THE PARTICIPATING POOR: THE EFFECT OF CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS ON BENEFICIARY POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

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ABSTRACT

CLAIRE E. DUNN: The Participating Poor: The Effect of Conditional Cash Transfers on Beneficiary Political Participation
(Under the direction of Evelyne Huber.)

Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs entered the social policy scene in Mexico and Brazil in the mid-1990s and have since been adopted by policymakers throughout Latin America. While the effects of these programs on health, education, child labor and poverty have been widely studied, the political effects have not been considered in nearly as much depth. Yet we know from studying other social policies that they often have consequences beyond their intended goals. In this paper I build on the existing literature on CCTs and the political consequences of social policies to examine the effect of CCTs on broad political participation. Using survey data from across Latin America and the Caribbean, I find that beneficiaries of CCTs are more likely to participate in a variety of electoral and non-electoral types of participation. Using the same survey data, I also aim to understand the mechanisms that lead CCT beneficiaries to participate at higher rates than non-beneficiaries. I find that beneficiaries express higher levels of political interest, stronger senses of political efficacy and greater trust in political institutions than non-beneficiaries. I argue increased participation among CCT beneficiaries is a result of policy feedback effects, but that these feedback effects are the opposite of what existing literature on advanced democracies would lead us to expect, indicating a need to adjust our theories to the Latin American context. [1]

[1] I thank the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and its major supporters (the United States Agency for International Development, the United Nations Development Program, the Inter-American Development Bank, and Vanderbilt University) for making the data available.

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INTRODUCTION

Conditional cash transfers(CCTs), programs that provide cash transfers to low-income families provided that they comply with certain conditions related to the development of human capital among their children, became a major new tool in Latin American social policy in the mid-1990s. With few exceptions, the programs are now found throughout the region and have been shown to have major effects on poverty-reduction, school attendance and utilization of health services(Fiszbein, Schady and Ferreira 2009). These wide-ranging positive effects are all the more impressive given that CCTs cost just 0.3 to 0.4 percent of GDP on average(Paes-Sousa, Regalia and Stampini 2013).

Despite the fact the CCTs have been so widely studied and have been adopted in countries across the world, we do not know a great deal about the political effects of CCTs. In political science, the study of CCTs has narrowly focused on whether or not the programs are insulated from clientelism and, as such, has focused almost exclusively on voting behavior. To date our knowledge about the political effects of CCTs beyond voting remains limited. Given that these programs cover so many citizens, nearly a quarter of the region's population in 2010 (Paes-Sousa, Regalia and Stampini 2013), understanding how these policies impact political behavior among beneficiaries is a substantively important question.

Literature on advanced capitalist democracies suggests that social policies can have wider ranging effects on the political behavior of beneficiaries and likewise suggests that the nature of these effects is related to the design of the policy. While this literature is quite rich, limited work has considered how these findings may translate to the context of less-developed states. This literature would lead us to assume, for instance, that CCT programs should actually serve as a disincentive for political participation among beneficiaries because of the conditions they impose(Watson 2015; Bruch, Ferree and Soss 2010). In this paper I argue that we need to change our expectations for Latin America. Not only are

baseline participation levels of the poor in Latin America higher than we see in more developed countries like the United States(Booth and Seligson 2008), but the welfare state is also much less extensive(Huber and Stephens 2012). Likewise, the conditions associated with CCTs are often not enforced or, when enforced, are used as a means of identifying when families may need more help rather than less(Bastagli 2009). I argue that these new and positive interactions with the state should increase the political interest of beneficiaries as well as their sense of political efficacy and trust in political institutions resulting in higher levels of political participation compared to other citizens of similar socioeconomic status.

To test my argument I use the 2014 Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) AmericasBarometer survey data. The AmericasBarometer survey is a representative survey of voting age individuals throughout Latin America and the Caribbean and is particularly useful because it asks respondents if they benefit from a conditional cash transfer program[2] . My sample includes all countries in which a CCT program is present and in which citizens were asked about their beneficiary status. The survey also asks respondents about their participation in a number of political activities, their level of political interest and probes their senses of political efficacy and trust making it well suited for me to consider not only the level of participation among CCT beneficiaries, but also to test the mechanisms I suspect are at work in leading to increased participation.

The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections. First I examine what we know about the feedback effects of social policies and discuss why these theories may need to be adjusted to fit the Latin American context. Second, I discuss the data and methods I use to test my theory. Third, I discuss the results of my statistical tests and finally I conclude and provide steps for future research.

Political Participation and Social Policy

Before examining how social policies can impact political participation, it is first important to consider what political participation looks like and who tends to participate. Democ-

[2] The actual survey questions used are included in the appendix

racy is based on the concept of citizen participation in governing. While the precise definition of democracy is often debated, no definition excludes the role of participation by the people. Beyond being a basic component of democracy, political participation can be seen as key to the quality of democracy. Where a greater portion of the population actively participates in politics, the government is responsive to a greater portion of the citizenry(Altman and Pérez-Liñán 2002). We should think then of participation not just as an integral part of democracy, but that frequent and diffuse participation is integral to high quality democracy.

Political participation is a broad concept. I follow Seligson and Booth (1976) in defining political participation as an action taken to influence the political system at any level as well as working collectively to solve problems not addressed by the government. Voting is perhaps the most obvious variety of participation, however many more political activities should also be considered.

Different types of political participation are more or less frequent depending on the level of initiative, coordination, and information required to complete each(Verba, Nie and Kim 1987). Voting, for instance, requires minimal information, initiative, or coordination and therefore a large portion of the population often participates in this way. Contacting a public official, on the other hand, while still requiring low coordination, requires high information and high initiative resulting in lower rates of participation.

I consider nine types of participation including voting, attending different types of political meetings, solving a community problem, contacting political officials and protesting. While protest is often categorized as an unconventional form of participation and therefore excluded from many studies of political participation, I choose to include it because protest is relevant in this case. The increased demand for health and education services by beneficiaries due to CCT conditionalities, it was thought, should lead to pressures on the government for increased supply as well as improved quality of such services. Some beneficiary protests have been reported (2006 CCT beneficiary protests for better health services in Panama, for example), though they have been few.

Political participation does not happen in a vacuum and a citizen's propensity to participate can be influenced through demographic factors as well as contextual factors. A

large body of literature has argued that political participation is also effected by public policies. This literature focuses on the idea of policy feedback effects and is the foundation of my argument for why CCT beneficiaries are more likely to participate in politics than non-beneficiaries.

Policy feedback effects arguments build on the idea that "new policies create a new politics"(Schattschneider 1935). Policies create both incentives and resources that influence the actions of groups influenced by that policy (Pierson 1993). That social policies have feedback effects is not a new concept and many studies have considered what such effects might be. The majority of this literature has focused on the United States and Western Europe. For example, Social Security in the United States led to a major mobilization of senior citizens. Once among the least likely to participate, senior citizens of all education and income levels have become among the most politically active groups following the expansion of Social Security(Campbell 2003).

The feedback effects of social policies, however, are not always positive. Looking more specifically at particular types of welfare programs, a number of studies have a found that universal welfare programs increase participation, while targeted, means-tested programs have the opposite effect(Kumlin 2004; Mettler and Stonecash 2008; Bruch, Ferree and Soss 2010; Watson 2015). Targeted programs, though, can have a positive effect if they are not highly stigmatized (Watson 2015) or if the policy's authority structure is democratic instead of paternalistic(Bruch, Ferree and Soss 2010). The structure of the program is key to understanding what effects the policy will have on beneficiaries.

Based on the trends observed in the United States and Europe we might be expect CCTs to have a negative impact on participation due to the targeted and conditional nature of the programs. However, the literature on developing countries casts doubt on this assumption; CCTs can actually lead to increased participation. Scholars have identified electoral effects from CCT programs. In Brazil, Bolsa Familia has led to an electoral bonus for the incumbent party presidential candidate, regardless of their party identification, but has not lead to a bonus for other members of the president's party or caused beneficiaries to change party identification(Hunter and Power 2007; Zucco 2008, 2013). Similar patterns are found

in Mexico(De La O 2013; Díaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2009). Most of this work has the underlying goal of identifying whether or not these programs are used in a clientelistic manner, but it has largely been acknowledged that, at least in the cases of Brazil and Mexico, the electoral bonus from the CCT is due to a mobilizing mechanism compatible with programmatic politics rather than a persuasive mechanism(De La O 2013).

I have already acknowledged, however, that political participation goes beyond voting behavior. There is some evidence that Mexico's CCT program has led CCT beneficiaries to contact public officials, engage in community activism, and engage in civil society at higher rates than non-beneficiaries(Schober 2013). If this effect exists in Mexico, we may expect to see similar effects from CCTs in other countries.

Given the evidence found in this literature, we are then left to wonder why CCTs may have the opposite effect than we should expect given the findings from studies of feedback effects on targeted social policies in advanced democracies. I aim to explain the gap.

The policy feedback effects literature would suggest that the conditions associated with CCTs are paternalistic and therefore keep beneficiaries marginalized rather than giving them an incentive to participate more. While it is possible to argue that CCTs are paternalistic due to the conditions, I argue that paternalism is in fact limited. While the programs have behavioral requirements attached to them, this is balanced out to some extent by the fact that these programs are based on joint responsibility of the family to bring their children to school and regular health appointments, but also the state to provide and improve education and health services (Rawlings 2006). Likewise, in some Latin American countries, such as Brazil, access to public health and education services are considered constitutional rights so the conditions can also be considered simply as a mechanism for encouraging citizens to realize their rights to such services.

Finally, enforcement of conditions varies greatly by country. Some countries, such as Ecuador, encourage beneficiaries to increase usage of health and educations services, but do not actually monitor compliance. In these cases the paternalistic aspect of the programs is certainly minimized. Other countries, like Brazil, do monitor compliance with conditionality and take steps to address non-compliance, but do so in a step by step manner where

initial enforcement is a warning and continued failure to comply is met with gradually more serious responses. Non-compliance, though, is actually viewed as a sign that the family may need additional support rather than as a reason to punish them(Bastagli 2009). With this type of enforcement, again, the paternalistic aspect is somewhat minimized.

In addition to programs being less paternalistic than perhaps assumed, CCTs often represent beneficiaries initial interaction with the welfare state. One of the key differences between the Latin American context and the US or European context is the size of the welfare state. The Latin American welfare state is less developed than the welfare states of the advanced industrial world and has largely been linked to formal sector employment(Huber and Stephens 2012). As such, those who benefit from CCT programs are generally people who were not previously incorporated into the welfare state. Welfare programs have the ability to either reinforce the marginal status of citizens by excluding them from such programs or incorporating them only in paternalistic programs or, conversely, to draw them into democratic society(Soss 2000). As I have already argued against CCTs being strongly paternalistic, I argue that by incorporating new citizens into the welfare state, they are being drawn into democratic society and given more full citizenship rights. The realization of such rights should give beneficiaries a greater stake in democratic politics and therefore a greater interest in participating to influence such politics.

I argue that the key mechanisms driving higher levels of participation by CCT beneficiaries are tied to this inclusion in the welfare state. Particularly, I argue that benefiting from a CCT will lead to increased levels of political interest and sense of political efficacy as well as higher levels of trust in institutions. Following the idea of policy feedbacks, by gaining a clear stake in the political system, politics have become salient in the lives of beneficiary families in a way that they were not before they were tied to the state through a CCT. By being newly included in the welfare state and having benefits tied to the use of state-provided services like public education and health care facilities, CCT beneficiaries are likely to begin to see politics as quite central to their lives. Hunter and Sugiyama find some evidence of this when asking beneficiaries what they would do if politicians were to eliminate Bolsa Familia. Respondents replied that they would vote against any politician

making such claims as well as protest and sign petitions should such a person get elected and move forward with eliminating the program (Hunter and Sugiyama 2014). Such responses provide evidence that beneficiaries, at least in Brazil, have an interest in politics as a result of their status as beneficiaries. As such, I hypothesize that beneficiaries should have increased levels of political interest compared to non-beneficiaries controlling for levels of education, wealth and other key factors that may impact political interest.

In addition, seeing the state responding to their needs may lead to increased feelings of political efficacy among beneficiaries. Political efficacy refers both to the idea that politicians are responsive to citizen demands and that citizens feel they are able to influence the political process. The way in which a policy is formulated has the potential to convey the positive message to beneficiaries that they are deserving and the government cares about helping them or, conversely, that they are burdensome. When beneficiaries receive the more positive message, they may see the government as responsive to their needs(Schneider and Ingram 1993). Similarly, beneficiaries may view the government as responsive to their needs when the policy leads them to have positive interactions with a government agency. For example, Hunter and Sugiyama note that beneficiaries of Bolsa Familia are those who historically would have received social benefits through clientelistic means. The CCT benefit on the other hand, is largely viewed by beneficiaries as free from influence of single politician or group of politicians; rather than being viewed as contingent, benefits are seen as a right(Hunter and Sugiyama 2014). The process of receiving a benefit in a non-clientelistic manner may lead to an increased sense of political efficacy. Likewise, evidence from a short-term CCT programs in Uruguay showed that beneficiaries of that program reported higher levels of confidence in the government(Manacorda, Miguel and Vigorito 2011). When political efficacy is higher, we should expect levels of political participation to be higher as well(Seligson 1980).

Trust in government institutions is closely tied to political efficacy in the literature. Trust has been cited as a key factor in driving political participation(Cruz-Coke 2001; Almond and Verba 1963), but the literature is far from conclusive on the impact of trust on participation. Many studies have considered the effect of trust on political participation and the

findings are quite varied with some suggesting that high trust, particularly when combined with high efficacy, leads to increased political participation(Gamson 1968) while others have found evidence that trust does not play an important role, but rather political efficacy is the main driver of participation(Seligson 1980). Given the lack of consensus in the literature, I choose to consider trust along with efficacy and hypothesize that beneficiaries will express higher levels of trust in government and that this higher level of trust contributes to greater levels of participation.

Additional explanations for why CCTs may lead to higher participation are possible, but unconvincing. For example, one could make a socioeconomic resources case for increased participation. Underlying much of the work on political participation is the initial assumption that the poor participate less than the non-poor. This assumption is prevalent, though debated, and underlies much of the literature that claims democracy is only possible when a country reaches a certain income level (Lipset 1959, 1960; Boix and Stokes 2003). The argument is that the poor lack the time or money to participate in democracy. This assumption runs deep and is supported by evidence from wealthy democracies where the poor do in fact tend to participate at lower rates than the non-poor(Verba and Nie 1987).

Evidence from Latin America, however, suggests that the poor and non-poor participate at relatively equal rates(Booth and Seligson 2008). We therefore would not expect an increase in resources alone to influence participation. Even if we were to accept the idea that socioeconomic resources are the main driver of participation, CCT beneficiaries remain poor (Stampini and Tornarolli 2012). While CCT benefits have been shown to have a poverty-reducing effect, they are actually quite small transfers and generally do not bring beneficiaries out of poverty, but rather just reduce the severity of poverty. For example, the average transfer from Brazil's Bolsa Familia program in 2015 was R$167.15 , or just under USD $50.00(Gazola Hellman 2015) per family. Even though their resources increase due to the CCT, beneficiaries continue to have comparatively low resources so would not be expected to participate at higher rates. Changes in levels of political interest, efficacy, and trust are much more promising mechanisms.

In the following section, I test the effect of CCTs across a range of participatory behav-

iors as well as test possible explanations for why CCT beneficiaries may participate more. My hypotheses are as follows:

H1: CCT beneficiaries will participate in politics at a higher rate than non-beneficiaries of similar socioeconomic status. While the magnitude of this effect may differ based on types of participation, I expect it to hold for all types of participation.

H2: CCT beneficiaries will express higher levels of political interest than non-beneficiaries of similar socioeconomic status.

H3: CCT beneficiaries will express a stronger sense of political efficacy and greater trust in political institutions compared to non-beneficiaries of similar socioeconomic status.

While the existing research suggests that CCTs shape participatory behavior among beneficiaries, this body of work is heavily focused on voting behavior and single country case studies without considering broader trends across the region as a result of these programs. If CCTs have important impacts on democratic participation, we should see these effects hold across the region.

Data and Methods

To test my hypotheses, I use data from the 2014 Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) AmericasBarometer surveys. The surveys are nationally and regionally representative samples of voting age individuals conducted throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. For the purposes of this study, I use all of the countries in the region that have conditional cash transfer programs and for which participants were asked about their beneficiary status in such a program. This results in 17 countries [3] in my sample and

[3] Countries included in this analysis are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago, and Uruguay

approximately 25,000 observations.

First I examine whether evidence supports my theory that beneficiaries will participate at higher rates than non-beneficiaries. I look at nine different types of participation, considering each as a separate dependent variable. These dependent variables are voting in the last presidential election, registering to vote, attending political meetings, attending municipal meetings, attending community meetings, solving a community problem, requesting help from a local official, requesting help from a municipal office, and protesting. As is evident from the summary statistics in tables 1 and 2, citizens are most likely to participate by registering to vote and voting. We may be somewhat suspect of the high degree of voting reported in part because the survey question asks citizens if they voted in the last presidential election. In some cases the last presidential election may have been quite recent while in others it may have been a number of years ago in which case we may have reason to distrust citizen's ability to remember. In none of the other types of participation is participating more common than not participating.

Because the data is individual-level data clustered by country, I estimate multilevel models with varying intercepts. Because of the clustered nature of the data, a multilevel model is needed to ensure correct standard errors. For six of the models, the dependent variable is dichotomous (a person either participated or they did not) so I estimate multilevel logit models. The original survey questions about attendance at political meetings, attendance at community improvement meetings, and helping to solve a community problem, are not simple yes or no questions, but rather consider the frequency with which a person participates. Because the responses are ordered, I estimate multilevel ordered logit models for these three dependent variables. The survey questions and response options are included in the appendix.

Table 1: Participation Summary Statistics-Dummy Variables

Participation Type	Yes	No
Vote	20,809	7,420
	(73.71)	(26.29)
Register	26,072	2,116
	(92.49)	(7.51)
Municipal Meeting	2,536	25,805
	(8.95)	(91.05)
Contact Local Official	4,575	23,699
	(16.18)	(83.82)
Contact Municipal Office	4,022	24,323
	(14.19)	(85.81)
Protest	1,911	26,308
	(6.77)	(93.23)

*percent in parentheses

Table 2: Participation Summary Statistics-Ordinal Variables

Participation Type	Weekly	Monthly	Yearly	Never
Comm. Prob.	1,400	3,360	4,916	18,527
	(4.96)	(11.91)	(17.43)	(65.69)
Comm. Meet	776	2,977	3,279	21,317
	(2.74)	(10.50)	(11.57)	(75.19)
Pol. Meet	425	1,185	3,127	23,604
	(1.50)	(4.18)	(11.03)	(83.29)

*percent in parentheses

In each of the models, my main independent variable is CCT beneficiary status coded as a dummy variable with 0 for non-beneficiaries and 1 for beneficiaries. I control for other demographic characteristics that are frequently thought to influence political participation including sex, age, years of education, wealth[4] , and a dummy variable for whether the person lives in a urban or rural area. Additionally, age is often argued to have a curvilinear effect on participation with the young and old participating less than those in middle age categories. As such, I include both age and age squared to model this curvilinear effect.

[4] I use wealth rather than income as other scholars using LAPOP data have done because income is self-reported making it less reliable and also prone to high levels of missing data. Wealth is measured as an additive index of 14 material goods and access to basic service that interviewees were asked if they owned. These include a refrigerator, a landline telephone, a cellular phone, number of vehicles, a washing machine, a microwave oven, a motorcycle, indoor plumbing, an indoor bathroom, a computer, internet, a television, a flat screen television, and connection to the sewage system.

In the developed world, the gender gap in participation has narrowed or disappeared, however, there is some evidence that a gender gap still seems to exist in Latin America(Desposato and Norrander 2009). Because of the continued existence of a gender gap, I expect the female variable to have a negative effect on participation. That education should have a positive effect on participation is widely accepted (Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1995), so I expect my education control variable to have a positive effect on participation. The effect of wealth is arguable(Krishna 2008; Verba and Nie 1987) so I have no clear expectation of how wealth may impact participation. Finally, urban residents may participate more than rural residents in certain types of political participation such as voting where central location may facilitate participation, but may have the opposite effect on other types of participation where the interpersonal reliance of rural communities may facilitate coordination and mobilization(Seligson and Booth 1976). Because of the varied effect depending on type of participation, I am neutral as to the expected effect of the urban dummy.

The model for each type of participation is shown below. The only differences between the models is that when looking at voting and voting registration, I add an additional control for whether or not these actions are compulsory in each country.[5]

$$\mathbf{Participation_{ij}} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{\mathbf{10}}(\mathbf{CCT_{ij}}) + \gamma_{\mathbf{20}}(\mathbf{Female_{ij}}) + \gamma_{\mathbf{30}}(\mathbf{Edu_{ij}})$$
$$+\gamma_{\mathbf{40}}(\mathbf{Age_{ij}}) + \gamma_{\mathbf{50}}(\mathbf{Age_{ij}^2}) + \gamma_{\mathbf{60}}(\mathbf{Wealth_{ij}}) + \gamma_{\mathbf{70}}(\mathbf{Urban_{ij}}) + \upsilon_{\mathbf{0j}} + \mathbf{r_{ij}}$$

To test my second hypothesis, I look at the effect of being a CCT beneficiary on reported political interest. Political interest is measured on scale of zero to three with zero being no interest and 3 being a lot of interest. I recode the variable as dichotomous, setting the two lowest response categories (indicating little to no interest) to 0 and the 2 highest response categories (indicating some to a lot of interest) to 1. I use the same set of controls as I use

[5] Data for whether or not voting and registering to vote is compulsory comes from the Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance Voter Turnout Database: http://www.idea.int/themes/voter-turnout

in the models for my first hypothesis.

$$\mathbf{PoliticalInterest_{ij}} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{\mathbf{10}}(\mathbf{CCT_{ij}}) + \gamma_{\mathbf{20}}(\mathbf{Female_{ij}}) + \gamma_{\mathbf{30}}(\mathbf{Edu_{ij}})$$
$$+\gamma_{\mathbf{40}}(\mathbf{Age_{ij}}) + \gamma_{\mathbf{50}}(\mathbf{Age^2_{ij}}) + \gamma_{\mathbf{60}}(\mathbf{Wealth_{ij}}) + \gamma_{\mathbf{70}}(\mathbf{Urban_{ij}}) + \upsilon_{\mathbf{0j}} + \mathbf{r_{ij}}$$

Finally, I test my final hypothesis, that beneficiaries will express a greater sense of political efficacy and greater trust in political institutions. My measure of political efficacy takes into account how much respondents agree or disagree with the statement, "Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think." Respondents answer on a scale of one to seven with one indicating strongly disagree and 7 indicated strongly agree. I recode responses to create a dichotomous variable with only the 2 highest response categories being recoded 1 and the 5 lower response options recoded to 0. I use this question as it gets at whether or not citizens view government as interested in responding to their needs.

As a compliment to this measure, I also look at trust in government institutions. As previously noted, political efficacy and trust in institutions are closely tied in the literature. I specifically focus on trust in the president, the national congress, and the local or municipal government. As with efficacy, trust is originally measured on a 1 to 7 scale with 1 indicating no trust and 7 indicating high trust. I recode these variables to dichotomous variables as well with responses of a six or a seven recoded 1 to indicate high levels of trust and the five lower responses recoded zero indicating low levels of trust.

For the political efficacy and trust models I control for demographic factors as before, but also for a number of variables that represent government performance since studies have found that trust in institutions and feelings of political efficacy are related to evaluations of government performance(Espinal, Hartlyn and Kelly 2006; Lee, Randall and Vaught 2015). These variables include whether or not a person has been a victim of crime in the past year, whether they know someone who was a target of clientelism in the last national elections and whether respondents think their economic situation is better, the same, or worse than a year ago. Crime and clientelism are expected to have negative effects on efficacy while

improvements in perception of economic status are expected to have a positive effect on efficacy(Lee, Randall and Vaught 2015).

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{PoliticalEfficacy_{ij}} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{\mathbf{10}}(\mathbf{CCT_{ij}}) + \gamma_{\mathbf{20}}(\mathbf{Female_{ij}}) + \gamma_{\mathbf{30}}(\mathbf{Edu_{ij}}) \\ +\gamma_{\mathbf{40}}(\mathbf{Age_{ij}}) + \gamma_{\mathbf{50}}(\mathbf{Age_{ij}^2}) + \gamma_{\mathbf{60}}(\mathbf{Wealth_{ij}}) + \gamma_{\mathbf{70}}(\mathbf{Urban_{ij}}) \\ +\gamma_{\mathbf{80}}(\mathbf{Crime_{ij}}) + \gamma_{\mathbf{90}}(\mathbf{Econ_{ij}}) + \gamma_{\mathbf{100}}(\mathbf{Clientelism_{ij}}) + \upsilon_{\mathbf{0j}} + \mathbf{r_{ij}}\end{aligned}$$

Results

My statistical analyses provide support for each of my three hypotheses; CCT beneficiaries seem to participate at higher rates as well as express higher levels of political interest, political efficacy, and trust in institutions.

Political Participation

I find that CCT beneficiaries participate at higher rates than non-beneficiaries across all nine forms of political participation considered. The models produce the following coefficients and standard errors for the the independent variable, CCT. [6]

Table 3: Model Coefficients and Standard Errors for CCT

Participation	Coefficient	Std. Error
Vote	0.184*	0.046
Register	0.140*	0.070
Municipal Meeting	0.417*	0.081
Political Meeting	0.575*	0.060
Community Meeting	0.429*	0.056
Community Problem	0.318*	0.051
Contact Local Official	0.386*	0.066
Contact Municipal Office	0.462*	0.050
Protest	0.315*	0.071

*$p < 0.05$

[6] Full results for each model are available in the appendix

The first two types of political participation I test, registering to vote and voting, are considered among the easiest types of participation in which citizens can engage. Given that both of these types of participation are compulsory or automatic in much of the region and the vast majority of the population already participates in both, I did not necessarily expect to find large differences here. I do, however, find a positive and statistically significant relationship between being a CCT beneficiary and both voting in the presidential election and registering to vote. The predicted probability of CCT beneficiaries having voted is .80 compared with .77 for non-beneficiaries. As noted previously, there is reason to be hesitant about the results related to voting however, given that the survey used asks about voting in the last presidential election which may have been a number of years ago in some cases. Responses to this question may not be reliable.

Likewise, the predicted probability of beneficiaries registering to vote is .944 compared to .936 for non-beneficiaries. That beneficiaries may be more likely to register to vote makes sense given that a voter registration card is in many cases one of the identification documents that beneficiaries can use to meet CCT program requirements. While the coefficient on CCT is significant for registering to voter, the difference between the predicted probabilities is not statistically significant indicating that the substantive difference is negligible.

Moving to less frequent types of participation overall, I continue to find that CCT beneficiaries participate more than non-beneficiaries. First, I consider attendance at meetings. I look at three different types of meetings: municipal,community, and political party or movements. I also include in this group, helping to solve a community problem since participation in community problem solving is approximately as frequent as meeting attendance. Again, I find that CCT beneficiaries are statistically significantly more likely to participate. Beneficiaries have a predicted probability of attending a municipal meeting of .11 compared to .08 for non-beneficiaries. Additionally, they have a predicted probability of attending a meeting of a political party or movement yearly of .14 compared to .09 for non-beneficiaries. The predicted probability of attending such meetings more frequently (monthly or weekly) is also higher for beneficiaries than non-beneficiaries. CCT beneficia-

ries have a predicted probability of attending a community meeting yearly of .14 compared to .11 for non-beneficiaries and a predicted probability of helping to solve a community problem yearly of .20 compared to .18 for non-beneficiaries. Again, the pattern holds when looking at participating in each of these activities monthly or weekly as well, while non-beneficiaries are more likely to never participate in any of these activities. The predicted probabilities for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are statistically significantly different from one another for each of these types of participation.

The next type of participation I consider is contacting public officials or offices. I look at contacting a local official and contacting a municipal office. CCT beneficiaries have a .19 predicted probability of requesting help from a municipal office compared to .13 for non-beneficiaries and a .21 predicted probability of requesting help from a local official compared to a .14 predicted probability for non-beneficiaries. Again, predicted probabilities for beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries are statistically significantly different from each other.

Finally, I look at protest, a type of participation that is the least frequent. The pattern of CCT beneficiaries participating more than non-beneficiaries, however, continues. Participation in protest is much less common overall, though CCT beneficiaries have a predicted probability of protesting of .08 compared to .06 for non-beneficiaries, a 33% increase in participation. It would be useful to know what types of protests beneficiaries are joining,bt they pro or anti government, but unfortunately this information is not available in this survey.

Table 4: Predicted Probabilities of Participating-Dichotomous Variables

Participation Type	Beneficiary	Non-Beneficiary	Diff. Statistically Significant?
Vote	0.799	0.769	Yes
Register	0.944	0.937	No
Municipal Meeting	0.113	0.078	Yes
Contact Local Official	0.205	0.144	Yes
Contact Municipal Office	0.186	0.126	Yes
Protest	0.080	0.060	Yes

While I find statistical significant difference between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries

for all types of participation, the magnitude of the difference varies. For the most part, substantive differences are small with predicted probabilities increasing by approximately .03 in most cases for beneficiaries compared to non beneficiaries. When we look at contacting officials, however, the increase is greater with the predicted probability for beneficiaries approximately .06 higher than for non-beneficiaries. The larger substantive effect in this type of participation makes sense for a number of reasons. First, beneficiaries are learning to interact with the government. Beneficiaries may start engaging with local officials as a means of understanding their benefits, addressing potential problems with their benefits, or expressing dissatisfaction with public services they must use as part of the conditions attached to receiving benefits. Likewise, compared to other types of participation, contacting officials can happen on the beneficiaries own schedule and is not dependent on coordination with others or an event like a meeting, protest, or election being scheduled.

Table 5: Predicted Probabilities of Participating-Categorical Variables

Participation Type	Beneficiary	Non-Beneficiary	Diff. Statistically Significant?
Community Problem			
Weekly	0.060	0.047	Yes
Monthly	0.143	0.116	Yes
Yearly	0.198	0.176	Yes
Never	0.598	0.661	Yes
Community Meeting			
Weekly	0.035	0.024	Yes
Monthly	0.133	0.096	Yes
Yearly	0.140	0.112	Yes
Never	0.692	0.769	Yes
Political Meeting			
Weekly	0.021	0.012	Yes
Monthly	0.057	0.035	Yes
Yearly	0.138	0.094	Yes
Never	0.784	0.858	Yes

In each of my models, an additional finding of interest is that in five out of nine types of participation I consider, the female variable has a statistically significant and negative effect on participating. Only in one case, voting, does the female variable have a statistically significant positive effect. Given that CCT benefits are often provided directly to women, we may expect CCTs to have a stronger effect on participation among women than among

men. To test this possibility, I interact female and CCT. There is some evidence that CCTs do lead to higher rates of voting among women(Baez, Camacho, Conover and Zárate 2012) and my analysis corroborates this finding across the region. When I include the interaction, the effect of CCT alone goes away indicating that the effect was likely mostly due to the increase in voting by female beneficiaries. With the exception of voting, the interaction term does not have a statistically significant effect on political participation. I do not find an interactive effect for any other type of participation. Additionally, for five of the nine types of participation, the interaction terms is negative, while in four it is positive. CCTs do not appear to have a consistently stronger mobilizing effect on women than on men.

Table 6: Model Coefficients and Standard Errors for CCT*Female

Participation	Coefficient	Std. Error
Vote	0.179**	0.086
Register	0.059	0.058
Municipal Meeting	-0.002	-0.110
Political Meeting	-0.069	0.083
Community Meeting	-0.034	0.075
Community Problem	-0.078	0.069
Contact Local Official	0.079	0.085
Contact Municipal Office	0.073	0.091
Protest	-0.114	0.131

** $p < 0.05$

Political Interest

Given that there does appear to be a relationship between broad forms of political participation and CCT beneficiary status, I also examine two explanations for why CCTs have such an effect. First, I examine my second hypothesis-that benefiting from a CCT leads to increased political interest among beneficiaries. Here I also find evidence supporting my hypothesis. Being a CCT beneficiary has a positive and statistically significant effect on political interest. Higher levels of political interest, then can help explain the link between CCT beneficiary status and increased political participation.

Table 7: Predicted Probabilities-Political Interest

Variable	Beneficiary	Non-Beneficiary	Diff. Statistically Significant?
Political Interest	0.380	0.324	Yes

Political Efficacy

Finally I test my third hypothesis, that beneficiaries will have stronger sense of political efficacy and higher levels of trust in government than non beneficiaries[7] . Again, I find support for my hypothesis. Benefiting from a CCT has a statistically significant and positive effect on political efficacy. Beneficiaries have a higher predicted probability of agreeing that the government listens to people like them. Similar trends hold for trust in the president , the national congress, and local or municipal government.

Table 8: Predicted Probabilities-Political Efficacy

Variable	Beneficiary	Non-Beneficiary	Diff. Statistically Significant?
Gov. Listens to People Like Me	0.307	0.280	Yes
Trust President	0.306	0.244	Yes
Trust National Congress	0.155	126	Yes
Trust Local Government	0.214	0.191	Yes

As with political interest, the results suggest that political efficacy may also be at work in linking CCT beneficiary status with higher levels of political participation. Given that CCT beneficiaries also express higher levels of trust in institutions, my work seems to suggest that both political efficacy and trust may be at work rather than just one or the other.

Discussion

Using survey data from 17 Latin American countries, I find support for my hypothesis that CCT beneficiaries participate more than non-beneficiaries in nine different types of political participation. Beneficiaries participate more in very common activities such as

[7] Trinidad and Tobago drops out of these models as not all questions included in the models were asked in that country

voting, but also in less common activities such as contacting public officials, attending meetings, and protesting.

Increases in political participation are consistent with the concept of policy feedback effects. My statistical results suggest that increased political interest, feelings of political efficacy, and trust in government institutions as a result of benefiting from these programs may be at work in influencing beneficiaries decisions to participate more frequently.

The fact that CCT beneficiaries participate at higher rates than non-beneficiaries runs contrary to what we would expect based on the policy feedback effects literature. The conditional nature of CCT programs does not have a demobilizing effect and actually has the opposite effect. These results are consistent with my argument that we need to adjust our theories to fit the Latin American context. The history of less developed welfare states that failed to cover much of the population in Latin America contrasts with more expansive welfare states in Europe and the US. This contrast can help explain why we see a different impact of a targeted, conditional program in the Latin American context than the literature would lead us to expect. Accounting for the importance of initial inclusion into the welfare state is necessary.

While I find evidence to support my theory, more work is needed on the broader political effects of CCTs. Speaking to beneficiaries about their motivations for participating in democratic politics will take us a long way in understanding the causal mechanism behind their higher levels of participation compared to the non-beneficiary population.

Additionally, work should also consider whether CCT beneficiaries exhibit similar trends in participation over time or if the effect diminishes or grows over time. It is conceivable that once beneficiaries begin to develop a stronger interest in politics, this interest will remain high or continue growing and, as a result, participation may remain higher among this group. Panel data would be very helpful in examining such trends, but to my knowledge is not yet available.

Additionally, we might ask if CCT beneficiaries are forming organizations on their own or being mobilized by existing organizations. While individual participation is important in its own right, collective action is necessary if groups such as CCT beneficiaries are to have

a larger impact on policymaking.

As CCTs have expanded and become increasingly important tools in the social policy toolboxes of developing countries, understanding their effects on political behavior beyond simply voting merits further study.

APPENDIX A: SURVEY QUESTIONS

Table 9: Survey Questions and Response Options

Question	Response 1	Response 2	Response 3	Response 4
Are you registered to vote?	Yes	No		
Did you vote in the last presidential elections?	Yes	No		
Have you attended a town meeting,city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months?	Yes	No		
Do you attend meetings of a political party or political organization...	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never
Do you attend meetings of a community improvement committee or association...	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never
In the last twelve months have you helped to solve a problem in your community or in your neighborhood?	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never
Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months?	Yes	No		
In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from a local public official or local government:for example , a mayor,municipal council, provincial official, civil governor or governor?	Yes	No		
In the last 12 months have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?	Yes	No		
How much interest do you have in politics?	A lot	Some	Little	None
Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?		Strongly Disagree (0)	-	Strongly Agree(6)
To what extent do you trust the President?		Not at All(0)	-	A lot(6)
To what extent do you trust the National Congress?		Not at All(0)	-	A lot(6)
To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?		Not at All(0)	-	A lot(6)

APPENDIX B: MODEL OUTPUT

Table 10: Model Output:Vote

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2.
CCT	0.184*	0.088
	(0.046)	(0.064)
Female	0.074*	0.045
	(0.032)	(0.035)
CCTxFemale		0.179*
		(0.086)
Age	0.226*	0.226*
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Age2	-0.002*	-0.002*
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Edu	0.064*	0.064*
	(0.005)	(0005)
Wealth	0.011	0.011
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Urban	-0.228*	-0.228*
	(0.041)	(0.041)
Compulsory	0.711*	0.712*
	(0.222)	(0.223)
Constant	-5.188*	-5.173*
	(0.218)	(0.218)
var(_cons[Country])	0.188	0.188
	(0.067)	(0.067)
Observations	25,555	25,555
Number of groups	17	17

* p<0.05

Standard errors in parentheses

Table 11: Model Output: Registering to Vote

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2
CCT	0.140*	0.108
	(0.070)	(0.098)
Female	0.017	0.005
	(0.052)	(0.058)
CCTxFemale		0.0592
		(0.131)
Age	0.213*	0.213*
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Age2	-0.002*	-0.002*
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Edu	0.083*	0.083*
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Wealth	0.014	0.014
	(0.011)	(0.010)
Urban	-0.181*	-0.181*
	(0.065)	(0.065)
Compulsory	1.035	1.036
	(0.821)	(0.821)
Constant	-3.582*	-3.576*
	(0.796)	(0.796)
var(_cons[Country])	1.181	1.181
	(0.443)	(0.443)
Observations	25,508	25,508
Number of groups	17	17

* p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses

Table 12: Model Output: Attend Political Meeting

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2
CCT	0.542*	0.575*
	(0.045)	(0.060)
Female	-0.299*	-0.283*
	(0.035)	(0.040)
CCTxFemale		-0.069
		(0.083)
Age	0.040*	0.041*
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age2	-0.000*	-0.000*
	(0.000)	((0.000))
Edu	0.032*	0.0302*
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Wealth	-0.027*	-0.027
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Urban	-0.238*	-0.238*
	(0.043)	(0.043)
Constant Cut 1	2.691*	2.699*
	(0.216)	(0.216)
Constant Cut 2	3.929*	3.937*
	(0.217)	(0.217)
Constant Cut 3	5.340*	5.348
	(0.222)	(0.222)
var(_cons[Country])	0.429	0.429
	(0.152)	(0.152)
Observations	25,625	25,625
Number of groups	17	17

* p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses

Table 13: Model Output: Attend Municipal Meeting

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2
CCT	0.416*	0.417*
	(0.059)	(0.081)
Female	-0.153*	-0.152
	(0.045)	(0.050)
CCTxFemale		-0.002
		(0.110)
Age	0.066*	0.066*
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Age2	-0.001*	-0.001*
	(0.000)	0.000
Edu	0.056*	0.056*
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Wealth	-0.014	-0.014
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Urban	-0.352*	-0.352*
	(0.055)	(0.055)
Constant	-4.204*	-4.204*
	(0.202)	(0.202)
var(_cons[Country])	0.058	0.058
	(0.024)	(0.024)
Observations	25,629	25629
Number of groups	17	17

*p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses

Table 14: Model Output: Attend Community Meeting

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2
CCT	0.411*	0.429*
	(0.040)	(0.056)
Female	-0.111*	-0.104*
	(0.030)	(0.033)
CCTxFemale		-0.034
		(0.075)
Age	0.075*	0.075*
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Age2	-0.001*	-0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.00)
Edu	0.029*	0.029*
	(0.004)	(0.006)
Wealth	-0.015	-0.015
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Urban	-0.478*	-0.478*
	(0.036)	(0.036)
Constant Cut 1	2.830*	2.834*
	(0.177)	(0.177)
Constant Cut 2	3.655*	3.659*
	(0.178)	(0.178)
Constant Cut 3	5.404*	5.407*
	(0.181)	0.181
var(_cons[Country])	0.259	0.259
	(0.091)	(0.091)
Observations	25,637	25,637
Number of groups	17	17

*p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses

Table 15: Model Output: Solve Community Problem

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2
CCT	0.278*	0.317*
	(0.037)	(0.051)
Female	-0.274*	-0.260*
	(0.026)	(0.029)
CCTxFemale		-0.078
		(0.069)
Age	0.059*	0.059*
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Age2	-0.000*	-0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Edu	0.051*	0.051*
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Wealth	0.006	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Urban	-0.196*	-0.196*
	(0.033)	(0.033)
Constant Cut 1	2.480*	2.487*
	(0.140)	(0.140)
Constant Cut 2	3.472*	3.479*
	(0.141)	(0.141)
Constant Cut 3	4.870*	4.877
	(0.143)	(0.143)
var(_cons[Country])	0.129*	0.129
	(0.045)	(0.045)
Observations	25,520	25,520
Number of groups	17	17

* p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses

Table 16: Model Output:Contact Local Official

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2
CCT	0.430*	0.386*
	(0.046)	(0.066)
Female	0.054	0.038
	(0.035)	(0.039)
CCTxFemale		0.079
		(0.085)
Age	0.057*	0.057*
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age2	-0.000*	-0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Edu	0.019*	0.019*
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Wealth	-0.046*	-0.046*
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Urban	-0.219*	-0.219*
	(0.043)	(0.043)
Constant	-2.857*	-2.849*
	(0.157)	(0.157)
var(_cons[Country])	0.059	0.059
	(0.157)	(0.023)
Observations	25,593	25,593
Number of groups	17	17

*p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses

Table 17: Contact Municipal Office

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2
CCT	0.462*	0.422*
	(0.050)	(0.070)
Female	0.049	0.0324
	(0.037)	(0.041)
CCTxFemale		0.073
		(0.091)
Age	0.068*	0.068*
	(0.006)	
Age2	-0.001*	-0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Edu	0.032*	0.032*
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Wealth	-0.028*	-0.028*
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Urban	-0.219*	-0.219*
	(0.046)	(0.046)
Constant	-3.542*	-3.534*
	(0.170)	(0.171)
var(_cons[Country])	0.079	0.079
	(0.030)	(0.030)
Observations	25,642	25,642
Number of groups	17	17

*p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses

Table 18: Model Output: Protest

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2
CCT	0.315*	0.371*
	(0.071)	(0.095)
Female	-0.200*	-0.179*
	(0.051)	(0.056)
CCTxFemale		-0.114
		(0.131)
Age	0.018	0.018
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Age2	-0.000*	-0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Edu	0.072*	0.072*
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Wealth	0.002	0.001
	(0.008)	(0.011)
Urban	0.121	0.121
	(0.069)	(0.069)
Constant	-3.726*	-3.736*
	(0.241)	(0.241)
var(_cons[pais])	0.211	0.211
	(0.079)	(0.079)
Observations	25,546	25,546
Number of groups	17	17

*p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses

Table 19: Model Output: Political Interest

VARIABLES	Coef	S.E.
CCT	0.240*	(0.033)
Female	-0.245*	(0.023)
Age	0.025*	(0.004)
Age2	-0.000*	(0.000)
Edu	0.072*	(0.003)
Wealth	0.026*	(0.005)
Urban	-0.136*	(0.029)
Constant Cut 1	0.628*	(0.117)
Constant Cut 2	2.164*	(0.118)
Constant Cut 3	3.760*	(0.120)
var(_cons[pais])	0.089	(0.031)
Observations	25,611	
Number of groups	17	

*p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses

Table 20: Model Output: Political Efficacy-Government Listens

VARIABLES	Coef	S.E.
CCT	0.088*	(0.035)
Female	-0.064*	(0.024)
Age	-0.003	(0.004)
Age2	0.000*	(0.000)
Edu	0.002*	(0.004)
Wealth	-0.005	(0.005)
Urban	-0.083*	(0.031)
Crime	-0.191*	(0.032)
Econ	0.243*	(0.018)
Clientelism	-0.194*	(0.037)
Constant Cut 1	-1.224*	(0.123)
Constant Cut 2	-0.601*	(0.123)
Constant Cut 3	0.042	(0.123)
Constant Cut 4	0.780*	(0.123)
Constant Cut 5	1.712*	(0.123)
Constant Cut 6	2.504*	(0.125)
var(_cons[pais])	0.092	(0.033)
Observations	21,210	
Number of groups	16	

* p<0.05

Standard errors in parentheses

Table 21: Model Output: Political Efficacy-Trust President

VARIABLES	Coef	S.E.
CCT	0.338*	(0.035)
Female	0.006	(0.024)
Age	0.002	(0.004)
Age2	0.000*	(0.000)
Edu	-0.018*	(0.004)
Wealth	-0.024*	(0.005)
Urban	-0.141*	(0.030)
Crime	-0.272*	(0.032)
Econ	0.447*	(0.018)
Clientelism	-0.294*	(0.037)
Constant Cut 1	-1.872*	(0.180)
Constant Cut 2	-1.344*	(0.180)
Constant Cut 3	-0.740*	(0.179)
Constant Cut 4	0.010	(0.179)
Constant Cut 5	0.856*	(0.179)
Constant Cut 6	1.655*	(0.180)
var(_cons[pais])	0.366	(0.130)
Observations	21,417	
Number of groups	16	

* p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses

Table 22: Model Output: Political Efficacy-Trust National Congress

VARIABLES	Coef	S.E.
CCT	0.212*	(0.035)
Female	0.121*	(0.025)
Age	-0.037*	(0.004)
Age2	0.000*	(0.000)
Edu	-0.007*	(0.004)
Wealth	-0.012*	(0.005)
Urban	-0.268*	(0.031)
Crime	-0.271*	(0.032)
Econ	0.234*	(0.018)
Clientelism	-0.256*	(0.037)
Constant Cut 1	-2.489*	(0.154)
Constant Cut 2	-1.815*	(0.153)
Constant Cut 3	-1.019*	(0.153)
Constant Cut 4	-0.138	(0.153)
Constant Cut 5	0.876*	(0.153)
Constant Cut 6	1.809*	(0.155)
var(_cons[pais])	0.223	(0.080)
Observations	21,044	
Number of groups	16	

* p<0.05

Standard errors in parentheses

Table 23: Model Output: Political Efficacy-Trust Local Government

VARIABLES	Coef	S.E.
CCT	0.133*	(0.034)
Female	0.067*	(0.024)
Age	-0.022*	(0.004)
Age2	0.000*	(0.000)
Edu	-0.023*	(0.004)
Wealth	0.010	(0.005)
Urban	-0.163*	(0.030)
Crime	-0.308*	(0.032)
Econ	0.266*	(0.018)
Clientelism	-0.337*	(0.037)
Constant Cut 1	-2.346*	(0.138)
Constant Cut 2	-1.739*	(0.138)
Constant Cut 3	-1.007*	(0.138)
Constant Cut 4	-0.183	(0.137)
Constant Cut 5	0.744*	(0.138)
Constant Cut 6	1.613*	(0.138)
var(_cons[pais])	0.155	(0.056)
Observations	21,388	
Number of groups	16	

*p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses

APPENDIX C: SUMMARY STATISTICS

Table 24: Respondent CCT Beneficiary Status by Country

Country	Non-Beneficiary	Beneficiary	Total
Argentina	1220	279	1499
Brazil	1117	381	1498
Chile	1471	87	1558
Colombia	1038	439	1477
Costa Rica	1403	124	1527
Dom. Rep.	941	579	1520
Ecuador	1038	439	1477
El Sal.	1389	120	1509
Guatemala	1243	260	1503
Honduras	1226	331	1557
Jamaica	1077	411	1488
Mexico	1168	361	1529
Panama	1283	199	1482
Paraguay	1379	116	1495
Peru	1409	75	1484
Trin. & Tob.	3735	406	4141
Uruguay	1349	161	1510
Total	23486	4783	28269

Table 25: Continuous Variable Summary Statistics

	Age	Age2	Wealth	Edu
Min	16	256	1.00	0.00
Mean	40.75	1920.35	8.86	9.63
Max	99	9801	16	18
StdDev	40.75	1486.96	3.15	4.26

Table 26: Political Interest and Efficacy Summary Statistics

	Frequency	Percent
Political Interest		
None	8,939	31.59
Little	9,914	35.04
Some	6,732	23.79
A Lot	2,709	9.57
Political Efficacy		
0	7,445	26.76
1	3,833	13.78
2	4,268	15.34
3	4,635	16.66
4	3,927	14.12
5	1,884	6.77
6	1,829	6.57

Table 27: Dichotomous Variable Summary Statistics

	Frequency	Percent
Male	13796	48.46
Female	14672	51.54
Rural	7264	25.52
Urban	21204	74.48

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