

# Distrusting Democrats in Latin America: Meanings, Measures, and Tests in Chile and Argentina

by  
Ryan E. Carlin

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Approved by:

Jonathan Hartlyn, Advisor

Evelyne Huber, Reader

Donald Searing, Reader

Lars Schoultz, Committee Member

Marco Steenbergen, Committee Member

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# Abstract

**RYAN E. CARLIN: Distrusting Democrats in Latin America: Meanings, Measures, and Tests in Chile and Argentina.**  
(Under the direction of Jonathan Hartlyn.)

By focusing on support for democracy and trust in political institutions, this dissertation makes important contributions to the study of democracy. It develops more refined conceptualizations and measures of both concepts. Using high-quality data demonstrate when and if support for democracy and distrust in political parties can be expected to generate accountability-seeking actions. Connecting these democratic beliefs and attitudes to political actions is crucial to understanding the linkages between mass beliefs and democracy in Latin America.

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

What are the cultural foundations of democracy? While scholars typically assume there is a link between mass beliefs about democracy and evaluations of democratic institutions, empirical tests of this connection have not been convincing for a variety of reasons. This dissertation claims that one of those reasons is our lack of refined conceptualizations and valid and reliable measures of support for democracy and trust in political institutions, in particular, political parties. My research focuses on Latin America, a region where democracy has often proven fragile and of low quality. I spent four and five months of fieldwork in Santiago, Chile and Buenos Aires, Argentina, respectively, collecting data on support for democracy and trust in political parties based on interviews, focus groups, Q-sorts, and surveys. I formed this research into three studies, each with a distinct conceptual, methodological, and theoretical contribution to the study of political culture and democracy.

Chapter 2 begins by noting that in established democracies “critical citizens” channel their mistrust in political actors and representative institutions and democratic support into political behaviors that seek to hold elected officials accountable. In post-authoritarian Latin America, however, overall levels of democratic support are modest and offset by support for populist and non-democratic governance. Lack of political

trust is even higher than in established democracies and, moreover, political participation is low and variable. Since “critical citizens” are likely to be fewer in Latin America and may not be as politically active, we need to identify them and compare how their behavior differs from their less democratic counterparts.

This chapter combines original data and high-quality survey data into a multi-method test of how “critical citizens” and their less democratic counterparts participate in the political process in Chile. The major conceptual and measurement innovation is what I call a multidimensional profile of support for democracy. This measure is based on a procedural definition of democracy, which implies that an ideal-type “democrat” is a citizen who has liberal (as opposed to illiberal), unconditional (as opposed to conditional), and committed (as opposed to uncommitted) orientations to procedural democracy. I measure citizen orientations to three classes of objects central to procedural democracy: democracy as a regime of governance; political rights and procedures; and civil liberties. Then using Q-sort methodology with data collected in the field and cluster analysis with survey data from LAPOP/AmericasBarometer, I detect five of profiles of democratic support in Chile. From there I model how citizens’ profiles of democratic support condition the effects of political trust on protest activism and electoral participation. As in established democracies, distrusting democrats are active protesters. But unlike their counterparts in established democracies, distrusting democrats are less likely than other Chileans to participate in elections. Distrusting Chileans who support a “delegative” form of democracy, however, do tend to participate in elections. Delegative Chileans prefer heavy-handed governance and leaders who are likely to govern without taking the legislative branch into consideration. Therefore, given the distribution of profiles of democratic support in Chile - in which the “democrats” are the fewest and the “delegatives” are the most - citizen-led advances

in the quality of democracy seem unlikely. Yet the presence of active distrusting democrats makes it less likely that presidential crises will lead to democratic breakdown in Chile.

In Chapter 3, I delve deeper into the concept of trust in political parties. Though pioneering theories of political culture propose that trust in political institutions and actors is critical for democratic institutions to function well, recent research has turned this assumption on its head. Still others have shown that the types of trust and distrust in political actors and the institutional conditions under which it is extended determines the quality of new democracies in Latin America. Over the past four decades, trust in a wide range of political actors has slowly eroded in advanced democracies. Theorists considered a variety of reasons for this erosion, including declining performance in an increasingly complex and difficult governing environment; lower levels of social capital in which trust plays a key role; and the rising importance of economic performance for individuals' well-being (Hardin, 2000). At the mass level, however, distrusting citizens have managed to press for institutional reforms to square political institutions with new participatory norms and give citizens a greater voice in government (Cain, Dalton and Scarrow, 2003).

In new Latin American democracies, however, trust in political institutions (e.g. parties and congress) dropped precipitously from very high levels during democratic transitions to levels lower than those found in established democracies. Many scholars took this to mean that transitions had generated unrealistic expectations and that once democracy's honeymoon period was over, citizens would once again entertain authoritarian alternatives. While levels of democracy, understood as political rights and civil liberties, have oscillated in Latin America over the past three decades, full democratic reversions have been exceptionally rare. Yet some of the longest-standing political parties and most consolidated party systems in Latin America have recently collapsed. In

their wake, populist leaders have won the presidency with antiparty campaigns and platforms. Once in office these presidents run roughshod over the institutions meant to check presidential power, namely legislatures and the judiciary. As a result, the quality of democracy declines. Whereas in established democracies growing distrust has lead citizens to demand democratic reforms to increase accountability, in Latin America growing distrust is correlated with the rise of leaders who use decree powers and other emergency reforms to decrease accountability. This calls into question the utility of extant measures of trust and distrust in political parties to explain variation in democratic quality.

To improve improve on existing measures, I conceptualize party trust and distrust as judgements of party trustworthiness in three dimensions: integrity, competence, and responsiveness. Using data from Q-sorts and focus groups, I show that trust and distrust in parties Chile and Argentina stem from citizen evaluations of party trustworthiness according to one of three rubrics. These rubrics represent the relative weight citizens assign to norms of party integrity, competence, and responsiveness. I extend my tripartite conceptualization to test contradictory theories about the effects of party trust and distrust on democratic quality using survey data from Argentina, Chile, and the rest of Latin America. My findings suggest that respondents who perceive parties as highly competent and responsive are likely to have higher levels of political action (i.e. signing petitions, participating in public demonstrations, boycotts, and illegal strikes). Yet respondents who judge parties as lacking in integrity are less likely to take political action. Meanwhile, the less-theoretical but more commonly cited measure of party trust/confidence explains relatively little about political action in the region.

My final empirical chapter, Chapter 3, attempts to bridge the gap between anthropological and behavioral approaches to the study of support for democracy. The

anthropological school assumes political culture as a rather static set of routinized and unquestioned attitudes and behaviors. Therefore it can be understood only through *verstehen*, or an inductive interpretation based on a deep, intimate knowledge of the target culture. The classic example for Latin America is Wiarda's 2004 interpretation of Latin American culture as hierarchical and authoritarian due to the influence of the Catholic Church in the region. The behavioral approach, in contrast, seeks to test objectively the extent to which polities exhibit a stable and coherent culture by observing patterns and distributions of individual attitudes and (often) behaviors. Scholars in this field prefer surveys or experiments to inductive and often unreplicable expert interpretations. Despite their shared roots, over time these two traditions have become further apart.

I believe public opinion surveys offer great advantages over more interpretative methods. My assumption is, however, that evaluating and improving current measures requires an injection of a holistic understanding of culture. To prove this point, I conducted with subjects whose views on support for democracy, political equality, and tolerance greatly contrast. Then I combined phrases taken verbatim from the interview and focus group transcripts with phrases from well-known survey questionnaires into a Q-sorting exercise. The Q-analyses find profiles of democratic, authoritarian, delegative, and instrumental regime support among the Chileans, and democratic, exclusionary, and hyper-presidential profiles of regime support among the Argentines. Using two cases helps pinpoint the extant survey items which best distinguish among regime support profiles and those items which may lack cross-national validity. A key finding is that the most common measures of democratic support, the Linzian and Churchillian measures, perform moderately well in Chile and extremely poorly in Argentina. The emphasis given to verbatim items sheds light on the concept formation of regime support and illuminates the continuity and discontinuity between popular

and scholarly conceptions. Finally, this study shows how qualitative anthropological approaches can be combined with behavioral methods to inform survey-based measures of democratic support, the cultural bases of democratic stability and quality.

By focusing on support for democracy and trust in political institutions, this dissertation makes important contributions to the study of democracy. Regarding both concepts, I develop more refined conceptualizations and measures. Using high-quality data demonstrate when and if support for democracy and distrust in political parties can be expected to generate accountability-seeking actions. Certainly, connecting these findings to variation in democratic stability and quality at the regime level requires much more theory and evidence. But by connecting these democratic beliefs and attitudes to political actions, this dissertation makes some important initial linkages between mass beliefs and democracy in Latin America.



## Chapter 2

# Beyond Critical Citizens: Support for Democracy, Trust in Political Parties, and Political Participation in Chile

What kinds of citizens enrich and sustain democracy? Recent scholarship focuses on “critical citizens” (Norris, 1999*c*; Nye, Zelikow and King, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Booth and Seligson, 2005) distinguished by three characteristics. At root, critical citizens are “democrats.” They “share widespread aspirations to the ideals and principles of democracy” and “adhere strongly to democratic values” (Norris, 1999*b*, 1, 3). They are also “critical,” decrying hierarchical representative institutions as untrustworthy, unaccountable, and at odds with more autonomous modes of participation. Lastly, the dissonance created by their democratic support alongside their critique of the institutional *status quo* inspires critical citizens to seek accountability and to demand reform. Myriad factors mediate the connections between political culture and regime outcomes, but a key first step is to determine who participates, in which ways, and

what they believe about democracy and democratic institutions.

Declining institutional trust in established democracies is puzzling (Pharr and Putnam, 2000), but many see it as a net positive: “[l]ess trust *about* government and more activism *interacting* with government: these may be the ingredients of a less comfortable but more robust democracy” (Tarrow, 2000, 289). Clearly institutional mistrust has not eroded support for democratic governance (Dalton, 2004), and new autonomous forms of political participation have emerged (Norris, 2002) without seriously hampering overall levels of electoral participation (Rose, 2004). Scholars credit this new brand of participatory politics with a wave of reforms aimed at squaring democratic institutions with the demands of an engaged, if critical, citizenry (Cain, Dalton and Scarrow, 2003). Thus established democracies are presumably replete with critical citizens who benefit, not threaten, democratic quality.

But in new Latin American democracies we neither know how many critical citizens there are nor their impact on democratic quality. Though trust in representative institutions is low, the modest levels of democratic support (Hagopian, 2005; Payne, Zovatto and Díaz, 2007) imply critical citizens in the region may be fewer. Moreover, they may not be the most active participants in the political process. Citizens who reject democracy are likely to vote for ex-authoritarian candidates (A. Seligson & Tucker 2005) and tolerate political violence (Canache, 2002). Many scholars group declining participation in political, civic, and labor organizations following the dual transition to democracy and markets (O’Donnell, 1993; UNDP, 2004; Kurtz, 2004) into a general syndrome of “low-intensity citizenship” in Latin America. In addition, falling electoral participation threatens to undercut elections as mechanisms of vertical accountability and opens space for anti-system rulers (Payne, Zovatto and Díaz, 2007; O’Donnell, 1999). While indigenous movements, NGOs, and civic groups deserve credit for enhancing political accountability (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Smulovitz and Peruzzotti,

2000), such groups are unevenly spread across the region, and their influence, degree of co-optation by formal regime institutions, and democratic *bona fides* vary widely. Yet occasionally throngs of protesters have ousted Latin American presidents or forced the hand of formal institutions to begin impeachment proceedings (Pérez-Liñán, 2007).

In the context of new democracies, it is unclear how much a small number of critical citizens can be expected to affect democratic quality. Connecting mass values to observable regime outcomes is a daunting and pressing theoretical task (Coppedge, N.d.). Yet several analytically prior conceptual and behavioral questions must first be addressed. My central argument is that understanding the relationship between mass democratic support and democracy in Latin America requires going beyond “critical citizens.” We must revisit some fundamental questions: What beliefs qualify citizens as “democratic”? What exactly do citizens believe when they espouse ambivalent values or reject democratic governance and norms outright? Do the behavioral consequences of institutional trust and distrust depend on these overall belief systems? To ascertain the democratic implications of mass support for democracy in Latin America, it is imperative to identify critical citizens as well as their less democratic counterparts and to compare how each behaves in the political arena.

I propose that stated support for (or rejection of) “democracy” does not exist in a vacuum but rather forms part of a larger belief system about which rights and freedoms are legitimate. Thus I conceptualize support for democracy as a multidimensional profile of orientations to democratic governance, open contestation, and citizen participation (Dahl, 1971). Next I identify profiles of democratic support empirically in Chile with two mutually reinforcing approaches: a Q-sorts study conducted in late 2005 and cluster analysis with survey data from the 2006 AmericasBarometer. Both approaches find an ideal-type democrat support profile along with several ambivalent support profiles. From there I expand the critical citizens framework by testing whether

these profiles condition the relationships between trust in parties and participation in protests and elections in Chile. The results suggest that distrusting Chileans with “democrat” support profiles, i.e. critical citizens, are typically inclined to political protest but not to vote. Yet distrusting Chileans with “delegative” support profiles are comparatively more active in electoral politics. The consequences for democratic quality are ambiguous and require further analysis. Nevertheless, these contributions lay the analytical groundwork for the construction and tests of more general theories linking profiles of democratic support to participatory norms that bolster democratic quality and stability.

## 2.1 Case Selection

Chile is a good case to study these phenomena because while many of its political institutions resemble those in established democracies, critical citizens there are likely to be few and less effective at pushing political reforms. On objective indicators of democratic quality, Chile scores at or near the top among Latin American democracies, but at or near the bottom among established democracies (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2007). Political parties played a central role in politicizing a series of cross-cutting social cleavages as suffrage steadily expanded in both established democracies (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) and Chile (Scully, 1992). Institutionalized party systems in both contexts currently face the challenges of widespread political dealignment (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000; Ortega Frei, 2003).

Like many new democracies, Chile confronts authoritarian legacies (Hite and Cesarini, 2004) that hinder effective participation. Over the first three civilian administrations, Pinochet’s 1980 Constitution gave the military checks on civilian power<sup>1</sup> and

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<sup>1</sup>While the constitution was recently amended to remove most of its authoritarian enclaves, at the time the data were collected for this study the effects of these reforms had yet to be felt.

enforced a pact to maintain the military regime's neoliberal economic model. While the model produced steady economic growth and helped reduce poverty, it did not lower income inequality and it undermined the mobilizational capacity and leverage of organized labor (Kurtz, 2004), popular organizations (Oxhorn, 1995), and social movements (Petras and Leiva, 1994). An electoral system that over-represents Rightist parties, excludes Far-Left parties, and narrows the policy distance between the two major coalitions dims the prospects of effecting reform via elections.

Civil society in Chile also faces several major roadblocks. According to Fuentes (2006), the concentration of authority in the executive grants the president wide sway over the political agenda and public debate. Citizens or groups voicing politically inconvenient demands or issues in conflict with the president's agenda face an uphill battle. The lack of a pluralist media in Chile makes influencing the public agenda dependent upon the tacit approval of conservative sectors. When asked in a recent Latinobarometer (2006) poll, "What is the most effective way you can influence how things change?", 54% of Chileans said voting for a party that defends one's positions, just under the regional average (57%). Indeed, many distrustful citizens cast blank/null ballots or fail to register to vote (Carlin, 2006). Only 7% responded "participate in protest movements and demand change directly," exactly half of the regional average (14%). Therefore, even if critical citizens exist, their actual and perceived ability to influence democratic quality may be quite limited.

## **2.2 Profiles of Support for Democracy**

Judging the impact of critical citizens and their counterparts on the quality of new democracies requires refined concepts and valid measures. I begin by defining democracy as a political system with procedures in place to foster open contestation, public

participation, and government responsiveness (Dahl, 1971, 1-9). Next I propose to measure support for democracy as a multidimensional profile of orientations to three classes of objects implied by procedural democracy. The first class of objects pertains to the regime itself - democracy and its authoritarian alternatives. The next two classes of objects correspond to the essential political rights and procedures (voting, running for office, free and fair elections) and the civil liberties (expression, association, alternative sources of information) that undergird procedural democracy. Thus profiles of support for democracy consist of general orientations and inclinations to the regime itself and the core principles, norms, and procedures that embody the democratic procedural minimum.




Figure 2.1: Orientations to Procedural Democracy

Which orientations matter? A profile of support for democracy includes orientations to the objects mentioned above that fall along three continua (see Figure 4.1): (1) liberal  $\leftrightarrow$  illiberal, (2) unconditional  $\leftrightarrow$  conditional, and (3) committed  $\leftrightarrow$  uncommitted. Whereas a liberal orientation suggests a firm preference for democracy or its

concomitant rights and liberties, illiberal orientations reject them outright. Indelible or unconditional orientations contrast with support for procedural democracy only under certain conditions. Committed orientations to a democratic regime and its principles are the antitheses of indifferent or uncommitted stances on them. Thus, orientations to any of the objects associated with procedural democracy that can be located in the three-dimensional space depicted in Figure 4.1 pertain to a profile of democratic support; orientations outside this space are not considered part of the profile of democratic support.

As an illustration, recall Linz's (1978) argument that on the eve of democratic breakdown elites and citizens are either loyal, semi-loyal, or disloyal to the regime. View through the lens of my conceptualization, the object of support in question is the democratic regime. Loyalists hold *liberal* (not *illiberal*) orientations to democratic governance. Insofar as they resist the conditions that brought the regime to the brink of collapse, loyalists' orientations prove *unconditional*. The position of the disloyalists is clearly *conditional*. Finally, the loyalists are *committed* to the democratic regime though their semi-loyalist counterparts are not, which, as Linz argues, makes semi-loyalists susceptible to disloyalists bent on altering the *status quo*. Profiles of support for democracy do not stop with the "regime" object. Rather they encompass liberal/illiberal, unconditional/conditional, and committed/uncommitted orientations to the full range of objects associated with procedural democracy.

This conceptualization of profiles of democrat support implies that an ideal-type "democrat" is a citizen who exhibits liberal, unconditional, and committed orientations not only to democracy in the abstract, but also to its essential political rights and procedures and civil liberties. An ideal-type "non-democrat" living in a non-authoritarian context espouses illiberal, conditional, and uncommitted orientations to democracy and

its concomitant rights and freedoms. Ambivalent support profiles feature a mix of orientations to democratic governance and political and civil freedoms. Multidimensional support profiles grounded *a priori* in a procedural definition of democracy not only sharpen our definitions of a “democrat,” “non-democrat,” and an “ambivalent”. They also neutralize thorny validity and conceptual issues facing extant measures of support for democracy.<sup>2</sup>

The most damaging validity problem is that citizens hold contested, vacuous, or even pejorative conceptions of democracy. If citizens interpret democracy differently, common survey questions asking citizens point-blank if they prefer “democracy” as a form of government will obviously lack validity. As Coppedge argues, much of the confusion stems from failing to define our terms ahead of time: “If we are interested in the nature, causes, or consequences of what *we* mean by ‘democracy,’ we cannot surrender the authority to define the concept to our research subjects” (N.d., 31). Multidimensional profiles of democratic support overcome this issue by measuring citizens against a clear standard of a “democrat”: one with liberal, unconditional, and committed orientations to democratic governance, political rights and procedures, and civil liberties. Citizens whose support profiles do not approximate this standard are not, by definition, democrats. It must be noted that grounding measures of democratic support in any *a priori* definition would constitute an advance over extant measures. Indeed, one can imagine casting support profiles according to the emphases of republican, direct, social, deliberative, communitarian, and even classical definitions of democracy (Held, 2006). The liberal-rights based conception is appealing because it parallels a compelling classification strategy for classifying regime sub-types. Political regimes

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<sup>2</sup>See Carrión (forthcoming), Schedler and Sarsfield (2007), (UNDP 2004), and papers presented at *Candidate Indicators for the UNDP Democracy Support Index (DSI)*, Center for the Americas at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, May 5-6, 2006 (<http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/LAPOUNDPWorkshop>).



featuring some but not all of Dahl's baseline criteria for procedural democracy are considered "democracies with adjectives" (Collier and Levitsky, 1997) or "electoral authoritarian" (Schedler, 2006; Levitsky and Way, 2002). Likewise, democratic support profiles grounded in procedural democracy can distinguish ideal-type democrats and non-democrats from citizens with mixed belief systems. Liberal-rights based measures of democratic support, thereby, provide a high degree of cross-level equivalence with measures of democracy presented by Freedom House and Vanhanen's Polyarchy Index.

Another conceptual issue is how to understand citizens who profess democratic support on one survey question, but express contradictory orientations on others. One report claims that between 30-60% of Latin Americans who say they prefer "democracy" would also endorse *coups d'etat* under various circumstances; would support the president acting above the law, restoring order by force, and controlling the media; and see parties and congress as dispensable (UNDP, 2004). To weed out these "questionnaire democrats" (Dalton, 1994) who "pay lip-service to democracy" (Inglehart, 2003), scholars either approximate democratic support with items tapping support for democratic rights and norms (e.g. Gibson, Duch & Tedin 1992), or de-link support for democratic governance from rights and norms (e.g. Inglehart 2003). But these 'solutions' ignore theoretically relevant mixed or ambivalent support profiles behind this lip-service. Indeed, some citizens may support a regime that has taken up the banner of "democracy" but regularly curbs free contestation and participation. Multidimensional democratic support profiles couch orientations to "democracy" among additional orientations to political and civil freedoms that do not mention the "d-word." Measuring a more complete system of beliefs detect nuanced ambivalent support profiles that other approaches might dismiss.

Lastly, extant measures separate conditional and unconditional orientations to democracy though they are theoretically linked. Conditional orientations follow an instrumental rationality - support for democracy as a means to an end. Unconditional orientations derive from an intrinsic rationality - support for democracy for democracy's sake (Bratton and Mattes, 2001; Sarsfield and Echegaray, 2006). However, we expect today's instrumental (conditional) orientations become tomorrow's intrinsic (unconditional) orientations (Easton, 1975; Lipset, 1981) to the extent a democratic regime outperforms the preceding authoritarian regime in terms of economic and political stability (Mishler and Rose, 2001; Bratton and Mattes, 2001). Moreover citizens may develop unconditional orientations to some governing norms, political procedures and rights, and civil liberties more quickly than others. While some survey questions tap unconditional support for democratic governance, they do not typically specify whether the respondent would sacrifice all democratic procedures, political rights, and civil liberties or just some of them. And given the theoretical implications of conditional support for the short- or long-term reversion of democracy or a sub-set of its rights, procedures, and liberties (Bermeo, 2003; Boix, 2003), the issue merits close attention. Multidimensional support profiles help remedy this problem.

In sum, detecting critical citizens and their counterparts calls for valid measures of democratic support. I propose multidimensional profiles of democratic support grounded in an *a priori* definition of a democrat based on liberal/illiberal, unconditional/conditional, and committed/uncommitted orientations to procedural democracy (Dahl, 1971). Any citizen's support profile can be judged against the ideal-type democrat this conceptualization implies. Conceiving of democratic support as a multidimensional profile neutralizes some of the complex validity problems facing extant measures. Incorporating conditionality helps account for the distinct rationalities underpinning

democratic support. Finally, this conceptualization points up two measurement techniques that together can reveal the number and nature of democratic support profiles. The next section describes these methods and how I apply them to detect profiles of democratic support in Chile.

## **2.3 Detecting Profiles of Democratic Support**

We cannot test the argument that critical citizens bolster democratic quality in new democracies unless we know something about profiles of democratic support in these contexts. Previous studies and the conceptual discussion above suggest an empirical analysis of multidimensional support profiles in Chile might uncover support profiles approaching democratic and non-democratic ideal-types and some ambivalent profiles (Schedler and Sarsfield, 2007; Carnaghan, 2007; UNDP, 2004; Powers, 2001; Catterberg, 1991). My approach to detecting democratic support profiles in Chile is two-pronged. The first entails a Q-methodological experiment conducted with 73 participants in Santiago, Chile in late 2005. The second tests the generalizability of the Q-analysis with a cluster analysis using 2006 AmericasBarometer survey data. I employ both the Q-analysis and the cluster analysis as exploratory, inductive ways to identify support profiles. Thus, their findings' credibility hinges on face validity and the degree of overlap between the two sets of results. In this case, both are substantial. The representative sample of the AmericasBarometer survey is crucial for testing hypotheses about the main research question - how does democratic support condition political participation?

### 2.3.1 Profiles of Democratic Support: A Q-Sorts Approach

Developed in psychology, Q methodology's goal is to understand sets of orientations, attitudes, and perspectives from the subjects' point of view. In other words, Q methodology seeks to identify systematically conceptions shared by a group of subjects (Brown, 1980; McKeown and Thomas, 1988). For instance, Drzyek and Holmes (2002) examine democratic discourses in post-Communist societies and link them to four distinct paths to democratization. Theiss-Morse (1993) connects distinct conceptions of citizenship to diverging modes of political participation in the United States. Zechmeister (2006) shows that different connotations of Left-Right ideological labels reflect political sophistication and correspond to elite packaging in Argentina and Mexico. Thus Q-methods are quite flexible.

How does Q methodology work? The method revolves around a measurement instrument called a Q-sort. To complete a Q-sort, a participant (a member of the P-sample) physically rank-orders along a spectrum, conventionally from agree to disagree, a set of statements (items of the Q-sample) about a concept written on small cards. The spectrum I use in this study is depicted in Figure 2.2. Since a finished Q-sort represents a free construction of the Q-sorter's subjective perspective on a concept it is more akin to an in-depth interview than an opinion survey (Brown, 1980). Multiple Q-sorts are then compiled and factor-analyzed to identify latent constructs upon which participants, not variables, load. The factor analysis of Q-sorts is often referred to as "inverted" factor analysis because a Q-sorts data set is the inverse of a survey data set. With a survey data set that places items in columns and subjects in rows, regular confirmatory factor analysis determines which *items* tap a latent variable. Q data sets, however, place *subjects* in columns and *items* in rows. The factor analysis, now "inverted" and exploratory, determines which *subjects* tap a latent variable or "shared conception." The letter *q* is meant to distinguish these "person correlations" from Pearson's *r*-based

“trait correlations.”




Figure 2.2: Quasi-Normal Q-Sort Distribution, 36 Items

To detect multidimensional democratic support profiles in Chile, I ask multiple participants from Santiago to express their support for democracy by completing a Q-sort. Afterwards, I searched for shared profiles of democratic support with by analyzing the participants’ Q-sorts with the “inverted” factor analytic techniques described above. A participant adheres to a shared support profile to the extent that her own Q-sort resembles it, as measured by her Q-sort’s factor loading. Analyzing the factor scores associated with the Q-sample statements indicates which orientations carry the most relative weight within a given profile. Ideally, the profiles of democratic support observed here will prove generalizable to a representative sample of Chileans. If so, we can test the interactive relationships between democratic support profiles, political trust,

and political participation implied by the critical citizens literature. Before continuing, I discuss the structure of Q-sample, recruitment of the P-sample, and on-site procedures.

The Q-sample is the central measurement instrument in Q methodology. It contains all the items the participants Q-sort. While surveys sample from the population of respondents, Q-samples draw from the universe of perspectives on the concept of study. I purposively sample and adapt 36 items from the universe of survey items tapping support for democracy<sup>3</sup> to structure a Q-sample to match a multidimensional profile of democratic support. To simplify the dimensionality, the sample includes three different items tapping each of the combinations of four orientations (liberal, illiberal, conditional, uncommitted) to three objects (democratic governance, political rights/procedures, civil liberties). For example, a “liberal” orientation to the object of “democracy”, item #1 reads, “Democracy is preferable to any other form of government.” Items #2 and #3 tap the same orientation and object. Combining “conditional” views with “political rights,” #17 says, “For the common good, sometimes you have to suspend the right to run for public office for people with extremist ideas.” As an “illiberal” view on “civil liberties”, item #31 states: “in general the government should limit the right to form associations.” Blending “uncommitted” with “democratic governance”, #12 reads, “I wouldn’t care if the military came to power again.”

After structuring the Q-sample, the next step is to recruit the P-sample, i.e. participants, to perform the Q-sorts. Unlike survey research, Q-methods do not require a large number of participants, and they need not be randomly selected. Rather, in line with best practices for small-*n* methods (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994), Q prioritizes maximizing the diversity of perspectives by recruiting participants who are likely

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<sup>3</sup>Questionnaires sampled include surveys by LAPOP/AmericasBarometer, the World Values Survey, Latinobarómetro; Chilean sources include Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Contemporánea (CERC), Instituto de Estudios Públicos of Universidad Andrés Bello.

to view the concept distinctly. To recruit my P-Sample of 73 Santiaguinos I offered refreshments and, when necessary, paid transportation costs and made donations to organizations that allowed me access to their members and venues. Although the participants come from contrasting backgrounds,<sup>4</sup> we cannot speculate on how pervasive the support profiles are in the population or whether other shared support profiles exist since they are not a representative sample of Chileans. The cluster analysis below is meant to overcome these limitations.

On site, participants first completed a short questionnaire about political support and demographics. Next they sorted the 36 Q-sample items - statements typed on small laminated cards - into three categories: agree, disagree, and no strong feeling either way (Brown, 1980). Subjects then ranked the statements by sorting them into eleven ordinal categories ranging from -5 (“least agree”) to +5 (“most agree”) conforming to Figure 2.2, where 0 is neutral.<sup>5</sup> Afterwards, the research team recorded the Q-sort and analyzed the data off-site.

Once the 73 Q-sorts were compiled into a data set, I performed an exploratory factor analysis of them and named each of the extracted factors. After varimax rotation, the factor analysis of indicated four factors, or shared multidimensional democratic support profiles: Democrat, Delegative, Instrumental, and Non-Democrat. Criteria for factor extraction include a scree test, explaining at least 5% of the variance, and at least 5% of subjects loading on it significantly.<sup>6</sup> The four-factor solution explained 52% of the

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<sup>4</sup>E.g., state employees, professionals, students, middle-class families, shanty-town dwellers, party militants, academics, blue-collar workers, mothers and women’s associations, neighborhood associations, NGOs, a nationalist group, and a homosexual rights movement. See Appendix for more information on the P-sample.

<sup>5</sup>The quasi-normal distribution of Figure 1 guarantees that the Q-sorts will not be unduly skewed or otherwise difficult to compare, but does not significantly alter the results (Brown, 1980).

<sup>6</sup>The eigenvalue (which equals the sum of squared factor loadings for each factor) is a common extraction criterion in  $r$ -based factor analysis, but aggregating across numerous variates, as done here, may inflate artificially them (Brown, 1980, 40-43). Thus, the percentage of variance explained by a factor (which equals the eigenvalue  $\div$   $n$  subjects sorting) helps ground the information the eigenvalue

variance across the 73 Q-sorts. This breaks down by factor (and eigenvalue) as follows: Liberal Democrat = 32.5% (23.7), Delegative = 8.0% (5.8), Instrumental = 5.7% (4.1), Non-Democrat = 5.5% (4.0). Seven participants failed to load significantly on any of the four factors.

The names of these support profiles reflect my interpretation of the results in Tables 2.1-2.4. There are two sets of entries for each item: normalized ( $z$ ) factor scores and, for the sake of comparison, their score as it transposes to the 11-point scale (-5 to +5) used in the Q-sort. Essentially, “the factor scores represent weighted combinations of the placement of statements in each individual’s Q-sort and thus reflect ideal typical patterns” (Theiss-Morse, 1993, 363). In calculating the factor scores, the raw data in each Q-sort are weighted to allow participants with higher factor loadings to contribute more.<sup>7</sup> Then the raw Q-sorts data are multiplied by their corresponding factor weight, summed across each item, and normalized (mean = 0, standard deviation = 1). I report these in the far right-hand column. Next these  $z$ -scores are transposed to scores on the 11-point Q-sort scale, reported in the far left-hand column. To focus on the profiles’ orientations, I report the twelve most dominant in Tables 2.1-2.4.

First we observe an ideal-type democrat support profile of liberal, unconditional, and committed orientations to democratic governance, political rights and procedures, and civil liberties (see Table 2.1). Democrats’s firmest orientations are, respectively, unconditional and liberal rejections of democratic reversions: “Under no circumstance could there ever be sufficient reason for a coup d’etat” (factor score 2.15, transposed to +5) and “We would be better off if the military were running the country,” (factor score 2.07, -5).<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, they are strongly committed to democratic governance,

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provides.

<sup>7</sup>Based on  $w = f/(1 - f^2)$ , where  $w$  is the factor weight and  $f$  is the factor loading (Brown, 1980, 241-2).

<sup>8</sup>From now on I refer only to the transposed scores for the sake of simplicity.



Table 2.1: Democrat Support Profile

Transposed Factor Score		Normalized Factor Score
	<b><i>Democratic Governance</i></b>	
+5	Under no circumstance could there ever be sufficient reason for a <i>coup d'etat</i> . ( <i>unconditional</i> )	2.15 <sup>d/i/n</sup>
+4	Democracy is preferable to any other form of government. ( <i>liberal</i> )	1.96 <sup>d/i/n</sup>
+4	Democracy may have problems, but it's better than any other form of government. ( <i>liberal</i> )	1.61 <sup>d/i/i</sup>
-3	In certain circumstances an authoritarian government could be preferable to a democratic government. ( <i>unconditional</i> )	-0.94 <sup>d/i/i</sup>
-3	For me there isn't a big difference between democratic governments and dictatorships. So the type of regime doesn't really matter to me. ( <i>committed</i> )	-0.97 <sup>d/i/i</sup>
-3	I would support an authoritarian government if resolves economic problems. ( <i>unconditional</i> )	-1.24 <sup>d/i/n</sup>
-4	Things cannot be resolved. Our country needs a government with a heavy hand. ( <i>liberal</i> )	-1.44 <sup>d/n</sup>
-4	I wouldn't care if the military came to power again. ( <i>committed</i> )	-1.78 <sup>d/i/n</sup>
-5	We would be better off if the military were governing the country. ( <i>liberal</i> )	-2.07 <sup>d/i/n</sup>
	<b><i>Political Rights &amp; Procedures</i></b>	
+3	Except for those excluded by the Constitution, all Chileans deserve the right to vote, even those who protest against the government. ( <i>liberal</i> )	1.24 <sup>n</sup>
+3	Any citizen of voting age should be allowed to run for public office. ( <i>liberal</i> )	1.15 <sup>i/i</sup>
	<b><i>Civil Liberties</i></b>	
+3	I approve of people participating in legal public protests. ( <i>liberal</i> )	1.31 <sup>i</sup>

Note: Score significantly different from *d* (Delegative), *i* (Instrumental), and *n* (Non-democrat),  $p < .001$ . Variance explained: 32.5%; subjects defining: 63.0%; eigenvalue: 23.7.

“I wouldn’t care if the military came to power again”, (-4). Democrats display liberal orientations on items representing so-called Linzian (“Democracy is preferable to any other form of government”, +4) and Churchillian (“Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government”, +4) formulations of support for democratic governance. Democrats strongly disagree that, “We would be better off if the military were running the country” (-5). As the rest of the scores indicate, democrats clearly support the civil liberties and political rights of *polyarchy*, most intensely the rights to vote, run for office, and protest.<sup>9</sup> Parallels to this profile are found in Mexico (Schedler and Sarsfield, 2007), Argentina (Powers, 2001), Russia (Carnaghan, 2007), Belarus, Romania, and Bulgaria (Dryzek and Holmes, 2002).

Although Chile is not considered a “delegative democracy” - a regime in which citizens delegate extensive power to elected executives who ignore institutional checks and balances and govern as they wish (O’Donnell, 1994) - we nevertheless observe a profile of delegative support (see Table 2.2). The support profile is truly ambivalent. Delegatives do not believe the military would improve their lot (-3), but they desire heavy-handed government (+5) and would increase the powers of an already powerful president vis-à-vis congress (+3). They hedge their bets on political rights and procedures, at once championing suffrage rights while maintaining conditional support for elections. Yet they hold liberal, unconditional, and committed orientations to civil liberties. These findings corroborate evidence of delegative support in Chile and elsewhere in Latin America (Gronke and Levitt, 2004).

Instrumental democratic support features conditional orientations to all three objects of support (see Table 2.3). Instrumentals would accept an authoritarian government on the condition that it solve economic problems (+5), agree that in certain

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<sup>9</sup>Though not reported here, items in favor of plural electoral competition and freedoms of association and the press score +2’s; illiberal orientations towards most political rights and civil liberties register -2’s.

Table 2.2: Delegative Support Profile

Transposed Factor Score	<i>Democratic Governance</i>	Normalized Factor Score
+5	Things cannot be resolved. Our country needs a government with a heavy hand. ( <i>illiberal</i> )	2.40 <sup><i>l/i</i></sup>
+4	In certain circumstances an authoritarian government could be preferable to a democratic government. ( <i>conditional</i> )	1.74 <sup><i>l/n</i></sup>
+3	There are junctures that require the president to leave congress behind. ( <i>conditional</i> )	1.22 <sup><i>l/i</i></sup>
-3	We would be better off if the military were governing the country. ( <i>liberal</i> )	-2.07 <sup><i>l/i</i></sup>
-3	To people like me it doesn't matter if we have a democratic or undemocratic regime. ( <i>committed</i> )	-1.15 <sup><i>l/i/n</i></sup>
-4	Under no circumstance could there ever be sufficient reason for a <i>coup d'etat</i> . ( <i>conditional</i> )	-1.52 <sup><i>l/i/n</i></sup>
	<b><i>Political Rights &amp; Procedures</i></b>	
+3	When the country lacks order the right to vote can be restricted. ( <i>conditional</i> )	1.37 <sup><i>l/i</i></sup>
+3	Except for those excluded by the Constitution, all Chileans deserve the right to vote, even those who protest the government. ( <i>liberal</i> )	1.28 <sup><i>l/i</i></sup>
	<b><i>Civil Liberties</i></b>	
+4	Our government has to guarantee all citizens the right to associate. ( <i>liberal</i> )	1.50 <sup><i>l/i/n</i></sup>
-3	In the case of a social emergency I would approve of the government censoring the media. ( <i>unconditional</i> )	-1.02 <sup><i>l/i/n</i></sup>
-4	The right to form associations is not crucial for our country. ( <i>committed</i> )	-1.52 <sup><i>l/n</i></sup>
-5	In general, the government should limit the right to form associations. ( <i>liberal</i> )	-2.04 <sup><i>l/i/n</i></sup>

Note: Score significantly different from *l* (Liberal), *i* (Instrumental), and *n* (Non-Democrat),  $p < .001$ . Variance explained: 8.0%; subjects defining: 17.8%; eigenvalue: 5.8.

Table 2.3: Instrumental Support Profile

Transposed Factor Score	<i>Democratic Governance</i>	Normalized Factor Score
+5	I would support an authoritarian government if resolves economic problems. ( <i>conditional</i> )	1.71 <sup><i>l/n</i></sup>
+4	I wouldn't care if the military came to power again. ( <i>uncommitted</i> )	1.37 <sup><i>l/d/n</i></sup>
+3	In certain circumstances an authoritarian government could be preferable to a democratic government. ( <i>conditional</i> )	1.36 <sup><i>l/n</i></sup>
+3	We would be better off if the military were governing the country. ( <i>illiberal</i> )	1.16 <sup><i>l/d/n</i></sup>
<b><i>Political Rights &amp; Procedures</i></b>		
+3	Except for those excluded by the Constitution, all Chileans deserve the right to vote, even those who protest against the government. ( <i>liberal</i> )	1.36 <sup><i>n</i></sup>
-3	When the country lacks order the right to vote can be restricted. ( <i>unconditional</i> )	-1.14 <sup><i>d/n</i></sup>
-4	Besides the people excluded by law, there are other groups and kinds of people who should not be able to vote. ( <i>liberal</i> )	-1.51 <sup><i>l/d/n</i></sup>
-4	Homosexuals should not have the right to run for public office. ( <i>liberal</i> )	-1.69 <sup><i>l/d/n</i></sup>
-5	It's all the same whether or not the great majority have the right to vote or only a few people. ( <i>committed</i> )	-2.19 <sup><i>l/d/n</i></sup>
<b><i>Civil Liberties</i></b>		
+4	In times of crisis, I would approve of a law that prohibited public protests. ( <i>conditional</i> )	1.44 <sup><i>l/d/n</i></sup>
-3	I don't approve of people participating in manifestations under any circumstance. ( <i>liberal</i> )	-1.05 <sup><i>d</i></sup>
-3	The right to form associations is not crucial for our country. ( <i>committed</i> )	-1.27 <sup><i>l/n</i></sup>

Note: Score significantly different from *l* (Liberal), *i* (Delegative), and *n* (Non-Democrat),  $p < .001$ . Variance explained: 5.7%; subjects defining: 9.5%; eigenvalue: 4.1.

circumstances they are better (+3), and would not mind the military returning to power (+4). On political rights and procedures instrumentals show liberal, unconditional, and committed orientations. Their liberal orientation to protest (-3) breaks down in crisis situations (+4). Instrumental Chileans seem to tolerate democratic norms so long as stability prevails. Conditional democratic preferences, ambivalence to civil liberties, and political tolerance makes them resemble “ambivalent non-democrats” in Mexico (Schedler and Sarsfield, 2007). Instrumental support in Chile exemplifies the means-to-end rationality found throughout the region (Carrión, forthcoming; Sarsfield and Echeagaray, 2006) and in parts of Africa (Bratton and Mattes, 2001).

Last we come to non-democratic support (Table 2.4). Non-democrats are uncommitted to democracy but spurn military rule and heavy-handed governance. They hold illiberal and conditional orientations to political rights and procedures: they would altogether exclude homosexuals and neo-nazis and, at certain junctures, forbid extremists from running for office and even halt elections. As such, they combine aspects of “exclusionary” and “homophobic” democrats in Mexico (Schedler and Sarsfield, 2007). Non-democrat Chileans remain unconvinced of democracy’s intrinsic value and they reject a subset of the necessary freedoms for open contestation and participation. They are not ideo-typically non-democratic but instead ambivalent, as their liberal and committed orientations to protest rights suggests.

This approach makes support for procedural democracy an empirical question participants answer in a Q-sort. Factor-analyzing the Q-sorts reveals four support profiles that allow the researcher to interpret each item “in terms of the ‘flavor added’ by the total milieu of the accompanying behavioral field” (Brown, 1980, 46). I find an ideal-type democrat profile and three ambivalent profiles (delegative, instrumental, non-democrat). The Q-study provides rich insight into at least some of the democratic support profiles in the Chilean polity, but do these profiles generalize beyond these 73

Table 2.4: Non-Democrat Support Profile

Transposed Factor Score	<i>Democratic Governance</i>	Normalized Factor Score
+5	There are other forms of government that could be as good as or better than democracy. ( <i>uncommitted</i> )	3.27 <sup><i>l/d/i</i></sup>
-3	There are junctures that require the president to leave congress behind. ( <i>unconditional</i> )	-1.03 <sup><i>l/d/i</i></sup>
-3	We would be better off if the military were governing the country. ( <i>liberal</i> )	-1.02 <sup><i>l/i</i></sup>
-3	Democracy is preferable to any other form of government. ( <i>illiberal</i> )	-1.42 <sup><i>l/d/i</i></sup>
-4	Things cannot be resolved. Our country needs a government with a heavy hand. ( <i>liberal</i> )	-1.49 <sup><i>d/i</i></sup>
-4	Democracy may have problems, but it's better than any other form of government. ( <i>illiberal</i> )	-1.52 <sup><i>l/d/i</i></sup>
<b><i>Political Rights &amp; Procedures</i></b>		
+4	Homosexuals should not have the right to run for public office. ( <i>illiberal</i> )	1.57 <sup><i>l/d/i</i></sup>
+4	The participation of neo-nazi political parties in national elections should be prohibited. ( <i>illiberal</i> )	1.22 <sup><i>l/d/i</i></sup>
+3	For the common good, sometimes you have to suspend the rights of persons with extremists ideas to run for publicly elected offices. ( <i>conditional</i> )	0.66 <sup><i>l/d/i</i></sup>
+3	When the country lacks order the right to vote can be restricted. ( <i>conditional</i> )	1.07 <sup><i>l/i</i></sup>
<b><i>Civil Liberties</i></b>		
+3	I approve of people participating in legal public protests. ( <i>liberal</i> )	1.04 <sup><i>i</i></sup>
-5	Public protest is not a necessary right for our society. ( <i>committed</i> )	-1.70 <sup><i>l/d/i</i></sup>

Note: Score significantly different from *l* (Liberal), *d* (Delegative), and *n* (Instrumental),  $p < .001$ . Variance explained: 5.5%; subjects defining: 12.3%; eigenvalue: 4.0.

participants? If so, how they are distributed in the population? Moreover, do these democratic support profiles condition the relationship between political distrust and political behavior? To answer these questions, I use cluster analysis with nationally representative survey data.

### 2.3.2 Generalization: A Cluster-Analysis Approach

Cluster analysis is designed to classify cases that vary along multiple dimensions. As opposed to factor analysis, which assumes that the underlying dimensions and associations in the data are continuous, cluster analysis assumes them to be categorical. Since the goal here is to identify multidimensional profiles of democratic support, cluster analysis will classify survey respondents into categories or “clusters” based on how similar their orientations to democracy are. And by relaxing the linearity assumption of factor-analytic techniques, cluster analysis can better describe and detect ambivalent and inconsistent support profiles. Respondents in the same cluster hold orientations to democracy that are most similar, while respondents in different clusters are most dissimilar.

Identifying multidimensional profiles of democratic support, and later testing their behavioral implications, requires an extraordinarily rich and large data set. The 2006 Chile AmericasBarometer survey fits the bill. Its large ( $n = 1517$ ) and representative national sample permits generalizations beyond the 73 Q-sort participants from Santiago.<sup>10</sup> It was conducted just nine months after the Q-study. Adherence to sound survey methodology ranks AmericasBarometer among the highest quality survey data available for Latin America. The questionnaire contains multiple items gauging orientations along the liberal  $\leftrightarrow$  illiberal and unconditional  $\leftrightarrow$  conditional spectra with

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<sup>10</sup> $\pm 2.57$  at the 95% confidence level. The sample is stratified by *comuna*, multistage, and probabilistic. Age and sex quotas are used in the last stage to match the distributions in the population.

respect to democratic governance, political rights and procedures, and civil liberties. Unfortunately, the AmericasBarometer includes very few proxies for committed and uncommitted orientations. But uncommitted orientations only account for two of the 48 most salient factors scores in the Q-sort analysis and many committed orientations amount to a rejection of indifference.

On these grounds, I proceed with the cluster analysis by constructing sets of measures that contrast (1) liberal to illiberal and (2) unconditional to conditional orientations to democratic governance, political rights and procedures, and civil liberties. For set (1), liberal versus illiberal orientations to democratic governance are measured via level of agreement with following statement: “Democracy may have problems, but it is still the best form of government”; responses range from totally disagree (0) to fully agree (3). For liberal/illiberal orientations to political rights and procedures, I construct a four-question scale gauging approval of extending Chileans who speak poorly of government the rights to vote, to conduct peaceful protests expressing political ideas, to run for public office, and to voice their views on television ( $\alpha = .91$ ).<sup>11</sup> For liberal/illiberal orientations to civil liberties, I create a scale measuring disapproval of laws prohibiting public protests and the meeting of groups who criticize the political system, and laws to allow the government to censor television programs, books in public school libraries, and critical media outlets ( $\alpha = .84$ ).

Set (2) measures pit unconditional against conditional orientations. I construct and unconditional-conditional orientation to democratic governance scale that sums responses about whether a military coup would be justified under the following five circumstances: high unemployment, many social protests, escalating crime, high inflation, and rampant corruption ( $\alpha = .81$ ). The conditionality of political rights and procedures measure asks respondents to choose between a government that would (1) cut

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<sup>11</sup>Full question wordings, responses, and details on operationalizations are found in the appendix.



unemployment in half and suspend elections versus respecting elections despite the unemployment rate; (2) cut crime in half and suspend elections versus respecting elections despite crime rates; (3) cut unemployment in half but pay no attention to congress or the judiciary versus respecting these state powers despite the unemployment rate; and (4) cut crime in half but pay no attention to congress or the judiciary versus respecting these state powers despite crime rates ( $\alpha = .86$ ). Finally, I tap conditional support for civil liberties via agreement with (a) “Our presidents must have the necessary power to act in the national interest,” as opposed to, (b) “Our presidents’ power must be limited so as not to put our liberties at risk.”

Following Schedler and Sarsfield’s (2007) work on the consistency of democratic support, I use an exploratory technique known as agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis with Ward’s algorithm to cluster respondents by multidimensional profiles of democratic support. Similarity in this method is measured by the sum of squared Euclidean distances:  $distance_{x,y} = \sum_i (x_i - y_i)^2$ , where  $x_i$  equals the value of variable  $i$  for respondent  $x$  and  $y_i$  equals the value of variable  $i$  for respondent  $y$ . The distance between two respondents on the six measures above is the sum of the squared differences between their values for each and every variable ( $i_1 - i_6$ ). Ward’s algorithm calculates the sum of squared Euclidean distances from each respondent to the mean of all variables and then minimizes the sum of squares of any two hypothetical clusters that can be formed at each step.

After running the agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis<sup>12</sup> with Ward’s algorithm on these six measures, Duda and Hart’s (1973) objective stopping rule suggests

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<sup>12</sup>To verify appropriateness of cluster analysis as opposed to factor analysis, I calculated a correlation matrix for the six measures. Only ten of the fifteen inter-correlations among the six measures reach statistical significance, and even then with only moderate strength (the highest is  $r = .22$ ). Moreover, an exploratory factor analysis of these six measures fails to generate a single factor with an eigenvalue over 1.

a five-cluster solution.<sup>13</sup> In other words, the analysis places the respondents into five democratic support profiles I name: democrat, hyper-presidential, delegative, instrumental, and non-democrat. The orientations and their relative salience within the support profile are determined by the mean scores for all respondents in that cluster on the six variables. Positive entries in Table 2.5 represent liberal or unconditional orientations to an object of support (democratic governance, political rights and procedures, civil liberties) and negative entries denote illiberal or conditional orientations.<sup>14</sup> For the sake of analysis and interpretation, variables are coded so that higher values connote more democratic orientations. The data is unweighted, the scales are standardized, and the dichotomous measure of contingent support for civil liberties remains 0/1. Insignificant differences of means between clusters are noted below Table 2.5.

Like the Q-study, the cluster analysis detects an ideal-type democrat support profile. Democrats not only display liberal and unconditional orientations across the six measures, their mean scores are the highest of the five clusters on all but one dimension. Yet at a mere 16.5% of the sample, the liberal support profile is the least pervasive in Chile, a much lower percentage than the roughly 60% of respondents whose Q-sorts loaded significantly on the democrat factor. This reflects a bias in the Q-sorters, many of whom were recruited from pre-existing civic groups whose members may be

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<sup>13</sup>Single, complete, and average linkages do not contradict a five-cluster solution. Schedler and Sarsfield (2007) employ subjective criteria rather than an objective stopping rule to settle on a cluster solution.

<sup>14</sup>Missing values are imputed in order to maximize the number of respondents in each cluster. The imputation model creates 5 multiple imputed datasets using the chained equations techniques (Royston, 2005). Equations incorporate each of the measures from the cluster and subsequent regression analyses (see below) except for vote choice. Assuming the data are missing at random (MAR), which should hold (King, Honaker, Joseph and Scheve, 2001), missing data for each variable is imputed with the appropriate regression model (i.e. OLS for continuous variables, logit for binary variables, multinomial logit for categorical variables, and ordered logit for ordinal variables). Since the normality assumption on the posterior distribution of non-continuous regression coefficients may not be valid, I rely on bootstrapping techniques to relax the normality assumption and produce robust estimates for non-continuous variables (Li, Raghunathan and Rubin, 1991).

more orientated to democracy than the average Chilean. Indeed, only 21% of participants disagreed on the pre-Q-sort questionnaire that “democracy may have problems but it is still the best form of government.”

The next two support profiles favor a strong executive. Undetected by the Q-study, hyper-presidentials are the more liberal of the two. Though generally displaying liberal and unconditional orientations, hyper-presidentials would conditionally support the subversion of civil liberties to a president acting in the “national interest”, as suggested by the 0.00 in the last column. Akin to delegates in the Q-study, the delegates the cluster analysis hold orientations to democratic governance that are not particularly liberal (-0.18) or unconditional (0.00). And while they also place conditions on political rights, their willingness to allow a leader to subsume individual liberties to the national interest diverges from their more civil-libertarian Q-study counterparts. In general, the delegative profiles in both the cluster and Q analyses reflect a good deal of ambivalence.

The last two profiles are instrumental and non-democrat, both of which resonate with the Q-study. Instrumentals hold by far the most illiberal and conditional orientations to democratic governance. That is, they do not believe democracy is the best form of government (-0.63) and welcome *coups d’etat* in various situations (-1.47). Instrumentals would readily swap political rights for economic and security gains, as their conditional orientation (-0.35) shows. Non-democrats, in turn, are illiberal towards democracy but unconditionally against military intervention (0.31). They prefer limited political pluralism and equality (-0.68), but would certainly not relinquish risk their civil liberties for a president to act in the national interest (1.00). It would appear that non-democrat Chileans currently living in a democratic context brace themselves against elected populists who might pervert democratic institutions. Despite distinct methods and data, four of the profiles are remarkably similar to the profiles identified by the Q-sorts, bolstering the overall validity of both analyses.

## 2.4 Profiles of Democratic Support, Trust in Political Parties & Political Participation

Constructing valid measures of democratic support profiles, we can now test whether they condition the effects of trust in political parties on participation in protests and elections? Before turning to the models of protest activism and electoral participation, I provide a quick review of the hypothetical expectations for each profile. Citing Gamson (1968), critical citizens scholars claim democratic orientations imbue citizens with a sense of efficacy and responsibility that predispose them to protest when they judge representative institutions untrustworthy (Norris, 1999*a*; Catterberg, 2003). However, modernization raises the value citizens place on self-expression, fostering a shift from conventional forms (like elections) to less hierarchical participatory modes (like protests) (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). So critical citizens might be less likely to vote than others with less liberal and unconditional orientations to democracy. Work on Chile shows that lack of political trust makes increases the likelihood of not registering to vote or casting blank/null ballot (Carlin, 2006). Thus, trusting democrats in Chile might be more inclined to participate in elections.

But what about citizens with mixed support profiles? Who protests and how actively are clues to the puzzle of social accountability in Chile. Hyper-presidential and delegative Chileans' would both support a president acting, presumably unilaterally, in the name of the nation. If they distrust parties, we should not expect them to participate in protests to demand accountability to representative institutions inhabited by party politicians. On the other hand, distrusting delegates, who already hold illiberal and conditional orientations to political rights and procedures, may be prime targets of mobilization for personalistic candidates running anti-party campaigns. Considering the moderately high degree of support for civil liberties instrumentals and

non-democrats exhibit, they may be likely to participate if they trust political parties enough to overcome their illiberal orientations to democratic governance. These admittedly rough expectations guide the models below, which present the first explicit tests of these inherently interactive relationships between democratic support profiles, institutional trust, and participation in accountability-exacting activities.<sup>15</sup>

In addition to the democratic support profiles, trust in political parties is my main explanatory variable. No indicator of institutional trust has dropped so precipitously in the post-authoritarian period as trust in political parties. According one source, exactly half of Chileans trusted in political parties in 1995, but in 1999 only 28 percent did so (Inglehart et al., 2004). Another source shows party trust fell by almost half, from 31% to 17%, between 1996 and 2004 (Payne, Zovatto and Díaz, 2007). The prominence of parties in Chile's transition to democracy and the favorable economic conditions since 1989 makes rapid decline of party trust all the more dramatic. While these trends make for shocking press releases, their behavioral implications are not well known. Therefore, a measure of trust in political parties<sup>16</sup> is a key independent variable in my models below.

The models examine two dependent variables, participation in public protests and elections, both of which offer citizens a degree of accountability. The first is Protest

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<sup>15</sup>Norris's (1999b, 260, 263) fails to include *any* measure of democrat support, focusing solely on institutional trust. Booth and Seligson (2005) include various dimensions of political legitimacy in their models, but do not consider their interactive effect. Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 124) show a bivariate correlation between country aggregate measures of (1) the change in the percentage of citizens claiming to have taken political action and (2) temporally prior percentages of citizens holding self-expression values. Catterberg (2003) comes closest. But rather than modelling an interaction term, she simulates interactive effects by calculating changes in predicted probabilities at high and low measures on her proxies for postmaterialism and democratic support, on one hand, and confidence in governing authorities, on the other hand.

<sup>16</sup>The LAPOP survey question reads, "To what extent do you have confidence/trust in political parties?" Responses range from "none" (1) to "a lot" (7).

Activism, operationalized as a four-point measure scored 3 if the respondent participated “often” in public protests in the last year, 2 if the respondent “almost never” participated in protests last year, 1 if the respondent “did not” participate any protests last year, and 0 if the respondent has “never” participated in a protest.<sup>17</sup> The second dependent variable is Voter Registration. In Chile voter registration is voluntary but, once registered, voting is compulsory and enforced, if sporadically, with sanctions. Since upwards of 90% of the population registered to vote ahead of the 1988 plebiscite on Pinochet’s rule, most unregistered voters are between the ages of 18 and 40. Tracking how their profiles of democratic support and evaluations of political parties influence their behavior should lead to insights on the dynamics of democratic quality in Chile. This variable is binary, scored 1 if the respondent was registered to vote in the 2005 national elections and 0 otherwise.

Controls include interpersonal trust, political interest,<sup>18</sup> Left-Right self-placement,<sup>19</sup> gender, education<sup>20</sup> (Norris, 1999a), income, membership in civic organizations<sup>21</sup> (Catterberg, 2003), and marital status.<sup>22</sup> Models of protest activism control for age, while the electoral participation models use socialization cohort dummies, where the pre-1973 cohort is the reference category (Carlin, 2006). Missing values are imputed (see fn. 11).

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<sup>17</sup>The survey question asks, “In the last year, have you participated in a public manifestation or protest? Have you done this several times, almost never, or never?”. Employing the following, more general question does not substantively alter the results: “At any time in your life have you participated in a public manifestation or protest? Have you done this several times, almost never, or never?”.

<sup>18</sup>This variable ranges 0-3 based on the question, “How much interest do you have in politics?”; 0 connotes “none” and 3 indicates “much” interest.

<sup>19</sup>Respondents place themselves on the ideological spectrum ranging from 0 (Left) to 7 (Right).

<sup>20</sup>Education ranges from no formal education (0) to full university education (17).

<sup>21</sup>This 14-point variable combines the frequency of attending meetings (never = 0, once or twice a year = 1, once or twice a month = 2, once a week = 3) for religious organizations, parents associations, neighborhood groups (*juntas de vecinos*), professional associations, unions, and political parties.

<sup>22</sup>Scored 1 if respondent is married, 0 otherwise.

### 2.4.1 Regression Analysis & Results

The analysis starts by estimating a series of ordered logistic regressions for protest activism reported in Table 2.6. Then it proceeds to a set of binary logistic regressions for Voter Registration displayed in Table 2.7.<sup>23</sup> Both analyses contain interactions between party trust and dummy variables representing democratic support profiles. To ease interpretation, Figures 2 and 3 provide visual representations of discrete changes in predicted probabilities based on the interactive relationships highlighted in Tables 2.6 and 2.7, respectively.




Figure 2.3: Discrete Change: Effects of Party Trust on Frequent Protest Activism by Support Profile

The results of Models I and II suggest that democratic support profiles indeed

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<sup>23</sup>For both sets of models, I combine the parameter estimates of the five multiple imputations of the data using Rubin's (1987) method. In addition I calculate robust estimates of the variance-covariance matrix of the regression coefficients (Li, Raghunathan and Rubin, 1991).

condition the effects of party trust/distrust on protest activism (see Table 2.6). Conforming to the expectations of the critical citizens hypothesis, Chilean democrats resort to protest as they lose trust in political parties. As the solid line in Figure 2.3 illustrates, the probability that a democrat is a frequent protester<sup>24</sup> increases by about 25% as party trust decreases over its range. The dashed lines indicate, that compared to democrats, hyper-presidentials and instrumentals become slightly more prone to protest the more they trust political parties.




Figure 2.4: Discrete Change: Effects of Party Trust on Voter Registration by Support Profile

Models II and IV in Table 2.7 examine how democratic orientations and evaluations of political parties influence voter registration. The results imply that distrusting

<sup>24</sup>These relationships do not change if we consider infrequent protest participation.



delegates are more likely to engage in electoral politics. Their democrat and non-democrat counterparts, however, become more apt to register to vote as their levels of party trust rise (see Figure 2.4). The main insight here is that democratic support profiles condition the effects of trust and distrust in political parties in a way not previously considered by theories that focus on established democracies. Moreover, understanding how ordinary citizens shape democratic quality in Chile, and perhaps other new democracies, must take this into account.

How much of an improvement do multidimensional profiles of democratic support make over two of the most common measures of democratic support? Models V-VII in Table 2.8 and Models VIII-X in Table 2.9 re-examine protest activism and voter registration, respectively, but replace the multidimensional democrat support profiles used in previous models with common measures inspired by Juan Linz and Winston Churchill.<sup>25</sup> As we can see, neither the Linzian and Churchillian of democratic support are robust predictors of any of the components of any of the interaction terms in these six models. Thus it is unlikely that democratic support measured in this way conditions the effects of party trust on political participation. Such evidence supports my claim that distilling the effects of democratic support and institutional trust on political participation requires more conceptually refined measures of democratic support.

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<sup>25</sup>The Linzian question is cited in full on page 9, and the Churchillian support measure is the liberal orientation to democratic governance used in the cluster analysis, cited in full on page 17.

Table 2.5: Cluster Means: Orientations to Democratic Governance, Political Rights & Procedures, Civil Liberties

Cluster	<i>Liberal vs. Illiberal</i>			<i>Unconditional vs. Conditional</i>		
	Democratic Governance & Procedures	Civil Liberties	Civil Liberties	Democratic Governance & Procedures	Political Rights	Civil Liberties
Liberal (n = 250, 16.5%)	Mean (s.d.)	0.50 <sup>h</sup> (0.63)	<b>0.60<sup>h</sup></b> ( <b>0.60</b> )	<b>0.59<sup>h</sup></b> ( <b>0.25</b> )	<b>0.46</b> ( <b>0.75</b> )	<b>1.00<sup>i</sup></b> ( <b>0.00</b> )
Hyper-Presidential (n = 263, 17.3%)	Mean (s.d.)	<b>0.61<sup>l</sup></b> ( <b>0.63</b> )	0.63 (0.81)	0.45 <sup>i</sup> (0.52)	0.05 (1.00)	0.00 <sup>d</sup> (0.00)
Delegative (n = 415, 27.4%)	Mean (s.d.)	-0.18 <sup>i</sup> (0.86)	-0.60 <sup>i</sup> (0.73)	0.00 (0.84)	-0.24 <sup>n</sup> (1.03)	0.00 <sup>h</sup> (0.00)
Instrumental (n = 259, 17.1%)	Mean (s.d.)	-0.63 (1.32)	0.29 (1.00)	-1.47 (0.84)	-0.35 <sup>d</sup> (1.02)	0.36 (0.48)
Non-Democrat (n = 330, 21.8%)	Mean (s.d.)	-0.16 <sup>d</sup> (0.96)	-0.68 <sup>d</sup> (0.72)	0.31 <sup>h</sup> (0.59)	0.11 <sup>h</sup> (0.97)	<b>1.00<sup>l</sup></b> ( <b>0.00</b> )
Sample (n = 1517, 100%)	Min. Max.	-2.86 1.72	-2.23 2.73	-2.77 2.84	-1.54 0.94	0.00 1.00

Note: Entries in bold and italics are the highest and lowest, respectively, across all clusters. Scalar variables standardized.

<sup>l</sup> Not significantly different from Liberal cluster mean according to Tukey's HSD pairwise means test.

<sup>h</sup> Not significantly different from Hyper-Presidential cluster mean according to Tukey's HSD pairwise means test.

<sup>d</sup> Not significantly different from Delegative cluster mean according to Tukey's HSD pairwise means test.

<sup>n</sup> Not significantly different from Instrumental cluster mean according to Tukey's HSD pairwise means test.

<sup>i</sup> Not significantly different from Illiberal cluster mean according to Tukey's HSD pairwise means test.

Table 2.6: Support Profiles, Party Trust and Protest Activism in Chile

	Model I		Model II	
	$\beta$	(s.e.)	$\beta$	(s.e.)
Party Trust	.003	(.048)	-.239*	(.094)
Liberal $\times$ Party Trust	-.246*	(.104)		
Hyper-Presidential $\times$ Party Trust		.304*	(.127)	
Delegative $\times$ Party Trust		.075	(.134)	
Instrumental $\times$ Party Trust		.380**	(.148)	
Illiberal $\times$ Party Trust		.231	(.137)	
Liberal	1.320***	(.380)		
Hyper-Presidential			-1.257**	(.479)
Delegative			-.984*	(.480)
Instrumental			-1.982***	(.559)
Non-Democrat			-1.239*	(.512)
Interpersonal Trust	.071	(.081)	.090	(.083)
Political Interest	.522***	(.073)	.496***	(.077)
Left-Right	-.176***	(.030)	-.167***	(.031)
Education	.118***	(.026)	.117***	(.027)
Income	.067	(.040)	.054	(.041)
Woman	-.355*	(.144)	-.335*	(.147)
Age	-.009	(.006)	-.010	(.006)
Married	-.554***	(.152)	-.541***	(.155)
Children	.274	(.149)	.274	(.152)
Cutpoint 1	2.263	(.432)	.857	(.513)
Cutpoint 2	3.903	(.438)	2.508	(.521)
Cutpoint 3	4.309	(.438)	2.913	(.526)
-2LLF	1794.8		1781.5	
Pseudo- $R^2_{McF}$	.126		.132	
N	1517		1517	

\*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*  $p \leq .01$ , \*  $p \leq .05$  (two-tailed test)

Table 2.7: Support Profiles, Party Trust and Voter Registration in Chile

	Model III		Model IV	
	$\beta$	(s.e.)	$\beta$	(s.e.)
Party Trust	.006	(.053)	-.126	(.102)
Liberal $\times$ Party Trust	.201	(.136)	.333*	(.165)
Hyper-Presidential $\times$ Party Trust			.226	(.153)
Delegative $\times$ Party Trust				
Instrumental $\times$ Party Trust			.064	(.149)
Illiberal $\times$ Party Trust			.257†	(.153)
Liberal	-.306	(.492)	-.900	(.607)
Hyper-Presidential			-1.063†	(.572)
Delegative				
Instrumental			-.458	(.538)
Illiberal			-.965†	(.567)
Interpersonal Trust	.053	(.092)	.047	(.095)
Political Interest	.437***	(.098)	.461***	(.103)
Left-Right	-.008	(.035)	-.008	(.037)
Education	-.011	(.031)	-.009	(.032)
Income	.042	(.047)	.041	(.049)
Woman	.044	(.170)	.047	(.177)
Post-Frei	-3.920***	(.318)	-3.909***	(.331)
Transition	-1.838***	(.330)	-1.818***	(.341)
Dictatorship	-.883**	(.332)	-.873*	(.344)
Married	.295†	(.179)	.286	(.186)
Children	.531**	(.172)	.544**	(.179)
Constant	2.155***	(.506)	2.714***	(.607)
-2LLF	1040.3		1033.2	
Pseudo- $R^2_{McF}$	.389		.393	
N	1517		1517	

\*\*\* p  $\leq$  .001, \*\* p  $\leq$  .01, \* p  $\leq$  .05, † p  $\leq$  .1 (two-tailed test)

Table 2.8: Linzian and Churchillian Support, Party Trust and Protest Activism in Chile

	Model V		Model VI		Model VII	
	$\beta$	(s.e.)	$\beta$	(s.e.)	$\beta$	(s.e.)
Party Trust	-.047	(.093)	-.034	(.049)	-.151	(.137)
Linzian Democrat $\times$ Party Trust	.013	(.105)				
Linzian Conditional $\times$ Party Trust			-.015	(.139)		
Linzian Uncommitted $\times$ Party Trust			-.001	(.142)		
Churchill Democrat $\times$ Party Trust					.022	(.028)
Linzian Democrat	.210	(.381)				
Linzian Conditional			-.274	(.515)		
Linzian Uncommitted			-.157	(.498)		
Churchill Democrat					-.069	(.093)
Interpersonal Trust	.066	(.082)	.066	(.082)	.093	(.080)
Political Interest	.533***	(.074)	.534***	(.074)	.512***	(.074)
Left-Right	-.183***	(.031)	-.183***	(.031)	-.183***	(.030)
Education	.125***	(.027)	.126***	(.027)	.122***	(.026)
Income	.074	(.041)	.074	(.041)	.068	(.040)
Woman	-.368	(.144)	-.370**	(.14)	-.387**	(.142)
Age	-.009	(.005)	-.009	(.006)	-.009	(.006)
Married	-.570***	(.153)	-.571***	(.153)	-.536***	(.150)
Children	.299*	(.150)	.300*	(.150)	.297*	(.148)
Cutpoint 1	2.297	(.432)	2.104	(.513)	1.691	(.590)
Cutpoint 2	3.972	(.438)	3.780	(.521)	3.310	(.599)
Cutpoint 3	4.357	(.438)	4.164	(.526)	3.713	(.602)
-2LLF	1955.6		1955.6		2025.0	
Pseudo- $R^2_{McF}$	.121		.121	.115		
N	1517		1517		1517	

\*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*  $p \leq .01$ , \*  $p \leq .05$  (two-tailed test)

Table 2.9: Linzian and Churchillian Support, Party Trust and Voter Registration in Chile

	Model VIII		Model IX		Model X	
	$\beta$	(s.e.)	$\beta$	(s.e.)	$\beta$	(s.e.)
Party Trust	.001	(.092)	.080	(.060)	-.147	(.149)
Linzian Democrat $\times$ Party Trust	.079	(.109)				
Linzian Conditional $\times$ Party Trust			.069	(.142)		
Linzian Uncommitted $\times$ Party Trust			-.224	(.145)		
Churchill Democrat $\times$ Party Trust					.043	(.031)
Linzian Democrat	-.307	(.394)				
Linzian Conditional			-.263	(.522)		
Linzian Uncommitted			.838	(.513)		
Churchill Democrat					-.115	(.104)
Interpersonal Trust	.038	(.095)	.034	(.095)	.075	(.094)
Political Interest	.423***	(.099)	.418***	(.100)	.430***	(.099)
Left-Right	-.006	(.036)	-.007	(.037)	-.001	(.036)
Education	-.014	(.033)	-.015	(.033)	-.017	(.032)
Income	.039	(.049)	.044	(.048)	.023	(.048)
Woman	.022	(.173)	.030	(.173)	.048	(.172)
Post-Frei	-3.970***	(.341)	-3.980***	(.341)	-3.981***	(.339)
Transition	-1.871***	(.354)	-1.884***	(.354)	-1.954***	(.350)
Dictatorship	-.970**	(.355)	-.971**	(.355)	-.906*	(.358)
Married	.304	(.184)	.304	(.184)	.308	(.183)
Children	.568***	(.178)	.568***	(.178)	.498**	(.176)
Constant	2.418***	(1.048)	2.117***	(.529)	2.817***	(.678)
-2LLF	1602.3		1602.3		1636.0	
Pseudo- $R^2_{McF}$	.392		.392		.394	
N	1517		1517		1517	

\*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*  $p \leq .01$ , \*  $p \leq .05$  (two-tailed test)

## 2.5 Discussion

By reinvigorating long-standing debates over the relationship between political culture and democracy, *Critical Citizens* earns Gabriel Almond's jacket-cover endorsement: "It is The Civic Culture study 40 years later." The volume argues that as citizens lose faith in democratic institutions, they will engage in contentious yet democratic modes of participation to demand accountability and to press for political reform. But this account is built on the assumption of widespread democratic support, valid only in long-lasting stable democracies, and it neglects the importance of electoral participation. The current study strongly urges scholars of new democracies to look beyond "critical citizens" to identify citizens with less-than-liberal orientations to democracy and observe their political behavior in the streets and at the ballot box. These citizens are critical, if often missing, pieces of the larger theoretical puzzle. This study contributes conceptual and methodological innovations that help fill in some of the pieces of the empirical and theoretical puzzles surrounding democratic beliefs and the quality of democracy.

The main conceptual and methodological advances concern the measurement of support for democracy. Previous conceptualizations of democratic support fail to define what "democrats" do, in fact, support. This hinders valid measurement and theory construction. Profiles of democratic support grounded in Dahl's (1971) democratic procedural minimum highlights the orientations to democracy and the objects of support essential to a profile of democratic support. Methodologically, Q-sorts and cluster analysis prove to be powerful and complementary ways to identify support profiles. The resulting measures address the pitfalls and tradeoffs that plague extant measures of democratic support reasonably well. Multidimensional profiles offer one way to incorporate the "d-word" into a valid measure of democratic support that draws information from a respondent's orientations to the core elements of procedural democracy. Knowing which aspects of procedural democracy citizens support could pave the

way for better hypothesis testing about the linkages between democratic support and the viability and quality of procedural democracy. In a crucial first step, the analysis suggests support profiles explain accountability-inducing behaviors, and they do so better than extant measures.

This study paints a drastically different picture of democratic support in Chile than previous studies. According to recent polls (Latinobarómetro, 2006), 56% of Chileans are “democrats” as determined by the Linzian support measure and 74% are “democrats” if we look only at the Churchillian measure of support. Using data from the 2006 LAPOP survey, Carrión (forthcoming) combines Linzian support with preference for liberal (as opposed to populist) rule and reports 61.4% of Chileans are “liberal democrats.” By clustering orientations to three class of objects (regime, political rights/procedures, civil liberties) using the same LAPOP data, I find just 16.5% of Chileans qualify as liberal “democrats”. My research takes an additional step towards validating the distinctions between democrats and their counterparts by showing that they tend to behave quite differently. Moreover, in a head-to-head competition, my measures outperform Linzian and Churchillian measures for predicting protest activism and voter turnout.

The empirical results of this study nuance our theoretical understanding of how democratic beliefs and attitudes might influence the stability and quality of democracy. In Chile, low trust in parties motivates “democrats” - and only “democrats” - to seek accountability via protest. In post-authoritarian Latin America, protesting catalyzed political actors and institutions to impeach or force from office elected presidents without causing a democratic breakdown (Pérez-Liñán, 2007). Therefore, a small group of distrusting democrats in Chile could potentially be expected react similarly in an emergency and, thereby, preserve democratic stability.

But the implications for democratic quality are less clear. As “democrats” lose



trust in parties they shy away from electoral participation. As “delegatives” lose trust in parties, however, they embrace it. So not only are Chilean democrats outnumbered, they also surrender their leverage over elected officials by remaining on the electoral sidelines. Perhaps this behavior owes to the difficulty of ‘throwing the rascals out’ posed by the binomial system, generational shifts in participatory norms (Carlin, 2006), or disgust with mandatory voting laws. Whatever the reason, democracy presupposes that elected officials represent those who voted them into office. In this sense, Chilean distrusting democrats seem to be betting that elected officials will pay more attention to the protesting (democratic) few than the voting (ambivalent) many. What remains to be seen is whether political opportunists will decide to see their bet and rise to power backed by a less-than-democratic majority. This insight underscores the empirical and theoretical contributions of this study as well as the challenges ahead.

A fuller understanding of how the distribution of democratic support at the mass level translates into observable outcomes at the regime level depends on myriad considerations (see Coppedge N.d.). Greater access to mass surveys from LAPOP and Latinobarómetro should facilitate research on cross-national patterns and within-country dynamics over time. Surveys of Latin American elites, like PELA, allow scholars to explore how democratic beliefs systems at the elite level take cues from or influence democratic support profiles in the populace. Further investigation into the political opportunity structures, capacity to overcome collective action problems, and the framing of motives may help link this research agenda to a broader theoretical story about the nature of contentious politics. More work also remains to be done on the determinants of democratic support profiles. Meanwhile, this study provides some conceptual and theoretical guideposts for future research on this central theme of democratic theory.

## Chapter 3

# Political Party Trust, Distrust, and Trustworthiness: Concepts, Rubrics, and Implications in Chile and Argentina

Latin American publics trust political parties less than any other political, economic, and social institution or actor, as survey after survey finds. Yet the implications for democracy are unclear. If it equates to antipartyism or support for antisystem leaders, then lack of trust in parties may threaten democratic quality and stability (Torcal, Gunther and Montero, 2002; Linz, 2002; Hagopian, 2005). But if it signals the growth of a critical citizenry in search of new forms of political representation and participation, it could have a salutary effect on democracy (Norris, 1999*a*; Catterberg, 2003; Dalton and Weldon, 2005; Cleary and Stokes, 2006). Or perhaps the implications depend on *why* citizens find parties untrustworthy. If citizens are simply appreciating the increasing complexity of governance, then it may well be that lack of party trust “*does not matter* very much” (Hardin, 2000, 50). But if low party trust reflects outrage over

moral impropriety and a crisis of representation, it could fuel demands for institutional reform and accountability. To understand the consequences of party trust in Latin America we need to know how to conceptualize it, how citizens judge parties, and how these judgements influence political behavior.

Most research on trust in political parties in new Latin American democracies employs measures modelled on the General Social Survey (GSS) item, “How much confidence do you have in political parties – Much, Some, Little, or None?” In Spanish, the stems use “*confianza*,” which means both “trust” and “confidence”.<sup>1</sup> The instrument is problematic on many levels. As I argue above, it impedes theorizing by obscuring citizens’ criteria for assessing party trustworthiness and, thus, the behavioral implications of party trust and distrust. Cook and Gronke (2005) cite further shortfalls. By stopping at “None”, the response set truncates the continuum between trust and distrust. It says nothing about *distrust*. Assuming that a lack of trust does not necessarily constitute distrust (Ullmann-Margalit, 2004), conclusions about party distrust are at best overstated and at worst misleading. Hence the GSS measure cannot distinguish *active* trust or distrust from *a lack of* trust or distrust. Differentiating these beliefs paints a more accurate portrait of party performance from the citizen point of view and disentangles the behavioral consequences of distrust in parties.

My study focuses on these conceptual, measurement, and theoretical issues. It proposes a conceptualization of party trust/distrust based on perceptions of party trustworthiness along three dimensions: integrity, competence, and responsiveness. With this tripartite conceptualization I investigate empirically the criteria upon which citizens judge the trustworthiness of political parties and the behavioral consequences of party

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<sup>1</sup>Surveys in Latin America come in two main variants. World Values Surveys use, “¿Cuánta confianza tiene usted en los partidos políticos – Mucha, Algo, Poca, o Nada?” Latin American Public Opinion Project surveys prefer, “¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos – Nada (0) . . . Mucho (7)?”

trust and distrust. Analyses of Q-sorts and focus-groups conducted in Santiago, Chile and Buenos Aires, Argentina suggest that party trust and distrust are based on three shared party trustworthiness “rubrics”, or sets of weighted criteria, that are remarkably similar in both cases. Then I test the linkages between my three-dimensional conceptualization of party trust/distrust and participation in elite-challenging political actions in a region-wide comparative analysis with survey data from *Latinobarómetro* (LB). Indeed, my conceptually-grounded measures outperform the GSS measure of party trust and tell a more nuanced story about how evaluations of parties influence participation. The study closes by summarizing its contributions to theory and measurement and pointing out paths for future research.

## Case Selection

For this comparative analysis, Chile and Argentina can be viewed as most-different cases in terms of political party integrity, the governing competence, responsiveness to citizens, and citizen evaluations of parties. Chilean parties are far from perfect on these scores, and Chileans themselves express only modest levels of trust in them. Aside from recent scandals regarding impropriety in awarding government contracts, corruption is considered quite low in Chile. Over the course of the transition to democracy that began in the late 1980s, parties formed two coalitions on the Center-Right and Center-Left of the political spectrum. The Center-Left *Concertación* has won the presidency in the four elections since 1989, while the Center-Right *Alianza* has played the role of a dutiful, if sometimes internally-conflicted, opposition. Parties of the Far Left compete well in municipal elections, but typically blocked from legislative representation by the binomial electoral system. Historically, parties in Chile have been the main political and social brokers (Valenzuela, 1977). These ties have weakened in the post-authoritarian era as parties have shifted from programmatic to pragmatic linkage

strategies (Posner, 1999; Luna, 2006). Since democracy's return in 1989, civil society's leverage has declined (Oxhorn, 1995), and organized labor has only recouped a fraction of its pre-1973 strike capacity (Kurtz, 2004). Trust in parties in Chile, at 23% based on the GSS question, is surpassed only by four other Latin American countries in the 2004 LB.

Argentina's party system nearly dissolved after an economic meltdown in 2001 triggered a major legitimacy crisis of the political class. In the streets, demonstrators chanted "Out with them all!". In the 2001 legislative elections, blank and spoiled ballots out-pollled all party lists in some districts. Parties in opposition to Peronism have never recovered. Successive administrations have battled hyperinflation and poorly managed currency regimes since the return to democracy in 1983. Under the Menem and De la Rúa's administrations corruption scandals dominated headlines fuelled citizen discontent with the political class. Historically, Argentina's labor movement, not political parties, have been the primary vehicles of interest articulation for the middle and working sectors. But party-base linkages in Argentina have drastically changed since 1983. Menem's "neoliberalism by surprise" (Stokes, 2001) shifted the Peronist Party from its traditional labor-based linkages to patronage and clientelistic networks (Levitsky, 2003*a*; Stokes, 2005; Auyero, 2001). If neoliberalism weakened organized labor, it drove unemployed ex-syndicalists to form *piquetero* organizations who seek redress by conducting roadblocks and other forms of collective action (Svampa and Pereyra, 2003). GSS-based party trust in Argentina is 12%, fourth lowest in the region in 2004.

Considering the vast dissimilarities between party systems, historical modes of representation, party/coalition stability, and many other factors, there is little reason to suspect citizens in both countries to judge parties on the same exact criteria. But if we broaden the lens to view trustworthiness in the three dimensions I map out below,

some patterns may arise. Any common findings across these two diverging cases could prove generalizable.

### 3.1 Party Trust, Distrust & Trustworthiness

Despite abundant theorizing on other objects of political trust, political parties are largely ignored. Drawing on Levi and Stoker's (2000) review, I provide a conceptual map of trust, distrust, and trustworthiness, both in general and as they relate to political parties. Then I propose that party trust and distrust derive from citizens' "rubrics of party trustworthiness."

Trust is relational and requires individuals to make themselves vulnerable to another individual, group, or institution with the capacity to harm or betray them. One grants trust over specific domains, but not unconditionally. Trust and distrust can be either a matter of degree or dichotomous, and it is possible that one neither trusts nor distrusts another person, group, or institution. Trust and distrust inspire action, such as extending, monitoring, or severing a relationship. Thus trust is the truster's belief in the trustworthiness of the trustee.

Trustworthiness is relational insofar as individuals and institutions possess attributes that potential trusters could perceive as trustworthy. Trustworthy attributes cluster around integrity and competence in the domain of trust. Hence over a prescribed range of actions and decisions, "the trustworthy will not betray the trust as a consequence of bad faith or ineptitude" (Levi and Stoker, 2000, 476). Therefore while trust is a belief and trustworthiness is a characteristic, they are connected since "to ask any question about trust is implicitly to ask about the reasons for thinking the relevant party to be trustworthy" (Hardin, 2004, 6).

Capturing these intuitions, Cleary and Stokes (2006) define trust as actor  $A$ 's belief that actor  $B$  will take action  $X$ , which is in  $A$ 's interest, even though  $B$  could stand

to gain by not taking this action, and  $A$  cannot directly monitor  $B$ 's actions. Distrust is  $A$ 's belief that  $B$  will not do  $X$ , which is in  $A$ 's interest. As such, distrust is “the contrapositive of trust” (12). Trustworthiness is  $B$ 's ability or predisposition to do  $X$ , as judged by  $A$ . Trust and distrust, then, boil down to “assessment[s] of the trustworthiness of the potentially trusted person or group or institution” (Hardin, 2004, 3) in a given domain of action.

Borrowing this framework, trust in political parties is citizen  $A$ 's belief that political parties  $B_{1...n}$  will represent  $A$ 's interests  $X_{1...n}$ . Distrust in parties is  $A$ 's belief that parties  $B_{1...n}$  will not represent  $A$ 's interests  $X_{1...n}$ . Political representation is the domain of action, assuming that citizens evaluate parties collectively as one in a range of potential vehicles of interest aggregation and articulation, rather than one party over another (e.g. Keele 2005). For parties to be effective vehicles of political representation, they must have integrity, competence, and responsiveness. If citizens perceive political parties as lacking in integrity, they will distrust them because parties will be likely to betray citizens' interests, break their promises, and/or become corrupt. If citizens perceive political parties as incompetent, they will distrust them because parties will be unlikely to govern effectively. If citizens perceive political parties as unresponsive, they will distrust them because parties will be unlikely to aggregate and articulate citizen interests and concerns adequately. Reversing these scenarios, trust in parties becomes at least possible, if not likely. A summary measure about one's level of trust in parties, like the GSS measure, is a blunt instrument if citizens actually judge party trustworthiness along these three dimensions.

My proposed conceptualization of trust in parties is consistent with recent theoretical discussions about trust in parties (Linz, 2002; Hagopian, 2005) in Latin America, as well as and trust in local and national governments in established democracies (Jennings, 1998; Denters, 2002). In addition, it resonates with citizen perspectives as

articulated in eight focus groups with in Santiago and Buenos Aires, and LB survey data. The focus groups were formed with members of pre-existing groups who were likely to have a variety of interactions with parties. In Santiago, these groups included an anti-globalization citizen movement, ATTAC-Chile; a group of neighborhood association leaders from Santiago's working-class borough, La Granja; a Christian Democrat Youth group from San Joaquín, another working-class *comuna*; and the Gay and Lesbian Brigade of the Socialist Party. The Buenos Aires focus groups were recruited from members of the class-based coalition, *Central de los Trabajadores* (CTA); vocational school students from the working-class districts of Vicente López and General San Martín; young party members participating in a leadership seminar at the think-tank *Centro de Implementación de la Políticas Públicas para la Equidad y Crecimiento* (CIPPEC); and activists in a human rights group, *Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos* (APDH). Despite variation in socioeconomic status, gender, ideology, and relationship to parties, participants echoed concerns along all three of the proposed dimensions. The next section elaborates this evidence with data from the transcriptions.

Further validation comes from a 2004 LB survey question asking citizens from 18 Latin American countries the top three factors that determine their levels of trust in public institutions.<sup>2</sup> As Table 3.1 indicates, six of the ten responses match the proposed conceptual dimensions of party trustworthiness: integrity, competence, responsiveness. The other four factors reflect second-hand knowledge (reputation), do not correspond clearly to political parties (equality), or allude to accountability mechanisms (third party enforcement). Between 35-48% of respondents cite integrity criteria, 22-42%

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<sup>2</sup>While the stem does not mention parties specifically, the two preceding questions probe the functions of political parties (P31) and trust in several other groups and institutions (P32), i.e. Banks, the police, the Church, the government, trade unions, television, armed forces.



Table 3.1: Percentage Mentioning Criteria for Trust in Public Institutions  
**Which of the following factors, if any, are the most important in determining how much trust you have in public institutions? Name up to three.**

<i>Criterion</i>	<i>Dimension</i>	<i>Argentina</i>	<i>Chile</i>	<i>Lat. Am.</i>
If they keep their promises	Integrity	47.9	39.4	39.9
If they admit responsibility when mistaken	Integrity	37.4	36.4	35.1
The leadership and management quality	Competence	21.2	22.8	18.5
If they give the required information	Competence	23.6	31.1	32.1
If they are interested in one's opinion	Responsiveness	26.2	22.1	24.0
If the service responds to my needs	Responsiveness	41.7	39.1	31.5
Total mentioning at least 1 of the 6 above		99.2	99.5	98.9
What friends and relatives say about it	Reputation	6.8	5.2	9.6
What the mass media says about it	Reputation	6.5	9.8	11.4
If they are supervised	Enforcement	57.5	54.7	60.1
If they treat everyone equally	Equality	57.5	54.7	59.7
Total mentioning at least 1 of the 4 above		64.5	63.4	71.3
Don't know/No response		4.33	5.3	12.0

*Source:* Latinobarómetro 2004.

*Note:* Entries represent the percentage of valid responses; DK/NR deleted list-wise.

mention responsiveness, and 21-31% name competence standards. Just 1% of respondents fail to mention any of the criteria in the proposed theoretical dimensions. Thus, citizens generally judge the trustworthiness of public institutions on integrity, competence, and responsiveness.<sup>3</sup> Citizens will either trust or distrust parties depending on how well parties meet these criteria. This conceptualization lays the groundwork for a closer look at the rubrics of party trust and distrust and how they drive elite-challenging political actions aimed at holding elected officials accountable.

### **3.2 Rubrics of Party Trustworthiness**

Conceiving of trust and distrust in political parties as beliefs deriving from evaluations of party trustworthiness raises the question: do all criteria matter equally? For some citizens, issues of integrity are most critical, while for others assessments capacity or responsiveness are central. Do citizens organize and weight their trustworthiness criteria systematically? I claim that citizens employ implicit “rubrics of party trustworthiness” to arrive at trust or distrust of parties. To education researchers and practitioners, a rubric is a scoring guide that weights performance criteria for student assessment (i.e. grading). Rubrics systematize the process of evaluation and indicate areas of success and failure. In short, I propose that citizens rely on trustworthiness rubrics and score parties accordingly. Not all citizens use the same rubrics. But trust and distrust in parties are likely to reflect citizens weighing their perceptions of parties against a limited number of sets of criteria. Knowing what drives trust and distrust in parties could clarify the consequences of these beliefs.

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<sup>3</sup>The popularity of third-party enforcement (55-60% mentioned) affirms the distinction between personal trust in politicians and institutional trust in the mechanisms of accountability (Cleary and Stokes, 2006). Another 55-60% of respondents mentioned equality, but logic would suggest this criterion is more applicable to formal institutions (e.g. congress, the judiciary, the bureaucracy) than to political parties.

Gauging political party trust or distrust based on how citizens “grade” the trustworthiness of parties has key advantages over the GSS measure. The most obvious is that rubrics are multidimensional measures, whereas the GSS item is an omnibus measure. And rubrics approach does not unduly truncate the spectrum between trust and distrust. The GSS measure, on the other hand, presumably lumps citizens who actively distrust political parties in with those who, simply, do not trust them. Yet these are distinct phenomena with potentially diverging behavioral implications. What do rubrics of party trustworthiness look like? Do common or shared rubrics exist either within or across cases? Q methodology is a promising way to address these questions.

### **3.2.1 Detecting Party Trustworthiness Rubrics: Q-Methods**

Psychologist William Stephenson (1953) designed Q methodology to study patterns of human subjectivity. In short, it reveals systematic perspectives and conceptions that are shared by more than one subject (Brown, 1980; McKeown and Thomas, 1988). Prime examples in political science include Drzyek and Holmes’s (2002) analysis of democratic discourses in post-Communist societies, which they link to distinct paths to democratization. Theiss-Morse (1993) connects distinct conceptions of citizenship to diverging modes of political participation in the United States. Zechmeister (2006) shows that different meanings of Left-Right ideological labels reflect political sophistication and respond to elite packaging in Argentina and Mexico. I seek to detect rubrics of party trustworthiness with Q-methods.

Q-methodologists observe a behavior called a Q-sort. Participants complete a Q-sort by physically rank-ordering along a continuum, typically from “most agree” to “most disagree”, a set of statements about the concept under study printed on laminated cards. Completed Q-sorts are then factor-analyzed to identify latent constructs upon which participants, not variables, load. Some describe this factor analysis as “inverted”

since a Q-sorts data set is the inverse of a survey data set. A survey data set places items in columns and subjects in rows. Factor analysis in this set-up shows which *items* tap a latent variable. Q data sets, however, place *subjects* in columns and *items* in rows. The factor analysis, now “inverted”, explores which *subjects* tap a latent variable or “shared conception.” The letter *q* is meant to distinguish these “person correlations” from Pearson’s *r*-based “trait correlations.”

To gauge party trust and distrust by exploring party trustworthiness rubrics, I asked participants from Santiago, Chile and Buenos Aires, Argentina to construct their own rubrics of party trustworthiness by Q-sorting statements that reflect assessments of political parties. Inverted factor analysis of these Q-sorts revealed latent rubrics of party trustworthiness shared among the participants. Whether a participant is an active truster or distrusters or neither depends on the *strength* of her factor loading on a given shared rubric. The *sign* of this factor loading indicates whether, after grading parties with this rubric, the subject ultimately trusts or distrusts political parties. I return to this conversation after describing the rubrics of party trustworthiness. Now let us turn to theoretical and methodological considerations that influence the design my Q-study: the construction of the Q-sample, the recruitment of the P-Sample, and the on-site procedures.

In Q-methods terminology, the set of items participants sort is called the “Q-sample.” Survey samples draw from the population of respondents, but Q-samples draw from the universe of perspectives on the concept under analysis. Here the concept is party trustworthiness, and my Q-sample ( $n = 24$ ) draws from the universe of survey

items on trust in parties, institutions, and government.<sup>4</sup> The items were sampled purposefully and I revised several to make “political parties” the object of the evaluation. For each of the three dimensions of party trustworthiness that form my conceptualization of party trust – integrity, competence, and responsiveness – there are eight items or statements tapping that dimension. Of these eight items, four of the statements are trustworthy assessments of parties and the other four are the corresponding untrustworthy evaluations of parties. This symmetry provides an important check on the consistency and coherence of the rubric.

The P-sample refers to the participants who complete the Q-sorting exercise. Unlike surveys, Q-sorts do not require a large number of randomly selected participants. Rather, in line with best practices for small-*n* methods (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994), Q prioritizes a diverse set of participants who can maximize the range of orientations to the concept under study, i.e. party trustworthiness. The P-samples were recruited from contrasting ages and walks of life in both Santiago (81 participants, October-December 2005) and Buenos Aires (82 participants, July-September 2006).<sup>5</sup> This non-representative sample prohibits us from inferring how widely-used these trustworthiness rubrics are in the population and whether other rubrics remain latent. Yet any similarities observed in both the Santiago and Buenos Aires analyses buttress the validity and generalizability of the findings.

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<sup>4</sup>Questionnaires are sampled from the following projects and surveys: National Election Study, El Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (Spain, various), Latin American Public Opinion Project, *Latinobarómetro*, Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Danish Gallup Poll on Local Government (1993), Consumers, Taxpayers, and Citizens Survey (Norway 1996), Local Democracy and Administrative Renewal Survey (Netherlands 1993), Public Opinion and Local Citizenship Survey (United Kingdom 1994-95).

<sup>5</sup>Participants included state employees, professionals, students, middle-class families, shanty-town dwellers, party militants, academics, blue-collar workers, mothers and women’s associations, neighborhood associations, NGOs, a nationalist group, and a homosexual rights movement. In Chile, the Q-study fell directly prior to the December 2005 elections. Argentina’s October 2007 national elections were more than a year away. Falling at different points on the electoral calendar accentuates the most-different cases design.




Figure 3.1: Quasi-Normal Q-Sort Distribution, 24 Items

On site, participants first completed a short questionnaire about political support and demographics. Next they sorted the 24 statements (Q-sample items) typed on small laminated cards into three categories: agree, disagree, and no strong feeling either way (Brown, 1980). Subjects then ranked the statements by sorting them into eleven ordinal categories ranging from -4 (“least agree”) to +4 (“most agree”) conforming to Figure 2, where 0 is neutral.<sup>6</sup> Participants place the item they most agree with under +4, the next two they most agree with under +3, the item they least agree with under -4, and so on. The research team recorded the position of the items in the Q-sort and analyzed the data off site. Finished Q-sorts represent the rubric of party trustworthiness participants employ in their decision to trust or distrust parties. Q methodology’s “inverted” factor analysis can tell us if a participant’s rubric is unique or representative of a more general set of evaluative criteria.

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<sup>6</sup>The quasi-normal distribution of Figure 2 guarantees that the Q-sorts will not be unduly skewed or otherwise difficult to compare, but does not significantly alter the results (Brown, 1980).

### 3.2.2 Analysis & Interpretation

There are some technical aspects of the analysis that are essential to a substantive interpretation of the results. Since the rubrics of party trustworthiness come from an exploratory factor analysis of Q-sorts, they take on meaning and substance after analyzing and interpreting the extracted factors. Some general statistical guidelines structure my factor analyses. I use varimax, not hand, rotation. Extracted factors must pass a scree test, explain at least 10% of the rotated variance, and 20% of subjects must load  $\geq |0.4|$ . The factor solution must explain at least 40% of the total variance. The percentage of variance explained by a factor (equal to the eigenvalue  $\div n$  Q-sorters) grounds the information eigenvalues provide.<sup>7</sup> Following these rules, the factor analyses of both the Santiago and Buenos Aires Q-sorts suggest three-factor solutions. In the Santiago analysis ( $n = 81$ ) the solution explains 41% of the rotated variance, while in the Buenos Aires analysis ( $n = 82$ ) it explains 51% of the variance.<sup>8</sup> These six latent factors represent shared party trustworthiness rubrics. As I describe below, each of the three rubrics in Santiago has a corresponding rubric in Buenos Aires that is similar enough to warrant the same name.

The most straightforward way to interpret and name these factors is by analyzing the factor scores for the items in the Q-sample. As Theiss-Morse (1993) explains, “the factor scores represent weighted combinations of the placement of statements in each individual’s Q-sort and thus reflect ideal typical patterns” (1993, 363). Simply put, a factor score is a criterion’s weight within the overall party trustworthiness rubric. In calculating the factor scores, the raw data in each Q-sort are weighted to allow

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<sup>7</sup>Eigenvalues (which equal the sum of squared factor loadings for each factor) are a common extraction criterion in  $r$ -based factor analysis. But aggregating across numerous variates, as done here, may inflate them artificially (Brown, 1980, 40-43).

<sup>8</sup>The explained variance can also be broken down by factor (and eigenvalue). For Santiago, Factor 1 = 20% (16.5); Factor 2 = 10% (7.9); Factor 3 = 11% (9.0). For Buenos Aires, Factor 1 = 19% (15.4); Factor 2 = 18% (14.9); Factor 3 = 14% (11.5).

participants with higher factor loadings to contribute more. Then the raw Q-sorts data are multiplied by their corresponding factor weight,<sup>9</sup> summed across each item, and normalized (mean = 0, s.d. = 1). Next these normalized (z) factor scores are transposed to scores on the 11-point Q-sort scale. This last step is not necessary, but transposed z-scores “are usually reported since they conform to the format in which the data were originally collected” (Brown, 1980, 243). Table 3.2 reports the transposed scores the most dominant and consistent items by case, factor, and dimension. Dominant items score +4, +3, +2, -2, -3, or -4. In some cases, a dominant item is inconsistent. Inconsistency arises when a trustworthy statement has a positive (+) score and the corresponding untrustworthy statement also has a positive (+) score. Or, conversely, when a trustworthy item has a negative (-) score and the corresponding untrustworthy item has a negative (-) score as well. In Table 3.2, trustworthy items are denoted with *t* and untrustworthy items denoted with *u*.

The shared rubrics are named for the weight they assign to the different trustworthiness dimensions. In this respect there are some differences in the three rubrics in Chile and the three rubrics in Argentina, but also some patterns. The following decision rules identify those patterns and suggest rubric names. First, I create summary scores for each dimension (integrity, competence, responsiveness) in all six factors and report them in Table 3.3. These scores are the sum, by dimension, of the absolute value of the transposed factor scores for the items in Table 3.2. If an item is inconsistent, as defined above, its score is left out of the dimension’s summary score. The name of the factor derives from the two dimensions with the highest summary scores, which appear in **bold** in Table 3.3. The dimension with the highest sum across both cases, whose scores are also underlined, comes first in the name. The three rubrics are Factor

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<sup>9</sup>Based on  $w = f/(1 - f^2)$ , where  $w$  is the factor weight and  $f$  is the factor loading (Brown, 1980, 241-2).



Table 3.2: Rubrics of Political Party Trustworthiness: Santiago and Buenos Aires

	<i>Santiago</i>			<i>Buenos Aires</i>		
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Integrity</b>						
1 <i>t.</i> I don't think political parties are corrupt.	-4			-2	-3	
2 <i>t.</i> Political parties fulfill their promises.			-2		-4	
3 <i>t.</i> Political parties work for the common good.	-3			-4		
4 <i>t.</i> The internal power struggle in political parties, while unpleasant, is necessary.	+2	+3	-4		+2	-4
<hr/>						
1 <i>u.</i> Political parties are corrupt.	+4	-2			+3	+3
2 <i>u.</i> Political parties don't fulfill their promises.			+2		+4	
3 <i>u.</i> Political parties don't work for the common good.	+3			+3	-2	+2
4 <i>u.</i> The internal power struggle in political parties is unpleasant and, moreover, unnecessary.	-2		+4		-3	+4
<hr/>						
<b>Competence</b>						
5 <i>t.</i> Most of the time political parties make good public policy decisions.	-2		-3			-2
6 <i>t.</i> Political parties are capable of solving the country's greatest socioeconomic problems.	-3		-2	-3	+2	-2
7 <i>t.</i> Political parties have been able to improve citizens' social reality.	-2			-2		
8 <i>t.</i> Most of the time political parties make good decisions about electoral strategies.		-2		-2		
<hr/>						
5 <i>u.</i> Most of the time political parties make bad public policy decisions.	+2		+2		+2	
6 <i>u.</i> Political parties are not capable of solving the country's greatest socioeconomic problems.	+3		+3	+2		+2
7 <i>u.</i> Political parties have not been able to improve citizens' social reality.	+3			+4		
8 <i>u.</i> Most of the time political parties make electoral strategies that do not reflect what citizens want.		+3		+3		+3
<hr/>						
<b>Responsiveness</b>						
9 <i>t.</i> Political parties place a lot of importance on the opinions of the average person.		-3	-2			
10 <i>t.</i> Political parties not only come around during election time. Afterwards, they stay in contact, too.		-4			-2	
11 <i>t.</i> Political parties strive for power to help the people, not for their own benefit.		-3		-3	-2	
12 <i>t.</i> Political parties deal with issues that interest me.		-2	-3			
<hr/>						
9 <i>u.</i> Political parties do not place much importance on the opinions of the average person.		+2				
10 <i>u.</i> Political parties come around during election time, but afterwards they lose contact.		+4			+3	
11 <i>u.</i> Political parties strive for power for their own benefit, not to help the people.				+2		
12 <i>u.</i> Political parties do not deal with issues that interest me.		+2	+3	+2		

*Note:* Differences between scores  $\geq |1|$  are statistically significant at  $p < .01$  or better.

1: Competence and Integrity; Factor 2: Responsiveness and Integrity; and Factor 3: Integrity and Competence. Now I describe these rubrics in turn.

Table 3.3: Dimension Summary Scores by Factor & Naming Rules: Santiago and Buenos Aires Analysis

Dimension	Factor 1: Competence & Integrity		Factor 2: Responsiveness & Integrity		Factor 3: Integrity & Competence, Process	
	Santiago	Buenos Aires	Santiago	Buenos Aires	Santiago	Buenos Aires
Integrity	<b>18</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>13</b>
Competence	<b>14</b>	<b>16</b>	5	4	<b>10</b>	<b>9</b>
Responsiveness	0	7	<b>20</b>	<b>7</b>	8	0
			S+BA	S+BA	S+BA	S+BA
			27	27	26	25
			<b>30</b>	9	9	<b>19</b>
			0	<b>27</b>	8	8

## Rubric 1: Competence & Integrity

The first rubric grades parties primarily on competence and integrity. Responsiveness is less of a concern, especially in Santiago. The main competence criteria the cases have in common relate to parties' ability to solve socioeconomic issues (#7*t*, 7*u*) and to their ability to improve citizens social reality (#7*t*, 7*u*). The integrity-based trustworthy item, "Political parties work for the common good" (#3*t*), scores -3 and -4 in the Santiago and Buenos Aires samples, respectively, while the item's untrustworthy counterpart, "Political parties don't work for the common good" (#3*u*), scores +3 in both analyses. Other criteria matter more in one case than the other. Santiaguinos place more emphasis party corruption (#1*t*, 1*u*) and Bonaerenses are more critical of parties' electoral strategies (#8*t*, 8*u*), supporting Mora y Araujo's (1991) thesis that Argentines disapprove of the closed-door, party-dominated nature of candidate selection. In general, responsiveness figures more prominently in the Buenos Aires rubric, particularly judgements about whether parties place their own interests above citizen interests (#11*t*, 11*u*) and address issues of interest to citizens (#12*u*).

The rubric can be seen in a complain from a 36-year old woman from Buenos Aires's upper-middle class Palermo: "the people are tired of the political class because they don't solve any problems and because of the constant stream of fraud." Echoing this, a 26-year old woman from the lower-middle class district of General San Martín says she distrusts parties because "there's no work; they make a lot of promises but they don't keep them." A man of 23 from San Joaquín, a working-class municipality of Santiago, claims "Parties' solutions do not go to the bottom of citizens' real problems. That is, politics today tends to be theatrical, done for the media. They give patchy solutions just to be able to cut a ribbon [for the cameras]." Another man, age 54, from Santiago's middle-class La Florida has a more nuanced view that also matches a rubric of trustworthiness based on party competence and integrity: "The majority of parties

in today's political elite don't aspire to solve problems but rather to maintain the *status quo*." These articulations boost our confidence that some citizens judge party trustworthiness primarily on standards embodied in this rubric.

## **Rubric 2: Responsiveness & Integrity**

When citizens employ Rubric 2 to assess party trustworthiness, the most heavily weighted criteria they examine concern party responsiveness and integrity. The untrustworthy item (#10*u*), "Political parties come around during election time, but afterwards they lose contact" registers +4 and +3 in the Santiago and Buenos Aires analyses, respectively, while the corresponding trustworthy item (#10*t*) scores -4 and -2. Across these cases, the centrality of parties' motivations for seeking power (to help people or to help themselves) is also fairly salient (#11*t*, 11*u*). As the dimension sums across Santiago and Buenos Aires (S+BA) in Table 3.3 show, integrity items matter much less to the Santiaguinos while responsiveness items matter quite a bit less to Bonaerenses.

An excerpt from a focus group with leaders of *juntas de vecinos* (neighborhood groups) in Santiago's lower-working class *comuna* of La Granja shows citizens wrestling chiefly with party responsiveness and integrity and relegating competence to a more minor role. Forty-four year-old "Pilar" judges parties on these grounds: "For example, [political parties] need me to vote for them. I participate, but if one day I need them for something they say, 'I don't remember you,' or they say, 'I'll call you,' and they never call you." At another stage of the focus group, the participants appear to combine responsiveness and integrity into the term "commitment" (*compromiso*). Competence matters in this rubric as well, but to a lesser degree than the other dimensions.

*Paula (age 58)*: Yes, [political parties] are capable.

*Inéz (age 42)*: They see the problems but they don't solve the problems. And they promise and promise...

*Paula*: Yeah, [but] they are capable.

*Pilar*: To me, they aren't capable. Put it this way: when they're running for election, [and] you have to vote, they offer you the sun, the moon, and everything else. And the moment they are elected they forget about all of it... they deliver nothing!

*Facilitator*: And do you think they fail to deliver because they lack the capacity or something else?

*Pilar*: They lack something else.

*Inéz*: I believe more that they lack commitment.

*Pilar*: No. No...

*Inéz*: Yes! I think so. Yeah, because a person who says, 'I'm going to do something,' and doesn't fulfill their word lacks commitment.

While fleshing out the entire trustworthiness rubric is impossible from this interchange, the subjects are clearly engaging in the types of assessment the rubric dictates. "Norma", from Greater Buenos Aires's lower-working class district Vicente López, takes a different angle but also judges parties on responsiveness and integrity, de-emphasizing competence:

I don't believe in any party because they make promises when it's most convenient for them. They give you the 20 pesos and afterwards they do what they want. I think some of them are competent, but there's always the intermediaries. There's the competent one, but the intermediary does whatever s/he wants. Maybe [the competent one] does want the country to move forward, but those surrounding him are waiting to seize the opportunity to grab something for their own benefit.

Indeed, Norma's point of view of political parties is marked by the pervasive patronage politics in the provincial districts that ring the capital. Each of these expressions resonate with research on the shift from programmatic to pragmatic party-base linkages in Argentina (Levitsky, 2003*b*) and Chile (Luna, 2006).

### Rubric 3: Integrity & Competence

The integrity-competence rubric is not simply an inversion of the emphasis on competence integrity in Rubric 1. The items with the most weight in this factor, #4*u* and 4*t*, highlight parties' internal power struggles. Not only are these items the most dominant in this rubric, but the underlying normalized (*z*) factor scores of these items are between 10-30% greater than any others in the entire analysis. Distrust based on this rubric reflects the view that internal party politics are a nasty business. Party trust from this rubric and connotes a "warts-and-all" embrace of political parties. In both cases this rubric is marked by criteria regarding parties' ability to make sound public policy and, in Buenos Aires, electoral strategies. Other weighty items include responsiveness to citizens interests in Santiago and most integrity items in Buenos Aires. By counting the number of inconsistent items, which are not reported, Rubric 3 is the least consistent of all the rubrics.

Again, the focus groups bear out the parameters of this rubric in citizens' own words. As a 40 year-old woman from working-class Vicente López in Gran Buenos Aires witnesses, personal experiences can destroy faith in the inner-workings of political parties.

Corruption – yes! You know why I say this? Because I never got into politics because it doesn't interest me, because it's a filthy mess (*porquería*). But I just met a person from the San Martín Party and she came by to talk because she knew I had no job. Finally she says, 'if you want, I will teach you how to steal. Because politics is like that,' she says. 'You don't have to be honest or anything,' she says. 'If not, you're never going to have anything. Have you worked all your life?' she asked. Yes it's true I worked all my life because they only gave me the grocery bonus for three months, and never again. And she says, 'and what do you have?' I have nothing. I don't have a house because this one was lent to me, I'm tired of asking everyone for things ... she told me '[politics] is just that easy.'

One man (age 36, male, Central Santiago) provides an insider's view of the Socialist

Party,

Just because the party has a more fluid relationship with society it doesn't mean that it's solved its 'elite problem.' The party is still an elitist, monarchical party, you get it? [A party] of nobles, say, where this guy was exiled so he and his nephew get jobs, and the guy finds all that he needs and finds it fast – right now – he's got all the connections! ...I wish they would grant the possibility of meritocracy, that is, this isn't meritocracy but 'connectionocracy' (*pitutocracia*)!

A fellow Socialist male (age 26, Providencia) added, “In general, the political parties are capable of solving the country's biggest problems. The issue is how they go about it; and the political calculus and the *realpolitik* makes them sincerely cruel, hardened, let's say, and they forget their principles.” These snapshots elucidate how some citizens prioritize perceptions of how parties function internally when forming their judgements of party trustworthiness.

### 3.2.3 Correlates of Rubric-Based Party Trust & Distrust

How many subjects actively trust or distrust parties? Not all, to be sure. Some might simply be “skeptical” (Cook and Gronke, 2005) of parties, or lack fully formed opinions about them. Others may actively trust or distrust parties according to rubrics orthogonal to the shared rubrics identified here. Factor loadings serve to distinguish active trusters and active distrusters from other subjects. A significant positive factor loading indicates a strong resemblance between the subject's implicit rubric of party trustworthiness (i.e. their Q-sort) and the shared rubric (i.e. the latent factor). Conversely, a significant negative factor loading suggests that the subject's Q-sort closely resembles a “mirror image” of the shared rubric (Conover and Feldman, 1986, 103).

Figure 2 displays the distribution of factor loadings by rubric and sample. I identify “active distrusters” as those with factor loadings  $\geq 0.4$  and “active trusters” as




Figure 3.2: Distribution of Factor Loadings by Party Trustworthiness Rubric



those with factor loadings  $\leq -0.4$ . All the “others” have insignificant loadings. We can consider 16% of the Santiago participants active trusters according to the competence-integrity rubric, i.e. they apply Rubric 1 and judge parties as worthy of their trust. Only 7% of the Buenos Aires sample comes to the same conclusion. In fact, more than one in three Bonaerenses who employ the competence-integrity rubric qualify as active distrusters, compared to about one in four Santiaguinos. Roughly twice as many subjects in the Buenos Aires sample actively distrust parties based on Rubric 2: Responsiveness and Integrity. And more Bonaerenses have active responsiveness-integrity trust, though still a low percentage (3.7%). While few subjects derive active trust or active distrust from the Rubric 3 (integrity-competence), their ranks are the most equally distributed, separated by just 6.2 and 3.6 percentage points for the Santiago and Buenos Aires analyses, respectively.

Table 3.4: Tests of Association: Rubrics of Party Trustworthiness, Santiago

	Rubric 1: Competence & Integrity	Rubric 2: Responsiveness & Integrity	Rubric 3: Integrity & Competence
<b>Socioeconomic Status</b>	Pearson's <i>r</i>		
Education	0.08	0.03	-0.13
Income	-0.30*	-0.18	-0.30*
Age	-0.18	-0.06	0.02
<b>Gender</b>	T-Test		
Women (n = 48)	0.141	0.204	0.138
Men (n = 33)	0.032	0.156	-0.037
<i>t</i>	-1.17	-0.80	-2.36**
<b>Socialization</b>	ANOVA		
Post-Frei (n = 7)	0.134	0.213	0.111
Transition (n = 22)	0.198	0.111	0.024
Dictatorship (n = 26)	0.051	0.198	0.099
Pre-Coup (n = 22)	0.031	0.326	0.068
<i>F</i>	0.76	1.49	0.19
<b>Party Identification</b>	ANOVA		
<i>Alianza por Chile</i>			
UDI (n = 4)	-0.110	0.191	0.337
RN (n = 5)	0.107	0.112	-0.086
<i>Concertación</i>			
PDC (n = 9)	0.017	0.100	0.087
PPD (n = 7)	-0.267	0.142	-0.359
PS (n = 11)	0.053	0.188	0.135
<i>Extra-Parliamentary Left</i>			
JP (n = 11)	0.235	0.146	0.154
<i>F</i>	1.32	0.14	3.36*

Note: Data from self-administered questionnaire prior to Q-sort.

N = 81. \*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$

Why do citizens who grade parties with similar rubrics and come to such diverging conclusions about party trustworthiness? A firm answer is beyond the scope of this research design, but tests of association between participants' Q-sort factor loadings and responses to a pre-Q-sort questionnaire (see Tables 3.4 and 3.5) are suggestive. Two of the three forms of distrust in parties are significantly related to low income for the Santiaguinos. While we see no relationship between income and party trust in the Buenos Aires sample, party distrust based on Responsiveness-Integrity (Rubric 2) is high among the educated. Women in the Santiago analysis derive distrust in parties from the Integrity-Competence (Rubric 3). Their counterparts in Buenos Aires, however, trust parties more than men when judging parties on Competence-Integrity (Rubric 1) and Responsiveness-Integrity (Rubric 2). Political socialization may also influence citizens' beliefs about parties.<sup>10</sup> Among the youngest cohorts Responsiveness-Integrity (Rubric 2) distrust is highest in both samples. Yet participants from Santiago socialized ahead of the 1973 *coup d'etat* hold even higher levels of Responsiveness-Integrity distrust than youth cohorts, a finding in line with research on eroding party-base linkages in the post-authoritarian era (Posner, 1999). It does not appear that party loyalties are driving all our results. Yet, in line with previous research in Latin America (Davis, Camp and Coleman, 2004), opposition partisans most ideological distant (in Chile, UDI, in Argentina *Propuesta Republicana*) from the executive's party (in Chile, PS, in Argentina *Partido Justicialista*, *FPV*) seem more receptive to allegations of political corruption, i.e. a lack of integrity (Rubric 3). To be sure, these first-cut analyses have very few degrees of freedom. Different brands of party trust and distrust may covary with a range of characteristics and political attitudes, but more research would increase our confidence.

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<sup>10</sup>These are based on respondents' eighteenth birthday. For Chile, I follow Carlin's (2006) socialization cohorts. For Argentina, I create cohorts guided by Rock's (1987) political history.

Table 3.5: Tests of Association: Rubrics of Party Trustworthiness, Buenos Aires

	Rubric 1: Competence & Integrity	Rubric 2: Responsiveness & Integrity	Rubric 3: Integrity & Competence
<b>Socioeconomic Status</b>	Pearson's <i>r</i>		
Education	0.12	0.19†	-0.16
Income	-0.08	0.16	-0.06
Age	-0.18	-0.24*	-0.14
<b>Gender</b>	T-Test		
Women (n = 50)	0.150	0.217	0.026
Men (n = 32)	0.290	0.344	0.055
<i>t</i>	1.62†	1.69*	0.34
<b>Socialization</b>	ANOVA		
Post-Menem (n = 23)	0.299	0.347	0.104
Transition (n = 36)	0.224	0.284	0.018
Proceso (n = 3)	0.106	0.078	0.200
Rev.Lib. → Isabelita (n = 18)	0.103	0.218	0.009
Perón (n = 2)	-0.149	-0.272	-0.382
<i>F</i>	1.16	2.08†	0.99
<b>Party Identification</b>	ANOVA		
<i>Propuesta Republicana</i>			
RECREAR, CPC (n = 5)	0.608	0.436	0.250
<i>Unión Cívica Radical</i>			
UCR (n = 1)	-0.325	-0.220	-0.699
<i>Partido Justicialista</i>			
PJ, FPV (n = 5)	0.306	0.198	0.028
<i>Center-Left</i>			
ARI, PSD (n = 5)	0.156	0.240	-0.162
<i>Far Left</i>			
PS, PO, PH, MAS, MST (n = 8)	0.319	0.084	-0.092
<i>F</i>	1.31	1.24	2.35†

Note: Data from self-administered questionnaire prior to Q-sort.

N = 82. \*\*\* p < .001, \*\* p < .01, \* p < .05, †p < .10

## Party Trust, Trustworthiness & Political Action

This study is guided by assumption that the democratic consequences of low party trust in Latin America depend on our conceptualizations of trust and distrust, citizens' evaluations of party trustworthiness, and how party trust and distrust influence political behavior. I start by offering a theoretically-grounded conceptualizations of party trust/distrust and party trustworthiness. Then I rely on Q-sorts to reveal shared rubrics of party trustworthiness and confirm that the GSS question distorts active distrust. Now I demonstrate the utility of a tripartite conceptualization of party trust for understanding elite-challenging political action in Latin America, behavior that shores up accountability and democratic quality.

Political distrust may enrich or endanger the prospects for democracy depending on whether it translates into political participation and how this citizen behavior is channelled into institutional change (Norris, 1999*a*). Thus, distrusting or “critical” citizens may be “less a threat to, than a force for, reform and improvement of democratic processes and structures as the third wave continues to flow” (Klingemann, 1999, 32). Research across new democracies (Catterberg, 2003) and both new and established democracies (Norris, 1999*a*) supports the link between low political trust and elite-challenging political action. Yet, as I have shown, the GSS-style questions these studies rely on obscure the evaluations and judgements that drive such participation and misrepresent the depth of active distrust in Latin America. To test the claim that distrust in representative institutions leads to political action in Latin American we must examine how citizens judge political parties trustworthiness in terms of integrity, competence, and responsiveness.

To form my hypotheses, I work backwards from arguments connecting democratic quality and consolidation to political trust and participation. Hagopian argues that preserving and deepening democracy requires vibrant parties and citizens who can hold

them accountable through well-functioning institutions rather than supporting antisystem leaders: “[w]hether or not governments perform well, citizens must *perceive* that their elected leaders are governing in a clean, transparent, and effective way, and above all, that their voices are being heard . . . [W]here parties are responsive and accountable to the preferences of citizens that can associate in civil and political society, democracy is somewhat inoculated from setbacks.” (2005, 321). Hagopian (2005, 337) claims that a “dangerous side effect” associated with a loss of confidence in representative institutions is it reduces political mobilization and the levels of demands citizens make on government. Filtered through my tripartite conceptualization of party trust, we might expect the most participatory citizens to be party trusters who deem parties to have integrity, competence, and responsiveness. But to understand the role of integrity we must contextualize trust and distrust within a larger institutional context. As Cleary and Stokes’s Cleary and Stokes (2006) argue compellingly, in much of Latin America third-party mechanisms of accountability do not exist or function properly. Without the institutional means to enforce the trust relationship, trust rooted in the belief that personal qualities like integrity and honesty will induce political actors to act in citizens’ interests is naïve. Moreover, it is associated with clientelism and personalistic politics, not accountability-extracting participation, and, thus, poor democratic quality.

Therefore, my hypotheses vary across the dimensions of party trustworthiness. The first hypothesis, derived from Cleary and Stokes (2006) is that citizens who judge political parties as lacking in integrity are more likely to participate in elite-challenging activities than citizens who believe parties have integrity. The next two hypotheses, based on Hagopian (2005), are that citizens who judge parties as competent and responsive are more likely to participate in elite-challenging activities than citizens who judge parties as incompetent and unresponsive. In summary, the most active participants in elite-challenging political actions are those who are not naïve enough to think

parties will take their interests to heart in the absence of institutional enforcement mechanisms, but who believe parties will at least listen to their demands and have the capacity to meet them.

### **3.2.4 Data & Methods**

I operationalize the three dimensions of party trustworthiness and compare their ability to predict elite-challenging political actions in Latin America to the omnibus GSS party trust measure. This should illuminate how party trust and distrust affect political participation and, thereby, democratic quality. Elections offer one way to hold parties accountable, but in Latin America their efficacy and equality are blurred by clientelism and falling participation. Thus, elite-challenging political actions – such as petitioning, boycotting, attending lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings or factories – are vital to expressing citizen demands for accountability and preferences for institutional reforms that can deepen democracy (Norris, 1999*a*).

To operationalize and test of my tripartite conceptualization of party trust/distrust in Latin America, I employ the 2004 LB survey data set. Using two survey questions, I create three independent variables that tap the party trustworthiness dimensions described above. Admittedly, these measures are imperfect, for they do not permit a full replication of citizens' party trustworthiness rubrics. But they act as decent proxies for citizen assessments of party trustworthiness.

The first measure taps (P33) party integrity: “Which of the following factors, if any, are the most important in determining how much trust you have in public institutions? Name up to three. (h) If they keep their promises.” Although this question does not mention political parties explicitly, the question regarding political parties that I use to measure party competence and party responsiveness (P31) falls two questions prior. And arguably, political parties give their word, e.g. campaign platforms and slogans,

pledges by their legislators and executives, and public commitments tendered by party presidents, at least as often and as publicly as any other institution. To better ensure that we tap perceptions of political parties, the models include a common trust in formal regime institutions (congress, the presidency, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary) scale for control.

I gauge perceived party competence and responsiveness by combining responses to the following question (P31): “Political parties fulfill a series of functions in a democracy. Thinking of these or of the parties you have voted for in the last elections, which of the following things have these parties done in (country)? (a) propose the best solutions to problems, (b) interpret what the people want, (c) defend my interests, (d) recruit the best candidates for elections, (e) listen to what I need to say (f), none of these.” Several of these responses figure prominently in the trustworthiness rubrics revealed in the Q analysis. I sum positive responses to (a) and (d) into a party competence scale (range 0-2, mean Argentina = 0.54, mean Chile = 0.41, mean Latin America = 0.59). For party responsiveness, I sum positive responses to (b), (c), and (e) (range 0-3, mean Argentina = 0.32, mean Chile = 0.51, mean Latin America = 0.51).

The dependent variable is the political action scale (Barnes, Kaase and et al., 1979) fashioned by summing respondents’ positive responses to having ever “signed a petition”, “taken part in a public demonstration”, “stopped buying a particular product for ethical, environmental or political reasons”, and “participated in illegal protests” into a five-point scale (0-4). This measure is the focus of a many studies of political culture, citizen participation, and the quality and stability of democracy (Norris, 1999*a*; Catterberg, 2003; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).

Following previous models (Norris, 1999*a*; Catterberg, 2003), the models below control for cultural, psychological, and resource-oriented predictors of political participation. Key cultural controls I controls include what Inglehart and Welzel (2005) label



“overt” and “intrinsic” support for democracy. The overt measure is Churchillian democratic support, and asks respondents their agreement with following statement: “Democracy may have problems, but it is still the best form of government”; responses range from totally disagree (0) to fully agree (3). To tap intrinsic support for democracy, I use four measures that closely match Inglehart and Welzel’s (2005) proxies: life satisfaction, interpersonal trust, preferences for living in a society free society over an orderly one, and support for public discussion of political matters. Finally, I include a series of socioeconomic and psychological controls linked to the resource theory of political participation (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995): education, employment status, age, gender, marital status, political interest, and self-identification with the Left-Right ideological spectrum.

Like all measures, these measures have drawbacks and advantages. Nonetheless, the wide coverage of the LB surveys allows a general, if rough, test of the utility of my three-dimensional conceptualization of party trust for understanding elite-challenging activism. Since the political action scale is an ordinal dependent variable, I estimate ordered logistic regressions. Table 3.6 presents two sets of models of political action in Chile, Argentina, and the rest of Latin America.<sup>11</sup> The first set includes a GSS-style party trust measure ranging from “no” trust in parties (0) to “a lot” (3) of trust in parties. The second set substitutes my proposed three dimensions of party trustworthiness. To maximize observations for the Argentina and Chile models, missing values are imputed<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

<sup>12</sup>The imputation model creates 5 multiple imputed datasets using the chained equations techniques (Royston, 2005). Equations contain each of the measures in regression analyses (see below), though ideology was broken into Left, Right, Center, and No Identification. Assuming the data are missing at random (MAR), which should hold here (King et al., 2001), missing data for each variable is imputed with with the appropriate regression model (i.e. OLS for interval variables, logit for binary variables, multinomial logit for categorical variables, and ordered logit for ordinal variables). Since the normality

### 3.2.5 Results

The results largely support my claims that understanding the linkages between trust in representative institutions, political participation, and democratic quality hinges on a more fine-grained conceptualization of party trust and distrust. As predicted, based on previous literature, the performance of the three dimensions of party trustworthiness is not uniform. The cases of Argentina and Chile show that not all of these dimensions function consistently. In Argentina, the integrity and responsiveness hypotheses cannot be rejected, but political action is independent from one's perception of party competence. In Chile, while perceived party competence and responsiveness drive political action, assessments of party integrity are not consistently related. So while the Q-sorts showed that integrity and competence contribute to party trust and distrust in Chile and Argentina, their influence on political action is quite different in these cases. For the rest of region, on average, citizens who view parties as lacking in integrity otherwise competence and responsive the most likely to engage in elite-challenging political action. A common thread across the analyses is that citizens who feel parties pay attention to their demands participate more routinely.

The second set of models indicates that, overall, the GSS party trust measure is a poor predictor of political action in models with the exact same specifications. Even after adjusting for the extra parameters, the models with three dimensions of party trustworthiness indicators fit the data slightly better than those with the GSS party trust measure, according to a McFadden's pseudo- $R^2$  (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). Thus, the three dimensions of party trustworthiness outperform the GSS party trust measure for predicting elite-challenging political action. These findings are consistent

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assumption on the posterior distribution of non-continuous regression coefficients may not be valid, I rely on bootstrapping techniques that relax the normality assumption and produce robust estimates for non-continuous variables (Li, Raghunathan and Rubin, 1991).

Table 3.6: Party Trust, Party Trustworthiness and Political Action, 2004

	<i>Argentina</i>		<i>Chile</i>		<i>Rest of Latin America</i>	
	$\beta$ (s.e.)	$\beta$ (s.e.)	$\beta$ (s.e.)	$\beta$ (s.e.)	$\beta$ (s.e.)	$\beta$ (s.e.)†
Trust in Parties (GSS)	-0.84 (.095)		.020 (.098)		.037 (.041)	
Trustworthy: Integrity		-.429* (.261)		.366 (.311)		-.369** (.131)
Trustworthy: Competence		.116 (.105)		.367*** (.095)		.119* (.051)
Trustworthy: Responsiveness		.254** (.100)		.196** (.080)		.196*** (.042)
Trust in Regime Institutions	.013 (.026)	-.013 (.024)	-.052 (.032)	-.065** (.028)	.007 (.010)	.005 (.012)
Support for Democracy	.193* (.095)	.227** (.095)	.090 (.097)	.070 (.098)	.064 (.086)	.062 (.084)
Freedom > Order	.185 (.126)	.173 (.126)	-.135 (.130)	-.165 (.131)	.070 (.084)	.079 (.083)
Life Satisfaction	-.030 (.075)	-.051 (.076)	-.081 (.083)	-.064 (.084)	-.033 (.035)	-.041 (.036)
Public Discussion Good	.149 (.138)	.152 (.139)	.345* (.150)	.374** (.151)	-.014 (.084)	-.015 (.084)
Interpersonal Trust	.440** (.156)	.461** (.156)	.484*** (.153)	.482*** (.154)	.266* (.122)	.254* (.118)
Political Interest	.345*** (.065)	.318*** (.064)	.408*** (.077)	.364*** (.078)	.249*** (.029)	.240*** (.030)
Ideological Identification	.304* (.185)	.283 (.185)	.535*** (.164)	.414** (.166)	.216* (.130)	.163 (.128)
Education	.123*** (.021)	.125*** (.021)	.102*** (.021)	.101*** (.021)	.075*** (.010)	.077*** (.009)
Employed	.462*** (.132)	.439*** (.131)	-.056 (.132)	-.056 (.132)	.216*** (.053)	.215*** (.052)
Woman	.133 (.128)	.108 (.128)	-.048 (.130)	-.046 (.131)	-.195*** (.053)	-.195*** (.057)
Age	.011** (.004)	.011** (.004)	.003 (.004)	.001 (.004)	.010*** (.001)	.010*** (.001)
Married	.210* (.126)	.232* (.127)	.030 (.128)	.034 (.128)	-.034 (.050)	-.036 (.047)
Cutpoint 1	3.61*** (.429)	3.63*** (.434)	2.53*** (.419)	2.55*** (.424)	2.43*** (.563)	2.53*** (.560)
Cutpoint 2	5.36*** (.448)	5.39*** (.453)	3.94*** (.429)	4.00*** (.434)	3.82*** (.546)	3.93*** (.541)
Cutpoint 3	6.58*** (.466)	6.63*** (.471)	5.23*** (.444)	5.23*** (.450)	4.99*** (.557)	5.10*** (.561)
Cutpoint 4	8.04*** (.515)	8.09*** (.520)	6.54*** (.489)	6.60*** (.494)	6.52*** (.526)	6.63*** (.530)
Log-likelihood	-1162.26	-1156.88	-1186.68	-1173.05	-11945.06	-11935.72
Adj. Pseudo- $R^2_{McF}$	.054	.056	.044	.054	.028	0.032
N	1200	1200	1200	1200	12300	12345

Note: Surveys are population-weighted.

†Robust, cluster-corrected standard errors.

\*\*\* p < .001, \*\* p < .01, \* p < .05 (one-tailed test)

with the main contentions of this study.

### 3.3 Conclusion

This study conceptualizes, measures, and tests the implications of political party trust, distrust, and trustworthiness. My theoretical conceptualization grounds party trust and distrust in perceived trustworthiness. Locating the domain of trust as political representation implies three logical dimensions of party trustworthiness: integrity, competence, and responsiveness. Q-sorts analyses, supported by focus groups, reveal three latent rubrics of party trustworthiness – integrity and competence, responsiveness and integrity, and political process – among 81 subjects from Santiago, Chile and 82 subjects from Buenos Aires, Argentina. The rubrics highlight distinct priorities and criteria upon which citizens base their trust and distrust in parties. Models political action show that the three party trustworthiness dimensions outperform the GSS measure of party trust. The GSS measure performs poorly because it obscures the dimensionality of trust and ignores active distrust. Consequently, a tripartite conceptualization is not only a conceptual improvement over the GSS measure, but also a better way to gauge the influence of citizen evaluations of political parties on the process of democratization in Latin America.

The study answers the recent scholarly call to specify the domain of trust (Cleary and Stokes, 2006; Levi and Stoker, 2000). I name political representation as the domain of trust which suggests, in a somewhat functionalist manner, three dimensions of trustworthiness. One could imagine a different domain of trust in parties, say for the delivery of patronage and particularist benefits, as Stokes (2005) does implicitly. As Levi and Stoker (2000) urge, specifying the domain could lend theoretical and empirical clarity to measures of trust in other institutions and actors, e.g. trust in the president in the domain of Commander in Chief, or the executive branch in the domain of policy

and legislation implementation.

Conceiving of trust/distrust in parties in terms of party trustworthiness opens a wide range of empirical questions. As independent variables, scholars may further explore the behavioral and attitudinal consequences of citizen perceptions of party trustworthiness. Particularly, it can provide a clearer profile of Latin America's "critical citizens" and how their patterns of political behavior influence democracy in the region. As dependent variables, party trustworthiness may signal the cultural conditions of party-system evolution and/or collapse in Latin America. In both instances, over-time and cross-national studies may be particularly rewarding.

Q-sorts analyses helped illuminate the previously unknown rubrics of party trustworthiness i.e. rationales for party trust and distrust. Considering the vast dissimilarities between Chile and Argentina vis-à-vis the party system, historical modes of representation, and party/coalition survival, just to name a few arenas, the results of the Q analysis are surprisingly similar. Therefore, the three rubrics of party trustworthiness may in fact generalize beyond these two capitals, and this could be a fruitful trajectory for future investigation.

Regression analyses suggest the effects of perceived party trustworthiness on political action vary across the dimensions and cross-nationally. My survey-based operationalization of three-dimensional party trustworthiness is crude. Nevertheless it outperforms the widely-cited GSS-style measure of trust in political parties when it comes to understanding elite-challenging political action. If future surveys include more items tapping party trustworthiness, a hierarchical cluster analysis could give us a better sense of (1) how well the rubrics of trustworthiness found in the Q-analysis hold in the general population(s), (2) whether other rubrics also exist, and (3) how pervasive these rubrics are throughout the country/region. Therefore, the incorporation of more indicators of the dimensions of political party trustworthiness into public opinion surveys

would facilitate more explicit investigations of the consequences of trust in parties for political accountability and institutional reform.

In conclusion, this study offers a conceptualization of trust and distrust in parties that maps onto citizen criteria for trusting parties as expressed in Q-sorts and surveys. Beyond its conceptual contributions, casting party trust and distrust as perceived party trustworthiness helps understand why citizens take political action. Democratic theory suggests political institutions would could eventually adapt to citizen demands, though this remains an empirical question. Overall, this research advances our understanding of the roles of party trust and distrust in democracy's unclear trajectory in Latin America and, perhaps, elsewhere.

## Chapter 4

# Sorting Out Democratic Support in Chile and Argentina: An Anthro-pological-Behavioral Approach

If democracy depends on a democratic citizenry (Lipset 1959, 1981; Almond & Verba 1963, 1980; Easton 1965, 1975; Muller & Seligson:1994, Linz & Stepan 1996, Diamond 1999, Norris 1999*b*, Seligson 2001, Inglehart & Welzel 2005), the modest public support for democracy, non-trivial levels of support for authoritarianism, and broad support for populist governance in new Latin American democracies (Payne, Zovatto and Díaz, 2007; Seligson, 2007; UNDP, 2004; Inglehart et al., 2004) would appear ominous. But scholars have not jumped to conclusions. One reason is that citizens' conceptions of democracy vary so widely (Carrión, forthcoming; Baviskar and Malone, 2004; Moreno, 2001) that responses to survey items containing the word "democracy" defy easy interpretation. Another is that scholars disagree on how to interpret citizens who claim to prefer democracy but also hold values in conflict with democratic principles (UNDP,

2004). Is this dissonance merely an expression of social desirability (Inglehart, 2003), or part of a coherent mixed belief system (Schedler and Sarsfield, 2007)? Lastly, aggregate levels of democratic support do not correlate with indicators of democratic stability and quality in Latin America (Hagopian, 2005). Crafting valid measures of democratic support, then, is central to a more comprehensive understanding of its implications for democracy.

Where shall we start? Scholars have presented several ways to make survey-based measures of democratic support more meaningful (Carrión, forthcoming; Schedler and Sarsfield, 2007; Seligson, 2005; Inglehart, 2003).<sup>1</sup> But surveys remain the default method. Given the high costs of surveys, the lack of consensus on “best practice”, and access to non-survey techniques, this is a surprising default position. It may reflect a widening gap between “anthropological” and “behavioral” approaches to political culture (Coppedge, N.d.). I argue that bridging this gap could ultimately improve survey measures of democratic support.

Because these two schools of thought hold distinct conceptions of political culture, they rely on distinct methods of inference. As Coppedge explains, the anthropological approach sees political culture as a rather static set of routinized and unquestioned attitudes and behaviors. Hence understanding political culture implies *verstehen*, or an inductive interpretation based on a deep, intimate knowledge of the target culture. For example, Wiarda (2004) claims Latin American culture is permeated by the hierarchical organization and teachings of the Catholic Church and thus inimical to democracy. Critics object that this approach cannot explain change (see Eckstein 1988); they reject the presumption of cultural homogeneity that ignores sub-groups (Knight, 2001); and they resist placing faith in “experts” whose results are difficult to replicate (Coppedge,

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<sup>1</sup>See also papers presented at *Candidate Indicators for the UNDP Democracy Support Index (DSI)*, Center for the Americas at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, May 5-6, 2006, <http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/LAPOPUNDPWorkshop>.



N.d.).

By contrast, the behavioral approach views culture as the aggregation of individual attitudes and (often) behaviors whose existence, stability, coherence, and distribution are not assumed but rather tested objectively, typically via surveys or experiments. For example, Almond and Verba (1963) draw inferences about political culture from survey items designed to tap pre-defined orientations to pre-defined political objects. They use this data to create typologies of culture. Some scholars are dubious: “Almond and Verba may have misinterpreted the beliefs people hold by not accurately categorizing their beliefs or by missing other orientations altogether” (Theiss-Morse, 1993, 357). Indeed the behavioral approach forces a tradeoff between objectivity and precision. In surveys and experiments “the concreteness of the response is bypassed in favor of the ‘objective’ meaning of the scale. The individual’s independent point of view, in effect, is considered to be dependent on the prior meaning of the scale” (Brown, 1980, 4). In the context of this study, a high score on a democratic support item or index would qualify the respondent as supportive of democracy, “in the same sense, presumably, that he has a temperature or a headache” (Brown, 1980, 2).

Is there any feasible way to marry the anthropological approach’s rich, holistic understanding of culture with the behavioral approach’s more reliable measurement techniques to produce a more valid survey-based measure of democratic support? I believe so. My central claim is that support for or rejection of “democracy” must be understood within a larger profile of orientations to democracy and its core components. After positing a working conceptualization of a “democrat,” I propose to measure “multidimensional profiles of democratic support” that incorporate three types of orientations to democracy and three distinct objects of support. Enlisting the help of over 130 participants in Santiago, Chile and 120 participants in Buenos Aires, Argentina, I demonstrate how Q-sort methodology can incorporate data from interviews, focus

groups, and surveys into seven profiles of democratic support. My support profiles analysis informs survey-based measures of democratic support on two scores. First, it tells us which orientations to democracy and democratic freedoms cohere into systematic support profiles and the relative weight of these orientations. Second, it indicates survey items that best tap orientations that distinguish one support profile from another as well as orientations held in consensus by all profiles. By taking seriously Juan Linz's remark, as paraphrased by Coppedge, that "[a] well-designed survey implements *verstehen*: it anticipates all the likely answers and offers respondents choices that they can agree with whole-heartedly" (N.d., 5), democratic support profiles can guide future survey measures of democratic support and, ultimately, help understand its influence on democracy.

## 4.1 Profiles of Democratic Support

Let me begin by defining some key terms and connecting them to my measurement approach and theoretical framework. By democracy I mean a political system with procedures in place to foster open contestation, public participation, and government responsiveness (Dahl, 1971, 1-9). A multidimensional support profile is a set of orientations to three classes of objects implied by procedural democracy. Object in the first class pertain to the regime itself - democracy and its authoritarian alternatives. Objects in the next two classes of objects refer to the essential political rights and procedures (voting, running for office, free and fair elections) and the civil liberties (expression, association, alternative sources of information) that undergird procedural democracy. Thus profiles of support for democracy consist of general orientations and inclinations to democracy as a regime and the core principles, norms, and procedures that embody the democratic procedural minimum. Two people with the same democratic support profile hold very similar orientations to democracy.




Figure 4.1: Dimensions of Support for Democracy

Which orientations matter? A profile of support for democracy includes orientations to the objects mentioned above that fall along three continua (see Figure 4.1): (1) liberal  $\leftrightarrow$  illiberal, (2) unconditional  $\leftrightarrow$  conditional, and (3) committed  $\leftrightarrow$  uncommitted. Whereas a liberal orientation suggests a firm preference for democracy or its concomitant rights and liberties, illiberal orientations reject them outright. Indelible or unconditional orientations contrast with support for procedural democracy only under certain conditions. Committed orientations to a democratic regime and its principles are the antitheses of indifferent or uncommitted stances on them. Thus, orientations to any of the objects associated with procedural democracy that can be located in the three-dimensional space depicted in Figure 4.1 pertain to a profile of democratic support; orientations outside this space are not considered part of the profile of democratic support.

As an illustration, recall Linz's (1978) argument that on the eve of democratic breakdown elites and citizens are either loyal, semi-loyal, or disloyal to the regime. View through the lens of my conceptualization, the object of support in question is the democratic regime. Loyalists hold *liberal* (not *illiberal*) orientations to democratic governance. Insofar as they resist the conditions that brought the regime to the brink

of collapse, loyalists' orientations prove *unconditional*. The position of the disloyalists is clearly *conditional*. Finally, the loyalists are *committed* to the democratic regime though their semi-loyalist counterparts are not, which, as Linz argues, makes semi-loyalists susceptible to disloyalists bent on altering the *status quo*. Profiles of support for democracy do not stop with the "regime" object. Rather they encompass liberal/illiberal, unconditional/conditional, and committed/uncommitted orientations to the full range of objects associated with procedural democracy.

This conceptualization of profiles of democrat support implies that an ideal-type "democrat" is a citizen who exhibits liberal, unconditional, and committed orientations not only to democracy in the abstract, but also to its essential political rights and procedures and civil liberties. An ideal-type "non-democrat" living in a non-authoritarian context espouses illiberal, conditional, and uncommitted orientations to democracy and its concomitant rights and freedoms. Ambivalent support profiles feature a mix of orientations to democratic governance and political and civil freedoms. Multidimensional support profiles grounded *a priori* in a procedural definition of democracy not only sharpen our definitions of a "democrat," "non-democrat," and an "ambivalent". They also neutralize thorny validity and conceptual issues facing extant measures of support for democracy that employ the word democracy, the so-called "d-word".<sup>2</sup>

The Achilles heel of "d-word" survey questions is that citizens define democracy in their own contested, vacuous, or pejorative way. An innovative qualitative research design can measure how democracy is performing relative to citizens' conceptions of democracy and distinguish patterns of democratic legitimization (Powers, 2001). Replicating this rich understanding via surveys is onerous. Analysts ask open-ended survey

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<sup>2</sup>See Carrión (forthcoming), Schedler and Sarsfield (2007), (UNDP 2004), and papers presented at *Candidate Indicators for the UNDP Democracy Support Index (DSI)*, Center for the Americas at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, May 5-6, 2006 (<http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/LAPOPUNDPWorkshop>).

questions about what democracy means. Convergence on the definitions increases our confidence to the comparability of “d-word” questions, but coming to this conclusion requires boiling the responses down to a few core categories. Close-ended questions economize this task by offering respondents a menu of definitions. However, the ease of choosing from a menu of close-ended response may artificially shrink the ranks of respondents with vacuous support for democracy, i.e. claiming to prefer democracy without being able to characterize or conceive of democracy in concrete terms. Such “non-attitudes” (Converse, 1964) are common where few citizens are politically socialized under democracy (Mishler and Rose, 2001; Bratton, 2002; Miller, Hesli and Reisinger, 1997). Thus, Coppedge urges scholars to “define our concepts on our own terms and design questions that ask respondents about their support for *our* version of democracy” (N.d., 32).

Taking this cue, I begin with a liberal-rights definition of democracy. Then I define a “democrat” as a citizen with a support profile dominated by liberal, unconditional, and committed orientations to democratic governance, political rights and procedures, and civil liberties. Citizens whose support profiles do not meet this benchmark are not, by this definition, democrats. Grounding measures of democratic support in an *a priori* definition constitutes an advance over extant measures. Theoretically, however, one could select a republican, direct, social, deliberative, or communitarian definition of democracy. In this case, the objects, orientations, and ideal-type “democrat” would fit the preferred conceptualization. Such studies would look very different indeed and provide distinct sets of implications.

Others may prefer a maximal definition that includes aspects of the rule of law (broadly construed) or social rights. But a liberal-rights based definition is preferable because it clearly delineates the “procedures that make democracy possible” (Schmitter and Karl, 1991) from the institutions and inputs and outputs that vary across

democratic systems. Gauging support for social democracy would force us to consider not only citizens' preferences for redistribution and welfare but also the frequency and manner in which they voice these preferences. Turning these preferences into policy is predicated on citizens and elites deepening their participation in and pursuing social rights through formal democratic procedures (Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens, 1997; O'Donnell, 2001; UNDP, 2004). So without a baseline of democratic procedures, these preferences and actions have a diminished impact on policy outputs. Since the spread of baseline democratic procedures in Latin America has been uneven and non-linear (Hagopian, 2005; Altman and Pérez-Liñán, 2002; Diamond, 1999), procedural democracy is seen as a necessary but insufficient condition for more profound forms of democracy. Testing whether the consolidation of procedural democracy owes to mass democratic support requires, at a minimum, that measures at both levels tap the same construct.

Depending on how one defines the rule of law gauging support for it may shift the focus from democracy as a regime of governance to institutional and political variation across regimes. On one hand support for the rule of law, as it regards to procedural minimal conditions (e.g. free and fair elections), is implicit in my conceptualization of support for procedural democracy. On the other hand, denunciations of (or allowance for) official breaches of the rule of law that are unrelated to procedural minimal conditions (e.g. preferential treatment in the awarding of government contracts) are treated as separate. Ridding such actions from the polity are likely to require not only procedural minimal conditions but also a variety of institutions whose strength and functions tend to vary across democratic regimes. Therefore one would need to account for preferences for, beliefs about, and affect towards institutional arrangements. This would blur the theoretical distinction between regime principles and regime institutions as objects of political support (Norris, 1999*b*; Easton, 1975).

Another conceptual problem that bedevils “d-word” measures is that conflicting and contradictory orientations to democracy. As many as 30-60% of Latin Americans who say they prefer “democracy” would also endorse *coups d’etat* under various circumstances; would support the president acting above the law, restoring order by force, and controlling the media; and see parties and congress as dispensable (UNDP, 2004). To weed out these “questionnaire democrats” (Dalton, 1994) who “pay lip-service to democracy” (Inglehart, 2003), scholars either approximate democratic support with items tapping support for democratic rights and norms (e.g. Gibson, Duch and Tedin 1992), or de-link support for democratic governance from rights and norms (e.g. Inglehart 2003). But these tacks ignore theoretically relevant ambivalent support profiles that potentially lie below the surface. Some citizens might support a regime that has taken up the banner of “democracy” but regularly curbs free contestation and participation. Others simply embrace concrete rights and liberties more strongly than abstract notions of “democracy”. Carnaghan’s (2007) novel coding of in-depth interviews finds mixed democratic support in Russia, but this quantification obscures the exact orientations are in conflict with liberal democracy. By displaying orientations that include the “d-word” in an array of orientations to political and civil freedoms, multidimensional democratic support profiles clarify ambivalent orientations and detect coherent belief systems that other approaches might have dismissed as social desirability.

Extant measurement approaches often distort the theoretical linkage between conditional and unconditional orientations to democracy. Conditional orientations reflect instrumental rationality – support for democracy as a means to an end. Unconditional orientations demonstrate an intrinsic rationality – support for democracy for democracy’s sake (Bratton and Mattes, 2001; Sarsfield and Echegaray, 2006). Legitimacy theorists argue that instrumental (conditional) orientations to democracy become

intrinsic (unconditional) orientations to the extent the current democratic regime outperforms the preceding authoritarian regime in terms of economic and political stability (Lipset 1959, 1981; Easton 1965, 1975, Mishler & Rose 2001, Bratton & Mattes 2001). Qualitative research on new democracies suggests unconditional orientations to democratic norms, procedures, rights, civil liberties may develop piecemeal and at varying rates (Carnaghan, 2007; Powers, 2001). Measuring support for democracy requires an instrument that captures orientations to democratic governance and political and civil freedoms at distinct points along the unconditional-conditional spectrum. Multidimensional profiles of democratic support can be designed for this purpose.

In sum, the lack of convincing measures of democratic support hinders the construction of testable theories connecting mass support for democracy with democratic stability and quality. I propose multidimensional profiles of democratic support grounded in an *a priori* definition of a democrat based on liberal, unconditional, and committed orientations to procedural democracy (Dahl, 1971). Any citizen's support profile can be judged against this standard. Conceiving of democratic support as a multidimensional profile neutralizes some of the trickiest validity problems facing extant measures. Incorporating conditionality accounts for the distinct rationalities underpinning democratic support. Finally, this conceptualization underscores the need of a measurement technique that can reveal the number and nature of multidimensional democratic support profiles. The next section describes my multi-method research design that seeks to improve survey measures with a comparative anthropological-behavioral study of democratic support.

## 4.2 Data & Methods

Measuring democratic support via multidimensional profiles obliges us to employ measurement instruments and techniques equipped to handle data on multiple dimensions.



I detect profiles of democratic support in Chile and Argentina by combining inputs from surveys, focus groups, and interviews into a comparative Q-methods research design. Q methodology was developed by physicist-psychologist William Stephenson (1953) to understand subjective orientations, attitudes, and perspectives from the point of view of the subjects, as opposed to the researcher. The goal of Q methodology is to identify systematic perspectives shared by the subjects being observed (Brown, 1980; McKeown and Thomas, 1988). For instance, Drzyek and Holmes (2002) examine democratic discourses in post-Communist societies and link them to four distinct paths to democratization. Theiss-Morse (1993) connects distinct conceptions of citizenship to diverging modes of political participation in the United States. Zechmeister (2006) shows that different connotations of Left-Right ideological labels reflect political sophistication and respond to elite packaging in Argentina and Mexico. Thus Q-methods help merge the deductive-objective “behavioralism” and the inductive-interpretive rationale of the “anthropological” approach into measures of democratic support.

How does Q methodology work? It all starts with a Q-sort: a participant physically rank-orders a set of statements about a concept written on small cards along a spectrum, conventionally from agree to disagree. A finished Q-sort represents a free construction of the Q-sorter’s subjective perspective on a concept and is, thus, more akin to an in-depth interview than an opinion survey (Brown, 1980). Multiple Q-sorts are compiled and factor-analyzed to identify latent constructs upon which participants, not variables, load. This factor analysis is often called “inverted” because a Q-sorts data set is the inverse of a survey data set. For a survey data set that places items in columns and subjects in rows, confirmatory factor analysis shows which *items* tap a latent variable. Q data sets, however, place *subjects* in columns and *items* in rows. The factor analysis, now “inverted” and exploratory, determines which *subjects* tap a latent variable or “shared conception.” The letter *q* is meant to distinguish these “person correlations”

from Pearson's  $r$ -based "trait correlations."

How can Q-methods detect multidimensional democratic support profiles? Participants from Santiago and Buenos Aires express their support for democracy in Q-sorts. Inverted factor analyses of the Q-sorts for both cases reveal the latent profiles of democratic support shared among the participants. A participant adheres to a shared support profile to the extent that her own Q-sort resembles it, as measured by her Q-sort's factor loadings. Analyzing the factor scores associated with the sorted statements highlight the orientations that carry the most relative weight within a given profile, are unique to a given profile, and for which there is virtual consensus across all profiles. Considering the radically different experiences with democracy and authoritarianism in Chile and Argentina, any common findings may generalize beyond these cases. Ideally, the support profiles observed here will shed light on the nature of democratic belief systems and, ultimately, how best to measure them with survey methods. Now I discuss the Q-sample, the P-sample, and on-site procedures in detail.

#### **4.2.1 Structuring the Q-Sample**

The Q-sample is the central measurement instrument in Q methodology. It contains the statements that participants Q-sort. While survey samples draw from the population of respondents, Q-samples draw from the universe of perspectives on the concept under analysis. My Q-sample draws from a universe of survey sources, focus groups, and interviews. I sampled items purposefully in order to tap the objects and orientations of democratic support implied by my definition of a "democrat." The Santiago and Buenos Aires Q-samples share a common core of the 36 items adapted from questionnaires of the most widely cited surveys of political culture in Latin America, Chile, and

Argentina<sup>3</sup>. The sample includes three items tapping each of the twelve combinations of four orientations (liberal, illiberal, conditional, uncommitted) to three objects (democratic governance, political rights/procedures, civil liberties). For example, a “liberal” orientation to the object of “democratic governance”, item #1 reads, “Democracy is preferable to any other form of government.” Combining “contingent” views with “political rights,” #17 says, “For the common good, sometimes you have to suspend the right to run for public office for people with extremist ideas.” As an “illiberal” view on “civil liberties”, item #31 states: “in general the government should limit the right to form associations.” Blending “indifference” with “democratic governance”, #12 reads, “I wouldn’t care if the military came to power again.”

I adapt 12 additional items from focus groups and interviews conducted in Santiago (August-November 2005) and Buenos Aires (April-June 2006) to form Q-sub-samples. Many items are verbatim from the transcripts to preserve their authentic meanings. Some of the items are not ideally worded or ambiguous and thus, operationalizing them for survey research would require careful revamping. I formed focus groups from pre-existing groups for methodological and practical reasons. Pre-existing groups simulate a “‘natural’ setting for discussion” which generates better data (Bloor et al., 2001, 35), and reduce attrition by relying on a group’s regular schedule and venue. In addition, pre-existing groups ease purposive sampling which helps to maximize the similarity of opinion within the group, and maximize the diversity of opinion across groups. A one-shot random sample provides no such control, and since the total number of participants is relatively small ( $\approx 40$ ), obtaining a truly representative random sample is impossible. Moreover, randomly sampled focus-group participants may share so few beliefs that it

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<sup>3</sup>Questionnaires sampled include surveys by LAPOP/AmericasBarometer, the World Values Survey, Latinobarómetro; Chilean sources include Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Contemporánea (CERC), Instituto de Estudios Públicos of Universidad Andrés Bello; Argentine sources include Centro de Estudios de Opinión Pública (CEDOP-UBA), and various surveys cited in Catterberg (1991) and Mora y Araujo (1991).

obstructs meaningful discussion and interaction (Morgan, 1997, 35-45). Nevertheless, my focus groups participants varied considerably in terms of age, gender, socioeconomic status, ideology, and orientations to democracy.<sup>4</sup>

For Santiago, the first group was formed by upper-class middle-aged and elderly members of the arch-conservative ultra-nationalist *Corporación por la Defensa de la Soberanía*. The second was comprised of four middle-aged syndicalists, each of whom are ex-militants of the political parties in Salvador Allende's Popular Unity coalition, but who now identify with left-wing splinters of the Socialist Party (PS), Communist Party (PC), and United Popular Action Movement (MAPU). A third group incorporated five law students from the middle-class *Universidad Nacional Andrés Bello*.<sup>5</sup> The fourth group included six upper-class students from the schools of business and government at *Universidad Adolfo Ibañez*.

The first Buenos Aires focus group drew from young and middle-aged members of the *Corriente Clasista y Combativa* (CCC) *piquetero* movement from the western localities (González Catán, Laferrere) of La Matanza. A second group consisted of ten lower-class vocational school students from the districts of Vicente López and General San Martín, in Buenos Aires Province. The third focus group was formed by four elderly and working-class members of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo—*Línea Fundadora*, the more moderate of the two mothers groups. A final group included four members of *Argentina Solidaria*, a group of middle-class youth who run soup kitchens in several shantytowns that ring Buenos Aires.

Since focus groups may not be ideal for investigating sensitive topics (Morgan,

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<sup>4</sup>Special thanks to Andrés Madrid for video-taping the focus groups and to Raúl Olguín for transcribing the Santiago groups, and to María José Chacón for doing both of these tasks in Buenos Aires. In addition, I am indebted to many other individuals in both cities who aided my recruitment efforts.

<sup>5</sup>While the directors and leadership of this university have a conservative reputation, the participants exhibited a mix of ideological stances and were at varying phases of political socialization.

1997; Bloor et al., 2001), such as military coups and political and civil intolerance, I conducted a series of interviews with subjects with less-than-liberal orientations to democracy. The interviews probed the same topics of the focus groups, but followed a less strict question schedule than the focus groups. Notes were taken by hand in order to foster a more congenial atmosphere. The interviewees in Santiago were an upper-middle class business man from the wealthy borough of Las Condes; a man who is an ex-militant of the fascist anti-Marxist pro-coup group, *Frente Nacionalista Patria y Libertad*; a leader in Chile's conservative Catholic organization, *Acción Familia*; and a man who prior to the 1973 coup was a militant in the *Partido Nacional* and a journalist for the conservative U.S.-backed pro-coup newspaper, *El Mercurio*. In Buenos Aires I interviewed a leader of the working-class coalition, *Central de los Trabajadores* (CTA); a leader of pro-democracy group of ex-military officers, *Centro de Militares para la Democracia* (CEMIDA); a middle-class young woman from Villa Ballester employed in the state health care system; an upper-class 40 year-old woman from Recoleta; and a leader of a Falkland Islands War veterans group.

#### **4.2.2 Recruiting the P-Sample & On-Site Procedures**

After structuring the Q-sample, the next step was to recruit a new, non-overlapping sample of participants, a P-sample, to perform the Q-sorts. The Santiago P-sample had 73 participants and Buenos Aires P-Sample numbered 63. Participants were offered refreshments and, if necessary, transportation costs for their participation. Unlike survey research, Q-methods do not require a large number of participants, and they need not be randomly selected. Rather, in line with best practices for small-*n* methods (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994), Q prioritizes maximizing the diversity of perspectives by recruiting participants who are likely to view the concept distinctly. So while the

participants come from contrasting backgrounds,<sup>6</sup> we cannot speculate on how pervasive the support profiles are in the population or whether other profiles exist since they are not a representative sample.




Figure 4.2: Quasi-Normal Q-Sort Distribution, 48 Items

On site, participants first completed a short questionnaire about political support and demographics. Next they sorted the 48 statements (Q-sample items) typed on small laminated cards into three categories: agree, disagree, and no strong feeling either way (Brown, 1980). Subjects then ranked the statements by sorting them into eleven ordinal categories ranging from  $-5$  (“least agree”) to  $+5$  (“most agree”) conforming to Figure 4.2, where 0 is neutral.<sup>7</sup> Participants place the three items they most agree with under

<sup>6</sup>E.g., state employees, professionals, students, middle-class families, shanty-town dwellers, party militants, academics, blue-collar workers, mothers and women’s associations, neighborhood associations, NGOs, a nationalist group, and a homosexual rights movement. See Appendix for more information on the P-sample.

<sup>7</sup>The quasi-normal distribution of Figure 4.2 guarantees that the Q-sorts will not be unduly skewed

+5, the next four under +4, and so on. The research team recorded the Q-sort and analyzed the data off-site.

### 4.3 Analysis & Results

To guide the reader to a substantive interpretation of the results, I review the essential technical aspects of the analysis. Next I describe the clusters of orientations that make up the seven support profiles. Last I identify “defining” and “consensus” orientations which are key to improving survey-based measures.

At bottom, the results come from an exploratory factor analysis of Q-sorts and the researcher’s interpretation of extracted factors. I mitigate researcher bias by employing some statistical guidelines. I use varimax, not hand, rotation. The first criterion for factor extraction is a scree test. Then extracted factors must explain at least 5% of the rotated variance, 10% of subjects must load  $\geq |0.4|$ , and the solution must explain at least 50% of the total variance. Eigenvalues (which equal the sum of squared factor loadings for each factor) are a common extraction criterion in  $r$ -based factor analysis. But aggregating across numerous variates, as done here, may inflate them artificially (Brown, 1980, 40-43). Thus, the percentage of variance explained by a factor (which equals the eigenvalue  $\div n$  subjects sorting) helps ground the information eigenvalues provide.

The Santiago Q-sorts analysis ( $n = 73$ ) reveals four factors, or support profiles: democrat, delegative, instrumental, and non-democrat. The solution explains 54% of the total variance, breaking down by factor (and eigenvalue) as follows: Democrat = 31.5% (23.0), Delegative = 8.5% (6.2), Instrumental = 6.9% (5.0), Non-Democrat = 6.7% (4.9). Nine participants do not have a significant loading on any of the four

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or otherwise difficult to compare, but does not significantly alter the results (Brown, 1980).

factors. The Buenos Aires Q-sorts analysis ( $n = 63$ ) suggests three profiles: popular, exclusionary, and delegative. The solution explains 60% of the total variance, broken down by factor (and eigenvalue): Popular = 27.7% (17.5), Exclusionary = 18.4% (11.6), Delegative = 13.8% (8.7). Three participants do not have a significant loading on any of the three factors. The names of these support profiles reflect my interpretation of the results in Tables 4.1-4.8.

Each item in Tables 4.1-4.7 has two entries: normalized ( $z$ ) factor scores and, for the sake of comparison, their score as it transposes to the 11-point scale (-5 to +5) used in the Q-sort. Essentially, “the factor scores represent weighted combinations of the placement of statements in each individual’s Q-sort and thus reflect ideal typical patterns” (Theiss-Morse, 1993, 363). In calculating the factor scores, the raw data in each Q-sort are weighted to allow participants with higher factor loadings to contribute more.<sup>8</sup> Then the raw Q-sorts data are multiplied by their corresponding factor weight, summed across each item, and normalized (mean = 0, s.d. = 1). I report these in the far right-hand column. Next these  $z$ -scores are transposed to scores on the 11-point Q-sort scale, reported in the far left-hand column. This last step is not necessary, but transposed  $z$ -scores “are usually reported since they conform to the format in which the data were originally collected” (Brown, 1980, 243).

In Tables 4.1-4.7 I report the fourteen most “dominant” and “defining” orientations for each support profile. Dominant orientations carry the most weight relative (+5’s, +4’s, -4’s, -5’s) to other orientations in the support profile. These orientations are deeply held. An orientation is defining if its  $z$ -score is more than one standard deviation from the average of the other profiles’  $z$ -scores for that item. We can consider defining orientations (entries underlined in the tables) unique to a given profile, either in terms

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<sup>8</sup>Based on  $w = f/(1 - f^2)$ , where  $w$  is the factor weight and  $f$  is the factor loading (Brown, 1980, 241-2).



of intensity (e.g. +2 versus +5) or direction (i.e. positive or negative). Most, but not all, of the dominant orientations are also defining orientations. The last set of results, in Table 4.8, are orientations that amount to virtual consensus across the profiles. To declare an orientation “consensus”, its z-scores across all profiles must be within one standard deviation of each other. Some items, also in Table 4.8, generate consensus in one case and unique orientations in the other. In terms of the overarching goal of improving survey-based measures, this analysis helps separate the wheat from the chaff among the myriad indicators of democratic support.

### 4.3.1 Democratic Support Profiles: Santiago, Chile

As Table 4.1 shows, Chilean democrats are defined by ideal-typical orientations to democratic governance: liberal (items #1, 2, 37, 7, 9, 39), unconditional (#3, 4, 38), and committed (#12). This pattern largely holds for orientations to the political rights and civil liberties embodied in *polyarchy*, most intensely the rights to vote (#13), run for office (#14), and human rights (#48). To this point, Chilean democrats resembles similar clusters of liberal beliefs in Mexico (Schedler and Sarsfield, 2007), Argentina (Powers, 2001), Russia (Carnaghan, 2007), Belarus, Romania, and Bulgaria (Dryzek and Holmes, 2002). Yet even as they profess support for the participation of “extremist parties” (#3), they express intolerance towards Marxist parties (#43) and neo-nazis (#47). Therefore, even the most democratic Chileans in our sample place boundaries on democracy.

Delegative support calls for strong leaders to “bring the country along” in times of crisis (#38). It is unclear whether this would entail the maintenance or destruction of democratic institutions and freedoms. Strong liberal (# 1, 2), unconditional (#4, 5), and committed (#11, 12) orientations to democratic governance within the profile suggest hyper-presidentials would support institutional channels to political change.

Table 4.1: Democratic Support Profile: Santiago, Chile Sample

Transposed Factor Score	<i>Democratic Governance</i>	Normalized Factor Score
<u>+5</u>	3. Under no circumstance could there ever be sufficient reason for a <i>coup d'etat</i> . ( <i>unconditional</i> )	<u>2.15</u>
<u>+5</u>	1. Democracy may have problems, but it's better than any other form of government. ( <i>liberal</i> )	<u>1.58</u>
<u>+5</u>	2. Democracy is preferable to any other form of government. ( <i>liberal</i> )	<u>1.56</u>
<u>+4</u>	37. "After the trauma of the coup and the military government, a political maturity has been reached. Now I think things can be resolved in other ways that do not imply military intervention." ( <i>liberal</i> )	<u>1.55</u>
<u>-3</u>	4. In certain circumstances an authoritarian government could be preferable to a democratic government. ( <i>unconditional</i> )	<u>-0.92</u>
<u>-4</u>	38. "In moments of crisis you need someone to take power and bring the country along." ( <i>unconditional</i> )	<u>-1.08</u>
<u>-4</u>	12. I wouldn't care if the military came to power again. ( <i>committed</i> )	<u>-1.43</u>
<u>-4</u>	7. Things cannot be resolved. Our country needs a government with a heavy hand. ( <i>liberal</i> )	<u>-1.57</u>
<u>-5</u>	9. We would be better off if the military were governing the country. ( <i>liberal</i> )	<u>-1.62</u>
<u>-5</u>	39. "I wouldn't have any problem if the Armed Forces governed because democracy has given me awful experiences." ( <i>liberal</i> )	<u>-1.74</u>
	<b><i>Political Rights &amp; Procedures Values</i></b>	
<u>+4</u>	13. Except for those excluded by the Constitution, all Chileans deserve the right to vote, even those who protest against the government. ( <i>liberal</i> )	<u>1.31</u>
<u>+4</u>	14. Any citizen of voting age should be allowed to run for public office. ( <i>liberal</i> )	<u>1.23</u>
<u>+3</u>	15. All political parties, including extremist ones, should be permitted to participate in national elections. ( <i>liberal</i> )	<u>1.12</u>
<u>+3</u>	43. Marxist parties should be prohibited from participating in national elections. ( <i>illiberal</i> )	<u>1.12</u>
<u>-2</u>	16. When the country lacks order the right to vote can be restricted. ( <i>unconditional</i> )	<u>-0.75</u>
	<b><i>Civil Liberties</i></b>	
<u>+2</u>	47. "They shouldn't let neo-nazis express themselves publicly." ( <i>illiberal</i> )	<u>0.80</u>
<u>-5</u>	48. "Respecting the human rights of all Chileans is not essential these days." ( <i>committed</i> )	<u>-1.84</u>

But illiberal orientations to political rights and procedures (#13-15) and lack of commitment to human rights (#48), media freedom (#36), protest rights (#35), free association (#34, 31) reduces these orientations to mere platitudes. The delegative profile exemplifies support for a fragile institutional order that rests on the whim of *caudillo*-style leaders. While few would classify Chile as a “delegative democracy” – a regime in which citizens delegate extensive power to elected executives who ignore institutional checks and balances and govern as they wish (O’Donnell, 1994) – some Chileans support this sort of governance.

An instrumental profile maintains conditional support for authoritarianism (#4), especially to resolve economic problems (#5). Since instrumentals support some political rights (#13, 43) and civil liberties (#32, 34-36) and reckon Chile has seen the last of military intervention (#37), it is tempting to associate these beliefs with political learning and a general acceptance of democratic rules of the game. Yet their acceptance of military rule (#39) and willingness to limit public protests (#29) and press freedom (#30) during times of crisis may signal more than simple “nostalgia” (Huneus and Maldonado, 2003). Indeed, instrumentals grant legitimacy to Pinochet’s protracted military regime (#9). If many Chileans supported “intervention as only a temporary measure” (Bermeo, 2003, 167) rather than “the institutionalization of military dictatorship in 1973” (166), instrumental support today certainly has a more ‘tried-and-true’ flavor.

Non-democrats believe crisis situations call for strong leaders (#38), but feign no support (#1, 2) or commitment to democracy (#11, 40). Moreover, they favor the *mano dura* (#7), accept *coups d’etat* (#3), and would proscribe Marxist parties (#43) and, in some circumstances, other extremists (#17) from electoral competition. In the present context of democracy, non-democrats cling to a variety of civil liberties (#26, 27, 30, 31). But support for these negative rights may reflect a determination

Table 4.2: Delegative Support Profile: Santiago, Chile Sample

Transposed Factor Score	<i>Democratic Governance</i>	Normalized Factor Score
+5	38. "In moments of crisis you need someone to take power and bring the country along." ( <i>conditional</i> )	<u>1.88</u>
+4	2. Democracy is preferable to any other form of government. ( <i>liberal</i> )	1.26
+4	1. Democracy may have problems, but it's better than any other form of government. ( <i>liberal</i> )	1.03
-3	37. "After the trauma of the coup and the military government, a political maturity has been reached. Now I think things can be resolved in other ways that do not imply military intervention." ( <i>illiberal</i> )	<u>-0.82</u>
-4	11. For me there isn't a big difference between democratic governments and dictatorships. So the type of regime doesn't really matter to me. ( <i>committed</i> )	-1.03
-4	12. I wouldn't care if the military came to power again. ( <i>committed</i> )	<u>-1.04</u>
-4	5. I would support an authoritarian government if it resolves economic problems. ( <i>unconditional</i> )	<u>-1.14</u>
-5	4. In certain circumstances an authoritarian government could be preferable to a democratic government. ( <i>unconditional</i> )	<u>-1.20</u>
	<b><i>Political Rights &amp; Procedures</i></b>	
+3	22. It's all the same whether or not the great majority have the right to vote or only a few people. ( <i>uncommitted</i> )	<u>0.84</u>
-1	13. Except for those excluded by the Constitution, all Chileans deserve the right to vote, even those who protest against the government. ( <i>illiberal</i> )	<u>-0.40</u>
-2	14. Any citizen of voting age should be allowed to run for public office. ( <i>illiberal</i> )	<u>-0.62</u>
-4	15. All political parties, including extremist ones, should be permitted to participate in national elections. ( <i>illiberal</i> )	<u>-1.03</u>
-5	43. Marxist parties should be prohibited from participating in national elections." ( <i>liberal</i> )	<u>-2.21</u>
	<b><i>Civil Liberties</i></b>	
+5	48. "Respecting the human rights of all Chileans is not essential these days." ( <i>uncommitted</i> )	<u>3.20</u>
+4	36. It wouldn't worry me if the government censored the communications media that criticize it. ( <i>uncommitted</i> )	<u>1.00</u>
+2	35. Public protest is not a necessary right for our society. ( <i>uncommitted</i> )	<u>0.53</u>
+2	34. The right to form associations is not crucial for our country. ( <i>uncommitted</i> )	<u>0.58</u>
+1	31. In general, the government should limit the right to form associations. ( <i>illiberal</i> )	<u>0.39</u>
-3	46. I respect gay people. But it would bother me if they showed their love in front the children. ( <i>unconditional</i> )	<u>-0.76</u>
-5	47. "They shouldn't let neo-nazis express themselves publicly." ( <i>liberal</i> )	<u>-1.54</u>

Table 4.3: Instrumental Support Profile: Santiago, Chile Sample

Transposed Factor Score	<i>Democratic Governance</i>	Normalized Factor Score
<u>+5</u>	4. In certain circumstances an authoritarian government could be preferable to a democratic government. ( <i>conditional</i> )	<u>2.02</u>
<u>+5</u>	37. “After the trauma of the coup and the military government, a political maturity has been reached. Now I think things can be resolved in other ways that do not imply military intervention.” ( <i>liberal</i> )	<u>1.99</u>
<u>+4</u>	5. I would support an authoritarian government if it resolves economic problems. ( <i>conditional</i> )	<u>1.38</u>
<u>+3</u>	9. We would be better off if the military were governing the country. ( <i>illiberal</i> )	<u>0.67</u>
<u>+2</u>	39. “I wouldn’t have any problem if the Armed Forces governed because democracy has given me awful experiences.” ( <i>illiberal</i> )	<u>0.51</u>
<u>+2</u>	12. I wouldn’t care if the military came to power again. ( <i>uncommitted</i> )	<u>0.50</u>
	<b><i>Political Rights &amp; Procedures</i></b>	
<u>+4</u>	13. Except for those excluded by the Constitution, all Chileans deserve the right to vote, even those who protest against the government. ( <i>liberal</i> )	<u>1.17</u>
<u>+1</u>	18. In times of national crisis it’s alright to prohibit a political party from participating in national elections. ( <i>conditional</i> )	<u>0.36</u>
<u>-5</u>	43. “Marxist parties should be prohibited from participating in national elections.” ( <i>liberal</i> )	<u>-2.45</u>
	<b><i>Civil Liberties</i></b>	
<u>+5</u>	46. I respect gay people. But it would bother me if they showed their love in front of the children. ( <i>conditional</i> )	<u>1.66</u>
<u>+4</u>	29. In times of crisis, I would approve of a law that prohibited public protests. ( <i>conditional</i> )	<u>1.35</u>
<u>+3</u>	30. In the case of a social emergency I would approve of the government censoring the media. ( <i>conditional</i> )	<u>0.73</u>
<u>-2</u>	26. I approve of people participating in legal public protests. ( <i>illiberal</i> )	<u>-0.56</u>
<u>-3</u>	27. I don’t approve of the government censoring the media that criticizes it. ( <i>illiberal</i> )	<u>-0.91</u>
<u>-3</u>	36. “It wouldn’t worry me if the government censored the communications media that criticize it. ( <i>committed</i> )	<u>-0.74</u>
<u>-4</u>	32. I don’t approve of people participating in manifestations under any circumstance. ( <i>liberal</i> )	<u>-1.14</u>
<u>-4</u>	34. The right to form associations is not crucial for our country. ( <i>committed</i> )	<u>-1.53</u>
<u>-5</u>	35. Public protest is not a necessary right for our society. ( <i>committed</i> )	<u>-1.60</u>
<u>-5</u>	47. “They shouldn’t let neo-nazis express themselves publicly.” ( <i>liberal</i> )	<u>-1.83</u>

to prevent a tyranny of the Left and may be withdrawn given the right conditions (#16, 17). Non-democrats remain unconvinced that Chile has seen the last of military intervention (#37).

Table 4.4: Non-Democrat Support Profile: Santiago, Chile Sample

Transposed Factor Score	<i>Democratic Governance</i>	Normalized Factor Score
<u>+5</u>	38. "In moments of crisis you need someone to take power and bring the country along." ( <i>conditional</i> )	<u>2.68</u>
+4	7. Things cannot be resolved. Our country needs a government with a heavy hand. ( <i>illiberal</i> )	1.01
<u>+2</u>	11. "For me there isn't a big difference between democratic governments and dictatorships. So the type of regime doesn't really matter to me." ( <i>uncommitted</i> )	<u>0.42</u>
<u>+2</u>	40. "I have to work to survive. I don't care if the government is democratic or military if it's not going to change my conditions." ( <i>uncommitted</i> )	<u>0.55</u>
<u>-2</u>	37. "After the trauma of the coup and the military government, a political maturity has been reached. Now I think things can be resolved in other ways that do not imply military intervention." ( <i>illiberal</i> )	<u>-0.74</u>
<u>-3</u>	2. Democracy is preferable to any other form of government. ( <i>illiberal</i> )	<u>-0.91</u>
<u>-4</u>	1. Democracy may have problems, but it's better than any other form of government. ( <i>illiberal</i> )	<u>-1.17</u>
<u>-4</u>	3. Under no circumstance could there ever be sufficient reason for a <i>coup d'etat</i> . ( <i>conditional</i> )	<u>-1.60</u>
	<b><i>Political Rights &amp; Procedures</i></b>	
<u>+5</u>	43. "Marxist parties should be prohibited from participating in national elections." ( <i>illiberal</i> )	<u>2.10</u>
<u>+4</u>	17. For the common good, sometimes you have to suspend the rights of persons with extremist ideas from running for publicly elected offices. ( <i>conditional</i> )	<u>1.07</u>
<u>+3</u>	19. Besides those excluded by law, there are other groups and kinds of people that should not be able to vote. ( <i>illiberal</i> )	<u>0.96</u>
<u>+3</u>	16. When the country lacks order the right to vote can be restricted. ( <i>conditional</i> )	<u>0.92</u>
<u>-3</u>	23. It doesn't matter to me if certain people are restricted from their right to run for office. ( <i>committed</i> )	<u>-1.07</u>
	<b><i>Civil Liberties</i></b>	
<u>+5</u>	27. I don't approve of the government censoring the media that criticizes it. ( <i>committed</i> )	
+4	26. I approve of people participating in legal protests. ( <i>liberal</i> )	1.05
<u>0</u>	47. "They shouldn't let neo-nazis express themselves publicly." ( <i>neutral</i> )	<u>0.18</u>
<u>-4</u>	31. In general, the government should limit the right to form associations. ( <i>liberal</i> )	<u>-1.10</u>
<u>-5</u>	48. "Respecting the human rights of all Chileans is not essential these days." ( <i>committed</i> )	<u>3.20</u>
<u>-5</u>	30. In the case of a social emergency I would approve of the government censoring the media. ( <i>unconditional</i> )	<u>-2.01</u>

Table 4.5: Popular Democratic Support: Buenos Aires, Argentina Sample

Transposed Factor Score		Normalized Factor Score
	<b><i>Democratic Governance</i></b>	
<u>+5</u>	3. Under no circumstance could there ever be sufficient reason for a <i>coup d'etat</i> . ( <i>unconditional</i> )	<u>1.64</u>
<u>+2</u>	8. There are other forms of government that could be as good as or better than democracy. ( <i>illiberal</i> )	<u>0.86</u>
<u>-4</u>	7. Things cannot be resolved. Our country needs a government with a heavy hand. ( <i>liberal</i> )	<u>-1.48</u>
-5	9. We would be better off if the military were governing the country. ( <i>committed</i> )	-1.52
<u>-5</u>	50. "If I had to choose between a civil war or a military coup, I would no doubt prefer the latter." ( <i>unconditional</i> )	<u>-1.80</u>
	<b><i>Political Rights Values</i></b>	
<u>+5</u>	56. "When you go to vote, your vote is worthless because you already know who will win before you vote." ( <i>uncommitted</i> )	<u>2.37</u>
<u>+4</u>	15. All political parties, including extremist ones, should be permitted to participate in national elections. ( <i>liberal</i> )	<u>1.26</u>
<u>+2</u>	55. "People who are managed by a political <i>puntero</i> should not have the right to vote." ( <i>illiberal</i> )	<u>0.54</u>
<u>+2</u>	22. It's all the same whether or not the great majority have the right to vote or only a few people. ( <i>uncommitted</i> )	<u>0.39</u>
<u>-3</u>	16. When the country lacks order the right to vote can be restricted. ( <i>unconditional</i> )	<u>-1.02</u>
	<b><i>Civil Liberties Values</i></b>	
<u>+5</u>	57. "Argentina should safeguard human rights." ( <i>liberal</i> )	<u>1.74</u>
<u>+2</u>	36. "It wouldn't worry me if the government censored the communications media that criticize it." ( <i>uncommitted</i> )	<u>0.58</u>
<u>+3</u>	60. "It doesn't bother me if the president pressures the media to have an officialist tendency." ( <i>uncommitted</i> )	<u>0.94</u>
<u>+1</u>	33. I approve of the government censoring the communications media that criticize it. ( <i>illiberal</i> )	<u>0.28</u>
<u>-3</u>	35. Public protest is not a necessary right for our society. ( <i>committed</i> )	<u>-1.01</u>
<u>-4</u>	59. "Our nation's priorities should be to maintain order before worrying about human rights." ( <i>committed</i> )	<u>-1.42</u>
<u>-5</u>	58. "It's your right to protest as long as you don't block the highway." ( <i>unconditional</i> )	<u>-1.96</u>

### 4.3.2 Democratic Support Profiles: Buenos Aires, Argentina

As I discuss in the following section, the profiles of support in the Buenos Aires analysis held a host of consensus orientations to democratic governance, procedures, rights, and liberties (see Table 4.8). In addition to these orientations, Argentines with popular support parallel the description of the "popular, justice-based democracy" legitimization



pattern Powers (2001) identifies among working-class Argentines. Such citizens do not consider a military regime “an acceptable alternative to imperfect institutions” (193) and advocate grassroots participation as a way to “work within the existing regime to participate in electoral politics and nonviolent social movements as a means to making small gains in social justice” (Powers, 2001, 193). Here, the popular support profile holds orientations that are more anti-military (#9, 50) than pro-democracy (#8). Popular democratic supporters perceive their votes to mean little (#56), but unconditionally favor elections (#16), champion equal participation rights for extremists (#15), defend human rights (#57, 59), and remain committed to protest rights (#35, 58). In fact, based on responses to the pre-Q-sort questionnaire, factor loadings on the popular support profile are significantly correlated with activity levels for signing petitions ( $r = .44$ ), boycotting ( $r = .45$ ), protesting ( $r = .56$ ), unofficial striking ( $r = .51$ ), occupying buildings ( $r = .41$ ), and road-blocking ( $r = .32$ ). Over time, these citizens’ adherence to democracy could be undermined by “the belief that liberal democracy is structured and supported by elites so that certain people are left out permanently” (Powers, 2001, 193).

The exclusionary support profile exposes the on-the-ground challenges of cultivating democratic support in Argentina. First, exclusionary support entertains political rights and procedures on a conditional or “exclusive” basis (#15-18). Indeed, there is strong support for proscribing Leftist parties (#55). Second, exclusionary support draws the boundaries of free expression at blocking the highway (#58, 35). This echoes a common response of middle-class Argentines to the *piquetero* movement whose *modus operandi* is to block major traffic arteries to demand social and economic rights. Critics view *piqueteros* as criminals or object that roadblocks place citizens in harm’s way and impinge on the right to circulate freely. Third, if forced to choose between a civil war and a military coup, exclusionary supporters would select the coup (#50), but they

Table 4.6: Exclusionary Support Profile: Buenos Aires, Argentina

Transposed Factor Score		Normalized Factor Score
	<b><i>Democratic Governance</i></b>	
<u>+4</u>	50. "If I had to choose between a civil war or a military coup, I would no doubt prefer the latter." ( <i>conditional</i> )	<u>1.04</u>
-4	9. We would be better off if the military were governing the country. ( <i>liberal</i> )	-1.36
<u>-1</u>	3. Under no circumstance could there ever be sufficient reason for a <i>coup d'etat</i> . ( <i>conditional</i> )	<u>-0.05</u>
<u>-4</u>	10. To people like me it doesn't matter if we have a democratic or undemocratic regime. ( <i>committed</i> )	<u>-1.50</u>
<u>-5</u>	52. "We were better off with the military, there wasn't so much crime. At least they provided works ( <i>obras</i> )." ( <i>liberal</i> )	<u>-1.74</u>
<u>-5</u>	11. For me there isn't a big difference between democratic governments and dictatorships. So the type of regime doesn't really matter to me. ( <i>committed</i> )	<u>-1.75</u>
	<b><i>Political Rights &amp; Procedures</i></b>	
<u>+5</u>	54. They should prohibit the participation of Leftist political parties in national elections. ( <i>illiberal</i> )	<u>1.58</u>
<u>+3</u>	18. In times of national crisis it's alright to prohibit a political party from participating in national elections. ( <i>conditional</i> )	<u>0.72</u>
<u>+2</u>	16. When the country lacks order the right to vote can be restricted. ( <i>conditional</i> )	<u>0.70</u>
<u>+2</u>	55. People who are managed by a political <i>puntero</i> should not have the right to vote. ( <i>illiberal</i> )	<u>0.54</u>
<u>-2</u>	15. All political parties, including extremist ones, should be permitted to participate in national elections. ( <i>illiberal</i> )	<u>1.26</u>
	<b><i>Civil Liberties</i></b>	
<u>+5</u>	58. "It's your right to protest as long as you don't block the highway." ( <i>conditional</i> )	<u>2.26</u>
<u>+1</u>	57. "Argentina should safeguard human rights." ( <i>liberal</i> )	<u>0.40</u>
<u>+3</u>	35. Public protest is not a necessary right for our society. ( <i>uncommitted</i> )	<u>0.80</u>
<u>-5</u>	60. "It doesn't bother me if the president pressures the media to have an officialist tendency." ( <i>committed</i> )	<u>-3.52</u>

Table 4.7: Delegative Support Profile: Buenos Aires, Argentina

Transposed Factor Score		Normalized Factor Score
	<b><i>Democratic Governance</i></b>	
<u>+4</u>	49. "I don't think there will be another <i>coup d'etat</i> en Argentina because the people are conscientious of how tragic military governments are." ( <i>liberal</i> )	<u>1.51</u>
<u>+2</u>	7. Things cannot be resolved. Our country needs a government with a heavy hand. ( <i>illiberal</i> )	<u>0.66</u>
<u>0</u>	9. We would be better off if the military were governing the country. ( <i>neutral</i> )	<u>0.10</u>
<u>-4</u>	50. "If I had to choose between a civil war or a military coup, I would no doubt prefer the latter." ( <i>unconditional</i> )	<u>-0.71</u>
<u>-5</u>	8. There are other forms of government that could be as good as or better than democracy. ( <i>committed</i> )	<u>-1.80</u>
	<b><i>Political Rights &amp; Procedures</i></b>	
<u>-4</u>	54. "They should should prohibit the participation of Leftist political parties in national elections." ( <i>liberal</i> )	<u>-1.60</u>
<u>-5</u>	55. People who are managed by a political <i>puntero</i> should not have the right to vote. ( <i>liberal</i> )	<u>-2.60</u>
<u>-5</u>	56. "When you go to vote, your vote is worthless because you already know who will win before you vote." ( <i>committed</i> )	<u>-3.13</u>
	<b><i>Civil Liberties</i></b>	
<u>+5</u>	58. "It's your right to protest as long as you don't block the highway." ( <i>conditional</i> )	<u>1.51</u>
<u>+5</u>	60. "It doesn't bother me if the president pressures the media to have an officialist tendency." ( <i>uncommitted</i> )	<u>2.07</u>
+4	57. "Argentina should safeguard human rights." ( <i>liberal</i> )	1.07
<u>-4</u>	33. I approve of the government censoring the communications media that criticize it. ( <i>illiberal</i> )	<u>-1.13</u>

do not favor long-term military solutions to shortcomings in democratic performance (#10-12, 51, 52). In this sense, they match the profile of orientations Bermeo (2003, 219-200) describes prior to the 1976 removal of Isabel Martínez de Perón. They also resonate reasonably well Catterberg's (1991, 45) "elitist" Argentines who emphasize the democratic rights over participation. In all, the exclusionary profile reveals the limits some Argentines would place on the democratic game.

Like the other profiles in Buenos Aires and the corresponding profile in Santiago, this delegative profile claims to prefer democratic governance. The Buenos Aires delegates place a high premium on voting rights (#53, 56 14), even for citizens taking cues from a political boss (*puntero*) (#54). Though they reject outright censorship (#33, 36,

30), delegatives are indifferent to the president pushing an official agenda onto media outlets (#60). They do not view roadblocks as a legitimate form of expression (#58) and, like delegatives in Santiago, waffle on human rights (#57; 59 is not a defining item but scores +3 for prioritizing “order” over “human rights”). In some ways, delegatives look like Catterberg’s (1991, 39-48) “populists”, for whom *polyarchy’s* participatory aspects (elections, full suffrage) outweigh its libertarian dimensions (press freedom, political minority rights). Indeed, they seem to value the populist governing style of then President Néstor Kirchner who commandeered the Peronist political machine after 2003 (Roberts, 2007). The Kirchner administration also took steps to increase its leverage over major newspapers and wielded this new influence to de-legitimize the *piquetero* movement that at times threatened governability (Svampa and Pereyra, 2003). Kirchner’s team was often accused of intimidating journalists. Not surprisingly, delegative support and trust in the president, a pre-Q-sort questionnaire item, are significantly correlated ( $r = .21$ ).

Three extant survey items produce defining orientations to democratic governance relatively well in both analyses. The first is item #3, “Under no circumstance could there ever be sufficient reason for a *coup d’etat*” (in Chile democrat = +5, delegative = +1, instrumental = -2, non-democracy = -4; in Argentina popular + +5, exclusionary = -1, delegative = +1). The second item, #5, posits support for authoritarian government on the condition that it “resolves economic problems” (in Chile -3, -5, +5, +3; in Argentina -3, +1, -2). The third item, #7, states support for heavy-handed (*mano dura*) governance (in Chile -4, +3, +3, +4; in Argentina -4, -2, +2). However, some of the focus-groups/interview items also tended to polarize orientations to democratic governance. For Chileans, the most discriminating of these is #37: “After the trauma of the coup and the military government, a political maturity has been reached. Now I think things can be solved in other ways that do not imply military intervention”

(+4, -3, +5, -2). For Argentines, the most defining item is #50: “If I had to choose between a civil war or a military coup, I would no doubt choose the latter” (-5, +4, -4). Thus the most effective democratic-governance items ask citizens to reflect on the lessons and legacies of their authoritarian pasts.

For political rights and procedures and civil liberties, the focus-group/interview items are quite revealing. In the Santiago analysis, orientations to extending free speech to neo-nazis (#47) delineate the support profiles (+2, -5, -5, 0).<sup>9</sup> Orientations to human rights are more puzzling. One item elicits consensus support for human rights (#45, “You must respect the human rights of all Chileans”) but another item (#48) is rejected by delegates. Given the disputed nature of human rights and historical memory in Chile, such orientations deserve further research.<sup>10</sup> The support profiles in the Buenos Aires analysis are marked by their orientations to roadblocks as a form of protest (#57), competing priorities of order and human rights (#59, 57), and the President pressing an official agenda on the media (#60). Finally, profiles in both cases differ wildly in their beliefs about political parties of the ideological Left (#43; 55). Support profiles in Chile and Argentina differ on where to set the limits of political and civil freedom and equality in their post-authoritarian eras.

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<sup>9</sup>Neo-nazi groups in Santiago have stirred public debate by attempting to hold an international forum in 2000 and engaging in public confrontations with homosexual rights groups.

<sup>10</sup>During the political transition 18% of respondents did not believe the human rights issues were real, but rather propaganda (but around 50% for self-identified Rightists and Independents). Another 12% did not know or answer. There was also considerable discord regarding solutions to the problem once the truth was established (Flisfisch et al., 1987, 105-116). Sixteen years later, 26% of Chileans believed human rights violations were “isolated cases” as opposed to a “systematic abuse” of authority. And 37% agreed with the statement, “After thirteen years since the end of the military government we shouldn’t insist on [solving] the problem of human rights violations during the military government” (Huneus, 2003, 174-76).

### 4.3.3 Consensus Orientations

How different are these orientations across the profiles? Recall the statistical rules of thumb that a “consensus” orientation has z-scores across all profiles that are within one standard deviation of each other. Items that engender consensus orientations cannot differentiate orientations that belong to one profiles of democratic support from orientations that fit in all profiles. Of equal importance are items that generate consensus orientations in one case, but defining orientations in another. Such items may be hinder cross-national comparisons. Towards the ultimate goal of improving survey-based measures, this analysis helps researcher choose the most effective indicators of democratic support.

More items generate consensus orientations to democratic governance in Buenos Aires than in Santiago (see Table 4.8). In fact, many items that elicit defining orientations for the Santiaguinos, uncover a liberal-unconditional-committed consensus for the Bonaerenses. This pattern is replicated across orientations to political rights and procedures and civil liberties. Whereas the Argentine profiles reach consensus on fourteen of these twenty-four orientations, the same items define the Chilean support profiles. However, for case-specific items, there is a bit more consensus among the Chilean profiles than the Argentine profiles.

These results give rise to several conclusions. While extant survey measures do a fairly good job of distinguishing between democratic support profiles in Chile, measures of support for democracy in Argentina could benefit from a fresh infusion of *verstehen*. Whereas four out of twelve focus-group/interview items tapped consensus orientations across the Santiago profiles, only two of twelve did so in Buenos Aires. Second, there are some items that poorly differentiate between support profiles in both cases (#20, 21, 24, 25), but only two items fail both to define and to garner consensus. The first is #8: “There are junctures that require the president to leave congress behind.” The second is

Table 4.8: Consensus Orientations & Cross-Case Comparison

		Santiago, Chile			Buenos Aires, Argentina		
Dem.	Deleg.	Instl.	NonDem.	Democratic Governance	Libtn.	Excls.	Deleg.
+5	+4	0	-3	1. Democracy is preferable to any other form of government.	+2	+4	+5
+5	+4	0	-4	2. Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.	+2	+4	+4
-3	-5	+5	+3	4. In certain circumstances an authoritarian government could be preferable to a democratic government.	-2	-2	-1
-4	-4	+2	-2	12. I wouldn't care if the military came to power again.	-4	-4	-2
				52. "Welfare and progress can be reached under either a democratic or a military government."	-4	-4	-4
<b>Political Rights &amp; Procedures</b>							
+4	-1	+4	0	13. Except for those excluded by the Constitution, everyone deserves the right to vote, even those who protest against the government.	+3	+4	+2
+4	-2	+1	+2	14. Any citizen of voting age should be allowed to run for public office.	+4	+2	+1
-1	+2	-2	+3	19. Besides those excluded by law, there are other groups and kinds of people who should not be able to vote.	0	-1	-1
-2	+1	-1	-1	20. Homosexuals should not have the right to run for public office.	-2	-2	-3
-3	0	0	+1	21. The participation of neo-nazi political parties in national elections should be prohibited.	-3	0	-2
+1	+1	+1	-3	23. It doesn't matter to me if certain people are restricted from their right to run for office.	0	-1	0
0	-3	0	0	24. It wouldn't matter to me if a political party were prohibited from participating in national elections.	-1	+1	0
+3	+4	+4	+4	41. "We have to protect our right to elect our own political representatives."			
-2	-2	-4	-4	42. "The votes of well educated people should be worth more than the vote of less well educated people."			
-4	-3	-4	-3	44. "It's all the same to me if they falsify election results."			
				53. "Even if the candidate I prefer loses or performs poorly, the important thing is having the liberty to choose."	+4	+5	+4
<b>Civil Liberties</b>							
+2	+3	+3	+1	25. Our government has to guarantee all citizens the right to associate.	+3	+3	+1
+3	+2	-2	+4	26. I approve of people participating in legal public protests.	+3	+2	+3
+2	+3	-3	+5	27. I don't approve of the government censoring the media that criticizes it.	+4	+2	+2
-1	-1	+4	+2	29. In times of crisis, I would approve of a law that prohibited public protests.	-1	0	+1
+1	0	+3	-5	30. In the case of a social emergency I would approve of the government censoring the media.	+1	-1	0
0	+1	-3	-4	31. In general, the government should limit the right to form associations.	0	0	-2
-1	+1	-4	-1	32. I don't approve of people participating in manifestations under any circumstance.	-2	0	-2
-1	0	0	-3	33. I approve of the government censoring communications media that criticize it.	+1	-1	-4
0	+2	-4	-1	34. The right to form associations is not crucial for our country.	+1	0	-1
+4	+5	+2	+3	45. "You must respect the human rights of all Chileans."			

#28: “It is fine for our government to limit the right to associate for a period of time.” A final conclusion concerns items representing the most commonly compared survey measures of democratic support in Latin America, often termed the “Linizian” (#1, 4) and “Churchillian” (#2). In this Q-sorts analysis, their power to discriminate between profiles of democratic support varies, from very high in Chile to extremely low very in Argentina. Beyond casting Juan Linz’s remark that survey questions must capture *verstehen* in an ironic light, this finding further questions the cross-case comparability of these much-maligned measures.

## 4.4 Discussion & Conclusions

Gauging democratic support or lack thereof may be crucial for determining whether democracy is here to stay in Latin America, or whether the region is passing through just another “democratic moment” (Malloy, 1987, 256-57). Yet our knowledge of how democratic support affects the building, maintenance, and deepening of democracy is beset by measurement dilemmas. The goal of this study is to point a way out of these present dilemmas by synthesizing anthropological and behavioral approaches. I conduct a Q-sorts experiment to measure and analyze multidimensional profiles of democratic support in Chile and Argentina. This comparative study provides insight into the nature of democratic support and, as I discuss below, points to ways researchers can enhance survey-based measures.

One of this study’s most basic but powerful lessons is that any measure of democratic support must begin with a clear conceptualization of democracy and, thus, a definition of a democrat. Defining a liberal democrat as one who is unconditionally committed to democratic governance and the political rights and procedures and civil liberties of Dahl’s (1971) *polyarchy* implied three things. First, the concept of democratic support encompasses three general objects of support. Second, it not only focuses



on liberal and illiberal orientations to these objects, but unconditional/conditional and committed/uncommitted orientations as well. Third, an appropriate measurement instrument must tap the concept's multiple dimensions. My *a priori* definitions helped to overcome well-known measurement problems: contested conceptions of democracy; contradictory values; competing rationalities; and mapping onto research at the regime level. So future measures must start with a definition.

The Q-sorts analysis confirms scholarly skepticism towards measures of democratic support that rely on the "d-word". But instead of dismissing mixed support profiles as social desirability, multidimensional profiles of democratic support help "draw attention away from the logical meaning of isolated words and phrases . . . to seek their meaning in terms of the 'flavor added' by the total milieu of the accompanying behavioral field" (Brown, 1980, 46). Regarding conflicting values, for example, delegative support profiles in both Santiago and Buenos Aires combine nominal preference for democracy with illiberal values on plural political competition, uncommitted orientations towards media autonomy media, and conflicting values regarding human rights. Along with exclusionary support, these profiles exemplify how stated support for democracy can be hollow. Finding delegative support in not only Argentina but also politically stable Chile, means support for delegative governance may be latent elsewhere, too.

While the results cannot be generalized to the whole populations of Chile or Argentina, the support profiles have a good deal of face validity. It is not surprising that many citizens in Chile and Argentina by and large support democratic governance, political rights, and procedures. Delegative support profiles in Argentina jibe with a history of Peronism, and is not inconsistent with factions of Allende's Popular Unity government. Indeed, delegative support is slightly but significantly higher (0.09,  $t = -1.91$ ) among Chileans who identify with a party of the ruling *Concertación* coalition compared to the rest of the P-sample. That instrumental democratic support exists

in Chile but not in Argentina squares with the diverging records of economic performance of past dictatorships in both cases – volatile with a strong finish in Chile and all downhill in Argentina. Buenos Aires’s exclusionary supporters parallel evidence of “democrats with adjectives” found in other new democracies (Schedler and Sarsfield, 2007; Carnaghan, 2007; Dryzek and Holmes, 2002; Powers, 2001), while Santiago’s illiberals alert us to new diminished sub-types, “authoritarians with adjectives”. Empirically, a high percentage of participants loaded significantly on the profiles (88% in Santiago, 95% in Buenos Aires).

The analysis of defining and consensus orientations makes three general points that will benefit future measures. To begin, the most oft-cited measures of democratic support, commonly referred to as the Linzian and Churchillian questions distinguish eliciting defining orientations in Chile but consensus orientations in Argentina. A reading of these results based on past research might conclude that support for democracy is high in Argentina and low in Chile. But other items illuminate pockets of illiberal, conditional, and uncommitted orientations across the cases, particularly items that reference justification for a coup (#3), *mano dura* (#7), participation of Left-wing parties (#43, 55), public protests (#32, 35), and censorship (#30, 36). Further tests with P-samples that over-represent citizens with illiberal, conditional, and uncommitted orientations make help confirm these tentative conclusions.

The second point is that each of the Q-sample items sampled from the focus groups and interviews was effective either for drawing out distinctions or consensus among the profiles. Hence future survey-based measures ought to incorporate items that reflect more subtle interpretations of the lessons learned under democracy and authoritarianism, and how political rights and procedures and civil liberties play out in real life. The current items are a start, but more research is necessary to hone phraseology and find items that apply to a wide array of cases. In Chile, perhaps the best place to

pick up is the topic of leadership in a crisis situation. What do Chileans mean when they envision a leader who “takes power and brings the country along” (#38; “*tomar el poder y sacar el país adelante*”)? Given the struggles Left-wing parties have faced to gain effective representation in both cases, future research should flesh out what citizens believe these parties’ legitimate role in the political system. Finally, attitudes towards the media expressed in focus-group/interview items define support for delegative governance. The future of democratic institutions may depend, to some extent, on citizen support for or rejection of such values.

Finally, survey researchers must decide how best to aggregate these multiple orientations via survey methods. Cluster analysis seems particularly well-suited to the task. Cluster analysis classifies respondents into clusters who are, vis-à-vis a set of measures, maximally similar to others within the same cluster and maximally dissimilar to respondents in other clusters. Similarity is defined in terms of the sum of squared Euclidean distances from each respondent to the mean of all variables. Like Q-sorts, cluster analysis generates multidimensional measures that relax the linearity assumptions of  $r$ -based factor analysis. Schedler and Sarsfield (2007) cluster analyze a series of variables tapping democratic preferences, values, and norms. They find several types of “democrats with adjectives” and some non-democrats in Mexico. Q-sorts and exploratory cluster analysis could be used in conjunction to place external validity checks on each other. Conventional stopping rules for determining the number of clusters in the final solution (Calinski, 1974; Duda and Hart, 1973) could bolster the reliability of such studies and replication studies could then use confirmatory cluster analysis (k-means) to examine the persistence of support profiles over time. Scholars will have to grapple which defining and/or consensus items to analyze. Consensus items could provide a baseline of comparison, but ultimately defining measures are the best way to differentiate among democratic support profiles. The overall research question is

likely to designate the right mix of defining and consensus items. If one is interested in overall levels of support for democracy, consensus items might figure into the measurement instrument. If the goal is to identify citizens by support profile and compare their behavior, defining items are crucial.

This study provides a conceptual roadmap for improving survey-based measures of democratic support. More research on democratic support with Q-sorts, focus groups, or other non-survey methods (experiments, intensive interviews, ethnography, participant observation, etc.) could save precious time and resources for national, regional, and global opinion projects seeking to understand democratic support. Testing the insights from non-survey studies with survey data ultimately depends on convincing survey researchers of the merit of the inferences we draw. From there, the task of connecting new and improved measures of democratic support to regime-level outcomes is mammoth. But if scholars could prove that citizens with different profiles of democratic support behave in ways that bolster or weaken democratic institutions, it would constitute an important advance towards a greater comprehension of how democratic culture influences democracy.

# Appendix A

## Field Methods: Focus Groups, Interviews, and Q-Sorts

While in the field in Santiago, Chile (August to December 2005) and in Buenos Aires, Argentina (March to August 2006), the first phase of my research involved a series of focus groups and in-depth interviews to better understand how citizens understood democracy and felt towards political parties. These two qualitative methodologies informed the construction of Q-sort experiment conducted in the second phase of my fieldwork. This appendix contains detailed information about several aspects of the focus groups, interviews, and Q-sorts. The first section covers the selection and recruitment of participants; conduct and format of the focus groups; descriptions of the groups; the pre-group self-completion questionnaire; and a descriptive summary of the focus group participants. The second section describes the interview methodology and interviewees. Finally, the third section discusses the recruitment of Q-sort subjects and presents summary data about them.

### A.1 Focus Groups

Focus group interviewing is a qualitative methodology that explicitly uses group interaction to produce insights and data that may be inaccessible without group interaction (Morgan, 1997, 2). My research employs focus groups as a supplementary source of data for my primary method, Q-sort methodology. Initially I assumed focus groups

would be the ideal setting in which to study how people understand their relationships with and form values and attitudes towards democratic political institutions. For the most part this assumption held. However, I noticed that citizens with less democratic beliefs were hard to recruit into focus groups. And even when my screening process, a pre-group self-completion questionnaire, detected authoritarian values in some focus-group subjects, these subjects were often not keen to voice these values and opinions in the focus group. Therefore, I relied on in-depth interviews as a way to “over-sample” in order to produce the necessary data I could later incorporate into the Q-sort exercises.

I conducted a total of fifteen focus groups: eight in Santiago and seven in Buenos Aires. Four of the Santiago groups and four of the Buenos Aires groups were dedicated primarily to citizen attitudes towards political parties. Orientations towards democracy and authoritarianism were the primary focus of four groups in Santiago and three groups in Buenos Aires. Each of these focus groups built on a core set of focusing activities that engaged the participants in a debate about the meaning of democracy, materialist and post-materialist values (Inglehart, 1997), and discrimination towards minority groups. Below I go into detail about these activities, but here I simply note that given the conceptual proximity of support for democracy and political parties, a degree of thematic overlap was not unusual in the focus groups.

### **A.1.1 Focus Group Conduct and Format**

Whereas interviews (in-depth, group, or survey) require a firm control by the interviewer, focus groups facilitators must allow for natural group interaction. Therefore, I divided my focus groups into structured tasks in the first half, and a much freer discussion shaped by a series of questions in the second half. I incorporated several core focusing exercises into each the focus group, regardless of whether the group was selected for its variation on support for democracy or political party trust. The core

activities break the ice and engage each participant at the outset, thereby increasing participation over the duration of the group and providing the facilitator with key insights into the range of beliefs, attitudes, and ideologies within the group. Additional group-specific questions were formulated beforehand to highlight a particular aspect of the research topic. I also allowed for questions to arise spontaneously based on the direction of group interaction. This follows Bloor et al.'s general advice to introduce just enough structure via focusing exercises to reach the research goals, but not so much that it stifles group interaction. As the facilitator I can attest that, "sometimes the facilitator may emerge from a most successful group feeling that she has been holding a tiger by the tail for the last hour and a half" (Bloor et al., 2001, 48).

Before beginning, I emphasize that there are no 'wrong answers' (Bloor et al., 2001). The first focusing exercise their materialist or post-materialist values. Arranging large (8 in. × 11 in.) laminated cards on a table, the participants work together to prioritize (a) maintaining order in the nation, (b) giving people more say in the government, (c) fighting rising prices, and (d) protecting freedom of speech. If there appears to be agreement, I ask if all agree or whether any participant would like to modify the order. If there is disagreement arises, I or my research assistant, eventually help organize the cards according to one participant's opinion, and inquire about what changes to the order other participants might prefer.

Another focusing activity asks the group to consider which of the following phrases (placed on large laminated cards) are central to their understanding of democracy: (a) liberty, (b) equality, voting in elections, (c) a form of government, (d) welfare and progress, (e) respecting the law, (f) human rights, or (g) other. After several minutes of discussion, I ask whether anything is missing from the definition and, if so, discuss further. While the list does not include any pejorative conceptions, it nevertheless generates subjective understandings of democracy. This knowledge helps detect fruitful

pathways for subsequent discussions about support for democracy and the normative implications of democratic procedures and institutions.

The third core focusing activity attempted to uncover political tolerance levels and to engender discussion over political rights and civil liberties. I begin by holding up large laminated cards displaying the name of a minority or discriminated group. These groups included women, gays, lesbians, citizens with low education levels, Jews, the military, police officers, drug addicts, people with AIDS/HIV, youth/students, blacks, Chinese, political extremists, Communists, neo-nazis, indigenous, Bolivians. Additional minority groups were incorporated depending on the country.<sup>1</sup> Then I ask which of these groups suffer the most discrimination. Then, going through the cards again, I ask whether these groups deserve more or less voice in politics. With an eye to groups that generate debate in the first two rounds of questioning, I probe whether these groups deserve the rights to vote, free association, and free expression.

In focus groups that tapping participants' feelings about political parties, I employed one of two additional focusing exercises. The first poses the question, "Political parties everywhere have problems of greater and lesser severity. How big of a problem are the following issues for political parties in Chile?" Sixteen issues are presented on large laminated cards: good faith; capacity to confront the big problems; corruption; the role of money; international credit agencies; internal party politics; public opinion polls; the electoral system; understanding the problems of the common people; elections; coalitions; lack of new faces; true alternatives; campaign promises; availability and accessibility; the role of the media. Following this activity I foster group interaction over how these problems affect individuals' or the group's relationship with parties. The second activity, which is less conducive to lively discussion than the first, features

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<sup>1</sup>In Chile, I inquired about the poor, punkies, peasants, evangelicals, alcoholics, the handicapped, "*momios*" (Right-wing, conservatives), "*rotos*" (Left-wing, Socialists/Communists), and Peruvians. In Argentina, I included the rich, Brazilians, and Paraguayans.



twenty-one phrases about political parties<sup>2</sup> to which group members responded true or false in concert. I give discrepancies additional attention.

Focus groups ranged in duration from about an hour and a half to two and a half hours. Native-speaking research assistants videotaped and transcribed each focus group. In Santiago, my Andrés Madrid, then an M.A. student of political science at the Universidad Católica de Chile was my cameraman. Subsequently, Raúl Olguín, who holds an M.A. in political history from the Universidad de Chile, transcribed the Santiago groups from the footage. In Buenos Aires, María José Chacón, then a sociology student and survey coordinator at the Universidad de Buenos Aires's Instituto Gino Germani, videotaped and transcribed each of the focus groups.<sup>3</sup> My project benefitted greatly from their hard work, dedication, and countless insights.

### **A.1.2 Selection and Recruitment**

The inevitable restrictions of time and money prohibited a perfectly representative sample of the population. Therefore I purposely selected pre-existing groups. Several factors influenced my purposive selection of pre-existing groups. Primarily, I sought a range of orientations to and experience with democracy and political parties as well as variation in terms of age, gender, socioeconomic status, ideology, and geographic locations in and around Santiago and Buenos Aires. Thus, one set of focus groups sought

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<sup>2</sup>These items are: political parties don't want to solve the country's problems; they aren't able to solve the biggest problems; the majority are corrupt; they are under the influence of business sectors; they are under the influence of international credit agencies; they are under the power of the unions; they have not been able to improve citizens' social reality; they worry more about the polls than real problems; they lie very often; they make good decisions most of the time; they listen to civic groups; they understand the problems of the common people; they only come around when there are elections; they waste the income that comes from taxes; they lack new faces; they offer real alternatives; they promise a lot, deliver little; they are not necessary; they are very accessible and available to citizens; they work for the common good; they do not know how to manage the economy.

<sup>3</sup>The humidity of winter in Buenos Aires damaged my analog camcorder. Unfortunately, some of the latter focus-group transcriptions are incomplete despite mine and María José's feverish note-taking.

information about citizens' conceptions of and support for democracy, political rights, and civil liberties. Another set intended to collect attitudes towards and "*confianza*" (trust/confidence) in political parties. As mentioned, I conducted interviews with individuals whose particular experience with democracy and authoritarianism might have been obscured in or diluted by social desirability effects.

Pre-existing groups have a number of methodological and practical advantages over random sampling. Purposive sampling from members of pre-existing groups increased the likelihood of discovering relatively consistent belief systems and crystalized attitudes as opposed "non-attitudes", a big risk in survey research (Converse, 1964). Pre-existing groups can better simulate a "'natural' setting for discussion" (Bloor et al., 2001, 35) which generates higher quality data and interaction. Focus-group specialists (Morgan, 1997; Bloor et al., 2001) warn that interactions among strangers with widely disparate viewpoints on sensitive issues may not only be counterproductive from a research standpoint, but also potentially emotionally damaging to subjects. Considering the often vitriolic nature of discussions of democracy, dictatorship, rights, memory, and party politics in Chile and Argentina, pre-existing groups provided baseline level of mutual respect among members that helped avoid any negative effects the focus group might have on participants. Relatedly, pre-existing groups can be slotted into a group's regular schedule and venue. Not only does this further contribute to a 'natural' setting, it reduces attrition and costs significantly.

My first step was to arrange a meeting with a leader/officer of the group. There I would mention my institutional affiliation – crucial for adding legitimacy – and explain my project, stressing its academic (i.e. non-commercial) value and assuring that I would take the necessary precautions to protect participants' anonymity. Additionally, I offered compensation in the forms of snacks and beverages during the focus group and, if necessary, transportation costs. When appropriate and/or necessary, I offered a

small donation to the group as a gesture of goodwill. If the leader accepted, we would proceed to schedule the focus group. On each occasion, I relied on the group leader to contact and recruit the focus-group participants from among the membership rather than recruiting them directly.<sup>4</sup> My experience suggested this tack lent my project transparency that, overall, made it easier to gain participants and win their confidence. This point is not stressed in the focus-group literature, but it may apply more generally to scholars conducting focus groups in foreign contexts on sensitive topics.

### **A.1.3 Santiago Democratic Support Focus Groups**

For Santiago, the first group on support for democracy was formed by upper-class middle-aged and elderly members and friends of the arch-conservative ultra-nationalist *Corporación por la Defensa de la Soberanía* (Corporation for the Defense of Sovereignty), or CDS. Their website defines their first principle: “To love the fatherland and to be willing to defend its sovereignty.” CDS vehemently rejects the 1984 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Chile and Argentina regarding the conflict over the Beagle Channel and Straits of Magellan<sup>5</sup> and the way Chile’s administrations (democratic and dictatorial) have handled border disputes. While CDS welcomes members from all political and social sectors, civilians and military alike, its current leadership is dominated by conservatives. Former and founding members include the Leftist Radical, Exequiel González Madariaga, the late Commander in Chief of the Air Force and ex-member of the military junta, Gustavo Leigh Guzmán, and the notorious Army

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<sup>4</sup>Many thanks to the many people who agreed to help with this critical aspect of the project.

<sup>5</sup>The treaty, mediated by the Vatican and signed by General Pinochet and President, Raúl Alfonsín, ended the Beagle Conflict by relinquishing sovereignty of the islands to Chile but allowing Argentina maritime rights. The conflict brought the two nations to the brink of war in 1978.

General Roberto Viaux Marambio.<sup>6</sup> The focus group was held September 15, 2005 at a participant's residence in Las Condes. Nine participants formed the group, but I was only able to collect six questionnaires since three came in after I had begun.

The second and third focus groups on democratic support were conducted among university students. Youth are essential to the project since their political socialization began roughly a decade after the return of elections in 1988 and half a decade since Pinochet was imprisoned in London in 1998. The second group incorporated five middle-class law students from the middle-class Universidad Nacional Andrés Bello (October 13, 2005). Though the directors of this private university are political and economic conservatives, the student participants exhibited a mix of ideological stances. Participants on October 19, 2005 at the Universidad Adolfo Ibañez included six upper-class students from the schools of business and government. This university is located amidst mansions that sit on the mountainside overlooking the working-class *comuna* of Peñalolen. Both focus groups were carried out on campus in a classroom setting.

The final Santiago focus group emphasizing issues of democratic support incorporated former and current labor leaders (November 9, 2005). These four middle-age syndicalists are also ex-militants of the political parties in Salvador Allende's Popular Unity coalition, but now identify with left-wing splinters of the Socialist Party (PS), Communist Party (PC), and United Popular Action Movement (MAPU). Each of these participants had close friends or relatives who were "disappeared" or slain during the political strife from 1973 to 1978. At least one of them was tortured twice by the military government, and currently advocates for other torture victims attempting to claim their monthly compensation checks from the Chilean government. While participants

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<sup>6</sup>Viaux's checkered resumé includes leading the *Tacnazo* rebellion against President Eduardo Frei Montalva in 1969, worked closely with CIA officials on the Track II plan to prevent President-Elect Salvador Allende from taking office, and was privy if not partially responsible for the assassination of Commander of Chief of Army, General René Schneider, in October 1970 (Kornbluh, 2003, 16-29).

of other focus groups filled out a pre-group questionnaire, members of this group were wary and collectively decided against it.

#### **A.1.4 Buenos Aires Democratic Support Focus Groups**

The first Buenos Aires focus group on democratic support drew six members of the *Corriente Clasista y Combativa* (Classist and Combative Current), or CCC, from the western part of La Matanza in the Province of Buenos Aires. The CCC is a working-class organization formed after widespread mobilizations of newly unemployed workers in 1994. With ascent of Juan Carlos Alderete as the leader of the unemployed (the CCC also incorporates employed and retired workers) in the mid- to late-1990s, the CCC became the principal group of the *piquetero* movement in Argentina. Politically, the CCC's allegiance is with the Partido Comunista Revolucionario, not Peronism, though it is unclear whether this has helped them resist state cooptation. The *piquetero* movement is engaged in road-blocking, recuperating closed factories, and other sorts of mass mobilizations and thus trigger public debate over civil and human rights in Argentina. The focus group (May 10, 2006) was conducted prior to a district-wide CCC meeting held in an abandoned school transformed into a neighborhood headquarters featuring daycare services, a soup kitchen, and meeting rooms.

A second focus group involved four elderly and working-class members of the *Madres la Plaza de Mayo, Linea Fundadora*. The *Madres* are considered international standard bearers of human, civil, political, and social rights. In 1977 a group of mothers began to march in silent weekly protests against the military junta which had “disappeared” their children. When President Raúl Alfonsín offered monthly reparations to the relatives of these victims, the organization split between those who accepted the money, *Linea Fundadora*, and those who rejected it, *Asociación*. While both *Madres* groups function as NGOs that advocate for justice and human rights, *Linea Fundadora* remains by far the

most politically moderate and internally democratic of the two. The focus group took place at the *Linea Fundadora* office in downtown Buenos Aires on June 6, 2006.

A final focus group discussing democratic support included four members of *Argentina Solidaria*, a group of middle-class youth who run soup kitchens in several shantytowns ringing Buenos Aires. Again, I sought the points of view of young people socialized well after the establishment of electoral democracy. *Argentina Solidaria* formed in response to the wave of unemployment and poverty unleashed by the economic crisis that culminated in the early 2000s. Since the group's leaders tended to meet rather often and informally the focus group convened at the residence of one of the participants in the capital's Villa del Parque neighborhood.

### **A.1.5 Santiago Political Party Trust Focus Groups**

The first of the four focus groups designed to get at political party trust in Santiago involved members of ATTAC. Founded in France in 1998, ATTAC is an international citizens movement that promotes debate over the neoliberal economic model and globalization and, in particular, the Tobin Tax on speculative financial transactions. The Chilean chapter aligns itself with the goals of the Porto Alegre World Social Forum, justice, democracy, and hope. I selected this group because their founding platform champions direct democracy: "It is urgent to radically deepen democracy; to throw off the moorings of the dictatorship and to establish a participatory democratic system in which we citizens regain control of our lives. The citizenry should participate in and directly decide [solutions to] our greatest problems by way of plebiscite." Thus I was interested to hear their critique of political parties, the historically dominant institutions of interest articulation in Chile. I conducted this seven-member focus group on September 12, 2005 at the downtown offices of CENDA, a think-tank dedicated to alternative development.

To conduct the second political-parties focus group I travelled to the working-class community of La Granja. The participants were seven (though only six filled out the questionnaire) leaders of neighborhood associations called *juntas de vecinos*. This group seemed well-placed to describe the behavior of political parties since, as social actors, they interacted frequently with them. By virtue of their leadership positions they were also able to disclose a variety of citizen interactions with parties in their neighborhoods. The focus group was conducted prior to a scheduled assembly in the atrium of gymnasium on the evening of September 26, 2005.

The third and fourth Santiago focus groups sought perceptions of political parties by citizens who, while maintaining party membership, are relegated to secondary positions within them. One group consisted of four young members of the Christian Democratic Youth (*Juventud Demócrata Cristiana*), based out of the working-class community of San Joaquín. Their agenda included attempts to reassert the role of youth within the party. The other group was formed by members of the Gay and Lesbian Brigade of the Socialist Party (*Brigada Gay-Lésbica del Partido Socialista*). Containing ten members, eight of whom completed the questionnaire, this focus group took place at the Socialist Party headquarters near downtown Santiago on September 28, 2005 during a regularly-scheduled monthly meeting.

### **A.1.6 Buenos Aires Political Party Trust Focus Groups**

In Buenos Aires, the first focus group to discuss perceptions of political parties was formed from members of the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights (*Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos*), or APDH. The group pursues truth and justice for human rights violations committed in Argentina by promoting education and documentation, organizing citizen activities, proposing legal initiatives to protect human rights, and lobbying elected officials for legislation to these ends. APDH's high degree

of contact with political parties and institutions made it a suitable group. The eight focus group participants convened during the first hour of a committee meeting on May 18, 2006.

On June 1, I met with ten students from *Escuela Camino*, a vocational school serving the working-class districts of Vicente López and General San Martín in the Province of Buenos Aires. Students attend *Escuela Camino* in order to acquire basic skills they either did not receive in the public school system or that they need in order to find work. Unemployment makes many of these citizens targets of clientelism and party patronage. Indeed, several indicated they currently receive or used to receive a social plan (e.g. *Plan Trabajar* or *Plan Jefes/Jefas de Hogar*) worth 150 pesos (\$50) per month. Often access to these plan is manipulated by political brokers who leverage them to win political support. Discussion during this engaging session also touched on the themes of democracy, dictatorship, freedoms, and rights.

A third party-trust focus group in Buenos Aires recruited participants from the *Central de los Trabajadores* (CTA). Conceived as a broad working-class coalition, the CTA is federation of trade unions that broke from the *Central General de Trabajadores* (CGT) in 1991. Over one million Argentines are affiliated with the CTA. Not surprisingly, it is an ideologically plural organization, including Socialists, Peronists, Communists, and Trotskyists. It also places candidates on party lists in national, provincial, and local elections. The confederation is governed by internal elections. Four members of the CTA Institute, the educational and policy wing, participated in a focus group at the institute's San Telmo location on June 13, 2006.

The last focus group featured young party members participating in a leadership seminar called PROLID sponsored by the think-tank *Centro de Implementación de la Políticas Públicas para la Equidad y Crecimiento* (CIPPEC). My rationale behind selecting this group was to receive perceptions about parties from citizens working



closely with them. One participant worked for Mauricio Macri's party, *Compromiso para el Cambio*, while the other was affiliated with Ricardo López Murphy's *Recrear* party. Both are Rightist parties.<sup>7</sup> As the facilitator, I was forced to play a somewhat larger role and to move beyond the scripted focusing exercises since there were only two participants. Luckily, they were extremely loquacious and interacted well. The focus group took place on June 14, 2006 at CIPPEC.

### **A.1.7 Questionnaires and Participants**

To check for initial points of divergence on the study topics, I had participants complete a pre-group questionnaire. As Bloor et al. (2001) note, "it is obviously to the advantage of the researcher to have some knowledge of these underlying issues in interpreting the unfolding events of the focus group, to know when there has been silent dissent, or when the developing discussion has caused a modification of initial viewpoints" (40-41). For Santiago I have relatively complete information on forty-two participants though closer to fifty participated in the focus groups. Fairly complete data exists for thirty-four Buenos Aires participants, though thirty-five actually participated. Tables A.1.7 and A.1.7 report selected items from the questionnaire to summary key characteristics of the participants.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Incidentally, these two parties joined to the form *Propuesta Republicana* (PRO) ticket in legislative elections in 2005 and for successful Macri's 2007 bid for the Head of the Government of Buenos Aires, Federal Capital.

<sup>8</sup>Additions to the Buenos Aires questionnaire included questions about education levels, tolerance, voting behavior, and presidential approval. The Buenos Aires questionnaire discarded some questions related only to trust in political institutions for reasons of space.

## Santiago Pre-Group Self-Completion Questionnaire

Grupo \_\_\_\_\_ Participante:

1. Sexo: M/F                      2. Edad: \_\_\_\_\_

3. Comuna: \_\_\_\_\_

4. Ingreso familiar mensual: \_\_\_\_\_

5. ¿Cuánta confianza tienes en las siguientes instituciones políticas?

	<i>Mucha Confianza</i>	<i>Bastante Confianza</i>	<i>Poca Confianza</i>	<i>Nada Confianza</i>
La iglesia				
Las fuerzas armadas				
El sistema judicial				
Los medios				
Los carabineiros				
El gobierno nacional				
El gobierno municipal				
El presidente				
El parlamento				
Los partidos políticos				

6. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes frases estás más de acuerdo?

\_\_\_ La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno.

\_\_\_ En algunas circunstancias, un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático.

\_\_\_ A la gente como uno, nos da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático.

7. Abajo hay varios tipos de sistemas políticos y yo quiero saber lo que piensas sobre cada uno como manera de gobernar este país. Por cada uno, dirías que es muy bueno, bueno, malo, muy malo. Marcar con X en la celda que corresponde.

	<i>Muy bueno</i>	<i>Bueno</i>	<i>No bueno</i>	<i>Malo</i>
Tener a un líder fuerte que no tenga que preocuparse de elecciones ni del parlamento.				
Tener a expertos, más que a políticos que tomen las decisiones conforme a lo que ellos creen mejor para el país.				
Que gobiernen las fuerzas armadas.				
No me importaría si un gobierno no democrático llegara a poder si pudiera resolver los problemas económicos.				
Que el presidente ponga orden por la fuerza				

8. Abajo hay algunas cosas que la gente dicen a veces sobre un sistema político democrático. Favor de indicar si estás de acuerdo fuertemente, estás de acuerdo, no estás de acuerdo, o no estás de acuerdo fuertemente. Marcar con X en la celda que corresponde.

	<i>De Acuerdo Fuertemente</i>	<i>De Acuerdo</i>	<i>No de Acuerdo</i>	<i>No de Acuerdo Fuertemente</i>
A veces la mano dura no le viene mal al país.				
Las democracias son muy indecisas y tienen demasiadas rencillas políticas.				
Las democracias no son buenas para mantener el orden				
La democracia puede tener problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otro modo de gobierno.				

9. Afiliación religiosa: Católico

Evangélico

Judío

Islámico Ateo

Agnóstico

Otra \_\_\_\_\_

10. ¿Con que partido te identificas más? Raya al lado del partido que corresponde.

Partido Comunista (PC)

Partido Humanista (PH)

Partido Social (PS)

Partido Por la Democracia (PPD)

Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC)

Partido Radical Social Demócrata (PRSD)

Renovación Nacional (RN)

Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI)

Otro: \_\_\_\_\_

No me siento cerca a ningún partido político.

11. ¿Estás inscrito en el registro electoral?

**Table A.1: Summary of 42 Santiago Focus Group Participants**

	Freq.	%		Freq.	%
<i>Residence</i>			<i>Age Group</i>		
Conchalí	1	2.44	18-30	19	42.22
El Bosque	1	2.44	31-40	7	15.56
La Florida	1	2.44	41-50	5	11.11
La Granja	6	14.63	51-60	7	15.56
La Reina	1	2.44	61-72	7	15.56
Las Condes	7	17.07			
Maipú	1	2.44	<i>Gender</i>		
Melipilla	2	4.88	Female	25	59.52
Ñuñoa	3	7.32	Male	17	40.48
Peñalolen	1	2.44	<i>Electoral Registration</i>		
Providencia	5	12.20	Registered	38	90.48
Recoleta	1	2.44	Not Registered	4	9.52
San Bernardo	1	2.44	<i>Party Identification</i>		
San Joaquín	2	4.88	JP	1	2.38
San Ramón	1	2.44	PH	1	2.38
Santiago	5	12.20	PS	9	21.43
Vitacura	2	4.88	PPD	4	7.14
<i>Religion Affiliation</i>			PDC	6	14.29
Catholic	20	47.62	RN	3	4.76
Evangelical	4	9.52	UDI	7	16.67
Naturalist	1	2.38	None	11	26.18
Mormon	1	2.38	<i>“Confianza” in Political Parties</i>		
Other	4	9.52	Some + Much	21	50.00
Agnostic	11	26.19	Little + None	21	50.00
Atheist	1	2.38	<i>Linizian Support for Democracy</i>		
			“Democracy is always the best form of government.”	33	82.50
			“In certain circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one.”	7	17.50
			“To people like me it doesn’t matter whether we have an authoritarian or democratic government.”	0	0.00
			<i>Churchillian Support for Democracy</i>		
			“Democracy may have problems but it is better than any other form of government.”		
			Strongly agree	20	47.62
			Agree	18	42.86
			Disagree	3	7.14
			Strongly disagree	1	2.38

*Note:* Tabulations by author based on pre-group self-completion questionnaire. Age group estimated for five participants for whom no other data is available.

## Buenos Aires Pre-Group Self-Completion Questionnaire

Grupo \_\_\_\_\_ Participante:

1. Sexo: M/F                      2. Edad: \_\_\_\_\_

3. Residencia: \_\_\_\_\_ 4. Ingreso familiar mensual: \_\_\_\_\_

5. ¿Cuál es el último nivel de educación alcanzado? (Encierra en un círculo):

Ningún                      Primario incompleto                      Primario completo  
 Secundario incompleto                      Secundario completo                      Terciario incompleto  
 Terciario completo                      Universitario incompleto                      Universitario completo  
 Post grado

6. ¿Cuánta confianza tienes en las siguientes instituciones políticas?

<i>Instituciones</i>	<i>Mucha Confianza</i>	<i>Confianza</i>	<i>Poca Nada Confianza</i>
El presidente			
El gobierno municipal			
El gobierno nacional			
El parlamento			
Los partidos políticos			

7. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes frases estás más de acuerdo?

\_\_\_ La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno.

\_\_\_ En algunas circunstancias, un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático.

\_\_\_ A la gente como uno, nos da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático.

8. Abajo hay varios tipos de sistemas políticos. Yo quiero saber lo que piensas sobre cada uno como sistema para gobernar este país. Respecto de cada uno, dirías que es muy bueno, bueno, malo, muy malo. Marcar con X en la celda que corresponde.

	<i>Muy bueno</i>	<i>Bueno</i>	<i>No tan bueno</i>	<i>Malo</i>
a un líder fuerte que no tenga que e de elecciones ni del parlamento.				
os, más que a políticos que tomen nforme a lo que ellos creen mejor para el país.				
ue gobiernen las fuerzas armadas.				
esidente ponga orden por la fuerza				

9. Abajo hay algunas cosas que la gente dice a veces sobre un sistema político democrático. Favor de indicar si estás de acuerdo fuertemente, estás de acuerdo, no estás de acuerdo, o no estás de acuerdo fuertemente. Marcar con X en la celda que corresponde.

	<i>De Acuerdo Fuertemente</i>	<i>De Acuerdo</i>	<i>No de Acuerdo</i>	<i>No de Acuerdo Fuertemente</i>
A veces la mano dura no le viene mal al país.				
Las democracias son muy indecisas y tienen demasiadas rencillas políticas.				
Las democracias no son buenas para mantener el orden				

---

No me importaría si un gobierno no Democrático llegara al poder, si pudiera resolver los problemas económicos.

La democracia puede tener problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otro modo de gobierno.

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10. Afiliación religiosa \_\_\_\_\_; Practicante? Sí \_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_

11. ¿Con que partido político/alianza política te identificas más?

\_\_\_\_No me siento cerca a ningún partido político.

12. ¿Votaste en las elecciones parlamentarias de 2005? Sí \_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_

¿Por qué partido votó/alianza votaste? \_\_\_\_\_

13. ¿Votaste en las elecciones presidenciales de 2003? Sí \_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_

¿Por qué candidato votaste? \_\_\_\_Carrió \_\_\_\_Kirchner \_\_\_\_López Murphy \_\_\_\_Menem \_\_\_\_Saa  
\_\_\_\_Otro \_\_\_\_No votaste \_\_\_\_Blanco/Nulo

14. Abajo hay un listado de unos grupos de personas. Encierra en un círculo todos los que no te gustaría tener como vecino de al lado.

personas que han cometido un delito    Inmigrantes    Extremistas políticos

militares    alcohólicos    homosexuales    discapacitados

neo-nazis    comunistas    policías

15. ¿Haciendo un balance general entre las cosas que le parecen bien y las que le parecen mal, ¿usted se inclina más o menos a aprobar o desaprobar la gestión de Néstor Kirchner como presidente? Encierre en un círculo:    Aprobar    Desaprobar

16. ¿Cuáles son las principales razones por las que Ud. (aprueba/desaprueba) la gestión de Néstor Kirchner?

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

**Table A.2: Summary of 34 Buenos Aires Focus Group Participants**

	Freq.	%		Freq.	%
<i>Residence</i>			<i>Age Group</i>		
Avellaneda	1	2.94	18-30	18	54.55
Caballito	1	2.94	31-40	6	18.18
Capital Federal	10	29.41	41-50	3	9.09
La Matanza	6	17.64	51-60	3	9.09
Lanus	1	2.94	61-72	3	9.09
La Paternal	1	2.94			
San Isidro	2	5.88	<i>Gender</i>		
San Martín	6	17.64	Female	23	67.65
Vicente López	3	8.82	Male	11	32.35
Villa Urquiza	1	2.94	<i>Party Identification</i>		
Villa del Parque	2	5.88	Socialist	6	17.64
			ARI	4	8.82
<i>Religion Affiliation</i>			Peronism	2	5.88
Agnostic	4	11.76	UCR	1	2.94
Atheist	5	14.71	Recrear	1	2.94
Catholic	11	32.35	CPC	1	2.94
Evangelical	1	2.94	None	20	58.82
Jehovah's Witness	1	2.94	<i>Confianza in Political Parties</i>		
Protestant	1	2.94	Some + Much	21	50.00
			Little + None	21	50.00
<i>Vote Choice: President 2003</i>			<i>President Kirchner's Performance</i>		
Carrió	5	15.15	Approve	12	35.29
Kirchner	8	24.24	Disapprove	4	11.76
López Murphy	4	12.12	DK/NR	18	21.42
Other	3	9.09			
Blank/null	4	12.12			
DK/NR	9	27.27			
<i>Linzian Support for Democracy</i>					
			"Democracy is always the best form of government."	29	85.29
			"In certain circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one."	3	8.82
			"To people like me it doesn't matter whether we have an authoritarian or democratic government."	2	5.88
<i>Churchillian Support for Democracy</i>					
			"Democracy may have problems but it is better than any other form of government."		
			Strongly agree	11	32.35
			Agree	13	38.23
			Disagree	4	11.76
			Strongly disagree	3	8.82
			DK/NR	2	5.88

*Note:* Tabulations by author based on pre-group self-completion questionnaire.

## A.2 Interviews

Focus groups may not be ideal for investigating socially undesirable topics (Morgan, 1997; Bloor et al., 2001) such as military coups and intolerance. Therefore I conducted a series of interviews with subjects with less-than-liberal orientations to democracy. The interviews probed the same topics as the focus groups, but followed a less strict format than the focus groups. None of the interviewees were focus-group participants, although my snow-balling sample lead me to seek individuals that may have some relation to the pre-existing groups from which I recruited focus-group participants. Some interviewees agreed to complete the same questionnaire as the focus group members. But in the majority of cases, based on a number of prior and contextual cues, I either did not ask them or did not insist that they complete the questionnaire. For some the subject matter was so sensitive and emotional that I took notes taken by hand in order to foster a more congenial atmosphere. Therefore, I do not report a formal summary of interview characteristics nor do I have complete transcripts of the interviews. Below, I provide a sketch of each of the interviewees.

The interviewees in Santiago were an upper-middle class business man from the wealthy borough of Las Condes; a man who is an ex-militant of the fascist anti-Marxist pro-coup group, *Frente Nacionalista Patria y Libertad*; a leader in Chile's conservative Catholic organization, *Acción Familia*; a man who prior to the 1973 coup was a militant in the *Partido Nacional* who also worked as a journalist for the conservative U.S.-backed pro-coup newspaper, *El Mercurio*; and an executive of *Corporación Chilena de Madera* (CORMA), the professional guild of the timber and forestry industry. In Buenos Aires I interviewed a committee leader coalition, *Central de los Trabajadores* (CTA); a leader of pro-democracy group of ex-military officers, *Centro de Militares para la Democracia* (CEMIDA); a leader of the occupation of Chilavert printing press in Pompeya; two leaders of the occupied Hotel Bauen; a middle-class young woman from Villa Ballester



employed in the state health care system; an upper-class woman from Recoleta; and a leader of a Falkland Islands War veterans group.

### **A.3 Q-Sort Methodology**

Since the goal of the Q-study was to delineate competing democratic belief systems and rubrics of political party trustworthiness. In this sense, the focus groups and interviews informed my construction of the Q-sort methodological exercises carried out during the second phase of my field research Santiago and Buenos Aires in several ways. These methods underscored the orientations towards democracy and attitudes and beliefs about political parties that were most controversial in both cases. That helped me to decided which dimensions of these concepts I would seek to measure in the Q-study. When it came to building the core Q-sample of thirty-six phrases, i.e. the set of items subjects Q-sort, I could match these themes to existing survey items in the literature, or construct my own survey-style items to include in the Q-sample. The core set of thirty-six items presented below in Table A.3 Finally, I used twelve items from the focus-group transcripts and interviews to form a sub-sample of verbatim items included in a second round of Q-sorting. These twelve items are well documented and discussed in Chapter 3.

The sequence of events for any Q-sort participant was as follows: (1) a brief introduction to the project; (2) participant completes a pre-Q-sort questionnaire; (3) research team gives instructions on how to complete the Q-sort; (4) participants sort 24 survey-style items on trust in political parties according to a model Q-sort; (5) research team member records information; (6) research team member gives the participant 12 additional items taken nearly verbatim from the focus groups and interviews and gives instructions on how to integrate the items into a new 36-item model Q-sort; (7) research team member records information; (8) participant sort 36 survey-style items

Table A.3: Factorial Design of Core 36-Item Support for Democracy Q-Sample

A. 4 Orientations	(a) Liberal	(b) Contingent	(c) Illiberal	(d) Uncommitted
B. 3 Dimensions	(e) Preference for Democracy	(f) Political Rights & Procedures	(g) Civil Liberties	
Q-Sample (N) = (Orientations)(Dimensions)(Replications) = ([A][B])(m)				
(A)(B) = (4)(3) = 12 Combinations				
(m) = 3 Replications				
N = (12)(3) = 36 Statements				
<b>Democratic Governance</b>				
<i>ae</i> <sub>1</sub> : Democracy is preferable to any other form of government.				
<i>ae</i> <sub>2</sub> : Democracy may have problems, but it's better than any other form of government.				
<i>ae</i> <sub>3</sub> : Under no circumstance could there ever be sufficient reason for a coup d'etat.				
<i>be</i> <sub>1</sub> : In certain circumstances an authoritarian government could be preferable to a democratic government.				
<i>be</i> <sub>2</sub> : I would support an authoritarian government if it resolves economic problems.				
<i>be</i> <sub>3</sub> : There are certain junctures which require that the president leave congress behind.				
<i>ce</i> <sub>1</sub> : Things cannot be resolved. Our country needs a government with a heavy hand.				
<i>ce</i> <sub>2</sub> : There are other forms of government that could be as good as or better than democracy.				
<i>ce</i> <sub>3</sub> : We would be better off if the military were governing the country.				
<i>de</i> <sub>1</sub> : To people like me it doesn't matter if we have a democratic or undemocratic regime.				
<i>de</i> <sub>2</sub> : For me there isn't a big difference between democratic governments and dictatorships. So the type of regime doesn't really matter to me.				
<i>de</i> <sub>3</sub> : I wouldn't care if the military came to power again.				
<b>Political Rights &amp; Procedures</b>				
<i>af</i> <sub>1</sub> : Except for those excluded by the Constitution, all Chileans deserve the right to vote, even those who protest against the government.				
<i>af</i> <sub>2</sub> : Any citizen of voting age should be allowed to run for public office.				
<i>af</i> <sub>3</sub> : All political parties, including extremist ones, should be permitted to participate in national elections.				
<i>bf</i> <sub>1</sub> : When the country lacks order the right to vote can be restricted.				
<i>bf</i> <sub>2</sub> : For the common good, sometimes you have to suspend the rights of persons with extremist ideas to run for publicly elected offices.				
<i>bf</i> <sub>3</sub> : In times of national crisis it's alright to prohibit a political party from participating in national elections.				
<i>cf</i> <sub>1</sub> : Besides those excluded by law, there are other groups and kinds of people that should not be able to vote.				
<i>cf</i> <sub>2</sub> : Homosexuals should not have the right to run for public office.				
<i>cf</i> <sub>3</sub> : The participation of neo-nazi political parties in national elections should be prohibited.				
<i>df</i> <sub>1</sub> : It's all the same whether or not the great majority have the right to vote or only a few people.				
<i>df</i> <sub>2</sub> : It doesn't matter to me if certain people are restricted from their right to run for office.				
<i>df</i> <sub>3</sub> : It wouldn't matter to me if a political party were prohibited from participating in national elections.				
<b>Civil Liberties</b>				
<i>ag</i> <sub>1</sub> : Our government has to guarantee all citizens the right to associate.				
<i>ag</i> <sub>2</sub> : I approve of people participating in legal public protests.				
<i>ag</i> <sub>3</sub> : I don't approve of the government censoring the media that criticizes it.				
<i>bg</i> <sub>1</sub> : It is fine for our government to limit the right to associate for a period of time.				
<i>bg</i> <sub>2</sub> : In times of crisis, I would approve of a law that prohibited public protests.				
<i>bg</i> <sub>3</sub> : In the case of a social emergency I would approve of the government censoring the media.				
<i>cg</i> <sub>1</sub> : In general, the government should limit the right to form associations.				
<i>cg</i> <sub>2</sub> : I don't approve of people participating in manifestations under any circumstance.				
<i>cg</i> <sub>3</sub> : I approve of the government censoring communications media that criticize it.				
<i>dg</i> <sub>1</sub> : The right to form associations is not crucial for our country.				
<i>dg</i> <sub>2</sub> : Public protest is not a necessary right for our society.				
<i>dg</i> <sub>3</sub> : It wouldn't worry me if the government censored the communications media that criticize it.				

on democratic support according to a model Q-sort; (9) research team member records information; (10) research team member gives the participant 12 additional items taken nearly verbatim from the focus groups and interviews and gives instructions on how to integrate the items into a new 48-item model Q-sort; (11) research team member records information. When these tasks are complete, the Q-sort exercise is finished.

Recruitment of Q-study participants, or the “P-sample” took many forms. Note that none of these participants overlapped with focus group participants or interviewees in order to avoid bias. Unlike survey research, Q-methods do not require a large number of participants, and they need not be randomly selected. Instead, Q seeks to maximize the diversity of perspectives by recruiting participants who are likely to have distinct views of the concept. Therefore, I and my research team recruited participants come from contrasting backgrounds. As with the focus group, Q-study participants were offered refreshments and, if necessary, transportation costs for their participation. While we recruited 92 participants in Santiago 102 in Buenos Aires. However, the analyses presented above are based on samples of fewer participants. Several factors caused these missing data points. Among the most common were (1) the research team’s illegible handwriting, (2) participants accidentally mixing the small laminated card from the various Q-samples, (3) participants leaving without completing each of the Q-sorts, and, extremely infrequently, (4) participants’ inability or unwillingness to complete one or more of the Q-sorts.

### **A.3.1 Questionnaires and Participants**

As with participants in the focus groups, I administered questionnaires to the participants in the Q-study before they engaged in the Q-sorting activities. The purpose of this was to allow me to compare how well (or poorly) standard questions of democratic support and political trust correlate with the more nuanced measures formed in the Q-analyses. Below Tables A.3.1 and A.3.1 describe the sample of participants who completed Q-sorts in Santiago and Buenos Aires. For reference, I also report the questionnaire as printed in Spanish. Though the vast majority of the questions are the same between the two cases, some modifications were added to the Buenos Aires questionnaire.

## Santiago Pre-Q-Sort Self-Completion Questionnaire

Grupo \_\_\_\_\_

Participante:

1. Sexo: M/F

2. Edad: \_\_\_\_\_

3. Comuna: \_\_\_\_\_

4. Ingreso familiar mensual: \_\_\_\_\_

5. ¿Cuánta confianza tienes en las siguientes instituciones políticas?

<i>Instituciones</i>	<i>Mucha Confianza</i>	<i>Confianza</i>	<i>Poca Confianza</i>	<i>Nada Confianza</i>
El presidente				
El gobierno municipal				
El gobierno nacional				
El parlamento				
Los partidos políticos				

6. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes frases estás más de acuerdo?

\_\_\_ La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno.

\_\_\_ En algunas circunstancias, un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático.

\_\_\_ A la gente como uno, nos da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático.

7. Abajo hay varios tipos de sistemas políticos y yo quiero saber lo que piensas sobre cada uno como manera de gobernar este país. Por cada uno, dirías que es muy bueno, bueno, malo, muy malo. Marcar con X en la celda que corresponde.

	<i>Muy bueno</i>	<i>Bueno</i>	<i>No bueno</i>	<i>Malo</i>
Tener a un líder fuerte que no tenga que preocuparse de elecciones ni del parlamento.				
Tener a expertos, más que a políticos que tomen las decisiones conforme a lo que ellos creen mejor para el país.				
Que gobiernen las fuerzas armadas.				
No me importaría si un gobierno no democrático llegara a poder si pudiera resolver los problemas económicos.				
Que el presidente ponga orden por la fuerza				

8. Abajo hay algunas cosas que la gente dicen a veces sobre un sistema político democrático. Favor de indicar si estás de acuerdo fuertemente, estás de acuerdo, no estás de acuerdo, o no estás de acuerdo fuertemente. Marcar con X en la celda que corresponde.

	<i>De Acuerdo Fuertemente</i>	<i>De Acuerdo</i>	<i>No de Acuerdo</i>	<i>No de Acuerdo Fuertemente</i>
A veces la mano dura no le viene mal al país.				
Las democracias son muy indecisas y tienen demasiadas rencillas políticas.				
Las democracias no son buenas para mantener el orden				
La democracia puede tener problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otro modo de gobierno.				

9. Afiliación religiosa: Católico      Evangélico      Judío      Islámico Ateo      Agnóstico  
Otra \_\_\_\_\_

10. ¿Con que partido te identificas más? Raya al lado del partido que corresponde.

- Partido Comunista (PC)
- Partido Humanista (PH)
- Partido Social (PS)
- Partido Por la Democracia (PPD)
- Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC)
- Partido Radical Social Demócrata (PRSD)
- Renovación Nacional (RN)
- Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI)
- Otro: \_\_\_\_\_
- No me siento cerca a ningún partido político.

11. ¿Estás inscrito en el registro electoral?

12. Abajo hay un listado de unos grupos de personas. Marcar con X todos los que no te gustaría tener como vecino de al lado:

- |  |                                      |  |                                      |
|--|--------------------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> personas que han cometido un delito | <input type="checkbox"/> inmigrantes | <input type="checkbox"/> extremistas políticos |                                      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> militares                           | <input type="checkbox"/> alcohólicos | <input type="checkbox"/> homosexuales          | <input type="checkbox"/> drogadictos |
| <input type="checkbox"/> discapacitados                      | <input type="checkbox"/> neo-nazis   | <input type="checkbox"/> comunistas            | <input type="checkbox"/> fascistas   |

**Table A.4: Summary of 92 Santiago Q-Study Participants**

	Freq.	%		Freq.	%
<i>Residence</i>			<i>Age Group</i>		
Cerro Navia	1	1.12	18-30	27	30.68
La Florida	2	2.25	31-40	29	32.95
La Granja	9	10.10	41-50	17	19.32
La Reina	3	3.37	51-60	8	9.09
Las Condes	8	8.99	61-76	7	7.95
Macul	2	2.25	<i>Gender</i>		
Maipú	1	1.12	Female	56	60.87
Ñuñoa	7	7.87	Male	36	39.13
Peñalolen	1	1.12	<i>Electoral Registration</i>		
Pirque	1	1.12	Registered	67	80.72
Providencia	4	4.49	Not Registered	16	19.28
Puente Alto	1	1.12	<i>Party Identification</i>		
Quilicura	1	1.12	PC/PH/JP/PDI	1	11.96
Quinta Normal	9	10.10	PS	14	15.22
Recoleta	1	1.12	PPD	7	7.61
San Joaquín	1	1.12	PDC	10	10.87
San Ramón	21	23.60	RN	5	5.43
Santiago	14	15.70	UDI	5	5.43
Vitacura	2	2.25	None	35	38.04
<i>Religion Affiliation</i>			DK/NR	5	5.43
Catholic	40	43.48	<i>Confianza in Political Parties</i>		
Evangelical	7	7.61	Some + Much	77	87.50
Other	2	2.17	Little + None	11	12.50
Agnostic	8	8.70	<i>Sometimes mano dura is good for the country.</i>		
Atheist	2	2.17	Stongly Agree + Agree	40	43.48
None	16	17.39	Strongly Disagree + Disagree	47	51.09
DK/NR	17	18.48	DK/NR	5	5.43
<i>Linzian Support for Democracy</i>					
“Democracy is always the best form of government.”				57	69.51
“In certain circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one.”				18	21.95
“To people like me it doesn’t matter whether we have an authoritarian or democratic government.”				7	8.54
<i>Churchillian Support for Democracy</i>					
“Democracy may have problems but it is better than any other form of government.”					
Strongly agree				39	46.43
Agree				28	33.33
Disagree				13	15.48
Strongly disagree				4	4.76

*Note:* Tabulations by author based on pre-group self-completion questionnaire.

## Buenos Aires Pre-Q-Sort Self-Completion Questionnaire

### Cuestionario

Participante:

1. Sexo: M/F 2. Edad: \_\_\_\_\_ 3. Residencia: \_\_\_\_\_  
 4a. Ingreso familiar mensual: \_\_\_\_\_ 4b. Plan Social (ej. Jefes/as) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

5. ¿Cuál es el último nivel de educación alcanzado? (Marca con X):

Primario incompleto                       Primario completo  
 Secundario incompleto                     Secundario completo  
 Terciario incompleto                       Terciario completo  
 Universitario incompleto                   Universitario completo  
 Post grado                                     Ningún

6. Afiliación religiosa \_\_\_\_\_; Practicante? Sí \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

7. ¿Con que partido político/alianza política te identificás más? Ningún \_\_\_\_\_

8. ¿Cuánta confianza tienes en las siguientes instituciones políticas?

<i>Instituciones</i>	<i>Mucha Confianza</i>	<i>Confianza</i>	<i>Poca Confianza</i>	<i>Nada Confianza</i>
El presidente				
El gobierno municipal				
El gobierno nacional				
El parlamento				
Los partidos políticos				

9. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo?

La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno.  
 En algunas circunstancias, un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático.  
 A la gente como uno, nos da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático.

10. Abajo hay varios tipos de sistemas políticos. Yo quiero saber lo que pensás sobre cada uno como sistema para gobernar este país. Respecto de cada uno, ¿dirías que es muy bueno, bueno, no tan bueno, malo? Marcar con X en la celda que corresponde.

	<i>Muy bueno</i>	<i>Bueno</i>	<i>No tan bueno</i>	<i>Malo</i>
Tener a un líder fuerte que no tenga que preocuparse de elecciones ni del parlamento.				
Tener a expertos, más que a políticos que tomen las decisiones conforme a lo que ellos creen mejor para el país.				
Que gobiernen las fuerzas armadas.				
Que el presidente ponga orden por la fuerza				

11. Abajo hay algunas cosas que la gente dice a veces sobre un sistema político democrático. Favor de indicar si estás de acuerdo fuertemente, estás de acuerdo, no estás de acuerdo, o no estás de acuerdo fuertemente. Marcar con X en la celda que corresponde.

	<i>De Acuerdo Fuertemente</i>	<i>De Acuerdo</i>	<i>No de Acuerdo</i>	<i>No de Acuerdo Fuertemente</i>
A veces la mano dura no le viene mal al país.				
En la democracia, el sistema económico funciona mal.				
Las democracias son muy indecisas y tienen demasiadas rencillas políticas.				
Las democracias no son buenas para mantener el orden				
No me importaría si un gobierno no democrático llegara al poder, si pudiera resolver los problemas económicos.				
La democracia puede tener problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otro modo de gobierno				

12. ¿Votaste en las elecciones parlamentarias de 2005? Sí \_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_ Blanco/Nulo \_\_\_\_  
 ¿Por qué partido votó/alianza votaste? \_\_\_\_\_

13. ¿Votaste en las elecciones presidenciales de 2003? Sí \_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_ Blanco/Nulo \_\_\_\_  
 ¿Por qué candidato votaste? Carrió \_\_\_\_ Kirchner \_\_\_\_ López Murphy \_\_\_\_ Menem \_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_ Saa Otro: \_\_\_\_\_

14. Abajo hay un listado de unos grupos de personas. Marcar con X todos los que no te gustaría tener como vecino de al lado:

\_\_\_\_ personas que han cometido un delito \_\_\_\_ inmigrantes \_\_\_\_ extremistas políticos  
 \_\_\_\_ militares \_\_\_\_ alcohólicos \_\_\_\_ drogadictos \_\_\_\_ homosexuales  
 \_\_\_\_ discapacitados \_\_\_\_ neo-nazis \_\_\_\_ comunistas \_\_\_\_ policías

15. ¿Con qué frecuencia has participado en las siguientes acciones políticas?

<i>Actividad Política</i>	<i>Varias Veces</i>	<i>Una vez</i>	<i>Nunca</i>
Firmar una petición			
Participar en un boicot			
Asistir a una manifestación o marcha legal			
Participar en una huelga no oficial			
Ocupar una fabrica o un edificio			
Cortar una ruta o un puente			
Participar en saqueos			

16. Marcar con X todos los tipos de organizaciones en las que sos miembro: \_\_\_\_ Deportiva  
 \_\_\_\_ Religiosa \_\_\_\_ Arte/cultural/educacional \_\_\_\_ Sindicato o Gremio \_\_\_\_ Comedor  
 \_\_\_\_ Movimiento Social \_\_\_\_ Partido Político \_\_\_\_ ONG \_\_\_\_ Profesional  
 \_\_\_\_ Caridad/Solidaridad \_\_\_\_ Asamblea Barrial \_\_\_\_ Sociedad de Fomento



**Table A.5: Summary of 82 Buenos Aires Q-Study Participants**

	Freq.	%		Freq.	%
<i>Residence</i>			<i>Age Group</i>		
<b>Buenos Aires, C.F.</b>	47	57.32	18-30	46	56.10
Almagro/Caballito	4	4.88	31-40	13	15.85
Balvanera/S.Cristo.	2	2.44	41-50	3	3.66
Flores	1	1.22	51-60	14	17.07
Floresta/Liniers	2	2.44	61-76	6	7.32
Montserrat	2	2.44	<i>Gender</i>		
Nueva Pompeya	4	4.88	Female	56	60.87
Nuñez	1	1.22	Male	36	39.13
Palermo/Recoleta	17	20.73	<i>Vote Choice: President 2003</i>		
Villa 31	9	10.98	Carrió	17	20.73
V.Crespo/Pat./Agro.	3	3.66	Kirchner	17	20.73
V.Devoto/V.G.Mitre	2	2.44	Menem	3	2.44
<b>Buenos Aires Prov.</b>	35	42.68	López Murphy	19	23.17
Almirante Brown	9	10.98	Walsh	3	3.66
Escobar/Pilar	2	2.44	<i>Party Identification</i>		
Morón	1	1.22	PO/PH/MAS/MST	8	9.76
S.Fernando/S.Isidro	3	3.66	PJ/FPV	4	4.88
San Martín	11	13.41	ARI	5	6.10
Vicente López	9	10.98	UCR	2	2.44
<i>Religion Affiliation</i>			Recrear/CPC/PRO	5	6.10
Catholic	38	46.34	None	58	70.73
Evangelical	5	6.10	<i>Confianza in Political Parties</i>		
Christian Orthodox	5	6.10	Some + Much	65	82.28
Protestant	4	4.88	Little + None	14	17.72
Jewish	3	3.66	<i>Sometimes mano dura is good for the country.</i>		
Atheist	1	1.22	Stongly Agree + Agree	64	80.00
None	23	28.05	Strongly Disagree + Disagree	16	20.00
<i>Linzian Support for Democracy</i>					
“Democracy is always the best form of government.”				78	96.12
“In certain circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one.”				2	2.4
“To people like me it doesn’t matter whether we have an authoritarian or democratic government.”				2	2.44
<i>Churchillian Support for Democracy</i>					
“Democracy may have problems but it is better than any other form of government.”					
Strongly agree				41	51.25
Agree				31	38.75
Disagree				6	7.50
Strongly disagree				2	2.50

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