

Stopping the Bloody Cycle of Civil Wars:
The Effect of Specific Regime Type on Civil War Recurrence

By Jennifer A. Jordan

A Thesis submitted to the faculty
of the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the
requirements of a degree with Honors in
Political Science.

2015

Approved by

Adviser

Stopping the Bloody Cycle of Civil Wars:

The Effect of Specific Regime Type on Civil War Recurrence

Abstract

This paper investigates which specific regime type is best able to prevent civil war recurrence. I theorize that due to the different levels of citizen involvement in each regime type, a regime such as a Consensus Democracy with a high level of citizen involvement will be less vulnerable to rebellion than a regime with low levels of citizen involvement, such as a Strongman Autocracy. I find that the only regime type significantly correlated with the outbreak of civil war in a post-conflict state is the Strongman regime. Among the autocratic-leaning regimes, I am unable to find any significant results for the personalistic and militaristic factors. Among the democratic-leaning regimes, I am also unable to find any significant results for the four institutions and democracy consensus scores. Overall, I found that it is less important to have a regime that is best at preventing conflict recurrence, but rather more important to avoid the regime type – Strongman Autocracies – that are worst at preventing conflict recurrence.

Introduction

In the modern era, few events provide countries the ability to establish a completely new government like a civil war, making them an enticing solution for unsatisfied citizens. But civil wars are inherently destructive forces that harm a country's economy, political institutions, health, and overall standard of living, disrupting the lives of both its citizens and neighbors. Given that about half of all countries that suffer through one civil war will experience another, one of the most important jobs a post-civil war government has is to prevent conflict recurrence.

Political regimes can be categorized by how democratic or authoritarian they are, but this one-dimensional sorting ignores the intricacies of how different autocracies and democracies actually handle internal political conflict. An autocratic Strongman regime, which relies on a single leader's personality and military power, will likely have a different approach to handling dissent than an autocratic Machine regime, in which no one leader has absolute power and the party rules over the military. Similarly, a democratic Majoritarian regime, which can ignore minority opinion and enables one elected official to have more power, will likely handle dissent differently than a democratic Consensus regime, in which minorities have their own institutional power and cooperation is necessary for political action.

Different regime types, with their own sets of political institutions, handle internal conflict differently. Sometimes a country is able to switch regimes without civil war being necessary. And sometimes a country returns to the same regime type no matter how many civil wars it has experienced. For example, consider the post-WWII experiences of Chad and Thailand.

Chad has been embroiled in five destructive civil wars for just under half of the time since its independence in 1960. The first Chadian Civil War occurred just five years after independence, lasting for six years, before the second broke out in 1980. Chadian politics has

been characterized by highly personalistic and authoritarian leaders throughout its modern history, with a tendency towards more militaristic leaders in the last half of Chad's statehood. Chad's cycle of recurring civil wars and unsuccessful dictators has contributed to its ranking as the fourth lowest country in the world on the UN's Human Development Index.

Thailand has also had a tumultuous political history. Until 1973, Thailand was led by military dictatorships, some more personalistic than others. Its first brush with democracy only lasted a few years, however, before the military regained control. Ever since, Thailand has been characterized by a rotation of rule by Juntas, a return to democracy triggered by protests, Democracies that tend to have more consensus traits (at least in the last few decades), and then relatively bloodless coups during periods of instability that lead to another Junta. Despite the instability of any one regime, Thailand's only civil war in the post-WWII period occurred in 1971-72, right before its first experiment with democracy.

Every country has a unique story of war and changing regimes. In my thesis, I attempt to find out what kind of government is best able to prevent the bloody cycle of recurring civil wars by simplifying each country's story down to the specific regime type that immediately precedes a civil war.

The literature on civil wars is extensive. The question of what causes a civil war to occur or reoccur has been asked many times, with each author focusing on the economy, political institutions, past conflict, demographic makeup, or any number of other factors. The benefits of consensus democracies versus majoritarian democracies have also been debated, albeit not with the degree of conclusiveness that is present in the civil war literature. However, the closest the two spheres of literature come to intersecting is in analyzing the benefits of power-sharing institutions in post-conflict states.

In my study, I analyzed the impact of both autocratic and democratic regime subtypes on civil war recurrence. In order to do this I categorized each autocratic-leaning regime as a Strongman, Boss, Junta, Machine, or Monarchy, and each democratic-leaning regime as Majoritarian, Mixed, or Consensus. For the democratic-leaning regimes, I do this by creating a consensus score based on four political institutions: legislative type, federalism, executive inclusion (or restraint), and executive type. I theorize that the reason each regime type would have a different effect on a state's chances of experiencing conflict recurrence has to do with the level of citizen involvement. The more people involved in the political decision-making process, the fewer there will be with the incentive to rebel.

I find that the effect of regime type on civil war recurrence is only significant for the most conflict-prone regimes. Strongman regimes are significantly more likely to trigger recurring civil wars. However, the regime types that perform better do not do so significantly relative to each other. Within the autocratic-leaning regime types, militaristic and personalistic regimes seem to be correlated with conflict recurrence, although this result is not quite at a level of significance. Within democratic-leaning regimes, the only significant result is that the federalism indicator is significantly correlated with conflict recurrence.

Literature Review

In the post-WWII era, civil war has become increasingly prevalent. There have been 155 civil wars since 1946 until 2007 (as measured by the Correlates of War dataset). These 155 civil wars occurred in 65 countries – just over a third of the 177 countries that existed during that time period (as measured by the Polity IV dataset). And 15 of these countries (23 percent) have experienced civil war for at least a quarter of their years from 1946 or independence; two countries (Angola and Sudan) have experienced civil war for more than half of those years.

As defined by the Correlates of War project, a civil war¹ must involve sustained combat between organized armed forces and result in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related deaths within a 12-month period. Furthermore, all sides must be capable of effective resistance - this criterion distinguishes civil wars from one-sided mass killings. Civil wars are fought between the state's government and a non-state entity; the state government's involvement is what distinguishes civil wars from other types of intrastate wars.

Understanding the definition of a civil war and its importance to the modern international community is essential to this paper, as only states that have experienced civil war between 1946 and 2007 as recorded in the Correlates of War dataset are analyzed. Furthermore, reviewing the theorized causes of a civil war's initial occurrence, termination, and later recurrence is necessary to understanding the role regime type plays in conflict recurrence. In the literature on the causes of civil wars, a major debate revolves around the role of ethnicity; in the literature on resolving civil wars, the issues of negotiated settlements versus military victories and UN Peacekeeping involvement are debated; and in the literature on civil war recurrence, the debate focuses on what incentives to rebel are most important.

The role of ethnicity

Given the dramatic increase in the number of civil wars following WWII, scholars have debated why the new international system is more prone to internal conflict than before. Much of the literature follows the Huntingtonian paradigm of attributing conflict to clashing ethnic, religious, and cultural identities (Huntington 1996); earlier literature argued for the importance of ethnic motivations in modern nationalism (Ignatieff 1993), ethnicity's historical role in

¹ The Correlates of War project differentiates between civil wars and other types of intrastate conflict (regional internal wars and intercommunal wars), but for this paper only civil wars are measured. After 1946, there was only 1 regional internal war and 11 intercommunal wars. These

forming nations (Smith 1986), and promoting ethnicity as the primary way of understanding all types of conflict (Moynihan 1993). These arguments were later disputed by empirical studies that rejected ethnicity as the primary cause for conflict, and instead looked at economic factors (Fearon & Laitin 2003, Collier & Hoeffler 2004).

Fearon and Laitin (2003) took a critical look at the conventional wisdom that civil wars became so prevalent following WWII due to ethnic and religious antagonisms, and instead argue that states are at risk when they have conditions that favor insurgency, such as poverty, political instability, rough terrain, and large populations. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) looked at rebellions in terms of motive and opportunity, rejecting the classic political science literature that rebellions are sufficiently explained by the circumstances that motivate people to rebel – such as ethnic or religious divisions – and instead argued that the opportunistic economic capability to rebel is a better predictor of civil war.

The problem here is that both sides only look at half of the issue – the motive (ethnicity) or the opportunity (economic capability) – because they have the disparate goals of asking why internal conflicts occur and how to best predict future internal conflicts. But in order to understand the whole picture, both motive and opportunity must be taken into account. Denny and Walter (2014) do this by recognizing the fact that civil wars are more likely to be initiated by ethnic groups than any other type of group. They argue that the ethnic group may be motivated by exclusion from political power, creating grievances. The ethnic group has opportunity from living together in concentrated spaces and sharing the exclusive ties of culture and language. Denny and Walter then add a third factor to the equation that pays homage to Walter's research focus: ethnic groups have fewer incentives to make credible commitments in the negotiation process due to the fact that ethnic identity is less elastic than other identities, like political party

affiliation.

The debate over the role of ethnicity is very important to my hypothesis, as one of the primary advantages of consensus democracies is its ability to include minorities like ethnic groups in the governmental decision making process. Denny and Walter's findings emphasize the need for an inclusive government that ethnic groups can more credibly commit to.

Ending the civil war

When looking at how civil wars end, the most important objective is how to ensure that the war stays finished; after all, over half of all modern civil wars have recurred (Quinn, Mason, & Gurses 2007). Civil wars typically end in one of two ways: military victory or a negotiated settlement. Conventionally it has been argued that military victories are more likely to result in durable peace, due to the fact that negotiated settlements are far more likely to break down than to result in a mutually satisfactory solution (Wagner 1993, Licklider 1995, Ohmura 2011).

Other studies have clarified or refuted this finding. Mason et al. (2011) found that "contrary to the existing literature on civil war outcome and peace duration, negotiated settlements do not necessarily produce a more fragile peace than decisive military victories. The peace that follows negotiated settlements is more fragile initially but more durable with time." Hartzell et al. (2001) looked at what characteristics make negotiated peace settlements more durable in the short term, and identified four factors: when the previous stable regime was a democracy, when the conflict was of low intensity over an extended period of time, when threatened groups are given territorial autonomy in the peace agreement, and when third party states or international organizations have given security assurances to the former combatants. It is important to note that one of the characteristics identified, giving territorial autonomy to threatened groups, is a key element in consensus democracies - federalism.

Walter (1999) argued that in order for a negotiated settlement to be successful, there must be credible guarantees to enforce the terms of the agreement. Even if the original dispute that started the civil war is resolved, unless the agreement has an enforcement mechanism civil war will resume. The importance of UN Peacekeeping forces in providing this mechanism and preventing conflict recurrence has been supported by multiple studies (Walter 2002, Doyle & Sambanis 2002, Fortna 2004, Hartzell & Hoddie 2003, Jung 2008). Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom (2008) found that doubling the PKO expenditure significantly reduced the post-conflict risk of recurrence, from 40 percent to 31 percent.

Why civil wars recur

Much of the recent literature on civil war recurrence elaborates on the economic and political incentives that Walter (2004) identified. Walter first established that the reasons for subsequent conflicts are not related to the reasons for the initial civil war, then argued there are two key incentives for individuals to rebel: “individual hardship or severe dissatisfaction with one’s current situation” and “the absence of any nonviolent means for change.”

Omae (2012) studied the issue of citizen hardship, and argued that the government’s response to the natural low levels of violence following a civil war determines whether or not the war will recur. He finds that the government’s use of both indiscriminate violence against noncombatants and selective violence with threats to physical integrity (such as extrajudicial killings, torture, or imprisonment) to suppress rebel factions contributes to a higher risk of conflict recurrence. Omae argues that third party interveners such as peacekeeping forces are key to preventing such violence by the government.

Quinn, Mason, and Gurses (2007) analyzed what structural conditions incentivized former combatants to start fighting again. They found that rebel victories are less likely to break down

than government victories, and negotiated settlements that are supported by peacekeeping forces are more stable than government victories. They later nuanced these initial findings to argue that rebel victories are only more stable than government victories if the new rebel regime can survive its first few years (Mason et al. 2011). Government victories are more stable in the short term, but are increasingly fragile as rebel groups have time to reform and rebuild. Negotiated peace settlements follow the same pattern as rebel victories - initially fragile but more stable over time.

However, this research does not take into account the type of regime that the rebels or government establish. Following Walter's (2004) logic, authoritarian governments would yield a greater incentive to rebel by not providing a non-violent means for change (such as elections). A democratic regime, therefore, would reduce this recurrence risk. The idea that democratic governments are less likely to experience civil conflict is explored within the theory of democratic peace.

Democratic Peace and the role of regime types

The theory of democratic peace primarily states that pairs of democracies are less likely to fight each other than democracy-autocracy pairs or autocracy pairs. More relevant to this paper, it also states that democracies are less prone to civil conflict. It is important to note that the theory of democratic peace concerns itself with all democracies - while there may be some debate over whether a state is democratic or not, there is no distinction between different kinds of democracies. Hegre (2014) provides a good overview of the democratic peace literature, and concludes that in terms of civil conflict, consolidated democracies have less conflict than semi-democracies. He also finds support for the idea that both democracies and the existence of peace are due to pre-existing socio-economic conditions - with the caveat that economic development

alone will not bring lasting peace unless democratic institutions are also present. This finding is supported by Haggard and Kaufman's (1997) argument that new post-civil war democracies of previously authoritarian states depend on short-term economic success in order for the democracy as a whole to be successful.

Some scholars maintain that democracy is bad for new states. Howarth (2014) argues that liberalizing post-conflict societies by encouraging democratization and liberal economic policies actually produces an environment conducive to inequality, interpersonal violence and crime. Howarth establishes a critique of liberal peace by providing empirical evidence that shows liberal economic policies create a "disenfranchised mass of citizens who have been incorporated into the global economy on unequal terms." However, Howarth primarily criticizes the economic policies associated with democratization, not the regime type itself.

Hegre (2014) concluded in his review of the literature on democratic peace that democracies are more stable than autocracies, and in turn autocracies are more stable than intermediate regimes (or anocracies). Democratic peace theory predicts that the end result of rebellions and regime transitions is that all states will become democratic, and then there will be no more war. But how does a state that has just emerged from civil conflict become a democracy? It is important to keep in mind that the fight to democratize post-conflict states is an uphill battle. As Huntington established in his 1968 book *Political Order in Changing Societies*, states newly emerged from a civil war are naturally inclined towards authoritarian regimes, since the first priority is for a stable political order rather than promoting the democratic process. And despite the research that indicates otherwise (as reviewed in Hegre 2014), authoritarian regimes can be perceived to be more stable than democracies.

In response to Huntington's theory, Jung (2008a) looks at why democratization in post-

civil war states has often failed. She finds that democratization is most successful when the civil war is resolved by negotiated settlement, when a UN Peacekeeping operation is present, and when there is a fast economic recovery. Jung finds that when these factors are present, post-conflict states are 23 times more likely to form democracies. She later argues (Jung 2008b) that following a civil war, “political institutions well designed to end civil war are not necessarily as effective for promoting democratic governance;” because while power-sharing arrangements can help the warring parties reach a negotiated agreement, if those power-sharing institutions are created too soon after the war’s end they can lock the wartime divisions into the post-war democratic government.

The role of power sharing institutions

For the most part, democracies are agreed to be the best regime type for any state, including post-conflict states. What is not agreed upon, however, is the institutional framework for the new democracy. Power sharing institutions, the key component of consensus democracies, are a hotly debated topic.

Jung’s theory, which discredits power-sharing institutions, is contradicted by Gurses and Mason’s (2008) findings. They argue that negotiated settlements are more likely to result in democratization than a military victory by either side - but that the presence of UN PKOs does not produce higher levels of democracy. Gurses and Mason also argue for incorporating power sharing between the former combatants. They find that the process of fighting in the civil war and then negotiating a settlement tends to result in a more balanced field of contenders, which makes it is easier to incorporate power sharing institutions into the newly formed democracy.

Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) also tested the effect of power sharing. They test power-sharing’s effect on enduring peace along four dimensions - political, territorial, military, and

economic. Hartzell and Hoddie found that the more dimensions of power sharing there are between former combatants, the more stable the peace. They argue that this is because establishing a multidimensional network of power-sharing institutions results in a self-enforcing peace, allowing the former combatants to share a sense of security within the new government.

Elections in the context of ethnic conflict

The election system is an explicitly political institution that can incorporate power sharing, and can often make or break the success of a new democracy. Consensus democracies are defined by a multi-party proportional representation system for elections, while majoritarian democracies are defined by a two-party plurality (“first past the post”) system. The danger of a majoritarian style democracy and election is especially important in the context of ethnicity’s role in civil wars, as famously argued in Michael Mann’s *The Dark Side of Democracy*. Mann theorized that the modern phenomenon of frequent and extremely deadly ethnic cleansing, often occurring in the context of ethnically based civil wars, is the result of the majority ethnic group’s rule being justified by the popularity of majoritarian democracy in this age. When one ethnic group rules over the others, creating an environment of oppression and exploitation, the minority group(s) will likely fight back, instigating a cycle of retaliation and radicalization, eventually resulting in murderous ethnic cleansing (Mann 2005).

Cederman, Gleditsch, and Hug (2013) built off of Mann’s work by using an ethnicity-based approach to elections in order to respond to the literature that argues elections increase the risk of conflict. They find there is only a weak relationship between elections and conflict, although the risk does increase under certain circumstances: ethnic groups are more likely to engage in conflict after competitive elections, especially the first two held in the newly democratic state. They theorize that this is due to the “sore loser” effect, which is not present in

noncompetitive elections. After the first two elections, the risk of conflict is minimal. However, unlike Mann, they do not distinguish between different election systems.

The consociationalist approach

Consociationalism is a relatively new approach to democracy that has been pioneered by Arend Lijphart and his intellectual successors over the past half-century. Inspired by his native country, the Netherlands, Lijphart first laid out the consociationalist approach in *The Politics of Accommodation* (Lijphart 1968), and then expanded his theory to be applicable to democracies at large (beyond the initial deviant case study) that were deeply divided along ethnic, religious, cultural, or linguistic lines in *Democracy in Plural Societies* (Lijphart 1977). This initial groundbreaking work culminated in a quantitative analysis that categorized all established democracies as having either majoritarian or consensus traits (Lijphart 1984), initially in 21 states but later expanded to 36 (1999, 2nd ed. 2012). An overview of Lijphart's work and how it has contributed to later scholarship on consensus democracy can be found in *Democracy and Institutions : the Life Work of Arend Lijphart* (Crepaz 2000), a homage to Lijphart by his fellow consociational scholars – both former graduate students (Markus Crepaz, Thomas Koeble, David Wilsford, Andrew Reynolds) and contemporaries (G. Bingham Powell Jr., Bernard Grofman, Rein Taagepera, Milton Esman, Jack Nagel). Consensus democracy is the successor to the more limited (and highly criticized) consociational democracy, and is designed to be applicable to any society, divided or not. Lijphart argues that consensus regimes are even more democratic than the more common majoritarian regimes, because of its emphasis on protecting minorities.

The question of how to apply consensus democratic principles to the constitutional framework of a fragile and divided post-conflict state is answered by Andrew Reynolds in *Designing Democracy in a Dangerous World* (Reynolds 2011). Reynolds takes a medical

approach to these fragile states, and proposes a treatment plan that utilizes Lijphart's consensus principles. He focuses primarily on electoral systems as the most important institution to incorporate power sharing into the new government, and applies his theoretical framework to a quantitative analysis of 66 "country-patients." Reynolds concludes that "simply imposing American- or European-style democratic institutions in the developing world is a recipe for disaster," and instead these new democracies should take advantage of the "broad menu of electoral and governance arrangements, which can be crafted to the needs of a given society."

The consociational approach is innovative and new, and has attracted both enthusiastic support and criticism. Earlier critics argue that the basis for Lijphart's theory – his experience in the Netherlands – is tautological and not applicable to other divided societies (Barry 1975, van Schendelen 1984). Others criticize his quantitative analysis, and argue that his coding and methodology are flawed, resulting in an "empirical overextension of consociational models" (Lustick 1979, 1997). Although many of these criticisms are addressed in Lijphart's later works, more recent criticisms argue that governmental systems should not institutionalize wartime societal divisions, and the applicability of consociationalism in post-conflict states is extremely limited (Jung 2008b, 2013).

The consensus model for post-conflict states deserves a closer look

Although the theory and quantitative support for consensus-style democracies is compelling, it is by no means conclusive. It is also almost exclusively compared to majoritarian democracies, and not other regime types. The review of the civil war literature shows that limiting incentives for individuals to rebel is vital to preventing recurrence, and the post-conflict government has a great deal of control over those incentives. In this paper I will test which

specific type of government is best able to limit incentives to rebel, and is thus best suited to prevent conflict recurrence in the vulnerable post-civil war state.

Theory

The debate surrounding the consensus versus majoritarian framework presents a new way to evaluate political institutions in post-civil war states, in much the same way that Slater's new subcategories for authoritarian regimes (2003) presented a new way to evaluate the initiation of interstate conflict (Weeks 2012). Not all democracies are the same, just as not all autocracies are the same. In order to evaluate all regime types along a single scale, a different dimension for evaluating these regimes is required. Slater's (2003) dimensions for distinguishing autocracies are who makes the decisions and who executes the decisions, or despotic and infrastructural power. Lijphart's (1999) dimensions for distinguishing democracies are how likely a single group can control the entire government and how easily the group in power can change policy.

Both theorists are essentially looking at how individual citizens, working within the existing institutional framework, can affect the lives of other citizens. This first group of citizens – those making governmental decisions - could conceivably consist of anywhere between a single individual and the entire population, while the second group consists of the entire citizenry. When the first group of citizens includes only a small percentage of the population, there is a low level of citizen involvement. When the first group of citizens includes a large percentage of the population, there is a high level of citizen involvement. Citizen involvement can be minimal, such as casting a vote or discussing policy, or it can be significantly more involved, such as campaigning for elections or protesting government policies.

By evaluating political regimes through this dimension of citizen involvement, it is easier to connect regime type with the likelihood of civil war recurrence. By definition, a civil war

requires a large number of citizens to be involved, on both sides of the conflict. As regimes can be ranked according to the level of citizen involvement – with a regime’s type determining the institutional allowance for citizen involvement – and a civil war requires a certain level of citizen involvement, this dimension of citizen involvement provides the logical link between the key variables of regime type and civil war recurrence.

Why Citizen Involvement

There are many different ways to measure and classify regimes, and therefore many dimensions through which to evaluate how political institutions effect civil war occurrence. However, that field narrows when considering the issue of civil war recurrence. A post-conflict state is fragile, and equally likely to fall back into conflict as not. Therefore, a different standard must be used to evaluate post-conflict states. The motive vs opportunity framework is a classic way of predicting conflict. In a state that has already experienced a civil war, the opportunity aspect is essentially a pre-existing condition. Opportunity, or having the capital, manpower, and strategic resources to conduct a war, continues to exist in some capacity after the first civil war. The level of opportunity may vary from state to state depending on the terms of the peace treaty or what actions the post-conflict regime takes, but the inherent infrastructure needed to conduct a rebellion remains. Therefore, in order to predict civil war recurrence, the focus must be on motive. As a general statement, citizens are motivated to rebel by a desire to effect change. If citizen involvement in the regime is high, then individuals will be able act within existing political institutions. If citizen involvement in the regime is low, then dissatisfied individuals may have no nonviolent means for change. While not explicitly stated, citizen involvement in the post-conflict regime is key to the incentives Walter (2004) identified for citizens to rebel (see “Why civil wars recur” in the Literature Review).

When considering incentives to rebel, the perceived level of citizen involvement may be more important than the actual level of citizen involvement, and would have to be quantified differently (such as through polls rather than voting statistics). And both perceived and actual citizen involvement may be different than the theoretical level established in the state's constitution or laws. For this reason, citizen involvement is defined as the general perception that an individual citizen has the ability to effect change by acting within established political institutions.

Citizen Involvement and Civil War Recurrence

When examining civil war recurrence through the lens of citizen involvement, there are two key thresholds to consider: the perceived level of citizen involvement in order to effectively rebel, and the perceived level of citizen involvement to effect change within the current regime. This presumes that there is a desire to affect change in the first place, but most citizens in post-conflict states experience some level of hardship simply as a result of the destructive forces of war. The equation is simple: if the collective perceived level of citizen involvement within the regime is higher than the level needed to effectively rebel, civil war will not recur. If the reverse is true, then civil war will recur. Assuming that different regime types can be ranked according to the level of citizen involvement, with each type being assigned a relative threshold, and there is one universal threshold at which citizens can rebel, then a few conclusions can be made: 1) a regime with the highest level of citizen involvement has the lowest risk of recurrence, and vice versa; 2) there will be a clear distinction between which regime types are able to avoid recurrence and which are not, from which the ranking of the universal rebellion threshold can be inferred; 3) the relative positions of each regime type's threshold can be inferred according to its collective success at avoiding recurrence.

Citizen Involvement and Regime Type

Citizen involvement is also an important dimension because it can be used to evaluate and rank all of the regime subtypes along a theoretical scale of the greatest level of perceived citizen involvement to the lowest level. The most important regime subtypes for my analysis are those within the democratic and authoritarian categories, as anocracies – or weak democracies and weak autocracies – are universally regarded as prone to civil war recurrence. The inverted-U relationship between level of democracy and likelihood of civil war is well established, which results in an equally lower level of civil conflict in consistent democratic and authoritarian regimes compared to the less consistent anocracies. However, this relationship is not as widely established for states that have already experienced a civil war. Whether democratic institutions in post-conflict states contribute to a lower or higher risk for recurrence is still up for debate, and this paper aims to contribute to that debate.

The nebulous position of anocracies along the scale of citizen involvement can be explained by the motive vs opportunity framework. I previously established that opportunity exists to some degree in all post-conflict states, leaving the motive as my primary concern since both need to be present for a state to be at risk. However, governments can control how much opportunity rebels have to some degree. This level of opportunity would then be more relevant to predicting conflict in the short term, while motive as explained through the dimension of citizen involvement is more relevant in the long term. Under this framework, democratic regimes would have high opportunity but low motive, authoritarian regimes would have low opportunity but high motive, and anocracies would have medium opportunity and medium motive. Given that in post-conflict states opportunity will be higher across the board, motive should remain the more significant predictor of civil war recurrence.

Within the category of democratic regime types are Consensus, Mixed, and Majoritarian, and within the category of authoritarian regime types are Boss, Strongman, Machine, and Junta. Anocracies can be categorized as leaning democratic or leaning authoritarian. Due to a number of key elements in a consensus democracy such as proportional representation election systems, decentralized government for greater local power, and a balance of power between the branches of government and political parties that makes cooperation necessary, I argue that consensus democracies have a higher level of perceived citizen involvement than majoritarian democracies. An individual's vote matters more in a consensus system, but any vote matters more than having none at all. Consensus democracies therefore hold the top rank, with mixed and then majoritarian democracies just below.

In authoritarian regimes, citizen involvement becomes less a function of elections and more a function of how easily citizens can influence policy by becoming a part of the government. In a personalistic regime, positions of power are limited to the leader's family, friends and cronies – those the leader regards as the most loyal. Nonpersonalistic regimes allow for dissent within the government, and positions of power are open to citizens so long as they are part of the military or party. Therefore, the nonpersonalistic Machine and Junta regimes rank below majoritarian democracies, with the personalistic Boss and Strongman ranking lowest in terms of citizen involvement.

Summary

The goal of this thesis is to discover which regime type – or more broadly, which group of political institutions – is best able to prevent civil war recurrence in the fragile post-conflict state. My hypothesis states that consensus democracies will be most successful at preventing conflict recurrence, due to the higher level of perceived citizen involvement in consensus

democracies. The philosophy of power-sharing that defines consensus political institutions is what allows for this high level of citizen involvement, and a greater perception that an individual's vote matters, compared to a majoritarian system. This hypothesis rests on the assumption that regime type is a significant predictor of civil war recurrence.

I also argue that more broadly, the integration of any consensus elements into a post-conflict state's government will decrease the likelihood of conflict recurrence. Most democracies use a mix of consensus and majoritarian traits, rather than belonging entirely to one category. Even on a smaller scale, consensus political institutions can contribute to the success of the new government.

Hypotheses

H1: Autocracies are more likely than Democracies to experience civil war recurrence

H2: Among Autocracies and Closed Anocracies, the Strongman and Boss regimes are more likely to experience civil war recurrence than Junta or Machine regimes.

H3: Among Democracies and Open Anocracies, Majoritarian regimes are more likely to experience civil war recurrence than Consensus regimes

H4: Among Democracies and Open Anocracies, a higher consensus score is correlated with a lower likelihood of civil war recurrence.

Data

In order to test my hypothesis I created a new dataset of countries' post-civil war political regime types. The dataset is organized into country-year units and is limited to countries that have experienced at least one civil war since 1946, as determined by the Correlates of War Intrastate Conflict dataset. The years included for each country are from 1946, or the year the state was established, until 2007, or the year the country collapsed. I chose 1946 as the starting

date due to the new international context after the end of World War II, and the greater availability of data. As the dataset is organized by country-year, each observation has a unique ID composed of its numeric country code and the year. For example, Cuba in 1950 has the unique ID 401950. Each observation has basic identifying variables such as the country code using several standards, country name, and year. For the purpose of continuity in my analysis, I am using the Gleditsch & Ward country codes, a modification of the COW codes that keeps the same code for states like the USSR and Russia.

The core of the dataset was created by merging the Correlates of War Intra-State Wars v.4.0 dataset and the Polity IV dataset. While the Polity IV data was already in country-year units, the COW dataset was organized with individual wars as the unit of analysis. In the COW dataset, I excluded all observations that had a start year less than 1946, had a war type of regional internal (6) or intercommunal (7) as these were not strictly civil wars, and where sideA, sideB, or ccode were coded as -8 (not applicable) as these represented observations that repeated an existing conflict but from the perspective of an intervening force. The remaining observations were then reformatted into country-year units in SAS. In order to deal with multiple wars occurring within the same country-year unit, each variable taken from the CoW dataset has a version 1 and 2, where the variable2 refers to the data for the second war if applicable. In the Polity IV dataset, I excluded all observations that had a year less than 1946, and a country code that did not exist in the modified COW dataset.

The dependent variable that I am measuring is civil war recurrence. This is measured by creating a dummy variable for each country-year, where a code of 1 means there was at least one civil war in that country-year, and a code of 0 means there were no civil wars that country-year. My dataset includes multiple ways to measure this: I use the Correlates of War dataset, but the

coding from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset in country-year format is also included, reduced to both a dummy variable measuring if there was a political conflict resulting in a civil war classification (1,000 deaths) and a dummy variable measuring if there was any political conflict (resulting in at least 25 deaths). The independent variable I am measuring is regime type. Basic regime type information is drawn from the Polity IV dataset; a Polity score of -10 to -6 is an Autocracy, a Polity score of -5 to 0 is a Closed Anocracy, a Polity score of 1 to 5 is an Open Anocracy, a Polity score of 6 to 10 is a Democracy, and a Polity code of -66, -77, or -88 is treated as a Transitional regime. Each regime is also assigned a specific subtype. Data on the authoritarian subtypes are based on Weeks' classification for her book *Dictators at War and Peace*, and data on the democratic subtypes are based on the key institutions Reynolds identified in his book *Designing democracy in a dangerous world*. I have also added a number of World Development Indicators as my control variables: GDP per capita percent growth, infant mortality rate, and life expectancy.

Constructing the Majoritarian-Consensus Scale for Democracies

For each country-year that had a Polity score of 1 or greater (Open Anocracies and Democracies), I generated a score from 0-10, with 0 being the most Majoritarian and 10 being the most Consensual. I based my scoring system off of the four key institutions identified in Reynolds' *Designing Democracy*: Legislative Type, Federalism & Decentralization, Executive Inclusion (or Constraints on the Executive), and Executive Type. The data necessary for measuring each of these four indicators was drawn from the Quality of Government Standard Dataset, which is itself a massive compilation of all other known datasets relevant to government and organized in country-year format.

The legislative type indicator (i1) was calculated by adding the base institutional score (0-

2) to the ENPP (effective number of parliamentary parties). A base score of 0 means the legislative election system was majoritarian, and had a system of plurality or absolute majority. A base score of 1 means the election system was mixed, and had a system of Mixed Independent. A base score of 2 means the election system was Proportional, and had a system of List PR or Single Transferable Vote. The total score was calculated by dividing the ENPP for the most recent election by 10 to reach a range of 0-.99, with the few cases of an ENPP greater than 10 (such as Lebanon) being set at .99. The final indicator score had a theoretical range of 0-2.99. This score was then multiplied by 3.333 to reach a standardized weighted score of 0-10. A variety of sources were used to make these calculations, but the primary source was Golder & Bormann's Democratic Electoral Systems dataset.

The federalism indicator (i2) was calculated by taking the base score of 0-2, and once again standardizing to a range of 0-10 by multiplying by 5. A base score of 0 means unitary, a base score of 1 means mixed, and a base score of 2 means federal. A variety of sources from the QoG dataset was used, but due to a lack of variables measuring federalism a large number of cases I used Gerring & Thacker's scoring of Unitarism, which averaged together the degree of federalism (0-2) and the degree of bicameralism (0-2). While a score of 0 still means a unitary system (which rated a 2 in Gerring and Thacker's dataset), and a score of 2 means a federal system, the scores in between (of .5, 1, or 1.5) are less strict. But as bicameralism is still a measure of federalism and using these scores allowed for more information to be included, I decided to use this data.

The Executive Inclusion indicator (i3) was measured by adding together the base coalition score to the POLCON3 variable, from Henisz's Political Constraints Index Dataset. The base score was taken by looking at the coalition type of the government, as more parties in a coalition

and thus providing opposition indicates greater restraint on the executive's power to do anything unilaterally, thus making the system more consensual. I used data from the Dataset of Political Institutions (found in the QoG dataset) to calculate the coalition score. A score of 0 means that there was 1 government party, and no opposition parties. A score of 1 means there was more than 1 government party, but no opposition parties. A score of 2 means there was 1 government party, and at least one opposition party. A score of 3 means there was more than 1 government party, and at least one opposition party. A coalition (of more than one government party) means greater cooperation, and the presence of opposition parties indicates even more limits on what the government parties can unilaterally do. The POLCON3 variable ranges from a theoretical score of 0-1, with 1 indicating the most constraint on any one political actor being able to enact policy changes. Together, the total indicator score ranges from 0-4. This was then multiplied by 2.5 to reach a standardized score of 0-10.

The Executive Type indicator (i4) was measured in a similar way as the legislative type. A base score of 0-2 was calculated by determining the executive type, as measured by Golder & Bormann's dataset or other sources in the QoG dataset, and adding the effective number of presidential candidates (enpres) once again divided by 10. A base score of 0 means a presidential system (or an unelected executive), a base score of 1 means a mixed system (with both a president and a prime minister), and a base score of 2 means a parliamentary system. The enpres variable was divided by 10 to have a theoretical range of 0-.99, and added to the base score to reach a range of 0-3. This score was then standardized to a range of 0-10 by multiplying it by 3.33.

Categorizing Democracies

I created two final consensus scores for categorizing into the democratic regime subtypes.

The first final score was calculated by adding together all four of the standardized scores, and then dividing by the number of non-missing indicators. A variable measuring the accuracy of each score is present as well, with a score of 5 meaning all 4 variables were taken into account to a score of 1 meaning no variables were present to be taken into account (and thus resulting in a missing final score). These final scores have a theoretical range of 0 to 10, with 10 being the most consensual. Each score was then fitted into a category of Majoritarian (with a score of 0-4), Mixed (4.01-5.99), or Consensus (6-10).

The second final score was calculated by adding together all three of the standardized scores except the Federalism (i2) score, and then dividing by the number of non-missing indicators. The final scores have a theoretical range of 0 to 10, and are arranged into the three categories by the same scoring system. There are several reasons for establishing this second score. The first is that federalism is thematically different from the other three indicators. Legislative Type, Executive Inclusion (Constraint), and Executive Type all address Lijphart's first Executive-Parties dimension, failing to measure only the fifth criteria of interest group systems. The Federalism indicator, however, addresses Lijphart's second Federal-Unitary dimension. While it does measure the main two criteria of this dimension (federal vs unitary and unicameral vs bicameral), it does not address the other three criteria (constitutional flexibility, judicial review, and central bank independence). The second reason is that the quality of data for the federalism indicator is poorer than for the other indicators. It has the most cases of missing observations, has less variability than the other indicators, and is less precise as some observations include bicameralism as a factor and others do not. Furthermore, for the second version of the final score, there are no observations after a country's first civil war in which the score is missing more than one indicator. The third reason is that the primary source of the

federalism data, Gerring and Thacker's dataset for their theory of Centripetalism, already suggests that a unitary system is better at preventing civil war recurrence than a federal system. For these three reasons, I believe that it is important to test both measures of the democratic regime subtypes.

Categorizing Autocracies

For each country-year that had a Polity score of 0 or less, I used Slater's typology and Weeks' methodology to determine if the autocracy was personalistic or not and militaristic or not, forming the four key categories. A fifth category of monarchies was also included, as autocracies that were considered monarchies were not ranked along the personalistic or militaristic dichotomies. In order to assign each country-year to one of these five categories (Strongman, Junta, Boss, Machine, or Monarchy), five dummy variables were created. For the personalistic dummy variable, a value of 1 was assigned for each country-year with a personalistic regime. For the non-personalistic dummy variable, a value of 1 was assigned for each country-year with a non-personalistic regime. The same rules applied for the militaristic and non-militaristic dummy variables. A regime that is considered a monarchy had a 1 for the monarchy variable, and a zero for the other for dummy variables. The four remaining categories were created such that if a country-year had a value of 1 for both the personalistic and militaristic variables, it received a 1 for the Strongman category; a country-year with a 1 for the non-personalistic and militaristic variables received a 1 for the Junta category; a country-year with a 1 for the personalistic and non-militaristic variables received a 1 for the Boss category; and a country-year with a 1 for the non-personalistic and non-militaristic variables received a 1 for the Machine category.

I used Weeks' most recent data (2015) as my primary source of data for these categories,

and then supplemented it with Geddes' most recent data (2014). Weeks does not have data for years after 2000, and places many autocracies under the catch-all "other" category when there is not enough information or the regime is a monarchy. Geddes includes data for years up to 2010, and codes each regime according to the four binary variables of party-based, military, personal, and monarchical, with overlap allowed between the first three variables. When there was data missing for a country-year from both Weeks' and Geddes' data, I used variables from the compiled Quality of Government dataset that I had used in ranking the democracies. I used the variables from the Polity dataset and Geddes' dataset to expand the values for one country-year to the missing row preceding or following it if the regime had not changed. Combined, these methods resulted in most Autocracies and Closed Anocracies being categorized.

The 10 Exclusive Regime Categories

Every country-year unit in the dataset, a total of 3,262 observations, has a value of 1 in a single category and a value of 0 in the nine other categories of regime subtypes. Observations with a Polity score of 1 to 10 are categorized as a Majoritarian Democracy, Mixed Democracy, or Consensus Democracy. Observations with a Polity score of 0 to -10 are categorized as a Strongman Autocracy, Junta Autocracy, Boss Autocracy, Machine Autocracy, or Monarchy. Observations with a new and/or unstable regime, identified by a Polity score of -66 (Interruption), -77 (Anarchy), or -88 (Transition), are categorized as an Unstable Regime. Observations with a Polity score of 0 or less, but no authoritarian category, or a Polity score of 1 or greater, but no democratic category, are categorized as Missing. The following figure details how the observations are distributed with the categorical breakdown shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1: Breakdown of Regime Subtype

Total Country-Year Observations:	3,626	*using 2nd score
Consensus Democracy:	109	207
Mixed Democracy:	533	706
Majoritarian Democracy:	562	282
Monarchy:	312	
Strongman Autocracy:	531	
Junta Autocracy:	292	
Boss Autocracy:	522	
Machine Autocracy:	401	
Unstable Regime:	298	
Missing Regime:	65	74

Analysis

I used a logistic regression analysis to test my hypotheses, with the independent and control variables lagged² by one year in order to prevent any reverse causality from interfering

² Note that in the dataset, this lagged effect was created by leading the dependent variables (civilwaryr) and the peace variables (peace, peace2, peace3) – these leading variables are identified by the prefix “t1_”.

with the results. All models are run twice – once without any control variables beyond the measure of peace duration (as well as peace squared & cubed, although these are not included in most of the results tables) and once with the additional control variables.

In order to test my hypotheses I ran 5 base models using Stata's logit command.

Unfortunately, these models yielded only a few significant results. However, the general trend that the models revealed do provide some support for my hypotheses. I found support against my first hypothesis, that Democracies were more successful than Autocracies at preventing civil war recurrence, although this result was only significant once at the lowest level. I did find that Closed Anocracies were significantly correlated with recurrence. I also found some support for my second hypotheses. Strongman regimes were the only subtype to be significantly correlated with recurrence, and were as bad as Unstable regimes in that respect. However, I predicted that the personalistic regimes would be the most likely to result in recurrence, and my fifth model shows that the personalistic factor is not a significant factor in civil war recurrence. Additionally, the Boss regime type is not significantly correlated with civil war recurrence. In regards to my third hypotheses, I was unable to find any significant results. Furthermore, the coefficients suggested opposite results depending on which Democracy scoring method was used, though neither were significant. Lastly, I was unable to find support for my fourth hypothesis.

Federalism was the only indicator with a significant result, and showed that a more federalist regime was correlated with a higher likelihood of civil war recurrence. The other three indicators were correlated with a lower likelihood of recurrence, but not at a significant level. Furthermore, neither of the democratic scoring methods had significant results.

Model 1: The Regime Ranking System

The first model acts as a general test for the ranking system laid out in the three hypotheses. I coded the regime subtypes as: 0 = Unstable, 1 = Strongman, 2 = Boss, 3 = Junta, 4 = Machine, 5 = Monarchy, 6 = Majoritarian, 7 = Mixed, and 8 = Consensus. The model was tested multiple times with variations as to the independent variable, with the democracies being categorized by method one (including the federalism indicator) and method two (excluding the federalism indicator), and with the control variables being included or excluded (the variable measuring the years since the previous civil war, peace duration, is always included).

TABLE 2: Model 1

Variables	Dem Score 1, Control excluded	Dem Score 2, Control excluded	Dem Score 1, Control included	Dem Score 2, Control included
Regime Subtype	-.183** (.070)	-.195*** (.068)	-.038 (.096)	-.059 (.092)
Peace duration	.057 (.082)	.063 (.083)	-.001 (.120)	.002 (.119)
Peace2	-.004 (.005)	-.004 (.005)	-.000 (.008)	-.000 (.008)
Peace3	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)
GDP per capita (% growth)			-.009 (.012)	-.009 (.012)
Life expectancy			-.061* (.032)	-.060* (.032)
Infant mortality			-.003 (.009)	-.003 (.009)
Constant	-2.538*** (.308)	-2.520*** (.301)	-.740 (2.428)	.738 (2.451)
# of observations	1657	1657	1304	1304
Log Likelihood	-270.08558	-268.83865	-176.2343	-176.01371
Pseudo R2	0.0481	0.0525	0.0675	0.0687

Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses.

*** $p < .005$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$

Model 1 provides general support for my hypothesis, as the higher the ranking of the regime subtypes, the less likely a country is to experience civil war recurrence. This remains true

for both methods of ranking the democracy. However, the results are no longer significant after the control variables are included in the analysis. When the same four tests were used with the dependent variable measured by PRIO, where all political conflict with 25 or more deaths were counted, the regime subtype had no significant effect. The next models will dig deeper to determine what is driving this relationship.

Model 2: Regime Types

The next model looks at the five broad regime types. Once again the independent variables have been lagged, and were drawn from the COW data.

TABLE 3: Model 2

Variables	Transitional incl. Control excl.	Transitional incl. Control incl.	Transitional excl. Control excl.	Transitional excl. Control incl.
Democracy	-.133 (.506)	.993* (.585)	-.104 (.491)	.834 (.590)
Open Anocracy	-.021 (.469)	.907* (.543)	-.051 (.459)	.769 (.528)
Closed Anocracy	.978*** (.324)	1.432*** (.477)	.924*** (.318)	1.370*** (.469)
Autocracy	BASELINE	BASELINE	BASELINE	BASELINE
Transitional	1.007** (.409)	1.314** (.504)	EXCLUDED	EXCLUDED
Peace duration	.068 (.084)	.011 (.127)	.019 (.088)	-.018 (.125)
GDP per capita (% growth)		-.009 (.000)		.005 (.020)
Life expectancy		-.053 (.013)		-.063 (.050)
Infant Mortality		.001 (.011)		-.006 (.011)
Constant	-3.483*** (.445)	-1.110 (3.534)	-3.156*** (.395)	.252 (3.827)
# of observations	1657	1304	1498	1218
Log Likelihood	-268.22915	-170.29336	-219.23098	-151.03093
Pseudo R2	0.0546	0.0990	.00569	0.0886

Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses.

*** $p < .005$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$

As is to be expected, Transitional regimes are significantly worse at preventing conflict recurrence. Among the established governments, Closed Anocracies are the most likely to result in civil war recurrence. Although Transitional governments and Closed Anocracies were the only regime types with consistent significant results, when the control variables were included Democracies and Open Anocracies were significantly correlated with recurrence. This seems to imply that out of all the basic regime types, Autocracies are better able to prevent civil war recurrence. These results are in line with the literature predicting that Anocracies are the most prone to civil war recurrence; however, these results reveal the important distinction that this is most significantly true for Closed Anocracies.

Model 3: Regime Subtypes

The next model breaks down the regime types into the respective subtypes. As the previous model used autocracies as a baseline, this model uses the Machine subtype as the baseline. There are variations of the model to account for the two democracy scoring methods and inclusion of control variables. Model 3 reveals that it is the strong likelihood for Strongman and Unstable regimes to result in civil war recurrence that drives the success of the regime ranking system from Model 1.

No other regime type significantly predicts civil war recurrence, though it is worth noting that under the first Democracy scoring system, Majoritarian regimes seem to be the most successful at preventing recurrence, followed by Mixed and then Consensus regimes. Under the second scoring system, Consensus regimes seem to be the most successful, although neither of these are significant results. Interestingly, some of the autocratic types such as the Machine, Junta, and Monarchy seem to be more successful than some Democracy types in the different model variations, although again this is not a significant result. After including the control

variables, the Strongman and Unstable regime types are no longer significant predictors of civil war recurrence.

TABLE 4: Model 3

Variables	Dem Score 1, Control excluded	Dem Score 2, Control excluded	Dem Score 1, Control included	Dem Score 2, Control included
Consensus	.510 (.645)	-.894 (1.141)	1.111 (.694)	-.340 (1.108)
Mixed	.257 (.646)	-.169 (.681)	.402 (.688)	.163 (.715)
Majoritarian	-.383 (.656)	.773 (.559)	.065 (.716)	.713 (.645)
Monarchy	-.832 (1.070)	-.835 (1.076)	0 (omitted)	0 (omitted)
Machine	BASELINE	BASELINE	BASELINE	BASELINE
Junta	-.012 (.640)	-.010 (.639)	-.485 (.732)	-.435 (.728)
Boss	.363 (.706)	.378 (.710)	-.547 (.910)	-.516 (.906)
Strongman	1.114** (.559)	1.125** (.563)	.685 (.648)	.695 (.652)
Unstable	1.170** (.564)	1.189** (.567)	.702 (.737)	.721 (.744)
Peace Duration	.072 (.084)	.072 (.085)	.032 (.116)	.027 (.119)
GDP per capita (% growth)			-.004 (.014)	-.005 (.014)
Life expectancy			-.083** (.037)	-.073* (.040)
Infant Mortality			.006 (.010)	.005 (.011)
Constant	-3.656*** (.603)	-3.689*** (.609)	1.742 (2.992)	1.119 (3.256)
# of observations	1657	1657	1241	1241
Log Likelihood	-265.97362	-264.43866	-170.8277	-170.77419
Pseudo R2	0.0626	0.0680	0.0857	0.0860

Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses.

*** $p < .005$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$

Model 4: Consensus indicators

The previous model revealed that changing the way Democracies are scored by excluding the federalism indicator seemed to change the success of the democratic subtypes in preventing civil war recurrence. Model 4 looks at each of these indicators to see which aspects of a consensus government changes its success at preventing recurrence, as well as both versions of the final Democracy score.

TABLE 5: Model 4 (.1-.7)

Variable	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.5	4.6	4.7
Legislative Type (i1)	-.107 (.103)					
Federalism (i2)		.114* (.060)				
Executive Incl. (i3)			.007 (.094)			
Executive Type (i4)				-.009 (.086)		
Score 1 i1, i2, i3, i4					.065 (.120)	
Score 2 i1, i3, i4						-.161 (.139)
Peace duration	.004 (.301)	.073 (.340)	.026 (.245)	.006 (.301)	.013 (.302)	.029 (.309)
Constant	-3.112*** (.773)	-3.999*** (1.332)	-3.424*** (.752)	-3.430*** (1.058)	-3.544*** (1.179)	-2.621*** (.671)
# of obs.	667	662	615	667	603	603
Log Likeli.	-73.505589	-72.265443	-65.5518	-74.482117	-65.44117	-68.579933
Pseudo R2	0.0715	0.0856	0.0704	0.0591	0.0681	.0859

Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses.

*** $p < .005$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$

The only indicator with any significance is i2, which reveals that a higher Federalism score is more likely to result in civil war recurrence. The other indicators show that a higher consensus level is less likely to result in recurrence, though these results do not reach the .1 significance level. As a result of removing the federalism indicator from the democracy score, the democracy

score is still not significant, at $p=.247$. These results are not enough to provide support for my last hypothesis.

Model 5: Autocracy factors

This model focuses on Autocracies and Closed Anocracies, and considers the two factors determining the (non-Monarchy) Autocratic regime subtypes. The only significant result from Model 3 was that Strongman regimes were a significant predictor of civil war recurrence. In the same way that the previous model looked at what factors drove the Democratic rankings, this model looks at how the personalistic and militaristic factors drive the Autocratic rankings.

TABLE 6: Model 5

Variables	Control excluded	Control included
Personalistic	.736 (.503)	.581 (.547)
Militaristic	.600 (.372)	.794 (.456)
Peace Duration	-.013 (.133)	-.023 (.164)
GDP per capita (% growth)		.020 (.020)
Life expectancy		-.081** (.033)
Infant Mortality		-.012 (.009)
Constant	-3.534*** (.639)	1.588 (2.451)
# of observations	802	611
Log Likelihood	-146.13069	-92.044245
Pseudo R2	0.0447	0.0607

Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses.

*** $p < .005$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$

Model 5 has no significant results. When the control variables are excluded, the significance of the personalistic factor is $p=.143$, and the significance of the militaristic factor is $p=.107$ – both just barely beyond the .1 significance level that would indicate both more

personalistic regimes and militaristic regimes contribute to a higher likelihood of conflict recurrence.

Conclusion

The goal of this thesis was to find the best possible type of regime for a state recovering from a civil war, in order to avoid being plagued by recurrent conflict as most states are. I assumed that there would be a best type to model a new government after, and theorized that a consensus democracy would fulfill that role. However, my findings show that in terms of regime type, it is less important to match the “best” regime type and more important to avoid the “worst” regime type.

My models resulted in few significant results, but did consistently show that Strongman regimes, which are both personalistic and militaristic, are the worst regime type at preventing civil war recurrence. Strongman regimes performed just as badly as Unstable regimes – those coded by Polity IV as being in anarchy, interruption, or transition. Further analysis indicated that personalistic and militaristic regimes might be correlated with civil war recurrence, albeit not quite at an significant level.

I was unable to find support for my primary theory – that consensus regimes would best prevent civil war recurrence. Using the four institutions identified in Reynolds’ *Designing Democracy*, I found that the three institutions relating to Lijphart’s Executive-Parties dimension (Legislative Type, Executive Type, and Executive Inclusion/Constraint) did not significantly impact the likelihood of conflict recurrence; however, the federalism institution, which relates to Lijphart’s Federal-Unitary dimension, was significantly correlated with civil war recurrence.

While my analyses do answer some basic questions and start to accomplish my initial goal of determining which regime types and institutional factors are the best and worst at

preventing civil war recurrence, there is still a lot of work to do. My analysis was limited by the availability of data – especially for the federalism indicator. In order to expand upon these initial results, I would analyze how each of the 10 factors Lijphart identifies in classifying a consensus regime affects that regime's likelihood of civil war recurrence. Furthermore, I would also like to investigate how a regime change would influence a state's likelihood to re-enter civil war. For instance, if a state went from a Boss regime to a Majoritarian regime, would that result in a lower risk of conflict? Would a transition from a Consensus to a Majoritarian regime result in a higher risk of conflict? Do such transitions tend to have an immediate or delayed effect on conflict recurrence? These are the questions I would like to later explore in order to find a more nuanced and hopefully significant answer to my original inspiration for this thesis. Working on both a more nuanced dataset and a different level of analysis that focuses more on how regimes change over time rather than what they are immediately prior to conflict would help immensely in providing a solid recommendation to policy-makers and civil war mediators, as well as nationals working to rebuild their post-war states into a durable government.

References

- Barry, Brian. 1975. "Political accommodation and consociational democracy." *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (4): 477–505.
- Cederman, Lars-Erik, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Simon Hug. 2013. "Elections and Ethnic Civil War." *Comparative Political Studies* 46 (February): 387-417.
- Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers* 56 (October): 563-595.
- Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom. 2008. "Post-Conflict Risks." *Journal of Peace Research* 45 (July): 461-478.
- Crepaz, Markus M. 2000. *Democracy and Institutions : the Life Work of Arend Lijphart*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Denny, Elaine, and Barbara Walter. 2014. "Ethnicity and civil war." *Journal of Peace Research* 51 (March): 199-212.
- Doyle, Michael, and Nicholas Sambanis. 2002. "International peacebuilding: a theoretical and quantitative analysis." *American Political Science Review* 94 (December): 779–801.
- Fearon, James, and David D. Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *The American Political Science Review* 97 (January): 75-90.
- Fortna, Virginia. 2004. "Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after civil war." *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (June): 269–292.
- Gurses, Mehmet, and David Mason. 2008. "Democracy out of Anarchy: The Prospects for Post-Civil-War Democracy." *Social Science Quarterly* 89 (June): 315-336.
- Hartzell, Caroline, Matthew Hoddie and Donald Rothchild. 2001. "Stabilizing the Peace after Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables." *International Organization* 55

- (Winter): 183-208.
- Hartzell, Caroline, and Matthew Hoddie. 2003. "Institutionalizing peace: power sharing and post-civil war conflict management." *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (April): 318–32.
- Hegre, Havard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, & Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2001. "Toward a democratic civil peace: Democracy, political change, and civil war, 1816–1992." *American Political Science Review* 95 (March): 33–48
- Hegre, Havard. 2014. "Democracy and armed conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 51 (January): 159-172.
- Hirota, Ohmura. 2011. "Termination and Recurrence of Civil War: Which Outcomes Lead to Durable Peace after Civil War?" *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 12 (December): 375-398.
- Howarth, Kirsten. 2014. "Connecting the dots: Liberal peace and post-conflict violence and crime." *Progress in Development Studies* 14 (May): 261-273.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Shuster.
- Ignatieff, Michael. 1993. *Blood and Belonging*. London: Noonday Press.
- Jung, Jai Kwan. 2008a. "Mission Impossible? Democracy Building in Post-Civil War Societies." Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago. (April 3, 2008).
- Jung, Jai Kwan. 2008b. "The Paradox of Institution Building After Civil War: A Trade-Off

- between Short-Term Peacemaking and Long-Term Democracy Building." Ph.D. Diss. 3339765. Cornell University, Ann Arbor.
- Jung, Jai Kwan. 2013. "Institutional Adoption in the Resolution of Civil Conflicts." *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 11 (June): 29-53.
- Licklider, Roy. 1995. "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993." *The American Political Science Review* 89 (3): 681–690.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1968. *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1977. *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1984. *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Democracies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lustick, Ian. 1979. "Stability in deeply divided societies: Consociationalism versus control". *World Politics* 31 (3): 325–344.
- Lustick, Ian. 1997. "Lijphart, Lakatos, and consociationalism". *World Politics* 50 (1): 88–117.
- Luttwak, Edward. 1999. "Give War a Chance." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 4, pp. 36–44.
- Mann, Michael. 2005. *The Dark Side of Democracy. Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mason, David, Joseph Weingarten, and Patrick Fett. 1999. "Win, Lose, or Draw: Predicting the Outcome of Civil Wars." *Political Research Quarterly* 52 (June): 239-268.
- Mason, David, et al. 2011. "When Civil Wars Recur: Conditions for Durable Peace after Civil

- Wars.” *International Studies Perspectives* 12 (May): 171–189.
- Moynihan, Daniel P. 1993. *Pandemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Omae, Masahiro. 2012. "Civil Wars with Or without an End: Postwar Violence and Civil War Recurrence." Ph.D. Diss. 3550727. University of California, Riverside.
- Quinn, Michael, David Mason, and Mehmet Gurses. 2007. “Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence.” *International Interactions* 33 (April): 167-193.
- Reynolds, Andrew. 2011. *Designing Democracy in a Dangerous World*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Slater, Dan. 2003. “Iron Cage in an Iron Fist: Authoritarian Institutions and the Personalization of Power in Malaysia.” *Comparative Politics* 36 (October): 81-101.
- Smith, Anthony. 1986. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Stephens, Israel. 2011. "Civil Wars." In *21st Century Political Science: A Reference Handbook*, edited by John T. Ishiyama and Marijke Breuning, 107-15. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc.
- van Schendelen, M. P. C. M. 1984. "The Views of Arend Lijphart and Collected Criticisms." *Acta Politica* 19 (1): 19-55.
- Wagner, R. Harrison. 1993. “The Causes of Peace.” In Roy Licklider, ed. *Stop the Killing: How Civil Wars End*, New York: New York University Press, pp. 235–268.
- Walter, Barbara. 1999. “Designing Transitions From Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization, and Commitments to Peace.” *International Security* 24 (Summer): 127-155.
- Walter, Barbara. 2002. *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars*. Princeton,

NJ: Princeton Univ. Press

Walter, Barbara. 2004. "Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War."

Journal of Peace Research 41 (May): 371-388.

Weeks, Jessica. 2012. "Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of

International Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 106 (May): 326-347.

Data Sources

Beck, Horsten, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh. 2001. "New tools in comparative political economy: The Database of Political Institutions." (v. 2010)

World Bank Economic Review 15:1 (September): 165-176. Available from

<http://www.nsd.uib.no/macrodatabank/set.html?id=11&sub=1>

Bormann, Nils-Christian & Matt Golder. 2013. "Democratic Electoral Systems Around the

World, 1946-2011," *Electoral Studies*. Available from

<https://files.nyu.edu/mrg217/public/elections.html>

Center for Systemic Peace. (2014). *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and*

Transitions, 1800-2013 (p4v2013) [Data file and codebook]. Available from

<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>

Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz. 2014. "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime

Transitions." *Perspectives on Politics* 12(2): forthcoming. Available from

<http://sites.psu.edu/dictators/>

Gerring, John & Strom Thacker. 2008. *A Centripetal Theory of Democratic Governance*.

Cambridge University Press. Available from

<http://www.bu.edu/sthacker/research/articles-and-data/>

Henisz, Witold J. 2002. "The institutional environment for infrastructure investment" (v. 2010).

- Industrial and Corporate Change* 11 (2): 355-389. Available from <http://mgmt5.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/>
- Norris, Pippa. 2009. *Democracy Time-Series* (v. 3.0) [Data file and codebook]. Available from <https://sites.google.com/site/pippanorris3/research/data>
- Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman. 2010. *Resort to War: 1816 – 2007* (Intrastate Wars v4.0) [Data file and codebook]. Correlates of War. Available from <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war>
- Teorell, Jan, Stefan Dahlberg, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Felix Hartmann & Richard Svensson. 2015. *The Quality of Government Standard Dataset* (v. Jan15) [Data file and codebook]. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute. Available from <http://www.qog.pol.gu.se>
- Themnér, Lotta & Peter Wallensteen. 2014. *Armed Conflict, 1946-2013* (v4-2014a) [Data file and codebook]. Uppsala Conflict Data Program & Peace Research Institute Oslo. Available from http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/
- Weeks, Jessica and Jeff Colgan. 2015. “Revolution, Personalistic Dictatorships, and International Conflict.” *International Organization* 69 (1): 163-194. Available from https://users.polisci.wisc.edu/jweeks/Jessica_Weeks/Research.html
- World Bank. 2014. *World Development Indicators* (v. Dec-2014) [Data file and codebook]. Available from <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>