

# The Allure of Distant War Drums: Refugees, Geography, and Foreign Policy Preferences in Turkey

## APPENDIX

— For Online Publication —

### Syrian Refugee Camps in Turkey

Figure A-1: Map of camp locations in Turkey (in June 2014)



### Our Sample

Turkey is a unitary state that is composed of 81 provinces. We first selected 27 provinces that: 1) have significant presence of Syrian refugees in southeast Turkey<sup>1</sup>; 2) were under emergency rule (OHAL) or declared as “adjacent zones” (mücavir alan in Turkish, which was a softer type of

<sup>1</sup>We included all the provinces with camps and the province of Mersin. The latter does not have a camp, but there is plenty of qualitative evidence that Mersin hosted many Syrian refugees. See for example AFAD (2013, 19), Orhan and Gündoğar (2015, 32), and Çetingüleç (2014).

emergency rule) after 1987<sup>2</sup>; and 3) do not have significant refugee population, were not OHAL provinces or adjacent zones, but border provinces that host many refugees or border OHAL / adjacent zone provinces.<sup>3</sup>

The 27 provinces are composed of 307 districts, which we divide into 12 strata according to three factors: refugee presence, past experience with the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, and support for the incumbent AKP party. We classify districts with refugee camps as “high” refugee presence, whereas districts without camps, but located in provinces with camps as having “medium” refugee presence. Districts with no camps located in provinces with no significant refugee population (no camps and not Mersin) are coded as having “low” refugee presence. Although presence of camps is not a perfect measure of refugees’ presence in a province or a district, during our survey there was a strong correlation between camps and the number of refugees in a province. For example, out of about 900,000 Syrian refugees in Turkey in June 2014, over 764,000 resided in provinces with camps (UNHCR, 2014). Thus, even though most of the refugees reside outside camps, camps are a good proxy for the overall number of refugees in a province, at least during the time of our survey. Past experience with Turkish-Kurdish conflict is based on whether a given district was in an OHAL province or in a province declared as adjacent zone. We classify support for the incumbent AKP as “low” if the district’s AKP vote-share in the municipal election in March 2014 is equal to or lower than the national median (43.3%), and as “high” if it is above the median.<sup>4</sup>

Next, we randomly sampled 33 districts based on the proportional share of each strata in the total population of the 307 districts, and on the proportional share of urban districts in each strata

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<sup>2</sup>OHAL provinces included in our sampling frame are Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Mardin, Siirt, and Van. While Diyarbakır was under emergency rule during the entire period between 1987-2002, the rest of these provinces were declared adjacent zones towards the end of this period; and Elazığ was declared an adjacent zone earlier, between 1993-96. The overall duration of emergency rule (including the periods as adjacent zones) was 9 years in Bitlis and Elazığ while it was 15 years in the rest (Belge, 2016). Provinces that were only declared adjacent zones and have experienced a softer type of emergency rule are Adıyaman and Muş. Adıyaman was an adjacent zone for 7 years, while Muş was an adjacent zone for 14 years (Belge, 2016). We excluded Hakkari, Şırnak and Tunceli due to security situation in those areas.

<sup>3</sup>These are Ağrı, Erzincan, Erzurum, Karaman, Kayseri, Konya, Niğde, and Sivas.

<sup>4</sup>Within the 307 districts, we also excluded several areas that presented safety concerns to the enumerators (Sincik and Gerger in Adıyaman province, Saray in Van province, and Pervari in Siirt province).

tum.<sup>5</sup> We oversampled individuals and districts that had a high presence of refugees, and also high past exposure to political conflict (OHAL and adjacent zone districts).

Within each district, our enumerators chose a random starting point. They then randomly selected households, and individuals within each household with the most recent birthday were asked to participate in a survey about “current events.” Households, not individuals were substituted. Sample demographics are shown in Table 1 in the main text.

We surveyed 1,257 respondents in central, eastern, and south-eastern Turkey. We dropped 15 of them from the analysis because in these interviews the enumerators reported that someone else interfered during the survey. Thus, our analysis covers 1,242 respondents, among them 526 Kurds. These respondents come from 33 districts in 17 Turkish provinces. These provinces and districts are listed in A-1. The map of these districts is in Figure 1 in the paper.

## Treatment Descriptions and Key Variables

### Treatments

*Enumerator* [Omitted in the Control Condition]: Now we are going to talk about a very important issue facing Turkey.

*Enumerator* [Omitted in the Control Condition]: There has been a lot of talk in the news about Syrian refugees here in Turkey. There are over a million Syrian refugees living in and out of camps here in Turkey. That number is expected to double to over 1.5 Syrian million refugees by next year. Experts familiar with the refugee situation point out that Syrian refugees will outnumber Turks in some parts of Turkey. They also argue that it is a mistake to call the Syrian refugees ‘guests,’ as the majority of the refugees will remain permanently in Turkey and not return to Syria.

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<sup>5</sup>Districts were labeled as urban if they were classified as metropolitan or central districts by the Turkish Statistical Institute, or had populations of or greater than 50,000, more than half of which are in urban areas.

Table A-1: Our Sample

| Province      | District     | Camp in province | Camp in district | Respondents | Kurds | OHAL or adjacent zone |
|---------------|--------------|------------------|------------------|-------------|-------|-----------------------|
| Adana         | Saricam      | 1                | 1                | 40          | 4     | 0                     |
| Adana         | Yuregir      | 1                | 0                | 59          | 13    | 0                     |
| Adiyaman      | Celikhan     | 1                | 0                | 30          | 27    | 1                     |
| Adiyaman      | Kahta        | 1                | 0                | 69          | 69    | 1                     |
| Adiyaman      | Merkez       | 1                | 1                | 40          | 37    | 1                     |
| Diyarbakir    | Baglar       | 0                | 0                | 60          | 56    | 1                     |
| Diyarbakir    | Ergani       | 0                | 0                | 30          | 30    | 1                     |
| Elazig        | Merkez       | 0                | 0                | 45          | 1     | 1                     |
| Gaziantep     | Oguzeli      | 1                | 0                | 30          | 4     | 0                     |
| Gaziantep     | Sahinbey     | 1                | 0                | 59          | 12    | 0                     |
| Hatay         | Altinozu     | 1                | 1                | 70          | 2     | 0                     |
| Hatay         | Antakya      | 1                | 1                | 50          | 1     | 0                     |
| Kahramanmaras | Dulkadiroglu | 1                | 1                | 42          | 2     | 0                     |
| Kahramanmaras | Pazarcik     | 1                | 0                | 27          | 0     | 0                     |
| Kahramanmaras | Turkoglu     | 1                | 0                | 29          | 1     | 0                     |
| Kayseri       | Hacilar      | 0                | 0                | 18          | 1     | 0                     |
| Kayseri       | Kocasinan    | 0                | 0                | 40          | 2     | 0                     |
| Kayseri       | Sarioglan    | 0                | 0                | 30          | 0     | 0                     |
| Kilis         | Elbeyli      | 1                | 1                | 30          | 3     | 0                     |
| Kilis         | Merkez       | 1                | 1                | 30          | 2     | 0                     |
| Mardin        | Kiziltepe    | 1                | 0                | 24          | 24    | 1                     |
| Mardin        | Midyat       | 1                | 1                | 31          | 17    | 1                     |
| Mardin        | Nusaybin     | 1                | 1                | 31          | 28    | 1                     |
| Mardin        | Yesilli      | 1                | 0                | 48          | 22    | 1                     |
| Mersin        | Mezitli      | 0                | 0                | 40          | 2     | 0                     |
| Mersin        | Tarsus       | 0                | 0                | 20          | 12    | 0                     |
| Mus           | Malazgirt    | 0                | 0                | 40          | 40    | 1                     |
| Osmaniye      | Merkez       | 1                | 1                | 30          | 1     | 0                     |
| Sanliurfa     | Karakopru    | 1                | 0                | 30          | 27    | 0                     |
| Sanliurfa     | Viransehir   | 1                | 1                | 40          | 36    | 0                     |
| Siirt         | Sirvan       | 0                | 0                | 30          | 30    | 1                     |
| Sivas         | Yildizeli    | 0                | 0                | 30          | 0     | 0                     |
| Van           | Catak        | 0                | 0                | 20          | 20    | 1                     |

[Randomly assign to one of the five following scenarios]

1. Control

2. Economic Cost (Negative)

*Enumerator:* Experts familiar with the Syrian refugee situation say that the actual cost of the refugees to Turkish citizens is much higher than people think. The Turkish government has spent xxxx Turkish lira (3 Billion USD) on housing and feeding the refugees. Also, the large refugee population means there are more people looking for jobs and setting up businesses. So, the refugees are using public money and taking away jobs that is meant for Turkish citizens.

3. Ethnic Balance (Negative)

*Enumerator:* Experts familiar with the Syrian refugee situation say that the actual cost of the refugees to Turkish citizens is much higher than people think. They argue that refugees disrupt the multi-cultural, multi-lingual and multi-sectarian structure of Turkey, which includes Turks, Kurds, Laz, Circassians, Arabs, Sunnis, and Alevis. The refugees are threatening the peaceful coexistence between the different groups in Turkey.

4. Militant Ties (Negative)

*Enumerator:* Experts familiar with the Syrian refugee situation say that the actual cost of the refugees to Turkish citizens is much higher than people think. They argue that refugees bring with them ties to militant rebel groups and arms. These relationships threaten to destabilize parts of Turkey and to bring the fighting from the Syrian Civil War here to Turkey.

5. Women and Children (Positive)

*Enumerator:* Experts familiar with the Syrian refugee situation say that the flow of refugees has done even more good than originally thought. They argue that thanks to Turkey's open-door policy, hundreds of thousands of women and children have been saved the horrors of

experiencing the Syrian Civil War.

## Key Variables

- **Alcohol Not OK:** It is not acceptable for someone to drink alcohol (1 Strongly Disagree to 7 Strongly agree).

- **Household Income:** Approximately what is your household's monthly income in Turkish lira (TL)?<sup>6</sup>

1. Less than 300 TL
2. 301-600 TL
3. 601-900 TL
4. 901-1200 TL
5. 1201-1500 TL
6. 1501-1800 TL
7. 1801-2100 TL
8. 2101-2400 TL
9. 2401-2700 TL
10. 2701-3000 TL
11. 3001-3300 TL
12. 3301-3600 TL
13. 3601-3900 TL
14. 3901-4200 TL
15. 4201-4500 TL
16. More than 4501 TL

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<sup>6</sup>At the time of the survey, 1 USD  $\approx$  2.15 TL.

- **Wealth Index:** Calculated first component of principal component analysis whether or not subjects owned the following:
  - Smartphone
  - Car
  - Computer
  - Washing machine
  - Dishwasher
  
- **Religious Index:** Calculated first component of principal component analysis of the following questions:
  - How frequently do you pray?
    1. No
    2. Only on religious holidays
    3. Every Friday
    4. More than once a week
    5. Every day at least once
    6. 5 times a day
    7. Only during Ramadan
  - It is not acceptable for someone to drink alcohol (1 Strongly Disagree to 7 Strongly Agree)
  - Women in my house cover their hair when leaving the house (1 Almost Never to 7 Almost Always)
  
- **Refugee Exposure:** The sum of exposure for each type of interaction in Table A-2 that is then rescaled to lie between 0-1.

The following questions are about your interaction with Syrian Refugees and how often do you or members of your immediate household experience the following CURRENTLY.

Table A-2: Refugee Exposure

| Interaction  | (1) Never | (2) Once a month | (3) Once a week | (4) 2-3 times a week | (5) Daily |
|--|-----------|------------------|-----------------|----------------------|-----------|
| See or hear Syrian refugees on public transportation   |           |                  |                 |                      |           |
| See or hear Syrian refugees on the street (begging or selling items)                                 |           |                  |                 |                      |           |
| Do business or interact in your business with Syrian refugees  |           |                  |                 |                      |           |
| Interact with Syrian refugees in social settings (dinner, mosque, restaurants, celebrations, hotels) |           |                  |                 |                      |           |
| See or interact with Syrian refugees at the local market   |           |                  |                 |                      |           |

In Table A-3 we examine inter-item correlations among these questions, to explore whether they relate to the same phenomenon. These correlations suggest that there is a high degree of correlation among the five dimensions of exposure to refugees (item-test correlation is above 0.7 for all the dimensions). Importantly, all the five dimensions seem to belong to the measure, since removal of any one of them would lead to a lower  $\alpha$ .

Table A-3: Refugee Exposure - Inter-item Correlations

| Item                        | Obs  | Sign | item-test correlation | item-rest correlation | average interitem covariance | alpha |
|-----------------------------|------|------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|-------|
| See on pub transport        | 1225 | +    | 0.807                 | 0.680                 | 0.079                        | 0.812 |
| See on the Street           | 1223 | +    | 0.770                 | 0.637                 | 0.085                        | 0.824 |
| Do business                 | 1219 | +    | 0.708                 | 0.542                 | 0.089                        | 0.848 |
| Interact in social settings | 1211 | +    | 0.830                 | 0.711                 | 0.075                        | 0.804 |
| See at the local market     | 1219 | +    | 0.833                 | 0.724                 | 0.077                        | 0.801 |
| Test scale                  |      |      |                       |                       | 0.081                        | 0.849 |



- **Partisanship:** Which political party do you feel closest to in terms of your political views  
(AKP, CHP, MHP, BDP, HDP other)

- AKP
- CHP
- MHP
- BDP
- HDP
- Other
- None

**Dependent Variables (Note: All variables below were rescaled to lie between 0-1.):** For each of the following actions Turkey could take in Syria please rank how much you support them (1 Strongly Oppose to 7 Strongly Support)?

- Use military force to remove Assad
- Use military force to create a safe zone in Northern Syria
- Support all opposition forces
- Support only Islamic opposition forces
- Support Assad
- Stay away from the conflict completely.

### **Factor analysis of the dependent variables**

Below we report correlations and factor analysis of the six questions. We show that the question on support Assad and stay away from the conflict do not load well with the other questions. We therefore focus on analyzing four questions that represent pro-intervention attitudes: removing Assad, establishing safe zone in North Syria, supporting all opposition, and supporting the Islamic opposition.

In Table A-4 we examine inter-item correlations among the answers to the first four dependent variables, which we use to construct the *Pro-intervention Attitudes* variable. These correlations allow us to explore whether they relate to the same phenomenon. These correlations suggest that there is a high degree of correlation among the four dimensions of *Pro-intervention Attitudes*. (item-test correlation is above 0.8 for all the dimensions). All the four dimensions seem to belong to the measure, since removal of any one of them would lead to a lower  $\alpha$ .

We begin with exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to examine whether these six question relate to the same underlying latent variable. Table A-5 presents the factor eigenvalues and loadings. It suggests that there are two factors. Examination of the factor loadings in Table A-6 shows that four variables—Remove Assad, Safe zone, Support all opposition, and Support Islamic opposition—load

Table A-4: Pro-intervention Attitudes - Inter-item Correlations

| Item                   | Obs  | Sign | item-test correlation | item-rest correlation | average interitem covariance | alpha |
|------------------------|------|------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|-------|
| Remove Assad           | 1181 | +    | 0.797                 | 0.654                 | 1.249                        | 0.658 |
| Safe Zone              | 1179 | +    | 0.756                 | 0.591                 | 1.309                        | 0.678 |
| Support All Rebels     | 1156 | +    | 0.818                 | 0.708                 | 1.248                        | 0.650 |
| Support Islamic Rebels | 1144 | +    | 0.820                 | 0.707                 | 1.230                        | 0.650 |
| Support Assad          | 1183 | +    | 0.527                 | 0.341                 | 1.744                        | 0.739 |
| Stay away              | 1156 | -    | 0.280                 | -0.008                | 2.268                        | 0.849 |
| Test scale             |      |      |                       |                       | 1.508                        | 0.750 |

well into one factor, suggesting they all refer to the same phenomenon. The variable of Support Assad has a significantly lower loading, suggesting it represents a separate phenomenon. The support for Stay away is loading well into the second factor.

Table A-5: Exploratory factor analysis - examining the eigenvalues

| Factor   | Eigenvalue | Difference | Proportion | Cumulative |
|----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Factor 1 | 3.168      | 2.123      | 0.528      | 0.528      |
| Factor 2 | 1.104      | 0.318      | 0.174      | 0.702      |
| Factor 3 | 0.727      | 0.242      | 0.121      | 0.823      |
| Factor 4 | 0.484      | 0.165      | 0.080      | 0.904      |
| Factor 5 | 0.319      | 0.061      | 0.053      | 0.957      |
| Factor 6 | 0.258      | .          | 0.043      | 1.000      |

Factor analysis / correlation  
 Method: principal-component factors  
 Rotation: (unrotated)  
 Number of obs = 1,102  
 Retained factors = 2  
 Number of params = 11

LR test: independent vs. saturated:  $\chi^2(15) = 2578.69$  Prob >  $\chi^2 = 0.000$

Table A-6: Exploratory factor analysis - Rotated factor loadings and unique variances

| Variable                   | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Uniqueness |
|----------------------------|----------|----------|------------|
| Remove Assad               | 0.827    | -0.045   | 0.314      |
| Safe zone                  | 0.813    | 0.104    | 0.328      |
| Support all rebels         | 0.862    | -0.065   | 0.252      |
| Support Islamic opposition | 0.849    | -0.146   | 0.259      |
| Support Assad              | 0.599    | 0.231    | 0.588      |
| Stay away                  | -0.006   | 0.976    | 0.047      |

We supplement this examination with confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Table A-7 presents

the results. The factor loadings of the four variables are above 0.75 and statistically significant suggesting these variables are strongly associated with the scale measure *Pro-intervention attitudes*. The factor loading of Support Assad is significantly lower, and we therefore drop it from the scale variable. We also do not include the attitude towards Stay Away because it is not well associated with the underlying measure (low factor loading of 0.28).

We now present inter-item correlations and factor analysis of the four pro-intervention questions that form our main dependent variable, *Pro-intervention attitudes*.

In Table A-8 we examine inter-item correlations among the answers to the first four dependent variables, which we use to construct the *Pro-intervention Attitudes* variable. These correlations allow us to explore whether they relate to the same phenomenon. These correlations suggest that there is a high degree of correlation among the four dimensions of *Pro-intervention Attitudes*. (item-test correlation is above 0.8 for all the dimensions). All the four dimensions seem to belong to the measure, since removal of any one of them would lead to a lower  $\alpha$ .

We further demonstrate that these four items indeed capture the same factor by conducting an exploratory factor analysis (EFA), supplemented by confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).

We begin with EFA. Table A-9 presents the factor eigenvalues and loadings. It suggests that there is only one factor since the eigenvalue of the second factor is too low. Examination of the factor loadings in Table A-10 shows that all the four variables load well into one factor, suggesting they all refer to the same phenomenon.

Now we proceed to examine this scale variable using CFA. Table A-11 presents the results. The factor loadings of the four variables are above 0.8 and statistically significant suggesting these variables are strongly associated with the scale measure *Pro-intervention attitudes*.

## Randomization Checks

Table A-7: Confirmatory factor analysis

Exogenous variables observed: Attitudes on Syrian policy

Endogenous variables observed:

Remove Assad, Save zone, Support all opp., Support Islamic opp., Support Assad, Stay away

Fitting target model:

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -13685.469

Iteration 1: log likelihood = -13685.469

Structural equation model

Number of obs = 1,102

Estimation method = ml

Log likelihood = -13685.469

| Standartized                      | Coef.  | OIM Std. Err. | z      | P> z  | [95% CI]        |
|-----------------------------------|--------|---------------|--------|-------|-----------------|
| <b>Structural</b>                 |        |               |        |       |                 |
| Remove Assad                      |        |               |        |       |                 |
| Pro-intervention attitudes        | 0.804  | 0.009         | 91.96  | 0.000 | 0.787-0.821     |
| Constant                          | 0.448  | 0.032         | 14.10  | 0.000 | 0.386-0.510     |
| Safe zone                         |        |               |        |       |                 |
| Pro-intervention attitudes        | 0.762  | 0.011         | 71.51  | 0.000 | 0.741-0.783     |
| Constant                          | 0.640  | 0.037         | 17.30  | 0.00  | 0.567-0.712     |
| Support all opposition            |        |               |        |       |                 |
| Pro-intervention attitudes        | 0.827  | 0.008         | 107.17 | 0.000 | 0.812-0.842     |
| Constant                          | 0.424  | 0.030         | 14.19  | 0.000 | 0.366- 0.483    |
| Support Islamic opposition        |        |               |        |       |                 |
| Pro-intervention attitudes        | 0.830  | 0.008         | 109.33 | 0.000 | 0.815-0.845     |
| Constant                          | 0.425  | 0.030         | 14.31  | 0.000 | 0.367-0.483     |
| Support Assad                     |        |               |        |       |                 |
| Pro-intervention attitudes        | 0.570  | 0.019         | 30.65  | 0.000 | 0.534-0.607     |
| Constant                          | 0.607  | 0.044         | 13.70  | 0.000 | 0.520-0.693     |
| Stay away                         |        |               |        |       |                 |
| Pro-intervention attitudes        | -0.279 | 0.027         | -10.25 | 0.000 | -0.333-(-0.226) |
| Constant                          | 2.181  | 0.054         | 40.72  | 0.000 | 2.076-2.286     |
| var(e.Remove Assad)               | 0.353  | 0.014         |        |       | 0.326-0.382     |
| var(e.Safe zone)                  | 0.420  | 0.016         |        |       | 0.389-0.453     |
| var(e.Support all opposition)     | 0.316  | 0.013         |        |       | 0.292-0.342     |
| var(e.Support Islamic opposition) | 0.311  | 0.013         |        |       | 0.287-0.340     |
| var(e.Support Assad)              | 0.675  | 0.021         |        |       | 0.635-0.718     |
| var(e.Stay away)                  | 0.922  | 0.015         |        |       | 0.893-0.952     |

Table A-8: Pro-intervention Attitudes - Inter-item Correlations

| Item           | Obs  | Sign | item-test correlation | item-rest correlation | average interitem covariance | alpha  |
|----------------|------|------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|--------|
| Remove Assad   | 1181 | +    | 0.8484                | 0.7138                | 2.84671                      | 0.8342 |
| Safe Zone      | 1179 | +    | 0.8470                | 0.7024                | 2.796263                     | 0.8387 |
| All Rebels     | 1156 | +    | 0.8530                | 0.7375                | 2.905018                     | 0.8259 |
| Islamic Rebels | 1144 | +    | 0.8501                | 0.7261                | 2.86911                      | 0.8300 |
| Test scale     |      |      |                       |                       | 2.85439                      | 0.8686 |

Table A-9: Exploratory factor analysis - examining the eigenvalues

Factor analysis / correlation  
 Method: principal-component factors  
 Rotation: (unrotated)

Number of obs = 1,120  
 Retained factors = 1  
 Number of params = 4

| Factor   | Eigenvalue | Difference | Proportion | Cumulative |
|----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Factor 1 | 2.881      | 2.363      | 0.720      | 0.720      |
| Factor 2 | 0.519      | 0.186      | 0.130      | 0.850      |
| Factor 3 | 0.333      | 0.067      | 0.083      | 0.933      |
| Factor 4 | 0.267      | .          | 0.067      | 1.000      |

LR test: independent vs. saturated:  $\chi^2(6) = 2256.35$  Prob >  $\chi^2 = 0.000$

Table A-10: Exploratory factor analysis - Rotated factor loadings and unique variances

| Variable                   | Factor 1 | Uniqueness |
|----------------------------|----------|------------|
| Remove Assad               | 0.839    | 0.296      |
| Safe zone                  | 0.837    | 0.299      |
| Support all rebels         | 0.862    | 0.258      |
| Support Islamic opposition | 0.857    | 0.266      |

Table A-11: Confirmatory factor analysis

Exogenous variables observed: Pro-intervention attitudes

Endogenous variables observed: Remove Assad, Save zone, Support all opp., Support Islamic opp.

Fitting target model:

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -7143.7818

Iteration 1: log likelihood = -7143.7818

Structural equation model

Number of obs = 1,120

Estimation method = ml

Log likelihood = -7143.7818

| Standartized                      | Coef. | OIM Std. Err. | z      | P> z  | [95% CI]     |
|-----------------------------------|-------|---------------|--------|-------|--------------|
| <b>Structural</b>                 |       |               |        |       |              |
| Remove Assad                      |       |               |        |       |              |
| Pro-intervention attitudes        | 0.844 | 0.007         | 122.09 | 0.000 | 0.830-0.857  |
| Constant                          | 0.433 | 0.028         | 15.41  | 0.000 | 0.378-0.488  |
| Safe zone                         |       |               |        |       |              |
| Pro-intervention attitudes        | 0.846 | 0.007         | 124.54 | 0.000 | 0.833-0.860  |
| Constant                          | 0.576 | 0.030         | 19.46  | 0.00  | 0.518-0.634  |
| Support all opposition            |       |               |        |       |              |
| Pro-intervention attitudes        | 0.853 | 0.007         | 131.15 | 0.000 | 0.840-0.866  |
| Constant                          | 0.425 | 0.027         | 15.56  | 0.000 | 0.378- 0.486 |
| Support Islamic opposition        |       |               |        |       |              |
| Pro-intervention attitudes        | 0.851 | 0.007         | 129.88 | 0.000 | 0.839-0.864  |
| Constant                          | 0.432 | 0.027         | 15.73  | 0.000 | 0.378-0.486  |
| var(e.Remove Assad)               | 0.288 | 0.012         |        |       | 0.266-0.312  |
| var(e.Safe zone)                  | 0.284 | 0.012         |        |       | 0.262-0.307  |
| var(e.Support all opposition)     | 0.273 | 0.011         |        |       | 0.252-0.295  |
| var(e.Support Islamic opposition) | 0.275 | 0.011         |        |       | 0.254-0.298  |

Table A-12: Randomization Checks

|                  | Kurdish          | High School       | Urban            | OHAL              | Border Province   |
|------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| <b>main</b>      |                  |                   |                  |                   |                   |
| Economic Cost    | 0.075<br>(0.181) | 0.051<br>(0.185)  | 0.126<br>(0.201) | 0.138<br>(0.202)  | 0.061<br>(0.183)  |
| Ethnic Balance   | 0.016<br>(0.181) | -0.052<br>(0.186) | 0.080<br>(0.200) | 0.042<br>(0.205)  | 0.034<br>(0.184)  |
| Militant Ties    | 0.107<br>(0.180) | -0.069<br>(0.186) | 0.085<br>(0.200) | -0.005<br>(0.206) | -0.023<br>(0.184) |
| Women & Children | 0.033<br>(0.181) | -0.194<br>(0.188) | 0.080<br>(0.200) | 0.042<br>(0.205)  | -0.000<br>(0.184) |
| Observations     | 1257             | 1255              | 1257             | 1257              | 1257              |
| Chi-squared      | 0.47             | 1.92              | 0.42             | 0.65              | 0.26              |
| P-value          | 0.98             | 0.75              | 0.98             | 0.96              | 0.99              |

Signif.: \*10% \*\*5% \*\*\*1%.



Table A-13: Randomization Checks

|                  | Age     | Cover Hair | Alcohol OK | Religious | Smart Phone | Wealth  | Refugee Exposure |
|------------------|---------|------------|------------|-----------|-------------|---------|------------------|
| Economic Cost    | -0.161* | 0.013      | 0.012      | 0.065     | 0.027       | 0.038   | -0.018           |
|                  | (0.097) | (0.028)    | (0.037)    | (0.062)   | (0.039)     | (0.072) | (0.028)          |
| Ethnic Balance   | -0.048  | 0.033      | 0.032      | 0.075     | 0.052       | 0.042   | -0.006           |
|                  | (0.097) | (0.028)    | (0.037)    | (0.062)   | (0.039)     | (0.072) | (0.028)          |
| Militant Ties    | -0.077  | -0.013     | -0.007     | -0.035    | 0.023       | 0.006   | -0.014           |
|                  | (0.097) | (0.028)    | (0.037)    | (0.062)   | (0.039)     | (0.072) | (0.028)          |
| Women & Children | 0.131   | 0.001      | -0.019     | 0.029     | 0.020       | -0.017  | -0.017           |
|                  | (0.097) | (0.028)    | (0.037)    | (0.062)   | (0.039)     | (0.072) | (0.028)          |
| Observations     | 1257    | 1235       | 1248       | 1186      | 1257        | 1257    | 1199             |
| F-statistic      | 2.47    | 0.76       | 0.57       | 1.08      | 0.44        | 0.25    | 0.15             |
| P-value          | 0.04    | 0.55       | 0.68       | 0.37      | 0.78        | 0.91    | 0.96             |
| R-squared        | 0.01    | 0.00       | 0.00       | 0.00      | 0.00        | 0.00    | 0.00             |

Signif.: \*10% \*\*5% \*\*\*1%.

## Coefficient Plots

Figure A-2: Support for Removing Assad – Border / Non-Border Provinces Comparison




Figure A-3: Support for Establishing a Safe Zone in North Syria – Border / Non-Border Provinces Comparison

### Support for Creating a Safe Zone in N. Syria




Figure A-4: Support for All Opposition – Border / Non-Border Provinces Comparison





Figure A-5: Support for Islamic Opposition – Border / Non-Border Provinces Comparison



## Additional Robustness Checks

Table A-14: Support for Intervention – Distance to the Syrian Border in km (log)

|                             | Change SQ           | Remove Assad         | Safe Zone           | All Rebels          | Islamic Rebels       |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Economic Cost               | -0.073<br>(0.110)   | -0.046<br>(0.132)    | -0.055<br>(0.140)   | -0.114<br>(0.117)   | -0.058<br>(0.124)    |
| Ethnic Balance              | -0.028<br>(0.109)   | 0.012<br>(0.132)     | -0.114<br>(0.141)   | 0.016<br>(0.129)    | 0.035<br>(0.123)     |
| Militant Ties               | -0.212**<br>(0.102) | -0.194<br>(0.126)    | -0.282**<br>(0.136) | -0.216*<br>(0.122)  | -0.049<br>(0.120)    |
| Women & Children            | -0.050<br>(0.110)   | -0.019<br>(0.129)    | -0.142<br>(0.136)   | -0.070<br>(0.123)   | 0.007<br>(0.121)     |
| Economic Cost X Distance    | 0.013<br>(0.025)    | 0.010<br>(0.030)     | 0.008<br>(0.032)    | 0.023<br>(0.027)    | 0.010<br>(0.028)     |
| Ethnic Balance X Distance   | 0.016<br>(0.025)    | 0.012<br>(0.030)     | 0.035<br>(0.032)    | 0.006<br>(0.029)    | -0.001<br>(0.028)    |
| Militant Ties X Distance    | 0.059**<br>(0.024)  | 0.056*<br>(0.029)    | 0.082***<br>(0.031) | 0.063**<br>(0.028)  | 0.017<br>(0.028)     |
| Women & Children X Distance | 0.009<br>(0.025)    | 0.007<br>(0.029)     | 0.029<br>(0.031)    | 0.014<br>(0.028)    | -0.005<br>(0.027)    |
| Distance                    | 0.118***<br>(0.039) | 0.132***<br>(0.050)  | 0.110**<br>(0.055)  | 0.134***<br>(0.044) | 0.184***<br>(0.047)  |
| OHAL                        | 0.005<br>(0.083)    | 0.095<br>(0.090)     | -0.020<br>(0.090)   | -0.026<br>(0.100)   | -0.040<br>(0.098)    |
| Refugee Exposure            | 0.104***<br>(0.038) | 0.138***<br>(0.050)  | 0.074<br>(0.050)    | 0.087*<br>(0.046)   | 0.102**<br>(0.047)   |
| Kurdish                     | 0.053<br>(0.036)    | -0.023<br>(0.042)    | 0.001<br>(0.045)    | 0.092**<br>(0.044)  | 0.132***<br>(0.043)  |
| Arab                        | 0.053<br>(0.034)    | 0.026<br>(0.043)     | 0.029<br>(0.049)    | 0.060<br>(0.041)    | 0.090**<br>(0.041)   |
| Alawite                     | -0.009<br>(0.034)   | 0.042<br>(0.044)     | 0.014<br>(0.045)    | -0.054<br>(0.040)   | -0.032<br>(0.040)    |
| CHP Supporter               | -0.079**<br>(0.034) | -0.121***<br>(0.040) | -0.092**<br>(0.043) | -0.063*<br>(0.038)  | -0.037<br>(0.039)    |
| MHP Supporter               | -0.008<br>(0.038)   | -0.034<br>(0.045)    | 0.015<br>(0.049)    | -0.006<br>(0.044)   | 0.010<br>(0.042)     |
| Kurdish Parties Supporter   | -0.036<br>(0.033)   | -0.064<br>(0.042)    | -0.022<br>(0.043)   | -0.006<br>(0.037)   | -0.036<br>(0.040)    |
| AKP Supporter               | 0.064***<br>(0.023) | 0.044<br>(0.030)     | 0.077**<br>(0.030)  | 0.080***<br>(0.028) | 0.066**<br>(0.029)   |
| Constant                    | -0.272<br>(0.192)   | -0.300<br>(0.251)    | -0.163<br>(0.271)   | -0.407*<br>(0.219)  | -0.699***<br>(0.232) |
| Observations                | 1077                | 1063                 | 1061                | 1041                | 1031                 |
| R-squared                   | 0.24                | 0.17                 | 0.18                | 0.20                | 0.27                 |

Dependent variables (0-1): Pro-intervention Attitudes (col. 1), removing Assad (col. 2), creating a safe zone (col. 3), all rebel forces (col. 4), and Islamic rebel forces (col. 5), All models include province fixed effects and additional controls: age, religiosity index, education, wealth index, sex, dummies for urban resident and for whether the interview was conducted during Ramadan (only 10%). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signif.: \*10% \*\*5% \*\*\*1%.

Table A-15: Support for Intervention – Border Districts vs Non-Border Districts

|                                 | Change SQ            | Remove Assad         | Safe Zone            | All Rebels           | Islamic Rebels       |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Economic Cost                   | -0.023<br>(0.029)    | -0.007<br>(0.036)    | -0.037<br>(0.036)    | -0.018<br>(0.033)    | -0.026<br>(0.034)    |
| Ethnic Balance                  | 0.042<br>(0.029)     | 0.075**<br>(0.037)   | 0.031<br>(0.037)     | 0.036<br>(0.035)     | 0.027<br>(0.035)     |
| Militant Ties                   | 0.061**<br>(0.030)   | 0.071*<br>(0.037)    | 0.099***<br>(0.037)  | 0.060*<br>(0.036)    | 0.024<br>(0.036)     |
| Women & Children                | -0.013<br>(0.027)    | 0.019<br>(0.036)     | -0.016<br>(0.034)    | -0.015<br>(0.032)    | -0.025<br>(0.033)    |
| Economic Cost X Border Dist.    | 0.045<br>(0.062)     | 0.035<br>(0.074)     | 0.073<br>(0.082)     | 0.026<br>(0.061)     | 0.072<br>(0.064)     |
| Ethnic Balance X Border Dist.   | -0.043<br>(0.061)    | -0.079<br>(0.073)    | -0.028<br>(0.082)    | -0.003<br>(0.068)    | -0.004<br>(0.066)    |
| Militant Ties X Border Dist.    | -0.101*<br>(0.059)   | -0.135*<br>(0.073)   | -0.172**<br>(0.079)  | -0.033<br>(0.068)    | 0.019<br>(0.066)     |
| Women & Children X Border Dist. | 0.014<br>(0.061)     | -0.029<br>(0.072)    | -0.017<br>(0.078)    | 0.037<br>(0.063)     | 0.063<br>(0.062)     |
| Border Dist.                    | -0.242***<br>(0.059) | -0.216***<br>(0.071) | -0.294***<br>(0.075) | -0.300***<br>(0.061) | -0.368***<br>(0.062) |
| OHAL                            | -0.009<br>(0.083)    | 0.080<br>(0.090)     | -0.037<br>(0.090)    | -0.041<br>(0.100)    | -0.058<br>(0.098)    |
| Refugee Exposure                | 0.117***<br>(0.037)  | 0.151***<br>(0.049)  | 0.089*<br>(0.049)    | 0.100**<br>(0.046)   | 0.119***<br>(0.045)  |
| Kurdish                         | 0.060*<br>(0.036)    | -0.016<br>(0.042)    | 0.007<br>(0.045)     | 0.102**<br>(0.044)   | 0.145***<br>(0.043)  |
| Arab                            | 0.027<br>(0.033)     | 0.000<br>(0.043)     | -0.008<br>(0.049)    | 0.042<br>(0.041)     | 0.065<br>(0.039)     |
| Alawite                         | -0.007<br>(0.032)    | 0.044<br>(0.043)     | 0.016<br>(0.042)     | -0.048<br>(0.039)    | -0.023<br>(0.039)    |
| CHP Supporter                   | -0.088***<br>(0.034) | -0.130***<br>(0.040) | -0.109***<br>(0.042) | -0.069*<br>(0.037)   | -0.043<br>(0.039)    |
| MHP Supporter                   | -0.019<br>(0.037)    | -0.047<br>(0.044)    | 0.001<br>(0.048)     | -0.012<br>(0.043)    | -0.001<br>(0.041)    |
| Kurdish Parties Supporter       | -0.038<br>(0.033)    | -0.065<br>(0.042)    | -0.018<br>(0.042)    | -0.008<br>(0.037)    | -0.040<br>(0.040)    |
| AKP Supporter                   | 0.045*<br>(0.023)    | 0.024<br>(0.029)     | 0.053*<br>(0.030)    | 0.062**<br>(0.028)   | 0.045<br>(0.028)     |
| Constant                        | 0.318***<br>(0.054)  | 0.350***<br>(0.069)  | 0.405***<br>(0.071)  | 0.258***<br>(0.064)  | 0.201***<br>(0.063)  |
| Observations                    | 1077                 | 1063                 | 1061                 | 1041                 | 1031                 |
| R-squared                       | 0.26                 | 0.18                 | 0.21                 | 0.21                 | 0.29                 |

Dependent variables (0-1): Support for changing the status quo in Syria (col. 1), removing Assad (col. 2), creating a safe zone (col. 3), all rebel forces (col. 4), and Islamic rebel forces (col. 5). All models include province fixed effects and additional controls: age, religiosity index, education, wealth index, sex, dummies for urban resident and for whether the interview was conducted during Ramadan (only 10%). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signif.: \*10% \*\*5% \*\*\*1%.

Table A-16: Support for Intervention – Only Non-Minority Respondents

|                                 | Change SQ            | Remove Assad         | Safe Zone            | All Rebels          | Islamic Rebels       |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Economic Cost                   | -0.032<br>(0.047)    | -0.010<br>(0.052)    | -0.062<br>(0.060)    | -0.017<br>(0.051)   | -0.068<br>(0.051)    |
| Ethnic Balance                  | 0.053<br>(0.051)     | 0.107*<br>(0.057)    | 0.044<br>(0.064)     | 0.047<br>(0.055)    | 0.001<br>(0.056)     |
| Militant Ties                   | 0.079<br>(0.050)     | 0.118**<br>(0.058)   | 0.117*<br>(0.064)    | 0.085<br>(0.056)    | -0.008<br>(0.055)    |
| Women & Children                | -0.025<br>(0.047)    | -0.010<br>(0.055)    | -0.021<br>(0.061)    | -0.003<br>(0.051)   | -0.069<br>(0.052)    |
| Economic Cost X Border Prov.    | -0.080<br>(0.078)    | -0.140<br>(0.089)    | -0.128<br>(0.105)    | -0.059<br>(0.087)   | 0.004<br>(0.084)     |
| Ethnic Balance X Border Prov.   | -0.096<br>(0.084)    | -0.177*<br>(0.097)   | -0.146<br>(0.109)    | -0.039<br>(0.094)   | -0.022<br>(0.092)    |
| Militant Ties X Border Prov.    | -0.184**<br>(0.083)  | -0.271***<br>(0.095) | -0.268**<br>(0.109)  | -0.131<br>(0.098)   | -0.062<br>(0.091)    |
| Women & Children X Border Prov. | -0.008<br>(0.094)    | -0.003<br>(0.106)    | -0.099<br>(0.112)    | -0.001<br>(0.101)   | 0.054<br>(0.098)     |
| Border Prov.                    | -0.125<br>(0.087)    | -0.093<br>(0.103)    | -0.121<br>(0.107)    | -0.141<br>(0.096)   | -0.130<br>(0.098)    |
| OHAL                            | 0.274*<br>(0.142)    | 0.418**<br>(0.172)   | 0.375*<br>(0.227)    | -0.062<br>(0.077)   | -0.131<br>(0.083)    |
| Refugee Exposure                | 0.235***<br>(0.056)  | 0.274***<br>(0.061)  | 0.164**<br>(0.074)   | 0.292***<br>(0.066) | 0.181***<br>(0.064)  |
| Kurdish                         | —                    | —                    | —                    | —                   | —                    |
| Arab                            | —                    | —                    | —                    | —                   | —                    |
| Alawite                         | —                    | —                    | —                    | —                   | —                    |
| CHP Supporter                   | -0.062<br>(0.043)    | -0.076<br>(0.048)    | -0.078<br>(0.055)    | -0.072<br>(0.047)   | -0.024<br>(0.046)    |
| MHP Supporter                   | -0.048<br>(0.045)    | -0.061<br>(0.050)    | -0.030<br>(0.059)    | -0.056<br>(0.052)   | -0.041<br>(0.052)    |
| Kurdish Parties Supporter       | -0.201***<br>(0.059) | -0.193**<br>(0.092)  | -0.198***<br>(0.076) | -0.173**<br>(0.074) | -0.178***<br>(0.063) |
| AKP Supporter                   | 0.035<br>(0.036)     | 0.038<br>(0.040)     | 0.045<br>(0.048)     | 0.047<br>(0.040)    | 0.003<br>(0.040)     |
| Constant                        | 0.316***<br>(0.077)  | 0.309***<br>(0.089)  | 0.453***<br>(0.100)  | 0.221***<br>(0.083) | 0.305***<br>(0.088)  |
| Observations                    | 503                  | 501                  | 496                  | 491                 | 490                  |
| R-squared                       | 0.19                 | 0.19                 | 0.15                 | 0.19                | 0.20                 |

Dependent variables (0-1): Support for changing the status quo in Syria (col. 1), removing Assad (col. 2), creating a safe zone (col. 3), all rebel forces (col. 4), and Islamic rebel forces (col. 5), All models include province fixed effects and additional controls: age, religiosity index, education, wealth index, sex, dummies for urban resident and for whether the interview was conducted during Ramadan (only 10%). Minority indicators dropped because these models use only non-minority respondents. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signif.: \*10% \*\*5% \*\*\*1%.



Table A-17: Knowledge About the Number of Refugees in Turkey

|                           | Knows the Correct Number |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| Economic Cost             | -0.051<br>(0.049)        |
| Ethnic Balance            | 0.042<br>(0.050)         |
| Militant Ties             | 0.059<br>(0.051)         |
| Women & Children          | 0.021<br>(0.051)         |
| Border Prov.              | 0.115<br>(0.095)         |
| OHAL                      | 0.198<br>(0.164)         |
| Refugee Exposure          | -0.059<br>(0.074)        |
| Kurdish                   | -0.012<br>(0.064)        |
| Arab                      | 0.061<br>(0.071)         |
| Alawite                   | -0.060<br>(0.067)        |
| CHP Supporter             | 0.133**<br>(0.064)       |
| MHP Supporter             | -0.039<br>(0.065)        |
| Kurdish Parties Supporter | 0.101<br>(0.067)         |
| AKP Supporter             | 0.027<br>(0.047)         |
| Constant                  | 0.241**<br>(0.110)       |
| Observations              | 825                      |
| R-squared                 | 0.19                     |

Dependent variable: Respondent knows how many refugees are in Turkey (1=knows the correct number of refugees, 0=does not know). All models include province fixed effects and additional controls: age, religiosity index, education, wealth index, sex, dummies for urban resident and for whether the interview was conducted during Ramadan (only 10%). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signif.: \*10% \*\*5% \*\*\*1%.

Table A-18: Sympathy towards Different Ethnic Groups of Refugees

|                                 | Sunni               | Arab                | Kurdish             | Alawite             |
|---------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Economic Cost                   | 0.040<br>(0.040)    | -0.009<br>(0.040)   | 0.029<br>(0.040)    | 0.023<br>(0.041)    |
| Ethnic Balance                  | -0.029<br>(0.041)   | -0.107**<br>(0.041) | -0.023<br>(0.039)   | -0.084**<br>(0.041) |
| Militant Ties                   | -0.028<br>(0.042)   | -0.065<br>(0.043)   | -0.061<br>(0.040)   | -0.072*<br>(0.042)  |
| Women & Children                | -0.074*<br>(0.039)  | -0.097**<br>(0.040) | -0.086**<br>(0.038) | -0.097**<br>(0.039) |
| Economic Cost X Border Prov.    | 0.020<br>(0.064)    | 0.018<br>(0.062)    | 0.022<br>(0.060)    | 0.020<br>(0.063)    |
| Ethnic Balance X Border Prov.   | 0.074<br>(0.062)    | 0.132**<br>(0.062)  | 0.053<br>(0.059)    | 0.112*<br>(0.060)   |
| Militant Ties X Border Prov.    | 0.101<br>(0.065)    | 0.092<br>(0.064)    | 0.070<br>(0.061)    | 0.091<br>(0.063)    |
| Women & Children X Border Prov. | 0.109*<br>(0.060)   | 0.112*<br>(0.057)   | 0.145**<br>(0.056)  | 0.112*<br>(0.060)   |
| Border Prov.                    | 0.045<br>(0.079)    | -0.113<br>(0.083)   | -0.066<br>(0.083)   | 0.023<br>(0.079)    |
| OHAL                            | 0.392***<br>(0.078) | 0.344***<br>(0.078) | 0.361***<br>(0.080) | 0.474***<br>(0.075) |
| Refugee Exposure                | 0.067<br>(0.042)    | 0.108**<br>(0.044)  | 0.102**<br>(0.041)  | 0.161***<br>(0.041) |
| Kurdish                         | 0.044<br>(0.045)    | 0.047<br>(0.042)    | 0.074*<br>(0.040)   | 0.018<br>(0.039)    |
| Arab                            | 0.072<br>(0.046)    | 0.053<br>(0.042)    | 0.012<br>(0.045)    | 0.037<br>(0.045)    |
| Alawite                         | -0.009<br>(0.041)   | 0.006<br>(0.040)    | -0.035<br>(0.038)   | 0.037<br>(0.041)    |
| CHP Supporter                   | 0.037<br>(0.044)    | 0.027<br>(0.039)    | 0.034<br>(0.041)    | 0.021<br>(0.041)    |
| MHP Supporter                   | -0.047<br>(0.043)   | -0.037<br>(0.042)   | -0.040<br>(0.042)   | -0.089**<br>(0.040) |
| Kurdish Parties Supporter       | 0.023<br>(0.040)    | -0.059<br>(0.040)   | 0.038<br>(0.034)    | -0.036<br>(0.042)   |
| AKP Supporter                   | 0.015<br>(0.028)    | 0.016<br>(0.028)    | -0.009<br>(0.026)   | -0.053*<br>(0.029)  |
| Constant                        | 0.168***<br>(0.064) | 0.296***<br>(0.071) | 0.300***<br>(0.067) | 0.210***<br>(0.065) |
| Observations                    | 1069                | 1061                | 1086                | 1054                |

Dependent variable is the respondents' feelings towards particular groups of Syrian refugees, on a scale from 1 (very cold) to 7 (very warm) rescaled to be between 0-1. Additional controls are dummies for the provinces, age, religiosity index, education, wealth index, sex, dummies for urban resident and for whether the interview was conducted during Ramadan (only 10%). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signif.: \*10% \*\*5% \*\*\*1%.

Table A-19: Support for Specific Policies of Intervention – Oprobit models

|                                 | Remove Assad         | Safe Zone            | All Rebels          | Islamic Rebels      |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| main                            |                      |                      |                     |                     |
| Economic Cost                   | 0.028<br>(0.147)     | -0.021<br>(0.146)    | 0.047<br>(0.148)    | 0.005<br>(0.152)    |
| Ethnic Balance                  | 0.286**<br>(0.143)   | 0.285*<br>(0.146)    | 0.180<br>(0.148)    | 0.146<br>(0.149)    |
| Militant Ties                   | 0.336**<br>(0.140)   | 0.528***<br>(0.138)  | 0.388***<br>(0.148) | 0.173<br>(0.150)    |
| Women & Children                | 0.074<br>(0.142)     | -0.009<br>(0.137)    | -0.020<br>(0.140)   | -0.040<br>(0.145)   |
| Economic Cost X Border Prov.    | -0.137<br>(0.219)    | -0.054<br>(0.212)    | -0.182<br>(0.217)   | -0.098<br>(0.225)   |
| Ethnic Balance X Border Prov.   | -0.249<br>(0.217)    | -0.387*<br>(0.211)   | -0.094<br>(0.225)   | -0.139<br>(0.228)   |
| Militant Ties X Border Prov.    | -0.599***<br>(0.219) | -0.844***<br>(0.216) | -0.570**<br>(0.232) | -0.242<br>(0.234)   |
| Women & Children X Border Prov. | -0.153<br>(0.221)    | -0.168<br>(0.209)    | -0.039<br>(0.224)   | -0.063<br>(0.228)   |
| Border Prov.                    | -0.176<br>(0.287)    | -0.080<br>(0.270)    | -0.132<br>(0.284)   | -0.096<br>(0.299)   |
| OHAL                            | 0.241<br>(0.267)     | -0.097<br>(0.264)    | -0.185<br>(0.329)   | -0.230<br>(0.329)   |
| Refugee Exposure                | 0.382**<br>(0.161)   | 0.197<br>(0.155)     | 0.245<br>(0.161)    | 0.288*<br>(0.163)   |
| Kurdish                         | -0.061<br>(0.134)    | 0.032<br>(0.137)     | 0.310**<br>(0.149)  | 0.448***<br>(0.145) |
| Arab                            | 0.077<br>(0.143)     | 0.126<br>(0.143)     | 0.203<br>(0.151)    | 0.312**<br>(0.155)  |
| Alawite                         | 0.143<br>(0.145)     | 0.052<br>(0.144)     | -0.218<br>(0.151)   | -0.080<br>(0.147)   |
| CHP Supporter                   | -0.375**<br>(0.148)  | -0.251*<br>(0.142)   | -0.224<br>(0.148)   | -0.124<br>(0.152)   |
| MHP Supporter                   | -0.137<br>(0.151)    | -0.026<br>(0.152)    | -0.082<br>(0.162)   | -0.041<br>(0.160)   |
| Kurdish Parties Supporter       | -0.208<br>(0.149)    | -0.120<br>(0.149)    | -0.086<br>(0.159)   | -0.179<br>(0.158)   |
| AKP Supporter                   | 0.184*<br>(0.098)    | 0.247***<br>(0.094)  | 0.270***<br>(0.104) | 0.214***<br>(0.104) |
| /                               |                      |                      |                     |                     |
| cut1                            | -0.328<br>(0.232)    | -0.321<br>(0.235)    | -0.053<br>(0.246)   | 0.116<br>(0.248)    |
| cut2                            | 0.048<br>(0.232)     | -0.063<br>(0.235)    | 0.279<br>(0.246)    | 0.463*<br>(0.248)   |
| cut3                            | 0.251<br>(0.231)     | 0.193<br>(0.234)     | 0.507**<br>(0.244)  | 0.755***<br>(0.246) |
| cut4                            | 0.727***<br>(0.231)  | 0.532**<br>(0.235)   | 0.991***<br>(0.245) | 1.123***<br>(0.247) |
| cut5                            | 0.939***<br>(0.232)  | 0.917***<br>(0.235)  | 1.290***<br>(0.246) | 1.515***<br>(0.251) |
| cut6                            | 1.105***<br>(0.233)  | 1.228***<br>(0.237)  | 1.594***<br>(0.248) | 1.739***<br>(0.250) |
| Observations                    | 1063                 | 1061                 | 1041                | 1031                |
| Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>           | 0.06                 | 0.06                 | 0.07                | 0.09                |

Dependent variables (0-1): Support for removing Assad (col. 1), creating a safe zone (col. 2), all rebel forces (col. 3), Islamic rebel forces (col. 4). All models include province fixed effects and additional controls: age, religiosity index, education, wealth index, sex, dummies for urban resident and for whether the interview was conducted during Ramadan (only 10%). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signif.: \*10% \*\*5% \*\*\*1%.

Table A-20: Support for Pro-Assad Policy and for Staying Away from Syria

|                                 | Support Assad       | Stay Out            |
|---------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Economic Cost                   | -0.049<br>(0.031)   | -0.037<br>(0.046)   |
| Ethnic Balance                  | -0.004<br>(0.032)   | 0.067<br>(0.046)    |
| Militant Ties                   | 0.023<br>(0.035)    | 0.019<br>(0.045)    |
| Women & Children                | -0.013<br>(0.032)   | 0.065<br>(0.046)    |
| Economic Cost X Border Prov.    | 0.120**<br>(0.049)  | 0.058<br>(0.072)    |
| Ethnic Balance X Border Prov.   | 0.018<br>(0.050)    | -0.049<br>(0.068)   |
| Militant Ties X Border Prov.    | -0.046<br>(0.051)   | -0.038<br>(0.068)   |
| Women & Children X Border Prov. | 0.024<br>(0.050)    | -0.074<br>(0.070)   |
| Border Prov.                    | -0.090<br>(0.067)   | -0.031<br>(0.085)   |
| OHAL                            | -0.069<br>(0.077)   | 0.095<br>(0.104)    |
| Refugee Exposure                | 0.133***<br>(0.038) | 0.053<br>(0.055)    |
| Kurdish                         | 0.088**<br>(0.036)  | -0.006<br>(0.045)   |
| Arab                            | 0.054<br>(0.034)    | -0.050<br>(0.049)   |
| Alawite                         | 0.052<br>(0.038)    | 0.030<br>(0.049)    |
| CHP Supporter                   | 0.006<br>(0.037)    | -0.006<br>(0.049)   |
| MHP Supporter                   | -0.031<br>(0.038)   | 0.036<br>(0.049)    |
| Kurdish Parties Supporter       | -0.026<br>(0.026)   | 0.023<br>(0.041)    |
| AKP Supporter                   | 0.014<br>(0.022)    | -0.017<br>(0.032)   |
| Constant                        | 0.187***<br>(0.059) | 0.295***<br>(0.081) |
| Observations                    | 1065                | 1043                |
| R-squared                       | 0.22                | 0.25                |

Dependent variables (0-1): Support for removing Assad (col. 1), creating a safe zone (col. 2), all rebel forces (col. 3), Islamic rebel forces (col. 4), All models include province fixed effects and additional controls: age, religiosity index, education, wealth index, sex, dummies for urban resident and for whether the interview was conducted during Ramadan (only 10%). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signif.: \*10% \*\*5% \*\*\*1%.

Table A-21: Refugee Exposure - excluding Seeing on the Street question

| Refugee Exposure - excluding Seeing on the Street question |                      |
|--|----------------------|
| Economic Cost  | 0.010<br>(0.034)     |
| Ethnic Balance   | 0.071**<br>(0.035)   |
| Militant Ties  | 0.103***<br>(0.034)  |
| Women & Children   | 0.002<br>(0.031)     |
| Economic Cost X Border Prov.                               | -0.050<br>(0.052)    |
| Ethnic Balance X Border Prov.                              | -0.075<br>(0.054)    |
| Militant Ties X Border Prov.                               | -0.174***<br>(0.053) |
| Women & Children X Border Prov.                            | -0.035<br>(0.053)    |
| Border Prov.   | -0.007<br>(0.068)    |
| OHAL   | 0.011<br>(0.082)     |
| Refugee Exposure   | 0.093**<br>(0.037)   |
| Kurdish  | 0.049<br>(0.037)     |
| Arab   | 0.062*<br>(0.034)    |
| Alawite  | -0.005<br>(0.034)    |
| CHP Supporter  | -0.059*<br>(0.034)   |
| MHP Supporter  | -0.011<br>(0.038)    |
| Kurdish Parties Supporter                                  | -0.040<br>(0.032)    |
| AKP Supporter  | 0.067***<br>(0.023)  |
| Constant   | 0.276***<br>(0.055)  |
| Observations   | 1078                 |
| R-squared  | 0.24                 |

Dependent variable: Support for changing status quo in Syria (0-1). Higher values indicate greater support for intervention. Scale composed of oppose vs. support removing Assad, creating a safe zone in northern Syria, supporting all rebel forces, and supporting only Islamic rebel forces. Additional controls are age, religiosity index, education, wealth index, sex, dummies for urban resident and for whether the interview was conducted during Ramadan (only 10%). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signif.: \*10% \*\*5% \*\*\*1%. Seeing refugees on the streets removed from the Refugee Exposure variable. Results do not change (compare to Table 4).

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