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**CHINESE TRADITIONAL VALUES
AND HUMAN RIGHTS
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY AMONG
STUDENTS IN SHANGHAI**

BY INES KAEMPFER

**ACCEPTED BY THE FACULTY OF ARTS OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF FRIBOURG, SWITZERLAND
ON THE RECOMMENDATION OF
PROF. RICHARD FRIEDLI, UNIVERSITY OF FRIBOURG,
(FIRST REPORTER),
PROF. JEAN-CLAUDE WOLF, UNIVERSITY OF FRIBOURG,
(SECOND REPORTER),
AND PROF. LIZHU FAN, FUDAN UNIVERSITY, SHANGHAI
(THIRD REPORTER)**

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Dean: Jean-Michel Spieser**

COVER: CHINESE CALLIGRAPHY WITH THE CHARACTERS “HUMAN RIGHTS”, PAINTED DURING THE ‘FIRST NATIONAL MEETING ON HUMAN RIGHTS - THEME CALLIGRAPHIC WORKS AND PAINTINGS’ IN BEIJING IN MARCH 2003, ORGANIZED BY THE STATE SPONSORED HUMAN RIGHTS RESEARCH CENTER. THE MEANING OF THE SMALLER CHARACTERS CAN BE TRANSLATED AS FOLLOWS: HUMAN RIGHTS ARE RIGHTS SHARED AMONG PEOPLE, THEY CAN BE DEFINED DIFFERENTLY.

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LOVE AND SUPPORT.**

Technical Remarks:

The Table of Content only contains Headings of level one and two. A detailed Table of Content is given at the beginning of each chapter.

Throughout the thesis you’ll find “grey boxes” containing summaries of each chapter or sub-chapter.

Chinese words are written in Chinese and pinyin the first time they appear, afterwards I only use pinyin.

Citations based on non-English sources are translated. The original version is added in a footnote.

Abstract

The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights clearly formulates its demands universally. When it comes to the concrete application of these rights, however, the claim for universality cannot remain unquestioned. The question that is asked is whether or not human rights fit into all cultural contexts, or if they are just another aspect of western cultural imperialism. This discussion is especially vivid in the Chinese context, where quite often Chinese values deriving from China's traditions and religions are seen as either an obstacle or an alternative to human rights.

It was the goal of this project to examine how Chinese religiosity, in particular Chinese traditional values, are related to human rights. Based on a quantitative empirical survey among 424 Chinese students in Shanghai I discovered two dimensions of traditional religious values. The two dimensions were labeled *li* (礼 ritual property) and *ren* (忍 forbearance). Whereas *li* describes interpersonal, hierarchical, and active values, *ren* stands for more inwardly oriented, fatalistic and passive values. *Li* values correlate positively with the support for human rights, as most students have a very hierarchical understanding of human rights. The study has also shown that human rights only make sense to those who truly believe in the possibility of social change. Consequently *ren* values do not seem compatible with the human rights idea, as they promote a very passive and rather fatalistic world-view.

An other result of this study is the fact, that being religious has no direct influence on one's attitude towards human rights: Being religious is coupled with support for both *li* and *ren* values, which have opposite relations with the support for human rights.

The study allows the conclusion that a wider and more complete human rights understanding, which includes both hierarchical and egalitarian aspects, would have the capacity to integrate both value dimension. A view which is absolutely in line with the ideas proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION



Shanghai under construction, Summer 2004

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1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINA

The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights clearly formulates its demands universally. The proclaimed rights apply to all human beings, regardless of race, gender, age and nationality. When it comes to the concrete application of these rights, however, the claim of universality cannot remain unquestioned. A closer look at the history of human rights shows that there are many controversies surrounding this issue (Ishay 2004). The first controversy concerns the origins of human rights and, closely related to this, whether human rights are solely a western concept which is only applicable in western culture, or if the rights claimed in the Declarations are truly 'universal'. A relativistic view of human rights often considers the mere notion of rights to be a western concept, pointing to the fact that in other societies people do not think in the category of rights but of duties. Another controversy revolves around the liberal or socialist definition of human rights, pointing to the 'conflict' between individual human rights, which in most cases ask for the non-interference of the state (negative rights) and social or cultural human rights, which actually demand state interference (positive rights). These questions are often brought up when discussing human rights in the Chinese context.

Several factors contribute to a lively controversy about China and human rights. First, China can be proud of its immense cultural heritage, which includes diverse philosophical and religious approaches toward what it means to be a "human being". These manifold traditions promote values both familiar and foreign to western tradition and human rights. Ever since the West came to know China, the complexity and genius of its traditions have both fascinated and scared western observers. Chinese tradition has been understood as a threat, concurrent with or alternative to western religion and philosophy. A second factor is China's major political and economic importance in the contemporary world. Its phenomenal economical progress, followed with its accession to the WTO (2001), has made China one of the most important players in world economy. In addition to its seat on the UN Security Council, where China has often been a deciding factor, China's growing economic power has strengthened its political authority in Asia and the world. The third factor, is China's poor human rights reputation. Although the international community has reduced its criticism of China's human rights record in recent years, and sometimes even recognized certain improvements, China is still widely perceived as a country which does not, or only scantily respects human rights. This poor reputation does not just refer to Communist China in general and the Cultural Revolution, but has been carved into our brain since the violent crack down of the 1989 democracy movement. Whatever our attitude towards human rights, whether we are outspoken critics of China as one of the worst human rights offenders or feel it is better to praise China for its progress than to nag on the shortcomings, it is clear that the issue is of major importance and that the future of China and human rights are interdependent. National Chinese human rights policy will not only influence the future of China, it will also strongly influence the question whether the international community will be able to hold on to the idea of a universal set of human rights.

Concerning the 'China - Human Rights' issue, the alleged relationship between Chinese values and values promoted by human rights can play a decisive factor; whether human rights are perceived as something foreign and irrelevant or whether

human rights are considered compatible with Chinese tradition and part of its contemporary society, will shape the future of China's human rights policy.

The question concerning the relationship between traditional values and human rights is not only a philosophical but also a sociological one. When asked sociologically, the focus is not on the concepts but rather on how people define these concepts. It raises questions such as: 'Are those people who support traditional values more critical towards human rights than those who do not support traditional values?'

Shifting the question to the sociological level means that the two concepts cannot be looked at in isolation, and that other factors that might influence the relationship must be considered. This includes questions about gender, socioeconomic background, and religiosity in general. The latter is important, as so-called 'traditional values' are all part of religious systems and schools, and are promoted by these schools. In this sense I extend the core issue of this study to 'religion / religiosity - traditional values - human rights'.

With this thesis I will try to contribute a level-headed analysis of possible relationships of two value settings which, in a globalized world, constantly confront and challenge each other.

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION

The goal of this project is to examine how Chinese religiosity, in particular Chinese traditional religious values, are related to human rights and how they are valued.

The question formulated above contains various sub-questions: (1) the issue of defining of Chinese traditional values, and (2) how these values can be related to human rights on a philosophical basis. The question also includes a set of empirical issues including (3) what traditional values are promoted by Chinese religious groups, (4) what values the Chinese actually believe in, (5) what stand they take towards human rights, and (6) if support for traditional values and religiosity is empirically related to that person's attitude towards human rights.

1.2.1 A Pragmatic Approach

I'd like to first define the term 'human rights'. In this thesis, I will simply define human rights as those rights proclaimed in the „Universal Declaration of Human Rights“ (UDHR)¹. The rights listed in the Universal Declaration are formulated in a legally binding version, in the „International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights“ ICCPR (signed but not ratified by China), and the „International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights“ ICESCR (signed and ratified by China). Of course this definition of human rights, as those rights which are defined by law, is not an exclusive definition but is one that is based on a pragmatic assessment of human rights. And although the universal implementation of this definition is far from ideal, it is still the most successful project of its kind in attempting to create an internationally accepted standard for the protection of every person's dignity. No other chart, declaration or resolution has received so much attention, mobilized governments and NGOs, and influenced national law as the Universal Declaration of human rights. Surely there are a great many controversies about human rights, and clearly many questions are open and unsolved. But, be that as it may, it is so far the best and only instrument to promote fundamental standards for the protection of human beings. Based on these observations I categorize human rights as something Durkheim referred to with his term 'fait social' (social fact), and I will treat it as such in my survey.

¹ See Appendix 10.1.1, page 295

1.2.2 An Empirical Approach

The heart of this study will be an empirical survey conducted among university students of Fudan University in Shanghai. This survey was intended to respond to questions concerning what values the Chinese actually believe in, what stand they take on human rights, and if support for traditional values and religiosity are empirically related to somebody's attitude towards human rights.

The reasons I chose an empirical approach are as follows. First, both human rights and Chinese values are social facts, existing in the empirical world. But there is no given or fixed relationship between the two value sets, and the relationship is constructed differently by different actors. I depart from the idea that every Chinese person who is confronted with his/her tradition and the idea of human rights, consciously or unconsciously, categorizes these value sets. It is my intent to find out if there are any patterns in this categorization, and if there are different models of categorization which are dependent on other sociological factors. With this approach, I hope to avoid creating yet another theory on the compatibility of human rights and values, as the data itself should represent the ideas and views of the interrogated students. The empirical setting of this research allows us to access information which we would not have otherwise, and it enables young Chinese people to participate in a discussion which has been lead only by academics, politicians and journalists. Thus, those so far left out, will receive the chance to contribute to the ongoing discussion about China and human rights.

Secondly, there is, to my knowledge, no empirical data about the perception of human rights and their relationship to Chinese values. Although the representation of the presented data is restricted, it is a start to fill the gap of missing empirical data about Chinese values and human rights.

1.2.3 A Historical Approach

In a sociological, empirical study such as this, the *historic* context cannot be left out. Many sociological studies on Chinese traditional values are based on limited historic knowledge about Chinese tradition, often reduced to general aspects of Confucianism. This consequently leads to a simplified definition of traditional values and data interpretation, reproducing stereotypes about China and the Chinese. Thus nearly half of this thesis is dedicated to a detailed analysis of the historical context concerning traditional Chinese values and human rights in China.

1.3 OUTLINE OF THIS STUDY

Following the requests to include a historical, sociological-empirical and pragmatic approach, I will start with a discussion on China's immense traditional heritage (Chapter Two), describing the historical context of the great traditions of Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism and Popular Religion, and analyzing these traditions along their promoted values. By doing so, I can base myself on a vast and rich amount of research conducted both by western and Chinese scholars. In Chapter Three, we will turn our attention to the second important aspect of this study – human rights. Again, I will trace some historical aspects of the human rights idea, then take a detailed look at the Chinese human rights discourse over the last 100 years. Compared to Chapter Two, the data here is rather thin, as the subject has not been studied by many researchers. Fortunately there is very good research done by the Swedish human rights-expert Marina Svensson and the American philosopher Stephen Angle, which provides the necessary data. The last part of Chapter Three will focus on the Asian/Chinese value debate, and highlight the different approaches and constructions of the

relationship between human rights and traditional Chinese values. Ever since the Bangkok conference in 1993, this issue has been taken up by (mostly western) scholars. As we will see, their results vary significantly, dismantling the subjectivity of most theoretical approaches.

Chapter Four first critiques the various theoretical and philosophical methods of approaching the issue, then provides the theoretical and empirical bases of the empirical survey. While we find helpful theories about values in general and the relationship between religion and values or value priorities, there is only a very restricted amount of empirical information about Chinese values. And concerning empirical data about attitude and perception of human rights, we can say it is virtually non-existent.

The method chosen for this survey, the measuring instruments, and the implementation of the survey, will be presented in Chapter Five.

Chapter Six, will give a detailed and rigid statistical analysis of the gathered data, which initially abstains from interpretation and explanation. The interpretation takes place in Chapter Seven, which gives an overall picture of the discoveries and provides possible interpretations and explanations for the data. The last chapter will conclude this thesis with a summary of the main results, showing both the successes and shortcomings of the study, and proposing certain fields where the knowledge could be applied.

The Appendix provides a wide range of background information and supplementary data, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the questionnaire and additional statistical data.


RESEARCH QUESTION

The goal of this project is to examine how Chinese religiosity, in particular Chinese traditional religious values, are related to human rights and how they are valued.

The question formulated above contains various sub-questions: (1) the issue of defining of Chinese traditional values, and (2) how these values can be related to human rights on a philosophical basis. The question also includes a set of empirical issues including (3) what traditional values are promoted by Chinese religious groups, (4) what values the Chinese actually believe in, (5) what stand they take towards human rights, and (6) if support for traditional values and religiosity is empirically related to that person's attitude towards human rights.

These questions will be approached pragmatically (understanding human rights as a social fact), historically and empirically.

CHAPTER 2 CHINESE RELIGIONS AND THEIR VALUES



Daoist Temple on Mount Tai, Summer 2003

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2 CHINESE RELIGIONS AND THEIR VALUES

The goal of this chapter is to give an overview of Chinese religions and their values. To do so I will first discuss the term 'religion' in the Chinese context and also introduce major aspects of Chinese religion. Next, I will introduce China's religious traditions, including Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism and Popular Religion. The third part of this chapter will be a short discussion of the relationship between religion and politics in China. This discussion is important to gain a better understanding of Chinese religious groups. The chapter will end with an account of the significance of religion in contemporary China, in which I will give a brief summary of Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism, Popular Religion and Christianity in modern China. Christianity is included because even though it is a foreign religion that was introduced in China only about 500 years ago, it is undoubtedly part of today's religious China; quite a few students that took part in the survey consider themselves close to Christianity. I decided, for purposes of this study, not to include Islam in China in our discussion, because none of the participating students mentioned that they feel close to Islamic religion. Also its influence is rather minor in Shanghai, where the survey was conducted.²

2.1 CHINESE RELIGION(S)

2.1.1 Definitions

As stated in the introduction, it is the goal of this study to enlighten the possible relationship between Chinese religious traditions and western human rights. The expressions 'traditional', 'religious', 'Chinese' and even 'values' can be understood very differently, and therefore the first step is to discuss and define these terms. It is not the goal to debate these concepts from every possible angle, but to clarify how these concepts will be understood and used in this study.

'TRADITIONS'

When talking about tradition, we mean systems that have shaped Chinese society and thinking for a long time, namely the four traditions of Daoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, and the so-called 'popular religion'. Tradition generally means customs, conventions or habits that have been conveyed from earlier generations, or at least are perceived as such. Often, tradition is understood as a set of values, symbols and beliefs which opposes modernity and progress.

In the case of China this dispute between old and new, restoration and reformation has often been fought out inside the major Chinese traditions, such as Confucianism and

² A few facts for the interested reader: The visit of Saad ibn Abi Waqqas, a companion of Muhammad, to China in 650 CE, is considered the birth of Islam in China. The first mosque was build around that time in Changan (today Xi'an). Muslims virtually dominated the import/export business in China during the Sung Dynasty (960 - 1279 CE). The Ming Dynasty (1368 - 1644 CE) is considered to be the golden age of Islam in China; Muslims integrated into Han society by adopting their name and some customs while retaining their Islamic mode of dress and dietary restrictions. Today, Muslims in China number more than 35 million, according to unofficial counts. They represent ten distinct ethnic groups. The largest of these are the Chinese Hui, who comprise over half of China's Muslim population. The largest of the Turkic groups are the Uygurs, most of which are found in the province of Xinjiang, where they were once an overwhelming majority. For more information, see: Gladney, Dru C. (2003). *Islam in China: Accommodation or Separatism?* In: Overmyer, Daniel L. (ed.). *Religion in China Today. The China Quarterly Special Issue*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 145-161.

Daoism. Consequently it would be too simplistic to understand Chinese traditions as a mere conservator of the old.

Today, China experiences more and more contact with the rest of the world and especially with the West, and it is constantly confronted with new and unfamiliar Western concepts. As such, the traditional schemes often present a familiar orientation point, serving as a reference to Chinese people's life and history.

In this thesis, therefore, traditions will not be defined as the opposite of modernity, but rather as what is familiar as opposed to the unfamiliar and foreign.

'RELIGIOUS'

Defining religion is far from easy; even its etymological source is not clear. Cicero took the word religion from the verb *relegere*, to gather things together or to repeatedly pass over the same ground. Most others considered *religare*, which means to bind things together, to be the source for religion. Regardless of the true etymology of the word, this latter definition surely points to an important aspect of religion: "it [religion] binds people together in common practices and beliefs: it draws them together in a common enterprise of life- so much that Durkheim regarded religion as being the social in symbolic form" (Bowker 1999, xvi). This definition of religion, partly following Durkheim's theory of religion³, emphasizes its social function: an institution which binds people together, providing and affirming common practices, beliefs and values. Of course this definition of religion is not decisive, but as this study will follow a sociological approach, it seems adequate to focus on a social definition of religion.

THE TERM 'RELIGION' IN THE CHINESE CONTEXT

The fact that we use the term 'religion' in a Chinese context, does not make things easier. This expression was not used in China before its exposure to Western thinking and language. Today the term religion is translated as *zong jiao* (宗教). *Zong* can be translated as ancestor, but also as faction, school, or clan. The word *jiao* means teaching. *Zong jiao* was first used in Japan, where Western missionaries created this combination and then brought it to China.

Nowadays the Chinese use this expression to describe Daoism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity. Confucianism has been called "ideology" by the communist leadership, and only recently has had a revival, being understood as an important philosophical and social tradition in Chinese culture. Confucianism is often referred to with the term *zhe xue* (哲学), normally translated as 'philosophy'. *Zhe* refers to the adjective 'wise' or to 'wise man', and *xue* means to learn. As is the case for the term 'religion', 'philosophy' is an imported word; the Chinese did not originally differentiate between philosophy and religion. The different schools of thinking, whether religious or philosophic, were called *jia* (家 family, house), their ideas were referred to as *jiao* (教), doctrine. It is sometimes argued that the absence of a specific word for religion shows the absence of religion in China. A closer examination of China and its culture does show that China never produced a Western-type of religion, but we do find systems that are 'functionally equivalent' to religions in the West (Yang 1961, 3). Also the

³ Durkheim's definition of religion: "A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden- beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them. The second element which thus finds a place in our definition is no less essential than the first; for by showing that the idea of religion is inseparable from that of the Church, it makes it clear that religion should be an eminently collective thing." (Durkheim 1912/ 1995, 44)

By referring to the Church, Durkheim emphasizes the social aspect of religion, an absolutely essential aspect of religion, which is nothing else than the institutionalized form of collective representations.

different schools were very early perceived as one unity. One of the first of Chinas historians, Sima Qian (?145-?86 BCE) uses the term *liu jia* (六家 the six houses/families) to refer to the following traditions: *Yin yang* school, Confucianism, Mohism, School of Names (School of Logic), Legalists and Daoists. He concluded that all of them are striving toward the same goal: a better government in this world. The main differences were their teachings and methods, with their arguments being more or less profound (Bauer 2001, 20). Obviously Sima Qian did not differentiate between the schools which included religious practices and beliefs (Confucianism, Daoism) and the ones excluding them totally (legalists).

More recently, the contemporary Chinese philosopher Feng Youlan (1948) tried to show that there has been a clear separation between philosophy and religion for a long time in China, the first being scientific and the latter rather superstitious. This, however, is not easily proven. Although it is true that at times schools which were more scientific fought religious or ‘superstitious’ movements, they often co-existed, even represented by the same person and/or school. Clearly many of the philosophic schools were influenced by religious ideas. As the German sinologist and philosopher Wolfgang Bauer puts it: “(..) uncountable philosophic ideas cannot be understood without the religious ideas that preceded, accompanied and followed them” (Bauer 2001, 24)⁴. One of the aspects of special interest in this study is the value system promoted by the different Chinese traditions. When talking about these values, we will automatically enter a more philosophical field. Nevertheless, as we are especially interested in Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism and popular religion, schools which all include religious rituals and activities, it is easiest to refer to them as *religious traditions*, knowing that the lines between philosophy and religion are very blurry and that the Chinese did not always differentiate between them.

THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF RELIGION IN THE CHINESE CONTEXT

Another important aspect which should be discussed at this point is the general concept the Chinese have of religion, as it differs significantly from the European and American understanding of religion. The emphasis of great Western Sinologists, such as James Legge⁵ and Lionel Giles,⁶ on the agnostic character of Confucianism have had a great influence on how Western scholars have perceived Chinese religion. For quite some time, the repeated accent on the secular characteristics of Confucianism made many scholars state that the Chinese had no religion at all, and were not religious per se. To quote Derk Bodde:

The Chinese have been less concerned with the world of the supernatural than with the world of nature of man. They are not people for whom religious ideas and activities constitute an all-important and absorbing part of life. It is ethics (especially Confucian ethics), and not religion of a formal, organized type, that has provided the spiritual basis of Chinese civilization.” (Bodde, Derk (1951). China. cit. in: Yang 1961, 4)

⁴ Translated by author. Original text in German: “Denn unzählige philosophische Ideen sind ohne die ihnen vorausgehenden, parallel laufenden oder nachfolgenden religiösen Vorstellungen gar nicht zu verstehen.”

⁵ Nevertheless, I will refer to several translations of James Legge on the following pages, because he is still one of the most careful translators of ancient Chinese books. See Bibliography.

⁶ Giles became especially famous for his translations of Sun Tzu’s “Art of War”, probably the most popular Chinese book in the West. E.g. Lionel Giles (trls.) (2002). Sun Tzu on the Art of War: The oldest Military Treatise in the World. New York: Penguin

This view has also been supported by modern Chinese scholars like Liang Chichao or Hu Shi, who say not only that Chinese people are not religious, but also that the probably only real religion in China, Daoism, would be a disgrace for China, as it is based only on superstition (Yang 1961, 5). In his introduction to the function of religion in China, the sociologist C.K. Yang points out that the positions of these Western and Chinese scholars must be seen in context, as they came in a time of rationalization and secularization of the Western world. Many Chinese scholars felt the “necessity of emphasizing the dignity of Chinese civilization in the face of the political and economic superiority of the Western world” (Yang 1961, 6). As Yang points out later in his book, this view of an unreligious China found no support in reality:

“There was not one corner in the vast land of China where one did not find temples, shrines, altars, and other places of worship. The temples and shrines dotting the entire landscape were a visible indication of the strong and pervasive influence of religion in Chinese society, for they stood as symbols of a social reality.” (Yang 1961, 6)

Another reason why Western scholars often thought of China as a country without a real religious tradition is that, while in Europe religion has been strongly institutionalized for a long time, this has not been the case in China. There was a time in the early Tang dynasty (618- 906 CE) where both Buddhism and Daoism showed a high level of organization and institutionalization, including wealth and power, but the revitalization of Confucianism and the suppression of Buddhism (845 CE) weakened this form of religious organization, which never reached such a level again. This lack of institutionalization however, should not be understood as a lack of religiosity. Clearly the religious groups were less powerful than the churches have been in Europe; in China power was centralized in the emperor, and he also controlled the field of religion. As David Ownby expresses it:

“Instead, this institutional weakness was a product of state policy, and meant among other things that the Buddhist and Daoist churches were rarely empowered to define and enforce centrally sanctioned visions of orthodoxy, as was the Roman Catholic Church in Europe during several centuries. Instead the burden of defining and enforcing orthodoxy fell to the imperial government. (...) Over time, the Chinese state established a network of state-supported cults, an co-opted or otherwise supported local cults whose deities seemed to reflect desired values.” (Ownby 2003, 226)

The lack of institutionalization is not the only reason for this different concept of religion. What we called ‘lack of institutionalization’ doesn’t mean religion in China is individualistic. Quite the opposite is true. Religion is institutionalized in the society and the family; it is just no institution of itself. In his introduction to Chinese religion, Laurence Thompson states that Religion in China has been so strongly part of social life and family that it never appeared to the Chinese as a totally independent system (Thompson 1996, xxiv). The same view is supported by Yang, the author of one of the first English publications about the social function of religion in China. In it, he shows how religion penetrated every aspect of life, and how “the concept and structure of all major Chinese social institutions contained religious elements” (Yang 1961, 19)⁷.

⁷ In one of the first sociological analyses of Chinese Religion, Yang introduces the concept of ‘diffused religion’: “Diffused religion is conceived of having its theology, cults and personnel so intimately diffused into one or more secular social institutions that they become part of the concept, rituals, and structure of the latter, thus having no significant independent existence” (Yang 1961, 294f). Yang concludes that in China, “diffused religion was a

This integration into other social systems is probably one reason why there is little notion that religious belief and practice must focus on a single tradition (Ownby 2003, 25). Except for monks and nuns, most Chinese would not identify themselves as ‘members’ of one religion. In a Chinese temple you find gods with a variety of affiliations, and some of them cannot even be categorized. People visiting these temples generally worship (*bai shen* 拜神)⁸ all of these gods. As all of these have their specialties, visitors may devote a special amount of money and time to the one that fits their specific needs the best. The religious affiliation hardly ever plays a role which god to pray too. To quote Ownby once more:

“Many Chinese temples in Hong Kong or Taiwan- which have carried forward late imperial popular religious traditions, and many Chinese believers seemingly exhibit little loyalty to any particular denomination, going from god to god and temple to temple according to their perception of a particular god’s efficacy. Many popular gods have no particular scriptural corpus attached to them, and although one often finds Buddhist or Daoist monks attached to temples of popular religion, many acts of worship are carried out entirely by the individual, unmediated by religious professionals. From a Western perspective, much of Chinese religious practice in the late imperial and modern periods appears to be recklessly underdefined.” (Ownby 2003, 224,225).

Similar observations are made by Yang (1961, 25), who even states that priests in certain temples could not reveal the identity of the religion to which they belonged. As an example, Yang brings up the Chenghuang Miao, the so called city temples, which could be found in many Chinese cities. In these temples, the main god Chenghuang was said to come from Daoism, although this God was already mentioned during the Chou Dynasty, before the emergence of Daoism. Also, in all of these temples Buddhists frescoes showing Buddhist concepts like the ‘Ten Courts of Hell’ could be found. Identification of these cults did not seem to play a role for the common worshiper. Yang emphasizes that one reason for this eclectic concept of religion was the functional orientation of popular religion, which “probably reconciled some of the theological contradictions between cults of different faiths and introduced a feeling of consistency in the mixing of gods into one pantheon.” (Yang, 1961, 25)

To sum up this last paragraph, we can say that *there are religious traditions* in China which always have been very closely connected to both the state and the family, but have never reached the form of independent institutionalization such as that experienced by the Catholic Church in Europe. These features of Chinese religion have led to the lesser significance of religious affiliation.

Another possible explanation why membership to a specific religious tradition in China is not essential to the practice of worship, is that all of the different traditions share certain concepts and qualities that can be considered as typically Chinese. The different cults, therefore, do not appear to be ‘that’ different to many people, as they all have these basic and unifying Chinese qualities. The most important of these common Chinese notions (e.g., bipolarity, constant change and transformation, *dao*) will now be briefly discussed, after which I will give an introduction on the specifics of the different Chinese religious traditions.

pervasive factor in all major aspects of social life, contributing to the stability of social institutions, and the institutional religion, although important in its own way, lacked organizational strength to make it a powerful factor in the over-all Chinese social organization” (Yang 1961, 296).

⁸ The word for worship in Chinese is *baishen* (拜神), is composed of the term *bai* (to honor, do obeisance) and *shen*, generally referring to spirits.

My presentation of Chinese religion will be strongly based on the works of Laurence Thompson and Joseph Adler. Their introductions to Chinese religion seemed most helpful to my purpose, as they trace out common notions of Chinese religion and combine information about both philosophical concepts and the religious practice, without making a clear distinction between the two. This approach is, for reasons I have described above, appropriate to describe Chinese religion.

2.1.2 Basic Features of Chinese Religious Traditions

BIPOLARITY: YIN AND YANG THEORY

Even in ancient China, the bipolarity of nature was evident. One of the most essential notions is the concept that everything has its opposite: day and night, positive and negative, open and closed, male and female. Every unity can be divided in two. This bipolarity is the elemental thought of *yin-yang* (阴阳)⁹ theory. It is not totally clear when the terms *yin* and *yang* were first used. Traditionally they are dated back as early as 1000-500 BCE, and it is generally suggested that *yin* and *yang* were used as answers in oracles (Malek 1996, 143f). Sources, however, are too thin to know for certain. The French Sinologist Marcel Granet (1934, 87) showed that music theorists used the concept in their works during the fourth and fifth century BCE, and that the symbols were used in lunar calendars from the third century BCE. In more recent works the formation of the actual *yin-yang* theory (and not the mere use of the words) is attributed to the late Han-Dynasty (202 BCE- 220 CE) (Thompson 1996, 155). When used in the *shijing* (诗经 Book of Songs)¹⁰ the word *yin* is used to describe thoughts about cold and nasty weather and a covered sky, *yang* is used when thinking of warmth and sunshine (Granet 1934, 88). Also *yin* is used for the shady and *yang* for the sunny side of a hill (Adler, 2002, 59). *Yin* and *yang* can both be understood as a form of *qi* (气), energy. *Yin* is the dark, passive receptive form of energy, whereas *yang* denotes the energy in its bright, active and creative mode (Adler 2002, 60). Although *yang* is considered the creative force, the interaction of *yin* and *yang* is necessary to create, develop and change things and beings. The *yin* and *yang* concept is also connected to gender (*yin* = female/ *yang*= male). As everything is created through the interaction between *yin* and *yang*, so are human beings created when the *yin* (male) and the *yang* (female) come together (Thompson 1996, 8).

The concepts of *yin* and *yang* should not be considered as static but as interacting forces, which are constantly transforming and replacing each other. Therefore it would be wrong to understand *yin* and *yang* as a form of dualism. On the contrary: *yin-yang* theory seems to show that traditional Chinese religion is non-dualistic; *yin* and *yang*, although different, can only exist in opposition to each other and not by themselves. As Adler puts it: “They have a complementary or bipolar relation as aspects of a more fundamental order (the *dao*)” (Adler 2002, 63). The Chinese way of thinking isn't monistic, as the differences are real and not sheer illusions, but are aspects of a more fundamental unity, the *dao* (道/way), which will be discussed below.

The Chinese concept of bipolarity, defined in the *yin-yang* theory, is neither dualistic nor monistic. It describes a non-dualistic relationship, meaning that everything has its

⁹ The character for *yin* (阴) is composed of the character for hill (阝) on the left side and with character for moon (月) on the right side. The character *yang* (阳) is also composed of hill on the left. The second part is made of the character for the sun (日).

¹⁰ The scripture of the Book of Songs, an anthology of song lyrics from the feudal states and the court of Chou (722-481 BCE)

opposite and that “these opposites are necessary and complementary to each other” (Thompson 1996, 1), as they are aspects of a fundamental unity.

CHANGE AND TRANSFORMATION: CYCLICAL PROCESS OF GROWTH AND DECLINE

Throughout Chinese philosophy and religion change and transformation are basic to all worldviews and beliefs. This change is either cyclical, e.g. the four seasons, or follows the law of growth and decline, like the moon waxing and waning. Change and transformation also play an important role in the *yin* and *yang* theory and bipolar thinking. Thompson understands the cyclical process and the process of growth and decline as the operational aspect of the basic idea of bipolarity (Thompson 1996, 1). One way to exemplify this process of transformation is through the five phases, better known as the five elements (*wuxing* 五行). The five phases are water, fire, wood, earth and metal. *Xing* is traditionally translated as ‘element,’ but this is slightly misleading. The word ‘element’ is generally used to describe that aspect of something which is steady and unchangeable. The original meaning of *xing*, however, was used as a verb, meaning to walk, to go or to act. *Xing* therefore should be understood as something active and changeable, not as a static element. It’s therefore more appropriate to use the term ‘phase’ rather than ‘element’ when describing the *wuxing*.

The five phases form a symbolic system whose categories apply to nearly every group of things. There are five directions (including the center), five colors, five organs, five tastes, five human relations and so forth. The relation between the five different phases is twofold: the *static correspondence* of all things in the same category, e.g. the five organs are spleen (wood), lungs (fire), heart (earth), liver (metal) and kidneys (water) while the five tastes are acidic (wood), bitter (fire), sweet (earth), spicy (metal), salty (water). In practice this correspondence may lead to the conclusion that people with spleen problems should eat acidic food, as spleen and acidic food both correspond to the wood category. The idea of transformation from one category into another describes the dynamic relation between the five phases. The philosopher normally seen as the “founder” of the theory of the five phases Zou Yan (305-240 BCE)¹¹ described the ‘conquest’ sequence: wood is conquered by metal (as the wood is chopped down), metal is conquered (melted) by fire, fire is conquered (quenched) by water, water is conquered (dammed) by earth, and earth again can be conquered by wood (the ancient “rammed earth” construction technique used wood frames). It was Zou Yan’s idea that these sequences could correspondingly be applied to human history and the dynasties, where one is conquered by another. Another form of the dynamic transformation is the series of production and reproduction, where wood turns into fire, fire into ashes (earth), earth into metal (as it is producing metal ores), metal into water (as metal is getting liquid when heated) and water into wood (as it allows the vegetation to grow) (Adler 2002, 60f). The theory of the five phases shows the basic idea of transformation, which is steady and cyclical, meaning that the weaker element will be conquered, but only to rise again at some other point in time. The *wuxing* theory also shows how abstract laws are deduced from nature, and how they are then applied to explain nature and culture, the empirical and the spiritual world, and the individual and society.

HEAVEN (TIAN)

The concept of Heaven is one of the oldest known in Chinese history. It goes back to the Shang Dynasty, dating from around 1200BC to 1040 BC (Roberts 2000, 9), where

¹¹ The concept of the five phases predated Zou Yan, but it was he who first systematized the theory.

it was believed that as the human served the king, the ancestors served under a god called *Shang Di* (上帝), the “Lord Above”. *Shang Di* was understood as a personalized God, who had power over, or could at least influence, the weather, success of crops, hunting, and the health of the king (Adler 2002, 27). The early Zhou elite, who took over the power from the Shang, worshipped a deity called *tian* (天 sky/heaven). For some time, the terms *Shang Di* and *tian* may have been used synonymously, but the term *tian* eventually became the commonly used name for the highest being. *Tian* included not only the personal deity aspect of *Shang Di*, but also had much wider significance as it was a more ambiguous term. *Tian* also had a strongly moral and impersonal connotation, which increasingly replaced the personal god, expressed in the name of *Shang Di*. The ruling class during the Western Zhou (?1122-256 BCE) understood *tian* as a moral deity that ordered the Zhou to take over the Shang Dynasty (?1766-1122 BCE). This belief, that the reigning emperor was given his position through Heaven, the so-called *tianming* (天命 mandate of heaven), lasted throughout Chinese history. The general idea that Heaven possesses a moral will became one of the most fundamental principles of Confucian tradition; it implies the idea that moral values are inherent in the natural world (Adler 2002, 27).

DAO

Another central concept of Chinese religion is the *Dao* (道)¹², translated as the way or path. It is definitely more adequate to leave the term *Dao* in its transliterate form, as its meaning is more diverse and complex than the translation may suggest. Thompson (1995, 3) points out that there are two general applications of the *Dao*. In the first, the *Dao* mainly refers to an ethical, religious truth. In terms of human conduct on the other hand, the *Dao* signifies the normative standards men should follow. This second interpretation is emphasized in the Confucian understanding of *Dao*. The Daoists placed more emphasis on the first application, meaning the reality behind appearances and the ultimate metaphysical truth. Significant for this understanding of *Dao* are the opening lines in the *Dao De Jing*¹³:

*The Tao that can be trodden is not the enduring and unchanging Tao. The name that can be named is not the enduring and unchanging name.
(Conceived of as) having no name, it is the originator of heaven and earth: (conceived of as) having a name, it is the Mother of all things.
Always without desire we must be found,
If its deep mystery we would sound;
But if desire always within us be,
It's outer fringe is all that we shall see.
Under these two aspects, it is really the same; but as development takes place, it receives the different names. Together we them the Mystery. Where the Mystery is the deepest is the gate of all that is subtle and wonderful. (Dao Dejing 1, transl. Legge 1962, 47)*

For Laozi, behind all relativity and changeability of things there is an absolute reality which cannot be explained or named. In certain passages the *Dao* is also described as being empty¹⁴. The *Dao* can also be understood as the absolute, unchangeable pattern or structure, which coordinates the ever-changing apparent world. This view is also supported but less emphasized in Confucian thinking.

¹² The term *dao* is composed of the two elements ‘walking’ (道 chuo) and ‘head’ (首 shou), signifying a ‘man on his way’.

¹³ One of the most important works in Daoism. For more information see 2.2.2 35.

¹⁴ “The Tao is (like) the emptiness of a vessel” (Dao De Jing, 4, trsl. Legge 1962).

Both in the Confucian and the Daoist understanding, the Dao is not only seen as the way of nature, but also as the ideal way of man, establishing moral standards for how one should live.

SUPERNATURAL BEINGS

Although the Dao has these absolute qualities, it was never perceived as a deity which could be compared with the God of the monotheistic religions. *Tian* was eventually referred to as the “almighty ruler”, but in the eyes of the sophisticated Chinese it was not perceived as a personalized god, but rather as a concept driven by the force of *yin* and *yang* which have their source in the *Dao*. Yet the fact that *dao* and *tian* are rather abstract concepts should not lead us to the conclusion that there is no belief in personalized gods and supernatural beings in Chinese religion. Quite the opposite is true; for the ordinary Chinese people, and even for most of the educated Chinese philosophers, the belief in supernatural powers played a very important role daily lives. For them, the different gods and spirits accounted for what was going on in their daily life and world. These spirits and gods are in most cases personified concepts of either the forces of nature or their ancestors. People believe that these deities can have a direct influence on the life of humans.

This world of spirits and gods is a real dimension of the world. It is believed that after death, the person’s shadow (or soul) continues to exist in the invisible world, sometimes appearing in the visible world and horrifying the ones still alive. Traces of this belief can be found in countless Chinese stories¹⁵. These horrifying ghosts are usually referred to as *gui* (鬼). But there are also benevolent ghosts called *shen* (神), which are the souls of those ancestors that are properly cared for. These beliefs are closely connected to the Chinese understanding of the soul, outlined and systematized during the Han Dynasty along the cosmological system. In this view, the human being, just as anything else, is a product of the dynamics of *yin* and *yang*. At death, the *yin* returns to Earth and the *yang* ascends to heaven. The *yin* soul that stays with the body may turn into a ghost (*gui*) if the body has not been buried the proper way and if the family of the dead does not follow all necessary rituals. In the ideal case, the *yin* soul stays in the grave and the *yang* soul stays with the family and brings them benefits. In the worst case, the unhappy *gui* will cause trouble for the family. The understanding of the soul as a product of *yin* and *yang* again is not dualistic, and should not be compared to the western dualism of body and soul. Thompson finds a very helpful allegory to explain the Chinese understanding of the human condition:

“Perhaps the human constitution in this Chinese concept could be likened to a mixture in a test tube. During life it is kept in stable solution by vigorous activity, but with the cessation of that activity due to death, it separates out, the coarse components settling to the bottom, leaving the pure liquid above.” (Thompson 1996, 9)

Although faith in ghosts is not widely discussed in the old classics of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism, this popular belief has always been part of Chinese religious life and, at least by the common people, has never been perceived as contradicting the teachings of the “official” religions¹⁶.

¹⁵ For Chinese Ghost stories, see, for example: Ma, Tom (2000). Chinese ghost stories for adults; sex, love, and murder between spirits and mortals. New York: Barricade Books.

¹⁶ It should be mentioned that with the popularization of Buddhism, a more Buddhist understanding of the soul became more important. The soul was believed to be the agent of the Karma, the idea of rebirth was adopted into popular religion, and many funeral rites developed around this faith. These funeral rites still are a vital part of the ancestral cult.

HARMONY AND CONTINUITY OF THE FAMILY

As mentioned previously, the West has often perceived China as being a country where religion is of no big importance. This view came from the fact that a considerable part of the Chinese philosophical discourse was focused on human nature and the relationships between and among humans. Although it is not true that the Chinese were only occupied with earthly matters, and although Daoism and Buddhism have been as influential on the Chinese tradition as the humanistic tradition of Confucianism, it is true that “all Chinese shared general and specific concepts about the social order and individual conduct” (Thompson 1996, 11). A basic feature of this social order was the patriarchic family system. The idea of a hierarchical structure of the world was established in the first millennium BCE, and was understood as a reflection of the given structure of nature and the relationship between heaven and earth. This hierarchical worldview was adapted to the family very early. Even the *Shujing*¹⁷, which is believed to have derived from the early Chou dynasty (?1122-257 BCE) refers to the ‘five classes’, standing for fathers, mothers, older and younger brothers, sons and the duty of each class. The more well-known version of this idea, usually referred to as the five relationships, is the one that can be found in the *Mengzi*¹⁸, a book that collects sayings of Mencius (?391-?308 BCE), a declared follower of Confucius, and one of the most important Confucian thinkers:

Between father and son, there should be affection; between sovereign and a minister, righteousness; between husband and wife, attention to their separate functions; between old and young, a proper order; and between friends, fidelity. (Mengzi, 4.8; transl. Legge 2004, 19)

There is a third version of the five relations in which the hierarchical character of these relationships is more evident:

The father is merciful, the son filial; the elder brother is good, the younger brother submissive; the husband is upright, the wife complaisant; the adult is kind, the child obedient. (Records of Ritual,) “Evolution of Rituals”; Li Chi, Li Yun, (James Legge, trans. The li KI, 2 vols. Oxford, 1885)

This form of morality, based in family relationships and extended to a broader social context, pervaded the Chinese society. The standards of morality that have to be followed became the most important subject in Confucian tradition. The family and its structure is not only of major social importance, but is also decisive for Chinese religion. Family and its hierarchical structure are the basic elements of the widely popular ancestor worship.¹⁹ Above, we mentioned how important it was to follow the proper funeral rites and how dead people remain a part of the family either in a positive (*shen*) or negative (*gui*) way. Another important aspect in the ancestor worship of the Chinese, is the role of the lineage (*zu* 祖). *Zu* refers to the male

¹⁷ The *Shujing* is part of the list of the Confucian classics that can be traced back to the 3rd Century BCE. The list of books is known as the “five classics”.

¹⁸ The book was most likely written by Mencius and his disciples, and was edited in the 2nd century. It became highly influential in Confucian history, as it became part of the Four Classics for the civil-service exam at the Mongol Court in 1315 (see Bowker (ed. 1999, ‘Mencius’).

¹⁹ It has been widely discussed whether the term ancestor *worship* is adequate, or if it should rather be called ancestor memorials. This question was extremely important for the Jesuit catholic missionaries, who had to know whether the converts were still allowed to follow these rites or not. This discussion, known as the “rites controversy,” occupied even the emperor and the pope, and in the end led to the expulsion of the catholic missionaries in China. Here, the term *worship* will be used for practical reasons, and I will not further discuss the question of appropriateness. (For more information about the rites controversy, see Minimaki, George (1985). *Chinese Rites Controversy from its Beginning to Modern Times*. Loyola Print.)

descendants of an ancestor, who bears the family name. *Zu* is patrilineal, as the wives marry into the lineage of their husbands. The concept of *zu* gives every individual a specific position in relationship to others according to the generation he belongs to and how close he is related to an ancestor. This position then defines his role in funeral rites and ancestor worship. Through these rituals the lineage ties can be renewed. Traditionally, the dead bodies of kinsmen were buried in the same ancestor temple so that the unity of the family could be restored.

We can see that the role of the family in Chinese society goes beyond the importance of family in the western traditions. This is especially true for the feature of lineage, which actually creates a religious community in which the individual has its specific position. The notion of lineage is of central importance in Chinese ancestor worship. These communities, where people worship the same ancestors, are described by Thompson as “religious cooperation” (Thompson 1996, 33). They are not only created through people who share the same faith, but through people who share the same blood and even more importantly the same family name, and therefore distinguish themselves from many other forms of religious groups. We can therefore conclude that not just the family, but the continuity of the family is a main value in Chinese tradition.

SELF-CULTIVATION AND UNITY WITH NATURE

As a last aspect of Chinese thought, I will briefly discuss the concept of ‘self-cultivation’. Chinese approaches to self-cultivation are diverse and numerous. Underlying these approaches is the fundamental understanding of the body as a microcosm of society and the universe (macrocosm). The body has the same cosmic structure of society and the universe, and therefore possesses both social and universal notions. The features discussed above, such as *yin* and *yang* or the five phases (*wuxing*), are all aspects of the individual body and of the greater universe. This spiritual resonance unites heaven and men.

It was based on these ideas that a variety of self-cultivation techniques were developed. Although the differentiation is far from clear, we can say that there are physical and moral forms of self-cultivation. Of course, they are not exclusive of each other, and any differentiation should only serve as a tool of clarification. The Confucian tradition strongly focuses on moral self-cultivation, believing that through the means of meditating, studying and respecting the rites men could improve morally or even achieve moral perfection (Slingerland 2001, 2). In the Daoist tradition we find many physical forms of self-cultivation, where the main goal was longevity or even immortality through cultivating one’s physical and spiritual health. Although the tradition of self-cultivation may seem rather individualistic, it has to be understood in the context of the individual’s contribution to a harmonic world, in which everything starts with the individual and reaches out to family, society and universe.

CHINESE RELIGION OR RELIGIONS?

As we will see in the next few pages, the concepts discussed above reappear in all of the more specific descriptions of the various Chinese traditions. The fact that these notions can be found in all Chinese religious traditions has led certain authors to talk about *Chinese religion* in its singular form (eg. Thompson). This is partly justified, as Chinese religions do in fact share these basic notions. Further, they do not exclude each other and there is significant mutual influence²⁰. Nevertheless, the different

²⁰ A similar approach was used by J.J.M de Groot, who used the term “Universism” to describe the common religion of Chinese people. He was defending the theory that the Chinese traditions (Daoism, Confucianism, and Chinese Buddhism) all emerged from a common base and therefore had no problem with reintegrating general

traditions have a specific history, along with qualities and worldviews that can be clearly distinguished. And, although they have many things in common, there are also contradictory values and beliefs. On the following pages the different religious traditions, that is Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism and Popular Religion, will be briefly described, focusing less on their history and more on the worldview and values supported by these groups. Throughout this discussion, we should bear in mind that common Chinese believers often do not necessarily perceive their religiosity in these categories of different religious traditions.

SUMMARY: MAIN CONCEPTS OF CHINESE RELIGION

There are religious traditions in China which always have been very closely connected to both the state and the family, but have never reached the form of independent institutionalization such as that experienced by the Catholic Church in Europe.

Major concepts of Chinese religions:

Yin-yang, the Chinese concept of bipolarity, is neither dualistic nor monistic. It describes a non-dualistic bipolar relationship, meaning that everything has its opposite and that "these opposites are necessary and complementary to each other" (Thompson 1996, 1), as they are aspects of a fundamental unity.

The theory of the five phases or five elements (*wuxing*) shows the basic idea of transformation, which is steady and cyclical, meaning that the weaker element will be conquered, but only to rise again at some other point in time.

Heaven: The general idea that Heaven possesses a moral will became one of the most fundamental principles of Confucian tradition; it implies the idea that moral values are inherent in the natural world (Adler 2002, 27).

Dao: The way, which in Daoism refers to a absolute ethical and religious truth. The Confucian tradition understands the Dao as the normative standards which man should follow.

Supernatural Beings: Believing in gods, spirits, and ghosts is an important element of Chinese religiosity. They are personified concepts of the forces of nature or their ancestors. The deities can have a direct influence on the life of humans, they are actually part of the real world. Beliefs of ghosts and spirits are closely connected to yin and yang, as at time of death the yin soul stays with the body and returns to earth, whereas the yang ascends to heaven.

The Notion of Family: Family is the most basic feature in Chinese society. The rules that define family life are mainly hierarchical and reciprocal. Every form of power brings with it certain responsibilities. Family relationships are perceived as model relationships for other social settings, such as the governor and his subjects, the teacher and the students and so forth. It also defines religious life, as the widespread ancestor worship is just an extension of the family-principle.

Self-Cultivation: The body is understood as a microcosms of society and the universe. Cultivating oneself therefore is an important contribution to cosmic harmony. Self-cultivation is both understood physically and morally, its ultimate goal may be moral perfection, longevity or even immortality.

aspects of Chinese tradition. This tradition is based on the belief that human life has to be led in total harmony with cosmic, or universal structure (see De Groot, J.J.M. 2004). The expression 'Universism' could not really establish itself in the academic world, references only go back to de Groot, and no other significant author seemed to have reused this terminology. (It was more often used in German language (e.g. Glasenapp 1979), and in the seventies and eighties made its way in global statistics about „world religion“.) Although many common features can be found among the different Chinese traditions, scholars are rather hesitant to conclude that there is one single religion called Universism (see e.g. Roetz 2000).

2.2 THE RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS OF CHINA

2.2.1 Confucianism

HISTORICAL ASPECTS

The term Confucianism is the western designation of a Chinese tradition that goes back to Confucius, the Latinized version of the Chinese name *Kongzi* (孔子). Confucius was most probably born in the year 551 or 552 BCE. Although his historical existence is not questioned, information about his family and biography are rather sparse. As is the case for Jesus, Buddha and Laozi, we find many legends that give detailed information about the life of Confucius, yet these legends cannot be historically supported or confirmed.

It is said that Confucius was born in a place near today's city of Qufu, in the province of Shandong. His family was most likely impoverished aristocracy. At a very young age Confucius became a teacher and later gathered around him about 30 close followers. He always sought to become a trusted adviser for one of the kings, but never reached his career goal. He apparently held one or two government posts, but they were of rather low status.

The fame of Confucius and his teaching, which later constituted one of the most influential traditions in China, was not due to the fact that it was revolutionary or new. On the contrary, it was Confucius' goal to reestablish the ideal state of former times. This ideal state was believed to have existed during the first half of the Zhou dynasty (around 1050- 770 BCE). Through this reference to the past, Confucius gained a certain legitimacy. He saw himself as a reformer of a lost and forgotten harmony, and it is therefore not surprising that Confucius himself did not write any new works. Confucius said of himself:

“The Master said, ‘I transmit but do not innovate; I am truthful in what I say and devoted to antiquity.’ (The Analects, 7.1, transl. Lao 1979, 87)

Confucius emphasized the importance of studying and knowing old texts. It is said he studied thoroughly and partly edited the 5 books later called the “Five Classics” (*wujing* 五经). These five classics were the *Classic of Change (Yijing)* a manual of divination; the *Classic of Odes (Shijing)*, a collection of poems and songs; the *book of historical documents (Shujing)*, a collection of official statements and documents from the early dynasties of Xia, Shang and Zhou; and the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, which are at least partly attributed to Confucius. The fifth classic comprised three works (*Yili, Zhouli, Liji*) describing rituals of the Zhou courts and further aspects of the three sage kings that reigned in the Zhou dynasty. The well-known ‘Doctrine of the Mean’, which is said to have been written by the grandson of Confucius, is part of the *Liji*. It focuses on the wise man who manages to always find the middle path.

Confucius' personal teachings were later recorded by his students in the *Analects*, the *lunyu* (论语), a rather thin book of twenty chapters where Confucius' main ideas were collected in the form of conversations. In his teachings he emphasized aspects like *ren* (仁), which can be translated as humanity or benevolence; *li* (礼), which is best translated with ritual propriety; *xiao* (孝) the filial piety; and *junzi* (君子), meaning a superior person in respect of his moral character. These aspects will be discussed in more detail when we look at the core values in Confucianism.

Another important person in Confucian history, and without whom the teaching of Confucius might have been lost, was Mencius (372-289 BCE)²¹. His ideas were also recorded by his students, but the records are more detailed and reliable than the ones in the analects. Mencius seemed to have more students than Confucius, and he was hired by several local rulers as a consultant. Mencius main ideas focused on “human government” and “human nature”. In his theories, Mencius parted from the idea that ‘human nature’ is basically good, and that education only had to support and develop this good nature, which after Mencius could be found in every human being, even in criminals²². Basing his teachings on ideas already expressed by Confucius, Mencius gave a more sophisticated elaboration on how a state should be governed. Basically ‘human government’ implied that a ruler behaved towards its people like a father to his children (Adler 2002, 37).

Although the ideas of Confucius and Mencius got their response in the intellectual world, Confucianism failed to establish itself as a major school for another 200 years. Only when in the emperor Wudi, who reigned from 140 to 87 BCE, decided to favor Confucian ideas over Daoism, did the Confucianism influence in Chinese history and society start to unfold. Wudi was strongly influenced by one of the most important philosophers of the Han dynasty, Dong Zhongshu (董仲舒). Dong Zhongshu wrote a commentary to the *Spring and Autumn annals*, in which he managed to develop an analogy of the relationship between heaven, earth, and men. Through his correlative cosmology and integration of the elements of *yin* and *yang*, the five phases and the principle of *dao*, he managed to legitimate the power of the emperor, “basically by conflating the categories of rulership and sagehood” (Adler 2002, 63). This theory obviously made Confucian teaching particularly attractive to rulers, and the emperor Wudi was persuaded to establish Confucianism as the state ideology. During the reign of Wudi the Confucian texts were restored and became the basis of the education of officials (Roberts 2000, 53).

In the last two decades of the second century, the Han Dynasty experienced social problems (great disparities in wealth), as well as problems on the frontiers and inside the government (factional fighting). Additionally, a new form of rebellious movements, influenced by Daoist ideas, threatened the imperial court (see page 59). All these aspects weakened the dynasty, which finally came to its end in 220CE. As Confucianism was very strongly associated with the Han Dynasty, it partly fell with it (Adler 2002, 66). Confucian principle remained the official philosophy of education and government, but its influence declined and Confucian philosophy stagnated, as most Confucian scholars only reproduced old texts and did not further develop the concepts. Confucian ideas were also more and more threatened by Buddhism, which was starting to play a significant role in China. A ‘Confucian revival’ came in the Song Dynasty (960-1279), when in the eleventh century a group of Confucian scholars tried to win back the term *dao* for Confucianism. For many years this term had been entirely utilized by the Daoists and the Buddhists. This group of Confucian scholars, called the *daoxue*- (studying the way 道学) scholars, claimed that the *dao* was actually the Confucian ‘way of the sages’ (*shengdao* 圣道). Most important among this group of scholars were Cheng Yi (程颐, 1033-1107) and Zhu Xi (朱熹, 1130 – 1200). Their version of the *daoxue*-philosophy, called the Cheng Zhu (程朱)-school, later became the orthodox interpretation of Confucianism. From 1313 to 1905, this school and its system was the basis of the examination system for government

²¹ Mencius is the Latinized name of Mengzi (孟子).

²² This belief was later strongly opposed by Xunzi who parted from the principle that humans were principally bad. Only through education this bad nature could be suppressed.

officials. As no one who wanted to occupy an official position in China could escape the in-depth study of Confucian texts, the importance of Confucian thinking in Chinese society cannot be neglected. Its influence on Chinese intellectuals was tremendous, “whether they agreed with it or not” (Adler 2002, 92).

CONFUCIANISM AS RELIGIOUS TRADITION

We have already discussed the difficulties with the term ‘religion’ and ‘religious’ in the Chinese context. We touch on the same discussion when asking whether Confucianism is a religion or a philosophy. Although the Chinese traditionally did not clearly differentiate between the two, they appear to do so now; in the People’s Republic of China, Confucianism is officially not a religion but rather a philosophy, a point of view shared by many Chinese. Nevertheless there are notions in Confucianism that are in many respects ‘religious’. I will discuss some of these notions with the hope that this discussion, in addition to the short introduction on the history of Confucianism above and the more philosophic approach to Confucian values below, will provide a more complete picture of this tradition.

Although many scholars understand Confucianism as a philosophy occupied only with worldly matters, there are a certain number of authors that have singled out its religious content (Fingarette 1972, Ching 1993, De Bary 1995, Thompson 1996, Tucker 1998). One important notion when looking at the religious dimensions of Confucianism is the importance of the ritual. Herbert Fingarette points out Confucius’ love and emphasis of the ritual; indeed, rituals are an absolutely essential part of Confucian teaching. In this he sees a sacred dimension. Confucian teachings helped to keep alive the cult of ancestor worship and the worship of Heaven, a cult mainly performed of emperors (see page 54). Sometimes, Confucius’ repeated emphasis on rituals is understood as a pure love of form, but in the analects we find the following text, allegedly spoken by Confucius:

“The master said, ‘The gentleman has morality as his basic stuff and by observing the rites puts it into practice, by being modest gives it expression, and by being trustworthy in word brings it to completion. Such is a gentleman.’” (The Analects 15:18, transl. Lau 1979, 134)

In this citation, we find that rituals are not empty forms but rather methods through which the real substance (the rightness) can be put into practice. Although it is definitely true that a major concern of Confucius was how a society should function, this shouldn’t lead to the conclusion that he did not believe in spirits and heaven; rather, it just wasn’t his priority to discuss those aspects. He nevertheless did teach that one should follow the traditional rituals to worship ancestors and heaven, as they were considered to be part of following the right way.

Confucianism developed its religious aspects, when it became the official state religion. Many of the essential features of the religion performed by emperors and officials date back to long before Confucius and the other Confucian philosophers. Some of the deities worshipped in state religion can even be traced back to the Shang Dynasty (?1751-?1111) (Thompson 1996, 67). However, as all officials and bureaucrats had to master the Confucian canon, the religious practice of the officials was more and more associated with and influenced by Confucian teaching. In state religion, the emperor personally officiated over the supreme sacrifices and his officials did the same at a lower level, thus ensuring that the same rituals were performed all over China.

Part of the official religion of Confucianism was also the deification of great men, and in fact Confucius himself soon became a component of this religion, although it might be said that he himself probably would not have agreed to this practice.

In chapter 2.3, I will explain more detailed certain aspects of state religion and the idea of the mandate of heaven. At this point it is only important to know that while the Confucian philosophers, including Confucius himself, were primarily concerned with the world of men, in its historical development Confucianism was integrated into concepts of Chinese religion and hence acquired its own religious tradition. This, of course, was only possible because Confucianism never neglected the importance of rituals such as ancestor worship. Another reason why it could be rather easily integrated in a religious context was its cosmological quality. In her article about the religious dimensions of Confucianism, Mary E. Tucker points out two aspects of Confucianism that uncover “something of the religious nature of the tradition” (Tucker 1998, 8). She refers to the term ‘cosmology’ and ‘cultivation’. In Confucianism, the term ‘cosmology’ explains the workings of the universe, and offers a meaningful image of the world in general and the role of humans. As we have seen already when talking about general Chinese concepts, Confucianism parts from the basic assumption that the whole cosmos is structured in one harmonious way, and that every part of it must fulfill its duty to keep up this harmony. In this view, every being and creature is a necessary part of the whole. This provides man with a reason for existence, and allows him to consider his life as having meaning. The term “cultivation” in Confucianism emphasizes the necessity to improve one’s character and morality in order to live up to the demands we are given through our social position. To fulfill one’s duty, it is necessary to integrate oneself into the cosmic life system. Below is a citation of the six key assumptions of Confucian cosmology as described by Tucker:

- 1. that the universe is ordered and patterned;*
 - 2. at the same time, it is made up of generative, dynamic changes;*
 - 3. that transformation in the universe and in the human being are part of an ongoing continuum;*
 - 4. that the human being is the microcosm of the universe in specific and recognizable ways;*
 - 5. that the essence of becoming human is discerning and cultivating that relationship with the cosmos and with all life forms; and*
 - 6. that while this cultivation emphasizes the singularity and special qualities of human relations, these relations are always dependent on larger patterns of connections to the cosmos as a whole. Hence, establishing a political ordered of harmony depends on being in concert with the natural world as well.“*
- (Tucker 1998, 11)*

In this description of the qualities of Confucian cosmology, we can see the role that personal cultivation plays. This personal cultivation is not a goal of itself, but is integrated into the larger necessity of upholding the harmony of the whole and integrate oneself into the cosmological order. If we look only at Confucian philosophy as a moral system to promote moral behavior and neglect the integration of the moral cultivation into a wider, world explaining system, we miss an important aspect of Confucianism.

It was not the goal of this paragraph to define whether or not Confucianism is a religion. Rather, I wanted to single out and describe the religious aspects of Confucianism, as they are often neglected in both western and Chinese accounts of

Confucianism. As we have seen, both the emphasis of the ritual and the integration of personal moral cultivation into a larger, world explaining cosmology, are clearly “religious” notions.

CONFUCIAN VALUES

I have listed some of the major Confucian concepts above, namely *ren* (humanity or benevolence), *li* (ritual propriety), *xiao* (filial piety), or the notion of *junzi* (the gentleman). Other important values or, better, ‘virtues’ (to use a more Confucian term), are the concepts of *zhi* (知 wisdom, smartness), *yi* (义 justice), and *xin* (信 trustworthiness, reliability). These notions all contain major Confucian values, emphasized not only by Confucius but by most Confucian writers that followed. I will now discuss those concepts I consider most important in Confucian teaching.

The first concept I will discuss is *li* (礼), translated as ritual propriety. Originally, *li* referred just to the ritual of worshipping ancestors and gods. Later, however, its meaning was extended to refer to ritualistically proper behavior in all circumstances of life, spanning from ordinary daily activities to special ceremonies. Confucius himself contributed to this larger understanding of *li*, as he emphasized it often in his teaching and understood it to be a basic characteristic of a (real) human:

“The master said, ‘To return to the observance of the rites (li) through overcoming the self constitutes benevolence²³ (ren).” (Analects 12:1, transl. Lao 1979, 24)

In the analects, it becomes clear that every aspect of life should be carefully shaped in accordance with *li*. We could say that Confucian lifestyle therefore becomes its own “continuing ceremony” (Adler 2002, 34), because in every moment one is aware of and behaves according to a code of rites, which defines daily life. A very important aspect of this code of life was the notion of the five relations, already discussed in point 2.1.2 (page 26). In general, one can say that the hierarchical structure was one basic principle of right behavior in Confucianism.

An absolutely fundamental aspect of this hierarchical understanding of society is *xiao*, filial piety. The meaning of *xiao* becomes obvious when we look at the Chinese character for *xiao* (孝). The upper part (老) is the Chinese symbol for “old”, supported by the underlying symbol for “children” (子). Thus, the character for filial piety in Chinese shows what it implies; that the young support the old. In the Confucian Canon we find countless statements about the importance of *xiao*. Here a few examples:

“‘What does that (xiao) mean?’ The Master said, ‘When your parents are alive, comply with the rites in serving them; when they die, comply with the rites in burying them; comply with the rites in sacrificing to them’.” (Analects 2,5, transl. Lao 1979, 63)

“Mencius said, ‘Of services, which is the greatest? The service of parents is the greatest. Of charges which is the greatest? The charge of one’s self is the greatest. That those who do not fail to keep themselves are able to serve their parents is what I have heard. But I have never heard of any, who, having failed to keep themselves, were able notwithstanding to serve their parents’”(The Writings of Mencius 14, 4,1, transl. Legge 2004, 75)

²³ Here the term *ren* is translated as “benevolence”. Other translators also used the term “to become humane”.

“The master said, ‘In serving his parents his filial son is as reverent as possible to them while they are living. In taking care of them he does so with all possible joy; when they are sick he is extremely anxious about them; when he buries them he is stricken with grief; when he sacrifices to them he does so with the utmost solemnity. These five (duties) being discharged in full measure, than he has been able (truly) to serve his parents.’ ” (Scripture of filiality X (Hisao Ching), trsl. Legge 1899)

These citations show us the importance of *xiao* in Chinese Culture. *Xiao* is one of the concepts in which *li* can be put into practice. For instance, one must show proper behavior to ones parents in order to be absolutely filial. The concept of the five relationships starts with filial piety, and is considered the most important of all of the relationships. The concept of *xiao* is so important in Chinese society that it defines the position of children in society –as supporters of the older generation. To use the words of Thompson:

“But whereas we tend to think of this (marriage as an institution for the production and nurturing of children) in terms of the future of humanity-or at least the future of our own line- the Chinese tended to think of it as the most important requirement for the support of the older generation and the generations that had already passed away.” (Thompson 1996, 37)

This view clearly imposed upon children the duty to devote themselves totally to the welfare of their parents and ancestors.

After having explained *li* and its corollary, *xiao*, both of which emphasize a more fixed, traditional and even severe approach to life, it is important to introduce another basic concept of Confucianism that goes at least partly in a different and “softer” direction. This concept is *ren* (仁). *Ren* is often translated as “benevolence”, but its meaning is actually much broader than is implied by this term, and I will therefore use the Chinese term to refer to this concept. *Ren* is sometimes listed as one of the Confucian virtues (among others like *li*, and *xiao*), but other authors see it as the most basic concept of Confucianism. In a Chinese booklet about *ren* in Confucianism, we find the following:

“To summarize, ren is an extremely important concept in the thinking of Kongzi. One could say that ren sa its philosophy, its worldview, its moral, political, and educational teaching. In short, it is the general line, unifying his vast and diverse ideology.” (Zhao; Guo 1990, 19)²⁴

The author Zhao and Guo describe *ren* as the one concept underlying all Confucian moral and philosophy. In *ren*, we can see ethical, emotional, and metaphysical qualities. If we understand *ren* as an ethical concept (see Roetz, Xue) it implies selfless action, charity and living accordance with the Confucian ‘golden rule’: “Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire” (The Analects 15, 23, transl. Lao 1979, 135). By incorporating the golden rule, which was called *shu* (恕) by Confucius, into the concept of *ren*, several authors also stress the importance of being able to anticipate what others feel and departing from the principle that others have the same needs as ourselves. Although the term *shu* is often translated with words such as reciprocity, fairness and mutuality, the term empathy is probably more adequate, as

²⁴ Original text in Chinese: 总之，仁的观念在孔子思想中有极其重要的地位。可以说仁是他的哲学，他的世界观，也是他的伦理道德学说，政治学说，教育一句话，是他的全部博大庞杂的思想体系的（一以贯之）的总纲。（Literally Zhao and Guo use the Chinese expression ‘*yi yi guanzhi*’, meaning ‘one unity pervades all things’ to characterize *ren*.)

shu does not describe a symmetrical relationship (one party is only passively involved) (Gu 1999,67).

Ren also has a more emotional meaning that is not necessarily coupled to a moral code. Mencius, who parts from the principle that man is basically good, describes *ren* as a very natural, emotional and affectionate form of loving and caring for others. He gives us the example of a child about to fall in a well: everybody will try to save that child²⁵. For Mencius, this is a sort of affectionate love that can be expanded to include all people, even those we don't actually like. Mencius believed that *ren* was not just a human concept, but rather that the whole cosmic world was unified through this principle. In this view *ren*, becomes a method for mankind to integrate itself in the cosmic harmony. This interpretation clearly emphasizes the metaphysical or religious dimension of *ren*.

What is especially interesting about the concept of *ren* is that, compared to *li*, it does not just emphasize acting in accordance with the norms and standards of society, but actually can be understood as a notion that favors human behavior (love, empathy, charity, righteousness) over everything else. In the analects, Confucius called three men true "*ren*- humans": Wei, Chi and Pi Gan. All of them opposed the tyrant Zhou. Wei lost his official position for his opposition, Chi decided to serve as a slave in a different family, and Pi Gan had to pay with his life. In Confucius' eyes they all lived the concept of *ren* (The Analects, 18,1, transl. Lau 1979, 149).

I consider it important to include this notion when talking about Confucian values- it shows that in the Confucian value set, we find virtues that not only support hierarchical society structures and the maintenance of the established order, but also strive toward the ideal of empathy and love for other human beings. To live up to this ideal it is sometimes even necessary to oppose the hierarchical structure of society.

2.2.2 Daoism

HISTORICAL ASPECTS

It had long been customary to divide Daoism into "philosophical Daoism" and "religious Daoism", with the former referring to the classical Daoist scriptures, such as the *Daodejing* and the *Zhuangzi*, and the latter referring to the organized religious institution with a priesthood and extended body of literature. Although this separation can be based on the two different Chinese terms *Daojia* (道家, school of the Way) and *Daojiao* (道教, teaching of the Way), this separation is no longer considered valid. For one, what is called "religious Daoism" is really only the practice of "philosophical Daoism" (Robinet 1997). Secondly, the mystical ideas of "philosophical Daoism" can only be understood in the context of religious practices existing in the time when Daoist ideas first developed. It is therefore inadequate to distinguish between the two.

The Daoist tradition is very diverse. It was practiced in many ways, "each reflecting the historical, social, or personal situation of its adherents" (Berling 1996, 1). This diversity makes it confusing to try to understand this tradition, but this very diversity is significant, as it shows the flexibility and adaptability of Daoism.

The classical Daoist concept, which we find in the *Daodejing* and the *Zhuangzi*, can be understood as a new interpretation of ancient Chinese religion and thought. According to tradition, the *Daodejing* was written by Laozi, a wise man living during the same time as Confucius. Historians today, however, agree the *Daodejing* had more than one author, and was written over a time span of a century in about the third century BCE. The origins of the second of these basic books, the *Zhuangzi*, and its

²⁵ See The Writings of Mencius, 6,6,3, transl. Legge 2004, 33)

author, Master Zhuang or Zhuangzi, after whom the book is named, are more clear. Zhuangzi reportedly lived in fourth century BCE and was a contemporary of Mencius. Although it is quite certain he wrote large segments of the 'Zhuangzi', little else is known about him (Bauer 2001, 84).

During the early Han dynasty (206BCE-9CE) one of the most influential school of thought at the Han court was a form of eclectic Daoism called the *Huang-Lao* school, represented in the *Huainanzi*. The *Huainanzi* was a compilation of texts covering a wide variety of topics including Daoist concepts of creation, the theory of governing by *wuwei*, and techniques of spiritual cultivation, all of which will be further discussed below. The *Huainanzi* was presented to the emperor Wudi, who rejected it in favor of Confucian teaching, after which the *Huang-Lao* school no longer played an important public role. Its ideas, however shaped many Daoist movements to come (Adler 2002, 67).

The Daoist movements in the late Han dynasty (23-220CE) can be identified as a major factor in the decline of the Han Dynasty. The year 184 marked the beginning of a new sexagenarian cycle in the Chinese calendar. In this time, several Daoist movements were formed, the main two movements being the Yellow Turbans and the Five Pecks of Rice²⁶. The inspirations for these movements came from a book called *Taping jing*, the Book of the Great Peace. This book predicted that the alleged author of the *Daodejing*, Laozi, would return and reign over an era of peace and tranquility (*taiping* in Chinese). Livia Kohn (1996) identified this to be the point in popular Daoism when Laozi changed from a sage into a God, the divine representation of the cosmic Dao. The promise attracted many peasants, who joined the organizations mentioned above and led attacks on government officials. Both the Yellow Turban and the Five Pecks of Rice rebellions were countered by the year 189, but it is believed that they assisted in the downfall of the Han dynasty²⁷ and were an example to the emperors of how dangerous organized religion could be (Pas 1995, 315).

Another, even more important movement in the history of Daoism, started out at around the same time and was also based on the idea of Laozi returning to earth as a deity. In his form as a divine representation of Dao, he appeared to a man called Zhang Daoling and gave him moral instructions and knowledge about meditation and medicine. Zhang Daoling became the first 'Celestial Master' (天士 *tianshi*). The tradition of the 'Way of the Master' (天士道 *tianshidao*) is, to this day, an important school in Daoism and is generally referred to as the *Tianshi Zhengyi Dao* (The Way of the Orthodox One of the Master Designated by the Heavens). The title of 'Celestial Master' has been handed down to the male descendants of Zhang Daoliang, and the 64th male descendant, the present Celestial Master, lives in Taiwan today. The instructions received by Zhang Daoliang gave a basis on which a Daoist community could be constructed. By the end of the Han Dynasty the Daoist community numbered about 400,000 (Adler, 2002, 68). The community prevailed because they later entered a treaty with the Northern Wei (386-534), offering their loyalty and spiritual support to the Wei emperor in exchange of his protection. This protection lasted only a short time, as in the 3rd century the Wei emperor faced political attacks and could no longer

²⁶ Chinese secret societies. The Yellow Turbans (active in the East of China) and their rebellion (84 BCE) was led by a Daoist faith healer (Zhang Jue), who gained many peasant supporters during a widespread pestilence. The rebels wore yellow headdresses that symbolized the earth they were fighting for. The society active in the west was called the Five Pecks of Rice (so named after the subscription paid by each follower) and led by Zhang Lu. The movements were inspired by the *Book of the great Peace*, which announced a new golden age of equality and prosperity (see Roberts 2000, 65).

²⁷ Roberts points out that there were other factors that led to the final downfall of the Han Dynasty, such as the massacre on the Eunuchs, who had always been a great support to the emperor, and the fact that actual power lay in the hands of military generals for quite a few years, not in the hands of the emperor (see Roberts 2000, 66).

control his country. During this time, many of the Chinese aristocracy who supported Daoism emigrated to southern China (Adler 2002, 68).

It was in these southern regions of China that Daoism came in contact with the tradition of alchemy. Around 320, Ge Hong, wrote the *Baopuzi*, or 'The Master who Embraces Simplicity'. This book is mainly a defense of conservative political, social and religious scholarship in the Han Dynasty. However, the inner chapters of the work also contain Ge Hong's own research on about transcendence, immortality, alchemy, meditation techniques and sexual practices (Adler 2002, 68). This book is one of the first examples in which Daoist teaching was mixed with ideas of alchemy. Around 390, Ge Chaofu, the grand nephew of Ge Hong, published the *Lingbao*, a text which he claimed had originated already with Ge Xuan, Ge Hong's great uncle.

"The Lingbao texts were the first to incorporate into Daoism confession, public rituals, moral precepts, and the Buddhist ideas of karma and rebirth. Lingbao public rituals became extremely popular among ordinary people in the Tang dynasty, and many are still performed today." (Adler, 68)

Another important Daoist practitioner in the 4th century was Yang Xi. He claimed to receive revelations from the deities called the 'Perfected Ones' (*zhenren*), in the Heaven of Highest Purity (*Shangqing*). The so-called *Shangqing* texts were later collected by Tao Hongjing (456-536), a scholar "who really completed the merging of the southern alchemical traditions with Celestial Master Daoism." (Adler, 2002, 68).

All the scriptures mentioned above, as well as many others, are now a part of the Daoist canon, which was concluded in 1445. Today it includes 1426 titles. Daoism experienced its most successful era during the Tang dynasty (618-906), mainly because the ruling emperors considered themselves to be descendants of Laozi.

THE DAOIST RELIGIOUS QUEST

Compared to the monotheistic religions of the western world, the concepts of 'sin' and 'liberation from sin' do not play a role in Chinese religious concepts. This does not mean, however, that Chinese religions do not promote liberation or at least transformation from the often-unsatisfying human condition. In Daoism, the religious aim is to transform oneself into a being free from physical boundaries. To use the words of Thompson:

"The religious quest is for liberation of the spiritual element of the ego from physical limitations, so that it may enjoy immortality or at least longevity. In other words, the goal is the triumph of the yang over the yin. When one has attained this liberation, this triumph, one may choose either to remain in the physical body to enjoy mundane pleasures or to wander freely in the realm of space, to visit or dwell in one of the fabled abodes of the immortals." (Thompson 1995, 81)

I mentioned above that this religious quest for longevity or immortality is often seen as being a superstitious misinterpretation of the mystics' metaphorical images. Thompson, however, points out that the basis for the quest for immortality or longevity is based in the *Daodejing*. As an example, he sites chapter 33 of the *Daodejing*:

But I have heard that he who is skilful in managing the life entrusted to him for a time travels on the land without having to shun rhinoceros or tiger, and enters a host without having to avoid buff coat or sharp weapon, The rhinoceros finds no place in him into which to thrust its horn, not the tiger a place in which to fix its claws, nor the

weapon a place to admit its point. And for what reason? Because there is in him no place of death. (Daodejing 50, 4, transl. Legge 1962, 92)

If this paragraph is taken literally, we clearly find the idea of immortality already present in the Daoist tradition.

Not all Daoists thinkers and Daoist books had such a physical understanding of 'immortality'. The author of the Zhuangzi follows a somewhat mystical insight, and scorns those who try to reach immortality through physical practices. But despite these critical voices one can say, that the use of physical practice to gain immortality has always been a goal of Daoism:

“Nevertheless, physical immortality was a Taoist goal probably long before and alongside the unfolding of Taoist mysticism. The adept of immortality had a choice among many methods that were all intended to restore the pure energies possessed at birth by the infant whose perfect vital force Lao-tzu admired. Through these methods, the adept became an immortal who lived 1000 years in this world if he so chose and, once satiated with, “ascended to heaven in broad daylight.” This was the final apotheosis of the Taoist who had transformed his body into pure Yang energy.” (Taoism, Encyclopedia Britannica)

The practical techniques to attain immortality can be differentiated between the *waidan* (外丹), or 'outer elixir', and *neidan* (内丹), 'inner elixir'. The *waidan*, which describes the search for an external elixir of immortality, is also referred to as alchemy. Alchemy, which was also practiced in Europe many years later, is based on compounding elixirs through the manipulation of natural sources. Texts concerning *waidan* consist of recipes, description of ingredients and the rules that have to be applied. It was believed that the elixir of immortality (often called the philosopher's stone in the Western tradition), would provide immortality to those who ingested it, and could transform cheaper minerals or other material into gold²⁸.

The search for immortality continued for centuries, and the elixir of immortality was increasingly considered in spiritual rather than physical terms. The search for immortality through spiritual means is described with the term *neidan*. *Neidan* can be understood as inner cultivation; often the vocabulary of a laboratory was used to refer to procedures in the body. *Neidan*, as well as other forms of self-cultivation, plays an important role in the Daoist religion, and of course is deeply rooted in the general Chinese idea of self-cultivation. Kohn points out that a distinct feature of the Daoist form of self-cultivation is its aim to achieve a “greater sense of belonging to Dao, of interacting with the underlying force of the larger universe, a transformation of self and body into a more cosmic, Dao-focused entity” (Kohn 2004, 4).

Self-cultivation is just one aspect of the religious life of a Daoist. Also of great importance is the Daoist community, with its priests, initiations, regular rituals and prayers. These Daoist rituals, which are practiced for and by entire communities, often have a more collective goal, emphasizing the well being of the community as a whole. The most important rituals, which can only be performed by the 'higher class Daoists'²⁹ are called *Jiao* (醮) and *Zhai* (齋), both rites of cosmic renewal. Historically these two were not greatly differentiated between, and even today the difference is not

²⁸ The aspect of transforming low value material into gold, was a big concern of the Chinese State, as they feared counterfeiting of gold money. Therefore alchemist activities were punished with public execution. This was one reason why the alchemic practices and theories were kept secret (Thompson 1996, 84).

²⁹ In Taiwan they are usually called the black heads (wearing black caps). They master a wide and deep range of Daoist texts, which qualifies them to perform more complex and profound rituals. The more ordinary Daoist priests, called red heads in Taiwan, have a lower level of education and knowledge of texts and are only entitled to perform less complex, rather rudimentary rituals (Thompson 195, 90).

easy to grasp. It can be said that the *Zhai* ritual has a more individualistic focus, serving to liberate the individual, whereas the *Jiao* ritual focuses on bringing blessings from heaven and union with the *dao* to the community practicing the ritual (Thompson 1996, 92).

These rituals work alongside the Daoist cosmology, which was revealed to Daoists during the first 400 years of our time. In this cosmology, the three highest deities are called the Three Pure Ones (三清 *sanqing*), each of them occupying one of the three heavens, which are arrayed above the six heavens occupied by all other Chinese deities (Adler 2002, 70f).

Both the historical introduction to Daoism and this short paragraph about the most important features in Daoist religious life give hints to the complexity of this religion. In general, Daoism can be understood as a religion of revelations. These revelations (e.g., to Zhang Daoliang or Yang Xi) shaped the path Daoism was to take and added new aspects to the religion. As Silvia Kohn, the preeminent Western scholar on Daoism, (2004) points out in her introduction to Daoism, Daoist life can be said to consist of three features: (1) the more intellectual and philosophical occupation with the Daoist worldview and its possible function in society, (2) being part of the Daoist community and (3) following the path of self-cultivation.

“(...) to be a complete Daoist one must follow all three paths; studying worldview and being socially responsible, performing rituals and praying to the gods, and undertaking self-cultivation (...)” (Kohn 2004, 7).

MORAL AND VALUE DIMENSIONS OF DAOISM

In this section, I will try to single out certain important moral and ethical views promulgated by Daoism. As already mentioned, just as Daoism cannot easily be defined as one unity, it is also difficult to trace down typical Daoist values. The following list should therefore not be understood as fixed, complete or representative. Rather, it mainly serves to give an idea as to what values played a role in Daoism, so as to better understand the Chinese world of values.

The first concept to be discussed is the role of nature in Daoism. It is probably already an inaccuracy to discuss ‘the role of nature’ in Daoism, as one could say that Daoism is nature (Kohn 2004). Or, using the formulation of Isabelle Robinet, the French expert on Daoism, one can also say that the “Taoist world is above all the world of nature” (Robinet 1997, 20). A third version about the importance of nature in Daoism comes from Craig Johnson who, in his article about Daoist leadership ethics, affirms that “nature is the ultimate ethical standard” (Johnson 2000, 82). This last citation is the most interesting one for our purposes, as it implies that all moral values supported by Daoism are based in nature. This aspect clearly distinguishes Daoism from other religions, which often view moral standards as concepts either given by a god or a higher force (Christianity, Islam and at least partly Confucianism), or formulated through individuals who found these truths inside themselves (e.g. Buddhism). Nature in Daoism is understood through many of the concepts that are universal to Chinese thought- the notion of *yin* and *yang*, *wuxing* and the idea of the circularity and cyclical functions of nature.

Yin and *yang* are understood as complementary opposites, implying that everything has its necessary opposite. This again involves the relativity of all things, and consequently also an ethical relativity (Johnson 2000, 82). What might be good in one moment or context may not be good in another. The same things that have been good in one situation may turn bad in others.

The five phases, or *wuxing*, which were already introduced above, are particularly important in the Daoist worldview. In this conception of the world, wood, fire, metal and water each govern one of the four parts of the world. Wood controls east-spring, fire south-summer, metal west-autumn and water north-winter. Earth provides cohesion of the whole, being in the center of time and place (Robinet 1997, 11). Like *yin* and *yang*, the five phases are understood as ‘breaths’ being, dynamic principles of which each has its place and time, and which work according to the season or time of the day. As Robinet explains it:

“For example, in springtime and/or in the east, everything connected with the wood category is particularly strong and active, whereas in summer, it is the turn of things belonging to fire. Hence the universe is governed by a changing equilibrium in which the various forces that animate it are never equal, but dominate it in turn in alternating hegemonies.” (Robinet 1997, 11)

It is believed that the five phases work as a balanced organism of coalition and adversary, thus forming an unity and a controversary, which provides the world with a “self-regulating system” (Robiner 1997, 11). This worldview clearly supports faith in the ways of nature, and makes the believer suspicious of every human intervention. Whereas in Confucianism the source of problems is often seen in the dysfunctional relationships among men, for Daoists the problems emerge when the harmony between man and nature (or in nature, as man is part of it) is disturbed. The harmony between man and nature is the ultimate goal of one of the most important concepts in Daoism, ‘*wuwei*’ (无为). *Wuwei* which means ‘non-interference’ is described as the most superior virtue practiced by a Daoist sage. An essential part of this superior virtue is the very unawareness of its being virtuous, and is aimed against the rather intellectual cognitive search for virtue in the Confucian tradition. In the *Daodejing*, we find the following passage:

“(Those who) possessed in highest degree the attributes of the Tao (ik: possess virtue) did not (seek) to show them, and therefore they possessed them (in fullest measure). (Those who) possessed in a lower degree those attributes (ik: virtue) (sought how) not to lose them, and therefore they did not possess them (in fullest measure).” (Daodejing, 38, 1 transl. Legge 1962, 80)

This man of superior virtue (the Daoist sage) follows *wuwei* and therefore “never acts”³⁰. The *wuwei* ideal does not mean absolute inaction; *wuwei* describes an action that is so well integrated into its environment that it does not leave any trace. This requires behavior that is completely natural, and which can only be found by returning to one’s natural form. This means that the sage must return to his infant form, or to “the undiminished vitality of the newborn state” (ECB, Taoism).

Wuwei is also closely connected to the ideal of spontaneity or primitivism. This spontaneity in Chinese is expressed by the term *ziran* (自然), which means ‘nature’, but also is used as an adverb, meaning ‘spontaneously’, ‘naturally’ or ‘in the course of events’. To follow *ziran* is to find the ultimate truth in spontaneity, and not through conscious human intervention (Robinet 1997, 28). This emphasis on spontaneity is again just another way of following the way of nature. The natural world, which is in perfect harmony (as long as humans do not get in the way), does not act with

³⁰ Eg.:Therefore a sage has said, ‘ I will do nothing (of purpose), and the people will be transformed of themselves; I will be fond of keeping still, and the people will of themselves become correct. I will take no trouble about it, and the people will of themselves become rich; I will manifest no ambition, and the people will of themselves attain to the primitive simplicity.’ (Daodejing 57, 3, transl. Legge 1962, 101)

conscious deliberation (Adler 2002, 48). We therefore, should also renounce the use of our consciousness and instead trust our unconscious ‘instincts’. Based on this logic, the ideal Daoist society is often described as the primitive agrarian community, which follows the rhythm of nature. People in this type of society are perceived as uneducated people without desires, representing a sort of ‘uncarved simplicity’. It is in this simplicity that they can attain their true nature. Zhuangzi, who often opposed *tian* (heaven or nature³¹) to *ren* (人 man), wanted man to renounce to artificial tools, as these tools would not just facilitate work but would lead to “a scheming mind” and “a unsettled spirit”³². Some Daoists incorporated this into an absolute retreat from civilization, while others tried to integrate themselves into society while finding ways to include the Daoist principles in society.

It is important to note that Daoism has penetrated all of Chinese civilization, and has had a strong influence on the Chinese way of thinking. Although Daoism sometimes supports the same values as Confucianism, its distinct focus on nature provides the Chinese intellectual and religious world with a different point of view. The importance of Daoism in contemporary Chinese society will be discussed in more detail in a later section.

2.2.3 Buddhism

Buddhism is the only foreign religion that was able to truly settle in China and become part of the Chinese culture. Looking at Buddhism in China today, it might appear that Buddhism is not foreign at all and is in complete compatibility with the Chinese worldview. This has not always been so, and it took many reciprocal iterations before Buddhism in China became as Chinese as it is now, and China as Buddhist as is the case nowadays.

HISTORY

There are reports of Buddhists in China that date back to the 3rd century BC, but Buddhism was not actively promulgated in China until the later Han Dynasty (25 – 220 BCE). Early Buddhism included many magical practices and was, from the beginning, made highly compatible with Daoism. One of the major Buddhist teachings of “non-self”, which later also became an important aspect in Chinese Buddhism, was first understood as the indestructibility of the soul, and the idea of Nirvana was perceived as a form of immortality.

This close connection between Buddhism and Daoism was enhanced by the widespread belief that Lao Zi had been reborn in India as the Buddha and that they are actually the same. As a consequence, Buddha and Lao Zi were worshipped on the same altar. There were also claims that Confucius had already known about Buddhism (Bauer 2001, 164). Another story tells us that Mingdi, an emperor of the later Han Dynasty, had a dream about a golden deity flying in front of his palace, and was later told that this deity was Buddha. He thereupon sent an envoy to India who brought back the Sutra in Forty Sections (Bauer 2001, 162).

Another reason for this strong connection between Chinese culture and Buddhism were the many difficulties that appeared when translating Buddhist texts into Chinese.

³¹ The actual translation of *tian* is heaven, but since the Daoist concept of heaven can be understood as natural, unchanged energy, this use of *tian* it can also be translated as nature, indicating that in Daoism the word had a different significance than in Confucianism.

³² “ ‘I have heard from my teacher that, where there are ingenious contrivances, there are sure to be subtle doings; and that where there are subtle doings, there is sure to be a scheming mind. But, when there is a scheming mind in the breast, its pure simplicity is impaired. When this pure simplicity is impaired, the spirit becomes unsettled, and the unsettled spirit is not the proper residence of the Tao. It is not that I do not know (the contrivance which you mention), but I should be ashamed to use it.’ “ (Zhuangzi, 12, 11, transl. Legge 1962, 320)

Often, the vocabulary used in the original scriptures could not be directly translated into Chinese, so Daoist expressions were used, giving the Buddhist texts a 'Daoist touch'. In general, Buddhism made slow progress in China (see Bauer 2001, 163ff). Once Buddhism was recognized more clearly as a distinct teaching, many obstacles to its spread became apparent.

“With its doctrine of renunciation of worldly concerns, including those of family ties, Buddhist values were directly opposed to those of Confucianism which emphasized the importance of the family.” (Roberts 2000, 76)

For many Chinese, Buddhism seemed strongly world-denying, which did not match their own tradition, in which the main concern was how to improve worldly life. The first Buddhist truth, that life is suffering, also strongly opposed the traditional Chinese way of thinking (Adler 2000, 83). In addition to having Buddhist beliefs that were foreign to Chinese thought, there was the previously mentioned difficulty of translating texts from Sanskrit to Chinese. For a very long time these difficulties prevented the spread of a distinct Buddhist thought. These translation problems created much confusion, and there was a strong tendency to treat the available Buddhist thoughts as eclectic.

Nevertheless, the *Sutra in Forty-two Sections*³³ was translated even before the fall of the Later Han Dynasty (23CE-220). Thompson (1996, 101) called the translation of Buddhist thought into Chinese language “one of the great intercultural movements of history”.

In the south of China, Buddhism was first practiced by educated Chinese who had also been attracted by a form of Neo-Daoism, which showed certain similarities with Buddhist ideas. In the fifth and early sixth centuries, Buddhism continued to progress among literary figures and the aristocracy. A famous representative of these aristocratic adherents of Buddhism was the Emperor Wu of the Liang Dynasty (502-549). Wu's goal was to rule as a true Buddhist monarch, taking as his model King Ashoka³⁴, the Indian ruler who had also been a devoted Buddhist (Roberts 2000, 78).

The development of Buddhism in the North was faster and more successful than in the south. The rulers in the north were mostly non-Chinese who didn't perceive Buddhism as a danger to Chinese culture and, on the contrary, felt that Buddhism offered a welcome alternative to the Confucian doctrine (Roberts 2000, 78).

By the middle of the 6th century, Buddhism was strongly established in China and had already acquired many specific Chinese characteristics. Hence, a distinct school of Chinese Buddhism evolved. To summarize the development of Buddhism in China, the following phrase is probably most adequate:

“one must recognize that first there was Indian Buddhism; then there was Indian Buddhism in China; and finally, after many centuries of adjustments, there was Chinese Buddhism.” (Thompson 1996, 102)

³³ This “Sutra of Forty-Two Sections” is said to be the first Buddhist scripture brought to China, but some scholars maintain that it is an apocryphal work produced in China. As the title suggests, it explains important tenets of Buddhist doctrine in 42 sections, thus serving, as it were, as an introduction to Buddhism. Basic Buddhist concepts such as suffering, impermanence and non-self as well as items relating to Buddhist practice, such as compassion and almsgiving, are elucidated. Owing to the fact that it is written in very simple language, this sutra was widely read in China, and there are as many as ten variant versions of the text (see <http://www.numatacenter.com>).

³⁴ King Ashoka (273-233 BCE) is a very important figure in early Buddhism. Being a tyrant and warlord in his younger days, he changed into a convinced pacifist after his conversion to Buddhism. He submitted his governance to the Buddhist teaching of dharma, and followed the teaching of ‘no killing’ by abolishing the death penalty and the sacrifice of animals. King Ashoka established an advanced health system by building public hospitals both for men and animals. He was also famous for his tolerance toward other religions and cultures (Tworkuschka Monika; Tworuschka, Udo 1992, 309)

The specific feature of what is called Chinese Buddhism is its focus on harmony and compromise which clearly reflects the pragmatic temper of the Chinese mind. This search for harmony and compromise is exemplified in the Chinese schools Tiantai (天台, sacred mountain in Zhejiang) and Huayan (华严). The Tiantai school of thought was established by Zhiyi, who classified the teaching of Buddha in systematic progression, considering the Lotus Sutra³⁵ as the most advanced of all available teachings. He based his teachings on the Lotus Sutra (Chen 1964, 310), and developed a systematic Buddhist philosophy. The school also emphasized the idea of *zhenru* (真如), or 'true suchness,' teaching that emptiness in Buddhism does not mean non-existence, but the lack of self-existence. Probably even more important than its core beliefs was the idea that Buddha taught different thoughts because different people need different teachings. This view was also shared by the Huayan School, which, similar to the Tiantai School, classified the Buddhist canon along a timely progression, but decided that the most developed teaching could be found in the Avatamsaka or Garland Sutra³⁶. The philosophical teaching of the Huayan School was more universal than the Tiantai-school, with the understanding that everything was a representation of the same supreme mind. Although these schools can be distinguished from each other, they actually were working toward a form of Buddhist ecumenism.

"It will be seen that the establishment of these two Chinese schools, far from compounding the sectarian division of Buddhism, in fact worked for ecumenism. Neither claimed monopoly of truth, and both acknowledged the necessity of various teachings to suit various needs. They did try to define the highest truth, but they recognized the value and the validity of what they considered to be only relative truth." (Thompson 1996, 111)

A third important school, the Chan or meditation school (better known under Japanese name of Zen Buddhism), focused on the importance of meditation as a method to attain enlightenment. This enlightenment could only be found by detecting one's own Buddha nature. Enlightenment was understood as a totally intuitive experience that could only be reached by meditation and not through the help of an outside power or through rituals. In this respect, the Chan School stood in strong contrast to the most popular of all Chinese Buddhist schools, the Jingtū (净土), or Pure Land, school. The Jingtū school promoted salvation through faith rather than through meditation and good works. This tradition emphasized the sutras that focus on Buddha Amithaba (Amituo in Chinese). Amithaba (when he was still a Bodhisatva³⁷) vowed that if he

³⁵ "The Sutra of the True Dharma", (The Dharma resembles a white Lotus). In Chinese: 法华经 (*fahua jing*). It reveals that Buddha has been enlightened from the beginning and has watched over the welfare of all creation like a father. He manifested himself in human form as the Buddha Sakyamuni (Bowker 1999, "lotus sutra"). The Lotus Sutra was translated by different schools and gained particular prominence as it spread through Central Asia into China, the Korean peninsula and Japan, mainly because of the universality of its message, which is that all people can attain enlightenment. The Lotus Sutra was originally translated into Chinese by Dharmaraksa around 290 CE.. (For a Buddhist discussion on the Lotus Sutra see: Reeves, Gene (ed.) (2003). *A Buddhist Kaleidoscope: Essays on the Lotus Sutra*. Tokyo: Kosei Publishing.)

³⁶ The Avatamsaka Sutra (Chinese: 华严经 *hua yan jing*) is one of the most influential scriptures in East Asian Buddhism. The title is rendered in English as *Flower Garland Sutra*, *Flower Adornment Sutra*, or *Flower Ornament Scripture*. The text describes a cosmos of infinite realms upon realms, mutually containing each other. Three full Chinese translations of the Avatamsaka Sutra were made. Fragmentary translation probably began in the second century CE, and the famous Ten Stages Sutra (十地经 *shidijing*), often treated as an individual scripture, was first translated in the third century. The first complete Chinese version was completed by Buddhahadra around 420, by Siksanda around 699, and the third by Prajna around 798 (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avatamsaka_Sutra).

³⁷ In the Mahayana tradition, a bodhisatva (person of enlightenment) is somebody who systematically strives for enlightenment or who has reached enlightenment already. But, he/she renounces to enter nirvana until all other creatures are freed from the cycle of reincarnation (Tworuschka; Tworuschka 1992, 305).

were to achieve enlightenment, he would reign over a heavenly paradise (Pure Land) in which he would admit anyone who believed in it. Based on this premise, that mercy was granted through faith and based on the belief that everybody possessed Buddha nature, the main practice in the Jingtū school was to chant the name of Buddha and repeating the sacred formula of 'Nānomo Amīto Fō' ('hail to Amithaba Buddha'). An important feature of the Jingtū school is the development of the Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara, the compassionate helper of Amithaba, into the most prominent deity of Jingtū Buddhism and of popular Chinese Religion. During the Tang dynasty and early Song dynasty, the Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara was considered to be male, but later became the compassionate mother figure and Goddess which is called Guanyin and is, up to now, the most popular goddess among the Chinese (see 2.2.4 p. 49).

It is important to emphasize once more that Chinese Buddhism is nonsectarian. Although the different schools emphasized different aspects of Buddhism, they also strived toward harmony and, especially in the eyes of the Chinese adherents, did not exclude the other beliefs/schools. A popular Chinese proverb says about these four most important schools "the Tiantai and Huayuan school for doctrine, the Meditation and Pure Land school for practice" (Chen 1964, 4).

The various schools described above developed during the 'golden age of Buddhism,' in the Tang dynasty (618-906). Buddhism, however, could never replace Daoism or Confucianism, and was often considered to be a rival of these two. In 845, the emperor Wu Cong began a major persecution against Buddhism, in which around 4,600 temples and 40,000 shrines were destroyed. 260,000 Buddhist monks were forced to leave the monasteries and return to lay life. Although Buddhism never really recovered from this violent persecution, it continued to play a significant role in religious life in China and in fact coalesced with Confucianism and Daoism, "forming a multi-religious ethos within all three traditions were more or less comfortably encompassed" (ECB, Buddhism).

MONASTIC LIFE AND LAY BUDDHISM

Monastic life has always been a distinctive feature of Buddhism, and it was the monks and nuns who constituted the heart of the Buddhist community, the Sangha. Monastic life was universally regulated through the rules codified in the Vinaya, which is part of the early Buddhist canon and believed to have been promulgated by Buddha himself. Thus, the Chinese Sangha was regulated through the rules specified in the Vinaya, as were all other Buddhist communities. Although there is this common codex in all Buddhist communities, there are some alterations and differences in the case of China, which should be mentioned here. In general, Chinese monks were much less mendicant than, for example, their Indian counterparts, as they Chinese Sangha tended to live in a settled fashion. An important function of the Chinese Buddhist monasteries was to host lay devotees, who were seeking refuge from the tensions of society. This aspect of serving as a refuge from society often also applied to the monks themselves. In a society where there was not much space for people who did not fit in, the Sangha often presented the only alternative for those people, and therefore served as a form of social security (Thompson 1996, 107). Many of the monks had been given to monasteries as children in fulfillment of their parents' religious vows.

Once a person joined the Sangha, he would be given training by his master. A specifically Chinese feature of the relationship between the master and the novice was the idea of this relationship as the equivalent of a father-son relationship, thus reproducing one of the five relationships defined in Confucianism.

*“Thus even in the celibate Buddhist Sangha, the Chinese family system retained its hold, with monk “families” continuing through many generation.”
(Thompson, 1996, 107)*

Another aspect peculiar to Buddhism in China is the importance of confessional rituals. These rituals were strongly promulgated by the Buddhist leader Tao An (312-385 BCE), and were originally a part of the South Asian tradition. An emphasis on rituals and morals in Chinese society in general, however, led to a wide acceptance of those rites. During the 10th century, the Buddhist monk Chueh Shih (963- 1032 AD) finalized several confessional rituals of the Pure Land and Tiantai schools. Confessional rites also became widely important for lay people, for whom these rites meant a harmonization of the social life. Confessional rituals stress the intonation of chanting, the arrangement of the sanctuary and the rules of entering and leaving the sanctuary. Hsiang-Chou Yo (1991) emphasizes that these rituals represent a system of ethics, and were actually the place where Confucian morals were manifested in Buddhism. For instance, filial piety was represented as a part of some confessional rites with the oath: “ I wish to donate this merit to my parents”. The ethical aspects of these confessional rituals can be exemplified through the emphasis on “Loving-Kindness and Compassion” in these rituals:

“Based on the concept of karma and “mind-only” causality, Buddhism does not hold that there are absolute criminals in this world. All sentient beings are equal from the very beginning. The reason why some people commit crimes is because of their ignorance. Everybody can be a Buddha right away if he can arouse the wisdom which everybody has from the very beginning. The Chinese Buddhist confessional rituals also emphasize this concept. The premise of equality, as well as the loving kindness and compassion manifested by confessional rituals, do not represent charity on the part of a superior being nor simply a negative consolation, but a kind of respect and expectation of promise and blessing. The ultimate of loving-kindness and compassion is giving equal care towards all sentient beings no matter whether they are your enemies or benefactors, relatives or aliens.” (Yo 1991, 181).

Confessional rituals incorporated the chanting of traditional Buddhist sutras and tantras, and also included more Chinese features, such as speaking out the names of the Buddhas of ten directions. The Buddhas of the ten directions represent the ever-expanding universe and the existence of gods or other beings on different levels of spiritual achievement in all directions. Certain confessional rites were also specifically designed for the Amithaba Buddha or the Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara (Guanyin).

MORAL AND VALUE DIMENSIONS IN BUDDHISM

I already mentioned a few specific values promoted by Chinese Buddhism in this chapter, but I will specify them more clearly in the following paragraph.

The ideas of ‘non self’ (*wuwo* 无我/*wuzixing* 无自行³⁸) and the emptiness of all things are fundamental to Buddhism in general but also play a major role in the Chinese context. These two ideas were not easily compatible with Chinese thought, as the Chinese strongly believed in a soul which would endure after death and transform into a different existence. The idea of ‘nonself’ was therefore slightly altered by the Chinese Buddhist schools, which conceptualized it as *no self – existence*, emphasizing that all existence is relative and only ‘is’ in relationship with others. This notion is

³⁸ *wuwo* may be translated as “ not I”, *wuzixing* as “no self character”. These expressions are often used together and to explain each other.

often expressed with the words “ a single body has no existence in itself” (Zhu Yueli, 8)³⁹, or, as it is formulated by Brook Ziporin:

“Emptiness means the absence of any definitive self-nature for any entity, the unintelligibility of the borders that separate it from what is other than it.”
(Brook, 504)

This aspect of no existence without relation to others also shines through when looking at the notion of *zhenru* (真如) the ‘true suchness’. *Zhenru* was considered “the ‘mean’ between the fundamental emptiness of things and their ‘provisional existence’” (Adler, 85). Again, the emphasis is on the lack of self-existence, as every existence is only provisional depending on the relational conditions in which it exists. Through this interpretation, Chinese Buddhism once more focused on the importance of society and nature, without which the individual was nonexistent. In this emphasis of the importance of society and nature, we obviously find the underlying aspects of Confucian and Daoist thoughts.

Another basic element of Chinese Buddhism which was strongly emphasized by the Chan and Huayuan schools is *Buddha nature*. The idea of *Buddha nature* is that every thing and being is a representation of the same supreme mind. On a moral level, this calls for a respectful attitude towards all things and people since all things and people are actually the same, although they appear relatively different. The Buddhist doctrine of not killing animals goes back to this belief that animals also possess Buddhist nature and should therefore be protected. The concept of the Buddha nature of all things necessarily leads to an accent on *compassion*, because if everything is actually the same, the suffering of others is also that of our own. The idea of compassion is central to the Jintu school of Buddhism and is also expressed in many of the Buddhist confessional rites. The idea of compassion is connected to the idea of mercy in the Jintu School, where it was believed that only through the pure mercy of the Buddha Amithaba could people enter the Pure Land. That the idea of mercy is appealing to many Chinese people can be seen in the popularity of the Goddess Guanyin, the Goddess of mercy (Malek, 121).

A further value promoted by Chinese Buddhism was the idea of *ren* (忍)⁴⁰, which can be translated as patience, endurance and forbearance. *Ren* was not the center of any Buddhist school of thought, but was incorporated in many general concepts of Mahayana Buddhism. For example, we find *ren* in the third concept of the six Paramitas⁴¹, where it is described as *renru* (忍辱), meaning patience in moments of distress and bearing insult without resentment. This kind of forbearance, which should be practiced even if one gets insulted, is one possible instrument for finding enlightenment. *Ren* seems to be a rather passive value, as it focuses on accepting whatever happens to us. Still, if we understand it in the same way as the authors of the Chinese book *Zongjiaojinji* (宗教禁忌), *ren* is not necessarily passive, but can alternatively be considered as the ability “not to lose hope in the salvation of all

³⁹ Original text in Chinese: “自行是指“自身独立的形而上之存在”，佛教不承认固定独存的性而上的成为佛教的根本理论。”

⁴⁰ Note that the pronunciation of *ren* (忍 forbearance) is the same as the Confucian concept of *ren* (仁 benevolence).

⁴¹ The six Paramitas could be translated as “the six things that ferry one beyond the sea of mortality to nirvana” Soothill; Hodous *Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms*
<http://www.hm.ty.g.jp/~acmuller/soothill/data/s516d-5ea6.html> (dl.17.12.05)

human beings even in times of misery⁴²” (Zhu Yueli, 14). In this understanding, *ren* includes an active form of faith.

As we have seen in the example of filial piety and its influence of the values and rules of the Chinese sangha, certain Confucian moral concepts became important features of Buddhist thinking. In certain Buddhist texts, the basic Confucian moral concepts are either repeated in their original Confucian version (Wang 1990) or just slightly altered, but still integrating the basic Confucian idea. A good example is the use of *li* (principle) in Chinese Buddhism. The term *li* in Confucianism means principle, which assures harmony and coherence among all beings. In Chinese Buddhism, *li* stands for the notion of emptiness. This is because the acceptance that there is no definite form of self-existence is what assures the harmony of all beings (Brook 2003, 523). This example shows how a Confucian concept (*li*) was integrated in Buddhist thinking with a distinctive Buddhist feature (emptiness), but still coherent to the Confucian principle (the that assures harmony among all beings).

This strong acculturation of Buddhism to the Chinese tradition, practiced since its inception in China, is an important value in of itself and was probably one reason that Buddhism survived in China through the ages (Jing, 149).

2.2.4 Popular Religion

Although the so-called popular religion does not have as distinctive a tradition as Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism, it is nevertheless of major importance in Chinese society. When we use the term popular religion we refer to religious traditions that are mostly performed by lay people, which are not necessarily based on any written documents, and often vary from region to region. Although they cannot be clearly categorized as “Buddhist” or “Daoist”, they often include aspects of all Chinese traditions, emphasizing typical Chinese beliefs and values⁴³.

It is rather difficult to discuss the historical origins of popular religion, as little is known of the religious practices of the common people in ancient times dating as far back as the Shang Dynasty (?1766-1122BCE). Even information taken from later periods, based on oral traditions, is sparse. For instance, there are some texts from the classical period (the time of Confucius) such as the Classic of Odes, where one can get sketchy information about the concerns and practices of the common people (Adler 2002, 17). This lack of exact knowledge should not lead us to conclude that popular religion did not play any role in Chinese society. As Fan Lizhu points out:

“Local religious practices and beliefs carried out by ordinary people in their daily life have long been the quantitative mainstream of the history of Chinese religions, and a fundamental support for traditional society, culture and moral values.” (Fan Lizhu 2003, 53).

For many years, the influence and importance of popular religious practices to the Chinese culture and people has been underestimated. Many western authors considered popular religion to be totally utilitarian, having as its only purpose to

⁴² Original text in Chinese: 为利益有情故, 忍受毁骂打击以及饥寒等苦, 所谓 难行能行, 难忍能忍, 终不放弃救度众生的志愿。

⁴³ Clearly, popular religion is a universal phenomena. All major elitist traditions have their popular versions. This applies inclusively to Christianity, Judaism, Islam and the Asian traditions. For an example of European Popular Tradition see: Ebertz, Miachel; Schultheis, Franz (ed.) (1986). *Volksfrömmigkeit in Europa. Beiträge zur Soziologie populärer Religiosität aus 14 Ländern*. München: Ch. Kaiser. For more detailed information on specific religious traditions see (Lovenstein, Steven; Fuchs, Ottmar et al. (2005). *Volksfrömmigkeit*. In: Betz, Hans Dieter; et al. (ed.). *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Mohr, Siebeck, pp.1171-1182). To understand Popular Religion in contrast to the elite see Jödicke, Ansgar (1999). *Elite*. In: Betz, Hans Dieter; et al. (ed.). *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, pp. 1223f.).

appease or placate a god for personal benefit (Kramer & Wu 1970, 2 / Tong 1988, 11). This view also reflected the idea that there was a clear barrier between the elite traditions, such as Confucianism and Daoism, and the religion of the ordinary people, which were deemed by many authors to be simplistic and inferior. Although we find some utilitarian aspects in popular Chinese religion, it would be wrong to reduce it solely to that aspect. Today, it is more and more clear to scholars that the barrier “between the ‘elite’ and ‘popular’ levels of Chinese culture was more porous than previously thought” (Adler 2002, 18). Throughout history, both levels had an important influence on the other. Often, the intellectual thought of the educated class reflected the basic worldviews of the average Chinese, and many of the Chinese peasants integrated Confucian principles in their value system⁴⁴. Keeping in mind that there is an underlying cohesion between the elite and the popular traditions, I will now point out certain distinct and specific interests and sensibilities of the popular tradition. The mutual influence of other Chinese traditions will shine through in several places.

SPIRITUAL WORLD

Chinese popular religion is often strongly localized, adapting itself to changing geographical and social factors. There are, however, several characteristics that appear to be common among nearly all of the various local traditions. One of these is the tendency to divide the spiritual world into three parts: gods, ghosts and ancestors. Popular religion is organized along the lines of *yin* and *yang*, in which *yang* refers to the realm of the living and *yin* refers to the realm of the dead. Gods are considered to be part of the *yang* world (as they are alive), whereas the realm of *yin* refers to the ghosts and ancestors (if they have not yet been deified).

All the creatures of the *yin* world (the dead spirits) and the *yang* world (the living spirits) are part of one natural order, making the world whole by their coexistence. Therefore, one should not consider the supernatural world as one that is separate from the world of the living, but rather as a part of the whole world. As we will see below, the division between gods, ghosts and ancestors correspond to social distinctions among the living, such as the distinctions between government officials, beggars or bandits, and family members (Adler 2002, 113). Below, I will discuss the various distinctions between gods, ghosts and ancestors.

In popular tradition, there are two kinds of gods (*shen* 神): *fu* (), the spirits of charismatic people (for example cultural heroes such as Confucius, or military heroes such as the God of War, Guandi), and *shi* (), the so called bureaucratic gods (see Wolf 1973). These gods often hold their positions only temporarily; they are local earth gods, city gods or kitchen gods in a specific household. Many of the *shi*- gods initially take the form of ancestors and are later transformed into gods. The highest god of the bureaucratic gods is the Jade emperor (Yuhuang Shangdi). Whereas the city gods have their own temples, the Jade emperor does not. As is the case on earth, ordinary people only very rarely address the emperor directly. It is important to point out that the official gods are part of a bureaucracy that corresponds to the old imperial bureaucracy established by the Chinese state. The city god is modeled after the local

⁴⁴ Again, this mutual influence is a universal phenomenon. The relationship between popular and official religion can vary a lot: Whereas in Hinduism those responsible for ascetic discipline (Brahmans) are part of the official Hindu religion, the Islamic Derwish, having the same function to perform magic rituals, are considered as part of traditional popular religion. Another possible relationship between official and popular religion can be seen in Catholicism, where often the lay people worship women and men, of which they are believed to have spiritual powers. The inauguration of these people in the catalogue of saints, then means the officialisation of such cults (See Krech, Volkhard (2005). *Volksfrömmigkeit*. In: Betz, Hans Dieter; et al. (ed.). *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, pp.1170f).

magistrate, who represented the emperor and had executive and judicial functions (Adler, 2002, 115).

Above, we have already discussed the meaning of ghosts, those spirits who have no one to conduct ancestor worship and therefore “lack proper roles in the social network and so are socially marginal, like the ‘beggars and bandits’ with whom they are often compared” (Adler 2002, 115).

A third category of spirits are the ancestors (*zuxian* 先). One doesn’t automatically turn into an ancestor after one’s death, but can only reach this state through a proper funeral and rituals. The difference between gods and ancestors is that, for one, gods have more power than ancestors and can influence not just a single family but a whole community. Also, gods are worshipped by many different people and families, whereas ancestors are venerated by only one family. Both gods and deified ancestors belong the realm of *yang* whereas the trouble-causing ghosts are considered part of the *yin* realm. The distinction between gods, ghosts and ancestors are not fixed; a ghost can transform into a god, and a family’s ancestor can cause trouble for another family and be therefore considered a ghost by the troubled family.

DIETIES

Chinese gods are all humanized in Chinese popular religion. This means that all gods have acquired biographies that describe their human life before they became gods, even those that weren’t real historical persons. For instance, some dieties are personifications of natural powers (wind, rivers, mountains). The dieties differ concerning their temporal and geographical relevance: some gods have been worshipped throughout China for centuries, while others are only known locally for a brief period of time.

The gods are only alive when they manifest themselves by showing their power (*ling*). “Any claim or attribution of *ling* that gains a certain public currency may result in deification” (Thompson 1995, 55). If there is no such ‘evidence’ of the power of a god, people lose faith in him and he might be forgotten.

I will now give two examples of gods in Chinese popular religion. The first is the already mentioned Goddess of Mercy, Guanyin, the most popular goddess throughout China. Another is the Silkworm Mother, a local goddess in a village in northern China. Both examples will illustrate certain typical aspects of Chinese popular religion.

Guanyin, originally a bodhisattva⁴⁵ called Avalokitesvara, was one of two assistants to the Buddha Amithaba. The worship of Guanyin (originally as a male bodhisattva) spread all over China through the popularity of the Lotus Sutra⁴⁶, which has a chapter dedicated to Avalokitesvara (Guanyin). In about in the tenth century, Guanyin started to shift from male to female⁴⁷. One of the reasons for this transformation is that the bodhisattva was often associated with childbirth, which stimulated her eventual assimilation to a fertility goddess. Guanyin became completely incorporated into Chinese popular religion, and over time her identity even became overlapped with those of other goddesses, including Mazu, who was thought to be an incarnation of Guanyin. Mazu was a young woman who died unmarried at a very young age. According to the legend, she developed spiritual powers towards the end of her life and was able to help fishermen survive storms. After her death this power became even stronger, and other fishermen started tell stories about Mazu saving their lives.

⁴⁵ See footnote 37, page 43.

⁴⁶ See footnote 35, page 43.

⁴⁷ For more details of this transformation see: Yu, Chun Fang (2001). *The Chinese Transformation of Avolokitesvara*. New York: Columbia University Press

Her fame grew and with it, her power (Adler 2002, 105)⁴⁸. Eventually, Mazu was considered a reincarnation of Guanyin who could help anyone who was in need. In this example we see how a living person transformed into a goddess, and how a local cult became merged with Buddhist beliefs.

The following description of the Silkworm Mother is based on a fieldwork study performed by Fan Lizhu (2003) in a Chinese village. The cult of the Silkworm Mother was very popular in areas such as Hebei, Jiansu, Sichuan and Zhejiang. Local believers say the Silkworm Mother was born 10 000 years ago in a village near Zhiwuying (Hebei). She helped solve difficulties and was able to cure and help families bear sons. After her death, the Silkworm Mother was responsible for protecting the silk industry, a traditional industry in China which was mostly performed by women. As we have seen in the example of Mazu, the powers of the Silkworm Mother grew with her fame, and it was later believed that she could protect people in all situations, not just connected to the silk industry. The cult of the Silkworm Mother was performed through many centuries, but was repressed during the Cultural Revolution. In the late 1970 the cult reemerged. A widowed woman, Mrs. Wu, from the village in Hebei, suddenly had a dream in which the Silkworm Mother talked to her, and told her that she was the reincarnation of the Silkworm Mother. At first the elderly woman did not dare to come out with her new 'identity'. However, when her own illness miraculously disappeared, a doctor sent one of his patients to her and that patient got better. After that incident, more and more people asked the old woman for help, calling her the Silkworm Mother. Her popularity spread to other villages, and the Silkworm Mother once more became an important deity in this region (Fan Lizhu 2003, 56ff).

Again, this second example shows how cults emerge, spread and reemerge through present time. It also shows how closely connected the world of gods is with the world of humans.

PRACTICE (RITUALS)

Practices in popular religion include the worship of ancestors and deities, funeral rituals, temple festivals of community renewal, divination, exorcism and many other rituals (Fan Lizhu 2003b, 450). In the case of the Silkworm mother cult, people visit Mrs. Wu and ask her for advice. In general, she tells them how to build an altar for the Silkworm mother in their homes, as well as how to burn incense and perform rituals in which people ask to receive healing or medicine directly from the Silkworm mother. For example, they are told to put a bowl with water on the altar and ask the Silkworm mother to add the medicine. Later they drink the water (Fan Lizhu 2003, 60).

Most practices of popular religion today consist of offering fruit or other food items and burning incense. Often, spirit money is burned; gods are given gold, ancestors silver, and ghosts copper. These practices should not merely be understood as "bribes". More accurately, they symbolize the principle of mutual obligation, or reciprocity (Adler 2002, 117). This sense of reciprocity reflects a basic aspect of the Chinese worldview:

" the assumption that things are defined by their relationship with other things. Gift exchange in Chinese society is the mechanism by which these relationships are affirmed, maintained and strengthened." (Adler 2002, 118)

⁴⁸ For a more detailed account of Mazu see Overmeyer, Daniel L. (1986). *The World as a Living System*. Long Grove Il: Laveland Press

This form of gift exchange is practiced with gods, spirits and ghosts in the same way that it is with other human beings. It implies that both sides are obliged to fulfill their obligations, meaning that not only do humans have the duty to worship gods and ancestors, but the gods and ancestors must ensure that the family/community is protected. If the gods and ancestors fail to keep their side of the bargain, the worshipper may turn to another god to worship. This mutual obligation is also one of the reasons why sacrifice is often closely connected to divination. While sacrifice or offerings acknowledge the higher status of the gods, divination is a means of receiving confirmation that the needs of the gods are satisfied and that they are ready to act in favor of the petitioner (Adler 2002, 23). Today, divination is often performed with moon blocks⁴⁹ or through spirit-mediums (as in the case of the Silkworm mother).

Whereas offering rituals are often performed in a private circle by a small group of people or even individuals, there are also rituals in popular religion that include the whole community. These rituals, however, have nearly vanished in the last century in mainland China, and are only slowly reemerging. One of these rituals is *jiao*, the “rite of cosmic renewal”, which has the goal of renew the relationship of a whole community with their local god. It is the same ritual we discussed in the chapter about Daoism (see page 37f). This ritual is generally performed by Daoist priests, but can be addressed to gods that are common in popular Chinese religion. Once more, we have an example of how popular religion is integrated into the other religious traditions; although we can separate them on paper, in real life they are tightly interwoven.

Another dimension of practice in popular religion are the many ‘pseudoscientific’ methods. The most popular of these sciences is *fengshui*, which constitutes a system of divination for determining the auspicious placing of human dwellings – both for the living and the dead. The basic idea is that people try to determine the workings of nature and to bring their own actions in accordance with them. Thus people may be able to improve their own fate (Thompson 1995, 19). The fundamental theory of *fengshui* is to decide on the place of one's home or the grave in regard to the functioning of *yin* and *yang* as expression of *qi* (breaths/energy). It is the goal to find a place where the vital breath (*qi*) is well kept together, and where it is protected from the wind and the flow of water which might scatter this vital energy before it can do any good (Eitel 1873, 48). At times whole cities in China were built in accordance with *fengshui* principle. This is not the case today anymore, but the idea of *fengshui* is still part of popular Chinese thinking. *Fengshui* is also a good example for the fact that what scholars of religion often call a ‘religious practice’ is not necessarily understood as such by those applying it. It happened to me several times that people told me not to believe in religion (using the term *zongjiao*), only to explain me the effectiveness of *fengshui* a few minutes later. As many popular beliefs *fengshui* has become such an integral part of Chinese thinking transcending different spheres that it is not perceived as something extraordinary but rather as a daily and even profane practice.

VALUE DIMENSIONS IN POPULAR RELIGION

Since popular religion is based on the Chinese worldview, it includes all of the features that are typical in Chinese thought: the teaching of the *dao*, *yin* and *yang*, the idea of cyclical transformation, the harmonious unity between nature and man, and the continuity and harmony of the family. In a sense, therefore, popular religion is an institution used to support the fundamental values of Chinese society. We have seen several examples where the religious beliefs reflect certain basic Chinese values, such

⁴⁹ Moon blocks are two small wooden crescent moons, about the size of knuckles. Each has a side that is round and one that is flat. During the ritual the blocks are dropped. It is said that if both flat sides land down, the gods are frowning, if the flats side land up, the gods are laughing, if one is up, one down, the gods are approving.

as ordering the gods in a way that corresponds to traditional Confucian society, or believing that all things can only exist through their relationship with others, as is seen through the offering rituals. This last notion clearly echoes the Chinese Buddhist interpretation of the teaching of “non-self”.

Another example of the reflection of basic Chinese values in popular religion is the ancestor rituals, giving religious form to a core institution (the family) of Chinese society. All of these aspects indicate that in many respects popular Chinese religion stands for the quest to harmonize life and all things. Popular religious rituals are a method to secure this harmony both in the spiritual world and in human society.

I would like to mention one implicit aspect of popular religion that might promote a value which is not so typical or generally observed in the Chinese tradition. This is the private aspect of popular religion. Although there are certain community rituals, much of the practice of popular religion is performed in private settings. As was already observed by Yang (1961):

“Temples and shrines as places of public worship were only one of the expressions of religious life of the people. Numerous religious activities did not take place in public. In a sense, every traditional Chinese home was a religious shrine, for it contained spirit tablets of the ancestors, and pictures and idols of many household deities.”
(Yang 1961, 16)

Fan Lizhu notes that “another important characteristic of Chinese popular religion has always been privatization”. Next to the fact that popular religion is often practiced in a private setting, there are some also other aspects which support the view that Chinese popular religion has a specific private and even individualistic notion. For example, one can point out that this individualistic streak is very present in popular religion through the worship of ghosts. (Weller 1994, 130-142). As Weller puts it:

“The very definition of ghosts rests on their existence apart from any normal social ties: They are the unincorporated dead, part of no larger social group. Requests to ghosts are uniformly individualistic.” (Weller 1999, 82)

As we remember, ghosts are those ancestors who have not been properly take care of and are often compared to the beggars and criminal in human society. They represent those that stand outside the society, that do not necessarily follow the laws and rules required to maintain harmony. We can therefore say that although in many respects Chinese popular religion is a fundamental institution for promoting traditional Chinese values emphasized by Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism, we can also find an aspect of individuality and privatization that is not as strongly present in the “official” religious traditions. This is probably one of the main reasons why the Chinese state has always been suspicious of cults that deviated from the officially accepted religious traditions, as we will see in the chapter below and when talking about religion in China today.

SUMMARY: VALUE SETTINGS IN CHINESE RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS

Confucianism: An essential Confucian value concept is li, meaning ritual propriety. The idea is that by always following li, life may become an ongoing ceremony. One always behaves the way one is supposed to based on one's status and position. An important aspect of li is the idea of xiao (filial piety), which defines the duties of children towards the parents. A more extended version of this hierarchical relationship is found in the 5 relationships between sovereign and subject, father and son, husband and wife, elder and younger brother, elder and younger friends. Although these relationships are strongly hierarchical, they do not only emphasize duties, but also responsibilities. Part of li is also the concept of ren (benevolence), which emphasizes charity, benevolence, love and compassion. This shows that in the Confucian value set, we also find virtues that strive toward the ideal of empathy and love for other human beings.

Daoism: Although Daoism sometimes supports the same values as Confucianism, its distinct focus on nature provides the Chinese intellectual and religious world with a different point of view. Whereas Confucian values are very active and often try to change given conditions and are focused on society, Daoism is focused on nature and emphasizes non-interference (wuwei), spontaneity (ziran), believing that adapting to the natural environment is the more effective way to harmonize the world.

Buddhism: Value concepts of Chinese Buddhism were strongly adapted to Chinese thinking, often meaning a reinterpretation of Buddhist thought. The idea of non-self was transferred to the idea of 'no self-existence', pointing to the importance of relationships: there is no single existence, everything exists only in relationship to the other.

Popular Religions: Through its ancestral rites Chinese popular religion strongly incorporates basic Chinese values, such as the importance of family, family hierarchy and reciprocal relationship. The fact that popular religion is mainly practiced in private, and the belief in ghosts, which are often seen as those not playing along the societal rules, add a private and even individualistic notion to its promoted values.

2.3 RELIGION AND POLITICS IN CHINA

As indicated in the introduction to the different religious traditions in China, a major aspect of religion in China is its close connection to politics. Many authors (Thompson 1996, Pas 1985, 1995, Roberts 2000, Adler 2002, Potter 2003) have emphasized that throughout Chinese history religious questions have always been closely connected to politics and vice versa. Jacques Gernet (1985, 105) points out that because the rulers “held total power over the organization of society and the universe, space, and time, it was not possible for religion in China to be an autonomous power”. An important aspect of this close connection between religion and politics is the so-called ‘mandate of heaven’ (see page 23), which legitimized the political ruler since ancient times. I will first take a closer look at this tradition, and with it the cult of imperial worship. I will then introduce the four types of connections between religion and politics, constructed by Julian F. Pas⁵⁰. These types will be illustrated with historical examples. The final paragraph will consider the question of whether there is independent (not state- controlled) religious life in China.

IMPERIAL WORSHIP AND THE MANDATE OF HEAVEN

It was quite common in ancient cultures around the world for the king or emperor to have an aura of divinity, making the line between politics and religion very unclear. In this respect, the ancient Chinese idea that the emperor was given his position by heaven is not unique. Yet, as Thompson points out, the mandate of heaven had a special quality to it:

“It (the Chinese version of the divine right) was qualified in such a way as to preclude the divinity of the ruling house. To put it in a word, what Heaven gives, Heaven could also take away. No man could establish himself and his line on the Dragon Throne unless he had been accepted by Heaven as the True King; but no dynasty could continue to be acceptable to Heaven unless its kings actually were True Kings.”(Thompson 1995, 70)

Heaven’s will was seen in whether or not the emperor could avoid or at least defeat any revolutionary movements. If a rebellion could successfully overthrow the reigning emperor and claim the throne for itself, it was obvious that the mandate of heaven was taken from the preceding emperor and was granted to somebody else. Thus, the ‘mandate of heaven’ did not suggest that the emperor himself was divine, but parted from the principle that the heavenly authorization could be taken from him and be passed on to another person. As this theory later was included into the sacred texts of the ‘Literati’, it could maintain his validity throughout Chinese history. Interestingly this theory also seems to implicitly approve revolution. This again forced the emperor to avoid any revolutionary movements by securing good life for his people, and fulfilling his responsibilities as a ruler. In addition to his ordinary responsibilities, the emperor also had moral and religious duties. In the Analects of Confucius it says:

Chi K’ang Tzu⁵¹ asked Confucius about government saying ‘What would you think if, in order to move closer to those who possess the Way, I were to kill those who do not follow the Way?’ Confucius answered, ‘In administrating your government, what need

⁵⁰ Julian F. Pas was a renowned specialist in Chinese religion, focusing mainly on Buddhism and Daoism. He was the editor Journal of Chinese religion.

⁵¹ Senior minister in the District Lu, held power from 492 BCE until his death in 468 BCE

is there for you to kill? Just desire the good yourself and the common people will be good. The virtue of the gentleman is like wind; the virtue of the small man is like grass. Let the wind blow over the grass and it is sure to bend'. (The Analects, XII, 19 transl. Lao 1979, 115)

This paragraph of the Analects shows to what extent the emperor (in the ideal case) is responsible for upholding moral standards among his people. His religious duty also mirrors the idea that the emperor's behavior is representative of that of his people. As the leader and representative of mankind, he was responsible for guaranteeing the harmonious relationship between nature and man. To do so, aside from the necessary administrative duties to ensure a functional agricultural system, the emperor had to follow the necessary rituals to offer his respect to the great powers of the universe (Thompson 1995, 70). In these rituals the emperor kowtowed in front of the altars of heaven and earth, declaring himself a subject of the great forces of heaven and earth, which also stood for the force of *yin* and *yang*. This show of humility by the emperor was the "ultimate sign of his legitimacy as ruler of the people" (Thompson 1995, 70). The emperor also performed sacrifices to his human parents and ancestors. Although these rituals may have been fancier than those of ordinary people, they were essentially the same. Both the rituals for the great forces of nature and for the ancestors exemplify that the emperor was not considered to be above everything else, but rather that he was given a special position and duty among men which was still dependent on greater forces.

THE 'OFFICIAL RELIGION'

Long before the teachings of Confucius became influential, there was a form of official religion. Archeological findings show that already in the late Shang Dynasty (?1751-?1111) there was an official list of deities that were worshipped, among them the supreme God, Shang Di, the God of Wind, the God of the six clouds, the God of the Moon and so forth. The same gods were also named in the government regulations of the Chin Dynasty in the 17th century. These regulations described a pantheon of gods and classified them into three ranks. The gods in the first two ranks were those that were already worshipped in the Shang Dynasty. The gods in the third rank became popular after the Han dynasty. These third-ranked gods often originated from local cults. As we have seen in the examples of Guanyin and the Silkworm mother, the position of these gods was due to their fame caused through deeds that proved their efficacy. Once officials approved of these gods, they were eventually recommended to the emperor who would, if he was convinced of the worthiness of the god, confer a rank and title on the spirit. The patronage of the emperor would result in the building of temples for the deity. Through this procedure a local cult could become part of the official religion (Thompson, 1995, 73).

The mandate of heaven, imperial worship and the procedure of officially accepting local cults all show the close connection between the Chinese government and its emperors to religious cults. The tie between politics and religion, however, did not only rely on the official imperial religion but also on the other religious institutions such as Buddhism and Taoism. These ties will be further discussed using Pas' (1989) model of the four types of connections between politics and religion in China.

PAS' MODEL OF THE FOUR FORMS OF CONNECTION BETWEEN POLITICS AND RELIGION IN CHINA

Pas' model tries to systematize the different modes of how religion and politics in China have been connected throughout history and in contemporary China. The first type of the connection Pas constructs is that of (1) 'legitimacy':

"Firstly religion was frequently used to establish royal or imperial authority, divine sanction, or divine legitimation of power." (Pas, 1989, 4)

The example of the mandate of heaven can be seen as an example of legitimacy of power: As long as an emperor could keep his throne, he could claim to be chosen by heaven to do so. He could thus rely on a great deal of respect and obedience from his people, as challenging the emperor might mean a challenge to heaven. Of course the whole idea of the mandate of heaven also depended on a common acceptance of a series of holy books which backed the belief. There are other examples of how emperors used religious justification to legitimate their power. The emperor Gaozu (r. 206-195 BCE)⁵² of the Han Dynasty, who favored Daoism over Buddhism, and feared that the latter might go out of control, claimed that his royal line was descended directly from Laozi. With this he tried to legitimate both his personal position and the one of Taoism (Roberts, 2000, 90).

When the famous empress Wu (r. 690-750), who favored Buddhism over Taoism, commissioned the carving of a 56-foot high Vairocana Buddha at the cave temple complex at Longmen, it is alleged that the features of the statue were those of the empress herself. Her support for Buddhism also brought her the approval of the Buddhist clergy. They claimed that the empress was the reborn Maitreya Buddha and that the mandate of heaven had passed to her. This double legitimacy (being the Maitreya Buddha and having received the mandate of heaven) definitely helped the empress to claim and receive power, as such a step was unusual for women. These examples show how religious beliefs were used to legitimate power, a pattern known not only in China but in all cultures up to present days.

The second type of connection Pas identifies might be called (2) 'expedient escape', where religion is used to shift attention from other political problems (Pas, 1989, 4). The Sung Emperor Zhezong (r. 1085-1100) can be used as an example. He claimed to have received divine revelations from the Jade Emperor⁵³, and with this claim he countered the loss of prestige incurred through his defeat in war against the Northern barbarians.

A third and probably one of the most common types of connection is the support of religious organizations (3) 'to ensure the sympathy and the cooperation of the masses' (Pas 1989, 4). An example for this mechanism can be the behavior of the founder of the Sui Dynasty, Emperor Wendi⁵⁴ (r. 581-604), who managed to unite China after four hundred years of division. Wendi had to furnish the newly established Sui

⁵² Gao Zu's birth name was Liu Bang. He was a man of peasant origin, who after the fall of the Qin dynasty (221-207 BCE) through his smart military and political measures gained sufficient allies to fulfill his idea of a moderate central state. He proclaimed himself emperor in 202 BCE, and named his dynasty the Han. He reigned until his death in 195 BCE:

⁵³ The Jade Emperor (*Yù Huáng* or *Yù Dì*) known formally is the ruler of Heaven and among the most important gods of the Chinese Daoist pantheon. From the ninth century, he was also the patron deity of the Chinese imperial family. The Jade Emperor rules over Heaven and Earth just as the earthly emperors once ruled over China. He and his court are at the center of a divine bureaucracy (mirroring that of ancient China) ruling over every aspect of human and animal life. The Jade Emperor is an important personality in Chinese Mythologies, and in certain creation myths is described as the creator of mankind.

⁵⁴ His actual name was Yang Jian, the name Wendi was given to him after he usurped the throne, meaning 'God of literature' or 'God of culture'.

dynasty (589-618) with an ideology to maintain its authority. Roberts describes the measures taken as followed:

“To assert his support for Confucian morality, Wendi arranged the offering of incentives to those whose conduct exemplified the Confucian virtues and in particular that of filial piety. With regard to Buddhism, which had been under attack under the Northern Zhou, Wendi went out of his way to present himself as an ideal monarch in the Buddhist sense, giving generously to Buddhist foundations, improving the condition of Buddhist clergy and promoting the acceptance of Buddhism as the common faith of the people.” (Roberts, 200, 81)

This example shows how Wendi showed support for both Confucian ideas and Buddhism, making sure not to anger anyone unnecessarily as he was aware of the possible destructive forces of both traditions if they weren't on his side.

Even when Buddhist monks challenged the emperor by stating that the monks did not owe any obedience to state or family and therefore denied tax payments, the emperors could not always react to this threat against their authority. Under the Northern Wei dynasty (386-534) during 446 and 452 and under the Northern Zhou dynasty during 574-578, there were several attempts to try to suppress Buddhism. Because Buddhism was so popular among the common people, however, and as the emperors mandate was dependent on the people's favor, these attempts were quickly revoked (Roberts, 200, 90).

A contemporary example of this use of religion can be observed in Taiwan, where it has become common practice for politicians to visit temples and offer incense as a part of their election campaign⁵⁵.

The fourth type of connection between state and religion could be labeled (4) 'religious counseling', where Buddhist and Daoist masters were chosen by the emperors as their counselors (Pas, 1989, 4). Through these positions the religious clergy could interfere in political and religious matters. In his position as chief astrologer under Gaozu, the Daoist priest Fu Yi was able to lead a rally against Buddhism and therefore influence (in favor of Daoism) the religious policy of the emperor.

A more extreme example of the interference of religious professionals in state affairs could be observed in the northern Song Dynasty (960-1127). The Song emperor Huizong, a devoted Daoist, appointed the Daoist monks Lin Lingsu and Zhang Jixian as his advisers⁵⁶. This cooperation had a rather disastrous effect, as the two monks cared much more about art and philosophy than about politics, and the emperor, a lover of art and philosophy himself, followed their example and neglected political duties. Soon after, the Song Dynasty was destroyed through the invasion of the Jurchen, a semi-nomadic Tungusic people (Roberts, 149).

Julian F. Pas' four different types of interaction between state and religion are based on a very functional level. They show the various ways emperors made use of religion to acquire legitimacy, distraction, popular support and advice. Although this functional approach to religion was surely followed by many of China's emperors, there have also been less rational and more personal reasons which influenced the relationship each emperor maintained with the various religious groups in China. If an emperor personally favored Buddhism or Daoism, these religious groups also could count on the emperor's support. Thus the fate of the religious groups could alter very quickly if a new emperor with different religious views took power, or if the emperor

⁵⁵ E.g. www.taipeitimes.com/News/edit/archives/2003/04/14/202038 dl: 9/02/2004.

⁵⁶ <http://www.eng.taoism.org.hk/general-daoism/development-of-daoism/pg1-2-5-1.asp> dl: 10/02/04.

changed his own beliefs during his lifetime. An illustration of this can be found in the early Tang period (618-907) and the reign of Gaozu. During his reign, he ordered a purge of the Buddhist clergy and reduced the number of Buddhist monasteries. When Gaozu's son, Taizong (r.626-649), came to power, he initially seemed to reverse his father's policy by overturning these orders. This policy, however, was not to last. In 637, 11 years after coming to power, he ordered the precedence of Daoist monks over Buddhist monks at all ceremonies. He also approved a law that prohibited both Buddhist and Daoist clergy to take part actively in public life and assigned severe punishment if they did. The objective of the law was to limit the influence of the monks in secular life and to make sure they stayed only in their monasteries and offered plainly religious services, with no direct impact on social life (Roberts, 2000, 91)⁵⁷. But this is not the end of the story. At the end of his life, Taizong was truly impressed by the Buddhist monk and translator Xuan Zang, who had traveled to India and gained extensive knowledge on foreign affairs. Taizong totally changed his views on Buddhism, accepting Xuan Zang as his mentor and authorizing the ordination of 18,500 Buddhist monks.

There is also the example of the empress Wu who had close connections to Buddhism. In this case it was a very personal affair which led to a shift in her religious policy. Empress Wu became personally involved with Xue Huayi, a former cosmetics peddler, and she made him abbot of a Buddhist monastery. The empress favored the Buddhist community at the time and ordered the construction of the Mingtang, or Hall of Light, a Buddhist pagoda in which wild religious rites were performed. The construction was supervised by Xue Huayi. When Xue Huayi fell out of the empress' favor, however, in an act of revenge he burned the pagoda. This incident provoked a shift in the empress' policy towards Buddhism, lessening her support and enhancing her patronage of Confucianism (Roberts, 95).

These examples show that the policy of the emperors towards religion weren't always just rational and functional, but also had more personal causes. They are also just another illustration of the extent of power the emperors had over religious life in China. In regard to the official state religion, the emperor was always a part of this religion. Although he could not claim divinity, he served as the necessary link between man and heaven. Without him, harmony between heaven, earth and the elements could not be assured. The institution of the state religion was not enough to prevent the building of the other big religious movements like Daoism and Buddhism, but the emperor's power was always enough to at least partly control these forces, or at least use them to his own advantage. Based on these observations Pas concludes the following:

“Within this context of an absolutist, totalistic world view according to which religion and the secular state were seen as one, it was unthinkable that any religion could be

⁵⁷ This situation might resemble to the duo sunt (two swords)- theory. This theory was introduced by Pope Gelasius I who, in 494, wrote a very influential letter to the emperor Anastasius, in which he established the dualistic principle that would underlie all Western European political thought for around 600 years. In the letter Gelasius expressed a distinction between "two powers", which he called the "holy authority of bishops" (*auctoritas sacrata pontificum*) and the "royal power" (*regalis potestas*). These two powers were considered independent in their own spheres of operation, yet expected to work together in harmony. In my view the Chinese case is somewhat similar, but it wasn't the religious power striving for this separation of power, but the state. Whereas in Europe the state was asked to stay out of all spiritual matter, in China the state asked the religious bodies to stay out of politics. A closer analysis of the differences and similarities between the power-sharing in China's past and the European Middle age would certainly be of interest, but I will not elaborate the question in this paper. For more information on Duo Sunt see: Kates, Philip (1928): *The Two Swords; A Study of the Union of Church and State*. Benedictine historical monographs III) St. Anselm Priory. Or: Charanis, Peter (1974). *Church and state in the later Roman empire: The religious policy of Anastasius the First, 491-518*. University of Wisconsin.

exempt from state control. Buddhism and Taoism failed to assert their independence; later Christianity did not fare any better.” (Pas, 1995, 325)

POPULAR RELIGION AND STATE CONTROL

This last statement of Pas must be questioned when taking a closer look at popular religion. As shown above, popular religion has often evolved and developed on a very local, sometimes even family level. Above, I described how certain religious activities never take place in public, but are instead restricted to people's private homes.

The gods worshipped in public temples did not always cover basic human needs, such as food, clothing, marriage, birth and death. These domains, therefore, were mainly dealt with in private religious activities in the home. Also, there was (and is) a vast number of myths about the world of spirits and gods, which are told among the people but have not been written down or controlled by any religious institution. China's imperial government never really could control this form of 'low-key' religious activity. When analyzing popular religious movements during the Ming Dynasty, Ownby makes a similar statement: "...in practice the state simply did not have the means to intervene in local practice on a daily basis." (Ownby, 2003, 4). This non-interference was mostly due to the impossibility of controlling all religious activities and not because the state did not care. The example of the Daoist inspired Yellow Turban insurrection has always been remembered by the various Chinese governments (Pas 1995, 315), and as a form of protection against such movements, the emperors ever after have been suspicious of all religious groups whose activity was outside the state controlled religious institutions. As a consequence, many of these gatherings were held secretly, regardless of whether their basic feature was religious or political. As long as these religious groups did not develop into major movements spreading over large parts of China, and thus did not raise the awareness of the emperor, they sometimes existed for years in their local environment. The Chinese state always tried to have as much influence as possible on religious matters and, in many areas had defining and controlling power over religious activities. However, although government policy prevented the establishment of strong independent religious institutions, the state was not able to totally regulate the personal religious life of the Chinese men and women.

There is one more aspect of religion and state in China that should be mentioned here. The state policy of binding religion closely to state affairs implied a general connection between politics and religion. I have already mentioned the sometimes secret religious groups. Although some of them remained purely religious, many also had political aspirations, such as the White Lotus Society (Ming and Ching Dynasty) or the Taping Revolution in the 19th century. Sometimes these political activities were actually the basis of the movement, but religious features were included to support their goals. By doing so, these groups used religion in the same way as the emperor did, to legitimate their task. An important aspect of this use of religion is the mandate of heaven. Natural calamities were understood as signs from heaven and that the mandate of the ruling emperor may be coming to an end. In such times religious-political groups could plausibly claim that the mandate was shifting, and found many adherents among the suffering population (Thompson 1995, 117). Thus the connection between religion and politics was not present just on a state level, but also in the forces who threatened the state.

This last aspect shows once more how strongly religion was integrated into other spheres, especially politics. A basic factor is the idea of the mandate of heaven, which had the function of legitimizing and maintaining power, but also could be used to justify revolutionary movements. This presence of religion in other spheres was

important because it prevented the total absorption of religion into the state, as its “privacy” was protected in the all-important institution of the family.

As we will see in the next chapter, the relationship between state and religion still plays a very important role in religion in contemporary China.

SUMMARY: RELIGION AND STATE IN CHINA

The Chinese state always tried to have as much influence as possible on religious matters and, in many areas had defining and controlling power over religious activities. However, although government policy prevented the establishment of strong independent religious institutions, the state was not able to totally regulate the personal religious life of the Chinese men and women.

A basic factor is the idea of the mandate of heaven, which had the function of legitimizing and maintaining power, but also could be used to justify revolutionary movements. The presence of religion in other spheres such as the community and the family was important because it prevented the total absorption of religion into the state, as its “privacy” was protected in the all-important institution of the family.

2.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA

2.4.1 Political Development during the Last 150 Years and its Influence on Religion

DOWNFALL OF IMPERIALISM - MOVEMENTS OF MODERNIZATION

The end of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century saw big changes in China. For many years, China was self-contained and considered itself to be superior to the rest of the world. At the end of the 19th century, this self-definition was challenged first by the western powers who all wanted a piece of one of the last pieces of uncolonialized land in the world, and second by the impact of modern science and technology. Unlike Europe, China didn't have time to develop slowly into a modern nation, but instead felt it had to move very quickly, as all sense of superiority was gone when they compared themselves to the advanced western nations.

Even before this outward pressure led to the downfall of the imperial systems, there were movements of modernization which had a strong impact on religion. In 1898 the Chinese scholar Kang Youwei⁵⁸ submitted a reform demand to the emperor asking that all temples in the country be confiscated and converted into schools. The demand was approved immediately by the emperor. This reform aimed to reinforce Confucianism as the only ‘State religion’⁵⁹, emphasizing its potential as a modern teaching based on education. Although this and other reforms were annulled by the empress Cixi a few years later, the idea was reawakened in 1904, when certain local officials confiscated temples to build a modern infrastructure including schools, police station and local administration.

⁵⁸ Kang Youwei (1858-1927) Chinese scholar who was a key figure in the intellectual development of modern China. When the reforms he proposed were annulled by the empress, he and 6 other reform leaders were executed he fled the country. To stabilize China's unity he didn't approve revolution and later also opposed Sun Yat-Sen.

⁵⁹ As a matter of fact it was during that time that the term “religion” (*zongjiao*) was first used in China. This signified that for the first time religion was considered as an independent institution and the intellectuals started to discuss about the role religion should have, and its relation to the state. The term *zongjiao* was originally synonymous with Christianity, and we can therefore assume that Kang Youwei's idea was influenced by certain European models of Christianity as a state religion.

While Kang Youwei's ideas aimed at transforming religion in China, many intellectuals later opted for total religious destruction. During this time the term *mixin* (迷信 'superstition') was first used, describing a negative attitude towards practices such as burning incense. If the intellectuals felt close to any religion it was Christianity, which they often considered to be superior to Chinese religion. There also was an opposite movement, however, which considered Christianity to be the religion of those intruders who deprived China of its national pride. This anti-western and anti-Christian sentiment was at its peak during the Boxer rebellion, a movement which was originally aimed at destroying both the Qing Dynasty and all foreign influence in China. The Boxers, or the "Fists of Righteous Harmony" as they called themselves, were a religious group which believed that they possessed magic powers which made them impervious to bullets and pain. To appease the masses the imperial court initially supported the movement, or at least did not oppose it. In the early 1900, however, Boxers roamed the countryside and attacked Christian missions, and the conflict came to a head when the foreign compound in Beijing was attacked. As we can see, this was an unstable time where movements in favor of and in opposition to various religious movements existed simultaneously.

In the end, the various modernization movements and critiques of the imperial system led to the revolution in 1911, in which the Republic was created.

Although revolutions are an important part of China's history, the revolution in 1911 is significant in that it, for the first time, changed not only the 'who' but also the 'how'. This is also true for the revolution that was to follow in 1949. "The twentieth-century revolution changed the actors, but much more important, they attacked the whole traditional system" (Thompson 1995, 135). And as religion was part of this traditional system it was affected greatly by this change of the political system.

REPUBLIC REGIME (1912-1949)

When the Nationalist government came into power in 1912, it made efforts to 'clean up' the superstitions of the popular religion. As with the dynastic regimes before it, the Nationalists considered the non-institutionalized forms of religion as a stumbling block towards reform. This led to attacks on monasteries and other religious sites, where statues and property were destroyed and violence was sometimes even used against the religious people (Gooseart 2003, 436). Christian groups (which at the beginning of the 20th century made great missionary efforts in China) also suffered some attacks, but as they were submitted to a special law that aimed to protect foreign religions, they were under less pressure. Still, there was serious resentment working against them as they were often "seen as agents of imperialism" (Pas 1995, 317). Gooseart insists, however, that pressure was far more intense for local religious groups:

"Local cults, on the contrary were considered as the incarnation of the old society and therefore had to be destroyed." (Gooseart 2003, 436 trsl. ik)⁶⁰

Although local cults were often hassled, there was also a contradictory tendency: the Chinese sociologist C.K Yang gives a detailed account of temples that were constructed throughout the republican area (Yang 1961, 342ff) and also mentions miracle stories which spread through the country during this time and were the baseline for emerging new local cults. These different accounts make it difficult to paint a general picture of the fate of religion after the 1911 revolution. What is clear is

⁶⁰ Original text in French: Les cultes locaux, en revanche, sont considérés comme l'incarnation même de la société ancienne et devraient être détruits..

that the period between 1912 and 1949 was chaotic and violent. Ongoing warfare also brought the destruction of many religious buildings and with it a part of the religious heritage of China⁶¹.

COMMUNIST ERA UNDER MAO

Ironically the system that was to ‘liberate’ China was inspired by the West: Marxism. Marxism basically departs from an atheistic worldview, although it cannot be said that a Marxist government would necessarily have to suppress all religion. But Marxism is not supportive of religion, and its theory states that religion should disappear automatically after a proletarian revolution, as it has no function in an egalitarian society. During the first period of its regime the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) did not have a clear or consistent policy towards religion. In general, however, religion was considered to be a waste of time and a feudal luxury, which could be a danger to national reconstruction if its values were opposed to Marxist and communist ideas. Thus the government was eager to actively assist the “natural process of its disappearance” (Pas 1995, 317).

Although freedom of religious beliefs was already marked in the first constitution of Communist China, the government quickly found another reason to oppress religion: the constitution clearly differentiates between religion and superstition. The only official religions are Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism. Everything else is superstition and therefore does not have to be protected. This had certain positive aspects for the officially accepted religions as national associations (e.g. the Buddhist Association of China) for all five religious groups were founded and allowed a national coordination for all religious activities. Yet the differentiation between superstition and religion (which had its roots in the republican era) was especially harmful not only for popular religion but also for Daoism. Daoism was

“regarded as a superstition without ethical foundations, a barrier to raising the cultural level of the masses, and a political danger because the secret societies associated with it had been the source of past revolts.” (Bush 1970, 383)

Many public places of worship were transformed for other purposes, and traditional festivals were altered to lose their religious meaning. The New Year festival, which originally referred to the age-old Chinese calendar, was transformed into “Spring festival”; the Qing Ming Festival, which focuses on remembering the ancestors by sweeping their graves, was changed into a national memorial day in which revolutionary martyrs were commemorated (Bush 1970, 410).

Even the protected religious groups were oppressed under Communist regime. Christians, particularly foreign missionaries, were accused of being agents of foreign powers. In 1948 there were more than 5000 missionaries in China, but by 1956 only 16 priests and 11 sisters remained, of which 13 priests were in prison (Bush 1970, 60f). Buddhism had to be treated a bit more carefully as it was of certain diplomatic importance (China had important ties with some Buddhist countries), but it was also under tight control of the government.

⁶¹ Scholars don’t seem to totally agree on how destructive this period was for China’s religion. On the one hand Gooseart (2003) emphasizes that destruction of religion during this time was immense, and that it would be wrong to blame the downfall of religion only on the communist regime that was to follow. On the other hand, some authors (e.g. Overmyer 1986, Pas 1995) consider the destruction and repression of religion under the communists much more systematic, whereas during the republic regime attacks on religion differed greatly between the regions and often wasn’t very coordinated.

While there were both ups and downs for religion in China during this first twenty years of communist rule, the Cultural Revolution (1966-1977) was disastrous for all religious groups. Under the banner of destroying the four “olds” (old culture, old ideas, old customs, old habits) students that were stirred up by Mao swept the country destroying everything that was a symbol for the pre-communist time, including temples, statues and books. In this chaotic time destruction didn’t stop with things but also included people; among them many religious professionals. Several authors support the hypothesis that in this ‘anti-religious’ time, the driving force was a nearly religious understanding of Communism and Mao in particular. The cult of Mao is often compared to a “state religion” (Thompson 1996, 138). Kipnis calls the emotional worship of Mao “an experience of the numinous” (Kipnis 2001, 38), which is a typical quality of religions. Even before the Cultural Revolution, Yan (1961) titles his chapter on Communism as “Communism as a New Faith” (Yang 1961, 378-404). After the death of Mao in 1976, however, both the teachings of Communism and the cult of Mao quickly faded away and disappeared.

After the Cultural Revolution ended, it seemed that there was no more traditional religious life in China. But as Pas rightly notes:

“While the storm lasted, religious life seemed to have expired. But the Chinese people are resilient: as soon as a storm was over, they started to rebuild.” (Pas 1955, 319)

REFORM ERA UNDER DENG XIAOPING AND JIANG ZIMIN

Nearly all authors that describe the state of religion in China from the 1980s on talk of a revival or reemergence of religion (MacInnis 1989, Ching 1993, Chan Hunter 1994, Pas 1995). After Deng Xiaoping took control of the Chinese government, he initialized drastic economic and social change. Political changes were more timid but “were accompanied by a revival of religion” (Pas 1995, 319). In 1989, MacInnis wrote that at present “quite a large number of people in China believe in religion” (MacInnis 1989, 40). Chan and Hunter talk of “phenomenal growth (of religion) in mainland China especially since the mid 1980s” (Chan & Hunter 1994, 52).

The reasons for this religious revival are not easy to grasp. One reason definitely is the fact that even though religion appeared to be dead for a certain period of time, religious ideas and the religious worldview never really disappeared. Thompson points out that although Marxism and other western ideas were discussed and welcomed by Chinese intellectuals, these ideas barely touched the most basic thinking of a vast majority of people. Therefore, the “native cosmology based on tao (dao), yin and yang, the five elemental operative qualities (..) were by no means swept away” (Thompson 1996, 136). As a result, when the Chinese government adopted a more tolerant perspective on religion the ground for a revival of religion was laid. An important step in this more tolerant policy towards religion was the Constitution of 1982, which (in regard to religion) is still valid today. In article 36 of the Constitution, people are promised religious freedom and that no one can force them to believe or not to believe in any religion. This article also assures that all “normal” religious activity is protected but that any religious activity that might disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational systems of the state is forbidden⁶².

⁶² Article 36. Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion. The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state. Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination (<http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html>, dl 22.04.05).

The document therefore is a “two-sided sword” (Pas 1996, 321), as it tries both to protect and to control religion. This back and forth between protection and control is typical of the Chinese government’s policy towards religion in China today. On the one hand, the Chinese government understands both the historical and also moral importance of religion, especially in a time where the moral implications of Marxism and Communism are no longer valid. On the other hand, the government is afraid of any movement that could be strong enough to challenge its authority. This fear of religion is evident in the reactions of the Chinese government to movements such as Falun Gong⁶³ or other nonofficial religious groups⁶⁴, where repressive measures are taken.

The government also uses official religious groups as a ‘moral backup’. In 1991 Jiang Zemin arranged a meeting with leaders from the protected religious associations to ensure their support for the government. He urged the leaders to

“firmly support the CCP leadership, support socialism (..) and insist on carrying out religious activities within the scope stipulated by the Constitution (..). (China Study Journal 6, April 1999, cit. in Pas 1995, 325)

These examples are typical of the government’s policy towards religion in China. Religion cannot be ignored, as its social impact is real and must be acknowledged, but it must also be tightly controlled. In the view of the government religion has both the potential for danger and opportunity; it could destroy their power but also provide legitimacy. This pattern is not new when analyzing the relationship between religion and state in China.

2.4.2 The State of Religion in China today

CURRENT LEGAL SITUATION

In regard to religion the constitution of 1982, and its basic assumption about the difference between religion and superstition are still valid today. The revival of religion observed since the 1980s has not stopped. Although statistical data is scarce, evidence of the reemerging of religion can be found throughout China.

During the last few years, nearly every aspect of communist and socialist China (except for the one party- system) has vanished, and China has adopted a harsh system

⁶³ Falun Gong is a movement founded in 1992 by Li Hongzhi. For two years the organization was part of the “China Qigong Scientific Research Society”, an officially accepted coordination group for Qigong. Its teaching is based on the writings of Li Hongzhi, promoting a certain form of meditation that harmonizes body and soul, and is based on a broader cosmology including the battle between good and evil energies. Certain Daoist and Buddhist ideas can be found in Li Hongzhi’s writings, but its references are not systematic. In 1994 the movement left this association and tried to be officially accepted by the Chinese government as a civil organization. After being rejected several times, they decide to adopt a very open organizational structure, which makes it nearly impossible for the government to control the movement. In 1999 about 10 000 people demonstrated in front of the government building Zhongnanhai, and asked for the total liberty to practice FG. A few months later the government started to arrest FG followers and declared the organization illegal. Accounts say that by the end of 1999 about 35,000 FG followers were arrested. The government enforces its campaign against the movement, both by oppressing it and by leading a “prevention” - campaign to warn all Chinese about the danger of the group. It is unclear how widespread the movement still is in China today. For more information about Falun Gong see: Fisher, G. (2003). Resistance and salvation in Falun Gong. *Nova Religio*, 6, 2, 294-311/ Lowe, S. (2003). Chinese and international contexts of the rise of Falun Gong. *Nova Religio*, 6, 2, 263-276 / Tong, J. (2002). An organizational analysis of the Falun Gong. *The China Quarterly*. 171, 636-660.

⁶⁴ Several human rights groups (e.g. Amnesty International/ Human Rights Watch/ Information Center for Human Rights and Democracy) regularly publish records about people being arrested or harassed by the government for illegal religious activity. The situation of Christians in China is regularly described in the German journal “China heute” (e.g. China heute XXI (2002), number 4-5 (122-123), pp.98-102/ China heute XXII (2003), number 1-2 (125-126) China heute XIII (2004), number 4-5 (134-135), pp.130-133/ China heute XXIV (2005), number 1-2 (137-138), pp. 2-5).

of capitalism, producing winners and losers. This situation has enforced the need for moral legitimacy for the Chinese government, as nothing much is left of the socialist ideal. The government now relies mostly on the idea of Nationalism, which is often backed up with reference to China's historical heritage and the values promoted by its tradition. Important values used by the Chinese government include stability and harmony, values that (again in the view of the government) are at the heart of the Chinese religious traditions⁶⁵ and are therefore likely to be propagated by the religious groups.

The idea of harmony is strongly emphasized through the new "regulations for religious affairs (宗教事物条例)" that became effective in March 2005. The official goal of these new regulations is to ensure the protection of religious freedom, the harmony between the religions, the stability of society and the management of religious affairs⁶⁶. The regulations don't have the status of a law, however, and therefore are not technically legal rights⁶⁷. These regulations do not specifically mention the five official religions, leaving open the possibility that these regulations may also be applied to other religious groups. Also, the regulations mention that national religious organizations may establish religious schools, but these schools must be approved by the government (Article 8 & 9). The regulations state that they may only be applied to 'normal' religious activity, but it does not clarify what is 'normal' and how it is defined. Again one can read this document with a critical point of view, pointing to its vagueness which is such "that anybody could find oneself on the wrong side of law" (Bequelin 2005)⁶⁸, or with an optimistic attitude, pointing out that this paper is evidence of the rising importance of religion in China.

That religion truly is of rising importance in China becomes even more clear when taking a closer look at the recent developments and present situation of the different religious groups in China.

CONFUCIANISM

Confucianism was under strong criticism for most of the 20th century. The 20th century revolutions both attacked Confucianism for being anachronistic and responsible for China's backwardness. Thompson considers Confucius to be "the most important casualty of these revolutionary ties" (Thompson 1996, 140). An important signal of the declining importance of Confucianism was the abolishment of the imperial examinations in 1905, which later was followed by a total reorganization of the educational systems with schoolbooks that were written in modern Chinese and no longer in the language of the Classics. During a brief period, the Nationalists tried to revive Confucian ideas as a counter to Communism, but they were not very successful. Still, during that time an important generation of Confucian thinkers established itself, among them the philosophers Feng Youlan⁶⁹ and Xiong Shili⁷⁰.

After the Communists took over, the Confucian worldview was considered part of the capitalist feudal system. Many scholars in classical Chinese traditions were accused of being counter revolutionaries, especially during the Cultural Revolution. An example

⁶⁵ About the importance of the word "harmony" in China's contemporary political landscape, see articles in *Courier International* Nr. 754 (14th to 20th of April), pp.34-39.

⁶⁶ See *Renminribao* 19.12. 2004, p.2.

⁶⁷ One could say the regulation is a sort of unofficial law. The interpretation of the document is not done by the court but by the government bureau for religious affairs.

⁶⁸ Article in "The Standard" February 18th 2005, <http://www.thestandard.com.hk/stdn/std/Focus/GB18Dh01.html>, dl. 24.04.05.

⁶⁹ Feng Youlan, 1895-1990, stayed in China during the rule of the CCP and was forced to rewrite his "history of Chinese Philosophy" so that it matched the Communist worldview.

⁷⁰ Xiong Shili, 1885-1968. His interpretation of Confucianism was strongly influenced by Buddhism.

was the famous historian and author Chen Yinke, who favored ideas published in articles by modern Neo Confucian scholars in the 1920s. : Chen Yinke was criticized as a counter revolutionary for his writings, but was later rehabilitated. This rehabilitation also shows the change the Communist regime has undergone concerning its attitude towards Confucianism. But long before Confucianism won back some appreciation in Mainland China, there have always been authors outside of the People's Republic in China who supported Confucian ideas and thought that they were well adaptable to modernity and could contribute to men's understanding of the world. In fact, these authors continued to contribute to the modern Neo-Confucianism that was started by thinkers like Feng Youlan and Xiong Shili. In his book "Reinventing Confucianism: The New Confucian Movement" Umberto Bressiani (2001) talks of three generations in the New Confucian Movement: The first generation was around Feng Youlan mentioned above, the second generation consisted of authors such as Tang Junyi⁷¹ and Xu Fuguan⁷². This second generation of authors published *A Manifesto to the World Concerning the Future of Chinese Culture* a "bold statement of the claim that Chinese culture, and particularly Confucianism had something to offer to philosophy and religion in global perspective" (Adler 2000, 111). The Manifesto talks about establishing Man as the ultimate creature but also emphasizes the importance of unconditional universal love and attaining total harmony with heaven. Bressiani groups the third generation of these modern Neo-Confucians around the Harvard professor Tu Weiming (see page 124) and Liu Shu-hsien⁷³. All of these authors surely made Confucian thought more accessible to the Western world, but for a long time their thinking had no influence in Mainland China (most authors of the second generation were based in Hong Kong or Taiwan). In the last 20 years, however, the attitude towards Confucianism has strongly changed inside China. Again the word 'revival' is appropriate to describe the development of Confucianism in the past few years. An article about Confucianism in the 1990s in China is even titled "Confucianism-Fever" (Lee 2001)⁷⁴.

In the past, Confucianism revealed itself both on a philosophical and a religious level, but "its modern manifestation is more an ethical philosophy than a religion" (Overmeyer 2003, 9). On this philosophical level, Confucianism is of major importance for today's China: The modern Confucian movement "has grown into a powerful social force involving approximately 10% of the intellectuals of mainland China" (Cha 2003, 482). Many of the intellectuals active in this movement are also part of the Communist Party, a sign that the Confucian worldview is no longer considered as being contradictory to the official party line. This intellectual movement presently even receives support from the Chinese Communist party and the government. The government actively supports different foundations that have as a goal to safeguard and promote Confucian heritage. In 2001, a bronze statue of Confucius was erected on the campus of Renmin University in Beijing (Cha 2003, 483). The government is also active in supporting the reconstruction and renovation of Qufu, the hometown of Confucius, and its Confucian mansions and temples. Whereas Qufu was of minor importance during Mao's regime, the city will now likely become

⁷¹ Tang Junyi (1909-1978). He saw Confucianism as being an ethic of responsibility informed by a transcendent vision, and understood the human being as a partner of heaven (See Tu 2001).

⁷² Xu Fuguan (1903-1982). Belonged to the rather conservative and anti-western wing of the New Confucians. He emphasized the importance of traditional values, often considering them superior to western values.

⁷³ Taiwanese professors. In Lie Shu-hsien's recent publications he emphasizes that we should learn from Confucius' attitude towards life, who fought all of his life for an ideal he knew he couldn't reach. Such an attitude was necessary for people in politics and economy. (See Liu, Shuxian (2004), *Essentials of Contemporary Neo-Confucian Philosophy*. Greenwood Pub. Group).

⁷⁴ Original in German: "Das Konfuzianismus -Fieber" im heutigen China.

a major center for Chinese culture. In 1993 the Confucius Culture Institute was established at the Qufu Teachers University, and there are plans for starting a Confucian Culture University in Qufu as well (Cha 2003, 482).

The Chinese government actively supports Confucianism partly for the same reasons that it supports religions in general; it understands its historical and moral value. Confucianism is especially helpful for the Chinese government because it emphasizes a morality that accepts certain hierarchical structures; it is indigenously Chinese and can therefore be used to reinforce feelings of Chinese nationalism; it has traditionally been relatively close to the government; and it has never constituted an organization of itself but has always looked for official integration into the state. This is different from Daoism and Buddhism, which often served as the spiritual basis for secret organizations working against the government. In general, Confucianism is helpful to fill the cavity caused by the destruction of traditional social values during the last 100 years.

Another aspect of Confucianism that may reassure the government is that although the modern neo-Confucian philosophy focuses on morality and ethical values, it is primarily concerned with culture and not with politics. To use the words of Cha in his article about Modern Chinese Confucianism:

“These neo-Confucian scholars’ distinction between politics and culture reveals characteristics of their views. Accordingly, they claim that issues of culture and ethics should be studied distinct from social and political order. According to these intellectuals, culture is related to issues of fundamental importance to humanity and the world, i.e. ultimate values such as ethics, morals and philosophy, and held not to be closely related to the political arena.” (Cha 2003, 483)

Understanding their task as cultural and not political, the modern neo-Confucian scholars try to develop a “general perception regarding the truth of the cosmos” (Zheng 1993, 95 cit. in Cha 2003, 487)⁷⁵ that is based on the unity between heaven and men. The writings of these modern neo-Confucian authors should be a contribution to “shape human souls and improve the state of life” (Cha 2003, 487). From this last remark we can presume that although modern neo-Confucianism is basically an intellectual movement it is not purely theoretical or historical; the search for the truth of the cosmos and the transformation of human beings shows that there is still a religious dimension to this movement. So although the religious dimensions are not dominant in modern neo-Confucianism, they are not non-existent either. It is actually quite possible that other religious dimensions such as the performing of rituals and the cult around the ‘saint’ Confucius will become more important in the future. The cult around Confucius is still very much alive in the Chinese Diaspora and in Taiwan, and it might return to Mainland China. Certain indications for this return could be observed in Qufu in autumn 2004, where many visitors burned incense and were praying in front of a statue of Confucius in the Confucius temple. I also observed a traditional funeral ritual of a member of the Kong family⁷⁶, who has the right to be buried on the Confucian graveyard. Internet-sites concerning Confucius now offer online mourning and funeral rituals, emphasizing the more spiritual aspects of this tradition and its close association with ancestor worship⁷⁷.

⁷⁵ Zheng Jia Dong (1993). *Modern Neo-Confucianism*, trans. Korean Institute of Philosophy and Thought. Seoul: Yemun Seowon.

⁷⁶ There still are many people in Qufu who claim to be related to Confucius. The 77th lineal descendant lives in Taiwan today, as he escaped the Communists 60 years ago.

⁷⁷ www.kongzi.com dl. 16.10.03.

A prognosis about the future of Confucianism is hard to make, as it will depend on the development of both the cultural and the political arena of China. What does seem clear is that the Confucian worldview is far from being dead; a tradition engraved so deeply in Chinese culture cannot be wiped out by just one hundred years of westernization, modernization or Communism.

DAOISM

We have seen above, certain rituals (e.g. the rite of cosmic renewal *jiao*) that might be considered part of Chinese popular religion are generally performed by Daoist priests. This close connection between Daoism and certain aspects of popular religion turned out to have a negative impact on the history of Daoism in the last hundred years: when popular religion was categorized as “superstitious”, Daoism also encountered skepticism by modernizing forces and the Chinese Nationalist government actively fought against it (Thompson 1996, 140).

Daoist priests belonging to the Zhengyi school (see page 35) traditionally do not live in monasteries but instead get married and live at home. Many of these priests were often confused with Shamans, which were not recognized by China’s intelligentsia at the beginning of the 20th century. The oppression of the Daoists worsened under the Communist regime: The Daoists were prohibited from performing any ordinations, and many of the temples were closed or even destroyed (see Lai 2003, 114f; Chan & Hunter 1994, 59f). When the head of the Zhengyi school, the 63rd Heavenly Master, Zhang Enpu (1904-1969) fled to Taiwan in 1949, his heredity was officially no longer recognized by the Mainland Daoists. The heredity still has not been restored in China. Zhang Enpu wasn’t the only Daoist priest who fled to Taiwan or Hong Kong. Many of those who stayed were severely persecuted by the state. As a result, the number of active priests was very small especially after the Cultural Revolution, and as no ordinations were allowed it looked as the tradition would vanish.

After the reign of Mao, China’s economic progress and its more tolerant policy towards religion allowed for a timid but steady revival of the Daoist tradition in mainland China⁷⁸. The economic boom also brought a nation-wide expansion of the tourist industry. This expansion directly led to the recovery of Daoist temples, which made a significant amount of money through tourism. This allowed for the restoration of the temples and the building of new statues, as most of them were destroyed during the Cultural Revolution (Lai 2003, 112). In 1989, after 40 years of absence, the first ordinations of Quanzhen⁷⁹ priests were performed. In this first round of ordination there were 75 ordinands. In the second round of ordinations in 1995, some 400 monks and nuns underwent the procedure (Lai 2003, 114). These ordinations were clearly only possible because the political situation in 1980 permitted the (re-) establishment of the National Daoist Association, first founded in 1957. It was the Daoist association which managed the restoration of the monasteries and coordinated ceremonies such as the ordination of priests. In his book about contemporary Daoism in China Li Yangzheng talks of around 1722 Daoist temples that were opened until 1996 (Li 2000, 185). To ensure the effective management of these temples, many regional Daoist associations have been founded. As of 1999, Chinese Daoist journals talk of 133

⁷⁸ The information of this chapter is mainly based on the Article “Lai Chi-Tim (2003). Daois in China Today, 1980-2002. In: In: Overmyer, Daniel L. (ed.). *Religion in China Today. The China Quarterly Special Issue*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 105-121, which gives a very detailed description of Daoism in today’s China. A good Chinese source is the book by Li Yangzheng (2000). *Dangdai daojiao*. Beijing: Dongfang Chubanshe, which was also consulted for this paragraph.

⁷⁹ One of the most important Daoist schools in today’s China, following the tradition of monastery priests.

regional Daoist associations in China (*Zhongguo daojiao*, 4, 1999, p.4 cit. in: Lai 2003, 110).

As implicitly mentioned above there are two main schools that play a major role in Daoism. One is the Quanzhen school, the school of total perfection, which adopted its style of monasticism and austerity from Buddhism. It is in these Quanzhen monasteries where many of the old Daoist traditions in meditation, medicine, and music have been preserved. Quanzhen Daoism is traditionally organized and structured through its monastic tradition, unlike the second important school in contemporary Daoism, the Zhengyi school. As mentioned at the beginning of this introduction to contemporary Daoism, Zhengyi priests are family men who perform services of local cults. Because such activities are harder to control and are still often perceived as superstitious traditions rather than religion, it took some time for the Daoist association to officially restore the ordination of the Zhengyi order. The school finally received official recognition in 1995 when the Nationalist Daoist Association issued a “Daoist certificate belonging to the Zhengyi school.” The rules associated with this certificate make it illegal to perform activities outside a Daoist temple or Daoist religious center (Lai 2003, 115).

This short assessment of the current situation of Daoism in China shows that although the Daoist tradition is still of minor importance in the religious landscape of China (compared to Buddhism) it has managed an impressive come back in the last 20 years. This despite the fact that the Daoists were and still are often associated with superstitious practices that do not enjoy the protection of the law and government. Of course there are also certain positive aspects to the close connection between popular tradition and Daoism. First, the Daoist worldview (the *dao*, *yin* and *yang*) is so deeply rooted in the Chinese way of thinking that even though the tradition has been oppressed for years, these ideas are far from being foreign to most Chinese. The same is true for the rituals performed in popular religion. These rituals are taught from one generation to others and are often performed privately; even the destruction of temples, statues and books did not extinguish this cultural inheritance. These rituals now reemerge naturally as people once more feel free to perform them. The circumstances are such that many of these rituals, if properly conducted, need Daoist priests⁸⁰. This large demand for priests has clearly impacted the revival of Daoism. Today the demand for priests offering such services is possibly still bigger than what the Daoist community can put forward.

BUDDHISM

At the beginning of the 20th century, Buddhism was relatively widespread in China and possessed a rather organized and institutionalized structure. This, however, did not prevent it from being significantly weakened both by modernization and Communism. Under the modernization movement Buddhism received criticism for its world-rejecting attitude, and many monks and monasteries were perceived as being corrupt and profiting from the ignorance of the simple people. The Buddhist scholars faced this criticism with two different methods. The more conservative response emphasized the importance of the basics in Buddhism⁸¹. The basic idea of this school was to go “back to the roots”, that is to focus on the core ideas of Buddhism. Such a

⁸⁰ For examples of the connection between popular religion and Daoist monks see Dean, Kenneth (1996). Daoist Ritual in Southeast China. In: Lopez, Donald S. Jr.(ed.). *Religions of China in Practice*. Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, pp. 306-326

⁸¹ For more information concerning the content and the representatives of this school see Birnbau, Raoul (2003). Buddhist China at the Century's Turn. In: Overmyer, Daniel L. (ed.). *Religion in China Today. The China Quarterly Special Issue*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 123-144.

response, was put forth by the pure land school. They considered the *yixin nian fo* (single minded concentration on Buddha) to be such a core activity. In Chan Buddhism the approach was quite similar as they emphasized the basic question *nianfo shi shei* (who is Buddha?), which actually corresponded to the question “who am I?”. This practices of course were not new, but

“ (...) the paring down to the singularity of practice as a core procedure within each cultivation tradition and the constricted range of practice options overall are particular characteristics of this era.” (Birnbaum 2003, 127)

While the first response really aimed to reduce the practice of Buddhism, the second influential school tended to extend it. The reformist and Buddhist lay practitioner Yang Wenhui (1837-1911) stressed that Buddhism was totally compatible with Western civilization and science. Yang believed that Buddhism should eliminate certain ‘superstitious’ practices and engage more strongly in society and social work. The Abbot Taixu (1890-1947) was a strong defender of Yang’s ideas, and in 1915 developed a plan for ‘The Reorganization of the Sangha’, which focused on social activism, such as building hospitals, orphanages and schools which combined Buddhist and secular teaching (Adler 200, 121). Taixu’s efforts were both encouraged by the National party and by Protestant missionaries, as they supported his rhetoric against superstitious practices and for social reforms (Birnbaum 2003, 129).

The support for this form of ‘Engaged Buddhism’ did not endure when the Communists took over the country. Although the Communist party accepted Buddhism more than any other religious groups, its existence was still only accepted under the condition of political subordination. Also, the 1950 land reform, in which private land was confiscated by the state, took away the economic base from the large monasteries. Many leading monks were labeled “landlords”, which often meant severe punishment for those affected. The pressure from the Communist regime “severely diminished the size of the clergy and numerous monasteries were destroyed or converted into factories and warehouse, schools or housing” (Birnbaum 2003, 132). The destruction of temples, statues and scriptures, as well as the persecution of religious people during the Cultural Revolution affected the Buddhists as much as every other religious group. The condition in China under Mao also led to a total disappearance of every kind of public lay activity⁸².

As with all other religious groups, the revival of Buddhism came in the 1980s as a result of the new state policy towards religion and the prospering economy. In fact, the situation of Buddhism nowadays seems to be so good that on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the China Buddhist Association, Master Yiching (Abbot of Fayuansi monastery in Beijing) talked of a “golden period for Buddhism” (Xinhua 25.09.2003 cit. in: Wenzel-Teuber 2003, 200). In general, we can say that the two schools of Buddhism (one emphasizing the basics of Buddhism, the other focusing on social activism) revived and are very influential in modern Chinese Buddhism. Both professional and lay activities have increased enormously in the last few years. Going to Buddhist temples to burn incense or perform other offering rituals has once more become a very normal and common activity for many Chinese people. The education of both lay Buddhists and monks seems to be very close to the Taixu’s plans: there is a nationwide network of Buddhist studies academies for monks and nuns that train both in Buddhist philosophy and in a wide range of other subjects (Birnbaum 2003, 134f).

⁸² The situation of Buddhism under Mao (especially during the first twenty years) is described in Welch, Holmes (1972). *Buddhism under Mao*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

This “golden period” of course has its specific features. Maybe not every Buddhist would totally agree to this assessment of the situation of Buddhism in Mainland China, as one of these features is the concept of Buddhism as a part of Chinese cultural and national pride, in which a sort of ‘patriotic Buddhism’ is promoted. The perception of the Buddhist tradition as a source for cultural pride made the government actively support the renovation and construction of Buddhist monasteries and temples. Also, the Buddhist Association of China has always been used as an instrument to promote political goals:

“ Through its contacts with Buddhists abroad, the Association carries on public relations work for the PRC government and engages in international diplomacy activities, its delegations act as government spokesmen abroad. It emphasizes the Chinese Buddhists apparently strong support for the government, thus providing legitimization, and provides a concrete example of the governments benevolent religious policy, which in turn acts as an affirmation of Communism.” (Pas 1989, 14)

To enhance the creation of a patriotic Buddhism, the government also tries to create patriotic Buddhist cult figures, such as the lay practitioner and Chairman of the Buddhist Association of China, Zhao Puchu. After his death in 2001, he was turned into a patriotic icon: his former house was renovated to become a memorial, statues were built, and conferences were held in his honor. In memorial festivities, Zhao was called a “superb patriotic religious “ who was an “example of all Buddhists in China” (Wenzel-Teuber 2004, 11). All of these activities were initialized by central government institutions. Another example of Buddhism as a possible political instrument is the cult around the holy Buddhist mountain Wutai shan, where both Tibetan and Chinese forms of Buddhism come together and are actively practiced side by side. An official Chinese newspaper called Wutaishan as an important symbol of national unity (Guanming ribao, 21.09.2004, cit. in: Wenzel-Teuber 2004b, 202).

Next to the political importance of Buddhism as a cultural heritage, there is also the economic importance of Buddhism: Buddhist mountains, temples and monasteries have become strong tourist attractions in China. The touristy attractiveness of a city or region can be significantly increased through the restoration or rebuilding of temples and statues for tourists. Buddhist tourism has become a lucrative income source both for regional governments and for the monasteries themselves, although most of the monasteries have to render a great part of their income (through entrance fees for the monasteries and donations) to the local government. The dependence between the government and Buddhist monasteries is reciprocal; although Buddhists are theoretically subordinate to the government, the government must have favorable relationships with local Buddhist communities to keep the tourist business flourishing⁸³. There are, of course, critics of the close connection between tourism and Buddhism, as it is partly seen as a threat to real Buddhist activities like meditation and devotion to Buddha. It is also criticized that believers must pay entrance fees to temples and that the temples are flooded with tourists who turn the temples into a busy market place. This situation is especially serious in famous monasteries such as Shaolin, where monks can hardly find a place to meditate among all the tourists (Wenzel-Teuber 2004, 202). Buddhist voices opposing the commercialization of Buddhist temples are getting louder, and some are also speaking out against the interference of local politicians in internal monastery affairs (Wenzel-Teuber 2005, 6). Time will show whether Buddhism will provide an alternative for people living in a

⁸³ The new relationship between monasteries and government is analysed in Zhe Ji (2004). Buddhism and the state: Increasing number of believers bring great changes to the monastice economy in China. *China Perspectives*, 55, pp. 2-10.

harsh capitalist system, or if it will become a part of the system itself. It is also not yet clear how successful the efforts to create a patriotic Buddhism will be, as there are a wide range of Buddhist activities which are not coordinated or sanctioned by the government, but are rather developed out of the need for people to reactivate past traditions which have been suppressed but not forgotten.

POPULAR RELIGION

In describing popular religion above, I mentioned some contemporary examples of popular religion such as the worship of Guanyin and the story of the silkworm mother. Again, it is quite impossible to get an overall picture of the state of popular religion in China; its form is too particular and local and, by definition, not controlled through any central institution. What we can say is that popular religion, as with all other religious movements, is experiencing a revival. From the beginning of the 20th century through Mao's reign, popular religion was probably attacked the most of all religions. Not only was it defined as "superstition" and received no support or protection from any regime, it was often actively oppressed. On the other hand, popular religion often managed to escape state control, as it was always part of family life and traditionally cults spread not through organized religious activities or scriptures but through oral transmission. Although the official attitude toward popular religion has not changed (it is still mainly considered "superstition") certain cults seem to be more tolerated than a few years before⁸⁴. Based on fieldwork in 600 villages in Southeast China, Kenneth Dean concludes that popular religion "has revived with great force" (Dean 2003, 32). This revival can be observed not only in the private sphere but also in public spaces:

"In some areas, the networks of village temples have formed a second tier of local government, providing services, raising funds, and mobilizing entire communities to participate in collective ritual." (Dean 2003, 32)

In addition to the revival of traditional cults and the worship of popular deities, there is also a growing interest in traditional methods of meditation and breathing, such as *qigong*. It was this interest in *qigong* which started the Falun Gong movement. As we have seen in the case of Falun Gong, although such movements may become very popular they are not always tolerated, and the Falun Gong, with its high level of organization, was quickly perceived as being dangerous and consequently persecuted severely.

As government policy towards popular religion continues to be repressive, we might say that its revival is not so much due to the change in the political situation but rather to the change in China's economic situation. The market reforms and open economic structure facilitated the emergence of healing practices combined with spirituality rooted in Chinese traditional religion. This positive economic environment for those offering such activities met a great demand on the consumer side. Many people suffered a lack of medical care through the withdrawal of state funds and general services which had previously been provided for through ones work unit and that were now privatized⁸⁵. This situation meant a drastic rise in consumer demand for healing

⁸⁴ A certain shift in attitude can also be observed among Chinese intellectuals doing research on Chinese religion. While they used to refer to such cults as "feudal superstition", they now use the term „popular religion“, often treating the subject of research with respect and as a part of China's cultural heritage (see Overmeyer, Daniel (2001). "From "Feudal Superstition" to "Popular Religion": New directions in Mainland Chinese studies of popular religion. Cahiers d'Extreme-Asie, 12, pp. 104ff).

⁸⁵ In Communist China before the reform era, the work unit, called *danwei* in Chinese, was of major importance. It was through the *danwei* that party and government officials controlled the social, political, and economic

methods alternative to western medicine. The combined healing methods of east and west are strongly rooted in Chinese society. We can therefore say that the economic possibilities, economic shortcomings and tradition “fuelled the explosive growth of healing sects” (Chen 2003, 201). Another important reason for the reemergence of popular cults and the *qigong* movement is that through the recent economic changes many people have been deracinated from their familiar environment. Whereas during the communist era it was often the work unit that replaced the family, this form of social organization has become less important during the last few years. Also, millions of people have been forced to move around to find work, and often end up in unfamiliar cities without any social network. *qigong* and other groups then offer an informal way of belonging (Chen 2003, 200). But it is not only the economic insecurity that drives people to reactivate traditional cults and beliefs. In her fieldwork in the booming city of Shenzhen, Fan Lizhu observed that with a rising economic standard there is a rise for spiritual concerns. Interestingly, to deal with these concerns

“Respondents in Shenzhen turn not to state recognized religious institutions, but to resources within their common cultural heritage. They embrace these traditional resources not as revival or regression, but as means of moving forward. Rather than simply repeating past patterns, they select particular beliefs and practices that resonate with present experience. And in an authentic spiritual response, they adapt these themes to their current circumstances”. (Withead & Whitehead 2003, 8 (article based on fieldwork material from Fan Lizhu))

In the citation above there is an additional aspect worthy of note: even though we talk in terms of a revival of popular religion, this “revival” also means “change” or “evolution”. When traditional cults reemerge their significance and form often changes to adapt to current needs and situations. This flexibility is an important characteristic of Chinese religion. And as we will see below, is even characteristic of Christianity in China despite the fact that Christianity traditionally is rather dogmatic and slow to change.

CHRISTIANITY

When introducing Chinese religions, I did not mention Christianity. Although Christianity has been present in China for a quite a long time, it is not perceived as one of China’s traditional religions or value systems. Nevertheless, it is a fact that Christianity is present in contemporary Chinese society and, when surveying modern China’s religious landscape, cannot be ignored. An understanding of Christianity in China will contribute to our greater understanding of contemporary Chinese religiosity, and will surely be useful when analyzing results of the empirical survey presented in chapter 7.

The first personal and intellectual link between Europe and China originated from the efforts of Catholic missionaries in the 16th century⁸⁶. A very prominent figure among

behavior of residents. The *danwei* typically controlled the allocation of housing, grain, edible oil, and cotton rations; the issuance of permits to travel, to marry, and to bear or adopt children; and permission to enter the army, party, and university and to change employment. In today’s China, the *danwei* lost some of its original importance, as people changes jobs more often in a market economy and many new laws actually minimize the control area of the *danwei*, as it is seen as a hindrance to the economic development of China.

⁸⁶ Historical records claim that the Nestorians (‘church of the east’, as opposed to the Roman church, which entered China in the 7th century. Historic proof of this early Christianity in China is the Nestorian Steel, which documents the existence of Christian communities in several cities in northern China and that the church had received recognition by the Tang emperor Dezong. The steel was unearthed around 1623, and is now displayed in Xi’an. A wave of persecution in the ninth century and the fall of the Tang Dynasty in 907 caused public Christianity to vanish for some time in China. Nestorians appeared again in the wake of Mongol invasion and trade, but did not develop into a significant religious tradition and today has totally vanished from the Chinese religious landscape.

these missionaries was Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) who even presented himself in front of the Chinese emperor after eighteen years of trying (Horner 1997, 41). Ricci and his colleagues were later known as “accommodationists,” as they “believed that much of inherited Confucian wisdom and ritual was consistent with Catholic teaching” (Horner 1997, 41). This view came under pressure both through the skeptical attitude towards Catholicism of the Manchu dynasty who followed the end of the Ming area in 1644, and the attack from Rome against the universal views of the Jesuits. In 1724, the emperor prohibited Catholicism, naming it a “perverted sect” (Horner 1997, 42). In 1742, the ‘rites controversy’⁸⁷ resulted in a papal bill that prohibited Catholics from participating in Confucian rites, such as ancestor worship. This development clearly was not favorable to the spread of Christianity in China, and the Catholic community never exceeded half a million.

Western and Christian influence on China began in the mid-nineteenth century. As trade relations increased, the right to practice Christianity and to proselytize became part of the treaty system between China and western nations⁸⁸. It was during this era that many Christian missionaries, Catholic and Protestant, entered China. They were partly successful in their efforts to convert Chinese people, yet the Christianization still was rather slow relative to Africa or Latin America. Also, the movement experienced several set backs through anti-western movements in China in the second half of the 19th century. The beginning of the 20th century was marked by the anti-western and anti-Christian Boxer rebellion (see page 60f), which caused many missionaries to leave China. Nevertheless, both the Protestants and the Catholics experienced a rather vigorous growth in the first 30 years of the 20th century (Bays 2003, Madsen 1998 & 2003). Certain intellectuals especially welcomed the Christians, as they also initiated the process of modernization of China. With the Christian missionaries came western techniques and culture; Christian missionary schools were the first to introduce modern Chinese education, Christian hospital brought western medicine, and Christian newspapers initiated something akin to a modern media system. Missionaries also successfully introduced the seven-day week and monogamy, and through their efforts the practice of binding women’s feet slowly was abandoned. It is clear that Christianity played a very important role in the early phase of China’s modernization. To quote the Chinese sociologist Gao Shining :

“During the phase of the beginning modernization of China Christianity in China played an active role, without being aware of it, many missionaries functioned as matchmakers in this encounter between China and modernity.” (Gao 2002, 124)⁸⁹

The difficulties for the Chinese Christians came with the start of the Communist regime. At the beginning of the communist era (1949-1956), all religious groups had

For more information see: Li Tang (2004). *A Study of the history of Nestorian Christianity in China and its Literature in Chinese*. Peter Lang.

⁸⁷ See footnote 19, page 26.

⁸⁸ China considered this treaty system to be unfair and referred to it as the ‘unequal treaties’. The ‘unequal treaties’ began with China following the First Opium War. China's defeat treaties with Britain opened up several ports to foreign trade while also allowing Christians to reside and proselytize in such open ports. In addition, in the case of crimes foreign residents in the port cities were afforded “trials” by their own consular authorities rather than the Chinese legal system (a concept termed extraterritoriality). China considered these treaties “unequal” because in most cases China saw itself as being forced to pay large amounts of reparations, open up ports, cede lands, and make various concessions to foreign “spheres of influence.” For more information on the treaties and on the significance of the expression ‘unequal treaties’, see Dong Wang (2005). *China’s Unequal Treaties: Narrating National History*. Lexington Books.

⁸⁹ Original text in German: “In der Phase der beginnenden Modernisierung Chinas spielte das Christentum in China eine aktive Rolle, und viele Missionarinnen und Missionare nahmen dabei- bewusst oder unbewusst- so etwas wie die Rolle von Heiratsvermittler an.”

to work actively to liberate China from its imperial system. This marked the beginning of Chinese Christianity- all foreign missionaries were forced to leave the country, and patriotic Chinese Christian associations (Catholic Patriotic Association/ Three self patriotic Movement and China Christian Council) were founded.

These associations were abolished during the Cultural Revolution and then re-established during the reform area of Deng Xiaoping. As with all other religious groups, the reform era brought new life to the Christian movement and in the last 20 years Christianity has developed faster than ever. This is true both for Catholics and for Protestants, but it should be noted that the Protestants developed much faster. It is difficult to know for sure how many Chinese Christians there are today, but it is estimated that there are about 10-12 million Catholics (Madsen 2003, 163) and over 20 million Protestants (Hunter & Chan 1993)⁹⁰. Both the Protestant and the Catholic churches have official and unofficial 'versions'. For Catholics there is an organized underground church loyal to Rome, whereas the official Church has had to separate itself from Rome as the Chinese government. This is because China would not allow any foreign interference in religious affairs (such as the nomination of a Bishop) and there are no diplomatic ties between the Vatican and China because the Vatican is the only western state that officially recognizes Taiwan as a nation⁹¹. Although there is no such problem on the Protestant side, there are still several Protestant groups who criticize the patriotic and submissive attitude of the official Protestant church and have organized their own services or religious meetings. Unlike the Catholic underground church, the unofficial protestant movement is not very organized, and the different groups act independently from each other, mostly meeting in locally organized home churches. These unofficial groups repeatedly come into conflict with the government, but members are often very engaged and willing to face discrimination and harassment in order to practice their religious conviction⁹².

Today's Chinese Christianity is strongly shaped by the rupture between the rural and urban forms of Catholicism and Protestantism. It is estimated that around 80% of the Christians in China live in the countryside (Gao 2002, 177). In certain areas whole villages are Protestant or Catholic, and religion is part of the identity of the people living in these places:

"Indeed, in many Catholic villages, especially in those relatively closed to the outside world, a Catholic identity becomes almost identified with such familistic relationships. Some villagers may be "true beliefs" and others "lax", but even lax Catholics can never completely lose their identity. At the very least, they will have to buried with catholic rites, in order to maintain a connection with their ancestors." (Madsen 2003, 171)

The rural Protestant and Catholic churches have many commonalities: the churches are very pragmatic, focusing on ritual, personal experience and worship. The theological level of sermons in rural churches is often basic and simple, with a focus on stories of personal healing rather than biblical theology or exegesis. Often, rural Christian faith is strongly connected to popular religion or takes the form of popular religion (Gao 2002 180; Bays 2003 189, Madsen 2003, 171). This connection between

⁹⁰ Some estimates go far beyond 20 millions depending on whether they include members of unofficial house churches. See Bays, Daniel (2003). Chinese Protestant Christianity today. . In: Overmyer, Daniel L. (ed.). *Religion in China Today. The China Quarterly Special Issue*. Campridge: Campridge University Press, pp. 182-198.

⁹¹ For more information on the underground Church see Madsen, Richard (1997). *China's Catholics: Tragedy and Hope in an Emerging Civil Society*. Berkely: University of California Press, pp.42-45.

⁹² Mostly American Christian association and human rights groups gather reports about these Christian house groups and accounts of persecution of these movements. See e.g. <http://www.worthynews.com/christian-persecution>.

Christianity and popular religion might lead to a total enculturation of Christianity, similar to the way Buddhism has adapted itself to the Chinese context. Although there are an impressive number of Christians in China today, it is still a rather marginal religion in China; only the future will show how deep it will enter the sphere of popular religion in China⁹³.

The mutual influence of Christianity and popular religion is less evident in urban Christian churches. While the Christians in rural areas often are uneducated and over 50 years old, Christians in big cities such as Shanghai are often young and well educated (Gao 2002, 178). Further, Christians in rural areas are generally quite poor, while urban Christians are often quite well-off and successful entrepreneurs (Bays 2003, 195). Urban Christians seem to have higher demands of the priest and the church in general, a demand which was not totally met by the church until recently, as good educational programs are still rather rare (Gao 2002, 179).

This absence of well-educated professional church workers should not lead us to the conclusion that there is no intellectual consideration of Christianity in China. In fact, the case of Protestantism shows that rather the opposite is true where there has been a “Christianity upsurge among the Chinese intellectuals” (He 2003, 131). This intellectual approach towards Christianity among urban Chinese intellectuals, however, is not related to the increase of Chinese Christians, most of whom live in rural areas. Although the two developments happened concurrently, there is no mutual stimulation (He 2003, 131). The approach of the Chinese intellectuals is not necessarily that of a believer, but often is that of a researcher interested and fascinated by his research object. The American history professor and expert on Christianity in China, Daniel H. Bays, referred to these intellectuals as “cultural Christians” (Bays 2003, 192), who consider Christianity to be helpful in China’s economic and social development:

*“Some (of these intellectuals) believe that Protestantism was centrally involved in the overall process of modernization that fuelled the economic development, political democratization and world-wide expansion of the West in the past few centuries. Others have found Protestant ethics and patterns of community formation interesting or attractive. Some intellectuals have actively advocated China’s adoption of some aspects of Christianity as part of its own modernization efforts, and a certain number of these intellectuals have themselves become Christians.” (Bays 2003, *ibid.*)*

The Chinese philosopher He Guanghu (who himself belongs to that group of intellectuals strongly interested in Christianity) also explains this interest in Christianity through the fact that many intellectuals growing up in China from the 1950s to 1980s experienced an immense gap between what they were taught in school and university and what they saw and heard in real life (He 2003, 133). Other than those who experienced the revolution and the first years of the People’s Republic of China, many of these intellectuals had a cynical attitude toward the official teachings of Communism and Socialism. When the first Christian books became available to Chinese intellectuals in the 1980s, they found a form of “spiritual nutrition” they were looking for. To cite He Guanghu once more:

⁹³ A famous example of Christianity being at the roots of a popular religious movement could be observed during the Taiping rebellion of 1850-1864. The Taiping rebellion was aimed against the Manchu Dynasty. Its political creed was strongly influenced by elements of Christianity, but in its form the movement resembled typical Chinese religious societies who managed to mobilize the masses of farmers to fight against the government. See also: Boardman E. P. (1952) *Christian Influence upon the Ideology of the Taiping Rebellion*; Shih, Vincent Y. C. (1967). *The Taiping Ideology: Its Sources, Interpretations and Influences*. Washington: University of Washington Press; Corrin, Jay et. Al (1991). *Modernization and Revolution in China*. New York: Sharpe.

“Christian thought on various important issues seemed to many intellectual so novel, attractive, rich and penetrating, becoming something good, at least worth of studying, from having been something bad at most deserving to be despised. An obscure and formless monster turned out suddenly to be an angel with quite acceptable, even desirable, though still strange face and form! One can imagine how interesting, even exiting it was to them!” (He 2003, 133)

This fascination for Christianity led to a strong increase in published articles and books about Christianity by Chinese intellectuals: from the late 1980s until today, around 2000 articles and 200 books on Christianity were published, compared to 8 articles and 2 books from 1949 to 1978 (He 2003, 134). Other than the Christians in rural areas who are interested in Christianity on a very personal level, emphasizing the personal relationship to God and the personal experience of spiritual and physical healing, the interest of the intellectuals is often motivated by the concern for the social and spiritual condition of the Chinese society. This mentality of Chinese intellectuals to “take the world as one’s own task” is deeply rooted in the Confucian tradition. We can therefore say that although this cultural Christianity might not be as syncretic as some of the rural forms of Christianity, its form is still strongly influenced by Chinese tradition. Knowing the history of Confucianism as the tradition of the literati, this Confucian understanding of Christianity is not surprising. There are diverse judgments as to the importance of Christianity in today’s China. Bays writes that Protestantism is “thoroughly rooted in Chinese society” (Bays 2003, 196), and Madsen is convinced that the “Catholic Church is a vital presence in China today” (Madsen 2003, 163). On the other hand, Gao thinks that Christianity is still only a “marginal phenomenon of the Chinese society”, which so far has “not had any real impact on China’s development” (Gao 2002, 181)⁹⁴, and Adler assumes that Christianity’s potential for growth is limited, as popular religion will be the much stronger force (Adler 2000, 124). Regardless of how the different religions in China will develop in the future, it is indisputable that religion has had an important revival in the last twenty years, and that all efforts to erase it from Chinese society, although having a certain impact, did not manage to completely wipe out Chinese religious traditions and their values. The example of Christianity as a rather new religion in China also shows that the religious field is developing and changing. Nevertheless we can already in its young history see that there is a Chinese Christianity, which embraces both ‘foreign’ Christian values and inherited Chinese traditions. To exemplify this last observation and to conclude this chapter I’d like to add the following anecdote:

A Chinese woman belonging to a rural underground church, was asked by a journalist why she was ready to take the risk of being persecuted and harassed for belonging to a foreign religious group. The woman answered that the risk was well worth it. Before she became a Christian she wasn’t a balanced person at all. The *yin* inside her was very strong and dominant and she was a very sad and angry person. But now Jesus has helped her to get *yin* and *yang* back in balance, and she can lead a much better life (NZZ, 08.01.01).

⁹⁴ Original text in German: “Deshalb meine ich, dass das chinesische Christentum noch immer am Rand der modernen chinesischen Gesellschaft und des gesellschaftlichen Lebens steht. Wenn man wollte, dass das Christentum in China als kulturelles Wissen breite Akzeptanz fände, wäre es nötig, dass das Christentum einen entscheidenden Beitrag zum historischen Prozess in China leisten würde.”

SUMMARY: THE IMPORTANCE OF RELIGION IN CHINA TODAY

One can surely talk of a religious revival. This is mainly true for Buddhism but also for Protestantism. In the case of Buddhism authors talk of a 'golden age for Buddhism, because it is generally accepted by the government and very popular among many Chinese.

The road is harder for Popular religion and Daoism, that are both often connected to 'superstition', which other than religion, does not enjoy the government's protection. But also these religions are on the rise.

The revival of Confucianism (actively encouraged by the government) so far is mainly a philosophical and cultural one, but there are indications that also Confucian rites, featuring religious aspects, enjoy more and more popularity.

CHAPTER THREE HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINA



Workers on a construction site in the Shanghai Biological Garden, Spring 2004

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3 HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINA

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter also referred to as the Declaration) was created by the United Nations in 1948 and is of major importance in today's world. In a world with many different value orientations and infinite shades of gray, human rights often are the smallest possible denominator between people and nations. A vast majority of countries have formally adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and a considerable part of foreign politics between countries is led by or done in the name of human rights. Human rights are generally accepted as being universal, applying to every human being regardless sex, age, race or nationality. Human rights are attributed to individuals and therefore necessarily assume a certain amount of individualism. Human rights are also based on an egalitarian worldview, as everyone has the same fundamental rights.

The history of human rights is very much based in the West, particularly in Europe. Although they are characterized as being universal to all living beings, the debate as to whether human rights really are a universal concept or if they are simply a colonial product of the powerful European countries and the US, is very much alive today.

In the first part of this chapter I will trace the most vital steps in human rights history, take a closer look at what human rights are and stand for, and discuss their contemporary significance. I will also touch on the debate as to whether human rights are universal or rather a product of European and Christian thinking. In the second part, I will focus on the subject of human rights in China. This includes a section about the notion of 'rights' in Chinese history, and the importance of the human rights issue in contemporary China.

3.1 DEVELOPMENT AND SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS

3.1.1 A Global History of Human Rights

EARLY HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS

The term 'human rights' is rather new, having become part of everyday language only since World War II and the founding of the United Nations. Human rights history, however, starts long before that. Although the expression was not used at the time, the concept of human rights can be traced back to antiquity; the basic idea that human beings have certain rights and the power to rationally define what is right and wrong, can be found in Hammourabi's Code⁹⁵, in the Hebrew bible⁹⁶ and in Greek antiquities⁹⁷.

One of the first documents that comes close to a human rights declaration was the Magna Carta, written in 1215 by English people living in France who revolted against their king (King John). The Magna Carta established for the first time the constitutional principle that the power of the king could be limited, and that the king

⁹⁵ Code of law issued by the prestigious sovereign of Mesopotamia in the 8th century BC. The code consists of about 280 articles and had the goal of creating a law that hindered the strong's ability to suppress the weak. It was specifically designed to protect orphans and widows.

⁹⁶ For example, the notion that human beings are built in the image of god (Genesis 1, 27) can be understood as the source for the concept of human dignity. See also 3.1.4.

⁹⁷ We could say that Socratic thinking (using rational argument to justify every political attitude) contains the perspective to oppose authority (see Haarscher 1987, 50). Platoon and Aristotle emphasize the idea that the perfect order lies in nature and thus prepared the ground for the idea of the natural law (see Ferry & Renaut 1985, 55f).

too had to respect certain basic laws. The Magna Carta was never considered to be a human rights declaration, but rather the practical solution for a dispute between the king and English barons who considered that the king was abusing his power. Nevertheless, it contains certain aspects of what human rights have come to signify today, including the right for every free man to get lawful justice before being held a prisoner,⁹⁸ and the basic notion that no one, not even the king, stands above the law⁹⁹. We can accordingly understand the Magna Carta as a historic ‘forerunner’ of human rights. It was not until the 17th century that the idea of human rights, at that time referred to as ‘natural rights’, gained ground. The scientific achievements during the 17th century and the Enlightenment era encouraged both the belief in natural law and the concept of a social contract. The idea of a social contract parted from the principle that the king’s position is valid only as long as he lives up to his obligations under natural law to protect his subjects. This belief in natural law was based on a growing confidence in human reason. For this development, the writings of the English philosopher John Locke were particularly vital. Locke argued that certain rights “self-evidently pertain to individuals as human beings, because they existed in ‘the state of nature’ before humankind entered civil society” (Burns, Weston [1992] In: Steiner & Aston 2000, 325). These self-evident rights included the right to life, liberty and property. The shift in political theory from basic organizational questions (e. g. taxation) to wider concepts such as liberty and equality, combined with an attack on the king’s absolute power, led to the transformation from natural law as duty to natural law as a right. Thus, “the foundations of modern human rights were truly laid” (Devine & Hansen 1999, 18). Locke was followed by the 18th century French philosophers Montesquieu, Voltaire and Rousseau, who shared supreme faith in reason and attacked religious dogmatism and social-economic restraints (ibid.). In their view, any human being, “solely by the virtue of his potential ability to exercise rational choice” (Sidorsky 1979, 90) had certain natural rights. These natural rights mostly consisted of ‘negative liberty’, in which the individual had the right to be protected from any invasion against his liberty. The concept of natural rights did not yet contain the notion of positive liberty, which would guarantee every individual “to achieve its purposes or ideals” (Sidorsky 1979, 90). It is important to note that under the philosophy of natural rights, these rights are derived from the order of nature and are not a historical or sociological product.

This intellectual movement had great influence on the western world in the 18th and 19th century. It supported popular revolutions in France and Britain, as well as the independence movement in the United States. These revolutions resulted in several documents that constitute the basis for our contemporary understanding of human rights: the English Bill of Rights in 1689¹⁰⁰, enforcing the rule of law; the American Declaration of Independence of 1776¹⁰¹, declaring the ‘self-evident truth ‘that all men are created equal’; and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789¹⁰², insisting that ‘men are born free and equal in rights’. The latter is definitely the most outspoken document regarding the equal rights of men, and comes very close to the

⁹⁸ Article 39 of the Magna Carta made ‘habeas corpus’ common law. ‘Habeas corpus’ is Latin for ‘you may have the body’. It is a writ which requires that a person detained by the authorities be brought before a court of law so that the legality of the detention may be examined. For more details see Freedman, Eric M. (2003). *Habeas Corpus: Rethinking the Great Writ of Liberty*. New York: New York University Press.

⁹⁹ Medieval English kings did not respect the Magna Carta, and it only regained significance in the 17th century when it was repeatedly used to solve problems between the king and the parliament. The Charta served as an example for other constitutional laws, such as the United States Constitution. For more information on the Magna Carta see: Breay, Claire (2002). *Magna Carta. Manuscripts and Myths*. London: British Library Publishing.

¹⁰⁰ For full text see http://www.constitution.org/eng/eng_bor.htm, dl. 23.05.05.

¹⁰¹ For full text see <http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/document/index.htm>, dl. 23.05.05.

¹⁰² For full text see <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/rightsof.htm>, dl. 23.05.05.

contemporary understanding of human rights. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man identifies the natural rights of man as the right to liberty (including free speech, freedom of association, and religious freedom), property, safety, and resistance to oppression.

These early human rights documents all legitimized their necessity by referring to natural and god-given law. These natural rights were conceived in absolutist terms, by definition not leaving any room for relativism or conditionality. It was this absolutist quality of the natural law that later made it especially vulnerable to both philosophical and political attacks. Some (e.g. the English conservatives Edmund Burke¹⁰³ and David Hume¹⁰⁴), who wanted to keep the status quo of the stratified society, feared that the idea would stimulate social unrest. Others (e.g. Jeremy Bentham¹⁰⁵) considered the idea to be misleading, as it pretended that all men were equal - a condition simply not true in real life. Other philosophers, jurists and historians of the 19th and 20th century (John S. Mill, John Austin, Ludwig Wittgenstein) also criticized the idea of a “natural law” such that, “by World War I, there was [were] scarcely any theorists who would or could defend the ‘rights of Man’ along the lines of natural law” (Weston Burns 1992, 325).

Although the initial sources for human rights were not undisputed, the idea of human rights itself endured and, in the 20th century, grew to have worldwide significance.

THE CREATION OF THE DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

In 1933 the French delegate to the League of Nations, René Cassin, opted for internationally recognized standards to protect “humanity and the rights of people comprehensively” after he heard accounts of how Jews were treated in Germany. At this time, however, the League of Nations adhered to the principle of non-intervention in the internal matters of a state, and decided not to condemn Germany or take any other action. It was only after the horrifying experience of World War II, when the states founded the United Nations, that the principle of non-interference was called into question. The United Nations Charter actually declared the protection of human rights as one of the UN’s task:

“The United Nations shall promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” (Article 55c of the United Nations Charter)

The UN did not incorporate a bill of rights into their Charter, but rather assigned its Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to “make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all” (Article 62, 2 of United Nations Charter). In 1946, the ECOSOC established the Commission on Human Rights. The Commission included 18 members representing a diversity of nations: Australia, Belgium, Byelorussia, Chile, China, Egypt, France, India, Iran, Lebanon, Panama, Philippines, Ukraine, UK, US, Uruguay, USSR, and Yugoslavia. The Commission included very prominent members such as the founder of the French human rights movement René Cassin, Charles Malik of Lebanon, and Eleanor Roosevelt of the United States. China was represented through Chang Peng Chun, a philosopher, playwright and former professor at the Nankai University, who was elected vice chairman of the Commission. The Commission

¹⁰³ Edmund Burke (1729-1797), British statesman, parliamentary orator and political thinker, played a prominent role in major political issues from 1765 to his death, and was an important figure in history of political theory.

¹⁰⁴ David Hume (1711-1776), Scottish philosopher and historian, one of the most important figures in the Scottish Enlightenment.

¹⁰⁵ Bentham, Jeremy (1748-1832), London based philosopher, one of the founders of Utilitarianism.

decided that the UN stance on human rights should take the form of a declaration exerting moral and political influence on UN member states, but which would not constitute a legally binding instrument.

To help the Commission of Human Rights draft such a declaration, the UNESCO sent out a questionnaire to scholars and philosophers from all over the world to “study the various rights traditions, including Chinese, Islamic, Hindu, American, and European worldviews on human rights as well as their customary legal perspectives” (Ishay 2004, 219). They received 70 responses from European, American, Arab and Asian scholars, including Mahatma Gandhi and the Chinese philosopher Chung-Shu Lo (see Maritain 1949)¹⁰⁶.

Based on these comments, the UN Commission created a draft Human Rights Declaration¹⁰⁷ in 1948, which was adopted in the same year by the General Assembly as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Of the 56 UN member states, 48 states voted in favor of the Declaration. Eight states abstained the vote, among them South Africa, Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union (Steiner 2000, 138f). The Commission on Human rights intended that the ratification of the Human Rights Declaration, which was not legally binding, would lead to a more legally binding human rights convention¹⁰⁸. As the cold war grew more and more intense, however, “human rights movement was buffeted by ideological conflict and the formal differences of approach in a polarized world” (Steiner 2000, 139).

The human rights conflict spun around whether or not there should be one covenant which included both civil/political rights and economic/social rights, or whether two covenants were needed, because only civil and political rights were of an absolute, enforceable character whereas social and economic rights could only be progressively implemented depending on the resources of the state. Those opting for a separation of the two covenants finally prevailed. After a long drafting and amendment process, two principle treaties emerged. In 1966, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)¹⁰⁹ and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)¹¹⁰ were approved by the General Assembly. These basic human rights documents (the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two covenants) were later followed by regional human rights documents including the American Convention on Human Rights (1969), the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights (1981), the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) the European Social Charta (1961), and finally the Arab Charter of Human Rights (1994). The Arab Charter has not yet been ratified by any Arab nations¹¹¹. The only two regions that do not currently have their own regional human rights documents are Australia and Asia. The German professor of international law Christian Tomuschat, explains the lack of an Asian declaration through the lack of cultural homogeneity in Asia (Tomuschat 2003, 34). For one, many of the Asian states have a competing relationship (e.g China and Japan). Second, Asia is divided by the different religious tradition of its peoples.

¹⁰⁶ Comments and interpretations are collected in this symposium report edited by Maritain. Maritain/ Unesco (ed.) (1949.). *Human Rights, Comments and Interpretation: A Symposium*. London: Wingate.

¹⁰⁷ A Declaration is a document of standards the signing parties agree on but it is not legally binding.

¹⁰⁸ A Convention (synonymous with ‘treaty’ or ‘covenant’) is a binding agreement between states. “Conventions are stronger than Declarations because they are legally binding for governments that have signed them. When the UN General Assembly adopts a convention, it creates international norms and standards (...). Governments that violate the standards set forth in a convention can then be censured by the UN.” (Shiman David, *Economic and Social Justice*, <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/hreduseries/tb1b/Section3/hrglossary.html> dl. 15/08/05).

¹⁰⁹ For full text see Appendix 10.1.2.

¹¹⁰ For full text see Annex 10.1.3.

¹¹¹ For more information and commentary see: An-Na’im (2001). *Human Rights in the Arab World: A Regional Perspective*. *Human Rights Quarterly* 23, 701ff and Mahiou (1998). *La Charte arabe des droits de l’homme*. In: *Mélanges offerts à Hubert Thierry. L’évolution du droit international*. Paris: Pedone

Tomuschat (2003, 34) is quite certain that, because of these factors, there will never be an Asian human rights declaration. Although not a human rights law document, the declaration of Bangkok, issued in 2003, might contradict this pessimistic view, as the conference produced a joint statement on human rights issues which was signed by all present Asian states (see page 104f).

3.1.2 What are Human Rights?

The term ‘human rights’ is familiar to everyone and is often used in everyday language. Most of the time, however, those using the expression have very different understandings and ideas of what it means. This next paragraph will provide an introduction in how human rights are structured and defined in the Universal Declaration and in the two human rights covenants (ICCPR & ICESCR).

One of the main drafters of the Universal Human Rights Declaration, René Cassin (1972), identified four pillars of human rights: dignity, liberty, equality and brotherhood. These concepts are the basis of the three types of human rights: Dignity and liberty lead to civil and political rights; equality leads to economic, social and cultural rights; and brotherhood is applied to the so-called third generation of rights that apply to whole populations.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains all three types of rights. The civil and political rights aimed at protecting the individual are captured in the first nineteen articles of the Declaration. These rights are related to personal liberties, such as life, security of one’s person, and protection against cruel treatment such as torture, and to certain collective activities, such as freedom of assembly and freedom of religion. These civil and political rights represent the demands that were fought for during the Enlightenment (Ishay 2004, 18). In most cases these civil and political rights, also referred to as ‘first generation- rights’, are negative rights; they enjoin states to abstain from actions that interfere with the personal freedom of its citizens. To guarantee freedom of speech, for instance, the state may not control and censor the press; to guarantee religious freedom, the state must simply omit all actions that hinder people from freely practicing their religious beliefs. As a matter of fact first generation rights aim to minimize the state’s influence into the personal life of an individual.

“They (civil and political rights) are rightly considered the core of the defense strategy against arbitrary use of power by governments.” (Tomuschat 2003, 27).

Articles 20 to 26 of the Declaration address the second type of rights championed during the industrial revolution: economic, social and cultural rights, such as the right to work and the right to receive social security and education. These rights are also called ‘second generation- rights’ or ‘positive rights’, as they imply a certain amount of action on the part of a state to guarantee these rights. For instance, the right to an education implicitly obliges the state to provide a nationwide educational system.

Third-generation rights, which focus on rights associated with communal and national solidarity, peace and development, are captured in articles 27 and 28. These rights were advocated throughout the post-colonial area and are still an important topic of contemporary discussion, as the rights to development and to a healthy environment are on the top of the agenda of both governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

While the first two groups of human rights are anchored in the ICCPR & ICESCR, legally binding covenants, there is no legal proposition for the third generation rights. There is the Declaration on the “Right of Development” issued by the UN General

Assembly, but, as mentioned above, declarations are not legally binding. The difficulty of these third-generation rights is that they can only be enforced on a long-term scale and, as is the case with certain social and economic rights, their implementation strongly depends on the resources of a state or community.

It is important to note that although the international community agreed on the two covenants of rights, the status of these covenants is subject to ongoing debate. The official position taken by the UN is that the two covenants on Human Rights are

“universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis” (Vienna Declaration, paragraph 5 in: Steiner, Aston 2000, 237).

As Henri J. Steiner and Philip Aston point out, this formal consensus only “masks a deep and enduring disagreement over the proper status of economic and social rights” (Steiner, Aston 2000, 237). One position is that social and economic rights are superior to civil rights, as there is no use in having political freedoms when one has to fear starvation. The other side argues that economic and social rights do not really constitute rights as they may allow large-scale state intervention into free market-economy and therefore provide an excuse to downgrade the importance of civil and political rights. The U.S. has often applied this argument; in the 1980’s the U.S. considered the idea of social and economic rights to be solely a tool for repressive governments to ignore political rights, and therefore omitted all discussion of those rights from its focus. China, on the other hand, sought to downgrade civil and political rights on the grounds that when people live in poverty, priority should be given to economic development. As we will see below, China’s position has somewhat weakened recently, but the focus on economic rights is still an important argument in the Chinese human rights discussion.

The majority of nations are less extreme in their positions; although they might favor one or another set of rights, they agree – at least in theory - that all three sets of rights coexist and support each other. In this view, the use of the term ‘generation’ for the three groups of rights is not adequate, as it is by no means true that the new generation makes the older generation obsolete. The different rights only make sense when they coexist. This notion is not opposed to the fact that there are certain differences between the various groups of rights. These differences are most obvious in the field of implementation. Whereas civil and political rights can be enforced by a judicial or quasi-judicial system, these measures are inappropriate for the vindication of economic, social and cultural rights, which are strongly context-dependent (a state with no funds cannot reassure work for everyone). Therefore the ICSECR (International Covenant of Social Economic and Cultural Rights) does not in general formulate individual rights but mainly duties which must be fulfilled by states to assure the rights of the individuals. As Tomaschet puts it:

“In sum, some of the social rights guaranteed in the ICSECR, in particular the right to work, remain essentially (binding) guidelines for the implementation at national level rather than genuine individual entitlements.” (Tomaschet 2003, 47)

3.1.3 The Significance of Human Rights in Today’s World

Despite these discussions about which human rights are more important, and although some of the basic questions concerning human rights (e.g. are human rights universal, god-given and eternal or a relative, historical and cultural product?) remain unanswered, the issue of human rights has become very influential both in

international and national politics and economics. Today, the idea of human rights embodies probably the only universal moral consensus in a globalized but highly differentiated world. At the same time, human rights are repeatedly disregarded and violated around the world, and their implementation is an extremely difficult task.

It is primarily the task of individual nations to enforce and monitor human rights within their borders. International bodies such as the UN Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights are also instruments to monitor the implementation of human rights. The efficiency of these international bodies is rather low, however, and the international community has a hard time forcing the application of human rights on unwilling states. The platform that has been most successful in enforcing and strengthening human rights is interstate relations. Many states have declared human rights as an important principle in their foreign policy, most particularly the European Union (EU) and the world's only superpower, the U.S.

In the introduction to its external policy, the EU states that it “respects and promotes the universal principle as laid down in the Universal Declaration”. Human rights are of major importance both in its internal relationships among member states and in its relationship with countries outside of the EU:

“The European Union is also bound by its one declarations on respect for human rights which, (...), are an essential part of its international relations and a cornerstone of European co-operation. (...). Since the early 1990s, the EC (European Commission) has included more or less systematically a so-called human rights clause in its bilateral trade and co-operation agreements with third countries (...).” (The EU's Human rights & Democratization Policy¹¹²)

We find a similar agenda in U.S. foreign policy. A statement issued by the U.S. Department of State on the occasion of Human Rights Day 2004 defines Human Rights as a “cornerstone” of American foreign policy:

“The promotion of human rights and democratic practices is a cornerstone of the United States Government's foreign policy. Supporting democracy not only promotes such fundamental American values as religious freedom and worker rights, but also helps to create a more secure, stable and prosperous global arena in which the United States can advance its national interests. (...) Thus, the United States is committed to keeping human rights issues at the forefront of our international agenda.” (U.S. Department of State, Human Rights Day 2004¹¹³)

In this spirit of promoting human rights, the U.S. Department of State compiles encyclopedic annual reports on countries around the world, reports that often get unsympathetic response from states that are criticized in these reports. Similar reports are issued by NGOs such as Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International. But while NGOs can only hope to influence UN actions and international diplomacy, the U.S. and the EU are both economically and politically influential enough to take direct actions against countries violating human rights. Unfortunately economic and political interests influence the human rights policies of both of the U.S. and the EU: The human rights issue is applied selectively, and double standards prevail in the international human rights discussion. Recent history has shown that the use of the human rights argument by one state to criticize another state can actually be very destructive. The strong stand for human rights by western powers such as the U.S. and the EU also often leads to the view of human rights as a purely western and therefore

¹¹² http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/intro/ dl. 15/08/05.

¹¹³ <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/c13573.htm> dl.15/08/05.

Christian concept. The question of the adequacy of this perception will be discussed below.

3.1.4 Human Rights: A Christian and Western Concept?

As we have seen in section 3.1.1, the idea of human rights can be easily traced back in European history. Although the most ancient sources, like Hamourabi's Code and the Hebrew Bible, were not created on European ground, their ideas strongly influenced European thinking.

The more recent history of human rights shows that laws resembling today's Universal Declaration of Human rights could first be found in Europe and the U.S.. This observation, however, shouldn't lead to the hasty conclusion that the idea of human rights can only be found in European history and that it basically is a Christian idea.

THE INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS IDEA.

Some authors consider the Bible and the Judeo-Christian tradition as a primary source for human rights (e.g. Cassin, Hessen, Stackhouse). One supporter of this view is the American theologian and ethic professor Max Stackhouse, who states that the "deepest roots of human rights are found in the biblical conception of life" (Stackhouse 1984, 31). In this view, human rights are considered an integral part of the Christian faith since basic human rights features such as *universalism*, *equality* and *individualism* are represented in Christianity: Christianity is *universal* because its religious credo applies to all men regardless their nationality or race. Because human beings are believed to be created after the image of God, they are therefore *equal* among themselves and before God. *Individualism* can be found in the idea that every human being is personally responsible for his deeds before God, an aspect that has been strongly emphasized by the reformist forces of the church. Thus, on one hand we have the perception of Christianity as the source for human rights. Conversely one might argue that human rights emerged in a time when people were growing critical of religion and the church. The Enlightenment movement promoted the belief in natural law and human reason, as opposed to the Christian ideal of a humble and obedient man who accepted his fate. From this point of view, human rights can be seen as an alternative to Christian thinking and the teachings of the Church. The creation of the first real human rights charta, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, came at a time when people were questioning Christian faith and proclaiming the absolute liberty and independence of mankind¹¹⁴. These ideas were strongly rejected by the Catholic Church, and in 1971 Pope Pius VI¹¹⁵ called the idea of equality among man "inanis", nonsense. Later, pope Gregory XVI¹¹⁶ and pope Pius IX¹¹⁷ also strongly criticized the ideas promoted by human rights advocates. In the apostolic letter "Quanta cura"¹¹⁸ Pius IX called the notion of a free consciousness and religious liberty

¹¹⁴ This is true only for the European human rights movement. In the case of the American human rights movement, Jellinek argued the idea of indisputable rights of the individual has a religious rather than a political origin. It is founded in the religious self-awareness of people who are free in faith and do not depend on the state to define their religion and beliefs. In Jellinek's view individual freedom is a presupposed condition of humanity, not a situation that must be created through a political revolution. This view very much contrasts with the French Enlightenment movement (see Jellinek, Georg (1927), Die Erklärung der Menschen- und Bürgerrechte, in: R. Schnur (ed.), Zur Geschichte der Erklärung der Menschenrechte, Darmstadt 1964, p. 1 ff.).

¹¹⁵ Pius VI 1717-1799, elect. Pope 1775.

¹¹⁶ Gregory XVI, 1765-1846, elect. Pope 1831.

¹¹⁷ Pius IX, 1792-1878, elect. Pope 1846.

¹¹⁸ Quanta Cura was a Papal encyclical issued by Pope Pius IX on December 8, 1864. It denounced several propositions relating to religious freedom and the freedom of speech. It was published at the same time as the 'Syllabus containing the most important errors of our time, which have been condemned by our Holy Father Pius

“deliramentum” (insane) and an “erroneo sentential” (epidemic error). Only later did the Catholic Church accepted that the idea of human rights was not necessarily atheistic and based only in natural law, but could also be founded in the belief of the dignity of all men, as they were all God’s creation. Although today the Catholic Church and most other Christian dominations are very supportive of human rights, we can see that the relationship between Christianity and human rights is not that easily defined. A possible synthesis can be found in the approach of the German Theologian Wolfinger, who points out that “human rights are not a self-evident part of the religious occidental tradition”¹¹⁹ (Wolfinger 2000, 30). Rather they are the product of a liberty movement which, especially in Europe, had a somewhat dialectic relationship with the Christian tradition. The liberty movement strongly opposed the blind obedience and humble acceptance of fate demanded by the Catholic Church. On the other hand, it promoted values of liberty which are, although often neglected by the medieval church, not foreign to Christian teaching. There are certain aspects of Christianity and also of classical occidental philosophy that influenced and certainly match the human rights idea well. As the American human rights expert Ishay points out, one can see human rights as a product of the religious (Reformation, Secularization) philosophical (liberalism), political (Democratic revolutions) and economic (emergence of Capitalism) development of Europe:

“... the development of capitalism in Europe, secularized with the progress of the Reformation and the democratic revolutions to the eighteenth century, and, finally, transformed into a liberal discourse that dominates our current conception of human rights.” (Ishay 2004, 61).

This of course is only a very brief discussion of how far human rights were influenced by Christian thinking¹²⁰, but it is sufficient to see that the relationship is by no way as self-evident as one might think.

Why did I raise this question? As we have seen above, human rights are formulated at a universal level, with the claim that they apply to all human beings. This claim has been questioned over the course of the history of human rights, and critics have claimed to find remnants of cultural imperialism in international law¹²¹. As we will see in Chapter 3.3.2, (page 120ff), such views also appear in the discussions about the compatibility between Chinese religion and human rights. On the other hand, many voices from non-western countries vigorously defend the universality of human rights. Ishay shows in her work how the different contributors to the human rights declaration all claimed to find encouragement for such a charter in their own tradition.

René Cassin, a Jew himself, easily found the basic idea of human rights in the Jewish tradition:

IX’. The Syllabus contained 80 theses concerning pantheism, naturalism, rationalism, tolerance in religious matters, socialism or modern liberalism. Many perceived the Syllabus to be an anti-modern statement of the catholic church, which was afraid of losing its influence in 19th century society.

¹¹⁹ Original text in German: “Die Menschenrechte sind kein selbstverständlicher Bestandteil der abendländischen Tradition, weder der philosophischen noch der jüdisch-christlichen. Sie sind vielmehr das Resultat eines kritischen Dialogs mit der modernen Freiheitsgeschichte” (Wolfinger 2000, 30).

¹²⁰ For a more detailed discussion of the question see e.g.: Six, Jean-François (1991). Religion, Eglise et droits de l’homme. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer/ Stackhous, Max L. (1984). Creeds, Society and Human Rights. A study in three cultures. Grand Rapids: William B, Eerdmans Publishing Company./ Rendtorff, Trutz: Christian concepts of the responsible self. In: Rouner, Leroy S. (ed.). *Human Rights and the World’s Religions*. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.

¹²¹ For example, such a claim was made by Mohammed Bedjaoui, the President of the International Court of Justice from 1994 to 1997. (Statement in: Dupuy, René (1984). *The Future of the International law in a Multicultural World*. The Hague: Nijhoff, p.192f cit. in Tomuschat 2003, 59).

“ the concept of human rights comes from the Bible, from the Old Testament, from the Ten Commandments. (...) These principles (...) were often phrased in terms of duties, which now presume rights. For instance, Thou shall not murder is the rights to life. Thou shall not steal is the right to own property, and so forth. We must not forget that Judaism gave the world the concept of human rights” (René Cassin (1972). Religions et droits de l’homme. In Amicorum discipulorumque liber. Vol.4, 98. cit. in: Ishay 2005, 19)

Humayun Kabir, in his response to the UNESCO questionnaire (see page 81f), insisted that the principles of democracy, justice and solidarity were by no means foreign to the Islamic tradition but actually emerged through the teaching of Mohammed:

“ the Western conception has to a large extent receded from the theory and practice of democracy set up by Islam, which did succeed in overcoming the distinction of race and colour to an extent experienced neither before nor since.” (Humyun Kabir. Human Rights: The Islamic Tradition and the Problems of the World Today” in: Maritain 1949, 191)

The Indian political scientist Puntambekar was convinced that both Hinduism and Buddhism made an important contribution to the universalism of the human rights idea. He claimed that “both Manu and Buddha propounded a code as it were of ten essential human freedoms and controls of virtues of good life” (Puntambekar S.V. Human Rights, in: Maritain 1949, 197) The ten essential human freedoms Puntambekar referred to are freedom from violence (Ahimsa), freedom from want (Asteya), freedom from exploitation (Aparigraha), freedom from early death (Armrutatva) and freedom from disease (Arogya), as well as the five ‘controls’: absence of intolerance (Akrodha), Bhutadaya, Adroha), knowledge (Jnana, Vidya), freedom of conscience and freedom from fear and despair (Pravrtti, Abhaya, Dhrti). Once one appreciates these virtues and freedoms in not just a spiritual way, they lay ground for the concept of human rights which shares similar goals; to free people from injustice and suffering, and to enable them to live freely.

The Chinese philosopher Chung-Shu Lo, a special consultant to UNESCO, was convinced that the Confucian tradition also holds positions comparable to the human rights idea:

“Chinese ethical teaching emphasized the sympathetic attitude of regarding all one’s fellow men as having the same desires, and therefore the same rights, as one would like to enjoy oneself.” (Lo, Chung-Shu. Human Rights in the Chinese Tradition. In: Maritain 1949, 186f)

These citations from adherents of different religions, all of whom were involved in creating the Human Rights Declaration, not only illustrate that support for human rights can be found in very different traditions, but also that philosophies from different traditions and religions contributed to the formulation of the Universal Declaration. The Universal Declaration therefore cannot be considered as a purely Western or Christian assembly but is also the result of the quest for a universal ethic.

SUMMARY: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEIR HISTORIC AND CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT

- The Universal Declaration had several forerunners in European and US history. Unlike its predecessors the Universal Declaration was from the beginning an international project with the claim of universality. To live up to this claim the Universal Declaration composers were anxious to integrate members from as many different cultures as possible and include the different worldviews implied.
- The Christian tradition clearly had a certain influence on the basic human rights idea, but human rights are also a product of other philosophical, political, and economic developments.
- The international, inter-religious and intercultural survey organized by UNESCO to collect opinions about a universal declaration has shown that it is possible to find support for a universal declaration in all cultures. The Universal Declaration - drafting committee also tried to include contributions from different cultures in their draft of the human rights declaration.
- Human rights are philosophically based on the four pillars of dignity, liberty, equality and brotherhood. The notions of dignity and liberty also imply the concept of individualism, as they stand for personal freedom and personal dignity.
- Today human rights are instruments of international law and have found legal status in the form of the two covenants for civil and political rights and social, economic, and cultural rights (ICCPR & ICESCR).
- Human rights are of major importance in today's world and play a significant role in international relationships.

3.2 HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA

In this section, I will examine the history and significance of the term “human rights” in China. To do so I will strongly rely on the publications of Marina Svensson (2001/2002), a researcher at the Swedish Lund University, who wrote her thesis on the “Chinese Conception of Human Rights” and published a reader of translated Human Rights documents of Chinese authors¹²² - a collection which is crucial to the understanding of the human rights issue in China. Another important source is the work of Kent (1999), who carefully traced China's involvement in the human rights work of the UN.

3.2.1 The Term “Human Rights” in Chinese History

MISSING ‘RIGHTS’ IN CLASSICAL CHINA

First, we must state that until the mid-nineteenth century there was no term in Chinese that corresponded to the term ‘right’ in western languages. Although there is wide discussion of privileges and powers in ancient Chinese texts, “we find rights in none of the senses encountered in modern Western thought” (Angle & Svensson 2001, XIII)¹²³. As outlined in Chapter Two, Confucian ethics along with other Chinese religions and philosophies stress the reciprocal responsibilities emerging from the roles one has within a relationship. This notion of mutual responsibility is not synonymous with ‘duties’. In fact, both the claim for rights and duties wasn't evoked for a long time; the whole theory spun around relationships and their consequences,

¹²² This collection was published in Cooperation with Stephen C. Angle, Assistant Professor of Philosophy et Wesleyan University.

¹²³ Max Weber also commented that rights of liberty were “absolutely missing” (fehlen im Grunde gänzlich) in Chinese tradition (Weber Max 1978, 391).

leaving aside the concept of individual rights and duties (Angle & Svensson 2001, XIV)¹²⁴.

ADOPTION OF 'RIGHTS'- TERM

With the opening of China and the import of foreign intellectual work, both Japan and China underwent major linguistic innovations and reformations. New words, meanings and discourses were needed to adequately discuss the ideas presented in foreign books. It is important to stress that we shouldn't part from the assumption that the West unilaterally imposed new words on China, but that the Chinese speakers shaped that process considerably (see Liu 1995, 26f). Also, the process of language reformation wasn't solely due to western influence; the rapid political changes in China at the end of the 19th and beginning of 20th century were also reflected in a new vocabulary. The terms 'rights' and 'human rights' were established during this time, along with other important political concepts such as civil society, democracy and nationalism. The process of this linguistic transformation was very complex and diverse. Particularly during the late 19th century, the Japanese were more advanced in translating Western work. Often the Chinese translators later made use of Japanese terms (written in Chinese characters Kanji) to find suitable Chinese words. In case of the Chinese term for 'rights' (权利 *quanli*) its inauguration into the Chinese language took several steps. The term was first created by W. A. P. Martin in 1864 in his Chinese translation of Elements of International Law by Henry Wheaton. The expression continued to be used in texts on international law but not in everyday language. Later Japanese translators adopted this term, among others, in their translations of western work. It was only when the term '*quanli*' became the most commonly used term for 'rights' did *quanli* become incorporated in common language. The Japanese usage then spread back to China¹²⁵.

The word *quanli* is a compound of two Chinese characters. The first character *quan* (权) meant "weighing", both literally and figuratively, in classical scriptures. A famous passage which used *quan* in classical Chinese philosophy can be found in the writings of Mencius, where the word refers to the moral decision of a virtuous person to break a rule in order to achieve a greater good. Mencius was asked what to do if a man wants to save a woman from drowning, as it was not considered moral at the time for a man and woman to touch each other. Mencius answered that not to touch the woman is the rule (ritual propriety *li*), but that a man would behave like a wolf if he wasn't to save her. Therefore to save her by touching her is to prove *quan*, that is to rightly weigh the importance of rules by applying superior moral standards¹²⁶. In this passage, *quan* is clearly associated with morality but Svensson points out that *quan* often simply means 'power' without any moral connotation (Svensson 2001, XV). *Quan* is used as the essential character to refer to rights and is often used in combination with other characters to refer to specific rights.

¹²⁴ The French Sinologist Marcel Granet also defended the view that, although the term 'rights' could never develop in China, Chinese wisdom was based on their experience of nature and therefore had a clear humanistic trait (Granet 1985, 256).

¹²⁵ For more detailed information on the history of the expression *quanli* see Svensson 2002, 71ff.

¹²⁶ Mencius 4, 17. Original text in Chinese: 淳于 曰: 男女授受不亲, 礼与? 孟子曰: 礼也。曰: 嫂溺, 则援之以手乎? 曰: 嫂溺不援, 是豺狼也。男女授受不亲礼也。嫂溺援之一手者, 权也。地第四卷, 上, 十七。 In this context D.C Lau translates *quan* as 'discretion' (Lau 1970, 124). Legge translates it as 'peculiar exigency' (Legge 2004, 74). Both translations don't seem suitable in this context, which is why I used the formulation "to rightly weigh the importance of a rules".

The second character *li* (利), can be translated as ‘benefit’, ‘advantage’ or ‘profit’. Although this translation was criticized in the past¹²⁷, it became accepted and reproduced by Chinese and Japanese thinkers and is now fully integrated into the Chinese language.

CHINESE TERMINOLOGY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE

The term most widely used for ‘human rights’ in Chinese is *renquan* (人权), a compound of the character *ren* for man and *quan*, which is explained above. Tracing the history of the usage of ‘human rights’ Svensson (2001, XVIII) again returns to the translation of General Law, in which Martin translates ‘human rights’ as *ziran quan* (自然权), literally translated as ‘natural rights’. The equation of human rights with natural rights clearly shows how the western discourse on rights influenced his translation. Another Chinese term for human rights also points to the idea of human rights given to mankind by a higher power. The expression *tianfu renquan* (天赋人权) ‘heaven-endowed human rights’ was first used in Japan and later became widely used in China. This reference to heaven or nature as the provider of rights was also reflected in other terms used by Chinese authors such as ‘due rights’ (*yingxiang zhi quanli* 应享之权利) or ‘sacred rights’ (*shensheng quanli* 神圣权利). As we saw in Chapter Two, the notion of heaven as the provider of life is very much anchored in Chinese tradition. It seemed natural, therefore, that many Chinese intellectuals, when first confronted with the human rights idea, understood those rights as ‘given by heaven’.

“Given that we are speaking of the great norms and laws, the greatest justice and fairness, thus quan must be given by heaven, rather than being established by people. Heaven gives people their lives, thus it also must give them quan with to attend their lives”. (He Qi; Hu Liyuan (1994). Quanyuepian shu hou (Postscript to Exhortation to Learning) cit. in: Angle & Svensson 2001, XVIII)

The discussion concerning human rights has always been very dynamic and diverse. Therefore not all would agree with the notion of rights as given, but emphasize that rights are a product of law. Tracing the history of the human rights discourse in China will reveal these different views.

3.2.2 History of the Human Rights Discourse in China

DOWNFALL OF IMPERIAL SYSTEM - MOVEMENTS OF MODERNIZATION (END OF QING-DYNASTY (1911))

At the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, discussions about the notion of rights and human rights were widespread among Chinese intellectuals. Many of the young writers involved in this discussion were studying in Japan and often got to know western work through Japanese translations, which they translated into Chinese. In general this was a time in which the Chinese tradition was critically reviewed and reflected on. The political situation of China (ongoing oppression by the Manchus, menace from Western states) motivated the intellectual community to look for possible solutions, reforms and changes that would save China. Most writers agreed that the concept of rights had to be implemented in a modern Chinese state. Whereas

¹²⁷ It was feared that the term *quanli* 权利 would be associated to strength by power and not right. This was even more so as the modern word for power (*quanli* 权力) is pronounced exactly the same way. Only the second character of the compound is different, meaning ‘strength’. Nevertheless Svensson is convinced that “it (*quanli*) seems to have rapidly become domesticated and accepted” (Svensson 2002, 80).

some writers like Liang Qichao¹²⁸ and Liu Shipei¹²⁹ built their arguments on Confucian ideas, others, like Zou Rong¹³⁰ adopted foreign ideas and eventually attacked the Chinese tradition, as can be seen in some extracts from Zou Rong's revolutionary pamphlet:

“The revolution we are carrying out today is a revolution that destroys for the sake of construction. (...) With the constant development of the natural sciences, the heresy that nature (tian) endowed Emperors with rulership can be obliterated. (...) With the enlightenment of man's wisdom, everyone will be able to enjoy their natural rights,”
(Zou Rong (1903) In: Svensson & Angle 2001, 30ff)

It was common to all early twentieth century writers in their discourses on rights to refer to freedom of thought, speech and publication. Svensson (2002, 107) states that “Chinese writers at that time put more emphasis on civil and political rights than on social and economic rights”. Invoking these personal rights to liberty was a means of emphasizing the importance of personal autonomy but was also used to support the political agenda of most of these young political writers: the liberation of the Manchu ‘occupation’ in order to create a Chinese nation. It is essential to note that from the very beginning the human rights discussion in China was closely connected to nationalism:

“The language of rights was thus closely related to both personal liberation and national salvation, a trend that would continue to inform Chinese human rights debates over the coming years.” (Svensson & Angle 2001, XXII)

THE REPUBLICAN REGIME (1914-1949)

Whilst in the beginning the human rights discourse was connected to Confucianism, it totally lost any association during the New Cultural Movement and the May 4th movement¹³¹. During this time Confucianism was strongly criticized by the intellectuals and with this critique there came the call for personal liberation (*geren jiefang* 个人解放). This emancipation of the self could be reached by accepting the rights to free thought and free speech. Western authors like Rousseau and contemporary scholars like Dewey were often cited in the political discourse of that time. Dewey actually held lectures in China, and his ideas of a social liberalism were highly popular among the Chinese avant-garde. The New Cultural movement was originally very transnational and cosmopolitan. This soon changed with the May 4th movement (1919), a movement that grew out of anger about the Peace conference after World War I in which territorial concessions were granted to Japan and Germany

¹²⁸ Liang's idea of *quanli* shows clear connections to enduring Confucian ideas (see Angle 2002, 150f).

¹²⁹ Liu Shipei made a connection between Neo-Confucianism and human rights by, for example, emphasizing the belief that individual desires and group interests coincide (see Angle 2002, 175).

¹³⁰ Zou Rong (1889 to 1905) was a controversial early reformer. In 1903 he wrote the Revolutionary Army, which was critical of the Manchu rulers and advocated social and political revolution justified through natural rights and ‘independence’. Zou was sentenced to two years of prison, where he contracted a severe illness and died in 1905.

¹³¹ Both the New Cultural Movement and the May 4th movement stand for a renewal of Chinese culture and strong criticism against Chinese traditions like Confucianism. On May 4th 1919 over 3000 students from Beijing University demonstrated in Tiananmen Square against the Versailles treaty, which in their eyes was a very bad deal for China. The demonstration was followed by student strikes, which expanded to include workers and business men. Later the reigning warlord's were forced to make concessions, free arrested students and dismiss the diplomats that were considered responsible for the faulty arrangement in the Versailles treaty. For more information on May 4th see for example Vera Schwarcz (1990). *The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919*. Berkeley, LA, London: University of California Press.

on Chinese ground¹³². For the May Fourthers, human rights were on the top of the agenda, but the idea was again connected not only to the idea of personal freedom but also to national liberation. The human rights issue was often discussed in the context of other western ideas like Communism and Socialism, which entered intellectual China at this time (Angle & Svensson XXIIIf). The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded in 1921. Interestingly, in the early discourse both liberals (e.g. Gao Yihan¹³³) and communists (e.g., Chen Duxiu, later the first president of the CCP) actively advocated human rights, understanding it as absolutely necessary to the establishment of a modern state:

“If we want to establish a new state and society of the Western model in order to be fit to exist in the contemporary world, then the fundamental question must first of all be to import the foundation of the Western societies, that is the belief in equality and human rights.” (Chen Duxiu (1916). The Constitution and Confucianism. Xin Qing Nian, 2, 2, 136, cit. in: Svensson 2002, 141)

The rights most frequently discussed in the 1920s and 30s were civil and political rights. But for the first time economic rights were brought on stage, most importantly the right of subsistence (*shengcun quan* 生存权). *Shengcun quan* was considered a necessary condition to truly enjoy civil and political rights. The first person to extensively discuss these rights was the liberal Gao Yihan. Although he stood for a very liberal political view, he was convinced that the state should play an active role to maintain the dignity and well being of the people so that civil and political rights wouldn't just be an empty promise.

“For example , the constitution stipulates only that “people have freedom of speech and thought”. We have to ask whether, in order to enjoy these kinds of freedoms, people do not also need some corresponding life capabilities? If so, then should society not have to provide each individual with the appropriate capabilities and facilities? The first precondition for all those who want to enjoy the freedom of speech and thought is to be able to live.” (Gao Yihan (1921) in: Angle & Svensson 2001, 100)

From the beginning, both the CCP and the Nationalist Party (Guo Min Dan, GMD) were not strong advocates of human rights in the areas they controlled. In fact, the political elite in both camps were relatively critical of human rights. They considered human rights to be an old-fashioned and bourgeois idea, not suitable to the state they wanted to build, in which individual interests had to be sacrificed for the good of the nation (Angle & Svensson 2001, XXIV). In 1927, the GMD declared the teaching of Sun Yatsen to be the official doctrine and started to oppress all opposition. This policy was strongly criticized by liberals and socialist intellectuals, but only after 1937, during the war with Japan, did human rights once more play a role in political discourse (Angle & Svensson 2001, XXIV). For a short time the GMD and the CCP joined together in the common fight against Japan, and they used the argument of human rights violation against the Japanese invaders. Very soon, however, the coalition broke and the reproach of human rights violation was used by the CCP against both Japan and the GMD.

¹³² For cultural aspects of the May 4th movement also see: Laughlin, Charles A. (2003). The May 4th movement: Modern Cultural Orthodoxy. In: Gamer Robert E. (ed). Understanding Contemporary China. London: Lynne Rienner Publisher pp-395-398.

¹³³ Professor of political science at Beijing University from 1918 to 1926, taught at China National Institute in Shanghai and after 1949 was the Dean of the Law School of Nanjing University. For detailed discussion on Gao Yihan's view on rights see Angle 2002, 188 –194.

It was during and after World War II that the human rights argument became a strong rhetorical tool in Chinese politics. Within China, the CCP used human rights as a rhetoric tool against the GMD. The GMD, on the other hand, used its apparent support for human rights to garner support on the international stage (Angle & Svensson 2001, XXV). Although the GMD did not translate its engagement in the human rights discussion into domestic politics, its leaders were actively engaged in process of formulating the international human rights Charta: A strong Nationalist delegation went to the San Francisco conference, where the UN-Charter was accepted. And, as already mentioned, the GMD Representative Zhang Pengjun served as vice-chair in the committee that drafted the Universal Declaration On December 10, 1948, Nationalist China voted in favor adopting the human rights Charta which included the human rights idea.

In 1949, 4 years after winning the war against the Japanese, the CCP managed to take power in Mainland China, forcing the GMD to retreat to the island of Taiwan where it established its own government. Although human rights weren't really respected by the GMD, the fact that they were actively promoting human rights on the international platform allowed for a lively discussion of human rights in Taiwan¹³⁴. My research focuses on Mainland China and I will therefore not further discuss the developments of the human rights discourse in Taiwan. My focus will be on the development of the idea of human rights in socialist China where, from 1949 until the early 1980s, any discussion on human rights was completely dismissed. The idea of human rights was labeled as a bourgeois and therefore dangerous idea.

COMMUNIST ERA DURING MAO

The absence of a real human rights discourse persisted throughout Mao's regime. Nevertheless, as Svensson shows in her work, there are indicators that the notion of human rights did not totally fade away, and that once the necessary freedoms were granted, human rights were revived and reclaimed (Svensson 2002, 221-228).

Such a short and punctual revival could be observed during the 'Hundred Flower Movement' in 1957. Mao Zedong initiated this movement and encouraged all people to speak out against the three evils of bureaucratization, subjectivism and sectarianism. At first people were hesitant, but then some people, most of whom were students, dared to criticize the government. The critiques touched both on general issues, such as style of governing and the constitution, as well as specific cases, such as unfair arrests. The critiques were made in the form of wall posters, speeches at student gathering and in newspaper articles. The newspaper articles contained only mild criticism, whereas the speeches and wallpapers of the students were very straightforward and damning. In those, some scattered references to human rights could be found. It is rather surprising that these young students, educated under the communist system, used the language of human rights to state their point.

The following two citations are proof of how the 'human rights' argument was used by students to criticize the government during the Hundred Flower Movement:

"The violation of human rights (renquan) is an everyday occurrence. Some lower-level cadres, in particular, feel that any opposition to them means opposition to the Party and the people. This is naturally a tragedy of their shallow intellect. We should respect the conduct and liberty of each member of the people. This situation is even more backward than the democracy movement of the bourgeoisie; it is a relic of feudalism, since the protection of human rights was put forward in the bourgeoisie

¹³⁴ For a Taiwanese example see: Yin, Haiguang (1958/2001). Do You Want to Be a Human Being? In: Angle & Svensson 2001, pp. 229-239.

revolution. Since the constitution was promulgated, it has been ignored by some Party members. We should strive for the equality of human rights in the law.” (Statement from People’s University Planning Department student Pu Zhongwen¹³⁵ In: Angle & Svensson 2001, 217f)

There have also been those who were driven mad by insulting criticisms and imprisonment, and some who even after being hounded to death were still insulted as counterrevolutionaries and the slackers. Where is the national law in all of this? For these reasons, I call on the National People’s Congress to formulate and pass a Bill of Human Rights which among other things would protect human rights, stipulate the legal handling of human rights violations, and (require) timely investigations of human rights cases. This would clarify the national law, and settle people’s hearts.” (Statement from People’s University History Student He Shifen¹³⁶ In: Angle & Svensson 2001, 218)

The regime’s reaction on the wide-ranged and in-depth criticism of the authorities was not long in coming. Although Mao originally launched the Hundred Flower Movement, the force of the criticism surprised him. Apparently he misjudged the people’s state of mind when he called for honest criticism. In the aftermath of the movement, more than 500,000 people were labeled rightists, lost their jobs and were even sent to labor camps. After the voices supporting human rights were silenced, human rights were mostly dismissed as a rightist and bourgeois slogan, as can be observed in the quote from Qian Si, a member of the CCP:

“The ‘human rights’ referred to by bourgeois international law and the ‘human rights’ it intends to protect are the rights of the bourgeoisie to enslave and to oppress the laboring people, that is to say, the human rights of the bourgeoisie. Internally, they are used to conceal the encroachment upon rights and freedoms of the laboring people by the bourgeoisie; externally, they provide pretexts for imperialist opposition to socialist and nationalist countries. They are reactionary from head to toe.” Qian Si (1960). In: Angle & Svensson (2001), 242)

The quote above was stimulated by the international critique of China’s human rights record, after its violent quell of the 1959 uprising in Tibet. China set aside all criticism with the argument that it was an interference into China’s internal affairs. In reaction to international criticism, they actually used the human rights language to defend themselves. They accused the United States of human rights violation in their treatment of the Indians, and justified China’s action in Tibet by declaring it a peaceful liberation that brought human rights to the Tibetans who suffered under the traditional feudal system of Tibet (Angle & Svensson 2001, 240).

In summary, we can say that during the 1960’s and early 1970’s, although the PRC sometimes referred to human rights on an international level, its domestic discourse was completely banned. Even those voices that criticized the regime, did not (dare to) refer to the idea of universal or fundamental human rights. To illustrate these circumstances, Svensson (2002, 234f) gives as an example Yu Luohe, who strongly accused the government of neglecting the principle of equality. In his view, the law of equality was violated if certain people were suspected of being counterrevolutionaries only because they came from a bourgeois family. Importantly, Yu Luohe did not ask

¹³⁵ Originally reprinted in Gaoden xuexiao youpai yanlun xuanbian (A Collection of Rightist Discussions from Schools of Higher Education). Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongguo renmin daxue weiyuanhui shehui zhuyi sixiang jiaoyu bongongshi, 1958 pp. 90, 91, 585-587).

¹³⁶ Originally reprinted in Gaoden xuexiao youpai yanlun xuanbian (A Collection of Rightist Discussions from Schools of Higher Education). Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongguo renmin daxue weiyuanhui shehui zhuyi sixiang jiaoyu bongongshi, 1958 pp. 90, 91, 585-587).

for equal rights and freedom for everybody, but rather stated his belief that everybody should have the right to join the socialist revolution. Nevertheless, Yu was arrested and executed in March 1970 for his criticism. Yu's argument was typical of that time, in which the rights-discussion was generally held "within the fold's of Marxism; they believed in socialism and analyzed rights from a class perspective" (Svensson 2002, 235).

A change came when China officially entered the international community. In 1971 China joined the United Nations and consequently also had to engage in human rights work. Although it only hesitantly joined in these activities, the Chinese government was forced to deal with the human rights question in a more profound way. China refused to contribute to the work of the UN Commission on Human Rights but did participate in the Commission on the Status of women, an Economic and Social council (ECOSOC) functional committee, and in that context was forced to respond to various human rights proposals. On such an occasion China made its most thorough statement on human rights:

"(T)he question of human rights was an important issue for the Economic and Social Council. China was ready to work together with all the countries and peoples who loved peace and upheld justice in supporting the struggles of the peoples of the world against imperialism, colonialism and racism and for the attainment and defense of national independence, national sovereignty and fundamental human rights in accordance with the spirit of the Charter." (UN DOC. E. /AC.7/SR. 699 (30 May 1972), at 143, cit. In: Kim 1979, 485)

Until 1980, China supported only resolutions concerning self-determination, independence, opposition to apartheid, and racial- and gender-discrimination. It did not support resolutions concerning human rights violations by sovereign states, such as the resolutions against Chile and El Slavador (Kent 1999, 42). China also used the human rights-language to serve itself by accusing Taiwan and the Soviet Union of human rights violations (Kent 1999, 42).

Although China did not participate in any of the human rights conventions and therefore was not subject to the monitoring of the human rights commission¹³⁷, in the late 1970's the criticism of the international community towards China's human rights record became louder and forced China to address this issue.

REFORM ERA BEFORE TIANANMEN

Although the international community influenced the growing discussion of human rights in China, it was mainly the domestic political development that changed and defined the human rights discourse in China. The death of Mao Zedong (9 Sept. 1976) and the fall of the Gang of Four (6 Oct. 1976) brought with them great political transformation. Deng Xiaoping advocated economic reforms and the rehabilitation of the victims of earlier political campaigns such as the anti- rightist movement and the Cultural Revolution. After years of chaos and arbitrariness, the new political leadership was determined to restore law and order. A new constitution was passed in 1979 and a criminal code was promulgated in 1979. This spirit of renewal among the Chinese leaders also raised great expectations among the Chinese people for the 11th Party Congress in December 1978. In November 1978, people gathered at a wall in Central Beijing, to put up big-character posters (*dazibao*) with poems and political essays. The point of this demonstration was to express their anger about the past and

¹³⁷ Since 1970, the UN Commission on human rights was authorized to conduct confidential investigations of human rights. During the years that followed the Commission reviewed the situation in around forty countries (see Kent 1999, 23).

hopes for the future. This was the beginning of an active deliberation among Chinese students and intellectuals about Chinese politics and the necessity of democratic reforms (see Gittings 2005, 154f). The movement is now referred to as the 'Democracy Wall Movement'. Human rights were an important issue in this movement, as many activists suffered human rights violations during the Cultural Revolution. The concern for human rights was thus motivated by personal experience (Svensson 2002, 238). Although all activists grew up in communist and often isolated China, they seemed to know about the different international human rights treaties. They often referred to the French Declaration of Rights of Man and also to the Universal Declaration (Svensson 2002, 239). The spirit of the Democracy Wall movement also enabled the founding of the Chinese Human Rights league, which entirely focused its arguments and publications on the human rights issue. In their Magazine *Zhongguo Renquan* (Chinese human rights), they published a Chinese Declaration of Human Rights containing 19 points, touching mainly civil and political rights, such as the freedom of speech, press, publication, assembly, association, and demonstration. Social problems typical to the situation of China in the 1970 were attacked in the declaration, including a paragraph on minority-rights, a subject that was not generally discussed in the Chinese human rights discourse. Here are some extracts from the declaration showing the various issues it touches on.

"The significance of human rights is more far-reaching, profound and enduring than anything else. This is a new mark of the political consciousness of the Chinese people and the natural trend of contemporary history. (..)

1. The citizens demand freedom of thought, freedom of speech, and the release of all prisoners of conscience and speech. (..)

2. The citizens demand that there be practical safeguards for their constitutional right to assess and criticize Party and state leaders.

3. Give the minority nationalities sufficient autonomy. (...)

12. Citizens demand that the state ensure basic food rations for peasants and eliminate the phenomenon of beggars.

17. Get rid of slum quarters and crowded living quarters where people of three generations or grown sons and daughters are packed close together in one room.

18. We are "citizens of the world". Citizens demand the borders be thrown open, trade be promoted, culture exchanged, and labor exported. (Zhongguo renquan No. 1, 1979. trls. In: Angle & Svensson 2001, 262 Full text see Appendix 10.1.4)

Another prominent voice in favor of human rights during the 1978 Democracy Movement was the somewhat radical activist Wei Jinsheng. In his magazine 'Exploration' he published accounts of unfair trials and gave detailed accounts of the miserable conditions in the Beijing prison Number 1. Wei was convinced that

"once one loses his human rights (renquan), he loses his rights to be a person (zuoren de quanli), an what is left to him is nothing but a position of dependency and slavery." (Wei Jingshen 1979, 49. cit. In: Svensson 2002, 242¹³⁸)

¹³⁸ Wei Jinsheng, (1979) "The fifth Modernisation", *Exploration* 2, , reprinted in *Dalu dixia kanwu huibian 1980-1984 (A Collection of Underground Publications Circulated on Chinese Mainland)*, 2, p. 6. Trsl. By Marina Svensson.

This strong affirmation of human rights and democracy led Wei to directly attack Communism, the government and Deng Xiaoping (Gittings 2005, 156). But Wei was quite lonely with his radical opposition. Most other activist didn't go that far, and generally discussed the human rights issue within the scope of a socialist China, taking "great pains to emphasize that advocacy of human rights did not imply a rejection of socialism" (Svensson 2002, 244). Wei was arrested in 1979, and although many activists did not necessarily share his radical view, they opposed his arrest. The new leadership under Deng Xiaoping became increasingly suspicious of the democracy movement and imposed controlling and suppressive measures to reduce its potential influence. In 1981, more than 20 activists were charged with counter-revolutionary activism and arrested (Gittings 2005, 158).

Human rights were also discussed in the official state controlled media. There, the question was raised whether human rights were compatible with a socialist society¹³⁹. For some, human rights still were a purely bourgeois idea, while others acknowledged its liberating power and, based on this notion of liberation, felt it had an objective similar to Marxism. But even when approving human rights, the official line was based on a rather relativistic view: human rights were seen as being defined by the economic level of a nation, meaning, therefore, that the realization of human rights in China would take a long time (Svensson 2002, 250). It is important to emphasize that the relativistic view wasn't due to cultural relativism but to economic relativism. At this stage of the Chinese human rights discussion, discourse was not based on cultural arguments that criticized human rights but was rather framed in reference to China's socialist system and economic condition.

Whereas domestically, the human rights discourse was strictly controlled and had to be conducted within the line of the 'Four Principles' formulated by Deng Xiaoping in 1979 (socialism, dictatorship of the proletariat, leadership of the CCP, Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought), on an international level China was strongly involved in the human rights discussion. Thus, even as more stories about Chinese dissidents leaked out and China was more and more criticized for its own human rights discourse by the international community, it was also increasingly involved in UN human rights work. It joined the UN human rights commission in 1982, and joined the Sub-Commission on the prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1984. From 1980 to 1989 it signed and partly ratified seven human rights convention and one protocol¹⁴⁰. China also took part in several working groups to draft further human rights conventions¹⁴¹. The signing and ratifying¹⁴² of human rights conventions such as the Racial Discrimination Convention, allowed the UN community to use these conventions as a basis for criticizing China's treatment of national or ethnic minorities (Kent 1999, 45). Criticism against the Chinese occupation of Tibet, however, was still a sensitive topic, and a resolution concerning

¹³⁹ See for example article from Lan Ying (1979) entitled "Is 'human rights' always a bourgeois slogan?"

¹⁴⁰ Following the chronological order of signature: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1980). International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1981). Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1982). Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1982). Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1983). International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1983). International Convention against Apartheid in Sports (1987). Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1988). List taken from Kent 1999, 267.

¹⁴¹ China actively participated in the formulation of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the Declaration of Rights of Persons belonging to National, Ethnic, Religions and Linguistic Minorities.

¹⁴² Signing means to express the intention of the government to apply the convention in the future. The signing country will e.g. change its national law to make it compatible to the UN convention in question. Once a convention is ratified the country agrees to respect the convention, and it is self-reporting to the UN about the implementation of the convention.

Tibet, which was intended to be passed in 1988, was later withdrawn (ibid.). Although some issues, such as the Chinese occupation of Tibet, were not up for discussion, it is clear that during this time period China was more responsive to occasional criticism and sometimes was willing to make certain concessions, “especially when economic and political benefits would result” (Kent 1999, 46).

By 1989, China was strongly involved in international human rights activities. After ratifying the Convention on Torture, China had to report to the UN Committee Against Torture on its domestic situation. China also engaged in drafting the Conventions on the Right of the Child and the Right of Migrant Workers (Kent 1999, 45.). China had not yet signed the two major international Covenants on civil and political rights (ICCPR) and on economic and political rights (the ICESCR), and was selective in its support of civil and political rights. Nevertheless, China’s commitment in human rights work and its willingness to be evaluated by the international community was a big step for China, which was normally opposed to any interference with its internal affairs.

TIANANMEN AND AFTER

China’s increased international participation was concurrent with a period of open political confrontation between scholars and the government, starting in 1988 and culminating in the Spring of 1989¹⁴³. During this time, Chinese academics dared to openly discuss the subject of human rights and to suggest views and opinions on human rights that weren’t along the party line. In 1989, Xu Bing of the Chinese Academy of Social Science wrote an essay “celebrating the idea of human rights” (Angle & Svensson 2001, XXVIII), in which he opposed the view of human rights as a bourgeois idea and instead emphasized the more fundamental nature of human rights:

“Human rights (renquan) are rights (quanli) that each individual cannot do without for one moment; naturally, this is a most fundamental issue that concerns the whole of humankind. Although the theory of human rights was first raised by the bourgeoisie, the proposition in itself transcends the boundaries of class, nationality, race and nation. Thus, as soon as human rights was raised, it became a common slogan of all of humanity, and a common banner under which all of humanity has called for subsistence (shengcun) development, and progress.” (Xu Bing 1989, in: Angle & Svensson 2001, 307).

In the same spirit of open political discourse, the scientist Fang Lizhi, who in 1957 was labeled a rightist and fully rehabilitated in 1978, wrote an open letter to Deng Xiao Ping asking for the liberation of Wei Jingsheng and calling the government to respect human rights:

“I believe that, regardless of how Wei Jingsheng is judged, his release after serving ten years of his sentence would be a humanitarian act that would improve the atmosphere of our society. This year also happens to be the two-hundredth anniversary of the French Revolution. From any perspective, the ideas of liberty, equality, fraternity, and human rights (renquan) that the French Revolution symbolizes have won the respect of people all over the world. In this light, let me again express my earnest hope that you will consider this suggestion, and thus demonstrate even more concern for our future.” (Fang Lizhi 1989, in: Angle & Svensson 2001, 320).

¹⁴³ Svensson & Angle (2001) refer to this period as a period of “political liberalization” (XXVIII). The journalist and China specialist Gittings (2005) believes that the scholars became active and outspoken “because in the sterile air of the Party’s paralysis they feared that worse was to come” (226).

Fang's petition was signed by 33 Chinese intellectuals, among them the poet Bei Dao, who later formulated a second open letter signed by more than one hundred scholars. The death of Hu Yaobang, a former Party Chairman who was forced to resign after he supported the 1986 students protest¹⁴⁴, gave the students a reason to gather once more on Tiananmen Square, calling for political change and democracy¹⁴⁵. Workers and other civilians soon joined the students in the protest, asking for more democracy, end to corruption, and freedom of speech and assembly. There were also a few explicit references to human rights made by the demonstrators. Around May 20, 1989, a group called the "Chinese Human Rights Movement Committee, Beijing" published a Declaration of Human Rights with 16 points in which they claimed freedom (point 1), the right to oppose oppression (point 2), freedom of conscious (point 3), freedom of religion (point 4), freedom of assembly (point 5) and so forth¹⁴⁶.

On June 4th, after a month of demonstrations on Tiananmen Square, the demonstrators were violently forced to retreat. Many resisted and an unknown number¹⁴⁷ of civilians died in the violent clash between the People's Liberation Army and the people. Many of the activists were arrested and the whole movement was labeled a 'counter-revolutionary rebellion'.

Naturally, the violent reaction of the Chinese government, recorded by foreign journalist and cameras, earned criticism from the international community, especially from the U.S.

China was accused of grave human rights violations, and the Chinese government dismissed the criticism of the international community as an unjustified interference in China's internal affairs. Importantly, as Svensson & Angle (2001, XXVIII) point out, this strong rejection of foreign criticism did not imply the repudiation of the human rights idea per se. On the contrary; China presented itself as the real defender of the human rights idea, claiming the demonstrating students had a wrong and bourgeois conception of human rights. An article from Shi Yun, appearing in the state sponsored newspaper, *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily), soon after the June 4th incident, is a good example of the rhetoric used by the Chinese government to defend its human rights position. It accused the U.S. of using the human rights question as means to illegitimately interfere in Chinese affairs and tried to promote a Chinese and Marxist analysis of human rights:

"In 1966, the UN adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Iteration Covenant on Economic, Social, and cultural Rights, which stipulated the rights of national self-determination and control over natural wealth and natural resources. This placed collective human rights (jiti renquan) in a newly important position and created a breakthrough in the traditional Western bourgeois human

¹⁴⁴ Hu Yaobang (1915-1989). It is not quite sure how far he really supported the protest, but he surely failed to control it. When still in office Hu Yaobang was a major reformist force backing up Deng Xiaoping's economical alterations. Hu Yaobang was also an outspoken supporter of freedom of speech and freedom of press. These ideas greatly influenced the students. There are some signs that Hu Yaobang who was forced to resign in 1986, will be rehabilitated soon. Apparently an official event is planned to commemorate Hu Yaobang's 90th birthday on November 20, 2005. This would be the first reaction of the CCP to his death in 1989. More info see: encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761584213.

¹⁴⁵ These activities overlapped with a government crisis and a dispute between Premier Li Peng and the head of the politburo Zhao Ziyang. The latter opted for a more attractive and open Communist Party, including grassroots trade unions as a form of democratic mass organization. Li Peng and Deng Xiaoping on the other hand emphasized the necessity of stability and perceived the boldness of Chinese intellectuals as a threat to Chinas solidity (Gittings 2005, 226). Zhao Ziyang lost this fight of power and his engagement for the students and against a military intervention wasn't successful. After the massacre the Party Secretary-General Zhao Ziyang disappeared from sight. He was put under house arrest, which was sometimes relaxed but never lifted. Zhao died in 2005.

¹⁴⁶ For the whole text of the Declaration see Appendix 10.1.5.

¹⁴⁷ Estimated toll of nearly thousand deaths and around 300 non-fatal casualties (Gittens 2005, 245).

rights concept, which has the individual as its basic unit”. (Shi Yun 1989, In: Angle & Svensson 2001, 324)

We can see here that the article was emphasizing the primacy of collective rights over individual rights. The latter could not be claimed if they interfered with collective rights. In this logic, demonstrating (an individual right), was illicit, as it infringed on the collective right of public order. The article also tackled the universality of human rights by pointing out the conditions that shaped human rights:

“Human rights are concrete rather than abstract and relative rather than absolute. Both the concrete stipulations in each country’s laws regarding citizens’ rights (gongmin quanli), and the actual situation of citizens’ rights in real life, are constrained by the country’s political system, economic relations, cultural traditions, habits and customs and many other factors. Thus, there is no and can be no universally applicable or abstract model of human rights for all of humanity; citizens’ rights can only be concrete and real. At the same time, the legal protection citizens’ rights must also follow the general restrictions on rights. When realizing his or her rights, a citizen may not harm the interests of another person or of society. Thus, human rights can only be relative and restricted, and not absolute and unrestricted. To try to achieve rights without duties is an unrealistic fantasy.” (Shi Yun July 1989, In: Angle & Svensson 2001, 326)

This article refers to the relativity of human rights depending on economic and cultural conditions. This reference to cultural conditions as shaping human rights is a relatively new argument in the discourse on human rights by the Communist regime. Since many of the CCP’s political programs actually had the goal of eliminating cultural traditions (often labeled as bourgeois and superstitious), the use of culture as the basis for argument in the human rights arena was not useful for a long time. Over time, however, this argument became more important, particularly during the nineties, and is still of certain importance in the contemporary human rights discourse.

In the early 1990s, human rights were a very important issue for China both on a domestic and international level. Both to counter attacks from the international community and to respond to the increasing demand of its citizens and academics, the Chinese government was eager to develop its own human rights theory. It therefore launched a wide range of research on human rights in China. One of the first outcomes of this research engagement was the White Paper on Human Rights in China, published in 1991. The content of the White Paper is somewhat ambiguous and has both an offensive and defensive character. As part of the defensive strategy, the paper attempts to show that western critiques were wrong and that China does in fact protect civil and political rights, such as the protection of human rights in its judicial system, freedom of religion, or the protection of human rights for minorities:

“The Chinese people gained real democratic rights after the founding of New China.” (63)

“ China attaches great importance to the promotion of democracy at the grass-roots level so as to guarantee that citizens can directly exercise their political rights.”(65)

“ The Constitution provides that freedom of the person of citizens of the People’s Republic of China is inviolable. Unlawful detention or deprivation of citizens’ freedom of the person by other means and unlawful search of the person of citizens are prohibited; (..)” (66).

(Human Rights in China, November 1991 In: Chinese government (2000). White Papers of the Chinese government)

The paper has also offensive aspects in developing a human rights philosophy for developing countries, in which the rights to welfare and to subsistence are of more importance than civil and political rights:

“It is a simple truth that, for any country or nation, the right to subsistence is the most important of all human rights, without which the other rights are out of the question. (...) To solve their human rights problems, the first thing for the Chinese people to do is, for historical reasons, to secure the right to subsistence” (Human Rights in China, November 1991 In: Chinese government (2000). White Papers of the Chinese government, 54).

The emphasis on the special Chinese human rights theory was enhanced by the official exegesis of the White Paper, which singled out the differences between the Western and Chinese views on human rights. The White Paper's interpretation is that the West understands human rights in an individual, absolute, and universal way, and does not consider economics or culture. Also, the West uses human rights as a means for interfering in the internal affairs of other nations and as the subject of bilateral relations. China, on the other hand, considers both individual and collective rights, and always weighs individual rights in the context of the greater good of a stable and peaceful society (Xu Jianyi¹⁴⁸, cit. In: Kent 1999, 159f.).

The white paper on human rights in China was the first of a series of white papers issued by the Chinese government concerning human rights. They were followed by white papers on China's criminal reform (August 1992), Tibet (September 1992) Taiwan (August 1993), the Situation of Chinese Women (1994) and so forth. White papers on human rights have actually become an institution in China and are now published on a regular basis.

These official papers on human rights were complemented through a large number of academic articles about human rights. The views of how to assess these writings differ somewhat. In Wheaterley's book on the discourse of Human Rights in China, he judges the articles to be in “accordance with the views espoused by the Chinese government” (Wheaterley 1999, 148). Svensson (2001, 275) on the other hand thinks that certain academic works differ from the official discourse and that the range of academic thought is very diverse. Svensson makes out different lines among the scholars ranging from neo-authoritarian, conservative, moderate and liberal (ibid, 276). Both Svensson and Wheaterly agree on the observation that most articles are written in a very abstract and demanding intellectual style. This ensures that the Chinese government did not have to worry that the ideas, even if not totally along the party line, would leave the academic ivory tower.

BANGKOK AND VIENNA 1993

On an international level, China was eager to regain initiative in order to free itself from the criticism it faced by the international community. Its international policy of human rights in the early 1990s consisted of two elements: one was conformity with UN demands and the other one was the establishment of its own human rights hierarchy (Kent 1999, 147). Both elements could be observed at the 1993 United Nations world conference on human rights in Vienna, as well as its preparatory

¹⁴⁸ Xu, Jianyi (1992). *Zhongguo di renquan zhuangkuang: wenit jieda* (Human Rights in China: Answers to Questions). Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe.

meeting in Bangkok. China's active participation both in Bangkok and Vienna, a first, showed that China was ready to involve itself in the UN human rights discussions even if it exposed China to the possibility of being criticized by other states. The way China used the platform of Bangkok and Vienna also showed China's intention of defending its theory of hierarchical human rights. Together with other Asian states, China used the Bangkok meeting to give a slightly different spin on human rights, one that wasn't in line with the classical human rights process which they viewed as "dominated by Western interests" (Angle & Svensson 2001, 390). Although the resulting Bangkok Declaration¹⁴⁹ basically accepted the universality of human rights, it also contextualized and relativized its practical application:

"(The signatories) recognize that while human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural, and religious backgrounds". (Article 8, Bangkok Declaration In: Davis 1995, 205-209)

The statement later given by the Chinese government at the Vienna Conference took up two major aspects of the Bangkok discussions: the hierarchy of human rights (some rights are more important than others) and the state as the sole guarantor of human rights protection. Both aspects were vehemently defended in a statement by Liu Huaqiu, the head of the Chinese Delegation:

"We believe that the major criteria for judging the human rights situation in a developing country should be whether its policies and measures help promote economic and social progress, help people meet their basic needs for food and clothing, and improve the quality of their life." (Liu Huaqiu 1993, in: Angle & Svensson 2001, 393)

"According to the UN Charter and the norms of international law, all countries, large or small, strong or weak, rich or poor have the right to choose their own political system, road to development, and values. Other countries have no right to interfere. To wantonly accuse another country of abuse of human rights and impose the human rights criteria of one's own country or region on other countries or regions is tantamount to an infringement upon the sovereignty of other countries and interference in the latter's internal affairs, which could result in political instability and social unrest in other countries. As a people who used to suffer tremendously from aggression by big powers but now enjoys independence, the Chinese have come to realize fully that state sovereignty is the basis for the realization of citizens' human rights" (Liu Huaqiu 1993, in: Angle & Svensson 2001, 393)

This statement wasn't the last word of the Chinese at the Vienna Conference. The statement was strongly criticized by many other participants and also by human rights organizations that participated in the conference. To smooth some of the tensions created by this statement, China was willing to concede certain points in the drafting of the Vienna Declaration. The final draft of the Vienna declaration actually contained several points that were a reversal of the Chinese statement. First and foremost, the Vienna Declaration emphasized the recognition of the universality of human rights. Secondly, the declaration stated that democracy, development and human rights were interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Finally, the declaration stated that a "lack of development may not be invoked to justify the abridgement of internationally

¹⁴⁹ For information on the Bangkok preparatory meeting see Kent 1999, 162ff.

recognized human rights” (Vienna Declaration Section I, Paragraph 10, cit. in: Kent 1999, 185).

We can conclude that during the early nineties, despite or maybe because of the strong criticism China faced after the violent crackdown of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations, China made several concessions and actively started to participate in international human rights work. Judging from these developments, Kent is not highly optimistic about the Chinese engagement but points out the second point on China’s agenda; to develop their own human rights theory:

“Thus, although China made concessions to international human rights norms in the short term, ultimately the emphasis was more on constructing a theory of human rights with Chinese characteristics that could enable China to lead what is still called “the developing world” in a debate against the West.” (Kent 1999, 193)

SUMMARY: HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE IN CHINA

- Human rights have been actively discussed in China for the last hundred years. From the beginning, Chinese discourse was closely connected to nationalism and personal rights were perceived as necessary to liberate China as a nation.
- It is similarly important to note that most of the early Chinese discussion on human rights focused on civil political rights, while the concentration on economic rights came later.
- Under communist rule the concept of human rights was dismissed completely and referred to as a bourgeois idea. After Mao Zedong’s death the PRC’s attitude towards human rights changed significantly as it went from denial to ‘redefinition’. This new relativistic and hierarchical definition of human rights was always based on an economic argument (“poor countries have different human rights priorities”) and not on a view of cultural relativism.

3.2.3 Contemporary Discourse on and Significance of Human Rights in China (1994-2004).

In the last ten years, the issue of human rights has become very complex and contradictory in a country similarly complex and contradictory. Politically, China’s primary goal has been and continues to be is stability and maintaining the CCP’s power. Economically, China is changing incredibly fast. Both aspects, the firm grip of the CCP and the economic ‘great leap forward’, influence the human rights question.

THE OFFICIAL POSITION

Officially, the PRC is actively involved in international human rights work and frequently uses the language of human rights both in international and national politics. It has signed and ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (signed in 1997 and ratified 2001), and it has also signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1998). For many western countries the signing of the two covenants was a clear positive sign regarding China’s commitment to human rights. Human rights organizations are more critical, however, and interpret the signing of international covenants as part of China’s strategy “to shape norms to meet its own standard” (HRiC 2003, 23). This latter interpretation is at least partly justified,

as shown by an official statement in the China Daily commenting on the signing of the ICCPR:

“It is not that China’s stance or policies on the issues of human rights have changed (...), rather that the related favorable turn in the international atmosphere has created an opportunity for China to elaborate this perspective” (China Daily 22/10/1998).

The Chinese view on human rights was also enhanced through the government sponsored research and the regular issuing of white papers reporting on the human rights situation in China. In 2000, the government published a white paper entitled *Fifty Years of Progress in China’s Human Rights*, in which it underlined how much the human rights situation has improved under the socialist regime. The report mainly focused on legal conditions and did not mention any discrepancy between the situation on paper and in reality. The 2004 human rights report went in the same direction, pointing out how China’s economic progress has improved the human rights situation in China. The 2004 report also defends China’s political system, pointing to democratic developments, such as the right of people in villages to freely elect their village committee¹⁵⁰, and the consultation status of other political parties¹⁵¹. In this report China also reinforces its dedication to cooperating with the international community:

“Realization of full human rights is a common pursuit of all countries in the world. It is also an important target of China’s all-round construction of a well-off, harmonious socialist society. Together with the international community, China will, as always, make persistent efforts in promoting continuous progress of human rights in China and healthy development of international human rights”. (China’s Progress in Human Rights 2004, chapter VII)

In addition to the government white papers, there is a considerable amount of academic work on human rights, which by and large follows the official government line but occasionally criticizes certain viewpoints of the Chinese human rights situation and gives support to the international human rights movement. As an example, we can mention the text of Liu Nanlai, the deputy director of the Center for Human Rights Study at the Chinese Academy of Social Science. His essay about developing countries and human rights stresses both the particularity and universality of human rights in the light of each country’s cultural and economic background:

¹⁵⁰ Since 1994 the director and the members of the villager’s committee have been elected by the village residents. Villagers who are over 18 can register to vote, and voters can freely nominate the candidates. The number of candidates must exceed the number of open positions, and the election is secret. Through this system the dominance of the local Party branch could be somewhat reduced, and it is seen as possible way to more democratic political structures in China. Since 2001 the same system has been applied in some township government elections, but this process is still led very carefully. For more information on village administration see Chen, Hong-yi (2005). *Rural Administrative Organizations*. In: Luo, Jing (ed.) *China Today. An Encyclopedia of Life in the People’s Republic*. Westport, London: Greenwood Press, pp. 518-521.

¹⁵¹ The PRC recognizes eight “democratic parties”. These parties once were the third forces that tried to provide an alternative to the political agenda of the KMT and the CCP. First the democratic parties enjoyed real political participation, and its members served as functionaries and as vice chairmen on committees of the National People’s Congress. But the parties and its members were soon met with suspicion, and Mao Zedong considerably weakened their power by preventing their independence and forcing members to be reeducated. But the parties were never totally dismissed as “they were found to have propaganda value” (Zhao 2005, 113). In the reform era the parties gained independence, and their critical view and consultative and supervisory role, has become more respected. The membership has reached a historical high. But, China does not have a multiparty government, and they are expected to operate within a “multiparty cooperation system under the leadership of the Communist Party” (ibid, 114).

“Human rights have the nature of universality as well as of particularity; and in dealing with human rights issues, diversities in political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions must be taken into account.” (Liu Nanlai 1994, In: Angle & Svensson 2001, 407)

Liu does not actually elucidate the cultural influence on human rights but focuses mainly on the impact of each country’s colonial history and economic circumstances:

“While stressing the right of self-determination, developing countries also lay emphasis on the right to development of peoples of all states. Learning from their own experience, these states became full aware of that ‘underdevelopment is a main obstacle in the realization and enjoyment of human rights’. People living in poverty and backwardness are not in the position to talk about the enjoyment of human rights. Developing countries therefore realize that in order to guarantee and promote the realization of human rights, it is imperative to create conditions for each state to have an equal opportunity for development, in order to enable both the state and the individual to develop fully.” (Liu Nanlai 1994, in: Angle & Svensson 2001, 405)

Although Liu is pointing to certain specifics of the Chinese human rights theory, he does not criticize the international human rights work. He fully understands the Universal Declaration as an international document and not as a western product. To underline his view he points to the international makeup of the drafting committee, which included many representatives from developing countries, including China. In a 1998, Liu Hainian wrote an article on the importance of freedom of speech, expressing his hope that “the Chinese will enjoy more freedom of speech in the future” (Liu Hainian 1998, 4).

Li Yunlong (2004),¹⁵² another member of the Center for Human Rights studies, wrote another interesting essay on the question of universality and particularity of human rights. Li (2004, 2), in which he defended the same basic theory as Liu Nanlai, that “different countries and regions have different priorities when selecting human rights”. A remarkable point in Li’s article is that he stresses the aspect of national sovereignty. National sovereignty for Li is an “important part of human rights” (ibid.). According to his article, national sovereignty is both a human right and a condition for human rights. Li connects this question with the Taiwan question, arguing that national sovereignty is only given when reunification is completed (ibid, 3). Thus the reunification with Taiwan actually turns into a basic human right. With this rather wide definition of human rights, Li is picking up a strongly nationalist view that seems to become more and more important in the contemporary human rights discourse (see discussion below).

The two articles by Liu Hainian and Li Yunlong are published on the official Chinese human rights website entitled “China’s Human Rights”¹⁵³. This website provides links to a wide range of academic articles on human rights, with the aim of informing Chinese citizens and the world on the human rights progress of China. The site is implementing China’s different definition of human rights and focuses mainly on the right of subsistence. In its rubric “human rights in pictures” you can therefore see many pictures of emergency workers helping victims of natural disasters. The national news section featuring human rights related information, focuses on subjects such as emergency relief, environmental protection or public safety¹⁵⁴. Some articles also refer

¹⁵² The article was posted on the Internet in 2004, but was probably published earlier.

¹⁵³ www.humanrights-china.org .

¹⁵⁴ Some examples of news posted on the 23/09/2005: “Natural disaster emergency response system taking place”/ “Free from cars on Car-free day”/ “Risk governance helps human prevent epidemic”. www.humanrights-china.org dl. 24/09/05.

to civil and political aspects, mostly concerning new laws¹⁵⁵ and sometimes also touching on the subject of law implementation¹⁵⁶. On this official ‘China’s Human Rights’ website, dissident voices and direct criticism on China’s human rights situation is rare.

In March 2004, China endorsed a new amendment to the 1982 Constitution through which respect and preservation for human rights were added to the first article of the chapter on basic rights and obligations of citizens. The amendment also stipulated the right of private property, a novelty in socialist China.

DISSIDENT AND CRITICAL VIEWS

The lack of published dissident views doesn’t mean criticism is non-existent. Even after the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown dissident views have been repeatedly expressed. In 1994, seven scientists, intellectuals, and poets published “An Appeal for Human Rights”, urging the PRC government to respect human rights. In 1995, forty-five Chinese citizens drafted “An Appeal for Tolerance”¹⁵⁷. In 1998, encouraged by the signing of the two main human rights covenants (ICESCR 1997, ICCPR 1998), some of the authors of earlier appeals drafted two human rights declarations, one on civil and political rights, and another on social economic rights (Angle & Svensson 2001, 413). In both declarations, the authors argue that respecting human rights is a necessity if one wants to improve a country’s level of civilization and quality of life:

“The level of civilization and quality of life of any country or nation should not merely be measured by whether or not it safeguards the survival of its people and provides them with an abundance of material goods, but also by whether or not every citizen enjoys the freedom to choose his or her own way of living, and the freedom to pursue self-realization in accordance with his or her individuality and aspirations. Any country that has continued until the present day in its autocratic traditions will never be able to ascend into the ranks of modern civilized nations before it recognizes and safeguards the freedoms and rights of its citizens.” (Declaration on Civil Rights and Freedoms, in: Angle & Svensson 2001, 415).

Such appeals were accompanied by several attempts to organize the human rights movement. According to Svensson there were regional groups such as the ‘Human Rights Defense Movement’ founded in 1994 in Xi’an, or the ‘Shanghai Human Rights Association’ founded in the same year. Another effort was made in 1998 with the ‘China Human Rights Monitor’. All these efforts were doomed to failure, as the organizations never received official recognition and because many activists were imprisoned or had to leave China (Svensson 2002, 283)¹⁵⁸. It is probably justified to also mention the demonstration of around 10,000 Falun Gong adherents on Tiananmen in 1998, who asked for the official recognition of their Qigong-organization. In the West this incident is often perceived and described as a human rights action, as the demonstrators were asking for the right to freely practice their belief. This view, however, is not shared by the Chinese government who labeled Falun Gong as a dangerous cult and not a religion. Be that as it may, critical and dissident voices on human rights have not had an easy stand in China during the last few years, and if NGOs do not follow the official line, they hardly have a chance to

¹⁵⁵ E.g. “Chinese leader stresses importance of Law on Civil Servants” http://www.humanrights.cn/menu_c.asp dl. 24/09/05.

¹⁵⁶ E.g. “implementation of civil law stressed” http://www.humanrights.cn/menu_c.asp dl. 24/09/05.

¹⁵⁷ Different Appeals to the government from 1994-1995 are listed in “letters from Citizens: China’s Human Rights Movement”, *China Rights Forum* 1995, 10-14.

¹⁵⁸ For more detailed information on the fate of human rights activists see: www.hrichina.org.

survive. Many critical academic voices therefore come from dissidents living outside of Mainland China, e.g. from Hu Ping (living in the US since 1986) and Liu Qing, Chairman of the organization 'Human Rights in China' operating from New York and Hong Kong. Text of both scholars can be found in the Human Rights Reader edited by Angle & Svensson. The Website of 'Human Rights in China'¹⁵⁹ and its periodical 'Human Rights Forum' features information about China's dissidents and gives them a platform to express their opinions. It also provides detailed information about China's political prisoners and its general human rights condition.

It is immensely difficult to assess the human rights discourse in China in the twenty-first century. Some newspaper articles give the impression that human rights are not on the top of the agenda of today's Chinese people, who are still impressed by the economic progress China has made in the last few years¹⁶⁰. But, in some newspapers published in China, one can find references to human rights or even human rights violations. It seems that state controlled newspapers are amplifying articles that take critical stands towards China's human rights condition. Some mainly focus on single cases and do not extend their criticism to general issues, while others use these cases to directly or indirectly point to widespread human rights problems in China. A good example for this form of criticism is the case of She Xianglin, who, having confessed the murder after several rounds of interrogation, was convicted for murdering his wife. He stayed in jail for 11 years until his allegedly dead wife reappeared. This incident led to a widespread discussion of China's legal system and practice, and several law experts remarked that "forced confession has been common in many places in China" (People's Daily 05/04/2005). Lawyers and journalist also used the case to state that a "suspect's right to defense should be further respected and protected in the country" (ibid)¹⁶¹. It is probably too early to decide which of these tendencies, the politically disinterested focus on economy or the open discussion of political issues such as human rights, will prevail in China.

Having described the contemporary discussion and main arguments from both the official and non-official side, I'd like to analyze the contemporary significance of human rights in China along three more analytical aspects: Human Rights as a playing card in bilateral relations, the role of economic and social rights in today's China, and the importance of the cultural argument.

BILATERAL RELATIONS

The human rights issue not only plays a major role in multilateral settings such as the UN, it also has become an important aspect of bilateral relationships and diplomacy. Particularly in the 1990s, as western countries slowly became more interested in developing good relationships with China for economic reasons, the human rights issue was regularly discussed at diplomatic meetings. Many countries (Australia, Canada, EU, Germany, Norway, UK) have institutionalized their human rights talk with China, organizing regular bilateral dialogues on the subject. Other nations, such

¹⁵⁹ www.hrchina.org. Following the Harvard study on Internet filtering (<http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china>) and based on personal experience this site cannot be accessed in China.

¹⁶⁰ E.g. article published by BBC News in January 05 after the death of the former head of the politburo Zhao Ziyang, who supported the student's movement in 1989 and who was against a military intervention. The article elucidates the mood of university students, and finds "no revolutionary fervor of days gone by". Interviewing today's students about the Tiananmen demonstrations the article shows that many of them do not approve of the radical actions taken by the students in 1989. Also, they are not particularly interested in politics, paying more attention to China's economic improvement and attesting that the government is "doing its best". Article can be downloaded on <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4191129.stm> (dl. 26/09/05).

¹⁶¹ Full article can be downloaded on http://english.people.com.cn/200504/05/eng20050405_179578.html (dl. 26/09/05).

the U.S. and Switzerland, meet only sporadically with China. A 2003 survey from several NGOs (including Human Rights in China) is rather critical of the effectiveness of such bilateral discussions. Clearly these meetings supported and promoted China's openness to discuss human rights questions with other states, and it clearly shows that China has accepted the human rights issue as a "legitimate subject for discussion" (HRiC 2003, 23). However, the NGOs also feel that the discussions are often a sort of trade-off: the nations receive benefits in return for a promise not to support any resolutions against China at the UN Commission for Human Rights (UNCHR). In general, the survey judges the bilateral dialogues to be ineffective, and also criticizes the lack of transparency of such dialogues (ibid.). In her study about both bilateral and multilateral efforts to push China's concern for human rights, Rosemary Foot is slightly more optimistic. Although she agrees that today's pressure on China is much lower than in the early nineties, she is convinced that

"Governments, even under condition of reduced pressure, do seem to be convinced themselves, and to have had some success in convincing Beijing, that the issue (human rights) is never going to laid entirely to rest while China's record invites such concern." (Foot 2000, 272)

Whatever the case, China's most important and probably most controversial bilateral relationship partner is the U.S. While many countries lead their bilateral human rights talks with China in a very discreet manner and behind closed doors, the U.S. under the Bush administration has become an outspoken critic of China's human rights situation. In recent years the U.S. has tried in vain to push resolutions in the UNCHR, and has often publicly accused China of human rights violations. In its annual human rights report the U.S. gives detailed accounts of China's human rights situation, the outcome of which is generally very harsh and critical:

"The (Chinese) government's human right's record remained poor, and the government continued to commit numerous and serious abuses. Citizens did not have the right to change their government, and many who openly expressed dissenting political views were harassed, detained, or imprisoned, particularly in a campaign late in the year against writers, religious activists, dissidents, and petitioners to the Central Government. Authorities were quick to suppress religious, political, and social groups that they perceived as threatening to government authority or national stability, especially before sensitive dates such as the 15th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen massacre and other significant political and religious occasions." (Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Released by the U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, February 28, 2005)¹⁶²

Foot (2000, 265) judges the U.S. human rights policy towards China as both controversial and inconsistent. Because of the U.S.' own record of failing to fully protect human rights, its bullying is often negatively perceived as "U.S. moral imperialism" (Foot 2000, 265). Foot also blames the U.S. for its impatience with multilateral approaches and behaving as the "custodian of international order" (Foot 2000, 265).

"The USA's own record of failure (...) have opened Washington to charges of hypocrisy, and to the claim that international legal rules do not apply to it, only to the weaker states. For these reasons, the US message with respect to China's human

¹⁶² Full text of 2004 report on China can be downloaded on <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41640.htm>.

rights is made weaker and that weakness reduces the size of the constituency sympathetic to Washington's criticism of Beijing." (Foot 2000, 266)

The reproach of double standards that the U.S. has toward human rights has become even stronger in the last few years; the human rights violation of American soldiers in Iraq and its domestic anti-terror laws have exposed the U.S. to criticism from the UN and international human rights NGOs. Not surprisingly China has quickly taken on these accusations, and the counter-attack on the U.S. became useful in helping to dismiss the criticism of its own human rights record. Since 2001 the Chinese government has published the U.S. human rights record in answer to the 'Country Report' of the U.S. The most recent report accused the U.S. of strong human rights violation, listing racial discrimination, lack of social responsibility (widespread homelessness and poverty), lack of real democracy (as U.S. democracy is defined by money), and violations of prisoners rights in Guantanamo and Iraqi prisons. China's argument is simple and strong: because the U.S. does not respect human rights, it has no business criticizing the human rights situation in other countries

"Despite tons of problems in its own human rights, the United States continues to stick to its belligerent stance, only trample on the sovereignty of other countries, and constantly stage tragedies of human rights infringement in the world.

Instead of indulging itself in publishing the "human rights country report" to censure other countries unreasonably, the United States should reflect on its erroneous behavior on human rights and take its own human rights problems seriously. The double standards of the United States on human rights and its exercise of hegemonism and power politics under the pretext of promoting human rights will certainly put itself in an isolated and passive position and beget opposition from all just members of the international community." (Human Rights Record of the US in 2004. By the Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China)¹⁶³

In addition to this direct attack on the U.S., China broadens its arguments to point out that no country is perfect and hence none has the right to intervene in another country's human rights policy.

"No country in the world can claim itself as perfect and has no room for improvement in the human rights area. And no country should exclude itself from the international human rights development process, or view itself as the incarnation of human rights which can reign over other countries and give orders to the others." (Human Rights Record of the US in 2004. By the Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China)

Both the U.S. human rights report on China and the Chinese human rights report on the U.S. show how much human rights have become a playing card in their bilateral relationship. It is also interesting to note that the Chinese public is very well informed about this ongoing dispute. Unlike reports from independent NGOs such as Amnesty International, the U.S. report on Chinese human rights violations is often publicly discussed in China. This might be due to the fact that the U.S. report is not a real concern for the Chinese government; for most Chinese it exemplifies just another U.S. power gesture and thus can be easily ignored.

¹⁶³ Full text can be downloaded on http://english.people.com.cn/200503/03/eng20050303_175406.html.

THE NATIONALIST ARGUMENT

The assault on the U.S. human rights record is also an expression of China's newfound self-confidence that comes along with rising patriotism and nationalism. As we have seen, the question of human rights was strongly connected to nationalism in China's human rights history. During the May 4th movement, human rights rhetoric was used to defend personal and national liberation. The war against Japan temporarily united the Nationalists and Communists, and the human rights argument was used in war rhetoric against the Japanese. In today's human rights discourse, this nationalism is equally important. I already mentioned the article by Liu Yunlong which presents the reunification with Taiwan as an issue of human rights. The official Chinese human rights website¹⁶⁴ also features the section "Anti-Japanese War and Human Rights". The section contains reports about the human rights violations committed by Japan during the war, and commemorates the immense suffering of the Chinese people during this time. It also supports demands for the Japanese government to acknowledge these crimes and compensate the victims¹⁶⁵.

The nationalist argument is not only used to support human rights claims, but is also used as a justification to bypass individual human rights. National rights are officially valued higher than certain individual rights. Xu Huanzhou an ethic professor from South China Normal University in Guangzhou reasons that "in China, sovereignty, or the rights of the State, is the totality of all people's human rights" (cit. in: China Daily, May 31, 2000). Another example for this line of argument is an article which defends China's Tibet policy by citing the Tibetan studies professor Shes-Rab Nyi Ma who argues that the West has totally misunderstood the Tibet question, and that the Tibetans actually have strong patriotic feelings towards China, which they consider as a big family:

"Unlike those of nation-states in Europe, various peoples in China have seen in their long historical process the country (China) as their big family, so to defer to their human rights is to respect their choices of remaining in such a big family" (China Daily, May 31, 2000).

Dissident voices do not utilize the nationalist argument as often as the Chinese government does. Nevertheless for many Chinese it is the feeling of pride and love for their nation that motivates them to fight for the improvement of the human rights situation in China¹⁶⁶. One could summarize this feeling with 'China deserves better'¹⁶⁷.

The nationalist argument is used both to promote and to restrict human rights, and has always been closely associated with the human rights question. In China, human rights were never solely the business of an individual but always perceived as a deciding factor for the whole nation.

THE ECONOMICAL ARGUMENT

Economic rights started to play a role in China's human rights discourse very early on. Although the first Chinese human rights theories mainly focused on civil and political rights, the notion of economic rights was soon incorporated into the Chinese human rights discussion. As we have seen, Gao Yihan referred to economic rights in 1921,

¹⁶⁴ www.huamnrights-china.org.

¹⁶⁵ see <http://www.humanrights.cn/zt/antijapanese/index.html> (dl.28/09/05).

¹⁶⁶ See for example reactions to the death of a 27 year old designer after he was wrongly arrested by Chinese police on <http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/china/beijing08/voices.htm>.

¹⁶⁷ The Hongkong based journalist Frank Ching used this argument when stating his hopes that one day China will have a real democratic government. Article on <http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2486.html> (dl.28/09/05).

emphasizing the importance of providing decent economic conditions in order to truly be able to enjoy civil and political rights. In socialist China the focus on economic rights has been repeatedly used to brush away claims for more political rights. The research-campaign on human rights, initiated by the Chinese government, also stressed the economy as a major factor in defining any country's human rights agenda. This new argument did not aim to omit civil and political rights, but reasoned that human rights should develop parallel to economic development.

*“Along with social development, scientific and technological advancement and cultural enhancement, the Chinese will enjoy more freedom of speech in the future”
(Liu 1998, 4)*

The same reasoning is used to explain China's differing view on human rights: as a developing country, China has a different human rights agenda than richer, more developed countries in the West. This argument, that China is still a developing country, is still used today. In the foreword of the 2004 human rights report we find the following statement:

“China is a developing country, and its human rights conditions are in a process of sustained development and perfection” (Chinese Government 2005, Foreword on <http://www.humanrights-china.org>)¹⁶⁸.

The importance of economic rights in China's human rights definition can also be seen in its report on human rights in the U.S. Many of the human rights violations listed by the Chinese government are violations of social and economic rights. The reference to economic rights, as the shaping tool of human rights agendas, is an ongoing theme in China's human rights history, and still plays an important role today. But things have changed: China's socialism has survived only on paper. Through the implementation of economic reforms, all of which point in the direction of a capitalist market-economy (officially called 'Socialism with Chinese characteristics'¹⁶⁹), China has gone through an economic transformation. China's east coast has developed into a prosperous region, and it's population has become a largely middle-class society. For these regions, the argument that China is simply not developed enough to allow for civil and political human rights has no strength. The capitalist system also has created large income differences, both between citizens and between regions. The Chinese government's claim that it is ensuring equal social and economic rights to everybody is hard to support. Most of the Chinese are much better off now than 15 years ago, but the economic boom has also left some behind. These people are wondering where their social and economic rights have gone. Not surprisingly this changing economic situation has also led to shifts in the human rights discourse:

First, whereas before, allusion to the economy and economic rights has typically represented the official position, more and more dissident voices are pointing to violations of economic rights. Articles, books, and complaints to the government about China's social and economic gaps are not unusual anymore. Often the writers of such statements use the government's own rhetoric against it. In her work, Svensson

¹⁶⁸ Exact link <http://www.humanrights-china.org/news/2005-4-18/rdgz2005418111426.htm> dl. 25/09/05.

¹⁶⁹ This notion was introduced by Deng Xiaoping. He was eager to reform China's Socialism, departing from a mechanical and fixed understanding of socialism and turning to a flexible, constructive form of socialism which adapts itself to historic conditions. In this context Deng Xiaoping talked of three criteria which should be used to define a socialist economy: 1. Whether it is favorable to promoting the growth of the productive forces in a socialist society 2. whether it increases the overall strength of the socialist state and 3. whether it raises people's living standards (see: Li Deshun (2002). *The Theoretical Cornerstone of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics*. Social Sciences in China. Autumn, pp.95-100).

(2002) quotes a complaint to Jiang Zemin in 1997, written by a group of laid-off workers:

“You said that human rights in China are the right to eat rice. This is an arbitrary justification for the sake of political agenda. This is not human rights, but rather animal rights. Anyway, according to your interpretation, when tens of millions of workers are deprived of their right to eat rice, doesn’t this amount to the loss of their human rights?” (cit. in Svensson 2002, 287)

In the year 2004, Chen Guidi and Wu Chuntao published the “China peasant survey” (*Zhongguo nongmin diaocha*), in which they describe the poverty and miserable living conditions in certain parts of rural China. The book is a vivid narrative of peasants’ life. The survey describes innumerable cases of peasants who are wrongfully taxed by corrupt local governments, and, if they are not able to pay, their possession is confiscated or they get beaten up by village gangs. When the survey became a bestseller in 2004, the Chinese government stopped the printing of the book, as its content was justified as too delicate¹⁷⁰. Although the book does not explicitly refer to human rights, it is clearly an account of various social and economic human rights violations. Implicitly, the book blames the central government for not living up to its promises to protect the poor. We find the following commentary in the book:

“We have a central government that signed the international human rights convention, and after all we do live in a civilized age, how can it be that these savage gangs (which blackmail farmers, unrightfully collect taxes, and confiscate the land of farmers) are still tolerated?” (Chen & Wu 2004, trls ik)¹⁷¹

Another example of the call for economic rights is the 2005 article entitled “Peasants on the Verge” by Pu Wenzhong, published in ‘China Rights Forum’. This article discusses the difficulties peasants go through in defending their land rights against investors and local party bosses. Interestingly, the article was first published on the web site ‘Peasantry Droit Vindicate’, a China-based website focusing on peasant rights¹⁷².

The second shift observed in the economic rights discussion, is that the official rights rhetoric can no longer entirely focus on social and economic rights and on economy as the defining condition for human rights. Therefore new arguments have to be found. One such argument is the increased focus on rights of subsistence by the Chinese government. As mentioned above, the official human rights website has plenty of reports about emergency relief after natural disasters, demonstrating that the Chinese government cares for its citizens. The right of subsistence can be understood as a downscaled economic right, focusing not on the economic condition in general but on the right of survival.

A second such argument to justify the Chinese human rights hierarchy with a theoretical basis is the newly awakened reference to Chinese tradition. As the relationship between cultural heritage and human rights lies at the heart of this study, this argument will be discussed in detail.

¹⁷⁰ The book can now be downloaded on <http://www.bjsos.com/html/nmdc/> (dl. 3/10/05).

¹⁷¹ Chapter 2 on <http://www.bjsos.com/html/nmdc/2.htm>. Original text in Chinese: “我们有一个签署了《国际人权公约》的中央政府，又毕竟处于文明时代，怎能容忍恶势力猖狂！” I have translated the expression 恶势力 (*eshili*) as ‘gang’. Sometimes *eshili* is also used on a more abstract level, meaning “vicious power”. The examples of their criminal behavior appearing in brackets in the citation above, are added by myself, giving a summary of the situation in villages and the behavior of these groups described meticulously in chapter two of ‘nongmin diaocha’.

¹⁷² <http://www.weiqian.org.cn/>.

THE CULTURAL ARGUMENT

Throughout the history of human rights discourse in China, the cultural argument has been used only sporadically, and did not always play a major role for Chinese thinkers. Nevertheless, reference to Chinese tradition was made from time to time: at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, Chinese traditional heritage was understood as an obstacle to the development of a Chinese human rights culture. When working on the Universal declaration of human rights, Chinese scholars tried to find support for the human rights idea in the Chinese tradition.

For a long time after the Communists took power in China, the connotation ‘Chinese tradition- human rights’ was hardly ever made. The CCP took a very critical stand towards the Chinese tradition, understanding socialism as liberation from China’s antiquated and corrupt tradition. But, as we have already observed in the discussion about modern day religion in China (see 2.4.2, 64ff), socialism today no longer provides a valuable value-system, hence the Chinese government increasingly uses references to China’s inherent culture and tradition.

This pattern applies to the human rights discourse as well. China’s definition of human rights is no longer just a product of its specific colonial history and economic condition, but is substantiated through Chinese culture:

“China’s culture, which places national or collective interest over those of individuals, is reflected in Chinese thinking on human rights”. (Xu Guangzhou, China Daily May 31, 2000)

This attitude was also expressed in the Bangkok declaration that made a clear reference to the relationship between culture and human rights, and was repeated in China’s Vienna statement. This tendency to point to the Chinese special traditional and religious heritage not only to support the human rights idea, but also to create a specific Chinese definition of human rights, is ongoing and might even increase.

The official Chinese human rights website definitely points in that direction. For example, we can find an article entitled ‘China’s Fine Traditional Morality and World Human Rights Oriented towards the 21st Century’ (written in 1998, posted on the net in 2004), in which the author makes direct reference to Confucius, the book of rites, and classical Chinese heroes in the same breath as social model workers such as Lei Feng¹⁷³. The author of this article appeals to all Chinese intellectuals to further examine Chinese tradition for the sake of human rights:

“Therefore, Chinese scholars have due responsibility in further digging and sifting the national cultural treasure, thereby promoting the course of China’s construction and world human rights oriented towards the 21st century.”
(Zhang Hongyi 1998)¹⁷⁴

¹⁷³ The concept of “model workers” has been an important tool of socialist propaganda. Ordinary workers were awarded with prizes for their outstanding behavior, loyalty and good deeds. This policy is still maintained, and in 2005 3000 Model workers were awarded, including the NBA Basketball star Yao Ming. See www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-04/30/content_438991.htm dl. 24/09/05.

Lei Feng was a poor country boy who served in the Chinese army after the Socialist liberation and ‘loved whatever assignment he was given’. After his death in 1961 (a work accident), his diary was published and many Chinese were truly touched of this account of a man who was dedicated to serve China. In 1962 Mao Zidong called him a model for China, and asked the Chinese to learn from Lei Feng. Although there are some doubts about the accuracy of his diary, the ‘learning from Lei Feng’ campaign is still maintained and different projects such as “Learning from Lei Feng Volunteering Day” are launched every year. For more information see <http://www.iisg.nl/~landsberger/lf.html> / Bonin, Michel (1996). Le retour des héros. Perspectives chinoises, 34, pp. 10-20 (has been transl. In English ‘When the Saints Come Marching back, China Perspective, 5, 1996).

¹⁷⁴ On <http://www.humanrights-china.org/zt/situation/2004020049984627.htm>, dl. 04/10/05.

The animated slogan that pops up when clicking on the official China Human Rights website also makes an allusion to the Chinese traditional heritage, promulgating “BUILDING A HARMONIOUS SOCIETY”. Surely this slogan has often been used by the socialist regime, but it is also a reference to the Confucian teaching of harmony (see page 26f in Chapter Two). And whereas before this harmonious society would have been based on a socialist worldview, today China’s older traditions are considered as a guiding principle for both the government and the future generation:

„Government officials see certain Confucius instructions as guidelines for their work and important components of Chinese traditional culture the youngsters should inherit.” (Wen Min & Tian Suley 2002)¹⁷⁵

Clearly this does not mean that the Chinese government is in absolute favor of the Chinese tradition; they still criticize aspects of it and often blame parts of China’s problem (e.g. corruption) on China’s past traditions (in this case the feudal system before the Socialist Revolution). Nevertheless, the shift to a more positive assessment of China’s heritage, which we already observed in Chapter Two, is generally affirmed by the way traditional teachings are used to define China’s official human rights discourse.

The cultural argument is of course not foreign to those with views which are different from or opposed to the official human rights discussion. Looking at the arguments of those fighting for human rights in China, however, it can hardly be found. The reason for this, most probably, is the fact that these people are so convinced of human rights as a basic value of mankind that they do not need any other value sets to justify it. Also, tradition is sometimes perceived as hindering the development of the implementation of human rights. An article on the one-child policy¹⁷⁶ and the rising gender disparity in China (more boys than girls due to excessive female mortality before birth and during childhood), points to cultural values as one factor (among others). The article concludes with a remark that a higher value should be placed on human rights than cultural values and national goals:

“The principle of universality gives human rights precedence over government policies, cultural considerations and traditional values. No violation of human rights can be justified for the sake of achieving national goals, especially when those goals have been determined in isolation from the participation of the mass majority of China’s people.” (Liu Si-Si 2004, 54)

Whereas the cultural argument is not of central importance to human rights activists within China, it has been discussed by Chinese intellectuals abroad. The relationship between Chinese tradition and Human Rights was widely debated in connection with the ‘Asian Value Debate’, which arose in the early nineties and is still going on today. I will now summarize this debate and give an overview of what has been said about Chinese (religious) tradition and human rights in the context of this debate.

¹⁷⁵ On <http://www.humanrights-china.org/news/2004-6-7/Local200467164855.htm>, dl 04/10/05.

¹⁷⁶ The one-child policy was introduced in 1979. The policy has helped to reduce China’s birthrate and also has been a major factor to providing more freedom for Chinese women (family pressure of giving birth to many children has been lifted). On the other hand, the policy also has had negative outcomes, such as gender disparity (boys are favored, with higher abortion rates for female fetuses). Lately the one-child policy has been somewhat weakened. In certain areas people are allowed to have more children (e.g. for minorities and in cities where birthrate is low). Punishment for violators of the policy is mostly indirect (the state does not help finance education and medical treatment for the second child). For more information: Li Liying (2005). Social Issues of One-Child Policy. In: Luo, Jing (ed.) China Today. An Encyclopedia of Life in the People’s Republic. Westport, London: Greenwood Press, pp.450-453/ Luo, Jing (2005). History of One-Child Policy. In: Luo, Jing (ed.) China Today. An Encyclopedia of Life in the People’s Republic. Westport, London: Greenwood Press, pp.448-450.

SUMMARY: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA

- Human rights play a major role in modern China, both in the domestic and international context. China is strongly engaged in international human rights work, and is vividly defending its own human rights priorities.
- The question of human rights is an important factor in U.S.-Sino relationship.
- The discourse on human rights in Mainland China is strongly influenced by the government or government loyal agencies.
- The nationalistic element (human rights as a mean to empower China as a nation), is stronger than ever.
- The cultural argument (explaining different human rights priorities through different cultural heritage) has become more important in recent years
- Voices opposed to the official line still can be heard from inside China, but a great part of the Chinese non-governmental human rights discourse is led by Chinese abroad.
- Dissident voices both inside and outside China who previously mainly focused on civil and political rights now also widely discuss economic rights, as in today's China economic disparity is growing.

3.3 THE ASIAN / CHINESE VALUES DEBATE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

3.3.1 The Asian Values Debate

The Asian Value Debate mainly came about during the early 1990s. The reason for this debate was a) the spectacular economic progress of the so-called 'Tiger states' (Japan, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong), and b) the 1993 Bangkok Declaration on Human Rights. The same cultural specifics which were used to explain Asia's economic success, were also used to explain the different human rights policies of those same Asian states. I will now line out more specifically who initiated this debate, what it stood for, why it is widely criticized and why, despite the criticism, it cannot be totally rejected.

WHAT THE ASIAN VALUES DEBATE STANDS FOR

The Asian values argument was most prominently used by the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir¹⁷⁷, former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew¹⁷⁸, and a number of public intellectuals like the Malaysina Noordin Sopiee¹⁷⁹ and the Singaporean Tomy Koh¹⁸⁰, and Kishore Mahbubani¹⁸¹. These politicians and authors defend the hypothesis that there is a set of values shared by Asian people (normally the authors refer to East and Southeast Asia). These values, according to these authors,

¹⁷⁷ Full Name: Mahathir bin Mohamad, also called Dr. M., he was in office from 1981-2003.

¹⁷⁸ 1st Prime Minister of Singapore, in office from 1959 to 1990. Was senior Minister under Singapore's 2nd Prime Minister Goh, Chok Tong. Now under the 3rd Prime Minister (his son Lee Hsien Long), he holds the position of Minister Metnor, and is still considered the second most influential politician in Singapore. See: Lee, Kuan Yew (1998). *The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew*. Singapore: Times Editions.

¹⁷⁹ See, for instance: Noordin, Sopiee (1995). *The Development of an East Asian Consciousness*. In: G. Sheridan (ed.). *Living with Dragons*. St. Leonard: Allen & Unwin, pp. 180-193.

¹⁸⁰ See, for instance: Koh, Tommy T. B. (1999). *Differences in Asian and European Values*. Report of the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 30.

¹⁸¹ See, for instance: Mahbubani, Kishore (2001). *Can Asian think? Understanding the Divide between East and West*. Singapore: Times Editions.

stress community, order and harmony, respect for the political leadership, and, on an economic level, an emphasis on saving and thriftiness (Milner 2002, 2). It is these values that led to the economic success of Asian countries, and they deserve the utmost respect from everyone, including Western countries. It is these authors' contention that no one has the right to criticize Asian countries on the basis of ethnocentric western values. The defenders of these so-called Asian Values believe that Asia has to offer a lot to the world, and that the West can learn a lot from the East. Based on these assumptions about Asian Values, the universality of values and consequently of human rights is brought into question. Although most supporters of Asian values are not radical defenders of cultural relativism, they do point out that Asian values are different from traditional Western values, which may lead to different approaches to the human rights idea. Above we have seen how the Bangkok Declaration emphasized cultural differences when considering the issue of human rights (Article 8). In the logic of Asian Values proponents, this different approach toward human rights is needed if the Asian countries want to become peaceful and prosperous nations.

The emphasis on community related values was warmly welcomed by western communitarians, who saw an interesting alternative to the western neo-liberal model (see De Bary 1998).

HOW THE CONCEPT OF ASIAN VALUES IS CRITICIZED

Not surprisingly, the Asian values argument was also criticized. Critics pointed out that many of those advocating Asian values were authoritarian leaders, trying to stabilize their power and prevent democratic reforms which could endanger their political position (see Kessler 1999). Some called the whole Asian value debate a mere "justification" of unrightful power (Mendes 2002,2); others even considered it to be a "dangerous" argument, as it could become a self-fulfilling prophecy and end in a violent confrontation between West and East (Freeman 1998, 48).

In fact, the entire concept of "Asian Values" does not go unquestioned. Many authors doubt that there actually is a value complex which is particularly 'Asian' (Svensson 2000, Freeman 1996). In fact, the so-called 'Asian values' often are identified with Confucian values. It is quite obvious, however, that in Asia, and even within 'classical' Confucian societies like China or Japan, we find many other traditions that played a major role in East Asia (Buddhism, Popular Religion, Socialism, Islam for South Eastern Asia and so forth). And, as Svensson points out, "it is unclear what Confucian values actually are" (Svensson 2000, 201). The question of how to define Asian Values also is central to the argument of Michael Freeman, a British political scientist. He argues that there are no fixed Asian values and therefore no 'Asian concept' of human rights. Of course there are different interpretations of human rights, but these interpretations do not follow the borders of continents, regions or states. Because these interpretations can only be made on an individual basis, humans therefore have to be able to express themselves and their views. In Freeman's arguments, the universality of human rights "is the protector, not the enemy of cultural diversity" (Freeman 1996, 364), because human rights assure the possibility of the freedom of speech, and therefore the possibility to defend one's understanding of human rights.

A third important string of criticism is the way the Asian values argument related culture, values and behavior. The economic discussion, in which Asian culture and values were considered responsible for the economic success in Asia, was based on a linear relationship between culture, values and behavior: 'culture defines values and

values define behavior'¹⁸². This simplistic view of how culture influences economy was also contested by the economic developments in the late nineties, when the economy of the Tiger States, particularly Japan, experienced a significant setback. Interestingly, some of the values that before were seen as a factor for economic success were now blamed for economic difficulties (e.g. emphasis on stable relationships hindered a free market competition). A commentator stated that the economic crisis in Asia has sounded "the death knell for the Asia-values debate." (CQ Reasearcher, 24 July 1998, cit. in: Milner 2002, 4).

WHY VALUES CANNOT BE IGNORED

Clearly the Asian value argument is not totally proved wrong by Asia's economic development; not all Asian states went through a crisis and China's economic progress seems unstoppable. And even if Asian values are not a 100% guarantee for economic success, this would not totally exclude the notion of special Asian values. Therefore, although one has to consider the political motivation of those promoting Asian values, and although its implicit reference to a fixed set of Asian values and to a direct relationship between culture, values and behavior cannot be upheld, the whole culture-value discussion cannot and should not be ignored, especially in the context of human rights.

First, the reference to cultural values has become an important aspect of human rights discussions. As we can see, the cultural argument is still used by many actively involved in the contemporary human rights discourse in China, and the argument has also been "rediscovered" by the Chinese government.

Second, although culture does not define values once and for all, it does play a role in our values construction. A survey conducted in 1994 showed that many people in Asia seem more favorable to an orderly society and to concepts like harmony (Hitchcock 1994). Other research has also shown that 'culture' has a potential significance in explaining human behavior (see Hefner 1998, Milner & Quilty 1997). So generally speaking, culture does matter. It should not, however, be taken as a fixed and unchangeable concept, but rather as an evolving, transforming and ever shifting institution. Values are part of culture, and therefore they, too, evolve and change.

3.3.2 Tour d'Horizon: Different Concepts of the Relationship between Chinese Traditional Religious Values and Human Rights.

Having pointed to the importance of cultural concepts I'd like to return to our key question about how Chinese traditional religious values are related to human rights. Now, as much as there is no fixed set of Asian values, there is no fixed set of Chinese values. Chapter Two has already shown the variety of possible Chinese values emerging from its rich religious and cultural traditions. Nevertheless, many contemporary scholars have tried to investigate whether Chinese values are compatible with the human rights idea. It is the goal of this last part of chapter three to give an overview of these different attempts to relate Chinese values to human rights. The analysis of the different interpretations will follow three main questions:

- a) How are Chinese values defined?
- b) What do the authors say about human rights?
- c) How are the two concepts (Chinese values and human rights) related?

¹⁸² Kessler called this simplistic understanding of culture and behavior "vulgarized Weberianism" (Kessler 1999, 295).

Analyzing the different authors along these questions has shown that 5 different approaches to the relationship between human rights and Chinese values can be found, ranging from a conflicting relationship to a totally harmonious bond.

CONFLICTING APPROACH

As we have seen above, those Chinese authors writing about human rights at the beginning of the 20th century felt strongly that the western idea of human rights and its implicit concept of total equality of all men were desirable for China. One of the most prominent exponents of this movement, Chen Du Xiu (1916) (later the founder of the Chinese Communist Party), argues that the essence of Confucian thinking was the concept of *lijiao*, ritual teachings. Chen Diu Xiu considered these teachings, including the principle of the three bounds (loyalty, piety and obedience), to be incompatible with the western concept of equality. Therefore they had to be suppressed so that the “new way” (Chen, p.74) could be practiced in China.

Contemporary authors are not nearly as radical as the first Chinese human rights theorists. Nevertheless we find quite a few scholars that also tend to see a certain conflict between traditional Chinese values and human rights. Daniel W.Y. Kwok, who was born and raised in China and now is Professor of History at the University of Hawaii, emphasizes the importance of status and relations in Chinese thinking (Kwok 1997). He believes that the Chinese focus on ritual propriety (*li*) and respect to the five cardinal relationships has led to a conception of the self that is always seen in its social context. Inter-human relationships are socially defined and differentiated. To be a human being (*zuoren*) therefore means to be governed by rites. For Kwok, the Chinese understanding of equality only goes so far as to admit that human beings are equal “in the sense of being equally human and different from animals” (Kwok 1998, 85). This tradition has prevented the idea of a completely autonomous individual. Kwok is conscious that the Confucian emphasize on rites is only one part of Chinese tradition. He also mentions China’s Daoist tradition of liberating the self from any worldly attachment. He refers to the sage Ruan Ji who does not stop playing a game of chess even after hearing of his mother’s death, without bothering about any funeral rites. But, after Kwok, this form of rather selfish spiritual liberation from rites did not lead to the notion of individualism. This lack of individualism prevented the Chinese from creating a human rights concept and in many cases led to oppression:

“(A) mode of human behavior based on rites and not on laws, or a spiritual liberation that neither recognizes nor makes any moral claims, both leave themselves open to authoritarian and despotic rule. Sometimes they even serve as ideological sanction for wielders of despotic authority.” (Kwok 1998, 91)

Although Kwok acknowledges that China does have a fine and exquisite tradition, and that the notions of rights was not totally absent in Chinese tradition (Kwok 1998, 90), he points to the limits of the Chinese tradition and to the fact that China never produced a “belief or a code which can be labeled individualism or a code of human rights”(Kwok 1998, 91).

From this, he concludes that the Chinese understanding of what it means to ‘behave as a human being’ must be widened and altered if it is to be of importance in today’s world:

“If, then, the Chinese traditional civilization adept at “behaving as human beings” has any relevance and contribution to the increasingly global civilization of the present, it will depend on whether it can broaden its won basic view of what

constitutes a human being and endow this person with legal rights the protection of which he or she can effectively claim when necessary.” (Kwok 1998, 91)

The Korean Scholar Kim Young Eon (2001) also refers to the five hierarchal relationships defined by Confucius. She concludes that even though in Confucianism we find the important notion of ‘*ren*’, which can be translated as humanity, kindness, goodwill, human virtue or charity, this humanity refers only to the ruling class, to men and to the privileged. Weak and unimportant men, as well as all women, are excluded from this notion of humanity (Kim 2001, 99). The reason for this reductive understanding of humanity is, in Kim’s view, due to the Chinese understanding of humanity. In European philosophy, humanity is born out of the mandate to realize the inner nature of individual human beings and to respect its inherent dignity. Not so the Chinese understanding of ‘humanity’:

“The Chinese notion of ren, on the other hand, focuses on the creation of harmony between human beings. Individual rights are not part of that concept; the individual has to serve the public.”
(Kim 2001, 99)¹⁸³.

Kim also notes that basic human rights values, such as the right to life, freedom and property, although not absent in Confucianism, are presented not as individual rights but as a catalogue of duties.

Unlike Chen Du Xiu, Kim and Kwok do not propose suppressing Confucianism, but argue for a reinterpretation of Confucianism which would be compatible with democracy and human rights. In Chen’s eyes, human rights are a favorable concept, not only for the Western world but also for China.¹⁸⁴

VALUABLE ALTERNATIVE

The analysis of Roger T. Ames (1988) and Henry Jr. Rosemont (1988, 1997) strongly resemble those of Kim and Kwok. They too see fundamental differences between traditional religious Chinese values and human rights. Both of them stress the Chinese idea of the individual existing only in the context of society, as well as the importance of the community. They also agree with the view that this contextualized view of the individual is not fully compatible with the individualism proposed in the human rights idea. Ames (1988, 204) points to the relational conception of human nature (*gexing* 个性)¹⁸⁵ taught by Mencius, who understood the human being as an ever-changing matrix of relationships through which one develops and defines one’s nature.

¹⁸³ Original version in German: “Im Gegensatz dazu ist das Streben nach zwischenmenschlichem Ausgleich und Einklang. Individuelle Rechte haben in diesem Denken keinen Platz; das Individuum hat der Allgemeinheit zu dienen.” (Kim 2001, 99). The same understanding of *ren* is supported by the German Sinologist Weggel (1997, 46), who defines *ren* as the right of the public to survive and develop, and that *ren* therefore aims at a ‘general justice’ (Gesamtgerechtigkeit) and not an ‘individual justice’ (Einzelgerechtigkeit).

¹⁸⁴ This high approval of human rights as a concept superior to culture is also enhanced by Erin E. Douglas (2001), who shows in his article how Confucianism, although it promotes tolerance and justice, also “lessens the worth of the individual” (2001, 157), and stands for a more communitarian view of the world. But, in the view of Douglas “egregious violations of human rights are not acceptable, regardless of a nation’s history, culture, and rate of economic growth or slight improvements in human rights” (2001, 176).

¹⁸⁵ In this context Ames also points to the fact that the character for ‘nature’ (*xing* 性) is a cognate of the character for ‘family name’ (*xing* 姓), and also contains the same component *sheng* (life 生). Ames considers the shared implications of the two cognates: “Like the concept of human nature, one’s family name is a generalization shared by a group of people that both defines them and is defined by them (...). Neither one’s family name nor one’s nature is an essential or innate faculty; both are a focus of relationships in which one participates” (Ames 1988, 204).

But unlike Chen, Kim or Kwok they do not consider this aspect as a shortcoming of the Chinese tradition, and in fact tend to favor the Chinese way of viewing the world. They do think that the concept of human rights is insufficient as it is based on the (wrong) “fundamental view of human beings as free, autonomous individuals” (Rosemont 1998, 55), and tries to reach human dignity through legal standards.

“In fact, reliance upon the application of law and human rights as a subset of law, far from being a means to realizing human dignity, is fundamentally dehumanizing, impoverishing as it does the possibilities of mutual accommodation and compromising our particular responsibility to define what would be appropriate conduct.” (Ames 1988, 213)

For Ames and Rosemont, the Chinese model with its concept of the individual as part of the community and of maintaining human dignity through social pressure and morals, therefore is a valuable alternative to the human rights idea, which has not proved as helpful to creating a peaceful and just world.

“The Confucian alternative suggests that almost all the actual rights and duties which define the sociopolitical order are sustained by extralegal institutions and practices and are enforced by social pressures rather than punishments. (...). The emphasis on ritual (...), is an effort toward optimization of these same possibilities. The Chinese model suggests alternative nonlegal mechanisms for resolving conflicts.” (Ames 1988, 213).

“Perhaps, then (...) we should study Confucianism as a genuine alternative to the modern Western theories of rights, rather than merely as a potentially early version of them. When it is remembered that three-quarters of the world’s peoples have, and continue to define themselves in terms of kinship and community rather than as rights-bearers, we may come to entertain seriously the possibility that if the search for universal moral and political principles is a worthwhile endeavor, we might find more of a philosophical grounding for those principles and beliefs in the writings of Confucius and Mengzi than those of John Locke, Adam Smith, and their successors.” (Rosemont 1998, 64)

In one of his publications, the German Sinologist Karl-Heinz Pohl (2002) discusses the compatibility between democracy and traditional Chinese values. Here, Chinese values are described as being orientated on consent, family and status, in which status defines the interpersonal relationships. Pohl (2002, 114) supports the idea of a traditional pattern that is inherent to the Chinese, in which public harmony and stability is the highest good¹⁸⁶. The philosophical background of this attitude is the traditional yin and yang theory, which describes two complementary poles. Pohl (2002, 114) concludes that while in the West we have a culture of discussion and open debate (“Streitkultur”), in China we find a culture of consent (“Konsenskultur”). In Pohl’s view it is doubtful whether western models of democracy and human rights make any sense in such a culture of consent. Although he does not (like Rosemont and Ames) promote that the West should learn from the Chinese model, he suggests that the Chinese should decide for themselves their culture what political and economic system they’d like in the future. For Pohl (2002, 128) it is clear China’s traditional

¹⁸⁶ Here Pohl refers to the work of the Chinese scholar Li Zehou, who talks of a cultural-psychological structure (wenhua –xinlijiegou). After Li Zehou this ‘underneath structure’ has stayed the same for the Chinese in spite of the recent transformation of China (see: Li Zehou 1992).

heritage provides a valid alternative which might lead to a less pluralistic form of democracy that respects China's orientation on consent, status and particularity¹⁸⁷.

COMPLEMENTARY APPROACH

The majority of contemporary authors probably do not come to such conflicting conclusions when analyzing the relationship between traditional Chinese values and human rights. Quite a few authors do support a complementary approach: they do believe in the universality of human rights but are also convinced that Chinese traditions can contribute to a more universal understanding of human rights.

The Chinese Intellectual Xia Yong¹⁸⁸ (1992), for example, is convinced that Eastern and Western value systems actually do complement each other. Xia (1992, 377f.) argues that China never created the idea of human rights because it has always emphasized duties and not rights, and the rule of virtue over law. In proposing humanity, benevolence and dignity, China was relying on active mutual love (*ren*) and not on passive mutual constraint. Yet Xia is convinced that the Chinese concept of harmony proposes a balance between the individual and the collective. While only focusing on individual rights the West sometimes tends to give all rights to the individual. On the other hand, the Chinese idea of harmony could never be fully realized as it was lacking the idea of individual rights. This argumentation leads Xia to the conclusion "that only when the spirit of humanism and great harmony in the Chinese tradition are accompanied by the spirit of the rule of law, can the harmony of humankind be better promoted" (Xia 1992, 387).

This necessity for connecting both western and Chinese views is also vividly promoted by the leading Confucian scholar Tu Weiming¹⁸⁹. For him, Confucian core values include the perception of the individual as the center of relationships, society as a community of trust, and the emphasis on duty. But although these values are not promoted by western liberalism (through which the human rights idea emerged), Tu is positive that:

"These values (the Confucian core values) are not only compatible with the implementation of human rights; they can in fact, enhance the universal appeal of human rights. The potential contribution of in-depth discussion on Asian values to a sophisticated cultural appreciation of the human rights discourse is great." (Tu Weiming 1998, 299)

Tu is convinced of the positive contribution of Confucianism to the human rights idea, and even claims that Confucian ethics have some of the spirit of the European Enlightenment. He is convinced that the Confucian personality ideals, such as the 'noble man' (*junzi*) or the sage (*shengren*), "can be realized more fully in the liberal-democratic society than in the traditional imperial dictatorship or a modern authoritarian regime. He therefore demands that:

¹⁸⁷ Original formulation in German: "So liesse sich denn auch fragen, obwohl demokratische politische Verhältnisse universell wünschenswert sind, inwieweit man dem Wachsen von alternativen und möglicherweise weniger pluralistischen demokratischen Strukturen, die jedoch mit den jeweiligen kulturellen Grundmuster (Konsenskultur, Statuskultur, partikularistische Kultur) verträglicher wären, Raum zu geben bereit ist.

¹⁸⁸ Xia Yong is a professor at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He wrote the first dissertation in China to deal with human rights. The following summary is based on a chapter of his thesis, published in Angel & Svensson's Chinese human rights reader.

¹⁸⁹ Tu Weiming is sometimes referred to as a representative of the Neo Confucians (rather confusing because we also talk of Neo Confucianism referring to the Confucian thinkers such as Cheng Yi or Zhu Xi, active during the northern and southern Song dynasty (960-1200) or of New Confucians. Most of the New Confucians are convinced that some aspects of Confucianism are very helpful in today's world, and that the elements no longer considered tenable have to be separated from those that are applicable in a modern liberal-democratic setting.

“East Asian Confucian ethics must creatively transform itself in the light of Enlightenment values before it can serve as an effective critique of the modern West. (...) Our willingness to learn from significantly different conceptualizations of the rights discourse and to respond openly and responsibly to criticisms of deficiency in our own human rights records must serve as a precondition for our determination to share our experience with the rest of the world and to make sure that human rights violation share clearly noted and properly corrected by the instruments at our disposal.” (Tu 1998, 304)

One of the most prominent scholars in the field of Chinese values and human rights is Theodore De Bary, a specialist on Neo-Confucianism and coworker (or better ‘co-thinker’) of Tu Weiming. He too can be considered a defender of the complementary approach. He finds evidence that, especially in Neo-Confucianism, the idea of human rights is represented already (De Bary 1988; 1997; 1998). To underscore this statement De Bary refers to Chiu Chun, a Confucian scholar from the Ming-Period. Chiu Chun uses the concept of *li* (ritual propriety) in a way we would mostly refer to law. When talking about self-cultivation, the major goal of *li*, Chiu Chun emphasizes self-liberation. De Bary concludes that Chiu Chun was “making a case for human rites in terms that came close to what we call human rights” (De Bary 1988, 194). In his introduction to the book ‘Confucianism and Human Rights’ (1998) De Bary also brings up the Confucian reformer Fan Zhongyan (989-1052), who interpreted the concept of the good and honorable man (*junzi*) as somebody who is compassionate and worries first of all about the world’s worries. In De Bary’s eyes, this idea of caring for the world goes hand in hand with the idea of human rights (De Bary 1997, 9). So although he agrees that Confucianism is rites-based and often supports equity over equality, De Bary is convinced that the basic human rights elements can easily be found in Confucianism. Not only are these ideas compatible but “Confucian personalism, family ideals, and social conscience (...) may provide a better grounding for both human rights and environmental rights” (De Bary 1997, 9). As with Tu, De Bary is persuaded that the learning process is twofold, and that not only does Confucianism contribute to the human rights idea, but human rights are able to solve some problems inherent in Confucianism:

“(...) “rites” alone had proved insufficient to cope the realities of power in late Imperial China, and when informed Confucians of the late nineteenth century in China became aware of constitutional law and “peoples rights” in the West, some recognized it immediately as having relevance to the ‘worries’ of earlier Confucians.” (De Bary 1998a, 109)

A fourth scholar who supports the idea of the two systems being complementary is Perenboom (1998). He argues that the Confucian function of rites (*li*) is to establish a moral consensus, but that it does not protect from tyranny if this consensus is broken. At that point, the human rights idea must be taken into account. Although Perenboom considers the two systems complementary, he takes the stance that when they are conflicting, human rights must be valued higher. Finally I’d like to mention the article of Wejen Chang, another defender of the complementary approach. He chose a unique way of reasoning, based mainly on the Confucian idea of *fen* (share), which he considers to be the closest Confucian concept to the western idea of rights. This does not mean that *fen* is just another name for rights. Chang translates *fen* as “his share or the responsibility each has in the life of the group” (Chang 1998, 128). Compared to rights, which can be a gift (either from society or nature), *fen* is always a social product:

“A person’s fen is a share of what is crated by the joint efforts of many members in a society, which they see fit to let him enjoy. The validity of a fen is thus dependent on the good will of those concerned; a person is not born with a fen, his fen is what his society allows or assigns him.” (Chang 1998, 132)

Chang argues that this concept of *fen* actually insures what today is called social and economic rights, but that the Confucian arguments did not use the concept of ‘claiming rights’; Confucianism maintained that people should treat each other as fellow human beings and help one another as fellow human beings to live a good life. This in Chang’s eyes is an idea easily compatible with human rights, and it even has certain advantages: whereas rights often provoke struggle and conflict, the concept of ‘share’ relies on mutual respect and reciprocity. On the other hand, the concept of share has its limits. When reciprocity does not prevail the individual has no means to fight for his ‘share’. That’s when human rights are a possible tool for empowering the individual. Out of this logic Chang develops his ideal of the two value systems complementing each other:

“Fortunately the two approaches are not mutually exclusive but can be complementary-people can first learn the Confucian norms and become compassionate and respectful toward on another and then be assured that they have certain “rights” which they can, when necessary, assert and defend. People would then have the benefits of both approaches but the problems of neither. Thus I would recommend this two-step approach to both those who live in the Confucian tradition and those who are more accustomed to the Western ideal of “human rights”, hoping that the combined wisdom of the East and the West could enable us to better achieve our common objective.” (Chang 1998, 134)

COMPATIBLE APPROACH

A rather pragmatic approach is followed by Sumner B. Twiss (1998). He is certain that Confucian thinking is not at all opposed to human rights. He demonstrates that in Confucianism a human is a social being, that duties of an individual toward its community are of a primary importance, and that social relationships are fundamental to communal flourishing. At the same time, Confucianism emphasizes moral self-cultivation, which aims to develop the virtues of benevolence, righteousness, propriety and discernment (Twiss 1998, 40). This leads Twiss to the following three hypotheses:

- (1) because of its focus on the collectivity, Confucianism is properly open to the recognition of socioeconomic Human Rights;
- (2) Neo-Confucianism, which focuses on the autonomy of the moral mind and individual conscience, is also compatible with the first generation civil-political Human Rights; and
- (3) Confucianism is also compatible with the third generation of development, collective rights. This last hypothesis is supported by the notion of the righteous rebellion and by the ideal of the unity of Man and Heaven. This latter ideal extends Confucian humanism to a universal scale, a notion that “would not only support the Third and Fourth World developmental claims to participate in the power, wealth and heritage of humankind, but also their rightful claims to peace and harmony on a total world scale” (Twiss 1998, 43).

Behind these three hypothesis lies the more general opinion that it is essential to find support for human rights in different traditions, as only through such a multi-cultural approach the universality of human rights can be achieved (Twiss 1998, 38).

A comparable approach is taken by Julia Ching (1998), who understands human rights as a (western and modern) product of different philosophical developments in

European history. But although the idea of human rights has never come up in China, China has had comparable philosophical history (e.g. humanism), and therefore it was no problem for Chinese and Confucian thinkers to take up and support the human rights idea. For China the problem of China and human rights is not a cultural but a political one:

“If obstacles remain to the observance of human rights in China, they are due not to any incompatibility of these concepts or practice with Confucian tradition, but to the misuse of political power in defense of entrenched repressive regimes.” (Ching 1998, 80)

HARMONIOUS APPROACH

Certain authors don't think merely that the two value- systems (Chinese values / human rights) are compatible but go even a step further, claiming that they are actually harmonious. Irene Bloom (1997), for example, shows how one of the most important scholars in Confucianism, Mencius, proclaims natural dignity as something which belongs to every human being regardless of his status. This idea in Bloom's eyes is closely connected to the Western human rights idea, which is based on the inherent dignity of every human being. Of course Bloom does not claim that Mencian Confucianism generated human rights and democracy, but

“that its fundamental institutions -with their crucial affirmations of human equality, responsibility, relatedness, and respect- are consistent with and morally and spiritually supportive of the consensus documents [human rights documents] that figure so importantly in our emerging modern civilization” (Bloom 1998, 111).

Bloom is not alone in her positive view of the relationship between human rights and Chinese values. The Chinese Authors Du Gangjian and Song Gang (1995) start their analyses by stating that “the fundamental nature of human rights ideology can be said to be based upon benevolence in the maintenance of personal dignity” (Du & Song, 1995, 37). Citing the Confucian Analects, which mention benevolence (*ren*) 109 times, the authors are convinced that the philosophical basis for Human Rights is laid out in Confucianism. They support their hypothesis by showing first, that *ren*, although strongly connected to *li* (ritual propriety), is always of primary importance. Second, *ren* promotes an active benevolence, and third it “depends upon individualism” (Du & Song, 1995, 38), calling on each person to use his own capacity to accomplish benevolence. As we can see, unlike the authors described so far, Du and Song do think that there are certain traces of individualism in Confucianism, and thus is compatible with the concept of human rights.

An alternative argument comes from Louis Henkin (1998). He thinks it is unfair to compare “antique” traditional Confucian concepts with “modern” human rights. If we analyze the two different concepts we have to focus on contemporary Confucianism, where there is a strong emphasis on human dignity. For Henkin, the concept of human rights is not based on imperialism, as it does not demand total uniformity and conformity, but rather is considered to be the mere ‘minimum’ which is required to maintain human dignity. In Henkin's view this maintenance of human dignity is also essential to contemporary Confucian values, leading Henkin to the conclusion that “there is no intrinsic inherent tension between Confucianism and human rights”(1998, 313).

3.3.3 Characteristics of the 'Chinese Values and Human Rights'- Discussion

This quick excursion through some more philosophical approaches shows that 'human rights' are mostly referred to using values such as dignity, equality, individualism, and the rule of law. Some authors like Rosemont and Ames seem to judge these aspects negatively. They contest the principle of the rule of law, and are skeptical towards the form of individualism which is implied by human rights. For them, human rights have failed to provide a valid universal ethic for the globalized world. On the other hand I've also presented three (interestingly Asian) authors, Chen, Kwok, and Kim, who perceive human rights to be a liberating concept that is of major importance in today's world. Most other authors mentioned here do share this view and generally support the idea of human rights and its universal claim. Nevertheless some scholars (e.g. De Bary and Tu) point to certain shortcomings of the human rights concept, in particular its implicit and (in the eye of these authors) radical individualism. They feel that Confucian values can contribute significantly to a different or more complex understanding of human rights.

Confucian values are most often identified with concepts like *li* (ritual propriety), *ren* (benevolence) and the importance of community. Again the authors differ in how to assess these values; for some they are a hindrance to developing a just and democratic society (Kim, Kwok), while for others they are a real alternative to creating a more peaceful and harmonious world-community (Rosemont, Ames). Still others feel that these Confucian concepts, while not a substitute for universal human rights, can be interpreted as an underlying philosophy of human rights (e.g. Ching, Twiss). Those authors claiming that Confucian values are not opposed to human rights point mostly to the aspect of personal dignity, an idea which underlies both human rights and Confucian values. Based on their different judgments about human rights, the universality of human rights and Confucian values, and the usefulness of these values, the authors come to very different conclusions about the relationship between human rights and Confucian values: As we have seen, the resulting relationships range from "conflicting value sets" to "totally compatible values".

As already indicated when talking about the Asian value debate, this 'sub-discussion' about the compatibility of traditional Chinese values and human rights can be criticized on various levels.

First, just as it is hardly possible to define Asian values, it is similarly difficult to define Chinese or Confucian values. Most of the authors described above present Confucian values as if they were the only Chinese value system. The book "Human Rights and Chinese Values" (Davis (ed.) 1995), which features the article of Du and Song, practically only refers to Confucian values. Other traditions like Buddhism, Daoism and Popular Religion are not mentioned. Articles explicitly focusing on Confucian values often present these values as the only influential traditional value system in China, and only rarely mention that other traditions have also played an influential role in China¹⁹⁰. As I have pointed out in Chapter Two, these traditions sometimes promote very different values than those proposed by Confucianism. For example, if we recall the different concepts of Chinese cosmology (e.g. correlation of yin and yang, five phases), which are based on a unitary and interconnected view, as well as work through shared energy, we find that these aspects do not necessarily imply the notions of hierarchy and status, one of 'core' values in Confucianism. Even if we do only consider Confucian values we find conflicting views in meaning,

¹⁹⁰ Svensson makes a similar critique about the Asian value debate when she says that "Asian values often come to be identified with Confucian values" (2000, 201).

perspective and definition (e.g. the meaning and importance of *ren* [see page 33]). It is therefore not possible to talk of Chinese or Confucian values as fixed and coherent, especially because one major aspect of Chinese thinking is its ability to combine beliefs and values that often seem contradicting to the observer.

Svensson brings up a second critique on the Asian value debate. She disapproves that many authors do not make clear whether they are looking for concepts that are compatible with human rights or whether they are actually trying to “discover proto-human rights ideas within Confucianism” (Svensson 2000, 202). The latter is definitely more difficult and slightly far-fetched. In this respect it is also important to clearly distinguish between human rights and the concepts of individualism and human dignity. Clearly the “latter presupposes the former” (Svensson 2000, 203), but they do not mean the same thing. In my view, many of the authors mentioned above identified human rights with either one or the other of these concepts, either explicitly or implicitly. Whether they perceived human rights simply as a concept of human dignity or one of individualism was a deciding factor in whether human rights were perceived negatively or positively, and often strongly influenced their conclusion about the compatibility of traditional Chinese values and human rights.

With this we have touched upon a third critique. The conclusions the authors make are highly subjective and often strongly influenced by their own cultural background and biography. We can, for example, observe the ‘grass is greener on the other side’-phenomena, when looking at the three Asian authors Chen, Kwok and Kim. These authors may have experienced the narrowing ambiance of an authoritarian Confucian environment and become derogatory towards their own tradition while advocating the western idea of human rights. On the other hand, many western authors have observed and experienced the difficulties of living in a pluralistic society sometimes indulging in extreme individualism (or egoism). This consequently makes them critical towards the concept of human rights and open to an alternative value system that brings new solutions.

So, I dare to make a very general and arguably simplistic statement about the relationship between human rights and Chinese values: on a theoretical and philosophical level these two value systems are totally compatible, if we want them to be. It just depends on how we define and judge human rights and on how we define and judge traditional religious Chinese values.

With this remark I do not want to ridicule the whole discussion, but just want to point out its subjectivity and the extent to which scholars can construct and define the relationship between human rights and Chinese values.

The work presented here will now attempt to leave the philosophical and theoretical level and turn to a more empirical analysis of the question.

SUMMARY: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES AS PART OF THE ASIAN VALUE DEBATE

- Many scholars discussed the possible relationship of human rights and traditional Chinese values as part of the Asian value debate.
- In this respect it could be observed that Chinese values are often identified with Confucian values.
- Confucian values are described with the concept of *li* (ritual propriety), *ren* (benevolence) and the importance of relationships and communities.
- Different approaches about how the authors judge the relationship between human rights and Chinese values can be found:
 - Conflicting approach: Confucianism is not compatible with the human rights idea, China must therefore either let go of Confucianism or (as this is hardly possible) totally reinvent Confucianism.
 - Alternative approach: Confucianism has a different worldview than implied by human rights. The Confucian alternative of structuring a community based on rites rather than rights, is favorable to us all as it prevents people from falling into the trap of individualism.
 - Complementary approach: Confucianism implies certain aspects that are not part of human rights thinking. These aspects should be combined in order to promote a more complex and universal human rights definition of human rights.
 - Compatible approach: There are several ideas of Confucianism that are compatible with human rights thinking.
 - Harmonious approach: We can find similar ideas in Confucianism as in the concept of human rights.

CHAPTER FOUR CHINESE VALUES – A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH



People burning incense in the Confucian Temple in Qufu, August 2004

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4 CHINESE VALUES- A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH

4.1 WHAT ARE VALUES?

In Chapters Two and Three we have addressed the question of values without really defining the term ‘value’, but rather have used it in a common-sense way. As this study pursues a sociological approach, it is necessary to examine the term ‘value’ and its connotation in social theory. Below I will discuss possible approaches to the content of values, the possibility of measuring values and how values can be explained. Different approaches from both the fields of sociology and of social psychology will be presented. These approaches contribute to the construction of a set of value-qualities that will be used in this study. Further, I will apply the discussed value theories to the Chinese context and to human rights, examining how the values promoted by Chinese tradition and the values represented by human rights fit into these theories.

4.1.1 Value content and structure

For a long time values have been understood as philosophical concepts, which were inseparably tied to a life of virtue and morality. In this view, values were understood as fixed elements of a stable system. However, most modern sociologists have abandoned this idea of values being stable and fixed. Rather, values are considered as “desirable goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in peoples lives” (Schwartz 1995, 93). This definition implies three qualities of values:

- (1) Desirability: Values do not represent facts, or how things really are in people’s lives, but how they wish them to be. Following this understanding of values, we could say, for example, that the Confucian value of hierarchically structured families does not mean that all Chinese families are hierarchically structured, but that Confucian scholars wish it was that way.
- (2) Varying importance: Not every value is of the same importance. If we take another Confucian example, like the value of *li* (ritual propriety) and the value *ren* (benevolence), we can note that, in cases where there should be a contradiction, certain authors estimated *ren* to be more important than *li*. Also, this aspect implies that the importance of values can change concerning the situation in which the value is applied.
- (3) Guiding principles: To understand values as guiding principles means to differentiate them from attitudes. Attitudes describe concepts that we have towards a certain topic, they are always attitudes about something. They answer questions like: “Do you think human rights are a good thing or not?” or: “What do you think about abortion?” Values, on the contrary, are more basic concepts that stand behind certain attitudes. They refer to major goals we have in life and are more stable than attitudes. Although values transcend actions and situations they may be context-dependent, and “seemingly inconsistent values may be held concurrently” (Bergmann 1998, 79f).

In studying the structure and pattern of values, several authors (e.g. Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck 1961, Rokeach 1979, Schwartz 1996, Hofstede 2001) have tried to define a universal set of human values. We find remarkable similarities among the different value concepts of these authors, which suggests that something like a universal set of human values might exist. Although it is not the goal of this study to examine the

suitability of such universal value theories, I will now further explain the value theories of Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck and Schwartz, as their theories might be helpful when it comes to analyzing the results of this survey in a broader context.

KLUCKHOHN AND STRODTBECK'S VALUES ORIENTATION THEORY

Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck based their theory on the following definition of values given by Clyde Kluckhohn, who defined values as:

“A conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of action” (Kluckhohn 1951, 395)

Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck tried to put the principles stated in this citation into action, when they made three basic assumptions about values:

- (1) *“There is a limited number of common human problems for which all peoples must at all times find some solution”*
- (2) *“While there is variability in solutions of all the problems, it is neither limitless nor random but is definitely variable within a range of possible solutions”*
- (3) *“All alternatives of all solutions are present in all societies at all times but are differentially preferred” (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck 1961)¹⁹¹*

They part from the assumption that the solutions to these problems, chosen by a given society, actually reflect a society's values. This implies that by measuring the preferred solution, we can define the values promoted by that society. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) suggested five types of problems, which occur and have to be dealt with in every society¹⁹². These five problems are (1) the question about the time of orientation: do we primarily focus on the past, the present or the future? The second question concerns (2) the relationship between humanity and nature: do we want to control nature, submit to nature or live in harmony with it? Another problem to solve concerns the sphere of (3) inter-human relationships: do we prefer hierarchical, collateral or individualistic relationships amongst each other? On a more psychological level is (4) the question of motivation: What is our prime motivation to express ourselves? Finally Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck name (5) the problem about the nature of human beings: are we basically good or bad, and can we change?

After sorting out these five value dimensions they then formulated possible answers to these questions, stating that the answer chosen would reflect the value priorities of a society. To better understand these five dimensions, and to find out whether the theory might be helpful for this study, I would like to apply these dimensions to some of the value dimensions of Chinese religious traditions described in Chapter Two. Of course, this is a solely theoretical application, based not on what solutions were chosen by Chinese society but on what solutions are proposed by the different Chinese religious traditions. The table below lists the 5 basic questions, the different orientation of possible solutions, an explanatory description, and value concepts we found in Chinese tradition, which totally or partly support the respective orientation:

¹⁹¹ Reprinted on <http://www.valuescenter.org/method.html>, dl.18/04/05.

¹⁹² Comparable models have been created e.g. by Maslow (1954), who singled out 8 different human needs and their priorities, starting with physiological needs and ending with transcendence. In this logic new needs become evident once the prior need is satisfied (Only when having freedom I can start thinking of XXX). The peace researcher Galtung (1990), has used this basic theory of Maslow to create his list of basic human needs. According to Galtung, not only physical needs are to be considered but also psychological and societal needs, e.g. welfare, freedom, meaning, are basic needs, and have to be met in order to guarantee peace (Galtung 1990, 301-335).

Table 1: Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck value orientation¹⁹³

Question	Orientation	Description	Tradition in which we can find this orientation (not exclusively)
Time	Past	Focus on the past, preserving and maintaining traditional teachings and beliefs.	Confucianism: goal is to restore ideal state, <i>li</i> (ritual propriety which focuses on traditional behavior)
	Present	Focus on the present, and on accommodating changes in beliefs and traditions.	Daoism: live with the situation
	Future	Focus on the future, seeking a way to replace the old.	Buddhism: concept of the pure land, as a future paradise
Humanity and Nature	Mastery	Exercise total control over the forces of nature	No significant representation in Chinese tradition
	Harmonious	Living in a balance with natural forces, implies partial but not total control.	Confucianism: living in harmony with <i>tian</i> (heaven)
	Submissive	Human beings are subject to higher power of these forces, no control at all.	Partly Daoism: submitting to nature not changing it, wuwei (non-interference), <i>ziran</i> (naturally).
Relating to other people	Hierarchical (“Lineal”)	Emphasis on hierarchical principles and deferring to higher authority or authorities within the group.	Confucianism: 5 hierarchical relationships, <i>li</i> (which defines right behavior through respecting others’ positions)
	As equals (“Collateral”)	Emphasis on consensus within the extended group of equals.	Confucianism: <i>ren</i> (concept of a all transcending human love, regardless of the others’ position)
	Individualistic	Emphasis on the individual or individual families within the group who make decisions independently of others.	Partly popular religion: with an emphasis on individual relationships with spirits, private character of religious actions
Motive for behavior	Being	Motivation is internal, emphasizing activities valued by our self, not necessarily by others	No significant representation in Chinese tradition
	Being-in-becoming	Motivation is to develop abilities which are valued by our self, not necessarily by others	Concept of self-cultivation in Buddhism, Daoism
	Achievement (“Doing”)	Motivation is external, emphasizing activity that is both valued by ourselves and is approved by others in our group	Concept of self-cultivation in Confucianism.
Human Nature ¹⁹⁴	Evil/mutable	Born evil, can learn to be good (danger of regression)	Confucianism, Xunzi: human are basically bad, can be educated to be good.
	Mixture, neutral/mutable	Born neither good or bad but can learn both good and bad traits	Possibly Buddhism, Daoism, Popular Religion (although concepts are not very suitable, as they take human nature as composed by bipolar concepts, yet the poles are not morally defined.)
	Good/mutable	Basically good, but subject to corruption	Confucianism, Mengzi: humans are basically good, education has to support the good traits, as they might be spoiled.

¹⁹³ The first three columns are taken from a table published in Hills 2002, 3.

¹⁹⁴ Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck suggested that next to the dimension good, bad there is also the dimension mutability vs. immutability. Moreover the orientation mixed may either mean ‘both good and bad’ or ‘neutral, neither good nor bad’. Therefore we can construct 8 different orientation categories (evil, mutable/evil, immutable/ mixture, mutable/ mixture, immutable/ neutral, mutable/ neutral, immutable/ good, mutable/ good, immutable). I only included those categories in the table that seem to be most adaptable to the Chinese context.

Although the categorizing of the different Chinese value concepts is certainly rather simplistic and crude (as we have seen in Chapter Two most of the concepts are rather complex), the exercise provides certain clues about using this (Western) theory in a Chinese context. Firstly, one can state that many of the basic human problems singled out by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck are clearly also of concern in Chinese tradition, a tradition which offers a wide range of possible solutions. We can therefore conclude that the categories of problems are well chosen, and indeed seem to apply to different cultures. Secondly, we can observe that the solutions provided by Chinese religious traditions do not fit into only one category of solutions, but that they are very diverse and that nearly all possible directions of solutions are proposed in one or more of the Chinese religious traditions (e.g. 'human nature'). This shows how diverse the value orientations in Chinese traditions are, and how difficult it is to talk of Chinese values in general¹⁹⁵. A third observation is the fact that not all created categories seem to fit well in the Chinese context. This is especially true of the question about whether human beings are basically good or bad. Although this question was asked Mengzi and Xunzi, one can say that it is not of major importance in the other traditions and schools. Clearly the Chinese view is the one of a mutable personality (opposed to a stable one), but whether this personality is good or bad is not a subject of most discussions about human nature. Also the table shows a certain shortcoming when it comes to categorizing the most basic Chinese features like the idea of bipolarity of all things or the necessity of relationships to define one's own existence. These concepts clearly escape this theory as they transcend both the sphere of problems and the different possible orientations.

Although the value orientation theory of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck is rather old, it is still considered to be a helpful instrument for value theories, and has inspired others, such as the Milton Rokeach Study of Values¹⁹⁶, the 5 dimension theory of Geert Hofstede¹⁹⁷, and the value theory of Shalom Schwartz, one of the leading figures in social psychology and value studies. The latter will be discussed below, as it seems to be another helpful instrument to explain and understand values.

SCHWARTZ'S THEORY OF INTEGRATED VALUE SYSTEMS

It was Schwartz's goal to create a comprehensive set of different motivational types of values that are recognized across cultures. Such a theory would then prevent important values from being overlooked in surveys concerning values and their relationship to other variables. Moreover, Schwartz's theory conceptualizes values as an integrated system, which allows "the full set of value priorities to be related to other values in an organized, coherent manner" (Schwartz 1996, 2). An important concept in Schwartz's theory is the 'motivational goal'. For Schwartz, values represent "three universal requirements of human existence". These requirements are biological needs, coordinated social interaction and group survival and function. Parting from the assumption of these three basic requirements of human existence, the theory derives

¹⁹⁵ See also discussion about 'Asian Values' in Chapter Three.

¹⁹⁶ The Rokeach Value Survey (Rokeach 1968 & 1973) consists of two parts: the first assesses terminal values (e.g. freedom, wisdom, salvation) and the second part addresses instrumental values (e.g. forgiving, 'polite' or 'broad-minded'). For each category 18 values were ranked.

¹⁹⁷ Hofstede identified five dimensions: Power-distance/ Collectivism vs. individualism/ Femininity vs. Masculinity/ Uncertainty avoidance/ Long-vs. short term orientation. He used the fifth dimension to describe Asian countries, in which according to Hofstede a stable society (the main long-term goal) demands hierarchy and unequal relationships. His fifth dimension was criticized strongly by the Chinese scholar Tony Fang (2003), who discovered several misinterpretations of Chinese philosophy in Hofstede's approach. See. Fang, Tony (2003). A Critique of Hofstede's fifth national culture dimension. *International Journal of Cross Cultural Management*, 3, 3, pp. 347-368

motivationally distinct types of values. To put it simply, Schwartz tries to distinguish different values by asking the question ‘What purpose do these values have? Are they created to satisfy our biological needs, to enable social interaction or to assure the survival of our group?’ By asking these questions Schwartz singles out ten motivational types of values that derive from one or more of the defined universal requirements. The different motivational types are listed in Table 2.


Table 2: Schwartz’s different motivational types*

Value types	Central goal	Single representational values
Power	Social status and prestige, control and dominance over people and resources.	Social power, authority, wealth
Achievement	Personal success through demonstrating competences according to social standards.	Successful, capable, ambitious, influential
Hedonism	Pleasure and sensuous gratification of oneself	Pleasure, enjoying life
Stimulation	Excitement, novelty and challenge in life	Daring, a varied/ excited life
Self-direction	Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring	Creativity, freedom, independent, curious, choosing own goals
Universalism	Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all people and nature	Broadminded, wisdom, social justice, equality, world of peace and beauty, unity with nature
Benevolence	Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact.	Helpful, honest, forgiving, loyal, responsible
Tradition	Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture and religion provide the self	Humble, accepting my portion in life, devout, respect for tradition, moderate
Conformity	Restraint of actions, inclinations and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations/norms	Politeness, obedient, self-discipline, honoring parents and elders
Security	Safety, harmony and stability of society, or relationships and of self	Family security, national security, social order, reciprocation of favors

*Source: Table 1.1 in Schwartz 1996, 3

What is rather extraordinary about this theory is that it not only lists the different value types, but it specifies dynamic relations among the types of values. Values, or more specifically their psychological, practical, and social consequences, may be compatible or contradictory. Schwartz therefore designs a circular value system in which competing value types emanate in opposing directions of the circle. Additionally, he organizes the value types in two dimensions. The first dimension ‘*openness to change versus conservatism*,’ opposes those values, which favor independence and change to those standing for self-restriction and traditional practice. The second dimension ‘*self-enhancement versus self-transcendence*’ opposes values of equality and benevolence to values emphasizing personal power and achievement. To understand this circular interaction of the different value types it is best to display it graphically as it is done in Graph 1.

Graph 1: Theoretical Model of Relations Among Motivational Types of Values, Higher-Order Value Types, and Bipolar Value Dimensions



Source: Fig. 1.1 in Schwartz; Sagiv 1995a, 93 (source does not contain Chinese values and Human Rights aspect)

In Graph 1 I have also included some of the traditional Chinese values discussed in Chapter Two. As we can see, the model can be easily adapted to this theoretical level of Chinese values. Whereas in the case of Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck’s theory, we could find values fitting in to all categories, this is not necessarily the case in the more detailed value categorization of Schwartz. For example we do not find much support for values of the group ‘self-direction’ from traditional Chinese value settings¹⁹⁸. In general, we can say that the value dimensions of self-transcendence and conservatism are represented more energetically than the dimensions ‘openness to change’ and ‘self-enhancement’ in Chinese traditions.

Looking at the values represented and stimulated by human rights, we might say that they are not one-sided either. Aspects like hedonism, self-direction, universalism and benevolence are all ‘covered’ by the human rights idea, as it instrumentalizes values such as the dignity, liberty and equality of every person. Emphasizing the universality of these values and the idea of brotherhood of all men, human rights constitute a complex and diversified concept to assure the wellbeing of men. Social and cultural rights actually emphasize the category ‘conservation’, as they contribute to the security of people and to the respect of the different cultures and traditions. Human

¹⁹⁸ This does not mean that those values are nonexistent in Chinese society. Empirical research has shown that all value categories can be found in contemporary China (Schwartz 1995, 99).

rights also concretize (to a certain degree) power values; the mere idea of ‘having rights’ is expression of power, as somebody with rights also performs a certain power. Compared to the traditional Chinese values, the category of ‘self-direction’ is more easily filled when talking about human rights. The idea of personal dignity and the individual possession of rights, not conditioned through any social relationships, clearly support stimulation and self-direction, and also signifies an openness to change. It is here that, on a theoretical level, we find the ‘biggest’ differences between the human rights idea and traditional Chinese values.

I would like to emphasize once more that this application has been purely theoretical, showing what kinds of values are promoted by which tradition and how they fit into the theories, but not making any conclusive statement about whether or not people from a Chinese or Western context would support those values. Also it is important to keep in mind that supporting values per se often lies on a rather theoretical level. As we have seen in the value definition of Kluckhohn: *Values are concepts of the desirable*, they often describe a ‘wish it was like that- condition’, and not how people behave in reality.

With this notion of values as concepts of the desirable, we approach the question of how we can actually observe and measure values.

4.1.2 Measuring Values

Representing the desirable, values are something internal to a human being, which makes it impossible to observe values. We also defined values as something rather stable and general, compared to attitudes, which describe a certain way of thinking towards a specific topic. The two theories about values discussed above showed that values often stand for rather abstract concepts like ‘security’ or ‘individualism’. This generality of values makes it difficult to observe, locate, and define values.

Further, values cannot simply be measured through behavior. Although our behavior to some extent reflects our values, this is not always the case. Values differ with respect to their scope of control (Hechter 1993). In other words, sometimes we can do something that our values might come true, we can behave following our values and sometimes we can not. If we take the value of ‘security’ for example: Person X might be able to live according to the tradition, buy himself a secure house and car, and therefore grant himself a sense of security following his personal value priority. Person Y who happens to live in an insecure and unstable environment, like in a war affected area, probably does not value ‘security’ less than person X, but their behavior might not be able to contribute to their security, because the condition is beyond their control.

Even in cases where the individual could live according to their values, the relationship between values and behavior is very unclear. Researchers who try to clarify this relationship often encounter various problems: First many individuals have never really reflected on their values, and are therefore not consciously aware of what their values are (Kolb 1991). Once they are asked to clarify their values, answers are often vague and imprecise. When forced to define their values in multiple-choice questions, the asked person is aware of the fact that there are, secondly, no consequences to whatever the answer is (Boyatzis et al. 2000, 48). That means that it is possible to take a stand for certain values without having to apply this value in real life. A third problem is the question of social desirability (Merton 1968). Often individuals do not ask themselves what they actually believe in, but what they should believe in.

These three problems, non- awareness, no-consequences and social desirability all add up to the problem of measuring values and relating them to real-life behavior. As our

study mainly focuses on the value level, we will not answer the question of how the different values influence behavior. I part from the principle that values do influence behavior, but that the influence is very complex and not linear. *Therefore values are non-empirical (not directly observable) concepts.* All we can do is ask people about their values, taking their answers as the only evidence possible and being aware of the problems this implies. The question of how to measure values will be approached once more in Chapter 5 when talking about the instrumentation of the different concepts.

4.1.3 Explaining Values

Not much easier than the question ‘how to measure values?’ are the questions ‘how to explain values?’, ‘why do we believe in certain values and do not believe in others?’, ‘why do people’s values differ?’. These questions have occupied many philosophers, psychologists and sociologists and different answers have been given. A very influential theory of value beliefs was Friedrich Nietzsche’s theory (1887), in which he proposes to explain values by their *psychological functions*, that is I believe X is good or bad because it best serves my psychological interest. Sigmund Freud, for whom normative beliefs are built on the psychological effects we unconsciously anticipate through adhering to these values, enforced this view. So following both Nietzsche and Freud, people might think that values are objectively grounded (X is good because it really is good), but in fact they are mere illusions. Karl Marx also shared a functionalist theory of values, but differently than Freud he considered values to have *sociological* and not *psychological functions*. A person endorses a certain value because this value best serves his class interests.

We find a different sociological explanation in Durkheim’s theory: values are an individual projection of collective beliefs (Durkheim 1912). The American anthropologist Geertz, who observes that values differ from culture to culture, draws a similar conclusion: People believe in certain values because those around them believe in the same values (Geertz 1984). The contemporary French sociologist Raymond Boudon argues that Durkheim’s theory should not be reduced to values as mere projections or illusions. Boudon emphasizes that while Durkheim says that we believe in something because the society we live in does so in a first stage, in a second stage a belief can only become collective because they are true (Boudon 2001, 5). Of course Durkheim is not talking of a universal truth. In his functional theory, something is true if it works and makes sense in a certain social context. That is one of the reasons why values differ from society to society.

Influenced by Durkheim, Talcott Parsons developed his model of structural functionalism, in which he defines four functional imperatives that are necessary for all systems, and which provide certain strings of explanations to the question of values. The four functional imperatives are the *function of adaptation* (1), which refers to the system’s ability to adapt to its environment and conversely to adapt the environment to its needs. The second necessity is the function of *goal attainment* (2), that is the need for every social systems to define primary goals and to enlist individuals to strive to attain these goals to assure the smooth functioning of the system. A third functional imperative is the *function of integration* (3), which is the ability of a system to regulate the interrelationship of the system’s components, and also to coordinate the other three functional imperatives. The last imperative and most interesting when talking of values, is the *function of latency or pattern maintenance* (4). With this last imperative Parsons points to the necessity of a system to maintain a certain stability of patterns of institutionalized culture, which define the structure of the system. On one hand the system has to provide a normative pattern, on the other hand this normative

pattern has been institutionalized sufficiently, to make sure the individual is motivated to commit to this normative pattern. This process is mainly provided through the socialization of the individual, as this is the process by which values are internalized in an individual. According to Parsons, all systems show a strong tendency to maintain themselves and their normative patterns. Therefore once a system has decided on and institutionalized certain patterns, they will not disappear easily, but consolidate a core pattern, which then constitutes the heart of a system. The individual who integrates himself in this system is often unaware of the underlying values on which the system is based.

Concepts like the 'collective memory' from Maurice Halbwachs (1985), or the use of the term 'Tiefenkultur' (deep culture) by peace researcher Johan Galtung (1996), follow the logic of Parsons, as they are all describing certain cultural codes that include our most basic values and understandings of the world. Galtung's theory mainly focuses on the basic worldview (Weltanschauung) and cosmologies. These cosmologies define a society's collective unconsciousness, and operate as socio-cultural codes, which "are carrying the essential messages about how reality is constructed" (Galtung 1996, 212). A more complex theory about the latent cultural structures that define our values and realities comes from the Swiss peace researcher Richard Friedli (2003), who understands "Tiefenkultur" as being not only defined through cosmology, but as the intersection of cosmology, value system and collective memory.

A difficulty of applying these theories in sociological research is that such value structures often are latent and hidden so that they are difficult to 'uncover'. It is the characteristic of such 'deep cultures' to be hidden and nonfigurative (Friedli 2003, 42). Therefore (as is the case for values in general) they cannot be observed directly but only be derived from what we can observe on the surface.

Another author who provides helpful explanations for values is Max Weber, with his comprehensive sociology. He parts from the principle that values are chosen freely on a market of values. The preferred values are those that are considered to be of interest and helpful to mankind. This decision of whether something is of interest or not cannot always be demonstrated in reality, but a society thinks X is good because it has rational reasons for it (Weber 1921). One could therefore say values are understandable. Following the French sociologist Boudon, this is "a basic principle of 'comprehensive' sociology in Weber's sense" (Boudon 2001, 7).

Strongly influenced by Weber was Pierre Bourdieu, who with his theory of field and habitus, gave a very sophisticated theory of how values, attitudes and taste are shaped. Using empirical data he showed how a person's values, attitudes, tastes and actions, or with Bourdieu's words, how the habitus, "an individual's system of dispositions functioning on the practical levels as categories of perception and assessment" (Bourdieu 1984, 101), is shaped by the individual's upbringing and education. These dispositions are produced and reproduced within the social field. In these fields both individuals and institutions try to distinguish themselves from others by acquiring both economic and cultural resources (capital) that is valuable or useful in the specific field. This process of acquiring capital is simultaneously a reproduction of the value definition valid in a particular field. Bourdieu does not really differentiate between tastes and values, as his theory is very inclusive, understanding values, tastes, and even actions as consequences of a person's habitus. Also it was one of Bourdieu's main goals to show that not only our big and basic values were influenced by our surrounding and upbringing, but that also little aspects of life, like taste, which is often considered to be very personal, are in fact at least partly defined through the field we live in. What makes Bourdieu's theory very flexible and interesting is the notion that

individuals do not always stay in one single field only, and that ‘traveling’ from one field to an other is possible, demonstrating that, although shaped by a certain habitus, the individual also has an independent capacity and is not a mere product of society.

For the purpose of this study it is not necessary to give a final theory about where values come from or how they are created and shaped. *I part from the principle that an individual's values are strongly influenced, even shaped, by his surrounding culture, society, class and family. To follow Weber, both the individual and the society do take a certain stand for values, because these values make sense in the particular time and situation they are in. Once a community or society adopts a value, this value becomes an internal part of society and is reproduced through its institutions, especially through the socialization of the individual. However, as values are not only collective imperatives, but also have to make sense both to the community and to the individual, values and especially value priorities are adapted to the given life circumstances. They are therefore subject to change, and every individual plays their part in the reproduction or renewal of value settings.*

One might say that this is kind of a cocktail of value theories including concepts from Durkheim, Weber, Parsons and Bourdieu. This is certainly right, but in my view justified, as I am convinced that values are an extremely complex phenomenon, for which one theoretical explanation is hardly enough. Different approaches and angles are needed to explain values, and even then the explanation might not be complete.

4.1.4 The concept of social representation

Before taking a closer look at the relationship between values and religion, I would like to present the concept of social representation- a concept that will be very helpful for our survey as it looks at values on a different level, and therefore also presents different methods to measure value dispositions. Social representations describe “a sense-giving system” (Bergman 1998,78) that can be understood as both the product of values and as a system which produces values, ideas and practices. In distinction to values, the study of social representations “explores how people construct and objectify certain mental constructs, such as madness, psychoanalysis, democracy or individualism” (Bergman 1998, 80). Social representation looks at how people subjectively create their reality by examining how people understand abstract concepts. So, if we take the example of the abstract entity ‘democracy’, social representation would not ask whether people think democracy is a good thing or not, but what they actually understand and mean when they use and hear this word. In one of the basic works about social representation the French psychologist and founder of the social representation paradigm, Serge Moscovici, points out that social representation is to be understood as the collective elaboration “of a social object by the community for the purpose of behaving and communicating” (Moscovici 1963, 251). Hence we can see that social representations are the concepts that make communication work, that is if Person A knows what person B meant, when using term X. Knowing how abstract terms are filled with sense by individuals often shows us a lot about the values and paradigm this individual lives with. Emphasizing this social aspect of social representation, we can summarize that “a social representation is the ensemble of thoughts and feelings being expressed in verbal and overt behavior of actors which constitutes an object for a social group” (Wagner et al. 1999, 96).

Although this theory is sometimes presented as an alternative to the value concept, I do not understand the concept of social representation as opposed to values, but as a concept lying on a different level, adding to a more complex understanding of how certain concepts are valued and understood by individuals or a society as a whole. For

the purpose of this study, the notion of social representation will be particularly helpful when it comes to researching valuation and attitudes towards the human rights idea; knowing how the term 'human rights' is understood will reveal a lot about the place of that concept in Chinese society.

4.2 VALUES AND RELIGION

Above I have stated some general aspects of values. For this particular study the role of religion in the context of values is of special interest. Several of the authors mentioned above have included religion in their theory. It is the goal of this section to display the role attributed to religion in value theory.

4.2.1 Religion and Values are Reciprocally Related

It is very common among many social theorists to assume that there is a relationship between religion and values. Yet the why and how of this relationship are often very vague and unclear. Following Marx's theory, religion is an expression of material realities and economic injustice; it is created through the productive classes to assure their role as a dominant class. The values promoted by religion are concepts that should help the poor and powerless to live with their situation. Therefore, according to Marx, religion is a means in the struggle for power maintenance of the dominant class, providing values that support this struggle. The perception of religion as a social phenomenon has also been strongly emphasized by Durkheim (1921) who understands religion as the mere expression of our collective consciousness, expressing the values our society depends on. Religion therefore is an institution that institutionalizes and represents a society's values. Strongly influenced by Durkheim is Parsons' theory of values and religion, as he regarded religion as a source of specific social values that were crucial to maintaining a minimal order in society. In Parsons' view, American society functioned as a moral community bound by a civil religion (which is strongly influenced by the Judo-Christian tradition) that consisted of very general but transcendent values (Robertson 1982).

In his comprehensive sociology, Weber attributed to religion sacred and irrational values, and tried to show how these irrational values influenced more rational values in non-religious areas such as economy. His most famous example of how religion defines values which then spread over to other fields, is his theory of the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. In Weber's theory the Protestant values of inner worldly asceticism and hard labor without resting (to deviate oneself from the question whether one is chosen or not) led to the basic economic values dominating the capitalist world.

Bourdieu was influenced by both Weber and Marx in his conception of religion as a field that was defined through the struggle between the priest (the official representation of the religion) and the prophet (a not officially accepted religious leader, trying to reform existing religious models) for the control of religious capital. An important function of religion, according to Bourdieu, is the legitimation of existing social positions by obscuring economic inequalities. In the religious field the struggle between priest and prophet can generate a change of value settings and with it comes the possibility of social change (Bourdieu 1977, 1991).

Most of these 'classical' authors link religion to values of stability and the maintenance of social order. Only in the case of Weber do we find that the genesis of a new religious group (e.g Protestantism, Calvinism) led to a profound change of values and society. Religion as a possible generator of value change can also be found in Bourdieu's theory, because it is in the religious field that prophets emerge, and if

these prophets are able to win the struggle for the religious capital, the change in the religious field can have consequences for the distribution of power in the whole society. Such a prophetic uprising is only possible in times of crisis and war (Bourdieu 2000, 101). However, according to Bourdieu, the successful prophet is rather an exception, because religion mostly emphasizes values of conformity and reproduces the given capital distribution (Bourdieu 2000, 97). Parsons' view of religion and its influence on values is more positive, as he considers religion necessary to promote values of social order and respect, without which society could not exist. Even if these theorists differ with regard to the specific values they link to religion, they all agree that religion has its influence on the believers' value system. Discussing the general relationship between religion and values, Schwartz also mentions that the influence is not linear (from religion to values) but rather mutual (religion influences values, values influence religion or religiosity):

Equally significant, value priorities may influence individuals' commitment to the religion they profess and (occasionally) their choice of a specific religion, because religions provide opportunities or pose barriers to the attainment of valued goals. (Schwartz 1995, 88)

4.2.2 Relations among Value Priorities and Religion

After having summarized theories of how religion and values are related in a very general manner, I would like to take a closer look at the question of whether certain values are linked more closely to religion than others. For this purpose I will refer to an empirical study conducted by Schwartz and Huisman (1995), in which they try to define how religiosity in four Western religions is linked to the value priorities defined in Schwartz's value theory. As the study only includes Western religions, it will not be directly adaptable to a study in China, but it still will give us a certain idea about how religiosity and values might be linked, and will help us in generating certain hypotheses in the next chapter. Using the theoretical model of Schwartz's ten motivational type of values (see Graph 1 on page 138), Schwarz and Huisman made 5 hypotheses about how these value types might be related to religion (ibid, 93).

They suggested that religion correlates

- (1) *positively* with 'tradition', because these values stress transcendence, belief, humility and preservation of social order,
- (2) most *negatively* with 'hedonism' because it emphasizes materialism
- (3) *positively* with 'conformity', 'benevolence' and 'security' because these values stand for social stability
- (4) *negatively* with 'stimulation' and 'self-direction' because these values might threaten the social order.

Assuming that the remaining three values types ('universalism', 'power' and 'achievement') might relate to religiosity in various maybe even opposite ways, they suggested that

- (5) Correlations of religiosity with 'universalism', 'power', and 'achievement' are less positive than those for 'conformity', 'benevolence' and 'security', but also less negative than those for 'self-direction' and 'stimulation'.

The first study to test these hypotheses was conducted in Greece, Netherlands, Israel and Spain and included people adhering to the Greek Orthodox, Protestant, Jewish, and Roman Catholic traditions. The results of the study confirmed the hypotheses listed above and added evidence to the model that relates religion to value priorities. Correlations were most positive between the value type of 'tradition' and most negative for 'hedonism'. Interestingly, the results all were similar in the four different

religions, although each religion was measured in a different country and therefore in a different social context.

From the results of this study we might conclude that religiosity is related to our value priorities, and that in the case of Western religion we do find that it is positively related to values like tradition and conformity which emphasize social order and stability, where it is rather negatively related to more self-enhancing values like 'hedonism', 'stimulation' or 'self-direction'. These results at least partly confirm the theories of Marx and Bourdieu, who considered religion as promoting system-maintaining values.

SUMMARY: VALUES

- Values are guiding principles that may vary in importance; they are concepts of the desirable.
- Values are non-empirical (not directly observable) concepts.
- A person's values are strongly influenced and shaped by their surrounding culture, society and family.
- Values are a constitutive part of a specific society, they are reproduced through its institutions, especially through the socialization of the individual.
- Values and value priorities are adapted to given life circumstances. They are therefore subject to change, and every individual plays their part in the reproduction of value settings.

SUMMARY: RELIGION AND VALUES

- There is a relationship between religiosity and values.
- This relationship is reciprocal and mutual (values influence one's religiosity, religion influences one's values).
- Both in theory and in the results of empirical surveys, religion and religiosity are linked to values of stability and maintenance of social order.

4.3 EMPIRICAL METHODS AND EVIDENCE

4.3.1 Chinese Values - Instruments of Analyses and Empirical Surveys

After these general thoughts and theories of values, I would like to focus once again on the question of Chinese values. In Chapter Two, I tried to single out values of the different religious traditions in China. Now I would like to give an overview of how Chinese values were defined and instrumentalized by contemporary authors who tried to measure Chinese values in empirical research.

I will start with the study performed by Thomas Brindley in Taiwan. He conducted 45 in-depth interviews with 'experts' (that is, sociologists or social psychologists) to construct a list of typical traditional Chinese values. His findings state that one important field of traditional values are the humanistic relationships, defined by the Confucian value of *ren* (benevolence) and the very practical value of '*guanxi*' (relations) and *mianzi* (saving face). *Guanxi* describes the importance of having and cherishing relationships to people that do not belong to the family or close circle of friends, as these relationships might be important at a certain point in life. A second field of traditional values is the one of morality and self-rectification, in which we find values such as *ren* (benevolence), *yi* (righteousness), *li* (ritual propriety), *shu* (reciprocity or empathy) and *chongyong* (the doctrine of the golden mean¹⁹⁹). A third field is family piety in which Brindley lists ancestor worship, respect for parents and the maintenance of harmonious family ties. Values regarding authoritarianism and

¹⁹⁹ Teaching after the 'Doctrine of the golden Mean', part of the records of rites. See Chapter Two, page 30.

paternalism, like the respect for stability and order, make a fourth group in Brindley's list. The last group concerns values of practicality, survival and materialism, e.g. being situation orientated or showing a strong work ethic. This list of traditional values very strongly reflects Confucian values. In fact Brindley often uses the adjective 'Confucian' as a synonym to 'Chinese', thus excluding other Chinese traditions. The fact that he interviewed a very specific group of experts who most probably studied such questions before seems to have the unsatisfactory result of reproducing what we might call 'typical' Chinese values, but which in my view neglect values that also play an important role in the Chinese worldview, such as values promoted by the Daoist tradition.

Another value survey, which was performed in the People's Republic of China by Godwin Chu and Ju Yanan (1993), used a questionnaire with 18 cultural values defined by the authors. The questionnaire was submitted to 2000 Chinese, half of them in Shanghai the other half in two smaller cities and in 20 different villages. The participants of this survey were given the 18 cultural values and were asked whether they were proud of these values. The table below lists the items by their favorability:

Table 3 Cultural values according to Chu & Ju

1. Long historical heritage	10. Chastity of women
2. Diligence and frugality	11. Glory to ancestors
3. Loyalty and devotion to the state	12. A house full of sons and grandsons
4. Benevolent father, filial son	13. Farmers high, merchants low
5. Generosity and virtues	14. Pleasing superiors
6. Respect for tradition	15. Discretion for self preservation
7. Submission to authority	16. Differentiation between men and women
8. Harmony is precious	17. Way of golden mean
9. Tolerance, propriety, deference	18. Three obediences and four virtues

Source: Chu; Ju 1993, 24

This classification of values shows that many Chinese do not consider some of these 'typical' Chinese values as values to be proud of (virtues, obedience, golden mean). Nevertheless, some traditional Confucian values (piety, respect for tradition) are ranked among the first. The first two ranks definitely reflect the situation of China in the 1990s, where nationalism and economic progress is valued very highly. Based on the fact that national pride and diligence and frugality are ranked so highly, the two authors come to the conclusion that "the emerging new Chinese culture (...) is a potential shift from obligation to rights as the guiding principle for social relations" (Chu; Ju 1993, 151f). As we can see above the list presented by Chu and Ju mixes both traditional, communist and modern values, and is mostly based on what the authors themselves consider to be cultural values. As both authors have a Chinese background the list is surely partly adequate, but one still might criticize that it is somewhat arbitrary, a problem which in my eyes reappears in most conceptions of 'Chinese values'.

A more systematic approach was used by the "Chinese Culture Connection (CCC)" (1987), a group of Chinese social researchers, whose names are unknown. They approached a number of Chinese social scientists and asked them to prepare a list of at least ten fundamental and basic values for Chinese people. In a second step they created synonym groupings, of which a list with 33 items was generated. Seven additional items which seemed similarly important were added, so they finally created a list of 40 items. Being a very big list of items it includes many aspects of Chinese values and is more complete than the ones proposed by Brindley or Chu & Ju. In this list we find items that represent Confucian values like 'loyalty to superiors' but we also find values that more often are associated with the Buddhist tradition like 'having few desires'. The survey was conducted in 22 different countries but not in Mainland

China. Analyzing their results, the authors made out the four factors *integration*, *Confucian work dynamism*, *human heartedness*, and *moral discipline*. The factor of integration includes values emphasizing social stability, inclusiveness and unity. Items loading high on factor two represent Confucian work ethics, the positive values in factor three suggest gentleness and compassion. Finally, factor four reflects values of moral restraint. The four factors and their items are listed below. Those items with (+) indicate that they load positively, whereas those items with (-) load negatively on the specific factor.

Table 4: 4 Factors out of 40 items discovered in the CCC- survey

Integration	Confucian work dynamism	Human heartedness	Moral discipline
Tolerance of others (+)	Ordering relationships(+)	Forgiveness, compassion(+)	Way of the mean(+)
Harmony with others(+)	Thrift(+)	Patience(+)	Disinterestedness (+)
Solidarity with others(+)	Persistence (+)	Courtesy (+)	Having few desires(+)
Non-competitiveness(+)	Sense of shame (+)	Sense of righteousness (-)	Adaptability (-)
Trustworthiness(+)	Reciprocity(-)	Patriotism(-)	Prudence (-)
Be content with one's life(+)	Protecting face(-)		
Conservatism (-)	Respect for tradition (-)		
Valuing friendship(-)	Personal stability(-)		
Filial piety(-)			
Chastity in women(-)			

Comparing the surveys in the different countries it could be demonstrated that the items of the factor 'Confucian work dynamism' were supported more strongly in Hong Kong and Taiwan than in other countries (CCC 1987, 153). Hence the values belonging to the factor 'Confucian work dynamism' were judged as a very specific Chinese value category. As the factor was also correlated strongly to the economic development of the country, one might raise the question of whether the Chinese work ethic is solely responsible for the positive economic development, or whether the work ethic is as high just because the economy is going well and people can see that their efforts are rewarded. Therefore the conclusion that "working hard" is the most typical Chinese value disposition, seems overly simplistic. One might also criticize the conclusion drawn from the factor analysis. Looking at these factors more closely, one can observe that they are not always very consistent and some items (loading very high or very low on a specific factor) seem hard to explain. One might ask, for example, why the item 'filial piety' loads negatively on the factor 'integration', in which all other positive items tend to emphasize social stability and order. Also it is not very evident why 'prudence' loads negatively on the factor 'moral discipline'.


Despite certain inconsistencies, this list of items is definitely an interesting instrument of measure and is still often used and referred to in contemporary research (Bond 1996/ Garrot 1995/ Ward; Pearson; Enterkin 2002/ Zhang; Harwood 2002).

In her survey Sha Lianxiang (1990) tried to find typical characteristics of the Chinese national character. Using 14 keynotes supposedly describing Chinese national character, she asked respondents to judge these values. Items like moral integrity, loyalty, piety and benevolence (*ren*) scored very high, whereas the doctrine of the mean, pragmatism, utility and materialism were judged rather negatively. Sha comes to the conclusion that the national character of the Chinese is strongly connected to Confucian humanism on one hand and to Daoist naturalism on the other (Sha 1990, 226). Sha's list of values again seems rather coincidental, and her conclusions are somehow unsatisfying. For example there is no explanation of why, if the Chinese

character is based on Confucianism and Daoism, the basic Confucian value of the doctrine of the mean scored rather low.

The last example of how to measure Chinese values comes from the Hong Kong based economist Oliver Yau who used a rather unique and original approach to generate his measuring instrument. Yau based his research on the 5 value dimensions defined by Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck (man to nature/inter-human relationship/ time orientation/ personal behavior/ human nature). He then chose two or four differentia, which matched the Chinese context. In a next step he gathered a hundred Chinese sayings, of which he chose 66 that matched the cultural dimension described above. I will not list all 66 Chinese sayings used in the survey but the figure below shows the different dimensions, its differentia and an example of a Chinese saying matching this category.

Graph 2: Value dimensions and Chinese sayings



Yao uses this categorization of Chinese values to derive marketing strategies mostly for foreign companies who want to invest in China. Although a question battery of 66 items is often not practical if one wants to include it in a questionnaire, Yao's approach is still very interesting as he presents a systematic application of a universal theory in the Chinese context, using a typical Chinese instrument (sayings) to fill the different categories.

Looking at the different methods of how Chinese values have been measured, some interesting approaches could be discovered. Yet many of the value scales used seem partly coincidental and it often is not made clear for the reader on which criteria the selection of values was based. For this study, which wants to focus on values that derive from China's religious traditions, the presented value scales are not specific enough to match the needs. Nevertheless, the different approaches and results will be useful to analyze and discuss possible results of this survey.

4.3.2 Attitude toward Human Rights – Empirical Evidence

Although the discussion about human rights in China is more alive than ever, there is hardly any empirical evidence about how the Chinese judge human rights. From the World Value Survey in 1993 (Inglehard, 1995), we can find a few items that can be connected with possible support for human rights, namely the items ‘support for human rights organizations’ and ‘support for individual freedom’²⁰⁰. When the Chinese were asked whether or not they approved human rights organizations only 27% answered with “strongly approve” (Inglehard, V293). In international comparison, this puts China on the lowest ranking. In certain countries like Nigeria or Brazil about 85% percent strongly support such movements, in Switzerland 60% gave their approval. The item ‘individual freedom’ was instrumentalized by the question whether the Chinese would prefer equality or freedom if they had to choose. Here only 21% think freedom is more important. Again this puts China in the last position in international comparison. Interestingly, these two questions (support for human rights organizations, preference of freedom over equality) got more positive answers from younger Chinese. Thirty-five percent of people under 30 support human rights groups, and 32% of this group valued freedom higher than equality. This difference might indicate a certain shift in value judgment in China. Also the survey was performed 15 years ago, and after the great change China has gone through during these last 15 years the data might look different today²⁰¹.

As shown above, many scholars suggest that in China the concept of rights is foreign to Chinese traditional thinking. Looking at another question of the World Value Study, we can see that the Chinese rather surprisingly have much confidence in the legal system. Three quarters of the Chinese answer that they do trust in their legal system, this is much more confidence than for example in France (58%) or in Britain (54%). Of course these results cannot be taken at face value. As these questions are kind of standing alone they can hardly be interpreted in an adequate way, and there are no control variables available to validate these results.

Another study of a certain importance to this project is the survey about the construction of human rights of Clémence, Doise et al. (1995). Although the research was not conducted in China, Clémence and Doise’s survey should be mentioned here, as they used the concept of social representation to evaluate differences in the understanding of human rights in an intercultural study.

Clémence, Doise et al. tried to measure the social representation of human rights with different items that (a) describe possible human rights violations in general, (b) that describe possible actions of a government that might be considered as human rights violations, (c) that describe certain actions of individuals that might be considered as human rights violations, (d) that describe obligations for individuals that might be considered as human rights violations. Not all of the actions or situations described in the single items would be judged as human rights violations from a legal point of view, but they all have the potential to be understood as such. To give two examples of the situations given by Clémence and Doise (1995, 192)²⁰²:

(1) *Somebody is sent to prison without having had a lawyer to defend him.*

(2) *A child is beaten by its parents*

²⁰⁰ This value definitely can be attributed to the first generation of human rights. It is not that obvious when including the second and third generations.

²⁰¹ Unfortunately there are no similar statistics available for the World Value Survey 2000/2001.

²⁰² Original items are in French “Quelqu’un es envoyé en prison sans qu’un avocat ait pu le défendre”/ “Un enfant est battu par ses parents”

Respondents then had to say whether they considered the given example as a human rights violation or not, or whether it was right for a government / individual to behave the way the item described (Clémence, Doise et al. 1995, p.129). Clémence, Doise et al. conducted their survey in several countries (France, Switzerland, Italy and Costa Rica). As China is not one of them I will not go into details of the study's results. It should be noted that in a cross - national comparison great differences could be observed concerning how much governmental control is accepted. This leads Clémence, Doise et al. (1995, 181) to the general statement that the social representation of human rights are culturally bound.

Although in a Chinese context not all of the items constructed by Clémence, Doise et al. can be used, it still is a very important instrument that will be of value for the construction of scales to measure the social representation of human rights in China.

4.3.3 Exploratory Interviews

While staying in Shanghai for three months in the summer of 2002 for language training, I conducted a total of four exploratory interviews with young Chinese people. These four people were recruited through my Chinese language teacher. She considered them to be “typical young educated Shanghainese”. Of course this sample is very coincidental. No final findings will be taken from these interviews. The main goal of these interviews was to see how these people reacted when confronted with terms like “human rights” or “traditional religious Chinese values”. Their answers and reactions can be an indication about problems, misunderstandings or just possible outcomes of a more structured, quantitative research.

Among the four interviewed people were three women and one man, aged 24 to 34. Two of them were still students, two of them had started working already, but had a university degree. One of them had once spent three months in Germany, the other 3 interviewed persons have never left China. One interview was held in English, one in German, and two in Chinese. (For the interviews in Chinese a third person was present to help translating in case there were language problems).

The following three questions were asked during the interviews:

- (1) If you hear the term “traditional Chinese values”, what comes to your mind?
- (2) If you hear the term “human rights” what comes to your mind?
- (3) Do you think there is a relationship and similarities between human rights and Chinese values?

When asked about traditional Chinese values the four interviewees mentioned values like family, collectivity, hierarchical relationships (most obvious between man and women), being polite, caring for others. One respondent directly used the Confucian term *ren* (benevolence) and *de* (virtue) to describe the most important traditional Chinese values. Although they brought up Confucian values, none of them actually called them ‘Confucian values’. In every interview I had to explicitly ask about the role of religious traditions, otherwise they would not have been mentioned. All four respondents pointed to the Chinese specificity that the influence of these different religious traditions could not be separated, as Chinese values are anchored in all of them. They also stated that the values are transferred from parents to children without bothering about the traditional religious sources. Thus parents tell children about the importance of the five hierarchical relationships without calling it a Confucian concept. One of the respondents thought that each of these religious traditions has different functions in the Chinese society; Confucianism for constructing society and giving instructions on how to be successful in life, Daoism to comfort you when you are not successful and things go badly, Buddhism to support you when you have important exams or business deals. One respondent stated that in contemporary China

Confucian values are reinforced through the government, because they think it is going to make people more obedient (respecting your leader is one of the five hierarchical Confucian relationships). She further argued that, consequently, Daoist values, which focus much more on the inner world and on spiritual aspects, are less known because it would be difficult for the government to instrumentalize them.

Asked about human rights, three of the four interviewees immediately referred to it as an American concept and talked about the fact that President Bush, and the Americans in general, were repeatedly criticizing China for not respecting human rights. Concerning the content of human rights, the respondents had only very vague ideas. They mentioned it had something to do with equality and dignity. One respondent thought human rights include a better behavior from state officials, as in China they always behaved in a very unfriendly manner. Two of them connected human rights to the freedom of speech. One respondent wondered whether or not human rights include rights and duties or only rights. Another respondent referred to the importance of material human rights (everybody possessing enough to live). None of them had ever heard of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

All respondents consider the relationship between human rights and traditional Chinese values as rather difficult. They see certain contradictions mainly because they think human rights are more individualistic than Chinese values. Two of them were convinced that human rights in China have to be different and include Chinese values. The other two respondents were convinced that Chinese society is getting more individualistic anyway, so enforcing human rights in China is necessary and part of the natural development of China. Clearly none of them considers Chinese traditional values to be a source of human rights.

SUMMARY: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND METHODS CHINESE VALUES

- On a theoretical level we can observe that value orientations in Chinese religious traditions are very diverse.
- Scales to measure Chinese values often seem arbitrary, focusing mainly on Confucianism and neglecting other traditions.
- Empirical surveys show that while certain traditional values are still strongly supported by Chinese people others are criticized.
- Exploratory interviews have shown that Chinese values are perceived as a unity, anchored in all different Chinese traditions.
- These values are passed on by parents as specific Chinese concepts, and only rarely are specified as Buddhist, Confucianist, or Daoist.

HUMAN RIGHTS

- A helpful method in approaching the understanding of human rights is the concept of social representation, which focuses on how people make sense of abstract terms such as human rights.
- There is no empirical evidence about attitudes towards human rights in China. Answers to a single question from the World Value Survey from 1990 point to a rather critical view of human rights.
- An international study (not including China) has shown that the social representation of human rights is culturally bound.
- Exploratory interviews have shown that knowledge about human rights is very vague, and that it is often associated with the U.S.
- These interviews have also shown that human rights are associated with individualism.

CHAPTER FIVE EMPIRICAL SURVEY: OBJECTIVES



Young people burning incense in a Buddhist temple near Shanghai, July 2004

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5 EMPIRICAL SURVEY: OBJECTIVES

5.1 DETAILED RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS

In the introduction I formulated the general objective of this thesis:

The goal of this project is to examine how Chinese religiosity, in particular Chinese traditional religious values, are related to human rights and how they are valued.

The question formulated above contains various sub-questions: (1) the issue of defining of Chinese traditional values, and (2) how these values can be related to human rights on a philosophical basis. The question also includes a set of empirical issues including (3) what traditional values are promoted by Chinese religious groups, (4) what values the Chinese actually believe in, (5) what stand they take towards human rights, and (6) if support for traditional values and religiosity is empirically related to that person's attitude towards human rights.

Questions 1 to 3 have been answered in the second and third chapter. Chapter Four provided the theoretical basis for questions 4 to 6, which are still to be answered, and described the current state of research concerning our empirical questions. The knowledge gained in Chapters Two, Three, and Four will now be included in either the conception or the analysis of the empirical project.

As mentioned in the introduction, the empirical project will include a quantitative survey among students of Fudan University in Shanghai. A list of the specific questions the survey should answer can be found in the table below. The questions will be developed and explained below. This chapter will also provide all necessary information about the survey, the construction of the questionnaire and its question batteries, the chosen sample and research method and the instruments of analysis.

Table 5: Survey questions

Univariate (descriptive):	1. What traditional religious values do students support?
	2. How and to what extent does religion play a role in a student's life?
	3. What is their definition of human rights and what attitude towards human rights do they have?
Bi- / multivariate (descriptive):	4. Is a person's support for Chinese traditional religious values related to their religiosity?
	5. Is the width of the human rights definition related to the support for human rights?
	6. Are these different views and attitudes towards human rights related to traditional religious values / religiosity?
Bi- / multivariate (explanatory):	7. Can we discover any relationship between general value orientations (ideologies of justice) and specific attitudes (e.g. attitude towards the United States) and support for human rights or traditional religious values?
	8. What role does religious socialization play on the variable religiosity and students' support for traditional religious values?
	9. Are there any sociological explanations for the variance between the support of human rights and traditional religious values?

5.1.1 Descriptive Questions: Univariate (1-3)

These first three questions should provide further knowledge about our three main concepts:

- Chinese traditional religious values
- Religiosity
- Human rights.

As we have seen in Chapter Three, the question about the relationship between Chinese tradition and human rights is led on the value basis exclusively. Other aspects of tradition like religiosity in a broader sense (including beliefs and activities) is only rarely included. Both theory and research in Europe has shown that there is a mutual relationship between religiosity in general and other values. Therefore, this survey will not only concentrate on religious traditions on a value level, but also on religiosity in a broader sense. When it comes to the question of the operationalization of the concept of religiosity, one could say that supporting traditional religious values is actually a part of the wider concept of religiosity next to other indicators of a religious lifestyle and religious beliefs. Although a special focus will be held on religious traditional values, they will also be understood as an indicator of religiosity in general.

The third question concerning human rights includes both the level of social representation of human rights and the attitude towards human rights. As mentioned earlier, I do not understand the paradigms as being contradictory, but rather as being complementary to each other. Doisé & Clémence (1998) have shown that the social representation of human rights relates to other values and attitudes like political orientation or the attitude toward institutions. Obviously there is an association between social representation and values. Nevertheless, most of the studies researching the social representation of a specific concept (e.g. human rights), do not include the value or attitude level of that same subject. In one of her studies on human rights Clémence et al. (1995) just assume that human rights in general are viewed as something good. As the survey was conducted mainly in Western countries, this notion might also be justified. In the case of China, since we know only little about the attitude of students towards human rights, it is not evident to part form the assumption that they are generally considered to be something good. The results of the World Value Survey in 1990 actually indicate a rather critical view towards human rights. Hence we cannot presume that human rights are basically judged in a positive way. On the other hand, it would not be sufficient to only include the attitude level, as we would then miss the way Chinese students interpret this term. Yet this knowledge is absolutely necessary if we want to understand how Chinese students perceive the relationship between the different values. Therefore I find it necessary to include both levels in this survey.

Questions 1 to 3 include four different question batteries: One set of questions will measure the support for Chinese traditional religious values, while another set will measure the religiosity of students. A third question battery will measure the social representation of human rights, and the fourth will measure the support for human rights (attitude). The results of these questions, particularly those of question 2, will also allow us a certain comparison between the social representation of human rights in China and in other countries, as the two authors Clémence and Doisé delivered comparable data.

5.1.2 Bi-and Multivariate questions

The fourth question concerns the possible relationship between a person's support for Chinese traditional religious values and their religiosity. It seems very logical that a person who is religious, and for whom religion has a certain importance, would also be more supportive to values that are promoted by Chinese religious groups. Of course, this is only evident for those adhering to a Chinese religion and might not apply to a religious person who feels close to Christianity. But as certain values like respect for tradition or benevolence are universally found in the value catalogue of religious groups, I still tend to assume that religious people show strong support for those values. The first hypothesis proposes a positive relationship between these two concepts:

- *H1: Religiosity is positively related to support for Chinese traditional values.*

Question 5 focuses on whether or not attitudes towards human rights and social representation of human rights are related. Is a student's specific definition of what human rights are related to his general attitude towards human rights? One might, on one hand, assume that a person with a very positive attitude towards human rights also has a wide definition of human rights. On the other hand, we might suggest that a person with a clear definition of human rights (which might be also restrictive) has a more positive attitude towards human rights because he is convinced he knows what he is talking about, whereas uncertainty towards such an abstract concept might be associated with a more negative attitude. Therefore, this second hypothesis suggests a non-directional association:

- *H2: There is an association between the width of the definition (social representation) of human rights and the attitude towards human rights.*

Question 6 focuses on the relationship between human rights and religion. This question is of basic importance in our survey, as we try to relate the two concepts (Chinese tradition and human rights) on an empirical level. Both for 'human rights' and 'religion' the question implies two levels of measurement and analysis: Regarding human rights I am interested in both the attitude towards human rights and social representation of human rights. Regarding religion I am interested both in religiosity and in the support for religious values.

Both the theoretical assumptions about the general influence of religion on values and the results from the explorative interviews might lead us to the assumption that religiosity and support for traditional values are rather negatively related to the attitude towards human rights in general. This assumption is partly supported by Schwartz's circle of value priorities, as we could see that certain human rights values are opposed to basic values of Chinese tradition. We have also seen that Chinese traditional values are very diverse, and we might find contradictory results. Concerning the social representation of human rights, we might find that a definition including social rights is related more positively to the support for traditional values and to religiosity, as religion often focuses on the wellbeing of the society and the maintenance of social order. Another reason to expect varied results is the diversity of Chinese religious values. Although the direction of the relationship between religion and human rights in the Chinese context is not very clear, I will formulate the following two hypotheses in a directional manner, not so much because theory would let us assume such a relationship, but because such hypotheses provide a good instrument of analysis.

- *H3: Religiosity and strong support for Chinese traditional values are negatively related to a strong support for human rights.*

- *H4: Students who are very religious and strongly support Chinese traditional values do not have an individual definition of human rights. This negative correlation cannot be found in the case of a social definition of human rights.*


Question 7 takes into account that both support for Chinese traditional religious values and value systems are closely connected to other sets of values. As the qualitative interviews have shown, human rights are closely connected to the USA. It is therefore quite probable that the general attitude towards the USA has a strong influence on how human rights, but also on how traditional values, are judged. As in many other parts of the world, anti-Americanism has been increasing over the last few years in China. In the nineties several books were published that mostly described the aspects and consequences of an unjust U.S.- policy towards China²⁰³. The books were extremely popular and seemed to fit the anti- American and nationalist mood of many Chinese. This leads us to hypothesis number 5:

- *H5: Anti-Americanism is negatively related to the support for human rights.*

Another aspect which will be considered in the survey, is China's communist past, For the last 60 years communism has been the official ideology in China. Whereas under Mao the economic system was organized along the communist ideas of a controlled market, the last three decades have seen an important shift to a free market economy. Although the Chinese government still officially adhere the socialist idea, the economy follows very open capitalist structures. This change in the China's economic system has brought along more openness and with it more Western influence. This situation leads to the conclusion that many different ideologies are on the market in China; the government is still preaching the Chinese form of socialism, whose main goal it is to bring welfare to the masses, and which emphasizes the social values that assure a harmonious society. On the other hand, the Chinese have to find their place in a very rough capitalist environment, in which certain "typical" Western values like hedonism or individualism seem more helpful to survival. The questionnaire should account for these different ideological influences by measuring different ideologies of justice. These ideologies of justice can be considered the heart of values settings as they describe models of preferences, which focus on the question of the responsibility for the distribution of resources. The justice researchers Wegener and Liebig (1993) based their concept of justice ideologies on the culture theory of the American anthropologist Mary Douglas (1982, 1996). Douglas parts from the principle that the social environment varies on two different dimensions: grid and group. *Grid* signifies the dimension of individuation, *group* the dimension of social incorporation. On the grid level social control is assured by the pressure one feels to follow the rules that are valid on a specific hierarchical position. On the group dimension social control is defined through the extend a person is determined by this group's norms. Wegener and Liebig have now applied this basic theory on the ideologies of justice, and have defined four stereotypes: ascriptivism, 'etatism' (state control), individualism and fatalism. The graph below explains how Wegener and Liebig decided on those four prototypes.

²⁰³ Here a list of some works with a anti-American tendency:
Song Qian et al. (1996). 中国可以说。 (China can say no), Beijing: Zhonghua Gongshang Lianhe Chubanshe
Hong Yonghong et al. (1996). 中美军事冲突前前后后。 (US-China Military Confrontations: before and after)
Beijing: Zhonghua Gongshang Lianhe Chubanshe. / Chen Feng et al. (1996). 中美较量大写真。 (The grand
portrait of US-China Confrontation). Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Chubanshi.

Graph 3: Four Ideologies of Justice (Liebig & Wegener)



As can be seen in the graph above, people who feel they live under hierarchical conditions in a dominant group find it natural to live in defined groups and to follow the rules their social position is based on. Therefore, they understand the distributions of resources as being ascriptive, that is given by nature or heaven. They support the current situation and with it the different hierarchical structures. This ideology is called '*ascriptivism*'.

Individuals who live in a very inclusive group but do not experience hierarchical structures tend to have an egalitarian view of the world and when it comes to the distribution of resources depend on the authority of the state who will distribute resources evenly. In this case Liebig and Wegener speak of '*etatism*'.

People who live in a hierarchical society but whose group does not provide any social integration will feel left alone and exposed to their own fate, and will therefore develop a '*fatalistic*' view of justice.

The fourth prototype of justice ideology is '*individualism*'; a view that occurs when both group integration and hierarchical structure are low and flexible. The individual is convinced it mostly depends on achievement and investment if one wants to profit from resources.

These four ideologies will be included in the research with the goal of discovering relationships between these basic values (ideologies of justice) and both religiosity (including traditional values) and support for human rights.

Again following the logic that religion often is group oriented, we might presume that it is positively related to both '*etatism*' and ascriptivism, but rather negative to individualism. The relationship to fatalism might also be negative, as religious people with strong traditional values often feel integrated in their groups (as integration is one of the main functions of religion). Yet one can also reason that religiosity often contributes to the maintenance of status quo, emphasizing the feeling that nothing can be changed. This feeling then would favor a positive relationship between religion and fatalism.

Considering human rights, a concept which, although not exclusively, is based on an individualistic perception of the world, a positive relationship with individualism can be assumed. On the other hand, support for human rights might rather be negatively related to both ascriptivism and fatalism, as both ideologies of justice do not seem very supportive of an idea that enables people to stand up for rights so that they might change their personal or societal situation. '*etatism*' provides an egalitarian view of human beings in general and therefore is expected to correlate positively with the

human rights idea. Eventually people with an etatist view of justice tend to be more supportive for social human rights.

To sum up the assumptions made in this last paragraph I would like to display hypothesis 6 in the following table:

Table 6: H6: Possible associations between ideologies of justice and human rights/religiosity

	Ascriptivism	'etatism'	Fatalism	Individualism
Support for human rights	-	+*	-	+
Traditional religious values/ religiosity	+	+	+ -	-

* especially for social human rights

5.1.3 Explicative questions

Questions 1 to 7 mainly explain the inner structure of the different variables and their relationships to each other. This last question focuses on possible sociological explanations of these variables.

As pointed out in Chapter Four I part from the assumption that values and value preferences reflect the social context of the people supporting these values. Sociology has developed different models to instrumentalize people's backgrounds, ranging from the class-model (Marx) to more detailed structures like social structure and stratification (e.g. Davis; Moore 1945, Giddens 1982) or the so-called lifestyle or milieu theory (Georg 1998, Grathoff 1995). Bourdieu's theory of field and habitus can be mentioned again here, as his theory provides an inclusive approach to both class and lifestyle.

These different models should not so much be seen as being alternatives but as being complementary, even if they do sometimes have different lines of differentiation, as the class model provides a vertical structure and life-style and milieu concepts a horizontal structure (Endruweit 2000). Still they are connected; Bourdieu (1979) shows in his work "la distinction" how lifestyle preferences often stem from class membership.

Common to all different theories is the attempt to find a method of how to define and categorize a person's background and context on a social level. Implicitly they all part from the principle that aspects like economic situation, ethnic membership, gender, education level, lifestyle and so forth stratify every society. Although for the last 60 years China lived under a regime that officially tried to avoid class differences, the assumptions about vertical and horizontal stratification also apply to China. Even when communism under Mao was on its height and not much was left of the feudal class differences that had characterized China through centuries, both vertical and horizontal differences continued to exist. These differences, especially the ones on the vertical dimension, have been strongly and rapidly enforced through the invasion of the market economy during the last three decades. Chinese sociologists (Ming Xia, 1999; Zhang Wanli, 2002; Sun Liping, 2002; Qiu, Liping, 2003) have shown that already since 1978 Chinese Society has undergone major changes and that the difference between poor and rich is getting bigger. Also Chinese society is structured not just by professional groups, education and economic power, but also by the different possible lifestyles. The open market economy not only brought more hierarchical differentiation, but also more horizontal differentiation, as there are more choices and possibilities of how to lead your life. Therefore it will be important to include socioeconomic variables (economic situation, urban-rural context, education), life-style patterns and aspects of socialization in the study.

This last aspect of socialization is of major importance: Not only does socialization play a major role on lifestyle patterns in general, but socialization is specifically decisive in the development of one's personal religiosity (Benson et al. 1989, Myers 1996). The influence of parents on the religiosity of their children has been empirically shown both in the U.S. and in European countries (Francis & Brown 1991, Martin et al. 2003). No respective data about China could be found. Yet there is no reason why Chinese parents should not have a similar influence on their children's religious beliefs. As a matter of fact, research has shown that in countries which are secularly organized "the effect of family religiosity on children's religiosity is strong" (Kelly & De Graaf 1997, 655). If we consider contemporary China as a secular state²⁰⁴, or in other words as a country where organized religion does not play a major public role (e.g. compared to Islamic states), we might assume that the family's religiosity will be a significant factor on the religiosity of the respondents. Research has also shown that the influence of fathers and mothers is not always similar (Martin et al. 2003, 179). Therefore it is necessary to inquire about parents' religiosity separately.

As parents are not included in this survey, their level of religiosity is only measured through the students. Hence we actually do not measure the religiosity of parents but the students' perception of the religiosity of parents. But, even if we do not get first-hand information about parents' religiosity the data we get will be of interest: Research has shown that "the relation between young adults' beliefs and their parents' beliefs was mediated by the young adults' perceptions of their parents beliefs" (Okagaki et al. 1999, 290). In other words, only if the religiosity of the parents is perceived as such, may it influence the child's religiosity. Of course, and this is another result of Lynn Okagaki's study mentioned above, the perception of the students and the self-reported religiosity of the parents correlate strongly (Okagaki et al. 1999, 285). Hence, even if we only get second-hand information concerning the parents' religiosity, this information will tell us something about the parents' actual religiosity and about the children's perception of the parents' religiosity, and allow us to measure the possible influence of parents' religiosity on the religiosity of their children.

Concerning the importance of socialization, I would like to state the following hypothesis.

- *H7: Parents' religiosity has a strong positive influence on the religiosity of their children.*

Concerning other possible sociological explanations for different values and levels of religiosity, we might get a few hints through a study about traditional and modern habits and values of Chinese people, conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Chinese Academy for Social Sciences in 1987 and analyzed by the German sinologist Bettina Gransow and Li Hanlin. The study showed that people from higher educational backgrounds considered traditional habits to be a real obstacle to a positive development in China, whereas, separated by profession, peasants considered that the low moral standard in contemporary China was to blame. Also, less educated people insisted much strongly that traditional values should be upheld, whereas people with a university degree voted for more innovative values, like a spirit of entrepreneurs, or self-confidence (Gransow, 1995, 54ff.). Furthermore, the level of education seemed to influence the grade of acceptance of a Western lifestyle. Gransow detected similar relationships between income and openness for change and modern (Western) values. Again, people with higher incomes were less skeptical toward these values (Gransow 1995, 82ff.). Differences could also be found between

²⁰⁴ The term secularism, which in its basic meaning signifies the separation between church and state, therefore is not really suitable in the Chinese context, where such a relationship never existed.

the female and male respondents. Male respondents supported the opening process to the West more strongly than did women (Gransow 1995, 97f). Unfortunately, the book does not deliver any multivariate analysis. So it is quite possible that the dimensions tested in fact interrelate (e.g.: women in general have lower education, that is why similar relationships can be detected). These results show how socioeconomic backgrounds influence attitudes and value priorities and it also gives certain hints about the possible direction of the relationship.

Both the results from Gransow and the different theoretical approaches lead us to the following assumption.


- *H8: A high socio-economic status is positively related to individualism and human rights ideas, whereas it is rather negatively related to the support for traditional values and religiosity²⁰⁵.*

As already mentioned, the survey will only include students from one university, which might cause a problem if we want to detect socioeconomic factors that influence the level of support for traditional religious values or for human rights. Still the sample will consist of a variety of socioeconomic backgrounds if we look not only at their current situation, but also at their upbringing, their origins and the socio-economic background of their parents. In his theory about value change, the author of the World Value Study, Inglehart, states that the relationship between the socioeconomic status and value priorities is not immediate. There is a time difference. For the most part, personal values “reflect the conditions that prevailed during one’s pre-adult years” (Inglehart 2000, 220). The university in which I conducted the survey, Fudan University, is an institution with a high reputation, recruiting people from all over China. China surely is no exception from the fact that accessing university is always easier with a high socio-economic background, but it somewhat softens this condition through an extensive scholarship system, which allows students from poor families to study for free. We can therefore expect a certain diversity in our sample concerning the socioeconomic background.

below all variables and the relationships of interest are listed. The variables listed under ‘sociological aspects’ are considered the independent variables, whereas the variables in the box on the right are the dependent values.

²⁰⁵ Results about the influence of socio-economic status on religiosity are often contradictory and complex: Gibson et al. (1990) e.g. have shown that adolescents from lower classes more often say that religion is important to them, but upper and middle class adolescents are more often religiously active (church going).

Graph 4: Variable model



5.2 METHOD AND SAMPLE

METHOD OF QUESTIONING

For this study a quantitative design has been chosen. This decision was based on two reasons: First, I wanted to be able to get the opinion and views of as many students as possible, and not only conduct a few interviews. Second, I felt that it was impossible for a Western researcher to conduct qualitative interviews, as my presence would have influenced the respondents too strongly and also because, in my view, qualitative interviews should be conducted in the mother tongue of both respondents and interviewer.

The quantitative survey was taken through standardized questionnaires that were filled out by respondents in writing. This method seemed the most feasible as I did not have a lot of personal resources to conduct the survey. The questionnaire was handed out in class, and students had the possibility to fill out the questionnaires during class hours. The questionnaires were gathered right away, so the problem of response rate could be eliminated.

POPULATION

The population of interest was students from Fudan University. It was the goal to get a sample of both female and male students from different faculties, including students of natural and technical science, of social science and of the faculty of arts. Of course the research questions do not necessarily require students, and the survey could as well have been conducted among a more differentiated population. The student population was chosen out of several practical reasons: First, it is still rather difficult

to for a foreigner to organize a widespread survey in China, and often compromises regarding the question wording and selection are inevitable. As the study would stay on the University campus, the Chinese authorities did not feel it was necessary to put any restrictions on the content of the questionnaire and hence the questionnaire could be constructed along scientific and not along political criteria²⁰⁶. Also, the research design and the questionnaire would be rather complex. Therefore it was necessary to assure a certain level of education of the respondents, as the questionnaire might have been too difficult to answer for people with only little education. Furthermore, the student population of an elite university like Fudan is of special interest, because many of today's students might be people that influence China's future, as many of them will be able to take over important roles in economics, politics and academia. Another interesting aspect is the fact that students are recruited from all over the country. Therefore the sample would not only consist of young Shanghainese but of students from both rural and urban areas of China.

SAMPLE

To assure the sample would be representative a partly random sample would have been the best method. Yet, although the University authorities did not try to hinder the survey, it was not possible for them to actively support this survey. This made it impossible to access data that would have allowed a random sample (e.g. a computer program randomly chooses 3 different courses in every faculty). Instead a 'snowball' system was used, where we first approached professors we were acquainted with, through whom we could approach other professors who they thought would be ready to hand out the questionnaire in their class and so on. During this process we were eager to include as many different branches in different faculties as possible. The ideal sample size was set at around 400 students, as this was a feasible number, with which many option for the statistical analyses would be open.

TIME

The survey was conducted at the end of May and beginning of June 2004 during a time period of around four weeks. Students were given around 20 minutes to fill out the questionnaire; the majority took around 15 minutes to answer the questions.

REPRESENTATIVITY

Although we were not able to use a random sample, and although the choice of professors in whose classes the survey was conducted was not coincidental, we might still talk of a representative sample of Fudan University students. This for the following reasons:

The survey included students from different faculties and branches. Both male and female students were involved.

The survey design did not in any way control what kind of students would participate, as we did not know what kind of students (male, female, rich, poor ...) would attend the classes.

As we will see in the next chapter, many of the socio-economic variables show close to normal distributions. This allows us to assume that the sample represents the total of the Fudan student population.

²⁰⁶ Looking at the World Value Survey conducted from 1999 to 2002 shows that many questions concerning religion and human rights have not been included in the questionnaire. There is no explanation why, but it is quite obvious that all sensitive questions have not been included in the case of China. This is an indicator that conducting empirical surveys about sensitive topics is still far from easy in China (See Inglehart et al. 2004).

Of course the sample is not representative for the whole of the Chinese population, and might not even be so for Chinese students. The sample allows us only to make assumptions about the highly educated group of students who managed to access an elite university. Still, we have for now no possibility to know if we would have gotten similar results in an elite university in Beijing or any other Chinese city.

5.3 INSTRUMENTATION

As we can see in Graph 4 above quite a view different variables were included in this questionnaire, many of them needed the construction of specific scales, or had to be operationalized in a special manner, to make them fit the Chinese context. The following table shows how the different variables have been operationalized and measured. For some variables the subchapters below provide additional detailed information about how and why the items have been constructed the way they were.

Table 7: Independent Variables and Items

Independent	
Variables	Items
Gender	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Male • Female
Age	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Age
Personal educational level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bachelor program • Masters program
Educational orientation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Subject of study
Personal economic situation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Amount of money available for one month (different groups: 0-999/1000-1999...)
Parents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Education • Social status (top down scale) • Profession
Origin	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Region • City • Countryside
Lifestyle	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clothing • Attending parties • Going to cafés with friends to chat
International contact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Traveling to other countries (Europe, US/ other foreign countries) • Reading foreign newspapers • Reading foreign books • Listening/ watching foreign news programs • Watching foreign films

Table 8: Dependent variables and items

Dependent	
Variables	Items
Social Representation of HR	Items are a selection of the scale used by Scale of Clémence/ Doise (1998) ²⁰⁷ Do you think this is a human rights violation? 1. Somebody is sent to prison without having had a lawyer to defend him 2. A child is beaten by his parents 3. People die of hunger 4. Children (aged 13) have to work in a factory 5. Member of a neighborhood community prevent the construction of a center for people with AIDS 6. A person has to go to prison because he was protesting against the government 7. The parents of two children (10 and 14 years old) are getting divorced. Without talking to the children the judge decides who the children live with 8. A suspected murderer flees to a foreign country. He is caught and sent back to his country without being able to express himself. 9. Somebody with a contagious illness is sent to the hospital by force to be treated 10. Some people have much higher salaries than others 11. Somebody is not allowed to smoke during a meeting.
Attitude towards HR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • General attitude towards Human Rights (not important –very important) • Respecting Human Rights is necessary for a successful country. • Every human being is entitled to rights that protect him from abuse by others and/ or the government. • Human rights an imported American concept?
Religiosity (see 5.3.1 p.167)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Beliefs (soul exists after death, religion important, world one can not see, <i>fengshui</i>, positive impact of religion) • Activities (burn incense, offerings, religious activities, contact with monks and fortune tellers, reading sacred books) • Adherence (feeling close to which religion? Buddhism, Confucianism, Daoism, Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam, Pop. Religion)
Chinese traditional religious values	14 items (see 5.3.2, p.169)
Religiosity of parents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Talk about religion to their children • Take part in religious activities • Offering to Buddha, ancestors, gods
Ideologies of Justice ²⁰⁸	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ‘etatism’: The government should provide a job for everyone who wants one • Ascriptivism: There is an incentive for individual effort only if differences in income are large enough • Fatalism: There is no point arguing about social justice since it is impossible to change things • Individualism: People are entitled to keep what they have earned, even if this means some people will be wealthier than others.
Attitude towards USA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attitude toward the American lifestyle • Attitude toward American international politics.
Political orientation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Party member yes no

²⁰⁷ These eleven items have been chosen from a list of 21 items constructed by Doisé and Clémence (1998), which was too long for the questionnaire. Also some of the original items like “women have to wear a veil” did not seem very suitable in the Chinese context. The items of the presented list were chosen by 5 Chinese sociology students, who picked those items they considered most understandable.

²⁰⁸ The items are taken from the scales used by Wegener & Liebig 1993. Original the instrument had 8 items (two per concept). To reduce the number of questions the item list was reduced to four (one per concept). Again those items were chosen that seemed understandable to the Chinese sociology students.

5.3.1 Measuring instruments: Religiosity

One of the major concepts the questionnaire has to include is the variable ‘religiosity’ of the respondent. I have so far often used the term religiosity and religion interchangeably. For this empirical survey I do consider it most adequate to use the term ‘religiosity’, because it indicates a specific degree of individual commitment. Other than the term ‘religion’, which also denotes the content of what somebody believes in, the expression religiosity is used to “quantify an individual’s commitment to any religion” (VanVleet et al. 2002, 3).

Finding a measurable definition of religion is a difficult and sensitive issue, as subjective views of what it means to be religious often influence the measuring instrument. Nevertheless, we will have to elaborate a suitable definition of religiosity so that we can define the necessary items to measure this concept. Often surveys on religiosity only include religious orientation and the involvement in religious institutions (like going to church) as a possible indicator. This method has been widely criticized by scholars of sociology of religion, as going to church can actually have a lot of different meanings other than being personally committed to one’s religion (Stark et al 1980). People may go to church because they have to, because of their friends and so on. Naturally it can be because of religious devotion, but not necessarily. Therefore “church attendance alone is an ineffective way to measure religiosity” (VanVleet et. al 2002, 10).

Research has also shown that many people do consider themselves very religious although they might not even be a member of a specific religious group or do not engage in any religious activities. Probably the best known theory of this shift in the perception of religiosity is Grace Davie’s (1994) concept of “believing without belonging, belonging without believing”, indicating that actually being active in religious groups does not necessarily mean to support religious beliefs and vice versa. A very common way to measure religiosity is to measure the frequency of praying and the level of support to core religious beliefs. Naturally, European surveys always depart from the assumption that the vast majority of their sample comes from a Christian or at least monotheistic background. Hence when asking questions like ‘how often do you pray’ or ‘do you believe in God’, these questions make sense to a vast majority of people. Yet they would not necessarily make sense to a Chinese public. The World Value Survey form 1990²⁰⁹ has shown that only 3% of Chinese people believe in God (Inglehard et al. 1995, V175). Yet it would be wrong to conclude that Chinese people are not religious, as the same survey indicated that 20% of the Chinese take moments of prayer or meditation (Inglehard et al. 1995, V178). And, while it is for most Europeans possible to define their religious domination, it is not so for a great majority of the Chinese. Also, their religious activity may (but doesn’t necessarily have to) differ from religious activities in the West. Clearly this survey cannot just reuse a religiosity scale used in Europe or the U.S., but a new scale has to be constructed, trying to include the specific qualities of religiosity in China.

It is therefore necessary to base one’s definition on several levels, including institutional and extra- institutional religious activity and religious beliefs. A good example is the approach of the Swedish political scientist Magnus Hagevi (2002): To relate religiosity to political opinion he gives a ‘three-layer-definition’ of religiosity as “the individual’s subjective perception of a transcendent, extra natural reality” (Hagevi 2002, 760). In this definition we find the levels of religious activity, support

²⁰⁹ Unfortunately, in the case of China, most questions concerning religion were not included in the 1999-2002 survey, that is why I had to refer to the data gathered in 1990.

of religious beliefs²¹⁰ and religious orientation. Following this example the scale will include these three levels activity, beliefs, and orientation.

RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY

A typical religious activity in general is the attendance at religious services. This of course is also true in the case of China, but one might say that it is not as important in traditional Chinese religions. Another aspect to consider is that in Mainland China attendance at religious services was for a long time strictly controlled and regulated, sometimes even forbidden. Due to a more open policy towards religion, this has changed in the last few years. If one belongs to the accepted religious groups (Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism), living one's religion has become much easier over the last few years and more and more people do attend church services or go to Buddhist and Daoist temples. But again, visiting temples is not necessarily done on a regular basis. The scale about religious activity therefore does not really separate between activities at home or in temple/ churches. The different items touch different possible activities (burning incense, making offerings, taking part in more organized religious activities). Also respondents are asked whether they consult fortune tellers (an important aspect in popular religion), whether they have contacts with monks and if they ever read so called sacred books. The data analysis will have to consider that some of the items are very general and suitable to different religions, whereas certain items are more specific, applying only to Chinese religions.

RELIGIOUS BELIEFS

Another way to measure religiosity is to ask after what people believe in. The question is whether people share any "religious" beliefs. Here religious beliefs are beliefs understood as beliefs, which touch the non-human non-visible world. Do people believe in an ultimate God? Do they believe in ghosts and spirits? Do they believe in the karmic law? On this level a catalog of the main beliefs of religion are listed to measure respondents' religiosity.

In this survey respondents will be asked whether they believe in a soul that exists after death, in a world different from the one we see, and in Fengshui. These items have been chosen because they are relatively general and might be believed in by people adhering to different religions. The Fengshui item was included so that the level of popular religion (which is hard to grasp in such a questionnaire) will not be excluded. Additionally to these three items, two more general statements about the importance of religion in one's personal life and in society have been included.

RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION

As mentioned on several occasions, most Chinese people do not feel like they belong to one specific religious group. Only the Chinese Muslims and Christians would consider themselves as members of the respective religious group. But even in this case it is often not as exclusive as is the case in other cultures. Many of the converted Christians go on with ancestor worship after their conversion and do not see any contradiction in this behavior.

But, although we find this widespread sort of 'syncretism', many of the Chinese still have preferences when it comes to religious beliefs. They might feel closer to

²¹⁰ Hagevi writes about "religious values", but he actually measures what I would call "beliefs", as he uses items like "the bible is absolutely true" or "salvation is important" (Hagevi, 2002, 761). Following the definition of "value" in Chapter 4, I do not consider these statements as values, and therefore do call them beliefs.

Buddhism than to Islam or they might reject any religious group. The notion of religious orientation will therefore not be neglected in this questionnaire, but it will be adapted to the Chinese context: The question will not ask what religion respondents belong to, but to which religion they feel close. Also the possibility to mention more than one religion will be given. This should enable us to measure certain preferences of religious orientation, and also to detect syncretism and multi-religious models.

5.3.2 Religious Values

The main subject of our study is traditional religious Chinese values and human rights, and whether or not a certain pattern among these values can be detected.

In Chapter Two I gave a short introduction to the four religious traditions that are most important in Chinese culture. I presented their history and their main beliefs and values, which showed the diversity of Chinese values. Also, we have seen how various authors defined and described typical Chinese values, and how their choice of ‘typical values’ is very subjective. Furthermore we have seen that in many cases Chinese values are equalized to Confucian values, ignoring values from the Buddhist or Daoist tradition. Point 5.4 also discusses different examples of value scales already used to define traditional Chinese values, and it has been argued that the construction of these scales seem to be rather coincidental.

To avoid these shortcomings of previous studies, this survey will not rely on scales that have been used before, but rather create a new scale, which should not only include Confucian values, but also values promoted by Daoism and Buddhism. First it is important to remember the applied definition of values as it has been presented in Chapter Four. Two propositions about the content of values have been stated there:

1. *Values are guiding principles that may vary in importance.*
2. *Values are conceptions of the desirable.*

When searching for value-statements in the religious traditions these propositions are of major importance. To be able to categorize a statement as a value, we have to look for statements representing guiding principle and the desirable. Every religion presents a certain catalogue of such concepts concerning different subjects.

I also presented Schwartz value theory and his three categories of values:

“values represent (...) three universal requirements of human existence to which all individuals and societies must be responsive: needs of individuals as biological organisms, requisites of coordinated social interaction, and survival and welfare needs of groups” (Schwartz 1992, 6)

As religions all offer universal worldviews we can assume that they also formulate value propositions on these three levels concerning the individual, social interaction, and collective welfare.

When listing a value catalogue for the traditional Chinese religions I will therefore look for statements that can be linked to one of these three categories and that match the propositions stated above. Also, specific and distinct value-statements seem to be most suitable for our case, as the values that will be included in our questionnaire have to be negotiable to a certain degree. For example, if we take a value statement like ‘human life is precious’ we might hardly find anybody who opposes this value. Therefore, more specific value statements will be chosen so that respondents can both disagree or agree with the concept.

It has now been outlined how a certain statement will be defined as a value. The question remains where these statements should be taken from. The three religious traditions all possess a long history. Their religious beliefs have changed and

developed. During the last 3000 years each of them gave birth to many different scholars and schools. As already discussed on several occasions, it is impossible to define what are Daoist, Buddhist or Confucian values. Whatever the list of values I choose, there will always be an adherent of the respective religion who will disagree with my presentation of his religion. As we have seen, this is one of the major problems we encounter in the discourse about Chinese values and human rights. To surmount this difficulty I have decided to leave the definition of the values to the religious groups themselves. However, as there are different fractions in each religion, I had to make a decision regarding which representatives I should consider.

To make this choice the following criteria were considered:

- The religion is presented by *insiders*, that is, by people who consider themselves as adherents.
- As it is an empirical study focusing on *contemporary* value structures, it is most adequate to look for contemporary representatives of these religions.
- The chosen groups should represent a *majority* of the specific religious groups, ideally representing different groups.
- They themselves should claim to represent “*mainstream*” ideas, referring to different schools and fractions in their presentation of the specific religion.
- The presentation of the specific religion should be *accessible* by a large public. (This excludes very specific scientific essays.)

Following these criteria I have decided to look for sources accessible on the Internet. In 2003 about 80 million Chinese (6.2%) were using the Internet, with a much higher rate in the main cities like Beijing and Shanghai²¹¹. Although the figure of 80 million is impressive, the rate is still very low compared to Western countries. Nevertheless the Internet is a suitable source as it allows religious groups and organizations to represent themselves to a wide and differentiated public, including adherents and non-adherents. We can therefore assume that the Internet presentations of religious groups try to focus on their main beliefs, values and goals, trying to make them accessible and understandable to as many people as possible. Also the Internet gives the groups the possibility to give an overview of their beliefs that is more detailed than printed pamphlets and which is kept up to date. Many sites include both general and specific information, often by putting printed articles or speeches and sermons on the net. Also research has shown that the major Chinese religious associations are represented on the Internet. Some do not have their own site, but contribute and support site providers. I will now present what kind of representations have been chosen for each group and why.

DAOISM

The chosen source to define typical Daoism is the internet page of the Hong Kong based Daoist Culture & Information Center²¹². The page of the named virtual center, presented by a group of Daoist adherents, provides a wide range of information about Daoism including its history and its main beliefs. The creators of the site present Daoism as a lively contemporary religion, and link Daoism to contemporary society and lifestyle. The page is presented both in English and Chinese, the two versions are identical. The page was chosen mainly because it represents the contemporary understanding of Chinese Daoists and it tries to present a complete picture of this religion, with the goal to promote Daoist religion in general. The site also is closely

²¹¹ Article of the online version of the China Daily of 17/01/04: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200401/17/eng20040117_132851.shtml dl.19/01/04

²¹² English: <http://www.eng.taoism.org.hk/> Chinese: <http://www.gb.taoism.org.hk/> dl: 16.10.03

linked to the official China Daoist Association, an organization accepted by the Chinese government, and trying to include all Daoist forces in China. The site is created by the Daoist Culture Database Committee²¹³ and the Fung Ying Seen Koon²¹⁴, an officially registered nonprofit charitable religious body. The wide acceptance of Fung Ying Seen Koon and the many important Daoist priests and seniors who work as advisers for this site supported my decision to use it as a data base for Daoist values.

BUDDHISM

In the case of Buddhism the official website of the China Buddhist Association, www.buddhism.com.cn was chosen. This site is maintained by the editorial board of the following Buddhist journals: FaYin(法音) of the Buddhist Information Network, the Fojia Wenhua (佛教文化) of the China Buddhist Research Institute, Fa Yuan (法源) of the China Buddhist Academy, Chan (禅) of the Hebei Buddhist Association and Conglin (丛林) of the Jiangxi Buddhist Association. The choice of this site as the main source for Buddhist values seems justified as it represents the official Chinese Buddhist Association, which itself represents various provincial Buddhist associations. This site is only presented in Chinese. It gives a very general introduction to Buddhism but also provides several links to more specific information, including a wide range of articles discussing Buddhist religious and philosophical questions, and the position of Buddhism in modern society.

CONFUCIANISM

The decision of which website should be chosen in the case of the Confucian tradition was a little harder. There are many websites having Confucianism in general and Confucius specifically as their main subject. But many of these sites are historical and academic sites, mostly discussing historical or philosophical questions, using a scientific approach rather than the approach of a believer. A certain exception to this is the site called 'www.kongzi.com'. This site is created by people who do 'believe in Confuciansim'. It shows support for Confucian values and even presents a virtual possibility to make offerings to Confucius²¹⁵, by writing down one's name, leaving messages and picking flowers on this virtual altar. It also offers a virtual Confucian cemetery and online mourning. Next to these services the site also includes historical introductions to Confucianism and its main scholars, Confucius and Mencius, and several articles about Confucian beliefs and values. Overall the makers of the site seem to be concerned to present Confucianism as a lively tradition that goes back a long way but is still relevant and even necessary in contemporary society.

There is also an English version of the site, but it is not 100% identical with the Chinese versions. Certain articles can only be found in one of the languages, and the Chinese site is more detailed.

²¹³ Advisors of the Daoist Culture Database Committee: The standing director of the China Daoist Association and Vice-president of the China Daoist Institute Prof. Li Yangzheng, the Director of the Institute of Religious Studies at Sechuan University Prof. Qing Xitai, and Senior Daoist Priest Qiu Fusionsong, Vice Chairman of the Hong Kong Daoist Federation., Director of the Daoist Culture Database Committee: Senior Daoist Priest Huan Chiquan, who is, as many other members and vice-directors, a member of Fung Ying Seen Koon.

²¹⁴ Its name comes from a Daoist temple, where the Patriarchs Chunyang and Qiu Changchun are enshrined, and who are widely respected among Daoist monks.

²¹⁵ Note that this does not mean Confucius is worshiped as a god in the Western sense. To bring offerings to Confucius is very natural in the tradition of the Chinese ancestor cult, as Confucius is one of, if not the most important ancestor.

The site is maintained by the China Confucius Society. Interestingly the site is actively sponsored by the municipal government of Jining and Qufu in Shandong²¹⁶. It is also supported by state enterprises, such as the Shandong Communication Service. After choosing these sites I analyzed the sites looking for moral statements describing the desirable, and grouped them in the categories presented above. To make the applied method transparent you will find one example row below. The complete table showing the results of this analysis is presented in Appendix 10.2, page 317ff.

Table 9: Example of Extraction of Value Statement from the Website of www.buddhism.com.cn

Original Chinese	Original (English)	Value	Final Item	Category
我前面说过释迦牟尼当初出家的目的是为了寻求解脱生老病死等痛苦之道。当时印度许多教派都是有最后解脱的理想。佛教教义的基本内容简单地说来，就是说世界的苦苦谛Dukkhasacca和苦的原因因谛或称集谛Samudayasacca，说苦的消灭灭谛Nirodhasacca和灭苦的方法道谛Maggasacca。	As I said before Buddha Sakyamuni became a monk in order to liberate himself from the suffering of being born, getting old, sick and to die. (...) To put it simple this is the basic creed of Buddhism: 1. The suffering in the world (Dukkhasacca) 2. The reason for suffering is Samudaysacca 3. We can get rid of the suffering through Nirodhasacca 4. To do so we us the way of Maggasacca.	Life is suffering, suffering comes through desire, and to eliminate the suffering we must eliminate the desire by following the eightfold path. (The Indian terms have been translated following their general meaning.)	To lead a good life we have to let go our desires.	Individual

The first row shows the original formulation of the value. As all the chosen statements refer to ideas and values that are of basic importance in the specific religion, similar statements can be found in the document. The chosen extracts are from passages where the value statement is framed in a lucid manner. In the case of Daoism and Confucianism the original citations are in English, as the sites provide English versions, in the case of Buddhism the original is in Chinese and then translated or summarized in English. In a second step, visible in the second row, the original statement is paraphrased to its basic meaning. The third row shows how the specific item will be formulated in the questionnaire. In this last row everyday language is used, so that all respondents will understand the value presented. Also this third step often lifts the statement on a more specific level, sometimes neglecting the wider more spiritual meaning present in the original formulation, reducing it to a clear statement about the desirable. This reduction is necessary so that we know exactly what people's answers are referring to. The reformulations were carefully constructed to make sure it stays as close to the original meaning as possible. Especially in the case of Buddhism and Daoism, it quickly became obvious that next to the three dimensions listed above (individual, social and collective) a fourth dimension 'nature' had to be added, as many of their value statements referred to the relationship between man and nature, or just to nature in general. On the chosen Confucian website I could not find many such statements, and they seem to play a minor role, and therefore were not included.²¹⁷ As it has been explained in Chapter Two, popular Chinese religion is only institutionalized on a very low level, temples often represent local cults, traditions are passed on orally from one generation to the other. There is no central organization that

²¹⁶ Confucius' hometown is Qufu.

²¹⁷ This does not imply that Confucians are not concerned about nature. There are several articles about Confucianism and Nature, eg 儒学与环境保护及可持续发展 (http://www.ica.org.cn/explore/explore-12_09.htm, dl.19/01/03), but the compared to Daoism and Buddhism this subject is discussed rarely.

would represent popular Chinese Religion, and therefore it could not be included in the analysis. Nevertheless popular religion is not really left out, as many of the values that are listed on the websites (mostly on the Buddhist and Daoist website) could also be understood as part of the popular Chinese tradition that has been included in the official religions.

After putting together the table as shown in Appendix 10.2, I sampled out 14 items that were included in the first version of the questionnaire. These items were chosen because they fulfilled the following criteria:

1. They are understandable both to religious and non-religious people.
2. They describe values that are not automatically supported by everybody, and of which we can therefore expect a certain range concerning the support for these values.
3. They constitute values on the different dimensions (nature, collective, social interaction, individual)

The following table contains the items in their English and Chinese version, the religious domination to which they are attributed, the value dimension (individual, social, collective, nature) they indicate, and some notes where necessary.

Table 10: Chinese Traditional Religious Values: Items in Chinese and English

Item in Chinese	Item in English	Websit e	Value- Level	Remarks
不要杀害动物。	We should not kill animals.	B	Nature	Being a vegetarian is often automatically connected with being a Buddhist.
人们应该适应自然环境地不用改变自然。	People should learn to adapt themselves to the natural conditions and not try to change them.	B/D	Nature	Strongly emphasized values by the Daoist website, and also mentioned on the Buddhist website.
战争永远不是解决分歧的核实的办法	War is never the right mean/method to solve a conflict.	D	Collective	
自己的行为一定要服务于祖国的利益	One should always behave in the interest of the motherland.	B/D	Collective	This value statement is very present on both analyzed websites, and should be understood in the light the special relationship between religion and state as described in Chapter Two.
赚得到钱的人应该捐一部分给穷人。	Everybody who earns some money should donate part of it to those who have less.	B/D	Collective	Value can also found between the lines on the Confucian website.
没一个对别应该对自己的佳人一样。	One should treat anyone the same as one treats one's own family members without discrimination.	D	Social interaction	A rather "revolutionary" statement, as partly opposite to the Confucian idea that family relationships are special, and should follow special rules.
做生意图即使可以得到更多，也要买卖公平。	When doing business one should never ask too high a price, even if one could.	B	Social interaction	
人际关系应该礼相待。	It is important that our relationships with other are shaped by given rules.	C	Social interaction	Modern interpretations of the Confucian principle of Li, Ritual.
总有一个前抗的，有等级观的家庭里面一个人能成为善良的人	Only in a healthy hierarchically structured family can a human being learn the proper way of being a human being.	C	Social interaction	
教育比什么都重要	Education is more important than anything else.	C	Individual/ Collective	This statement is difficult to be designated as one of the value levels, as it can apply to the individual and the collective.
远离欲望，才能有好的生活	To lead a good life we have to let go of our desires.	B/D	Individual	
静坐方能到达理想境界。	It is important to take some time for oneself and to mediate so that we can find a peaceful spirit.	B	Individual	
如果别人伤害我们，我们应该忍受。	If other people hurt us we should be ready to accept the suffering.	B	Individual	
每个人应该有义务的提高自我修养。	Everybody has the duty to work on his self-cultivation.	C	Individual	Very close to the value of meditation and peaceful spirit, but the vocabulary of the different religious denominations is so different that it seems necessary to include both versions.

It is once more important to emphasize the following aspects concerning this list of values: The goal is not to give a complete list of the values supported by China's religions. These values are only a (hopefully significant) sample of the values supported by these religious groups. Also, it is not the goal of this research to categorize people as Confucians, Buddhists or Daoists, according what values they support. Considering the Chinese 'syncretism', it is not expected that people's value priorities represent only one specific tradition. Additionally, many of the values are supported by several religious groups and cannot be attributed to one group only. These items should be considered as a proposition. The statistical analysis will then show which of these items are most helpful and meaningful if we want to measure typical Chinese traditional religious values.

5.4 THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The final questionnaire had a total of 76 questions, all of them standardized and closed. The very first version of the questionnaire was written in English. After that a first Chinese translation was made. This first Chinese version was the basis for many rounds of discussions with both professors and students to decide on the best way to formulate the questions. A big problem was the wording of the questions, as often the question did not sound really "Chinese" to the Chinese people, but it was not easy to find real Chinese formulations, as they often did not live up to scientific criteria: In Chinese it is very common to use sayings (mostly combined of four characters) to express certain ideas. Yet such sayings often were not very suitable, as they usually represent general public opinion and therefore make it hard to oppose these ideas, as the social desirability of such statements is too high.

Therefore we tried to use an authentic Chinese language without using standardized sayings. This was an attempt that provoked many hours of discussions, until we thought the questionnaire could be tested in a first pretest round. This pretest (with 33 students) was overall very successful and after a first analysis a few corrections were made. The corrections mostly concerned the wording of the questions.

The questionnaire (both in Chinese and English) can be found in Appendix 10.3, page 325ff. The English version is a translation from the final Chinese versions, and the English formulations are kept as close to the Chinese ones as possible.

5.5 INSTRUMENTS OF ANALYSIS

The data was analyzed with the software program SPSS for statistical analysis in social science. Next to descriptive statistics (frequencies, distribution), I used several test instruments which measure inter-variable relationships and differences. Below I will shortly introduce the main instruments that are used in the next chapter.

PEARSON'S CORRELATION

Pearson's Correlation is used for bivariate data analysis. It shows how variables are related. The correlation coefficient indicates the strength of the relationship and ranges from -1 (perfect negative relationship) to $+1$ (perfect positive relationship). Pearson's Correlation is a measure of linear association. That means that it discovers relationships only if they are linear. Two variables can be perfectly related, but if the relationship is not linear, the correlation coefficient is not an appropriate measure. Analysis of the Pearson's Correlation is always combined with a significant test, which defines to what extent the results might be due to chance. In this study the

significant level is defined as .05, meaning that only results where the possibility of chance is lower than 5% are considered significant.

REGRESSION

Linear regression estimates the coefficients of a linear equation, which involves one or more independent variables, and defines those variables that best predict the value of the dependent variable. Compared to the correlation analysis which measures the strength of the relationship, the regression analysis gives us a clue about the quality of the relationship.

ETA

Eta is a measure of association that is appropriate for a dependent variable measured on interval scale and an independent variable with a limited number of categories. The coefficient also ranges from -1 to $+1$ indicating the strength of the relationship. The 'Eta squared' can be interpreted as the proportion of variance which is explained through the independent variable. Eta is asymmetric and does not assume a linear relationship between the variables.

ONE- WAY ANOVA

The One-Way Anova procedure produces an analysis of variance for a dependent variable by a single independent variable by comparing the means of the groups generated by the independent variable. It determines whether there exist differences among the means and whether these differences are significant.

RELIABILITY ANALYSIS, CRONBACH'S ALPHA

Reliability analysis allows us to examine the appropriateness of measurement scales and the items that make them up. Cronbach's Alpha is a model of internal consistency that measures the average inter-item correlation. The closer the Alpha value is to 1 the better the internal consistency of the scale.

CATPCA

CATPCA quantifies categorical variables using optimal scaling, resulting in optimal principal components for the transformed variables. CATPCA calculates its results on the basis of an alternating least-squares algorithm. The variables can have mixed scaling level and as the CATPCA makes no distributional assumptions about the variables, the procedure is a suitable test for non-normal distributions. The goal of CATPCA is to reduce an original set of variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated components that represent most of the information found in the original variables. In CATPCA dimensions correspond to components, that is, an analysis with two dimensions results in two components. It allows the researcher to discover and display associations between different variables and detect dimensions in the data set.

CATREG (CATEGORICAL REGRESSION)

Categorical regression quantifies categorical data by assigning numerical values to the categories. As a result we get an optimal linear regression equation for the transformed variables. CATREG can deal with variables of different levels, as it simultaneously scales nominal, ordinal and numerical variables. Similarly to a linear regression, it finds the best fitting model of how to explain the dependent variable.

OVERVIEW: SURVEY ESSENTIALS

HYPOTHESES:

- H1: Religiosity is positively related to support for Chinese traditional values.
- H2: There is an association between the width of the definition (social representation) of human rights and the attitude towards human rights.
- H3: Religiosity and strong support for Chinese traditional values are negatively related to a strong support for human rights.
- H4: Students who are very religious and strongly support Chinese traditional values do not have an individual definition of human rights. This negative correlation cannot be found in the case of a social definition of human rights.
- H5: Anti-Americanism is negatively related to the support for human rights.
- H6:

	Ascriptivism	'etatism'	Fatalism	Individualism
Support for human rights	-	+*	-	+
Traditional values/ religiosity	+	+	+ -	-
- H7: Parents' religiosity has a strong positive influence on the religiosity of their children.
- H8: A high socio-economic status is positively related to individualism and human rights ideas, whereas it is rather negatively related to the support for traditional values and religiosity.

METHOD, POPULATION, SAMPLE, TIME

I used a quantitative approach. The data was gathered through a written standardized questionnaire which was filled out during classhours. The population of interest was students from Fudan University.

The sample consisted of 424 students, including both female and male students from different faculties (technical science, of social science and of the faculty of arts).

To contact the students a 'snowball' system was used, where we first approached professors we were acquainted with, through whom we could approach other professors who then handed out the questionnaire in their class.

The survey was conducted at the end of May and beginning of June 2004 during a time period of around four weeks. Students were given around 20 minutes to fill out the questionnaire; the majority took around 15 minutes to answer the questions.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:

- Gender
- Age
- Personal educational level
- Educational orientation
- Personal economic situation
- Parents (education, level of religiosity)
- Origin
- Lifestyle
- International contact

DEPENDENT VARIABLES:

- Social Representation of HR
- Attitude towards HR
- Religiosity (Beliefs, Activities, Affiliation)
- Chinese traditional religious values (taken from the websites:
 - www.buddhism.com.cn/www.kongzi.com/ www.eng.taoism.org.hk)
- Religiosity of parents
- Ideologies of Justice
- Attitude towards USA
- Political orientation

CHAPTER SIX RESULTS



View from Pudong on the Bund (Waitang), Shanghai June 2004

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6 RESULTS

I would like to start my analysis with a presentation of data providing general information about the sample, including information on who the questioned students are, i.e. what major they have chosen, where they come from and if they adhere to western lifestyle patterns. This knowledge should help us to better understand the second part of the analysis focusing on key variables like traditional religious values and human rights. To make this analysis more readable, I have structured it alongside the specific fields of interest (religiosity, human rights, attitude towards the US, views on justice). After presenting univariate results for each of these themes, bivariate analysis will allow us to see if there are any significant explanations for these results, that is whether variation in a variable distribution can be explained sociologically, such as through independent variables like social background or gender.

Thirdly, the analysis will then try to detect relationships among the different variables (e.g. human rights and religious values). This last part includes both bivariate and multivariate analysis, trying to generate inclusive models that would allow us to test the hypothesis 1-5 generated in the preceding chapter. Finally, I will present an overall model that takes into consideration the different results.

6.1 THE SAMPLE: EDUCATION, SOCIAL ECONOMIC STATUS AND LIFESTYLE

6.1.1 Gender, Education


The survey included a total of 424 students from Fudan University. Forty-one percent of the interrogated students are male, 59% female. Most of the students are bachelor students, only 9 of them are in a masters program. The majority (265) of the bachelor students questioned are freshmen, 40 of them are in the second year and 105 students are in their third year. The age ranges from 17-37, but the vast majority (96%) of the students is between 18 and 22 years old. The students are involved in 17 different major programs, ranging from social work to electrical engineering²¹⁸. We can make out three big groups of more than 70 students, namely Chinese culture and history, sociology and industrial management. The two groups of social work and electrical engineering students contain around 50 students each. Other majors such as travel management, philosophy, law & medicine were represented with less than 30 students, in some cases even with only one student. The reason why in some cases there is only one student per major is that they took part in non-compulsory classes outside their major during which they participated in the survey.

This difference concerning the quantity of students from the different majors is a result of the rather difficult circumstances of this survey, which did not allow for a tight control of the sample (see Chapter Five, page 163). Nevertheless, we can confidently conclude that the main goal to reach students from different faculties and branches, was achieved.

We can also create more comparable groups when recoding the variable in four groups as shown on the pie chart below.

²¹⁸Exact distribution see Appendix Graph 60.

Graph 5 Pie chart: Four major groups




In a bivariate analysis we can see that the choice of major is connected to the student's gender:

Women are over-averagely represented in social sciences and arts and underrepresented in technical sciences and economics²¹⁹.

6.1.2 Background

Looking at the students' background, we can observe that half of the students grew up in large cities (47.4%), a quarter in mid-sized or small cities, 16.7% in a town, and 10% in the countryside. This distribution shows that half of the students surely did not grow up in Shanghai or any other large city. Nevertheless, the students from larger cities make the biggest group. This distribution also reflects the current condition in China, in which it is still easier for students from large cities to have access to high-end universities than for students in rural areas²²⁰.

Graph 6 Pie chart: Urban / rural background



²¹⁹ Exact distribution see Appendix Table 19.

²²⁰ See China Statistical Yearbook 2005, 711.


The data also shows us that many students come from a family where at least one of the parents enjoyed higher education, meaning that the father or the mother or both attended professional school, university or higher. Fifty-seven percent of fathers and 49% of mothers reached this kind of education²²¹. Considering the fact that the overall percentage of Chinese enjoying higher education was at 10.5% in 2004²²², this shows that the interrogated students come from very privileged and educated families. Interestingly, there is no significant difference between the education of fathers and mothers: the two variables correlate rather strongly ($r .699$, sig. $.000$), showing that the level of education of one parent quite possibly corresponds to the level of the other parent.

The privileged background of many students is also indicated in their answers about the social position of their families: 85% of the students chose point 3-5 on a scale ranging from 1 to 7, meaning that they feel their families are neither extremely deprived nor extremely well-off. Ten percent feel their families to be situated on the lower end of the scale (points 1-2) and 3% say they come from high-class families (point 6 or 7). Taking a closer look we can see that 82 students, around 20%, perceive their families to be a little under average (lower than point 4) and another 20% think they are a little better off than the average Chinese (higher than point 4). Still the largest group claims to belong to a middle-class family (point 4).

As the students all live in Shanghai we might assume that their scale of comparison is on a rather high level, considering the avant-garde status of Shanghai. The fact that most students feel that they are coming from an average family can be interpreted as a sign that middle-class families are overrepresented in our sample if we compare it to official data, which only speaks of around 5% of Chinese belonging to the middle class²²³.

The bar chart below gives the exact data of how the students judged the social position of their families:

Graph 7 Bar chart: Social status of students




²²¹ Exact distribution see Appendix Graph 61.

²²² See <http://www.china.org.cn/english/shuzi-en/en-shuzi/kj/htm/biao/20-1.htm> dl.30/11/05.

²²³ See http://english.people.com.cn/200501/20/eng20050120_171332.html dl 30/11/05.

The three variables (*place where one grew up*, *education of parents* and *social status of family*) measuring socioeconomic status (ses), are all correlated. The strongest correlation can be observed between the rural/ urban background and the education level of the parents ($r .439$). Interestingly, the correlation is stronger in the case of the education of mothers ($r .453$) than of fathers ($r .349$) indicating that the rural/ urban background seems to be more decisive for the education of women than for men. The social status correlates with the rural/ urban background at $r .367$, indicating that families in mid-sized and large cities are better off than the ones in small towns and in the countryside. This relationship is displayed on the Box plot below:

Graph 8 Box plot: Place where one grew up & social situation (divided by gender)²²⁴



The social situation is also correlated to the educational level ($r .472$). When submitting the three variables to a regression analysis, defining the rural/urban situation and the parents' education level as the independent variable and the social situation as the dependent variable, we receive a regression model with an R (multiple correlation coefficient²²⁵) of $.504$ indicating a remarkable relationship. The model explains about 25% of the variance, and the Anova test is significant at sig. $.000$, thus refuting the assumption that the results are coincidental. These correlations also show that the item 'social status', measured only by the self-positioning of the students, seems to be a fairly adequate measure.

When we look at these background variables in connection to gender we find an interesting yet weak association. Apparently the students coming from the countryside are more likely to be male, as their factual count (27) is much higher than the expected count (18.5) whereas it is lower for girls (count 17; exp. count 26.5). There is also a

²²⁴ Explanation Box plot: The Boxes each show the range of 50% of the cases. The bottom line of the box shows the first quartile (25% of the cases) the upper line the 3rd quartile (75% of cases). The stretched "arms" show the range of the lowest respectively highest 25%. The circles show outliers (individual cases with values that are 1.5 two 3 box-lengths away from the upper or lower box-line).

²²⁵ R is the correlation between the observed and predicted values of the dependent variable.

very weak deviation from the expected count in the case of the category of big cities, but here women score higher than expected. These results might indicate the stronger traditional values in rural areas, meaning that the education of male children is more enhanced than that of females, thus only few girls from the countryside make it to such a prestigious university as Fudan. Another possible explanation is that there are more male than female children in China's countryside. Due to the One-Child Policy China has an uneven sex ratio at birth: there are 116.9 male newborns per 100 female newborns (Li Liying 2005, 452). This trend is explained through cultural patterns that favor male children²²⁶. Assuming that such patterns are stronger in rural areas than in urban areas, this would add to the explanation of why only few girls from rural areas make it to such a high-class university as Fudan.

The information about the background of the students allows us to create the variable 'socioeconomic status', which includes the item 'place of family in the society', 'urban/rural background', and the 'education level of parents'. This variable was computed by adding all three items together²²⁷, and will be used for further analyses.

6.1.3 Students' Lifestyle and International Experience

When asked if they sometimes practice Western lifestyle habits like clubbing, wearing brand name clothes and going to coffee houses, the majority of students answered that they only rarely engage in these activities in their spare time. Around half of the students agree or partly agree with the statement that they sometimes hang out in coffee houses to chat with friends. This makes it the most popular Western lifestyle habit compared to clubbing and buying labeled clothes. In the case of clubbing and partying, 80% say they never or hardly ever spend time in clubs and at parties, and around 70% of students don't agree with the statement that they sometimes buy western clothes²²⁸. In general we can say that students only rarely perform these activities. One possible explanation is the fact that most students (88%) have less than 1000 RMB /month to spend, a budget that does not allow a student to participate in Western lifestyle activities on a regular basis²²⁹.

The survey has also shown that the students have hardly any international experience. Only 13% (N=54) of the students have ever traveled to a foreign country. Of these students, 21 have traveled to a European or American state before, and 47 say they have traveled to other Asian countries²³⁰. The relatively little international experience of the students is not surprising as both economic and political circumstances made it rather difficult for most Chinese to be able to leave their country for vacations. Chinese families only now start to be able to afford travels to foreign countries, and only lately has the restricted travel policy been loosened a bit, allowing the average Chinese person to take part in organized group travel to foreign countries.

International exchange on an intellectual level is rather rare too, 80% of the students say they rarely or never consume foreign newspapers, books or radio and TV

²²⁶ See Ancestor worship in Chapter Two, page 26ff.

²²⁷ For the purpose of the ses- scale the item concerning the urban or rural background was not used as a categorical variable but as an ordinal variable indicating the level of 'rurality'. The scale has an internal reliability of Alpha= .6516.

²²⁸ Exact distributions see Appendix Table 20.

²²⁹ A cup of coffee in a Western style shop costs between 50 and 100 yuan, a pair of Western brand name jeans 500 RMB and more. A night out in Shanghai can easily cost around 200-500 yuan. The connection between the financial situation and lifestyle is supported statistically in the case of the variable 'buying western clothes' which correlates significantly at $r = .277$ with the financial situation, indicating that students who have more money to spend tend to buy Western brand names clothes slightly more often than students with a smaller budget. See Box plot and explanation in Appendix Graph 62.

²³⁰ The total of travels (68) extends the number of students (54) that actually travelled to a foreign country, because some students both traveled to a Western European and to another country.

programs. Concerning foreign movies, we get a different picture where 3/4 say that they watch foreign movies often²³¹.

To understand this data one has to consider that for many students foreign TV programs are not easily accessible, as they only come with paid TV. Certain radio stations and newspapers are accessible through the Internet, but there is often a big language barrier, as consuming news in English is difficult for most students. Furthermore, access to the internet pages of foreign newspapers both in English or other foreign languages and in Chinese are often censored by the Chinese government²³². Compared to these difficulties, access to foreign movies is relatively easy as one can get black market DVDs of all kind of films at every corner of Shanghai's streets. A small selection of foreign movies is also shown in the local movie theaters.

The only significant explanatory factor for these variables is the foreign information and the educational / social status of parents. But the correlations are rather weak, never reaching an r higher than .2.

The question concerning the political activity showed that the vast majority of the questioned students are members of the youth brigade of the Communist Party. This membership should not be overrated, as one nearly automatically becomes a member if one does not explicitly refuse it. Therefore it is very common among students to be a youth brigade member, but it does not necessarily indicate any personal political opinions. Fifty-three of the students are members of the Communist Party. Only a tiny minority (13) belongs to the masses, meaning they are neither member of the Party nor of the youth brigade nor of any other political parties. Only five students said that they belong other political parties that are integrated and sponsored through the Communist Party²³³. Clearly there are only a few cases where we can assume a personal decision (being a member of the Communist Party, another party, or not belonging to any groups). In most cases, however, the variable does not provide any meaningful information about political opinion and interest, and we therefore have to say that this variable is not very helpful. Also no associations with other variables could be found, enhancing the decision that we have to drop this aspect for further analysis.

6.2 CHINESE TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS VALUES

6.2.1 What Traditional Values Do Students Support?


After this general analysis about the sample I will now focus on the specific questions raised in Chapter 6. In question one I asked what Chinese traditional religious values students support the most. The items used to measure support for Chinese traditional values promoted by Chinese religious organizations were especially constructed for this questionnaire. Analyzing the items very quickly showed that some of the items were more useful than others. The item supported the most was the basic idea of Confucian rituals, stating that everybody should treat each other with the respect he /she earns. On the other end of the scale we find the Buddhist item 'to bear suffering'. The bar chart below shows how the students judged the single items.

²³¹ Exact distributions see Appendix Graph 63.

²³² See Chapter Three, footnote 159.

²³³ See Chapter Three, footnote 151.

Graph 9: Approval to traditional religious values²³⁴



Looking at this list of items we can see that values from all major Chinese traditions are both supported and rejected. The Confucian values of respect and self-cultivation are strongly supported, while other Confucian values like education are looked at more critically. The same is the case for items we took from the Buddhist website; the value not to kill animals is very much approved, the notion to bear suffering is strongly rejected. Quite a few of the items constructed from the Daoist website (adapt to nature, treat everybody like family) can be found in the middle of the field, indicating that they are both supported and contested.

Interestingly, the 4 items most supported are a mix of values constructed from all three websites and that also touch 4 different value dimensions: The most important value in interpersonal relationships is 'respect'. Self-cultivation is considered most important on an individual level, charity is the value that should characterize society, and respect towards the life of animals should be significant in our relationship to nature.

More than in the single item, I was interested to see if these items could be combined to a useful scale. The items hardly correlate with each other and also a factor analysis does not produce very strong components²³⁵. As the factor analysis did not seem to create helpful information the variables were submit to a CATPCA analysis. After several rounds of analysis, and reducing the list of items from 16 to six, two dimensions, that is two possible scales, could be detected. On one dimension we find the classical Buddhist values of '*meditation necessary to reach ideal in life*', '*patiently bear suffering*', '*there is nothing man cannot deal with, nothing he cannot endure*'. On a second dimension we find the items '*treat each other with due respect*', '*donate money to the poor*' '*only in a healthy and hierarchical family environment can someone become a good person*'. Dimension one reaches an Eigenvalue²³⁶ of 1.797 Dimension two shows a Eigenvalue of 1.529, both explaining about 30% of the

²³⁴ Result concerning single items can be found in Appendix Table 21.

²³⁵ The strongest component only explaining a variance of 20%, component 2 explains around 11% of variance.

²³⁶ The "Eigenvalue" shows how much of the total variance is explained through this dimension. The higher the Eigenvalue the more variance is explained. The Eigenvalue can maximally reach the number of variables, if 100% are explained.

variance. The total model reaches a Cronbachs Alpha²³⁷ of .839 based on the total Eigenvalue of 3.326 and so explaining 55.4% of the variance. The dimensions indicate that there is an association between the variables loading high on the same dimension but not between the two dimensions as they show very different answering patterns. Looking at the two dimensions we find two basic concepts of Chinese thinking in these dimensions. Dimension one represents the idea of *ren* 忍 ‘forbearance or endurance’ (see page 46f) and, including the item of meditation, emphasizes more passive values. Dimension two represents the aspect of *li* 礼 ‘ritual propriety’. The item ‘*treat each other with due respect*’ and ‘*healthy family environment needed*’ item fit into that concept of *li*. If we understand *ren* 仁 (benevolence) as a form of *li*, and charity as a form of benevolence, then the item ‘*donate money to the poor*’ is also part of the concept of *li*, defining the right behavior in inter-human relationships. Dimension *li* shows rather active and hierarchical values, and represents Confucian ideas, whereas dimension *ren* describes more passive items, coming from a Buddhist background. The table below once more displays the two dimensions, the items they include and the interpretation of these two dimensions.


Table 11: Value dimensions found in sample

Dimensions	Items	Values	Common aspect	Explanation
Dimension 1	Only if we meditate can we achieve our ideal.	Importance of meditation	Forbearance 忍	Both method and values rather ‘passive’, focused on accepting life as it is. Rather inwardly oriented.
	If others hurt us, we just have to bear it patiently.	Forbearance		
	There is nothing man cannot deal with, nothing he cannot endure.	Endurance, Acceptance of fate		
Dimension 2	People should treat each other with the level of respect they deserve due to their social position.	Ritual propriety, respect with a hierarchical notion	Ritual propriety 礼	Focus on behaving according to traditional lines, respecting the rules, focus on society. Values rather active. Notion of hierarchy in two of the items
	Part of ones’ income should be donated to the poor.	Charity/ Benevolence 仁		
	Only in a healthy family, which respects the rituals of courtesy, can a child grow into a good person.	Hierarchical family structure, ritual propriety		

The graph below shows the component loading of the 6 six items. The further the item is away from ‘zero’, the stronger this component loads on one dimension.

²³⁷ This is a model of internal consistency, based on the average inter-item correlation.

Graph 10: Component loading of items on two-dimensional plot (CATPCA)



As there is no positive or negative correlation between the dimensions, it is important to note that support for one of the dimensions does not exclude support for the other one²³⁸.

It should be noted that many other items also gave some interesting information, for example the Daoist item *treat others like family members* also loads high on dimension *ren*, but it does not improve the model and actually lowers the Eigenvalue of dimension *ren* and of the overall model. Therefore only those items were chosen that were part of the best model that could be found. These two dimensions *li/ren* can now be used as variables of their own, and will be included in future analysis.


6.2.2 How Can Differences Concerning the Support for *Ren* (Forbearance) or *Li* Values Be Explained?

In Hypothesis 8 in Chapter Five (see paragraph 5.1.3) we stated that a high socioeconomic status is negatively related to the support for traditional values. Yet, upon examining our data it seems to be rather difficult to identify any independent variables that could explain the differences of how much someone supports the measured religious values. Especially in the case of *ren* (2) (forbearance), we could not identify any possible correlation or association. In the case of *li*, the only variable that seems to have any explanatory value is 'gender'. Apparently women show stronger support for the *li* values than men. For women the mean value lies at 13.83 compared to 13.25 for men. Although the difference is rather small, Anova is significant at a level of .009, but as eta is as low as .096, the relationship is a mere assumption.

²³⁸ Object plot see Appendix Graph 64.

The correlation analysis and the analysis of means (Anova) shows no significant relationship between the social status and the support for *li* or *ren* (2) values. Still, when displaying the data graphically, as on the mean plot below, we get some noteworthy information.

Graph 11 Bar charts: Ren /Li * Place of family in society



Those graphs show us how differently the means of *ren* and *li* develop when we compare the seven groups of the variable ‘place of family in society’. The *ren* mean develops rather horizontally with a tendency to become lower the higher the social status of the family, with exception of the last group who shows a very high *ren* value. It is quite possible that this group of students (which is very small, 9 students) has a tendency to choose extreme values. Compared *ren*, the line for *li* shows a tendency for an upward movement. We get the impression that the *li* values are rather positively judged by students of higher status, whereas the tendency for *ren* develops in a downward direction. Especially if we compare the mean value of the three lowest groups on the social status scale, we can see that while they score relatively high on the *ren* scale, the score low on the *li* scale compared to the other groups. Of course as these results are not significant we have to consider the chance that these values are coincidental (the possibility of coincidence lies at 8% for *li* and 9% for *ren*). If we extend our analysis to variable of socioeconomic status (including three items: place of family in society, rural/urban situation, education of parents), we can observe those students belonging to the highest social economic status are those who on average score highest on the *li*-value scale. In Chapter Five I formulated the hypothesis that high socioeconomic status is negatively related to support for traditional values. *We might suggest that our hypothesis was right if we look at the ren value dimension, but was clearly wrong when looking at the li-values, where we find tendencies for a positive relationship.*

6.3 RELIGIOSITY

Question 2 focused on different aspects of religiosity and to what measure religiosity plays a role in students’ life. Under paragraph 5.3.1 (page 167ff) I have shown that the concept of religiosity should be measured on the three levels of religious beliefs, activities and orientation (affiliation). After analyzing each level on its own, I will examine the relationship among the different dimensions of religiosity.

6.3.1 Religious Beliefs, Activities and Affiliation

RELIGIOUS BELIEFS

A total of 5 items were chosen to measure religious beliefs, of which three items expressed specific religious beliefs (soul exists after death/ there is a world one cannot see/ belief in fengshui) and two items focused on the attitude towards religion in a more general way (religion important in one's personal life, positive impact of religion on society).

It can be said that the items chosen statistically work well in the Chinese context, as they construct a fairly stable scale, showing an internal reliability coefficient of .8007 (Alpha). On the tabulation below we can see how the single items correlate with each other. The item showing the smallest correlations with the other items is the item *fengshui is trustworthy*. This might be explained through the fact that it is the only item that touches a very specific belief, which can be traced back to the tradition of Chinese popular tradition, and is not as general as other items are.

Table 12: Correlations religious beliefs²³⁹

		Correlations				
		soul exists after death	religion promotes morals and ethics in society	religion is very important	there is no other world than the one we see	fengshui is trustworthy
soul exists after death	Pearson Correlation	1	.437**	.579**	-.544**	.489**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	423	423	421	422	423
religion promotes morals and ethics in society	Pearson Correlation	.437**	1	.499**	-.426**	.305**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.	.000	.000	.000
	N	423	423	421	422	423
religion is very important	Pearson Correlation	.579**	.499**	1	-.502**	.338**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.	.000	.000
	N	421	421	421	420	421
there is no other world than the one we see	Pearson Correlation	-.544**	-.426**	-.502**	1	-.317**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.	.000
	N	422	422	420	422	422
fengshui is trustworthy	Pearson Correlation	.489**	.305**	.338**	-.317**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.
	N	423	423	421	422	423

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).


Looking at the answers to the single items, it can be said that quite a few students are rather critical towards religious beliefs, especially towards *fengshui* and believing *in a soul after death*. Also, most of the students report that religion is not very important in their personal life. On the other hand, the item that religion can improve social ethics is highly supported: a majority of the students believes in the possible positive impact of religion in society. This shows us that although many students do not have any specific religious beliefs, and although religion is not especially important in their personal life, they seem to have a positive but distant attitude towards religion.

The mean value for the different items is displayed below. The higher the score the more approval the specific item received from the students²⁴⁰.

²³⁹ The negative correlation with no other world than the one we see of course is due to the fact that the item was negatively formulated. When added to the scale this item is reversely recoded.

²⁴⁰ Exact distributions see Appendix Graph 65.

Graph 12: Religious beliefs



As mentioned earlier, these results illustrate that the usefulness of religion is widely accepted, even by students who do not consider themselves as being very religious. The Chinese religious associations and the Chinese government have also increasingly emphasized the aspect of the positive function of religion for society during the last few years. This goes along with a general shift in the attitude towards religion in China. Whereas in the Maoist era religion was considered to be dangerous to society, it is now perceived as being a major source of morality and ethics (see Chapter Two, paragraph 2.4.2). Of course this positive attitude only refers to a rather narrow definition of religion (including the 5 official religious groups) and not to smaller religious groups that are often considered superstitious (see Chapter Two, page 64ff). This skepticism promoted by the Chinese government towards all kind of ‘non-official’ religion might also explain part of the skepticism towards *Fengshui*, which is the least supported item.

RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY


To measure if the students perform any religious activities six items (burn incense / taking part in religious activities, meetings or organized activities (活动) / make offerings / read sacred books / consult fortunetellers / contact with monks) that fit the Chinese context have been constructed. If we want to summarize these items as one scale (indicating the level of religious activity), it seems best to exclude the item *burn incense*, as it only correlates weakly with the other items. The internal reliability of the scale is .3729 (Alpha) with the item, whereas it rises to .7366 without it. The reason why the burn incense item does not fit in the scale can be found when looking at the items singularly: the activity most popular is the burning of incense sticks either at home or in a temple. Fifty percent of the students say they at least sometimes burn incense, of which 20% declare they do it on a more regular basis at least a few times a year. Although half of the students say they never burn incense, compared to the other items it is the most widespread activity. For the construction of the scale one could say

it is too common and thus does not seem to be a good measure to separate those who practice religious activities and those who do not. When looking at ‘religious activities’ in general we will therefore use the scale without the item *burn incense*.

Looking at the distribution of the other items, we can observe that a little less than 50% of students sporadically or regularly take part in organized religious activities, either at home, in a temple or in a church. The students performing such organized activities on a regular basis only represent around 17% of the total. About 40% say they (at least) sometimes worship ancestors or Buddha. We find the same frequencies in the case of reading religious books. Students only very seldom have contact with monks or consult fortunetellers.

The bar chart below summarizes the results concerning religious activities.

Graph 13 Bar chart: Religious activities




RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

The question of religious affiliation seems especially interesting in the Chinese context. As explained above, the concept of religious affiliation is relatively alien to the Chinese and therefore the students were not asked which religion they belonged to but to which religion they felt close. The religions listed were Buddhism, Daoism, Confucianism, Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam, and Popular Religion. A category ‘other’ was included to make sure not to exclude any religion. Also the students had the possibility to choose several answers.

A slight minority (199) answered that they would not feel close to any religion, 224 mentioned at least one religion they felt close to. As can be seen in the bar chart below, the most popular religion among the students is Buddhism, a total of 127 students stated that they feel close to that religion. Protestantism follows with 74 students, 40 students chose Confucianism and 32 chose Daoism.


Graph 14 Bar chart: Feeling close to which religion²⁴¹



The bar chart illustrates how often the students chose the specific religion. As already mentioned, the students could pick more than one religion and quite a few students also used this possibility. In certain cases the students chose up to four different religions. Single models still were the most frequent pattern. Of the 224 students who feel close to at least one religion, 156 chose to check only one religion. Among these, the biggest group are those who only chose Buddhism (76) followed by a group of 37 students who only checked Protestantism. Other single groups are Confucianism (14), Popular religion (10), Catholicism (8), Daoism (7) Islam (1). Around 1/3, that is 64 of the students, chose mixed models, of which the biggest group is Buddhism and Protestantism (14). Nine students chose Buddhism and Daoism, six Buddhism, Confucianism and Daoism, five Buddhism and Confucianism. Four students chose Buddhism, Protestantism and Catholicism, and another group of four chose Protestantism and Catholicism. Another thirty of the students chose other mixed models, which consist of three or four religions.


²⁴¹ Does not include results concerning the number of student (199) who don't feel close to any religion.

Graph 15 Pie chart: Religious affiliation models



As we can see, single models are most common among the students, and Buddhism clearly is the most popular religion among them. Still, there are a remarkable 68 students who feel close to more than one religion, and interestingly the largest group among these students is the one combining an Asian religion (Buddhism) and a Western religion (Protestantism). If we divide the religions into “Chinese Religions” (including Buddhism, Confucianism, Daoism and Popular Religion), and “Christianity” (including both Protestantism and Catholicism), we can see that 136 of the student choose one or more Chinese religions (of which 76 chose Buddhism only), 52 chose one or more Christian religion and 33 chose a mixed model both including Christian and Chinese religion²⁴². Altogether 5 significant groups could be found as can be seen on the pie chart below.

Graph 16 Pie chart: Religious affiliation, 5 groups




²⁴² As Islam was only chosen once it was ignored as a missing value in this part of the analysis.

6.3.2 Associations and Correlations Among Different Levels of Religiosity

After looking at the different levels of religiosity one by one I will now examine how these levels relate to each other. For this analysis we will not use the data concerning the single items of each level, but will add the items to a scale. Relying on the sufficient internal reliability of the items chosen this method seems justified²⁴³.

This inter-level analysis shows that there are several associations and relationships between the different levels of religiosity: there is a rather strong association between religious affiliation (dummy variable: no religion/ close to one or more religions) and both religious faith and religious activities²⁴⁴. This relationship is graphically displayed on the box plots below.

Graph 17: Box plot religious affiliation (dummy) * religious beliefs * religious activities




These box plots show us that students not feeling close to any religion are also less religiously active and have less religious beliefs. The relationship between the religious affiliation and religious beliefs also persists when we use the 5 group-variable for religious affiliation, summarizing the different models of religious affiliation in 5 groups (Buddhism, Chinese Religion, Christianity, Chinese Religions and Christianity). Anova shows a significant association between these two variables and eta lies at .508. The box plot below shows that the group with the weakest religious beliefs are those students who do not feel close to any religion, the group with the strongest religious beliefs are those who chose both one or more Chinese religions and a Christian Religion (mean 19.72 on belief scale ranging from 6-30). Next follow the students close to Buddhism with a mean of 17.99. Those choosing Christianity only or Chinese religions only score lower on the belief scale with means of 16.96 and 14.92 respectively.

²⁴³ As mentioned above the item burn incense is excluded from the 'religious activity'-scale

²⁴⁴ Running a correlation we get an r of .455 for religious beliefs and an r of .414 for religious activities.


Graph 18: Box plot religious affiliation (5 groups) * religious beliefs



The fact that the Christians score lower on that belief scale might be explained through the fact that some items do not necessarily apply to Christianity (like believing in Fengshui). It is quite logical that the group with the broadest religious affiliation scores highest on the belief scale as their view is very inclusive and therefore most probably also includes many different beliefs. The data gets more meaningful when taking a closer look between these 5 groups of religious affiliation and religious activities.

Again Anova shows a significant association between the two variables, eta being slightly lower with a value of .428. Once more the box plot below will help us to understand this relationship better. In the case of the activities the group with the highest mean are those who believe in one or more Chinese religion. As above, those close to Buddhism only are the second most active group followed by those feeling close to Chinese religions and Christianity. In the case of the activities those feeling close to Christianity are the least active of the different “religious groups”.


Graph 19: Box plot religious affiliation (5 groups)* religious activities



The result reveals that while certain religious affiliation models are associated positively with religious beliefs (e.g. intercultural model) others seem more strongly connected to religious activities (e.g. one or more Chinese religion). While Buddhism scores relatively high in both fields, in the case of Christianity we find a relatively low score both for beliefs and activities, but especially for activities. It seems that for many who feel close to Christianity this is a rather abstract or internal feeling and not one that explicitly shows itself in activities.

While the association between religious affiliation and beliefs/activities cannot be understood as a linear correlation (as the variable religious affiliation is nominal and not interval or ordinal) we can find such a correlation between the belief and activity scale. They correlate with an r of .476 at a significance level of .000. This relationship is graphically displayed on the scatter plot below.

Graph 20: Scatter plot religious beliefs* religious activities²⁴⁵



²⁴⁵ The sunflowers indicate the number of cases at one position (circle =one case, every additional leaf =one case).

These results show us that the different levels of religiosity are related. If somebody has religious beliefs he is rather likely to also be religiously active and to feel close to one or more religion. Yet, as we have seen, the correlations between the levels although noticeable are not extremely high (never exceeding .5), indicating the fact that some students do have religious beliefs and at the same time are not or only very seldom religiously active.

6.3.3 How to Explain Differences Concerning the Variance in Religiosity

Above we discovered certain relationships between the different levels of religiosity and between religiosity and support for traditional religious values. Of course, these results do not explain why certain students are more religious than others and why some show more support for traditional values than others. In Hypothesis 7, I assumed that the parents' religiosity has a strong influence on the religiosity of students. To be able to verify this hypothesis respondents were not only asked to answer questions about their own religiosity but also about their parents' religiosity. Unlike for the students, the parents' religiosity was only measured on the level of activity and affiliation. The level of beliefs was not included, mostly because the parents could not answer themselves, and for many students it might have been impossible to give adequate information on their parents' religious beliefs. I will first give a short description of the reported religiosity of parents and then I will both compare and relate the religiosity of parents to the religiosity of their children.

RELIGIOSITY OF PARENTS

The items used to measure the religious activities of the parents were: *taking part in religious activities/meetings* and *making offerings to ancestors or Buddha*. Looking at these two items we can observe that there is a significant difference between mothers and fathers concerning the amount of religious activity, this is that mothers are more often religiously active than fathers²⁴⁶. A total of 78 students report that their mothers take part in religious activities on a more or less regular basis (at least once or more a year), whereas the same is only true for 50 of the fathers. Quite similar results can be found for the item *making offerings to ancestors or Buddha*. This last result is rather surprising as normally ancestor worship is a duty of the man. Of course as the item does not separate between ancestor worship and Buddhist rituals it is quite possible that the mothers often perform Buddhist rituals. But it might also show a certain shift in the religious roles in a family. Despite those differences, and the fact that mothers were perceived more active than the fathers, the results concerning the religious activity of each parent correlate with each other very strongly ($r .702$, sig. $.000$). Clearly this signifies that if one parent is religiously active there is a great chance that the other parent is too.


The students were also asked how often their parents talked to them about religion while they were children. Half of the students (229 for fathers / 223 for mothers) reported that their parents never talked to them about religion when they were children, and in only a few households was the subject evoked on a regular (once a month/week) basis (15 f/ 23 m). A rather big group of students (180 f/m 178) reports that their father / mother talked about religion once in a while (seldom/once or more a year)²⁴⁷.

²⁴⁶ Anova results: Religious meetings: Mean 1.48 f/1.71 m; $t 6.136$; sig. $.000$ / Offerings to ancestors/ Buddha: Mean 1.59 f/1.71 m; $t 5.188$; sig. $.000$.

²⁴⁷ For the exact distributions for the three items see Appendix Graph 66.


Combining the three items of religious activities of both parents we receive a scale that ranges from 6 to 30. From that scale we can see that 27% of the students report that neither of their parents ever take part in any religious activity and also never talked about religion. On the other end of the scale, only about 7% of the students seem to have grown up in a rather 'religious' household, if we draw the line at 18 points (indicating an average value of 3, which is labeled "once or more a year" for all proposed activities).

Graph 21 Bar chart: Scale, Religious Activities Parents (N =417)



Taking a look at the religious affiliation of the parents the picture is as follows: again the biggest group of both fathers (277) and mothers (210) are those who do not feel close to any religion. The number of mothers reported not to be close to any religion is much smaller than that of fathers. This difference is basically due to the fact that mothers are (according to the information provided by their children) more often close to Buddhism and to popular religion. On the other hand, we find slightly more fathers that are reported to be close to Confucianism and Daoism. These religions differ in a certain way from Buddhism and Popular Religion as they have mostly survived in their philosophical form, although both Confucian and Daoist rituals are reemerging. The finding that mothers more often feel close to religion than fathers is congruent to the result that mothers are more often religiously active.

Graph 22 Pie chart: Religious affiliation of parents




SHIFTS AND ASSOCIATION BETWEEN PARENTS' AND CHILDREN'S RELIGIOSITY

As we have seen there is a correlation between the religiosity of one parent and that of the other parent. We also find relationships between the parents and their children. When looking at the religious activity of mothers we can see that it is positively related to the religious activities (r. .610, sig. .000) and to the religious beliefs of the students (r. .352, sig. .000). Very similar relationships can be found between the religious activities of fathers and the activities and beliefs of the students, correlating at .652 and .392 respectively, both significant at .000. These results provide interesting information. Firstly, it is obvious that the religiosity of the parents seems to influence the religiosity of the children. The relationship seems much stronger on the activity level, that is religiously active parents have religiously active children. The relationship between the level of religious activity of the parents and beliefs of their children can still be observed, but is not as strong. Interestingly, the correlations of these relationships are a bit higher in the case of fathers.

When we analyze the influence of the parents on the religious activities of their children in a regression analysis, we can also observe that both the standardized Coefficient Beta and the T-value are much higher for the fathers (t 8.877 / beta .445) than for mothers (t 5.896 / beta .295). This data suggests that fathers, although less religious, seem to have more influence on whether or not their children become religiously active. But as the regression model shows, the influence is strongest if we combine both the religiosity of the fathers and the mothers. In the model summary we get an R of .685 explaining about 47% of the variance. On the Scatter plot below we can observe the strong relationship between the parents and the students concerning religious activity and the less strong but significant relationship between the activity of the parents and religious beliefs.

Graph 23 Scatter plot: Religious activity of parents* religious activity/ belief of students




The influence of parents' religiosity on their children can also be observed in the case of religious affiliation if we reduce the item to a dummy variable (no religion/ feel close to one or more religions) both for students and parents. We then find a correlation of $r=0.424$ (sig. 000) between the parents and the students.

After these results we can conclude that H7 turned out to absolutely true for our sample. *If the parents are religious (or at least are perceived as religious by their children) the chance that the children are both religiously active, have religious beliefs and feel close to one or more religion rises significantly.*

Yet, although this result is very clear, we might also detect certain shifts between the religiosity of parents and that of their children. Firstly, students less often say that they do not feel close to any religion. Compared to 277 in the case of the fathers and 210 in the case of the mothers, only 199 students say that they do not feel close to any religion. Of course it has to be taken into consideration that the students had the advantage of answering for themselves, whereas the parents are reported through their children. Therefore it is quite possible that the students are not always aware of the religious preferences of their parents, especially as many students indicate that their parents hardly talked about religion. This absence of information most probably makes many students conclude that their parents do not have any preferences and do not care about religion too much. This conclusion may be adequate in general, but might underreport the level of religiosity in a few cases.

A second major shift between parents and students is that both for fathers and mothers we find hardly any of them being close to Christianity, only 3 students said their fathers would feel close to Christianity and 11 students perceived their mothers as being close to Christian religion. But more than 50 students reported that they themselves felt close to Christianity. Third we notice that intercultural mixed models are rarely to be found among the parents (4 mothers, 7 fathers), where as they make a relatively (compared to their parents) big group (33) in the case of the students. The number of students close (only) to Buddhism is similar to the one of the fathers, but dropped when compared to mothers, the number of respondents close to Chinese religion are similar to the ones of the parents. Still we can observe that that only a few students feel close to Popular Religion whereas quite a few mothers feel close to this oldest form of Chinese religion. These shifts can be observed on the bar chart below:

Graph 24: Religious affiliation of parents and students



When comparing the religiosity of the students to that of their parents, there are two major results: on one hand, the parents have a very strong influence on their children in that field. On the other hand, some major shifts could be observed: 1) students more often consider themselves to feel close to a religion than their parents, and 2) we find more students feeling close to Western religions and/or intercultural models than is the case for their parents.


SOCIOECONOMIC BACKGROUND AND RELIGIOSITY

We have seen that the parents' religiosity partly explains why some students are more religious than others. The question is whether other independent values such as social status or lifestyle have any influence on the students' religiosity. I will not examine this question for every single level of religiosity but combine the variables religious beliefs, religious activity and religious affiliation (dummy) to one variable "religiosity"²⁴⁸, which will make it easier to understand and present the data.

In a first correlation-analysis we could find a few independent variables (ses, gender) that show significant correlations, but in most cases they are extremely frail. The highest correlation can be observed between socioeconomic status²⁴⁹ and the strength of the variable religiosity. The correlation value lies at .262. Interestingly, the influence of socioeconomic background is much higher for men than for women. Looking at the correlation separately we get a value of .319 for men and of .171 for women. If we look at the single items of the socioeconomic status variable (place of family in the society, education of parents, rural/urban situation) we can also observe significant correlations, but they are even weaker and all tend to be around .2²⁵⁰.

As the correlations are rather weak and not very informative, it is worthwhile to take a more descriptive look at this association. Below you can see the mean plot for the socioeconomic status as the independent variable and religiosity as the dependent variable.

Graph 25 Bar chart / Mean plot: religious beliefs * ses



²⁴⁸ This variable "religiosity" shows an internal correlation of Alpha = .8251, and it is therefore justified to consider the eleven different items as one scale of religiosity.

²⁴⁹ Variable combines 3 items: social place of family in society, education level of parents, urban/rural situation


²⁵⁰ The exact correlations between the single socioeconomic status items and religiosity are displayed in Appendix Table 22, and

Table 23.

This graph clearly shows that the mean of the variable *religiosity* is rising together with the status of the family. Comparing the mean values statistically, the Anova analysis confirms that the differences are significant (sig. .000, eta .266).


Next, I would like to look at the non-ordinal variable of the rural/urban situation (taken as an ordinal scale of urbanity as part of the ses-scale). A significant but rather weak correlation (.174 for w/ .179 for m) already suggests that there is a certain relationship between the religiosity and one's rural/urban situation. On the box plot below we can observe, rather surprisingly, that although the 75% variance is about the same for all groups, on average students who grew up in large cities are more religious than those from the countryside. This observation is also supported by an Anova analysis which is significant at .000.

Graph 26 Box plot: religiosity * rural/urban situation



There is also a relationship between the variable gender and religious beliefs: the comparison of the means (which shows significant results when running an Anova analysis; sig. 000) indicates that the interrogated women are more religious than the men, although the differences are not very extreme.

Graph 27 Box plot: religious beliefs* gender



Another interesting observation can be made when looking at the variable academic major. The direction of one's major and the strength of religious belief is associated; there are significant differences between the means of the different groups. Anova


shows a significance of .025. Comparing the means we can see that those studying in the faculty of arts (Mean = 25.3) and those students in social sciences (24.6) are significantly more religious than students from technical sciences (23.58) and economics (22.6).

SOCIOECONOMIC BACKGROUND AND THE DIRECTION OF RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

Before turning to the multivariate analysis, I would like to take a more detailed look at the relationship between religious affiliation and independent variables.

Looking at the box plot below we can observe differences concerning the socioeconomic status between the different groups (no religion/ Buddhism/ Chinese religion/ Christianity/ Chinese Religions and Christianity). We can see that those feeling close to *no religion* and to *Chinese religions* on average show a lower socioeconomic status than those who say they feel either close to Buddhism, Christianity or to both Chinese Religions and Christianity. Those favoring intercultural models on average have the highest socioeconomic background. The difference of means is significant, a level of .002 (Anova analysis), and the eta value lies at .199, indicating a significant but weak relationship. This result leads to the hypothesis that students with a high socioeconomic status also have more access to “intercultural” goods, which might be reflected in their openness to other traditions.

Graph 28: Box plot ses* religious affiliation



No other independent variables that have an influence on religious affiliation could be found. Other than in the case of the general religiosity scale, there is no difference between female and male students concerning their religious preferences. There are slightly more women who feel close to Buddhism but the difference is not statistically significant²⁵¹.


To summarize the results concerning religiosity and independent variables, we might say that someone who comes from a big city with a high socioeconomic background, who is female and studying either arts or social sciences and has religious parents is much more likely to be religious than a student from the countryside with a low socioeconomic standard, who is male, studies economics and has rather non-religious

²⁵¹ Chi_Square Test showed a sig. level of .100. Exact distributions see Pie chart in Appendix Graph 73. The same is true for the relationship between the major and religious affiliation. Although some differences can be observed (eg. social science students choose Christianity more often) no statistical significance is given.

parents. How these different variables complete each other and how important their influence is, will be discussed now.

If we include the different variables in a multivariate regression analysis we get a model with three independent variables that is able to explain about 40% (R Square .399/ adjusted .395) of the variance of the variable “religiosity” and that shows an R of .632. The strongest variable in this model is the religiosity of parents (standardized Coefficient (Beta) = .552), followed by the socioeconomic background (Beta = .194) and gender (Beta=.148). All variables make a significant difference in the model and help to improve the explanatory power of the model²⁵². The variable ‘major’ does not contribute to the explanatory power of the model. The chart below illustrates how ‘religiosity’ can be explained.

Graph 29: Explanatory model for ‘religiosity’



To find out whether or not the model is both valid for male and female students, I split the sample and ran the same regression analysis again including both the religiosity of parents and the socioeconomic status as independent variables.


Interestingly, we can observe that both variables seem more effective for male than for female students. In the case of men the two variables manage to explain 43% of variance (R square .435, adjusted R square .427), with an overall R of .659. For female students only 32% (R square .328/ adjusted R square .322) of variance are explained, the R value is significantly lower (R=. 573). These results indicate that

²⁵² If we run a categorical regression analysis (CATREG), which takes into account that the variables are not all normally distributed, and that the variable gender actually is a nominal and not an ordinal, we get even stronger results for this model. The model then explains 60% (R square .604/ adjusted R square .596) of the variance of religiosity and the relationship is rather strong (multiple R .777). When the variable gender is considered as a nominal its importance for the model diminishes totally and it does not make a significant change any more (importance .000/ sig. .873). As in the regression analysis, by far most the important variable is the religiosity of parents (importance .838/ sig. .000) followed by the socioeconomic status of the students (importance .162/ sig. .000).

male students seem to be more influenced by their socioeconomic background and by their parents when developing their own religiosity.

Above (p.201), we have seen that the influence of parents was stronger for girls concerning religious activities and weaker for beliefs. By running separate regression analysis for religious activities and beliefs including both parents' religiosity and the socioeconomic status as independent variables we find similar results: in general the influence of the socioeconomic background and the parents' religiosity is stronger on the amount of religious activities than on religious beliefs. In the case of the male students the variable 'parents' religiosity' accounts for 50% of the variance (R. .700/ R square .503/ R square adjusted .500). Adding the socioeconomic status does not improve the model as its contribution is not significant. This means that the only explaining factor for the amount of religious activities is the religiosity of parents. For female students we get an R value of .670, explaining around 45% of variance. This *figure* is close to the men's results, but in the case of women the socioeconomic background obviously plays a certain role on defining the frequency of religious activities, as it is significant on a .000 level and shows a standardized beta value of .101. The difference is not that evident in the case of religious beliefs, as both for male and female students the model is much weaker (f R. 411/ m R. 517), explaining only around 26% (R square .267/adjusted R square .258) of variance in the case of male students and only 16% (R square .169/ adjusted R square .162) for women. Compared to results for religious activities, both the socioeconomic status and the parents' religiosity have a stronger effect in the case of men. Again we can conclude that male students seem to be more strongly inspired by their surroundings, especially in the case of beliefs, whereas female students more often take a stand on religion that cannot necessarily be explained by their socioeconomic and religious background. The graph below summarizes the differences we observed regarding the different levels of religiosity and of the influence of gender in this multivariate analysis.

Graph 30: Explanatory (2) model for religiosity




6.3.4 Religiosity and Religious Values

After understanding the relationship between the different levels of religiosity, and having found some independent variables that at least partly explain why somebody is more or less religious, I would like to find out whether or not the hypothesis (H1) that a high level of religiosity would be related to a strong support for values promoted by religious groups is correct. For this analysis we will once more use the scales constructed for religious beliefs and activities and the value concepts *ren* (forbearance) and *li* (ritual propriety), developed through the CATPCA analysis. For the variable religiosity I will first take a look at the general religiosity scale (combining belief, activity, affiliation) and then scrutinize the different levels of religiosity.

CHINESE TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS VALUES AND RELIGIOSITY IN GENERAL

If we are looking at the correlation analysis between the general religiosity scale and the two value dimensions *li* and *ren*, we might suggest that our hypothesis only partly right, as there are only weak correlations ($< .2$) between the different concepts. Religiosity and the value dimension *ren* show the highest correlation ($r .178$). This correlation is statistically significant but extremely low, so we have to be very careful when talking about a relationship. Nevertheless, we can find certain associations among the concepts when running nonlinear tests. Anova is significant on a .001 level for *li*. This means that the level of support for these values differs significantly between students with a dissimilar level of religiosity. Testing for the linearity we can observe that the association between *li* and religiosity significantly deviates from linearity (sig. .003). This also explains why the correlation value for *li* is very low, and why we get an eta value of .398, which is not extremely high but nevertheless is noticeable. The mean plots below display the associations between religiosity and *ren* / *li*. We can easily observe the different patterns of the relationship: while *ren*, although not perfectly linear, seems to raise with the religiosity (significant linear correlation), in the case of *li* the line first shows a downward movement before raising again.

Graph 31: Mean plot religiosity * ren and * li



CHINESE TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS VALUES AND THE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF RELIGIOSITY

Examining the different levels of religiosity, no noteworthy correlation ($> .2$) between religious affiliation, religious beliefs and religious activities and the value dimension *ren* and *li* could be observed.

Expanding the analysis to nonlinear association (eta), weak but significant associations between religious activities / beliefs and the value dimensions *ren* and *li* could be found.


The table below shows the direction and strength of the associations found among religious beliefs, activities and traditional values:

Table 13: Religiosity and traditional religious value dimensions (*ren/li*)

	Religious Beliefs	Religious Activity
Ren (forbearance)	Eta= .317 Sig. = .014 (deviation from linearity sig.=.115)	Eta=. 225 Sig.= .127 (deviation from linearity sig.= .53)
Li (ritual propriety)	Eta. 317 Sig. = .014 (deviation from linearity sig.= .036)	Eta=. 239 Sig.= .063 (deviation from linearity sig.= .063)

As we can see there is a loose association between *ren* and religious beliefs. This relationship is displayed on the mean plot below.

Graph 32: Mean plot religious beliefs²⁵³ **ren* (forbearance)




N=420

This chart shows a positive relationship between *ren* and religious beliefs, or, to be more exact: those students who have strong religious beliefs show more support for values that emphasize forbearance, patience and meditation than those who do not have any religious beliefs. As the zigzag line of the mean plot indicates, the relationship is not totally linear. As a matter of fact, students having some religious beliefs on average approve *ren* values less than students more critical towards religious beliefs. Yet, looking at the line in general there is an overall upward movement, supporting (at least part) of our hypothesis that Chinese traditional religious values are

²⁵³ The relationship between *ren* and religious beliefs is displayed on the graph above. The data of religious beliefs was regrouped in 5 ntiles. Every group represents around 20% of the cases, group 1 are the 20% with the lowest scores on the scale, group 5 the 20% of cases with the highest scores (as the data cannot be exactly separated in 5 groups of each 20%, the SPSS program chooses the solution closest to these 20%, the exact distribution is indicated on the graph).

positively related to a high support for religious beliefs. However, we should not forget that the statistical data of this relationship, although significant, is rather weak. On the table above it is indicated that for both the value dimensions (*ren* and *li*) the strength of the relationship is the same, but in the case of *li* we can observe a significant deviation from linearity, indicating that the non-linearity of the relationship is stronger than in the case of *ren*. We find proof for this assumption when looking at the mean plot between religious beliefs and *li*:

Graph 33: Meanplot religious beliefs²⁵⁴ *li (ritual propriety)




As one can read from the chart, the approval for *li* (support for traditional family structure, benevolence and ritual propriety) is very high among those who also have strong religious beliefs. Interestingly, the group with no religious beliefs also shows relatively high values towards *li*, compared to those having certain yet not many religious beliefs.

In summary, people with a few religious beliefs are rather critical towards *li* values, whereas those who do not have any religious beliefs and those with strong religious beliefs show high support for *li* values. Although the statistical relationship is not strong, it is a very interesting result that will have to be discussed more closely in the following chapter.

Next, I would like to take a closer look at the relationship between religious activities and traditional value settings. As shown in Table 13 above we find no significant (>.05) relationship among activities and values, and the eta values indicate that the strength of the relationship is very weak. Nevertheless I will now discuss the possible association between religious activities and *ren*, as it's significant value (.063) is still under 0.1. Again I constructed a meanplot, deviding the sample into 5 groups depending on the amount they are religiously active.

Graph 34: Meanplot religious activities * ren

²⁵⁴ The relationship between *li* and religious beliefs is displayed on the graph above. The data of religious beliefs was regrouped in 5 ntiles. Every group represents around 20% of the cases, group 1 are the 20% with the lowest scores on the scale, group 5 the 20% of cases with the highest scores (as the data cannot be exactly separated in 5 groups of each 20%, the SPSS program chooses the solution closest to these 20%, the exact distribution is indicated on the graph).




As was the case for religious beliefs, support for *ren* is higher among those who are never religiously active than among those who seldom perform such activities. As the curve shows, the mean of the *ren* dimension rises considerably in case of the last 40% of the students with the highest score on the activity scale.

Finally, I would like to find out if the direction of the religious affiliation makes any difference concerning the support for Chinese traditional values. After all, the items have been constructed following the value statements of Chinese religious groups, and a connection between affiliation and value preferences is therefore quite possible. Concerning the value dimensions *ren* and *li*, we might say that the *ren* values were mostly stated by the Buddhist organization, whereas the *li* values appeared above all on the Confucian website. Therefore we might assume that students feeling close to Buddhism also support the *ren* value dimension and those supporting Confucianism are more likely to approve with the *li* values. Or, as we cannot divide those variables in independent or dependent variables, we might say that somebody who supports *li* values (in the first place) feels close to Confucianism because they too support these values.

However, as the bar chart below shows, the results are more complex and not always easy to explain:

Graph 35: Bar chart religious affiliation²⁵⁵ * *ren/li*



The first category shows those students not feeling close to any religion. As we can see, and this is a first interesting result, they are the only group who does score negatively on the *ren* and *li* value dimension. *Obviously those feeling close to one or more religion also score higher on one of the tested traditional value dimensions²⁵⁶*. Interestingly, there is only one other group that scores negatively for the *li* values; the group feeling close to popular religion. At the same time, this group also shows the highest score on the *ren* value dimension. This result has to be taken with prudence, as this group is very small. Somewhat similar are the results for those who feel close to Catholicism. Although their average *li* score is positive, they also show more approval for the *ren* values than for *li*, which is not the case for any of the other groups. As we can see, approval for the *li* values is particularly high among those who feel close to Buddhism, Protestantism and Daoism. Surprisingly low is the support for the *li* values in the case of those feeling close to Confucianism.

To try to summarize the rather complex results that are shown on this bar chart, we might say that we can make out for different groups: those that score negatively on both value dimensions (no religion), those that score positively on *ren* and negatively on *li* (Popular Religion), those that score positively on *li* but negatively on *ren* (Daoism, Confucianism, and Protestantism), and those scoring positively on both value dimensions (Buddhism and Catholicism). I will further discuss this result in the next chapter, but as a first superficial conclusion we might explain these not always coherent results with the fact that the preferences of the religious orientation is often not necessarily based on a rational choice, but often connected to rather emotional

²⁵⁵ Religious affiliation was measured through the question “to which religion do you feel close?”. More than one religion could be chosen, that is why the total N (525) exceeds the actual sample size (N=424).


²⁵⁶ Anova shows a significant difference of mean between the two groups (sig. = .023) when the two value dimensions are looked at together. Eta value lies at .111.

factors. This might explain why feeling close to Confucianism does not automatically mean that one also supports typical Confucian values.

As we can see, the answer to whether our first hypotheses (H1: Positive relationship between religiosity and traditional values) is true, is not easily given. It seems at least partly true for the level of religious beliefs, which seem positively connected to the value dimension *li* and *ren*. Yet for *li* there is the interesting result that the positive relationship only becomes obvious for the students having many religious beliefs and is not true for those having few religious beliefs. It is also partly true for the level of religious affiliation if we compare those who do not and those who do feel close to one or more religion. The former clearly are more critical towards the two traditional value dimensions *ren* and *li*.

The following model should once more summarize the relationship between religiosity and Chinese traditional values. The thickness of the arrows indicates the strength of the relationship between the different variables.

Graph 36: Different levels of religiosity and support for Chinese religious values



These results also match the result we found in the case of the general scale of religiosity: *Ren* and *li* both seem associated with the two value dimensions, the associations is very weak. And while for *ren* we can detect a linear association, in the case of *li* the association is not linear but shows a “U-shaped” relationship.

6.4 ATTITUDE TOWARDS HUMAN RIGHTS

After having examined the data concerning Chinese traditional values and religiosity, I will now shift the attention to the second major concept of interest in this study: human rights. I will first present the results concerning the students’ attitude towards human rights and how they define human rights (Question 3). In a next step I will analyze possible relationships between the attitude towards human rights and the definition of human rights (Question 4).


The attitude towards human rights was measured through four items: (1) whether human rights are important or not, (2) whether respecting human rights is necessary for a successful country, (3) whether every human being is entitled to human rights, and (4) whether human rights are an imported American concept.

6.4.1 Univariate Analysis: Attitude towards Human Rights and the Social Representation of Human Rights

ATTITUDE

Regarding the first item, we can say that a majority of students think that human rights are important. About 50% of the students showed their clear approval by choosing 6 or 7 on a scale of 1 (not important at all) to 7 (very important). Another 30% of the students chose the value 5, indicating that they do think human rights are important, but maybe not unconditionally. Fifteen percent chose the middle value 4, thus stating that they think human rights are not extremely important and most certainly also indicating a certain ambiguity towards how to answer this question. A very small minority (21 students / 5%) thinks human rights are not important. The distribution is displayed in the bar chart below.


Graph 37 Bar chart: The importance of human rights



Concerning the other two items measuring the attitude toward human rights, we can observe a similar picture. Seventy percent of the students agree that *human rights are necessary for a successful government*; the other 30% only partly agree or do not agree. Support is even stronger for the general statement that *human beings are entitled to have rights, which protect them against abuse*. Here 92% agree clearly, 6% rather agree and only 8 students do not agree. These results unmistakably show that human rights are understood by a vast majority of students as being something positive, and on this theoretical level most of the students approve the idea of human rights. It should be mentioned that the item with the highest rate of approval is the one where the term ‘human rights’ is not used (*human beings are entitled to rights that protect them from abuse*), here the approval is around 20% higher than for the other two items. One possible explanation is that *protection from being abused by other*

individuals or the government is a very wide formulation, open to many interpretations, but it might also indicate that for certain students the term “human rights” next to its positive connotation also has a slightly negative one. This negative connotation might be connected to the fact that 40% of the students think human rights are an American concept imported to China. Sixty percent (269 students) do not agree to this statement. Of those who do not agree to this statement, 118 chose the option “rather don’t agree”, probably indicating that they are not a hundred percent sure of their answers, and still somehow connect human rights to a foreign concept. Still, 151 students evidently refuse this notion.


Graph 38 Bar chart: Attitude towards human rights (N=414)



SOCIAL REPRESENTATION/DEFINITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

To find out what students actually mean when using the term human rights we used items developed by Clémence and Doisé to measure the social representation of human rights. The items consisted of 11 examples of possible human rights violations. The students then had to decide whether or not in their opinion the described cases are human rights violations. The students were also given the possibility to answer “don’t know”, as they should not be forced to decide in cases where they really felt unsure. The bar chart below shows us how students judged the single examples. The chart shows the percentage of students who answered “most probably a hr-violation” or “clearly a hr-violation”.

Graph 39 Bar chart: Human rights violation or not



The items *judge decides where children live after divorce*, *suspected criminal sent back to country*, *children age 13 have to work*, *people die of hunger*, *sent to prison without a lawyer* are strongly judged as human rights violations. A rather mixed picture is provoked by the items *arrested because of opposing government*, *neighborhood hinders construction of AIDS center* and *parents beat children*. The items *patient with contagious illness sent to hospital by force*, *high income differences* and *not allowed to smoke in a meeting* are clearly not considered as human rights violations by a majority of students.


The answers do not show any clear-cut pattern.²⁵⁷ For example, we cannot say that social rights are supported more enthusiastically than individual rights. As we can see, certain situations that concern social rights like *people die of hunger* are considered to be human rights violations, whereas another social example, *high income differences*, is not judged as a human right violation by a majority of the questioned students. We do find a tendency to support children's rights more strongly than others; most items where the victims were children are clearly judged as human rights violations. The only example where this is not the case is the one where the parents are the aggressors. Apparently, the rights of children are highly valued if they do not interfere with family life. Concerning the aggressors, it can be observed that all cases that are clearly considered to be human rights violations, describe examples where the aggressor is either the state or one of its organs. The items where the subjects (aggressors) are individuals or non-governmental institutions (*parents beat children*, *community hinders construction of AIDS center*, and *no smoking during a meeting*) are not or not as clearly judged to be a human rights violation.

If we look at the 'don't know'- answers to each item we get a comparable picture. We get the by far highest number of 'don't know'- answers in the case of the item *hinder the construction of the AIDS center*. One possibility why students found it hard to decide on that item might be the fact that it describes the decision of a community. In

²⁵⁷ The exact distributions for every single item are displayed in Appendix Graph 75.

this item we therefore have two different possible human rights interests, the one of the sick people to be treated, and the interest of the community to decide by themselves about what's going on in their neighborhood. The following two items (*high income differences, people die of hunger*) with a rather high number of 'don't knows' are both examples which concern social issues. It seems that for a few students, including social issues into the human rights discussion seems not to be evident, and therefore leads to a certain insecurity about how to judge these items. The number of 'don't know' answers for each item can be compared on the chart below.

Graph 40 Bar chart: 'Don't know'- answers regarding whether examples describe human rights violations




INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON

As mentioned earlier, the items have been taken from a scale constructed by Clémence et al. and was used in different surveys in Europe and also South America. I will now compare the results of this survey with the average results of the data acquired in the three European countries Switzerland, France and Italy²⁵⁸. The chart shows the percentage of students who answered “most probably a hr-violation” or “clearly a hr-violation”

²⁵⁸ The samples used are students from the age of 13 to 20. (The group of 17 to 20 year olds visit different non-compulsory schools, not necessarily university)

Graph 41: Comparison between 3 European countries and China: Human rights violation or not?



When comparing the results we can observe several differences that are of interest: in general we may state that the Chinese students are more critical or hesitating to call something a human rights violation. The percentage that considers the given examples as a human rights violation is often lower for Chinese students than for European students. This difference is obvious for the item ‘*hinder construction of AIDS center*’, ‘*sent to prison because he/she is opposing the government*’ and ‘*sent to hospital because of contagious illness.*’ The reservation concerning the example of the AIDS center might be partly due to the fact that AIDS is a subject that has been discussed in public only in the past few years, and the knowledge about AIDS and the danger of contamination are often very small. The fact that Chinese students are more hesitant to judge opposition against the government as a human rights violation should be understood in the context of the policy of the Chinese government to consider every opposition as a danger for stability that would interrupt the ongoing growth of the Chinese economy. It is also not surprising that the third item (*contagious illness*) is not judged as a human rights violation by a majority of the Chinese students, as they all experienced the anxiety of SARS just a year before the survey, and in that context might still feel the necessity of hospitalizing someone by force. Of course these explanations do not change the general result that the Chinese students are somehow more hesitant to call something a human rights violation. It should be noted that this difference also persists in the case of the items touching social issues, such as ‘*people who die of hunger*’ or ‘*income difference*’. Interestingly, the item ‘*people die of hunger*’ only comes in forth place in the survey at Fudan, whereas the European students put the example as the second most obvious human rights violation. As a matter of fact, there are only two items which are more often judged as human rights violation by the Chinese students than by the European. One touches international law

(suspected criminal sent back to its own country) and other children's law (placement after divorce).

To conclude, we may note that although the interrogated Chinese students in general show a positive attitude towards human rights and although they judge many examples that touch different spheres of law (individual, social, international law, children's law...) as being human rights violations, they are more hesitant to identify human rights violations than comparable samples in Europe. In Chapter Seven I will discuss these results in greater detail.


6.4.2 The Relationship between Attitude and Definition of Human Rights

In Chapter Five I formulated the question if the definition of human rights (width) is somehow connected to the attitude towards human rights. Also, our second hypothesis predicted a relationship between the two levels of measuring human rights. To verify this hypothesis the 3 items measuring the attitude of human rights ('human rights are important', 'a successful country has to respect human rights', and 'everyone has the right to be protected from abuse') were combined on one scale (alpha .61). Similarly, the data concerning the definition of human rights was understood as being an indicator of the width of someone's human rights definition. On other words, the more different situations the respondent judges to be human rights violations, the more open his/her definition of human rights is. By adding up all 11 definition-items we therefore produce a scale measuring the width of the human rights definition²⁵⁹. We then receive a scale ranging from 11 to 55, the lowest actual value being 17, the highest 53. The results are close to a normal distribution²⁶⁰.

Correlating the two scales we can observe a positive association between the width of the definition of human rights and the general attitude towards human rights. The correlation between the two scales is very low ($r = .209$) but significant. We also find significant results when comparing the means through a One-Way Anova, with an F of 3.187 and a level of significance at .000.

The graph below shows the means of the width of the human rights definition in relation to the general attitude towards human rights.

Graph 42: Attitude towards human rights and width of definition (N=418)



²⁵⁹ To be able to include the "don't know" answers, don't know was understood as a middle value as the students could not decide whether or not to call it a human rights violation. Therefore for the scale the items were recoded in 1 clearly no human rights violation, 2 rather no human rights violation, 3 don't know, 4 rather a human rights violation 5 clearly a human rights violation (Alpha = .60).

²⁶⁰ Mean 37.56/ Median 38.00/ Mode 39

As we can see, the line generally moves upwards, indicating that if one has a very positive attitude towards human rights, one is more likely to also have a open definition of human rights. This positive relationship is also supported by the results of a CATREG procedure, an optimal scaling regression method. This optimal scaling method was chosen since in the case of the human rights attitude we do not have a normal distribution, and the optimal scaling procedure may level out difficulties rising from this condition.

The results of this procedure show that there is a significant correlation between the two variables (Multiple R .425) explaining about 18% of the variance (R Square .181). This significant relationship between the two variables is obviously not very strong, the regression model reaches a Sum of Square of 75.617 (explained cases) and a residual of 342.383 (unexplained cases), thus showing that only a small part of the variance of the definition is explained through the general attitude. In other words, a positive attitude does not automatically mean that one has a wide definition of human rights, but that many students being very supportive of human rights also have clear ideas about how to define human rights. This view is supported by the following results: if we exclude the two items that by legal standards and in the eyes of the majority of the students are not necessarily human rights violations (*sent to hospital/ no smoking*) from the definition scale, the positive relationship to the general human rights attitude gets more obvious and stronger. Running the same CATREG test again, we find that Multiple R rises to .559, thus explaining a variance of 31% compared to the 18% before, the explained regression rises to 130.951, nearly the double of the first test that included the two items.

We may therefore conclude that to a certain degree students have a more open definition of human rights if their attitude towards human rights is positive, but that their definition is not boundlessly vast. This result matches the argumentation presented in the last chapter, where I were predicted a positive relationship between the width of the human rights definition and the attitude on one hand, because someone who is favorable to the idea in general might also be more open towards what to include in the definition. On the other hand, I suggested that a clear definition of something shows a certain familiarity with a concept, and consequently the concept is judged more positively. This result again will be part of the discussion in Chapter 7.


6.4.3 How Can We Explain the Variance in the Attitude towards Human Rights?

Is it possible to explain the different attitudes towards human rights through independent variables? In Hypothesis 8 a positive relationship between a high socioeconomic status and human rights ideas was suggested. Yet our data cannot confirm this hypothesis.

The independent variables included in this survey do not seem to deliver an explanation as to why certain students support human rights more strongly than others. No significant or strong relationship between the socioeconomic status of the students and their attitude towards human rights could be found.

The only hint we get is the relationship between the amount of *consumption of foreign news, books and films* and the *attitude toward human rights*. The Anova test is significant at .006. The relationship is positive as can be seen in the mean chart below. Those groups of students who consume more foreign information and entertainment also show higher means on the human rights attitude scale.

Graph 43: Human rights attitude* foreign information



Although the chart's results look very obvious, I have some reservations about the validity of this result. This is a) because the relationship is very weak when we look at the correlation or eta value (eta .186), and b) even if we assume a relationship we cannot be sure if the variable *foreign information* really is an independent variable. As the students self-reported their behavior it is not sure how accurate it is. It is quite possible that students who have a positive attitude towards the West both say that they consume foreign information more often (as they think it is a desirable thing to do) and also have a very positive attitude towards human rights. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the attitude towards the U.S. (both foreign policy and lifestyle) is more positive for those students consuming more foreign information. On the other hand, the possibility that consuming foreign information has a positive impact on the attitude towards human rights and towards America cannot be totally excluded. The association is too weak to draw any final conclusions. The variable *foreign information* could become a more interesting factor in the future, when access to foreign information becomes easier and more common.

6.5 ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE U.S. AND ITS INFLUENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS PERCEPTION

Hypothesis five stated that there is a relationship between the attitude towards the U.S. and the attitude towards human rights. As we have seen above, quite a considerable part of the students consider human rights to be at least partly imported from the U.S. (40%), and we are assuming that human rights are often connected to the U.S. on an emotional level (see Chapter 4).

6.5.1 Attitude towards the U.S.


The attitude towards the U.S. was measured with two items, one focusing on the American lifestyle and the other item focusing on the foreign politics of the U.S.²⁶¹ When asked about their *attitude towards American lifestyle*, most of the students are rather uncertain how to judge it and choose a middle position (46%), most probably

²⁶¹ Exact items: What do you think of the American lifestyle?/ What do you think of foreign American politics? Students answer on a scale between "very negative" to "very positive".

indicating their awareness of the pros and cons of an American lifestyle. Thirteen percent have a negative view of the American lifestyle, though a large group of 40% thinks that it is something good.

Students are far more critical towards American foreign policy. Only 12% have a positive picture of it, 30% choose middle positions and a majority of 60% judge it negatively. These results reflect the critical attitude towards American policy in China. This critical view was most probably intensified by the revelation of torture in Iraqi prisons by U.S. soldiers, news that made headlines just about two weeks before the survey was run.


Graph 44 Bar charts: Attitude towards American Foreign Policy/ American Lifestyle



6.5.2 How the Attitude towards the U.S. Is Related to the Attitude towards Human Rights

As predicted in Hypothesis 5, there is a significant relationship between the attitude towards the United States (including both American lifestyle and American foreign policy) and towards human rights, but the relationship is rather weak ($r = .229$, sig. .000). Interestingly, the relationship between the two single items *how important are human rights* and *attitude towards the American lifestyle* is stronger ($r = .309$, sig. .000) than when we look at both *American foreign policy* and *American lifestyle* together, as was done above. On the scatter plot below we still can spot this relationship, showing that nearly all students strongly approving American lifestyle also firmly approve human rights.

Graph 45 Box plot: Importance of human rights * attitude towards the American lifestyle



We find a similar result when we look at the means. With the exception between level 2 and 3, the mean of general attitude towards human rights rises constantly the higher the approval of an American lifestyle. Running an Anova test for this relationship shows that the relationship is significant at a level of .000, and that it shows a linear relationship²⁶².

We can conclude from these results that the attitude towards human rights is connected more strongly to the general opinion about an American lifestyle than to the attitude towards American foreign policy.

These results do not give us any information about whether the students first had their attitude towards the U.S. and then developed the attitude towards human rights, or the other way round. But we can clearly see that the two concepts are related. Therefore, when talking about human rights in China the discussion is also closely connected to its relationship with the U.S.- another interesting result that will have to be discussed in greater detail.

6.6 VIEWS OF JUSTICE

6.6.1 What Do Students Consider to Be Just?

Another variable that I suggested is connected with one's attitude towards human rights and religiosity/support for religious values was the personal view one has of what is just and what is not (Question 7). To measure the different views I have chosen four items, each of which describes a basic idea of four different notions of justice: 'etatism' (state control), ascriptivism, fatalism and individualism²⁶³.


When comparing the four different concepts we can see that the concept of individualism is supported the strongest (89% rather agree to agree very much), in second place follows 'etatism' (73% chose rather agree to agree very much), and then ascriptivism (50% chose rather agree to agree very much). Clearly less supported is a

²⁶² The means and the Anova table are displayed in the Appendix Table 24.

²⁶³ 'etatism': 'The government should provide sufficient jobs for everybody.' Individualism: 'Everybody is entitled to keep what they earn, even if this makes some people richer than others.' Ascriptivism: 'High income differences are needed for motivation.' Fatalism: 'There is no use to talk about justice, one cannot change anything anyway.'

fatalistic view, which was only judged positively by around 32%. These numbers are displayed on the graph below²⁶⁴.

Graph 46 Bar chart: Views of justice (N=423)



When analyzing the answers to all four questions, five answering patterns can be detected. The biggest group (102 students) is those students who favor ideas of state control combined with individualism. In other words, they expect the government to provide jobs but think everybody is entitled to keep what they earn. The second group approves individualism, ‘etatism’ and ascriptivism, only rejecting the fatalistic world view (88).


A third group might be called the “every thing goes” group, as they show a tendency of approving all four items (56 students²⁶⁵). A much clearer position is taken by group number four, who only approve the individualist view and none of the other items (36 students). The last group both supports ascriptivism and individualism (31 students)²⁶⁶. It should be noted that the groups were evaluated by reducing the answering categories to agree/ don’t agree and so the levels of agreement and disagreement are not accounted for. The graph below shows these five groups and the chosen combinations.

²⁶⁴ For exact frequencies see Appendix Graph 76.

²⁶⁵ For this analysis a dummy variable was constructed, the data about the strength of approval/ disapproval was therefore lost.

²⁶⁶ The rest of the students show different answering structures, yet those groups are rather small (<20).

Graph 47: Views of justice, multiple answers: Main groups²⁶⁷



These results show that most of the respondents do not support only one view of justice. The fact that the biggest group favors both an individualistic and more 'etatic' perception of justice seems to represent the common situation in China where people actually live in a capitalistic system but the idea of socialism is still a high valued ideal. It probably also shows the effort to maintain both individual competition and possibilities combined with a safety guarantee from the state. Another interesting aspect is the wide refusal of fatalism, showing the optimistic and active spirit that can so easily be observed among all habitants of Shanghai.

6.6.2 Views of Justice and Their Association with Human Rights, Religiosity and Chinese Traditional Religious Values.



VIEWS OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

In hypothesis 6 we suggested that ascriptivism and fatalism are negatively related to human rights, whereas individualism and 'etatism' show a positive relationship. Looking at the correlations between these variables this hypothesis partly seems to match our data: The support for human rights is positively related to the individualistic perception of justice ($r .260/\eta .341$ sig. $.000$) and negatively to fatalism ($r. -.193/\eta .259$, sig. $.000$). Relationships are not very strong, and the higher eta value indicates that the relationship is not totally linear. The mean plots below confirm this nonlinear relationship. Yet this non-linearity might be due to the low number of cases in these categories. As soon as N gets higher than 30, we can observe that both curves are linear, one in a positive and the other in a negative direction.

²⁶⁷ For exact multiple response table see Appendix Table 25.

No significant relationships (either negative nor positive) are observable between the support for human rights and ascriptivism and 'etatism'. In the case of 'etatism' we suggested a positive association with the support for social human rights. But even if we create a special variable for a social definition of human rights, including only the examples that could be understood as a violation of social human rights (hunger, force children to work, income differences), we cannot not observe any relationship.

Graph 48: Attitude towards human rights and individualistic/ fatalistic view of justice




VIEWS OF JUSTICE AND RELIGIOSITY/SUPPORT FOR TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS VALUES.

I didn't only suggest that the views of justice are related to the support for human rights, but also to religiosity and support for traditional religious values.

Looking at the correlation between the four variables measuring the different views of justice and the two value dimensions *ren* and *li*, we cannot discover any strong relationships. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy to mention that *ren* compared to *li* seems to be more strongly associated with the fatalistic view of justice ($r = .118$, sig. .045) and with ascriptivism ($r = .166$, sig. .001). On the other hand, we find a stronger association between *li* and the individualistic view of justice ($r = .179$, sig. .000). If we examine this relationship more closely we discover that the eta value is slightly higher (eta .278) and that the Anova test is significant at a .000 level. Eta showing the stronger value indicates that the association is not linear. As a matter of fact, we find a somehow comparable curve between *li* and the individualistic view of justice as we did between attitude towards human rights and the individualistic view of justice, as

can be seen below. The two first categories with rather low N show a downward movement, but as soon as the N per category gets bigger the line gets linear indicating that those who support an individualistic view of justice on average also show strong support for li values.

Graph 49: Mean plot individual view of justice * dimension li



Looking at the variable religiosity (all the different dimensions of religiosity: belief, activity, affiliation and the total scale), there is only one significant correlation with the different views of justice: between the fatalistic view and religiosity we find a weak but significant relationship ($r = .115$, sig. .019).

The table below summarizes the results and directions of the associations discovered. Comparing this table to Table 6 (page 160) in Chapter Five, we can see that our hypothesis went in the right direction in some cases.

Table 14: Associations between ideologies of justice and human rights/religiosity

		Ascriptivism	'etatism'	Fatalism	Individualism
Support for human rights		/	/	- (r. -.193 sig. .000)	+ r. .260, sig. .000
Traditional religious values	Li (ritual propriety)	+ (r. .119, sig. .015)	+ r. .122, sig. .012	/	+ r. .179, sig. .000
	Ren (forbearance)	+ r. .166, sig. .001	+ r. .133, sig. .006	+ r. .118, sig. .005	/
Religiosity		/	/	+ r. .115, sig. .019	/

Especially in the case of human rights, our hypothesis was right for fatalism and individualism. The results concerning religiosity and religious traditional values are more complex. Although we find positive association with ascriptivism and 'etatism', we can see with both the *li* and *ren* value dimensions that in both cases the relationship is a bit stronger for the *ren* value dimension. Also the *ren* dimension is

not associated to individualism, where we get the strongest association for *li*. In this respect, our hypothesis in Chapter 5 was partly wrong, as we considered traditional religious values as a unity. This result indicates that the different aspects of these values also are associated differently with other values.

6.7 HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGION

This part of the analysis focuses on the heart of our study: how are religious values and religiosity related to the attitude /definition of human rights? (Question 6) I will first look at possible associations between religious values and human rights. In a second step I will focus on the different levels of religiosity and check if they are somehow related to human rights.

6.7.1 Associations between Human Rights and Chinese Traditional Values

In hypothesis 3 we stated that a strong support for traditional religious values is negatively related to the support for human rights. As we have seen in Chapter 3, the question is widely controversial in philosophical discussions, and several constructions of this relationship could be found. The results of this survey are not totally clear-cut either. But as the following table shows, even though correlations are weak, there seem to be certain associations between the value dimension of *li / ren* (2) and the attitude towards human rights and width of the definition of human rights.

Table 15: Correlation human rights * religious values

		de finition HR (9 items)	Scale: Atitude towards Human Rights
de finition HR (9 items)	Pearson Correlation	1	.252**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.000
	N	419	419
Scale: Attitude towards Human Rights	Pearson Correlation	.252**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.
	N	419	424
dimension 1: ren (forbearance)	Pearson Correlation	-.029	-.133**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.555	.006
	N	419	424
dimension 2: li (ritual propriety)	Pearson Correlation	.121*	.244**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.013	.000
	N	419	424

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).


* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The correlation matrix shows that there are significant but weak relationships between the human rights attitude and the value dimension *ren* (2). Interestingly, the relationship is negative, indicating that a very positive attitude with *ren* (2) in certain cases is not compatible with strong support for human rights. The strongest relationship (which is still rather weak) can be found between the general attitude towards human rights and the dimension *li* (ritual). This relationship is positive, showing that the two items correlate with each other. If we do not want to speak of correlation, as the values are extremely weak, we at least can state that they surely do not exclude each other. The third relationship between the width of definition and the dimension *li* is only due to the correlation between the general attitude of human

rights and the width of the definition. When controlling for the general attitude towards human rights in a partial correlation, the relationship between the definition of human rights and *li* turns out to be insignificant ($r = .0514$).


When submitting these variables to an Anova analysis²⁶⁸, only the association between the general human rights attitude and the dimension *li* shows a significant result ($F = 8.449$, sig. $.000$, eta. $.273$). On the mean plot below we can observe that the means of *attitude towards human rights* are quite constantly rising along the axis of the *li* value dimension. In other words, the group of those students scoring high on the *li* dimension also scores higher on the scale measuring the general attitude towards human rights. We can also see that there is a little drop at the end of the line, showing that the line is not totally linear.

Graph 50 Mean plot: value dimension *li* * general human rights attitude



Although Anova does not indicate a significant relationship between *ren* and the attitude towards human rights, it is still worthwhile to take a look at the mean plot for this relationship. As we can see below, the curve has a very different direction than the one for *li*, moving downwards and not upwards, confirming the negative correlation coefficient.

Graph 51: Mean plot value dimension *Ren (forbearance)* * general human rights attitude




²⁶⁸ For the Anova test 5 tiles of *ren* and *li* were used, as otherwise there would have been too many categories.

As we can see, the curve looks rather dramatic. However, we have to consider that the range of the mean values is very small (only differentiating about 0.5 points), whereas in the case of *li* it differs 1.7. This small range in the case of *ren* is one of the reasons why the association is not statistically significant (Anova), implying that the chances of the result being due to coincidence is higher than 5 %. Of course, the little range on the human rights- attitude scale is not surprising, as 80% of the students score between 15 and 19 on a scale from 6 to 19. This reminds us that a vast majority of students has a very positive attitude towards human rights and also those students showing strong support for the value dimension *ren* on average still score in the upper half of the scale. Their attitude towards human rights is not negative, just not as positive as the average of the students more critical towards those *ren* values.

Another way to show the relationship between the human rights scale and the traditional religious values is to run a CATPCA procedure. This allows us to demonstrate how each scale loads on a two dimensional model. The result in the graph below confirms what has been said so far.

Graph 52: Component loadings CATPCA (human rights, *li*, *ren*)



Dimension 2 could be called human rights, as on this dimension the human right scale loads very high (.914). Looking at this dimension we find that *li* is much closer to human rights than *ren* (*forbearance*). *Li* still loads positively on this dimension with .304, whereas *ren* loads negatively with -.425. On the other hand, we have dimension one where we find that *li* and *ren* get really close to each other if opposed to human rights. This dimension indicates that there is also a certain association among *li* and *ren* (2), and this is neither opposed nor related to human rights. This chart gives us a geographical display of where we find the different variables on such a two dimensional map.


Concerning our hypothesis, we might say that it was partly right for the *ren* value dimension and wrong for the *li* value dimension. In general, we must conclude that the relationships are not very strong, and that further data would be needed to clarify the relationship between traditional religious values and the support for human rights.

6.7.2 Relations among Human Rights and Religiosity

Looking for possible relationships between religiosity (religious beliefs, activities and affiliation) and support for human rights, the correlation matrix did not show any possible relationships or associations. The R coefficient never exceeded 0.1 and the results are not close to being significant at a .05 level.

Comparing the means with an Anova procedure, the only significant relationship that could be found was between the amount of religious activities and the width of the definition of human rights. The relationship is not linear though, as those who are never religiously active have a rather narrow definition of human rights, yet those who are sometimes religiously active have a very vast definition of human rights. After that, the curve is sinking again. Apparently we have a similar width of definition both for those who are very active in the field of religion and those who are not at all. The curve of the mean value is displayed below. Again, when looking at this curve one has to keep in mind that eta is only .188, indicating a weak association.


Graph 53: Mean plot religious activity* definition of human rights²⁶⁹



This tendency of a negative relationship between human rights and the width of the definition of human rights for those students that are religiously active could also be observed in case of the attitude towards human rights if we exclude those students who say that they are never religiously active. Excluding these students, we find significant correlations between religious activity and the width of the human rights definition (-.192, sig. .001) and the general support for human rights (-.127, sig. .007). We also find a significant relationship between the total religiosity scale (belief, activity and affiliation) and the width of the human rights definition (-.157, sig. .007). We can see that in all cases the relationship is negative. That is, if we single out those students who are religiously active, we can see that there is a negative relationship with the support for human rights and the width of the definition. This correlation becomes lost when including those students that are never religiously active, as they do not behave at all according to the pattern “less religiously active more supportive for human rights”. As a matter of fact, their average support for human rights is closer to that of those who are very often religiously active. This nonlinear relationship can be observed in the error plots below.

²⁶⁹ The N is as value, because for the variable width of human rights definition, all students showing one or several “don’t know” –answers were excluded.

Graph 54: Error plot: Religious activity * support for human rights / width of definition



The difference between the groups is only significant in the case of the width of definition (Anova sig. 001) but not for the support for human rights (Anova sig. .133), as for the latter the differences are too small. Nevertheless, we can observe that in both cases the non-active group behaves similarly to the very active group²⁷⁰.

To summarize our results, we might say that in the case of religious activity we could discover a relationship as was predicted in hypothesis 3, but that this relationship is not linear: a certain amount of religious activity seems positively connected the support for human rights and to a wide definition of human rights. We can therefore not talk of a generally negative relationship between the two variables; the latter only applies to people being often or very often religiously active.

6.8 WHAT DOES THE DATA SAY?

6.8.1 Results Concerning the Hypotheses Stated in Chapter 6

The following table summarizes the results concerning our hypotheses stated in Chapter 6. As this is a summary, the results are somewhat ‘simplified’, yet this should help to get a general overview on the outcome of the data analyses.

²⁷⁰ Other relationships between human rights and religiosity could not be discovered, tests of correlation, Anova procedure and chi square tests showed no significant relationship.

Table 16: Hypothesis and corresponding results


Hypothesis	Results
<i>H1: Religiosity is positively related to the support for Chinese traditional religious values</i>	Relationships in general are rather weak. Hypothesis is true for <i>ren</i> - values, which are more strongly supported by religious students. In the case of <i>li</i> -values the relationship is not totally linear, but the strongest support again can be found among those 40 students that are most religious.
<i>H2: There is an association between the width of the definition (social representation) of human rights and the attitude towards human rights.</i>	The hypothesis is true as there is a significant relationship between the two variables. Students who strongly support human rights also have a rather wide definition of human rights, yet they do not include very extreme cases, such as smoking in a meeting.
H3: Religiosity (a) and strong support for Chinese traditional values (b) are negatively related to a strong support for human rights.	(a) The amount of religious activity is associated with the width of the human rights definition, but not in a linear way: students who are often religiously active and students who are not at all both show a more restricted definition of human rights than students that sporadically perform religious activities. (b) The hypothesis is true for <i>ren</i> values but not for <i>li</i> . The first shows a negative relationship to the support of human rights, while latter is positively related to the support for human rights.
H4: Students who are very religious and strongly support Chinese traditional values do not have an individualistic definition of human rights. This negative correlation cannot be found in the case of a social definition of human rights.	No such relationship could be found. The hypothesis therefore has to be rejected.
H5: Anti-Americanism is negatively related to the support for human rights.	The hypothesis was verified: a critical view towards the U.S. (especially towards the American lifestyle) often is associated with a less positive attitude towards human rights.
H6 a: Support for human rights is positively related to ‘etatism’ and individualism, and negatively to fatalism. H6 b: Support for to religious values and religiosity are positively related to ascriptivism, and negatively to individualism. The relationship with fatalism might be both negative and positive.	a) No relationship between the support for human rights and ascriptivism/ ‘etatism’ could be found. Hypothesis is true for fatalism (neg. relationship) and individualism (positive relationship) b) Partly true, but relationships are very weak. Most important results: <i>li</i> values are closer to individualism whereas <i>ren</i> values are closer to fatalism. For detailed results see page 227, Table 14.
H7: The parents’ religiosity has a strong influence on the religiosity of students.	Hypothesis very true. Parents’ influence on the religiosity of children seems very strong. Influence is stronger for male students than for female students.
H8: A high socioeconomic status is positively related to human rights ideas (a), whereas it is rather negatively related to the support for traditional values (b) and religiosity (c).	(a) Hypothesis could not be proven. There is no relationship between the socioeconomic background and support for human rights. (b) Hypothesis is clearly wrong in the case of <i>li</i> values: the higher the social status of the family the stronger the support for <i>li</i> . In the case of <i>ren</i> no definite relationship could be found. c) Hypothesis is wrong, rather the opposite is true: a high socioeconomic status is positively related to religiosity.

6.8.2 Values, Human Rights and Religiosity: The Overall Model

The detailed results above and the evaluation of the hypotheses do not make it easy to get an overall picture about how the data is structured. Some results might even seem contradictory. For example, we have seen that religiosity is positively correlated to *ren* values, which are negatively related to human rights. After these results a negative relationship between religiosity and human rights could be expected, but no such relationship has been found.

The data is best understood when realizing that we actually have two axes, which each contribute to the explanation and understanding of the data. One axis is defined through the attitude towards human rights, whereas the second axis is defined through religiosity. The graph below presents the structure of the data in the form of a circle around the two axes.

Graph 55: Variable map



On the ‘human rights- axis’, values like individualism and the traditional value group *li* (*ritual propriety*) are positively related to a high support for human rights, whereas fatalism and support for *ren* (*forbearance*) is negatively related. Also on this axis we find the attitude towards the U.S., which is positively correlated with the support for human rights.

The second major axis is religiosity. We could observe that, while religiosity is positively related with both *li* and *ren*, no direct relationship to the human rights axis could be discovered.

The level of religiosity is strongly related to the parents’ religiosity, which is why this independent value is placed on the religiosity axis. Religiosity is also positively related to the socioeconomic status. The higher the socioeconomic status, the greater

are the chances that the questioned student is religious. The same is true for the support of *li* values, which also correlate positively with the socioeconomic status. Therefore the socioeconomic status is placed on the religiosity-axis, especially as no relationship with the support for human rights could be found.


The data analysis has shown that we can identify groups that can be placed on this value map. These groups and their qualities are described in the table below.

Table 17: Four different groups

Group	Significant qualities	Other qualities (not statistically significant)	Human rights support influenced through:	Religiosity associated with:
1 'The individual activist'	High approval of human rights, wide definition of human rights. Rather approving of US foreign policy and lifestyle. Strong support for an individualistic view of justice. Strong support for <i>li</i> -values, rejection of <i>ren</i> values	Rather low support for fatalism, score average on religiosity scale (includes very religious, partly religious and not religious people). Socioeconomic status is average.	Support for <i>li</i> and individualism.	Those very religious in this group also have higher socioeconomic status and are more supportive for <i>ren</i> values.
2 'To watch and to bear'	Rather critical view of human rights, rather narrow definition of human rights. Critical towards the US. Rejection of <i>li</i> values, and support for <i>ren</i> values. Fatalistic and not individualistic view of justice.	This group is more religious than group 1, students come from more religious families. Socioeconomic status lower than group one.	Human rights criticism is associated with fatalism and <i>ren</i> values.	Religiosity is positively correlated with the socioeconomic status and support for <i>ren</i> values.
A 'Rich and Religious'	Come from a high socioeconomic background and from religious families. They are themselves very religious. Those students feeling close to both Christianity and Chinese religions are in this group. Strongly support both <i>ren</i> and <i>li</i> values. Compared to not so religious students, they more often have a fatalistic view of justice.	Their definition of human rights is rather restrictive. Average score on human rights scale.	Support for <i>li</i> .	Religiosity is positively correlated with fatalism (inside the group this correlation is only significant at .087 level).
B 'Profane and active'	Come from rather low socioeconomic background, have no religious family background, and are not religious themselves. They are critical towards <i>ren</i> values.	Average score on human rights scale. Rather supportive of individualism and <i>li</i> values.	Negative correlation with <i>ren</i> values and fatalism. Positive correlation with <i>li</i> and individualism.	No significant correlation inside group.

It is important to note that group 1 and 2 are defined through the criteria 'human rights support', whereas group A and B are defined through 'level of religiosity'. As a consequence the four groups overlap. Strong support for *li* is both shared by group 1 and A. Group B and group 1 both strongly support individualism. Group 2 shares its support for *ren* values with group A, and also its tendency to be more religious, but as mentioned previously is not statistically significant. The same is true for the light tendency of students in group 2 to have a rather low socioeconomic status, which is a significant characteristic of group B.

Graph 56: Overlapping groups



Throughout the analysis we have seen that both support for *li* and individualism are absolutely decisive for one's attitude towards human rights. This relationship is once more confirmed when looking at the four different groups. Looking at group A and B we can actually say that it makes no difference how religious students are when it comes to support for human rights, because those that are very religious show a strong support for *li* and those that are not religious at all show strong support for individualism, and both variables are related to the approval of the human rights idea. Therefore it does not matter that those very religious students in group B also support *ren* values and some even have fatalistic views, which are actually negatively correlated to human rights. Their support for *li* values seems to make up for it and lead to an average support for human rights. These two variables (*ren* and fatalism), on the other hand, lead to a critical view of human rights in group 2, because these students, of which some are very religious, only approve *ren* but not *li* values. Therefore, the support for traditional values (*ren*) has a negative effect on human rights, other than was the case in group A. It is interesting to note that the students in group A also come from a high socioeconomic background and many feel close to various religions. Nearly all students feeling close to Christianity and one or more Chinese religion are in that group. We can say they seem to have a rather 'universal' form of religiosity. They also support different sets of traditional values, which apparently is not a contradiction to them. The religiosity we can observe in group 2 seems different: more students belonging to that group feel close to only one religion, and intercultural models are rare. Their support for traditional values only goes in one direction, a more passive attitude, focused on the inside. In this case we can say that such a worldview has a rather negative impact on the human rights attitude.

What about group B? These are students with a rather low socioeconomic status, who do not support any of the traditional value sets, who are not religious at all but who show a strong support for individualism. Here it is the support for individualism that assures a rather positive attitude towards human rights.

6.9 SUMMARY OF MAJOR RESULTS

Concerning Religion

About half of the students have certain religious beliefs, engage in religious activities and feel close to one or more religious denomination. The most popular religion among students is Buddhism, in the second place follows Christianity. About 15% of the students feel close to more than one religion. The most popular combination is to feel close both to Buddhism and Christianity. Compared to their parents the students are more religious. Also much more students say they feel close to Christianity. The cross-cultural model (an Asian and Western religion) is non-existent among parents, but applies to quite a few students. Although we can observe these shifts between parents and students, the parents' religiosity is very much a deciding factor on whether or not children are religious.

A positive association between socioeconomic status and religion could be observed. Students from big cities with educated parents and with a high social status are on average more often religiously active and support more religious beliefs than students from the countryside with a rather low socioeconomic status.

Concerning Religious Values

From the list of 16 items, six items, split up in two groups, were chosen as most informative because of their statistical and content-wise consistency. One group of items describes values concerning *li* (ritual propriety), describing aspects like respect towards others, classical hierarchical family structure, and charity. The other three items describe values that can be categorized as *ren* (forbearance), describing aspects like bearing injustice, be ready to accept whatever life brings and meditation. In general the students are far more critical towards these values than towards the values *li*, which are widely accepted. Students with a high socioeconomic background tend to approve to the *li* values more often than students with a low socioeconomic status. There is a slight tendency that students with a low socioeconomic status tend to approve the *ren* values more, but this relationship is not significant and rather weak.

Concerning Human Rights

The questioned students in general strongly support human rights. About 1/4 of the students show a certain amount of skepticism. The attitude towards human rights is related to the attitude towards the U.S. Students that are more critical towards the American lifestyle and foreign policy are on average also more critical towards human rights.

Social representation of human rights varies among students. Two aspects could be observed:

- Examples that describe human rights violations by the state are more often considered as human rights violations than those examples where the author is either undefined or a civil party.
- Rights that concern children are strongly accepted as being human rights.

The width of definition of human rights is related to the attitude towards the U.S.

Compared to students from European countries, the Chinese students are more skeptical of calling something a human rights violation. This applies both to so called social and individual human rights.

Students who consume Western media (TV, radio, books, newspapers, movies) are more favorable to human rights and have a wider definition of human rights (relationship is rather weak). No socioeconomic variables could explain the variance in the attitude and definition of human rights.

Concerning the Relationship between Human Rights and Religion.

Associations between these two fields are not very strong and definite. We could observe that support for human rights is closer to the *li* values than support for *ren*, which is in a rather conflicting position with human rights. Also it could be observed that students that are very religious have a rather narrow definition of human rights. Students who are little religious show the widest human rights definition, wider than those who do not support any religious beliefs and are not religiously active.

Concerning the Perception of Justice

The view of justice most strongly supported by the students is individualism, followed by 'etatism' (state control), ascriptivism and fatalism. The most common group are those who both support individualism and 'etatism', expressing both faith in the free market system, and in the same time indicating certain expectations from the state. Interestingly, we could see that students supporting individualistic worldviews also tend to be very positive towards human rights. Students with a more fatalistic view tend to be a bit more critical. Also we saw an association between support for *li* values and support for individualism, whereas supporters of *ren* values tend to be more favorable to a fatalistic view of justice. This is also true for students that are very religious

Concerning Gender

There were three results concerning the gender question that seem especially interesting. First, female students are more religious than their male colleagues on all measured levels of religiosity (beliefs, activities, affiliation). Second, women seem to be less influenced by their parents when it comes to religious beliefs. Whereas in the case of male students the parents' religiosity has a very strong influence on how much they believe, this influence is not as strong for women. But when it comes to activities, the female students are very strongly influenced by the parents, stronger even than the male students. We can conclude that for women the "external influence" of parents is stronger than for men, for which the "internal influence" is more intense. Interestingly, female students also seem less influenced by their socioeconomic background than it is the case for men.

The four groups

Four groups on two different axes were detected. These groups also give an overall model of the data. Group 1 and 2 are defined through the extensiveness of their human rights support. It is very strong in the case of group 1, and weaker in the case of group 2. Group A and B are defined through the extensiveness of religiosity. A is a group of very religious students; students in group B are not religious at all. In general it is the support for *li* values and individualism that boosts support for human rights, fatalism and *ren* values are negatively related to human rights support. These relationships explain why the level of religiosity has no direct influence on human rights support, as religiosity is positively related to both factors with a positive (*li* values), and negative (*ren* values and fatalism) influence on human rights.

CHAPTER SEVEN DISCUSSION



Inside the Ta'er Monastery in Xining, Qinghai Mai 2004

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7 DISCUSSION

In this chapter I will try to find possible interpretations and explanations for the data presented above. I will compare the results of this survey with other research from China, Europe and the US, and discuss them in the light of various historical and theoretical aspects, some of which have been mentioned in chapters two, three, four and five. Once more I will first take a look at the different fields of interest (religion / human rights) before giving a more general interpretation of our results.

7.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF RELIGION IN CHINA TODAY

The results indicate that about half of the students surveyed have certain religious beliefs and are 'religiously active' from time to time. We cannot, of course, assume that this would be true for half of the entire Chinese population, because the sample had such a limited representation. What we can say, however, is that this relatively large proportion of religiously sensitive students supports the claims of a 'religious revival' in China, which I discussed in Chapter Two. Communism is clearly going through a spiritual crisis, and it is quite possible that religion is filling the void. What is unclear though is how this religious revival will develop. The current increase in religiosity, and the fact that more young people feel close to religious ideas, might mean that the development of religiosity will continue and intensify. On the other hand, this increase could be a temporary spike, as was observed in Eastern European countries, where religion had a great revival after the downfall of Communism. But it turned out to be a short-term phenomenon and, although religion did not disappear, today religion in Eastern Europe is of no more importance than in Western European countries (Norris & Inglehard 2004). Thus there is also some reason to doubt an ongoing religious revival in China.

The survey data also allowed the observation that the traditional ritual of burning incense is widespread among the students surveyed. The popularity of such rituals is likely not just a Fudan-University phenomenon but is rather a widespread trend in cities throughout China. Temples in Shanghai have reported a drastic increase in visitors during the Spring festival in the last ten years. In a newspaper article, an employee of the Shanghai Longhua Temple talked of around "100,000 people who came all the way here to light incense sticks in the Spring Festival. The long queue stretched right around the temple" (Shanghai Star 2005/02/24).

Another interesting result is that 64% think that religion promotes moral and ethics in society. This result is truly surprising in light of the official position China has long had towards religion. But, as could be shown in chapter two, not only can we observe a religious revival in China but also a significant shift of the Chinese government's policy on religion. The discussion on the relationship between state and religion has shown that these two are inseparably linked, and we can therefore conclude that there would be no revival of religious traditions if the Chinese government did not support it. The Chinese government's support of religion is not unreserved, but, and this leads us back to the survey result, it fully acknowledges the usefulness of religion in promoting moral standards and ethics, especially those moral standards and ethics approved by the CCP which support stability and social peace. In this respect, the students strongly support the government's religious policy, understanding religion as a social system fulfilling the function of producing morals and ethics which guarantee

a harmonious society. Even if this policy might seem restrictive to some observers, it has allowed religion in China to once more become a visible part of society.

7.1.1 The Popularity of Buddhism and Christianity

This last remark is especially true for Buddhism and Christianity. In Chapter Two I already described the rising popularity of Buddhism. The survey results similarly reveal Buddhism as the most popular religion among the students; 30% of the students surveyed say that they ‘feel close’ to Buddhism. The general revival of Buddhism, labeled as “phenomenal” by the 2005 China Today Encyclopedia (Shan 2005, 505), can be understood as one of the reasons for the popularity of Buddhism among the students. Buddhism is quite present in today’s China; Buddhist temples can be found everywhere, and many tourist destinations in China are also Buddhist pilgrimage destinations. Buddhist associations have become more and more active in charity work, and have slowly developed activities that go beyond the religious field. This makes Buddhism a ‘low-threshold-religion’, accessible even to those who have thus far not been familiar with religion. The general attraction of Buddhism might also stem from its practical nature. Although a big part of Buddhist teaching is philosophical and abstract, Buddhist practice in China is often very concrete and specific. Most temples feature different gods for different worries of daily life. Many Chinese go to Buddhist temples to find courage and confidence before handling important business deals, exams or relationship issues²⁷¹.

Another aspect of Buddhist popularity is the very warm and inviting behavior of Buddhist monks, who, even when confronted with visitors who come mainly for tourist and not spiritual reasons, are open and welcoming. They often actively open discussions and dialogues with visitors or invite them to perform simple rituals in front of the Buddha statues. This openness, based on various visits to Buddhist temples all over China, is in sharp contrast to Daoist temples, where monks often avoid the public, focusing instead on their own meditation practices and rituals. This observation is of course subjective, but based on its background of ‘secrecy’ and the harsh suppression Daoism went through during the Maoist regime, it seems natural that the Daoist culture is not as accessible as Buddhism. Unlike Daoism, which is still a purely Chinese tradition, Buddhism is more international, and the Buddhist revival in China could count on the active support of many financially strong Buddhist associations abroad. The extensiveness, accessibility and openness, as well as international and governmental backing all are factors that contribute to the popularity of Buddhism.

After Buddhism, Christianity is the second most popular religion among the students surveyed. In a time where Chinese nationalism is at an all-time high and anti-western feelings are quite widespread, this result might be a bit surprising. Apparently these nationalist feelings do not prevent young Chinese from indicating a certain affection for this foreign religion. The analysis has shown that the affection seems rather intellectual, as most of the students who indicate that they feel close to Christianity are not particularly religiously active. This seems to support the claims of He Guanghu and Daniel H. Bays discussed in Chapter Two (see page 76f). He talks of a “Christianity upsurge among Chinese intellectuals” (He 2003, 131), and Bays refers to these intellectuals as “cultural Christians” (Bays 2003, 192). Bays hypothesizes that

²⁷¹ In my explorative interviews (see 4.3.3, page 150), one interview partner explicitly called Buddhism the ‘religion for business deals and exams’. Of course temples of popular religion are very similar in that respect, and as discussed in chapter two, the different temples cannot always be assigned to a specific religion. Once a temple features a Buddha statue most visitors are going to perceive the temple as a Buddhist temple, even if there are many other gods which aren’t necessarily a part of the Buddhist tradition.

Christianity, particularly Protestantism, is attractive to many Chinese intellectuals because they associate it with modernization, economic development and political democratization as well as with a very strong ethic. This hypothesis is partly supported by our data, because those feeling close to Protestantism also have an individualistic view of justice and more strongly support the active, society-oriented *li*-values (ritual property) over the more passive *ren*-values (forebearance). The fact that many students coming from social sciences feel close to Christianity might be another hint that the social values of Christianity appeal to some of the students. On a general basis I would say that the data gathered probably mirrors the position of Christianity in contemporary China: although Christianity is not as popular as Buddhism and is often understood on an intellectual rather than emotional level, it has become an important part of Chinese religious landscape and, as far as such forecasts are possible, is here to stay. So much that some perceive Christianity as a threat to China. In fact, there are nationalist voices in China who want to promote Confucianism as the official state religion, in order to keep Christianity from conquering China (Siemons 2006, 31).

7.1.2 The Mixed Model

In Chapter Two I have pointed to the often integrative and syncretistic character of Chinese religions and Chinese religiosity. We have seen that concepts like *yin* and *yang*, the Dao, the idea of bipolarity, harmony and self-cultivation are part of popular religion, Confucianism, Daoism and also have been integrated in Chinese Buddhism. The data presented here confirms this distinctive feature of Chinese religiosity: 85 students that they feel close to two or more religions. In fact, the ‘syncretism’²⁷² found in the data even goes beyond the integration of just Chinese religions; 33 students chose an intercultural model, that is they feel close to Protestantism and/or Catholicism in addition to at least one Chinese religion. It would be interesting to know how exactly the students which chose such models cope with such intercultural models intellectually and psychologically. Unfortunately, the standardized questionnaire did not enable students to give a definitive answer to that question. From a western point of view, it is necessary to find one logical way of making the two systems compatible (e.g. through choosing similar interpretations of all religions, focusing especially on the universalistic aspects of religion). It is quite possible, however, that this is not necessary for many Chinese, as they clearly possess the ability to consider beliefs and values in their temporary and conditional context. In one of the explorative interviews, one of the respondents gave a functional meaning for Confucianism that is ‘to be successful’. Buddhism was used for concrete and specific events, and Daoism had the function of ‘comforting in difficult times’. This attitude could be described as ‘every religion has its time’. This same understanding might be at the bottom of the intercultural model, which does not necessarily search for the compatibility of all different religions, but sees the usefulness of religion in each specific and distinctive context.

7.1.3 Family and State Influence

The data in this survey has shown that there are certain shifts between parents’ and students’ religiosity, in particular that students seem to be more religious in general

²⁷² The term syncretism may not be perfectly suitable, as it has a pejorative sense, meaning “not so much a mixing but a confusing” (Bowker, John (ed.) (1997) Oxford Dictionary of World Religions, ‘Syncretism’, p.936). The use of this term here, however, is not pejorative, but rather leans on a second definition of syncretism which comes from the word’s etymological source ‘Creta’, a Greek island, where adherents of different religious groups united in order to face external threat (see A. Bailly (1950). Dictionnaire Grec-Français. Paris).

and more attracted to Christianity than their parents. It is still true, however, that the students' religiosity is strongly influenced by the parents. This observation supports the results of various surveys in other countries in which family environment was found to be absolutely decisive for the children's religiosity (Benson et al. 1989, Francis & Brown 1991, Myers 1996, Martin et al. 2003). The statistically very strong influence of parents on their children's religiosity has two possible explanations in my view. First, as was shown in the study by Kelley & De Graf (1997), family environment is more important in countries where religion is of public unimportance. This is especially true for China, where religion, though a part of everyday life, is not often found in public life. There is no institutionalized religious education, and even the teachings on Confucianism and other important Chinese philosophers are often superficial. Only recently did politicians ask for improved education on traditional ethics and Confucian humanism (Siemons 2006, 31). This is not only a consequence of Communism but also, and this is the second possible explanation, because religion in China has always been part of family-life and was traditionally passed on from generation to generation. Thus even if the traditional 'family religion', with its focus on ancestors and daily veneration has diminished during the last 100 years, religion in China is still very much a family affair. This is true both for families where religion is present and where religion is absent. If one is not exposed to religion in the family environment, it is unlikely that there will be another form of access. This at least is true for the students surveyed: if their parents' weren't religious, chances were very high that they weren't either.

The importance of the family environment also supports the claim made in Chapter Two that even though the Chinese state has repeatedly tried to gain total control over religion, its influence did not always reach the family sphere where religion continued to be practiced and passed on.

Of course it would be naïve to completely dismiss the influence of state control and the years of Communism (especially under Mao) when religion was not supposed to be part of the world of a good Chinese worker. In this historical background we can easily explain why around half of the students grew up in families where religion did not play any importance at all. The choice of religion made by the students, especially the popularity of Buddhism, which is (with the exception of Tibetan Lamaism) largely approved by the government, and the apparent unpopularity of popular religion (often referred to as superstitious cults), also suggests that state policy has been partly successful in its attempt to define religion.

This last remark does not mean that popular religion is unimportant in today's China. As several authors (Chen 2003, Dean 2003, Fan 2003) have shown, popular cults are reemerging all over China. The low popularity of popular religion among the respondents of this survey might have different causes. First, as just mentioned, it could be a consequence of the state's definition of religion, which makes 'popular' religion 'unpopular'. Second, the state's definition of religion also influences the answering behavior in such questionnaires. To say that you feel close to a religion which is officially not considered a religion, requires courage and independent thinking. We must therefore assume a certain bias due to 'social desirability'. Third, we might say that popular religion is simply not the religious tradition cherished by highly educated young people, as intellectuals often tend to focus more on written traditions, which they may feel offer more complex worldviews. This last reason also suggests that the results might differ with a more diverse sample that includes other groups of people and not only students.

7.1.4 The Importance of Gender

According to the results, female students are far more religious than male students. This result is consistent with various studies about religiosity and gender over time (Clark & Worthington 1987, Brown 1987, Martin et al. 2003). Data from the 1999 to 2002 value surveys in 98 countries also supports the theory that women are more religious than men; women say that religion is important to them more often than men²⁷³. Social psychology has provided an interesting explanation to why women tend to be more religious:

“the religious and non-religious prototypes are gender typed, since people assign feminine traits to a religious person and masculine traits to a non-religious person.”
(Gaston & Brown 1991, 233).

This study, conducted in Australia, showed that people who were identified as being religious had more feminine characteristics assigned to them, whereas non-religious people were assigned more masculine characteristics (Gaston & Brown 1991, 239). The authors of the study suggest that it might be easier for women to be religious than for men. This last study, of course, was conducted in a western context, and the question is whether we can make the same assumption on our data. I tend to answer yes, because of the second interesting result we got concerning gender: that the influence of parents on female students is stronger in the case of religious activities than beliefs, while it is the other way around for male students. In other words, the female students ‘openly’ follow their parents’ example, whereas the male students seem more reluctant to do so. We could therefore conclude that ‘to behave religiously’ is more expected of and more socially accepted for women, whereas it is not a specific trait of masculine behavior. This result is also supported by the fact that mothers are more religious than fathers. It makes more sense for women to follow their mothers’ example than it does for men. For women, being religiously active is in perfect harmony with their socially designated gender role, whereas for men ‘too much of it’, might be perceived as unmasculine. This line of reasoning might also explain why the influence of parents works more internally, that is, on the level of beliefs, for boys.

7.2 THE TWO VALUE DIMENSIONS REN (FORBEARANCE) AND LI (RITUAL PROPERTY)

In a next step I’d like to analyze the results concerning traditional values, which were based on an in-depth analysis of major Internet sites of Chinese religious associations, from which an item list was developed. From this list, six items proved statistically helpful and were used for further analysis.

7.2.1 General observations about traditional value scale

Before discussing the survey results concerning values more closely, I’d like to remark on some observations I made when constructing the traditional value scale. While reading through the different websites and looking for value statements, the importance of the state – religion relationship once more became very obvious; on every one of the analyzed sites, one can feel the influence of the Chinese government. Consequently the scale resulting from that analysis could be labeled as rather conservative; many items refer to rather hierarchical values (e.g. support for hierarchical family structure) and are supportive of the status quo (e.g. do not speak

²⁷³ Mean: 1.89 for women, 2.09 for men. Scale: 1 to 4 (1 = very important, 4 = not important at all). (Figures based on data published by Inglehart et al. 2004, calculation: Ines Kämpfer).

out if not if it is vexing others) as well as Chinese nationalism (e.g. do not speak out if not in interest of motherland). As already mentioned, the Confucian website is actually sponsored by the local government. It quickly becomes clear upon analyzing the Daoist and Buddhist site that they strongly support social stability and patriotism, values that are currently top the Chinese government's agenda. Thus we can observe a hidden form of Pas' first type of religion-government relationship, that the government finds a certain legitimacy through religious groups because they both strive for stability and harmony, values that may prevent revolutions and help the government to stay in power.

Now one might say that religious groups are forced to support these values and restrain from criticizing the government to ensure their survival in the PRC. This is certainly partly true, but might not be the only explanation. Although Hong Kong is part of China, NGOs in Hong Kong have much more freedom of expression than in Mainland China. The fact that the Daoist site based in Hongkong, is strongly focusing on stability and social peace, abstaining entirely from any criticism towards the Chinese government, indicates that government pressure is not the only reason for the conservative tone of these sites. It would also be unfair to the Confucian, Buddhist and Daoist community to assume that the only reason they support the current government is because they are following government directives, not daring to pronounce their own view. I'd rather suggest that many representatives of these groups truly believe in the values of stability and harmony and reject any form of open conflict, opting instead for the maintenance of status quo or, if necessary, for a smooth transformation. Referring to Chapter Two, such a view makes sense to Daoists, who believe in the value of non-interference; Buddhists, who, with the concept of no-self and forbearance, focus on the person as defined by the context; and Confucians, who espouse harmony. Based on this understanding, the conformist view of the Internet sites seems to be a result of both government pressure and the internal values of the traditions themselves²⁷⁴.

As was pointed out by Durkheim, Bourdieu and Parson, it is typical of the official religious institutions to promote stability. Interestingly, although the students surveyed clearly approve a certain hierarchical structure, in particular treating everybody with due respect, they did not cherish all of those values that were along the 'official line'. For instance, only 29% of the students agreed that one should not speak out if it's not in interest of motherland. Only two items met with less approval. Other, more unconventional values, in which there might be the potential for criticism, such as 'war is never a suitable method' or 'treat everybody like family', were approved by more than half of the students. We might therefore conclude that the proclamation of government values through the tool of religious organizations is only partly successful, and that feeling close to a religion does not mean to approve to all values promoted by that group.

7.2.2 *Li* and its Hierarchical Implications

Interestingly, the six values which were statistically most significant could be combined into two value groups which are very typical for Chinese religions: the *li* values and the *ren* values. The *li* values, which emphasize respect, hierarchical family structure and charity, have several things in common. On the one hand, they all focus on interpersonal relationships, such as how humans treat each other and what forms they use to live together in harmony. These values are also rather active, with a focus

²⁷⁴ Especially concerning Christianity, we have seen in Chapter Two (2.4.2, page 73) that those adherents carrying other values often belong to religious underground group and do not get a chance to influence the official religion.

on giving, treating others with respect, and building healthy families. As a third common criterion we can say they all implicitly contain the idea of hierarchy. The concept of treating others with the respect they deserve implicitly means that some people deserve more respect than others and that society is hierarchical. The element of hierarchy is obvious in the idea that children can only grow up happily in hierarchical families. Again this means that the students agreeing to this item are implicitly agreeing to the fact that social institutions need authorities in order to work. In the last item, 'charity', this hierarchical idea might not be totally obvious. But clearly in an interpersonal relationship where the one who has money gives to the one who hasn't, we again find a hierarchical relationship. Being charitable can in fact reinforce hierarchical relationships, as the poor might become even more dependent on the rich²⁷⁵.

Interestingly, the view of justice that is closest to the *li* values is individualism. Apparently support for these hierarchical and interpersonal values are not perceived to be opposed to individualism. Looking at both ideas more closely we can easily understand why. Individualism was measured with the item 'everyone is entitled to keep what he earns, even if this means that there are poor and rich people'. We again find a hierarchical feature in this item, as it attests that differences in income are part of society. Also we might say that the item used for "individualism" contains the idea of being 'active', as it talks about 'earning something'. Thus I conclude that the positive association between *li* and individualism is due to their active and hierarchical characteristics.

7.2.3 *Ren (forbearance)* and its Association with Ascriptivism and Fatalism

The second group of values (accept suffering, endurance, meditation) we found was labeled as *ren* (forbearance). Again we can find several similarities among those values. First, they focus on the individual. Unlike the *li*-values, the *ren* values focus not on interpersonal relationships but rather on how one personally deals with the difficulties in life. They describe a psychological process. A second quality of these values is the more passive approach they take when dealing with problematic situations. The idea behind these values is not to go out and change society, but rather to deal with difficulties by accepting them. Also, and this is a third characteristic of these values, they are rather religious. Meditation is often associated with religion or religiosity, as it has been promoted by Buddhism and Daoism. The acceptance of suffering also has a certain religious quality in it, as it is not just a psychological process but also a spiritual²⁷⁶ one. The same is true for the third item, which claims that man can endure everything. The spiritual quality of these *ren* values is enforced by the observed correlation between the level of religiosity and *ren*. In other words,

²⁷⁵ This observation has been made in several historical analyses of 18th century European societies (e.g. Van Leeuwen, Marco H. D. (2000). *The logic of Charity: Amsterdam, 1800-1850*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000, or: Shapeley, Peter (1998). *Charity, Status and Leadership. Charitable Image and the Manchester Man*. *Journal of Social History*, 32, pp. 57ff.). A similar critical view towards charity is also pronounced by Janet Poppendieck who made an indepth survey of American 'Soup Kitchens', and concludes that charity doesn't relief poverty but causes it. See: Poppendieck, Janet (1999). *Sweet Charity? Emergency Food and the End of Entitlement*. New York: Penguin Books.

²⁷⁶ I use the term „spiritual“ in its common sense, meaning to relate to the soul or spirit, in contrast to material things; to relate to religious or sacred things rather than to worldly things; and to show great refinement and concern with the higher things in life (Encarta® World English Dictionary © 1999 Microsoft Corporation). There are more complex definitions of spirituality, including into the term the social responsibility based on the experience with an absolute power. Following this argument spirituality is not only a private and internal affair, but has a sociopolitical dimension (Friedli, Richard (2002). *Spiritualität im Übergang*. *Universitäts Friburgensis*, September, pp.9-10).

only those students who are very religious also approved to *ren* values. Apparently they have a stronger tendency to try to solve problems not only on the interpersonal level but also through spirituality and internal methods. The fact that *ren* values correlate significantly with ascriptivism and fatalism supports our interpretation of these values as being passive rather than active. These values, just as with ascriptivism and fatalism, do not try to change society and the differences among men, but instead accept these differences. They even opt for acceptance when life means suffering. It is important to note that ascriptivism correlates more strongly with *ren* than fatalism. We can therefore conclude that supporting *ren* values does not necessarily mean that one is desperate and disappointed by society, but that endurance and forbearance might also imply a positive form of acceptance of society. It might also mean that one has found a way to deal with negative experiences without getting frustrated about it. Of course it can also turn into a more fatalistic, desperate acceptance of fate, but it doesn't necessarily have to be that way.

7.2.4 *Ren* and *Li*, *Yin* and *Yang* ?

In Chapter Four, I presented the Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck value theory, which in part forms five basic questions or problems and different value orientations on how to face these problems. In Table 1 (page 135) I supplemented these questions with possible answers given through Chinese values. We saw that Chinese values are very diverse and include nearly all value orientations. I'd like to repeat the exercise, trying to fit in the *li* and *ren* value groups to that table:

Table 18 *Li* and *ren* values in Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's table of value orientation

	<i>li</i> values	<i>ren</i> values
Question	Orientation	Notes
Time	Past	The hierarchical structure promoted by <i>li</i> (ritual property) goes back to China's long historical tradition.
	Present	The importance of meditation, which is often focused on the here and now, lets us assume that support for <i>ren</i> values is strongly focused on the present.
	Future	The items express a certain activity, especially the item 'charity', which might indicate the belief in the future and the belief in change.
Humanity and Nature	Mastery	No reference found
	Harmony	Following the principle of ritual property and respectful hierarchy, we can assume that <i>li</i> values can lead to a harmonious relationship with nature.
	Submission	The <i>ren</i> values emphasize acceptance of the conditions one lives in, this might also include the conditions of nature.
Relating to other people	Hierarchical ("Lineal")	All the items describe hierarchical conditions.
	As equals ("Collateral")	The <i>ren</i> values do not include any hierarchies, also the item 'treat everybody like family' was very close to the <i>ren</i> value group.
	Individualistic	<i>Li</i> values correlate strongly with individualism.
Motive for behaving	Being	No reference found
	Being-in-becoming	Meditation which is part of the <i>ren</i> value group, is a means for self-cultivation, and through its closeness to Buddhist ideas we might assume that self-cultivation is aiming to develop abilities which are valued by the person itself and not necessarily by others.
	Achievement ("Doing")	The correlation with individualism, which is measured through an item emphasizing achievement, lets us assume that great motivation comes from achieving something (and thus earns respect)
Human Nature *	Evil/mutable	<i>Ren</i> values assume that people get hurt by other people. This circumstance can alternatively be explained with the Buddhist understanding that life is suffering as man is destined through his conditions (no judgment about the quality of human nature), or by the idea that man is also bad.
	Mixture, neutral/mutable	
	Good/ mutable	We can assume that supporters of <i>li</i> values believe in the good of human beings, also because they refuse a fatalistic view of justice.

We can see that when interpreting *li* and *ren* values freely, and also adding some knowledge about the correlations the value groups show, the two value settings can lead to different possible problem solutions in nearly every category. This is an indicator that the statistical analysis, which was used to generate the two value groups, actually gave us very significant results: The six items used contain characteristics that lead to a broad range of problem solutions. In fact, in comparing this table to the theoretical one in chapter four, it seems that we can fill the same categories with these two value groups, as we can when referring to Chinese traditional values in general. Therefore I deduce that the two value groups give a very representative sample of Chinese traditional values in general.

Another interesting observation can be made when fitting the two value groups into the value circle of Schwartz (1996). I fit the concepts of ritual propriety (*li*) and forbearance (*ren*) into that value circle (see Table 2, page 137) based on theoretical knowledge about the two concepts. Following this categorization *li* was considered part of the 'tradition' category, and *ren* was put into the 'conformity' category. This categorization was confirmed in our data. The *li* values we detected in our survey emphasize respect and acceptance of traditional culture, characteristics Schwartz gave this motivational type. With *Ren* values, on the other hand, people restrain from

processes. Despite these contradictory elements, we observed no negative correlation between *ren* and *li*, meaning that quite a few students support both value groups. This pattern is similar to the intercultural-religiosity model, where seemingly contradictory features are combined. It is not surprising that those with intercultural-religiosity models also are those that support *li* and *ren* the strongest.

In fact, these results show the implicit application of a traditional Chinese value that was not explicitly included in the questionnaire: the idea of *yin* and *yang*, opposites that must be combined to achieve a complete whole.

7.3 HUMAN RIGHTS

7.3.1 General Support for Human Rights

Support for human rights in general is very high among the students surveyed. This, of itself, is a very important result in my view. We have seen that the relationship towards and the use of the human rights issue by the Chinese government is ambivalent. The government often uses human rights as an argument in the international arena, but its implementation inside China's boundaries is less enthusiastic. Human rights NGOs are rare and their scope of activities is restricted, meaning that true lobbying for human rights in China is difficult, if not impossible. Notwithstanding these facts, it is quite obvious that the term human rights has a positive connotation among the students. Students consider it a very important issue, and they are convinced that a nation which respects human rights is better off. They also believe that it is a state's duty to respect human rights. These general human rights beliefs are similar to those held in Europe and the U.S., and thus appear to signify a universal consensus. The variance concerning some of the traditional values has been far greater than in the case of the human rights. This is very similar to Western societies, in which the human rights idea is one of the rare moral consensuses still existing. This result is also in line with Durkheim's assessment of the importance of believing in individualism and human dignity. After Durkheim, this cult of the individual, whose dignity is sacred²⁷⁷, could become a universal system of shared values and a guaranty for cultural integration in modernity' (König 2002, 143)²⁷⁸. Looking at our data, the idea that human rights could be such a 'guaranty' for integration in Chinese society is supported; the approval of human rights is a common value, shared by nearly all students, regardless of their religious beliefs and socioeconomic background. The question is how deep this approval is rooted, and whether it is just a temporary social desirability to be in favor of human rights or if it is a value that has or will become part of Chinese society.

7.3.2 The Vast Definition of Human Rights and its Implication on the Human Rights dialogue

The survey has shown not only that students are in favor of the human rights idea, but also that the definition of human rights is rather broad and inconsistent. Students tend to label many of the items displayed as part of the human rights definition, but we also find significant differences among the students on what is to be labeled a human rights violation. These differences are more important than those observed in case of

²⁷⁷ This notion is most obvious in Durkheim's work, 'Suicide', where he emphasizes the religious character of the cult of the individual in modern society. Other than archaic societies where altruistic suicide was socially accepted in certain cases, this form of suicide is despised in modern society. The human being has become 'a god', to kill him therefore is blasphemy (Durkheim 1983, 391).

²⁷⁸ Original text in German: Durkheim deutet den "Kult des Individuums" als ein gemeinschaftlich geteiltes Wertesystem und damit als ein Garant kultureller Integration in der Moderne".

European students. In the survey made in Europe, seven of the eleven items were considered human rights violations by more than 80% of the surveyed group. Three other items were clearly not a human rights violation and only one was disputed. This means that a vast majority agreed on what is a human rights violation and what is not. In our survey, only three items were considered to be human rights violations by more than 80% of the group, three items were clearly not, and four items were disputed (see Chapter Six, Graph 39, page 216). For that reason I construe that the definition of human rights varies more among the Chinese students surveyed than among those surveyed in the European sample²⁷⁹. This is significant when looking back on why I actually included these questions in the questionnaire. I wanted to know how the term 'human rights' is socially represented among Chinese students. Social representations, we saw, describe "sense-giving systems" (Bergmann 1998, 78) and tell us how people subjectively create their reality by defining abstract concepts. The founder of the idea of social representation, Serge Moscovici, points out that social representations are of major importance for behaving and communicating inside a specific society (Moscovici 1963). In other words, we could say that abstract concepts need social representation in order for these concepts to make sense and for communication in a society to be possible. I said that the definition of human rights by the students is varied, but we could also say the definition is rather diffuse and unclear; there is no clear-cut pattern of the social representation 'human rights'. In the logic of the social representation concept, this might render communication more difficult. If there is no clear consensus as to what is meant when discussing human rights or human rights violations, it is quite possible that those addressed understand it differently than those sending the message. This problem can often be observed on the international stage, where each person means something different when using the term human rights. Our survey results suggest that a similar difficulty might occur when talking about human rights in China. Or to put it positively: to assure a smooth communication process when talking and discussing human rights, the parties must communicate their proper definitions. This might enable more productive and transparent discussions, avoid underlying misunderstandings, and eventually even eliminate certain prejudices.

7.3.3 Children First

Although results concerning the human rights definition are rather diffuse, we could observe two characteristics or tendencies of how Chinese students define human rights. The first concerns the victims, and the second the aggressors.

Out of three items where children were described as the victims, two were judged as a human rights violation by more than 80%. The item 'children have to work' was more often judged as a human rights violation than, for example, 'people die of hunger'. We can conclude that for many of the students, children's rights are very important. The high value placed on children's rights can be explained first by the fact that respondents are still quite young and therefore identify themselves with children's rights more strongly. Secondly, these feelings are reinforced by the fact that children are of particular importance in Chinese society; only through them is the continuity of the family, and the performance of ancestor rites, secured (see Chapter Two, page 26ff). The only item where children's rights are disputed is the item 'parents hit their children'; around 30% of the interrogated students would not call this a human rights violation. Some students apparently refuse to use human rights language when it comes to the parent-child relationship- an indication that inside the family there exist

²⁷⁹ Contrasting definitions also could be observed in European samples, but there were less variations, and clusters and patterns could be observed (see Clémence et al. 2001).

other value priorities. Education, discipline and hierarchy might be more important than the right of the child not to get beaten. This exceptional position of the family can also be seen in the fact that the situation most often judged as a human rights violation is the one where a judge decides where children should live after a divorce, without consulting the children. In this case the judge not only restricts the children's right to choose, he is also interfering in a family affair. This might be the reason why this item is so unanimously considered a human rights violation by the students surveyed: it interferes with the 'sacred' sphere of the family and neglects children's rights. These 'violations' are unacceptable for a vast majority of the interrogated students, and, understanding the importance of children and family in Chinese tradition, we might assume that this would be the case for most of the Chinese.

7.3.4 Institutional, State-Oriented Definition of Human Rights

Our results show that students are more hesitant to call something a human rights violation if the author of the crime is not the state or a state-sponsored organization, or if it is unclear who committed the act. Situations in which the author of the possible human rights violation is unknown, frequently led to 'don't know' answers, pointing to the uncertainty such examples caused among the students. Thus we might say that for the students, in order to unanimously call something a human rights violation, the author of the crime has to be the state. This makes sense if we depart from the assumption that human rights are something given by the state, an assumption that is often made in the continental European tradition of human rights. In this tradition, the state is the provider of human rights. Human rights are not given per se, it is not something mankind is given by nature (or heaven), but something that only becomes reality once the state assures it. This is very different from the Anglophone tradition of human rights, where rights are based either on the law of nature or the belief in a creator who gives human beings their dignity. In the Anglophone tradition, human rights started out as negative rights. The assumption was that human beings have inherent rights, and it was the state's duty to abstain from interfering with these rights. The United States Bill of Rights and the English Bill of Rights codify such 'negative rights', especially the freedoms of speech, religion and assembly. On the other hand the Continental European tradition, strongly influenced by Rousseau, denotes positive rights that the state is obliged to protect and provide. According to Rousseau, rights and liberties are not entitlements given through heaven or by nature, but are social contracts. One has rights and individual freedoms because the rest of the society agrees on those rights and liberties. The state is the guarantor of this social contract, and assures the well-being of society and its individuals. In exchange, the individual is expected to respect the authority of the state and accept certain restrictions of his personal freedom, as long as the government assures the equality and liberty of everyone (Rousseau 1762). In this logic, the state's duty is not just to refrain from interfering but also to actively provide rights, such as education, livelihood, work, and equality.

Early approaches to the discussion on human rights in China often included the idea of human rights as inherent to human nature. The expression *tianfu renquan* (天府人权) 'heaven-endowed human rights' contains this idea of natural human rights. But with nationalism and later Marxist socialism, the idea of human rights and rights in general as being dependent on law became more important in Chinese human rights discussion²⁸⁰. This view dominates the official discussion of human rights in today's

²⁸⁰ This rather 'restricted' definition of rights as a simple instrument for upholding the ruling order did not enter China until after the revolution. As a matter of fact, this was the view promoted by the Chinese legalist school:

China; rights are not given per se, but defined by economic and cultural conditions. To sustain this argument I will quote once more the article printed in Renmin Bao (People's Daily), the state sponsored newspaper shortly after June 4th, 1989:

“Human rights are concrete rather than abstract and relative rather than absolute. Both the concrete stipulations in each country’s law regarding citizen’s rights (gongmin quanli), and the actual situation of citizens’ rights in real life, are constrained by the country’s political system, economic relations, cultural traditions, habits and custom and many other factors.” (Shi Yun 1989, in: Angle & Svensson 2001, 326)

The quote expresses that rights are something defined by the economic, social and political system of a country. It is the state who defines what rights are feasible and suitable, and it is the state who provides for these rights. One hypothesis for why examples of possible human rights violation without a specific aggressor are not necessarily considered human rights violation, might be due to the institutional and state-centered human rights definition of many students. If human rights are state-based, only the state can violate them. In this view, other problems, such as high income differences, are bad situations but not necessarily human rights violation, as nobody, even not the state, directly caused this form of suffering. Of course one can claim that the state indirectly responsible for these situations, but this connection is not obvious in the questionnaire items, as they are formulated in one sentence and do not include any ‘background information’ about why there are high income differences. It would be interesting to see how students would react if the items about violations of social rights, such as ‘people die of hunger’, were formulated differently and included more information (e.g. ‘people die of hunger because the state is demanding very high taxes, so that people have nothing left’). My supposition is that the results would differ from the ones in this survey, and that these examples would more often be regarded as human rights violations.

7.3.5 Comparison: Chinese and European students

The institutional definition of human rights is not isolated to the Chinese context. The research done by Clémence et al. (1995) in three European countries show similar, even more obvious patterns. Again, those examples where the state is the aggressor were considered human rights violations by nearly all students. Compared to the Chinese students, however, European students most strongly condemned the suppression of democratic rights, that is the item ‘somebody is arrested because he opposes the government’. 80% of the European students and only around 50% of the Chinese students called this item a human rights violation. Thus we can observe a difference concerning what kind of state interventions are accepted. The other state intervention described in the example ‘somebody is sent back to his home country without a trial’ is one of the few cases that was more frequently judged a human rights violation by the Chinese students than by European students.

I already mentioned in Chapter Six (page 218) that compared to the European students, the students in my survey sample are generally more hesitant to call something a human rights violation. This observation and the example about democratic rights (being opposed to the government) seem to show that Chinese students are more willing than European students to accept state interference, and that the cases in which such interference is accepted, differ from each other. In this respect, we might say that

„The ‚rule of law’ advocated by the Chinese legalist was basically instrumentalist in nature., namely the law was used as an instrument by the rulers to control the ruled“ (Xin 2004, 403).

the Chinese government's policy of promoting a more restrictive human rights definition has been successful. But, the state has not been entirely successful when it comes to promoting a hierarchical understanding of human rights. The students in the survey did not follow the state's credo to emphasize social rights. It appears that the influence of the state on the student's human rights definition is restricted. This is because even if other sources on human rights cannot be easily accessed, students can still construct their own personal construction of human rights which is likely influenced through other value settings and information. Thus we can explain the tendency for students to define human rights as institutionalized and state-centered (government influence), the preferences for children's rights (traditional influence), and the fact that definitions are very diverse and sometimes vague (lack of more detailed information).

7.3.6 Human rights and its association with the U.S.

Another factor in discussing the social representation of human rights among students, is the association made by many students between the U.S. and human rights issues. This association, discussed in Chapter Four (page 150f) and Five (page 158), was supported by our data, which showed that the more favorably someone views the U.S., the more likely that person is to strongly support human rights. In our study, 40% of the students surveyed partly or totally agree to the statement that human rights are a concept that was imported from the U.S. This association indicates that part of the social representation of human rights is its association with the United States. This of course is of major importance in contemporary Chinese human rights discourse. As long as the two concepts are closely associated, every discussion on human rights will also be a discussion about the United States. Additionally United States actions will always be looked at in respect to human rights; every U.S. action that violates human rights is an argument against the idea of human rights in general and its practical feasibility, and sustains the government's reasoning that the human rights situation in China is the same as everywhere else.

An example of the negative impact U.S. actions have had on the human rights discussion in China, is the article published in People's Daily shortly after it became known that U.S. soldiers apparently flushed the Quran down the toilet at Quantamono Bay naval station (the story was later denied). This article, entitled "Who is violating religious freedom?" uses the incident to show why any intervention in Chinese human rights policy is unjustified. He not only states that the U.S. is itself violating human rights, but that its lack of respect towards Islamic culture is just another sign of the arrogance of the U.S. in imposing its own human rights standards on the rest of the world.

"For a long time the United States has posed itself as the "guardian of human rights". Disregarding political, economic, historical, cultural and social development differences among different countries it looks down on other countries cultural and religious customs. It often makes arbitrary condemnations on human rights conditions in other countries according to its own values and ideology, and accuses others of violating religious freedom. The desecration of the Quran again revealed its "extremely conceived" arrogance. The facts proved that the one violating religious freedom is none other than the United States itself." (People's Daily, May 15th 2005)²⁸¹

²⁸¹ Title and source: Who is violating religious freedom? English translation on: http://english.people.com.cn/200505/16/eng20050516_185235.html

Understanding the strong association between the United States and human rights, as well as the impact U.S. actions have on the Chinese human rights discourse, is of major importance when entering into a dialogue on human rights in China. In fact, a real discussion on human rights is only possible if the two issues could be separated from each other. This would necessitate enhancing Chinese human rights discourse with a lot of information on human rights and international human rights history. The historical discussion on human rights presented in Chapter Three is not well known in Mainland China, and it would probably be surprising to many Chinese to realize how actively human rights were discussed in China in the last 100 years, and how differentiated the varied positions were.

7.4 GROUPS AND THEIR VALUES

Before coming to such practical considerations I'd like to further analyze the different 'typical' groups I could discover in my data. In so doing, I'll discuss the multivariate analyzes, that is the correlations and associations between the different variables and concepts.

7.4.1 Group 1: 'The individual activists'

Students from group one, which show a broad definition of and high support for human rights, are labeled as 'individual activists'. I chose that label because of their positive attitude towards human rights combined with a strong support for individualism and support for the *li* values, which, as we have seen, are oriented towards the society. This clear orientation to the outside world, their refusal of values promoting acceptance (low score for fatalism) and forbearance (low score on *ren* scale), and their support for human rights makes me consider these students as 'active', as they seem to have faith in human rights and society.

In the hypothesis formulated in Chapter Five (page 160), I assumed a positive correlation between individualism and human rights. As we have seen, this hypothesis is strongly supported by the students in this group. Still, when looking at the item we used to measure 'individualism' (everybody is entitled to keep what they earn, even if this means some people are richer than others), the positive correlation with human rights might be a bit surprising. It describes individualism as a system that produces income differences, not just as a system that assures personal freedom. Nevertheless many students strongly agree with that item. We have seen in Chapter Five (page 159) that support for an individualistic view of justice is explained through low group integration and flexible hierarchical structures. In other words, individualists feel free to follow their personal interest and consider change possible, but do not feel very integrated in society. Using this logic, the relationship between human rights and individualism can not only be explained by the focus on the individual, but also because human rights might provide a 'backup'-system for an individual who does not feel well-integrated in and protected by society. As Erich Fromm has emphasized on several occasions, freedom is always twofold, containing possibilities and risks:

" [the analysis of freedom] showed that freedom from the traditional bonds of medieval society, though giving the individual a new feeling of independence, at the same time made him feel alone and isolated, filled him with doubt and anxiety (...)"
(Fromm 1941, 103)

Human rights might be an instrument to deal with these feelings of isolation and loneliness described by Fromm, because they assure those 'free individuals' that there is a safety net: even if everything goes wrong, even if I abuse my freedom, my

personal dignity will still be guaranteed. In human rights logic, everybody, even the criminal, has his rights.

The theory that an individualistic view of justice is connected to low group integration is also supported through our findings that many of those students supporting individual views are at least partly oriented toward the west. They are less critical (than students from group 2) towards the U.S. and consume western media more often. Again, the relationship between individualism and a more pro-western attitude might be explained by the fact that the west is more oriented toward the individual. But, as importantly, the orientation towards another culture might also be a sign of low integration with one's own society, or, to formulate it positively, the freedom to accept ideas that are not necessarily part of one's tradition. A similar process could be observed in European society, where a high degree of individualism and a low degree of integration let many people look for and take on ideas from other cultures which they may consider to be more helpful and interesting than their own traditions. This weakening loyalty towards one's own traditions often leads to increased mobilization across national boundaries (Harper & Le Beau 2005).

Now it would be wrong to understand the 'individual activists' as totally rejecting their own traditions. Our data shows that high support for human rights is not at odds with religiosity. In fact, to be partly religious is associated positively with an open definition of human rights. Only those who are very religious tend to have a slightly more restricted definition of human rights. Students in this first group are very favorable towards the traditional and hierarchical *li* values. I already explained why these values are in accordance with an individualistic ideal of justice (see page 246), but the question remains why these hierarchical *li* values correlate well with human rights support. In fact *li* is often associated with the idea of the rule of man, which is opposed to the rule of law and thus opposed to human rights²⁸². In my view, there are two explanations for why we nevertheless find a positive correlation between the two concepts. The first lies in the social representation of human rights: they are understood as an institutional and hierarchical concept. This understanding of human rights is in accordance with traditional hierarchical values, as both part from the fact that there are the powerful and the powerless; the powerless have rights because the powerful grant rights. The hierarchical characteristic is also contained in individualism: to consider income differences as just, means to accept hierarchy in society. But contrary to those with fatalistic views, the individualists and human rights supporters also believe in the flexibility and restrictiveness of such hierarchical structures. Such hierarchies are both flexible because everybody has rights and the chance to improve his or her situation, and restricted because the use of power is not boundless, but is controlled by the minimum principles described through the human rights idea.

A second reason is the active characteristic of human rights. To believe in human rights only makes sense if one believes in the possibility of social change. As we have seen, this 'active' view is characteristic of individualism and *li* values.

Thus we can explain why human rights, individualism and support for *li* values seem compatible, and are all equally supported by students in group 1.

7.4.2 Group 2: 'To watch and to bear'

The only group which showed a rather critical view towards human rights are those who approve a fatalistic view of justice, are favorable to values of forbearance (*ren*),

²⁸² For example Xin Chungying (2004, 409): "The traditional Confucianist culture has always stressed the "rule of li", over the rule of law. Although the idea of the rule of law appeared very early in the Chinese history, it has never gotten the upper hand over the "rule of li", or rule of man in China."

and who are critical of *li* values. The fact that those students who score high on fatalism also score high on *ren* values is not surprising. As described above, *ren* values have certain fatalistic aspects, oriented toward the psychological process through which the individual deals with difficulties. This does not mean that the *ren* value group simply signifies ‘fatalism’. Unlike pure fatalism, the *ren* values also contain a religious quality. The item on the importance of meditation particularly highlights this dimension. Supporting the rather passive *ren* values can lead to very confident decisions about how one deals with difficulties and proves inner strength. Pure fatalism, on the other hand, would mean that one has given up hope for change and has lost faith in oneself and in society. Students belonging to group 2, also show a strong approval for ascriptivism. Ascriptivism describes people who feel highly integrated in their society and in their specific social group. So much so that they are willing to stay in that group even if this means to belong to the lower class.

We can therefore conclude that students in this group have accepted their situation as it is, and think it is necessary to develop psychological coping strategies to deal with difficulties, rather than changing the outside world. This situation includes feelings of desperation, but not necessarily; some students feel very integrated in their group and their refusal to change the situation might be because they actually identify themselves with their social positions and its implications. Changing their situations might be understood as a threat to their identity.

This acceptance of the status quo, be it ascriptivistic or fatalistic, is associated with a critical view of human rights, and a rather restrictive definition of human rights. Interestingly Clémence et al. (2001, 89) made the same observation in their study on the social representation of human rights in France, Italy, Romania, Switzerland and Costa Rica. They observed that “a more restricted definition [of human rights] was rooted in a fatalistic conception of human rights”. This negative correlation between ‘human rights support’/‘broad definition of human rights’ and fatalism, indicates that human rights are not understood merely as a theoretical idea but also as an instrument to change society. It also indicates that respondents both in Europe and in China understand that human rights application is not always a given. To implement human rights, change is needed. To those who do not think that change is possible or necessary, this doesn’t make sense. Therefore human rights are much closer to ‘activists’ than to those watching the world passively.

7.4.3 Group A: Rich and Religious

Students in group A, are characterized by strong religiosity and high socioeconomic status. The positive correlation between religiosity and socioeconomic status is rather special, as many other surveys show that lower class and less educated people in general are more religious than educated upper class people:

As mentioned in Chapter Five, results from Gransow’s survey in 1987 in China led to the conclusion that traditional values and religiosity correlated positively to low socioeconomic status (see page 162). In general, there seem to be two conflicting theories on the relationship between socioeconomic status and religiosity. According to the *secularization hypothesis*, faith in religion and religious institutions wanes as a country’s inhabitants become richer and more educated. The *religion-market model*, first used by Weber, actually emphasizes the role of religion for economic growth. Support for the *secularization hypothesis* has been found by Edward Glaesner & Bruce Sacerdote (2002), who observed in the United States that education results in a decrease in the extent of religious beliefs. The result of an international study conducted by Harvard Professor Robert Barro & Rachel Mc Cleary (2003b) goes in a similar direction: Overall economic development represented by per capita GDP tends

to reduce religiosity. But when we take a more detailed look at the studies, things become more unclear. Although the paper by Glaesner & Sacerdote also describes a negative correlation between education and religious beliefs, there is a positive correlation between education and church attendance. Barro & Cleary (2003a; 2003b) on the other hand, make a contrary observation: in their international study, the results suggested that education and economic status were positively related to religious beliefs and negatively to church attendance. These conflicting results show that the relationship between religiosity and the socioeconomic status has many layers. We might even assume that the relationship is a dynamic one; the secularization process pushed and was pushed by economic growth, thus leading to a negative correlation between religiosity and socioeconomic status. In the last few years, a religious revival, based less on the revival of religious institutions and more on religious beliefs, was observed and commented on by many researchers (e.g. Hervieu-Leger 1998, Berger 1999, Davie 1999, Aldrige 2000,). It is quite possible that the relationship between religiosity and socioeconomic status will continue to change, because the new religiosity is not comparable with the institutionalized religions that shaped society before secularization.

Returning to our sample, we did find a clearly positive relationship between religiosity and socioeconomic status, for both religious activities, beliefs and affiliation. Based on China's history and current situation, this makes sense. Religion has been very critically viewed by the Chinese government for a long time. The extent of religious freedom the Chinese enjoy today is a rather new phenomenon, which is still developing today. Historically, the growing freedom of religion in China has been coupled with China's policy of economic reform. The economic reform had its first and strongest impact on the major cities, such as Shanghai and Beijing; similarly we can assume that religious freedom was also first felt in big urban centers. Although the Chinese religious revival can also be observed on the countryside, our data suggest that its primary impact, at least for the moment, has been stronger in urban centers and among highly educated and well-off people. It remains to be seen if this relationship will eventually be leveled out or even turned around in the future.

We also have to remember that in this study religiosity was measured by levels of belief, activity and affiliation. Affiliation was not conceptualized as a physical affiliation but more as an emotional affiliation. Thus the religiosity I measured is not just a form of 'patrimonial religiosity', meaning that students identify with the culture and the community of a religious domination, but that other forms of religiosity, be it purely emotional, humanist or aesthetic are also included into our category of 'religiosity'²⁸³. As seen in Chapter Two in the case of Christianity (page 73ff), these forms of religiosity are especially attractive to intellectuals and highly educated people in general.

From our data, we can also conclude that the ethical dimension of religion is of importance for those religious students in group A. They are not only more religious than average, they also show very strong support for both *li* and *ren* values. In this group we find support for the remark made above that although *li* and *ren* have some contradictory elements, they are not necessarily exclusive. In chapter two we have

²⁸³ The terms used here to describe these different forms of religiosity are taken from the categorization of different forms of Christianity by Hervieu-Leger, Danièle (1998). She differentiates between four dimensions of religiosity: Communal (belonging to a community), Ethical (values), Cultural (heritage of doctrines and rituals, history) and Emotional (experience). The different combinations of these dimensions lead to six different types of Christians: Emotional (feeling of communal belonging), Patrimonial (cultural and communal belonging), Humanitarian (emotional and ethical), Political (communal and ethical), Humanist (cultural and ethical) Aesthetic (cultural and emotional). See: The transmission and formation of socioreligious identities in modernity; an analytical essay. *International Sociology*, 13 (2), pp. 213-228

seen that all Chinese religious traditions contain aspects of *li* and *ren*, and this is also true for very religious students. Thus values directed both to the external and internal world are of importance to them, and they approve of both passive and active coping strategies. We have also seen that many of the students in this group feel close to several religions, including Chinese religions and Christianity. Their religiosity is very inclusive, and it makes sense that their value palette is also very inclusive.

Although students from this group do not totally reject an individual view of justice, their high level of religiosity is also associated with support for a fatalistic worldview. Thus, in this group of very religious and well off students we find approval for both individualist and fatalistic views. This finding is in line with other surveys analyzing the relationship between fatalism and religiosity: Part of these studies suggest that religiosity prevents a fatalistic worldview, because it gives people the feeling of being in control of their lives (Krause & Tran 1989) or because it compensates for a lack of resources (Schieman et al. 2003). Others (e.g. Hunt & Hunt 1977, Jacobson 1999) find that religiosity promotes a fatalistic worldview, as it supplies psychological relief from alienating material conditions, while at the same time fostering the feeling that life is controlled by higher powers. Thus we can assume that among the students in group A there are both cases; for some religion helps to 'feel in control', whereas others 'feel controlled'.

This feeling of being controlled does not occur just with lower class students. In Chapter Five (page 159) we described fatalism as a result of 'high grid' (living in a hierarchical society) and 'low group' integration. This condition can definitely apply to those who better off. Today's China is strongly hierarchical, and differences between rich and poor are getting bigger and also more stable. Also it has been observed by several Chinese researchers (Tang 2000, Wang 2001, Whyte 2000) that many Chinese feel less and less integrated in their society, as they live in unfamiliar cities, and are separated from their families. This condition applies not just to migrant workers, but also to many of the students surveyed, who came to Shanghai to study and whose families live at least a day away.

As we saw in Chapter Six (page 235) students of group A are generally supportive of the human rights idea. But they are not more supportive than those students in group B who are not religious at all and they are less supportive than group 1. Looking at the value preferences of students in group A this result is not surprising. Their support of *li* values is positively correlated with human rights support, while their support for *ren* values is negatively correlated. Hence human rights support is both supported and softened by their belief in traditional value settings, and their diverse views of justice. The strong religiosity of these students therefore has contradictory impacts on their attitudes towards human rights.

7.4.4 Group B: Profane and active

Students in group B are in many respects the opposite of students in group A. They are not religious and score much lower on the socioeconomic scale. Above, we explained the result between high socioeconomic status and religiosity through the fact that the religious revival was connected to the economic revival, and therefore, at least on a short term basis, has had a stronger impact in urban centers than in rural areas. For many students of group B, religion does not play any role in their lives. They were raised in non-religious families, rarely perform religious activities themselves, and do not have any religious beliefs. We can say they are much more focused on worldly life and do not bother with spiritual questions. This of course does not mean that they do not have values or ethical standards; they too are rather supportive of *li* values, which emphasize respect, hierarchical structures and charity,

but their support is weaker than of students in group A. They are also much more critical towards *ren* values. The spiritual *ren* values don't seem attractive to these students who do not feel close to religion in general. Students in this group are rather supportive of an individualistic view of justice, even though their rather low socioeconomic status is often associated with a fatalist view of justice. But thinking of the backgrounds of these students, this (partial) support for individualism and for *li* values is not surprising. They come from relatively poor families, often from a rural environment and a poorly educated family, but they made it to one of the country's best universities. They made it because they are hard working and smart. Their support for individualism can thus be explained through their personal experience and the feeling of having personally 'earned' what they got and will get in their future. Without a doubt these students are ready to fight to improve their living standard, and consequently feel much closer to 'active' values (*li*) than to very 'passive' values such as (*ren*).

Students in group B are also supportive of the human rights idea. In fact, their support is comparable to those very religious students. Their support for human rights is also pushed through *li* values and individualism. But because both support for *li* values and individualism is not as strong as in group 1, support for human rights is not above average.

The critical attitude of students in Group B towards religion and a wide range of values, might indicate a lack of value settings. This statement is a bit strong, however, as support for *li* values and for individualism is not completely absent, and the students are averagely favorable to human rights. Nevertheless they are the group which comes closest to the critical picture of Chinese people often given by western observers and by the Chinese themselves: they are interested only in worldly matters and everyday life, and have a hard time following principles that go beyond personal interest. The Taiwanese author Bo Yang (1992) described this character in his book 'The ugly China man', where he harshly accuses Chinese people of being selfish, impolite and devoid of ethical values. But it is also a stereotype that reappears in a more moderate way, in discussions about China's human rights situation or in connection with the lack of environmental protection in China²⁸⁴. A critical observer must admit that such observations are not always unjustified, and that China certainly faces problems that stem from a lack of respect of certain values like environmental protection. It is also a phenomenon the Chinese government is trying to face, by enhancing knowledge about Chinese cultural values, especially Confucian values. Concerning this call for a change of values or value priorities, one also has to take into account that China's fast economical development demands these changes; the increased living standard creates new problems and sensibilities, which calls for an adjustment of value priorities. Arguably such a change is not obvious if there is no basis for such values, and in this respect a missing reference to traditional and religious value-system or possible 'substitutes' (e.g communist teaching) can be a problem.

But, considering not only those students in group B but all three groups, it would be wrong to talk of a total lack of ethical reference systems among the students surveyed. In fact, a majority of the students are supportive of one or both of the traditional

²⁸⁴ E.g. a comment made by a journalist of the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, when writing an article about China's environmental problems: "For people[in China] it is extremely difficult to respect rules, whose value goes beyond the immediate personal profit" (Hoher Preis der Modernisierung in China, NZZ, 7th/8th January 2006, page 5). Original text "Den Menschen [in China] fällt es ausserordentlich schwer, Verhaltensregeln zu respektieren, deren Wert sich nicht unmittelbar in einem persönlichen Gewinn niederschlägt."

values sets, and half of them feel close to one or more religious traditions, indicating that reference systems are present in their lives.

7.4.5 Religion, Values and Human Rights

Our results show that the relationship between religiosity, values and human rights is not linear and straightforward. While religiosity is positively correlated with support for traditional values, part of these traditional values (*li*) are positively related to human rights, while others (*ren*) are not. Additionally we have seen that many other variables, such as attitude towards the U.S., the general view of justice, and socioeconomic status have an impact on the variables of ‘religiosity’, ‘traditional values’ and ‘support for human rights’. In Chapter Four (page 141), I mentioned the theory of Richard Friedli, who states, that the “Tiefenkultur” of a society is the intersection of cosmology, value system, and collective memory. If we expand those categories, we can apply this model also to our survey results,. The questionnaire does not explicitly deal with Chinese cosmology, but since cosmology describes aspects of how we see the world, it can be filled with the views of justice, which were part of the questionnaire. The originally Greek term for cosmology, first used in the 18th century, can be translated as ‘discourse about the world’ (cosmos / logos). According to this general understanding of cosmology, it is justified to understand the survey question, ‘what is just?’ as part of this discourse on the world, how it functions and how humans fit in it. It is arguably only one aspect of cosmology, but, unlike repeating cosmological myths of Daoism or Confucianism, it allows us to rely on data given by the students, and prevents the sometime careless reproduction of stereotypes of how the ‘Chinese see the world’.


The ‘value’ category can be filled with the two value groups *li* and *ren*, which represent traditional values by combining values from different religious traditions and representing different focuses (inside/ outside), strategies (passive/ active) and fields (sacred / profane).

The third category in Friedli’s deep culture theory is ‘collective memory’. The term was first used by Halbwachs (1925, 1941), to refer to the representation of history in a society. To understand a society’s collective memory, we have to ask questions such as: “How is history told in this society?” or “what is remembered and what isn’t?”. Collective memory wasn’t a central part of my survey, but the importance of the student’s attitude towards the U.S. is surely an aspect that can be categorized as ‘collective memory’. The general critical view towards American lifestyle and foreign policy is a phenomenon that can not only be understood based on contemporary conditions (e. g. war in Iraq), but which also stems from the history of Sino-American relations. In general, one can say that the unequal treaties, the colonization of parts of China’s major cities (German Concession in Qingtao (1898-1914), the International settlement zone in Shanghai (English, American, French, 1848-1942), the British colony in Hong Kong (1841-1997), the Portuguese colony in Macau 1553-1999)²⁸⁵, and the Boxer Rebellion left the Chinese many negative feelings towards foreign powers. Sino-American relations were furthered poisoned during the Korean war, in which the U.S. fought against Chinese troops which had come to reinforce the North Koreans. This situation was used by the U.S. to “contain the Chinese threat” (Worden et al. 1987) through a trade embargo and travel restrictions. These measures affected many ordinary Chinese who were not directly involved in the war and naturally made a deep impression on the collective memory of the Chinese. The Korean war also led

²⁸⁵ For a detailed list of all Foreign concessions and colonies in China see
http://www.worldstatesmen.org/China_Foreign_colonies.html.

to increased support of Taiwan's military defense, thus weakening the possibility of Chinese reunification. The involvement of the U.S. in the Vietnamese war, in which Beijing supported the other side, is another aspect of the conflicting history of Sino-American relations. It goes without saying that such a conflicting history leaves traces in society, even more so when government propaganda uses these incidents for its own purposes; discrediting the enemy is the best way to strengthen one's own position. In this historical background I understand the attitudes towards the U.S. to be part of the collective memory of China and the Chinese. Following this argument, we get the following picture when applying the survey results to Friedli's model:

Graph 58: Application of Friedli's Deep Culture Model



In the image above, I filled every category with two aspects of the survey results. For values, we detected the significant value groups *ren* and *li*, fatalism and individualism, were found to be significantly related to human rights, as the was the attitude towards the U.S..

It is important to note that by including the different poles of these categories, which could all be observed in the questionnaire and are contained in groups 1, 2, A and B, we can also see that it would be simplistic to consider the intersection as a uniform deep culture. In fact, the different poles show that although we might discover certain tendencies, what is called "Tiefenkultur" is not a one-dimensional and one-directional concept. On the contrary, in society, and even in a rather homogenous group of students, we always find different constructions of the world. If this is true for a rather uniform sample, it should apply even more so for a much more disparate Chinese society. Our analysis has also shown that variables such as socioeconomic background and religious upbringing can strongly influence how the different categories in Friedli's model are filled.

This variance and inclusiveness is actually very characteristic of Chinese society, Chinese thinking and Chinese psychology. It is also the expression of a globalized world, in which uniform structures are replaced more and more with diversified models. This observation once more reminds us that human beings cannot be categorized and stereotyped.

CONCLUSIVE REMARKS AND HYPOTHESIS STATED IN CHAPTER 7

CONCERNING RELIGION:

- A relatively large proportion of religiously sensitive students support the claims of a 'religious revival' in China.
- The extensiveness, accessibility, openness and international and governmental backing all contribute to the popularity of Buddhism, which I call a "low-threshold religion".
- The data gathered is understood as a mirror of the position of Christianity in contemporary China: often understood on an intellectual and ethical rather than on an affective and communal level, it has become an important part of the Chinese religious landscape.
- Students with an intercultural model of religiosity do not necessarily search for the compatibility of all different religions, but see the usefulness of religion in their specific and distinctive context.
- For women, being religiously active is in harmony with their socially designed gender role, whereas for men it might be perceived as conflicting with their masculinity.
- The observed positive relationship between religiosity and socioeconomic status can be explained through China's recent history, in which increased religious freedom was coupled with China's economic development.
- The ethical dimension of religion is of high importance for religious students.

CONCERNING RELIGION AND STATE IN CHINA

- Students strongly support the government's religious policy, understanding religion as a social system which fulfills the function of producing morals and ethics, and which guarantees a harmonious society.
- The choice of religion made by the students (favoring 'official religions' (e.g. Buddhism) over popular religion), suggests a successful state policy in its attempt to define religion.
- The importance of the family environment in religious socialization supports the claim that even in times of repression, the family remained the institution where religion was practiced and passed on.

CONCERNING TRADITIONAL CHINESE VALUES

- *Li* and *ren* value groups have certain contradictory qualities(*li* =more active, focused on interpersonal relationships, *ren*= passive, focused on more spiritual, psychological procedures), the two systems are not exclusive, hinting at the bipolarity and inclusiveness of traditional Chinese values systems.
- Students critical to all traditional values are a minority, therefore it would be wrong to talk of the total lack of ethical reference systems among the Chinese youth.

ATTITUDE TOWARDS HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS DEFINITION

- For our sample it is true that human rights approval is a common value, shared by nearly all students, regardless of their religious beliefs and socioeconomic background.
- Among the interrogated students there is no clear-cut pattern on the social representation of 'human rights'. This might exacerbate miscommunications about human rights.
- The tendency of an institutionalized, state-centered human rights definition can be explained through government influence; the preferences for children's rights can be explained through the influence of traditional values. The fact that definitions are very diverse and vague might be due to the lack of more detailed information about human rights.
- Knowing about the association between the perception of the U.S. and human rights is of major importance when entering a dialogue about human rights in China.

TRADITIONAL CHINESE VALUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

- The hierarchical *li* values correlate well with human rights support because: 1. Human rights are understood as institutional and hierarchical concepts. 2. the active characteristic of human rights. Believing in human rights presupposes the faith in and necessity for social change.
- Students showing strong support for *ren* develop psychological coping strategies to accept life as it is, rather than changing the outside world. This may come from feelings of desperation (fatalism), but also from a feeling of total integration in their group (ascriptivism), resulting in a strong identification with their social position. In both cases the attitude is rather opposed to the human rights idea, which comprises the idea of social change.
- Human rights support is both supported and softened by religiosity, as religiosity is positively associated with values supportive of (*li*) and values obstructive to (*ren*) an affirmative human rights attitude.
- Adapting the results of this survey to the Deep Culture Model of Friedli shows that we have to part from bipolar components, which then result in different patterns of 'deep culture'.

CHAPTER EIGHT CONCLUSION



View from New Century Park in Shanghai, November 2003

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8 CONCLUSION

8.1 MAIN RESULTS

The basic question I asked in the introductory chapter of this thesis was *how Chinese religiosity in general and how Chinese traditional religious values in particular are related to human rights and their implicit values.*

This question included several sub-questions concerning *traditional Chinese values, Chinese religiosity, human rights*, and how these different concepts are related, as well as what other factors might influence these variables and the relationship among them.

THE MAGNITUDE OF YIN AND YANG

Chapter Two has shown the complexity and diversity of concepts and values promoted by the different Chinese traditions. Confucianism, for example, is strongly focused on society and interpersonal relationships, whereas the Daoist and Buddhist traditions emphasize internal and spiritual aspects. But we've also seen that some concepts such as the ideas of *yin* and *yang*, change and transformation, interdependency, the importance of the family, and harmony, were omnipresent in all of the Chinese traditions.

Three different websites of major Chinese religious organizations were analyzed to single out the values promoted by these groups. In general, I observed a rather traditional and conformist tendency, as all groups opt for supporting the status quo and believe that, where change is necessary, it should be done in a harmonious and thoughtful way. The survey results, the original data resource of this paper, has indicated that students are both supportive and critical of the values proposed by these religious groups. Hierarchical values are generally well received, but values emphasizing the suppression of individual thoughts and opinions were strongly disputed.

Using the CATPA procedure, I found two significant value groups, which I labeled *li* (ritual propriety) and *ren* (forbearance). *Li* values are items describing respect, hierarchy and charitable behavior. They can be associated with interpersonal relationships, activity, hierarchy and support of tradition. The second group, the *ren* values, measuring meditation, forbearance of suffering, and that man can deal with everything, were associated with a more psychological and spiritual level, religiosity, passivity and conformity. We thus found two value dimensions which measure different concepts but are not necessarily exclusive. For our total sample it could be observed that *li* values are generally more popular among the students surveyed. Those students who consider themselves very religious, however, tend to support both value groups. Reapplying the value groups into Kluckhohn and Strotdbecks value table and Schwartz's value circle, showed that the two value groups offer a wide range of problem solutions, proposing both internal and external coping-strategies. This result of a bi-polar value structure, and the possibility to consider them complimentary, are in total accordance to what was said about Chinese traditions in Chapter Two. The empirical result reconfirms the importance of bi-polarity (*yin yang*) and its harmonizing power, through the fact that *ren* and *li* are not negatively correlated and do not exclude each other.

THE MAGNITUDE OF RELIGION

Both the historical analysis and the statistical data analysis point to the importance of religion in China. Although China never had a religious organization comparable to the Catholic Church in Europe, religion has always played an important role in China, both in the family and the political spheres. Religion was banned from public life after the communist takeover in 1949, but it has survived in the private sphere, and lately experienced a real revival. The religions where this revival can be observed most strongly is Buddhism and, secondly, Protestantism. But most other religious dominations have also gained support and public attention over the last 20 years.

The survey data has shown that around half of the students feel close to one or more religion, have religious beliefs, and perform religious activities from time to time, revealing that religion is a part of their life. Female students appear to be more religious than their male colleagues, a result which is in line with other findings around the world, and supporting the theory that being religious corresponds to a female prototype. The finding that the students consider themselves more religious than their parents is another hint toward the religious revival observed in Chapter Two (see Chapter 2.4.2 page 64ff). This revival is closely related to China's recent economic development, which promoted a great amount of personal freedom in all areas, including religion. As this economic development was sensed mostly in urban centers, the citizens of big cities were the first to enjoy and profit from this freedom. This is one of the major reasons why in our sample students from urban centers are more religious than those from rural areas.

Being religious is also connected to a strong support for traditional values; very religious students tend to support both values poles (*ren* and *li*), thus applying the value of bipolarity and *yin* and *yang* in their personal value setting. The frequency of inter-religious and intercultural models (feeling close to one or more religions, combining religions from different cultures) is understood as another indicator for a 'inclusive religiosity'.

THE SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Chapter Three has shown that for more than a hundred years, the concept of human rights has been actively discussed among Chinese intellectuals and in the last decades has become an important aspect in China's foreign relations and China's role as a member of the international community. In this time, the Chinese government has tried to establish its own hierarchical definition of human rights, claiming that human rights are not absolute but are rather dependent of the economic, political and cultural context. Behind this view is the basic idea that the state is the guarantor and creator of rights, as human rights do not exist *sui generis*. As a matter of fact, this 'Rousseauist' assessment of human rights is a consequence of China's legalist tradition (understanding the law as a means to maintain power) and its socialist orientation. It was not shared by early liberal Chinese human rights theorists who understood human rights as inherently given or heaven-endowed.

The students in our sample, all of them very favorable to the human rights idea in general, tend to support an institutional definition of human rights, connecting them closely to state action. The horizontal understanding of human rights (meaning that everyone can protect and violate human rights) is less represented among the interrogated students.

TRADITIONAL VALUES- RELIGIOSITY- HUMAN RIGHTS: TWO AXES

Our main question concerned the relationship between religiosity, traditional values and support for human rights. In Chapter Three (page 120ff), I presented several approaches taken by authors who, on a theoretical basis, tried to relate human rights to traditional Chinese values. The outcomes of these studies, ranging from conflicting to harmonious models, have shown that there is no fixed relationship between traditional Chinese values and human rights, and that the constructed relationship is strongly influenced through the personal values of the different authors.

There really is no clear-cut or simple answer when it comes to defining the relationship between these two concepts. The survey results have actually revealed a rather complex outcome: I could detect two different axes (human rights support and religiosity) on which we find four different value-clusters.

On the axis of 'human rights support' we saw that strong support is associated with a strong focus on interpersonal relationships and values like individualism, hierarchy, activity, respect, charity and traditionalism, values summarized in the *li* value group. Strong human rights support is also positively associated with consuming western media and a rather positive attitude towards the U.S.


On the same axis, a critical view of human rights is associated by values incorporated through the *ren* value group; the focus lies on a psychological world and it boosts values like forbearance, passivity, spirituality, conformity and an ascriptivistic (see page 159) or fatalistic view of justice.

On the religiosity axis, extended religiosity is associated with strong support for both the *li* and *ren* value groups, and both fatalistic and ascriptivist worldviews are shared. Significant for this value cluster is its inclusiveness and bi-polarity. This again promotes an average support for the human rights idea, as both factors with a positive (*li*) and negative (*ren*, fatalism) correlation with human rights are included. This value cluster is associated with a rather high socioeconomic status.

On the other end of this axis there is low religiosity, associated with weak support of traditional values, although the hierarchical and traditional *li* values are still supported more strongly than *ren* values. The weak support for traditional values is correlated with low socioeconomic status.

These different value clusters also represent the four different groups of students that could be detected. These groups are not totally exclusive, and students with a tendency to choose middle positions would find themselves in the intersection of these different groups (Graph 56, page 236). To clarify these different axes and value clusters, I will once more present the graph already introduced on page 234. This time it is a more interpretative model, also including aspects discussed in chapter seven.

Graph 59: Value Map on two axes



We can summarize the relationship between religiosity- traditional values- and human rights for our sample as follows:

There are two poles of traditional values: li and ren. The more hierarchical and active li values are positively correlated with support for human rights, the more fatalistic and passive ren values are more negatively correlated with human rights. Strong religiosity enforces both ren and li values as they are both part of Chinese religiosity. Thus religiosity has a neutral relationship towards human rights, as it contains values both supportive and critical of human rights.

8.2 SHORTCOMINGS AND OPEN QUESTIONS

Although the survey provided a lot of information about possible relationships between religiosity, values and human rights, some questions remain unanswered.

One shortcoming of this survey is the homogeneity of my sample. The fact that I interrogated only (successful) students, which all belong to the same age group and today live in China's most developed city, certainly affects the representative quality of this survey. In my view the results concerning the influence of the socioeconomic status are strongly biased by the homogeneity of the sample. We have seen for example that students with low socioeconomic status are more supportive of an individualistic worldview. My explanation for this is the particular biographical experiences of these students, who managed to leave their rural and poor families to study at one of the country's best universities. It is likely that with another sample, ascriptivistic and fatalistic views would be more widespread among those less educated and economically weaker. As we have seen, fatalism is counterproductive to strong human rights support, and thus we might assume that the strong support for human rights shown by students in this survey, regardless of economic background, is a result very specific to the sample chosen.

The data presented also produces questions which could only be researched using qualitative methods. That is, it would be interesting to understand how the students combine different value-poles and religions from different culture backgrounds, and if they themselves cognitively relate human rights to their value settings.

Concerning the social representation of human rights, more extensive and focused research would be helpful. This would allow questions concerning the importance of the state in one's human rights definition, as well as the differences between a liberal and socialist human rights theory and its influence on popular human rights definition, to be analyzed more closely.

Finally, more research on developing suitable measurements for religiosity in the Chinese context is necessary. Hopefully both Chinese and foreign researchers will give these questions more attention so that in future World Value studies questions concerning religion will not just be excluded (as was the case in the 2002 survey), but measured adequately.

8.3 PROSPECTIVE AND FIELDS OF APPLICATION

In the introduction of this thesis, the concept of human rights was presented as the most helpful instrument to date to assure the dignity and protection of mankind, and was valued as a precious achievement of international cooperation in the 20th century. Based on these moral assumptions, the survey results can provide certain practical hints for those actively promoting the idea of human rights in China.

First, as mentioned before, the survey results showing a rather diffuse definition of human rights point to concrete difficulties when discussing human rights in China, and can be interpreted as a certain lack of information about human rights. From the survey results and from personal conversations with many Chinese I assume that the great majority of Chinese are unfamiliar with the exact content of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This of course is also true for most Western countries, but it might be more meaningful in a country where human rights issues are often ideologized and use as an instrument both by the Chinese government and by politicians from western countries who use the human rights argument to implement economic sanctions against China²⁸⁶.

The close association of human rights with the U.S. is another problematic aspect when discussing human rights. The necessary separation of the two issues would need a policy change both inside and outside China. First, more human rights information and education would be helpful, and it would strengthen the internal Chinese human rights discourse. Secondly, the U.S. should review the productivity of its own human rights policy. Although the human rights violations described in the U.S.' annual human rights report may be adequate and true, as long as stories of torture and maltreatment in U.S. war prisons make the world news, such reports clearly bring more damage than profit to the human rights cause.

A third possible application of the survey results may appeal to those looking for an understanding of human rights in a specifically Chinese context. Our results has shown that only one dimension of traditional values, what I called the *li* values, are

²⁸⁶ See for example press release of the European Parliament from the 10th September 2005, where members of the European parliament ask for import restrictions, also on basis of China's labor situation, which is opposed to human rights standards: "Those companies which wish to export to Europe should respect human rights and international standards of the environment and employment" (http://www.europarl.eu.int/news/public/default_en.htm). On the other hand China's progress in human rights implementation is often emphasized by European politicians signing economic trades, favorable to the European country's economies (see <http://www.dw-world.com/dw/article/0,2144,1771400,00.html>).

correlated positively with human rights, whereas *ren* values are at odds with strong human rights support. As explained, the positive correlation between *li* and human rights support is seen as a consequence of a hierarchical and institutionalized understanding of human rights. Thus we might say that if the understanding of human rights is expanded, that is, if human rights are understood not just as something organizing our vertical relationships but also our horizontal relationships, if they are seen not only as something purely societal but also spiritual²⁸⁷, we might find that they become attractive also to those who have internalized *ren* values. Or to use a more Chinese vocabulary: As can be seen on the value map above, human rights seem to be in the *yin* sphere, which is associated with activity, change and transformation. If the *yang* side of human rights could also be discovered, they might become a much more attractive part of Chinese society. This shouldn't be too hard; the idea of human rights contains passive elements, such as non-interference from the state and is emphasizing stability unless change is necessary. Thus, quite paradoxically, by adding some liberal features (absence/non-interference of the state) to the institutionalized human rights definition, it might actually become a more balanced, and possibly more Chinese, concept.

²⁸⁷ For more detailed discussions of the spiritual/ religious dimension on human rights see: Marty, E. Martin (1996). Religious Dimensions of Human Rights. Emory International Law Review. 10, pp.97-106 and Witte, John (1997). Religious Dimensions of Law, Human rights and Democracy. In: Dienstein, Y. (ed.) Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 26, pp 87-115.

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APPENDIX



Discussing the Questionnaire with Fudan Professor Fan Lizhu in May 2004

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10 APPENDIX

10.1 GENERAL HUMAN RIGHTS DECLARATIONS

10.1.1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights²⁸⁸

Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948

PREAMBLE

Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,

Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,

Now, Therefore THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

Article 1.

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2.

Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 3.

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article 4.

No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Article 5.

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 6.

Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 7.

All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8.

Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the

²⁸⁸ Source: <http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>.

fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Article 9.

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 10.

Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Article 11.

(1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.

(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

Article 12.

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 13.

(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Article 14.

(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.

(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 15.

(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

Article 16.

(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.

(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.

(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

Article 17.

(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Article 18.

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Article 19.

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 20.

(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

Article 21.

(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.

(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 22.

Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Article 23.

(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.

(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.

(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.

(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

Article 24.

Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

Article 25.

(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

Article 26.

(1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.

(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

Article 27.

(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.

(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Article 28.

Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

Article 29.

(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.

(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 30.

Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

10.1.2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights²⁸⁹

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966
entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 49

Preamble

The States Parties to the present Covenant,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person,
Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights,
Considering the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms,
Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant,

Agree upon the following articles:

PART I

Article 1

1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

PART II

Article 2

1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
 - (a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
 - (b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
 - (c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.

Article 3

The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the

²⁸⁹ Source: http://www.unhcr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm

enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant.

Article 4

1. In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.

2. No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision.

3. Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of derogation shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the present Covenant, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of the provisions from which it has derogated and of the reasons by which it was actuated. A further communication shall be made, through the same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such derogation.

Article 5

1. Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant.

2. There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any State Party to the present Covenant pursuant to law, conventions, regulations or custom on the pretext that the present Covenant does not recognize such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent.

PART III

Article 6

1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.

2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgement rendered by a competent court.

3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood that nothing in this article shall authorize any State Party to the present Covenant to derogate in any way from any obligation assumed under the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all cases.

5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women.

6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of capital punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant.

Article 7 No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.

Article 8

1. No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all their forms shall be prohibited.

2. No one shall be held in servitude.

3. (a) No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour;

(b) Paragraph 3 (a) shall not be held to preclude, in countries where imprisonment with hard labour may be imposed as a punishment for a crime, the performance of hard labour in pursuance of a sentence to such punishment by a competent court;

(c) For the purpose of this paragraph the term "forced or compulsory labour" shall not include:

(i) Any work or service, not referred to in subparagraph (b), normally required of a person who is under detention in consequence of a lawful order of a court, or of a person during conditional release from such detention;

(ii) Any service of a military character and, in countries where conscientious objection is recognized, any national service required by law of conscientious objectors;

(iii) Any service exacted in cases of emergency or calamity threatening the life or well-being of the

community;

(iv) Any work or service which forms part of normal civil obligations.

Article 9

1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.

2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.

3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgement.

4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.

5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.

Article 10

1. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.

2. (a) Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated from convicted persons and shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons;

(b) Accused juvenile persons shall be separated from adults and brought as speedily as possible for adjudication. 3. The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation. Juvenile offenders shall be segregated from adults and be accorded treatment appropriate to their age and legal status.

Article 11

No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation.

Article 12

1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.

2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.

3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.

4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

Article 13

An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons especially designated by the competent authority.

Article 14

1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice; but any judgement rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law shall be made public except where the interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children.

2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.

3. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:

(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him;

(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with

counsel of his own choosing;
(c) To be tried without undue delay;
(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it;
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
(f) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court;
(g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.

4. In the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such as will take account of their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation.

5. Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law.

6. When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him.

7. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country.

Article 15

1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of the lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.

2. Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.

Article 16

Everyone shall have the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 17

1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.

2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 18

1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.

2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.

3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.

Article 19

1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.

2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.

3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:

(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;

(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.

Article 20

1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.

2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.

Article 21

The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

Article 22

1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on members of the armed forces and of the police in their exercise of this right.

3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or to apply the law in such a manner as to prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that Convention.

Article 23

1. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

2. The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized.

3. No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses.

4. States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. In the case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary protection of any children.

Article 24

1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.

2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.

Article 25

Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:

(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;

(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;

(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.

Article 26

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Article 27

In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.

PART IV

Article 28

1. There shall be established a Human Rights Committee (hereafter referred to in the present Covenant as the Committee). It shall consist of eighteen members and shall carry out the functions hereinafter provided.

2. The Committee shall be composed of nationals of the States Parties to the present Covenant who shall be persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the field of human rights, consideration being given to the usefulness of the participation of some persons having legal experience.

3. The members of the Committee shall be elected and shall serve in their personal capacity.

Article 29

1. The members of the Committee shall be elected by secret ballot from a list of persons possessing the qualifications prescribed in article 28 and nominated for the purpose by the States Parties to the present Covenant.

2. Each State Party to the present Covenant may nominate not more than two persons. These persons shall be nationals of the nominating State.

3. A person shall be eligible for renomination.

Article 30

1. The initial election shall be held no later than six months after the date of the entry into force of the present Covenant.

2. At least four months before the date of each election to the Committee, other than an election to fill a vacancy declared in accordance with article 34, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall address a written invitation to the States Parties to the present Covenant to submit their nominations for membership of the Committee within three months.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of all the persons thus nominated, with an indication of the States Parties which have nominated them, and shall submit it to the States Parties to the present Covenant no later than one month before the date of each election.

4. Elections of the members of the Committee shall be held at a meeting of the States Parties to the present Covenant convened by the Secretary General of the United Nations at the Headquarters of the United Nations. At that meeting, for which two thirds of the States Parties to the present Covenant shall constitute a quorum, the persons elected to the Committee shall be those nominees who obtain the largest number of votes and an absolute majority of the votes of the representatives of States Parties present and voting.

Article 31

1. The Committee may not include more than one national of the same State.

2. In the election of the Committee, consideration shall be given to equitable geographical distribution of membership and to the representation of the different forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems.

Article 32

1. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a term of four years. They shall be eligible for re-election if renominated. However, the terms of nine of the members elected at the first election shall expire at the end of two years; immediately after the first election, the names of these nine members shall be chosen by lot by the Chairman of the meeting referred to in article 30, paragraph 4.

2. Elections at the expiry of office shall be held in accordance with the preceding articles of this part of the present Covenant.

Article 33

1. If, in the unanimous opinion of the other members, a member of the Committee has ceased to carry out his functions for any cause other than absence of a temporary character, the Chairman of the Committee shall notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall then declare the seat of that member to be vacant.

2. In the event of the death or the resignation of a member of the Committee, the Chairman shall immediately notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall declare the seat vacant from the date of death or the date on which the resignation takes effect.

Article 34

1. When a vacancy is declared in accordance with article 33 and if the term of office of the member to be replaced does not expire within six months of the declaration of the vacancy, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify each of the States Parties to the present Covenant, which may within two months submit nominations in accordance with article 29 for the purpose of filling the vacancy.

2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of the persons thus nominated and shall submit it to the States Parties to the present Covenant. The election to fill the vacancy shall then take place in accordance with the relevant provisions of this part of the present Covenant.

3. A member of the Committee elected to fill a vacancy declared in accordance with article 33 shall hold office for the remainder of the term of the member who vacated the seat on the Committee under the provisions of that article.

Article 35

The members of the Committee shall, with the approval of the General Assembly of the United Nations, receive emoluments from United Nations resources on such terms and conditions as the General Assembly may decide, having regard to the importance of the Committee's responsibilities.

Article 36

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall provide the necessary staff and facilities for the effective performance of the functions of the Committee under the present Covenant.

Article 37

1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene the initial meeting of the Committee at the Headquarters of the United Nations.
2. After its initial meeting, the Committee shall meet at such times as shall be provided in its rules of procedure.
3. The Committee shall normally meet at the Headquarters of the United Nations or at the United Nations Office at Geneva.

Article 38

Every member of the Committee shall, before taking up his duties, make a solemn declaration in open committee that he will perform his functions impartially and conscientiously.

Article 39

1. The Committee shall elect its officers for a term of two years. They may be re-elected.
2. The Committee shall establish its own rules of procedure, but these rules shall provide, inter alia, that:
 - (a) Twelve members shall constitute a quorum;
 - (b) Decisions of the Committee shall be made by a majority vote of the members present.

Article 40

1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to submit reports on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights:
 - (a) Within one year of the entry into force of the present Covenant for the States Parties concerned;
 - (b) Thereafter whenever the Committee so requests.
2. All reports shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit them to the Committee for consideration. Reports shall indicate the factors and difficulties, if any, affecting the implementation of the present Covenant.
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations may, after consultation with the Committee, transmit to the specialized agencies concerned copies of such parts of the reports as may fall within their field of competence.
4. The Committee shall study the reports submitted by the States Parties to the present Covenant. It shall transmit its reports, and such general comments as it may consider appropriate, to the States Parties. The Committee may also transmit to the Economic and Social Council these comments along with the copies of the reports it has received from States Parties to the present Covenant.
5. The States Parties to the present Covenant may submit to the Committee observations on any comments that may be made in accordance with paragraph 4 of this article.

Article 41

1. A State Party to the present Covenant may at any time declare under this article that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the present Covenant. Communications under this article may be received and considered only if submitted by a State Party which has made a declaration recognizing in regard to itself the competence of the Committee. No communication shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party which has not made such a declaration. Communications received under this article shall be dealt with in accordance with the following procedure:
 - (a) If a State Party to the present Covenant considers that another State Party is not giving effect to the provisions of the present Covenant, it may, by written communication, bring the matter to the attention of that State Party. Within three months after the receipt of the communication the receiving State shall afford the State which sent the communication an explanation, or any other statement in writing clarifying the matter which should include, to the extent possible and pertinent, reference to domestic procedures and remedies taken, pending, or available in the matter;
 - (b) If the matter is not adjusted to the satisfaction of both States Parties concerned within six months after the receipt by the receiving State of the initial communication, either State shall have the right to refer the matter to the Committee, by notice given to the Committee and to the other State;
 - (c) The Committee shall deal with a matter referred to it only after it has ascertained that all available domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted in the matter, in conformity with the generally recognized principles of international law. This shall not be the rule where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged;
 - (d) The Committee shall hold closed meetings when examining communications under this article;
 - (e) Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (c), the Committee shall make available its good offices

to the States Parties concerned with a view to a friendly solution of the matter on the basis of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the present Covenant;

(f) In any matter referred to it, the Committee may call upon the States Parties concerned, referred to in subparagraph (b), to supply any relevant information;

(g) The States Parties concerned, referred to in subparagraph (b), shall have the right to be represented when the matter is being considered in the Committee and to make submissions orally and/or in writing;

(h) The Committee shall, within twelve months after the date of receipt of notice under subparagraph (b), submit a report:

(i) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph (e) is reached, the Committee shall confine its report to a brief statement of the facts and of the solution reached;

(ii) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph (e) is not reached, the Committee shall confine its report to a brief statement of the facts; the written submissions and record of the oral submissions made by the States Parties concerned shall be attached to the report. In every matter, the report shall be communicated to the States Parties concerned.

2. The provisions of this article shall come into force when ten States Parties to the present Covenant have made declarations under paragraph 1 of this article. Such declarations shall be deposited by the States Parties with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the other States Parties. A declaration may be withdrawn at any time by notification to the Secretary-General. Such a withdrawal shall not prejudice the consideration of any matter which is the subject of a communication already transmitted under this article; no further communication by any State Party shall be received after the notification of withdrawal of the declaration has been received by the Secretary-General, unless the State Party concerned has made a new declaration.

Article 42

1. (a) If a matter referred to the Committee in accordance with article 41 is not resolved to the satisfaction of the States Parties concerned, the Committee may, with the prior consent of the States Parties concerned, appoint an ad hoc Conciliation Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission). The good offices of the Commission shall be made available to the States Parties concerned with a view to an amicable solution of the matter on the basis of respect for the present Covenant;

(b) The Commission shall consist of five persons acceptable to the States Parties concerned. If the States Parties concerned fail to reach agreement within three months on all or part of the composition of the Commission, the members of the Commission concerning whom no agreement has been reached shall be elected by secret ballot by a two-thirds majority vote of the Committee from among its members.

2. The members of the Commission shall serve in their personal capacity. They shall not be nationals of the States Parties concerned, or of a State not Party to the present Covenant, or of a State Party which has not made a declaration under article 41.

3. The Commission shall elect its own Chairman and adopt its own rules of procedure.

4. The meetings of the Commission shall normally be held at the Headquarters of the United Nations or at the United Nations Office at Geneva. However, they may be held at such other convenient places as the Commission may determine in consultation with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the States Parties concerned.

5. The secretariat provided in accordance with article 36 shall also service the commissions appointed under this article.

6. The information received and collated by the Committee shall be made available to the Commission and the Commission may call upon the States Parties concerned to supply any other relevant information. 7. When the Commission has fully considered the matter, but in any event not later than twelve months after having been seized of the matter, it shall submit to the Chairman of the Committee a report for communication to the States Parties concerned:

(a) If the Commission is unable to complete its consideration of the matter within twelve months, it shall confine its report to a brief statement of the status of its consideration of the matter;

(b) If an amicable solution to the matter on the basis of respect for human rights as recognized in the present Covenant is reached, the Commission shall confine its report to a brief statement of the facts and of the solution reached;

(c) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph (b) is not reached, the Commission's report shall embody its findings on all questions of fact relevant to the issues between the States Parties concerned, and its views on the possibilities of an amicable solution of the matter. This report shall also contain the written submissions and a record of the oral submissions made by the States Parties concerned;

(d) If the Commission's report is submitted under subparagraph (c), the States Parties concerned shall, within three months of the receipt of the report, notify the Chairman of the Committee whether or not

they accept the contents of the report of the Commission.

8. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Committee under article 41.

9. The States Parties concerned shall share equally all the expenses of the members of the Commission in accordance with estimates to be provided by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

10. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be empowered to pay the expenses of the members of the Commission, if necessary, before reimbursement by the States Parties concerned, in accordance with paragraph 9 of this article.

Article 43

The members of the Committee, and of the ad hoc conciliation commissions which may be appointed under article 42, shall be entitled to the facilities, privileges and immunities of experts on mission for the United Nations as laid down in the relevant sections of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

Article 44

The provisions for the implementation of the present Covenant shall apply without prejudice to the procedures prescribed in the field of human rights by or under the constituent instruments and the conventions of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies and shall not prevent the States Parties to the present Covenant from having recourse to other procedures for settling a dispute in accordance with general or special international agreements in force between them.

Article 45

The Committee shall submit to the General Assembly of the United Nations, through the Economic and Social Council, an annual report on its activities.

PART V

Article 46 .

Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and of the constitutions of the specialized agencies which define the respective responsibilities of the various organs of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies in regard to the matters dealt with in the present Covenant.

Article 47

Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources.

PART VI

Article 48

1. The present Covenant is open for signature by any State Member of the United Nations or member of any of its specialized agencies, by any State Party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and by any other State which has been invited by the General Assembly of the United Nations to become a Party to the present Covenant.

2. The present Covenant is subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. The present Covenant shall be open to accession by any State referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.

4. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States which have signed this Covenant or acceded to it of the deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession.

Article 49

1. The present Covenant shall enter into force three months after the date of the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or instrument of accession.

2. For each State ratifying the present Covenant or acceding to it after the deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or instrument of accession, the present Covenant shall enter into force three months after the date of the deposit of its own instrument of ratification or instrument of accession.

Article 50

The provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to all parts of federal States without any limitations or exceptions.

Article 51

1. Any State Party to the present Covenant may propose an amendment and file it with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate any proposed amendments to the States Parties to the present Covenant with a request

that they notify him whether they favour a conference of States Parties for the purpose of considering and voting upon the proposals. In the event that at least one third of the States Parties favours such a conference, the Secretary-General shall convene the conference under the auspices of the United Nations. Any amendment adopted by a majority of the States Parties present and voting at the conference shall be submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations for approval.

2. Amendments shall come into force when they have been approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations and accepted by a two-thirds majority of the States Parties to the present Covenant in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. 3. When amendments come into force, they shall be binding on those States Parties which have accepted them, other States Parties still being bound by the provisions of the present Covenant and any earlier amendment which they have accepted.

Article 52

Irrespective of the notifications made under article 48, paragraph 5, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States referred to in paragraph I of the same article of the following particulars:

(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions under article 48;

(b) The date of the entry into force of the present Covenant under article 49 and the date of the entry into force of any amendments under article 51.

Article 53

1. The present Covenant, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations.

2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit certified copies of the present Covenant to all States referred to in article 48.

10.1.3 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 3 January 1976, in accordance with article 27

Preamble

The States Parties to the present Covenant,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person,
Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights,
Considering the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms,
Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant,
Agree upon the following articles:

PART I

Article 1

1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

PART II

Article 2

1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
3. Developing countries, with due regard to human rights and their national economy, may determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the present Covenant to non-nationals.

Article 3

The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the present Covenant.

Article 4

The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, in the enjoyment of those rights provided by the State in conformity with the present Covenant, the State may subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.

Article 5

1. Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights or freedoms recognized herein, or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant.
2. No restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any country in virtue of law, conventions, regulations or custom shall be admitted on the pretext that the present Covenant does not recognize such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent.

PART III

Article 6

1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right.
2. The steps to be taken by a State Party to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include technical and vocational guidance and training programmes, policies and techniques to achieve steady economic, social and cultural development and full and productive employment under conditions safeguarding fundamental political and economic freedoms to the individual.

Article 7

The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which ensure, in particular:

- (a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
 - (i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;
 - (ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in accordance with the provisions of the present Covenant;
- (b) Safe and healthy working conditions;
- (c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and competence;
- (d) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays

Article 8

1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure:
 - (a) The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his choice, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, for the promotion and protection of his economic and social interests. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others;
 - (b) The right of trade unions to establish national federations or confederations and the right of the latter to form or join international trade-union organizations;
 - (c) The right of trade unions to function freely subject to no limitations other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others;
 - (d) The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country.
2. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces or of the police or of the administration of the State.
3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or apply the law in such a manner as would prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that Convention.

Article 9

The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance.

Article 10

The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that:

1. The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible for the care and education of dependent children. Marriage must be entered into with the free consent of the intending spouses.
2. Special protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period before and after

childbirth. During such period working mothers should be accorded paid leave or leave with adequate social security benefits.

3. Special measures of protection and assistance should be taken on behalf of all children and young persons without any discrimination for reasons of parentage or other conditions. Children and young persons should be protected from economic and social exploitation. Their employment in work harmful to their morals or health or dangerous to life or likely to hamper their normal development should be punishable by law. States should also set age limits below which the paid employment of child labour should be prohibited and punishable by law.

Article 11

1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent.

2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, individually and through international co-operation, the measures, including specific programmes, which are needed:

(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficient development and utilization of natural resources;

(b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need.

Article 12

1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.

2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for:

(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy development of the child;

(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene;

(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases;

(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness.

Article 13

1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to education. They agree that education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. They further agree that education shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

2. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a view to achieving the full realization of this right:

(a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all;

(b) Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational secondary education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education;

(c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education;

(d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged or intensified as far as possible for those persons who have not received or completed the whole period of their primary education;

(e) The development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively pursued, an adequate fellowship system shall be established, and the material conditions of teaching staff shall be continuously improved.

3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to choose for their children schools, other than those established by the public authorities, which conform to such minimum educational standards as may be laid down or approved by the State and to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.

4. No part of this article shall be construed so as to interfere with the liberty of individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions, subject always to the observance of the principles set

forth in paragraph I of this article and to the requirement that the education given in such institutions shall conform to such minimum standards as may be laid down by the State.

Article 14

Each State Party to the present Covenant which, at the time of becoming a Party, has not been able to secure in its metropolitan territory or other territories under its jurisdiction compulsory primary education, free of charge, undertakes, within two years, to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for the progressive implementation, within a reasonable number of years, to be fixed in the plan, of the principle of compulsory education free of charge for all.

Article 15

1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone:

- (a) To take part in cultural life;
- (b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications;
- (c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for the conservation, the development and the diffusion of science and culture.

3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative activity.

4. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the benefits to be derived from the encouragement and development of international contacts and co-operation in the scientific and cultural fields.

PART IV

Article 16

1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to submit in conformity with this part of the Covenant reports on the measures which they have adopted and the progress made in achieving the observance of the rights recognized herein.

2. (a) All reports shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies to the Economic and Social Council for consideration in accordance with the provisions of the present Covenant;

(b) The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall also transmit to the specialized agencies copies of the reports, or any relevant parts therefrom, from States Parties to the present Covenant which are also members of these specialized agencies in so far as these reports, or parts therefrom, relate to any matters which fall within the responsibilities of the said agencies in accordance with their constitutional instruments.

Article 17

1. The States Parties to the present Covenant shall furnish their reports in stages, in accordance with a programme to be established by the Economic and Social Council within one year of the entry into force of the present Covenant after consultation with the States Parties and the specialized agencies concerned.

2. Reports may indicate factors and difficulties affecting the degree of fulfilment of obligations under the present Covenant.

3. Where relevant information has previously been furnished to the United Nations or to any specialized agency by any State Party to the present Covenant, it will not be necessary to reproduce that information, but a precise reference to the information so furnished will suffice.

Article 18

Pursuant to its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the Economic and Social Council may make arrangements with the specialized agencies in respect of their reporting to it on the progress made in achieving the observance of the provisions of the present Covenant falling within the scope of their activities. These reports may include particulars of decisions and recommendations on such implementation adopted by their competent organs.

Article 19

The Economic and Social Council may transmit to the Commission on Human Rights for study and general recommendation or, as appropriate, for information the reports concerning human rights submitted by States in accordance with articles 16 and 17, and those concerning human rights submitted by the specialized agencies in accordance with article 18.

Article 20

The States Parties to the present Covenant and the specialized agencies concerned may submit comments to the Economic and Social Council on any general recommendation under article 19 or

reference to such general recommendation in any report of the Commission on Human Rights or any documentation referred to therein.

Article 21

The Economic and Social Council may submit from time to time to the General Assembly reports with recommendations of a general nature and a summary of the information received from the States Parties to the present Covenant and the specialized agencies on the measures taken and the progress made in achieving general observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant.

Article 22

The Economic and Social Council may bring to the attention of other organs of the United Nations, their subsidiary organs and specialized agencies concerned with furnishing technical assistance any matters arising out of the reports referred to in this part of the present Covenant which may assist such bodies in deciding, each within its field of competence, on the advisability of international measures likely to contribute to the effective progressive implementation of the present Covenant.

Article 23

The States Parties to the present Covenant agree that international action for the achievement of the rights recognized in the present Covenant includes such methods as the conclusion of conventions, the adoption of recommendations, the furnishing of technical assistance and the holding of regional meetings and technical meetings for the purpose of consultation and study organized in conjunction with the Governments concerned.

Article 24

Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and of the constitutions of the specialized agencies which define the respective responsibilities of the various organs of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies in regard to the matters dealt with in the present Covenant.

Article 25

Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources.

PART V

Article 26

1. The present Covenant is open for signature by any State Member of the United Nations or member of any of its specialized agencies, by any State Party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and by any other State which has been invited by the General Assembly of the United Nations to become a party to the present Covenant.
2. The present Covenant is subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. The present Covenant shall be open to accession by any State referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.
4. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States which have signed the present Covenant or acceded to it of the deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession.

Article 27

1. The present Covenant shall enter into force three months after the date of the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or instrument of accession.
2. For each State ratifying the present Covenant or acceding to it after the deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or instrument of accession, the present Covenant shall enter into force three months after the date of the deposit of its own instrument of ratification or instrument of accession.

Article 28

The provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to all parts of federal States without any limitations or exceptions.

Article 29

1. Any State Party to the present Covenant may propose an amendment and file it with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall thereupon communicate any proposed amendments to the States Parties to the present Covenant with a request that they notify him whether they favour a conference of States Parties for the purpose of considering and voting upon the proposals. In the event that at least one third of the States Parties favours such a conference, the Secretary-General shall convene the conference under the auspices of the United Nations. Any amendment adopted by a majority of the States Parties present and voting at the conference shall be submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations for approval.

2. Amendments shall come into force when they have been approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations and accepted by a two-thirds majority of the States Parties to the present Covenant in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

3. When amendments come into force they shall be binding on those States Parties which have accepted them, other States Parties still being bound by the provisions of the present Covenant and any earlier amendment which they have accepted.

Article 30

Irrespective of the notifications made under article 26, paragraph 5, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States referred to in paragraph I of the same article of the following particulars:

(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions under article 26;

(b) The date of the entry into force of the present Covenant under article 27 and the date of the entry into force of any amendments under article 29.

Article 31

1. The present Covenant, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations.

2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit certified copies of the present Covenant to all States referred to in article 26.

10.1.4 A Chinese Declaration of Human Rights: Nineteen Points (1979)²⁹⁰

The China Human Rights League was officially established in Beijing on 1 January 1979. The league discussed and approved [this] human rights declaration.

In the final analysis, the 1976 Tiananmen Incident was a human rights movement. The significance of human rights is more far-reaching, profound, and enduring than anything else. This is a new mark of the political consciousness of the Chinese people and the natural trend of contemporary history. With a new content and a unique spirit, our human rights movement this year has again won the support and approval of the whole world. This has hastened and promoted the establishment of relations between the Chinese and the U.S. governments. To stimulate the development of our social productive forces and promote world peace and the progressive cause, we put forward the following nineteen points:

1. The citizen demand freedom of conscience and speech. It is as absurd to incorporate individual thinking in the Constitution as it is to have a successor listed in Party regulations and the Constitution. This is against the principle of freedom of speech and against the law of human thought. It is also against the materialistic principle of the “diversified nature of matter, “, is a manifestation of feudalism, and is regarded with great disgust by the people throughout the country. In the world there is nothing that is sacred, unchanging, or inviolable. The citizens demand the thorough elimination of superstition, deification, and personality cult, the removal of [Mao Zedong’s] crystal coffin in favor of a memorial hall, the building of a memorial hall dedicated to Premier Zhou [Enlai], the commemoration of the May Fourth Movement every year, and the emancipation of faith from the confines of superstition.
2. The citizens demand that there be practical safeguards for their constitutional right to assess and criticize Party and state leaders. To save the present generation and all future generations from suffering, to protect truth that the feudal imperial criterion of equation opposition to an individual with opposition to the revolution (a criterion that is still being applied be given forever. They demand that our society be built on the basis of the principles of people’s democracy.
3. Given the minority nationalities sufficient autonomy. Our country is not only multinational but also has many political parties and factions. In our socialist development, we should take the existence of various political parties and factions into due consideration. Various parties and groups should be allowed to join the National People’s Congress (NPC). It is most ridiculous that various parties and factions cannot join the NPC, which claims to be an organ with supreme power in the country. This is a manifestation or replacing the government with the Party and not separating the Party from the government. This is incompatible with democratic centralism. It will inevitably result in the continuous development of bureaucratism. Our country’s citizens do not want a “showcase” constitution.
4. Citizens demand that a national referendum be held to elect state leaders and the leaders at all levels in various areas. Deputies to the Fourth and Fifth National People’s Congresses were not elected in a general election involving all the people. This was not only a scathing lampoon of our socialist democracy but also made a mockery of the human rights of 970 millions citizens. The citizens demand the establishment of a “citizens’ committee” or “citizens’ office” (gongmin yuan) through a direct vote of all the citizens. It would be a standing organ of the NPC and would be able to participate in discussing and voting on policy matters and to exercise supervision over the government. The citizens demand that the state uphold the law and punish those Party and state leaders who have violated the law and punish those Party and state leaders who have violated the law, and also that the state use the law to supervise Party and state leaders.
5. Chinese citizens have the right to demand that the state make public the national budget, final financial statements, the gross national product, [and other important statistics].
6. The NPC can no longer convene in camera. The citizens demand the right to attend as observers and witness the proceedings of the NPC, its standing committee conferences, and its preparatory meetings.
7. State ownership of the means of production should be gradually abolished in a transition to social ownership...
8. ... Major changes in our deistic and foreign policies and guidelines in recent years have borne full testimony to the bankruptcy of “revisionism” in theory and in practice. There is no objective basis for ideological differences and disputes to exist between China and the Soviet Union. The citizens demand détente. The Soviet people are a great people. The people of China and the United States, China and Japan, China and the Soviet Union must be friends for all generations to come.

²⁹⁰ Reprinted in: Angle & Svensson 2001. 262-266.

9. The citizens demand realization of the Marxist doctrine that a socialist society is one in which everyone can develop freely. Any socialist country's form of government is a continuation of the traditional form of capitalism. Without the material civilization of capitalism, socialist democracy and freedom cannot survive. The basic thinking of this classic doctrine is also an important lesson that the Chinese people have obtained after more than twenty years of groping in the dark. We must not only draw on western science and technology but also on western traditions, democracy, and culture. The citizens demand that the state continue to keep closed doors open. Let ideas smash through the confines of prisons. Let freedom spread far and near. Let the wise people of China share the treasure of the whole mankind. Let the suffering generation enjoy freedom. Let the younger generation be spared suffering. Eliminate class prejudices and ban deceptive propaganda.
10. Citizens must have the freedom to go in and out of foreign embassies to obtain propaganda, the freedom to talk to foreign correspondents, and the freedom to publish works abroad. Make available all "internal reading matter" and "internal movies" and let everyone be equal in enjoying culture. The citizens must have the freedom to subscribe to and read foreign magazines and newspapers and listen to foreign television and radio stations. Citizens demand that the state grant publishing and printing rights that are true to the Constitution.
11. The system in which a citizen devotes his whole life to a work unit (danwei) must be abolished. Citizens demand the freedoms to choose their own vocations, the freedom to dress as they like, and the freedom of movement. Abolish all regulations and systems that stand in the way of solving problems of husbands and wives being obliged to live in different parts of the country. Cadres demand the freedom to change [their work]. Personnel engaged in classified work should have the freedom of love and marriage. Middle school graduates should have the freedom not to be sent down to the countryside. We oppose the use of administrative measures to enforce family planning and other policies. Unemployed people demand the right to receive state relief.
12. Citizens demand that the state ensure basic food rations for peasants and eliminate [the phenomenon of] beggars.
13. Educated young people on state farms should enjoy reassignment rights. Educated young people in agriculture demand that the state abolish inhuman treatment. [They demand] political equality, an improved standard of living, and a wage increase.
14. Citizens demand that the state ban the use of deceptive means to recruit various technical workers. Those cadres and units that practice deception should be punished by law. Those who give bribes, and especially those who receive bribes, should be punished.
15. While undivided attention is being paid to promoting modernization, no less attention should be given to the firm implementation of policy. Those who are victims of false, unjust, and misjudged cases demand that the state reform the system for appeal and give the organs handling the appeal the power to directly rectify [these cases]. The state law should punish those who [are responsible for] framing cases [against others]. The citizens' demand that the state put into action the policy once applied to those GMD officers and soldiers along with their families who came over to our side in the early postliberation period.
16. Secret police and the Party committee of a work unit have no right to arrest citizens or investigate them. They have no right to use methods of reconnaissance against innocent people. The secret police system is incompatible with socialist democracy. Citizens demand its abolition.
17. Get rid of slum quarters and crowded living quarters where people of three generations or grown sons and daughters are packed close together in the same room....Ensure the freedom to visit exhibitions inside and outside of the country. Abolish the system of censorship and allow artistic freedom and freedom of the media. Abolish the system of examining one's political record at college entrance examinations and ensure that all are [treated] equally with respect to grading.
18. We are "citizens of the world." Citizens demand that the borders be thrown open, trade be promoted, culture exchanged, and labor exported. They demand the freedom to work and study abroad and the freedom to make a living or travel abroad.
19. This league appeals to the governments of all countries in the world, to human rights organizations, and to the public for support.

China Human Rights League, Prepared 17 January 1979 in Beijing

10.1.5 Declaration of Human Rights (May 1989)

Chinese Human Rights Movement Committee, Beijing

In view of the widespread ignorance and neglect of, or even apathy toward, human rights in Chinese society; in view of several thousand years of cruel interference in and infringement of human rights by our rulers; and in view of the need to create a new society, a new order, and a new morality, we hereby solemnly declare the following to be the inviolable and inalienable natural rights of human beings:

1. Everyone is born free and equal, regardless of origin, status, age sex, professional level of schooling, religion, party affiliation, and ethnicity.
2. The rights to life and security, and to oppose oppression, are humankind's inalienable natural rights.
3. There are no crimes of conscience. Everyone's has freedom of speech, writing, publication, and advocacy.
4. ... Everyone has the freedom to believe or not believe in a religion or in various theories (Marxism).
5. ... Everyone has the right to travel and to reside inside or outside the country.
6. Personal dignity shall not be infringed on because of criminal conviction.
7. The individual has the right to privacy. One's family, domicile, and correspondence are protected by law.
8. Everyone has the right to education. Higher education should be open to everyone based on achievement scores.
9. Private property acquired through one's [own] labor is sacred and inviolable.
10. Freedom of marriage between adult men and women shall not be interfered with by any outside force. Marriage must be voluntarily agreed upon by both parties.
11. Everyone has the right to assembly and association, whether openly or secretly.
12. The power of the government comes from the people. In the absence of free elections..., the people may rescind any power usurped either by force or under the guise of the will of the people by any individual or group (including any of the political parties).
13. Everyone has the right to either direct or indirect participation in government (through free elections of representatives).
14. The law is the embodiment of the popular will and cannot be changed arbitrarily by one individual or any one political party.
15. The army is the defender of the interests of the people and of the state. It must strictly observe neutrality in political affairs and not [be subordinate] an individual or a political party.
16. Democracy and freedom are the basic guarantees of social stability, people's well being, and national prosperity. Therefore, each person has the right and the duty to establish and safeguard such as system and to oppose autocracy and tyranny.

10.2 INSTRUMENTATION

10.2.1 Buddhism

Original Chinese	Translation /Summary	Value	Final Item	Category
我前面说过释迦牟尼当初出家的目的是为了寻求解脱生老病死等痛苦之道。当时印度许多教派都是有最后解脱的理想。佛教教义的基本内容简单地说来，就是说世界的苦苦谛Dukkhasacca和苦的原因因谛或称集谛Samudayasacca，说苦的消灭灭谛Nirodhasacca和灭苦的方法道谛Maggasacca。	The basic subject of Buddhism is: To seek for one self from the suffering of being born, getting old, sick and to die. The basic content of Buddhism: 1.The suffering in the world. 2. The reason for suffering 3. how to get rid of the suffering4. What methods can be used to get rid of the suffering.	Life is suffering, suffering comes through desire, and to eliminate the suffering we must eliminate the desire by following the eightfold path.	To lead a good life we have to let go our desires.	Individual
第五是禅定Samadhi	The fifth virtue is to meditate and to look for wisdom.	The fifth virtue is to meditate and look for tranquility.	It is important to take some time and meditate so that we find a peaceful spirit.	Individual
佛教根据以上两方面的分析，说明有情不是固定的单一独立体，而是种种要素的聚合体，而任何要素又是刹那刹那依缘而生灭着的，所以找不到一个固定的独立的“有情”在支配着身心，也就是找不到“我”的存在。这便是无我的简单解释	On the basis of analyzing always the both sides of one aspect, Buddhism shows, that feelings are not something fix or independent, they can be eliminated in only a few seconds. So as we do not find a fix and independent feelings in our own we cannot talk about a self neither.	There are no independent and fix feelings in our minds, there is no independent self. Existence can only be found in the relationships.	Human beings only exists in relationship to other beings.	Social interaction
第三是忍Khanti，即为利益有情故，忍受毁骂打击，以及饥寒等苦，所谓“难行能行、难忍能忍”，终不放弃救度众生的志愿。	The third virtue is endurance and tolerance, it is in the interest of the wish of all living creatures the their hope for salvation, to endure destruction, attacks and curses, hunger and cold.	The third virtue is endurance and/ or tolerance, and therefore one should accept bad things happening to us.	If other people hurt us, we should be ready to accept the suffering.	Social interaction
第一是布施Dāna，有三种：凡以物质利益施与大众的叫作“财施”，	The first of the 6 virtues is to give almonds. This can be done in three ways: 1 caring for the material well being of the people 2. Making sure they have nothing to fear and can live a life of		If one finds his own happiness it is his	Collective welfare

<p>在于世，固然可以说有生命，山河大地等能够为人所用，对于人间有贡献，也应视为有生命者</p> <p>” 我们的生命可以流注于物质世界里，此即所谓“空即是色”；无穷的万物也可以和我们的生命结为一体，此即所谓“色即是空”。所以佛教讲到世界，是无量无边；讲到众生，也是无量无边；讲到生命，不但无量无边，而且是无限永恒。</p> <p>www.kangzheng.com/langyuan/wz4/WZ4_17.htm</p>	<p>mean, “so long as one still as a breath left”, but it lies in the fact whether or not you possess and apply values and worth. People live in the world; we can say they have lives, mountains, rivers the earth can be used by the people they contribute to our world (the people's world), so we can say they also have lives.</p> <p>Our life can float into the material world, this can even be called “The immaterial is the material”, and We can also have a specified relationship to the endless universe and all living, to create one unity. This can even be called: “everything visible is empty”. So when we talk about the “world” in Buddhism, this means a world without borders, when we talk about “all living creature”, we mean all the uncountable, measureless, boundless world of living things, when we talk about “life, we don't only understand it as boundless, but also as with no end and eternal.</p>		men	
<p>佛教将世界看成是一个整体，佛教的生态实践可以分为两类，一是对生命的保护，二是对环境的保护。前者包含不杀生、素食、放生、和平运动等行为，后者集中体现为佛化自然、生活环保等。</p> <p>尊重生命、珍惜生命，是佛家的根本观念</p> <p>” 不杀生的理由有二：一是慈悲心，二是避免杀生恶业。</p> <p>素食是以食用植物为主体的饮食方式，。</p> <p>素食的根本目的是从生活中培育人的慈悲佛性种子。</p> <p>佛教有悠久的放生传统。所谓放生，就是用钱赎买被捕的鱼、鸟等动物，将其放回江河、山野，重获生命自由。放生是戒杀、素食的发展，如果说不杀生、素食是对生命的消极保护，那么，放生就是对生命的积极保护。</p> <p>在中国民间，放生是颇受尊敬的善行，人们喜欢在节日放生，也愿意到寺庙放生。为满足教徒的放生意愿，在寺庙中，还有专门的放生建筑，这就是“放生池”。从佛教不杀生的根本教义出发，20世纪佛教教徒的一个重要关注对象是和平问题。</p> <p>佛教徒的环境建设不是盲目的，有其独特的理论指导，这就是佛教的净土理想。寺庙园林环境是描绘天国的特殊手</p>	<p>Buddhism considers nature to be one unity.</p> <p>The Buddhist ecological practice focuses on two different aspects. One is the protection of life, and one is the protection of the environment.</p> <p>The former includes no killing, to follow a vegetarian diet, to free captive birds and fish and to move around carefully, the latter concentrates to realize Buddhism understanding of nature and life in environmental protection.</p> <p>To respect and cherish life is a basic (radical) conception of Buddhism.</p> <p>There are two reasons why one shouldn't kill: one is to show mercy; the other one is to avoid evil deeds and thoughts.</p> <p>Therefore a vegetarian diet, consisting of vegetables and plants should be one of the basic methods.</p> <p>The basic goal/purpose for a vegetarian diet is that the person shows mercy and cultivates life, and so unfolds its Buddha- nature.</p> <p>Buddhism has an age-old tradition of freeing captive animals. Freeing means buying out captive fish, birds and other animals, and taking them back, to the mountains and rivers, so that they will obtain a free live.</p> <p>. Freeing life forbids killing, orders a vegetarian diet. IF we say no killing, this includes passively care for life, but also too actively care for life.</p> <p>Among the Chinese freeing animals is a respectful benevolent act. On holidays people love to free animals, and they wish, that the temples freed animals too.</p> <p>To satisfy the wishes of the believers, the temples still have special places to free animals</p>	<p>We shouldn't kill any life, neither the one of animals. Therefore we should follow a vegetarian diet.</p> <p>It is wrong to keep animals captivated.</p>	<p>We shouldn't kill any lives, the ones of animals either.</p>	<p>Nature/social interaction</p> <p>Nature</p>

<p>段，佛教徒依据佛经关于极乐世界的描述，顺应自然，融入自然，点染自然，升华自然，建设自己的生存环境</p>	<p>Since the beginning of the idea of not killing, this question has been followed with interest during the 20th century, being a question of peaceful life.</p> <p>Buddhism is not blind towards the question of environmental protection (construction?), and has (developed) its own method to guide, direct environmental protection, which is an ideal in the pure land Buddhism.</p> <p>The gardens and environment of Buddhist temple is as portray of paradise, and shows a method. The Buddhist, following the description of lustful happiness in Buddhist basic literature, adjusts to nature, merges with nature hints (?) at nature and sublimates it, and is thus building the environment of his own existence.</p>	<p>We need nature to exist ourselves. Existence we can only fin in interaction with others.</p>	<p>We only exist in interaction with our environment.</p>	<p>Social interaction/nature</p>
<p>首先，佛法要求我们正确地对待自己的国家，正确地对待人民群众，因而提出了“庄严国土，利乐有情”的基本教义。</p> <p>其次，佛法要求我们正确地对待自己，正确地对待人民群众，因而提出了“奉行五戒、十善以净化自己，广修四摄、六度以利益人群”的教义。</p> <p>所谓“五戒”，即不杀生、不偷盗、不邪淫、不妄语、不饮酒。所谓“十善”，即不杀生，不偷盗、不邪淫、不妄语、不两舌、不恶口、不绮语、不贪欲、不嗔恚、不邪见。</p> <p>所谓“四摄”，即布施摄（若众生乐财则施财，乐佛法则施佛法）、爱语摄（随众生的根性善言慰喻）、利行摄（做利益众生的种种事）、同事摄（亲近众生，共其苦乐，随机教化）。</p> <p>所谓“六度”，即布施度（对治悭贪，消除贫穷）、持戒度（对治恶业，使身心清凉）、忍辱度（以治嗔恚、使心安住）、精进度（对治懈怠，生长善法）、禅定度（对治乱意，使心安定）、智慧度（对治愚痴，开真实之智慧，即可把握生命之真谛）。</p> <p>所谓“四无量心”，就是“慈无量心”，即考虑如何为众生做好事，给众生以欢乐。“悲无量心”，即考虑如何拨除一切众生的苦难。“喜无量</p>	<p>First Buddhism wants us to have the right attitude to our country, to be correct towards the masses, that's why we emphasize to respects the holy national territory, to always behave in the interest of the country to have warm and loving feelings to it.</p> <p>Second, Buddhism wants us to ourselves correctly, that's why we emphasize to “pursue the five prohibitions”, the “ten goods” to purify yourself, the “4 absorptions” and the six virtues in the interest of the people.</p> <p>What we call the 5 prohibitions which is not to kill, not to steal, no debauchery, no lying, no drinking, the ten goods which are not to kill, not to steal, no debauchery, no lying, no talking with a double tongue, no abusive words, no perverse talk, no rapacity, no anger and hate, no unconventional, provoking opinion.</p> <p>What we call the 4 absorptions, means to give almonds (___), use a loving language (___), to do benevolent actions (act in the interest of all living creatures), work together (be close to the masses and share their sorrows and joys).</p> <p>What we call the six virtues, that is to give almonds (___), observe the commandments (___), endure humiliation (___), willingness to progress (___), tranquility, concentration and meditation (-----), perfect wisdom (___).</p> <p>The 4 infinite hearts: The measureless compassionate heart, which tries to find a way to do good to all living creatures, to give all living creatures happiness. The infinitely sad heart that thinks about a way to get rid of all suffering. The infinite happy heart, which sees all living creatures leaving sadness behind, reaching happiness and feeling glad.</p>	<p>Always behave in the interest of the motherland.</p> <p>Do not provoke others by supporting unconventional opinions.</p> <p>Everybody who possesses material things should share those with people who have less</p> <p>We should all care for the well being of all</p>	<p>One should always behave in the interest of the motherland</p> <p>We should no provoke others by supporting unconventional opinions</p> <p>One should always share its material wealth with others.</p>	<p>Collective welfare</p> <p>Individual/social interaction</p> <p>Collective welfare</p>

<p>心”，即见到众生离苦得乐，感到喜乐。“舍无量心”，即对众生无憎无爱，一视同仁，平等对待。</p> <p>第五，佛法要求我们广作资生福利事业，因而提出了“上报四重恩，下济三涂苦”的教义。所谓“四重恩”，即父母恩、众生恩、国土恩和三宝恩。所谓“三涂苦”，即火途苦（地狱道苦）、刀途苦（饿鬼道苦）、血途苦（畜生道苦）。这里所讲的“报众生恩”、“济三涂苦”，都是资生福利事业。《法华经》说：“资生业等，皆顺正法。”《大智度论》也说：“一切资生事业悉是佛道。”这都是说，从一切衣食住等资助他人之生命者，就是佛所说的正法，也就是成佛之道。</p> <p>资生福利事业，不仅直接利乐众生，而且有助于道德的提高和完善。我们佛教徒救济伤残、衰老、孤儿、寡母等不幸者的义举，不仅是佛教慈悲情怀的流露，也体现出崇高的人道主义精神和舍己为人的高尚道德情操，展现了人生的美好与尊严。所以，资生福利事业，是内益于己、外益于人、生益于时、死益于后的伟大事业，它既体现了佛法的根本精神，也适应了新时代的道德要求。因为，通过这一利生实践，有助于形成有难共当、有苦共担的社会风尚，有助于创造和乐共处、相亲相爱的社会氛围，可以引导人们向善、向上，从而使整个社会变得更文明、更美好。</p> <p>关心和支持资生福利事业，是我们每一个佛教徒的神圣职责。有的人只看到出家人脱离世俗的家庭，一般不问世事，不参加国家和社会的工作，就认为出家人与世无争，对国家和社会没有什么贡献。实际上这种看法是片面的。前面谈到的资生福利事业，关心残疾儿童、救济贫病、灾民等，这对社会、人生能说没有积极作用吗？佛法宣扬“诸恶莫作，众善奉行”；“一日不作，一日</p>	<p>The infinite abandoning heart, which does neither hate nor love the living creatures, and treats them equally without discrimination.</p> <p>5. Buddhism requests us to invest in the welfare system, consequently to support the Buddhist learning of the “four kindnesses” and to relief all living creatures from the “3 evils”.</p> <p>The so called 4 Kindnesses are: the kindness/love for the parents, the kindness/love for all living creatures, the love for the motherland and the love for its people.</p> <p>The so-called 3 evils, includes the bitter way of fire (the way of hell), the bitter way of the knife (the way of the evil spirit), and the bitter way of blood (the way of the beast).</p> <p>The here discussed principles of the 4 kindnesses and relieving the 3 evil ways, all contribute to the social welfare system. The lotus sutra says, in order to serve the society, one should always follow the proper law. The Daozhedulun says: Every service to life means to follow the Buddhist way. In other words, whenever we contribute to someone's living expenses and care for his food, clothes or accommodation), we actually do respect the proper law and we do follow the Buddhist way.</p> <p>To contribute to the social services, has not only an immediate benefit on all living creatures, but is helpful to rise and perfectionate ones virtues and ethics.</p> <p>When we Buddhists relief the bourdon of the wounded and disabled, the old, the orphans, widows and the unfortunate, by doing virtuous acts, this does not only reveal our feelings of worry or pity, but it reveals the noble virtue of sacrificing oneself to others, showing the beauty and dignity of humans. Therefore to contribute to social welfare has benefits the inside and yourself, but also benefits the outside (the other human beings), it thus benefits live, and has its benefits even pass death as it serves the great cause, so it both suits the necessities of Buddhism and Modernity. Because if we adopt this beneficial practices, it will be helpful to form the difficult (social virtues), like sharing and serving, to be empathetic and carry the bitterness of others, and it will be helpful to reach a happy coexistence, to produce a loving social atmosphere, it can lead people to do good deeds, to progress, thus create a even more civilized and beautiful society.</p> <p>To be concerned about and to sustain contributions of the welfare services, it's the sacred duty of every Buddhist.</p> <p>Some people only see how the Buddhist monk has separated himself from the secular world, family, and is generally no paying any attention to human affairs, not taking part in the work for the motherland and the society, some people</p>	<p>living creatures, of humans, animals and nature.</p> <p>Everybody should do its outmost to support social values.</p>	<p>Everybody who earns some money should donate part of it to social /environmental religious projects.</p>	<p>Collective welfare</p>
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不食”；“庄严国土，利乐有情”；“奉行五戒、十善以净化自己，广修四摄、六度以利益人群”等等，难道对完善社会道德、建设精神文明没有一点儿积极作用吗？出家人也不是对国家、社会漠不关心的，出家人是以：“出世的精神，作入世的事业。

http://review.zj.cninfo.net/review/ftck/fxwz/0007/wz7/W27_37-42.htm dl 01/12/03

belief the monks just hold themselves aloof from the world, no contributing anything for the motherland and the society. As a matter of fact such a view is one-sided.

Above we talked about (the Buddhists duty) to contribute to social services, to be concerned about handicapped children and the poor and the people with poor health, and disaster victims- aren't these positive activities towards the society and life? Buddhism propagates 1. "no form of evil can be penetrated, many goods (shall be) pursued" 2. If there is no work, there is no food? 3. Respect for the motherland brings happy feelings. 4. Respects the 5 prohibitions, the 4 terminations and the 6 virtues.

Can these rules not contribute to the perfection of the society? Don't they have a positive function to enhance the construction of a spirited civilized society?

The Buddhist monks are not indifferent towards the motherland and the society, therefore the Buddhist monks _____?

10.2.2 Confucianism

Original (English)	Paraphrase	Final Item	Categorie
<p>Since self-cultivation is the root for the regulation of family, governance of state, and peace under Heaven, the quality of life of particular society depends on the level of self-cultivation of its members. A society that encourages self-cultivation as a necessary condition for human flourishing is a society that encourages self-cultivation as a necessary condition for human flourishing is a society that cherishes virtue-centered political leadership, mutual exhortation as a communal way of self-realization, the value of the family as the proper home for learning to be human, civility as the normal pattern of human interaction and, education as character building.</p>	<p>Self-cultivation is the basis of a good society. Everybody has to work on self-cultivation.</p>	<p>It is everybody's duty to work on his self-cultivation.</p>	<p>Individual</p>
<p>Although law is essential as the minimum requirement for social stability, "organic solidarity" can only result from the implementation of humane rites of interaction. The civilized mode of conduct can never be communicated through coercion. Exemplary teaching as a standard of inspiration invites voluntary participation. Law alone cannot generate a sense of shame to guide civilized behavior. It is the ritual act that encourages people to live up to their own aspirations.</p>	<p>Society need rules of interaction</p>	<p>It is important that our relationships with others are shaped by given rules/rites.</p>	<p>Social interaction</p>
<p>Family as the basic unit of society is the locus from which the core values are transmitted. The dyadic relationships within the family, differentiated by age, gender, authority, status and hierarchy, provide a richly textured natural environment for learning the proper way of being human. The principle of reciprocity, as a two-way traffic of human interaction, defines all forms of human habitat, are brought into a continuous flow of intimate sentiments of human care.</p>	<p>Family is the basis of society. Family has to be structured hierarchal.</p>	<p>Only in a healthy hierarchal structured family a human being can learn the proper way (of being a human being)</p>	<p>Social interaction<</p>
<p>Government leadership in a market economy is not only necessary but is also desirable. (..) A government that is responsive to public needs, responsible for the welfare of the people and accountable to society at large is vitally important for the creation of and maintenance of order.</p>	<p>Government leadership is needed the government is responsible for the welfare of the people.</p>		
<p>Civil society flourishes not because it is an autonomous arena above the family and beyond the state, The image of the family as a microcosm of the state and the ideal of the state as an enlargement of the family indicate that family stability is vitally important for the body politic and a vitally important function of the state is to ensure organic solidarity of the family.</p>	<p>State and family have to interact.</p>	<p>The society needs healthy families to be stable; the family needs a stable society to be healthy.</p>	<p>Collective welfare</p>
<p>Education ought to be the civil religion of society. The primary purpose of education is character building. Intent on the cultivation of the full person, schools should emphasize ethical as well as cognitive intelligence. Schools should teach the art of accumulating "social capital" through communication. In addition to acquisition of knowledge and skill, schooling must be congenial to the development of cultural competence and appreciation of spiritual values.</p>	<p>Education is the religion, the ultimate value of society.</p>	<p>Education is more important than anything else.</p>	<p>Collective welfare</p>

10.2.3 Daoism

Original (English)	Paraphrase	Final Item	
"That is to say, human beings are to follow the basic rule of heaven, earth and nature by pursuing a state of tranquility, and go away from unrest." (/daoist-beliefs/social-ideals/pg2-5-2.asp)	A man should keep to deep tranquility.	1. A human being shouldn't follow his desires. But should get rid of these desires to attain a peaceful inner spirit. (+)	Individual
"How does a man attain to tranquility? Laozi thinks the answer is to purge one's mind of desires and ambitions." (/daoist-beliefs/social-ideals/pg2-5-2.asp)	One should purge one's mind of desires and ambitions		
"It says that a man's original spirit inclines to purity, but his sensual desires mislead it. So if a man can get rid of his sensual desires, his inner nature will remain undisturbed. When a man's inner nature is in tranquility, his original spirit will be pure and bright. The concept of Sensual Desires includes many things, but is normally embodied in the six desires related to a man's five sensory organs (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body) as well as the desire produced by his consciousness..." (/daoist-beliefs/social-ideals/pg2-5-2.asp)	Get rid of all desires to attain tranquility.		
"So-called equality means a man's concern for others- in another word, the mutual love among people in a society which, in the Book of Salvation, is specified as the ten 'no's': no murdering, no injuring, no envying, no hating, no indulging in promiscuity, no stealing, no indulging in greed, no indulging in corrupt desires no abominating, no suspecting others. In addition to all these, a man should not say lies not use bad words. On the basis of that people are to love each other without discrimination, and treat others as their family members." (/daoist-beliefs/social-ideals/pg2-5-1.asp)	People should love each other without discrimination and treat each other with respect like family members.	2. One should treat everyone the same as one treats his own family members, without discrimination. (+)	Social interaction
" (...) a society of supreme peace is characterized by equality and fraternal love among its inhabitants. The concept of equality originates in the idea the Great Dao gives birth to all human beings equally." (/daoist-beliefs/social-ideals/pg2-5-1.asp)	A peaceful society needs equality and fraternity.		
"That's why Daoism is always against wars, especially the vicious ones. (...) . Only when a country imposes a war on us, is it reasonable to fight back." (/daoist-beliefs/social-ideals/pg2-5-1.asp)	War is generally the wrong option; it might be justified in certain cases for defense.	3. War is never the right mean/ method to solve a conflict. (+)	Collective welfare
"He (Wang Changyue, famous Daoist in the Qing Dynasty of the Dragon Gate sect of complete perfection) considered self-salvation as prerequisite for universal salvation."	Everyone has to search for self salvation in order to rescue the whole society	(To abstract)	
"According to the Book of Supreme Peace, as a common belonging of heaven, earth and human beings, the wealth of the world should be shared by all people." (/daoist-beliefs/social-ideals/pg2-5-1.asp)	Wealth should be shared, gaps between poor and rich are harmful for a society	4. If one earns a lot of money he should give a considerable part to the poor. (+)	
"on the basis of the idea that Heaven, Earth and Man commonly originated from the Vital Breath of Dao, Daoism always stresses the importance of harmony between human beings and nature, as well as the protection of nature. ...it (Daoism) denies that human beings are to conquer nature, or wage war against nature".	The environment has to be protected by all means. Mankind should not aim to control nature.	5. A successful state must try to develop means to control the sometimes-disastrous impacts of nature. (-)	Nature
"Daoism advocates Non-interference, which refers to conformity to nature in administration and to the objective laws of human behavior. It does not mean doing nothing." (/daoist-beliefs/social-ideals/pg2-5-2.asp)	Non-interference means to conform one self to the given context and laws of nature.	6. People should learn to adapt themselves to the natural conditions and not try to change them.	

10.3 QUESTIONNAIRE

10.3.1 Original Chinese Version

问卷

本中心目前正在进行一项有关当代中国年轻人的「价值观」与「宗教」的研究计划，你的参与是本研究能否成功的重要关键，恳请抽出大约20至25分钟的时间，填写这份问卷，协助本研究取得宝贵信息，完成此次调查工作。

本研究之研究结果仅供学术参考。所有的回答将绝对保密，绝不对外披露个人答案。在作答时，请不要和你的同学、朋友或其它任何人讨论，因为我们需要的是你个人的意见，所有的答案也没有所谓的对错，请你安心作答！此研究计划的完成，有赖于你的协助与合作，请你务必完整填写问卷上的所有题目，另外也恳请你坦率回答真实的答案。

非常感谢你对本研究的协助及参与。敬祝

身体健康 学业进步

复旦大学社会发展研究中心2004年5月

	完全正确	比较正确	一般正确	比较不正确	完全不正确
1. 我花很多钱买名牌衣服。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. 周末我有的时候去舞会或者泡吧。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. 我有的时候和朋友去咖啡馆喝咖啡，聊天。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

请选择下列更适合生活方式的选项：

你进行以下活动的频率是多少？

	没有	一次	几次
4. 去过欧美国家。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. 去过除欧美国家之外的外国。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	从没有	很少	比较频繁	非常频繁
6. 读外文报纸(印刷品或电子版)。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. 读外文书。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. 收听/观看外国电台/电视台的节目。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. 看外国电影。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

请概括你对下列问题的态度。

	非常不同意 1	2	3	4	5	6	非常重要 7
10. 一般来说你对人权持什么态度？	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	非常不好 1	2	3	4	5	6	非常好 7
11. 一般来说你如何看待美国人的生活方式？	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12. 你对美国的国际政治持什么态度？	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	完全正确	比较正确	一般正确	比较不正确	完全不正确
1. 我花很多钱买名牌衣服。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. 周末我有的时候去舞会或者酒吧。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. 我有的时候和朋友去咖啡馆喝咖啡，聊天。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

请选择下列更适合生活方式的选项：

你进行以下活动的频率是多少？

	没有	一次	几次
4. 去过欧美国家。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. 去过除欧美国家之外的外国。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	从没有	很少	比较频繁	非常频繁
6. 读外文报纸(印刷品或电子版)。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. 读外文书。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. 收听/观看外国电台/电视台的节目。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. 看外国电影。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

请概括你对下列问题的态度。

	非常不同意 1	2	3	4	5	6	非常重要 7
10. 一般来说你对人权持什么态度？	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	非常不好 1	2	3	4	5	6	非常好 7
11. 一般来说你如何看待美国人的生活方式？	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12. 你对美国的国际政治持什么态度？	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

请选择你对下列关于人权和正义等问题的看法。

	非常同意	同意	比较同意	比较不同意	不同意	完全不同意
13. 要想成为好的政府就一定要尊重人权。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14. 每个人都有不受他人或政府虐待的权利。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15. 人权是一个美国舶来的概念。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16. 政府应该给每个需要工作的人提供工作机会。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
17. 只有收入差异足够大才能鼓励大家努力工作。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18. 为社会正义争辩是没有用的，因为什么都会改变。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19. 人们有权利保留自己的收入，即使这可能意味着他将比他人富有。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20. 战争永远不是解决分歧的合适办法。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
21. 有时候坚持说出真相，胜过拘泥于国家利益。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
22. 一个成功的商人总是不择手段，想赚更多的钱。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
23. 有时为坚持自己的观点而激怒他人也未尝不可。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
24. 人们应该适应自然环境，不应改变自然。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
25. 不要杀害动物。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
26. 赚到的钱应该捐一部分给穷人。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
27. 人与人之间应该以礼相待。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
28. 只有在健康，讲究礼数的家庭里，一个人才能成为善良的人。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
29. 生活中有比较养更重要的方面。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
30. 没有什么事是不行的，没有什么事是不能忍的。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
31. 每个人对别人都应该像对自己的家人一样。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
32. 只有不断满足自己的欲望，才能获得理想的生活。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
33. 静坐方能到达最佳状态。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
34. 如果别人伤害我们，只能忍耐。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
35. 提高自我修养只是个人的事情，与社会责任无关。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

请判断下列情况是否违反人权。

	肯定不违反人权	可能不违反人权	可能违反人权	肯定违反人权	不知道
36. 一个人被捕，没有律师为他辩护。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
37. 父母打孩子。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
38. 人们死于饥饿。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
39. 孩子（13岁以下）不得不去工作。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
40. 人们反对在住所附近建立艾滋病中心。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
41. 一个人因违反政府而被捕。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
42. 两个孩子（10和14岁）的父母离婚，审判员不问孩子们的想法就决定他们跟谁住。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
43. 一个犯罪嫌疑人逃到国外，当他被捕并遣送回国的时候，没有为自己辩护的机会。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
44. 传染病患者被强迫送到医院。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
45. 贫富差距悬殊	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
46. 人们被禁止在会议上抽烟。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

请表达你对下列说法的态度。

	非常同意	同意	比较同意	比较不同意	不同意	完全不同意
47. 人死后灵魂仍然存在。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
48. 宗教信仰会提升社会的道德水准。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
49. 宗教对我来说很重要的。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
50. 我不相信有一个我们看不见的精神世界。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
51. 风水是一种非常可信的东西。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

请回答以下关于宗教的问题。

	佛教	儒教	道教	基督教	天主教	伊斯兰教	民间信仰	没有	其它
52. 你比较倾向于哪种宗教信仰? (可多选)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
53. 你妈妈倾向于哪种宗教信仰? (可多选)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
54. 你爸爸倾向于哪种宗教信仰? (可多选)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	一个星期一次或几次。	一个月一次或几次。	一年一次或几次。	很少	从不
55. 我____烧香（在家里或庙里）。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
56. 我____在家里供佛/神或到庙里拜佛/神。	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
57. 我____参加一次宗教活动（在家里、教堂、庙里或清真寺等）？	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
58. 你跟和尚接触吗？	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
59. 你找别人算命吗？	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
60. 你读经书吗？	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
61. 在你成年以前你的母亲跟你讨论过宗教/中国传统的思想吗？	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
62. 在你成年以前你的父亲跟你讨论过宗教/中国传统的思想吗？	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
63. 你成年以前你的母亲经常参加宗教类的活动（在家里、教堂、庙里或清真寺等）吗？	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
64. 你成年以前你的父亲经常参加宗教类的活动（在家里、教堂、庙里或清真寺等）吗？	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
65. 你成年以前你的母亲在家里供佛/神或到庙里拜佛/神吗？	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
66. 你成年以前你的父亲在家里供佛/神或到庙里拜佛/神吗？	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

最后，请填写你的个人情况。

67. 年龄:	_____			
68. 性别:	<input type="checkbox"/> 男	<input type="checkbox"/> 女		
69. 学历:	<input type="checkbox"/> 大专一年级	<input type="checkbox"/> 大专二年级	<input type="checkbox"/> 大专三年级	<input type="checkbox"/> 本科一年级
	<input type="checkbox"/> 本科二年级	<input type="checkbox"/> 本科三年级	<input type="checkbox"/> 本科四年级	
	<input type="checkbox"/> 硕士一年级	<input type="checkbox"/> 硕士二年级	<input type="checkbox"/> 硕士三年级	<input type="checkbox"/> 硕士四年级
70. 专业:	_____			
71. 政治面貌:				
	<input type="checkbox"/> 中共党员	<input type="checkbox"/> 共青团员	<input type="checkbox"/> 群众	<input type="checkbox"/> 其他
72. 平均每个月大约可以花多少钱?				
	<input type="checkbox"/> 500 RMB 以下	<input type="checkbox"/> 1000-1499 RMB	<input type="checkbox"/> 2000-2500 RMB	<input type="checkbox"/> 2500 RMB 以上
	<input type="checkbox"/> 500-999 RMB	<input type="checkbox"/> 1500-1999 RMB		
73. 16岁以前大部分时间在_____长大。				
	<input type="checkbox"/> 大城市	<input type="checkbox"/> 中, 小城市	<input type="checkbox"/> 镇城	<input type="checkbox"/> 农村
74. 母亲的教育程度——_____				
	<input type="checkbox"/> 小学或者 小学以下	<input type="checkbox"/> 中学	<input type="checkbox"/> 专科学校	<input type="checkbox"/> 大学 (包括大专)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 大学以上			
75. 父亲的教育程度——_____				
	<input type="checkbox"/> 小学或者 小学以下	<input type="checkbox"/> 中学	<input type="checkbox"/> 专科学校	<input type="checkbox"/> 大学 (包括大专)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 大学以上			
76. 如果我们把社会划分为几个级别，你认为你的家庭处在哪一个级别?				
	较低 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> 较高			

谢谢配合!

10.3.2 Questionnaire (English Translation)

Questionnaire

Dear Students:

Our center is working on a study concerning the values and religion of young Chinese people. Your participation is crucial for the successful outcome of this project, and we earnestly request you take 20 to 30 minutes of your time to fill out this questionnaire. This will help us to acquire valuable information and to complete this field study. The study only includes university students. The information you give as will be treated confidential and not given to any other students. While you answer this questionnaire please do not talk with your classmates, friends or any other person. We are interested in your opinion! Also there are no right or wrong answers, so feel at ease when answering these questions. The outcome of our project depends on you helping us by filling out this questionnaire, we therefore request you to answer every question and to give us your frank opinion concerning the raised topics.

Thanks a lot for your help and participation.

We wish you good health and lots of success in your studies.

Fudan University, Research Center of Sociology and Development
May , 2005

Please tell us a few things about your lifestyle.

	Absolutely right	Rather right	Partly right	Rather not right	Absolutely not right
1. I spend a lot of money on buying western clothes.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. On weekends I often go to clubs and parties.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. I often go to a café with friends, to drink something and chat.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

How often have you experienced the activities below?

	Never	Once	More than once
4. I traveled to a European country or the US.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. I traveled to countries other than Europe and the US.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	Never	rarely	Rather often	Very often
6. Read foreign newspapers (in printed version or on the internet)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. Read foreign books	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. Listen/watch foreign radio/TV-Programs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. Watch foreign films	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please tell us your opinion towards the questions/problems listed below.

	Not important at all	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very important
10. Generally speaking, what do you think of HR?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Not good at all	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very good
11. What do you think of American lifestyle?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
12. What do you think of American foreign policy?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	

Below are several statements concerning human rights, the idea of justice and so on. Please tell us your opinion.

	Agree very much	Agree	Rather agree	Rather don't agree	Don't agree	Don't agree at all
13. A government, which wants to be good has to respect human rights.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14. Everyone should have rights that protect him from the abuse of others or the government.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15. Human rights are a concept that has been imported from the US.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16. The government should provide work for everyone who needs work.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
17. Only if the differences in income are big enough, people can be motivated to work hard.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18. There is no use to argue about social justice, as nothing can be changed anyway.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19. War is never a suitable method to solve a conflict.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20. People have the right to keep their income, even if this means that they are wealthier than others.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
21. Sometimes one has to uphold his view, even if this is not in the interest of the motherland.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
22. A good business man will use all possible methods to make the highest profit.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
23. Sometimes one has to uphold his point of view, even if this might be vexing others.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
24. People should adapt to nature and not change it.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
25. One shouldn't kill animals.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
26. Part of one's income should be donated to the poor.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
27. People should treat each other with due respect. (with the level of respect/ritual the deserve due to their social position)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
28. Only in a healthy family, which respects the rituals of courtesy, a child can grow into a good person.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
29. There are things in life that are more important than (intellectual and moral) education.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
30. Everybody should treat other people as if they were their own family members.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
31. Only if we constantly try to make real our wishes (desires), we will have a good life.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
32. Only if we mediate (sit quietly) we can achieve (our) ideal.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
33. There is nothing man can not deal with, nothing he cannot endure.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
34. If others hurt us, we just have to bear it patiently.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
35. Self cultivation is everybody's own business, and we do not owe it to society.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please tell us, if in your opinion, the situations below are a human rights violation or not.

		Clearly no HRV	Most probably no HRV	Don't know	Most probably a HRV	Clearly a HRV
36.	Somebody is send to prison without having a lawyer to defend him.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
37.	Parents beat their children.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
38.	People die of hunger.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
39.	Children younger than 13 have to go to work.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
40.	People hinder the construction of a AIDS center in their neighborhood.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
41.	Somebody is arrested because he opposes the government.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
42.	The parents of two children (10 and 14) get divorced. Without consulting the children's opinion the judge decides with whom the children should live.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
43.	A suspected criminal flees to a foreign country. Without having any chance to defend himself, he is send back to his country.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
44.	Somebody with a contagious illness is send to the hospital by force to be treated.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
45.	The income differences are very high.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
46.	During a meeting people are not allowed to smoke.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please tell us your opinion concerning the statements below.

		Absolutely agree	Agree	Rather agree	Rather don't agree	Don't agree	Don't agree at all
47.	The soul goes on to exist after death.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
48.	Religious belief is promoting a higher level of moral and ethics in society.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
49.	Religion very important for me.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
50.	I don't believe there exists a world, which we cannot see with our eyes.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
51.	Fengshui is very trustworthy.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please answer the following questions about religion.

		Never	Once	Once or twice a year	Regularly about once a month	About once a week
52.	You _____ burn incense (either at home or in a temple).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
53.	You _____ make offerings to Buddha /other gods (at home, in a temple).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
54.	You _____ take part in religious activities (at home, in church, in a temple or mosque).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

		Buddhism	Confucianism	Daoism	Protestantism	Catholicism	Islam	Popular Religion	none
55.	To which of the following religions do you feel close? (You can choose more than one.)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
56.	To which of the following religions does your mother feel close? (You can choose more than one.)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
57.	To which of the following religions does your father feel close? (You can choose more than one.)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

		Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often
58.	Have you contact with a monk?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
59.	Do you consult fortunetellers?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
60.	Do you read sacred books?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
61.	When you were a child did your mother talk to you about religion or traditional way of thinking?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
62.	When you were a child did your father talk to you about religious or traditional way of thinking?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
63.	When you were a child did your mother take part in religious activities (at home, in church, in a temple or mosque)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
64.	When you were a child did your father take part in religious activities (at home, in church, in a temple or mosque)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
65.	When you were a child did your mother make offerings to Buddha /other gods (at home, in a temple)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
66.	When you were a child did your father make offerings to Buddha /other gods (at home, in a temple)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Finally, could you give us some information about yourself


67. Age:	_____			
68. Gender:	<input type="checkbox"/> 男	<input type="checkbox"/> 女		
69. Major:	_____			
70. Year of study:	<input type="checkbox"/> college, first year	<input type="checkbox"/> college, second year	<input type="checkbox"/> college, third year	
	<input type="checkbox"/> bachelor, first year	<input type="checkbox"/> bachelor, second year	<input type="checkbox"/> bachelor, third year	<input type="checkbox"/> bachelor, fourth year
	<input type="checkbox"/> master, first year	<input type="checkbox"/> master second year	<input type="checkbox"/> master, third year	<input type="checkbox"/> master, fourth year
71. Are you a party member?				
	<input type="checkbox"/> Communist Party member	<input type="checkbox"/> Communist youth brigade member	<input type="checkbox"/> Member of the masses	<input type="checkbox"/> other <input type="checkbox"/> none
72. About how much money can spend per month?				
	<input type="checkbox"/> 500 RMB or less	<input type="checkbox"/> 1000-1499 RMB	<input type="checkbox"/> 2000-2500 RMB	
	<input type="checkbox"/> 500-999 RMB	<input type="checkbox"/> 1500-1999 RMB	<input type="checkbox"/> 2500 RMB and more	
73. Where did you grow up most of the time before you were 16?				
	<input type="checkbox"/> Big city	<input type="checkbox"/> "middle" or small city	<input type="checkbox"/> town	<input type="checkbox"/> countryside
74. The education level of your mother:				
	<input type="checkbox"/> primary school or less	<input type="checkbox"/> middle school	<input type="checkbox"/> professional school	<input type="checkbox"/> University (including 3 year-college)
				<input type="checkbox"/> Higher than University
75. Education level of your father:				
	<input type="checkbox"/> primary school or less	<input type="checkbox"/> middle school	<input type="checkbox"/> professional school	<input type="checkbox"/> University (including 3 year-college)
				<input type="checkbox"/> Higher than University
76. If we rank society on a scale, where do you think is your family located?				
	low	—————→		high
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Thanks a lot for your cooperation !

10.4 ADDITIONAL RESULTS, CHARTS AND TABLES

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING: INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Graph 60 Barchart: Major 10 groups



The barchart below shows the different majors and its counts. To make the chart clearer and readable, the majors have been combined to 10 groups, 7 majors with a count of one have been merged with an other major, whose content is comparable.


Table 19 : Crosstabulation: Gender * major²⁹¹

gender of respondent * major 4 groups Crosstabulation

			major 4 groups				Total
			arts	social science	economics	technical sciences	
gender of respondent	male	Count	28	31	79	34	172
		Expected Count	32.0	62.4	56.6	20.9	172.0
		% within major 4 groups	35.9%	20.4%	57.2%	66.7%	41.1%
	female	Count	50	121	59	17	247
		Expected Count	46.0	89.6	81.4	30.1	247.0
		% within major 4 groups	64.1%	79.6%	42.8%	33.3%	58.9%
Total	Count	78	152	138	51	419	
	Expected Count	78.0	152.0	138.0	51.0	419.0	
	% within major 4 groups	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

²⁹¹ As this crosstabulation already indicates the chi-square test is significant at a .000 level, refusing the hypothesis that these two variables are independent, and therefore claiming an association between the two variables.

Graph 61 Barchart: Education father/ mother




ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING LIFESTYLE

Table 20: Lifestyle distributions (buying label clothes, clubbing and partying, going to coffeehouses)

clubbing and partying				buying label clothes			
	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
absolutely not right	275	64.9	65.2	absolutely not right	148	34.9	35.0
rather not right	70	16.5	81.8	rather not right	148	34.9	70.0
partly right	58	13.7	95.5	partly right	70	16.5	86.5
rather right	16	3.8	99.3	rather right	49	11.6	98.1
absolutely right	3	.7	100.0	absolutely right	8	1.9	100.0
Total	422	99.5		Total	423	99.8	
missing	2	.5		missing	1	.2	
Total	424	100.0		Total	424	100.0	

chatting in coffeehouse			
	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid absolutely not right	117	27.6	27.7
Valid rather not right	98	23.1	50.8
Valid partly right	112	26.4	77.3
Valid rather right	73	17.2	94.6
Valid absolutely right	23	5.4	100.0
Total	423	99.8	
Missing missing	1	.2	
Total	424	100.0	


Graph 62 Boxplot: Buying label clothes and financial situation



The content of information of the boxplot has to be judged critically, as there are some doubts about the reliability of the variable ‘financial situation’; Some students might not feel confident to display their real financial situation. Having money in China although on one hand often shown off to others, still is something certain people don’t like to talk about too much, as being rich is often associated with being bad and corrupt (as for many years doing illegal business and corruption were the only real possibilities to get rich...). This assumption that the variable “financial situation” might not be 100% adequate measure is also

supported through the fact the relationship between financial situation and social position is not as evident as one might expect. There is a positive significant (sig. 000) correlation, but it is fairly low (r .278). For two variables measuring very close concepts, a higher correlation was to be expected, especially as most students are depending on their parents during their studies²⁹².

Graph 63 Barchart: Distributions Foreign information/ entertainment




²⁹² Part time working students are a rather new phenomena, and although some of the students might earn some extra money, still a vast majority of students depends on their parents while studying.

Additional Information concerning: Traditional Values , *Ren and Li*

Table 21: Distribution Chinese traditional religious values


		don't agree at all	don't agree	rather don't agree	rather agree	agree	agree very much
war never a suitable method	Count	15	16	73	105	88	126
	%	3.5%	3.8%	17.3%	24.8%	21%	29.8%
speak out, even if not in interest of motherland	Count	14	20	88	116	117	68
	%	3.3%	4.7%	20.8%	27.4%	28%	16.1%
doing fair business even if more profit possible	Count	35	51	138	105	63	31
	%	8.3%	12.1%	32.6%	24.8%	15%	7.3%
defend ones opinion even if vexing others	Count	12	42	112	149	62	46
	%	2.8%	9.9%	26.5%	35.2%	15%	10.9%
adapt to nature not change it	Count	17	49	107	97	75	79
	%	4.0%	11.6%	25.2%	22.9%	18%	18.6%
animals should not be killed	Count	17	19	68	109	106	104
	%	4.0%	4.5%	16.1%	25.8%	25%	24.6%
donate money to the poor	Count	5	9	61	142	124	83
	%	1.2%	2.1%	14.4%	33.5%	29%	19.6%
treat everybody with due respect	Count			8	44	152	219
	%			1.9%	10.4%	36%	51.8%
healthy family needed for proper development	Count	36	51	91	115	67	64
	%	8.5%	12.0%	21.5%	27.1%	16%	15.1%
there are more important things in life than education	Count	8	17	48	111	137	101
	%	1.9%	4.0%	11.4%	26.3%	32%	23.9%
nothing man cannot deal with	Count	40	68	118	83	71	44
	%	9.4%	16.0%	27.8%	19.6%	17%	10.4%
treat others like in only	Count	22	37	131	137	69	27
	%	5.2%	8.7%	31.0%	32.4%	16%	6.4%
dualism necessary to reach ideal life	Count	46	74	135	95	42	30
	%	10.9%	17.5%	32.0%	22.5%	10%	7.1%
meditation necessary to lead good life	Count	56	104	130	79	35	19
	%	13.2%	24.6%	30.7%	18.7%	8.3%	4.5%
patiently bear suffering	Count	152	141	89	23	10	7
	%	36.0%	33.4%	21.1%	5.5%	2.4%	1.7%
self-cultivation is not a moral duty	Count	111	156	97	39	10	11
	%	26.2%	36.8%	22.9%	9.2%	2.4%	2.6%

Graph 64: Object points and component loading on dimension *ren* (formbearance) and dimension *li* (ritual)




ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: RELIGIOSITY

Graph 65: Distribution: Religious beliefs



Graph 66: Religious activities



Graph 67: Religious activities parents




Table 22: Socioeconomic Status and religious beliefs


Correlations			Correlations		
		scale: religious beliefs		male scale: religious beliefs	female scale: religious beliefs
scale: religious beliefs	Pearson Correlation	1	scale: religious beliefs	Pearson Corr.	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.		Sig. (2-t)	.1*
	N	420		N	170
scale: socioeconomic status	Pearson Correlation	.257**	scale: socioeconomic status	Pearson Corr.	.322*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		Sig. (2-t)	.000
	N	410		N	166
gender of respondent	Pearson Correlation	.190**	amount of money that can be spend per month	Pearson Corr.	.228*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		Sig. (2-t)	.003
	N	418		N	169
amount of money that can be spent per month	Pearson Correlation	.168**	place of family in society	Pearson Corr.	.169*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001		Sig. (2-t)	.028
	N	416		N	168
place of family in society	Pearson Correlation	.188**	place where one grew up	Pearson Corr.	.240*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		Sig. (2-t)	.002
	N	415		N	170
place where one grew up	Pearson Correlation	.229**	education parents	Pearson Corr.	.240*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		Sig. (2-t)	.002
	N	419		N	169
education level of parents	Pearson Correlation	.155**			
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001			
	N	419			

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Graph 68: Meanplot religious beliefs * place of family in society/ socioeconomic status






Table 23: Correlations: Socioeconomic Status and Religiosity


Correlations

		Scale: Religious belief	Scale: Religious activity	Close to one or more religion (yes/no)	Scale: Religiosity
education level of mother	Pearson Corr.	.140**	.098*	.084	.151**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.004	.044	.086	.002
	N	419	420	419	413
education level of father	Pearson Corr.	.143**	.111*	.072	.161**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.003	.023	.141	.001
	N	419	420	419	413
place of family in society	Pearson Corr.	.188**	.143**	.064	.193**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.003	.193	.000
	N	415	416	415	409
place where one grew up	Pearson Corr.	.229**	.100*	.074	.202**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.040	.129	.000
	N	419	420	419	413
Scale: socioeconomic status	Pearson Corr.	.257**	.179**	.104*	.262**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.035	.000
	N	410	411	410	404
Scale: Religious belief	Pearson Corr.	1	.476**	.455**	.931**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.000	.000	.000
	N	420	417	417	414
Scale: Religious activity	Pearson Corr.	.476**	1	.414**	.758**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.	.000	.000
	N	417	421	417	414
Close to one or more religion (yes/no)	Pearson Corr.	.455**	.414**	1	.556**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.	.000
	N	417	417	420	414
Scale: Religiosity	Pearson Corr.	.931**	.758**	.556**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.
	N	414	414	414	414


** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).


Graph 69: Boxplot religious activities* socioeconomic status




Graph 70: religious beliefs* direction of major




Graph 71: Boxplot religious activities* gender




Graph 72: Barchart / boxplot ses* religious affiliation



Graph 73: gender* religious affiliation



Graph 74: major (4 groups)* religious affiliation



ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: HUMAN RIGHTS

Graph 75: Charts Definition of human rights violation




Table 24: Mean/ Anova Importance of human rights * attitude tw American lifestyle.

Report				Measures of Association				
<i>Importance of Human Rights</i>								
		Mean	N	Std. Deviation	R	R Squared	Eta	Eta Squared
general attitude towards american lifestyle	1, not good at all	3.33	6	2.338	.304	.092	.338	.114
	2	4.86	14	1.834				
	3	4.74	34	1.483				
	4	5.51	195	1.216				
	5	5.85	116	1.057				
	6	5.88	43	1.159				
	7, very good	6.27	15	1.280				
	Total	5.55	423	1.307				

ANOVA Table

			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Importance of Human Rights * general attitude towards american lifestyle	Between Groups	(Combined)	82.289	6	13.715	8.939	.000
		Linearity	66.556	1	66.556	43.379	.000
		Deviation from Linearity	15.733	5	3.147	2.051	.071
	Within Groups	638.264	416	1.534			
Total			720.553	422			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: VIEWS OF JUSTICE

Graph 76: Views of justice




Table 25: Multiple response table views of justice (reduced to don't agree =1/ agree=2)

government should provide work for eo (dummy)	1	difference in income, necessary tool for motivation (dummy)	1	no use talking about social justice	entitled to keep what they earn even if richer than others (dummy)	
					1	2
	1	difference in income, necessary tool for motivation (dummy)	1	no use talking about social justice	1	7
					2	36
			2	no use talking about social justice	1	4
					2	13
	2	difference in income, necessary tool for motivation (dummy)	1	no use talking about social justice	1	2
					2	31
			2	no use talking about social justice	1	2
					2	18
1	difference in income, necessary tool for motivation (dummy)	1	no use talking about social justice	1	15	
				2	102	
		2	no use talking about social justice	1	5	
				2	30	
2	difference in income, necessary tool for motivation (dummy)	1	no use talking about social justice	1	8	
				2	88	
		2	no use talking about social justice	1	4	
				2	56	