THREE ESSAYS ON MORAL CULTURE

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ABSTRACT

STEPHEN BRADLEY VAISEY: Three Essays on Moral Culture
(under the direction of Andrew J. Perrin and Christian Smith)

The goal of this dissertation is to examine empirically the role that morality plays in social life. The first two chapters use data from the National Study of Youth and Religion to investigate the role that different understandings of good and bad, right and wrong, play in shaping the lives of U.S. teenagers. The first chapter advances a new theoretical model for understanding the role that moral cultures play in shaping action. Drawing on sociological practice theories and work in cognitive science, it outlines a "dual process theory of culture in action," which holds that most cultural motivation operates at an unconscious level. Consistent with this model, the data analysis shows that individualist moralities tend to foster both more drug use and less civic engagement even though evidence from in-depth suggests that teenagers are largely unable to articulate these moral differences. The second chapter explores how different moral understandings shape social interaction over time. An analyses of ego network data between 2002 and 2005 demonstrates that teenagers with different moral understandings develop friendship networks with different proportions of drug users, those who frequently get in trouble, and regular volunteers. Once again, there is evidence that individualist moralities tend to promote more association with deviant peers and less association with civically engaged peers. The final chapter uses data from Benjamin Zablocki's Urban Communes Project to explore the relationship between shared moral worldview and community. An analysis of

data from 50 urban communes collected in 1974 shows that shared moral order is the best predictor of the degree to which a group's participants experience it as a true community. Further analyses using fuzzy set methods, however, show that shared moral order must work together with specific structural arrangements in order to ensure the experience of community. Taken together, these studies suggest that morality is a vital dimension of social life that deserves further investigation by sociologists.

ACKNOWLEGEMENTS

This dissertation—like my entire graduate school experience—could not have happened as it did without the support and assistance of many people. I would first like to thank my co-chairs. Chris Smith was the first to suggest that I study morality and thus inadvertently set me on a path likely to occupy me for the next few decades. He also introduced me to Charles Taylor, whose writings have become so central to my thinking. That Taylor reading group was in some ways the real launching point of my intellectual career. Chris also provided me the chance to get involved with the National Study of Youth and Religion, which has been the raw material for so much of the work I have done and the training I have received. Beyond that, he has been an unwavering supporter (financial and otherwise) as well as an exemplar of the kind of research I want to pursue. It is not an exaggeration to say that my life would look almost nothing like it does now were it not for him. Thanks, Chris. Andy Perrin, my other chair, introduced me to this strange thing called "culture" and helped me on many occasions to translate my thoughts into something my fellow culturalists might care about. From my very first semester of grad school, Andy gave me a long leash and loads of useful feedback even when I wasn't making much sense. (I still have in my top desk drawer the thoughtful comments he gave me on my first ever grad school paper on "evolutionary sociology.") Andy's willingness to let me go my own way and give me the benefit of the doubt have been exactly the kind of advising I needed. Thanks, Andy.

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To Rebekah, Delia, Milo, Eloise, and Oliver

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INTRODUCTION

Culture is everywhere. After two or three decades of focusing almost exclusively on "hard" social structures like occupation and class, sociologists have once again turned toward thinking about the world of ideas, beliefs, and symbols. Researchers who study everything from economic markets to social movements to religion are abuzz about cultural toolkits, repertoires, narratives, discourse, framing, and more. All this talk about culture, however, masks a single glaring fact: there is no current theory of culture that takes seriously its *causal* role. In the current thinking, culture is something people *use* to solve problems, to make sense of their lives, and to justify their actions and choices to others when socially required. It is learned in fragmented bits and then "deployed" and "mobilized" in strategic ways. Despite the many virtues of this approach, it has come at a high cost. We no longer have a compelling account of how culture might independently motivate and give direction to individual action rather than merely playing a "channeling" role for structural imperatives or a legitimating role for the pursuit of expected utility. For this reason, current theories of culture are less than useful for helping us solve the puzzle of why certain people choose to do some things rather than others.

The goal of this dissertation is to present three pieces of research that take seriously the specifically causal role that culture can play in human life. My particular focus here is on *moral culture*. This term has two parts, and I will attempt to define both. First, I follow Christian Smith (2003:8) and adopt Charles Taylor's definition of morality,

which is "discriminations of right and wrong, better or worse, higher or lower, which are not rendered valid by our own desires, inclinations, or choices, but rather stand independently of these and offer standards by which they can be judged." Second, by culture, I refer to patterns of meanings that are thematically shared by social groups, thus excluding purely individual or idiosyncratic mental contents. Therefore by *moral culture* I refer to widely available themes for thinking about right and wrong, better or worse, and so on. The three papers in this dissertation have the common goal of trying to understand how these shared themes shape outcomes in different areas of social life.

Chapter 1, "Toward a Dual-Process Theory of Culture in Action," outlines the theoretical case for understanding cultural causation at the micro level and provides an empirical demonstration of the theory's usefulness. Building on an engagement between the sociological practice theories of Giddens and Bourdieu, on the one hand, and dual-process theories of cognition on the other, the theory moves toward a better understanding of how culture can both motivate behavior and justify it after the fact. In the process, I argue that this theory is able to make sense of contradictory findings from quantitative and qualitative methods as well as between subfields like the sociology of religion and the sociology of culture. More specifically, using data from two waves of the National Study of Youth and Religion, this paper shows that different moral understandings are associated with different trajectories in marijuana use and volunteering, with "individualist" teenagers more likely to engage in the former, and less likely to engage in the latter.

Chapter 2, "Moral Cultures and Network Composition," takes the argument in Chapter 1 a step further. Rather than arguing that moral understandings are able to shape

behavior *net of* the social context, I argue in this paper that moral understandings are also able to *shape* that context over time. Also using Waves 1 and 2 of the National Study of Youth and Religion, this paper looks at how different moral worldviews shape the composition of social networks over time. In parallel to the findings of Chapter 1, this research finds that, relative to community and religious worldviews, individualist moral worldviews lead to increases in the number of friends who use drugs and are often in trouble and decreases in the number of friends that are regular volunteers. Taken together, then, Chapters 1 and 2 strongly suggest that differences in moral-cultural worldviews translate into different behavioral and interactional trajectories.

Chapter 3, "Structure, Culture, and Community," looks at moral culture at a different level of analysis. Here, rather than considering processes at the individual level, the cases are urban communes from the mid-1970s. Rather than considering the substantive content of moral cultures, at issue in this chapter are the consequences of the formal property of moral-cultural *sharedness*. Specifically, this paper looks at how shared ideology is related to the experience of community among each group's members. Using multivariate regression, the findings show that a shared moral worldview is the single best predictor of whether or not the group manifests a high degree of "we-feeling." Interestingly, the regression results show that other factors like authority and extent of interaction have either null or negative effects when shared moral order is controlled. Fuzzy set techniques supplement these findings in three ways. First, they show that strong moral orders almost always co-occur with structural characteristics that support them. Second, they show that strong moral orders must join with structural characteristics to be sufficient to produce the we-feeling. Third, they suggest that moral order, while not

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a strictly necessary condition for producing the we-feeling, is a necessary part of all the causal recipes that do produce it.

Though these pieces of research address different outcomes and levels of analysis, they point to a common conclusion: that culture is vital for understanding why some things happen and others do not. The current understandings of culture as "repertoires of justification" (Boltanksi and Thévenot 2006) or "toolkits" (Swidler 2001) are not sufficient to model the role that cultural differences play in social life. It is my hope that the research contained in this dissertation will help promote debate and help move sociology toward a more robust understanding of how culture matters.

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CHAPTER 1: TOWARD A DUAL PROCESS THEORY OF CULTURE IN ACTION

This paper seeks to move toward a more satisfactory answer to a simple question: What role do cultural beliefs play in people's behavior? Contemporary sociologists who care about this question—mainly those who study culture and religion—are necessarily nagged by a basic theoretical confusion. One the one hand, scholars claim that cultural beliefs about what is good or bad, right or wrong, are tools that people use to solve their everyday problems. According to this view, culture is best viewed as a loose repertoire of justifications that rationalize or make sense of the choices that individuals make in their lives (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999; Swidler 2001). On the other hand, the idea that cultural beliefs or values play a motivational role in shaping behavior remains, primarily in studies of religion (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004; Lakoff 2002; Smith 2003; Smith and Denton 2005). Even there, however, this perspective is declining somewhat, as many researchers are beginning to apply the notion of problem-solving "repertoire" to religious beliefs (Bartkowski and Read 2003; Clydesdale 1997; Emerson and Smith 2000; Lamont, Schmalzbauer, Waller and Weber 1996; Smilde 2005). While motivational and justificatory understandings of culture are not necessarily contradictory, the choice to apply one or the other to a specific empirical problem seems largely a matter of the researcher's personal preference (Jackson 2006). There is little sense of how one might coherently combine the intuitively appealing possibility that culture matters both as a social and psychological justification *and* as a motivation for action. The goal of this

paper is to take one step toward synthesizing these two distinct conceptualizations of culture by offering a dual-process model of cultural cognition.

My argument has four parts. First, I briefly outline the history of the motivation/ justification split in cultural theory and show that both the older Weberian/Parsonian and the newer toolkit or repertoire views of culture make the assumption that the link between beliefs and behavior are to be found in conscious thought. I outline some compelling reasons to question this assumption.

Second, I introduce insights from sociological "practice theories" and research in psychology and neuroscience that may provide a useful and empirically-grounded synthesis of the motivational and justificatory perspective. I offer a heuristic model that distinguishes between automatic and deliberative cognition and considers the relationship of each to cultural beliefs. I argue that while most moral *justification* occurs at the conscious level, most moral *evaluation* occurs below the level of conscious awareness. This suggests that we can profitably extend Bourdieu's concept of habitus from the realm of "good art" and "good music" to "the good" more generally.

Third, I consider some of the substantive and practical implications of the model sketched in part two. Because there is good reason to believe that practical consciousness is more operative in everyday behavior, surveys (which rely more on implicit knowledge) may be better suited than interviews for investigating the belief-behavior link. Taken by themselves, interview methods (relying as they do on discursive cognition that is specialized for social justification) may produce results that exaggerate the incoherence of cultural forms and downplay the motivational role of moral culture.

Fourth, I provide an empirical illustration of the model using both interview and longitudinal survey data from the National Study of Youth and Religion. This exercise demonstrates the consistency and usefulness of the dual-process model. The empirical results specifically show that, net of a host of structural controls, young people who identified with relational (i.e., community-based) and theistic moral worldviews in 2002 were much less likely to use drugs and much more likely to volunteer in 2005 than those who had endorsed individualist moral schemas. I conclude by suggesting some practical ways to improve empirical research and theory in the sociological study of culture and religion.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Tracing the Split between Motivation and Justification

Once upon a time, sociologists believed that people were motivated by the values they learned from society. From Weber's *zweckrationalitat* to Parsons' voluntarist theory of action, the idea that consciously desired ends provide the motivation for individual behavior was a building block of sociological theory (see Campbell 2006). Culture was held to be the repository of those values which were transmitted via socialization from parents, schools, and churches to children (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004; Joas 1996, 2000). A few decades ago, however, this assumption began to undergo a sustained critique from a number of sources.

Though C. Wright Mills questioned the causal power of moral beliefs as early as 1940, his position did not become mainstream until more than four decades later. Mills' (1940) view that cultural beliefs provide justifications rather than motivations for

behavior found its most influential proponent in Ann Swidler, who famously critiqued values as "the unmoved mover in the theory of action" (Swidler 1986, p. 274).[1] In some respects this was a bold claim, but in others, it was an idea whose time had arrived. Just as Swidler's essay was published in the *American Sociological Review*, social movement scholars, for example, were moving away from the idea of ideological motivation toward a notion of "framing" as persuasive social practice (e.g., Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford 1986). Around the same time, Goffman's "dramaturgical" perspective—which focuses on the ways actors manipulate symbols and appearances—had reached the height of its popularity.[2] Consistent with their larger theoretical project, symbolic interactionists disregarded any thought of subjective states in favor of *inter*subjective states; from there, it is a short jump to conclude that beliefs are the product of the situation rather than a possible influence upon them (Campbell 1996).

In other quarters, scholars enamored of the Marxist perspective were beginning to take culture seriously—not as a causal factor in its own right, but as a necessary prerequisite for the expression of material imperatives (Bourdieu 1984). Scott and Lyman's (1968) influential paper on "accounts" was amplified by neo-institutionalists who emphasize cultural legitimacy as an external environment of action that otherwise rational organizations have to face rather than as shaping action in any motivational way (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977; see also Alexander 2003:23). Rethinking culture as a tool of social sense-making instead of a motive force was not

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[1] For brevity and clarity, I focus the discussion around the work of Ann Swidler (1986, 2001), undoubtedly the most well-known and exemplary member of the "justificatory" or "situationalist" school among sociological students of culture. For a much more comprehensive account of the rise of "situationalism" in action theory, see Campbell (1996).

[2] As reflected among other things in Goffman's 1982 election to the presidency of the American Sociological Association.

confined to any single subfield, but was simply part of the sociological *zeitgeist* in the mid-1980s.

Yet Swidler's critique was not simply fashionable or faddish. It was based on two key empirical observations. The first was a novel and highly insightful interpretation of Weber's *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Swidler argued that while the ideology of Protestantism (e.g., the concern with glorifying God through work) gave way to that of capitalism, the practices—thrift, industry, and so on—persisted. From this, she concludes that what survive and causally matter are not primarily ideas or beliefs, but "strategies of action"; in other words, the behavioral habits, styles, and skills that actors bring to bear on the problems of everyday life.

This societal-level realization was further strengthened by a second, more "micro" observation, one that was not fully codified until her 2001 book, *Talk of Love*. This second insight is that individuals are *remarkably bad* at giving consistent reasons for or explanations of their behavior. In her discussions about marriage with middle-class Americans, she found little evidence that ideology or beliefs motivate action. Rather, she found that people tend "to trim their philosophy to fit their action commitments" (2001, p. 148). That is, people embedded in different social networks and under different kinds of institutional pressures may act differently in their marriages, but the *reasons* they give for their actions are efficacious only in that they "make sense" of these actions, both to network alters and to the actors themselves. In this view, even one's one self or identity is not causally consequential for behavior. Evangelical Protestants, for example, as just as likely as others—Swidler argues—to understand their marriages through a framework of "what makes me happy." Though Swidler outlines three types of selves—utilitarian,

attuned, and disciplined—she does not accord these self-constructions any motivational power. Instead, the self is simply "one of many tools" a person may "pick up or put down" in the course of social interaction (2001, p. 24). According to the toolkit or repertoire model, this is "how culture matters."

It should be noted here that though Swidler is the most oft-cited proponent of the toolkit or repertoire approach to culture, her view is by no means idiosyncratic (see Campbell 1996; Hechter et al. 1999). For example, Boltanski and Thévenot (1999) refer to moral justification as a socially required sense-making phenomenon; DiMaggio (1997, 2002) argues that we grab bits of culture seemingly at random to justify ourselves; Lamont (1992) sees symbolic repertoires serving primarily as tools of social inclusion and exclusion; and Lichterman (1996) claims that moral languages are simply different ways of talking while we go about the "life-ways" (action habits or customs) we learn in organizations and networks. Even scholars who might not identify with the "justificatory" school tend to assume a priori that the pressure to maintain particular beliefs is social rather than intrapsychic (e.g., Martin 2000). Though the terminology may differ, most sociologists now see culture as rationalizing or making sense of action rather than motivating it (Hechter et al. 1999). Swidler is simply the recent theorist who has done the most to work out an *explicit* formulation of this view.

An Unstated Premise of "Toolkit Theory"

The intellectual history of the justificatory view is too complex to trace here, but Swidler (2001) nicely sums up its logic. The argument goes something like this: people generally pursue consistent lines of action; however, when asked to explain these lines of

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action, people invariably give contradictory or incoherent accounts of their motives. Being contradictory, the accounts themselves cannot really be motivating and we must therefore turn outside the person's subjectivity to find the true springs of action. These springs of action are found in institutions, because they have the power to control "departures from the [institutionalized] pattern" via application of "rewards and sanctions" (Jepperson, quoted in Swidler 2001). Therefore institutions both large (e.g., the legal structure of marriage) and small (e.g., my friends) are what drive action, while culture is what helps makes sense of these actions.[3]

This argument for toolkit theory is simple, insightful, and elegant. It turns out, however, that it is also based on unrealistic assumptions about the necessary cognitive link between cultural beliefs and motivation. Swidler assumes that if cultural beliefs were, in fact, motivational, they would have to be grounded in articulable, rule-like cognitive structures. Moreover, she assumes that if beliefs were motives we would find consistency between the moral beliefs people articulate and their subsequent actions. (That is, if people *really* believed in the romantic model of marriage, they would divorce the instant their marriage no longer promised fulfillment.) Failing to find either pattern, Swidler concludes that the contradictory beliefs her informants articulate must be causally unrelated to action itself. DiMaggio (1997, 2002) makes a similar point. He argues that people indeed know a lot more culture than they use, and that much of this cultural information is contradictory and stored away without reference to its truth value. It follows from this reasoning that the cultural schemas people internalize (being

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[3] It is not tenable to suggest here that toolkit theorists are only interested in post hoc "sense making" and are unconcerned with the processes—subjective or otherwise—that give rise to action itself. As I have shown above, toolkit theory is founded in an *express denial* of the causal power of subjective states (Mills 1940; Scott and Lyman 1968; Swidler 1986; see also Campbell 1996; Hechter et al. 1999).

contradictory) cannot *themselves* be the reasons behind observed behavior. Consistent with the institutional and network focus of toolkit theory, DiMaggio maintains that we should look to the "external environment" for the social cues that activate particular cultural schemas rather than others in different situations.

The power of this argument is in its simplicity, yet accepting it, as I will show, also requires accepting an unstated premise: that moral decision-making (were it to occur) would have to be a deliberative, conscious affair. One the face of it, this premise seems uncontroversial. The primary moral philosophical tradition going back to Kant holds that moral judgment is a matter of logical reasoning. In a more recent incarnation, the dominant empirical research program on moral psychology makes the same assumption, and asks people to reason deliberately through moral dilemmas in order to arrive at correct decisions (Kohlberg 1981). Even utilitarianism, the main philosophical competitor to the Kantian, deontological approach, prescribes extensive mathematical computation about the relative happiness that a decision will confer on oneself and others (Haidt 2005).[4] Given its distinguished intellectual heritage, one can hardly fault toolkit and repertoire theorists for not questioning the unstated premise that morality relies on conscious deliberation, either regarding one's duty or in order to maximize personal or collective utility.

Yet there are, in fact, very serious reasons to question it. Over the past decade or so, many scholars have reached a consensus that recognizes two primary levels of consciousness—deliberative and automatic—and understands that most of our evaluations and decision-making occur below the level of conscious awareness. I will

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[4] Incidentally, the battle between deontological and utilitarian approaches to morality also took on sociological form, respectively, in normative (Parsons, Durkheim) and instrumentalist (rational choice) theories of action (see Joas 1996).

outline this evidence from two different directions. I begin with insights from the "practice theories" of Giddens and Bourdieu. Though these theorists have many followers, their insights into the dual nature of consciousness have either largely been neglected or treated as an optional "point of view." Next, I provide a brief overview of developments in psychology and neuroscience that confirm and clarify the prescient insights of these sociological theorists. Because of the lack of links between sociology and these disciplines, it is no surprise that cultural sociologists have not been aware of these developments. (Plus, as DiMaggio [1997] rightly points out, the "interpretivist" style of most cultural sociologists does not lend itself to integrating the "positivist" research findings of cognitive scientists.) After outlining the evidence for dual-process theory, I return to repertoire theory, question it in light of this discussion, and discuss several empirical and methodological implications of the comparison.

"THE DIVIDED SELF"

Practice Theories in Sociology

Giddens (1984) was among the first contemporary sociological theorists to highlight the difference between discursive and practical levels of consciousness.[5] His concern with the "stratified self" emerged from an insightful critique of Goffman, who famously demonstrated that people go out of their way to manage appearances and coordinate face-saving rituals. Giddens argues that though Goffman's work is indeed

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[5] Camic (1986) offers an important discussion of the concept of "habit" in early sociological theory. In light of that discussion, I certainly do not argue here that Giddens and Bourdieu were the first to take "practical consciousness" seriously. I focus on these two "practice theorists," however, because their work in this area has broad contemporary influence and its general familiarity will spare the necessity of establishing in detail their position on the subject.

brilliant, it lacks an important ingredient—an account of motivation. While Goffman

focuses on how people manage their self-presentation, and maintain order in their lives,

Giddens asks, *Why* on earth do people go through all this trouble? Drawing on Erickson

and Freud, Giddens argues that motivation is unconscious, and grounded in what he calls

the need for "ontological security"—a sense that the world is meaningful and stable.

Pierre Bourdieu's work also provides an account that relies on the power of

unconscious dispositions. In *Distinction*, for instance, Bourdieu argues that the

inclination to pursue different types of art, music, and literature, is not conscious at all.

Rather, he seems to suggest that these motives come from an unconscious tendency to

reproduce one's class position (Bourdieu 1984).[6] Whereas I might argue that I love

beauty and excellence for its own sake, my pursuit and enjoyment of high culture are

unconsciously motivated by my class position and tend to recreate it. Though Bourdieu's

field theory is more general than this (see Martin 2003), it is vital to remember that

according to Bourdieu himself, the unconscious dispositions of the habitus cannot be

understood without simultaneous reference to capital and field—or more specifically, to

one's position in the field generated by the intersection of economic and cultural capital

(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Thus, while Giddens grounds unconscious motivation in

the need for ontological security, Bourdieu grounds an actor's dispositions towards action

in the deployment and reproduction of one's mix of capitals.

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[6] See Bourdieu's *Logic of Practice* (1990) for a more general version of this argument.

Neuroscience and Psychology

Though the practice theories of Giddens and Bourdieu differ from one another in some respects, cognitive science has confirmed their shared insight into the stratified nature of consciousness. There is neither the space nor the need to conduct a thorough review of the related literature here, since there are many good and accessible reviews.[7] The idea that human cognition is based on two basic processes—one automatic and largely unconscious, one slow and largely conscious—is now uncontroversial in neuroscience and psychology (Chaiken and Trope 1999; Greene et al. 2004; Schwarz 1998; Wilson 2002). As I will argue below, understanding the different ways these processes operate is key to understanding the role of beliefs in sociological models of human behavior.

Based on this work in dual-process theory, social psychologist Jonathan Haidt (2001, 2005) offers a useful metaphor for summarizing this "divided self": a rider on the back of an elephant. The rider, which represents our conscious processes, is the part of ourselves we know best—she can talk, reason, and explain things to our heart's content. Yet, for the most part, she is not in charge. The elephant, which stands for our automatic processes, is larger and stronger than the rider, and is totally unencumbered by the need, or the ability, to justify itself. Driven by the simple mechanism of attraction and repulsion (what Haidt colloquially calls the "like-o-meter"), the elephant goes where it wants. As the metaphor implies, the rider is no match for the elephant in a direct struggle. While the rider usually only pretends to be in control, she *can* slowly train the elephant over time, or perhaps trick it into going a different way. But in any given moment, the elephant—

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[7] One popular treatment of this literature that may be familiar to many sociologists is *Blink*, by Malcolm Gladwell (2005).

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practical consciousness—is usually in charge. For the most part, this is a tremendously

advantageous thing. Having a durable practical consciousness means that rather than

having to weigh the pros and cons of our beliefs and routines on a daily basis (e.g.,

"Well, should I go to work again today?") we can leave some things up to cumulated

habits. Having to consciously reevaluate one's political leanings, religious commitments,

hygienic habits, and life goals on a daily basis would be cognitively overwhelming.

Though the rider/elephant metaphor may be intuitively attractive to some, it is

important to note that it is *not* simply a metaphor but a heuristic encapsulation of decades

of neurological and psychological research (Chaiken and Trope 1999; Wilson 2002). It is

also imperative to point out that reliance on neuroscience and psychology to develop a

more realistic model of human cognition is by no means reductionistic. Rather,

acknowledging "the elephant" provides a validated mechanism for understanding an

important way in which society can "get into" human beings that is homologous with

Giddens's practical consciousness and Bourdieu's habitus.[8] These insights can remove

some of the sting of "black box" critiques that have been leveled against the habitus (e.g.,

Boudon 1998).

Toward a Synthesis

While neuroscience and psychology are essential for understanding the *form* or

process of the divided self, sociology is particularly suited to understanding its

substantive *content*. What makes up the elephant? What kinds of things does it like or

dislike? Psychologists are good at specifying general characteristics of the elephant, such

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[8] Because the focus here is on action rather than on socialization, this paper is more concerned with the *effects* of particular forms of practical consciousness than with their *origins*. Future research will consider the social sources of different forms of practical consciousness.

as the seemingly universal tendency toward reciprocity. But there is much more to social cognition than human universals. Might not some of the elephant's tendencies be socially pattered, differing systematically across "cognitive subcultures" (Zerubavel 1997)? Bourdieu's research into aesthetic judgment offers an obvious "yes" to this question, but there is no need to believe a priori that the habitus is limited to evaluating tastes or even discriminating among other class-linked goods. Developing a more thorough understanding of the "elephant" – habitus, or practical consciousness – may help us answer the question motivating this paper: what is the role of cultural and moral beliefs in people's behavior?

A substantial amount of evidence supports the assertion that not only consciously stated values and beliefs but also moral intuitions—the unreflective likes and dislikes of practical consciousness—vary between cultures. Cultural psychologist and anthropologist Richard Shweder and colleagues have outlined a cross-culturally validated typology of three major ethics: the ethic of *autonomy*, concerned with harm, rights, and justice; the ethic of *community*, concerned with role obligations; and the ethic of *divinity*, concerned with maintaining purity and not violating the "natural" order (Shweder 2003). This three part typology is remarkably similar to the individualist, community-centered, and religious typology that Bellah offers.[9] Though Shweder himself talks about these three ethics mainly in terms of "discourse," psychological research has associated them with varied emotions and intuitions about right and wrong in natural and experimental settings (Haidt 2001; Rozin, Lowery, Imada and Haidt 1999; Wheatley and Haidt 2005). These studies have shown important differences in moral intuitions between (for example)

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[9] Close parallels can also be found with Triandis's vertical/horizontal and individualist/collectivist typology (Triandis 1995; Oishi et al. 1998) and Mary Douglas's group/grid typology (Douglas and Ney 1998).

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India, Brazil, and the United States, but also between political liberals and conservatives in the United States. Culture shapes emotions and intuitions as well as acceptable forms of talk (compare Scott and Lyman 1968).

These findings can easily be translated in sociologically useful ways. There is also a growing acknowledgement that (despite Bourdieu's assertion) the habitus can serve as a general theoretical tool apart from its relationship to stratifying forms of capital.[10] For instance, Raymond Lau (2004) and Andrew Sayer (2005) have argued that the habitus should best be thought of as produced by many kinds of experience—class-based, family-based, and so on. Sayer in particular contends that moral concerns are central to a complete understanding of habitus. After all, if a working class person can internalize from experience that classical music is "not for the likes of us," couldn't (say) some evangelical Protestants internalize the notion that pornography is "not for the likes of us" and turn away from it in disgust, no matter what arguments are offered to justify it? In essence, Sayer revives parts of the classical notion of habitus that Bourdieu ignored, and invites us to extend the logic of Bourdieu's theory from "good music" or "good art" to "the good" more generally.

Cognitive anthropologists Claudia Strauss and Naomi Quinn (1997) make a similar argument, explicitly likening Bourdieu's habitus to the unconscious schemas that people develop through life experience. Strauss and Quinn's argument is particularly important for sociologists of culture because their use of the "schema" concept is significantly different than that typically employed by sociologists of culture (compare DiMaggio 1997). While there is indeed evidence that people file away bits and pieces of

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[10] Michèle Lamont (1992) has similarly argued that Bourdieu overemphasizes "capitals" at the expense of morality, but grounded her multivalent scheme in conscious "repertoires of evaluation" rather than in an internalized habitus.

culture and draw on them strategically (say, to win an argument), cognitive anthropologists have also come to the conclusion that some cultural schemas are more internalized than others. Far from rejecting the notion of internalized beliefs and values, D'Andrade discusses how "the beliefs and values of a culture may be internalized" through "secondary appraisals [i.e., cultural talk] and the cultural shaping of emotion" (p. 227). D'Andrade outlines four levels of internalization, from simple acquisition, to the "cliché stage," to belief, to belief with high salience. He contends that while the lower stages of internalization (on which DiMaggio 1997 focuses) concern classification, cultural knowledge, and social reasoning, the final stage becomes truly motivational: "this cultural shaping of emotions gives certain cultural representations emotional force, in that individuals experience the truth and rightness of certain ideas as emotions within themselves" (p. 229). He then spends the next fourteen pages discussing precisely how cultural representations can serve as motives for action in some persons and groups. In sum, while arguing contra earlier anthropologists (e.g., Geertz 1973) that cultural schemas are not perfectly shared or perfectly internalized by all members of a given society, cognitive anthropology has certainly not rejected the idea of "culture as values that suffuse other aspects of belief, intention, and collective life [in favor of one that sees] culture as complex, rule-like structures that can be put to strategic use" (DiMaggio 1997, p. 264-5).

Consistent with this logic, Strauss and Quinn (1997) do not talk of schemas as things that are "deployed" like cultural tools, but rather as deep, largely unconscious knowledge structures that facilitate perception and interpretation. Their use of the word "schema" is much more like Zerubavel's (1997) notion of "social mindscape" than like a

cultural tool. Indeed, one might argue, as do Strauss and Quinn, that schemas serve as the building blocks of the habitus, disposing us to interpret present events in light of past experience. This view is eminently compatible with Bourdieu's own definition of habitus: "systems of durable transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations ... *without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends* or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them" (Bourdieu 1990, p. 52; emphasis added). Unlike Bourdieu, but similar to Lau and Sayer, Strauss and Quinn do not privilege the "structuring power" of different forms of capital, but rather proceed inductively and empirically to discover experiences that may have formed the schemas of their informants.

The model that emerges from combining practice theories with recent work in neuroscience and psychology is relatively straightforward, but differs significantly from the one most empirical researchers bring to bear (explicitly or implicitly) when studying cultural beliefs. What is offered here is a dual-process model of cultural cognition: actors are driven primarily by deeply internalized automatic processes (the "elephant"/practical consciousness/habitus) yet also capable of deliberation (the "rider"/discursive consciousness). This simple model is a potentially powerful theoretical heuristic. For the purposes of examining the importance of cultural beliefs for behavior, this model also opens up space for considering how beliefs and worldviews might operate through automatic cognition. In the next section, I outline some of the practical implications of the basic dual-process model.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

Taking the existence of the elephant seriously and combining it with insights from sociology and related disciplines does not take us all the way toward a complete theory of how values, culture, and morality matter in shaping people's behavior. Yet it does two important things. First, it tempers our excitement about the evidence that has been offered for the justificatory, toolkit, or repertoire perspective. As I argued above, the evidence repertoire theorists provide for this view rests on a highly questionable implicit premise (albeit one with a distinguished pedigree)—that beliefs, worldviews, and morality would have to operate through conscious thought to be causally efficacious. In the language of Haidt's metaphor, Swidler's discussions, for example, are with the rider alone. This empirical method cannot rule out the possibility that deeply internalized *moral* attractions and repulsions (grounded in automatic processes) are patterned in motivationally important ways. The foregoing argument suggests that some of her respondents would be less likely to divorce than others—even if their friends were divorcing—because of internalized habits of moral judgment they cannot, themselves, articulate clearly. However, since Swidler does not treat culture as a predictor but rather as an outcome, we cannot know whether the "culture talk" her respondents rely on is correlated with different types of marital outcomes.[11] Thus, we must look for additional evidence to bolster or question her conclusions about the ways culture matters.

The second implication of the model is that methods matter, and that they matter in a very specific way. The unstructured or semi-structured interview puts us in direct contact with the rider, but probably gives us little leverage on the elephant. The rider is

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[11] Lamont and colleagues (1996) also treat cultural-moral boundaries as products of social location rather than as predictors of behavior.

incredibly good at offering reasons, which may not be at all related to the real motives behind a person's behavior. For instance, in split brain studies, experimenters have directly exploited this discursive/ automatic divide by flashing different pictures to different sides of a participant's field of vision (and therefore to different sides of the brain). In Gazzaniga's celebrated study (quoted in [Haidt 2005]), a picture of a chicken claw was flashed to the side of the brain which specializes in language while a picture of a house covered with snow was simultaneously flashed to the other side. When asked to select from a card the picture that goes best with what he or she had seen, the patient's right hand pointed to a chicken and the left hand pointed to a shovel. When the experimenter asked for an explanation of these choices, the patient inevitably said something like, "You need a shovel to clean out the chicken coop," completely unaware that the choice of the shovel was motivated by having seen a snow-covered scene. As Swidler (2001) and others have correctly noted, we are very good at providing justifications for our behavior, even when they have little to do with our true motivations.

While these studies prove nothing per se for sociologists, this line of reasoning suggests an unorthodox methodological possibility: interviews may not be the best way to understand how people make most judgments. Carefully constructed and implemented, surveys may be better suited to the study of the culture-action link. (Experiments, though powerful tests of specific formal processes, seem less well-suited for exploring the culture-action link in everyday life.) Indeed, in a domain more closely related to sociology, moral psychological research comparing the Moral Judgment Interview, an open ended instrument, and the Defining Issues Test, a fixed-response survey, suggests that the fixed response format yields better estimates of people's actual moral decision

processes (Narvaez and Bock 2002). This is because—consistent with a dual-process model of discursive and practical consciousness—most of the knowledge we bring to bear in everyday life is tacit and schematic rather than explicit and deliberative.

Again, neuroscientific research points in a similar direction. In other studies of patients whose corpus callosa had been severed, researchers flashed pictures of objects to different sides of a patient's field of vision. When a picture of a shape was flashed to the side corresponding to the brain's language center, the patient was able to report that he had seen that shape. Conversely, when the same picture was flashed to the other side of the field of vision, the patient was unable to report this verbally. Yet, when asked to select from a list of shapes, he could select the correct one (Gazzaniga 1987). Thus, just as a six year old is very good as recognizing incorrect grammar (e.g., she knows that "he are" is incorrect) while remaining unable to explain *why* it is incorrect, we seem better able to recognize our tacit beliefs than to explain them to an interlocutor. This is entirely consistent with Giddens's view of practical consciousness.

Let me summarize the methodological implications of this model by analogy. If talking about our mental processes with an interviewer is like describing a criminal suspect to a sketch artist, then answering survey questions is like picking a suspect out of a line up. The latter is simply much less cognitively demanding and more accurate, provided the right answers are in the survey "line up." Getting the right line up is, of course, the function of good theory. Again, this is not an argument *from* metaphor, but a metaphoric illustration of an argument based on extensive empirical evidence that is eminently compatible with sociological practice theories. Well-designed survey questions may measure practical knowledge better because they present the respondent with

situations that are homologous to the quasi-aesthetic processes of judgment at work in daily life. When we hear a survey question, we simply have to pick the response our practical consciousness prefers; the response that seems right to us (and *for* us). Similarly, all of Bourdieu's respondents in *Distinction* surely thought they listened to "good music," yet their responses were patterned in sociologically interpretable ways. In the same way, we may be able to rely on respondents' choice from a fixed list of moral schemas to predict their morally-relevant behavior. The following section illustrates this possibility empirically.

AN EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATION OF THE MODEL

If the dual-process, rider-on-an-elephant, model of moral culture outlined above is indeed correct, it suggests two empirical propositions:

PROPOSITION 1: Because discursive consciousness is largely uninvolved in routine moral decision-making, interview respondents will tend to be incoherent and self-contradictory in explaining how they make moral decisions;

PROPOSITION 2: Because the practical consciousness (or moral habitus) knows which survey responses it prefers (even if it can't explain why), respondents' choice of moral schema in surveys will be predictive of their future morally-relevant behavior.

It should be noted here that only the dual-process model of culture can integrate both of these propositions into its logic. The classical means-ends or "voluntarist" view

would be most consistent with the data if interviews and surveys yielded similar strong associations between moral beliefs and behavior. The toolkit or repertoire view, on the other hand, would assume that neither interviews nor surveys would be causally connected to important outcomes once social networks and institutional locations are accounted for.

Data and Analytic Strategy

The data I will use to illustrate the model come from in-depth interviews and a two-wave telephone survey included in the National Study of Youth and Religion, a large, multiyear, multimethod investigation in which I was directly involved. The telephone survey began in 2002 and obtained completed surveys from 3,290 respondents, ages 13-18. The Wave 2 survey in 2005 contacted around 79 percent of these respondents, then aged 15-20. I personally conducted around 35 in-depth interviews with respondents over a period of over two years. I also have read through the 264 interview transcripts from the first wave and the 122 from the second wave. In addition, the researchers who were involved in the Wave 1 and Wave 2 interviewing spent a week together (after each wave) talking about general patterns and striving for consensus on major themes. For more information on the general study design, see Smith and Denton (2005) and youthandreligion.org.

While Proposition 2 can be shown to be accurate here in a statistical sense, Proposition 1 is not susceptible to quick demonstration. Because "tending to incoherence and self-contradiction" are evaluations arrived at over time and by reading (and conducting) hundreds of interviews, I cannot offer a simple, compelling illustration.

Furthermore, this proposition has already been amply demonstrated by other research on moral beliefs and decision-making (Bellah et. al [1985] 1996; Swidler 2001). Instead, I will offer quotations from interviews that illustrate rather than "prove" the overall pattern that I and the other interviewers noted in the NSYR. This pattern is consistent with that already noted in the literature.

To provide the best possible illustration of the model, I examine semi-structured discussions and survey questions related to two behavioral and network outcomes—smoking marijuana, volunteering, and having friends that engage in both these practices. These two outcomes represent both proscriptive and prescriptive elements of moral judgment (Joas 2000). Smoking marijuana is "deviant" behavior that is generally discouraged by society, while volunteering is a prosocial behavior that is generally encouraged. To measure marijuana use, I use a survey question that asked: "How often, if ever, do you use marijuana?" and has 7 response categories from "never" to "once a day or more." For the measure of marijuana use, the Wave 1 response categories were somewhat different, with four possible responses ranging from never to "use it regularly." To measure volunteering, I use a question that asked, "In the last year, how much, if at all, have you done organized volunteer work or community service?" The response categories are "never," "a few times," "occasionally," and "regularly."

I use a single variable to measure the moral schema that resonates best with each respondent. Consistent with previous research on moral judgment (Hunter 2000), I rely on a question designed to mirror the moral typology developed in *Habits of the Heart* (Bellah et al. [1985] 1996). This typology includes expressive individualism and utilitarian individualism as well as the "relational" (community-centered) and theistic

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moralities covered in *Habits*. To get at which one of these moral schemas resonates best with a person's moral habitus, the survey asks, "If you were unsure of what was right or wrong in a particular situation, how would you decide what to do? Would you… 1) Do what would make you feel happy (*expressive individualist* [chosen by 26 percent]), 2) Do what would help you to get ahead (*utilitarian individualist* [11 percent]), 3) Follow the advice of a teacher, parent, or other adult you respect (*relational* [42 percent]), or 4) Do what you think God or scripture tells you is right (*theistic* [21 percent])?"[12] A single item measure is of course not ideal, and as a measure of moral judgment, this question is certainly not exhaustive of the possibilities. For example it doesn't allow for certain answers that we might expect in this population (e.g., "do what my friends would do"). Nevertheless, as a single item it is well-matched to the Bellah typology and was explicitly designed to measure these moral schemas in the teenage and young adult population.

To illustrate Proposition 2, I estimate ordered logistic regression models predicting behavior at Wave 2 using the lagged dependent variables and other predictors from Wave 1 (Halaby 2004). (See the Appendix 1 for details on all variables, including descriptive statistics.) The objective is to isolate the effect of the moral habitus at Wave 1 on changes in the outcome at Wave 2, net of other confounding factors at Wave 1. The two-and-a-half year lag between waves may be longer than ideal, but since we are interested in durable moral dispositions, a lag of this length should not pose a significant problem. In estimating the effect of moral schemas, the expressive individualist schema ("do what makes me feel happy") is treated as the reference category. Because the goal is not to estimate the effects of a change in moral habitus on a change in behavior, but

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[12] This question was based on the one developed by Hunter (2000), but it was significantly modified by Christian Smith for use in the National Study of Youth and Religion.

instead the effects of a *prior state* of the moral habitus on future behavior, I use a lagged

dependent variable model rather than a fixed-effects specification (Haynie and Osgood

2005).

Since marijuana use represents "deviance," we should find that the more

traditional relational and theistic schemas are negatively associated with this outcome. On

the other hand, since both community and religious moralities are "collectivist" (Hitlin

2003; Oishi et al. 1998; Triandis 1995) we should expect that they will be positively

associated with community volunteering. In addition to the usual demographic controls,

several other factors are included to attempt to rule out potential spurious associations. To

exclude the possibility that adult network connections (rather than practical

consciousness itself) are driving the community moral schema response, I control for

closeness to parents and adult network closure around the respondent. To rule out the

possibility that religious networks or institutions are driving the theistic response, I

control for religious attendance, religious tradition, and the number of close friends who

share the respondent's religious beliefs. Altogether, the sociodemographic and network

controls should account for the institutional and interactional context that is usually held

to motivate or constrain behavior (Lichterman 1996; Mills 1940; Swidler 2001; see also

Campbell 1996). Before turning to these models, however, I illustrate Proposition 1 using

data from the NSYR.

Assessing Discursive Moral Consciousness

Teenagers are not widely considered to be the most articulate group. Yet the

interviews I and others conducted for the National Study of Youth and Religion

demonstrated that this inarticulacy is strongly pattered by domain. Many teenagers, for instance, are extremely articulate about sexually transmitted diseases, the groups at their school, and other topics that are highly salient to teen life and/or are frequently discussed in school settings (particularly in health class) (Smith and Denton 2005). These patterns suggest that there is no developmental "upper bound" on articulacy for teenage subjects. We found, however, that these same teenagers were generally highly inarticulate about how they make moral decisions. In our semi-structured interview format, we asked a very similar question about moral judgment to that posed in the survey. First, we asked, "Has there ever been a situation in your life where you were unsure what was right and wrong?" In most cases, the adolescent was able to think of and describe a situation. We then asked, "How did you decide what to do?" Later on in the interview, we also asked a more general question, "How do you generally decide what is right or wrong, good or bad, in life?" By eliciting both specific and general descriptions of decision making, we hoped to get good information on the ways in which American youth make moral decisions. In the vast majority of cases, however, they had tremendous difficulty articulating their mental processes for us.

When adolescents *did* offer explanations for their moral decision-making processes, their responses generally fell into one of two classes. The first generally treated moral knowledge as self-evident. That is, those who responded in this way "just knew" that certain activities or relationships were morally suspect.

I: Has there ever been a time when you were unsure of what was right and wrong in a particular situation?

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R: Yes. [...]

I: Okay, how do you decide, how did you decide what to do?

R: Mm, just with what *felt better*.

I: Okay what, what do you mean by that?

R: Just a *gut instinct*, I guess.

(17-year-old girl, emphasis added)

In many respects, this general group of interviews gave impressions similar to Brian Palmer in *Habits of the Heart*, who says: "Why is integrity important and lying bad? I don't know. It just is. It's just so basic. I don't want to be bothered with challenging that. It's part of me. I don't know where it came from, but it's very important." Here is another excerpt from a similar interview I conducted.

I: Okay. How do you generally decide what to do when you're unsure of what's right and wrong?

R: Um, I, I don't, um, really know. I, I, I, just um, I just um, kind of instinctively know usually. Just sort of feel it.

(17-year-old boy)

The language of "doing what feels right" is most often associated with a lack of guiding moral principles. Yet both these respondents were highly religious and were not engaged in any of the "deviant" practices we asked about in the survey or interview. Moreover, when forced by the design of the survey question to identify from fixed

responses, each chose "do what God or scripture says is right" as the best way of describing their moral decision process. In general, we found little link between the rhetorical style invoked and the overall level of either religiosity or "deviant behavior." Nearly all respondents, regardless of their particular behavioral profile or survey choice of moral schema, reported relying on intuitive judgment.

Another group of respondents, however, also insisted on offering reasons for their moral commitments. This group of interviewees best reflect Swidler's claim in *Talk of Love* that individuals "trim their philosophy to fit their action commitments" (148), and "resist the implications of their ideas whenever the ideas don't lead in the direction they want" (147). Because of this dynamic, the exchanges with these respondents could be quite long. Here is one example, from a different 17-year old girl.

> I: Do you think that drinking, or smoking pot or doing drugs is morally wrong or not?
>
> R: Yeah, it is.
>
> I: What is it that makes it wrong?
>
> R: Um, the nicotine makes it addicting or the alcohol that makes it so you're out of control and it just causes more problems, both of them.

I attempted to get this interviewee to think about the fact that if personal harm were really the reason not to engage in these activities, there should be situations where using illegal substances is rendered morally irrelevant.

I: Okay … let's say a person was terminally ill and they had a week

        to live or something and they just wanted to smoke some cigarettes

        or something before they die just to see what it was like, you know

        do you think that would be okay or not?

R: That's gonna harm them right before they die. [laughs nervously]

I: I mean, if they're gonna die anyway … do you think that would

        still be a problem, or no?

R: Yeah, 'cause that would be awfully hard on their throat right

        before they'd die, too.

At the end of this particular conversation, the young woman conceded that people can "kill themselves if they want to" but it would still be immoral "no matter what." Needless to say, the logic here is painfully strained. The idea that a clear moral principle of "do no harm" is at work seems highly dubious. This exchange, and others like it, are strongly consonant with the notion that beliefs are post hoc explanations for action with another causal source. The majority of the interviews give the strong impression that it is indeed the "action commitments" of respondents that matter most (Swidler 2001). Even when interviewees were able to see the holes in their arguments (by finally realizing, for example, that the principle of "do no harm" is not very persuasive in the case of terminal illness) they simply searched for different reasons to support their behavioral habits and friendship choices.

These excerpts from the NSYR interviews are meant to complement previous research that has found inarticulacy regarding the link between beliefs, moral judgment, and action consistent with Proposition 1. Considered alone, these illustrations are also highly consistent with toolkit or repertoire theory. The qualitative data in general seem to rule out the idea that these interviewees engage very often in deliberative moral reasoning or that their deliberations could serve as clear guides to action. Indeed, the interviewers saw a clear pattern of "repertoires of justification" or cultural toolkits at work. But turning to the survey results, we see that relying solely on discursive accounts to evaluate the link between cultural belief and action can be misleading.

Assessing Practical Moral Consciousness

Table 1.1 shows the results of ordered logistic regression models predicting Wave 2 volunteering, marijuana use, and network composition. The basic pattern of results is clear across models. Net of a host of other network, family, religious, and sociodemographic controls, a respondent's choice of moral schema strongly predicts behavior two-and-a-half years later. These results are highly consistent with Proposition 2. More specifically, and in conjunction with expectations, relational and theistic schemas have negative effects on drug use and positive effects on volunteering. These relationships are robust even when taking previous behavior and network composition into account.

The moral schema variables are not only statistically significant; they are among the most consistent predictors across all models. The theistic moral schema is the only variable (other than previous behavior and network composition) that is statistically

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significant in all four models. The relational moral schema is significant in three of the four models. Table 1.2 offers a measure of effect size by presenting the percentage change in the odds that the respondent will be in a higher ordinal category of the outcome associated with theoretically important predictor variables. For dichotomous variables the percentage change in odds is reported for a discrete change in the predictor from 0 to 1. For the other variables, the percentage change in odds reflects a one standard deviation increase in the predictor.

Table 1.2 illustrates the net explanatory power of practical moral consciousness. In the model predicting marijuana use, prior use has the largest effect (+89.9 percent increase in odds). Yet among the other main predictors, both moral schema variables have an influence similar to or larger than one-SD change in drug and alcohol using networks. In fact, the theistic schema produces an effect equivalent to a *two standard deviation* change in prior network composition. Compared to the expressive individualists, the theistic moral schema also has a larger "protective effect" against marijuana use than school achievement (GPA) or the "hard structure" of an intact biological family. The results for the volunteering model are similar; the lagged dependent variable has the largest effect, while the moral schema effects exceed the network and family structure effects. In the case of the drug using network model, however, the effect of the theistic moral schema is even *larger* in absolute terms than that of a one-SD change in the lagged dependent variable. In the volunteering networks model, both moral schema variables produce changes in the odds of being in a higher response category by more than a one-SD change in prior network composition. Given the attention that is typically paid to the power of networks to shape behavior, these are

strong effects. We can therefore safely conclude from these analyses that the moral schema variables are not only statistically significant but substantively significant as well.

DISCUSSION

The empirical exercises above were meant to illustrate rather than prove the utility of a dual process model of culture in action. Let us step back for a moment and consider what the results imply. First, the NSYR interviews show—consistent with previous research—that most interviewees claim to know the difference between right and wrong in an intuitive way, yet are largely incapable of articulating their moral decision-making processes. Many young people who do attempt to articulate their moral reasoning maintain their "action commitments" even when the evidence they offer is painfully insufficient or even self-contradictory. Second, despite this inarticulacy, the survey analysis shows strong effects of moral schema choice on behaviors nearly three years later. This finding is remarkable—a single, very general question about moral judgment, asked in a few seconds over the phone, is a better net predictor of deviance nearly three years later than income, education, peer networks, family structure, or religiosity. How can these results be best understood?

Neither qualitative nor quantitative analyses of a single case can establish the adequacy of a particular theoretical model. They can, however, offer evidence that is more or less consistent with competing explanations and shift the parameters of plausibility. In this case, the combined finding of discursive inarticulacy with strong moral schema effects makes the dual-process model of culture seem a more satisfactory explanation than the available alternatives. If moral cultural beliefs were consistently

articulated and demonstrated to be causally efficacious, we might want to return to the days of the "voluntarist theory of action." Yet our results show that Mills, Scott and Lyman, Swidler and others are right on in their assessment of how people use cultural evaluations—to justify their action commitments. The interview data illustrate this process at work, casting doubt on the adequacy of the Parsonian model of culture-as-ends. Combined with survey data, however, we see that the toolkit-repertoire approach itself has a major flaw. It cannot incorporate the findings of the survey analysis in its own theoretical logic. There appears to be an effect of moral cultural beliefs above and beyond the institutional and interactional context surrounding the actor. Of the three theories discussed in this paper—Parsonian, toolkit-repertoire, and dual-process—only the latter can account for the mixed-method results without introducing concepts foreign to its own logic.

In a research community increasingly interested in understanding mechanisms rather than documenting associations, the dual-process model also provides a more satisfying and empirically justifiable account of the way that culturally-influenced "social mindscapes" are related to action (Archer 1996). Without the insights of this model, we might have told one of two kinds of common, but probably unrealistic stories about the relationship between teenagers' beliefs and actions: either that they have different moral beliefs that they use as "moral compasses" to make decisions (Hunter 2000; Smith 2003); or that they deploy the different moral repertoires they have learned to make sense of their decisions to others (Mills 1940; Scott and Lyman 1968; Swidler 2001). As we have seen, in this particular case at least, neither of these stories can make sense of *all* the data. Understanding the possible disconnect between discursive and practical consciousness,

however, enables a more realistic interpretation of the findings: American teenagers are profoundly influenced by cultural forces in ways that they are largely unaware of and unable to articulate. The case I have used here is merely an illustration, however. Though it indeed appears promising, future research is needed to confirm, refine, and expand on the basic model.

The dual process model of culture outlined and illustrated here is not only useful for resolving arcane debates in a specific subfield; it also has implications for the most theoretically disinterested sociological researcher. While many sociologists talk as if the survey is simply a necessary evil, a mass-scale substitute for the deep insight of an interview, these results suggest that fixed-response surveys play a vital role in inquiry about the role of beliefs in action. It appears that the vast majority of individuals, living as they do in a world that is not continuously narrated in theoretical terms, rely on practical consciousness for most of their decisions (Giddens 1984). Thus they may be much better able to pick themselves out of the proverbial line up than to describe themselves to a sociological sketch artist.[13]

On the other hand, far from being a nice bonus, or adding a certain richness to quantitative inquiry, interviews may be a vital component of theory testing, particularly in the sociologies of culture and religion. Interviews are also necessary for understanding how people "make sense" of the world to each other and to themselves in the face of an inquisitive questioner (Scott and Lyman 1968). But one methodological strategy is not appropriate for answering all questions. In particular, there are strong reasons to question the validity of interview methods as a sufficient window into the culture-action link. The

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[13] Laboratory research in psychology has found parallel differences in the results of studies that "access" discursive versus practical consciousness (Wilson 2002).

insights yielded here into the mechanisms of moral decision making simply could not have been found with one method alone. Future research ought to compare the results of ethnographies, focus groups, interviews, and surveys—ideally of the same subjects—in order to see how different methods encourage reliance on different forms of cognitive processing. Future research should also explore the types of actor-situation profiles that render certain forms of processing more relevant for predicting action. It remains to be seen, for example, which actor-situation combinations render deliberative thought more or less consequential for generating observed behavior. In addition, although the vast majority of NSYR respondents, like the middle-class adults in *Habits of the Heart*, had difficulty discussing the link between their beliefs and behaviors, this articulacy is probably not randomly distributed. Future research should also examine individual-level variability in discursive articulacy with an eye toward its potential social consequences.

CONCLUSION

This paper has been an attempt at making a theoretical contribution and illustrating the usefulness of this contribution through an empirical illustration. My argument had four main parts. First, I traced the development of the motivation/justification split in the sociology of culture and religion, and unearthed a questionable premise underlying both. Second, I drew on sociological practice theories, augmented and validated by research in psychology and neuroscience, to offer a simple synthesis of the motivation/justification approaches—a dual-process model of cultural cognition. Third, I provided a mixed-method illustration that showed how the dual-process model can make sense of the data than either its "Parsonian" or toolkit-repertoire

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theory competitors. Fourth, I discussed some implications of these findings for research in the sociology of culture and the sociology of religion.

Lest I be misunderstood, let me clarify what I have *not* done. First, I have not attempted to turn the sociology of culture on its head. My goal is simply to offer a heuristic model of culture in action that improves upon both the voluntarist theory of action and the toolkit while preserving the strengths of both. Second, I have not offered radically new or different insights into the nature of human life. The notion of the "elephant"—a non-discursive, practical side of the person—is borrowed from contemporary social psychology (Haidt 2005; Wilson 2002) and can be traced back to Freud or even further back to Aristotle and the scholastics. The idea that we internalize principles of moral judgment through practice is straight out of the Nichomachean Ethics (Casebeer and Churchland 2003). Furthermore, there are already sociological approaches (outside of the sociology of culture) that point in a broadly similar direction. Affect control theory (Smith-Lovin 1995) takes seriously the role of unconscious evaluations and the sociology of emotions more generally (e.g., Thoits 1989) invites us to look beyond "discourse" to causally efficacious internal states. While I have focused here on the broadly shared ideas of dual process theory, sociologists who study culture, religion, and cognition can look for specific inspiration both inside and outside of the discipline.

Thus, rather than offer anything new, my objective has been to bridge a gap between work in the sociology of culture and religion on the one hand, and highly relevant work in cognitive science on the other. Because of the academic division of labor, psychologists have developed much better models of the *forms* of human cognition than sociologists have. Yet our strength is in articulating and investigating how socially

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patterned cultural *contents* interact with that form to produce observable human conduct (Zerubavel 1997). One of the goals of this paper is thus to encourage a fruitful cross-disciplinary dialogue in the domain of moral-cultural judgment. This is not an attempt at synthesis for the sake of synthesis. The argument here is that by relying on sociological theories that emphasize a single mode of processing, we necessarily leave out a sizeable chunk of human life, not to mention foregoing explanatory power (Hechter et al. 1999). Achieving greater cognitive verisimilitude will allow sociologists to explain social life in a more satisfactory fashion both qualitatively and quantitatively.

I argue that taking the difference between discursive and practical consciousness seriously will help move toward a more realistic view of the role of beliefs in human behavior. As Swidler acknowledges in the introduction to *Talk of Love*, culture can "use us" as much as we can use it, yet repertoire theory is poorly equipped for dealing with that important aspect of "how culture matters." Although the dual-process model is not a complete "theory of culture," and is not presented as such, it offers a simple framework that is capable of generating and testing a host of research questions in a systematic way. It has clear constituent concepts (discursive and practical consciousness) and relies on models of human cognitive processing that have been cross-validated with research in psychology and neuroscience. The sociological study of culture is a growing enterprise, and its metaphors matter. Perhaps a simple change from "toolkit" to "rider on an elephant" would in fact constitute theoretical progress.

Table 1.1. Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Wave 2 Behavior

	(1) Marijuana		(2) Volunteering	
Moral Schemas				
Expressive (reference)	--		--	
Utilitarian	-.387		.098	
Relational	-.308	*	.168	
Theistic	-.911	***	.344	*
Previous Behaviors				
Smoking Pot	.883	***	--	
Volunteering	--		.427	***
Peer Networks				
# Use Drugs/Drink a Lot	.184	***	--	
# Volunteer Regularly	--		.076	*
# Similar Religious Beliefs	.027		.057	*
Family, Community, Religion				
Parent Closeness	.012		.085	
Network Closure	.022		.092	*
Church Attendance	-.029		.020	
Evangelical Protestant	-.059		-.354	
Mainline Protestant	.040		-.063	
Black Protestant	.344		-.300	
Catholic	.131		-.182	
Jewish	-.758		-.022	
Mormon	-.653		.625	
Other Religion	-.211		.070	
Indeterminate Religion	.258		-.849	*
Not Religious (reference)	--		--	
Other Factors				
Female	-.120		.128	
Age	-.082		-.121	***
Black	-.456		-.247	
Other race	-.448	*	.164	
South	-.257		-.023	
Midwest	-.124		-.076	
West	.061		-.056	
GPA	-.330	**	.270	***
Number of Friends	.026		-.085	
Parent Income	.036		.024	
Parent Education	.048		.086	***
Two-Parent Bio. Family	-.358	*	.040	
N	2209		2223	
Log-likelihood	-1881.2		-2763.3	
Cragg and Uhler's R²	.216		.192	

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (two-tailed)

Table 1.2. Percent Changes in Odds at Wave 2 Associated with Changes in Selected Variables

		Marijuana Use	Volunteering
Wave 1	Relational Schema	-26.5	*ns*
Wave 1	Theistic Schema	-59.8	41.0
Wave 1	Marijuana Use ‡	89.9	--
Wave 1	Volunteering ‡	--	53.8
Wave 1	Drug Using Networks ‡	26.3	--
Wave 1	Volunteering Networks ‡	--	12.0
Wave 1	GPA ‡	-20.3	20.4
Wave 1	Two-Parent Biological Family	-30.1	*ns*

NOTE: ‡ = the change in the odds associated with a one-SD change in the predictor. For the other variables, the change in odds is for a discrete change from 0 to 1.

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CHAPTER 2: MORAL CULTURES AND NETWORK COMPOSITION

Sociology is a highly fractured discipline, containing simultaneously a number of theories and perspectives that are contradictory or even incommensurable. In recent years, however, one theoretical viewpoint—network theory—has attained a high degree of acceptance discipline-wide, from social movements to comparative-historical to social psychology to cultural sociology. If 21st century American sociology shares any substantively meaningful common ground it is that "networks matter." Of course, different scholars and different subfields vary in the importance they accord to social networks. But in practice this variation in importance occurs on a scale from "very" to "total." Either the substantive content or the geometric structure of networks are held to influence, if not cause, everything from religious conversion (Lofland and Stark 1965), to finding a job (Granovetter 1995), to personal identity (McFarland and Pals 2005), to mercantile dominance of Florence in the early 15th century (Padgett and Ansell 1993). Networks are everywhere.

As other scholars have pointed out, network theory has many obvious attractions (see Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). It provides a largely observable mechanism (interactions between real people), the proffered mechanism is truly social (not grounded in personality or idiosyncratic preferences), and the formal nature of network explanations makes them generalizable across substantive areas. Concepts like centrality, closure, brokerage, and density are useable in widely diverse substantive inquiries.

Though network theory is not without problems or complications, these factors, among others, help explain the appeal of network theory across the discipline.

The goal of this paper is certainly not to dismiss the causal importance of networks. There is ample reason to believe that both the shape and content of social relations have a profound effect on their members. Instead, the goal of this paper is to problematize the *formation* of social networks from a cultural perspective. In practice, most analyses treat networks as exogenous to explanation. That is, most research that relies on network explanation assumes that networks simply *are* and that they cause other things to happen.[1] For example, Martin (2002) assumes that the leadership and power structures in communal groups lead to increased ideological consistency. The possibility that groups with highly articulated ideologies might be more willing to accept—or survive—strong leadership and hierarchy is not actively considered.

The assumption that networks are a dominant causal force is especially puzzling in the sociology of culture. Making beliefs, ideas, and identities the product of networks or other social structures unnecessarily limits the role of culture to an outcome (dependent variable) rather than considering it as a possible cause (independent variable) (Alexander 2003). In one recent exception to the rule, Lizardo (2006) argues that different forms of cultural consumption actually lead to different network structures rather than vice versa. This usually unconsidered possibility therefore leads to new sociological knowledge. Though Lizardo's use of instrumental variables provides some degree of confidence that the effects he finds in cross-sectional data are indeed causal,

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[1] One notable exception to this is the "homophily principle," which is an attempt to explain all network formation with recourse to a single idea—like attracts like (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). Although promising, there is plenty of room for investigating other sources of network formation.

only longitudinal network data will allow a more rigorous and precise modeling of the interplay between culture and networks.

In this paper, therefore, I use two waves of data from the National Study of Youth and Religion to examine predictors of changes in ego network characteristics over a three-year period among a sample of more than 2000 U.S. adolescents. Specifically, I examine predictors of changes in the number of respondents' strong ties who use controlled substances and who volunteer in the community. I choose these particular network characteristics because much research has focused on the importance of peer networks in promoting both controlled substance use (Akers et al. 1979) and volunteering behaviors (McAdam 1986). I find strong evidence that core moral-cultural beliefs play a decisive role in shaping future network formation, net of previous network composition and other structural controls. I discuss the implications of these findings for cultural sociology and network theory.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Since there are many extant reviews of the network literature (e.g., Wasserman and Faust 1994; Watts 2004), there is no need to provide such a review here. Instead, I focus on the more delimited discussion about the relationship between networks and culture.

Over a decade ago, Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994; hereafter E&G) offered one of the first culturally-informed critiques of network analysis. The authors distinguished between three implicit network-theoretic models. The first, *structuralist determinism*, views networks as "infrastructural" (in the Marxian sense) and as straightforwardly

giving rise to "softer," more cultural phenomena. E&G criticize this view because it neglects the role of human agency in social life. The next model, *structuralist instrumentalism*, adds the notion of interest-seeking to network structures. Though E&G's writing preceded the recent explosion of economic sociology, much of the network-related research in that area relies, implicitly or explicitly, on structuralist instrumentalism. (The colloquial use of "networking" as a conscious strategy for getting ahead would be an example of this model.) The third model outlined by E&G is *structuralist constructionism*, which takes most seriously the interplay between culture, agency, and networks. In this model, actors' identities and normative commitments interact with network structure to produce action. Though E&G claim that, to that point, no existing research had made full use of the possibilities inherent in the constructionist view, they offer it as the most promising site for development in network theory. Following Archer (1988), E&G reject the idea that culture and structure are analytically inseparable from one another, and suggest that researchers should attempt to model the over-time interplay of normative commitments and network structures. They conclude, "Network analysis … neglects or inadequately conceptualizes the crucial dimension of subjective meaning and motivation—including the normative commitments of actors—and thereby fails to show exactly how it is that intentional, creative human action serves in part to constitute those very social networks that so powerfully constrain actors" (p. 1413).

Though E&G's extremely helpful exegesis of network theory has been widely cited, it appears not to have had a large influence on the actual practice of network analysis in sociology. David Smilde (2005), who relies heavily on E&G to frame his

recent investigation of networks and religious conversion, is able to make many of the same criticisms of network research that E&G had made over a decade prior. But Smilde's research, while it greatly advances our understanding of network dynamics by creatively linking the influence-based and agentic notions of networks, does not help us better understand the normative dimension of network formation alluded to by E&G. Perhaps one of the reasons for this absence of engagement is that scholars—explicitly including E&G—are wary of falling back into "values-based" sociology, which they identify with disciplinary pariahs Talcott Parsons and structural functionalism. Although receptive to cultural causation when couched in language like "narratives" or "discourse," E&G for some reason resist the straightforward idea that people might select into networks based on the normative beliefs they have internalized from different narratives or strains of discourse (see Smith 2003). The relationship between normative beliefs and networks is an empirical question, however, and must be approached empirically. But is there any a priori reason to hypothesize that normative beliefs might lead to changes in network composition in their own right?

Lizardo's (2006) review of the networks and culture literature makes an important contribution that can indirectly shed light on the role that beliefs might play in shaping social networks. Though Lizardo's substantive focus in on cultural consumption rather than on normative beliefs, he relies on two insights from the literature that also open up space for thinking about normative influences on social networks. First, he points to the finding that networks are not the "hard," durable configurations that are implied by the metaphor of "social structure." In fact, studies repeatedly show tremendous turnover in individual social networks, even over short periods of time. Second, consistent with

Bourdieu's work on the habitus, research on taste shows that people's likes and dislikes are formed early and are remarkably durable. Based on this, Lizardo draws the unorthodox conclusion that the "infrastructure" of networks is actually much less stable than the "superstructure" of cultural preferences. On the basis of this insight, he goes on to demonstrate that cultural tastes themselves appear to have an effect on the composition of respondents' social networks.

Research on values and moral beliefs shows a very similar pattern to that of tastes—that is, they are formed early on in life and are largely stable thereafter (see Halaby 2003; Hitlin and Piliavin 2004). Moreover, a number of social theorists have called for extending Bourdieu's concept of habitus from the realm of "cultural capital" to the realm of moral dispositions and commitments (Lamont 1992; Sayer 2005; see also Calhoun 1991; Smith 2003). Thus, the same rationale that exists for examining the effect of cultural consumption on networks also exists for investigating the effect of normative commitments on networks. Rather than refusing to consider how moral beliefs or values might shape social networks in a causal way (out of a fear of being too "Parsonian"), we should make this causal relationship an empirical question. The data used in this study allow us to do just that.

DATA

The data for this study come from Waves 1 and 2 of the National Study of Youth and Religion (NSYR), a random-digit-dial survey of American teenagers begun in 2002. The first wave of the NSYR is a random sample of English- and Spanish-speaking teenagers (ages 13-17) in the United States. A total of 3,290 teenagers were interviewed.

The final response rate was 57 percent (for more details, see Smith and Denton 2005).

Wave 2 data collection began in 2005 and an attempt was made to contact all of the teen

respondents from Wave 1, who were then between 15 and 20 years of age. The retention

rate between waves was about 78 percent. I employ an appropriate weight for all analyses

(see Smith and Denton 2005). Because of missing data, the N for each analysis varies

between 2100 and 2140.

These data are particularly well-suited to the question of normative influences on

network composition for a number of reasons. First, the data contain information on a

number of measures of network composition at two waves (2002 and 2005). Second, the

data provide two measures of moral worldview that have been successfully employed in

previous research (Baker 2005; Hunter 2000). Third, the data contain a wide variety of

information on socioeconomic and demographic characteristics that might also be

predictive of changes in network composition, thus allowing controls for confounding

factors.

MEASURES

Dependent Variables

NETWORK COMPOSITION: The outcomes of interest here are the number of each

respondent's friends who (1) "do drugs or drink a lot of alcohol," (2) "have been in

trouble in school for fighting, cheating, or skipping classes," and (3) "regularly do

volunteer work or community service." This value was generated by asking the

respondent to name up to five "closest friends," and asking which of those friends engage

in the activities in question. This data was collected in 2005, during Wave 2 of the NSYR.

Independent Variables

LAGGED DEPENDENT VARIABLES: These measures reflect the composition of the respondent's social network at Wave 1 of the survey (2002). They were constructed identically to the measures at Wave 2.

MORAL CULTURE/MORAL WORLDVIEW: The NSYR provides two ways of measuring moral-cultural worldview. The first is based on Hunter's (2000) operationalization of the Bellah team's expressivist-utilitarian-civic-biblical typology offered in *Habits of the Heart* (1985). This question asks, "If you were unsure of what was right or wrong in a particular situation, how would you decide what to do? Would you… 1) Do what would make you feel happy (expressive individualist [chosen by 26 percent]), 2) Do what would help you to get ahead (utilitarian individualist [11 percent]), 3) Follow the advice of a teacher, parent, or other adult you respect (community-centered [42 percent]), or 4) Do what you think God or scripture tells you is right (theistic [21 percent])?" A single item measure is of course not ideal, and as a measure of moral worldview, this question is certainly not exhaustive of the possibilities. Nevertheless, as a single item, it is well-matched to the Bellah typology and was explicitly designed to measure these moral worldviews in the teenage and young adult population.[2] Furthermore, in his research, Hunter (2000) found that one's response to this question predicted other survey responses in a huge number of domains and with a high degree of

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[2] This question was based on the one developed by Hunter (2000), but it was modified by Christian Smith for use in the National Study of Youth and Religion.

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discrimination. There is therefore reason to hypothesize that these differences might also lead to differences in social networks. Since drug using and getting into trouble represent "deviance," one should find that the more traditional community and theistic worldviews are negatively associated with these outcomes. On the other hand, since both community and theistic moralities are "collectivist" (Hitlin 2003; Oishi et al. 1998) one should expect that they will be positively associated with acquiring or maintaining strong ties to regular community volunteers.

The second measure of moral worldview is an indicator of moral absolutism and relativism that closely resembles that used on the World Values Survey (see Baker 2005). This question asks, "Some people say that morals are relative, that there are no definite rights and wrongs for everybody. Do you agree or disagree?" The respondent could simply agree (1) or disagree (0). Since research in this area shows that relativists are more likely to accept practices that have been traditionally frowned upon (such as abortion or premarital sex; see Baker 2005) and less likely to derive a sense of community from others (Ryle and Robinson 2006), I hypothesize that relativists will develop or maintain more network ties to controlled substance users and maintain fewer network ties to regular volunteers than will absolutists.[3]

OTHER CONTROLS: In addition to the usual demographic controls, several other factors are included to attempt to rule out potential spurious associations. To exclude the possibility that adult network connections are driving the community moral worldview response, I control for closeness to parents and adult network closure around the

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[3] Despite Baker's (2005) assertion that the Hunter question and the relativism question are interchangeable measures of absolutism, Smith's revision of Hunter's question and a question about moral relativism are only moderately associated ($\eta = .172$) in the NSYR.

respondent.[4] To rule out the possibility that religious networks or institutions are driving the theistic response, I control for religious attendance, religious tradition, and the number of close friends who share the respondent's religious beliefs. Altogether, these sociodemographic and network controls should account for the institutional and interactional context that is usually held to shape beliefs, networks, and action in the sociology of culture (Lichterman 1996; Swidler 2001; see also Campbell 1996). Furthermore, I control for relevant behavior at Wave 1 (frequency of using marijuana and getting drunk for drug using networks; cheating, cutting class or getting suspended for "trouble" networks; and volunteering for volunteer networks) in order to account for behavioral homophily and isolate the effects of the moral worldviews as much as possible.

MODELS

Because the outcomes of interest are counts, I use Poisson regression to estimate changes in network composition.[5] These models control for prior network composition, moral worldview, and a number of other sociodemographic controls. Because the goal is to determine the effect of a durable state (moral worldview) on change in network composition between survey waves, I use a lagged dependent variable model rather than a fixed-effects specification (see Halaby 2004). Though the longitudinal nature of the data ensure causal order, the models estimated here necessarily make the assumption that the specified lag (two-and-a-half to three years) is an appropriate one for detecting the

[4] See the Appendix for descriptive statistics and definitions for all variables.

[5] It is debatable here whether a Poisson, negative binomial, ordered logistic, or Tobit model is most appropriate here. We have estimated the models with all four specifications and the results are substantively identical.

causal relationships I have hypothesized. Although this assumption may not be tenable in all cases, it seems plausible in the case of analyzing possible effects of moral worldviews on network change in this population.

In addition to estimating coefficients and test statistics, I compare effect sizes by comparing percent changes in the estimated count. For dichotomous variables, I use the percentage change in estimated count for an estimate of effect size. For the other variables, I use the percent change associated with a one standard deviation change in the predictor (see Long 1997). These values will allow comparing the relative net strength of each predictor.

RESULTS

Table 2.1 shows the results of the regression models predicting Wave 2 network composition. The table is largely self-explanatory, but there are several results worth highlighting. As one would expect, network composition in 2002 is a good predictor of network composition in 2005. Of course, we cannot know whether or not the same individuals are in the network, but there is a tendency for network characteristics to remain the same. This finding should not be taken as indicating the exceptional durability of such networks, however; the polychoric correlations (not shown in the table) between Wave 1 and Wave 2 network composition are .47 for controlled substance use, .29 for trouble, and .33 for volunteering. Therefore, while there are clear continuities in network characteristics, there is plenty of variation to account for between survey waves. This is consistent with previous research that shows high volatility in network ties even in time spans as short as one year (Burt 2000; Wellman et al 1997). The multivariate models also

show that prior behavior (e.g., getting drunk, cheating, volunteering) is also a good predictor of future network composition, indicating a theoretically expected tendency toward behavioral homophily. That is, people tend to develop ties with individuals who are similar to themselves in terms of lifestyle habits (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001).

In addition to continuity and homophily, only one other factor was significant in all three models: moral worldview as measured by Smith's revision of Hunter's (2000) Bellah-inspired indicator. Compared to the community norms-centered reference category ("follow the advice of an adult"), young people espousing an expressivist worldview ("makes me happy") are more likely to develop or maintain strong ties with heavy substance users and "troublemakers" and—along with utilitarian ("get ahead") respondents—less likely to develop or maintain strong ties with regular volunteers. Again compared to the community norms-centered respondents, youth invoking a theistic moral worldview are less likely to develop or maintain friendships with controlled substance users and "troublemakers." It should be noted that here that these are not simply "religious" youth in the usual sense; religious attendance and conservative religious tradition play no role here. The 21 percent of teenagers who identify with the theistic worldview are not identical to the teens one might otherwise call "religious" based on standard measures. If some form of "social control" is at work here, it is a social control over and above adult connections, parent monitoring, religious tradition, networks of religious friends, and church attendance.

The "effect size" column for each model allows us to compare the relative strength of the significant predictors. These results seem surprising from the point of

view of a standard network approach, but are perhaps unsurprising given the arguments

of Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994) and Lizardo (2006): moral worldview has a larger (in

some instances much larger) net effect on Wave 2 network composition than a change of

one (or several) standard deviations in either Wave 1 network composition or previous

behavior. In this population at least, worldview predicts changes in the content of social

networks much better than race, sex, household income, parents' education and a host of

other factors. To get a better sense of these predicted differences, Figure 2.1 shows the

predicted counts by worldview for Wave 2 network characteristics holding all other

covariates at their means. Taken together, these results are certainly noteworthy—a

single, relatively abstract moral question, asked nearly three years earlier, is more

predictive of future friendship networks than either prior networks, behavioral

homophily, or demographic characteristics. Such a possibility is seldom, if ever,

acknowledged in the literature on networks and culture, which usually conceive of

cultural beliefs as driven by social interaction, rather than vice versa.

ADDITIONAL ANALYSES: DO NETWORKS SHAPE WORLDVIEW?

I have argued that cultural sociology and network theory need to move beyond

deterministic and "conflationist" views of the culture-structure relationship to investigate

empirically their dynamic relationship. Though the emphasis in this paper is exploring

the role that moral-cultural worldviews play in shaping network change, I also briefly

consider here the other side of the dynamic process: the role that prior networks might

play in influencing changes in worldview. From Wave 1 to Wave 2, 54 percent of

respondents changed their response to the moral worldview question, though only 33

percent made the substantively larger change (in either direction) between an individualist response and either of the more collectivist responses. With only one item, these figures undoubtedly reflect randomness and measurement error, but significant patterns should be detectable nonetheless.

Table 2.2 shows the results of a multinomial logistic regression model predicting moral worldview at Wave 2 using all of the Wave 1 predictors used in Table 2.1. This model treats the community-centered option as the reference category at both waves. Because the significance of a single coefficient is dependent on its difference from the reference category only, we also present Wald X^2 tests for the joint significance of each predictor across all three equations. We do not take the time here to substantively interpret each coefficient, but rather note findings that are directly relevant to our theoretical concern.

First, the best predictor of worldview at Wave 2 is worldview at Wave 1. Given the assertion above about the durability of cultural worldviews, this is perhaps not surprising. The strong tie variables, on the other hand, are not significant predictors of these changes, again intimating the relative durability of cognitive structures relative to proximate peer influence. There is, however, some evidence of structural effects on worldview change. Adult network closure around the respondent is associated with a lower probability of adopting or maintaining either of the individualist worldviews. That is, a dense network of adult involvement seems to dispose teenagers to adopting or maintaining a more collectivist worldview. A similar pattern emerges for parental monitoring as well, with greater supervision negatively associated with choosing "what makes me happy." Church attendance is also a good predictor of maintaining or adopting

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a religious worldview. Overall, then, there appears to be a fair degree of stability in cultural worldviews though we also find a limited, though readily interpretable, degree of structural influence over a three year time span.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The goal of this paper has been to empirically investigate factors related to the formation of social networks over time. Inspired by Emirbayer and Goodwin's (1994) important essay on networks and culture, this study looked specifically at how moral worldviews influence changes in network formation over time in the lives of American young people. The results show, consistent with Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994) and Archer (1988), that cultural beliefs play an independent role in forming and changing social structures. Though many sociologists would be willing to admit this of course, the vast majority of research in this area assumes (intentionally or not) that the relevant causal pathway is always from networks to cultural beliefs.

One question that might legitimately be posed at this point is: Is there really any culture here? Admittedly, calling a single survey question an indicator of "culture" requires some justification. As I noted earlier, the four-part moral worldview question is a modified version of the item designed by Hunter (2000) to measure the *Habits of the Heart* typology in survey analysis. It is therefore indirectly based on the extensive fieldwork undertaken for that project. Further analyses (not shown here) also show that this question is more "central" than most in the sense that it is highly correlated with nearly every opinion or attitude measure on both the NSYR and using Hunter's original data, even with items that are not strongly correlated with each other. Although it is

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phrased as a simple question about moral judgment, it is likely tapping (as it was intended to) into larger, culturally available worldviews.

This result does not lead us to the Parsonian "consensualism" or "idealism" that E&G warn us about. These moral worldviews are not pieces of a unitary culture, but are often in conflict with each other (see Baker 2005; Hunter 2000). Neither do they stand for free-floating ideas, since these moral "schemas" are strongly connected to structural "resources" in society (Sewell 1992). Other research using these data (in progress) demonstrates that different responses to this item are linked to different religious and occupational parental backgrounds and even to different favorite television shows and musical artists. While this evidence is not conclusive, it does suggest that the response to this single survey question is more than idiosyncratic opinion or personality; it may in fact tell us something at the individual level about the larger moral-cultural themes identified in studies like *Habits of the Heart*.

In addition to their potential theoretical significance, these results also speak to the substantive concerns expressed by the Bellah team (1985). Among other things, the authors expressed concern that individualism would lead to lower levels of civic engagement. Subsequent ethnographic research by Lichterman (1996) cast doubt on this concern, but the analysis here suggests that Bellah may have been on to something after all. Among American youth, at least, individualist worldviews (doing what "makes me happy" or "what will help me get ahead") are indeed associated with decreased connections to socially engaged peers compared to their more community- or religion-oriented counterparts. The consequences of moral worldviews for developing adult

volunteering networks and their implications for actual volunteering behavior should be the subject of future research.

All sociologists agree that networks matter. But it is time to problematize the formation of social networks in order to gain a fuller understanding of their emergence. Gathering network data at multiple survey waves should be a high priority for future data collections in order to move from philosophical discussion to a more empirically grounded perspective. Our theories often take cultural causes seriously but fail to integrate them into empirical models. There is every reason to believe that culture exists not only "out there" as codes or narratives but "in here" in the form of schemas or habitus and that this internalized culture plays a role in actors' everyday choices (Bourdieu 1984; DiMaggio 1997; Lizardo 2006; Strauss and Quinn 1997). For cultural sociologists, a truly cultural account of motivation is clearly preferable to the rational-choice default which so often quietly colonizes our work (Calhoun 1991; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Smith 2003). This study is but one step in helping develop such an account.

Table 2.1. Results of Poisson Regressions Predicting Wave 2 Network Composition

	Substance Using Ties		"In Trouble" Strong Ties		Volunteeing Strong Ties	
	β	Effect size	β	Effect size	β	Effect size
Prior Networks						
Using Strong Ties	.083***	*11.1*	---		---	
In Trouble Strong Ties	---		.132***	*11.8*	---	
Volunteering Strong Ties	---		---		.106***	*16.9*
Moral Worldviews						
Expressivist	.129*	13.8	.203**	22.5	-.305***	-26.3
Utilitarian	.080		.077		-.303*	-26.1
Theistic	-.211*	-19.0	-.226*	-20.2	.027	
Community (reference)	---		---		---	
Moral Relativist	.083		-.096		-.026	
Other Network Characteristics						
Same Religion Strong Ties	-.010		-.001		.042*	*8.9*
Adult Network Closure	.004		-.011		.033	
Dating	.094		.063		-.098	
Number of Strong Ties	-.004		.039		-.078	
Prior Behavior						
Frequency of Drunkenness	.053*	*5.1*	---		---	
Frequency of Smoking Pot	.130***	*9.9*	---		---	
Frequency of Cheating	---		.053*	*11.8*	---	
Frequency of Cutting Class	---		.177***	*7.1*	---	
Ever Suspended	---		.211**	23.5	---	
Frequency of Volunteering	---		---		.087**	*9.2*
Family Characteristics						
Parent Monitoring	-.079**	*-7.5*	-.038		.095**	*9.8*
Two-Parent Bio Family	-.153**	-14.2	-.127		.113	
Closeness to Parents	-.030		.012		.010	
Religious Participation and Identity						
Church Attendance	.009		-.022		.016	
Conservative Protestant	-.075		.090		.074	
Black Protestant	.084		-.222		-.011	
Mainline Protestant	-.099		.070		.059	
Catholic	-.038		.008		-.014	
Jewish	-.355*	-29.9	-.192		.188	
Mormon (LDS)	-.186		-.019		.114	
Other Religion	-.100		-.151		.441*	55.5
Indeterminate Religion	-.163		.024		-.411	
No Religion (reference)	---		---		---	
Demographic and Other Characteristics						
Gender (female = 1)	-.183***	-16.7	-.292***	25.3	.012	
Age (W1)	.020		-.096***	*12.5*	-.004	
Black	-.188		.248*	28.1	-.148	
Other race	-.151*	-14.0	.021		.085	
Southern Residence	-.084		-.013		-.119	
GPA	-.057		-.115**	*-7.6*	.111*	*7.9*
Household Income	.027*	*9.1*	.000		.005	
Parent Education	-.006		-.028*	*-7.3*	.038**	*11.2*
N	2140		2116		2100	
χ^2	588.75		474.49		394.62	

Notes: Effect sizes calculated as the percentage change in count associated with the presence (versus absence) of a dichotomous variable or a one-SD change in a non-dichotomous variable. Effect sizes are only displayed for significant variables. Non-dichotomous effect sizes are italicized.

Figure 2.1. Predicted Number of Strong Ties at Wave 2 by Worldview

Table 2.2. Wave 1 Predictors of Wave 2 Worldview

Outcome (W2; Community Reference)	*Expressive*	*Utilitarian*	*Theistic*	Wald Test
	b	b	b	
Prior Worldview				
Expressivist	1.106***	.876***	.025	***
Utilitarian	.534**	.848***	.205	**
Theistic	.553**	.733**	1.242***	***
Community (reference)				
Moral Relativist	.225	-.120	-.391**	***
Prior Network Composition				
Using Strong Ties	-.009	-.081	.015	
In Trouble Strong Ties	-.006	-.172	-.067	
Volunteering Strong Ties	.049	-.020	.082	
Prior Behavior				
Frequency of Drunkenness	.015	.153	.072	
Frequency of Smoking Pot	.161	.392**	.031	*
Frequency of Cheating	.117*	.015	.111*	*
Frequency of Cutting Class	.057	.160	.141	
Ever Suspended	-.203	.254	-.243	
Frequency of Volunteering	.045	-.025	-.121	
Other Network Characteristics				
Same Religion Strong Ties	.018	-.040	.058	
Adult Network Closure	-.162**	-.168*	.061	**
Dating	.035	.034	-.150	
Number of Strong Ties	.177	.270*	-.028	
Family Characteristics				
Parent Monitoring	-.153*	-.117	.122	**
Two-Parent Biological Family	-.165	.029	-.047	
Closeness to Parents	-.009	-.034	.024	
Religious Participation				
Church Attendance	-.054	-.028	.142***	***
Conservative Protestant	-.307	.182	.536	
Black Protestant	-.255	-.356	-.239	
Mainline Protestant	.350	.411	.375	
Catholic	-.120	.122	-.440	
Jewish	-.177	-1.478	.671	
Mormon (LDS)	-.448	-.025	.682	
Other Religion	.466	.654	1.065*	
Indeterminate Religion	.488	1.164*	.632	
No Religion (reference)				
Demographic and Other Characteristics				
Gender (female = 1)	-.049	-.286	-.444**	**
Age (W1)	-.065	-.161*	-.001	
Black	-.411	.499	.247	
Other race	-.287	.395	.113	*
Southern Residence	-.100	-.173	-.015	
GPA	-.028	.064	.197	
Household Income	.000	-.027	-.016	
Parent Education	-.019	.066	-.007	
Constant	-.260	-1.343	-2.442*	
N		2098		
χ^2		650.31		

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CHAPTER 3: STRUCTURE, CULTURE, AND COMMUNITY

Few concepts have generated as much theoretical speculation and as little scientific payoff as "community." While Tönnies's ([1897] 1988) distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* resides at the heart of sociology – or at least at the heart of sociology's historical origins – it has generated little generalizable knowledge about the social world. This has not, however, stopped community from playing an important role in social scientific and political discourse. Among classical theorists, Durkheim's notions of anomie and solidarity, Weber's warnings about the "iron cage" of rationalization, and Marx's concerns about alienation from our "species being" all speak to a greater or lesser degree to the disappearance of "authentic" relational life in modernity (see Delanty 2003). Although the nostalgic narrative of "Community Lost" seemed to fade among sociologists in the years following World War II (see Smith 2003), there is ample evidence of resurgent interest. Recently, for example, there has been a renaissance of concern for community under the auspices of social capital theory (see Field 2003:5). Though he is ostensibly not fond of the term "community," Robert Putnam nevertheless chose "The Collapse and Revival of American Community" as the subtitle for *Bowling Alone* (2000), suggesting that the social capital literature deals with many of the same issues under a different name.

Community can be a slippery term and I do not seek to solve its conceptual problems once and for all. My goal is more modest: to explore the structural and cultural mechanisms that lead to the experience of community in communal groups. I begin with

the simple observation that individuals and groups subjectively *experience* their social relationships in different ways and argue that an important dimension of this variation tracks along Tönnies' distinction between "natural" and "rational" will. To investigate the structural and cultural origins of these differing relational experiences in communal settings, I rely on data from the Urban Communes Project (UCP), a collection of ethnographic, network, and survey data that was collected in 1974-1975 from 60 urban communes in the United States.

Communes are not of course representative of all attempts to create face-to-face community. Nevertheless, as Kanter (1972) and Zablocki (1980) have pointed out, communes are strategic sites for engaging with important sociological questions about alienation, anomie, and solidarity. Despite their limitations, communes as bounded social entities offer the rare opportunity to observe mechanisms of interaction, solidarity, and social conflict on a scale that is more tractable than with larger, less clearly defined, and less intentional units of analysis such as neighborhoods. The UCP data are particularly valuable because they contain information on groups that are much more varied than one might expect given popular stereotypes. While some UCP communes were intense and demanded large investments of time, resources, and ideological commitment, others were little more than "crash pads" organized around a vague desire for communal life.[19] The heterogeneity of the sample facilitates meaningful analysis and comparison, providing a valuable opportunity to observe basic social processes at work in discrete, clearly bounded entities (Zablocki 1980). I further discuss the advantages and disadvantages of studying such groups below.

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[19] For example, in some UCP groups the average member spent almost 24 hours a day on site, while in others the average was less than 10 hours per day (barely enough time to sleep, dress, and eat).

To understand how and why some of these groups led to an intense experience of *Gemeinschaft* while others did not, I rely on various social and political theories of community to suggest plausible causal mechanisms. I distinguish between two general types of explanation – the structural (i.e., mechanisms grounded in organizational factors) and the substantive (i.e., mechanisms grounded in cultural meanings). This division is by no means novel; it corresponds roughly to the historic divide between formal theories of community that have their origins in Plato, Hobbes, and Rousseau and the more spiritual or emotional theories of community linked to Augustine and Johannes Althusius (see Keller 2003:16-36). While this debate has typically been about how to best *define* community, however, I treat these perspectives as alternative theoretical frameworks for generating testable hypotheses. Each tradition proposes different mechanisms that may be responsible for generating what Kanter (1972) calls the "we-feeling" – a sense of group identification and solidarity.

While the regression analyses below suggest that substantive theories of community are generally more consistent with these data than structural theories, fuzzy-set techniques shed light on important ways in which cultural and structural factors work together to produce—or prevent—the presence of *Gemeinschaft*. I argue below that this two-method strategy is essential for capturing both proximate mechanisms and "the duality of structure" simultaneously (Sewell 1992). In addition to highlighting a novel analytic approach, the analyses in this paper supply two main substantive contributions: first, an improved account of the factors that produce the we-feeling in communal groups; and second, some empirical evidence that suggests the value of reconsidering culture's role in producing community in face-to-face groups.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

Community as Experience

Both Tönnies ([1887] 1988) and Weber ([1921] 1978) relied on the experience of particular kinds of relationships in order to get leverage on the community concept. Tönnies contrasted the "natural will" (i.e., bonds based on affect and trust) with the "rational will" (i.e., associations based on mutual advantage or contract). Weber ([1922] 1978:40-43) relied on a similar, though not identical, division between motivational orientations, with substantive rationality underlying communal action and instrumental rationality underlying "associative" action (see Brint 2001:3f). I discuss issues of definition and measurement below, but in general terms the outcome of interest here could be called "the experience of *Gemeinschaft*," we-feeling, a sense of collective self, or the feeling of natural belonging (Bender 1978; Kanter 1972; Keller 2003).

Some scholars have criticized this subjective view as insufficiently grounded in specific patterns of interaction (e.g. Calhoun 1980; see also Wuthnow 1989). They have usually based their criticism on the fact that some social patterns co-occur with the experience of the "natural will." This is of course true, and if one were simply interested in providing yet another definition or typology of community, the categories of experience or "will" would indeed be inadequate. But, as Keller (2003:xi) notes, the original impetus for studying community emerges out of the question, "Where can I be at home?" Durkheim's anomie and Marx's estrangement, for example, while grounded in macrostructures of collective representations or material production, become salient in our *experience* of them as persons. Like the study of income inequality or racial discrimination, the study of community ultimately derives its importance from its consequences for human lives (Sayer 2005:11-12). Though studying community-as-

experience does not capture all dimensions of the concept, it does encompass a theoretically justifiable and subjectively important aspect of human life.

There are two principal schools of thought used to explain the experience of *Gemeinschaft*: the structural and the substantive. Though the distinction between the two is not hard and fast, it is nevertheless highly useful. Structural theories explain community in terms of a set of organizational properties such as power relations, "dynamic density," the built environment, or other formal characteristics. Substantive theories, on the other hand, explain *Gemeinschaft* as a product of moral order. I now turn to a brief outline of these theories, their associated mechanisms, and their implications for the study of the *Gemeinschaft* experience in communes.

Structural Theories of Community

One exemplary structural theory comes from the social neworks and social capital tradition. Though rarely stated explictly, Putnam (2000:19) comes closest to giving a formal articulation of this view: "[S]ocial capital refers to connections among individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness *that arise from them*" (emphasis added). On this account, the norms and trust that constitute major aspects of community are emergent from the "infrastructure" of the social networks that underlie them (for a review of this literature, see Field 2003). The relationship between networks and culture here is one of "structural determinism" (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994).

This network-influenced view is not only widespread among those who want to understand community, but also among those who seek to promote it. Putnam (2000:204-15) and Brint (2001), for instance, speak to the importance of physical space, advocating

the creation of "well-traveled paths and common meeting places" that will provide "opportunities for interaction" (Brint 2001:19). An emphasis on the vital importance of physical space also underlies New Urbanism, an enormously influential planning philosophy that is behind the creation of hundreds of planned communities in the United States (Calthorpe 1993; Katz 1994). What all of these theories have in common is the assumption that a shared identity and meaning *emerge from* the spatio-temporal organization of social life. Solidarity is viewed as the by-product of interaction.

Another important strand of structural theory also comes from network theory and has its clearest incarnation in the work of McPherson and colleagues (e.g., McPherson and Rotolo 1996). These scholars have done compelling research showing that the distribution of individuals in "Blau space" (that is, the multidimensional space defined by various sociodemographic variables) influences the relative growth of voluntary organizations. The presumed engine behind this phenomenon is homophily—that actors who are alike in their education, income, or other sociodemographic characteristics will tend to gravitate toward and interact with each other (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). While McPherson and colleagues do not specifically address the issue of community in Tönnies's sense, their work suggests that social homogeneity may be an important factor leading to the experience of community.

Finally, Steven Brint's (2001) work on community can also be placed squarely in the structural camp. I have already noted his focus on interaction as a catalyst for *Gemeinschaft*. He goes further than this, however, drawing on the work of Kanter (1972) and others to suggest other mechanisms that can serve as "instruments of community-building" (Brint 2001, Table 2). He classifies these mechanisms into two groups:

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voluntaristic and sacrificial (see also Kanter 1972:68-74). Voluntaristic mechanisms include well-traveled meeting places, regular times for gathering, ritual occasions, and "socioemotional leadership." The first three are variants on the spatio-temporal themes already discussed. (Ritual, while not merely spatio-temporal, is certainly structural in that it is based in Durkheim's [(1912) 2001] later sociology of religion, which largely disregards substantive content.) "Socioemotional leadership," according to Brint, means that group leaders are to organize their group's culture "out of the materials of personality and experience" rather than out of shared beliefs or moral commitments (p. 19).

Sacrificial mechanisms are meant to separate individuals from outgroups by demanding sacrifices. Unlike voluntaristic mechanisms, which are (largely) grounded in the shared, elective use of spatio-temporal resources, sacrificial mechanisms imply strong authority and high levels of investment. The four mechanisms advanced by Brint (2001, Table 2) are: hazing, the renunciation of pleasure(s), investment of time and/or money, and enforced changes in appearance and expression. The organizing principles of these mechanisms are *authority* and *investment* – that is, group leaders set controls on entry as well as on the required behavior of members. There is a strong parallel here to rational choice theories of religion, which identify "strictness" as a primary mechanism behind variation in organizational growth (see Iannaccone 1994). Advocates of this view hold that by screening out free-riders, strict groups create higher levels of average investment, creating a better shared experience for participating members.

In general, then, the proposed mechanisms of structural theories can be grouped under four headings: (1) spatio-temporal interaction, (2) homophily, (3) authority, and (4)

investment. With these in mind, I now turn to a review of substantive theories of community.

Substantive Theories of Community

The overriding concern of substantive theories is that ideas, culture, and identity matter at least as much as social structure for the development of particular forms of social interaction. One theorist who has been particularly critical of structural theories is Amitai Etzioni (2001). Etzioni contends that while Putnam (2000) and others are correct that interactions are a necessary part of community they are not in and of themselves sufficient to produce it. He argues, "[W]ithout shared values, communities are unable to withstand centrifugal forces… For these reasons, the mainstays of community cannot be bowling leagues, bird watching societies, and chess clubs" (Etzioni 2001:224). These types of organizations are not adequate, he contends, because they are not formed around shared moral cultures (see also MacIntyre 1981; Sandel 1996, 2001).

Charles Taylor (2003) shares with communitarian theorists a focus on moral order. Taylor argues that both individual and group identity are firmly grounded on what actors intersubjectively hold to be good or valuable in life (see Taylor 1989, 1991, 2003). Taylor is not an idealist; he simply argues that practices (such as those posited by structural theories) can have no social power unless they are interpreted through the "hermeneutic key" of shared moral order (see Taylor 2003:23-30). He contends that shared interpretive understanding "makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy" (2003:23). In other words, without a common understanding about

what a given practice *means* in the context of a group's day-to-day interactions, it cannot provide a basis for solidarity.

Taylor's work has been translated into sociological theory primarily through the writings of Craig Calhoun (1991) and Christian Smith (1998, 2003). While Calhoun stresses in a general way the importance of moral horizons for grounding individual and collective selves, Smith has adapted these ideas for empirical inquiry. Smith's (1998) subcultural theory of religious strength maintains (*contra* rational choice theory) that "strict churches" are not strong because they require investments, but rather because they inspire a shared and morally salient group identity. Proposition 1 of Smith's (1998:90) theory holds that "[t]he human drives for meaning and belonging are satisfied primarily by locating human selves within social groups that sustain distinctive, *morally orienting* collective identities" (emphasis added). In contrast to the structural mechanisms considered previously, these substantive theories possess a common core – the importance of the mechanism of *shared moral order* for generating a sense of belonging in face-to-face groups.

DATA

I test these theories of community using data from the Urban Communes Project, a stratified sample of urban communes collected in six U.S. metropolitan areas—Atlanta, Boston, Houston, Los Angeles, New York, and the Twin Cities—in 1974 and 1975. To be included in the sampling frame, groups had to have at least five members, and at least one member of each sex (or resident children). (This design was meant to exclude monasteries and convents.) The sample was drawn using a clustered quota design. To

maximize geographical diversity, six large Standard Metropolitan Sampling Areas from different regions across the United States were chosen for analysis. Fieldworkers in each city first compiled a comprehensive census of communes within the SMSA. Ten communes in each SMSA were then selected on the basis of certain key variables such as ideological type, population size, and year founded (see Zablocki 1980). The study design included several different methodologies. Participant observers were sent to each of the communes and given a standardized form to fill out based on their observations. These observers also asked the members of each group to fill out a variety of survey instruments on attitudes, beliefs, and communal relationships (see Zablocki 1980 and Martin, Yeung, and Zablocki 2001). These data present a rich picture of life in a number of groups that were attempting to achieve the *Gemeinschaft* experience. Because of missing data on some theoretically important variables, the analyses in this paper are restricted to 50 groups.

Though the questions that motivate this analysis concern the broader issue of "community," the data are of course limited by their specificity. Communes are not representative of all attempts to build face-to-face community. Yet because producing the phenomenological *experience* of belonging was a major objective of these groups, they serve as valuable self-imposed experiments that permit testing predictions or recipes offered by very different theories in well-defined settings.

Though the communes are demographically very similar—whiter, younger, and more educated than the general population—they also differ from one another in many ways. At the individual level, far from all sharing a similar ideology, Zablocki (1980:194) concluded on the basis of attitude surveys that commune members were "almost

maximally heterogeneous," with the major difference between them and non-communal

samples being the former's relatively high rates of survey non-response. There are also

group differences in ideology. The original research team devised a seven-part typology

they deemed most useful for coding each group's ideology (Zablocki 1980). Among the

50 groups examined in this analysis, there are 14 Eastern religious, 8 Christian, 6 political

(revolutionary), 7 countercultural (hippie), 5 alternative family, 7 cooperative living, and

3 "psychological" communes.[20] What is more relevant for this particular investigation,

these 50 groups vary markedly in their degree of *Gemeinschaft* as well as in their levels

of spatio-temporal interaction, social homogeneity, authority structures, investment, and

strength of moral order. This variation is not simply an artifact of measuring relative

differences between nearly identical groups; for example, as shown in Appendix 2, Table

2A, the ratio-level variables show a great deal of variation, indicating real differences

between groups. This leaves plenty of scope for testing links between the we-feeling and

the various factors that are held to give rise to it.

MEASURES AND METHODS

Measuring the Experience of Community

      As I have argued above, one way to think of *Gemeinschaft* is as a kind of

phenomenological experience characterized by what Tönnies ([1897] 1988) called the

"natural will" or what Kanter (1972) referred to as the we-feeling. This refers to human

relations based primarily on emotion and trust rather than on instrumentality. It is

doubtful that a single measure could capture this multivalent concept (see Loomis and

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[20] Since the ideological typology has little explanatory power beyond the other variables employed in the analysis, I do not spend more time defining these types. See Zablocki (1980:189-246) for more details.

McKinney 1956). Thus, while I also conduct replications using single measures (see

Appendix B), I rely primarily on a scale of six different measures, one of which comes

from ethnographic observation and the others from the survey data. A UCP ethnographer

was asked to rate each commune's level of "feeling of community"; possible values were

"no feeling of 'We the commune' apparent among members, just feelings of a collection

of individuals" (1); "minimal feeling of 'We the commune,' more dominant feelings of

'I' among the members" (2); "feeling of 'We the commune' on certain occasions" (3);

and "strong feeling of a sense of 'We the commune' among members."[21] I also used each

group's mean[22] response to a number of individual-level survey questions. The measures

used to construct the *Gemeinschaft* scale (coded so higher values are more *Gemeinschaft*-

like) are as follows:

- "I feel the members of this commune are my true family" (5-point scale from
  "agree strongly" to "disagree strongly")

- "Most people in this commune are more inclined to look out for themselves
  than to consider the needs of others" (same coding)

- "No one in this communal household is going to care much about what
  happens to me" (same coding)

- "I think there is a very good chance I will still be living communally ten years
  from now" (same coding)

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[21] Though for these and other ethnographer-coded measures there is no available interrater reliability, most
scores were subsequently confirmed by the principal investigator, who also visited the research sites
(Zablocki, personal communication).

[22] For all individual-level measures in these analyses, I employ the group mean. The analyses were also
tried using the group median and there were no meaningful differences.

- "If you were offered $10,000 in cash by an anonymous donor to leave this commune, and never again live communally in this house or with any of these same people (spouse, children, relatives excepted) would you: 1) definitely accept the offer, 2) have to think about it, 3) definitely reject the offer."

These measures each tap different, but related dimensions of the community experience. The first three deal with the affective quality of relations within the group, specifically the extent to which the members are attached to each other in a non-instrumental way. The fourth question assesses each groups's average degree of commitment to a communal lifestyle. The last directly tests whether each group's communal relationships are reducible to instrumental value, directly capturing Weber's and Tönnies' distinction between natural (substantive) and instrumental motivations for interaction. To construct the overall measure of *Gemeinschaft*, I compute a scale from the ethnographers' rating, the average value of the first four survey questions, and the proportion responding "definitely reject" to the hypothetical cash offer. (As with all scales in this study, the individual variables were standardized before summing to give equal weight to each component.) A factor analysis using varimax rotation (not shown here) confirms that all of these measures load on a single factor. Cronbach's alpha for this scale is .84, and would not be improved by eliminating any of the individual measures.[23]

Measuring Structural Mechanisms

Above, I outlined four basic types of structural mechanisms – spatio-temporal organization, social homogeneity, authority, and investment. Fortunately, the UCP data

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[23] Because most of the variables used in these analyses are categorical rather than continuous, I use the polychoric correlation coefficient (ρ; Stata -polychoric-) instead of Pearson's r to compute α.

contain multiple measures in each of these categories. In the primary analysis, I use standardized scales to measure these concepts. In the supplemental analyses (Appendix B), however, I replicate key findings using single measures.

Spatio-temporal interaction refers to the frequency that members of the commune interact with each other as members of the group. To assess the degree of interaction, I consider the following three measures: 1) the number of meetings per month, which ranges from 0 to 30; 2) the frequency of eating meals together, which is measured on a five-point scale – never, special occasions only, one meal per day, two meals per day, three meals per day; and 3) the log interpersonal density of the commune (log(persons/rooms)). Meetings and meals provide opportunities for ritual occasions and "collective effervescence" within the group, and interpersonal density increases necessity of physical interaction. When combined into a scale of spatio-temporal intensity, Cronbach's alpha equals .72.

Social homogeneity reflects the degree of social similarity between members of each commune. I consider potential homophily effects on three axes: age, education, and father's occupational prestige. (There is no available question about individual race or income.) As noted above, these measures figure prominently in McPherson's work on organizational growth and vitality (e.g., McPherson and Rotolo 1996). I measure age similarity by the group's standard deviation in age. Because of the original question's categorical response scale, I measure educational similarity by the probability that any two group members picked at random would have the same degree status (college vs. no college). Finally, I measure "class" similarity using the group's standard deviation of father's occupational prestige (based on 1970 Census occupational codes). Since the

differing forms of social homogeneity are conceptually very different, they are never combined into a single scale.

Authority refers to the degree to which commune life is regulated by leader(s) with coercive power. To construct this measure, I rely on reports by the UCP participant observers. The first measure is the "extent of authority" in the commune, which varies on a four-point scale from "no authority recognized" to "high degree of authority." The second reports the "extent of rules" in the commune, which can vary on a four-point scale from "no rules" to "many rules governing conduct and behavior." The final measure of authority is derived from a series of five variables reported by UCP ethnographers. The observers were asked to report on the way the group made decisions in five areas: "the executive sphere," defining values, making judgments, setting policy, and making specific house decisions. I include the number of these areas (0 to 6) in which decisions are made by leaders without consulting the group as a whole through either democratic or consensual processes.[24] When all three measures are combined in an authority scale, Cronbach's alpha equals .87.

Investment refers to the amount of scarce resources a member or prospective member must devote to the commune. This construct is meant to assess how "demanding" the group is in terms of time, economic resources, and personal freedom. To construct this measure, I use three ethnographer reports and one survey item. The ethnographic variables are: the degree of economic communism (a four-point scale

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[24] The possible codings for these variables were: no authority recognized, group consensus, group majority, multiple leaders, absentee leader, absentee leader with resident lieutenant, and single resident leader (or couple). On the basis of extensive exploratory analyses, the first three were coded 0 and the others 1 for the purposes of defining this measure. The means for the resulting variables range from .32 to .43 with the exception of defining values (.89). These indicators are almost perfectly correlated with each other ($\rho >$ .92).

ranging from "no communism" to "virtually total communism"), and two dichotomous

variables representing whether the group assigns chores to its members (rather than using

a volunteer system), and whether a trial membership or novitiate is required to join the

group. The survey-based measure is the number of hours the average member spent in the

commune during the preceding three days. When combined into a scale of investment,

Cronbach's alpha equals .85.

Measuring Substantive Mechanisms

Following Smith (1998, 2003) and Taylor (1989), I define moral order as a group

possessing a belief structure with two characteristics: *sharedness* and the capacity for

orienting action.[25] To get at these aspects of moral order, I rely on two ethnographic and

two survey measures. Participant observers were asked to rate the "degree of consensus

about commune's ideology, values and beliefs among members" using a four point scale

with options "much diversity," "some homogeneity," "great homogeneity," and

"ideological unity." This reflects sharedness of beliefs. They also rated the "importance

of ideology, values and beliefs in [each] commune's life" on a three-point scale, which

reflects the extent to which these shared beliefs are capable of being translated into

action. To supplement these ethnographer-reported indicators, I also look to the

individual-level data for indicators of morally-orienting beliefs. I take the average value

of two survey measures (both measured on a five point scale from "agree strongly" to

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[25] This definition rules out two conditions that might qualify as shared beliefs but not as moral order as defined in the literature. The first is shared individualism; while it is certainly possible that the sacredness of individual preferences can be a widely shared belief, Bellah and colleagues (1985), Joas (2000), and Smith (2003) have all pointed out that "sacred individual" subcultures are not capable of sustaining collective identity because they are not morally orienting in a way that is collectively actionable. The second condition is shared beliefs that are incidental to the life of the group. For example, the fact that a group's members all prefer the color red is not likely to generate much solidarity. Moral order, as defined and measured here, is a combination of sharedness, importance, and action relevance.

"disagree strongly") which indirectly tap the morally-orienting character of the group's beliefs. The mean value of the survey question, "With respect to relations between husband and wife these days there are no clear guidelines to tell us what is right and what is wrong," is used because it represents a common dilemma for organizing communal life. Individuals who belong to groups with morally-orienting cultures should have a clear sense of how marital relations ought to be organized, whether it be along traditional or egalitarian lines (Smith 1998:90). The next survey based item is the group's mean value for the question: "I am skeptical of anything that tries to tell me the right way to live." Again, following the definition of moral orders as orienting, groups with a strong moral order should have clear beliefs about the "right" way to live, whatever that may be. When combined into a scale, Cronbach's alpha for these four items is .91.[26]

While measures of belief unity and moral orientation capture the overall sharedness, importance, and morally-orienting character of the group's ideology, the general *type* of organizing ideology may itself play a role. This is measured by dummy variables that reference the group typology decided on by the study investigators (i.e., Eastern religious, countercultural, etc.; Zablocki 1980).

Additional Variables

There are a few other factors that may relate to the overall level of *Gemeinschaft* in these groups that are not directly addressed by either structural or substantive theories. Several control variables will therefore be included in the multivariate analyses. Group size may not play a clear role here since even the largest communes are quite small in absolute terms. Nevertheless, the number of members in the group (aged 15 or more), is

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[26] The results are substantively unchanged if the variance of these items is also included in the scale.

included here as a control variable. The age of the group (in years) is also considered since we might expect that groups with a longer history will have developed a stronger sense of community. Finally, I include a dummy variable coded 1 if the group derived from a prior organization or organized group, since it represents a prior association between at least some current commune members, and may therefore reflect a pre-existing stock of we-feeling independent of current group characteristics.

There are additional factors that have been examined in other studies of communes (e.g., Zablocki 1980) but that I do not include in this investigation. The first is the presence of "charisma," and the second is the character of sexual relations in the group. I do not include these variables in the analysis because they do not fit well into either the structural or substantive theories of community that guide this study. Of course, I cannot simply exclude these variables without testing if their exclusion might bias the results. While ethnographer-coded charisma is positively associated with *Gemeinschaft* (ρ = .314) and "shifting sexual relationships" are negatively associated with it (ρ = -.653), neither is significant in the multivariate model below (p > .10). I therefore conclude that I am justified in excluding them from the analysis.

Hypotheses and Note on Causality

The bivariate hypotheses suggested by the theories are straightforward. High-levels of spatio-temporal interaction, social homogeneity, authority, investment, and moral order should be positively related to the overall level of *Gemeinschaft* in these groups. Moreover, since these theories go beyond positing associations and offer specific mechanisms for producing the experience of community, we should expect their effects

to persist net of other factors. For example, if specific mechanisms of investment (such as the exclusion of free riders) are really operative, then the association between investment and we-feeling should persist even when other factors are controlled statistically. Otherwise, we would have to conclude that the bivariate relationship between investment and the experience of community exists because investment produces another phenomenon (or is itself produced by another phenomenon) which is the "real" (i.e., proximate) culprit. Thus, multivariate analysis will also be necessary to try to isolate the specific mechanisms at work in the production of community (see Ron 2002). The theories outlined above would lead us to hypothesize that *interaction*, *homogeneity*, *authority*, *investment*, and *moral order* will all be positively related to the experience of *Gemeinschaft* net of other factors.

Finally, implicit in these hypotheses is that these mechanisms *produce* a sense of community instead of somehow being produced by it. Although theories of community treat the feeling of belonging as a "dependent variable," it is possible that a group of people who already (for whatever reason) share a sense of community might come to desire and pursue more interaction or increased investment, or might be more willing to submit themselves to an authority or develop a shared moral vision. Perhaps more plausibly, causality may operate in both directions – certain mechanisms may lead to greater *Gemeinschaft* which in turn may lead to an increased intensity of (or willingness to accept) the original mechanism. Even though qualitative work and empirically-driven theory has pointed to the *causal* importance of these factors (e.g., Brint 2001; Kanter 1972), there is no way to rule out alternative explanations in this investigation. The goal

of this study is thus to test which theoretical perspectives are most consistent with these particular cases and the empirical data at hand.

Analytic Strategy

The empirical analysis will proceed in three steps. The first step is to evaluate the simple associations between the presence of each of the mechanisms and the level of *Gemeinschaft*. Because many of the measures are categorical, I use polychoric correlations if one of the variables has fewer than 10 response categories. In each case, the experience of community will be measured by the continuous *Gemeinschaft* scale as defined above. These bivariate associations will provide a baseline for comparison with the multivariate analysis.

Next, I simultaneously regress the *Gemeinschaft* scale on all of the variables defined above. Normally an analysis which relies so heavily on multiple measures of fairly abstract concepts such as *Gemeinschaft* or "investment" would be best handled using structural equations with latent variables (Bollen 1989). However, since there are too few cases in these data to allow me to take such an approach, I rely instead on OLS. I provide further details and analysis as needed.

In the final step of the analysis, I use a modified version of fuzzy set analysis (FSA; Ragin 2000). Although regression is well suited to uncovering the proximate mechanisms linked to the outcome of interest, contemporary sociological theory holds that cultural schemas and material resources and practices must work together to generate social phenomena (Giddens 1984; Sewell 1992). This duality is hard to capture in regression models, since by design they pit explanatory variables against each other in a competition to explain variance. FSA, on the other hand, does not pit variables against

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each other; instead, it looks at different configurations of the independent variables and compares their relationships to the outcome. Although FSA has its weaknesses, it is well-suited to conditions where high levels of contingency are theorized as well as in situations with a moderate number of data points, both of which are true in the present case (Ragin 2000, 2006a). Since this method is not familiar to many readers, I discuss the exact procedure used in more detail below.

One possible objection to this analytic strategy is that the way I have conceived of and measured moral order will "stack the deck" in its favor. This concern might arise from two quarters: first, since moral order and we-feeling are both "cultural" and subjective they might in fact be two measures of the same concept; and second, since communes are often thought of as explicitly organized around substantive ideological goals, this might also make moral order a more salient factor in these groups. While I cannot address these concerns definitively, I would like to consider each briefly.

First, though moral order and we-feeling are indeed highly correlated in these data (.71), they are conceptually distinct in that they differentiate between *belief organization* on the one hand, and *relational sentiment* on the other. (As a thought experiment, it is very possible to think of people who share ideological goals and beliefs who nonetheless hate each other.) Also, despite the high overall correlation, the UCP ethographers were perfectly willing to code some communes as having a strong we-feeling and a not-so-strong moral order—for instance, only 43 percent of all groups classified as having a strong sense of we-feeling were also classified as having high ideological homogeneity. In the minds of the ethnographers at least, these were not equivalent concepts.

In response to the second objection—that communes are universally centered around substantive ideological goals—I want to reemphasize that, despite popular stereotypes, communes differed greatly in their approach to communal life. Just as the theories outlined above distinguish between more procedural and more substantive approaches to community, so too did some groups emphasize collective *procedures* while others stressed collective *ideology*. "Cooperative living" communes, for example, were more focused on putting communal practices into place than on articulating a coherent ideology. "Old Plantation," one of the urban communes described in Zablocki (1980), exemplifies this type of group. The stated goal of this group was to help its members "pursue [their] *individual goals* to the best of [their] ability. The pursuit of individual goals was seen to be *facilitated by* communal living" (Zablocki 1980:224, emphasis added). Here and in others of the UCP groups, communal life was viewed as an instrumental practice for individuals rather than an ideological goal in its own right. Reflecting this, the UCP ethnographers also distinguished between ideological importance and we-feeling: a full third of groups with strong we-feeling were coded as having only moderate or no role for ideology. Once again, we see that despite high correlations, these are not be the same concepts. Though the measures here are certainly not beyond question, thoughtful consideration of the theoretical, historical, and measurement issues involved can provide some confidence in their relative validity and reliability. (The supplemental analyses in Appendix B further demonstrate the robustness of the results to alternative specifications and measures.)

ANALYSES AND RESULTS

Bivariate Analyses

Table 3.1 shows the correlations between each of the theoretical variables and the

Gemeinschaft scale. Nearly all of the measures of the theoretical mechanisms are

positively related to the community scale, some quite strongly. There are exceptions,

however. The measure of the commune's interpersonal density is positively but not

significantly related to the we-feeling. Another unexpected result was the absence of

association between the experience of *Gemeinschaft* and the three homogeneity variables.

There appears to be no connection in these groups between age, education, and class

homogeneity and the overall sense of belonging. (Because this null relationship persisted

into all multivariate analyses, the homophily hypothesis is rejected at this point and the

social homogeneity variables are not considered further.)

In general, the results here are consistent with much of the theoretical and

qualitative work on community (e.g., Kanter 1972; Brint 2001; Keller 2003). Groups with

more spatio-temporal interaction, higher levels of authority and investment, and stronger

moral orders have higher levels of we-feeling. This is true both for the aggregated scales

and for each of the individual measures. For the indicators of group type, there are also

significant relationships. Christian groups are linked to a higher degree of community,

while hippie, cooperative living, and psychological groups are associated with lower

levels. This finding is unsurprising given Kanter's (1972:136-138) analysis of the

community-building practices often associated with religious groups. Finally, turning to

the controls, Table 3.1 shows that groups that originated from previous groups have a

higher level of *Gemeinschaft*.

These results paint a descriptive picture of the relationships between aspects of commune life and the phenomenological experience of *Gemeinschaft*. In almost all cases, the theoretical predictions based on previous literature have been supported. In order to go beyond simple description and toward an understanding of the mechanisms involved, I now turn to the multivariate analysis.

Regression Models

Table 3.2 shows the results of the regression of the *Gemeinschaft* scale on the four scales representing the theoretical mechanisms, as well as controls for group type and other relevant characteristics. Overall, the model fits the data very well, accounting for more than 75 percent of the variance in community experience between the groups. Only three of the regression coefficients are statistically significant at the .05 level – authority, investment, and moral order. The type of group, net of other factors, is unrelated to the level of we-feeling. Unexpectedly, the level of spatio-temporal interaction is not significantly related to the outcome. The interaction hypothesis is therefore rejected. The coefficient for authority is significant and quite large, but in the *opposite direction* from the theoretical expectation (β = -.595). The authority hypothesis is therefore rejected. The coefficient for investment, however, is both significant and positive (β = .374), suggesting that investment is positively related to we-feeling net of other factors. The investment hypothesis is thus supported. Finally, the coefficient for the strength of moral order is highly significant and very large – over two and a half times as large as the coefficient for investment (β = .936). Thus, we may conclude that, net of other factors,

the strength of moral order is strongly and positively associated with the community

experience. The moral order hypothesis is therefore also supported.[27]

Taken together, these results yield a number of findings. While there is support

for the investment hypothesis, the structural theories as a whole have not performed as

well in this particular test as one might have expected. There is little evidence to this

point that the formal or structural community building mechanisms emphasized by

Kanter (1972) and Brint (2001) actually play a "front line" role in creating a feeling of

natural belonging. In that sense, characteristics such as frequent interactions, meetings,

and authoritarian social control are not (strictly speaking) community-building

mechanisms in these groups – they do not appear to *directly* lead to a greater level of

Gemeinschaft (see Hedström and Swedberg 1998). In fact, there is evidence here that the

direct effects of authority can be alienating.

Substantive theory, on the other hand, has performed much better. In moving

from the bivariate to the multivariate analyses, the strength of the association between

moral order and we-feeling actually *increased*.[28] The regression analyses are consistent

with the idea that interaction, authority, and (to some extent) investment have positive

total effects because of their tendency to be associated with moral order. The precise way

in which these factors are interrelated is impossible to know with any certainty based on

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[27] Diagnostic tests (available on request) showed that heteroskedasticity, mulitcollinearity, and influential cases did not significantly bias the results. Further, the substantive results from this model are extremely robust. Removing some of the single measures from the scales (both dependent and independent) and removing group type indicators or control variables does not appreciably change the conclusions. Nor does bootstrapping the standard errors. The results are also largely consistent if all measures are included individually. See Appendix B for additional results.

[28] This is due to a statistical suppression effect—while the direct effect of authority is negative, it is positively associated with moral order; thus the total effect of moral order on the we-feeling is attenuated by its indirect effect via authority. When authority is statistically controlled, however, the "true" direct effect of moral order is revealed.

these analyses and given the cross-sectional nature of the data. But the regression models

are consistent with the notion that, while structural and cultural arrangements may tend to

co-occur, moral order is the proximate mechanism that leads to the production of we-

feeling in these groups.

Fuzzy-Set Analysis

As an alternative way to model causal complexity, I rely on fuzzy set analysis

(FSA). Like its parent technique, QCA, FSA looks at simultaneous configurations of

predictors rather than at net effects of single predictors (Ragin 2000, 2006a; Roscigno

and Hodson 2004).[29] Unlike QCA, however, FSA does not require that variables be

defined dichotomously. For instance, rather than defining a commune's level of

investment as "high" (1) or "low" (0), it can be coded continuously from 0 to 1. To

convert the *Gemeinschaft* scale and the four main predictors into fuzzy sets here, I use a

procedure analogous to the median split employed by Roscigno and Hodson (2004). I

rank each commune on the variable from 1 to 50 and then rescale the resulting ranking so

that it varies between 0 and 1 with .5 as the median. (Other transformations, including the

cumulative normal and the ridit transformation, produced nearly identical results.) This

procedure does not satisfy Ragin's (2000) or Smithson and Verkuilen's (2006) demand

for a theory- or knowledge-based coding of fuzzy sets. This strategy is necessary and

justified, however, for three reasons. First, I do not have in-depth knowledge on all 50

cases and cannot acquire it three decades after the fact. Second, given the high

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[29] Though they seem similar, QCA/FSA configurations are very different from GLM interaction terms. For instance, an "A × B" interaction term would take on equivalent values if A were high and B were low or vice-versa. QCA/FSA treats these as separate types of cases. Also, in FSA, set values are not multiplied together, but rather the minimum value is taken (see below). Thus the set-theoretic logic of QCA/FSA is not easily translatable in terms of the GLM, with or without interaction terms (see Ragin 2000; Roscigno and Hodson 2004; Smithson and Verkuilen 2006).

correlations between the predictors, there will tend to be a number of sparse cells in the FSA truth table; a median-based coding strategy minimizes this problem by creating maximal empirical diversity (i.e., the fewest sparse or empty cells). Finally, this coding strategy is justifiable in the present context because the original sampling design makes these groups the closest available approximation to a random sample from the population of urban communes in 1974. The set values attached to each commune can therefore be substantively interpreted relative to that population of groups.[30]

FSA assesses the empirical relationship between all possible combinations of the predictors and the outcome of interest. The four predictors are spatio-temporal interaction (S), authority (A), investment (I), and moral order (M), which means there are 2^4 or 16 possible set configurations. FSA analyzes the extent to which each configuration is a subset of the outcome because subsetness is evidence of logical sufficiency. In other words, if X is a subset of Y, one can also say "if X, then Y." To determine whether, say, communes with high interaction, low authority, low investment, and high moral order (S·a·i·M)[31] are subsets of *Gemeinschaft*, one computes the inclusion coefficient of the configuration in the outcome set. The inclusion coefficient is estimated using equation 1,

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[30] Though this analysis relies on fuzzy sets, there are descriptive advantages to dichotomizing the variables at the median and generating a 16 cell table (see Appendix A, Table A3). We see that a substantial majority of communes (60 percent) are best described as either high or low on all four key predictors. "Off-diagonal" cases are much rarer, but are also most theoretically interesting for this study. While the regression results indicate that communes with high moral order, high investment, and low authority should be the most *Gemeinschaft*-like, there is, in fact, only one group in the data that fits that profile. This means, among other things, that there would be too little power to model causal complexity using interaction terms even though the coding used here minimizes the incidence of empty cells. Because QCA/FSA makes the (lack of) diversity in the data explicit, is has distinct advantages for examining causal complexity.

[31] These configurations are labeled, according to convention, with capital letters signifying 1("high") and lowercase letters signifying 0 ("low"). In the fuzzy set case, "high" simply means the set membership (e.g., S) and "low" means 1-the set membership (e.g., 1-S). The operator "•" stands for the Boolean "and" which means "take the minimum value of these sets." Thus, S•a•I•m would be translated "high interaction *and* low authority *and* high investment *and* low moral order," or in quantitative terms, would be the minimum value of S, (1-A), I, and (1-M).

$$(1) \qquad I_{XY} = \frac{\sum \min(x_i, y_i)}{\sum x_i}$$

where X stands for one of the 16 configurations (S·A·I·M, S·A·I·m, S·A·i·M, and so on), Y stands for the outcome set, and x_i and y_i stand for each commune's membership score on X and Y, respectively (Ragin 2006b; Smithson and Verkuilen 2006). The resulting number is akin to a fuzzy conditional probability, with numbers closer to 1 signifying a closer empirical correspondence to a subset relation or, equivalently, the logical statement "if X, then Y." Here, I compare I_{XY} and $I_{X(1-Y)}$ using a Wald F-test, which means that, for each configuration, I simply ask whether the data are more consistent with calling that configuration a sufficient condition for the *presence* of we-feeling (Y) or a sufficient condition for the *absence* of we-feeling (1-Y). Where the difference between I_{XY} and $I_{X(1-Y)}$ is not statistically significant, the configuration's relationship to the outcome is considered ambiguous.

Because the 16 configurations are fuzzily defined, individual communes can be partial members of multiple configurations. Some configurations are highly correlated with each other because communes tend to have similar scores in both.[32] Because some of the configurations are empirically quite rare (i.e., they tend to have low membership values), I use a data-driven strategy to reduce the number of overall configurations (see Roscigno and Hodson 2004 for a crisp set approach to reducing the number of configurations). The technique used here, clustering around latent variables (CLV), uses the correlation matrix of the configurations to combine those that are the most empirically similar to each other in a step-by-step manner (Vigneau and Qannari 2003).

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[32] For example, a commune with S=.80, A=.70, I=.52, and M=.75 would have very similar membership scores in S·A·I·M (.52) and in S·A·i·M (.48). Any commune with nonzero membership on all four predictor sets will be a member of all 16 possible configurations to some extent.

Based on theory and the findings of the regression analyses, the typology that best combines parsimony and complexity seems to be the one that distinguishes between six types of groups: 1) all high (S•A•I•M); 2) all low (s•a•i•m); 3) all other high authority, high moral order groups besides S•A•I•M (other A•M); 4) high authority, low moral order groups (A•m); 5) low authority, high moral order groups (a•M); and 6) all other low authority, low moral order groups besides s•a•i•m (other a•m). This provides a good mix of extreme types as well as "off diagonal" types that are of particular theoretical interest.[33]

Table 3.3 shows the results of the tests for all six groups. Only one configuration, S•A•I•M, is significantly more *Gemeinschaft*-like than not. That is, the data are more consistent with the assertion that S•A•I•M is a subset of the outcome (Y) than with the assertion that S•A•I•M is a subset of the absence of the outcome (1-Y). This highlights the fact that moral order and structural arrangements must work together to produce the experience of *Gemeinschaft* in a consistent way (see Giddens 1984; Sewell 1992). In contrast to what the regression suggests, moral order alone does not appear sufficient to produce we-feeling. Conversely, three of the groups are more included in 1-Y than in Y: the all low set (s•a•i•m), and both of the other low moral order sets (A•m and other a•m). In other words, all of the configurations that contain the low moral order element (m) are better thought of as not *Gemeinschaft*-like. While a high level of moral order is therefore not sufficient by itself to produce we-feeling, the fuzzy analysis suggests that its absence may be sufficient to prevent it. In logical terms, then, we can conclude that moral order is an INUS condition for *Gemeinschaft*—an insufficient but necessary part of all

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[33] This cluster solution accounts for 79.2 of the variance, as defined by the sum of the first eigenvalues of all six clusters (12.67) divided by the total number of variables (16). For separate tests of all 16 possible configurations, see Appendix B, Table B3.

unnecessary but sufficient conditions (Mackie 1965). That it, while the presence or absence of moral order is not sufficient in its own right to produce or prevent the we-feeling, it is a necessary part of of all the recipes that *are* sufficient to do so. Detecting such conditions is beyond the scope of regression and gives us new insight into the structure-culture relationship in these groups.

DISCUSSION

The combined results of the regression and fuzzy set approaches warrant a number of empirical inferences. First, the findings here strongly support the hypotheses advanced by substantive theories of community: there is good evidence that moral order is a vital dimension of producing the experience of *Gemeinschaft* in these groups. Conversely, there is little evidence that interaction, authority, or (to a lesser extent) investment can—on their own—produce the experience of community in such groups.

Second, it may be that moral order intervenes to explain the bivariate association between we-feeling and the structural variables in communes because interaction, investment, and authority tend themselves to co-occur with moral order. Strong authority may appear to "work," for example, because its indirect positive relationship to we-feeling via its association with moral order is greater than its direct alienating effects. Both Martin (2002) and Sewell (1999) have previously argued that social power has the ability to organize cultural beliefs, which would account for the co-occurrence of authority and moral order, but other explanations are certainly plausible. It may be, for example, that groups with strong moral orders are willing to accept stricter authorities because they see them as legitimate. Ultimately, however, because we cannot isolate causal order with any precision, any specific interpretation must remain speculative.

Third, despite the findings of the regression models, it would be unwise to downplay the importance of structural factors here. FSA showed that moral order is only sufficient to produce community in the presence of particular structural arrangements. While regression is indeed useful for uncovering the most proximate factors producing the outcome, it is in a sense overly simplistic because its "struggle for variance" logic does not capture well the potential complementary relationships between important factors. Even the inclusion of interaction terms in regression does not model causal complexity in the same way as FSA (see Ragin 2000, 2006a).

The fuzzy set analyses also suggest that while the existence of moral order is not sufficient in and of itself to produce we-feeling, the absence of moral order is sufficient to prevent it. A plausible interpretation of this result can be found in the work of Charles Taylor (2003), who argues that moral orders provide "hermeneutic keys" for interpreting practices – that is, for answering the common query, "Why are we doing this again?" Though it is not always the case, communal life can be particularly demanding in terms of time, resources, freedom, and other generally valued goods. If actors don't have some shared, collective sense of why they are going to meetings, making food for other people, submitting to authority, and so on, how could they continue to feel that these efforts were worthwhile? Authority, in particular, appears to be alienating in the absence of shared moral order, at least in these groups.

The findings also highlight the importance of using regression and FSA together. By combining two analytical approaches into a single investigation, we have gained a much greater understanding of how different types of communes and the social mechanisms in each are related to the experience of community. Neither regression nor

FSA alone could have provided such a nuanced understanding of the interplay of cultural and structural factors in this sample of communes.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper seeks to contribute to debates in the literature on intentional communities, community studies, and the social capital literature by disentangling some of the processes at work in the creation of the experience of community. Since the findings are based on a study of communes in a particular time and place, the results here are not necessarily generalizable to other face-to-face groups, much less to non-localized forms of community such as race or ethnicity. Communes are different in important ways from other kinds of organizations. They typically (but not always) demand higher investments than other forms of association; they are more face-to-face and personal rather than, say, nations, professions, or religious traditions; and these particular groups arose out a particular culturally- and historically-specific time in United States history (Zablocki 1980). I have argued, however, that the groups under consideration here are far more diverse than one might expect given the sterotype of "commune" and that they therefore serve as a fruitful window for exploring some general processes that previous work has linked theoretically to the we-feeling. On the face of it, one might expect face-to-face, bounded, and voluntary groups with solidarity as an explicit goal (like religious congregrations or social movement chapters) to be more like communes than other organizations, but this remains speculative. Ultimately generalizability is, strictly speaking, an empirical question. Future research will have to determine the extent to which these findings are applicable to other settings.

Despite their limitations in scope, these findings do lend credibility to Etzioni's (2001) claims about the moral underpinnings of trust and social capital. More empirical research is needed, but these analyses suggest that cultural theories that emphasize moral order may be an important corrective to the structuralist determinism that seems to pervade the social capital and network literature (see Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). In the case of these communes, at least, the key point is this: contrary to Putnam (2000:19) and others, *reciprocity and trustworthiness do* not *simply "arise" from social networks, except, perhaps, as that interaction is either animated by or productive of shared moral understandings*. Even in previous study of communes, this fact has been surprisingly underappreciated.

To the extent these findings can be generalized to religious congregations as a related form of face-to-face community, this paper also casts some doubt on the "strictness" theory of religious vitality (e.g., Iannaccone 1994), at least insofar as it offers a *mechanism* for actually producing satisfying group life. The level of required investment does not appear to matter as much (at least directly) as the presence of "morally orienting collective identities" (Smith 1998:90). This paper, then, has taken a small step toward adjudicating between two theories that produce very similar predictions at the denominational level. While the FSA results show that high investment and strong moral orders usually co-occur, the regression analyses suggest that moral order is a more likely candidate mechanism for directly producing the experience of community. If sociologists are to move beyond the description of empirical regularities to explanatory theory in this area, more empirical research is needed that can isolate the specific processes at work (see Hedström and Swedberg 1998; Danermark et al. 2002).

In emphasizing the importance of moral order, my objective is not to imply that cultural belief structures are determinative of structures or practices, nor to suggest that moral orders are static, immutable things that hegemonically define meanings for social actors. Because of the need for resources to enact and sustain moral orders, they are subject to being influenced through the exercise of economic or political power (see Sewell 1999; Smith 2003; Wuthnow 1989). Furthermore, social structures themselves are inherently polysemous – that is, in their relationship with human actors they contain an interpretive flexibility that allows (even requires) cultural improvisation and change that can in turn affect the distribution of resources (Sewell 1992). The structure-culture relationship is one of complexity and dualism rather than of determinism.

Indeed, one of the primary advantages of FSA is that it helps us transcend either-or determinisms on the one hand and the unhelpful assertion that both structure and culture "matter" on the other. Because it explicitly models how different factors combine to produce outcomes, FSA is a method that corresponds well with our best theories of structural-cultural interplay. Nearly every subfield of sociology posits a complex working relationship between structure and culture, but general linear methods often force us to pit them against each other in ways alien to our theories. Economic sociology (e.g., Dobbin 2004), social movements (e.g., McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001), and social psychology (e.g., Ridgeway 2006), to name only a few, are subfields that are struggling to think about and model the relationship between networks, resources, and cultural schemas. Using FSA in conjunction with regression analyses would allow investigating both proximate mechanisms and structure-culture interplay using the same data and cases. This paper has

shown some of the benefits of this strategy for understanding how structure and culture lead to—or prevent—the experience of *Gemeinschaft* in a sample of urban communes.

Finally, the substantive issues in this study go beyond a mere academic interest. It is the human experience of alienation and anomie that has inspired social theorists and lay people alike to ponder – and attempt – the creation of community. Since Tönnies and Durkheim wrote about these issues more than a century ago, the problem of modernity's "Great Disembedding" has not gone away (Taylor 2003:50). Human beings are still left to attempt to "re-embed" themselves in ways that will not do undue violence to their freedom or autonomy, while simultaneously trying to find sources of shared meaning and purpose. As the experience of these communes shows, this is not a simple or straightforward process. Yet perhaps work in this area will help us find better and better answers to a foundational sociological – and human – question: "Where can I be at home?"

Table 3.1. Correlations between *Gemeinschaft* Scale and All Predictor Variables

	ρ	s.e.			ρ	s.e.	
SPATIO-TEMPORAL	**.355**	**.155**	**	**MORAL ORDER**	**.713**	**.094**	***
Meetings	.352	.122	**	Ideological unity	.707	.084	***
Eating together	.456	.126	***	Importance of ideology	.693	.069	***
Density	.124	.133		Role certainty	.580	.116	***
				"How to live"	.564	.119	***
AUTHORITARIANISM	**.379**	**.124**	**				
Authoritarian governance	.337	.125	**	**TYPE OF GROUP**	n/a		
Extent of authority	.364	.145	*	Eastern religious	.330	.202	
Number of rules	.469	.112	***	Christian	.688	.153	***
				Political	.053	.208	
INVESTMENT	**.543**	**.122**	***	Counter cultural (hippie)	-.362	.155	*
Time spent	.301	.136	*	Alternative family	-.169	.225	
Communism	.630	.081	***	Household	-.489	.157	**
Bar to entry	.441	.172	*	Personal Growth	-.256	.117	*
Assigned chores	.714	.111	***				
				CONTROLS	n/a		
HOMOGENEITY	n/a			Size of group	-.033	.134	
Age	.044	.141		Age of group	.123	.119	
Education	.178	.139		Evolved from previous	.538	.152	***
Class	-.193	.139					

Notes: Bolded statistics are for scale measurements. Categorical variables use polychoric correlations. Other variables use Pearson's *r*. N/a = not applicable.

Table 3.2. OLS Regression of *Gemeinschaft* scale on Independent Variables

MECHANISMS	b	*ß*	t	
Spatio-temporal intensity	-.281	-.192	-1.300	
Authority	-.665	-.595	-3.170	**
Investment	.485	.374	2.460	**
Strength of moral order	1.033	.936	4.360	***
GROUP TYPES				
Eastern religious	(reference)			
Christian	.403	.153	1.470	
Political	.315	.106	.780	
Counter cultural	-.095	-.034	-.220	
Alternative family	.655	.203	1.410	
Household	-.050	-.018	-.110	
Personal growth	.250	.061	.490	
CONTROLS				
Size of group	-.017	-.155	-1.310	
Age of group	.118	.191	2.010	
Evolved from previous	.457	.220	1.790	
CONSTANT	-.464		-1.630	
N			50	
R²			.754	
Adjusted R²			.665	

Notes: * = $p<.05$; ** = $p<.01$; *** = $p<.001$ (two-tailed)

Table 3.3. Testing Fuzzy Inclusion for the Six Reduced Configurations

Configuration	Inclusion in…		Difference		
	Y	(1-Y)	F	p	
S•A•I•M	.882	.575	11.15	.002	**
s•a•i•m	.632	.880	6.27	.016	*
other A•M	.903	.805	1.87	.178	
A•m	.733	.928	5.74	.020	*
a•M	.914	.819	1.59	.214	
other a•m	.737	.896	3.24	.078	+

Note: Y = inclusion coefficent in high *Gemeinschaft* set; (1-Y) = inclusion coefficient in 1-Y; F = the value of the Wald F-test of the difference between the coefficients (df = 1, 49); p = the p-value of the F-test; ** = p < .01; * = p < .05; + = p < .10

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APPENDIX 1: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 1

Most of the control variables used in the analyses (see Table 1A) are either self-explanatory or can be found in the documentation at youthandreligion.org. I only note below variables that I constructed especially for these analyses.

Parent closeness is the maximum value of the closeness variable reported by the respondent for either parent. The resulting value was standardized (in the full sample) to have mean = 0 and SD = 1.

Network closure was constructed from three variables that were asked of each respondent's social network. For each reported friend, the respondent was asked, which of these friends, 1) "(do/does) your [PARENT TYPE] not really know that well"; 2) "have parents who know YOU by name"; 3) "have parents who know your [PARENT TYPE] well enough to call (him/her/them) on the phone." These responses were combined (the first was reverse coded) to give a sense of how much adult networks were closed around the respondent. The resulting sum (0-15) was divided by 3 to make it comparable to the other network measures.

GPA was constructed from the variable "grades" (y91), which asked, "What kind of grades do you usually get in school?" The original responses were 10 ordinal categories ranging from "all As" to "mostly Fs" with an additional category for "mixed" (n=159). The GPA scale used in these analyses was made into a scale with range 0 to 4 by rescaling the 10 point ordinal scale and setting the "mixed" responses to the sample mean.

Parent education is the highest level of education for either parent, measured on a 12-point ordinal scale.

Table 1A. Descriptive Statistics for All Variables

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Smoking Pot (W2)	2498	1.73	1.61	1	7
Smoking Pot	2525	1.36	.76	1	4
Volunteering (W2)	2515	2.15	1.03	1	4
Volunteering	2526	2.12	1.00	1	4
# Friends Use Drugs	2526	.70	1.32	0	5
# Friends Volunteer Regularly	2499	.99	1.42	0	5
# Friends Similar Religious Beliefs	2530	2.63	2.06	0	5
Utilitarian Schema	2489	.11	.31	0	1
Relational Schema	2489	.42	.49	0	1
Theistic Schema	2489	.21	.41	0	1
Parent Closeness	2527	-.01	1.00	-4.12	1.22
Network Closure	2530	3.37	1.22	0	5
Church Attendance	2526	3.22	2.19	0	6
Evangelical Protestant	2530	.33	.47	0	1
Mainline Protestant	2530	.12	.32	0	1
Black Protestant	2530	.11	.32	0	1
Catholic	2530	.24	.43	0	1
Jewish	2530	.02	.13	0	1
Mormon	2530	.02	.15	0	1
Other Religion	2530	.03	.16	0	1
Indeterminate Religion	2530	.02	.15	0	1
Female	2530	.50	.50	0	1
Age	2530	15.46	1.42	12.95	18.49
Black	2530	.16	.37	0	1
Other race	2530	.15	.36	0	1
South	2530	.41	.49	0	1
Midwest	2530	.24	.43	0	1
West	2530	.20	.40	0	1
GPA	2444	2.89	.68	0	4
Number of Friends	2504	4.78	.68	1	5
Parent Income	2386	6.09	2.89	1	11
Parent Education	2525	7.53	2.64	0	12
Two-Parent Bio HH	2530	.71	.45	0	1

Unless otherwise noted, variables are taken from NSYR Wave 1. Summary statistics are for respondents who answered both waves of the survey.

APPENDIX 2: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 2

Most of the control variables used in the analyses (see Table 2A) are either self-explanatory or can be found in the documentation at youthandreligion.org. I only note below variables that I constructed especially for these analyses.

Parent closeness is the maximum value of the closeness variable reported by the respondent for either parent. The resulting value was standardized (in the full sample) to have mean = 0 and SD = 1.

Network closure was constructed from three variables that were asked of each respondent's social network. For each reported friend, the respondent was asked, which of these friends, 1) "(do/does) your [PARENT TYPE] not really know that well"; 2) "have parents who know YOU by name"; 3) "have parents who know your [PARENT TYPE] well enough to call (him/her/them) on the phone." These responses were combined (the first was reverse coded) to give a sense of how much adult networks were closed around the respondent. The resulting sum (0-15) was divided by 3 to make it comparable to the other network measures.

GPA was constructed from the variable "grades" (y91), which asked, "What kind of grades do you usually get in school?" The original responses were 10 ordinal categories ranging from "all As" to "mostly Fs" with an additional category for "mixed" (n=159). The GPA scale used in these analyses was made into a scale with range 0 to 4 by rescaling the 10 point ordinal scale and setting the "mixed" responses to the sample mean.

Parent education is the highest level of education for either parent, measured on a 12-point ordinal scale.

Table 2A. Descriptive Statistics for All Variables

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
# Ties Use Drugs/Drink a Lot (W2)	2494	1.76	1.79	0	5
# Ties Volunteer Regularly (W2)	2456	1.27	1.47	0	5
# Ties Use Drugs /Drink a Lot	2526	.70	1.32	0	5
# Ties Volunteer Regularly	2499	.99	1.42	0	5
Volunteering	2526	2.12	1.00	1	4
Smoking Pot	2525	1.36	.76	1	4
Getting Drunk	2528	1.44	.95	1	6
Expressivist Worldview	2489	.26	.44	0	1
Utilitarian Worldview	2489	.11	.31	0	1
Theistic Worldview	2489	.21	.41	0	1
Moral Relativism	2444	.47	.50	0	1
# Ties Similar Religious Beliefs	2530	2.63	2.06	0	5
Parent Closeness	2527	-.01	1.00	-4.12	1.22
Network Closure	2530	3.37	1.22	0	5
# of Strong Ties	2504	4.78	.68	1	5
Church Attendance	2526	3.22	2.19	0	6
Evangelical Protestant	2530	.33	.47	0	1
Mainline Protestant	2530	.12	.32	0	1
Black Protestant	2530	.11	.32	0	1
Catholic	2530	.24	.43	0	1
Jewish	2530	.02	.13	0	1
Mormon	2530	.02	.15	0	1
Other Religion	2530	.03	.16	0	1
Indeterminate Religion	2530	.02	.15	0	1
Female	2530	.50	.50	0	1
Age	2530	15.46	1.42	12.95	18.49
Black	2530	.16	.37	0	1
Other race	2530	.15	.36	0	1
South	2530	.41	.49	0	1
GPA	2444	2.89	.68	0	4
Number of Friends	2504	4.78	.68	1	5
Parent Income	2386	6.09	2.89	1	11
Parent Education	2525	7.53	2.64	0	12
Two-Parent Bio HH	2530	.71	.45	0	1

Unless otherwise noted, variables are taken from NSYR Wave 1. Summary statistics are for respondents who answered both waves of the survey.

APPENDIX 3: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 3

Tables 3A, 3B, and 3C present additional descriptive statistics from the data used in the paper. The remaining tables in this Appendix contain information regarding checks for robustness that were performed using different multivariate specifications.

The scaled measures in the main text were constructed *a priori* using substantive and theoretical knowledge both of communes and of the community literature more generally. However, I replicate the findings in two ways using the individual measures. In general terms the same substantive conclusions emerge from these tables as from the analyses in the main text.

In Table 3D, which regresses the six individual *Gemeinschaft* variables on the predictor scales and controls, moral order is significant in five of six models, while investment is only significant in one. Authority and spatio-temporal interaction alternate between null and negative effects. These results are consistent with the claims about the importance of moral order, the lesser importance of investment, and the negative net effect of authority. They also show that the results are not dependent upon a particular definition of the *Gemeinschaft* scale.

Table 3E, which regresses the *Gemeinschaft* scale and its six component parts on all individual variables, is also consistent with these general interpretations. The interaction and authority variables mostly alternate between null and negative effects, although one or two positive and significant coefficients do emerge in different models. Most noteworthy is that interpersonal density is nearly always negatively related to the outcome. This suggests that—like authority—close personal proximity may also be alienating absent other factors. The investment variables produce four positive coefficients, and a majority of null coefficients, consistent with the interpretation that

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investment plays a modest direct role in the production of *Gemeinschaft*. The individual

moral order variables are the most consistent, with each producing between two and five

positive coefficients. These results also show that while the ethographer-coded measures

are the most powerful, no single measure is driving the results by itself. These additional

results should increase confidence in the regression analyses conducted above.

Table 3F shows the results of the FSA for all 16 configurations of the predictor

sets. While the clustered analysis is probably more justified because it deals with types of

communes that have a greater presence in the data, Table B3 shows that the overall

findings are robust to a simpler analysis. The column marked "p" shows the p-value of

the F-test of the differences between I_{XY} and $I_{X(1-Y)}$. Because the non-extreme types are so

rare in the data, only the inclusion coefficients for S·A·I·M and s·a·i·m are different at the

.05 level. Both s·A·i·m and S·a·i·m are significant at the .10 level, and three additional

configurations (s·A·I·M, S·A·i·m, and S·A·I·m) come in very close to that at $p \leq .105$.

After that, the p-values jump up very significantly. If we take these seven configurations

and assess their relationship to the data (allowing a bit of leeway on the p-values due to

low sample size), the same basic pattern emerges. The two sets sharing A·I·M are best

considered *Gemeinschaft*-like. On the other hand, the five sets that are best thought of as

not *Gemeinschaft*-like combine low moral order (m) with either high interaction and

authority (S·A) or low investment (i). While not all eight sets containing low moral order

(m) have $I_{X(1-Y)} > I_{XY}$, this is partly due to the fact that they are not all adequately

represented in the data (see Table A3). (The goal of the clustering algorithm used in the

main text is to combine rare types together into similar supersets that *can* be adequately

tested.) In general terms, however, Table 3F is consistent with the conclusions reached

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above: 1) structural and cultural factors must work together to produce the we-feeling; and 2) moral order, while neither necessary nor sufficient in its own right, can be best thought of as an INUS condition for producing the we-feeling, and its absence as an INUS condition for producing the absence of we-feeling.

Table 3A. Descriptive Statistics for All Variables

Variable	mean	sd	min	max
GEMEINSHAFT	0.09	0.98	-2.09	1.65
Observer "we-feeling"	3.29	0.94	1	4
True family	3.42	1.08	1	5
Look out for selves (reverse)	4.01	0.82	1.75	5
No one cares (reverse)	4.69	0.30	3.67	5
Live communally in 10 years	2.62	0.76	1	4
Rejects money to leave	0.46	0.27	0	1
SPATIO-TEMPORAL	-0.02	0.67	-1.27	2.15
Meetings per month	4.38	5.98	0	30
Frequency of eating together	2.10	0.84	0	4
Density (ln[persons/room])	-0.21	0.45	-1.18	1.72
HOMOGENEITY	(no scale)			
Age	-0.01	1.00	-3.34	1.18
Education	0.03	1.01	-0.89	3.15
Father's prestige ("class")	0.02	1.00	-2.25	1.54
AUTHORITARIANISM	-0.06	0.88	-1.15	1.34
Extent of authority	1.58	1.16	0	3
Extent of rules	2.66	0.96	1	4
Authoritarian governance	2.76	2.39	0	6
INVESTMENT	0.00	0.76	-1.07	1.62
Economic communism	2.56	0.95	1	4
Assigned chores	0.28	0.45	0	1
Bar to entry	0.32	0.47	0	1
Average hours last 3 days	49.61	10.28	30.6	70.5
MORAL ORDER	0.03	0.89	-1.48	1.55
Ideological unity	2.58	1.05	1	4
Importance of ideology	2.28	0.78	1	3
Marital role certainty	3.22	1.07	1.40	5
"How to live"	2.82	1.00	1.20	5
CONTROLS	(no scale)			
Group size	10.42	9.11	5	67
Group age	1.50	1.58	0	8
Evolved from previous group	0.68	0.47	0	1

Table 3B. Correlations Between All Variables Used in the Main Explanatory Model

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(1) *Gemeinschaft*	1.000							
(2) Spatio-temporal	0.355 *	1.000						
(3) Authoritarianism	0.379 *	0.708 *	1.000					
(4) Investment	0.543 *	0.706 *	0.776 *	1.000				
(5) Moral order	0.713 *	0.684 *	0.771 *	0.727 *	1.000			
(6) Previous group	0.538 *	0.734 *	0.733 *	0.658 *	0.807 *	1.000		
(7) Group size	-0.033	0.468 *	0.302 *	0.273	0.230	0.889	1.000	
(8) Group age	0.123	0.242	0.204	0.166	0.008	-0.131	0.234	1.000

Notes: all correlations involving items (6) and (8) use the polychoric correlation coefficient (ρ); all other use

Table 3C. Diversity of Commune Types

Spatio-temporal	Authority	Investment	Moral order	N
Low	low	low	low	13
Low	low	low	high	1
Low	low	high	low	4
Low	low	high	high	1
Low	high	low	low	2
Low	high	low	high	2
Low	high	high	low	0
Low	high	high	high	2
High	low	low	low	3
High	low	low	high	1
High	low	high	low	1
High	low	high	high	0
High	high	low	low	2
High	high	low	high	1
High	high	high	low	0
High	high	high	high	17

Note: Scales divided at medians with 25 high and 25 low in each category.

Table 3D. Coefficients from the Regression of All Gemeinschaft Variables on Independent Variables

	(1) observer "we-feeling"	(2) true family	(3) (reverse) lookout for selves	(4) (reverse) no one cares	(5) living commune in 10 yrs	(6) wouldn't leave for money
MECHANISMS						
Spatio-temporal intensity	.907	-.420 +	-.198	-.176 +	.029	-.012
Authority	-1.414	-.144	-.794 **	-.097	-.583 *	-.098
Investment	1.357	.165	.627 **	.071	.312	.085
Strength of moral order	1.811 +	1.141 **	.417	.321 **	.676 **	.164 +
GROUP TYPES						
Eastern religious	(reference)					
Christian	1.962	-.342	.052	.248 *	.041	.324 **
Political	.935	-.175	-.263	.402 *	-.114	.142
Counter cultural	-.209	-.005	-.991 *	.307 +	-.017	.066
Alternative family	.899	.625	-.153	.442 *	-.068	.325 +
Cooperative living	.803	-.587	-.790	.383 *	-.463	.219
Psychological	1.356	.953 +	-.642	.028	.628	-.025
CONTROLS						
Size of group	-.079	-.028 +	.017	-.008	-.012	-.007
Age of group	.556	.103	-.001	.032	.108 +	.023
Previous origin	2.352 *	.361	.280	.050	.013	.141
Constant		3.313 **	3.900 **	4.432 **	2.562 **	.248 *
R²	-	.78	.59	.59	.57	.56
Adjusted count R²	.41	-	-	-	-	-

Notes: coefficients are logits in model 1 (ordered logit), standardized regression coefficients (β) in models 2-6 (OLS).   + = $p<.10$; * = $p<.05$; ** = $p<.01$ (two-tailed tests)

Table 3E. Regressions of Dependent Variables on all Individual Scale Variables

	Gemein. scale	observer "we-feeling"	true family	(reverse) lookout for selves	(reverse) no one cares	living commune in 10 yrs	wouldn't leave for money
Meetings/month	.110	.033	.040	.029	-.040	.161	.294*
Eating	-.132	.098	-.363*	-.245	-.269	.156	.036
Interpersonal density	-.527*	.052	-.353+	-.375	-.621*	-.427+	-.699*
Extent of Authority	-.361+	.624*	.062	-.630+	-.782*	-.559+	-.333
Extent of Rules	.183	.230	-.042	.209	.414+	-.199	.251
Authoritarian Gov.	-.352+	-1.132**	-.135	-.396	.238	-.080	-.132
Communism	-.025	-.135	.055	.110	-.092	.163	-.244
Assigned Chores	-.046	-.005	-.066	.156	-.198	.037	-.155
Bar to Entry	.158+	.235*	.072	.085	-.047	.202+	.184
Avg. hours, last 3 days	.070	-.132	-.007	.160	.332*	-.078	.042
Ideological unity	.668**	.894**	.466*	.422+	.344	.296	.669*
Importance of ideology	.637**	.495*	.254	.180	.616*	.835**	.550*
Marital role certainty	.184	-.396+	.181	.481+	.631*	-.023	-.066
"How to live"	.130	.299+	.318*	-.132	-.068	.045	.144
Group size	.026	-.354*	-.157	.375+	.175	-.021	.090
Group age	.136	.174+	.201+	-.008	.137	.114	.002
Evolved from previous	.163	.354*	.215+	.205	-.199	-.060	.243+
Eastern	(reference)						
Christian	.122	.255+	-.189+	-.003	.224+	-.041	.344*
Political	.090	.336*	-.132	-.019	.345*	-.162	.068
Counterculture	.143	.645**	-.184	-.345	.421+	-.031	.199
Alternative family	.270+	.494**	.074	.028	.369+	-.102	.413*
Cooperative living	.141	.589**	-.262	-.265	.408+	-.190	.429+
Psychological	.093	.012	.137	-.006	.052	.246	-.028
R2	.847	.825	.829	.689	.742	.765	.736
adj. R2	.694	.642	.659	.378	.484	.531	.471

NOTES: Standardized beta coefficients from OLS models. Observer we-feeling also uses OLS because ML results were unstable with a high number of covariates. + = p<.10; * = p<.05; ** = p<.01 (one-tailed tests)

Table 3F. Inclusion Ratios for All Configurations

Configuration	I_{XY}	$I_{X(1-Y)}$	F	p
saim	.632	.880	6.27	.016
saiM	.920	.857	.97	.330
saIm	.803	.891	.81	.372
saIM	.939	.843	1.40	.242
sAim	.776	.928	3.74	.059
sAiM	.919	.878	.43	.517
sAIm	.867	.913	.41	.523
sAIM	.938	.829	2.73	.105
Saim	.810	.934	2.86	.097
SaiM	.928	.892	.30	.586
SaIm	.865	.931	1.21	.276
SaIM	.948	.864	1.57	.217
SAim	.782	.945	2.77	.102
SAiM	.923	.847	1.09	.303
SAIm	.856	.952	2.73	.105
SAIM	.882	.575	11.15	.002

NOTE: "and" operator omitted from set titles