The Impact of International Criminal Court Arrest Warrants on Peace Processes

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Introduction

On July 17, 1998, the international community created the Rome Statute, the document outlining the creation of the ICC. The Rome Statute was ratified by 60 countries by July 1, 2002, making the ICC a legitimate and operating institution (About the Court). The ICC is able to prosecute four categories of crime – genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression (Schabas 2011, 88) – for which it has temporal jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and territorial jurisdiction. Temporal jurisdiction limits the court to only considering crimes that occurred after the Rome Statute was ratified (Schabas 2011, 69). Personal jurisdiction allows the court to consider crimes where the accused is a national of a state party regardless of where the crimes occurred (Schabas 2011, 76). Finally, territorial jurisdiction empowers the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over crimes that occur within the territory of a state party to the ICC or where the United Nations Security Council gives jurisdiction to crimes occurring in a particular territory (Schabas 2011, 81). The ICC was created to end impunity for international criminals, and to subsequently stop and prevent international atrocities (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 2002, 1).

Although the creation of a court to end impunity for international crimes was celebrated by many, critics worried about the impact of the ICC in ongoing conflicts. Specifically, some scholars argued that, "When faced with indictment and punishment, a human rights abuser might in fact dig in his heels, and refuse to give up or compromise" (Ginsburg 2009, 502). This debate over the ICC has been termed the "peace versus justice" debate with scholars wondering if the ICC forces a choice between peace and

justice. The question this thesis grapples with is the whether the ICC does pursue justice to the detriment of a peace process.

States join the ICC to show a credible commitment to the prosecution of international crimes. However, there are times when states need to show a credible commitment to not prosecute (e.g. times when states need to be able to grant an amnesty) to achieve other goals, such as peace process resolution (Ginsburg 2009, 500). Because the ICC makes the credible promise of amnesties difficult (if not impossible) (Ginsburg 2009, 500), many scholars argue that peace is sacrificed for justice. This thesis will investigate the peace versus justice debate by looking specifically at the implications of ICC arrest warrants on the peace process bargaining model. This thesis looks at the impact of introducing a third party – with set, unmoveable preferences – into a typical two party bargaining model.

This thesis is divided into five parts: part one will engage in a literature review to provide background on the current state of the peace versus justice literature; part two will introduce the theory this thesis proposes; part three will engage in an empirical test of the theory; part four will be a case illustration; and part five will offer conclusions and recommendations for future research.

Part One: Literature Review

Although much literature focuses on the positive role of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in ending impunity, some scholars have critically questioned the impact of the ICC (Ginsburg 2009, 501). These skeptical scholars focus on whether the ICC makes peace and justice mutually exclusive. The debate over the existence of this dichotomy has been termed the peace versus justice debate. This debate intensified with

the Juba Peace Process in Uganda and the concurrent ICC arrest warrants. There was an outcry from civilians and NGO activists that the ICC arrest warrants would prevent a peace deal. Betty Bigombe, the head of peace negotiations in Uganda, felt so strongly that the ICC would harm peace processes that she threatened to abandon the peace process (Branch 2007, 183-184). The peace versus justice debate was brought to the public's attention with many arguing that the ICC's goal of ending impunity sacrifices the opportunity for peace.

The opinions on this debate vary. In an interview on June 8, 2012, Christopher Hall of Amnesty International expressed that the ICC may stall peace but ending impunity is the most important goal. Other scholars such as Adam Branch (2009) argue that, as in the case in Uganda, the arrest warrants absolutely prevent a peace deal from being reached because of the removal of amnesty from the bargaining table. Branch explains that this occurs despite popular demand for an amnesty and conclusion to the war from the people most affected by the war (184). The existing literature on the peace versus justice debate presents theoretical arguments based on credible commitments and the politics of intervention in ongoing conflicts to argue that the ICC will stall or inhibit peace in the international crusade to end impunity.

The literature begins with the base assumption that countries commit to the ICC to credibly signal that they will prosecute international criminals (Ginsburg 2009, 503). Simmons and Danner (2010) produced a study based on credible commitment that showed counterintuitive results. They found that nondemocracies with recent histories of civil war were three times more likely to commit themselves to the Rome Statute than comparable nondemocracies without a similar conflict history (240). Simmons and

Danner identified two main reasons states would join the ICC: 1) they did not anticipate that their government would ever engage in activity that would fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC (i.e. Scandinavian countries); or 2) the signing governments want to use the ICC in a calculated way to credibly commit to reducing violence by promising to prosecute and to be prosecuted (231-232). Under reason two, countries with recent histories of war but weak internal prosecuting institutions could gain significantly from ICC involvement if the government were threatened by rebels (234-235). Therefore the countries that may most need to be able to offer amnesties in the future could be the same countries that were making a credible commitment to prosecute. This shows that answering the peace versus justice debate is important and relevant as the ICC continues to develop as an institution and its docket continues to grow.

Tom Ginsburg (2009) explains the problem with countries credibly committing themselves to prosecuting international criminals. While signing onto the Rome Statute shows a commitment to ending impunity, it is possible that in the future a nation may want to credibly promise not to prosecute and be able to credibly offer amnesty (for the accomplishment of a peace agreement) (500). While a domestic government may genuinely offer an amnesty, the accused (and the home government) will realize that amnesties are no longer simply a domestic matter. The ICC can press charges regardless of a domestic deal as these agreements are not binding on the ICC. Thus, by signing the Rome Statute, many domestic governments sign away a powerful negotiation tool (Ginsburg 2009, 507-508). Because the ICC needs to act apolitically and uniformly to end impunity and maintain its credibility (regardless of the concerns of pragmatists), the accused will take a strategy of not agreeing to a peace deal in the expectation that the ICC

will pursue prosecution (Ginsburg 2009, 509-510). Ginsburg (2009) argues that "by taking the power to give effective amnesties away from government, we may in fact exacerbate some of the worst human rights abuses" (507). However, at the same time, Ginsburg recognizes the need to prosecute. Without a real threat of prosecution, amnesty would not be a meaningful negotiation tool (508). Amnesty and prosecution are interconnected, and the ICC creates a commitment problem that brings this relationship to the forefront.

The ICC's case against Uganda provided the opportunity to view the interconnected role of amnesty and prosecution. Scholars started to look pragmatically at the impact of ICC arrest warrants on peace processes. Adam Branch (2007) applied his peace versus justice argument to the case of Uganda and Sarah Nouwen (2012) used the Uganda case study to challenge the ideology around the ICC of "no peace without justice" (Nouwen 2012, 172). Other scholars and supporters of the ICC have used the Uganda case study to argue that the ICC encourages peace. For example, they argued that because the Juba Peace talks began just months after the ICC arrest warrants were issued, the ICC can help bring about peace (Nouwen 2012, 180). Thus, theoretical arguments began to be grounded in case studies.

Recently, as the ICC has grown its docket and consequently the sample size for study, scholars have begun to test their theories using empirical analysis. In 2013 at the Peace Sciences Society, Alyssa Prorok presented her research that showed that war duration in which there was no ICC involvement had a lower probability of conflict survival (i.e. higher likelihood of termination) than war duration in which there was ICC involvement (Prorok 2013, slide 13).

The peace versus justice debate has included theoretical debates, case studies, credible commitment theory, political analysis of the nature of the ICC, and now empirical analysis. The literature is missing an analysis of the impact of ICC arrest warrants grounded in bargaining model theory. Therefore, I will theorize about the introduction of the ICC to a bargaining model built around two actors. Through quantitative analysis, I will test the results I expect to see from my theory and I will apply my theory to a case illustration.

Part 2: Theory

In peace agreements, amnesty is often offered as a bargaining chip to induce a rebel actor to sign an agreement. However, in "The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court", Michael Scharf (1999) explains that it is not realistic to expect a rebel actor to sign an agreement if he or she can reasonably expect to be prosecuted shortly after signing the agreement (508). This would clearly be acting against the rational self-interest of the rebel leaders. In case studies of Haiti, South Africa, and the Dayton Accords, Scharf demonstrated that an "amnesty may be a necessary bargaining chip to induce human rights violators to agree to peace and relinquish power" (508-509). Ginsburg (2009) explains that when facing prosecution, an international criminal might refuse to give up rather than compromise (502).

Figure 1 shows the options and outcomes Actor B (the rebel actor) would face in a peace agreement in which amnesty is not a possible outcome.

FIGURE 1: Peace process without an amnesty

Actor A \ Actor B	Cooperate	Defect
Cooperate	Peace agreement; Actor B arrested (2,2)	Actor B gains advantage; Actor B eludes arrest (1,4)
Defect	Actor A gains advantage; Actor B arrested (4,1)	War continues; Actor B eludes arrest (3, 3)

In Figure 1, cooperate means to sign and honor a peace agreement and defect means to not agree to and/or not honor a peace agreement. In this case, Actor B has two choices. If Actor B cooperates, Actor B will be arrested, resulting in Actor B will losing all of their resources, facing prosecution, and – most likely – facing some sort of sentence. The value of cooperation is thus any concessions gained for a peace agreement minus the loss of freedom and resources. If Actor B defects, Actor B will be able to elude arrest – even if only temporarily. The value of defecting is thus the value of retaining freedom or resources, any potential further profit to be gained from continuing the war, minus the probability of losing the war and not having any of the concessions offered in the peace agreement. Thus, for a rational Actor B, choosing to cooperate would have a payoff of 1 or 2, and defecting – or not agreeing to a peace resolution – has a payoff of 3 or 4. Although Actor B may have incentives to participate in a peace process, ultimately, without the promise of an amnesty, Actor B is incentivized to defect.

For Actor A, it is possible that due to pressure from constituents, Actor A may genuinely want to reach a peace agreement. However, Actor A must respond to Actor B's

clear, dominant strategy. As established, Actor B's dominant strategy is to defect. Thus, with the expectation that Actor B will defect, Actor A sets their own strategy. I assume that Actor A does not want to cooperate if Actor B is going to defect; Actor A would not want to be on the receiving end of a first-strike breaking a stalemate or be caught unprepared if Actor B does not honor portions of the agreement. Thus, cooperating has a payoff of 1 or 2 for Actor A and defecting has a payoff of 3 or 4. Actor A would much rather fall into the bottom right corner of the dilemma than the top right corner of the dilemma. The relative payoffs incentivize both Actor A and Actor B to defect, resulting in a nash equilibrium that continues the status quo (i.e. the war).

Figure 2 shows the choices Actor B would face if the promise of an amnesty were a possible outcome of a peace negotiation.

FIGURE 2: Peace process with amnesty

		Actor B	
		Cooperate	Defect
Actor A	Cooperate	Peace agreement; Actor B not arrested (4, 4)	Actor B gains advantage; Actor B not arrested (1, 3)
	Defect	Actor A gains an advantage; Actor B not arrested (3, 1)	Conflict continues; Actor B not arrested (2, 2)

In this case, Actor A signals their strategy first by offering an amnesty. The offering of an amnesty signals that Actor A is willing to cooperate rather than defect. This willingness to cooperate is likely from constituent pressure to reach a peace

agreement. In this case, Actor A's preferences are: peace agreement (4) > Actor A gains advantage (3) > status quo (2) > Actor B gains an advantage (1).

Actor B responds to this strategy. Once again, Actor B has two choices – continue the war or accept the peace agreement. If Actor B continues the war, Actor B could achieve additional profit, but Actor B risks being caught in the future and not having the option of amnesty. If Actor B accepts the peace agreement, Actor B would forgo any additional profit from continuing the war but would be guaranteed his freedom and current resources. Actor B could still choose to defect, but the payoff for cooperation has changed. So long as the risk of continuing the war is greater than the profit expected from continuing the war, Actor B's new preferences are: peace agreement (4) > Actor B gaining an advantage (3) > status quo (2) > Actor A gaining an advantage (1). In this case, both actors prefer to cooperate if the other will cooperate and defect if the other defects. Therefore, with amnesty on the table, cooperate-cooperate is the nash equilibrium and a peace agreement resolution can be reached.

As shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, Actor A and Actor B's strategy – cooperate or defect – depends on the deal being offered. In all peace negotiations there exists a bargaining range – a set of deals that both parties prefer to the returning to war (Frieden, Lake, and Schultz 2010, 92). The bargaining range is composed of the individual preferences of the two actors. Figure 3 shows Actor A's preferences.

Figure 3: Preferences for Actor A



As demonstrated in Figure 3, P is the predicted outcome of the war. There is a cost to A for continuing the war (diminishing returns for continuing the war); this cost is labeled P1-a. Actor A would be willing to accept anything to the right of P1-a because the cost is less than the cost of continuing the war. Actor A is unwilling to accept anything to the left of P1-a because it is more costly to Actor A than the cost of continuing the war (Frieden, Lake, and Schultz 2010, 91-93). Similarly, Actor B has preferences, which are shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Preferences for Actor B



As demonstrated in Figure 4, there is also a cost to B for continuing the war; this cost is labeled P1+b. Actor B would be willing to accept anything to the left of P1+b because the cost is less than the cost of continuing the war. Actor B is unwilling to accept anything to the right of P1+b because it is more costly to Actor B than the cost of continuing the war (Frieden, Lake, and Schultz 2010, 91-93).

Figure 5 shows the combination of Actor A and Actor B's preferences.

Figure 5: Bargaining Range for Actor A and Actor B



As shown, there is an overlap among the outcomes Actor A would accept over war and the outcomes Actor B would accept over war (Frieden, Lake, and Schultz 2010, 91-93).

Thus, an organic bargaining range develops is which a resolution is possible. There is a range of outcomes that both actors would accept, and a successful peace negotiation occurs when a deal is negotiated that falls within this mutually agreeable range.

I make several key assumptions about Actor A and Actor B's bargaining ranges. First, the bargaining ranges are representative of a zero sum game. Shifts within the bargaining range result in moving closer to one party's ideal point and further away from another party's ideal point. Thus, shifts result in making one party better off and one party worse off (Frieden, Lake, and Schultz 2010, 52). Second, I assume that – even though it is a zero sum game – the two actors can move with fluidity within the range in which they both agree; there are no issues of indivisibility within the mutually agreeable range. Third, I assume that the actors involved are rational; they make predictable decisions based on positive and negative incentives.

Combining the bargaining ranges with the preferences detailed in the prisoner's dilemmas, I theorize that Actor B will not accept a peace deal without the promise of an amnesty and could accept a peace deal with the promise of amnesty. Returning to Figure 5, I assume that everything to the left of P1+b includes some sort of promise of amnesty in the deal, and everything to the right of P1+b does not include a promise of amnesty. Accordingly, Actor B will not accept a peace deal without a promise of amnesty. Because this theory also assumes that the Actors do have overlapping preferences, a successful peace deal (found in range P1-a, P1+b) could include an amnesty for Actor A.

ICC arrest warrants affect the peace process by preventing Actor A from offering a credible promise of an amnesty because the ability to prevent prosecution is no longer solely in Actor A's hands. Traditionally, third parties are able to solve credibility

problems by offering a guarantee of implementation or compliance (Walter 2009, 255). Many studies have found that "civil wars are significantly more likely to end in a negotiated settlement if an outside state or international organization has sent peacekeepers to help with implementation" (Walter 2009, 255). However, the ICC brings in a new type of third-party influence. Unlike peacekeepers who are neutral and monitor the compliance of a deal agreed upon by the negotiating parties, the ICC can only support certain deals. Because the ICC arrest warrants serve as a credible promise to prosecute, they cannot support a peace deal that contains the promise of an amnesty. Furthermore, the ICC has sent a strong signal of their credible promise to prosecute through the arrest warrants and through former Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo's responses to critics. Ocampo operated the ICC under the vision of prosecuting each case whenever there is jurisdiction for ICC regardless of local politics (Ginsburg 2005, 510). Therefore, the presence of the ICC alters the bargaining range by adding a third party with set preferences. The new bargaining range is shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Bargaining Range for Actor A, Actor B, and the ICC



The ICC has a minimum deal they would be willing to accept; one in which they would still act on their arrest warrants and prosecute Actor B. Thus, the ICC will not comply with any peace deal to the left of its minimum deal point and will only comply with peace deals to the right of the minimum deal point. However, the ICC's minimum deal point is

outside of the organic bargaining range created by the overlap of Actor A and Actor B's preferences; the ICC's minimum deal point is in the range within which Actor B prefers war to any other outcome. Accordingly, Actor A cannot offer Actor B a deal within their mutually agreed upon bargaining range; thus, Actor B will not accept a peace deal. Consequently, the presence of ICC arrest warrants eliminates the possibility of a successful peace deal.

This theory predicts that the ICC renders the resolution of a peace process impossible by introducing a third party who mandates a certain kind of peace agreement outside of an organic bargaining range. Thus, this theory can be tested by looking at cases in which the ICC is involved to see if a peace process was reached. If peace process resolutions are reached, then support for my theory is not found; however, if peace process resolutions are not reached, then I do find support for my theory. Accordingly, the hypothesis I will test is: *ICC arrest warrants prevent the successful resolution of a peace process (measured by the signing and implementation of a peace agreement).* However, as a peace processes could fail for many other reasons, I will need to ensure that any testing controls for other possibilities, so that I can conclude – as confidently as possible – that the lack of a successful peace process resolution is correlated with the ICC arrest warrants rather than another factor.

Part Three: Empirical Analysis

Set Up

As explained above, the ICC has been involved in a small number of cases. However, Alyssa Prorok compiled a useable database on the ICC (Prorok 2013). For her database, she used all civil conflict dyads from Cunningham, Salehyan, and Gleditsch's

Non-State Actor dataset for the years 2002-2010 and expanded on their work. In their codebook, Cunningham, Salehyan, and Gleditsch explain that they define a civil conflict using the Uppsala Armed Conflict Data (1). According to the Armed Conflict Codebook, conflict is defined as concerning a government and/or territory where there is a use of armed force between two parties and at least 25 battle-related deaths (1). In Prorok's database, five dyads in four countries – Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, and the Central African Republic – within the data set received an ICC arrest warrant (see Appendix for context of all seven of the ICC's active cases).

I selected this database because Prorok coded for several important variables related to the ICC – warrant at the country level, warrant at the dyad level, ICC active on country level, and ICC active on dyad level. The database includes data for all civil conflicts that occurred from 2002-2010. Each year of conflict for a particular dyad in a particular country is listed, and the data are coded as time dummy variables. A 0 is listed if the conflict did not terminate in that year and a 1 is listed if the conflict terminated in that year. The same is true for ICC arrest warrants (i.e. if a warrant was in place in the year) and ICC involvement (i.e. if the ICC was involved in that year) (Prorok 2014 1).

Because I am testing for the impact of ICC arrest warrants on ending conflict through a peace process, my dependent variable is whether or not the conflict terminated. The Uppsala Armed Conflict Codebook explains that conflict is coded as having ended if the conflict is inactive the following year (11). Unfortunately, this is a proxy variable as it does not directly test for my outcome – termination by peace process resolution – but tests for termination generally. I recognize that termination can occur through two main

ways: 1) One side loses or 2) an agreement is reached. Because this dependent variable covers both options, I will control for one side losing.

My independent variable of interest is ICC arrest warrants at the dyad level. Specifically, I am looking to see if ICC arrest warrants at the dyad level have a positive or negative association with conflict termination. Based on my hypothesis, I anticipate that ICC arrest warrants at the dyad level will be negatively associated with conflict termination by preventing the successful resolution of a peace process, and consequently termination of the conflict. Based on my theory, I hypothesize that I will see this result at the dyad level because the ICC arrest warrant will impose set preferences in that specific dyad's actor's bargaining range.

In my analysis I will consider six controls. I used control variables to help isolate and analyze the effect of ICC arrest warrants on conflict termination. To fully test my hypothesis, I want to ensure I am seeing just the impact of ICC arrest warrants, and not ICC arrest warrants and another factor. Accordingly, I used control variables to control for other obvious alternative explanations (for example, the strength of one of the sides leading to the termination of a war).

First, I control for the alternative termination outcome – one side losing the war. I do so by including the variable "Relative Strength". This variable measures the relative strength of side b. It is coded 0 if side b is much weaker than the state, 1 if side b is weaker than the state, and 2 if side b is equivalent to or stronger than the state (Prorok 2014, 2). Because this variable takes into account the relative strength of side b against the state, it can control for one side losing (either side b or the state). This variable is

obviously a subjective variable as there is no perfectly objective way to measure relative strength. However, Prorok coded this variable using Cunningham, Salehyan, and Gleditsch Non-State Actor dataset (Prorok 2014, 1), which is a well-respected dataset.

Second, I control for intervention in the conflict. Often, third party involvement can enhance the relative strength of one side in combat or in peace negotiations. For example, the involvement of the United States/United Nations in the conflict in Bosnia in the early 1990s led to an expedited termination of the conflict. Accordingly, I included the variable "Balanced Intervention" which is coded 0 if only one side is receiving third party support and coded 1 if both sides are receiving third party support (Prorok 2014, 2).

Third, I control for the country's financial position. Paul Collier and Anke Heffler's work (2002) on conflict theory highlights the importance of "greed" – or the role of financial opportunity – in starting and continuing civil conflict (1). Therefore, I used the variable "GDP" – the natural log of GDP per capita (Prorok 2014, 2) – to control for the rebel's financial opportunities of engaging in and continuing the war.

Fourth, I controlled for whether or not the rebel group controlled territory using a dummy variable "Rebel Territory". This variable was created by Prorok (2014) using the NSA dataset (1). I included it because this variable, combined with "Relative Strength" and "Duration" (explained below), tested for an alternative hypothesis articulated by Prorok (2013) that cases in which the ICC are involved are also the "worst" cases. Accordingly, it could be that the ICC becomes involved in the worst cases which, because they are the worst cases, would be the slowest to terminate anyway, rather than the hypothesis that the cases are slower to terminate because of ICC involvement.

Although there is a robust sample size – 398 observations – these observations come from 111 dyads in 42 countries for the years 2002-2010. In this data set, the observations are not independent across time because each year of a conflict is not separated from each other. For example, in the previous year, one side could have been substantially weakened leading to conflict termination in the subsequent year. Accordingly, I control for time. To do so, this model uses the method advocated for by David Carter and Curtis Signorino – including duration, duration^2, and duration^3 in the model – to control for the time dependency (Carter and Signorino 2010, 271).

Finally, I control for the fact that the observations are not dependent across space. In this data, there are obvious groups within the data that make the data not perfectly random. Once conflict occurs in one country, all the observations of conflict (e.g. conflict in that country in 2002, 2003, and 2004) are selected. Accordingly, the observations are clustered. I control for this lack of separation by using Stata's cluster tool on country code.

Test

For this test, my null hypothesis is that warrants at the dyad level should not have an impact on conflict termination. My alternative hypothesis is that warrants at the dyad level do have an impact on conflict termination (thus, this is a two-sided t-test). However, based on my theory, I would expect that if I am able to accept the null hypothesis, the impact would be negative (i.e. it is associated with a decrease in conflict termination).

Because the dependent variable – conflict termination – is a binary variable, I used a logit model and clustered for the country code. Table 1 shows my results.

Table 1: Logit model testing dependent variable of conflict termination

Terminate	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	Z	P>|z|	95% Confidence Interval
Warrant at Dyad Level	-1.525	.365	-4.18	.000	-2.241, -.809
Balanced Intervention	.155	.535	0.29	.771	-.893, 1.205
Duration	-.344	.134	-2.55	.011	-.607, -.080
Duration^2	.023	.013	1.74	.082	-.003, .050
Duration^3	-.000	.000	-1.52	.129	-.001, .000
GDP	-.210	.129	-1.62	.105	-.465, .044
Relative Strength	.259	.299	.86	.387	-.328, .847
Rebel Territory	.333	.268	1.24	.214	-.192, .859
Constant	1.148	1.056	1.09	.277	-.922, 3.218
					N = 398

Based on my analysis, I am able to reject the null hypothesis that warrants at the dyad level do not have an impact on conflict termination and accept the alternative hypothesis that warrants at the dyad level do have an impact on conflict termination. Specifically, warrants at the dyad level should have a negative impact on conflict termination with an impact on the slope of negative 1.525; this finding is statistically significant with a p-value of .000.

Additionally, it is important to note that out of the 398 observations, only 17 of these observations are coded for having an ICC arrest warrant at the dyad level. To date, the ICC has indicted 32 people from seven different countries – the Democratic Republic

of Congo, the Central African Republic, Uganda, Sudan, Kenya, Libya, and the Cote d'Ivoire ("All Cases"). Thus, I expect that over time, as the sample of arrest warrants at the dyad level grows, these findings will grow in strength and robustness.

To test the dependency of my model, I used the logit test and included other independent variables coded by Prorok such as the natural log of the country's population, the natural log of the number of dyads fighting the state, and the country's polity score (coded 1 if between -6 and 6) (Prorok). As Table 2 shows, even when including these other variables, the p-value for warrants at the dyad level was .000.

Table 2: Logit model with additional variables

Terminate	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	Z	P>|z|	95% Confidence Interval
Warrant at Dyad Level	-1.731	.427	-4.05	.000	-2.569, -.892
Balanced Intervention	-.282	.679	-0.42	.678	-1.613, 1.049
Duration	-.317	.134	-2.36	.018	-.580, -.053
Duration^2	.022	.012	1.75	.080	-.002, .047
Duration^3	-.000	.000	-1.61	.108	-.001, .000
GDP	-.216	.138	-1.56	.119	-.487, .055
Relative Strength	.333	.300	1.11	.266	-.254, .922
Rebel Territory	.215	.289	0.75	.456	-.350, .782
Population	-.244	.100	-2.43	.015	-.442, -.047
# of Dyads fighting	.622	.265	2.35	.019	.103, 1.142
Polity Score	.086	.419	.21	.836	-.734, .908
constant	3.231	1.620	1.99	.046	.055, 6.408
					N = 398

I also tried substituting warrants at the dyad level with warrants at the country level and clustering around dyad i.d.. In this logit analysis, the coefficient for warrants at the country level was -.8923 with a statistically significant p-value of .038. Thus, as shown in Table 3, I was still able to – with 95% confidence – reject the null hypothesis that ICC arrest warrants did not have an impact on conflict termination.

Table 3: Logit model clustered around dyad rather than country

Terminate	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	Z	P>|z|	95% Confidence Interval
Warrant at Cntry Level	-.892	.429	-2.08	.038	-1.733, -.051
Balanced Intervention	.146	.416	.35	.724	-.668, .962
Duration	-.356	.140	-2.54	.011	-.631, -.081
Duration^2	.024	.014	1.69	.090	-.003, .052
Duration^3	-.000	.000	-1.47	.142	-.001, .000
GDP	-.247	.139	-1.78	.076	-.521, .025
Relative Strength	.251	.292	.86	.391	-.322, .824
Rebel Territory	.349	.330	1.06	.291	-.298, .996
constant	1.487	1.119	1.33	.184	-.705, 3.681
					N = 398

Additionally, I deliberately excluded many variables such as ICC involvement at the dyad level or ICC involvement at the country level because of multicollinearity. I assumed that an arrest warrant would not be present at the dyad level or the country level if the ICC was not involved at the dyad or country level. Accordingly, including both

variables increased the standard errors which in turn increased the p-values as it was difficult to tell which variable was having which effect due to the overlap.

Some weaknesses of the model include the inability to test my exact dependent variable (i.e. termination due to a peace process resolution rather than any termination), the dependency of the observations (although this was controlled for), and the relatively small sample size. However, my findings were significant even when controlling the relative strength of side b, time, the financial opportunity of the war, the impact of third party intervention, and dependency of the observations around country groupings which allows me to be confident in my conclusions.

Based on this data analysis, I find that ICC warrants are negatively correlated with conflict termination. However, I would like to attempt to move beyond just correlation, and see if I can find a causal link for ICC arrest warrants preventing or prolonging conflict termination. Thus, I will use a case illustration to perform an in-depth analysis of one of the data points included in Prorok's database – the case against the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda. I will apply my theory to the actual reality of the situation in the Uganda to see if I can logically trace the lack of a successful peace process resolution to the arrest warrants served by the ICC.

Part Four: Case Illustration

As stated, for my case illustration, I have selected the Juba Peace talks of 2006-2008 in which the participating parties were the government of Uganda (led by President Museveni) and the Lord's Resistance Army (led by Joseph Kony). In addition to being a data point in Prorok's database, the peace process for this case was well documented with the many different NGOs and governments participating in the peace process releasing

reflections and updates on the process; thus, a lot of resources are available for analysis. Concerning these talks, a local leader, Father Carlose Rodriguez of the Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative, stated, "Obviously, nobody can convince the leaders of a rebel movement to come to the negotiating table and at the same time tell them that they will appear in courts to be prosecuted" (Branch 2009, 183). Clearly, these talks exhibit the relationship between peace and justice that I want to examine.

President Yoweri Museveni came to power in January 1986 after fighting the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) (Allen 2005, 10). In response to the conflict following Museveni's rise to power, many "nebi" – people who claimed to have been endowed with power from spirits – began to emerge (Allen 2005, 11-13). The largest cult developed around a woman named Alice Lakenwa, and she created The Holy Spirit Movement (HSM). In October 1987 the HSM was defeated by Museveni's forces, the National Resistance Army (NRA) (Allen 2005, 13-15).

While the HSM was active, Joseph Kony claimed that he was Alice's cousin and that he was possessed by spirits too (Allen 2005, 16). While Alice recruited in Kitgum, Kony recruited followers in Gulu. In 1988, Museveni signed a peace agreement with leaders of the Ugandan People's Democratic Army (UPDA). UPDA forces that were unwilling to surrender joined Kony (Allen 2005, 16). Kony named his movement the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Since 1988, the LRA has been engaged in a guerilla campaign against the government of Uganda (Allen 2005, 17). The LRA has engaged in "massacres, maimings, and the forced recruitment of thousands of Acholi" (Branch 2007, 180).

In 1991, the government launched Operation North, an intense insurgency attempting to end the conflict. The LRA responded aggressively and hundreds were killed (Allen 2005, 20). However, despite the conflict of Operation North, in 1994 Bigombe was able to engage the LRA and, during peace talks, arranged a cease fire (Branch 2005, 20). Ultimately, the peace talks ended when Museveni issued a seven day ultimatum to the LRA requiring them to turn themselves over to the government (Allen 2005, 21). Then, in the mid-1990s, the Sudanese Government provided support to the LRA in return for the LRA assisting Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir in fighting the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) (Allen 2005, 21). Following this new support, in 1996, the LRA agreed to ceasefire and offered a permanent ceasefire if Museveni was not reelected (Allen 2005, 22).

In 2000, the Uganda Amnesty Act was created (Allen 2005, 32) at the request of the Acholi people – those most impacted by the violence (Branch 2007, 184). They lobbied for the creation of the Act because, according to Branch, they understood "that the war [would] not end until the LRA leadership abandon[ed] the rebellion" and wanted to provide an incentive for them to do so (2007, 184). In 2002, Museveni launched Operation Iron Fist in which the Ugandan Army, renamed to the Uganda Peoples Defence Force (UPDF) partnered with the SPLA to eliminate the LRA (Allen 2005, 22).

In 2003, President Museveni referred "the Situation Concerning the Lord's Resistance Army" to the ICC. The Ugandan government explained,

> "Having exhausted every other means of bringing an end to this terrible suffering, the Republic of Uganda now turns to the newly established ICC and its promise of

> global justice. Uganda pledges its full cooperation to the Prosecutor in the investigation and prosecution of LRA crimes, achievement of which is vital not only for the future progress of the nation, but also for the suppression of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole" (Branch 2007, 182-183).

In July 2004 the Office of the Prosecutor officially opened an investigation and in October 2005 arrest warrants were issued against Joseph Kony and four top commanders of the Lord's Resistance Army. They were charged with both war crimes and crimes against humanity (Branch 2007, 179). These arrest warrants overruled the Uganda Amnesty Act (Branch 2007, 184). Also in 2004, Museveni launched a second Iron Fist offensive (Allen 2005, 23).

Adam Branch argues that the government of Uganda was set to gain from ICC intervention. By labeling his opponent as a criminal, Museveni was able to legitimize his side of the war, and use the ICC for his own benefit (Branch 2007, 183). Nouwen (2012) emphasized the importance of referring the "situation regarding the LRA" and not the "situation in Uganda" (176). Branch explains that this referral was on purpose; Museveni was able to protect himself and his army from being investigated (Branch 2007, 179-180). The result was that Museveni has been able to quiet political opposition, gain international support, and justify defense spending on the army that keeps him in power (2007, 185). Thus, Branch hypothesizes that it is possible that Uganda referred the situation to the ICC not to bring about an end to the war, but to gain justification for their side of the war (2007, 185-186) and allow Museveni to focus on a military only solution (184).

The reactions to the arrest warrants were highly polarized. Many celebrated the ICC's involvement and supported the ending of impunity for Kony to achieve "justice". However, many Ugandans, especially the leaders of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative, were outspoken in condemning the warrants (Allen 2005 42-43). Father Carlos Rodriguez stated, "The issuing… of international arrest warrants would practically close once and for all the path to peaceful negotiation as a means to end this long war…" (Allen 2005, 43). Even Ugandan government officials, such as the Amnesty Commission spokesperson, recognized that excluding Kony and other LRA leaders from the Amnesty Act would make ending the war more difficult (Allen 2005, 43). Allen (2005) conducted a group interview with people at Awere IDP camp. One man stated, "The ICC is going to make the war continue because those commanders who will be willing to come back will be discouraged and continue fighting" (50-51).

Surprisingly, however, only a few months after the arrest warrants were issued, the LRA agreed to enter into peace talks with the Ugandan government. Thus, the Juba Peace talks began in 2006 (Nouwen 2012, 180). Many advocates for the ICC claimed that the arrest warrants served as the catalyst that brought Kony to the negotiating table. Although perhaps the international pressure that an ICC arrest warrant carries is what spurred Kony to reach out, Nouwen (2012) argues that perhaps the effect was less direct. Nouwen points to the fact that the ICC's arrest warrants caused the government of Sudan to withdraw their support for the LRA and join the government of Uganda in putting pressure on the LRA. Thus, the willingness to negotiate could have been a result of the LRAs increasing vulnerability, which provided the LRA with an incentive to talk (180). The argument presented by Nouwen fits with the key assumption made in this paper –

actors will follow the incentives that help them to survive. Thus, for Kony, agreeing to participate in peace negotiations could have been an attempt to temporarily survive.

The Juba Peace talks officially began on July 16, 2006 (Machar 2008, 1). In analyzing these peace talks, I assume that, despite the fact that Kony claims to be possessed by a spirit, Kony is a rational actor who can respond predictably to incentives. This is assumption backed by Tim Allen, who in an interview on July 7, 2012, explained that he has personally met with Kony. Allen (2005) points to the LRA's political agenda to suggest that this movement is motivated by more than just the voice of a religious spirit. Allen names ten political demands that Kony and the LRA have publicized through manifestos and pamphlets (19). Examples of these political goals include "education for all" and "relocation of Uganda's administrative capital to Kigumba in Masindi District" (Allen 2005, 19). Allen also suggests that Kony's use of the "spirits" has been purposeful; "terror has been a strategy of choice" (20). In this paper, I assume that Allen is correct; Kony is not just a deranged lunatic who hears voices from "spirits" but rather makes deliberate choices – such as killing LRA members in front of other LRA members or by claiming to be possessed by spirits to instill fear in his troops and thus command them.

In an interview between Allen and a young LRA soldier who had escaped, the LRA soldier describes rational, intentional decisions by Kony. He explains that "Kony fears to come by himself (in reference to peace talks) so he would rather send his representative because he says that he knows what the Government [sic] intentions are.." (2005, 35). The young soldier then continues to explain that Kony provided them with

concrete examples as to why he (Kony) did not trust the government's intention, such as the 2002 peace deal (Allen 2005, 35).

For the Juba Peace talks, Riek Machar was mutually agreed upon to be the chief mediator (Hendrickson and Tumutegyereize 2012, 6). Machar (2008) explained that representation for the LRA was a challenge from the start as Kony and other LRA leaders refused to go to Juba in person because of the ICC arrest warrants. Thus, they sent representatives on their behalf or communicated through phone or planned visits outside of the Juba Peace talks (2). Because the arrest warrants challenged Kony and Museveni's ability to communicate, it was difficult for Kony and Museveni to make clear to each other what their individual bargaining models looked like.

However, despite the communication challenge, six agenda items were discussed, and official agreements were signed. These agreements included: agreement on cessation of hostilities, agreement on comprehensive solutions, agreement on accountability and reconciliation, agreement on a permanent ceasefire, agreement on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, and agreement on implementation and monitoring mechanisms (Machar 2008, 2). The fact that these agreements were reached implies that Kony and Museveni did have overlapping bargaining ranges resulting in a bargaining model in which they could find places of agreement. Figure 7 illustrates this model.

Figure 7: Bargaining Range for Museveni and Kony



For example, in the agreement on accountability and reconciliation, it was agreed that the LRA would be removed from the list of Terrorist Organizations upon disarmament by the

LRA ("Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation" 2007, 10). It was also agreed that the government of Uganda would develop new legislation providing for alternative penalties and sanctions for human rights violations committed by non-state actors ("Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation" 2007, 7). Thus, there were items that Kony and Museveni could agree to in principle that they favored over the continuation of war.

However, Kony and Museveni were not the only actors in the Juba Peace talks. The ICC – through the arrest warrants – acted an external actor. Thus, Figure 8 represents the true bargaining range for the Juba Peace talks.

Figure 8: Bargaining Model for Museveni, Kony, and the ICC



In this bargaining model, the ICC imposes a set preference outside of the organic bargaining range that exists between Kony and Museveni. This models assumes: 1) that the ICC will not accept a deal that does not include prosecution by the ICC; 2) that Museveni would be willing to accept either outcome (prosecution by the ICC or amnesty); and 3) that Kony will not accept any deal that results in prosecution by the ICC.

The ICC has made a clear signal to Uganda and the international community that they are not willing to accept any deal in which they do not prosecute Kony and the other LRA commanders facing ICC arrest warrants. As Ginsburg (2008) explained, the ICC – as a new institution – is currently trying to build its own credibility. The ICC needs to

signal to the world that it is a court with "a role to play" (510). ICC Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo has explained "that he regularly obtains communications from states, NGOs, and parties to various conflicts asking him to refrain from initiating prosecutions so that a peace deal can be worked out" (Ginsburg 2008, 509). However, despite these communications, Prosecutor Ocampo has stated, "I apply the law without political consideration. But the other actors have to adjust to the law." (Nouwen and Werner 2010, 942). As the first case initiated by the ICC, and considering the fact that the ICC is still pursuing the charges, it seems unlikely that the ICC – which is still trying to build its credibility – would be willing to accept an outcome where they do not prosecute Kony. Thus, I assume that the location of the ICC's preferences in Figure 8 is in fact reflective of the situation in Juba.

Although the ICC would not accept any deal which does not involve prosecution, it is likely that Museveni would be willing to accept either amnesty or prosecution. Because Museveni referred the situation to the ICC, it is easy to conclude that he will be willing to accept prosecution (assuming that he does understand the role and functions of the ICC). As examined earlier, Branch (2007) argues that Museveni referred the situation to justify a military end to the war (185-186). As a military solution would end with prosecution, there is support for this assumption.

Additionally, there is also support for the assumption that Museveni would be willing to accept amnesty. Kennedy Tumutegyereize of the NGO Conciliation Resources was present and involved at the Juba Peace talks. In his reflections on the talks – written with Dylan Hendrickson (2012) – he explains that in Juba, the talks focused on "how to find a way around the huge constraints posed by the ICC arrest warrants and convince

Kony that giving himself up was in his interest – a game that necessitated taking the real talks outside the formal Juba framework" (12). In an interview, Tumutegyereize and colleague Caesar Poblicks, explained that informal negotiations began to occur outside of the public negotiations. These informal negotiations were composed of a small team of Kony and Museveni's most trusted advisors and focused on finding a solution acceptable to Kony. This was confirmed in the reflections by Tumutegyereize and Hendrickson (2012) as they explained that Museveni began to communicate directly with Kony over the phone about Kony's personal situation to find a resolution (24). Thus, the fact that Museveni discussed other options directly with Kony at the least implies that he was willing to consider another option than prosecution. Furthermore, Tumutegyereize and Hendrickson (2012) wrote that a "gentleman's agreement" was in fact reached. In this agreement, the Ugandan government would ask the United Nation's Security Council to suspend the ICC's involvement. In return for the suspension, the government of Uganda would create a Special Court to try Kony. Kony would be "imprisoned" in Uganda but he would maintain some freedoms and be spared "the humiliation of formal incarceration" (24). While it is clear this agreement ultimately failed, it does show that Museveni was willing to accept some version of amnesty. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that Museveni was willing to accept anything to the right of p1-a in Figure 7.

Finally, there is evidence to suggest that Kony would not be willing to accept any deal to the right of p1+b (i.e. any deal that includes prosecution by the ICC). At the very beginning of the talks, the LRA asked that the ICC arrest warrants be "withdrawn" (Nouwen 2012, 181). As explained above, it was because of this insistence on the dropping of the arrest warrants that the informal negotiations between Kony and

Museveni developed. However, Hendrickson and Tumutegyereize (2012) commented that these negotiations fell apart because Kony refused to sign any agreement without the ICC arrest warrants being dropped first (24). In explaining this refusal to sign, Kony has referenced Charles Taylor, the former Liberian president who was promised asylum and ultimately prosecuted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone (Nouwen 2012, 181). Thus, Kony is aware and hesitant of promises of amnesty without credible proof; consequently, Kony is unwilling to accept any deal that does not satisfactorily convince him he would not be prosecuted by the ICC (i.e. any deal that he is not convinced is fully within the mutually agreeable range). Finally, this theory is supported by the fact that although the LRA delegation signed the different Juba Peace talk agreement, Kony has – to date – refused to sign the final document (Nouwen 2012, 181). As shown in the prisoner's dilemma in Figure 1, without the promise of an amnesty, Kony's dominant strategy was to defect.

Based on the supporting evidence I conclude that the ICC is unwilling to accept a deal that does not include prosecution, that Museveni is willing to accept a deal with or without prosecution, and that Kony is unwilling to accept a deal that includes prosecution. Accordingly, the model developed in my theory holds true in this case illustration.

Part Four: Conclusion

Since the beginning of the Juba Peace Process in 2006, NGOs, governments, civilians, and scholars have claimed that the intervention of the ICC prevented peace in the case of Uganda. Furthermore, they fear that this is a universal effect; they fear that the ICC will prevent the successful peaceful resolution of conflict in all cases in which the

ICC intervenes. Currently, the literature has remained broad and theoretical, debating topics like the merits of ending impunity. This thesis hopes to contribute to and shift the dialogue in the peace versus justice debate by looking at the impact of the ICC arrest warrants on peace processes in the traditional two party bargaining model. By grounding my argument in bargaining model theory, I shift the discussion to predicting actors' actions through game theory and incentives.

I theorized that the ICC imposes set preferences in the bargaining model between the two actors. Because I assume that Actor B (the accused Actor) is unwilling to accept a deal without an amnesty, and the ICC is unwilling to accept a deal with an amnesty, a peace agreement will not be able to be reached. In testing my theory, I found that ICC arrest warrants at the dyad level did have a statistically significant impact on conflict termination. In line with my prediction, this impact was negative, meaning that ICC arrest warrants did decrease the probability of conflict termination. Additionally, I applied my theory to the case study of Uganda and found that my assumptions were supported by the events that occurred; Kony did not sign a peace agreement and he cited the ICC as the main reason why.

In an interview with Dapo Akende at Oxford University on June 14, 2012, it was pointed out that this research could be expanded by looking at the changing "landscape" of peace negotiations. Akende explained that the comparison is no longer peace process with ICC arrest warrant versus peace process with no ICC arrest warrant, but rather, peace process with ICC arrest warrant versus peace process in which the ICC has not yet decided to pursue a case. Thus further research could be on the impact of the international presence of the ICC on all peace negotiations (Akende 2012).

Unfortunately, this thesis is ultimately limited by the lack of available cases to study, as only 17 of the 398 cases included in the dataset used had an ICC arrest warrant. However, as the ICC continues to grow its docket, my theory will be able to be further tested and applied and in other case studies. Since ratification in 2002, the ICC has set out to prove its legitimacy. As the ICC gets further involved in international conflicts, the peace versus justice debate will grow, but scholars will be able to gather enough data to draw a conclusion grounded in empirical research.

Appendix 1:

ICC Country Involvement

Currently, the ICC has cases open in seven different countries. The seven countries where arrests have occurred are the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Uganda, Sudan, Kenya, Libya, and the Cote d'Ivoire ("All Cases").

The ICC initiated six arrest warrants against individuals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo ("All Cases). Although various peace processes have occurred during the conflict within the Democratic Republic of the Congo, only one of the agreements involved one of the six individuals indicted by the ICC after the arrest warrants had been confirmed. Bosco Ntaganda was involved in a peace agreement signed on March 23, 2009 (almost three years after his ICC arrest warrant was issued). This peace agreement – signed by the government and by leaders of the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) – incorporated the CNDP rebels into the Congolese army and Ntaganda was promoted to the role of general in the army. Ntaganda defected by forming a new rebel group, M23, named for the peace agreement he defected from (Human Rights Watch 2013, 1).

Initially, the ICC issued one arrest warrant in the Central African Republic for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo ("All Cases"). He was arrested by the Belgian authorities on the same day that Pre-Trial Chamber III issued the arrest warrant ("Central African Republic"). Since that time, a second case has been opened with arrest warrants for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aime Kilolo Musama, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidele Babala Wandu, and Narcisse Arido for presenting false or forged evidence and/or corrupting a witness ("Central African Republic").

In Uganda, the ICC issued five arrest warrants for top leaders in the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) ("All Cases"). After the issuance, a major peace process – the Juba Peace Talks – began between the LRA and the Uganda. Ultimately, the LRA's top commander, Joseph Kony, failed to sign the peace agreement.

In Sudan, the ICC issued charges for Ahmad Muhammad Harun, Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, and Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain ("All Cases"). As president of Sudan, Omar Al Bashir has been involved in many peace processes. For example, in 2011, the Government of Sudan signed the "Doha Document for Peace in Darfur" with Liberation and Justice Movement leaders (such as Bahar Abu Garda who is also facing ICC arrest warrants) which established the framework for a comprehensive peace process in Darfur (UNAMID) ("Signing of Doha Agreement prompts mixed reactions"). However, it is important to note that none of the peace processes Bashir has engaged in call for him to step down from office and that much of the violence in Sudan is still ongoing.

In Kenya, the ICC is pursuing charges against William Samoei Ruto, Joshus Arap Sang, Uhur Muigai Kenyatta, and Walter Osapiri Barasa ("Kenya"). The peace deal ending the violence in Kenya was signed in 2008 (Gettleman 2008); thus, a peace agreement was reached before ICC arrest warrants were issued.

In Libya, the ICC issued three arrest warrants ("All Cases"). A peace agreement was not reached before Mummar Gaddafi passed away, but a peace process was initiated and a ceasefire was agreed upon. However, the peace talks broke down when the rebel

leaders insisted that Gaddafi and his sons be removed from power ("What peace deal?" 2011).

In the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire, the ICC has issued three arrest warrants ("All Cases"). Peace agreements have not occurred with those facing ICC arrest warrants.

Appendix 2: Conflicts included in Prorok's dataset (2013)

Conflict ID	Years Included	Side B	Country
191	2002-2003	GIA	Algeria
191	2002-2010	AQIM	Algeria
131	2002	UNITA	Angola, Namibia
90	2002-2003	CNDD-FDD	Burundi
90	2002-2008	Palipehutu-FNL	Burundi
91	2002	MDJT	Chad
214	2002	Ntsiloulous	Congo-Brazzaville, Angola, Chad
133	2002-2010	ONLF	Ethiopia
219	2002-2010	OLF	Ethiopia
225	2002	MPCI	Cote D'Ivoire
225	2002-2003	MPIGO	Cote D'Ivoire
146	2002-2003	LURD	Liberia
179	2002	Opposition	Rwanda
179	2009-2010	FDLR	Rwanda
180	2002-2003	MFDC	Senegal
118	2002-2010	LRA	Uganda
192	2002-2009	FLEC-FAC	Angola
192	2002	FLEC	Angola
141	2002	SRRC	Somalia
10	2002-2010	Communist	Philippines
95	2007-2010	Sendero	Peru
92	2002-2010	FARC	Colombia
112	2002-2010	MILF	Philippines
157	2002-2009	LTTE	Sri Lanka
225	2002-2003	MJP	Cote D'Ivoire
112	2002-2010	Abu	Philippines
112	2002	MNLF	Philippines
139	2002-2006	NLFT	India
222	2002	Faction	Central African Republic, Libya
170	2002-2010	ULFA	India
198	2004	Republic	Georgia
198	2008	Republic	Georgia
227	2002-2004	BDSF/NDFB	India
152	2004-2006	PLA	India
137	2003-2010	Taliban	Afghanistan
159	2002-2010	PKK/Kadek	Turkey
152	2002-2009	UNLF	India
92	2002-2010	ELN	Colombia
92	2004	EPL	Colombia
171	2002-2005	GAM	Indonesia
206	2002-2007	Republic	Russia

72	2002-2006	CPN-M/UPF	Nepal
146	2003	MODEL	Liberia
169	2002-2010	Kashmir	India
224	2002-2010	Al-Qaida	USA, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Netherlands, Poland
193	2005	Republic	Azerbaijan
37	2002-2007	Fatah	Israel
37	2002-2010	PIJ	Israel
37	2002-2010	Hamas	Israel
29	2002-2004	Naxalites/PWG	India
29	2002-2004	MCC	India
137	2008-2010	Hezb-i-Islami	Afghanistan
37	2002-2004	AMB	Israel
37	2002	PNA	Israel
113	2003-2010	SLM/A	Sudan
113	2003-2010	JEM	Sudan
130	2003	EIJM	Eritrea
225	2004	FN	Cote D'Ivoire
186	2004	FLRN	Haiti
186	2004	OP	Haiti
62	2004-2008	Al-Mahdi	Iraq
62	2004-2007	Ansar	iraq
221	2004	JIG	Uzbekistan
249	2004	Ahlul	Nigeria
62	2004-2010	ISI/Jama'at	Iraq
29	2005-2010	CPI-Maoist	India
54	2005-2007	NSCN	India
91	2005-2005	FUCD	Chad
188	2005	MKP	Turkey
143	2005-2010	PJAK	Iran
248	2003-2010	Patani	Thailand
250	2004	NDPVF	Nigeria
62	2005-2007	RJF/Al-Jaysh	Iraq
222	2006	UFDR	Central African Republic
37	2006	Popular	Israel
113	2006	NRF	Sudan
113	2006	SLM/A	Sudan
141	2006-2008	ARS/UIC	Somalia
91	2006	RAFD	Chad
91	2006-2007	UFDD	Chad
129	2005-2006	Baluch	Pakistan
129	2004-2010	BLA/Baluchistan	Pakistan
143	2006-2010	Jondullah	Iran
113	2002-2004	SPLM	Sudan

251	2006	Hezbollah	Israel
86	2006-2008	CNDP	Democratic Republic of Congo
112	2007	MNLF	Philippines
113	2007-2008	SLM/A-Unity	Sudan
177	2007-2009	ATNMC	Mali
254	2007-2008	BDK	Democratic Republic of Congo
209	2007	TNSM	Pakistan
255	2007-2008	MNJ	Niger
152	2008-2009	KCP	India
258	2008	DHD	India
152	2008-2009	PREPAK	India
91	2008	AN	Chad
209	2008-2010	TTP	Pakistan
141	2008-2010	Al-Shabaab	Somalia
141	2008	Harakat	Somalia
259	2008	PULF	India
257	2007-2010	Forces	Russia
129	2008-2009	BRA/Baluchistan	Pakistan
222	2009-2010	CPJP	Central African Republic
91	2009	UFR	Chad
33	2009-2010	AQAP	Yemen
227	2009-2010	NDFB	India
100	2009-2010	Boko	Nigeria
141	2009-2010	Hizbul-Islam	Somalia
267	2010	AQIM	Mauritania
91	2010	PFNR	Chad
113	2010	Forces	Sudan
266	2010	IMU	Tajikistan

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