# EXPLAINING U.S. CIVIC ACTION: DISPOSITIONS, NETWORKS, RELIGION, AND SEPTEMBER 11

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## ABSTRACT

Kraig Beyerlein: EXPLAINING U.S. CIVIC ACTION: DISPOSITIONS, NETWORKS, RELIGION, AND SEPTEMBER 11
(Under the direction of Kenneth Bollen and Christian Smith)

This dissertation advances our understanding of the enduring theoretical question of why certain people participate in activism while others do not. Contrary to prior theoretical and empirical models of differential participation, it specifies and tests a synthetic model of activism, integrating dispositional and relational perspectives. Because these perspectives have generally been pursued in isolation, our knowledge of the processes that explain activist participation has been limited. Combining dispositional and relational perspectives offers a more comprehensive view of activism by showing how these perspectives work in concert to mobilize people to participate in volunteer efforts in communities. My synthetic model of activism has the additional strength of addressing the important issue of selection versus influence concerning social network and organization effects. This dissertation also examines the demobilizing character of social networks and organizations, which has generally gone unnoticed in scholarship on activist participation until recently. It does so for the case of religious-based activism, considering the hindering effects of integration into quiescent clergy-led congregations and embeddedness in "bonding" religious networks. In addition, this dissertation explicates the pathways through which congregations promote participation in civic engagement in communities, focusing on exposure to encouragement from activist clergy, location in activist religious peer networks, and cultivation of

transposable skills. Last, this dissertation focuses on the nature of civic response after the September 11 terrorist attacks, investigating whether tragedy-related factors promoted involvement in efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers as well as others in communities. It also considers how prosocial dispositions shaped Americans' responses to 9/11 and how these responses in turn affected post-9/11 helping behavior as well as the precise dimensions of social networks and organization that were most important for mobilizing participation in helping behavior after the 9/11 tragedy.

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# CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

From participation in episodes of major political unrest—such as the U.S. civil rights movement in the 1960s or the East German revolution in 1989—to routine acts of civic engagement—such as volunteer efforts to help the homeless or to lobby to get particular policies passed—one of the most enduring theoretical questions in the social sciences is why do certain people participate in activism while others do not. Given that studies have shown that activism can have meaningful and lasting effects on the lives of those involved as well as broader consequences for communities and societies (see, for example, Andrews 2004; McAdam 1989; McAdam and Su 2002; Sherkat and Blocker 1997), understanding what accounts for differential participation is an important topic of scholarly inquiry. There is no single perspective for explaining variation in individual activism. Rather, myriad perspectives have been proposed to explain what differentiates participants from nonparticipants. In general, these perspectives fall into one of two categories. On the one hand are those that emphasize the "push" of internal factors, while on the other are those that stress the "pull" of external factors. Because these perspectives tend to be the product of different intellectual commitments and disciplinary fields, they are often viewed in isolation or even opposition. The lack of any systematic effort to combine and integrate the internal and external perspectives of activist participation has substantially limited our understanding of the processes that explain why certain people get involved in activism while others do not.

To broaden our knowledge of the dynamics of activism, my dissertation develops a synthetic model that integrates a dispositional and a relational perspective of activism. In particular, this model focuses on how an activist orientation serves as a conduit, driving people to embed themselves in activist networks and organizations, which in turn induce participation in activism. My synthetic model of activism therefore shows how dispositional and relational perspectives of activism are complementary, working together to advance our understanding of differential participation. This is the first contribution of my dissertation.

My synthetic model of activism has the additional strength of addressing the important issue of selection versus influence concerning social network and organization effects. Given the adage that "birds of a feather flock together," people who are psychologically disposed toward activism should be very likely to embed themselves in activist networks and organizations. This has important implications for the relational perspective that has thus far been advanced to explain activist participation. Although scholars from a relational perspective have assumed the causal significance of social networks and organizations for mobilizing people to participate in activism, they have generally not considered, let alone tested, the alternative explanation that homophily accounts for the observed social network and organization effects. Based on extant studies, then, we do not know whether the widely accepted robust effects of social networks and organizations on activist participation are mainly due to social influence from activist peers and organizational leaders as relational scholars claim, or to the fact that people who are committed to activism intentionally choose to be friends with each other and join activist organizations. Demonstrating whether the relational effects of activism are due to social influence or spurious due to homophily is the second contribution that my dissertation makes.

Although social networks and organizations have been central explanations for differential participation in the literature, there has been surprisingly little attention devoted to identifying the *exact* types of social networks and organizations that are the most important for mobilizing activism. In many cases, prior scholarship has simply modeled the effect of the overall number of network connections or organizational memberships on activism, positing a general "integration" effect. But given the heterogeneity of different types of social networks and organizations, this is theoretically and empirically inappropriate. Because the likelihood of being exposed to the relational factors that promote activist participation should differ considerably depending on whether networks and organizations are activist in nature or not, this analytical distinction seems crucial. For instance, people who are embedded in activist networks should be especially susceptible to be encouraged to get involved in activism compared to those who are embedded in non-activist networks. However, activists may exert different types of social influence on friends, which may affect how likely they are to respond to peer social influence and thus get involved in activism. My dissertation distinguishes among different types of activist social influence that peers exert on friends and tests whether these distinctions have explanatory consequences. By making the general distinction between activist and non-activist networks and organizations as well as finer-grained distinctions among activist ties, my dissertation explicates the specific types of social integration that matter most for mobilizing people to participate in activism. This represents the third contribution of my dissertation.

Differentiating social networks and organizations that are activist in nature from those that are not helps us recognize not only that certain networks and organizations are more likely to facilitate participation in activism than others, but also that, under certain conditions,

non-activist networks and organization can actually *constrain* people from getting involved in activism. The demobilizing character of social networks and organizations has generally gone unnoticed in scholarship on activist participation until recently. In the last decade, certain social movement scholars have begun to acknowledge that networks and organizations have the potential to hinder involvement in activism (Goodwin 1997; Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Kitts 2000; McAdam and Paulsen 1993). But the understanding of this potential has been very limited. Hence, identifying the types of non-activist networks and organizations that inhibit participation and developing a theoretical account to explain their inhibiting effects significantly advances our knowledge about relationship between social embeddedness and activism and thus is the fourth contribution of my dissertation.

Recent disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, the Tsunami in South East Asia, and the terrorist attacks of September 11, have renewed interest in the question of how tragedy shapes activism. Given the nature of the September 11 terrorist attacks, its mobilizing scope has been of particular interest. But as with studies of responses to other disasters, data limitations have prevented a systematic evaluation of whether 9/11 mobilized a broad or narrow civic response. To address the mobilizing scope of 9/11, my dissertation examines the extent to which tragedy-generated factors—such as knowing victims, patriotism, sorrow, or commemorative gatherings—motivated Americans to get involved in efforts to help others in communities in addition to efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers in the months following the attacks. By doing do, my dissertation identifies whether 9/11 helped revitalize U.S. civic life as certain scholars have posited (Putnam 2000:402; 2002).

There is also the important issue of explaining why certain Americans got involved in activism after 9/11 while others did not. I bring my synthetic model of activism to bear on

activist responses after 9/11, focusing specifically on how the "push" of orientations and the "pull" of networks and organizations work together to explain variation in helping efforts not only for victims of the tragedy but also for others in communities. Like the literature on activism in general, disaster scholarship on participation in relief efforts has neglected this integrated approach of activism. The case of volunteerism after 9/11 provides an opportunity to extend my synthetic model of activism in an important way, exploring whether an activist psychological disposition shaped interpretations of responses to the 9/11 tragedy and potential consequences this had for involvement in helping efforts after 9/11. Finally, because the disaster literature has not been careful to distinguish between activist and non-activist networks and organizations, we do not know whether this is a relevant analytical distinction for understanding the effect of social embeddedness on helping efforts after tragedies. Exploring the effects of this distinction will clarify the relational factors that are most important for inducing activist responses after disasters. Understanding the mobilizing scope of 9/11 and the processes through which Americans got involved in activism after 9/11 constitute the final two contributions of my dissertation.

What exactly is activism? There is no universally agreed upon theoretical definition of activism. Reflecting this fact, studies of differential participation have focused on forms of activism diverse as petition campaigns (Oegema and Klandermans 1994) and collective riots (McPhail 1971; McPhail and Wohlstein 1983; Paige 1971). Often, activism is defined in terms of its nature, such as low-risk/cost or high-risk/cost (McAdam 1986), or its targets, such as single corporations or entire nations. My dissertation defines activism as unpaid activity that, in some capacity, serves the interests of the broader community. For people to be counted as activists, then, they must be engaged in some sort of volunteering effort that

benefits or has the potential to benefit communities and their residents. In this sense, the target of activism is crucial, while its nature is not. Importantly, studies have shown that, unlike other forms of civic engagement (Putnam 2000), rates of community activism have not declined, but have rather remained stable or actually increased over time (Sampson et al. 2006; Wuthnow 2002b). Hence, understanding the factors that mobilize as well as constrain participation in volunteer efforts to help others in communities has important implications for how to preserve and strengthen U.S. civil society.

Concerning methodology, my dissertation employs advanced quantitative techniques to analyze a nationally representative survey of American adults. Conducted in the spring and early summer of 2002, the Religion and Public Activism Survey (RAPAS) contains detailed modules on community activism, social networks, voluntary organizations, dispositions toward activism, and 9/11 reactions and responses, making it an ideal survey to evaluate the substantive issues outlined above. As I demonstrate in the forthcoming chapters, Structural Equation Models (SEMs) allow me to model appropriately the synthetic nature of dispositional and relational perspectives of activism as well as to test empirically the important analytic distinctions previously mentioned. By doing so, I am able to evaluate thoroughly the validity of my specified theoretical approach for understanding why certain people participate in activism while others do not.

My dissertation comprises three related but distinct chapters, each of which contributes to one or more of the substantive themes noted in the prior paragraphs. The first chapter lays the basic theoretical foundation of the dissertation, articulating my synthetic model of activism. In this chapter, I discuss the conceptual integration of a dispositional and a relational perspective of activism and significance of this integration for helping to resolve

the important issue of selection versus influence concerning relational effects on activist participation. Based on this theoretical integration, I derive and test empirical models of my synthetic perspective of activism. My first dissertation chapter also evaluates whether different types of activist personal networks and the different types of social influence that they generate have differing effects on community activism. Specifically, I test whether there are differences among passive behavioral social influence (learning about friends' activist participation), active behavioral social influence (receiving direct requests from friends to participate in activism), and attitudinal social influence (knowing that friends approve of activist participation) for mobilizing people to get involved in activism. The final part of my first dissertation chapter explores whether network density—the extent to which individuals in a person's network know each other—alters any of the effects of activist networks on participation in activism.

My second dissertation chapter uses the case of religious-based activism to address two important themes. First, I focus on the largely overlooked issue of the demobilizing effects of social networks and organizations. Because of the importance placed on caring for the social and spiritual needs of fellow members, it is expected that people who are integrated into quiescent clergy-led congregations and embedded in "bonding" religious networks will be very unlikely to participate in volunteer efforts that serve others in communities outside of their religious group. However, when congregations and networks established in them are activist in nature, they should promote participation in community activism. Explicating how integration into activist congregations and networks induces participation in volunteer efforts that benefit those in the broader community is the other important issue that my second dissertation chapter addresses. Although scholars of civil society have increasingly come to

recognize the mobilizing potential of religious organizations, their understanding of this potential has generally been limited to description. Moving toward actual causal explanation, by contrast, I specify three distinct pathways—encouragement from activist clergy, embeddedness in activist religious peer networks, and cultivation of transposable skills—through which congregation integration can mobilize activist participation. This chapter thus connects to broader concerns about how organizations can mobilize as well as demobilize participation.

My final dissertation chapter explains the nature of activist responses in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. First, I specify the precise dimensions of social networks and organizational memberships that mobilized people to get involved in volunteer efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers as well as others in communities after 9/11. The majority of studies explaining variation in helping efforts after disasters have focused simply on the overall number of organizations or social ties. Through a more fine-grained analysis, I am able to identify more precisely the types of social networks and organizations that were most important for mobilizing civic action after the national tragedy of 9/11. Second, I consider how a psychological disposition toward activism shaped people's responses to 9/11 and how these responses in turn promoted involvement in volunteer efforts to help. Finally, I examine whether 9/11-generated factors facilitated participation exclusively in efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers of the tragedy, or whether these factors also facilitated participation in efforts to help others in communities after the 9/11 attacks. By doing so, I establish whether 9/11 mobilized a broad or narrow civic response and thus the extent to which this national tragedy helped revitalize U.S. civic life.

# CHAPTER 2: EXPLAINING AMERICANS' PARTICIPATION IN COLLECTIVE CIVIC ACTION: INTEGRATING DISPOSITIONAL AND RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

Why certain people participate in activism while others do not is a core question in the field of collective action. For decades, this question has attracted the attention of scholars from various sociological disciplines, most notably scholars of social movements, altruistic behavior, volunteerism, and rational choice. The broad interest in differential participation has produced a wealth of empirical studies, focusing on such diverse forms of collective action as petition campaigns (Oegema and Klandermans 1994), volunteer efforts (Wilson 2000; Wilson and Musick 1997, 1999; Wuthnow 1991), organization-based activities (Barkan, Cohn, and Whitaker 1995; Kitts 1999; Oliver 1984; Passy 2001, 2003; Passy and Giugni 2001), activist projects (McAdam 1986; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Nepstad 2004; Nepstad and Smith 1999; Smith 1996; Wiltfang and McAdam 1991), protests against political policies and regimes, (Klandermans and Oegema 1987; Opp 1989; Opp and Gern 1993), and riots and other civil disorders (McPhail 1971; McPhail and Wohlstein 1983; Paige 1971). Given the scope of scholarship on collective action, it is not surprising that myriad factors have been proposed to explain what differentiates participants from nonparticipants.

Two perspectives that have emerged among the many factors as important explanations of differential participation are a dispositional perspective and a relational perspective. While a dispositional perspective emphasizes the *push* of certain orientations to explain individual variation in collective action, a relational perspective stresses the *pull* of

social ties to explain this variation. These perspectives tend to be discipline specific, with scholars of altruistic behavior and volunteerism advancing the former perspective and scholars of social movements advancing the latter perspective. Furthermore, these perspectives are often perceived as competing and perhaps incompatible explanations for differential participation, especially by some social movement scholars (McAdam 1986; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; but see Snow and Oliver 1995). Because of this perception and the fact that these perspectives generally represent different disciplines, there has been little systematic effort to combine them in models of collective action, producing a truncated view of processes that underlie the formation of collective action.

To advance our knowledge of the dynamics of collective action, I develop theoretically and test empirically a synthetic approach that integrates these two important perspectives. As I argue below, people who have activist psychological orientations tend to embed themselves in social relations that are supportive of collective action, and this, in turn, increases the likelihood of participation. By not incorporating a relational perspective in their models, scholars emphasizing a dispositional perspective have missed an important pathway through which activist orientations promote collective action. On the other hand, because scholars stressing a relational perspective have not included activist orientations in their models, it is difficult to accept the explanatory weight that they place on social network effects. Despite the fact that this is rarely acknowledged, let alone tested, the observed positive relationship between social networks and collective action could partly or entirely reflect selection, in which people disposed toward activism choose as friends people who share their commitment to collective action. Consequently, a relational perspective of collective action leaves open the possibility that the effects of social networks on collective

action are spurious, attributable to activist psychological orientations. By modeling activist orientations and thus a basis on which collective action networks form and remain intact, this chapter addresses a problem that potentially undermines the robustness of the observed social networks effects, but has to date not received adequate conceptual attention or empirical investigation.

This chapter also contributes to our understanding of *why* social networks mobilize people to participate in collective action. Calls from social movement scholars to develop and test theoretical accounts of social network effects notwithstanding (McAdam and Paulsen 1993), this issue largely remains unresolved. As a move toward addressing this issue, I draw on analytic concepts and theories from broader scholarship on peer network effects and conceptualize social ties as sources of *social influence* inducing participation in collective action. Based on this scholarship, I also differentiate among attitudinal, active behavioral, and passive behavioral forms of social influence to assess whether different dimensions of social influence have different effects on participation in collective action. By conceiving of personal ties as sources of social influence and identifying the precise dimensions of these ties that are the most significant sources of social influence mobilizing participation, I help explain *why* social networks promote collective action.

To advance further our knowledge of the relationship between social ties and collective action, this chapter also considers characteristics of larger networks in which people are embedded. Despite the fact that broader scholarship on social networks has demonstrated that network characteristics are important for explaining a range of individual behaviors, there has been scant attention paid to network characteristics in micro-level models of collective action (but see Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl 1988; Oliver and Marwell

1988 for discussions about network characteristics in macro-level models; Oliver, Marwell, and Teixeira 1985). I address this limitation by focusing on the important network characteristic of density. Following and extending broader scholarship on social networks, I analyze the extent to which network density moderates the effect of social influence from individual ties on participation in collective action and whether this moderating effect varies depending on the dimension of social influence modeled.

Before proceeding to the theoretical sections of this chapter, it is necessary to discuss briefly the form of collective action on which I focus. As the above examples attest, collective action takes various forms. This chapter, however, focuses on one particular, important form: collective *civic* action. Although specific claims and grievances can characterize collective civic action, *purposes* more commonly characterize this form of collective action (McAdam et al. 2005; Sampson et al. 2006). Collective civic action mobilizes for purposes of serving and benefiting those in the larger community, such as projects to raise funds to repair dilapidated houses or programs to distribute food and clothing to the needy. Unlike protest forms of collective action that use disruptive or even violent tactics, collective civic action employs non-disruptive and nonviolent tactics. Importantly, contrary to claims of social capital theorists (Putnam 2000), collective civic action has not declined over time and currently constitutes the most vigorous form of collective action in the United States (McAdam et al. 2005; Sampson et al. 2006). Consequently, explaining the nature of collective civic action is a crucial task that has broad implications for our understanding of U.S. community life and civil society. Nevertheless, because collective civic action is only one of the many possible forms of collective action, I discuss in the conclusion of this chapter the consequences that this focus has for explaining

differential participation in other forms of collective action, especially contentious and disruptive forms.

**A Dispositional Perspective of Collective Civic Action**

One important answer to the question of why certain people participate in collective action while others do not comes from the altruistic behavior and volunteerism tradition of research. According to this tradition, certain orientations or dispositions differentiate activists from nonactivists. As far as collective civic action is concerned, a *prosocial orientation* seems most crucially important. Penner and Finkelstein (1998:526) define a prosocial orientation as "an enduring tendency to think about the welfare and rights of other people, to feel concern and empathy for them, and to act in a way that benefits them" (see also Penner 2002; Penner et al. 1995). Studies have shown that a prosocial orientation is generally the product of a combination of genetic and early socialization factors, such as parental emphasis on or modeling of benevolence, and that this orientation tends to be stable over the life course (see, for example, Bar-Tal 1976:11-37; Davis and Franzoi 1991; Eisenberg et al. 2002; Eisenberg et al. 1999; Eisenberg and Mussen 1989; Grusec 1981; Hoffman 1981; Koestner, Franz, and Weinberger 1990; Oliner and Oliner 1988; Rossi 2001a; Schroeder et al. 1995:91-125).

Penner and colleagues developed the Prosocial Personality Battery (PSB) to operationalize and test the effect of a prosocial orientation on activism. Studies using the PSB have generally shown that the greater the prosocial orientation, the greater the likelihood of participation in volunteer efforts. For instance, Penner and Finkelstein (1998) found that a prosocial orientation significantly predicted the amount of time people spent volunteering at

an AIDS service organization and the amount of time people personally spent interacting with AIDS patients. Although not specifically employing the PSB, a large body of research has demonstrated a robust relationship between measures reflecting a prosocial orientation, such as commitment to contributing to the well-being of others, and being involved in various kinds of civic activity (Carlo et al. 2005; Clary, Snyder, and Stukas 1996; Elshaug and Metzer 2001; Piliavin and Callero 1991; Piliavin and Charng 1990; Rossi 2001b; Sokolowski 1996; Wilson and Musick 1997, 1998, 1999; Wuthnow 1991). Thus, a prosocial orientation seems to be an important factor for explaining differential participation in collective civic action.

**A Relational Perspective of Collective Civic Action**

While the field of altruistic behavior and volunteerism has generally advanced a dispositional perspective to account for individual variation in collective action, the field of social movements has generally advanced a relational perspective. Voluminous empirical literature has demonstrated the significance of social networks for explaining differential participation (see, for example, Chong 1991; della Porta 1988; Diani 1995; Kitts 1999, 2000; Klandermans and Oegema 1987; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Opp 1989; Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980). However, this literature identifies that *strong*, not weak, ties are crucial for distinguishing participants from nonparticipants. Several notable examples demonstrate this pattern. First, Opp and Gern (1993) found that having friends who were ideologically critical of and politically active against the regime were a significant determinant of participation in the 1989 East German Revolution, while having critical co-workers was not. Second, McAdam (1986) showed that applicants to the Mississippi Freedom Summer project

who had preexisting close relationships with other applicants and activists were more likely to participate in this project than those who did not. But he reported that having preexisting distant relationships with other applicants and activists did not differentiate applicants who journeyed to Mississippi to participate in the project from those who withdrew and stayed home. Last, Passey (2001) documented that embeddedness in activist friendship networks, but not activist acquaintanceship networks, had a robust effect on getting involved in organizations affiliated with the Swiss solidarity movement (Passy 2003; Passy and Giugni 2001).

Theoretical accounts to explain the observed strong ties effects on collective action have been slow to develop and have not generally tapped into the broader scholarship on peer network effects. This broader scholarship, however, brings to bear important insights on the difference between strong and weak ties for collective action, identifying *social influence* as the key mechanism through which social networks facilitate behavior (see, for example, Akers 1985; Akers et al. 1979; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Friedkin 1998; Friedkin and Cook 1990; Graham, Marks, and Hansen 1991; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944; Marsden and Friedkin 1993; Matsueda and Anderson 1998; Warr and Stafford 1991). Although not developing a theory of social influence to explain social network effects on collective action, McAdam and Paulsen (1993:655) alluded to its importance over a decade ago, stating that "the significant positive relationship between strong ties and participation and the absence of any relationship between weak ties and involvement suggests that, at the microlevel, ties are less important as conduits of information than as sources of social influence." Weak ties may provide exposure to more diverse information and communication than strong ties (c.f. Granovetter 1973) and thus help explain variation in

the diffusion of movements once in motion, but they lack the necessary social persuasion that induces people to participate in collective action (see Kitts 2000). If individuals do not feel personally close to activists, they will not feel pressure to respond to the recruitment request. Hence, the mobilizing *strength* of strong ties lies in their ability to exert social influence on those to whom they are closely linked.

Unlike information or other theoretical approaches, social influence comports with the theoretical account that currently has the most momentum and widest attraction in the social movement literature for explaining social network effects. According to this account, which instrumental or rational choice theorists originally articulated, people who are embedded in activist networks—exposed to activist social influence to use the language from above—participate in collective action to receive social approval and avoid social disapproval from peers. Importantly, strong ties to activists solve Olson's (1965) classic dilemma, as they function as nonmaterial selective incentives, eliminating the desire to free ride and abstain from participating. As Chong (1991 :34-35) states, "the desires to gain or sustain friendships, to maintain one's social standing, and to avoid ridicule and ostracism are all social goals that constitute selective incentives for individuals to participate in collective action." More culturally centered theorists of collective action also share this view, though they highlight the emotional nature of selective incentives from strong ties. Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta write (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001 :8) that "we accept a friend's invitation to a rally because we like her, or because we fear her disapproval if we turn her down…. It is affective ties that bind and preserve the networks in the first place, as well as give them much of their causal impact." Individuals can reap the public benefits of collective action without personally participating, such as the legal rights for entire groups of people

that social movements have won, but they cannot receive rewards and avoid punishments from activist peers unless they personally engage in activism.

Empirical evaluations of the social influence or selective incentive account for the impact of strong ties on collective action have been rare. However, the few studies that do exist seem supportive. Opp (1989:43-82) reported that expecting to receive positive reinforcement from important others was a significant determinant of engaging in legal and illegal protest activities. Similarly, della Porta (1988) found that individuals joined Italian left-wing terrorist groups because they sought approval of friends who were in the process of joining or who had already joined. Last, Chong (1991:56-57) recounts how despite his desire to sneak out, Jim Farmer, leader of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), participated in the dangerous freedom rides in Mississippi to preserve his image and reputation in the eyes of the other freedom riders (for a similar analysis, see Goodwin and Pfaff 2001).

As valuable as the above theoretical account and empirical studies supporting it are for advancing knowledge of why social ties promote collective action, they are limited in two significant respects. First, they neither analytically nor empirically distinguish different dimensions of social influence that peers exert on friends, but rather conceptualize and operationalize social influence as one broad construct that captures all types of social influence to which people respond to receive social approval and avoid social disapproval. Second, they do not explore whether different dimensions of social influence vary in terms of mobilizing participation. As I describe below, there is good reason to think that the likelihood of people responding to social influence and thus participating in collective action depends on the type of social influence that peers exert on them. These limitations largely seem to stem from the fact that social movement scholars have generally been able to include

only one dimension of social influence in their models, with strong ties to activists being the most available measure (Kitts 2000). Because the correlation between the different dimensions of social influence is likely high, including only one measure very likely conflates the dimensions of social influence and thus muddles interpretations of the dimension or dimensions of social influence that matter most for inducing participation.

Broader scholarship on peer networks distinguishes several distinct dimensions along which peers can exert social influence on friends. This scholarship specifically differentiates attitudinal social influence from behavioral social influence as well as active behavioral social influence from passive behavioral social influence (Akers 1985; Akers et al. 1979; Graham et al. 1991; Matsueda and Anderson 1998; Warr and Stafford 1991). Drawing on this literature, I specify how these different dimensions of social influence apply to collective action.

First, *attitudinal* social influence consists of approval from strong ties to participate in collective action, such as friends' verbal support for participating in a community project. Second, *active behavioral* social influence consists of explicit offers or encouragements from strong ties to engage in collective action.[1] This type of behavioral social influence calls for an immediate response to accept or reject the offer or encouragement to participate in collective action. Third, *passive behavioral* social influence consists of the observation or knowledge of strong ties' involvement in collective action. Unlike active behavioral social influence, this type of behavioral social influence does not call for an immediate response of acceptance or rejection to participate in collective action, though one may occur. More often, there is a delay in the response to passive behavioral social influence. Empirical studies on

[1] I drew particularly on Graham et al.'s (1991) discussion of active and passive behavioral social influence for deviant behavior in developing how these two types of social influence operate for collective action.

behaviors other than collective action have generally shown that behavioral social influence has stronger effects than attitudinal social influence (Graham et al. 1991; Warr and Stafford 1991), though the difference between active behavioral social influence and passive behavioral influence has not been rigorously investigated.

In the models that follow, I operationalize and test whether there are differences in the effects of attitudinal, active behavioral, and passive behavioral social influence on participation in collective civic action. By doing so, I identify the types of social influence that are most significant for explaining differential participation in collective civic action and thus contribute to the long-standing concern in social movement scholarship of explicating the precise dimensions of social ties that are most consequential for mobilizing activism (McAdam and Paulsen 1993).

**Strong Tie Effects on Collective Civic Action: Social Influence or Selection?**

Based on the previously developed theoretical account, we would expect strong ties to activists to be powerful sources of social influence, inducing people to participate in collective civic action. However, an alternative explanation calls into question this interpretation of strong tie effects. Given the nonrandom nature of friendship formation, instead of strong ties causing people to participate in collective action because of social influence, it is entirely possible that individuals purposively seek out and select as friends people who share their commitment to collective action. As James Jasper (1997:61-62) expresses, "many networks result from conscious, often political, decisions: comrades are those we have chosen because we share with them some image of social justice or social change." If activists choose to become friends with other activists, then the relationship

between strong ties and collective action would be attributable to selection, not social influence. Given the old adage that "birds of a feather flock together," homophily represents a plausible competing explanation for the observed strong tie effects on collective action.

Despite its importance, social movement scholars have largely neglected the selection process when modeling the effect of strong ties on collective action. For instance, revisiting an example from above, Opp and Gern (1993) documented that people who had friends who were critical of and acted politically against the regime were more likely to participate in the East German Revolution of 1989 than those who did not have such friends. Although these scholars attribute this finding to the positive incentives that critical friends provided to participate, it is just as likely that selection explains this finding as people who shared a commitment to overthrowing the regime were drawn to each other and became friends.[2] Supporting this view, broader scholarship on social networks has shown that selection is an important explanation for the observed behavior homogeneity among peers (see, for instance, Bauman and Ennett 1996; Cohen 1977, 1983; Ennett and Bauman 1994; Jussim and Osgood 1989; Kandel 1978; Matsueda and Anderson 1998). In light of this evidence, we need to account for selection before we can be confident that strong ties to activists promote participation in collective action as scholars of social movements claim.

Incorporating a dispositional perspective into network models of collective action allows us to address directly this important issue of selection. As discussed above, this perspective emphasizes the *push* of a prosocial orientation to explain differential participation in collective civic action. Besides encouraging involvement in collective action, the homophily principle predicts that people who are prosocially oriented will embed

[2] Opp and Gern (1993) seem to recognize this possibility, stating, "Theory and research on social exchange indicate that personal networks develop on the basis of similarity. Thus, critical respondents are likely to have critical friends." However, they dismiss this possibility and give it no more attention.

themselves in social relations that are supportive of collective civic action. In other words, a prosocial orientation constitutes an important basis on which activist friendships form and remain intact. It is important to point out that although a prosocial orientation should directly lead people to form friendships with others who are committed to collective action, organization involvements are likely to mediate this formation. That is, people who have a prosocial orientation are likely to be attracted to organizations that reflect this orientation, such as ones that engage in charitable activity, and these organizations, in turn, provide the necessary opportunity for people who have a prosocial orientation to interact with each other and become friends (c.f. Feld 1982). Numerous studies have shown that voluntary organizations are among the most important social spaces in which people develop close relationships with similar others (Feld 1982; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). Consequently, the effect of a prosocial orientation on selection of activist friends is likely to be direct and indirect through involvement in certain types of organizations. In sum, by modeling a prosocial orientation, I will identify whether the effect of strong ties is robust to the inclusion of this orientation and thus the extent to which strong ties to activists represents a spurious effect due to homophily or a significant effect due to social influence.

Besides evaluating the significance of selection and social influence for a relational perspective of collective action, bringing together a prosocial orientation and social embeddedness will advance our knowledge of a dispositional perspective of collective action. Because dispositional models of collective action have not included social ties, they have likely missed an important mechanism through which a prosocial orientation channels involvement in collective action. Although scholars from a dispositional perspective have

documented a direct link between a prosocial orientation and collective action, it is possible that a prosocial orientation's importance is mainly as a conduit, guiding people to form close bonds with others who are committed to collective action and thus sources of social influence inducing participation. By specifying whether this is true or not, this chapter makes a significant contribution to our understanding of how a dispositional perspective generates collective civic action and connects to the larger issue in the social movement literature of explicating the precise pathways of participation (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001).

Figure 2.1 summarizes my synthetic model of collective civic action. A relational perspective of collective civic action assumes that strong civic activist ties are significant sources of social influence inducing participation (see bolded arrow in Figure 2.2). But as discussed above, the homophily principle predicts that people who have a prosocial orientation will embed themselves in activist social relations. This may be direct or indirect through voluntary organizations since these institutions provide the requisite social spaces for similar people to meet and develop close relationships. The bold arrows in Figure 2.3 represent the possible homophily effects. By incorporating a prosocial orientation into network models of collective action, my synthetic model helps identify whether the effect of strong civic activist ties represents a spurious effect due to homophily on a prosocial orientation (see dashed arrow in Figure 2.4), or whether the effect of strong civic activist ties represents a significant effect due to social influence (Figure 2.2). In addition, my synthetic model makes an important contribution to a dispositional understanding of collective civic action. It does so by specifying whether a prosocial orientation's importance for collective civic action participation is entirely indirect, driving people to integrate themselves in social networks that are sources of social influence encouraging participation (see bolded arrows

and dashed arrow in Figure 2.5), or whether a prosocial orientation still directly affects participation in collective civic action after adding these important mediating relational effects (Figure 2.6).

**The Possible Moderating Effect of Network Density**

Beyond strong ties to individual activists, the network structure of these ties may be important for explaining differential participation in collective civic action. As Klovdahl (Klovdahl 1985 1204) states, "the structure of a network has consequences for its individual members and for the network as a whole, over and above effects of characteristics and behaviors of the individuals involved." One particularly important network characteristic linked with a range of behaviors is network density (see, for example, Wellman 1979). Network density is the extent to which individuals in a person's network have direct ties to each other and is formally operationalized as the number of actual direct ties among people in a person's network divided by the possible number of direct ties among people in a person's network (Scott 2000 :70-71). When each member in a person's network knows every other member, network density is at its maximum value of one, and when none of the members in a person's network knows each other, network density is at its minimum value of zero.

It is conceivable that embeddedness in more dense networks should increase the likelihood of conforming to the behaviors and expectations of network members relative to embeddedness in less dense networks. Because people who are in more dense networks interact and communicate more frequently with each other than people who are in less dense networks, rejecting or accepting the social influence that members exert on each other likely

carries with it a greater risk of collective punishments or a greater gain of collective rewards (Coleman 1988, 1990). For example, if a member of a network with a density of one refuses to participate when asked to do so by other members, this person may face negative sanctions that are far more extensive and perhaps intense than a member of a network with a zero density. Because members of perfectly dense networks are likely to communicate and interact with each other, the chances are good that the member's refusal will become widely known. As the other members discuss with each other how their fellow member turned them down, the negative feelings that each held for this member are reinforced and heightened in collective awareness. However, in a network with a density of zero, if a person turns down friends' requests to participate in collective action, the negative sanctions that this person faces are not collectively corroborated and thus not intensified since members in the network do not know each other. This line of reasoning and explanation is consistent with the previously mentioned selective incentive account for explaining social network effects on activism, though it emphasizes the structure giving rise to *collective* social approval and disapproval of strong ties.

Broader scholarship on social networks confirms this theory, finding that network density considerably moderates the effect of social influence of individual peers on behavior (see, especially, Haynie 2001). However, this scholarship has tended to focus only on passive behavioral social influence. We thus do not know whether network density also moderates other forms of social influence. In what follows, I draw on broader scholarship on social networks and test whether network density moderates the effect of social influence of individual ties on collective civic action. I also extend this scholarship by examining whether this moderating effect varies depending on the dimension of social influence tested.

## Data, Variables, and Models

### *Data*

To test the synthetic model of collective civic action proposed in this chapter, it was necessary that the employed survey data included measures of a prosocial orientation, strong ties to civic activists, civic participation, and demographic variables to account for possible confounding effects. The 2002 Religion and Public Activism Survey (RAPAS) contains measures that capture all of these concepts. Given that commonly used survey data for analyzing civic engagement, such as the General Social Surveys, Independent Sector, or National Election Studies, do not, the RAPAS is unique in its design and is the only dataset of which I am aware that allows for testing the proposed synthetic model of collective civic action. The 2002 RAPAS was a telephone survey representing English-speaking Americans 18 years of age and older who resided in households in the United States, conducted by FGI Research Inc., a national survey research firm based in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. The survey was conducted from April to July 2002 using a random-digit-dial method, employing a sample of randomly generated telephone numbers representative of all telephones in the 50 United States. The survey was conducted with English-speaking households only. In order to randomize responses within households, and so as to ensure representativeness of age and gender, interviewers asked to conduct the interview with the adult in the household who had the most recent birthday. All non-household numbers (business, government, nonprofit, etc.) were screened out of the sample through direct calling dispositions or ascription of contact and non-contact telephone numbers for non-completes based on proportions of household numbers among working telephone numbers. Survey respondents were offered an incentive of 10 dollars to complete the survey. The final sample size for this survey was 2,898 and

response rate based on AAPOR's RR3 method was 47 percent (American Association for Public Opinion Research 2006).[3,4]

In the next part of this section, I describe how I operationalize each of the variables used in the synthetic model of collective civic action. In this description, I distinguish between measures of endogenous and exogenous variables. The final part of this section discusses the statistical method employed: Structural Equation Models (SEMs). I first explain the reasons why SEMs were the optimal choice of the available statistical methods to test my synthetic model of collective civic action. I then briefly elaborate technical mechanics involved in using SEMs to estimate this model (for a full description of these mechanics, see Appendix A).

### *Endogenous Variables*

The first endogenous variable in the model was a binary measure for participation in collective civic action.[5] I coded this variable as one if respondents volunteered for a

[3] The formula for AAPOR's RR3 method is (I )/((I +P)+(R+NC+O)+e(UH+UO)), where I is Completed Interviews, P is Partial Interviews, R is Refusals or Break-offs, NC is Non-contacts, O is Other, UH is Unknown household eligibility, UO is unknown other eligibility, and e is the estimated proportion of cases of unknown eligibility that are eligible. For contacted numbers where it could not be determined whether they were household numbers or not, 38.83 percent was used for e, which represents the FCC's percentage of working telephone numbers that were household numbers in 2002 (FCC 2000). For non-contacted numbers after multiple attempts, 24.2 percent was used for e, which represents Brick, Montaquilla, and Scheuren's (2002) estimate of the percentage of undermined numbers (no answer or answering machine) after multiple call attempts that are residential numbers.

[4] Because the RAPAS was unable to collect information on individuals who did not participate in the survey (since they refused to participate), there was no way to investigate whether those who responded to the survey were distinctive in any meaningful way from those who did not. Given the focus of this chapter, if those who were more civically active were more likely to respond than those who refused, this could be an important source of bias. While it is true that people who are more civically engaged tend to be more likely to participate in surveys than the less civically engaged, offering an incentive generally negates this difference (Groves, Singer, and Corning 2000). Incentives generally produce greater survey representativeness without any deleterious consequences, such as jeopardizing data quality (Singer et al. 1999; Singer, Van Hoewyk, and Maher 2000). Regarding demographic differences between the RAPAS and Census averages, older, more educated, and female respondents were over represented. The RAPAS constructed a weight based on these demographic variables (the weight also adjusted for household size), so that its demographic distributions matched those of the Census for American adults.

community project during the last year, and I coded this variable as zero if respondents did not volunteer for a community project in the last year. A prosocial orientation was the second endogenous variable in the model. Following the conceptualization of a prosocial orientation as a concern for the welfare and rights of other people (Penner 2002; Penner and Finkelstein 1998; Penner et al. 1995), I used two five-category ordinal variables that tap this conceptualization. The first variable measured how responsible respondents personally feel to help other people who are in need. The second variable measured how responsible respondents personally feel to take action against wrongs and injustices in life. Each variable ranges from one (not responsible at all) to five (extremely responsible).

My third and fourth endogenous variables measured participation in charitable and non-charitable organizations. The RAPAS asked respondents the number of groups or organizations in which they were involved during the past 12 months. Respondents who reported being involved in any organization were then asked to report the number of organizations in which they were involved. For each organization reported, respondents were then asked whether the organization sponsored efforts that serve the needs of people in the community. I used this information to construct a variable for the number of organizations in which respondents were activity involved that serve needs of people in the community (charitable organizations) and a variable for the number of organizations in which respondents were activity involved that do not (non-charitable organizations).

[5] Although it is clear that some of the control variables discussed below causally precede a prosocial orientation, such as gender, race, or age, this is not the case for others. For these variables, it would be preferable to not have to assume causal order, but rather covary them with a prosocial orientation. However, a programming limitation in Mplus precludes this option and thus I also treated the other control variables as occurring casually prior to a prosocial orientation, even though in some cases this does not make substantive sense (e.g., working full-time). But this is preferable to other alternatives, such as transforming the control variables to underlying propensities (see Appendix A for a discussion of this point) and covarying their errors with the measure for a prosocial orientation. Treating a prosocial orientation as an endogenous variable, then, seems to violate the least number of assumptions. But since it is not without flaws, I do not interpret the effects of the control variables on the measure for a prosocial orientation.

My fifth, sixth, and seventh endogenous variables measured attitudinal, passive behavioral, and active behavioral social influence that strong ties exert for collective civic action. The RAPAS asked respondents to nominate up to five people to whom they felt closest who were not members of their household, and then asked numerous questions about the characteristics of these people. Attitudinal social influence was measured as the number of strong ties who would respond positively if respondents did volunteer work for a social, political, or community issue. Passive behavioral social influence was measured as the number of strong ties who regularly do volunteer work, while active behavioral social influence was measured as the number of strong ties who asked or encouraged respondents to do volunteer work in the past year. The eighth endogenous variable was a measure of network size, representing the total number of strong ties whom respondents nominated.

My ninth endogenous variable was a measure of network density. Respondents were asked whether each strong tie they nominated knew well each of the other strong ties they nominated. This knowledge was assumed to be nondirectional. For instance, if respondents indicated that strong tie A knew strong tie B well, it was assumed that strong tie B also knew strong tie A well, which seems to be a reasonable assumption. To calculate network density, I thus used the formula for nondirectional association among network ties: A/(P[P-1]/2), where A is the actual number of strong ties that knew each other well and P is the possible number of strong ties that knew each other well (Scott 2000). Because respondents could nominate up to five strong ties, the total number of possible pairs of strong ties that could know each other well is 10 (5[5-1]/2]).[6] The final endogenous variables measured the interaction between density and attitudinal, passive behavioral, and active behavioral social

[6] I follow convention for ego-centric networks and only count the links among strong ties nominated and not the links between respondents and each strong tie nominated (Scott 2000:72-73).

influence described above, multiplying density and each measure of social influence together.

### *Exogenous Variables*

Because prior studies of collective action have identified that demographic characteristics are important factors for distinguishing participants from nonparticipants, I controlled for the following exogenous variables that might have otherwise confounded the effect of my key explanatory variables: age (in years); gender (1 = female ; 0 = male); race (0 = white; 1 = African American; 1 = other race); education (1 = four-year college degree; 0 = less than a four-year college degree); region (1 = South; 0 = Non-South); community type (1 = rural; 0 = non-rural); working status (1 = working full-time; 0 = not working full-time); marital status (1= married; 0 = unmarried); military service (1 = respondent served; 0 = did not serve); physical health (five-point ordinal variable, ranging from excellent to very poor); parenthood (number of children living in the household who are under nineteen years old); and household income (eight-point ordinal variable ranging from $10,000 or less to greater than $100,000). Table 2.1 displays descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis.[7]

### *Structural Equation Models*

Simply measuring a prosocial orientation with observed variables would likely introduce substantial measurement error because they would not *perfectly* capture what is conceptually meant by this concept. Furthermore, as described above, I have two measures for a prosocial orientation. If we were to form scales for these measures and run a series of regression

[7] Descriptive statistics use weighted data to account for differential probabilities of selection based on number of eligible adults in the household and to adjust for the known demographic discrepancies as mentioned above.

models, the results would be difficult to interpret since the measurement error in them would not be taken into account and thus the coefficients would be biased. Structural equation models (SEMs) with latent variables are well suited to address these problems (Bollen 1989b). SEMs allow concepts to be represented as unobserved or latent variables that incorporate measurement error.[8] Additionally, SEMs can simultaneously estimate numerous regression equations, and they facilitate the decomposition of indirect, direct, and total effects among these equations. This is crucial for adequately evaluating my synthetic model of collective civic action in Figure 2.1, as it requires not only explicating the direct paths strong civic activist ties and a prosocial orientation on collective civic action, but also intervening paths, most importantly whether strong civic activist ties mediate the relationship between a prosocial orientation and participation in collective civic action (see Figure 2.1).

Because some of my observed endogenous variables were binary or ordinal, I could not use traditional SEMs to estimate my models of collective civic action because they assume that all observed endogenous variables are continuous. I therefore used methods devised to correct the various problems that categorical observed endogenous variables pose for traditional SEMs. Appendix A provides a more formal presentation of the SEM approach that I use. In brief, the techniques assume that the ordinal and dichotomous variables are crude representations of normally distributed continuous variables. The covariance matrix of these underlying continuous variables is estimated and is the basis for the analysis. In the case of a single equation with an ordinal or dichotomous outcome variable with exogenous explanatory variables, these techniques are equivalent to probit regression. However, the SEM procedures are more general in that they can estimate multiple equations with a mixture

[8] Because it is assumed that the other variables have negligible measurement error, any measurement error in them should not introduce considerable bias for the results and thus alter any of the substantive interpretations.

of ordinal and dichotomous indicators. See Appendix A. To compare the magnitude of the effects of the different types of social influence, I calculated predicted probabilities for them.

Multiple imputation (MI) was used to handle variables in the analysis that did not have complete information (Rubin 1991; Schafer 1997, 1999; Schafer and Graham 2002; Schafer and Olsen 1998).[9] MI avoids shortcomings of other commonly employed techniques for dealing with missing data, such as listwise deletion, pairwise deletion, dummy variable adjustment, or mean imputation (Allison 2002:5-12). Moreover, MI assumes only that the data are missing at random (MAR) rather than the more restrictive assumption that they are missing completely at random (MCAR), which is a requirement of the other commonly employed techniques, such as listwise or pairwise deletion. Five imputations were generated, each of which replaced cases with missing information with plausible values based on their predictive distributions. Identical SEMs were run for each of the five imputed datasets, using complete data on all variables. The results were then combined to produce overall estimates, standard errors, and significance levels that take into account uncertainty about missing data.

My analyses proceed in the following steps. I first estimate models that replicate a dispositional and a relational perspective of collective civic action. I next estimate a model for my synthetic perspective of collective civic action and demonstrate how it improves on the two previous models. I then calculate predicted probabilities for the effects of the different types of social influence that strong ties exert and compare the magnitude of these probabilities. This allows me to answer the important question of whether different dimensions of social influence have differing effects on participation in collective civic action. I conclude by testing whether network density moderates the effect of social

[9] For MI, the MICE program (van Buuren, Boshuizen, and Knook 1999) designed for STATA (Royston 2004, 2005) was used, which explicitly handles categorical variables.

influence on participation in collective civic action and whether this moderating effect differs depending on the type of social influence modeled.

## Results

### *Dispositional and Relational Models of Collective Civic Action*

Table 2.2 replicates the previously discussed dispositional and relational models of collective civic action.[10] To replicate the former model, I set all parameters that involve effects of strong civic activist ties on collective civic action to zero as well as all parameters that involve effects of a prosocial orientation on strong civic activist ties, so that the effects of a prosocial orientation on collective civic action would occur without the effects of strong civic activist ties (see Figure 2.5).[11] Replication of the latter model required setting the parameter for the effect of a prosocial orientation on collective civic action to zero as well as all parameters that involve effects of a prosocial orientation on strong civic activist ties, so that the effects of strong ties to civic activists on collective civic action would result without controlling for a prosocial orientation (see Figure 2.2).[12] Both models control for all demographic variables mentioned above. As the first row in Table 2.2 indicates, the higher the prosocial orientation, the greater the likelihood of individual participation in collective civic action ($\beta = .255$; $p < .001$) and thus support for a dispositional model of collective civic

[10] All models from SEM estimates use unweighted data (DuMouchel and Duncan 1983; Winship and Radbill 1994).

[11] Although they are not the focus of this chapter, the organizational effects are considered to be part of the relational model (see Figure 2.2) and thus all parameters that involve effects of organizations on collective civic action are set to zero as well as all parameters that involve effects of a prosocial orientation on organizations in the dispositional model.

[12] All parameters that involve effects of a prosocial orientation on organizations are also set to zero in the relational model because organizations are considered to be part of this model (see note 11).

action.[13] Looking at the second column in Table 2.2, we also see confirmation for a relational model of collective civic action. Replacing a strong non-activist tie with either a strong tie who approves of volunteer work ($\beta = .086$; $p < .001$), a strong tie who engages in volunteer work ($\beta = .152$; $p < .001$), or a strong tie who requests volunteer work ($\beta = .116$; $p < .001$) significantly increases the probability of participating in collective civic action.[14] However, as I argued in the theoretical sections of this chapter, there are important limitations when estimating a dispositional and a relational model of collective civic action in isolation. For a dispositional model, this isolation likely means missing an important pathway through which a prosocial orientation promotes collective civic action, as it is expected that prosocially oriented people will embed themselves in activist social networks, which in turn mobilize participation. In terms of a relational perspective, not taking into account a prosocial orientation makes it difficult to accept the position that strong ties are sources of social influence inducing participation. It is just as likely that this effect reflects selection rather than social influence, as prosocially oriented people form friendships with others who share their commitment to collective civic action.

The overall fit statistics listed at the bottom of the columns in Table 2.2 provide empirical evidence of the inadequacy of treating dispositional and relational models of

[13] To facilitate interpretation of the prosocial orientation latent variable, I scaled it in the same unit as one of its indicators by setting the regression coefficient for feeling personally responsible to help other people who are in need to one. As expected, the regression coefficient for the other indicator—personally feeling responsible to take action against wrongs and injustice in life—was positive and statistically significant ($p < .001$). In addition, the prosocial orientation latent variable explained a substantial portion of each of its indicators variability, as evident by the high $R^2$ values for both (.589 and .435). Overall, then, the latent variable for a prosocial orientation achieved an excellent component fit.

[14] To hold constant the number of strong ties, an increase in the number of strong civic activist ties of any type means that there must be an equivalent decrease in strong non-activist ties. So, for example, if a person has 3 total strong ties and gains 2 strong civic activist ties, then this person must also lose 2 strong non-activist ties. My substantive interpretation of the effect of strong ties and strong civic activist ties on participation in collective civic action incorporates the interdependence of these measures, and thus the measure for the number of strong ties (network size) captures the effect for strong non-activist ties.

collective active action in isolation. For the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), Incremental Fit Index (IFI), and Comparative Fit Index (CFI), values greater than .95 generally indicate a good model fit, while values less than .90 generally indicate a poor model fit (Bollen 1989a; Bollen and Curran 2006:44-47). For the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), values less than .05 generally indicate a very good model fit, while values greater than .10 generally indicate a poor model fit (Browne and Cudeck 1993). The fit statistics indicate that the dispositional model of collective civic action achieves a poor fit to the data and that the relational model of collective civic action achieves a moderate fit to the data at best, which indicates these models are not properly specified. To address this misspecification in these models, I estimate my synthetic model of collective civic action that integrates the dispositional and relational models of activism.

### *Synthetic Model of Collective Civic Action*

Table 2.3 reports overall fit statistics and direct effects in the form of probit coefficients for my synthetic model of collective civic action illustrated in Figure 2.1. Each column represents a separate probit regression that corresponds to each path in this figure. All models control for demographic variables described above (but because demographic variables are not the focus of this chapter and to conserve space, their results are only displayed in Appendix B in Table B1). The synthetic model of collective civic action shown in Table 2.3 frees the parameters for strong civic ties that the dispositional model in Table 2.2 constrained to zero as well as the parameters for a prosocial orientation that the relational

model constrained to zero.[15] Freely estimating these parameters allows me to test simultaneously the effects of strong ties and a prosocial orientation on collective civic action.

Because the dispositional model and relational model are nested in the synthetic model, I tested whether the synthetic model improved the fit compared to the other two models of collective civic action. Results from these chi-square difference tests indicated that the synthetic model of collective civic action led to a significant improvement in fit relative to both the dispositional and relational models displayed in Table 2.2 ($\chi^2 = 115.02$; df =9; $p < .001$ and $\chi^2 = 49.56$; df =6; $p < .001$ respectively).[16] Furthermore, looking at the overall fit statistics listed at the bottom of the first column in Table 2.3, we see that, in contrast to the dispositional and relational models previously estimated, the synthetic model achieves a good fit to the data. Although the chi-square test statistic is significant, indicating rejection of the null hypothesis that the model fits the data perfectly, this test is not suited to evaluate model fit with large sample sizes like the one in this case (N = 2,898). This is because the ability of detecting even small differences between the population model implied covariance and the population observed variable covariance increases with sample size. All of the other fit statistics indicted a good model fit. The values for the TLI, IFI, and CFI are .991 and the value for the RMSEA is .034, indicating that the synthetic model of collective civic action is a good fitting model. The synthetic model of collective civic action, then, improves the fit relative to the dispositional and relational models in Table 2.2 and shows a good overall fit to the data. It is also worth noting that the synthetic model of collective civic

[15] The synthetic model of collective civic action also frees the parameters for organizational involvements that the dispositional model constrained to zero.

[16] These nested tests were done using the DIFFTEST option in Mplus (Muthen and Asparouhov 2006). Because the nested tests were conducted on five datasets from multiple imputation, Allison's SAS marco (COMBCHI) was used to produce the final values for these tests.

action explains almost 40 percent of the variability in people's propensity to get involved in community volunteer efforts.

Turning to the first row in Table 2.3, we see that a prosocial orientation leads people directly to form strong relationships with individuals who request volunteer work ($\beta = .156$; $p < .001$), who participate in volunteer work ($\beta = .224$; $p < .001$), and who approve of volunteer work ($\beta = .288$; $p < .001$), thus supporting the theoretical argument that a prosocial orientation is an important basis of civic activist friendships. Combining these direct effects with its significant positive indirect effects through charitable and non-charitable organizational involvements gives a prosocial orientation a total effect of .302 for having strong ties who approve of volunteer work, a total effect of .273 of having strong ties who do volunteer work, and a total effect of .190 of having strong ties who request volunteer work (see Table 2.4). Notably, even after accounting for the impact of a prosocial orientation on strong civic activist ties, this orientation still significantly and positively affects participation in collective civic action ($\beta = .163$; $p <. 001$). In addition to the significance of the coefficient for a prosocial orientation, the chi-square difference test showed that the model that freely estimates the direct effect of a prosocial orientation on collective civic action has a better fit than the model that constrains this effect to be zero ($\chi^2 = 24.5$; df =1; $p < .001$). Nonetheless, by not accounting for the effect of a prosocial orientation on strong ties to civic activists, as in the case of the dispositional model in Table 2.2, we miss an important mechanism through which a prosocial orientation promotes collective civic action. The significance of a prosocial orientation for mobilizing collective civic action is also as a conduit, guiding people to embed themselves in strong civic activist networks, which in turn facilitate participation. A prosocial orientation has a total indirect effect of .131 on collective

civic action, which is due to its direct effects on different types of strong civic activist ties, its indirect effects on these ties through organizational involvements, and its direct effects on organizational involvements. Its indirect effects through strong civic activists ties accounts for 26 percent of prosocial orientation's total effect on collective civic action.[17]

I next explore the extent to which a prosocial orientation attenuates the effects of strong ties to civic activists on collective civic action observed in the relational model in Table 2.2, and thus help specify whether these effects are largely due to selection or social influence. While there is some reduction in the effects of the strong civic activist tie measures on collective civic action when the parameters for a prosocial orientation that were set to zero in the relational model are freely estimated, all of these measures remain as robust positive predictors of participation. This demonstrates that strong civic activist ties affect participation in collective civic action above and beyond selection effects due to a prosocial orientation, supporting the argument that strong ties are important sources of social influence inducing participation. It is also noteworthy that each strong civic activist tie measure significantly and positively affects participation in collective civic action net of the other measures and the overall number of strong ties. Replacing a strong non-activist tie with either a strong tie who approves of volunteer work ($\beta = .062$; $p < .01$), a strong tie who engages in volunteer work ($\beta = .140$; $p < .001$), or a strong tie who requests volunteer work ($\beta = .095$; $p < .001$) significantly increases the probability of participating in collective civic action. This indicates that each dimension of social influence distinctively mobilizes participation in collective civic action. In sum, my synthetic model of collective civic action

[17] This was calculated by excluding the portion of a prosocial orientation's total indirect effect on collective civic action that was due to its direct effects on organizational involvements (.056). Without these direct effects included, a prosocial orientation's total indirect effect on collective civic action is .075 and thus the percentage of a prosocial orientation's total effect on collective civic action that is due to its effects on strong civic activist ties is 26 (.075/.294 = .25).

substantially improves on the dispositional and relational models estimated in Table 2.2, as it detects an important pathway through which a prosocial orientation promotes participation and helps establish the significance of strong ties as powerful sources of social influence compelling participation.

### *Which Dimensions of Social Influence Matter Most?*

From Table 2.3 we learned that each dimension of measured social influence distinctively contributes to generating participation in collective civic action. I now turn to the issue of whether different dimensions of social influence have differing effects on participation in collective civic action. To do so, I calculated the difference in the predicted probability of participation in collective civic action when the number of strong non-activist ties was replaced with the same number of strong activist ties for each dimension of social influence.[18, 19] Figure 2.7 graphically displays these differences. Comparing the heights for the different set of bars, we see in all cases that the difference in the predicted probability of participation in collective civic action for replacing strong non-activist ties with strong ties

[18] The values for the number of strong ties who approve of volunteering, the number of strong ties who request volunteering, and the number of strong ties who engage in volunteering are simultaneously set to zero to obtain the predicted probability of participation in collective civic action for the number of strong non-activist ties. For instance, to obtain the predicted probability of participation in collective civic action for one strong non-activist tie required setting the number of strong ties to 1 and number of strong ties who approve of volunteering to 0, the number of strong ties who request volunteering to 0, and the number of strong ties who engage in volunteering to 0. Because we are interested in the possible differing effects of the different types of strong activist ties, when the predicted probability of participation in collective civic action was calculated for one type of strong activist ties the values for the other types of strong activist ties were set to 0. Returning to the previous example, to obtain the predicted probability of participation in collective civic action for one strong tie who approves of volunteering required setting the number of strong ties to 1, the number of strong ties who approve of volunteering to 1, the number of strong ties who request volunteering to 0, and the number of strong ties who engage in volunteering to zero.

[19] The following formula was used to calculate the predicted probabilities: $\Pr(y_i = 1 | x_i) = 1 - \Phi(\tau_1 - \beta x_i)$. Other than the values for the strong ties, which vary from model to model, the predicted probabilities are for white married college educated females age 25 who have children under 19 living at home, military experience, attend no charitable or non-charitable organizations, live outside the south, live in rural areas, have average prosocial orientation, average physical health, and average income.

who engage in volunteering is *greater* than the difference in the predicted probability of participation in collective civic action for replacing strong non-activist ties with either strong ties who request volunteering or strong ties who approve of volunteering. We also see that in all cases that the difference in the predicted probability of participation in collective civic action for replacing strong non-activist ties with strong ties who request volunteering is *greater* than the difference in the predicted probability of participation in collective civic action for replacing strong non-activist ties with strong ties who approve of volunteering. These differences grow as we increase the number of strong non-activist ties being replaced by the number of strong activist ties. For instance, the difference in the predicted probability of participation in collective civic action for replacing five strong non-activist ties with five strong ties who approve of volunteering is .119, while the difference in the predicted probability of participation in collective civic action for replacing five strong non-activist ties with five strong ties who request volunteering is .178 and the difference in the predicted probability of participation in collective civic action for replacing five strong non-activist ties with five strong ties who engage in volunteering is .249. To summarize, while attitudinal social influence is a significant predictor of participation in collective civic action, it has weaker effects on this participation than active behavioral social influence and especially passive behavioral social influence. Concerning the difference in participation in collective civic action between the behavioral types of social influence, passive behavioral social influence has stronger effects than active behavioral social influence.

### *Moderating Effect of Network Density*

My final model tests whether network density moderates the effect of social influence on collective civic action, and if so, whether this moderating effect applies to all types of social influence or just certain ones. To test this possibility, I entered terms for the interaction between density and each of the different measures of social influence from strong ties.[20] Looking at the results in Table 2.5, we see that none of the interaction terms were significant.[21] Contrary to theoretical expectations discussed above, then, it seems that network density does *not* significantly amplify the effect of any of the measures of social influence on participation in collective civic action.[22]

## Responses to Possible Objections

Given the cross-sectional nature of the data employed, the source of information of the strong tie network characteristics, and the timing of the survey, several objections to the statistical models and interpretations are possible. This section reviews and responds to these objections.

First, instead of a prosocial orientation or disposition driving the selection of adult activist friendships, the causal direction could also go the other way, where activist

[20] To reduce collinearity, I centered these terms.

[21] The chi-square difference test showed that the model that freely estimates the joint effects of the interaction terms fit no better than the model that constrains the joint effects of the interaction terms to be equal ($\chi^2$ = 1.032; df =3; $p < .384$). In addition, the nonsignificant findings for the interaction terms were not an artifact of jointly entering them in the model, as entering each interaction term while removing the other two produced the same nonsignificant results.

[22] On conceptual grounds, people who have no strong ties or only one strong tie have a density of zero. But since there may be a concern that coding people who have no strong ties or only 1 strong tie as zero on network density would bias the results, I restricted the sample to respondents who had at least two strong ties and reestimated the model in Table 2.5. The results were substantively similar, as were the results when the sample was restricted to respondents who had at least three strong ties.

friendships promote a prosocial orientation. But this possibility seems unlikely when judged against previous empirical studies. Research has demonstrated that the forming of a prosocial orientation largely occurs from a combination of genetic and early socialization factors, such as parental emphasis on or modeling helping, and that this orientation tends to exhibit continuity over the life course (see, for example, Bar-Tal 1976:11-37; Davis and Franzoi 1991; Eisenberg et al. 2002; Eisenberg et al. 1999; Eisenberg and Mussen 1989; Grusec 1981; Hoffman 1981; Koestner et al. 1990; Oliner and Oliner 1988; Rossi 2001a; Schroeder et al. 1995:91-125). Given this evidence, it appears that a prosocial orientation generally develops prior to and shapes current activist friendships rather than the other way around.

Second, because the survey obtained information on strong tie characteristics from respondents instead of strong ties themselves, it is possible that respondents may have inaccurately reported on the characteristics of their strong ties. However, this is less of a concern in my case, given that social influence theory presumes awareness. If people are unaware of the social influence that strong ties exert on them, then social influence is not operating, at least from the perspective of respondents whose behaviors we are trying to explain. For instance, recall from above that passive behavioral social influence consists of respondents learning of strong ties' participation in collective action. Hence, even if respondents do not always know about and report all of the civic activities of all their strong ties, the important point is that they report social influence from strong ties of which they are aware. Because social influence requires by definition awareness by those who are the objects of social influence, reports from respondents seem preferable to those from strong ties.

Third, because the 2002 RAPAS was administered in the months after the September 11 terrorist attacks and asked questions about activities during a portion of these months, this may bias the results regarding participation in collective civic action. Even if 9/11 affected the extent to which people got involved in collective civic action, it is unlikely that this would have fundamentally altered the nature of the causal relationships that I observed. In other words, even if September 11 had, for instance, increased the rates of peers who encouraged friends to do volunteer work or the rates of volunteering for community projects, it seems unlikely that these increases would have changed, for instance, the fact that having such peers is a powerful source of social influence inducing participation in collective civic action. Although prior studies have not integrated a prosocial orientation and social networks as I have here, these studies have consistently shown the importance of these factors for explaining who participates in volunteer efforts and who does not outside of disaster contexts. Consequently, any effects of September 11 on my survey data and results would appear to have been exogenous, possibly increasing levels of civic behaviors and commitments, but not altering the fundamental processes that I have observed.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, besides strong civic activist ties being powerful sources of social influence inducing collective civic action, it is possible that participation in collective civic action could also affect the formation of these ties. The main argument for this possibility would seem to be that involvement in collective civic action provides opportunities to interact with other activists and form friendships, much in the same way that formal organization involvements do. However, unlike formal organizations that have fixed meeting spaces, regular and structured gatherings, and events and activities that often span extended periods of time, collective civic action is generally transient, sporadic,

loosely structured, and short in duration. Consequently, it does not seem that participation in collective civic action would provide either the quantity or quality of interaction needed to create and sustain strong connections among individuals. Recall that the measures of civic activist ties were the five *closest* people to respondents, not acquaintances or other weak ties, which may be likely to develop in the context of collective civic action. In his ethnography of various advocacy groups, Lichterman (2005:82-83) found that participation in community efforts did *not* give rise to close, personal relationships with other activists or people whom these efforts served. When connections did develop from this participation, they were brief and impersonal.

Lichterman's (2005) evidence suggests that participation in collective civic action does not substantially affect the formation of activist ties and thus the exclusion of this effect should not undermine my results for the effect of activist ties. However, given the importance of this issue, I conducted sensitivity tests assuming that there was a feedback effect of participation in collective civic action on the formation of activist ties to see if the effect of activist ties on participation was robust to the inclusion of this feedback effect.[23] Specifically, I estimated models in which I set the coefficient for feedback effect of participation on activist ties to varying percentages of the coefficient for the effect of activist ties on participation.[24] This allowed me to identify whether the feedback effect had to be a

[23] Ideally, longitudinal analysis or a nonrecursive model would be conducted to test for the robustness of the activist strong tie effects in the presence of this feedback. However, I am aware of no data over time that contain measures of activist networks and activist participation. Concerning estimating a nonrecursive model, I would need two instrumental variables: one that affects participation in collective civic action but not strong civic activist ties and one that affects strong civic activist ties but not collective civic action. Unfortunately, with the survey data employed, instrumental variables do not exist for either case. But this is not surprising, as instrumental variables are extremely difficult to identify in general.

[24] This was done in four steps. First, to establish a comparable metric, the standardized coefficients for the effects of activist ties on participation in collective civic action were derived. These standardized coefficients were then multiplied by varying percentages. Third, the products of the standardized coefficients and the

low or high percentage of the effect of activist ties on participation for this effect to fall to nonsignificance. If this was a low percentage, say 25 percent, this would seem to call into question my results, as it is reasonable to think that the feedback effect could actually be 25 percent of the effect of activist ties on participation. However, if this was a high percentage, say over 50 percent, this would give me confidence in my results, as it is not very reasonable to think that the feedback effect would actually be over 50 percent of the effect of activist ties on participation.

Table 2.6 displays the results of these sensitivity tests. Looking down the second and third column of this table, we see that all the effects of activist ties are robust when assuming that the coefficient for the feedback effect is 25 or 50 percent of the value of the coefficient for the effect of each type of activist ties on participation in collective civic action. When the coefficient for the feedback effect is set to 75 percent of the value of the coefficient for the effect of active behavioral social influence on participation in collective civic action, this effect falls to nonsignificance (see the fourth column in Table 6). But is it plausible to think that this feedback effect would really be 75 percent of the effect of active behavioral social influence on participation in collective civic action? Based on my previous conceptual discussion and Lichterman's (2005) empirical finding, this seems unlikely. Even if we assume that the coefficient for the feedback effect is 100 percent of the value of the coefficient for the effect of passive behavioral social influence on this participation, the effect of passive behavior social influence on participation in collective civic action is still

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varying percentages were multiplied by $\sigma_y / \sigma_x$, where $\sigma_y$ represents the standard deviation of participation in collective civic action and $\sigma_x$ represents the standard deviation for activist ties. This step was necessary to convert the values of the feedback effects back to unstandardized coefficients. Finally, the feedback effect was fixed to the product from the third step and the model was reestimated so the robustness of the original effects of activist ties on participation in collective civic action could be evaluated when feedback effect of participation in collective civic action on activist ties was included.

significant. The same is true for attitudinal social influence. Overall, then, even assuming that the coefficient for the feedback is a substantial percentage of the effect of activist ties on participation in collective civic action does not change the fact that activist ties are robust predictors of participation in collective civic action. This result thus gives me confidence in my estimated models showing the important activist ties for inducing participation in collective civic action.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

This chapter demonstrates the advantages of integrating a dispositional and a relational perspective for explaining arguably the enduring question in the collective action literature of differential participation. My synthetic model of collective action offers key insights into the dynamics of activism that are missed when these two perspectives are treated in isolation, showing how prosocially oriented people select others as friends who share their commitment to collective action, and how embeddedness in these friendship networks, in turn, induce participation. Hence, rather than viewing a dispositional and a relational perspective as competing and incompatible explanations for differential participation, as has often been the case in the past, I see these two perspectives as complementary, working together to expand what has been until now a limited view of the nature of collective action.

Consistent with a dispositional perspective of collective action that tends to pervade the fields of altruistic behavior and volunteerism, the results in this chapter showed that a prosocial orientation directly leads people to participate in activism, suggesting that "an enduring concern for the welfare and rights of other people and felt empathy for them" (Penner and Finkelstein 1998:526) is a sufficient condition for motivating participation.

However, by demonstrating an important pathway through which a prosocial orientation generates participation in collective action, this chapter moved beyond a static view of the relationship between dispositions and activism. As my empirical models demonstrated, the significance of a prosocial orientation for collective action is also a conduit, guiding people to embed themselves in activist networks that are powerful sources of social influence encouraging participation. Because scholars from a dispositional perspective have not generally included measures of social networks in their models, they have missed an opportunity to contribute to the broader call in the collective action literature of specifying the precise mechanisms of mobilization (McAdam et al. 2001). While future research may uncover additional mechanisms, we cannot deny the central importance of activist networks for mediating the relationship between orientations and participation, which is only observed through a synthesis of a dispositional and relational perspective of collective action.

Because a relational perspective of collective action was largely constructed in opposition to the classic psychological "strain" theory of activism and the fact that this perspective has tended to be the leading one for explaining differential participation in the field of social movements, the "psychology" of collective action has generally been absent in this field. This has recently begun to change, however, with the "cultural turn" in social movement scholarship during the last decade. Among other things, this turn has sought to reintroduce personal motivations and reactions to the study collective action, emphasizing the ways in which psychological "shocks" can directly trigger and stimulate participation (Jasper 1997, 1998; Snow et al. 1998). For instance, Luker (1984) found that two-thirds of the California pro-life activists she studied were "self-recruits," actively seeking out this movement in response to information about abortion that offended and horrified them. This

chapter demonstrates a similar process, but for a more stable, consistent, and enduring motivation, explicating how a prosocial orientation indirectly and directly mobilizes participation in collective action. In light of this evidence, future social movement scholarship on differential participation would likely benefit by including enduring individual dispositions in their models.

Besides generally benefiting social movement literature on differential participation, incorporating a dispositional perspective specifically benefits a relational perspective of collective action, providing a way to evaluate the significance that scholars from this perspective have attached to social network effects. Despite findings from numerous relational models of collective action showing the positive effects of social networks, none of these models have accounted for the important alternative explanation of selection. Consequently, instead of the observed social network effects being the result of social influence, they could just as easily be due to homophily, in which people who are committed to collective action choose others as friends who share their commitment to collective action. As I argued above, controlling for a prosocial orientation helps address selection given that it is an important bias on which activist friendships form. The inclusion of a prosocial orientation should thus render social network effects nonsignificant if selection is mainly responsible for these effects. But my empirical models showed that, even after taking into account a prosocial orientation, the effects of strong ties to people who engage in, encourage, and support collective civic action were robust. Therefore, while a prosocial orientation leads people to form friendships with others who support collective action, these friendships are significant sources of social influence that promote participation above and beyond the

orientation that is the basis of this friendship. This supports the view that social networks constitute important selective incentives for participation.

This fact notwithstanding, not all types of social influence are equally important for mobilizing participation in collective action. While my empirical results showed that attitudinal, passive behavioral, and active behavioral forms of social influence all had distinct and positive effects on collective action, comparing the magnitude of these effects revealed an important difference: behavioral social influence of both types was more important for promoting participation than attitudinal social influence. Because prior studies modeling the effect of social ties on activism have generally only included a single measure of social influence, they have not been able to detect this difference. This has given rise to misinterpretations of the exact dimensions of social influence that matter most for mobilizing participation.

Differences in the effects of attitudinal and behavioral social influence on collective action are most likely due to differences in the positive and negative sanctions that follow from these two types of social influence. Although people who are merely supportive of activism are likely to reward friends who participate, people who actually participate are likely to reward friends *more* who participate. This is because people who actually participate are presumably more committed to activism than mere attitudinal supporters, and thus place more value on friends' participation. Actually engaging in what others practice therefore should generate stronger social approval than doing what others simply support attitudinally. Moreover, we would not expect people who simply support activism to disapprove of friends who do not participate since they themselves are not participants. By comparison, we would expect individuals who themselves participate in collective action to

be more likely to disapprove of nonparticipating friends, given their strong and public commitment to activism and desire of the same from friends. Therefore, individuals have more to gain from participating in collective action and much more to lose from not participating when they have friends who actually participate in activism compared to being merely attitudinal supporters of activism.

Similar differences in gains and losses are evident in the case of friends who explicitly request or encourage activism versus friends who simply support activism. People who participate in activism in response to the actual direct request of friends are likely to receive various forms of praises for doing so, since they have responded positively to their friends' request. This scenario cannot occur when friends merely support activism. In terms of the negative sanctions discussed above, not participating carries with it relatively little risk of falling from good graces with friends who only support activism. Again, we would not expect people who do not participate themselves to disapprove of friends who also do not participate. However, not participating carries with it a great deal of risk of falling from good graces with friends who directly request participation. This is because the fact of failing to participate is more obvious and potentially more slighting when a direct request has been made and then not acted on. But relative to attitudinal social influence, active behavioral social influence had weaker effects on participation in collective civic action than passive behavioral social influence. Based on the logic just outlined, it is not clear why this would be the case. Future research should examine this difference in more detail. In sum, as far as the mobilizing power of social influence is concerned, it appears that "actions speak louder than words."

Contrary to arguments that people in more dense networks communicate with each other more frequently and thus rejecting social influence from activist strong ties to participate carries with it the threat of more severe sanctioning than does this rejection for people in less dense networks, the empirical models in this chapter did not identify any significant interactions between the number of activist strong ties and network density. Based on this finding, network density does *not* amplify the effect of any type of social influence on participation in collective civic action. It thus seems that connections among friends provide no additional incentives for inducing participation. It is having *individual* friends who exert social influence that is crucial for mobilizing people to participate in collective civic action.

Given that there are various forms of collective action, an important issue that needs to be addressed is the extent to which the findings for collective civic action, which is a form of low-risk/cost activism, generalize to forms of high-risk/cost activism, such as protests. Despite the fact that social movement scholars have long argued that different dynamics explain participation in low-risk/cost activism and high-risk/cost activism (McAdam 1986), closer inspection suggests that, at least in this case, there should be very few differences in the mobilization processes of these types of activism. Whether people are embedded in social networks that focus on protesting to overthrow political regimes or social networks that focus on volunteering to improve the broader community, both provide selective incentives that induce participation. In fact, numerous studies of disruptive collective action have demonstrated that social ties are important for mobilizing participation (della Porta 1988; McAdam 1986; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Opp 1989; Opp and Gern 1993). It is thus difficult to see why the effects of social networks observed for collective civic action

would change for more contentious forms of activism. Moreover, the level of risk and cost of activism should not alter the finding that attitudinal social influence is less important for mobilizing participation than behavioral types of social influence or the moderating effect of network density on behavioral social influence. This chapter proposed general explanations for these effects, which are unlikely to vary for different forms of collective action.

However, when the collective action studied is of a high-risk/cost nature, there may be two important differences for the effects of dispositions in general and a prosocial disposition in particular. First, although a prosocial disposition may be associated with protest action (c.f. Keniston 1968; Loveman 1998; Smith 1996:169-208), other dispositions may show stronger associations with protest action, such as a tendency for radicalism and social change. Second, regardless of the disposition that is most correlated with protest activism, the high-risk/cost nature of protest activism may render this disposition insufficient for participation. If this were the case, this would run counter to the finding that a prosocial orientation is a sufficient condition for motivating participation in collective civic action, suggesting that the level of risk and cost associated with activism can alter the relationship between orientations and participation. Even if this were true, protest dispositions should still indirectly promote participation, connecting people to other protesters and people who support protest action. This would be an important contribution given that so little is known about the formation of protest networks. Overall, then, with the exception of the direct effect of orientations on participation, it seems that the processes observed for collective civic action should generalize to other, more disruptive forms of collective action.

To conclude, this chapter has advanced our understanding of differential participation in three important ways. First, by synthesizing a dispositional and a relational perspective of

collective action, it has broadened our knowledge of the dynamics of activism, specifying how the *push* of orientations connects to the *pull* of social networks to promote participation in collective action. Second, this chapter has explicated the precise dimensions of social networks that are the most potent sources of social influence inducing participation, showing that behavioral types of social influence are more important for mobilizing collective action than attitudinal social influence. Last, it has shown that the important network characteristic of density does not moderate the effect of any type of social influence on participation in collective action. Because there are good reasons to believe that these contributions generalize beyond the case of collective civic action, this encourages future studies of differential participation to incorporate them in their models of collective action regardless of whether the form studied is of a low-risk/cost or high-risk/cost nature.

**Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Analysis**

| | Mean | S.D. |
|---|---|---|
| *Collective civic action* | | |
| Volunteered for a community project | .327 | .469 |
| *Prosocial orientation* | | |
| Personally feeling responsible to help others in need | 3.722 | .884 |
| Personally feel responsible to take action against injustice | 3.435 | 1.020 |
| *Attitudinal social influence* | | |
| # of strong ties who approve of volunteering | 3.762 | 1.951 |
| *Passive behavioral social influence* | | |
| # of strong ties who volunteer | 1.325 | 1.476 |
| *Active behavioral social influence* | | |
| # of strong ties who request volunteering | .597 | 1.178 |
| # of strong ties (network size) | 4.620 | 1.068 |
| Network density | .207 | .244 |
| # of charitable organizations | .346 | .768 |
| # of noncharitable organizations | .186 | .585 |
| *Demographic variables* | | |
| White | .760 | .427 |
| Black | .111 | .314 |
| Other race | .128 | .334 |
| College education | .243 | .429 |
| Income | 5.487 | 2.844 |
| Female | .519 | .500 |
| Age | 45.013 | 17.713 |
| Physical heath | 3.855 | .921 |
| # of children under 19 living in household | .617 | 1.021 |
| Working full-time | .493 | .500 |
| Served in the military | .156 | .363 |
| Married | .563 | .495 |
| South | .386 | .487 |
| Rural | .230 | .421 |

**Table 2.2 Probit Coefficients for Direct Effects of Dispositional and Relational Models of Collective Civic Action**

| | Collective Civic Action | |
|---|---|---|
| Explanatory variables | Dispositional Model | Relational Model |
| Prosocial orientation | .255*** | — |
| | (.046) | |
| *Attitudinal Social Influence* | | |
| # of strong ties who approve of volunteering | — | .086*** |
| | | (.018) |
| *Passive Behavioral Social Influence* | — | |
| # of strong ties who volunteer | | .152*** |
| | | (.020) |
| *Active Behavioral Social Influence* | — | |
| # of strong ties who request volunteering | | .116*** |
| | | (.021) |
| # of strong ties | — | .002 |
| | | (.036) |
| Noncharitable organizations | — | .238*** |
| | | (.038) |
| Charitable organizations | — | .477*** |
| | | (.024) |
| $R^2$ | .194 | .377 |
| Model $\chi^2$ | 1479.100*** | 451.137*** |
| Degrees of freedom | 21 | 17 |
| CFI | .751 | .926 |
| IFI | .755 | .927 |
| TLI | .755 | .927 |
| RMSEA | .155 | .094 |

*Notes* : Standard errors are in parentheses; number of cases for both models is 2,898 individuals. Also included but not shown are controls for all demographic variables listed in Table 2.1.
*** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

**Table 2.3. Probit Coefficients for Direct Effects of Synthetic Model of Collective Civic Action**

| Explanatory variables | Nonchartiable Organizations | Charitable Organizations | # of strong ties | # of strong ties who approve of volunteering | # of strong ties who volunteer | # of strong ties who request volunteering | Collective Civic Action |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Prosocial Orientation | .037** | .101*** | .058** | .288*** | .224*** | .156*** | .163*** |
| | (.013) | (.020) | (.019) | (.052) | (.041) | (.031) | (.038) |
| Nonchariable organizations | — | — | .024 | .056 | .178*** | .054* | .235*** |
| | | | (.003) | (.053) | (.038) | (.026) | (.040) |
| Charitable organizations | — | — | .061* | .141*** | .421*** | .318*** | .465*** |
| | | | (.026) | (.041) | (.030) | (.026) | (.024) |
| # of strong ties | — | — | — | — | — | — | .007 |
| | | | | | | | (.036) |
| *Attitudinal Social Influence* | | | | | | | |
| # of strong ties who approve of volunteering | — | — | — | — | — | — | .062** |
| | | | | | | | (.020) |
| *Passive Behavioral Social Influence* | | | | | | | |
| # of strong ties who volunteer | — | — | — | — | — | — | .140*** |
| | | | | | | | (.023) |
| *Active Behavioral Social Influence* | | | | | | | |
| # of strong ties who request volunteering | — | — | — | — | — | — | .095*** |
| | | | | | | | (.028) |
| $R^2$ | .032 | .071 | .050 | .109 | .171 | .098 | .397 |
| Model $\chi^2$ | 69.272*** | | | | | | |
| Degrees of freedom | 16 | | | | | | |
| CFI | .991 | | | | | | |
| IFI | .991 | | | | | | |
| TLI | .991 | | | | | | |
| RMSEA | .034 | | | | | | |

*Notes* : Standard errors are in parentheses; number of cases for all models is 2,898 individuals. Also included but not shown are controls for all demographic variables listed in Table 2.1 (see Appendix B for results for demographic variables).
* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

**Table 2.4. Indirect and Total Effects of Prosocial Orientation on Strong Civic Activist Ties and Collective Civic Action**

| | # of strong ties who approve of volunteering | # of strong ties who volunteer | # of strong ties who request volunteering | Collective Civic Action |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Prosocial Orientation | .014/.302 | .049/.273 | .034/.190 | .131/.294 |

*Note* : Indirect effect/total effect; all effects significant at the $p < .05$ level (two-tail tests) or lower.

## Table 2.5. Moderating Effect of Network Density

| Explanatory variables | Collective Civic Action |
|---|---|
| *Attitudinal Social Influence* | |
| # of strong ties who approve of volunteering | .063** |
| | (.021) |
| *Passive Behavioral Social Influence* | |
| # of strong ties who volunteer | .136*** |
| | (.023) |
| *Active Behavioral Social Influence* | |
| # of strong ties who request volunteering | .111*** |
| | (.028) |
| # of strong ties | .001 |
| | (.037) |
| Network density | -.037 |
| | (.142) |
| Network density × # of strong ties who approve of volunteering | -.042 |
| | (.073) |
| Network density × # of strong ties who volunteer | -.116 |
| | (.091) |
| Network density × # of strong ties who request volunteering | .144 |
| | (.113) |
| $R^2$ | .401 |
| Model $\chi^2$ | 242.197*** |
| Degrees of freedom | 28 |
| CFI | .975 |
| IFI | .976 |
| TLI | .976 |
| RMSEA | .052 |

*Notes*: Standard errors are in parentheses; number of cases for both models is 2,898 individuals.
Also included but not shown are controls for organizations and all demographic variables listed in Table 2.1.
** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

**Table 2.6. Sensitivity Tests for Hypothetical Values for Feedback Effect of Participation in Collective Civic Action on the Formation of Strong Civic Activist Ties**

| | Percentage | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 0 | 25 | 50 | 75 | 100 |
| *Attitudinal Social Influence* | | | | | |
| # of strong ties who approve of volunteering | .062** | .055** | .049* | .042* | .036+ |
| *Passive Behavioral Social Influence* | | | | | |
| # of strong ties who volunteer | .140*** | .117*** | .094*** | .071** | .048* |
| *Active Behavioral Social Influence* | | | | | |
| # of strong ties who request volunteering | .095*** | .075** | .057* | .037 | — |

*Notes*: Number of cases for all models is 2,898 individuals. Also included but not shown are controls for network size, organizations, and all demographic variables listed in Table 2.1.
+ p < .10; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

**Figure 2.1. Conceptual Synthetic Model of Collective Civic Action**




*Note*: Strong ties to those who approve of civic action, to those who request civic action, and to those who participate in civic action are represented with the single box labeled "strong civic activist ties."

**Figure 2.2. Conceptual Relational Model of Collective Civic Action**




*Note*: Strong ties to those who approve of civic action, to those who request civic action, and to those who participate in civic action are represented with the single box labeled "strong civic activist ties."

**Figure 2.3. Conceptual Model of Collective Civic Action: Homophily Effects**




*Note*: Strong ties to those who approve of civic action, to those who request civic action, and to those who participate in civic action are represented with the single box labeled "strong civic activist ties."

**Figure 2.4. Conceptual Synthetic Model of Collective Civic Action: Spurious Network Effects**




*Note*: Strong ties to those who approve of civic action, to those who request civic action, and to those who participate in civic action are represented with the single box labeled "strong civic activist ties."

**Figure 2.5. Conceptual Synthetic Model of Collective Civic Action: Dispositional Indirect Effects**




*Note*: Strong ties to those who approve of civic action, to those who request civic action, and to those who participate in civic action are represented with the single box labeled "strong civic activist ties."

**Figure 2.6. Conceptual Synthetic Model of Collective Civic Action: Dispositional Direct Effect**




*Note*: Strong ties to those who approve of civic action, to those who request civic action, and to those who participate in civic action are represented with the single box labeled "strong civic activist ties."

**Figure 2.7. Effects of Different Dimensions of Social Influence on Participation in Collective Civic Action**



# CHAPTER 3: THE EFFECT OF RELIGIOUS CONGREGATION ON U.S. CIVIC ENGAGEMENT: EXPLICATING MECHANISMS OF MOBILIZATION AND CONSTRAINT

Echoing the observations of Alexis de Tocqueville over a century and a half ago and contrary to secularization and privatization theorists, political scientists and sociologists have regularly observed the significance of today's religious institutions for mobilizing a critical mass of U.S. citizens to participate in social and political action.[25] A large body of scholarship has demonstrated that embeddedness in religious organizations promotes participation in various kinds of civic engagement, including volunteer efforts in communities, lobbying campaigns to elect candidates, and protests and demonstrations to support or oppose governmental policies (Becker and Dhingra 2001; Beyerlein and Hipp 2006; Brown and Brown 2003; Calhoun-Brown 1996; Campbell and Yonish 2003; Cassel 1999; Cavendish 2001; Guth et al. 1998; Harris 1994, 1999; Jackson et al. 1995; Lam 2002; McVeigh and Smith 1999; Musick et al. 2000; Park and Smith 2002; Peterson 1992; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wilson and Janoski 1995; Wilson and Musick 1997, 1999; Wiltfang and McAdam 1991; Wuthnow 1999, 2004). The increasing presence of religion in American public life has given rise to much scholarly and

[25] This chapter focuses on the relationship between religious congregational embeddedness and civic engagement. The impact of other dimensions of religion, such as beliefs or private devotional practices, on civic engagement is less clear. Prior research has found that they sometimes mobilize, demobilize, or have no effect on getting involved in civic action (see, for example, Becker and Dhingra 2001; Lam 2002; Musick, Wilson, and Bynum 2000). Given these contradictory findings, a profitable direction for future research would be to conduct a systematic analysis on the connection between other dimensions of religion and civic engagement as this chapter has done for the organizational dimension of religion.

pubic debate, with conservatives generally arguing for a greater role of religious organizations, and liberals generally arguing for a more restricted role.

As far as a cultivating a robust civil society is concerned, one issue is the extent to which religious participation encourages inter-group community activism, that is, whether it promotes forms of social participation that are focused exclusively within religious groups or, rather, beyond their own bounds. As a baseline, many scholars suggest that the simple existence of a multiplicity of non-state social groups, organizations, and institutions mediating between individuals and the state fosters a rich civil society crucial for sustaining healthy democracies (Berger and Neuhaus 1977). Beyond that, some scholars also suggest that the cohesion of civil society is further strengthened when voluntary associations of civil society are able to mobilize support not only for involvement in their own activities, but also for outwardly-focused social relations and voluntary service to people beyond their own immediate groups (Paxton 2002; Putnam 2000). When religious groups mainly encourage participants to devote time and energy to relating to and helping fellow members and to advancing their own religious activities and interests, religious institutions strengthen civil society in an elementary way through their simple existence. On the other hand, when religious involvements motivate activities that go beyond merely serving in-group members to also serving those in the wider community, to engagement in forms of social participation that benefit citizens broadly regardless of their religious commitments, then we have reason to believe the influence of religious organizations in the public sphere in this way is likely to further enhance the cohesion and functioning of civil society. Nearly one-hundred million Americans participate every week in religious congregations, spending more time in faith congregations than any other type of voluntary association. Religious institutions thus

significantly shape the nature of American civil society in various ways. Therefore, understanding the mechanisms through which congregational embeddedness can *mobilize* or *constrain* activism that serves those in the broader community would seem to have important implications for our understanding of the character and vitality of civil society in the United States.

But this is where extant scholarship on religion and civic engagement is of little help. For one, this scholarship has generally focused on describing rather than explaining the relationship between congregation participation and civic engagement. Consequently, we do not know what exactly it is about congregation integration that mobilizes participation in civic activism in communities. Connected to this, the scholarship on religion and civic engagement has not been careful to specify the dimensions of congregation embeddedness that are most important for mobilization. Another important limitation of extant scholarship on religion and civic engagement is that it tends to assume that religious integration always facilitates participation in civic engagement in communities. However, social movement scholarship has begun to emphasize that embeddedness in certain organizations and networks need not necessarily mobilize activist participation, and that it may actually demobilize activist participation (Goodwin 1997; Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Kitts 2000; McAdam and Paulsen 1993). To grasp fully religious participation's effect on civil society, it is crucial that we not only identify the processes that lead to mobilization of civic engagement, but also those that may lead to demobilization. Finally, studies and debates about the relationship between religious organizations and civic action invoke language that grants causal power to these organizations' mobilization efforts. However, the relationship between religious embeddedness and civic engagement could just as easily be the result of selection, where

religious people who were previously committed to activism purposively join activist congregations because they reflect their values. Given that current studies have generally ignored selection, we cannot be confident that the observed positive effects of religious organizations on civic engagement in communities are in fact the function of their mobilization efforts.

In what follows, I substantially advance our understanding of the relationship between religion and civic engagement by overcoming these important limitations of past research. First, I develop and test a theoretical model that explicates the various mechanisms through which different dimensions of congregation embeddedness promotes volunteer efforts that help those in the broader community. Second, in contrast to the current religion and civic engagement scholarship, I identify how congregation participation also constrains participation in civic activism in communities. Last, I draw on a dispositional model to address the alternative explanation of selection, and thus help isolate the effect of congregations' mobilization efforts on promoting civic engagement in communities.

## A Model of Congregation Mobilization

### *Clergy Mobilization*

The first way in which congregations can mobilize parishioners to participate in civic action in communities is through clergy mobilization efforts. Because of the way in which religious institutions are organized, they have preexisting leadership structures, in the form of clergy, priests, pastors, ministers, rabbis, or imams.[26] This is important because the social movement literature has demonstrated an important link between leadership and the emergence, growth, decline, success, and failure of various collective action struggles (for a

[26] For brevity, I use the term clergy to refer to the leaders of various religious traditions and communities.

recent review of social movement scholarship on leadership, see Morris 2000). In social movements where religious organizations have played a key role, for example the U.S. civil rights movement, Central America peace struggle, Solidarity movement in Poland, and community-based organizing, studies often identify the significance of clergy, especially in terms of inducing people to participate and sacrifice for the cause (McAdam 1999; Morris 1984; Nepstad 2004; Oberschall 1973; Osa 2003; Smith 1996; Warren 2001; Wood 2002). In his classic study of the civil rights movement, Morris (1984) demonstrated how many black pastors embraced and preached a militant version of Christianity, demanding that church members engage in the fight to end racial injustice (see also McAdam 1999; Oberschall 1973). By doing so, black clergy were often able to raise the activist consciousness and broaden perceptions of church members and thus get them involved in the movement, which they may not have done otherwise.

In addition to case studies of social movements, the religion and politics literature highlights that clergy often attempt to mobilize parishioners for external civic action. In general, this literature stresses two main strategies that clergy use to promote civic engagement among members. First, clergy try to get laity involved in civic action by providing information about opportunities to be active. For example, clergy make announcements about civic activities during formal and informal religious gatherings (Brewer, Kersh, and Petersen 2003; Greenberg 2000; Guth et al. 1997; Olson 2000; Welch et al. 1993), and clergy organize events to let members know about civic activities in communities, including arranging representatives of community or social service organizations to speak at congregations (Chaves 2004). Second, and more important, clergy attempt to promote lay participation in civic action by encouraging them to get involved to

help and serve others in communities during sermons, teachings, homilies, prayers, or discussions. These encouragements may be indirect or direct in nature. Indirectly, for instance, clergy may emphasize the importance of helping the needy during sermons or religious teachings. In their study of Protestant clergy, Guth and colleagues (1997) found that, on average, issues of hunger and poverty were discussed very often or often in 80 percent of sermons that clergy delivered. Similarly, Wuthnow (2004 :68) found that almost 60 percent of members of congregations heard a sermon about "caring for the poor" in the last year. Clergy may also directly encourage civic action through, for example, personal appeals to members to get involved in volunteer efforts in communities. Verba and colleagues (1995) found that clergy attempted to recruit over a third of members of congregations to get involved in some civic action other than voting.

Because the unit of analysis in the previously mentioned studies tends to be movements, clergy, or congregations, it is difficult to evaluate the success of clergy mobilization efforts in terms of getting members involved in civic activities in communities. The few studies that have collected data on both clergy mobilization efforts and congregation members' activist participation suggest that these efforts are quite effective. For example, in his case study of participation in parish-based civic action in the south side of Chicago, Cavendish (2001) found that parish members of a predominantly African American church who were exposed to preaching that stressed the value of activist commitments were more likely to participate in parish-based civic action. To account for the effect of clergy mobilization on participation, Cavendish (2001) focused on how activist preaching may cultivate attitudes that are conducive to activism, such as religious justifications for action. This is similar to Morris' (1984) account discussed above for how black clergy mobilized

church members to participate in the civil rights movement. However, Cavendish (2001) found that exposure to activist preaching was a robust predictor of participation in parish-based civic action even after the inclusion of attitudinal factors of activism. This suggests that there is another explanation for the link between clergy mobilization efforts and members' participation in civic engagement beyond fostering attitudes useful for activism.

As leaders of religious congregations, clergy occupy a position of prestige, authority, and respect relative to other congregation members. Congregation members look to clergy for advice not only on religious matters, but also on nonreligious matters, and members are likely to feel obligated to follow what clergy advise. Although it is rarely viewed in this manner, the relationship between clergy and laity can be thought of as a *vertical social network* consisting of an asymmetric relation of power and dependence (Putnam 1994: 173). By conceiving of the clergy-laity link in this way, we can see that clergy exert a considerable degree of social influence over members. Because congregation members tend to hold clergy in high esteem, they are likely to want to please and avoid disappointing them.

This has important implications for our understanding of clergy mobilization efforts and the response of congregation members to these efforts. The broader social network literature discusses how social influence is an important mechanism that motivates action and helps explain the robust effects of human connections (see, for example, Akers 1985; Akers et al. 1979; Berelson et al. 1954; Friedkin 1998; Friedkin and Cook 1990; Graham et al. 1991; Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Marsden and Friedkin 1993; Matsueda and Anderson 1998; Warr and Stafford 1991). Although not using the exact language of social influence, rational choice as well as cultural theorists of collective action argue that the desire to gain approval and avoid disapproval from significant others is an important nonmaterial selection incentive

motivating participation in various forms of activism (see, for example, Chong 1991; Goodwin et al. 2001; Opp 1989; Opp and Gern 1993). Following this line of thought, clergy's exertion of social influence on congregation members to get involved in civic efforts in communities, whether informally or formally, serves as an important selective incentive inducing members to participate, given that they have much to gain by participating or much to lose by not. Hence, I expect that when clergy call on members to get involved in civic action in communities, they will generally respond to this call and participate.

***Laity Mobilization***

The second way in which congregations can encourage members to participate in civic engagement in communities is through mobilization networks consisting of fellow congregation members. A great deal of social movement scholarship on differential participation has demonstrated that embeddedness in activist personal networks is one of the main factors for explaining why certain people participate in collective action while others do not (see, for example, Chong 1991; della Porta 1988; Diani 1995; Kitts 1999, 2000; Klandermans and Oegema 1987; McAdam 1986; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Opp 1989; Opp and Gern 1993; Passy 2001, 2003; Passy and Giugni 2001; Snow et al. 1980). Importantly, this scholarship has shown that it is *strong* activist ties that are most consequential, as they are powerful sources of social influence inducing participation in collective action (for a recent discussion of this point, see Kitts 2000). People respond to the request of close friends to participate in activism because they desire their approval and wish to avoid their disapproval, but they have little or nothing to lose by turning down or little or nothing to gain by acting on the request of a stranger or a distant acquaintance. Echoing this sentiment, Passy (2001) found that having friends who were activists had a positive effect of

participation in the Swiss solidarity movement, while having acquaintances who were activists did not (see also McAdam 1986; Opp and Gern 1993). Congregation peer networks should therefore mobilize participation in civic action if they are strong and activist in nature.

In terms of closeness, congregations are among the most important social institutions for forging strong bonds among individuals. Wuthnow (2004 :81), for example, found that 80 percent of congregation members had three or more close friends who were also congregation members. Congregations, then, clearly fulfill the strength component that is necessary for peer network mobilization, but do they also provide the activist component? Given the significance of congregations in various social movements as previously mentioned, the answer would seem to be yes. Surprisingly, however, little attention has been given to the possible activist nature of congregation peer networks. Campbell and Yonish's (2003) analysis of the Giving and Volunteering Surveys did show that among people engaged in civic activities, 30 percent of recruitment efforts were through congregations, though sampling on the dependent variable obviously limits the usefulness of this study. But it does demonstrate that congregation ties can be mobilizing in character.

More often, research on the relationship between congregation networks and civic engagement simply models the effect of the number of congregation friends in general. Becker and Dhingra (2001), for instance, found among a sample of attenders in upstate New York that having congregation members in one's close circle of friends predicted engaging in general volunteering, while being able to confide in fellow congregation members predicted engaging in congregation-based volunteering efforts. However, the results of such studies do not have a clear interpretation since they do not account for the activist nature of congregation ties. It is unclear why congregation peer networks in general would mobilize

participation in civic action, especially civic action in the wider community. The lack of empirical evidence notwithstanding, the theoretical reasons articulated above lead us to expect that when congregation peer networks are activist in nature, they will induce members to participate in volunteer efforts that serve those in the broader community.

***Cultivation of Transposable Skills***

The third way in which congregations can mobilize participation in civic engagement in communities is through cultivating relevant skills for activism. Political scientists Verba and colleagues (1995) have demonstrated that people who possess organizing skills are considerably more likely to be involved in civic activities that demand significant time and energy relative to those who lack organizing skills (see also Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 1982:85-87; Opp 1989:Chapter 8). Importantly, Verba et al. (1995) documented that, along with other voluntary organizations and workplace institutions, congregations were important settings in which people acquired and sharpened organizing skills: writing letters, planning meetings, giving presentations, and attending meetings where decisions were made during the course of congregation involvement. These skills can then be transferred to civic activities outside of congregations, as Verba et al. (1995) demonstrate.

Like the Verba (1995) team, a central focus of recent scholarship on religion and civic engagement has been on how involvement in congregation activity beyond religious service attendance "spills over" to external civic engagement. Numerous studies have found a positive connection between congregation activity and participation in a wide range of civic outcomes. Brown and Brown (2003) found that the more African Americans participate in church committee work, the more likely they are to participate in voting and other types of civic activism (see also Harris 1994; Harris 1999). Similarly, Park and Smith (2002) found

among churchgoing Protestants that involvement in church activities beyond worship service—such as attending potlucks, Bible studies, choir practice, or small groups—was positively associated with both religious and nonreligious sponsored community volunteering. Many other studies of more representative samples have found a similar connection between engagement in church activity beyond worship service and engagement in different kinds of civic activity outside of congregations (Beyerlein and Hipp 2006; Cassel 1999; Lam 2002; Peterson 1992; Wuthnow 2004).

The assumption of Verba et al (1995) and recent religion and civic engagement scholarship is that participation in congregation activity beyond religious service attendance of *any* sort will foster skills that lead to participation in other civic activities. But this may be an incorrect assumption, as skills gained from, say, leading Bible studies in congregations would seem to be very different from those gained from, say, participating in volunteer efforts in congregations. Because of the difference in skill acquisition, participation in different kinds of congregation activity is likely to have a differential effect on promoting involvement civic engagement in communities.

This perspective about congregation activity and civic engagement has not received adequate attention. Although it is hard to know why for sure, this neglect is presumably because of data limitations. Since the majority of studies examining the effect of congregation activity on participation in civic activities have been restricted to one general measure of congregation activity, they have been unable to differentiate among different types of congregation activity and test for possible differential effects. Wuthnow's (2004:112-115) analysis represents one exception. In his study of predictors of volunteering to help disadvantaged people in communities, Wuthow (2004:112-115) included three

distinct measures of involvement in congregation activity beyond religious service attendance: attending Sunday school, serving on a church committee, and belonging to a small group. For members of congregations, he found that while the measure for Sunday school attendance was an insignificant predictor of participation in volunteer efforts to assist disadvantaged people, the measures of church committee service and small group membership significantly positively predicted this participation. One important drawback of Wuthnow's (2004:112-115) model is that he was unable to distinguish between participation in religious activity and volunteering activity in congregations. But this seems to be the crucial distinction in terms of identifying congregation activity that is most likely to promote participation in civic engagement in communities.

Although not focusing exclusively on religious congregations, Lam (2002) found that doing volunteer work for religious organizations (some of which were congregations) had a significant positive effect on doing volunteer work for other voluntary organizations, net of other types of religious organization involvement. By engaging in volunteer work in congregations, members acquire and hone skills that are directly applicable to volunteer work outside of congregations. For instance, congregation members learn the skill of caring and providing for others as they engage in volunteer work in congregations. Similar to Sewell's (1992) notion of transposablity of schema or mental categories, the skills that members learn from volunteering in a congregation context are "transposable" to volunteering in other contexts, such as those in the larger community. However, not all volunteer work in congregations may be equally "transposable" to civic engagement in communities. Congregation volunteer work that primarily focuses on the upkeep of the organization or serving members would seem less valuable in terms of cultivating a volunteering repertoire

that is most useful for engaging in volunteer efforts that serve those in the broader community relative to congregation volunteer work that is mainly aimed at helping nonmembers. Because of data limitations, Lam (2002) was unable to test for the effect of the distinction between "inwardly-focused" and "outwardly-focused" volunteer work in religious organizations. In my empirical models, I test for this finer-grained distinction, expecting that participation in outwardly-focused congregation volunteer work activity will be a particularly strong mobilizer of participation in other volunteer efforts that serve those in the broader community.

**Summary of Congregation Mobilization Model**

Based on the above theoretical arguments, I posit that participation in activist clergy-led congregations, embeddedness in activist congregation peer networks, and involvement in congregation volunteer activity will directly promote involvement in civic engagement in communities. In addition to the direct effect of participation in activist clergy-led congregations, it is likely that participation in these congregations will have indirect effects through encouraging the formation of activist ties among fellow members as well as participation in volunteer work in congregations, especially volunteer work that is outwardly-focused. In terms of forging congregation activist peer networks, a large body of research has shown that voluntary organizations are among the most important social settings in which similar people develop and form friendships (Feld 1982; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; McPherson et al. 2001). Because of homophily, religious activists are likely to be attracted to and populate congregations with activist clergy. Participation in these congregations therefore gives activist members the necessary opportunities to interact with

each other and become friends. In terms of promoting involvement in volunteer activity in congregations, Verba and colleagues (1995) found, as discussed above, that congregations were among the most important voluntary organizations for cultivating skills useful to activism. But activist clergy-led congregations should be particularly prone to offering opportunities for members to get involved in volunteer efforts in congregations, especially those focused on helping nonmembers, given the knowledge that participation in these efforts increases the activist expertise of laity and thus makes them more likely to get involved in other types of civic engagement that benefit people in the larger community (Hart 2001; Warren 2001; Wood 2002). Although there are good reasons to expect that participation in activist clergy-led congregations will be antecedent to both the formation of activist congregation ties and participation in volunteer efforts in congregations, the causal order between activist congregation peer networks and congregation volunteer activity is less clear. As Wuthnow (2004:83) states, "Those who participate more frequently are more likely to make friends in their congregations, and having friends probably encourages people to participate more often and to feel better about being part of their congregation. For this reason, I do not assign causal order between activist congregation ties and volunteer activity within congregations, but rather assume that they are just positively related. The above arguments motivate the conceptual model of congregation mobilization represented in Figure 3.1.

**Congregation Mobilization or Selection of Religious Activists Into Mobilizing Congregations?**

Figure 3.1 specifies that participation in congregations with activist clergy, embeddedness in activist congregation networks, and engagement in volunteer activity in

congregations will promote involvement in civic action in communities. These congregation factors—not other factors—are thus assumed to explain members' involvement in volunteer efforts that benefit people in the broader community. But there is an alternative explanation that threatens the interpretation that congregation integration *drives* participation in civic action in communities. Instead of members' participation being the result of congregations' mobilization efforts, it is possible that members who are already committed to activism purposely seek out and join activist clergy-led congregations as well as associate with other activist members and participate in volunteer efforts in congregations. If this were the case, then congregations would not generally be responsible for mobilizing members to participate in civic engagement in communities. Rather, the positive relationship between congregation integration and civic engagement would reflect the fact that people with prior activist commitments "select" into activist congregations and activist congregation networks because they reflect their values. If we are to attribute congregation members' civic engagement to the congregation factors specified in Figure 3.1, then it is important that we account for selection. Current scholarship on religion and civic engagement is of little help in this regard since it has generally been silent on the issue of selection (but see Beyerlein and Hipp 2006).

Drawing on insights from a dispositional perspective of civic engagement provides a way to address the important issue of selection. This perspective stresses that what is often called a "prosocial orientation" motivates people directly to participate in civic action to help others. Penner and Finkelstein (1998:526) define a prosocial orientation as "an enduring tendency to think about the welfare and rights of other people, to feel concern and empathy for them, and to act in a way that benefits them" (see also Penner 2002; Penner et al. 1995). Importantly, a large body of research has found a significant positive connection between a

prosocial orientation (or measures capturing it) and participation in a range of civic activities (Carlo et al. 2005; Clary et al. 1996; Elshaug and Metzer 2001; Penner 2002; Penner and Finkelstein 1998; Penner et al. 1995; Piliavin and Callero 1991; Piliavin and Charng 1990; Rossi 2001b; Sokolowski 1996; Wilson and Musick 1997, 1998, 1999; Wuthnow 1991). Given the maxim that "birds of a feather flock together," we would expect prosocially oriented people to join activist clergy-led congregations, embed themselves in activist congregation networks, and participate in volunteer activity within congregations. Consequently, a prosocial orientation is an important way to control for selection and thus help isolate the effects of congregation mobilization efforts on promoting participation in civic engagement in communities.

**Constraining Effects of Congregations**

Figure 3.1 assumes that congregations are important vehicles of mobilization, exposing members to clergy recruitment efforts, integrating members into activist networks, and fostering transposable volunteering skills in members. But it would be a mistake to assume that activist clergy always lead congregations, that congregation peer networks are always activist in nature, and that congregation activities always focus on volunteering. This may be called the mobilizing myth of congregations and represents one of the most significant limitations in current scholarship on religion and civic engagement.[27] This scholarship has generally been silent on any possible constraining effects of congregation integration on civic engagement in communities. But when congregations are viewed as

[27] In the late sixties, certain research examining the effect of religion on support for and participation in the civil rights movement among American Africans acknowledged that certain religious orientations may inhibit support for and participation in this movement (Marx 1967). Besides this research, it is difficult to find any mention of the possible constraining effects of religion on civic engagement, especially in literature specifically focused on this topic.

religious establishments—which they are first and foremost—it is not difficult to see how involvement and ties developed in them can hinder participation in volunteer efforts that serve those in the broader community.

The primary purpose of congregations is, of course, to provide religious guidance and social fellowship (see, for example, Ammerman 2005), not to organize efforts for civic action in communities. Given this, civic engagement is often not a vital or part at all of many congregations' missions. Nurturing the spiritual and social needs of members is the first priority, and mobilizing takes a back seat or is altogether avoided due to concerns that it will compromise this nurturing (Greenberg 2000). For example, based on the 1998 National Congregations Study (NCS), Chaves (2004:182-183) found that while over 40 percent of congregations did not engage in social service activity of any sort in the last year, only 1 percent of congregations did not engage in worship of some sort in the last week and only 10 percent of congregations did not engage in religious education classes in the last week. Additionally, Chaves (2004:184) found that significantly more people were involved in worship and religious education activities in congregations relative to social service activities. Even the mobilization efforts of the "black church"—generally regarded as the most activist of all U.S. religious institutions—are far from universal. During the height of the civil rights movement, for instance, the theological conservatism of many African American congregations rendered their participation unlikely (Kurzman 1998; Payne 1995; Reed 1986:Chapter 4). Current studies of the black church also identify the quiescence of many of its institutions, finding that one fourth or more of African American congregations today abstain from mobilization efforts altogether, such as organizing activist events or preaching activist sermons (Wuthnow 2002a, 2004). This is not to say that all congregations

do not engage in mobilization efforts, because some do as the above section described. But these studies point out that many congregations are *not* vehicles of mobilization, a fact that is rarely, if ever, acknowledged in current scholarship on religion and civic engagement. Instead, this scholarship generally reads as though congregations always mobilize members for participation in civic engagement in communities (but see Wood 2002).

In the past, social movement scholars were guilty of the same oversight in their discussion of the role of organizations and networks in the activist process. But over the last decade or so social movement scholars have begun to acknowledge that organization and network embeddedness are not only a source of mobilization, but can also function as a barrier to activist participation (Goodwin 1997; Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Kitts 2000). As McAdam and Paulsen (1993:645, 641) articulate, "social ties may constrain as well as encourage activism…[People] are invariably embedded in many organizational or association networks or individual relationships that may expose the individual to conflicting behavioral pressures." The social movement literature, however, has yet to specify the exact kinds of organizations and networks that are most likely to hinder activism. Given the focus on spiritual and social support of members, congregations and the networks that they foster may substantially hinder members from civic engagement in communities. In what follows, I discuss three specific ways in which congregations can constrain participation in volunteer efforts that serve those in the broader community.

First, when congregation networks are quiescent in nature, embeddedness in them should function as a *disincentive* for participation in civic action in communities. Congregation members who are not committed to activism are likely to see their primary role as serving the spiritual and social needs of fellow members. There is no shortage of evidence

for the "bonding" nature of congregation ties. Congregation members are called to care for the spiritual needs of fellow members. As Krause et al. (2001:638) state, "…fellow parishioners help each other in ways that are uniquely religious, such as providing spiritual support (i.e., mutual encouragement to adopt and practice various tenets of religion)." These scholars found that embeddedness in congregation networks providing spiritual support was positively associated with religious coping, such as looking to God for strength or seeking help from God to let go of anger. In terms of social support, Wuthnow (2004:84) found, for example, that 40 percent of people said that they could count on members of their congregation for help if they or family members became sick, whereas only 29 percent of people said they could count on co-workers and 9 percent of people said they could count on members of other nonprofit organization for this help. Moreover, a large body of literature on religion and health echoes the finding that congregation ties serve as significant providers of social support for members (for a recent review, see George, Ellison, and Larson 2002).

Because congregation members who are not activists are more likely to perceive that civic engagement may conflict with helping fellow members spiritually and socially (Greenberg 2000), which may be the first priority in their minds, they would be more likely to disapprove of activist participation than congregational members who are community activists. In the same way that individuals desire not to disappoint activist peers by not participating in collective action, congregation members desire not to disappoint fellow members who are primarily committed to serving the spiritual and social needs of members by participating in this action. If members who are embedded in religious congregations that tend toward exclusive "bonding" social relations engage in civic action in communities, they risk being sanctioned by fellow members for going against their wishes and what they think

is most important. Recall from above that congregation ties are generally strong in nature and thus their social influence on those who have them tends to be great. Hence, integration into congregation networks that are not activist in nature should be a very powerful source of social influence deterring involvement in external civic activities.

In his study of the Communist-led Huk rebellion in the Philippines, Goodwin (1997) suggested that because of safety concerns for loved ones, activists embedded in romantic and familial networks faced intense pressure to withdraw from the high-risk activities of the insurgency, which many did, leading to the eventual demise of the movement. There may be a broad parallel here in American religious congregations, in which a primary concern for the spiritual and social needs of members might discourage participation in out-group volunteer efforts in communities. Hence, integration in congregation networks that are not activist in nature may represent a significant barrier to participation in civic engagement which is seen as distracting from caring for congregation members spiritually and socially. This observation has an important methodological implication that to date has not been incorporated. Because many relationships forged among members in congregations are unlikely to be activist in nature, it is important to include not only a measure for the number of congregation ties, but also a measure for the number of congregation activist ties when modeling the effect of congregation network embeddedness on participation in civic engagement in communities. But prior studies such as Becker and Dhingra (2001) have not done so , including only a measure of the number of congregation ties in general, and thus they have likely obscured the fact that integration into certain types of congregation networks—"bonding"—are likely to constrain rather than mobilize involvement in volunteer efforts that benefit people outside of congregations.

Second, congregation activity that does not consist of volunteering activity also has the potential to hinder participation in civic engagement in communities. Although Verba et al. (1995) and scholarship on religion and civic engagement (Brown and Brown 2003; Cassel 1999; Harris 1994, 1999; Lam 2002; Park and Smith 2002; Peterson 1992; Wuthnow 2004) have argued that congregation activity of *any* sort should foster skills that are transferable to external civic action, there are good reasons to question this argument. Because of the nature of civic engagement in communities, volunteer activity in congregations, especially when outwardly-focused, is the most likely type of activity to generate skills that transpose to getting involved in volunteer efforts to help those in the wider community. Following this logic, engaging in such exclusively religious activities in congregations as leading Bible studies or teaching Sunday school is less likely to generate skills that are applicable for participation in volunteer efforts in communities. Rather, this activity is more likely to generate skills that are most useful for participation in other religious activities in congregations. Consequently, members who engage in solely religious activity in congregations will be less prepared to participate in volunteer efforts focused on serving others in the broader community and thus may avoid them, preferring instead to devote their time to religious activities for which they are well versed. In this way, participation in activity in congregations that does not involve volunteer work may hinder participation in civic engagement in communities.

Third, like members of congregations who are not committed to activism, clergy who abstain from mobilizing parishioners for civic action in communities likely believe that their focus should be on the spiritual and social needs of members, and consequently that mobilization efforts undermine this focus (Greenberg 2000). Beyond devotion to the

spiritual and social needs of members, quiescent clergy likely object to mobilizing laity for community activism because they see this as an inappropriate solution to social ills. As one "disengaged" pastor in Olson's (2000:18) study of Protestant clergy stated, "I see the real solution to society's problems as evangelism and personal holiness in the lives of individuals rather than social activism." Whether the result of commitment to spiritual and social needs of members or rejection of activism as an adequate response to social problems, quiescent clergy are likely to make implicitly and explicitly known their dislike for activism to parishioners. Congregation members thus risk falling out of good graces with clergy, whom they are likely to hold in high regard given that they are spiritual leaders, if they go against their desires and get involved in civic engagement. In light of this, I expect an inverse relationship between participation in quiescent clergy-led congregations and involvement in volunteer efforts in communities.

While the direct effect of attending quiescent clergy-led congregations on civic engagement in communities has a clear expectation, this is not the case for its indirect effect. On the one hand, we may reasonably posit that participation in quiescent clergy-led congregations will indirectly inhibit participation in civic engagement in communities through limiting involvement in volunteer activity in congregations and embeddedness in activist congregation networks as well as promoting participation in religious activity in congregations and integration into congregation non-activist networks. The homophily principle predicts that congregations with quiescent clergy are more likely to be populated with members who are not activists, and thus participation in them is likely to give rise to embeddedness in congregation non-activist peer networks rather than embeddedness in congregation activist peer networks. Furthermore, because of the emphasis on spiritual

development and providing social fellowship, the focus of the internal activities of these congregations are likely to be spiritual matters and member support, such as Bible studies or self-group groups, rather than volunteer efforts, especially those aimed at helping people outside of congregations.

On the other hand, it is possible that participation in quiescent clergy-led congregations may indirectly foster involvement in civic action in communities. In support of this, research on other nonpolitical organizations has demonstrated that they often promote participation in external civic activities. One important way that they do so is by getting members involved internally. For instance, Leighley (1996) found that unintentional mobilization efforts—involvement in internal democratic practices—of nonpolitical organizations were important for promoting members' engagement in civic activities outside of the group. Importantly, Hoge et al. (1998) showed that religious service attendance in general was associated with doing volunteer work in congregations. Because there are additional motivations for encouraging volunteer work in congregations other than cultivating skills relevant for external activism, perhaps quiescent clergy-led congregation may promote internal volunteer work. Another possible way in which participation in non-activist clergy-led congregations may indirectly promote volunteer efforts in communities is through fostering connections with members who are activists. Given that there are other reasons besides those activist in nature for motivating people to join congregations, such as geographic proximity or theological fit, it is possible that even non-activist congregations provide opportunities for members to form relationships with other activists. As Rosenstone and Hansen (1993:87) state, "organizations, by design, multiply contact." Regarding congregations, Wuthnow (2004:89-94) found that general congregation integration was

linked to increased probability of forming friendships with influential people (e.g., elected officials or corporate executives) and individuals from diverse racial and class backgrounds. Consequently, members of congregations are likely to come in contact with various types of people in their congregation, which increases the odds that one or more of these people will be activists. By promoting participation in volunteer efforts in congregations and fostering activist connections, involvement in quiescent clergy-led congregations may indirectly promote civic engagement in communities. In what follows, I test these two competing perspectives regarding the indirect effect of attending quiescent clergy-led congregations on participation in volunteer efforts in communities.

Given the above arguments, Figure 3.1 needs to be revised to incorporate the constraining effects of congregations. Figure 3.2 thus combines the arguments about congregation mobilization presented in Figure 1 with the arguments made in this section about the inhibiting effects of congregations. Depending on the nature of the clergy, ties developed, and internal activity practiced, congregations are posited to constrain as well as promote volunteer efforts that benefit people in the broader community. Figure 3.2 captures both the mobilization and demobilization aspects of congregations, as well as the ambiguity of the indirect effects of participation in quiescent clergy-led congregations.

## Data, Variables, and Models

### *Data*

To test my model of congregation mobilization and demobilization illustrated in Figure 3.2, I used the 2002 Religion and Public Activism Survey (RAPAS). Unlike other commonly employed surveys on religion and civic engagement, the 2002 RAPAS contained

detailed information on clergy mobilization efforts, congregation ties' activist involvements, and different types of congregation participation beyond religious service attendance, including making the crucial distinction between religious activity and volunteering activity (and between inwardly-focused and outwardly-focused congregation volunteer activity). As discussed above, this information allowed me to test not only the proposed mobilizing mechanisms of congregations, but also the proposed demobilizing mechanisms. The 2002 RAPAS was a telephone survey representing English-speaking Americans 18 years of age and older who resided in households in the United States, conducted by FGI Research Inc., a national survey research firm based in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. The survey was conducted from April to July 2002 using a random-digit-dial method, employing a sample of randomly generated telephone numbers representative of all telephones in the 50 United States. The survey was conducted with English-speaking households only. In order to randomize responses within households, and so as to ensure representativeness of age and gender, interviewers asked to conduct the interview with the person in the household who had the most recent birthday. All non-household numbers (business, government, nonprofit, etc.) were screened out of the sample through direct calling dispositions or ascription of contact and non-contact telephone numbers for non-completes based on proportions of household numbers among working telephone numbers. Survey respondents were offered an incentive of 10 dollars to complete the survey. The final sample size for the 2002 RAPAS was 2,898 and the response rate based on AAPOR's RR3 method was 47 percent (American Association for Public Opinion Research 2006).[28,29]

[28] The formula for AAPOR's RR3 method is I /((I +P)+(R+NC+O)+e(UH+UO)), where I is Completed Interviews, P is Partial Interviews, R is Refusals or Break-offs, NC is Non-contacts, O is Other, UH is Unknown household eligibility, UO is unknown other eligibility, and e is the estimated proportion of cases of unknown eligibility that are eligible. For contacted numbers where it could not be determined whether they

### *Endogenous Variables*

The first endogenous variable in the model, which all other variables predict, was a binary measure for doing volunteer work through a nonreligious organization that benefits people in the community outside the group. I coded this variable as one if respondents did this type of volunteer work during the last year, and I coded this variable as zero if they did not. My second endogenous variable measured participation in activist clergy-led congregations, which was operationalized with an eight-point ordinal variable that ranged from never attending congregations where clergy encourage participation in volunteer efforts to attending congregations where clergy encourage participation in volunteer efforts more than once a week. To measure participation in quiescent clergy-led congregations, my third endogenous variable, I included an eight-point ordinal variable ranging from never attend congregations where clergy refrain from encouraging involvement in volunteer efforts to attend congregations where clergy refrain from encouraging involvement in volunteer efforts

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were household numbers or not, 38.83 percent was used for e, which represents the FCC's percentage of working telephone numbers that were household numbers in 2002 (FCC 2000). For non-contacted numbers after multiple attempts, 24.2 percent was used for e, which represents Brick, Montaquilla, and Scheuren's (2002) estimate of the percentage of undermined numbers (no answer or answering machine) after multiple call attempts that are residential numbers.

[29] Because the 2002 RAPAS was unable to collect information on nonparticipants, there was no way to investigate whether those who responded to the survey were distinctive in any meaningful way from those who did not. Given the focus of this chapter, if those who were more civically active were more likely to respond than those who refused, this could be an important source of bias. While it is true that people who are more civically engaged tend to be more likely to participate in surveys than the less civically engaged, offering an incentive generally negates this difference (Groves et al. 2000). Incentives generally produce greater survey representativeness without any deleterious consequences, such as jeopardizing data quality (Singer et al. 1999; Singer et al. 2000). Regarding demographic differences between the 2002 RAPAS and Census averages, older, more educated, and female respondents were overrepresented. The 2002 RAPAS constructed a weight based on these demographic variables (the weight also adjusted for household size), so that its demographic distributions matched those of the Census for American adults.

more than once a week.[30] Participation in religious leadership activity was my fourth endogenous variable. I operationalized this variable with a binary measure that was coded as one if respondents held any religious leadership positions in their congregations, such as serving as an elder or deacon, and zero if otherwise. My fifth endogenous variable was a measure for participation in inwardly-focused congregation volunteer activity in congregations, such as helping with the upkeep of the organization or serving members. I coded this variable as one if respondents participated in this type of volunteer activity in congregations, and zero if they did not. My sixth endogenous variable measured participation in congregation volunteer activity that served nonmembers in some way. I coded the outwardly-focused congregation volunteer activity variable as one if respondents did this type of volunteer work in congregations, and zero if they did not. My seventh endogenous variable was a measure for the number of strong ties out of five who were members of the respondents' congregation.[31] The eighth endogenous variable in my model was a measure for the number of strong ties out of five who were members of the respondents' congregation and who participated in volunteer work.[32]

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[30] Although assuming that the absence of encouragement implies discouragement may not be reasonable for leaders of other organizations, because of their focus on the spiritual and social care of members and the fact that activism is generally perceived as conflicting with this care (see arguments above), I interpret congregations with quiescent clergy as providing significant *disincentives* to get involved in volunteer efforts in communities. Greater attendance at these congregations should therefore reduce the likelihood of external civic engagement. If this is an unreasonable assumption—that some quiescent clergy are truly neutral toward civic engagement in communities—then the effects would be stronger once attending congregations with neutral and disapproving clergy were separated into two different measures. Unfortunately, the 2002 RAPAS or other extant surveys of which I am aware do not contain measures to make this separation and thus allow me to test this assumption.

[31] The 2002 RAPAS defined strong ties in terms of closeness, asking respondents to nominate up to five people to whom they felt the closest outside of their household. Because this chapter focuses on congregation factors for explaining civic engagement, nominated strong ties must also be members of respondents' congregations.

[32] The high correlation among the three measures of congregation tie activist social influence (the other two being the number of congregation tie who request volunteer work and the number of congregation ties who approve of volunteer work) caused estimation problems when they were all entered in the same model. Since the focus on this chapter is not on specifying the effect of different types of congregation activist ties, but rather

My final endogenous variable, a prosocial orientation, was included to control for selection.[33] Following the conceptualization of a prosocial orientation as a concern for the welfare and rights of other people (Penner 2002; Penner and Finkelstein 1998; Penner et al. 1995), I used two five-category ordinal variables that tap this conceptualization. The first variable measured how responsible respondents personally feel to help other people who are in need. The second variable measured how responsible respondents personally feel to take action against wrongs and injustices in life. Each variable ranges from one (not responsible at all) to five (extremely responsible).

### *Exogenous Variables*

Because prior studies of civic engagement have identified that demographic characteristics are important factors for distinguishing individuals who are civically engaged from those who are not, I thus controlled for the following exogenous variables that might have otherwise confounded the effect of the congregation factors described above on civic engagement: age (in years); gender (1 = female ; 0 = male); race (0 = white; 1 = African American; 1 = other race); education (1 = four-year college degree; 0 = less than a four-year college degree); region (1 = South; 0 = Non-South); community type (1 = rural; 0 = non-

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on differentiating congregation activist from non-activist ties, it was only necessary that I include one measure of congregation activist ties. I chose to include the number of congregation ties that engage in volunteer work as the measure for congregation activist ties in the final model because it arguably captures the strongest source of congregation activist peer social influence (see Chapter 1).

[33] Although it is clear that some of the control variables discussed below causally precede a prosocial orientation, such as gender, race, or age, this is not the case for others. For these variables, it would be preferable to not have to assume causal order, but rather covary them with a prosocial orientation. However, a programming limitation in Mplus precludes this option and thus I also treated the other control variables as occurring casually prior to a prosocial orientation, even though in some cases this does not make substantive sense (e.g., working full-time). But this is preferable to other alternatives, such as transforming the control variables to underlying propensities (see Appendix A for a discussion of this point) and covarying their errors with the measure for a prosocial orientation. Treating a prosocial orientation as an endogenous variable, then, seems to violate the least number of assumptions. But since it is not without flaws, I do not interpret the effects of the control variables on the measure for a prosocial orientation.

rural); working status (1 = working full-time; 0 = not working full-time); marital status (1= married; 0 = unmarried); military service (1 = respondent served; 0 = did not serve); physical health (five-point ordinal variable, ranging from excellent to very poor); parenthood (number of children living in the household who are under nineteen years old); and household income (eight-point ordinal variable ranging from $10,000 or less to greater than $100,000). Table 3.1 displays descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis.[34]

***Structural Equation Models***

Figure 3.2 specified that congregation factors may directly and indirectly mobilize as well as constrain civic engagement in communities. Structural equation models (SEMs) can simultaneously estimate numerous regression equations, and they facilitate the decomposition of indirect, direct, and total effects among these equations (Bollen 1989). This is the first reason that I chose to use this statistical procedure to test my conceptual model of congregation mobilization and demobilization presented in Figure 3.2. The second reason that I used SEMs was because they allowed me to account for measurement error that might otherwise be present for a prosocial orientation, given that observed variables are unlikely to capture perfectly what is conceptually meant by this concept. Furthermore, as described above, I have two measures for a prosocial orientation. If we were to form scales for these measures and run a series of regression models, the results would be difficult to interpret since the measurement error in them would not be taken into account and thus the coefficients would be biased. Given that accurately accounting for selection requires that I

[34] Descriptive statistics use weighted data to account for differential probabilities of selection based on number of eligible adults in the household and to adjust for the known demographic discrepancies as mentioned above.

adequately measure the concept representing it, I modeled a prosocial orientation as an unobserved or latent variable that incorporates measurement error.[35]

Because some of my observed endogenous variables were binary or ordinal, I could not use traditional SEMs to estimate my congregation mobilization and demobilization model because they assume that all observed endogenous variables are continuous. I therefore used methods devised to correct the various problems that categorical observed endogenous variables pose for traditional SEMs. Appendix A provides a more formal presentation of the SEM approach that I use. In brief, the techniques assume that the ordinal and dichotomous variables are crude representations of normally distributed continuous variables. The covariance matrix of these underlying continuous variables is estimated and is the basis for the analysis. In the case of a single equation with an ordinal or dichotomous outcome variable with exogenous explanatory variables, these techniques are equivalent to probit regression. However, the SEM procedures are more general in that they can estimate multiple equations with a mixture of ordinal and dichotomous indicators (see Appendix A for complete details). To facilitate interpretation of the effects of congregation factors on civic engagement in communities, I calculated predicted probabilities for them. This also allowed me to obtain a better understanding of the magnitude of their effects.

Multiple imputation (MI) was used to handle variables in the analysis that did not have complete information (Rubin 1991; Schafer 1997, 1999; Schafer and Graham 2002; Schafer and Olsen 1998).[36] MI avoids shortcomings of other commonly employed

[35] I assume that the other measures have negligible measurement error. This seems to be a reasonable assumption, as, for example, the measure of participation in outwardly-focused congregation volunteer activity measures "doing volunteer work for congregations that benefits nonmembers." I thus assume that any measurement error in the other measures would not introduce considerable bias for the results.

[36] For MI, I used the MICE program (van Buuren et al. 1999) designed for STATA (Royston 2004, 2005), which explicitly handles categorical variables.

techniques for dealing with missing data, such as listwise deletion, pairwise deletion, dummy variable adjustment, or mean imputation (Allison 2002:5-12). Moreover, MI assumes only that the data are missing at random (MAR) rather than the more restrictive assumption that they are missing completely at random (MCAR), which is a requirement of the other commonly employed techniques. I generated five imputations, each of which replaced cases with missing information with plausible values based on their predictive distributions. I ran identical SEMs for each of the five imputed datasets, using complete data on all variables. I then combined these results to produce overall estimates, standard errors, and significance levels that take into account uncertainty about missing data.

My analyses proceed in the following steps. I first estimate a model that replicates prior studies on religion and civic engagement to demonstrate its limitations. I next estimate my model of congregation mobilization and demobilization illustrated in Figure 3.2. In doing so, I calculate predicted probabilities for the significant congregation effects in order to gain a better understanding of the magnitude of their effects as well as to highlight and contrast the mobilizing and demobilizing nature of congregation effects.

## Results

### *Previous Religion and Civic Engagement Model Replication*

Table 3.2 replicates prior models of religion and civic engagement, entering a general measure of religious service attendance, a measure for participation in any sort of congregation activity beyond attendance, and a measure for the number of strong ties who are congregation members (demographic variables described above are controlled). Looking down the last column in Table 3.2, we see that only congregation activity of any sort has a

significant effect on participation in civic engagement in communities ($\beta = .563$; $p < .001$).[37] This is somewhat surprising given that this measure combines involvement in religious leadership activities and volunteer activities in congregations and thus the expected negative effect of the former should have offset the expected positive effect of the latter. But the other two congregation factors behave as predicted, as both have no significant relationship to civic engagement in communities. Given the heterogeneity of the congregation attendance and number of congregation tie measures, this is not surprising. The general congregation attendance measure conflates attendance at activist clergy-led congregations and attendance at quiescent clergy-led congregations, while the general congregation tie measure conflates embeddedness in congregation networks that are activist and non-activist in nature. These results reveal the drawback of not differentiating congregations' mobilizing dimensions from their demobilizing ones, which is characteristic of prior scholarship on religion and civic engagement. Furthermore, like this prior scholarship, the model in Table 3.2 does not address selection, nor does it consider that congregation attendance may precede participation in congregation activity and the formation of congregation ties. In other words, it does not allow for indirect effects for congregation attendance on participation in volunteer efforts that benefit those in the larger community. For these reasons, prior models of religion and civic engagement are unsatisfactory. To address the drawbacks of prior models on religion and civic engagement, I estimate my congregation mobilization and demobilization model depicted in Figure 3.2.

[37] For brevity, I refer to doing volunteer work through any nonreligious organization that benefits people in the community outside the group as civic engagement in communities, volunteer efforts that serve the needs of those in the broader community, or similar language.

### *Congregation Mobilization and Demobilization Effects*

Table 3.3 reports the direct effects in the form of probit coefficients for my congregation mobilization and demobilization model illustrated in Figure 3.2.[38] Each column represents a separate probit regression that corresponds to each path in Figure 3.2. All models control for a prosocial orientation as well as for the demographic variables described above (but because demographic variables are not the focus of this chapter and to conserve space, I display their results only in Appendix D in Table D1). Turning to Table 3.3, we can see the importance of differentiating factors of congregations that mobilize from those that demobilize in terms of explaining participation in civic engagement in communities. The last column in Table 3.3 shows that, with the exception of congregation religious leadership participation and congregation inwardly-focused volunteer activity, each congregation factor has a significant direct effect on getting involved in volunteer efforts that serve those in the broader community. Confirming expectation about congregations' mobilizing potential, the greater the participation in activist clergy-led congregations, the greater the probability of participation in civic engagement in communities ($\beta = .026$; $p < .10$). Involvement in congregation outwardly-focused volunteer activity also significantly positively predicts civic engagement in communities ($\beta = .290$; $p < .05$). And replacing a congregation non-activist tie with a congregation activist tie increases the probability of doing volunteer work to benefit people in the wider community ($\beta = .111$; $p < .001$).[39]

[38] All models from the SEM estimates are based on unweighted data (DuMouchel and Duncan 1983; Winship and Radbill 1994).

[39] To hold constant the number of congregation ties, an increase in the number of congregation activist ties means that there must be an equivalent decrease in congregation non-activist ties. So, for example, if a person has 3 total congregation ties and gains 2 congregation activist ties, then this person must also lose 2

Shifting focus to congregations' demobilizing capacity, the first column in Table 3.3 indicates that the more people participate in quiescent clergy-led congregations, the less likely they are to get involved in volunteer efforts that help those in the wider community ($\beta = -.077$; $p < .001$). Similarly, each additional congregation non-activist tie decreases the likelihood of this involvement as well ($\beta = -.075$; $p < .05$), holding the number of congregation activist ties and demographic variables constant.[40] The effects for congregation religious leadership and inwardly-focused congregation volunteer activity are also negative, but neither effect is significant. This indicates that congregation activity beyond religious service attendance of any sort does *not* mobilize people to get involved in civic engagement in communities. Only when congregation activity is volunteering in nature and outwardly-focused does it "spill over" to participation in civic engagement in communities.

It should be emphasized that, unlike prior models of religion and civic engagement, all these observed effects occur after accounting for selection since a prosocial orientation is included in all models. As a dispositional model and the homophily principle predict, we see in the eighth column in Table 3.3 that a prosocial orientation has a significant positive direct effect on involvement in activist clergy-led congregations ($\beta = .263$; $p < .01$), involvement in congregation inwardly-focused congregation volunteer activity ($\beta = .083$; $p < .05$) as well as outwardly-focused congregation volunteer activity ($\beta = .120$; $p < .01$), and participation in civic engagement in communities ($\beta = .088$; $p < .01$). Although it does not have a significant direct effect on promoting integration into congregation activist networks, a prosocial

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congregation non-activist ties. My substantive interpretation of the effect of congregation ties and congregation activist ties on civic engagement incorporates this interdependence, and thus the measure for general congregation ties captures the effect for congregation non-activist ties.

[40] In terms of substantive interpretation, the same logic applies here as for the measure of quiescent clergy-led congregation attendance (see note 30).

orientation has a significant indirect effect of .026 on promoting this integration through its significant direct effect on participation in activist clergy-led congregations (.263 × .099 = .026). Interestingly, a prosocial orientation has a significant negative direct effect on participation in quiescent clergy-led congregations ($\beta$ = -.058; $p < .10$). Finally, prosocially oriented people are more likely to be involved in congregation religious leadership activities ($\beta$ = .093; $p < .01$).

Looking at the overall fit statistics listed at the bottom of the first column in Table 3.3, we see that the congregation mobilizing and demobilizing model generally achieves a moderately good to good fit to the data. Although the chi-square test statistic is significant, indicating rejection of the null hypothesis that the model fits the data perfectly, this test statistic is not suited to evaluate model fit with large sample sizes like the one in congregation mobilizing and demobilizing model (N = 2,898). This is because the ability of detecting even small differences between the model implied covariance and the observed covariance substantially increases with sample size. All of the other fit statistics indicate a moderately good to good model fit.[41] For the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), Incremental Fit Index (IFI), and Comparative Fit Index (CFI), values greater than .95 generally indicate a good model fit, while values less than .90 generally indicate a poor model fit. For the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), values less than .05 generally indicate a very good model fit, values greater than .10 generally indicate a poor model fit, with values in between indicating a moderate fit (Browne and Cudeck 1993). The values for the TLI, IFI, and CFI are all .968 indicating that the congregation mobilizing and demobilizing model is a good fitting model, while the value for the RMSEA is .077, indicating that this model has

[41] There is ambiguity about how to calculate fit statistics in SEM when using MI (Bollen and Curran 2006:68). The fit statistics reported in this chapter are based on averages across the five imputed datasets.

a satisfactory overall fit. Finally, looking at the $R^2$ value for civic engagement communities in the last column in Table 3.3, we see that the congregation mobilizing and demobilizing model explains almost 30 percent of the variability in people's propensity to get involved in volunteer efforts that serve those in the broader community.

To gain a better understanding of the mobilizing and demobilizing effects of congregation factors on civic engagement in communities, I calculated predicted probabilities for them while setting other variables to particular values.[42] This allowed me to explicate the magnitudes of the direct effects for the different congregation factors. As Figure 3.3 shows, the effects of participation in activist clergy-led congregations and quiescent clergy-led congregations on civic engagement in communities differ considerably, especially at high levels of congregation attendance. For instance, the predicted probability of participation in civic engagement for attending congregations more than once a week where clergy encourage volunteer efforts is .465, while this predicted probability for attending congregations more than once a week where clergy do not encourage volunteer efforts is .181, a difference of .284.[43] Turning to the predicted probabilities for the different types of congregation networks in Figure 3.4, we can clearly see that, depending on their nature, embeddedness in them promotes as well as constrains participation in volunteer

[42] The following formula was used to calculate the predicted probabilities: $\Pr(y_i = 1 | x_i) = 1 - \Phi(\tau_1 - \beta x_i)$. Unless otherwise noted, the predicted probabilities of civic engagement in communities are for white unmarried college educated males age 25 who have no children under 19 living at home, military experience, attend activist clergy-led congregations weekly, engage in outwardly-focused volunteer work in congregations, live outside the south, live in rural areas, have 3 congregation activist friends, average prosocial orientation, average physical health, and average income.

[43] Although the focus of this chapter in terms of congregation attendance is on differences in civic engagement in communities between quiescent clergy-led congregation attendance and activist clergy-led congregation attendance, Figure C1 in Appendix C shows the result of the probability of this engagement for never attend congregations for comparative purposes. Looking at this figure, we see that while the probability of civic engagement in communities for never attending congregations is lower than that for attending activist clergy-led congregations more than weekly, this probability is higher for never attending congregations relative to attending quiescent clergy-led congregations more than weekly (although the differences are not as great, the same pattern holds for lower levels of congregation attendance).

efforts that serve those in the broader community. Each set of bars in Figure 3.4 displays the predicted probability of civic engagement for a different congregation non-activist/activist tie combination, with the left bar in the set representing the predicted probability of civic engagement for the congregation non-activist/activist tie combination and the right bar in the set representing the predicted probability of civic engagement for the congregation activist/non-activist tie combination. Given that the maximum number of congregation ties was 5 and as an easy way to hold the number congregation ties constant, I used the following combinations when calculating the predicted probabilities: 3/2 (2/3), 4 /1 (1/4), and 5/0 (0/5). Since the first set of bars is for the 3/2 (2/3) combination, the left bar in the set is the predicted probability of civic engagement for 3 congregation non-activist ties/2 congregation activist ties, while the right bar in this set is the predicted probability of civic engagement for 2 congregation non-activist ties/3 congregation activist ties. Another way to approach Figure 3.4 is to think of the sets of bars as representing differences in the predicted probability of civic engagement for different congregation non-activist/activist tie combinations, with the right bar favoring the congregation non-activist tie difference and the left bar favoring the congregation activist tie difference. Returning to the first set of bars, we can think of them as displaying the predicted probability of civic engagement for a difference of 1 in the congregation non-activist/activist tie combination (the right bar is for 1 greater congregation non-activist tie as this is the 3/2 congregation non-activist/activist combination and the left bar is for 1 greater congregation activist tie as this is the 2/3 congregation activist/non-activist combination).

Whichever way we think about Figure 3.4, the results clearly reveal that the difference in the predicted probability of civic engagement is always greater for congregation

activist/non-activist tie combination than the congregation non-activist/activist tie combination (thus the greater heights for the bars on the right in all cases). Looking at various sets of bars, we can see that the difference in the predicted probability of civic engagement between the congregation non-activist/activist tie combinations grows as the difference in the combinations becomes greater. The final set of bars shows that the predicted probability of civic engagement for individuals who have 5 congregation ties who *do not* engage in volunteer efforts and 0 congregations ties who *do* is .284, while this predicted probability is .494 for those who have 5 congregation ties who *do* engage in volunteer efforts and 0 congregation ties who *do not*, a difference of .210. This demonstrates the mobilizing power of embeddedness in congregation activist networks on the one hand, and the constraining power of integration in congregation non-activist networks on the other. Shifting attention to the effect of congregation outwardly-focused congregation volunteer activity on civic engagement on communities, there is a .112 difference in the predicted probability of this engagement between engaging in this type of volunteer work in congregations (.465) and not engaging in this work in congregations (.353). In sum, the predicted probabilities further emphasize that congregation factors mobilize as well as demobilize people to get involved in volunteer efforts that benefit those in the broader community.

Besides direct effects of congregation factors, Figure 3.2 specified indirect effects for attending activist clergy-led and quiescent clergy-led congregations, for which my empirical models provide support. Looking down the second row in Table 3.3, we see that the more people participate in congregations where clergy encourage volunteer efforts, the more likely they are to get involved in outwardly-focused volunteer activity in congregations ($\beta$ =.213; p

< .001) and to be embedded in congregation activist networks (β =.099; $p < .001$), both of which increase the probability of civic engagement in communities and thus provide two positive indirect effects for activist clergy-led congregation attendance. However, because attending activist clergy-led congregations has a positive direct effect on having congregation ties in general, this reduces its indirect effect since this measure has a significant negative direct effect on civic engagement in communities.[44] But this negative indirect effect does not cancel out the other two positive effects of attending activist clergy-led congregations.

Table 3.4 shows that activist clergy-led congregation attendance's total indirect effect on participation in civic engagement in communities is .063. When its positive direct effect of .026 is included, this gives attending an activist clergy-led congregation a total effect for engaging in volunteer efforts that serve those in the broader community of .089. By contrast, as the first column in Table 3.4 indicates, attending a quiescent clergy-led congregation's total effect on participation in civic engagement is negative. This is the result of its negative total indirect effect and negative direct effect. Returning to Table 3.3, we see that the greater the attendance at quiescent clergy-led congregations, the lower the probability of outwardly-focused congregation volunteer activity (β = -.076; $p < .001$) and the fewer number of congregation activist friends (β = -.014; $p < .10$). Both of these effects contribute to a quiescent clergy-led congregation attendance's negative total indirect effect, given that participation in outwardly-focused congregation volunteer activity and having more congregation activist friends promote participation in volunteer efforts that benefit people in the broader community. Further contributing to attending a quiescent clergy-led

[44] Attending an activist clergy-led congregation also significantly affects congregation religious leadership and congregation inwardly-focused volunteer activity. But since both measures do not have significant effects on civic engagement in communities, they are not included in the calculation of total indirect effect for activist clergy-led congregation attendance.

congregation's total indirect effect is its positive direct effect on having a greater number of general congregation friends ($\beta = .064$; $p < .001$), which is negatively associated with participation in civic engagement in communities. Summing these negative indirect effects and negative direct effect gives attending a quiescent clergy-led congregation a total effect for participation in volunteer efforts that serve those in the larger community of -.105 (see first column in Table 3.4).]

**Responses to Possible Objections**

Given the cross-sectional nature of the data employed, the source of information of the strong tie network characteristics, and the timing of the survey, several objections to the above statistical models and interpretations are possible. This section reviews and responds to these objections.

First, instead of a prosocial orientation or disposition driving the selection of adult activist friendships, the causal direction could also go the other way, where activist friendships promote a prosocial orientation. But this possibility seems unlikely when judged against previous empirical studies. Research has demonstrated that the forming of a prosocial orientation largely occurs from a combination of genetic and early socialization factors, such as parental emphasis on or modeling helping, and that this orientation tends to exhibit continuity over the life course (see, for example, Bar-Tal 1976:11-37; Davis and Franzoi 1991; Eisenberg et al. 2002; Eisenberg et al. 1999; Eisenberg and Mussen 1989; Grusec 1981; Hoffman 1981; Koestner et al. 1990; Oliner and Oliner 1988; Rossi 2001a; Schroeder et al. 1995:91-125). Given this evidence, it appears that a prosocial orientation generally develops prior to and shapes current activist friendships rather than the other way around.

Second, because the survey obtained information on strong tie characteristics from respondents instead of strong ties themselves, it is possible that respondents may have inaccurately reported on the characteristics of their strong ties. However, this is less of a concern in my case, given that social influence theory presumes awareness. If people are unaware of the social influence that strong ties exert on them, then social influence is not operating, at least from the perspective of respondents whose behaviors we are trying to explain. For instance, recall from above that passive behavioral social influence consists of respondents learning of strong ties' participation in collective action. Hence, even if respondents do not always know about and report all of the civic activities of all their strong ties, the important point is that they report social influence from strong ties of which they are aware. Because social influence requires by definition awareness by those who are the objects of social influence, reports from respondents seem preferable to those from strong ties.

Third, because the 2002 RAPAS was administered in the months after the September 11 terrorist attacks and asked questions about activities during a portion of these months, this may bias the results regarding participation in collective civic action. Even if 9/11 affected the extent to which people got involved in collective civic action, it is unlikely that this would have fundamentally altered the nature of the causal relationships that I observed. In other words, even if September 11 had, for instance, increased the rates of peers who encouraged friends to do volunteer work or the rates of volunteering for community projects, it seems unlikely that these increases would have changed, for instance, the fact that having such peers is a powerful source of social influence inducing participation in collective civic action. Although prior studies have not integrated a prosocial orientation and social networks

as I have here, these studies have consistently shown the importance of these factors for explaining who participates in volunteer efforts and who does not outside of disaster contexts. Consequently, any effects of September 11 on my survey data and results would appear to have been exogenous, possibly increasing levels of civic behaviors and commitments, but not altering the fundamental processes that I have observed.

**Conclusion and Contributions**

Recent decades have witnessed a boom in studies on religion and civic engagement, which no doubt has contributed to the emergence of religion as an important explanatory factor of activist participation in fields other than the sociology of religion. Scholarship on social movements and philanthropy, for instance, has increasingly focused on how religion shapes involvement in various kinds of collective action. As valuable as the large body of prior research on religion and civic engagement is, it has three important limitations that problematize our ability to evaluate the extent to which religious organizations foster a healthy civil society. Because of the lack of attention to specifying the dimensions and mechanisms of congregation influence in prior scholarship, the conditions under and processes through which congregation participation is a force mobilizing citizens to participate in civic action were unknown. Recall from my replication of previous religion and civic engagement models the general lack of significant findings for general congregation factors, such as religious service attendance or number of congregation ties. If congregations do indeed induce activism, as prior research claims, then it is important that we understand exactly how they do so. Second, given the tendency of prior religion and civic engagement scholarship to view congregations as exclusively mobilizing agents, it was unknown whether congregations also constrain activism in any respect. If congregation

involvement was to hinder participation in civic engagement in communities, then this would raise doubts about congregations' ability to promote a strong civil society. Finally, prior scholarship has ignored the possibility that selection explains the positive relationship between congregation participation and civic engagement. As a result, we could not be confident that this relationship was the result of the mobilization efforts of congregations. Yet scholars contend that congregations are responsible for mobilizing citizens to get involved in civic action in communities, rather than prior committed religious activists intentionally choosing to join activist congregations because they reflect their values.

This chapter overcomes the important flaws of prior research on religion and civic engagement to advance substantially our understanding of how religious organizations shape the nature of American civil society. As de Tocqueville described over a century and a half ago and as numerous modern observers point out today, the results in this chapter demonstrate that participation in congregations *mobilizes* members to participate in volunteer efforts that help citizens in the larger community. In this way, religious organizations clearly strengthen civil society. However, this is only part of the story. My findings reveal that congregation involvement also *constrains* members from getting involved in such volunteer efforts, which calls into question religious organizations' ability to cultivate a vibrant civil society. This side of congregation participation has generally been ignored. But the story about religion and civic engagement is incomplete and misleading without it. By specifying the conditions under which congregation embeddedness mobilizes and demobilizes civic action in communities, I bring a new perspective to bear on the study of religion and civic engagement. In what follows, I discuss the implications of this perspective as well as

discussing the other main contributions of this chapter, connecting them to broader theoretical concerns in the social movement and social capital literatures.

Recently, social movement scholarship has called for greater specificity in understanding the dimensions and pathways that motivate activist participation (McAdam et al. 2001). Responding to this call, I have moved beyond the descriptive nature that generally characterizes past studies of religion and civic engagement to identify the precise ways in which congregations mobilize members to get involved in civic engagement in communities. Specifically, my conceptual model in Figure 3.2 emphasized that congregations encourage members to participate in civic action by exposing them to clergy recruitment efforts, forging activist relationships, and cultivating transposable skills. My empirical results confirmed the utility of this conceptual model, showing that each of these congregation factors had a significant positive direct effect on mobilizing members to participate in civic engagement in communities. Because of their position as leaders of congregations, clergy have considerable social influence over their parishioners. By going against the wishes of clergy, members risk receiving disapproval or losing support from religious leaders, whom they likely deeply respect and admire. Consequently, when clergy encourage members to get involved in civic engagement, this represents a powerful selective incentive inducing lay participation in civic action. But activist clergy are not the only source of social influence in congregations that encourage civic engagement. As prior research has observed, congregations are among the most important voluntary organizations for fostering close relationships among members (Wuthnow 2004). When congregation peer networks are activist in nature, embeddedness in them also becomes a powerful source of social influence promoting participation in civic engagement. Members of congregations have much to lose if they do not respond or much to

gain if they do to the social influence that fellow congregation activist members exert on them. In the social movement literature on differential participation, both rationalists and culturalists alike emphasize that activist friendships constitute an important selective incentive that motivates participation in collective action (Chong 1991; Goodwin et al. 2001; Opp 1989). Given the robustness of the findings for attending congregations where clergy encourage volunteer efforts and embeddedness in congregation peer networks that do the same, this also seems to be the case for integration into activist vertical and horizontal relationships in congregations.

In addition to networks of social influence, congregations foster skills that are transposable to participation in volunteer efforts that help those in the broader community. Supporting this argument, my empirical models identified that involvement in outwardly-focused congregation volunteer activity significantly encourages participation in civic engagement in communities. However, participation in congregation religious leadership activity did not (though it did not decrease participation in civic engagement either), nor did participation in inwardly-focused congregation volunteer activity. Counter to Verba et al. (1995) and religion and civic engagement scholarship (Brown and Brown 2003; Cassel 1999; Harris 1994, 1999; Lam 2002; Park and Smith 2002; Peterson 1992; Wuthnow 2004), then, participation in congregation activity beyond religious service attendance of any sort does *not* "spill over" to involvement in civic engagement in communities. Rather, it is only involvement in volunteer activity in congregations that focuses on helping nonmembers that does. Because prior research has not made these differentiations among congregation activity beyond religious service attendance, it has missed this important finding. That participation in outwardly-focused congregation volunteer activity, as opposed to religious

activity or inwardly-focused volunteer activity in congregations, transposes to external civic engagement is not surprising. As members engage in volunteer work in congregations that serve nonmembers, they acquire and hone skills—such as caring for those who are different—that are directly applicable to other volunteer efforts that benefit people in the broader community. In other words, members who participate in outwardly-focused congregation volunteer work develop a volunteering repertoire that is transposable to other types of civic engagement in communities that serve those outside their social group. By contrast, it is unclear clear how participation in religious leadership activity or inwardly-focused volunteer activity does, which likely explains why these activities in congregations were not significantly related to participation in volunteer efforts that serve those in the broader community.

Besides the important direct effect of attending congregations with activist clergy on participation in civic engagement in communities, attending these congregations also has two important indirect effects on participation in civic engagement. First, my empirical models showed that the greater the attendance at activist clergy-led congregations, the greater the likelihood of embeddedness in activist congregation peer networks. Given that religious activists are likely to be attracted to activist clergy-led congregations, participation in these congregations gives activist members the necessary opportunities to interact and form friendships. Echoing this finding, social movement studies have found that involvement in political associations is particularly likely to foster activist connections among members. For instance, Opp (1989:Chapter 5) demonstrated that political group membership had a significant positive on embeddedness in protest-encouraging networks (see also Opp and Gern 1993). Second, I found that individuals who attend activist clergy-led congregations

were more likely to be involved in outwardly-focused volunteer activity in congregations. Given activist clergy's commitment to external civic engagement, they are likely to organize volunteering activities of this sort as a way to equip members with the needed skills to get involved in other volunteer efforts that serve individuals outside of congregations (Hart 2001; Warren 2001; Wood 2002). By facilitating participation in internal volunteer activity and helping forge activist ties among members, congregations with activist clergy provide two important pathways to get people involved in volunteer efforts in communities.

Notwithstanding the above discussion, congregations also constrain involvement in civic engagement in communities. This is an important corrective to prior scholarship on civic engagement, which has generally contended that congregations always mobilize—or at least never demobilize—members to participate in civic action in communities. But as my empirical models demonstrate, this simply is not true. Attendance at quiescent clergy-led congregations and embeddedness in the same kinds of horizontal congregation peer networks function as significant barriers to participation in volunteer efforts that serve those in the broader community. For many clergy and laity, their first priority is caring for the spiritual and social needs of fellow members. As past research has shown, activism is often seen, by clergy and laity alike, as a threat to this care (Greenberg 2000; Olson 2000). Unless clergy and members are committed to activism, they are likely to avoid and frown upon activism. Hence, congregation members involved in non-activist clergy-led congregations and embedded in non-activist congregation peer networks risk being negatively sanctioned from people whom they hold in high esteem and fracturing important relationships if they were to get involved in community activism. In this way, congregation networks constitute an important selective *disincentive* for participating in civic engagement in communities. This

observation has generally gone unnoticed in prior scholarship on religion and civic engagement.

Case in point is Ruiter and De Graaf's (2006) recent *American Sociological Review* article on religion and volunteering. Drawing on prior scholarship on religion and civic engagement, they identified networks as the key variable for explaining the link between congregation participation and involvement in volunteer efforts. As Ruiter and De Graaf (2006:193) state, "…church members are more likely to meet other volunteers and be recruited by them." Based on this premise, they theorized that individuals in more devout societies should have more extensive religious networks and thus more extensive volunteer networks relative to individuals in secular societies. For this reason, Ruiter and De Graaf (2006) posited that people in devout nations should be more likely to volunteer than those in secular nations, and that levels of church attendance should matter more for volunteering in the latter context. But empirical results from my chapter demonstrate that religious networks actually can constrain participation in civic engagement, directly challenging Ruiter and De Graaf's (2006) theoretical explanation. Besides correcting prior scholarship on religion and civic engagement's assumption that religious networks imply activist networks, observing that congregation ties hinder volunteer efforts in communities makes a valuable contribution to the social movement on differential participation. Although social movement scholarship has begun to recognize that organizations and networks can hinder participation in collective action (Goodwin 1997; Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Kitts 2000; McAdam and Paulsen 1993), it has yet to specify the exact types of associational connections that are the most potent constrainers of this action. My chapter demonstrates that, when they are quiescent in nature, religious leadership and religious networks significantly inhibit involvement in civic

engagement in communities. The broader point seems to be that when activism is perceived to jeopardize the primary goals of organizations, then it is likely to be discouraged, and thus group members will more likely abstain from activist participation in order to avoid negative reactions from leaders and other group members who prefer to focus on spiritual and in-group activities.

Participation in quiescent clergy-led congregations also indirectly discourages civic engagement in communities. In contrast, other studies of other nonpolitical organizations have found that unintentional mobilization efforts of these organizations are important for facilitating participation in external activities (Leighley 1996). In fact, Hoge et al (1998) found a positive relationship between general religious service attendance and doing volunteer work in congregations. But I found that when distinguishing between the activist and non-activist nature of congregation leadership, attending quiescent clergy-led congregations inhibits participation in volunteer efforts in congregations, especially those that are outwardly-focused, which in turn reduces the probability of getting involved in volunteer efforts in communities. Additionally, consistent with the homophily principle, attending congregations with quiescent clergy prevented the formation of congregation activist peer networks while promoting the formation of general congregation peer networks, both of which further indirectly hampered participation in civic engagement that benefit the broader community. As a result, while attending quiescent clergy-led congregations may encourage congregation friendships that cross racial or class lines (Wuthnow 2004), it does not seem to encourage congregation friendships that cross activist lines.

Identifying that congregations can actually demobilize civic engagement in broader communities also has important implications for the literature on social capital. Although

most attention to social capital has focused on its positive effects, scholars have also begun to focus on the potential so-called "dark side" of social capital (Beyerlein and Hipp 2005; Fiorina 1999; Paxton 1999, 2002; Portes 1998). These scholars have noted that social capital need not necessarily produce outcomes generally considered socially desirable, but that it may produce outcomes often considered undesirable. Even Robert Putnam (2000:350-363), arguably the most outspoken advocate for social capital's positive benefits, has also stressed that social capital can have harmful consequences. Much of the current discussion about social capital's potential negative effects focuses on differences in who benefits from social capital. Voluntary organizations clearly provide numerous benefits to members, and this contributes to civil society in an elementary but important way. But when they also provide benefits to nonmembers—for example, through their out-group volunteering or activism—we have reason to think that they further strengthen the cohesion of civil society in contributing broadly to American community life. Because of the emphasis on spiritual nurturance and social fellowship, participation in non-activist-clergy-led congregations and integration into non-activist congregation networks appears to inhibit participation in volunteer efforts that serve those in the larger community. We might think of these congregations as relatively "greedy institutions" (Coser 1974), monopolizing indigenous resources primarily for their own use. By doing so, these congregations may successfully serve the needs of their members, but they weaken civil society's provision of assistance to those in need outside of their communities and to fostering "bridging" social capital in the wider community.

The final limitation of prior scholarship on religion and civic engagement that this chapter has taken a significant step to address and overcome is the omission of attention to potential selection effects. Prior scholarship on religion and civic engagement has assumed

that the positive relationship between congregation participation and civic action in communities is the result of congregations' mobilization efforts. But, as previously mentioned, this relationship may just as easily reflect selection processes over time, where prior committed religious activists purposively join activist congregations. To address this selection concern, I drew in this analysis on a dispositional perspective of civic engagement that emphasizes the push of a "prosocial" orientation—which is believed to be formed through socialization very early in the life course—to explain involvement (Penner 2002; Penner and Finkelstein 1998; Penner et al. 1995). Although this perspective had not been previously applied to research on religion and civic engagement, the homophily principle led me to expect that prosocially oriented people would be attracted to activist congregations, networks, and activity. Consistent with this expectation, I found that a prosocial orientation had a significant positive effect on respondents attending congregations where clergy encourage volunteer efforts, indirectly forging friendships with activist members, and engaging in volunteer activity in congregations. Interestingly, a prosocial orientation also had a significant negative effect on attendance at congregations without activist clergy, suggesting that prosocially-oriented people tend to avoid joining congregations where clergy do not attempt to mobilize members for activities that reflect their values. As found in other studies, a prosocial orientation positively predicted participation in civic engagement in communities (Carlo et al. 2005; Clary et al. 1996; Elshaug and Metzer 2001; Penner 2002; Penner and Finkelstein 1998; Penner et al. 1995; Piliavin and Callero 1991; Piliavin and Charng 1990; Rossi 2001b; Sokolowski 1996; Wilson and Musick 1997, 1998, 1999; Wuthnow 1991). Most importantly, though, the effect of attendance at congregations with activist clergy, embeddedness in activist congregation peer networks, and participation in

outwardly-focused congregation volunteer activity was robust to the inclusion of a prosocial orientation. This ought to significantly increase our confidence that the social influence of activist clergy and members as well as the cultivation of transposable skills are important factors for explaining the relationship between congregations and participation in civic engagement in communities, beyond the effects of selection.

In sum, this chapter has made three important contributions to our understanding of the relationship between religion and civic engagement. First, I have shown the dimensions and mechanisms through which congregations mobilize participation in civic engagement in communities. Second, this chapter has demonstrated that certain kinds of congregations may actually deter participation in civic engagement. Last, I have established that congregational factors promote participation in civic engagement even after the inclusion of a control for selection. Given that many tens of millions of Americans participate in congregations every week and the fact that they mobilize as well as demobilize members to participate in civic engagement in communities, religious organizations should be seen as powerful but complicated and variable actors influencing the character of civil society in the Untied States. Based on the findings from this chapter, neither the call from conservatives for a greater blanket influence of religious organizations in public life, nor the call from liberals for a highly restricted influence would seem to be an adequate response to interests in strengthening the capability of civil society to strengthen and enrich American communities and democracy broadly. Rather, according to the findings and arguments of this chapter, religion's influence on civil society significantly varies, according to the more or less socially mobilizing nature of its leadership, internal activities, and member composition. In this sense, future scholarship ought not to investigate the effects of "American religion" as if it

were a monolithic entity, but should rather, as I have attempted to do here, disaggregate quite different types and tendencies *within* the broader field of American religion. By doing so, we will bring to the surface more fine-grained yet key distinctions which will help to better understand the nature and function of community life, social capital, and civil society in the United States.

**Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis**

| | Mean | S.D. |
|---|---|---|
| *Civic Engagement in Communities* | | |
| Do volunteer work through a nonreligious organization that benefits people in the community outside the group | .130 | .337 |
| *Congregation Factors* | | |
| Attend quiescent clergy-led congregation | 2.458 | 2.334 |
| Attend activist clergy-led congregation | 3.205 | 2.755 |
| # of congregation ties | .976 | 1.457 |
| # of congregation activist ties | .422 | .931 |
| Congregation religious leadership position | .144 | .351 |
| Congregation inward volunteer activity | .212 | .401 |
| Congregation outward volunteer activity | .189 | .391 |
| *Prosocial orientation* | | |
| Personally feel responsible to help others in need | 3.719 | .885 |
| Personally feel responsible to take action against injustice | 3.437 | 1.020 |
| *Demographic variables* | | |
| White | .761 | .426 |
| Black | .110 | .313 |
| Other race | .128 | .334 |
| College education | .244 | .429 |
| Income | 5.491 | 2.854 |
| Female | .519 | .500 |
| Age | 45.016 | .17.711 |
| Physical heath | 3.855 | .921 |
| # of children under 19 living in household | .617 | 1.021 |
| Working full-time | .493 | .500 |
| Served in the military | .156 | .363 |
| Married | .564 | .500 |
| South | .386 | .487 |
| Rural | .230 | .421 |

**Table 3.2. Probit Coefficients for Effects of Prior Religion and Civic Engagement Replication Model**

| Explanatory variables | Civic Engagement in Communities |
|---|---|
| Congregation attendance | .002 |
| | (.015) |
| Any congregation activity beyond attendance | .563*** |
| | (.079) |
| # of congregation ties | -.021 |
| | (.024) |
| $R^2$ | .123 |
| Model $\chi^2$ | — |
| Degrees of freedom | — |
| CFI | — |
| IFI | — |
| TLI | — |
| RMSEA | — |

*Notes*: Standard errors are in parentheses; number of cases for all models is 2,898 individuals. Also included but not shown are controls for all demographic variables listed in Table 3.1.
*** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

## Table 3.3. Probit Coefficients for Direct Effects of Congregation Mobilizing and Demobilizing Model

| Explanatory variables | Quiescent clergy-led congregation attendance | Activist clergy-led congregation attendance | Congregation religious leadership position | Congregation inward volunteer activity | Congregation outward volunteer activity | Number of congregation ties | Number of congregation activist ties | Civic engagement in communities |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Quiescent clergy-led congregation attendance | — | — | -.016 | -.053*** | -.076*** | .064*** | -.014+ | -.077*** |
| | | | (.014) | (.013) | (.014) | (.011) | (.007) | (.017) |
| Activist clergy-led congregation attendance | — | — | .185** | .229*** | .213*** | .126*** | .099*** | .026+ |
| | | | (.011) | (.013) | (.012) | (.009) | (.006) | (.014) |
| Congregation religious leadership position | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | -.017 |
| | | | | | | | | (.087) |
| Congregation inward volunteer activity | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | -.010 |
| | | | | | | | | (.153) |
| Congregation outward volunteer activity | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | .290* |
| | | | | | | | | (.127) |
| Number of congregation ties | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | -.075* |
| | | | | | | | | (.031) |
| Number of congregation activist ties | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | .111** |
| | | | | | | | | (.042) |
| Prosocial Orientation | -.058+ | .263** | .093* | .083* | .120** | .004 | .016 | .088** |
| | (.032) | (.094) | (.037) | (.033) | (.045) | (.016) | (.011) | (.037) |
| $R^2$ | .067 | .086 | .337 | .380 | .379 | .106 | .113 | .277 |
| Model $\chi^2$ | 312.012*** | | | | | | | |
| Degrees of freedom | 17 | | | | | | | |
| CFI | .968 | | | | | | | |
| IFI | .968 | | | | | | | |
| TLI | .968 | | | | | | | |
| RMSEA | .077 | | | | | | | |

*Notes* : Standard errors are in parentheses; number of cases for all models is 2,898 individuals. Also included but not shown are controls for all demographic variables listed in Table 3.1 (see Appendix D for results for demographic variables).
+ $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests)

**Table 3.4. Indirect and Total Effects of Quiescent and Activist Clergy-Led Congregation Attendance on Civic Engagement in Communities**

| Explanatory variables | Civic Engagement in Communities |
|---|---|
| Quiescent clergy-led congregation attendance | -.028/-.105 |
| Activist clergy-led congregation attendance | .063./089 |

*Note* : Indirect effect/total effect; all effects significant at the $p < .05$ level (two-tail tests) or lower.

**Figure 3.1 Conceptual Congregation Mobilization Model**



**Figure 3.2. Conceptual Congregation Mobilization and Demobilization Model**




*Note*: Dashed arrows represent theorized negative effects, thin solid arrows represent theorized positive effects, and bold solid arrows represent effects where the theorized direction is unclear. All specified effects assume that a prosocial orientation is controlled.

**Figure 3.3. Effects of Activist and Quiescent Clergy-Led Attendance on Civic Engagement in Communities**



**Figure 3.4. Effects of Activist and Non-Activist Congregation Networks on Civic Engagement in Communities**



# CHAPTER 4: U.S. CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AFTER 9/11: EXPLORING THE MOBILIZING SCOPE OF TRAGEDY, SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND PROSOCIAL ORIENTATION

The terrorist attacks occurring on the morning of September 11, 2001 left an indelible mark on the lives of New Yorkers and Americans. Given the gravity of 9/11, it should come as no surprise that the tragedy and its aftermath have been the subject of a growing body of social scientific research. Among the important issues receiving a great deal of scholarly attention is the extent to which the September 11 events revitalized Americans' waning civic commitments and behaviors. Drawing on his arguments about how World War II mobilized a generation of Americans to get involved in civic action and remain involved throughout their lives, Robert Putnam posited that 9/11 was just what America needed to reverse its downward trend in civic participation.[45] In his book *Bowling Alone*, Putnam (2000:402) stated that the "[increase in civic disengagement] would be eased by a palpable national crisis, like war or depression or natural disaster, but for better *and* for worse, America at the dawn of the new century faces no such galvanizing crisis" (emphasis in original). But then on the morning of September 11, Americans found themselves living through one of the greatest national crises in U.S. history. But was Putnam (2000) correct? Did 9/11 mobilize Americans to espouse stronger civic attitudes and participate in civic activities in greater numbers than before the attacks?

[45] There has been much scholarly debate in recent years about the decline in U.S. civic participation (see, for example, Paxton 1999; Sampson et al. 2006).

Based on available data, it seems that while 9/11 may have created greater civic mindedness in Americans, especially in the short-term, it did not promote any systematic increase in Americans' civic participation. Regarding civic attitudes, Traugott et al. (2002) found that Americans had more favorable attitudes toward such American ethnic groups as African Americans and Hispanics in their post-9/11 fall 2001 survey than in either the 1998 or 2000 National Election Studies (NES). Additionally, Ford and colleagues (2003) discovered among a large sample of adolescents that respondents interviewed within two months after 9/11 were more likely to agree that they could trust all levels of government (i.e., federal, state and local) than those interviewed in the two months before 9/11. Regarding national pride, Smith et al. (2001) showed that respondents to the National Tragedy Survey (NTS), conducted between September 12 and September 27, 2001, were much more likely to disagree with the statement "there are some things about America today that make me feel ashamed of America" relative to respondents from previous years of the General Social Survey (GSS). Furthermore, based on a panel study of 500 individuals surveyed in the fall of 2000 and then reinterviewed in October and November of 2001, Putnam (2002) found that Americans' interest in politics had increased, which is particularly impressive since the national Presidential campaign was going on in the fall of 2000.

Civic behaviors, however, did not appear to have followed the same pattern as civic attitudes after the tragedy. Available evidence suggests that more Americans did not participate in civic efforts after 9/11. Returning to Traugott et al.'s (2002) study, they found that Americans were actually less likely to get involved in "any sort of volunteer or charitable activity in their community" after 9/11 than before. On their post-9/11 fall survey, Traugott et al. (2002) found that 39 percent of respondents had engaged in volunteer or

charitable activity in their community, while a comparable question on a survey conducted before 9/11 found that the percentage of Americans who had engaged in this activity was 43. Although Putnam (2002) tended not to find a decline between pre- and post-9/11 estimates of civic engagement on his survey, he documented only negligible or no differences in these estimates. While increases in civic attitudes are notable, especially if they remain elevated, it is civic involvement that is most crucial for reviving American civic life. As Putnam (2002:22) states, "Changes in attitudes alone, no matter how promising, do not constitute civic renewal." Because the attacks of 9/11 do not seem to have mobilized Americans to participate in civic engagement in greater numbers than before, this calls into question Putnam's (2000) hypothesis that an event such as 9/11 would rally the country to engage broadly in civic action throughout communities and help restore U.S. civic life.

Before dismissing the possibility that 9/11 motivated more Americans to participate in civic engagement than before the attacks, we need to consider more closely how the previously presented studies operationalized post-9/11 civic engagement. Because these studies focused on comparing rates of civic behaviors that occurred before and after the 9/11 attacks, they did not include volunteer efforts that directly focused on helping victims, families of victims, or rescue workers, as these efforts obviously could not have occurred prior to the attacks. However, we know that, at least in the short-term, participation in volunteer efforts to help those directly harmed by the tragedy was an important part of the post-9/11 civic response (Beyerlein and Sikkink 2005). Consequently, when prior studies like Traugott et al. (2002) measured civic engagement in terms of doing volunteer or charitable activity in communities, they did not capture volunteering for 9/11 relief efforts. If participation in volunteer efforts to help 9/11 victims, families of victims, or rescue workers

was part of the post-9/11 civic engagement estimates, it is likely that we would have observed a significant increase in civic engagement similar to what Putnam (2000) predicted.

But even if we had, it still would be debatable whether this constitutes a broad renewal of U.S. civic engagement like the one Putnam (2000) had in mind. Examining the studies on 9/11 relief efforts, we learn that, not surprisingly, the most important factors for differentiating Americans who participated in some sort of 9/11 relief effort from those who did not were products of the 9/11 tragedy itself, such as proximity to the attack sites, personal relationships to victims or potential victims, and public displays of patriotism (Beyerlein and Sikkink 2005). For instance, Smith et al. (2001) found that there was an eleven-point percentage difference in giving blood to help victims in the immediate days and weeks following the 9/11 attacks between New Yorkers and those living in other parts of the United States. That 9/11 factors mobilized Americans to help victims certainly indicates an important civic response and shows solidarity with those injured or killed. However, if these factors motivated participation exclusively in 9/11 relief efforts, then this casts doubt on the interpretation that 9/11 mobilized Americans to contribute broadly to civic life and helped start the process of civic renewal. On the other hand, if 9/11-generated factors also encouraged Americans to participate in other forms of civic engagement, such as volunteer efforts in communities, then this would suggest a greater impact of 9/11 on U.S. civic life than has to date been acknowledged. Because prior studies did not distinguish between post-9/11 volunteer efforts that focused on helping those harmed by the tragedy and post-9/11 volunteer efforts that focused on helping others in communities besides victims, we have no way to know whether the mobilizing effect of 9/11-generated factors was narrow or broad in scope. Given that the same data limitation exists for scholarship on participation in relief

efforts during natural disasters and the 1995 domestic terrorist bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (Haines, Hurlbert, and Beggs 1996; Kaniasty and Norris 1995; Nelson 1973; O'Brien and Mileti 1992; St. John and Fuchs 2002), it is also unknown in these cases whether disaster-generated factors only promoted helping behavior focused on victims of tragedies, or whether they also encouraged other types of helping behavior. Beyond the case of 9/11, then, identifying whether 9/11-generated factors mobilized participation in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts as well as 9/11 relief efforts has important implications for our understanding of the nature of civic response in the aftermath of tragedy.

Besides 9/11-generated factors, this chapter focuses on the significance of what scholars have recently called "social capital"—network and organizational embeddedness—as well as psychological orientations for explaining variation in helping behavior after a crisis. Concerning social capital, the sociology of disaster literature has demonstrated that social connections and voluntary organization membership significantly predict who volunteers to help with recovery efforts and who does not. Likewise, a large amount of literature on civic engagement emphasizes the importance of social networks and organizations for understanding differential participation in volunteerism outside of disaster contexts. However, an important limitation of both of these literatures is that they have not specified the *exact* types of personal ties and associational memberships that are most important for facilitating participation in helping behavior. As a result, the civic engagement literature and the disaster literature have not developed a compelling theoretical account to explain why certain social networks and organizations are more likely than others to mobilize people to volunteer in routine and nonroutine situations. To overcome these limitations, I

draw on the broader scholarship on social networks and social movements to explain the differential effects of different types of social networks and organizations on helping behavior focused on victims, families of victims, or rescue workers as well as those focused on others in communities after 9/11.

A prosocial orientation is the final factor on which this chapter focuses to account for differences in participation in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 volunteer efforts in communities. A large body of literature on the psychology of volunteering emphasizes the importance of the "push" of this orientation for differentiating volunteers from nonvolunteers (Carlo et al. 2005; Clary et al. 1996; Elshaug and Metzer 2001; Penner 2002; Penner and Finkelstein 1998; Penner et al. 1995; Piliavin and Callero 1991; Piliavin and Charng 1990; Rossi 2001b; Sokolowski 1996; Wilson and Musick 1997, 1998, 1999; Wuthnow 1991).[46] Surprisingly, however, a dispositional perspective has generally not been incorporated in the disaster scholarship to understand variation in involvement in efforts to help victims and rescue workers after tragedies. Given the robustness of a prosocial orientation's effect on participation in volunteer efforts outside of disaster contexts, its omission from models of helping with relief efforts is notable. Furthermore, as discussed below, incorporating a prosocial orientation in models of helping behavior after tragedies provides a way to address the selection problem that may otherwise undermine the interpretation that social networks and organizations were sources of mobilizing for this behavior. By bringing a dispositional perspective to bear on participation in volunteers efforts to help 9/11 victims, families of

[46] The dispositional psychological perspective is one of many psychological perspectives relevant for understanding helping behavior. For instance, psychological scholarship on helping behavior has focused on perceived diffusion of responsibility for assisting others in distress (Latane and Darley 1970). For a review of the many psychological processes that can affect helping behavior see (Schroeder et al. 1995).

victims, or rescue workers, I broaden our understanding of the dynamics that encourage civic engagement to help those harmed by tragedies.

**Tragedy-Generated Factors and Helping Behavior**

Scholarship on the sociology of disaster demonstrates the importance of tragedy-generated factors for explaining why some individuals volunteer to help those harmed by catastrophes while others do not. One important factor in this regard is being a victim of some sort. Although disaster studies have established the importance of this variable, there is some debate about whether experiencing loss from traumatic events positively or negatively affects getting involved in volunteer efforts to help other victims. On the one hand, some argue that experiencing loss, especially severe loss, may limit individuals' ability to help other victims since they have to care for themselves and focus on rebuilding their own damaged lives. Supporting this view, Haines et al. (1996) found that the greater the house damage from Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the lower the likelihood of engaging in recovery efforts to help other victims of the hurricane.

But there seems to be greater support for the alternative view that being a victim gives rise to identification and solidarity with other victims and thus promotes participation in volunteer efforts to help others harmed. As Dynes and Drabek (1994:12) state, "Disaster victims do not exhibit irrational and self destructive behavior nor do they become helpless and dependent…They become resources. Most early emergency tasks, such as search and rescue, are done by disaster victims themselves…Such victims seldom exhibit traumatic indication of stress but do exhibit types of altruistic behavior uncommon prior to the disaster." In their study of the predictors of helping behavior after Hurricane Hugo in 1989, Kaniasty and Norris (1995) found that individuals who experienced greater property and

belonging loss were more likely to provide tangible and informational help to other hurricane victims. They found a similar effect for experiencing greater disaster-related injuries and perceiving greater life threats during the hurricane. For residents of Santa Cruz and San Francisco, California, O'Brien and Mileti (1992) showed that greater household and neighborhood damage from the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake was positively associated with greater participation in emergency response efforts in the aftermath of the quake. Concerning the catastrophic tornado that hit Lubbock, Texas, in 1971, Nelson (1973) found that among residents living within the disaster area, those who suffered personal loss or injury were much more likely to donate funds than those who did not. Prior disaster studies have also documented that experiencing loss from tragedies in the form of the death of friends, colleagues, or other associates also significantly motivates participation in relief efforts. For the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, St. John and Fuchs (2002) found that people who knew more victims of the bombing (other than relatives) were considerably more likely to participate in a range of relief effort activities compared to those who knew no victims. Regarding the terrorist attacks of September 11, Beyerlein and Sikkink (2005) also found that knowing more victims or potential victims was positively related to volunteering for organizations or groups to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers. They argued conceptually that knowing victims or potential victims reflected a strong emotional attachment to those harmed and thus created a personal stake in getting involved in relief efforts as a way to honor the injured or the memory of a departed loved one.

Extending the arguments of disaster scholarship and drawing on social movement as well as collective behavior scholarship, Beyerlein and Sikkink (2005) posited that other tragedy-generated factors should also be important for explaining variation in 9/11 relief

efforts. They focused especially on the role of emotions, geographic propinquity, collective and regional identity, and commemorative gatherings to explain this variation. In terms of emotions, they theorized that sorrow and grief would be central since these emotions arise from suffering and loss and create identification with and empathy for victims. Because living close to the terrorist attack sites likely increased the chance of knowing victims or potential victims, knowledge about helping opportunities, and awareness of needs, Beyerlein and Sikkink (2005) argued that proximity should also be an important factor facilitating participation in relief efforts. They hypothesized that patriotism—understood as a symbolic bond with America and commitment to its history, ideals, traditions, and way of life—as well should mobilize Americans to participate in efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers of the attacks. Beyerlein and Sikkink (2005) claimed that the spike in patriotism after 9/11, as evident by the large number of public displays of the American flag and other patriotic symbols (Collins 2004), was likely an important expression of identification with the nation perceived to be the object of the attacks. For many Americans, then, these authors argued that patriotism represented a salient collective identity that united citizens in a common struggle and thus should have increased the likelihood of volunteering for 9/11 relief efforts. According to Beyerlein and Sikkink (2005), the attacks of 9/11 may have also activated a regional collective identity (see also Abrams, Albright, and Panofsky 2004). These authors argued that those living in the New York area likely interpreted 9/11 as an assault on the self, their distinctive way of life, and fellow New Yorkers. Given this, New Yorkers should have participated in relief efforts at greater rates than individuals living in other parts of the United States to defend their identity and to show their solidarity with other New Yorkers. Finally, Beyerlein and Sikkink (2005) emphasized that participation in

commemorative events to honor victims—such as community candlelight or prayer vigils—should have spurred people to get involved in 9/11 relief efforts, as participation in these events likely heightened the significance of tragedy, intensified values conducive to helping behavior, including sympathy and compassion, and increased information about opportunities to help victims. Based on analyses of a nationally representative survey of Americans after 9/11, Beyerlein and Sikkink (2005) generally found empirical support for their arguments about the positive relationship between 9/11-generated factors and getting involved in volunteer efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers of the tragedy.

Returning to one of the central questions of this chapter, did the 9/11-generated factors on which Beyerlein and Sikkink (2005) focused also motivate Americans to get involved in post-9/11 volunteer efforts in communities? Like previous disaster scholarship on relief efforts, Beyerlein and Sikkink's (2005) analysis was limited to participation in volunteer efforts to help 9/11 victims, families of victims, or rescue workers. Without a comparative analysis, we cannot answer the important question of whether these factors also mobilized other types of helping behavior after 9/11 and thus evaluate the extent to which the tragedy may have helped contribute to reviving U.S. civic life. On the one hand, it is possible theoretically that, for instance, because patriotism evoked feelings of solidarity, greater levels of patriotism would have encouraged Americans to help not only those harmed by the 9/11 attacks, but also citizens broadly as a way to strengthen, heal, and unify the nation. On the other hand, however, perhaps greater patriotism limited Americans from getting involved in volunteer efforts in communities after 9/11, as they may have been consumed with helping victims, families of victims, or rescue workers since these were the

people who directly suffered loss or died and thus most represented the fallen nation in need of care. In what follows, I test whether 9/11-generated factors—knowing victims or potential victims, proximity to the attack sites, sorrow in response to the attacks, patriotism, New York residence, and participation in commemorative gatherings—predicted getting involved in post-9/11 volunteer efforts in communities in addition to 9/11 relief efforts, or whether the effects of these factors were limited to getting involved to help victims, families, or rescue workers of the 9/11 attacks. By doing so, I identify for the first time whether tragedy-generated factors mobilize a civic response that is narrow or broad in scope.

**Social Capital and Helping Behavior**

Besides the previously identified 9/11-generated factors, variables scholars have generally labeled as "social capital"—networks and organizations—should be important for explaining involvement in 9/11 relief efforts as well as involvement in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts. Literature on the sociology of disaster has demonstrated the significance of personal connections for explaining who provides help after catastrophes. In their study of the determinants of providing help to prepare for and involvement in recovery efforts after Hurricane Andrew, Haines et al. (2005) found that people who had larger and denser social networks were more likely to engage in a greater number of recovery efforts. Regarding the preparation phase, however, only network density was associated with a greater number of helping behaviors. Kanisty and Norris (1995) also found that the greater the network size, the greater the likelihood of proving tangible help, informational help, and emotional help to victims of Hurricane Hugo. Echoing these findings are those from the scholarship on civic engagement. This scholarship has also demonstrated the importance of social ties for

distinguishing volunteers from nonvolunteers outside of disaster contexts. For example, Wilson and Musick (1999) found that the greater number of friends and the greater interaction with them (either in person or by telephone), the greater the participation in volunteer activity in a variety of contexts and the greater the number of hours volunteered. Similarly, Amato (1990) showed that people who had more people in their social network and greater contact with them, the more likely they were to engage in planned volunteer efforts.

Overall, then, the scholarship on disaster relief efforts and civic engagement demonstrates that individuals who are embedded in larger social networks and interact more often with their social ties are more likely to participate in helping behavior during normal times and times of crisis. As valuable as this scholarship is for directing our attention to the role of social connections for understanding who volunteers for relief and other efforts, it is less helpful for understanding *why* social networks mobilize volunteerism. This is because prior research has only focused on general network characteristics, namely size, instead of specific network characteristics. However, there is nothing about network size *per se* that should induce people to participate in relief efforts or other types of volunteer efforts. In support of this view, social movement scholarship on differential participation has shown that having more friends is not what is important for explaining activist participation, but rather having more friends who are activists or committed to activism. For example, when Passy (2001) controlled for the number of ties who supported the Swiss solidarity movement, she found that there was no positive effect of network size on participation in activism on behalf of this movement. Applying this logic to participation in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts, the characteristic of social networks that should matter

most for promoting this participation is a commitment to volunteering, expressed either verbally, behaviorally, or both. The majority of studies on helping behavior in and outside disaster situations have ignored the volunteering characteristic of social networks. When studies have acknowledged this characteristic, they have done so only in passing to justify their measure of network size, arguing that the larger the social network, the greater the opportunity of coming in contact with a volunteer (Pearce 1993; Wilson and Musick 1999). But as just noted above, Passey (2001) demonstrated it is not the size of friendship networks that is important, but whether they are activist in nature. Furthermore, the "opportunity thesis" tells us nothing about why having friends who volunteer would be important for mobilizing people to participate in volunteer efforts to help victims and others in communities after tragedies. To explain why embeddedness in volunteering networks should motivate participation in volunteer efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers of tragedies as well as others in communities, we must turn to the theoretical insights of the broader scholarship on social networks and social movements.

The broader network literature emphasizes that *social influence* is the crucial mechanism for understanding the importance of social networks for shaping the behavior of those embedded in them (see, for example, Akers 1985; Akers et al. 1979; Berelson et al. 1954; Friedkin 1998; Friedkin and Cook 1990; Graham et al. 1991; Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Marsden and Friedkin 1993; Matsueda and Anderson 1998; Warr and Stafford 1991). Because people desire to gain approval and avoid disapproval from friends, they are likely to act in a way that conforms to the commitments and expectations of those in their social circle. While a network perspective has been a prominent part of a myriad of different sociological literatures, the most relevant literature for the purposes of this chapter is the

social movement literature on personal ties and protest participation. A large body of social movement research has demonstrated the importance of embeddedness in activist friendship networks for explaining why certain people participate in protest activism while others do not (see, for example, Chong 1991; della Porta 1988; Diani 1995; Kitts 1999, 2000; Klandermans and Oegema 1987; McAdam 1986; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Opp 1989; Opp and Gern 1993; Passy 2001, 2003; Passy and Giugni 2001; Snow et al. 1980). For instance, McAdam (1986) showed that applicants to the Mississippi Freedom Summer project who had preexisting close relationships with other applicants and activists were considerably more likely to participate in this project than those who did not. Although not using the exact language of social influence, social movement scholars as diverse as rationalists and culturalists have employed a similar logic to explain the robust effects of activist networks on participation. These scholars have argued that because people integrated into activist networks are subject to positive and negative sanctions from peers, they have powerful "selective incentives" to get involved in protest activity (Olson 1965). By participating in protest activism, members of activist networks likely receive praise and avoid criticism from friends and thus remain in their good graces (Chong 1991; Kitts 2000; Opp 1989). Consider, for instance, the work of della Porta (1988). She found that individuals joined Italian left-wing terrorist groups because they sought approval of friends who were in the process of joining or who had already joined. Extending these arguments to the topic of this chapter, we would expect individuals embedded in volunteering networks to be more likely to help 9/11 victims, families of victims, or rescue workers as well as to help others in communities besides those directly harmed by the tragedy after 9/11.

However, volunteer friends may exert different types of social influence on peers, which may affect how likely they are to respond to this influence and get involved in helping behavior. Broader scholarship on peer networks differentiates among attitudinal, passive behavioral, and active behavioral social influence (Akers 1985; Akers et al. 1979; Graham et al. 1991; Matsueda and Anderson 1998; Warr and Stafford 1991). Given the focus on this chapter, I explain these types of social influence in terms of helping behavior. First, attitudinal social influence consists of approval from peers to participate in helping behavior, such as friends' verbal support to volunteer for 9/11 relief efforts or community efforts. Second, active behavioral social influence consists of explicit offers or encouragements from peers to engage in helping behavior.[47] This type of behavioral social influence calls for an immediate response to accept or reject the offer or encouragement to volunteer. Third, passive behavioral social influence consists of the observation or knowledge of peers' involvement in helping behavior. Unlike active behavioral social influence, this type of behavioral social influence does not call for an immediate response of acceptance or rejection to volunteer, though one may occur. More often, there is a delay in the response to passive behavioral social influence. Empirical studies on behaviors other than volunteering have generally shown that behavioral social influence has stronger effects than attitudinal social influence (Graham et al. 1991; Warr and Stafford 1991), though the difference between active behavioral social influence and passive behavioral influence has not been rigorously investigated. It is thus expected that behavioral volunteer social influence will have stronger effects on 9/11 volunteering and post-9/11 community volunteering than attitudinal social influence.

[47] Graham et al.'s (1991) discussion of active and passive behavioral social influence for deviant behavior was particularly drawn on in developing the argument for how these two types of social influence operate for helping behavior.

Just as embeddedness in volunteering networks should be important for explaining variation in helping behavior for 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts, so should integration into voluntary organizations. Both the sociology of disaster and civic engagement literatures support this observation. Returning to Haines et al.'s (1996) study of the determinants of helping to prepare for and participation in recovery efforts after Hurricane Andrew, they found that while none of the measures for organization membership were significant predictors of helping in the preparation phrase, the measures for fraternal, service, and other group membership were significant predictors of helping in the recovery phrase. Additionally, Nelson (1973) found that relative to individuals who held no memberships in voluntary organizations, those who held at least one voluntary organization membership were more likely to engage in emergency helping behavior following the Lubbock tornado. Furthermore, St. John and Fuchs (2002) found that people who were members of more voluntary organizations prior to the Oklahoma City bombing were more likely to donate professional and nonprofessional services to victims and rescue workers as well to volunteer for organizations helping with and participating in the search and rescue efforts. Consistent with the findings from the disaster literature, the civic engagement literature has identified a robust relationship between voluntary organization participation and participation in various types of volunteer efforts in routine situations. For example, Wilson and Musick (1999) found that the more people attended meetings or programs of any voluntary organization, the more likely they were to engage in volunteer efforts and remain engaged.

The importance of establishing the institutional foundation of volunteer efforts in times of crisis and normal times notwithstanding, the way in which the disaster and civic

engagement literatures have tended to conceptualize voluntary organization membership is subject to a similar critique that was raised above for social networks. These literatures have generally viewed participation in voluntary organizations of any sort as equally likely to mobilize people to participate in helping behavior in and outside of disaster situations (but see Paxton 2002; Perrin 2006; Stolle and Rochon 1998). Supporting this view is disaster and civic engagement scholarship's combining of different types of voluntary organization memberships into a single measure and modeling the effect of the overall number of organizations on helping behavior (Nelson 1973; St. John and Fuchs 2002; Wilson and Musick 1999). Even when disaster and civic engagement scholarship has included measures for different types of voluntary organizations, it has treated them as conceptually equivalent, positing a general "organizational" membership effect for explaining involvement in volunteer efforts in routine and nonroutine situations (Haines et al. 1996). But similar to what was previously discussed for social networks, there are good reasons to think that different *types* of organizations will encourage participation in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts at different rates. Although there are several dimensions along which organizations could be distinguished when studying their effects on helping behavior, this chapter focuses on the important distinction between charitable organizations or those that are committed to helping nonmembers and non-charitable organizations or those that are not committed to helping nonmembers.

Based on previous research in social movements and political science, there seems to be four main ways through which participation in voluntary organizations could promote volunteering for 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community efforts: (1) cultivation of useful skills; (2) dissemination of information about opportunities to help; (2) exposure to leader

social influence to be active; and (4) integration into volunteering peer networks that are also sources of social influence to help. As discussed in what follows, each should be more prevalent among charitable organizations. First, Verba and colleagues (1995) have argued that, along with workplace institutions, voluntary organizations are among the most important social settings in which people acquire and hone skills that are transferable to numerous external activities. Verba et al. (1995) focused on skills that were derived from writing letters, planning meetings, giving presentations, and attending meeting where decisions were made. Although these "organizing" skills are certainly relevant for promoting involvement in civic engagement—such as time-based political activity as Verba et al. (1995:357-364) demonstrated—other skills may be more important for encouraging participation in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts. For instance, learning to take care of others would seem to be a more valuable skill for engaging in helping behavior than learning how to lead meetings. Given charitable organizations' commitment to helping nonmembers, they should be especially likely to organize and to encourage participation in activities that cultivate skills that can be used to help victims of disasters and others in need in communities. Second, voluntary organizations can facilitate participation in helping behavior by publicizing opportunities to get involved during meetings, informal gatherings, and in written materials. Like acquisition of useful skills, charitable organizations are probably more likely to provide a greater amount of information about volunteer efforts in communities than are non-charitable organizations, because of their greater commitment to and linkages with the broader community.

Leader social influence to help is the third way through which voluntary organizations likely promote participation in volunteer efforts. Because members likely look

up to and respect group leaders, they are likely to want to gain their approval and avoid their disapproval. As a result, when leaders of voluntary organizations encourage members to get involved in volunteer efforts, they are likely to respond and get involved to retain their good standing with group leaders. But this assumes that all leaders of voluntary organizations encourage members to get involved in helping behavior. However, Verba et al. (1995) have shown that leaders of voluntary organizations vary substantially in the extent to which they exert social influence on members to be politically active. The same should be true for voluntary organization leadership encouragements to get involved in helping behavior. Again, given that helping nonmembers is central to the mission of charitable organizations, it is reasonable to assume that leaders of these organizations would be very committed to getting members involved in volunteer efforts and thus would be particularly likely to encourage them to get involved in helping efforts.

Last, because voluntary organizations provide the necessary opportunities for volunteers to interact with each other and become friends, they promote embeddedness in peer social networks that are important sources of social influence inducing helping behavior. A large body of scholarship has established that voluntary organizations are among the most important social settings in which similar people develop and form friendships (Feld 1982; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; McPherson et al. 2001). Given the homophily principle, people who are committed to helping others are likely to be attracted to and populate charitable organizations because they reflect their values. Consequently, participation in these organizations should be very likely to foster integration into volunteering peer networks. Supporting this argument, social movement scholarship has found a positive relationship between involvement in political organizations and embeddedness in activist

networks. For instance, Opp (1989:Chapter 5) demonstrated that political group membership had a significant positive effect on the likelihood of being located in protest-encouraging networks (see also Opp and Gern 1993).

In light of these arguments, we would expect people integrated into charitable organizations to be extremely susceptible to participating in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts. However, the effect of charitable and non-charitable organizations on volunteering for 9/11 relief efforts is less clear. Since volunteering for 9/11 relief efforts requires skills that charitable organizations are more likely to foster, members of these organizations may have enjoyed a greater skill advantage over members of non-charitable organizations, which would increase the likelihood of having been involved in 9/11 relief efforts. But information as well as leadership and peer encouragement advantages may have been more minimal in the case of 9/11 relief efforts. On the one hand, given the impact of the 9/11 attacks, non-charitable organizations may have been just as likely to acquire relevant information about how to help victims. Additionally, leaders and members of non-charitable organizations may have been just as likely to encourage people to get involved in relief efforts to help victims given the gravity of the attacks. On the other hand, because of charitable organizations' strong commitment to helping nonmembers, their leaders and members may have been even more likely to encourage others to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers of the 9/11 tragedy, and given their more extensive embeddedness in the broader community, charitable organizations may have been even more likely to gain information about opportunities to get involved in 9/11 relief efforts. The empirical models that follow test whether there were differences in the extent to which integration into charitable organizations

and integration into non-charitable organizations promoted participation in both types of helping behavior after the 9/11 attacks.

**Prosocial Orientation and Helping Behavior**

The final factor on which this chapter focuses to explain why some people participated in 9/11 relief efforts and community volunteer efforts after 9/11 while others did not is dispositional in nature. According to this perspective of helping behavior, certain orientations or dispositions should account for variation in helping behavior after the 9/11 tragedy. Among the most important orientations linked to helping behavior is a prosocial orientation. Penner and Finkelstein (1998:526) define a prosocial orientation as "an enduring tendency to think about the welfare and rights of other people, to feel concern and empathy for them, and to act in a way that benefits them" (see also Penner 2002; Penner et al. 1995). A large body of research has found a significant positive relationship between a prosocial orientation (or measures reflecting it) and participation in a variety of volunteer efforts outside of disaster contexts(Carlo et al. 2005; Clary et al. 1996; Elshaug and Metzer 2001; Penner 2002; Penner and Finkelstein 1998; Penner et al. 1995; Piliavin and Callero 1991; Piliavin and Charng 1990; Rossi 2001b; Sokolowski 1996; Wilson and Musick 1997, 1998, 1999; Wuthnow 1991). Based on this evidence, we would expect that people who were more prosocially oriented would have been more likely to engage in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts than those who were less prosocially oriented.

Surprisingly, however, scant attention has been paid to the role of a prosocial orientation for explaining who gets involved to help with recovery efforts and who does not. None of the previously reviewed studies on disaster relief considered a prosocial orientation,

or other orientations for that matter, to understand differences in helping behavior after tragedies. Although not focusing on disasters, Oliner and Oliner (1988) identified that what Penner and colleagues (Penner 2002; Penner and Finkelstein 1998; Penner et al. 1995) would call a prosocial orientation was an important factor for differentiating people who helped rescue Jews from the Nazis from those who did not. As they state, "What distinguished rescuers [from nonrescuers] was…their stronger sense of attachment to others and their feelings of responsibility for the welfare of others, including those outside their immediate familial or communal circles" (Oliner and Oliner 1988. p. 249). This indicates that a prosocial orientation can be an important determinant of helping behavior in times of crisis and threat. Combined with a prosocial orientation's robust effects on helping behavior in routine situations, we would expect more prosocially oriented people to have been more likely to get involved in volunteer efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers of the 9/11 tragedy than less prosocially oriented people.

The above arguments suggest that a prosocial orientation should have directly mobilized Americans to participate in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts. However, a prosocial orientation may have also indirectly affected helping behavior after the tragedy through fostering integration into volunteering networks, promoting involvement in charitable organizations, heightening sorrow and patriotic response, and increasing attendance at commemorative events for victims. Since "birds of a feather flock together," people who are committed to helping others should be likely to embed themselves in volunteering networks. Given that a prosocial orientation consists of concerns for the wellbeing of others, we would expect this orientation to be an important basis on which friendships among fellow volunteers form and remain intact. For the same reasons, we

would expect prosocially oriented people to be attracted to and participate in charitable organizations. In addition to its indirect effects on helping behavior through social networks and organizations, a prosocial orientation may have indirectly affected this behavior through increasing feelings of sorrow about the attacks, participation in gatherings to honor victims, and expressions of patriotism. Because the 9/11 attacks caused much human suffering and death, prosocially oriented people may have been especially likely to feel sorrow for and participate in events to commemorate the victims given their proclivity to be concerned about and care for the welfare of others. To the extent that the nation was identified with human loss, prosocially oriented people may have also been more likely to display patriotic symbols as a way to show their solidarity with those who had died or were suffering.

Beyond specifying the pathways through which a prosocial orientation may have mobilized helping behavior after the 9/11 tragedy, incorporating this orientation into models of post-9/11 helping behavior helps address the issue of selection. Although disaster and civic engagement scholarship on the relationship between relational factors and helping behavior has conceptually and empirically ignored this issue, selection, if left unaccounted, casts doubt on the previous arguments that charitable organizations and volunteering networks induce volunteering through social influence. Because prosocially orientated people value helping others, the homophily principle predicts that they will be attracted to charitable organizations and people who engage in volunteer efforts. Consequently, any observed charitable organization or volunteering network effects may be the result of selection rather than social influence. If the addition of a prosocial social orientation renders the effects of charitable organizations and volunteering networks insignificant, then this would suggest that their effects are spurious due to homophily. But if the effects of

charitable organizations and volunteering networks are robust to the inclusion of a prosocial orientation, this would suggest that their effects are due to social influence (for a detailed discussion of selection and influence see Chapter 1).

**Summary of Post-9/11 Helping Behavior Model**

Figure 4.1 summarizes my model of post-9/11 helping behavior. While NY/NJ residence, WTC distance, knowing victims or potential victims, patriotism, sorrow in response to the attacks, and attendance at commemorative events (the latter three are presented by box "Other 9/11-Generated Factors" box) should have had significant effects on getting involved in efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers of the 9/11 tragedy, it is an open question whether they also had significant effects on getting involved in efforts to help others in communities after the 9/11 attacks. It is also expected that there was a positive relationship between knowing more victims or potential victims and the other 9/11-generated factors as well as a positive relationship between both NY/NJ residence and WTC distance and knowing more victims or potential victims and the other 9/11-generated factors. Because NY/NJ residence and distance from WTC were very likely antecedent to the social capital variables, they should have had effects on them, though the direction of their effects is not clear. Net of homophily, there are good reasons to think that the social capital variables—especially charitable organizational involvement and embeddedness in volunteering networks—would have predicted getting involved in efforts to help not only victims, families of victims, or rescue workers of the tragedy, but also others in communities after 9/11. Finally, it is expected that a prosocial orientation directly affected both types of helping behaviors after 9/11 and indirectly affected these behaviors through its direct effects

on sorrow in response to the attacks, patriotism, and attendance at commemorative events as well as its direct effects on the social capital variables. In addition to specifying the mechanisms through which a prosocial orientation affected participation in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts, controlling for this orientation provides a way to determine whether the effects of organizational involvements and social networks were mainly due to social influence or selection.

## Data, Variables, and Models

### *Data*

To test the model of post-9/11 helping behavior illustrated in Figure 4.1, the 2002 Religion and Public Activism Survey (RAPAS) was used. This survey was ideal for testing the model of post-9/11 helping behavior, as it contained detailed information on the types of volunteer efforts in which individuals were involved after the attacks, including making the crucial distinction between helping victims, families of victims, or rescue worker and others in communities. Additionally, the 2002 RAPAS collected measures on various 9/11 responses, such as sorrow and patriotism. Finally, this survey included modules of voluntary organizations and social networks as well as a series of questions that tap psychological orientations toward activism. The 2002 RAPAS is a telephone survey representing English-speaking Americans 18 years of age and older who resided in households in the United States, conducted by FGI Research Inc., a national survey research firm based in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. The survey was conducted from April to July 2002 using a random-digit-dial method, employing a sample of randomly generated telephone numbers representative of all telephones in the 50 United States. The survey was conducted with English-speaking

households only. In order to randomize responses within households, and so as to ensure representativeness of age and gender, interviewers asked to conduct the interview with the person in the household who had the most recent birthday. All non-household numbers (business, government, nonprofit, etc.) were screened out of the sample through direct calling dispositions or ascription of contact and non-contact telephone numbers for non-completes based on proportions of household numbers among working telephone numbers. Survey respondents were offered an incentive of 10 dollars to complete the survey. The final sample size for the 2002 RAPAS was 2,898 and the response rate based on AAPOR's RR3 method was 47 percent (American Association for Public Opinion Research 2006).[48,49]

### *Endogenous Variables*

The first and second endogenous variables in the model, which all other variables predict, were binary measures for doing volunteer work for any group or organization providing direct relief to the September 11 terrorist attack victims, their families, or workers,

[48] The formula for AAPOR's RR3 method is I/((I +P)+(R+NC+O)+e(UH+UO)), where I is Completed Interviews, P is Partial Interviews, R is Refusals or Break-offs, NC is Non-contacts, O is Other, UH is Unknown household eligibility, UO is unknown other eligibility, and e is the estimated proportion of cases of unknown eligibility that are eligible. For contacted numbers where it could not be determined whether they were household numbers or not, 38.83 percent was used for e, which represents the FCC's percentage of working telephone numbers that were household numbers in 2002 (FCC 2000). For non-contacted numbers after multiple attempts, 24.2 percent was used for e, which represents Brick, Montaquilla, and Scheuren's (2002) estimate of the percentage of undermined numbers (no answer or answering machine) after multiple call attempts that are residential numbers.

[49] Because the 2002 RAPAS was unable to collect information on nonparticipants, there was no way to investigate whether those who responded to the survey were distinctive in any meaningful way from those who did not. Given the focus of this chapter, if those who were more civically active were more likely to respond than those who refused, this could be an important source of bias. While it is true that people who are more civically engaged tend to be more likely to participate in surveys than the less civically engaged, offering an incentive generally negates this difference (Groves et al. 2000). Incentives generally produce greater survey representativeness without any deleterious consequences, such as jeopardizing data quality (Singer et al. 1999; Singer et al. 2000). Regarding demographic differences between the 2002 RAPAS and Census averages, older, more educated, and female respondents were overrepresented. The 2002 RAPAS constructed a weight based on these demographic variables (the weight also adjusted for household size), so that its demographic distributions matched those of the Census for American adults.

and for volunteering for a community project after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Respondents who had done volunteer work for 9/11 relief efforts were coded one and those who had not were coded as zero. The same coding scheme was used for post-9/11 community volunteering. The third, fourth, and fifth endogenous variables measured attitudinal, passive behavioral, and active behavioral social influence that strong ties exert for volunteering. The RAPAS asked respondents to nominate up to the five people to whom they felt closest who were not members of their household, and then asked numerous questions about the characteristics of these people. Attitudinal social influence was measured as the number of strong ties who would respond positively if respondents did volunteer work for a social, political, or community issue. Passive behavioral social influence was measured as the number of strong ties who regularly do volunteer work, while active behavioral social influence was measured as the number of strong ties who asked or encouraged respondents to do volunteer work in the past year. The sixth endogenous variable was a measure of network size, representing the total number of strong ties whom respondents nominated.

The seventh and eighth endogenous variables measured participation in charitable and non-charitable organizations. The RAPAS asked respondents the number of groups or organizations in which they were involved during the past 12 months. Respondents who reported being involved in any organization were then asked to report the number of organizations in which they were involved. For each organization reported, respondents were then asked whether the organization sponsored efforts that serve the needs of people in the community outside the group. This information was used to construct a variable for the number of organizations in which respondents were activity involved that provided help to

nonmembers (charitable organizations) and a variable for the number of organizations in which respondents were activity involved that did not (non-charitable organizations).

The next set of endogenous variables measured the 9/11-generated factors (see the section on exogenous variables for the description of the New York and distance from the WTC measures). The tenth endogenous variable was a measure for the number of people respondents knew who died or were in danger during the terrorist attacks.[50] The eleventh endogenous variable was a dichotomous variable for whether respondents felt sad, blue, or depressed for a week or more because of the terrorist attacks of September 11, which was coded as one if respondents felt sad, blue, or depressed because of the attacks and zero if they did not. The twelfth endogenous variable was a measure for the number of American flags or other patriotic symbols publicly displayed after September 11.[51] The thirteenth endogenous variable was a dichotomous measure for whether respondents had participated in a prayer or community candlelight vigil about the September 11 terrorist attacks, with those who had coded as one and those who had not coded as zero.

A prosocial orientation was the final endogenous variable.[52] Following the conceptualization of a prosocial orientation as a concern for the welfare and rights of other people (Penner 2002; Penner and Finkelstein 1998; Penner et al. 1995), two five-category

[50] Response categories "six or more" were collapsed to form the upper category.

[51] Response categories seven or more were coded as the top category.

[52] Although it is clear that some of the control variables discussed below causally precede a prosocial orientation, such as gender, race, or age, this is not the case for others. For these variables, it would be preferable to not have to assume causal order, but rather covary them with a prosocial orientation. However, a programming limitation in Mplus precludes this option and thus the other control variables were treated as occurring casually prior to a prosocial orientation, even though in some cases this does not make substantive sense (e.g., working full-time). But this is preferable to other alternatives, such as transforming the control variables to underlying propensities (see Appendix A for a discussion of this point) and covarying their errors with the measure for a prosocial orientation. Treating a prosocial orientation as an endogenous variable, then, seems to violate the least number of assumptions. But since this strategy is not without flaws, the effects of the control variables on the measure for a prosocial orientation were not interpreted.

ordinal variables were used that tap this conceptualization. The first variable measured how responsible respondents personally feel to help other people who are in need. The second variable measured how responsible respondents personally feel to take action against wrongs and injustices in life. Each variable ranges from one (not responsible at all) to five (extremely responsible).

### *Exogenous Variable*

The two main exogenous variables were New York residence and distance from the World Trade Center. The first was operationalized with a dichotomous variable that was coded as one if respondents lived in either the "New York, Northern New Jersey, Long Island" CMSA identified by the U.S. Census or other parts of New York or New Jersey, and zero if otherwise.[53,54] To measure proximity to the September 11 terrorist attacks, a dichotomous variable was used that was coded as one if respondents lived 10 miles or less from where the World Trade Center stood, and zero if otherwise.[55] This distance seems a reasonable estimate of increased opportunities and reduction of logistic barriers that would have made helping with relief efforts more probable.

Because prior studies of helping behavior have identified that demographic characteristics are important factors for distinguishing individuals who help from those who do not, the following exogenous variables that might have otherwise confounded the effect of

[53] Besides counties in New York and New Jersey, this CMSA includes four counties in Connecticut (Fairfield, Litchfield, Middlesex, and New Haven) and one county in Pennsylvania (Pike).

[54] Auxiliary analyses tested for differences in volunteering between those living in "New York, Northern New Jersey, Long Island" CMSA and those living in other parts of New York or New Jersey. Because no such differences were found, these two categories were combined.

[55] The distance from where the World Trade Center was located was calculated from latitude and longitude measurements of survey respondents' home addresses.

the main explanatory variables were included: age (in years); gender (1 = female ; 0 = male); race (0 = white; 1 = African American; 1 = other race); education (1 = four-year college degree; 0 = less than a four-year college degree); community type (1 = rural; 0 = non-rural); working status (1 = working full-time; 0 = not working full-time); marital status (1= married; 0 = unmarried); military service (1 = respondent served; 0 = did not serve); physical health (five-point ordinal variable, ranging from excellent to very poor); parenthood (number of children living in the household who are under nineteen years old); and household income (eight-point ordinal variable ranging from $10,000 or less to greater than $100,000). Table 4.1 displays descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis.[56]

***Structural Equation Models***

Figure 4.1 specified that there should be mediating relationships among many of the factors posited to be important for explaining participation in helping behavior after 9/11. Structural equation models (SEMs) can simultaneously estimate numerous regression equations, and they facilitate the decomposition of indirect, direct, and total effects among these equations (Bollen 1989b). This was the first reason that this statistical procedure was chosen to test the conceptual model of post-9/11 helping behavior presented in Figure 4.1. The second reason for using SEMs was because they allowed measurement error to be taken into account that might have otherwise been present for a prosocial orientation, given that observed variables are unlikely to capture perfectly what is conceptually meant by this concept. Furthermore, as described above, there were two measures for a prosocial orientation. If scales for these measures were to be formed and a series of regression models

[56] Descriptive statistics use weighted data to account for differential probabilities of selection based on number of eligible adults in the household and to adjust for the known demographic discrepancies as mentioned above.

were to be run, the results would be difficult to interpret since the measurement error in them would not have been taken into account and thus the coefficients would be biased. Given that accurately accounting for selection requires adequately measuring the concept representing it, a prosocial orientation was modeled as an unobserved or latent variable that incorporated measurement error.[57]

Because some of the observed endogenous variables were binary or ordinal, traditional SEMs could not be used to estimate the post-9/11 helping behavior model, as they assume that all observed endogenous variables are continuous. Methods devised to correct the various problems that categorical observed endogenous variables pose for traditional SEMs were thus used. Appendix A provides a more formal presentation of the SEM approach used. In brief, the techniques assume that the ordinal and dichotomous variables are crude representations of normally distributed continuous variables. The covariance matrix of these underlying continuous variables is estimated and is the basis for the analysis. In the case of a single equation with an ordinal or dichotomous outcome variable with exogenous explanatory variables, these techniques are equivalent to probit regression. However, the SEM procedures are more general in that they can estimate multiple equations with a mixture of ordinal and dichotomous indicators (see Appendix A for complete details). To facilitate interpretation of the effects of the main explanatory variables on 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts and to gain a better understanding of the magnitude of their effects, predicted probabilities were calculated.

[57] The other variables are assumed to have negligible measurement error. This seems to be a reasonable assumption, as, for example, the variable for sorrow in response to the 9/11 attacks measured "whether respondents felt sad, blue, or depressed for a week or more because of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001." It is thus assumed that any measurement error in the other measures would not introduce bias that would considerably alter the substantive interpretation of the findings.

Multiple imputation (MI) was used to handle variables in the analysis that did not have complete information (Rubin 1991; Schafer 1997, 1999; Schafer and Graham 2002; Schafer and Olsen 1998).[58] MI avoids shortcomings of other commonly employed techniques for dealing with missing data, such as listwise deletion, pairwise deletion, dummy variable adjustment, or mean imputation (Allison 2002:5-12). Moreover, MI assumes only that the data are missing at random (MAR) rather than the more restrictive assumption that they are missing completely at random (MCAR), which is a requirement of the other commonly employed techniques, such as listwise or pairwise deletion. Five imputations were generated, each of which replaced cases with missing information with plausible values based on their predictive distributions. Identical SEMs were run for each of the five imputed datasets, using complete data on all variables. The results were then combined to produce overall estimates, standard errors, and significance levels that take into account uncertainty about missing data.

My analyses proceed in the following steps. First, my model of post-9/11 helping was estimated and calculated predicted probabilities were calculated for the effects of the main explanatory variables. Based on the results from this model, it was next tested whether there were significant differences in the magnitude of effects for the different explanatory variables on participation in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts. Then, the analysis shifts to understanding the pathways through which certain explanatory variables mobilized involvement in the two types of helping behavior after 9/11. Finally, auxiliary analyses were conducted to address the issue of the extent to which 9/11 contributed to revitalizing U.S. civic life.

[58] For MI, the MICE program (van Buuren et al. 1999) designed for STATA (Royston 2004, 2005) was used, which explicitly handles categorical variables.

**Results**

Table 4.2 reports the direct effects in the form of probit coefficients for the post-9/11 helping behavior model illustrated in Figure 4.1.[59] Each column represents a separate probit regression that corresponds to each path in this figure. All models control for the demographic variables described above, but because demographic variables are not the focus of this chapter and to conserve space, their results are only displayed in Appendix E in Table E1. Considering first the overall fit statistics listed at the bottom of the first column in Table 4.2, we see that the post-9/11 helping behavior model achieves a good fit to the data. Although the chi-square test statistic was not significant, indicating rejection of the null hypothesis that the model fits the data perfectly, this test statistic is not suited to evaluate model fit with large sample sizes like the one in the post-9/11 helping behavior model (N = 2,898). This is because the ability of detecting even small differences between the population model implied covariance and the population observed variable covariance substantially increases with sample size. All of the other fit statistics indicate a good model fit.[60] For the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), Incremental Fit Index (IFI), and Comparative Fit Index (CFI), values greater than .95 generally indicate a good model fit, while values less than .90 generally indicate a poor model fit (Bollen 1989a; Bollen and Curran 2006:44-47). For the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), values less than .05 generally indicate a very good model fit, while values greater than .10 generally indicate a poor model fit (Browne and Cudeck 1993). The values for the TLI, IFI, and CFI are .994 and the value

[59] All models from the SEM estimates are based on unweighted data (DuMouchel and Duncan 1983; Winship and Radbill 1994).

[60] There is ambiguity about how to calculate fit statistics in SEM when using MI (Bollen and Curran 2006:68). The fit statistics reported in this chapter are based on averages across the five imputed datasets.

for the RMSEA is .028, indicating that the post-9/11 helping behavior model is good fitting model. Finally, looking at the $R^2$ values for 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts at the bottom of the last two columns in Table 4.2, we see that the post-9/11 helping behavior model explains over 25 percent of the variability in people's propensity to get involved in 9/11 relief efforts and almost 40 percent of the variability in people's propensity to get involved in post-9/11 community efforts.

Turning to the second to the last column in Table 4.2, we see that with the exception of sorrow in response to the 9/11 attacks, all the 9/11-generated factors *directly* mobilized Americans to get involved in relief efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers of the tragedy. For instance, the more patriotic symbols displayed after 9/11, the more likely they were to volunteer for 9/11 relief efforts ($\beta = .080$; $p < .001$). That 9/11-generated factors promoted helping with 9/11 relief efforts is not surprising, but did these factors also promote participation in post-9/11 volunteer efforts that were focused on others in communities after the tragedy? The last column in Table 4.3 indicates that, yes, they generally did. Other than NY/NJ residence, all of the 9/11-generated factors also had positive significant direct effects on getting involved in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts. As with 9/11 relief efforts, the more patriotic symbols displayed after 9/11, the greater the probability of participation in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts ($\beta = .030$; $p < .05$). Interestingly, while sorrow in response to the 9/11 attacks was not a significant predictor of volunteering for 9/11 relief efforts, it was a significant predictor of volunteering for post-9/11 community efforts ($\beta = .075$; $p < .05$).

Although the 9/11-generated factors generally had significant positive direct effects on getting involved in 9/11 relief efforts and post-911 community efforts, the size of their

effects was greater for the former type of helping behavior after the tragedy than the latter type (with the exception of sorrow in response to the 9/11 attacks, which had a stronger effect on post-9/11 community volunteer efforts). Comparing the difference in the predicted probability of 9/11 relief efforts for the presence or absence of the 9/11-generated factors to the difference in the predicted probability of post-9/11 community efforts for the presence or absence of the 9/11-generated factors clearly shows this size difference.[61] Figure 4.2 graphically displays these differences in predicted probabilities. The top bar in the set represents the predicted probability difference in 9/11 relief efforts for the presence or absence of the 9/11-generated factors, while the bottom bar in the set represents the predicted probability difference in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts for the presence or absence of the 9/11-generated factors. As Figure 4.2 shows, the top bar is always longer with the exception of sorrow in response to the 9/11 attacks, indicating that the difference in the predicted probability of 9/11 relief efforts for the presence or absence of the 9/11-generated factors is greater than the difference in the predicted probability of post-9/11 community volunteer efforts for the presence or absence of these factors. Looking at the third set of bars from the top, for instance, we see that the difference in the predicted probability of getting involved in 9/11 relief efforts for displaying four patriotic symbols after 9/11 and displaying no patriotic symbols after 9/11 is .111, while the difference in the predicted probability of getting involved in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts for displaying four patriotic symbols after 9/11 and displaying no patriotic symbols after 9/11 is .036. This demonstrates

[61] The following formula was used to calculate the predicted probabilities: $\Pr(y_i = 1 | x_i) = 1 - \Phi(\tau_1 - \beta x_i)$. Unless otherwise noted, the predicted probabilities are for white married college educated females age 25 who have children under 19 living at home, military experience, live in New York or New Jersey, live in non-rural areas, have three strong volunteering friends, participate in 1 charitable and 1 non-charitable organization, have average prosocial orientation, average physical health, and average income.

that 9/11-generated factors seem to have been more important for mobilizing Americans to participate in 9/11 relief efforts than post-9/11 volunteer efforts to help others in communities besides victims, families of victims, or rescue workers of the tragedy.

Shifting our attention to the social capital variables in the latter rows of Table 4.2, we see that while neither having more non-volunteering strong ties nor replacing a non-volunteering strong tie with an approving volunteer strong tie significantly encouraged getting involved in 9/11 relief efforts, replacing a non-volunteering strong tie with an encouraging volunteer strong tie ($\beta = .044$; $p < .05$) or a volunteering strong tie ($\beta = .072$; $p < .05$) as well as participating in more charitable voluntary organizations ($\beta = .241$; $p < .001$) or non-charitable voluntary organizations ($\beta = .093$; $p < .05$) did.[62] As the last column in Table 4.3 indicates, all of the social capital variables that had significant positive direct effects on getting involved in 9/11 relief efforts also had significant positive direct effects on getting involved in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts. Moreover, unlike 9/11 relief efforts, replacing a non-volunteering strong tie with an approving volunteer strong tie significantly encouraged helping others in communities besides those directly harmed by 9/11 ($\beta = .031$; $p < .10$). While the social capital variables generally had significant positive direct effects on both types of post-9/11 helping behavior, the size of their effects was greater for post-9/11 community volunteer efforts than for 9/11 relief efforts. Recall from above that the reverse was true for the 9/11-generated factors. The difference in the effects of the social capital variables on the different helping behaviors after 9/11 is apparent when viewing Figure 4.3.

[62] To hold constant the number of strong ties, an increase in the number of volunteering strong ties of any type means that there must be an equivalent decrease in non-volunteering strong ties. So, for example, if a person has 3 total strong ties and gains 2 volunteering strong ties, then this person must also lose 2 non-volunteering ties. My substantive interpretation of the effect of strong ties and volunteering strong ties on participation in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts incorporates the interdependence of these measures, and thus the measure for the number of strong ties (network size) captures the effect for non-volunteering strong ties.

This figure compares the difference in the predicted probability of participation in 9/11 relief efforts for the presence or absence of each social capital variable to the difference in the predicted probability of participation in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts for the presence or absence of each social capital variable. Contrary to Figure 4.2, the bottom bars (the predicted probability difference in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts for the presence and absence of the social capital variables) are longer in all cases than the top bars (the predicted probability difference in 9/11 relief efforts for the presence and absence of the social capital variables). For example, the last set of bars in Figure 4.3 indicates that the difference in the predicted probability of 9/11 relief efforts for individuals who have five volunteering strong ties and those who have no volunteering strong ties is .096, while the difference in the predicted probability of post-9/11 community efforts for this contrast in volunteering strong ties is .240.

Figure 4.3 also addresses the important issue of whether different types of organizations and networks had differing effects on participation in helping behavior after the 9/11 attacks. Comparing the difference in the predicted probability of getting involved in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts for belonging to one non-charitable organization and belonging to none to the difference in this predicted probability for belonging to one charitable organization and belonging to none, we see that the difference is much greater for charitable organizations (the same pattern exits for 9/11 relief efforts). This suggests that involvement in charitable organizations was a greater mobilizing force of participation in helping behavior after the 9/11 attacks than involvement in non-charitable organizations. Looking at the difference in the predicted probability of getting involved in the helping behaviors after 9/11 for having five friends who approve of volunteer work and having none

who do and the difference in this predicted probability for having five friends who either encourage volunteer work or engage in volunteer work and having none who do not, we note that the difference for the latter is much greater. This means that both types of behavioral social influence were more likely to induce Americans to participate in helping behavior after 9/11 than was attitudinal social influence. With that said, it appears that passive behavioral social influence had an even greater effect on helping behavior than active behavioral social influence, especially for post-9/11 community volunteer efforts.

Finally, considering the effect of a prosocial orientation on helping behavior after 9/11, we see that this orientation had a significant direct effect on participation in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts ($\beta = .069$; $p < .10$ and $\beta = .124$; $p < .001$ respectively). But as with the social capital variables, a prosocial orientation had a stronger effect on helping others in communities after 9/11 than helping victims, families of victims, or rescue workers. Figure 4.4 compares the difference in the predicted probability of participation in 9/11 relief efforts for a standard deviation shift (both below and above the mean) in a prosocial orientation to the difference in the predicted probability of participation in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts for a standard deviation shift (both below and above the mean) in a prosocial orientation. The bottom bars (the predicted probability difference in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts for a standard deviation shift in a prosocial orientation) are longer in both cases than the top bars (the predicted probability difference in 9/11 relief efforts for a standard deviation shift in a prosocial orientation). This suggests that a prosocial orientation was a greater motivating force for getting involved in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts than 9/11 relief efforts.

Thus far we have observed that 9/11-generated factors, social capital variables, and a prosocial orientation generally mobilized participation in both 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts, but that the effects of the 9/11 generated factors were stronger for the former type of helping behavior after the tragedy while the effects of the social capital variables and a prosocial orientation were stronger for the latter type of helping behavior. But were these differences significant? Because specific hypotheses were not formulated, the first step was to conduct a chi-square different test between a restricted model in which the coefficients for the effects of all the explanatory variables—9/11-generated factors, social capital, and prosocial orientation—on 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts were *jointly* constrained to be equal and a unrestricted model in which the coefficients for these effects were freely estimated (this is possible because the restricted model is nested in the unrestricted model).[63] If the chi-square difference test is significant, we would conclude that the model that freely estimates the effects of all the explanatory variables ($H_1$) has a better fit than the model that jointly constrains all of these effects to be equal ($H_0$). If we fail to reject that the freely estimated model ($H_1$) improves the fit compared to the constrained model ($H_0$), then we would conclude that the freely estimated model fits no better than the model that jointly constrains all the effects to be equal. If the former is the case, it would be reasonable to conduct a chi-square different test for the effect of each explanatory variable separately in order to identify if there was a significant difference for any individual explanatory variable. But if the latter is the case, conducting a chi-square difference test for the effect of each explanatory variable would not be justified. Looking at the first column in Table 4.3, we see that the chi-square

[63] No further constraints were imposed on the restricted or unrestricted model and thus the unrestricted model is equivalent to the model presented in Table 4.3 in all cases.

difference test is significant, indicating that the unrestricted model in which the coefficients for all the explanatory variables are freely estimated has a better model than the restricted model in which the coefficients for all the explanatory variables are constrained to be equal.[64]

Before turning to the results of the chi-square difference test for each explanatory variable, it is important to understand the implications of this test for each explanatory variable. Consider, for example, the chi-square difference test and what a significant or insignificant result would mean for patriotism. In this case, the chi-square difference test compares the restricted model in which the coefficients for the effects of patriotism on 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 volunteer efforts are constrained to be equal to the unrestricted model in which the coefficients for the effects of patriotism are freely estimated. If the chi-square difference test is significant, we would conclude that the model that freely estimates the effects of patriotism ($H_1$) has a better fit than the model that constrains these effects to be equal ($H_0$). Substantively, this result would mean that the coefficients from the freely estimated model are the appropriate estimates and thus the difference in the size of the effects of patriotism on 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer is significant. Given that the freely estimated model shows that the coefficient for the effect of patriotism on participation in 9/11 relief efforts is over double the size of the coefficient for the effect of patriotism on participation in post-9/11 community efforts (see column 4 in Table 4.2), we would reasonably conclude that patriotism more strongly mobilized Americans to participate in the former type of helping behavior after the tragedy relative to the latter type of helping behavior. If we fail to reject that the freely estimated model ($H_1$) improves the fit compared

[64] All nested tests were done using the DIFFTEST option in Mplus (Muthen and Asparouhov 2006). Because the nested tests were conducted on five datasets from multiple imputation, Allison's SAS marco (COMBCHI) was used to produce the final values for these tests.

to the constrained model ($H_0$), then we would conclude that the freely estimated model fits no better than the constrained model and thus there was not a significant differences in the size of the effects of patriotism on the two helping behaviors after 9/11.

Table 4.3 displays the results of the chi-square difference test for the various nested models described above. Looking at this table, we see in five cases the unrestricted model (no equality constraints) lead to a better fit compared to the restricted model (equality constraints). The five cases were NY/NJ residence, patriotism, commemorative event participation, charitable organization participation, and non-charitable organization participation. Since the coefficients for the effects of the first, second, and third variables were greater for 9/11 relief efforts than for post-9/11 community volunteer efforts (see rows 1, 3, and 6 in Table 4.2), and since the reverse was true for the coefficients for the effects of the fourth and fifth variables (see rows 11 and 12 in Table 4.2), we find evidence that certain 9/11-generated factors more strongly encouraged participation in volunteer efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers, and that certain social capital variables more strongly encouraged participation in volunteer efforts to help others in communities in the months following the 9/11 attacks.

In addition to the observed direct effects of 9/11-generated and social capital variables, Table 4.4 shows some important indirect effects for these variables. Looking at the third row in Table 4.3, we see that the more victims or potential victims known, the more patriotic symbols displayed after 9/11 ($\beta = .121$; $p < .001$) and the greater likelihood of feeling sorrow in response to the 9/11 attacks ($\beta = .078$; $p < .001$) as well as participating in events to honor the victims of the 9/11 attacks ($\beta = .107$; $p < .001$). Because greater levels of patriotism and attendance at commemorative services had significant positive direct effects

on participation in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts, and because sorrow in response to the 9/11 attacks had a significant positive direct effect on participation in post-9/11 community efforts, the significant positive direct effect of knowing victims or potential victims on these variables gave it an indirect effect of .033 for getting involved in the former type of helping behavior and an indirect effect of .109 for the getting involved in the latter type of helping behavior (see Table 4.4). When knowing victims or potential victims' direct effects for these helping behaviors are included, its total effect for volunteering for 9/11 relief efforts is .109 and its total effect for volunteering for post-9/11 community efforts is .061 (see Table 4.4). Given that both NY/NJ residence and WTC distance significantly positively affected the number of victims or potential victims known ($\beta = .835$; $p < .001$ and $\beta = .940$; $p < .001$ respectively) and the fact that knowing more victims or potential victims had the effects just mentioned, this indirectly increased these variables' likelihood of involvement in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community efforts. With the exception of NY/NJ residence's significant positive direct effect on participation in non-charitable voluntary organizations, however, this 9/11-generated factor and WTC distance had either nonsignificant direct effects or significant negative direct effects on the social capital variables. In addition, distance from the WTC significantly negatively affected the number of patriotic symbols displayed ($\beta = -1.007$; $p < .01$), suggesting that those living close to the attack site were uncomfortable with overt displays of patriotism, which is consistent with the ethnographic work of Abrams et al. (2004). These significant negative direct effects reduced the total indirect effect of NY/NJ residence and WTC distance on 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts. But they were not enough to offset the positive indirect effects that NY/NJ residence and WTC distance gained from their

significant positive direct effects on knowing victims or potential victims. Hence, as Table 4.4 shows, the total indirect effects for NY/NJ residence and WTC distance on 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts were .072 and .021 and .022 and .005 respectively. When adding the direct effect of WTC distance on helping behavior after 9/11, this gave this 9/11-generated factor a .520 total effect on 9/11 relief efforts and a .483 total effect on post-9/11 community efforts. NY/NJ residence's total effect of .406 on 9/11 relief efforts was a combination of its indirect effects and direct effect, but its total effect of .021 on post-9/11 community efforts was entirely a function of its indirect effects.

Turning to the social capital variables, we see that participation in charitable organizations significantly positively predicted embeddedness in all types of volunteering networks, which in turn promoted getting involved in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts (charitable organizations also significantly predicted network size, but this variable did not have a significant effect on either type of helping behavior after the tragedy). Charitable organization's total indirect effect on participation in 9/11 relief efforts was .043 and its total indirect effect on post-9/11 community volunteer efforts was .083. Adding its direct effects gave charitable organization involvement a total effect of .284 on the former type of helping behavior and a total effect of .412 on the latter type of helping behavior. Non-charitable organization participation had a total indirect effect of .015 on 9/11 relief efforts and a total indirect effect of .027 on post-9/11 community volunteer efforts, both of which were due to its significant positive indirect effect on having more friends who encourage volunteer work ($\beta = .067 < .05$) and having more friends who engage in volunteer work ($\beta = .164$; $p < .001$). When non-charitable organization's direct effects were taken into account, its total effect on 9/11 relief efforts was .108 and its total effect on post-9/11

community volunteer effort was .249. Finally, in addition to its direct effect on both types of helping behavior after 9/11, a prosocial orientation had important indirect effects. As the last column in Table 4.2 indicates, a prosocial orientation had significant positive direct effects on publicly displaying patriotic symbols after 9/11 ($\beta = .206$; $p < .001$), feeling sorrow in response to the attacks ($\beta = .060$; $p < .05$), and attending commemorative events for victims ($\beta = .169$; $p < .001$). A prosocial orientation also had significant positive direct effects on all of the social capital variables. Because these 9/11-generated factors and the social capital variables generally had significant positive direct effects on getting involved in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts, a prosocial orientation significantly indirectly encouraged participation in these two types of helping behavior after the 9/11 attacks. Table 4.4 shows that a prosocial orientation's total indirect effect on getting involved in 9/11 relief efforts was .255 and its total indirect effect on getting involved in post-9/11 community effort was .233. Adding a prosocial orientation's direct effect on 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts gave it a total effect of .324 on the former type of helping behavior after 9/11 and a total effect of .357 on the latter type of helping behavior after 9/11.

**Responses to Possible Objections**

Given the cross-sectional nature of the data employed, source of information of the strong tie network characteristics, and respondents' pre-9/11 volunteering commitments, several objections to the above statistical models and interpretations are possible. This section reviews and responds to these objections.

First, instead of a prosocial orientation or disposition driving the selection of adult activist friendships, the causal direction could also go the other way, where activist friendships promote a prosocial orientation. But this possibility seems unlikely when judged against previous empirical studies. Research has demonstrated that the forming of a prosocial orientation largely occurs from a combination of genetic and early socialization factors, such as parental emphasis on or modeling helping, and that this orientation tends to exhibit continuity over the life course (see, for example, Bar-Tal 1976:11-37; Davis and Franzoi 1991; Eisenberg et al. 2002; Eisenberg et al. 1999; Eisenberg and Mussen 1989; Grusec 1981; Hoffman 1981; Koestner et al. 1990; Oliner and Oliner 1988; Rossi 2001a; Schroeder et al. 1995:91-125). Given this evidence, it appears that a prosocial orientation generally develops prior to and shapes current activist friendships rather than the other way around.

Second, because the survey obtained information on strong tie characteristics from respondents instead of strong ties themselves, it is possible that respondents may have inaccurately reported on the characteristics of their strong ties. However, this is less of a concern in my case, given that social influence theory presumes awareness. If people are unaware of the social influence that strong ties exert on them, then social influence is not operating, at least from the perspective of respondents whose behaviors we are trying to explain. For instance, recall from above that passive behavioral social influence consists of respondents learning of strong ties' participation in collective action. Hence, even if respondents do not always know about and report all of the civic activities of all their strong ties, the important point is that they report social influence from strong ties of which they are aware. Because social influence requires by definition awareness by those who are the

objects of social influence, reports from respondents seem preferable to those from strong ties.

Third, there is the issue of the mobilizing scope of 9/11 and its role in revitalizing U.S. life. Supporting the view that 9/11 encouraged a broad civic response, the empirical models in this chapter generally demonstrated that 9/11-generated factors mobilized Americans to get involved in volunteer efforts to help others in communities in addition to efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers of the tragedy. This is an important finding that contributes to our understanding of the mobilizing capacity of tragedy, but it is only a necessary condition for establishing Putnam's (2000) claim that 9/11 helped revive U.S. civic life. Because it is possible that the knowing victims or potential victims, NY/NJ residence, WTC distance, displaying patriotic symbols, sorrow about the attacks, and participation in commemorative events could have been related to pre-9/11 community volunteering, to establish sufficiently Putnam's (2000) claim requires demonstrating that the effects of the 9/11-generated variables on participation in post-9/11 helping behavior were robust to the inclusion of pre-9/11 community volunteering. If the effects of the 9/11-generated factors on post-9/11 volunteering were to fall to nonsignificance with the addition of pre-9/11 community volunteering, this would suggest that these factors did *not* mobilize more Americans to get involved in volunteer efforts than before the attacks. If this turned out to be the case, then this would call into question Putnam's claim that 9/11 helped broadly renew U.S. civic engagement. However, if the effects of the 9/11-generated factors were to remain robust with the addition of pre-9/11 volunteering , this would suggest that 9/11 mobilized Americans to participate in volunteer efforts in greater numbers than before the attacks, which would lend support to Putnam's (2000) claim. Including pre-9/11 community

volunteering has the additional benefit of checking whether the effects of the social capital variables and a prosocial orientation on post-9/11 helping behavior change in any meaningful way.

The 2002 RAPAS asked respondents retrospectively whether they had participated in community volunteer efforts before as well as after the 9/11 attacks and thus a test of the above scenarios was possible.[65] Table 4.5 displays the results of the models in Table 4.2 while controlling for pre-9/11 community volunteering. Looking at this table, we see that, with the one exception, the effects of the 9/11-genererated factors on post-9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community efforts remain significant with the inclusion of pre-9/11 volunteering. It thus seems that the 9/11 attacks mobilized more people to help others in communities than before the tragedy. The one exception to this was people who knew victims or potential victims. While the third row in Table 4.5 shows that knowing victims or potential victims was still a significant predictor of participation in 9/11 relief efforts when pre-9/11 community volunteering was added, this 9/11 generated factor was no longer a significant predictor of participation in post-9/11 community volunteering efforts. This casts doubt on the interpretation that knowing more victims or potential victims mobilized Americans to get involved in community volunteer efforts in greater numbers than before the attacks, the possible reasons for which are discussed in the conclusion of this chapter. Although the effect of knowing victims or potential victims on post-9/11 community volunteering fell to nonsignificance with the inclusion of the measure for pre-9/11 community volunteering, this did not happen for the other 9/11-generated factors. Overall, then, the effect of the 9/11-generated factors was to mobilize Americans to participate in

[65] Pre-9/11 community volunteering was entered as an endogenous variable, with a prosocial orientation and covariates predicting it. For the other endogenous variables, it was assumed only that there was an association between a prosocial orientation and these variables.

volunteer efforts in communities in greater numbers than before the terrorist attacks, which lends support to Putnam's (2000) expectation that 9/11 would help revitalize U.S. civic life.

It is also interesting to note that the social capital variable and prosocial orientation effects generally remain unchanged with the addition of pre-9/11 community volunteering variable. This orientation had a significant direct effect on pre-9/11 community volunteering (see row 14 in Table 4.5). This identifies yet another mechanism through which a prosocial orientation affected post-9/11 helping behavior. But this effect did render the direct effect of a prosocial orientation on 9/11 relief efforts insignificant. Also, with the addition of pre-9/11 community volunteering, the weakest volunteering strong tie measure—approval from friends to do volunteer work—became insignificant. All of the other explanatory effects remain substantively unchanged with the inclusion of pre-9/11 community volunteering. In general, though, controlling for pre-9/11 community volunteering did not change the effects of the social capital variables and a prosocial orientation.

Finally, besides strong volunteering ties being powerful sources of social influence inducing participation in volunteer efforts, it is possible that participation in these efforts could also affect the formation of these ties. The main argument for this possibility would seem to be that involvement in volunteer efforts provides opportunities to interact with other volunteers and form friendships. However, in his ethnography of various advocacy groups, Lichterman (2005:82-83) found that participation in community efforts did *not* give rise to close, personal relationships with other activists or people whom these efforts served. When connections did develop from this participation, they were brief and impersonal. Lichterman's (2005) evidence suggests that participation in volunteer efforts does not

substantially affect the formation of volunteering ties and thus the exclusion of this effect should not undermine my results for the effect of volunteering ties.

Furthermore, even if there was an effect of participation in volunteer efforts on the formation of volunteering ties, this would have almost certainly occurred from participation in volunteer efforts prior to 9/11 given the nature of the volunteering ties. Recall that the measures of volunteering ties were the five *closest* people to respondents, not acquaintances or other weak ties. Since my models control for pre-9/11 community volunteering, this would mean that people who did not develop strong volunteering ties from participation in pre-9/11 volunteer efforts got involved in volunteer efforts after 9/11, and, as a result of this involvement, formed close personal relationships with other volunteers whom they did not know or with whom they were not close prior to 9/11, including those whom they may have previously meet during pre-9/11 volunteer efforts. Combining the remoteness of this possibility with Lichterman's (2005) finding, it seems reasonable to assume that involvement in post-9/11 volunteer efforts did not substantially affect the formation of strong volunteering ties while holding constant pre-9/11 volunteering.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

Synthesizing and extending insights from the disaster, civic engagement, and dispositional literatures on helping behavior and drawing on insights from the social network and social movement literatures on the relational dynamics of human action, this chapter theoretically developed and empirically tested a model that significantly advanced our knowledge about why certain Americans participated in helping efforts after 9/11 while others did not. This model focused specifically on the role of tragedy-generated factors,

social capital, and prosocial orientation to explain participation in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts. In what follows, I discuss the contributions of each of these variables for understanding variation in helping behavior in the months following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Confirming expectation and supporting prior research on participation in disaster relief efforts (Haines et al. 1996; Kaniasty and Norris 1995; Nelson 1973; O'Brien and Mileti 1992; St. John and Fuchs 2002), 9/11-generated factors generally encouraged Americans to get involved in volunteer efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers of the tragedy. But unlike other studies of involvement in helping behavior after disasters, this chapter analyzed whether tragedy-generated factors also mobilized Americans to get involved in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts. The empirical models showed that, with the exception of NY/NJ residence, all of the 9/11-generated factors significantly predicted participation in volunteer efforts to help others in communities besides those directly harmed by the 9/11 tragedy. It seems thus that, for example, patriotism's cultivation of greater feelings of solidarity spurred Americans to help not only 9/11 victims, but citizens broadly as way to strengthen, heal, and unify the attacked nation. Interestingly, three of the 9/11-generated factors—New York area residence, patriotism, and participation in commemorative events—had stronger effects on getting involved in 9/11 relief efforts than in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts. This indicates that although these tragedy-generated factors motivated Americans to participate in both types of helping behavior after the 9/11 attacks, they more strongly motivated Americans to participate in 9/11 relief efforts.

Importantly, sensitivity analyses showed that, with one exception, the introduction of pre-9/11 community volunteering did not render the effects of the 9/11-genererated factors

on post-9/11 helping behavior insignificant. This suggests, then, that the 9/11 tragedy mobilized Americans to get involved in community volunteer efforts in greater numbers than before. Based on this and other evidence presented in this chapter, there appears to be support for Putnam's (2000) claim that 9/11 helped revitalize U.S. civic life. But how long did this revitalization last? Would the 9/11-generated factors that significantly differentiated Americans who participated in community volunteer efforts from those who did not in the months following the terrorist attacks still do so? Without data over time, there is no way to know whether the 9/11-generated factors would promote civic engagement today. Future longitudinal research is needed to determine how long the tragedy-produced factors were a significant source mobilizing Americans to participate in volunteer efforts in their community. Whatever the outcome of this research, it should not distract from the fact that, net of pre-9/11 community volunteering, the people most affected by 9/11 were more likely to volunteer not only for relief efforts to help those directly harmed by the attacks but also for efforts to help others in their communities in the months after the 9/11 attacks.

As discussed above, the general pattern was that the 9/11-generated factors encouraged people to get involved in efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescues workers as well as in efforts to help others in communities. However, there were two 9/11-generated factors that did not follow this pattern: New York area residence only directly mobilized participation in 9/11 relief efforts and sorrow in response to the attacks only directly mobilized participation in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts. The first priority for those living in the New York area was probably to care for fellow New Yorkers who were injured or killed in the attacks and families who lost loved ones. This would have left little time and energy to engage in other volunteer efforts. Second, it seems that people who

felt sorrow about the attacks were only directly motivated to volunteer for efforts to help others in communities when other 9/11-tragedy and other variables were controlled.

Concerning the robustness of the effects of 9/11-generated factors on participation in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts, only the effect of knowing victims or potential victims fell to nonsignificance. What may explain why knowing victims or potential victims was the only 9/11-generated variable *not* to encourage more Americans to participate in volunteer efforts in communities than before the attacks? Like the other 9/11-genereated factors, knowing victims or potential victims was a sufficient motivator for getting involved in 9/11 relief efforts, creating a personal stake to get involved to honor the memory of a departed family member, friend, or colleague. But unlike the other 9/11 generated factors, there may have been other reasons beyond those related to the tragedy for why people who knew victims or potential victims volunteered in communities. Given that the majority of terrorist attack victims were of higher status backgrounds, knowing more victims or potential victims likely reflects greater network centrality and prestige.[66] This may be the key to understanding the effect of this 9/11-generated factor on community volunteer efforts, as prior studies have found a positive relationship between greater network centrality and prestige and civic engagement (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996). Perhaps because of their greater centrality and prestige, people who knew more victims or potential victims did not need the extra motivation that the 9/11 tragedy provided for getting involved in community volunteer efforts.

[66] Based on data about the World Trade Center victims available online at CNN (http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/trade.center/victims/main.html), the occupations of victims were coded into three broad categories: professionals, blue-collar workers, and firefighters, police officers, and paramedics. Sixty-nine percent of WTC victims were professionals.

Beyond specifying the mobilizing scope of tragedy-generated factors, this chapter significantly advanced our understanding of the relationship between social capital and involvement in helping behavior after tragedies. Previous scholarship on volunteer efforts in and outside of disaster contexts has tended to focus on integration into voluntary organizations of any sort to explain variation in helping behavior. However, results from this chapter demonstrated that involvement in charitable organizations—those committed to helping nonmembers—was more effective than involvement in non-charitable organizations—those not committed to helping nonmembers—for mobilizing Americans to participate in efforts to help victims, families, or rescue workers as well as others in communities after 9/11. The empirical models identified that people who were integrated into charitable organizations had a higher probability of getting involved in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts than those who were integrated into non-charitable organizations. This was partly due to the fact that involvement in charitable organizations was more likely to foster embeddedness in volunteering networks. But the direct effect of charitable organization integration on participating in both types of helping behavior was also stronger than that of non-charitable organization integration. Because of their commitment to helping nonmembers, charitable organizations were probably more likely to cultivate more relevant helping skills among members, provide members with more information about helping opportunities, and expose members to group leader social influence to help than non-charitable organizations. Given these likely differences in mobilization efforts and the robust empirical findings for the differing effects of charitable and non-charitable organizations, the distinction between organizations that help

nonmembers and those that do not is crucial for understanding variation in helping behavior after tragedies.

This chapter explicated the exact types of social networks that were most important for mobilizing people to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers and others in communities after the 9/11 attacks. Unlike disaster and civic engagement scholarship that has tended to focus simply on greater network size to explain the effect of social ties on helping behavior, this chapter focused on the number of volunteering strong ties, arguing that they should have been crucial sources of social influence inducing participating in both types of helping behavior after the tragedy. Supporting this expectation, the empirical models showed that the greater number of strong ties who were committed to volunteering, the greater the probability of getting involved in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts. However, the overall number of strong ties was not a significant predictor of participation in either type of helping behavior after the attacks when the number of volunteering strong ties was controlled. This calls into question the findings from prior disaster and civic engagement studies showing the importance of network size for promoting involvement in volunteer efforts in and outside disaster contexts. In light of this evidence, it seems that it is not having a greater number of close ties that matters for inducing helping behavior, but rather having a greater number of close ties who are committed to volunteering (c.f. Passy and Giugni 2001). This should come as no surprise, as it is volunteers who should be most likely to care about helping others and thus exert social influence over their peers to get involved to help. Drawing on the broader social network literature (see, for example, Akers 1985; Akers et al. 1979; Berelson et al. 1954; Friedkin 1998; Friedkin and Cook 1990; Graham et al. 1991; Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Marsden and Friedkin 1993; Matsueda and

Anderson 1998; Warr and Stafford 1991), this chapter also distinguished among attitudinal, active behavioral, and passive behavioral types of social influence and explored whether these distinctions mattered for explaining helping behavior after 9/11. By doing so, it offered even a finer-grained understanding of the effect of volunteering ties on helping behavior after tragedies. For both 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts, the effect of having more friends who exerted behavioral social influence was stronger than the effect of having more friends who exerted attitudinal social influence. This suggests that verbal support from friends to help was less important than explicit encouragements from friends to help or observing friends participation in helping behavior for inducing involvement in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts. Because these social networks effects were robust to the inclusion of a prosocial orientation, this gives us confidence that they mainly reflect social influence rather than selection.

Bringing a dispositional perspective to bear on helping behavior after tragedies was the final contribution that this chapter made. Although the civic engagement literature on helping behavior outside of disaster contexts has paid attention to the role of a prosocial orientation for explaining variation in volunteer efforts, the disaster literature on helping behavior has not. The empirical findings in this chapter demonstrate that this is a significant omission. A prosocial orientation significantly encouraged participation in 9/11 relief efforts as well as post-9/11 community volunteer efforts. In addition to its direct effect on helping behavior after 9/11, a prosocial orientation had important indirect effects. Consistent with the homophily principle, prosocially oriented people were more likely to be involved in charitable and non-charitable organizations as well as to embed themselves in volunteering networks, both of which promoted participation in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11

community volunteer efforts. Additionally, a prosocial orientation promoted involvement in the two types of helping behavior after 9/11 through its significant positive effect on certain 9/11-generated factors. Because the 9/11 attacks were a significant source of human suffering and because the nation was identified with that suffering, it follows that prosocially oriented people would have been more likely to feel sorrow about the attacks, participate in events to commemorate victims, and display patriotic symbols given their penchant to be concerned about the welfare of others. Finally, a prosocial orientation affected getting involved in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts through increasing pre-9/11 community volunteering. The findings in this chapter encourage future research on participation in disaster relief efforts to incorporate a prosocial orientation and to explore the various ways through which this orientation acts as a conduit for encouraging helping behavior after tragedies.

To conclude, this chapter has demonstrated the importance of tragedy-generated factors, social capital, and a prosocial orientation for explaining differential participation in volunteer efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers as well as others in communities after the 9/11attacks. These variables did not act in isolation, but often worked together to mobilize Americans to participate in helping behavior in the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy. Because prior studies on disaster have not simultaneously incorporated tragedy-generated factors, social capital, and psychological disposition into models of volunteering for relief efforts, our understanding of the dynamics of helping behavior after tragedies has been limited. A natural question to ask is the extent to which the findings presented here generalize to helping behavior after other disasters. It is difficult to imagine why the observed relational and dispositional foundations of 9/11 helping behavior would differ

dramatically for helping behavior after other disasters. These seem to be general mechanisms, broadly applicable to helping behavior in and outside of disaster contexts. However, while certain 9/11-generated factors, such as knowing victims or propinquity to the disaster sites, may have similar effects on participation in relief efforts for other disasters, other 9/11-generated factors may not. Given that 9/11 was constructed as an attack on America and its citizens, the effects of patriotism would seem to matter less for natural disasters. For instance, it is doubtful that patriotism differentiated people who traveled to the Gulf region to help the victims of Hurricane Katrina from those who did not. For this reason, scholars need to pay particular attention to how victims and bystanders interpret the nature of the disaster. Doing so will likely produce theoretically richer descriptions of how people are mobilized to help victims and others in communities after tragedies.

**Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis**

| | Mean | S.D. |
|---|---|---|
| *Post-9/11 Helping Efforts* | | |
| Volunteer for 9/11 relief efforts | .104 | .305 |
| Volunteered for a community project | .268 | 0.443 |
| *9/11-Generated Variables* | | |
| NY/NJ residence | .088 | .284 |
| Distance from WTC | .012 | .108 |
| # of victims or potential victims known | .644 | 1.393 |
| # of patriotic symbols displayed | 2.711 | 2.195 |
| Sorrow in response to the attacks | .238 | .426 |
| Commemorative gathering attendance | .322 | .467 |
| *Social Capital Variables* | | |
| # of strong ties who encourage volunteering | .595 | 1.175 |
| # of strong ties who engage in volunteering | 1.330 | 1.477 |
| # of strong ties who approve of volunteering | 3.737 | 1.970 |
| # of strong ties nominated (network size) | 4.601 | 1.103 |
| # of charitable organizations | .346 | .768 |
| # of non-charitable organizations | .186 | .583 |
| *Prosocial orientation* | | |
| Personally feeling responsible to help others in need | 3.720 | .884 |
| Personally feel responsible to take action against injustice | 3.435 | 1.020 |
| *Demographic variables* | | |
| White | .760 | .427 |
| Black | .111 | .315 |
| Other race | .128 | .335 |
| College education | .244 | .430 |
| Income | 5.504 | 2.838 |
| Female | .519 | .500 |
| Age | 45.028 | 17.721 |
| Physical heath | 3.856 | .921 |
| # of children under 19 living in household | .618 | 1.020 |
| Working full-time | .493 | .500 |
| Served in the military | .156 | .363 |
| Married | .564 | .496 |
| Rural | .230 | .421 |

## Table 4.2. Probit Coefficients for Direct Effects of Post-9/11 Helping Behavior

| Explanatory variables | # of victims or potential victims known | # of patriotic symbols displayed | Sorrow in response to the attacks | commem-orative gathering attendance | # of strong ties who encourage volunteering | # of strong ties who engage in volunteering |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *9/11-Generated Variables* | | | | | | |
| NY/NJ residence | .835*** | .026 | .166 | .094 | -.193+ | -.278* |
| | (.074) | (.159) | (.103) | (.097) | (.109) | (.120) |
| Distance from WTC | .940*** | -1.007** | .319 | .061 | .050 | -.416 |
| | (.166) | (.381) | (.218) | (.248) | (.233) | (.344) |
| # of victims or potential victims known | — | .121*** | .078*** | .107*** | — | — |
| | | (.026) | (.018) | (.017) | | |
| # of patriotic symbols displayed | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Sorrow in response to the attacks | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Commemorative gathering attendance | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| *Social Capital Variables* | | | | | | |
| # of strong ties who encourage volunteering | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| # of strong ties who engage in volunteering | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| # of strong ties who approve of volunteering | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| # of strong ties nominated (network size) | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| # of charitable organizations | — | — | — | — | .295*** | .417*** |
| | | | | | (.025) | (.033) |
| # of non-charitable organizations | — | — | — | — | .067* | .164*** |
| | | | | | (.028) | (.037) |
| Prosocial orientation | — | .206*** | .060* | .169*** | .154*** | .220*** |
| | | (.048) | (.028) | (.034) | (.031) | (.039) |
| $R^2$ | .077 | .060 | .117 | .122 | .100 | .177 |
| Model $\chi^2$ | 69.346*** | | | | | |
| Degrees of freedom | 21 | | | | | |
| CFI | .994 | | | | | |
| IFI | .994 | | | | | |
| TLI | .994 | | | | | |
| RMSEA | .028 | | | | | |

*Notes* : Standard errors are in parentheses; number of cases for all models is 2,898 individuals. Also included but not shown are controls for all demographic variables listed in Table 4.1 (see Appendix E for results for these variables).
+ $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

## Table 4.2 Probit Coefficients for Direct Effects of Post-9/11 Helping Behavior Model (Continued)

| Explanatory variables | # of strong ties who approve of volunteering | # of strong ties nominated | # of charitable organizations | # of non-charitable organizations | Volunteer for 9/11 relief efforts | Volunteer for post-9/11 community efforts |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *9/11-Generated Variables* | | | | | | |
| NY/NJ residence | -.162 | -.008 | -.051 | .089* | .334** | -.065 |
| | (.152) | (.085) | (.069) | (.040) | (.118) | (.117) |
| Distance from WTC | -.728* | -.614*** | .033 | -.238 | .498* | .478* |
| | (.338) | (.128) | (.159) | (.241) | (.254) | (.240) |
| # of victims or potential victims known | — | — | — | — | .076*** | .039* |
| | | | | | (.021) | (.018) |
| # of patriotic symbols displayed | — | — | — | — | .080*** | .030* |
| | | | | | (.016) | (.013) |
| Sorrow in response to the attacks | — | — | — | — | .039 | .075* |
| | | | | | (.025) | (.037) |
| Commemorative gathering attendance | — | — | — | — | .216*** | .118** |
| | | | | | (.048) | (.040) |
| *Social Capital Variables* | | | | | | |
| # of strong ties who encourage volunteering | — | — | — | — | .044* | .092*** |
| | | | | | (.021) | (.023) |
| # of strong ties who engage in volunteering | — | — | — | — | .072* | .124*** |
| | | | | | (.028) | (.021) |
| # of strong ties who approve of volunteering | — | — | — | — | .001 | .031+ |
| | | | | | (.028) | (.018) |
| # of strong ties nominated (network size) | — | — | — | — | -.063 | .024 |
| | | | | | (.044) | (.041) |
| # of charitable organizations | .140** | .061* | — | — | .241*** | .412*** |
| | (.041) | (.027) | | | (.032) | (.025) |
| # of non-charitable organizations | .051 | .017 | — | — | .093* | .222*** |
| | (.053) | (.029) | | | (.045) | (.037) |
| Prosocial orientation | .274*** | .055** | .096*** | .035** | .069+ | .124*** |
| | (.050) | (.020) | (.020) | (.013) | (.041) | (.036) |
| $R^2$ | .112 | .058 | .070 | .034 | .269 | .392 |
| Model $\chi^2$ | | | | | | |
| Degrees of freedom | | | | | | |
| CFI | | | | | | |
| IFI | | | | | | |
| TLI | | | | | | |
| RMSEA | | | | | | |

*Notes* : Standard errors are in parentheses; number of cases for all models is 2,898 individuals. Also included but not shown are controls for all demographic variables listed in Table 4.1 (see Appendix E for results for these variables).
+ $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

**Table 4.3. Difference Tests for 9/11 Relief Efforts and Post-9/11 Community Volunteer Efforts**

| | $\chi^2$ value | Degrees of freedom | *p* -value |
|---|---|---|---|
| Joint test | 82.3 | 11 | .000 |
| *9/11-Generated Variables* | | | |
| NY/NJ residence | 6.909 | 1 | .010 |
| Distance from WTC | 0.005 | 1 | .941 |
| # of victims or potential victims known | 1.97 | 1 | .161 |
| # of patriotic symbols displayed | 7.003 | 1 | .010 |
| Sorrow in response to the attacks | 0.344 | 1 | .558 |
| Commemorative gathering attendance | 2.801 | 1 | .094 |
| *Social Capital Variables* | | | |
| # of strong ties who encourage volunteering | 1.042 | 1 | .313 |
| # of strong ties who engage in volunteering | 2.547 | 1 | .111 |
| # of strong ties who approve of volunteering | 1.005 | 1 | .317 |
| # of strong ties nominated (network size) | 1.56 | 1 | .343 |
| # of charitable organizations | 19.31 | 1 | .000 |
| # of non-charitable organizations | 5.136 | 1 | .024 |
| Prosocial orientation | 1.47 | 1 | .228 |

**Table 4.4. Indirect and Total Effects for Post-9/11 Helping Behavior Model**

| Explanatory variables | Volunteer for 9/11 relief efforts | Volunteer for post-9/11 community efforts |
|---|---|---|
| NY/NJ residence | .072/.406 | .021/.021 |
| Distance from WTC | .022/.520 | .005/.483 |
| # of victims or potential victims known | .033/.109 | .022/.061 |
| # of charitable organizations | .043/.284 | .083/.412 |
| # of non-charitable organizations | .015/.108 | .027/.249 |
| Prosocial orientation | .255/.324 | .233/.357 |

*Note* : Indirect effect/total effect; all effects significant at the $p < .05$ level (two-tail tests) or lower.

## Table 4.5. Probit Coefficients for Direct Effects of Post-9/11 Helping Behavior Model, Controlling for Pre-9/11 Community Volunteering

| Explanatory variables | # of victims or potential victims known | # of patriotic symbols displayed | Sorrow in response to the attacks | commem-orative gathering attendance | # of strong ties who encourage volunteering | # of strong ties who engage in volunteering |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *9/11-Generated Variables* | | | | | | |
| NY/NJ residence | .835*** | .026 | .166 | .094 | -.193+ | -.279* |
| | (.074) | (.159) | (.103) | (.097) | (.109) | (.120) |
| Distance from WTC | .939*** | -1.009** | .320 | .062 | .051 | -.419 |
| | (.166) | (.381) | (.218) | (.248) | (.233) | (.343) |
| # of victims or potential victims known | — | .121*** | .078*** | .107*** | — | — |
| | | (.026) | (.018) | (.017) | | |
| # of patriotic symbols displayed | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Sorrow in response to the attacks | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Commemorative gathering attendance | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| *Social Capital Variables* | | | | | | |
| # of strong ties who encourage volunteering | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| # of strong ties who engage in volunteering | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| # of strong ties who approve of volunteering | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| # of strong ties nominated (network size) | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| # of charitable organizations | — | — | — | — | .295*** | .417*** |
| | | | | | (.025) | (.033) |
| # of non-charitable organizations | — | — | — | — | .067* | .164*** |
| | | | | | (.028) | (.037) |
| Pre-9/11 Community Volunteering | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Prosocial orientation | — | .200*** | .058* | .164*** | .149*** | .214*** |
| | | (.047) | (.027) | (.033) | (.030) | (.039) |
| $R^2$ | .077 | .060 | .117 | .122 | .100 | .177 |
| Model $\chi^2$ | 75.539*** | | | | | |
| Degrees of freedom | 22 | | | | | |
| CFI | .993 | | | | | |
| IFI | .994 | | | | | |
| TLI | .994 | | | | | |
| RMSEA | .028 | | | | | |

*Notes* : Standard errors are in parentheses; number of cases for all models is 2,898 individuals. Also included but not shown are controls for all demographic variables listed in Table 4.1.
+ $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

## Table 4.5. Probit Coefficients for Direct Effects of Post-9/11 Helping Behavior Model, Controlling for Pre-9/11 Community Volunteering (Continued)

| Explanatory variables | # of strong ties who approve of volunteering | # of strong ties nominated | # of charitable organizations | # of non-charitable organizations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *9/11-Generated Variables* | | | | |
| NY/NJ residence | -.163 | -.008 | -.051 | .089* |
| | (.152) | (.085) | (.069) | (.040) |
| Distance from WTC | -.728* | -.614*** | .033 | -.239 |
| | (.338) | (.128) | (.159) | (.241) |
| # of victims or potential victims known | — | — | — | — |
| # of patriotic symbols displayed | — | — | — | — |
| Sorrow in response to the attacks | — | — | — | — |
| Commemorative gathering attendance | — | — | — | — |
| *Social Capital Variables* | | | | |
| # of strong ties who encourage volunteering | — | — | — | — |
| # of strong ties who engage in volunteering | — | — | — | — |
| # of strong ties who approve of volunteering | — | — | — | — |
| # of strong ties nominated (network size) | — | — | — | — |
| # of charitable organizations | .140** | .061* | — | — |
| | (.041) | (.027) | | |
| # of non-charitable organizations | .051 | .017 | — | — |
| | (.053) | (.029) | | |
| Pre-9/11 Community Volunteering | — | — | — | — |
| Prosocial orientation | .265*** | .034** | .096*** | .035** |
| | (.049) | (.012) | (.020) | (.013) |
| $R^2$ | .112 | .058 | .070 | .034 |
| Model $\chi^2$ | | | | |
| Degrees of freedom | | | | |
| CFI | | | | |
| IFI | | | | |
| TLI | | | | |
| RMSEA | | | | |

*Notes*: Standard errors are in parentheses; number of cases for all models is 2,898 individuals. Also included but not shown are controls for all demographic variables listed in Table 4.1.
+ $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

## Table 4.5. Probit Coefficients for Direct Effects of Post-9/11 Helping Behavior Model, Controlling for Pre-9/11 Community Volunteering (Continued)

| Explanatory variables | Voluntter for pre-9/11 community efforts | Volunteer for 9/11 relief efforts | Volunteer for post-9/11 community efforts |
|---|---|---|---|
| *9/11-Generated Variables* | | | |
| NY/NJ residence | -.102 | .348** | -.022 |
| | (.119) | (.121) | (.131) |
| Distance from WTC | -.044 | .500+ | .564+ |
| | (.288) | (.260) | (.322) |
| # of victims or potential victims known | — | .074*** | .032 |
| | | (.021) | (.021) |
| # of patriotic symbols displayed | — | .081*** | .038* |
| | | (.016) | (.016) |
| Sorrow in response to the attacks | — | .042 | .107* |
| | | (.031) | (.050) |
| Commemorative gathering attendance | — | .213*** | .117* |
| | | (.048) | (.050) |
| *Social Capital Variables* | | | |
| # of strong ties who encourage volunteering | — | .039+ | .089** |
| | | (.023) | (.028) |
| # of strong ties who engage in volunteering | — | .060* | .083** |
| | | (.029) | (.026) |
| # of strong ties who approve of volunteering | — | -.006 | .002 |
| | | (.028) | (.025) |
| # of strong ties nominated (network size) | — | -.063 | .032 |
| | | (.044) | (.052) |
| # of charitable organizations | — | .207*** | .308*** |
| | | (.033) | (.032) |
| # of non-charitable organizations | — | .081+ | .204*** |
| | | (.045) | (.048) |
| Pre-9/11 Community Volunteering | — | .140** | .728*** |
| | | (.054) | (.060) |
| Prosocial orientation | .185** | .052 | .065+ |
| | (.039) | (.040) | (.039) |
| $R^2$ | .131 | .281 | .590 |
| Model $\chi^2$ | | | |
| Degrees of freedom | | | |
| CFI | | | |
| IFI | | | |
| TLI | | | |
| RMSEA | | | |

*Notes*: Standard errors are in parentheses; number of cases for all models is 2,898 individuals. Also included but not shown are controls for all demographic variables listed in Table 4.1.
+ $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

## Figure 4.1. Conceptual Post-9/11 Helping Behavior Model




*Note*: Solid arrows represent paths where the theoretical expectation is clear; dashed arrows represent paths where the theoretical expectation is unclear. For clarity, the double-headed arrows (representing correlations) are omitted between knowing victims and a prosocial orientation; knowing victims and organizational involvements; knowing victims and volunteering strong ties; organizational involvements and 9/11-generated variable; volunteering strong ties and 9/11-generated variables; and 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community efforts.

**Figure 4.2. Differences in the Effects of 9/11-Generated Factors on Participation in 9/11 Relief Efforts and Post-9/11 Community Efforts**



**Figure 4.3. Differences in the Effects of Social Capital Variables on Participation in 9/11 Relief Efforts and Post-9/11 Community Efforts**



**Figure 4.4. Differences in the Effect of Prosocial Orientation on Participation in 9/11 Relief Efforts and Post-9/11 Community Efforts**



# CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

My dissertation has advanced our understanding of the enduring question of why certain people participate in activism while others do not in a number of significant ways. Contrary to prior theoretical and empirical models of differential participation, I specified and tested a synthetic model of activism, integrating dispositional and relational perspectives. Because these perspectives have generally been pursued in isolation, our knowledge of the processes that explain activist participation has been limited. Combining dispositional and relational perspectives offers a more comprehensive view of activism by showing how these perspectives work in concert to mobilize people to participate in volunteer efforts in communities.

Regarding a dispositional perspective, my synthetic model established an important pathway through which a prosocial orientation affects community activism. Given the homophily principle, prosocially oriented people form friendships with others who share their activist commitments and join organizations that are committed to helping others in communities. In doing so, prosocially oriented people embed themselves in structures that are powerful sources of social influence inducing participation. My empirical models showed that the greater the prosocial orientation, the greater the probability of having more activist friends of various types and joining more activist voluntary organizations. Since prior dispositional models of activism have not incorporated relational factors, they have missed how a prosocial orientation acts as a conduit for activism, driving people to embed themselves in activist networks and organizations that in turn mobilize participation.

Notably, including this important mechanism did not wash out the direct effect of a prosocial orientation on community activism. Consistent with a dispositional perspective, a prosocial orientation *directly* motivated involvement in activism to help others in communities. But only when a prosocial orientation's effects on relational factors are included do we fully grasp how this orientation promotes activist participation.

Despite the fact that network and organizational effects on activism have become widely accepted, I argued that they should be viewed critically since relational models of activism have generally not controlled for selection. Because my empirical models demonstrated that there is selection into activist networks and organizations based on a prosocial orientation, including this orientation when modeling the effect of relational factors on activism provides a way to account for selection. Importantly, net of a prosocial orientation, integration into activist networks and organizations mobilized people to get involved in community activism. This is not surprising, as activist networks and organizations are potent sources of social influence. In this way, embeddedness in activist friendship networks and voluntary organizations solves Olson's (1965) classic collective action dilemma. Although free riders reap the public benefits of activist efforts—such as living in clean and safe communities—they cannot receive rewards or avoid punishments from activist peers without personally participating in activism. Because we care about what our friends think about us, people who are integrated into activist social relationships are very likely to participate in activism so they can remain in the good graces of their activist friends. Social influence is thus a powerful motivator of activist behavior.

Drawing on the broader scholarship on social networks, I distinguished three different types of social influence that activist friends can exert on peers: attitudinal social influence,

passive behavioral social influence, and active behavioral social influence. My empirical models revealed that these analytic distinctions had important explanatory consequences, as both types of behavioral social influence had stronger effects on participation in activism than attitudinal social influence. Given the differences in positive and negative sanctions that likely follow from these different types of social influence, this is what we would theoretically expect. Individuals who actually participate or directly request participation are likely to reward friends *more* who get involved relative to friends who merely support activism. This is due to the fact that people who are activists are presumably more committed to activism than people who merely support activism and thus they place a higher value on their friends' participation. When peers directly request friends to participate in activism they are likely to receive praises for doing so since they have responded positively to what friends want. When there is no direct request made, as is the case of mere attitudinal support of activism, this scenario is not possible. Because mere attitudinal supporters of activism do not participate themselves, they are unlikely to react negatively when peers do not participate. In contrast, people who are engaged in activism are more likely to disapprove of nonparticipating friends given their strong commitment to activism. And turning down the direct requests of friends to participate in activism carries with it a great deal of risk of falling from good graces of friends since they are likely to feel slighted.

We should not forget, however, that certain networks and organizations actually *constrain* activism. My empirical models showed that integration into quiescent clergy-led congregations and "bonding" religious networks substantially hindered getting involved in volunteer efforts to help others in communities. But given the emphasis on taking care of fellow members socially and spiritually and the fact that activism is often seen as

undermining this care, it is not surprising that when religious organizations and ties are non-activist in nature, they would be significant sources of constraint for community activism. The broader point seems to be that when activism is perceived to jeopardize the primary goals of organizations, religious or otherwise, then it is likely to be discouraged, and thus group members are likely to abstain from activist participation in order to avoid negative reactions from leaders and other group members who prefer to focus on helping group members and participating in-group activities.

My synthetic model of activism and network and organizational distinctions were also helpful for explaining why certain Americans participated in helping efforts after 9/11 while others did not. Contrary to disaster scholarship on participation in other relief efforts, I showed that activist social ties and organizations were more important than non-activist ties and organizations for mobilizing participation in volunteer efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers as well as others in communities after 9/11. While non-activist organizations had significant effects on these helping behaviors after 9/11, their effects were much weaker than those of activist organizations. Importantly, simply having more friends was not a significant predictor of either type of helping effort after 9/11. This calls into question arguments that there is a "general" integration effect on participation in disaster relief efforts (Haines et al. 1996; Nelson 1973; St. John and Fuchs 2002). As with general community activism, the effects activist networks and organizations had on 9/11 relief efforts were robust to the inclusion of a prosocial orientation, giving us confidence that they are not spurious and thus entirely due to homophily. A prosocial orientation indirectly affected participation in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts by boosting certain 9/11 responses (i.e., patriotism, sorrow, and commemorative gatherings). The

findings are especially important for 9/11 relief efforts, as disaster scholarship has generally ignored the role of dispositions when explaining variation in volunteer efforts to help those harmed by tragedies. Finally, it appears that 9/11 mobilized more Americans to participate in volunteer efforts in communities than before the attacks. With the exception of knowing victims, the effects of the 9/11-generated variables were impervious to the inclusion of pre-9/11 community volunteering. This means that prior community activism does not explain why, for instance, feeling sorrow about the 9/11 attacks mobilized Americans to volunteer in their communities after 9/11. In light of this evidence, there appears to be support for Putnam's claim that 9/11 mobilized a civic response that was broad in scope, though I could not ascertain for how long this effect lasted.

No research project is perfect. Given the various and complex social process involved in my synthetic model of activism, I would have ideally analyzed longitudinal data on activist networks and organizations, prosocial dispositions, and participation in volunteer efforts in communities. But because these data do not exist, I analyzed cross-sectional data and drew on prior established research findings and conducted important sensitivity tests when possible to bolster support for my causal arguments about the relationships among activist networks and organizations, a prosocial orientation, and community activism. Nevertheless, future studies should collect data over time to evaluate how these causal processes unfold over time. Preferably, these studies would begin in childhood and follow people throughout the life course, observing their entries into and exits from activist networks and activist behaviors as well as how orientations shape these actions.

To conclude, my dissertation has broadened our knowledge of the dynamics of activism in a number of ways. But there is more research to be done. In particular, I plan to

explore the relevancy of my synthetic model of activism for cases of high-risk/cost activity. A prosocial orientation may not be the orientation that is most important for explaining participation in protest activism and other acts of rebellion (but see Keniston 1968; Loveman 1998; Smith 1996:169-208). Nonetheless, we would expect the insights of my synthetic model of activism still to be applicable. Once the disposition that is most likely to promote insurgency is identified, we would expect it to be an important basis on which protest friendships form and thus including it in network models of high-risk/cost activism would help account for selection. However, it is an open question whether a protest disposition would directly motivate participation in disruptive activity since this activity often involves considerable risk and cost. This is where the significance of integration into activist networks comes in (della Porta 1988; McAdam 1986; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Opp 1989; Opp and Gern 1993). To establish this claim, however, requires accounting for the process of selection, which is why identifying, measuring, and modeling a disposition toward protest activity is so crucial. By integrating dispositional and relational perspectives of activism, I will continue to advance our understanding of why people sacrifice time, energy, and even their livelihood for causes while others who do not.

## APPENDIX A: TECHNICAL DETAILS OF STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELS

### Specifications and Assumptions of Traditional SEMs

SEMs traditionally comprise two main components. The first component is the structural model that describes the effects of the latent variables on each other. The second component is the measurement model that specifies the link between the unobserved latent variables and their observed indicators. The latent variable model's general equation is $\boldsymbol{\eta} = \mathbf{B}\boldsymbol{\eta} + \boldsymbol{\Gamma}\boldsymbol{\xi} + \boldsymbol{\zeta}$, where $\boldsymbol{\eta}$ is an $m \times 1$ vector of latent endogenous variables ($m$ is the number of latent endogenous variables), $\boldsymbol{\xi}$ is an $n \times 1$ vector of latent exogenous variables ($n$ is the number of latent exogenous variables), $\mathbf{B}$ is an $m \times m$ coefficient matrix for the regressions among the $\eta$'s, $\boldsymbol{\Gamma}$ is an $m \times n$ coefficient matrix for the regressions of the $\eta$'s on the $\xi$'s, and $\boldsymbol{\zeta}$ is an $m \times 1$ vector of disturbances or the unexplained component of the $\eta$'s. There are also two covariance matrices that are part of the latent variable model. The covariance matrix of the $\xi$'s is an $n \times n$ matrix, $\Phi$, and the covariance matrix of the $\zeta$'s is an $m \times m$ matrix, $\boldsymbol{\psi}$. The latent variable models assume that $\zeta$'s have expected values of zero, covariances between $\zeta$'s and $\xi$'s are zero, $\zeta$'s are homoscedastic and nonautocorrelated, and $(\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{B})$ is nonsingular.

The general equation for the exogenous or independent variable measurement model is $\mathbf{x} = \boldsymbol{\Lambda}_x\boldsymbol{\xi} + \boldsymbol{\delta}$, where $\mathbf{x}$ is a $q \times 1$ vector of observed indicators of the $\xi$'s ($q$ is the number of observed indicators of $\boldsymbol{\xi}$), $\boldsymbol{\Lambda}_x$ is a $q \times n$ matrix of coefficients or loadings for the regressions of the x's on the $\xi$'s, and $\boldsymbol{\delta}$ is a $q \times 1$ vector of measurement errors. The covariance matrix of the $\delta$'s is a $q \times q$ matrix, $\boldsymbol{\Theta}_{\boldsymbol{\delta}}$. And the endogenous or dependent variable measurement model's general equation is $\mathbf{y} = \boldsymbol{\Lambda}_y\boldsymbol{\eta} + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}$, where $\mathbf{y}$ is a $p \times 1$ vector of the observed indicators of the $\eta$'s ($p$ is the number of observed indicators of $\boldsymbol{\eta}$), $\boldsymbol{\Lambda}_y$ is a $p \times m$ matrix of coefficients

or loadings for the regressions of the y's on the η's, and $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}$ is a $p \times 1$ vector of measurement errors. The covariance matrix of the ε's is a $p \times p$ matrix, $\boldsymbol{\Theta}_{\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}}$. These measurement models assume that δ's and ε's have expected values of zero, δ's are uncorrelated with ε's, η's, ξ's, and ζ's, ε's are uncorrelated with δ's, η's, ξ's, and ζ's, and δ's and ε's are homosecdastic and nonautocorrelated.

**Correction of Categorical Endogenous Variables for Traditional SEMs**

I first added an auxiliary measurement model to the traditional one since the traditional measurement model does not hold when the observed endogenous variables are not continuous. The auxiliary measurement model assumes that underlying each categorical observed variable, $y_i$, is a latent continuous one, $y_i^*$. This measurement model's general equation is $y_i = c$, if $\tau_{ic\text{-}1} < y_i^* \leq \tau_{ic}$, where $c$ is the number of categories for $y_i$, $\tau_{ic}$ ($i = 1, 2, \ldots, c - 1$) is the category threshold, and $y_i^*$ is the latent continuous variable that determines the values of $y_i$ as it reaches or exceeds different thresholds ($\tau_{i0}$ and $\tau_{ic}$, the two extreme thresholds, are respectively equal to $-\infty$ and $+\infty$). For instance, the auxiliary measurement model equation for a binary observed endogenous variable, $y_1$, is:

$$y_1 = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } y_1^* \geq \tau \\ 0, & \text{if } y_1^* < \tau. \end{cases}$$

If $y_1^*$ is less than τ, then $y_1 = 0$. If $y_1^*$ reaches or exceeds τ, then $y_1 = 1$. All underlying latent continuous variables are assumed to be multinormally distributed, and the threshold values for the categorical observed endogenous variables are estimated from the univariate marginal distributions. Because in the auxiliary measurement model categorical observed variables are nonlinearly and deterministically linked to their latent continuous counterparts through

threshold models, error terms are not attached to the categorical observed variables as in traditional measurement models. Error terms are instead attached to the latent continuous variables that underlie the categorical observed variables.

Because each categorical observed endogenous variable is connected to a latent continuous variable through a threshold model, all estimated regressions are those of either binary or ordered probits. The general equation for an ordered probit regression model is $P(y_i = c \mid x_i) = \Phi(\tau_{ic} - \mathbf{Bx_i}) - \Phi(\tau_{ic\text{-}1} - \mathbf{Bx_i})$, where $\Phi$ is the normal cumulative distribution function (CDF), $c$ is the number of categories for $y_i$, $\tau_{ic}$ ($i = 1, 2, \ldots, c - 1$) is the category threshold, $\mathbf{x_i}$ is a matrix of explanatory variables, and $\mathbf{B}$ is a vector of regression coefficients that link the explanatory variables to the outcome variable. For the binary probit regression model, the second term on the right-hand side of the equation is omitted.

Categorical observed endogenous variables also problematize the covariance structure hypothesis of traditional SEMs. This fundamental hypothesis of traditional SEMs evaluates the extent to which the covariance matrix of the observed variables is a function of the specified model parameters. Its general equation is $H_0: \Sigma = \Sigma(\theta)$, where $\Sigma$ is the population covariance matrix of observed variables, $\theta$ is a vector of the model parameters, and $\Sigma(\theta)$ is the model implied covariance matrix. Rejection of $H_0$ suggests that the constraints on $\Sigma$ implied by the proposed model appear to be invalid and thus indicate that the proposed model has a poor fit to the data. On the other hand, failure to reject $H_0$ means that the proposed model seems to have an adequate fit to the data.

The covariance structure hypothesis of traditional SEMs, however, does not generally hold when the observed variables of the population covariance matrix are noncontinuous. This is corrected by testing the population covariance matrix of the latent continuous

variables that underlie the categorical observed variables, $\Sigma^*$, instead of the population covariance matrix of the categorical observed variables, $\Sigma$ (Bollen 1989b:441-442). To estimate $\Sigma^*$, a matrix of polychoric correlations—associations between the latent continuous variables that underlie the categorical observed variables—were generated from the bivariate marginal distributions conditional upon the given threshold values. In order to obtain a suitable weight matrix, I also estimated the asymptotic covariance matrix of the polychoric correlation matrix. With these matrices as input, I then estimated the models using diagonally weighted least squares with robust standard errors (Muthen and Muthen 1998-2004).

# APPENDIX B

## Table B1. Probit Coefficients for Direct Effects of Synthetic Model of Collective Civic Action, Control Variables

| Demographic variables | Nonchartiable Organizations | Charitable Organizations | # of strong ties | # of strong ties who approve of volunteering | # of strong ties who volunteer | # of strong ties who request volunteering | Collective Civic Action |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Black | -.021 | -.053 | -.115+ | -.178 | .065 | .222** | -.109 |
| | (.042) | (.059) | (.066) | (.113) | (.100) | (.075) | (.094) |
| Other race | -.051 | -.010 | -.143** | -.393*** | -.220* | .059 | .050 |
| | (.040) | (.051) | (.046) | (.113) | (.089) | (.078) | (.088) |
| College education | .124*** | .229*** | -.036 | .236** | .315*** | .089+ | .246*** |
| | (.026) | (.035) | (.046) | (.089) | (.062) | (.051) | (.061) |
| Income | .008 | .034*** | .023* | .029+ | .034** | -.005 | .038** |
| | (.005) | (.007) | (.010) | (.017) | (.012) | (.010) | (.012) |
| Female | .032 | .117** | .116* | .356*** | -.077 | -.019 | .151* |
| | (.032) | (.039) | (.048) | (.089) | (.074) | (.058) | (.064) |
| Age | .001 | -.002 | -.007*** | -.018*** | .008*** | -.003+ | -.003+ |
| | (.001) | (.001) | (.001) | (.002) | (.002) | (.002) | (.002) |
| Physical heath | .035* | -.012 | .001 | .058 | .053+ | .008 | .104** |
| | (.015) | (.017) | (.020) | (.039) | (.032) | (.025) | (.030) |
| # of children under 19 living in household | .053*** | .055*** | -.026 | -.001 | .037 | .028 | .007 |
| | (.012) | (.016) | (.024) | (.042) | (.029) | (.024) | (.029) |
| Working full-time | -.006 | -.036 | .170*** | .191* | -.081 | -.051 | -.138* |
| | (.027) | (.036) | (.046) | (.089) | (.061) | (.052) | (.061) |
| Served in military | .012 | .149** | -.011 | -.005 | -.251* | -.189* | .145 |
| | (.044) | (.047) | (.056) | (.110) | (.086) | (.078) | (.089) |
| Married | -.035 | -.107** | .049 | .140+ | .188* | .067 | .101 |
| | (.030) | (.036) | (.042) | (.081) | (.006) | (.053) | (.061) |
| South | -.019 | -.052 | -.016 | .078 | .079 | .055 | .005 |
| | (.026) | (.033) | (.039) | (.074) | (.057) | (.049) | (.056) |
| Rural | -.002 | .079 | .051 | .155+ | .166* | .111* | .100 |
| | (.030) | (.038) | (.051) | (.087) | (.070) | (.056) | (.066) |

*Notes*: Standard errors are in parentheses; number of cases for all models is 2,898 individuals.
+ $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

# APPENDIX C

## Figure C1. Effects of Activist Clergy-Led Congregation Attendance, Quiescent Clergy-Led Congregation Attendance, and No Congregation Attendance on Civic Engagement in Communities



# APPENDIX D

## Table D1. Probit Coefficients for Direct Effects of Congregation Mobilizing and Demobilizing Model, Control Variables

| Explanatory variables | Quiescent clergy-led congregation attendance | Activist clergy-led congregation attendance | Congregation religious leadership position | Congregation inward volunteer activity | Congregation outward volunteer activity | Number of congregation ties | Number of congregation activist ties | Civic engagement in communities |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Black | .692*** | .405* | .368*** | .413*** | .590*** | .026 | .210* | -.031 |
| | (.130) | (.167) | (.109) | (.101) | (.101) | (.068) | (.088) | (.115) |
| Other race | .061 | .002 | -.017 | -.077 | -.103 | .001 | .084 | -.092 |
| | (.147) | (.166) | (.106) | (.095) | (.102) | (.055) | (.086) | (.107) |
| College education | -.199* | .283* | .199** | .097 | .043 | .007 | -.073 | .271*** |
| | (.101) | (.119) | (.073) | (.068) | (.007) | (.042) | (.065) | (.074) |
| Income | -.078*** | .001 | -.014 | -.021 | .015 | -.019* | -.053*** | .038* |
| | (.020) | (.022) | (.014) | (.014) | (.013) | (.009) | (.012) | (.014) |
| Female | .284** | .118 | .061 | .060 | .103 | -.041 | -.038 | .080 |
| | (.107) | (.122) | (.076) | (.070) | (.074) | (.041) | (.065) | (.076) |
| Age | .019*** | .003 | .009*** | .004+ | .001 | .004*** | .006** | -.003 |
| | (.003) | (.003) | (.002) | (.002) | (.002) | (.001) | (.002) | (.002) |
| Physical heath | -.048 | .266*** | .090* | .051 | .034 | .019 | .050+ | .001 |
| | (.048) | (.029) | (.037) | (.035) | (.035) | (.020) | (.023) | (.039) |
| # of children under 19 | -.048 | .169** | .005 | .105*** | .075* | .024 | .050+ | .061+ |
| living in household | (.049) | (.054) | (.032) | (.031) | (.032) | (.018) | (.003) | (.034) |
| Working full-time | .014 | -.091 | .007 | -.115+ | -.135+ | -.047 | -.072 | -.097 |
| | (.095) | (.112) | (.070) | (.066) | (.070) | (.060) | (.062) | (.071) |
| Served in military | .027 | -.332+ | .046 | -.047 | -.169 | -.047 | -.186* | .260* |
| | (.136) | (.169) | (.101) | (.097) | (.107) | (.041) | (.094) | (.105) |
| Married | .076 | .539*** | .170* | .181** | -.029 | .014 | .028 | -.161+ |
| | (.096) | (.119) | (.074) | (.068) | (.070) | (.041) | (.062) | (.034) |
| South | .307*** | .405*** | .290*** | .096 | .049 | .001 | .072 | -.043 |
| | (.086) | (.106) | (.066) | (.061) | (.064) | (.036) | (.056) | (.071) |
| Rural | .235* | .052 | .326*** | .223** | .266*** | .137*** | .177** | .177* |
| | (.098) | (.122) | (.075) | (.070) | (.074) | (.039) | (.064) | (.082) |

*Notes*: Standard errors are in parentheses; number of cases for all models is 2,898 individuals.
+ $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests)

# APPENDIX E

## Table E1. Probit Coefficients for Direct Effects of Post-9/11 Helping Behavior Model, Control Variables

| Explanatory variables | # of victims or potential victims known | # of patriotic symbols displayed | Sorrow in response to the attacks | commem-orative gathering attendance | # of strong ties who encourage volunteering | # of strong ties who engage in volunteering |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Black | .098 | -.326** | -.008 | -.084 | .220** | .080 |
| | (.084) | (.126) | (.088) | (.087) | (.078) | (.098) |
| Other race | .233** | -.180 | .045 | -.152+ | .073 | -.198* |
| | (.077) | (.132) | (.083) | (.083) | (.074) | (.091) |
| College education | .254*** | -.732*** | .057 | -.053 | .092+ | .310*** |
| | (.059) | (.100) | (.065) | (.059) | (.052) | (.061) |
| Income | .038*** | .005 | -.031* | .006 | -.003 | .039** |
| | (.011) | (.018) | (.012) | (.011) | (.009) | (.013) |
| Female | .185** | .101 | .370*** | .303*** | -.016 | -.062 |
| | (.060) | (.092) | (.062) | (.059) | (.055) | (.063) |
| Age | -.008*** | -.003 | -.011*** | -.007*** | -.003 | .008*** |
| | (.002) | (.003) | (.002) | (.002) | (.002) | (.002) |
| Physical heath | .063+ | -.021 | -.156*** | .026 | .006 | .047 |
| | (.033) | (.046) | (.030) | (.030) | (.025) | (.031) |
| # of children under 19 | -.003 | .102* | -.003 | .047+ | .021 | .034 |
| living in household | (.028) | (.042) | (.029) | (.027) | (.023) | (.003) |
| Working full-time | .024 | .140 | -.008 | .079 | -.052 | -.073 |
| | (.060) | (.087) | (.059) | (.055) | (.054) | (.062) |
| Served in military | .176* | -.071 | -.175+ | -.056 | -.185* | -.247** |
| | (.083) | (.130) | (.097) | (.083) | (.077) | (.093) |
| Married | -.029 | .387*** | .107+ | .122* | .053 | .162** |
| | (.060) | (.089) | (.062) | (.057) | (.055) | (.061) |
| Rural | -.060 | -.024 | -.080 | .028 | .112+ | .182*** |
| | (.077) | (.097) | (.068) | (.062) | (.060) | (.069) |

*Notes* : Standard errors are in parentheses; number of cases for all models is 2,898 individuals.
+ $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

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