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Title of the thesis is '**The perception between the Pro-Islamic and Pro-Kurdish Political streams in Turkey, 1980-2011**'.

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Abstract

Official state ideology (Kemalism) whose core principles are Turkish nationalism and secularism excluded Kurds and Islamists from the newly formed social and political structure of modern Turkey. By insisting on a Kemalist modernization project in which assimilation of Kurdish ethnic identity within Turkish nationalism, and a top down imposition of secular policies on public and state affairs, Turkey has had to deal with two profound issues—the Kurdish question, and political Islam. As these social and political rivals of official state ideology present an alternative way of modernization projects, the Kemalist state apparatus has until recently considered their existence and development within Turkish society as a menace to their core existence.

That is why the nearly century-long Kurdish question and Islamism (reactionism-gericilik) have occupied the agenda. The striking point of this reality of Turkey is that while Kurdish nationalist and Islamist social and political groups, whether they are legal or illegal, have sought to supersede the official state ideology with their understandings, they have never united or operated joint activities against their, roughly speaking, enemy. The research, because of this focuses on the reasons why these two social and political groups in Turkey did not work together to eliminate their common rival.

Regarding pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic groups, ideological distinctiveness and rigidity led them to consider each other as a part of or as an extension of official state ideology which tries to eliminate its rivals. Despite the fact that they both ideologically and practically confirmed the existence of repression towards Kurds and religious people, the leftist-oriented pro-Kurdish political stream considered religion as a component of denial and assimilationist policy of official state ideology, so that they did not differentiate between Islamist groups and the established state structure, whereas the pro-Islamic political stream refused to co-operate with any member of the leftist-oriented pro-Kurdish stream because of its secular characteristic.

The reaction of these groups towards assimilation of Kurdish ethnic origin, and repression over religion, initially embodied itself in several uprisings and revolts in the Kurdish populated eastern areas of Turkey, and religiously sensitive cities, respectively. Thanks to the multi-party system, these groups have found a way in which they can express themselves through political parties, labour unions, associations and foundations so that they have become social movements forcing the Kemalism dominated state to meet their demands. As long as these demands are not met, the interaction between these two social movements and the official state

ideology has been hostile. Within this process, the hostile approach to their common enemy reflected in each other's activities and understandings as they see each other as a part of official state ideology. In the next phase in which their transformation from social movements to a legal political stream competed, the inherited ideological rigidity between pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political streams preserved itself.

Overall, the research will indicate that since the mid-20th century, ideological barriers between pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic streams have become the fundamental determinant of how they perceive each other.

Key Words: Pro-Kurdish political stream, Pro-Islamic political stream, Kurdish question, Islamism

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Abbreviations

Most of the abbreviations are as below, which are chosen in accordance with the most common use of them within the literature.

AKP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)

ARMHC Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafai Hukuk Cemiyeti (The Committee of Defence of Anatolia and Rumelia)

BDP Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party)

CDA Critical Discourse Analysis

CHP Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People Party, RPP)

CUP Committee of Union and Progress (İttihad ve Terakki Partisi)

DEHAP Demokratik Halk Partisi (Democratic People Party)

DEP Demokrasi Partisi (Democracy Party)

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Directorate of Religious Affairs-DRA)

DP Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party)

DTP Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society Party)

FP Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party)

HADEP Halkın Demokrasi Partisi (People's Democracy Party)

HEP Halkın Emek Partisi- (People's Labour Party)

Hürriyet and İtilaf Fırkası (Freedom and Accord Party, FAP)

JP Justice Party (Adalet Partisi)

KDPT Kurdistan Demokrat Partisi- Türkiye (Kurdistan Democrat Party in Turkey)

KSHS Kurdish Student-Hope Society (Kürt Talebe-Hevi Cemiyeti)

MHP Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party)

MNP Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party)

MSP Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party)

ÖZDEP Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi (Freedom and Democracy Party)

PKK Kurdistan İşçi Partisi (Kurdistan Labour Party- Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan in Kurdish)

RP Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)

SMT Social Movement Theory

SP Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party)

SRK the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan (Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti)

SRPK Society for Rise and Progress of Kurdistan (Kürdistan Teali ve Terakki Cemiyeti)

TWP Turkey Worker Party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi)

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INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Turkey was established from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire and has been seen as the main successor state of the former empire. From the early Republic to the present, Turkey has had two significant fundamental issues to struggle with—Islam as a religion, and the Kurds as an ethnically distinct population living within. Islam was perceived to be a major obstacle since the latter stage of the Empire because it was perceived as being a source of backwardness vis-a-vis European powers. This perception has continued through to the foundation of modern Turkey. Therefore, ruling elites of modern Turkey spent a significant amount of effort trying to prevent re-emergence of the religion into the official political arena by passing special laws eliminating Islamic symbols and reminders. The new regime was, in practice, mostly successful in the annihilation of the social and political power of religion especially in the time span from consolidation of the single party regime until the mid-20th century. Yet, it is arguably impossible to preclude religious sentiments of people forever, and infant religious movements emerged by the 1950s. This trend has gradually grown and an Islamic-rooted party, whether it is named as being political Islamist or conservative, has now been in charge of Turkey for the last decade.

The presence of the Kurdish, of ethnic origin, constituted the other significant issue that compelled the founder of modern Turkey to put some precautions in operation to obstruct the emergence of a Kurdish nationalist movement, and also to implement a radical Turkish nationalism. Several Kurdish revolts occurred as a backlash towards secularization and nationalization processes in the single party era, but none of them succeeded. Atatürk and his close associates, the founders of modern Turkey, used religion to bind Kurdish people to the Turkish nation as their religious brothers in the course of the War of Independence, but excluded them while establishing the structure of the state just after. Interestingly, in spite of several Kurdish uprisings in the Republican era, there was no nationalist revolt embraced by all Kurdish, but eventually and inevitably, radical nationalist Kurdish organizations including political parties were founded in late 1970s. This remains significant in domestic, regional and international terms.

These two issues have been fundamental issues since the establishment of modern Turkey. The striking fact is that in Turkish political history, these two aspects meant to be erased in social, political, cultural and even economic arenas by Republican ruling elites, but in fact, recently they have become two major political groups with tremendous influence on Turkish politics. This condition attracted my attention while I was reading about political Islam in Turkey and I started to wonder as to how these factions perceive each other, and how this perception reflects itself onto, or affects, Turkish politics. This question and the issues around it are the main questions of this research.

On the one hand, Islamic sentiments in Turkey never fully disappeared—they had remained overtly apolitical, but still maintained their presence. For instance, the religious movement of Said-i Nursi and several tariqahs (religious orders) such as Naqhsibedi, Ticani and Qadiri have stayed silent until the advent of a multi-party system in the 1950s, and within the ongoing years they sometimes co-operated with the mainstream conservative parties. In addition, the Milli Selamet Partisi¹ (MSP-National Salvation Party), which can be considered as an early iteration of the political Islamic movement in Turkey was founded by Necmettin Erbakan due to the fact that its final target was making Islamic rules the common law of Turkey, and turning back to the religious sources to re-establish an Islamic order.

On the other hand, after the brutal suppression of Kurdish ethnic identity in the single party era, Kurdish nationalism gained a greater space in which they could breathe more oxygen than before in the multi-party era, but their ethnic identity was still denied by the official state ideology. As a result, Kurdish nationalism could not form its own political party; instead, it placed itself into the centre-right, or conservative, and leftist political parties. By the 1980s an illegal armed organization, the PKK² (Kürdistan İşçi Partisi- Kurdistan Worker Party), surfaced via a struggle against the state and afterwards, by the 1990s, pro-Kurdish legal political parties have had a chance to organize without officially mentioning their Kurdishness.

¹ Just before the Milli Selamet Partisi, established in 1972, Necmettin Erbakan formed another political party, named the Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP- National Order Party) in 1970, but it was closed because of 1970 coup d'état in Turkey.

² The abbreviation of the PKK originally comes from its Kurdish name, which is 'Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan.'

These groups suffered from the official state ideology, namely Kemalism, or Atatürkçülük. Roughly speaking, by relying on the concept that ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’, it would suggest that these two political groups should have come together against the official state ideology denying Islamic legacy as well as Kurdish ethnic origin. They might have come together in conservative or leftist political parties and there could have been a tangible improvement in the political history of Turkey. Based on the fact that none of these groups ever worked together, it is obvious that they do not perceive each other as friends. This lets me move on to my main research question, which is how pro-Kurdish³ and pro-Islamic political⁴ streams perceive each other specifically over the Kurdish question in Turkey.

Contributions of the Research

Nowadays, the political atmosphere in Turkey is concerned with solving or at least dealing with the Kurdish question. The main actors in that process are the Peace and Democracy Party representing the pro-Kurdish side, and the Justice and Development Party, representing the pro-Islamic side. This research will definitely contribute to the politics in Turkey by illustrating the history of the relations between Kurdish and Islamic streams, and the analysis obtained from the research will provide a kind of road map of the current and future political condition of Turkey.

In general, the research might contribute to the relations between a minority group and an Islamic movement in any country. The research is believed to contribute an ideological examination of Middle Eastern, specifically, of Turkish, societies. By emphasizing their similarities, it is going to be seen that by targeting a global good as their eventual goal for humanity, it can also be

³ What I mean by saying the pro-Kurdish political stream is legal pro-Kurdish political parties starting with the establishment of HEP (Halkın Emek Partisi- People’s Labour Party) and continues with ÖZDEP (Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi- Freedom and Democracy Party), DEP (Demokrasi Partisi –Democracy Party), HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi- People’s Democracy Party), DEHAP (Demokratik Halk Partisi- Democratic People Party), DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi- Democratic Society Party) and BDP (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi-Peace and Democracy Party). Except last one, the rest of them were banned by the Constitutional Court in Turkey. Since they are successor political parties with more or less the same mentality of being pro-Kurdish, I have named this continuation as ‘pro-Kurdish political stream. With the same token, Ruşen Çakır, a prominent columnist and an expert on Kurdish politics in Turkey defines this ongoing political tradition from HEP in 1990s to current BDP as ‘Legal Kurdish Political Movement’ (Yasal Kürt Siyasi Hareketi) (2011, p.4).

⁴ While I am articulating with the phrase of ‘pro-Islamic political stream’, I mean the same as in the case of pro-Kurdish political stream, which began with the MNP (Milli Nizam Partisi- National Order Party), continued as the MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi-National Salvation Party), the RP (Refah Partisi-Welfare Party), the FP (Fazilet Partisi-Virtue Party) and then divided into two as the SP (Saadet Partisi-Felicity Party) and the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi- Justice and Development Party).

considered as a major point towards which they can both work, at least from a practical point of view. Furthermore, their common issues, e.g. asking for benefits on behalf of oppressed groups, could remove or at least refine ideological barriers preventing people who are from different, even opposing ideas, uniting to benefit, at least, social science, and specifically, the Kurdish question in Turkey.

Furthermore, the main reason that I have delved into such a research question is my hope that it would also make a contribution to the field of the studies related to the Kurdish question and Islamism in Turkey. I am ethnically a Kurd and also have a religious background. These two significant identities directed me to search for any sort of co-operation between Kurdish ethnic politics and religious politics in terms of replacing the official state ideology. I realized that there is almost nothing in which they unite in order to have a more robust stand against repressive Kemalist implications. That is why I personally want to look towards researching the reasons why they never worked together. I have concluded that they perceive each other as rivals and not as another repressed group.

The possible readers of the research might be academicians and students at every level, as well as decision makers in Turkey in order to find out how perception affects their practices in terms of delivering local and national policies.

Limitations

I will limit my research to the pro-Islamic political parties (the National Salvation Party, the National Order Party, the Welfare Party, the Virtue Party, and finally the Justice and Development Party) and the pro-Kurdish legal political parties (People's Labour Party, Democracy Party, People's Democracy Party, Democratic People Party, Democratic Society Party, and finally Peace and Democracy Party). As these parties are the continuation of, or successor to those of the same ideological aims, I will refer to them as pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish political streams, respectively.

While I use the term 'pro-Islamic or pro-Kurdish political stream in Turkey' I only mean the political actors represented with the parties that I have

mentioned above. Other religious groups are not included in the research because almost all of them are unofficial Islamic groups which make tracing and researching them difficult.

The time period the research covers starts with the date 1980 when both pro-Kurdish and Islamist parties had emerged in Turkey and ends with the year of 2011, when the last national general election occurred. It is because of this fact that the research will focus on the perception pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political streams have of each other. Of course, I have to investigate the conditions that led to the emergence of the Kurdish nationalist and political Islamist groups in Turkey; that time span will start from the late Ottoman Empire and early modern Turkey to investigate the roots of Kurdish nationalism and of the Islamism. By beginning early modern Turkey, it will be possible to highlight historical similarities of these oppositional social and political groups. In this case, it would be argued that despite their historical similarities, ideological rigidity would have core factors shaping relations of each other.

Methodological Framework: Critical Discourse Analysis

‘It (CDA) is not a method, nor a theory that simply can be applied to social problems. CDA can be conducted in, and combined with any approach and subdiscipline in the humanities and the social sciences.’ (Van Dijk 2001, p.96)

‘Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context.’ (Van Dijk, 2003, p.352)

Perception is not easy to measure. Therefore, unless directly mentioning ideas about someone or something, to examine the perception between two distinctive groups requires an in-depth analysis of the language in use whether it is written, oral, visual, or behavioural. In specific terms, the perception between pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political streams is also considerably hard to determine. Yet, I believe that, thanks to limiting the resources within legal political streams, official party programs and speeches of MPs of political parties within these two political streams, there are adequate, at least substantial, resources to study. The question that should be asked is whether

or not this methodology is reliable or justifies the idea of measuring the perception between the two political streams. From my point of view it is applicable and reliable, based on core principles of the critical discourse analysis.

First of all, I am not a linguist and this research is not a linguistic study. It seems beneficial to state that I am not going to apply linguistic analysis to this research. What I am going to do is to expose the perception between these political groups through the interpretation of the language used in party programs. This provides a justification for presenting Critical Discourse Analysis as a methodological framework. In the following paragraphs I think that I answer this crucial question in depth.

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is derived from linguistic (semantic, grammar, and vocabulary) studies and originated in discourse analysis. Critical linguistics, developed by the East Anglia School, can be regarded as the inception point of CDA, with respected linguists such as Bakhtin (1981). Its fundamental aim is to critically interrogate the constructed or structured social inequalities, which are legitimized, expressed, constituted or signalled by the language in use. In this sense, it can be said that CDA to a degree, takes Habermas' arguments that 'language is also a medium of domination and social force and that language is ideological as given or approved contraction (1977, p.259). That is why critical discourse analysts think that discourse not only covers written and spoken texts but also every action, productions and meanings socially, historically and cognitively constructed into discourse. Foucault's social theory follows these developments. In linguistic terms, Chomsky's (1957) transformational grammar, and later Halliday's (1985) 'systemic functional grammars,⁵ have prevailed in the field of CDA (Wodak and Chilton 2005, p.20).

Despite several different approaches including 'the social psychological approach of Wetherell and Potter (1992), the social cognitive model of van Dijk (1993 and 2001), and the discourse historic model of Wodak (2001), Fairclough's approach to CDA has seemed to prevail within the CDA literature.

⁵ For more examples of application of systemic functional grammar, please see Young, L. & Harrison, C. (2004). *Systemic Functional Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis: Studies in Social Science*. London and New York: Continuum.

Leaving linguistic discussions on definitions of discourse and text aside (Widdowson, 2004; Locke, 2004), and relying on prominent figures of CDA, Norman Fairclough (1989, 1992 and 1995) transcends linguistic studies and combines it with social change pertaining to ideology and power. Influenced by Michel Foucault, the French philosopher who argued that the nature of power functioned within the social structure, Fairclough suggests relationships may be discerned between language and power through regarding 'language as social practice' (Wodak, 2001, p.1). In the same line with Ruth Wodak, Van Dijk summarizes core principles of CDA as such (2003, p.353):

1. CDA addresses social problems.
2. Power relations are discursive.
3. Discourse constitutes society and culture.
4. Discourse does ideological work.
5. Discourse is historical.
6. The link between text and society is mediated.
7. Discourse analysis is interpretive and explanatory.
8. Discourse is a form of social action.

As seen from the principles above, discourse is not something restricted within the written texts but might consist of all kinds of acts reflecting core ideas of a certain group. From this perspective, the concept of discourse is constituted through economic, social and cultural changes and interactions among these variations (Fairclough, 1992; Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p. 4). In other words, context and therefore discourse, is 'crucial for CDA, since this explicitly includes social-psychological, political, and ideological components and thereby postulates an interdisciplinary procedure' (Meyer, 2001, p.15). Therefore, apart from texts as a part of discourse, the concept has been considered as something which can be produced, disseminated, consumed and if necessary, reproduced. Fairclough developed a 'three dimensional framework' for CDA consisting of 'text, discourse practice and social practice.' He also emphasizes the significance of the link or relations between text and practice by stating that 'analysis of texts should not be artificially isolated from analysis of institutional and discourse practices within which texts are embedded' (Fairclough, 1995, p.9). Instead of separating the CDA into three theoretical components of text, discourse and social practice, as Fairclough did, I would prefer to take it as a set of ideas reflecting and visualizing itself into actions including ideological influence on written texts (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000, p.456). In this case, language is an instrument bridging

between what is in the mind and written text or speech. Language infiltrated by ideological implications is a sort of mediation between text and institution, between communication and structure, and between discourse and society (Weiss & Wodak, 2003, p. 9; Wooffitt, 2005, pp.137-45).

In terms of CDA, ideology is seen as a significant aspect of eradicating and maintaining power relations between the dominated and the dominant. It also cohesively locates in structures of combination of past and current events. In specific terms, as Gramsci argued, ideology is regarded as 'a conception of the world that is implicitly manifest in art, in law, in economic activity and in the manifestations of individual and collective life' (Gramsci, 1971, p.328). Eventually, it can be argued that '...language is a material form of ideology, and language is invested by ideology' (Fairclough, 1995, p.73). In this sense, ideological approaches to the party programs would be justified. The leftist-oriented pro-Kurdish political stream and pro-Islamic political stream have an ideological distinctiveness compared to each other, so key vocabularies affiliated with certain ideologies can be traced in party programs. For instance, looking at what is written in the section on 'religion' in pro-Kurdish parties' party programs would give a clue as to how they perceive pro-Islamic political parties. On the other hand, for instance, looking at what is written in the section 'Eastern question' in pro-Islamic parties' party programs would also reflect how they perceive pro-Kurdish political parties. Definitions, contextualization and conceptualization of crucial values and principles in written or spoken texts, even in whole discourses including actions give clues as to the perception of the one over the other. It is because of this, that I presume that their different ideological backgrounds are one of the significant determinants of the perception between the two political streams.

To crystalize, the way of reading the world system, regional politics, position of Turkey within these conditions and finally local dynamics will be used to point out ideological connotations differing from each other. In this term, I actually measure the perception between these two political party streams via how they define and describe political and social conditions of the world, regional politics and national and local factors which have direct impact on their way of thinking of each other. It might be because it is hard to find out directly related phrases and references over each other but this would not stop the research

as their distinctive way of reading and thinking can be dismantled into ideological components in which specific understandings of each other can be taken out. Apart from that, specific words referring to each other can be analysed by relying on critical discourse analysis. For instance, in leftist-oriented pro-Kurdish political streams, 'gerici güçler veya odaklar' (reactionist powers or foci) are referred to any sort of religious (Islamic) groups whether they are legal political parties or illegal socio-political movements. On the contrary, in pro-Islamic political streams, 'materialists, separatists or banditries' are used to refer to leftist-oriented pro-Kurdish legal political streams or covertly the PKK. It is easy to come across such specific terms within speeches of representatives of each political stream or in their written texts. Therefore, CDA will definitely help to indicate what is actually meant by using these specific terms in an implicit way.

Furthermore, since the inception of the modern Republic of Turkey, Kemalist ideas such as full independence of Turkey, Turkish nationalism, recognizing Islam as a part of being Turkishness albeit one that should be state-controlled and secularism, were determined by Atatürk and his close associates, as sacred founders of the state⁶, who formed the ideology of people in Turkey through controlling most of the instruments disseminating the dominant discourse. This included the socially respected elites through whom official state ideology gained absolute authority over public discourse and its structure. In the same way, it always has a control in the production and reproductions of ideas and values, which are socially accepted in people's mind. In relation to that, van Dijk suggests 'access to socially valued resources such as wealth, income, position, status, force, group membership, education or knowledge' as a substantial requirement of social power providing control on actions and cognition of people⁷ (1993, p.254). That is to say that there is a direct correlation between social power and dominance in a positive way so that their combination might lead to inequalities between/amongst dominant powers (ideology) controlling social power, and dominated groups within the same society. His approach to social power seems to provide an explanation

⁶ This includes the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi- Republican People Party), Atatürk's party, and the military acting as guardians of what was gained from the First World War.

⁷ He also takes the core ideas of the Gramscian concept of 'hegemony', while van Dijk is arguing a power and dominance relation through claiming that this relationship is 'usually organized and institutionalized' (Van Dijk, 1993, p.255).

and a context in terms of pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political streams working against the Kemalist-dominated state structure.

While general cultural, political and economic discourse of official state ideology has continued to preserve its hegemony over public discourse, opposition movements have sought an alternative way of cultural, social, and political discourse as much and long as conditions have allowed them to do. That is why, in forthcoming chapters I have explained how rivals of official state ideologies emerged, and finally institutionalized as political streams which now have created their own place within the political structure of Turkey. The discourses of these two rivals have always been a way of shaping their adherents' minds and actions against a symbolic enemy.

The Kemalist regime enforces the ideas of secularism and Turkish nationalism. On the other hand, one of its rivals, the pro-Kurdish political stream approves the initial but refuses the latter, while the other, pro-Islamic political stream, rejects the initial but partially approves the latter. Based on this picture, it seems that pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political streams have always preserved their ties with the official state ideology and so in some occasions or context their discourses have resembled each other on the subjects they have in common. From this perspective, I look at how they perceive 'the embedded state', as both groups have been excluded from mainstream politics.

This situation illustrates the complications of political thoughts within Turkish society. Ethnic and ideological distinctiveness in discourse of these groups' representatives always create fluctuations in people's minds. Despite that, prevailing thoughts of these groups on each other's positions accordingly to their discourse in context, text and talk can be used to measure how these political entities perceive each other. To respond to these questions, CDA, as a sort of political analysis focusing on the role of discourse and contending a set of ideas, values, historical cognition of events and socio-political elements, seems to be useful to apply in the research, especially by interpretation of certain sections, utterance, words,⁸ and eventually context of party programs.

⁸ To emphasize the vitality of words, it is meaningful to quote a phrase from Luke, which is that 'To use the vocabulary of power in the context of social relationships is to speak of human agents, separately or together, in groups or organizations, through action or inaction, significantly affecting the thoughts or actions of others' (1974, p.54).

In the sense that 'interpretation arises from an act of reading or analysis which makes meaning of a text' (Locke, 2004, p.8), it is to say that I will take what is written in the party programs of each political parties in these two political streams by offering '*interpretations* of the meanings of texts rather than just quantifying textual features and deriving meaning from this; situate *what* is written or said in the *context* in which it occurs, rather than just summarizing patterns or regularities in text; and argue that textual meaning is *constructed* through an interaction between producer, text, and consumer rather than simply being 'read off' the page by all readers in exactly the same way' (Richardson, 2007, p.15).

In addition, the methods of the research will use general qualitative research methods ranging from using archival resources to interviews. Due to the fact that members of these political streams have subsequently been closed down by the constitutional court, their party programs and declarations are hard to obtain unless archival resources of successor political parties have a hardcopy. Interviews will be with members of these two political parties, especially the deputies, and also with the members of previously banned political parties on both sides. The structure of the interviews would be semi-structured as their massive memory directs the interviews to more interesting areas in which tiny details might be quite useful. In addition, I will use the archives of political parties as well as the national archive to determine a clear history from the beginning of modern Turkey to the 1970s. Based on the party programs and regulations, I will also use the discourse analysis method, which is explained in preceding paragraphs. It will assist me to analyse critical concepts and identify words illustrating the pro-Kurdish and Islamists' perception of each other.

Conceptual Framework: Nationalism and Islamism

Nationalism

The concept of 'nationalism' has become one of the legitimate way for forming a state since the late 18th and early 19th centuries and constituted a level of analysis within the social sciences despite the fact that transnationalism,

internationalism and multiculturalism⁹ fields arguably reduced its core position (Brown, 2000). It basically claims that a unit of people has an exclusive right to have their own state and government, which is able to exercise the legitimate power within its borders and among other states. That group of people constructing the 'nation' have a certain amount of features. They have been granted as self-evident in terms of natural right to govern themselves within the national state structure in which nationality is a crucial determinant and affiliated with certain characteristics (Kedourie, 1993, pp.1-4). As a fundamental duty of a given state is to provide to its own people happiness, welfare and other basic needs, it is thought that the best way a state can fulfil these duties is through having a homogeneous society regarding to nationality requiring love for the fatherland and people putting their nationality at their most important notion.

Under these circumstances, what the French revolution brought is that people of a nation have the right to choose their own government in case the incumbent government is not wanted; they should be able to change it with another as they wish (Fuller, 2012). In other words, the core principle of sovereignty within a national state is embedded into the nation and those, which are based on the national will, are legitimate. It is quite natural that nationalism wiped out or at least degenerated the previous legitimation instruments ranging from feudal structure, kingdoms, tribal structure, etc. As long as a nation is formed, that nation would decide the system with which they would be governed. Gellner's definition of nationalism makes perfect sense here as he defines it as 'a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent' (Gellner, 1983, p.35).

Within this way of conceptualising of nationalism, the question of what the nation is and of what the nation consists of requires further explanations. The literal meaning of nation stems from the Latin word of '*natio*', which has a strong affiliation with birth and being born. Through the historical evolution of the concept, nation can denote to a group of people constituting a community in which people have a common descent, language, culture, values, and history (Smith, 1983, and 1986). These commonalities can be extended with

⁹ In particular, multiculturalism has been promoting a pluralist concept of nationalism seeking for a national identity in which all ethnic, religions, racial individuals and groups can find themselves.

common territory, common race, the sense of solidarity among the members of a given community, which also varies, for example, citizenship solidarity, ethnic solidarity, and territorial (political/administrative borders) solidarity. Relying on these various factors applied into defining what the nation is, different forms of nationalism have emerged in accordance with the importance of, and determinative role given to mentioned factors generating core of a nation.

Ranging from ethnically homogeneous society in which people give priority to ethnicity with common history, language, culture/cultural symbols, religion and sense of ethnic solidarity, to citizenship based-nations in which different ethnicities, cultures, and languages are approved within a state structure, and even to nations without states (Guibernau, 1999) but possessing cultural recognition and political autonomy. The core ideas of each argument led to fierce debates on nationalism theories¹⁰ within the social sciences. The initial one can be described as ethnic nationalism (ethno-nationalism), whereas the latter one is labelled as civic nationalism. The last one is hard to put within any nationalist theories, yet it is obvious that it directs researchers to more discussions and research in order to have a conclusive description and also shows that there has to be a limitation within the nationalism discussion before dragging people into atomization based one single common point among people together with newly emerged concepts such as particularism or cosmopolitanism (Gans, 2003).

Apart from these types of nationalism theories, cultural nationalism¹¹ is a recent phenomenon, which emphasises the recognition of cultural existence of a certain group of people and the right to sustain it for the following generations. What differentiates cultural nationalism from nationalism is argued that the first one focuses solely on cultural rights within the embedded administrative structure and geography, while the second combines these

¹⁰ For further details about various nationalism theories or classifications, please look at: Alter, P. (1989). *Nationalism*, trans. S. McKinnon-Evans (London, 1985); Eley, G., & Suny, G. (Eds.). (1996). *Becoming national: A reader*. Oxford University Press; Billig, M. (1995). *Banal nationalism*. SAGE publications Ltd.; Brown, D. (2004). *Contemporary nationalism: civic, ethnocultural, and multicultural politics*. London and New York: Routledge. Hastings, A. (1997). *The construction of nationhood: Ethnicity, religion and nationalism*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

¹¹ Chaim Gans also makes a distinction between liberal and non-liberal cultural nationalism just after he divides the concept of nationalism into two: cultural and statist nationalism seeking more cultural homogeneity among its citizens, based on single culture (2003, p.1). Within the first chapter, he has a distinguished discussion on various types of nationalism theories.

demands with national self-determination and national territory with political borders.

Since the implementation of nation-state structure, the discussion of modernity goes further with the discussion of nationalism. If modernity requires freedoms, including cultural and language rights as common points of a nation, then modernity causes the emergence of every nationalist movement to have absolute freedom of applying their culture through a separate nation state. That is why Taylor argues, 'the nationalist imperative is born' (1997, p.34). Eventually, modernity brought nationalist discussion with itself, regarding both internal national rights among different ethnicities, and nation-state-centric analysis at the international level.

Though the subject of this thesis is not providing a full theoretical explanation for either Turkish or Kurdish nationalism, it is better to clarify the concepts used within it. While the concept of 'ethnic awareness' or cultural nationalism is stated among the lines of the thesis, it does not mean that a proper nationalist movement must demand for full ethnically based national rights within political sovereignty as a separate state. It might denote that the existence of an ethnic group with its own cultural daily practices and language, who just demand only that they not be deprived of their rights to remain as they were/are. Within this context, at the time of the late Ottoman Empire, Kurdish ethnic awareness increased as a reaction towards centralization as well as parallel with other ethnic nationalist uprisings in the Balkans, and cultural nationalism among Arab subjects of the Empire. I believe that, as the rest of the thesis will indicate; Kurdish ethnic nationalism has mainly remained as cultural nationalism, which has been willing to accept local self-determination without asking for a full independent Kurdish state until the end of the 1970s in Turkey.

On the other hand, studies pertaining to the Kurdish ethno-nationalism (Entessar, 1992) would argue otherwise. By employing primitive nationalism which 'contains elements which have disappeared or are disappearing from the character of modern nationalism' (Koht, 1947, p.265), most of the Kurdish ethno-nationalist studies date the Kurdish nationalism back centuries in order to historically prove the presence of an ethnically aware Kurdish community by

using the example of Medes and Zoroastrianism as a Kurdish state and Kurdish religion before Islam, respectively (Edmonds, 1971, p.88). The same case can be witnessed with the other post-Ottoman nationalisms as Turks trace their culture back to the Hittites and other Turkish tribes in Asia, as Egyptians emphasized their time of the Pharaohs, and Iraqi Arabs claimed Babylon. Furthermore, the uprising of Kurdish tribes since the early 19th century, to the demise of the Empire (Strohmeier, 2003), has been considered as indicative of Kurdish nationalism even though they were actually reactions towards centralization and reformation policies of the Empire. Yet, it can still be claimed that they have gradually raised ethnic awareness among leading Kurdish figures (intellectuals, tribal and religious leaders and notables). That awareness gradually developed legal and illegal pro-Kurdish social and political organizations after the mid-20th century in Turkey, especially those that fledged between the 1960s and 1980s.

Emergence of the PKK with a Marxist-Leninist ideological background with the target being the rule of the proletarians and labour, in a classless and equal society, from the 1980s to 1990s, might be an exception since based on the PKK's documents, a fundamental aim was to form a separate great Kurdistan covering certain territories from Iran, Iraq, Syrian and Turkey, just after liberating Kurds from the exploitation of Turks. When for the first time, Abdullah Öcalan, states the possibility of a federal structure in which Kurds could have their own local self-determination, especially choosing their own rulers, as a solution for the Kurdish question, the Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey regained its cultural nationalist characteristic. This might be because no fraction of Kurdish nationalist movements including the PKK, have never obtained the privilege to represent all Kurds in Turkey, whether religions or a different language dialect prevented such a thing or not. So that none of the aforementioned Kurdish nationalist groups achieved a total ethnic solidarity among all Kurds, as even in mid-1990s when the armed struggle reached a peak level, some of the Kurds sided with various legal and illegal organizations rather than to gather around a single one.

Current peace negotiations between the PKK together with BDP¹² and Qandil (headquarter of the armed PKK guerrillas) and incumbent AKP government evolves around cultural rights, especially language, of course apart from a peaceful return of the PKK militias if disarmed. Not asking for a separate national state does not reduce the qualification of Kurdish nationalist movement, as not to be 'national' or 'nationalist', it is because of that it is still possible to have nationalist politics within a nation-building process through mobilizing national myths, emphasizing national holidays, using the Kurdish language in literature, stressing Kurdish ethnic consciousness within discourses and sentiments (Tsang and Woods, 2014; Edensor, 1997; Greenfeld, 1992) given that Kurds' priority of religion, tribal loyalty, different language accents, and geographical obstacles, prevents Kurds having a common ethnic sense of solidarity among all Kurds. Within the context of the thesis, any phrase pertaining to stages of development of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, I believe would make more sense together with the conceptual framework of nationalism.

Islamism

Islam as a religion has regulations covering almost every single aspect of lives ranging from individual faith to political issues which stem from the Qur'anic verses, the Prophet Muhammed's sayings, and interpretations of these two fundamental Islamic sources by Islamic scholars. This creates a tremendous amount of different applications of Islamic rules based on different interpretations, by applying and comparing any single context with another case. It is a natural process that each individual might come up with slightly, or totally different, interpretations of given cases, rules, and regulations. As a result, official or unofficial Islamic applications vary in terms of the way which they follow the law in order to fulfil religious duties. Taking plenty of Islamic groups with distinctive social, economic and cultural environments (in this case, nation states) into account, these groups in accordance to their core ideals revitalizing Islamic society and states as in the time of the Prophet

¹² Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP- Peace and Democratic Party) is current pro-Kurdish political party in Turkey. The very initial one was Halkın Emek Partisi (HEP-People's Labor Party), formed in 1991, and from this to current one, there have been many political party succeeding one after another as the constitutional court of Turkey banned those parties with the argument of that they were menace to the indivisible unitary of the state. That is why I have named the continuation of pro-Kurdish political parties as 'pro-Kurdish political stream.'

Muhammad¹³, and the instruments used to achieve their ideas pave the way for different labelling of Islamic groups. The first sentence of Esposito in his book (1997), 'Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform?' is quite meaningful to quote here; he states that 'Across the Middle East in the late 1990s, Islam takes many shapes and forms: Islamic republics; illegal opposition organizations and groups; and Islamic movements, from Egypt to Pakistan, engaging in social and political activism and participating within state and society' (p.1).

From this perspective, the concepts of Islamism, political Islam, and radical (jihadist) Islam or fundamentalism (Makris, 2007, pp.193-197), seem to be byproducts of new political formations following the demise of the Ottoman Empire. During the Ottoman Empire, Islam as a religion was employed as a way of legitimation for the established state structure (Margulies and Yildizoglu, 1997, p.145; Toprak, 1981, p.20-34),¹⁴ which was more or less taking control of religious institutions. Yet, taking the religion out of components of legitimation and superseding it with the nation (ethnic or territorial based) pushed social religious organization to be constrained within the society rather than within an official circle. That is why unofficial Islam has reshaped itself as initially social (legal or illegal) organizations aiming at preaching the good, and forbidding evil as well through asking Muslims to be comparatively more pious. Examples of this include; the Deoban school in the Indian sub-continent (India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan), Tabligh organization in Bangladesh, Ihvan-i Muslim in Egypt; Cemmat-i Islamiyye in Pakistan (Kepel, 2002, pp.23-42), and religious orders (Naqshibendi, Khalidiyye, Qadiri) in Turkey (Mardin, 1983, p.144).

After the mid-20th century, these Islamic movements transcended their area of influence from individuals, to society, and then to politics as soon as they could. The presence of the communist threat, as disseminated by the US and the western block during the Cold War era, accelerated Islamic groups'

¹³ The core idea of Islamism and its all variations is the returning to the original sources which are the Qur'an and Sunnah (Prophet Muhammad's sayings and teachings). However, adherents of any Islamic groups are preaching their ideas or doing politics in modern world. Which is why, Emmanuel Sivan titles his book as 'Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics'.

¹⁴ Historical perspectives might refute my division of pre-and post Ottoman state approaches to Islam and Islamic organizations as several figures such as Cemaleddin Afgani and Abdullah ibn-Wahhab (founder of Wahhabi sectarian) were already critical towards the way of Islamic implications. This critical approach continued with Afgani's students like Muhammad Abduh, and Rashid Rida.

activities since all leftist groups were considered as anti-Islam. In addition, most of the Muslim-populated states used Islamic groups as a counterbalance to prevent the rising of communist or socialist ideas within society and state. Furthermore, the necessity of reformation within the Islamic circle to catch up to the level of development in the western states can be traced back to the Ottoman time, but more remarkable ones would be Cemaleddin Afghani, Muhammed Abduh and Rashid Rida (Enayat, 1982, pp.69-82; Makris, 2007, pp.142-193), who were in favour of western development in state structure and economy, and also in social relations or lifestyles. On the other hand, Hasan el-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, focused more on a social level of Islamization starting from individual adjustments to core Islamic regulations (the Qur'an and Sunnah). His tradition was followed by comparatively more radical Muslim intellectuals, such as Sayyid Qutb who made a clear distinction between 'dal ul-Islam' (Islamic state and society) and 'dar ul- Harb' (non-Islamic society and state against which Jihad is required) and Abu'l A'la Mawdudi (Kepel, 2002, pp.23-42). This radical distinction led some Islamic groups to fight against their own nation-state together with leftist movements. The present historical development of Islamic movements made themselves more explicit when Islamic states were formed in Sudan and Iran. The concept of 'mujahidin' (religious fighters), which has already consolidated itself in the Afghan jihad against the Soviets, spread through all Muslim countries. These people have become a fundamental human resource in terms of radical ideologies, and fighting skills, within almost of all radical Islamic groups from Malaysia to Morocco. Nowadays, a de-radicalization process forces them to be a part of the democratic political process, or of social movements (Ashour, 2009).

The reason why I have given a short historical summary of the Islamic movements is to indicate that Islamist movements can dramatically vary from time to time, and from country to country. Thus, in Turkey's case, I believe that the phrase 'pro-Islamic social movements' seems to be more suitable to describe major Islamic movements until the 1980s and the phrase of 'legal pro-Islamic political stream' seems to fit perfectly in order to denote the Milli Görüş from which the AKP, the current ruling political party, was extracted.

In terms of Islamic movements, it is a contemporary subject, as they were mostly considered revolutionary in the cases of Sudan and Iran as radical Islamism, and in the Arab world as socialist nationalist Islamism. Since the last decade of the 20th century, Islamic movements have been classified by scholars variously: militant and political (Karawan, 1997); pragmatic and ideological (El-Said, 1995); conservative, radical and political (Zubaida, 2001); reformist and traditional (Eickelman, 2000), and social and political (Halliday, 1995). All these classifications are either based on what methods they used, articulated idioms, and targeted goals. Regarding these definitions, it is understood that their consideration by scholars have changed, and survived from just labelling them as anti-western, anti-democratic, or anti-modern. Also, that the movements have a political party to disseminate their ideas and to mobilize, they are mostly considered a political social movement and seemed to be more acceptable than any radical and armed Islamist political group. Despite this, there is an understanding that Islamic groups are against modernism and this causes ambiguity when attempting to determine whether Islamic politics is modern or not. The way of they are doing politics (in the case that they have a political party) is actually a reinterpretation of tradition within the context of the modern way as a method to transform any given society through politics (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996, pp.22-45). In Turkish cases, armed radical Islamist groups have never been effective enough to become a social movement though they occupied Turkey's agenda in pre and post-1980 period for awhile.

Based on these classifications, it is much more meaningful to put the Milli Görüş movement into a political Islamic movement category. Islamic movements in Turkey are ideologically similar to Islamic movements in Palestine, Pakistan and Lebanon-Hamas, Jamaat-i Islami, and Hezbollah, respectively, since they all originate from popular grassroots support and are fed by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Despite this familiarity with the Egyptian movement, it is fundamentally different from them since it has never ended up with armed groups fighting against the established government. In addition, leaders and adherents of the political Islamic groups in Turkey were not religious leaders in terms of their occupation (Delibas, 2009). Yet, they, Necmettin Erbakan and his close associates, are professionals and

businessmen and in spite of their attendance in religious circles, do not have clerical backgrounds in their educational histories. For instance, neither Erbakan nor Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has such training, whereas the former was an engineer who graduated from a German university, and the latter graduated from the Department of Economics in Marmara University. Even though leading figures of political Islamic movements also adhere to a nationalist secular state structure and they can be seen as byproducts of the system, they extracted a new conceptualization that locates between tradition and modernity, secularism and religion. From this perspective, to call the political Islamic movement in Turkey a fundamentalist movement is unlikely to be true though it is possible that a modern religious conscience is leading people to become a pious and is able to make sense of contemporary social, economic, cultural and religious conditions at both a national and international scale (Göle, 1997, p. 54). Given that changes from more religious arguments to a more liberal understanding and reinterpretation of the concept of laicism, it would be quite easy to understand how the Milli Görüş movement gave a birth to the AKP.

Structure of the Thesis

What is done in the first part, titled 'Historical Development of Pro-Kurdish and Pro-Islamist Identities: From Denial to Resurface' is that it takes the Kurdish nationalist and Islamist backgrounds and through analysing them separately, shows how these two significant social movements were suppressed by the Turkish government in the republican (single party) and then multi-party (Democrat Party) eras. The fundamental concerns of this chapter are to show that these two basic elements of society were denied for the sake of the country's attempt to reach a perceived level of European civilization and modernization and historically approximate similarities until they were able to organize themselves as legal political actors. In terms of every aspect with the official state ideology, which considered them as arch-enemies, they have gradually consolidated themselves within the Turkish society and have emerged as political actors shaping contemporary Turkish politics. This process is basically examined through historical development of politics in Turkey. Eventually, this section's main aim is to portray and analyse the

political history of Turkey from very early Republic until the 1980s in terms of specifically pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish groups.

To move on, part two, 'Institutionalization of Pro-Islamic and Pro-Kurdish Political Streams', the main argument will be that both pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish political streams have gained grassroots support and so grew to critical mass by the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s. The conditions and political atmosphere that led to these political streams which turned out to be a vital actor in Turkey, will basically be summarized. By the end of this part, I believe that I can draw a clear picture showing how the PKK and later on the legal pro-Kurdish political parties dominated the Kurdish nationalist movement, and on the other hand, how the Milli Görüş movement has become one of the crucial political actors heading to power.

In the last part, 'Perceptions Between Pro-Kurdish and Pro-Islamic Political Streams: 1980-2011', I have set a time period division in order to have a more robust evaluation in terms of changes in the political and social atmosphere affecting these perceptions. In each specific period, critical discourse analysis will be applied throughout the part three by looking at official documents of both streams.

With the first sub-title of the third part, covering from the 1980s to 1991, the intention is to discuss the perceptions of the PKK and the Refah party. Why I am commencing with this is that there was no legal political group that was explicitly pro-Kurdish nationalist, but there was an illegal one, which is the PKK in Turkey until 1991 when the People's Labour Party was formed. In this sense, what I am going to do in this chapter is to look for the official statement of the Refah Party and, if there is a counter-statement of the PKK to analyse the perceptions between them. In addition, the interviews with those who were occupying critical positions in both groups would reflect the perceptions between them. Furthermore, based on this perception, by looking at what kinds of politics they followed I will seek to identify the influence of this perception on Turkish politics.

When it comes to the time period of 1991-1998, beginning with the preceding chapter, but continuing mainly from this chapter on, the interviews will determine the direction of the research. The perception is not something which

can be wholly found among written documents so it is necessary to ask those who were in charge of decision making and implementing policies. However, party programs and the discourse used in election campaigns will be useful documents for understanding perceptions. I did not mention the name of the Kurdish nationalist political parties because they were frequently banned by the constitutional court of Turkey. On the other hand, the time limitation of this sub-title is pertained to the soft-coup d'état conducted by official state ideology, which is mostly driven by the military against the Refah Party-led government in 1998. The coup forced the Refah-Yol (Refah Party and True Path Party coalition) government to resign and has changed the approach of political Islamists towards the politics so that some of them have chosen a more adaptive or moderate way.

I will name the time period between 1998 and 2002 as a transition period wherein global, regional and local changes transformed the ideological borders of these political streams and led them to come closer in terms of the Kurdish question.

Finally, the last time period from 2002 to 2011 might be considered to be the heart of the research because it examines the ongoing and vital process, which witnessed fundamental changes in the Kurdish question in Turkey so immediately, that it causes a change in the perception of the others. As the case in the preceding chapter, apart from the written documents such as party programs and official announcements, interviews will be crucial for this chapter. Relying on these significant documents to measure the perception between pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish political streams over the Kurdish question will be much easier as they have extended their ideas in an inclusive way.

PART ONE: Historical Development of Pro-Kurdish and Pro-Islamist Identities: From Denial to Resurface

Kemalism, as a core ideology, excluded opponents from the state apparatus including political, social and economic issues in single party era (1923-1946). Thanks to transformation from the single party to the multi-party political structure since 1946, the next term in which state policies over Kurdish and religious identities have gradually but not officially loosen its pressure and led Kurds and religiously pious people doing politics with the condition of behaving like a Turk and of secular has begun. Nevertheless, this relative flexibility was adequate to threaten the core ideology, and then military intervened into civil politics and restored official state ideology. While withdrawing into their barracks they took constitutional precautions. Since then to the 1980 coup d'état, ethnically Kurds and religious people have mobilized themselves with the leading functions of educated and immigrant peoples in metropolises. After that, Kurdish nationalist and Islamic social movement have institutionalized themselves whose most prominent figure has become the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan) and Milli Görüş.

In terms historical development of pro-Kurdish and Pro-Islamist identities in Turkey, it could be argued that they have actually been twin sisters but with the condition that Kurdish one has experienced officially total denial of its existence. Given that official state ideology's rigidity in secular nationalism, it would not be hard to imagine official pressure over alternative identities that definitely relied on ethnically Turkish and religiously secular. Proceeding without mentioning Kemalism's controlled official Islamic discourse with the establishment of the Directorate of religious Affairs to main body of this part would be unfair comparing historical development of pro-Kurdish and Pro-Islamic identities. Yet, together with total denial of existence of all ethnic identities but Turkish, alternative version of Islamic understandings (ranging from tariqah to radicalism) have been repressed and not given a chance to develop before 1990s.

Apart from mentioned general resemblance of their historical developments, in specific terms, they have witnessed almost the same way of repressing within

the same time period. To make this similarity much clearer, it is better to have the history of Turkey politics into three periods from the formation to the 1980 coup d'état. The first period is going to be single party period from 1920s to 1950, the second one is from 1950 to 1960, which can be labelled as democrat party era and then the third one is from 1960 to 1980 when both political streams consolidated their own arguments as alternative ways against the official state ideology (Kemalism). Each periods prominent features can be listed as strict repression, flexibility and mobilization (consolidation of ideas and political stance), respectively.

Chapter One: Single Party Era: Total Repression of Kurdish and Islamic Identities

Introduction

What I am examining in this chapter is how these two political groups, excluded from the politics, were suppressed for the purpose of demolishing them so that they could not be a threat to the foundation of the Turkish republic. As a continuation of the understanding of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), Atatürk and his close associates intended to replace the Ottoman multi-ethnic and religion-based social structure,¹⁵ with an ethnically Turkish nationalist and secular republic (Mardin, 1971). In other words, this chapter shows the efforts to combine materialist western ideas, performed by using 'a social engineering from above' (Kadioğlu, 1996, p.191), and inherited popular culture, and how these operated and clashed in terms of exclusion of fundamental identities—specifically ethnic Kurdishness and Islam.

In the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, nationalist discourse dramatically increased among not only non-Muslim, but also Muslim subjects of the Empire. Thanks to cooperation between Turkish and Kurdish nationalists who were all-aware of their distinct ethnic identity and recognized each other, a new struggle against domestic, namely the Armenians and foreign enemies, the European powers, commenced. All these struggles were fed by the idea of Muslim brotherhood during the War of Independence, and lasted until the beginning of the emergence of the modern Turkish state (Bozarslan, 2005; Dönmez, 2007). At the beginning of the War of Independence, in 1919, the Amasya Protocol was signed by the Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafai Hukuk Cemiyeti (ARMHC)¹⁶ and the Ottoman government recognizing that Turks and Kurds were two major components of the remnants of the Ottoman lands (Yeğen, 2007). At the end of the War of Independence the ruling elites of the new republic saw salvation in the establishment of a national and secular state

¹⁵ Serif Mardin's thesis which traces the understating of Atatürk and his close associates back to the Young Turks seems quite reasonable. This defines the revolutionary movement led by Atatürk in 1908 as an official start. In this sense, the Turkish nationalist and secular conscience of Atatürk could be justified with the legacy of the CUP established by the Young Turks.

¹⁶ Following the collapse of the Empire, several local associations were established to protect their homeland. On the 4th September of 1919, in the Sivas Congress led by Atatürk, these local societies came together and established '*Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafai Hukuk Cemiyeti*' (ARMHC)—The Association for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia—which was responsible for the implementation of the decision taken in the congress (Ahmed, 1993).

as a means of not repeating Ottoman mistakes, and to raise Turkey to the level of the western civilization¹⁷. Thus, the established relationships based on Muslim brotherhood with Kurds and any other Muslim ethnic minorities were superseded with ethnic Turkishness. As a result, 'the Turkish leaders did not fulfil their promises to the Kurds' (Dönmez, 2007, p.50). A strong resentment amongst the Kurds developed, and this naturally caused a reaction which developed into Kurdish nationalism. By saying that 'the major reason for the politicization of Kurdish cultural identity is the shift from multi-ethnic, multi-cultural realities of the Ottoman Empire to the nation state model' (Yavuz, 2001, p.1), Hakan Yavuz summarized the fundamental change that formed the roots of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey.

Throughout the single party era in which the Republican People Party, established by Atatürk, was the only ruling party, the state's Kurdish policy was to deny and then to assimilate Kurdish people unless they were not integrated into the state which was dominated by Turkish nationalism (Yeğen, 2007). The harsh responses to the Şeyh Sait, Ağrı and Dersim rebellions by the government and the settlement acts, and reports on the Kurdish people explicitly prove the assimilation policy of the state. As a part of the assimilation process, apart from the few years after the establishment of the Turkish Republic, voicing the word 'Kurd', and any phrase including this word, was officially and practically abandoned by the government until the beginning of the 1990s. This is in spite of statements made in the Turkish Assembly and at international conferences by ruling elites of the state, such as Atatürk¹⁸ himself, the first president of the Turkey, and İsmet İnönü¹⁹, the first prime minister of Turkey, both of whom claimed that the fundamental elements of the Turkish republic were Turks and Kurds (Oran, 1989; Hatipoğlu, 1992, respectively).

¹⁷ With the proclamation of Tanzimat reforms, from the late Empire to the early Republic, ruling elites spent too much effort trying to modernize what was left of the Empire, with the implementation of western modernization including lifestyles and anything affiliated with Europe. The officially created identity later became an embedded status quo, which is preserved and used against possible internal threats to its structure (İrem, 2004).

¹⁸ Due to the fact that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is not the main subject of this research, details on him will not be part of this chapter. The following give considerable information about him and his ideas: Macfie, 1994; Kazancigil & Ozbudun, 1981, and Webster, 1973.

¹⁹ His personal life, ideas and even notable statements have been studied by Metin Heper. His study on İnönü published is titled 'İsmet İnönü' (Heper, 1998).

In addition to four more pillars of Kemal Atatürk's 'isms'—populism, republicanism, statist, revolutionarism—nationalism and secularism were strictly implemented in Turkey. By constitutionalizing these six pillars of Atatürk in the late 1930s, they became official state ideology which has to be followed by incumbent governments and were subsequently named as Kemalism (Dumont, 1984; Kadioglu, 1996; Tanil, 2003, p.437). That also created a new official identity which has to be applied to all people in either public or private life—e.g. 'what people ate, how they dressed, how they looked physically ...what language they spoke' (Aslan, 2011, p.78). This policy naturally created a considerable backlash among those who were not ethnically Turk and those who were pious religious people, whether they were Turks or Kurds. Atatürk's lifetime goal was to eliminate these two dissenting viewpoints from Turkish politics by imposing so-called modernization reforms.²⁰ Atatürk and his foundational political party, the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) dominated Turkish politics through the integration of all party institutions with state institutions (Zurcher, 2009) until the end of the Second World War when Turkey transformed from a single party to multi-party regime.

As a result of this dramatic change, in the first free election attendant by two parties- the CHP and Democrat Party (DP) in 1950, Atatürk's CHP was defeated by the oppositional party, the DP, which obtained adequate votes to form a single party government. During this term until 1960, dissidents found a channel to participate into politics with which to dissipate their grievances. In other words, the reign of Democrat party government was actually an invisible and unofficial battle between the established state structure, and the mass population that could not fully get used to the imposed political and social structure. This term was ended by the guardian of the Republic and Kemalist state ideology—the Turkish Army—which perceives itself as having the right to protect the initial state structure against internal and external threats (Cooper, 2002).

Due to the overarching political and social pressures against any adversarial ideas in the single and multi-party regimes, witnessing Kurdish nationalist or

²⁰ Relying on nationalism theories, Cetin in his article claims that nations are not a product of natural process but a social construction, and nationalism needs a homogeneous society to build itself on it. That is why Atatürk sought to create a Turkish nation-state by suppressing the Ottoman remnants, which was associated with old Islamic and multi-ethnic characteristics of the Empire (Cetin, 2004).

Islamist political parties, and even legal oppositional social groups, is out of the question as a result of the official nationalist and secularist ideology of the state. Not having these parties might exclude this period from the realm of the research, but in terms of better understanding the emergence of Kurdish nationalist and political Islamist groups and then political parties in the following periods, it is essential to examine how the nationalist and secular Turkish state secured itself. As it is explicit, this chapter will have two significant sub-subjects: the suppression of Kurdish and of Islamist identities, which is at the root of either political movement's mobilization. For a better illustration of the emergence and consolidation of these political oppositions, social movement theory will be applied these cases.

Denial of Kurdish Identity in the Single Party Era

Regarding ethnic nationalism, the existence of Kurds who remained in the border of the Republic of Turkey was officially denied by the authorities in the single and multi-party eras of Turkey, except for a couple of years following 1923 when the establishment of Turkey was declared by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The Lausanne treaty—considered to be the founding treaty of modern Turkey—defines minorities according to religious affiliation but not ethnic origin, so Kurds were not included as a minority since they are predominantly Muslim (Robins, 1993, p.660). Yet, this differentiation was incomplete without the recognition of ethnic Kurds. That is why since the beginning, the Kurdish question has been one of the fundamental issues of Turkey. In the late Ottoman Empire Kurdish people were still recognized by the government, but rising Turkish nationalism prevailed and directed politics towards an exclusion of the Kurds, and possible Kurdish nationalism. Albanians, Arabs, and diverse nationalities in the Balkans succeeded at establishing their own national states, but Kurds and Turks mostly moved together in the late of the Empire and early Republican era (Yayman, 2011; Kirişci, et al., 1997).

Most of the significant Kurdish groups—sheiks, tribal chiefs, agahas, and intellectuals—were already integrated into Ottoman politics and they continued the same way in the Republican era due to the mutuality of their fighting together against 'infidels' to save the sultan-caliph, and of being Ottoman subjects with a basis of religious sentiments. Even, as proved by archival

documents, on the eve of the Lausanne negotiation, both Atatürk and several Kurdish deputies made speeches stressing the brotherhood of Kurdish and Turkish people in Turkish history, and especially in the War of Independence (Yayman, 2011, pp.40-41). Yet, it had been realized by several important Kurdish elites that Turks were going to suppress Kurdish people for the sake of Turkish Nationalism. Thus, they choose to rebel against the Turkish authority as they thought that the newly established Turkish state would violate their right to govern themselves.

This reason I believe which accounts for western educated Kurdish elites aiming at the establishment of an independent, or at least autonomous, status for Kurdish people. Based on this view, it is hard to say that the Kurdish mass was thinking of such aims which the small number of Kurdish elites sought to reach, as is the case in era of the late Empire. Given that significance of religious leaders among Kurds such as Seyh Ubeydullah and Seyh Said, what matters for the Kurdish mass was mostly related to religion more than ethnic origin. Therefore, from my point of view, Turkish nationalism gave birth to Kurdish nationalism as a result of an intellectual battle and suppression of what bound the Kurdish mass with the other ethnics in Turkey—religion—which caused a reaction against the Turkish regime. This combination of nationalism and secularism was the driving force in the acceleration of Kurdish resentment in Turkey. The Şeyh Said rebellion constituted a meaningful instance of this combination as it was organized by not only a religious leader, but also a positivist Kurdish nationalist group, *Azadi*. Under the light of the first considerable Kurdish rebellion in modern Turkey, by depending on reasonable propositions, it can be claimed that the modernization policy of Atatürk created this Kurdish problem. Changing the phrases from the 'people of Turkey' in the 1921 constitution, which was seen as the most democratic constitution of Turkey by Özbudun (1992), to the 'Turkish people', in the 1924 constitution, implied an enforcement of all Muslims to become primarily Turks (Yeğen, 2011). The abolishment of the Caliphate in 1924,²¹ together with this, created

²¹ The influence of the abolishment of Caliphate on Kurdish people is described by McDowall as below. 'On 4 March Mustafa Kemal abolished the caliphate. This was the real body blow. He deterred opposition by establishing 'Tribunals of Independence' with full powers of life and death and extending the Law of Treason to include all discussion of the caliphate or any appeal to religion in political life. This cut the last ideological tie Kurds felt with Turks. The closure of the religious schools, the *madrasas* and *kuttabs*, removed the last remaining source of education for most Kurds. By stripping Turkey of its religious institutions, Mustafa Kemal now made enemies of the very Kurds who had helped Turkey

the mortar for the building of a Kurdish nationalist wall (McDowall, 1995; Earle, 1925, p.86).

As a consequence, the early history of the Turkish state witnessed several Kurdish rebellions²² with sources primarily being religious or nationalist discontent. These two were conceptualized as dynamite at the root of the Turkish Republic. It is because of this that the ruling elite of Turkey, primarily Atatürk and his close associates, spent all their efforts establishing a secular, nation-state modelled on western states. Those that might harm the secular and nationalistic foundation of the state had to be eliminated in order to secure the presence of the state. The Şeyh Sait rebellion in 1925 created a suitable political condition for the state to fight against these two concepts because as much as it can be understood from the statement of Şeyh Sait, it was a mostly religious uprising in terms of his position, and also a nationalistic rebellion in terms of participation of the Kurdish nationalist *Azadi* (Freedom)²³ group against the state. The state committed itself to purge the influence of the Islamic legacy of the Empire as well as the existence of other possible ethnic nationalism within the borders of the state.

The initial indication of the intention of the fledging government of Turkey led by Atatürk on the Kurdish issue can be seen in the discourse performed by ruling Kemalist elites. The reservation for being an equal citizen and a member of parliament, which was to be a Turk, the concept of ethnic Turkishness, was placed at the core of Turkey (Barkey, et al., 1998). In the on-going years, the stressing on the Turkishness of the state, society, history, and culture,

survive the years of trial, 1919-22. These were the religiously-minded, the shaykhs and the old Hamidiye aghas who had genuinely believed in the defence of the caliphate' (McDowall, 2007, p.192)

²²Relying on archives of the Presidency of the General Staff (Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı), a book was published which is titled, 'Uprisings in the Republican Period' penned by Staff Colonel Reşat Hallı. The books show that there were 28 Kurdish rebellions in the region. Ahmet Kahraman comes up with a different thesis that does not accept that they were all rebellions, but only two of them, the Şeyh Said and Ararat were. He claims that they were mostly a form of suppression and retribution for several mutinies and small-scale struggles. He believes that military officers intentionally called these small-scale struggles rebellion to excuse their harsh and bloody reactions. Eventually, he states that there have been three rebellions in the whole history of the Turkish republic by adding the PKK to the list containing the Şeyh Said and the Ararat rebellions (Kahraman, 2007).

²³ There is no exact date on which academicians agreed that the *Azadi* group was established, but it is obvious that ex-officers and several significant Kurdish notables took part in forming such a group between 1921 when the Koçgiri rebellion happened, and 1923, couple of month after the declaration of the Turkish Republic. Its original name is *Ciwata Azadi Kurd* (Society for Kurdish Freedom but it is known as *Azadi* for short. As Olson states, according to British sources, it was established in 1921 by Colonel Halil Cibran Bey, and spread to most Kurdish cities in the East. Each branch secretly organized, and their leaders were generally ex-Ottoman officers and influential notables. Its activities such as speaking only Kurdish, wearing Kurdish clothes and delivering Kurdish poems showed that they were undeniably Kurdish nationalists (Olson, 1989; Van Bruinessen, 1978).

increased. This conscience continued until the Şeyh Said rebellion when the policy of the Turkish state dramatically changed. This rebellion is considered to be a turning point in the realm of the Kurdish question in modern Turkey by academicians and historians (Jwaideh, 2006; Olson, 1989; Kirişci, et al., 1997; Yayman, 2011).

As previously mentioned, most of the powerful Kurdish tribes had been purged by the Ottoman Empire and the power vacuum was filled by the religious leaders in the region starting with Şeyh Ubeydullah and many, but small, landlords, or aghas. This condition prevailed in the region during that time. Religious loyalty of the Kurdish mass led by Sheikhs and Sayyids was destroyed because of the abolishment of the Caliphate and caused fierce grievances amongst the Kurdish people (McDowall, 1995; Taspinar, 2005). By doing so, Atatürk eliminated one of the most profound threats to his modernization ideas, but also broke a crucial bond between the new state and the Kurdish people even when ethnic Turkish nationalism was taken into account. Not considering several Kurdish revolts during the War of Independence, such as Koçgiri,²⁴ the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925 was the first revolt against the Turkish government founded by Atatürk. This rebellion is tremendously important in the political history of the Turkish Republic as it reflected the strong resentments not only against Turkish nationalist ideas, but also demonstrated the secularist intention of the ruling elite of Turkey.

The rebellion was driven by both Kurdish nationalist and religious sentiments. A Kurdish nationalist group, formed by ex-Ottoman Kurdish officers and Kurdish intellectuals in 1923 sought to mobilize Kurdish people in the region. As a result of this strategy, Sheikh Said was involved in the organization because of his high-ranking religious status among the Kurdish people. Both figures resented the abolishment of the Caliphate, and recognized the repressive policy of the Republic over the Kurdish people by forbidding, according to the new constitution declared in 1924, the use of the Kurdish language in public, and the teaching of it (Haig, 2003), in addition to enforced

²⁴ The Koçgiri rebellion was one of the most significant Kurdish revolts led by Nuri Dersimi and Halil Cibran Bey (Olson, 1989). The main objective of the revolt was to obtain autonomy from the Ankara government based on the Serve Treaty and Wilsonian principles. Due to lack of supports from Kurdish tribes around the region and policy of Ankara government, it failed and the participants of the revolt were crushed by Turkish military forces (Kutlay, 2011, p.270).

resettlement of influential Kurdish notables in the west of the country (Zürcher, 2009).

As a natural reaction of these repressive policy, the Sheikh Said rebellion erupted on the 8 February in 1925 with the trading of gunfire between the Sheikh's disciples and the Gendarmerie in spite of an agreement to commence a rebellion in May, by the *Azadi* group and Sheik Said. The rebellion quickly permeated throughout Diyarbakır and Elazığ with the persuasion of the surrounding Kurdish tribes to participate, by the Sheikh. In this process, *Alevi*s in Dersim province refused to join the rebellion because of historical resentments between the Sunni Islam and *Alevi* groups in the region. In a short time, a fierce struggle between the Sheikh's and the government's forces occurred. Some numbers might be exaggerated, but they are indicative of the harsh treatment of the Kurdish people: '206 villages were destroyed, 8,758 houses were burned and 15,200 people were killed' (Gunter, 1990, p.13; Manafy, 2005). With the arrest of the Sheikh, the rebellion ended.

Whether the main characteristic of the rebellion was religious or nationalist has been adequately discussed by historians and academicians (Jwaideh, 2006; Olson, 1989; Toker, 1968; Behçet, 1955), thus, instead of discussing this issue, I would rather discuss it as being a religio-nationalist rebellion. This is because of the symbols and slogans used to mobilize the Kurdish people were mostly religious with the aim of creating an autonomous or separate Kurdish political entity. What I would like is to analyse the consequences of the rebellion, which was tremendously significant in terms of the radical reforms imposed by Atatürk, and the political history of Turkey. Atatürk and his colleagues utilized the rebellion to eliminate the last barriers standing against radical reforms in an effort to elevate Turkey to a modern level.

As soon as the significance of the rebellion was predicted by the government, the first thing which was done was to replace Fethi Okyar, the Prime Minister of that time, with İsmet İnönü who was considered capable of managing the situation with harsh measures. He utilized this event as an excuse to declare martial law on the 21st February 1925, and to pass 'Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu' (the Maintenance of Order Act) in 4 March 1925. Thanks to martial law, the independent tribunals were formed in Diyarbakır and Ankara, as was the case

during the independent war. The tribunals' judges were chosen from amongst the deputies, and their verdicts were absolute—there was no appeal process. Based on absolute power taken from the law, firstly all papers were closed down, and then the opposition party, the Progressive Republican Party, was banned by the independent tribunal after charging the members of being in contract with Kurdish insurgents (Ahmed, 2008). By doing so, the government had an absolute and unquestionable power, and as a component of this power, an independent tribunal sentenced Şeyh Said and his close associates to death, a sentence which was executed without any delay.

As Yeğen states in his articles, the official documents of these courts expose the denial of Kurdish ethnic origin by defining them omitting any overt reference to Kurdishness. He used a quotation from the chairman of the Tribune to illustrate how the government considered the uprising without actually mentioning the Kurdishness of the situation (Yeğen, 2011, p.69). In the speech the chairman used the words 'banditry, sheikhs and feudal landlords' instead of referring to their ethnic origins of those being tried. As Yeğen states, by using these words the Kurds and their existence were thus affiliated with the Ottoman past, which had been changed by the modern rulers of Turkey. This also implied that the Kurdish people in the region were still living in conditions of the past, which was the main reason blamed for the backwardness of the Empire, and which the modern state fought to replace with modernism.²⁵ From these words, without including the 'Kurdishness' of the problem, the government reduced this rebellion to being a social question and thus denied its ethnic origin.

With the same token, İsmet İnönü declared the official assimilation policy by stating that, 'We are frankly nationalists... and nationalism is our only factor of cohesion. In the face of a Turkish majority other elements have no kind of influence. We must turkify the inhabitants of our land at any price, and we will annihilate those who oppose the Turks or 'le turquisme' in 1925 (Barkey, et al., 1998, p.10). In this sense, the Ankara government implemented a brutal

²⁵ The responsibility to modernize Kurdish people, who were ignorant, backward, and feudal, in the east of Turkey was taken on by the government. As one of the means of this modernizing policy, People's Houses were opened all over the country. Specifically, in the eastern provinces of Turkey, these institutions organized concerts, conferences, exhibitions, tea parties, field, trips, theatre play, public class for education to make people familiar with western lifestyles and values. For instance, in Hakkari, this institution sought to teach the national anthem to peasants, which led them to learn music and Turkish. In Elazığ, piano and violin classes, and monthly dance parties were organized (Aslan, 2011, p.79).

retaliation against the rebellions to the extent that even in 1926, entrance of foreigners into the region was banned in order to avoid any international intervention. Following the rebellion, relatives of rebels and influential figures in the region were deported to the western part of Turkey where the Kurdish people were the minority. These policies were proven as a result of several official reports in which Kurdish regions were referred as 'the East' (Gorgas, 2009, p.5).

This was the starting point of assimilation and to reach this aim, the government had to extend this policy from deportation, to anything associated with Kurdishness. The first thing of course that comes to mind was the word of 'Kurd' and its derivations, followed by abolishment of using the Kurdish language itself. The East Reform Report, prepared by the Ministry of Interior Affairs, Cemil Unaydın, the Ministry of Justice, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, and Mustafa Aldulhalik Renda, the Speaker of TBMM in 1925, led to development of an official Kurdish policy for Turkey which relied on denial and assimilation of the Kurdish people (Cagaptay, 2006; Elphinston, 1946, p.96). Due to this, the policy is actually quite profound for both Turkish and Kurdish history. It contained abundant suggestions pertaining to how assimilate Kurds but most significantly, it suggested the abolishment of Kurdish language in public, the deportation of important Kurdish families, and even villages to the west, the building of railways and roads to make access easy for military forces, the establishment of 'Inspectorate General' (Umumi Müfettişlik)²⁶ to control the area, and eventually, the appointment of military governors to the region.²⁷ This report was directly applied to the region as soon as it was ratified by the government. Basic points of the report were the resettlement, assimilation and turkification of the Kurdish people.

²⁶ The General Inspectorate was an official institution of Turkey, which was established for watching every activity in the eastern part of Turkey where it was highly likely to have an insurgency, or at least highly potential for there to be one. It was established in 1927 following the Şeyh Said Rebellion and stayed in operation until 1952 (Koçak, 2010).

²⁷ For instance, it also included the appointment of Turkish officers at any level and increased their salary, to prevent especially Kurdish women to speak their language, to establish boarding school and so on. In June 1927, the institution of Inspectorate General covering Mardin, Siirt, Hakkari, Van, Bitlis, Urfa, Elazığ and Diyarbakır as a centre point was established and given crucial powers to control the implementation of the report (Yayman, 2011) and to prevent possible Kurdish revolts (Cagaptay, 2006). As the report indicated, the establishment of roads and railways, the disarmament of tribes, and the assimilation policy reduced the power of Kurdish tribes to rebel again (Arfa, 1966). These precautions provided a silence for a couple of years, but of course did not prevent a reaction of Kurdish people forever; instead, it fuelled future revolts.

All precautions applied by the Turkish government, based on denial of Kurdish identity, did not work. In fact it accelerated Kurdish reactions. Thus, the remnants of the Şeyh Said Rebellion, and the left Kurdish intellectuals who fled to neighbouring countries, managed to establish another organization, called the National Kurdish League. With the assistance of *Hoyboun*²⁸ ('independence', in Kurdish), it convened meetings of influential members of several earlier Kurdish groups (the Association for the Recovery of Kurdistan, Kurdish Social Committee and the Society for Kurdish Independence) in Lebanon in order to launch another more organized revolt, in Mount Ararat, (Agri Dagi) which commenced in 1929, led by Ihsan Nuri Pasha, another ex-Ottoman military officer. The Mount Ararat revolt was crushed by the government.

This revolt experienced the same result—failure—as most of the Kurdish uprisings did. It also caused the Turkish government to enhance its assimilation policy with more legal regulations. Following this uprising, the Kurdish region was divided into four zones:

- A. Where Turkish ethnics would be sent to increase the density of the Turkish population;
- B. A Turkish region to be established where Kurdish people would be sent to assimilate;
- C. The fertile Kurdish region from where the Kurdish people were deported and where Turkish immigrants would be allowed to settle without state assistance, and,
- D. A Kurdish region which was evacuated, or was deemed inappropriate to live in due to security, strategic, political, cultural, material, and public health reasons.

The policy also banned the formation of new villages by people whose mother tongue was not Turkish. From the perspective of Celadet Ali Bedirhan, the leader of *Hoybun*²⁹, organized in Syria, this law actually referred to Kurdish

²⁸ It was a Kurdish nationalist party formed in 1927 in Lebanon under the presidency of Celadet Bedirhan. Indeed, the party was consisting of ex-member of banned Kurdish organization established in the late of the Empire. They believed that the only way to obtain independence through an organized military struggle so they launched the Ağrı Rebellion (McDowall, 2007).

²⁹ Rohat Alakom's work, *Hoybun Örgütü ve Ağrı Ayaklanması*, is one of the more extensive studies on the organization.

and Turkish lands behind the scene of the zones divided into three and he claimed that it was an operation of depopulating Kurdistan, and of replacing them with a new population (Bedirhan, 1997). By the end of 1935 the tension between the Kurdish population in Dersim and the Turkish government, since the Koçgiri rebellion in 1921, had accelerated and reached alarming levels. Because of this tension, several reports on Dersim by the Inspectorate General and the other state institutions were prepared and presented to the government in order to take measures to prevent a possible revolt.³⁰ In 1938, the Dersim revolt occurred and the reaction of the government was more brutal than ever before, so it shared the same result of previous revolts when the leader of the revolt, Sayyid Rıza was captured and immediately hanged.

The denial of Kurdish identity and the harsh cracking down of Kurdish revolts in the region were not the only policies to assimilate the other ethnic origins and to 'turkify' them. As a part of the nationalist character of the Turkish state, the concept of Turkishness became portrayed as being the most valuable, noble race in the world through slogans such as, 'A Turk is worth the whole universe' (Bir Türk Dünyaya Bedel), 'Happy to whome says I am a Turk' (Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene). In addition, official institutions through the 'Turkish History Thesis' and through the development and dissemination of the 'Sun Language Theory', claimed that all races were actually Turks, and that the Turkish language was the mother of all languages in the world, respectively. This proves to what extent Turkish nationalism humiliated other nations not only by crushing them but also by claiming Kurdish people to be actually of Turkish origin. Thanks to these theories, the state official discourse redefined Kurdish people as mountain Turks and the Kurdish language as a mixture of Turkish, Arabic, Persian and Armenian, at the same time as banning their use in public and official areas. These state produced theories were added into the school history curriculum and this created a Turkish nationalist generation as its product (Zürcher, 2009). During this time even until as late as the 1990s, the words 'Kurd' and 'Kurdistan', and its derivations, were taken out all official

³⁰ The common points of these reports (the Hamdi Bey Report in 1926, the Ali Cemal Bardakçı Report in 1926, the İbrahim Tali Öngören Report in 1930, the Fevzi Çakmak Report in 1931, the Ömer Halis Bıyıktaş Report in 1931, the Şükrü Kaya Report in 1932 and Abdullah Alpdoğan report in 1936) were to suggest a strict assimilation policy through using military power against the people (Yayman, 2011). For instance, İbrahim Tali Öngören stated in his report that 'the houses and villages locating in the top of the mountains and dominant position should be burned and their habitants should deport to the west or to the places which are not maintained' (Yayman, 2011, p.99).

documents, and even dictionaries (Saatçi, 2002). The state described and degraded the Kurdish revolts as being a reaction (Barkey, 2000) of backwards people and bandits (*eşkiyalar*) opposed to modernization. During the revolt years, as a part of the complete denial of Kurdish people, the Turkish media ceased to use the word Kurds, instead, they substituted the word 'bandits' (Alakom, 1998).

Since the end of the 1930s to the early 1960s, it is hard to say that there was a Kurdish ethnic revolt despite the fact that several tiny squirmishes happened in the Kurdish region. It is obviously because of that, that Turkish ethno-nationalism, and also secularism, prevailed in every aspect of the state apparatus in Turkey, especially politics, culture, education, military, and economy. The modernization policy of Turkey included centralization, nationalization and secularization, which left no room for any activities in which some Kurdishness could be found. The only place where Kurds existed was in parliament as deputies who were associated with state official ideology but who had never revealed their ethnic origins. The revolt years also saw the executions of many potential Kurdish leaders, the dismantling of influential tribes, abandoned religious orders and institutions, and deportation of significant notables to the west or abroad. As a natural consequence of this, there was no potential left for the Kurds to rise up against any nationalist or secularist policy of the government in the Kurdish region. Denise Natali emphasizes this condition by stating that, 'The denial of Kurdish, ethnic identity, harsh secularization policies, prohibition of opposition groups, and militarization of the Kurdish regions prevented the continued evolution and open manifestation of nationalist sentiments' (Natali, 2005, p.85). In addition, Bozarslan's hypothesis could explain this stagnation; not only the elimination of Kurdish leaders and nationalist groups in Turkey, but also in Iraq with the *Barzani* rebellion in 1943, and in Iran with the collapse of Mahabad Kurdish Republic in 1946, created a generation who would be thinking of 'national oppression' and not of 'national emancipation' (Bozarslan, 2007). He states that 'the national oppression had been accepted as the Kurds' long-lasting existential condition' (Bozarslan, 2007, p.45). Yet, 'In the long term, the assimilation policies, and urbanization of Kurdish populations have created a wider and stronger Kurdish consciousness, which has expressed itself in the

armed, long and bloody resistance on the one side, and, although limited, a political movement within the Turkish political system on the other' (Saatci, 2002, p.558).

Denial of Religious Identity in the Single Party Era

Thanks to the victory gained against the Greeks instilled by the western powers, in the first and the second Balkan wars, Atatürk had the social and political power to form a new assembly representing a new Turkish State. During the whole struggle, social groups who helped Atatürk consisted of notables, western educated intellectuals, ex-Ottoman army officers, provincial landlords, and tribal leaders in Anatolia, whose single concentrated goal was to save the Sultanate and Caliphate from the invasion of Christians and imperialist western powers (Zürcher, 2009; Heper, 1981, p.350). This propaganda worked smoothly, as most of these groups still preserved the Ottoman legacy and understanding. The majority of the participants of the preceding congress in Sivas and Erzurum, and then the first assembly, were among from these groups who were mostly adherent of the Caliphate³¹. Different from the majority of the assembly, Atatürk and his close associates were eager to have a western-style, modern state rather than preserve the traditionalist and conservative state structure of the Empire. Claiming that the Sultan co-operated with the western invaders and betrayed the nation, reduced the popularity of the Sultanate and both modernist and conservatives agreed to abolish the Sultanate in 1922 (Ahmed, 1993). When it came to the subject of the Caliphate, Atatürk and his friends who shared the same ideas, realized that they did not have the power to abandon the Caliphate which was a title covering not only Muslim Turkey, but also throughout the world. To reach their aim of transformation of the state into a modern nation state, they formed a political party after the international recognition of the Republic of Turkey via the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, and then gained a majority of the Assembly by changing the profile of deputies in such a way as they were able to pass any rules without considerable opposition. When the Caliphate was abandoned and all members of the Ottoman dynasty were sent

³¹ A contradiction over the regime of the state constituted among the cadre who fought in the independence war including Atatürk, and those thinking of nationalism and secularism as the way to become a western style modern state. Considerable numbers of high military officers and intellectuals in Istanbul, such as Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Rauf Orbay, Refet Bele, Kazım Karabekir, Cafer Tayyar Eğilmez, Mehmet Rahmi Eyüboğlu, İsmail Canbulat, Adnan Adıvar, (Cagaptay, 2006) were still loyal to the Caliphate and Sultanate which they fought for to save

into exile, they split from the People's Party (Halk Fırkası), established by Atatürk, and renamed themselves as the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası) in 1924, thus establishing an opposition party, the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası), in the same year. Despite the fact that the opposition had ample common ideas on forming a modern state, they also 'advocated decentralization, separation of powers and evolutionary rather than revolutionary change' (Zürcher, 2009, p.168), and they were considered as a conservative party due to their vivid loyalty to the Caliphate. Atatürk's cadre managed to obtain the majority of the assembly but the members of the opposition party were influential and symbolic names from the War of Independence, and talented military officers, resulting in the fact that they were still significant obstacle in front of the radical reforms to impose a secularist³² policy.

In addition to the denial of Kurdish ethnic identity, the second massive barrier towards a modern Turkey, with its homogenization of people, was 'religion' which was believed to be one of the main obstacles preventing progress, and also a main reason for the perceived 'backwardness' of the Empire and the Republic. This subject might seem not related to the subject of the research but actually it is, because the emergence of political Islam in Turkey was a backlash towards a radical secular policy of the state. This policy started with the abolishment of the Sultanate and Caliphate after the petition sent by the Caliph to increase Caliphate treasure, and the letter sent by two Indian dignitaries, the *Agha Kahn* and *Ameer Ali* who identified the importance of the Caliphate institution for all Muslims in the world. Atatürk believed that the institution of the Caliphate could be used as an instrument to intervene in internal and external Turkish politics (Berkes, 1998). The demise of the Sultanate and Caliphate automatically brought two more secularizing acts; one for abolishing the previous ministries of Şeriat ve Evkaf Bakanlığı (Shariah and Foundations) and then it continued with the declaration of 'Tevhid-i Tedrisat

³² Niyazi Berkes's book (1998) illustrates that the roots of secularism dated back to the beginning of 19th century and dramatically increased in Tanzimat era of the Ottoman Empire (Berkes, 1998). In that era, a dual judicial structure was put in operation and so sharia was not the only source of justice any more. This term also led to the appearance of western educated bureaucrats who were close to western secularism and then they created a Young Turk group whose significant members, including their leader Ali Rıza Bey were positivist or materialist and believed that religion was one of the crucial causes for the backwardness of the Empire (Yavuz, 2003, p.46). Thus, it was something unknown for Kemalist cadres who were already familiar with the CUP terms. What Atatürk did was to radicalize secularism measurements against so-called backward Islam.

Kanunu' (the act for unification of education) which demolished most of the religious educational institutions. All education and religious matters were taken under the control of the Ministry of National Education and 'Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı'³³(Directorate of Religious Affairs-DRA), respectively. It meant that the influential power of religion over the people was reduced and taken under the control of the state in order to prevent the use of this potential power against the state. In other words, 'Kemalist reformers refrained from using religion; their very target was the hold of religion [Islam] on the polity and society' (Heper, 1981, p.350).

This gives us a great clue that the Republic's intention was not complete eradication of Islam, but to expand the state's absolute authority over religion and religious institutions and to use religious sentiments as an instrument to impose nationalism. The quotation taken from Zafer Çetin's article fits here meaningfully as a way to simply explain the actual aim of the state on secularism. 'When the Republican state elite tried to eliminate the old-fashioned religious practices, rituals, and institutions, they did not aim merely to destroy; the aim was to replace the old, disapproved rituals with new, secular, officially-sanctioned nationalist rites designed to express loyalty to the new state' (Çetin, 2004, p.351). This policy explicitly showed itself in the Islamic education textbooks though not Islamic education. In the content of most of the books about Islam, 'the love of fatherland, obedience to order, zealous work, strict compliance with military, respect for Turkish flags, submission to the laws and to the state requirements, sacrifice of one's life for the safety of the nation' (Taspinar, 2005, p.30) were imposed as primary religious duties of all Muslims in order that they become good citizens who are nationalist and secularist. To this end, a new educational institution, the schools for Preachers and Chiefs of Prayers (İmam Hatip Okulları) were established as a part of a 'social engineering' process to obtain this type of citizens. For instance, a committee headed by Mehmet Fuat Köprülü was formed by the government to modernize religion in accordance with rationality and science. This committee suggested that shoes should not be taken off while entering mosques, the instruction of prayers should be in Turkish, the

³³ Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı was also used to disseminate the ideas of the 'love of homeland (vatan sevgisi), 'the sacredness of military service', 'respect for law and order' and hard work for development of Turkey' (Yavuz, 2003, p.49). By doing so, religious sentiments were employed to promote state ideologies and according to requirement of the state.

prayer times should be rearranged according to working hours, and finally, church type music and pews should be used instead of recitation of the Qur'an (Yavuz, 2003, p.50). Except for the reciting of the *Ezan*³⁴ in Turkish, most of these suggestions were not implemented because of the fear of a strong, negative reaction from the people (Taspinar, 2005). As it is obvious from the example above, an attempt to use religion was tried as an instrument for western style modernization. Afterwards, an attempt was made to replace Islamic values and symbols with the symbols of the European civilization.

Due to the fact that secularism was put into the constitution and internalized by almost all of the state institutions by taking the statement that 'Islam is the religion of the state' out of constitution, all instruments under state control started to produce a Turkish nationalist and secularist state bureaucracy of ruling elites and also intellectuals. This is contrary to the fact that the secularist and nationalist state ideology had not been demanded by the people, but imposed by the government. As generally accepted, the direction of reforms in Turkey was not made from the bottom to top, but from the top to bottom. Bozarslan stresses a distinction to be made by the Kemalism between the nation, which was represented by modern, educated and westernized ruling elites, and the people, who were represented by the ignorant mass. This perception directed Kemalist elites to discipline this ignorant mass 'by revolutionary reforms, and if necessary, by coercion' (Bozarslan, 2006, p.31). In the light of these historical facts, Atatürk's established state structure in Turkey alienated the mass from the state (Yavuz, 2003, p.48), and both the concept of secularism and Turkish nationalism- has each created oppositions—political Islamism and Kurdish nationalism, respectively. It is interesting enough to note that these two opposition groups actually determine the current foreign and internal Turkish politics through their political parties. As an example of new social streams, their emergence as illegal, and then legal, groups will be the main theme of the next chapter.

At the end of two years of intense debate, Shariah courts, for instance, were also abolished, the Swiss Civil Code was approved by the Assembly in 1926, which was seen by the Ministry of Justice, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt as a ticket for entrance into what was considered to be a contemporary civilization of

³⁴According to Islam, it is a recitation of specific phrases to indicate that the prayer time has come.

progress (Berkes, 1998). The implementation of this civil code, the Law of family name, the right of voting, and of being a candidate in elections was given to women at the beginning of 1930s. Moreover, the Hat Law was promulgated in 1925, which prohibited the wearing of any traditional clothes³⁵ or headwear symbolizing any religious positions or affiliations, especially the *Fez*. Atatürk himself explained what the policy was behind these radical changes in a speech in 1927 abolishing the *Fez* by stating that ‘Gentlemen, it was necessary to abolish the *fez*, which sat on the heads of our nation as an emblem of ignorance, negligence, fanaticism, and hatred of progress and civilization, to accept in its place the hat, the headgear used by the whole civilized world, and in this way to demonstrate that the Turkish nation, in its mentality as on other respect, in no way diverges from civilized social life’ (Lewis, 2002, p.268). By saying this, he actually equated all aspects of life before the Republic—regardless what they were—as being equally detrimental to the new Republic; that is, anything reminiscent of the Empire’s social, religious, economic and political legacy was considered to be ignorant, fanatic and backwards, all of which left the people of the Empire ‘behind’ the more ‘civilized’ European powers. Furthermore, as another example of the aim of halting social power of an established Islamist movement and ‘breaking its hold on the minds and hearts of the Turkish people’ (Lewis, 2002, p.416), the *Aya Sofya* mosque was converted into a museum. This change was significant because it had been one of the strongest religious symbols from the Ottoman legacy. The mosque, which was converted from the church, the Santa Sophia was seen as a monument of victory of the Islamic Ottoman Empire against Christian Byzantium, and converted into a museum by republican ruling elites as—a symbol of Europeanization.

In addition, the Latin alphabet was approved by the government, superseding the Arabic alphabet in 1928, which also was used as an excuse for taking Arabic and Persian words from Turkish as a part of the radical nationalist project of Turkey (Zürcher, 2009). What is more, the government changed the day of rest from Friday, which has a religious basis, to Sunday, and western time and weight measures were adopted (Yavuz, 2003, p.49). These changes

³⁵ For instance, between the 1930s and 1940s, villagers who were coming to the capital, Ankara, with their traditional clothes such as *salvar*, were not allowed to visit main streets and were directed to back streets (Yavuz, 2000).

were actually not just to secularize modern Turkey but also to take control of religion. From this perspective, Turkish secularism differs from the western type of secularism. While the act of Unification of Education closed all *medreses*, *tekkes*, and religious orders (*tariqah*), but gave the right to the formation of divinity schools at the secondary education and university level, all these regulations were based on a secular understanding and were aimed at cutting all connections between the Islamic legacy of the Empire and the new generation of Turkey. However, the Kemalist cadre had known that the religious feeling had a strong social ability to mobilize people, so that they sought to modify religion to certain preferred way, thereby using it to arguably assist to transform Turkey into a contemporary modern country. For instance, by changing the language of *Ezan*, *Mevluts* and *Friday Hutbe* from Arabic to Turkish in 1932, they not only performed a secular but also a nationalist intention. In this regard, the Kemalist reforms stood against traditional institutionalized Islam through secularization of state, education and law, through replacing religious symbols with the symbols of European civilization, and popular Islam by secularizing social life (Zürcher, 2009). The fundamental result of religious reforms in Turkey was 'to break the power of institutional Islam completely, and make it directly subject to the secular authorities' (Stirling, 1958, p. 408).

The Turkish History Thesis claiming that most early civilizations were ethnically Turkish, and the Sun Language Theory, claiming that almost every language is derived from Turkish, were employed to emphasize pre-Ottoman Turkish history and sever the connection between the Islamic legacy and modern Turkish history. Based on these theories, a new Turkish history that neglected sixth century Ottoman-Islamic history was written and became the official school text for the primary level. Then the Turkish language society was established to purge foreign words from Turkish. Foreign, of course meant Arabic and Persian words which were prevalent in religion and poetry in the Ottoman era (Mango, 1999). Using the Turkish language in religious practice was actually a reflection of the Atatürk government's nationalist and secularist intention of Atatürk. As a result of this policy, the first time the Qur'an was recited in Istanbul was in the Turkish language. A group of people

reacted to these changes, but they were arrested and the event was described as a 'hateful reactionary incident' (Mango, 1999, p.497).

Conclusion

The common identity for the Turks, Kurds, and other ethnic and religious minorities, were by and large destroyed by the Kemalist policy in the process of creating a homogeneous society and state based on ethnic Turkish nationalism and secularism. In short, 'The Turkish reformers' main intention was to end the Ottoman multicultural and multinational legacy by melding all differences under the name 'Turk' (Çolak, 2006, p.591). According to them, this transformation from a religiously determined social and political structure to a modern, national and secular identity could only be achieved 'by means of a secular state and society' (Çolak, 2006, p.591). Therefore, the Kemalist elites targeted the second majority of ethnic groups (Sirkeci, 2000), the Kurds, and popular religious sentiments, for elimination and treated them as if they had never existed.

Regarding the Kurdish question in Turkey, after a religiously formed brotherhood or social contract between the Kurdish and Turkish people, sealed by the presence of the title of Caliphate in the capital, was broken by the Kemalist government in their drive to reach at high level modern civilization, national and secular Kurdish people resisted such a state-building process that occupied their own land where they had lived for more than a millennium. The Kurdish revolts, whether they had nationalist or religious character, are undeniably an indication of that resistance for their identities (Taspinar, 2005). In addition, the radical nationalist measures taken by the government also automatically created its opposition in the absence of religious ties, Kurdish nationalism which was considered as a counter-revolution by the Kemalist regime, and then security originated military, and the assimilation policy, were implemented to get rid of these barriers standing in front of nationalization of Turkish state. It employed the settlement laws and official denial of Kurdish ethnic identity by not referring to Kurdishness within the context of the question for assimilation, and through the deployment of a heavy military presence in the Kurdish region for security (Taspinar, 2005). Regarding to position of religion (Islam) within the society, Kemalist elites spent tremendous amount of efforts to reduce the influence of religion and

then modernize it in accordance with their modernization project. Within this process, religious social and political institutions along with the religious symbols among the societies were intentionally de-popularized by imposing secular nationalist characters over societies.

From the beginning of the Republic to the 1950s, the Kemalist single party regime achieved its aim of silencing its crucial rivals—Kurdish ethnic nationalism and popular religion. By the end of this regime there was no indication of any possible resurface of these rivals due to the fact that party branches and state institutions were integrated each other so the CHP's ideology became automatically that of a state ideology. Thus, they had control of every corner and spread a strong sense of fear among people in Turkey. At the end of this dramatic part of Turkish history a massive empire turned to a national state.

The single party era is when both Kurdish and Islamic identities have most resemblances comparing forthcoming two time periods since they witnessed direct and official elimination their own identities not only from official arenas but also from social, economical and political arenas. This argument sheds lights on the argument of which the roots of Kurdish and Islamic questions are actually relying on the policies produced and applied in the single party era.

While moving on the next time period, aforementioned radical and harsh precautions seem to work for a while, especially during the single party regime, but if the history of the Turkish republic is considered as a whole, it just increased the level of ethnic conscience among the Kurds and of religious conscience among people which initially exposed itself at the beginning of the multi-party regime.

Chapter Two: Kurdish and Islamic Identities in Democrat Party (Multi-Party System) Era

Transition from the Single Party to the Multi-party System

It would be true to claim that the beginning point of social movements in Turkey coincided with the demolition of the single party regime whose ideological base had been always Kemalism, and after Turkey's switch to a multi-party system.³⁶ This vital change is not simply a regime change, but also a change which altered social, political, and economic conditions in Turkey, especially after the 1961 Turkish constitution, considered to be one of the most liberal. In brief, this transition paved the way for alternative voices in every aspect of Turkish citizens' lives (Karpas, 1970, p.1681).

It is an undeniable fact that the political transformation from a single party to a multi-party system paved the way for distinct ideas to be heard³⁷ (Poulton, 1997, p.131; Natali, 2005, p.92), and which would see social movements end up as political parties. As mentioned in preceding chapters, Islam as a religion, and Kurdishness as distinct ethnic origin, were sought to be taken out of the political, social and economic realms since, to ruling elites, they were seen as fundamental barriers standing in the way of the modernization process of Turkey. At the first opportunity, these two eliminated groups found themselves endorsing the Democrat Party (DP), which swept away votes in the ballot box. By the end of 1950s, when they were not entirely satisfied with the political and social conditions the Democrat Party brought, they began organizing their own social and political groups. As the quotation above indicates, new challenges have gradually, but systematically, opposed the premises of the Republic of Turkey.

³⁶ The fundamental reasons why Turkey's political system transformed from a single party to a multi-party system is believed to be the changed international system, İnönü's commitment to democracy, the democratic structure of the Republican People's Party, and finally, social discontent reaching the top level during, and just after, the Second World War. Turkish and other scholars studied these reasons but none of them considered social discontent as a primary issue in this transition. On the other hand, M. Asim Karaömerlioğlu's article on this subject more or less proved that social discontent could be a primary reason why ruling elites of the Republic chose democracy as soon as the war ended (Karaömerlioğlu, 2006, pp.89-94). That is why the slogan of the Democrat Party in the 1950 general election, 'Artık Yeter' (Enough), was sensitive over people.

³⁷ Hugh Poulton argues that the Democrat Party reign did not have much difference from the Republican Party reign as the essence of the 1924 constitution remained the same, with rules to maintain an authoritarian state structure, and as leading members of the Democrat Party were driven from the Republican Party. So he argues that the authoritarian single party regime was handed over from one to another.

The Case of Kurdish Nationalism

The Turkish government might have thought that they resolved the Eastern or South Eastern question for a while because of relative silence in the region, and the intensive use of Turkish language in Kurdish towns (Van Bruinessen, 1984). But it was just a time of stagnation for the Kurdish people who would gain an ethnic conscience which did not rely on a traditional structure of its Kurdish people, or religious or cultural sentiments, but leftist ideas which were seen potentially able to solve Kurdish economic, agricultural and social problems as well as providing Kurds with official recognition. The 1940s had witnessed an international power struggle between the one side, which was represented by democracy, and its twin sister, capitalism, and the rival side, which was affiliated with fascist, authoritarian, and military regimes. By the end of the struggle, the Second World War occurred; Turkey sided with democracy by declaring war against Germany and became a charter member of the United Nations representing the victory of democracy, liberalism and capitalism. Eventually, Turkey changed its regime from a single party to a multi-party system with the establishment of the Democrat Party (DP) founded by ex-republican party deputies in 1946.

The people in Turkey, regardless of their ethnic or religious origins took a further step in order to remove the CHP from power because of its nationalist and secular policy, for the sake of being modern, despite the resentment felt amongst the people towards European powers. As was the case in the first initiative of having an opposition party, the Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası (The Free Republican Party) in 1930, under the control and tutelage of Kemal Atatürk, the people's support for the new opposition party was surprisingly high. In the first free general election in 1950, the DP obtained a majority of the votes and formed a single party government. A new opposition party became a centre for previously suppressed groups, especially for pious people and Kurdish nationalists. Regarding the Kurdish question in Turkey, the new government did not create or open any path through which a Kurdish nationalist might walk and express resentment, but it stretched the secular policy of the state in favour of religion, which created a massive support from both Kurdish and Turkish people who still adhered to the popular religion instead of imposing an official state religion. It also allowed exiled, important,

Kurdish families and tribal leaders to return home and helped them a bit in the recovery of what they had lost.

In the multi-party era, as remnants of the Kurdish rebellions, some Kurdish aghas and tribes co-opted with the government. In the previous era, official Turkish politics had been washed out from most of the religious Kurdish figures because of secularization, and also from secular Kurdish elites because of nationalization, unless they cooperated with, or were integrated into the secular-nationalist political structure of Turkey. During this era until the 1960s, there were no representatives of the Kurdish people except for the aghas in the Kurdish region, who exchanged the numbers of votes they had with personal privileges and basic infrastructure (Taspinar, 2005) so that schools, main roads, and several more hospitals appeared in the Kurdish region (Nezan, 1980). Returned agahs, and tribal leaders now became entrepreneurs, landlords or wholesalers, whose main concern became economic underdevelopment of Kurdish cities not Kurdish nationalism. Furthermore, by looking at the silence of the Kurdish people because of military suppression, it can be said that Republican Turkey 'succeeded in compelling Kurds to recognize its political and military authority' (Yeğen, 2011, p.71). This security based denial of Kurdish identity caused a severe economic underdevelopment.³⁸ Thus, in the reign of the DP, the Kurdish question was perceived as that of economic backwardness of the Kurdish land, which created another reason for denial of Kurdish ethnic identity. When the ongoing feudal structure of Kurdish society was combined with this economic underdevelopment, the Kurdish question was named as a socio-economic problem of the East preserved by the feudal groups, and even in recent years the governments of Turkey have used this definition. Yet, there was no official flexibility in denial of a Kurdish ethnic identity but in practice, several small resentments in both Kurdish and leftist Turkish groups would cause the emergence of illegal Kurdish nationalist groups. The most important group and the one which has influenced on Kurdish politics in Turkey was the PKK which developed obviously as a long-terms result of the denial of Kurdish identity (Saatçi, 2002).

³⁸ Insecurity forces people to realize that they are way out of their insecure position, which might be economic, social, cultural, identical, and so on. If ethnic violence is accepted as one of these ways out, then armed ethnic struggle can be justifiable from this perspective. For more details and a theoretical explanation, Icduygu, Romano and Sirkeci's work might be explanatory (2010).

Eventually, regarding the Kurdish condition in the first decade of the multi-party era of Turkey, Kurdish people were restricted in terms of ethnic identity and did not have a chance for any mobilization of a pro-Kurdish political group. Yet, under the Turkish citizenship edict, they had an opportunity to manifest themselves as part of conservative, and especially leftist, legal political groups (Natali, 2005). As mentioned, the main concern was not ethnic rights but economic and cultural backwardness of eastern Turkey where Kurdish people constituted a majority of the population. The trial of the 49's (49'lar [in Turkish] referring to 49 people who were taken into custody because of a telegram they sent to the Parliament and the Prime Ministry concerning the speech of the MP Asim Eren) in 1959 can be given as an example of a continuation of denial of Kurdish ethnicity, in which forty-nine Kurdish intellectuals were accused of being part of activities involving the Kurdish question such as publishing poems and articles in the Kurdish language. They were tried and sentenced in the last year of the DP government (Güzeldere, 2010).

Thanks to mechanization of agriculture, Turkey had a remarkable boost in economic growth during the initial years of the DP government, from 1950 to the mid-1950s. This dazzling development caused an increase in the party's vote but the consequences triggered social and then political changes in Turkish politics (Karpat, 1962, p.311). A tremendous migration from rural eastern and middle Anatolia reshaped the social structure of big cities. These immigrants settled into suburban areas which were adjacent to central Turkey, and now almost fully integrated to the city, created an extensive ground from which Kurdish nationalist and political Islamist could get support. The more migrants the more politicized society which threatened military officers who were afraid of erosion of Kemalist reforms (Taspinar, 2005). In addition, the foreign debts taken to improve agriculture at the beginning of the 1950s caused a dramatic devaluation in currency in 1958 which led to strong grievances among Kemalist bureaucrats, especially the military, who had already resented flexibility in secular policy as they thought that the government was moving away from a Kemalist understanding. The Democrat Party experience ended with a coup d'état organized and led by the Kemalist military and bureaucracy. Under the leadership of General Cemal Gürsel, a

National Unity Committee was formed and was in power for a year and half until the 1961 general election (Zürcher, 2009).

The Case of Political Islam

Atatürk constitutionalized secularization reforms with his close associates so that even successor governments could not change them easily. In addition, these reforms, which appeared and are known as the Kemalist 'six principles', were perceived as foundation stones of the Republic and were guarded by the Kemalist military forces. As mentioned before, the initiative of forming an opposition party by Atatürk had failed because of surprising popular support. This could not exactly demonstrate that the reaction of the people was totally due to the secular policy of the government, but it would not be wrong to claim that it was a part of it. Şeyh Said's reaction to the abolishment of the Caliphate could be a very early example of backlash against secularization as well, even considering it was also furnished by Kurdish nationalist sentiments. The most striking reaction against secularization of Turkey occurred in Menemen, which is still annually inaugurated by Kemalists in Turkey (Ahmad, 1991, p.7). The essence of the event is that when an officer named Kubilay tried to prevent a local dervish preaching against the regime, he was captured by the disciples and was beheaded. The event indicated that the reforms led by Kemalist ruling elites did not go as far as the roots of popular culture inherited from the Empire (Kadioğlu, 1996). This event has been considered as a proof of what would happen if secularism had not been in operation.

These resentments reflected during the multi-party election of 1950 in Turkey and resulted in the absolute victory of the Democrat Party (DP). As soon as a multi-party election was anticipated in the near future, by establishing more religious schools (İmam Hatip Okulları) and one more divinity faculty in Ankara University and using religious discourse, the CHP utilized religious sentiments to get people's support (Poulton, 1997). Even, the *türbeler*, the tombs of religious figures, which were closed by the CHP itself, were reopened (Zürcher, 2009). This itself was an overt indication that even the CHP understood that what they had done was not at the will of the people, but their own modernization project. This could be understood from the principle of populism which could be summarized with the motto, 'For the people, despite the people' which was used by the CHP in early the 1930s and reflected a

massive cultural gap between the ruling elites and society (Taspinar, 2005). In spite of the fact that the CHP sought to appear to be tolerant towards religion in order to secure the vote of religious people between 1946 to the end of its rule in 1950, as Lewis articulates, religious figures of society in Anatolia had never forgiven the Kemalist regime for imposing secularization, and because of that, at the first opportunity, they took a stand against it (Lewis, 2002; Szyliowicz, 1962, p.432). The slogan of the DP in this election was quite meaningful, which was, 'Yeter, Söz Milletindir' (Enough! Now the people have their say) to illustrate that what had been done for the sake of modernization though it was not asked of the people nor demanded by the people.

In a multi-party regime, both the CHP and DP aimed to obtain the votes of religious people. Because of that, the DP showed much more flexibility than the CHP in terms of religion. As soon as the DP gained power, the recitation of the Qur'an could be heard on radio stations and the language of *Ezan* was returned to Arabic. It also contacted religious groups such as *Nurcus* and exchanged religious flexibility or tolerance with votes (Zürcher, 2009). During its government, several demands such as returning to the Arabic alphabets and revitalizing the *evkaf* (foundations) and Shariah ministry by religious groups had been brought to the DP, but they were not taken seriously. It can be said that the DP as was the case in the late CHP era, just gave a more room to breathe for religion and religious people, but did not have any intention of going backwards from the Kemalist reforms in terms of secularization. For instance, some explicit Islamic publications and the Islam Democrat Party and also the Islamist Nation Party, which overtly called for returning to *shariah*, were banned (Poulton, 1997).

Thanks to the tolerant appearance of the DP and considerable improvement in agriculture in the western and central Anatolia, the DP were provided with one more absolute victory in the next election. These economic developments created a new middle class apart from the upper class which Kemalist state ideology established (Lewis, 2002). At the end of the 1950s, a sort of class struggle between the new middle class and the Kemalist upper class, ended in favour of the Kemalist upper class as one of the components of Kemalism, the Turkish military ceased civil administration with the coup in 1960 on the grounds that they protected Kemalist reforms eroded by the DP.

Conclusion

As a demarcation of transition from single party to multi party system in Turkey, the DP decade is mostly considered to be beginning point of major changes in Turkey. What makes this era so significant is actually that first time different voices had a change to be heard and suppressed identities were explicitly presented to those who were governing the state. That is why, this decade is crucial in terms of 'political opportunity structure.

Suppression of identities, except secular-nationalist identity led people to reside with any alternative options. The DP government did take these serious grievances into account by loosening level of pressure over excluded groups not constitutionally but practically. In reverse, the DP provided a political opportunity by which excluded groups could be integrated into the embedded structure. While providing such an opportunity, demands of these excluded groups would not met by the representatives (MPs) occupied parliamentary seats from the DP quota. This can be proven with the formation of other political parties, such as Turkish Labour Party and New Turkey Party just after the 1960 coup d'état.

It is obvious that practical pressure on both ethnically Kurdish and religiously Islamic identities were loosened but not applied into official regulations. That is the same historical experience which both identities have witnessed and exposed to. Considering such common pressures originated from official state ideology, it would not be surprising if someone argues the question of that these groups should have come together and combine their strength against metaphorically common enemy. Until 1960s and as would be touched upon next chapters until the early 21st century they have not, so this situation leads us to question of why. That how they perceived each other so that perception prevented such possibility. It will be largely examined in the third part by applying critical discourse analysis over official party programmes of both political streams.

Thanks to participating into politics through the DP local and provincial braches, excluded groups experienced an open way for communication with the state. Since then, not only Kurdish nationalist but also political Islamist social movements have maintained their connection with the state agencies at

least via a single member of parliament. Once that connection ended illegal social and political groups with their own organizations forced the structure to meet their demands while their ideas, resources and discourses were mobilizing.

Chapter Three: Mobilization of Pro-Kurdish and Pro-Islamic Social Movements, 1960-1980

Mobilization of the Pro-Kurdish Social Movement

The fundamental difference in the DP's policies was that it presented itself as being respectful to religion, specifically, Islam,³⁹ and invested in the eastern side of Turkey thanks to land reforms and cooperation with aghas and Sheikhs in the Kurdish region (McDowall, 2010, p.399). Because of these policies, DP obtained support from the Kurdish populated area until it was realized that DP had never made a concession from the official state ideology⁴⁰. As a result, when the first coup d'état of the multi-party term of Turkey occurred in 1960, much more fragmented social and political structures appeared in Turkey. Two of these fragmentations were Easternists⁴¹ (Doğucular) under the sovereignty of the leftist movement, who demanded economically, and in terms of citizenship, equal treatment from the government, and Islamists who demanded Islam to be more influential in every aspect of the state ranging from economic to foreign policy.

This fragmented social structure gained more space in which to operate. Remaining traditional representatives of the Kurdish people⁴² who were/are sheikhs and aghas, failed to bridge the gap between what was demanded and received. Therefore, rival Kurdish groups consisting of university students stepped forward and raised the issues of Kurdish identity together with the economic and political issues. They realized a backwardness of the eastern

³⁹ Alike Said-i Kurdi, Qadiri and Halidi religious orders supported the DP since they unconditionally refuse any Republican Party presence in the region and the DP discourse was more religious than its rival (McDowall, 2010, p.398)

⁴⁰ Naci Kutlay, one of the prominent figures in the preliminary stages of the Kurdish movement states that the support of Kurdish people and students towards the Democrat Party in his memoirs. He later would become a member of Turkish Worker Party and later on the Republican People's Party. Yet, His memoirs are quite important to indicate that at the beginning of the 1950s, the Democrat Party was considered as a chance to get rid of the Republican's cruelty (Kutlay, 1998, p.29).

⁴¹ As it can be seen in most of the memories of those who witnessed the 1950s and 60s, even at universities, Kurdish students were called as 'Doğulu', not as Kurds (Kutlay, 1998, p.62).

⁴² From the 1925 Seyh Sait Rebellion to the 1938 Dersim rebellion, most of the rebels, elites and notable Kurdish families were killed, exiled, or silenced, apart from those who co-opted with Turkish government. Two hundred of those co-opting with established Turkish politics and supporting DP had been arrested accused of being separatist Kurds by the military government of 1960. Fifty-five of them were convicted and then sent to exile in the western part of the country. As soon as civil rule took power, these Kurdish aghas were excused and allowed to go back to their original land. As Taspinar states, this is an indication that Turkish civil politics needed to re-establish the traditional relationship between Ankara and Kurdish notables who were still able to guarantee a considerable amount of votes in elections (Taspinar, 2005, p.89).

area of Turkey while they were studying in the western part of Turkey. Inevitably, they were influenced by communist and socialist ideologies,⁴³ which was based on the concept of proletariats and workers whose rights were exploited by their agahs, sheiks or governments.

Regarding relative deprivation, there was no satisfactory improvement in social, cultural, economic and political conditions of the Kurdish people in neither the Republican nor the Democrat Party era. When extreme deprivation in all the mentioned conditions of the Kurdish people met with the leftist movement in which Kurdish students were active, firstly, as a part of leftist movement and then separately, the Kurdish nationalist movement emerged in Turkey. However, at the same time, some of the sons of traditional Kurdish representatives—aghas, aşirets and sheikhs, whether they were deputies of previous political parties—became politically involved in the Kurdish movement. They consisted of rightist or conservative parts of the movement. Leftist students and intellectuals took their place in the Turkish Worker's Party⁴⁴ while conservative and traditional Kurdish notables formed the 'New Turkey Party'⁴⁵ (Yeni Türkiye Partisi) (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997, p.107). By employing these deprivations as a means of propaganda over the Kurdish people, both sides became extremely politicized until the 1980s (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997, p.106).

In terms of economy, the Kurdish populated area remained the most underdeveloped area where economic life was still based on agriculture and livestock breeding. People who were working for their aghas, sheikhs and aşirets, and who did not have their own land and livestock, remained in the same poor conditions since there were no land reforms applied nor investment

⁴³ Integration of the Kurdish movement into the leftist movement in Turkey is explained by Bozarslan (2012) by these statements; 'The Kurdish movement finds a sort of legitimization in the leftist discourse. Why? Because the left wing movement and 'Marxist-Leninism' as a supposedly unified ideology insist strongly on the rights of the oppressed nations to determine their own future...It was thus supposed to allow a double emancipation: the emancipation of the Turkish working class and oppressed strata, and the emancipation of the Kurds.'

⁴⁴ Kurdish intellectuals taking their place in the party used the party as a legitimate way in which they could change the deprived conditions of the Kurdish people and region by using basic rights advocated in the new constitution (Ekinci, 2004, p.268).

⁴⁵ The New Turkey Party consisted mostly of Kurdish notables from the eastern part of Turkey. An important point should be mentioned here is that they were already familiar with Turkish politics as they were in contact with previous dominant political parties—the Republican People's Party and the Democrat Party. In the first election they experienced, in 1961, the party received approximately 13 percent of the votes and more than 50 seats in the parliament. When the party became a member of a coalition with the CHP, it was able to help pass a law on the return of 55 Kurdish notables who were accused of being Kurdish nationalists and members of the Democrat party who were sent to exile in the western cities of Turkey (Kirişçi & Winrow, 1997, p.108; Liaras, 2009, p.5).

for animal breeding. Even if there were some, they were totally controlled by traditional rulers of the regions. Therefore, capital given to the region, and investment, did not directly reach the people (Bozarslan, 2002, p.17). These areas were still rural areas in which there was no industry apart from agriculture being controlled by these traditional and prominent figures of society. From this perspective, there was no direct political or any kind of relationship with the centre, as peasants were doing what they had been told to do by their rulers who provided peasants' votes in exchange for political immunity, or key investments, from political authority. These established relationships were shaken during the Democrat Party era and then reshaped by leftist and conservative Kurdish groups after the 1961 constitution provided a more liberal political and social environment.

Economic underdevelopment of Kurdish regions was not because of, as official state ideology articulated, a lack of natural resources and adversity of geographic features. Burkay refutes these arguments by bringing the percentage of natural resources in the Kurdish region forward. He thinks that this was a result of a deliberate economic policy of the state. For instance, Kurdish populated areas have been one of the richest areas in terms of petroleum, iron, chrome, copper, and coal. Despite this fact, the state did not invest in the Kurdish region; instead it extracted these mines and sold the resources to customers directly, or moved it to the western part of Turkey to manufacture it (Burkay, 1986, pp.113-122). Given that Kurdish areas are still the most economically underdeveloped areas of Turkey, adversity of geographic features cannot be counted as an obstacle since technological advancement is now able to overcome most of the natural barriers if somewhere is worth the investment. For instance, as Besikci argues, having only 3.3 per cent of tractors provided by state, 4.7 per cent of harvesting machines and only 6.5 per cent of transportation in the region compare to the western part of Turkey, indicate that there is a massive gap between economic investment in the east and west (Besikci, 1967, p.87). The economy's worsening after the mid-1950s affected all individuals in Turkey, but the Kurdish populated area particularly felt it with 'the average household income in the Kurdish southern provinces earning only 74.8% of the country average income in 1968, and the east 83.4%, while Istanbul earned 259.4%, and

Ankara 162.0%' (White, 2007, p.145). This huge gap in average income continued until the 1980s in line with political radicalization. These inequalities were overtly remarkable for those who had a chance to look at the region from the outside and to compare. Eventually, economic deprivation would trigger initially the individual, but later, a social reaction to articulate the problem and then restore equilibrium, or at least force the authorities to do so (Natali, 2005, pp.100-101).

At the same time, mechanization of agriculture⁴⁶ and military pressure on the Kurdish people forced them to migrate to the western part of Turkey (Van Bruinessen, 2000). Extremely poor people in the western part became a major human resource for mobilization of the Kurdish movement as they were aware of their conditions in the region, and demanded a more comfortable life—at least as much as their Turkish counterparts experienced.

Regarding social and cultural situations, due to the official assimilation policy of the Turkish government, the cultural distinctiveness of the Kurdish people was eliminated and any attempts expressing Kurdish culture was strictly suppressed (Taspinar, 2005, p.91). For instance, traditional Kurdish dresses were banned from public areas. Communication in the Kurdish language in city centres, and literature on the Kurds and in the Kurdish language⁴⁷ were also forbidden. In addition, the names of Kurdish places were changed with the Turkish ones by military rulers of the 1960 coup d'état (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997, p.107). Moreover, before military rulers handed the government over, civil rulers, and the head of military coup, Cemal Gürsel, threatened the Kurds by stating, 'The army will not hesitate to bombard towns and villages: there will be such a bloodbath that they (any rebels) will be swallowed up in their

⁴⁶ Before mechanization in agriculture, aghas, beys and sheiks needed human resources as their fundamental requirement for cultivation. Yet, mechanization dramatically reduced the number of man and animal power needed to cultivate the lands, lands which were mostly owned by these traditional leaders. This condition was a major factor increasing migration from the east to the west of Turkey (McDowall, 2010).

⁴⁷ In 1948, founded by Musa Anter, Hüseyin Dikici, Talat Saygın and Veli Dolu Kasımoğlu who stayed in Dicle Student Hostel in Istanbul, the Dicle Kaynağı newspaper is an explanatory example of pressure of the state on any kinds of literature, bringing key events in Kurdish history such as Zilan killings, Şeyh Said revolt, Ağrı, Sason and Dersim rebellions to the fore. It was closed down by the state (Anter, 2011, pp.116-8). Since the moment that the Democrat Party government was eliminated by the 1960 coup d'état, more liberal social and political conditions were established. Within this circle, Ahmet Hamdi Başar published Barış Dünyası magazine. The writings of Musa Anter on Kurdish issues in the magazine again constituted a main reason why the magazine was closed down (Anter, 2011, p.170; McDowall, 2010, p.407). In the early years of the 1960s, Kurdish literature found a tiny space to exist, but their life span did not, generally, last for more than a year. For instance, Dicle-Firat Newspaper, Deng Magazine, and later İleri Yurt, Roja Nu can be considered to be examples of such (Burkay, 2002, p.144).

country' on the ground that the fight between General Qasim and Molla Mustafa Barzani in Iraq came close to Turkey's border (McDowall, 2010, p.406). Considering these social and cultural pressures with the official denial of Kurdish identity, and additionally, the humiliating attitudes of military officers and bureaucrats⁴⁸ toward local Kurdish people, as if they were not even human beings, shows to what degree Kurdish people were deprived of equal rights as citizens.

From a social perspective, the tribal social structure of Kurdish areas was disrupted in the late Ottoman Empire due to the centralization policy, but Turkish policy makers in the republican era kept this structure intact as they inherited, but also did not hesitate to crush, those who were against the newly established state structure. The fundamental relationship between the remaining aghas, sheiks and tribal leaders with the centre, was that their positions were not interfered with, in exchange for votes by the people under their suzerainty. In several occasions some of the notables were elected as members of parliament⁴⁹ on the condition of accepting the established official ideology. It can be said that it remained the same until a real multi-party system was implemented in practise as well. Within this centre-periphery relationship, none of the Kurdish cities had met with modernization and their own free will to choose what was best for themselves continued to be denied. As much as Kurdish people, who were mostly village people, apart from notables and bureaucrats living in city centre, met with the new world and developments, their desire for these improvements forced them to do something. A first wave of Kurdish migration from an underdeveloped and socially tribal structure, to developed western city centres, and to relatively much more liberal areas, was achieved by high school and university students,

⁴⁸ At this moment, the example of a military officer would be quite meaningful. As Bozarslan mentioned in his book, a letter sent by the commander of Bayrambaşlı Military Station in Silvan, Diyarbakır, Mustafa Eski, to his friends in Ankara was released to the press, and thanks to a villager somehow obtained it. What is written in this letter is clear and irrefutable evidence of that how military officers saw the Kurdish people and region. 'It is not too difficult to live here. As if I am vasted there. 125 piasters are not sufficient here. The stick is more powerful here. If you somehow felt into my hands, you could not survive without putting two more zeros next to the 1 (500 piaster). I am really strict. Don't think that I am how I was there. I am terrifying Kurds. 19 villages and 9 mukhtars were under my command. It is very active. There is no work less than 1000 piaster. I bought land in Diyarbakır. I will build an apartment' (Translation is mine, originally it is in Turkish) (Bozarslan, 2002, p.170). It is also published in Cumhuriyet Newspaper in the date of 28 December 1964.

⁴⁹ Those notables or their sons were not discriminated against due to their ethnic origin since they did not say or want anything in the name of their Kurdishness. It is known that of the basis of this political inclination, approximately one fourth of deputies in the Grand National Assembly have always been ethnically Kurdish (Ergil, 2000, p.126).

and the second wave was carried out by rural people as a result of mechanization of agriculture and the cruelty they faced from aghas, tribal leaders and Sheiks (Ergil, 2000, p.125).

Until the end of 20th century, social and cultural structures of Kurdish people in eastern Turkey had never been improved as those living there were left to the hands of Kurdish notables and agahs. Therefore, they initially handled any nationalist discourse or activities, as they were afraid of that their prominent position would be lessened or lost. What Kurdish people experienced under this social and cultural structure was one of the greatest deprivations they have ever experienced.

Last, but not least, political opportunities of Kurdish people were controlled by their traditional leaders co-opting with the government in exchange for votes (Bozarslan, 2002, p.177). These notables were taking parts in Turkish political life but not with their original ethnic identity intact. They might become significant bureaucrats and even Members of Parliament in a conservative or leftist political party, but they were not allowed to engage in politics with their ethnic origin intact and they could not mention a single problem of the Kurdish people by stating the words 'Kurd' or 'Kurdistan'. Furthermore, there was no political party concentrating on Kurdish rights in which Kurdish people could take part and pursue their rights in legal political activities. From the relative deprivation perspective, it is undeniable that these accumulated deprivations would find a way of expressing themselves, as water finds its way out in one way or another. In addition to the previous suppression of the Kurdish ethnic identity, language and culture since 1925, these fundamental and ongoing deprivations mentioned above, became a source of mobilization among Kurdish people. These severe deprivations, compared to those of ethnically Turkish people, were articulated by both conservative and leftist Kurdish groups in the name of 'Eastism' (Doğuculuk), just as using the word 'Kurds' was prohibited by official nationalist state ideology.

The mobilization of Kurdish ethnic identity can be argued to have commenced with the '49s' event which exemplifies the condition in which university students for the first time had officially said something. This event occurred in 1959 when one of the Republican People's Party's representatives from Niğde

province, Asim Eren, brought a parliamentary question to be responded to by the Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes. In this question, he asked whether or not the Turkish government would kill the same number of Kurds in Turkey as Turkish men who were killed by the Kurds in Iraq, based on the principle of retaliation. One hundred and two Kurdish students studying in Istanbul University sent a telegraph to condemn what Asim Eren said to the Prime Ministry and the Republican People's Party headquarter (Çamlıbel, 2007, p.15). This was made public with the headline '102 Üniversiteli Kürtlük iddiasında bulundu.' (102 University Student claimed themselves to be Kurdist) by Aksam newspaper in 16 April 1959. Among those who were arrested for so-called Kurdist activities, there was not yet a clear distinction between leftist or conservative groups⁵⁰. Their common point was not ideological, but ethnic awareness. In his memoir, Naci Kutlay states that most of the inmates thought that they would have been punished severely and even sentenced to death. It was not because they did really something so bad, but they knew that Kurds had been punished for no rational reason other than just for being Kurds (Kutlay, 1998, p.92). This observation is meaningful in terms of the perception of Kurds towards official authorities.

By this time, future leaders of the Kurdish nationalist movement were growing up in boarding schools and then universities. For instance, Kemal Burkay, Naci Kutlay, and Anter, were educated in boarding schools in which they realized their different ethnic origin and then that their basic rights were suppressed (Marcus, 2007, pp.26-27; Watts, 2007, p.54). While studying Law at Istanbul University, Musa Anter's initiatives of student hostels, namely *Fırat* and *Dicle*, became a sort of meeting place for students coming from different parts of Kurdistan (Mango, 1994, p.978). Tarik Ziya Ekinçi who later became secretary-general of the Turkish Worker Party, Yusuf Azizoğlu who was Democrat party deputy, Faik Bucak who was founder of the KDPT (Kurdistan Democrat Party in Turkey), Ali Karahan, Ziya Serefhanoglu, Edip Altınakar, Enver Aytekin, and Necat Cemiloğlu, were all breathing the atmospheres of these student hostels (McDowall, 2010, p.405; Alış, 2012, p. 61). In addition, young Kurdish students coming from the eastern cities to major cities such as

⁵⁰ As Naci Kutlay states in his memory, 'Kurdish leftism and conservatism, to a degree were predicated on this term. It may not be an exact reality but it is mostly true...At the first stage, Kurdish inmates who were just Kurds separated as leftist and conservative later' (Kutlay, 1998, p.84).

Istanbul and Ankara were seeking out other students coming from, specifically, the same city, and generally from the east. The process in which these students were realizing their differences in all aspects, carried them to the next level by organizing cultural activities, Eastern nights, unofficial associations, and visiting their Kurdish friends would lead to larger mobilization of ordinary people from the east (Gündoğan, 2011, p. 408; Kutlay, 1998). Spreading socialist and also nationalist ideas among Kurdish students in major cities was almost entirely based on personal close relationships (Burkay, 2002, p.132) until it would meet with the socialist political party, TWP (Turkey Worker Party-Türkiye İşçi Partisi).

These young Kurds attending boarding schools and university would turn into pioneering intellectuals promulgating ethnic awareness among Kurds and challenging traditional notables, which would be another paramount component of declining tribal ties (Romano, 2006, p.42). It is an undeniable fact that the role of intellectuals in mobilizing people in a social movement was applied in the Kurdish movement as in other cases of social movements.

Furthermore, news from the southern side of the Turkish border could be counted as another mobilizing factor among Kurds. Molla Mustafa Barzani returned from exile in Iran to Iraq in 1958. Even though he faced a major failure in the Mahabad Kurdish state in Iran, he was welcomed there like he was a hero. That the news of this return was articulated and written about in Turkish media was substantially influential in making the 'Kurds' a common word, especially under the condition that the existence of Kurds had been officially denied (McDowall, 2010; Watts, 2007, p.57). In addition, achievement of Molla Mustafa in 1970 as a result of an armed struggle with Baghdad explicitly would cause enthusiasm among Kurdish groups and also lead them to think about an armed struggle against the Turkish state as an alternative means of achieving their goals. These were efficient elements causing mobilization of Kurdish ethnicity towards a mass movement.

Educated Kurdish people who had been, or were students, influenced by leftist ideologies since the late 1950s, participated in the Turkish Worker Party which was the first mass leftist political party which gave space to resentments and

grievances of Kurds in Turkey (Yavuz, 2001, p.9; Burkay, 2002, p.161). In the party they were not known as a Kurdish group, elites, or people, but known as the Eastern Group. They managed to have an article accepted in the party programme in the 4th Congress in 1970, in which the existence of Kurdish ethnicity was officially declared. The article suggesting that ‘there is a Kurdish people in Turkey...’ turned out to be an excuse for the government to close the party down in 1971 (Taspinar, 2005, p.92; Gunter, 1988, p.392). Kurdish intellectuals in the party were one of the propellant forces to promulgate the ethnic awareness as well as the economic deprivation of the region. By opening party branches even in some towns far from the centre, their campaigns before local and general elections more or less influenced people to reconsider their ethnic origin, and the positions of notables (sheiks, aghas and tribal leaders), and established parties’ assimilationist policies. This active propaganda, despite the regime’s official and unofficial barrier to prevent it, gradually mobilized Kurds to attend the party’s activities. For instance, organized by socialist or generally leftist Kurdish groups, with the help of Turkish Worker Party, the meetings were held in eastern cities where Kurdish people mostly habituated, in order to protest the government’s assimilation, economic and social policy over Kurds, and were known as ‘Eastern Meetings’⁵¹ (Doğu Mitingleri).

⁵¹ Eastern Meetings or the “Meeting of the East” was simultaneously and anonymously organized by people of the east to express cultural, economic and political dissatisfactions (Watts, 2007, p.65). In organizing committees, there were several illegal Kurdish student organizations as well as members of the Turkish Worker’s Party. The slogans chanted in the meeting could be taken as proof of a major reason for demanding basic rights without having an ethnically separatist knowledge (Gündoğan, 2011, p.414). Thanks to these meetings, public awareness of Kurdish people rose up (Yavuz, 2001, p.10) and then several more Kurdish associations were formed to promote Kurdish ethnic identity, in order to persuade the government to recognize Kurdish ethnicity and to gain more cultural rights. The most effective of them was the ‘Doğu Devrimci Kültür Ocakları’ (Revolutionary Cultural Society of the East). The first of these meetings took place in Diyarbakır and then five in eastern Turkey and one in Ankara, totally, eight meetings were held. This also can be read as evidence that traditional representatives of the Kurdish people were gradually handing over their position to leftist and nationalist Kurdish groups (Kirişçi & Winrow, 1997, p.109; McDowall, 2010, p.410; Alış, 2012, p.81). Another one was the ‘Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu’ (The Federation of Revolutionary Youth of Turkey), in short, *Dev-Genç*, which was again a leftist organization established and based on freedom of association led by 1961 constitution. Its major argument was that capitalist and imperialist policies of Turkey had been a major reason behind the denial of Kurdish ethnicity and a lack of economic backwardness of Anatolia. It was concerned not only with the Kurdish people but included general revolutionary youth regardless of their ethnic origins. In terms of the Kurdish side, the domination of agahs, tribal leaders and sheiks over the Kurdish populated area was because of the same reason. Therefore, they believed that a leftist revolution in Turkey would bring a solution to the conservative established social structure and economic underdevelopment of the eastern area (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997, pp.109-110). It can be said that the unity of Turkish and Kurdish students and youths under a leftist ideology, did allow for a proliferation of Kurdish movements in these leftist organizations (Romano, 2006, 42). As it will be touched upon, this unitedness would be broken away after the 1974 general amnesty into two major part; the Turkish leftist and the Kurdish leftist movements and later would be fragmented in themselves—nationalist, Leninist, Trockist, socialist and so on.

I believe that these economic, social, cultural, and political deprivations forced educated Kurdish elites, whether they were from leftist or conservative, to do something to compensate for their fellow Kurds' deprivations. Therefore, after 22 years of silence, since the suppression of the Dersim Rebellion, these deprivations were accelerated by nationalist Turkish governments. When they reached an unbearable level, coinciding with the most democratic constitution of Turkey, it was inevitable that educated leftist and conservative Kurdish elites would do something to change the established political, social, and economic structure of Turkey. As a result, several leftist and conservative Kurdish groups were illegally established.⁵² They were non-violent groups as they hoped the freedoms provided by the 1961 constitution could be used to alter the conditions in which Kurdish people were.

During the 1960s, the educated Kurdish and elites were seen primarily in leftist labour unions, associations, and political parties. They were supporting leftist ideologies as they thought that it could be a remedy for the Kurdish question in Turkey. The reason why most of the Kurdish intellectuals chose leftist ideologies is out of the scope of this research, but it is important to give a short explanation as to why they thought this the route to take. Traditional Kurdish notables who were against nationalist and secular official state ideology had already rebelled against the government since 1925 when the first Kurdish rebellion occurred, the Şeyh Said Rebellion. From that time to 1938, these series of rebellion were harshly and brutally suppressed. The rest of traditional Kurdish representatives either kept silence or co-opted with the government. In addition, secularization policy eliminated the religious leaders of the Kurdish people, who had taken over the leadership from the Kurdish Beys and Pashas, governing their own region since Bedirhan Bey Rebellion. By the 1960s, none of the Kurdish notables or Sheiks was powerful enough to pioneer a Kurdish movement. The first opposition against an established state structure came from leftist movement⁵³ regardless of ethnic origin, and Kurdish people had

⁵² The Rizgazi, the Kawa, the Tekosin, the UKO (National Independence Army), the PKK, the TKSP (Turkish Kurdistan Socialist Party), as leftist Kurdish nationalist groups, and the T-KDP (Kurdistan Democrat Party of Turkey) and the KUK, as conservative Kurdish nationalist groups, can be given as examples of the fragmented structure of Kurdish nationalist movements in the 1970s.

⁵³ Leftist nationalist movements constituted oppositions not only in Turkey but also in most of the world, especially in the Middle Eastern and European countries from the 1960s to 1980 (Aydinoğlu, 2007, p.187). The 1968 student movements were active oppositions as well. Since student protests in 1960 against the Democrat Party government, regardless of their ethnic or religious origin, they generated dynamism of most of the leftist groups in Turkey. The Dev-Genç (University students) and even the Dev-

enough from their aghas and sheiks. Therefore the driving force of the Kurdish nationalist movement turned to a leftist ideology which was against any kind of exploitation by traditional leaders and governments (Watts, 2007, p.59).

Most of the legal means to change the deprivations of the Kurdish people were employed by leftists, and at that time, by some of conservative Kurdish groups. Yet, the response of the established state structure was not positive, and in 1970 another coup d'état reconsolidated the militaristic, nationalist, and secularist state ideology against all oppositional groups. By doing so, a political channel through which minority groups could enter was shut down. Mostly from leftist groups, but also a considerable number of people from rightist groups, were arrested and severely punished. Within this decade, from 1960 to 1970, Kurdish nationalist discourse gained considerable experience in legal and illegal activities. It would not be wrong to claim that Kurdish groups employed both legal and illegal means to obtain their basic rights, especially the recognition of their ethnic identity yet, they could not succeed.

As a result of that, from 1970 to 1980, illegal Kurdish groups separated themselves from the Turkish left since the mainstream Turkish leftist movement did not consider the Kurdish question as a primary one. They thought that Turkey's main problem was the question of regime. As soon as a socialist, or to a lesser degree, communist revolution succeeded, Kurds would have their all rights under the new regime (Ekinçi, 2004, p.28; Koca, 1999, p.288; Taspınar, 2005, p.90). What was expected did not occurred in the 1970 coup d'état. On the contrary, Kurds had to face more severe precautions taken by the government. As Kutlay states in his memories, 'Everything and everyone pertaining to Kurds and Kurdishness was taken into prison' (Kutlay, 1998, p.101). He might exaggerate the situation a little, but this is what happened in 1971 coup d'état regardless of leftist, conservative, legal, or illegal, ways they employed; most active Kurds were taken into custody or at least followed by the security forces.⁵⁴ In the previous decade, massification and mobilization of ethnically conscious Kurdish intellectuals, and the people,

Lis (Revolutionary High School student group) were active political entities in those years (Aydınöğlü, 2007, p.249). From this perspective, it seems meaningful that, the founder of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, was an active university student in Ankara in the Law Faculty.

⁵⁴ As a consequence of the coup, not only Kurdish elites and associations were cracked down on, but also most of the Turkish leftist groups and intellectuals were removed from politics. The DDKD, the Dev-Genç, the Turkish Worker Party, the Disk, were all outlawed and relative freedoms gained with the 1961 constitution were removed (Romano, 2006, p.45; Aydınöğlü, 2007, p.281).

had already commenced. Thanks to Kurdish migrants who settled next to each other in city centres,⁵⁵ an increased number of educated Kurdish people, and political activities of Kurdish members of the Turkish Worker Party in eastern cities, the first time a potential mass Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkish history—including the late Ottoman Empire—occurred.

This potential had been manipulated by illegal Kurdish organizations and most of them armed themselves against nationalist state forces and also against radicalized Turkish nationalist groups. Within these highly politicized social conditions, fights between leftist and rightist groups⁵⁶ became a routine event of everyday life in most of the cities in Turkey. In this term, social organizations, whether they were legal or illegal, gained much more importance to mobilize people for their ultimate targets. It might be claimed that the years from 1970 to 1980 were the years in which most of the university students as well as ordinary people were politicised and mobilized.

Legal or not and Kurdish or Turkish, leftist movements had recommenced activities in 1974 when a general amnesty was declared and applied to all prisoners. By this time, politicization among youth dramatically increased. Kurdish leftists believed that it would be better if they organized themselves as separate groups from the Turkish leftist movement, and then some of the Kurdish leftist movement saw the solution in an armed struggle against the government to establish an independent Kurdish state (Ekinci, 2004, p.316). As a response to the government's policy towards the Kurdish people, which was till then based on denial of Kurdish ethnicity, and assimilationist, most of the highly politicized Kurdish intellectuals and students participated in one of the socialist or communist Kurdish nationalist groups. Massification of the Kurdish nationalist movement, which began in 1960, and I believe this process increased in parallel with the level of politicization of Turkish and Kurdish society. What makes this decade distinct from the previous one is that

⁵⁵ No matter what reason the Kurdish people migrated from rural areas to major cities, their settlement adjacent to each other made the Kurdish question realized by a society whose members were mostly Turks. (McDowall, 2010, p.404) Given that the increased number of migrants to major cities was taken into account, how big Kurdish communities had grown to in major cities can be imagined. For instance, the current political part of Kurdish nationalist movement, the BDP has two members of parliament from Istanbul, one from Adana and one from Mersin.

⁵⁶ By saying 'rightist' groups, I mean Turkish nationalist groups, namely 'ülküçüler'. This group was nationalist but at the same time, they were conservative Muslims. That is why I called them rightist. In Turkish, 'sağcı' has more of a religious identity than a sense of nationalism. This might seem contradictory but, generally speaking 'sağcı' refers to Islamists as well (Poulton, 1997, p.130).

radically nationalist Kurdish groups, in other words, ethno-nationalist (Dönmez, 2007, p.52), which of course can be named as 'social movement organizations', were established, and they did not have difficulty in finding members from every type of social strata. However, I think, the process of having a mass nationalist Kurdish movement would be completed by the time their fragmented organization structure⁵⁷ was reduced to several major groups, and that one of them, which would be the PKK a decade later, became involved in a direct armed struggle with Turkish security forces.

Regarding resource mobilization theory, social movement organizations have a key role in achieving the goals of the movement.⁵⁸ One of the implementations of this theory is in the Kurdish case; it cannot be said that Kurdish nationalist social movement organizations achieved what they aimed for, but it is an undeniable fact that social movement organizations played a crucial role in massification of the movement to the level which can be called a mass Kurdish nationalist movement. First of all, they refused the monopoly of Kurdish notable families over Kurdish, or mostly, the Eastern question, and became prominent pioneering figures of the movement. Today's public supports of Kurdish nationalist political parties, from the People's Labour Party (Halkın Emek Partisi) to the Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi), has mostly based on PKK's individual disciples.

To sum up, since the mid-1950s, a 'combination of economic deprivations, social injustice and physical displacement as well as ideas of ethnic identity'

⁵⁷ Previously listed illegal Kurdish organizations were also divided into several more groups as their Turkish counterpart's experience. For instance, the Ala Rizgari was derived from the Rizgari group, the Denge Kawa was derived from the Kawa, the Tekoşin was derived from the Kurtuluş, and the Kurdistan Workers Party (Kurdistan İşçi Partisi) was from the T-KDP. This fragmented structure caused intergroup struggles in both Turkey and Europe as several leaders of these groups escaped from the military coup in 1980 to Europe, and Kurdish mobilization continued there (Robins, 1993, p.663). Moreover, according to İsmet İmset, there were 13 Kurdish separatist illegal organizations in the 1970s in Turkey, as well as several more in abroad (İmset, 1992, p.379).

⁵⁸ For instance, 1977 local elections indicated that what fragmented Kurdish nationalist groups can success when they were got together and pursued for a common target. Mehdi Zana ran in the election as an independent candidate for the mayor of Diyarbakır. Despite the fact that none of the established political parties, Republican People's Party and Justice Party did not give a chance, he won the election and became mayor of Diyarbakır in 1977 (Dorronsoro and Watts, 2009). The same cases happened in Ağrı and Batman districts in which Orhan Alpaslan and Edip Solmaz became majors, respectively (Natali, 2005, p.106). In this success, fundamental actors were social movement organization, which mobilized people towards one aim by organizing active events such as meetings, brochures, propagating the major parties injusticeness. What is more to the point, based on local election results, neither established central right and left parties such as CHP and JP nor TWP which was re-established after the general amnesty did get what they expected since the region had already become ethnically politicized. Fragmented illegal Marxist or socialist Kurdish groups such as TKSP, KUK, Rizgari and DDKO agreed on supporting Mehdi Zana. This also shows capability of unification of these groups or one dominant nationalist group and can be considered a social ground on which PKK, as remained dominant group would grow upon (Dorronsoro and Watts, 2009).

(McDowall, 2010, p.404) constituted an atmosphere of revolt which manifested by the late 1970s. On the other hand, rightist groups including Turkish nationalists, and partly Islamist, were also politicized. The struggle between these generally leftist and rightist groups rose to an armed struggle ending with deaths among university students and youths.⁵⁹ Under the highly radicalized society— such as bureaucracy, trade unions, associations and even security forces (Dodd, 1990, p.47)— Turkey experienced one more coup d'état, in 1980, which crushed disorder for a while but did not totally sweep them away.

Mobilization of the Pro-Islamist Social Movement

Since the formation of the Republic of Turkey, it has been a unique state in terms of being secular despite the fact that 99% of its population is Muslim. Of other countries whose population is mostly Muslims, more or less nationalist as the Turkish Republic is—but regarded to be closest to European values— Turkey is unique. Due to the ultimate target of the single party era, the CHP took religion under its control by establishing Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı). As Eligür (2010) states that political transformation from a single party to a multi-party system revitalized the politics of the electorate, since then people's votes became significant to determine who would have the power even because of that, the CHP took initiatives to change the perception of the party from anti-religious to religion-friendly by allowing the reestablishment of Islamic symbols and institutions. Its first legitimate rival, the DP, through employing religious feelings, swept the CHP away in the 1950 general elections.

For a decade from 1950, as Kurdish conservative representatives integrated into DP politics hoping for more liberal regulations on their issues, religious people as well as religious groups who had gone underground during the single party era, re-surfaced, and supported the DP. As mentioned above, once it is realized that the DP did not reverse the understating of official Kemalist ideology suppressing religious affairs but rather, preserved it, religious people and groups sought for alternate ways to reach their targets. Although the DP was a party of established politics based on Kemalism,

⁵⁹ According to Dodd, the estimated number of deaths in 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1978 and 1980 were 35, 90, 260, 800-100, 1500, and 3500 respectively (Dodd, 1990, p.77). Escalation of deaths is a clear indication of the level of violent politicization of society in the second half of the 1970s.

thanks to it, ordinary suppressed people and groups were brought into politics, and they had a chance of to articulate their demands. That was sufficient for the guardians of the Kemalist regime, the military, to overtake the parliament and supersede a shaken and loosened Kemalist official state ideology and politics, with a more robust one in 1960. The military Kemalist regime consolidated its power by putting constitutional institutions into practice—the National Union Committee and Constitutional Court—in spite of fighting for a more liberal constitution in 1961 (Eligur, 2010, p.60).

The annihilation of the DP from Turkish politics created an extremely fragmented political life in Turkey. It is because of that, that the DP's support obtained from all over the country, was actually based on being anti-CHP, since their understanding of life and ideology were overtly distinctive, apart from slight differences in specifically domestic agricultural, and generally speaking, economic policies. Once it is understood, the monopoly of the CHP was destroyed and a new way for every different political ideas emerged.

Severe relative deprivation in terms of identity in a single party era induced people to make their living conditions better—basically, to be accepted as a Muslim in political, economic, and social spheres of Turkey. To do so, they appeared firstly in the DP, as opposed to the CHP's anti-religious policies, and then after the coup in 1960, they continued to participate into politics in the successor to the DP, Justice Party (JP, afterwards). In early years of the second decade, from the mid-20th century, people desired to be heard and to be able to say something on their issues; this coincided with the Islamic discourse of the JP. This coincidence lasted until the early 1970s, when the very early political Islamist party appeared in Turkish political life, as the MNP (Milli Nizam Partisi- National Order Party) (Yavuz, 1997, p.66). For instance, the JP's president, Süleyman Demirel, mostly articulated a hadiths (sayings of Prophet Muhammad) or verses of the Qur'an in meetings before elections, and accused opposition party, e.g. the CHP, of being communist and leftist which was considered to be anti-religion (Geyikdağı, 1984, pp.118-120). During the 1965 general election campaign the JP, under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel, chose the slogan 'We are right of centre and on the path of Allah' (Ortanın Sağındayız, Allah'ın Yolundayız), while accusing the CHP of being a

communist party with the slogan 'Left of the centre is the road to Moscow' (Ortanın Solu Moskova Yolu) (Zurcher, 2009, p.253).

As indicated in the preceding paragraphs, the resurfacing of religious orders began to be active in established major political parties. The origin of most Islamic movements whether they are political or not, actually stems from religious orders (tariqahs). In the Democratic Party era, these ranged from Tijani orders to Naqsibendi orders, and contributed actively to gathering votes for the DP. Then their religious groups which stemmed from Naqsibendi orders such as Nurcus in general, Süleymancı, Fetullahcı⁶⁰ and İskenderpaşa orders specifically, became integrated into power politics and so had advantage of getting positions in the state bureaucracy. These religious groups within and outside political parties presented and consolidated distinctive values and modern ideas to their disciples. These values were against the Kemalist modernity which relied on positivist ideologies, basically nationalism and secularism. What these religious groups accomplished was that a progressive, and at the same time religiously acceptable, modernity filled the gap created by the CHP in single party era. That is why, even in the second half of the 1940s, the CHP itself made an effort to be considered an Islam-friendly party (Yavuz, 2003, p.5). Eventually, it can be said that

'Despite this state-led secularization policy, Islam has continued to offer a set of rules for regulating and constituting everyday life. Given the on-going struggle between a militantly antireligious state elite and ideology and the majority of society, for many Turkish Muslims, Islam continues to serve as a repertoire and a site of counter statist discourse and an organizational framework for social mobilization to deal with the stresses of development' (Yavuz, 2003, p.31).

Khalidiyye and Naqsibendiyye⁶¹ have had a long history going back to the Prophet Mohammed. Religious orders' interactions with official state authority have always been a major part of the Islamic past. It is the same in the Turkish case. From Yavuz's point of view, religious orders have passed through three stages, with the last of them actively in progress in Turkey. The latter two stages were 'confrontation', represented with Sheik Said (Alam, 2009, p.360)

⁶⁰ For more details please see, Yavuz, Hakan M. (1999). Towards an Islamic Liberalism?: The Nurcu Movement and Fetullah Gülen. *Middle East Journal*, 53 (4), pp.584-605 and Yavuz, Hakan M. & Esposito, John L. (2003). *Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement*. New York: Syracuse University Press.

⁶¹ For more information, see Yavuz, H. (2003). *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*. In addition, as an anthropological study of the Suleymancis, the most recent article of Brian Silverstein could be looked at, Silverstein, B. (2008). 'Disciplines of Presence in Modern Turkey: Discourse, Companionship, and the Mass Mediation of Islamic Practice'. *Cultural Anthropology*, 23(1), pp.118-153.

rebellion, and 'withdrawal' from political scene, from rebellion to the inception of multi-party system. The last stage is 'engagement' in every aspect of the state, ranging from internal to foreign issues (Yavuz, 2003, p.134). Within this engagement process, current major Islamic groups developed out of religious orders. Since the early stages of relatively more liberal political conditions in the 1950s, the religious orders have become intellectual bases for emerging urbanized Islamic dynamics, which were kept intact and developed in remote city centres and villages of Anatolia, and then, publicly moved to the major cities as waves of people migrated from Anatolia to urban centres. The former important figures were Abdülaziz Bekkine and Nurettin Topçu who was leader of Hareket movement, Abdulhakim Arvasi, Osman Yüksel, and Necip Fazıl who were leading figures of *Büyük Doğu*⁶² an intellectual circle that affected the discourse of Islamism in Turkey since 1940s (Alam, 2009, p.360). Apart from these leaders, there were five major branches of the Naqşibendi movement in Turkey: İskenderpaşa Cemaati led by Nurettin Coşan, Erenköy Cemaati⁶³, Süleymanci⁶⁴ formed by Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan, İsmailağa Cemaati located in Fatih/İstanbul, and Menzil Cemaati centred in the Adıyaman province.

In addition, one of the most effective and largest Islamic movements is the Nurcu movement, which was initiated by Said-i Kurdi—from Nurs village in Bitlis province—and is based on his writings, *Risale-i Nur Külliyyatı*. Said-i Kurdi offered an alternative modernization project predicated on Islamic rules rather

⁶² Born into a high-level Ottoman bureaucrat family and educated in an Ottoman school system in which both religion and the sciences were taught, and also who studied in Paris, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek established his own periodical, *Büyük Doğu* which was closed down several times but survived until 1971. By writing his essays in his periodical, he was one of the most effective and prominent figures of Islamic intelligencia since the republican era. He was against a secular understanding of the state, but also more or less combined Islam as an inseparable part of Turkish identity (Atasoy, 2005, p.76).

⁶³ It dated back to the late 19th century as its former was Mehmet Esat Efendi, born in Arbil, Iraq and trained in a Naqşibendi education circle. After the Young Turks revolution in 1908 he returned to Istanbul and settled in Üsküdar as he was sent to exile from İstanbul to Arbil, by Abdulhamid II. After he died in 1931, Mahmut Sami Ramazanoğlu became the leader of the movement, and his successor was Musa Topbaş since 1984. Due to economic opportunities in the 1990s, the movement transformed into an apolitical civil society with its own charity organization, educational networks, and publishing houses (Yavuz, 2003, p.144).

⁶⁴ It was established by Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan who was a Naqşibendi Sheik (1888-1959). His tremendous efforts to teach the Qur'an to younger generation in order to protect them from contaminating ideologies such as secularism imposed by the state, resulted in political Islamism accelerating in 1950s in the Arab world and Shi'a and Wahhabi fractions of Islam, which all of them were considered hazardous towards Sunni-Hanefi Islamic understanding. His insisting on teaching the Qur'an to children was treated as if he had betrayed his country, by Kemalist state ideology who were taking Islam under control and reshaping it in line with their target. Thus he was arrested in three times and taken into custody many times. In the DP era, contrary to the CHP term, he was employed by the Directorate of Religious Affairs to train future imams, most of whom would become disciples of the movement (Yavuz, 2003, p.145).

than the Kemalist modernization project. His alternate ideas were to promote science and the rule of law based on Islamic law in addition to human-made law [secular] as Kemalist modernization had been (Atasoy, 2005, p.79). What distinguishes these two modernization projects is that the former originated from society's deep roots and spiritual traditions, while the latter is based on a western modernization experience. This dualistic comparison can be extended as follow: *ala turka* versus *ala franga*, salon versus family room, positivist science versus science which is at peace with religion, the modern versus traditional, state-based versus society-based, top-down imposed reforms versus bottom-up self-leading reforms, and so on (Yavuz, 2003, p.156). In short, his cluster of ideas was founded on his interpretation of religious rules with the needs of society as a focus, and was much more suitable to take root in the society. In light of these discourses, he did not hesitate to support a multi-party system and the DP against the ruling CHP (Yavuz, 2003, p.156; McDowall, 2010, p.398).

Even though it was outlawed to disseminate Said-i Kurdi's writings, his network of disciples was able to take them from where he was and then copy them by hand, and circulate them. Hence, his writings have become regular material to be read in privately rented gathering houses, which were known as Dershane (Hakan, 1999, p.197). Continuation of, and an increasing number of dershanes, created an Islamic socio-political conscience among his disciples and resulted in a high level of societal approval. Thanks to reading and discussions on the writings, a new Islamic, and also cognitive, language was constituted, which was different from the Nurcus and from other religious groups. Said-i Kurdi was a member of the Naqshibendi religious order yet his legacy ended up founding a distinguished Islamic social movement⁶⁵ as a result of mobilization of his ideas (Yavuz, 2003, p.165).

Another Naqshibendi leader, Mehmet Zahit Kotku, also promoted an understanding of Islam, which was in favour of science and a progressive political movement. He became the leader of the Gümüşhanevi Naqshibendi order as a successor of Abdulaziz Bekkin who died in 1952. While he was

⁶⁵ After his death, his disciples divided into three major Islamic social movements, which were mostly crystallized after the 1980 coup d'état. They are those who follow the Fethullah Gülen, which is now called the Gülen Movement, the Yeni Asyaci and the Yeni Nesilciler. These major factions, as well as dozens of small-scale Nurcu groups, have been a part of normal life all over Turkey.

imam in Iskender Pasha Mosque in Fatih/Istanbul, he brought an intellectual circle consisting of university students into being. He can be considered as being one of the architects of current political life in Turkey since he taught most of the key figures of Turkish political life. These include: Turgut Özal, Necmettin Erbakan and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who have both been prime ministers, Fehim Adak, Korkut Özal, Hasan Aksay, and Lütfi Doğan, who have become ministers of Turkey. His ideas which favoured scientific improvements, technology, an open market economy, and most significantly, the participation of Muslims in politics, encouraged Muslim intellectuals to take positions in the economy, social groups, and politics. He was the one who directed and intellectually guided his disciples to establish the first political Islamist political party in Turkey—Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP) and then Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP) (Atasoy, 2005, p.122; Yavuz, 2003, p.141; Alam, 2009, p.362).

These branches of the Naqsibendi order were undeniable moral forces blossoming within society as a reaction of religiously sensitive people towards the Kemalist modernization project which imposed secularism through top-down reforms. That is why their strong presence in society continues to be still active and recruits people. The re-emergence of these religious orders in the 1950s, as a result of a relatively more liberal and democratic political atmosphere, applied crucial methods in order to mobilize their ideas and groups. This resulted in fragmented Islamic social movements whose basic target was to raise an Islamic conscience among people.

First of all, as with the Kurdish case, electoral politics among embedded political parties created a sort of contestation which resulted in guaranteeing religious groups votes in their favour. This opened the gates for less political pressure on the groups. Therefore, adherents of religious groups found more political freedom to overtly publicize their ideas to a society which was ready to receive them. For instance, most of the fragments groups of the Nurcu movement supported first the DP, and then after the 1960s, divided into other conservative political parties including the Justice Party, the NSP and the nationalist conservative 'The Republican Peasants' Nation Party' (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi) (Zurcher, 2009, p.264; Sakallioglu, 1996, p.240). Thanks to the struggle for the vote, established political parties shut

their eyes to several activities of these Islamic movements which were not directly anti-secular, but mostly concentrated on virtue and moral issues. In the process of interaction between embedded political parties and Islamic groups, adherents of the groups infiltrated official state institutions and also had easy access to critical positions in the state apparatus (Kramer, 2001, pp.63-64). As a result, more publicly and state-founded mosques, Imam Hatip schools, and Qur'an courses, have been established.

Imams of mosques appointed by the Directorate of Religious Affairs were not only leading crowds in prayers, but also conducted Sermons (Vaazlar) to increase a religious conscience of people in mosques.⁶⁶ Imams who were adherents of one of the mentioned Islamic groups acted as a recruitment agency. There was a major mobilization activity of the Imams. The current leader of the Gülen Movement, Fetullah Gülen, known as Hoca Efendi, Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan, and Mehmet Zahit Kotku, were all imams of mosques in which they performed speeches highlighting Islamic values and virtues as well as a consistent view of Islam in the context of modern concepts and conditions. Furthermore, student hostels built with people's donations by the Süleymancı movement were also working as hotspots where high school, university, and Qur'an students were taken into areas wherein the movement operated, in order to promote their Islamic ideas. As a result, religious orders in mosques, dershanes, and dormitories (Alam, 2009, p.361) were and have been nurseries wherein, whether they were or are politically Islamist, or not, youth with Islamic consciences were encouraged and became active disciples disseminating what they learnt and were taught.

Printed-base propaganda and radio station (currently newspapers, TV stations, journals, and any other periodicals) of religious groups focusing on subjects of faith and moral values ought to be included in the list of significant ways in which the mobilization of Islamism occurred among not only youths but also small-scale merchants. These instruments of mobilization have gradually, improved and mushroomed in numbers congruent to that of Islamic groups in Turkey after the 1980s. Magazines and newspapers, and books,

⁶⁶ The quantity of mosques in Turkey went down slightly in the single Party era, apart from that, the number of mosques has always increased. Özcan's research on this subject is quite indicative in which he finds out that between 1973 and 1999, their numbers increased from 45,152 to 75,000 (1994). Considering these mosques as a branch of one or another Islamist group, it would be possible to imagine to what degree these mosques contributed to the mobilization of Islamism.

especially *Risale-i Nur Külliyyatı*, include translated books published by other political religious groups in various Muslim countries, especially from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the revolutionary Islamic movement of Iran. For instance, in 1967, a small educational group, *Nurcus*, *Mihrab Publishing*, was established and published a magazine named as 'İttihad'. The groups transferred its print-based instruments into a newspaper called 'Yeni Asya' after their previous publishing house was closed down by the 1971 military rulers of the coup. Under the editorial leadership of Mesut Toplayıcı, another magazine called 'Köprü' was formed, and served the same aim of generating 'harmony in reading and interpreting Said-i Nursi's works' (Yavuz, 2003, p.173). Moreover, the NSP's unofficial newspaper, 'Milli Gazete', was established in 1973 and still continues to be published. Its major slogan, located just under the newspaper's name, has been 'Hak Geldi, Batıl Zail Oldu'⁶⁷ which means, 'The truth (Islam) has come, Vanity has been perished' (Emre, 2002, p.183). The political Islamist perspective of the party could be traced with this slogan referring to the fact that the actual owner of the country has come and would take the power from West-imitated ruling elites. Furthermore, small but effective political Islamist magazines took their places in 1970s. These include: *Düşünce*, *Şura*, *Tevhid*, *Hicret*, *Sebil*, *Milli Gençlik*, *Hareket*, *Diriliş*, and *Yeni Devir*, and so on. Current prominent political Islamist writers and thinkers were the first writers of these magazines and journals

Increased popularity of political Islamic movements in the Muslim world in general, and specifically in Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia, inevitably influenced Muslim youth in Turkey. Most Muslim groups fought for their countries' independence from western colonial states. Soon after their independence, Islamic features of society were, as in the case of most Muslim countries, ignored by the state apparatus. That is why Muslim groups created a social menace against established state structures—thanks to political Islamic groups. As Torrow argues, contemporary social movements have gained a transnational character crossing national borders (1996, p.61). Translations of prominent leaders of political Islamist groups such as Hassan al Banna (1906-49), Sayyid Qutp (1906-64), and Abu'l A'la Mawdudi (1903-79) in the 1960s, and Ali Seriatı and Khomeini in 1970s, have explicitly reframed political Islamic

⁶⁷ This quotation was articulated by the Prophet Mohammed when he was bringing down the idols after Mecca was conquered and he entered into the Kaaba.

movements' ideas and discourse (Eligur, 2010, p.62; Göle, 1997, pp.53-57). Given that the Islamic revolution of Iran succeeded in 1979 by Khomeini⁶⁸ fostered this influence, as it was the first state which fought for Islamic rule and arguably gained victory against a secular regime.

Migrants from Anatolian villages, small cities, and major cities were, as with the Kurdish nationalist case, becoming a source of human resources for the Islamic social movement, as most of them were still religiously devout and has not encountered the modernization process of cities (Alam, 2009, p.365). In cities' suburban areas, Anatolian and Kurdish migrants were 'economically disadvantaged, culturally disintegrated and politically isolated' (Narli, 1999, p.42) and these deprivations facilitated a radical ideology rooted in their lives by opening the door to demonstrate their deprivations. Furthermore, graduates from the İmam Hatip Schools were educated in religious institutions and thus their raised Islamic consciousness also facilitated a mobilization of Islamic social movements (Aksit, 1991, p.146-152). Legally allowing graduates of İmam Hatip Schools to enter universities in 1973 would result in 'the creation of religious counter-elites'⁶⁹ (Oran, 2008, p.26; Alam, 2009, p.364). These elites would later integrate into state institutions as well as high positions in conservative companies, which would allow them to gain more economic importance in liberalized economic restructuring. University students, the same as in the Kurdish case, commenced to politicize due to the fact that they were also under the influence of a rising Islamic consciousness and aware of political Islamic discourses abroad and in their homeland. They not only had the opportunity to read translated books of Hasan al-Benna, Mewdudi, and Sayyid Qutb, but also established legal and illegal student associations. Milli Türk Talebe Birliği⁷⁰ (MTTB, afterwards, National Turkish Students Union),

⁶⁸ The MSP and Islamic social organizations organized a rally in Konya in 1980, just before the coup. The reason for this was to condemn the decision by Israel to proclaim Jerusalem as its capital instead of Tel- Aviv. The slogans and chants articulated in this rally were quite indicative to what extent the Milli Görüş was politically Islamic, and its adherents were influenced by Iranian Islamic revolution. Some of them were as follows: 'Şeriat Gelecek, Zulüm Bitecek' (Sharia will come, brutality will end), 'Ya Şeriat, Ya Ölüm' (Sharia or Death), and 'Bugün İran, Yarın Türkiye' (Today Iran, Tomorrow Turkey) (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği, 1981, pp.187-188).

⁶⁹ As soon as the RP's coalition government was forced to resign from power, following politicians together with military support passed draconian laws from the parliament to curtail the entrance of İmam Hatip graduates into the university in order to cut the vein of religious educated intelligencia and from the middle class.

⁷⁰ The MTTB's history goes back to the late Ottoman time, the CUP government era. It was first established by the CUP rulers in 1916 and at that time, the pan-Turkist ideology was prevailing within the institution and its members until 1920. The republican Kemalist government re-opened in 1926 and followed the official state ideology. The organization, which began for the third time in 1946, was under

Milli Mücadele Birliđi⁷¹ and Akıncılar⁷² were active political Islamist groups constituting the roots of the movement.

Thanks to these mobilization opportunities, most of the Islamic groups have explicitly enhanced their roots in society. Since the 1970s, Necmettin Erbakan and his close associates, who were spiritually nurtured and encouraged to get involved in economics and politics by İskenderpaşa Cemaati, led by Mehmet Zahit Kotku, formed the NOP and its heir the NSP with the slogan of 'Just Order' (adil düzen) underscoring the significance of Islamic values, and refusing a strict secularist implementation of governance in Turkey (Barkey, 1996, p.47). By doing so, I think, the party made itself politically Islamist. As not only Şeyh Kotku but also the rest of Naqsibendi religious orders gave importance to politics and economics along with moral and faith issues, none of them had chosen to form a political party to pursue their ideas except the Milli Görüş movement. Instead, they preferred to integrate into electoral politics with established political parties through a relationship of providing votes in exchange for political tutelage. This distinctive feature of the Milli Görüş movement compares to other religious orders and groups, which made the movement small but effective as a political party throughout the 1970s, a

the control of leftist students and from 1965 to 1980, Islamist and nationalist discourse dominated (MTTB Tarihi n.d.). It was re-established in 2004 by its former Islamist members. In its previous term, the union was one of the centres for mobilization of Islamic conscience, which the RP wanted to use if as its youth organization as it did the same for the Akıncılar and the Büyük Dođu circle.

⁷¹ The Milli Mücadele Birliđi, established by Aykut Edibali, a university student in the law faculty at Istanbul University, and the Yavuz Aslan Argun, was a legal association aimed at having its members attain key positions in the state apparatus since all problems stemmed from mal-systemization of the State. That is why the association focused on training people according to religious rules. Its principles were against Zionism, capitalism and communism in favour of rightist and nationalism, in religious terms. As a part of their education system, to re-vitalize the Prophet Mohammed and his companions' lives, they encouraged reading their biographies along with the Qur'an since they thought the cause of social depression was the move away from the Qur'an. In addition, ideological education had always been given with religious education. They had also followed events in other Muslim countries and read translated books written by the leaders of their political Islamist movements. Their cultural and art magazine was named *Pinar*, which later became a publishing house, which is still operating, and publishing a monthly journal, *Umran* (Büyükkara, 2007, p.125).

⁷² As a legal organization, the Akıncılar Derneđi (Riders Association) was established in the 1970s and was and Sporcular (sportsmen). On the other hand, several more illegal organizations such as the Türkiye İslam Kurtuluş Ordusu (TIKKO-Islamic Freedom Army of Turkey), the Türkiye İslam Kurtuluş Cephesi (TIK/C-Islamic Freedom Front of Turkey), the İslam Devriminin Acil Mücahitleri (IDAM-Rapid Freedom Fighters of Islamic Revolution), the İslam Kurtuluş Partisi Cephesi (IKP/C-Islamic Freedom Party Front) and so on were formed, and mobilized radical Islamic conscience by organizing martyrdom nights among Muslim youths (Eligur, 2010, p.70). Despite the revolutionary and radical expressions in their names, these groups did not endorse violent political activities as much as the leftist and Kurdish Nationalist radical groups did (Eligur, 2010, p.91). Yet, they were quite active in cooperation with the Milli Görüş movement and the MTTB.

party which has been known as the political Islamist party of Turkey⁷³ since then.

In general, the multi-party system caused the re-emergence of society's religious sentiments which evolved into separate social groups by distancing themselves from the established political structure, and ended up with a distinctive Islamist social movement which mobilized from the 1950s to the 1980s, consolidating themselves after 1980s to the present. Among these Islamist social streams, only one of them is considered as political Islamist, the Milli Görüş Movement. This movement presented with political parties beginning with the NOP, and continued with successor parties until the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi- Justice and Development Party) since the rest of them generally focused on moral issues and preferred not to directly delve into active politics but to be part of embedded political parties in Turkey. Despite the fact that every single one of them followed different paths as their method of mobilization and political preference, their common ground was and has been, to increase Islamic consciousness. They might be organizationally fragmented, yet the whole of Islamic movements in Turkey share the undeniable fact that they are shaping economic, social, cultural and political life. The process after the 1980s to the present can be labelled as a consolidation of organizational framework of each Islamist group in Turkey, yet it is not covered by this research. Thus, the influence of social movement organizations in the failure or success of a social movement will not be examined here in order not to divert from the main subject.

Conclusion

The Kemalist state structure itself created its own enemies since it suppressed any differences which did not fit into its ideology. Deprived mainstream groups have developed themselves, at any chance they could throughout their histories. The massive mobilization of Kurdish nationalism and Islamism in Turkey yielded oppositional groups offering alternative modernization and

⁷³ For instance, in 1976 when an international conference chaired by Necmettin Erbakan, deputy prime minister of Turkey and attended by foreign ministers of Muslim states, was organized by the MSP, in his speech, he emphasized five fundamental commonalities amongst Muslim states. These were: the United Nation of Muslim Countries, the Common Economic Market of Muslim Countries, the Common Defence Alliance of Muslim Countries, the Cultural Cooperation of Muslim Countries, and the Common currency among Muslim states (Ceylan, 1991). The envisaging of a future in line with the interest of not only Muslims in Turkey, but also for all Muslim states, can be included in the discourse of political Islam if this attitude is compared to other religious movements which have co-opted with established power politics in Turkey.

social structure projects against embedded ones. In other words, as Blumer states, 'Social movement can be viewed as collective enterprises seeking to establish a new order of life. They have their inception in a condition of unrest, and derive motive power on one hand, from wishes and hopes for a new scheme or system of living' (Blumer, 1969, p.99). These two identities worked towards the day in which they could explicitly express their identity, and eventually, create their own social movements to fight for their thoughts, ideas, norms and values, which they perceived to be contradictory to official state ideology.

Since early modern Turkey, the last period prominently indicates that both political streams have consolidated their arguments and taken their ideological stance towards others. It seems that not only their historical exclusion from political, social and economic structures of Turkey but also their ideological developments and consolidations is another common point which can be taken as a reason why indeed they should have come together to fight back against their common repressor. Just after the explanation of how these social movements institutionalized themselves, how much importance their ideological distinctiveness' has had in how they perceive each other in the part three.

In this chapter, it is claimed that mobilization of these mainstream political oppositions occurred between 1960 and 1980. They have insisted on their natural identity to revitalize them and struggle for these norms. By doing so, there is the opportunity to investigate in further chapters, why and how current pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish active political streams representing their individual identities have been constituted.

PART TWO: Institutionalisation of Pro-Kurdish and Pro-Islamic Political Groups

Chapter Four: Institutionalisation of Pro-Kurdish and Pro-Islamic Political Groups

Introduction

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, since the 1950s to the 1980s Kurdish nationalists and Islamists groups have grown substantially politically, and in one way or another they have become embedded in Turkish politics. Ranging from historical denial of their identities to development of ideological background and event to number of internal factions, their commonality is prominent. During this period there was no single group representing either of these social movements. Yet, from the 1980s and after, one single group broke free of each political movement and became seemingly unique, and particularly representative of each political stream. The PKK and later on pro-Kurdish political stream began with the HEP until the BDP as pro-Kurdish, and the Milli Görüş Movement started with the MNP to the AKP as pro-Islamic. The rest of these social groups in each political stream were eliminated from or integrated into the established state structure. These two specific groups continue to project an alternative to modernization or development policy contrary to the official state ideology. That is why they have always been a part of the political development of Turkey.

Institutionalisation of Grassroots Pro-Kurdish Political Stream

The PKK,⁷⁴ formed by Abdullah Öcalan⁷⁵ and his close associates, gained its reputation after it survived internal dissent amongst Kurdish nationalist groups

⁷⁴ I would like to mention here that the argument is that because of the PKK's insurgents, the military reaction of the state was so harsh against Kurdish nationalism. I do not want to try to justify the existence of the PKK, but I think based on previous chapters, the PKK is an outcome of the state's Kurdish policies, which relied on denial and assimilation. For instance, the armed fights between leftist and rightist groups were a reality of daily life during the late 1970s. This is to say that taking up arms was not a new phenomenon among Kurdish nationalist groups as most of them had already become armed in case of possible attacks coming from Turkish ultra-nationalist groups and also from rival Kurdish groups.

⁷⁵ The claim that Abdullah Öcalan was an agent of the Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı (MIT-National Intelligence Organization) (Mumcu, 1993) has been repeatedly articulated by several prominent Kurdish nationalist figures such as Kemal Burkay, Ibrahim Sahin, and Gani Sungur. I have conducted interviews with them and they presented their evidence that he was lead by the MIT to form the PKK. Whether it is true or not, as the main subject of this research is the perception between political Islamist and Kurdish nationalist political parties, I will not touch upon this subject.

(Gunter, 1990, pp.60-67) and the 1980 coup d'état, by escaping to Syria (Imset, 1992, p.29). News of the party came to the fore when its militants attacked security forces in Hakkari province in 1984. The reasons for the emergence of this kind of armed group are explained in previous paragraphs so I do not intend on delving into this subject. However, in addition to these reasons which I have already explained, cruel treatment of military regimes towards those demanding better human rights and recognition of their Kurdish ethnic origin during the three years military regime, following the 1980 coup d'état forced non-PKK supporters among the different Kurdish nationalist groups which were advocating none-violence, to pay attention to this organization. Furthermore, the PKK preserved its leading figures while most of the Kurdish nationalist groups were eliminated thanks to the military regime. Before the establishment of a legal political party stream with the HEP in 1991, the PKK remained the only one dominating the Kurdish nationalist movement from the 1980s to the 1990s.

Although the history of the PKK might date back to the early 1970s, because of its founder Abdullah Öcalan's activities in Dev-Genc, and subsequent meetings before the party was publicly announced, it was formally established in 1978 with a handful of leftist-nationalist students who formed the nucleus of the movement in Ankara.⁷⁶ It can be also described as an example of separation from the Kurdish leftist movement and from the general but Turkish dominated leftist movement of Turkey (Imset, 1992, pp.9-11). The PKK was in an expanding period to a more organized structure in Syria when the September 12, 1980 military coup crushed most of the leftist groups. In his own words, Öcalan states that, 'in any way, our armed resistance had not yet expanded. In some areas the armed groups were only just coming into being and these were amateur groups. The armed groups were just at the point of developing and only newly moving out to the rural zones from the cities. Just when we were in such a situation, the September 12 regime took the power' (Öcalan, 1991, p.20). Despite the fact that the coup considerably weakened the organization by taking the members of the central committee down and left no room for reorganization, the PKK succeeded in escaping to, and settling in,

⁷⁶ It is interesting to note that, within the 20th century, beside Hoybun, all of the Kurdish nationalist organizations were established either in Ankara or Istanbul then disseminated their presence towards the Kurdish-populated eastern part of Turkey. The PKK is not an exception to this.

Syria. Until the first attack on Hakkari province to assault the security forces and demolish Kurdish agahas collaborating with the Turkish government, the PKK re-organized itself militarily with the help of Syrian intelligence (McDowall, 2010, p.422; Marcus, 2007, p.76), and the KDP (Taspinar, 2005, p.99). Furthermore, from a political perspective, it organized its first and second congress in 1981 and 1982, respectively.

After the military and political developments with the help of Syrian authorities and the KDP (Gunter, 1991, pp.9-11), the organization came to the stage of implementation of their goals which was primarily to establish an independent Kurdish national state which was ideologically, Marxist-Leninist (Jongerden and Akkaya, 2011). From an ideological perspective, one of the PKK members, Abdurahman Kandemir, stated in a martial court, 'our aim is to establish a Communist Kurdish state. This state is to be a member of the Warsaw Pact' (Gunter, 1988, p.401). From 1984 to 1986, the attacks were directed at security forces and Kurdish agahas (Manafy, 2005, p.108) but were not adequate enough to establish the name of the PKK as a popular Kurdish nationalist group supported by Kurdish people. It was still an organized but not grassroots party. As the PKK militants attacked security forces in Cukurca, Hakkari province, and killed twelve soldiers, the response of the Turkish government was to bomb the PKK's camps in Iraqi territory. Moreover, the village guard system has systematically and officially been applied in the region, which would later become one of the major targets of the PKK attacks. It is important to note that by 1986, the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan himself realized that they did not have public support from amongst Kurdish people in Turkish territory (Imset, 1992).

In 1987, attacking Kurdish civilians⁷⁷ in the region and revitalizing a 'village guard system' were two crucial points that contributed towards the PKK becoming an organization of which Kurdish people themselves were afraid. As a response to the guerrilla attacks on civilians, security forces and village guards, reaction of the military escalated and increased in its cruelty. Within this process, the PKK tried to get public support from local Kurdish people but

⁷⁷ Two houses were bombed by the PKK militants in Uludere, Hakkari provinces. These houses were raided in a village in Mardin province, and five village guards were killed in Siirt. These attacks created an atmosphere where for the first time, regular Kurdish people were caught between two forces, both of which they were extremely frightened.

once it could not succeed, then it used armed attacks to attempt to get support based not on trust or support, but on fear and terror (Bal, 2007, pp.76-77). The fundamental aim of the PKK in doing this was to obtain secured areas where it had locals' support in order to settle its forces in Kurdish territory in Turkey as the relationship between the PKK and the KDP in northern Iraq were deteriorating. On the other hand, the military forces, as it has been since the beginning of the republic, did not bother to gain people's support. They co-opted with remaining tribal leaders and notables in the struggle with the PKK. There has not been any indication of trust between gendarme forces, most of whom were not in the region voluntarily, but were mostly sent to the region and were counting remaining days to leave, and the locals who were not treated as human beings but were mostly humiliated. As Imset states, because of that, 'villagers were squeezed in between two forces' (Imset, 1992, p.60). Due to continuing foreign support and local assistance, because they were afraid, the PKK prevailed and actually extended its presence in the east of Turkey. By these years, the concept of 'a handful of bandits' (bir avuç eşkiya) developed into an organized terrorist-separatist organization which came to define what the PKK remains to be in the minds of Turkish politicians and security forces (Marcus, 2007, 129). In addition, when the intensive military presence were treating local people as if they were enemies (Taspinar, 2005, p.97), combined with high level security measurements which witnessed scenes in which the Kurdish people saw their children⁷⁸ killed by the Turkish military, the feelings of hatred and alienation⁷⁹ spread gradually to local people. Even those who had not been supporters of the PKK started to sympathise with their struggle (McDowall, 2010, p.427). Although the initial cooperation of local people with the PKK was because of fear, since the late

⁷⁸ This argument might be meaningless to someone who is not familiar with the family structure and culture of Kurdish people. To explain, tribal relations or kinship among Kurdish people has preserved its importance. If at least one member of a small group of relatives is killed or tortured by security forces, it would be deemed appropriate for all of them to begin to hate the Turkish state and to sympathise with the PKK's struggle, even though the ideology of the PKK (Marxist-Leninist leftist ideology) seems strange and unacceptable in their own Islamic culture. Therefore, as long as the PKK can maintain its existence, it is more likely that one of the relatives of the killed guerrillas would replace him or her. Considering the existence of the PKK for more than thirty years, it is unimaginable to what extent this factor contributes to the required human recourse the PKK has needed. Considering the torture of Kurdish prisoners in Diyarbakır prison from the 1980s and onwards, (Zeydanlioglu, 2009) the number of people taking up arms against the state and siding with the PKK would be innumerable.

⁷⁹ The report prepared by the SHP (Social Democratic Populist Party) was quite indicative of how the security forces perceived locals in 1986 and was put forward by Cumhuriyet newspaper as quoted: '...eastern Turkey had become a sort of concentration camp where every citizen was treated as a suspect, and where oppression, torture and insult by the military was the norm.' Quoted by Taspinar (2005, p.100). With this information he considers this to be a fundamental reason why the PKK could easily recruit fresh supporters, and local support to challenge the Turkish state.

1980s it has gradually transformed into unconditional support, at least for a considerable number of Kurdish people by the early 1990s (McDowall, 2010, p.429).

For instance, Imset, quoted from a confidential report prepared by the government in Ankara, states that in Şırnak for example, while in 1987 the local people were referring to the PKK as 'terrorist', and in 1988 as 'students', in 1991 they were openly referring to them as 'the guerrillas' or 'the resistance'. This change in language demonstrates how effectively PKK propaganda had improved. Şırnak is now a potential PKK stronghold and may soon be subjected to increased popular activity. The reason for the effectiveness of the PKK propaganda is partly explained by Osman Öcalan who states, '...even if the PKK has won the city of (i.e.) Cizre [...] we only won half of it with our efforts while Turkey, with its oppressive policies, has given the other half to us on a silver plate' (Imset, 1992, pp.223-224). Considering these two quotations together, I do not think that it is going to be difficult to understand to what extent the state policy of Turkey has become an influential factor justifying the existence of the PKK in the eyes of Kurdish people. As the report envisaged, in the current condition, Şırnak and Hakkari provinces of Turkey are now where the PKK has unquestionable public support.

To obtain such popular support from the locals, the organizations changed their attitudes towards Islam by using Islamic discourse in pamphlets and statements where formerly it had been strictly forbidden to practice religious prayers at every stage of the party. This policy change can also be seen as a reaction to the state's using of Islam to eliminate ethnic nationalism by emphasizing the brotherhood of Muslims (McDowall, 2010, p.435). The fundamental aim was to illustrate an argument that it was not an obligation to be a Marxist or generally leftist to fight back against the Turkish state, and that it was okay if you were religious. Also Islamic verses and sayings of Prophet Mohammed were used to justify their fight (Imset, 1992, p.137). Another dramatic change in the PKK's strategy was to declare that federalist solutions might be acceptable instead of an independent Kurdish state, which would be extracted from current Turkish state territory (Imset, 1992, p.231). With all these evaluation and changing processes, eventually, by the 1990s, the PKK has emerged as a well-organized violent terrorist organization (Criss, 2008). It

established political, financial and military administration all over Turkey⁸⁰ and Europe⁸¹ by the late 1980s and developed them right up to the present (Gunter, 1997, p.31; Byman, 1998⁸²).

The early 1990s was when a legal pro-Kurdish political party was formed—the HEP. The local support of the PKK was automatically transferred to legal politics as legitimate electorates voted for pro-Kurdish political parties. From the first pro-Kurdish legal political party to the present one, the BDP, the more support the PKK obtains, the higher the percentage of votes are gained by the incumbent political party. The popular support of the legal pro-Kurdish political party movement has increased to slightly more than 6% in general elections. Thanks to this support, once again the candidates of this political party movement won a large majority in local elections. For instance, current representatives of this political movement, the BDP is now running 99 mayoralties in the south eastern and eastern region of Turkey, including key cities and districts such as Diyarbakır, Van, and Tunceli. Furthermore, the banning of pro-Kurdish political parties one by one, with an accusation of links to the terrorist organization the PKK, removed Kurdish representatives from the assembly. Because of this Leyla Zana, who was elected as a MP from the SHP in 1991 sought to make her oath in Kurdish together with Turkish, and enhanced the justification of the armed struggle of the PKK with the argument that there is no room in the political arena in Turkey, and so armed struggle is the only way to obtain the fundamental rights of Kurds.

That is why the political struggle of Kurdish nationalism has evolved together with the armed struggle of the PKK and has never become extinct since beginning. By 1991, attitudes of security forces towards Kurdish demonstrators, such as opening fire with real bullets over crowds (Imset,

⁸⁰ Due to the economic hardship and evacuation of villages in the early 1990s by military forces, internal migration from the eastern to western provinces resulted in an accumulation of Kurdish people in specific districts. Ethnically conscience Kurdish people settled in major cities such as Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, and Manisa, and they have created a suitable suburban environment for increasing the support of the PKK since the 1980s, and later on, for pro-Kurdish political parties (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997, p.133).

⁸¹ The migration from Turkey to European countries, because of political and military suppression of the Turkish government on Kurds (Taspinar ,2005, p.98), and work opportunities from the 1960s up until the present, created ethnic Kurdish ghettos, in which increased ethnic conscience gathered people together to form organizations, networks and communication channels. They have also become a financial source for the PKK since the 1980s (Saatci, 2002, p.559; Lyon and Ucarer, 2001).

⁸² Daniel Byman explains the understating of ethnic terrorism from a theoretical perspective and I think his theory suits the case of the PKK. He claims that the actual targets of terrorist activities are not rivalries, but indeed their own constituencies, identity creation, creating defensive excuses, and internal group maintenance.

1992, p.241), I believe, was the time when a real mass Kurdish nationalism established itself with the help of the PKK and inadvertently, the Turkish security forces. Killing people randomly and unsolved murders of political Kurdish activists⁸³ directed the Kurdish people towards a Kurdish nationalist movement as an act of revenge and also to obtain their basic rights (Ergil, 2000, p.128). It is natural that people have chosen the PKK side against the Turkish security forces as the latter's history has been full of assimilation, isolation, humiliation,⁸⁴ and suppression of Kurdish people since the inception of the Republic. Given the previously mentioned snowball effect, which means that one member of the PKK who has been killed led to greater membership in the PKK by his or her relatives, and the endurance of the PKK for more than a decade, it is obvious that the number of people supporting the PKK or at least sympathising with it has dramatically increased. Because of that, I argue that the actual mass of Kurdish nationalism embraces a significant number of ordinary people, and was initiated by the PKK and embedded, by the 1990s, in Turkey.

Institutionalisation of Grassroots Pro-Islamist Political Stream

The political life of the political Islamist Milli Görüş movement commenced in 1969 when Necmettin Erbakan was elected to the parliament as an independent member of parliament from Konya province. And then, the establishment of the Milli Nizam Party led the movement in politics until now (Dagi 2005, p.4). After the 1980 coup d'état when all political parties were abandoned, the Refah Partisi was established by the same political Islamist cadre of the MSP in 1983. It had the same political argument that the elimination of Islamic symbols and practices was the major source of fundamental problems in Turkey, (Yavuz, 1997, p.70) including the Kurdish question. Again, because of military intervention into the coalition government

⁸³ 'Faili meçhul Cinayetler' (unidentified murders) were actually identified in the eyes of local people. It is known that these murderers were a part secret security services. Opening fire on locals by security forces while a killed terrorist was being buried is a repeated example. For instance, Vedat Aydın, the provincial president of the HEP in Diyarbakır was killed by an unidentified assassin, but no suspects were taken into custody. Moreover, at his funeral, a masked man who was accompanied by an official uniformed member of the police forces, opened fire on attendants from the top of Diyarbakır castle. Again, nobody was arrested for this action (Imset, 1992, p.253).

⁸⁴ Imset's interviews with locals in south eastern Turkey, and in various resources, clearly indicate that members of security forces in the region, especially military personnel, publicly humiliate Kurdish people. For instance, Sergeant Recep Cömert was one of them. What locals think about him is that, 'he not only harasses and frightens us, but also swears at us in an unbearable way. Taking the significance of honour and dignity among Kurdish people into account, the negative influence of this kind of harassment on Kurdish people is beyond imagination.' To see more examples on the same issue, please look at Imset, 1992, pp.257-276.

in 1998,⁸⁵ the RP was closed and its all representatives were transferred to the next successor political party, Fazilet Partisi (FP, afterwards, the Virtue Party), which was also banned by the constitutional court. For the same reason that the RP was banned, the FP was closed down and the current political Islamist party, the Saadet Partisi survived until the present. The fundamental claim of this political movement has been that Kemalist secular nationalism emulating the West is not a suitable modernization project; instead, by reusing the idea that Islam is an obstacle for modernization and progress, an Islamic based modernization is possible and more applicable in a Muslim society (Gülalp, 2002, p.30).

Islamic vernacular discourses articulated by Necmettin Erbakan were new in the 1970s and suggested a different modernization project. He first of all, opposed the dominance of western culture in Turkish culture and economy, as well as the military (Dagi, 1999, pp.23-25), and offered moral and material improvement based on Islamic regulation that did not copy westerns. He also restated the glory of the Ottoman time, which endured for six centuries and controlled lands in three continents. For instance, in his early propaganda, he states, 'Thus, the Europeans, by making us copy them blindly and without any understanding, trapped us in this monkey's cage and as a result, forced us to abandon our personality and nobility. That is to say, he was successful in this because he used agents recruited from within, who felt [inferior and] disgusted with themselves, bringing to his knees the Turk who for centuries could not be defeated by the crusades and external blows' (Erbakan, 1970, p.196). The movement argues that replacement of all Islamic heritages and tradition with western ideals is the root of all problems in Turkey, including the Kurdish question. In my interview with Mustafa Kamalak, the head of the current political party of the movement, Saadet Partisi, he also states that Kurdish question appeared entirely because of wrong westernization projects of the ruling elites of Turkey (Kamalak, 2012).

⁸⁵ This time, military generals employed a unique method to overthrow the Erbakan-led government. In the NSC meeting which convened on the 28 February, 1997, the council made a written pact to restore and preserve the secular character of the state against the menace of Islamism, and forced the government to sign these decisions. This process has been called the '28 February Process' and enforcement of it had it referred to as being a 'soft coup'. These decisions targeted Islamic social, economic and political developments. As a result of this process, the combined forces of military, media, trade associations, as well as the judiciary, made a case against the RP to close it down. Eventually, the Erbakan-led government had to dissolve in July 1997 and the party was banned in 1998 (Dagi, 2005, p.7).

By preserving the same anti-west and westernization point of view, the second political party of this movement, the Milli Selamet Partisi,⁸⁶ took part in coalition governments with the socialist CHP led by Bülent Ecevit, later on with Justice Party and the Nationalist Action Party during 1970s. By doing so, the political movement proved that it did not have any radical ideological barriers to cooperation with other political parties having different ideologies. From this perspective, more radicalized Islamic groups criticized the party, accusing it of being a part of the established political system which was controlled by an official state ideology. At the same time, it was the main reason why the leftist rooted Kurdish nationalist movement, including the PKK perceived the political Islamist MSP and then the RP as a part of an official state ideology which has been used to pacify religious Kurdish people and used as a counter measure for ethnic Kurdish politics.

This political stream also proposes a new way for small-scale Anatolian merchants who were religiously sensitive, to challenge the monopoly of certain firms whose owners were close to the official state ideology in the Turkish economic structure (Ahmad, 1991, p.16). After 1983, when Özal's Anavatan Partisi⁸⁷ (ANAP, the Motherland Party) came to power and applied more liberal and export-oriented economic policies, these small-scale Anatolian merchants had the opportunity to grow and compete with established large companies (Gülalp, 2001, p.437). This competition is represented between TÜSIAD (Türkiye Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği) and MÜSIAD (Müstakil Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği),⁸⁸ respectively. They represented the struggle between official state ideology (Turkish nationalist and secular) and Islamists. Revival of political Islamism in economic terms generally relies on analysis of these two associations and close relations of MÜSIAD's member companies with the Islamist political parties (Oran, 2008, p.30; Atasoy, 2005, p.172). In short,

⁸⁶ The Party obtained 11.8 and 8.6 percent of the votes in general elections in 1973 and 1977, respectively and became one of the significant political actors by taking part in all coalition governments from 1973 to 1980 and holding several ministries (Toprak, 1984).

⁸⁷ What distinguishes between the conservative ANAP and the pro-Islamic Refah Party was best evaluated by Feroz Ahmad who stating that, 'They [Turgut Özal and the men in his inner circle] may be 'cultural Islamists' because of their social background and their technical education, but they are not reactionaries and do not approve of the Islamist wing of their party, nor does it approve of them' (Ahmad, 1988, pp.766-767). On the other hand, Muhittin Ataman's article examines the ethnic policy of ANAP by considering Özal and his party as an extension of political Islam (Ataman, 2002).

⁸⁸ It is a voluntary association that was, at the beginning, a group of small business entrepreneurs, each of whom employed less than 25 workers. Its main argument has been that the state authority does not treat them equally in comparison to big companies whose owners are close to the political circle. Its members state that the current economic policy of the state favours large firms and treats them as 'step-children' (Sungur, 1997, p.99).

economic liberalization policies since the 1980s led to Islamic finance, and religious Anatolian merchants and industrialists' growth. This development was formulated by the RP as the concept and phrase, 'adil ekonomik düzen' (just economic order) (Salt, 1995, p.21; Cinar, 1994; Lapidot, 1996).

The social welfare programme of the RP has to be seen as one of the sources of its grass root support in local and general elections. Municipalities in which RP candidates won local elections delivered incentives such as coal and basic foods⁸⁹ in pre and post election terms, and also raised an Ottoman consciousness by organizing events recalling the Ottoman times (Akinci, 1999, pp.76-77). They provided a good example through services in major cities e.g., by solving water problems, muddy roads of suburban areas, and air pollution problems. These efforts turned into public support especially in municipal elections all over Turkey. As a result, the RP which won 17 municipalities with five per cent votes in the 1984 local elections increased the number of its municipalities to 100 in 1989, and in the next local election, to 327 in 1994, including Konya, Ankara, Istanbul, Sivas, Van, Urfa, and so on (Esmer, 2002, p. 76; Yavuz, 1997, p.78). Together with the corruption of incumbents' political parties and mayors, which caused a major decrease in the number of votes in local and general elections (Gülalp, 2001, p. 438; Eligur, 2010, p. 136), the well-known reputation of RP municipal administrations carried the RP to a clear victory in the 1995 general election, with 158 representatives and 21.4 per cent of total votes (Akinci, 1999, p.78). 'Although they have different concerns and motives for supporting political Islam, these different segments of society are united in their common opposition to Kemalism and their expression of political will through the assertion of an Islamic identity' (Gulalp,

⁸⁹ Just before the 1994 local and 1995 general elections, the mayor of Bahçelievler from the RP, Muzaffer Doğan distributed one and half tons of coal in winter and grocery packages during Ramadan for free. The mayor of Kartal district, Mehmet Sekmen also delivered clothing and soup for the needy (White, 1997, p.26). Akinci states that the party worked as if it was a social welfare agency rather than a political party (Akinci, 1999, p.77). What makes the RP and its successor parties distinctive from the other political parties, as Delibas states, 'their activism is a year round activity. They visit households on all social occasions and offer help in times of crisis, showing solidarity, compassion and sympathy. The provision of material benefits is the primary activity (37 percent) of the VP's neighbourhood committees. These benefits include the supply of food, coal, clothing, bursaries for school children, health care and medical aid, assisting people to find jobs, or solving problems in the government offices, reflecting the dire socioeconomic conditions of the urban poor' (Delibas, 2009, p.98). This feature of the Refah or Fazilet Parties is not limited with their case, but can be generalized for the most of the Islamist movements in the Middle Eastern and other Islamic societies. Espesiot's (2002) observation on this issue is quite meaningful to quote: 'Islamic movements and associations became part or parcel of mainstream institutional forces in civil society. Islamist activist organizations and NGOs created networks of mosque, hospitals, clinics, day-care centres, youth clubs, legal aid societies, foreign language schools, banks, drug rehabilitation programs, insurance companies, and publishing houses' (p.147).

2001, p.444). In light of these figures, despite the fact that its history as a political party began only in 1970, it had been a party of Islamists. I would claim that the first time the Milli Görüş movement turned into a grassroots political Islamist party was the 1989 local election in which they gained 100 municipalities.

Explicit Islamic idioms and arguments created the movement's ideological base and did not ease up until the closure of the FP in 1999. From then until now, the position of the movement towards the European Union has changed because they realized that they needed more democratization to be free of the Kemalist state suppression on the party (Yavuz, 1999, pp.127-128). As a result of this turning point, the party divided into two—traditionalists (Gelenekçiler), on the one hand, and innovationists (Yenilikçiler)⁹⁰. The former continued its political life within the circle of the SP and the latter organized as the AKP (Justice and Development Party), which has been in power since 2002, and will be discussed in a separate chapter.

Official State Ideology and its Rivals

Relying on the explanations above, the emerged and institutionalized mass pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamist political movements have been represented by certain political parties and have created certain norms and values which presented an alternative to the embedded structure. I think it is reasonable to state that two major opponents of official state ideology have emerged and consolidated, and formed a mass movement to fight. Interactions, and to some extent armed struggle, among Kurdish nationalism, political Islam, and official state ideology, have definitely shaped every aspect of politics in Turkey. Due to the fact that legal political parties that are Kurdish-rights-centred have formed in the 1990s, and that the research examines the perception of these oppositional groups, from now until the end of next chapter a short examination on how the PKK and the Milli Görüş perceived each other will take place.

As stated previously, nationalization of religion in Turkish culture imposed by official state ideology has actually been a part of Turkish politics since the

⁹⁰ In the last general Congress of SP, Abdullah GÜL representing 'yenilikçiler' and Recai KUTAN representing 'gelenekçiler' run for the presidency of the party. The former part slightly lost the elections. Then, they resigned from the party and established today's incumbent political party, AKP (Dagi, 2005, p.10).

inception of the Republic. It might seem contradictory when on the one hand, dismantling Islamic symbols and institutions occurred, but on the other hand, the establishment of a Directorate of Religious Affairs, and accepting only Muslim Turkish minorities from the Balkans (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997, p.18), proves that religion has always been a component of official state ideology whether it was controlled, institutionalized (Alam, 2009, p.357), or used as a means to disseminate the concept of ‘the love of homeland’ and ‘respect for state and military’ which was imposed people as a part of Islamic faith. For instance, throughout the history of modern Turkey, mosques have been run, and a governmental institution, the DRA, has paid imams. Sacred Islamic titles have always been in use, such as *şehit* (martyr), *gazi* (veteran), and the military are called ‘*peygamber ocağı*’ (the heart of Prophet) (Smith, 2005, p.456). These features of Islam were strictly suppressed in the single party era, but since the multi-party system, they have been used for electoral purposes and used as a countermeasure against leftist movement by the state apparatus. That is why Sakallıoğlu suggests that, ‘the values and norm structures they [ethnic nationalism and religion] have maintained among their adherents have sometimes been ‘reinforcing’, at other times ‘conflicting’, considering the fact that religion has provided the indispensable ingredient of national identity both in Turkey and in the region’ (Sakallıoğlu, 1994, p.256).

This institutionalized and controlled Islam became a social weapon to be used against leftist opposition. Since leftist movements in Turkey re-appeared in politics as student organizations in the late DP decade, official state ideology did entitle those as communist affiliated with infidels to delegitimize them in the minds of ordinary Muslims. As the Kurdish nationalist movement was born in leftist movement, any attempts to express Kurdish ethnic rights and the underdeveloped conditions of the Kurdish region were considered to come from separatist ‘heathens’ (secularists) to the general public.⁹¹ For instance, arrest of the forty-nine university students who telegraphed a letter to the prime ministry to condemn Asim Eren’s statements on Kurds were portrayed as belonging to communist and separatist attempts to overthrow the government. In addition, the decision to ban the Turkish Worker Party through

⁹¹ ‘Bloody Sunday’ refers to the suppression of leftist groups protesting the American navy visiting Turkey in 1969, by ‘rightist’—including Islamists—in front of police forces. The police did not prevent violence but rather, opened a corridor for rightists against leftist. This is a good example of the partial closeness of Islamists to the state authority (Saylan ,1992, p.100).

the accusation of separatist activity, due the fact that it was the first political party which officially approved the existence of Kurdish ethnicity in Turkey, was predicated on once again, so-called separatist and leftist ideology. By doing so, the government facilitated its struggle against a Kurdish nationalist movement under the label of 'struggle against communism' [all leftist variations]. For instance, the Marxist-Leninist PKK fighting for Kurdish rights was branded as 'unbelievers' in order to keep religious Kurdish groups away from it (Smith, 2005, p.456; Gunter, 1988, p.394), and to legitimize the killing of PKK fighters in the eyes of Muslims. This strategy of using religious sentiments and employing religious language to balance against the leftist and Kurdish nationalist movement, have been used until the present, along with the strategy of perceiving and promoting the Kurdish issue as a security question and not as a human, minority, or political rights question.

Building upon the preceding paragraph, the Turkish-Islam synthesis is a production of this strategy firstly put into operation, unofficially, in the 1970s, and then officially consolidating itself after the 1980 coup d'état (Yesilada, 1988, p.364; Saylan, 1992, p.89; Taspinar, 2005, p.139; Kurt, 2010, p.123) because of the 'National Culture Report'⁹² which considered the 'protection, development, and spread of a national culture based on Sunni Islam as a solution to the threat of communism in Turkey' (Eligur, 2010, p.105). To this thesis, being Muslim and Turkish is considered as being two inseparable components of this identity. It is thought that *muhafazakarlık* (conservativeness) could be defined as being inextricably, Muslim and Turkish. Within this conception, distinct ethnic origin has been excluded from legitimate identities, according to official state ideology.⁹³ At the same time, the synthesis excluded a political Islamist identity which could strive for a more Islamic state and society. Therefore, this thesis has been carried out and

⁹² The report was prepared and declared on 8 October 1982, by the State Planning Institution by the order of General Kenan Evren, the president of National Security Council.

⁹³ Nationalization of Islam is not something created in the 1960s or 70s, but it has already been applied by the Islamist authors, Sebil ur-Resad, Büyük Cihat, Selamet and *Serdengeçti* magazine in the 1940s—members of the Sufi religious orders (Alam, 2009, p.361; Saylan, 1992, pp.92-93). These magazines superseded the phrase of 'Türkiye Müslümanları' (Muslims of Turkey) with Müslüman Türk (Muslim Turkish), which echoes the changing of the phrase of 'Türkiye Milleti' (the nations of Turkey) to 'Türk Milleti' (Turkish Nation) by the Kemalist regime in terms of Kurdish nationalism.

implemented by the hands of non-political religious orders and the DRA (Directorate of Religious Affairs).⁹⁴

The unity of these two groups might seem contradictory. The former is not eager to have an extremely politicized Islamic struggle, but instead prefers a more convenient, gradual Islamic influence on the individual and societal faith and moral issues. The latter does not want to have a political challenge to its core existence. Thus, on the one hand, the imams in mosques articulated an Islamic brotherhood of Turkish and Kurdish ethnicities which articulated obedience to the state as a requirement of their belief. On the other hand, centre right political parties, including Anavatan (ANAP) and Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP), religious groups such as Nurcus, especially the Gülen movement (Yavuz, 1999, p.126), Süleymançıs, and other tariqahs that directed people to be good Muslims without mentioning ethnic origins and rights as an Islamic will be considered. In other words, the Turkish-Islamic synthesis was put forward as an antidote to any kind of radicalization, including leftists and Islamists, by advancing a limited knowledge of Islam to be taught in secondary and high schools, and through the claim that Islam was one of the core elements of Turkish culture (Toprak, 1990, p.10). As a result, neither the political Islamist movement,⁹⁵ including the MNP, MSP, RP, FP, nor the Kurdish ethnic rights-centred political movement, including the HEP, ÖZDEP, DEP, HADEP, DEHAP and the DTP, escaped persecution from the Constitution Court, and subsequently, were outlawed. Despite this legal barrier, both political movements survived and their current successors, the AKP/SP and BDP respectively, are still operational in Turkish politics.

⁹⁴ The DRA was constitutionalized by with the 1982 Constitution's article 136. This article states the goal of the institution as being one of 'promotion and consolidation of national solidarity and unity.' By the 1990s, the budget of the institution was significantly raised, and had much more subsidises even than the ministries of Foreign, and Interior Affairs. The numbers of personnel and mosques under the control of the DRI have also dramatically increased. For instance, it operated 5,000 Qur'an Courses in 1993, had over 90,000 staff and more than 70,000 mosques in 1999 (Oran, 2008, p.28; Poulton, 1997, p.186).

⁹⁵ Even though the synthesis excluded political Islamist and left-oriented Kurdish nationalist movements, it is a reality that it contributed to the mobilization of political Islamism (Eligur, 2010, p.85). Regarding the revival of political Islamist discourse and adherents, Ates Altinordu's article in which he compares the revival of German Catholicism in the second half of the 19th century, and Turkish Islam in 1970s and afterwards, gives a theoretical explanation as he applies the 'theory of Revival-Reaction-Politicization'. This theory argues that if the states' response towards the revival of a religious groups is harsh and oppressive, then reactions of these certain religious groups to the backlash will accelerate politicization among these given groups (2010, pp.521-526). The stage of religious revival resembles the mobilization of social movements. This resemblance can be found in Altinordu's statements arguing that, 'Religious revivals increase the public visibility of religion in terms of religious dress and practice... Religious revivals also build the cultural and organizational capacity required for successful politicization' (Altinordu, 2000, p.522) by bolstering and then diffusing religious collective identity.

As mentioned, the official state ideology of Turkey, Kemalism, affiliated with secularism and Turkish nationalism, has had an immediate and powerful reaction towards any sort of menace to its core existence even though these menaces were stemming from people's own will. In terms of political rights, this natural reflex of the state's ideology to protect itself, has always been employed by state apparatus. For instance, the most important one has been that of the military which has taken power four times (1960, 1970, 1980, and 1998) in the name of protecting the state from separatists, communists and Islamists, and has re-established the order—convenient with Kemalist state ideology (Sakallıoğlu, 1997). In each case, the military regime crushed any indication of opposition, including political parties, associations, foundations, and illegal groups, regardless from which direction the threat comes.⁹⁶ Furthermore, the Constitutional Court of Turkey which consists of those following Kemalist state ideology, and which makes decisions according to what best protects state ideology, has been the other state agency. The court did tolerate the existence of neither Islamist political parties (the cases of Refah and Fazilet Partisi) nor political parties pursuing Kurdish rights (the cases of HEP, DEHAP, DEP, ÖZDEP, HADEP, and DTP) as to protect official state ideology (Kemalism) from any possible threats has been its duty. In these cases, it is explicit that the court has not intended to uphold individual rights over the state's rights, or to work towards an embedded society, but has worked to the contrary. As Arslan states, ' [it] adopted an ideology-based paradigm in political party cases' (2002, p.11).

In both examples, judicial or military limitation does not seem applicable when it comes to a fundamental assumption of the state. Kogacioglu (2003) argues this argument in his article by examining the HEP and Refah Partisi cases from a legal perspective. This protective attitude of official state ideology or

⁹⁶ The year 1980 saw the experience of the greatest military-based coup. Generals conducting the post-coup period for three years, through the National Security Council (NSC), created a depoliticized society and an authoritarian state, due to the constitution of 1982, which was prepared by academicians but supervised by generals. To the constitution, the civil politicians in the pre-1980 period were all banned from returning to politics for five years, and all labour and trade unions were abandoned except the TÜRK-İS. Together with the NSC, a supra-university institution, *Yüksek Öğretim Kurumu* (YÖK-Higher Education Council) to oversee the universities and their administrators, was constitutionalized. And also certain professionals such as soldiers, teachers, civil servants and even high school students were prohibited from forming associations (Yesilada, 1988, p.351-355).

structure towards any initiative for pluralist democracy⁹⁷ in Turkey prevented the inclusion of formerly excluded groups of society such as the Kurdish nationalist and Islamists into the state structure. Belge calls any institution or aspect of an established official ideology as an 'alliance' since it is not constrained by inclusion of the military and the Constitution Court, but extends to the universities, professions and media (Belge, 2006, p.636). The escalation of unacceptable Kurdish nationalist and Islamist opposition from the 1980s to the 1990s forced the official state apparatus to behave undemocratically. Given the mobilization of excluded groups since the inception of the multi-party system is still in progress, to what degree these political groups have developed and arrived at the level of disrupting the embedded state ideology can be estimated. Eventually, the level of democratization has opened room for the growing political Islamist and Kurdish nationalist parties. In spite of this their political parties which have been removed from politics, they have managed to form another, and have gone further along their paths to achieve their goals.

Conclusion

This chapter of the thesis sought to illustrate that both political movements have become leading political actors in Turkish politics. Since early modern Turkey, they might take different path but experienced historically almost developments. As an example of this, they have created their own institutionalized organizations representing their own unique alternative political structures in contrast to the embedded official state ideology. The processes with which they have become grassroots organizations developed from the 1980s to the 1990s. The explanation above shed lights on this process and it can be said that they have been ready to take over the official state ideology and supersede it with their own social, political, economic and cultural projects. It is also indicative that the unrest amongst the military, by reducing the Kurdish question to a security issue, and anxiety amongst secularist elites of the state, against rising Islamist politics, forced them to take precautions in order to stop the resurgence of these parties. Neither military attacks on the PKK, nor the presence of a considerably high level of security

⁹⁷ A theoretically explanatory article, by Mehran Kamrava, is worth mentioning here as it defines the democratic system of Turkey as, 'pseudo-democratic politics' due to the involvement of non-civilian elected factors—vis-à-vis the rise and fall of the Refah Party (Kamrava, 1998).

forces in the region, and neither anti-terror laws, nor the efforts made to prevent Islamist social, economic and political agents to take power, worked and the state could not prevent their rising popularity.

From the institutional theory perspective, the embedded structure of an organization once established, becomes one of the significant agencies for changing people's minds and recruiting fresh adherents to that which the organization represents (Peters, 1999). In this sense, those who have been removed from the established organized groups are easily superseded by new recruits as the organization itself attracts the attention of people. For instance, members of the PKK who have been killed fighting with the security forces in the mountains, or of pro-Kurdish political parties those who have been arrested and sentenced to prison, have always been replaced by another willing recruit immediately. This is because the institution or organization has gained adequate human and financial resources in order to keep their existence alive for a prolonged period of time. Therefore, the endurance of the Kurdish issue, and political Islamism at least for last three decades, has a direct relationship with the institutionalization of these particular groups as political parties who have financial, cultural, social, and political branches, as well as unofficial media links.

To summarize, since the 1980s, the PKK and legal political parties⁹⁸ among Kurdish nationalist political groups, and the Milli Görüş movement⁹⁹ among Islamist groups, have managed to become institutionalized political entities that have as their active successors in Turkish politics, the BDP and AKP, respectively.

⁹⁸ According to McDowall, the PKK has been the first Kurdish mass movement compare to pervious pro-Kurdish social groups (McDowall, 2010, p.420)

⁹⁹ From Hugh Poulton's perspective, it is clear that 'in the 1990s the RP has managed to break out of its previous minority role and become a mass party attracting almost 20 per cent of the national votes (Poulton,1997, p.192).

PART THREE: How Pro-Kurdish and Pro-Islamic Political Streams Perceive Each Other

Now it is time to examine the direct or indirect perceptions that representatives of each of these political movements have between each other with methodologically application of critical discourse analysis over official documents of each political stream. In terms of applying critical discourse analysis, ideological connotations of specific terms and how they define and see the word, region and local dynamics would play crucial role to have perceptions measured. To have an example of it, the phrase of 'Eastern Question' would perfectly fit as almost all of the representative parties of pro-Islamic political stream have used this word not as a geographic literature or any other issues in the eastern part of Turkey but as a reference to Kurdish ethnic question of Turkey. On the contrary, this way of defining Kurdish question has never been approved by any members of pro-Kurdish political steam and also considered as a different version of official state ideology's way of seeing the Kurds.

This part can be divided into three chronological phases. The first phase looks at perceptions between the PKK and the Welfare Party, as there was no legal pro-Kurdish political party in Turkey from 1980 to 1991. This chronological distinction is based on the establishment of a legal pro-Kurdish political party in 1991, the HEP (Halkın Emek Partisi—the People's Labour Party). The next phase covers the period that starts in 1991 and ends in 1998 when the coalition government of Turkey, whose Refah Party was the major partner, was forced to resign from the post. This caused not a fully ideological, but tactical transformation within the pro-Islamic political stream. The reason for this specific distinction, regarding the pro-Islamic political stream is that, in due course, there was a division of the Fazilet (Virtue) Party into the Saadet (Felicity) and the Adalet ve Kalkinma (Justice and Development) Parties. On the other hand, regarding the pro-Kurdish political stream, Abdullah Öcalan, the founder of the PKK, was captured in 1999 and in his first trial, stated that he was ready to co-operate with the state. Due to the significance of these events, it is better to have a detailed section for the circumstances, which led to both political streams' transformation. Thus, the second phase would include the HEP, the DEP, the HADEP, while on the other side, the Refah

Partisi (RP) and the Fazilet Partisi (FP). Finally the last phase began in 2002 and ended in 2011 when people went to the ballot box to vote in the national general election since the declarations in which the political parties tell people what their plans are for forthcoming years are crucial resources to trace the perception. As a result, this period covers the DEHAP, the DTP, the BDP from the pro-Kurdish political stream and the AKP from the pro-Islamic political stream.

Chapter Five: PKK and Welfare (Refah) Party, 1980-1991

For the decade after 1980¹⁰⁰ there was no legal pro-Kurdish political party, whereas the existence of a pro-Islamic political party commenced from 1969 till the present. Due to this fact, it is better to examine how the PKK perceived Islam, and on the other hand, how the pro-Islamic political party perceived the Kurdish nationalist movement on the behalf of the PKK.

The Refah party was founded in 1983 when the establishment of political parties was re-permitted by the military rule. As a continuation of the Milli Selamet Party, the Refah party was founded by Ahmet Tekdal, since Necmettin Erbakan was prohibited to engage in politics for five years. On the other hand, the PKK was illegally founded by Abdullah Öcalan in 1978 (PKK Program ve Tüzüğü, 1995, p.6).

In the declaration of foundation, as a leftist revolutionary organization,¹⁰¹ the PKK explains its aim as being, 'to liberate the Kurdish nation from the imperialist and colonial system, to form a democratic peoples dictatorship in an independent and unified Kurdistan, and eventually to realize classless society in the era of collapsing imperialism and rising proletariat revolutions'. In the document, it continues to state, '[the] Kurdish national independence struggle led by the PKK is an inseparable part of world socialist revolutions which are consisting of socialist countries, national independence movements and working class movements' (PKK, 1978, p.37). The PKK sees western imperialism behind of every backwardness and poverty among Kurdish people as these powers divided Kurdistan into four parts and shared it among themselves. That is why the party does not approve of the current political boundaries (system). Apart from the PKK, any type of Kurdish movement accepting these boundaries, or engaging in legal politics within these boundaries is thus regarded as a part of imperialism. Relying on this idea, it sees the dissolution of any power groups, fascist or 'social chauvinist

¹⁰⁰ Right after the 1980 coup d'état, military rulers of the country closed down all political parties and the 1982 constitution empowered the constitutional court to close down anti-constitutional political parties. This ensured that all political parties followed the constitutional pillars of Kemalism. The law of a political party enforces all newly established political parties to fall in line with Atatürk's principles and revolutions in which a united status of state and secularism are protected by the constitution (Güney & Baskan, 2008, p.266).

¹⁰¹ While he was captured and seated in the court, one of the founders of the PKK, Kemal Pir, has described the PKK as that 'The movement known as the PKK, which emerged after 1972, is not an organization; it is an ideological and political movement. That movement has the intention to unite [the divided revolutionary left in Turkey]' (Kemal Pir, Court Defence, 1981). The quotation is taken from Jongerden and Akkaya (2011).

ideologies', which make Kurdish people commit crimes against its national existence, as a primary focus. While doing this, it is legitimate to use revolutionary terror as a method for struggle method against the secret and official police, agents, and agents provocateurs.

Not directly but indirectly, these accusation claimed by the PKK covers religiously sensitive people supporting a member of pro-Islamic political stream. It would be academically wrong if it were thought that the PKK accuses all religiously sensitive Kurds of being agents. Yet, it is a reality that in every terms all apparently conservative political parties obtained considerable amount of votes from the mostly Kurdish populated areas. Therefore, it would be true that these accusations indirectly cover electorates of any pro-Islamic or even conservative political parties.

In light of this declaration, it is quite obvious that the PKK has a Marxist-Leninist ideology at the centre of its ideology (PKK, 1978, pp.32-35). In addition, radical leftist discourse can be traced in all of its documents since there is a strong emphasis on leftist-Marxist terminology, with the use of words like, proletariat, feudalism, imperialism, working and village class, the First Imperialist Sharing War (I. Emperyalizm Paylasim Savasi), colonialism, revolution, and various forms of this literature. Not only in the declaration, but also in the PKK's party program and regulations, any books of Abdullah Öcalan, the founder of the PKK, its publication *Serxwebun*¹⁰² and so on, Marxist-Leninist discourses and terminology, have prevailed in every utterance and certain words.

Its core ideology reflects as to how the parties read the world, as well. An example follows: 'in the mid nineteenth century, thanks to the industrial revolution, the bourgeoisie which had contributed to the revolutionary era transformed the political structure to a reactionist structure because of capitalism which coincided with the imperialism stage [imperialist implications]' (PKK, 1978, p.5). As a result of the brutal invasion of imperialist states on colonies and dependent states, the PKK thinks, the national liberation movement by proletariats had emerged in exploited states as a result of the October Revolution (Öcalan, 1978, pp.46-49) in Soviet Russia, and later the

¹⁰² Serxwebun's issues are available online, please see: <http://www.serxwebun.org>

revolution in Cuba, the war in Vietnam,¹⁰³ and China's revolution (PKK Program ve Tüzüğü, 1995, pp.19-22). Furthermore, based on the PKK's party program, it is believed that NATO, the American hegemony, the European Economic Community, CENTO (Central Eastern Treaty Organization) were all created as defence alliances against socialist independent states and national liberation movements. This is relevant for the discussion of this region. In the Middle East, these imperialist powers established their figurehead or cooperative governments against the people's will. Regional political systems were set up according to these imperialist interests, ultimately causing the division of the Kurdish nation into four non-Kurdish states under Turkish, Persian and Arab control. As a result, from a global perspective of imperialist monopolies, and from the local perspective of national feudal compradors, together they controlled not only the economy but also the social, cultural, and political arenas of Kurdish areas.

These arguments also give a clue as to how the PKK is just a part of a global-wide, national liberation movement. Then, to claim that socialist internationalism, in terms of liberation of all working class and nations from imperialist powers as being one of the key features of the PKK would not be wrong. This also shows that the PKK does accept a nation state system, which is produced and applied within the western imperial countries, but rejects the bourgeoisie's hegemony over working class. I have deliberately mentioned this feature, as it may be compared with the concept of *Ummah* which, means all Muslims are brothers, and constitutes a single religious unity¹⁰⁴ as advocated by pro-Islamic political movements, which envisages a religious view of 'the state-society relations' (Yavuz, 2001, p.10).

This data taken from the PKK's party program and regulations shows that the PKK considers 'the Republic of Turkey' as an enemy invading Kurdish lands, and as being a part of global imperialism.¹⁰⁵ This hostility has deep historical

¹⁰³ To indicate how the PKK in the 1980s emulated the Cuban and Vietnam revolution, it is quite meaningful to give this quotation. 'The Cuban and Vietnam revolutions proved that even the poorest and smallest nations, if they decide to fight, can reach revolution through a national liberation movement without waiting for any major war' (PKK, 1978, p.15).

¹⁰⁴ 'Ummah' comes originally from The Qur'an which states 'The believers are but brothers, so make a settlement between your brothers. And fear Allah that you may receive mercy' (10/49, <http://quran.com/49>) and the Prophet Muhammad's sayings in which he uses the concept of ummah while addressing all Muslims not only in his time but also past and future Muslims. .

¹⁰⁵ To prove that Turkey is a puppet of the ABD's imperialism, and its regional collaborator, by sending troops to Korea, and its entrance to NATO, accepting Marshall Assistance and a bilateral agreement with

origins, from the PKK's perception, as the PKK traces Kurdish nationalism back to 1000 B.C, the times of Medes¹⁰⁶ and claims it as having been 'a new invasive power [that] appeared over Kurdistan in the 11th century. This power was of the Oğuz Tribes [Turkic], who operated at the highest level of barbarism and so had gained skills for concurring [as character]¹⁰⁷ because of accepting Islam' (PKK Program ve Tüzüğü 1995, 38). As an illegal organization using terrorism as its method for struggle, the state never tolerated the PKK's presence over the last three decades. The concept of state, which is dominated by official state ideology denying the existence of Kurds within its border, has been ideologically understood as an imperial structure exploiting Kurdish lands' physical and human resources. Because of this, the PKK justifies armed struggle against any agents representing the central state. In the Party program, by stating that 'the time period between 1980 and 1990 which witnessed extensive resistance [by the PKK] against the 12 September fascist-colonial regime¹⁰⁸ and in which [our cause or resistance] strengthened with the 15 August 1984 attack¹⁰⁹ is a period in which the hegemony of the Republic of Turkey over Kurdistan was ruptured, and the national liberation movement gained power in terms of warlike [askeri, in Turkish] and fronts [cephe in Turkish]' (PKK Program ve Tüzüğü, 1995, p.52), the PKK presents as if there was an ongoing war¹¹⁰ between equal state's armies. This understanding of the state also causes an intra-Kurdish nationalist movement struggle since whether they are pro-Islamic or pro-leftist

the USA, were employed, and at the end this is evidence of Turkey surrendering to imperialism (Öcalan, 1978, p.81).

¹⁰⁶ As an indication of primordial nationalism, the PKK and most of the nationalist groups, whether they are legal or illegal, seek a historical justification for their undeniable existence. By doing so, anything that is known historically about Kurds may be taken as the inception of their nationalist movement. That is why, in the PKK's program, Kurdish history starts in the time of Medes (PKK Program ve Tüzüğü, 1995, pp.35-36).

¹⁰⁷ In the manifesto, it is stated that the core aim of conquering was the enslavement of free people and looting of their possessions (Öcalan, 1978, p.36). This argument also makes clear that the PKK thinks that there is no spiritual space in Islam or religion, but that the hidden aim was always, capital. It also shows to what extent a materialist and positivist approach prevails in the PKK's perception of Islam.

¹⁰⁸ What is meant by the 12 September Fascist-Colonial regime, is the military rule which prevailed in Turkey from 1980 to 1983 as a result of the 1980 coup d'état.

¹⁰⁹ On 15 August 1984, the PKK guerrillas attacked Eruh in Siirt province and Semdinli in Hakkari province in an attempt to take them under the PKK's control. It was the first organized attack of army forces in Turkey, so this event became a starting point of a massive revolutionary attack amongst the PKK guerrillas and sympathizers as of the 15th of August, which is still being celebrated.

¹¹⁰ Using the discourse of war for defining the armed struggle between the PKK and the armed forces of Turkey has always been employed in various publication of the PKK. One of the countless examples of this is a paper written in Serxwebun with the title of 'Emperyalizmin Özel Savasi ve Türk Ordusunun Kürdistan'da Yürüttüğü Savasin Niteligi Üzerine' (Imperialism's Special War and On Qualification of the War Conducted by Turkish Army in Kurdistan) (Serxwebun, 1985).

organizations, any sort of reformist Kurdish groups¹¹¹ seeking for constitutional recognition of Kurdish people and believing the Kurdish question might be solved within civil politics in Turkey were all accused of being slaves of a hegemonic Turkish bourgeoisie and several of those reformists were killed by the PKK. The fundamental reason why the PKK totally excludes them from the Kurdish nationalist movement is that these reformist Kurdish groups never intended to eliminate the state (Turkish) but rather, asked for local administration (Kurdish) instead of foreign administration (Turkish). Their utmost demand has been autonomy within the state not complete independence (PKK, 1978, p.31). The PKK's perception of the state as an enemy resulted in the exclusion of the rest of the reformists from the Kurdish nationalist movement. Given that the PKK did not approve even of the reformist Kurdish movement, it is not then too difficult to guess its reactions against the pro-Islamic movement in the region, which has been seen as an agent of imperialism.

Referring to imperial powers as 'gerici güçler' (reactionist powers) implies that that reactionist powers includes religious groups and identities. Since the concept of 'gerici' is another way of describing possible pro-Islamic groups or movements. The meaning itself has a strong connotation to religion because it has been used by official state ideology to describe so-called radical Islamic groups who wants more Islamic way of life and system. Employment of that concept to define all imperial powers contends religious organizations and these imperialist powers are the ones the PKK wants to destroy to reach revolution firstly in Kurdistan and then whole world. Ideological contradiction between the PKK as a beginning point of the pro-Islamic political stream after 1980s and pro-Islamic political stream starts in such a general ideological discourse.

Under this imperialism and its regional and local collaborators' exploitation, it is claimed that a semi-proletariat of the rural and proletariat classes in urban areas has emerged. This has been a phenomena derived from a large number of young intellectuals from amongst the group, upon which a modern

¹¹¹ Exclusion of reformist ideas from the Nationalist movement by the PKK seems to lose sharpness by the 1990s. I believe that it is because of the establishment of pro-Kurdish political parties, requiring help from the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) in Northern Iraq (PKK Program ve Tüzüğü, 1995, p.50), and also of the collapsing of the Soviet Union, which contributed to the most important ideological change towards the PKK.

ideological and social structure could be built. Within this historical context, the PKK accuses a closed feudal socio-economic system of providing a continuation of local imperialism among Kurdish people. This is actually where the pro-leftist-oriented Kurdish movement intersects with the pro-Islamic discourse since this closed feudal socio-economic system consists of tribal leaders,¹¹² the feudal structure, and related to the research, clerics.¹¹³ These groups were perceived by the PKK as a form of national denialism (milli inkarcilik), submissiveness (teslimiyetçilik) and ummah (ümmetçilik), respectively (PKK, 1978, p.28; Öcalan, 1978, p.25). They were identified as being responsible for the dissemination of colonialism in term of language and culture.

As mentioned above, a core Islamic concept of “Ummah” is seen as a component of local imperialism. It is known that Ummah refers to all Muslims as a single community. Therefore, any affiliations to an Islamic organization whether being radical, political or moderate was considered to be fuel of maintained imperial order from global to local level. Such an understanding would undeniably impact on how the PKK saw Refah Party for a decade from 1980 to 1990.

Regarding legal political areas, all political parties including the MSP (the successor to the Refah Party) were seen as being representatives of the bourgeoisie, and Kurds supporting these political parties were all considered to be traitors.¹¹⁴ By overtly describing these embedded political parties as

¹¹² Tribal connections among people are something that has to be eliminated to finally arrive at a classless society. The PKK believes that people and nations would live the most stable lives under socialism in the communist era. Even ethnic identities would eventually degenerate before the supra-identity, communism (Öcalan, 1978, p.21). In addition, in the mid-1980s, several tribes were armed by the state against the PKK attacks. This was called as the Village Guard System (Robins, 1993, p.664). This also constituted another justification for destroying the tribal socio-political structure in the Kurdish areas.

¹¹³ Clerics have been religious leaders (Mele in Kurdish) from certain Kurdish areas, and who have been quite influential over villages and certain tribes.

¹¹⁴ Describing how the PKK perceived the pro-Islamic political stream, I think it is better to have the original version of the paragraph in Turkish in case there is a scepticism vis-à-vis the approach to translation. ‘Askeri, siyasi, kültürel ve ekonomik alanda ortaklaşa bir sömürgeci yapıya dayanan burjuvazinin farklı kesimleri, kendi aralarındaki çelişkilerden kaynaklanan ideolojik ve politik gruplaşmaları Kürdistan’a da aynen yansıtırlar. Türkiye’de burjuvazini farklı kesimlerini temsil eden AP, CHP, MSP, MHP vb partilerin Kürdistan’da da birer uzantıları daima vardır. Temsilcisi oldukları sınıfın ulusal ve toplumsal konulardaki görüşlerini Kürt yandaşlarına da aynen benimseten bu örgütler, Kürdistan gerçeği inkar temelinde yola çıkıp, Kürdistan’ı Türkiye’nin bölünmez ve doğal bir parçası olarak kabul ederler. TC Anayasası’na göre programına ‘Türkiye, ülkesi ve milleti ile bölünmez bir bütündür’ ilkesini temel almayan partilerin kurulmasına hiçbir surette izin verilmez. Legal partiler ister sağ, ister sol bu ilkeyi kabul ederek kurulabilirler. Daha çok asiret reisleri, din adamları ve büyük toprak sahipleri gibi geleneksel hain Kürt kesimlerini bünyelerine alan bu partiler, günümüzde yıprandıklarından, eski ideolojik ve politik akımlarla sömürgeciliğin gizlenmesi mümkün olamamaktadır. Kemalist ideolojinin yaratığı yapı hızla bozulmakta, yerine yeni yapılar oluşturulmaya çalışılmaktadır. Sosyal demokrat, fasist ve islamcı

social democrats, fascist and Islamist, it is totally clear that Islam or pro-Islamic political parties were regarded as a part of Turkish state imperialism in the Kurdish region (PKK, 1978, p.29).

The position of any religions within the leftist territory is mostly seen as dogmatic, not open to change, development, and improvement. It is believed that religion closes people's minds to any further progress. In this sense, most of the technological and scientific innovations are generally perceived to be anti-religious. In essence, alike as in most of the materialist and positivist approaches, religion is regarded as one of the major obstacles preventing any contemporary development. In most of the leftist-oriented ideology such as Maoism, Stalinism, Leninism or Marxist-Leninist, there is no place, or at least only as a cultural entity, for religion inside society. Under the influence of such a strict approach to religion, Abdullah Öcalan's ideas are mostly determinative to examine and understand how the PKK perceives religions, specifically Islam. In his Marxist-Leninist approach to Islam, contrary to most of the communist parties in the Middle East, he suggests a 'denial approach to the reality of religion, which is a broad implication of dialectic materialism, is one of the main reasons why Middle Eastern revolutions did not develop' (Öcalan, 1990, p.11). He also states that presumptions that 'communists are atheists' and 'religion equals reactionism' are methodologically wrong and prevent people's sympathies to leftist or revolutionary movements. Indeed, he suggests acknowledging religion as a social reality and acting accordingly. These ideas are actually tactical approaches to convince the relatively conservative Muslim Kurdish people to side with the PKK.

Once delving into his book, it would be much clearer how he and the PKK on behalf of the pro-Kurdish political stream perceive Islam. The phrase of 'in the period when humanization started as a species' indicated that there is no faith in creation by Allah (God) (Öcalan 1978, p.32). Based on the statement that '...because conditions in which human beings emerged, only religion could be perceived to be a deceptive method to restrain natural forces' (Öcalan, 1990, p.15). He basically believes that the environmental conditions made what

maskelere bürünen soven Türk milliyetçiliği yeniden örgütlendirilmeye çalışılmakta, bu amaçla, para ve devlet görevliliği bir koz olarak kullanılmaktadır (PKK, 1978, pp.29-30).

human beings are now. Following a general description, he defines religion as a way in which human species first thought and developed spiritually when they encountered nature (Öcalan, 1990, p.16). Furthermore, he does not believe in prophecy and claims that the Prophet Muhammad refused Judaism and Christianity, as both religions were against commercial interests and did not make room for others. Thus, because of the prophecy tradition in the region, he claimed himself to be a prophet, even the last one, which is according to Öcalan, quite realistic and revolutionary. In addition, Öcalan argues that as a result of intensive thinking about social conditions of the time, the Qur'an was written by the Prophet Muhammad, and does not consider that it was revealed from Allah. His most remarkable evaluation of Islam is that, 'in the final analysis, Islam is a religion of the most developed feudal civilization. That is why he thinks Islam converted a tremendous amount of lands in such a sort time' (Öcalan, 1990, pp.24-26).

This kind of understanding of Islam directs him to think that the Islamization of Turkish tribes caused Turkish imperialism, especially in Kurdistan. So Seljuks and Ottomans used their religion to establish an alignment against their enemies not to protect Islam, but to protect their borders against the Persians. In this sense, he suggests that religion was just used as an instrument in order to preserve their national interest, not only by the Ottomans, but also by the Persians and Arabs. Within this triangle, Kurdish people were all kept as a colony and thus could not find their own opportunity to form their own national state. Perhaps, the most radical discourse about Islam is used in the Manifesto by stating, 'Islamism which has more of an anaesthetic effect than bourgeoisie ideologies means to be a satellite of an Arab hegemony and so a denial of the Kurd's national past in quest for nationhood'¹¹⁵ (Öcalan, 1978, p.24). His historical reading of Islam prevailed among the PKK ranks but strategically changed appearance, since the military regime officially justified Islam as a defence against leftist and leftist-oriented separation movements after the 1980s. Especially, a 'Turkish-Islam synthesis' sought to disseminate this idea all around Turkey via the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA) and educational institutions (Öcalan, 1990, p.43) in order to turkify and enslave the

¹¹⁵ Another statement in the manifesto is also quite meaningful to quote in order to understand how the PKK perceives Islam. It states, 'Kurds were invaded by foreigners in terms of spiritual aspect. Islam is alike a Trojan horse preparing Kurds to deny their ethnic identity and playing the role of getting insight track' (Öcalan, 1978, p.25).

Kurdish people (Öcalan, 1978, pp.102-105). He uses these developments to solidify his argument that Turks has been using Islam for their own national interests and by doing so they have also exploited Kurds for centuries.

Abdullah Öcalan also thinks using Islam against colonized Muslim nations such as the Kurds is intentionally planned by imperialist America and its collaborators in Turkey. When he gives examples, he mentions Müslüman Kardeşler (Ihvan-i Muslimin) in the Middle East, and interestingly, the Refah Partisi and the MSP. While he is portraying the situation of the Refah Party, he says, 'Although they seem to advocate Islam and to be in favour of Islamic brotherhood, they are definitely not adhering to Islam's revolutionary essence and to the Islam as a moral value for society. They are seeking to use Islamic traditions in a distorted and dogmatic way in order to maintain their corrupted exploitation and repression' ¹¹⁶(Öcalan, 1990, p.44). Despite that, he confess that these Islamic movements have considerable amount of support, at least more than leftist adherents, but they are not regarded as Muslim achievements, but are seen as methods successful in inducing people with dogmatic, reactionist, and Sunni understandings of Islam. As a response to imperialist instruments such as *tarikah* (religious orders), Seyhs, Sayyids, he suggests that the PKK's disciples respect Islamic codes and tells people of Islam's revolutionary essence.

On the other hand, whereas the PKK perceives religion, especially Islam, as an instrument of global, regional and local imperialists, in order to exploit Kurdish proletariats by making them traitors to their own ethnicity, the Refah party totally approves of the negative intentions of global imperialism since it spreads ethnic differences among *ummah* in order to eliminate the possibility of Islamic unity. What makes Refah's understanding of imperialism accessible is to consider the capitalist western block led by the USA and the communist

¹¹⁶ Biz bu degerlendirmeleri daha çok genelde din, özelde Islam dini gerçek- ligini ortaya çıkarmak için yaptık. Ancak günümüz için çıkarılacak sonuç sudur: Genelde sosyalizm adına, ama kaba materyalistçe dinin ve Islamın yorumlanması tehlikelidir, buna kesinlikle karşı olmak gerekiyor. Islamın genelde ABD emperyalizmi, özelde onun Türk isbirlikçileri tarafından tehlikeli bir biçimde, Islam kökenli halkların uyanısını engellemek ve daha çok da Iran Islam Devrimi'nin anti-emperyalist özelliklerini bosa çıkarmak için kullanılması söz konusudur. Bunun yanı sıra sahte Islamcı akımlara Ortadogu monarsilerince muazzam parasal destek yapılmaktadır. Kısmen 'Müslüman Kardeşler' teskilatında bu destek somutlaşmıştır. Ve Türkiye'de de 'Refah Partisi'nin içinde, daha önce de MSP bünyesinde bu destek somutlaşmıştır. Islamı savunuyor gibi görünmelerine ve Islam kardeşliginden yana olduklarını iddia etmelerine ragmen, kesinlikle Islamın devrimci özülüyle, halkların bir moral degeri olarak Islamla hiçbir ilişkileri yoktur. Kokusmus sömürü ve baskı düzenlerini sürdürmek için Islamın geleneksel etkisini çarpık ve dogmatik bir tarzda kullanmaya çaba sarf etmektedirler (Öcalan, 1990, p.44).

or socialist Eastern block led by Soviet Union, together as imperialist (Erbakan, 1991, p.100). Both have materialist and positivist approaches. Mr. Kazan, one of the prominent figures of the Refah Party and an ex-MP conceptualizes Refah's way of seeing the world as that of being one wherein the 'Western block embraced democracy as an open political regime and capitalism as an economic system, whereas the Eastern block chose socialism as a closed political system and communism as an economic system. These different choices resulted in a cold war enduring for almost forty years in a bipolar globe'. For instance, in the first general congregation of the Refah Party in 1985, Ahmet Tekdal, the president emphasized both Western [Europe and the USA] and Eastern [Soviet Russia] powers as imperialists (Tekdal, 1985, p.5). To give a more specific example from the same speech, he emphasized the Soviet Union as a cruel and imperialist power when he was talking about the invasion of Afghanistan¹¹⁷ then went on to regard the Soviet Union as communists, and Afghan fighters, as Muslim mujahedeen.¹¹⁸

In summary, from the Refah Party's point of view, imperial powers, whether they are from the west or the East, have been active in all Muslim lands in order to exploit their resources and to prevent Muslims from uniting. That is why, in the same speech, Mr. Tekdal linked the political instability and ongoing wars in the Middle East and the pre-1980 situation in Turkey with the imperialist states' intentions (Tekdal, 1985, p.5). Mr. Erbakan summarized existing ideas in Turkey into three classifications. The first, and to him, the primary one is the *Milli Görüş* (National Outlook), and the other two are usurer (money lender) capitalist and leftist-Marxist ideas which have been imported from the western and eastern imperialists, respectively (Erbakan, 1991, p.120). He then emphasized that capitalism and communism both were bankrupt, so he thinks the only solution for Turkey and Islamic states is just political, economic, judicial and educational systems constituting of just order (Adil Düzen), towards all of these the *Milli Görüş* aims (Erbakan, 1991, p.148; Kazan, 2006, p.34; Erbakan, 2010, p.105).

¹¹⁷ 'While Afghanistan was being invaded by cruel and imperialist powers ...' (Tekdal, 1985, p.4)

¹¹⁸ It is originally an Arabic word meaning fighters who are fighting for religiously sacred cause.

The Refah Party, from the MSP period to the mid-1990s, was against any form of agreement or international institutions such as NATO, the ECC, and the Warsaw Pact, as they were all regarded as being one of many instruments with which imperial powers could control the Muslim counties (Erbakan, 1991, pp.15-33). A reflection of this understanding can be seen in another statement of Tekdal in his speech. He argued, 'in Bulgaria [Turkish Muslim minority group], the Philippines, and other Asian countries, in Eritrea, South Africa, torture and brutality towards human beings, especially to Muslims, were revealed' (Tekdal, 1985, p.4). In this sense, the Refah party distinguishes itself from the rest of the political parties in terms of their targets and claims that they are indeed all the same parties but just appear differently. Mr. Tekdal consolidated this approach by refusing to be classified as either leftist or rightist. For one, they were based on materialist ideals and it is correct to say that the Refah Party represents something different, which is obviously, a spiritual, moral, and traditional approach that takes its cue from Islam.

Religious-oriented discourse has prevailed in almost all official documents and written speeches of the Refah Party. As it is a legal obligation to mention the Party's submission to the Atatürk's principles, the party program of Refah starts with such statements (Refah Partisi Programı, 1983, p.3). Then it continues with the concept of '*milli*' added into every suitable article in entire program. This *milli* concept is not translated into English as national, but the way in which Refah Party uses this phrase is not referring to ethnicity either, but meant to be the way used as in the 95th verse in the House of Imran (Al-i Imran) Chapter of Qur'an.¹¹⁹ In this verse, *milleth* was used interchangeably with 'religion'. Since, according to the 58th article of the election law stating that the use of religious phrases and symbols is not allowed in any party publishing (Election Law, 1961), by using a word implying religious origin, but in current Turkish literature, means that the national Refah Party's program was full of religious discourse. In addition, concepts of spirituality, tradition, morality, culture, justice (*adil*), and a preference for the Ottoman language literature in a Latin alphabet provide a religious appearance in whole document. To solidify these arguments, looking at the main aims of the Refah Party, written in the

¹¹⁹ It states 'Say, 'Allah has told the truth. So follow the religion of Abraham, inclining toward truth; and he was not of the polytheists.' (<http://quran.com/3>)

party program would be helpful. 'Our main aim is to elevate our nation into the level of contemporary civilization by (a) endeavouring for the development and reconstruction of our country and (b) endeavouring for cultural and spiritual development. These endeavours are going to be done through bearing in mind our *milli* (religious) characters and features' (Refah Partisi Programı, 1983, p.4). At first glance, it seems that *milli* meant to be national, but it should not be forgotten that this concept also has a religious (Islamic) connotation (Yildiz, 2003).

Following the above explanations on how the Refah party reads the world, and what ideological orientation has prevailed inside its messaging, the next paragraphs examine how the Refah Party perceives the state, the Republic of Turkey. In general, based on official documents of the Party, it can be said that the Refah party has never considered the state as an enemy which has to be fought. Yet, it is believed that the state has been in the wrong hands since the inception of the Republic, as the ruling elites had sought to disregard historically constituted state tradition, based on Islamic codes, or at least, an Islamic-oriented past, and had begun to copycat western style modernization policies. Even though strict secular implementation of the Republic has repressed religious institutions and removed religious people from the state structure, most of the Islamic groups (political or social) have not accused the state itself (as an abstract institution) but have accused the ruling elites for creating the wrong policies. Thus, more or less most Islamic organizations (legal, illegal, social, political or cultural) did not consider the state as an arch enemy. It is partly because the position of the state in orthodox Sunni Islam has been seen as a sacred institution, and the way to protect Islam from attacks. This originates from the 59th verse of the Women Chapter (Nisa Suresi) of the Qur'an¹²⁰ in which one is ordered to obey Allah, His Prophet and the *ûlu'l-emr* (administrators). Gradually, in Sunni Islam, it is generalized as a rule that suggests to Muslims that they obey state leaders (Sarıkaya, 1997, p.11). In other words, 'For Turkey's Islamic tradition, the state is historically conceptualized as a sanctified entity, as sublime and eternal (*Devlet-i Ali, Devlet-i Ebed-Muddet*), commanding strict loyalty and obedience to the

¹²⁰ 'Ey iman edenler! Allah'a itaat edin, Rasulüne ve sizden olan (idareciler) e de itaat edin.' In Turkish and 'O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in Al'ah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result.' In English 59/4 in the Qur'an.

ruler'¹²¹ (Güney, 1992, p.42). Associated with the Ottoman state system, this understanding took the shape of that 'the intellectual tradition of Ottoman Islam has always subscribed to the unconditional obedience to the ruler, since the Ottoman state was regarded as the institutional embodiment of the principles of Islam and the caliphate'¹²² (Bulac, 1992, p.31).

In my interview with Recai Kutan who has been influential in the Milli Görüş political movement since the late 1960s, and also became president of two political parties of the stream (Fazilet and Saadet Parties), as a response to my question as to how he perceives the state, he begins his reply by stating, 'You see, first of all, there is nothing such as being against the state, but only being against the state's practices... As we have always mentioned, the state [devlet] is our state...' (Kutan, 2012).¹²³

The striking statements indicate how the Refah Party perceive the state, and are articulated by Sevket Kazan, who was the minister of Justice in 1974 in the coalition government of the MSP and the CHP. It is of course, from the pre-1980 period, but he was still active within the predecessor pro-Islamic parties. In this regard, his ideas on the pre or post-1980 periods more or less represent the parties' approaches to any issue. There was a general amnesty conducted and applied by that coalition government. My key question pertains to why those who had leftist ideologies, including Kurds or Kurdish nationalists, or Kurdish leftists, were not included in the first draft of the amnesty law, since later on the CHP brought this law to the constitutional court to make it cover all prisoners. His answer to my question was quite long but still worth quoting here, as it is extremely representative of the situation.

'The CHP in 1974, we had 48 representatives ... but a 14s (14'ler) group was formed; they were Nurcu [disciples of the Nur movement formed by Said-i Nursi]. Of course there was no such thing as a Fetullahcilik [followers of Fetullah Gülen who formed another branch as a part of Nur movement]... we were [are] all Muslims. Yet, regarding amnesty, they were rather under the influence of nationalism, thus they considered the left as if it was infidelity. Now, you would form a movement with the CHP, who wanted to free from those convicted of leftism and we wanted to free those convicted by Article 163 of the Turkish Criminal Law... There were approximately 800-1000 Muslims in jail on the other hand, more or less

¹²¹ Translation from Turkish to English belongs to Umit Cizre Sakallioğlu (2007, p.77).

¹²² Translation from Turkish to English belongs to Umit Cizre Sakallioğlu (2007, p.77).

¹²³ The exact words articulated by Mr. Kutan were 'Efendim bir defa, devlete karsi olmak diye bir sey yok, ancak devletin uygulamalarina karsi olmak diye... Hep ifade ettigimiz, devlet bizim devletimiz...' as in Turkish.

2000 leftists... the only criteria we could apply were Islamic codes in order to convince the Nurcus. ... I first looked at the Ukubat [crime and punishment regulations in Islamic law] chapters. ... There were [some] crimes in the legal frameworks [Turkish penal codes] which were considered as crimes according to Islam, too. Then I thought we could include them [those who committed the crimes] into an amnesty... there were some crimes, which are crimes in both legal regulations and Islam, for example murder... And in the end, with the research I did, I drew a table; one line is for those, which are not a crime according to Islam ... which are forgivable. Well then, aren't there any crimes we cannot forgive [according to Islamic rules]? These were those who were convicted from the 149th article [of the constitution]. We decided to exclude them from the amnesty list partly because out of respect for these friends [Nurcus] in the group. That 149, those raised against the state, were *bagii* [disobedient to the state in Arabic]. I said they did not uprising against the Islamic state anyway, as there are some who think there was a state of Islam [dar ul-Islam], so to satisfy them, we can exclude them from the amnesty list' (Kazan, 2012).

Based on this reply to the question, those who rose up against the state using armed force were not capable of being forgiven, according to Islamic rules. It seems there is also an issue of whether there is an Islamic state or not, except for the sake of convincing the Nurcus within the party. This event shed lights on the perception of the state in the eyes of the party administrators and also indicates that high ranking politicians among the Refah Party do not distinguish leftist movements as Kurdish, or Turkish, they have a holistic approach to all leftist movements.

Whether it is Islamic oriented or not, the Refah Party and other previous and successor political parties, have never seen the state as someone else's. Because of this, this political movement has not been thinking of taking arms up against the state and taking it back from those who stole it from them. Relying on this perception of the state, any practical mistakes or wrong policies are not affiliated with the state, but with those who are running the state. In this sense, a major problem for Turkey which Mr. Erbakan accused Republican administrators, especially the CHP in the single party era, of ruining the country, and of copycat mentality in terms of deeming western style modernization as being the only way for development¹²⁴ (Erbakan, 1991). Even the relatively conservative Party, the ANAP (Motherland Party) was

¹²⁴ The Milli Görüş movement's approach to the Kurdish question, by accusing the single Party era of creating Turkey's biggest questions, also has a religious background. This perspective is meaningfully summarized by Yavuz and Özcan (2006) as they argue that, 'the Kurdish problem is not about nationalism but rather forced secularism and Turkish nationalism of the type enforced by Kemalist ideology' (p.103). They think that this argument is also valid for the AKP's approach to the Kurdish question. I agree with them but the AKP's democracy and human rights policies should also be included since the AKP does not think religious ties would be enough to solve the Kurdish question.

accused of being a regional agent of the USA during the Gulf Crisis in the 1990s, as the ANAP government was supporting western intervention into Iraq. In this sense, Mr. Kazan's quote, taken from Yavuz Gökmen's book, is strikingly meaningful. He says, 'Özal wanted to prove that Turkey would never disappoint the Americans and Europe in the region. Özal wanted the war'¹²⁵ (Gökmen, 1992, p.186). This also proves that whether the party is relatively conservative, leftist, or secular, apart from their possible governance, the other of political parties (possibly the governments) have always been accused of supporting a copycat the modernization project. But the concept of the state itself has never been touched by this in a negative way, as the pro-Islamic political stream thinks that the state is theirs by nature, but being ruled by the wrong hands since the demise of the Empire.

What is going to be done now is a comparison of these two political streams' perceptions of the world and Turkey. It is now obvious that they have almost the same understanding of imperialism which they are both fighting against, politically. While reading their documents in which there are couple of paragraphs on imperialism, it is surprisingly difficult to determine if they are written by the leftist-Marxist-oriented PKK or the pro-Islamic Refah party. For instance, the following paragraphs are presented without any attributions in order to demonstrate how difficult it is to identify who is the author. I believe this will be rather shocking for the reader. Here is the first:

In practice, an ongoing slave class has been established. This slave class is only ruled by an oppressive regime. All practices, which are against human rights in today's Turkey, are actually assisting foreign powers in achieving their desires. This is to say, that colonial order needs repression to maintain itself.¹²⁶

The second is as follows:

As an idea of the right [ideologically rightist] gives power to the upper hand, the west is an exploiter. Capitalism means that capital owners suppress proletariats. In capitalism there is a class that suppresses and a suppressed class. Because of this, capitalism in time has caused social explosion.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ The original language of the quotation is Turkish as 'Özal, bölgede Amerika ve Avrupa'nın gözünü arkada bırakmayacak bir Türkiye'nin varlığını kanıtlamak istiyordu. Özal savaş istiyordu!'

¹²⁶ 'Halen Türkiye'de tatbikatta ekonomik yönden bir köle düzeni kurulmuştur. Bu köle düzeni, ancak bir baskı rejimi ile yürütülmektedir. Bugün Türkiye'de insan haklarına aykırı olarak yapılan tatbikatin hepsi, aslında dış güçlerin arzularına erişmesine yardımcı olmaktadır' (Erbakan, 1991, p.166).

¹²⁷ 'Bati'da hak arayışı kuvveti üstün tuttuğu için batı sömürücüdür. Kapitalizm demek, sermaye sahiplerinin emekçileri ezmesi demektir, kapitalizmde bir ezen bir de ezilen sınıf mevcuttur. Onun için Kapitalizm zamanla sosyal patlamaya sebep olmaktadır' (Erbakan, 1991, p.168).

By looking at the discourses used in these two paragraphs it seems that they are articulated by a leftist person, or written for a leftist-oriented document. Yet they were stated by Mr. Erbakan, who was the most prominent figure in pro-Islamic politics in Turkey, and also the founder of the Milli Görüş political movement. Although these two political streams explain imperialism with almost the same discourse. What distinguishes them from each other is that they see each other as an agent of imperialism. The PKK and later on the pro-Kurdish political parties have ideologically leftist approaches, which is only hostile to western capitalism or imperialism, whereas the Refah Party (Milli Görüş) has an ideologically religious approach. This latter approach is not only against western capitalism, but also eastern Soviet communism, or socialism. The first sample considers that all conservative or Islamic political structures, including the Milli Görüş political parties, are organized by western imperialists in order to prevent the emergence of labour movements, or at least to balance leftist revivalism with conservatism. The latter one regards all leftist movements as the *foci* of degeneration ruining Islamic values, beliefs, and tradition, within the society.

These sharp ideological borders determine how these two political streams perceive the Kurdish question in Turkey, too. As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the PKK believes that Kurds and Kurdistan have been exploited by imperial powers and their regional agents. These agents include Turkey and other Kurdish populated countries (basically, Iran, Iraq, and Syria), so it is hardly likely that any of these countries would have sympathy for any political party or groups stressing the position of these states as regional agents of imperial powers. On the other hand, as the Refah Party believes, foreign powers do not want a religious and developed Turkey. This is why they are always promoting Kurdish separatism as a way of keeping Turkey preoccupied, so that it would not find its way to development and return to its core ideas in terms of religion. In common with each other, both sides indeed acknowledge the existence of the problem, but where they see the root of the question, the solutions they offer are totally different. Regarding the solution, the PKK thought that separation, as an independent Kurdish state¹²⁸ from

¹²⁸ In the PKK's documents, a final target of establishing an independent and united state is still articulated, but in 1992, Abdullah Öcalan himself states the possibility of a federation in Turkey when he was interviewed by Mehmed Ali Birand.

Turkey, is the only solution, while the Refah Party considers correcting the mistakes of previous governments, which only they are able to do, as a solution. More than a thousand years of brotherhood,¹²⁹ based on Islamic ties, is still active in the hearts of Turkish and Kurdish Muslims. This provides a suitable ground upon which solidarity can be rebuilt between them. In opposition to this argument, the PKK's perception of religion (Islam) as an instrument of applied imperialism in the region is from the ground up rejected.

Moreover, these two political streams believe that once they have achieved their final targets—revolution from the PKK perspective (internationalism), and an Islamic state from the pro-Islamic perspective (ümmetçilik)—the Kurdish question will naturally be solved. The final classless global society and Islamic unity among all ethnically different nations, respectively would give all the rights Kurdish people naturally needs to have, and as much as other ethnic nationalities possess. In this regard, it can be said that their global perspective and eventual target has already been established by the Kurds. Nevertheless, the Kurdish leftist-oriented nationalist movement separated itself from the general Turkish left, since whenever the Kurds touched upon their ethnic rights, they received the response that 'it was not time to talk about as it divides our power in achieving a revolution in which Kurds eventually would get all their rights.'

On the other hand, within the pro-Islamic stream whenever Kurds talk about their rights or state oppression over Kurdish people, the way they respond is almost identical to the reply the leftist Kurds receive. In Islamic perspective, they were told, is that once the final target, an Islamic state, is achieved, all Kurds will get their rights, but it was not the time to divide power, but rather, the political stream needed to focus on obtaining an Islamic state. This situation can be regarded in both negative and positive ways. It might be argued that leftist and Islamic ideologies actually served for the continuation of oppression of Kurds, and from a positive point of view, these ideologies made

¹²⁹ The brotherhood has always been articulated in official documents of the pro-Islamic political parties. One of the articulations of that can be seen in the Mr. Tekdal's speech in the general congress of Refah Party. He ended his speech by stating that, 'Go forward for a Turkey in which people are safe with each other and 50 million are brothers and love each other! (Tekdal, 1985, p.41). The discourse of the Islamic brotherhood presented by the Refah party as a solution of the Kurdish question is comprehensively examined by Ahmet Yıldız (2003, p.188).

the Kurdish people realize their ethnic identity as being different from Turkish, which raised their ethnic awareness.

Taking the political atmosphere of the late 1970s through to the 1980s into consideration, having such strict and firm ideological boundaries from which there was no permission to go through, or a concession to, any other ideologies, might seem understandable. Thus, eventually to argue that this is the main reason behind why these groups, which have been oppressed by official state ideology (Kemalism), never came together and did something to tackle the Kurdish question, or at least to lessen the pressure on the Kurds. In light of the data extracted from the parties' party programs, it seems that in practice, they resemble one another far more than they differ. Yet, their core ideological approaches to the issues, specifically the Kurdish question, keep these political streams poles apart.

When it comes to the legal pro-Kurdish political parties in the early 1990s, such an ideological polarization has seemed to be more flexible compared to the 1980s, but still, the main barrier preventing these two political groups centres around how to deal with the Kurds and the Kurdish question in Turkey. Furthermore, according to the records of the state, the PKK has been a terrorist organization, and despite the fact that several pro-Kurdish legal political parties were banned by the constitutional court with the accusation that they had assisted the PKK and breached the principle of indivisible unity of the country. These parties could not be accused of such an argument until the court's decision. In due course they became totally legal political parties to which the Refah Party could speak. I believe it is the same reasons why the legal pro-Islamic and legal pro-Kurdish parties did not, or could not, unite on the subject of the Kurdish question.

Chapter Six: The Perception between Pro-Kurdish and Pro-Islamic Political Streams, 1991-1998

In the last decade of the 20th century, a pro-Kurdish political party was eventually established and took its place in Turkish political history. As a result of closure of all political parties by the 1980 coup d'état, social democrats sought for an alternative leadership to follow. In this sense, the merging of the Populist Party (Halkçı Party) formed by Necdet Calp, and the Social Democracy Party led by Erdal İnönü, the SHP emerged in Turkish politics together with another social democrat party, the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Partisi), led by Bülent Ecevit. In this political atmosphere, the leftist movement divided into two against the rightist (Dogru Yol Partisi-Right Parth Party, Anavatan Partisi-Motherlan Party) and pro-Islamic parties (Refah Partisi). In the words of Eyüp Demir, 'The SHP is the address of left, who were inconvenient to the system. Within this extensive base, there were various people ranging from Kemalists to social democrats and from socialists to Kurds' (Demir, 2005, p.55).

Kurds adhering to social democrat ideas within the SHP's cadres became much more visible by the end of the 1980s. The first of this was Ibrahim Aksoy's exclusion from politics for two years for his speech in the European Community Joint Parliament in 1989, in which he was accused of being a separatist (Demir, 2005, pp.61-64). The core message of his speech was that Kurds are a different nation. Once such a tense atmosphere within the SHP around the issue of the Kurdish question, the last event inducing separation of legal Kurdish figures from a social democratic political structure, was the Paris Kurdish Conference organized by the Paris Kurdish Institute in 14-15 October 1989, which was aiming at, as Kendal Nezan, president of the Institute expressed, making the Kurdish issue an international one (Balli, 1991, p.592). Seven Members of Parliament¹³⁰ who attended the conference were all dismissed from the party. As a backlash to this decision taken by the Central Discipline Assembly of the SHP, 12 provincial and various district organizations resigned from their positions, and also six more MPs resigned:

¹³⁰ Those MPs were Ahmet Türk, Mahmut Alınak, Adnan Ekmen, Mehmet Ali Eren, Salih Sümer, Ismail Hakkı Önal, Kenan Sönmez and Ibrahim Aksoy.

Abdullah Baştürk (Istanbul), Mehmet Kahraman (Diyarbakır), İlhami Binici (Bingöl), Fehmi Işıklar (Bursa), Cüneyt Canver (Adana) and Arif Sag (Ankara).

Those MPs who resigned sought a real social democrat political structure, dissimilar to that of the SHP, which they thought was not pursuing an actual socialist democracy, specifically through ignoring the reality of the Kurdish issue, and cooperating with the official state ideology denying the ethnic origin of Kurdish people. This political condition directed them to bring a new party into existence in the Turkish politics, which did not neglect the Kurdish issues, a party with the motto of being social democrat, or a socialist democracy, ideologically. However, this new political desire was not considered, as being Kurdish-dominated enough, but rather, was primarily that of socialist solidarity. That is why under the name of a 'new democratic formation' (yeni demokratik oluşum), a congress was held in Ankara in March 1990. Despite the fact that the congress was enthusiastic, due to several disagreements and the prevalence of Kurds in the congress, this¹³¹ new socialist block including, Turks and Kurds, entered onto a path of being an ideologically socialist pro-Kurdish political party¹³² (Demir, 2005, pp.82-84). Eventually, pro-leftist but considering the Kurdish question as their priority, the Halkın Emek Partisi (HEP)¹³³ was founded on 7 June 1990 and presided over by Ahmet Fehmi Işıklar.

Following the first party meeting, at the press conference Işıklar defined the HEP as 'the only party in the left' by considering the rest of the political parties as parties of [an embedded] political system (düzen partisi).¹³⁴ The concept of the ideologically leftist-orientation and how the world and Turkey has been

¹³¹ Establishments and closures of pro-Kurdish political parties by the constitutional court is a massive research area. That is why this research is not going to delve into this area but will focus on the perception between pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political parties in Turkey. For details on this massive area of study, please look at Eyüp Demir's book (2005), *Yasal Kürtler*, Güney & Baskan, 2008, pp.272-276.

¹³² It might be irrelevant to the scope of the thesis, but I could not pass up mentioning this. General leftist streams tended to take up arms against the imperialist state in the 1970s and were divided into Turkish and Kurdish lefts. The failure of a new democratic formation and the congress could be regarded as another missed opportunity for uniting leftist streams, but at this time, it was thought that democratic ways could tackle the Kurdish question.

¹³³ The priority of the Kurdish question appears in almost every political party of the mainstream. For instance, the DEP party program states that 'Türkiye'de demokrasinin ve Barış ortamının gerçekleşmesi, Kürt Sorunun adil bir biçimde çözümü ile mümkündür. (To have democracy and peace in Turkey is only possible with solving the Kurdish question justly.) (DEP, 1993, p.3). In addition, ÖZDEP's program argues that 'ÖZDEP approves the solution of Kurdish question as basis of democracy.' (Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi Kürt Sorunun çözüme kavuşturulmasını demokrasinin temeli kabul eder.) (ÖZDEP, 1992, p.23).

¹³⁴ This way of seeing all other political parties continued until the mid-1990s as the HADEP's declaration of the 1995 general election contends, the same definition for the other political parties, including the pro-Islamic Refah Party (HADEP, 1995).

approached, can be seen in every single political party within the pro-Kurdish political stream (HEP, 1990, p.5; ÖZDEP, 1992, pp.5-12; DEP, 1993; DEHAP, 1997, p.3; HADEP, 1994 and 2001). Nevertheless the HEP¹³⁵ claimed that it was a Turkey party; yet Kurds in Turkey regarded it as their party¹³⁶ (Demir, 2005, p.99) so that the rest of the political parties considered it to be a Kurds' Party. In addition, despite the fact that there were explicit organizational differences between the PKK and pro-Kurdish political parties, and some high-ranking members of these parties ideologically supported the PKK, it is claimed that there is an organic relationship between the PKK and their legal political parties apart from the electoral base (Watts, 2006, p.127). That is why an evaluation of the HEP as a pro-Kurdish political party perfectly fits. The Refah Party is included in this category along with the rest of the political parties. In specific terms, the Refah party has a special position among the rest of the political parties in Turkey, as it does not perfectly fit with the definition of imperialist, fascist, or ultra-nationalist. The only possible way of defining the Refah Party from a pro-Kurdish perspective is 'reactionist'¹³⁷ (gerici), which has been the one definition the official state ideology has used for all rival Islamic movements.

From the pro-Islamic perspective, terrorism and its political extension is something unacceptable within Islamic rules. Although it is thought that as long as a political party does not involve itself with terrorism and separatism, legal pro-Kurdish political parties always approached this with reservations, since the official ideology (the state) had sought to make these parties a political branch of the PKK. Despite the fact that from the beginning with the

¹³⁵ To find out more about how the PKK received the establishment of such a pro-Kurdish political party, please look at an interview conducted by Yalcin Küçük with Abdullah Öcalan (Küçük & Öcalan, 1993; Demir, 2005, p.101).

¹³⁶ Regarding the question of whether the HEP was a Kurdish or leftist party, given that Hamit Bozarslan has tremendous support in the Kurdish movement in Turkey then his statements can be taken as a reference. He states that 'The HEP is above all a Kurdish party, plus a leftwing party. I think that says a lot. What is this *'plus'*? It means the party is saying 'we are in the front of any kind of social fight, the trade unions fights, the fights for women's rights... we are the most democratic party of Turkey' but at the heart there is this Kurdish thickness. That is also the case for DEP. It will be the case for all the parties. What makes the HEP a popular party is that before everything else it is a Kurdish party' (Bozarslan, 2012). On the other hand, Murat Somer's article analyzing the discursive transformation of media on the Kurds from 1984 to 1998 is quite explanatory about the how the Kurds and Kurdish related political parties were considered by the mainstream media (Somer, 2005).

¹³⁷ To give an example, the ÖZDEP's program states that 'the ÖZDEP is party advocating labourers' government and interests against imperialism, colonialism, fascism, and other sorts of reactionism (ÖZDEP, 1992, p.12). The reactionism sometimes is defined in different ways but it is obvious that it is changeable within context. For instance, in the HADEP's declaration for the 1995 general election, the pro-Islamist party was defined as 'conservative' (muhafazakar) while other rightist political parties evaluated as militarist (HADEP, 1995).

HEP to the BDP (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi-Peace and Democracy Party), the current representative of the pro-Kurdish political party stream argues that they are not a political branch of the PKK, but just that they have support from the same political base, sympathizers of the PKK, and from the electorates of this political stream (Demirtaş, 2012). This argument does not seem to have worked; almost all of the mainstream political parties more or less regard the pro-Kurdish political streams as having an organic relationship with the PKK (Ergil, 2000, pp.129-130).

In addition, the perception of leftism with reference to the Refah Party has hardly changed. It is an undeniable fact that the HEP's party program is full of leftist discourse (HEP, 1990) and includes definitions such as evaluating the society based on class and exploitation of the proletariats in Turkey. To solidify this argument, a speech of Mr. Erbakan can be taken as evidence. In this he states,

'humanity looks for a new order. Communism, Capitalism and National Outlook (Milli Görüş)... the decay of communism was obvious. Because both interests ([Islamically] unrightful income) and profits (rightful income) have been abandoned. It was understatement. ... On the other hand, capitalism legitimates both unrightfully income, which is interest and rightful income [islamically] profit. It is very excessive and does the rich richer and the poor poorer.'

Based on this argument, apart from the Milli Görüş, all of the political parties in Turkey are considered to have a copycat mentality either from capitalism or socialism. As it is explicitly explained, the Refah Party is against capitalism and communism (Refah Partisi, 1991, p.2). In this regard, the Refah Party has a common ideological ground as being anti-capitalist, but opposite ideas about communism or socialism, and leftism in general. Given that the HEP and the parties who operated within the last decade of the 20th century were all in favor of a leftist ideology, then it is more understandable that there would be an ideological conflict. In other words, the way they have seen the world, Turkey, and people, is significantly different from each other, even though they have practically identical demands with regard to certain issues.

By the 1990s, the Refah Party gradually increased its political support and so gained districts and provincial mayoralities across Turkey, including the Kurdish-dominated areas of eastern and southeastern Turkey. In the 1991 general elections, neither the Refah nor the HEP was supported enough to

transcend the 10 per cent threshold. Thus, they preferred to get involved in coalitions in the election. Actually, this election was a cornerstone which shaped the perception between these two political streams from the 1990s to the present. From the HEP's side, it was as though that there was no way of forming a coalition with the ANAP and the DYP, so only the SHP and the RP appeared as a possibility (Demir, 2005, p.129). Due to the possibility of such a coalition, Mr. Ahmet Türk visited the headquarters of the Refah Party in Ankara, but the negotiation did not end with a positive result. In his words:

[with] the Kurdish question, we can not say that the Refah Party operates quite a clear policy by confirming Kurdish rights. ... Yet, in realizing Kurds' [electoral] power, it was an approach based on getting somewhere with this power. For instance, once there was no 10 per cent threshold, they never entered into a dialogue with Kurds. Nevertheless, when they saw they could not pass the threshold, that is to say, with the Kurds' support to do so, when we looked at it, there is no just partnership but a mentality to pass the threshold with a couple of Kurds. Even, further to that, on the one hand, they were doing these negotiations with Kurds, on the other hand, they were thinking of entering the election together with Türkeş's Party. We kept these meetings and even we told them about it, they said yes, when they said we were talking with them as well, we replied that there is no way to come together with Türkeş's party [a political party which is integrated into the politics of Turkey]. Your attitude is not honest; you just want to be a group [within the general assembly] (Türk, 2013).

Eventually, the Refah Party established a coalition with the Turkish nationalist MCP and IDP, and the HEP formed its coalition with the SHP. Taking the ideological bases of the coalitions into account, to what extent ideological similarities are influential even with approaches to the Kurdish question would be understood. The MCP and IDP might have nationalist character as a primary identity, but still they were partly conservative, and on the other hand, the SHP also might have a nationalist character in line with the official state ideology, but its social democrat feature prevailed. Under these conditions, it looked very natural to have such a political coalition based on ideological resemblance: leftist and conservative, respectively.

One of the striking points driven from such a meeting is that this was the first time representatives of each political stream visited each other. The reason for this was the national election, which has vital importance. Despite the fact that the coalition initiative failed, electoral politics created a suitable political atmosphere in which each group met, and at least discussed a possibility of a coalition. In this sense, the flexibility of an official state ideology in terms of

dominance should be paid attention to. Once it is done, it is quite crucial that civilian politics might be able to create its own political solution to its core problems, that is to say, denial of the Kurdish question and repression of Islamic elements. The more electoral politics prevail without the influence of any armed conflict, whether coming from the PKK or the state of Turkey, the more possibility of representatives from these two political streams would prefer negotiations rather than any sorts of armed struggle. Eventually, since the 1990s, general and local elections gradually forced each groups to think about their counter-politics in terms of electoral politics. This point might notably have solidified in the first decade of the 21st century, yet it is meaningful to mention here that it actually started by the 1990s. In addition, it is the first time representatives of pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic legal political streams participated into an election.

The way in which the Refah Party considers the Kurdish question is mostly hidden within the Islamic discourse of brotherhood. This hiddenness has been articulated with the discourse of '60 Milyon Kardeşiz' (We are 60 Millions Brothers),¹³⁸ 'Devlet Millet Kaynaşması' (State-Nation Amalgamation), 'Barış, Hoşgörü ve Kardeşlik' (Peace, Tolerance, and Brotherhood), 'Baskı ve Zulüm Değil, Hizmet' (Not Repression and Cruelty, the Service) and Herkese Refah 'Welfare for Everyone' (Erbakan, 1991, p.18). The core idea of this understanding can be traced back to the inception of the Republic. It is thought that strict secular policies of the Republic broke the Islamic ties between Turks and other ethnicities including the Kurds, Arabs, and Circassians, etc., and when it was reinforced with ethnic Turkish nationalism, the ethnic question has emerged. Along the same line, relying on Houston's ideas (2003), Bahcheli and Noles argue that 'Islamist discourse views Kurds essentially as fellow victims of the secular Kemalist republic and acknowledges them as a people with a language and identity of their own.' Furthermore, the idea of the Muslim brotherhood and eventually transforming the state towards an Islamic-oriented state structure was the dominant and prevailing aim. It was thought that any other problems, especially the Kurdish question, might divert their energy to the secondary important issues, so that their eventual aim might be harmed.

¹³⁸ This slogan has always accorded with the total population of Turkey so the figure can change for time periods.

That is why pro-Islamic stream 'calls for subordination of such an identity [ethnic Kurdish] to an Islamic one' (Houston, 2003, p.157).

On the other hand, contrary to the Refah Party, from the first pro-Kurdish political party, the HEP to current one, the BDP, these parties have all expressed that the capitalist system is causing all problems in the world, and specifically, that the Kurdish problem is the core of all issues in Turkey, associating with politics, society, culture, economy and so on. They also consider these problems from the leftist perspective based on reading societies in Turkey, as classes. Together with mentioning that people are under political, religious and ethnical pressure (HEP, 1990, p.5), it is claimed that the capitalist mentality of Turkey preserves the aghas and Seyhs, which are, to them, the main obstacle barring industrialization and development of people. In terms of the Kurdish question, HEP's party program states:

In the east and southeast, repression and assimilation policies are being applied. The state of emergency has become a proctored administrative regime; people neither have security of their lives nor of property. The news of destroyed villages, people forced to migrate, illegal arrests, torture and killings has become usual. The region has been ruled through unlawful enactments. The way of going to court is closed and these enactments are free from judicial control. The precautions claimed to be brought forward for the southeast affects all of Turkey. From now on, it is not possible to talk about the state of law, nor human rights and liberties (p.9).

This kind of discourse continues by suggesting that, 'through cultural and education institutions, labourer's demands and observations are diverted by channelling them into chauvinistic nationalism and religious ideologies' (HEP, 1990, p.9). In this sense, it is perceived that religious and ultra-Turkish nationalist structures are fundamental barriers preventing people who are labourers, to see their rights and to fight to obtain them. Based on that, Turkish nationalism by assimilation of the Kurdish people through convincing them that they are actually Turkish, and a religious discourse that emphasizes religious brotherhood instead of ethnic awareness, or separation, are totally rejected since these ideas are still more or less alive and find support amongst the Kurdish people. In this respect, the HEP seems to be totally correct because by the 1990s, embedded political parties including leftist, rightists and Islamists (RP), obtained a considerable amount of votes in general and local elections. That is why, in the HEP's party program, it is argued that 'whether

they are leftist or rightist, all political parties and cadres in Turkey continue the path of *İttihat ve Terakki's*¹³⁹ tradition and mentality' (HEP, 1990, p.10).

In the same vein, the Refah Party accused all political parties of intentionally, or unintentionally, copying western ideals. Whether they define themselves as leftist or social democrat, or liberal or capitalist, or rightist, or nationalist or conservative, no matter what they say, the result is that they are parties copying the west (Refah Partisi, 1991, p.7). It is crucially argued that these parties [apart from the RP] cannot solve even a tiny problem of Turkey, and actually cause only problems rather than solution, e.g. inflation, unemployment, the headscarf, and the Southeast (Refah Partisi, 1991, p.27). What is meant by stating 'Southeast' in the list of problems, is obviously the Kurdish question. It is importantly, the first time a concept implying the Kurdish question has been used among party documents without linking it with terrorism. The declaration gives profoundly significant clues pertaining to the Kurdish question in Turkey. Conceptually, it is argued that because of the application of wrong policies, terrorist activities accelerated. With the claim of preventing these activities, repression, unjustness, and excessive state terrorism against innocent people, are wrong policies, and are copycat of the ANAP government.¹⁴⁰ After an explanation of such an understanding, the paragraph ends by stating that there is no southeast issue in Turkey, but rather, it is a question of regime. This denotes that a political regime is the origin of the problem. Eventually, in case the party is elected and gets power, then the establishment of a new civilization would emerge (Refah Partisi, 1991, p.79) in which spiritual values would be made a higher priority and then naturally religious ties between Turkish and Kurdish people would cement relationships, and not ethnic identities (Yildiz, 2003, p.189).

Practical Examination

General perceptions between the pro-Kurdish (HEP, DEP, ÖZDEP, HADEP and DEHAP) and the pro-Islamic political stream (Refah Party) are as above. For better understanding and examination in detail, a practical evaluation

¹³⁹ İttihat ve Terakki refers to the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). For more, please look at historical background in the introduction of the thesis.

¹⁴⁰ As it is quite important how the Refah Party perceived the Kurdish question, it is better to have an original context in Turkish. 'Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu'da, uygulanan yanlış politikalarından dolayı terör eylemleri tırmanmaktadır. Bu eylemleri önlemek iddiasıyla, aşırılığa kaçarak, yapılan baskı ve haksızlıkları, masum halka uygulanan devlet terörünü de, taklitçilerin ve ANAP'ın hatalı politikaları olarak görmekteyiz. Güney Doğu Meselesi Yoktur, Rejim Meselesi Vardır (Refah Partisi, 1991, p.31).

noting what these political parties promise to its electorates seems required. This is done through looking at party programs and declarations published, and made, just before elections. By doing so, it is possible to trace changes in party promises according to time periods. As mentioned above, these two political streams emerged as a rival to applications of the single party policies developed by the inception of the Republic of Turkey. In many terms, they are against the applications seeking to preserve the prevalence of the official state ideology (Kemalism). Thus, it is going to be surprising at the tremendous number of common promises these political parties make in order to get people's votes.

First of all, both streams are against human rights violations (HEP, 1990, p.14; ÖZDEP, 1992, p.14; Refah Partisi, 1991, p.32). Primarily violations emphasize the denial of Kurdish ethnicity on the pro-Kurdish side, and repression on implementation of Islamic codes in public spheres (e.g. the headscarf) on the pro-Islamic side. In essence, they have the same concerns in terms of the official state ideology's legal restrictions. Yet, the pro-Kurdish one considers more democratization as a way of solving the Kurdish question (HEP, 1990, p.12), whereas the pro-Islamic one thinks that 'Just Order' (Adil Düzen) is the only way to correct wrong policies (Refah Partisi, 1991, p.32). One of the slogans, at the end of the human rights section of the Refah Party's declaration in the 1991 general election, is quite meaningful because of implying the right to speak in one's mother tongue, especially Kurdish. It is stated that, 'İstedğin Gibi İnan, Örgütlen, Konuş' (Believe, Associate, Speak Whatever You Want) (Refah Partisi, 1991, p.35). In addition, they were also against:

1. The new anti-terrorist law on the grounds that it still limits basic human rights and narrows liberties;
2. The law of political parties on the grounds that it restricts ethnic and religious propaganda during elections;
3. The law of association on the grounds that it restrains Kurdish and religious people from forming associations in line with their concerns;
4. The law of election because of the 10% election thresholds;
5. The law of the TRT due to biased broadcasting, and
6. The law against demonstration.

Even though they have almost an identical discourse in terms of meaning and aim, while the initial one almost justifies taking arms against human rights

violations, implicitly referring to the PKK (HEP, 1990, p.15), the Refah Party sees a solution in taking the state power away from the wrong hands and giving it to its actual owners—in general Muslims, and in specific terms, the Milli Görüş.

Willing to join into the European Community (EC) differs in the context of pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political streams. The HEP presents the EC with reference to solving the Kurdish question within democratic methods, but the Refah Party still rejects joining the EC on the grounds that this sort of western organization is actually intending to obstruct development of Turkey by degenerating the sovereignty of the state. This approach to the EC and later the European Union (EU) would be effective with regard to the perception of pro-Islamic political streams until the Refah Party government was taken out of power via a soft coup (Fazilet Partisi, 1999, p.45).¹⁴¹ This is also another indication of ideological differences; the HEP and other pro-Kurdish political parties are based on a nation-state structure, which dominated the entire world for the last two centuries. This mentality is indeed relying on western modernism theories originating from a positivist secular ideology. Regarding this issue, the leftist-centred approach of the pro-Kurdish political stream, which is against the western capitalist system, was given secondary significance as nationalist ideals overweighed it. Despite this ideological contradiction, the legal pro-Kurdish political stream has always sided with European values in terms of ethnic minority rights.

Ideological reactions of the Refah Party against the western powers' malicious intention to always keep Turkey busy with internal instability, so that Turkey could never rise its head and look around, constitutes another approach to the

¹⁴¹ This subject is actually another issue requiring separate research. Until the Refah Party was taken over from the government, the pro-Islamic political streams had always been against western organizations. As a result of this coup d'état, successor parties of the streams changed their minds towards the EU as it was thought that the only way of eliminating dominance of an official state ideology was to support the EU since this process might remove military influence on civilian politics. Since the beginning of the Republic of Turkey, the military has taken the responsibility of protection of an official state ideology (Kemalism) against external and internal (Kurdish separatism and Islamism) threats. Recently, the law letting military officers to be judged in the civil courts for their possible crimes related to civilians and civil politics opened the way to arresting the military general attempting to take over the civil governments (Kaya, 2012; Kuru, 2012). The most prominent one is the Ergenekon case, which has just finalized and in which a considerable number of military officers were sentenced for long time prison. Because of that, Ümit Cizre argues that the AKP's initiatives to solve the Kurdish question through democratic means started after the Ergenekon case, which paved the way for the emergence of the government's solid Kurdish policy (Cizre, 2009 and Cizre & Walker, 2010). For a short perspective of the influence of the relations between Ergenekon case (Turkey's Deep State) and democratization process, please see, Park, B. (2008). Turkey's Deep State: Ergenekon and the Threat to Democratization in the Republic. *Rusi*, 153(5), pp.54-59.

Kurdish question. It is believed that PKK terrorism is being operated under the control of western powers. Because of that, the Refah Party defines the PKK as an externally supported terrorist organization seeking to divide Turkey in two. The most solid expression of such an understanding shows itself within the fifty-fourth government's¹⁴² program in which Mr. Erbakan outlined the program in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM). He states that, 'externally supported separatist terror is still continuing to menace our internal security. According to the rules written in the constitution and most pertinaciously, by preserving unitary-national state structure; it would be determinately fought against terror both inside and outside.'¹⁴³ (Erbakan Hükümeti Programı, 1996) After highlighting this kind of determinacy, he also emphasized that the concepts of 'unity, solidarity, and brotherhood' be consolidated.

Secondly, each party's perception for desired social order seems to be quite close in terms of content, despite the fact that these demands are driven from different ideological backgrounds. In spite of that they have a distinctive state understanding regarding social order; the HEP highlights the concept of social state governed by rule of law (HEP, 1990, pp.12-23) while the Refah party emphasizes 'Adil Sosyal Düzen' (Just Social Order) (Refah Partisi, 1991, pp.73-79). Within these chapters of the documents, peace, equality, freedom, justice and etc. occupy a considerable amount of space and are given primary significance. The contexts are more or less the same. Even if the leftist discourse and literature was switched, it might have been impossible to separate which one was pro-Kurdish or pro-Islamic. In addition, the Refah Party promise that the 'Milli Görüş' has the power to make 60 million people brothers thanks to the promised just social order which originates from religious ideals.

Associated with social order, a specific example might be very helpful to understand the closeness of the two parties' promises. The Refah party, following that the official language of the state is Turkish, advocates that local assemblies would be able to choose another language to learn alongside with

¹⁴² The 54th government of Turkey was formed with the coalition of the Refah Party and the Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP-True Path Party) in 1996.

¹⁴³ In the original language, 'Dış kaynaklı bölücü terör, iç güvenliğimizi tehdiye devam etmektedir. Anayasamızda yer alan esaslar ve bilhassa üniter-millî devlet yapısı muhafaza edilerek terörle; içte ve dışta kararlılıkla mücadele edilecektir.'

Turkish (Refah Partisi, 1991, p.91). It is not overtly expressed, but for one who is familiar with the politics in Turkey, it is not difficult at first glance to understand that the implied language is Kurdish. This is despite the fact that education in the Kurdish language is something the Refah Party has always been against, yet in local terms, it is acceptable. This promise, however, is quite significant, once the political conditions of the early 1990s are taken into account.

From the economic perspective, thirdly, they both have an anti-imperialist approach which disapproves of capitalism. In the HEP's party program, it is argued that 'international monopolies and their local collaborative monopolies prevail economy in Turkey. Unemployment, high inflation, forcing consumers to buy expensive and poor quality goods, and not providing economic development, are all results of a hegemony of monopolies in the economy' (HEP, 1990, p.61). On the other hand, the Refah party's declaration of the 1991 general election argues that the 'ANAP government's and similar parties' economic policies can be defined with these words: rise in unemployment, inflation, waste, injustice, and cruelty' (Refah Partisi, 1991, p.37). As these two political streams have their own leftist and religious discourse, they might use different words, but what they mean is approximately the same. The most remarkable resemblance between these two political streams in terms of the economy is that they have almost the same subtitles under the main title, 'Economy'. Strikingly, they give quite much significance to the eastern parts of Turkey, with different names but which carry the same meaning. To solidify it, the economic problems of Kurdish populated areas is expressed with the subtitle of 'Bölgeler Arası Dengesizlik' (imbalances among the regions) in the HEP's party program (HEP, 1990, p.64), and on the other hand with the subtitle of 'Geri Kalmış Bölgeler' (underdeveloped regions) (Refah Partisi, 1991, p.48). Within the concept of these titles, they both accuse the state for the economic underdevelopment of the Kurdish populated areas, and promise development once they get power.

Next, but at the same time, as one of the most important issues, administrative decentralization is another common point between these two political streams despite the fact that they have a slight difference in the authorities which would be transferred from the centre to the local administration. As is the case in the

HEP's party program, all local or regional administrative positions would come to power through election so that people's actual free will would come into existence. To achieve that, related legal regulations would be all changed in favour of local demands. For instance, it is stated that, 'provincial and districts governors, as with mayors, would come to power through election, from among those who have attained a certain level of education. Village and small city headmen (muhtar) and the assembly would be elected by local people' (HEP, 1990, p.24; DEP, 1993, p.5; ÖZDEP, 1992, p.24; DEHAP, 1997, p.17). In the same vein, the DEP program emphasizes the abolition of anti-democratic institutions and regulations in which appointed governors have much more power than elected ones (DEP, 1993, p.4). On the other hand, the Refah Party approves the election of provincial governors, but the rest of the sub-administrative positions would be appointed by those elected governors. Instead of filling low-level administrative positions via elections, the Refah Party suggests giving them special training associated with how the best governing could be done. Of course, the qualifications which those provincial or low level governors should have is also emphasized by stating that, 'the high ranking administrators would be raised and sensitively elected, with a high level of morality, bound to our national and spiritual values, and wishing to serve the people' (Refah Partisi, 1991, p.93). By the same token, when the Refah party got into power in 1996, Mr. Erbakan gave a decentralization policy in his government's program in which promises were made mainly for a new administration law handing over certain responsibilities of the centre to local authorities (Erbakan Hükümeti Programı, 1996). The initial decentralization model is based on current western style administration, while the latter seems to be derived from a traditional Ottoman administrative model shaped during a time of harsh administrative reform throughout 19th century. This common point is crucially significant as it indeed aims to solve the Kurdish question by applying democratic ways rather than through an armed struggle between the Turkish military and the PKK.¹⁴⁴

Finally, several more common points can be added to this list. Before moving on to list them, it is important to note that in each of them an ideological

¹⁴⁴ This issue is going to be major way of solving Kurdish question in the name of a peace process as a part of the democratization process of Turkey. Examination of this issue will come in the next section in detail, while the perception between pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political streams covering the DEHAP, the DTP, the BDP and the AKP, respectively.

background has always been expressed via their discourse, or their approaches, to religion, leftism, separatism, and vice versa. The pro-Kurdish political stream wants to remove Yüksek Öğretim Kurumu (YÖK- Higher Education Organization) as it sees this institution as a partially military tutelage over that of educational (HEP, 1990, p.59), whereas the Refah party is willing to reform it instead of totally removal (Refah Partisi, 1991, p.106). Furthermore, they promise judicial reforms with which Turkish nationalist and secular characteristics create fundamental barriers in their struggle against the official state ideology. This complication I think requires a bit more explanation. The left-oriented Kurdish political stream is in essence advocating secularism, but against Turkish nationalism, yet, the pro-Islamic legal political stream is against secularism while not totally supporting, but at least partly approving Turkish nationalism for the sake of preserving a state structure, which is almost entirely made up by Turks. That is why, for their own interests they are in legal terms fighting against an official state structure. However, it does not mean that they are not rivals, in contrary; they are actually fighting each other behind the scenes. Another common point might be the implication of the state of emergency in the Kurdish populated areas, which are the east and south eastern parts of Turkey (HEP, 1990, p.25; Refah Partisi, 1991, p.31).

This amount of resemblances in terms of election promises enforces us to think about why these political streams did not have a chance to work together against the official state ideology from which they both suffer. As a response to such a question, their perceptions of state and religion, colored by ideological distinctiveness, prevents them at least fighting for the elimination of an official state structure or ideology within a legitimate legislative framework. To make this clearer, this example will be touched upon. Even though they both arguably believe in the concept of state terrorism in the eastern part of Turkey, the initial one uses this as a justification of their struggle. The latter employs this as proof that the state apparatus is in the wrong hands and that is why the state follows the wrong policies regarding the Kurdish issue. Within this context, the Refah Party's declaration in the 1995 general election states that, 'The state's presence is for serving people. Not for tyranny, not for oppression' (Refah Party, 1995, p.19). The results might be same in how this issue might be solved; yet, the reasons at the centre of the problem differ according to

their ideological approach. This example can be applied to all common points, but ideological differences, in other words, core ideals shaping their perceptions, would remain far from each other. This apparent distance continues to remain important even in current politics in Turkey.

Eventually, the pro-Kurdish legal political stream sees the solution of the Kurdish question in terms of ethnic equal rights and voluntary togetherness (ÖZDEP, 1992, p.23) within a democratic regime¹⁴⁵ (HADEP, 1994). These words on paper seem quite acceptable. Yet, given that a strictly embedded official state ideology was still prevailing, and the PKK's terrorist activities aimed at a revolutionary people's war (Devrimci Halk Savaşı) was going on, these peaceful words require more theoretical and practical explanations. Pro-Kurdish legal parties affiliate almost all of the problems in Turkey with the Kurdish question (DEHAP, 1997, p.7). Ethnic-centred equal citizenship rights within a leftist-designed state and social structure might be summarized as the envisaged solution for the Kurdish question. On the other hand, the Refah Party sees the core problem as causing all other problems in Turkey in a strictly secular and ultra-nationalist understating of such policy implementations. The pro-Islamic legal political stream then considers a more religiously oriented society as the solution. It is because of this that ethnicities are not a primary identity in such a state and social structure as much as an Islamic brotherhood¹⁴⁶ which would help to overcome the Kurdish question, together with removing oppression and denial of ethnic identity, which is against Islamic codes. Moreover, Islam does not negate or deny any ethnic identity but promotes them as a facilitator for interaction among races.¹⁴⁷ Adding this very different and counterargument in solving the Kurdish question to the dominance of an official state ideology which is based on Turkish

¹⁴⁵ Although pro-Kurdish political parties have always preferred to solve the Kurdish question within the borders of a democratic regime, their perception in the eyes of other political parties, and almost none of the Kurds, has mostly been that a Kurdish party is an extension of the PKK's political branch. This reality was articulated by the president of the HADEP, Murat Bozlak in an interview with Derya Sazak, a journalist from the Milliyet daily newspaper. He states that, 'It was claimed that HADEP has been the political arm of the PKK. It is not true... HADEP is not a separatist party. Neither is it an ordinary nationalist party. Ours is a leftist mass party. We have never perceived ourselves as a Kurdish Party' (Bozlak, 2001, Translation is quoted from Güney & Baskan, 2008, p.274).

¹⁴⁶ The Islamic brotherhood has given much more importance to blood ties among brothers. This rule comes from a verse in the Qur'an, which says, 'The believers are but brothers, so make settlement between your brothers. And fear Allah that you may receive mercy.' 49/10, <http://quran.com/49>

¹⁴⁷ This Islamic code also comes from a verse in the Qur'an, which says, 'O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you. Indeed, Allah is Knowing and Acquainted.' 49/13, <http://quran.com/49>

nationalism and secularism over the politics in Turkey, is actually an ideological battle in which it is almost impossible to determine who is fighting whome.

Chapter Seven: Transition Period for Both Streams, 1998-2002

In the last decade of the 20th century, along with several pro-Kurdish political parties and pro-Islamic political parties, the Refah Party were closed by the constitutional court on the grounds of being foci points of separatism and being core points of activities against laicism, respectively. Military tutelage was the triggering point for the closure of the Refah Party due to the 28 February decisions taken by National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK), which were all about fundamental Islamic and reactionist activities. In addition, reactionist activities (irticai faaliyetler) were placed side by side with the separatist terror (PKK) as primary internal menaces against unitary and secular state structure in the national security document (milli güvenlik belgesi) (Bilgin, 2005, p.192). As a result, the Refah Party was closed down in January 1998 and superseded by the Fazilet Party (Virtue Party), which was already established in December 1997, as a spare political party in case the Refah Party would be closed. This political manoeuvre did not work as the Fazilet Party was also closed down in 2001 as being an extension of the Refah Party. The embedded idea of secularism during the process would be considered influential against the AKP governments not by the military itself, but by secular oppositional parties (Çınar, 2010). Since the positivist ideological understanding of the pro-Kurdish political stream sided with secular opposition, rather than with democratic values which has to be applied to pro-Islamic political stream as much as to pro-Kurdish ones asks for, the ideological centres of the pro-Kurdish political stream has resurfaced until military tutelage was weakened. For instance, a prominent figure of the pro-Kurdish political stream, Mr. Ahmet Türk's statement that, 'we are at the same side in terms of laicism' and approving the concept of 'common enemy'¹⁴⁸ (Kürt Sorunu, 2009) in the time of military critiquing the AKP's Islamist tendency, is quite indicative.

The reason why this period is analyzed separately is that within such a short political history of Turkey, pro-Islamic political parties have changed their ideas as methods to be used to get the power. Because of this, Ahmet Yıldız does not place the Virtue (Fazilet) party among the parties with a national outlook (Milli Görüş) (Yıldız, 2003). To make it clearer, instead of being totally against

¹⁴⁸ http://www.haksozhaber.net/okul/article_print.php?id=5831

western organizations (EU, NATO, IMF and so on) and rejecting all practical indications of official state ideology guarded by the military,¹⁴⁹ the idea of being more adaptive and playing the game according to its rules, gained much more support. This is to say that the only way of getting power and to be able to stay there is to go slowly in changing legal regulations on which official state ideology lean.¹⁵⁰ To summarize this transition period from the Refah to the AK Party, as a pro-Islamic political stream, 'In the process, religious preferences have not been abandoned, but have been reframed to engage the political regime on its own terms' (Mecham, 2004, p.340). In addition to internal ones, transforming from an anti-western position to visiting US politicians and Jewish lobbies in America in 1999, by the Virtue Party, and later Erdogan's visit to the USA could be taken as solid indications of such transformation in terms of international politics.¹⁵¹

This political maneuver is actually valid for both sides. Grassroots support of the Refah Party, as well as a pro-Kurdish political party, can also be taken as proof that official state ideology had to be more flexible when presenting their ideas to the masses. That is why the military preferred to have a soft-coup rather than a direct military intervention into civil politics. It is of course undeniable that global developments and the market economy also have an effect on this choice, but still it is impossible to deny mass support to alternative ways being embedded into societies within Turkey.

¹⁴⁹ Experience of the 28 February Process in Turkey, which was a soft-coup led by the military forced the pro-Islamic political party to behave not in the same way with the Refah policies, but in a more progressive manner in terms of western values. This understanding was not for nothing, as then General Chief of Staff of Turkish Military Forces, Mr. Hilmi Özkök implicitly threatened the AKP government in 2003 by stating that, 'The February 28 process was the consequence of certain developments in Turkey. The effect would not be different if the causes continue to exist' (Heper, 2005 and 2011, p.243). This understanding of the military in Turkey was not new but can be said to have consolidated itself after the 1980 coup d'état and prevailed until the end of the first decade of the 21st century. As proof of that, General Kenan Evren, the conductor general of the 12 Spetember 1980 coup d'état argues that, 'We were afraid that if, following the military interventions, a political party leader we would not approve of comes to power everything that we had worked so hard to achieve may be done away with' (Heper & Güney, 1996, p.623).

¹⁵⁰ Sefa Şimşek takes the changes within this transition period into account of new social movement theory. In his essay, it is claimed that contradictory ideologies or ideas have been more conciliatory at societal level, especially in terms of invisible ideological struggle among pro-Kurdish, pro-Islamic and Kemalist understandings (Şimşek, 2004). For instance, societies are quite developed to approve Kurdish ethnicity without separation, Islamist politics without asking for implementing sharia law, traditional Islamic practices (headscarf) without official state ideology's pressure.

¹⁵¹ This change has been analysed by Ahmet Kuru whose article claims that globalization has diversified the Islamist movements in Turkey through theoretically, an international political opportunity structure (Kuru, 2005, pp.271-272). In addition, Hasan Kosebalan's article should also be looked at in terms of understanding the influence of globalization on changes in the core ideas of the political Islamist movement including the AKP in Turkey; Kosebalan, H. (2005). The Impact of Globalization on Islamic Political Identity: The case of Turkey. *World Affairs*, 168 (1), pp.27-37.

These developments affected internal discussions within the pro-Islamic political party. As a result, two divisions have emerged as traditionalists (gelenekçiler) and modernists or reformists (yenilikçiler) (Mecham, 2004, pp.349-350). After the closure of the Fazilet Party, another successor political party, the Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party)¹⁵² was established. Reflection of such a division showed itself in the first general congress of the party to elect a new president of the Party. On the one side, Recai Kutan represented traditionalists who were actually following the former Prime Minister, Mr. Erbakan's directives, behind the scenes and on the other, Abdullah Gül was the presidential candidate of modernists or reformists (Duran, 2010, p.15). This congress was a historical turning point as it was the first time two candidates competed for the presidency of a pro-Islamic political party. Recai Kutan was elected as the new president of the Saadet Party, which made the division deeper, and eventually caused the creation of a new political party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi-AKP), formed along with the presidency of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in August 2001 (Güney and Baskan, 2008, p.270). It would be true to argue that the AKP has a more extensive approach to electorate policy, but the Saadet Party maintained its strict Islamic-oriented discourse and policy. The AKP redefined itself as a 'conservative democrat party' and sought to justify itself by comparison with European conservative democrat parties. Even though such a definition was made to separate itself from the 'Milli Görüş' movement and to address not only religious or conservative people, but everyone else, it means to be a center-right party,¹⁵³ the core ideas and founders of the party have remained intact. I will continue to examine pro-Islamic political streams over the AKP as I think it is a continuation of the Milli Görüş movement, but a more adapted version of it to the world's and Turkey's realities.

¹⁵² Translation of Fazilet might be different in literature as sometimes it is translated into English as 'prosperity'.

¹⁵³ As Ersin Kalaycioglu's researchs on the general election in 2007, which AKP gradually increased its votes, indicates that not only religious appearance of the party but also ethnicities, and economic developments are significant determinants of vote preference in favor of the AKP (Kalaycioglu, 2010). It is quite meaningful to argue that AKP has a religious appearance due to political history of its founders and religious agenda adapted to the global developments but it addresses other identities within the society. Before that, he also emphasized significance of 'Muhafazakarlık' (Conservatism) in electoral preferences in Turkey (Kalaycioglu, 2007). Related with the issue, Birol Yesilada and Peter Noordijk's findings, which based on the world value surveys, show that religiosity has been increasing since 1995 in Turkey (2010, p.24).

From Ziya Önis's point of view (Önis, 2001 and 2006), the AKP's party program is more likely to be a center-right or center-left political party's program and lacks a religious character, unlike its predecessors. As well, it seems to follow pro-western economic and foreign policy. These arguments are more or less true but the AKP's program is still full of Islamic discourse in terms of religious-affiliated words and discourse of a civilization whose core points are coming from Islam (Duran, 2013). The AKP can still be considered as one of the pro-Islamic political streams. Taking the Fazilet and the Saadet Parties' party programs, they have also been more pro-western in terms of promising actual democracy and economic integration of Turkey into a global, open market, economic system (Fazilet Partisi, 1999, p.56; Saadet Partisi, 2001). The AK Party's definition of itself, I think, is quite indicative to take as a reference. In the declaration of the November 2002 general election, the AK Party defines itself as, 'democrat, conservative, progressive, contemporary' (AK Parti 2 Kasım 2002 Seçim Beyannamesi, 2002, p.11). From this perspective, as mentioned above, the AKP can be considered as one of the political parties of the pro-Islamic political stream.

On the other hand, intensive discussion of Turkish nationalism throughout the 1990s as a result of the PKK's ongoing armed attacks, and a gradually appearance of a Kurdish ethnic identity since the Gulf war in northern Iraq, caused a 'major break' (Yeğen, 2006, p.137), increasing ethnic separation in mentalities and forcing mainstream Turkish politics to accept the existence of Kurds with an ethnic and cultural identity. In addition to the internationalization of a Kurdish identity via Iraqi Kurds¹⁵⁴, and the PKK's struggle in the region, a leftist-oriented ideology backed by a Soviet model has also diminished once socialist satellite states in Eastern Europe dramatically turned their face to Western Europe. Regime changes within these states, from socialism to capitalist-dominated democracy, have loosened rigid ideological barriers preventing any flexibility on the Kurdish question. At the same time, unarmed

¹⁵⁴ Until the middle of the first decade of the 21st century, partly including the AKP governments, Turkey's official position towards Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq was almost exactly what Bill Park prescribed; 'Turkey feared the KRG might serve as a pole of attraction for Turkey's restive Kurds, or that it might become emboldened enough to lend them direct support. It could garner international sympathy for the idea of wider Kurdish national self-determination, possibly leading ultimately to a sovereign Kurdish state' (Park, 2004, p.22). Within recent peace process on-going between the Turkish state and the PKK through negotiations with imprisoned Abdullah Öcalan and economic relations formed with the KRG have created a new approach diverted from fear to hope of togetherness.

legal political activities of the pro-Kurdish political stream such as celebrations (*Newroz*), cultural events, Kurdish language studies, funerals (e.g. of those killed guerillas of the PKK), and parliamentary experiences, has put Kurdish ethnic rights and security issues at the centre of agendas of all major Turkish institutions (Watts 2006, p.134). Thanks to these developments, Kurds, Kurdishness, and all things related to Kurds have occupied a considerable amount of space within media and official agendas. Obtaining local and district mayoralties in the local elections allows the pro-Kurdish political stream to gain experience and engage with the political atmosphere in Turkey, and gives its members a chance to present themselves at practical level. This also facilitates the adoptive integration of legal pro-Kurdish politics into the general politics of Turkey by forcing the prevailing official state ideology in political terms.

Another aspect making this period a sort of transition one is that Abdullah Öcalan was forced to leave Syria in 1998 and was captured¹⁵⁵ in 1999. Despite the fact that the PKK called on all Kurds to attack the Turkish state, in his first interview with a journalist as well as in his first trial, he stated that, 'I really love Turkey and the Turkish people. My mother is Turkish. Sincerely, I will do all I can to be of service to the Turkish state'. These events shed light on two basic arguments—the first is that the armed forces of the PKK has always been willing to fight till ultimate victory, and the second is that what Öcalan said encourages legal politics through democratic ways. In addition, although harsh state suppression of pro-Kurdish legal politics in the 1990s (Watts, 2006, p.126), and the stream's parties were closed down one by one, the pro-Kurdish political party solidified its popular support by obtaining around seven per cent of the general vote, and dominated Kurdish inhabited areas. The PKK's approach to reformist pro-Kurdish groups, whether they were legal or illegal, deemed them as unacceptable, even sometimes as betrayal, but had changed their views by the end of the 1990s and a two-way co-operative struggle developed an armed struggle in the mountains, and a legal struggle on the plains.

¹⁵⁵ Those who are interested in the capture of Abdullah Öcalan might be interested in some of the allegations indicating that he was delivered by the USA to Turkey.

Furthermore, tremendous efforts made by the Republic of Turkey to join the EU have gradually paved the way for more space in which both pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political parties mobilize.¹⁵⁶ In the 1980s, both political streams were totally against western economic or political organizations due to their own ideological attitudes to the west, and western values. By the 1990s, the pro-Kurdish political stream advocated (Casier, 2010) European values in terms of obtaining more ethnic recognition and cultural rights through democratization, whereas the Refah Party insisted on the west's ill intentions, and used these international organizations only as an instrument with which to achieve their targeting of Turkey. By the end of the 1990s, especially after experiencing a soft-coup d'état against the Refah-Yol (coalition between RP and DYP) government, even in terms of religious rights, European values might have seemed to be helpful vis-à-vis a policy without crackdowns by an official state ideology whose core values have been constituted in accordance with Kemalism (Mardin, 1973). In 1999, the Helsinki Summit approved Turkey as a candidate for joining the EU with a reservation of attunement to the Copenhagen criteria which requires ample reforms in legal, social, and state structures, as well as a solution for 'Southeast' question through peaceful means (Ikizler, 2011, pp.11-20; Ulusoy, 2009). In brief, the EU stands for not only more democratic rights both for the ethnic minority and religious lives, but also for reducing the military influence over Turkish civilian politics. That is why, the less military involvement in the state apparatus, the more the possibility that commonalities of pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political streams could create a new democratic atmosphere in which together they can solve the Kurdish question once and for all.

As a result of these developments, representations of pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political streams have been going through several changes in their respective documents. As mentioned before, the most dramatic change in the pro-Islamic political streams was the removal of their anti-EU stances, and accusing the EU of being a 'Christian club' implicitly seeking to prevent the development of Turkey as a means of regaining for regional power (Fazilet Partisi, 1999, p.45). It can be seen in one of the Fazilet Party's development

¹⁵⁶ Nowadays, the EU accession process is likely to end in a political stalemate, it is mostly approved that the EU process has provided convincing arguments, as both pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political streams follow in terms of ethnic and religious rights and paved the way for 'political space for Islamism and ethno-nationalism' (Gökalp & Unsar, 2008, pp.93-95)

programs emphasizing 'actual democracy' (1998, p.3), and international agreements on human rights such as the 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights, European Convention on Human Rights, Paris Conventions, and Helsinki Final Act (1998, p.5) and finally instead of pioneering 'Just Economic Order' (Adil Ekonomik Düzen), highlighting the need for a global open market system as a requirement of economic development (1998, pp.15-18). Furthermore, by stating that 'instead of sanctity of the state, immunity of human rights and freedoms are prioritized' (Fazilet Partisi, 1998, p.29), protection of the state as a way of protecting Islamic codes are rendered to be more flexible and in favor of human rights. Regarding the Kurdish question, it is still defined as the 'Southeast' question, and for the party, became not only a security question, but also it was recognized that urgent economic and social programs should be prepared and applied in the region¹⁵⁷ as a solution (Fazilet Partisi, 1998, pp.32-33). Lastly, a document examining decentralization and increased authority for local governors was published which gives the authority to choose the language to be studied and used in education and in the local assemblies. This is also worth mentioning as an indication of changes in the mentality of the pro-Islamic political stream. Within this issue, the Fazilet Party went further and even stated the concept of 'autonomy or self-determination' (özerklik), while decentralization was touched upon (Fazilet Partisi, 1999, p.15).

On the side of the pro-Kurdish political stream, the HADEP's new program is quite indicative in terms of the transition period. First of all the statement that, 'the parties which are able to transform themselves in accordance with social requirements could not save themselves from marginalization within a vicious circle' (HADEP, 2001, p.1), makes sense regarding that. Following that, the program itself explains why they have made such a change by suggesting, 'Either we make ourselves as an alternative for attaining power through a new program and by extending ourselves through the democratic struggle, or by continuing with an old, outmoded program which is not able to address current problems, we would enter into a situation in which we would be a marginal

¹⁵⁷ Under the title of 'Internal Security and Public Order', after emphasizing again the concepts of friendship, brotherhood and solidarity among citizens of the country' it is stated in Turkish that 'Partimiz Güneydoğu sorununu salt bir güvenlik sorunu olarak görmemektedir. Bu sorunu ortadan kaldırmak için, bölgeye yönelik acil ekonomik ve sosyal politikalar hazırlanması ve uygulamaya konulması ziyadesiyle önem arz etmektedir.'

player, dealing with our internal problems' (HADEP, 2001, p.1). The first and second pages of this new program are full of explanations why they need to change their approach to Turkey's questions. It is quite obvious that the pro-Kurdish political stream is so eager to change the perception of itself from being a Kurdish party to a 'Turkey party'. It does not mean that while doing so the political streams would change their priority on the Kurdish question, but it means that they would work harder to cover all problems as one of the political parties integrated into the political atmosphere in Turkey. Furthermore, there are considerable number of critics of what the real-socialism is that underscores the need for a new socialist approach in opposing the central state structure against a new world order that degenerates national values (HADEP, 2001, pp.3-4). Within this context, this global development reduces the importance and sovereignty of national states so that the struggle must continue in democratic ways at the social level. These ideas have been underscored with the argument that that particular era of revolution did not end, but that the world entered a deeper and esthetic social, cultural, spiritual, and ethical set of revolutions (p.6).

In summary, the socialist approach to reading the world, the regions, and Turkey, have not been altered but new global developments had to be taken into account while participating in politics. The most remarkable indication of such a transition is that ever since the HEP was established, all the party programs of political parties within the pro-Kurdish political stream, began with an evaluation of the world, region and lastly, with Turkey, in which the leftist ideology discourse can be found throughout the documents. The current pro-Kurdish political party's (BDP- Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi) program did not start with such an evaluation but with a page of introduction evaluating Turkey, and then delved into the political principles of the party (BDP, 2008, pp.116-118).

The most salient argument taken from this transition period could be that as long as the ideological barriers of pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic streams loosened, as within this time period, the possibility of merging to solve the Kurdish question in Turkey has increased. How these political streams see the world, region, and Turkey, and also to what degree they support decentralization and authorizing local governors elected by people, would be

basic determinants of future negotiations between the government of Turkey, led by pro-Islamic AKP, and on the other hand, the PKK, and legal pro-Kurdish political parties, currently, the BDP. In specific terms, in case a holistic perception of a pro-Kurdish political stream towards pro-Islamic politics as being that of religious bigotry, and of a pro-Islamic political stream towards pro-Kurdish politics as being that of communists and separatists, could be broadened; their common points which differ only in terms of their intensity, might result in a civilized negotiation around the table instead of armed fighting in the region.

Chapter Eight: The Perception between Pro-Kurdish and Pro-Islamic Political Streams, 2002-2011

On the one hand, representatives of the pro-Kurdish political stream, the DEHAP, and on the other, the representative of the pro-Islamic political stream, the AKP,¹⁵⁸ went to the 2002 general election with experience obtained in the last decade of the 20th century. Along with that, perceptions of each other preserved their central ideas, but as indicated above, they have both become closer to general, globally accepted values. For instance, the AKP has become one of the most prominent advocates of the EU, and at the same time stressed acceptance of a changing world by ceding its strident ideological approaches (AK Parti 2 Kasim 2002 Seçim Beyannamesi, 2002, p.7). The DEHAP has sought to deal with all other questions of Turkey rather than primarily focusing on only the Kurdish question in its desire to change its appearance to being perceived as a Turkey party (Türkiye Partisi). As proof of that, the DEHAP entered into the 3 November 2002 election as part of a coalition, named the 'Emek-Barış-Demokrasi Bloku'¹⁵⁹ (Labour -Peace-Democracy Block). It also stated, after highlighting various provinces from both western and eastern Turkey, that the 'DEHAP is embracing Turkey. It represents brotherhood and unity of the country amongst Turks, Kurds, Lazs, Arabs, and Circassians' (DEHAP, 2002). Within this section will be an analysis of how these two political streams perceive each other by relying on their party programs and declarations from their general elections.

First of all, both streams approve the requirements of change in their documents. While the DEHAP's declaration for the 2002 general election

¹⁵⁸ Since then till now, AK party has preserved its electoral legitimacy by increasing its votes in three general elections, which nowadays causes a discussion of dictatorship of AKP (Bac-Muftuler & Keyman, 2012), especially Mr. Erdoğan, of gaining statist characters due to preservation of state's position over its citizens. Despite these kinds of criticism, the party still holds the most democratic appearance of Turkey since the beginning. That is why by 2002 when the AKP first came to power, it is thought that a new path emerged in the political history of Turkey (Ziya & Keyman, 2003; Insel, 2003). Evaluation of the personality of the Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, over the concepts of Islam, modernity and democracy is subject to an article by Metin Heper and Sule Toktas (2003). It is worth to have a look in case of more detail is required.

¹⁵⁹ This initiative has indeed established in order to enter into the parliament through an independent candidacy for general elections because of a ten per cent threshold. Components of the coalition are mostly ideologically socialist oriented and this coalition has continued up until now, and lastly applied in the 2011 general election. It is currently consisting of Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, Demokrasi Partisi, Demokrasi ve Özgürlük Hareketi, Devrimci Sosyalist İşçi Partisi, Emek Partisi, Emekçi Hareket Partisi, Eşitlik ve Demokrasi Partisi, İşçi Cephesi, İşçilerin Sosyalist Partisi, Hak ve Özgürlükler Partisi, Katılımcı Demokrasi Partisi, Koz, Sosyalist Birlik Hareketi, Sosyalist Dayanışma Platformu, Sosyalist Demokrasi Partisi, Sosyalist Gelecek Parti Hareketi, Toplumsal Özgürlük Platformu, Türkiye Gerçeği, Uluslararası İşçi Dayanışması Derneği, and Partizan.

states that, '[the] 3 November election is the expected change. Nobody consents to live the same as before' The AKP's party program¹⁶⁰ starts with stating that, 'Turkey has a strong desire to change during such a painful time period.' The only way of getting rid of this condition is through political will, which would begin to initiate economic development, fix imbalances in income distribution, end poverty, and dissipate resentment, would be through a synthesis, through all embracing policies thus obtaining social peace, which will be new and dynamic' (AKP, 2001). These statements from the beginning constitute one of the common points between the two streams, in the political atmosphere of the early years of 21st century. This would offer alternative ways with which people could become hopeful. Yet, this also proves that ideological connections are still much more active in forming coalitions rather than political interests.

The AK party regulations explain fundamental principles of the party within 15 points. In the first one it states, '[The] AK Party believes that the most important achievement of the Turkish nation is the Republic, and sovereignty unconditionally, belongs to the nation. The only determinative power is the 'Milli Irade' (National Will). ... the National will, the rule of law, intellect, science, experience, democracy, individual fundamental rights and freedoms and morality are approved as main references of the political ruling mentality (AKP Tüzüğü, 2006, pp.11-12). In this sense, it can be said that global values which are effective in making certain social, economic and political policies, are, and would be, all taken into account while the party rules the country. What is meant by emphasizing 'national will' is actually that the party that gained the national election should rule the country, and this ruling should not have any intervention by other state apparatus such as the military—which had done so a couple of times, and recently, in the 28 February process. In other words, the way in which the official state ideology's reflex to preserve itself against the national will is unacceptable. Based on this argument, it can be said that the AKP does not want a revolution in order to change the state, but rather, an evolution through replacing the official state ideology with the national will (Milli Irade).

¹⁶⁰ It is not possible to give a page number for referencing the AK Party's party program as it is just available online not as hardcopy. Please see the link for it, <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-programi>

The next points are also significant in terms of approaching the Kurdish question, stating that the 'AK Party advocates that the Turkish nation's country and state are indivisible.' In the fourth point, it is stated that the 'AK Party knows and respects that people have different faiths, thoughts, race, languages, expressions, associations and lifestyles, which is with them from birth. It accepts that these differences are not a separation, but rather, a reinforcing of cultural richness' (AKP Tüzüğü, 2006, p.11). The rest of the points also show that the AKP favors a social state understanding, the family as core of its society, moral development among people, representative democracy with participatory and competitive qualifications, and referendum as a way of participatory democracy. In light of these points, it seems obvious that the AKP is also against separatism of any type, but quite eager to socially, though not legally, approve of any differences amongst societies constituting Turkey (AKP, 2001). By perceiving any sort of differences as cultural richness, it is quite emphatic in this regard. Then, the question to consider is if a pro-Kurdish political party demands legal regulations approving the existence of Kurdish ethnic identity, or constitutional recognition for Kurds whose name has never been articulated in any constitution in the history of Turkey, then what would happen?

While the AK party preserved these basic understandings of the pro-Islamic political stream, in practical terms and discourse, it seems to be more adaptive to change. The AK party disapproves using an ideological approach to the main questions of Turkey, but supports discussing them in the context of a platform of contemporary democratic values without paying attention to gender, ethnic identity, beliefs, and the worldview of all citizens (AKP, 2001). This philosophy might pave the way for a much more hopeful negotiation process to solve the Kurdish question in Turkey. Regarding the Kurdish question, the AK Party's party program presents a considerable number of clues on the subject under the title, 'Doğu ve Güneydoğu' (East and Southeast). The title itself means that the AK Party still perceives the Kurdish question on a regional basis, but the context contends much more than that. It starts with a definition of the problem, but unfortunately it is ambiguous. It states that 'the event which some of us call the Southeast, some as the Kurdish question, and some as the terror question, is unfortunately a reality of

Turkey' (AKP, 2001). This ambiguous definition implies that there is no exact definition in their minds so that the solution which is argued in the program is also ambiguous. It states that, 'By acknowledging the negativities this problem causes in our social lives, the Party would follow a policy intending to completely and permanently solve the problem through respecting the society's sensibilities, and through paying attention to people's happiness, welfare,¹⁶¹ rights and freedoms in the region and of protecting Turkey's unitary state structure along with not creating weakness through the struggle with terrorism' (AKP, 2001). The BDP's intention also, as a way of a democratic solution, pertains not only to citizenship, but is a constitutional one. The BDP offers, in its party program, 'Instead of a single race, single language, single culture and male-dominated understanding, 'the citizenship of the Republic of Turkey'¹⁶² would be taken as a fundamental, and thus, supra-identity¹⁶³ which would be defined as constitutional citizenship as a way of including all ethnic, cultural, faiths, and gender differences' (BDP, 2008, p.121).

In light of this solution's method, it can be said that the AK party still makes a clear distinction between terrorism, implying the PKK, and the region's cultural, economic and social problems. This understanding of the party can also be seen in the agenda embedded in the language, which as mentioned, is a part of cultural differences. The party program states that, 'With the condition that Turkish would remain the official language and the language of education, cultural activities, including broadcasting in languages apart from Turkish, all are to be considered as an enforcing and recuperative richness, not as a

¹⁶¹ In terms of social assistance such as delivering cools in winters, food packages in Ramadan, providing major electrical home-equipment, etc. welfare dimension of social issues are still occupying great amount of place in both pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish political stream's agenda. On the one hand, Pro-Kurdish political parties think that the AKP misuse its power to convince to people to vote for the party by providing social assistance to Kurdish people all over the country, not only in the east and southeast. Whereas the AK Party argues that this social assistance is a sort of bribery used to obtain people's votes, and is just because of these people's need. Regarding this issue, Erdem Yörük's article is worth having a look at as it is about using social assistance as political containment, especially in the Kurdish case (Yörük, 2012).

¹⁶² Promising more or less the same concept in terms of citizenship, the BDP and the AKP made an agreement in the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission, established for preparing a new civil constitution in the parliament. Another point that should not be passed without mentioning, is that by almost using the words used in the direct quotation in the paragraph, has also been articulated in the DTP's party program. Thus, it can be considered as a demand of the pro-Kurdish political stream produced in the first decade of the 21st century.

¹⁶³ Supra identity as begun in Turkey (Türkiyeli), and sub-identity as Turks, Kurds, and so on, were brought forward by Prime Minister Erdoğan, yet again these arguments were harshly criticized by the state apparatus, especially the military and opposition parties for endangering national (Turkish) identity (Yavuz & Özcan, 2006, p.112). In this sense, the definition of citizenship in the constitution occupies a massive place within this discussion. Ayse Kadioglu delves into this discussion with her historically comprehensive article, 'Denationalization of Citizenship? The Turkish Experience' (Kadioglu, 2007).

factor harming togetherness and the unity of our country.’ In addition to the arguments that terrorism in the region has gained external supports, unemployment should be dramatically reduced through investment in the region, recovering and compensation programs for those who have suffered from terrorism should be applied, and a new state mentality respecting basic rights and freedoms should be formulated instead of repression of people in the region. This section of the program ends with a crucial point, which states that, ‘the awareness of being a citizen of the Republic of Turkey is the cement of our society’s unity and togetherness’ (AKP, 2001). It seems that the AKP has no problem in providing a social, cultural, political and economic atmosphere in which Kurds can practice what they are doing in these areas as being known as Kurdish, but in legal terms there are still concerns which can be extracted from emphasizing cultural aspects of Kurds—though not constitutional or legal recognition.

On the other hand, the DEHAP’s declaration for the November 2002 general election continues highlighting economic aspects of Turkey in which it is claimed that all of the political parties, apart from itself, consider the IMF’s (International Monetary Funds) programs to regulate the economy of Turkey as their own program. This claim is also seen as a fundamental reason why people are suffering from increased unemployment, ruined industry and agriculture, an anxious future, and finally the dependence of Turkey on foreign powers in the fields of economy and politics. Furthermore, ‘Led by the USA, the efforts of capitalist-imperialist powers to reorganize the world in accordance with the requirement of global capitals’ has been the core point of another pro-Kurdish political party (ÖZGÜR Parti, 2003, p.5). This way of reading the then political atmosphere and political parties is quite obviously a leftist way of seeing the world. One of their main characteristics is the economic-oriented and social class-based analysis of a society that exists in all party-programs and declarations of pro-Kurdish political parties, within the first decade of 21st century. Where they see the solution for Turkey’s problems is through employing Turkey’s resources in favor of people and not of moneylenders and fraudulence, and through social unjustness by fortifying democratic regime.

Regarding the Kurdish question, the document suggests a solution in accordance with peaceful and democratic ways (ÖZGÜR Parti, 2003, pp.13-20) with the conditions of abolishing village guard systems, and OHAL (Olağanüstü Hal- the state of emergency), in Kurdish-dominated regions. Before coming to the end of the document, a different interpretation of laicism is worthy of attention. To the DEHAP, while being impartial towards all faiths and strictly separating religious and state affairs, in the eyes of the AKP it is the responsibility of the state to protect all religious rights within democratic conditions, and in a state where religious and state affairs are already separated. The document finalizes with a prodigious argument stating that, 'we unite Turkey, who has lost its self-trust because of the fears of 'bölünme' (separation) and 'dış düşman' (external enemy). We protect the brotherhood between Turks and Kurds and between Kurds and Turks.' The reason why this quotation is important is that the argument accords with the claim of the pro-Kurdish political streams as being a 'Turkey Party' (Türkiye Partisi) rather than being only a Kurdish party. At the same time, it might be a different approach, but still extends this argument in opposition to official state ideology in which 'separation' and 'external enemy' threats have always been utilized as a counter-argument of demands of the pro-Kurdish political stream.

The political regime in demand, is summarized in Özgür Toplum Partisi's (ÖZGÜR Party) program in which it is argued that the Özgür Toplum Party believes that today's main contradictions can only be resolved by taking democratic socialism as the basis, and a high degree of awareness of democracy, organization and life style. Our democratic socialist understanding would rely on the science and would reject all sorts of base materialism [capitalism], dogmatic [religion] and predestinarian [religion] understanding' (ÖZGÜR Parti, 2003, p.4). This discourse is applied in the preceding quotation and has a tendency to restrict Islamic core ideas, as within a scientific approach, religion is a dogmatic set of systems, and predestinarianism is something unacceptable. In the same token, during the analysis of the Middle East, dogmatic tendencies of countries are regarded as the nation's fundamental problem, and interestingly argued that without abandoning dogmatism (religion-Islam), it is not possible to have a renaissance (ÖZGÜR Parti, 2003, p.7). From this perspective, the positivist feature of any variations

of leftist ideas, as in the case of democratic socialism, has been prevailed within the pro-Kurdish political stream. As a result of renaissance, enlightenment would not happen in the Middle East unless dogmatism (religion) was abandoned. Thus, it can be concluded that this approach to religion seems to cease peaceful initiatives coming from the pro-Islamic stream when tackling the Kurdish question. In other words, the issues between these two streams are not focusing on the Kurdish question, but reflecting their ideologies into the real politics of Turkey.

Within the same program, official state ideology also takes its share, which is defined as an oligarchical system. Historical examples of the attitudes of the Kemalist ruling elites of Turkey towards the Kurds have been considered as a major reason as to why the Kurdish question has become so complicated (ÖZGÜR Parti, 2003, pp.8-9). Within this examination of the history of Turkey's politics, the dominance of the military among civilian politics is also reflected in the language as being a protector and implementer of Turkish nationalism. In the Demokratik Toplum Partisi's (DTP-Democratic Society Party) party program, this issue receives a bit more space. It classifies the political history of Turkey in two; the single party and the multi-party eras. Being a Turkish nationalist is considered to be a common point of these two eras but quite importantly, in the second era, it is claimed that, 'Türk-Islam synthesis, chauvinist-fascist focal points, and Islamist in religious orders [tarikah] type have found places within the state. The nationalism in terms of M. Kemal and Ismet Inonu was fed by western culture, while after the 1950's, because of the USA's anti-communist policies, nationalism was supported with fascist and religiously reactionist ideologies.' These striking statements indicate that the pro-Kurdish political stream, even in 2005 while the AKP held power, thinks Islamism is an instrument of official state ideology against a leftist and leftist-oriented Kurdish political stream, by considering all pro-Islamic streams as the same and as being a single entity.

At the end of the section from which the above quotation was taken, the DTP's intention to cooperate with Turkey's democratic powers was only to develop a democratization process for Turkey. For the sake of this, it means that consideration of the pro-Islamic political stream as an instrument of official state ideology could prevent the formation of a coalition with them, in practical

terms, the AKP, since in the DTP's eyes, the pro-Islamic political stream is not a part of democratic forces in Turkey but a part of official state ideology which is the main obstacle before democracy. Yet, first of all, the AKP, since its very earliest days, has always emphasized democracy and fundamental human rights and freedoms. In that case, how could such a coalition with the AKP be achieved? There are two options, which might present an answer to that question. Either the pro-Kurdish political stream does not approve of any pro-Islamic political parties such as democrats, as the religion itself is dogmatic, or still sees all pro-Islamic organizations as a way of exploiting the Kurds' minds because they are reactionary, not progressive, and most importantly, still preserve Turkish nationalist characteristics. Regarding the second option, it is hard to be sure that other leftist or social democrat organizations which are believed to be more appropriate to form a coalition would not have a Turkish nationalist character. As a result, positivism as a core idea of leftist ideologies is still active among social democrats or leftist factions, whether they are Turkish or Kurdish, making any sort of coalition possible within the Turkish political structure, but which seems highly unlikely with pro-Islamic political organizations, at least in order to solve the Kurdish question.

These general perceptions of the AK Party, if looked at closely, they have more or less the same perceptions of the pro-Kurdish political parties about the Kurdish question. After explaining the pro-Kurdish political stream's perceptions on the issue, it would be much clearer to see what makes the two political streams so different in appearance. A practical examination, based on promises given in the party programs and general election declarations, would provide an extensive arena with which to see their common and distinctive points.

Practical Examination

Compared to the first two decades of the post-1980 process, a loosening of sharp ideological dominancy over the discourse and official documents has relatively changed the parties' focal point from leftist and Islamic promises to reflecting people's demands. In this regard, the claim of the pro-Kurdish political parties to be a 'Turkey Party' has degenerated as immediately after a promise was made in party programs, that promise became connected with the Kurdish question, or the Kurds in one way or another. From their

perspective, all of their problems such as health, social, political, human rights, environmental, unemployment, and women's rights and so on, in the region are said to have been caused by the Kurdish question and imperialism. Within this type of approach to the problems, it is hard to say that pro-Kurdish political parties are a Turkey Party, but rather, that they are a Kurdish or Kurds' political party. To compare, the way the AK Party's approach is that Turkey has a tremendous number of problems, which should immediately be met, and they are all connected to each other. The AKP puts neither the problems of rough secularist implementations nor the Kurdish question at the centre of all of its problems. That is why the AKP manages to be, generally speaking, a centre-right cadre political party in the politics of Turkey, due to the fact that its electorate profile consists of people from almost all social and ideological groups (Toprak, Uslu and King, 2009).

Following their different approaches to the fundamental problems of Turkey, the essence of their promises are more or less the same, especially in certain issues. The initial point should be the concept of democracy, what kind of democracy, and how they think democracy would help solve Turkey's fundamental questions, especially the Kurdish question.

From the Özgür Party's point of view, as a member of the pro-Kurdish political stream, the state itself must be democratized in order to have social reconciliation and development. And then, the way of preserving such a state is seen in pluralism relying on multiculturalism, and decision makers at the local, provincial, and state level should be elected by the society in which there are suitable conditions so that people are totally free to express their ethnic and cultural distinctiveness, faiths, ideas and political structures. Thanks to this method, a way of presenting all kinds of different ideas within the state structure could be achieved. As soon as such a democratic concept has been articulated, the solution of the Kurdish question has depended on that kind of democracy in which nationalist and racist mentality is rejected, and where the historical brotherhood of Turks and Kurds is emphasized, and human rights are protected. In addition, within such democracy recognition of the existence of Kurds as much as of Turks, because of equality principles must be approved, non-governmental organizations would all be permitted and bans on the right of association would be abandoned. Finally, a new constitution

replacing the 1982 constitution should be put into operation, with the new democracy, the laws of election and of political parties, as well as that a justice system should be reformed in line with the democratic criteria. The new constitution should also approve a liberal democratic laicism that is superseded with decentralization instead of central state structure (ÖZGÜR Parti, 2003, pp.13-20). These requirements for democracy are all almost identically articulated in the DTP's (2005) and the BDP's (2008, pp.134-155) in their individual party programs.

By demanding this kind of democracy, the BDP is implicitly criticizing the AKP government for trying to remove all opposition political groups, closing down all opportunities for negotiation and reconciliation, and indirectly forcing them to obey. The BDP also claims that the state has been turned into be a huge organizational structure with massive power and authority and thinks that the state has been run in accordance with a small group of ruling elites' interests (2008, p.134). To overcome such a state structure, and form a much more democratic one, the BDP sees participatory democracy, in which people would be involved in the decision making process, as a path heading towards a democratic state. The party does this by stating that 'improving participatory democracy, opportunities and allowing people to reflect their ideas, a state government would be created' (2008, p.136). Within such a democracy, the BDP believes that local authorities should be redesigned according to liberalist, egalitarian, pluralist, and participatory principles. Thus, local societies' individual demands and needs would be met within democratic autonomy structure.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁴ Democratic autonomy is a current and popular system the BDP is demanding not only for Kurdish-dominated areas in the east of Turkey but also for its western parts. Historical justification of such autonomy is expressed by the BDP within two paragraphs in their party program. To understand what they mean and what discourse is prevailing within these two paragraphs, I think it is going to be meaningful to quote them in their original language. 'Tarihte yerel ve bölgesel özerklik politikaları hep olagelmiş, ahlakî ve politik toplumun varlığını sürdürmesinde önemli rol oynamışlardır. Tarih boyunca dağlar, çöller ve ormanlık alanlar başta olmak üzere, yeryüzünün çok geniş bir coğrafyasında kabile, aşiret, köy ve kent toplumu halinde yaşayan halklar ve uluslar, demokratik-özgürlükçü olmayan güçlere karşı sürekli özerklik ve bağımsızlık politikaları ile direniş sergilemişlerdir. İdari yönetim bağlamında yerel özerklik ve demokrasi taleplerinin giderek artması, günümüzde katı merkezîyetçi yönetim modellerinin terk edilerek, âdem-i merkezîyetçiliği esas alan ve yerellerde halkın karar süreçlerine doğrudan katılımının önünü açan güçlendirilmiş yerel yönetimler modeline geçişi beraberinde getirmiştir. Ülkemizde ise, katı merkezîyetçi, hantal yönetim yapısı halen varlığını sürdürmekte ve yerel demokrasinin gelişiminin önünü kesmektedir. Bu anlamda yerel yönetimleri demokrasinin beşiği olarak kabul eden temel paradigmadan hareketle siyasal yönetimin katılımcılığı temelinde, ekolojik dengenin esas alındığı yerinden yönetimle, yerel toplumun özgül talep ve ihtiyaçlarına dayanan demokratik özerklik geliştirilecektir.' (BDP, 2008, pp.137-138). It is also available in the Party's official website, <http://www.bdp.org.tr/devam/17-bdp-program.aspx>

As mentioned before, the AK party is also a fierce supporter of more democratization in every aspect of the state and social structure. The starting point of the AK party's conceptualization of democracy is accepting the current operating democracy. Yet, it acknowledges that it has to be re-accorded basic human rights and freedoms, and global rule of law. That is why, in the early years of the AKP governments, neither in party programs nor in the declarations of the November general election are there separate titles pertaining to democracy (AKP, 2001; AK Parti, 2002). Democracy has been touched upon under the title of fundamental rights and freedoms. Later on, in the declaration of the 2007 general election (AK Parti, 2007), the word democracy could be seen in the table of contents, and even in the declaration of the 2011 general election, the concept of 'advanced democracy' (İleri demokrasi) is used for a separate chapter (AK Parti, 2011, p.7). In the initial years of the AKP government, it can be said that it did not identify any particular 'question's' name, such as the Kurdish question, but all of the social unrest is linked to the lack of implementation of fundamental rights and freedoms. In the declaration of the 2007 general election, the AK party defines democracy as, 'a political regime in which sovereignty belongs to nation', and 'pluralist governance' (AK Parti, 2007, p.10). At the same time, the participatory feature of democracy is also advocated, but the emphasized methods are through consultation and reconciliation with the people as much as possible, rather than the people's direct involvement in the decision making process via local governance—the model offered by the BDP. Similarly, the pro-Kurdish political stream's demand within the democratic model which they offered, the AK party is seen as being also a supporter of a new constitution, prepared by and approved by civilians, not by the military. This results in a more effective civil society through changes in the laws of association, and of reforms in judicial fields. Differently from the pro-Kurdish political stream, it aims to disempower the sources of terror, while at the same time, to improve the sense of belonging amongst citizens (AK Parti, 2007, p.23). Despite many more common points in their policies, based on their different ways in which they support aspects of democracy, it would not be wrong to claim that different approaches of the pro-Islamic and the pro-Kurdish political streams towards the PKK, and its existence, outweighs a lot of more common points.

In terms of the current political atmosphere in Turkey, the concept of 'advanced democracy' seems to be making pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish political streams closer regarding what they understand as being democracy. Because of that, the AK party also emphasizes significantly, a pluralist and participatory democracy,¹⁶⁵ and the empowerment of local administration as an indispensable component of democracy¹⁶⁶ (AK Parti, 2011, p.8), as the BDP highlights in the declaration of the 2011 general election. Nevertheless, by stating, 'To simultaneously and complementarily meet the demand for democracy and security of our nation is our main target. Actual peace and security is only possible in a society in which freedom and justice are actually being provided' (AK Parti, 2011, p.108), the AK party implicitly has reservations around the PKK's terrorism when it comes to political relations with the pro-Kurdish political stream, but recently, it seems to have changed.

Within more than a decade's governance, the AK party has fulfilled previous demands of the pro-Kurdish political stream of the 1990s. Remarkable examples include the removal of the OHAL (state of emergency in the east and south of Turkey), changes in the law of associations and the law of meeting and demonstration, legal changes in torture and assault, removal of the state security courts¹⁶⁷ (devlet güvenlik mahkemeleri), removal of the law prohibiting the broadcasting in languages other than Turkish, and legal changes allowing high-ranking military personnel to be judged in civil court (AK Parti, 2011, p.9). These improvements are all that pro-Kurdish political parties wanted to see changed in the 1990s.

The language issue is nowadays the only critical issue determining perceptions between pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish political streams. The BDP still insists on using Kurdish as its language for education in Kurdish-dominated areas, but on the other hand, the AKP wants to keep the Kurdish

¹⁶⁵ For the full text of the declaration in Turkish, please look at the link, <http://www.akparti.org.tr/beyanname2011.pdf>

¹⁶⁶ Regarding decentralization, even in the declaration of the 2011 general election, the AKP admits, 'Despite all our efforts, public administration in Turkey could not be freed from its extremely centralized and lumpish structure' (AK Parti, 2007, p.153) although AK Party promised to overcome strictly centralized and hierarchical state structure and replace it with more participatory and accountability (AK Parti, 2002, p.34).

¹⁶⁷ State security courts was representing official state ideology and charging those acting against it. That is why members of pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political streams or social groups were all put on trial there. The most prominent case of this trial was the case of MPs from pro-Kurdish political parties—the HEP and the DEP's representatives were accused of behaving against an indivisible unitedness, and of helping the separatist PKK and those parties, as being its legal extension.

language as an elective course in the schools. This is in schools which those who wish to, can attend, and the rest of the population does not have to attend the courses. The pro-Kurdish political stream has concerns that without making Kurdish language mandatory in education, the Kurdish culture, as language, is a fundamental part of culture and is also important in preventing the extinction of the Kurdish culture, which would slowly fade away and be forgotten. Whereas the AKP perceives the Kurdish language as a part of the cultural richness of Turkey, so it is okay if someone wants to take a Kurdish course, but it should be optional and not mandatory. When the AKP talks about its democratization efforts (AK Parti, 2011, p.10), the abolition of bans against using the Kurdish language in media and political propaganda, and in opening private Kurdish language schools, are all mentioned as a dramatic improvement. But they did not talk about Kurdish language education in public schools.¹⁶⁸ In this regard, the BDP accuses the AKP of behaving like the official state ideology since it does not accept Kurds and the Kurdish language in an official way.

The project of national unity and togetherness¹⁶⁹ (milli birlik ve beraberlik projesi), is also worth mentioning here, as the first time it is offered as a totally political solution within democratic ways. That initiative, to Kerim Yildiz, indicates the government's 'new and clear willingness to solve the Kurdish conflict' (Yildiz, 2012, p.156). In name, it covers almost every problem of Turkey ranging from issues of alleviates (a religions minority group), Kurds, religious orders, the headscarf, to Romany and non-Muslim minorities, with priority given to the Kurdish question (AK Parti, 2011, p.11-12). Within the last

¹⁶⁸ Cuma Cicek's article presents a different perspective on the limitation of the AKP towards the Kurdish question especially the mother tongue, by taking a political atmosphere such as the closure of the DTP in 2009, and arresting the members of the KCK (Union of Communities in Kurdistan) into consideration (Cicek, 2011, pp.21-23). On the other, it is remarkable that state-society relations in Kurdish-dominated areas, especially the southeast of Turkey, has dramatically changed within the last decade, compared to the 1990s (Watts, 2009).

¹⁶⁹ This project was held due to harsh criticism as if it was a declaration of division of Turkey not togetherness by pioneering forces of official state ideology and Turkish nationalists. Due to given primary importance to Kurdish question, this project was perceived by some anti-AKP oppositions groups including MHP and CHP, military and certain medias as 'Kurdish Opening' (Kürt Açılımı) for refusing its legitimacy. To indicate this contradiction, Somer and Liaras suggest that some 'religious-conservative elites' became more pluralist but some 'secular elites became more cynical...' (Somer & Liaras, 2010, p.152). Yet, this project has resurfaced with different name as 'Peace Process' (Barış Süreci) after the disclosure of Oslo negotiation between the PKK and the state representatives under the arbitrary of the third state. This process is also covering other fundamental issues but as it is obvious again the primary subject is Kurdish question. While these letters are being typed a new reform package, namely, democratization package, would be declared by the AK Party government. Peace process is not included into the thesis because of time limitation and not mentioned neither in party programs and declaration of general election, yet due to its significance, conclusion chapter will have place for the evaluation of the process.

two initiatives, to tackle the Kurdish question, the PKK is indirectly seen as a part of the negotiation table. These developments indicate that as a pro-Islamic political party, the AK party gradually has withdrawn its reservations of the PKK, while approaching the pro-Kurdish political stream. It can eventually be argued that the level of democratization in Turkey assists in the degree of closeness between these two political streams under the political conditions that the official state ideology's dominance has been reduced.

Last but not least, the concept of laicism appears to be more or less the same, but indeed different from an ideological perspective so that its implementation would change accordingly. It is totally surprising that the AK Party's program, and three declarations for general elections,¹⁷⁰ did not have a specific section presenting what the party thinks about or perceives of laicism. This is despite of the fact that strict secularist implementation of official state ideology closed down two previous parties (Refah and Fazilet) within the pro-Islamic political stream. The most directly related statements are the ones in the party program under the title of fundamental rights and freedoms. It is suggested that, 'Our Party accepts religion as the most important institution of humanity, and laicism as an indispensable condition of democracy and guarantee for the freedom of religion and conscience.' And it claims that laicism has been wrongly understood as it actually does not mean to be hostile to religion, but it means that both believers and non-believers have the right to express their ideas and the freedom of practicing religions acts (AKP, 2001). In addition, in the declaration of the 22 July 2007 general election, a considerable amount of space is given to the Directorate of Religious Affairs by highlighting its primary responsibility to tell people about religion, correctly, without entering any political arenas (AK Parti, 2007, p.112-113). In this sense, the declaration admits religion's role to organize society and its influence on social order. Thus, indirectly, the AK Party governments would declare employment of religion (Islam) among people and societies as a precaution to prevent several social problems such as any kind of discrimination, violation of women's rights, homeless children, and so on.

¹⁷⁰ There is no section titled as laicism or secularism in the declaration for 2011 general election, it is just touched upon by articulating freedom of religion, which means everyone, is free to practice their religion in the content of basic human rights and freedoms in intended new constitution (AK Parti, 2011, p.17).

Regarding the Pro-Kurdish political stream's perception about laicism, the title of the sub-section within its documents is quite meaningful. It is, 'Libertarian Democratic Laicism' (ÖZGÜR Parti, 2003, p.19; DTP, 2005). The next sentence might seem quite non-academic but, in terms of Turkey's reality, it makes sense. The title and the content of the section is as if implying that religion is dogmatic and conservative so that people should be freed from its influence. The statement within the section, which is, 'Scientific struggle against dogmatism and conservatism is the most difficult point in improving society to a democratic level (ÖZGÜR Parti, 2003, p.19) makes such an impression. This statement was taken from the rest of the document of the pro-Kurdish political parties, while most of the paragraphs have been kept exactly the same, as it might indicate a reduction of ideological influence over party politics and documents. All of the documents of the pro-Kurdish political stream begin the section with criticizing the official state ideology's enforcement in homogenising the society in terms of religion and keeping people from practicing their religion (ÖZGÜR Parti, 2003; DTP, 2005; BDP, 2008, p.127). From this perspective, there is quite a lot of resemblance with the pro-Islamic perspective. The section differs from the perspective of the pro-Islamic political stream when it comes to the position of the Directorate of Religious Affairs. The Directorate is accused of being Sunni and a hanafiyyah school, dominated and sectarian against alleviates and other faith groups such as yezidis and Assyrians. Overall, it can be said that the pro-Kurdish political stream¹⁷¹ in favour of classical laicism, which means separation of the state and religious affairs in more strict way, does not trust the Directorate, so it promises to leave religious affairs to religious groups, whereas the pro-Islamic political stream desires to have the Directorate be more active and influential vis-a-vis social order.

Summary

In light of the developments within the last three decades, it is undeniable that the pro-Kurdish and the pro-Islamic political streams have gone through

¹⁷¹ As the last official document of pro-Kurdish political stream, BDP's declaration of the 12 June 2011 general election explicitly states that practical and legal banning on headscarf would be ended and mistreated ones would be compensated. It is quite indicator of to what degree ideological influence over their policies has changes as it is the first time a pro-Kurdish political party articulates a religious freedom by giving a specific example in their official declaration.

tremendous changes, not dramatically, but gradually, in their ideological strictness, with their approach primarily to the Kurdish question and the rest.

At first glance, from the pre and post-1980 coup d'état, it can be understood, by looking at verbal or official written discourses, that ideological references prevailed in many places. It might be considered as another striking commonality of these political streams, because they both utilized historical events (Göcek, 2008) in which they were equally repressed and oppressed, even denied, under the dominance of the Turkish nationalist and secularist official state ideology. By articulating and remembering these events, they reproduce their concepts and legitimize their current actions, whether they were including violence or not, in the minds of their disciples.

In the 1980s, due to the extreme dominance of ideological borders of both pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish streams, it can be claimed that there was seemingly no perception between these two groups, as if they did not think of each other. Using a holistic approach, without separating the leftist movement from the Kurdish one, and the rightist movement from the political Islamist ones, seems to be the cause of that. Indeed, at a practical level, it was quite convenient that such a perception of an intra-stream struggle was also going on among leftist and rightist groups, unless they did not counter with the opposite. When it comes to the 1990s, both political streams experienced a degree of flexibility in terms of ideology to integrate them into the state structure, in which official state ideology still held its dominance. In addition, electoral policy in order to gain and then increase their legitimacy among their supporters, and eventually to obtain political power to make changes they wanted or fought for, forced decision-makers of the two political streams to get closer to the people who were mostly advocating orthodoxy, not radicalization, in both streams.¹⁷² Within this period they had a lot of common points and demands to change the embedded political structure, as some parts of their ideals were against the prevailing official state ideology so they were both repressed. In this sense, it is natural to make common statements against, so to speak, their common

¹⁷² Within the scope of moderation theory, it is accepted that the tendency from the radical position to the embedded political system due to electoral policy causes moderation of political parties (Tezcür, 2009), yet it might cause the opposite result in which democratization might cause radicalization of certain groups (Tezcür, 2010). Regarding to the influence of electoral participation on pro-Islamic political stream, Ihsan Yılmaz' (2008) article constitutes a good discussion ground although I do not agree with him about the transformation of Islamism into post-Islamism (pp.51-53).

enemy. From a specific perspective, these common points were not enough to unite them in the field of the Kurdish question since their ideological flexibility could not reach the level of directing these political streams together.

Yet, as the first decade of the 21st century showed us, the level of democratization, in parallel with the removal of military oversight of civilian politics, forced the parties to go further and loosen their ideological stances. The only legitimate way of obtaining power in democracies is with the ballot box. Thus they chose to get closer to the centre of their ideological stance rather than walking around radical ideas, and preferring to take short cuts when heading for utmost targets, for which some people could risk death. Because of this, it might be hard to classify the AKP within the pro-Islamic political stream as it does not call for *sharia*, and the BDP within the pro-Kurdish political stream as it is now partly approving of good economic and political relations with 'imperialist' America, from a leftist perspective. These changes are of course not immune from other local, regional and international developments¹⁷³ affecting the political, social, cultural, and economic structure of Turkey, so there is a vice versa situation in terms of forcing each other to change. As a result of such a process, current incumbent political parties of both streams are much more eager to work together in solving Turkey's problem, as it can be guessed, primarily, the Kurdish question which occupies a highly central point in order for this study to present how these two streams perceive each other.

Since 1994 when Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the then Mayor of Istanbul province, prepared a report¹⁷⁴ on the Kurds and presented it to Mr Necmettin Erbakan, he argues that considering the Kurdish question as only a security issue is wrong, and social, political, humanitarian, cultural and economic aspects of the Kurdish question should immediately be taken into account to solve the problem. Since then, his and the AKP's approach to the Kurdish question is 'more democracy and more freedom for people' (Efegil, 2011, p.31). To accomplish such a policy without regarding the PKK as one side of the problem, the AKP has fiercely supported the entrance of pro-Kurdish political

¹⁷³ As these changes are massive areas deserving separate, detailed research, I tried not to investigate other issues directly or indirectly around those subjects relating to the influence on relationship between pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political streams.

¹⁷⁴ <http://www.dunyabulteni.net/index.php?aType=haberArchive&ArticleID=30433>

parties in the national assembly and forced them to accept the PKK as terrorist group anytime that the PKK attacks security forces. Within this process, the AKP cannot consider the pro-Kurdish political stream just as a leftist movement, but a representative of the Kurdish people, as much as the AKP is, because they both received a considerable number of votes from the east and southeast of Turkey where the Kurds mostly live.

As a response to the AKP's policy, the pro-Kurdish political stream has never approved of the PKK as a terrorist organization, because whether they actually regard its fight legitimate against the state repression and exploitation, or their electoral supports are coming from those who have sympathy towards the PKK. In the mean time, the AKP's initiatives to give certain cultural rights to the Kurds under the democratization policy (Efegil, 2011, p.32) have not been enough to remove the PKK from the equation, nor to convince the legal political stream for not demanding constitutional recognition in the presence and cultural rights of Kurds and education in the mother tongue. Eventually, the AKP's negotiation with the PKK began with the Oslo negotiation, and when it failed, the current peace process was launched in which the pro-Kurdish political stream is not the major actor, but a sort of messenger between Abdullah Öcalan and Qandil (headquarters of the PKK, in the border of northern Iraq). As a result, right now, even slight ideological differences shaping the perception between the pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish political stream seems to be invisible and would remain like this until the peace process ends, whether in a negative or positive way. Regarding electoral politics, the eventual targets of democratization in which Kurdish cultural rights are crucial, and would determine the highest level of achieving their goals which the AKP governments could reach. Because of this, the following quotation is quite meaningful to end the chapter with, 'The AKP will live or die by its policies towards the Kurds' (Abramowitz and Barkey, 2009, p.121).

CONCLUSION

Kurds and Islamists who have been politically active and sought to place themselves in the state structure from which they were excluded, have constituted a substantial social and political struggle since the commencement of the Republic. Within the last century of the Empire the social and political structure of the Ottomans had been reshaped by ruling elites in line with the western powers' military, administrative, social, and economic features. This a century-long gradual change which resulted in a Turkish nationalist and secular state just after the end of the war for independence, led by Atatürk and his close associates. The foundation of the new republic continued to undertake the transformation of social, political and economic frameworks of Turkey again, by modelling itself on western states. This process can be called a western style modernization in which an ethnically homogenised nation state separates religious and political affairs through taking religious components under its control. Within this process, the victories of Atatürk against non-Muslim invaders (especially Greece, France, and Britain) consolidated their positions as being the most eligible ruling elites to run the newly emerged country. The people trusted them to elevate the country to the level of civilized countries, which meant, becoming a western state. That is why Atatürk himself and the Kemalist elites after him had no trouble with implementing their revolutionary top-down transformation projects over people left living in the style of the Ottoman Empire, particularly in Anatolia.

Ethnic Kurds, and religious elites, and soldiers, gradually realized the direction of the state driven by Atatürk by the mid-1920s, yet their initiatives—whether uprising or through legal political procedures—were not adequate to divert the state from the envisaged modernization process applied throughout the single party era from 1923 to 1946. For instance, Kurdish uprisings such as the Şeyh Said, Agri and the Dersim cases, and on the other hand, occasional reactions from religious groups against sweeping religious symbols away, occurred locally, yet could not challenge the state structure. These backlashes from both suppressed groups nevertheless caused more repression for them. Due to these occasional reactions, even tiny indications of resentment towards the embedded Kemalist state structure was considered to be a serious menace to the core of the state, not as a demand stemming from ordinary citizens.

Reaction of these repressed groups was mostly because their members were deprived of their primary identities, and so they even could not appear to express these identities within public spheres. Resentment caused by this condition found the opportunity to be voiced when a relatively libertarian multi-party system developed after the Second World War. Within this period, historical resemblance of identity deprivation seems to be the most common point of both streams. It was unimaginable to have a political figure, for instance an MP, overtly employing his Islamic or Kurdish identity within political circles. This is not to say that there were no religious and Kurdish people involved in politics, but they preferred not to mention, or could not mention, their ethnic origin or religiosity in a political atmosphere that was totally occupied with the ideas of Turkish nationalism and secularism, respectively. Such a political and social condition was inherited by multi-party politics.

Of course resentful people immediately take the opportunity of having their voices heard, and thus members of these groups either attended Democrat party cadres, or at least voted for the party. Even though there was no regression from the embedded official ideology, denying the existence of ethnic Kurds, and repressing any religious appearances and applications, people pushed the state to change its policies towards these two deprived groups. I believe that as long as restrictions stemming from the official state ideology of these deprived groups are preserved, evolution and eventually massification of these groups will continue in parallel. Within this period, developments and the relative involvement of prominent figures from deprived groups were unsatisfactory, or they raised their demands of the state structure. As a result, together with the benefits of a multi-party political system, those who were asking for more freedom in terms of identity within the public and official space, mobilized their resources to increase their adherents, since the more liberal constitution of 1971 was put into operation, until the other conversely more strict constitution of 1982, was approved by referendum.

The experience of these social movements (Islamic and leftist-oriented Kurdish) gradually emerged and became influential in social and political arenas, leading them comparatively to much more political activity, despite the

repressive character of the 1982 constitution which is the most advocatory of the official state ideology within the decade immediately after the 1980 coup d'état when the PKK as Kurdish nationalist, and the National Outlook (Milli Görüş) movement, formed the legal political party, the Refah Party.

Historical development of these two separate socio-political actors of Turkey until 1980s have had tremendous similarities which leads to the question of that why they did not even come together to eliminate the official state ideology repressing them. Right after such question, perception comes into the issue which has been basic source of not having a cooperation for such a cause.

Since the end of the 1980s (the PKK and the Refah party as representative of pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic sides), and throughout the 1990s, in which the legal pro-Kurdish political stream was formed, have stood out amongst the others within the exclusively pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish social streams. That is to say, they have become prominent representatives of each distinctive movement in the political arena. The core reason why they have succeeded is that they have dramatically increased their grassroots support, and seem to be the most organized in terms of institutionalization. Thus, their institutionalization, and being eager to engage with the political system of Turkey as a way of having their ideas and way of life heard, and eventually, to obtain power to make the required changes according to their core beliefs, led them to think about their rivals. Within this period, it is also significant to say that the position of the Milli Görüş movement as a prominent component of the pro-Islamic side, and the position of the pro-Kurdish legal political stream, ranging from the HEP to the BDP, have become much more crystallized among their co-ideologues, and also among contesting ideologies, compared to the pre and post-1980 decades. In other words, in the eyes of the Refah Party, the pro-Kurdish political stream has been considered a political party engaged in ethnic-centred politics with an alleged affiliation with the PKK, a separatist terrorist organization, and on the other hand, the pro-Kurdish political stream changed its holistic approach to that of an all-Islamic, or conservative stream, as a means of separating the Refah Party from other 'rightist' (*sagci*) political groups.

Repression of all leftist oriented groups, together with the denial of Kurdish ethnic identity, assisted in raising the profile of the PKK among Kurds, whereas a Turkish-Islamic synthesis constituted a massive area of manoeuvre from which the pro-Islamic Refah Party benefited¹⁷⁵. These distinctive conditions generated a political struggle among these rival political streams, especially those of the relatively deprived suburban migrants of metropolis, and also from eastern areas where religion and ethnic identities were given priority when it came to electoral politics. A tiny failed interaction between the HEP and the Refah Party (based on Ahmet Türk's visit to headquarter of Refah Party in 1991) might be taken as a starting point of such a struggle. It was not of course a violent struggle but, as indicated in the thesis, based on ideological differences shaping their understanding of others. On the one hand, there is a leftist-oriented pro-Kurdish political stream, one of whose aims has been to reduce the influence of religion over society, and religion's control over reason, and a religiously driven political party demanding more official and public space for the implementation of religion doctrines, on the other.

Despite the fact that these two rival political streams have a substantial amount of common points or critiques in terms of being against capitalism and the official state ideology at practical level, what determinates the perception between them is not their practices, and critiques, but their core ideology. This feature shapes not only the post-1980s but also the pre-1980s terms. This is because of the degree of rigidity in ideology. This rigidity leads them to consider each other as a part of an established state structure as on the one hand, Kurdish ethnicity has not been fully recognized by the pro-Islamic political stream. On the other hand, the place of religion in official and public spaces is not fully recognized by the pro-Kurdish political stream. Given that the PKK has not been involved in the Turkish structure, the ideological rigidity preserved itself. That is how the PKK perceived the Refah Party until the pro-Kurdish legal political stream was established in 1991.

An inherited and rigid ideologically driven understanding of world has shaped the perception between pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish political streams. Even

¹⁷⁵ I intentionally used the word 'benefit' as Turkish-Islamic synthesis has also been against the radicalization of Islamic groups and would rather have more conservative, if say, traditional Islam, Islamic understanding and of course apolitical. For instance, as Bill Park states in one of his article, what has been targeted with the Turkish-Islamic synthesis is that 'religiosity would offer a more conservative and spiritual, and politically less threatening' (Park, 2007, p.49) among societies in Turkey.

when it comes to a critical approach, the implementation of official state ideology and a religious-oriented approach to the issues of the pro-Islamic political parties sometimes contradicts with the approach of leftist-driven (social democrats) ideology of pro-Kurdish political parties, respective of the terms in which one of the representatives of these political streams exists. In contradiction, in 1997, both Kurdish separatism and reactionary religious activities (irticai faaliyetler) were both placed at the top of the list of domestic menaces which had to be dealt with. Based on that, throughout the 1990s, prevailing official state ideology repressed these two rival political streams in the name of protecting the unity and indivisibility of the state and the modern secular state character, respectively.

Nevertheless, Turkey as a part of the global nation-state system could not be free from the global developments of liberalization, democratization and integration of national economics in the international economy. Specifically worth mentioning, the intention of being a member of the European Union forced Turkey to be more flexible in recognition of existence of the Kurds, and to loose the deployment of radical secularism over religious-related issues. In parallel with these developments, two rival political streams gradually obtained more space in which they could operate, especially in the political arena. Within this process, the perception has never changed or transformed from one side as being communist, and the other one, being Islamist. In other words, asking for more democracy for their own political stream does not include one another, as they were still ideologically driven political parties. This embedded and also inherited perception sometimes led them to co-opt with official state ideology against each other, if not in public, at least by standing silent while the official state ideology focused on one of them, to repress. Last but not least, the final decade of the 20th century witnessed the rise of pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic streams through increasing their support to the extent which the official state ideology had to withdrawn its oppressive policies over them. In terms of electoral politics in the Kurdish-populated areas, these distinctive and rival political streams had to produce certain politics in the eye of their own electorate in order to convince more of the electorate to vote for their parties. In light of these developments in Turkey, it can be said that these political streams, which came from grassroots political groups, have loosened

their rigid ideologically oriented understandings. Of course this effected the perception of each other and led them to have more comprehensive ideas of other rivals, in contrast to having simple communist versus Islamist holistic views of each other, as in the pre-1980s period.

As a result, new global and national conditions have created more suitable grounds upon which pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political parties were able to obtain much more support by loosening their rigid ideological standings and ideas—or at least, not emphasizing them. Regarding the pro-Islamic political stream, the AKP emphasized the concept of ‘conservative democrats’ which meant that they are not radicals anymore, and also respected democracy, which once they considered ‘un-Islamic’. On the other hand, the pro-Kurdish political stream, the HADEP, began to extend its influence from being totally Kurdish-centred, to becoming social democrats, in which they believed that Turks and Kurds, and all leftist variations could co-operate. It is hard to determine whether the democratization process and global developments influenced them to follow such strategy, or the other way around, yet it is an undeniable fact that the AKP became a ‘Turkey party’ by taking a substantial amount of votes from all over Turkey, and from all kinds of social classes and ethnicities. Within the first decade of the 21st century, the entrance of independent Kurdish candidates into parliament, and later the formation of a group there, was the first time that all fundamental ideologies of Turkey came together under the roof of a general assembly. The pro-Islamist AKP, the pro-Kurdish DTP, the Turkish nationalist MHP, and arguably, the Kemalist CHP have been shaping the politics in Turkey ever since.

The AKP’s all-encompassing struggle with the military overseeing the state structure at every level marked the initial years of its powers. Within those years it is hard to see any initiatives dealing with the Kurdish issue until 2007, with the election of Abdullah Gül as the president of the republic. As soon as the AKP felt comparatively free from the threat of coup d’état, possibly coming from the military, it delved into the Kurdish question by promoting a solution through ‘national unity and brotherhood’ projects, while at the same time forcing the pro-Kurdish political stream to put a clear distance between itself and the PKK by declaring it a terrorist organization. In this process, the leftist feature of the pro-Kurdish political stream has been deemphasized, and

rather, its status as being the sole representative of the Kurdish people has been promoted. Thanks to this initiative, the once public discussions of the Kurd and the Kurdish question have been legitimized. For the sake of solving the Kurdish question, further steps have been taken by the AKP governments such as negotiating with the life-long imprisoned Abdullah Öcalan, the head of the PKK, and allowing members of the BDP (currently representative of pro-Kurdish political stream) to visit him and carry his message to the Qandil mountain where the headquarter of the PKK is located (Ensaroğlu, 2013, p.14).

Such initiatives could not have even been possible while these two rival political streams had still considered each other as being 'communist and Islamist'. Taking down their guards towards each rival's ideologically based organizations, have made two contrary political groups working together, at least on the Kurdish issue. Of course, the concept of 'Ummah' reduces the importance of ethnic differences, and gives importance to religiosity, and can also be counted as another reason why the pro-Islamist political stream seems close to solving such issues of ethnic-denial.

The ideological orientation of each group has never gone away, but has enlarged their commonalities in terms of practices. Based on that, it might be possible to argue that most of the ruling elites of the pro-Kurdish and the pro-Islamist political streams would personally prefer to have a leftist Kurdish administration, and a religiously driven social and political structure, respectively. Their final target might be to transform the society towards their lines of understanding, gradually, but not in revolutionary manner. Thus, leftist approaches to Islam which is believed, according to them, one of the crucial barriers in order to liberate people from any kinds of irrational dogmas, should be changed, while at the same time, the Islamist approach to leftist ideas should be changed from perceiving the socialists or communists as 'Allahsız' (no faith to Allah) to those demanding an increase in the value of labour, and equality, as well as exploitation.

With regard to the most recent developments, the formation of another umbrella political party, consisting of social democrats and marginalized groups of society, the HDP (Halkların Demokrasi Partisi-People's Democracy

Party) indicates that immediately after the possible solution of the Kurdish question, the leftist ideology of a pro-Kurdish political stream would resurface as a dominant feature. Three MPs resigned from the BDP (Sabahat Tuncel, elected as the president of newly established party, Sırrı Süreyya Önder, a leftist Turk, and Ertuğrul Kürkçü) and joined the HDP. It is because of the ethnically Kurdish-centred appearance of the pro-Kurdish political stream, that it has always been an obstacle to cooperation with other Turkish and Kurdish leftist groups in Turkey. Considering that the PKK declared any political groups seeking a solution to the Kurdish question within the Turkish political arena as being betrayers, up to the end of the 1980s, the formation of such an umbrella political party is meaningful in terms of understanding to what extent the Kurdish political stream is free from the military overseeing of the PKK, or to what extent the PKK desires to be a legitimate political group within the politics of Turkey.

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