#### <sup>1</sup> Chapter 8

### <sup>2</sup> Realizing Benefit Sharing: Is there a Role

<sup>3</sup> for Ethics Review?

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Abstract The donors of human genetic resources deserve benefits in return for their 6 contribution to scientific research. In the context of developing countries this claim 7 holds as a matter of justice. But how can this demand be realised and implemented? 8 This chapter looks at the role of ethics review as a possible benefit sharing mecha-9 nism. In particular the promising role of research ethics committees in monitor-10 ing the Declaration of Helsinki's post-study obligations is considered. However, a 11 range of obstacles are identified, which would have to be overcome before ethics 12 review could reliably achieve justice for the donors of human genetic resources in 13 developing countries. These issues are addressed in specific recommendations. The 14

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15 chapter concludes that the provision of health care, however extensive, in return for

16 the donation of human genetic resources does not represent undue inducement, but

17 rather fair benefit sharing.

18 Keywords Benefit sharing • Research ethics • Developing countries • Post19 study access • Declaration of Helsinki

#### 20 8.1 Introduction

'The arc of the universe is long, but it bends towards justice.' This is how Martin 21 Luther King Jr. expressed his hopes for the future. Of course, justice does not 22 arrive of its own accord. Four years after receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 1964 23 for his non-violent work to advance civil rights King was assassinated. Today, 24 there is a black President of the United States, giving an indication that some of 25 King's dreams of justice have been realized. However, when we turn to interna-26 tional justice, we note that the US is one of a handful of countries<sup>1</sup> that are not 27 parties to the international Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). In the pre-28 vious chapter, an expansion of the CBD was suggested in order to achieve justice 29 for donors of human genetic resources.<sup>2</sup> This chapter will explore the potential for 30 utilizing the existing, well-established system of ethical review to advance benefit 31 32 sharing.

33 How does one protect human research participants from harm and exploitation?

Four basic markers for the occurrence of harm in the research context can be dis-

tinguished (see Chap. 2).

36 1. Unfavourable risk-benefit ratio

37 2. Breach of confidentiality or privacy

38 3. Invalid consent

39 4. Lack of access to the benefits of research.

40 Exploitation is mainly relevant to the fourth marker and equates to 'a failure to

41 benefit others as some norm of fairness requires' (Mayer 2007: 142) (see Chap. 2).

42 Ethics committees have increasingly taken on the responsibility of preventing such

43 exploitation. They appear in two main varieties: clinical ethics committees have

44 been in existence since the early 1960s, mostly to support staff, patients and fami-

45 lies in making end-of-life decisions, while research ethics committees have been

46 in existence since the late 1960s (see below) to govern research involving human

47 participants (Aulisio 2003: 841).<sup>3</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Two exceptions at the time of writing are Andorra and South Sudan.

 $<sup>^2\,</sup>$  By human biological resources, we mean human biological samples collected for genetic studies and related data.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> For more on clinical ethics committees see McGee et al. (2001), Kuczewski (2004), Slowther (2007) and ASBH (1998).

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Research ethics committees are most relevant to this chapter. Their primary role is to decide whether a particular research project is ethical or not by reviewing ts study protocol. Such committees usually comprise scientists, professionals and lay people supported by an administrator. Standard questions for such a committee would be:

• Are the research participants appropriately informed?

- Is the balance of risks and benefits posed by the research fair and reasonable?
- Are the research participants likely to be worse off for participating in research?
- 56 If so, does their consent represent a sufficient protection of their interests (or are 57 they being exploited)?
- Is the research likely to be useful and informative? (Ashcroft 2007: 684)

Ethical review generally follows a particular pattern. Study protocols are 59 received from researchers, and are then reviewed by a single member, a small con-60 sultation team or the full ethics committee. Applications may be approved at that 61 point; if not, they are returned to the applicant with queries before being reconsid-62 ered and finally approved or rejected. The legitimacy of ethics committees derives 63 from the fact that they are lawfully established and adhere to a process of delib-64 eration as a diverse group of experts (including lay people) who reach consensus 65 after discussion (Garrard and Dawson 2005: 423). While review requirements dif-66 fer between (and sometimes within) countries, Fig. 8.1 shows the most basic steps. 67 In assessing whether a protocol is ethically acceptable, research ethics com-68 mittees refer to international guidelines (e.g. the Declaration of Helsinki), national 69 guidelines (e.g. UK Medical Research Council guidelines) and national law (e.g. 70 National Health Council of Brazil resolutions). A research ethics committee there-71 fore seeks to protect the interests of research subjects by ensuring compliance with 72 ethical guidelines. Many countries (e.g. the US and the UK) have made it a criminal 73 offence to start medical research without ethical approval from the relevant research 74

ethics committee. This, de facto, gives ethics committees the role of a regulatoryauthority, a position with 'immense power over the research that is carried out'

77 (McGuinness 2008: 695).

The Nuremberg Code (1949)<sup>4</sup> and the World Medical Association's Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects (1964) placed responsibility for safeguarding research participants on the investigator. In 1975, however, the Tokyo revision of the Declaration of Helsinki introduced ethics

committee review of research as its second basic principle (Levine 1995: 2312):

83 The design and performance of each experimental procedure involving human subjects

should be clearly formulated in an experimental protocol which should be transmitted to

- a specially appointed independent committee for consideration, comment and guidance
- 86 (WMA 1975).

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The Nuremberg Code of 1949 is a set of principles and rules to be observed when undertaking research with human participants. It was developed after the Nuremberg trials in 1946 and 1947 of Nazi doctors who had committed atrocities against concentration camp internees as part of medical research. It was superseded by the Declaration of Helsinki in 1964 (see Chap. 3).




Fig. 8.1 Simplified Ethical Review Process

Since 1975, repeated revisions of the Declaration of Helsinki have specified in increasing detail what is implied by ethics committee review. Principle 15 of the current (2008) declaration reads:

The research protocol must be submitted for consideration, comment, guidance and 90 approval to a research ethics committee before the study begins. This committee must be 91 independent of the researcher, the sponsor and any other undue influence. It must take into 92 consideration the laws and regulations of the country or countries in which the research 93 is to be performed as well as applicable international norms and standards but these must 94 not be allowed to reduce or eliminate any of the protections for research subjects set forth 95 in this Declaration. The committee must have the right to monitor ongoing studies. The 96 researcher must provide monitoring information to the committee, especially information 97 about any serious adverse events. No change to the protocol may be made without consid-98 eration and approval by the committee (WMA 2008). 99

<sup>100</sup> Until the end of the twentieth century, ethics committee review concentrated <sup>101</sup> on pre-start approval, but nowadays it is increasingly seen as a process that does <sup>102</sup> not stop until the research has been completed. For instance, funding bodies such

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as the Economic and Social Research Council in Britain see monitoring as a mini mum ethics requirement. The council's Framework for Research Ethics includes
 the following:

Procedures for institutional monitoring should be in place. Universities and other research organisations should establish appropriate procedures to monitor the conduct of research which has received ethics approval until it is completed, and to ensure appropriate continuing review where the research design anticipates possible changes over time that may need to be addressed (ESRC n.d.: 5).

It would therefore be feasible for ethics review of a research project to continue up to the point at which it may be possible to determine whether vulnerable research participants, especially in developing countries, have benefited from taking part in research. To complement the Chap. 7, which recommended expanding the provisions of the CBD to include access and benefit-sharing arrangements for human biological resources, we will ask:

117 Could research ethics committees ensure compliance with post-study obligations (a form118 of benefit sharing), in order to avoid burdening medical research with further governance119 structures?

Before answering this question, it is worth revisiting and strengthening a claim made earlier (see Chap. 2), namely that the developing world should be treated differently from the developed world when it comes to the governance of human biological resources. The alleged altruism shown by European DNA donors, for instance, cannot be expected of donors from developing countries without perpetuating exploitative relationships.

# 8.2 Benefit Sharing Versus the Altruism or Solidarity Model

For decades human tissue has been provided voluntarily by individuals for research purposes, in most cases without any expectation of benefit. The case of blood donation in the United Kingdom for blood transfusions and research purposes is a case in point (Keown 1997). This altruism is also apparent among research participants in developing countries. In interviews undertaken with sex worker participants enrolled in long-term HIV/AIDS research in Majengo, Nairobi (see Chap. 5), one respondent said:

On my faith ... they can get a cure from my blood and it can help the whole world. So that is why I gave myself. Even if I am infected...I am ready because I agreed to collabo-

137 rate in the research.<sup>5</sup>

This respondent donated her blood to help the whole world. However, international ethics guidelines (see Chap. 3) now *require* benefit sharing with research

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Interview with Majengo participant in GenBenefit project, April 2007.

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participants. To recap, paragraph 14 of the Declaration of Helsinki (WMA 2008)requires as follows:

The protocol should describe arrangements for post-study access by study subjects tointerventions identified as beneficial in the study or access to other appropriate care orbenefits.

Hence, every research project which is presented for ethics approval must outline in its protocol how it will deal with post-study obligations. This is particularly
important in the case of vulnerable populations, which is why the Declaration of
Helsinki (WMA 2008) adds in paragraph 17:

Medical research involving a disadvantaged or vulnerable population or community
is only justified if ... there is a reasonable likelihood that this population or community
stands to benefit from the results of the research.

The question arises: why should humans not be able to simply donate their 152 tissue for the good of the world, without requiring burdensome and bureaucratic 153 arrangements for post-study access to benefits? It seems that most people who pro-154 vide blood or samples for research in the developed world are content to do so 155 purely on the assurance that the tissue supplied will be utilized for the betterment 156 of humankind. Why then should individuals from the developing world expect any 157 more from the same transaction? No work is involved in producing DNA, nor do 158 donors incur significant risks in donating samples. One could say that we need to 159 draw upon the altruism of humankind to ensure the provision of resources that are 160 so important for health research (Berg and Chadwick 2001: 320). 161

Altruism, which in its broadest sense means promoting the interests of another 162 (Scott and Seglow 2007: 1), is an interesting concept. Under scrutiny it reveals 163 complex questions about morality. For example, to donate one's blood or organs 164 with the proviso that they can only be given to those of one's own race would 165 be altruistic, but morally questionable. A UK government investigation found it 166 'abhorrent' that a hospital had accepted an organ donation on condition that it ben-167 efited a white patient (BBC 2000). Hence, acts of altruism might not always be as 168 morally pure as they appear at first sight. 169

The eighteenth-century political economist Adam Smith maintained that ego-170 ism or self-interest would lead to general welfare, stating that it was not 'from 171 the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect our din-172 ner, but from their regard to their own interest' (Smith 1976: 26f). On the other 173 hand, French philosopher Auguste Comte, who coined the term 'altruism' in the 174 early nineteenth century, believed that promoting other people's interests meant 175 that morality triumphed over egoism (Scott and Seglow 2007: 15). Immanuel 176 Kant provided useful guidance on the motives behind altruism. He distinguished 177 beneficence (Wohltun), which is understood as doing good, from benevolence 178 (Wohlwollen), which is understood as wishing well. Beneficence is then benevo-179 lence in action; acting in accordance with a 'maxim of making others' happiness 180 one's end' (Kant 1996: 452). While this might appear noble in essence, the motive 181 Kant provided for beneficence is actually close to self-interest. He claimed that 182 one would not want to live in a world where those in need were not supported or 183

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assisted, simply because one might require similar assistance from others in thefuture.

This scenario of individuals mutually acknowledging their human needs and subsequent duties has been called the duty of mutual aid (Herman 1993). In this context, reciprocity and expectations are important. Such reciprocity protects the altruist, even though it might provide a less than perfectly noble motive for her good deeds. Reciprocal altruism is performed in the hope of obtaining a future reward, for instance in the form of assistance, and is therefore something of a hybrid between altruism and self-interest.

Reciprocity was examined by Marcel Mauss in his classic 1950 anthropologi-193 cal study The Gift (2002). Mauss examined gift-giving in ancient times and in 194 more recent Roman, Jewish, Germanic and other Indo-European societies. The 195 seemingly ubiquitous practice of gift-giving existed separately from commer-196 cial transactions in all these societies. He defined a gift as 'a voluntary, unre-197 quited surrender of resources' (Mauss 2002: 3). The apparent generosity of the 198 gifting practices seemed to indicate very high levels of solidarity, charity and 199 trust. However, Mauss famously concluded that in all such societies there were 200 201 no free gifts. The giving of gifts engaged the giver and the receiver alike in finely woven, if implicit, obligations and commitments that reflected and resonated 202 with the institutions of the day. Morality did not seem to enter the transaction, 203 and the society's (unwritten) norms and expectations framed what was required 204 in certain circumstances. Mauss established that the entire notion of a free gift 205 206 was based upon a misunderstanding of the nature of such a transaction, and concluded that a gift that expected no return, that did nothing to enhance solidarity, 207 was a contradiction in terms (Mauss 2002: xii). His work encourages us to con-208 sider that material items, whether sold or given, always retain something of the 209 identity of the giver, and often require reciprocation in some form. 210

211 The work of Richard Titmuss added significantly to the understanding of altruism. In his book The Gift Relationship (1997) he attempted to counter policies that 212 promoted the commodification of human blood. His primary aim was to advocate 213 voluntary blood donation, which allowed people the moral choice to give blood as 214 a 'symbolic gift of life to an unnamed stranger' (Titmuss 1997: 140). What might 215 216 be regarded as particularly altruistic was that the gift of blood was to unknown individuals. Hence, it was not given to those in close relationships to whom, in 217 Mauss's societies, one might turn in times of need. The only reward for the donors 218 was the knowledge that they had contributed to the public good. 219

One of Titmuss's most powerful arguments was that the opportunity to behave 220 221 altruistically was an essential human right. He believed that specific instruments of public policy were able to harness and encourage that crucial element of altru-222 ism in opposition to the 'possessive egoism of the marketplace' (Titmuss 1997: 223 59). His plea was that people should be enabled to choose to give to unnamed 224 strangers, and not be 'constrained by the market' (Titmuss 1997: 310). However, 225 226 whether the donation of blood is a true gift that expects no return, or instead creative altruism that fosters a sense of belonging to a community of assistance, is dif-227 228 ficult to establish (Scott and Seglow 2007: 111).

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Titmuss's plea has been echoed in more recent appeals for altruistic donation 229 (or solidarity) in the context of genetic research. Kåre Berg and Ruth Chadwick 230 talk about a 'duty to facilitate research progress and to provide knowledge 231 232 that could be crucial to the health of others' (Berg and Chadwick 2001: 320). Solidarity and equity are suggested as frameworks or paradigms in which the 233 emphasis is on the duty of individuals and communities to participate in health 234 research for the benefit of others. This approach might, however, contradict the 235 post-study obligations outlined in paragraphs 14 and 17 of the Declaration of 236 237 Helsinki (WMA 2008), as quoted above, given that these require benefit sharing.

Berg and Chadwick give two main reasons for preferring a solidarity framework over benefit sharing. First as noted above, no work is required to produce DNA or blood:

The populations, families and individuals, whose samples have formed the basis for new products and revenue, have not themselves done anything to make their samples 'valuable'... If anything, their samples have become valuable because of work conducted by scientists (Berg and Chadwick 2001: 320).

Second, 'the emphasis on distribution of benefits might be seen not as an exercise in ... justice, but as an attempt to buy people off' (Berg and Chadwick 2001: 321). The implication of 'buying people off' is that providing specific benefits to donors would entail the risk of unduly influencing individuals to participate in research. Such undue inducement is prohibited by almost all ethics guidelines, as is the commodification of the body (i.e. the possibility of obtaining money in return for body parts or bodily tissue).

It is difficult to see how the first point could be justified morally. At first it appears 252 as if it might be based on John Locke's widely accepted labour-desert theory. He 253 argued in the seventeenth century that ownership can be achieved if one mixes one's 254 labour with otherwise unowned objects. In the Second Treatise on Civil Government 255 he writes: 'As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the 256 product of, so much is his property' (Locke 1690: Chapter V, 'Of Property', sec-257 tion 32). For instance, if one looked after raspberry bushes on unowned land, one 258 might be able to declare ownership of the bushes after a period of time. But the 259 basis for Locke's theory is his belief that we all own our individual bodies. Hence, 260 the labour of geneticists is not mixed with unowned objects. Besides, if the sam-261 ples were not valuable in themselves, there would be no interest in obtaining them. 262 Assuming that value is only added later is reminiscent of debates prior to the adop-263 tion of the CBD. Vandana Shiva (2005: 15) wrote in this context: 264

[It is assumed] that prior to prospecting, the resources of desire were unknown, unused
and without value. Using terminology derived from earlier 'prospecting' for minerals and
fossil fuels, 'bioprospecting' obscures the fact that living resources are not non-renewable
and are not without value prior to exploitation by global commercial interests for global
markets.

Hence, to assume that value is only created through doing something with a resource, as scientists might, risks falling back into pre-CBD exploitative practices in relation to accessing the resources of developing countries. With the adoption of

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the CBD, it has been legally accepted that natural resources in developing countries are not unowned, only to become valuable with added (Western) labour. The fact that nobody has 'made' their own DNA is not therefore in itself an objection to benefit sharing.

The objection to benefit sharing which arises from prohibitions against undue 277 inducement and commodification of the body is more serious. At the same time, it 278 must be understood that benefit sharing does not mean handing over cash for DNA 279 samples, which could be regarded as straightforward commodification. The CBD's 280 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 281 Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization (see Chap. 2) lists considera-282 bly fewer monetary than non-monetary benefits. The latter include collaboration 283 in scientific research, collaboration in education and training, institutional capac-284 ity-building, access to scientific information, contributions to the local economy, 285 research directed towards priority needs, such as health and food security, liveli-286 hood security benefits and social recognition. 287

This brings us to an important point that helps us explain why research participants in the developing world should be treated differently from those in developed countries in relation to the governance of human biological resources. DNA donors from Northern countries generally benefit automatically from education and livelihood security benefits. Those contributing to medical research in the North can usually rest assured of (see Chap. 2):

- Access to ever-increasing numbers of medical interventions to achieve and maintain health, which are tailored to local health needs and (in principle) accessible to all
- Increased knowledge about human health, which is made available to citizens
   through general education or health campaigns.

299 Hence, the 'altruistic' donor in the North could be regarded as part of a community which offers a fair exchange model to such donors. People experience a 300 tangible form of reciprocity for their participation in the complex social and eco-301 nomic network encompassed by the health care system, reminiscent of a Maussian 302 society, ensuring the fairness of the entire exchange. Assured of far more than the 303 mere cup of tea and biscuit traditionally received by blood donors since Titmuss's 304 time, individuals from affluent countries might appear to be acting out of solidar-305 ity with their group, but their ostensible altruism is strongly bolstered by the fact 306 that their contribution is virtually risk-free, and reciprocation is provided through 307 the assurance of fair compensation via the health care system. 308

309 It is still the case that others may free-ride (type 1 exploitation, see Chap. 2) on the willingness of research participants to donate their time or even take risks. 310 In this regard, Berg and Chadwick (2001) are right to appeal for more solidarity 311 within communities. But it would be highly exploitative to demand such solidar-312 ity from donors who are outside the fair exchange model and who contribute their 313 314 DNA without receiving any benefit in return. Participants from an impoverished developing country are assured of none of the above benefits, and the use of their 315 donated genetic material for the benefit of affluent, distant strangers deserves 316

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critical attention, which returns us to the question: could research ethics commit-tees ensure compliance with post-study obligations (a form of benefit sharing), inorder to avoid burdening medical research with further governance structures?

320 As African bioethicist Godfrey Tangwa notes:

In medical research the principle of justice demands fairness in the treatment of individuals and communities and the equitable distribution of the burdens and benefits of research.
This has important implications for such issues as ... post-study benefits, and long term
access or distribution of the benefits of the study. These are the issues, which preoccupy
every research ethics committee sitting to review a health research protocol in Africa
today (Tangwa 2009: S5).

When assessing the question of how justice might be secured within current 327 regulatory frameworks, it is essential to distinguish between two types of bene-328 fit-sharing arrangements which have different compliance challenges associated 329 with them. First, we shall consider obstacles to enforcing post-study obligations 330 which aim to provide a successfully tested health care intervention to research 331 participants after the study has been concluded. We term this duty 'post-study 332 access'. Second, we shall analyse obstacles to enforcing the provision of benefits 333 not directly linked to the study, such as access to health care, support for the local 334 health infrastructure or health information campaigns. These will be referred to as 335 'other benefits'. We shall discuss first the challenges that apply to both benefit-336 sharing types, and then those that apply exclusively to either type. 337

#### 338 8.3 Post-study Access and Other Benefits

The following challenges to implementing a benefit-sharing framework of poststudy obligations apply both to giving research participants access to successfully tested interventions and to the provision of 'other benefits'.

#### 342 8.3.1 Whose Duty?

The Declaration of Helsinki does not specify whose obligation it is to discharge post-study obligations. Is it the duty of individual researchers? After all, they are the interface between sample donors on the one hand and research studies on the other. They are also the ones with the most to gain, aside from research participants. Unlike physicians, whose prime duty is the promotion and safeguarding of patient health, researchers have potentially competing obligations to their sponsors, as well as aspirations to achieve scientific progress.

While the Declaration of Helsinki clearly stipulates that '[i]n medical research involving human subjects, the well-being of the individual research subject must take precedence over all other interests' (WMA 2008: paragraph 6), such 'other interests' cannot be ignored altogether. What is, however, identical in the two relationships – that

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between doctor and patient and that between researcher and research participant – is that trust plays a major role and the relationship is often highly personal.

356 The breaking off of a relationship between researcher and research participant can be very difficult, even traumatic. If, as is frequently the case in the developing 357 world, participation in a research study is the only way to access health care, then 358 the end of a study implies the end of health care. In particular, researchers work-359 ing with AIDS patients often find it difficult to withdraw in the knowledge that 360 those patients are likely to die from a treatable disease (Shapiro and Benatar 2005: 361 362 45). Needless to say, the sense of abandonment for the research participant is even stronger, especially when the study provided the only access to health care. In the 363 worst cases, the end of the research results in death. 364

It is in this context that post-study obligations to research participants are advo-365 cated. Focus group research conducted among patients, clinical researchers and 366 research administrators in Kenya showed that all stakeholders believed strongly 367 that researchers had a long-term obligation to participants. 'The rationale behind 368 this belief - whether fear of death, inability to continue therapy, or an ethical 369 obligation – warrants attention' (Shaffer et al. 2006: 55). Focusing on the ethical 370 371 obligations, one would argue that research participants, having contributed to the advancement of knowledge, deserve some benefit in return. This aligns with the 372 argument for non-exploitation as advocated throughout this book. 373

Importantly, though, a number of participants in the focus groups noted specifically that the loss of access to health care would result in a general loss of trust between research participants and researchers, potentially making the community unwilling to participate in research at all (NBAC 2001: 59). Both sides consider it unacceptable to abandon, at the end of a study, research participants who are in dire need of medical attention.

In terms of who has how much invested in the relationship, it might therefore make sense to allocate post-study obligations to researchers. However, these could also be among the duties of research funders and sponsors, who, one would assume, are best placed to find the resources to discharge such obligations.

One of the few countries with binding national law on post-study obligations is Brazil (see Chap. 3). In 1997, a resolution by that country's National Health Council set the following stipulation:

Access to the medicine being tested must be assured by the sponsor or by the institution,
 researcher, or promoter, if there is no sponsor, in the event its superiority to the conven tional treatment is proven (National Health Council 1997: article IV.1(m)).

390 The Declaration of Helsinki lacks a similarly clear assignment of duties to a specified group. One might argue that this allows the flexibility needed in guide-391 lines that must apply all over the world. In practice, however, this flexibility is 392 partly responsible for the ineffectiveness of the guideline and the concomitant lack 393 of good practice examples for post-study obligations. If the commitment to benefit 394 395 sharing re-emphasized in the 2008 Declaration of Helsinki is to be effective, then research ethics committees need to know whose duty it is to provide access to suc-396 cessfully tested interventions or 'other benefits' in order to ensure compliance. 397

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#### 398 8.3.2 Insufficient Capacity for Review

Concerns about workload and personnel resources are factors that detract from 399 the effectiveness of research ethics committees even in affluent settings (Schuppli 400 and Fraser 2007). It is therefore not surprising that ethics committees in develop-401 ing countries often lack the resources to give adequate attention to ethical review. 402 A study published in 2009 that examined the effectiveness and training needs of 403 African research ethics committees concluded that the 'major constraints identi-404 fied are shortage of resources and inadequate training of the ERC ethical review 405 committee] members' (Nyika et al. 2009: 193). The study also summarized the 406 constraints hindering the adequate review of study protocols in African settings. 407 Table 8.1 lists the constraints in order of perceived gravity: that is, the first con-408 straint is the one noted by the highest number of respondents. 409

Other studies have also shown that 'the capacity to conduct ethical review in 410 developing countries needs to be developed or enhanced' (Hyder et al. 2004). 411 Evidently, insufficient resources, lack of expertise and so on can render the protection 412 of human research participants unreliable or even non-existent. Under these circum-413 stances, it is unlikely that research ethics committees in developing countries would 414 be in a position to enforce the requirement of benefit sharing. In order to carry out 415 this task, they would need investment in both infrastructure and training. As the next 416 subsection will show, this issue is particularly problematic when research ethics com-417 mittees in the country of the research funder or sponsor are likely to ignore the obli-418 gation. Encouragingly, though, a funding stream from the European and Developing 419 Countries Clinical Trials Partnership is successfully funding the establishment of new 420 ethics committees in Africa and capacity-building for existing committees.<sup>6</sup> 421

#### 422 8.3.3 US Withdrawal from Post-study Obligations

The previous chapter suggested that an expansion of the provisions of the CBD to include human biological resources would close an important gap in the international legal framework. It would establish an *inclusive* approach to biodiversity, both human and non-human, bring legal clarity to a contentious area and, most importantly, provide a way forward when a spectrum of genetic resources are used by various industries (e.g. when a product is developed using plant and human genetic resources).

As noted in the beginning of this chapter, the US is virtually the only country that is not a party to the CBD. At the same time, the US is the leading innovation economy in the world. For instance, the *2011 World Intellectual Property Indicators* showed that 24% of all patents world-wide were granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office (WIPO 2011). In 2008, however, the US government effectively

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> See the partnership's website at http://www.edctp.org.

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Table 8.1	Constraints on African Research Ethics Committees
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Insufficient resources	
Expertise on ethical review lacking	
Pressure from researchers	
Lack of active or consistent participation by members	
Lack of recognition of importance of committee functions	
Lack of support from institute concerned	
Insufficient independence	
Pressure from sponsors	
Unequal treatment of applicants in review	

Source Nyika et al. (2009) (modified)

opted out of the Declaration of Helsinki when the US Food and Drug Administration 435 discontinued its reliance on the declaration and issued independent Guidelines for 436 Good Clinical Practice. The new guidelines omit the two standard benefit-sharing 437 principles of the Declaration of Helsinki, namely post-study access to successfully 438 tested interventions and the requirement that research, particularly in developing 439 countries, must benefit local communities and be responsive to local health needs 440 (Kimmelman et al. 2009). This means that US government requirements for the treat-441 ment of research participants are now in direct conflict with the prescriptions of the 442 443 Declaration of Helsinki (aside from the fact that the US is not a party to the CBD).

This development could mean that US research ethics committees (or institutional 444 review boards) will in general put less pressure on researchers to describe compliance 445 with post-study obligations in study protocols than their international counterparts 446 that fully subscribe to the Declaration of Helsinki. While this is a serious concern, 447 448 resource provider states are not entirely powerless in relation to compliance where they rely on ethics review. US researchers, like any others, require local ethics review 449 in order to access human genetic resources. Such local ethics review (for instance 450 in Kenya, Thailand or Bolivia) can, if well informed and decisive enough, provide 451 approval only on condition that benefits to research participants and local communi-452 453 ties are explicitly articulated. This strategy presents a distinct advantage over CBD expansion. In fact, strong ethics committees or national legislation in developing 454 countries (see for instance Brazil's benefit-sharing legislation as outlined in Chap. 3) 455 can enforce benefit-sharing compliance *now*, without additional legal frameworks. 456

#### 457 8.3.4 Timeliness of Research

458 A related advantage of utilizing ethics review to achieve benefit-sharing compli-459 ance is that the procedure needs to be undertaken by researchers in any case. For 460 instance, informed consent documentation and risk-benefit ratios will always be 461 checked by an ethics review committee whether or not benefit sharing is *also* regu-462 lated through independent mechanisms. Adding benefit-sharing information to that

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already required in the protocol in terms of the Declaration of Helsinki puts only alimited extra burden on the existing approval process.

Assuming that benefit-sharing requirements for human research participants 465 were to be regulated through the CBD framework, another approval process would 466 have to be added. According to Laird and Wynberg (2008), '[t]he negotiation of 467 consent and benefit sharing agreements between those who access and those who 468 provide non-human genetic resources takes on average 1-2 years and sometimes 469 longer' This would be a significant additional burden with considerable impact on 470 the timeliness of research. Especially in health research, such delays can be highly 471 detrimental to global public health and individual patients. 472

#### 473 8.4 Post-study Access

The constraints we have listed so far concern enforcing the provision of post-study access to successfully tested interventions and 'other benefits'. However, some challenges are limited to ensuring post-study access.

#### 477 8.4.1 Unrealistic Timeframe for Post-study Access

By the time a post-study obligation becomes relevant, some of the researchers 478 involved are likely to have left the study site and even the country. In 'helicop-479 ter research' (flying in and out of locations, for instance in a current epidemic), 480 researchers leave as soon as the data is obtained. Many research units have long-481 standing collaborations with host countries, but some do not, leaving research eth-482 ics committees with no recourse to researchers after the completion of their study. 483 In any case, it takes on average a decade to bring a drug to market (Trade and 484 Industry Select Committee 2002). To be required to return to participants a decade 485 after the study to see whether they are in need of the developed intervention is 486 rather unrealistic and cumbersome to say the least. More importantly, for the pur-487 poses of this chapter, it would be highly unrealistic to expect research ethics com-488 mittees to ensure compliance ten years after a project's completion. 489

# 490 8.4.2 Inbuilt Unfairness in Post-study Access: The Research 491 Participant

Research ethics committees aim to protect *all* human research participants from exploitation, not just some.

Failure rates in drug development are extremely high. Of those developments that make it into clinical trials, 38% fail Phase I (safety), 60% of the remainder fail

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Phase II (basic efficacy), 40% of the rest fail Phase III (comprehensive efficacy) and 23% of those still in the running will not be approved by the relevant health agency (Lowe 2004). As a result, the chances for any individual participant that the particular research she or he was involved in will actually lead to a marketable product are very slim, particularly for donors of biological materials in the early phases of research, and participants in Phase I and II drug trials.

Even if post-study access could be assured a decade after a study's completion, 502 503 it would only benefit those research participants lucky enough to have been part of bench-to-bed research which overcame all hurdles smoothly. But since those whose 504 participation shows that a product is unsafe or not efficacious contribute as much to 505 medical research as their luckier counterparts, one cannot argue that only the latter 506 are entitled to benefit sharing – and there is no way to predict which participants 507 508 will fall into which category. By the time a research ethics committee can establish which participants will not have an option of post-study access, it is likely to be too 509 late to ensure any other benefits either. The committees are therefore restricted in 510 their ability to provide equitable protection for *all* research participants. 511

A related problem is that of involvement in basic research, which is not likely to lead directly to any new medical interventions. In this case, however, research ethics committees could opt for the choice of 'other benefits' from the start.

## 515 8.4.3 Inbuilt Unfairness in Post-study Access and Possible 516 Side Effects

It has been argued that imposing post-study obligations on researchers or their sponsors could mean that developing country research focused on local health needs would not be undertaken due to prohibitive costs (Brody 2002: 2857; McMillan and Conlon 2004: 206). One could respond with Solomon Benatar that '[r]equiring greater sensitivity to the plight of the poor and some degree of solidarity with them is not an excessive moral requirement' (Shapiro and Benatar 2005: 42).

However, this could mean that attempts to achieve compliance with the ben-523 524 efit-sharing regulations of the Declaration of Helsinki in order to achieve justice for resource providers in line with the CBD might be self-defeating. Currently, 525 the demand to provide post-study access to successfully tested interventions 526 applies equally to researchers who are using charitable funds to develop drugs 527 for neglected diseases that only exist in, say, South East Asia, and pharmaceuti-528 529 cal companies running clinical trials in developing countries for diseases that are prevalent and widespread in the North. However, the former is arguably not a case 530 of exploitation, whereas the latter could be. Benefit sharing is intended to be an 531 instrument to mitigate such exploitation. Yet if the mechanism is so coarse that it 532 makes valuable (and arguably non-exploitative) research prohibitively costly, then 533 534 enforcing benefit sharing through ethics review could undermine global efforts to realise access to locally tailored health care. In this case, the global injustice in 535

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terms of access to health care could deepen rather than lessen, and concentratingon smaller details could cause the bigger picture to be overlooked.

Based on the three challenges to post-study access discussed above, one could venture that 'other benefits' may be a more promising and consistent benefit-sharing tool for research ethics committees to require.

#### 541 **8.5 Other Benefits**

In practice, when benefit sharing is addressed through ethics review, 'other benefits' are generally thought to be a more realistic arrangement than post-study access. The most common example of this type of benefit sharing is access to health care during a study, as was and is the case for the Majengo sex workers (see Chap. 5). However, there are two problems here.

First, the latest (2008) Declaration of Helsinki may inadvertently have restricted the use of 'other benefits' as a benefit-sharing mechanism. The 2004 declaration required study protocols to include information on post-trial access or 'other benefits', and imposed no restrictions on what might constitute 'other benefits'. It did not exclude, for example, health care during or after a study. By contrast, paragraph 33 of the 2008 declaration states:

At the conclusion of the study, patients ... are entitled ... to share any benefits that result
 from it, for example, access to interventions identified as beneficial in the study or to other
 appropriate care or benefits' (WMA 2008: paragraph 33) (our emphasis).

This formulation aligns with the general usage of terms, as one usually speaks of *post*-study obligations. However, it means that comprehensive health care delivered *during* a study, even a longitudinal study, is no longer included under 'other benefits' as a benefit-sharing mechanism.<sup>7</sup> Yet many of the Nairobi sex workers interviewed in the course of our research indicated that access to health care was an important benefit they received in return for donating samples (see Box 8.1).

Box 8.1 Comments from sex workers in Majengo on the provision of free health care<sup>8</sup>
I don't pay for the medicine. I don't do anything with respect to them but

- I don't pay for the medicine, I don't do anything with respect to them, but they give me medicine. When I get some little ailment, they help me.
- I came and joined the clinic and I have been helped a lot. I used to have

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Of course, one could argue that comprehensive health care during a study offers too little in terms of benefit sharing. However, where comprehensive health care is offered to study participants and their families, sometimes for decades, as is the case with some Nairobi sex workers, the fair exchange model available to donors from affluent countries is being approximated.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Interviews with Majengo research participants, GenBenefit, April 2007.

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567	bad headaches, you know when your immunity goes down you get other
568	ailments and they are worse than normal but once you know your sta-
569 570	tus you can come and be treated quickly before it gets worse So I'm grateful to this clinic, it has done us a lot of good.
570 571	<ul> <li>Yes, treatment. I get it for free; if they want to carry out some research</li> </ul>
572	and they need blood they give us bus fare because the appointed day may
573	come to take your blood or urine sample and you may not be able because
574	you don't have bus fare.
575	• I expected treatment, free of charge. Every time I fall sick I come for
576	treatment and it's free. • They just passed by talling people on the streats, and I learned there is
577	• They just passed by telling people on the streets, and I learned there is
578	a clinic for helping people to detect diseases and in return they use your blood for research. We agreed that it is OK.
579	<ul><li>You see, they usually check us down there to see how we are getting on;</li></ul>
580 581	you could be developing something. So you get to know about it early
582	enough and save yourself. That for me is a benefit.
583	<ul><li>No, I did not expect money or such things, just treatment.</li></ul>
584	<ul> <li>They give us free medicine because of the nature of our work. If you have</li> </ul>
585	a problem they help you.
586	<ul><li>Because that is what I need. That is what is important, they give me what</li></ul>
587	I would otherwise not be able to get [treatment].
588	• I was told I would get benefits of [testing for and treatment of] communi-
589	cable diseases. If I am found with them, I would be treated, there is a doc-
590	tor here, and there is medicine
591	• Yes, I am satisfied because when I come here I get a cheerful doctor who
592	I can confide in without fear and tell her about my pains, and when I have
593	problems there is a counsellor I can go and talk to and [s]he counsels me
594	until I am satisfied I like this clinic because since we realized the ben-
595	efits of the clinic, we try to bring many people so that they too can ben-
596	efit. And the benefits I get from this clinic have also helped me in doing
597	my work. I can protect myself against infections according to how we are
598	advised at the clinic and I also teach others so that they can protect them-
599	selves too.
600	• We have a very nice doctor, sisters, they all welcome us in the clinic.
601	• For me I see that the benefits I would expect is treatment because what-
602	ever kind of sickness I get I am treated. So this clinic has a lot of benefits.
603	• I don't think there should be any other kind of benefits we are given
604	free medicine, free treatment.
605	• I think it's forever, because there are some women I have heard saying
606	they have been here since 1986. So it can go on forever, that is so long as
607	you are going to sponsor it [Interviewer: So you will be getting these free
608	services forever?] Yes, hopefully! God willing. [Laughter].
609	• I don't know what I will do if they close down.

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If the emphasis in the Declaration of Helsinki is on *post*-sharing of benefits, some of the challenges of securing post-study access (for example, the unrealistic timeframe) would now also apply to 'other benefits'. In other words, if only those benefits delivered *after* a study is completed count towards benefit sharing, seeking compliance through an ethics review committee could become difficult, as the committee usually ceases its monitoring work once the research is complete.

Second, offering access to health care as a benefit to participants could violate 616 undue inducement prohibitions, a topic we have considered before (see Chaps. 2 617 and 5). When undertaking research on economically disadvantaged or otherwise 618 vulnerable populations possibly suffering from hunger or malnutrition, and lack-619 ing access even to elementary health care, any prospect of health care (for exam-620 ple, a general check-up as part of being enlisted in a study) can be regarded as 621 an undue inducement. It is no surprise that UNESCO's Universal Declaration on 622 623 Bioethics and Human Rights includes two requirements of benefit sharing: first, that '[b]enefits resulting from any scientific research and its applications should be 624 shared with society as a whole and within the international community, in particular 625 with developing countries', but, secondly, that those '[b]enefits should not consti-626 tute improper inducements to participate in research' (UNESCO 2005: article 15). 627

Some international guidelines, such as the International Ethical Guidelines 628 for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects issued by the Council for 629 International Organizations of Medical Science (CIOMS), accept that research 630 participants may receive free medical services. However, CIOMS also notes that 631 these services should not be 'so extensive as to induce prospective subjects to con-632 sent to participate in the research against their better judgment' (CIOMS 2002: 633 guideline 7). And research has shown – unsurprisingly – that the need to access 634 medical services can amount to pressure to join research studies in developing 635 countries. One cannot reliably determine how many participants actually take part 636 'against their better judgement', but it is clear that many feel they effectively have 637 no choice. As one of the Majengo research participants said, 'I don't know what I 638 will do if they close down.' 639

When 347 Ugandan parents with children enrolled in a malaria study were asked whether they had felt coerced to join, more than half said they had 'felt pressure to enrol their children because of the child's sickness' (Pace and Emanuel 2005). As Annas and Grodin (1998) have formulated it,

644 in the absence of health care, virtually any offer of medical assistance (even in the guise
645 of research) will be accepted as 'better than nothing' and research will almost inevitably
646 be confused with treatment.

Ironically, strict prohibitions against undue inducement lead to a rather paradoxical result. The poorer a community is, the smaller the benefits that can be offered without potentially exercising undue influence on the decision to participate. The conflict here occurs because participants are meant to be protected against undue inducement on the one hand and exploitation on the other. Yet limiting benefit-sharing possibilities gives research sponsors who outsource research to developing countries a convenient 'ethical' argument for limiting the benefits to

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study participants (Ballantyne 2008: 190). As long as this paradox remains unresolved, ethics committees will not be in a position to decide definitively whether the 'other benefits' in a given case constitute benefit sharing or an undue inducement. This makes it extremely difficult for committees to play their governance role successfully.

The authors of this chapter are continuing their research on the potential ten-659 sion between benefit sharing for human genetic resources and undue inducement. 660 They are already satisfied, however, that it is possible to provide benefit sharing 661 while avoiding undue inducement. The commodification of the body can indeed 662 open up further opportunities for exploitation, especially in developing coun-663 tries. An example would be paid surrogate pregnancy, when Indian mothers, for 664 instance, carry babies for affluent mothers in the North (Taneja 2008). But such 665 commodification can be avoided by prohibiting one-to-one financial gain from a 666 research transaction. If individual donors for DNA were given no cash except for 667 legitimate expenses, the risk of undue inducement would be much reduced. 668

What, then, might legitimate benefit sharing that avoids undue inducement look like? Here it is important to look at two of the main reasons for legislating against undue inducement (see Chap. 2): namely, that research participants might accept a risk (usually to their health) that would not otherwise be acceptable, and that they would then participate in research against their better judgement.

It has already been noted that the donation of human genetic resources carries 674 minimal risk and imposes a minimal burden.<sup>9</sup> Hence, the foundation of the undue 675 inducement principle does not apply to access to genetic resources in the same 676 way as it applies to enrolling in Phase I clinical trials. If risk reduction can only be 677 achieved by restricting benefits to research participants (as, for instance, in bur-678 densome, risky trials involving healthy volunteers), minimal risk studies can con-679 centrate more on benefit sharing than misplaced concerns about undue 680 681 inducement. Access to health care for research participants and their local communities is therefore the ideal benefit to be shared with the donors of human biologi-682 cal resources. Through such benefit sharing, they would come one step closer to 683 the fair exchange model that exists between medical researchers in the North and 684 their research participants. Global research without borders would then contribute 685 686 to global justice without borders when it comes to access to health care. At least some additional access to health care, some new health care facilities and some 687 health care training and education could be achieved this way. 688

At the same time, it is essential to note that benefit sharing cannot resolve deepseated issues of distributive injustice or human rights issues that render national governments unable to respect, protect, and fulfil the human right to access to health care. For this reason, we shall present in Chap. 9 an example of a reform plan that provides a way forward for increasing the availability of life-saving medicines for the poor, with the potential to close the health care gap between developing and developed countries.

 $<sup>^9</sup>$  Some exceptions, as outlined in Chap. 2 xx, would have to be dealt with separately, for instance where blood might have sacred meaning.

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#### 696 8.6 Conclusion

Can compliance with benefit-sharing obligations as outlined in the Declaration of Helsinki be achieved through ethical review? As we have seen, the obstacles are manifold. In particular, post-study access does not seem to be a promising scenario, given the unrealistic timeframes and the potential for injustice. 'Other benefits' are a more realistic option, in particular the provision of comprehensive health care during long-term studies. In order to strengthen the capacity of ethics review to ensure benefit sharing, we submit the following recommendations:

Research ethics committees and other parties need to know whose duty it is to discharge post-study obligations. This could be specified in the Declaration of Helsinki, Specification in national law (as in Brazil) is another possibility. Solutions should be integrated with local health systems in developing countries so that research sponsors and local authorities understand their specific roles in providing health care to populations.

 Effective research ethics committees require adequate resources, training and time to fulfil their important roles. As studies have shown, this cannot be taken for granted in developing countries. There is already a pressing need to facilitate

innovative ways of offering training and education in research ethics. As well as supporting
and enhancing current training programmes it will be essential to build up a cadre of trainers
located in developing scountries, as well as establishing a process of mentoring for local ethics committees (Bhutta 2004).

 In addition, further ways of providing financial support to ethics committees in developing countries need to be found.

Applying post-study obligations to all types of research without further refinement would be unlikely to achieve broad acceptance of the duties entailed and may even lead to new injustices, in particular if valuable publicly funded research tailored to Type III diseases<sup>10</sup> were abandoned in developing countries.
 Such research could attract exemptions or waivers from post-study obligations, as they already comply with fairness requirements.

The tension between benefit sharing and undue inducement needs to be resolved 725 for developing countries. The ideal solution would be the global success of the 726 fair exchange model between the health care industry, human research partici-727 pants and national governments: human research participants show solidarity 728 with others (Knoppers 2000; Berg and Chadwick 2001) by taking part in medi-729 cal research and are rewarded, like their fellow citizens, with the fruits of medi-730 cal progress, generated through industry and partly funded through national 731 governments. In such circumstances, concerns about undue inducements would 732 be restricted to substantial monetary rewards and other excessive remunerations. 733 However, as long as this ideal solution remains no more than an aspira-734 •

tion, ways must be found to avoid the exploitation of research participants in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Type III diseases are those that occur exclusively or overwhelmingly in poor countries.

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developing countries. One such way is to promote access to health care, as well
as health care training and education, as a standard and legitimate means of
sharing benefits for research involving minimal risk. To substantiate this recommendation, one could argue that CIOMS supports it indirectly.

When research interventions or procedures that do not hold out the prospect of direct
benefit present more than minimal risk, all parties involved in the research – sponsors,
investigators and ethical review committees – in both funding and host countries should
be careful to avoid undue material inducement (CIOMS 2002: guideline 7, commentary).

- In other words, concerns about undue inducement which essentially aim to avoid a situation where participants take risks with their health, against their better judgement, in order to qualify for a benefit are much less problematic when a research intervention poses only minimal risk (for example, sample donation). In such cases, the provision of health care (however extensive and for however long) should not count as an undue inducement. On the contrary, it should count as desirable benefit sharing.
- Overall, it is important not to lose sight of the bigger picture when discussing 751 benefit sharing. Research sponsors and funders are, after all, not the main duty 752 bearers for providing health care to those who cannot afford it. It is essential 753 to support and strengthen the capacity of national governments to discharge 754 their duties with regard to the right to health. Such support efforts should go 755 far beyond the monitoring of post-study obligations through research ethics 756 committees and concentrate on other factors, for instance the fact that - with 757 reference to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 758 Rights (TRIPS) and free trade agreements (FTAs) – 'TRIPS and FTAs have had 759 an adverse impact on prices and availability of medicines, making it difficult for 760 countries to comply with their obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil the right 761 to health' (Grover 2009: paragraph 94). The next chapter will introduce a reform 762 plan which aims to contribute a part-solution to this problem. 763
- Last, but not least, Martin Luther King's country of birth, the United States,
   should be put under pressure for opting out of the benefit-sharing frameworks of
   the CBD and the Declaration of Helsinki.

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