellectual organizations, communities, networks, relationships to society, and experiences on the Left that segregated these intellectuals from those of the Right.

The second two chapters begin the analysis of the intellectual identity constructed on the Right by presenting case studies of two significant right-wing intellectuals of the period. These selected intellectuals of the Right have been chosen for their self-identification as both intellectuals and members of the extreme Right. They also have been chosen based on their prominence in the debate over intellectual identity, role, responsibility, and values and their adherence to the important right-wing intellectual communities of the time. For each period, one case study is on an intellectual who has received some scholarly attention, though most often for being an “anti-intellectual,” and the other is on an intellectual who has been relatively ignored by historians. The intellectuals chosen for case study are: Maurice Barrès and Ferdinand Brunetière during the Dreyfus Affair, Charles Maurras and Henri Massis during the Nouvelle Sorbonne debate, Abel Bonnard and Ramon Fernandez during the interwar years, Drieu la Rochelle and Alphonse de Châteaubriant during the occupation, and Maurice Bardèche and Jacques Laurent during the postwar. In each of these case studies, the intellectuals reveal the same pattern of engagement and struggle: recognition of left-wing dominance, resentment of this hegemony, struggle to legitimize themselves as intellectual guides while differentiating their value system and worldview, segregation of their intellectual communities and networks, and a resulting alienation of their experience as intellectuals from that of the mainstream

Left and Center. These case study chapters will approach the issue of identity construction from the personal speeches and statements, literary work, journalism, and private reflections of the *engagé*.

The fourth chapter in each section will consider right-wing intellectual identity construction from the collective or social identity perspective. It will look at the significant right-wing intellectual organizations, revues, movements, parties, professional networks and social spaces and the segregated, polarizing nature of these communities for collective intellectual identity. It also considers the trajectories, behaviors, practices, relationships to their society, and experiences that were particular and distinctive to the intellectual Right and helped to separate their understanding of what it meant to be an intellectual from that of the Left. All together, the four chapters for each of the five periods will reveal both the changing conceptions of what it meant to be an intellectual of the Right and also the continuities in the Right's perception of exclusion, resentment, distinctive values, and ideological segregation that linked different generations of the intellectual Right to one another.

The study concludes with the construction of a new model for understanding right-wing intellectual identity based on this pattern revealed by the intellectuals in the case studies. There are certain characteristics and experiences that the case studies reveal to be essential to being an intellectual of the extreme Right, no matter the time period. These characteristics are those that most dramatically distinguish right-wing intellectuals from their counterparts on the Center and Left, and, therefore, form the basis for the new model of right-wing intellectual identity. The intellectual of the Right is marked first by an intense resentment of what he perceives to be left-wing intellectual hegemony. Whether the exclusion is real or imagined, he feels himself ostracized from places of influence and power by a hegemonic Left. This has led him to identify intellectual identity with the role of the pariah, the heretic, and the prophet and to equate intellectual responsibility with resistance and opposition to the established academic and political world. This resentment of the Left and the desire to challenge it have led to a certain mentality of engagement that is characteristic of the extreme Right throughout the century. Right-wing intellectual engagement and its discourse are always colored by the underlying need to first legitimize the right-wing position as intellectually

viable. This added crusade has led to a distinctive language of engagement that emphasizes the idea of “true” and “false” intellectuals, “True France,” and the “responsibility” of intelligence.

Legitimization by the intellectual of the Right also involves a differentiation of values from those of the dominant Left. There are certain core values which are found on the intellectual Right from the Dreyfus Affair to the postwar era: rejection of universal abstractions, promotion of Realism, opposition to internationalism as cosmopolitanism, advocacy of rooted nationalism, rejection of egalitarianism, and preference for elitism, hierarchy, and authority. Even when certain values, such as Realism or socialism, were also claimed by the intellectual Left, the intellectual Right had a distinctive interpretation of those values that continued to differentiate them. When these values were linked together as part of an intellectual itinerary, many of the internal contradictions of extreme Right wing thought would emerge. Yet the intellectual Right saw its program as a cohesive whole that both legitimized its claims to intellectual status and differentiated its engagement from the Left. The intellectual of the Right also separated himself from the model of the Left by his distinctive, segregated intellectual communities. Right-wing intellectuals participated in particular networks, communities, and collectives outside the mainstream, left-dominated milieu including right-wing political parties, *ligues*, cultural organizations, revue teams, publishing firms, and petitions. These communities and the networks that formed to interconnect them are different from those of the Left that have been the basis for the existing model of collective intellectual identity. Finally, the intellectual of the Right is also marked by an increasing alienation from the mainstream intellectual world. He believes he has a different relationship to the government, society, and certain intellectual institutions like the university than his peers on the Left. Even when they shared certain basic behaviors, these distinctive relationships when paired with the segregated intellectual communities and socio-professional networks, made being an intellectual of the Right a different experience from being an intellectual of the Left.

This model is an effort to provide historians with a foundation for identifying and grappling with these other, right-wing intellectuals. Because the definitions that historians use today to analyze

intellectual life are based on left-wing engagement, intellectual values, and communities, they do not accurately reflect the right-wing intellectual experience. As a result, those few narratives of intellectual life that attempt to incorporate the right-wing intellectual tend to view them as anti-intellectual *engagés* or curious aberrations of the intellectual. Instead, it must be recognized that the intellectuals of the Right, although they identified themselves as intellectuals and claimed the right to engage in public debates, had an extremely different understanding of what this identification meant. Because of this, they present a different model of intellectual identity that historians must contend with if they want to understand the intellectual Right. In order to judge the validity of this new model for understanding future intellectuals of the Right, the study will close with an examination its applicability to Nouvelle Droite intellectual Alain de Benoist and his circle of peers at GRECE.

SECTION II

THE DREYFUS AFFAIR, 1898-1902

Although the term *intellectuel* had been used in France before the Dreyfus Affair, it would not be until 1898 that control over who could be considered an intellectual became a point of contention among the educated elite. The Affair initiated an unprecedented polarization within the academic and literary milieu that would begin a century-long division of the intellectual world between those considered “of the Left” and those considered “of the Right.”⁸² Because the Left was first to accept the title of “intellectual” and the role of public engagement, they would mold these concepts according to their own values and deny them to their right-wing opposition. The effectiveness with which they excluded the thinkers, writers, and academics of the Right from this role would instigate a cycle of resentment, self-legitimation, differentiation, and segregation that provided the foundation for the alternative intellectual identity of the Right.

The Dreyfus Affair proper began with the discovery of the “bordereau” in 1894 and the subsequent indictment and imprisonment of the Jewish officer Alfred Dreyfus for treason. The suggestion made two years later by Maire Georges Picquart that Dreyfus had been unjustly accused in the place of the real traitor, Walsin-Esterhazy, would spark a new interest in the case, particularly among the educated elite. When Esterhazy was promptly acquitted and Picquart arrested based on evidence falsified by Major Henry, several men of letters and journalists began to suspect that the military was attempting to cover up an injustice to preserve its public image. It was with these suspicions that Emile Zola wrote the “Lettre à M. Felix Faure,” which Georges Clemenceau would

⁸² “From June 1898 to February 1899, a gradual step by step clarification of the political scene was to take place: the Left after breaking with nationalism and anti-Semitism, would gradually come to identify itself with Dreyfusism. And it would be more directly opposed to a Right which was wholly anti-Dreyfusard.” Eric Cahm, *The Dreyfus Affair in French Society and Politics* (London: Longman, 1996), 108.

publish on January 13, 1898 under the title “J’accuse!” This open letter and the two subsequent petitions for full disclosure and revision of the Dreyfus case would spark a maelstrom of intellectual activity.⁸³ By February 8, the number of savants, academics, and men of letters who had lent their name and title to the petitions in favor of Dreyfus would reach 1,482.

Clemenceau quickly published a congratulatory article in *L’Aurore* saying, “is it not a sign, all these *intellectuels* come from all corners of the world grouping themselves around an idea.”⁸⁴ From this point on, the thinkers who lent their influence to the defense of Dreyfus would proudly identify with the title “intellectual.” The dreyfusard milieu of the *Revue Blanche* would quickly take up the name as would Lucien Herr in his response to Barrès’ February 1 article condemning intellectual engagement. More importantly, they would associate intellectual role and responsibility with the values and worldviews that the defense of Dreyfus came to represent: egalitarianism, individual rights, the universal ideals of Truth and Justice, and the rejection of anti-Semitism. To better promote these Enlightenment values, the Dreyfusard intellectuals created a collective organization aptly named the Ligue française pour la defense des droits de l’homme et du citoyen in February 1898.

However, according to the extreme Right, being a Dreyfusard intellectual also implied a corresponding lack of patriotic nationalism, an attack on the military in a time of European instability, and a cosmopolitanism that risked deformation of the French national identity.⁸⁵ Therefore, although

⁸³ The first petition read “the undersigned, protesting against the violation of the judicial forms in the trial of 1894 and against the mysteries which have surrounded the Esterhazy affair, persist in demanding revision.” The second read “the undersigned, struck by the irregularities committed in the Dreyfus trial of 1894 and by the mystery which surrounds the trial of commandant Esterhazy, persuaded in addition that the entire nation is interested in the maintaining of legal guarantees, the protection of citizens in a free nation, astonished by the findings of lieutenant-colonel Picquart and the findings no less illegal attributed to the latter, moved by the procedures of judicial information employed by the military authority, demand the Chamber maintain the legal guarantees of citizens against all things arbitrary.” *L’Aurore*, January 23, 1898.

⁸⁴ “A la derive,” *L’Aurore* January 23, 1898.

⁸⁵ The army, despite its defeat in 1870, had become for many on the Right, the great heroic force which would exact its revenge on Germany and return Alsace-Lorraine to the nation. Widespread insecurity about the military preparedness of France until this revenge led not only to glorification of military figures but to immediate opposition to anything that might damage its stability and stature. Nationalism, which had long been

Clemenceau had been the first to apply the term to the Left, it would be Maurice Barrès, one of the most outspoken Anti-Dreyfusard writers, who popularized the term in the more widely circulated *Le Journal*. His February 1 article “La protestation des intellectuels” was a scathing condemnation of the “intellectuels” who, he said, attempted to apply their general intelligence to the diverse problems surrounding the Dreyfus Affair without the necessary information about the case to even form an opinion. By March, Ferdinand Brunetière, René Doumic, and other anti-Dreyfusard men of letters would write essays that asked “Qu’est-ce qu’un intellectuel?” and answered that they were men who claimed a superiority based on their intelligence, training, and erudition, who believed logic and rationality could comprehend the universal values of Truth and Justice, and that these abstractions could be applied to society. Rather than participate in this abuse of their talents, Barrès said he and the Anti-Dreyfusards preferred to “be intelligent, rather than *intellectuels*.” This meant leaving the fate of Dreyfus to the military courts to preserve the stability of the military, protecting the interest of the collective nation, and acknowledging the realistic limitations on grasping universal truths.

Despite their best efforts to discredit the “intellectuals,” the “men of intelligence” on the Anti-Dreyfusard Right soon perceived that these Dreyfusard spokesmen for the universal were effectively influencing public opinion and political policy. Right-wing scorn for the Dreyfusard concept of an engaged intellectual turned to envy of their authority and resentment of their unrivaled dominance over the role of social and moral guide. To gain equal influence over public affairs, the anti-Dreyfusards realized they would need not only to engage their work in the delegitimization of the intellectual of the Left, they would need to claim for themselves both the title and role of the

associated with Jacobin patriotism, had been redefined and popularized by Barrès in 1892 with a new anti-Republican tone and became synonymous with defense of traditional values and institutions against internal and external enemies. Nationalism as a concept and a program would therefore switch, in these pre-Dreyfus Affair years, from the liberal, Jacobin and Republican Left to the monarchist and extreme-Right. The connection between the new, right-wing nationalism, Anti-Dreyfusism, and anti-Semitism also caused a noticeable shift of anti-Semitism. Before it had been prominent on the Left and particularly among the socialists who associated Jews with capitalism, during the years of the Affair, it would switch camps to the political and intellectual Right. Jennings, “Anti-Semitic discourse,” 19. The Ligue antisemitique of Guérin, the Ligue des Patriotes, and the work *La France juive* and journal *La Libre Parole* of Edouard Drumont would be instrumental in associating anti-Semitism with anti-Dreyfusism and the extreme Right. Peter M. Rutkoff, *Revanche and Revision: the Ligue des Patriotes and the Origins of the Radical Right in France, 1882-1900* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981).

intellectual and the responsibility to engage. This crusade on the Right would begin with the creation of the Ligue de la Patrie française on January 1, 1899.⁸⁶ Barrès expressed the members' new claim to the title 'intellectuel' saying, "The important thing is that no one is able to say any longer that intelligence and the intellectuals- to use that questionable French word- are only on one side."⁸⁷ Brunetière would follow suit saying "we have been irritated by hearing it said that all the men of study and thought, all the intellectuals, were on the same side. This is not true and we prove it."⁸⁸

Yet, the anti-Dreyfusard claim to the title and role of the intellectual would not indicate a corresponding shift in intellectual values. They would maintain their nationalist relativism, anti-Semitism, Realism, collectivism, rejection of universal abstractions, and opposition to the reconsideration of the Dreyfus trial.⁸⁹ Because the anti-Dreyfusards still rejected what the Dreyfusards had come to see as essential components of intellectual identity, the Dreyfusard intellectual community refused them recognition as intellectuals and denied them the right to speak as authorities on public affairs. The anti-parliamentarianism of the anti-Dreyfusard Right, coupled with its association with violent anti-Semitic street leagues would also result in its repression in 1899 by Waldeck-Rousseau's "government of republican defense." This turn in the political tides from a regime supportive of the military to one that "offered greater guarantees to the Left,"⁹⁰ had begun with the Radical ministry of Brisson as early as June 1898.⁹¹ This governmental repression, the 1899

⁸⁶ The Ligue had an initial membership list that included 22 academicians in addition to men of letters, savants, university, law and medical professionals.

⁸⁷ AN F7 13229-13230.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ For example, Anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals would be prominent in the "Henry Monument" that raised 14,000 signatures and 131,000 francs for the widow of Colonel Henry. Cahm, *The Dreyfus Affair*, 132. Henry had created the forgeries that implicated Dreyfus and exonerated Esterhazy and had committed suicide upon their revelation.

⁹⁰ Cahm, *The Dreyfus Affair*, 110.

⁹¹ The crack down on right-wing organizations had been prompted by the attempt by Deroulede and the Ligue des Patriotes to spark a military coup during the funeral of President Faure. Maurice Barrès would

retrial and pardon of Dreyfus, and the increasingly perceptible association of intellectuals with Dreyfusism, led the anti-Dreyfusard Right to see itself as suppressed, marginalized, and dominated by the Left.⁹²

The creation of the Ligue de la Patrie and the effort by the Right to be recognized as intellectuals instigated a struggle between the Dreyfusard Left and the anti-Dreyfusard Right to control the concept, title, and empowering identity of the intellectual. The Dreyfusards' success in gaining revision of the trial, repression of their opponents, and dominance over the intellectual field did not end this struggle. Instead, the resentful Right would continue its campaign for recognition, legitimacy, and influence over public opinion through its increasingly segregated intellectual communities. The divisions and antagonisms revealed in the intellectual milieu by the Affair would result in the creation of two distinct concepts of what it meant to be an intellectual as early as 1899. And these two different concepts would continue to inspire conflict between Left and Right over the right to represent French intelligence well into the twentieth-century.

play a prominent role in both the attempted coup itself and in the right-wing journalistic narrative of the coup, the trial of Deroulede, and the subsequent repression of the Right.

⁹² September 11, 1899 Dreyfus was found guilty with “extenuating circumstances.” Eight days later he was pardoned. By 1900 all Dreyfusards indicted for crimes in the Affair received amnesty and in 1906 the original verdict was overruled. The military, however, would not officially declare Dreyfus innocent until 1995.

CHAPTER 1

LEFT-WING INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY DURING THE DREYFUS AFFAIR: DREYFUSARD INTELLECTUAL VALUES

For intellectuals, the Dreyfus Affair was not solely about defending Dreyfus. It was about creating a certain image of France and, more particularly, of themselves as its intellectual representatives and guides. It was “a clash between two world views, two conceptions of society, two scales of moral values.”⁹³ What had previously been seen as a single strata of French society united by its education and profession, was revealed to be two fundamentally opposed camps. The division was not a simple political disagreement, but what Dreyfusard intellectual François de Pressensé would describe as “an unbreachable abyss” between the most essential aspects of intellectual identity on the Right and Left.⁹⁴ As early as 1898, the Dreyfusards had developed a distinctly republican and left-wing model of what it meant to be an intellectual that would become the dominant concept well into the twentieth century. This Dreyfusard model stipulated the mentality of engagement, values and worldviews, socio-professional communities, and relationships to government and intellectual institutions that the Left equated with true intellectual identity. All of these components of the left-wing model would intentionally exclude the opposing views of the extreme Right.

Because they enjoyed an unrivaled monopoly over the title and role of the intellectual for a full year, the Dreyfusard Left developed a mentality of engagement that would distinguish them from the Right. While the anti-Dreyfusards had to justify a reversal of their earlier position on engagement and struggle to make up for lost ground in the battle for intellectual authority and legitimacy, the Dreyfusard Left had no such past to overcome. While the anti-Dreyfusards quickly earned

⁹³ Drake, *French Intellectuals and Politics*, 23.

⁹⁴ François de Pressensé, “La Nouvelle Ligue des Patriotes,” *L’Aurore*, January 2, 1899.

disapprobation and repression from the regime, the Dreyfusard Left received the Third Republic's support after 1899. The benefits of anteriority and a connection to the existing regime meant that the Dreyfusards engaged in public debates confident that the public would see them as legitimate authorities. As the first to control the title and role of intellectual, they simply defended their hegemony over the concept while the Right had to launch a campaign to seize and redefine it. Dreyfusard Jaures could declare, "the intellectuals of the Right have no right to the title of intellectuals" without first needing to justify his own right to it.⁹⁵ The intellectuals of the Left, therefore, would not display the resentment, insecurity, or compulsion to legitimize themselves as intellectuals that would characterize the mentality of engagement on the Right.

Because they enjoyed this hegemony, the Dreyfusards were able to indelibly fuse their worldview, concept of society, and moral values to the concept of the intellectual. The supporters of revision wanted French society to consider itself the product of its Enlightenment and Revolutionary heritage rather than its military conquests or national borders. They promoted a belief in universal abstractions like Truth, Justice, and the Rights of Man and the use of Reason and rationalism to comprehend and apply these abstractions to society. They advocated individualism and individual rights, and believed in the equality and fraternity of a universal mankind regardless of nationality or religion. These values would provide an underlying thematic unity to the Dreyfusard intellectuals' more specific arguments in favor of revision, against the military leadership, and in opposition to right-wing anti-Semitism. They would also provide the foundation for the Dreyfusard intellectual model.

Francis de Pressensé would write in summation of the Dreyfusard intellectuals, "for us, the tradition or rather the soul of France is the cult of Justice and Truth, it is the strong sense of solidarity that means an innocent does not suffer without all citizens sensing themselves deprived in their

⁹⁵ Charle, *Naissance des "intellectuals,"* 162.

rights.”⁹⁶ The belief in such universals and in their importance in defining not only the soul of France but the role and responsibility of her intellectual guides was a theme emphasized by all the Dreyfusard engagés. Gaston Paris described the Dreyfusard intellectuals as “those who demand Truth and Justice” and who “consider these two things one of our most precious heritages.”⁹⁷ Emile Zola implored France to turn to Dreyfusism in order to “become again the nation of honor, the nation of Humanity, of Truth and Justice.”⁹⁸ And the appeal to create the Ligue pour la Defense des droits de l’homme declared its purpose was to “spread anew, in the entire nation, the ideals of Justice, of Truth, and of Liberty from which it appears for a moment that public opinion has been detached.”⁹⁹

For the Dreyfusard intellectual, true intelligence and morality lay not in the particular laws, traditions, or determinations of a particular nation, society, or time but in the abstract ideals that existed outside time and place. Émile Duclaux lamented, in an article for the *Revue du Palais*, the folly of the anti-Dreyfusards who “have approached the Affair as a question of the honor of the French military” and the stability of the French nation rather than a question of Truth, Justice, and the Rights of Man.¹⁰⁰ He was appalled by the anti-Dreyfusard writers like Barrès who suggested that there were “relative” or “national” truths which only applied to certain nations and that questions of justice and equality should be considered in the light of these national circumstances. The true intellectual, according to the Dreyfusards, was responsible for translating the universal, absolute Truths into accessible national policies rather than making particular national experience into the general ideal.

Equally essential to the Dreyfusard concept of intellectual identity was the use of logic and reason to grasp the universal truths and translate their abstract laws into social policy. “In the domain

⁹⁶ Pressensé, “La Nouvelle Ligue.”

⁹⁷ Gaston Paris, “La Ligue de la Patrie française” *Le Siècle* January 4, 1899.

⁹⁸ Jennings, “1898-1998,” 831.

⁹⁹ AN F7 12487 “Ligue Française pour la defense des droits de l’homme et du citoyen.”

¹⁰⁰ “L’Elite Intellectuelle et la democratie,” *Revue politique et litteraire; revue bleue*, May 21, 1904, 34.

of truth,” Alphonse Darlu wrote, “it is not possible to have an authority other than Reason.”¹⁰¹

Dreyfusard Rationalism was linked to the Enlightenment promise that reason and logic, when applied to the questions of society, would yield “the Truth,” and a moral direction and social guidance backed by scientific and mathematical certainty. As the representatives of intelligence and the spokesmen for morality and truth, the intellectual was obligated to suppress any national, religious, or individual passions in favor of impartial Reason. Emile Duclaux wrote that in contrast with the Anti-Dreyfusards who betrayed logical thought to accept the statements of the military high command, the Dreyfusard intellectuals “are incapable of inclining their logic before the order of a general and ask instead about the state of mind of those who would dare demand it of them.”¹⁰² This identification of intelligence with Rationalism and the belief that reason could provide social guidance brought the intellectual Left into conflict with an extreme Right that equated intelligence with Realism and social guidance with particular, national experiences. For the extreme Right, rational thought produced only inapplicable, utopian theories; realism produced practical results.

Rationalism also implied an impartiality and tolerance that the Dreyfusards linked to the Enlightenment and Revolutionary goal of intellectual secularization. The *Defense des droits de l’homme* manifest stated that reliance on reason, rather than religious morality, gave the Dreyfusards “clear minds” unclouded by “clerical reaction” with which to judge the Dreyfus case. It was their rationalism and their secularism that gave them the ability, and the authority, to speak for impartial intelligence. Rejection of religious intolerance, “clerical reaction,” and anti-Semitism would become one of the most visible hallmarks of the Dreyfusard concept of intellectual identity. According to Alphonse Darlu, the Dreyfusard “pro razione” concept of intelligence and truth, which proposed to return the moral direction of minds to philosophy rather than religious authorities, was in direct opposition to the anti-Dreyfusard concept of intelligence and truth which he saw to be tied to the

¹⁰¹ Alphonse Darlu, *M. Brunetiere et l’individualisme; a propos de l’article Après le process* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1898), 41.

¹⁰² “L’Elite Intellectuelle,” 34.

irrational worldview of the Catholic church.¹⁰³ Brunetière and the anti-Dreyfusards, he wrote, returned to the anti-Semitic orthodoxy of the Middle Ages and, in doing so, betrayed their responsibility to uphold free, individual, and unorthodox thought. Rationalism, reason, logic, and science were all impartial, unaligned, and secular in nature. To be an intellectual, according to the Dreyfusards, required not only devotion to rationalism, but to the secular thought and education necessary to sustain it. Although not all Dreyfusards denounced the influence of the Church, they would all reject anti-Semitism. Even the socialists, who had previously equated anti-Semitism with anti-capitalism, would renounce it in favor of the universal rights and equality under the law of all “humanity.” As a result, anti-Semitism and the associated themes of anti-cosmopolitanism, *enracinement*, and integral nationalism would become the domain of the extreme Right alone and a mark of “anti-intellectualism.”

Secularism and rejection of anti-Semitism would be linked to a final Dreyfusard concept of intellectual responsibility: the defense of individual rights and the equality of man under the law. The Ligue des droits de l’homme made protection of “the rights of an accused, whatever his religious or political opinions may be,”¹⁰⁴ a central tenet of their program. In particular, the appeal specified, individual rights were not to be sacrificed to the “raison d’Etat.” For Dreyfusard intellectuals, the freedom of the individual was the foundation for a secure society, rather than, as the anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals argued, the security of society the foundation for free individuals.¹⁰⁵ Clemenceau would write, “the guarantees offered by justice cannot be withdrawn from a single person without

¹⁰³ Darlu, *M. Brunetiere*.

¹⁰⁴ AN F7 12487

¹⁰⁵ Against Brunetière’s rejection of individualism as anarchism and the loss of all social authority, Dreyfusard Henri Bérenger would write “To progressively free the individual from all exterior authority, to put in his internal life the rule of all moral and intellectual obligation, to respect among others this same personal liberty of which one has made his own law, this is the individualism of the French revolution and of modern philosophy” that the anti-Dreyfusards ignore. Henry Berenger, *La France intellectuelle* (Paris: Armand Colin et Cie, 1899), 43.

threatening the whole fabric of society.”¹⁰⁶ Rather than viewing the nation as an organic collective as the anti-Dreyfusards would, the Dreyfusards saw it as a civic agreement by a collection of individuals each bound to the collective only to the extent that their individual rights were assured. This concept of society and the individual led the Dreyfusard intellectual to locate his responsibility and role in the defense of the disenfranchised individual Alfred Dreyfus. In contrast, the intellectual of the Right would find his responsibility in the defense of the beleaguered nation and its military.

The “military dictatorship” and “clerical reaction” that Zola saw in the Dreyfus Affair made him fear that what made the people of France “French,” the values outlined by the Enlightenment and protected by the Dreyfusards, was being threatened by the anti-French and anti-intellectual values of the anti-Dreyfusard extreme Right.¹⁰⁷ By continuing to present themselves as the defenders of Truth and Justice, the protectors of individual rights, the proponents of Reason, and, therefore, the only legitimate guides of French intelligence, the Dreyfusards would indelibly associate the identity of the intellectual with the republican value system. From this point on, the intellectual was accepted by most as one who, as Lucien Herr wrote, “puts the law and an ideal of Justice before themselves, their natural instincts, and the egoisms of their group”¹⁰⁸ and who, as Péguy wrote, displayed a “passion for Truth, and a passion for Justice.”¹⁰⁹ It was against the standards of universalism, abstract values, individualism, Rationalism, and secularism that right-wing anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals were later measured and found wanting. By claiming that it was their values that defined the essential nature of France, the Dreyfusards legitimized themselves as the only intellectual guides for the nation. All those who opposed them were, by default, both anti-French and anti-intellectual.

¹⁰⁶ Cahm, *The Dreyfus Affair*, 70.

¹⁰⁷ “How,” Zola worried, “can you [France] want Truth and Justice when all your legendary virtues, the clarity of your intelligence and the solidity of your reason are being destroyed?” Jennings, *1898-1998*, 831.

¹⁰⁸ Sirinelli and Ory, *Les intellectuals en France*, 18.

¹⁰⁹ Rutkoff, *Revanche et Revision*, 539.

Dreyfusard Intellectual Communities and Networks

The “unbreachable abyss” between the Dreyfusard intellectuals and the anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals, and the two distinctive concepts of intellectual identity that resulted, was therefore a product of two very different sets of socio-political values. It would also be a product of two different, and increasingly segregated, socio-professional communities and networks. It was in these intellectual communities that the abyss between right and left-wing value systems evolved from a theoretical disagreement into an actual physical separation of the intellectual milieu. The Dreyfus affair divided families, friends, even university departments, but in dividing the old, it created new groups whose shared intellectual values brought a new sense of collective identity. Certain schools, revues, ligues, and salons relinquished their bipartisan natures to be identified as Dreyfusard centers where individual Dreyfusard efforts were amplified and radicalized in a collective crusade. The physical division of these communities would contribute to the growing perception among intellectuals that there was a division of the educated elite between two fundamentally opposed camps. The Dreyfusards made certain that the public understood that the “true intellectuals” were those who involved themselves in the communities, networks, and trajectories of their camp, not those of their opponents.

Zola’s initial letter prompted the engagement of several prominent figures beginning on January 14th with the signatures of Anatole France, Émile Duclaux, Daniel Halévy, Felix Fénéon, Marcel Proust, Lucien Herr, Charles Andler and Gabriel Monod. To these prominent names would be added, among thousands of others, the support of emergent Dreyfusard leaders Jean Jaurès, Yves Guyot, Émile Durkheim, Julien Benda, André de Séipse, Henri Bérenger, François de Pressensé and Alphonse Darlu. The intellectual communities, networks, and professional paths that these individuals participated in would be transformed from apolitical intellectual spaces into centers of political engagement and defining characteristics of intellectual practice.

The university, particularly certain schools and faculties, came to be seen as a Dreyfusard stronghold even though, in truth, the majority of *universitaires* remained outside of the debate.

Dreyfusards were prominent in the scientific faculties at the Sorbonne, at the College des Chartes, and the École Pratique des Hautes Études while, in contrast, no member of the Faculty of Law signed a Dreyfusard petition.¹¹⁰ The École Normale Supérieure was also considered a center of Dreyfusard, and particularly socialist, engagement. Lucien Herr was a dominant force in shaping young minds as the librarian of the ENS.¹¹¹ His anticlerical, socialist, and Dreyfusard political discussions in the afternoons in the library began as early as 1894 and influenced untold numbers of students who recounted his impact on their intellectual formation in their memoirs. It would be a left-wing space so devoted to the mentoring of future left-wing intellectuals that right-wing Robert Brasillach would recall he felt out of place. Several students noted the general perception among their classmates that the ENS and its professors were “Dreyfusard with very few exceptions.”¹¹² The equation of the *universitaire* and Normalien with the collective identity of the Dreyfusard intellectual would have important consequences for the concept of left-wing intellectual practice.

Although the Dreyfusard Left would not enjoy the dominance of the press that the anti-Dreyfusards did, they did form their own, distinctly Dreyfusard network of revues. The revues that were Dreyfusard centers of intellectual community included the militant and university revues like *Revue philosophique*, *Revue historique* where Monod was editor, *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* where Darlu wrote against Brunetière, and *Revue Bleue* where Durkheim wrote “L’individualisme et les intellectuels.” To these were added the socialist revues that became Dreyfusard following Jaurès and Millerand: *Le Mouvement socialiste*, *Les Cahiers de la Quinzaine* of Péguy, and *Pages libres*. There were also several literary revues like *Revue Blanche* and journals of daily information like *L’Aurore* and *Le Siècle*.

¹¹⁰ Christophe Charle, “Academics or Intellectuals? The professors of the University of Paris and political debate in France from the Dreyfus Affair to the Algerian War,” in *Intellectuals in twentieth-century France: Mandarins and Samurais*, ed. Jeremy Jennings (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 109.

¹¹¹ Louis Bodin, “L’Affaire Dreyfus et la notion d’ ‘intellectuel’ ” in *Les Intellectuels face à l’affaire dreyfus alors et aujourd’hui: perception et impact de l’affaire in France et à l’étranger*, ed. Roselyne Koren and Dan Michman (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1995).

¹¹² Smith, *The Ecole Normale*, 92.

These revue teams provided socio-professional camaraderie that also contributed to the Dreyfusard intellectual collective identity. The offices of *Revue Blanche*, for example, would become “one of the great rallying centers of the writers, artists, and intellectuals who were convinced of the innocence of Dreyfus.”¹¹³ Felix Fénéon was the editor and attracted contributors like Octave Mirbeau, Pierre Quillard, Jean Psichari, Julien Benda, André Gide, Lucien Herr, Gustave Kahn, Léon Blum, and Bernard-Lazare.¹¹⁴ The Affair would make the revue team, which had once welcomed diverse political adherents and had considered Maurice Barrès one of its masters, into a politically segregated Dreyfusard community where even Barrès was excluded and attacked.¹¹⁵

In the pages and offices of *Revue Blanche*, men of different literary persuasions and talents found in their Dreyfusism a strong link between themselves and others in the revue.¹¹⁶ This camaraderie was based on shared intellectual values and sense of duty which separated them from their anti-dreyfusard peers into an intellectual community. Benda would write of it “here is a phalange of men who not only conceive of general ideas but in whom these ideas determine corresponding emotions that in their turn determine actions.” They shared, he concluded, “not intellectualism but intellectual sensibility.”¹¹⁷ The revue was not only a place for camaraderie with fellow Dreyfusard writers and an outlet favorable to their intellectual sensibilities, it was a center of militantism. The offices became “true councils of war” where collaborators met and discussed late into the night. Blum would write of these evenings, “we met at the revue, toward the end of each day,

¹¹³ A.B. Jackson, *La Révue blanche, 1889-1903: origine, influence, bibliographie* (Paris: Lettres Modernes, 1960), 101.

¹¹⁴ Fénéon was an anarchist imprisoned in 1894 for suspicion of bombing activity and an immediate supporter of Dreyfus.

¹¹⁵ Lucien Herr would attack Barrès and the anti-Dreyfusards in *Revue Blanche* saying, “You have against you,” he wrote, “the true men of reflection, the unrooted and disinterested who know how to put the law and the ideal of justice before themselves, before their instincts, and their group egoism.” Winock, *Le Siècle des intellectuels*, 15.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid*, 131.

¹¹⁷ Charle, *Naissance des “intellectuels,”* 184.

nearly every evening at the same hour. We could hear the passionate ideas of Octave Mirbeau, comment on the last news from *Le Temps*, share that which each had learned during the day.”¹¹⁸ At the end of the evening, the discussions could sometimes spill over into nearby Café Calisaya, which itself became a Dreyfusard center.

Dreyfusard intellectual communities and social identities were, therefore, also reinforced in separated salons, bookstores, and cafes where anti-Dreyfusard thinkers and opinions were excluded. Salons had initially been spaces where diversity and contrast in ideas was believed to be intellectually beneficial. During the Dreyfus affair, however, several of these spaces became devoted centers of one or another side of the polemic. Dreyfusards found particularly willing listeners in the salon of Mme de Caillavet where the visitors and the political discussion naturally drove away many previous attendees like Charles Maurras and Jules Lemaître while attracting new visitors like Clemenceau and Jean Jaurès. The salon of Mme Strauss had also been frequented by Lemaître and Arthur Meyer, director of the monarchist *Le Gaulois*, until the Dreyfus Affair. Meyer would later write in his memoirs that his frequenting of the salon of Mme Strauss stopped “the day when the Dreyfus Affair, which has separated all from being able to agree, broke relations which were very precious to me.”¹¹⁹ Other politicized salons of the Dreyfusards included that of Mme Menard-Dorian who favored socialist and anti-clerical ideas and hosted Blum, Clemenceau and Zola,¹²⁰ of Mme de Saint-Victor who was surnamed “Notre Dame de la Revision,” and of the marquise Arconati-Visconti who would later be labeled by the right-wing Action Française as “the protector and benefactor of all that which decomposes and dissolves society and French intelligence.”¹²¹

¹¹⁸ Jackson, *La Revue blanche*, 106.

¹¹⁹ Jean-Francois Sirinelli, *Histoire des Droites en France*, vol. 2 *Cultures* (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), 115.

¹²⁰ Laure Rièse, *Les Salons littéraires parisiens du second Empire à nos jours* (Paris: Privat, 1962), 118.

¹²¹ Winock, *Le siècle des intellectuels*, 46.

Like salons, cafes have long been recognized as spaces of intellectual sociability yet these places were also divided in many cases. During the Affair, for example, La Closerie des Lilas was strongly Dreyfusard and was “diametrically opposed both geographically and politically to the Café de Flore, the cradle and fief of the Action Française.” Here young dreyfusards like Gide would gather and feel themselves surrounded by others who shared their “international spirit.”¹²² A Dreyfusard bookstore, Librairie Bellais, opened by Charles Péguy in the Latin Quarter was also a gathering place for dreyfusard thinkers, particularly students interested in socialism. Blum, who frequented the site, described it as the “general center of Dreyfusism in the Latin Quarter.” Bellais was not only a space for discussing shared ideas, it was also a center for Dreyfusard youth militancy. Here, Daniel Halévy wrote, “clashes [with the anti-Dreyfusard students] were frequent in the corridors of the Sorbonne, the entrance of which was only 100 meters away from Bellais. Péguy kept himself in constant readiness to send his friends into the fight...if he was in the school when the call came he would immediately go from study to study opening the doors. Assemble! He cried at each door. They would all seize their sticks and rush to the Sorbonne.”¹²³ Intellectual communities were therefore not only effective in organizing and amplifying individual engagements, they also converted thought into collective action.

These centers of physical, tangible communion were expanded to include Dreyfusards who might never actually share the same space through the imagined communities of manifests and petitions. These collections of names, perhaps better than any other form of intellectual community, drew a line of division between Left and Right. Signers of Dreyfusard manifests like that famously dubbed the “Manifeste des intellectuels,” felt that they shared a common purpose and engagement with the intellectuals whose names were listed alongside theirs. In contrast, they considered those names on the anti-Dreyfusard petition for the Ligue de la Patrie to be suspect and outside their

¹²² *Sociabilités Intellectuelles: lieux, milieux, réseaux*, ed. Michel Trebitsch and Nicole Racine (Paris: Institut d'histoire du temps présent, 1992), 159.

¹²³ Cahm, *The Dreyfus Affair*, 85.

community. Yves Guyot of *Le Siècle* would write of this petition, “It is useful. It classes men. We will preciously guard their names. They disqualify themselves. We know now who are the professors in the university who represent the Jesuit spirit.”¹²⁴ Petitions literally provided a list of all those who shared the same worldview, values, and engagements while also clearly listing those who were outsiders and adversaries.

The very practice of petition construction also reveals a distinctly Dreyfusard concept of intellectual community. While the anti-Dreyfusard listing of names revealed the organization, hierarchy, and elitism prized by the extreme Right, the Dreyfusard petitions revealed a certain desire for egalitarianism between intellectuals and non-intellectual activists. The petition in favor of Picquart was ordered alphabetically, the Manifeste des intellectuels had no clear organization by social or intellectual cadre, and later petitions mixed the professions completely.¹²⁵ The very construction of the petitions indicates that the Dreyfusard intellectuals felt their network of engagement connected beyond the intellectual milieu to the general public and was not based on any internal hierarchy of academic titles or honors.

The community that would have the most influence on the construction of Dreyfusard collective identity, however, was the Ligue Française pour la defense des droits de l’homme et du citoyen which was a veritable “organ for disseminating Dreyfusard] ideas and a cartel of its forces.”¹²⁶ At the initial meeting on February 20, 1898, immediately after Zola’s trial, it was said and recorded that here, “one was happy to be among Dreyfusards.”¹²⁷ Because the Ligue “was an

¹²⁴ Yves Guyot, “La Ligue du Sabre et du Goupillon,” *Le Siècle* January 6, 1899.

¹²⁵ Charle, *Naissance des “intellectuels,”* 148.

¹²⁶ Jean-Pierre Rioux, *Nationalisme et conservatisme: la ligue de la patrie française, 1899-1904* (Paris: Editions Beauchesne, 1977), 8. The ligue was born when Ludovic Trarieux decided “to form a group, an association, to found a ligue, something which would be like a safeguard for the individual rights of the liberty of citizens, for their equality before the law.” Henri See, *Histoire de la Ligue des droits de l’homme, 1898-1926* (Paris: Ligue des droits de l’homme, 1927), 9.

¹²⁷ By June 4, the Ligue held their first general assembly where the fifteen member directing committee was announced and statutes for the ligue were established. By December of 1898 it had already held

important place of co-habitation for the otherwise isolated intellectual” it was an effective means of amplifying and interconnecting individual efforts of engagement that might otherwise have been easily silenced.

In its appeal to new members in 1900, the Ligue clearly separated itself from the anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals. Although it did not, as the right-wing Ligue de la Patrie Française would, prohibit any of its opponents from becoming members, it clearly distinguished its values and intentions from those on the anti-Dreyfusard Right. In particular its first statute declared that the association was designed “to defend the principles of liberty, equality, justice announced in the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789” and declared all forms of “arbitrariness and intolerance are a menace of civil division, a menace to Civilization and Progress.”¹²⁸ The appeal declared a rejection of the “old religious hatreds,” the “obscure superstitions of the middle ages,” and the “odious excitations” of the people expressed by the Right. The Ligue, it continued, was created to combat this and to make “prevail the just and liberal ideas which are the imperishable honor of the Revolution.” Thanks to the Ligue, it claimed, “public meetings have been organized to spread anew in the entire nation the ideas of Justice, of Truth, and of Liberty” and to carry out the “work of Republican defense.”¹²⁹ The plea closed by outlining the role and responsibility of the Dreyfusard intellectual: “We have a great mission to fulfill. We have to spread and make known and loved the ideas of Justice, Truth, and Liberty.”

The Ligue was an important source of ideological organization as well as social interaction and networking for its members. It not only held lectures and meetings but also published an official *Bulletin*, created an intellectual revue called *Droits de l'homme* and held annual congresses for members. It also hosted banquets where its intellectual leaders and political members could fraternize

ten meetings in Paris and several outside and had over 8,000 members. By 1904 it had grown to 47,000 members. See, *Histoire de la Ligue*, 37.

¹²⁸ AN F7 12487

¹²⁹ Ibid.

and share ideas. One banquet, described in *L'Aurore* in 1902 was host to more than 600 people. A table of honor was reported to seat not only the new committee members Buisson, Guieysse and de Pressensé but also Anatole France, Brissaud, Psichari, and Gustave Hervé among other prominent Dreyfusards. One final arm of the Ligue that was intended define Dreyfusard intellectual values was that of popular education. In addition to public lectures and the creation of popular bookstores, the Ligue set for itself the task of operating the “universities populaires.” Their aim was to educate the broad masses in “republican” ideas: the universal abstractions, individualism, rationalism, and secularism that they believed made France not only Republican but truly French.¹³⁰

Whether it was in revues, university departments, ligues, petitions, or even previously unaffiliated spaces like cafés and salons, the Dreyfusard intellectuals created communities where their values and engagements could be amplified from individual efforts into a more effective collective action. The communities became centers of sociability, professional networking, and mentorship, but most importantly, they became centers of collective identity. Being a Dreyfusard intellectual meant not only sharing certain values and political ideals, it also meant engaging in certain organizations and expressing oneself through certain organs. An important element in the left-wing monopoly over intellectual identity would be the Dreyfusards’ ability to link membership in these communities and networks to public perception of the role and responsibility of the true intellectuals. Engagés of the extreme Right were either refused participation in these communities or simply deterred from them by an intellectual environment that was hostile to right-wing values. Either way, they were excluded from these legitimizing communities and identified as anti-intellectual by their absence.

The Dreyfusard Intellectual Experience

The great power behind the Dreyfusard monopoly of intellectual collective identity also came from the dominance that the Dreyfusard intellectuals exerted over the public’s perception of

¹³⁰ See, *Histoire de la Ligue*, 32.

legitimate intellectual behavior and experience. The different relationships that the intellectuals of the Left had to places of power gave them a certain experience of intellectual life that would dramatically separate them from the intellectuals of the Right. For the Dreyfusards, being an intellectual required a certain relationship to the Third Republic, the university, and the Church that the intellectual Right did not share.

Being an intellectual, according to the Dreyfusards, implied first a certain relationship to the republican government and its institutions. Although the Dreyfusards accused both the military high command and the government of perpetuating a known injustice, they did so in the name of the better, truer nature of the French Republic. In striking contrast, the anti-Dreyfusards defended the military and the interests of the collective *patrie*, yet they did so by announcing the inadequacy of the Republic and the collapse of Enlightenment values. For the Dreyfusards, France was the parliamentary Republic and the Republic was the socio-political, intellectual, and moral values of the Enlightenment and the revolutionaries of 1789. By defending the implementation and practice of the latter, they saw themselves as the defenders of the Republic. The identification of the Dreyfusard intellectual with the Third Republic would apply not only to republican intellectuals like Anatole France and Emile Zola, but to the socialist leaders as well.¹³¹ By 1899, socialists would be an integral part of the “government of Republican defense” and socialist intellectuals would increasingly identify their role as defenders of the Third Republic.

For both the republicans and socialists, therefore, being an engaged Dreyfusard, and therefore being an “intellectual,” meant identification with the fundamental values of republicanism and defense of the existing Republican regime. In return, they and their intellectual agendas would be promoted, protected, and nurtured by the Republican ministries as early as the 1899 ministry of

¹³¹ Although initially Alexandre Millerand had urged the socialists to remain aloof from the debates and thus side with neither the military nor a wealthy bourgeois officer, the ardent Dreyfusism of intellectuals like Jean Jaures and Charles Péguy would eventually triumph. Jaures and Péguy would be instrumental in steering the socialist party toward closer identification with republican ideals like individual liberty, universal human rights, and rejection of military tyranny that resonated equally well with the socialist program. Leslie Derfler, *The Dreyfus Affair* (London: Greenwood Press, 2002), 33.

Waldeck-Rousseau. In contrast, the anti-parliamentarianism and anti-Republicanism of the extreme Right would earn the tangible repression of anti-Dreyfusard intellectual engagement and its organizations.¹³² The Dreyfusard, therefore, experienced intellectual life from the vantage point of the protected Republican intelligentsia while the anti-Dreyfusards's experience became that of the repressed and persecuted intellectual opposition.

The Dreyfusard's relationship to republicanism would be linked to their relationship to the secular university system. The French educational institutions would be important places of engagement and intellectual activity during the Affair for both Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards. The Left-Right polarization of both the students and professors along school, faculty, and even course lines created important intellectual sub-communities and networks for both Left and Right.¹³³ However, the overwhelming percentage of *universitaires* in the Dreyfusard intellectual ranks, and the relatively fewer number in the anti-Dreyfusard camp, would be an important factor in the identification of Dreyfusism, and therefore of intellectual identity, with the experience of the universitaire. Within the ranks of the Dreyfusards, the university professors "had a directing and leading role" and their prominence and influence helped to identify the intellectual with the university professor. It was in the Sorbonne and the ENS, in particular, that the "innovatory concept of the Dreyfusard 'intellectual' and the revisionist cause" found its "best supporters."¹³⁴ In contrast, the *universitaires* of the anti-Dreyfusard camp were merely "one element of support within a much larger coalition" that was directed by and recognized for its journalists and writers rather than its professors.¹³⁵ Because of this, the Dreyfusard concept of the behavior and experience of the

¹³² Under the ministry of Waldeck-Rousseau and later of Combes, extreme right-wing leaders like Deroulede and Guérin would be exiled and imprisoned, right-wing leagues would be banned, and religious orders associated with anti-Dreyfusism and anti-Semitism were persecuted and forced to seek government authorization to function.

¹³³ Charle, "Academics or Intellectuals?," 95-113. These sub-communities are examined in greater detail in the section on intellectual community.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 99.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 105.

intellectual would be modeled on that of the university professor rather than the journalist and writer who would serve as the model for the Right.

Finally, the relationship of the Dreyfusard intellectual to the Catholic Church would be important in differentiating the experience of the Dreyfusard intellectual from that of the anti-Dreyfusard. The debates surrounding the Dreyfus Affair would be linked, sometimes overtly, to the discussion of the place of the Church in French society and the issue of secularization. Catholicism was not a defining characteristic of either the Dreyfusard Left or the anti-Dreyfusard Right since Catholics remained prominent on both sides. However, many anti-Dreyfusards would intentionally link themselves to the institution and tradition of the Church in their discussions of anti-Semitism and the integral French nation while most of the Dreyfusards pointedly linked their engagement to the secular and even anti-clerical tradition of the Enlightenment and civic nationalism.¹³⁶ They juxtaposed their value of Rationalism, scientific reason, and free thought with what they saw as the Church's irrationalism, superstition, and limits to free thought. Also, although there were many Catholics who favored revision, they were joined by Protestants, like André Gide, and Jews, like Daniel Halévy, who were rarely found in the anti-Dreyfusard camp.¹³⁷ For the Dreyfusards, therefore, part of the intellectual experience that divided them from the Right was the separation of their religion and their engaged thought. Being a Dreyfusard intellectual meant identification with secular values that could be supported by all religious faiths rather than the traditions and institutions of the Catholic Church.

The Dreyfusard, therefore, experienced intellectual life in a distinctive way that would not be shared by their peers on the Right. Their relationships to the regime, the university, and the Church dictated certain practices and experiences, from participation in a government of republican defense to the professional trajectory of universitaire, that excluded the intellectual of the Right. When

¹³⁶ It is not surprising that when Waldeck-Rousseau and Combes sought to limit the influence of the extreme right-wing, they included religious orders in their list of banned organizations, nor that separation of Church and State was finalized in 1905 when the Dreyfusards were enjoying political prominence.

¹³⁷ There were a few Jews who converted to Catholicism during the Affair and joined the anti-Dreyfusards.

combined with the increasing segregation of the intellectual community, these distinctive experiences and relationships fostered a collective identity of the Left that would entirely separate it from the collective identity of the Right.

The Dreyfusard Intellectual Model

The Left gained a unique advantage in the struggle to guide public opinion by taking on the title and role of the engaged intellectual well before the Right. They were able to monopolize the public's first understanding of the intellectual and of the values, organizations, and experiences that defined him. This hegemony provided a certain mentality of engagement that would be characteristic of the Left and contributed to the emergent model of left-wing intellectual identity. The model dictated first a certain set of values that all those who took the title and role of the intellectual were expected to support. Intellectuals were universalists, rationalists, individualists, and secularists. The model of the Left also identified certain collective communities and organizations with which intellectuals were expected to identify. Dreyfusard intellectuals were defined in part by their participation in the university, Dreyfusard revues, the Ligue des droits de l'homme, certain petitions, and social spaces that had become Dreyfusard centers. Finally, the Dreyfusard intellectual came to be identified collectively with the institutions of the Third Republic and the university and with opposition to the authority of the Church. The Dreyfusard intellectual's mentality of engagement, values and worldviews, socio-professional communities, and even the very experience of intellectual life and engagement would be completely at odds with those of the intellectual of the Right. The Right felt excluded from this newly constructed model of intellectual identity and responded, in resentment, by creating its own, alternative version. Recognized men of letters Maurice Barrès and Ferdinand Brunetière would play a central part in this struggle to create a new concept of the intellectual for French society.

CHAPTER 2

THE INTELLECTUALS OF THE ANTI-DREYFUSARD RIGHT: THE CASE OF MAURICE BARRÈS

As early as October 1898, when the initial plans were laid for a ligue of anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals, it is necessary to recognize the presence of a new model of the engaged intellectual, one that was equally qualified in terms of professional success and influence, equally engaged in public affairs, and yet, was indisputably on the political “Right.” This new species of intellectual resented the dominance that the Republican and leftist intellectuals held over the concepts of the intellectual and engagement and sought not only to attack and delegitimize this dominance but also to legitimize their own, alternative model. Maurice Barrès was one of the originators of this alternative model and his work and experience provide valuable insight into right-wing intellectual identity.

Barrès was one of the intellectual leaders of his time and influenced both the reading public and his fellow writers and thinkers.¹³⁸ He was not only, as his peers in the Latin Quarter would immortalize him, the “prince of youth” and the leader of intellectual trends among those of his generation, but also a mentor for the next generation of thinkers like Henri Massis,¹³⁹ a political influence in the Chamber, and an accomplished author and Academy member. Barrès was born in 1862 to a mother with a long family heritage in Lorraine. His childhood memory of France’s defeat and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany would be a driving force for much of his later nationalism and political writings. His desire to return Alsace-Lorraine to France would come out explicitly in many of his speeches for the Ligue de la Patrie as well as his writings on the military, the

¹³⁸ Robert Soucy, *Fascism in France: the case of Maurice Barres* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 2. Shlomo Sand is among the minority who consider Barrès’ influence to have been “peripheral.”

¹³⁹ Massis wrote “For me, I find the influence of Barrès at the origin of all my ideas.” *Ibid.*, 5.

weakness of the parliamentary Republic, and the need to be rooted in one's region. Barrès', unhappiness at the lycée de Nancy and his detestation of the Kantism of his professor there, M. Burdeau, are believed to be the inspiration for insipid character Bouteiller in *Déracinés*,¹⁴⁰ who became a symbolic character in the campaign against Dreyfusard *universitaires*.

By 1883, Barrès had left Nancy for Paris and begun to make his way as a journalist. He was still an unknown in the world of literature, however, until his 1888 *Sous les yeux des barbares* received a favorable review from Paul Bourget who would introduce Barrès, as he had Brunetière, into the world of the literary elite.¹⁴¹ The following year, during the Boulangist crisis Barrès ran and was elected as a Boulangist deputy. These sympathies would later unite him with other ex-Boulangist, anti-Dreyfusards like Déroulède and would form the basis for his novel *Appel au Soldat*: a galvanizing text for the anti-Dreyfusard intellectual community after 1900. It is during these years that Barrès is credited by several historians and some later fascists¹⁴² with developing a sort of “nationalist socialism.” This new approach to socialist reform from a nationalist rather than internationalist perspective was one of the themes of Barrès' next journalistic endeavor from 1894-1895 as editor of *La Cocarde*. Here Barrès combined the efforts of royalist, federalist, republican and socialist collaborators to provide a provocative approach to nationalist critique of the Republic. Several eventual anti-Dreyfusards would collaborate with Barrès in this journal, including Charles Maurras.

During the years leading up to the Dreyfus Affair, Barrès' work began to show the interconnected themes of anti-Semitism and enracinement which would contribute to his concept of

¹⁴⁰ Part of the *Roman de l'énergie nationale* trilogy.

¹⁴¹ In *Sous les yeux des barbares*, and in the other two novels *Homme Libre* and *Jardin de Bernice* which completed the *Culte du Moi* trilogy, Barrès' intellectual interest was in the expression of individualism. Barrès himself would claim during the Affair that this early stage of his writings was either a ploy, meant to lure in young decadent writers to his ideas so that he could then expose them to the greater good of nationalism and the collective, or that it was all consistent with his later writings, the cult of the individual being simply preparation for the larger cult of the nation and the race.

¹⁴² For example, historian Robert Soucy and contemporary Fascieu leader Valois

nationalism based on rooted regional identities. It is this theme of “rootedness” that dominates the *Roman de l’énergie nationale* series of novels, *Deracines*, *Appel au Soldat*, and *Leurs figures*, written at the height of the Dreyfus Affair between 1897 and 1902. In order to lend his notoriety to the cause against the Dreyfusards, Barrès also involved himself in the anti-Dreyfusard journalistic campaigns in the mainstream *Figaro* and *Le Journal*, but also in the monarchist *Gaulois* and anti-Semitic *Le Drapeau* of Déroulède’s Patriotes.¹⁴³ His February 1 article in *Le Journal* was the first article by a recognized writer to condemn the Dreyfusard intellectuals’ engagement, thus initiating the debate over intellectual responsibility and values. He was also a founder of the Ligue de la Patrie Française and served on its directing committee for several years. Barrès engaged his name, his pen, and his voice in a struggle to preserve what he considered essential cultural and intellectual values that were in crisis and to formulate a right-wing vision of True France. He would pioneer and popularize not only the term “intellectuel,” but a different conceptualization of the values, responsibilities, and communities that provided the identity of this intellectual.

The creation of this right-wing intellectual model would evolve according to what would become a century long pattern of the intellectual Right. It began with Barrès’ recognition and resentment of the Dreyfusard hegemony over intellectual engagement. His desire to redefine intellectual authority according to his own worldviews and values would initiate a crusade to delegitimize the intellectual Left while legitimizing the Right. The most effective means to this end was the differentiation and popularization his own intellectual values and visions for society. His individual effort to differentiate, separate, and yet legitimize his intellectual identity was reinforced by the creation of right-wing, anti-Dreyfusard intellectual communities and social networks. Here, among like-minded peers, Barrès was able to solidify and popularize his own concept of intellectual identity and more effectively present his version to the public. His perception of exclusion and repression, his resentful struggle to legitimize himself as a different, yet viable intellectual guide, and

¹⁴³ Maurice Barres, *Journal de ma vie exterieure* ed. François Broche and Eric Roussel (Paris: Editions Julliard, 1994).

the resulting segregation of his intellectual life would all contribute to his alternative concept of intellectual identity.

Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy

From the first acceptance of the title “intellectual” by Clemenceau in January 1898 until the public announcement of the anti-Dreyfusard Ligue de la Patrie in January 1899, the hegemony of the intellectual Left over the concept and role of the engagé was not only perceptible, it was unchallenged. During this year, the men of thought and letters on the Right studiously avoided both the term and the role of the intellectual and focused their efforts on delegitimizing the concept of engagement rather than redefining it for their own purpose. It would not be until October of 1898 that the first indications of resentment and a desire to end the left-wing monopoly on the role would appear. And it would not be until January 1899 that the effort to legitimize a right-wing intellectual model would ignite the struggle to control intellectual identity. It is after January 1899 that the Left’s casual hegemony became an intentional effort to exclude and repress the Right. Only then would the Right feel the need to create its own legitimate alternative.

As early as his February 1, 1898 article, Barrès had begun to delegitimize Dreyfusard engagement and legitimize the anti-Dreyfusard position. Barrès wrote that Clemenceau had solicited the signatures of men of intelligence and published their names in *Aurore* saying, “this is the protest of the intellectuals.” By calling them intellectuals, Barrès claimed that Clemenceau was advertising the petition as a “catalogue of the elite—who would not want to be in it!” and saying to undecided writers, “give me your name and I will give you the title of intellectuel.” By trivializing the motivations of these signers, Barrès hoped to delegitimize their claims to moral and intellectual superiority. The intellectual, Barrès continued, “defines himself as a cultivated individual, though one without mandate, who claims to apply his intelligence to efficiently solve the diverse circumstances of the Dreyfus Affair.” But, he wrote, there is nothing in the Affair that has been clarified, no elements of real knowledge to attach one’s intelligence or on which to base an opinion of guilt or

innocence. All positions, whether for or against Dreyfus, were based not on truth, justice, reason or science, but on hypothesis. “How do you intend,” Barrès taunted the “intellectuels,” “you cultivated men, you men of method, to undertake to solve the problem when you do not have all the data?” He closed the article with his own newly developed definition of the intellectual: “an individual who persuades himself that society ought to be founded on logic and who does not recognize that it rests in fact on anterior necessities and is able to be foreign to individual reason.”¹⁴⁴

The article was specifically intended to weaken the Dreyfusard intellectuals’ cause by scorning their claim to be recovering truth and justice based on their superior reasoning skills. The truth of the case, Barrès argued, could not be determined by science or reason and therefore the writers and savants of the petitions held no special authority or legitimacy. Rather than claiming to be “intellectuels” who made false claims to a superior knowledge, Barrès wrote of himself and the anti-Dreyfusards who had not signed the petitions “it pleases us to be intelligent rather than intellectuals” and to keep to their profession rather than attempting to meddle in judicial affairs where they had no special knowledge. He did not intend, Barrès continued, “that we muzzle, as we have been accused of wanting to do, the men of the laboratory and the library. But we do not approve of them saying everything, in every manner, in all circumstances, and to all sorts of people. They do not act in the abstract.” In contrast to this irresponsible behavior of speaking in abstractions without considering the dangers for concrete society, Barrès presented the anti-Dreyfusard thinker whose realism, recognition of the needs of society, and refusal to interfere in judicial affairs beyond his skill “forbids him from being an ‘intellectuel.’”¹⁴⁵ It was this mantra that would be taken up for the next ten months by the anti-Dreyfusard writers and thinkers in their attempt to undermine and delegitimize the Dreyfusard intellectual position.

However, by October 1898, the influence of the Dreyfusard intellectual had become a source of resentment on the Right. To gain equal social authority, the thinkers of the Right realized that they

¹⁴⁴ Maurice Barres, *Scènes et Doctrines du nationalisme* (Paris: Editions du Trident, 1987).

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

needed to take the title and role of the intellectual while redefining it according to their idea of the role of “men of intelligence.” Three anti-Dreyfusard agrégés, Louis Dausset, Gabriel Syveton, and Henri Vaugeois developed a petition hostile to the Dreyfusards which called for the creation of a “society of intellectuals” to maintain the traditions of the patrie against the agitations created by the Affair. From this initial petition would be born the committee and petition of the Ligue de la Patrie Française, which included Barrès at its head, and more importantly, the first claims by the anti-Dreyfusards to the title of intellectual. In an article in *Le Journal* on January 2, 1899, Barrès wrote what is perhaps the clearest expression of these efforts to claim the authority and title of the “intellectuel,” for the Right. The aim of the Ligue, he wrote, was to “protest against the pretension expressed by the defenders of Dreyfus that all the intellectuals are in their ranks.”¹⁴⁶ Barrès’ position was reiterated in the first conference of the Patrie Française where Lemaître said, “WE, that is all of France minus a few hundred thousand individuals- we were punished...we remained silent...but one day we wanted to reassure the brave men and comfort the army by showing that all the intellectuals were not on one side.”¹⁴⁷

Yet, as soon as Barrès began the campaign to claim the title of intellectual, the Dreyfusard papers had begun their own campaign to prevent it. The title, role, and influence of the intellectual was a valuable tool for the Dreyfusards that they did not intend to relinquish to Barrès and the Right. The thinker of the Right had to be excluded, marginalized, delegitimized, and ostracized from intellectual life. The day after the publication of the Ligue de la Patrie manifest, François de Pressensé wrote in *L'Aurore* “The Academicians [of the Right] are indignant to hear it said that the intellectuals are on the side of Justice and Truth. They have wanted to re-establish the equilibrium. But, he sneered, “It would be a naïve illusion to persuade oneself that because one has been part of the Academy, one has the right to the title of intellectual. He continued by declaring to the anti-

¹⁴⁶ AN F7 13229-13230

¹⁴⁷ Jules Lemaître, “Conference de la Patrie française (Paris: Bureaux de “La Patrie française), 11.

Dreyfusard thinkers, “it is well evident that between you and us there is an unbreachable abyss” that necessarily prevented them from sharing the same title. On one side the “so-called intellectuals” of the Ligue, and on the other, the real intellectuals, “those among us who have opened our eyes to the light and will no longer close them.” Here he claims, is the division between the “Two Frances: one which tries an offensive return under the name of nationalism, in the interest of clericalism, and in the hope of a Caesar, and one that orients itself definitively toward the future and which proclaims itself proudly of the Revolution.” The new Ligue, Pressensé wrote, taking care to emphasize his point with the use of italics, “is on the side of the first. The *Intellectuals* who have taken in hand the cause of the revision are and remain on the side of the second.”¹⁴⁸

Other leaders of the intellectual Left quickly rallied to exclude the Right from the public’s image of the intellectual and to solidify the Dreyfusard hegemony over the concept. Clemenceau would write in *L’Aurore* that though he had at first been overjoyed by the idea of a ligue for the patrie, reading the list of the members of the Ligue had quickly revealed that it would not be what he had envisioned. Clemenceau wrote of the Ligue founders, “when one poses oneself as ‘intellectuals against intellectuals,’ it is necessary at least to give oneself the appearance of Reason.” This is why, he claimed, he had no fear that this new Ligue of “pretended intellectuals” would impact the Dreyfusard vision of a patrie of justice and truth. In fact he wrote that he was overjoyed to hear that they would be attempting to counter the Dreyfusard intellectuals in debates and lectures. “As soon as you cease to howl, as soon as you return to the articulated language which distinguishes men from beast, as soon as you foolishly accept the meeting of thoughts,” Clemenceau triumphantly claimed, “you are able to say nothing which does not turn to our advantage.”¹⁴⁹ Although the anti-Dreyfusards might be able to supply a list of illustrious Academicians, Pressensé and Clemenceau were suggesting, they had no real “intellectual merit” because their values were those of irrational authority rather than Enlightened rationalism. It was this rationale that would prompt Jaures’ summary

¹⁴⁸ Pressensé, “La Nouvelle Ligue.”

¹⁴⁹ Georges Clemenceau, “Une Ligue nouvelle” *L’Aurore* January 5 1899.

dismissal in “La classe intellectuelle,” that “the intellectuals of the Right have no right to the title of intellectuals.”¹⁵⁰

Resentment of this new, intentional *exclusion* from the intellectual field would become one of the main themes in the work of the anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals. “I was enthusiastic,” one Ligue de la Patrie member wrote, “by the response which had opposed the new ligue to the exorbitant pretensions of the pseudo-intellectuals who imposed on their fellow citizens their convictions of the innocence of Dreyfus and their hatred of the military institution.”¹⁵¹ Charles Maurras praised the progress of the Ligue in a letter to Barrès that concluded, “Do not forget that the Anti-Dreyfusard people has been governed for three years by more or less avowed Dreyfusards.”¹⁵² And, in one of the initial speeches of the Ligue, Lemaître summarized this “theme” by saying, “We are oppressed by a minority and by an evil-doing minority.”¹⁵³ These republican thinkers, he continued, “who make us feel the yoke,” claimed to be “free-thinkers.” “What error! Hatred of men because they themselves... explain differently than we do the mystery of the universe, this is miserable. But this is the case with these feeble philosophers. They have the mania of evoking the State... against those who do not think as they do.” He concluded of the Dreyfusard hegemons, “they are marvelously organized for domination.”¹⁵⁴

In particular, resentment was voiced against the large number of Dreyfusards believed to be dominating the Sorbonne and university system. Here it was claimed that Herr, Durkheim, Seignobos,

¹⁵⁰ Charle, *Naissance des “intellectuels,”* 162. When they did not directly attack the anti-Dreyfusards’ right to be considered intellectuals, the Dreyfusard journals met them with silence. When Barrès gave a lecture on Alsace-Lorraine for the Ligue, a letter in *L’Écho* said, “Unhappily, it is only the minority who had knowledge of it [lecture]... They have systematically annihilated it by their silence.” Maurice Barres, *Mes Cahiers* tomes 1-2 (Paris: Plon, 1929), 284.

¹⁵¹ AN F7 13229 and F7 15930

¹⁵² Barres, *Mes Cahiers*, 291.

¹⁵³ *L’Oeuvre de la Patrie française* (Paris: Bureau de la Patrie française, 1899), 9.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 13.

and other prominent Dreyfusard professors were molding young minds to believe that the only true intellectuals were those who supported the Dreyfusard values. Barrès expressed this frustration with this Dreyfusard influence in an attack on the values taught by the Republican institutions. “The philosophy which the State teaches is primarily responsible if the people believe the intellectual despises the national unconscious and makes intelligence function in the pure abstract outside the field of realities...this is what we have reproached the University, this is what creates, as its product, the ‘intellectuel,’ the enemy of society.” If they have any doubt that this philosophy is a powerful force of aberration in the university, Barrès continued, they need only consider the attitude shown by the majority of *universitaires* during the Dreyfus Affair, “an attitude favorable to Dreyfusism.”¹⁵⁵ The great fear among the anti-Dreyfusards, was that the hegemony of Dreyfusism in the university would not only taint the concept of intellectual values in the present but would be engrained in successive generations as well. “If Dreyfus and his friends write the history and scholarly texts, Barrès warned, “you patriots who read me, we will be scoundrels before the centuries.”¹⁵⁶ It was vital that the anti-Dreyfusards present a new intellectual model and a new vision of France before such an alternative became inconceivable to these future generations.

But before presenting this right-wing alternative, it was necessary first to delegitimize the Dreyfusard model. Barrès wrote of the Ligue de la Patrie that it would provide “national resistance, on the interior, against the anarchic forces and particularly against the “intellectuels pervertis.”¹⁵⁷ From January 1899 on, Barrès and the intellectual Right would work to delegitimize not the concept of the intellectual or engagement per se, but only the version constructed by the Left. Those in support of Dreyfus were labeled pseudo-intellectuals, perverted intellectuals, anarchic intellectuals, demi-intellectuals, mandarins, or simply referred to as intellectuals in quotes or italics to suggest

¹⁵⁵ Barrès, *Scènes et doctrines*.

¹⁵⁶ *La République ou le Roi; correspondance inédite*, 1888-1923 (Paris: Plon, 1970), xxviii.

¹⁵⁷ AN F7 13229-13230

doubt of legitimacy. This was mirrored by a corresponding attempt to legitimize the alternative right-wing intellectual concept. Even before the official announcement of the Ligue, Barrès would write in his *Cahiers* of his own concept of himself and his anti-Dreyfusard peers as intellectuals “I say to the good intellectuals: you decorate French thought; you are able to serve it.” Were there any doubt of the identity of the “good intellectuals,” Barrès emphasized, “the good intellectuals have received the young *universitaires* who came to propose to them a nationalist ligue.”¹⁵⁸ The good intellectuals, as opposed to the perverted, demi, false intellectuals were those of the Ligue de la Patrie.¹⁵⁹

With the creation of the Ligue, these good intellectuals had a forum to combat the Dreyfusard hegemony and to legitimize their alternative. “The important thing,” Barrès wrote of the ligue, “is that one is no longer able to say that intelligence, and the intellectuals- to use the questionable French term- are only on one side.... There is no longer anyone who is able to believe that all the intellectuals are partisans of Dreyfus or Picquart.”¹⁶⁰ It was, Barrès wrote, their distress at seeing the Dreyfusard “mandarins” applaud the destruction of the patrie that had roused them to engage as a collective.¹⁶¹ With the creation of a ligue, the intellectual Right would “no longer be a troop of sheep who bow to a squad of shepherds” on the Left.¹⁶² They would be an equally legitimate, equally authoritative intellectual alternative.

Although these strategies were useful in attacking the Left and promoting the Right, the most effective means of legitimizing their distinctive alternative would be the public differentiation of right-wing intellectual values. “There are now among us,” Barrès wrote of the Dreyfusards, “individuals born French who detest or think they detest all that which we believe. With them it

¹⁵⁸ Ligue de la Patrie founders Dausset, Syveton, and Vaugeois are the young *universitaires* here.

¹⁵⁹ Barrès, *Mes Cahiers*, 87.

¹⁶⁰ Barrès, *Scènes et doctrines*, 53.

¹⁶¹ “It is thus that we others, divided on many points but who have in common the knowledge of the conditions without which there is no society, have assembled in order to resolve the public health.” *Ibid.*, 56.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 56.

seems that we no longer have in common words or sentiments. Here are the enemies, or rather the dangerous misleaders.”¹⁶³ This sense of separation from the enemy “other,” of an unbreachable abyss in worldviews, of a total lack of shared sentiments and values was essential to the formation of separate intellectual identities. Highlighting these differences and the implications for right-wing intellectual identity would become a major theme in the work of Barrès. To the value of universalism he opposed relativism, to abstractions and Rationalism he opposed Realism, to individualism, he opposed collectivism, and to internationalism he opposed national socialism.

Differentiation of Intellectual Values: National Relativism and *Enracinement*

One central Dreyfusard intellectual value that Barrès opposed was that of Universals. For the Dreyfusard Left, there was a set of universal truths, like Truth, Justice, and the Rights of Man that were to be recognized in all places and times. Barrès rejected the very foundation of universalism in favor of national relativism. There were no absolute truths but only truths relative to circumstances and nations. Man was therefore not a universal being but a national man whose consciousness and identity was, at its core, “rooted” in the particular nation. This different worldview had important ramifications for the distinctive right-wing concept of intellectual role and responsibility. Rather than professing universals, true intellectuals spoke of the French truth, of the identity of the rooted Frenchman, and considered all questions of truth and justice in relation to the French nation. “It is necessary,” he would write in summation of intellectual responsibility, “to judge things in the relative.”¹⁶⁴

As early as October 1898, Barrès confided to his *Cahiers* an exploration of his ideas of national relativism and their incompatibility with the Dreyfusard intellectual ideal. “One more time I examine an aspect of my thought: What is Justice? There are just relationships in a given time between given

¹⁶³ *Decentralisation: Polemique entre Royaliste et Républicain par Colonel Royal et Maurice Toussaint avec un lettre par Maurice Barres* (Nancy: E. Thomas, 1907).

¹⁶⁴ Barrès, *Mes Cahiers*, 84.

objects. This is the same story as that of the Rights of Man. Which man? Where does he live? When did he live? This error is so strongly accredited in France because we have no national consciousness. This is the incalculable wrong that Paris does to France.”¹⁶⁵ Barrès blamed Paris because he blamed the Dreyfusard, universalist *universitaires*, centered in Paris, for inculcating these values in the youth. He would emphasize this concern later writing, “there are miserable ones who want to teach the children the absolute Truth. Naturally these professors are not able to discern it and they serve instead sentimental drivel. It is necessary to teach the French truth, that is to say what is the most useful to the nation.”¹⁶⁶ Only in teaching the truth as it related to the circumstances of both time and place did intellectuals fulfill their responsibility to educate the nation. “In the order of facts, that which we call Justice and Right do not exist,” Barrès wrote. “It is this,” he continued, “that they will never understand, these theoreticians of the university drunk with an unhealthy Kantism. They repeat like Bouteiller ‘I ought always to act in a way that my action serve the universal rule.’ No sirs- leave these great words ‘always’ and ‘universal’ and since you are French, preoccupy yourselves with acting according to the French interest at the time.”¹⁶⁷ The responsibility of the intellectual, as conceived by the anti-Dreyfusard Right, was to determine the practical needs of France, not of an abstract vision of a universal humanity.

National relativism also dictated the right-wing concept of the proper role of the intellectual in the Dreyfus Affair. Barrès determined, “It is possible that Dreyfus is not guilty, but it is absolutely certain that France is innocent.”¹⁶⁸ According to the anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals, it was better to sacrifice an individual’s “human rights” than to sacrifice the well-being of the collective nation which secured these rights for all. The incompatibility between these Dreyfusard and anti-Dreyfusard

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 83.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 86.

¹⁶⁷ Barrès, *Scènes et doctrines*, 30.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 25.

approaches was clearly summarized by Barrès. “Never,” he wrote, “has one sensed the necessity of the relative better than in the course of this Dreyfus Affair which is a profound orgy of metaphysicians. They judge all by the abstract. We judge each thing by relation to France.”¹⁶⁹ Dreyfusards defended the individual Dreyfus despite the instability it caused the military and the nation. Anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals looked beyond the abstract “droits de l’homme” to France’s particular need for collective stability at the time. The role of the anti-Dreyfusard intellectual was clear to Barrès and it was directly opposed to the universal truths of the Left. “We have sensed that there are French Truths,” he wrote, “Let us prove them... We will be the men in whom France persists.”¹⁷⁰

Barrès’ conception of national relativism was therefore closely linked to his idea of the French essence as a product of rootedness. An individual and a nation, he believed, gained their full identity and consciousness from their own earth and dead, or in other words, their national territory and history. Those outside of the nation or the *déracinés* who were uprooted from it were not able to fully understand it. Although rootedness was central to several of his works including *Déracinés*, it is best summarized in Barrès’ speech for the Ligue entitled “La Terre et les Morts.” Here he declared, “the German truth and the English truth are not the same as the French truth and are able to poison us. It is in vain that the foreigner tries to naturalize himself, in vain that he links his interests to ours, in vain tries to think and live in French, the blood refuses to follow the order.”¹⁷¹ For Barrès, being rooted in one’s land and one’s history provided structure for the sentiments and the intelligence. It was a sort of determinism that encouraged some thoughts, actions, and sentiments while discouraging others. The essence of French intelligence and culture depended on a continuing connection to the patrie. This was why Barrès felt education, one of the responsibilities of the intellectual, was best served by the

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 62.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 89.

¹⁷¹ Maurice Barres, *La Terre et les Morts* (Paris: Bureaux de “la Patrie française, 1899), 24.

national relativism of the anti-Dreyfusards, not the universalism, internationalism, or cosmopolitanism favored by the Dreyfusard Left.¹⁷²

Barrès summarized the separation in worldviews by saying, “The Opportunists have favored, for twenty years, the Jew, the foreigner, the cosmopolitan. Those who commit this criminal error say these exotic elements bring energetic elements to France. Here is the truth, the energetic elements that France has need of, it finds them in itself.”¹⁷³ Dreyfusard André Gide specifically opposed this idea of rootedness in his novel *Les Nouvelles nourritures*. Here Gide proposed, instead of national self-sufficiency and the rejection of “foreign” intellectual elements, the transplantation and infusion of foreign ideas. He claimed that over history this influx of different ideas had strengthened France, aided her progress, and enriched her culture. Barrès argued that universalist intellectuals could not even properly communicate their cosmopolitan ideas to the average Frenchman because they were so disconnected from French thought and sentiment. The role of the intellectual was not to seek universal ideals from “foreign” sources and force them on France, but rather to discern first the needs of France and draw inspiration from traditional sources that resonated with the people.

Barrès also used this idea of “foreign intellectual elements” to justify his increasing anti-Semitism. Dreyfus was identified as a member of a “foreign race” who “did not harmonize with the soil he was transplanted too.”¹⁷⁴ Jews, Barrès, claimed, as opposed to other nationalities were particularly uprooted because they had no actual homeland in which to have their own roots. They were therefore transplanted in France and attempted to assimilate but had no concept of nationalism, patrie, or national loyalty. Barrès wrote during the second Dreyfus trial, “I have no need of telling myself why Dreyfus betrayed France... That Dreyfus is capable of treason I conclude from his

¹⁷² “It is necessary to watch the University,” he warned, “it contributes to destroy the French principles, to ‘decereber’ us, under the pretext of making us citizens of humanity, it uproots us from our soil and from our ideals.” Barrès, *Mes Cahiers*, 54.

¹⁷³ Barrès, *Scènes et doctrines*, 303.

¹⁷⁴ Maurice Barres, *Ce que j’ai vu à Rennes* (Paris: Bibliothèque internationale d’édition, 1904), 40.

race.”¹⁷⁵ Barrès’ concept of rootedness, and with it his cultural anti-Semitism and anti-cosmopolitanism, further intensified the intellectual barrier between him and the Dreyfusard intellectual.

The concept of rootedness was in turn linked to Barrès’ distinctive concept of national identity and of “True France.” Extreme nationalism and its corresponding view of France came to be a distinctive trait of the intellectual Right that separated it from the Left. For the intellectual Left, the nation was understood as a collection of laws and rights conferred by the Declaration of the Rights of man. Civic nationalism was a legal determination that conferred citizenship and national identity on all those who desired to live under the laws of France. The intellectual Right, however, and particularly Barrès, understood nationalism differently. For Barrès, nationalism was an integral, organic concept, a birthright conferred through the blood and culture of their families and ancestors. Nationalism was not the result of any legal determination but the result of a lifetime of shared experiences and sentiments. “The nation” for Barrès and the anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals, was not a contract but rather “a group of men united by common legends, a tradition, habits, in the same milieu and sharing a series of ancestors.”¹⁷⁶ Guiding French intelligence required an appreciation of this heritage, not of representative democracy.

Barrès also rejected the Dreyfusard concept of the nation as “a republican idea.” His most scorned character, Bouteiller, taught that, “France is the ensemble of notions that all the Republican thinkers have elaborated and which compose the tradition of this Party. One is French if one possesses these in his soul...without the philosophy of the State, there is no real national unity.”¹⁷⁷ Dreyfusards identified ‘True France’ with the Revolutionary principles, Rights of man, and Republican institutions that had not existed until 1789. Barrès and the Anti-Dreyfusards, in contrast,

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 41.

¹⁷⁶ Philip Ouston, *The Imagination of Maurice Barres* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 66.

¹⁷⁷ Maurice Barrès, *Les déracinés* (Paris: Plon, 1947), 259.

prided themselves on a concept of France that extended back to the Gauls, to the first connection between man and the soil, the first development of national traditions and language. This respect for all of France, according to Barrès, was what made the anti-Dreyfusards patriots and nationalists and the Dreyfusards cosmopolitans and republicans. This in turn differentiated their sense of responsibility and duty, as intellectual guides, to the republican regime and the individual rights of its citizens.

Barrès and intellectuals of the Right rejected the model of the intellectual as a defender of universal mankind, individual rights, cosmopolitanism, and republican-based nationalism. Instead, they presented the concept of a right-wing intellectual who saw his role and responsibility to be the defense of particular national needs, elaboration of a national consciousness, protection of the uniquely French intelligence, and identification with the long history of the pre-revolutionary nation. These different concepts produced a divide between the Dreyfusard and anti-Dreyfusard understanding of intellectual identity.

Realism and Anti-Rationalism

Almost inseparable from the Dreyfusard value of universals was that of abstractions. The idea of a universal implied a concept or determination that could be applied equally to all men and nations regardless of time or place, a sort of absolute value not altered by circumstances. The idea of abstraction implied a value that did not need foundation in any reality, a determination based on rational thought alone, an ideal that functioned outside the confines of real society. For Dreyfusards there was a pure form, attainable through rational thought, on which all social values: justice, equality, fraternity, were to be based. For the Anti-Dreyfusards, there was no pure form attainable by the simple logic and rationality of man. If there were higher forms of Truth and Justice, these were knowable only to God and not to man. Intellectuals instead were responsible for making the abstraction practical by molding the value to best meet the needs of real society. Rather than be high priests of the rational abstract, Anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals would be the communicators of the real.

Barrès expressed his hatred of abstractions and his preference for an intelligence tied to reality in many ways but perhaps the clearest statement of it was in *Le Journal* in October 1898. Here he accused the Dreyfusards of dwelling so completely in the world of the abstract ideal that they could not see that blind application of such ideals would ruin rather than preserve France. “In abstraction, one is able to support this thesis or that thesis, one is able according to the mind that one has to depreciate or appreciate the army, the military jurisdiction, and the struggles of the race...but these questions ought to be treated in relation to the interest of France. It is necessary to not suppress the army because a militia would not suffice...It is necessary not to complain about anti-Semitism at the moment where one sees the enormous power of the Jewish nationality which menaces the French State.”¹⁷⁸ When later he considered the ruling that would be handed down from the *cour de cassation*, he wrote, “it will furnish us with a truth finally. It will not be the absolute truth, for this no institution is able to furnish and no one is able to possess since it is not of this world. To promise such to us, one must have the extreme religious optimism of certain ignorant ones....We await not the absolute truth but the judicial truth.”¹⁷⁹ The Dreyfusards, Barrès wrote, wanted the Revelation of the great truth of Dreyfus’ innocence, the anti-Dreyfusards wanted simply a judicial decision that could be implemented to repair the social divisions and disruptions created by the Affair.

Barrès was certain that the application of abstract theories of social justice to real society by the Dreyfusard intellectuals was actually destroying, rather than guiding, France. Those who remained mentally trapped in their ivory tower of abstractions and ideals, he warned, will only destroy themselves and society by engaging in public affairs. “I do not mean that all theoreticians of the absolute necessarily are concussed, but it is the constant observation verified once again in the Dreyfus Affair that any theoretician of the absolute destroys himself in public affairs...I have several

¹⁷⁸ Barrès, *Scènes et doctrines*, 30.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

times seen societies without Justice, but I have never seen Justice without a society.”¹⁸⁰ Societies could function without the pure abstractions of the Dreyfusard intellectuals, he was saying, but pure abstractions had no function outside of real society. Those who attempted to live in the ideal, outside the confines of reality, were not only deluded and dangerous, they were incapable of serving as intellectuals. According to Barrès, the very role and definition of the “intellectual” as a social guide was incompatible with the Dreyfusard ideal. An intellectual, he explained, is not the same as the philosopher who devises grand theories that need not apply to real life. The intellectual was responsible for using theories to guide a real society. Those who were divorced from the real, Barrès wrote, ought not attempt to guide it.

The right-wing concept of the intellectual’s relationship to reality required an equally distinctive understanding of the source of wisdom and intelligence. According to Barrès, wisdom was never the result of abstract logic or rationalization by individuals. Instead, wisdom was a result of exposure to the collective wisdom of the patrie through appreciation of its history and traditions. The intellectual’s responsibility to educate was therefore ill served by the Dreyfusard university’s instruction in logic, rationalism, and theoretical abstractions. Instead, Barrès and the anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals promoted education in what the Dreyfusards considered “irrational” and “anti-intellectual” sources of inspiration: sensibility, experience, emotion, the subconscious, and intuition gained by excursions with families to see the battlegrounds, churches, and forests of the pays. The responsibility of the right-wing intellectual was to provide students with “a sense of the real and of the relative, to convince the professors...to judge things as historians rather than metaphysicians... and to create for us...a national consciousness.”¹⁸¹ The latter could only be achieved by drawing on sources of collective wisdom that existed beyond the capability of the mind alone and were foreign to the Dreyfusard concept of individual, isolated, abstract reason.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

According to the Dreyfusards, the Right's focus on the practical realities of a particular time and place, rejection of rationalism and abstract truths, and irrational approach to intelligence identified them as anti-intellectuals. Barrès and the anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals, however, believed that it was their sense of the Real that best qualified them to represent French intelligence. Appreciation of the social realities, they argued, was essential to the very concept of intellectual engagement. It was the dominant Dreyfusards, Barrès complained, who were "responsible for leading the people to believe that the intellectual despised the national unconscious and made intelligence function in the pure abstract, outside the field of realities."¹⁸² In truth, the true intellectual was a student of the Real, not of abstract reason.

Collectivism and National Socialism

For Dreyfusards the individual was the foundation upon which society was built. For Barrès and the Anti-Dreyfusards, society was the foundation for the creation of individuals. Because of his prioritization of a stable collective before individual rights, Barrès was drawn to the ideas of socialism, which, as he understood it, emphasized the importance of the collective over the individual. However his nationalism led him to oppose the international socialism and concept of class conflict on the socialist Left in favor of his own concept of "national socialism." Barrès developed a concept of intellectual responsibility and values for the anti-Dreyfusard, nationalist Right that promoted collectivism and socialism without advocating internationalism.

Despite his early *Culte de Moi* novels, by 1898 Barrès had come to identify individual rights and liberties as subordinated in the hierarchy of values to the collective security of the nation that granted and secured these liberties. Collective society was the structure within which the individual could reflect and free himself: society created the individual, individuals did not create society. "Do they ignore," he wrote, "these intellectuals, that each individual...is playing at ease in a collective

¹⁸² Ibid.

discipline?”¹⁸³ Without the stability of the national collective, the individual would lose all liberty. Barrès also saw the collapse of the collective in favor of the individual to be a threat to intelligence and culture. For Barrès, knowledge and wisdom were not the result of isolated, logic based study by individual thinkers but rather the result of exposure to real life, to the ideas of the past, to the traditions and faiths of the patrie. The individual was simply a vessel for this accumulation of thought and sentiment. Therefore, it was the protection of the collective which was essential to French intelligence, not the protection of the individual.¹⁸⁴ With this in mind, Barrès confided to his cahiers that it was his goal as an intellectual guide to “protect with a durable effectiveness the most intimate and most noble element of the social organization, the living sentiment of the general interest, against the growing flood of individualism.”¹⁸⁵

It was also in submitting one’s individual interest to the needs of the collective that Barrès believed individuals most fully realized their potential identity. As Lemaître summarized in a ligue speech, “This sentiment is not a duping of the individual since from it the individual’s life and being are aggrandized... a strong patrie maintains order and makes good finances, a prosperous commerce and a dignified foreign politics. And the sentiment that one is the member of a robust community engenders a generous pride, a confidence in oneself, a taste for action, a hardiness, and a disinterest.”¹⁸⁶ According to Barrès, it also did not take away an individual’s sense of distinctive identity or *moi*, it simply expanded this *moi* to include the larger national family, the collective identity of one’s patrie or ethnies.¹⁸⁷ It was this larger association of the individual that the intellectual

¹⁸³ Barrès, “Ce que j’ai vu,” 84.

¹⁸⁴ Soucy, *Fascism in France*, 77.

¹⁸⁵ Barrès, *Mes Cahiers*, 87.

¹⁸⁶ Lemaître, *Conference*, 17.

¹⁸⁷ Ouston, *The Imagination*, 77.

of the Left, according to Barrès, was unable to comprehend.¹⁸⁸ The true intellectual could encourage individualism, but never at the expense of the collective will or the security of the nation. It was the anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals, Barrès insisted, who understood this task of true intelligence.

Right-wing understandings of collectivism, however, were quite different from that of the international socialists. The anti-Dreyfusards opposed vehemently “those among us who are ruled by...the gross German utopia of Marxism, which we reject because we believe that the solution to social questions was in free association and mutuality and because we fear in the socialism of the state pan-bureaucracy, pan-functionarism, uniformity, general mediocrity, the death of individual initiative, and the laziness and sluggishness of the citizenry.”¹⁸⁹ Barrès intentionally portrayed the Dreyfusard support for Marxist socialism as a playful decadence or a misguided opportunism while legitimizing the anti-Dreyfusard opposition to it as well reasoned and in keeping with the needs of France.

Although the anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals and Barrès in particular opposed international socialism, they did not exclude “nationalist socialism.” The first expression of this is believed to have been in Barrès’ *La Cocarde* where socialism was understood as “a relentless struggle against economic liberalism...in favor of the organization of labor and...the suppression of the proletariat by integrating it into society.”¹⁹⁰ According to Barrès, the liberalism of Jules Simon and the Marxist hatred of the classes were both entirely foreign to the true nature of collectivism. This made the economic doctrines “of Jaurès, to which the Dreyfusards refer themselves,” intellectually unsuitable

¹⁸⁸ Barrès wrote “here is the incomplete reasoning of those who call themselves ‘Intellectuals.’ These men are not capable of distinguishing how the Moi, submitting itself to analysis, annihilates itself in order to leave only the collectivity which produced it...all high civilization is born from an ordered collectivity.” Barrès, “Ce que j’ai vu,” 84.

¹⁸⁹ *L’Oeuvre de la Patire française*, 14.

¹⁹⁰ Eugen Weber, “Nationalism, Socialism, and National-Socialism in France,” *French Historical Studies* 2 no. 3 (Spring, 1962), 276.

for France.¹⁹¹ He proposed rather a collectivism based on nationalist socialism: protectionism for workers, class cooperation, and the idea of all stages in production serving the nation equally.¹⁹² Such a program was called socialism only by the anti-Dreyfusards and was in clear opposition to the left-wing intellectual ideal of international socialism and of collectivism.

Barrès and the Right-Wing Intellectual Model

Barrès was one of the first on the anti-Dreyfusard Right to oppose the influence of the Dreyfusard intellectuals and one of the leaders in the struggle to legitimize an alternative. His experience of engagement and effort to construct a right-wing intellectual identity involved a cycle of behavior and a set of values that would become essential to right-wing intellectual identity construction over the century. Barrès rightly perceived himself excluded from the title and role of the intellectual, both before and after 1899, by a left-wing hegemony over the concept. Before 1899, he resented only the audacity of the Left's engagement. After 1899, he would resent his own exclusion from this authority. The repetition of the themes of dominance, exclusion, repression, and struggle in his work indicates an important difference between his mentality of engagement and that of the Dreyfusard intellectual. While the Dreyfusards confidently defended their title and did not concern themselves with proving their right to it, Barrès and the anti-Dreyfusards had to overcome both their past condemnation of engagement and the concept of the intellectual that had been engrained in the public imagination. Barrès, as an anti-Dreyfusard intellectual, had a double burden. He had to first prove himself a legitimate intellectual before ever attempting to sway public opinion on the Affair. Barrès not only claimed the right to speak as an intellectual, he intentionally highlighted the "abyss" between his concepts of true intellectual values and those of the Dreyfusards. Instead of universalism he valued relativism and nationalism and saw the role of the intellectual to be defense of the collective nation rather than the rights of an individual. Instead of abstraction and rationalism he

¹⁹¹ Barrès, "Ce que j'ai vu," 87.

¹⁹² *Annales de la Patrie Française* (Paris: Bureaux de "la Patrie française, 1900), 257-8.

promoted realism and “irrational” sources of wisdom and saw intellectual duty to lie in the elaboration of practical, French based social guidance. And, to the ideals of individualism and international socialism, he suggested that the true intellectual would advocate the prioritization of the collective and national economic cooperation. This differentiation and separation of his value system would eventually become a physical separation of his intellectual experience with the increasing segregation of the intellectual community. All together, the “unbreachable abyss” between left and right-wing intellectual mentalities of engagement, cultural values, socio-professional communities, daily experiences, relationships, and behaviors would produce a completely different right-wing intellectual identity. Barrès would not be the only contributor to this intellectual model, however. He would be joined in the effort by Ferdinand Brunetière.

CHAPTER 3

THE INTELLECTUALS OF THE ANTI-DREYFUSARD RIGHT: THE CASE OF FERDINAND BRUNETIÈRE

Ferdinand Brunetière brought to the conceptualization of the intellectual his own resentment of the dominant intellectual Left, his own intellectual values, and his own social and intellectual network. Although Brunetière is less recognized among scholars today, his influence on the intellectual milieu during the Affair was considerable. He was one of the first intellectuals after Barrès to publicly oppose “J’accuse” and to deliberately call into question the responsibility of the intellectual through his landmark article “Après le Procès.” Brunetière was an original Ligue de la Patrie committee member, and one of its touted Academicians. Because his anti-republicanism was more reformist than that of Barrès and since he has been recognized by contemporaries and historians to be opposed to anti-Semitism, Brunetière also offers a different insight into the right-wing intellectual model. His concept of intellectual identity showed some deviations from that of Barrès, yet he remained firmly right-wing, was adamantly opposed to the idea of the intellectual on the Dreyfusard Left, and was vehemently resentful of their dominance of the concept.

Brunetière was born in Toulon in July 1849. Although his father urged him to attend the École Polytechnique, Brunetière’s interests were in literature and he moved to Paris to prepare for the ENS at lycée Louis le Grand. Here he met Paul Bourget who would prove instrumental in his later literary career. Brunetière failed the entrance exam and so would never earn a degree higher than his bachelor in letters and bachelor in science. He enrolled in the army in 1870 to defend Paris and was horrified by the disorder and anarchy that he saw in the Commune. This experience would influence his later anti-Dreyfusard writings on individualism, anarchy, and the necessity of the military. With the end of the war, Brunetière found a position with Bourget preparing students for the bac at Lelarge

during the days and began writing articles for small journals in the evenings. By 1874 he had received an introduction to *Revue Bleue* and soon after was introduced by Bourget to the highly prestigious *Revue des Deux Mondes* where he would stay until his death in 1906.

During these early years of his literary and journalistic career, Brunetière was seen as a republican, a positivist, an anti-clericist, and a modernist but by the 1890s, he had become recognized by his contemporaries as a “reactionary, traditionalist, religious conservative.”¹⁹³ It is in the pages of the *Revue des Deux Mondes* that Brunetière would make this transformation in intellectual values and begin to make a name for himself in the world of letters. From the intellectual stronghold of the *RDM*, Brunetière began launching his attacks on the Naturalist school and in particular against its leading author Émile Zola. He built a strong reputation there as a literary critic of exceptional talent and taste and soon began to move up the ranks in the revue. By 1877 he was the secretary of the *RDM* and by 1893, he had taken over the direction from Charles Buloz. During these years, Brunetière was also working on his multi-volume critical study *Études critiques sur l’histoire de la littérature Française*, his *Histoire et littérature* series, and his two works on French theater and lyric poetry. In recognition of his extraordinary literary accomplishments and his pervasive knowledge of 17th and 18th century French literature, he was granted a professorship in French language and literature at the ENS in 1886 despite his lack of a university degree. He would retain his position at the ENS and add a position as lecturer at the Sorbonne until his ostracism from the university system in 1905.

By 1895, Brunetière’s résumé was imposing enough that his shift to conservatism and particularly to Catholicism aroused great speculation and debate in the literary milieu. His essay, “Après un visite au Vatican,” was widely denounced by those who would later be found in the ranks of the Dreyfusard intellectuals as a declaration of the bankruptcy of science and progress in favor of

¹⁹³ Elton Hocking, *Ferdinand Brunetière: the Evolution of a Critic* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1936), 37.

Catholicism.¹⁹⁴ Brunetière was intrigued more by Catholicism's capacity for moral guidance and social structure than its religious promises and would not fully convert until after the Dreyfus Affair. By 1897, Brunetière had become an internationally recognized public figure whose lectures at the Sorbonne became sites of militant student confrontation, some yelling "vive Zola" and others demonstrating in favor of their beloved professor. He had become, "as early as 1894, a public man, an 'intellectual' before the word was created, whose smallest declaration was published in the press" in both Paris and the US.¹⁹⁵ It is not surprising, therefore that after returning to Paris from the US, Brunetière became embroiled in the Affair.

Brunetière's primary podium during the Affair was the *RDM* and his opinions permeated every article and chronicle during these years, particularly in the weeks when he chose to write the political chronicle.¹⁹⁶ The chronicles and the revue as a whole initially pled for respect for the court judgment, the priority of national defense, and the return to social unity. Eventually they would follow Brunetière into a demand for equal recognition of the anti-Dreyfusards as engaged intellectuals and a more passionate defense of their right-wing values. The most contentious piece to emerge from the journal was Brunetière's own "Après le Procès" from March 15, 1898 which sparked a whole series of Dreyfusard responses from figures like Duclaux, Darlu, Yves Guyot, and Henri Bérenger. As the Affair continued on, Brunetière joined with the self-proclaimed anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals who formed the Ligue de la Patrie and became one of their primary spokesmen in the journals and a lecturer on their behalf. Although he would resign from the directing committee of the Ligue due to differences in opinion over the electoral politics of Lemaître and the anti-Semitism of Barrès,

¹⁹⁴ Gabriel de Broglie, *Histoire politique de la Revue des Deux mondes, de 1829 à 1979* (Paris: Librairie Academique Perrin, 1979), 233.

¹⁹⁵ Antoine Compagnon, *Connaissez-vous Brunetière? Enquête sur un antidreyfusard et ses amis* (Paris: Seuil, 1997), 23. In 1897, Brunetière was giving a seven week lecture series in the US including lectures opposing Zola and naturalism at schools like Columbia, Johns Hopkins, and Yale.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 127.

Brunetière would publicly declare that he was still a member of the Ligue and would continue to give lectures under its name.

As the Affair and its aftermath came to a close in the early 1900s, Brunetière increased his opposition to the secularization of the new Dreyfusard dominated Republic and his attachment to Catholicism. Because of his anti-Dreyfusard views and his new Catholic faith, Brunetière's tenure at both the ENS and Sorbonne was ended. His ejection from the university was seen by Brunetière and his contemporaries as an ostracism from a new university elite that was dominated by the Dreyfusards. Brunetière's resentment of the Dreyfusard intellectual hegemony did not begin with this insult however, it had been smoldering since the first claims to the term *intellectuel* in *L'Aurore*. Like Barrès, Brunetière immediately attempted to delegitimize the intellectual Left and to reject its dominance in shaping public opinion. By 1899, he joined Barrès in developing a new, alternative concept of intellectual identity based on anti-Dreyfusard intellectual values.

Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy

Brunetière was one of the first prominent thinkers to protest against the interference of the so-called "intellectuals" in the Dreyfus Affair and did so from the *Revue des Deux Mondes* with the explosive article "Après le Procès." Like Barrès, before January 1899, Brunetière refused the "intellectuals" any special ability to intervene in public debates. "The 'intellectuals,' he wrote, "seem to me to have interfered with no discretion in a question which does not involve them at all."¹⁹⁷ This strategy of delegitimization was continued throughout the article as Brunetière both sneered at the 'intellectuals' claim to have special insight into judicial truth and rejected their monopoly over this moral superiority. "What is an intellectual?" he asked, "and from which conception of life does he draw the superiority which he claims over all those whom he does not honor with this name?"¹⁹⁸ He

¹⁹⁷ Ferdinand Brunetière, *Après le Procès; réponse à quelques 'intellectuels'* (Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1898), 3.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

continued that these self-proclaimed intellectuals, because of their authority in their specific fields, seemed to assume that “this superiority communicated itself to all that which they thought and their authentic reputation to all that which they said.”¹⁹⁹ But, Brunetière continued, this is in fact a great mistake by them and a great danger for us since they are taken at their word and one is inclined to believe them on things of which they are incompetent. They behave, he concluded, like Nietzsche’s “enemy of the laws” who place their ideas above the laws of social institutions and beyond the understanding of those they did not include under the title “intellectuel.” “We have,” he said with resentment, “we other mediocre ones, only to admire and thank them for it.”²⁰⁰

These attempts by Brunetière to discredit the Dreyfusards as intellectual guides in all matters of moral truth and justice would spark weeks of polemic between Brunetière and the Dreyfusard organ *Le Siècle* in August 1898. The “portrait of Basile” article in *Siècle* claimed that Brunetière had a “moral defect,” that he was “working for the great power of darkness,” and that the section in “Après le Procès” on intellectuals was “truly dishonoring for a man of thought.”²⁰¹ The author, Michel Colline, compared the Dreyfusard crusade to the work of Voltaire in the Calas case. Brunetière responded that Voltaire’s engagement was an opportunistic attempt to crush the Church, not an effort to correct an injustice. This critique of Voltaire’s motives was a clear insinuation that Zola had been attempting to discredit and overturn the military authority rather than protect the rights of Dreyfus.²⁰² In the Chronicle of *RDM* Brunetière would expand on this theme saying Zola had been “looking for something to do,”²⁰³ and the affair had been only a “pretext” for the Dreyfusards who had a predetermined hatred of the military and Catholicism. “Without Dreyfus,” he wrote, “you would have found some other ‘victim’ to defend since it was only done for “political reasons.” These

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Yves Guyot, *Les Raisons de Basile* (Paris: PV Stock Editeur, 1899), 6.

²⁰² Ferdinand Brunetière, *Lettres de combat* (Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1912), 15.

²⁰³ “Chronique,” *Revue des Deux mondes* January 31, 1898.

reasons, he continued, were “to reverse the ministry, to satisfy old rancors, to recapture a morsel of power” to receive praise and compensation for their work. He wrote that they had engaged in the Affair because they were disgruntled that “they were not yet the masters or idols of public opinion...because one disputed their sentiments and did not tremble when they spoke.”²⁰⁴ It was for personal and professional gain, according to Brunetière, that a writer or thinker engaged as a Dreyfusard, not for Truth or Justice of which they knew no more in the case than he did.

The accusations made by *Siècle* and its ability to monopolize the discussion would eventually cause Brunetière to shift his resentment from the concept of engagement itself to the Left’s control over it. Hostility, rather than mockery began to permeate the tone of his articles and the dominance, control, and censorship by the Left became his central theme. In his last letters to *Siècle*, he wrote, “We differ in opinion on an essential point and instead of responding to my reasons with your reasons...you try to persuade the readers of *Siècle* that if I do not share your opinion it is because I have secret motives. One is not able to be of good faith if one does not think as you do! One is not able then to desire truth or justice but only politics! By what right do you say this? What is this method of erecting yourself, you and yours, as the sole representatives of Truth, Justice, Probity, you who have always lived by politics?”²⁰⁵

In particular, Brunetière fumed against the Dreyfusard attempt to claim that all those who rejected the French Revolution and the principles of the Declaration of the Rights of Man were anti-Republican and anti-intellectual and therefore could not represent France or intelligence. It was in *Siècle*, well before 1899 when the Anti-Dreyfusards officially claimed the title and role of the intellectual, that Brunetière unleashed his most virulent statement of resentment against this Dreyfusard hegemony over the “intellectual truth” and guidance of public affairs. “By what right do you confound the “religion of the Revolution” with France?” he wrote, “Ah yes, I know it well! You

²⁰⁴ Brunetière, *Lettres de combat*, 58.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 86.

alone are France and you alone represent it! Whoever is not with *Le Siècle* or the Republic of which you compose the ministry is not French, would not know how to be French...for you treat him like an ‘émigré à l’interieur’... Suffer, monsieur, that we feel and think in a different way! We are French like you and we have been so for a long time.”²⁰⁶ He continued with a claim to equal intellectual legitimacy despite his anti-Republicanism and opposition to the Revolution: “we are able to judge the Revolution and if several of its consequences appear harmful to us, we believe to do the work of good Frenchmen in combating it or correcting it or in ameliorating it. We do not imagine it to hold the monopoly on Truth and Justice but we do not prevent you from believing it. And on the Revolution, as on those who make it the means of their declarations, we have the right, we maintain it, to think that which we want, we have the right to say it, and we will use it. And you, you have the right to contradict us, but not to denature us, to travesty or demean our intentions.”²⁰⁷ Brunetière was intent on distinguishing his own thought and values from those of the intellectual Dreyfusards. “I maintain our right to think otherwise than you,” he wrote to *Siècle*, “on the Revolution, on science, on justice, on Free thought, and on the Church.”²⁰⁸

Brunetière was furious that his claim to be able to speak as a Frenchman and a man of letters before the public was being questioned and denied to him because he did not express the same intellectual and social values as the Dreyfusards. He was even more outraged that by claiming the title and role of intellectuals, the Dreyfusards now dominated the role of public guide for society. “That which the free thinkers do not pardon the Church for having done in the past,” he wrote in the *Chronicle of RDM*, “is precisely what they have done. They have made all government action serve the propaganda of a philosophical doctrine. Whoever does not think as they do is excommunicated;

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 61.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 62.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 91.

they chase him from the Republic, they denounce him as loathsome to all ‘republicans.’²⁰⁹ The Dreyfusards, by proclaiming themselves the only intellectuals, had convinced the public that they alone spoke for French intelligence and that all ideas and opinions contrary to theirs were backward, opportunistic, or unjust. Brunetière resented this. It had become clear to him that if he wanted to enjoy the right to think differently, to hold different intellectual and social values despite the Dreyfusard hegemony, he had to also claim the right to engage, to speak for France, and to be an intellectual.

Brunetière had perhaps recognized this need for the status, responsibility, and authority inherent in the title of intellectual earlier than any other anti-Dreyfusard. In a March 15, 1898 letter to *Vogue*, he had protested the hegemony of the Dreyfusard intellectuals by introducing himself and the anti-Dreyfusard elite as “we other intellectuals.” It was an explicit attempt to show that the title, and therefore the prestige and responsibilities being associated with it, “had not yet taken on exclusive meaning” by being irrevocably fused to Dreyfusard values.²¹⁰ Yet Brunetière did not push his claim to the title more forcefully at the time and the Dreyfusard intellectual press quickly moved to discredit Brunetière and prevent him from effectively claiming the role of intellectual as long as he opposed their views. *L’Aurore* printed an article that claimed sections of the *RDM* were plagiarized and questioned Brunetière’s qualification for its leadership by referring to him maliciously as “this eminent anti-intellectual.”²¹¹ It was not until the formation of the Ligue de la Patrie in 1899 that Brunetière would again lay claim to the title and role of the intellectual. In an interview about the formation of the Ligue, Brunetière would explain, “Several of my friends and I have been wearied and irritated by hearing it said that all the men of study and thought, the intellectuals, were on the same side. This was not true and we prove it. It was necessary to show that intelligence, which has its

²⁰⁹ “Chronique,” *Revue des Deux Mondes*, April 30, 1898.

²¹⁰ Compagnon, *Connaissez-vous Brunetière?*, 268.

²¹¹ BA 986

part, a very large part in the direction of the affairs of this nation, has not taken part in the abominable campaign conducted against the army.”²¹²

For Brunetière, however, it did not just concern taking the title of intellectual; it was necessary also to take on the responsibility of guiding public opinion toward true intellectual values and denouncing false and dangerous ones. Because he was attempting to legitimize the values and worldviews of the extreme Right as those of a viable intellectual alternative, Brunetière knew the Dreyfusard intellectuals would attempt to discredit him. “In conforming to the Jacobin logic,” he wrote, “our adversaries will accuse us of backward political thinking and reactionary intentions. In effect we are reactionaries against the radicals. We try to react against the ideas that we believe are dangerous.”²¹³ In some instances, he argued, like this one, reaction ought to be considered synonymous with progress and liberty.²¹⁴ In particular, he warned that the hegemonic Dreyfusards would attempt to maintain their monopoly over public understanding by preventing the anti-Dreyfusards from perpetuating their value system. “Today we hear,” he continued in his speech, “that we are not prevented the liberty of thinking as we please, but that this right to have ideas contrary to theirs can only be exercised behind closed doors.” Teaching, as the most effective way to propagate intellectual values, was expressly forbidden to the Anti-Dreyfusards. In truth, he wrote in 1900, they were not prevented from teaching, “we are only forbidden to have students.”²¹⁵

Had Brunetière not already been convinced that the Dreyfusard intellectual exercised a hegemony over the role of the intellectual, his own exclusion from the teaching field would convince him of this truth. After having been invited to present himself for the chair of French language and literature at the College de France and made the nominee of the Academy, a campaign was launched

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Ferdinand Brunetière, *Le Droit de l'enfant* (1903) BNF 16R Piece 2066

²¹⁴ Ferdinand Brunetière, *La Liberté de l'enseignement* (Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1900), 4-5.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 6.

against him in the Dreyfusard press. *L'Aurore* claimed that those who wanted to block Brunetière from this post would form an alliance. The campaign proved effective and Brunetière was forced to withdraw his candidacy.²¹⁶ During the reorganization of the Sorbonne, Brunetière would also be the only professor not incorporated into the Sorbonne from the ENS. Even the protégés of Brunetière were prevented from holding professorships. When René Doumic applied at the ENS, he was told, “since it is a chair at the ENS, yes, your political opinions will put you aside. Wrong or right you have been classified and you are not classified as a republican...never would the current ministers welcome a candidate to the École presented by Brunetière.”²¹⁷ Doumic admitted that as a prominent anti-Dreyfusard he had foreseen this hegemony over the university, but continued, “I do not see without regret all the doors to higher education close before me.”

Brunetière, like the other anti-Dreyfusard writers and thinkers who were now claiming to be intellectuals, was excluded from the university system and other republican, Dreyfusard controlled spaces because of his intellectual values. His ideas were deemed hostile to the Dreyfusard intellectual values of individualism, universal abstraction, rationalism and social republicanism and so he was rejected as anti-intellectual. When Brunetière proclaimed himself an intellectual of the anti-Dreyfusard Right, he faced an uphill struggle to overturn the existing left-wing hegemony and legitimize himself as a viable intellectual representative for France. Like Barrès, he found the most effective means to legitimize his own intellectual identity was to differentiate his intellectual values, to separate his worldview from that of the Left, and prove the intellectual and social superiority of his alternative. To the Dreyfusard ideal of individualism and individual rights, Brunetière opposed the collective good, to left-wing rationalism he opposed realism, and to internationalism he opposed nationalism.

²¹⁶ Compagnon, *Connaissez-vous Brunetière?*, 197.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 98.

Differentiation of Intellectual Values: Collectivism and Anti-Individualism

Opposition to individualism was central to all of Brunetière's work and was the stance most often cited by the Dreyfusards as proof that he was unqualified for the position of the intellectual. Brunetière's opposition to individualism and individual rights was part of an anti-Dreyfusard worldview that understood the foundation of society and the relationship of citizens to the nation in a fundamentally different way than the Dreyfusards. According to the Dreyfusards, intelligence, thought, reflection, and creativity were all individual attributes that required the absence of restrictions and authority to blossom. Intelligence had to remain independent and the representatives of intelligence, the intellectuals, also had to remain free from the influence of government, institutions like the military, and in general all circumstances and situations that might require them to submit their independent thought to the will of a collective authority. Those like Brunetière who defended the greater good of a strong military against the individual rights of a single defendant were, according to the Dreyfusards, truly opposed to individualism and the independence of thought essential to the identity of the intellectual.

Alphonse Darlu's response to "Après le Procès" was specifically entitled, "M. Brunetière et l'individualisme" and declared that his main concern would be addressing the question of individualism raised by Brunetière. Since Brunetière had begun to "neglect his books to concern himself with public life," it was necessary, Darlu wrote, to consider his ideas, particularly on individualism, to determine if they were the best possible for society.²¹⁸ In other words, to determine if Brunetière merited the title and authority of the intellectual. It is quickly clear that Darlu did not find him worthy of the role. He attributed Brunetière's "blindness" in his "chosen side" of the anti-Dreyfusard camp to be a result of his rejection of the essential intellectual value of individualism. Other Dreyfusard writers soon joined Darlu in attacking Brunetière's qualification for engagement specifically because of his anti-individualism. Yves Guyot clarified the Dreyfusard concept of the

²¹⁸ Darlu, *M. Brunetière et l'individualisme*, 12.

intellectual and its link to individualism saying, “it is not authority and social institutions which should be the concern of the men of intelligence but rather “freedom of examination, which is simply the highest expression of individualism.”²¹⁹ Brunetière’s attack on individualism and individual rights in favor of the collective was therefore, according to Guyot, incompatible with the responsibility of the intellectual.²²⁰ The Dreyfusard intellectual position was made clear for the public. Those who opposed individualism were the servants of blind, governmental authority, and the enemies of free examination, personal liberty, and, most importantly, the intellectual.

In response to this campaign against him, Brunetière gave an explicit statement of his anti-individualism and clearly delineated his intellectual values from those of the Dreyfusards. While boldly continuing to stand against individualism, he nevertheless claimed the right to the status of the intellectual. He declared that in fact, far from destroying the essence of French intellectual values, his anti-individualism was the best choice for the preservation of true French society. “When I attack this ‘individualism’ of which you are the apostles,” he fumed, “what right do you have, I do not say to combat in your turn my reasons, but to put them aside in order to substitute others for them? You think that this country lacks individualism and I believe, on the contrary, that if it suffers a great evil, it is precisely the excess of this individualism.”²²¹ This great evil arising from individualism that Brunetière believed it was his duty as an intellectual to combat was the progressive spread of egoism. His alternative vision for France was the submission of the individual ego to the collective good. “We no longer know how to submit ourselves, nor to subordinate ourselves, nor even to associate ourselves” he said. “Each of us, all by himself, wants to be the government, the justice, the truth.”²²² This, Brunetière urged, was nothing short of egoism, and once it had spread through society,

²¹⁹ Guyot, *Les Raisons de Basile*, 24.

²²⁰ Guyot juxtaposes the two terms to make them seem a single affront: “the judgment that he [Brunetière] has come to carry against individualism and intellectuals.” Guyot, *Les Raisons de Basile*, 8.

²²¹ Brunetière, *Lettres de combat*, 64.

²²² *Ibid.*

purportedly as a freedom but in reality a harmful germ, it would mutate into an even greater danger for society, anarchism. Brunetière argued that in promoting collectivism and rejecting revision of the Dreyfus case, he was not attacking the foundation of French intelligence or representing “anti-intellectual” militarism but rather acting as a responsible intellectual guide for collective society. “If I find these ideas [of individual rights] false, if I find it dangerous, it is an opinion and it is mine,” he concluded, the Dreyfusard intellectuals could reject and oppose it but they could not deny him the right to think in this way nor to deem it anti-intellectual.²²³

The Dreyfus Affair was for Brunetière simply the clarification of a great division in forces, those of social order against those of individual license. His own eventual engagement was, therefore, never about the guilt or innocence of Dreyfus but always an opposition to the Dreyfusard intellectuals whom he saw fomenting “rebellion against the two pillars of society: the army and the courts.”²²⁴ In a question of individualism or social authority, for Brunetière, social authority, and the stability it offered for the collective, always had priority.²²⁵ It was his conviction that the individual was only able to arise from the liberty that a stable, ordered society provided. In areas and times of social instability, he believed that individualism and individual thought were prevented from their fullest expression. Individuals did not create their societies, as Darlu and the Dreyfusards claimed. Instead, strong societies created the necessary environment for the development of individuals. “We do not exist for ourselves alone,” he wrote, “but for other men as well, and, what is more, we can only reach our full development as the result of commerce with our fellows... Let us renounce our egoism in the interest of human society.”²²⁶ The true work of the intellectual was therefore not to protect and

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Hocking, *Ferdinand Brunetiere*, 10.

²²⁵ Ibid., 46.

²²⁶ Ibid., 102.

pamper the individual in his egoism but rather to strengthen the individual and guide him toward fulfillment by urging him to submit himself to the higher good of the collective society.²²⁷

Brunetière's most extensive statements against individualism in general are found in his two public speeches "L'Idée de patrie" and "Les Ennemis de l'âme Française." In explaining his concept of "True France," Brunetière clearly identified individualism as its principle antithesis. "The most dangerous of all are the individualists, I mean all those who do not recognize other law for their activity than of working to the development of all their powers...those who recognize no obligation and no duty than in the cult and idolatry of themselves." Rather than seeing the essence of France as a collection of separate individuals, Brunetière and the intellectuals of the Right saw it as an extension of the idea of family. The idea of family and therefore of the patrie arises from "the realization that the individual cannot provide for his own personal security nor his own development alone." The individualist intellectuals, who valued the single man before the needs of the patrie, had no concept of the patrie, no respect for the societal bonds that held France together. They were, Brunetière wrote, more interested in their own individual well-being than that of the France they claimed to be guiding. In his speech on the enemies of the French soul given in March 1899, Brunetière continued this line of attack on individualism. When considering what it was that "destroyed this hereditary communion of sentiments and ideas which is the French soul," Brunetière determined that it was the division or atomization of society that had caused it to denature, disassociate and destroy itself.²²⁸ To "the individualists who say ubi bene ibi patria," Brunetière and the anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals replied "ubi patria ibi bene."²²⁹

²²⁷ "Individualism," he said in a speech for the Ligue, "is the cult of the self, it is egoism, it is the resources and means of civilization turned from the usage of the community in order to be only servants of our instincts and appetites, of our caprices and fantasies. But to give the individual another object or another end than himself, to want to place him back in society in order to make him the worker of a work which passes beyond him," this, Brunetière claimed, was the role of men of intelligence at the turn of the century. Ferdinand Brunetière, *Discours de combat* (Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1900), 51.

²²⁸ Ferdinand Brunetière, *Discours de combat* (Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1900), 162.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, 136.

Brunetière's anti-individualism was the foundation for his support for the military, a position that placed him in direct confrontation with the Dreyfusard intellectuals on a tangible political matter. In a speech for the Ligue on "La nation et l'armée," he said, "in the years after 1870, we had associated in an indissoluble manner the interests of the nation and the army."²³⁰ What, he asked, had changed since then in the mentality of the people? And he answered, "all that which there was of defiance, of hatred even of the military institution in the heart of several 'intellectuals'... had been emancipated by the Dreyfus Affair."²³¹ These intellectuals, he sneered, when they claim to protect French intelligence and culture by demanding prioritization of the individual over the honor of the military, "do not think for one second that without the military, without the gift that it provides even to its internal enemies, there would be no leisure to martyr oneself in the laboratories nor the ease of holding a Congress of Peace nor the freedom to insult good sense and justice."²³² The defense of intelligence, of French culture, lay in the stability of the collective French nation and it was the intellectuals of the Right who promoted this cause.

Brunetière's prioritization of collective society and the stability of the nation before the individual rights promised in the Declaration of the Rights of Man placed him in direct conflict with the Dreyfusard intellectuals. Because of this incompatibility in their views of the foundation of society and the relationship of citizens to the nation, the dominant Dreyfusard intellectuals would accuse Brunetière of anti-intellectualism and block his efforts to engage as a legitimate "intellectual." This would become a major source of resentment for Brunetière who wrote of his struggle, "I do not want them [Dreyfusard intellectuals] to have ideas contrary to mine, but I demand the right to have

²³⁰ Ibid., 230.

²³¹ In one discussion of the incompatibility between patriotism and Dreyfusism, Brunetière wrote, "When the newspapers announced the suicide of Colonel Henry, 'an eminent 'intellectual,'" left me a note saying "my sincere condolences on the probable loss of your illusions." "In truth," Brunetière explains, "I had lost my illusions that day, but not those on the loyalty of the military judges, rather those that I held on the patriotism of several of our 'intellectuals.'" Ibid., 219.

²³² Ibid., 230.

ideas contrary to theirs.”²³³ He demanded to be recognized as an intellectual with alternative, even oppositional ideas on individualism and the French nation.

Realism and Anti-Rationalism

Brunetière’s rejection of individualism in favor of the broader collective was closely tied to another intellectual value that would set him apart from the Dreyfusard intellectuals: his concept of realism and his opposition to rationalism. Brunetière’s understanding of intellectual realism was a rejection of the ability of “pure thought” and theoretical abstraction to represent reality. Individualist thought could only be abstract since it had no real foundation in the society. Any application of this individual idea to the broader society was possibly dangerous and certainly irresponsible. For a Dreyfusard, an idea, if it was logical and rational, was true no matter how it affected society once it was implemented. If society suffered, it did not diminish the intrinsic value of the idea or make the thinker who had proposed the idea culpable. Brunetière flatly rejected this approach to thought. For him, thought was only good and true if it positively affected the reality to which it was applied. Ideas had no intrinsic value, they were not real entities on their own nor did they lead to a more perfect reality if they were themselves logically perfect. Ideas only had value according to the practical implementation they provided. In this thinking, Brunetière shared his friend Paul Bourget’s concerns with Dreyfusard abstraction: “A philosophe, is he able to disperse among men the explanation he has conceived of the universe without considering whether this metaphysical explanation will translate in practice as a dangerous morality? Is he responsible for the harmful realities that his doctrine is able to give birth to?”²³⁴ For Brunetière, the effect of an abstract idea on the real world was the intellectual’s greatest concern and responsibility.

²³³ Ibid., 247.

²³⁴ Henry Bordeaux, *Les Ecrivains et les mœurs; notes, essays, et figurines, 1900-1902* (Paris: Plon, 1902), 103.

It is on this division in values that Brunetière and Anatole France engaged in a lively polemic during the Affair. According to France, freedom of thought, essential to the intellectual, required the absence of not only authority but of all burden of responsibility as well. “Any savant who has an idea of the world ought to express it,” he wrote, “the rights of thought are superior to all.”²³⁵ For France and the Dreyfusards, pure thought and philosophy were “above morality, and to subordinate philosophy to morality was to desire the death of thought, the ruin of all intellectual speculation, the eternal silence of the mind.”²³⁶ In terms of the Affair, France argued that the goodness of the Dreyfusard ideas of truth and justice justified and in fact made acceptable the division and instability that the protest had caused society. Yet, for Brunetière and the anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals, the beauty of the ideas did not justify the destructiveness of their implementation. He asked, “since they [abstract ideas] are able to be translated into acts, since they are able to leave the invisible world and enter the visible world, do we not have the right to envision them in their consequences and judge them accordingly?” Rather than judging the truth and quality of an idea by its purity, its logic, and its beautiful composition, Brunetière argued, “all doctrine ought to be judged according to the social principles that it fortifies or menaces.” The abstractions of Truth and Justice had no value if they were applied to society in a way that disrupted and divided it as the Affair had.

Brunetière’s insistence that the value of thought was measured by its impact on reality brought him in conflict with other Dreyfusards besides France. Guyot and Darlu would both accuse Brunetière of “considering the practical consequences rather than the truth of opinions” which was, for them, a scandalous stance for a self-proclaimed intellectual. Brunetière accepted the accusation with pleasure writing, “Darlu would have done well to tell us what the truth is, by what signs he recognizes it, and how he has been able to have so much confidence in being the only possessor of it. As for what he has said of me, I continue to think that in the matter of social morality, the practical consequences of ideas are of some importance...the defect of the intellectuals in general is precisely

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Ibid.

that of not regarding the practical consequences of the truths or of the so-called truths which they announce.”²³⁷ Here then were two completely opposed concepts of intellectual responsibility and intellectual defect. For the Dreyfusards, intellectuals were to work in the realm of the abstract and to concern themselves with the purity of the idea rather than its practical effect. For Brunetière and the Anti-Dreyfusards, intellectuals were only responsible thinkers if they considered first how their ideas would impact the real people and institutions of their particular society.

Brunetière, like Barrès, was also willing to draw intellectual inspiration from sources outside rational thought that the Dreyfusards considered anti-intellectual. For the Dreyfusards, thought and intelligence were a function of logic and rationalism alone. For Brunetière, thought had to encompass all the methods of judgment and determination, even those deemed irrational. The Anti-Dreyfusards argued that intelligence, the mind, and rational thought were not the only means to approach reality and determine the truth. Brunetière believed that the will, faith, emotion, and character could augment rational thought and lead more effectively to the truth. This division in worldviews and values would find expression in the debate between Brunetière and the Dreyfusards over the “bankruptcy of science.”²³⁸ Science and the scientific method, Brunetière argued, were incapable of being the source of truth and justice or of furnishing men with a “rule of life.”²³⁹ The rationalism of science could not provide insight into morality nor into questions of truth. Therefore, he argued, the intellectuals who claimed this insight into the Affair because they were scientifically trained minds had misled the people. While science was a noble application of intelligence, neither science nor intelligence were “the entire man, nor that which there is of the best in him, it is therefore not the only force which ought to govern the world.”²⁴⁰ To pure intelligence functioning in the abstract, Brunetière contrasted

²³⁷ Brunetière, *Lettres de combat*, 28.

²³⁸ Brunetière’s comments on the failure of science had in fact been made in 1894 but they were revived by the Dreyfusards during the initial months of 1898.

²³⁹ Brunetière, *Après le proces*.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

experience, character, and will which he claimed were qualities of the mind and soul that were more connected to the real. He believed the anti-Dreyfusards' recognition of these qualities made them the more qualified intellectual guides.

Nationalism and National Socialism

Well before the ENS ostracized Brunetière and his devotees from the university system and classified them as 'anti-Republican,' Brunetière had felt himself distanced, separated, and even rejected from the Republican regime that was in office during the Affair. This was in part due to his increasing opposition to individualism and rationalism. It was also a result of his hostility toward what he saw as an increasing tendency toward international socialism in the regime. The Dreyfusards considered internationalism to be an identifying trait of the intellectual since it was the manifestation of the left-wing ideal of universal humanity. Dreyfusard internationalism was directly tied to their concept of the model intellectual as a "citizen of the world" who was linked to men through ideas rather than national boundaries. For Dreyfusards, the intellectual shared more with men of thought throughout the world than they did with the "anti-intellectuals" of France. In contrast, for Brunetière and the intellectuals of the Right, the quality of "Frenchness" was inseparable from French intelligence since it provided the intellectual with a unique cultural inspiration. Those who sought to expunge this nationalism from their approach to culture and intelligence, Brunetière determined, were not fit to be intellectual guides. As he had with individualism, abstraction, and rationalism, Brunetière attempted to separate his own intellectual worldview from that of the internationalists and to elaborate his own approach to socialism that was clearly distinct from that of the Dreyfusard intellectuals.

Brunetière's stance against internationalism is perhaps best summarized in his lecture on "Les Ennemies de l'âme Française" in March 1899. Here he lists internationalism, second only to individualism, as one of the most threatening internal enemies of the French society. The internationalists, he complained, in their search to extend their hand to all humanity and to erase divisions, were weakening France in a time when other nations were building up these separations.

“While everywhere around us we see nationalities concentrate on themselves, assemble and unite themselves as of old,” he wrote, “I entreat you to see that our worst enemies are the most internal. They are those you [Ligue members] have believed it necessary to combat: the Internationalists who repeat the imprudent verse “Nation is simply a pompous word to mean barbarism.”²⁴¹ Although Brunetière scoffed at the idea that the Dreyfusards’ intellectualized internationalism could ever replace the instinctual love of the patrie in the people, he still warned against complacency. “These latter,” he wrote of the international humanists, “are the inheritors of the social philosophy of Mme Sand and M Lamartine. ‘I am the fellow citizen of any man who thinks; liberty is my country’ they say.” Of these intellectuals whose abstract internationalism would have the English, French, German and Chinese live and love one another as brothers, Brunetière says “I believe they fool themselves.”²⁴²

He was therefore quick to differentiate his concept of the relationship that the true, right-wing intellectual was to have with the patrie. While, he wrote, “certain philosophes find the idea of the patrie limiting...and are ‘fellow-citizens of any man who thinks’ with a strange tendency to find that one thinks better everywhere else than in their own patrie,” he himself chose to “reason in a different manner.”²⁴³ Far from being convinced by the rationalizations of the Dreyfusard internationalists, Brunetière wrote “I say hardily that if the idea of the patrie finds itself one day to be contradictory to the reasonings of ‘Reason’ or to the suggestions of nature, considering what we owe it in the present as in the past, the need that we have of it, and the superior life that it lets us live, so much the worse for nature and it is Reason which I will consider wrong.”²⁴⁴ In practice, this meant that the role of the intellectual was not to seek the suppression of national differences in favor of a universal,

²⁴¹ Brunetière, *Discours de combat*, 162.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, 165.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, 157.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

international intelligence but rather to defend national difference and national relativism. Defending the patrie entailed defending its traditions which were, according to Brunetière, “the military tradition, the literary tradition, the intellectual tradition, and...a religious tradition.” This meant defending the courts’ decision on Dreyfus, the Church’s views on Jews and education, and the heritage of pre-Enlightenment intellectual values including militarism, authority, hierarchy, and French patriotism.

Like Barrès, although Brunetière rejected internationalism in favor of traditional patriotism, he did not completely oppose socialism as long as he was able to define the term according to his own, alternative worldview. “I declare to you first,” he began, “that in the current sense, in the political meaning of the word, I am not socialist.” He explained that he regretted that he was not because in the true sense of the word, which had been denatured by the internationalists, socialism was simply a word for solidarity or collectivism, the “idea that the rights of society are anterior to those of the individual since they found them,” and the rejection of individualism.²⁴⁵ “I regret that the abuse that one has given the word prevents me from serving myself of it; I regret that a word invented only to be the antithesis of egoism and the synonym of solidarity has come to signify only hatred and miserable envy,” he wrote, “in other times less troubled and less confused where I would not risk being misunderstood, I would have liked to call myself socialist but I am not it. And of all the reforms with which socialism menaces us from the ‘nationalization of the soil’ to the ‘disintegration of the idea of the patrie,’ I admit none of them.”²⁴⁶ International socialism had denatured the idea of socialism into “dreams of sick minds and idealists who lack the sense of reality.”²⁴⁷ To oppose this distorted concept of the Dreyfusard Left, Brunetière outlined his own conception of a nationalist

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 47.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 44.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 49.

socialism in keeping with his anti-Dreyfusard intellectual values of realism, collectivism, nationalism, and class cooperation.

First Brunetière explained that the negation of the patrie was not necessary to the socialist concept. The patrie, had been portrayed as the enemy by international socialists, but the social solidarity these groups represented was actually at the heart of the idea of socialism. Perhaps the problem, Brunetière wrote, was that the international socialists understood solidarity differently than he did. In the contemporary application of the concept, it had come to mean dependency rather than cooperation. It is necessary, he wrote “to clarify a necessary distinction. I do not reject absolutely either the idea or the word solidarity. I demand only that one explain it and if possible that one define it. Since we do not understand the same thing by the same word, I ask that they say so and that though one might not elaborate on all the bases, that one at least not feign that all are of the same accord regarding it.”²⁴⁸ Brunetière understood solidarity as a national or professional unity which, far from requiring class conflict and struggle as the international socialists proposed, instead encouraged and fostered class cooperation and mutual assistance. When, Brunetière wrote, we “have disengaged socialism from collectivism and anarchism and thus retained what it contains of the practical and legitimate and separated it from what it contains of the dangerous and utopian,” then the anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals would have constructed their own concept of socialism.²⁴⁹ It would be this nationalist concept of socialism that Brunetière believed it was the intellectual’s responsibility to advocate. Those who promoted an internationalist socialism were betraying their responsibility to French intelligence and French society.

Brunetière and the Right-wing Intellectual Model

Brunetière was one of the first prominent writers on the Anti-Dreyfusard Right to engage in the debate over the role and responsibility of the intellectual. His initial condemnation of the concept

²⁴⁸ Ferdinand Brunetière, *Discours de Combat II* (Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1904), 72.

²⁴⁹ “Chronique,” *Revue des Deux Mondes*, April 30, 1898.

of intellectual engagement in *Après le Procès* quickly turned into resentment of the left-wing monopoly over it. Brunetière expressed, perhaps better than any of his right-wing peers, his resentment of the Dreyfusards' ability to dominate the discussion of moral and intellectual values and to silence and delegitimize their opponents by excluding them from the new authoritative role of the intellectual. As the Affair continued, he would feel himself increasingly excluded from places of intellectual authority like the university and marginalized because of his religious, political, and intellectual values. He therefore claimed equal rights to speak as an intellectual and began, with Barrès and others of the Ligue de la Patrie, the process of constructing an alternative intellectual model for the engagé of the Right. Convincing the public of the legitimacy of this alternative would become an additional but necessary component of his engagement and would result in a certain defensive mentality that the Dreyfusards did not share. This process of self-legitimization also involved an intentional differentiation of intellectual values and responsibilities. According to Brunetière, the true intellectual believed the individual only reached his potential in an ordered and stable society and therefore saw his role to be the stabilization of collective society rather than defense of individual rights. The true intellectual had a responsibility to advocate particular ideas that were relevant and practical for real society rather than creating abstract theories that were destructive in practice. And, the true intellectual saw himself to be linked to his compatriots by French culture and intelligence rather than to an international of intellectuals linked by rational, universal thought. Brunetière's perception that he was excluded from the new authority of the intellectual guide, his resentment of this hegemony, his belief that his engagement required a secondary aim of self-legitimization, and his desire to differentiate his cultural values and concept of intellectual role and responsibility from those of the Dreyfusard Left were shared by others on the Anti-Dreyfusard Right. These like-minded individuals would come together in intellectual communities, separate from those dominated by the Dreyfusards, in order to transform their individual protest into a more effective counter-engagement. These collective communities of the excluded and ostracized intellectuals of the

Right, and the different relationships, practices, and experiences that developed there, contribute the final component of the right-wing model of true intellectual identity.

CHAPTER 4

THE WORLD OF THE ANTI-DREYFUSARD RIGHT: COMMUNITIES, NETWORKS, AND THE INTELLECTUAL EXPERIENCE

As the Dreyfusards had, the Anti-Dreyfusards congregated in revues, ligues, salons and cafés and other areas of Parisian intellectual sociability. As the debates intensified, these spaces, which had before been home to men of both political persuasions, became exclusive centers of Dreyfusard or Anti-Dreyfusard opinion, resulting in a radical polarization of the intellectual community. In these places of professional and personal sociability, right-wing resentments, worldviews, values, and understanding of role were nurtured and reinforced by constant exposure to like-minded peers. Men of letters who had seen their work as an individual expression, now collaborated with others in a shared effort as intellectuals. Whether it was in a ligue, a revue *equipe*, a salon, or a gathering of engaged friends at a café or banquet, belonging to the anti-Dreyfusard intellectual camp and participating in its networks of professional support and personal friendships provided the anti-Dreyfusard intellectual with a new sense of belonging and a new collective identity that was separate from that of the Dreyfusard intellectuals. And, although they shared general intellectual behaviors with the Dreyfusards, from teaching to journalism to petition signing, the segregation of the two groups during the Affair revealed underlying differences in the experience of these basic professional practices that would contribute to a sense of fundamental incompatibility. As time passed, the segregation and sense of exclusion from the mainstream milieu would come to differentiate the behaviors and practices themselves. The new collective identity that was created in the separate, alternative intellectual communities of the Right both perpetuated and substantiated the perception by the Anti-Dreyfusards that they had a different intellectual identity from the Dreyfusards.

The first step toward collective engagement on the Anti-Dreyfusard Right would be the announcement of the new Ligue de la Patrie on January 1, 1899. The ligue had originally been conceived by three agrégés, Louis Dausset, Gabriel Syveton, and Henri Vaugeois in October of 1898. The petition they created would be circulated quietly among the prestigious men of letters who had refused to participate in the Dreyfusard petitions and ligues. This initial statement of anti-Dreyfusard engagement, which read in closing, “the undersigned, persuaded that they express the opinion of France, are resolved to work, within the limits of their professional duty, to maintain...the traditions of the French patrie,” was signed by Charles Maurras, Barrès, Brunetière, François Coppée, Jules Lemaître, René Doumic, the Comtesse de Martel,²⁵⁰ and numerous other men of letters, artists, and professors.²⁵¹ On January 1, 1899 *Le Soleil*, a monarchist paper, broke the story that there was a new ligue forming and volunteered its revue team’s signatures for the petition. Although the founders expressed irritation that their ligue had been announced before a suitable number of prestigious names had been gathered, they took the opportunity of increased publicity to launch their ligue. An initial comite de direction was formed in 1899 including Barrès, Brunetière, Coppée, Lemaître, Syvetton, Vaugeois, and Dausset.²⁵²

The Ligue de la Patrie would become the central network of the anti-Dreyfusard intellectual and formed a clear division between those who were Dreyfusard and those who were not. Although the Dreyfusard Ligue des Droits de l’homme had not *literally* excluded any particular men of letters from signing, the anti-Dreyfusard ligue would pointedly include the proscription that no individual who had signed the Dreyfusard petitions in favor of revision would be accepted as a member of the new ligue. Lists of new adherents were published in blatantly anti-Dreyfusard journals like *L’Éclair*, *L’Écho de Paris*, and *Gil Blas*. And, the first meetings of the Ligue in the salle des Horticulteurs were

²⁵⁰ More often identified by the nom de plume Gyp.

²⁵¹ Jean-François Sirinelli, *Intellectuels et passions française: manifestes et petitions au XXe siècle* (Paris: Fayard, 1990), 27.

²⁵² AN F7 13229 and F7 15930

for invited guests only.²⁵³ With this stipulation, the ligue became an arm of specifically anti-Dreyfusard collective engagement. The most effective expression of this collective engagement, and the most significant contribution to collective intellectual identity, would be the ligue lecture tours.

These tours began in Paris, where speakers gave lectures before large crowds of university students and the general public, before traveling to the larger provincial cities. They were referred to as “conférences patriotiques” and were not only reproduced partially in the larger papers the following morning but also were printed and sold as pamphlets by the Ligue’s own press.²⁵⁴ Certain speeches, like one given by Lemaître in 1900, were not even sold, but rather distributed in envelopes to every home in all the quarters of Paris.²⁵⁵ The dissemination of these lectures created an imagined community of like-minded readers that extended well beyond the small number of actual attendees. The published speeches were also an effective means of promoting the larger anti-Dreyfusard intellectual network. After 1900, the inside-cover of several of these printed lectures included advertisements for the ligue bulletin *Annales* and a summary of the contents of the next issue. Back covers often listed other essays and lectures given by Ligue members that were available to purchase.²⁵⁶ The lectures were also the aspect of Ligue engagement that continued to connect member intellectuals in the ligue’s socio-professional network. Although Brunetière would leave the directing committee as early as February of 1899 and Barrès would leave it in October of 1901, they both remained committed members of the Ligue’s lecture efforts throughout the Affair.²⁵⁷

These lecture tours were essential in promoting and consolidating the alternative intellectual model developed on the Right and reinforcing the sense of common purpose and sentiment among right-wing intellectuals. They magnified the common themes on the Right about the existence of a

²⁵³ Rioux, *Nationalisme et conservatisme*, 31.

²⁵⁴ AN F7 13229-13230

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ AN F7 13229

²⁵⁷ BA 986

Dreyfusard intellectual hegemony, the resentment felt by its opponents, the struggle being waged to combat this monopoly over public opinion, and the alternative set of values and intellectual positions on the anti-Dreyfusard Right. Lectures by Coppée and Lemaître noted the “oppression by an evil doing minority” who claimed to have a “monopoly” on engagement.²⁵⁸ They called for the Ligue to continue to organize, discipline, and publicize itself in order to legitimize its alternative position.²⁵⁹ In the Ligue’s fifth conference entitled “Où Sont Les Intellectuels?,” Doumic complained that the Dreyfusards had “entitled themselves ‘les intellectuels’ and excluded from this role all who disagreed with them.²⁶⁰ These men had been friends and peers of ours, he continued, but “suddenly they appeared to us transformed... We held them for men of open and tolerant minds, but they now consider that all those who were not of their opinion were men without heart, that they alone had the monopoly on humanity, piety, and generally all of the beautiful sentiments, while we were, we others, the partisans of injustice and barbarism.” He concluded by declaring of this unwarranted Dreyfusard hegemony, “In entitling themselves with pomp ‘Les Intellectuels’ instead of calling themselves as they ought to have ‘plusieurs intellectuels,’ they have wanted to make it be believed that the immense majority of France who thinks, reflects, and lives by intelligence was on their side. And it is the contrary that is true.”²⁶¹

After collectively denouncing the Dreyfusard hegemony, lecturers continued by declaring themselves the originators of a legitimate, authoritative, French alternative and differentiating the worldviews and values of this alternative model. They collectively expressed the relativism, collectivism, realism, and national socialism that Barrès and Brunetière had expressed individually. The first lecture entitled “La Patrie Française” was given by Lemaître to “explain the spirit and design

²⁵⁸ The second lecture was given by Coppée and Marcel Dubois on “L’Avenir de la Ligue de la Patrie” and the sixth was again given by Lemaître on “L’Oeuvre de la Patrie Française.”

²⁵⁹ *L’Oeuvre de la Patrie*.

²⁶⁰ René Doumic, *Où Sont les intellectuels?* (Paris: Bureaux de “la Patrie française, June 1899), 8.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 9.

of the Ligue.” Here he argued that while the Dreyfusards had accused them of not loving “truth and justice as much, of not being as attached as them to the rights of man and the citizen,” they were here to clarify that though they loved truth and justice, as intellectuals they also “had a duty to respect the fundamental pacts of human society” and the stability of the nation.²⁶² Barrès began his lectures by reminding listeners that the Ligue was led by “an elite of historians, savants, artists and grands lettrés” who had taken the responsibility of “advising on the necessities of the Patrie.” He continued, “we share a common will...and we have among us the men of France most capable of expressing in a clear and moving fashion, with disinterested hearts, the national sentiment.”²⁶³ The Ligue, he wrote, held as its highest purpose the replacement of abstract internationalism and universalism with a patriotism grounded in the national reality.²⁶⁴

The Ligue de la Patrie also created a network of intellectuals and devotees that served to link various members to one another in a larger right-wing community. Beginning in 1900, there were monthly Ligue sponsored banquets that brought together the leading names of the Ligue and celebrated the members newly elected to office. It organized its own section for women called the “Dames de la Patrie Française” which continued to hold permanent meetings well past the Dreyfus Affair and printed its own Bulletin by 1910. Belonging to the Ligue de la Patrie also linked members to other anti-Dreyfusard ligues. Despite the clear dominance of intellectuals in the Ligue de la Patrie and the working class majority of the other leading anti-Dreyfusard ligues, the memberships, and especially the audience, of the ligues could not help but overlap during the Affair.²⁶⁵ The Ligue de la Patrie cooperated with Déroulède’s Ligue des Patriotes in several electoral campaigns and they and the Ligue antisémite would support one another’s writers and public demonstrations. Barrès not only

²⁶² Lemaître, *Conférence de la patrie*.

²⁶³ Barrès, *La Terre et les Morts*, 5.

²⁶⁴ Brunetière provided a lecture on “La Nation et l’armée” that echoed this sentiment.

²⁶⁵ Peter M. Rutkoff, “The Ligue des Patriotes: the Nature of the Radical Right and the Dreyfus Affair,” *French Historical Studies* 8 no. 4 (Autumn, 1974).

belonged to the Ligue des Patriotes, he joined in Déroulède's February 1899 attempted coup and eventually became the editor of *Le Drapeau* and the leader of the Patriotes.²⁶⁶ Brunetière was giving lectures and articles on the enemies of France and the values of anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals to the Union de la paix sociale and the Catholic University during the time that he was speaking for the Ligue de la Patrie. And Lemaître, Dausset, Syveton, and Vaugeois would all join Maurras and Maurice Pujo in the Action Française. The latter was born almost simultaneously with the Ligue de la Patrie and saw itself as a son of this original collective community.

The creation of the Ligue would also initiate yet another form of intellectual community: the imaginary community created by manifests and petitions. Those who signed the ligue manifest believed they were in the company of like-minded peers and felt a certain affinity for their fellow signers even though they might never come in contact with them. These imagined communities were able to create a sense of collective identity on a massive scale. When the ligue petition was first published, it had 22 academician signatures, by the first official assembly of the Ligue there were 10,000 adherents, by the end of 1899 there were 20,000, and by the end of 1900 over 500,000 compared to the 8,000 of the Ligue des Droits de l'homme.²⁶⁷ The ligue petition was followed by other anti-Dreyfusard petitions, like the "Henry Monument." Begun in *La Libre Parole*,²⁶⁸ it garnered fewer signatures but became a means, used by both camps, to identify intellectuals as anti-Dreyfusards. Signing one's name and title to these petitions implied a certain willingness to be identified with the values and programs of the collective extreme Right and a disassociation with the Dreyfusard Left. The very practice of petition signing also indicated a certain concept of intellectual community on the Right that was distinctive from that of the Left. While the Left listed names alphabetically or in no particular order, the petitions of the Right classed their signatures by

²⁶⁶ Rutkoff, *Revanche et Revision*, 159.

²⁶⁷ Sirinelli and Ory, *Les Intellectuels en France*, 23.

²⁶⁸ The petition was to raise funds and express support for Colonel Henry's widow. 14,000 signatures and 131,000 francs were collected within a month.

professional cadre, academic standing, or social position.²⁶⁹ While the Dreyfusard Left liked to envision its intellectual community as an egalitarian society, the anti-Dreyfusard Right saw their community as ordered and hierarchical.

The Ligue de la Patrie was the largest of the right-wing intellectual collectives, but it was not the only source of sociability, mentorship, or collective identity for anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals. The division created by the Affair revealed a previously existing division in professional trajectories between the Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards. The anti-Dreyfusard dominance in letters and the press meant that revue teams and offices would become important communities and networks for the intellectual Right. The revue provided not only a laboratory and an outlet for ideas that were oppositional to the regime and university, it also served as a space of interaction and fellowship for the writers. Here students who eschewed the professional path of the university professor found professional mentors and opportunities to develop their skills as contributors before becoming regular columnists. Collaborators on revue teams usually worked in the same offices and shared opinions and stories, met to discuss the upcoming issue or consider literary contributions for publication in serial, or simply used the offices as points of rendezvous for other social gatherings with fellow collaborators. Their shared values and likeminded approach to the political and social situation, in addition to their shared professional pursuits in journalism and literature, more often than not, engendered friendships and a strong sense of social community and collective identity. This sense of community and collective identity was also experienced on a broader scale, among the network of journals that shared collaborators and socio-political perspectives throughout France. The revues provided, therefore, not only real interpersonal community but also a source for an imagined intellectual community shared with all the other writers who contributed to like-minded papers.

Right-wing intellectuals dominated the teams of several of the larger revues and daily presses, including *Gaulois*, *La Presse*, *Gil Blas*, *Libre Parole*, *L'Intransigeant*, *La Patrie*, *L'Écho de Paris*, *Le Journal*, *Figaro*, *Petit Journal* and *L'Éclair*. The anti-Dreyfusard collective identity of these

²⁶⁹ Charle, *Naissance des "intellectuels,"* 150.

papers was seldom in question since the revues continued the same right-wing themes as the individual intellectuals. One article in *Gil Blas*, for example, denounced Dreyfusard hegemony and advocated the legitimacy of the Ligue saying, “The men attached to the cause of Dreyfus have affirmed that the elite of France is with them...they have concluded that they dispose of all the intellectual forces of the nation....The foundation of the Ligue de la Patrie Française shows that the Dreyfusards have only created an illusion for us. The intellectual elite of France is not with them, it is divided.”²⁷⁰ A small bi-monthly revue called *Les Annales de la Patrie Française* was also created expressly as the organ of the Ligue in May of 1900. Each number included political essays or articles in addition to literary pieces, poetry, theater, and a section called “Le Mouvement Nationaliste” advertising the meetings, lectures, and committees being held around France.²⁷¹ In a clear attempt to forge a sense of collective intellectual identity in the initial issue, Lemaître listed five values believed to unite all the readers and collaborators of the revue in a single mindset.²⁷² Although each of these revues would provide a segregated community that reinforced and amplified anti-Dreyfusard engagement, it was Brunetière’s *Revue des Deux Mondes* which was the most prestigious and least ephemeral of these communities.

The *RDM* was one of the more actively engaged literary revues in the anti-Dreyfusard arsenal and employed such leading anti-Dreyfusards as Lemaître, Doumic, Brunetière, François Chalmes, and Charles Benoist on its permanent staff of chroniclers as well as inviting regular articles and literary contributions from other anti-Dreyfusard notables like Paul Bourget, André Bellesort, and Barrès. The revue was a socio-professional space for all of its contributors, but particularly for Brunetière who worked in his office alongside his contributors every day, read each of their pieces, and collaborated

²⁷⁰ AN F7 12721

²⁷¹ *Annales de la Patrie française* no. 1 (Paris: Bureaux de “la Patrie française, 1900).

²⁷² The first was that individual liberties had been violated by the loi de scolarite and that the Republic of the day was “sectarian, persecuting, Masonic, and exploited by a party.” The following statements said that the Third regime had as its friends the anarchists who desired the collapse of the army, the strikers who refused the right to work to others, and the international collectivists represented in the ministry by Millerand. It concluded with the statement that even monarchies allowed the freedom of assembly denied under the Third Republic to the nationalist and anti-Dreyfusard ligues. Ibid.

with them on revisions and alterations. Twice a week he gathered all the permanent writers to his offices for a discussion of the issue,²⁷³ and in the evenings, there were salon meetings hosted by Louis Buloz in the offices of the revue.²⁷⁴(95,97) The revue team was therefore a significant part of Brunetière's life and was central to his conceptualization of himself as an engaged intellectual.

Brunetière knew that the revue was a flagship for anti-Dreyfusism and preferred his post as director to any political position he could have earned since he saw it to be “a podium more resounding than any other in France or even in Europe.”(95,92) This platform provided an opportunity for other contributors to amplify their own views as well and to protest the monopoly of the Left and the repression of the Right with more effect.²⁷⁵ The *RDM* team was, therefore, both a place of sociability and professional collegiality for Brunetière and his contributors and a means to amplify their individual engagement. It linked its writers in a network of like-minded peers who shared a purpose and a system of values. Most importantly, identification with *RDM* implied a sense of alienation from Dreyfusard communities. Writers for the *RDM* during the Affair were often found in other anti-Dreyfusard journals and revues but rarely, if ever, had essays or even literary works published in the network of Dreyfusard journals. Brunetière even removed his work from Calmann Lévy's publishing catalogue when Lévy published the *Revue de Paris*, led by Dreyfusards Ernest Lavissee and Lucien Herr, and gave it instead to publishers Perrin, Delagrave, and Hachette until his death in 1906. Writing for *RDM* implied a decision to support the anti-Dreyfusard camp and a rejection of the Dreyfusard community.

²⁷³ *Le Livre du centenaire; cent ans de vie française à la Revue des deux mondes* (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1929), 423-426.

²⁷⁴ Compagnon, *Connaissez-vous Brunetière?*, 94.

²⁷⁵ For example, In the June 1899 political chronicle Charmes spoke for the revue in saying that though the Ligue des Droits de l'homme said “all the intellectuals were on its side,” that this “was false. Other intellectuals who were inferior to them neither in quality nor even in number have been wearied and irritated by hearing this incorrect affirmation repeated.”(99j) The following year, when Waldeck-Rousseau's ministry initiated the laws on associations that primarily punished anti-Dreyfusard organizations, the *RDM* published a series of articles deploring this abuse of political power and loss of guaranteed rights to assemble.

The Ligue and the Revue were not the only spaces in the intellectual world that served as politically segregated centers of sociability and community for anti-Dreyfusards. Salons were particularly popular places for intellectuals to meet and be introduced to fellow anti-Dreyfusard thinkers, discuss and share ideas, and forge valuable professional networks. Brunetière's salons of choice were those of Mme Buloz which often met at the offices of the *RDM* and that of Mme Aubernon where "the Dreyfusard artists no longer showed themselves" after the Affair sparked the division into camps.²⁷⁶ The Anti-Dreyfusards found themselves most at home in the salons of Mme Leland, Mme de Loynes, and Comtesse de Martel, known in the literary world as Gyp, who were all three ardent anti-Dreyfusards. They were also such strong supporters of the work of the Ligue de la Patrie that they became its "bailleuses de fonds."²⁷⁷ Mme de Loynes' salon had once welcomed as diverse a clientele as Renan, Flaubert, Anatole France and Barrès in the same salon, yet, with the advent of the Dreyfus Affair, her salon became a "fortress of nationalism" where Dreyfusard thinkers were no longer welcomed while Lemaître, Barrès, and Brunetière were frequent visitors.²⁷⁸ Salons were also important centers of mentorship and professional networking for right-wing intellectuals. De Loynes' salon helped right-wing editors find financial assistance and introduced Ernest Judet of *Le Petit Journal* to financier Antoine Vlasto, enabling Judet to start the more nationalist and anti-Semitic paper *L'Éclair*. Other editors including Gaston Calmette of *Figaro*,²⁷⁹ Henry Simond of *L'Écho de Paris*, and Léon Bailby of *La Presse* and *L'Intransigeant* were frequent guests of de Loynes and used the salons as opportunities to meet potential contributors. It was even at one of de

²⁷⁶ Winock, *Le siècle des intellectuels*, 45.

²⁷⁷ Rièse, *Les Salons littéraires parisiens*, 119.

²⁷⁸ Hocking, *Ferdinand Brunetière*, 69.

²⁷⁹ Sisley Huddleston, *Paris Salons, Cafés, Studios* (London, J.B. Lippincott Company, 1928), 155.

Loynes' dinners, among friends who shared the same intellectual frustrations during the Affair, that the original plan to create the Ligue de la Patrie was supposedly devised.²⁸⁰

Cafés and small dinners offered more casual opportunities for anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals to form personal links to like-minded peers, to discuss and debate their ideas, and even to hold small organizational meetings with fellow engaged writers. Several café spaces, particularly during the divisiveness of the affair, separated what had before been a clientele of mixed ideologies into very polarized communities whose political persuasion dominated the atmosphere and patronage of the café. Café des Vosges, for example, would literally change its name to Café François Coppée to recognize the dominance at that café of Coppée and his followers around the time of the Affair.²⁸¹ Café Procope and Café Voltaire were also widely recognized as anti-Dreyfusard spaces during the Affair where one could find Barrès, Bourget, Jean Moreas and Maurras holding small gatherings or simply relaxing and discussing affairs with a few friends.²⁸² Café Voltaire, in particular, became the home of the Association nationalistes de la Jeunesse whose aim was said to be creating a space for student sociability “where one does not admit Dreyfusards.”²⁸³ These now divided social spaces reflected the corresponding division in personal and professional friendships that had often been formed around socializing in a café. Anti-Dreyfusard activist Léon Daudet recounted how on the eve of the Affair, his father Alphonse, Zola, Anatole France, Coppée, Lemaître, Bourget, and Barrès had enjoyed meeting together at Restaurant Durand. When Daudet declared that it was necessary for all who thought and wrote to take the side of France and the army, Zola responded to the contrary and the atmosphere of the group, according to Daudet, “became glacial.” When the party broke up for the evening, Lemaître suggested to the group that, “the Balzac dinners had a place at one time, but it is

²⁸⁰ Sirinelli, *Histoire des Droites en France*, 126.

²⁸¹ Noël Riley Fitch, *Literary Cafés of Paris* (Washington DC: Starrhill Press, 1989).

²⁸² *Sociabilités Intellectuelles*, 255.

²⁸³ AN F7 13229-13230

likely they will not take place again.” It is thus, Daudet concluded, “that the Dreyfus Affair divided the world.”²⁸⁴

Perhaps the largest gatherings of anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals for politically charged dinner discussions were those in honor of Barrès’ *Appel au Soldat* held most often in the Café de l’Univers. In recollecting these dinners, Barrès expressed clearly the sense of intellectual community and collective identity that formed here. “Two years ago,” he wrote, “the majority of those who are today united around this table did not know one another. They were made sensible to one another by the intensity, the cruelty of the drama of which France was almost the victim. This first of all brought us together.”²⁸⁵ Barrès did not consider the grouping to have been only voluntary however. There were pre-existing sentiments in the men present in that hall, he continued, and certain words like *Patrie* and *France* awakened in them ideas that “were not able to be understood by those in whom these associations of ideas had not previously existed. It is not a matter of intelligence: whatever their [Dreyfusard intellectuals] rapidity of mind, whatever their alertness, they are not able to sense things as we do. A shared instinct, a shared physiology has grouped us.”²⁸⁶ And, he was clearly suggesting, this psychology and sense of things that had brought the anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals together in this community also separated them as intellectuals from the Dreyfusards.

Whether meeting and forming bonds in ligue, petitions, revues, salons or cafés, the anti-Dreyfusards, as the Dreyfusards had, sought to unite and bond with like-minded peers who could be part of a specific intellectual network and community favorable to their own values, worldviews, and socio-political positions. But, it was not the segregation of spaces, groups, and networks alone that created a distinctive right-wing collective identity for intellectuals. Integral to the formation of this collective identity was the perception, voiced so well by Barrès, that there was a more fundamental division between the two camps of intellectuals. The opposition in values and the division in

²⁸⁴ Leon Daudet, *Etudes et milieux littéraires* (Paris: Grasset, 1927), 171.

²⁸⁵ Barrès, *Scènes et doctrines*, 86.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

communities was paired with the perception of an essential abyss, between Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards, in the very experience of being an intellectual.

The Anti-Dreyfusard Intellectual Experience

During the Dreyfus Affair, intellectuals of the Right came to have a very different understanding of what it meant to “be an intellectual” than the intellectuals of the Left. The distinctive experience of daily intellectual life on the anti-Dreyfusard Right was partly a result of their segregated communities, but it was also a product of the very different relationship that the intellectual of the Right had to the republican regime and French cultural institutions. Many of these differences between Dreyfusard and anti-Dreyfusard relationships and experiences originated before 1898, but they would not carry much significance until the struggle to control intellectual identity during the Affair. After 1898, the distinctive relationships and experiences of the anti-Dreyfusard Right were used by the dominant Left as a tool for identifying them as anti-intellectuals. However, while the Left used its own relationships to the Republic, the university, and the Church to define the intellectual experience and exclude anti-Dreyfusards, the intellectual Right began to outline its own concept of these relationships and use them to define its own model of true intellectual experience.

The Dreyfusards identified themselves collectively as the intellectual defenders of the Republic and of the France created by the Enlightenment and Revolution. The Dreyfusards, therefore, experienced intellectual life as the protected intelligentsia. Among the anti-Dreyfusards, in contrast, anti-Republicanism, entailing both a rejection of parliamentarism and of liberalism, became an expectation of the intellectual. Barrès, despite his past position as deputy from Nancy, symbolized this anti-republican cause. He said of his anti-Dreyfusard peers, “we are united by the most complete disgust, we are clearly and resolutely in revolt and in disgust against the parliamentary regime.”²⁸⁷ Brunetière, who had considered himself a republican before the Affair, was distraught by the infusion

²⁸⁷ Ibid., 92.

of internationalist socialism into republicanism and came to identify himself as a “nationalist” rather than a “republican” intellectual. As early as 1898, the chronicle in the *RDM* expressed the role and responsibility of the anti-Dreyfusard intellectual when it said, “we have struggled against the inherent faults of our republican and parliamentary regime.”²⁸⁸ Beginning with the Affair, intellectuals of the Right would not engage to support of the Republic or defend its values. Instead, being an intellectual of the Right would come to mean being the anti-republican, anti-liberal, and anti-parliamentarian opposition.

This oppositional relationship to the Third Republic and its political values meant that the right-wing experience of intellectual life was one of perceived repression and persecution. The Dreyfusards would exclude them from the category of the intellectual by denouncing them as anti-republican and therefore anti-French.²⁸⁹ René Doumic would react to this perceived exclusion writing, “The spirit of the sect [political Left] is the spirit of exclusion. To exclude, this is their favorite pastime. No one will be Republican outside of us and our friends!”²⁹⁰ Behind the “word screens” of Justice, Liberty, and Civil Equality, he concluded, “is practiced a politics of oppression.” While the intellectuals of the Left used anti-republicanism to exclude the Right from the intellectual milieu, the ministries of Brisson, Waldeck-Rousseau, and Combes would use it as a rationale for political persecution of right-wing organizations and leaders. The Right was forced to apply for governmental authorization of its organizations and revues, reorganize its disbanded ligues, and replace its imprisoned leaders.²⁹¹ While the intellectual Left increasingly enjoyed a daily intellectual life of political support, organizational stability, and the resulting public prominence, the intellectual Right’s

²⁸⁸ Broglie, *Histoire politique*, 244.

²⁸⁹ Dreyfusard André de Séipse wrote of the Ligue de la Patrie, “The Ligue de la Patrie kills France...their design, whether they avow it or hide it, is to reverse the Republic...for the Republic is the body of the ideas of the Revolution.” André de Séipse, “Lettre III sur la soi-disant Ligue de la Patrie,” (Paris: Librairie de l’art indépendant, 1899), 24.

²⁹⁰ René Doumic, *L’Esprit du Secte* (January 1900).

²⁹¹ Barrès, for example, would replaced the imprisoned Deroulede as leader of the Ligue des Patriotes.

experience of intellectual life was one of perceived suppression, vulnerability, and organizational instability.

As Brunetière would discover when he was dismissed from his positions at the ENS and the Sorbonne for anti-republicanism and clericalism, the anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals' relationship to the Republic would also affect their relationship to the university system. The pre-1898 tendency of the right-wing to follow the professional trajectory of journalism rather than university teaching would be exacerbated by the perceived Dreyfusard dominance of the ENS and the university system. Although anti-Dreyfusards continued to predominate certain areas like the Faculty of Law and Collège de France, they were increasingly outnumbered by their left-wing opponents in the faculties of Arts and Sciences at the Sorbonne.²⁹² And, as the experience of the universitaire became identified with the Dreyfusard intellectual, being a right-wing universitaire was increasingly seen as aberrant. As generations of right-wing students perceived this imbalance in the university system, they would seek mentors outside the university and find new professional alternatives in journalism.

This tendency toward journalism and literature rather than the university would yield a significant difference in the experience of daily intellectual life on the Left and Right. While the Dreyfusards were able to form smaller revues like *Siècle*, *Aurore*, and *Petit Republic*, the Anti-Dreyfusards dominated the larger, more prestigious literary revues, particularly the *Revue des Deux Mondes*.²⁹³ The large daily presses were also usually anti-Dreyfusard, especially *L'Écho de Paris*, which became the flagship journal for the Ligue de la Patrie Française, as well as *Le Journal*, *Figaro*, and *Petit Journal*.²⁹⁴ The anti-Dreyfusard intellectual enjoyed an array of possible forums for his literary engagement and was assured of a much larger audience for his articles than his Dreyfusard

²⁹² Charle, "Academics or Intellectuals?," 105.

²⁹³ Winock, *Le siècle des intellectuels*, 51.

²⁹⁴ In fact, it has been said that "the popular daily of the Left, though often announced, never lived a day in France." Sirinelli, *Histoire des Droites*, 132-6.

opponents.²⁹⁵ By the end of the Affair, although there were anti-Dreyfusard *universitaires*, it was the journalists and men of letters who had become the prominent leaders of the right-wing camp and the model of the right-wing intellectual experience.

The anti-Dreyfusard intellectual experience would also be influenced by the relationship of the extreme Right to the Catholic church. As previously mentioned, Catholicism did not predispose intellectuals to be anti-Dreyfusards since many prominent Dreyfusards were practicing Catholics. However, the intellectual Right invoked faith, religion, and catholic tradition more often than the Left in its intellectual discourse and did not see secularism as a necessary quality of intelligence. Also, in contrast with the Dreyfusard camp, the presence of Protestant or Jewish names on anti-Dreyfusard petitions was rare, while those of church officials was commonplace. The Dreyfusards eagerly highlighted the religious thought of their right-wing opponents in an effort to dismiss them as anti-intellectual, irrational, and intolerant. They claimed Brunetière's writings on the importance of the Church for social order, the Catholic tradition of anti-Semitism, and the value of religious primary education indicated he was unsuited for intellectual responsibilities. However, Brunetière and the intellectuals of the Right saw faith, religion, and church tradition as essential to the French national identity and therefore as important influences on the formation of French intelligence. Being a responsible intellectual of the Right required the translation of these faith-based, traditional sources into cultural and intellectual inspiration.²⁹⁶ For Dreyfusards, being an intellectual required a separation of religious and intellectual life. For the anti-Dreyfusards, the two were intertwined and symbiotic.

Anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals, therefore, had a very different understanding of their relationship to political and cultural power than their Dreyfusard peers. Their antagonism toward the republican regime, marginalization in the university, and close association with the press and the

²⁹⁵ See the work on this imbalance by Christophe Charle in "Academics or Intellectuals?"

²⁹⁶ They would suffer a loss of intellectual authority with the separation of Church and State and the elimination of many religious educational institutions.

Church would give them a particular experience of intellectual life that distinguished their concept of what it meant to be an intellectual from that of their opponents. This fundamental difference in intellectual experience was intensified, actualized, and perpetuated by the segregation of the intellectual community. Spaces of intellectual sociability and professional networks from *ligues* and *revues* to petitions, *cafés*, and salons became politically polarized. This segregation led over time to an increasing sense of separation and incompatibility between the two camps. The communities and spaces of the intellectual milieu became centers of engagement and politicization that radicalized individual intellectuals and gave them a new sense of their collective identity as anti-Dreyfusard *engagés*.

The Right-Wing Intellectual Model During the Dreyfus Affair

Barrès and Brunetière were two of the first anti-Dreyfusard men of letters to engage in the Dreyfus Affair and, therefore, were instrumental in the construction of an alternative, right-wing intellectual identity. First and foremost, both men showed a strong resentment of the dominance exercised by the Left over the authority of the “intellectual” and their exclusion from this role. This resentment, which would continue to mark all of the intellectuals of the Right over the century, would inspire a desire to legitimize themselves as equal, if not superior, intellectual guides for France. This struggle for legitimacy would become an essential aspect of Barrès’ and Brunetière’s mentality of engagement that distinguished them from the left-wing intellectuals who engaged without any such obligation. Both Barrès and Brunetière would consider the differentiation and defense of their right-wing socio-cultural values to be an important part of this legitimization process. They advocated nationalism, realism, and collectivism as the true ideals of French intelligence rather than the Dreyfusard values of universalism, rationalism, and individualism. These different value

systems would correspond to equally distinctive attitudes toward intellectual role, responsibility, and behavior. The abyss that became apparent between the values and attitudes of the individual right-wing intellectuals would be reinforced and radicalized by the physical segregation of their collective intellectual communities and socio-professional networks. The organizations, spaces, and camaraderie that Barrès and Brunetière shared with their like-minded peers would give them a sense of collective identification with the right-wing camp and would enhance the effectiveness of their individual engagements. This physical separation of the intellectual field would both reflect and inspire distinctive relationships to the places of political and cultural power in France. This resulted in a different right-wing experience of intellectual life. All together, these factors contributed to a very different concept of intellectual identity on the anti-Dreyfusard Right and Dreyfusard Left. This pattern of alternative identity construction on the extreme Right would not end with the resolution of the Affair, however. It would continue into the next decades when the crisis of the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates caused intellectuals of the Left and Right to engage once more.

SECTION III

THE NOUVELLE SORBONNE AND THE INTERNATIONAL THREAT: 1910-1920

The large scale political engagement by intellectuals in Dreyfus Affair had revealed underlying differences within the intellectual milieu between the Dreyfusard Center and Left and anti-Dreyfusard Right. These differences were not mere political disagreements; they were the result of a veritable abyss between these intellectuals' understanding of the essence of the nation, the conceptualization of culture and intelligence, and the responsibilities and values of the intellectual. The separate concepts of intellectual identity did not disappear with the end of the Affair. Instead, the resentments, struggle for legitimacy, and process of differentiation and segregation on the extreme Right would continue into the decades surrounding World War I. The Right's efforts to construct an alternative model of intellectual identity can be seen once more, almost immediately after the Dreyfus Affair, in the debates over the Nouvelle Sorbonne and the international threat of Germany. In these debates, a new group of intellectuals on both the Left and Right took the reins from their Dreyfus Affair predecessors. Engagement in the years surrounding World War I was driven by the modernists and internationalists of the Left and the traditionalists and integral nationalists of the Right. The polemic began to take form as early as 1908, and continued until the declaration of War in 1914, when the majority of the intellectuals temporarily put aside their differences in the *Union sacrée*. Even this union, however, was based on two different rationales, on the Left and Right, for engaging in the war. The separations of the pre-war debate would reappear after the Versailles treaty, reinvigorated by the new ideological oppositions of the post-war era.

The movement of the intellectual Right against the reforms made to secondary and higher education, dubbed the "Nouvelle Sorbonne" by writers Henri Massis and Alfred de Tarde, had its

origins in the divisions created during the Dreyfus Affair. In 1871, with the loss of the Franco-Prussian war, many French *universitaires* demanded reforms to the French system which would model it after Germany's university system. These German inspired reforms included a new focus on practical sciences, an emphasis on modern languages, scientifically-based methodologies in the humanities, and a new attempt to guide students toward a specialization. However, the reforms were not actually implemented until 1902, and were quickly associated with the dominant Dreyfusard position, since the young *universitaires* who supported and implemented the new reforms were ardent Dreyfusards.²⁹⁷ By 1908, the formerly anti-Dreyfusard Right had rallied its forces to combat this new left-wing assault on traditional French culture, intelligence, and civilization by promoting the humanities and arts, classical languages, traditional teaching methods, and the benefits of a general education. As one historian of the debate has noted, the old battle lines between Dreyfusard Left and Anti-Dreyfusard Right seem to have simply been redrawn in the decade before World War I around the new issue of French education.²⁹⁸

The 1902 reforms to secondary education introduced four options for the baccalaureate, including one which required only sciences and modern language. Although the traditional option of humanities and classical languages remained an alternative, right-wing men of letters were outraged by the assault on traditional culture. Insult was added to injury in 1903 when the Dreyfusard *universitaires* arranged for the integration of the elite ENS into the Sorbonne. The conflation was intended to democratize higher education by making coursework and degrees more accessible to the average student, and also to erode the intellectual elitism of the ENS. The shift was widely reproached on the Right as an effort to destroy the natural hierarchy of intelligences and to create an unnatural egalitarianism which would only result in widespread mediocrity. The Combes ministry also succeeded, by 1905, in the separation of Church and State. This resulted in the forced resignation

²⁹⁷ Claire-Françoise Bompaigne-Evesque, *Un Débat sur l'université au temps de la Troisième République: la lutte contre la nouvelle Sorbonne* (Paris: Aux amateurs de livres, 1988), 21.

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

of many Catholic professors like Brunetière and the elimination of the catholic schools that the Right saw as a mainstay of traditional, conservative education. The final blow came in 1907, when reformers suppressed the Latin and French composition requirements for the license in letters. Right-wing traditionalists responded by declaring a “crisis of French” and calling for widespread intellectual engagement against the crippling of French education by the Third Republic.

These Republican and left-wing inspired reforms to the education system seemed, to the former anti-Dreyfusards, to be yet another attempt by the Left to dominate society’s concept of culture and the nation by monopolizing the formation of the French youth. The resentment of left-wing hegemony that had festered since the Affair found a new outlet in the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates. Pierre Lasserre and Charles Maurras led the campaign against the reforms for the newly emergent Action Française. The Action Française had been created in 1898 as an anti-republican and anti-Dreyfusard, though not yet monarchist, organization. With Charles Maurras as its theoretician, its core membership slowly shifted toward monarchism while retaining a strong base of nationalist and anti-republican supporters. Due to its large student clientele, the AF necessarily concerned itself with university affairs and in particular the reforms to secondary and superior education. It would play a prominent role in the collective engagement of the Right.

Although the AF gained rapid popularity, it was the work of “Agathon” in articles for *L’Opinion* that first declared educational reform the new divisive issue for intellectuals. The series of articles by right-wing intellectuals Henri Massis and Alfred de Tarde brought the moderate, conservative, and extreme-right wing presses as well as the majority of the men of letters to the support of the humanities and classical languages and forced the socialist and republican press and the left-wing *universitaires* to defend the reforms. The articles were a condemnation of the university’s failure to achieve its goals of a French national education. The cause of this failure, they claimed, was the heavy influence of German philosophy, pantheism, and the utilitarian and scientific methods so revered by the Republican and left-wing intellectuals. The success of these articles spawned a 1913

enquête published as *Les jeunes gens d'aujourd'hui* in which Agathon outlined the new right-wing model of the intellectual.

The years of the educational debate were also those of increased fears among the public of a second war with Germany. In 1906, the Kaiser, who had watched the defeat of France's ally Russia at the hands of the emergent Japanese power, took the opportunity to travel to French Morocco to express his support for Moroccan independence. This undeniable threat increased the latent fears of Germany that had lingered since 1870 and increased public support for nationalist groups, including the anti-German AF.²⁹⁹ In response to this increased nationalism and militarism on the French Right, the French Left, and particularly the recently united SFIO, emphasized its message of internationalism and anti-militarism. The clash between nationalist right-wing and socialist left-wing intellectuals during this time of international tension was made public in the debates over the "law of three years" which required three years of mandatory military service. The socialist Left considered this excessive militarism while the nationalist Right considered it essential for the preservation of the nation in view of Germany's increased military strength.³⁰⁰ However, with the declaration of war on August 3, 1914 and the call by Raymond Poincaré for a Union Sacrée, the intellectual gap, even on this issue, seemed to close temporarily in a united effort to defend France.

This union of the intellectuals can be considered something of a victory for the intellectual Right, since it was their values and worldviews that were affirmed. There were several instances in which the entire intellectual community seemed united in these values such as the response to the German intellectuals' "Appeal to the Civilized World." Only marginalized intellectuals like Romain Rolland refused to enter the "fray" and withheld their support. However, the Union sacrée did not remove the underlying causes of intellectual incompatibility, and when the crisis of war passed, the two camps returned to their separate sides. The nationalist Right, and particularly the AF, emerged

²⁹⁹ David Drake, *French Intellectuals and Politics from the Dreyfus Affair to the Occupation* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 44.

³⁰⁰ Sirinelli and Ory, *Les intellectuels en France*, 59.

from the war stronger than ever, reinforced by their apparent victory in the *Union sacrée*. Right-wing intellectuals like Massis saw the war as proof of the need for a continued right-wing intellectual engagement in a defense of “civilization” against the forces of barbarism represented now not only by German philosophy but also by Bolshevism. The Russian Revolution of 1917 and the increasing popularity in Europe of the communist movement had simply broadened the scope of the intellectual Right’s concerns about foreign threats to French cultural identity.

In contrast, the intellectual Left would revert, with even greater fervor, to its pre-war anti-militarist, internationalist, and philo-German ideas and programs. Intellectuals of the Left had quickly been made ashamed of their excessive nationalism by writers, like Rolland, who had remained “above the fray.” This contributed to an increasingly strong movement on the intellectual Left in favor of pacifism.³⁰¹ By 1920, the PCF had emerged from the Socialist party as a new alternative on the Left and had taken with it the valuable organ *L’Humanité*. The two distinct trajectories after the war, one on the extreme Right in favor of continued intellectual vigilance against the international threat, and the other on the Center and Left in favor of a return to internationalist values, renewed the old divisions over foreign influence that had first divided intellectuals in the debates over the *Nouvelle Sorbonne*.

The decade 1910 to 1920 was therefore a period of great transition for intellectuals. They saw their debates shift from internal quarrels over French education to externally influenced divisions over international ideologies. The intellectual Right believed it was more excluded and marginalized in the intellectual world than it had been during the *Affair*, since now they were denied not only the right to engage as intellectuals, they were also increasingly marginalized in the education of the youth. They would respond by taking a new interest in guiding the student population and developing new socio-professional alternatives to the university for the next generation of intellectuals. Yet, despite these evolutions, the pattern of right-wing intellectual identity construction would remain. The intellectual of the Right continued to be distinguished by a resentment of left-wing hegemony, a distinctive

³⁰¹ For example the intellectual movements of the socialist ARAC and the communist movement Clarté.

mentality of engagement created by their struggle for legitimacy, and a desire to differentiate their intellectual values and segregate their communities from those of the dominant Left. This would result in a distinctive experience of intellectual life that prevents the right-wing intellectual of the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates and World War I years from being explained by the traditional model on the Left.

CHAPTER 5

LEFT-WING INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY DURING THE NOUVELLE SORBONNE AND WORLD WAR I ERA

Questions of education have always been grounds for passionate debate in France, yet in the period between the Dreyfus Affair and World War I, the discussions of education carried implications beyond the specific institutional reforms. The reaction by the intellectual Right to the Nouvelle Sorbonne reformers revealed two fundamentally opposed concepts of French culture and society and two corresponding visions of the responsibility of the university, the educator, and the intellectual. These underlying divisions could not be mended by the *Union sacrée*, and reappeared after the war in a new debate over intellectual responsibilities in the post-war world. The distinctly left-wing approach to engagement and the values and worldviews that united the otherwise disparate Republican, socialist, and communist intellectuals against the intellectuals of the Right would contribute to a dominant model of intellectual identity that intentionally excluded the *engagés* of the Right.

The authority and prestige that the Dreyfusard intellectuals had garnered for their camp during the Affair would give them an added advantage in the new debates over French cultural identity and provide them with a distinctly left-wing mentality of engagement. They were proposing drastic and even initially unpopular changes to the traditional university that were characterized by the Right as an imitation of German structures foreign to the French mind. But the intellectuals of the Left presented them as a continuation of the Dreyfusard, Republican, and Enlightenment spirit and of the universal, abstract truths that had gained great intellectual authority.³⁰² In contrast, the extreme

³⁰² The break with the church and the new focus on science and modern language was promoted as instruction in rational, logical abstraction and development of scientific, progressive, internationally minded

Right would quickly be identified with some of its more prominent, if not entirely representative, catholic and monarchist elements and their “anti-intellectual” stigma. The reformers would also benefit from the post-Affair association of intellectual authority with the person and role of the *universitaire*. Although the traditionalists of the Right enjoyed numerical advantage in the debates, the left-wing reformers would enjoy positions of dominance in the university and, therefore, in the battle for intellectual authority. Republican and socialist reformers from Lavissee to Croisset to Durkheim held prominent and powerful positions in the university system, and they effectively implied that the new reforms were backed by the university as a whole. This portrayal was reinforced by the young *universitaires* who dominated the scientific and modern disciplines that received the most public attention in the debate. Most importantly, however, the reforms of the Nouvelle Sorbonne had been in place for several years before the protest of Agathon ignited right-wing engagement.³⁰³ As it had with the Dreyfus Affair, the delayed reaction of the intellectual Right would damage the effectiveness of its engagement. The reformist Left engaged in the debates as the confident defenders of a functioning program rather than its external challengers.

Because the left-wing reformers enjoyed pre-existing public authority, positions of power in the institution, a numerical majority in the modern disciplines, the support of the Republican regime, and the absence of any initial opposition, their engagement in defense of the Nouvelle Sorbonne was done with confidence and the expectation of success. After a momentary lapse during the Union sacrée, the Left’s return to its values of universalism and internationalism would allow it to regain quickly its lost intellectual authority and its confident claim to represent French intelligence.

Intellectuals of the Left displayed no compulsion to legitimize themselves as authorities and displayed no concern that the intellectual Right dominated public opinion.

individuals freed from clerical traditionalism. And, institutional changes to the Sorbonne and ENS were presented as steps toward true democratization, egalitarianism, and the foundation for an education in republican citizenship.

³⁰³ Even the 1907 suppression of the Latin and French composition requirement had been institutionalized before Agathon’s complaints gained the attention of the intellectual Right.

Paired with these distinctive approaches to engagement was an equally distinctive set of socio-cultural values and worldviews that held important implications for the intellectuals' concept of role, responsibility, and identity. The Nouvelle Sorbonne that was under attack in Agathon's articles, and in the right-wing press campaign which followed, was not so much the institution itself or even a series of reforms, but rather a collection of intellectual values that Agathon referred to as a "spirit." The reaction certainly targeted the tangible reforms of 1902 and 1907, but these specific attacks developed from the Right's rejection of the general principles of education and culture that were shared by the republican and extreme left-wing reformers. Although the reformist Left included a diverse range of political ideologies from liberal republicanism to socialism to, after 1917, a small contingent of Communists, they all identified with certain general values, worldviews, and concepts of the intellectual that would separate them, as a bloc, from the intellectual Right. Their tendency toward the university led them to envision the role of the intellectual as that of the university professor and the erudite, and identified intellectual responsibility and practice with objective science, specialization, and international cultural exchange. They specified the essential values of the true intellectual as those of rationalism, democratic egalitarianism, progressive modernism, and internationalism. This concept of the role, responsibilities, and values of the intellectual that emerged from the debates would be essential to the model of intellectual identity created on the Left; one that by its very nature, excluded the Right.

Perhaps most essential to the reformist concept of the intellectual was the devotion to Rationalism and the scientific methodologies it engendered. This value and the roles and responsibilities it implied for the intellectual as educator would become one of the main sources of division between the Left and Right during the debates. In a speech before the Ligue de l'Enseignement, Alfred Croiset, doyen of the Sorbonne, specifically attacked Agathon and drew a clear line of division between the intellectual values of the two camps. The opponents of the

Sorbonne, he summarized, were “the enemies of Rationalism.”³⁰⁴ According to the republican and left-wing intellectual reformers, to be a true intellectual and educator required that one be a Rationalist who valued logical deduction, fact driven research, and the consistency of the scientific method. Facts, procedures, and steps of analysis were all able to be taught uniformly across the particular discipline and did not vary according to the taste, preferences, or particularities of the instructor. This uniform consistency and verifiable results, according to the reformers, meant that scientific rationalism brought one closer to “the Truth” than irrational methods based on traditional interpretations, personal taste, or irrational analyses. Rationalism and science therefore became synonymous with intelligence and the intellectual while taste and sentiment were rejected as anti-intellectual and of little value in educating the nation.

Croiset and Ernest Lavisse, director of the ENS, both linked the reformist value of scientific rationalism to the new professional practices that were to mark the model intellectual of the Left. In contrast to the hierarchical concept of the classroom, favored by the traditionalists, where professors lectured without defending their reasoning to students, the reformers envisioned a new role for the educator. Lavisse wrote articles in *Le Temps* suggesting that a strong education in the steps of the scientific method would encourage students to question their professors and professors to guide their students through the steps of their analysis. It would ensure that professors taught according to the verifiable facts of their disciplines, even in literature and the arts, rather than their intuition, sentiments, or personal tastes. Croiset echoed this new vision of the responsibility and practice of the reformed *universitaire* saying, “our role is not to form men of taste, amiable dilettantes... taste is too individual an affair to be made a part of university instruction.”³⁰⁵ Erudition based on factual knowledge and scientific methods, not unquantifiable refinement and taste, was the responsibility of the educator.

³⁰⁴ Bompaire-Evesque, *Un Débat sur l'université*, 154.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 153.

This newly defined responsibility required not only an evolution in teaching practices; it also demanded a transformation of the disciplines themselves. Charles Seignobos, a reformist professor of history whose work was often utilized in the Sorbonne as official textbooks,³⁰⁶ argued for the transformation of history from a vague philosophy to a scientific and rational pursuit of factual truths. Only scientific methods applied in a thoroughly rationalist approach, he wrote, would “lead to the scientific truth” which was the aim of all historical investigation. The application of the scientific method to history would make it less subjective and provide a clear methodology for students to follow that would consistently lead them to the same truths.³⁰⁷ Rules and procedures for study would prevent history from being what it had been in the past, simply an instinctual imitation of the ideas of previous masters. Instinct and talent, he wrote, “were not rational procedures” and resulted in contradictory claims and ill-founded theories. The positivist dimension that Gabriel Monod added to the study of history was referred to scathingly by Agathon and the intellectual Right as the German “fetish of ‘*méthode historique*.’”³⁰⁸ Perhaps most irksome to the intellectual Right however was the method of bibliography which would become a central component of historical and literary studies and a more vital component of the examinations than essays or compositions. The tendency to have advanced students in history compile bibliographies and historiographies on a given subject rather than produce a new interpretation was an overt effort to support a rational approach to history through the scientific collection of data. Yet it was also seen by the intellectual Right as a covert attempt to reform the university system into a more egalitarian, democratic, and therefore utilitarian institution.

³⁰⁶ His *Introduction aux études historiques* written in cooperation with fellow reformer Victor Langlois and published by the reform-friendly Hachette firm was particularly recommended by the Nouvelle Sorbonne proponents.

³⁰⁷ As one means to repair this intellectual decadence, Seignobos recommended a required course in philology, the critical examination of historical texts.

³⁰⁸ Monod introduced the auxiliary sciences of paleography, epigraphy, and archeology to historical study. He was credited with introducing the German historical methodology to France after his extensive study in the German university system in the mid 1860s. This made his work immediately suspect to the intellectual nationalists who profaned of the introduction of German Kultur into the French civilizing process.

Equally important to the left-wing concept of the intellectual was the devotion to democratic egalitarianism first identified with intellectual identity by the Dreyfusards. The egalitarianism that united the reformers and opposed them to the traditionalists on the Right was perhaps best revealed by the reform that integrated the elite ENS into the democratic Sorbonne. This reform leveled the graduation requirements of the ENS to those of the Sorbonne, merged both the students and the professors of the two schools, and equated the degrees conferred by each institution. Yet the passion for democratic equality in education was also essential to less dramatic reforms including the new preference for bibliography, the reorganization of the bac, the attack on Latin and classics, and the rejection of the traditional literary canon. In their defense of each of these reforms, the intellectuals of the Left linked their egalitarianism and democratic ideals to their concept of the role of the university and the professor in modern society. While the intellectual of the Right saw the university as an education in humanities for the nation's elite, the intellectual of the Left saw it as a training ground for the entire citizenry in necessary skills for daily life. In contrast with the intellectuals of the Right who saw the role of the educator to be identifying and refining the talented few, the intellectuals of the Left promoted a concept of the educator as the instructor of the masses in utilitarian skills.

One of the leaders of the Reform, Gustave Lanson, was instrumental in propagating the new intellectual practices that corresponded to this Left wing concept of the educator. He considered bibliographies to be an introduction to history and literature that was accessible to all students and required no theorization or analysis that might reveal differences in the abilities of the students. The intellectual Right declared this new methodology a glorification of mediocrity and the forced equality of naturally unequal abilities. Yet, Lanson believed that since secondary education was now to be extended to all the French citizenry, this mass influx of students into a previously elite system required a new conceptualization of the methods of education. Rather than the "useless" exercises in theory, composition, and analysis, the reformers proposed utilitarian methods of study which would better serve the needs of the mass of students who were destined for jobs in science, industry, or business rather than life as savants or philosophers. The traditional methods of lecture and

composition were not tailored to the needs of these students, but only to the elite. Therefore new utilitarian methods like laboratory learning, bibliography, and sociological study would be essential if the university were to fulfill its function of equally educating all of society.³⁰⁹ “I am not able to conceive of a teaching which is not clearly utilitarian,” Lanson wrote, “education ought to prepare us to solve, in the measure which is given to each of us, the great social and moral questions which are posed today.”³¹⁰ These questions of the day, according to Lanson, were modern issues of Republican citizenship.

The progressive modernism of the reformist intellectuals divided them from the intellectuals of the Right and was linked to both the reformers’ emphasis on scientific rationalism and their vision of the university as a democratic institution. While the intellectual of the Right believed the essence of French culture, intelligence, and power lay in its intellectual and cultural heritage and its role as the representative of Western civilization, the intellectual of the Left saw the essence of France, her responsibility, and her future security lay in scientific progress and technological modernization. They labeled as backward, “oriented toward the past,” and anti-intellectual those disciplines, methodologies, and educators that valued classicism and traditionalism over modernism. According to the reformists, the true intellectual guides of France provided an education designed to meet the needs of the modern republican citizen, not instruction in dead languages or collapsed civilizations. Lanson and the reformers were adamant that Latin language and ancient history was not only unnecessary for French studies, it was in fact an elitist pursuit that had no practical application. French was a republican language, Lanson wrote, while Latin was aristocratic and elitist and did not correspond to the needs of a modern democracy. An article by fellow reformist professor Jules

³⁰⁹ It should be noted here that the combination of democratism and scientific methodology on the Left led them to embrace the “practical” aspects of intellectual life that they had dismissed as anti-intellectual in the work of Brunetiere. During these years, the Right would also distinguish its concept of the Real by linking it more to the irrational realities of national enracinement, emotion, sentiment, and experience than practical application.

³¹⁰ Gustave Lanson, “L’etude des auteurs francais” *Revue universiatire* (1894), 262.

Delvaille emphasized this point saying, “what good is it to have the young men continually live in Rome...when one allows them to ignore the things of their own pays.”³¹¹ The Left’s understanding of its role as educators of the republican citizenry also led it to reject the traditional literary canon. Lanson identified the works of the 17th century which had been the mainstay of a literary education as “monarchical and Christian” and therefore completely unacceptable in a democratic Republic which admitted no state religion. Literary instruction for the republican reformers was not a means to impart taste and style to students but rather to instruct them in civic values. Lanson saw no patriotic value in the works of the pre-Revolutionary era and utilized only the works of the 19th century. Those professors of pre-Revolutionary French literature, who tended, like the classicists, to be anti-reformist educators in an increasingly left-wing university system, were labeled backward, reactionary, monarchist, and anti-intellectual.³¹²

The values of scientific rationalism, egalitarianism, and progressive modernism that came to define the university intellectual of the reformist Left led these dominant intellectuals to a cultural internationalism that promoted active imitation of the German university. In keeping with its integral and Barrèssian nationalism, the intellectual Right attacked this imitation as the perversion of French culture and intelligence with methodologies and ideas “foreign” to it. But the adaptation of the French university to the German design was understood by the reformers on the Left as an expression of international intellectual exchange. The very act of imitating the German model became essential to the left-wing intellectual’s understanding of his role since it indicated a belief in universally applicable abstract ideas and the intellectual benefits of internationalism. Even the declaration of war in 1914 and the resulting rush to defend France both militarily and intellectually from invasion did

³¹¹ Jules Delvaille, “A propos de la ‘crise du français,’” *Revue universitaire*, (1911), 117-119.

³¹² While there were several *universitaires* and writers who favored the conservation of latin and the humanities while still supporting the liberal ideals of the Third Republic, the majority of the opposition to the Nouvelle Sorbonne and particularly its intellectual leaders were anti-Republican and rejected efforts to remove Latin for Republican and democratic reasons. In contrast, most historians have recognized, as the contemporaries of the debates did, that the Nouvelle Sorbonne and its “modern culture recruited its defenders from the electorate of the Left” and the staunch supporters of the Third Republic. Bompaigne-Evesque, *Un Débat sur l’université*, 15.

not diminish the left-wing value of internationalism. It would emerge in a new discourse about “two Germanies” and a call for the demobilization of intelligence that was unique to the intellectual Left.

During the years of the war and the *Union sacrée*, intellectual differences between the international pacifists and the national militarists seemed to be put aside as even Gustave Hervé became an ardent patriot and the majority of socialist party members enlisted.³¹³ Yet, the left-wing intellectual’s firm belief in international fraternity remained, and it continued to differentiate their discourse from that of the extreme Right. Intellectuals of the Left felt driven to patriotic militarism for reasons that would distinguish them from the extreme Right. For the Left, the atrocities committed by Germany, and their rationalization by German intellectuals, was an affront to universal human rights. They rejected German imperialism as contrary to the revolutionary and Enlightenment spirit, and they accepted French engagement and militarism as a necessary evil to combat the more sinister militarism of Germany. For the intellectual Right, the enemy was Germany and the German people who it was believed had an innate aggression for France. The intellectual Left, however, retained its belief in the universal fraternity of all “peoples” and identified the Junker class as the enemy. Unlike the intellectual Right, which waged war in the name of nationalism, the French intellectual Left promoted the war under the banners of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, Truth, Justice, and Reason.³¹⁴ The intellectuals of the Left also salvaged their philo-germanism and internationalism by making the “two Germanies theory” a central theme of their wartime engagement. This theory argued that the traditional Germany of Kant and scientific methodology was a valuable source of culture while the

³¹³ In the years leading up to the war, the socialists, except Peguy who would be claimed by the nationalists during this period, rallied in the parliament, the press, and the streets against the “law of three years.” The socialist journal *L’Humanité* led a campaign in 1912 against the law that included not only a petition but also socialist demonstrations against the law held May 25 1913. Seignobos declared that the German emperor loved his army too much to risk it in battle and determined it was therefore unreasonable to extend French military service. Finally, the radical socialists like Gustave Hervé advocated a general strike by all workers should the nation declare war.

³¹⁴ Several intellectuals of the Left even compared the struggle against German militarism to the wars of 1793 against royal despotism.

other, militaristic and nationalist Germany was a threat to both France and true German culture.³¹⁵ In this way the Republican and Left intellectuals hoped the focus the hostility of the war on militarism and imperialism while retaining their internationalism. Such differences in intellectual values despite the war-time union foreshadowed the quick collapse of Union sacrée intellectual compatibility.

As soon as the war ended, so too did the union of intellectuals under the banner of nationalism. The work of Romain Rolland chastised the intellectuals of the Left for engaging their work in irrational patriotism and for betraying their responsibility to open cultural exchange. His September 1914 article in *Journal de Geneve*, “Au-dessus de la mêlée,” called for a return to the internationalist principles so essential to the left-wing intellectual. “Young men of all nations,” he wrote of the war, were “brought into conflict by a common ideal, making enemies of all those who should be brothers.”³¹⁶ The responsibility of the intellectual was to resist the passions of nationalism in order to promote cultural understanding among all Europeans. Although his work was marginalized by both camps during the war, Rolland would become the new spokesman for the repentant intellectual Left during the immediate post-war years. His “Appel” in *L’Humanité* on June 26, 1919 entitled “Fière déclaration d’intellectuels” garnered the hasty support of numerous republican and left-wing intellectuals eager to return to their pre-war values of pacifism and internationalism. The new responsibility of the intellectual to help “demilitarize” intelligence was outlined in this appeal and echoed in other left-wing organs like André Gide’s *Nouvelle Revue Française*. Intellectual mobilization, led by the nationalists of the extreme Right, the Appeal claimed, had been a “near total abdication of the intelligence of the world.” Intellectuals had “worked to destroy the comprehension and love between men. And in doing this they had degraded and abased thought, of which they were the representatives.”³¹⁷ But intellectual responsibility could be regained

³¹⁵ Martha Hanna, *The Mobilization of Intellect: French Scholars and Writers During the Great War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 10.

³¹⁶ Romain Rolland, *Au dessus de la mêlée* (Paris: Ollendorff, 1915), 37.

³¹⁷ “Fière déclaration d’intellectuels,” *L’Humanité*, June 26 1919.

by a return to disinterested thought, international cooperation, and intellectual pacifism. Rolland's "declaration of the intellectuals" made the position of the true intellectuals quite clear. The nationalists, royalists, and those who continued to call for mobilization of intelligence like Massis and Maurras degraded thought and rejected the fundamental principles of intellectual responsibility. Only internationalism provided the dispassionate foundation essential for "free thought." Thought tied to national interest was, by contrast, enslaved and anti-intellectual.

The return of the republican and Left wing intellectual to the values of internationalism and pacifism would also lead a few avant-garde left-wing intellectuals toward a new avenue of intellectual engagement: communism. Communist intellectuals in these early years, like Henri Barbusse and the members of Clarté, saw bolshevism as an extension of the internationalism and anti-militarism they had long supported. These thinkers identified the role of the intellectual with the critique of capitalism and privilege, the conspiracy of the governments and the capitalists, and the militarism bred by nationalism.³¹⁸ The growing fascination with bolshevism by this segment of the intellectual Left was mirrored by an increasing antipathy for it on the intellectual Right, adding new intensity to the old quarrels over internationalism, socialism, pacifism, and foreign influence on French culture.

For Republicans and the extreme Left, being an intellectual and an educator implied the identification with certain fundamental intellectual values and worldviews. True intellectuals advocated firm rationalism and scientific methodology as the source of all valuable knowledge and cultural truths. They promoted the ideals of democratic egalitarianism and saw their responsibility to be the education of the masses in utilitarian skills for the market and civic life. This vision of their role necessitated utilitarian, modern, scientific, and practical applications in specialized fields that would prepare students for their future occupations rather than providing them with a vague sense of style and culture. And, in their intellectual guidance, the true intellectual and educator was open-minded, disinterested, and a "free thinker" and therefore a proponent of internationalism.

³¹⁸ Henri Barbusse, *La Lueur dans l'abîme ce que veut le groupe Clarté*, (Paris: Editions Clarté, 1920), 11.

Internationalism required the speedy demobilization of intelligence by those who had betrayed their responsibilities during the war. Those thinkers, particularly on the royalist and nationalist Right, who rejected these stipulations of intellectual identity were zealously denied the legitimizing status of the intellectual and duty to engage.

Reformist Intellectual Communities and Networks

As they did during the Dreyfus Affair, the conflict in intellectual values during the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates and post-war years led to the creation of separate intellectual communities. These communities provided a common space and socio-professional network for like-minded intellectuals, reinforced their distinctive intellectual values, and emphasized certain professional practices. In particular, these polarized communities and networks fostered a new sense of collective identity among the participating intellectuals and a sense of separation from the excluded “other.”³¹⁹ The “intellectual,” as defined by the dominant Left, came to be recognized not only by his particular cultural and social values like rationalism, but also by his affiliation with specific associations, ligues, petitions, and revues, choice of certain professional trajectories, method of mentorship, and general experience of daily intellectual life. Those on the Right who rejected these associations, or were excluded from them, were correspondingly defined as anti-intellectual and denied the authority and role of the engagé.

One of the important communities for republican and left-wing reformers was that of the Musée pédagogique. The organization had been founded by Jules Ferry in 1879 with the aim of furthering popular education and serving as an example of the pedagogic renovations being made in education. By 1902, the Musée was directed by reformist historian Charles-Victor Langlois and

³¹⁹ As they had during the Dreyfus Affair, the segmented body of left-wing intellectuals found common ground, both ideologically and physically, in order to more effectively ostracize the engagement of the intellectual Right. As late as 1921, the communist organ *Humanité* would identify themselves with the camp of liberal republican Anatole France in an effort to isolate and suppress the extreme Right. “Anatole France,” the article read, “is one of ours, and it is a little of his glory which reflects on our community.” “Contre le Service de Trois Ans,” *L’Humanité*, March 24, 1912.

served as an outlet for reformist ideas and a network for republican and left-wing intellectuals. The Musée provided lectures and seminar discussions such as those by reformers Ferdinand Brunot in 1906, Charles Seignobos in 1907, and Lanson in 1909. These lectures were particularly followed by lycée and college professors who hoped to keep up to date with the latest pedagogical reforms created by the Sorbonne intellectuals, and implement them in their own teaching. Lectures like Lanson's on "L'Education de la Democratie" and Seignobos' on "L'enseignement de l'histoire comme instrument d'education politique" were intended to convince these professors that the mission of secondary education was the formation of youth for their roles in democracy and the modern world.³²⁰ In the Musée pedagogique community, the educational values and practices considered by the Left to define the true intellectual were developed, clarified, and then mentored to the secondary instructors.

A similar and closely linked community was created in the Ecole des Hautes Etudes Sociales, directed by Alfred Croiset in 1910. The mission of the Ecole was in keeping with the spirit of the declining "universities populaires," which had been an important arm of the Left during the Dreyfus Affair. The program of the Ecole for the year 1910-1911 included the public lectures by leading reformers like Seignobos, Croiset, Levy-Bruhl, Basch, Andler, Delacroix, Lanson, Langlois, and Rolland. The Ecole not only brought together the leading minds of the Reform and spread their ideas to the broader populace; it also formed a network of intellectuals who exerted great collective influence over the nomination and selection of Sorbonne professors and chairs. Although the extent of this influence cannot be gauged, the professional networks and political connections created there among various reformers, university leaders, and political figures is undeniable.³²¹ Both the influential network of the Ecole and the forum for mentorship of the Musée were closed to intellectuals of the Right.

³²⁰ Bompaigne-Evesque, *Un Débat sur l'université*, 32.

³²¹ *Ibid.*, 67.

The intellectual Ligue, which had been such a powerful foundation for intellectual community during the Dreyfus Affair, was quickly adapted to the new needs of the reformers. The Amis du Français et de la culture moderne was created as a left-wing reformist center to combat the right-wing Ligue pour la culture Française and the moderate but traditionalist Amis du Latin. While the Ligue pour la culture Française and the Amis du Latin welcomed conservatives, numerous former members of the Anti-Dreyfusard Ligue de la Patrie, and a large majority of the world of the men of letters, it only had two Sorbonne professors. The Amis du Française, on the other hand, mainly “received the support of the *universitaires* generally situated on the Left, from Charles Andler to Paul Langevin.”³²² In fact, “few of the writers supported the Amis du Française et de la culture moderne, and the majority of those who did belonged exclusively to the intellectual families of the Left.”³²³ The activities of the Ligue were not as coordinated as those of the Ligue des Droits de l’homme, yet it provided a clearly segregated space for reformers to commune and share ideas as well as a platform for expression of their collective intellectual views.

Yet another space of clearly segregated intellectual community was that of the petition. Reformist petitions created an imaginary community of left-wing intellectuals that extended beyond their daily interactions to create an international community of like-minded thinkers. They literally provided a list of those who identified themselves as both engaged and “of the Left.” And, perhaps better than any other community, the petition was able to collectively express the values, worldviews, and programs that united the disparate intellectual Left, from liberal republicans to communists, in a single concept of intellectual identity. One petition against the “law of three years” read, “moved by the risk of voting in a measure as grave as a transformation in military law, considering that the project profoundly affects the intellectual and economic life of the nation and is able to cause a step backward in French civilization...the undersigned vow that it will be submitted to a profound discussion.” Over time the petition was signed by over 200 left-wing intellectuals including a strong

³²² Ibid., 192.

³²³ Ibid., 215.

number of professors active in the reform like Alain, Lucien Herr, Durkheim, and Paul Langevin.³²⁴

Many of these same intellectuals joined together later in the post-war “Fière declaration d’intellectuels.” Here forty intellectuals collectively declared their “independence de l’esprit” by renouncing their engagement in favor of the nation during the war, recalling their prior commitments to an abstract, universal “People,” and reclaiming their responsibility to universal, internationalist, and unconstrained thought.³²⁵ When determining who merited the title and authority of the intellectual, the reformers of the Left would cite the Right’s absence from these left-wing manifests as proof of its incompatibility with legitimate intellectual positions.

To reach a broad audience and garner substantial support, a petition or manifest needed to be placed in a sympathetic journal or revue where like-minded readers could appreciate its appeal. Although the majority of the reformers were *universitaires* whose dominance was in the university and education system rather than the world of letters and journalism, there were several republican and left-wing papers. These revues formed a sort of web or network which was connected by shared writers, gerants, readership, or even publishing houses. Revues, therefore, were not only a source of intellectual community for those who fraternized in the revue’s offices. They were an interconnected literary and journalistic world which provided support for each others’ ideas, movements, petitions, books and articles. While the larger journals like *Figaro*, *Temps*, and *Journal des Debats* remained supporters of classical culture and traditional education, the reformers found journalistic havens in the left-wing militant presses like those of *La Dépêche de Toulouse*, *L’Humanité*, and the previously Dreyfusard *Le Siècle*. Leading reformer Alphonse Aulard published his defense of the Nouvelle Sorbonne in *Siecle*, *Dépêche*, and *L’Action*, while Célestin Bouglé printed his dissection of the psychology of the opposition in *Dépêche*. Numerous reformers including Anatole France, Andler and Lanson wrote articles for *Humanité* and made personal and professional connections there with socialists Herr, Blum, Halevy, and Pressensé. Other left-wing revues which had blossomed under the

³²⁴ Sirinelli, *Intellectuels et passions*, 29.

³²⁵ “Fiere declaration d’intellectuels.”

Dreyfusards like *Le Radical* helped the Reformers to paint the opposition as politically motivated and declared all opposition to all modern, scientific, utilitarian, and rationalist education “anti-Republican” as well as “anti-intellectual.”³²⁶

Other revues that became communities for reformists were those devoted to educational affairs and university issues and directed by university leaders. In these educational journals, leaders of the reform were constant contributors while those opposing the Nouvelle Sorbonne were never featured. *Revue critique d'histoire et de littérature* was led by a Sorbonne reformer and Croiset directed the *Revue internationale de l'enseignement*. *Revue universitaire* had a committee of patronage and edition of almost exclusively Sorbonne professors, including Victor Berard, Ferdinand Brunot, Croiset, former Dreyfusard leader Alphonse Darlu, Lanson, Lavisie, Seignobos, and Gustave Reynier. As one of the flagship revues for pedagogy, whose cover promised articles on the latest in “pedagogy, educational and teaching issues, administration, literary issues, bibliography, exams and courses,” its reformist tone was intended to influence its primary subscribers: lycée, college, and provincial professors awed by the Sorbonne. Writing for these revues, therefore, also became an important form of mentorship for the intellectual Left who, if they were a minority in the larger world of journalism, dominated the important segment of the field marketed to educators.

During the war, most left-wing revues joined in the Union sacrée,³²⁷ but, after the war, pre-war divisiveness in intellectual revue communities would reappear. *L'Humanité* and *Mercure* begin the post-war era by supporting Rolland's petition with articles attacking Massis. By 1923 the revue *Europe* would be created to counter Massis and Bainville's *Revue universelle* and “give to the pacifist, humanitarian, and communisant current an organ of propaganda destined for the intellectual

³²⁶ An April 1911 article entitled “une campagne antirepublicaine” argued that any opposition to the reforms to education instituted in 1902 was an attack on the stability of the Republic and on the principle of equal and useful education for the French youth. Bompaigne-Evesque, *Un Débat sur l'université*, 98.

³²⁷ Although the socialist *Bonnet Rouge* continued to support international socialism and question the war effort and Martin du Gard, Rolland and Barbusse wrote for *La Tranchée républicaine* whose articles proposed opposition to the war and international peace. AN F7 12863

milieu.”³²⁸ And, in addition to *L’Humanité*, the communist element would create *Clarté* to serve as a community particularly hostile to the intellectual Right.³²⁹ The movement, and subsequent revue *Clarté*, was launched in May 1919 and would become a “center of revolutionary education”³³⁰ and a source of socio-professional community and collective identity for the communist element of the extreme Left.

The constant appearance of several key reformers in all of these revues was not the only link that existed between this network of reformist revues. Several of the revues and the authors also shared common publishing firms which were extremely sympathetic to their goals. Publishers Hachette, Alcan, and Armand Colin were particularly supportive of the reformist position and many of the reformers revues and independent works and textbooks could be found in their catalogues.³³¹ Armand Colin published both *Revue de Paris* and *Revue universitaire*, Alcan published Gabriel Monod’s *Revue historique*, and Hachette published the history textbook *Introduction aux études historiques* of Seignobos and Langlois. Those who wrote for *Humanité* were also supported by the socialist Société nouvelle de librairie et d’édition which was led by Herr.³³² The *Nouvelle Revue Française* of André Gide and its powerful press under Gallimard was just coming of age during the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates. However, despite its assurances of an apolitical focus, it would slowly attract a left-wing clientele including Roger Martin du Gard and perceptibly arouse the hostility of the Right.

Belonging to and identifying with the organizations, petitions, revues, and publishing firms that welcomed and supported the Left had important ramifications for reformist and internationalist

³²⁸ Michel Toda, *Henri Massis; un témoin de la droite intellectuelle* (Paris: La Table ronde, 1987), 184.

³²⁹ *Clarté* had been created from the pacifist organization Association republicaine des anciens combattants (ARAC) founded by Henri Barbusse, Paul Vaillant-Couturier and Raymond Lefebvre. In September of 1919 the ARAC held its first conference where it claimed to have over 300 sections and 20,000 members.

³³⁰ Michel Winock, *Le siècle des intellectuels* (Paris: Seuil, 1997), 171.

³³¹ Bompaire-Evesque, *Un Débat sur l’université*, 80.

³³² Winock, *Le siècle des intellectuels*, 92.

intellectuals. These physical centers of engagement amplified the individual contributions of their members into a powerful arm of collective engagement. They served as spaces of personal and professional connection and provided important forums for mentorship of fellow educators and the general public. Most importantly, they provided a foundation for a left-wing collective intellectual identity. To be recognized as an intellectual by peers and the public, it was necessary to participate in one of these communities of the Left. Those who shunned these communities, or were excluded from them, were marked as anti-intellectual by default.

The Leftist Intellectual Experience

It was not only the values and socio-professional communities that would separate the intellectual of the Left from that of the Right. The different relationships that the reformist, and later internationalist, intellectuals of the Left had to the Republic, the Church, and the university would give them a certain experience of daily intellectual life not shared by their opponents on the Right. The practices, behaviors, professional trajectories, and methods of mentorship that resulted from these relationships on the Left would all contribute to a distinctly left-wing understanding of what it meant to “be an intellectual.”

Being a Nouvelle Sorbonne intellectual automatically entailed supporting the fundamental values of republicanism and their incarnation in the institutions of the Third Republic. And, as the ruling of minister of public education Theodore Steeg made clear, opposing the Nouvelle Sorbonne was “anti-Republican.”³³³ The intellectual of the Left, whether liberal or socialist, engaged to make the education of French youth more “republican” by making it more egalitarian, rational, scientific, modern, and cosmopolitan. The reforms they defended were those legislated by the Third Republic and supported by its ministries. Unlike their opponents on the Right, the intellectual of the Left continued to experience the practice of daily intellectual life as his predecessors the Dreyfusards had:

³³³ In 1911, Theodore Steeg, minister of public education, rejected a petition demanding the revision of the reforms of 1902. The Third Republic made it quite clear that to oppose the Sorbonne was to oppose the Government. Bompaigne-Evesque, *Un Débat sur l'université*, 97.

as the protected intelligentsia. Under the state-sponsored reforms, right-wing professors were replaced with more progressive, left-wing *universitaires*, positions of power and influence within the university system went to left-wing reformers like Croiset, Lavisse, and Durkheim, and disciplines where right-wing traditionalists predominated were slowly eliminated or deemphasized in favor of left-wing dominated scientific disciplines. Because their reforms were made in the name of republican values, the reformers easily earned the authorization of the regime for any institutional changes they deemed necessary, from a required course in pedagogy taught by Durkheim to an emphasis on bibliography. Being an intellectual of the reformist Left meant enjoying privilege, promotion, and power within the university and having the ear of the government.

As a correlate, being a reformist intellectual also demanded a certain disassociation with the Catholic Church. Once again, Catholicism was not an automatic mark of anti-intellectualism since practicing Catholics were found in both camps. However, overtly Catholic lycées, professors, texts, and interpretations were intentionally removed from the new university and replaced with secular, republican, rational alternatives. Jesuit schools in particular were deemed dangerous to the education of the youth and disbanded. Most catholic educators would turn, out of necessity, to the educational alternatives established by the Action Française in order to continue teaching. Reformers argued that the intellectual values of science, progress, rationalism, and even democracy were contradicted by the irrational, superstitious, and past-oriented nature of religious instruction. They also claimed that Catholicism was too closely linked to the Ancien Regime and monarchism to provide an effective education in republican citizenship. The intellectual's role as educator of the republican citizenry and responsibility to free, unrestricted thought necessarily precluded him, according to the reformers, from religious instruction. Reflecting the official separation of Church and State, being an intellectual, according to the Left, meant separating public intellectual life and practice from private religious belief.

However, it was their relationship to the University that most distinguished the professional identity and intellectual practices of the intellectual of the Left from those of the Right. In the decade

following the Affair, the number of professors on the Right diminished while the number of professors considered on the Left, particularly the socialist Left, had increased.³³⁴ While the Right increasingly felt its values and goals for intelligence excluded from the university and turned toward careers in journalism and literature, the Left continued to command the university trajectory. This divisive tendency was perhaps best exemplified by the composition of the left-wing Amis du Française and the right-wing Ligue pour la culture. The Amis included over fifteen Sorbonne professors and enjoyed wide support within the university while the Ligue had only two Sorbonnards, the Latin professor Frédéric Plessis and conservative Emile Faguet, and was dominated instead by journalists and men of letters.³³⁵ This division in professional trajectories led left-wing intellectuals to have not only a different intellectual community and network within the University space than the minority Right did, but also different intellectual experiences and expectations. The intellectual of the Left who followed the common trajectory of university teaching began not only on a different professional path from his right-wing peers, he also began in a different region. Very few agrégés earned teaching positions in Paris and most found themselves teaching at one of the provincial universities for several years before returning to a position in Paris. While the intellectuals of the Right were able to begin building a name, a professional network, and a publishing career in Paris at an early age, their university bound peers on the Left were exiled to the provinces and had to regain public influence when they returned.

One of the most significant differences in the left-wing *universitaire* and right-wing litterateur intellectual experience was the ease with which the Left was able to mentor the youth. By physically and ideologically dominating the ENS and the Sorbonne and influencing primary and secondary educators through pedagogical lectures and journals, the reformers of the Left exercised a veritable hegemony over the mentorship of emerging intellectuals. Lucien Herr had a strong influence on students at the ENS through afternoon discussions in the library and guidance of the students'

³³⁴ Ibid., 67.

³³⁵ Ibid., 183.

reading selections. Alain had a long-standing forum at lycée Condorcet and Emile Durkheim personally mentored each aspiring *universitaire* in his required pedagogy course at the Sorbonne. Even if the professor was not a reformist, the students still received reformist guidance through the official textbooks. Seignobos' book *Introduction* was routinely assigned as a history text, as was that of Lavissee, whose history textbooks were disseminated for free in the schools courtesy of the publisher Ville de Paris. In literature, Lanson's *Histoire de la littérature française* became the foundational text for literature. His concept of literary history was even a required component of the exit exams.³³⁶

This different relationship to the university and, therefore, to the mentorship of the student population would yield distinctly different intellectual practices on the Left and Right. Those on the Right like Massis and Maurras most often had to create their own mentoring environments, hand pick literary or journalistic protégés, and go to great effort to attract a youth following. The reformers enjoyed the benefits of an established, and often required, forum for their mentorship in the lycée and university classroom. They dispersed their values through their everyday lectures and their textbooks. Rather than seeking alternative opportunities to connect with the youth, the Left simply worked to increase the reach and authority of their influence as university professors.

The Reformist *universitaire* of the intellectual Left therefore could be said to have experienced intellectual life differently than his right-wing peers and therefore to have conceived of his role, responsibility, and intellectual activity differently. Distinctly left-wing relationships to the Church, the Republican government, the University, and most importantly, the next generation of intellectuals, led to a distinctly left-wing experience of daily intellectual life and practice. These different experiences and intellectual activities simply reinforced the separation in physical spaces and networks of Left wing intellectual communities.

³³⁶ Ibid., 79.

The Reformist Intellectual Model

The intellectual of the Left developed a distinctly left-wing model of intellectual identity during the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates and the years immediately following World War I. Although they were not a statistical majority of the educated elite, they did dominate the university and effectively utilized this hegemony to control public perception of intellectual identity. This monopoly in the university, the public's predisposition to equate republican values with intellectual legitimacy, and the failure of the Right to oppose the reforms before they were implemented gave the reformers a certain confidence in their engagement that was not shared by the Right. The intellectual Left was able to effectively equate intellectual identity with the values of rationalism, progressive modernism, egalitarianism, and internationalism and also with the role and practices of the university professor, the erudite, and the objective scientist. According to the reformist model, the intellectual was also identified by participation in certain left-wing and reform-oriented organizations, petitions, revues, and publishing houses. Finally, the intellectual, as defined by the Left, enjoyed certain relationships to the government and the university that gave him a particular experience of intellectual life not shared by those on the Right. The exclusion of the intellectual Right from this dominant, left-wing model of the intellectual would revive old resentments and frustrations and result in the creation of an alternative version of intellectual identity on the traditionalist Right. Henri Massis and Charles Maurras would be at the forefront of this movement.

CHAPTER 6

THE INTELLECTUALS OF THE TRADITIONALIST RIGHT: THE CASE OF HENRI MASSIS

Henri Massis has been recognized by his biographer as a “witness of the intellectual Right,”³³⁷ yet, in truth, he was more a provocateur of intellectual issues and a linchpin to the complex networks of right-wing intellectual life than mere witness. Massis provoked the explosion of the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates in 1910, outlined his vision of the intellectual of the Right in 1912, led the crusade for the continued mobilization of intelligence in 1919, introduced the discourse of a “defense of western civilization” to the arsenal of the Right in 1927, provoked the engagement of right-wing intellectuals on the side of fascist Italy in 1935, wrote the speech that would create the Petainist myth of the sword and shield in 1944, and added his weight to the petitions in favor of French Algeria in 1961. His lifetime was spent raising new issues and clarifying the values of the intellectual Right while creating spaces, networks, and personal connections that mentored the next generation of right-wing intellectuals.

Massis studied first at lycée Condorcet where he took his philosophy classes with reformist and socialist Alain. While greatly admiring the man, Massis did not share the same attraction to his ideas that other students did and sought alternative mentors.³³⁸ After study at the ENS des arts decoratifs and later the Sorbonne, Massis turned to a life of literature and journalism rather than teaching. His first literary study on Zola was the only work that he had to present when he was introduced to Maurice Barrès, but Barrès found promise in the young writer, despite his topic, and aided him in his entry into the world of letters. His next study in 1908 on Barrès himself allowed

³³⁷ Toda, *Henri Massis*.

³³⁸ Toda explains the separation saying, “for Massis it was different. Life would carry him toward other masters, toward other doctrines, he would be led to combat Alain, to oppose himself to him.” *Ibid.*, 18.

Massis to remain in constant contact with Barrès and to receive his regular suggestions, critique and editing. During the years between this introduction to the literary world and his explosion on the scene as “Agathon,” Massis received introductions and began writing for various journals in the right-wing network including *L’Echo de Paris*, *Figaro*, *Gil Blas* and *Paris-Journal*. By 1909 he had taken political direction of *Petit Journal*, by 1912 the secretariat de redaction of *L’Opinion*, and, by 1914, he was the literary critic for *L’éclair*.³³⁹ It was, however, his work as “Agathon” in 1911 and 1913 that secured his reputation and leadership in the world of right-wing engaged journalism.

Alfred de Tarde arranged an introduction to Massis after reading his articles in *Paris-Journal* and the two agreed to collaborate as Agathon on an article against the Sorbonne reforms for *L’Opinion* in 1910. Had it not received the immediate condemnation of Ernest Lavisse and, therefore, great public interest, this article might have been the only one written. However, the raging debate sparked more articles and the mystery of Agathon remained until the Spring when the authors revealed themselves to great outrage among the reformist milieu.³⁴⁰ The two were made immediate stars of the intellectual Right and were invited to join the comité d’action of the Ligue pour la culture française being formed by several Academy members. Agathon would reunite for one last large work before parting ways: *Les jeunes gens d’aujourd’hui* which was published in *L’Opinion* in 1912 before being released as a book in 1913. This enquete claimed to see a new spirit among the rising generation of intellectuals which was disgusted with the current state of affairs. Although Agathon’s enquete claimed to be reporting a measured change among the youth, it is today widely recognized that he was instead attempting to create this change and promote his own concept of right-wing intellectual identity among the next generation. During these years, Massis’ work carried the clear imprint of Barrès’ influence and he remained outside the ever growing circle of Maurras and the AF.

³³⁹ Ibid.,41.

³⁴⁰ They had believed Agathon was the pen name for a prestigious *universitaire* or man of letters, not two novice journalists.

By 1914, Massis had already engaged in polemics with both André Gide and Romain Rolland whom he accused of decadence and dilettantism. The most intense of these attacks, written while Massis was convalescing, in January 1915, would be collected and published as *Romain Rolland contre la France*. After his demobilization in 1919, Massis was outraged to find Rolland's manifest in *Humanité* and created his own petition for the intellectual Right entitled "Le Manifest du parti de l'intelligence" which was published in *Figaro* the following month. Here he outlined the post-war Right's demand for a continued mobilization of national intelligence against internationalism and the new threat of bolshevism. He connected the new struggle to the old one by declaring that an education in traditional and classical culture was the best counter to these anti-French influences. This petition became the foundation for the creation of a new Action Française allied revue, *Revue Universelle* which Massis would co-directed with Jacques Bainville. This new connection to the AF network indicated the subtle shift during the war that had led Massis away from his old mentor Barrès and closer to Maurras. Although he would never officially join the AF, Massis became a new advocate for their ideology and an important figure in their intellectual network during the succeeding decades.

Massis would continue to play a vital role in the intellectual expression and engagement of the Right in the decades after the war, but his most significant contribution to the construction of right-wing intellectual identity came from his engagement in the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates and postwar debates over demobilization. During this period, Massis exemplified both the continuity and transformation that right-wing values and concepts of intellectual role underwent from the close of the Dreyfus Affair to the advent of the inter-war years. His engagement also touched a number of important right-wing intellectual communities and networks where he was first the student and then the mentor of right-wing cultural values and intellectual identity. Finally, Massis provided a powerful expression of the continued right-wing resentment of the perceived left-wing hegemony over the concept of the intellectual.

Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy

By waiting to engage in the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates until after the reforms had been legislated and implemented, the intellectuals of the Right once again allowed the Left to define the parameters of the concept of the intellectual and to forcibly exclude the values and visions of the Right. The anteriority of the reforms, the dominance of the Left in the university disciplines under discussion, and the support of the Third Republic would all contribute to a left-wing intellectual hegemony. The intellectual, in his role as educator and public guide, became indelibly linked to the image of the reformist *universitaire* and to the idea of educational modernization and cultural exchange. By 1910, the intellectual Right recognized that to combat this trend in the education of the nation, they needed to legitimize their own views and redefine the role, responsibility, and identity of the intellectual guide according to their own model.

Massis's engagement was driven by his resentment of the hegemony that the intellectual Left held over the education of the university students. He resolved, in the summer of 1910, that it was "his duty to react against the Germanization of higher education at the Nouvelle Sorbonne, against this sterile erudition which demoralized the souls and enslaved the intelligences."³⁴¹ He felt sure that his mentor Barrès would appreciate his new crusade and was crushed when Barrès dismissed his frustrations as those of every student. Massis recalled his shock that the great opponent of Dreyfusard domination did not recognize the new hegemony they exerted now in the university as reformers. "How could he not comprehend that the Sorbonne of Aulard, Seignobos, Lanson and Durkheim constituted a party which was going to give its direction to politics, to the mind, to the temporal, to the spirit of France, and that the party tended toward nothing less than the subversion of all that which he, Barrès, defended?"³⁴² It could only be, Massis decided, that Barrès did not know the Nouvelle Sorbonne well enough to recognize the power that its monopoly assured the Left. "This attempt

³⁴¹ Henri Massis, *Evocations; Souvenirs 1905-1911* (Paris: Plon, 1931), 49.

³⁴² *Ibid.*

against culture, against intelligence,” Massis mourned, Barrès “did not see it or, if he saw it, he saw it too late.” To save true culture and intelligence, he determined, a coordinated campaign was necessary to reveal the nature of the Nouvelle Sorbonne and the threat it posed to true, right-wing intellectual values.

It was this campaign that the articles by Agathon in *L’Opinion*, was intended to spark. They are perhaps his most significant statement of resentment against the hegemony of the intellectual Left in the university. The articles were a public statement of “repugnance for the suffering of constraint that our masters of superior education, dazzled by Germanic science, have imposed on young minds.”³⁴³ Yet, more than this, they were a warning about the wider “intellectual despotism” of the Left through the means of the university. Massis particularly rejected the influence on the next generation of Durkheim. His required course in pedagogy was the perfect opportunity to instill the value system of the reformers in all the students who would become professors. “Students today,” Massis later wrote, “are not able to imagine the domination of Durkheim at that time, the extent of his power and the authority that his sociology exercised over certain students.”³⁴⁴ Clearly, Massis continued, Durkheim was an “omnipotent personage” who exerted a “despotic” monopoly over the image of the educator and the formation of the intellectual elite.

Massis was particularly incensed that Durkheim was part of the committee that surveyed all the nominations to superior education positions and that students had to reproduce his sociological interpretations of pedagogy in order to be admitted to exams. “Through Pedagogy,” Massis fumed, “even more by the prerogatives of administrative authority which have been attributed to him, M. Durkheim has strongly established his intellectual despotism. He has made of his teaching an instrument of rule.”³⁴⁵ Massis warned that Durkheim used his monopoly over the university to insert

³⁴³ Agathon, *L’Esprit de la Nouvelle Sorbonne; la crise de la culture classique, la crise du français* (Paris: Mercure de France, 1911), 9.

³⁴⁴ Massis, *Evocations*, 81.

³⁴⁵ Agathon, *L’Esprit de la Nouvelle Sorbonne*, 100.

the new discipline of sociology favored by the scientifically minded reformers. Sociology, Massis concluded, was the “scorn for ideas and individuals, the vehicle of despotism.” Sociology and Durkheim had both been rejected by the leaders of the Sorbonne, Massis claimed, until the Dreyfus Affair when it was decided that anyone who was as ardent a Dreyfusard as Durkheim must have reason on their side and “follow a common ideal” with the other Sorbonnards.³⁴⁶ After this, sociology had been welcomed as the official philosophy of the Sorbonne and made a tool of moral re-education and control. “An appetite for domination, the ideal of moral enslavement, a narrow dogmatism” Massis wrote, “this is the philosophy of the Sorbonne” as represented by sociology.³⁴⁷ It was this sort of “dogmatic authoritarianism,” “intellectual despotism,” and “moral enslavement” by the Left that Massis demanded the intellectuals of the Right engage against. If they failed to collectively oppose the Left, he warned, future generations might not even recognize the invisible system of intellectual oppression. “In truth,” he concluded, “Erudition as exclusive master of the intelligences would reign over the people as slaves...it would be intellectual servitude.”³⁴⁸ The values of the Left would be engrained from the earliest age and become the unquestioned model of intelligence and culture.

Durkheim was not the only harmful influence dominating the university system however. “It is impossible to misconstrue the hold of Lucien Herr on souls nor the dominating leadership that the famous librarian of the ENS exercised over the minds and wills of his generation,” Massis wrote. Herr, Massis claimed, was “intimately linked to the ‘parti intellectuel’ even though he “worked in the shadow” of the library since he had had a decisive influence on the formation of French socialism among *universitaires*. “He made of the Ecole Normale, Massis warned, “the cradle of university

³⁴⁶ Ibid., 107.

³⁴⁷ Ibid., 115.

³⁴⁸ Ibid., 161.

socialism on which Jaures supported himself and where he recruited his cadres.”³⁴⁹ Massis concluded “it was the action of this group of intellectuals, of whom Herr was the leader, that made the Sorbonne and the ENS the foyer of the parti pro-allemand.”³⁵⁰

After showing the dominance of these leading left-wing intellectuals, Massis expanded his complaint against left-wing hegemony to the university as a whole. “We imagined an independent and free university,” he lamented, “we found it enslaved, degraded by politicians and the grossest demagoguery, by that which has a hatred of intelligence.”³⁵¹ As the ideological arm of the Republic, the Nouvelle Sorbonne proclaimed itself the center of true French intelligence and culture. All thought that opposed the ideals of republicanism were, by default, anti-intellectual and anti-French. Massis resented the left-wing bloc that he perceived to unite the university and the government. He complained that the university under the reformers had become the “ideological fortress of the regime” which protected and disseminated a set of ideals derived from Dreyfusism.³⁵² They dispensed with all ideas, particularly those from pre-Revolutionary history and literature, that did not meet their ideal of republican culture, replaced them with modern science, and proclaimed these the true foundation of French thought. Massis wrote angrily, “they have decided to make a blank slate of all the inherited ideas- why? Because they have not been obtained scientifically. They say ‘we are the representatives of Science, we alone are able to speak as it is necessary of Justice, of Peace, of the Passions. We are the masters of Thought.’”³⁵³

Most importantly, Massis warned, the intellectuals of the Left intended to actually become the masters of Thought by rejecting all ideas and knowledge that had come before them. The

³⁴⁹ Henri Massis, *L'honneur de servir; textes réunis pour contribuer à l'histoire d'une generation, 1912-1937* (Paris: Plon, 1937), 157.

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 160.

³⁵¹ Massis, *Evocations*, 138.

³⁵² Toda, *Henri Massis*, 53.

³⁵³ *Ibid.*, 55.

intellectual Left's fascination for scientific learning was, Massis claimed, simply the most effective way to destroy the system of education that had been maintained by the traditionalist Right over the centuries. Only by destroying public faith in the traditional values and methods could they insert themselves as the new guides of French education. In imposing these values and seeking only their own aggrandizement, Massis wrote, these *universitaires* had betrayed their role and responsibility as intellectuals. It was they, not the Right, who were the "anti-intellectuals" or false intellectuals. He wrote of the new scientific methods, "in the eyes of these *false intellectuals*, it [science] was only a pretext to exercise an imperious privilege, to claim a temporal dominion, and to impose it with much more fanaticism... That which the 'parti intellectuel' pursued was the enslavement of intelligences."³⁵⁴ It was the responsibility and role of the intellectual of the Right to prevent this destruction and enslavement.

The Left, according to Massis, controlled not only the programs and direction of the university and the title and image of the intellectual, they also controlled the public's perception of the role and practice of the intellectual. The role of the intellectual, and the authority to guide public opinion, educate the nation, and influence affairs that this role entailed, was now closely associated with the university professor. "Society," Massis fumed, "has been led to think that a university savant knows all and thus leave their sons with no defenses in the university. We cannot conceive that a man who puts the title of agrégé on his calling cards could be tricked in his political party and does not have all the instruction that one is able to receive."³⁵⁵ The Left had garnered the truest form of intellectual dominance according to Massis, it had seduced the public into believing that the true intellectual and representative of intelligence was the university man of science. Against this inculcation, it was practically impossible for the intellectual of the Right to convince anyone that their values and positions outside the university were better suited for French intelligence. "The educator,"

³⁵⁴ Massis, *Evocations*, 152.

³⁵⁵ Agathon, "Mandarinat Universitaire," *L'Opinion*, November 29 1919.

Massis complained, “is, for the worker, the depository of all science and if we come into a provincial salon to oppose a professor of philosophy, you will see quickly appear on all the faces the signs of severe disapprobation.”³⁵⁶ This, he continued, was both a ridiculous and dangerous illusion that it was the responsibility of all right-wing intellectuals to combat.

To do this, it was necessary to publicly legitimize the right-wing intellectual. Agathon wrote the articles in 1912 that would become *Jeunes gens d'aujourd'hui* with this purpose in mind. Although written as a testimony to events of the time, these articles were in fact an effort of propaganda by Agathon; a conscious effort to legitimize his own concept of intelligence and his own model of intellectual identity. Rather than revealing an actual generational shift, the work was a vision for the future, a vision built around the ideals of the intellectual Right. Massis claimed that he was portraying the sentiments of the “new type of the young intellectual elite” whose ideal was synonymous with the will of a New France.³⁵⁷ By proclaiming this vision to be the new sentiment among the youth, Agathon was countering the legitimizing power of the university with the legitimizing power of the elite youth. In speaking with his young friend Ernest Psichari about his plans for this work, Massis said “I will speak of the Sorbonne, the university tyranny, the false erudition, and I will defend culture despite our professors. Yes, it will be... a long analysis of our sentiments, of our ideas, all this animated by an active love of intelligence, despite the intellectuals! And we will speak of the young men of today in search of an order, a discipline, a faith”³⁵⁸ The key was that the young men would be shown to be searching outside the confines of the university and its left-wing ideology and to be finding their alternative on the Right.

As the war drew nearer, Massis intensified his struggle to legitimize the intellectual worldview of the Right. The intellectuals of the Left, he warned, “betrayed their responsibility to

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ Henri Massis, *Les Jeunes gens d'aujourd'hui; le gout de l'action, la foi patriotique, une renaissance catholique, le realisme politique* (Paris: Plon, 1913), iii.

³⁵⁸ Massis, *Evocations*, 266.

culture” by defending internationalism and pacifism as invasion threatened. While the “legitimate role of the university would have been to put the masses on guard” it instead “betrayed its role” by appealing to their egoism and urging them against the law of three years.³⁵⁹ In contrast, as one right-wing engage wrote, the intellectuals of the Right had “perceived our task, our proper role, our duty.”³⁶⁰ The defense of the patrie required the mobilization of intelligence and the Right would prove its legitimacy as guardian of French culture by leading this effort.

In his 1919 manifest in Figaro, “Pour un parti de l’intelligence,” Massis made quite clear his intention of legitimizing the intellectual Right and redefining the concept of the intellectual according to right-wing standards. The undersigned, it read, believed that “public opinion...had need of being guided and protected, and they believe this is the role of the writers who are truly conscious of the peril and intend to offer their service. Against the bolshevism of thought, against the party of ignorance, they intend to organize an intellectual defense.”³⁶¹ The manifest was a clear demand for the Right to be recognized as intellectuals and to be able to redefine intellectual responsibility. “Finally,” Massis wrote of the men of letters on the Right, “the intellectual elite has rediscovered the sense of its social responsibility” and “restored the sense of our duty toward this people whom we are charged with enlightening.”³⁶² The party of intelligence was to begin “an immense work of reconstruction” not only for France but for all of civilization. The Manifest not only claimed the identity of the intellectual for the Right, it sought to differentiate true, right-wing, intellectual identity from the false version on the Left. While those writers who had signed the manifest of Rolland displayed “an action susceptible of acting as an evil ferment and menacing intelligence and society,” those who signed this manifest of Massis would put first the need of France and national reconstitution, they would “serve and accept our civic obligations” by “organizing the defense of

³⁵⁹ Toda, *Henri Massis*, 140.

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 142.

³⁶¹ “Pour un parti de l’intelligence,” *Le Figaro*, July 19 1919.

³⁶² *Ibid.*

French intelligence.” In striking contrast with the intellectual of the Left, the intellectual of the Right, as defined by Massis, would defend classicism, elitism, realism, and nationalism.

Differentiation of Intellectual Values: Classicism and Elitism

Massis and the intellectuals of the Right had a very different understanding of the essence of French intelligence and culture and of the aim of education than the intellectuals of the Left. While the Left favored reforms that introduced German inspired modernity, positivism, and scientific research, the Right defended the traditional, classical humanities as the foundation for French intelligence and culture. To the Left’s belief in specialization and utilitarian education as the key to intellectual progress the Right opposed a trust in the benefits of a general, liberal education in French and classical thought and literature which would enable the student to meet new problems with time-tested ideas. And, while the Left saw the aim of education to be the preparation of the masses for democratic citizenship, the Right believed education, particularly superior education, was intended to form an intellectual elite who would guide this democratic mass. These different visions of the purpose and method of education were at the core of the Right’s defense of Classical thought against German influences.

Perhaps the most powerful statement by Massis against the Left’s concept of culture and intelligence was found in *L’Esprit de la Nouvelle Sorbonne* where he wrote, “If there is a culture opposed to ours and that we are not able to imitate without forcing and falsifying our natural qualities it is without doubt the Germanic culture... This spirit that the Nouvelle Sorbonne has imported from the Germanic universities... is incompatible with French culture and perhaps with all true culture.”³⁶³ True culture, he explained was not the Germanic categorization of concepts but rather the French approach, modeled on that of the ancients, of attempting to understand the ideas behind a concept and to appreciate their beauty. The latter required a higher form of intelligence, a more intimate

³⁶³ Agathon, *L’Esprit de la Nouvelle Sorbonne*, 174-6.

knowledge of the material, and a devotion to thoughtful analysis. While the German scientific methods might benefit the physical sciences, the true French intellectual understood that there was more to intelligence and to culture than these sciences. True French culture was intimately connected to classicism and the humanities, not science and erudition. “There exists a profound accord between our French genius and that which we call “classical culture,”³⁶⁴ he wrote, therefore “in combating for taste and style we [the intellectuals of the Right] are fighting for the prestige of French thought.”

Not surprisingly, it was this respect for Classical thought against the infiltration of Germanic science that the new intellectual elite of *Jeunes gens d'aujourd'hui* displayed. Massis wrote that these new intellectuals, these intellectuals of the Right, recognized that the battle between classicism and modernism was over a moral conception, over the spiritual notions out of which the youth would make their lives. They found in the scientific approaches to intelligence and culture proposed by the Sorbonne only “a pedantic materialism... a dehumanization of the soul... where there is only the most mediocre, the most despaired moral ideal.”³⁶⁵ Instead, they turned to the classics, where they found “as much a moral benefit as an intellectual benefit.” By immersing themselves in classical thought, Massis proclaimed, the right-wing intellectual youth were separated from their utilitarian peers by more than just forms of intelligence, they were affected in their daily and moral lives. Youth formed by classical, French culture had “a taste for the definitive, for stability, for order... a horror of unruliness, of anarchy as the worst obstruction to the development of themselves and true liberty.”³⁶⁶ Because of these different formations of intellectual and moral values, Massis believed this new classically educated youth, the intellectuals of the Right, would separate entirely from those youth who remained mired in the scientific teachings of the university and form their own “communities of

³⁶⁴ Ibid., 174.

³⁶⁵ Massis, *Les Jeunes gens*, 57.

³⁶⁶ Ibid., 63.

moral life.”³⁶⁷ Classical history, ancient literature, and languages provided a model of man, of culture, and of moral life which was essential to the continuation of French culture and society. In destroying the classical ideal of culture and “replacing it with a new intellectual model” the reformers were not only abasing classical humanities, they were endangering the intellectual and moral preparation of the nation.³⁶⁸

This distinctly right-wing, traditionalist vision of a true education had important implications for the right-wing intellectual’s approach to educational practices. The intellectual of the Left promoted “the new ideal of specialization”³⁶⁹ and the preparation for professions and the utilization of knowledge for industry as quickly as possible. For this reason, Massis wrote, they kept the students ignorant of the “liberal and disinterested intellectual culture” on which artists and litterateurs thrived.³⁷⁰ While, according to Massis, the Left saw education as the mass production of specialized parts, the Right wanted an intelligence which would “form judgment, discover the capacities of intelligence, and develop the innate gifts” of taste, style, and talent. Massis claimed this separation in the aims of education between Right and Left was proven true by Durkheim’s work *La Division du travail social* where instead of proposing the creation of a complete, total man he suggested the need for specialized man. Durkheim and the reformers, Massis wrote, wanted to shrink the horizons of the minds of the youth, to force the “spiritual activity of individuals to adapt itself to a more and more narrow task.” This, he continued, supported the “defeat of all culture and of all moral ideals.”³⁷¹ In contrast, the intellectual, as defined by the Right, advocated a broad education in the classical humanities. Here history and science would not be ignored or subordinated but would be grouped around the central study of letters which was essential to the formation of cultured men. “Many will

³⁶⁷ Ibid.

³⁶⁸ Agathon, *L’Esprit de la Nouvelle Sorbonne*, 69.

³⁶⁹ Ibid.

³⁷⁰ Ibid., 57.

³⁷¹ Ibid., 73.

die without ever having had to use algebra,” Massis supporter René Doumic wrote, but all their life they will have had to use the observation, wisdom, and dreams which are enclosed in literature...before becoming a doctor or a savant it is necessary first to become a man.”³⁷² Massis believed, as did those on the intellectual Right who opposed the Reformers, that a broad classical education created complete men capable of moral and intellectual growth while specialized education was only intended to create cogs in the republic’s economic wheel.

Massis’ support for a broad, classical education indicated yet another distinction in his concept of the role of education from that on the intellectual Left. The reformers wanted to democratize secondary and superior education, to make it accessible to all, and to use this new common education as a tool for social egalitarianism in all aspects of life. In contrast, the intellectual of the Right engaged to protect superior education as the domain of the elite. The difficulty of a classical education was intended to separate the intellectual wheat from the mediocre chaff. According to Massis, those who opposed classicism were promoting the republican vision of egalitarianism at the expense of the well being of French culture and intelligence; a clear betrayal of their duty as intellectuals. The “apostles of our so called intellectual democratization,” Massis wrote, desired the “abasement of education” in order to “give it a broader hold” on the populace.³⁷³ It no longer mattered the quality of the instruction provided as long as it was given out in equal quantities to all the students. This Massis fumed, made secondary and superior education the glorification of mediocrity. While intellectuals of the Left like Lanson praised the reformers for their “democratic tendencies” and ability to “utilize the mediocre who were neglected by the former literary education,” Massis and the intellectuals of the Right decried the sacrifice of the elite, the unnatural praise for those without aptitude, and the obsession with number to the detriment of talent.

³⁷² Rene Doumic, *La Defense de l'esprit français* (1918), 32.

³⁷³ Agathon, *L'Esprit de la Nouvelle Sorbonne*, 124.

To the mediocrity of a higher education leveled to the abilities of all, Massis and the opposition demanded that superior and even secondary education retain their focus on philosophy, critique, composition, language, and analysis attainable only by an intellectual elite. The purpose and aim of education, and therefore the responsibility of the intellectual as educator, was not the democratic formation of average citizens but rather the formation of an intellectual elite who would serve as guides for the mass of society. Instead of erasing this intellectual divide, the right-wing intellectual nurtured it as the natural result of the human hierarchy.³⁷⁴

Realism

The Right also had an appreciation and understanding of the Real Massis believed the Left was incapable of sharing. As it had been for Barrès and Brunetière, Realism was a primary organizing principle of intelligence for Massis. Although the new emphasis on practical, utilitarian knowledge by the reformers was presented as intellectual Realism, the intellectuals of the Right intentionally differentiated their concept of intellectual realism from that on the Left. Realism for Massis entailed an appreciation for the contributions made by sentiment, experience, action, and will, as well as pure intelligence and logic, to man's understanding of the world. It was this appreciation that separated the Realism of the Right from the "pure" intellectuals of the Left who found value only in what could be deduced by logic and scientific theory; by the mechanics of the intellect alone. In keeping with the anti-Dreyfusard concept of realism, Massis also defined real knowledge as a product of the time and place of the thinker, applicable only to the needs of the nation and the era. Left-wing utilitarian science was based on an abstract knowledge that could be universally applied to any circumstance with the certainty of a scientific procedure. Such a fundamental division in the concept of

³⁷⁴ Even after the end of the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates and the appearance of new intellectual threats with the end of World War I, the *Revue universelle* would continue to warn against the democratization of higher education, particularly by the incorporation of the ENS, and to demand a new forum for the creation of an intellectual elite. Georges Dumézil, "La reform de 1903," *Revue universelle*, June 15 1920. and Georges Dumézil, "La misere de l'Ecole Normale," *Revue universelle*, April 1 1920.

intelligence, the resources on which the intellectual could draw, and the scope of intellectual responsibility led to an essential abyss between the two concepts of intellectual identity.

Massis wrote that the reformers of the intellectual Left “disdained the study of concrete reality” in favor of a fetish for doctrines and thus “distanced themselves from any truly living study.”³⁷⁵ In contrast, the intellectual Right proposed an education for complete men in full contact with the realities of human existence. This education was not, as reformer Paul Souday would accuse Massis, “an intellectual abasement” that favored action and energy to the detriment of ideas and the mind. Instead it was conceived as an appreciation for all the resources available to intellectual analysis. Massis defended his vision of intellectual realism in *Jeunes gens* saying, “In giving to the realities of the sentiment and of action a place which the pure ‘intellectuels’ refused to them, the enquete did not believe to violate the supremacy of intelligence: such dispositions seemed on the contrary to enrich it in dissuading it from remaining sterile.”³⁷⁶ Only an intelligence which tapped into the other wellsprings of human understanding could provide real guidance for real men in real situations. Pure intelligence was too abstract, too sterile. For the Left whose intellectual endeavors were reduced to speculation with no bearing on real things, enlightenment became simply a “pride in knowing elevated things.” In contrast, Massis wrote we intellectuals of the Right “are practical men; we do not content ourselves with playing with ideas, with taking pleasure from them, we demand from them the knowledge of the real, the joy of the truth,” a usefulness for France.³⁷⁷

It is no surprise therefore that the theme of Realism played a central role in the description of the new intellectual elite in *Jeunes gens*. “The spirit that guides the youth of today is that of affirmation, of creation” he wrote, “their sensibility is realist; it is submitted to fact.”³⁷⁸ These youth

³⁷⁵ Agathon, *L'Esprit de la Nouvelle Sorbonne*, 96.

³⁷⁶ Toda, *Henri Massis*, 136.

³⁷⁷ “Y a-t-il un ‘Renouveau Philosophique,’” *L'Opinion*, February 7 1914.

³⁷⁸ Massis, *Les Jeunes gens*, 16.

had been united by their realism, their acceptance of the conditions of the real for the formation of thought. Massis would later write that it was around the central theme of Realism that the tendencies which defined the new intellectual elite, like dreams of national renewal, patriotism, and religious faith, were grouped.³⁷⁹ It was in being Realist in fact that Massis most distinguished his ideal of the intellectual Right from the concept of “intellectualism” that had been dominated by the Left. “Yes, thought is able to launch itself outside of reality, but in this it is falsified...our youth, consciously or by instinct is anti-intellectualist; it does not consider life an intellectual debate: a debate where only rational elements enter into play.”³⁸⁰ While the Left lost itself in universalisms and abstractions, the new intellectual elite of the Right were conscious “that they live in France, in a certain period of its history, and that all ought to be envisioned from this current and French point of view.” This was the “realist spirit” of the youth who formed Massis’ model of the right-wing intellectual.³⁸¹

Intellectual realism also distinguished the role and practice of the intellectual of the Right who would be a man of letters rather than a scientist. The intellectual of the university, Massis wrote, had “faith in the autonomous value of ideas independent of all contact with the real.” This lack of contact with the real and devotion to pure abstraction was ironically what had led the Left to a fascination with science. Science and mathematics, though seemingly based on physical reality, were in fact efforts to make an intellectual abstraction, a formula, or a theorem out of reality, to “reduce the abundant diversity of beings to a system of abstractions.”³⁸² Intellectual Realism as Massis understood it was not a rejection of intelligence or intellect nor a wild abandonment to instinct, mysticism, or imagination. It was simply a “metaphysics which envisioned all things from the point

³⁷⁹ Henri Massis, *La Guerre de trente ans; destin d'un age, 1909-1939* (Paris: Plon, 1940), 17.

³⁸⁰ Here it is important to note Massis was not denouncing the concept of an engaged intellectual. He was, as the anti-Dreyfusards had, specifically rejecting only the intellectual and moral values attached to this term which separated it from his own vision of the intellectual. Massis, *Les Jeunes gens*, 19.

³⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 20.

³⁸² *Ibid.*

of view of human life.”³⁸³ It was this connection between intelligence and life that Massis claimed had for too long been deemed a contradiction by the dominant Left. The intellectual of the Right realized that life and action were the purpose of intelligence and that the intellectualism of the Left, which separated thought from real life, was the real incompatibility. Literature, not science, was in contact with human emotions, life, will, and action. The identity of the responsible intellectual, according to Massis and the Right, was therefore associated with the role and practices of the litterateur and journalist rather than the savant or *universitaire* as the Left suggested.

Nationalism and Defense of Western Civilization

Both before and after World War I, Massis would forcibly differentiate his concept of intellectual role and responsibility from that of the Left by promoting the intellectual as a spokesman of the French nation and of Western civilization rather than a representative of the “International of thought.” The Left *universitaires*, Massis wrote, were “detached from all contingency, plunged in the pure abstractions of the mind, assembled together in an international place, in the hall of the Sorbonne.”³⁸⁴ Here professors like Ruysen taught the utopia of internationalism and the federation of patries into a fraternal society while other professors dismissed patriotic fervor in the youth as ignorant superstition and unscientific sentiment.³⁸⁵ Lucien Herr “taught successive generations that the ‘politics of national sentiment were dead’ and that ‘no one raises the people in the name of France any more’ and spread internationalism under the cover of science.”³⁸⁶ In contrast, it would be the responsibility of the intellectuals of the Right to provide an education in French ideas and intellectual patriotism.

³⁸³ Ibid., 81.

³⁸⁴ Massis, *La Guerre de trente ans*.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ Massis, *L'honneur de servir*, 158.

Again, it was in *Jeunes gens* that Massis would outline his model of the right-wing intellectual. To the “humanitarian internationalism of the ‘intellectuals,’³⁸⁷ the new intellectual elite opposed patriotic faith and a focus on the needs of France as a collective. According to Massis, Sorbonne pacifism and international humanitarianism had no effect on the intellectual of the Right who rejected the university tendency to “sacrifice the patrie to the Idea, to put patriotism in the service of internationalism.”³⁸⁸ For this new intellectual youth, ideas and patriotism were not contradictory, they were inseparable. Intellectual thought was laced now with ideas of force, action, energy, sacrifice, heroism, and faith rather than cosmopolitanism, decadence, anti-patriotism, and idealism. The “intellectual youth formed by *universitaire* idealism and cosmopolitan culture was entirely won to international socialism” during the Dreyfus Affair, Massis wrote. But today it concerned itself instead with the nation and it approached political questions from the French point of view.³⁸⁹

It was the internationalism of the intellectual of the Left, Massis wrote during the war, that most distinguished him from the intellectual of the Right. The intellectual of the Left said, “I only recognize intelligence, it does not suffer borders and I would sacrifice one hundred French imbeciles for a single intelligent citizen of any nation...one is able to conquer the territory around me, never will one attain my thought.”³⁹⁰ The intellectual of the Right, in contrast, believed there was no abstract “intelligence,” no “detachment of the intelligence from the place and its borders.” Real intelligence, culture, and thought only existed in relation to the peoples, territory, and history that it drew from. Intellectual internationalism was not true intelligence but only a dangerous myth that led to sterile thought and an absence of culture. And, Massis continued, any foreign invasion during war

³⁸⁷ Massis, *Les Jeunes gens*, 23.

³⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 27.

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 94.

³⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 38.

would mean the imposition of foreign culture on French life. The intellectual of the Left would not be able to retain the freedom of his thought if his territory were no longer free. French genius, different from other nations' genius, had been made over time from order, clarity, and taste.³⁹¹ Whether from physical invasion during war or insidious infiltration of the educational system, any dilution of this genius by foreign thought risked the corruption of centuries of French culture and intelligence.

Massis carried over this assessment of intelligence into his rejection of the International of Thought after the war. Rolland had called for a demobilization and reunification of all the intellectuals of Europe after the war in an attempt to reprioritize intellectual fraternity and cooperation after the degrading experience of nationalist partisanship. Massis was firmly opposed to Rolland's efforts to demobilize all the intellectuals of Europe and involve them in this new International devoted to shared enlightenment and the concerns of an abstract humanity. Rolland, he wrote, was not able to love only France, he was too "generous a soul" and wanted instead to love all humanity. Massis determined that this abstraction and anti-patriotism was a result of Rolland's inability to organize his thoughts, to prioritize, and to make decisions. His internationalism was a very clear indication of his intellectual dilettantism and confusion. Intellectual nationalism, on the other hand, was based on reality, on firm roots, and on an ordered and organized process of prioritization and decisiveness.³⁹² This cultural nationalism clearly divided the Left and Right intellectuals. "Here," he wrote, "is that which separated the intellectuals of the Left from the ensemble of their colleagues: they have no confidence in their patrie!"³⁹³ This cultural nationalism would be the priority of the right-wing "Parti de l'intelligence."

The concept of the intellectual as a "defender of Western Civilization" outlined by Massis in this manifest revealed an "abyss" between left-wing and right-wing concepts of Civilization and the

³⁹¹ Agathon, *L'Esprit de la Nouvelle Sorbonne*, 17.

³⁹² Henri Massis, *Romain Rolland contre la France* (Paris: H. Floury, 1915).

³⁹³ Toda, *Henri Massis*, 187.

intellectual's responsibility to it. French civilization was a product of the classical spirit, "elaborated over the ages, brought to us by good tradition, for a long time rejected or misunderstood in the shadows by the ways of the Revolution and Romanticism."³⁹⁴ It was the result of French national intelligence, not a homogenous, universal culture as envisioned by the Left. The different vision of the foundations of Western, and particularly French, civilization and intelligence had important ramifications for the concept of intellectual role and responsibility on the Right. While the Rolland manifest envisioned intellectuals aiding in the homogenization and interspersing of national cultures throughout Europe in a sort of melting pot of thought, Massis and the Right envisioned instead the role of the intellectual as strengthening and purifying each national culture in order to create a mosaic of separate but brilliant components. Promoting cultural nationalism, not internationalism, was the means to protect civilization and therefore the responsibility of the true intellectual. Massis explained "if we put first the preoccupation of the needs of France and national reconstitution, if we want before all to serve and accept our civic obligations, if we claim to organize the defense of French intelligence, it is because we have in view the spiritual future of all civilization."³⁹⁵ The explanation was later shortened to the pithy mantra "national intelligence in the service of national interests is our primary principle."

It was their different understandings of civilization and intelligence that renewed the pre-war divisions in the concept of intellectual responsibility between the Right and Left. The Left promoted the International of Thought based on its own idea of the benefit to civilization of the continued progress of intelligence through cultural cross-pollination. The Right opposed this with its own nationalist Party of Intelligence based on its alternative view of Civilization as the product of unadulterated French national tradition and classical heritage.

³⁹⁴ "Pour un parti de l'intelligence."

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

Massis and the Right-wing Intellectual Model

The debates over the Nouvelle Sorbonne were never simply about policy for Massis and the intellectuals of the Right. They believed the reformers were transmitting to the next generation a certain understanding of culture, intelligence, and the purpose of education which dramatically differed from their own. Faced with the legitimization of these values by the authority of the University, the Right feared the Republican and Left intellectuals would gain an even stronger hold on the public's perception of the role and identity of the true intellectual. Massis expressed the resentment and frustration of his peers on the traditionalist Right when he raged against the "intellectual despotism" of the left-wing "masters of Thought." While the reformist intellectuals of the Republic and extreme Left defended the already legislated reforms confident in the submission of the public and the support of the regime, Massis and the intellectuals of the Right would develop a distinctly right-wing mentality of engagement. Massis believed the hegemony of the Left in the university and over the concept of the intellectual required him to first legitimize his position as intellectually viable, through propaganda efforts like *Jeunes gens d'aujourd'hui* and the 1919 Manifest, before he could hope to sway public opinion. Like the anti-Dreyfusards who preceded him, Massis took on the mentality of the oppressed, anti-establishment outsider. To distinguish his alternative, right-wing concept of the intellectual, Massis would clearly differentiate his own intellectual values from those of the Left. The model intellectual of the Right valued the classicism, taste, and style attainable only by the elite students over utilitarian science available to all and so advocated a general education over specialization. He promoted a vision of intellectual realism that incorporated the knowledge gained by sentiment, experience, and action into concepts of intelligence rather than one based on practical but sterile scientific logic alone. And, the intellectual of the Right saw Civilization to be a mosaic of independent national cultures rather than a homogenized, international intelligence and so engaged to defend cultural nationalism rather than international cultural exchange both before and after the war. Massis made these different concepts of intellectual values and responsibility central to his struggle to differentiate and legitimize his own concept of

intellectual identity from that being promulgated on the Left. The abyss that became apparent between the Right and Left versions of the intellectual as educator would be reinforced during the decade by the increasing segregation of the intellectual community and by the distinctive experiences of intellectual life that these separate communities revealed and engendered. Massis was not the only right-wing intellectual who resented the Left's dominance over intellectual identity and developed his own concept. He was joined in this effort by the imposing figure of Charles Maurras.

CHAPTER 7

THE INTELLECTUALS OF THE TRADITIONALIST RIGHT: THE CASE OF CHARLES MAURRAS

Charles Maurras is one of the best known writers of the intellectual Right. His remarkable intellectual career began in the Dreyfus Affair and would not end until after his collaboration with Vichy France. Throughout this period of engagement, he was a leader in the movement to expand, popularize, and clarify the right-wing intellectual presence in French culture and politics. The Action Française movement which came to be synonymous with his name can be considered the most extensive and most enduring of the right-wing intellectual organizations. And the avowed influence of both Maurras and the AF on successive generations of young writers from the Left and Right speaks to the intellectual and political significance of both the man and his movement.

In 1895, Maurras had come to Paris as a youth of seventeen to begin his career as a writer. Rather than opting for the professional trajectory of the *universitaire*, Maurras entered the literary world by writing for the catholic journal *L'Observateur Française* at the age of nineteen and later Barrès' nationalist and socialist revue *La Cocarde*. By 1898, Maurras was writing for the main royalist and soon to be anti-Dreyfusard organs *Gazette de France* and *Le Soleil*. During these pre-Dreyfus Affair years, Maurras had also confirmed his classical and traditionalist values by creating the Ecole Romane with Jean Moréas. The aim of this movement was to replace German romanticism with traditional French styles in the intellectual field. This renewal of literature would be augmented by a returned respect for the healthy traditional institutions of the Church, the monarchy, and classical language. Maurras claimed the source of this monarchism was the trip he made in 1896 to Greece.

Seeing France from an external vantage point, he recognized the faults that plagued it under the republican regime.³⁹⁶

As an ardent anti-Dreyfusard intellectual, Maurras had been an active member of the Ligue de la Patrie Française, but had been disillusioned by its electioneering. He believed he had found a better alternative in the small Comité d'Action Française created by Maurice Pujo and Henri Vaugeois as a daughter movement of the Ligue de la Patrie. By 1899, the movement had become more royalist than republican under the influence of Maurras and had declared a division between the *pays legale* of the Republic and the *pays réel* of “True France.”³⁹⁷ This royalism was popularized by the first edition of Maurras' *Enquête sur la monarchie* in 1900. By this time, Maurras had already surpassed the founders of the movement in terms of ideological influence and began to be recognized as the mentor and leader of the organization. His distinctively right-wing conceptions of royalist nationalism and French intelligence would be the foundation of all the organs of the Action Française developed over the next decade.

Although Agathon would receive the glory for popularizing the Nouvelle Sorbonne debate, the Action Française had actually taken the lead in attacking the German-inspired scientific reforms of the university as early as 1907. These attacks were led by Pierre Lasserre and provoked a continual polemic by AF members against the reformists from 1907 to 1914 as well as street and classroom protests by AF youth. All of these attacks on the Sorbonne found firm footing in the ideas and writings of Maurras during these years which praised classical and traditional education, rejected Germanism in all its forms, and strongly opposed the University. Maurras saw the university system to have been corrupted by Dreyfusards during the Affair and to have increasingly become a citadel

³⁹⁶ Here in Greece, he concluded, “the decision of my intellectual royalism was made.” Charles Maurras, *Au Signe de Flore; souvenirs de vie politique, l'affaire dreyfus et la fondation de l'action française, 1898-1900* (Paris: Grasset, 1933), 44.

³⁹⁷ Eugen Weber, *Action Française: royalism and reaction in twentieth-century France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 25.

for Republican and socialist values and views, to the exclusion of traditional, classical, nationalist, and particularly royalist intellectual values.³⁹⁸

During these pre-war years, although Maurras took pains to place himself in clear opposition to the intellectual values and movements of the Republic and Left like international socialism, class conflict, and egalitarianism, he did not exclude from the royalist movement those left-wing thinkers who had come to sympathize with his ideas. This attempt to unite the French under monarchism regardless of past affiliations is perhaps most apparent in the Cercle Proudhon created in 1911 and chaired by Maurras with the aid of syndicalists Georges Sorrel and Edouard Berth. Although the movement spawned a few attempts at collaboration between syndicalists and monarchists, the compromise between the two parties was short lived and their efforts eventually abandoned due to irreconcilable differences in values. Despite this brief collaboration and statements of inclusion, being royalist and Maurrassian came to be understood by contemporaries as being irrefutably on the Intellectual Right.

During the war, Maurras would be one of the most vocal supporters of the Union sacrée. Unlike the intellectual Left, he and others on the Right viewed the union and engagement in the war as validation of their intellectual values of nationalism, militarism, and anti-internationalism. The union did not, however, prevent Maurras from critiquing the inefficiency of the Republican regime or from attacking the socialist press like *Bonnet Rouge* for what he considered defeatism. During these years he continued daily publications in the Action Française which would be collected as the four volume *Les Conditions de la victoire*. In the post-war years, Maurras pushed for harsher penalties on Germany, including the re-division of the unified German state. His anti-Germanism and anti-

³⁹⁸ A great majority of his work during these pre-war years is devoted to spreading the political Realism that is integral nationalism, nationalism which ends in the destruction of the Republic and reconstitution of the monarchy, as the only natural solution for France. Second only to this are the works which focus on the threat posed to French civilization by Germany and German intellectual influences ranging from Kantism to Protestantism and individualism to Marxist internationalism. Finally are his works which echo or augment the work of Lasserre in support of classicism and traditionalism in the educational system instead of German inspired utilitarian science and romanticism.

internationalism would continue unabated into the 1920s and 1930s making Action Française royalism a beacon of right-wing thought against the increasing turn to internationalism and communism by the intellectual Left. It would be here in the Action Française intellectual milieu, which by the post-war years included Henri Massis, that the young non-conformists of the 1930s found their first intellectual mentors and professional community.

Like Massis, Maurras adamantly separated himself from the intellectuals of the Left by promoting the right-wing intellectual values of classicism in education, realism in politics, and nationalism in international affairs. But the royalism which transcended these values for Maurras would distinguish his approach to these values from the one previously seen in the work of Barrès and Massis. His contribution to the elaboration of right-wing intellectual values and construction of intellectual communities during the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates and the pre and post-war years provides both insight into one of the most influential right-wing movements of the time and an equally significant model of right-wing intellectual identity.

Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy

Maurras began working through the AF to redefine intellectual identity according to a right-wing model when the Republicans and Left rejected his own values as anti-intellectual and anti-French. He and other right-wing men of intelligence who sought to guide public affairs resented their forced marginalization and devoted much of their energies to legitimizing themselves and their ideas as intellectually viable. Like Barrès and Brunetière, Maurras and the other founders of the Action Française had been drawn to the Ligue de la Patrie because of their frustration with the way that intellectual values and responsible engagement were being defined by the Left. But, when these anti-Dreyfusard ligues seemed to lose their focus, Maurras felt the need to make the AF into a new legitimizing force for the Right. During the years 1910-1920, Maurras and the AF would be one of the most powerful voices on the Right calling for an end to the republican and left-wing hegemony

over the role of the intellectual and its replacement with an alternative, right-wing model of intellectual engagement based on the ideals of royalism, classicism, realism, and nationalism.

One of the clearest statements of resentment about the hegemony of the Left over the concept of the intellectual was written by AF devotee Pierre Lasserre. “Before critiquing the attitude of the ‘Intellectuals,’ he wrote, “we must first state that the orators of the Action Française are also intellectuals and that they have equal rights to participate in this debate.”³⁹⁹ Only by claiming the status of the intellectual and the responsibility to engage would the AF be able to participate as equals, in the eyes of the public, in the debates over the Nouvelle Sorbonne and French education. Lasserre’s demand for equal recognition of the Action Française “intellectuals” encapsulated the resentment and demand for intellectual status shared by all AF thinkers and by Maurras in particular. Maurras’ own demand for intellectual authority was, like the enquête on youth by Agathon, both an attempt to reveal the existing hegemony of the Left and an effort to claim legitimacy by suggesting that a shift to the Right was underway. He claimed that beginning in the years 1906-1909, the Action Française had accomplished a massive shift in Western history. “Intellectual prestige,” the statement read, “the honors of the mind, the ability to hypothesize on the future, had ceased to be reserved to the doctrines and tendencies of the Left; the ideas of the Right had taken their place.”⁴⁰⁰ He wanted to emphasize that the Left had held hegemony over the authority of the intellectual but that the Right, through the AF, was now the new intellectual model. Maurras was attempting to win authority and legitimacy for the AF by claiming that these goals had already been achieved. From now on, Maurras continued, no one would ask “if it was true that to be intelligent it was necessary to be Dreyfusard.”⁴⁰¹

³⁹⁹ AN F7 12863

⁴⁰⁰ Maurras, *Au Signe de Flore*, xv.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 72.

Instead, the public would have a superior alternative to the left-wing intellectual model that had been so dominant, it would have the model of the royalist intellectual of the nationalist Right.⁴⁰²

During the Nouvelle Sorbonne era, Maurras believed the hegemony in the intellectual world that the AF had been called to combat was most visible and most pernicious in the Left dominated and Republican controlled university system. It was the intellectuals of the university, and the concept of intelligence, culture, France, and engagement that they instilled in the youth, that Maurras found to be the most threatening to the future of right-wing intellectual identity. One of Maurras' more forceful statements against the university dominance was made in his *L'Avenir de l'Intelligence*. This work was his summation of the history of French intelligence, his condemnation of the decadence into which it had fallen under the Republic, and his proposed model for the royalist, right-wing intellectual engagement that would save it for the future. Here he popularized his resentment of the monopoly that the Left and the Republic held over education of the youth in particular and intellectual production and expression in general.

The University, Maurras wrote, was a product “of the State” and “with the methods that the State could dispose of, created an immense obstruction in the scientific, philosophical, and literary domain.” The goal of the University to monopolize intellectual life, he continued, “to take literature, philosophy, and science captive” led it to “stifle” all opposition from the Right. It exercised in this way, he concluded resentfully, “an indirect monopoly” over intellectual life and “determined speech or silence” of intellectuals.⁴⁰³ The ties between the left-wing leaders of the university and the Third

⁴⁰² The AF intellectuals' claim to be the new spokesmen for intellectual identity meant that they also claimed the key terms associated with intellectual responsibility like Truth and Justice. However, they made it quite clear that these terms would take on very different meaning when used by the extreme Right. “Ten years ago, the Dreyfusads claimed the monopoly on Truth and Justice. They made them so sullied that one was no longer able to serve themselves of them. We have retaken the usage of them through hard struggle... They have returned to our side. It is the same with all the great and beautiful words: Right, Liberty, Humanity, Civilization. Words hollow on Republican lips, words full of meaning in the mouths of monarchists.” *Action Française mensuelle*, August 15 1909.

⁴⁰³ Charles Maurras, *L'Avenir de l'intelligence* (Paris: Flammarion, 1927), 82. Similar statements were echoed in the articles of Action Française such as the Dec 15 1908 article by Montesquiou “L'Utilite de notre Institut” which claimed “any school the Republican state does not directly or indirectly control will always be

Republic made the hegemony of the left-wing reformers and *universitaires* even more ominous. The Republic's bureaucracy reached into every village primary school and thus prevented the development in the next generation of any serious adversary to its "muzzling and sedating of intelligence" through the university. By controlling the education of the youth, access to publication, and the dispensation of intellectual honors, the Republic exercised an invisible hegemony over the intellectual field that made thinking outside the parameters of the intellectual Left virtually "unthinkable." Maurras would summarize this saying, the Republican university system "prevented the opposition from knowing a political truth, and if it saw this truth from telling others of it, and if it told others of it from being heard and understood by them."⁴⁰⁴ In short, by monopolizing the University system that mentored all future intellectuals, the Republican regime silenced any possible intellectual opposition or deviation from its value system. It was this hegemony that Maurras intended to break with the communities and educational institutions constructed around the AF network.

In particular, Maurras and the AF intellectuals resented the dominance that certain reformist intellectuals held over the university and their ability to exclude as "anti-intellectual" the ideas and educators of the extreme Right. An article by Lasserre identified Durkheim, Lavisser, Lanson, and Seignobos as "belonging to a little group of professors of the Sorbonne whose...omnipotence in all things of public instruction has been the most characteristic fact of university life for the past twelve years."⁴⁰⁵ Durkheim was recognized as both a political and administrative power within the university and his pedagogy course as "cover for a maneuver to tighten around him the new generations of *universitaires*, to make of sociology according to Durkheim' their new religion."⁴⁰⁶ Yet, the control supposedly exerted over public instruction by these reformers was nothing, according to Maurras,

suspect to it. In teaching and education the republican state has need of a monopoly... of making the individuals passionate for its principles." *Action Française mensuelle* (1908), 698.

⁴⁰⁴ Maurras, *L'Avenir de l'intelligence*, 83.

⁴⁰⁵ *Action Française mensuelle*, August 15 1911.

⁴⁰⁶ *Action Française mensuelle*, June 15 1910.

compared to that exerted by Gabriel Monod. Monod, Maurras wrote, had annulled the positive, nationalist influence of the historian Fustel de Coulanges by denigrating his work in the University and glorifying instead the German histories and methods. Monod had the State, the administration, and the “subsidized bookstores and the enslaved press” supporting his interpretation of history. It was, he fumed, a veritable intellectual and governmental “bloc.” Against this hegemonic power the intellectuals of the Right had only the AF Institut and their independent press to draw back the minds of the youth. For the past thirty years, Maurras continued, Monod had influenced every branch of the moral sciences, presided over their development, and jealously surveyed their progress. He had integrated his own left-wing concepts of intelligence and history into the university courses while excluding those ideas, professors, and historical interpretations which did not correspond to his views. In truth, he had been “the tyrant of professors of French history.”⁴⁰⁷

And should any readers suspect that Maurras’s resentment was unfounded or the dominance of the university by the Republican regime and the left-wing intellectual reformers was exaggerated, the example was given to them of Dimier and Lasserre. These two Action Française advocates had doctorates in letters and yet had been ejected from the Sorbonne. They had turned to the AF Institut in order to continue teaching their intellectual and cultural values. Here they taught courses that were not “authorized to a professor in the Sorbonne” since the University feared such courses would reverse the official republican and socialist curricula.⁴⁰⁸

Maurras took great pains to show the hegemony and dominance of the Left over the concept of the intellectual and particularly over the formation of these intellectuals in the university. His expressions of resentment and anger at this exclusion were seconded only by his statements claiming legitimacy for the repressed Right. This struggle to convince the public of the legitimacy of the intellectual of the Right took several forms. One of the main strategies of legitimization, as it had

⁴⁰⁷ Charles Maurras, *Quand les Français ne s’aimaient pas; chronique d’une renaissance 1895-1905* (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1916), 100.

⁴⁰⁸ *Action Française mensuelle*, April 15 1909.

been for the Anti-Dreyfusard petitionnaires, was to display publicly the recognized men of letters who had joined the camp of the Right. Respected names in literature and journalism were advertised as lecturers for the Institut d'Action Française, which was intended to provide an alternate education in right-wing values for both the general public and the university student. To these masters associated with the AF, Lasserre compared the influential men of letters of the Left. Anatole France, he smirked, was the only one of “great intellectual and literary value who had not taken in regard to the regime an attitude of hostility and distaste.” In a great stroke of bravado, Lasserre continued “What therefore can we put on the intellectual *bilan* of the Republic? I see nothing.”⁴⁰⁹ In his enquête on the monarchy, Maurras concluded that monarchist, right-wing intellectuals deserved public recognition and authority since “so many collaborators of infinite price” had shown themselves on the side of the Right.⁴¹⁰ By publicizing the famous names of men of letters affiliated with the Right and the AF, Maurras intended to impress the public with the talent that supported their camp and therefore legitimize themselves as authoritative intellectual guides.⁴¹¹

A second strategy of legitimization was to claim, as Agathon had done with such marked success, that the youth of France, the symbol of fresh thought and progress, were on the side of the AF intellectuals. “The new generation,” Maurras wrote in defense of his ideas on monarchism and his hostility toward the Republic, “is above all in revolt against the resignation to death.”⁴¹² The youth, he continued, were no longer seduced by theories claiming to be “free-thinking or revolutionary” and instead recognized them as utopias which could not offer the substance of traditional French instruction.⁴¹³ By popularizing the image of the “youthful reactionaries of the AF,” the “generation of

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid, August 15 1909.

⁴¹⁰ *Enquête sur la monarchie, suivie de Une campagne royaliste au Figaro et Si le coup de force est possible* (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1909).

⁴¹¹ Intellectuals of note here included Vaugeois, Barrès, Lucien Moreau, Henri Bordeaux, Bainville, Leon de Montesquiou, Louis Dimier, and Sully Proudhomme.

⁴¹² Charles Maurras, *Idées royalistes* (Paris: Bureau de l'Action Française, 1910), 11.

⁴¹³ *Action Française mensuelle*, January 15 1909.

national royalists who did not believe themselves any more anachronistic than their adversaries,”⁴¹⁴ Maurras was able to claim intellectual prestige and victory had “changed camps” from Left to Right. The youth of the intellectual elite, Maurras wrote, were no longer “convinced that the future horizons were only able to open themselves to the ideas of the Left” and had made a break from the dominant majority in favor of the new intellectual alternative of the AF.⁴¹⁵ Claiming a youthful and elite avant garde gave the intellectual Right a powerful tool in the struggle for public perception of true intellectual identity.

Maurras and the intellectuals of the Action Francaise believed that they had been excluded from the role and responsibility of the engaged intellectual, particularly in the university. Maurras had embraced both the title of intellectual and the role of the politically engaged thinker as early as the Dreyfus Affair and rejected, as his right-wing peers had, only the values, behaviors, and programs attached to it by the intellectuals of the Left. During the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates, Maurras would continue to distance himself from the intellectual model of the Left. He saw serious and fundamental differences between the two worldviews that made their intellectual outlooks incompatible. “One does not see any ground of entente between the Jacobins and us,” he wrote of the Left in the years before the Union sacrée, “their spirit is opposed to ours. The two spirits had been manifested in the Dreyfus Affair and they have survived it. Any reconciliation is only a sham.”⁴¹⁶ Maurras saw with increasing resentment the growing power of republican and left-wing reformist intellectuals like Monod and Durkheim and the decreasing influence or outright exclusion of the anti-republican, right-wing *universitaires* like Lasserre. The dominance of these individuals of the Left mirrored the increasing hegemony of the reformist, modernist, and left-wing value system in French education. As

⁴¹⁴ Charles Maurras, *La contre-revolution spontanée; la recherché, la discussion, l'emeute, 1899-1939* (Paris: H. Lardanchet, 1943), 16.

⁴¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁴¹⁶ Maurras, *Au Signe de Flore*, 252.

successive generations of intellectuals were mentored by this left-wing system, Maurras warned, engaging outside of or in opposition to the engrained left-wing ideals would literally become inconceivable. Against this hegemony, AF intellectuals demanded equal right to the title and role of the intellectual and equal responsibility to engage in the debate over French education. They developed strategies to legitimize their alternative right-wing model, but the most effective would be to highlight the differences that existed between the Left and Right the ramifications these different visions had for intellectual life.

Differentiation of Intellectual Values: Realism and Royalism

The intellectual platform that most separated Maurras and the intellectual Right of the Action Française from the dominant intellectual model of the Republican Left was the complex set of intellectual issues that surrounded their royalism.⁴¹⁷ For Maurras and the AF, although the mantra would become “Politics First,” the original incentive to engage, as they often had to explain, had been intellectual and aesthetic. From the beginning, therefore, Maurras closely identified his political royalism with his intellectual responsibility and the needs of French intelligence. The third Congress of the AF in 1910 emphasized this connection between political platform and intellectual values in a speech which read, “These past five years have made proof of the identical cause of the French monarchy and that of French intelligence.”⁴¹⁸ Lasserre clarified this connection even further saying, “The doctrine called Action Française concerns the national politics, but it implies the usage of an intellectual discipline which has a general value, a general application.”⁴¹⁹ These general values which were expressed politically as royalism were expressed more generally as the intellectual value of Realism.

⁴¹⁷ Although many historians have considered the political nature of Maurras’ royalism, it is important here to consider the equally distinctive intellectual foundations for his political choice.

⁴¹⁸ *Action Française mensuelle*, December 15 1910.

⁴¹⁹ *Action Française mensuelle*, March 15 1911.

Realism was a fundamental intellectual value for Maurras and the AF that distinguished their worldview and concept of responsibility from that of the Left. The “intellectual discipline” that Maurras believed to guide the AF consisted of “simply taking for foundations and for guides the theory and practice of the natural and necessary relationships of things, the laws of reality.”⁴²⁰ These laws of Reality were drawn from historical experience and the observance of constants in natural relationships. Maurras’ concept of realism as a tool for intellectual engagement was known as “organizing empiricism.” It was the reorganization of ideas drawn from experience into new patterns that could address the needs of the future.⁴²¹ Rather than rely solely on theory, abstract logic, or even mathematical laws applied to society and economics, Maurras and the AF looked to historical experience to guide society toward the future. Like Barrès and Brunetière, Maurras would emphasize that the “Real” was not a universal or international concept but rather one tied to a particular time, space, and people. This meant that, unlike the intellectuals of the Left who borrowed methodologies, educational formats, and social theories from Germany, Russia, and other nations with the belief that logical ideas were universally applicable, the right-wing intellectuals of the AF looked only to the history of France for inspiration; specifically the history of pre-Revolutionary France.

According to Maurras, the intellectual’s duty to the Real obligated them to engage against the Third Republic and the ideals of democracy. Since Maurras believed that the monarchy had brought France territory, cultural glory, and international influence while the Republics had only brought social unrest, declining influence, and economic failure, he determined that monarchism alone offered a successful example for emulation. All of the components of Left Republican thought were incongruous with historical experience and therefore divorced from the reality which ruled all responsible intellectual positions. Unlike many right-wing nationalists who retained some hope for republican reform, Maurras’ anti-republicanism was expressed through his refusal of the democratic

⁴²⁰ Ibid.

⁴²¹ Charles Maurras, *Mes idées politiques* (Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1937).

principle in general. Organizing empiricism, Maurras wrote, determined the political “necessity of the monarchy and the malevolence of democracy.”⁴²² The supreme rationale for this opposition to democratism was its inability to function in the real world, beyond the realm of abstract political theory. “The defenders of democracy,” he wrote, “are the pure mystics, their opinion is only supported by a mix of dreams and subjective impulses.”⁴²³ The intellectuals of the Republic and the Left who attempted to use abstract Rationalism to defend the principles of democratic regimes were not only deceiving the public, Maurras claimed, they were abusing intelligence and betraying the responsibility of the intellectual. “They have believed to be able to make nature, history, and the facts speak in favor of the dogmas of 1789, Democracy, and the Republic,” he wrote, “Have they succeeded? No.”⁴²⁴ The right-wing intellectual, according to the model of identity developed by Maurras and the AF, engaged in opposition to the Republic and to all democratic forms. This made them, necessarily, anti-establishment, external, and oppositional intellectual critics clearly separate from the institutional intellectuals of the Left.

Maurrassian realism would also dictate a certain conception of France for the right-wing intellectual of the AF that would determine their engagement in the discussion of reforms to the history curricula. France, Maurras wrote, was not a geographic, racial, or linguistic entity like the other European nations. It was a historical product of the Kings who had created France between 987 and 1789 by establishing its traditions, borders, and historical identity.⁴²⁵ French national identity and therefore knowledge of its interests was bound to the political form of monarchism. While Republicanism was based on the fantasy of utopian equality, self governance, and anarchic individual liberties, monarchism was based on the reality, proven viable over the years, of hierarchy, authority,

⁴²² *Action Française mensuelle*, March 1911.

⁴²³ Charles Maurras, *Devant l'Allemagne éternelle; Gaulois, Germains, Latins; chronique d'une résistance* (Paris: A l'Etoile, 1937), 5.

⁴²⁴ *Action Française mensuelle*, March 1911.

⁴²⁵ Auguste Longnon, *Origines et formation de la nationalité française; éléments ethniques, unité territoriale* (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1912).

and liberty through order. Maurras and the royalists were particularly disturbed that this fantasy of democratism was the official doctrine of the monopolized university and that the youth were being deliberately divorced from the stable reality of their royal past in favor of an emphasis on the post-Revolutionary era. Maurras was incensed by Lanson's attempt to minimize all history and literature that hadn't been written in the 19th century. He was outraged by the attitude of Nouvelle Sorbonne reformer Aulard who said "it does not concern teaching the child the historical truth but teaching him to abhor all that which is not of the Revolution in our past."⁴²⁶ For the AF intellectual, France was the sum of her historical experience, specifically the experience of the monarchy. It was, therefore, the responsibility of the intellectual as educator to instruct the nation in its glorious royal past so that society would have effective examples to profit from. This would be the mission of the intellectuals who lectured for the AF Institut. Teaching history from the perspective of the failed Republic, as the reformers did, was, by contrast, a betrayal of intellectual duty.⁴²⁷

Realism would also have important implications for Maurras' approach to nationalism. The Left's entire political conception was based on what Maurras considered an unrealistic abstraction: the idea of humanity as a real political entity. Instead, in a statement reminiscent of Barrès, Maurras wrote of his intellectual peers on the nationalist and royalist Right, "We say 'real political community' because it concerns pre-existing conditions, we do not speak of humanity for example because humanity has never existed in itself and we do not know if it is able to... In the measure of the real, humanity is the nation."⁴²⁸ The Left had accused Maurras and the nationalists of betraying intelligence by submitting their work to a sentimental, emotional nationalism. In truth, Maurras wrote, the Right recognized political realities while the Left betrayed intelligence by founding their political

⁴²⁶ *Action Française mensuelle*, March 1910.

⁴²⁷ Charles Maurras, *Enquête sur la monarchie, suivie de Une campagne royaliste au Figaro et Si le coup de force est possible* (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1916), x.

⁴²⁸ Charles Maurras, *L'Ordre et le desordre; les 'idées positives' et la Revolution* (Paris: les Iles d'Or editions, 1948), 11.

ideas on abstraction. According to Maurras, humanity was too vague and broad a category for real political relationships. “International relations, whether they are political, moral, or scientific,” he wrote, “depend on the maintenance of nationalities.” Without the nation, founded in political and historical reality, serving as a vessel for the expression and preservation of humanity, humanism itself was lost. Therefore the nation needed to be the primary concern of intellectuals.⁴²⁹ This meant that the work of a responsible intellectual of the Right included defining French national identity, making cultural nationalism a priority, and protecting the university from foreign, particularly German, infiltration. In contrast with the intellectual reformers and post-war internationalists of the Left, the intellectual of the Right would see his role to be the preservation of a pure French intelligence nurtured in French and classical sources rather than the cross-pollination of intelligence through international cultural exchange.

Because Maurras saw the nation as the only real political unit, he was equally dismissive of the intellectual Left’s glorification of the individual. Individualism, according to Maurras, was a metaphysical abstraction that had no foundation in natural relationships just as humanity did not. In nature, the smallest grouping was not the individual but the family, the association. Under the unnatural Republican laws of individual autonomy and freedom, the individual was left isolated, society atomized, and the nation weakened.⁴³⁰ “The Realistic mind,” Maurras wrote, is instead “warned by history, not deformed by a false history of laws. The true guarantee of individual rights is first society and then association. In a well made society, the individual accepts the law of the species, the species does not perish by the will of the individual.”⁴³¹ While the intellectual Left might prefer what Maurras called the illusion of freedom and autonomy that came from individualism, the AF and the intellectual Right instead recognized the need for a foundation in stable reality to achieve true

⁴²⁹ Maurras, *Quand les Français*, 323.

⁴³⁰ William Curt Buthman, *The Rise of Integral Nationalism in France* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), 274.

⁴³¹ Charles Maurras, *Mes idées politiques* (Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1937).

liberty. “It is necessary to choose between devotion to the patrie or devotion to the individual,” an article in the AF read. “Intellectual France has for 120 years chosen the second and we are dying from it. It is a choice to be remade. We [the intellectuals of the AF] fulfill our duty to French intelligence.”⁴³²

Finally, Maurras claimed intellectual Realism as the justification for the Action Française’s anti-egalitarianism. “Inequality,” he wrote, “is a fact. We want it to be recognized as a vital fact outside of which no life is possible.”⁴³³ This fact, this human reality of inequality was proved by the experience of history and the observation of relationships among living things in nature. “Equality is not able to reign anywhere,” Maurras wrote, because it is an unnatural relationship between men foisted upon them by an idealistic republican regime. A powerful state like the Third Republic could provide many rights to the people, but “it is not up to it to make these rights equal when they correspond to naturally unequal situations. When the law claims such an equality, the citizens receive permanent council of anarchy.”⁴³⁴ Equality was unnatural and led to chaos, disorder, a false sense of liberty, and eventual disintegration of society. Superior life for men was always to be found in inequality, in the acceptance of one’s place in the social hierarchy and submission to the best interests of the collective instead of the will of each individual. According to Maurras, the role of the intellectual of the Right was not to democratize education or bring about a more equal society, it was to equip men with the knowledge necessary to take their place willingly in the national hierarchy and to work for the stabilization of an orderly society.

Whether it was expressed as anti-egalitarianism, anti-individualism, royalist integral nationalism, anti-republicanism, or a general application of organizing empiricism, Realism was a fundamental intellectual value for Maurras and the AF. It dramatically distinguished their intellectual

⁴³² *Action Française mensuelle*, July 1913.

⁴³³ Maurras, *L’Ordre et le desordre*, 20.

⁴³⁴ Maurras, *Mes idées politiques*, conclusion.

value system and worldview from that of the Left. And, as Maurras showed, it was essential to the distinctive model of intellectual role, responsibility, and identity on the Right.

Classicism and Traditionalism

The intellectual Right did not always agree on the foundations for French tradition or classical culture. Barrès and Maurras for example disputed the inclusion of contributions from the revolutionary era while others debated the primacy of Latin over medieval influences. Yet despite these internal disagreements, the appreciation of classicism and traditionalism was believed by intellectuals on the Right to be a defining characteristic of their thought. It was viewed as an intellectual value which separated them from the intellectuals of the Left, whom they believed to prefer German romanticism, scientific rationalism, and utilitarianism. Maurras was one of the predominant intellectual forces behind the movement to return to a classical, traditional aesthetic during the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates and the post-war 1920s.⁴³⁵ While the Left accused the Right of backward thinking, unscientific sentimentality for the past, and a desire to revert society to the Medieval Age, the Right saw its appreciation for tradition and the classics as a preservation of French cultural identity and the fundamentals of civilization necessary for any stable progress.⁴³⁶ In this way, the AF intellectuals believed they were acting as realist, responsible, and practical intellectual guides for modern society by supporting classical and traditional forms in education against the scientific modernism of the Left.

⁴³⁵ Although the issue of classicism became a public focal point during the Sorbonne debates, AF classicism was an integral part of Maurras' intellectual identity and approach to culture and politics as late as the 1950s. Buthman, *The Rise of Integral Nationalism*, 1.

⁴³⁶ It is important to recognize that Maurrassian classicism was not a neo-classicism which idealized, romanticized, and "fetishized" the past, but an appreciation and realistic assessment of the values and lessons offered by the past that could be adapted to present needs. Buthman, 10.

For Maurras and the AF, France was “the legitimate heir of the Greek and Roman world” not the Frankish “barbarians” who had settled in the land.⁴³⁷ Germanic ideas, particularly the scientific approaches, were therefore foreign and even corrosive to the French mind. Classicism and the traditional French literary canon, which drew inspiration from the literature and law of the Greeks and Romans, were, on the other hand, a means to preserve French national identity, intelligence, and culture. The reformist intellectuals’ determination to “reform” the university by replacing the French and classical elements with German ones implied a distaste for French intelligence incompatible with being its intellectual leaders. It was when, Maurras wrote, “the French were taught to despise themselves, when they no longer love themselves, when they can no longer suffer that which is made by their own hand or their ancestors” that they delivered themselves to their enemies.⁴³⁸ The campaign by Pierre Lasserre in *Action Française* during the years 1908-1912⁴³⁹ best represents this Maurrassian defense of classicism and critique of the intellectual Left who, they believed, wanted to eradicate it. Lasserre claimed the Republic, the “government of Dreyfus...had need for its own conservation of violating the tradition of the intellectual culture in our nation, of making a generation of minds without ideas, without method, without taste, minds without patrie, without civilization, and without defense.”⁴⁴⁰ It was for this anti-French reason that the humanities and classics had been chased from the university and secondary schools, Lasserre wrote, and substituted with the foreign and sterile products of erudition.⁴⁴¹ This failure by the Republic and the Left to preserve the nation’s cultural and intellectual heritage was recognized in not only the importation of German scientific methods, erudition, and utilitarian courses by the Nouvelle Sorbonne reformers but also in the general

⁴³⁷ Maurras, *Mes idées politiques*, 79.

⁴³⁸ Maurras, *Quand les Français*, viii.

⁴³⁹ Lasserre was a former professor of the Sorbonne, a current professor at the Institut d’AF, and the editor during these years of the monthly *Action Française*.

⁴⁴⁰ *Action Française mensuelle*, April 1911.

⁴⁴¹ *Ibid.*, August 1911.

fascination among the intellectual Left with the Germanic philosophies of Kantism, socialism, pantheism, and Romanticism.⁴⁴²

The AF intellectual's defense of Classicism against the scientific modernism of the Left was not simply a debate over pedagogical method or German influence. It was the cornerstone of a vital debate over "the definition and object of public education" and, by correlation, over the definition and role of the intellectual and educator. The reformers and the AF traditionalists conceived of the goal of French education and the responsibility of the university completely differently and, therefore, "contradicted one another at their very foundation on the sort of intellectual formation suitable for new French generations."⁴⁴³ An education in classical languages and history was extremely impractical for the French masses and served only to identify those students who would become men of letters or savants. It provided excellent material for advanced instruction in style, taste, and individual interpretation but not in the basic skills of computation, compilation, and repetition. Articles in the *Action Française* were particularly adamant that scientific and utilitarian education were only for vulgar minds who appreciated quantity over quality and the accumulation of erudition over a true education in civilization, culture, and morality. The intellectual of the Left saw his role to be the democratization and leveling of the educational system so that all students received an equal education that would prove utilitarian in the modern market society. The intellectual Right sought to provide an education in classics and traditional French humanities so that they could carry out their role of identifying and nurturing the elite who would be the intellectual leaders of a hierarchically ordered society.

⁴⁴² Ibid.

⁴⁴³ Ibid., November 1911.

Patriotism and Nationalism

Maurras and the Action Française also considered the intellectuals of the extreme Right to be the representatives of all that was nationalist and patriotic, claiming at one point “all that is national is ours.” They perceived their nationalism to be a characteristic of their intellectual identity that distinguished them from the anti-patriotic, internationalist Left and that clearly designated them as the more appropriate intellectual guides for France. The idea of “intellectual patriotism” that rejected not only German intellectual annexation but also “foreign” Protestant and Jewish contributions was a distinctive component of Maurrassian right-wing intellectual identity that would separate it clearly from the model of the Left.

Maurras identified patriotism as a value of the intellectual Right, and particularly the Action Française, while denying its appreciation among the intellectual Left. He wrote that the Left sacrificed the “primordial interests...of life in this nation” to the German inspired value of universalism. The Left was, he continued, well guarded at its very intellectual foundation from the only Germanic value worth emulating, “the passion of intellectual patriotism.”⁴⁴⁴ In an article on anti-patriotism and the Republic, AF writer Montesquiou clarified this denial. The AF, he wrote, followed the principle of the Ligue de la Patrie in conceiving of all questions in their relation to the national interest. There was, in contrast, a “group of citizens to which this point of view seems forbidden—those who call themselves true “republicans.” What distinguished the thinkers of the AF from those of the Republic, he concluded, was that the AF wanted the health of the patrie while the republican only wanted the health of the republican form and the socialist only the health of international socialism. “With these others,” he wrote of the socialist Left and Republican intellectuals, “we are not able to be understood since we do not want the same things.”⁴⁴⁵ Clearly the intellectuals of the AF

⁴⁴⁴ Maurras, *Quand les Français*, xviii.

⁴⁴⁵ *Action Française mensuelle*, 1910.

Right saw an abyss between their own values and visions as intellectuals and those of the Republican and Left intellectuals.

Maurras found intellectual patriotism particularly lacking “in the university milieu” where he claimed pacifists, Jews, and socialists taught about nations in the abstract and as a family of equals. For example, Durkheim claimed to teach patriotism but his patriotism was celebrating a “new type of patrie in a formation which envelops our patrie: the European or human patrie.”⁴⁴⁶ Such “conception of patriotism was objectively and practically the equivalent of anti-patriotism itself” one AF article declared. And the willingness to teach the youth internationalism disguised as patriotism was, according to the intellectual Right, a betrayal of intellectual duty that merited that “one rap his knuckles in order to teach him his responsibilities.”⁴⁴⁷ Equally untenable in the university was the teaching by reformist and socialist historians that the French nation had been born in 1789 with the Revolution and the Rights of Man. This, Maurras wrote, was a misconception of the nation as a civic idea, a contract made by individuals of their own will. This, he continued, was not the AF understanding of the patrie. Right-wing intellectuals understood the patrie as a natural, historical society constructed by the kings and based on the hereditary tradition transmitted over generations. It was “the earth and the dead,” as Barrès had written, plus a body of tradition and political experience.⁴⁴⁸ The Left’s incompatible conception of the nation and patriotism, according to Maurras, separated its intellectual vision for France from that of the Right and clearly disqualified it.

Maurras also believed that the Left, in its desire to turn the theory of internationalism into a reality, had permitted the “intellectual annexation” of France by Germany. Protestant ideas of individualism, Marxist theories of social economics, and scientific reforms to education were all German imports that made France more sympathetic and open to her dangerous neighbor. Maurras

⁴⁴⁶ *Action Française mensuelle*, December 1912.

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁸ Maurras, *Mes idées politiques*, 252.

saw a division in concepts of intellectual responsibility between the Right and Left in the opposing attitudes that the two camps took toward this annexation. While the Left glorified this annexation and perpetuated it through the reforms to the Sorbonne,⁴⁴⁹ the intellectual Right combated it with the traditional French arsenal of classicism and traditionalism.⁴⁵⁰ The republican university and the socialist professors continued to teach, until the outbreak of war in 1914, that “Germany is the second patrie of all thinking men.”⁴⁵¹ Even the war would not cure these reformers like Croiset, Maurras wrote, “insane with the Germanic esprit” who would continue their internationalism after 1919.⁴⁵² In contrast, the intellectual of the Right saw himself as a spokesman for France, not a citizen of the world or an intellectual citizen of Germany. They would reject the “Two Germanies theory” and would wholeheartedly support intellectual mobilization against German influence both before and after the war. It was the duty of the maurrassian intellectuals to prevent further annexation of France.⁴⁵³

Finally, Maurras and the Action Française incorporated the idea of the “internationalism of the interior” into their conception of intellectual values and responsibility. This rejection of Jews, Protestants, masons, and “metics,” as well as socialists as elements foreign to the French national identity clearly divided the Maurrassian Right from the intellectuals of the Republic and the Left who instead tended to embrace thinkers from these groups and their ideas. Maurras’ anti-Semitism was

⁴⁴⁹ Charles Maurras, *Devant l’Allemagne éternelle; Gaulois, Germains, Latins; chronique d’une résistance* (Paris: A l’Etoile, 1937), 293.

⁴⁵⁰ Maurras, in a chapter entitled “The Intellectual Annexation of 1895,” blamed the translation of Fichte’s *Discourses to the German People* for much of the fascination with German ideas in French intellectual circles. Yet he found many other sources of German cultural infiltration before this year. German Protestantism had supplied many of the intellectual currents for the French Revolution as had Kantian and Rousseauian philosophies. Therefore any philosophy or morality based on the ideas of 1789 was inherently corrupted. Charles Maurras, *Reflexions sur l’ordre en France, 1916-1917* (Paris: Au Pigeonnier, 1927), 21.

⁴⁵¹ Charles Maurras, *Conditions de la Victory*, vol. 1 *La France se sauve elle-meme; juillet à mi-novembre 1914* (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1916), 360.

⁴⁵² *Ibid.*, 410.

⁴⁵³ *Action Française mensuelle*, February 1908.

similar in many ways to Barrès' concept of *enracinement* but intentionally opposed to the Germanic idea of racial or biological anti-Semitism. There were, Maurras claimed, no French races but rather a French national history, tradition, and culture which was imbibed through family life and attachment to the land. Jews, having no homeland, were identified as always uprooted and never connected in this way to the French essence. Because they had no strong affiliation with the French patrie over any other country despite years of attempted assimilation, they were always a hidden threat to French unity. Maurras therefore blamed all those areas of intellectual or political life which he deemed foreign or corrupt on the influence of the Jews. He particularly embraced the stereotype of the wealthy capitalist Jew who controlled the French media and was supportive of the socialist presses.⁴⁵⁴

The Protestant community was equally targeted as a dominant force in the intellectual world and the university. "The Protestant community," he wrote, "who makes the laws for us in the university, the administration, and the bookstore ought to be warned that it is without rights on us" since it is outside the national body.⁴⁵⁵ Maurras was not as concerned about the religious doctrine of Protestantism as the fact that Protestantism was a Germanic product, the inspiration for egalitarianism, individualism, and revolutionary thought, and a source of social schism within the French nation. French identity, as a historical construct, was linked to both monarchism and Catholicism since it was from these traditional institutions that France had achieved its cultural tradition, its international force and prestige, and its national cohesiveness. Protestantism and the many Protestant thinkers of the intellectual Left were therefore deemed anti-French and an international enemy on the interior.

This concept of international enemies on the interior who were unable or unwilling to work for the best interests of the patrie and instead promoted ideals which destroyed French unity clearly divided Maurras and the AF intellectuals from those on the Left. While the Left could list an overwhelming number of socialist, Jewish, and Protestant intellectuals in its ranks, the AF Right was

⁴⁵⁴ Maurras, *L'Avenir de l'intelligence*, 84.

⁴⁵⁵ Maurras, *Idées royalists*, 18.

hard pressed to counter with even one who had not converted or become a syndicalist. To this separation was added Maurras' preoccupation with the dangers of intellectual annexation by Germany, which the Left had embraced in the Nouvelle Sorbonne, and the need for intellectual patriotism, from which he excluded the internationalist Left. Integral Nationalism was therefore an intellectual value that Maurras found to clearly divide the intellectual Left and Right and to create two different concepts of the responsible engaged intellectual. Like the values of Realism and Classicism, its distinctive qualities would be reinforced by the intellectual communities, networks, and behaviors created around the AF.

Maurras and the Right-wing Intellectual Model

Maurras and the intellectuals of the Action Francaise Right fiercely resented the monopoly that the reformers and the government exercised over the influence of the university and over the intellectual authority it granted. Maurras' desire to legitimize himself and his royalist program as a viable intellectual alternative led him to adopt a distinctly right-wing mentality of engagement. Before engaging against the reforms or later against the internationalism of the inter-war years, Maurras and the monarchists believed it was first necessary to develop strategies and discourses of legitimization and construct an impressive structure of supporting intellectual communities like the Institut and the revue *Action Française*. Although he would claim to be speaking from the position of the new majority, Maurras would continue to portray himself and his engagement as excluded, marginalized, and repressed by the official power of the regime and its left-wing intelligentsia. Although they resented the intellectuals of the Left, the AF did not reject the title, role or responsibility to engage and simply sought to redefine the identity of the intellectual and the concept of engagement according to their own right-wing value system, communities, and experiences. Maurras would begin this process of differentiation and redefinition by intentionally separating his own intellectual values and worldviews from those of the Left. According to Maurras, the true intellectual advocated a Realism that was incompatible with democratic republicanism, international

humanism, individualism, and egalitarianism. It dictated that the intellectual adopt political monarchism, teach cultural nationalism, and serve as the external, anti-establishment opposition of the regime. The intellectual of the Right valued a classical and traditional education over a modern, scientifically based one and sought to educate the elite of society in matters of taste and style rather than the masses in utilitarian basics. Right-wing intellectuals, according to the model dictated by Maurras, were defenders of the national heritage against the infusion of foreign ideas from both external and internal sources. Maurras and the AF intellectuals felt excluded from the places of influence and power in the university and resented the resulting marginalization of their intellectual influence. They attempted to redefine intellectual identity according to their own distinctly right-wing values and views since they truly felt that they were “not able to be understood” by their intellectual opponents on the Left. In this effort to segregate and redefine intellectual identity, they would be aided by the creation of distinctly right-wing intellectual communities and networks that fostered a sense of collective identity.

CHAPTER 8

THE WORLD OF THE TRADITIONALIST RIGHT: COMMUNITIES, NETWORKS, AND THE INTELLECTUAL EXPERIENCE

During the decade 1910-1920, the traditionalists and nationalists of the extreme Right would build upon and expand the communities, networks, and social spaces created for right-wing intellectuals during the Dreyfus Affair. The Nouvelle Sorbonne reforms caused the intellectuals of the Right to feel themselves intentionally excluded and marginalized by the Left in the university system. Because they no longer found community, professional networks, or even opportunities to mentor the youth in the university space, the Right focused much of its attention on creating new spaces, through ligues, manifests, revues, and the outlets of the AF that could replace this lost community. The increasingly segregated and isolated nature of these right-wing alternative communities provided the intellectuals of the Right with a sense of collective identity and shared purpose. They reinforced and radicalized individual efforts to engage and emphasized certain daily experiences of intellectual life that would further separate the right-wing intellectual's understanding of what it meant to be an intellectual from that of the Left.

As they had been during the Dreyfus Affair, Ligues remained a popular method of grouping like-minded supporters and focusing engagement for both the Left and Right. The Nouvelle Sorbonne debates saw the creation of oppositional ligues whose members either agreed on the need to protect classics and the humanities from German inspired reforms, like the Amis du Latin, or on the necessity of defending university reforms designed to bring scientific progress. On the side of the right-wing Ligue pour la Culture Française were found over thirty-six conservative academicians in addition to the right-wing engages Massis, de Tarde, Maurras, and right-wing activists Daudet, Drumont, and

Rochefort, but few *universitaires*.⁴⁵⁶ The Ligue released two manifests of its collective goals for education and its resentment of the Sorbonne reforms, yet it was rather vague in its plan for addressing these concerns and would be short lived. Although Massis recalled his invitation to join this Ligue as a turning point in his career, since it indicated recognition of his influence by the intellectuals of his camp, this Ligue could not claim the impact on intellectual collective identity that its partner in the Nouvelle Sorbonne crusade, the Ligue de l'Action Française, did.

The AF was an extensive and multifaceted organization, even in the early years of the century, including two powerful journals, associated presses, a publishing house, and an influential network of *cercles*, youth groups, writers, political candidates, and activists. Yet, in 1905, its first method of grouping large numbers of adherents outside the collaborators of its small monthly revue was to form a Ligue. The Ligue was described by Maurras as the creation of a handful of men who wanted to create, in the larger body of followers and supporters, “a national sense, a national esprit...in this veritable intellectual desert.”⁴⁵⁷ The Ligue was therefore recognized as a powerful means of creating an intellectual environment, a community of like-minded peers, which would be favorable to the ideas and visions of the emergent Action Française. The ligue had its own *siege*, its own leadership including Vaugois as president and Maurras as Vice President, and its own mission statement and pledge of support. These Ligue statements and written pledges publicized the values of royalism, nationalism, anti-republicanism, traditionalism, Catholicism, and anti-Semitism that would become identifying traits of the collective AF intellectual milieu.⁴⁵⁸

The Action Française ligue would become the center of an extensive network on the intellectual Right spreading its influence beyond the limited royalist circle to the larger nationalist and traditionalist community. It would remain, however, closed and unwelcoming to the reformist and

⁴⁵⁶ Toda, *Henri Massis*, 51.

⁴⁵⁷ Maurras, *Devant l'Allemagne éternelle*, 99.

⁴⁵⁸ AN F7 12863

internationalist intellectuals of the Left making it a segregated and polarized socio-professional network. Under its auspices, a collection of smaller ligues were created that were designed to help group and support the different types of adherents, both intellectual and non-intellectual, in the growing AF. These included the female organizations Dames de l'Action Française and the Jeunes Filles Royalistes, and the student organizations the militant Camelots du Roi and the Étudiants d'AF. There were also regional sections of the AF that formed their own local leadership, created their own regional journals, and nominated local leaders for the AF political campaigns. Other organizations were designed specifically as communities for right-wing intellectuals. The Cercle Fustel de Coulanges grouped those who advocated the teaching of nationalist history and united them through a journal and demonstrations on the anniversary of Fustel's birth.⁴⁵⁹ The Cercle Proudhon, created in 1911, attempted a short lived collaboration with Sorel's syndicalists and united intellectuals interested in economic reform.⁴⁶⁰ Each of these smaller groups retained an affiliation with the AF while working to create smaller, AF friendly communities around its particular membership demographic. The network of support created by all of these interconnected sub-ligues provided a veritable intellectual and social world on the royalist Right where any concern from youth affairs to economic questions could be considered outside the confines of Left and Republican thought.

The imagined communities created by manifests, and particularly on the Right, the enquête, were valuable for creating collective identity and shared purpose on the Right among intellectuals who might never share the same physical spaces. They were also a means to identify by name those intellectuals who identified with the collective community of the intellectual Right rather than the intellectual Left. The *Enquête sur le monarchie* was first published in the royalist *Gazette de France* in 1900.⁴⁶¹ This series of questions on the viability of the monarchy and the decadence of the republic

⁴⁵⁹ Maurras, *Devant l'Allemagne éternelle*, 99.

⁴⁶⁰ AN F7 12863

⁴⁶¹ It was augmented and revised eight times between 1900 and 1916 due to its popularity and influence on the Right.

was addressed to “philosophers and savants” who had “considered the French nationalist problem.”⁴⁶²

Contributors to the enquete included intellectuals who were both supporters and opponents of monarchism but all of whom were “of the Right.” Letters by Barrès, Vaugeois, Lucien Moreau, Henry Bordeaux, Bainville, Montesquiou, Louis Dimier, and Sully Prudhomme provided the perception of an imagined intellectual community of shared values and aims which crossed generational and geographic barriers in support for a revival of nationalism. An important aspect of this enquête by Maurras was also the legitimacy that such powerful names in the world of letters provided for the right-wing venture. Even the reservations about monarchism that Barrès expressed could not outweigh the support that his contribution to the work provided the AF and the intellectual Right.

The 1912 enquête by Agathon on the *Jeunes gens d'aujourd'hui* did not include the names of the young men who had supposedly contributed these reflections on their intellectual generation but its very ambiguity provided a certain sense of imagined community as well. By not including a list of names, Agathon was able to imply that the opinions he included in the work were those of all the French youth rather than simply his own vision. Such implied universality granted the right-wing intellectual model that Agathon was developing in these pages enormous legitimacy among the readers. In the post-war manifest that Massis created for Figaro, “Pour un parti de l’intelligence,” the same efforts at legitimization reappeared, although the fifty-four supporters this time included their signatures. Here the intellectuals of the right who sent in their signatures gave the appearance of an intellectual community brought together by their outrage. The manifest was not only a statement of shared values but a call for collective engagement and a tangible work of reconstruction. Although Massis clarified this was not a party in the normal political sense, it was a community of like-minded intellectuals who were “taking the part of intelligence” by defending their shared values and worldviews. And once again, the community was exclusively right-wing in nature. These enquêtes

⁴⁶² *Enquête sur la monarchie.*

and manifests therefore brought together a group of intellectuals of the Right, who were often separated geographically, creating a legitimate community of thought.

Perhaps the most important intellectual communities on the Right, and the most segregated, were those that were built around the revue. The intellectuals of the Right increasingly tended toward journalistic and literary professions rather than university professorships or state functions. Often, when they did take this academic path, they felt excluded by the republican and socialist hegemony there. Independent revues, therefore, became one of their most powerful tools for the collective expression of their oppositional values.⁴⁶³ The revue was also a place to make professional connections with other writers and even with publishers since the revue either utilized a publisher who was sympathetic to its values or created a press of its own. For example, *Action Française* writers were often published by its own press the Nouvelle Librairie Nationale or by sympathetic presses like Fayard and Flammarion.⁴⁶⁴ The importance of the revue to the intellectual Right was perhaps best seen in the *Action Française*. The movement began with the little semi-monthly, gray-covered revue that was published from 1899-1908. However, Maurras and the team recognized that in order to expand the influence and legitimacy of their movement they would need access to a daily journal. After a brief attempt to buy *La Libre Parole*, the team began its daily *Action Française* in Spring 1908 while retaining the monthly revue. These revues were the nucleus of its operation, the means of propaganda for its activities and its ideas, and the center of the intellectual and social community that it was beginning to build.

⁴⁶³ There were a large number of right-wing intellectual revues during the period 1910-1920 but those that both Maurras and Massis mentioned as revues forming a complementary network included *La Libre Parole*, *L'Intransigeant*, *Gazette de France*, *Soleil*, *Gil Blas*, *Gaulois*, *L'éclair*, *L'Autorite*, *L'Accord social*, and *La Correspondance nationale*. *Action Française menseulle*, 1908. Each of these papers occasionally squabbled with the dominant Right-wing revues *Action Française* and *Revue Universelle*, and were occasionally the target of these larger revues because of their competition for similar readers, but the general sense of a shared mission remained. AN F7 12842-12844. These right-wing revues often shared publishers and contributors and even publicized the works, activities, and special events organized by the other journals.

⁴⁶⁴ AN F7 12863

Journal and revue teams and offices provided a space for fraternization among contributors and often daily exposure to like-minded writers. These teams often developed into, or out of, strong personal friendships whose ties extended beyond the workplace. It was not uncommon for teams to gather at nearby cafes or restaurants to continue discussion of an issue or even an intellectual debate that had begun in the offices. AF journalists like Leon Daudet recalled meetings after hours in the home of Maurras where writers would sit around a table “writing a tract or poster while the secretary Louis Gonnet took notes and led the debate on useful documents.”⁴⁶⁵ It was here, he wrote, that he had the chance to meet and share ideas with Montesquiou, Bainville, Moreau, Dimier, Pujo, Lasserre and others who were on the directing committee of the *Action Française*. “All these men,” Daudet marveled, “came from different places including the university, the military, and the literary worlds, but all agreed and came together around the thought of Maurras.”⁴⁶⁶ A shared sense of intellectual purpose and values combined with the sociability provided by such revue team interactions yielded, as Daudet testified, a new sense of intellectual unity, community, and collective identity as Maurrassian intellectuals.

Maurras himself spoke of the personal connection that had initiated the revue and which continued to extend to the friends who were brought into write for it as it expanded. He wrote in his *Au Signe de Flore* of the early meeting of friends Vaugeois, Pujo, Bainville, and Moreau and the determination that each shared to construct an intellectual movement to counter Republican and Left dominance. He had met Moreau at the *Revue encyclopedique* where the two of them had felt isolated by the Dreyfusards and frustrated that their opinions were ignored. He had then met Syveton through a school friend and had from there been introduced to others like Dausset and Vaugeois.⁴⁶⁷ This network of friends would continue, from that point on, to bring in writers and thinkers from an ever

⁴⁶⁵ Leon Daudet, *Souvenirs litteraires* (Paris: Grasset, 1968), 286.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁷ Maurras, *Au Signe de Flore*, 84.

expanding web of personal and professional connections. Early meetings were held in committee members' homes, in Café Flore, or in café Voltaire where official journal business was seconded only by intellectual and political discussions akin to a salon which drew crowds of students and aspiring writers. It was in this way, Maurras wrote, that the AF had "composed in our nation a veritable circle of ardent intellectual friendships."⁴⁶⁸ The network created by these socio-professional relationships remained a right-wing, if not always monarchist, community that left-wing intellectuals had no interest in joining.

The post-war revue team of *Revue Universelle*, directed by Bainville and Massis, would experience the same sort of professional networking, team camaraderie, and collective identity. Massis recalled fondly, for example, starting the *Revue Universelle* in 1920 with Jacques Bainville. They "shared a common office...where they met each Monday" and where Massis wrote he had the "marvelous privilege of working in the presence of Bainville for sixteen years."⁴⁶⁹ Here at the *RU*, was created "a haven for conservative-nationalist, traditionalist, and reactionary writers" where ideas could be expressed freely without repression, friendships formed, and mentoring offered.⁴⁷⁰ In particular, the *RU* opened itself to the emerging names of the Jeune droite and the non-conformist circles of the inter-war years as a sort of training ground. Here writers like Maulnier, Benjamin, and Massis' particular protégée, Robert Brasillach were introduced to nationalist, anti-international, anti-communist, and occasionally anti-Semitic journalism.⁴⁷¹

Massis and Bainville did not fail to recognize the influence that their revue would have on the effort of intellectual community building and mentoring on the Right. In their first issue where they outlined their program, they extolled these benefits writing "The moment is come to realize the idea

⁴⁶⁸ *La Politique de Charles Maurras, 1926-1927* (Versailles : Bibliothèque des œuvres politiques, 1928), 172.

⁴⁶⁹ Toda, *Henri Massis*, 198.

⁴⁷⁰ Edward R. Tannenbaum, *The Action française; die-hard reactionaries in twentieth-century France* (New York: Wiley, 1962), 59.

⁴⁷¹ Sirinelli, *Histoire des Droites*, 180.

which rallied the signers of the manifesto [Pour un parti de l'intelligence] by giving to writers of the intellectual and national renaissance the means to put these principles to work. This method is furnished by a general revue...this organ will federate all the intellectual elements which on all the points of the globe are devoted to safeguarding civilization."⁴⁷² The "destiny" of the Revue, they continued, was to spread relationships between groups devoted to the cause of the mind which too often ignored one another. Here, "French patriots," could enter into contact with one another, unite, and realize their alliance. In coming together they would "know themselves and each other better" and "take consciousness of their force" in order to increase the "effectiveness of their action."⁴⁷³ Only, they concluded, when "all those who think the same way come together and collaborate" would the "just ideas" they shared triumph. It was this aim of intellectual community and fraternity, of shared purpose, of effective engagement, and of a united front against the "forces of intellectual dissolution" on the Left that helped build these right-wing intellectual communities and contributed to a distinctive collective identity on the Right.

Whether they were uniting in *ligues*, organizations and *cercles*, manifests and enquetes, or revue teams, the intellectuals of the extreme Right sought to form communities and socio-professional networks, separate from those of the dominant Left, where their own, right-wing values and engagements could be nurtured. Association with these larger communities led the intellectuals of the Right to identify themselves as part of a greater collectivity separate from the Left and marked them as "other" in the eyes of the Left. But segregated spaces and networks were not the only influence on right-wing collective identity. Exclusion from the communities of the Center and Left and segregation in exclusively right-wing communities tended to both highlight existing differences in the daily experience of intellectual life and create new ones.

⁴⁷² "Notre Programme," *Revue universelle*, April 1 1920.

⁴⁷³ *Ibid.*

The Right-Wing Intellectual Experience

The reformist *universitaire* and the traditionalist litterateur and journalist not only formed communities in different spaces and networks with different ties, they also experienced the daily practice of being an intellectual differently. This different experience of daily intellectual life and practice was in part a result of their different relationships to the important French institutions of the Government, the Church, and the University.

The pre-war Sorbonne debates and even, to some extent the post-war debates over intellectual internationalism, displayed the abyss in the Right and Left wing intellectuals relationship with the State. In contrast to the Republican and left-wing intellectuals' symbiotic relationship to the Third Regime and the ideals of democratic republicanism, the intellectual of the Right would experience intellectual life as an outsider and opponent of this regime. Maurras would explain his very different conception of the only true relationship between the intellectual and the State in the first line of one of his chronicle of right-wing intellectual experience. "This book," the line read, "is a simple chronicle of our moral and mental resistance [to the State] before the war of 1914."⁴⁷⁴ The intellectual of the Right had already felt excluded, repressed, and even persecuted by the dominant intellectual powers of the Republic and their socialist allies during the Affair. The changing nature of the university would make them feel their values were excluded and marginalized in one of the most important institutions of the Republic. A speech for the youth of the Latin Quarter in 1913 lamented this obstacle to AF *universitaires* saying, "our [AF] *universitaires* do not occupy the official posts but on the contrary have been hunted down and excluded from it by the republican government."⁴⁷⁵ The engagement of the intellectual of the Right would therefore be a force of opposition and resistance to what Maurras called the "official world" of the Center and Left. For years, Maurras wrote, he and the AF had carried out this "reaction, always private, always exterior and hostile to the official world,

⁴⁷⁴ Maurras, *Devant l'Allemagne éternelle*, 1.

⁴⁷⁵ AN F7 12863

treated by this official world as an enemy.” Being an intellectual of the Right, according to the Maurrassian model, meant being a “reactionary” whose experience of engagement was one of opposition, repression, and external critique.⁴⁷⁶

The Right’s oppositional relationship to the Republic would be related to its more sympathetic relationship to the Catholic Church. Traditionalists of the Right tended to appreciate the order, stability, social morality, and historical tradition of the Church. It was the Right that opposed the regime’s separation of Church and State and defended the right of parents to send their children to religious schools instead of the secular public schools of the State. The Catholic Church, however, found its staunchest allies in the intellectual milieu in the Action Française and Charles Maurras.⁴⁷⁷ The royalists believed the Church was an important source of French national identity, social tradition, public order, and education. The AF would take the lead in defending both catholic *universitaires* and instruction in religious topics. The Thalamas affair was their most emblematic engagement in favor of religious instruction. In 1908, AF intellectuals and students protested the presence at the Sorbonne of lycée professor Thalamas who had suggested in his course that Joan of Arc’s mission was not divinely inspired.⁴⁷⁸ In contrast with the intellectuals of the Left who believed being an intellectual meant separating one’s irrational faith from intellectual life, the intellectuals of the Right found inspiration for their intellectual life and engagement in the tradition, order, history, and faith of the Church and its educators.

The most important distinction in intellectual experience during the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates and immediate postwar years would be based on the very different relationships that the intellectuals of the Right and Left had to the university system. The university was dominated by the Republican and left-wing reformers during the years 1910-1920 and was believed to be a hostile

⁴⁷⁶ Maurras, *Devant l’Allemagne éternelle*, 294.

⁴⁷⁷ At least until the 1926 feud with the papacy that resulted in the censoring of the AF and the placement of AF writers on the Index.

⁴⁷⁸ *Action Française mensuelle*, April 15 1909.

environment by the few intellectuals of the Right who took this professional path. Right-wing intellectuals increasingly found their ideas, their courses, their texts, and even their positions excluded from the new Sorbonne and the mentoring possibilities of the classroom. Those intellectuals of the Right who engaged most effectively in the debates were those like Massis and Maurras who were not confined by the university setting but rather had taken the path of independent men of letters. Even former professors like Lasserre broke from the confines of the Republican university in order to publish their ideas in journals like the *Action Française* and later in books published by the AF firm. This professional tendency toward the life of the journalist and litterateur dramatically altered the intellectual practices of the Right from those of the *universitaire* Left. It provided a different professional focus, and most importantly for this time period and series of debates, a different strategy of mentorship.

Men of letters like Maurras and Massis had a different daily experience of intellectual engagement because their professional focus was on the contribution to and often the direction of a revue instead of classroom lecturing and research. Like Brunetiere, Maurras had begun his journalistic and literary career without attending the university and had built a reputation and network of journal columns for himself at an early age. He was therefore well prepared by the turn of the century to launch his own revue and eventually to write daily articles for the journal while continuing to juggle the responsibilities of the AF movement. Massis had begun contributing to influential journals like *Figaro* and *L'Echo de Paris* while still in school and by age twenty-six had already taken over direction or editorship of three respected literary revues.⁴⁷⁹ Their professional focus was on journalism and literary activity and so their primary experience of political engagement and influence was, at least initially, through this medium. Although the Republicans and the Left made use of journalism for their defense of reform and later for their defense of internationalism, even these outlets were often linked to their primary life and focus as *universitaires*. The journals that they

⁴⁷⁹ Toda, *Henri Massis*, 41.

dominated were most often pedagogical journals,⁴⁸⁰ and their larger works were often written for use as university texts. The majority of the reformists' engagement was related in some way to the university, therefore, while that of the Right was influenced more by the world of journalism and literature.

These different professional trajectories also led to different practices of mentorship between the Left and Right. While the Left enjoyed the benefit of the automatic prestige attached to the University and the easy access to the minds of the youth, the Right had to be more strategic and more focused on gaining student followers. Massis has been recognized by many of the non-conformist and fascist sympathizing intellectuals of the inter-war years as one of their most valuable mentors. His mentorship was not offered through the classroom but rather through personal relationships made with individual students one at a time. Brasillach recalled walking with Massis in the avenues around the ENS and speaking of political matters in their student *turnes* or at the Deux Magots café instead of attending the popular socialist circle of Lucien Herr. Both he and Maulnier recalled recognizing Massis as a voice of the disaffected youth of their own generation, but who could offer guidance. “Massis found himself among us, or us around him,” Maulnier wrote, “we considered him naturally as a guide since he knew that which we had to do.”⁴⁸¹ Brasillach and Maulnier would join other right-wing youth in collaborating in the small revues that Massis had created, such as *1933*, as training revues for emerging right-wing talent. Massis would introduce those who were successful in these preparatory journals to the larger organs like the *AF* and *RU* or help critique their literary works and introduce them to publishers. Massis was therefore as dedicated as any professor to the students he had taken under his wing. He simply found different ways to ingratiate himself with the youth and to offer them guidance and professional support.

⁴⁸⁰ One striking example to this rule would be the rising power of the *Nouvelle Revue Française* which would become an important outlet for left-wing engagement during the interwar years.

⁴⁸¹ Henri Massis, *Au long d'une vie* (Paris: Plon, 1967), 12.

The influence of Massis was remarkable considering he did not have a classroom of students at his disposal. Yet it cannot compare with the machinery of youth mentorship and propaganda which was the Action Française. The AF had connected with the youth of the Latin Quarter at the start of the century and worked constantly to retain and expand its influence over their thought and activity. Various strategies were implemented ranging from the smaller, intellectually focused student journals like *L'étudiant français* to the massive youth movements like the Camelots du roi and the Étudiants d'AF. These youth organizations were not small affairs of individual mentoring but rather massive bodies of students with their own leadership, meetings, and forms of engagement. The youth were not always interested in the finer points of right-wing doctrine but the AF goal was to exert influence over the political mobilization of the mass body of the youth. This was accomplished by organizing events for hundreds of AF students like Banquets de la Classe for all the AF youth before the start of the school year where speakers reminded the youth of the left-wing corruption of their schools,⁴⁸² annual processions to the statue of Joan of Arc,⁴⁸³ Camelots fetes with speeches, music, and political rallies, and excursions to property in Neuilly for sporting events.⁴⁸⁴ In return, the youth were called upon to engage themselves in the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates by provoking street demonstrations against Thalamas and disrupting reformists' lectures.⁴⁸⁵

Perhaps the most significant testimony to the efforts of the AF to mentor the next generation of intellectuals in right-wing identity was the creation in 1906 of the Institut d'Action Française. This Institut had been devised by AF leaders at one of their fortnightly dinners at the Boeuf à la Mode where discussion had focused on efforts to mentor the student population in the ideas of the AF

⁴⁸² Henri Vaugeois, *Notre pays; figures de France, voyages d'Action française, le temps de la guerre* (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1916).

⁴⁸³ *Action Française mensuelle*, 1914.

⁴⁸⁴ AN F7 12864

⁴⁸⁵ Throughout the AF's existence they served as bodyguards for Maurras, street militants against the communist youth, and the most vocal supporters of AF rallies and speeches. AN F7 15983/2

outside the confines of the republican and socialist University.⁴⁸⁶ The general purpose of the Institut was described at its tenth anniversary as “the intellectual reform of our nation misled fifty years ago by the false principles of the Revolution.” The mission of its professors was “to carry to the French nation all the general light, all the clarification of principles of which these men dispose who have for the past fifteen years oriented all their reflections, consecrated all their studies, each in his own sphere, to the restoration of the intelligence of the patrie.”⁴⁸⁷ The Institut was originally organized around four chairs named for figures admired by the AF like Comte and Barrès with professors such as Maurras, Montesquieu, Dimier, and Moreau providing a series of seven to ten lectures.⁴⁸⁸ It welcomed the general public as well as students and so countered the influence of the already faltering left-wing universities populaires as well as the Sorbonne. It also admitted left-wing students whom Vaugeois claimed were not inherently incapable of coming to integral nationalism, just less prepared than their right-wing peers who had already been “initiated to the royalist political truth which we explain.”⁴⁸⁹ The Institut was therefore a strategically designed, broad scale counter-influence to the mentoring provided by the University. Even though they shared the basic practice of lecturing, the intellectuals of the Right who participated in the Institut had a very different mentoring experience from the *universitaires* of the Left.

The intellectual of the Right therefore could be said to have experienced intellectual life differently than his right-wing peers and therefore to have conceived of his role, responsibility, and intellectual activity differently. His alternative values and views led to different relationships to the Republican government and the Church, to the University and world of journalism, and most importantly to the youth he struggled to mentor. His practices and strategies for engagement, though

⁴⁸⁶ Weber, *Action Française*, 39.

⁴⁸⁷ AN F7 12863

⁴⁸⁸ Charles Maurras, *Liberalisme et libertes; democratie et peuple* special issue *Action française revue bi-mensuelle* (1906). The lecture series covered topics like intelligence and the revolution, the family and the patrie, the accord between Catholicism and positivism, and intellectualism and rationalism.

⁴⁸⁹ Vaugeois, *Notre pays*.

sharing the same goals of political persuasion and social guidance as the engaged intellectual of the Left, were, as a result, distinctive and separate from those of his opponents. These different experiences and intellectual practices both necessitated and reinforced the separation in physical spaces and networks between Left and Right wing intellectual communities.

The Right-Wing Intellectual Model During the Nouvelle Sorbonne Debates

Massis and Maurras were instrumental in elaborating the right-wing model of intellectual identity during the decade 1910-1920. During these years, thinkers of the Right perceived their values, leaders, and intellectual authority to be excluded increasingly not only from a specific debate like that of the Dreyfus Affair, but also from the republican university system and the transmission of intellectual values to the French youth. Massis, Maurras, and the intellectual leaders of the debates responded to this increased hegemony over intellectual identity and authority by helping to legitimize an alternative to the university and a distinctly right-wing model of engagement. Although they would introduce new programs and political positions like monarchism to the intellectual world of the Right, they would also build on the foundation of the very separate intellectual communities and experiences created by their predecessors during the Dreyfus Affair. Most importantly, they continued the attitudes, relationships, and essential values of engagement that increasingly served to identify the intellectuals of the Right. Massis and Maurras both believed that they and their peers on the Right were marginalized and excluded from the mentorship of French youth in the university system by the Nouvelle Sorbonne reforms. They resented this ostracism of their right-wing values in one of the most significant forums for the formation of both intellectuals and the public understanding of intellectual identity. Both men felt obligated to legitimize their own concept of intellectual identity before ever entering into the specific debates on education. They devoted much energy to strategies to delegitimize the ideas, programs, and reforms of the Republic and the Left and present their own model as the choice of the progressive youth. This added element of their engagement in the debates gave them a different mentality of engagement than their peers on the Left. Both Massis and Maurras

were also spokesmen for a distinctly right-wing set of intellectual values including classicism, elitism, realism, and nationalism both before and after World War I. These values would isolate them from the programs of engagement on the Left that valued scientific modernism, egalitarianism, universal rationalism, and internationalism. The distinctive values of the Right had important implications for right-wing concepts of intellectual responsibility and role that would mark them, according to the Left, as anti-intellectual. The Left identified the intellectual as the erudite, the savant, and the *universitaire* whose duty was to promote international cultural exchange, scientific progress, and the democratization of education. In contrast, the Right identified the intellectual as the man of letters, journalist, or independent educator whose duty was to preserve the classical tradition of Western civilization, promote cultural nationalism, and train the intellectual elite of France. The abyss that was revealed between Right and Left concepts of engagement, intellectual values, and the role and responsibility of the educator during the Sorbonne debates and the postwar discussion of mobilization necessitated separate, segregated intellectual communities. In the network of intellectual communities created by the extreme Right, intellectuals like Massis and Maurras clarified their ideas and amplified the effectiveness of their individual engagement. The professional, personal, and mentoring relationships formed among like-minded peers in these separate communities gave them a sense of collective identification with the intellectual Right. The distinctive relationship of this collective community of the intellectual Right with the government, the church, and the university would reveal underlying differences, and create new ones, in the daily experience of intellectual life on the Right. All together, these factors led to the formation of a very different concept of intellectual identity on the Right than that on the Left. The model of identity initiated during the Dreyfus Affair and continued during the decade 1910-1920 would reappear during the interwar years of the 1930s when the rise of fascism and communism in Europe once again led intellectuals of the Left and Right to engage.

SECTION IV

THE RISE OF INTERNATIONAL FASCISM AND COMMUNISM: 1930-1939

The debates over the Nouvelle Sorbonne and the threat of international influence revealed, once more, the divisions in values and worldviews that separated politically engaged thinkers into two opposed camps. Those thinkers who came to be recognized as “of the Right” in these years shared certain fundamental intellectual values like realism, nationalism, and classicism, as well as common intellectual communities and practices. Most importantly, they identified themselves as a collective community of engaged thinkers who were ostracized from the university and the image of the intellectual by those who were “of the Republic” and “of the Left.” This division in intellectual values and identities would intensify during the inter-war years as international pressures raised the stakes of intellectual engagement. The new international alternatives of fascism and communism would lead more thinkers to engage than ever before and would produce unrivaled “cleavages within French intellectual society.”⁴⁹⁰ The new generation’s increasing frustration with the failures of the Republic, and of the existing political alternatives to it, would cause a significant evolution in many of the values and communities of both the intellectual Right and Left. However, it would not change the perceived hegemony of the Left, the resentment felt by the intellectuals of the Right, nor the Right’s desire to legitimize and differentiate their intellectual identities from the model of intellectual engagement on the Left. With the rise of the Popular Front and the new anti-fascist blocs, the intellectual Right perceived the hegemony of the Left to be even more widespread and believed itself to be excluded not only from the university, but from French public affairs in general. In response, they would expand their crusade to include not only the reeducation of the youth but also the development of a new socio-political vision for France.

⁴⁹⁰ Sirinelli and Ory, *Les intellectuels en France*, 92.

In the decade between the debates over demobilization of intelligence in 1919 and the new wave of engagement in the 1930s, the intellectual Right and Left continued to struggle for control of the title and role of the intellectual. Occasional calls to engage, like the intellectual debate over the 1925 Rif war in Morocco, revealed the continuing resentment on the Right of the perceived hegemony of the Left. In 1925, the intellectuals of *Humanité*, *Clarté*, and *Europe* supported the Rif insurgency through a petition that claimed to speak for all intellectuals. Resentful of this portrayal, the Right responded with its own petition supporting the French military presence in North Africa. “As with the responses to the Dreyfusard petitions and the reply to Rolland’s 1919 text, the signatories of this open letter denied the right to the signatories of Barbusse’s text to speak on behalf of all French intellectuals.”⁴⁹¹

This conflict over intellectual authority and the right to speak for France would reemerge in the 1930s. Although the Wall Street crash would cause increasing frustration with the liberal Republic as early as 1931, the crisis that intellectuals of both the Left and Right identified as the incentive for their respective engagement was the Stavisky scandal of 1934 and the resulting February 6 riots. Because the majority of those killed in the riots were right-wing activists from the Action Française and Croix de Feu, the riots were quickly associated with the movements of the extreme Right. They were countered by the first combined protest of the socialist and communist Left on February 12. The association of the riots of February 6 with the influence of fascism would collapse the earlier tripartite division between fascism, communism, and republicanism and create instead the dual camps of fascism and anti-fascism.⁴⁹² The Stavisky scandal and February 6 riot was the “turning point in political polarization” for many intellectuals since the Right found justification for its anti-Republicanism, and the Republic and Left believed it had uncovered a new fascist force in right-wing

⁴⁹¹ Drake, *French Intellectuals and Politics*, 90.

⁴⁹² David Caute, *Communism and the French Intellectuals, 1914-1960* (New York: Macmillan, 1964), 113.

France that necessitated a united opposition from the “anti-fascist” Left.⁴⁹³ Fascism was much more threatening to the intellectual Left than either the classicism and nationalism of the Nouvelle Sorbonne era or the anti-Dreyfusism of the turn of the century. It would therefore inspire a more vocal and virulent engagement by the Left and a more passionate ostracism of the “fascist” Right from the intellectual milieu.

The engagement prompted by the Stavisky scandal reflected the intellectuals’ larger international concerns. On the Right, intellectuals were uneasy about the increasing attraction of the PCF for internationalist intellectuals and the infusion of communism into French affairs under the cover of anti-fascism. In 1932, the Comintern had altered its policy on proletarian culture in order to woo the intellectual milieu to its side and away from the fascist temptation. By 1933, movements created by intellectuals and approved by the communist party like the Amsterdam-Pleyel movement, the AEAR, and the CVIA capitalized on the broad appeal of “anti-fascism” for intellectuals of both the Republic and the various parties of the Left. By joining in the anti-fascist cause, even moderates like Gide were drawn into increasingly polarized active engagement. On the Left, intellectuals were disturbed by the successes of Mussolini in Italy, Hitler in Germany, and Franco in Spain. They feared that the new generation of non-conformist intellectuals, who had begun to distance themselves from the inactivity of the Action Française, would see foreign fascism as a political alternative for France. New militant groups like the Croix de Feu and revues like *Je Suis Partout* and *Gringoire* radicalized the intellectual Right and provided a threatening forum for opposition to the republic and extreme Left.

These tensions and fears in the intellectual community would turn into mass active engagement when Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935. Competing claims over the role of the intellectual were quick to appear as intellectuals of the Right signed a manifest written by Massis and entitled “Un mainfeste d’intellectuels français pour la défense de l’Occident” and intellectuals of the Left

⁴⁹³ Drake, *French Intellectuals and Politics*, 107.

responded with a manifest claiming to be the “true representatives of the French intelligentsia.”⁴⁹⁴

Intellectual divisions between the fascist sympathizing Right and the anti-fascist Left would continue with debates over French involvement in the Spanish Civil war and appeasement of Germany at Munich.

The confrontation of the intellectuals over the affairs of Europe was mirrored on the national level by their battles over the French Popular Front. A 1935 shift in Comintern policy encouraged the anti-fascist coalition of communists and socialists and even their alliance with the Radicals. This policy of cooperation tilted the balance of power in the French government to the favor of the new Left coalition and put the government of Leon Blum in power in 1936. The Popular Front made itself the government of the anti-fascist intellectuals by giving them significant roles as government advisors and emphasizing cultural as well as social and economic change. All of this was intended to increase its legitimacy by garnering the support of anti-fascist intellectuals from all parties of the Left.⁴⁹⁵ While the Popular Front rallied the intellectuals of the Republic and the Left, its existence also gave new unity, strength, and purpose to the excluded intellectuals of the Right. They saw the Front as proof of a long-standing alliance between the republican Center and socialist or communist extreme Left that intentionally excluded the Right from public affairs.⁴⁹⁶ Due to the leadership of Leon Blum, the Popular Front also sparked a renewal of right-wing anti-Semitism, the intensity of which had not been seen since the Dreyfus Affair. When Blum was attacked in 1936 by the Camelots, all extreme-right wing groups were banned by the government. This repression was interpreted as validation of the Right’s perception of left-wing dominance not only in the university, but in governmental and public affairs as a whole. The victory of the Popular Front, ironically, became the

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid., 132.

⁴⁹⁵ Sirinelli and Ory, *Les intellectuels en France*, 99. Also, Julien Jackson, *The Popular Front in France: defending democracy 1934-1938* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 39.

⁴⁹⁶ In particular, the Right claimed the government was manipulated from afar by the Comintern. There was an element of truth to these fears since the intellectual spaces and revues under the PF were heavily dominated by the PCF. Ibid., 104.

incentive for many thinkers of the Right to become active, engaged intellectuals and for the creation of a new network of right-wing communities, such as the Parti Populaire Français, that could provide a socio-political alternative for the increasingly ostracized intellectual of the Right.

During the Dreyfus Affair and Nouvelle Sorbonne debates, only a vocal minority had chosen to engage in public affairs as intellectuals. In the interwar decade of the 1930s, engagement became the new way of life for the majority of French academics, savants, and men of letters. Abstention from engagement, in the name of disinterested art or ivory tower academicism, was no longer a respected choice for the educated elite. Responsible use of one's talent and intelligence now demanded active engagement either against communism or against fascism. In time, even engagement in favor of the Third Republic and status quo politics, instead of the extreme alternatives, came to be seen as abstention and "intellectuals of the center" became increasingly rare.⁴⁹⁷ The anti-fascism and anti-communism of the intellectual extremists, therefore, became the mutually exclusive, identifying traits of the two camps and created, once more, an "unbreachable abyss" between the intellectuals of the Right and Left.

⁴⁹⁷ Martyn Cornick, *Intellectuals in history : the Nouvelle revue française under Jean Paulhan, 1925-1940* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1995), 4.

CHAPTER 9

LEFT-WING INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY DURING THE 1930S: ANTI-FASCIST INTELLECTUAL VALUES

The emergent forces of communism and fascism were met with different reactions by the intellectuals formerly identified as “of the Republic” or “of the Left.” Some chose to retain their liberal values while expressing distant sympathy for the communist cause while others believed their values had been realized in the USSR and engaged fully as committed party intellectuals. Naturally the intellectual Right perceived the entire spectrum of these responses as a threat to their own values and grouped them all under the category of “intellectual bolshevism.” Although this was a strategic and emotional reaction by the intellectual Right, there was some truth to the right-wing perception of a bloc of intellectuals united by their anti-fascism against the Right. The model of intellectual identity created by the Center and Left during the 1930s acknowledged both the diversity that existed in approaches to the international situation as well as the mentality of engagement and intellectual values that united them against the alternative model on the Right.

The intellectuals of the anti-Fascist Left maintained the confident mentality of engagement that had separated their camp from the resentful Right since the Affair. Despite the popularity of the Action Française in the 1920s, the intellectual Left would continue to benefit from the intellectual authority and legitimacy of their internationalist and reformist predecessors.⁴⁹⁸ They wisely presented their new crusade against fascism and, for some, in favor of the USSR, as a continuation of the universalist, Enlightenment ideals associated with the intellectual since the Dreyfus Affair. While

⁴⁹⁸ Although the Action Française had constructed a powerful organ of intellectual legitimization during the 1920s, the sanctions from the Vatican and the failure of the February 6 riots to evolve into the promised coup would damage their image as intellectual leaders with both the intellectual Right and the general public in the 1930s.

maintaining their dominance in the university, they added a new monopoly over political affairs when the Popular Front government solicited their involvement. The State's identification of Popular Front supporters as the intellectual representatives of France gave them significant cultural capital in their effort to dominate the role of the intellectual. Most importantly, the principle of anti-fascism that united the diverse elements of the Popular Front became synonymous with intellectual responsibility and moral authority. The Left effectively characterized both Italian Fascism and German Nazism as a menace to the stability of republican France and to French cultural and intellectual values.⁴⁹⁹ By labeling the programs and values of their opponents on the monarchist, nationalist, or non-conformist Right as "fascist," and identifying themselves and their various programs and values as "anti-fascist," the Left created a division between the legitimate intellectuals of the Left and the "anti-intellectual fascists" of the Right.

The moral superiority, governmental approbation, and inherited authority of the anti-fascist Left gave it a certain stability and confidence in its engagement that would not be shared by the Right. They would confidently identify themselves as "the true representatives of the French intelligentsia" with little concern that the public would question this assertion.⁵⁰⁰ Although the intellectual Left was concerned about the influence of foreign fascism, it did not express any feelings of powerlessness, exclusion, repression, or marginalization. They did not devote their engagement to denouncing their opponents' monopoly on intelligence as the intellectuals of the Right would. They displayed no compulsion to first legitimize themselves or their positions as intellectually viable before engaging in public debate.⁵⁰¹ They were not preoccupied with the possibility of State suppression of their

⁴⁹⁹ Constant reference to Goering's statement: "when I hear the word culture, I reach for my revolver," was only one of many strategies used by the intellectual Left to instruct the public in the anti-intellectual nature of fascism.

⁵⁰⁰ Drake, *French Intellectuals and Politics*, 132.

⁵⁰¹ Even communist fellow travelers would not feel the need to defend their work as intelligent or independent in the way that the fascist sympathizers would, despite efforts by the Right to link French communist literature to the influence of the Comintern. André Gide's struggle to justify his attraction to communism with his intellectual pursuits would be an exception to this trend on the Left.

intellectual communities or with the existence of a hegemonic alliance between the regime and their intellectual opponents. And, although the communist element might call for a proletarian revolution against the bourgeois republic, even the communists did not identify themselves as isolated or excluded from intellectual influence, especially during the Popular Front. Rather than viewing their engagement as that of the oppressed, minority, isolated, opposition, as the Right did, the Left saw itself as the political avant garde of a regime that agreed with it on the fundamental goal of anti-fascism.

The values and worldviews identified during the 1930s as “anti-fascist” would unite what was otherwise a diverse collection of thinkers and parties ranging from liberal republican Radicals to SFIO socialists to PCF communists. Although they may have been divided internally on many matters,⁵⁰² their common rejection of the “fascist” thinkers, positions, and cultural values of the extreme Right would lead them to work together as a collective to exclude the intellectual Right from public influence. Their shared values of universal abstraction, internationalism, and egalitarianism would continue the left-wing and republican intellectual tradition of the previous decades while evolving in scope to counter the new right-wing values associated with fascism.⁵⁰³

Although the intellectual Left continued to see belief in universal abstractions as essential to intellectual identity, the new focus in the 1930s would not be the Dreyfusards’ “Truth and Justice,” but the abstract ideas of Revolution and the People. Themes of revolution and the People would distinguish the discourse of the intellectual Left from the Right. The Left was especially eager to monopolize plans for the 150th anniversary of the Revolution so that the Right could not effectively use the term “Revolution” for their own camp.⁵⁰⁴ Liberal intellectual Alain’s “Message au Peuple”

⁵⁰² See Julian Jackson’s *The Popular Front in France* for the implications of these divisions for the instability of the Popular Front.

⁵⁰³ The PCF, SFIO, and Radicals were all steeped in the historical tradition of the Enlightenment, Revolution, and Republic. *Ibid.*, 53.

⁵⁰⁴ The intellectuals of the Left were particularly outraged by the Right’s discourse of “National Revolution.”

was an effort to associate his calls for democratic reform with the abstract concept of the French People.⁵⁰⁵ The abstract concept of revolution also attracted those of the Left like André Gide to the communist dominated anti-fascist communities. In order to appeal to a broad spectrum of left-wing intellectuals, the communist experiment was portrayed by the Soviets and the PCF as a continuation of the general, universal, enlightenment aims of social revolution, scientific progress, individualism, and egalitarianism. “Revolution” in its most generic and universal sense was used as a theme to unite intellectuals who identified with the traditionally left-wing ideals of the French revolution with the intellectuals who identified with the new aims of the communist revolution. The communist inspired Association des Ecrivains et Artistes révolutionnaires (AEAR) would attract large numbers of non-communist intellectuals of the Left based on this shared association of intellectual responsibility with the universal values associated with revolution and the people.

On the more extreme end of the left wing, PCF intellectuals like Paul Nizan, André Malraux, Vaillant-Couturier, and Aragon would advocate the application of the soviet model of Revolution and concept of the People to the French political field.⁵⁰⁶ These PCF intellectuals were a minority on the engaged Left, but they spearheaded the anti-fascist engagement and so dominated the image of the intellectual more than their numbers might suggest. Unlike those on the Left like Gide who admired the Soviet system but did not recommend its imitation in France, the party intellectuals saw communist revolution and proletarian dictatorship as abstract truths that were universally applicable. In this way, although Aragon and Nizan both claimed to be replacing ivory tower intellectualism with a new activism, they continued to advocate the universalist conception of an international humanity and abstract political truths that were independent of time and place. The extreme Right saw the PCF’s fascination with a foreign, generic concept of revolution, their image of the People as divorced

⁵⁰⁵ Later, in his struggle against fascism, Alain envisioned an abstract People rising to “protect the rights and liberties” they had earned from the “fascist dictatorship” of the Right. In his article “Face à la coalition fasciste: le Peuple.” Alain, *Message au peuple* (Paris: Librairie Picart, 1934).

⁵⁰⁶ Although Nizan would break with the PCF in 1939 over the Nazi-Soviet pact, he was an active collaborator of the PCF intellectual model throughout the decade under consideration in this section.

from any national or ethnic ties, and their belief that these abstractions could be applied to the French circumstance as proof of a continued left-wing disconnection from French reality.

This continuing devotion to abstract universals on the Left would impact the Left's concept of role and responsibility and separate it from the image conceived by the Right. The intellectual of the Left increasingly saw his duty as an intellectual to be the awakening of "the People"⁵⁰⁷ and the advocacy of revolutionary social change. The duty of the intellectual, Nizan wrote, was to "serve the revolution with their pens by waking the minds of the masses."⁵⁰⁸ A few PCF intellectuals like Aragon would extend the idea of popular education in revolution to include socialist realism. This approach to literature emphasized proletarian-friendly themes and use of language and style that could be understood by the masses. The PCF intellectuals in particular tended to identify the new role of the intellectual as that of the "active revolutionary" and "party member" rather than the university educator or social commentator. Intellectuals were to follow the revolutionary path dictated by Marx by putting an end to social injustices, destroying the old bourgeois social and intellectual apparatus, and working alongside the workers in response to their needs. Those like Gide and Alain, who were sympathetic to the PCF but eschewed party membership as detrimental to the independence of the intellectual, still saw participation in anti-fascist and communist inspired intellectual endeavors like the CVIA and AEAR congresses as essential to responsible intellectual behavior.

The Left also believed the legitimate intellectual was a proponent of social egalitarianism. This shared value, and its association with anti-fascism, would envelop positions ranging from liberal visions of republican fraternity among the classes to communist visions of class conflict and social reorganization. Alain warned that the essence of France was found in the guarantee of the "precious equality of persons" that was threatened by attacks on individual liberties in Germany and Italy. He chastised those who "even among our friends" were now discarding liberty and equality as "old idols"

⁵⁰⁷ The People were envisioned by the extreme Left as the proletariat rather than the bourgeoisie.

⁵⁰⁸ Paul Nizan, *The Watchdogs: Philosophers of the Established Order* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 126-138.

in favor of new, and, he insinuated, un-French, alternatives.⁵⁰⁹ Those of the Left who were more sympathetic to communism, like Gide, closely identified intellectual identity with the value of egalitarianism. As a member of the intellectual and economic elite, Gide was plagued by intense guilt and sought to assuage his conscience by rescuing the working class.⁵¹⁰ He believed the communist promise of cultural and moral enlightenment for the working class would achieve the left-wing goal of an end to working class privation and material inequalities. It was, in part, his devotion to social egalitarianism that would attract him to the USSR where, he was convinced, all inequalities had been erased. PCF intellectuals Nizan, Malraux, Paul Vaillant-Couturier and Aragon shared Gide's sense of guilt and "class treason" that came with escaping the working class by means of their higher education. The intellectual, according to the PCF, could never be part of the honored proletariat since he was relegated by birth and education to the shameful institution of the bourgeoisie. He could, however, redeem himself by actively promoting social homogenization: working in conjunction with the masses, writing for and about the working class, and supporting the idea of class conflict and struggle.⁵¹¹ Alain, Gide, and PCF intellectuals like Aragon would all extend their engagement against social inequality beyond the hexagon to a "condemnation of all colonialism without reservation," particularly the colonialism of the fascist powers.⁵¹² This anti-imperialism, particularly during the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, would be cited by both the intellectual Left and Right as a clear indication of the abyss between the two camps.

This value of egalitarianism also influenced the Left's expectation of intellectual behavior.

Despite internal differences on the place of the proles, all intellectuals of the Left identified the role of

⁵⁰⁹ Alain, *Message au peuple*.

⁵¹⁰ Gide made almost comedic attempts to level his position to that of the masses by, as he recalls in his diary, such daily efforts as taking the dark meat from the bird rather than the white which was usually more expensive.

⁵¹¹ In his 1930 *Front Rouge* poem, Aragon wrote "Bring down the police comrades, bring down the police, onward toward the West where sleep rich children...I sing the violent domination of the bourgeois by the proletariat, for the annihilation of the bourgeoisie." Caute, *Communism and the French Intellectuals*, 94.

⁵¹² Caute, *Communism and the French Intellectuals*, 206.

the intellectual as the “herald of progress for the masses.”⁵¹³ Alain’s most prominent engagement was the construction of the manifest that would begin the Comité de vigilance des intellectuels antifascists (CVIA); a manifest entitled “Aux Travailleurs.” This document envisioned the left-wing intellectual as the “comrade” and “partner” of the worker in the struggle against fascism.⁵¹⁴ The intellectual’s responsibility was to form this “intimate liaison” with his working class brothers in order to actively promote the social egalitarianism essential to a reformed Republic and the battle against fascism. Among the PCF intellectuals, egalitarianism took on anti-republican tones in addition to anti-fascist ones. Vaillant-Couturier made it clear in his program for the AEAR that the role of these intellectuals was to become “the little group among the ruling class that detaches itself from this class in order to join itself to the revolutionary class to whom the future belongs.”⁵¹⁵ They were to be “social revolutionaries” who aided in the inevitable collapse of the bourgeois class and the ascendancy of the proles.⁵¹⁶ Although some fascist sympathizers of the extreme Right, especially in the PPF, would promote an image of the intellectual as the guide and partner of the people, they would be quick to differentiate their vision of the role of the intellectual from that outlined by the Left.

The left-wing value of social egalitarianism was also linked to the continued intellectual value of internationalism. Republicans, socialists, and communists could agree on a vision of man as a universal abstraction, unfettered by national or racial particularities. Republicans continued to defend the idea of the international rights of man while communist intellectuals promoted the related idea of the fraternity of the international working class. In sharp contrast with the extreme Right, the Left increasingly devalued the idea of national culture, enracinement, and biological racism in favor of internationalist, cosmopolitan worldviews and concepts of culture and intelligence. Gide

⁵¹³ Ibid., 49.

⁵¹⁴ Nicole Racine, Le manifeste du comité de vigilance des intellectuels antifascists, <http://biosoc.univ-paris1.fr/histoire/textimage/texte22.htm>.

⁵¹⁵ Paul Vaillant-Couturier, “Un an d’activité de l’association des écrivains et artistes révolutionnaires,” *L’Humanité*, March 21 1933.

summarized the aims of the anti-fascist International Writers Congress for the Defense of Culture by saying, “we must begin with the idea that this culture which we seek to defend is the sum of the particular cultures of each nation... that it is international.”⁵¹⁷ This internationalist view of “culture” would be emphasized, by both the Left and Right, as a distinguishing characteristic that separated the intellectuals of the Left and their program of engagement from those of the Right. According to the intellectual of the Left, one “can be deeply internationalist while remaining deeply French.”⁵¹⁸ In contrast, the intellectual of the Right found the two identities mutually exclusive. Even when borrowing elements from Nazism, Rexism, or Italian Fascism, the intellectual of the Right emphasized the French foundations of the ideas or the alterations necessary to adapt it to French circumstances.

Internationalism would also distinguish the practice of engagement on the Left. Although the extreme Right would invite fascist representatives and speakers from Germany and Italy to its rallies and lecture tours, it would not identify its intellectuals as members of an international community of thought in the way that the Left did. The intellectual Left, inspired by both the internationalist tradition of republicanism and socialism and by the new influence of the communist International, made the infusion of non-French thought and intellectual representatives a central component of its engagement. Creations such as the International Writers Association for the Defense of Culture and the AEAR identified their collective communities as international spaces and displayed their international members like Ilya Ehrenburg, Maxim Gorky, and Dimitrov prominently. Internationalism would also lead to several left-wing intellectuals’ engagement in favor of pacifism, during the early 1930s, when war between nations was seen as undermining either the Enlightenment

⁵¹⁷ Herbert Lottman, *The Left Bank: writers, artists, and politics from the Popular Front to the Cold War* (San Francisco: Halo Books, 1991), 87.

⁵¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 90.

legacy of fraternity or the international alliance of the working class.⁵¹⁹ In the later 1930s, particularly after the Munich concessions, the Left switched trajectories and engaged to define internationalism as the “grand ideal of the SDN” against the “false pacifism” now promoted by the extreme Right to avoid war with Germany and Italy.⁵²⁰ For the internationalists of the Left, the struggle against fascism abroad was the same struggle as that faced by French anti-fascists at home.

The political unity of intellectuals in the Popular Front, where the mantra was “no enemies to the Left,” was emblematic of the sense among left-wing intellectuals that they shared a common set of intellectual values and worldviews. This set of values was categorized under the legitimizing title of anti-fascism and served as a foundation for the new left-wing model of intellectual identity. The continued respect for universalism, egalitarianism, and internationalism on the Left and the resulting vision of intellectual role and responsibility would once again dominate the public and historical image of the intellectual. As a result, the opposing values of the Right were identified as “fascist” and, by correlation, anti-intellectual.

Anti-Fascist Intellectual Communities and Networks

As they had during the Dreyfus Affair and the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates, the intellectuals of the Left dominated certain spaces and networks where their distinctly left-wing values were appreciated and where their individual engagement could take on a collective force. These intellectual communities gathered like-minded peers in a common effort and excluded those on the intellectual Right either by directly rejecting them or indirectly creating an environment hostile to their positions. By segregating and separating their intellectuals in this way and “othering” the intellectual opposition, these communities of the Left reinforced among their members a certain segregated conception of intellectual identity. Being an intellectual, according to the Left, required the thinker

⁵¹⁹ For the first, see Alain’s defense of pacifism in “A la jeunesse,” and for the latter, Aragon’s poetry in *Commune*.

⁵²⁰ Aragon, “Un jour du monde,” *Ce Soir*, October 2, 1938.

not only to advocate certain values, but also to belong to certain intellectual communities and to experience intellectual life in a certain way.

Perhaps the community of Left intellectuals that was most influential in the formation of left-wing intellectual identity was the Association des Ecrivains et Artistes Révolutionnaires (AEAR) created in March 1932 under the direction of communist intellectual Vaillant-Couturier. The AEAR was an association intimately tied to intellectual communism since it was conceived as a French section of the Moscow based Union internationale des écrivains révolutionnaires. Yet, it, and its subsequent organs of propaganda, would welcome, even before the Comintern shift toward frontism, intellectuals of all affiliation on the Left who were opposed to fascism. By 1933, the movement was announced to have attracted over 550 writers and artists who wished to “struggle alongside the proletariat.”⁵²¹ The AEAR fostered community and collective identity in two ways, one more tangible and based on the interaction of French intellectuals within the association, and the other more imaginary, based on a sense of shared mission with intellectuals across Europe. Both senses of community were emphasized in the smaller intellectual communities created under the AEAR: the revue *Commune*, the International Writers Congress, and the Maisons de Culture.

The revue *Commune*'s directing committee was a diverse collection of left-wing intellectuals sympathetic to communism including Barbusse, Gide, Rolland, Vaillant-Couturier, Aragon, and Nizan. These directors were also constant contributors to the revue alongside international names like Maxim Gorky and Ilya Ehrenbourg.⁵²² *Commune* served as an important network linking the various AEAR groups and supporting its affiliated writers and ideals. Here readers and adherents could find articles on the AEAR, notes on the upcoming programs of the Maisons de Culture, as well as poetry, essays, political chronicles, and critiques of other journals by AEAR writers.⁵²³ The contributors

⁵²¹ Lottman, *The Left Bank*, 59.

⁵²² *Commune*, July 1933.

⁵²³ One critique of *Esprit* chastised Maritain for believing that the church could remedy the profound causes of the current social malaise. Another issue included political poems calling for proletarian revolution.

found their common ground in the mission statement included in every issue. “Commune,” it read, “is a revue of combat, it makes public the struggle that the AEAR leads.” Anti-fascism was a particularly important component of unity: “in the face of the confusion through which modern culture marches toward fascism, *Commune* proclaims that the only revolution is the proletarian revolution. It engages in combat against the first evidence of French fascism on the Left and Right, against the ideological preparations for imperial war and the armed struggle against the USSR.”⁵²⁴ This statement provided not only intellectual and political unity but a sense of collective purpose and mission to the contributors and the readers of the revue. Those who were part of the *Commune* community recognized their own identity as individual intellectuals in the engagement of the larger collective.

To reinforce the sense of unity, engagement, and collective purpose that *Commune* provided on the written page, AEAR also sponsored grand writers congresses where audiences could hear speeches by French and international intellectuals. The first of these was held in March 1933 with the proclaimed purpose of combating the rise of Hitler. It featured Gide as its principle speaker in an effort to show that AEAR welcomed all “non-conformist representatives of literature and art” on the anti-fascist Left. But, this open invitation did not include representatives from the Right nor were the topics of anti-fascism designed to make right-wing thinkers feel welcomed. The topics of Gide’s speech, anti-fascism and anti-imperialism, reinforced the intellectual values shared by both communist and non-communist intellectuals alike. The AEAR’s crusade: to give “writers ‘of the Left’ an orientation by mixing them in the struggles of the proletariat” was specifically directed to “writers of the Left” and was not open to the intellectual Right.⁵²⁵ The success of this first endeavor led to a much greater undertaking in June 1935 before an audience of over three thousand.

An enquete in 1933 and 1934 asked “pour qui ecrivez-vous” and suggested the proper answer was for the proletariat. And an article by Vaillant-Couturier considered “avec qui etes-vous artistes et ecrivains?” *Commune*, July 1933.

⁵²⁴ *Commune*, July 1933.

⁵²⁵ Vaillant-Couturier, “Un an d’activité.”

This 1935 International Writers Congress for the Defense of Culture included an extensive list of French and foreign writers and political activists including Benda, Jean Cassou, Dimitrov, and Gorki.⁵²⁶ Of course, in a left-wing atmosphere such as this, “conservative writers were unwelcome,” and although all the great names of the literary Left were invited, those on the Right, including Montherlant, Mauriac, Morand, Henri Beraud, and Maurras, were intentionally excluded.⁵²⁷ At the close of the Congress, the sense of community and shared purpose was so inspiring that the members refused to disband without first arranging for a permanent International Writers Association for the Defense of Culture. The association would continue the values and vision of the AEAR, namely “to struggle on its own terrain, which is culture, against war, fascism, and in a general manner against all threats to civilization.”⁵²⁸ Again, right-wing intellectuals, identified as the anti-intellectual fascists, would be excluded from this defense of culture and civilization.

Congresses were excellent means of bringing together the left-wing intellectual community under the principles of the AEAR, but they were rare occurrences. The AEAR needed a more consistent means to reach the public and bring together its intellectuals for engaged activity. The Maisons de culture were opened in Paris in 1934 and offered music, poetry, and lectures on literature, film, and political affairs by AEAR affiliated intellectuals. Within two years they were serving over 96,000 members and had sections throughout France and Algeria.⁵²⁹ These centers of left-wing intellectual community and collective engagement would become one of the most vilified targets of the intellectual Right who saw them as organs of propaganda.

⁵²⁶ Topics of speeches ranged from “the Role of the Writer in Society” to “The Individual” to speeches against nationalism and in favor of socialist realism

⁵²⁷ This exclusion of the right-wing writers was met with feigned outrage by the extreme right journals who claimed, “a congress of writers which deprives itself of the great majority of writers is only a clan of partisans.” Lottman, *The Left Bank*, 83. In truth, they would not have had any interest in speaking in this left-wing environment.

⁵²⁸ *Ibid.*, 97.

⁵²⁹ *Ibid.*, 60.

Akin to the AEAR in many ways yet without the connection to international communism and the USSR was the Comité de vigilance des intellectuels antifascists. The CVIA was founded in 1934 with the manifest “Aux travailleurs,” written by the socialist Paul Rivet, radical republican Alain, and communist sympathizer Paul Langevin. The alliance of the three authors in the stated purpose of confronting and defying internal and external fascism was emblematic of the larger unity and frontism provided by the movement for the left-wing intellectual community. The express purpose of the movement was to form collective groups of intellectuals and workers who maintained a “vigilance” against the rise of fascism in France and the concept of “national revolution.”⁵³⁰ This collective would therefore not include intellectuals of the Right who sympathized with both of these ideas. By the end of the year they had gained over 6000 signatures from writers, journalists, and professors who sympathized with their goals of fighting fascism in all its forms.⁵³¹ Anti-fascism was the message and the mission of the numerous brochures of the CVIA and the short-lived bulletin *Vigilance*. With the arrival in power of the Popular Front, the CVIA rallied the intellectuals of the Left to become a sort of laboratory of ideas for the new regime. Although it provided fewer physical gatherings for intellectuals of the Left than the AEAR, the CVIA was more likely to draw in republican, pacifist, and non-communist intellectuals of the Left and to involve them in the engagement against fascism that would divide them from the intellectual Right.

Frontist organizations like the AEAR and CIVA provided a strong sense of intellectual community, shared purpose, and political alliance. This tangible intellectual fraternity and collective identity was echoed by the imaginary communities created by the numerous petitions and manifests of the 1930s. These petitions and manifests, by their very nature, tended to group intellectuals into oppositional camps, particularly along Left-Right lines. Thus divided into like-minded groups, they served, as they had during the Dreyfus Affair and Nouvelle Sorbonne, as forums for the expression of

⁵³⁰ Racine, *Le manifeste du comité de vigilance*.

⁵³¹ “We are ready to sacrifice all,” they wrote, “to prevent France from being submitted to a regime of repression and bellicose misery under the cover of a national revolution.” Ibid.

collective identity. As early as 1931, the pacifist left issued the Manifeste contre les excès du nationalisme that claimed to speak on behalf of all intellectuals. Signed by 186 intellectuals drawn in large numbers from the contributors to the NRF, the manifest implored France to break with the strategy of war in favor of one of reconciliation. The intellectual youth of the extreme Right would be so indignant by this attempt to monopolize the title of intellectual that they launched their own manifeste des jeunes intellectuels ‘mobilisables’ which prominently utilized the name “intellectuel” and demanded an equal authority to speak for the intellectual community. By 1936, the associations of the Right and Left had shifted noticeably to their new pro-fascist and pro-communist positions so that the right now favored pacifism while the left demanded the right to intervene in international affairs. Yet the separation and opposition between the two camps remained fixed.

The final great war of petitions was waged in 1936 over involvement in the Spanish civil war. The Left petition entitled “Declaration des intellectuels républicains” was placed in *Commune* in December 1936. The signers claimed a “duty” to speak for France and to help guide public opinion in the path of the universal conscience. Any policy of non-intervention, they wrote, was simply intervention in favor of the rebels against the Popular Front. The signers were united by their anti-fascism and their desire to help the Popular Front, Communist-friendly Spanish government. In response, the intellectuals of the Right would band together in the Manifeste aux intellectuels espagnols where they expressed their support for the rebels of Franco. In these imagined spaces of collective identity, even the structuring of the petitions revealed a difference between the communities of the Right and Left. Signers of the left-wing petitions like the Declaration des intellectuels républicains were grouped separately under the headings of Professors and Writers. Because the number of *universitaires*, over 200, outnumbered those of the men of letters, the latter was augmented by artists, architects, and others of the liberal professions. Even so, it still totaled only

half of the *universitaire* number.⁵³² On the Right, such divisions were less common. Writers and journalists, who dominated the list of signers, held prominent places in its display.

These manifests were most effective in amplifying individual engagements when they were well publicized in a journal or revue that had built a community of sympathetic readers. The most prominent revues and the most widely circulated papers during the 1930s remained the property of the intellectual Right. Even during the years of the Popular Front, the mass journals of the Right like *Gringoire*, *Candide*, and *Action Française* drastically outsold left-wing papers and even republican journals like *Figaro*.⁵³³ But there were several important left-wing revues that provided a sense of intellectual community, a fraternity of writers, and a shared journalistic mission to their collaborators. The French press sympathetic to the left-wing effort included papers like *Humanité*, *Commune*, *Monde*, *Clarté*, *Nouvel Age*, *Europe*, and later *Ce Soir*. Even revues like the *NRF* that tried to maintain their moderate republican or even apolitical appearance still visibly favored anti-fascist works and authors. Each of these journals was part of the larger network of the intellectual Left and provided support and propaganda for the rest of the community. *Humanité* published many of the first announcements of the AEAR congresses as well as reproductions of the speeches that were given there. In addition, they announced meetings of the Maisons de Culture and promoted books written by AEAR and communist friendly authors. Later, *Ce Soir*, directed by Aragon and J.R. Bloch, would join *Humanité* in this effort of communication with the faithful and unification of the intellectual Left.⁵³⁴ *Ce Soir* also published the 1938 manifest of intellectuals that criticized right-wing pacifism in the face of war with Germany as “faux pacifisme.”⁵³⁵ Like *Commune*, these journals kept their left-

⁵³² Sirinelli, *Intellectuels et passions française*, 105.

⁵³³ Lottman, *The Left Bank*, 71.

⁵³⁴ Here Aragon reserved for himself a daily column “Un jour du monde” where he tried to solidify public and intellectual opinion on issues such as Munich and the war.

⁵³⁵ Aragon, “Un jour du monde.”

wing collaborators connected, informed, and engaged in a collective effort of anti-fascism. Right-wing writers were not included among their contributors.

These left-wing journals were linked in a professional network that included publishing houses that managed both the journals and authors sympathetic to the cause. In this way, revue collaborators gained important publishing connections. Editons Clarté, the Librairie de l'Humanité, and Editions Sociales Internationales were firms particularly sympathetic to communism while the Gallimard press retained an open catalogue but tended to welcome NRF contributors because of its close ties to the revue.⁵³⁶ Although right-wing writers like Drieu la Rochelle might be included in Gallimard's catalogue, they would not find the sort of camaraderie and sympathy there that left-wing writers did. Most, including Drieu, would eventually take their work elsewhere.

Revue teams not only provided segregated professional networks, they influenced writers' social interactions as well. Although, under Paulhan, the NRF attempted to retain the apolitical priorities of the journal, Gide's interest in communism severely altered its tone.⁵³⁷ The newly politicized team was an intellectual and social community unto itself. The staff met socially after hours at Gide's home, in the nearby Pont Royal bar, or in the home of communist writer Malraux. On a larger scale, contributors were invited to extravagant summer retreats in Burgundy where they could participate in symposia, outings, and even parlor games. Retreats like these allowed aspiring young authors like Sartre to make professional contacts with Gallimard publishers and with the entire network of prestigious NRF writers. On a weekly basis, the wives and families of NRF staff would come by to watch the printing process before journeying out together as a giant family to a nearby restaurant.⁵³⁸ This polarization of social interactions due to revue team socialization did not eliminate friendships between left and right-wing writers. But it contributed to a general sense of collective identity with those who shared these spaces of daily intellectual life. Such intimate networks of

⁵³⁶ Caute, *Communism and the French Intellectuals*, 47.

⁵³⁷ Cornick, *Intellectuals in History*, 34.

⁵³⁸ Lottman, *The Left Bank*.

sociability and professional support created a strong sense of identification with the left-wing revue teams, publishing networks, petition communities, and political organizations. In contrast, the exclusion of right-wing intellectuals tended to reinforce the sense of intellectual and personal separation between the two political camps.

The Anti-Fascist Intellectual Experience

The collective intellectual identity of the Left was not purely based on the community of left-wing revues, manifests, and front movements. It was also a product of the shared experiences of being an intellectual of the Left, experiences that were not shared by those of the Right. As in previous periods of engagement, the intellectual Left's close relationship with the Third Republic and the university system would continue to affect its experience of daily intellectual life. Their more distanced relationship to the Catholic Church remained much as it had in previous decades; but it was less and less of a distinguishing factor for left-wing intellectual experience.⁵³⁹ During the 1930s, however, left-wing intellectual experience would also be influenced by new relationships to the international community.

The relationship of the anti-fascist Left to the Third Republic, especially after the Comintern shift in 1935, continued to be a close working partnership. Under the Popular Front, the intellectual community of the Left enjoyed, more than ever before, the governmental support and protection of an intelligentsia. Left-wing intellectuals saw themselves as especially valued by this new government, in part because many leading left-wing intellectuals like Leon Blum had taken leading roles. This close relationship between the intellectual Left and the regime included State mandated repression of their intellectual opposition on the Right in 1936. Although the Front would not last long, the symbiotic

⁵³⁹ Right-wing intellectuals, particularly those sympathetic to fascism, increasingly disassociated themselves from the Catholic Church in the 1930s. Although the AF intellectuals would continue to claim ties to Catholicism, the reprimand by the Vatican would sever its ties to the institution of the Church. Relationships to the Church, therefore, no longer played an important role in distinguishing Right and Left intellectual experience and identity.

relationship of the Left and the government during these years would be touted by the Right as evidence of a distinctly left-wing experience of intellectual life that engagés of the Right did not share.

Liberal republican and socialist universitaires continued to dominate the university system in the 1930s. This perceived left-wing atmosphere in the university influenced not only the experience of the universitaires themselves, but also the experience of the student population. There were statistically more left-wing students at the ENS throughout the 1930s,⁵⁴⁰ and the perception of their dominance led these students to engage differently from their right-wing classmates. While the Right began the creation of right-wing student journals like the *Revue Française*,⁵⁴¹ the left-wing students concentrated their efforts on university related youth movements and school sections of political parties. And, while the students of the Left were mentored through the existing professorial relationships and the guidance of Lucien Herr, the excluded right-wing minority searched beyond the classroom for external mentoring relationships with men like Massis who introduced them to the world of journalism. It is perhaps because of these early student experiences at the ENS that so many right-wing Normaliens of the 1930s engaged primarily through their literary work while their left-wing peers in the university track were more likely to join parties and consider writing a supplementary activity.⁵⁴²

This early introduction to intellectual life on the Left was indicative of the distinctive relationship that the intellectual Left had to international political parties. It would be a mistake to believe that there was “any natural incomprehension between the Right and political parties.”⁵⁴³ But, despite the electoral efforts of the Patrie Française, the AF, or the PPF, there was no political party on

⁵⁴⁰ This numerical dominance of the Left at the ENS has led historians to treat the presence of right-wing Normaliens as an aberration. Rubenstein, *What's Left?*, 12.

⁵⁴¹ Created by right-wing students Thierry Maulnier and Robert Brasillach.

⁵⁴² Rubenstein, *What's Left?*, 9-27.

⁵⁴³ Sirinelli, *Histoire des Droites en France*, 18.

the extreme Right that provided the sort of organization, doctrine, and international network for its intellectuals that the Socialist and Communist parties provided. It has been estimated that, by the 1930s, the PCF was the most powerful and organized communist party outside of Russia. Its “initiative in mobilizing intellectuals on an international as well as national level” cannot be disregarded when considering the experience of the left-wing intellectuals.⁵⁴⁴ When the Comintern realized in 1932 that intellectuals were a vital component of revolutionary preparation, new efforts were made to court intellectuals to its side. Fellow-traveling became a way of intellectual life for many during these years and even those who remained technically unaffiliated benefited from the party structure.

The relationship that the Left had to international circles meant that being an intellectual of the Left provided extensive opportunity for international cultural exchange. Left-wing intellectuals developed ties to foreign thinkers at writers’ congresses and saw themselves as collaborating on a daily basis with intellectuals from across Europe at literary revues like *Commune*. The Right would be much slower to capitalize on the benefits of such international collaboration with German and Italian intellectuals, in part because there was no official fascist party in France that could facilitate such exchanges. Despite these attractions, the influence of party doctrine and Comintern policy on intellectual expression could, occasionally, adversely affect the experience of the Left. Aragon’s poetry was admittedly geared to the official party line and its tone and message had to be altered as Comintern policy shifted over the years. Gide was distressed to find that even in the French hosted AEAR congress, the Comintern was able to influence the schedule of speakers so that dissidents were not invited or only able to speak at late hours. He found the party expectation that every anti-fascist and pro-soviet writer produce social realist works to be so restrictive on his intellectual expression that he preferred to not write at all during his years of association with communism. And, when the Comintern declared that anti-fascism was no longer a priority of the intellectual community after

⁵⁴⁴ Caute, *Communism and the French Intellectuals*, 115.

1939, many intellectuals found themselves required to support the very ideology they had joined the party to combat.

The Left's relationship to the Third Republic and the Popular Front, to the ENS and its engagement opportunities, to an organized party, and to an international intellectual community meant that intellectuals of the Left experienced engagement and intellectual life differently from their right-wing peers. These different experiences, when combined with separated intellectual communities like the front movements and the left-wing revue networks, helped to foster among the intellectuals of the Left a sense of distinct, separate collective intellectual identity.

The Anti-Fascist Intellectual Model

The model of intellectual identity created by the Left in the 1930s was able to incorporate a diverse array of political positions under the aegis of intellectual anti-fascism. By operating as an anti-fascist bloc, and by creating a supportive partnership with the Third Republic and an international intellectual community against fascism, the intellectual Left assured itself dominance in the discussion of public affairs. This hegemony gave them a certain mentality of engagement that their peers on the Right would not share. It also created an abyss between concepts of model intellectual values and behaviors. According to the model developed by the Left, being a true "intellectual" required first and foremost an opposition to the values and programs of the fascists. The intellectual also engaged in the name of universal abstractions, social egalitarianism, and the international ideal. His role was to be a spokesman for the masses, a social revolutionary, and a member of an international community of thought. Intellectuals on the Left were also identified by their participation in certain collective communities like the AEAR or CVIA congresses, anti-fascist petitions, left-wing revue teams, and publishing firms. Those who engaged in public affairs outside of these communities and in opposition to the values and programs of the anti-fascist Left were denounced by the Left as anti-intellectual and even anti-French. They were denied the right to speak as intellectual guides for the nation and were excluded and marginalized in the intellectual

community. Their resentment of this exclusion, both real and imagined, would lead them to create their own image of the intellectual. Abel Bonnard and Ramon Fernandez took the lead in developing and defending this alternative model of intellectual identity for the Right.

CHAPTER 10

RIGHT WING INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY IN THE 1930S: THE CASE OF ABEL BONNARD

Abel Bonnard was one of the more prestigious intellectuals of the extreme Right in the 1930s and was engaged in a wide variety of intellectual groups, petitions, and revues. Although Bonnard began his politicization in the 1920s as a Maurrassian, he demanded a more active solution during the 1930s. Despite his anti-German education from the AF, he was drawn to the promise of German fascism. Although his ideas would never be as extreme as those of more notorious fascist intellectuals like Robert Brasillach, Bonnard's extensive involvement in a wide variety of intellectual communities make him a good representative of the right-wing socio-political world. Bonnard also was at the forefront of the crusade against the perceived left-wing hegemony and expressed, more clearly than most, his resentment of this intellectual monopoly. He is representative, therefore, of the intellectual who turned from royalism to fascism in an effort to overthrow the dominant left-wing concept of society and intellectual identity.

Born in 1883, Bonnard had, by 1908, already begun to secure his literary reputation with three books of poetry, *Les Familiers*, *Les Royautes*, and *Les Histories*, all published by Fayard who was sympathetic to conservative writers. Before volunteering for World War I, he had also completed two additional novels. During the immediate post-war years, he traveled extensively across Europe, the Far East, and Brazil. His writing on China would receive the Grand prix de Litterature from the Academy, but would provoke much opposition on the intellectual Left for its blatant approval of French colonialism.⁵⁴⁵ During these years, he was also beginning what would become a prolific career

⁵⁴⁵ J. Mievre, "L'évolution politique d'Abel Bonnard (jusqu'au printemps 1942)," *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale* 108 (October 1977), 4.

in journalism.⁵⁴⁶ As early as 1912, he had begun writing for *Figaro* and had garnered a reputation for Maurrassian sympathies and a strong opposition to republicanism. By 1925 he began developing his ideas in the daily paper of Georges Valois, *Nouveau Siècle*. Here he pled for a European movement that would free people from the double myths of parliamentary democracy and Marxism. His association with this organ of the Fascieau would mark him early on as a “homme de droite” who was searching for a more active alternative to the AF.⁵⁴⁷

Despite these early forays into extreme right political journals, Bonnard would not begin his active intellectual engagement until the beginning of the 1930s. As an Academy member, his engagement was particularly welcomed by the right-wing groups seeking intellectual legitimization. In the early 1930s, Bonnard showed particular interest in mentoring the intellectual youth. He became an early leader of the Cercle Fustel de Coulanges where he specialized in questions of pedagogy and regularly published appeals to the youth in the new non-conformist revue *1933*.⁵⁴⁸ After 1935, his name was prominent on both the *Defense de l'Occident* manifesto, as one of its sixteen Academy signatures, and on the *Manifeste aux intellectuels espagnols*.

In 1936, Bonnard published one of his most politically significant works, *Les Modérés*. This book was an impassioned attack on the moderate republicans who had formed an antifascist alliance with the socialists and communists of the Left. The result, Bonnard claimed, was that there was no longer any representation from the Center, simply one large party of the Left. The book was a violent rejection of the social philosophy, moral crisis, and abstract intellectualism he believed to see on this united Left.⁵⁴⁹ The intellectual Right welcomed this book as the official refutation of the recently

⁵⁴⁶ Over his lifetime, Bonnard would publish in over 100 journals.

⁵⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁵⁴⁸ Abel Bonnard, *Inédits politiques d'Abel Bonnard de l'academie française* (Paris: Editions Avalon, 1987), 14.

⁵⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 25.

formed Popular Front and raised Bonnard as a symbol of their cause.⁵⁵⁰ Although he would not publish the sister essay, *Les Reactionnaires*, which was a critique “from the Right” of the royalists, until 1941, it was already apparent by 1936 that Bonnard was becoming disillusioned with the royalist Right of the AF.⁵⁵¹ By 1936, he had abandoned Maurrassianism for fascism along with other ex-AF affiliates.⁵⁵²

Bonnard’s new foray into extreme right engagement outside the AF would lead him to the more active PPF of Jacques Doriot. As early as 1936 he had begun directing the party’s monthly journal *Rassemblement national* and within a year was presiding over many of the functions of the Cercles Populaires Francais, the intellectual arm of the movement. This new inclination toward fascism was intensified in 1937 when Bonnard traveled to Germany. Along with fellow travelers Brasillach and Alphonse de Châteaubriant, he would return from his visit and his personal interview with Hitler enthusiastic about the fascist experiment and the Fuhrer.⁵⁵³ Although Bonnard would eschew biological anti-Semitism and maintain a lifelong friendship with Jewish writer André Suarès, his support for fascism and his silence on the anti-semitism it encouraged cannot be ignored. His only commentary on Jews, *La Question Juive* in 1937, expressed his concern over the mixing of races and did little to redress the excessive anti-Semitism of his peers on the Right.

After the defeat in 1940, Bonnard became an active collaborationist writing for such regime friendly revues as Brasillach’s *Je Suis Partout*, Chateaubriant’s *La Gerbe*, and Drieu’s reconceptualized *NRF*. He also took leading roles in the Groupe Collaboration and the LVF, and was named Minister of Education for Vichy in 1942. With such extensive pre-war fascist sympathies and wartime collaborationism, it was not surprising that after the Liberation, his name was prominent on

⁵⁵⁰ Mievre, “L’évolution politique,” 11.

⁵⁵¹ Oliver Mathieu, *Abel Bonnard; une aventure inachevée* (Paris: Avalon, 1988), 253.

⁵⁵² Bonnard, *Inedits politiques*, 32.

⁵⁵³ Mathieu, *Abel Bonnard*, 263.

the CNE blacklist or that he was convicted of treason *in absentia* and forced into exile in Spain until his death in 1968.

In the 1930s, Bonnard chose to engage actively in order to overturn what he perceived to be the hegemony of a united Republican-Left front. His resentment of this dominance was expressed not only in his condemnation of the Left, but also in his attempts to legitimize and promote his own right-wing and fascist friendly values of intellectual realism, elitism, regeneration through national revolution, and Franco-German rapprochement. This resentment and desire to legitimize alternative intellectual values, when combined with his engagement in a variety of right-wing communities and networks, led Bonnard to construct a new model of right-wing intellectual identity for the 1930s.

Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy

The right-wing intellectuals of the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates had focused their resentment on the domination they believed the Left exerted over the university system. During these years they had struggled to overturn the Left's claim that "the intellectual" was a man of the university who promoted certain left-wing values like scientific utilitarianism and internationalism. By the 1930s, although the left-wing dominance of the university had not abated, right-wing resentment and frustration had found broader targets. During the 1930s, and particularly during the years of the Popular Front, the intellectual Right felt that it was excluded, even ostracized, not simply from the university system but from public affairs in general. The ties between the Popular Front and the intellectuals of the Left contributed to right-wing suspicions of a conspiracy against them and reinforced their sense of segregation and exclusion. Bonnard would be one of the most vocal opponents of this hegemony. His engaged work took on new tones of resentment and new themes of intellectual responsibility and left-wing oppression. He demanded not only that the unwarranted dominance of the bloc be overturned, but that the intellectual Right be recognized instead as the legitimate guides of public affairs.

Bonnard found the hegemony and repression he so resented to be present in all the aspects of his daily life as an intellectual, from mentorship of the youth to participation in public life. He believed the Left had monopolized the university system and thus prevented both the intellectuals and the ideas of the Right from gaining the ear of the youth. His resentment of this hegemony would find an outlet in the Cercle Fustel de Coulanges, a group of right-wing intellectuals devoted to overturning the left-wing influence on education and replacing it with their own. An article in the Cercle's *Cahiers* summarized the Right's frustration saying, "an incessant propaganda under the aegis of the Third international, has rallied all the educators to Marxism." Because of this, it continued, "there exists currently a Marxist pedagogy, a Marxist doctrine of education. Its organs are spread in the larger public, it disposes of defenders in the ministry and University...and proposes Marxism to our students not as a doctrine of the past but as one of the future and of progress."⁵⁵⁴ Bonnard was particularly incensed that the teaching of history had been "deformed and perverted since the beginning of the century by the socialist and communist ideologies of the teaching Left."⁵⁵⁵ Distorting history allowed the Left to present its own ideas of internationalism and egalitarianism as those that had built the nation. Without a true knowledge of their collective national past, Bonnard believed the Left would find it increasingly easy to "manipulate students to their will."⁵⁵⁶ But control of the university and mentorship, Bonnard feared, was only one step in a larger plan for left-wing domination of all of French intellectual life. Marxist dominated pedagogy in the University was, Bonnard concluded ominously, an attempt by certain intellectuals to dominate a profession that "implied disinterest so that they could control all the world" without suspicion.⁵⁵⁷

⁵⁵⁴ A. Rivaud, "Marxisme et education," *Cahiers Fustel de Coulanges; revue bitrimestrielle*, December 1935.

⁵⁵⁵ Abel Bonnard, "L'Intelligence française," *La Gerbe*, April 16 1942.

⁵⁵⁶ *Cahiers Fustel de Coulanges; revue bitrimestrielle*, July 1931.

⁵⁵⁷ *Cahiers Fustel de Coulanges; revue bitrimestrielle*, July 1933.

Bonnard's resentment of the dominance of the Left was, therefore, not limited to its appearance in the university system. His frustration and fury was directed toward the intellectual Left as a whole which he believed exerted an unwarranted and unhealthy dominance over the entire intellectual milieu of the 1930s. This dominance was in great part a result of their ties to the regime. In general, he wrote, it sufficed that an intellectual be well disposed toward the regime of the Popular Front for him to be treated as an intellectual master.⁵⁵⁸ These "lapdogs of the regime" had only to declare themselves communists to add an additional "rosette of esprit" to their reputation among the public. "While the true sages and authorities on the human race" on the Right dared not say anything against the increasingly dominant Left, Bonnard wrote in outrage, the destructive ones "intimidated everyone with their reel of sophisms," and for this were "adorned with intellectual prestige."⁵⁵⁹ During these years, Bonnard was arguing, it was necessary to be a supporter of the Popular Front to be considered an intellectual. Those who agreed with the ideology of the Left, no matter the strength of their minds, were granted the authority of an intellectual master. "They promenaded in society," he wrote of the intellectual Left, "distributing around them the diplomas of intelligence. Only these certificates were never awarded according to the value of the minds but according to the color of the opinions. If one showed finesse and judgment but remained attached to the social order, he obtained from them no praise, but if another, unreasonable and haphazard, declared himself against this order, the desired diploma was soon awarded to him and he carried it proudly."⁵⁶⁰ In other words, those who aligned themselves with the ideas of the dominant Left rose to intellectual prominence while those who opposed these ideas were rejected and excluded from this new construction of intellectual identity and social authority.

⁵⁵⁸ Bonnard, "L'Intelligence française."

⁵⁵⁹ Abel Bonnard, *Le Drame du présent; les Modérés* (Paris: Grasset, 1936), 137.

⁵⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 129.

The intellectuals of the Left claimed for themselves not only the titles and authority of the intellectual elite but also the determination of what made “intelligence.” Bonnard claimed that much of this attempt to dominate the term was a calculated effort to exclude the Right from such a legitimizing concept. Yet beyond this opportunism and strategy, he wrote, there was the truly ingrained sentiment among the intellectuals of the Republic and extreme Left that “there is always intelligence in being a socialist and that there is never intelligence in being a royalist.”⁵⁶¹ It was this sentiment, which had become woven into the mental fabric of society since the Dreyfus Affair, that Bonnard believed to secure the real hegemony of the intellectual Left. Intelligence, when used by the Left in the 1930s, came to be synonymous with the communist intellectual values and with the vague idealism and abstraction of the Left. “When one realizes,” Bonnard continued, “that this disposition has been spread in France from the salons to the cabarets, from the men of the world to the students, and that one has believed everywhere that it suffices to declare oneself against the principles that maintain human society in order to prove themselves intelligent, one is surprised that the rudiments of order have survived.”⁵⁶² Bonnard expressed his furious resentment of this invisible hegemony saying that the Left had given the term intelligence new vogue among its adherents but that it “mocked that which it designates essentially.”⁵⁶³ In an effort to delegitimize this automatic association of intelligence with the Left, Bonnard argued that the Left did not understand the true meaning of intelligence because it associated it with its values of abstraction and universalism rather than its necessary component, realism.

Bonnard also resented the implications made by the Left that their concept of the intellectual was the only one which favored freedom of thought and the goal of progress. The intellectuals of the Left, he wrote, “claim to prove to us by their opinions that they have a free mind... and to suggest

⁵⁶¹ Ibid., 132.

⁵⁶² Ibid.

⁵⁶³ Ibid., 130.

that all other minds have only a choice between prejudices.”⁵⁶⁴ In truth, he would write, “that which one calls having a free mind is only that of having the prejudices of a little group of intellectuals which has put itself in the position of distributing diplomas” and who “believe to have acquired by the handling of abstractions, the right to rule all things.”⁵⁶⁵ Bonnard was quick to show that this claim to be the only representatives of free thought hid an even more sinister form of domination and repression. Free thought was not only *attributed* to the intellectual Left alone, it was to be *allowed* to the intellectual Left alone. One article reported that a socialist deputy had cried, “Liberty yes, but not for those who do not think as we do!” Here, the article continued, was “thesis of the Popular Front: entire license given to the faithful of this government to act in their guise, all the repressive force of the state turned against the opposition.” In this, it asked, how is the Popular Front’s domination of intellectual life any better than fascism? In fact, it is worse because while fascism also restricts its own partisans, the “fascism of the Popular Front closes the opposition in prison only to free the field to its own unleashed troops.”⁵⁶⁶

Bonnard was particularly resentful of the Left’s attempt to delegitimize the Right by associating its own views with progress and those of the Right with regression. This association of the Right with backwards political and social thought had been commonplace since the Dreyfusards’ crusade against Brunetière. However, Bonnard wrote, it had become the cornerstone of the communist intellectual’s argument that Marxism offered a progressive, scientific path to the future while fascism reverted to the old traditionalism and blind nationalism of the Middle Ages. In an attempt to describe the dramatic division that this strategy yielded, Bonnard wrote, “the antithesis that the philosophes and romantics instituted between a past of darkness and a future of light is rediscovered in the antithesis that current political discourse has established between the Right and

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid., 125.

⁵⁶⁵ Abel Bonnard, *Ce Monde et moi; aphorisms et fragments recueillis par Luc Gendrillon* (Paris: Dismas, 1991), 38.

⁵⁶⁶ *Courrier royal*, April 25 1936.

the Left.” He continued by recalling a story of a socialist orator who had made this association quite clear by saying “Waldeck-Rousseau wanted to go toward the future. What did he do therefore? He went toward the Left.”⁵⁶⁷ Claiming the legitimizing ideal of intellectual and social progress was just one more way that Bonnard believed the intellectual Left was attempting to dominate the intellectual milieu of his time. Had the Left only threatened to dominate the intellectual field, Bonnard might have felt more confidence in the ability of the intellectual right to overturn its influence. Yet this was not the only area in which he found a hegemonic Left.

In its most generalized form, Bonnard believed the entirety of the political and governing system was dominated by the Communist-Republican alliance. Although this political hegemony was not specifically targeted against the intellectual milieu, Bonnard argued that there was a strong correlation. If all of public affairs, from international relations to socio-economic policies, were controlled by the Left, to the exclusion of right-wing ideas and values, these ideals would be engrained in the public mind and the intellectuals of the Right would face an uphill battle to change public opinion. In a left-wing world, there would be no room for right-wing intellectuals. With this in mind, Bonnard began his crusade against the Popular Front with *Les Modérés*.

Bonnard’s first task in *Les Modérés* was to prove the collusion of the moderate republicans of the political center with the extreme left socialists and communists. In truth, he summarized, “there is only one party in France: that which encompasses the Left and the Extreme Left.”⁵⁶⁸ The political Left controlled the government and excluded the persons and ideas of the political Right in the same way that the intellectual Left excluded the intellectual Right: by purporting to “have all the virtues” and by “excommunicating all that which was excluded from it.”⁵⁶⁹ They assigned themselves a “moral superiority without bothering to justify it” and in announcing this superiority of their sect,

⁵⁶⁷ Bonnard, *Le Drame du present*, 244.

⁵⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 64.

⁵⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 41.

claimed they owed nothing to those they dominated and did not regard them as equals.⁵⁷⁰ By aligning themselves with the extreme Left, the Moderates had been compensated with high offices, but they had also allowed the infiltration of the communists into positions of power. “They have found opened to them,” he wrote of the communists, “all the gates of the fortress that a government worthy of its function would have defended against them, and thus they have enjoyed the protection of the State in the destruction of the nation, of society, and of the State itself.”⁵⁷¹

“Politics,” Bonnard complained, “is no longer a battle because one side no longer fights. Those who claim to constitute an opposition have a spirit so intimidated by their adversaries that they do not dare to offend by a single truth the system of lies where they are enclosed. They salute the same idols as the men of the Left.”⁵⁷² Even the conservative republicans, Bonnard wrote, had been captivated by the republican ideals of egalitarianism, democratic liberties, and international fraternity. In these parties of the so-called conservatives, there was a “prejudice in favor of revolutionary opinions.”⁵⁷³ In short, within the current Republican system, there was no longer any opposition, “there is only the excess of the Left that exists without counterpoint.”⁵⁷⁴ Only the external opposition of the politically excluded extreme right remained.

This extra-parliamentary extreme Right, Bonnard believed in the early 1930s, was represented by what he termed the “reactionaries” among whose number he counted himself. The reactionaries, he wrote, were given this name which “marked a rupture and an absolute opposition to the established regime which is evil in its essence according to us.”⁵⁷⁵ These reactionaries were

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid., 34.

⁵⁷¹ Ibid., 43.

⁵⁷² Ibid., 139.

⁵⁷³ Ibid., 179.

⁵⁷⁴ Ibid., 171.

⁵⁷⁵ Abel Bonnard, “Les Reactionnaires,” *Je Suis Partout*, May 19 1941. In sum, they were the men who “remained faithful to the truths of life in a regime which constituted itself on principles opposed to them... who

epitomized by the leaders of the Action Française. Unfortunately, Bonnard wrote in his eventual disillusionment with the AF, because the world was allied against them and their values, because the regime deprived them of any chance to serve their nation, because it excluded them from the places of power, they had separated themselves from the life of the world.⁵⁷⁶ By isolating and alienating their intellectual community from the general public and embracing a political form disconnected from the needs of modern society, the AF had become ineffective and inactive. During these years where Bonnard sensed the entire political world of France to be dominated by the Left and the only external opposition to have been rendered ineffective that he found a new opportunity for the excluded Right: fascism.

Bonnard's resentment of the intellectual hegemony of the Left was paired with a corresponding desire to delegitimize this dominant power and legitimize the alternative model and values of the Right. The Left was accused of allowing an international party to manipulate and corrupt its freedom of thought and of debasing its intellectual ability in socialist realism. While Bonnard dismissed left-wing values as dangerous and "false ideas" that were unnatural for the French, he hailed those of the Right as "the ideal of French political thought and culture."⁵⁷⁷ He urged the French Right not to have any fear of acting or "shame of their opinions, even when their adversaries treat them as fascists." For if, he continued, the ideas of the Right were those of fascism, as the Left said in an attempt to discredit them, then despite the fact that the Left "had made a bogeyman of it," fascism was a valuable resource.⁵⁷⁸

As it had been for his predecessors on the engaged Right, the most effective means of delegitimizing the intellectual Left while legitimizing the intellectual Right was to display the

recalled obstinately the laws of all health in a society which is lost and exalts the ideas which continue to lose it."

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁷ Mievre, "L'évolution politique," 11.

⁵⁷⁸ Bonnard, *Inedits politiques*, 48.

differences in intellectual values, worldviews, and concepts of intellectual responsibility and role between the two camps. By clearly noting these differences from the dominant intellectual model being promoted by the Left, men with substantial intellectual and journalistic prestige, like Bonnard, hoped to convince the public that their ideas and their thinkers, though demeaned as fascist or anti-intellectual by the Left, were in fact legitimate alternatives. As Bonnard would write, “It is here that the men of thought are able to be useful . . . far from repeating to them that differences in political opinion are of little importance” the intellectuals should instead “fulfill their duty” by giving an example of committed opinion and marking clearly the differences that exist between the camps.⁵⁷⁹ In particular, Bonnard believed that the right-wing values of Realism, Elitism, and fascist renewal through Franco-German rapprochement separated the intellectuals of the Right from the Left and gave them their own distinctive identity.

Differentiation of Intellectual Values: Realism

Essential to this right-wing intellectual identity was an appreciation for and a connection to the Real. This was, Bonnard was always quick to point out, a value that the intellectual Left was unable to comprehend. Just as the intellectuals of the Right, from Barrès to Maurras, had before him, Bonnard claimed that having a concept of intelligence and a social vision that was grounded in reality and backed by experience made his intellectual guidance more effective in meeting the actual needs of France. The romance of the Real was not new to the Right. As in the past, 1930s realism implied that intelligence was only true if it was produced from contact with the social, geographical, and temporal realities. Because of this, the Right continued to reject abstraction, universals, and absolute truths that remained essential to the Left’s concept of intelligence. But, the changing circumstances of the 1930s would give the Right’s understanding of realism a new layer of complexity. With the new influence of fascism, there was an increasing tendency to see intelligence as a product of an organic collective rather than an individual. The new fascist glorification of action also contributed to the new

⁵⁷⁹ Bonnard, *Le Drame du present*, 308.

understanding of intellectual realism. Ideas that were in contact with the Real were ideas that could be put into action and practically applied. Finally, intellectual realism began to be connected to the fascist concept of the complete man. The true intellectual was a “complete man” who drew inspiration not only from rational thought but also from his experience, sentiment, will, and inherited wisdom.

Bonnard was adamant that Realism was a quality found only on the intellectual Right since the intellectual of the Left was incapable of recognizing or relating to the Real. He accused the Popular Front in general of “abhorring all reality” and epitomizing the “irrealism which the entire nation had attained.”⁵⁸⁰ The intellectuals of the Left were so immersed in their abstract theories that they were incapable of appreciating the reality that surrounded them. “The intellectuals that I know,” Bonnard wrote, “whose profession is to understand all, no longer understand anything because they close their windows to think at the very moment where they ought to open them wide...they have not enough mind for the reality which is offered to them.” In particular, Bonnard accused the Left of dwelling in intellectual abstraction and verbalism rather than attempting to understand the restrictions that reality placed on their ideas or the implications that their thought would have on real social life. He accused the erudite thinkers of the Left of weaving beautiful phrases like “acrobats” high above the plane of real life. These ideas and visions, particularly those envisioned by the Marxists, of egalitarianism, higher standards of living, and an end to war, might be beautiful and enticing, he warned, but they could never be effectively applied because they had no basis in real historical experience.

The Right’s appreciation of the current, French reality gave them a distinctive understanding of their role and responsibility as intellectual guides that the Left would not share. According to Bonnard, the Left believed that being an intellectual necessitated a separation from real society in order to develop a superior idea of a perfected humanity. The role of the intellectual of the Left was to

⁵⁸⁰ Abel Bonnard, “Le Français qu’il nous faut,” *Je Suis Partout*, March 21 1941.

be a disinterested critic removed from the impurities of real society and a visionary of better alternatives. Once theorized, their abstract vision could be imposed on the existing reality. Their universal values and abstract theories, Bonnard concluded, “are only a common expedient...to ignore the world. One formulated that which the world ought to be in order to dispense with going to see for oneself that which it had become.”⁵⁸¹ But, he continued, despite their beauty, these universal values and theories had not started with an honest assessment of man and society as it currently existed, but rather with rationalizations, high ideals, and an abstract understanding of “humanity.” Because of this they were sterile, inapplicable to the real world, and insignificant to society.

The intellectual of the Right, on the other hand, saw his duty differently. Rather than dreaming of the world as it should be, Bonnard wrote, the true intellectual’s “role is to know the world ‘such as it is’ in order to prevent it from remaining such as it is.”⁵⁸² To fulfill this role, the intellectual needed to be able to “rediscover the attraction, the taste, the love of the real” and to know the world rather than simply critique it. Only by first recognizing and accepting the world as it was, could the intellectual find the power to act on the world in order to change it. Action in the realm of the real was therefore key to right-wing concepts of intellectual responsibility and engagement. Unlike the intellectual of the Left, who Bonnard described as “the man who serves himself of words in order to separate himself from things,” the intellectual of the Right, the “true man” eschewed this sterile verbalism in favor of intellectual action, preferring “to use words in order to know and make known these things.”⁵⁸³ Verbalism, which Bonnard associated with the intellectual Left, sought to hide and ignore, Realism, which he attributed solely to the intellectual Right, sought to uncover and change through action.

⁵⁸¹ Bonnard, “L’Intelligence française.”

⁵⁸² Bonnard, “Le Français qu’il nous faut.”

⁵⁸³ Abel Bonnard, “Morale d’une défaite” September 7 1940 in *Inédits politiques d’Abel Bonnard de l’academie française* (Paris: Editions Avalon, 1987).

Bonnard's attachment to intellectual Realism would lead him to reject the term "intelligence" in favor of "good sense" and "character." His distinction between the two concepts was drawn from a tradition of right-wing Realism stretching back to Massis' appreciation of sentiment and experience and Barrès' concept of collective wisdom. Yet, it was also influenced by the new fascist theme of the "complete man" as the foundation for social change. Bonnard's dismissal of the term "intelligence" and his related article entitled "je n'aime pas les intellectuels"⁵⁸⁴ were immediately touted by the Left as an indication of his anti-intellectualism. However, Bonnard was not dismissing either the traditional concept of intelligence nor the title and role of the intellectual, but only the connotations these terms had assumed under the dominant Left. To clarify, he wrote in the first paragraph of the offending article: "I myself am an intellectual," and used the title to describe his peers on the Right. The article specified that the reason he "did not like intellectuals" was because the intellectuals of the Left "believe only in the type of merit that they flatter themselves of having." In particular, Bonnard clarified, these "faux intellectuels" believed in the merit of abstract, rational, logical thought divorced from the other sensibilities that made man complete and real.⁵⁸⁵

Bonnard also made it clear that his preference for "character" and "good sense" was not a rejection of intelligence but rather a heightened concept of it that was divorced from this rationalism of the Left. He wrote of the two concepts, "Is there an incompatibility between good sense and intelligence? I do not believe it. On the contrary, true intelligence is only a magnificent extension of good sense. But there is an enormous gap between good sense and false intelligence."⁵⁸⁶ False intelligence, he made clear, was that which he had attributed to the Left, based on "brilliant words" and ideas "without any sort of verification in reality." It was, he emphasized, "entirely the opposite of

⁵⁸⁴ Abel Bonnard, "Je n'aime pas les intellectuels," *Emancipation Nationale*, March 19 1938.

⁵⁸⁵ He fumed in one article, "these French intellectuals of the Left, the men the most aged and outdated that there are in the world, without relation to any type of reality, speak without cease of 'progress' because they dare not regard the future. Whatever they are able to say, life is otherwise." "En ecoutant la voix anglaise" August 22 1940 in *Inedits politiques d'Abel Bonnard de l'academie française* (Paris: Editions Avalon, 1987).

⁵⁸⁶ Abel Bonnard, "Le bon sens francais," *La revue hebdomadaire*, March 19 1938.

intelligence.”⁵⁸⁷ Common good sense and character, in contrast, were “augmented, enriched, refined in the harmonious development of an individual born to think” until they became true intelligence.⁵⁸⁸ Good sense in the hands of these thinking men would produce not vacant words but “useful words, words that have value by the application that one is able to make of them in real life.”⁵⁸⁹ “The so called intelligence, “he wrote of the left-wing concept, “is only the wandering in a void, good sense is a practical intelligence on a sure terrain.”⁵⁹⁰ This sure terrain of true intelligence was the accumulation of experience in the real world by a long history of the collective French people.

In clear opposition to the Left’s concept of intelligence as an individual accomplishment of private logic and reasoning, Bonnard saw intelligence as Barrès had: as an expression of collective wisdom. “Good sense,” he explained, “is the wisdom of all speaking from the mouth of one, the speech it inspires is not the invention of an individual...it recalls to us the virtues proven by the centuries.”⁵⁹¹ The theme of collective wisdom would also be influenced by the new fascist discourse of the organic nation. To be a nationalist rather than an internationalist, to be rooted in the reality of one’s time and space rather than in vague assumptions about humanity provided the intellectual with “a manner of entering into things.” This organic connection with the essence of the nation made him a “concrete man... animated by more force than he could have been by himself, proud of the grandeur in which he participated.” It was the intellectuals of the nationalist and fascist Right, who “being both men of thought and men of heart” had this essential organic connection with the nation.⁵⁹²

The role and responsibility of the realist intellectual, therefore, was to draw on all of the elements of human life and the particularities of current French society in order to develop a practical

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁸ Bonnard, *Ce monde et moi*, 130.

⁵⁸⁹ Bonnard, “Le bon sense français.”

⁵⁹⁰ Bonnard, *Ce monde et moi*, 129.

⁵⁹¹ Ibid.

⁵⁹² Abel Bonnard, “Preface,” in *L’Education et l’idée de patrie* (Paris: Librairie de l’Arc., 1936).

solution to the contemporary malaise. This required an active participation in the life of society, an appreciation of the accumulated wisdom in national traditions, and an understanding of society “as it is” rather than “as it should be.” Being a realist meant thinking on the level of the national rather than the international, the concrete rather than the abstract, and the utilitarian rather than the utopian. In practice, this meant speaking and thinking in terms of the French people rather than the abstract, universal “People” and of “National Revolution” rather than “Revolution.” It was, Bonnard concluded, a responsibility understood only by the Right.

Elitism and anti-Egalitarianism

Bonnard’s work also consistently emphasized another intellectual value of the Right that distinguished it dramatically from the intellectual Left: the desire for an elite. While the intellectual Left glorified the democratic ideal of egalitarianism or, as the communists did, called for revolution to level society, the intellectual Right favored hierarchy and elitism. In Bonnard’s writing, this was expressed through opposition to democracy and communism and the egalitarianism he believed was the common foundation for both political forms. Bonnard’s concept of elitism and anti-egalitarianism was strongly influenced by his early background as a Maurrassian, yet by the late 1930s he had broken with the Action Française vision of the elite. Instead of one tied to monarchism, Bonnard began to advocate a new type of elite which remained a prerogative of the Right, but was influenced more by fascism than monarchism.

The evils of egalitarianism and the Republican crusade against social hierarchy and elitism began, Bonnard believed, with the enlightenment and the French Revolution. Bonnard and others on the Right saw a long history of struggle between the “two Frances...revolutionary France of the Rights of man enflamed with pure republican mystique and conservative and traditional France.”⁵⁹³ The first was incontestably linked to the “Left since it is in the ideas of the Left that the purest

⁵⁹³ Cahiers Fustel de Coulanges; *revue bitrimestrielle*, July 1930.

democratic doctrine is incarnated” while the second was the patrimony of the intellectual Right.⁵⁹⁴ Egalitarianism and a hatred of any form of elitism was, Bonnard believed, the most noxious outcome of this Revolution. The steady decline of France was due in great part to the fact that the “nation remained impregnated with the abstract idea of man that the 18th century had formed and that democracy had translated by saying that each man was the equal of another.”⁵⁹⁵ The great danger, Bonnard wrote, was that this “master idea” “was so well admitted” that it didn’t even have to be expressed any more. It had become engrained and almost incontrovertible in the public’s mind.⁵⁹⁶ Such a hegemonic ideal gave the Left a real political power over the Right and prevented the Right from effectively replacing the defective egalitarian political formats with right-wing, fascist alternatives. It was the role of the intellectual of the Right to root out this engrained view of man and replace it with a more natural, organic concept of society.

According to Bonnard, the ideology of egalitarianism and its republican incarnation had proven to be unviable in the modern world because of the failures of the Third Republic and the revolutions against democratic governments across Europe. Bonnard wrote as early as 1933 that democracy was “everywhere obsolete” and that the responsibility of the intellectuals should not be attempting to revive or even eulogize it but rather to determine “with what noble form to replace it.”⁵⁹⁷ His engagement was founded in his opposition to democratic ideal of the equality of all men. Election of representatives was simply allowing the blind to lead the blind. The fear of a tyrannical elite instilled in the public by the Jacobins led them to prefer automatically their less threatening peers as leaders. Those who had some wisdom or talent in public affairs were immediately made suspect and the mediocre elected in their stead. In opposition to these essentials of democratic government,

⁵⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁵ Bonnard, *Le Drame du present*, 242.

⁵⁹⁶ Ibid, 241.

⁵⁹⁷ Abel Bonnard, “Necessite d’une elite,” *La revue hebdomadaire*, January 24 1933.

Bonnard was convinced that “the good of the people is only able to be assured by an authority which is not directly emanated from it nor subject to being revoked by it.”⁵⁹⁸ It needed leadership with vision and authority beyond its limited comprehension in order to reemerge from the chaos into which democracy had thrown it.

Communism did not escape Bonnard’s critique either. As a sister political form to democracy founded on the ideal of egalitarianism and social leveling, Marxism, Bonnard decided, took the concept of homogenized mediocrity to extremes. “Communism,” Bonnard wrote, “renders man stupid...the internationalist is a consumed, dehumanized, *leveled* man.”⁵⁹⁹ The responsible intellectual celebrated the unity of the patrie in all its various social levels and envisioned the nation in solidarity, while “the socialists and their friends on the left, the Bolsheviks, destroy the patrie by means of the following idea: there is no vertical solidarity...there is only a horizontal international solidarity.”⁶⁰⁰ This idea of international solidarity based on class consciousness was, Bonnard fumed, enticing to the intellectuals of the Left whose excessive egalitarianism caused them to champion the downtrodden. The communist goal, according to Bonnard, was a society lowered to the level of the proletariat. Here all those with talent and potential, like the savant and the writer, were made to resent their “original social sin” and to strive toward mediocrity in order to serve the communist revolution.

Bonnard believed his struggle to destroy the engrained notion of egalitarianism was more than just a political crusade against its communist and democratic incarnations. Elitism and anti-egalitarianism were also essential to his concept of the intellectual’s responsibility to defend intelligence and culture. Egalitarianism, which Bonnard equated to social leveling in both its democratic and communist formats, demanded that men be conceived as equals not only under the law but in questions of moral, intellectual, and social leadership abilities as well. This was both

⁵⁹⁸ Bonnard, *Ce monde et moi*, 20.

⁵⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 24-6.

⁶⁰⁰ Bocquillon, “Patriotisme,” *Cahiers Fustel de Coulanges; revue bitrimestrielle*, April 1929.

unnatural and unwise according to Bonnard. He constantly expressed his concern that “when it is equality that one wants, it is uniformity that one obtains.”⁶⁰¹ Uniformity was an assault on culture and Western civilization. As one article put it, the intellectual’s duty to defend culture “was one of the strongest motives for leading against democracy the defense of the Intelligence that it degrades and the people that it enslaves in stupidity.”⁶⁰²

Bonnard’s concept of intellectual responsibility therefore demanded that he not simply denounce the evils of egalitarianism but seek to replace it with a new and viable Elite. “Democracy,” Bonnard had written, is an immense enterprise of abasement. If you are convinced that it is the enemy of nobility and of human reason as of the happiness of men, if you believe that the societies it penetrates tend toward baseness, it is necessary to recreate principles that will be capable of engendering a contrary order.”⁶⁰³ This new order opposed to democratic egalitarianism was originally conceived by Bonnard as one of monarchical hierarchy but would eventually evolve into a concept of social elites led by a fascist style “chief.” Rather than the vague system of representative elections, Bonnard wrote, “man today wants to have leaders who are seen, where a power is exercised.” The chief would be chosen and advised by the elite who would automatically recognize his worth, rather than the public who lacked this foresight.⁶⁰⁴ He would exercise an authority to speak and act in the name of the people and would embody their will without being tied to their whim. And, instead of the democratic and Marxist desire to “reduce the elite to the dominant socio-economic class of the time,” Bonnard proposed this elite be chosen, not through “market criteria,” but through meritocracy.⁶⁰⁵

This meritorious elite that Bonnard believed would be the force to reconstitute France would not be a permanent body of aristocrats as the royalists had conceived but rather a fascist elite which

⁶⁰¹ Abel Bonnard, “A la recherche des caractères,” <http://abelbonnard.free.fr/chroniques.htm>.

⁶⁰² Henri Boegner, “Intelligence et démocratie,” *Cahiers Fustel de Coulanges*; revue bitrimestrielle, December 1928.

⁶⁰³ Bonnard, “Nécessité d’ une elite.”

⁶⁰⁴ Mathieu, *Abel Bonnard*, 243.

drew from all levels of the social hierarchy. This “solid harmony, this marvelous constellation of elites” would be representative of the best talents of each layer of the national social structure and would work together to recreate French values and mentalities.⁶⁰⁶ This vision was in clear opposition to the communist vision. Instead of class conflict which would destroy the elite in order to create a level society of proletarian equals, the right-wing intellectuals envisioned class cooperation that created a new elite within their respective social stations. The existing class structure would remain, but each class would be represented and led by its most meritorious members. They would envision themselves as French nationalists rather than part of an International of proles. In this way, the transformation that Bonnard envisioned for society would be a “constructive revolution” of fascist inspiration rather than the “destructive revolution” that he attributed to the communists.

Bonnard’s belief in the necessity of an elite and the destructive nature of egalitarian ideologies placed his vision of the intellectual in clear opposition to those of both the republicans and the communists. While Alain promoted the “precious equality of persons,” Gide supported working class revolution, and Aragon called for class warfare, Bonnard was advocating natural inequality, social stratification, and the cooperation of a new elite united across these strata.

Decadence and Renewal

The discursive themes of decadence and renewal became increasingly popular tools in the cultural politics of the intellectual Right during the 1930s. Their prolific use among writers ranging from the more moderate Massis to the extremist Brasillach, especially during the years leading to the occupation, reveals the increasing influence of fascism on the entire spectrum of the intellectual Right. Decadence and renewal were, for Bonnard in particular, intimately linked to the right-wing ideals of Realism, elitism, and opposition to democracy and communism. As such they were culturally and intellectually powerful tools for critiquing the Republic and the Left and for rallying

⁶⁰⁶ Bonnard, “Necessité d’une elite.”

intellectual support for a Third way like French fascism. They were also part of a common language distinctive to the intellectual Right that indicates a more fundamental separation in intellectual worldviews from that of the Left.

As early as *Les Modérés*, Bonnard was connecting the idea of decadence to the existing parliamentary democratic system and that of renewal to his concept of intellectual Realism and an elite. The elite would be composed of complete men, rooted in the Real and connected to the virility of the ancient and medieval past rather than the corruption of post-1789 France. “These regenerated French,” Bonnard wrote, would recognize “democracy for what it is, they would see the immense enterprise of abasement, and prove that it degrades men.”⁶⁰⁷ Bonnard’s concern in *Modérés* was not whether the destruction of democratic “decadence” was warranted, but rather, “if there will be enough of them [the complete and virile men] to save their country and remake it.”⁶⁰⁸ Bonnard saw this “remaking” of France to be the new role and responsibility of the intellectual elite. As early as 1931, before fascism had provided him with a viable solution, Bonnard was already posing the problem of the decadence of the current demagoguery and the need for a group of intellectuals, like those of the cercle Fustel, to provide an alternative. Others in the cercle imitated this denunciation of the decadence. One article claimed “democracy brings the enslavement of intelligence and the decadence of the intellectual.” The only option for the cercle and the intellectual Right as a whole was to try to “convince our colleagues [on the intellectual Left] that in favoring democracy, they contribute to the intellectual ruin of their country.”⁶⁰⁹

By 1938, as international tensions escalated, Bonnard intensified his contrast between left-wing decadence and the necessary promise of right-wing renewal by painting it as an apocalyptic struggle between the forces of good and evil. “When I speak of combat,” he wrote of the duty of the

⁶⁰⁷ Bonnard, *Le Drame du present*, 298.

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁹ *Cahiers Fustel de Coulanges; revue bitrimestrielle*, July 1936.

engaged intellectual, “ I mean this action that we must without reserve and without relaxing lead against the base and deceitful ideology [of the Left] in order to replace it with the just notions and noble ideas by which a people is able to be reborn.” Only then, he continued, will France, like so many other European nations, “reassure themselves by their abundance of life that they have survived the risk that they ran of dying.”⁶¹⁰ The call “to remake France” and the “necessity of being reborn” from the existing “social decadence” became part of a new language distinct to the intellectual Right in these years appearing in articles, speeches, and even a few manifests like the *Magnifique reveil des intellectuels francais*.⁶¹¹ It was not only the language that was distinctive, but also the concept of social rebirth. Being reborn and remaking France required not a literal revolution like that of the communists but rather a figurative revolution: the reprioritization and renewal of all the general ideas and values in society. This necessitated not a struggle of arms between classes but rather an internal growth within each individual. It was this internal renewal that Bonnard believed fascism alone could accomplish with its return to national tradition, glorification of action, realism, and its reliance on Force and Will.

With the apparent triumph of fascism during the occupation, those intellectuals of the Right like Bonnard who inclined toward collaborationism would declare fascism and Vichy to be the regenerating renaissance they had been calling for. “The government of France,” Bonnard would write of the new Vichy government, “has solemnly announced to us the collapse of a guilty regime and the birth of a regenerating regime...when it concerns for a whole nation being reborn, the creation of a noble and energetic state is the necessary condition for all renewal.”⁶¹² Only the collaborationist government, they believed, in realizing the principles of fascism, could bring about the vital energy, the glory of the past, the spirit of fraternity, and the conditions of spiritual and

⁶¹⁰ Bonnard, “Le Bon sense francais.”

⁶¹¹ Abel Bonnard, “Les Durs et les mous,” *Emancipation Nationale*, April 1 1938.

⁶¹² “Nos défauts et nous” August 25 1940

material life necessary to restore France to its rightful place in Europe. This rebirth of France, according to thinkers like Bonnard, would be accomplished with the cooperation of fascist Germany.

Franco-German Rapprochement

Perhaps the most striking evolution of the intellectual Right in the 1930s was the transition that it made away from the anti-Germanist influence of Maurras and the Action Française. This expansive intellectual organization had held sway over the ideas of nationalism within the intellectual Right for three decades, but its successive failure to bring about the anti-revolutionary coup it had promised, particularly on February 6, caused many disillusioned supporters to seek an alternative. Bonnard was one of many to find this alternative in fascism. Although Maurras would manage to combine his sympathy for fascism with a continued anti-Germanism by identifying with the Italian version, most of the fascist sympathizers of the late 1930s, including Bonnard, were forced to discard the remnants of their AF anti-Germanism for the new ideal of Franco-German rapprochement and collaboration. Because they increasingly saw fascism as the counterpoint to the Popular Front and communism, right-wing intellectuals like Bonnard quickly made rapprochement an integral part of their concept of intellectual responsibility. This image of intellectual duty further separated their concept from that held by the intellectual Left. Although the Left favored an International of Thought, they did not include Nazi Germany in their vision, and, although the Right favored rapprochement with Germany and Italy, they did not include non-fascist nations in theirs.

Bonnard had broken with the Maurrassian model of integral nationalism and anti-germanism as early as 1936, although he continued to lend his name to several AF events.⁶¹³ In the place of what he came to consider the isolated nationalism of Maurras, he began to believe in the benefits of an International of European nationalisms where French nationalism would combine its energy with others in order to effectively destroy democracy and communism. Given this new fascination with

⁶¹³ Mathieu, *Abel Bonnard*, 256.

other European nationalisms, it was not surprising that Bonnard traveled to Germany as a journalist in 1937. It was in his reflections on this voyage and his interviews with fascist leaders, including Hitler and Rosenberg, that Bonnard most clearly outlined his new vision of intellectual collaboration and Franco-German rapprochement.

After speaking with Hitler, Bonnard wrote that he was convinced the best interest of Europe lay in rapprochement. “If reciprocal knowledge is necessary between all the nations,” he wrote, “it is particularly indispensable to France and Germany. In that where all the values are concerned, where the fate of general civilization is decided along with the fate of the patrie, France and Germany are involuntarily linked in solidarity.”⁶¹⁴ Germany and France, he believed now, were the two European geniuses whose mutual cooperation was essential to the regeneration of the continent and the struggle against the communism. They had been equal contributors to the cultural legacy of Europe through science, music, art, and literature. Their continued exchange would not cease to be fruitful in the future. Bonnard was convinced that the “artificial” cultural antagonism that had been placed between them during World War I had been exacerbated by the “false intellectuals” who desired that France’s natural bond with Germany be replaced with a forced relationship to the USSR. It was the true intellectual’s responsibility to increase the fruitful relationships between the two neighbor nations.

Working toward this rapprochement would be an important part of the right-wing intellectual’s role and duty. “The best way to favor a rapprochement,” he wrote, “is to multiply the personal relationships between the Germans and French of all classes. Thus will be created, outside of politics, the relationships that are necessary to influence politics itself.”⁶¹⁵ The only way to create these personal relationships on the popular level, was for French intellectuals to develop cultural liaisons with German intellectuals and organize outlets in science, art, music, or even sports for this interaction. Rapprochement, he wrote, began “not by embraces but by exchanges.” These exchanges

⁶¹⁴ Ibid., 263.

⁶¹⁵ Ibid., 266.

would be “crowned at the top by those which attach between the two nations the savants, the professors, the writers, and the artists and thus will establish itself, outside of politics, a reality of sentiments of which politics itself will only be able to profit.” In this way, the intellectuals would be “fulfilling their function and doing their duty” to preserve culture, serve peace, and connect themselves with their international intellectual peers.⁶¹⁶

Bonnard attempted to model responsible intellectual behavior by participating in a variety of Franco-German exchanges including writers’ congresses and a pilgrimage to Germany. But his most effective engagement would be the steady stream of pro-German, pro-fascist, and pro-cultural rapprochement articles and speeches. His powerful “Berlin en Mai” essay enthusiastically recounted the speeches of Hitler and Goebbels. He praised the industrial, commercial and cultural advances made since Hitler’s rise to power, and described the fraternal bonds nurtured between the youth of all classes as the great alternative to communist class war. Germany was presented in Bonnard’s work as the sister nation to France that would most effectively ally with her “against the elements of universal destruction” which was communism.⁶¹⁷ In summation, Bonnard pleaded for his readers to see the new Germany as a “promise” to the virile peoples and nations and to rise to meet that promise by regenerating France and seeking rapprochement. These articles in favor of Nazi Germany reveal Bonnard’s belief that the responsibility of the active, engaged intellectual was to bring about the cultural and political rapprochement of France and the new Germany.

Bonnard and the Right-Wing Intellectual Model

Bonnard’s engagement during the 1930s was inspired by his resentment of what he perceived to be a left-wing hegemony over every aspect of public affairs and intellectual life. He was convinced that the intellectual Left dominated and excluded the Right from the university, the conceptualization

⁶¹⁶ Bonnard, “Morale d’une défaite.”

⁶¹⁷ Abel Bonnard, “Berlin en Mai,” in *Inédits politiques d’Abel Bonnard de l’academie française* (Paris: Editions Avalon, 1987).

of intelligence, progress, and free thought, and the prestige accorded to intellectuals by the regime. Because of this dominance, he believed the Left had been able to attach their idea of rational, abstract intelligence to the very title of “intellectual.” As they had been defined by the Left, therefore, Bonnard did “not like intellectuals.” But, when conceived according to the vision and values of the Right, he considered himself to be an intellectual. Denouncing the monopoly of the Left and legitimizing the intellectual Right would be an essential component of Bonnard’s engaged work and would distinguish his approach to engagement from that of the intellectual Left. His compulsion to legitimize the Right as an alternative to the intellectual Left led him to highlight the different values and worldviews that existed between the two camps and the very different concepts of intellectual role and responsibility that resulted. Intellectuals of the Right were representatives of a “good sense” that was inspired by all the elements of real life rather than “intelligence” that drew only from rationalism. They were actively involved in meeting the needs of society “as it was” rather than passively envisioning society “as it should have been.” The intellectual of the Right favored the creation of an elite and a vertical solidarity within the nation rather than promoting an unrealistic egalitarianism and international class consciousness. Right-wing intellectuals could be distinguished by their language of decadence and renewal and by their concept of a national revolution. Intellectuals of the Right like Bonnard who had broken with the AF would also be marked by their desire for Franco-German rapprochement. Bonnard’s resentment, mentality of engagement, and concept of intellectual values and role revealed a distinctly right-wing model of intellectual identity that continued the right-wing traditions of the previous decades while evolving to meet the needs of the new political climate. In this he would be joined by Ramon Fernandez.

CHAPTER 11

RIGHT-WING INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY IN THE 1930S: THE CASE OF RAMON FERNANDEZ

Fernandez, like Bonnard, worked to create an alternative model of intellectual identity based on the intellectual values and communities of the Right. Although Bonnard's intellectual evolution was indicative of the great majority of the *fascisant* intellectuals of the 1930s Right who came from a background of political conservatism or Action Française royalism, there were many intellectuals who were drawn to the new Right from the revolutionary Left. Ramon Fernandez is representative of the intellectuals of this trajectory. Despite his early adherence to the SFIO and his support for the AEAR and CVIA, Fernandez would come to be classified as an intellectual "of the Right" by contemporaries and historians because of his late 1930s disavowal of communism and fascination with fascism.⁶¹⁸ This was a classification he was first resistant to, but then embraced as he sought to disassociate himself from the intellectual model of the Left.

Although Ramon was officially born a citizen of Mexico, he would take on French citizenship in 1927 after studying at lycée Louis-le-Grand and the Sorbonne and marrying a Frenchwoman. His Mexican citizenship would, however, prevent him from being drafted in World War I. Fernandez, like many on the Left, was trained at the Sorbonne to become a professor and taught for four years at the college de Montcel. He eventually turned to a career as a writer, a literary critic, and a journalist. By 1922, Fernandez had begun writing articles and literary criticism and received an introduction to Jacques Rivière at the NRF. This would begin a twenty year association

⁶¹⁸ For a more in depth discussion of the place of the PPF in the right-left continuum, see Robert Soucy's response to Zeev Sternhell's *Ni Droite Ni Gauche: l'idéologie fasciste en France* in his *Fascism the First Wave and Fascism the Second Wave*. Also Ory and Sirinelli's *Les intellectuels en France, de l'affaire Dreyfus à nos jours* finds both Fernandez and the PPF to be of the extreme Right by 1936.

with this revue that spanned not only the years of Gide's influence, but also the fascist period under Drieu's direction in the early 1940s. During the 1920s and early 1930s, Fernandez also wrote for other left-wing journals including the *Bulletin de l'Union pour la Verite*, *Europe* and *Commune* and founded the republican weekly *Marianne* with Emmanuel Berl. He maintained, during these years, the adherence to the SFIO that he had begun in 1925. As late as the February 6 riots, Fernandez would write that he was disturbed by the French fascists and that they had made of him, if not a communist, at least an anti-fascist revolutionary.

However, by 1935, Fernandez had become more engaged in political affairs and had grown disillusioned with the communist influence on the Left's understanding of nationalism, revolution, realism, and the working class. This disillusionment was expressed in his politically charged 1935 novel *Les Violents* where his evolution toward "socialisme fasciste" was first indicated. While before he had supported the republic and the socialists despite his disapproval of the communists, he now saw the three parties to be one and the same adversary. In his search for a nationalist party that could counter the adverse effects of the communists, he found the Parti Populaire Français of Jacques Doriot. Doriot had himself been a committed communist and mayor of the communist stronghold Saint Denis until being expelled from the party for questioning doctrine. In 1936, he created the nationalist PPF that would oppose the communists, socialists, and Popular Front to the point that it began to favor fascism. The PPF professed ideas and visions of class cooperation, national socialism, French independence from international forces, and alternative economic policies that brought it closer to the intellectual values of the extreme Right and distanced it dramatically from the intellectual Left. Fernandez would be attracted to the movement as early as its creation in 1936 and would join the party in May 1937. By December, his name would appear in the right-wing *Manifeste aux intellectuels espagnols*, placing him on the side of the "fascist" rebels under Franco and clearly opposed to the intellectual Left who favored the Spanish popular front.

By 1937 Fernandez had become a leading member of the PPF and was writing regular columns in the PPF organ *Emancipation Nationale* on intellectual responsibility, the differences

between left and right-wing intellectuals, and the dangers of intellectual communism. The title of one article, “Qu’est-ce qu’un intellectuel?” was emblematic of the primary force behind his engagement. In May of 1938, he took a leading role in the creation of the Cercles Populaires français. This movement was created explicitly to counter the influence of the left-wing AEAR and its maisons de culture. Although there was much discussion of the place of the CPF in creating a link between the working class and the right-wing intellectuals, the movement was clearly designed to appeal to and communicate with the intellectuals. The CPF was the most active of Fernandez’s efforts to bring intellectual and philosophical values the forefront of the PPF organization and to make it the party of the intellectuals on the Right.

After the occupation, Fernandez continued in his right-wing trajectory as a collaborationist. In October 1941 he joined a coterie of fascist intellectuals traveling to the Weimar congress of writers where he spoke on the role of the intellectual in the new Europe. With the mounting hostility between Vichy and occupied Paris, Fernandez took the side of Paris and converted the CPF to anti-Vichy, pro-German propaganda. Like Bonnard, Fernandez was disinterested in the rabid anti-Semitism of the collaborationists but his occasional articles supporting Jewish separatism cannot be excused or ignored. His articles in the anti-Semitic collaborationist press, from *Aujourd’hui* to *La Gerbe*, also implicate him in the anti-Semitic propaganda of the time. Fernandez was spared official judgment for this anti-Semitism and his broader collaborationism, however, since he died just weeks before the liberation of Paris.

Fernandez has been recognized as an exemplar of the intellectual engaged in politics.⁶¹⁹ His evolution from the intellectual Left to the intellectual Right provides important insight into the significant group of intellectuals who felt themselves drawn to fascism from origins on the Left and were thereafter recognized as being “of the Right.” Most importantly, he was perhaps the intellectual of the 1930s who was the most conscious of his role as an intellectual. Fernandez made intellectual

⁶¹⁹ Pascal Mercier, “Ramon Fernandez,” in *Dictionnaire des Intellectuels Français: les personnes, les lieux, les moments*, ed. Jacques Julliard and Michel Winock (Paris: Seuil, 2002).

identity, intellectual values and responsibility, and the distinction between intellectuals of the fascist right and communist left a focus of every piece he wrote, regardless of topic, in the late 1930s.

Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy

Although Fernandez would be considered an intellectual of the Left until around 1935, after this time, he would have all the fervor of the recently converted. His missionary zeal for the PPF and its crusade against the left-wing intellectuals of the Popular Front would cause Fernandez to become one of the most outspoken intellectuals of the camp “dits de droite” in the 1930s. In particular, Fernandez was insistent on unmasking the hegemony he believed was exerted over intellectual values and engagement in the inter-war years by the communist Left and on asserting the moral and cultural authority of his new right-wing intellectual community. Fernandez, like Bonnard, believed the hegemony of the Left had extended beyond the university setting. He resented the Left’s monopoly on the title and role of the intellectual and their dominance in the most general aspects of daily intellectual and political life. This resentment and desire for legitimacy would affect both the tone and the themes of his engaged work. His articles and speeches would be laced with denunciations of left-wing hegemony, efforts to claim the role of the intellectual for the Right, and attempts to delegitimize the intellectual Left.

Initially, Fernandez’s resentment of the Left was expressed purely as an angry denunciation of their hegemony over intellectual life. In one of his clearest attempts to explain this hegemony, Fernandez wrote, “The complaisance of the men of the Left does not cease to astonish me. They do not claim only to have an opinion, which is their right, but they claim to have THE opinion, that which is not their right. They not only claim to have intelligence, which is possible after all, they claim to have THE intelligence, the only, the unique intelligence. They do not only claim to have good sentiments, they claim to have THE good sentiments.” In short, he concluded “these adversaries of monopolies have the monopoly on genius. These enemies of trusts make a trust of all the human

qualities. Such, at least is their pretension. But they are far from accurate.”⁶²⁰ Fernandez was furious and resentful that by being categorized as a fascist intellectual, he had been excluded from the moral superiority and cultural authority associated with the role of the intellectual. Despite the presence in the oppositional camp of recognized, engaged men of thought like Maurras, Bonnard, Drieu, and Fernandez himself, the intellectuals of the Left continued to claim for themselves the “monopoly” over French thought, intelligence, culture, and the best interests of society.

To make matters worse, Fernandez fumed, they had convinced the public both at home and abroad of the legitimacy of this dominance. When reflecting on the “scandal” that was the submission of French intellectuals to the Popular Front, Fernandez was even more distressed by the public’s perception that the “intellectual” could only support the Popular Front. In a line reminiscent of Barres’ 1899 declaration, Fernandez wrote, “that which is more serious still is that many foreigners currently imagine that French intelligence is entirely on the side of the Popular Front.”⁶²¹ This international perception of the intellectual was a coup for the intellectual Left that Fernandez angrily attributed to “the unpardonable act of brainwashing” by the Popular Front thinkers.⁶²² This manipulation of opinion by the intellectual Left, according to Fernandez, came out noticeably in their engagement in favor of the Spanish writers of the Left. He wrote that the intellectual Left “says to the readers that it concerns here the ‘authentic representatives of Spain. The others, the intellectuals of Spain ranged against the Marxist tyranny of Madrid and Barcelona are only, without doubt, bloody mercenaries disguised for the cause in the false feathers of authentic intellectual representatives.”⁶²³ But, Fernandez wrote, discrediting the intellectual Right of Spain was nothing compared to the Left’s

⁶²⁰ Ramon Fernandez, “La culpabilité morale de Leon Blum,” *Emancipation Nationale*, July 10, 1937.

⁶²¹ Ibid.

⁶²² Ibid.

⁶²³ Ramon Fernandez, “Les intellectuels et la guerre d’Espagne,” *Emancipation Nationale*, March 17, 1939.

efforts to keep the intellectual Right of France out of public favor. The key to this discredit would be anti-fascism.

Anti-fascism was the primary tool of the intellectual Left in its crusade to disempower the intellectual Right. As such, it received the focused fury of Fernandez in his tirades against left-wing hegemony. In an article tellingly entitled “Incapables d’avoir raison contre Doriot...les ‘intellectuels’ s’en consolent en le représentant comme un croquemitaine fasciste,” Fernandez claimed that what the “intellectual,” placed in quotes to suggest the dubious nature of his title, calls fascism today are “all the political programs opposed to that which he has elaborated in the silence of his room, between his dreams and his books.”⁶²⁴ In other words, the intellectuals of the Left labeled as fascist any intellectual program that was rooted in social reality, opposed their communist utopias, and therefore categorically of the Right. Unable to justify their accusations of fascism, Fernandez continued angrily, “these sirs have invented a prefascism” which they accuse all their opposition on the Right of displaying. In truth, Fernandez wrote, the label of fascist and prefascist was simply a refusal to enter into a debate of ideas with the intellectual Right. “Behind the proposal of ‘anti-fascism, one senses a great fear of thinking, of creating,” in short, a refusal to fulfill the responsibilities of an intellectual. Instead of accepting the intellectuals of the Right and debating their ideas, Fernandez explained, the intellectuals of the communist Left chose to automatically discredit them. “M. Langevin is a great savant, M. Maurras a great mind, M. Montherlant a stylist of great value, here are the facts,” Fernandez wrote as example. “Here now is what the communist tactic draws from the facts: Langevin is with us therefore he is a genius. Maurras is against us therefore he is an idiot and naturally a fascist.”⁶²⁵ This showed the irresponsibility of the so-called intellectuals of the Left who hid behind anti-fascism to avoid discussion, Fernandez wrote. “These intellectuals do not attempt at all to *be*

⁶²⁴ Ramon Fernandez, “Incapables d’avoir raison contre Doriot,” *Emancipation Nationale*, July 24, 1937.

⁶²⁵ Ramon Fernandez, “En Russie les Communistes ont domestiqué les intellectuels,” *Emancipation Nationale*, July 17, 1937.

right, they simply give ‘right’ to themselves.”⁶²⁶ This was the epitome of an abusive intellectual hegemony.

To counter this hegemony, Fernandez would not hesitate to claim the title and role of the true intellectual for himself and his peers on the intellectual Right. In an article on the Second Congress of the PPF, Fernandez spoke clearly of his own role in the party. “I pronounce myself here as an intellectual,” he began, explaining that Doriot had given him the momentous task of “representing the intellectuals” for the PPF and of organizing its intellectual community the CPF.⁶²⁷ Fernandez believed that, unlike the communist and socialist parties that utilized intellectuals simply to glorify the workers, the PPF was the “party of the workers *and* the intellectuals.”⁶²⁸ As such, he wrote, intellectuals felt welcomed and did not have to “sacrifice their culture” or their intellectual integrity, as social realists did, by adhering. It was in his capacity as the organizer of the PPF intellectuals, he continued, that he had been able to note the large number of recognized writers and savants who had chosen to engage through the PPF. “I have observed,” he emphasized here, “the quality, the cultural value of the intellectuals who have come to us.”⁶²⁹ And, he would write in later articles, “in the enthusiastic response of the intellectual elites... very few weeks pass where I do not find in the register some eminent name.”⁶³⁰ In his effort to legitimize the right-wing intellectual of the PPF, it was not uncommon for Fernandez to list these “eminent names” of PPF associated intellectuals who were popular or had achieved academic honors like Bonnard, Drieu, and Bertrand de Jouvenel.

Claiming the title and role of the intellectual and calling attention to the distinguished names of the Right did not automatically assure the right-wing intellectual legitimacy and authority. With this in mind, Fernandez worked diligently to outline what he considered to be the true “task of an

⁶²⁶ Ramon Fernandez, “L’Esprit du Temps,” *Emancipation Nationale*, January 20, 1939.

⁶²⁷ Ramon Fernandez, “Notre deuxieme Congres,” *Emancipation Nationale*, March 26, 1938.

⁶²⁸ Ramon Fernandez, “Le PPF et le pays intellectuel,” *Emancipation Nationale*, March 11, 1938.

⁶²⁹ Fernandez, “Notre deuxieme Congres.”

⁶³⁰ Fernandez, “Le PPF et le pays intellectuel.”

intellectual” and to distinguish “those intellectuals worthy of the name” on the Right from those like the left-wing Guehenno and Benda “who have not wanted to see clearly and have failed in their task.”⁶³¹ Part of this legitimizing strategy for Fernandez was to emphasize his own decision to convert. “I served the ideas called ‘of the Left’ for years” he wrote, “but toward the end of June 1936, from the point that one could see clearly the methods of this majority, such service was no longer possible.”⁶³² Fernandez argued here that in order to continue to uphold intellectual responsibility and the values of any truly French intellectual, it had been necessary for him to leave the Left for the PPF and the ideas called “of the Right.”

Now, his intellectual responsibility lay in “taking back [from the dominant Left] one by one all the ideas, one by one all the words which compose our mental universe.”⁶³³ Taking these ideas, like family, fidelity, authority, and liberty back and returning to them their right-wing content, Fernandez and his collaborators believed, was one of the responsibilities of the true French intellectual, and it was only available to those who were in touch with the values of the intellectual, nationalist Right. Also, far from the internationalism proclaimed by the Left to be the hallmark of the French intellectual, Fernandez would write that “the intellectual, the true one” would produce a work of genius that was “only able to be national.”⁶³⁴ By showing the international, communist Left incapable of intellectual responsibility and the nationalist Right preternaturally disposed toward it, Fernandez hoped to legitimize the concept of right-wing intellectuals and to replace the Left’s dominance over intellectual authority.

Fernandez was also intent on discrediting the ideology of the Left itself by revealing the inherent dangers of communism. The hegemony that allowed the “intellectual bolshevization of

⁶³¹ Ramon Fernandez, “Le Front Populaire est enterré par ses intellectuels,” *Emancipation Nationale*, May 20, 1938.

⁶³² Ibid.

⁶³³ Ramon Fernandez, “De l’Elite,” *Emancipation Nationale*, May 26, 1939.

⁶³⁴ “Ramon Fernandez à Marseille,” *La Liberté*, September 23, 1938.

France” was, according to Fernandez, undeniable. “One of the preoccupations of the Left since 1936,” he wrote, “has been to establish that only the communists and their allies are capable of saving France, of understanding French interests.”⁶³⁵ This hegemony over the role of French social and moral guide was completely unwarranted according to Fernandez. Communism, he explained, was “the action of a party in the pay of a foreigner who has dragged the French flag in the mud and France into the manure.”⁶³⁶ They have been able to “trace a circle of black magic so that nothing is able to be truly French without being designated as reactionary and renegade.”⁶³⁷ Communism, therefore, could not represent French thought or French culture because it had no comprehension of national things and worked only to destroy them and their proponents. Yet, Fernandez wrote, communism still held sway over the public mind. “The bolshevik publishing houses,” he argued, “institute sweetly a veritable dictatorship over thought.” And the intellectuals of the Republic, if they did not welcome it, were unable to see its infiltration.⁶³⁸

Rather than indicating a defense of culture as the “anti-fascists” boasted, Fernandez wrote that “antifascism, when led by the communists, contented itself with attracting “naïve intellectuals to it in order to maneuver them like puppets.”⁶³⁹ Under the Marxist spell, intellectuals “were obligated to undermine the forces of free intelligence, of free will, of energy, and notably of all that which makes the force and traditional grace of French civilization.”⁶⁴⁰ What greater proof, Fernandez was asking, could the public need to see that the communist thinker betrayed culture and True France and was unfit for the role of intellectual. “French thought,” he continued in order to drive this point home,

⁶³⁵ Ramon Fernandez, “La Droite et la Gauche,” *Emancipation Nationale*, June 30, 1939.

⁶³⁶ Ramon Fernandez, “Le Communisme et M. Julien Benda,” *Emancipation Nationale*, August 12, 1938.

⁶³⁷ Ramon Fernandez, “M. Hubert Bourgin explique lumineusement la corruption de l’élite intellectuelle,” *Emancipation Nationale*, April 22, 1938.

⁶³⁸ Ramon Fernandez, “Délivrons la pensée du mensonge libéral,” *Emancipation Nationale*, December 31, 1937.

⁶³⁹ Fernandez, “En Russia.”

⁶⁴⁰ Ibid.

“expresses the exact opposite of Marxist thought...and as French thought is living, strong, and rich from a glorious past, it declares war on those who want to crush it.” The true representatives of French thought, Fernandez wrote, were those on the intellectual Right who defended its vital national sources. And “to distinguish its enemies, the criteria is simple,” he wrote with flourish, “all the intellectuals, whatever be their claims, who accept being led by the Marxist tactic and therefore who accept Marxism, who betray French thought and with it universal thought.”⁶⁴¹ The communist “intellectuals” were therefore disqualified from the role of the French intellectual and the right-wing intellectuals were its true representatives.

In order to redefine the intellectual for the Right and separate it from the ideals fused to it by the Left, Fernandez had to clearly differentiate his own concept of intellectual values and role from that of the Left. Throughout his engaged work, he highlighted intellectual values that he believed distanced him from his peers on the Left, particularly the communists, while uniting him to the true intellectuals of true France. His emphasis on intellectual Realism, the necessity of an elite, class cooperation, and nationalism linked him to a broad network of intellectuals on the new Right while emphasizing his separation from those of the Popular Front and communism.

Differentiation of Intellectual Values: Class cooperation and anti-communism

During the 1930s, the intellectuals of the communist sympathizing Left from the more hesitant Gide to the extremist Aragon were praising the USSR for the destruction of the bourgeoisie through class conflict. These intellectuals saw social relations and economic corruption to be so irreparable that salvation could only come from a revolution where ownership changed hands and social class dominance shifted. In an effort to aid this revolution and the proletarian dictatorship it would prepare, many of these writers altered their literary production to cater to the needs and interests of the masses. In clear opposition to this concept of social class relations and the responsibility of the intellectual, Fernandez would promote the PPF ideal of class cooperation, oppose

⁶⁴¹ Ibid.

the communist idea of revolution, and reject the soviet's worker-focused culture. In these ways, he made obvious the division that now existed between his right-wing concept of class, culture, and social change and those of his peers on the communist Left.

Fernandez retained a real concern for the working class from his left-wing origins that would color his involvement in the new Right of the 1930s. Although the CPF was primarily an organization for intellectuals whose appeals to the workers were of secondary concern, these appeals were always made. And, although Fernandez's new fascination with the PPF and the intellectual Right led him to focus primarily on the need for an elite, many of his articles and speeches returned to the issue of the masses and the working class. Unlike the communist sympathizing intellectuals, however, Fernandez did not make the People or class revolution a theme of his work. Nor did he see the role of the intellectual to be inspiring conflict between the workers and the elite. "The intellectual ought to go to the people, not to say 'People you are God,'" Fernandez wrote, "and not to say 'me, the thinker, I am God' but rather to say 'we, all of us, have a great task which is to construct a nation.'" This view of the true role of the intellectual, Fernandez wrote in an effort to distinguish his own vision from that of the intellectual Left, would not be "found in these 'intellectual' journals of the Popular Front."⁶⁴²

In striking contrast to the communist ideology, Fernandez and the PPF continued to see "profit as the motor of economic activity" and rather than seeking to destroy the capitalist urge, sought only to reign in its most extreme abuses.⁶⁴³ Profit, Fernandez believed, was not the evil in itself. Rather it was the diversion of all profits to the owners that created economic disaster. If the workers had a legitimate part of the profit from their industry, then cooperation could continue without the need for a communist style conflict. Fernandez also supported the PPF in its recognition of the bourgeoisie. "The PPF, unlike the Marxists and the Liberals," its program read, "considers the middle classes to be useful, to have a great economic future, and to be the representatives of a specific

⁶⁴² Ibid.

⁶⁴³ Paul Marion, *Programme du Parti Populaire français* (Paris: Les Oeuvres Françaises, 1938), 21.

French social type.”⁶⁴⁴ Because the bourgeoisie was a vital part of the French socio-economic landscape, rather than a superfluous, parasitical class, Fernandez and the PPF would devote as much of their economic discussion to small business protection and tax relief as they did to working class conditions and rights. Most importantly, however, Fernandez and the PPF opposed the communist economic ideology and the doctrine of class conflict by demanding that the public recognize that the problems of the French nation were not all economic in nature. A Marxist revolution against bourgeois capitalism, the PPF stated, would not cure France. “To reduce the national and social transformation which imposes itself on France...to the struggle against a certain economic regime is to shrink, pervert, and finally mask and evade the real problem. All our evils do not come because our production of material goods rises from private initiative.”⁶⁴⁵ Like Bonnard, Fernandez believed that instead of class revolution in the Marxist style, the role of the intellectual was to promote a reformation of the French esprit and mentality. This reformation would only come about through mutual understanding, national fraternity, and inter-class cooperation, not through class antagonism or conflict.

Fernandez was quick to compare the communist method of inspiring class hatred to that created under the Terror during the Revolution. In this way, he attempted to use the Left’s omnipresent discursive themes of “Revolution” and “the People” against them. “Here is the source of the evil which today kills the philosophy of the Popular Front,” he wrote, “It is the faith of Rousseau, the faith of the Terror. It elects a part of the nation that it calls ‘the People’ and that it makes the exclusive object of its adoration and its wills. All the rest is its enemy all the rest is the perfidious conspiracy against ‘humanity.’”⁶⁴⁶ Such an approach to French class relations, Fernandez believed, would only lead to the sort of national division and disaster that the Terror had produced. Rather than

⁶⁴⁴ Ibid., 50.

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid., 65.

⁶⁴⁶ Fernandez, “Le Front Populaire est enterré.”

glorifying the working class and demonizing the owning class in order to create or intensify a sense of division and irreconcilability, Fernandez wanted a class policy that was rooted in French nationalism. Like Bonnard, he wanted a vertical solidarity rather than a horizontal, class based one. “Render to the workers, to the masses, a sense of the national will,” he wrote, “such is the only path for a creative revolution capable of uniting all the French.”⁶⁴⁷ It was his concept of nationalism uniting the working class with the owning class in a common effort of national growth and shared economic prosperity that Fernandez believed distinguished his concept of economics and class relations from the communists. He would make this distinction quite clear saying, “The Popular Front is not able to achieve unity because they detest certain classes, groups, because they reject portions of France. But nothing of that which is French is foreign to us.”⁶⁴⁸ How could any thinking man, Fernandez wondered, reject the possibility for social change shown by this “total adhesion to the nation” for the “deceitful rut of the dictatorship of the proletariat.”⁶⁴⁹

Fernandez’s approach to class cooperation was mirrored by his concept of the role of the intellectual. Although the committed party intellectuals of the Left were small in number, their powerful influence over the concept of the left-wing intellectual led Fernandez to cite them most often in his effort to differentiate the role of the right-wing intellectual. The PCF intellectual of the Left had come to see his responsibility to culture to be a responsibility to the working class. The proletariat became the audience, the subject, and the muse of any literary work and the intellectual was made ashamed of his own superior education and talent. Soviet culture was worker-focused culture and all else, even literature that avoided social and economic issues, was suspected of bourgeois or even aristocratic inclination. For Fernandez, intellectual responsibility borrowed from the idea of class cooperation. Rather than glorifying the worker and subjugating the intellectual,

⁶⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁹ Ramon Fernandez, “Ils ne comprennent la Revolutin qu’a partir de la Terreur!” *Emancipation Nationale*, June 19, 1937.

intellectuals and workers were to participate in a harmonious exchange where each learned from the other's strengths. "The CPF" Fernandez wrote of what he believed was the incarnation of this vision, "intends to proceed differently" from the communists and the Maison de Culture. "They believe that workers and intellectuals have essential things to say to one another...that it is necessary neither to intellectualize the worker nor to demagogically proletarianize the intellectual."⁶⁵⁰ For Fernandez, the Cercles were an effort by the intellectuals to "collaborate together and better know" the workers in order to "save France from the Marxist enterprise" that was class conflict and worker domination.⁶⁵¹

This collaboration of the intellectuals with the workers envisioned that the intellectual would provide "nourriture intellectuelle" to the masses, inculcating them with respect for the traditions and history of the nation.⁶⁵² This responsibility gave cultural and moral authority to the intellectuals rather than deeming them incapable of understanding the workers' revolution or finding them useful only when their work was easily accessible to the lowest of the masses. Fernandez summarized this essential difference between Left and Right saying, "we think, on the contrary, that in place of reducing the nation to the people, it is necessary to raise them to the equal of the nation."⁶⁵³ Rather than finding in the masses as they were the ideal for France, Fernandez believed that the ideal for France needed to be inculcated in the masses until they grew to meet its high standards. This difference in conceptualizations of intellectual responsibility and the potential of the working class was perhaps one of Fernandez's most intense reasons for rejecting intellectual communism. Without naming names, Fernandez would write "Neither nationalism nor communism completely assures the birth, development, and perfection of the essential activities which raise the spirit. All that one is able to say is that some political forms, some social measures are more proper than others for the

⁶⁵⁰ Ramon Fernandez, "La Leçon de Saint Denis," *Emancipation Nationale*, July 16, 1938.

⁶⁵¹ APP Ba 1946

⁶⁵² Ibid.

⁶⁵³ Fernandez, *Le Front Populaire est enterré.*

protection of culture and spiritual values and favor their continuation.”⁶⁵⁴ There could be no doubt about whether it was communism or nationalism that Fernandez believed was more “proper” for these tasks.⁶⁵⁵

Fernandez’s concept of class cooperation was therefore essential to both his vision of socio-economic relationships and to his concept of intellectual responsibility. Since Fernandez understood the role of the intellectual to be both guide in social affairs and leader in cultural concerns, class cooperation was an important element of his concept of intellectual identity. It therefore played an important part in his rejection of the communist intellectual model and his creation of a new intellectual model for the new Right.

Realism

In the early 1930s while he was still affiliated with the intellectual Left, Fernandez made little to no mention of the concept of realism. It was not until he broke with the communist Left in 1936 and found a new intellectual community on the Right that he began to incorporate the idea of intellectual Realism into his thought and work. As it had been for his predecessors on the Right, Fernandez’s concept of realism was closely tied to his nationalism. True intelligence was that which was applicable and relative to France, not of an abstract nature supposedly valid for universal man. Fernandez made a point of critiquing the Left writing, “there are no pure ideas valuable in all circumstances.”⁶⁵⁶ Instead there were ideas based on experience and a connection to reality that fit the needs and situation of each society. While communism offered a utopian vision of revolution based on the musings of Marx, the PPF and the Right provided a concrete program of cooperation that showed a true understanding of the reality of French social relations in the 1930s. Because of this,

⁶⁵⁴ Ramon Fernandez, “Sur les valeurs spirituelles,” *Emancipation Nationale*, January 19, 1940.

⁶⁵⁵ And if there were, Fernandez clarified in “En Russia” saying, “If the communists have robbed us of culture, it is not to appropriate it themselves, it is to annihilate it. Their very doctrine obligates it.”

⁶⁵⁶ Fernandez, “Incapables d’avoir raison.”

Fernandez would quickly identify intellectual realism as a distinctive trait of the new intellectual Right.

Fernandez was quick to use intellectual realism as a tool by which to judge the intellectuals of the Left and find them wanting. When comparing his new heroic figure Doriot to the Popular Front's Blum, Fernandez wrote, "Read the astonishing texts of Leon Blum, observe the formation of the abstract ideas of an intellectual completely ignorant of the political reality... He is an ignorant and stubborn mystic, stubborn from ignorance, who is reduced by it to accusing reality for the defeat of his false ideas."⁶⁵⁷ This, Fernandez argued, was why the Popular Front would fail. Its intellectual and political leaders remained convinced that the abstract theories they had concocted in the classroom or borrowed from Marx could be applied, without any alteration or adaptation, to the present day French society. His critique of Blum extended to the entirety of the Popular Front ideology. The intellectual revue of the Front, *Vendredi*, had "failed," he wrote, "because the philosophy of the Popular Front, that which its editors claimed to expose and defend, is a false philosophy, because it does not correspond to anything real."⁶⁵⁸ Intelligence, intellectuals, intellectual revues, and governments, Fernandez believed, all demanded more than ideas and theories to succeed. They needed the stability and force which came only from their ability to put into action, in the real world, the ideas they represented.

In striking contrast to the sterile abstraction of the Left, Fernandez painted the intellectuals of the Right, particularly those of the PPF, as the representatives of realism. The PPF in particular, Fernandez wrote, chose to "look the world in the face... the world as it is, that our masters have hidden from us."⁶⁵⁹ This real world, Fernandez wrote, was that of Europe, of France's place within Europe, and of the fascist and totalitarian powers in control of Europe that demanded a response from

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁸ Fernandez, "Le Front Populaire."

⁶⁵⁹ Ramon Fernandez, "Avec Doriot," *Emancipation Nationale*, July 31, 1937.

France. While the Left attempted to ignore or reject this reality that did not suit their vision of the rise of international communism, the PPF had chosen to accept the existing reality and design its ideas and programs to function within the new reality. The PPF, Fernandez continued, unlike the communists, did not develop “ideas to adhere to for one time and always.” Rather it adapted its ideas to the experiences of the world at the time. Doriot, he wrote, “is more savant and artist than philosopher, more intelligent than theoretical. All his ideas have issued from a direct collaboration of his thought with things...one is not able to consider them in isolation as beautiful pure ideas that a solitary philosopher perfects at his desk.”⁶⁶⁰ It was his grounding in the real nature of society, Fernandez believed, that gave Doriot “true political intelligence” and the PPF its ability to respond actively to the needs of France during the crisis of the 1930s.

The ideology of the PPF, Fernandez believed, was the only one to which the true intellectual could adhere and still retain his responsibility to guide society in the ways of the real. It was the only party that could “propose living responses to the agonizing questions which pose themselves to the man who makes reflection his métier.”⁶⁶¹ Instead of, as the communists did, “pronouncing words” and “fashionable theories,” the intellectuals of the PPF worked to have an idea that had a life and a significance, which could be realized for society.⁶⁶² “Here is why,” he wrote, “the PPF is an admirable educator of the intellectual. It obliges him...to remain in constant contact with reality. From the intellectual cocoon he leaves a man, and this man, in becoming a man, becomes more intelligent because he has become more true.”⁶⁶³ Although such statements would be attacked by the Left as indicative of anti-intellectualism, it was clearly the abstraction and isolation of the “intellectual cocoon” that Fernandez opposed, not the concept of the engaged thinker itself. In fact, he

⁶⁶⁰ Fernandez, “Incapables d’avoir raison.”

⁶⁶¹ Ramon Fernandez, “Rassemblement Intellectuel,” *Emancipation Nationale*, June 10, 1938.

⁶⁶² Ramon Fernandez, “De l’Elite,” *Emancipation Nationale*, May 5, 1939.

⁶⁶³ Fernandez, “L’Esprit du Temps.”

proclaimed the PPF educated intellectual as the “true intellectual,” one who was rooted in social realities and had intelligence formed by experience, not just logic and reason. Because of this, Fernandez suggested, the intellectual of the Right was not only distinct from the intellectual model of the Left, he was a superior guide for society.

Necessity of an Elite and a “Chef”

While the democratic and communist intellectuals struggled for social equality and the collapse of any hierarchy or elitism, Fernandez was writing a series of articles on the necessity of an elite and the need for an authoritative Chef. Fernandez believed the republicans and communists had corrupted the true meaning of equality, yet it had become their standard, their “crème tart” in the window of the Republic. According to the PPF intellectuals, the Left’s commonly accepted, yet false idea of equality led to the “simultaneous leveling which the utopians of socialism dream of.”⁶⁶⁴ It was this mass leveling of humanity, envisioned by the intellectual Left, that Fernandez found most harmful to the nation and particularly at odds with the worldview of the intellectual Right.

Equality had been linked in the revolutionary slogan with fraternity and liberty, but, Fernandez wrote, neither of these other two valuable concepts were compatible with democratic equality. “Without discipline, without the joyful recognition of each of his place in the hierarchy there is no life possible for men united in a group. This discipline is the only condition for liberty.”⁶⁶⁵ True liberty and true fraternity could only be found when each worked together in cooperation for the best interests of the free nation. It was when he recognized the necessity and value of his proper place in this national effort of cooperation that man truly made himself the equal of all his peers. The intellectuals of the Left, Fernandez believed, could not comprehend this concept of equality within hierarchy.

⁶⁶⁴ Ramon Fernandez, “Perspectives sur les relativites humaines de Jacques Moreau,” *Emancipation Nationale*, December 17, 1937.

⁶⁶⁵ Ibid.

The cooperation of equals within a hierarchy, according to Fernandez, required the concept of elitism that only the intellectual Right understood. Rather than an elite based on materialism or class as the democrats and communists envisioned, the PPF elite would be a fraternal collection of the talented men of all the levels of social life. This elite envisioned by the PPF intellectuals was an ensemble of persons particularly qualified to lead particular aspects of social activity. Democracy failed to recognize that all men were not equally qualified for these leadership positions. In a real society, the Left's abstract vision of the equality of man was not only foolish, it could be debilitating.⁶⁶⁶ It was particularly dangerous since the elite would provide not only leadership within its particular cadre but also advise the Chef. As Fernandez put it, "there is no strong society without a chef, no society at all without an elite."⁶⁶⁷ The chef would have need of an elite cadre of men in each area of social life who could advise him on the needs of that social domain. They would be his "knowing lieutenants." The intellectual elite would be prominent among this group of public leaders and would be responsible for organizing the other elites. They would be identifiable by several characteristics, Fernandez believed, including the proposal of realistic ideas rather than abstract theories and the maintenance of a traditional morality. Clearly, the intellectual elite was to be composed only of right-wing intellectuals.

The role of these intellectuals would be to prepare the current democratic society for the changes necessary to restructure society. In democratic societies, he was convinced, a wealth and class-based elite already existed that manipulated society behind the curtain of proletarian dictatorship or representative government. In the new society proposed by PPF intellectuals, Fernandez continued, the elites would be out in the open and would be given social power and authority rather than having to surreptitiously manipulate it. And instead of being a product of their

⁶⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁷ Fernandez, "De l'Elite."

class or wealth, they would be self-made and chosen by their peers as leaders.⁶⁶⁸ This official recognition and investment of an elite, Fernandez sincerely believed, was what the fascist intellectuals of Portugal, Spain, Germany, Italy and Japan had initiated under their new governments.⁶⁶⁹ It was also what he envisioned for France after the revolution of mentalities that would be brought about by the PPF. The role of the PPF intellectuals was to pave the way for this revolution and organize the resulting system of elites.⁶⁷⁰

Leading this system would be a Chef selected by and from the collection of elites. Democracy could not institute a true chef because the electors would never choose a man they believed to be superior to them.⁶⁷¹ And the communists, Fernandez wrote, could never create one because he would always be responsible to Moscow and the Party rather than to France and his elites.⁶⁷² Only in the nationalist organizations of the Right like the PPF was there any understanding of what a true chef was, “of his nature, his function, and his necessity.”⁶⁷³ Unlike the men of the Left who avoided all that could not be explained by logic or a theoretical doctrine, the men of the Right accepted that the true Chef was a product of nature, not logic and that his actions were not confined by any accepted doctrine or plebiscite. The Chef would not be bound by the demands of the people or of a theory because it was his responsibility to embody the characteristics that the masses lacked and to fulfill their needs even before those needs were recognized. Fernandez attempted to explain the rationale for such license writing “The chef commands because he sees that which the others do not

⁶⁶⁸ Ramon Fernandez, “De l’Elite suite,” *Emancipation Nationale*, May 12, 1939.

⁶⁶⁹ Ramon Fernandez, “De l’Elite suite,” *Emancipation Nationale*, May 19, 1939.

⁶⁷⁰ APP Ba 1946

⁶⁷¹ Ibid.

⁶⁷² Drieu la Rochelle, “Pas de Chef Communist,” *Emancipation Nationale*, October 10, 1936.

⁶⁷³ Ramon Fernandez, “Sur la notion de le Chef,” *Emancipation Nationale*, March 31, 1939.

yet, his authority results from a difference in optics.”⁶⁷⁴ Only the French Right was able to accept the sort of organic relationship that would exist between the true chef and the nation.

Fernandez’s vision of a harmony of social elites and an authoritative, organically linked chef at their head echoed that of Bonnard, Drieu la Rochelle, and many other of the intellectuals of the fascist sympathizing Right. More importantly, it clashed dramatically with the worldview and social vision of both the more democratic republicans and the committed communists of the intellectual Left. As the crisis in Europe escalated, these conflicting visions of social organization and leadership became increasingly central to the separate self-identification of their intellectual promoters.

Nationalist Man and Nationalism

Fernandez and the PPF intellectuals also had a distinctly right-wing concept of man that was influenced by their nationalism. Fernandez adamantly opposed the Left’s internationalism in favor of a strong French nationalism built on a sense of the past and tradition. In his concept of the New Europe, France would be a cultural and intellectual leader and would regain its former glory among nations. In this pursuit, Fernandez recognized the new governments of Italy and Germany as models for rebuilding a French strong nation within a new international mosaic of strong nations. His concept of man would be drawn from this nationalist worldview.

The PPF was clear to separate its own view of man and the French nation from the internationalist and economic concept of universal man created by the Left. “The politicians of the Left and the socialists in particular, consider man in two ways,” PPF works explained, as an electoral creature and an economic creature.⁶⁷⁵ In both ways it did not matter if “this man is Chinese, French, Russian, or Jew. The only concern is that if he is a patron he takes the profit and if he is a worker he

⁶⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁵ Marion, *Programme*, 97.

provides the value.”⁶⁷⁶ The nationalist, right-wing, and PPF understanding of man was much different. Rather than “this monstrous and false conception of man, accepted by all that which is socialist, Marxist, and Bolshevik, we oppose a man who refuses to be a machine and who senses himself something other than material.”⁶⁷⁷ Their concept of man was as a national being, “a man of a long line, of a long history, of a province, of a *métier*.” The Frenchman gained his identity not from his economic station or electoral ability but from his *enracinement* in the nation. Fernandez was incensed by the “Marxist intellectuals who detested France by order” in an effort to uphold the internationalism of the Party. He recalled a communist lycée professor who said that when a regiment passed he had to “surmount the guilty weakness” that caused him to be moved by patriotism.”⁶⁷⁸ To this falsely internationalist man, he opposed a nationalist man connected to his *patrie* rather than foreign to it.

As they had differentiated their view of man, the PPF would also be certain to separate their idea of the nation from that which they believed was proposed by the Left. In his efforts to explain the PPF vision of France, Fernandez wrote “in sum, the PPF will remake the core of the True France.”⁶⁷⁹ He argued that this “True France” was not a mute piece in the soviet world, “as those who confound the Popular Front with France” believed, it was a leader among autonomous nations with a glorious past.⁶⁸⁰ “For the internationalists,” the PPF believed, “France is a country like any other... the equivalent of the Ukraine in the union of socialist republics.” However, “for us, France has a particular figure, a past, traditions, a soul, and a pride.”⁶⁸¹ Only a nationalist politics like that proposed by the PPF could draw from this wealth of the past in order to lead France to a strong future.

⁶⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁷ Ibid., 98.

⁶⁷⁸ Ramon Fernandez, “La France Retrouvée,” *Emancipation Nationale*, January 7, 1938.

⁶⁷⁹ Ramon Fernandez, “L’Ecole du caractere,” *Emancipation Nationale*, January 27, 1939.

⁶⁸⁰ Fernandez, “Le Front Populaire.”

⁶⁸¹ Marion, *Programme*, 101.

Only the nationalist parties of the Right, Fernandez believed, could renew France so that it could take its place in the New Europe being created by the fascist nations. “To the France degraded and leveled of the Marxist world, we oppose a France brilliant with initiatives and intellectual, social, and political values... a patrie that will once again give lessons and models to the universe.”⁶⁸² For Fernandez and his peers on the new intellectual Right of the 1930s, this strong, rooted France was the only “True France” and its leadership in a mosaic of autonomous European nations was the only internationalism that could be sustained.

Fernandez’s concept of PPF nationalism was a product of the new ideas and tensions of the 1930s and of his strong recoil from his left-wing origins. Like Bonnard’s nationalism, Fernandez’s was distanced in many ways from the integral, monarchist, and anti-German nationalism of Maurras, Massis, and the Action Française Right. But his nationalism was also a product of right-wing influences in many ways, particularly in the channeling of Barrèssian concepts of enracinement. As such, his nationalist approach to “True France,” like his ideas of class cooperation, realism, and the necessity of an elite, identified him unmistakably as an intellectual who was in solidarity with the newly evolved Right of the 1930s.

Fernandez and the Right-Wing Intellectual Model

Despite, or perhaps because of, his early experience on the intellectual Left, Fernandez would be one of the most committed proponents of a separate right-wing intellectual identity. His resentment of the hegemony that the Left exercised over the title of intellectual, the role of social guide, and the daily activities of political and intellectual life, colored all of his work during the late 1930s. It gave him a distinctly right-wing rage and mentality of engagement that would distance his approach to intellectual life from that of the Left. Rather than engaging directly in the discussion of fascism and anti-fascism, Fernandez believed it was necessary to first denounce the hold of the Left over the public and to deny them the “monopoly on genius.” Each article on social and political affairs,

⁶⁸² Ibid., 102.

therefore, was laced with demands for equal intellectual authority. Even his engagement in the PPF was done primarily through the CPF as a “representative of the intellectuals” who had been ostracized from the Left dominated mainstream. Fernandez’ sense that he and his peers on the *fascisant* Right were excluded from the public image of the intellectual and from recognized cultural authority led him to engage his work in a redefinition of the intellectual according to right-wing ideals. This redefined intellectual valued class cooperation rather than conflict, Realism rather than universalism, elitism rather than egalitarianism, and organic nationalism rather than internationalism. He fulfilled his role and responsibility to society by advocating middle class social reforms and fraternization between intellectual elites and workers, participating in real French society, and promoting a new nationalist hierarchy. Fernandez’s efforts to outline a new model for intellectual identity led him to not only differentiate his political and social values from the Left but also to turn to alternative socio-professional intellectual communities. Here, among his right-wing peers, he would continue his work of engagement and redefinition of intellectual life.

CHAPTER 12

THE INTELLECTUAL WORLD OF THE 1930S RIGHT: COMMUNITIES, NETWORKS, AND THE INTELLECTUAL EXPERIENCE

The world of the Right during the 1930s was a complex system of interconnected communities that were linked through personal and professional networks and a shared sense of purpose. Although these communities would remain officially unaffiliated and often jealously guarded their memberships, they were loosely united by their opposition to communism, the Popular Front, and democratic Republicanism and by their fascination with the fascist movements of Europe. They were also linked by the intellectuals who tended to write for a variety of revues, participate in numerous cultural outlets, and create socio-professional ties with fellow intellectuals in these other communities. Although they could not participate in all of these groups of the Right, Bonnard and Fernandez were both at the center of this web of connected networks. Their participation in these alternative communities and the resulting relationships that they formed with the Republic, the university, and the international intellectual community gave them a distinctly right-wing collective identity that would alienate them even further from the collective intellectual identity created on the Left.

Despite a history of proscription by the Republic, the right-wing, anti-parliamentary ligue continued to flourish in the early 1930s. However, intellectuals did not tend to play as prominent a role there as they had during the years after the Dreyfus Affair. Taittinger's Jeunesses Patriotes, Coty's Solidarite Française, and even de la Rocque's Croix de Feu, which by 1938 would outnumber alone the combined memberships of the PCF and SFIO, garnered little active participation by the intellectual milieu. Even the once mighty force of the Action Française was, by the 1930s, losing its attraction for many right-wing intellectuals. However this did not indicate any innate hostility

between these right-wing ligues and the intellectuals. The ligue's paramilitary style and charismatic leadership in the struggle against the Left would provide the intellectuals of the Right with inspiration, confidence, and a sense of collective élan with these active and often violent ligue organizations. In place of active participation in street ligues, the intellectuals tended to congregate instead in organizations like the coterie of non-conformist intellectuals of the Jeune Droite, the cultural organizations of the PPF, and the numerous cercles sympathetic to the ideas of the extreme Right.

Although Bonnard and Fernandez would not be considered participants in the Jeune Droite movement, these non-conformist writers were developing a parallel concept of right-wing intellectual engagement and their networks would all often intersect. The nucleus of the JD was comprised of young but talented intellectuals like Brasillach, Maulnier, Jean de Fabrègues, Jean-Pierre Maxence, Claude Roy, and Jacques Laurent.⁶⁸³ While connected to the Action Française by the influence of Maurras and the mentorship of Massis, these intellectuals rejected the closed nationalism, anti-Germanism, and monarchism that its doctrine of engagement imposed on them.⁶⁸⁴ Instead they proposed an active engagement against democratic decadence and a nationalist, non-marxist, non-monarchist revolution to renew France. Although they had no official party or tangible organization, the collection of right-wing intellectuals that made up the JD would have great influence over their peers on the Right through the various journals they created like *Revue Française*, *Combat*, and *L'Insurge*, and through the expansive range of their contributions to other right-wing journals. Like Bonnard and Fernandez, these JD writers attempted to articulate a “version of nationalist engagement” and a concept of the right-wing intellectual in contrast with the intellectual camp of the

⁶⁸³ Paul Mazgaj, *Fascism, Immense and Red: the Cultural and Generational Politics of the French Young Right, 1930-1945*, book in print p3.

⁶⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 152-3.

Left.⁶⁸⁵ In this way, they were one of the many voices in the network of the Right that reinforced the sense of a distinctive right-wing intellectual identity and contributed to a sense of collective community.

Although there would be no anti-communist umbrella organization like the AEAR or CVIA on the intellectual Right, many right-wing intellectuals who did not find a home in the traditional arms of the AF or its JD offshoot found a like-minded community in the PPF of Jacques Doriot. Here disillusioned intellectuals from the left, center, and traditional right were brought together in a new community that was self-identified as a party of the Right because of its opposition to the communists and the Left. It was here that a writer with origins on the left like Fernandez could commune and collaborate with a former Maurrassian like Bonnard and a self-proclaimed fascist like Drieu la Rochelle. Fernandez would write excitedly of the powerful bonds that the collective community would have on him and the other intellectuals saying, “For fifteen years I disputed with Drieu. But now we no longer dispute. It is the miracle of the PPF. Before we were never in accord by either nature or friendship...but now we love each other well and find ourselves in the same party.”⁶⁸⁶ Among the diverse intellectuals who formed this “miracle” community could be found such recognized names of the intellectual Right network as Alfred Fabre-Luce, Bertrand de Jouvenel, and Camille Fegy in addition to Paul Marion, Jacques Boulenger, Paul Chack, and Claude Jeantet.⁶⁸⁷

The PPF had no single doctrine or foundational text but it did have a party program that both reinforced and influenced the ideas of its intellectual supporters. Primary in this program was the crusade against bolshevism in all its forms, including both the USSR and the Popular Front. Bolshevism, it made clear, was the cause of the current malaise of France, the corruption of its politics and decadence of its culture and society. The PPF painted itself as the “party of renewal and

⁶⁸⁵ Paul Mazgaj, “Engagement and the French Nationalist Right: The Case of the Jeune Droite,” *European History Quarterly* 32, no.2 (2002): 214.

⁶⁸⁶ Fernandez, “Avec Doriot.”

⁶⁸⁷ APP Ba 1946

reconstruction of the patrie” and proposed moral, social, and economic reforms that countered those of the Left.⁶⁸⁸ In the PPF program, Bonnard found affirmation for his ideas of realism, elitism, and Franco-German rapprochement and Fernandez found reinforcement for his ideas on class cooperation, the need for a chef, and nationalism. The PPF also provided a social world for its member intellectuals and public supporters. It had annual congresses, worker organizations, a “sections feminines,” brigades of shock troops, youth programs, and even an aviation club.⁶⁸⁹ Most importantly, it gave great attention to the community of intellectuals it had attracted, providing them with the CPF, journalistic outlets in *Emancipation Nationale* and *La Liberte*, opportunities to give lectures, and a place of honor in its organization.

The CPF was created at the instigation of Fernandez and was placed under his authority, although its meetings would have several presidents over the years, including Bonnard. In one of the first meetings of the CPF, Fernandez explained their purpose. “These cercles of which I am the founder,” he said, “have been created with the aim of fraternity and comprehension, our desire being to see the intellectuals and the manual laborers collaborate together.”⁶⁹⁰ Although the PPF could not be seen as a right-wing AEAR, Fernandez was insistent that the intellectuals of the Right have an outlet for the dissemination and elaboration of their ideas and values like the intellectual Left had in the Maisons de Culture. “In short,” he continued in explaining the CPF’s purpose, “we want, as in the communist maisons de culture, to inculcate in them [members] our faith and our dynamism.”⁶⁹¹ The new group’s purpose was summarized in a speech that declared, “it is to put a stop to the conquest of the intellectuals by the communist party that we have created the Cercles populaires. We want to

⁶⁸⁸ Marion, *Programme*, 14.

⁶⁸⁹ APP Ba 1946

⁶⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁹¹ Ibid.

inculcate in the intellectuals the true sense of French politics.⁶⁹² The CPF would also provide proof of the intellectual legitimacy and responsibility of the Right. In “the AEAR organ *Commune*,” one PPF intellectual fumed, “one explains admirably that the nationalist Right disinterests itself in questions of education, laboratories, artists and writers.” The CPF would serve as an arm to end this “intellectual propaganda” and reveal the true intellectual priorities of the Right.⁶⁹³

Here in the CPF, according to its description in the *Emancipation Nationale*, the PPF intellectuals would have “recourse to all the means of expression which are able to adapt critical reflection to the conditions of social action: meetings, lectures, courses, brochures, etc.”⁶⁹⁴ In these meetings and lectures, the PPF intellectuals would speak to fellow writers, students, members of the liberal professions and the few working class members who were encouraged to attend.⁶⁹⁵ Topics varied from discussions of love, poetry, and cinema, to the more politically engaged issues of the new Germany, intelligence and character, African colonialism, Salazar’s Portugal, and National Revolution.⁶⁹⁶ PPF intellectuals also made efforts to expand the reach of their efforts by taking their lectures abroad. Fernandez would give a series of seven lectures during a week in Morocco and created, by the end of his travels, a Moroccan branch of the CPF.

Although the CPF and its parent organization the PPF would provide some of the most active intellectual arms of the Right, they would not be the only intellectual communities sympathetic to the ideas and values of the Right. Bonnard was actively involved in one of these many groups, the Cercle Fustel de Coulanges, which attracted several of the intellectuals of the Action Française milieu. The Cercle, named for the nationalist historian, gave its aim as the “consideration of the problems of

⁶⁹² Ibid.

⁶⁹³ J. Saint-Germain, “Il faut fermer cet établissement sovietique,” *Emancipation Nationale*, July 28, 1939.

⁶⁹⁴ Ramon Fernandez, “Pour une culture française... Voici les Cercles Populaires Français,” *Emancipation Nationale*, May 13, 1938.

⁶⁹⁵ Ramon Fernandez, “Première soirée littéraire des Ecrivains PPF,” *Emancipation Nationale*, June 10, 1938.

⁶⁹⁶ APP Ba 1946.

education and the defense of intelligence and French patriotism.”⁶⁹⁷ Its range was not as great as the CPF but it claimed to have recruited over two thousand members of the intellectual and teaching milieu and boasted that its influence was better measured by the “furious attacks that *L’Humanité*, *Populaire*, La Ligue des Droites de l’Homme, and the University” had launched against it.⁶⁹⁸ The Cercle united those right-wing intellectuals and educators who valued nationalism, the classical humanities, militarism, colonialism, and a rejection of the intrusion into culture of bolshevism and republicanism. The cercle intellectuals also communed in a more socio-professional environment through the collaboration on a *Cahiers* that ran for over a decade and a series of independent publications.⁶⁹⁹ Personal ties and professional networks were also forged through a series of banquets for the socialization and exchange of ideas among its members.

Physical groupings of intellectuals like the JD, CPF, and Cercle Fustel would not be the only means of building a sense of collective identity among the intellectual Right. As they had during the Dreyfus Affair and the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates, manifests signed by like-minded intellectuals were able to create a sense of imaginary community. It has even been suggested that larger manifests like the *Défense de l’Occident* were designed to be frontist responses to organizations like the CVIA and created the same sense of collective engagement that these groups created for the Left.⁷⁰⁰ These petitions provided an additional forum, in addition to journalism, speaking tours, and literature, for the intellectuals to engage in international or national affairs. They also allowed intellectuals to share the resentment they felt toward the Left, the demand to be recognized as intellectuals, and the belief that they represented the true values of French intelligence and culture.

⁶⁹⁷ Henri Boenger, “Intelligence et Democratie,” *Cahiers Fustel de Coulanges*, December 1928.

⁶⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁹ Collection du Cercle Fustel de Coulanges (Paris: Librairie de l’Arc) 1930.

⁷⁰⁰ David Drake, *French Intellectuals and Politics from the Dreyfus Affair to the Occupation* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 131.

Some of these manifests were quite small, gathering only the signatures of those in the revue's or the author's immediate intellectual network. One such smaller manifest in the *Emancipation Nationale* entitled "Un magnifique reveil des intellectuels francais" gathered mainly writers associated with the PPF like Bonnard, Fernandez, Drieu, Brasillach, Boulenger, Chack, and Maulnier along with a few non-PPF intellectuals like Henri Massis. These signers vaguely demanded national unity among all the social classes and the renewal of France through French, rather than foreign, inspired reforms. Despite its small size, the manifest was able to group these writers and claim for them not only the title of intellectual but the right to speak out as intellectuals on issues of social importance.

In October 1935, Henri Massis penned the much larger *Defense de l'Occident* manifest which had sixty-four signatures, including twelve Academy members, in its first publication. Like the smaller petitions, the manifest sought to provide a platform for intellectuals to collectively engage in a particular public concern, in this case, the colonizing efforts of Mussolini's Italy. The manifest proudly proclaimed the right-wing signers to be "the French intellectuals" and argued that it was because of their vocation as intellectuals that they felt the responsibility to speak out against the sanctions placed on Italy. "While the acts of men, to whom the destiny of nations is confided, risk putting in danger the future of civilization," the manifest began, "those who consecrate their work to the things of intelligence ought to make known with vigor the demands of the mind."⁷⁰¹ It continued to explain that Rome was the home of Western civilization and that efforts to stifle the growth of Italy indicated that "intelligence" had "abdicated its authority" in favor of political ideology. In closing, it again claimed the title and responsibility of intellectuals saying, "As intellectuals, we ought to protect culture with even more vigilance since we profit from its benefits, we are not able to allow civilization to decide against itself. To prevent such a suicide, we appeal to all the forces of the

⁷⁰¹ Jean-François Sirinelli, *Intellectuels et passions françaises: manifestes et petitions* (Paris: Fayard, 1990), 93.

esprit.”⁷⁰² The right wing signers were clearly claiming the right to speak as intellectuals and the duty to conserve culture and guide affairs. They were also denying this continued right to the thinkers of the Left who had “abdicated” their responsibilities to intelligence by dabbling in left-wing politics.

The 1937 Manifeste aux intellectuels espagnols was the other major manifest to publicly assert the ideas of the Right against those of the intellectuals on the Left. This manifest was written in clear response to the leftist Declaration des intellectuels republicains that supported the Spanish popular front. Here again, the signers of the right-wing manifest claimed themselves to be “intellectuels francais” in the very first sentence.⁷⁰³ These forty-two self-proclaimed intellectuals, including Fernandez and Bonnard, again announced themselves to be the ones faithfully representing the demands of culture and intelligence. They also stated, in an obvious effort to contrast their ideas of this representation with those on the communist Left, “we place ourselves above all politics” and cited their belief in the “fraternity of the classes, not their reciprocal hatred” and the right to defend the nation against exterior interference under pretext of ideology.⁷⁰⁴ In close, they emphasized that they, as right-wing intellectuals, were speaking for “la vraie France.” All of these manifests, no matter their size, were efficient methods for building a sense of collective intellectual identity and shared intellectual values.

One final significant source of collective identity construction among the intellectual Right in the 1930s was revue team. Revue journalism continued to be one of the main outlets for intellectual expression by the Right since it felt increasingly excluded from the University. While the young students of the Left continued the traditional path from ENS to professorships before augmenting their engagement with literary or journalistic efforts, the students of the Right found external, non-university mentors and tended to leave the ENS for immediate literary careers. The camaraderie and shared purpose of these right-wing revue teams built a strong sense of collective identity both within

⁷⁰² Ibid., 94.

⁷⁰³ Ibid., 107.

⁷⁰⁴ Ibid., 108.

the team and in the larger web of journals connected by one or more contributors. Of course, the network remained a right-wing one since, other than the occasional publication in the *NRF* , right-wing writers were refused at the left-wing journals and had little interest publishing there. Some of the most powerful intellectual revues on the Right, beyond the ever dominant *Action Française* and the *Revue Universelle* , were *Candide* and its radical offshoot *Je Suis Partout* , *Gringoire* , and the PPF journal *Emancipation Nationale* . When combined with the networks of smaller journals, the web of right-wing journals became a powerful tool for building collective community and socio-professional ties.

Candide , published by Fayard and directed by Gaxotte, had direct ties to the Action Française and brought in a number of its collaborators including Bainville, Daudet, Lucien Rebatet, and Brasillach. The enormous circulation of *Candide* , around 400,000 during the years of the Popular Front, made it a formidable opponent for the Left whose journals could not begin to compete with such numbers. *Candide* would retain, however, the maurrassian anti-germanism and would distance itself from the extreme *fascisant* camp. Because of this, several of the writers tempted by fascism and German renewal, like Rebatet and Brasillach, would gradually pull away from *Candide* and take its international offshoot, *Je Suis Partout* , with them. *JSP* , also published by Fayard, attracted many of the young writers who were disillusioned by AF inaction and sought a new avenue of engagement. These included the Jeune Droite writers Brasillach, Maulnier, and Claude Roy as well as other non-conformists and fascist sympathizers like Fegy, Jeantet, and Pierre-Antoine Cousteau.⁷⁰⁵ Bonnard was drawn to JSP by his friendship with Lucien Rebatet which had been formed when they both collaborated on the right-wing revue *Courrier royal* . As early as 1932, *JSP* was showing an interest in both Italian and German fascism and was a strong advocate of anti-communism, nationalism, elitism, and the charismatic chef. It was also one of the most anti-Semitic of the right-wing journals of the 1930s. *Gringoire* , with a circulation near 600,000, enjoyed the status of being the most highly diffused weekly of any paper in the 1930s. It also enjoyed the redoubtable talents and prestige of

⁷⁰⁵ *Je Suis Partout* articles from 1938.

writers Henri Béraud, André Tardieu, and Drieu la Rochelle. *Gringoire* writers were active in the opposition to sanctions on Italy and the general defense of fascism. Thanks to Béraud, *Gringoire* also expressed more vividly than many revues the increasing Anglophobia of the fascist-sympathizing Right in addition to the usual anti-republicanism and anti-communism. *Gringoire* also participated, though not to the same extent, in the increasing anti-Semitism that was found in *JSP*. Most importantly, *Gringoire* was one of the leading opponents of Leon Blum and the Popular Front. The mass circulation of the paper did not fail to influence fellow right-wing intellectuals and its ideas and articles were often cited in smaller right-wing papers.

Fernandez and Bonnard would both find a fraternal community in the PPF journal *Emancipation Nationale*. Here they collaborated with writers like Drieu la Rochelle, Maulnier, Brasillach, Jeantet, de Jouvenel, Fabre-Luce, and Boulanger. The popular daily paper of the PPF, *La Liberté*, would also employ many of these same intellectuals to fill its columns on cultural interests, public affairs, and political news. In the pages of the *EN*, right-wing intellectuals supported one another in the effort against communism and the Popular Front, support for Franco in Spain, discussions of nationalism and renewal after decadence, elitism and the need for a chef, and the place of the intellectual. While Fernandez tended to limit his engagement to the pages of the *EN*, Bonnard would expand his literary collaboration to the pages of several smaller right-wing journals. *1933*, a journal created by Massis and published by the sympathetic firm Plon, welcomed Bonnard as an occasional collaborator, particularly in articles directed to the youth. In yet another Plon revue, *La Revue hebdomadaire*, Bonnard shared his talents and ideas, particularly on the need for an elite, with *Gringoire*'s Tardieu and *JSP*'s Bellesort.

Individual right-wing revue teams created a sense of solidarity, shared purpose, and social camaraderie among their contributors leading to a real identification by these writers with their journal and their peers. When compiled with the sense of a larger community of like-minded intellectuals in other, linked journals, a real sense of intellectual sociability and collective identity was created. This right-wing collective identity, created outside of and in opposition to the communities of

the Left, reinforced the sense of separation and difference that the Right believed to exist between their own identity as intellectuals and that of the Left.

The 1930s Right-Wing Intellectual Experience

This sense of separation created by alternative socio-professional communities was compounded by the fact that intellectuals on the Right tended to experience the daily aspects of being an intellectual differently from those on the Left. Their different understanding of what it meant to “be an intellectual” was due in great part to their different relationships with the Third Republic, the university, and the international community.⁷⁰⁶ This distinctive experience would compound the Right’s sense of its alienation and differentiation from the intellectual Left.

The relationship of the intellectual of the Right to the Third Republic, particularly under the Popular Front, was one of contention and opposition. Unlike the intellectual of the Left who enjoyed support and positions of prestige and authority under the State, the intellectual of the Right continued to see daily intellectual life as a struggle against state sponsored repression. The suppression of all right-wing leagues and organizations after the failed assassination attempt on Leon Blum simply provided proof for the right-wing engagés who already believed in a government conspiracy to eliminate them. Instead of working within the Popular Front and serving as its intelligentsia, the intellectual of the Right believed it was his duty to work within organizations and parties that sought to destroy the Front and replace the Republic with a fascist style Chef. As in previous decades, the intellectual of the Right equated intellectual life with the life of political opposition and the search for new alternatives.

The relationship between the Right and the University system remained as contentious as that between the Right and the State. While the young students of the Left were continuing to make

⁷⁰⁶ Once again, among the fascist sympathizing intellectuals who spearheaded the redefinition of intellectual identity in the 1930s, a relationship to the Catholic church was not as important as it had been in previous decades. It would not, therefore, provide a significant distinction in the experience of intellectual life between the Left and Right.

professional and political connections through mentors at the ENS and Sorbonne, the students of the Right found themselves increasingly unwelcome and unhappy in these mentoring opportunities. Brasillach recalled that in listening to the student group around Herr, he felt out of place and uninspired. While students of the Left were turning their *turnes* into socialist cells and participating in the efforts of the larger socialist and communist party organizations, students of the Right searched for alternative routes to political and professional prominence. Massis became the particular friend and patron of the young ENS group that included Brasillach and Maulnier and would provide them with journalistic opportunities at *Revue Universelle* and *1933* and introduce them to the Plon editors. The Action Française student paper *L'Étudiant Français*, also provided an easy transition for young right-wing students of talent seeking entry into the world of letters and political journalism. Other mentors included Pierre Gaxotte, who introduced young Normaliens of the Right to the sympathetic publisher Fayard, and Jean Prevost, who provided internships for students at his right-wing paper *L'Intransigeant*.⁷⁰⁷

These networks of mentors, patrons, and political organizations were available much more quickly to the “right-wing students who, by not taking provincial teaching positions like those of the Left, stayed in Paris and worked their way through these networks” until they had gained prominence.⁷⁰⁸ Because, statistically, the intellectuals of the Right tended to enter the literary and journalistic world earlier and in greater number than their Leftist and Centrist peers, they had the advantage of anteriority and dominance in that path to political engagement. Therefore, while journalism served as a supplementary form of political engagement for many on the Left, it was the primary way of life and of engagement for the Right. Fernandez would make the distinction quite clear in his discussion of “qu’est-ce qu’un intellectuel” on the Left and Right. On the Left, he gave the example of Popular Front *universitaire*, and self-proclaimed intellectual Victor Basch whom he

⁷⁰⁷ Diane Rubenstein, *What’s Left: the Ecole Normale Superior and the Right* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), 107.

⁷⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 109.

wrote “would be totally unknown except to a few students” had he not joined in the Front efforts. “On the Left,” Fernandez explained, “one becomes an intellectual not by the good works that one puts on the literary market but by the oral protestations that confer an unmerited dignity.”⁷⁰⁹ In contrast, he continued, the intellectual of the Right earned his authority and legitimacy by producing intelligent pieces of journalism and literary works of high caliber. It was the support of the Popular Front, according to Fernandez, that gave the *universitaires* of the Left their unmerited public exposure.

The experience of intellectual life on the Right in the 1930s would evolve from that of previous decades due to the new influence of international intellectual communities on French intellectual life. In the years before the Occupation, the influence of the “magnetic field of fascism” would certainly be felt by the intellectuals of the Right, particularly in an evolution of their anti-Semitism. However, it would not have the same sort of influences that the Communist party had for intellectuals of the Left. This was due in great part to the fact that the Communists had one vibrant example, the USSR, and one doctrine drawn from a single theorist. There was one party line, one official instruction to all the parties which claimed to be communist or fellow-traveling. The PCF had the Comintern to help it organize and structure its programs and its members. The fascist sympathizers, on the other hand, had no single theorist or doctrine and no single exemplar. Maurras looked to Mussolini’s Italy for inspiration, Fernandez to Salazar’s Portugal, Brasillach to the Spanish Phalange and Belgian Rexism, and others like Bonnard to Hitler’s Germany. Because of this, the fascist leaning intellectuals lacked the organization and doctrinal unity of their communist sympathizing peers on the Left. Since Hitler and Mussolini declared that fascism was not for export, there was no Comintern, no *Pravda*, and no international organization or Comintern approved leaders like Thorez.

Because of this lack of organization, however, the intellectuals drawn to fascism did not experience the same constraint on their literary expression, their choice of speakers at congresses, or

⁷⁰⁹ Ramon Fernandez, “Qu’est-ce qu’un intellectuel?,” *Emancipation Nationale*, August 20, 1937.

their political affiliations until after the Occupation. Instead, the intellectual Right saw itself as creating, not a satellite of a larger political entity, but rather its own unique, French form of the vague phenomenon which was fascism.⁷¹⁰ They often claimed that they represented French thought and culture while the communist fellow-travelers were slaves to a foreign nation and an un-French political ideology. Fernandez accused the “intellectual agents of Moscow” of “penetrating the French salons” and demanded that the thinkers who sympathized with the PPF build a veritable “maginot line before its infiltration.”⁷¹¹ Other EN articles claimed that the Maison de Culture’s writers “drew from the foreigner their political orders”⁷¹² while “our comrades have sacrificed nothing of their own culture in adhering to the PPF.”⁷¹³ Specifically, they accused the intellectuals of the Popular Front and the communists of “submitting to the extra-intellectual intelligence of the party,” “adopting the ‘line,’” or “becoming a gear in the machine.”⁷¹⁴ Unlike these party activists, “like M Louis Aragon,” who had been “deintellectualisé” by their submission to the international communist party, Fernandez claimed those of the PPF, the AF, and other right-wing parties remained fully French and fully capable of their intellectual responsibility.⁷¹⁵ Being an intellectual of the Right, according to these engagés, did not

⁷¹⁰ The argument, created by historians and intellectuals of the Left immediately after the Liberation, that fascism had little influence in France before the occupation and that it was a foreign import from Germany, has since been amended by most historians of fascism. The early belief that France was immune to fascism was held by historians like René Remond, Stanley Payne, Pierre Milza, and even the recent work of Serge Bernstein and Michel Winock. This post-war history was overturned by the work of Robert Paxton, Zeev Sternhell, Robert Soucy and Philippe Burrin and the recent work of Griffin and Sweets. Rather than seeing it as an “aberration,” more and more credence has been given to the fascist sympathizing intellectuals’ own claims that they were building a French form of fascism that drew, not on German or Italian examples, but on the traditional nationalism, anti-parliamentarianism, anti-communism, and even anti-Semitism of true France. Those intellectuals like Bonnard and Fernandez, who showed an increasing attraction to fascism during the latter 1930s, made reference to the nationalist ideas of Barrès, Maurras, Fustel, la Tour du Pin, and others in the traditional French lexicon to express their ideas of the French version of the national revolution.

⁷¹¹ Ramon Fernandez, “L’incendie des idées,” *Emancipation Nationale*, December 8, 1939.

⁷¹² Henri-Nancroix, “Pour la vraie pensée française,” *Emancipation Nationale*, November 28, 1936.

⁷¹³ Fernandez, Notre deuxième Congrès.”

⁷¹⁴ Ramon Fernandez, “Le Procès de l’Intellectuel,” *Nouvelle Revue Française*, August 1938.

⁷¹⁵ Ibid.

make one part of a larger International of Thought. Instead, the intellectual was, by definition, a nationalist man in an intellectual mosaic, connected and yet distinct from his international peers.

However, the lack of any official party organization or international doctrine did not prevent the influence of foreign fascist ideas from inspiring the French intellectuals to give new emphasis to anti-Semitism.⁷¹⁶ Anti-Semitism had been extremely rare in the work of Abel Bonnard until his turn to fascism in mid 1937. During this year, he suddenly began to treat the idea in essays like *La question juive*. Here he recognized the Jews as “others,” warned against the “racial mixing” and cultural disruption that would come from the “Jewish invasion,” and claimed the “excess of Jews” was a sign of “French decadence.”⁷¹⁷ Such ideas were certainly not foreign to the traditional French Right, but they had been relatively foreign to Bonnard’s work before his interest in international forms of fascism. Fernandez would not adopt anti-Semitism until after the Occupation.

Being an intellectual of the Right did not imply the same relationship to the government and Popular Front, the university and its professional trajectories, or the international communities and its organizing parties as being an intellectual of the Left. These different relationships contributed to a different understanding of what intellectual daily life entailed. This different experience of political and professional life would both contribute to and result from the intellectual Right’s sense of a separation in intellectual values and segregation of communities. All together, these factors would yield a distinctive right-wing concept of intellectual identity and an alternative model of intellectual role, responsibility, and behavior.

⁷¹⁶ The idea that fascism tended to influence its sympathizers by degrees, in various levels of impregnation like a “magnetic field,” is one that can explain the sort of influence that did affect the intellectual Right. Philippe Burrin, *La Derive fasciste: Doriot, Déat, Bergery: 1933-1945* (Paris: Seuil, 1986). Note that Burrin considers the PPF to be strongly fascist.

⁷¹⁷ Abel Bonnard, *Inédits politiques d’Abel Bonnard de l’Académie française* (Paris: Editions Avalon, 1987), 112-142.

The Right-Wing Intellectual Model During the 1930s

The model of intellectual identity created by the fascist sympathizing Right in the 1930s would continue in the pattern developed by the anti-Dreyfusards, but would evolve to meet the changing environment of the interwar years. During the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates, the intellectual Right had been rejected by the Left as reactionary and excluded from the university system. In the 1930s, the rise of fascism caused the French Left to see the Right not simply as backward but as a dangerous, “pre-fascist” threat. The Left consolidated its forces in a Popular Front and excluded all “fascist” intellectuals from public affairs in general. Resentful of this new, expanded ostracism, intellectuals like Bonnard and Fernandez sought not only a new path to the minds of the youth, but an alternative form of government and social organization. To gain authority, right-wing intellectuals engaged not only to combat the politics of anti-fascism and communism but to redefine intellectual identity according to right-wing ideals. The struggle to legitimize the right-wing intellectual and overturn the left-wing hegemony became a primary theme in their engagement that distinguished the tone and content of their work from that on the engaged Left. The intellectuals of the Right were also distanced from those of the Left by their emphasis on themes like decadence, True France, and the Real, and their visions of class cooperation, a hierarchy of elites, and Franco-German rapprochement. These distinctive right-wing values led not only to a right-wing model of true intellectual role and responsibility but also to the formation of segregated intellectual communities and networks to foster these values. Right-wing intellectuals were identified by their participation in certain parties, cercles, and movements, their appearance on certain manifests, and their relationships to certain journalistic and publishing networks. The right-wing collective identity fostered in these segregated spaces contributed to and was influenced by the Right’s perception of its relationship to the places of power and influence like the government, university, and international parties that affected daily intellectual experience. Together, these elements contributed to a distinctly right-wing concept of what it meant to be an intellectual and an alternative model of intellectual identity to counter that of the dominant

Left. This concept of the right-wing intellectual would evolve yet again after 1940 to address the changing place of the Right under German occupation.

SECTION V

THE OCCUPATION, 1940-1944

The 1930s had been a time of great engagement for the intellectuals of both the Left and Right. The rise of fascist states in Europe had united the Republican Center and the communist Left in an anti-fascist front. And the increasing influence of communism in France brought together diverse elements of the Right against this front. Both camps portrayed their struggle as the preservation of French values and active engagement became synonymous with intellectual responsibility on both sides of the political divide. The rising intensity of engagement led to an even more passionate struggle to control the identity of the legitimate intellectual. The Leftist front increasingly excluded the Right from not only the intellectual world but also the political affairs of the nation. In response to this increased marginalization, many young intellectuals of the Right began to actively promote an alternative political system for France, based on foreign fascist models, that was more in keeping with their ideological ideals. Although the declaration of war in 1939 and the subsequent 1940 invasion would momentarily bring together intellectuals from both sides of the political divide,⁷¹⁸ the resulting occupation would violently re-divide the intellectual world to an extent previously unimaginable.

The division of the French intellectual world during the years of the Occupation resembled that of the 1930s division between the “anti-fascists” and those opposed to the Popular Front. However, the new source of division, the choice to collaborate or to resist, evoked much stronger passions in an intellectual environment that was already strained by the events of the war, occupation, and censorship. During the Occupation, the resistance believed its opponents were traitors to the

⁷¹⁸ Intellectuals of the fascist Right like Brasillach found themselves fighting the German invasion alongside extreme Left intellectuals like Sartre.

intellectual ideals of the patrie, free thought, and human rights while the collaborationists viewed the resisters as saboteurs of French civilization's last chance to renew itself and take its place in the new world order. There was a sense on both sides that an apocalypse for France was imminent. With this radicalized view of the danger posed by the opposing camp, differences in opinion were now reinforced with violence, denunciation, imprisonment, or death, making all previous intellectual differences and resentments, even those of the more volatile 1930s, seem like mere academic exercises. Never had it seemed so important for intellectuals to clarify the differences between the two camps and legitimize their own group as the nation's rightful intellectual guides.

These efforts to differentiate resistance and collaborationist concepts of intellectual identity during the Occupation were so effective that they have become one of the main obstacles to the integration of the Right into the intellectual narrative. The distinctive values, ideals, and behavior of the collaborationist intellectual, particularly given our understanding of the Holocaust, make it very difficult for historians to accept that the collaborationists believed they were acting in accordance with any intellectual ideal. Despite the presence of many recognized writers and artists on the collaborationist Right, therefore, the historical community has consistently struggled to reconcile the concept of the true intellectual with that of collaboration. For intellectual historians, the figure of the responsible French intellectual during the occupation can only be represented by the writers of the Resistance.

Although they are not identified as such, it was the intellectual Right who served as the only authorized French intellectuals of the time. Both the German government in the North and Vichy in the South repressed and persecuted the intellectuals of the Republic and the Left and provided financial, material, and institutional support to the collaborationists. The Right dominated the authorized press, publishing houses, and even the university system and worked in tandem with a government that reinforced its values. Despite the fact that the structures of intellectual hegemony changed hands, the intellectual of the Right would still identify with the images and discourses of exclusion and struggle that had defined his identity during the previous decades. After so many years

of being considered anti-intellectual and excluded from cultural authority, the intellectual Right eagerly seized control of all aspects of the intellectual world, yet it never felt secure in its new position of power and continued to feel the need to justify its choice of intellectual collaboration as that of the legitimate intellectual. And, although the Resistance lacked the tools to dominate the intellectual world during these years, its clandestine, oppositional status during foreign occupation gave it newfound claims to moral superiority and patriotism. Therefore, this brief period of right-wing dominance during the Occupation continued the developing pattern of right-wing resentment, exclusion, and struggle for legitimacy.

The months before and after the German invasion of June 1940 seem best described as those of indecision and chaos, particularly in the intellectual world. In the months leading to the phoney war, the intellectual Right had been staunchly Munichois and pacifist, leaving the bellicose nationalism to the communists. With the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact, however, the committed communists suddenly lowered their objections. This led the Republicans to mobilize more urgently not only against the fascist Right but also their former allies from the Popular Front. Communist outlets like *L'Humanité* and the PCF were both banned by the government and remained clandestine operations that favored Germany and opposed both de Gaulle and the Allies until the German invasion of the USSR in 1941. With the declaration of war, several intellectuals of both the Left and Right, from Brasillach to Sartre, served in the military. Many of those on the Left who had opposed fascism in the 1930s like Aron, JR Bloch, and André Breton sought exile in America, England, the USSR, and even Brazil while others like Malraux and Gide simply fled Paris to the unoccupied South or the colonies. Those who remained in France, choosing to “wait and see” what the occupation would bring, were faced with decisions about collaborationism.

The great majority who remained in France were neither ardent resisters nor collaborationists. For most, even in the intellectual world, life in occupied Paris and Vichy required an element of collaboration balanced by an element of resistance. On either extreme of this gray zone in the intellectual world, however, was a polarized minority of vocal intellectuals who spearheaded the

divisive struggle to monopolize true intellectual identity. The intellectual Resistance drew primarily from the anti-fascist camp of the 1930s, although the communist writers would not become a dominant force in the resistance until summer 1941. Intellectual resistance was achieved primarily through the clandestine press and the numerous small papers and rare literary journals that were published underground. As the Otto lists, which named the writers hostile to Nazi Germany who were to be excluded from publication, grew in length, writers of the Left increasingly turned to participation in the clandestine press. By the Fall of 1941, one of the earliest civilian resistance organizations, the Front national (FN), created a section for writers called the Comité national des écrivains (CNE). By the following year, it had formed its own literary journal, *Les Lettres Françaises*, which would become the home of some of the most prestigious intellectuals of the communist and republican Left. The Resistance supported de Gaulle as the only representative of the French government, praised the Allies, and urged efforts of sabotage and resistance. By the Spring of 1942, the tide of war had turned and the Resistance gained increasing force and energy. With the fall of Mussolini, the landing of de Gaulle in Algeria, and the German defeat at Stalingrad, this new Resistance force began to envision itself as the victors. After 1943, they developed two new themes in their work: the construction of a post-Liberation France and the punishment of those, particularly the intellectuals, who had collaborated.

Collaborationism was not completely synonymous with the intellectual Right of the 1940s since several intellectuals of the Right, even those who had been fascinated by fascism in the 1930s, were unwilling to accept fascism in the form of German occupation. However, the great majority of intellectuals of the extreme Right maintained their ideological trajectory and supported either the National Revolution of Vichy or the collaboration of the occupied zone. Those who chose to engage in the unoccupied zone, like Maurras, Massis, and Bonnard, were drawn by the ideas and the political and professional opportunities that Vichy offered to those intellectuals who supported its national revolution. They found Petain to be the Chef they had sought and believed Vichy was the incarnation of a French nationalist fascism. Those, on the other hand, who returned to Paris were disenchanted

with the more conservative Petain, although they admired his second in command, Laval. They advocated the cultural policies of Germany in France, as relayed to them by the cultural ambassador Otto Abetz, and supported Germany's attempts to drain the men and materiel of France for its war efforts. The most committed among them advocated the shooting of resistance hostages and the deportation of Jewish families. Although there are numerous stories of collaborationist intellectuals like Brasillach and Drieu using their newfound political authority to secure the release of fellow intellectuals of the Left, more often the now dominant intellectual Right used their power to unleash a vendetta against their opponents. Collaborationist papers and publishers were the only ones reinstated in the occupied zone and those intellectuals who took the opportunity they provided accepted not only the financial backing of the Nazis but their censorship and political line as well, including biological racism. Although some collaborationists, like Drieu, recognized the impending defeat of Germany as early as 1943 and slowly withdrew from active collaboration, this would not erase their culpability in the eyes of the intellectual Resistance.

The occupation turned the tables on intellectual hegemony, placing the previously excluded extreme Right in positions of cultural power and repressing the intellectual Left. However, this did not alter the struggle on either side to differentiate their intellectual values or to legitimize their intellectual model as the best for the French patrie and civilization. While the intellectual Right enjoyed a hitherto unknown dominance that came with supporting the party in power, the intellectual Left laid claim to patriotism, free thought, and the moral superiority of the oppressed opposition. As in previous times of crisis and engagement, both sides created intellectual communities and networks, public on the Right and clandestine on the Left, to help them carry out their struggle for intellectual legitimacy. Most importantly, both sides continued to develop severely disparate concepts of what it meant to be an intellectual.

CHAPTER 13

LEFT-WING INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY DURING THE OCCUPATION: RESISTOR INTELLECTUAL VALUES

After the initial confusion of the occupation and the scattering of the intellectual community had subsided, “two attitudes became apparent: one either accepted or rejected the occupation.”⁷¹⁹ The decision to join the intellectual Resistance or Collaboration must be attributed at least in part to the dramatic division in intellectual values between the two camps. In both the Northern and Southern zones, the Left-wing writers who would form the body of the intellectual Resistance quickly found themselves unwelcome in the places of intellectual power they had previously called home, from the university to the ministry to prestigious revues like the *NRF*. Even when their presence was not officially condemned, they felt, as the Right had for so many years, that their values were no longer represented there. These institutions that had defined left-wing intellectual identity for the first half of the century were now controlled by the collaborationists. The intellectual of the Left was forced to redefine intellectual identity as opposition to, rather than participation in, these traditional bastions of left-wing values.

Despite the new right-wing monopoly over political and intellectual institutions, the intellectual of the Left would continue to be marked by a certain confident mentality of engagement that, once again, the Right would not share. The Left believed that regardless of its clandestine status, it remained the intellectual authority for the public and that its values were inextricable from the popular concept of intellectual identity. As the first number of *Combat* confidently explained, the “majority of our patrie remains faithful to its traditions of honor and of liberty” and recognized its

⁷¹⁹ Sapiro, *La Guerre des écrivains*, 21.

intellectuals as those who defended these anti-fascist ideals.⁷²⁰ The intellectual Left felt certain that although the Right had displaced it from power, they had not replaced it in the French imagination. In fact, they were certain that their opposition to foreign occupation gave them a moral authority and patriotism that the Right could no longer claim. This moral superiority became essential to the Left's new approach to engagement and redefinition of intellectual authority. As Sartre would later explain, those who opposed collaborationism came to believe that there was "a moral elitism of the Resistance" and that the war and the occupation "was gradually creating a new class of moral leaders" on the anti-collaborationist Left that would take over direction of France at the end of the war.⁷²¹

Although they were physically ostracized, the intellectual of the Left would not adopt the discourse of exclusion, resentment, and struggle for public legitimacy that had characterized the engagement of the Right. Resistance articles presented their authors as the legitimate, albeit displaced, authority and the spokesmen of the silent majority, instead of portraying them as a minority forced to struggle against a hostile, engrained nation-wide mentality. Rather than being preoccupied by their new exclusion from official positions of power, the intellectual Left redefined intellectual power as moral superiority and named themselves its only representatives. The Comité National des Ecrivains claimed in its 1943 manifest that it united "the intellectual elite of the entire nation" and "gave to the writers of France and to all its intellectuals the general mobilization of the mind against the Barbarians."⁷²² Ironically, while the Right enjoyed the role of the regime's intelligentsia for the first time, they continued to conceive of their engagement as a struggle for legitimacy among a resistant public. And, while the Left was physically excluded from places of intellectual power, they continued to present their engagement as emblematic of the only recognized intellectual model.

⁷²⁰ "Appel," *Combat* no. 1, December 1941.

⁷²¹ James D. Wilkinson, *The Intellectual Resistance in Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 48.

⁷²² *La Culture Française sous l'occupation; la résistance des intellectuels* (New York: Section de Documentation French Press and Information Service, 1945).

Intellectuals of the Resistance maintained their confident perception of unaltered authority in part because they continued to uphold many of the ideals that had become synonymous with intellectual responsibility since the Dreyfus Affair. The collaborationist Right's belief in the cultural and intellectual benefits of Franco-German collaboration, their fascination with action and physicality, their belief that Realists accepted the occupation, and their concept of France as a component of the New Europe all clashed with the traditional elements of Republican and left-wing thought. By 1942, the republican and communist intellectuals engaged together once more, united by their opposition to the collaborationist Right and their shared values of rationalism, universalism, and a revived Jacobin nationalism.

The intellectual stance that would most distinguish the resisters of the Left from their right-wing peers during the occupation was the basic refusal of collaborationism. This anti-collaborationist identification was made clear in one of the first manifests of the Resistance that claimed to speak for the entire body of French intellectuals. "Against the bestial terrorism installed in our nation by the barbarian occupant," the statement read, "we the intellectuals of France, writers, artists, professors...raise before French opinion and before the collection of the civilized world a solemn protest."⁷²³ The manifest repeatedly emphasized that "the intellectuals of France" were defined during the Occupation by their refusal to collaborate, to publish, or even to accept the defeat. "We the intellectuals of France," the manifest continued, "reject with scorn the shameful appeals of a cowardly submission." The Right, it argued, partook in intellectual life as it had been reinstated and authorized by the Germans, which was an intellectual life that was really "a regime of terror installed under the cover of cultural 'collaboration.'" Instead, the intellectual as redefined by the Left would "take part in the liberating struggle," putting their "knowledge, their art, and their authority in the

⁷²³ Ibid., 38.

service of the immortal cause of the patrie.”⁷²⁴ Active anti-collaborationism was therefore the hallmark of the true intellectual.

Anti-collaborationism required a reconceptualization of the role of the intellectual during wartime. Some writers like Gide, Sartre, and Paulhan initially continued publishing in the occupied press in the belief that it was their responsibility as intellectuals to continue the cultural life and expression of France despite occupation. However, by the end of 1940, the intellectual Resistance had determined that the new role of the intellectual was to oppose this occupied press and declared that “all legal literature was treasonous literature.” The CNE in particular equated fascism and collaborationism with barbarism and the destruction of culture. It therefore made the role of the organization, and the responsibility of the intellectuals affiliated with it, the “anti-collaborationist struggle against the institutions, literature, and culture of collaboration as well as the individuals who collaborated.”⁷²⁵ While the Right argued that continuing to publish according to the German dictates was the only way to promote French culture in the new Europe, after 1940, the intellectual of the Left increasingly saw his duty as an intellectual to be refraining from publishing in the mainstream press. They would therefore turn to the clandestine presses where they could fully express their own values without fear of reprisal or censorship.

Here in the clandestine press, the role of the intellectual as a writer was once again celebrated. The declaration of the role of the writer in *Les Lettres Françaises* read, “In this world of lies in which we are forced to live, our role as writers is to ‘shout the truth.’”⁷²⁶ The professors of the university who rejected the intrusion of Vichy into the educational system also published a statement declaring the true role of the professor was “to take the necessary initiative and contribute by our authority and by our example to the liberation of France... to organize a resistance of French

⁷²⁴ Ibid.

⁷²⁵ Drake, *French Intellectuals and Politics*, 177.

⁷²⁶ Ibid.

intelligence, and to safeguard, complete, and orient the programs that the Nazis sabotage.”⁷²⁷ By 1943, the CNE had solidified its position on the role of the intellectual and published its official manifest. “Do not listen to those who ask, what are we able to do, we are only intellectuals?” the manifest declared. Instead, “aid in all your means with your science and your intelligence in the sabotage of this monstrous collaboration.”⁷²⁸ The “intellectual at his post,” the manifest explained, was the one who participated in the battle to expel the German invader, not the one who withdrew from the struggle or, even worse, like the collaborationist intellectuals, accepted the German yoke.

Intellectual opposition to collaborationism necessarily involved an opposition to the influences of Nazi and German culture in France. The Left, which had favored cosmopolitanism, internationalism, and the influence of German culture since the Dreyfus Affair, now found itself calling for pure French culture and intellectual patriotism while the Right called for Europeanism and cultural exchange with Germany. Borrowing from the vocabulary of the inter-war extreme Right, the Germans became the “barbarians” and the “Boches,” who had “stomped under foot all our intellectual patrimony.”⁷²⁹ All language of internationalism and Franco-German cooperation was replaced by a new left-wing nationalism and all previous admiration for German writers, musicians, and scientists evaporated in the Resistance press. As one resistance paper would explain, “our program, our tendency is summarized in our name, *Valmy*, the first victory of the Revolution against the Prussians.”⁷³⁰ The CNE, even after the return of the communist influence in 1942, would proclaim its role as “a movement created by intellectuals for intellectuals” to be “the grouping of all the French intellectuals around a single mission: the defense of the patrie and of its spiritual patrimony.”⁷³¹

⁷²⁷ *La Culture Française*, 43.

⁷²⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁷²⁹ *Ibid.*, 42.

⁷³⁰ *Free France* April 1942.

⁷³¹ *La Culture Française*, 30.

However, the collaborationist Right also presented its Franco-German collaboration and Europeanism as a broader form of French nationalism. It was therefore necessary for the Left to recapture its 19th century monopoly on nationalism by reviving an older form of the word more in keeping with its values. While the intellectual Right claimed to continue to represent French nationalism by collaborating with the Germans in order to create a new and stronger France, the intellectual Left reverted to a Jacobin inspired nationalism laced with the Revolutionary vision of True France. In this way, the Left made a concerted effort to monopolize the concept of French nationalism and True France, so valuable during wartime, for its own camp. “Do not be tricked,” read one manifest from 1941 that claimed to be the “spokesman for numerous intellectuals,” “do not be tricked by appearances, True France is not the minority which has supported if not provoked a capitulation without honor. It is not the journalists who today praise the vanquisher.”⁷³² Instead, True France was the “man of thought, the writers, the universitaires, and savants, the representatives of the sacred tradition” of 1789 who had launched papers protesting collaboration and occupation. It was not the collaborationist “masters of the day” but the resisters who truly knew the “soul of the nation” and the best interests of France.

The Left’s return to Jacobin nationalism was perhaps best revealed in its continuing identification with the universal absolutes of Revolution, the People, Democracy, and the Rights of Man at the foundation of the republican ideal. The *Manifest of the Intellectuals* in 1941 highlighted the Left’s defense of these absolutes as the major point of division between Right and Left. It declared that the struggle of collaborationists and anti-collaborationists was not a struggle in the traditional sense but rather a struggle between men who were “divided by esprit.” On one side were the traitors who had succumbed to the force of an anti-French ideology that negated the values on which the nation had been built, on the other were those “for whom truth, justice, tolerance, national

⁷³² Ibid., 4.

independence, love of peace, fraternity and humanity are the only world that is inhabitable.”⁷³³ Both communist and republican intellectuals alike turned to the symbols and discourse of the French Revolution in an effort to link democratic values and the promise of communist revolution to a historic and victorious France. “Tell them” Henri Laugier wrote concerning French publications in America, “that France has maintained her faith in the efficacy of the principles of 1789, of the Revolution, of the Rights of Man, of popular sovereignty and of free institutions.”⁷³⁴ The universalist vocabulary of individual rights, democracy, egalitarianism, tolerance, and revolution practically became a required element of any resistance article. “France,” one article in *Franc-Tireur* said, “has remained ardently and fiercely republican and searches no other doctrine than the Rights of Man so odiously derided by the so-called French government.”⁷³⁵ Because of this, it would be on the “republican idea, the new and true republican tradition, that France, delivered from the Nazis and from Vichy, would shape her future anew.”⁷³⁶

The Left’s celebration of Enlightenment universals and their incarnation in the democratic system extended during the occupation to include praise for the representatives of democracy abroad from de Gaulle to America and England. While the intellectual Right was declaring the bankruptcy of western democracy and joining their anti-communism to an increasingly bitter anti-Americanism, the Resistance press had only praise for the English, American, and eventually Soviet allies. In keeping with the philosophy that the enemy of my enemy is my friend, the intellectuals of the Resistance disposed of any previous anti-American or anti-British sentiments and renewed their former infatuation with the Soviet Union.⁷³⁷ The new role of the Resistance intellectual was to engage in

⁷³³ Ibid.

⁷³⁴ *Free France* April 1942

⁷³⁵ *Free France* September 1942

⁷³⁶ Ibid.

⁷³⁷ Philippe Roger has shown in his book *The American Enemy: a story of French anti-Americanism* that anti-American sentiment was found on both the Left and Right, particularly in the inter-war and post-war years, although it has commonly only been associated with the Right. (for example, pages 260 and 316)

support of all the Allies in a front reminiscent of the anti-fascist movements of the 1930s.⁷³⁸ There was less unanimity on the desirability of the Free French and de Gaulle but many of the resistance papers with the largest circulation and greatest longevity would be staunch supporters of both. *Franc-Tireur* claimed General de Gaulle was the only person qualified to maintain order during the period of transition that would surely come after Liberation.⁷³⁹ *Combat* reminded readers that the Allies had recognized the Free French, not Vichy, as the official government of France in 1942.⁷⁴⁰ And *Liberation* consistently praised de Gaulle as the “anti-Pétain” who was the true leader of France.⁷⁴¹ Although admiration for de Gaulle was not unanimous, it remained a clear point of division from the intellectual Right for whom opinion on the “traitor” was quite clear.

The intellectual Left also revived its longstanding association of intellectual identity with rational thought. During the years of the occupation, left-wing rationalism was highlighted by both camps as the counterpoint to the Nazi concept of intelligence as a product of irrational will, action, and sentiment. In particular, the Left emphasized its devotion to mental calculation and rational thought in order to distance itself from the fascist focus on the physical body as a source of inspiration. Action, the body, masculinity, and the “complete man,” who relied on sources outside the intellect, were important themes in the work of the collaborationist Right. The Left rejected these sources as anti-intellectual, “mystical,” and a “Barbarism” that was a “degradation of French thought,” specifically because these sources existed beyond the boundaries of rational analysis.⁷⁴² The

However, it is apparent that during the few years of the occupation, anti-American sentiment was, at least publicly, an expression of the collaborationist Right alone.

⁷³⁸ Sirinelli and Ory, *Les intellectuels en France*, 140.

⁷³⁹ *Free France*, September 1942. *Franc-Tireur* would summarize this devotion by the intellectual Left to democratic values and their representatives abroad in its “program” which stated the paper’s mission to “combat the Boche, to aid the English and Fighting France...to support General de Gaulle...to work toward the organization of a Fourth Republic.”

⁷⁴⁰ *Free France* March 1942.

⁷⁴¹ *Free France* April 1942.

⁷⁴² “Appel,” *Combat* December 1941.

Right welcomed this portrayal of fascism as irrational and mystical while continuing to see it as the only possible trajectory for French intellectuals. The Left's emphasis on rational thought over irrational reaction also had important implications for left-wing intellectuals' continuing opposition to anti-Semitism. Racism, even that purported to be scientific or biological, was identified by the intellectual Left as a strain of irrational thought that conflicted with the fundamental goals of the Enlightenment, and therefore with the French intellectual tradition. Although the Resistance did not always make the defense of the French Jews a central component of its work, its fundamental opposition to the idea of a racial elite served to distance its idea of responsible intellectual engagement under the occupation from that of the Right.

Overthrowing the imposed values of the Nazis and creating an alternative became essential to the role and responsibility of the resistant intellectual. "Above all, the *écrivains résistants* believed that their task was to formulate moral ideals opposed to Fascism."⁷⁴³ After they were formulated, Sartre explained, the responsible intellectual was required to act on these anti-fascist ideals by rejecting them in his work. The responsibility of the writer, he said, was to shed light on injustice, to stir the public to action, to demand human freedom and reject oppression. It was not possible, he clarified, to create good art that favored anti-semitism, imperialism, or oppression. Collaborationist writers like Drieu and Chateaubriant who defended these fascist inspired programs, according to the Left, had betrayed their responsibility as intellectuals. Because of this, the intellectuals of the Left during the Occupation developed an important new theme in their engaged work and a distinctly "resistor" sense of purpose and role. Particularly after 1943, the intellectual of the Left was intent on outlining "the role that he might be able to play in creating a new France once victory had been achieved."⁷⁴⁴ This involved not only redesigning the Republic for the post-war, but also punishing the intellectual traitors of the Right.

⁷⁴³ Wilkinson, *The Intellectual Resistance*, 45.

⁷⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 39.

The values and positions shared by the intellectual Resistance of anti-collaborationism, universalism, Jacobin nationalism, and rationalism would separate the resistant Left from their collaborationist peers. Their values provided them with a different concept of intellectual responsibility and role, a different representation of True France, different visions of the post-war world, and different allies in their struggle. These elements of intellectual identity were nurtured in the clandestine communities and networks that the Resistance created to combat the Right's newfound monopoly over the traditional intellectual structures.

The Intellectual World of the Left: Communities, Networks, and Intellectual Experience

The occupation forced a complete “restructuring of the intellectual space” and yielded an intellectual environment in which the intellectual Left was forced to create new communities and formulate new practices for itself. The broad moral and ideological abyss that the intellectuals of both the Left and Right perceived between their two camps meant that these communities and networks created by the Left would be even more segregated and isolated from those of the Right than they had ever been before. Collaborationists would never have considered writing for the resistance papers, and the model Resistor, except during the initial period of confusion after the defeat, adamantly refused to participate in collaborationist circles. As resistant intellectuals gathered in this clandestine network and developed new intellectual practices amenable to the underground experience, they redefined for themselves what it meant to be a true intellectual under the Occupation.

The Resistance intellectual communities created tight bonds of friendship, loyalty, and shared values between their members. There was a certain “resistance mystique of solidarity and camaraderie based on common danger” that many intellectuals had not found even in their inter-war engagement.⁷⁴⁵ The fraternity they found in clandestine communities and in the acts of literary resistance provided them with a previously elusive collective identity and a sense of greater purpose.

⁷⁴⁵ Ibid., 49.

In Simone Beauvoir's work *Le Sang des Autres*, the young intellectual dies happily at the end, her "search for identity ending with the revelation of Resistance solidarity."⁷⁴⁶ For many besides Beauvoir, the experience of the clandestine intellectual resistance remained one of the happiest memories of intellectual life and they worked diligently to prolong its effects after the Liberation. The model of the Resistance community became a discursive theme in almost every essay published during the occupation on the ideal restructuring of society, politics, and class relations after the Liberation.⁷⁴⁷ The resistance community, which the Left idealized as a classless society without party divisions, political angling, or involvement by the Right, was to be the new model for "human relations in the new France."⁷⁴⁸ When the Liberation brought these tightly linked and fiercely loyal communities into the open and returned them to dominance, they maintained their self-containment by excluding the intellectual Right.

The principal organization of the intellectual Resistance was the Comité National des Ecrivains. The CNE was created in the occupied zone in the Fall of 1941 at the suggestion of Jacques Decour, a prominent resistor and editor of the pre-war AEAR organ *Commune*. It was to be the intellectual section of the civil Resistance movement the Front national de lutte pour l'indépendance de la France (FN). The FN was dominated by the Communists, but included Gaullists, republicans, and unaffiliated professionals and workers. The first committee of the CNE had seven resistance leaders including François Mauriac and Jean Guéhenno. A second section was created by 1943 in the southern zone at the suggestion of Aragon. Both sections drew from the experience and techniques of mobilization and organization learned during the anti-fascist crusades of the 1930s and provided an umbrella organization for resisters.⁷⁴⁹

⁷⁴⁶ Ibid., 50.

⁷⁴⁷ One resistor wrote "it was the only period of my life when I lived in a truly classless society." Ibid., 49.

⁷⁴⁸ Ibid., 62.

⁷⁴⁹ Sapero, *La Guerre des écrivains*, 467.

The CNE, unlike the FN and other early resistance movements that focused on acts of political and paramilitary resistance, was exclusively devoted to intellectual activities and to opposing the intellectual collaborationists. As the center of intellectual organization for the resistance, the CNE was able to “impose norms of conduct for writers” and define true intellectual identity in part by adherence to its programs.⁷⁵⁰ Its redefinition of intellectual norms and intellectual responsibility according to Resistance values, practices, and associations was an essential component of its attempt to recapture public opinion and earn international recognition.⁷⁵¹ The CNE mobilized and organized the various left-wing intellectuals who had been excluded from their previous positions of dominance in the university or literary world. While protecting their anonymity, the CNE proclaimed these engagés to be the true and original intellectual representatives of France; displaced by anti-intellectual pretenders. By the Liberation, it claimed to have attracted over two hundred of these intellectuals to its ranks who might otherwise have remained isolated voices or never have engaged in the resistance on their own. In this way, the CNE worked to create not only a collective forum for more effective engagement but also a collective identity, as the legitimate intellectuals, for its adherents.

Since engaged resisters were excluded from their strongholds in the university, the most effective tool of mobilization for the CNE and the intellectual Resistance was the newspaper or journal. The CNE’s official organ was *Les Lettres Françaises*. The journal would become the primary outlet for the prestigious writers of the resistance and would unite them in the resistance program as outlined by the CNE.⁷⁵² Decour’s original manifest to the writers of France was prominently displayed in the first issue, published in 1942, and declared to its readers, “*Lettres Françaises* will be

⁷⁵⁰ Ibid., 17.

⁷⁵¹ Its success in solidifying its own concept of intellectual responsibility as the true one can be gauged by its ability to conduct the post-war purges with little immediate reaction.

⁷⁵² The manifest of the CNE was published in the first authorized number of the journal in 1944. Decour had argued for the need for such an organ to be the voice of the CNE and by 1941 would bring in the former editor of the *NRF*, Jean Paulhan, to plan its realization. Decour’s arrest and execution, and the resulting fears that the journal’s contributors had been exposed, delayed the initial number of the journal. However, by September 1942, the first issue was published and distributed under the direction of Claude Morgan.

our weapon and through its publication we intend to take our place as writers in the struggle to the death waged by the French nation to free itself from its oppressors.”⁷⁵³ The claim to speak for the majority of the French nation against the minority of collaborators and the foreign occupiers would remain a central theme in all the articles of the paper for each of its nineteen clandestine issues.

In its few pages, the writers created articles on the politics of the war, the movement of military forces, and the martyrs of the Resistance. However, the main force of the paper was in the struggle waged against its collaborationist opponents. Paulhan provided literary critiques that praised resistance writers and denigrated the work of “compromised” artists as that of a lower tier of writers. Sartre, Mauriac, and Morgan provided portraits of writers like “Drieu la Rochelle ou la haine de soi” that theorized on the psychological aberrations and treasonous intentions of the collaborationist writers. Most essays and literary critiques provided some sort of invective against the collaborationist press, the quality of its writers, and the constrained literature produced under foreign censorship. One article lamented, for example, “alas, there is not much left of what was fine in the *NRF*” under the new direction of Drieu.⁷⁵⁴ In contrast with this collaborationist work, *Lettres Françaises* consistently promoted literature written by its own network of authors, like Sartre’s *Les Mouches* and foreign literature by allied authors like Ilya Ehrenburg, as that of the real, untarnished literary elite.

The writers who gathered together in the *Lettres Françaises* équipe included intellectuals who had been prominent and successful before the war and those who were coming of age during the occupation and would become significant forces in the post-war literary world. Here, anonymously, Aragon, Guéhenno, Paulhan, Mauriac, Cassou, Frenaud, Vercors, and even Julien Benda wrote alongside newcomers Sartre, Roy, and Camus. The CNE of the southern zone would also begin its own literary journal *Les Etoiles* with writers like Aragon, Emmanuel, Prévost, and Malherbe. By 1944, it had added such notable voices to its pages as Schulmberger, Valéry, Duhamel, and the Tharaud brothers. Many of these same writers published work in other resistance papers linking the

⁷⁵³ Drake, *French Intellectuals and Politics*, 144.

⁷⁵⁴ *Free France* April 1942.

resistance journalists in a large network united by anti-collaborationism. *Combat*, for example, which published 58 clandestine issues, employed the talents of Camus, Sartre, Gide, Raymond Aron, and eventually Malraux who all wrote for other Resistance papers as well. In addition to the continued publication of *L'Humanité* and *Le Populaire*, the Resistance message was carried by numerous new resistance papers. *Défense de la France* published 47 clandestine issues, *Le Franc-Tireur* put out 37, and *Liberation Sud* and *Liberation Nord* circulated over 240 issues together. Intellectuals were particularly prominent in *L'Université Libre* which was first published in 1943 by Sorbonne professors as the organ of the university resistance.⁷⁵⁵

Resistance intellectuals in exile found communities in the Voice of America, BBC, and the Ecole des hautes études de New York.⁷⁵⁶ The journal *La France Libre* was an important literary community for several writers in exile including Bernanos, Aron, and Romains. Its first issue explained that its mission was “to undertake a crusade of ideas” that would struggle against the moral acceptance of defeat and restore a civilization founded on human liberty.”⁷⁵⁷ Like its hexagonal partners in the intellectual Resistance, *France Libre* claimed to represent the true intellectuals of France in order “to affirm the French intellectual presence to the world and exert an antidotal effect on the French.” Although it was published in London, was made available mainly in New York, Algeria, and Cairo, and only published an abbreviated version in France, it claimed to be the voice of true France and the true intellectual. As the self-proclaimed organ of True France, rather than the occupied and treasonous France, *France Libre* devoted many of its articles to defining the identity of the French nation. In particular, the writers here emphasized the democratic, revolutionary roots of national identity and added the tag line Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité to its journal title to remind readers of what they believed to be the true tradition of French political thought.

⁷⁵⁵ Pierre Albert, “The Journalism of the French Resistance: an underground war of words,” www.freedomforum.org/publications_msj/courage.summer2000/y08.html.

⁷⁵⁶ Sirinelli and Ory, *Les Intellectuels en France*, 138.

⁷⁵⁷ Winock and Julliard, *Dictionnaire des intellectuels français*.

Resistance journalists saw their role as engaged intellectuals to be formulating and promoting the themes of the Resistance: opposition to German influences, opposition to collaboration and its supporters, and support for de Gaulle, republican ideals, and the Allied forces. These communities of resistance writers and the papers they produced were “journals of combat...they are the voice of the Resistance and express its point of view.”⁷⁵⁸ But these papers would have all had extremely limited circulations, reaching many fewer readers, had they not had the support of sympathetic publishing houses.

Although Gallimard would survive the occupation with its reputation relatively untarnished, it was authorized to publish its catalog of pre-occupation writers only after agreeing to publish the new *NRF* under the direction of Drieu la Rochelle. It would remain a publishing house which was friendlier to anti-colaborationist writers like Aragon than any of the other authorized presses, but it was under strict censorship and would publish no “controversial” pieces. The truly oppositional works of literature and journalism were published by the Editions de Minuit. Minuit published Sartre’s *Les Mouches*, Guéhenno’s *Dans la prison*, and Vercor’s *Le Silence de la Mer* among other clandestine works. Unlike many of the other clandestine resistance operations, like the *Bibliothèque française*, which was a communist affiliated publishing house, Editions de Minuit remained relatively autonomous and independent of the communist influence. However, it remained open to all resistance authors and ideologies as long as they opposed the occupation and collaboration. Such sympathetic publishers were spaces of refuge for the resistance intellectual where his ideas and values were welcomed rather than persecuted and there was no fear that one would be turned over to the authorities by the publishers or the other contributors.

The intellectual Resistance was not segregated from the larger intellectual structures of France by its separate, clandestine spaces and communities alone. The very act of writing, publishing, and distributing clandestinely in opposition to the occupying force and the official government resulted in dramatic changes in intellectual practice and behavior. These newly created behaviors and

⁷⁵⁸ *La Culture Française*, 37.

the decisions they involved would make the experience of intellectual life on the Resistant Left much different from that of the collaborationist Right during the occupation, leaving two different conceptions of what true intellectual experience entailed during these years.

The Resistance Intellectual Experience

Once again, the relationships that intellectuals had to spaces of power in the government and university would impact their experience of daily intellectual life and their concept of what “being an intellectual” entailed. With the creation of Vichy and the occupation of the North, the collaborationists became the new intelligentsia and replaced the Left in positions of power and influence in the government and its university system. The Left was reduced to clandestine activity outside of and in opposition to its traditional institutions. This new set of relationships created a new set of practices and behaviors on the Left that became essential to the model of intellectual identity that they formed under the occupation.

The intellectuals of the Resistance found themselves, for the first time, outcasts from the governing regime. They no longer had ties to the ministry, but more importantly, they could no longer identify themselves as the intellectual representatives and advisors of the Republic. Forced to redefine their authority and legitimacy for the public, the Resistance initially drew on the language of the extreme Right by proclaiming themselves the representatives of “the voice of Real France which is stifled by dictatorship.”⁷⁵⁹ However, as previously seen, this Real France bore little resemblance to the True France of the Right. After 1942, the language shifted to an association with the “government of France in exile” led by de Gaulle. An article in *Combat* reminded readers that the Free French was “the legal government of France” and its only independent and free representation.⁷⁶⁰ By allying themselves with de Gaulle, the intellectual Resistance was able to reassert its relationship to the French Republic and the government. According to the Resistance intellectuals, the government, like

⁷⁵⁹ *Free France*, April 1942.

⁷⁶⁰ *Free France*, March 1942.

they themselves, had been merely displaced, not replaced. However, this new allegiance made the resistance intellectual, more than ever, an enemy of the current regime. The experience of a political repression more severe than anything imagined by the pre-war Right would lead the Left to new practices and behaviors adapted to intellectual life underground.

The new relationship of the Left to the University would also have important implications for intellectual practice and identity construction. Under the direction of Bonnard, Vichy's Ministry of Education ejected communist, socialist, and Jewish universitaires and replaced them with collaborationists. Even the structure of the university underwent a right-wing reconfiguration as two new chairs with anti-Semitic themes were introduced to the Sorbonne. The university was no longer a welcoming space for the intellectual Left and the cultural authority associated with the universitaire was now extended to the extremists of the Right. Many left-wing universitaires did continue their work in education and even conducted clandestine resistance efforts from within. Contributors to *Libre France*, the "organ of French university forces," made the recruitment of universitaires and students the primary focus of their engagement. Châteaubriant was incensed to discover that several members of his collaborationist community Groupe Collaboration were in fact devoted recruiters for the Resistance within the university. However, for the most part, the intellectual Resistance no longer associated intellectual identity with the life and practice of the universitaire. Instead, during this time of repression, they redefined intellectual identity according to new practices in journalism.

Even before engaging in the active intellectual resistance, writers of the anti-collaborationist Left faced a difficult professional and moral decision about their role and responsibility as intellectuals that the collaborationists would not. Those who chose anti-collaborationism had to choose between continuing to write and publish their work and forgoing an open literary production while France was under foreign occupation. Especially in the early months of the occupation, before the clandestine press became a viable force, writers like Sartre and Gide were willing to continue publishing books and articles under the reauthorized presses. They believed that French intellectuals had a duty to produce literature to show the world and the French people that French civilization had

not been defeated. The same sense of a professional and moral imperative was found in the university. Writing, publishing, and teaching were essential to these intellectuals' sense of role, responsibility, and identity and the decision to leave these spaces of intellectual legitimacy for exile or clandestine resistance was difficult to make. It was also difficult for many to withdraw from the literary and journalistic world since they knew that their places would be taken by less scrupulous and less talented writers eager to capitalize on the new demand for authors. The agonizing decision that many left-wing, anti-collaborationist intellectuals had to make between their art and their politics was a traumatic process that the pro-collaborationist Right did not have to experience.

Once made, the decision to engage in active intellectual resistance yielded an entirely new set of practices and behaviors. One of the most tangible changes was the result of the material deprivation that clandestine publication entailed. Although the collaborationist Right had some material shortages due to the financial and material strain of the war, they were negligible compared to the shortages suffered by underground presses. Added to the material shortages were the limits placed on publication and distribution both by the rudimentary nature of the underground press and the fear of detection. One of the earliest resistance papers, *Valmy*, noted these initial hardships of setting up an underground publication. The director recalled that the paper had started as the publication of brief slogans passed hand to hand. Eventually it became a paper with several pages but was printed out of a resistor's home on a child's toy printing set. The first edition had only fifty copies and was passed hand to hand to prevent detection by authorities.⁷⁶¹ Paper was perhaps the most vital and the most limited supply. While authorized collaborationist papers were receiving financial support from the Germans in the North and allotments of paper from the Commission de controle du papier d'edition in Vichy, the resistance papers were reduced to "requisitioning" paper from these larger journals. Because of this shortage, resistance papers usually only had two to four pages of much smaller size and were printed only on one side so that they could be posted for multiple readers

⁷⁶¹ *Free France*, April 1942.

rather than individual consumption.⁷⁶² Contributors were severely limited in their expression and most were forced to dispense with their stylistic prose in favor of terse, instructive pieces. Few journals were able to maintain even a consistent monthly schedule and many smaller papers were forced to shut down after only a few issues.⁷⁶³ The experience of intellectual life as one of instability and adaptation was a trait that resistance intellectuals came to identify as part of being a true intellectual under the Occupation.

Although material difficulties forced new practices on the resistant intellectual community that dramatically changed the experience of book publication and journalism, perhaps the most significant change in intellectual experience was the new danger associated with these previously innocuous professional activities. The story of Decour's arrest and execution, or that of the seven members of the Musée de l'Homme's *Résistance* team of writers, would be repeated throughout the occupation. The *Défense de la France* network of writers had over a third of its three thousand members imprisoned, sent to camps, or executed.⁷⁶⁴ The Bernhard and Otto lists made quite clear what sort of literature would be punishable in these ways for both the writer and the publisher. Instructions for both distributors and readers of *Combat* made the danger and the necessary changes in intellectual practice clear. "Let us recommend to you the utmost caution," it warned distributors, "distribute the newspaper as fast as possible, avoid keeping bundles of it at home, never write any name on a newspaper."⁷⁶⁵ The danger of intellectual opposition severely affected how resisters were able to go about their daily life as intellectuals. All writers, even those like Raymond Aron who wrote

⁷⁶² Albert, "The Journalism of the French Resistance."

⁷⁶³ As the occupation continued, de Gaulle's Free French began providing some financial support, since all resistance papers were freely distributed rather than sold or subscribed to. They would also develop more sophisticated underground printing stations in larger southern cities. Although material hardships were somewhat ameliorated in these ways, the danger of distribution remained.

⁷⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁵ Readers earned similar warnings to "be discreet, do not try to know who makes your newspaper, do not try to find out where it comes from." These distributors and readers were not considered part of the intellectual milieu but their need for caution indicates the pressure felt by writers to keep their work hidden. Ibid.

in exile, worked under pseudonyms or simply left their pieces unsigned. Meetings between publishers, editors, and writing staff that had once been occasions for weekly socializing, literary discussions, and mentoring of new writers became hurried, secret affairs. Paulhan opened the offices of the *NRF* to *Lettres Françaises* writers late at night and others met publishers secretly or in guarded and protected spaces. And writers and publishers were constantly forced to be suspicious, guarded, and extremely careful in all their literary activities since even the offices, studies, and libraries of private homes were not immune to search and seizure by the Gestapo or Milice.

Intellectuals of the Resistance, therefore, found the experience of intellectual life under the occupation much different from their peers on the collaborationist Right. Physically they were scattered across France and the allied world, cut off from the traditional Parisian intellectual spaces and legitimizing cultural institutions they had once dominated. Professionally they found publication of books difficult to arrange and circulation of that work necessarily limited. Even expression through journalism was limited by available space in the severely abbreviated pages and the limited number of issues. Resistance writers therefore found that they could not say what they wished in the open, prestigious spaces they were accustomed to, that in the clandestine press their stylistic elements were cut for brevity, that they had few opportunities to publish, and that once published, they could not take ownership of their work. The danger of opposition under the occupation created a necessity for these clandestine, anonymous intellectual practices that severely altered the left-wing resistance writer's concept of intellectual life and the experience of engagement under the occupation. It would create a very different concept of what it meant to be an intellectual, particularly among the generation of writers coming of age during the occupation, from that being formulated on the collaborationist Right.

The Resistance Intellectual Model

Under the Occupation, the intellectuals of the Left found themselves, for the first time, excluded from their positions of dominance in the political field and in their traditional intellectual

institutions. These new relationships led to a redefinition on the Left of what the model of intellectual identity involved. The intellectual of the Resistance, despite repression, continued to believe the French public still accepted them as the only legitimate intellectual guides. This was in part due to their continued defense of the themes and worldviews, from universalism to Rationalism, that the Left had associated with intellectual responsibility and role since the Dreyfus Affair. Even a new emphasis on French nationalism was reconceptualized in the Jacobin, Enlightenment tradition to distinguish it from the nationalism of the Right. Under the Occupation, however, Resistance intellectuals no longer enjoyed positions of prominence and power in the intellectual communities, from the university to the NRF, that they had habitually dominated. Whether they were literally ejected by the Collaborationists, or felt isolated in the hostile environment, the intellectuals of the Resistance saw the need to create new communities and networks, most often underground, to organize their engagement and provide a collective socio-political identity. Belonging to these new communities would become an important part of the Left's model of intellectual behavior under the Occupation. The Resistance intellectuals were distinguished by a confident approach to engagement, a certain set of left-wing cultural values, an association with organizations of the Resistance, and a new set of intellectual practices and experiences that were adapted to their new relationship to centers of power and intellectual life. These elements would be used to distinguish the "true" intellectual of the Left from the "collaborationist" of the Right and served as the foundation for the reconstruction of left-wing intellectual identity during the Occupation years.

CHAPTER 14

INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY AND THE COLLABORATIONIST RIGHT: THE CASE OF PIERRE DRIEU LA ROCHELLE

Pierre Drieu la Rochelle has perhaps been one of the most studied of all collaborationist intellectuals, second only to Robert Brasillach. This is due in part to the large body of work that he left behind and his overwhelming tendency toward introspection. Drieu seems to have written his own ideas and emotions into most of his fictional works and took great pains to explain his itinerary, thought process, and motivation in all of his politically engaged articles. Because of this, he is particularly well suited for any study of intellectual self-conceptualization and identity construction. His self-analysis and popularity among scholars, however, has not produced any real consensus on his trajectory toward collaborationism. In many ways, Drieu must be considered an eccentric individual whose motivations make him a poor representative for his intellectual peers. However, the desire for legitimacy that he expressed, the intellectual and political values that he promoted, and the communities that he engaged in during the Occupation were representative of a broader intellectual trend among the collaborationist Right and make him an important spokesman for intellectual identity construction during this time.

Drieu was born in 1893 to a religious, conservative, and bourgeois family that he would eventually come to despise. After a less than impressive scholarly performance at the Sorbonne, Drieu enlisted in the military to fight in World War I. Here he found the camaraderie and the active engagement in the world around him that he believed made of him not an abstract and isolated individual but a complete man.⁷⁶⁶ Even after being wounded, he still found war to be a necessary

⁷⁶⁶ Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, *Chronique politique, 1934-1942* (Paris: Gallimard, 1942), 3.

experience for all men and nations that tested their strength by destroying their decadence and individualism.⁷⁶⁷ After the war, Drieu joined the Dadaists and forged a personal friendship with Louis Aragon. However, after Aragon turned to communism, Drieu would break publicly with the group and personally with Aragon. During the 1920s, he was drawn toward Action Française royalism only to be disappointed in integral nationalism.

Integral nationalism was inappropriate for modern times in which the struggle against American and Soviet powers, he predicted, would necessitate a European union based on autonomous, but cooperative nationalisms.⁷⁶⁸ This European union would need the guidance of a strong France but also the force of the new fascist Germany. Drieu began his infatuation with fascism and Germany in 1934 when he traveled there and met Otto Abetz at a meeting of the *Sohlbergkreis*, a movement that sought Franco-German cooperation. During this time, Drieu wrote the articles that would become *Socialisme Fasciste* and publicly announced his sympathy for the fascist ideology. In his search for a French version of the fascist alternative, Drieu was drawn to the PPF of Doriot. From 1936 to 1938 he would be the ideological voice of the PPF and would form strong bonds with fellow PPF intellectuals Ramon Fernandez, Abel Bonnard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Alfred Fabre-Luce, and Georges Suarez.

By 1938, Drieu had become disgruntled by the PPF's failure to take action and to build a strong fascist France that could be the partner of Nazi Germany. By 1939 he had resigned. With the declaration of war in 1939, Drieu tried to gain a post as a liaison officer with the British or a cultural diplomat to Spain, but his previous admiration for fascism prevented both. After briefly considering flight to England and suicide, Drieu chose to remain in Paris and attempted to work with the German victors to bring about the equal cooperation he had envisioned. With this goal, he found Paris, rather than Vichy, allowed him the greater freedom of expression and possibility to effect real cultural liaison. Because of this, he turned down a position as Censor of Literary Production in Vichy to write

⁷⁶⁷ Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, *Secret Journal*, trans. Alastair Hamilton (New York: H. Fertig, 1973), xv.

⁷⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

in occupied Paris. During the occupation, Drieu wrote for Châteaubriant's *La Gerbe*, the PPF's *Emancipation Nationale* and *La Révolution Nationale*, and Brasillach's *Je Suis Partout*. Abetz offered him the direction of the newly re-staffed and now authorized *NRF*. Although Drieu attempted to keep several of the original *NRF* staff, including Gide and Paulhan, he would effectively turn the revue into a voice of collaborationism.

Drieu had not previously shown anti-Semitic tendencies and had been married to French Jewess Colette Jeramac, but he would quickly accommodate himself to the biological anti-Semitism of the collaborationist press. He had never considered the Jews to be fully assimilated Frenchmen and believed they were excessively modern, cosmopolitan, and bourgeois and therefore a danger to his vision of France. Because of this, his writings on French culture, European collaboration, and the fascist political vision tended to dovetail with the required anti-Semitic tone of the time.⁷⁶⁹

By 1943, however, Drieu had become dissatisfied with the Nazis. He had not found the equal partnership for France that he had sought and Germany appeared to be steadily losing ground to America and the USSR. In 1943, he shut down publication of the new *NRF* and, although he would continue to write for other collaborationist journals, reduced the level of his engagement. After two suicide attempts in the summer of 1944, Drieu succeeded in ending his life in March 1945 in order to avoid a summons to appear before a Liberation tribunal. Several historians have attempted to see his despair over collaborationism in these final years as a statement of his rejection of fascism and even a new respect for communism, but his secret diary of these final months indicates differently. To the end, although he recognized that they had triumphed, Drieu maintained his opposition to communism and democratic republicanism and, despite its failure, maintained his devotion to the fascist ideal.

The scholarship on Drieu reveals the continuing resistance by the historical community to recognize intellectuals of the Right, particularly during the occupation, as legitimate, though different, representatives of intellectual identity. Golsan has rightfully attributed this to an inability by scholars

⁷⁶⁹ This did not prevent him from using his considerable prestige with the Germans to save his ex-wife from deportation in addition to protecting his intellectual adversaries like Paulhan from imprisonment.

to bridge the “insurmountable abyss” that has been arranged between fascism on one hand and culture on another.⁷⁷⁰ As such, the concept of a fascist, much less a collaborationist, intellectual is untenable. The earliest work on Drieu, by Resistance intellectuals eager to explain collaborationism as intellectual irresponsibility or psychological aberration, reduced his ideological attachments to political expediency, professional opportunism, suicidal tendencies, and a pathological loathing of himself and his intellectual class.⁷⁷¹ Since these Liberation era assessments, scholarship on Drieu has progressed surprisingly little.⁷⁷² However, the perception of an abyss between collaborationism and intellectual identity is not a product of post-war historical scholarship alone, but a continuation of a century-long left-wing dominance over the idea of the intellectual. Drieu struggled to define himself as an intellectual against what he perceived to be an ingrained association. It is necessary to recognize Drieu’s own claims to intellectual identity, his resentment of left-wing hegemony, and his distinctly collaborationist model of intellectual role and responsibility.

Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy

During the interwar period and particularly the years of the Popular Front, intellectuals of the Right had not only felt excluded from the centers of intellectual power and legitimacy like the university but from the larger arena of moral and political affairs. Drieu and his fellow

⁷⁷⁰ Golsan, *Drieu la Rochelle aux Etats-Unis*, 65.

⁷⁷¹ For example, Sartre’s “Drieu la Rochelle ou la haine de soi.”

⁷⁷² In the early 1970s, Hamilton continued to see Drieu’s engagement as a result of his self-loathing and his hatred of larger society which he believed collaboration and nazi occupation would help eradicate. By the latter 1970s, Tucker labeled Drieu’s fascism “romantic” and reduced his engagement to an irrationalism and aestheticism that negated any serious political thought. In reaction to this, Soucy would argue Drieu’s political trajectory had been well considered and rationally chosen as an ideology in keeping with his concept of western political values. Yet Soucy still found “fascism and culture to be two antipodes of the human experience” and structured his study around the question of how an intelligent writer like Drieu could have succumbed to the fascist error. Robert Soucy, *Fascist Intellectual: Drieu la Rochelle* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979). This trend continued in the 1980s where Balvet wondered how intellectuals could proclaim themselves fascist when fascism signified “the negation of all thought, of all culture” and determined that Drieu had effectively killed the intellectual within him by choosing collaborationism. Marie Balvet, *Itineraire d’un intellectuel vers le fascisme; Drieu la Rochelle* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1984).

collaborationists entered into the intellectual world under this left-wing hegemony and would carry the resentment and sense of oppression that it fostered in them long after 1940 when the literal domination of the Left ceased. Identifying with the oppressed minority had become second nature to the point that, although they reveled in their newfound cultural and political dominance, they found it hard to discard the discourse and behavior of their decades-long struggle. Drieu expressed quite well the feeling shared by many collaborationists that, despite their new positions of power in the intellectual field, they still faced an uphill battle to change the mindset of the French people. He believed the public had not only been predisposed over the century to favor left-wing values and political views, they had been taught to look to the Left for their intellectual guides and to view the Right, particularly the fascist Right as anti-intellectual. In response, Drieu adamantly proclaimed himself both an intellectual and a collaborationist, especially after the Liberation denied this duality.

Drieu's belief in the necessity of a continued struggle for legitimacy was based in great part on his concept of the world prior to the 1940 defeat. For Drieu, the dominance of the republican ideals, communist influence, and left-wing intellectual milieu had been so complete before 1940 that nothing short of a complete revolution in thought, not just personnel, could unseat it. He recalled his personal experience of this left-wing hegemony saying, "Ever since I returned from the other war, I had suffered censure. At times I didn't even write the articles, I knew so well that they wouldn't be published. Between 1920 and 1930 I was a sleepwalking journalist—I could not write during the day so I wrote in my sleep."⁷⁷³ He had had to use "intrigue," he said, simply to break into the "enthroned" journals like *NRF*. Once he had "broken in," however, he felt excluded and unwanted. By 1940, resentful of this continued lack of welcome, he wrote, "I have decided to no longer set foot in the *NRF* where the Jews, the Communist sympathizers, the former surrealists and all sorts of men who

⁷⁷³ Drieu, *Chronique Politique*, 217.

believe in the principle that ‘the Truth is on the Left’ dominate.”⁷⁷⁴ Yet, for Drieu, this frustrating experience of intellectual exclusion had been only the sign of a more sinister hegemony by the Left.

This dominance was not one of individual censors but of a broad public mindset that was now so ingrained that it resulted in a type of public autocensure. “The France which had read Sorel, Barres, Maurras, Peguy, Bernanos, Celine, Giono... was not strong enough to impose itself on the France which had read Anatole France, Duhamel, Giradoux, Mauriac, and Maurois,” Drieu complained. “What is one able to do with a people made morons by two centuries of rationalist and individualist teaching?”⁷⁷⁵ Several times he noted that France “is entirely what its educators have made it” and lamented the fact that these educators were the “pacifist and the antimilitarist, the atheist, and the petty socialist” who had instilled their “sclerotic, rationalist values” in the people from youth.⁷⁷⁶ Even the triumph of fascism would not turn them to the ideas of the Right if the Right did not continually struggle to legitimize these ideas and destroy the invisible dominance of the Left. Initially, Drieu had hope that Vichy would win this struggle. “Vichy works hard,” he wrote, “Vichy beats itself against a world of perfidious difficulties, against a hell of evil wills.”⁷⁷⁷ But, he soon came to realize, the long held “prejudices” of the public could not be changed by Vichy since even the men of Vichy had been formed in part by left-wing republican values and unseen communist influences. “Vichy is very poor and very sad,” he would eventually conclude, “This old France of the Right, all used and eaten away by the long submission to the prejudices of the Left, has tried to replace this France of the Left, but the replacement has the same defects as the predecessor.”⁷⁷⁸ Even Vichy had not been able to shed its invisible, ingrained, left-wing tendencies in order to become fascist.

⁷⁷⁴ Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, *Journal, 1939-1945* (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), 175.

⁷⁷⁵ Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, *Notes pour comprendre le siècle* (Paris: Gallimard, 1941), 173.

⁷⁷⁶ Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, *Ecrits, 1939-1940* (Paris: Grasset, 1964), 168.

⁷⁷⁷ Drieu, *Chronique Politique*, 281.

⁷⁷⁸ Drieu, *Journal*, 275.

Perhaps Drieu's most blatant expression of resentment of the Left's entrenched monopoly over thought was reserved for his private journal. The Left, he wrote, which was composed of "radicalism, socialism, and communism at the same time," was "a little milieu full of arrogance and of self-importance which thinks it holds the monopoly on intelligence, on art, on everything."⁷⁷⁹ Against this monopoly, Drieu wrote, "I am on the alert, on the defense against the dominant prejudice which is the prejudice of the Left, a prejudice accumulated in my nation for more than two centuries."⁷⁸⁰ And although "the majority of the French have made it a habit to always think and to feel in this direction," Drieu accepted that it was his duty, as an intellectual opposed to this dominant mindset, to reorient their thought toward fascism and collaboration. In this endeavor, he believed, he was in the intellectual minority despite the opportunities for a tangible dominance over the field that the Occupation provided.

By seeing and portraying himself as a representative of the oppressed, vilified, and even martyr-like minority, despite the power that the occupation provided for his views, Drieu was able to continue to identify with the right-wing discourse of exclusion and isolation and see himself still as the misunderstood prophet. "I am always found in the opposition," he wrote, "This is the proper place for the intellectual...there is always a majority among the intellectuals, I am content to always be against this majority."⁷⁸¹ Drieu wrote that, far from seeing the occupation as an opportunity to be part of the dominant majority, he had always known that he would be in the minority by accepting collaborationism. "When I returned to Paris in the end of August 1940," he explained, "I said to myself that I would never write in the Parisian press- one would detest me too much in my quarter. A month later I took an article to Châteaubriant—his solitude had attracted me. Never will men pardon

⁷⁷⁹ Ibid., 107.

⁷⁸⁰ Ibid., 109.

⁷⁸¹ Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, "En Marge I," *Defense de l'Occident; revue mensuelle politique et litteraire* no. 50 (February 1958) previously published in *Revolution Nationale* March 25 1944.

us for this trait of non-conformism.”⁷⁸² His intellectual responsibility to be the prophetic voice of the minority, according to Drieu, had trumped his desire to be adored by the people. Conformity during the occupation, Drieu wrote, far from being an acceptance of fascism and collaborationism, was actually Resistance which “conserved the old forms of the spirit of the literary Left.”⁷⁸³ The true avant-garde of thought, and therefore the intellectual pariahs, were, according to Drieu, still on the Right.

The image of the prophet in his hometown was one that Drieu returned to consistently in order to identify himself as the intellectual leader against a hostile mindset. “It is necessary to give up being politically linked in the present to accept the position of prophet,” Drieu wrote of his own feeling of isolation from the majority thought of his time. “I have truly been a prophet,” he wrote, “in reading the prophets, I discover that they were ‘collaborationists,’ they knew that all of a certain form was lost” and sought to lead the people toward the new horizon.⁷⁸⁴ The image of himself as “prophet” not only encouraged Drieu’s perception that he was oppressed in a world predisposed against his values, it also lent a moral quality to his new concept of the role and duty of the intellectual. He wrote in his post-Liberation self-defense statement that “the main reason I was hated” was because he accepted the reality of French weakness in the world. “It was natural that I should be hated,” he wrote piously, “and an intellectual worthy of the name has no alternative but to put up with hatred as stoically as possible; his duty is to continue in his thankless task.”⁷⁸⁵ The responsibility of the intellectual, as conceived by Drieu and the Right, was to point out the failures of the status quo and design radical alternatives that would not earn immediate public acceptance. He continued, “I came to Paris in 1940 fully determined to break with the vast majority of French opinion for a long time to

⁷⁸² Ibid.

⁷⁸³ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁴ Drieu, *Journal*, 217 and 284.

⁷⁸⁵ Drieu, *Secret Journal*, 69.

come...despite my fears and my hesitations I forced myself to do what I thought was my duty.”⁷⁸⁶ By placing intellectual responsibility on the side of the collaborationists and claiming that it was they, rather than the resistance, who were hated during the occupation years, Drieu was able to envision himself as the morally superior prophetic martyr. It was the invisible but dominant hand of the intellectual Left, in this scenario of the occupation, that remained the hegemonic power.

The self-portrayal of collaborationists as a minority against the engrained and still dominant ideology of the Left may have been a device that allowed them to return to the comfort of their decades-long discourse of exclusion and resentment. Or, it may have truly been the way that the collaborationist Right perceived the task of converting the public to fascism. Either way, the perception that their new control of the intellectual field would not be accepted as legitimate by the public, led intellectuals like Drieu to proclaim more than ever their right to the title and role of the intellectual. His written self-defense began with a single statement of his most intimate identification: “I am an intellectual.” He continued by explaining that he remained both an intellectual and a collaborationist throughout the occupation and that these were not mutually exclusive terms as the Resistance intellectuals had claimed. “I do not plead guilty” he wrote of the charges of intelligence with the enemy and treason, “I believe that I acted as an intellectual and a man, a Frenchman and a European should have acted.”⁷⁸⁷ In his peroration he continued this line of defense by beginning, “I, the intellectual, acted perfectly consciously according to the idea that I had formed of the duties of an intellectual.”⁷⁸⁸

In claiming the title in this way, Drieu needed to also explain his distinctly right-wing concept of the role and duties of the intellectual and how this, unlike the concept on the Left, was able to coincide with fascism and collaborationism. “It is the duty of the intellectual,” he wrote, “to go

⁷⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁷ Ibid., 66.

⁷⁸⁸ Ibid., 70.

beyond the event, to take risks, to try out the roads of History...to be outside the crowd.”⁷⁸⁹ This duty required the intellectual to step outside the ivory tower and experience life as a complete man, rather than as a theoretician like the Marxists did. “In order to ‘look’ the best,” he wrote, “I should have situated myself at the lowest level, been a pure intellectual, purely contemplative, entirely disincarnated.”⁷⁹⁰ This “action” and submersion in life of the Right was, Drieu believed, entirely foreign to the intellectual Left whom he accused of abstract intellectualism. “I say,” Drieu warned these intellectuals of the Left, “you will sleep and you will die as democrats and liberals or you will awaken, rise, and triumph as fascists.”⁷⁹¹ Intellectual theory might produce beautiful ideas he wrote, but this was not the place of the true intellectual in a time of crisis. “In times of crisis,” he explained, “it is the least of the duties of the intellectual who wishes to remain in some measure a man to expose himself...to anger and hatred.”⁷⁹² This meant actively exploring the “roads” offered by unpopular ideas like fascism and participating in their incarnation. “I wanted,” Drieu explained of his concept of role, “to make myself the intellectual counselor of that which was: a world on the path to metamorphosis.”⁷⁹³ In short, it was to be actively engaged in the political path which seemed best for the future of society and to help bring about the renewing change. For Drieu, the path was fascism and the responsibility: collaboration.

Drieu and his peers on the collaborationist Right actually dominated the intellectual spaces and structures of occupied France and forced the resistant Left underground through persecution, censorship, and intimidation. This was a position they had not enjoyed since the Dreyfus Affair and in many ways they seemed unable to believe their fortune. Although they could not claim actual exclusion or minority status in the intellectual field, they made every effort to identify themselves in

⁷⁸⁹ Ibid., 71.

⁷⁹⁰ Drieu, *Journal*, 393.

⁷⁹¹ Drieu, *Chronique Politique*, 190.

⁷⁹² Soucy, *Fascist Intellectual*, 201.

⁷⁹³ Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, *Socialisme fasciste* (Paris: Gallimard, 1934), 222.

this way. Their struggle for legitimacy, as Drieu explained, was no longer against a hegemony of left-wing personnel but against the continuing dominance of left-wing values, political ideals, and representations of true intellectual identity. As their right-wing predecessors had, the collaborationists attempted to outline their own model of intellectual identity by differentiating, yet legitimizing, their alternative intellectual values.

Differentiation of Intellectual Values: Realism and “the Body”

For Drieu, the role and responsibility of the intellectual was not tied to the rational thought or “pure intellectualism” that he associated with the Left, but rather to participation and experience in the real world. This demanded the intellectual have a certain predisposition for action and force and an appreciation of the physical, corporeal elements of man. Drieu’s fascination with the “Body” and the fascist complete man were emphasized by the Resistance as indications of his irrational and anti-intellectual engagement. However, according to Drieu, the right-wing intellectual did not disdain the things of the mind but rather sought to merge thought and action, mind and body into a harmonious existence reminiscent of the Greek ideal. He believed the Left’s reliance on intellect and rationalism had divorced it from the physical reality and created an imbalance that led toward cultural decadence. It was the role of the intellectual, as conceived by the collaborationist Right, to restore balance by reintroducing the physical element and renewing and rejuvenating man and his sources of inspiration.

Since the Dreyfus Affair, the intellectual Right had insisted that they alone were able to meet the needs of real society. Drieu saw realism to be an integral part of his new model concept of the fascist intellectual that separated it from the intellectual of the Left. His autobiographical character Gilles explained that he “had a horror of the attitude of the intellectuals who oppose to social life, such as it is, one knows not what abstraction of it.”⁷⁹⁴ Instead, he spoke of the “true French reason” which was not abstract rationalism but rather a complete intelligence that “embraced all the elements

⁷⁹⁴ Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, *Gilles* (Paris: Gallimard, 1939), 384.

of the being” that were offered by both the abstraction of the soul and the physical realities of the body.⁷⁹⁵ Unfortunately, Drieu complained, the intellectual Left took great pains to portray the intellectual who was in touch with this reality as un-intelligent and anti-intellectual. “It is a great political trick in France to leave the impression that the adversary is not intelligent,” Drieu explained, “The popular front treated the fascists of France and the fascists of other countries as imbeciles. But what is it to be intelligent? It is not showing how agile one can be at picking dry notions off a tree; it is the gift of wresting from the universe the most constant means of living largely.”⁷⁹⁶ He argued that according to the Left, those who favored the physical world, concrete experiences, and the sentiments born from active engagement were no longer intellectuals. In actuality, Drieu wrote, this supposed anti-intellectualism gave them the only intelligence worthy of guiding the people: a knowledge of their needs and of the real paths possible to achieve them.

In practice, this connection to the real and rejection of left-wing rationalism meant that the responsibility of the intellectual was to accept the world “as it is” rather than “as it could be.” During the occupation, this meant accepting the realities of the defeat, of the invasion, and of the occupation. It was the role of the intellectuals not only to collaborate themselves, but to urge the general public to cooperate. Resistance, according to Drieu, was simply a return to the void verbalism and abstract utopianism that had characterized the intellectual Left for decades. “What matters today,” Drieu wrote in the first months of the occupation, “is not what the French say, it is what they do. They collaborate. Repair roads and bridges—rebuild France. English radio is pretty but it is for those who have nothing to do. It has little to do with the reality, with the immediate French reality, with the question of life or death for the men, women, and children of this nation.”⁷⁹⁷ According to Drieu, the intellectual Left proved its idealism and detachment from the concrete realities of life by refusing to accept the

⁷⁹⁵ Ibid., 392.

⁷⁹⁶ Soucy, *Fascist Intellectual*, 245.

⁷⁹⁷ Drieu, *Chronique Politique*, 257.

parameters imposed by occupation. Instead, the responsible intellectual of the occupation, according to Drieu's concept, had a duty to involve himself in the "ugliness" of reality in order to make the best of it. "One must assume one's responsibilities," he wrote in his post-Liberation defense, "join impure groups, acknowledge that political law obliges us to accept contemptible or odious allies. We must dirty our feet, at least, but not our hands. And this is what I did."⁷⁹⁸ According to Drieu's concept of identity, although collaboration had "dirtied his feet," he had been acting as a responsible intellectual by accepting and engaging in the real circumstances of the time.

The right-wing intellectual's romance of realism also informed his sense of intellectual inspiration and intelligence. The real or complete man, who was to be the model for both society and the intellectual, was not a rational abstraction or an intellect divorced from physical, bodily experience, but rather an amalgam of the intellectual and the physical. Intelligence, therefore, needed to draw from both the rational thought of the mind and the experience and sensation of the body. The Left rejected these latter irrational sources of intelligence as "anti-intellectual," but Drieu believed them to be a truer expression of intellectual life. Because of their devotion to Enlightenment rationalism, Drieu believed, the Left ignored the full spectrum of intelligence that the Right appreciated in the complete man.

Drieu's vision of the complete man was the foundation for his concept of fascist intellectual identity. In clear contrast to the abstract intellectuals of the Left, whom Drieu accused of mental asceticism, the fascist intellectual model combined intellectualism and action.⁷⁹⁹ This would be the message of his *L'Homme à cheval*. "Men of action are important only when they are sufficiently men of thought," he wrote, "and men of thought are only valuable because of the embryonic man of action they carry within themselves."⁸⁰⁰ The true intellectual represented in the work was drawn to the

⁷⁹⁸ Drieu, *Secret Journal*, 72.

⁷⁹⁹ Drieu, *Chronique Politique*, 283

⁸⁰⁰ Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, *The Man on Horseback*, trans. Thomas M. Hines (Columbia: French Literature Publications Co., 1978), 138.

“heroic form” of the Chef and fulfilled his responsibility and role by actively aiding the leader to accomplish change. For Drieu, the true intellectual spoke not from an intellectual assessment of life, but rather from the passionate and emotional involvement that came from the combination of thought with revolutionary action.⁸⁰¹ In short, Drieu’s concept of the true intellectual would “combine the role of the pure intellectual with that of the man of action.”⁸⁰² According to the intellectual Right, fascist action was not anti-intellectualism or “opposition to thought, but rather a new thought substituting itself for an old thought.” And the new fascist thinkers were not anti-intellectualists or opposed to culture, but were rather “extraordinary thinkers who by tying up thought in their action reinforce this thought rather than isolating and weakening it.”⁸⁰³

For Drieu and many of his collaborationist peers, the desire to celebrate both the intellect and the bodily sources of intelligence and culture led to a new, fascist-inspired discourse of “the Body” that would not be shared on the Left.⁸⁰⁴ Among the collaborationists, the Body became a device to critique the values of the Left, to justify anti-Semitism and misogyny, and to create an image of the new virility they envisioned for France. According to Drieu, the “French national body,” which was a product of each individual body in the nation, had been a strong and healthy organism during the Medieval Age thanks to the celebration of both the spiritual and the physical in that time. After the Enlightenment, however, the intellectual Left had devalued physical action and force in favor of rationalism. As a result, the individual body had been deemphasized in education and culture and the national Body had been weakened. In contrast to the “New Man” or “Hitlerian Man” developed by the rest of Europe, Drieu wrote, “France has created its opposite: a nation of sitters, Pernod drinkers,

⁸⁰¹ Barrie Cadwallader, *Crisis of the European Mind: a Study of André Malraux and Drieu la Rochelle* (Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1981), 200.

⁸⁰² Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, *Notes pour comprendre le siècle* (Paris: Gallimard, 1941).

⁸⁰³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰⁴ Although it drew from many traditional sources on the extreme Right, the cult of the Body was particular to the fascist intellectuals.

babblers in committees.” This ignorance of the body, initiated under the Enlightenment, was fostered, he continued, by the “teachers, professors, and intellectuals who directed the political majority in France through the freemasons, radical and socialist parties.” Because of this asceticism and “condemnation of the physical by the old, deranged world of the intellectuals of the Left,” France was weakened in comparison to her European neighbors.⁸⁰⁵ It was the duty of the intellectual to lead France toward a reintegration and celebration of the body that would eventually strengthen the body of the nation as a whole.

The focus that Drieu and many of his collaborationist peers gave to the fascist cult of the body influenced their conceptions of gender and masculinity in a way that would distance them even further from the intellectual Left.⁸⁰⁶ For Drieu, women and the femininity they represented were a constant presence in his life as wives, mistresses, and affairs yet never as friends, equals, or professional peers.⁸⁰⁷ “For years after the other war,” he wrote during the occupation, “one might have thought I was especially interested in women. In fact I was much more interested in men. For

⁸⁰⁵ Soucy, *Fascist Intellectual*, 237. “Our professors, our intellectuals have forgotten this rule of life,” he wrote, and as a result of the deprivation of the body, had engendered the “weakness or rather the absence of the soul of France.” Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, “Pensées urgents,” *La Gerbe*, November 14 1940. France had become overly intellectualized while “Germany and Italy put on their feet a new type of man” who “by his physical and moral quality entirely outclassed the poor little rationalist silhouette that three quarters of our French institutions and professors still cultivate.” Drieu, *Chronique Politique*, 133.

⁸⁰⁶ Although there may have been slight divisions in language of gender before the advent of fascism, it is during the Nazi-inspired years of the pre-war and occupation period that gender seems to have most divided the Left and Right. The homosocial nature of Nazism and, to a lesser extent, of the other European fascist movements, has attracted much scholarly attention in recent decades. Several works have uncovered the segregated communities and separate spheres for women created by fascism to emphasize gender differences and unequal social roles. Others consider the new emphasis that fascist ideology placed on the physical, emotional, and intellectual discrepancies between the masculine and the feminine natures. The consensus is that fascism entailed the glorification of force, militarism, physical strength, and virility as well as an attraction to homosocial environments where masculinity was reinforced. In many ways it was a male ideology that had little room for the female except as the mother of children and the representative of domesticity. Many historians and contemporaries of French collaborationist intellectuals have distorted this fascist separation of gender identities into a proclivity to sexual deviancy. Accusations by the Resisters that the collaborationists were guilty of a homosexual love affair with the idea of the virile German soldier were written as public propaganda to destroy the collaborationist intellectuals. However, they do indicate a sense that the issue of gender was a point of division between the intellectuals of the Left and Right after the introduction of fascism on the Right.

⁸⁰⁷ Soucy, *Fascist Intellectual*, 326.

me the drama of friendship between men is the whole heart of politics.⁸⁰⁸ Drieu's preference for masculine friendships and environments was amplified by his increasingly negative view of women. His literary portrayal of women, from Myriam and Dora in *Gilles* to Camilla and Conchita in *L'Homme à cheval*, reveal his relative misogyny. According to Drieu, women were focused on their own narrow personal ambitions and did not understand the larger implications of politics, war, or revolutionary action. As such they could not be taken seriously as intellectuals, journalists, business owners, or political activists but only as mothers, wives, and domestic caretakers. He was particularly incensed against women because he viewed them, like he did purely rationalist intellectuals, as the antithesis of the healthy, strong body that he found essential to the creation of the complete man. Drieu's concept of the gulf existing between regenerative, active masculinity and decadent, inert femininity was one which was reinforced and exacerbated by his engagement in fascism and collaborationism.

Drieu's understanding of France as an organic national body, that was a product of all the individual Frenchmen, would also inform his anti-Semitism. Collaborationist anti-Semitism marked a clear separation in the values and worldview of the intellectuals of the collaborationist Right and the resistant, anti-fascist Left during the occupation.⁸⁰⁹ Although initially Drieu was resistant to Nazi ideas of biological racism, he and his collaborationist peers continued a right-wing intellectual tradition, stretching back to the *enracinement* of Barrès, of seeing Jews as foreign elements within the French national body that corrupted its purity.⁸¹⁰ With this intellectual heritage, the extreme Right

⁸⁰⁸ Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, *Sur les Ecrivains* (Paris: Gallimard, 1982), 44.

⁸⁰⁹ Although not all European fascisms were anti-Semitic and many fascist sympathizers continued to disapprove of anti-Semitism into the late 1930s, it is clear that collaborationism required, at the very minimum, a certain tacit acceptance of it. Many collaborationists like Celine, Brasillach, Rebatet and others of the rabidly anti-Semitic *Je Suis Partout* would engage in the biological racism of the Germans and encourage the deportation of Jews from France. Others like Drieu and Bonnard would continue to avoid biological racism but would adopt anti-Semitic language and accept the deportations as necessary for French national renewal.

⁸¹⁰ In the 1920s, Drieu had rejected anti-Semitism as a historically created bias and had instead praised the Jewish community for its patriotism during World War I. During this period he had many Jewish friends and colleagues and was married to a Jewish woman, although he later claimed to have despised this marriage and have only committed to it for financial stability. Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, *Gilles* (Paris: Gallimard, 1939),

was more susceptible to the racist philosophies of the Nazis than the Center and Left. By 1940, Drieu had settled into a firm language of anti-Semitism that, while not biological, was clearly connected to his ideas of decadence, renewal, and the need for a healthy French body. In keeping with a right-wing tradition stretching back to Barrès, Drieu believed Jews were only French by assimilation and therefore remained a foreign element in the national body. They were connected to the decadence, rationalism, materialism, modernism, and liberalism that he believed were at the root of French decay and therefore their removal would be the first step in the return to health.

Although the majority of Drieu's journalism remained surprisingly free of radical anti-Semitism, his private journal during these years reveals a more sinister form of anti-Semitism that tended to distinguish the collaborationist intellectuals. He suggested in the journal that one could avow a sort of "intelligent anti-Semitism" which recognized that Jews were deprived of taste and intelligence and therefore incapable of being artists or writers. Those who infiltrated the literary world ruined it with their self-interest and their "insufficiency in handling the treasures of the French tradition." Benda, for example, was a pedant and Soares a false genius.⁸¹¹ They were also all, he insisted, drawn to communism and therefore incapable of leading French to political health.⁸¹² Despite this unsuitability, Drieu complained, the Jews had, before the war, taken command of all the revues and publishing houses and had kept those writers, like himself, who spoke the truth about the fascist revolution from publishing their work.⁸¹³ It was no different in the rest of the intellectual world from political administration to the Sorbonne, to the field of Medicine. Therefore, while the anti-fascist Left showed appreciation and support for Jewish intellectual talent and rejected the language

99. At the time of the Popular Front, Drieu would adopt the anti-Semitic language being used by the intellectual Right to critique Leon Blum and the regime. However, he would also write the 1938 "In Regard to Racism" which was a condemnation of strong anti-Semitism.

⁸¹¹ Drieu, *Journal*, 146.

⁸¹² *Ibid.*, 88.

⁸¹³ *Ibid.*, 146.

as well as the sentiments of anti-Semitism, the Right identified the Jews as a foreign, hegemonic presence in the body of France that needed to be “surgically removed.”

Drieu’s argument that he had acted as a responsible intellectual during the occupation was based in great part on his belief that it was the role of the intellectual to work within the existing reality, to promote a concept of intelligence drawn from both physical and intellectual sources, and to actively engage in the strengthening of the French body. This perspective on intellectual identity enabled him to rationalize his seemingly anti-French and anti-intellectual anti-Semitism, misogyny, glorification of action and physicality over intellect, and acceptance of the occupation and collaboration as essential to his role as a French intellectual.

Europeanism

Drieu and many on the collaborationist Right believed that, after 1940, the age of the independent nation state had been replaced by the new age of the European union. This shift would mark an important evolution in the thought of the intellectual Right which had for decades associated their identity with nationalism and the protection of the French patrimony. As the Resistant Left adopted the discourse of nationalism to their own Jacobin tradition, the intellectual Right sought to explain its new attraction to Europeanism as an expanded form of nationalism that was more viable in the post-1940 global community. The Right argued that the idealists of the Left, because they were detached from the reality of France “as it was,” were unable to see the necessity of working within this new European conglomerate and so clung stubbornly to patriotic nationalism or communist internationalism. In particular, the Resistance intellectuals, Drieu wrote, failed to see the result of their outdated nationalism would be either victimization by America and England or by the USSR. “It is this that our brave men in the resistance do not understand,” Drieu wrote of this end result, “they live still in the anachronistic vision of a world where each state lives isolated and ideally

sovereign.”⁸¹⁴ As the prophets of a better way, the intellectuals of the Right saw their role to be redefining French nationalism, promoting a broader European identity among the French, and engaging in liaison efforts to cement the alliance.

Drieu claimed that his combination of “a morose love of France with a naïve and violent faith in Europe” had been a life-long obsession that neither the traditional Right nor the internationalist Left had accepted or fulfilled. Only fascism would eventually vindicate the merger of these seemingly opposed concepts through the idea of collaboration.⁸¹⁵ In the modern world, the continental power was like the fascist ideal of the complete man. While the complete man combined the seemingly contradictory concepts of thought and action, the New Europe would combine the seemingly contradictory ideas of nationalism and internationalism. As early as *Socialisme Fasciste*, Drieu was calling for the reassessment of the nationalist idea in the modern world. Such critical “analysis of the nationalist idea” and its increasing ineffectiveness in a world of industrial, economic, and demographic superpowers was, Drieu wrote, “the proper role of the intellectual.”⁸¹⁶ By 1940, he believed he had found the solution. By creating a league of fascist nations, a “veritable Geneva of socializing fascisms,” that were united under German leadership and followed its model of military and political force, Europe, and through her, France, could compete with the other continental powers.⁸¹⁷

Drieu was always very careful to emphasize the benefits of such a league to France in order to prove that Europeanism did not indicate an anti-nationalism, anti-patriotism, or anti-French sentiment on the part of the collaborationists. Instead Europeanism was portrayed as a nationalism that transcended petty border divisions and created a more powerful and effective “True France”

⁸¹⁴ Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, “Ephemerides,” *Revolution Nationale*, February 19 1944.

⁸¹⁵ Drieu, *Journal*, 326.

⁸¹⁶ Drieu, *Socialisme fasciste*, 234.

⁸¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 233.

within a mosaic of other like-minded nations. Needless to say this vision of Europe where traditional French nationalism was subordinated to the greater continental good was radically opposed to the idea of “True France” held by the Resistance. For Drieu, True France was not “purely concrete, attached to the soil or the peasantry, nor was it purely abstract, attached to the divine name of France.”⁸¹⁸ In particular, he emphasized, France was not bound up in a single governing ideology like democracy.⁸¹⁹ This inability to identify True France with its name, soil, or government was revealed, he sneered, by the failed attempts at nationalism made by the Resistance Left. True France was “a moral figure,” and a culture and a people whose content was more important than the structure that contained it. For this reason, in the modern day, France as a nation could exist better in the structure of a European conglomerate than in the traditional hexagonal borders. For the collaborationist Right, Europeanism was the true nationalism.

The role of the intellectual, therefore, was to redefine French identity along European lines and to engage in an active effort to achieve this new continental collective. Europeanism, however, would not be anything like the internationalism envisioned for decades by the intellectual Left. Drieu emphasized he had never been “an internationalist in a pacifist, humanitarian manner, not a universalist” like those on the Left who claimed internationalism.⁸²⁰ His Europeanism was not an “internationalism of individuals which is cosmopolitanism” nor the sort of union of centrally controlled soviet satellites imagined by the communists.⁸²¹ Rather it would be a type of European Empire or League of Nations that allowed autonomy and the maintenance of distinctive national politics, cultures, and local economies while accepting the unifying ideology of fascism. Its autonomous national components, like pieces in a mosaic, would form a larger power that would be

⁸¹⁸ Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, “Nationalisme et Internationalisme,” *Defense de l’Occident; revue mensuelle politique et litteraire* no. 50 (February 1958) previously published March 13 1945.

⁸¹⁹ Drieu, *Chronique Politique*, 78.

⁸²⁰ Drieu, *Secret Journal*, 67.

⁸²¹ Drieu, “En Marge I.”

united against the superpowers. In his pre-war novel *Gilles*, Drieu envisioned how this new collective identity of “European patriotism” would be formed when the European nations had to defend themselves as a group against the invasion of the Americans and the Russians.⁸²² Yet this new collective identity, did not, like Left-wing concepts of internationalism, destroy the integrity of each national identity. It simply amplified their force.⁸²³

In practice, this new sense of a collective European identity necessitated a certain level of cooperation between the nations of the new Europe and between their intellectual leaders. The first step in such an alliance, would of course be intellectual, military, and economic collaboration with Germany. “A country cannot live any longer on its own land,” Drieu explained, “it needs the land of others and their factories and resources as well as their talents and geniuses.”⁸²⁴ The intellectual was to take his part in the effort to merge talents and geniuses into a continental collective by participating in the exchange of scientific research with the Germans, attending writers’ congresses in Weimar, giving lecture tours throughout Germany, translating German works into French for university use and public consumption, and producing German propaganda. Intellectuals also had a duty to support other forms of European collaboration from joining in active military units on the Eastern front to convincing French workers to work in the German factories to denouncing Jews in hiding. In this way, the collaborationists believed they were fulfilling their duty to create a new European body in which France was a harmonious partner.

The concept of Europeanism that was neither anti-nationalist nor internationalist in the traditional left-wing sense distinguished Drieu and the collaborationist intellectuals during the

⁸²² Drieu, *Gilles*, 476.

⁸²³ Drieu would continue to insist that his vision of Europe was not anti-French even when he came to the determination that France’s defeat and her failure to revive herself independently through Vichy had left no choice but a German hegemony. “In these times of decadence, weakness, and political democracy,” he wrote, “one is not able to hope for the theoretical equality of federation. We need a responsible hegemony—one that is open and honest rather than hidden and destructive.” Drieu, “Le Fait.”

⁸²⁴ Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, “Le Fait,” *Defense de l’Occident; revue mensuelle politique et littéraire* no. 50 (February 1958) previously published in *Le Français d’Europe*.

occupation. While the Resistance looked to revive traditional cultural patriotism and political nationalism, the collaborationists envisioned international exchange and a federation of fascist nations. This differentiation between resistance and collaborationist worldviews would be intensified when Parisian intellectuals like Drieu became disillusioned with the National Revolution of Vichy and determined that France could not transform herself independently into an equal partner for Germany. Instead, they began to favor a Europe dominated by Nazi Germany where France would play the role of the junior partner or mentee. In contrast, the Resistance intellectuals would turn toward England, America, and the USSR in order to defeat the possibility of a German led Europe.

Anti-Communism and Opposition to the Allies

Identifying as an intellectual, for collaborationists like Drieu, was in part defined by opposition to the programs of both communism and democracy and to their incarnation in the Allies. During the Occupation, the intellectual Resistance found its natural allies in the anti-fascist front: the communist and democratic powers of the Allies. Any previous anti-Americanism or anti-British program by the communists was quickly set aside as was any hesitation about Stalinist Russia by the more democratically minded resisters. In contrast, the collaborationist Right would make hostility toward England and America central to its discussion of political responsibility and, after 1941, find new depth in its pre-war anti-communism. Collaborationist intellectuals, like Drieu, found both ideologies to be incompatible with their ideas of intellectual responsibility, culture, and intelligence. Therefore, they constructed their identity as right-wing intellectuals around an opposition to these ideas and to the Allies.

Throughout his life, Drieu made occasional statements that indicated a willingness to consider Stalinist Russia as a possible alternative to liberal democracy. He was inclined toward nationalist socialism and authoritarian governments which he believed Stalinism could provide were it to free itself more from the Marxist model. And, toward the end of the occupation, as Drieu realized that Nazi Germany was collapsing, he suggested that it would be the USSR which would succeed

Germany in monopolizing Europe since it had proven itself the stronger of the two competitors. Several historians have taken these statements as an indication that Drieu, in the last years of his life, had turned from fascism to a fascination with communism out of opportunism or a desire to prophesy the future power.⁸²⁵ This, however, underestimates the strength of Drieu's life-long anti-communist convictions and the incompatibility of his concept of intellectual identity with the communist philosophy.

Even as a youth, Drieu would analyze his reasons for turning to the Right rather than the communist or socialist Left and determine, "it was because there was nothing on that side for me."⁸²⁶ The socialism that he envisioned for France was based more on the idea of bourgeois led reform than the proletarian revolution of Marx and would later align more closely with fascist ideas of national socialism than communist ones.⁸²⁷ Drieu was also opposed to the communist concept of intelligence and education which he considered to be a leveling of genius and a prevention of the natural intellectual elite.⁸²⁸ With the rise of fascist thought in the 1930s, Drieu's opposition to communism, particularly as it related to intellectual affairs, would be even more marked. "For an intellectual," he wrote in *The Young Man and the Older Man*, "there is something tedious about being among communists. I am not at ease with them...they have a jargon that is at least half a century old...and they all repeat the same thing...always simplistic, without nuances."⁸²⁹ Drieu often noted this failure of communism to meet the intellectual needs of its following suggesting in *L'Agent double*, for example, that while the Left should be willing to open their minds to the ideas of the Right, it would

⁸²⁵ Jean-Pierre Morel, "Drieu la Rochelle et le communisme," in *Drieu la Rochelle; Ecrivain et intellectuel actes du colloque international* (Paris: Presses de la Nouvelle Sorbonne, 1995), 55.

⁸²⁶ Soucy, *Fascist Intellectual*, 46.

⁸²⁷ Drieu, *Socialisme Fasciste*, 10-44.

⁸²⁸ The character Kokuparki in *The Last Capitalist* is particularly indicative of this.

⁸²⁹ Soucy, *Fascist Intellectual*, 159.

be a mistake for the Right to do the same.⁸³⁰ This was because the Left was limited to “doctrine,” Drieu believed, making it intellectually deprived.⁸³¹ In the last year of the occupation and Drieu’s life, when many claim he turned to an appreciation of communism, these same convictions and anti-communist values remained, even in his private journal self-reflections. “What unhappiness that one is not able to abandon oneself to communism,” he wrote when considering the Soviet victories over the Germans. But, he continued, “I am against communism.”⁸³² According to Drieu, communism was a negation of intellectual responsibility.⁸³³ Anti-Communism and by correlation, opposition to the USSR, was therefore a unifying theme of Drieu’s work and of the collaborationist Right as a whole. It put their intellectual itinerary in direct conflict with the Resistance intellectuals who, particularly after the summer of 1941, were heavily influenced by communist resisters and looked to the USSR for liberation and renewal.

Drieu was equally opposed to the existing liberal democratic society that the Resistance sought to reinstate after Liberation. Gilles, who describes Marxism as “a stupidity,” an “enormous joke,” and “an unrealistic repetition of the gospels,” would express this dual hostility saying, “Not believing in Marxism and even detesting it with all my force, I do not want any less for the Marxists to destroy present society.”⁸³⁴ This disgust with liberal democratic society and its incarnation in France would extend during the occupation to a hatred of the democratic allies, England and America in particular, who wished to restore it. Although anti-Americanism and antagonism toward England were not foreign to the intellectual Right before the occupation, it had not been an overwhelming

⁸³⁰ Ibid., 227.

⁸³¹ Drieu, *Chronique Politique*, 185.

⁸³² Drieu, *Journal*, 327.

⁸³³ It was also a negation of French national identity according to Drieu. Communism and its occupation incarnation, the Resistance, he wrote, could never be French nor patriotic. There was not even a foundation of French ideas upon which communism could be constructed.(219L) In Drieu’s *Chiens de Paille*, the communist resister Salis no long even bothered to identify as French since his patriotism had been “only an order from Moscow.” Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, *Les Chiens de Paille* (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 31.

⁸³⁴ Drieu, *Gilles*, 364.

theme. Many right-wing intellectuals had traveled to England and America to share their work, and even Drieu had shown a particular affinity for these two nations before 1940.⁸³⁵ However, after the occupation, collaborationist intellectuals, including Drieu, developed anti-Americanism and anti-English sentiment into a main theme of their work. In contrast, the intellectual Resistance would erase all signs of their previous anti-American and anti-English discourse.

This theme became a significant aspect of right-wing intellectual identity in part because the intellectual Right equated its role as intellectual guides with the reconstruction of a culturally strong Europe. One of Drieu's main complaints against England was that it had turned to favor America instead of Europe. "England is no longer of Europe," he wrote in 1941, "in order to save itself from Germany it has engaged its men and goods with America." Because of this, they had to now be considered, "Americanophiles, that is to say, traitors to Europe."⁸³⁶ America was not able to understand Europe, Drieu believed, because they were unable to fully appreciate European history, art, music, and literature, or to comprehend the European tradition and mentality. American culture was an amalgam of culturally void pop art. It was an assimilation of a melting pot of international art forms with no strong roots or clear identity. Most importantly for France, American culture was invasive and homogenizing. If England was abandoning the legacy it shared with Europe in favor of the American alliance, then she was equally foreign in nature to France. "What does America understand of Europe?" he wrote, "we are therefore against the English hegemony which is only able to be an American hegemony."⁸³⁷

Drieu and his collaborationist peers defined their role as intellectuals in part by their efforts to rebuild a strong European culture. They believed that communism and American democracy were both anathema to traditional European culture and intellectual expression. Therefore, rejection of

⁸³⁵ Even with the outbreak of war, after his conversion to fascism, Drieu's first choice of placement in the military effort had been as a liaison to England.

⁸³⁶ Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, "Des vérités désagréables," *La Gerbe*, June 19 1941.

⁸³⁷ Drieu, *Chronique Politique*, 311.

these foreign ideas and cooperation with fascism, the only purely European ideology, became an essential aspect of their concept of intellectual responsibility and identity.

Drieu and the Right-Wing Intellectual Model

In his post-Liberation self-defense, Drieu would indicate, perhaps better than any other right-wing intellectual, the existence of an alternative model of intellectual identity on the extreme Right. It was according to this alternative model that Drieu could see his collaboration and his occupation engagement as fulfilling “the duties of the intellectual” despite accusations of anti-intellectualism and betrayal from the Left. In keeping with the pattern of intellectual behavior essential to this alternative identity construction in previous decades, Drieu’s engagement would be driven by a strong resentment of the Left’s hegemony and a desire to legitimize his own concept. Despite the newfound dominance of the Right over the intellectual field during the Occupation, Drieu continued to approach engagement as a member of the minority opposition. He saw himself as a beleaguered prophet whose truth was rejected by a public predisposed to left-wing ideas and models of intellectual identity. Against this hidden hegemony of the Left, Drieu pronounced himself both a fascist and a legitimate French intellectual. The model of the fascist, collaborationist intellectual that he constructed would draw from many of the traditional values of the intellectual Right from anti-communism and anti-democratism to a romance of the Real. The collaborationist intellectual continued to see his duty to lie in accepting the circumstances of the time, promoting alternative sources of intelligence outside rationalism, and denouncing the anti-intellectual nature of communism. However, the new collaborationist intellectual would also emphasize new themes and discourses like that of the Body and propose a vision of nationalism as Europeanism that significantly altered traditional right-wing ideas of French national identity. The role of the intellectual, therefore, also came to involve a promotion of physical vitality, a merger of thought and action, and active engagement in collaboration and the European collective community. Drieu’s understanding of what it meant to be

an intellectual would be reinforced by other right-wing intellectuals in the collaborationist community like Alphonse de Châteaubriant who were also constructing alternative visions of intellectual identity.

CHAPTER 15

INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY AND THE COLLABORATIONIST RIGHT: THE CASE OF ALPHONSE DE CHÂTEAUBRIANT

Alphonse de Châteaubriant has been overshadowed in the scholarship on collaborationist writers by the more flamboyant figures of Brasillach and Drieu. Yet he was equally if not more involved in the activity of intellectual collaboration and was at the center of two of the most important intellectual communities for collaborationists: Groupe Collaboration and the weekly journal *La Gerbe*. In both his independent work and his contribution to these two intellectual communities, Châteaubriant would strive to convince the public that the values and programs put forth by the collaborationists were the only intellectually viable options. To succeed in this struggle, he had to both distinguish his vision and values from those of the republican and communist intellectuals who had been dominant before the war and claim the role and responsibility of the French intellectual guide for himself and his fellow collaborators.

Châteaubriant was born in 1877 to a Catholic family whose ancestors had emigrated from Hamburg, Germany to become gentlemen farmers around Nantes. His preparation for Saint-Cyr and his subsequent military service would give him a lasting admiration for military strength but would also, surprisingly, lead him to become a Dreyfusard in 1898.⁸³⁸ After his military service, Châteaubriant was introduced to the Dreyfusard world of letters where he wrote for Republican journals like *Le Radical* and formed lasting friendships with left-wing writers like Romain Rolland. By 1911, Châteaubriant had published his first major novel, *Monsieur des Lourdines*, to great critical acclaim and had won the Goncourt prize. The events of World War I would prove politically decisive

⁸³⁸ L.A. Maugendre, *Alphonse de Châteaubriant, 1877-1951* (Paris: André Bonne, 1977), 32.

for Châteaubriant. His participation in the war led him to increasingly apocalyptic views of democratic Europe and an intense antipathy for bolshevism.

During the interwar years, Châteaubriant signed Rolland's Declaration d'Indépendance de l'Esprit out of friendship for its author but increasingly found himself at odds politically and ideologically with his friend. By 1922 he published *Briere*, which had won the grand prix du roman from the Academy, and *Reponse du Seigneur* in Massis' *Revue Universelle*. During these years he also began the spiritual renaissance that would lead him to an unorthodox interpretation of Catholicism and Christianity. His political path toward the Right and fascist collaboration would not begin, however, until he traveled to Germany in 1935 seeking inspiration for his next novel. The novel would be set aside in favor of a work on the New Germany he believed he had found entitled *Gerbe des Forces*. The work was met with hostility by the Left and was hailed during the occupation as the epitome of collaborationist literature. The initial visit was followed in 1936 by a more extensive trip during which Châteaubriant interviewed Hitler, Goebbels, and Ribbentrop, spoke to a mass meeting of Hitler youth, and assisted in the opening of the Olympic Games in Berlin.⁸³⁹ For the next few years before the war, Châteaubriant would plea for rapprochement and cultural collaboration between France and Germany and would personally return to Germany to give lectures and to have his works translated and published in German. He increasingly found the changes made by fascism in the new Germany to be the solution to the French crisis that had become disastrous under the Popular Front. In particular, he saw Germany to be France's only strong ally against communist infiltration.

In 1940, immediately after Pétain's speech asking for an armistice, Châteaubriant would meet with the printer Jean Floch and begin preparations for a new European journal to be published in Paris: *La Gerbe*. *Gerbe* quickly earned approval to begin publishing from the Propagandastaffel and put out its first issue July 11, 1940. Over the years the journal would gather to it some of the most prominent names of the intellectual collaboration including Brasillach, Drieu, Giono, and Celine. But its most tireless contributor would remain Châteaubriant who contributed over 86 articles during its

⁸³⁹ Ibid., 194.

publication. He would also help found the Groupe Collaboration in 1940, which was to be “a veritable crusade against the rhetoricians from whom came the decrepitude of the French spirit.”⁸⁴⁰ The organization was created specifically for the intellectual milieu to spread its collaborationist visions and values in the areas of economics, literature, art, music, and the sciences through publications, lecture tours, and workshops. In other words, it was a tool of intellectual legitimacy whose mission was to struggle against the existing republican and left-wing intellectual paradigm.

As early as autumn 1941, Châteaubriant expressed his disappointment in the National Revolution of Vichy and promoted collaboration directly with the Germans as the only possibility for the creation of a new fascist France. This included an increasing participation of *Gerbe* in the anti-Semitic discourse and denunciation of the Resistance; positions encouraged by the German occupier. In particular, Châteaubriant encouraged the publication of radical anti-Semites Georges Montandon, Céline, and Gobineau in *Gerbe* and made no protests against the 1942 ordinances requiring the yellow star or against mass deportations. He condoned the declarations of the Comité pour l'épuration de la race française and supported the creation and activities of the Milice. By 1944 he would even sign a “Déclaration commune sur la situation politique” demanding that Vichy join Germany in the war effort and create even more repressive ordinances against the “promoters of civil war” in the Resistance.

Châteaubriant would continue to be a staunch proponent of both the Nazi efforts and the fascist ideals even to the Liberation, but he understood the realities of his precarious political situation and so fled France in July 1944. For much of 1945, he was part of the community of collaborationist intellectuals in exile at Sigmaringen where he reunited with many Groupe and *Gerbe* contributors. By October, Châteaubriant had been listed on the CNE list of undesirable authors, had a warrant placed for his arrest, and had fled to Austria to live under the name of Dr. Alfred Wolf. He would be tried in absentia by the High court in France and condemned to death in 1948 but would remain safely in

⁸⁴⁰ Jean Weiland, “Nos Principes d'action,” *Collaboration: groupement des énergies-Françaises pour l'unité continentale*, May-June 1944.

exile until his death by natural causes in 1951. Despite his prominence during the years of the occupation at *Gerbe* and Groupe Collaboration, Châteaubriant was seldom the object of post-war apologies by the Right, other than those conducted by his son, and since then has received relatively little attention from historians.⁸⁴¹

The oversight can be attributed in part to scholars' suggestion that Châteaubriant's collaborationism was based less on fascism and more on his unorthodox approach to Christianity.⁸⁴² This latter interpretation tends to underplay the fascist characteristics of his thought in order to more dramatically highlight his spirituality and millenarian discourse.⁸⁴³ Although this approach to Châteaubriant has revealed many of the complexities of his thought and is an important reminder of the diverse motivations for intellectual collaboration, it has also obscured many of the intellectual and social values that distinguished Châteaubriant from the Christian Left, while uniting him closely to his recognizably fascist peers. Châteaubriant may have seen the world through the lens of spirituality, but this did not prevent him from identifying himself as a legitimate, right-wing intellectual. Those who consider Châteaubriant an isolated Christian writer usually find his ability to attract prominent collaborationists to his journal and his Groupe very surprising and are hard pressed to explain his success. It is in his identification as a collaborationist intellectual, not a Christian, that Châteaubriant and his Occupation engagement are best understood.

Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy

Like Drieu and the other collaborationists, Châteaubriant did not imagine that the new positions of power that he enjoyed in the intellectual field had actually changed public perception of

⁸⁴¹ Some believe that because Chateaubriant survived the purge in exile, he did not attract the following of apologists in the 1950s that other martyred writers did. Others suggest that Chateaubriant's fascination with Germany and the person of Hitler made him a less likely subject for historians interested in expressions of a purely French literary fascism.

⁸⁴² Kay Chadwick, *Alphonse de Châteaubriant: Catholic Collaborator* (New York: P. Lang, 2002), 17.

⁸⁴³ Richard J. Golsan, *French Writers and the Politics of Complicity: crises of democracy in the 1940s and 1990s* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 74.

intellectual identity. He believed that for over three decades, the intellectual Left had exercised something of a monopoly over the conceptualization of intellectual values and responsibility and had engrained a certain perception of France and her international relations in the public imagination. Intellectuals had been associated with democratic ideals, avant garde communism, and most importantly, anti-fascism, while all those who had called for an end to the Republic, a fight against communism, and an appreciation of the fascist program had been categorized as anti-intellectual. This perception would not be changed simply because the German occupiers had placed the collaborationist intellectuals in positions of dominance. In fact, their very connection to the German enemy would make their program of a national revitalization through fascism and European cultural cooperation suspect to the French. Because of this, Châteaubriant approached his engagement as a struggle against a defeated yet engrained mentality and felt the need first to legitimize his positions as those of a viable intellectual.

According to Châteaubriant, the intellectual leaders of the Left, these “murderous, sleepwalking Mandarins,” who took their ideas of France from “from the abstract geometric figures that dance under the sky of their minds,” had continued to monopolize discourse in France well after the Popular Front. Instead of approaching the new Germany as a source of strength and adapting the fascist ideals to better the French nation, they had retreated into their “immortal principles” and accused all outside of these principles of treasonous and anti-French thought. “Official thought,” he concluded, “had descended on France without the least political sense, the least notion of the spirit or the law of other peoples, without any intelligent, direct view of the true interests of the French people” but only with their “blind prejudices” and the “miserable nourishment of lies and stupidity.”⁸⁴⁴ Men like Châteaubriant and the *Gerbe* staff, he explained, had tried to oppose this official thought of the Republic and the communist Left with new, healthy fascist ideas, but had been rejected, marginalized, and excluded from intellectual discussion until the occupation had given them

⁸⁴⁴ Alphonse de Châteaubriant, “Lettre à Monsieur le Marechal Petain,” *La Gerbe*, July 11 1940.

a platform from which to speak. “Those who grew fat off the regime had not permitted it to be questioned,” one article explained, “they imposed a conspiracy of silence against the non-conformists.” This “conspiracy of silence” against the Right had been enforced not only by the “politicians of the Left” who imposed their “crude and limiting anti-fascism” but also, he wrote, “by the ‘intellectuels’ who aided them and who claimed to express through them their ‘humanism.’”⁸⁴⁵

Châteaubriant was convinced that these “prejudices and stupidities” of the pre-war intellectual Left and their “official thought” continued to dominate the minds of the French even after their fall from official power. “There are too many men in this country,” Châteaubriant wrote resentfully, “in the train of old sensibilities and slow in the virile disciplines; too many men in false liberty, in false individualism, in false instruction, in false intelligence.”⁸⁴⁶ And “these men, in their narrow blindness, continued to suffocate France.”⁸⁴⁷ If France were to regain her stature and her independence in the world, he believed, society needed to shake itself loose from the official thought and values, from the “false intelligence” of the intellectual Left and “purify” its “sullied minds.” This, he wrote, was the “struggle” that the intellectuals of Collaboration and *Gerbe* engaged in. The first issue of the revue *Collaboration* would emphasize the nature of this struggle saying their group was “desirous of scattering with the light of experience the unjust preventions sewn into the minds of the French and the sterile scorns amassed in their hearts.”⁸⁴⁸ It was in this way made clear that the reason that the intellectual collaboration had to struggle to legitimize its values before the public was because the harmful conceptions of the intellectual Left had been so long engrained that they were literally paralyzing the nation. “We have searched to bring back our compatriots to the very sources of life and

⁸⁴⁵ “Gerbe ou Faisceau,” *La Gerbe*, August 15 1940.

⁸⁴⁶ Châteaubriant, “Lettre à Monsieur le Marechal Pétain.”

⁸⁴⁷ *Collaboration*, October 1942.

⁸⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

of thought,” the principles of the revue would emphasize two years later, “to untangle them from the conceptions which have been paralyzed by a century and a half of aberration.”⁸⁴⁹

The language scattered throughout other articles only emphasized this vision of struggle against a dominant mindset and the surgical effort, the “work of demolition,” needed to uproot it.⁸⁵⁰ The journal *Gerbe* was described as “an organ of our effort and of our struggle” and later as an organ of “action and of purge.”⁸⁵¹ In language reminiscent of Drieu’s those who sought to proclaim the new way of fascist health were described as the “prophets who cry in the desert” of predetermined intellectual misconceptions.⁸⁵² The intellectual Resistance was described as the “deficient elite which had not known how to or wanted to clarify the country.”⁸⁵³ They were the “rival who represents a past world which does not want to die” in a life and death struggle, “a last duel,” or a “war of the worlds” with the collaborationists and “the new world which wants to live.”⁸⁵⁴ Because of them, France was a “prisoner of its conceptions” and was prevented from renewal by its “old illusions.”⁸⁵⁵ They were the “carriers of an intellectual bacteria” that continued to sicken society long after the first contamination decades before.⁸⁵⁶ The collaborationist intellectuals, in contrast, were consistently described as engaged in a “arduous task” to transform the public perception of Germany, intellectual life, and

⁸⁴⁹ Jean Weiland, “Nos Principes d’action.”

⁸⁵⁰ “Les Grandes conférences de ‘La Gerbe,’” *La Gerbe*, January 23 1941.

⁸⁵¹ Alphonse de Châteaubriant, “Sur la Gerbe,” *La Gerbe*, July 18 1940.

⁸⁵² Alphonse de Châteaubriant, “Alerte!,” *La Gerbe*, August 29 1940.

⁸⁵³ Georges Claude, “Au seuil d’un monde nouveau,” *La Gerbe*, November 7 1940.

⁸⁵⁴ Alphonse de Châteaubriant, “Le dernier duel!,” *La Gerbe*, September 19 1940.

⁸⁵⁵ Alphonse de Châteaubriant, “Une conférence de M. Alphonse de Châteaubriant,” *La Gerbe*, November 5 1941.

⁸⁵⁶ Camille Mauclair, “Droits et devoirs du talent,” *La Gerbe*, January 14 1943.

national responsibility. To change these engrained mindsets one article summarized, “it was necessary to struggle against a profound intoxication of the minds” by the Resistance.⁸⁵⁷

In these articles was found the familiar, decades-long self-portrayal of the intellectual of the Right as the minority opposition, struggling against a dominant intellectual Left position. Despite the new monopoly they enjoyed under the occupation, the collaborationists returned to their stock discourse of oppression, exclusion, and the rejected prophet. A declaration in *Collaboration* complained, “In France, the clairvoyant servants of the nation have only received incomprehension and ingratitude.”⁸⁵⁸ In case there was any doubt, the clairvoyants in the declaration were identified as the intellectual milieu of *Collaboration*. Later articles explained that Groupe Collaboration had been formed because, as a misunderstood minority, the collaborationist intellectuals’ “actions were often betrayed and annihilated by an uncomprehending public opinion” and they needed a friendly space to reinforce and support them in their work.⁸⁵⁹ For the great masses of society, Châteaubriant reiterated, “things are not clear and it is necessary for us to clarify them.” But, he continued, “this is not always easy for we are plunged in the shadows, the shadows of false liberty and of false sentiment of self, of false intelligence and false guidance. So many things are against us!”⁸⁶⁰ The many forces assailing the collaborationist intellectual included the “blind or abused crowd, the adversaries too interested that nothing be changed... and the reactionaries who deliberately sacrifice the nation.”⁸⁶¹ In short, the collaborationists urged, they could not be seen as the new masters of thought under the occupation since they were still the misunderstood and marginalized prophets of truth. After the Liberation, Châteaubriant would continue this theme in his work, explaining that the collaborationist had been like “the man who sees things too early.” Though they had tried to “rise above the battle and see as

⁸⁵⁷ “Une année d’activite du groupe ‘collaboration,” *La Gerbe*, October 2 1941.

⁸⁵⁸ Rene Pichard du Page, “Vues sur la collaboration culturelle,” *Collaboration*, May-June 1943.

⁸⁵⁹ *Collaboration*, September-October 1943.

⁸⁶⁰ *Collaboration*, November-December 1942.

⁸⁶¹ *Collaboration*, September-October 1943.

far ahead as possible,” the “intellectual Resistance, armed to the teeth with the passions of the preceding century,” had crushed all hope of progress and revitalization and “shot those for whom the problem posed itself in its true and vast proportions... suppressed them as traitors.”⁸⁶²

Yet, far from being traitors, Châteaubriant and his peers at Collaboration believed they had been the only intellectual representatives during the Occupation. The members of Groupe Collaboration in particular would proclaim themselves “intellectuals” and would state that true intellectual responsibility lay not in Resistance or even neutral “waiting” but in guiding society toward collaboration. “Is it not the duty of those who know and who had [before the war] vainly tried to give to the French people the necessary warning and put it on guard” the Groupe asked, “to take up again the task interrupted by the catastrophe of war?”⁸⁶³ Châteaubriant would declare that he himself had fulfilled this collaborationist understanding of intellectual responsibility saying that he was, “in the middle of my compatriots, the sower of the very principles of health that experience had elucidated in my consciousness.” It was his role to “remake France” by “giving it a better comprehension of its true political situation” which meant, during the occupation, understanding its new role in a fascist Europe.⁸⁶⁴ In his final statement of self-defense, Châteaubriant would write that he, as a true intellectual, had “acted with the most total sincerity in the view of that which I believed to be the interests of my nation” and that insinuations of intellectual irresponsibility by the Left were “the result of ignorance and the credulity of politicized men.”⁸⁶⁵

This collaborationist understanding of intellectual identity during the Occupation would lead Châteaubriant, like Drieu, to protest vehemently against his designation as an intellectual traitor during the Liberation and post-war purge. He saw the CNE blacklist and the purge to be proof that the

⁸⁶² Alphonse de Châteaubriant, *Proces posthume d'un visionnaire* (Paris: Nouvelles editions latines, 1987), 39.

⁸⁶³ *Une Année d'activité du Groupe Collaboration; September 1940-September 1941* (Paris: F. Bérout, 1941), 4.

⁸⁶⁴ Alphonse de Châteaubriant, *Cahiers, 1906-1951* (Paris: Grasset, 1955), 185.

⁸⁶⁵ Sorella, *Histoire d'une amitié; nombreux textes inédits de Romain Rolland et d'Alphonse de Châteaubriant* (Paris: Librairie académique Perrin, 1962), 17.

intellectual Resistance and the Left had not ceased to exercise a monopoly over the understanding of intellectual values in France. The intensified exclusion and elimination of the intellectual Right during the post-war years was, to Châteaubriant, only confirmation of their abusive and unwarranted hegemony over the concept of intellectual identity. When describing the renewed hegemony of the post-war Resistance, Châteaubriant would write, “As for me, laureate of the Goncourt and the Academy, I see myself today erased from French literature... I have suffered erasure because I had loved my nation to the point of sacrificing to it the works” of my life.⁸⁶⁶ The intellectual Left had monopolized conceptualization of the intellectual during the Occupation, Châteaubriant sorrowed, but after the Liberation, former collaborationists were not even allowed to pose the Right as an alternative.

In previous decades, the intellectual Right had believed its exclusion from claiming the position of the intellectual in a debate, the university, or the political system, was a result of the Left’s relationship to power and ability to control the intellectual field. During the occupation, when this control was reversed, the Right determined that its exclusion was in fact a result of French society’s engrained conceptualization of intellectual identity. This sense of a more fundamental exclusion from intellectual life drove the collaborationist Right to continue its efforts to differentiate its concept of values, role, and responsibility from that of the Left. As Châteaubriant would write of the continuing abyss between understanding of intellectual identity, “the incomprehension that our adversaries manifest on this essential question [of what values and choices led to the true health of France], shows us one more time that our minds are divided into two different types.”⁸⁶⁷ For Châteaubriant, the German fascists were closer in mentality and values to him than the French intellectual Left. “There are no longer sentiments, traditions, or nationalities which oppose one another,” he explained, “there

⁸⁶⁶ Alphonse de Châteaubriant, *Proces posthume d'un visionnaire* (Paris: Nouvelles editions latines, 1987), 25.

⁸⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 40.

are only two conceptions of life, one excluding the other.”⁸⁶⁸ In Châteaubriant’s opinion, the intellectual Left had one conception of life, the intellectual Right another, opposing one. If one were to legitimize the intellectual Right, it was important to first make clear the divisions in the two conceptions.

Differentiation of Intellectual Values: The Fascist Complete Man

Châteaubriant believed that one of the most important worldviews that distinguished his concept of the intellectual from that created by the Resistance was the belief in the fascist complete man. He believed the right’s embrace of the concept of the “new” or “complete” man and the Left’s rejection of it was not just a minor discrepancy in political views but rather revealed two deeply divided understandings of the essence of man and society. “Societies,” he explained, “always construct themselves on a certain foundation and this foundation is the idea that they have made of man- a religious, metaphysical, ontological idea. They construct themselves on this man and for this man.”⁸⁶⁹ The modern, democratic society of the French Republics had been created around a vision of “the man of material progress, the man of techniques, of positive and experimental science” and above all, the man of the Rousseauian Social Contract.⁸⁷⁰ But this concept of man was incomplete, inadequate to embrace the complete man and the society structured around their concept was thus flawed and in decline. The intellectual of the Right had a duty to propose a new concept of man based on the fascist model and, from this, a new structure for society.

This inadequacy of the republican, materialist man was expressed in society not simply as a surface social decadence, but as a “decadence of essences, a global abasement of human values in the

⁸⁶⁸ Alphonse de Châteaubriant, “L’éclair,” *La Gerbe*, July 17 1941.

⁸⁶⁹ *Collaboration*, November-December 1942.

⁸⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

human conscience.”⁸⁷¹ For Châteaubriant, this decadence of essences was revealed by a collapse of traditional and Christian values that had sustained the West for centuries. “In the man of the West,” he wrote, “there was, constructed by the work of generations, an architecture of values among which were love, obedience, consciousness of duty, honor, respect, and courage.”⁸⁷² During the years of the Republics, these values had faded and been falsified, resulting in the crisis in values that modern society faced. Châteaubriant would attribute this collapse of values to the new understanding of the essence of man that arose from the increasing industrialization of society.⁸⁷³ A shift had been made socially from concern about the quality of man’s culture and mind to an interest in the quantity of goods he could produce and consume. And after the impact of Rousseau and the French Revolution, the shift had been made from leadership by a recognized elite to government by a numerical majority of isolated individuals. This concept of man as material and as an isolated individual within a nameless mass, according to Châteaubriant, was inherently flawed and incapable of sustaining man or a viable society. Yet, it remained the only vision of man on the intellectual Left.

The fascist and collaborationist Right, in contrast, had recognized the inadequacy and decline of the Left’s conception of man and had embraced a new vision. “A radical change has intervened in the fashion of conceiving life,” Châteaubriant wrote in explanation, “a positive value of life is imposed on the conscience accompanied by the revelation of the principles of conduct and action which render it possible. And these are completely foreign to those [the Left] who until now have reigned.”⁸⁷⁴ The intellectual of the Right drew this new positive assessment of man and life from the fascist understanding of man as “complete.” The complete, new man was understood not an isolated individual in a proletarian mass or a material being but a vital and integral member of a collective

⁸⁷¹ Alphonse de Châteaubriant, *Les Pas ont chanté* (Paris: Grasset, 1938), 324.

⁸⁷² Alphonse de Châteaubriant, *Cahiers, 1906-1951* (Paris: Grasset, 1955), 223.

⁸⁷³ Alphonse de Châteaubriant, *La Psychologie et le drame des temps présents* (Paris: Charaire, 1943).

⁸⁷⁴ Châteaubriant, *Proces posthume d’un visionnaire*, 157.

body and a spiritual being. Châteaubriant would define the new “collective” man as “a being who comes from a total, absolute, fundamental rupture with the man of the Social contract.”⁸⁷⁵ The man of the social contract was an isolated individual who was connected to society only in order to preserve his goods and was politically an “emasculated practitioner of political representation.” In contrast, he continued, with “the new man, an entirely different concept of self intervenes... the new man is not an individual separated from all others... his spirit refuses this egoistic conception, he is attached by all his most profound energies to the life of the community.”⁸⁷⁶ This alternative concept of man constructed by the intellectual Right was the foundation of a new concept of society and government. Instead of political representation, the new man was a being of action and direct participation. His interest was not in his own affairs alone but in the well being of his collective community as a whole. In striking contrast to the man of the Left, the man envisioned by the fascist Right was “organic,” connected to others in his society and to the body of the nation itself.⁸⁷⁷ In sum, Châteaubriant, believed, the new organic man, unlike the individualist and materialist man of the republicans and the communists, would put “at the foundation of his life the sacrifice of his personal interests to something greater than himself.”⁸⁷⁸

To achieve this new man and organic society, it was necessary that man’s understanding of himself and of his society literally undergo a spiritual rebirth.⁸⁷⁹ According to Châteaubriant, his role as an intellectual was to be in guiding this rebirth. In Germany, he wrote, he had seen “the state

⁸⁷⁵ Ibid., 204.

⁸⁷⁶ Ibid., 205.

⁸⁷⁷ Ibid., 209.

⁸⁷⁸ Ibid., 14.

⁸⁷⁹ This idea of rebirth and reconceptualization would bring out both Chateaubriant’s revolutionary and millenarian language. Only fascism offered the “unique solution” which was a “moral reconstruction of man” that would transport him outside of social conflict rather than continue to embroil him in the struggles of class. It was this “revolution in the principles of life, in the law of the forces of the planet, in the human personality” that created the new man, a man that was “changed in his entirety,” not just in his relationships to other men. This was the rebirth of man on earth that Chateaubriant had found lacking in traditional Christian dogma and addressed only in Hitler’s concept of fascism.

recreated around the human person himself and the world become new again.”⁸⁸⁰ In Châteaubriant’s view, fascism offered a “reconstitution of man,” a revolution, not of men against men like the Bolsheviks wanted, but “a revolution within man, a revolution in the spirit of man.”⁸⁸¹ It was, he wrote, “the immense role and the incalculable responsibility of the writer...to sow the images, to lavish in every place the germs of action, and accumulate in the mental humus of his generation all sorts of figures who will only demand to grow!”⁸⁸² These fascist images were to be the nourishment, the incentive, and the exemplar for the reconceptualized new man.⁸⁸³ Because the average man could not remove himself from the epistemological confines of his current existence in order to envision the possibility of rebirth, the intellectual guide, who was able to see beyond these boundaries to the fascist possibility, had to provide this vision for them. Naturally, it was only the intellectual who had accepted the fascist principles and the concept of a new man who could truly fulfill this role.

Châteaubriant believed that his very understanding of man and society was fundamentally opposed to that created and maintained by the intellectual Left and the Resistance. Interwoven in his understanding of the new fascist man was his rejection of the decadence of modern, materialist and democratic society, his appreciation of collective society, and his millenarian desire for a rebirth of man on earth. His desire to play a part in this rebirth of man and society would be an essential factor in his concept of his role as an intellectual.

Franco-German Collaboration

Like many of the collaborationists, Châteaubriant had developed a fascination with Germany well before the occupation. For these intellectuals, collaboration provided not only the possibility to

⁸⁸⁰ Châteaubriant, *Cahiers*, 213.

⁸⁸¹ Alphonse de Châteaubriant, *La Gerbe des Forces* (Paris: Grasset, 1937), 205.

⁸⁸² Châteaubriant, *La Psychologie et le drame des temps presents*, 7.

⁸⁸³ “National Socialism,” he wrote, “alone instinctively addressed itself to the...illumination of the image and of the myth” and forced the soul of man to connect to the images of grandeur, traditional values, and collectivism that could renew it. *Ibid.*, 11.

model France on a successful fascist nation, but also an opportunity for cultural exchange with one of Europe's most influential artistic, scientific, and intellectual powers. While the intellectual Resistance promoted cultural nationalism and opposition to all things German, Châteaubriant and the intellectual collaborationists would find their role and responsibility as intellectuals to be precisely in the promotion of intellectual recognition, exchange, and cooperation with Germany. "Our 'intellectuals'" of the pre-war years, one article explained, "had a large responsibility for the ignorance in which we have been plunged about the real Germany."⁸⁸⁴ In contrast, the collaborationist intellectual believed his role was to look beyond the prejudices of the crowd to see the truth of fascist Germany and the possibilities for intellectual and cultural cooperation. The writers of Groupe Collaboration were passionate about this component of their intellectual duty. They devoted their work to convincing the public of the cultural affinities between Germany and France, the desirability on both sides of intellectual exchange, and the importance of collaboration for France.

Châteaubriant and Groupe Collaboration believed that by promoting the intellectual affinities of Germany and France and seeking cultural collaboration, they were serving the best interests of intellectual life. Most of the group's articles referenced the fact that the two neighboring nations had long been the primary cultural geniuses of Europe with "equal importance in the intellectual life of Humanity."⁸⁸⁵ One speech argued that "these two peoples, having received from the creator such gifts, ought not create politics which risk leading to catastrophe, but ought always to remember the obligations that they have to themselves, to each other, and to all of Europe."⁸⁸⁶ For the collaborationists, Germany was France's natural intellectual peer, so mutual spiritual enrichment was guaranteed by their collaboration. Collaboration writers credited Germany's great scientific and

⁸⁸⁴ Pichard du Page, "Vues sur la collaboration."

⁸⁸⁵ Rene Pichard du Page, "Affinities intellectuelles," *Collaboration*, January-February 1944, 1.

⁸⁸⁶ Jean Weiland, René Pichard du Page, and Ernest Fornairon, *Pourquoi nous croyons en la collaboration, causerie donnée le 27 décembre 1940 sous les auspices du groupe Collaboration* (Paris: Groupe Collaboration, 1940), 20.

philosophical minds with influencing the French Enlightenment and its Romantics with providing new avenues in literature and music. France in turn, they wrote, had provided a language of grace and beauty to German thought.⁸⁸⁷ These exchanges, Châteaubriant argued, had provided the cultural leadership for European civilization. It would be intellectually irresponsible to abandon this fruitful exchange simply because politics had opposed the two nations in war. Instead, intellectuals had a duty to encourage the two nations to “stimulate one another, and to complete one another in the domain of sciences and arts” for the good of both their own national interests and the interests of intellectual life. Collaboration, according to the fascist intellectuals, put culture above politics and the needs of civilization above petty national quarrels. In this way, Châteaubriant was able to justify collaboration as morally superior to resistance and as the choice of the true intellectual.

Collaborationist intellectuals also believed they were fulfilling their responsibility to French society and the nation by encouraging such collaboration. As the demonstrably weaker of the two parties, France needed to incorporate what it could of the German genius in order to revitalize itself and return to its place of cultural authority. Because he believed that France had the most to gain from cultural collaboration, Châteaubriant would emphasize consistently the continued willingness of Germany to cooperate as cultural equals and the willful blindness of the French Resistance who rejected these overtures. Hitler was portrayed as being willing to “bury the hatchet of war and establish an alliance” of intellectual equals while France was shown to be self-destructive in its xenophobic nationalism. “The vanquisher still proposes to us friendship and reconciliation,” one article marveled, “and we refused!”⁸⁸⁸ Much attention was also paid to the efforts of Francophile German cultural ambassador Otto Abetz and the German version of the Comité France-Allemagne to promote cultural alliances with the recalcitrant French intellectual elite. Most prominent in these arguments about the importance of collaboration with the occupier, however, was the enumeration of

⁸⁸⁷ Pichard du Page, “Affinities intellectuelles.”

⁸⁸⁸ Weiland, *Pourquoi nous croyons*, 16.

the benefits that France would receive from intellectual cooperation. The collaborationist intellectuals described the possibility of learning from German technological advances, scientific discoveries, and cultural resources. “Is this not a great adventure to draw the poets of France and Germany together?” one article asked, “and by poets we mean all the aristocrats of the mind, those who compose truly the elite, who are apt to create or at least to lead, writers, artists, thinkers or savants.”⁸⁸⁹ According to Châteaubriant and the Groupe Collaboration, Franco-German collaboration was essential to the socio-economic, technological, and cultural regeneration of France. As such, it defined the duty and practice of the intellectual elite.

Châteaubriant believed that collaborationist intellectuals also fulfilled their duty to France by strengthening the new Europe. According to Châteaubriant, Europe was being “assaulted” by two continents: Asia, in the form of Russia, and America. In order for Europe and her civilization to survive, it was necessary that “the two expressions of its genius [France and Germany] closely unite themselves” against these superpowers.⁸⁹⁰ Against left-wing accusations that collaboration was an alliance that only contributed to a Germany hegemony over Europe, the collaborationists argued that Franco-German collaboration was a cooperation of equals rather than the submission of a conquered people.⁸⁹¹ In fact, the collaborationists claimed it was the Allies who planned the degradation and division of the French empire in order to promote their self-interests. While the USSR and America had no need of a strong France, they wrote, “Germany needs a strong France to support the new Europe and be the ‘living link’ between Europe and Africa”. She was “therefore interested in

⁸⁸⁹ Pichard du Page, “Vies sur la collaboration culturelle.”

⁸⁹⁰ Alphonse de Châteaubriant, “Quand s’elevent des voix francaises,” *Cri du Peuple*, February 18 1943.

⁸⁹¹ According to Chateaubriant and Groupe Collaboration, Germany needed France’s agricultural and economic production as well as its cultural prestige among nations of the world if it were to compete against the US and USSR. Baron Verner von Rheinbaben, *Vers une Nouvelle Europe, causerie donnée April 1941 sous les auspices du groupe Collaboration* (Paris: Groupe Collaboration, 1941). Collaborationists argued therefore that Germany’s own self-interest and need for a powerful Europe would incline her toward maintaining an autonomous and viable France. Georges Claude, *Histoire d’une evolution; de l’hostilité à la collaboration* (Paris: Les Editions de France, 1941), 42.

maintaining the force of France.⁸⁹² According to Châteaubriant and his peers, a strong Europe was the only defense that a single nation like France had in the new global community that was dominated economically, militarily, and culturally by the continental superpowers. And since only Germany seemed capable of leading a European superpower, cooperation with Germany was the only means for France to “regain the place which it had lost” in a revitalized Europe.⁸⁹³ It was the intellectuals who engaged in this cooperation, according to Châteaubriant, who fulfilled their duty to Europe, and through it, to France.

While the intellectual Resistance promoted cultural nationalism, isolation from German overtures, and support for the Allies, the intellectual collaborationists were advocating the natural affinities between German and French cultures, the mutual benefits of intellectual exchange with the new Nazi Germany, and the need for cooperation to create a Europe powerful enough to compete with the continental superpowers. For Châteaubriant, the latter was the role and responsibility of the true intellectual, the former the mark of intellectual irresponsibility and treason to France.

Intellectual Realism

Châteaubriant, like Drieu and their predecessors on the intellectual Right, would highlight the theme of intellectual Realism as one that distinguished his approach to intellectual life from that taken by the Left. His understanding of intellectual realism would involve two different but linked imperatives. One was to accept and react to the lived reality of the nation, society, and man “as it actually is” rather than devising intellectual solutions based on an idealized abstraction. For Châteaubriant, this would involve accepting the reality of the decline, defeat, and occupation of France by Germany and the necessity of collaboration. The other imperative was to recognize the reality of Europe’s decline relative to the continental superpowers, particularly the USSR, and the dangers that communism would have for French civilization. The collaborationist Right’s

⁸⁹² *Collaboration*, November-December 1942.

⁸⁹³ *Une Année d'activité du Groupe Collaboration; Septembre 1940-Septembre 1941* (Paris: F. Bérout, 1941).

understanding of Realism was in total opposition to the rationalism, abstraction, and what Châteaubriant referred to as the “intellectualism” of the resistant Left. As it had been for his predecessors on the Right, this rejection of “intellectualism” was not a rejection of intelligence or engagement as the term “anti-intellectual” has been taken to mean. Rather, it was a rejection of the sterile, abstract logic devoid of other contributing sources like sentiment and experience that he associated with the pre-war Left. For Châteaubriant, the true intellectual was one who applied his intelligence to real circumstances and who accepted, in return, the influence of real external forces on his reasoning.

In his *Cahiers*, Châteaubriant would muse over the differences he found in his own approach to intellectual identity and that taken by the “man of intellectuality” on the Left. “Intellectualism often lacks the substantial truth,” he began, since abstract thought alone was a superficial exercise if it had no relation to man and the reality of his culture. “Intellectuality is a magnificent mirror, precious among precious things,” he conceded, “but the false intellectual and the bad intellectual wrongly and inconsiderately fill this with finite forms, instead of removing it from these finite forms to let integral life be reflected there.”⁸⁹⁴ To be truth, according to Châteaubriant, thought had to work in real life, beyond the confines of theory and reason. The “false intellectuals,” he continued, “do not see the force of things” in the real world and so have not known how to prevent the evils that have arisen from the attempted application of their false ideas. In particular, Châteaubriant was thinking of the application of Marxist theory on a French society ill suited for it.⁸⁹⁵ Even in his last journal entries during the post-war, Châteaubriant maintained that pure intellect was inadequate to approach the real world.⁸⁹⁶ “The man of intellect,” he wrote, “only knows the intellect, and is incapable of knowing and measuring the gifts of the intellect in their relation to total life.”⁸⁹⁷

⁸⁹⁴ Châteaubriant, *Cahiers*, 170.

⁸⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁹⁶ Note that especially in these final years, Chateaubriant considered the reality of man to be more spiritual in nature so his rejection of abstract rationalism was more influenced by his religious beliefs.

Châteaubriant would devote much of his discussion of the inadequacy of abstract rationalism to chastising the intellectual Left. Because they could not detach themselves from abstraction to approach reality, he found them not only false, but irresponsible intellectuals. “The intellectuals say of that which they do not understand” on the Right, he scoffed, “that it is ‘confused.’ They ignore that there exists a certain level of intelligence to which they are not initiated, not able to know with their intellect.”⁸⁹⁸ This would be lamentable but not irresponsible, he continued, if they did not attempt to denounce all those who searched beyond these confines. “The error committed by the disciples of the rational method considered as the only means of knowing,” he continued resentfully, “consists in believing that the searchers who transport themselves beyond this method have broken relations with reason. They call this extra-rational domain the domain of the irrational.”⁸⁹⁹ It was not “irrational,” he fumed, to attempt to know man and society by means other than a distant and removed rationalism. Those who did so, he wrote, reminded him of “the men who have only learned how to ride a horse in the riding manuals” and yet still dared to advise those who had real riding experience.⁹⁰⁰ “Pure intellectualism,” he summarized, “is only an image without substance.”⁹⁰¹ To advise society properly as an intellectual, one needed more than knowledge of the manual, more than an image of life, one needed all the resources that real experience could provide.

Châteaubriant would intentionally contrast these false intellectuals to his own concept of the true intellectual who was formed by fascism. The intellectual elite, he explained, had been corrupted by democratic society and enlightenment values like rationalism. In order to responsibly guide the “people who wait and hope” toward the future they deserved, the intellectual himself needed to be

⁸⁹⁷ Alphonse de Châteaubriant, *Fragments d'une confession* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1953), 108.

⁸⁹⁸ Châteaubriant, *Cahiers*, 236.

⁸⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰⁰ Ibid., 257.

⁹⁰¹ *Cahiers Franco-Allemande* March 1939.

reeducated by fascism. “It is necessary that the vain subtleties of abstract rationalism which, in many of them, falsifies the sense of life necessary to lead,” one article explained, “be replaced by a profound and direct vision. To abandon intellectuality is to rediscover true intelligence.”⁹⁰² The direct vision and true intelligence which belonged to the fascist intellectual was one which came not from “a master or a book, but from daily observation, constant meditation on things, persons, events...it does not isolate itself...it is not an exercise of memory but the fruit of experience of all that which is able to touch the spirit.”⁹⁰³ Such an intellectual formation, the collaborationists claimed proudly, “is only able to come from us.”

In daily practice, being a realist intellectual of the Right meant first and foremost the acceptance of defeat, occupation, and the necessity of collaboration. As one Groupe Collaboration speaker put it, “you have a choice, to take refuge in a wild but useless Resistance, to wait for the turn of events to take position, or to loyally fulfill the conditions of an armistice that France solicited. You have seen that the first of these attitudes...put our nation in catastrophe.”⁹⁰⁴ Collaboration was the only realistic approach to the current circumstances of France, Châteaubriant believed. It was also the only possibility for Europe to gain the strength necessary to preserve its autonomy and its civilization in the face of assault from the US and particularly the USSR. “Collaboration, does not concern simply universal fraternity,” he wrote, “but a more clarified...more Realist comprehension of the true international situation. The question is that of the health of humanity.”⁹⁰⁵

The role of the realist intellectual would, therefore, also be to warn the public of the dangerous international situation posed by a weak Europe and a victorious USSR. Anti-bolshevism had been a strong element in the thought of the intellectual Right for decades and it would be a

⁹⁰² Rene Pichard du Page, “La Collaboration des elites,” *La Gerbe*, June 18, 1942.

⁹⁰³ Gonzague Truc, “De la Vraie culture,” *La Gerbe*, September 3 1942.

⁹⁰⁴ Weiland, “Nos Principes d’action.”

⁹⁰⁵ Châteaubriant, *Proces Postume*, 12.

driving principle for Châteaubriant. Communism, he believed, was not only a political ideology opposed to fascism, it involved a completely different, and in his mind unviable, concept of man and society. This communist concept of man was of the “homo economicus...completely dominated by the material world.”⁹⁰⁶ Because they understood man as a material being rather than a spiritual one, all their images and conceptions of life and society were based on relationships of materialism. The danger to humanity would be, Châteaubriant wrote, “if all societies came to construct themselves on and for the man of material.”⁹⁰⁷ Such a society, he continued, would turn all questions of life and culture into economic issues and lead to the mindset that “a renovation of French economic thought is imperative in order to save French intellectual man.”⁹⁰⁸ Instead, Châteaubriant argued, the reverse was necessary, since only a revitalized mind and soul could envision true socio-economic reform. Anti-communism would therefore become an essential element of Châteaubriant’s understanding of intellectual responsibility. “It depends on us,” he wrote, “educated men and the so-called enlightened of our era to make a revolution of our own account instead of freeing the reigns of the world to bolshevism...this popular dementia.”⁹⁰⁹ In practice, this responsibility to oppose and replace communism would require intellectuals to “make common cause” with the fascist governments of Europe “against the common enemy; international bolshevism,”⁹¹⁰ and against “Gaullism... the antechamber of Communism.”⁹¹¹

According to Châteaubriant, the sterile intellectualism of the Resistance had led to a misunderstanding of man, society, and the international situation. As a result, they had misled the public and failed in their responsibility to France. Châteaubriant was adamant that intellectual

⁹⁰⁶ *Collaboration*, November-December 1942.

⁹⁰⁷ Châteaubriant, *Cahiers*, 178.

⁹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 190.

⁹⁰⁹ Châteaubriant, *Proces Postume*, 10.

⁹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁹¹¹ Pichard du Page, “Affinities intellectuelles.”

Realism was a value and an approach limited to the intellectuals of the collaborationist Right. It was they who were connected to the actual needs and experiences of society and could devise solutions to its real problems.

Châteaubriant and the Right-Wing Intellectual Model

Châteaubriant would join Drieu in creating his own alternative model of the intellectual to counter that constructed over the century by the Left. Although he, like Drieu, would introduce new themes, such as the significance of “images,” to the conceptualization of the right-wing intellectual, his process of identity construction would follow the same model developed since the Affair. Châteaubriant did not believe that the newfound power of the Right under the Occupation had actually changed public perceptions of intellectual identity and values. He continued, therefore, to assume that his ideas and values would be incompatible with the public’s view of intellectual engagement. Like his predecessors on the Right, Châteaubriant felt it was necessary to first struggle against these “blind prejudices” of the Left’s hegemonic “official thought” before ever entering into a specific debate. This mentality of engagement, even in a time that the Right controlled the political and intellectual field, would continue to separate him from the intellectuals of the Left and link him to his predecessors on the Right. His resentment of the Left, perception of their invisible hegemony, and desire to validate his own intellectual alternative would lead Châteaubriant, as it had his right-wing peers, to claim the title and role of the intellectual while distancing his values and worldviews from the Left. Châteaubriant’s understanding of intellectual Realism, desire for Franco-German collaboration, and fascination with the fascist complete man would all align him incontestably on the collaborationist Right and separate him from the intellectuals of the Resistance Left. From these values he developed a new sense of intellectual role and responsibility during the Occupation. Intellectuals, according to Châteaubriant, were responsible for creating a set of images, drawn from sources outside the intellect, in order to inspire a complete man. They fulfilled their duty to the nation and broader European civilization by encouraging Franco-German exchange and collaboration. And

they accepted the reality of the occupation and the international threat to Europe posed by the continental superpowers. Châteaubriant developed his concept of the intellectual in conjunction with his collaborationist peers. To amplify their struggle and to more effectively promote collaborationist values to a reluctant public, these intellectuals would come together in collaborationist intellectual communities. These communities, like those of the pre-occupation intellectual Right, were created to nurture their values and provide them with a source of support in what they perceived to be a still hostile environment.

CHAPTER 16

THE WORLD OF THE COLLABORATIONIST RIGHT: COMMUNITIES, NETWORKS, AND THE INTELLECTUAL EXPERIENCE

In the decades leading to the war, intellectuals of the Right had felt their ideas and intellectual values had been excluded from both the political milieu and the mainstream intellectual communities by the Republic and Left. In response, they adopted a new political vision and created alternative intellectual communities in order to reach the public. During the Occupation, the intellectual Right could hardly feel excluded from the spaces of political and intellectual power since their fascist and collaborationist values were the only ones authorized by the German government. However, those who chose active collaborationism were a relative minority and remained unpopular with much of the general public.⁹¹² The collaborationists' perception of this consistent unpopularity and rejection, even when they were in power, would make them increasingly eager to work together in intellectual communities that could magnify the effect of their individual engagement. As they had been during the interwar period, these communities of intellectuals were linked in extensive webs of socio-professional networks by common memberships and a shared sense of purpose. And, as in the past, these communities would be spaces of sociability and collective engagement that welcomed the collaborationist Right while excluding the Resistance and the Left. For the Right, as it had been for the Left, belonging to certain segregated collective communities was an important part of their daily life as intellectuals and an integral component of their definition of intellectual identity during the Occupation.

⁹¹² John Sweets, *Choices in Vichy France: the French under Nazi occupation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 83.

Many collaborationist intellectuals were linked, though not necessarily active members, in the major collaborationist political parties of the Occupation period. These parties would not have as many members during the occupation as they had in the pre-war period, but their journalistic organs attracted several intellectual contributors and linked them to their cause. It would be the journals, rather than the parties themselves, which would most directly influence the sense of collective intellectual identity. Eugène Deloncle's Mouvement Social Révolutionnaire (MSR) had only 20,000 members in 1941 but one of its supporters, Jean Fontenoy, was the editor of *Revolution Nationale* and *Rassemblement*. These two papers expressed views extremely sympathetic to the program of the MSR, at least in the early years of the occupation, and would eventually win intellectual contributors as prominent as Drieu and Brasillach. A second collaborationist party, Déat's Rassemblement national populaire (RNP), was created with the partnership of Deloncle to promote the idea of a single fascist party in France, to increase French anti-communism, and to protest against the hesitancy of Vichy. The RNP took over the previously Radical paper *L'Oeuvre* in September 1940 and made it a powerful organ of this party. Finally, Doriot's Parti Populaire Française (PPF), which had been shut down before the war, was reinstated with German approval in 1942. It maintained its pre-war organ *Emancipation Nationale* and added the PPF affiliated paper *Cri du Peuple*. Both of these would attract a network of intellectual contributors including Châteaubriant, Bonnard, and Fernandez.

Some of the smaller political and special interest organizations that arose during the occupation would also draw intellectual support, if not participation, and would link collaborationists to one another in a larger ideological network. One of these smaller groups was the Comité d'épuration de la race Française, which worked to exclude Jews from the larger social life of France. This group advocated National Revolution, the concept of a united Europe, and the elimination of the "foreign" elements in France.⁹¹³ Intellectuals from Bonnard to Châteaubriant supported its efforts and Groupe Collaboration members even handed out literature on its behalf. The Comité d'Action Anti-

⁹¹³ "Manifeste," Comité d'Épuration de la Race (BDIC Nanterre document O piece 21.448).

Bolchévique was headed by historian and writer Paul Chack and would be an important distributor of anti-communist literature and propaganda in the collaborationist intellectual circles. Equally opposed to communism was the Légion des Volontaires Françaises (LVF) of which Châteaubriant would be an honorary Legionnaire. The idea for the LVF had been suggested by the PPF in June 1941 and would be prohibited in Vichy until Laval gave it public recognition in 1943. Châteaubriant and the Groupe encouraged the French youth to enlist in the legion and volunteer for military service against the USSR on the Eastern front. Several Groupe members, including Marc Augier, would even join the volunteer troops themselves. Each of these smaller collaborationist groups linked members in a common purpose, from anti-Semitism to anti-communism, and gave them yet another space to engage as a collective group and promote their ideas before the hesitant public.

Perhaps the most recognized and most influential of the collaborationist organizations, however, was not officially a political party or political organization but a cultural one. Groupe Collaboration was formed in Paris in September 1940 and had earned approval to operate in Vichy by November 1941.⁹¹⁴ Under the presidency of Châteaubriant and the direction of Jean Weiland, it would gather to it some of the most prestigious names in science, arts, and letters in the collaborationist camp. Among its directing committee were found the names of noted savant Georges Claude, Academicians Abel Hermant, Abel Bonnard, Cardinal Baudrillart, and Pierre Benoit, and public intellectuals and journalists Drieu la Rochelle, Rene Pichard du Page, and Ernest Fornairon. Groupe Collaboration also had the distinction among the collaborationist organizations of having the largest membership, with numbers estimated around 100,000, and of having the only membership to increase during the final years of the occupation when the war was turning against the Germans.⁹¹⁵ The sense of collective purpose that the Groupe provided for its intellectuals was summarized by its statutes. The Groupe was to assemble those who desired to see a New France reborn within the New

⁹¹⁴ *Collaboration*, October 1942.

⁹¹⁵ Bertram Gordon, *Collaborationism in France during the Second World War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), 41.

Europe, support the policies of collaboration as they had been outlined at Montoire, and establish a spirit of cultural and intellectual collaboration between France and the “real Germany.”⁹¹⁶

Many of the intellectuals drawn to Groupe Collaboration, including Châteaubriant, had been long time advocates of this Franco-German rapprochement and had participated in the earlier efforts of the intellectual exchange organization Comité France-Allemagne. Many of its members, including Châteaubriant, Bonnard, Celine, Chack, and Hermant, also participated in the Cercles européen, a group whose mission was to “facilitate contacts between the writers, intellectuals, economists, industrialists, and businessmen of diverse nationalities of Europe.”⁹¹⁷ The overlapping memberships made Groupe Collaboration and Cercles européen more like a single network than two separate organizations. Their members came together in any venture intended to educate the public about the New Germany and the benefits of collaboration. They engaged their work through lecture series, speeches by French and German intellectuals, and cultural exhibitions. Perhaps one of the most popular of these was the lecture series on bolshevism provided by German professor Friedrich Grimm which toured the provinces after great success in Paris.⁹¹⁸ Speeches were given on “Le Progres scientifique et l’Europe nouvelle,” and “Le Savant et la Societe” that professed the benefits of intellectual collaboration for the sciences and the possibilities of sharing technology and discoveries. Others provided visions of “Littérature Européenne” and the role of music in the New Europe. For those in the general public who could not attend these lectures and events, Groupe Collaboration also offered a radio address on Radio-Paris where such intellectuals as Bonnard, Fernandez, Paul Chack, Edmond Pilon, and Bernard Grasset gave short talks on cultural affairs and collaborationism.

Groupe Collaboration itself was divided into smaller sub-communities that were intended to group intellectuals by their primary cultural interests. These sections included the Economic, Literary,

⁹¹⁶ *Collaboration*, October 1942.

⁹¹⁷ *Les Intellectuels et l’occupation, 1940-1944; collaborer, partir, resister*, ed. Albrecht Betz and Stefan Martens (Paris: Editions Autrement, 2004), 46.

⁹¹⁸ AN F41 347 folder 3.

Artistic, Musical, Cinema, and Scientific groupings. Sub-committees of the group and its sections would spread throughout the occupied zone, into the provinces of the Southern zone, and even into North Africa for a short time.⁹¹⁹ As the reflection on the Groupe's first year would explain, "many come to us...conscious of the necessity of grouping themselves" in order to accomplish their vision of France.⁹²⁰ The Groupe, its sections, and its provincial committees all grouped intellectuals and supporters who sought to amplify their voices in a collective engagement. These groups were not only more effective than individual engagement, they also provided collaborationists with smaller, more intimate groups of peers with which to identify within the larger collaborationist camp.

This was particularly important in the case of the Groupe's Youth section, the Jeunes d'Europe Nouvelle (JEN). This sub-group, created in May 1941 and led by Jacques Schweizer, would hold its own youth congresses, provide a cadet program for school youth, offer protection squads for Groupe Collaboration meetings, and sponsor social events with the "section féminine."⁹²¹ It held demonstrations during certain anniversaries of the war, set up a summer camp to foster the exchange of ideas among the collaborationist youth, and arranged weekly showings of fascist films.⁹²² These activities were designed to build a sense of fraternity, solidarity, and collaborationist purpose in the next generation. The Groupe's vision in creating the JEN, Fornairon would explain, was not to create yet another militant youth group but "to support among our youth of the New Europe, the formation of a training ground of leaders."⁹²³ This philosophy meant that the JEN would cooperate, rather than compete, with the other collaborationist youth groups like the Jeunesse Franciste and the Jeunesses Nationales Populaires "permitting the JEN to make contact with their comrades" in a great "fête of

⁹¹⁹ Weiland, "Pourquoi nous croyons."

⁹²⁰ *Un Anée d'activité*, 4.

⁹²¹ Pichard du Page, "Affinities intellectuels."

⁹²² AN F41 347 folder 3.

⁹²³ Pichard du Page, "Affinities intellectuels."

youth.”⁹²⁴ The Groupe’s effort to create for its youth a space of intellectual sociability where collaborationist ideas could be freely exchanged was a reflection of its vision for its own, adult members.

The intellectuals of Groupe Collaboration enjoyed yet another collective space, that of the journals *Collaboration* and *La Gerbe*. *Collaboration* was the bi-monthly official organ of the Groupe and its pages served as a support network for the Groupe’s writers. Its mission, as indicated by its motto “Rénovation Française, Reconciliation Franco-Allemande, Solidarité Européene,” echoed that of the larger Groupe and of the collaborationist community as a whole. Here Groupe members published the texts of their speeches, provided new essays on collaboration and culture, and promoted the literary work and collaborationist activities of its members and its sections. The bulletin provided a sense of imaginary community for those intellectuals who shared in the work of the Groupe, but had little opportunity or time to socialize with its other contributors. It also provided the Groupe intellectuals with yet another avenue for collective engagement and identity formation.

La Gerbe was a much larger hebdo that was able to attract and link together a majority of the prominent writers of the right-wing intellectual world.⁹²⁵ Its pages boasted the familiar names of Claude, Bonnard, Hermant, Brasillach, Drieu, Cocteau, Giono, Marcel Ayme, Bernard Fay, and Celine in addition to the almost weekly articles of its director Châteaubriant. *Gerbe* would use its space to advertise the events of Groupe Collaboration, to promote the independent publications of its contributors, and to speak on cultural and intellectual issues as well as ideological and political ones. A quick overview of the articles in *Gerbe* during its four year publication finds the familiar collaborationist themes of Europeanism, anti-bolshevism, anti-republicanism, and the revitalization of France through the new Fascist man modeled by Germany. Various articles clearly directed to the intellectual milieu discuss the duty of men of talent, the need to take care of French intellectuals, the

⁹²⁴ Ibid.

⁹²⁵ *Les Intellectuels et l’occupation*, 44. *La Gerbe* was one of the few journals actually created and financed by the German Embassy. Beginning publication in July 1940, it was one of the first weekly papers to be authorized in the occupied zone.

formation a new intellectual elite, the transformation of education, the promotion of “la vraie culture” that was European fascism, and stepping outside the “tour d’ivoire” into the real world. These articles reveal both a collective vision for France under the occupation and a shared concept of the values and responsibilities necessary for intellectuals. The pages of *Gerbe* allowed collaborationist intellectuals not only to publish their views, but also to feel they were surrounded by others engaged in the same struggle.

The network that was created between Groupe Collaboration, *Collaboration*, and *La Gerbe* was tightly knit and easily recognized. But these intellectuals were also linked, through common contributors and a shared mission, in an extensive web with other major journal teams in the occupied zone. The German Propagandastaffel helped launch several Paris daily papers in early 1940 including *Matin*, *Paris-Soir*, and *La France au Travail* where some of the prominent collaborationists like Bonnard published occasional pieces. Châteaubriant and Drieu contributed to Doriot’s *Cri du Peuple* while the daily *Aujourd’hui*, which claimed to address a literary and theatre clientele, employed the editing talents of writer Georges Suarez. Smaller organs that promoted intellectual collaboration like the *Cahiers Franco-Allemande* would continue to draw support from French intellectuals interested in cultural exchange with Germany.⁹²⁶ And *Revolution Nationale*, which promoted itself as a “political and literary” weekly after having distanced itself from the MSR in the latter years of the occupation, would draw Brasillach, Combelle, Rebatet, and Drieu. Two of the most anti-Semitic papers of the occupation, *Au Pilon* and *Je Suis Partout*, would also be linked to these intellectual networks. *Au Pilon* made itself the advocate of many collaborationists, even those who did not write for it. For example, they wrote an article whose argument was: “Drieu is an intellectual...but he is a true one.”⁹²⁷ Although *Au Pilon* was too extremist for many, Brasillach’s *Je Suis Partout* and *Gerbe* were the premier organs of the collaborationist intellectuals in the occupied zone. *JSP* employed a long list

⁹²⁶ *Cahiers Franco-Allemande* March 1939.

⁹²⁷ Sirinelli and Ory, *Les intellectuels en France*, 132.

of intellectuals whose names, from Celine to Rebatet and from Bonnard to Hermant, were found on the rosters of many other collaborationist journals and organizations.

One final collaborationist journal that deserves mention was the new, occupation version of the *NRF* directed by Drieu la Rochelle. The *NRF* had been the stronghold of the Republican Left in the interwar period and had even engaged in sympathetic discussions of communism under the influence of Gide. Its writers had included such notable names of the intellectual Left as Gide, Mauriac, Aragon, Schlumberger, Benda, Sartre, and Benjamin Cremieux. With the occupation, the journal had been shut down and production stopped for the second half of 1940. Otto Abetz and the Germans, however, had an interest in maintaining the appearance of cultural continuity in order to ease the transition of occupation. For this reason, they reauthorized the *NRF* in December 1940 under the direction of committed collaborationist Drieu.⁹²⁸ Drieu attempted to retain many of the pre-war intellectual elites of the paper and succeeded, at least for a few issues, in attracting Paulhan, Gide, and Alain. However, as the occupation wore on, those who chose to publish in the *NRF* were increasingly aware that they were writing for the Germans, not the *NRF* of old, and that their participation would be seen as intellectual collaboration. The list of contributors would therefore show a significant shift from its pre-war roster. In the place of the usual names of the Left, one found Chardonne, Jouhandeau, Giono, Alfred Fabre-Luce, Morand, Fernandez, Bonnard, Montherlant, and regular pieces by Drieu. Therefore, despite any efforts to retain the names of the revue's founders, Drieu made of the *NRF* a "lieu de vigilance" whose writers were, from then on, marked as collaborationists and as part of the extreme Right.⁹²⁹

Networks of interconnected revue teams, cultural outlets and intellectual organizations, and even political parties provided spaces for intellectual sociability where collaborationists could feel themselves part of a larger collectivity. These spaces gave intellectuals a sense of solidarity in the

⁹²⁸ The *NRF* publisher, Gallimard, would initially refuse collaboration but would be convinced to continue publishing an occupation version of the journal in return for the retention of his publishing catalogue.

⁹²⁹ Pascal Ory, *Les Collaborateurs, 1940-1945* (Paris: Seuil, 1976), 215.

shared responsibility of intellectual collaborationism and the promotion of fascist values among the hesitant public. Most importantly, it created intellectual communities that were exclusively right-wing and collaborationist and excluded the ideas and the intellectuals of the Left and the Resistance. Being a part of these right-wing organizations, activities, and socio-professional networks became essential to the right-wing idea of intellectual life, practice, and engagement. From these communities, therefore, collaborationist intellectuals constructed a distinctly separate collective identity than that formed in the circles of the intellectual Resistance.

The Collaborationist Intellectual Experience

The networks and communities of the collaborationists were not the only components of this distinctive, right-wing concept of collective intellectual identity. The schism caused by the occupation created two very different understandings of the proper relationship of the intellectual to the government, the university, and the authorized literary and journalistic milieu. As a result, the practices, behaviors, and daily experiences of the collaborationists during the occupation were entirely distinct from those of the resisters. Their different experience of daily intellectual life gave them a distinctly right-wing understanding of what it meant to be an intellectual during Occupation. While Drieu and his peers on the Right would continue to defend their practices and experience as the proper actions of an intellectual, the Left would denounce this experience of intellectual life under foreign occupation as treasonous and anti-intellectual. It would be the Left's understanding of responsible intellectual behavior under the Occupation that would triumph after the Liberation.

The intellectual Right, for the first time since the Affair, would experience life as the authorized voice, rather than the repressed opposition, of the governing regime. Bonnard found himself the Minister of Education under Vichy with the power to restructure the Sorbonne according to his fascist ideals. Maurras identified himself as the counselor of the Prince in his new position as informal advisor to Pétain. Drieu was offered a position as Censor of Literary Production in Vichy which he turned down in order to accept Abetz's offer to direct the new NRF. Collaborationist

intellectuals found themselves feted by the fascist-friendly regimes in the North and South and officially recognized as the only intellectual spokesmen for France. With this new relationship to the governing regime came a similar change in the relationship of the Right to the university. Once a stronghold of the Republic and the Left, the university system under the Occupation became increasingly open to the intellectuals of Right and their values. Jewish and communist professors were replaced with instructors sympathetic to the new government and the Sorbonne was expanded to include chairs in anti-Semitic studies. Although journalism and literature would remain the primary professional trajectory of the Right, they no longer felt excluded from the university experience.

This new relationship between the Right and the official spaces of power in France would have important implications for daily life and intellectual practice. While the Left was forced to adapt its practice and engagement to life underground, the Right would enjoy the privileges of the intelligentsia. Although the material shortages of war would affect the entire intellectual milieu, it was ameliorated to a great extent for the collaborationists. Papers like *Gerbe* received direct financial support from the German cultural embassy and were able to pay their contributors handsomely despite the wartime economy. Eleven journals, including *Gerbe*, *JSP*, *Au Pilon*, and *Revolution Nationale* were given priority status in the distribution of restricted materials like paper and ink. This significantly affected the ability of collaborationist intellectuals to write and publish. While the clandestine journals of the Resistance were often unable to produce on even a consistent bi-monthly schedule, collaborationist journals could be assured enough materials for consistent daily publication. And while the Resistance papers were limited by their equipment, supplies, and the nature of underground printing to limited pages and circulation numbers, the collaborationist presses produced much longer papers, with full length columns for its contributors, and circulations that could reach around 140,000.⁹³⁰ For the intellectual collaboration, the daily practice of journalism entailed no great

⁹³⁰ Sapiro, *La Guerre des écrivains*, 36.

personal risk, no need to requisition supplies, and no unusual limitations on the length or frequency of articles. It was a much more stable experience of occupation journalism than that of the Resistance.

Individual authors experienced similar effects of German support. While the Bernhard and Otto Lists created pariahs on the intellectual Left who were no longer authorized to be published, the German occupiers made equally influential efforts to promote the work of the intellectual Right. A list was compiled of 189 works by collaborationist and fascist friendly authors like Drieu, Brasillach, Châteaubriant, Chardonne, Rebatet, Montherlant, Morand and Giono. These works and all new pieces by their authors were to be welcomed and given priority publishing rights by those publishing houses that wanted to retain the good graces and material support of the Germans.⁹³¹ Collaborationist writers also found an additional perquisite of German support. Works by Châteaubriant and at least ten other French authors were selected for translation and publication in the German speaking world. Others had their works adapted for German cinema, and many were invited for speaking tours and Writers Congresses, like those held in Weimar and Nuremberg. (ibid) Collaborationists were also welcomed and their work eagerly solicited by the authorized publishing firms. The most notorious of the collaborationist publishers was Grasset publishing who handled many of the writers at *Gerbe* and *JSP*. Those collaborationists who were not already part of his catalogue, including Drieu, were actively seduced from their original firms. Grasset was not the only firm to welcome collaborationists, however. Other sympathetic firms included Baudiniere, Denoel, Sorlot, and Editions de France.⁹³² Once again, the very essential intellectual practice of publishing work was extremely different for those favored by the regime and those repressed by it.

The experience of intellectual life as the representatives of the regime was not always a positive one, however. The financial assistance and the preferential publishing came with stipulations and demands that severely altered the intellectual expression of the collaborationist intellectuals.

⁹³¹ Ibid., 34.

⁹³² Ory, *Les Collaborateurs*, 220.

There were three main German services for controlling intellectual expression, even in the authorized presses: the Propaganda-Abteilung which controlled the production of pro-German propaganda as well as basic censorship, the Institut allemande, headed by cultural liaison Karl Epting, which promoted collaborationist material, and the Ant Schrifttum that arranged the censorship and elimination of undesirable works.⁹³³ In the southern zone, Inter-France, a supposedly autonomous “cooperative society of the press” that eventually included 180 authorized periodicals, was created to assure that journals and writers promoted a positive view of both Germany and Vichy.⁹³⁴ In 1940 and afterward, any director attempting to authorize a journal in the occupied zone had to appear before the Propagandastaffel offices on the Champs-Élysées and pledge to support both Germany and its military efforts and to align itself with all propaganda directives.⁹³⁵

These directives included specific instructions on the content, tone, and language of all radio and press expression. In 1944, for example, journalists were instructed to minimize the effects of the aerial offensive and to suggest the invention of more powerful weapons by Germany, to continue condemning the imperialism of Stalin, and to advertise the American refusal to recognize the Comité d’Alger as the provisional government of France.⁹³⁶ German interference in intellectual expression could take even more intrusive forms. At *Gerbe*, the weekly column “Le fait de la semaine” under the name “Aimé Casar” was actually written by Eitel Moelhausen from the Berlin ministry of Foreign affairs. Châteaubriant, despite his position as director, had no editing control over this column. Perhaps even more disruptive to the intellectual experience than the overt censorship, however, was the new practice on the intellectual Right of auto-censure. Collaborationists like Châteaubriant, Drieu, and their journals had few instances of direct censorship because they conformed their writing to the

⁹³³ Sapiro, *La Guerre des écrivains*, 33.

⁹³⁴ Ory, *Les Collaborateurs*, 67.

⁹³⁵ Maugendre, *Alphonse de Châteaubriant*, 250.

⁹³⁶ AN F41 347 folder 3.

expectations of the occupiers. Although for most, this conformity was a result of ideological alignment with Germany, there are indications that public writings did not always express the full thought of the authors. Drieu's private journal entries, for example, express more defeatism, frustration with the German effort, and admiration for Soviet power than was ever permitted in his public journalism.

Conformity to the Nazi propaganda directives would also heighten the anti-Semitism of the collaborationist writers. Although many like Brasillach, Rebatet, and Celine rejoiced in the newfound freedom to express their long held anti-Semitic vitriol, others like Fernandez, Bonnard, and even Châteaubriant, had expressed little or no anti-Semitism before the occupation. Châteaubriant had maintained his life-long friendship with Romain Rolland throughout the inter-war period despite the "mutual distancing" caused by the dramatic opposition of their ideas. But, when Châteaubriant conformed to the anti-Semitism of *Gerbe*, his friend was dismayed by the new trajectory and wrote a final letter of farewell saying, "you know what distances me above all from you, it is the brutal, injurious anti-Semitism which fills the columns of...the pages [of *Gerbe*]." ⁹³⁷ Whether from conformity to the Nazi directives and expectations or out of an intense and long-held biological racism, the collaborationist intellectuals' support and participation in anti-Semitism would drastically differentiate not only their intellectual values and social worldviews but also their intellectual practice from those of the Resistance and the Left. Anti-Semitic language, discussions of the legitimacy of biological racism, denunciations of Jews, and approval of the measures taken against the Jewish population were found only on the collaborationist Right.

The collaborationist Right developed a new relationship to the occupation government and its authorized spaces like the university that allowed it to experience life as the intelligentsia for the first time. As the only official intellectual authority, they received newfound material, financial, and ideological support from the regime that allowed them to continue to write, publish, and publicize

⁹³⁷ "L'un et l'autre: Alphonse de Châteaubriant et Romain Rolland chois de lettres," *Cahiers Romain Rolland* vol. 2 1915-1944 (Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1983), 402.

their work in ways that the Resistance could not. For the Right, being an intellectual under the occupation came to mean working closely with the regime, often in positions of political power, publishing in the large authorized presses, participating in cultural exchange efforts with the occupying power, and accepting censorship, directives, and even a new anti-Semitic tone and vocabulary in one's work. While the Right redefined intellectual identity under the Occupation according to its new experiences, the intellectuals of the Resistance would do the same, creating a new standard of acceptable intellectual behavior under foreign occupation that was defined by their own experience of clandestine life.

The Right-Wing Intellectual Model During the Occupation

Drieu and Châteaubriant were influential spokesmen for collaborationist intellectuals who led the way in claiming to be intellectuals as well as fascists. In their efforts to merge these two defining elements of their identity, they would continue the pattern of identity construction that, over the century, has yielded a relatively consistent model of the right-wing intellectual. Both men resented the hegemony that they perceived the Left to exert over both the concept of the intellectual and the cultural field. Although they would gain dominance over the intellectual world under the Occupation, Drieu and Châteaubriant continued to see themselves as excluded from the public's perception of the intellectual. They felt it was necessary, in every effort of engagement, to first struggle to dispel the engrained perception that the intellectual was, by definition, of the Left. In their struggle for legitimacy and intellectual authority, they worked to distinguish their own fascist values and worldviews from those of the Left while still claiming the identity, responsibility, and role of the intellectual. According to their alternative model, the intellectual advocated Realism, Europeanism, and a concept of man as "complete." In practice, this meant that the role of the intellectual was to work within the reality of the occupation by engaging in collaboration, to promote physical action and virile force rather than overly intellectualized concepts of man and culture, and to actively work toward a redefinition of French nationalism along continental lines. Collaborationists came together

in communities segregated from the intellectual Left to create a network of socio-professional support and camaraderie and to amplify each individual's engagement. Participation in and association with this interconnected web of collaborationist communities, from revue teams and political parties to youth organizations and publishing firms, became an important aspect of right-wing collective identity. The relationship that these collective communities and their individual intellectuals had to the new regime and its institutions would also provide the collaborationists with a distinctly different experience of intellectual life, behavior, and practice than that on the resistant Left. After the Liberation, the Resistance intellectuals would return to power and definitively link intellectual responsibility to the experiences, communities, and values of the Left. In contrast, despite the efforts of post-war intellectuals of the Right like Jacques Laurent and Maurice Bardèche, the Right would be linked to Nazism, denied any claim to intellectual identity, and practically erased from historical reflections on the intellectual life of the century.

SECTION VI

THE POST-WAR, 1945-1967

The choice of collaboration or resistance during the occupation would deeply divide the intellectual world and resulted in the creation of two distinctly different understandings of true intellectual responsibility, values, and experience during these years. The intellectual extreme Right would continue to identify itself as the oppressed minority and maintain its discourse of exclusion, resentment, and struggle despite enjoying its first real intellectual hegemony in decades. With the Liberation of France, the Right's perceived exclusion from the conceptualization of the intellectual would become, more than ever in the past, a reality. The stain of Nazism and the glorification of the Resistance during the post-war period would effectively return the Left to a position of intellectual dominance and exclude the Right not only from positions of power within the political and cultural world, but from the ability even to identify as a member of the intellectual elite or express their ideas as alternatives. This post-war concept of intellectual identity as a republican and left-wing construct would also become the basis for the majority of the historical interpretations of intellectual life in the twentieth century.

The post-war period, from the Liberation to the colonial conflicts, was a period of dramatic political transition, national reconstruction, and transformation in both the conception of True France and of the place of the true intellectual. With the Liberation, the ideas of the Right were quickly discredited and the ideas and figures of the Resistance became not only the dominant voice in the political and cultural world, but the only voice. As early as the first clandestine papers of the occupation, the Resistance intellectuals had promoted two programs for the post-war period which they would proceed to carry out: the construction of a new French Republic, founded on the

principles and relationships discovered during the Resistance, and the punishment of the collaborationists. Visions of a cooperative new Republic with all the parties of the Resistance soon evaporated in the reality of internal divisions.⁹³⁸ These divisions would destabilize the political efforts of the Fourth Republic and cause friction among the various representatives of the Republican and Left intellectual elite. However, despite these internal divisions, the Right would continue to view these parties as a united left-wing bloc.

The intellectuals of the Republic and the extreme Left were, at least initially, able to agree on the second course of action: the purge. Although the punishment of all political, economic, and intellectual collaborators would influence the exclusion of the Right in the French public space, it is the punishment of intellectuals for “intelligence with the enemy” under Article 175 that would most affect post-war understanding of intellectual responsibility and identity. Collaborationist intellectuals were accused of betraying the “French soul,” and of “collusion with a foreign power.” In short, they had betrayed a “certain idea of France” held by the Resistance.⁹³⁹ Fifteen writers, including Georges Suarez, Henri Béraud, Brasillach, Châteaubriant, and Drieu would be charged with treason and sentenced to death. By August 1944, a second law was created that sought to punish collaborationists for “indignité nationale,” rather than political treason, and carried prison sentences, fines, and the loss of citizenship rights including voting, teaching, and writing for the French press.

The CNE, which was increasingly dominated after the Liberation by the PCF, would become the most prominent institutional advocate of the purge of the intellectuals. It created, in September 1944, the first of three blacklists identifying writers accused of espousing Nazi ideology, supporting the *relève* and *Milice*, and opposing the allies and Free French. By October, it had expanded the initial twelve name blacklist to 165 and had brought the list to the Ministry of Justice to help steer

⁹³⁸ The main intellectual representatives of the Resistance would divide roughly into three categories in the post-war, the Gaullists and liberal democrats of the RPF and MRP including Raymond Aron, André Malraux, and Francois Mauriac, the “Third Way” proponents of non-communist social revolution including Sartre and Mounier, and the communist party intellectuals like Aragon, Morgan, and Roy.

⁹³⁹ Philip Watts, *Allegories of the Purge: How Literature Responded to the Postwar Trials of Writers and Intellectuals in France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).

judicial indictments. However, it was not the judicial punishments which would most damage the intellectuals on the blacklist, but the proscription that the CNE placed on their work. Publishers, journals, and other writers refused to work with writers identified by the CNE as collaborationists, effectively excluding them from the mainstream post-war intellectual world and forcing them to find new, separate avenues for their intellectual expression.

Due to the purge, the CNE proscription, and the general delegitimization of the intellectual Right in the early postwar years, most public discussions of intellectual responsibility, the right to err,⁹⁴⁰ true intellectual values, and the necessity of engagement were carried out within the intellectual camps of the Left and Center. In these internal debates of the Left, the PCF and the communist intellectual vision held the greatest influence. Sartre and the majority of *Les Temps Modernes* “third way” intellectuals would come under its sway by 1952 and, initially, even the Catholic intellectuals of *Esprit* would enter into a hesitant alliance with intellectual communism.⁹⁴¹ During the mid 1950s, news of Soviet purge trials, deportations, and even the campaign against Yugoslavia were denied, rationalized, or dismissed as anti-communist propaganda by intellectuals of both the extreme Left and Third Way leaving anti-communism to the Gaullist intellectuals like Aron.⁹⁴² News of American action in the Korean War promoted strong anti-Americanism and an increased leniency for the USSR as did PCF led efforts to limit atomic proliferation through the Stockholm Appeal. It would not be until 1956, when Khrushchev’s report against Stalin emerged and the Soviets crushed the Hungarian

⁹⁴⁰ The “right to err” became an important discussion surrounding intellectual legitimacy and collaboration. Some intellectuals of the Left argued that collaborationists should not be held responsible for the results of their ideas and programs since free thought necessitated the right to theorize, experiment, and make mistakes without being held responsible for the consequences of their words. This had been the view of many on the pre-war Left like Anatole France and would be continued by post-war intellectuals like Paulhan. The majority of the intellectuals of the Left, however, believed that the thought of the collaborationists had too many consequences to be provided the leniency normally accorded to intellectual theory. They saw their work as speech-acts and denied them the “right to err” with impunity.

⁹⁴¹ Michel Winock, *Le siècle des intellectuels* (Paris: Seuil, 1997), 427.

⁹⁴² The events of the cold war would admittedly cause many communist sympathizing intellectuals like Merleau-Ponty to become disenchanted with the communist party and the USSR, but the majority of the fellow travelers were solidified in their beliefs during these early years.

uprising, that intellectuals would show the first significant disillusionment with the USSR, resulting in mass resignations from the PCF and even a petition calling for its ban.⁹⁴³

However even this blow did not immediately dethrone the hegemonic influence of communism. While many continued to look to the USSR and simply to call for reform of the party from within, the majority maintained their faith in communism and revolution, though not the USSR or the PCF, by turning their attention to the newly emergent communist nations in China, Southeast Asia, and Cuba. Communist revolution would therefore remain, well into the 1960s, the “grid of political analysis and the system of ideological reference” for the intellectual milieu.⁹⁴⁴ There might be dissent and debate over its course of action, but there was never any question of supporting its opponents on the Right.⁹⁴⁵

The efforts to contain communism and the global struggles for independence would spark new debates about intellectual responsibility on the Left and Right. Although the French interventions in Indochina during the late 1940s would raise relatively little interest among the intellectual milieu, the war for Algerian independence from 1954 to 1962 and the later involvement of the US in the Vietnam conflict would become the new crusade of the engaged intellectual on the Left and give new life and influence to the extreme Right. It is true that, at least initially, division of the intellectual camp over the issue of Algerian independence was not clearly an issue of Left and Right. Numerous intellectuals who considered themselves “of the Left” including Camus and Jacques Soustelle were opposed to the idea of an independent Algeria. However, it is important to note that while several left-wing intellectuals supported the idea of French Algeria, none on the extreme Right advocated an independent Algeria. By 1960, de Gaulle and democratic republicans of the Center had joined the

⁹⁴³ Michael Scott Christofferson, “French Intellectuals and the Repression of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956: the politics of a protest reconsidered,” in *After the Deluge: New Perspectives on the Intellectual and Cultural History of Postwar France*, ed. Julian Bourg (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004), 256.

⁹⁴⁴ Jean-François Sirinelli, *Intellectuels et passions française: manifestes et pétitions au XXe siècle* (Paris: Fayard, 1990), 187.

⁹⁴⁵ David Drake, *Intellectuals and Politics in Post-War France* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 86.

majority of the intellectual Left in supporting independent Algeria as the most logical course for France and pushing for the withdrawal of French forces there. At this point, only the extreme Right would continue to support the OAS and to argue the benefits of French control. Subsequent intellectual division over the efforts for independence in Vietnam would be much more clearly marked between the Right and Left. The intellectual Left supported communist inspired revolution by Ho Chi Minh against the American forces and the extreme Right, despite its own anti-Americanism, denounced soviet aid as communist infiltration and dismissed the intellectual Left's reports of American atrocities as propaganda.

The events of the post-war era are extremely significant for any discussion of intellectual identity. The main crusades of the engaged intellectuals, from the institution of the purge to the question of independence, were connected to two larger themes: French national identity in the post-war and the identity of the intellectual representative. The purge raised questions not only of political traitors to True France but of intellectual responsibility, intellectual treason, and the right to err. It also allowed the dominant intellectual Left to exclude those on the Right it deemed irresponsible from practicing and identifying as intellectuals in the mainstream public. By the early 1960s, when the Right had reinserted itself into the intellectual life of the nation, the intellectual Left felt threatened once again and revived its discourse of national and intellectual identity. These debates over national and intellectual identity would create a climate of confusion and instability in the years leading to May 1968.

CHAPTER 17

LEFT-WING INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY DURING THE POST-WAR: REPUBLICAN AND EXTREME LEFT VALUES

The euphoria of the Liberation for the intellectuals of the Resistance would quickly turn to questions about post-war society. New international powers threatened to reduce France to a minor player on the global stage and led intellectuals to question not only the place and role of France in the new post-war world but also the essential values that would define her role. Since intellectuals were the representatives of this national essence, the post-war would also be a time for intellectuals to reflect on the nature of intellectual identity. For many on the Left, “authentic” intellectual identity would, for the first time, become synonymous with active engagement against all forms of oppression. The post-war also sparked new interest in defining not only who could be considered French and intellectual but what it meant to be “of the Left” or even the Republican Center instead of “of the Right.” These preoccupations of the post-war intellectual elite show a renewed interest in the conceptualization and definition of French intellectual identity. On the Left, they reveal a desire to distance left-wing intellectual values from those of the extreme Right, to return these left-wing values to public dominance after four years of suppression, and to exclude the Right from participation in the new intellectual identity.

Since the Right was disgraced and completely excluded from public affairs in the immediate post-war, the initial public campaign to define the values, visions, and behaviors of the true French intellectual took place more as internal debates among the various members of the Resistance than as a struggle with the Right. During the post-war years, the front created by the Resistance slowly disintegrated into a complex array of diverse republican and extreme Left camps that each had different perspectives on intellectual responsibility. At its most conservative pole, this spectrum

would include the liberal republicanism of Raymond Aron, Jean Paulhan, and the intellectuals of *Figaro* and *Preuves* as well as the Gaullist intellectuals like Malraux and Mauriac. On its most extreme Left, it would extend to the committed PCF intellectuals of *Lettres Françaises*, *Action*, and *Nouvelles Critiques* from Aragon to Claude Morgan. In between the two, were the intellectuals of the revolutionary but non-PCF “Third Way” which included Camus and the catholic intellectuals of Mounier’s *Esprit*, but which was unquestionably dominated by Sartre and the collaborators of *Les Temps Modernes*.

Although PCF intellectuals had a tremendous impact, it was the Third Way intellectuals, epitomized by Sartre, who were the most influential in defining the intellectual model of the Left during the post-war years. The writings and ideas of liberal republicans like Raymond Aron and Gaullists like Mauriac were often marginalized by these more dominant extremists of the Left because of their opposition to social revolution. Despite their differences with the extreme Left, however, the republican Center intellectuals must still be considered a product of the Resistance and of the ideals of the anti-fascist Left when comparing them to the intellectuals of the extreme Right. In the eyes of the intellectual extreme Right, the Gaullists and republicans were not merely part of the Resistance, they were co-conspirators of the PCF in the hegemonic Leftist bloc. For this reason, former conservatives like Mauriac who had turned to Gaullism would be singled out for attack by the resentful Right as often as Sartre and the PCF intellectuals. The Right’s perception of a left-wing bloc of former Resistance intellectuals was not entirely fabricated. Although each faction of the Left had its own perspective, there were certain views that had united them in the Resistance and would continue to provide some continuity in the post-war era.

In particular, the distinct factions of the Center and Left would be united by a mentality of engagement formed by their participation in the underground resistance. The Resistance intellectuals believed that the collaborationists had proved themselves irresponsible and dangerous during the Occupation. Therefore, under the auspices of the CNE, they worked to deny intellectual identity and engagement to the Right after the Liberation. Although several intellectuals like Camus became

disenchanted with the purge, they all benefited from the absence of the right-wing intellectuals. As Malraux would famously claim when speaking of the Gaullists, “What is there today in France? Us and the Communists, and nothing else.”⁹⁴⁶ Since there were no longer any opponents to the Right, the intellectual of the Left expressed no concern that his work might be dismissed as anti-intellectual while this was a dominant theme in the work of the Right. The Left was also not preoccupied with matters of censorship, isolation, exclusion, or “intellectual ostracism” like the Right was.⁹⁴⁷ The intellectual of the Left did not struggle to find an outlet for his work or an audience receptive to its arguments. In particular, left-wing engagés benefited from the ability to disseminate their version of the history of France and the intellectual during the Occupation without contradiction from the Right. While the Right continued to approach its engagement as a struggle against oppression, exclusion, and ostracism, the Left’s mentality of engagement was, once again, one of self-assured dominance.

The diverse factions of the Center and Left could also be identified by several shared intellectual values drawn from a century long tradition of left-wing thought. Of all the internal discussions of intellectual identity, the most concise effort to define the intellectual Left and its values, and to distinguish it as a bloc from the Right, was found in the special number of *Les Temps Modernes* published in the Spring of 1955. This number, devoted to “La Gauche” considered the drastic division between the thought of the extreme Right and the extreme Left, the values that united the diverse factions of the Left, and the essential definition of the Left as conceived by its intellectuals. A summary enquête in the issue determined that despite their internal divisions, the intellectual Left and Right were internally cohesive mentalities that were distinctly different from one another and opposed at their very essence.⁹⁴⁸ “The findings of this study,” it concluded, “show a

⁹⁴⁶ Sunil Khilnani, *Arguing Revolution: The Intellectual Left in Postwar France* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1993), 31.

⁹⁴⁷ Maurice Bardèche, *Sparte et les sudistes* (Paris: Les Sept Couleurs, 1968), 43..

⁹⁴⁸ Rather than asking for political affiliation and using this to classify responses, the enquête classed the responses to questions about values as either right-wing or left-wing based on a preconceived notion of how these two camps would reply. In other words, the picture that the enquête provides of the mentality of the Left

fundamental difference between the man of the Left and the man of the Right.”⁹⁴⁹ The entire issue clearly summarized these differences that the LTM intellectuals believed separated the intellectuals of the Left from the Right. These included a certain interpretation of the war and Liberation, a dedication to universalism, an opposition to colonialism, and a vision of social revolution.

Despite minor disagreements, the intellectual Left shared a fundamental historical interpretation of the war and Liberation years that required a distinctly left-wing view of the purge and the right to err. The intellectuals of the Left united behind a narrative of the war that described France as the nation of 40 million resisters, the government as the Free French in exile, and de Gaulle as the prophet of the mobile army and the liberator of France. According to this historical perspective, which would become the standard interpretation of the war in France until the work of Robert Paxton, the people had silently rejected collaboration, Vichy was treasonous to France, and de Gaulle was the only legitimate leader of the liberated nation. This narrative made the punishment of the “minority” collaborationists through a purge seem more justifiable. A few intellectuals associated with the Resistance, like Maulnier and Paulhan, rejected the idea of the purge and defended the intellectual’s “right to err” as essential to free expression. However, as a majority, the Left was united behind both the necessity of the purge and the refusal to see collaboration as a forgivable error. The PCF and existentialist intellectuals in particular argued that the collaborationists’ “opinions” had led to real and foreseeable consequences for France and that their speech had therefore taken on the characteristic of an act that could be judged. The intellectual did not have the “right to err” or to free speech, according to the Left, if it resulted in the oppression of others. The purge was the enforcement of this new understanding of intellectual responsibility. The language of betrayal and legal culpability attached to the collaborationists during the purge indicated the Left’s attempt to define and limit intellectual

and its difference from the Right is based on what the writers at *Les Temps Modernes* already conceived these different mentalities to be. “A la recherche de la ‘gauche’; un enquête de l’institut français d’opinion publique,” *Les Temps Modernes*, Spring 1955.

⁹⁴⁹ It continued, “The ideology of the Left is a coherent ensemble that the communist Left represents with the most vigor,” and the “Right manifests an identical coherence” in its own, diametrically opposed ideology. *Ibid.*, 1596.

identity to the thinkers who shared the values of the Resistance.⁹⁵⁰ In response, the intellectual Right resentfully declared themselves “political prisoners” of the ideological dominance of the Left and compared the purge to the Terror of 1793 saying it had been created “to punish unpopular, that is, extreme right-wing political opinions.”⁹⁵¹ But the historical interpretation of the Left would predominate. The purge was seen by the majority of contemporaries as just retribution for intellectual betrayal of France that was necessary in order to exclude from intellectual activities, the “men whom France is carrying within her, like foreign bodies, whose existence poses a problem for justice.”⁹⁵²

This concept of the purge as “justice” and of the execution of intellectuals for collaboration as morally justified was linked to the continued appreciation, on the republican and extreme Left, of the traditional left-wing value of universalism. If there were, as the Left had maintained over the century, an abstract humanity and a universal man, then there was also a set of universal human rights, an abstract standard of morality, and a universal conscience. Events like the Holocaust and the occupation of France were able to be universally condemned according to these standards and their individual supporters punished. While the Right argued for extenuating circumstances and the impracticality of any supranational standards for behavior and rights, the Left supported international bodies that were to represent the universal conscience of an abstract humanity. In practice, the Left’s idea of a “universal conscience” and abstract standards of civilized thought and behavior led it to actively support the Nuremberg Trials, the “crimes against humanity” clause, the partitioning of Germany, and participation in the United Nations, in addition to its own internal purge. Although the Left continued to couch these universalizing aims in terms of the French nation, a strategy which had proven popular during the years of the Resistance, they would “interpret France’s identity in terms of

⁹⁵⁰ Khilnani, *Arguing Revolution*, 33.

⁹⁵¹ Watts, *Allegories of the Purge*, 67.

⁹⁵² *Ibid.*, 6.

its universal mission” rather than its national or European one as the Right did.⁹⁵³ The true essence of the French nation, representatives of the intellectual Left argued, was found in the universal goals of world peace, international justice, and freedom from oppression first elaborated in 1789. Therefore, according to the intellectual Left, French nationalism was exemplified by such international bodies as the UN and international tribunals. The Left’s internationalist interpretation of True France would, therefore, correspond to a vision of intellectual responsibility to the nation and to civilization that was in keeping with their universalism.

The idea of a universal conscience and a duty to guide not just France, but humanity, was linked to the Left’s new postwar passion of anti-colonialism.⁹⁵⁴ The debate over independence for Algeria would not initially create a clear Left-Right division since several noted intellectuals of the Left, like Camus and Soustelle, favored French Algeria. However, by the time of the debates over American involvement in Vietnam, it was clear that being an intellectual of the Left included an opposition to colonialism. As Sartre summarized, the intellectuals of the Left believed that “colonialism is in the midst of destroying itself, but it still influences the atmosphere, it is our shame, it mocks our laws, it infests us with racism...our role [as intellectuals] is to aid it in dying.”⁹⁵⁵ Peace and the ability to focus on social change, they believed, demanded an end to all wars, but particularly those carried out under the aegis of imperialism and economic oppression.⁹⁵⁶

In practice, this demanded that the intellectual of the Left conceive of his role not as an ivory tower theorist for hexagonal France, but as a globally vigilant activist. While the French colonial struggle in Vietnam had attracted little intellectual or public interest outside of LTM and *Esprit*, the conflict in Algeria would quickly align the entire intellectual community to an extent that

⁹⁵³ Khilnani, *Arguing Revolution*, 31.

⁹⁵⁴ Although Algeria was not legally categorized as a colony, the intellectuals of the Left and Right used the term “colonialism” to describe the debate carried out over its future relationship to France.

⁹⁵⁵ Sirinelli, *Intellectuels et passions française*, 200.

⁹⁵⁶ The LTM and *Esprit* would both be relatively active in opposing colonialism as early as 1945 and would support the PCF in making anti-colonialism a major tenet of the World Peace Movement.

contemporaries compared to the Dreyfus Affair. Initially, the majority of the intellectual Left devoted their engagement to a protest against the use of torture and the inequalities and exploitation of the colonial system in general. Even the PCF, during the early years, would not support the idea of a fully independent Algeria. However, as the Right and the Republican government increasingly tried to justify colonialism as a beneficial and necessary experience for the people of Algeria, anti-colonialism, opposition to continued war in Algeria, and eventually even support for an independent Algeria became the “cement” that would group “divergent political positions on the Left” and clarify the division as a “Right-Left cleavage.”⁹⁵⁷ The identification of the intellectual of the Left with active protest against colonialism would intensify during the post-1965 debates as the intellectual Left engaged en masse again to denounce American involvement in Vietnam.

Their position on Algeria would therefore become an important part of the Left’s distinguishing concept of intellectual identity. The majority of the dominant Left was against colonialism and later in favor of Algerian independence, so they set the parameters of this discussion of identity by asking “whether an intellectual...could advocate French colonialism in Algeria or express admiration for the so-called advantages Western colonialism had brought to Algeria.”⁹⁵⁸ Despite the Republic’s identification with its overseas empire and the presence in the colonialist camp of figures like Camus, “it soon became clear that intellectual legitimacy was going to become more allied with anti-colonialism and a new vision of France.”⁹⁵⁹ Because of their dominance over the field the Left was able to redefine French national identity, and with it intellectual responsibility, on their value of anti-colonialism rather than French empire. Colonialism was argued to be, not a system for encouraging progress, but a system of exploitation, oppression, tyranny, the loss of human rights, and even torture. As such, it was a violation of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the revolutionary

⁹⁵⁷ Ibid., 201-209.

⁹⁵⁸ LeSueur, *Uncivil War*, 4.

⁹⁵⁹ Ibid., 6.

and enlightened values which were the essence of French national identity.⁹⁶⁰ Intellectual legitimacy, in turn, was gained by defending these Rights of Man in France and throughout the new global community.

The Left, therefore, identified its anti-colonialism as part of a larger left-wing responsibility to promote egalitarianism and social revolution. As intellectuals, they saw themselves as inheritors of the Enlightenment and Revolutionary legacy and so sought to engage their work against all forms of racial intolerance, paternalism, inequality, economic exploitation, and political oppression. The idea of social revolution, both in the colonies and at home among the working class, would be essential to the Left's concept of the intellectual and to its portrayal of legitimate engagement. In particular, the Left, whether socialist, communist, or third way, emphasized revolutionary symbols and discourses, the culture of social rights and progress of 1789, the image of popular revolution, and the identification of the Nation with the People in its engaged work.⁹⁶¹ Although they continued the resistance language of nationalism, intellectuals of the Left identified French national identity with the themes of revolution that were enjoying universal success rather than with the specific traditions and territories of France. Therefore, as the representatives of the true French nation, the intellectuals of the Left "defined their own identity and their authority based on arguments drawn from the language of revolutionary politics."⁹⁶² According to the intellectual Left, support for social revolution was the rule by which one could "identify those who properly constituted the nation and exclude

⁹⁶⁰ Henri Marrou's 1956 article "France ma patrie," recognized as one of the foundational texts of the intellectual Left's engagement against French Algeria, was the first to make this argument that France undermined its most essential national values by its presence in Algeria. His position would be radicalized and extended from national identity and values to intellectual identity and values by those like Sartre who, by 1960, were identifying the cause of independent Algeria with the identity of the intellectual Left. "The French Left must be in solidarity with the FLN," he wrote, "their fates are linked. The victory of the FLN will be the victory of the Left." Drake, *Intellectuals and Politics*, 122.

⁹⁶¹ Khilnani, *Arguing Revolution*, 9.

⁹⁶² *Ibid.*, 13.

traitors.”⁹⁶³ As a correlate, support for social revolution was the mark of those who properly constituted the intellectual elite and opposition to it, the mark of the intellectual traitors.

The LTM enquête on “La Gauche” identified this support for social revolution, particularly in exploited colonies, as an integral part of the role of the intellectual. The Left, this enquête argued, believed in a transformation of society through revolution. This was based on the intellectual Left’s understanding of the innate goodness and perfectibility of man and the role of the intellectual to progress society by changing the material conditions. In contrast, the enquête argued, the Right was skeptical about the possibility of any social evolution and ignored the impact on man that material conditions had. This was due to the Right’s distrust of man and its belief that society could only devolve into decadent decay over time. This very different understanding of man, society, and the necessity of material changes was the key, the enquête concluded, to the Left and Right’s distinctive post-war engagements. In the same issue, Beauvoir summarized this difference between the intellectuals and the Right in “La Pensée de Droite, aujourd’hui.”⁹⁶⁴ Since the fall of fascism, she wrote, the Right saw no future except decadence, decline, and the collapse of civilization. Since they had no positive vision of the future, Beauvoir continued, the Right could only define itself negatively. “The contemporary Right no longer knows what it defends,” she decided, “it defends itself against communism, that is all.”⁹⁶⁵ By rejecting the revolutionary alternative provided by communism, the intellectual Right made itself the protector of social difference, privilege, racism, and inequality which they called “Civilization.” But, she wrote, the Right fails to recognize that the “civilization” they cling to is not the “civilization” envisioned by the intellectuals of the Left. The responsible intellectual did not defend status quo inequalities but fought actively for a world civilization of equals that was possible only through social, and even communist, revolution.

⁹⁶³ Ibid., 38.

⁹⁶⁴ Simone Beauvoir, “La Pensée de Droite, aujourd’hui,” *Les Temps Modernes*, Spring 1955.

⁹⁶⁵ Ibid.

Out of this left-wing approach to intellectual responsibility in the post-war would come Sartre's existentialist understanding of the "authentic intellectual." This was an exclusively left-wing concept that would dominate the public's understanding of intellectual identity and engagement until the 1970s. Sartre's vision of literature as a "social function" and of the intellectual as an agent for change would become the driving force behind *Les Temps Modernes*, as noted in its opening "Presentation."⁹⁶⁶ The authentic or true intellectual would not accept or support injustice and oppression, but would rather work specifically to eradicate these by actively engaging his work in political affairs. Authentic intellectuals were therefore pledged to engage against the injustice of capitalism and colonialism and in favor of revolutionary change to man's material social condition. The "authentic intellectual," it concluded of the role of the left-wing intellectual, "wants to be a universal man...in solidarity with the oppressed."⁹⁶⁷

Although the post-war Left was internally divided on many issues, it shared a fundamental set of intellectual values, drawn from a long tradition of engagement, that distinguished it clearly from the post-war Right. The intellectuals of the Left continued to identify legitimate intellectual practice with the Enlightenment ideals of racial tolerance, egalitarianism, social revolution, abstract humanity, and the universal rights of man. In the post-war, the Left would also be identified by its shared perspective on the wartime narrative and, at least initially, the necessity of a purge. Because they effectively controlled the intellectual field for more than a decade after the Liberation, the intellectual Left was able to fuse these values to the post-war concept of intellectual identity and responsibility. The dominance of the intellectual values of the Left was reinforced by the hegemony of its revived, and no longer clandestine, intellectual communities and socio-professional networks. Participation in these left-wing communities would become another important component of the Left's understanding of intellectual identity.

⁹⁶⁶ Jean-Paul Sartre, "Presentation," *Les Temps Modernes*, October 1 1945. And later in "Qu'est-ce que la littérature?"

⁹⁶⁷ Claude Lanzmann, "L'Homme de Gauche," *Les Temps Modernes*, Spring 1955.

The Intellectual World of the Left: Communities, Networks, and Intellectual Practice

After four years of clandestine activity, suppression, and persecution, the intellectuals of the Resistance were eager to retake their positions of dominance in the intellectual field and revive the communities and networks that would give their individual engagement collective force. This process required not only the purging and banning of collaborationist and right-wing parties, revues, publishing firms, cultural organizations, and youth movements but the recreation of these communities for the extreme Left. The diversity of the post-war Left, particularly in its relation to the USSR, would mean that the intellectual world of the Left remained relatively fractured despite the idealistic hopes for unity during the early months of the Liberation. However, this pluralism of left-wing communities did not prevent the sort of cross-over networking and intellectual socialization that had characterized the decades before the war. And, as always, the communities and networks of the intellectual Left, no matter how internally divided, remained united in their opposition to and exclusion of the values, programs, and thinkers of the intellectual Right.

The Comité National des Ecrivains would remain, especially during the early years of the post-war era, the most significant community for intellectuals of the Left. It portrayed itself as the premier organization of the Resistance and drew to it over two hundred intellectuals including the prestigious and actively engaged Valéry, Vercors, Malraux, Duhamel, Schlumberger, Guéhenno, Mauriac, Morgan, Eluard, Frénaud, Camus, Sartre, Cassou, Roy, Paulhan, Triolet, and Aragon who would serve as its general secretary. Initially, it was able to unite its membership behind the mission to purge France of the fascist and collaborationist influences of the previous four years. In its first, non-clandestine meeting after the Liberation in September 1944, it called for the “just punishment of the imposters and traitors” of the intellectual field and gathered over sixty signatures for its “manifeste des écrivains français.” In the manifest, the CNE members proclaimed the CNE as “the

only representative and acting organization of French writers.”⁹⁶⁸ Post-war editors and revue directors obediently followed its blacklist proscriptions and intellectuals, even those who were concerned by the excesses of the treason trials, were united behind its efforts to delegitimize the intellectual Right. The clearest statement of this community cohesion and sense of collective identity and shared purpose was published as early as September 1944. “The members of the CNE,” it read, “have engaged themselves to refuse all collaboration to the journals, revues, collections, etc, which publish a text signed by a writer of which the attitude or the writing during the occupation brought moral or material aid to the oppressor.”⁹⁶⁹ In this way, the CNE defined proper intellectual practice for the collective community of the former Resistance intellectuals.

The CNE was also the umbrella organization for several other sources of intellectual community. The CNE sponsored salons and literary discussions at its siege at the Maison de la pensée française on Saturdays. Here intellectual leaders like Aragon and Eluard spoke on current events and literary themes, foreign and often communist writers were feted, and aspiring young authors were given opportunities to be mentored and made legitimate in the eyes of the public. Most importantly, perhaps, was the community that was formed around the CNE organ *Les Lettres françaises*. The communist dominated journal had been extremely active during the resistance years and would retain most of its original PCF and soviet contributors including Vercors, Aragon, Thomas, Severine, Triolet, Roy, JR Bloch, Ehrenbourg, and its director Claude Morgan. Most of the CNE manifests and declarations were found in the pages of *Lettres françaises* and the journal would be responsible for publicizing the CNE’s program and value system, particularly that of the extreme PCF contingent of the CNE. The strong connection and network that existed between the CNE, *Lettres françaises*, and the intellectuals of the PCF was one that was readily recognized by contemporaries.

The PCF was therefore another important socio-professional community for the intellectual extreme Left, even though it could only claim a fraction of the intellectual field as committed party

⁹⁶⁸ Sirinelli, *Intellectuels et passions française*, 144.

⁹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 145.

members. As it had during the interwar years, the PCF was able to draw to it committed intellectuals like Aragon, Roy, and Daix but garnered its real influence from its ability to draw non-PCF intellectuals into its sphere of influence through its affiliated organizations, revues, cultural congresses, and petitions. Communism, according to the PCF, was the path to the future, the party of revolution, progress, and enlightenment that left-wing intellectuals, by definition, supported. It provided them with the moral superiority of being on the side of the oppressed, the working class, and the exploited. After the occupation, the communist party, as the strongest organization to emerge from the Resistance, would also take on the mantle of the preserver of the French cultural patrimony. All of these were irresistible lures for intellectuals.⁹⁷⁰ The PCF became an important community for the non-communist intellectuals of the Left by providing ceremonies for national and cultural heroes, referencing past French intellectuals in its pieces, and celebrating French national tradition, particularly revolutionary tradition. On a more material level, communist membership provided writers with translation rights in soviet controlled countries, promotion of their books and articles by one of the dominant political parties in France, invitations to travel and speak in the USSR, and various awards and conference honors.

As it had in the interwar years, the PCF would also sponsor many congresses and movements directed toward the intellectual in order to draw non-party intellectual supporters to its sphere of influence. As early as June 1946, the PCF organized one of the largest gatherings of intellectuals since the war: the Congrès de la Pensée. The texts from the Congress would be published the following year as *Le Parti communiste, les intellectuels et la nation* in order to spread the force of this effort of collective engagement to those who had not attended the congress.⁹⁷¹ Perhaps most influential, though, was the World Congress of Intellectuals for Peace which had been created in 1948 in Poland by communist intellectuals and the Cominform. The French subsidiary would be the Mouvement des Intellectuels Français pour la Défense de la Paix. The Peace Movement would draw

⁹⁷⁰ Winock, *Le siècle des intellectuels*, 417.

⁹⁷¹ Sirinelli and Ory, *Les intellectuels en France*, 159

to it such prestigious names as Vercors, Cassou, and Sartre by proclaiming its mission to be, not the spread of communism, but the end of colonial wars, the defeat of lingering fascism, and the preservation of European national independence. The Movement would initiate its own congress in 1949 and one year later would be instrumental in gathering over 14 million signatures for the Stockholm Appeal. These congresses provided communist sympathizing intellectuals with yet another platform for engagement. In 1952, for example, Sartre spoke at the Vienna congress on the necessity of German reunification, UN recognition of the Peoples Republic of China, and an end to colonial war in Indochine.

The PCF controlled journals were perhaps the clearest source of intellectual community where PCF members and non-party intellectuals were able, at least in the early post-war years, to work together. The PCF organ *Action* initially drew to its pages not only doctrinaire PCF writers, but also non-party contributors including Benda, Merleau-Ponty, and Mauriac. After 1947 this camaraderie would slowly disappear as the party tightened its restrictions on non-party line contributions, but the initial effort had forged socio-professional networks between many of its former writers. Other PCF organs included *La Pensée* where Langevin and Joliot-Curie attempted to connect Marxism to traditional French philosophy, *Ce Soir* where Aragon remained a constant contributor, *La Nouvelle Critique* and *L'Humanité*. Each of these journals would suffer internal dissent and debate over issues ranging from Tito's Yugoslavia to the appropriate response to Hungary to the place to accord Althusser's interpretations. Yet, despite the dissention and fracturing of their revue teams, these journals remained important centers of professional networking and of intellectual sociability. Like the congresses and the participation in the party structure itself, these journals provided a space where like-minded intellectuals could share ideas and values and work collectively to achieve their intellectual visions for France.

The PCF was not the only organization to provide a sense of intellectual community for its members. The short lived Third Way party Rassemblement Democratique Revolutionnaire (RDR) organized mass meetings featuring intellectual speakers like Camus, Breton, Sartre and Richard

Wright until its decline in 1949. Even the SFIO and its journal *Populaire* remained a viable option for those like Camus who rejected the dogma of the PCF. The centrist democrats André Malraux and Raymond Aron formed journalistic networks at the democratic papers *Preuves*, *L'Aube*, and *Figaro*. Mounier's *Esprit*, which had briefly connected to the RDR and allied with the P⁹⁷²CF until 1949, would provide an intellectual community for the catholic, third way intellectuals. The intellectual collectivity of *Esprit* was instrumental in creating the "nouvelle gauche" spaces that provided the left-wing youth with a socially progressive alternative to communism. When Algerian protesters were massacred by the police in Paris, *Esprit* would be one of the first to gather its intellectuals for a collective expression of outrage.⁹⁷³ Its socio-professional network and collective community would extend to its publishing firm Seuil, which published the majority of the *Esprit* contributors and was led by *Esprit* writer Paul Flamand.⁹⁷⁴ However, the third way intellectual community around the revue équipe of *Esprit* could not compare in influence to the most dominant revue team in the post-war intellectual world: that of *Les Temps Modernes*.

The sense of community and shared purpose created by the revue team of LTM was an undeniable influence on the conceptualization of responsibility and identity among its contributors. The 1945 comité de redaction composed of Aron, Beauvoir, Leiris, Merleau-Ponty, Albert Oliver, and Paulhan would undergo several changes as Sartre turned toward communism and by 1955 had been restructured around Claude Lanzmann, Marcel Péju, and Jean Cau. Yet, at each point in its evolution, this collective of intellectuals saw themselves as "firmly rooted on the Left." In its first issue, Sartre outlined this collective purpose in his "Presentation" and spoke of the team and the contributors as a collective "we." As a collective entity, they agreed to use the pages of the revue to

⁹⁷² Drake, *Intellectuals and Politics*, 80.

⁹⁷³ David Schalk, *War and the Ivory Tower: Algeria and Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 93.

⁹⁷⁴ Winock, *Le siècle des intellectuels*, 427.

“change the social condition of man and the conception he has of himself.”⁹⁷⁵ They were also united, particularly after the departure of Aron, in the demand for social revolution rather than legislative reform to effect this change. As the political color of the revue changed over time to follow Sartre’s communist conversion, the evolved revue team would reflect the new political themes of communism, anti-Americanism, and an increasing opposition to colonialism. Whether as contributors or committee members of the revue, these writers benefited from a professional network and collective political purpose that influenced their own individual concept of intellectual identity. But they also gained a sense of themselves as individuals within a larger, like-minded collective by forming social bonds with fellow contributors. LTM writers often congregated in the café de Flore to work, debate, or simply socialize. “Flore was truly our club,” Sartre wrote of this social space and intellectual community, which was clearly a left-wing territory as, on the other extreme, le Bar du Pont-Royal was a right-wing space. The dominance and prestige of the LTM in the post-war intellectual field, similar in many ways to that of the NRF in the interwar years, meant that being a part of the LTM community was an important connection for any left-wing intellectual and became a valuable part of their self-identification.

One final source of intellectual community and collective identity for the post-war intellectual Left would be the imagined communities created by the numerous manifests and petitions. As they had in all previous periods of intellectual debate, manifests and petitions provided a forum for intellectual engagement and expression that united its signers in an imagined community of shared values. Although the signers might never have any true social contact, they were brought together through the petition into an intellectual community that extended beyond these material limits to encompass all like-minded intellectuals. The petitions of the intellectual Left began immediately after the Liberation with the manifests in *Lettres françaises* calling for the purge. The Manifeste des écrivains français was signed by sixty intellectuals of the Resistance including Aragon,

⁹⁷⁵ Sartre, “Presentation.”

Benda, Camus, Eluard, Guehenno, Malraux, Mauriac, Sartre, and Paulhan. Later petitions ranged from one encouraging publishing firms to boycott the collaborationists listed on the CNE blacklist to one calling for clemency for Brasillach by those on the Resistant Left. Some petitions would divide the intellectual Left, like those created during the crisis of the Hungarian suppression in 1956. “Contre l’intervention soviétique” signed by those former PCF supporters who were protesting the Soviet action like Sartre, Vercors, Roy, Beauvoir, Leiris, and Morgan, would be strenuously opposed by those whose petition stated collectively, “we, communist militants, resolved to be and remain so, have decided to express ourselves from within the Party.”⁹⁷⁶ Yet, even these seemingly divisive petitions still created sub-communities within the intellectual Left that allowed intellectuals to group themselves in order to amplify their engagement.

Perhaps the most significant battle of petitions was that which would occur during the Algerian War between the intellectuals of the Left and those of the newly revived Right. As early as 1955, a federation of left-wing intellectuals united against colonialism would be created under the name Comité d’Action des Intellectuels contre la Poursuite de la Guerre en Afrique du Nord. This comite’s principles would be signed by hundreds of supporters including Martin du Gard, Mauriac, Breton, Guehenno, and Sartre. The following years would see a flurry of manifests from both sides as intellectuals attempted to determine their position on Algeria in particular and colonialism in general. Yet the most significant would be the Manifest of the 121, or the “Déclaration sur le droit à l’insoumission dans la guerre d’Algerie,” which initially could only be published outside of France because of its incendiary statements advocating insubordination among the French troops in Algeria. The 121 intellectuals who signed the manifest included such familiar names as Beauvoir, Sartre, Eluard, Lefebvre, Roy, Vercors, and Vidal-Naquet. The signers were united in seeing the conflict in Algeria as an imperialist and racist war carried out against a people seeking independence. They called collectively for an end to the “criminal and absurd combat” which was “operating overtly and

⁹⁷⁶ Sirinelli, *Intellectuels et passions française*, 180.

violently outside all legality” and compared the use of torture there to the abuses of Hitlerian Germany.⁹⁷⁷ In response, the *Manifeste des intellectuels français* would be published and signed by over 300 figures, predominantly the intellectuals of the recently revived extreme Right. The use of petitions and manifests to create a powerful bloc of intellectuals and amplify their engagement in a collective voice would continue after Algerian independence, particularly on the Left, as intellectuals sought to protest collectively against the war in Vietnam. These petitions, all of which saw repeated the same names of the intellectual Left, included an accusation of genocide in Vietnam in 1966, a call for a “day of intellectuals for Vietnam” in 1968, a mass protest against the bombing campaigns in 1972, and a letter to the university professors of America signed by over 650 French intellectuals later in the same year.⁹⁷⁸

Whether through participation in organizations like the CNE and PCF and their subsidiary networks, through engagement in powerful revue teams like the LTM, or through the act of signing a petition, intellectuals of the post-war Left found numerous ways to recreate intellectual communities that reinforced their values. Such communities not only supported intellectuals in a like-minded group and amplified their individual engagement, they contributed to a sense of collective identity that impacted the way the intellectual of the Left conceived of his identity as an intellectual. But this collective identity as an intellectual of the Left, as opposed to the Right, was influenced by yet another factor, the distinctive experiences and practices that would be found during the post-war only among the intellectual Left.

The Post-War Intellectual Experience

The Liberation brought with it another complete reversal of the intellectual field as the right-wing collaborationists were expelled from the places of political and cultural power and replaced, once more, by their opponents on the resistant Left. This shift in relationships to the regime, the

⁹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 213.

⁹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 250.

university, and the publishing world would bring a change in daily intellectual life for the Left. Particularly in the years immediately following Liberation, the intellectuals of the Center and Left enjoyed a newfound political power through the CNE. Although ostensibly a cultural organization for writers, the CNE wielded considerable power under the provisional government and influenced judicial decisions, legislation, and the very tenor of the new Republic that was being constructed. Under the provisional government and the Fourth Republic, the liberals like Aron and Gaullists, like recently reformed communist André Malraux, enjoyed a compatible, if not always conflict-free, relationship with the regime. Malraux would even become Minister of Information and later Minister of Culture under the new government. And, although the Third Way and PCF intellectuals would clash with de Gaulle over several issues and attack his positions as those of the Right, the communists enjoyed more freedom and influence under the post-war governments than they had in any previous decade. In particular, they benefited from de Gaulle's disgust with the collaborationist extreme Right. Right-wing collaborationists like Bonnard and Maurras, for example, were stripped of their seats in the Academy for their activities under the occupation. When new members were considered for their seats, de Gaulle was influential in assuring that only Resisters replaced them.

This return to power in politics was mirrored by a return to power in the university and publishing world. The intellectual Left quickly regained its close identification with the Sorbonne, filling in those positions left vacant by the purged collaborators with new professors dedicated to the ideals of the Resistance. The ENS student body recovered its left-wing inclination and the PCF became the party of choice among its members. An enquête conducted by *L'Express* in 1957 indicated that communism and left-wing ideology had effectively "pervaded classrooms and become the intellectual apprenticeship for a series of generations." When asked which writer had most affected the youth of the day, the leading response was Sartre, followed by Gide and Mauriac.⁹⁷⁹ The intellectual Left would also take advantage of the vacancies left by the purge to install itself in the

⁹⁷⁹ Sirinelli and Ory, *Les intellectuels en France* 147-152.

offices of the larger collaborationist journals like *L'Intransigeant* and to re-exert control over the major publishing firms like Gallimard. While the intellectual Right would struggle to earn authorization for even a few literary journals and had to create their own publishing firms, the intellectual Left, and the young aspiring writers who turned to the Left, once again enjoyed a large number of well publicized and well financed options. The Left's return to its accustomed relationship with the government and university, and its new control over the publishing world meant that the practices and experiences of the intelligentsia, universitaire, and mainstream journalist, were once again an important component of the Left's concept of what it meant to be an intellectual.

The post-war purge made the intellectuals of the Right, more than ever before, pariahs within the cultural community. While those claiming to be intellectuals on the Right were viewed with suspicion and hostility, those on the Left had immediate public authority. This abyss created by collaboration influenced the way intellectuals of the Right and Left practiced their profession and experienced engaged intellectual life. Due to its delegitimization in the eyes of the public, the intellectual Right was much less effective in the battle of petitions, at least until their revival during the Algerian war. This, in essence, left the traditional intellectual practice of signing manifests and gathering petitions in the hands of the Left for much of the post-war period. Even as late as the left-wing petitions over US involvement in Vietnam, the intellectual Right would be largely absent from the petition battle. Instead, they would turn to street violence and youth demonstrations to voice their disapproval.⁹⁸⁰

Although the intellectual Right still had political journalists like Bardèche and the intellectual Left could produce several ivory tower intellectuals, the suspicion placed on right-wing engagement meant that the Right tended to avoid politicization while the Left embraced it as central to their understanding of intellectual duty. Many of the intellectuals on the Right who sought to reenter the literary and intellectual field were forced to legitimize their work by operating, or at least appearing to operate, in the realm of pure, disinterested art. Laurent and the Hussards would take great pains to

⁹⁸⁰ Sirinelli, *Intellectuels et passions française*, 247.

portray their literature and their journalistic endeavors as the expression of art for art's sake and to clearly mark their work as "apolitical" to avoid being targeted as fascists. In striking contrast, Sartre's camp, as well as the PCF intellectuals who together dominated the intellectual Left, demanded that all responsible literature be both politicized and engaged. Literature was not to be an aimless expression of exuberance and certainly not a celebration of decadence but rather had a clear social mission and political purpose. It was to serve the needs of the oppressed, whether proletariat or colonist, and to provoke social revolution and the transformation of man. Even the Left's turn to philosophy would not indicate a return to ivory tower disengagement. Philosophy, like journalism, theater, and literature before it, would become the new vehicle on the Left for political theorizing and refining the practice of engagement.

This politicization of the Left would yield one final difference in their intellectual experience. As it had for the interwar Left, the PCF and soviet communism would provide the postwar Left, even those who rejected the party, with the main point of ideological reference. From this ideological dominance, the Left would gain a measure of organization that would help it to focus its engagement and amplify its effectiveness. However, the communist party's inability to constructively absorb debate and dissent from its sympathizers would also lead to internal strife on the intellectual Left. Whether communist party member or not, intellectuals on the Left who spoke out against the PCF line were certain to be attacked by the committed intellectuals for being "right-wing," "fascist," or "pro-American." Even Sartre's camp was berated by the PCF, in the years before he turned to the party, for its existentialist view of man which conflicted with that of the Marxist conception. While the intellectual Right in the post-war, as in the interwar years, suffered from disorganization and political ineffectiveness because of its lack of an organized party leadership or even a clear socio-political doctrine, the Left suffered from the reverse. Although it certainly did not quell all dissent, the influence on public opinion of the PCF's disapprobation could not be ignored by intellectuals who hoped to retain their audience and authority.

The intellectual Left's compatible relationship to the government, university, and official publishing world gave it a distinctly different experience of daily intellectual life and practice than the stigmatized and ostracized intellectual of the Right. These two different experiences of intellectual life in the post-war would provide yet another distinctive frame of reference for the construction of collective identities on the Left and Right.

The Left-Wing Intellectual Model

In the past, the intellectuals of the Right had been frustrated by what they perceived to be the Left's unfair dominance over intellectual life and the public's understanding of intellectual identity. However, except for a few isolated cases, this de facto dominance and the resulting marginalization of the Right had been relatively intangible. In the post-war, the hegemony of the intellectual Left and the near total ostracism of the Right became institutionalized by the purge. More than ever in the past, therefore, the intellectual Left would be unchallenged from the Right in its formulation of social values, education of the youth, and dominance of professional and honorary titles and positions. The intellectual, as outlined by this left-wing model, had been part of the Resistance and retained a desire to cleanse France of fascism and the collaborationists. Intellectuals had a certain perspective of the war and liberation that favored the parties of the Left and denied the intellectual Right the "right to err." They defended the concept of a universal man and the ability of international bodies to determine universal standards of morality and conduct and enforce them in individual nations. They opposed all forms of oppression, including colonialism, and sought to eradicate these inequalities through social revolution. In practice, this made the intellectual of the Left an internationally minded activist and revolutionary rather than an isolated theorist. The intellectual of the Left participated in certain organizations like the CNE and the Peace Movement, wrote for a variety of journals considered "of the Left" from *L'Humanité* to *Les Temps Modernes*, and actively participated in petitions like the Manifest of the 121. Finally, the engagés of the Left had a certain understanding of what it meant to "be an intellectual" that developed from their rediscovered monopoly over the

intellectual field. Even after the purge had ended, this left-wing model of intellectual identity would remain the only recognized model due to the difficulty that the extreme Right had in overcoming the entrenched positions of the Left and recreating a space and legitimacy outside the stain of collaboration. It was against this model of the intellectual that Maurice Bardèche and Jacques Laurent struggled.

CHAPTER 18

INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY AND THE POST-WAR EXTREME RIGHT: THE CASE OF MAURICE BARDÈCHE

Maurice Bardèche has attracted more historical interest for being the brother-in-law of Robert Brasillach than for being a neo-fascist intellectual of the post-war. This is due in part to the fact that Bardèche preferred literary studies to political involvement during the interwar and occupation years and so has not been included among the interwar fascist intellectuals. However, with the purge of his more compromised peers, and particularly the execution of Brasillach, Bardèche emerged from his ivory tower. He was an extremely vocal opponent of the post-war purge, spoke out against the international justice proclaimed at Nuremberg, initiated negationism, and wrote radical articles in favor of French Algeria. In the post-war decades where it seemed that those who remained on the Right wanted to distance themselves from fascism, Bardèche would proudly proclaim “I am a fascist writer” and would work to legitimize the concept of a neo-fascist intellectual. In all of these guises, Bardèche was a significant force on the intellectual extreme-Right of the postwar decades. And, for all of these reasons, he has been intentionally excluded from any contemporary or historical understanding of postwar intellectual identity. His sense of frustrated resentment with the left-wing hegemony, his desire to legitimize and exculpate fascist intellectuals, and his frank discussion of the values and visions of the post-war extreme Right make him a valuable contributor to right-wing intellectual identity.⁹⁸¹

⁹⁸¹ Ian Barnes, one of the few historians to study Bardèche and, more importantly, to accept him as an intellectual, explains, “Bardèche has a position of great importance in French right-wing intellectual thought because he was the only post-war French fascist of any intellectual distinction and provided continuity with 1930s literary fascism... he revives the old ideas of fascism but transcends them by introducing fascist aestheticism and heroism into a new ideology for the post-war world.” Ian R. Barnes, “Antisemitic Europe and the ‘Third Way’: The ideas of Maurice Bardèche, *Patterns of Prejudice* 34, no. 2 (2000): 57.

Bardèche, born in 1907, was raised in a republican family and considered himself a revolutionary among his conservative peers at the lycée Louis-le-Grand. But he would quickly align himself with the nonconformist students there including Brasillach and Maulnier. He maintained these close friends at the ENS and eventually married Suzanne Brasillach. During the war, Bardèche was classified as unfit for battle and spent the war months moving his family away from the front. During these months, Bardèche remained apolitical, but would recall later in his *Souvenirs* that he had been irritated by the left-wing promoters of war against Germany that he called the “clan, resolved to impose its decision on us despite our rejections and our anger.”⁹⁸² He was indifferent to the collapse of the Third Republic, finding it a corrupt and weak government, and took from the experience of war and defeat, not any desire for vengeance but instead an “intellectual condemnation of certain ideas which had tricked us...like Democracy.”⁹⁸³

Although Bardèche would not be actively engaged in collaborationist politics, he would accept a position as chair of nineteenth-century literature at the Sorbonne which had been left open by its former Jewish occupant.⁹⁸⁴ His concern during the occupation years, he recalled, was not with the larger political decisions of the day but rather with the daily affairs of wartime existence. He would, however, contribute occasional articles to Brasillach’s *Je Suis Partout* and also held small literary and political discussions with a circle of students at the ENS. When several of these students turned out to be directors of a resistance paper, Bardèche would say he felt betrayed and would withdraw even further from political discussion, claiming he had no time for political engagement due to his teaching responsibilities.⁹⁸⁵ Bardèche did, however, see the defeat of Germany with trepidation. It did not

⁹⁸² Maurice Bardèche, *Souvenirs* (Paris: Editions Buchet/Chastel, 1993), 72.

⁹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 100.

⁹⁸⁴ He would later leave the Sorbonne for a position as chair at the University at Lille claiming that he had been ejected from the Sorbonne in 1942 by its remaining liberal professors because they discovered he was related to the notorious Brasillach.

⁹⁸⁵ Bardèche, *Souvenirs*, 137.

signal, he wrote, the victory of France but rather the victory of the “enemies of these fascist regimes I had admired and the victory of the democracies that I had detested.”⁹⁸⁶

He felt himself confirmed in this opinion when, with the Liberation, he was detained in Drancy with other collaborationists and then sent to Fresnes. After the execution of Brasillach and his own trial where his apolitical wartime pursuits were confirmed, Bardèche would be freed from prison only to discover his property had been seized by the Resistance. It was during these times, he would write, that he found himself part of a new community of former collaborationists. The execution of Brasillach and the purge of his peers would galvanize Bardèche and lead him on a new path of political journalism and engagement. His *Lettre à François Mauriac* would initiate his engagement on the extreme Right as both an opponent of the purge and an advocate for fascism. When, because of his political views, he was released from his publishing firm, Bardèche would form his own publishing house, Sept Couleurs, in 1949. Here he would print not only his next two controversial works on Nuremberg, which would earn him a trial for treason, a prison sentence, and a reputation as a Negationist, but also a catalogue of Brasillach’s works which were not allowed at other publishers. By 1952, he had also founded the right-wing revue *Défense de l’Occident* which would be a source of intellectual community for the excluded Right for over a decade.

In the years that followed, Bardèche would become one of the most vocal and visible representatives of extreme-right wing thought and the most prestigious among the intellectual proponents of neo-fascism. He would represent France at the “conférence européenne des mouvements néo-fascistes” in Malmo, Sweden in 1951 and would be an active supporter of the International Amis de Robert Brasillach. His essay “Qu’est-ce que le fascisme?” would lay out the groundwork for the creation of a new neo-fascist ideology and attempt to distance the ideas of fascism from the failed incarnations of Nazi Germany, Italy, and Vichy. During the late 1950s, Bardèche would describe himself as merely a “passionate spectator” of the debates over French Algeria. But, by 1960, he was writing numerous articles defending French Algeria and third world colonialism and advocating what

⁹⁸⁶ Ibid., 162.

he considered to be a new concept of racism based on segregation. Under his guidance, *Défense de l'Occident* would become one of the centers of this extreme-right intellectual approach to international affairs continued in the next decades by the Nouvelle Droite and GRECE.

Bardèche's boldness in speaking of himself as a right-wing intellectual and a neo-fascist makes him something of an anomaly in the post-war. However, his resentment of the marginalization of the Right, his desire to revive the positive aspects of right-wing ideology, and his effort to legitimize extreme-right wing values and writers were a common theme among the various groups of the extreme Right. As one scholar of Bardèche realized, "a review of the literature emanating from the extreme Right in France since 1945 makes it clear that Bardèche has...articulated the fears and values of a pariah caste as well as the psychological consequences of prolonged ideological isolation and the defensive reactions it engenders."⁹⁸⁷ Bardèche was, therefore, a valuable spokesman for the disempowered thinkers of the extreme Right and for their distinctive conceptualization of true intellectual identity in the post-war world.⁹⁸⁸

Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy

During the occupation, intellectuals of the Right had held the places of power in the intellectual field and yet had continued to feel that the public's perception of intellectual identity remained molded by the discourse, values, and visions of the Left. In the post-war years, this perception of exclusion from intellectual identity and public leadership would become a reality as the intellectual Right was effectively cut out of the intellectual discussion of the day because of their association with the defeated policies of fascism and collaboration. Collaborationism and fascism were deemed the ultimate expression of the anti-French and the anti-intellectual and its supporters were no longer accorded the right or the opportunity to speak as intellectual representatives of France.

⁹⁸⁷ Barnes, "Antisemitic Europe," 57.

⁹⁸⁸ Ibid., 60.

Bardèche would be more resentful and infuriated by this exclusion and its implication for his concept of self than any other right-wing intellectual. Every article, book, and memory is colored by his resentment of the hegemony of the Left, his desire to prove it unfounded, and his attempts to legitimize his own intellectual position. His resentment of this ostracism was essential to his approach to engagement and his struggle against it was integral to his understanding of intellectual behavior.

Bardèche provided an intimate analysis of his own feelings of exclusion, isolation, and marginalization in the intellectual world throughout his post-war writings. Each line is tinged with his palpable resentment of the Left for what he called their creation of “a world of intellectual terrorism which excluded all discussion.”⁹⁸⁹ In his *Souvenirs*, Bardèche wrote of the years after the purge, “I do not know if I discovered immediately my isolation, my situation of foreigner within the nation of which I carried the name.”⁹⁹⁰ His understanding of the Occupation and the decisions and motivations of the collaborationists, he wrote, would give him a separate “vision of the past and the present” which isolated him ideologically from the intellectual Resistance and, because of this, from all public affairs. This understanding of the Occupation, he continued “had installed me on a deserted island. In truth I was not alone there; I had companions. But I was alone with my companions against an apparent unanimity” among the rest of the intellectual field.⁹⁹¹ For Bardèche, this perception of isolation and exclusion brought with it not resignation but rather a sense of righteous indignation, frustration, and resentment toward those who had intentionally ostracized him.

His resentment of his exclusion and isolation in the new intellectual environment of the post-war would remain with Bardèche for the rest of his intellectual career. The purge, he wrote later, was the beginning of an enterprise of dispossession which...is still pursued at the moment where I write

⁹⁸⁹ Maurice Bardèche, *L'Épuration* (Paris: Editions Confrerie Castille, 1997) originally published in *Defense de l'Occident*, January-February 1957, 119.

⁹⁹⁰ Bardèche, *Souvenirs*, 198.

⁹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

these lines.”⁹⁹² The intellectuals of the Right had been dispossessed of their positions in academia and journalism, of their authority in society, but most importantly, of their very identity as intellectual spokesmen and guides for the nation by the hegemonic intellectuals of the Left. “They condemn our truth,” Bardèche wrote resentfully, “they declare it radically false. They condemn our sentiment, our roots even, our most profound manner of seeing and feeling. They explain to us that our mind is not made as it should be; that we have the mind of a barbarian.”⁹⁹³ And Bardèche would not base this sense of exclusion and condemnation on perception alone. He fumed later that during the immediate post-war years, his failure to conform to the unanimity of the dominant majority had literally excluded him from the title and role of the writer and intellectual calling him instead with disdain “écrivain sic.”⁹⁹⁴

Bardèche wrote of the purge that it was not simply a judicial punishment that allowed the accused to retain their own views but rather a process for domination, control over important concepts like that of the intellectual, and reeducation along left-wing lines. The purge not only eliminated significant sources of opposition on the Right, it sought to substitute “one consciousness for another,” and impose an “obligatory vision of the past” in order for the Left to legitimize their new position. In short, he wrote, it was a calculated attempt at “brainwashing.”⁹⁹⁵ This brainwashing of both the intellectual milieu and the general public followed the postulate that “whoever has not been a resistor has been a bad Frenchman.” And no one, Bardèche argued, was “free to think or deduce outside of this postulate” if they wanted to be considered a legitimate thinker.⁹⁹⁶ From this postulate, Bardèche continued, in the eyes of the French public, all the intellectuals of the Right were made “exiles” outside true French sensibilities and were therefore, by definition, incapable of being French

⁹⁹² Ibid., 217.

⁹⁹³ Maurice Bardèche, *Nuremberg ou la terre promise* (Paris: Les Sept Couleurs, 1948), 54.

⁹⁹⁴ Bardèche, *Souvenirs*, 253.

⁹⁹⁵ Ibid., 200.

⁹⁹⁶ Maurice Bardèche, *Lettre à François Mauriac* (Paris: La Pensée libre, 1947), 15.

intellectuals.⁹⁹⁷ What was worse, he wrote, the Left had even convinced some among the intellectual Right that they had been intellectual traitors.

This exclusion of the intellectual Right from the categories of Frenchman and intellectual which were so important for their role as social guides, Bardèche wrote, had been blatant and crude during the purge. However, it was more insidious in the decades after the purge because it was less apparent but more effective. “Nothing is expressly forbidden,” he explained, “but we are forewarned that a certain orientation is not good.” The required intellectual values were infused into the indoctrination of the youth, Bardèche wrote, as “one taught us to conjugate verbs ‘M. Mandel is a great patriot...M. Jean-Richard Bloch is a great writer. M. Benda is a thinker’ and inversely ‘I will never be a racist, I curse eternally the SS, Charles Maurras, and *Je Suis Partout*.’”⁹⁹⁸ And what, he asked, of those who refuse these sympathies, whose minds “think through other categories?”⁹⁹⁹ They are labeled intellectual heretics and unpatriotic Frenchmen and are forthwith excluded from authority or legitimacy. And the result, Bardèche assured his readers, was that the Left had “created a minority which, not seeing history through your glasses and not being able to see it thus, is condemned to permanent loss of citizenship...this vilified minority...has neither the means to express itself loyally by its journals nor the means to honestly designate representatives.”¹⁰⁰⁰ In short, he raged, the intellectuals of the Left had made of the intellectual Right a class of “untouchables and children of untouchables...and created on the interior of the nation a heresy and its heretics.”¹⁰⁰¹

It was this “intellectual ostracism,” Bardèche argued, which made the hegemony of the Left such a frightening force in France and which excluded the Right from its rightful claim to intellectual

⁹⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁹⁸ Bardèche, *Nuremberg ou la terre promise*, 53.

⁹⁹⁹ Ibid., 54.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Bardèche, *Lettre à Francois Mauriac*, 19.

¹⁰⁰¹ Ibid., 21.

identity.¹⁰⁰² The intellectual Left, he insisted, was carrying out a modern day war of religion during the post-war decades. This war of religion was not simply about tearing down the visible structures of the intellectual Right's power during the occupation. It was about "the installation of a certain optic which colors all things, not only politics but morals, habits, judgments which one makes, in a word, all of life...a certain manner of being."¹⁰⁰³ The Left was intent on uprooting any of the moral qualities, the sensibilities, and the images of man, society, and the moral universe that the Right valued. To do this, the Left had realized that it was not effective to carry out purge trials which made of the victims national martyrs. "Those who refuse to 'be in line,'" Bardèche wrote, were not sent to Siberia but they became citizens of the second zone...One does not prevent them from speaking but one arranges it so that no one hears their voice. One does not prevent them from living, but one arranges that their lives be useless... One does not persecute them but one ignores them."¹⁰⁰⁴ In this way, he assured readers, the intellectual Left did not need violence or physical exile to accomplish its religious cleansing. It simply proclaimed certain ideas, thinkers, and values heretical and outside the boundaries of intellectual legitimacy and it eliminated the Right through silent extinction.

In the years following the occupation and particularly those after Brasillach's execution, Bardèche carried a real sense of shame that he had been only an apolitical observer during the occupation while his peers had attempted to change the world. He saw it as his duty in the postwar to compensate for this ivory tower isolation by engaging without hesitation in the struggle against the dominance of the intellectual Left. This required first that the public be brought to see the hegemony and then that it recognize its illegitimacy. In a simple statement explaining the hegemony, Bardèche would write, "there is currently a monopoly on political opinion. One only allows those to exist who

¹⁰⁰² Bardèche, *Sparte et les sudistes*, 43.

¹⁰⁰³ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁰⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 34.

do not call the fundamental truths of the regime into question.”¹⁰⁰⁵ In this latter group, Bardèche, like the interwar Right, would casually lump together communists like Aragon with republicans like Aron under the general category of “the Regime” or “the System.” He also referred to the bloc as “the intellectual Party,” referencing Peguy’s condemnation of the pre-World War I intellectual hegemony of the bloc of the intellectual Left.¹⁰⁰⁶ The hegemony exerted by the “intellectual Party” prevented the intellectual Right from fulfilling its role and responsibility by preventing them from reaching the public with their ideas. “Only those who serve *your* truth” he wrote to Mauriac, have the right to speak. This manipulation of opinion created what Bardèche called “a divided society where one side has the right to carry arms and the other side to receive the blows.”¹⁰⁰⁷ This monopoly of the Left over intelligence and opinion was a repression which the Right could not tolerate but also could not effectively combat without resources.

For this reason, he believed, the hegemony was particularly heinous in the press. “The resisters declared that since all the French newspapers had committed treason during the Occupation,” he wrote, “they were now the masters of all the newspapers. So they took charge of all of them—and the presses too. Consequently absolutely all opinion, not only the mass media but the whole press was in their hands...there was sort of an intellectual coup d’etat.”¹⁰⁰⁸ During these postwar decades, Bardèche explained, the intellectual Right was not even able to protest the hegemony. “I did not have a journal through which to respond when one affirmed in 200,000 copies that I had applauded the concentration camps,” he wrote angrily. “And I was not able to appeal to the judgment of the reader since one prevented him from reading my book himself.”¹⁰⁰⁹ The press,

¹⁰⁰⁵ Maurice Bardèche, *L’oeuf de Christophe Colomb; lettre à un sénateur d’Amérique* (Paris: Les Sept Couleurs, 1951), 119.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Francis d’Orcival, “Nos intellectuels sont-ils des imbeciles?,” *Defense de l’Occident*, June 1963.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Bardèche, *Lettre à Francois Mauriac*, 55.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Alice Kaplan, *Reproductions of Banality: Fascism, Literature, and French Intellectual Life* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 178-9.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Maurice Bardèche, *Nuremberg II ou les faux monnayeurs* (Paris: Les Sept Couleurs, 1950), 10.

because it excluded the Right, was just as much a reflection of the common front “System” as the intellectuals themselves, Bardèche believed. “For ten years,” he complained, “no new daily was able to be founded to break the organized blockade around public opinion made by the new press...in the essential things, it is the same journal at the foundation of all we read.”¹⁰¹⁰ Because of this “unanimity” in the intellectual world, Bardèche warned the public, “we live in the time of the brainwashed.”¹⁰¹¹ The true intellectual’s role was not to join in the prearranged chorus but to bring new ideas, challenges, and opposition to the System. The intellectual Right alone was capable of doing this.

According to Bardèche, therefore, it was the intellectual Right’s responsibility during the postwar to actively reassert the legitimacy of its ideas, values, and writers in order to win back public opinion and effect its own vision of change.¹⁰¹² The first step in legitimizing the reconceived values of the intellectual Right was to publicly claim the status, role, and title of the intellectual. “We have our intellectuals,” *Defense de l’Occident* boldly proclaimed in a statement strikingly reminiscent of Barrès’ original claim to the term. “The term used does not signify that we have writers, journalists, men of letters on our side; this is already evidenced. We want to say that the well known phenomenon exists equally in our ranks. We have our men who in writing doctrinal studies and political memoirs, can claim to give weight to them because they are *intellectuals*.”¹⁰¹³ Once the title and role of the

¹⁰¹⁰ Maurice Bardèche, *Les Temps Modernes* (Paris: Les Sept Couleurs, 1956), 26.

¹⁰¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹² In general, Bardèche and the intellectual Right would proclaim themselves and their purged peers legitimate representatives of France because they had supported, rather than resisted, what had been internationally recognized as the legitimate French government during the occupation. Bardèche fumed that it was the collaborators, those who had worked with the accepted Vichy regime who were being ostracized and the rebels who had sought to undermine this authorized government that now dictated morality. “I was guilty only of not having been a dissident, a rebel, a combatant in the shadow,” he wrote, “and for this alone I was proscribed in my own nation.” Bardèche, *Souvenirs*, 208. The political “heresy” of collaboration had been based, he wrote to Mauriac, on the strong foundation of governmental “légitimité.” Bardèche, *Lettre à Francois Mauriac*, 21.

¹⁰¹³ d’Orcival, “Nos intellectuels,” 12.

intellectual was claimed, the second step in regaining legitimacy and public authority for the intellectual Right was to bring together the two concepts that have been so difficult to reconcile: fascism and intellectualism. “I am a fascist writer” Bardèche wrote in what has become one of the most recognized statements of the intellectual Right in the postwar.¹⁰¹⁴ In a time where even Bardèche admitted “no one consents to being a fascist,” he believed it was his duty to not only claim to be an intellectual but to link this to his fascism. And Bardèche did not accept that he was the only fascist intellectual. “If I were the only one of my species,” he wrote, “this clarification would not merit being discussed... but if the fascist writer, the fascist intellectual is a rare prey...there is still a fascist spirit and thousands of men who are fascists without knowing it.”¹⁰¹⁵ The role of the intellectual then, as Bardèche understood it, was to legitimize the new concept of fascism so that these men and these intellectuals who shared in the fascist spirit would no longer be resistant to claiming it alongside their title of intellectual.

During the occupation, right-wing intellectuals had styled themselves martyrs, claiming to be misunderstood prophets in a society where left-wing intellectual values were thoroughly engrained. In the post-war, Bardèche and his peers on the Right would find this pariah status was no longer a useful tool but rather an inescapable reality. The hegemony of the intellectual Left was absolute and unquestioned over both the institutions and the conceptualization of the intellectual. For Bardèche, this exclusion from the intellectual world and isolation from public debate brought with it “a sort of living death” for the intellectual.¹⁰¹⁶ It was vital that the intellectual Right reclaim its right to participate as intellectuals and clarify the distinctions that existed between them and the Left. The struggle against the hegemonic Left might appear hopeless, he conceded, but they were the only option if the Right was to avoid extinction. “Even if the dreams of the promised land seem distant to

¹⁰¹⁴ Maurice Bardèche, *Qu'est-ce que le fascisme?* (Paris: Les Sept Couleurs, 1961), 10.

¹⁰¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁰¹⁶ Kaplan, *Reproductions of Banality*, 178-9.

us,” he concluded, “it has been too long that all which is ours in France has been excluded from power for us not to have a desire to throw out the usurpers. Even if we will not do better...we have had enough of being in exile for half a century and of being impotent...after all, since we are nothing now, what do we have to lose?”¹⁰¹⁷

Differentiation of Intellectual Values: Political Realism

During the preceding decades, the intellectual Right had claimed an exclusive connection to “reality” that the Left could not approach because of its love of abstraction and universalism. And it had received relatively little contradiction from the intellectual Left. In light of the occupation, however, the intellectual Left, and particularly the existentialists surrounding Sartre, would condemn their pre-war abstraction and ivory tower intellectualism in favor of a connection to the lived realities of French society. To the great frustration of the intellectual Right, which continued to proclaim itself the sole spokesman of intellectual Realism, the intellectual Left now began to claim the concept for its own and to attach it to its own ideas of intellectual responsibility. The “Presentation” of LTM would announce that the contributors saw their role to be conveying a concept of man as it related to the particular time and nation.¹⁰¹⁸ And Beauvoir would proclaim that it was “the ideologies of the contemporary Right” which during the post-war were “idealist,” “cut off from the resistance of the real world,” and which “substituted abstract Ideas for reality.”¹⁰¹⁹ Bardèche and the intellectuals of the Right would therefore go to great lengths to separate their understanding of Realism and delegitimize that described by the Left.

The Communists’ concept of intellectual reality, Bardèche explained, was tied directly to recognition and affirmation of the struggle of the classes and the material needs of the proletariat.

¹⁰¹⁷ Maurice Bardèche, “Autocritique,” *Defense de l’Occident*, July 1959, 7.

¹⁰¹⁸ Sartre, “Presentation.”

¹⁰¹⁹ Beauvoir, “La Pensée de Droite.”

This understanding of reality would dictate a concept of intellectual role and responsibility geared toward social revolution. The liberals' understanding was based on the universal equality of man and his fundamental human nature. Liberal engagement in "reality" led them to support institutions of the universal conscience like the Nuremberg tribunals. The intellectual Right argued that this conceptualization of reality as a product of universal class or universal nature was simply a game of semantics. Under the name realism, the Left continued the original abstract, universalist concepts of man and society that had defined them throughout the century. In opposition to the Left's "realism," Bardèche outlined his own understanding of intellectual Realism and the role that it dictated for the intellectual.

The most powerful statement of Bardèche's differentiation between his concept of intellectual Realism and the Left's was found in his *Sparte et les Sudistes*. "The opposition between the Right and the Left," he wrote, "puts in light the antinomie of the two temperaments... The men of the Left have a rational and abstract definition of man and they want to arrange the force of men in shelves that they have prepared."¹⁰²⁰ In contrast, he continued, "the men of the Right do not have a system, they do not construct society with a ruler and a compass. They take men as they find them, in the place where they have grown, in the unequal bunches that nature has formed."¹⁰²¹ In short, he was insisting, the intellectual Right understood the true role of the intellectual was to begin with man "as he was" rather than "as he should be." The left-wing proponents of liberalism, the third way, or communism all believed they were addressing reality by looking at material conditions and class relations, according to Bardèche. But they approached these real conditions of France through the lens of their ideology. The central ideologies of the Left themselves universalist abstractions which, no matter how they tried to claim a connection to a particular society, were always imposed on that society through an

¹⁰²⁰ Bardèche, *Sparte et les sudistes*, 136.

¹⁰²¹ Ibid.

idealized, universal application.¹⁰²² “The intellectual mechanism of ideology,” Bardèche began by explaining, “consists in isolating one sentiment from the others and...organizing a system” around it as the “*idée fixe*.” Those who devoted themselves to ideology were cut off from “the real world and its complexity” and saw only the principles outlined by their abstract model. As such they were “detached and separated from the national life.” They were no longer men of their nation, he continued, but rather men of a universal religion whose dictates trumped those of the nation.

In contrast, Bardèche wrote, the intellectual of the Right understood that a responsibility to Realism required the intellectual to recognize the needs of the nation in its particular time. It was the role of the intellectual, therefore, to nurture a sense of the national consciousness in himself and in the public. “The national consciousness,” he wrote, “is the pulsing of the *pays reel*. It is our history, our race, generations of peasants and artisans...who are the sons of the same earth.” In contrast, the universal consciousness of a universal humanity was “the dispossession, the expropriation of our souls, the uprooting and sterilization of our people.”¹⁰²³ Those who proclaim that “a principle, an idea is superior to the imperatives of national life,” he continued, “strike this energy at its source” and destroy the autonomy of the nation.¹⁰²⁴ Only armed with an understanding of the national consciousness could the intellectual devise social and political programs suitable to the French people.

Bardèche also deplored the Left’s continued understanding of a universal, abstract humanity rather seeing, as the Right did, distinctive races, nationalities, and rooted peoples.¹⁰²⁵ In a statement

¹⁰²² Of course, fascism, for Bardèche, was not one of these ideologies because it was not universal or abstract in nature but rather a distinctive national expression, born out of the national need, in each of its manifestations.

¹⁰²³ Bardèche, *L’oeuf de Christophe Colomb*, 106.

¹⁰²⁴ *Ibid.*, 87.

¹⁰²⁵ The intellectual Left, he wrote, had long made of this concept of a universal consciousness a religious idol, “the cloud of the tabernacle at the head of the procession.” Bardèche, *Sparte et les sudistes*, 25. To question the equality and universalism of abstract man by suggesting the power of race or nation was to commit a heresy.

strikingly similar to one by Barrès during the Affair, he wrote, “I know a French youth of French parents, I do not know this ‘Personne humaine’ and I do not know the anonymous society called ‘civilization.’”¹⁰²⁶ How, he marveled, could the intellectual Left proclaim itself realists and claim to be responsibly engaging in the life of the real nation if it continued to conceive of the French citizen as one among a homogenous sea of humanity? The “Religion of Humanity” that Bardèche accused the liberals and communists of constructing, was designed, he argued, to destroy the reality of national consciousness in favor of a universal consciousness based either on democratic ideals or class. It was the contradiction of the century, Bardèche believed, that the intellectual of the Left understood his role to be both the purveyor of realism, which was inextricable from the particular, and the advocate of the universal consciousness, which was its antithesis.

Bardèche saw the two distinct ideas of realism to have two extremely different results for intellectual practice and responsibility. For the Left, he began, “one was able to be a traitor by serving the legitimate government if this government was not authorized by democracy” or some other universal ideology.¹⁰²⁷ In practice, therefore, they would condemn the undemocratic government of Vichy. In contrast, the intellectuals of the Right had supported Vichy as the only functioning, sanctioned government that French society had at the time. They had worked within the current reality, Bardèche wrote, while the Left had created a fantasy government in the resistance or paid allegiance to a government in exile. Different approaches to reality would also yield two different reactions to the Nuremberg trials. By supporting the punishment of war crimes based on a universal standard of morality, the intellectuals of the Left felt they were upholding the role of the engaged intellectual. Of course, Bardèche wrote resentfully, the victorious powers claimed they had “erected themselves as judges because they represent civilization.”¹⁰²⁸ This, he continued, was a sophism

¹⁰²⁶ Bardèche, *Lettre à Francois Mauriac*, 175.

¹⁰²⁷ Bardèche, *Les Temps Modernes*, 61-9.

¹⁰²⁸ Bardèche, *Nuremberg ou la terre promise*, 15.

because they claimed to determine the qualifications of a universal standard of civilization based on the assumption that they themselves epitomized it. In truth, the Left desperately needed to prove its own actions moral and its opponents' heinous or their own war crimes would be equally reprehensible. By claiming to be delivering judgment based on the universal consciousness of a certain standard of human morality, they could cover this base need with a noble veneer. In truth, though, the idea of a universal morality was an affront to true justice which took intentionality and circumstances into account.¹⁰²⁹ All that judgment based on universal morality accomplished was to destroy the sovereignty of the nation.

In contrast, the intellectual of the Right rejected the judgment of Nuremberg since it annulled the authority of the nation and ignored the particular needs, rationales, and interests of the people being judged. "We must consider our nations to have 'moral space,'" he mused, "just like there is national 'air space' and 'national waters.'"¹⁰³⁰ An intellectual Realist, he believed, was a national relativist. The "human person, in abstracto, in the sense that the Tribunal understands it" had "no patrie," no sense of connection to his roots and his cité. This, Bardèche wrote, was a "citizen of the world," a "dehydrated man" that he refused to recognize as man anymore.¹⁰³¹ These dehydrated men were content to be educated, governed, and manipulated by dictates of the "universal consciousness" and therefore by the Americans and Soviets who were the puppet masters of the concept. In contrast, Bardèche advocated the defense of the human person as product of family, race, nation, and land. Only this understanding of man as a particular product of his national consciousness, not as a product of a universal class or a universal ideology, was in keeping with the true concept of intellectual Realism.

¹⁰²⁹ Even the claim to "human rights violations" was not universally applied to all combatants, Bardèche continued, otherwise the Americans would have paid equally before the court of world opinion for the deportations of their Japanese citizens. *Ibid.*, 38.

¹⁰³⁰ Bardèche, *L'oeuf de Christophe Colomb*, 97.

¹⁰³¹ Bardèche, *Nuremberg ou la terre promise*, 241.

Negationism

Bardèche was also one of the initial intellectual promoters of Holocaust trivialization or negationism.¹⁰³² His position on this issue clearly separated him from the model of responsible intellectual behavior on the Left at the time and that reveals an entirely different set of intellectual values and engagements. However, based on the model of intellectual identity constructed on the Right, Bardèche and many of his peers were able to see negationism as synonymous with responsible intellectual behavior.

It was Bardèche's concept of the intellectual as a nationalist rather than an internationalist that would most clearly influence his Negationism. The French should be concerned about justice and judgment for atrocities committed against their own nation, he argued. There was no universal standard of morality, judgment, or even of justice that could be applied to all the situations of the war indiscriminately because each action, each perpetrator, each case would be particular in its nature. Therefore, Bardèche did not deny the presence of concentration camps but argued, "as for the concentration camps, honesty consists for us in demanding justice and reparation for the French innocents who had been deported and tortured, not for the others."¹⁰³³ Bardèche's rejection of universal morality and international justice were augmented here by his right-wing intellectual values of race and rootedness. Despite his disclaimer "I am not an anti-Semite," this racist approach to international politics and morality was a constant in the work of the neo-fascist Right. "What becomes apparent," Bardèche rationalized in *Nuremberg ou la terre promise*, "is that there was no will to exterminate the French but only to exterminate the Jews and while there are no proofs for

¹⁰³² His initial questioning of the German atrocities and the judgement of Nuremberg were published as *Nuremberg ou la terre promise* in 1948. The work would earn him a trial under the lois scélérates that determined him guilty and sentenced him to a fine and one year in prison of which he served only two weeks after a pardon. Pierre Milza, "Le negationisme en France," *Relations internationales*, (Spring 1991), 27. He rebutted this condemnation with his second negationist work *Nuremberg II ou les faux monnayeurs* in 1952.

¹⁰³³ Bardèche, *Nuremberg ou la terre promise*, 181.

French extermination there are many proofs for Jewish extermination.” And while the intellectuals of the liberal and communist Left might consider the Jews members of the universal human religion and therefore deserving of French interference, Bardèche and many on the intellectual Right continued to believe that they “should not consider Jews our affair because they were foreigners accepted into our nation who have weakened it with their wealth and influence.”¹⁰³⁴ He continued, in attempted humanitarianism, “I find it sad that one massacred them and persecuted them but my sentiment does not change if one adds that they lived in Bordeaux.”¹⁰³⁵ For Bardèche, the Jews, whether French citizens or not, had been foreigners to France and, therefore, should not be considered by the French nation in its demands for justice against Germany. Only the universalists of the Left, he was suggesting, due to their idea of abstract morality felt the need to demand justice for all the peoples of the earth.

Bardèche was also quite certain that in questioning the testimony and decisions of Nuremberg, he was doing his intellectual duty and that the intellectual Left’s failure to do so was a betrayal of responsibility in favor of vendetta. He believed he was searching out the truth of the situation more diligently by questioning the evidence and provoking closer consideration of the allied claims. “I do not sense myself guilty in any way,” he wrote of the questions he raised about German atrocities in his *Nuremberg ou la terre promise*, “for having done that which I regard as my duty as an honest man.”¹⁰³⁶ This duty applied particularly to the intellectuals, he wrote, for it was their responsibility to fully consider the evidence of the case and provide guidance rather than to be swept up like the common crowd in punishing the defeated Germans. “Is it honorable,” he asked, “for men, in particular the intellectuals and in particular for the intellectuals of our nation...that none dare to demand that a Germany without defense, even one it considered guilty, benefit from the loyal and

¹⁰³⁴ Ibid., 189.

¹⁰³⁵ Ibid., 193.

¹⁰³⁶ Bardèche, *Nuremberg II ou les faux monnayeurs*, 178.

honest questioning that any accused has the right to demand?”¹⁰³⁷ If the intellectuals of the Left were blind to this responsibility, Bardèche wrote, he would have to pose the questions himself that the entire intellectual community, were it not blinded by ideology, should have posed.

Bardèche realized that his negationism would make his struggle for intellectual legitimacy even more difficult and so made it central to his concept of intellectual responsibility. “It was necessary,” he began his second Nuremberg work, “to show that I was neither a monster nor a fool and that others had doubts similar to mine.”¹⁰³⁸ These doubts, he continued, were based on clearheaded examination of the available documents. To add authority to his argument, he listed the various international writers and journalists including writers from the *Chicago Tribune* who had questioned the trial evidence alongside him. Other nations, he wrote, did not stifle the free speech of their intellectual opposition as France did under the dominance of the former intellectual Resistance. It was this intellectual travesty and the loss of moral superiority which accompanied it, Bardèche continued, that limited France’s influence in the postwar world. “Such is the result of our fear of the truth,” he wrote, “French literature has as much importance today as the French army.”¹⁰³⁹ The Left’s dominance of the intellectual field allowed them to ignore with impunity not only the opinions and ideas of their opponents, but the facts of the case as well.

It was, Bardèche wrote, the role and responsibility of the intellectual to pursue the truth, no matter how unpopular. “Facts need to be confirmed,” Bardèche chided his peers on the Left. And in particular, testimony needed to be considered in light of the means used to extract it. He claimed the Malmedy affair had uncovered a massacre of American soldiers only by using torture and trickery to extract confessions. How, he asked, could the intellectual community, if it were truly impartial as it ought to be, condemn a crime against human rights during war time and excuse another during peace?

¹⁰³⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰³⁸ Ibid., 11.

¹⁰³⁹ Ibid, 112.

And, he continued, the testimony needed to be unbiased in its presentation. Witnesses against the Germans, he complained, had been upheld as heroes while those who suggested that camp life was not as it had been pictured were persecuted and accused of false testimony and hatred of the allied justice.¹⁰⁴⁰ The intellectual Left, he warned, was allowing its liberal, communist, and resistance based passions to interfere with justice and duty. “Do we condemn ourselves to ignorance or hatred because these are easy positions?” he cried, “Is it a crime according to our laws now to try to understand? Is it an obligation to accord ourselves without reserve to the official condemnations and the maledictions of the journals?”¹⁰⁴¹ No! he answered. Rather it was the responsibility of the intellectual milieu, among whom he seemed to be the only one to continue in his duty, to question the official information, to analyze the evidence, to add complexity to the options presented, and to consider the moral implications. “This,” he concluded, “is why I have wanted to be that voice raised in this nation for that which I believe to be the truth and justice.”¹⁰⁴² Being a responsible intellectual during the post-war, according to Bardèche, meant questioning the official account of events and opening up debate rather than stifling contradiction. In this way, questioning the Allied presentation of the Holocaust and Axis war crimes was in keeping with the role of the intellectual.

Europeanism and Neo-fascism

As his fascist and collaborationist predecessors had in the interwar and occupation years, Bardèche would maintain that a strong Europe was necessary for international balance between the superpowers and that a strong Germany was a requisite for this Europe. America, he claimed, had attempted to reconstruct Europe after the war based on its own vision of a strong continent capable of serving as a buffer zone against Soviet communism. However, they had simultaneously weakened the defeated Germany by imposing a foreign occupation and limiting its military and economic growth.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Ibid., 206.

¹⁰⁴¹ Ibid., 229.

¹⁰⁴² Ibid., 270.

“If,” Bardèche warned, “they want a strong Europe capable of defending itself and building strong industry and force to combat bolshevism, they must recognize Germany.”¹⁰⁴³ Germany, he believed, was the heartland of Europe and had strong ties to all European tradition and history. It had also been at the forefront of the struggle against communism. Germany’s defeat and the subsequent discrimination against her as a nation in the international community subsequently weakened all of Europe. In contrast to the intellectual Left who sought the continued flagellation of Germany, Bardèche and the extreme right-wing intellectuals argued in favor of a strong Germany who could lead Europe in a reformed fascism.

Europe, and France, needed a political ideology that drew from neither the democratic ideologies of America or the communist ones of the USSR. It was this, Bardèche believed, that the intellectual Left failed to grasp. They continued to promote either liberal democracy under the name of Gaullism or communist revolutionary visions that were either openly affiliated with the PCF or masqueraded as a third way. The European Community proposed by the liberal Left, for example, was touted as providing a united, economically organic Europe, Bardèche wrote. But at its foundation, it would be subjected “to all the weaknesses and fatalities of capitalism” and the democratic ideology.¹⁰⁴⁴ If Europe were to be economically independent, and therefore militarily and diplomatically independent, Bardèche argued, it could not adopt systems that were tied, even ideologically, to the capitalist or communist superpowers. It had to create its own European alternative.

The only clear political ideology that was a European product and associated in no way with either of the two political poles was that of fascism. It was therefore the intellectual responsibility of the extreme Right to recover the vital aspects of fascism, to revitalize it and restore its image before a public that was “intimidated by its values and disquieted by its terms,” and reinstate it as the

¹⁰⁴³ Bardèche, *L’oeuf de Christophe Colomb*, 45.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Maurice Bardèche, “Le regne de la buse,” *Defense de l’Occident*, January 1959.

ideological foundation for a new Europe.¹⁰⁴⁵ “Europe,” Bardèche wrote, “had been a bastion of anti-communist will and faith under fascism. Today this force is lost.”¹⁰⁴⁶ Under fascism its peoples had risen in “defensive action” against the bourgeois decadence and disorder of capitalism and democracy. If Europe were to regain its lost independence, its economic, military, diplomatic, and moral force, it needed to reassert its only natural ideological defense against communism and democratic decadence. Bardèche saw this struggle as not only a political one, but a moral and cultural one that held European civilization in the balance. “The mission of Europe is not only to be a third force,” he wrote, “but to be a third Civilization, the carrier of a third vision of the world.” It was to promote a third vision of man and society which is proper to its own history.¹⁰⁴⁷ “We have need of a third image of man and of life,” he explained, “to refuse today both Washington and Moscow is not a political shock, it is a moral choice.”¹⁰⁴⁸ Such a mission to redefine man, society, civilization, and morality, Bardèche continued, was clearly the work of the intellectual elite.

But the dominant intellectuals of France had failed in this work because they had been overtaken by their ideologies. “The liberal press in France is useless,” he wrote, “because it is simply a mouthpiece for government theses and refuses to call into question the two opposing versions of consumer society: [American] plutocracy and [Soviet] collectivism. In this, it fails in its mission of information and its duty of intellectual probity.”¹⁰⁴⁹ It was the intellectual Right, Bardèche was suggesting, that carried the burden of this responsibility to outline a third way. It was the intellectual’s responsibility to say “We don’t want de Gaulle and we don’t want the system, but what do we want?”¹⁰⁵⁰ And, he continued, the true intellectual’s response could only be fascism. But, not be the

¹⁰⁴⁵ Bardèche, *Sparte et les sudistes*, 16.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Bardèche, *L’oeuf de Christophe Colomb*, 16.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Bardèche, *Sparte et les sudistes*, 157.

¹⁰⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 166.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Maurice Bardèche, “Ni le System ni de Gaulle,” *Defense de l’Occident*, April 1958.

failed fascism of the past, of the Nazis or of Vichy, but a neo-fascism built on all that had been healthy in the fascist idea. “There is currently no fascism in France,” one *Defense de l’Occident* article elaborated, “but only a fascist tradition. It concerns in reality a long intellectual and moral reform to produce a form which will be very different from that which the past has known.”¹⁰⁵¹ It was, according to Bardèche and his peers on the Right, the duty of the engaged intellectuals to outline the new parameters of fascism. With this understanding of his purpose as an intellectual, Bardèche wrote *Qu’est-ce que le fascisme?*, his most comprehensive effort to transform fascism into a viable program for postwar Europe.

Bardèche warned readers first that the term and concept of fascism had been so distorted during the war and so maligned by the Left after the Liberation that few if any would admit to supporting fascism in the postwar world. “In truth,” he wrote, “fascism had been extirpated like a heresy, its leaders massacred, its symbols maligned... and this campaign was not the effort of a moment, it was continued, methodical, industrial. It endures still and will endure as long as the vanquishers of fascism are the exclusive possessors of all the organs of opinion: press, radio, cinema, publishing.”¹⁰⁵² But in the fascism which “the intellectuals, journals, and parties call fascism,” he explained, “the fascists refuse to recognize themselves.”¹⁰⁵³ It was necessary therefore for the fascist intellectuals to be persistent in promoting their own concept.

Bardèche began the process of revitalization by distancing neo-fascism from the failed versions of Germany, Italy, and Vichy.¹⁰⁵⁴ Instead, he proposed a “New Fascism” that had no dependence on biological racism, no imperative to expansion and war, and no requirement of a

¹⁰⁵¹ This new fascism would retain, the article assured the readers, at minimum, the essential elements “common to all fascist regimes: an attempt to unite traditional values and true social progress.” Bernard Vorge, “Ou devrait aller la droite; réponse à Paul Sérant,” *Defense de l’Occident*, May-June 1958.

¹⁰⁵² Bardèche, *Qu’est-ce que le fascisme?*, 87.

¹⁰⁵³ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Although Bardèche would point to the Italian Salo Republic of 1944 as one viable model for neo-fascism. *Ibid.*, 21.

“providential man” or chef. The new fascism required only an elite which represented the best of the people, served as pioneers of the new ideas, and provided exemplars of the lived ideology.¹⁰⁵⁵ It would not be a system of “constraint” as the Left claimed, but one of “discipline” based on an understanding of the collective interest of the nation.¹⁰⁵⁶ Fascism would provide a new image of man based on heroism, non-conformism, and an idea of liberty that promoted the collective good rather than individual rights.¹⁰⁵⁷ Finally, it would realize the mission which had eluded the wartime regimes: the construction of a true national socialism. This national socialism would oppose both Marxism’s focus on class warfare and the proletariat and capitalism’s materialist decadence and provide a nationalist and yet European organic unity.¹⁰⁵⁸ Only an ideology based on these principles of neo-fascism, Bardèche argued, would revive the French nation so that it could participate fully in European politics and withstand the influences of both democracy and communism.

For Bardèche, being an intellectual of the extreme, non-communist and non-democratic Right meant being a fascist intellectual. As such, he believed it was his responsibility to promote the idea of European unity based on an unbiased incorporation of Germany and a truly Third way that had no influence from American or Soviet ideologies. This purpose, he believed, set him in radical opposition to the intellectuals of both the liberal and communist Left who were, he claimed, actually betraying their intellectual role.

Colonialism and Racism

Although support for a French presence in Algeria and Vietnam during the late 1950s and early 1960s did not necessarily divide the intellectual Left and Right, anti-colonialism remained the

¹⁰⁵⁵ Ibid., 37.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Ibid., 43-54.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Ibid., 183.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Ibid., 140-8.

dominant intellectual value on the Left and colonialism the majority position of the Right. Even before 1960, the intellectual Left had made the question of colonialism a determining factor in defining intellectual identity. Because of this, the Right, including Bardèche, would be adamant about defending their support for French Algeria alongside their identity as intellectuals.¹⁰⁵⁹

Although colonialism did not clearly divide the intellectual community along Left-Right lines until 1960, and even then remained an imperfect separation, the values that informed the Right's support for colonialism would be more divisive. Economic exploitation, racism, and paternalism, in particular, were themes on the intellectual Right that did not appear in the arguments of the Left. One *Defense de l'Occident* article summarized quite clearly the economic position of the Right saying "we pose the fundamental principle; Algeria is and ought to remain French. We must maintain a presence here to maintain access to all of Africa for Africa is indispensable to the new European economic ensemble."¹⁰⁶⁰ The natural and human resources of African colonies needed to be available for exploitation by Europe if Europe were to transform into a third superpower that could "resist bolshevism" and "return France to a respected place in the first rank of nations."¹⁰⁶¹ But, the article warned, the idea of a European-African economic partnership was not the same as that of the pro-colonialists on the Left like Soustelle. Soustelle, the article complained, believed in integration, that French Algeria also meant Algerian France. This, the article clarified was not the position of the extreme Right which believed that integration was "the corruption of the white continent of Europe."¹⁰⁶²

In contrast, Bardèche would formulate a new concept of "racism" specifically to counter this integrationist idea of colonialism. Racism, he argued had been made into a "bogeyman" because the

¹⁰⁵⁹ Bardèche warned readers not to be "tricked into thinking that the opinion of the anti-fascist groups was that of the whole society" in one article on Algeria and explained that the intellectual minority still had a voice at *Defense de l'Occident*. Maurice Bardèche, "Un peuple fatigué," *Defense de l'Occident*, January 1960.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Yves Jeanne, "De l'Algerie française à l'Algerie européenne," *Defense de l'Occident*, January 1959.

¹⁰⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶² Ibid.

Left did not understand its true meaning or its importance for French culture and nationalism. “For the great part of public opinion and particularly for the great part of the ‘intellectuals,’ Bardèche complained, “racism means uniquely or at least primarily anti-Semitism.”¹⁰⁶³ It had been “delegitimized” by the Left as the “extermination or destruction of inferior races to assure the empire of a privileged race.”¹⁰⁶⁴ This was to attribute one moment of extremism to an entire historical concept. But, despite the inaccuracy, the intellectual Left would maintain this “erroneous conception... for the ease of polemic” it provided even though it “does not correspond to the conceptions held by the ‘racists’ themselves.”¹⁰⁶⁵ This “trembling conformism before the question of racism” by the Left, Bardèche charged, was “one of the most curious examples of the childishness and even in reality of the cowardice of our ‘intellectuals.’”¹⁰⁶⁶ Bardèche argued instead for a concept of “neo-racism” which was non-imperialist, had no concept of a superior or elect race, and did not entail hatred between races. All races were, however, divided by racial differences and needed to be kept distinct entities in order to serve their purpose in the international order. The neo-racism of the intellectual Right, according to Bardèche, accepted the “racial realities” of the world and understood that the Chinese and the Russians, for example, had not only different skin but different mentalities and that their shared communism would not bring fraternity in their international relations because of these differences.¹⁰⁶⁷ It was left-wing anti-racism, not right-wing racism, which ignored the real human condition.

Bardèche’s colonialism was based not only on economic need and racism but on a traditional European paternalism. The white race had perhaps ruined other civilizations, he admitted, but it was

¹⁰⁶³ Maurice Bardèche, “Sur le Racisme,” *Defense de l’Occident*, May 1963.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Maurice Bardèche, “Le Racisme, cet inconnu,” *Defense de l’Occident*, September 1960.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Bardèche, “Sur le Racisme.”

¹⁰⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶⁷ “Tomorrow,” he explained, “the white race will no longer struggle for its economic or political predominance but for its biological survival” and wars will be not among classes as the Left believed but among races. Bardèche, “Le Racisme.”

the only race progressed enough to repair this damage. “We are the only guides out of the forest where we have lost humanity,” he wrote, “therefore we cannot accept the principle of the equality of the races, it is only the white race that can reverse the present world circumstances.”¹⁰⁶⁸ If sovereignty, he continued, were to be given to the Muslims of Algeria, they would be incapable of capitalizing upon it. “We have not only the right but the duty,” he summarized, “to protect the peoples of Africa against their economic and military impotence, against their political childishness.”¹⁰⁶⁹ Algeria, according to the intellectual extreme Right, needed to remain French not only for the sake of the new France but for its own developmental benefit.

The intellectuals of the Right argued for French Algeria and later American intervention in Vietnam for reasons of economic benefits, racial segregation, and paternalism. These rationales separated it not only from the anti-colonialist majority on the Left but also from the pro-colonialist intellectuals of the Left like Soustelle and Camus. These values provided a different understanding of intellectual responsibility during the Algerian war that, when put into practice, led intellectuals like Bardèche to engage their work in favor of the OAS as passionately as those like Sartre supported the FLN. For the Left, being an intellectual meant support for racial equality, the right to political liberty, freedom from exploitation, and, at the base of these, a belief in the universal nature of all mankind. For the Right, one could not be a true intellectual if one did not appreciate and work with the “racial realities” of the world, understand the needs of European civilization in the post-war world, and accept that at foundation, there was no universal man but rather men of particular nations and races with distinctive mentalities.

Bardèche and the Right-Wing Intellectual Model

Bardèche’s engagement in the post-war decades was prompted by his resentment of the Left’s renewed and intensified hegemony over intellectual life. While before the war he had recognized a

¹⁰⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Ibid.

left-wing dominance, after the Liberation he saw this dominance become an institutionalized “enterprise of dispossession” under which it was literally inconceivable to link the terms intellectual and fascist. The Right was not simply a political opponent anymore, it was a moral and intellectual heresy and a class of “untouchables.” The “intellectual ostracism” of the Right that extended well beyond the purge made it nearly impossible to think outside the confines of the Left or to propose an alternative intellectual model. Yet, Bardèche would make this struggle against the Left essential to his concept of intellectual role and responsibility. “We have our intellectuals too,”¹⁰⁷⁰ his journal proudly declared, and then devoted its pages to differentiating and legitimizing these intellectuals of the Right. According to Bardèche’s model of the neo-fascist intellectual, the responsible intellectual valued realism over universalism, sought the truth behind official interpretations, advocated ideological trajectories in keeping with French sensibilities, and accepted the realities of racial segregation and inequality. In practice, this meant the role and responsibility of the intellectual was to condemn the institution of international tribunals or universal standards of morality, to question Allied accounts of German war crimes, to defend the restoration of a strong Germany, to define a neo-fascism that could replace the existing political options in Europe, and to support the work of the OAS and any other pro-colonialist ventures in Algeria and Vietnam. However, although Bardèche and his peers were loathe to dwell on it, in reality, the intellectual positions of the post-war Right translated into a defense of the Milice and German war criminals, suspicion of the extent of the Holocaust or refusal to condemn it because the Jews were not French, support for the suppression of an independence movement, and justification of biological racism. In the post-war era, it was increasingly difficult for those outside the extreme Right to accept these values as those of a legitimate intellectual. Despite this universal condemnation, other self-proclaimed intellectuals of the Right, like Jacques Laurent, would join Bardèche in formulating a model of intellectual identity that was compatible with the values and worldviews of the Right.

¹⁰⁷⁰ d’Orcival, “Nos intellectuels,” 12

CHAPTER 19

INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY AND THE POSTWAR EXTREME RIGHT: THE CASE OF JACQUES LAURENT

In the postwar era which saw the racism of Bardèche and the extremism of *Rivarol* and Occident, Jacques Laurent was not the most radical spokesman of the intellectual Right. He was, however, the intellectual “dits à droite” who most directly combated the Sartrian, Gaullist, and communist interpretation of intellectual engagement and their dominance over the intellectual field. Laurent was not only a master of popular literature, a respected Academician, and winner of the Goncourt prize; he was also a prolific journalist, revue director, and one of the four writers dubbed the “Hussards.” He was a voice that the previous generation of right-wing writers like Bardèche wanted to nurture and that the next generation of right-wing intellectuals recognized as “the most active, during the pandemonium of the century, of all the writers of the young literary Right.”¹⁰⁷¹ His legitimacy and omnipresence in the intellectual field and his relative lack of any compromising collaborationism during the occupation made him a difficult opponent for the Left to discredit or ignore. Most importantly, in his crusades against the intellectual Left, Laurent would effectively verbalize the resentment that the intellectuals of the Right harbored against the Left and their desire to differentiate their own engagement.

Laurent, born in 1919, was connected to the extreme Right by his uncle Eugene Deloncle.¹⁰⁷² After a brief flirtation with the Jeunesses socialistes as a youth, Laurent would reject all parties of the

¹⁰⁷¹ Pol Vandromme, *Bivouacs d'un hussard; souvenirs* (Paris: La Table ronde, 2002), 164.

¹⁰⁷² Leader of the Cagoulards, a right-wing paramilitary group organized to overthrow the Third Republic in the mid 1930s.

intellectual Left as the puppets of either communism or the republican regime.¹⁰⁷³ At lycée Condorcet, he was introduced to the politics and intellectual philosophy of Maurras and the AF. He wrote of this new alternative to the intellectual Left, “after having almost enclosed myself in a world where man was an abstraction that it concerned modifying in order to render him compatible with Marxism, I was able to breathe!”¹⁰⁷⁴ Here he began his journalistic career writing articles for the AF student paper *L'Étudiant français* and his political activism as a member of the Étudiants de l'AF. It was his participation in the AF that would first expose him to what he considered the hegemony of the intellectual Left in the university system. His professors, he wrote later, informed him that they were “perplexed” by his association with “the extreme Right” since they were convinced that “the word culture” was only associated “with the friends of the proletariat.” They were even able to convince him for a while of the “intellectual superiority of the Left” despite his own intellectual talents and his identification with the Right.¹⁰⁷⁵ But, he wrote, his engagement in the “school of thought” that the AF provided would eventually convince him that the Right held equal intellectual opportunity, albeit a different one. “In the AF,” he elaborated, “one tried to put the accent on all that which separated this movement from the ‘esprit’ of the Left.”¹⁰⁷⁶ This lesson in differentiation and its importance for right-wing intellectual legitimacy was one that Laurent would carry with him in his own postwar engagement.

During the interwar years, Laurent would continue writing for *Étudiant français* and begin collaborating with the non-conformists of *Combat* and *Civilisation*. During these years where the Left and Right began to polarize over fascism and communism, Laurent wrote, “I knew myself to be of the Right because I preferred the civilization of my nation... of that which it had acquired by arms...and because I did not hold as sacred among us the health of the proletariat... and because the sacrifice of

¹⁰⁷³ Jacques Laurent, *Histoire Egoïste* (Paris: La Table ronde, 1976), 111.

¹⁰⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 125.

¹⁰⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 107.

¹⁰⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 127.

the individual to the collective which gave me horror was the basis of the thought of the Left.”¹⁰⁷⁷

During the war and the occupation, Laurent would stay in the southern zone and write briefly for the revues *Idées* and *L’Echo des étudiants* before withdrawing, disillusioned, from collaboration with Vichy. But he emphasized later, this disillusionment would never cause him to question the validity of the Vichy government or to find the Gaullists or the Resistance legitimate authorities.¹⁰⁷⁸

Like his peers on the intellectual Right, Laurent was appalled by the purge and condemned the CNE sponsored seizure of the press and the exclusion of the Right from all intellectual institutions. By 1947, he had joined with the other intellectuals of the Right who had avoided the blacklist in the revue *La Table Ronde*. This revue and its press would be one of the only organs of the intellectual Right for several years after the Liberation. Although the articles were not extremist or even overtly political, Laurent’s participation, like that of the other writers there, was an expression of defiance against the left-wing hegemony over the press and the literary milieu. It was his participation in this journal, Laurent wrote later, that would definitively mark him as “of the Right” in the postwar intellectual world.¹⁰⁷⁹ In particular, Laurent would devote his articles in LTR to his new crusade against Sartre and the left-wing concept of engagement. This crusade would be crowned in 1951 by the publication of *Paul et Jean-Paul*, a polemical comparison of the work of Sartre and Bourget and a clear condemnation of the *roman à thèse* or any literature dictated by political doctrine. Although Laurent would argue during these years against intellectual engagement and politicized literature, he would clarify that it was the communist, Gaullist, and existentialist approach to political engagement that he opposed, not that of the Right.

While Laurent did not oppose intellectual engagement in political affairs in and of itself, he would not engage in political polemic himself until the late 1950s and early 1960s. During the first

¹⁰⁷⁷ Ibid., 135.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Ibid., 208.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Ibid., 260.

half of the 1950s, Laurent occupied himself by writing “bestsellers” like *Caroline chérie* under the pseudonym Cecil Saint Laurent. He would also create two revues that welcomed intellectual contributors from the Right. Both *La Parisienne* (1953) and *Arts* (1954) were literary journals, rather than political ones, and sought to remain, for the most part, outside the political debates of the time. However, like LTR, the very existence of the journals as spaces sympathetic to the values and expression of the intellectual Right made them organs of opposition to the dominance of the Left.

Beginning in the late 1950s, Laurent would end his long political silence in order to speak out in favor of French Algeria and to oppose the Gaullist regime which he considered to be part of the dominant left-wing “bloc.”¹⁰⁸⁰ He traveled to Algeria in 1958 as a political correspondent for *L’Aurore* and would return a convinced advocate of reform rather than independence. Although his engagement revealed an underlying belief in the benefits of European colonialism for Algeria, the real force of his arguments lay in his condemnation of the “intellectual dishonesty” he believed to find in the Left’s arguments for independence and their manipulation of public opinion. By the early 1960s, this accusation would be extended to de Gaulle whom Laurent accused of duplicity in his position on Algeria. His outrage against the regime and the mainstream intellectual support for the FLN would be such that he would join with other young right-wing intellectuals in propagandizing the actions of Sergeant and the OAS.¹⁰⁸¹ During the American involvement in Vietnam, Laurent traveled to South Vietnam twice independently claiming that no journal was willing to sponsor reports that did not comply with the communist party line.¹⁰⁸² Here he claimed to find, as in Algeria, that the left-wing position was not only misguided but intentionally unreceptive to the truth of the conflict because of its blind obedience to doctrine. The works which resulted from his travels, *Mauriac sous de Gaulle*

¹⁰⁸⁰ Because Laurent perceived de Gaulle and the Republican intellectuals like Mauriac to be part of the oppressive left-wing “bloc” and categorized them as “of the Left,” this chapter will also, despite the more common historical opinion that Gaullism was a product of the moderate Right.

¹⁰⁸¹ Bertrand de Saint Vincent, *Jacques Laurent; biographie* (Paris: Julliard, 1995), 283.

¹⁰⁸² Jean-François Bory, *Jacques Laurent* (Paris: Editions Artefact, 1987), 168.

(1964) and *Choses vues au Vietnam* (1968), would solidify his oppositional engagement and would result in his persecution by the government as a “subversive writer.”¹⁰⁸³ During these years, Laurent was taken to court by de Gaulle for libel and pursued by the police. This activity solidified his self-identification as a right-wing oppositional intellectual and intensified his resentment. After this flurry of engagement, and a brief interest in the student revolutionaries of 1968, Laurent would retire from political polemic to focus on his purely literary pursuits until his death in 2000.

Laurent struggled, more than most on the intellectual Right, to analyze and differentiate his own forms of political engagement from that practiced on the Left. His resentment of the dominance that the left-wing concept of engagement held over the public’s understanding intellectual legitimacy drove him in this struggle to define himself as an intellectual apart from the left-wing model. In this way, he helped to construct a new right-wing version of legitimate intellectual engagement, responsibility, and identity for the postwar era.

Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy

As it had been for Bardèche, the unquestioned dominance of the intellectual Left in the post-occupation cultural and political world would be a major source of frustration and resentment for Laurent, despite his claims to be apolitical. Like Bardèche, he saw the “intellectual Left” to be a united bloc of communists, Sartrians, and Gaullists who all worked to exclude and delegitimize the expression of any intellectual values that opposed their own. For Laurent and his right-wing peers, this hegemony did not end with the literal suppression of writers but extended to a more sinister dominance over the concept of intellectual identity. According to Laurent, the Left no longer simply monopolized the university or political regime; it annihilated the Right and prevented them from even gaining an audience for their views. The general public, Laurent complained, had been so “brainwashed” that they could no longer fathom an intellectual who was not of the Left. Even the intellectuals of the Right themselves often refused to be identified as right-wing. Laurent believed,

¹⁰⁸³ Laurent, *Histoire Egoïste*, 286.

however, that it was the responsibility of the intellectuals of the Right to reveal this manipulation and the inequity in intellectual affairs and to reassert their own ideas as viable sources for postwar France.¹⁰⁸⁴

Laurent's personal resentment of what he perceived to be a monopoly over the intellectual world was best revealed by the terms he used to describe the two camps. Intellectuals of the Right were "pariahs," he wrote, excluded from intellectual society.¹⁰⁸⁵ It was in the offices of the right-wing journals that one "met the excluded, the pariahs, the badly whitewashed, and the suspect." It was therefore on the Right that one was truly among the "camp of the reprovéd."¹⁰⁸⁶ Of his own experience of intellectual life, Laurent wrote, "Algeria made me first a rebel, then a pariah. Suddenly I was no longer a star but an outlaw."¹⁰⁸⁷ Intellectuals of the Left were, correspondingly, "intellectual terrorists,"¹⁰⁸⁸ who exercised a "tyranny" over letters, and "religious fanatics charged with a mission of extermination" against the intellectual Right.¹⁰⁸⁹ According to Laurent, this tyrannical monopoly of intellectual life was a product of a united front by the camps of the PCF, Sartre, and de Gaulle. "This was an era," he complained, "where the majority of writers, even former communists like Claude Roy, sang the praises of de Gaulle,"¹⁰⁹⁰ and where "there was formed between the Left and Gaullism a complicity."¹⁰⁹¹ This complicit bloc, Laurent believed, had cooperated since the Liberation, despite

¹⁰⁸⁴ He wrote of his own efforts in this role, "French thought was dominated completely by Marxist-Sartreism, which was not attackable. I had been the first to attack it with *Paul et Jean-Paul*... all the sudden one was able to contest Sartreism, all the sudden, one ceased to submit to it." Christophe Mercier, *Conversation avec Jacques Laurent* (Paris: Julliard, 1995), 99.

¹⁰⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 101.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Christian Millau, *Au Galop des Hussards; dans le tourbillon littéraire des années 50* (Paris: Fallois, 1999), 34.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Saint Vincent, *Jacques Laurent*, 285.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Mercier, *Conversation avec Jacques Laurent*, 114.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Saint Vincent, *Jacques Laurent*, 283.

¹⁰⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 309.

¹⁰⁹¹ Laurent, *Mauriac sous de Gaulle*, 177.

its internal quarrels, to effectively exclude the Right from French intellectual life. All who were of their bloc were “dits à gauche” and intellectually authoritative, all who were opposed were automatically “dits à droite” and intellectual outcasts.

This repression of the Right by a Republican-Left bloc was not a matter of perception, Laurent wrote, but of fact. Right-wing writers were suppressed with ease by the regime for any opinion which was deemed “subversive.”¹⁰⁹² He complained that several of his friends on the Right had been arrested during the Algerian conflict for subversive views and that he himself had been “hounded by the police,” put under surveillance, and brought in for interrogation.¹⁰⁹³ “What had I done?” Laurent demanded resentfully, “Nothing other than to signal in a few articles...my preference for a French Algeria.”¹⁰⁹⁴ He was equally outraged that the “subversive” views in his *Mauriac sous de Gaulle* would earn him a trial and result in the censorship of twenty-five pages.¹⁰⁹⁵ Intellectual freedom, he wrote, was obviously a facade in France since only the views of the intellectual Left were allowed to reach the public. In a more discrete article, he fabricated a conversation with a Spanish intellectual who was enamored of the intellectual liberties of the French. During their conversation, Laurent was interrupted several times by passing friends. One stopped to commiserate that Laurent had been denied a visa to Algeria for his political views, another to report that a fellow writer was being pursued for subversive writing, and another to tell of the seizure by the government of two right-wing weeklies.¹⁰⁹⁶ The supposed liberties of French intellectual life, Laurent was saying, were only granted to the thinkers who supported the values and programs of the Left.

¹⁰⁹² Ibid., 180.

¹⁰⁹³ Mercier, *Conversation avec Jacques Laurent*, 140.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Saint Vincent, *Jacques Laurent*, 285.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Ibid., 318.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Jacques Laurent, *Combat*, March 22 1961.

Yet, Laurent reminded readers, this tangible oppression of the Right was not the most heinous aspect of the Left's intellectual terrorism. The great coup of the intellectual Left had been first to strip the intellectual Right of any cultural authority or moral superiority before resorting to acts of legal suppression. In this way, Laurent wrote, they prevented the Right from earning martyrdom and no one, not even the intellectuals of the Right themselves, dared defend or identify with it. The purge and the omnipotence of the CNE had disappeared in the late 1940s, Laurent wrote, but the great problem for the intellectual Right in the 1960s was that the CNE's "grotesque enterprise" of "intellectual terrorism" had not disappeared with it.¹⁰⁹⁷ "The dictates of the CNE had ceased to control letters," he explained, "but letters continued to suffer the effects of a regimentation... a generation of students, professors, and critics were formed by what Marxism and Resistantism decided were ethical and aesthetic."¹⁰⁹⁸ As late as 1968, Laurent would lament that "there is in the young intellectuals a desire to be fashionable and the fashion is to be of the Left."¹⁰⁹⁹ The Left's conceptualization of culture, the nation, and intellectual values, Laurent claimed, had been engrained in the public imagination after the Liberation. At the same time, the Right's concepts had been extinguished by their inability to gain exposure and their negative association with fascism and defeat.

It was the Left's ability to limit the exposure of intellectual expression on the Right that seemed to most frustrate Laurent. "The work of the writers called 'of the Right' is successful enough," Laurent argued, "but it is ignored. The left has won this battle; that of the *faux-savoir*. In the foreign universities, one learns Camus, Robbe-Grillet, and Duverger by heart but ignores the name of Nimier."¹¹⁰⁰ A survey of literature textbooks in the decades after 1950 proves his accusation true. Only four percent of these texts mentioned right-wing authors like Laurent, and of these, the reigning

¹⁰⁹⁷ Mercier, *Conversation avec Jacques Laurent*, 114.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Laurent, *Histoire Egoïste*, 271.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Jacques Laurent, *Les Choses que j'ai vues au Vietnam m'ont fait douter de l'intelligence occidentale* (Paris: La Table ronde, 1968), 10.

¹¹⁰⁰ Jacques Laurent, *Au Contraire* (Paris: La Table ronde, 1967), 300.

assessment included the negative description “turned toward the past.”¹¹⁰¹ It was to promote exposure of the intellectuals of the Right that Laurent would lend his pen to journals like LTR where the “pariahs” were able to write. It was also with increased exposure in mind that he would create *La Parisienne* and *Arts* which both accepted contributions from previously blacklisted writers. Despite their efforts to reinsert the right-wing into French intellectual life, Laurent sorrowed, the hegemony of the Left was such that the Right was practically eliminated from the intellectual narrative without anyone taking notice.

Laurent admitted that this program to eliminate the Right from the intellectual narrative had not begun with the postwar Left. The question “was intelligence and culture on the Right or on the Left?” had always been in fashion, he wrote. “And there was an intellectual party which went far back, at least to Lucien Herr...and the defeatists of the war of 1914 who had... confiscated the word culture to the profit of the friends of the proletariat.”¹¹⁰² This long running trend had even caused him, as a youth, to “hold as evident that nationalism was only good for boors, that a man of mind... was pacifist and cosmopolitan” and to “believe evident the intellectual superiority of the Left.”¹¹⁰³ But, he continued, during the years of the postwar, this tendency to grant intellectual status to the Left had become a sort of religious faith that none dared question. In the journals of the Left, Laurent explained, one was able to read statements such as “the PC is the party of France, it is above all the party which is always right!” and “All the intellectuals, with rare exception, are Stalinist at this time.” And at the tenth congress of the PCF, the communist party was “joyfully proclaimed the ‘Parti de l’intelligence française’ without making the Sorbonne or the journals collapse with laughter.”¹¹⁰⁴

¹¹⁰¹ Michel Schmitt, “Ecole des Hussards? Les Hussards à l’école,” in *Les Hussards; un generation littéraire*, ed. Marc Dambre (Paris: Presses de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, 2000).

¹¹⁰² Laurent, *Histoire Egoïste*, 107.

¹¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰⁴ Millau, *Au Galop des Hussards*, 41.

But, more importantly, as Laurent would note, even the intellectuals of the Right accepted this dominance as self-evident and perpetuated the misconception of intellectual identity. “The French Right of these past years,” he wrote in frustration, “lets itself be accused of immobility and conservatism without saying a word... the Left, since it exists, is believed to have priority, political and ideological over the Right.”¹¹⁰⁵ Unopposed, the Left was able to make of itself a religion, it became “Lord of Progress and the general will while the Right,” Laurent complained, “intimidated before its enormous religious claims was only able to cry Tyranny!”¹¹⁰⁶ There was no concerted effort by the Right, he was insisting, to counter the claims by the Left to represent all intelligence. And, even worse, the intellectuals of the Right, out of frustration with their subordinate status or shame at being seen as anti-intellectual, compounded this error by refusing to be labeled “of the Right.” “The Right is not stupid or unconscious,” he wrote, “it has shame of the motive which the Left has assigned it... Before the question ‘Why am I on the Right?’ the temptation is great to avoid it with an anecdote or to doubt if one truly is on the Right.”¹¹⁰⁷ But this was unacceptable if the intellectual Right was to be revived and provide some counterpoint to the monopoly over intelligence by the Left. “A new Right searches for itself,” he wrote, “it is not impossible. But here are the conditions for its success: it must strip itself of the prejudices and deliver itself from the shame that the Left has imposed on it.”¹¹⁰⁸ Only in breaking with the image of the anti-intellectual Right created by the Left could they have a new model for their intellectual identity.

As they had at every point during the century when they felt they were excluded from the legitimizing title of “intellectual,” the engaged writers of the postwar Right would begin their struggle to define intellectual identity on their own terms by claiming equal right to the title itself. In a 1954

¹¹⁰⁵ “Bilan et avenir,” *La Parisienne*, October 1956.

¹¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

article in *L'Express* entitled “À la recherche des intellectuels de droite,” the left-wing journal mockingly wrote that, having found no “intellectuals” among the writers of the postwar Right, it would have to resort to the works of pre-war writers like Drieu to complete its survey.¹¹⁰⁹ Laurent would pen an immediate response to this challenge in *La Parisienne*. He chastised the left-wing journal for suggesting that the writers who did not construct their novels to influence the elections were unworthy of their role. But the Right’s clearest attempts to claim the title and role of the intellectual would not come until the Algerian conflict. In a 1960 enquête in *Combat* questioning the role of intellectuals in Algeria and the reaction to the Manifest of the 121, Laurent would give a decided response. While defending the “particular duties” incumbent on “intellectuals” that separated them from average citizens, Laurent would question whether the left-wing signers of the Manifest deserved this distinction. Laurent accused the signers of the anti-colonialist manifest of claiming the right to the title and role of the intellectual without meriting it. “The aim of this manifest,” he concluded, was in great part to “make it believed that the ‘French elite’ had pronounced itself” in favor of an independent Algeria.¹¹¹⁰ In fact, he wrote, the “true” French intellectuals were actually opposed to the Manifest. The Left’s attempt to “imprison the conscience of France and intoxicate public opinion”¹¹¹¹ by claiming to represent all of French intelligence was not only treason to France, it was, Laurent wrote, intellectually “irresponsible.”¹¹¹²

Laurent greatly resented the post-war trend on the Left of declaring that “all that was revolutionary and Marxist was good, all that was reactionary and fascist was bad.”¹¹¹³ This, he charged, was a distortion of the true nature of postwar culture meant to eliminate the Right from

¹¹⁰⁹ Saint Vincent, *Jacques Laurent*, 237.

¹¹¹⁰ “Le probleme de l’insoumission et de l’objection de conscience et les reactions au manifeste des ‘121,’” *Combat*, October 6 1960.

¹¹¹¹ “La bataille des intellectuels; contre-manifeste aux ‘121,’” *Combat*, October 7 1960.

¹¹¹² “Le probleme de l’insoumission.”

¹¹¹³ Jacques Laurent, *Les années cinquante* (Paris: La manufacture, 1989), 9.

French intellectual life. Instead, he and his right-wing peers claimed the right to engage as intellectuals and to construct their own version of intellectual role and responsibility. Laurent would take great care to note the abyss which existed between his own values for the intellectual and those of the Left on issues like intellectual engagement, colonialism, and the historical perspective on occupied France.

Differentiation of Intellectual Values: Intellectual Engagement

Laurent would initially differentiate his own approach to literature and politics from that of the Left by rejecting the idea of engagement and claiming that his own work and revues were apolitical. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, he was “essentially the spokesperson for the principle of disengagement of intellectuals.”¹¹¹⁴ This early position was seen by the intellectual Left and by many historians as irreconcilable with his latter engagement in the Algerian and Vietnam conflicts. It is important to recognize, however, that Laurent did not understand disengagement as the intellectual Left of the pre-war years had. It was not a retreat before the events of the day to an ivory tower abstraction or isolationism. Instead, he explained, it was a “refusal of any particular political dogmatism” in favor of an “authentic freedom of esprit.”¹¹¹⁵ For Laurent and his peers on the young new Right, the refusal of “engagement” was actually an act of opposition, a statement of “disrespect” for the intellectual expectations of the Left.¹¹¹⁶ Since only the Left was allowed to voice its political opinion in the intellectual milieu during these years, opposition to engagement was, in reality, only opposition to the idea of engagement as it was practiced and defined by the Left. In this way, his early espousal of anti-engagement and his later political involvement should be seen not as a discontinuity

¹¹¹⁴ Laurent, *Au Contraire*, 7.

¹¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹¹⁶ Ibid.

but as a continuous effort to oppose and differentiate his own activity from the concept of intellectual identity promoted by the Left.

This intellectual itinerary is evident in Laurent's own explanation of his seemingly disjointed attitude toward engagement. "In the era where I had attacked 'engagement,' he wrote, "it was the vehicle of my adversaries. The strikes that I bought against the doctrine of engagement had been brought against those who employed it to terrorize literature."¹¹⁷ His adversaries on the Left had monopolized the conceptualization and practice of engagement during the early 1950s. To oppose it, in Laurent's mind, was to oppose the doctrines and ideas of the Left which were so closely associated with it. When he later chose to engage his own work on the side of French Algeria, he explained, he would intentionally differentiate his own practice of engagement from that previously conceived by the intellectuals of the Left. "Had I practiced engagement?" he asked himself, "No, at least not in the sense that Sartre had given it."¹¹⁸ He would instead infuse the term with his own intellectual values and his alternative, right-wing concept of intellectual role and responsibility.

Laurent believed this difference was neatly juxtaposed in contrasting issues of LTM and *La Parisienne* that were both devoted to "the Right." "Take Sartre and Beauvoir," he wrote, "writers of the Left at the head of a revue of the Left they have consecrated an issue to the Right. Against the Right they have produced the issue that one would expect of them." But, Laurent continued, "although LTM had mobilized laboriously against the Right all that which one could hope of indoctrinated bad faith... *La Parisienne*, in place of being the counterpart of the LTM issue, is independent!"¹¹⁹ For Laurent and the intellectual Right, therefore, engagement, as it was practiced by the intellectual Left, involved two betrayals. First, left-wing engagement required the enslavement of intelligence to the demands of a doctrine or political catechism like communism, revolutionary

¹¹⁷ Laurent, *Au Contraire*, preface.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Laurent, *Les années cinquante*, 129.

socialism, or Gaullist republicanism. In contrast, the intellectual Right, because it had no strong political doctrine or party organization, touted its own engagement as autonomous. Secondly, left-wing engagement, particularly that of the existentialists, distorted literature by making it polemical. Laurent and his peers prided themselves conversely on separating their art from their political writing.

For Laurent, one of the most essential differences between his own approach to public affairs and those of a left-wing engagé was the willingness of a man of the Left to submit his thought to a political ideology. “If I have reproved the vogue of engagement,” he wrote in 1956, “it is because it implies that the writer is a disciplined servant.”¹¹²⁰ When defining engagement for an article against Sartre as early as 1948, he described it as a practice of the Left which “only allowed the freedom to critique from a single point of view.”¹¹²¹ Intellectuals who adhered to the camps of Sartre, the PCF, and de Gaulle were all writing according to a doctrine which limited their search for truth. These intellectuals, Laurent believed, sacrificed their identity as writers and artists to their identity as political men. “There are not communist writers,” he quipped, but writing communists.”¹¹²² But it was not only the PCF intellectuals whose engagement Laurent believed was an enslavement of intelligence. Laurent rejected Sartre’s engagement of literature in “third way” political programs as “the collapse of the writer in favor of the militant” well before he joined the PCF and would reserve a particular vitriol for Mauriac and the other Gaullist writers.¹¹²³ “The party,” he wrote disdainfully, whether it was the PCF or the RPF, “obtains unlimited obedience, and novelists, critics, philosophers, and savants are expected to serve on all the fronts according to the same line, with the same

¹¹²⁰ Laurent, *Au Contraire*, 196.

¹¹²¹ Jacques Laurent, “Chronique,” *La Table ronde*, December 1948.

¹¹²² Laurent, *Au Contraire*, 49.

¹¹²³ Vandromme, *Bivouacs d’un hussard*, 160.

words.”¹¹²⁴ Their devotion to a particular political program and worldview would always take precedence over their responsibility to literature and disinterested thought.

This, Laurent believed, was a betrayal of independent thought that separated the Left’s engagement from the responsible intellectual engagement of the Right. “I propose,” he would write, “to define the writer of the Right as one who writes without referring to a code...without searching like Sartre and Camus to express the tendencies of groups or collectivities.”¹¹²⁵ This intellectual autonomy, for Laurent, was the hallmark of the right-wing conceptualization of engagement. It linked the intellectual Right’s rejection of engagement as it was conceived by the Left in the early postwar years to their enthusiastic engagement, according to their own concept, during the colonial wars. “If you search a continuity in my enterprise,” he summarized when asked about this seeming rupture, “find it in the refusal to enslave intelligence.”¹¹²⁶ Laurent’s views on engagement were echoed throughout the post-war Right. In the initial presentation of the right-wing revue *La Table ronde*, the contributors pledged, “the writers of this revue consider themselves as ‘engagés,’ but the word engagement would be excessive if it is taken to mean obedience to the instructions that a party dictates.”¹¹²⁷ Because they were not part of a larger party, intellectuals of the Right believed they were able to engage in political affairs and even take sides on issues like Algeria without betraying their responsibility to free, critical thought.

This contrast between right-wing independent engagement and left-wing “enslaved” engagement would also be a factor in Laurent’s accusation that the left-wing engagé conflated literature and polemic.¹¹²⁸ This second charge of a betrayal of intelligence would be leveled most

¹¹²⁴ Laurent, *Histoire Egoïste*, 263.

¹¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 280.

¹¹²⁶ Laurent, *Au Contraire*, preface.

¹¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, annex no. 4.

¹¹²⁸ In an interview in 1955, Laurent would say “For Sartre in *Les Chemins de la Liberté*, the characters who do not have the same opinion as the author are monstrous. This is engagement. An engaged novelist is one

prominently against Sartre in *Paul et Jean Paul*. According to Laurent, Sartre's existentialist approach to literature, in which every piece was valuable for its contribution to the political cause rather than for its artistic merit, caused him to "confound literature and didacticism."¹¹²⁹ "Good literature for Sartre," Laurent warned readers, "is a good prospectus. It concerns selling...several political concepts by which literature becomes a publicity poster."¹¹³⁰ Rather than writing novels and pieces that were informed by political affairs and opinions, Laurent wrote, Sartre and the Left "believed that 'roman' means 'roman à these."¹¹³¹ These works of fiction were manipulations of literature and readers where the conclusions were "arrived at in advance" based on the political leaning of the author. Characters were black and white figures with no nuance where "only the 'friends' of the author are living characters and the adversaries are monsters or caricatures."¹¹³² And most importantly, the novel was not a personal expression for the Left but a "public service" and a "example for the public," therefore it was always to be "ideological, of universal portent, and of immediate interest."¹¹³³ In short, Laurent wrote, the roman à these was a "dishonest enterprise" in which authors wrote political opinions under the cover of fiction in order to manipulate readers without having to defend their positions.¹¹³⁴

Laurent's opposition to the existentialist roman à these, however, was not a rejection of intellectual engagement per se, only of the interpretation that Sartre had given it. For Laurent, writers could involve themselves in political affairs and lend the weight of their names and intellectual

who is only able to paint the world according to his own political convictions. This is entirely contrary to the art of the novel." Laurent, *Les années cinquante*, 152.

¹¹²⁹ Laurent, *Histoire Egoïste*, 257.

¹¹³⁰ Laurent, *Au Contraire*, 42.

¹¹³¹ Jacques Laurent, *Paul et Jean-Paul* (Paris: Grasset, 1951), 31.

¹¹³² Laurent, *Les années cinquante*, 150 and 89.

¹¹³³ Laurent, *Au Contraire*, 218.

¹¹³⁴ Laurent, *Les années cinquante*, 85.

authority to a cause as long as their opinion was expressed in openly political essays. “I did not mix the novel with the pamphlet,” Laurent would later emphasize, “Where I ceased to be a novelist, I became a polemicist- this is a different enterprise. I did not mix the two as I had accused Sartre of doing. He wrote engaged novels, me I engaged myself in my polemical works...and directly attacked my objective.”¹¹³⁵ Even with the novels of Cecil Saint Laurent like *Agites d’Alger*, in which characters supported French Algeria, Laurent claimed his engagement remained different from that of the Left since he had “attempted to understand all the characters” rather than deeming some black and others white.¹¹³⁶

For Laurent, therefore, there were significant differences between the “engagement” conceived by the Left and that practiced on the Right. By opposing the first in the early 1950s and defending the second during Algeria, Laurent and the intellectual Right in fact remained consistent. Both were efforts to differentiate and legitimize their understanding of intellectual responsibility and identity from that of the Left. According to Laurent, while the Left betrayed intelligence by enslaving their thought to a political doctrine or party line, the Right remained critical and independent. And, while the Left ignored its responsibilities to literature by dishonestly masquerading polemic as fiction, the Right preserved the distinction and provided forthright exemplars of both.

Colonialism

Although a minority on the Left favored a French Algeria, the fact remains that, after 1960, support for French Algeria was mainly found on the Right. This division would be even more striking during the conflict in Vietnam. Those intellectuals of the Left who continued to support reform and a colonial presence were ostracized by the dominant intellectuals of the Left and made to join the

¹¹³⁵ Mercier, *Conversation avec Jacques Laurent*, 130.

¹¹³⁶ Engagés of the Left, he concluded, were prevented by their ideological “fanaticism” from sympathetically representing the characters whose political opinions were alien to their own. “By contrast, the writer of the Right could represent a communist in a sympathetic fashion.” Laurent, *Les années cinquante*, 151.

pariahs of the Right.¹¹³⁷ A concerted public opinion campaign was waged by the dominant intellectuals to exclude both these rebellious left-wing thinkers and the entirety of the Right from the status, authority, and title of intellectual. According to the majority on the Left, being an “intellectual” meant actively engaging against oppression, racism, and exploitation and in favor of the Rights of Man, revolutionary struggle, and independence. For the Right, being an “intellectual” meant representing French interests and supporting the spread of French civilization. In particular, Laurent would contrast what he considered to be the responsible engagement by the intellectual Right and the dishonest, manipulative, and irresponsible engagement of the intellectual Left in the public debates over colonialism.

In his memoirs, Laurent reflected on his support for French Algeria and the image of France that his support was founded upon. He had initially, he recalled, been ambiguous on the question of colonialism and the superiority of the European civilization. “France had a great empire like England and other nations of Europe possessed numerous colonies,” he would write, “this state of things seemed normal to me.”¹¹³⁸ He would become more passionate about French Algeria when the conflict there threatened to remove it from his image of the French national identity. When “the bombings turned into war in Algeria, I reacted without ambiguity,” he explained, “I had a certain idea or rather a certain image of France and when I imagined it reduced to a hexagon, I had a crisis of claustrophobia.”¹¹³⁹ For Laurent, Algerians were Frenchmen who were being denied their patrimony by the French Left who thought revolution and independence were panaceas to all political ills. The truly responsible intellectual attitude, he argued, was not to impose a preconceived idea of

¹¹³⁷ As *Uncivil War* has revealed.

¹¹³⁸ Laurent, *Histoire Egoïste*, 288.

¹¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 292.

nationalism and liberty on the people of Algeria but rather to attempt to truly understand the Algerian situation.¹¹⁴⁰

The intellectuals of the Left demanded independence for Algeria, he wrote, without considering the plausibility of this immediate independence or its desirability for the Algerians. According to Laurent, the majority of the Algerians had no interest in independence and considered themselves Frenchmen. In his *Agites d'Alger*, one character asked “if the civilians unleash themselves and if you are sent to reestablish order, would you shoot men who only manifested in order to remain French?”¹¹⁴¹ After his journey to Algeria as a correspondent for *L'Aurore*, Laurent would be solidified in his opinion. There was no Algerian nationalism, he wrote, only local, tribal ones.¹¹⁴² The FLN was a handful of “fanatical rebels”¹¹⁴³ who did not represent the majority. The majority wished to remain French but their will was misrepresented by the propaganda of the intellectual Left who wanted to make Algeria the new model for international decolonization.

The Left not only betrayed its intellectual duty by distorting the desire for independence in Algeria, it also, Laurent claimed, misrepresented the effects of colonization in order to convince the public of its vision. For the Left, colonization was exploitation and racist concept of inferior and superior races, for the intellectuals of the Right, as Laurent tried to explain it was a beneficial tutelage in civilization that carried no concept of inferior races. “The colonial adventure seemed to me,” Laurent wrote, “a happy enterprise for the people who were being developed. I believed in the superiority of civilization but no scorn entered into the regard that I had for exotic races.”¹¹⁴⁴ The “happy enterprise” of colonialism, according to Laurent, provided Algeria with more political structure and economic possibilities than they could accomplish for themselves as an independent

¹¹⁴⁰ Saint Vincent, *Jacques Laurent*, 279.

¹¹⁴¹ Cecil Saint-Laurent, *Les Agites d'Alger* (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1961), 16.

¹¹⁴² Laurent, *Histoire Egoïste*, 293.

¹¹⁴³ “La bataille des intellectuels.”

¹¹⁴⁴ Laurent, *Histoire Egoïste*, 288.

nation. In his *Les Passagers pour Alger*, professor Demeilhan asks an Algerian about his desire for independence. The Algerian's reply is "that the only true independence is from cold, hunger, violence, slavery and that he did not hope for this from an Algerian government."¹¹⁴⁵ France, this novel explained, had "constructed a civilization which, imperfect as it is, was a thousand times superior to that which Algeria would have had had it remained to itself."¹¹⁴⁶ If, he summarized elsewhere, one considered the national fact paramount, then the French presence there was criminal, but "if one considers that civilization is preferable to barbarism, then it is no longer a right which is given to us to stay but rather a duty."¹¹⁴⁷ The push for decolonization by the intellectual Left, he concluded, was not a responsible recognition of Algeria's preparation for independence but rather a betrayal and abandonment, under cover of high principles, of the duty to civilize.

Laurent found the intellectual irresponsibility and dishonesty of the Left to be even more apparent during the Vietnam conflict. Because these intellectuals of the Left engaged according to party line and were willing to manipulate the truth for the good of their political cause, he explained, they distorted the public's perception of the war. The bombs that fall on North Vietnam are bad, he wrote, but none condemns the rockets launched by the Vietcong.¹¹⁴⁸ The intellectuals of the Left chose to portray the conflict as a Manichean struggle between good and evil in which the "bad was represented by the Americans who forced the people of South Vietnam to fight the men of North Vietnam who were their best friends and brothers and the good was represented by the North."¹¹⁴⁹ Because it suited their program of decolonization and socialist revolution, the intellectuals of the Left

¹¹⁴⁵ Cecil Saint-Laurent, *Les Passagers pour Alger* (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1960), 622.

¹¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 618.

¹¹⁴⁷ Saint Vincent, *Jacques Laurent*, 269. In fact, he argued, although "great reforms were necessary and urgent" in order for the colonies to reach the desired levels of civilization, this did not necessitate an immediate independence. In fact the reforms had to be undertaken by the French. It was their responsibility to undo the errors they had set into motion in the colonies and so it was their "duty to stay in Algeria and accomplish these reforms."

¹¹⁴⁸ Laurent, *Les Choses que j'ai vues*, 12.

¹¹⁴⁹ Bory, *Jacques Laurent*, 168.

wanted to make the Vietcong the embodiment of all the good human qualities and the Americans its suppressors. This polarized view of the combatants, Laurent was convinced, was accepted by the intellectuals of the Left as a given, as the starting point in any discussion of Vietnam.

But this vision, Laurent warned, was not based on reality. There is such a strong urge to manifest “for Vietnam,” he wrote, that it seems to these intellectuals “superfluous to know what is actually happening there.”¹¹⁵⁰ The Sartrians, he wrote, “never showed the need to go see a little of what occurred over there, they had given themselves as aim, all their life, to close their eyes to reality in order to make their ideology triumph.”¹¹⁵¹ Laurent would accuse Sartre in particular of proclaiming “the Truth does not interest us” and of dampening the West’s critical judgment with the ideologically biased reports of the Russell Tribunal.¹¹⁵² In contrast, Laurent wrote, as a responsible intellectual of the Right, he had made the effort to understand the reality of the conflict by traveling to Vietnam twice and observing the conflict. The reality, he wrote, was that the war was the result of the North’s desire for the economic resources of the South and of the communists’ desire to extend their ideology beyond the USSR and China. It was, he concluded, a war of conquest in which the South was “content” to have American aid in its defense. Journalists who traveled to Vietnam saw the truth of what was happening there, he complained, “but the truth is not appreciated in France [so] they were obligated to give the news which corresponded to the pre-established judgments.”¹¹⁵³ Clearly, Laurent believed, the intellectuals of the Right more legitimately fulfilled the role of public educator and guide. But, because the Left dominated the intellectual milieu and declared its position morally

¹¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹¹⁵¹ Ibid., 171.

¹¹⁵² Laurent, *Les Choses que j’ai vues*, 87.

¹¹⁵³ Bory, *Jacques Laurent*, 169.

superior, his pamphlet on the truths of Vietnam, which “went against all the received ideas of the time,” would gain little exposure.¹¹⁵⁴

For Laurent and the intellectuals of the Right, being a true, responsible, and legitimate intellectual required thinking critically about the issue of colonization and considering the realities of the particular situations. Even more importantly, it meant honestly relaying these realities to the public without ideological bias. In practice, it meant accepting that there was little desire for national independence among the majority of Algerians and that such autonomy might be disastrous for their progress. In Vietnam, it meant recognizing the economic and ideological reasons for the war and accepting that the South preferred American protection.

Memories of Vichy and Occupation

Laurent had a strong personal “detestation of de Gaulle,”¹¹⁵⁵ and would critique the President directly in works like *Mauriac sous de Gaulle* and the subsequent *Offenses au Chef de l’Etat*. But, it was his resentment of the intellectual Left’s portrayal of de Gaulle and Vichy that inspired all his engaged works.¹¹⁵⁶ The intellectuals of the Left were constructing the dominant historical narrative of the occupation that demonized Petain, Vichy, and the collaborators while portraying de Gaulle as the great liberator of France. Laurent, however, declared this narrative to be a distortion of historical reality and a manipulation of the truth. The intellectual Left was seeking to advance its own ideological agenda by “whitewashing” de Gaulle’s past and luring the public into an uncritical admiration of the regime. This, Laurent accused, was a betrayal of the responsibility and integrity of the intellectual and made the Left unfit to serve as the representatives of French intelligence. It was

¹¹⁵⁴ Mercier, *Conversation avec Jacques Laurent*, 142.

¹¹⁵⁵ Saint Vincent, *Jacques Laurent*, 285.

¹¹⁵⁶ It is important to remember that Mauriac and the other Gaullist writers will be referred to here as intellectuals “of the Left” since this is the way that Laurent perceived them despite many left-wing assertions that de Gaulle and his supporters were “of the Right.”

the intellectuals of the Right who had the necessary perspective to construct the true memories of France.

The accurate memory of the occupation, according to Laurent, was of Vichy as the first line of Resistance. Laurent's portrayal of Vichy and Petain as the shield which lessened the impact of occupation and initiated clandestine liberation efforts was a common theme in the work of the intellectual Right. Its message had a dual purpose: to repair the public's image of Vichy as the "shield" and to undermine de Gaulle's claims to have been the "first Resistor of France."¹¹⁵⁷ The intellectuals of the Left, he wrote, "desperately tried to consolidate this fable" of de Gaulle as the core of the Resistance. But this manipulation could not long mask the truth, Laurent wrote, that "the first Resistors were the French who did not flee their nation in danger, they did not live in London, they were not Gaullists. The first resistor was Petain and the resistance was Vichy."¹¹⁵⁸

In an interview years later, Laurent would recall the necessity of posing this alternative vision of Vichy and the Resistance to the dominant, left-wing narrative. Here he claimed that his interpretation which "called into question all the habits of thought and all the education of a generation" was based on "incontestable testimony" rather than "fabricated on an immense lie" as the vision of the Left was.¹¹⁵⁹ In short, in his construction of this right-wing memory of Vichy, Laurent would portray himself as the more responsible historian and intellectual who marshaled real evidence rather than ideology. He paraded quotes from Eisenhower saying it was Boisson, Vichy's representative, not de Gaulle who had saved French Africa and he highlighted the work of Jeantet's Amicale de France which he claimed had aided the Liberation while remaining devoted to Petain.¹¹⁶⁰ His most concerted effort to portray the right-wing memory of Vichy as the true one, however, was in

¹¹⁵⁷ Jacques Laurent, *Mauriac sous de Gaulle* (Paris: La Table ronde, 1964), 187.

¹¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁵⁹ Mercier, *Conversation avec Jacques Laurent*, 135.

¹¹⁶⁰ Jacques Laurent and Gabriel Jeantet, *Année 40; Londres, de Gaulle, Vichy* (Paris: La Table ronde, 1965), 230, and 374.

his *Année 40* where he collected and commented on documents that he believed “put to light the double game of Petain and the insignificant role of de Gaulle in the opposition to the Germans.”¹¹⁶¹ De Gaulle’s only accomplishments, he wrote, had been justifying the English attack at Mers-el-Kébir and the raid on Dakar, and endangering French relations with England while being the friend of the communists.¹¹⁶² In truth, Laurent argued, had he not endangered and betrayed France in these ways, he would be completely insignificant in history. “De Gaulle,” Laurent explained, “has changed nothing in the history of France. With or without de Gaulle, France would have been liberated on the same day.” This alternative vision was important to promote, he concluded, because “it is the defense of the truth” which the intellectuals of the Left had betrayed.¹¹⁶³

“Our future is in our intelligence,” Laurent lamented, but “the unsuitability of the regime that we submit to is that it has as its principle strategy the corruption of the information and the minds which have to analyze it.”¹¹⁶⁴ Gaullism, he claimed, exercised a certain power over writers and savants which led them to “mold the facts, denature them, erase and disfigure them” to the benefit of the regime.¹¹⁶⁵ This great betrayal of intellectual responsibility and integrity was no where more apparent than in the work of Mauriac. In his *Mauriac sous de Gaulle*, Laurent accused Mauriac of having more reverence for the personage of de Gaulle in his latest biography than he had held “when treating the Son of God” in a previous work.¹¹⁶⁶ Mauriac, Laurent wrote, “had renounced himself completely” and lost his ability to critique when faced with the embodiment of the political ideology

¹¹⁶¹ Saint Vincent, *Jacques Laurent*, 320.

¹¹⁶² Laurent and Jeantet, *Année 40*, 389.

¹¹⁶³ Mercier, *Conversation avec Jacques Laurent*, 135.

¹¹⁶⁴ Laurent, *Au Contraire*, 276.

¹¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶⁶ Laurent, *Mauriac sous de Gaulle*, 6.

he had adopted.¹¹⁶⁷ He accused Mauriac of deleting passages of de Gaulle's speeches in order to "paint a rosy picture" and of deliberately ignoring evidence that contradicted his image of de Gaulle's regime. Mauriac was entitled to his opinion, Laurent wrote, but "he ought to submit them without reprieve to the proof of facts and the study of documents, which he has not done."¹¹⁶⁸ Instead, Laurent continued, he had denatured the truth because he was less "preoccupied with his duty, with the truth, than with making his apologetic work."¹¹⁶⁹ Mauriac is, Laurent concluded, like all those who defend and support him with their writing, one of "de Gaulle's servants." When Mauriac "wrote flattery and lies" while claiming to write a true history, Laurent concluded, he endangered the minds of the French and subsequently relinquished his right to the role of intellectual.¹¹⁷⁰

The collective memory of Vichy and the Liberation, as Henry Rousso has shown, continued to be a source of division and debate well after 1945. It is no surprise, therefore, that the construction of this national narrative revealed deep divisions within the intellectual milieu and led to a struggle to produce the authoritative version. For the Gaullist Left, responsible intellectuals could never engage in support of collaborationists, Vichy, or Petain. Being an intellectual meant unreservedly denouncing these elements of France's past and engaging in unquestioning support of their antithesis: de Gaulle and the Republic. For Laurent and the Right, being a responsible intellectual meant providing a voice of opposition to de Gaulle and the Republic, questioning the revealed truths that came out of the Resistance, and resisting the influences on art of political power.

¹¹⁶⁷ Ibid. While Mauriac showed de Gaulle as a principled David against Goliath during the occupation, Laurent assured readers his decision to resist was self-interested. When Mauriac waxed poetic about de Gaulle's ability to steer the events of the war, Laurent insisted that de Gaulle was merely "annoying" to the world leaders and more interested in defeating his rivals in France than in defeating the Axis powers. And, though Mauriac portrayed de Gaulle as the providential man who always appeared when France was in crisis, Laurent suggested that perhaps he allowed the disasters to occur "in order to exploit them." Ibid, 70.

¹¹⁶⁸ Jacques Laurent, *Offenses au Chef de l'Etat; audiences des 8 et 9 octobre 1965* (Paris: La Table ronde, 1965), 29.

¹¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 33.

¹¹⁷⁰ Laurent, *Mauriac sous de Gaulle*, 144 and 216.

Laurent and the Right-Wing Intellectual Model

Jacques Laurent was a vocal opponent of the hegemony of the post-war Left and devoted much of his work to redefining the identity of the intellectual according to right-wing standards. His engagement, like that of his right-wing predecessors, was driven by a resentment of the Left's "intellectual terrorism" and a desire to legitimize his own political values as those of the intellectual elite. He approached engagement in the debates over Algeria and Vietnam, therefore, with the mentality of the oppressed minority. This approach to engagement meant, according to Laurent, it was necessary first to justify his participation as an intellectual and validate the ideas of the Right before entering into a particular debate. In particular, he would seek to distance his concept of the intellectual's values and role from that modeled by the intellectual Left. According to Laurent's model of intellectual identity, the responsible post-war intellectual was one who engaged independently, without accepting the dogma of a party line, and who separated this engaged work from pure literature rather than using art to camouflage politics. The intellectual of the Right envisioned France as an empire that extended beyond the hexagon and believed he had a responsibility to educate, civilize, and govern this empire. The abstract ideas of revolution and independence behind the Left's decolonization were, to the intellectual of the Right, incompatible with the real circumstances of the colonies. And, the intellectual, as defined by the Right, had a certain memory of the war and Liberation that neither vilified Vichy nor glorified de Gaulle. This perspective, Laurent believed, meant the Right discovered historical evidence that the Left obscured and formed opinions without coercion from the regime. As a result, the intellectual of the Right was responsible to historical truth while the Left betrayed it for political gain. Laurent's alternative image of the responsibility and values of the intellectual excluded him from the intellectual communities and networks that were once again dominated by the Left. To give his engagement collective force, Laurent had to find new avenues for his self-expression and new communities in which to form a right-wing intellectual society.

CHAPTER 20

THE INTELLECTUAL WORLD OF THE POSTWAR RIGHT: COMMUNITIES, NETWORKS, AND THE INTELLECTUAL EXPERIENCE

During the occupation, the intellectual Right had felt itself an ideological minority despite its actual dominance over the positions of power in the intellectual field. After the Liberation, the perception of isolation and alienation became a tangible reality as the Right was purged from these places of cultural power and found that even their interwar spaces and outlets were closed to them. In order to regain even a small foothold in French cultural life, they formed communities, spaces, and socio-professional networks that could serve as support structures for their return to active engagement. And, because the communities, organizations, and organs which had been their support structure during the interwar and occupation years were outlawed or seized for the Left, these communities had to be completely recreated. Even after the purge proper had ended, the ideas, values, writers, and organizations labeled “of the Right” were immediately suspect and shunned by the intellectual community as fascist or racist well into the 1960s. Before the Liberation, the Right had felt marginalized in intellectual society and had constructed alternative communities in protest. During the post-war years, from the purge to the colonial debates, they were literally prevented from practicing and identifying as intellectuals and they created their segregated communities in order to survive.

The intellectual Right would not have the party discipline that the PCF gave to the communist Left or even the ideological coherence that Sartre and de Gaulle gave to their camps.¹¹⁷¹ But this did not prevent them from forming small communities of like-minded thinkers whose shared opposition

¹¹⁷¹ Two of the opposition parties, the UNIR and the Centre national des indépendants et paysans were able to get deputies elected but held little sway over intellectual attitudes on the Right.

to the dominant politics of the day provided them with a common mission. In the early years of the purge, several right-wing groups like de Jonquière's Ligue des intellectuels indépendents, to which Bardèche belonged, would unite right-wing intellectuals in a protest of the purge and a defense of Vichy and the collaborators.¹¹⁷² There was also the Comité national français, of which Bardèche was a co-founder, which was an "umbrella organization" for numerous smaller efforts on the extreme and neo-fascist Right. Although the French Right was not able to hold the mass meetings and congresses that it had during the interwar and occupation years, French intellectuals including Bardèche would attend the 1951 Malmö congress in Sweden. Here basic tenets of right-wing thought and political positions were agreed upon including the necessity of a strong Germany and anti-communism.¹¹⁷³ During these early decades of the postwar there were few organized alternatives for intellectuals on the Right, but, by the late 1960s and early 1970s, Bardèche and other right-wing intellectuals would be drawn to the efforts of new groups that were beginning to redefine the political and intellectual extreme Right like Ordre Nouveau, the Front national, and GRECE.¹¹⁷⁴

The basic building blocks of these collective communities was the network of socio-professional and personal relationships that formed in the adversity of the purge and continued to be fostered by the polarized environment of the following decades. Bardèche would recall that in the years of the purge, he and his family were stripped of their property and homes and were forced to rely on "the professional solidarity which was established so rapidly among the delinquents" in order to find new lodging.¹¹⁷⁵ He explained that there was a surprising readiness among the oppressed to share their resources and influence to help their fellow outcasts. While he was excluded from the

¹¹⁷² Barnes, "Antisemitic Europe," 59.

¹¹⁷³ Bardèche, *Souvenirs*, 240. The organization of Euro-Right in 1978 would also provide some unifying tenets for a new extreme Right which was to be separate from the traditional right-wing values of social conservatism. The French contribution to this international effort, the Parti des forces nouvelles (PFN), was led by a *Defense de l'Occident* contributor Pascal Gauchon and received the active support of Bardèche.

¹¹⁷⁴ Barnes, "Antisemitic Europe," 70-2.

¹¹⁷⁵ Bardèche, *Souvenirs*, 203.

company of the republican and left-wing university professors he had enjoyed before the war, he recalled that he was “touched by the young men unknown to us who came to offer their friendship to replace those that had been lost to us.”¹¹⁷⁶ Bardèche in particular would also find “a whole new circle of international friends” through the Association internationale des Amis de Robert Brasillach created in 1968. Here he formed personal and professional networks through years of correspondence with intellectuals sympathetic to neofascism and collaborationism throughout Europe.¹¹⁷⁷ The one community of intellectuals to which Bardèche did not create a strong link was the Hussards. This failure to create a network with these younger intellectuals, he wrote, was one of his “great regrets” since he knew and liked their work and felt he “shared many ideas” with them.¹¹⁷⁸

The group known as the Hussards would develop its own network of relationships in the larger intellectual Right community. The term Hussard was actually introduced by the left-wing writer Bernard Frank in an effort, Laurent claimed, to tar a group of right-wing writers with the label “fascist.” In reality, Laurent would write, there was no firm organization, simply a group of “men who were, during this time, united against the sort of intellectual consensus which came from the opposing side.”¹¹⁷⁹ The category was intended to include the young oppositional writers Roger Nimier, Antoine Blondin, Michel Deon, and Laurent. These writers shared a common worldview, contributed to the same journals, wrote in the same style, and formed both personal and professional ties. Most importantly, however, the hussards would share the same disrespect for the established political values and concept of engagement. They formed, “the contestatory pole opposite the group from LTM” and as such “invented their own way of life” on the Right.¹¹⁸⁰ The hussards were seen by both the members themselves and the intellectual Left as a separate “community” of intellectuals on

¹¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 205.

¹¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 251.

¹¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 253.

¹¹⁷⁹ Bory, *Jacques Laurent*, 157.

¹¹⁸⁰ *Les Hussards; un generation littéraire*, ed. Marc Dambre (Paris: Presses de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, 2000), 8.

the Right.¹¹⁸¹ As one young admirer of the group wrote, it was a “resplendent family” of right-wing intellectuals.¹¹⁸² Here, he continued, a young right-wing writer, excluded and marginalized in other intellectual communities, “walked into a group of young men seated around tables laughing” and felt that he had been immediately made “a member of the family.”¹¹⁸³

These “families” of writers and socio-professional networks of ostracized intellectuals were quick to coalesce around independent revues and journals that could amplify their individual efforts to engage. It was in the shared practice of oppositional journalism and the sense of sociability created by the close knit revue team that much of the collective identity of the intellectual Right was formed. Revues provided a supportive space where the writers of the right-wing opposition could express their political and cultural values without fear of repression. These right-wing revues and journals also created a social space where writers could congregate and form both professional and personal ties outside the networks of the Left. The writers of LTR, for example, would form what Laurent later referred to as, “a *Table ronde* clan, an ensemble, a literary life” separate from the intellectual society of the Left.¹¹⁸⁴ The revue was also a space for mentoring the next generation of right-wing intellectuals and introducing them to opposition journalism. Before Mauriac became a devotee of de Gaulle and alienated himself from the more extreme writers, a group of young LTR contributors gathered “nearly every Monday to dine at five or six around Mauriac in one of the little restaurants. All the personnel [of LTR] came...they allocated a little room to us which became our office.”¹¹⁸⁵ The revue team was therefore a key contributor to the formation of a distinctly right-wing collective

¹¹⁸¹ Jean Maire Rouart speaking of the hussards says “it was not necessarily a school, but it was a community.” Schmitt, “Ecole des Hussards?” 105.

¹¹⁸² Millau, *Au Galop des Hussards*, 16.

¹¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 23.

¹¹⁸⁴ Bory, *Jacques Laurent*, 159.

¹¹⁸⁵ Laurent, *Histoire Egoïste*, 260. The Decameron would also become a veritable “annex of the LTR” where one could find Laurent and Roland Laudenbach, director of the LTR publishing house, smoking and drinking together at the end of the day.

intellectual identity. It surrounded authors with other like-minded right-wing thinkers, giving them a sense of validation, and connected them to others in the right-wing community. And, most importantly, right-wing revues were truly right-wing spaces, isolated from and opposed to the ideas and authors of the Left.

Despite the blacklist and the limits placed on right-wing expression, the Right would create several journalistic outlets for its remaining writers that were clearly spaces of the intellectual Right where no left-wing or republican writer would think of contributing. The Action Francaise students would continue the royalist presence by creating *Documents nationaux* and *Aspects de la France*, but royalism attracted few of the postwar intellectuals. The “first periodical of the postwar Opposition Nationale” was *Perspectives*, a small bulletin created by Rene Malliavin which would change its name to *Questions actuelles* before the end of 1944, then to *Ecrits de Paris* in 1947. The team of *Ecrits*, including such notable figures of the Right as Malliavin, Tattinger, Jacques Isorni, Jouvenel, and Paul Morand would also start the extremist hebdo *Rivarol* by 1951 which served as a rallying point for the most radical of the right-wing engagés.¹¹⁸⁶ Although Laurent found this journal too extremist, even during the height of his engagement, his fellow hussard Blondin would be one of its most prolific contributors. Rene Binet, who radicalized the CNF to the point that even Bardèche broke off to create a separate Committee, would also direct a right-wing journal, *La Sentinelle*.¹¹⁸⁷

One of the most significant revue teams to provide a haven for right-wing writers and offer a mentoring space for young writers of the Right was that of Bardèche’s *Defense de l’Occident*. Contributors to *Defense de l’Occident* included Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Paul Serant, and Jean-Marie Le Pen among others of the extreme Right.¹¹⁸⁸ The journal promoted the ideas of neo-fascism, the new racism, and negationism, republished the works of collaborationists, opposed Sartre,

¹¹⁸⁶ Nicholas Hewitt, *Literature and the Right in Post-war France: the story of the Hussards* (Washington DC: Berg, 1996), 46.

¹¹⁸⁷ Bardèche, *Souvenirs*, 210.

¹¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 262.

communism, and the Gaullist Republics, and advocated French Algeria.¹¹⁸⁹ It would be a “training ground” for the young intellectuals who would form the next generation of the extreme-Right. Despite *Defense*’s popularity with the more extremist, neo-fascist Right, the most influential and respected intellectual journal of the immediate postwar years was the more moderate *La Table ronde*.

The monthly *La Table ronde* was created in 1948 by Mauriac and Maulnier specifically to counter the power of Sartre’s *Les Temps modernes* and to provide an outlet for the right-wing writers like Giono, Montherlant, Celine, and Jouhandeau who had been silenced by the Liberation press. Initially, the journal included contributions from both sides of the political spectrum and had a committee of moderate anti-communists: Mauriac, Paulhan, Camus, Malunier, Aron, and Malraux. The journal presented itself as preserving the “responsibility of the métier” by promoting unity in the postwar and advocating freedom of expression for all, not just the Resistance Left.¹¹⁹⁰ By 1954, these moderates had been edged out by their more extremist, more right-wing contributors like Bardèche and the hussards. Mauriac would write of this unexpected mutiny, “never did a hen hatch so many non-conformist extreme right-wing ducks.”¹¹⁹¹ In the latter years of the post-war, under the more extremist influence, the journal supported French Algeria and opposed Sartre and communism.

After growing disinterested in the direction of LTR themselves, the “hussards,” who “had a horror of the sanctuary of revealed truths” which was the mainstream media, formed a vast, interconnected network of journals that were outside the intellectual world of the Left and provided what Laurent would call “a breath of fresh air.”¹¹⁹² Hussard signatures were found in the right-wing journals *Combat*, *Armée Nation*, *Opera*, *Esprit public*, and, most prominently, in the journals created by Laurent: *La Parisienne*, *Arts*, *Au Contraire*, and *I68*. The covers of each of these journals even cross-promoted one another by saying that readers could find more from the same authors in the other

¹¹⁸⁹ Bardèche, “Autocritique.”

¹¹⁹⁰ Laurent, “Chronique,” *La Table ronde*, January 1948.

¹¹⁹¹ Drake, *Intellectuals and Politics*, 87.

¹¹⁹² Bory, *Jacques Laurent*, 157.

journals. While *Arts* and LP were both originally advertised as apolitical literary revues, LP would often break this mold in order to comment on the affairs of the day. In particular, one issue was devoted to reviving the work of Drieu la Rochelle, while another was dedicated to “La Droite” in a clear counterattack on the LTM issue on the Right. *Esprit public* was much more actively engaged and gathered the hussards along with other right-wing intellectuals for a crusade in favor of French Algeria and opposition to de Gaulle.¹¹⁹³ Finally, the short lived *168* and *Au Contraire* were both intended to continue the crusade against de Gaulle that Laurent, Laudénbach, and others of the hussard community believed *Esprit public* had lost sight of in the years after the Algerian conflict.

Although revues provided some of the most prolific of the segregated communities for the intellectual Right, they were not the only intellectual spaces that would be divided down left-right lines. Publishing houses, particularly in the years after the Liberation, followed the dictates of the CNE and refused to publish blacklisted authors. In order to survive as intellectuals, the Right had to create its own presses in order to publish its work. The largest publishing house for the Right would be the firm of *La Table ronde* which was one of the few firms to publish right-wing authors immediately after the Liberation. Bardèche created the firm Sept Couleurs in 1949 in order to publish the complete works of Robert Brasillach. Although Bardèche would originally publish his own work with Calmann-Levy, the other left-wing writers in this house, Bardèche recalled, “were indignant about my presence among them,” and eventually convinced Calmann to drop him from the catalogue.¹¹⁹⁴ Sept Couleurs would become an important fixture on the Right after this, publishing the majority of Bardèche’s own works in addition to those of other right-wing authors like Pierre Fontaine. The Hussards would also find their own favorite publisher in Charles Fremanger.¹¹⁹⁵

¹¹⁹³ Laurent, *Au Contraire*.

¹¹⁹⁴ Bardèche, *Souvenirs*, 233.

¹¹⁹⁵ Vandromme, *Bivouacs d’un hussard*, 193.

The postwar would also see the rise of the segregation of intellectual cafes reminiscent of the turn of the century divisions. Sartre, Beauvoir, and their camp made a habit of writing and meeting friends in the cafes of Deux Magots and Flore during the postwar decades and created something of an intellectual fortress in these cafes for the extreme Left. Laurent recalled the extent to which the intellectuals of the Right were ostracized from even these seemingly neutral spaces. “Claude Roy had said that it was necessary for me not to return to Café de Flore, because this was a sacred place!” Laurent wrote. In fact, he continued, the entirety of Saint-Germain des Pres seemed overtaken by the intellectuals of the Left and “when I walked in the Saint-Germain des Pres, I went for a walk among enemies—which amused me for I loved to provoke them.”¹¹⁹⁶ In opposition to these left-wing intellectual strongholds, the Right would gather at Brasserie Lipp where Laurent was often found writing and at the Bar at Pont Royal where the LTR team would meet after hours and where the hussards and supporters of Captain Sergent’s OAS propaganda would congregate.¹¹⁹⁷ The cafes of Paris could, therefore, literally be divided into two camps during these years based on the political leanings of their most devoted intellectual clientele.¹¹⁹⁸

A final space where intellectuals, though engaging in the same sort of practice, found themselves in clearly divided, politically polarized communities was that of the petition. As they had in all previous periods of intellectual debate, manifests and petitions provided a forum to amplify individual engagement that united its signers in a community of shared values and sense of intellectual responsibility. Although the signers might never have any true social contact, they were brought together through the petition into an imagined community that extended beyond the bounds of physical interaction. The Left would begin its manifests as early as the 1944 Manifeste des écrivains français calling for the purge, but the Right, for obvious reasons, had little success mounting an effective petition campaign until the crisis in Algeria. The greatest of these petition wars would be

¹¹⁹⁶ Mercier, *Conversation avec Jacques Laurent*, 108.

¹¹⁹⁷ Saint Vincent, *Jacques Laurent*, 283.

¹¹⁹⁸ Lottman, *The Left Bank*.

that between the left-wing Manifest of the 121 and the right-wing Manifeste des intellectuels français. The latter was signed by over three hundred right-wing, self-proclaimed “intellectuals” including all four hussards, Gaxotte, Massis, and Maulnier among others. The right-wing manifest stated that the signers had gathered to protest the Left’s attempt to “make it believed that the great part of our intellectual elites condemn the action of France in Algeria.”¹¹⁹⁹ They denied the Left the right to “pose as representatives of French intelligence” if they were going to advocate desertion in the military and support the revolutionary efforts of “fanatics.”¹²⁰⁰ The Right would produce very few additional petitions after this effort during Algeria. One of the few was organized by Suzanne Labin to show support for South Vietnam’s rejection of communism in 1972 and included, for the most part, the same names as the petition for Algeria.¹²⁰¹ Despite the limited number of petitions on the Right, the imagined community that it created during the Algerian conflict would be influential in building a sense of collective intellectual identity during the postwar.

The intellectuals of the Right, because they were so adamantly excluded from the intellectual networks and spaces controlled by the Resistance and the Left, were forced to create their own communities. These right-wing communities provided them with supportive social networks and spaces, an array of journals and revues that were sympathetic to their intellectual values, and forums where their individual engagement could be part of a collective force. The segregation of intellectuals into two mutually exclusive societies created a real sense of collective identity within the camps. Participating in one of these networks or communities on the Right became an important part of being a right-wing intellectual. But a set of shared intellectual values and a network of intellectual communities were not the only factors in creating a distinctive intellectual identity on the Right.

¹¹⁹⁹ Sirinelli, *Intellectuels et passions française*, 215.

¹²⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹²⁰¹ Ibid., 243.

The Post-War Right-Wing Intellectual Experience

The relationships of daily intellectual life on the Left and Right, particularly those with the places of power in the government, university, and publishing world, would be distinct enough that the very experience of being an intellectual became different between the two camps. The influence on government affairs of the former Resistance, CNE, and PCF in the immediate postwar years made the relationship of the State with the former collaborationists one of hostility. During the years of the purge, intellectuals like Brasillach, Drieu, and Chateaubriant were sentenced by the regime to death for intellectual treason while others like Maurras were given prison terms and suffered a state mandated national degradation. Although this more severe relationship between the state and the extreme Right would be ameliorated after the purge, the memory of the occupation years and the purge would remain strong for both parties and the mutual hostility did not disappear for decades.¹²⁰² The inequity between the “pariahs” of the Right and the “tyrants” of the State that Laurent described as late as 1960 was, therefore, not a matter of perception; it was a verifiable repression justified by the Right’s association with wartime collaboration. In particular, the intellectual Left’s exclusive relationship with the republican regime allowed them to deny the Right access to legitimizing cultural institutions and practices through State sanctioned exclusion. Maurras, Hermant, and Bonnard not only lost their seats in the Academy after the Liberation, but new nominees like Paul Morand were continually denied a seat due to de Gaulle’s insistence that only Resisters be accorded this honor.¹²⁰³ Right-wing intellectuals would even be excluded from intellectual honors like a State burial. “It is easy to see who the state honors and who it neglects,” Laurent wrote resentfully, “Caudel yes, Montherlant no, Mauriac yes, Cocteau no. Good writers are rewarded with commendation, decoration, and national honors. Bad writers are forbidden from publishing, from giving lectures and

¹²⁰² Although many on the extreme Left considered de Gaulle’s government to be “of the Right,” the extreme Right felt just as alienated by the Fourth and Fifth Republics as it had previously.

¹²⁰³ Saint Vincent, *Jacques Laurent*, 249. After several nominations, Morand would eventually secure his place in the Academy in 1968. Laurent would not join him there until 1987.

from holding public posts.” But, Laurent, emphasized, “how does the state decide good and bad? Nothing is more dangerous than personal politics mixing with the judgment of lettres by lettres.”¹²⁰⁴ It was instances like these, Laurent insisted, that revealed the exclusion of the Right and the dominance of the Left was not simply a perceived inequity but rather an organized, institutionalized hegemony sanctioned, authorized, and even carried out by the State.

This same antagonism between the Right and post-war power continued in the university system. The Right was quickly ejected from the professorships and especially the chairs that it had filled in the universities and the ENS during the occupation. University instruction would once again become a left-wing dominated intellectual practice leaving the intellectuals of the Right to search alternative trajectories and mentoring opportunities. Bardèche in particular blamed the loss of his profession on the dominance of the Left. When he left his position at the Sorbonne, he claimed he had been driven out by liberal professors who had learned he was related to Brasillach. When later he lost his position at the University of Lille, he wrote that he felt alienated from the entire university system and the former friends there and turned instead to the community of pariahs in the right-wing publishing world. Although the Right had not shown a strong tendency toward the university for several decades, the complete alienation of the Right from the university during the post-war would turn them even more decidedly toward professions in journalism and literature.

However, even publishing and literary milieu, which had once been the stronghold of the intellectual Right, was closed to the Right in the initial years of the postwar. This would lead many on the intellectual Right, in contrast with the intellectual Left for whom all literature was engaged literature, to advertise their work as apolitical. Jouhandeau, Giono, and other respected litterateurs of the prewar Right were denied access to journals well into the 1950s except for organs like *LTR*, *Opera*, *Carrefour* and *La Parisienne* that claimed to be apolitical in order to provide a space for right-

¹²⁰⁴ Laurent, *L'Esprit des Lettres*.

wing writers.¹²⁰⁵ Laurent and the Hussards would studiously affect an indifference to political affairs in order to write and publish despite their right-wing affiliations. In particular, they turned to seemingly apolitical novels in order to write without censorship. The honors and awards that the intellectual community had always seen as a mark of legitimacy and prestige would also, according to the intellectuals on the Right, be denied them for political reasons. Laurent claimed that his novel had been passed over for a literary prize in favor of a piece by Camus which had not yet even been published, a consideration which had only been made for political reasons. With each slight, the Right became increasingly bitter about intellectual honors and began to deem them marks of subservience to the regime. Although Laurent would happily accept both the Goncourt prize and entry into the Academy later, the majority of the intellectual Right learned to disconnect intellectual honors and literary recognition from its concept of intellectual identity.

The most basic practices of intellectual life, from having work published to producing a play would also be made increasingly difficult for the Right well into the 1950s. Publishing firms were hesitant to challenge the CNE or flaunt the majority opinion by publishing authors labeled fascist or extremist. And, the new right-wing firms that agreed to publish these authors faced an uphill battle to compete with the established houses. Published works and productions were also labeled as subversive in order to limit their sales or, as Laurent's *Mauriac sous de Gaulle*, censored to remove the oppositional thought. Bardèche found that as late as 1957, when a play by Brasillach was to be put on in Paris, the intellectuals of the Resistance were able to successfully prevent its production.¹²⁰⁶ The postwar government was also slow to authorize the journals and revues of the Right while immediately sanctioning those of the Resistance. Once right-wing journals received authorization, they still were retarded in their development for years by the lack of materiel. While left-wing journalists and journals seized and converted the offices, printing materials, presses, and even

¹²⁰⁵ Millau, *Au Galop des Hussards*, 112.

¹²⁰⁶ Sirinelli, *Intellectuels et passions française*, 161.

established papers of the pre-war and occupation Right, the journalists of the Right were forced to build their journals and publication process from the ground up. In previous decades, the Right had been able to boast of large circulations for its journals like *Action Française*, *Gringoire*, and *Gerbe*. In the postwar years, the Right would accept smaller circulations with pride, claiming the small numbers were an indication, not of limited public interest, but of their status as a persecuted, opposition press.

Even the practice of petition signing would show marked discrepancies between the Left and Right. The Left, which had produced only limited and unsigned manifests during the occupation would return triumphantly to petition signing in the postwar while the Right, defeated and persecuted in turn, remained silent. The intellectuals of the Right would admittedly reemerge in full force during the conflict in Algeria, but the fact remained that “in the war of petitions and the mobilization of clerics, the Left and extreme-Left imposed themselves and were even in a hegemonic situation” well into the 1970s.¹²⁰⁷ Intellectuals of the Right were extremely hesitant to sign their names to documents expressing right-wing values or manifests including the names of more extremist thinkers that could be deemed “fascist” by the government and the Left. As an alternative to the practice of signing petitions, the intellectuals of the extreme Right, particularly the student youth, would turn to an old practice of the opposition: street violence. The student activists of Occident would create a new force on the intellectual Right by organizing protest marches, breaking up left-wing manifestations like the 1967 *Etats généraux de l’université de Paris pour la paix au Vietnam*, and generating a general unease among the Left with its violence.¹²⁰⁸ During the postwar period, therefore, limitation of the practices essential to the daily life of the intellectual from petitioning to publishing, censorship of intellectual expression, and the refusal of legitimizing honors all combined to create a very different experience

¹²⁰⁷ Ibid., 246.

¹²⁰⁸ The protesting students of Occident would disband in 1968 but soon evolve into the student wing of *Ordre Nouveau* and by 1973 contribute to the formation of the new Right wing power, the *Front National*. Ian Barnes, *Patterns of Prejudice*, 2 2000, 69.

of intellectual life on the Right and Left. As old practices were denied them, the Right developed new perspectives on what sort of experience truly made one “an intellectual.”

The Right-Wing Intellectual Model During the Post-War Decades

In the decades leading to World War II, the intellectuals of the Right had perceived themselves to be marginalized and discredited as intellectuals by the Republic and the extreme Left. They had therefore adopted the language and mentality of the persecuted, minority, opposition. During the postwar, however, this perception became a verifiable reality. The Right did not just perceive itself at a disadvantage in the public’s understanding of intellectual identity, it literally could not pose itself before the public as an alternative. By the 1950s, it had become inconceivable to pair the adjectives “fascist,” “collaborationist,” or “right-wing” with the term intellectual. This mindset would carry over into the post-war histories of all twentieth-century intellectual life. What Bardèche termed a “dispossession” of the intellectuals of the Right and Laurent called “intellectual terrorism” had effectively divorced the extreme Right from the practice of intellectual life and the identification as intellectuals as defined by the Left. More than any period before it, the postwar was a time of left-wing dominance over the intellectual field and of the right-wing struggle for intellectual legitimacy. As such, it was also a time in which the intellectuals of the Right made an effort to redefine for themselves and the public their concept of true intellectual responsibility, role, and identity. As before, their understanding of their identity as intellectuals was closely linked to their own fundamentally different intellectual values and political visions from political Realism, negationism, and neo-fascism to colonialism and a new definition of “engagement.” The alternative concept of the intellectual and of intellectual responsibility that men like Laurent and Bardèche created around these values would be strengthened and

validated for them by the community of like-minded intellectuals with which they surrounded themselves. From these communities of dispossessed, ostracized intellectuals of the extreme Right would come not only a new collective identity for the intellectual of the Right, but also a new set of practices and experiences drawn from the Right's alienation from the State, university, and publishing world. Throughout the post-war decades, therefore, the intellectual of the Right was alienated from public affairs and identification as the intellectual elite. After 1968, however, this isolated and alienated Right would evolve under the leadership of GRECE and the Nouvelle Droite in an effort to reinsert itself into public affairs and intellectual leadership.

SECTION VII

CONCLUSION: ALAIN DE BENOIST AND THE NEW MODEL OF INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY

This study has proposed a model of the intellectual of the Right based on the testimony and behavior of ten intellectuals from 1898-1968. However, if the model is to continue to be a useful tool for historians of French intellectual life, it must be able to speak to contemporary intellectuals of the Right as well. It seems necessary, therefore, to consider in closing whether the pattern of characteristics laid out here as the distinctive model of right-wing intellectual engagement can accommodate the intellectuals “dits à droite” today.

Alain de Benoist has been the recognized master theoretician of the Nouvelle Droite and its self-proclaimed laboratory of ideas, GRECE, since the latter’s creation in the late 1960s.¹²⁰⁹ As a student, he was involved in both the anti-Semitic journals of Henry Coston and the monarchist efforts of the Action Française and he would later write for the neo-fascist *Defense de l’Occident* of Bardèche. However, Benoist’s approach to political and cultural affairs would quickly evolve beyond these standard positions of the “old Right” into a new right-wing ideology. While continuing to advocate for nationalism, rootedness, and traditionalism, and to engage against communism and republican democracy, Benoist would outline a new intellectual program for the Nouvelle Droite that was proclaimed to be separate from monarchism, anti-Semitism, and fascism. The vehicle for this new intellectual program of the Right would be the intellectual “community” GRECE, created by Benoist and thirty nine other right-wing thinkers in 1968. In particular, Benoist has sought to use GRECE and its journals to create a “Gramscism of the Right” by which the intellectual Right could counter the metapolitical hegemony of the intellectual Left. As the public face of this new right-wing

¹²⁰⁹ Groupement de recherche et d’études pour la civilisation européenne.

metapolitics, Benoist has been the key figure in the promotion and legitimization of the intellectual Right. But, it is his ability to insert the ideas, thinkers, and journalism of the New Right into the mainstream media that has most antagonized the Left against him and made him and GRECE the crucible for debates over intellectual identity and the right-wing in the global age.

Before considering whether Benoist fits the pattern and characteristics of the prototypical intellectual of the Right as identified in this study, it is necessary first to be certain that he is both “of the Right” and a self-identified intellectual. It is important to recognize that Benoist’s thought has undergone a transformation since the 1960s and to acknowledge that he himself is today often reluctant to identify as a member of the political Right. This hesitation is multifaceted. Most often, Benoist argues that he cannot be categorized as Right or Left because his work is cultural rather than political in nature. However, this is a disingenuous defense since both he and GRECE acknowledge that engagement in cultural affairs has political transformation as its final goal. More significantly, Benoist is hesitant to claim right-wing identity today since he was distanced from many on the post-war extreme Right when he determined that communism was a dying ideology and that the intellectual Right should instead focus its opposition against liberalism and Americanism. He rejects many of the foundational tenets of the “old Right,” including racism, the idea of a Chef, social hierarchy, and negationism. Finally, Benoist has expressed admiration for many components of new Left thought like the concept of “difference” and the assault on capitalism, while continuing to distinguish his own ideas on the concepts. In this endeavor, he claims to be undertaking the project of a Third Way where the splinters of the now useless categories of Right and Left can find new unity.¹²¹⁰ However, despite this seeming break with the traditional Right, Benoist acknowledges the

¹²¹⁰ Despite his rhetoric on the meaninglessness of a Right-Left divide in modern politics, it is instructive to note that in his own discussions of politics as late as 2003, these are the categories he uses for his own analysis.

continuities that he maintains with the Right: the ideas of a federal Europe, opposition to universalism, and rejection of egalitarianism.¹²¹¹

It is these continuities and his absolute rejection of the worldview of the intellectual Left that place Benoist, in the final analysis, on the Right. As he admits, “The ND declares itself on the Right because it rejects the ‘ideas’ of the Left, it is on the Right by the very fact that it designates the intellectual Left as its principal adversary.” In perhaps his most concise statement of his identification with the intellectual Right, Benoist would conclude, when asked why he called himself “of the Right,” “essentially because the Left has a conception of the world that I do not share, of which I refuse the essential postulates.”¹²¹² The very project of combining the concepts of the New Left with those of the New Right into a Third Way is even described by GRECE and Benoist as a project for the intellectual Right.¹²¹³ And, significantly, he explains that he defines being of the Right as having a consistent attitude in favor of diversity and against the homogenization that results from egalitarianism. This definition could be equally applied to being a member of GRECE or a follower of Benoist. So, although they are often treated as ideological traitors by segments of the intellectual Right like the Club d’Horloge, Benoist and GRECE self-identify as members of the intellectual Right.

And, perhaps even more importantly, they are identified as right-wing by the intellectual Left who excluded them from intellectual debate and public influence because of it. This is nowhere more apparent than in the “Appeal for Vigilance” in *Le Monde* in July 1993 where self-identified intellectuals of the Left warned readers not to be seduced by GRECE. Although they seemed to have respect for left-wing positions and to reject many tenets of the old Right, it warned, GRECE and Benoist were simply employing a “strategy of legitimization” to cover their extreme Right wing

¹²¹¹ Alain de Benoist, *Le grain de sable; jalons pour un fin de siècle* (Paris: La Labyrinthe, 1994), 14.

¹²¹² Pierre-André Taguieff, *Sur la Nouvelle Droite; jalons d’une analyse critique* (Paris: Descartes & Cie, 1994), 214.

¹²¹³ Alain de Benoist, *Vu de droite; anthologie critique des idées contemporaines* (Paris: Copernic, 1979), 24.

nature.¹²¹⁴ Any attempt to engage in a dialogue with members of GRECE, it continued, would be viewed as a betrayal of French intellectual and cultural standards. As such, the signers of the Appeal agreed not to participate in any public dialogue, tv programs, or journals connected with GRECE, Benoist, and the far Right. Even liberal intellectuals like Pierre-André Taguieff who sought to understand and debate with Benoist were tarred as traitors to intellectual life.¹²¹⁵ Benoist's recent protests against participation in the wars in Iraq, a position shared by the intellectual Left, have even been viewed as intellectually suspect and attacked for promoting the right position; that of the Left, for the wrong reasons; those of the Right. In this way, the intellectuals of the Left continue their century-long refusal to recognize a possible convergence between right-wing identity and intellectual identity.

However, Benoist and the members of GRECE not only identify as right-wing, they also identify themselves as "intellectuels." In an unmistakable claim to the title and role, Benoist has stated, "I am an intellectual."¹²¹⁶ When replying to the "attack" on him in the *Le Monde* Appeal, Benoist would proudly write, "I know that I am the only intellectual today who is treated in this way."¹²¹⁷ In the same way, GRECE is presented as a cultural and intellectual community and defined as a "laboratory of ideas" and a "society of thought."¹²¹⁸ In claiming equal right to the role of the public intellectual while continuing to identify with right-wing values and programs, Benoist and the

¹²¹⁴ "The Appeal to Vigilance by Forty Intellectuals," *Telos* (Spring 1993): 136. Originally published in *Le Monde* July 13 1993.

¹²¹⁵ Pierre-André Taguieff, "Intellectuals and 'the confusion of ideas' a serious error in analysis," *Telos* (Spring 1993): 137-144. Originally published in *Le Monde* July 27 1993. When *Telos* published articles by Benoist, many of its editors gave statement of protest indicating that they did not find Benoist's work honest or worthy of inclusion in a journal of ideas.

¹²¹⁶ "Entretien avec Alain de Benoist sur la droite et la gauche" Les Amis d'Alain de Benoist <http://www.alaindebenoist.com>. Also quoted in Anne-Marie Duranton-Crabol, *Visages de la Nouvelle Droite; Le GRECE et son histoire* (Paris: Presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1988), 57.

¹²¹⁷ Alain de Benoist, "Quarrels of the Ancien Regime," *Telos* (Spring 1993): 144.

¹²¹⁸ Pierre Vial, *Pour un renaissance culturelle; le GRECE prend la parole* (Paris: Copernic, 1979), 10. Also found in Alain de Benoist and Charles Champetier, *The French New Right in the Year 2000*, <http://www.alphalink.com.au/~radnat/debenoist/alain9.html>

members of GRECE are continuing a century-long struggle by the Right for recognition and legitimacy in an intellectual world dominated by the Left.

Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment and the Struggle for Legitimacy

Since 1898, the model of the intellectual of the Right has been marked by a certain resentment and hostility toward what it perceives to be a bloc of Republican and left-wing intellectuals. They feel that this “Left” has dominated and defined not only the intellectual space, but the very conceptualization of intellectual values, responsibility, and behavior. And, because these dominant values and programs are quite different from those advocated by the Right, right-wing thinkers have been excluded from the prevailing concepts of the intellectual and forced to struggle for legitimacy. Benoist’s work shows that he too has been formed by this resentment of the Left and perception of his own repression and exclusion. When the New Right emerged in 1968, he wrote, “no one claimed openly to be part of the Right” since there was “a Left hegemony, quite evident within university circles and, generally speaking among intellectuals.”¹²¹⁹ Today, he continued, this blatant hegemony of the Left has been replaced by a “quiet hegemony of former leftist intellectuals now more or less tied to the dominant political system... who extended their influence beyond universities to journals, publishing houses, and the media in general.”¹²²⁰ The intellectual Right’s resentment of this exclusion and marginalization has led them to see their own engagement as a struggle for public legitimacy and a redefinition of intellectual mores according to right-wing values. This struggle to “reconstitute” the ideas, discourse, and concepts surrounding intellectual life is one that Benoist believes “has not yet been achieved” thirty years later. It remains a central objective for Benoist and GRECE and “gives life” to their social and political engagement.¹²²¹ Resentment and struggle for

¹²¹⁹ Frank Adler, “On the French Right- New and Old: an interview with Alain de Benoist” January 11 2003 <http://www.alaindebenoist.com>.

¹²²⁰ Ibid.

¹²²¹ Ibid.

legitimacy, two defining characteristics of right-wing intellectual engagement from the Dreyfus Affair to the postwar, therefore, continue to be a powerful influence on the nature of the intellectuals of the Nouvelle Droite and of Benoist in particular.

Benoist has been quite clear about the left-wing hegemony he believes to exist in the intellectual and cultural field. “For at least thirty years in France,” he writes, “that which one calls by convention the Left and the extreme Left have never attained political power. By contrast, they have enjoyed a quasi-monopoly in the cultural domain. This is not contested by anybody.”¹²²² This hegemony of the Left over the cultural domain has allowed it to exclude any competing influences and to eliminate alternatives in intellectual values, political programs, and even moral judgment. “This intelligentsia has had the actual direction of the general ideas and implicit values, and above all of the social myths of which the spirit of the time was nourished,” he writes, “it incarnated culture, knowledge, and the moral conscience.”¹²²³ In short, Benoist writes, the intellectual Left has succeeded in making of its members the organic intellectuals envisioned by Gramsci. The metapolitical dominance of these intellectuals in the cultural field allowed them to steer leftward, unperceived by the public, the very fundamental values and belief structures of France.¹²²⁴

This, Benoist explained, was the subversive purpose of the Left’s cultural monopoly. The political progress of the Left was owed to “the general climate it had foreseen to create metapolitically and by relation to which its political discourse sounds more and more true.”¹²²⁵ If a student did not have very strong reasons to reject this dominant ideological undertow, Benoist continued, it would be nearly impossible for him not to be “mentally affiliated” with the liberal and Marxist egalitarianisms. This was because, he warned, the ideology of the Left “no longer forms a

¹²²² Alain de Benoist, *Les idées à l'endroit* (Paris: Editions Libres-Hallier, 1979), 14.

¹²²³ *Ibid.*, 17.

¹²²⁴ Benoist, *Vu de droite*, 406.

¹²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 19.

doctrine among others, it forms the very framework on which all constituted thought is inscribed.”¹²²⁶

So engrained was the mentality of the Left, it required an act of conscious will on the part of the intellectual to even think outside the prescribed thought of the Left. “One speaks of repression,” he explains, but it is not a gross political censure. Rather it is in the psychoanalytical sense; the perfect murder. The idea that one rejects spontaneously, which is unthought because it is effectively unthinkable by relation to the dominant ideology of the Left, the idea that one rejects without even having the sense of rejecting it.”¹²²⁷ This was the new totalitarianism of thought for Benoist: an autocensure so engrained and automatic that it was not even recognized.

And for those who, like Benoist and the intellectuals of GRECE, had broken out of the mental molds created by the Left and recognized the hegemony, the struggle was not yet over. The metapolitical hegemony of the Left depended not only on saturation of the intellectual superstructure but also on its ability to prevent any oppositional thought from reaching the public. But this was not the crude repression of before that made martyrs of the suppressed Right. Today, Benoist wrote, the objective of the Left is to eliminate the intellectual Right by denying its existence. The goal, he explained, is “above all not to give ‘them’ any publicity, to do things in a way that one does not know that ‘they’ exist. To travesty cultural discourse as political ambitions, to maintain at any price the image of a group of thinkers who have no thought, who are not able to have it, who ought not have it... exclusions, anathema, the final aim is to prevent debate.”¹²²⁸ By refusing to debate the intellectuals of the Right as peers or equals, Benoist continued, or even consider their ideas as viable opponents to their own, the left-wing intellectual bloc was attempting to deny it publicity and legitimacy. “Today,” he concluded, “one decrees that there are ideas which have no value as ideas, opinions which are not opinions but crimes—in the eyes of the dominant ideology. As always, it

¹²²⁶ Benoist, *Le grain de sable*, 40.

¹²²⁷ Benoist, *Les idées à l'endroit*, 290.

¹²²⁸ Benoist, *Le grain de sable*, 61.

admits all opinions...except those which are not opinions.”¹²²⁹ To deny the status of thought or intellectual identity to the intellectuals of the Right, Benoist argued, was the ultimate form of “intellectual terrorism.”¹²³⁰

This intellectual terrorism that was the new censorship would take many forms depending on the power of the idea to be refuted. The first form, Benoist writes, is the strategy of silence “where it pretends that intelligence is ‘hemiplegique.’”¹²³¹ Any representative of the Right already has a “hard life” and must “crawl” in order to have his work published since the publishing houses and revues are “normally all on the Left.”¹²³² But if the representative manages to get published, the strategy is “not to write a single line on his work.” If the work becomes popular despite this campaign of silence, the “next level of attack is to attribute certain lines out of context” or to lie about the contents.¹²³³ Here the “new police of intellectual moeurs, the culture cops” at left-wing papers like *Nouvel Observateur* effectively stifle right-wing ideas by misrepresenting them.¹²³⁴ All works by right-wing authors that question or oppose certain tenets of the Left are, in this stage, accused of intellectual parochialism. “If one does not support such or such work of the avant garde,” Benoist explains, “it is because one does not understand it... there are those who understand and then there are the others. The first are intelligent and culturally developed and the second are only able to be half-wits.”¹²³⁵ If all else fails, Benoist claims, the intellectual Left turns to “the major excommunication: the accusation of fascism.”¹²³⁶ This trump allows the intellectual Left to “demonize the ideas of the New Right. These

¹²²⁹ Ibid., 63.

¹²³⁰ Ibid., 58.

¹²³¹ Benoist, *Vu de droite*, 409.

¹²³² Ibid., 408.

¹²³³ Benoist, *Les idées à l'endroit*, 24.

¹²³⁴ Ibid., 290.

¹²³⁵ Benoist, *Vu de droite*, 409.

¹²³⁶ Ibid.

ideas are rejected from the start as emanating from a subject, individual (Benoist) or collective (GRECE) which already has been submitted to a *reductio ad hitlerum* by insinuation.”¹²³⁷ In one of the more blatant attempts at this form of censure, *Le Canard enchaîné* even invented a letter from Dr. Mengele that was intended to connect him to Benoist.¹²³⁸ This array of strategies forms a veritable wall between the intellectual Right and the public, ensuring the Left’s ideological dominance by keeping the Right’s “intellectuals forever excluded from the legitimate space of debate.”¹²³⁹

There is one final strategy, most often employed by modern historians, that Benoist does not identify but that continues the pattern of repression by denying him and GRECE intellectual legitimacy. This strategy is to claim that the intellectual Right’s efforts to cross political divides and utilize concepts like “difference” in its cultural discourse are facades. The accusation is that any seemingly legitimate discourse actually has “clandestine meaning” for right-wing readers who know how to decode it.¹²⁴⁰ Likewise, any effort by GRECE to debate intellectuals of the Left or to include left-wing contributors in its revues is simply a way to trick the public into seeing its journals, and therefore its right-wing contributors, as intellectually legitimate. In keeping with this strategy, one historian asks how it was that the ideas of the ND ever gained an audience and surmises that perhaps they were so well cloaked in left-wing discourse that the critical Left did not at first recognize them.¹²⁴¹ The clear insinuation here is that the intellectual Right can only find intellectual legitimacy by masquerading in the ideas of the Left and associating with the intellectual Left community.

The perception, by Benoist and GRECE, that the Left exercises hegemony over the role and identity of the intellectual has dramatically marked their own approach to engagement and intellectual

¹²³⁷ Pierre-André Taguieff, “Discussion or Inquisition? The Case of Alain de Benoist,” *Telos* (Spring 1993): 42.

¹²³⁸ Duranton-Crabol, *Visages de la Nouvelle Droite*, 196.

¹²³⁹ Taguieff, “Discussion or Inquisition?” 45.

¹²⁴⁰ Duranton-Crabol, *Visages de la Nouvelle Droite*, 66.

¹²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 15.

life. As the above samples of Benoist's work show, resentment and opposition to the Left's metapolitical dominance has clearly become an organizing principle of the New Right's thought and colors almost every article and interview. The fight against the ever-growing hegemony of the intellectual Left is the very foundation for the existence of GRECE and the engagement of the intellectuals of the ND.¹²⁴² The Right continues to identify itself as the unfairly suppressed minority whose engagement must be active and combative in order to reverse the indoctrination of the public. The perceived hegemony of the Left has therefore sparked yet another defining characteristic of right-wing intellectual identity: a distinctive mentality of engagement that has legitimacy as its ulterior motive. For Benoist and GRECE, the struggle for intellectual legitimacy demands the creation of a "counter-metapolitics," a "Gramscism of the Right."¹²⁴³

As it did for the intellectual of the Right over the century, resentment of the hegemonic Left and perception of exclusion have permeated the very role and responsibility that Benoist has outlined for the intellectual of the Right. The "metapolitical strategy" that involves "denouncing the intellectual terrorism of the Left and presenting a new Gramscism of the Right" would be a new responsibility for the Right, since the intellectual Right had, according to Benoist, previously "abandoned the intellectual-cultural field to the Marxist Left."¹²⁴⁴ As one interview of Benoist summarized of the strategy: "the historical significance of the New Right consists in having established a right-wing intellectual hegemony after a long tradition of left-wing liberal hegemony in France."¹²⁴⁵ According to Benoist, the ND would succeed in this endeavor because it alone

¹²⁴² The "reason for being of GRECE resides," one article says, "in being an "enterprise of metapolitical action.. an action to respond to the cultural power (of the Left) on its own terrain with a counter-cultural power." Benoist, *Le grain de sable*, 41. As one pamphlet published in 2000 puts it, "the manifest of GRECE. A fatal virus for the dominant ideology!" BNF Tolbiac 2000.

¹²⁴³ Taguieff, *Sur la Nouvelle Droite*, 17.

¹²⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁴⁵ "Three interviews with Alain de Benoist," *Telos* (Spring 1993): 183.

understood the importance of “beating the adversary on his own ground.”¹²⁴⁶ Rather than attempting to force a shift in hegemony and legitimacy by influencing politics directly, as right-wing intellectuals had for decades, GRECE would infiltrate the cultural field, infusing its values into the literature, cinema, fashion, and mores of society. This “metapolitical reconquest” would allow the ideas and visions of the intellectual Right to slowly penetrate the public mentality until the engrained republican and communist worldviews were driven out and replaced with the right-wing alternative.¹²⁴⁷ Only then, with a new set of intellectual and cultural values and views in the general public, would the political and social climate shift to the Right.

Although the proposed “Gramscism of the Right” was supposedly a new strategy of legitimization for the intellectual Right, the desire to differentiate right-wing values remained an essential component of this struggle. Engagés of the Left and Right were not all a common group of “intellectuals” who simply had different political opinions, they were distinctive, differentiated, “types” of intellectuals whose very identity was a product of their different values and worldviews. The set of intellectual values that right-wing intellectuals identified over the century as those distinctive to their community and foreign to the Left continue to be themes of the new intellectual of the ND. These include a rejection of universalism and egalitarianism, a claim to be the sole representatives of intellectual realism, and an anti-Jacobin approach to nationalism. But, it was not enough to separate the ND from the ideas and programs of the Left, Benoist believed; it was necessary to “provide a real alternative, a complete ideological and theological corpus that would provide a real substitute.”¹²⁴⁸ The stated goal of GRECE was therefore to “construct a new culture, a new view of the world and a new ideological project.”¹²⁴⁹ Its promise to provide an “alternative vision

¹²⁴⁶ Vial, *Pour un renaissance culturelle*, 35.

¹²⁴⁷ GRECE documents BNF Tolbiac 2000 piece no. 4.

¹²⁴⁸ Pierre-André Taguieff, “From Race to Culture: the New Right’s View of European Identity,” *Telos* (Spring 1993): 108.

¹²⁴⁹ Taguieff, *Sur la Nouvelle Droite*, 17.

of the world,¹²⁵⁰ was based on Benoist's belief that "there are different ways of seeing the world and of being in the world, ways of the Right and ways of the Left, which encompass the pure knowledges, intuitive beliefs, emotions, implicit values, daily choices, artistic sentiments, etc."¹²⁵¹ The intellectuals of GRECE were quite certain that their "specific world view" separated their cultural and intellectual pursuits from those of the intellectuals of the Left. This ideological separation between Right and Left infused every aspect of the intellectual's life and made not only his values and programs different, but his very identity as a cultural being. It created, as one writer described Benoist, "a new type of French intellectual, fundamentally different from the dogmatic prototype identified with Sartre."¹²⁵²

Rejection of Universalism and Egalitarianism in Favor of a Right to Difference

As early as Barrès and the intellectual Right of 1898, a rejection of universal abstraction and democratic egalitarianism or leveling have been hallmarks of the intellectuals of the Right. Benoist and the intellectuals of the New Right continue in this tradition while adding a new variation on the theme: the right to difference and the rejection of global homogenization. As Benoist explains, "I define the Right as that attitude which wants to take into consideration the diversity of the world. Consequently the relative inequalities which necessarily follow from this diversity are good. The homogenization extolled in the discourse of egalitarian ideology is evil."¹²⁵³ According to Benoist, the intellectual Left, by contrast, opposes this diversity in favor of an universalism and egalitarianism based on man as an abstraction.

Anti-egalitarianism has been the most dominant and the most consistent of the themes of ND thought and has been one of the intellectual trademarks of Benoist's work from the 1960s to today.

¹²⁵⁰ GRECE documents BNF Tolbiac 2000 piece no. 1.

¹²⁵¹ Benoist, *Vu de droite*, 20.

¹²⁵² Frank Adler, "Left Vigilance in France," *Telos* (Spring 1993): 29.

¹²⁵³ Taguieff, "From Race to Culture," 108.

For the ND intellectuals, egalitarianism is the root evil that created both liberalism and Marxism. “The enemy,” according to GRECE, “is all the doctrines, all the praxis which represent and incarnate a form of egalitarianism.”¹²⁵⁴ It is for this reason, that the ND has broken with the Club d’Horloge and others of the liberal Right who focus their attacks on communism while abiding liberalism, Americanism, and democratic republicanism. But, for Benoist and GRECE, the problem is not the political form but the intellectual mindset. Whether it takes the form of communism or liberalism, the illusion of a natural equality of men and the subsequent demand for equal rights comes from the same decadence: the desire to no longer have leaders or a recognized elite. When all want to lead and none to follow, Benoist warns, civilizations are on the verge of collapse.¹²⁵⁵ Instead of this false equality, the intellectuals of the ND propose instead to measure man “by the responsibilities that each assumes related to his concrete aptitude.”¹²⁵⁶ A hierarchy of rights, in other words, corresponds to the hierarchy of social responsibilities.

Benoist’s rejection of the Left’s egalitarianism and leveling of society is connected directly to his opposition to the very principle of universal abstractions. If there is no abstract humanity, there can be no universal or natural rights but only rights of particular men in relation to their particular cultural communities. By their very nature, these particularities prevent the idea of a homogenized equality of men. In a statement reminiscent of his predecessors on the extreme Right over the century, Benoist writes, “men exist but man in himself, abstract man, universal man, this man does not exist. He is only a construction of the mind utilized to oppose the peoples a pure operatory concept destined to be the negative interpellation of the Real.”¹²⁵⁷ Reality, Benoist believes, has shown that man is a particular creation whose nature is determined by his particular environment and biology. It is this

¹²⁵⁴ Vial, *Pour un renaissance culturelle*, 31.

¹²⁵⁵ Alain de Benoist, *La ligne de mire; discours aux citoyens européens*, vol. 1 1972-1987 (Paris: Le Labyrinthe, 1995), 20.

¹²⁵⁶ Benoist, *Vu de droite*, 16.

¹²⁵⁷ Alain de Benoist, *Tiers monde, meme combat* (Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 1986), 212.

belief of the intellectual Right that he believes distinguishes the intellectual worldview of the Right from that of the Left. He clarifies this distinction as that between the left-wing universalist and the right-wing nominalist.

For the universalist, he explains, all reality is founded on an intellectual order. There are general principles and absolute truths that pre-exist the individual. For the nominalist, on the other hand, “there exists nothing but the individual, the particular.”¹²⁵⁸ According to Benoist, the intellectual of the Left does not act in the name of himself, his nation, or any other finite form but in the name of the universal order. In believing that he has understood the “intellectual order of reality,” he believes it is his responsibility as an intellectual to “convert all those who have not yet had the revelation of these universals.” Those who oppose him in this mission are not, therefore, expressing a personal difference, but committing a falsehood against an absolute, revealed truth. The intellectual of the Right, however, knows that though universalism seems a superior theory since it claims to reveal the common essence among men, “it is superior only in theory, in reality it has never existed.”¹²⁵⁹ They deny themselves, therefore, the easy authority that the Left has accumulated as representatives of universal truth and instead take the more arduous path of speaking the French truth. For the nominalist intellectual of the Right, diversity is the fundamental fact of the real world. There is no common essence, no absolute truth, no universal abstraction, no general humanity, no natural rights, and no unmitigated equality. Individuals are valued for their differences rather than for their ability to incarnate “an abstract concept of the universal individual.”¹²⁶⁰

According to Benoist, respect for these differences and recognition of cultural and racial particularities is a defining characteristic of the Nouvelle Droite intellectual which separates him from the intellectual Left. While the intellectual Left prefers to seek what equalizes men, the intellectual

¹²⁵⁸ Armin Mohler, “Le tournant nominaliste; un essai de clarification,” *Nouvelle Ecole* (June 1979): 13.

¹²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 14.

¹²⁶⁰ Benoist, *Les idées à l'endroit*, 87.

Right prefers to focus on what distinguishes them. At its most basic level these differences are found in race, ethnies, and nationality. While the intellectual Left warns the public that this discourse of difference is a cloaked form of racism and xenophobia, Benoist defends the “right to difference” as the true “anti-racism.” A celebration and exploration of what makes each people different, he claims, is not racism. For example, he continues, the Black Power movement in the US recognized the loss of their distinctive culture in the American melting pot and sought to re-root themselves in their African heritage rather than suppressing their differences through integration. The real racist, according to Benoist, is the intellectual Left which seeks to eradicate these racial and national families in order to create a single, homogenized mass that has the qualities it deems desirable. Only the universalist, who has a “global paradigm outside mankind,” can believe that difference implies imperfection or inferiority.¹²⁶¹ From now on, he contends, the struggles and wars of the world will not be between men on different sides of a border but between opposed world views and ways of being, a differentialist way and a universalist way, an anti-egalitarian way and an egalitarian way, a way which aspires to an organic society where diversity is always recognized or a mechanical society where homogeneity reigns.¹²⁶²

It is this homogenization that Benoist believes is the greatest threat to the intellectual integrity of France and world cultures. Americanization of pop culture, the “McWorld” phenomenon of multinational corporations, and the globalization achieved by technology are all to blame for this progressive disappearance of cultural diversity and the leveling and reduction of cultures to a common, mediocre denominator. But it is the intellectual desire for this homogeneity behind the corporations and technology that most distresses the ND. The fundamental question, he writes, “is whether it is better to have a planet where different human types and varied cultures exist, or where a

¹²⁶¹ Benoist and Champetier, “The French New Right.”

¹²⁶² Benoist, *Vu de droite*, 25.

single culture and in the end a single type of people exists.”¹²⁶³ It is a question, Benoist believes, that the intellectual Left and the intellectual ND answer differently. As recently as its 2000 Manifest, the ND and Benoist have declared the right to difference and to traditional cultural identities one of the major positions which differentiates it from the rest of the intellectual movements in France, particularly those of the Left.¹²⁶⁴

This “right to difference” campaign in the name of respect for foreign cultures and a “differentialist anti-racism” provides a seemingly new theme to the anti-egalitarianism and anti-universalism that has been a continuing intellectual value on the extreme Right. In practice, the ND presents itself as the defender of African and Asian ethnic groups and regional cultures against the “Western imperialism” advocated by the universalist Left. However, this claim is made in conjunction the ND position on immigration which it finds to create an “imbalance” that is not desirable for the host or the immigrant population. Assimilation and the abolition of “the distinction between nationals and foreigners” undermines, Benoist writes in a passage reminiscent of Barrès, both French and foreign cultural and national identities.¹²⁶⁵ He advocates instead that economic incentives and reforms be provided to the African and Asian nations so that their populations will remain in their own “environment” rather than relocating.¹²⁶⁶ In the final analysis, although the ND does not admit it directly, the respect for difference and the rejection of cultural homogenization in the global world is also a call for cultural, racial, and national segregation. So, although the language of difference and cultural plurality may be a new addition to the traditional right-wing combat against universalism, egalitarianism, and abstraction, the underlying desire for distinctive, rooted, cultural

¹²⁶³ Benoist, *Les idées à l'endroit*, 154.

¹²⁶⁴ Benoist and Champetier, “The French New Right.”

¹²⁶⁵ Benoist, *La ligne de mire*, 140.

¹²⁶⁶ Although it is doubtful that Benoist intends the outsourcing of French jobs to these other nations as part of the economic reform.

and national identities is reminiscent of the calls for enracinement and closed nationalism that have marked the discourse of the extreme Right since 1898.

Intellectual Realism

In the tradition of the intellectual Right from Barrès to Bardèche, Benoist and the intellectuals of GRECE claim an exclusive connection to intellectual Realism that the intellectuals of the Left, no matter what they might claim, are unable to share. “To the holders of absolute concepts,” Benoist explains, “to the intellectual terrorists, we oppose a reality ceaselessly changing.”¹²⁶⁷ Observation and experience of real life, he claims, show that there is no immutable, absolute truth or any abstract humanity. Reality presents change, particularity, inequalities, and concrete examples. The intellectuals of GRECE believe their devotion to the Real rather than to the intellectualized abstraction or theory separates their world-view from the Marxists and Liberals whose concepts are all rooted in the “immutable truth” of egalitarianism. For ND intellectuals, egalitarianism is the antithesis of intellectual Realism. Egalitarianism, Benoist explains, is premised on the natural equality of men but modern science and DNA studies have shown that man is different “down to the finest structures of his being.”¹²⁶⁸ Diversity is therefore a fundamental fact of real life. Homogenization and equality are only possible in the realm of theory. Here is the basis that Benoist believes exists for the separation between the intellectual Right and Left. While the intellectual Left, both liberal and Marxist, increasingly attempts to level the real differences between men, the intellectual Right of GRECE “on the contrary, searches to have a better knowledge of the facts of the Real,” of the diversities and differences between men, and to apply them to political practice.¹²⁶⁹

¹²⁶⁷ *Elements; le revue de la Nouvelle droite* (Winter 1983-4) 4.

¹²⁶⁸ Benoist, *La ligne de mire*, 115.

¹²⁶⁹ Taguieff, *Sur la Nouvelle Droite*, 11.

The Right, he continues in his effort to explain this difference, is “the representative of a party of the reality of things” and “does not believe in single explanations of reality based on class struggle, race, economics etc.”¹²⁷⁰ In contrast, he writes quoting Thomas Molnar, “the philosophy of the Left suffers from a radical divorce with the Real.”¹²⁷¹ This divorce is proven by the fact that the programs and political visions of the Left always involve a mutation or abolition of the existing social reality. Marxism in particular seeks to change the world as it is into something idealized in theory. What can be assumed from this, he asks, but that the “intellectual Left is the party of those who are unhappy with being what they are” and therefore “radically denounce existing reality.”¹²⁷² The Right, on the other hand, he continues, “is the opposite,” its programs and projects are “rooted in reality.” The problem for the Right, however, is that while the Left has been able to promote its idealism through very real methods from revolution to media propaganda, the Right has not been able to grasp the need to support its realistic projects and visions with real action and methods. Because of this, the Left has monopolized the press and popular movements while the Right has found itself excluded from popular culture.

The great irony in this, Benoist writes, is that because the intellectual Left monopolizes these cultural organs and excludes the Right, they have been able to proclaim their own idealistic programs those of the intellectual while labeling those realistic ones of the Right “anti-intellectual.” As nominalists, he explains, the intellectuals of the Right postulate that “ideas are true only so much as they are incarnated, that is to say lived... which, for us, comes back to saying that there is no reality outside the real.” It is this rejection of abstract theorization and utopianism and attachment to the real experience of life rather than the fabrications of the intellect that have excluded them from categorization as intellectuals. “Our ‘anti-intellectualism,’” he writes scornfully, “comes from this

¹²⁷⁰ Benoist, *Vu de droite*, 16.

¹²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 394.

¹²⁷² *Ibid.*

conviction that life is always better than the idea that one makes of it, that there is a pre-eminence of the soul over the mind, of character over intelligence, of sensibility over intellect, of image over concept, of myth over doctrine.”¹²⁷³

The concept of reality shares many attributes with that of the right-wing intellectuals from Barrès to Bardèche who believed an appreciation for reality meant an appreciation for distinctive races, nationalities, and *enracinement* rather than the abstraction of universal humanity. These intellectuals have all claimed to know no “men,” only “Frenchmen.” The ND concept of realism also shares many elements with that of Drieu, Fernandez, Bonnard, and Châteaubriant who glorified the complete man, exposure to real life experiences, and favored an appreciation for action, sentiment, and character over intellectualism and mental acrobatics. For these intellectuals, ideas cannot come from “sterile” abstraction but only from lived experience. This understanding of reality, the nature of intelligence, and the relationship that a true intellectual must have to the Real is something that the intellectuals of the Right have, over the century, believed to separate them from the intellectuals of the Left. The intellectual Left’s tendency to label them anti-intellectual because of this approach to realism and rejection of abstraction has only strengthened the perception of a separation.

Anti-Jacobin Nationalism

One final component of Nouvelle Droite intellectual values that shows a strong continuity with the right-wing model over the century and a clear separation from the intellectual Left is that of an anti-Jacobin concept of nationalism and Europeanism.¹²⁷⁴ According to Benoist, the intellectuals of the Left believe nationality is a product of civil ceremony and legal rights rather than history, ethnicity, or family. Civic concepts of nationality require no rooting in the history, language, religion, or land of the nation but only an agreement to abide by the laws of the country and they therefore

¹²⁷³ Benoist, *Les idées à l'endroit*, 34.

¹²⁷⁴ Benoist and Champetier, “The French New Right,” 13.

allow for massive immigration. The problem, according to Benoist, however, is that immigration and legal naturalization do not really accomplish the assimilation they claim. Groups remain separate, pluralities within the nation, weakening its unanimity. Instead, he proposes a new concept of nationalism that is expanded to a European nationalism.¹²⁷⁵ This European alliance would not be founded on the Jacobin ideal of legal rights and civic ties but on the Barrèssian concept of *enracinement* and cultural legacy. The European “Empire” would be a cooperative federation of culturally rooted nations large enough to compete with the continental superpowers of the global age and united by its common Indo-European cultural heritage.¹²⁷⁶

The new Europe would also, according to Benoist, more accurately reflect the reality of difference in the modern world.¹²⁷⁷ The “frontiers of blood and of history are realities,” he writes, they cannot, therefore, be ignored by arbitrary lines of civic national borders.¹²⁷⁸ Nor, he continues, should anyone desire that these frontiers be erased. The world, he argues, is not made of interchangeable individuals but of rooted peoples and the defense of these distinctive roots is essential to the preservation of a people’s identity in an increasingly homogenized world.¹²⁷⁹ Nations and the European federation that they compose must therefore be built around the realities of difference in race, ethnicity, religion, history, and cultural tradition rather than the arbitrary administrative borders agreed upon by colonizing powers or the United Nations. Nationality, for the Nouvelle Droite, is not a function of “abstract politico-administrative borders” as it is for the Jacobin Left but of culture and

¹²⁷⁵ Unlike many of his predecessors on the Right, Benoist does not see a united bloc of the “Occident” but only of western Europe because he finds America to be foreign to the European mentality.

¹²⁷⁶ Benoist’s concept of nationalism and Europeanism as a product of rooted national traditions has led him to search truer spiritual roots for Europe in paganism. Greco-Roman paganism, he has determined, is the true spiritual foundation of the Indo-European world and is therefore the best source for the new Europe.

¹²⁷⁷ Benoist, *Tiers Monde, meme combat*.

¹²⁷⁸ Benoist, *Le grain de sable*, 33.

¹²⁷⁹ Benoist, *La ligne de mire*, 140.

biology.¹²⁸⁰ It is, Benoist writes in a description reminiscent of Barrès’ “Earth and the Dead,” “a living entity, an ensemble exceeding the sum of its parts and including the dead and the unborn.”¹²⁸¹ This is directly connected to the different understandings of man and of Reality on the Left and Right. For the Left, the nation can be constructed as a civic, theoretical, abstract concept out of whatever peoples populate a certain area since man is a universal, homogenous entity. For the Right, the nation can only be the result of shared, lived experience since men are distinctive products of their history, culture, and biology.

Whether it is the value given to culture and history in the concept of nationalism, the belief that intellectual responsibility requires a devotion to lived experience and realities above theoretical abstractions, or the opposition to egalitarianism and universalism in favor of a recognition of difference, Benoist and the intellectuals of the Nouvelle Droite have maintained the tradition of right-wing intellectual values that extends back to the anti-Dreyfusards of 1898. Their engagement and identity as intellectuals has been formed by their resentment of left-wing hegemony, their mentality of engagement that involves struggle for legitimacy, and a common set of essential right-wing intellectual values. But the model of identity is not complete without the collective identity component. The intellectuals of the Nouvelle Droite, like their predecessors over the century, formed communities and socio-professional networks of like-minded peers where the distinctive experience of being a right-wing intellectual was fostered. It was through the experience of daily life in these segregated, polarized communities that the perception of a separate and oppositional intellectual identity became a reality.

Communities, Networks and the Intellectual Experience

The final component of the model of right-wing intellectual identity is a tendency to feel ostracized from the socio-professional communities and networks dominated by the intellectual Left.

¹²⁸⁰ Ibid., 132.

¹²⁸¹ Ibid.

Directly resulting from this feeling of exclusion is the creation of an alternative, sympathetic intellectual community where right-wing intellectual values are reinforced and even radicalized and right-wing engagés are welcomed, mentored, and promoted. From these segregated communities came distinctly right-wing practices and experiences that made “being an intellectual” entirely different on the Right. Like their predecessors over the century, the ND has constructed alternative intellectual communities, in response to the left-dominated mainstream, where their own thinkers are able to engage as a collective. Such a segregation of intellectual society has been both a reflection and a cause of the two different experiences of intellectual life on the Left and Right and the two different understandings of what it means to be an intellectual in the global era.

The intellectuals of the ND have been quite clear about the importance that their alternative intellectual communities, particularly those around GRECE, have had on their engagement and experience as intellectuals. The Manifest of GRECE perhaps states the importance of community most clearly when it introduces its *raison d’être* by saying, “From the beginning, the French New Right has brought together people interested in participating in the development of a community. It constitutes a community of work and reflection whose members are not necessarily all intellectuals, but all of whom are interested, in one way or another, in the battle of ideas.”¹²⁸² The ND has found it essential to create its own intellectual and cultural spaces where it can foster its own engagés and educate the general public according to its own values. Jean Varenne, past president of GRECE, has explained the importance of GRECE as a place of sociability and professional community where like-minded intellectuals can amplify the effectiveness of their engagement. “Having taken conscience,” he writes, “that the cultural power...in France belonged to the Marxists and their following, it appeared that the first thing to do was to reconquer this lost territory. It was necessary therefore to create a society of thought, that is to say an organism permitting the assembly of those who had the same vision of things in order to permit them to act more effectively. Thus was born GRECE...which

¹²⁸² Benoist and Champetier, “The French New Right.”

gave itself the task of ideological formation of its members and the diffusion of a certain view of the world in the intellectual milieu.”¹²⁸³

In GRECE, therefore, the ND has intended to create not only a “laboratory of ideas,” but also a community that can provide a place of sociability, a professional network, a mentoring process, an educational organ, and a platform for engagement in the “battle of ideas.” It is perhaps the closest that the intellectual Right has come to repeating the success of the Action Française phenomenon since the 1920s. One of GRECE’s forty founders, Jean-Claude Valla would write, “GRECE was not to be a simple addition of individuals which would have in common only the signature of a membership pass but aspired rather to transform itself...into a true community.” It was to be a “community of work and thought” that would provide “support in daily life, professional facilities, and a certain duty of solidarity” for its members. GRECE was not, therefore, an accidental conglomeration but a calculated, organized, and structured attempt to create an alternative intellectual society with the support structures necessary to be a real force in engaged thought.

In the tradition of the right-wing communities since the Ligue de la Patrie, some of the most important “professional facilities” offered by GRECE to its community of intellectuals are sympathetic publishing firms like Copernic and its later replacement Labyrinthe. Since the ND intellectuals, like their predecessors over the century, believed themselves excluded and unwelcome at the firms seen as sympathetic to the dominant Left, they needed a space where their works would be published without censorship. The two firms, both directed by Benoist for several years, have been the primary publishing firms for the ND intellectuals and the only source for the published transcripts of the GRECE colloquia.¹²⁸⁴ Labyrinthe in particular would create the Livre-club du Labyrinthe which published by subscription those works “which do not situate themselves in the line of the

¹²⁸³ “La Coeur de la Nouvelle Droite,” interview with Jean Varenne *Elements; le revue de la Nouvelle droite* (Winter 1985): 43.

¹²⁸⁴ Taguieff, *Sur la Nouvelle Droite*, 205.

dominant ideology.”¹²⁸⁵ These publishing firms are not only vital organs for the dissemination of the thought of the right-wing community, they are also a source of imagined community among all those who share a space in its catalogue. Next to the publishing houses, the most influential places of community are GRECE’s numerous revues and professional networks of journalists.

In particular, the central revue for GRECE, *Elements*, born as a simple bulletin in 1968, has been vital in spreading the ideas of the ND and welcoming the ostracized right-wing writer. It has created both a real community of writers among its regular columnists and editing team like Benoist, Jean-Claude Valla, and Pierre Vial, and an imaginary community including all its contributors and subscribers.¹²⁸⁶ It is in *Elements*, more than any of the other GRECE organs, that one finds advertisements for works by Grecist authors, summaries of the recent colloquia and debates offered by GRECE, and cross promotion of other GRECE journals. To this main revue have been added over the years the interior bulletin *GRECE-Traditions*, the theoretical organ *Etudes et Recherches*, and the short-lived *Panorama des idées actuelles*. Of great importance is the *Nouvelle Ecole*, a publication intimately tied to the program and ideas of GRECE and founded and directed since 1969 by Benoist. It is here, more than in the other journals of GRECE, that Benoist lays out his own ideas and excerpts his larger works. Linked to these main journals through common contributors, the influence of Benoist, and a similarity of ideology are the right-wing influenced journals *Figaro-Magazine*, *Valeurs actuelles*, and *Spectacle du Monde*. Further along in the network of journals were those that shared a few contributors like Bardèche at *Defense de l’Occident*, Robert Poulet at *Rivarol*, and Alain Sanders at *Aspects de la France*.

Although these revues and networks have been vital to the successes of GRECE in reaching the public and baiting the intellectual Left, they are not the only sources of sociability and collective engagement for the ND. Just like its predecessor the Action Française, GRECE has created an entire intellectual society for itself complete with educational and mentoring opportunities for students,

¹²⁸⁵ Duranton-Crabol, *Visages de la Nouvelle Droite*, 225.

¹²⁸⁶ Vial, *Pour un renaissance culturelle*, 14.

leisure activities, clubs, and public discussions where the intellectual Left is the minority. GRECE provides its members with annual colloquia such as the one held in 1983 with the theme “Face au vide intellectuel, la troisième voie.” In the colloquia, for over 33 years now, GRECE intellectuals including Benoist, Vial, and Guillaume Faye mentor the public and particularly the right-wing student youth on timely political issues. Then there are the group meetings, a series of lectures and debates open to the public, appointed days of study and special educational seminars led by GRECE intellectuals. Finally, there are the group voyages, organized vacations, a cinema club, and a summer Université européenne du GRECE where right-wing student youth participate in GRECE sponsored conferences, courses, and activities.¹²⁸⁷ For the adults there are the “Cafés philo” which offers seminars and conferences for the general public around themes like that of the internal contradictions of liberalism. There is even an imagined community created specifically for those members of GRECE who are not able to participate and engage in these numerous social communities. The Club de Mille is a community for those who are unable to give of their time and so contribute to the GRECE community with monthly financial pledges.¹²⁸⁸

All of these collective communities created for the intellectuals of the ND fostered a sense of separation between these intellectuals and those of the Left. The fundamental objective of GRECE and the intellectual ND, to create a counter-discourse and a counter-concept of intellectual life to rival that dominated by the Left, made such a separation and sense of division unavoidable. But the separate communities created on the margins of this dominant intellectual milieu reinforced and made into tangible reality what had before been only the perception of difference, opposition, and incompatibility. Just as their right-wing predecessors over the century, the intellectuals of the ND, raised in this separate, isolated intellectual environment since 1968, have had a different experience of daily intellectual life.

¹²⁸⁷ GRECE documents BNF Tolbiac 2000. Since its creation in 1968, in each of these forums, the new names of the intellectuals of GRECE are mixed with familiar names of the traditional extreme Right like Bardèche, Lucien Rebatet, Paul Serant, Marcel Jouhandeau, Jean Cau, and Jean Giono.

¹²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, piece no. 2.

The New Right's practice and experience of daily intellectual life has been, as it was for the intellectual Right over the century, a product of its relationships to the State and university. The University has, as Benoist pointed out in a 2003 interview, been traditionally dominated by the intellectual Left and so this professional trajectory relied upon by the emerging intellectual of the Left has been relatively unappealing to the young intellectual of the Right. Since ND intellectuals are hardly welcomed as professors in the state university system, they have, as their predecessors did for over a century, relied on journalism and literary publication as their primary means of engagement and expression. This professional focus has allowed the relatively small number of ND intellectuals to produce a prolific number of revues, articles, books, and interviews and to make a greater impact on public affairs and journalistic debate than they might otherwise have had.¹²⁸⁹ As it did for the previous generations of right-wing intellectuals, however, this avoidance of the university has made the necessary mentoring of the youth a more difficult task. GRECE has provided a different experience of intellectual mentorship for both the intellectual and the youth by arranging summer institutes and "university" courses, colloquia, and lecture series that move the experience of mentorship outside the traditional university setting.

The daily and necessary practice of educating the general public has also proven a different experience for the intellectual Right. The new media of television talk shows and political interviews has been, Benoist suggests, mastered by "the young wolves of the intellectual Left" like Bernard Henri Levy who make it a regular practice to do televised appearances both in France and abroad to popularize their ideas. In contrast, when the "representative of the Right" is fortunate enough to gain this platform, he remains passive, ineffective, and simply "smiles without realizing the game he is getting ready to enter."¹²⁹⁰ When they do enter these new public forums aggressively, as Benoist has done, and attempt to debate the intellectuals of the Left, they face further difficulties, in particular, the

¹²⁸⁹ Benoist, for example, has published over 50 books, 4000 articles, and has conducted over 300 interviews.

¹²⁹⁰ Benoist, *Vu de droite*, 17.

absence of an opponent. The intellectual of the Left is able to refuse to debate the intellectual of the Right without appearing intellectually cowardly by proclaiming that they do not want to “play the game of the Right.”¹²⁹¹ With this they are suggesting that any legitimate argument by the Right would be a distortion of its true position and that the intellectual of the Left should not be forced to dignify it with a response. Here Benoist argues that, as with the other elements of French metapolitics, the intellectual of the Right has not experienced life as the “media darlings” as the intellectual of the Left has. It is clear, therefore, that beyond the different experience inherent in their position as a minority, oppositional, and dominated camp, the intellectual of the Right has developed a distinctive collective identity from the different daily experience of intellectual life in the segregated communities of the Right.

Despite their recent resistance to the categorization of Left and Right, Benoist and the community of intellectuals around GRECE seem, on the contrary, to provide evidence of its continued viability, at least in the case of intellectual identity. In particular, they are exemplars of the distinctive model of right-wing intellectual identity constructed over the century and outlined in this study. While it is impossible to continue to ignore the presence of right-wing intellectuals in the narrative of 20th century French intellectual engagement, it is equally unacceptable to reinsert them into history as politically deviant imitations of their left-wing peers. It is necessary, therefore, to have a new concept, a new model of the intellectual that recognizes these two very distinctive intellectual camps.

The Right-Wing Intellectual Model

The purpose of this study has been first to dismiss the perception among historians today that “intellectuel de droite” is a “contradiction in terms.” In both scholarly circles and the general public, the concept of the intellectual has become practically inconceivable outside of left-wing and republican values and intellectual communities. “Intellectual” has become synonymous with an

¹²⁹¹ Benoist, *Le grain de sable*, 98.

engagé who values universalism, abstraction, idealism, internationalism and Enlightenment principles from egalitarianism and individualism to the romance of popular revolution. Studies of intellectuals seek their exemplars in the Ligue des Droits de l'homme, the University, the *NRF*, the SFIO and PCF, and *Les Temps modernes*. However, what is today an expected and almost automatic omission of the right-wing engagé from the narrative of the intellectual is the result of a more calculated, century-long crusade by the Center and Left intellectuals to dominate the role of intellectual guide. The second purpose of the study has therefore been to uncover this struggle to define intellectual identity and to examine its impact on the creation of a distinctly right-wing intellectual model. The Left, over the century, worked to ensure that the public believed “intellectuals of the Right have no right to the title of intellectuel.”¹²⁹² This was met with increasing resentment by a Right whose own efforts to redefine the title and role of the intellectual became something of an obsession. Resentment, struggle against exclusion, and the effort to be seen as separate yet legitimate were central, formative experiences for the Right that recurred over the century. They permeated and influenced the Right’s mentality of engagement, values and discourses, choice of communities and practices, and, as a result, their very model of true intellectual identity. As they internalized this ostracism, they responded by segregating themselves, radicalizing their values and opinions, and alienating themselves ever further from the intellectual mainstream. In the end, this model of the Right has continued to be labeled “anti-intellectual” by historians and excluded from the historical narrative of engagement while the intellectual of the Left has become the sole model of intellectual identity.

Those few historians who have recognized the legitimacy of the intellectuals of the Right have made great strides in reversing this conflation of the terms *intellectuel* and *intellectuel de gauche*. However these studies have tended to define the intellectual only by common behaviors and have resulted in such broad definitions as “producer or consummator of an ideology,” and “the man of culture put in the situation of the man of politics.” These generalized definitions of the French intellectual do allow the reinsertion of the intellectual of the Right into the historical picture, but they

¹²⁹² Jaures’ accusation found in Charle, *Naissance des “intellectuels,”* 163.

are too vague to be useful and gloss over what the Right believed were important differences in its identity. Instead, it is necessary to propose a new conceptualization of the intellectual that reinserts the engagés of the Right into the historical narrative while recognizing that their intellectual identity is too distinctive from the Left's to be conflated in such a generalized definition. This new approach to the intellectual demands that both Left and Right thinkers be included in the historical narrative since both engaged their cultural capital in French affairs and exerted influence over public opinion. But it also recognizes that while Left and Right both claimed the title and role of the intellectual, their intellectual identity and the mentality, values, perception of responsibility, and collective identities that construct this identity were very different. Because the predominant concept of the intellectual is based on a left-wing or republican model, this different conceptualization of intellectual identity on the Right has been misinterpreted as "anti-intellectualism" by historians and has caused the exclusion of the right-wing from historical analyses of intellectual engagement. The new concept of the intellectual demands that historians recognize not only the model of intellectual identity created by the Left but the alternative model, constructed in opposition to this, on the Right. It is this alternative model that the ten case studies have attempted to outline.

The ten writers selected for case study reveal significant changes in the values, programs, and visions for France on the extreme Right over the century. Barrèssian nationalism was replaced for many on the Right by Maurrassian monarchism and then by French fascism and Europeanism. But these changes are outweighed by the continuities that reveal a certain pattern or model over the century. It has become clear that there are certain common characteristics and experiences that are essential to being an intellectual of the Right, no matter the time period, and that distinguish these right-wing intellectuals, whether they be nationalists, monarchists, or fascists, from their counterparts on the republican Center and extreme Left. From these case studies, it can be argued that right-wing intellectuals are not just left-wing intellectuals with different political opinions, but their own category of engagé. Their concept of role and identity has been uniquely formed by their perception

of exclusion and their resentment of marginalization. They have a different conception of their place in society and intellectual affairs, a different relationship to the university and the State, a different mentality of engagement, a whole different system of intellectual, cultural, and social values, a different worldview and conception of “True France,” a different set of intellectual spaces, socio-professional networks, and professional trajectories, a different community of peers and organizations for mentorship, publication, education, and socialization. All together this has resulted in a very different experience of intellectual life and a distinctive understanding of what it means to be an intellectual.

The intellectual of the extreme Right from the Dreyfus Affair to the Algerian conflict has been marked by an incredible resentment of what he perceives as a left-wing hegemony over the intellectual field. In its most blatant form, this hegemony has emerged in the Left’s refusal to recognize the engagés of the Right as “intellectuals.” The effectiveness of the Left’s effort to exclude the Right from the title, role, and practices of the intellectual was due in part to its close ties to what the Right referred to as the “official world.” The Right perceived itself to be in a hostile and even persecutory relationship with the “official world” of the State and its republican institutions like the University. In the mind of the right-wing intellectual, the extreme Left and Republican Center intellectuals formed a majority that was allied in a bloc or front against them. This bloc, according to the Right, had been able to effectively dominate and infiltrate the government, the university, mainstream intellectual organizations and the official organs of the press. In contrast, the intellectual Right had been excluded, ostracized, and ejected both literally and figuratively from these places of power and influence. For Brunetiere, it was expulsion from his position at the ENS, for Bardèche, ostracism from the CNE dominated publishing firms, but all perceived themselves rejected and oppressed. In particular, they believed that their exclusion was self-perpetuating since the left-wing intellectual model was engrained in the education system, and therefore in the minds of the next generations. The Right, therefore, saw its exclusion as a vicious cycle. Denied the title and identity of

the intellectual, they were more easily excluded as “anti-intellectual” from places of power within the intellectual world. Denied participation in these spaces of intellectual power and legitimization, they were further alienated from the public’s perception of intellectual identity.

Over the century, this hostile relationship to the “official world” has become essential to the right-wing intellectuals’ perception of their place in French society and intellectual affairs. This, in turn, has affected their perception of themselves as intellectuals, their understanding of the role of the intellectual, and their mentality of engagement. The Right internalized and reappropriated the Left’s language of exclusion to make it an essential, and positive, component of their self-identification as intellectuals. Bardèche identified himself as “a foreigner” within the nation and intellectual world, a member of the class of intellectual “untouchables,” and an intellectual “heretic,” while Laurent saw himself as the “pariah,” the “outlaw,” the “excluded,” and the “suspect.” Even when the Right monopolized the field during the Occupation, Drieu identified dramatically with the wandering hometown prophet speaking the truth to a resistant crowd while Châteaubriant saw himself as one of the misunderstood minority. Whether the Right was empowered or not, they identified themselves, as Maurras was famous for doing, as the often unpopular “intellectual opposition” to the dominant, mainstream Left. Unlike the intellectuals of the Left who often enjoyed a profitable relationship with the government, the university, and official thought, the intellectual of the Right believed himself oppressed, excluded, and ostracized from these relationships and therefore identified intellectual responsibility and role with resistance, struggle, and opposition to the mainstream.

Because the intellectuals of the Right had been labeled “anti-intellectual” as early as 1898, their engagement was always burdened with an underlying desire to legitimize their own right-wing values and claim superior right to the title of “intellectuel.” Ever since Barrès and Brunetière declared that “not all the intellectuals were on one side,” the intellectual of the Right has associated engagement with struggle for intellectual legitimacy and authority. Claiming and effectively redefining the title and role of the intellectual, which they saw to be increasingly denied to them by

the Left, became something of an obsession for the engagés of the Right. They saw themselves as having a double mission in their engagement. The Right engaged in order to manipulate public opinion on the current political or social question just like the Left. But it also engaged in order to counter the perception by the public that the dominant intellectuals on the Left spoke for the entire body of intellectual elite. It is not surprising that Barres' 1898 claim to the title and role of the intellectual was echoed over the century by his successors even as late as the 1963 reproach: "We have our intellectuals too."

This approach to engagement also caused more subtle shifts in language that have been, over the century, markers of the intellectual of the Right. The experience of being part of the marginalized Right affected the very themes and vocabulary they used in their work. Their struggle to throw off the label of "anti-intellectual" led to the recurrent discourse on the Right of "true intellectuals" and "intellectual responsibility." The true intellectuals, they argued understood their responsibility to society, culture, and intelligence according to right-wing values while the "false intellectuals" remained mired in the values and visions of the Left. And, since their ideas and values were repeatedly proclaimed not only "anti-intellectual" but "anti-French," much of their engaged work is a defense of their ideas as the best representatives of the history and traditions of France. The concept of the nation would also be an important source of legitimization since the Right refused to portray itself as the representatives of the universal, as the Left did. Because of this, the definition of "True France" and its true values became an essential theme in the language of engagement on the Right. Since it enjoyed a fruitful relationship to the State and a secure claim to the title of intellectual, the Left had no ulterior motive to secure legitimacy and, until the Occupation, displayed none of the Right's obsession with intellectual responsibility or True France. As a result, the discourse of legitimacy, struggle, True France, and true intellectual responsibility essential to the Right's discussion of engagement have been overlooked by historians.

Resentment of their exclusion and an underlying rejection of the left-wing value system also led the Right intentionally to differentiate their own, alternative values and world views. Right-wing engagés wanted to claim the title, role, and responsibilities of the intellectual, but not to adopt or be seen as supporting the values and programs associated with this title by the Left. Because of this, they went to great lengths to differentiate their own intellectual values and advertise their intellectual guidance as an alternative worldview. In short, they wanted it quite clear that they were intellectuals, but of a very different type than those on the Left. Although the specific programs and positions of the Right changed over the century, reacting to and precipitating changes on the intellectual Left, several core values and worldviews have remained constant identifying marks of the intellectual Right. The intellectual of the Right, no matter the decade, can be identified by his rejection of universalism, devotion to Realism, opposition to internationalism in favor of a rooted concept of nationalism, and rejection of egalitarianism.

One of the most significant distinctions in intellectual values between the Left and Right was the conflict over universalism. For the intellectuals of the Left, particularly during the first half of the century, intellectual responsibility coincided with the ability to isolate abstract, universal laws and absolute truths from the confusion of reality and utilize these ideals in the formation of theories. The intellectual was to be above the real world, isolated by his ability to think in general rather than particular terms and able to see the world as it could be rather than as it was. The intellectual was defined as the defender of the abstract absolutes of Truth, Justice, and the Rights of Man. This universalism was linked to the equally essential ideas of egalitarianism and internationalism, based on the idea of a universal humanity and the abstract idea of man. When put in practice, this universalism resulted in engagement extending from a defense of Dreyfus' right to a retrial to decolonization and international war crimes tribunals. For the intellectual of the Right, however, intellectual responsibility required that the intellectual remove himself from the ivory tower of abstractions to construct real solutions based on real societies.

For the intellectual of the Right, there were no universals, only particulars, no single humanity but nations, peoples, and races, and no absolute truths, only relative ones. Barrès' declaration that he did not know "man" but only particular men living in particular places in times would be repeated over the century by right-wing thinkers from Brunetière to Bardèche. His belief that truths were relative to the nations that constructed them would find echoes in the monarchist, fascist, collaborationist, and neo-fascist search for a third way. Third way ideologies were proclaimed to be suited to the French national character in contrast with democratic or communist ideologies that were internationalist and universalist in their approach. Even during the post-war years when the intellectual of the Left laid equal claim to the representation of Realism, the intellectual of the Right would distinguish its own claim as the rightful one. The realism of the Left, whether it was in the Communist dictatorship of the proletariat or the democratic republic of equals, Bardèche and Laurent argued, was still based on an approach to man "as he could be," an idealized, universal man, rather than man "as he is" a rooted product of his own time and place. Right-wing concepts of Realism would elicit particularly strong condemnation for anti-intellectualism because they claimed to draw inspiration from the "complete" or "total" man rather than from the intellect alone. Beginning with Brunetière and Barrès and echoed most strongly by the fascists, the intellectual of the Right identified himself as a Realist because his assessments were based on the elements of real life experience: praxis, character, emotion, sensibility, and will rather than abstract intelligence and rationalism alone. This, he believed, also made him a more effective intellectual.

The intellectual of the Right also differentiated himself from the intellectual model of the Left by his anti-internationalism and support for a rooted concept of nationalism. From Barrès and Brunetière to the fascist sympathizing intellectuals of the 1930s, internationalism was intimately linked to the concept of the left-wing intellectual and associated with the anti-nationalist forces of Marxist socialism, Judaism, cosmopolitanism, and the League of Nations. Cosmopolitanism implied rejection of the rootedness, traditionalism, regional and national pride, and cultural relativism that the

intellectual of the Left considered detrimental to the detached intellectual. But for the intellectual of the Right, there was no universal culture or genius, but only national and regional ones so a lack of roots and relativism meant a detachment from one's source of inspiration and truth. Representation and guidance of intelligence and culture therefore required the intellectual to be grounded in these particularities and attached to the history, tradition, and ancestors from which this national genius evolved. The internationalism of the university intellectual was seen as destructive of French culture, genius, and style. Intellectuals of the Right, rather than urging France to become more open, both figuratively and literally, to foreign influences and thought, prided themselves on preservation of the purely French. Even the Europeanism of the fascist, collaborationist, and postwar intellectuals of the Right was understood not as internationalism but as a new approach to the idea of nationalism. In a world of superpowers and continental forces, Europe would be the means for the survival of the autonomous nation and the preservation of its shared indo-European culture in an increasingly globalized world.

To this anti-internationalism was tied a distinctly rooted concept of nationalism. For the intellectual of the Left, the concept of the patrie was a legal, rather than a racial or historical one, and nationalism was a civic, not an integral construct. For the intellectual of the Left, the French nation was born in 1789 with the Revolution and solidified by the Declaration of the Rights of Man. Nationalism was a product of citizenship and the contractual obligation to protect the patrie in return for a guarantee of rights. In this way, the intellectual of the Left could reconcile his universalist view of man, his egalitarianism, and his cosmopolitanism with a certain level of national pride and duty. He identified primarily as an international intellectual, a citizen of the world, and secondarily as a French citizen. For the intellectual of the Right, however, the nation was a living essence, not a legal concept. It was created by its distinct history, language, races, religion, traditions, cultures, regions, and political experience. It was the product of Roman antiquity, generations of ancestors, a line of kings, and military triumphs. To be French was to be endowed with a distinctive essence that those of

foreign nations did not share, no matter their legal status or attempt at assimilation. In practice, this meant that the intellectual of the Right was easily attracted to anti-Semitism, opposed international organizations like the UN, and opposed all supranational ideologies. The intellectual of the Right, in the final analysis, identified primarily as a Frenchman, as a product of French genius, and secondarily as a member of a broader intellectual community.

Finally, the intellectual of the Right can be identified over the century by a clear opposition to the left-wing principle of egalitarianism and to its political incarnations as both democratic republicanism and communism. The left-wing model of intellectual identity and role has been intimately tied to the principles of the Rights of Man and the ideals of the Enlightenment, particularly that of equality. For the Dreyfusards, this meant defense of the equal rights of Dreyfus, for the *universitaires* of the Nouvelle Sorbonne, it meant democratization of the educational system, for the Communists it meant bringing down the bourgeoisie and exalting the prole, and for the anti-colonialists it meant demanding equal rights to self-determination. The intellectual of the Right, however, rejected egalitarianism in all its forms as a sort of unnatural leveling and homogenization of the naturally occurring hierarchy.

Men, the intellectual of the Right believed, were not born equal nor should they be forced into a false equality by political ideology. During the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates, the intellectual of the Right identified not with the democratization of education but with the formation of an educated elite. Leveling society by promoting the mediocre and hindering the exceptional only stunted the growth of French civilization. According to both the monarchists and the fascists, egalitarianism was particularly dangerous when it was allowed to influence political affairs. The nation, they argued, should be run by its elite or by a naturally selected head, either monarch or chef, not by the masses. Both democracy and communism placed the power of the nation in the hands of the masses and majority rule in the belief that all men had equal abilities to determine civic affairs. This leveling of political and cultural talents by means of a legislated equality, the intellectual Right argued, had led to

political disasters and a failure to thrive as a civilization. The Right identified their responsibility with defense of the natural inequality of man, construction of a social hierarchy to preserve order, and support for an elite or a chef to lead the nation. These positions, paired with a rejection of democracy and communism, the two principle ideologies of the intellectual of the Left and Center, would quickly label the Right “anti-intellectual.”

Certainly these characteristic values of the extreme Right, when viewed as components of a right-wing intellectual program, indicate certain inconsistencies and internal contradictions in right-wing thought. The intellectuals of the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates who claimed to be intellectual Realists promoted classicism instead of the technology and science most applicable to real modern society. The anti-universalists of the interwar years were willing to adapt fascist ideologies constructed outside France and promoted a Europeanism that was only with great difficulty distinguished from internationalism. The position of the extreme Right on its German neighbor would vacillate over the decades switching from hostility and cultural isolation during the Affair and Nouvelle Sorbonne years to fascination, emulation, and exchange during the interwar and war years. The post-war advocates of French Algeria blithely mixed their anti-universalism with a sincere belief in the applicability of French civilization to the rest of the world. And holocaust trivializers like Bardèche somehow juxtaposed Europeanism with a closed nationalism that expressed an interest only in French affairs and rejected European-wide institutions and tribunals. These inconsistencies and lapses in logic are apparent now to the historian, but were considered part of a distinctive, cohesive intellectual itinerary by the engagés of the extreme Right at the time.

Because they felt that these worldviews distinguished them from the Left and excluded them from left-wing intellectual communities, the intellectual of the Right sought new intellectual spaces and networks where their own values could be nurtured. The Left associated being an intellectual with participation in left-wing collective communities like the Ligue des droits de l’homme during the Dreyfus Affair, the university and its presses during the Sorbonne debates, the *NRF* and *AEAR* or *CVIA* during the 1930s, the Resistance press during the occupation, or the *CNE* and *Les Temps*

Modernes in the post-war. But the Right, which felt itself excluded from these communities, social networks, and professional channels, congregated instead in its own, alternative and competing groups. They constructed a different set of intellectual spaces, socio-professional networks, and professional trajectories that provided them with a different community of peers and organizations for mentorship, publication, education, and socialization. When they were excluded from the Dreyfusard leagues and petitions, they created their own. When they found themselves increasingly a minority presence in the university system, they created their own personal mentoring relationships and organized summer institutes and courses to educate the youth in their own values. When they were not steered toward the professional life of the *universitaire*, they swelled the ranks of the professional journalists in order to remain politically and professionally influential. When they felt ostracized from social and governmental affairs, they formed their own anti-Republican political parties and cultural organizations like the PPF. And when they were denied all access to the public through traditional intellectual channels during the postwar, they congregated in sympathetic publishing houses and revues like LTR. The intellectual of the Right, like that of the Left, constructed his concept of individual intellectual identity in part from these collective communities, networks, and trajectories to which he belonged. But these communities created by the intellectual Right were not those of their left-wing peers that had been equated for so long with intellectual life.

These intellectual communities of the Left and Right were polarized by their values and ideologies and therefore quite segregated in their memberships. Members of the Ligue des droits de l'homme would not be found in the ranks of the Ligue de la Patrie, as the latter's manifest had made clear, and devotees of the PCF would not dream of writing for *Défense de l'Occident*. These communities were therefore separate intellectual worlds coexisting within Paris. In these separate intellectual spaces, like-minded intellectuals formed social attachments, arranged professional relationships, and created mentoring ties to the youth. They found themselves surrounded by other intellectuals who shared their basic value system, supported the same political programs, and advocated the same social changes. This family of thought tended to reinforce and even radicalize

intellectuals in their decision to engage their work; intellectuals who might, had they felt themselves isolated and alone, have tended to remain silent. The communities were, therefore, essential to the amplification of individual efforts to engage. Most important, though, was the fact that these communities and networks of like-minded intellectuals provided a collective, something larger than themselves, with which the intellectual could identify. They identified as part of a certain revue team, signers of a certain petition, participants in certain educational efforts, partisans of a political party, or followers of a certain ideologue. They shared not only the same socio-professional spaces but the same mission and sense of purpose as intellectuals. It was within these socio-professional communities, therefore, that intellectuals were able to create a collective identity for themselves. And this collective identity would be as distinctive on the Left and Right as the communities themselves.

These segregated intellectual communities and the separate collective identities that they encouraged led to a very different experience of intellectual life on the Left and Right. Although they often engaged in many of the same basic behaviors as the intellectuals of the Left, from publishing books to mentoring the student population, the intellectual of the Right usually went about these daily activities differently. However, once again, the Right's distinctive experiences do not indicate anti-intellectualism but rather an alternative experience of intellectual life that needs to be accounted for in historical narratives of intellectual life.

It is necessary, therefore, to introduce this new model of intellectual identity to the historical narrative of the French intellectual; one that recognizes the omnipresent influences of resentment and struggle for legitimacy, incorporates an alternative set of intellectual values and socio-political worldviews, accepts membership in a different network of intellectual communities, and respects as viable this alternative experience of daily intellectual life. This new model is not intended to replace the traditional model of the left-wing intellectual but to be paired with it as an alternative representative of intellectual identity. The narrative of French intellectual history must include the Right as a contributor to the meaning of the terms "intellectuel" and "engage." Understanding the existence of two very different but influential camps of intellectuals will allow historians of French

and intellectual history to fully appreciate the complexity of the intellectual debates that occurred over the century and the choice that society faced.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival Sources

Archives de Prefecture de Police

Ba 1946

Ba 986

Archives Nationale de France

F41 347

F7 12487

F7 12721

F7 12842-12844

F7 12863

F7 12864

F7 13229

F7 13229-13230

F7 15930

F7 15983/2

Periodicals

Action française revue bi-mensuelle (1906).

Action Française mensuelle (1908-1914).

L'Aurore (Jan 1898- January 1899).

Cahiers Franco-Allemande (March 1939).

Cahiers Fustel de Coulanges; revue bitrimestrielle (1928-1936).

Ce Soir (September 29 1938).

Chronicles; a magazine of American Culture (April 1996).

Collaboration (January-February 1944).

Collaboration: groupement des energies-Françaises pour l'unite continentale
(October 1942-June 1944).

Combat (December 1941).

Combat (October 1960 and March 22 1961).

Commune (July 1933).

Courrier royal (April 25 1936).

Cri du Peuple (February 18 1943).

Defense de l'Occident, (April-June 1958, January1959-September 1960, June 1963).

Defense de l'Occident; revue mensuelle politique et litteraire (February 1958).

Elements; le revue de la Nouvelle droite (Winter 1983-1984).

Emancipation Nationale (1935-1939).

Le Figaro (July 19 1919).

Free France (1943-4).

La Gerbe (July 1940-December 1943).

L'Humanité (March 1912, June 1919, March 1933).

Je Suis Partout (March-May 1941).

La Liberté (September 1938).

Nouvelle Ecole (June 1979).

Nouvelle Revue française (August 1938).

L'Opinion (September1910, January- February 1914, June 1919-January 1920).

La Parisienne (October 1956).

La revue hebdomadaire (January 24, 1933 and March 19 1938).

Revolution Nationale (November 1943, January-April 1944).

Revue des Deux mondes January 1898- June 1899.

Revue du Midi (January 1 1899).

Revue politique et litteraire; revue bleue (May 21 1904).

Revue universelle (June-April 1920).

Revue universitaire (1911).

La Table ronde (December 1948).

Telos (1993)

Les Temps (January 1 1899- February 22 1899).

Les Temps Modernes (October 1945 and Spring 1955).

Books and Essays

Adler, Frank. "On the French Right-New and Old: an interview with Alain de Benoist"
<http://www.alaindebenoist.com2002-3>.

Agathon, *L'Esprit de la Nouvelle Sorbonne; la crise de la culture classique, la crise du français*.
Paris: Mercure de France, 1911.

Alain. *Message au peuple*. Paris: Librairie Picart, 1934.

Annales de la Patrie française no. 1 (1900).

Barbusse, Henri. *La Lueur dans l'abime ce que veut le groupe Clarté*. Paris: Editions Clarté, 1920.

Bardèche. Maurice. *L'Épuration*. Paris: Editions Confrerie Castille, 1997.

----- *Lettre à Francois Mauriac*. Paris: La Pensée libre, 1947.

----- *Nuremberg ou la terre promise*. Paris: Les Sept Couleurs, 1948.

----- *Nuremberg II ou les faux monnayeurs*. Paris: Les Sept Couleurs, 1950.

----- *L'oeuf de Christophe Colomb; lettre à un sénateur d'Amérique*. Paris: Les Sept Couleurs, 1951.

----- *Qu'est-ce que le fascisme?* Paris: Les Sept Couleurs, 1961.

----- *Souvenirs*. Paris: Editions Buchet/Chastel, 1993.

----- *Sparte et les sudistes*. Paris: Les Sept Couleurs, 1968.

----- *Les Temps Modernes*. Paris: Les Sept Couleurs, 1956.

Barres, Maurice. *Les amitiés françaises: notes sur l'acquisition par un petit Lorrain des sentiments qui donnent un prix a la vie*. Paris: Plon, 1927.

----- *Ce que j'ai vu à Rennes*. Paris: Bibliotheque internationale d'édition, 1904.

- *Contre les Etrangers; Etude pour la protection des ouvriers français*. Paris: Grande imprimerie parisienne, 1893.
- *Le Départ pour la vie*. Paris: Plon, 1961.
- Maurice. *Les déracinés*. Paris: Plon, 1947.
- Maurice. *Journal de ma vie exterieure*. Paris: Editions Julliard, 1994.
- *Les Maîtres*. Paris: Plon, 1927.
- *Les Mauvais Instituteurs*. Paris: Ligue de la Patrie française, 1907.
- *Mes Cahiers* tomes 1-2. Paris: Plon, 1929.
- *Scènes et Doctrines du nationalisme*. Paris: Editions du Trident, 1987.
- *La Terre et les Morts*. Paris: Bureau de la Patrie française, 1899.
- Benda, Julien. *La Trahison des clercs*. Paris: Grasset, 1956.
- Benoist and Charles Champetier. *The French New Right in the Year 2000*,
<http://www.alphalink.com.au/~radnat/debenoist/alain9.html>.
- Benoist, Alain de. *Le grain de sable; jalons pour un fin de siecle*. Paris: La Labyrinthe, 1994.
- *Les idées à l'endroit*. Paris: Editions Libres-Hallier, 1986.
- *La ligne de mire; discours aux citoyens européens*, vol. 1 1972-1987. Paris: Le Labyrinthe, 1995.
- , *Tiers monde, meme combat*. Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 1986.
- *Vu de droite; anthologie critique des idées contemporaines*. Paris: Copernic, 1979.
- Berenger, Henry. *La France intellectuelle*. Paris: Armand Colin et Cie, 1899.
- Bonnard, Abel. "A la recherche des caractères," <http://abelbonnard.free.fr/chroniques.htm>.
- *Ce Monde et moi; aphorisms et fragments recueillis par Luc Gendrillon*. Paris: Dismas, 1991.
- *Le Drame du present; les Modérés*. Paris: Grasset, 1936.
- *Inédits politiques d'Abel Bonnard de l'academie française*. Paris: Editions Avalon, 1987.
- "Preface," in *L'Education et l'idée de patrie*. Paris: Librairie de l'Arc, 1936.
- Bordeaux, Henry. *Les Ecrivains et les moeurs; notes, essays, et figurines, 1900-1902*. Paris: Plon, 1902.
- Brunetière, Ferdinand. *Après le Proces; reponse à quelques 'intellectuels.'* Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1898.

----- *Discours de combat*. Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1900.

----- *Discours de Combat*. Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1904.

----- *Le Droit de l'enfant* (1903) BNF 16R Piece 2066

----- *Lettres de combat*. Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1912.

----- *La Liberté de l'enseignement*. Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1900.

Bushman, William Curt. *The Rise of Integral Nationalism in France*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939.

Châteaubriant, Alphonse de. *Cahiers, 1906-1951*. Paris: Grasset, 1955.

----- *Fragments d'une confession*. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1953.

----- *La Gerbe des Forces*. Paris: Grasset, 1937.

----- *Les Pas ont chanté*. Paris: Grasset, 1938.

----- Preface to *Mon Discours de Nuremberg: la paix des Anciens combattants* by Jean Boissel, Paris: Reveil, 1935.

----- Preface to *Un homme parmi les autres; un chef et son peuple* by Heinrich Hess. Paris: Edition Trois épis, 1941.

----- *Proces posthume d'un visionnaire*. Paris: Nouvelles editions latines, 1987.

----- *La Psychologie et le drame des temps presents*. Paris: Charaire, 1943.

Claude, Georges. *Histoire d'une evolution; de l'hostilité à la collaboration*. Paris: Les Editions de France, 1941.

Darlu, Alphonse. *M. Brunetiere et l'individualisme; a propos de l'article Apres le process*. Paris: Armand Colin, 1898.

Daudet, Leon. *Etudes et milieux litteraires*. Paris: Grasset, 1927.

Daudet, *Souvenirs litteraires*. Paris: Grasset, 1968.

Decentralisation: Polemique entre Royaliste et Républicain par Colonel Royal et Maurice Toussaint avec un lettre par Maurice Barres. Nancy: E. Thomas, 1907.

Doumic, Rene. *La Defense de l'esprit français* (1918).

----- *L'Esprit du Secte* (January 1900).

----- *Ou Sont les intellectuels?* (June 1899).

- *Le Role social de l'écrivain*. Paris: Au Siege du Comite de Defense et de progress social, 1896.
- Drieu la Rochelle, Pierre. *Les Chiens de Paille*. Paris: Gallimard, 1964.
- *Chronique politique, 1934-1942*. Paris: Gallimard, 1942.
- *Ecrits, 1939-1940*. Paris: Grasset, 1964.
- *Gilles*. Paris: Gallimard, 1939.
- *Journal, 1939-1945*. Paris: Gallimard, 1992.
- *Notes pour comprendre le siècle*. Paris: Gallimard, 1941.
- *Secret Journal*, trans. Alastair Hamilton. New York: H. Fertig, 1973.
- *Socialisme fasciste*. Paris: Gallimard, 1934.
- *Sur les Ecrivains*. Paris: Gallimard, 1982.
- *The Man on Horseback*, trans. Thomas M. Hines. Columbia: French Literature Publications Co., 1978.
- Duclaux, Emile. *Avant le process*. Paris: PV Stock, 1898.
- Entretien avec Alain de Benoist sur la droite et le gauche* <http://www.alaindebenoist.com2002-3>.
- Enquête sur la monarchie, suivie de Une campagne royaliste au Figaro et Si le coup de force est possible*. Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1909.
- GRECE documents BNF Tolbiac 2000 pieces 1-4.
- Guyot, Yves. *Les Raisons de Basile*. Paris: PV Stock Editeur, 1899.
- Huddleston, Sisley. *Paris Salons, Cafés, Studios*. London, J.B. Lippincott Company, 1928.
- Inédits politiques d'Abel Bonnard de l'academie française*. Paris: Editions Avalon, 1987.
- L'Oeuvre de la Patrie française*. Paris: Bureau de la Patrie française, 1899.
- La Culture Française sous l'occupation; la resistance des intellectuels*. New York: Section de Documentation French Press and Information Service, 1945.
- La Politique de Charles Maurras, 1926-1927* (Versailles : Bibliothèque des œuvres politiques, 1928).
- La République ou le Roi; correspondance inédite, 1888-1923*. Paris: Plon, 1970.
- Laurent, Jacques and Gabriel Jeantet. *Année 40; Londres, de Gaulle, Vichy*. Paris: La Table ronde, 1965.
- Laurent. Jacques. *Les années cinquante*. Paris: La manufacture, 1989.

- *Au Contraire*. Paris: La Table ronde, 1967.
- *Les Choses que j'ai vues au Vietnam m'ont fait douter de l'intelligence occidentale*. Paris: La Table ronde, 1968.
- *L'Esprit des Lettres: La Table ronde, La Parisienne*. Paris: Editions de Fallois, 1999.
- *Histoire Egoïste*. Paris: La Table ronde, 1976.
- *Mauriac sous de Gaulle*. Paris: La Table ronde, 1964.
- *Offenses au Chef de l'Etat; audiences des 8 et 9 octobre 1965*. Paris: La Table ronde, 1965.
- *Paul et Jean-Paul*. Paris: Grasset, 1951.
- Le Livre du centenaire; cent ans de vie française à la Revue des deux mondes*. Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1929.
- Lemaitre, Jules. *Conférence de la Patrie française*. Paris: Bureau de la Patrie française, 1899.
- Longnon, Auguste. *Origines et formation de la nationalité française; éléments ethniques, unité territoriale*. Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1912.
- “Manifeste.” Comité d’Epuración de la Race (BDIC Nanterre document O piece 21.448)
- Marion, Paul. *Programme du Parti Populaire français*. Paris: Les Oeuvres françaises, 1938.
- Massis, Henri. *Au long d'une vie*. Paris: Plon, 1967.
- *Barres et nous*. Paris: Plon, 1962.
- *Evocations; Souvenirs 1905-1911*. Paris: Plon, 1931.
- *La Guerre de trente ans; destin d'un âge, 1909-1939*. Paris: Plon, 1940.
- *L'honneur de servir; textes réunis pour contribuer à l'histoire d'une génération, 1912-1937*. Paris: Plon, 1937.
- *Les idées restent*. Paris: H. Lardanchet, 1941.
- *Les Jeunes gens d'aujourd'hui; le goût de l'action, la foi patriotique, une renaissance catholique, le réalisme politique*. Paris: Plon, 1913.
- *Romain Rolland contre la France*. Paris: H. Floury, 1915.
- Maurras, Charles. *Au Signe de Flore; souvenirs de vie politique, l'affaire dreyfus et la fondation de l'action française, 1898-1900*. Paris: Grasset, 1933.
- *Aux Républicains de Russie; réponse à l'enquête du journal 'Rousskoïé Slovo' de Moscou*. Paris: Bureau de l'Action Française, 1917.

- *L'Avenir de l'intelligence*. Paris: Flammarion, 1927.
- *Les Chefs socialistes pendant la guerre*. Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1918.
- *Conditions de la Victory*, vol. 1 *La France se sauve elle-meme; juillet à mi novembre 1914*. Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1916.
- *La contre-revolution spontanée; la recherché, la discussion, l'emeute, 1899-1939*. Paris: H. Lardanchet, 1943.
- *Devant l'Allemagne éternelle; Gaulois, Germains, Latins; chronique d'une resistance*. Paris: A l'Etoile, 1937.
- *Enquête sur la monarchie, suivie de Une campagne royaliste au Figaro et Si le coup de force est possible*. Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1916.
- "L'idée de decentralization," in *Fédéralisme et decentralization*. Paris: Restauration nationale, 1993.
- *Idées royalists*. Paris: Bureau de l'Action Française, 1910.
- *L'Ordre et le desordre; les 'idées positives' et la Revolution*. Paris: les Iles d'Or editions, 1948.
- *Mes idées politiques*. Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1937.
- *Quand les Français ne s'aimaient pas; chronique d'une renaissance 1895-1905*. Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1916.
- *Reflexions sur l'ordre en France, 1916-1917*. Paris: Au Pigeonnier, 1927.
- *Trois idées politiques; Châteaubriand, Michelet, Sainte-Beuve in Romanticisme et Revolution*. Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1925.
- Mercier, Christophe. *Conversation avec Jacques Laurent*. Paris: Julliard, 1995.
- Millau, Christian. *Au Galop des Hussards; dans le tourbillon litteraire des années 50*. Paris: Fallois, 1999.
- Nizan, Paul. *The Watchdogs: Philosophers of the Established Order*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971.
- Rolland, Romain. *Au dessus de la mêlée*. Paris: Ollendorff, 1915.
- Saint-Laurent, Cecil. *Les Agites d'Alger*. Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1961.
- *Les Passagers pour Alger*. Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1960.
- See, Henri. *Histoire de la Ligue des droits de l'homme, 1898-1926*. Paris: Ligue des droits de l'homme, 1927.

- Séipse, André de. "Lettre III sur la soi-disant Ligue de la Patrie." Paris: Librairie de l'art indépendant, 1899.
- Taguieff, Pierre-André. *Sur la Nouvelle Droite; jalons d'une analyse critique*. Paris: Descartes & Cie, 1994.
- Téry, Gustave, ed. *Le Bottin de la diffamation; petits morceaux de Leon Daudet et Charles Maurras*. Paris: L'Oeuvre, 1917.
- Une Année d'activité du Groupe Collaboration; September 1940-September 1941*. Paris: F. Bérout, 1941.
- Vandromme, Pol. *Bivouacs d'un hussard; souvenirs*. Paris: La Table ronde, 2002.
- Vaugeois, Henri. *Notre pays; figures de France, voyages d'Action française, le temps de la guerre*. Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1916.
- Verner von Rheinbaben, Baron. *Vers une Nouvelle Europe, causerie donnée April 1941 sous les auspices du groupe Collaboration*. Paris: Groupe Collaboration, 1941.
- Vial, Pierre. *Pour un renaissance culturelle; le GRECE prend la parole*. Paris: Copernic, 1979.
- Weiland, Jean, René Pichard du Page, and Ernest Fornairon. *Pourquoi nous croyons en la collaboration, causerie donnée le 27 décembre 1940 sous les auspices du groupe Collaboration*. Paris: Groupe Collaboration, 1940.

Secondary Sources

- Albert, Pierre. "The Journalism of the French Resistance: an underground war of words," www.freedomforum.org/publications/msj/courage.summer2000/y08.html.
- Arnold, Edward J. *The Development of the Radical Right in France: From Boulanger to Le Pen*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000.
- Balmand, Pascal. "L'anti-intellectualisme dans la culture politique française." *Vingtième Siècle* 36 (1992).
- Balvet, Robert. *Itineraire d'un intellectuel vers le fascisme; Drieu la Rochelle*. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1984.
- Barnes, Ian R. "Antisemitic Europe and the 'Third Way': The ideas of Maurice Bardèche." *Patterns of Prejudice* 34, no. 2 (2000).
- Bennett, Rab. *Under the Shadow of the Swastika: The Moral Dilemmas of Resistance and Collaboration in Hitler's Europe*. New York: New York University Press, 1999.
- Betz, Albrecht and Stefan Martens, ed. *Les Intellectuels et l'occupation, 1940-1944; collaborer, partir, résister*. Paris: Editions Autrement, 2004.
- Bompaire-Evesque, Claire-Françoise. *Un Débat sur l'université au temps de la Troisième*

- République: la lutte contre la nouvelle Sorbonne*. Paris: Aux amateurs de livres, 1988.
- Bory, Jean-François. *Jacques Laurent*. Paris: Editions Artefact, 1987.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. *Homo Academicus*. trans. Peter Collier. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988.
- Bourg, Julian, ed. *After the Deluge: New Perspectives on the Intellectual and Cultural History of Postwar France*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004.
- Brogie, Gabriel de. *Histoire politique de la Revue des Deux mondes, de 1829 à 1979*. Paris: Librairie Academique Perrin, 1979.
- Brunet, Manon and Pierre Lanthier, ed. *L'Inscription sociale de l'intellectuel*. Paris: Presses de l'Universite Laval, 2000.
- Cadwallader, Barrie. *Crisis of the European Mind: a Study of André Malraux and Drieu la Rochelle*. Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1981.
- Cahm, Eric. *The Dreyfus Affair in French Society and Politics*. London: Longman, 1996.
- Caute, David. *Communism and the French Intellectuals, 1914-1960*. New York: Macmillan, 1964.
- Chadwick, Kay. *Alphonse de Châteaubriant: Catholic Collaborator*. New York: P. Lang, 2002.
- Charle, Christophe. *Naissance des "intellectuels," 1880-1900*. Paris: Minuit, 1990.
- Clark, John. *La Pensée de Ferdinand Brunetière*. Paris: Librairie Nizet, 1954.
- Compagnon, Antoine. *Connaissez-vous Brunetière? Enquête sur un antidreyfusard et ses amis*. Paris: Seuil, 1997.
- Cornick, Martyn. *Intellectuals in history : the Nouvelle revue française under Jean Paulhan, 1925-1940*. Amsterdam : Rodopi, 1995.
- Curtis, Michel. *Three Against the Third Republic: Georges Sorel, Barres, and Maurras*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959.
- Dambre, Marc, ed. *Les Hussards; un generation littéraire*. Paris: Presses de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, 2000.
- Datta, Venita. *Birth of a National Icon: the literary avant garde and the origins of the intellectual in France*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999.
- Derfler, Leslie. *The Dreyfus Affair*. London: Greenwood Press, 2002.
- Drake, David. *French Intellectuals and Politics from the Dreyfus Affair to the Occupation*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
- *Intellectuals and Politics in Post-War France*. New York: Palgrave, 2002.

- Duranton-Crabol, Anne-Marie. *Visages de la Nouvelle Droite; Le GRECE et son histoire*. Paris: Presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1988.
- Fitch, Noël Riley. *Literary Cafés of Paris*. Washington DC: Starrhill Press, 1989.
- Foucault, Michel. *Power/knowledge: selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980.
- Gerbod, Paul. *Les enseignants et la politique*. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1976.
- Golsan, Richard J. *French Writers and the Politics of Complicity: crises of democracy in the 1940s and 1990s*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006.
- . "Drieu la Rochelle aux Etats-Unis: Entre l'Esthétique et le Fascisme" in *Drieu la Rochelle; Ecrivain et Intellectuel: actes du colloque international*. Paris: Presses de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, 1995.
- Gordon, Bertram. *Collaborationism in France during the Second World War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980.
- Grigor, Ronald and Michael D. Kennedy, ed. *Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999.
- Hanna, Martha. *The Mobilization of Intellect: French Scholars and Writers During the Great War*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996.
- Hewitt, Nicholas. *Literature and the Right in Post-war France: the story of the Hussards*. Washington DC: Berg, 1996.
- Hocking, Elton. *Ferdinand Brunetière: the Evolution of a Critic*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1936.
- Holub, Robert. "It's Academic: Intellectual Responsibility and the Rise of Neo-Mandarinism," in *Responsibility and Commitment*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1996.
- Humphrey, Richard. *Georges Sorel: Prophet without honor a study in anti-intellectualism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951.
- Hurtin, Jean. "Trois manifestes pour l'intellectuel et ses devoirs." *Magazine littéraire* (December 1987): 23-25.
- Jackson, Julien. *The Popular Front in France: defending democracy 1934-1938*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Jennings, Jeremy, ed. *Intellectuals in twentieth-century France: Mandarins and Samurais*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.
- . "1898-1998: From Zola's 'J'accuse' to the Death of the Intellectual." *The European Legacy* 5 no. 6 (International Society for the Study of European Ideas, 2000).

- . "Intellectuals and Political Culture." *The European Legacy* 5, no. 6 (2000).
- Julliard, Jacques. "Le monde des revues au debut du siècle." *Cahiers Georges Sorel* 5 (1987).
- Khilnani, Sunil. *Arguing Revolution: The Intellectual Left in Postwar France*. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1993.
- Koren, Roselyne and Dan Michman, ed. *Les Intellectuels face à l'affaire dreyfus alors et aujourd'hui: perception et impact de l'affaire in France et à l'étranger*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 1995.
- Lebovics, Herman. *True France: the wars over cultural identity, 1900-1945*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992.
- LeSueur, James D. *Uncivil War: Intellectuals and Identity Politics during the decolonization of Algeria*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001.
- Leymarie, Michel and Jean-François Sirinelli, ed. *L'histoire des intellectuels aujourd'hui*. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2003.
- Lop, Ferdinand. "Quartier Latin; les Cafés littéraires," *Les Cahiers du Temps Present* vol. 1 (1958).
- Lottman, Herbert. *The Left Bank: writers, artists, and politics from the Popular Front to the Cold War*. San Francisco: Halo Books, 1991.
- Mathieu, Oliver. *Abel Bonnard; une aventure inachevée*. Paris: Avalon, 1988.
- Maugendre, L.A. *Alphonse de Châteaubriant, 1877-1951*. Paris: André Bonne, 1977.
- Mazgaj, Paul. "Engagement and the French Nationalist Right: The Case of the Jeune Droite." *European History Quarterly* 32, no. 2 (2002).
- . *Imagining Fascism: The Cultural Politics of the Young Right, 1930-1945*. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2007.
- McWilliam, Neil. *Action française, Classicism, and the Dilemmas of Traditionalism in France, 1900-1914*. paper presented at the National Humanities Center (2004-2005).
- Mievre, J. "L'évolution politique d'Abel Bonnard (jusqu'au printemps 1942)." *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale* 108 (October 1977).
- Milza, Pierre. "Le negationisme en France." *Relations internationales* (Spring 1991).
- Morel, Jean-Pierre. "Drieu la Rochelle et le communisme," in *Drieu la Rochelle; Ecrivain et intellectuel actes du colloque international*. Paris: Presses de la Nouvelle Sorbonne, 1995.
- Netter, Marie Laurence. "Ferdinand Brunetière contre les intellectuels." *Mil Neuf Cent* 11 (1992): 66-70.
- Ory, Pascal. *Les Collaborateurs, 1940-1945*. Paris: Seuil, 1976.

- , ed. *Dernières questions aux intellectuels : et quatre essais pour y répondre*. Paris: Oliver Orban, 1990.
- Ouston, Philip. *The Imagination of Maurice Barres*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974.
- Racine, Nicole. Le manifeste du comité de vigilance des intellectuels antifascists
<http://biosoc.univ-paris1.fr/histoire/textimage/texte22.htm>.
- Rémond, René. *The Right-Wing in France from 1815 to de Gaulle*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966.
- Rieffel, Remy. *La Tribu des clercs; les intellectuels sous la V République, 1958-1990*. Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1993.
- Rièse, Laure. *Les Salons littéraires parisiens du second Empire à nos jours*. Paris: Privat, 1962.
- Ringer, Fritz. *Fields of Knowledge: French academic culture in comparative perspective, 1890-1920*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Rioux, Jean-Pierre. *Nationalisme et conservatisme: la ligue de la patrie française, 1899-1904*. Paris: Editions Beauchesne, 1977.
- Roger, Philippe. *The American Enemy: a Story of French Anti-Americanism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
- Rubenstein, Diane. *What's Left: The Ecole Normale Supérieure and the Right*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990.
- Rutkoff, Peter M. "The Ligue des Patriotes: the Nature of the Radical Right and the Dreyfus Affair." *French Historical Studies* 8 no. 4 (Autumn, 1974).
- , *Revanche and Revision: the Ligue des Patriotes and the Origins of the Radical Right in France, 1882-1900*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981.
- Saint Vincent, Bertrand de. *Jacques Laurent; biographie*. Paris: Julliard, 1995.
- Sapiro, Gisele. *La Guerre des écrivains; 1940-1953*. Paris: Fayard, 1999.
- Schalk, David. *War and the Ivory Tower: Algeria and Vietnam*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
- Sirinelli, Jean François. "Les intellectuels de droite de Boulanger à Poujade." *Magazine littéraire* (April 1982).
- , "Les intellectuels au miroir du siècle." *Magazine littéraire* (December 1987):18-23.
- Sirinelli, Jean-François and Pascal Ory. *Les intellectuels en France; de l'Affaire Dreyfus à nos jours*. Paris: A Colin, 1986.
- , *Generations Intellectuelles: Effects d'âge et phénomènes de génération dans le milieu intellectuel français*. Paris, Centre national de la recherche scientifique 1987.

- *Histoire des Droites en France*, vol. 2 *Cultures*. Paris: Gallimard, 1992.
- *Histoire des Droites en France*, vol. 3 *Sensibilités*. Paris: Gallimard, 1992.
- *Intellectuels et passions française: manifestes et pétitions au XXe siècle*. Paris: Fayard, 1990.
- Smith, Robert. *The Ecole Normale Supérieure and the Third Republic*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982.
- Sorella. *Histoire d'une amitié; nombreux textes inédits de Romain Rolland et d'Alphonse de Châteaubriant*. Paris: Librairie académique Perrin, 1962.
- Soucy, Robert. *Fascism in France: the case of Maurice Barres*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.
- *Fascist Intellectual: Drieu la Rochelle*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979.
- Sternhell, Zeev. *The Intellectual Revolt Against Liberal Democracy, 1870-1945*. Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1996.
- Sweets, John. *Choices in Vichy France: the French under Nazi occupation*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.
- Tannenbaum, Edward R. *The Action française; die-hard reactionaries in twentieth-century France* (New York: Wiley, 1962).
- Toda, Michel. *Henri Massis; un témoin de la droite intellectuelle*. Paris: La Table ronde, 1987.
- Trebitsch, Michel and Nicole Racine, ed. *Sociabilités Intellectuelles: lieux, milieux, réseaux*. l'Institut d'histoire du temps présent, 1992.
- "L'un et l'autre: Alphonse de Châteaubriant et Romain Rolland chois de letters." *Cahiers Romain Rolland* vol. 2 1915-1944. Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1983.
- Watts, Philip. *Allegories of the Purge: How Literature Responded to the Postwar Trials of Writers and Intellectuals in France*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998.
- Weber, Eugen. "Nationalism, Socialism, and National-Socialism in France." *French Historical Studies* 2 no. 3 (Spring, 1962).
- Weber, Eugen. *Action Française: royalism and reaction in twentieth-century France*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962.
- Wesseling, H. L. *Certain Ideas of France: Essays on French History and Civilization*. London: Greenwood Press, 2002.
- Wilkinson, James D. *The Intellectual Resistance in Europe*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.

Winock, Michel and Jacques Julliard. *Dictionnaire des intellectuels français: les personnes, les lieux, les moments*. Paris: Seuil, 1996.

Winock, Michel, ed. *La Droite depuis 1789; les hommes, les idées, les réseaux*. Paris: Seuil, 1995.

----- *Histoire de l'extrême droite en France*. Paris: Seuil, 1993.

----- *Le siècle des intellectuels*. Paris: Seuil, 1997.