Security Issues of the Newly Independent States of Central Asia: The Cases of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan

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Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD

Department of Politics

March 1999

Summary

The thesis is a comparative examination of selected security threats and vulnerabilities which confronted Kazakstan and Uzbekistan between 1991-96. Through this study, the broader economic, political and social processes that accompanied their transition from Soviet republican status to independent statehood are exemplified.

The research is concerned with three case-studies which are prime regional concerns and will be central to the future development of the republics. These are:

- Government-minority relations; in Kazakstan between Almaty and the Russian community, and in Uzbekistan between Tashkent and the Tajik minority. This case-study explores issues of group political consciousness and mobilisation, political access and participation, and nation- and state-building;
- Competition and conflict over the region's riverine waters. The relationship between environmental resources, economic development and social stability are central to this study. The research suggests that elite and popular attitudes towards the exploitation and/or management of environmental resources, resource ownership and economic and environmental reform are of as equal significance to this debate as are actual environmental degradation and absolute resource scarcity; and
- Islam's ideological and physical challenge to the republics' political and security stability. Central to this debate are the issues of the state's ideological foundation, regime legitimacy, the blurred nexus between regime and state security, and the economic and social context in which political ideas compete.

The case-studies also offer a challenge to and critique of traditional Realist International Relations (IR.) assumptions on the concepts of *state* and *security*, because of their characteristics; intra- and/or trans-state in location, frequently indirect and non-specific in their consequences, and rooted as equally in the subjective and perceptual as they are in the physical realm. Consequently, a comprehensive security approach, based upon Pluralist IR. assumptions, has been applied. This perspective emphasises the multiple sources of insecurity that the two republics are confronted by, and the need for a broad range of policies to address such problems, which are particularly acute during transitional periods.

The principal conclusion drawn from this research is that whilst ethnicity, the environment and religion are not intrinsically destabilising, they were used in an aggressive and instrumentalist manner during the late-Soviet and early independence periods and have the potential to re-emerge as sources of tension in the near-future due to the absence of comprehensive reforms in the region's economic, political and social affairs.

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Acknowledgements

In the course of researching this thesis I have received the generous assistance and support of numerous individuals to all of whom I am much indebted.

The staff and students of the Department of Politics have provided me with a conducive and stimulating environment in which to undertake this thesis. Individual thanks is extended to my supervisor, Julian Birch, who has patiently steered my progress, Rob Collins and Sarah Cooke. Emma Cawley, Timothy Edmunds, Jeannie Grussendorf, John Steel, Darren Webb, and my family all have my gratitude for their consistent encouragement and interest.

My fieldwork would have not been possible without the invitations and assistance of Rafik Saifulin, from the Uzbekistan Institute of Strategic and Regional Studies, and the staff of the Civic Peace Association, Almaty. Numerous other individuals in the two republics, including Rita Chornysheva and Pamela Strong, my interpreters, Marzan and Mubarak, and all those whose interviews provided invaluable information, not only assisted my research but also offered hospitality and an insight into the life of the region, which I hope to be able to reciprocate in the future.

Glossary of Acronyms and Terms

Apparat: Party Administrative Apparatus.

AR/ASSR: Autonomous Republic/Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

Ataman: Cossack Leader.

Aul: Kazak migratory unit.

CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States. Formed in 1992 after the collapse of the USSR. It now contains Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

CPSU: Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

CSCE/OSCE: The Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe Known as the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe after 1994.

Din wa dawla: A political and religious role for Islam.

DUMK: The Muslim Spiritual Directorate for Kazakstan.

DUMSAK: The Muslim Spiritual Directorate for Central Asia and Kazakstan.

FSU: The Former Soviet Union.

Goskompriroda: The State Committee on the Environment.

Hokim: Regional governor in Uzbekistan.

Hadith: The traditions and sayings of the Prophet, consulted as a source of doctrine for issues not made clear in the Quran.

Haijj: The pilgrimage to Mecca. Muslims are expected to make his journey once in their life.

Imam: A Muslim spiritual leader. Ranging from a prayer leader to holder of supreme religious or political authority.

IRP: Islamic Renaissance Party.

Kolkhoz: Soviet Collective Farm.

Jihad: Holy war or struggle. Can be used either to designate a war waged in accordance with the Shari'a in defence of the faith, or as the personal struggle to become a better Muslim.

Madrasa: Religious school, where the Quran, Islamic law and related subjects are studied.

Mahalla: Uzbek neighbourhood.

MFA: The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Mirab: Water master.

Mullah: Religious teacher or preacher.

Nomenklatura: The system of political and administrative appointments from party approved list.

NIS: Newly Independent State.

Oblast: Administrative province, subordinate to SSR.

Oli Majlis: The Lower House of both Kazakstan and Uzbekistans' parliaments.

RF: Russian Federation.

RSFSR: Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic.

Shi'ia (Shi'ite): The branch of Islam which holds that Ali, Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law was his successor. They accept the spiritual authority of

Muhammad's direct descendants along the line of Ali. Found mainly in Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan Afghanistan.

Shari'a: Islamic religious law.

SNB: The successor to the KGB in Uzbekistan.

SSR: Soviet Socialist Republic.

Sunna: traditions of the Prophet and his initial followers. The term **Sunni** for the main branch of Islam derives from this term. Sunni Muslims recognise no divinely guided heir to Muhammad's spiritual authority, but accept the temporal authority of the caliphs and elected leaders.

Transoxiana: The land between the Amu Darya and Syr Darya.

Ulama: Religious leaders.

Umma: The Muslim community.

UTO: United Tajik Opposition.

Wahhabism: Ultraconservative Sunni puritan reformist movement. Eighteenth century in origin and is the prevalent form of Islam in Saudi Arabia.

Waqf: Religious endowment.

Viloyet: Post-1991 name for oblast in Uzbekistan.

Zhuz: Kazak term for Horde. The Kazaks are divided into the Greater (Ulu), Middle (Orta) and Small (Kichi) Zhuz.

Map 1. Central Asia - 1991


Area of Detail
Semipalatinsk
Lake Zayzan
KAZAKHSTAN
Gur'yev
Lake Balkash
Aral Sea
Kzyl-Orda
Alma-Ata
Caspian Sea
Zaliv Kara-Bogaz-Gol
UZBEKISTAN
Bishkek
KYRGYZSTAN
Tashkent
CHINA
Leninabad
TURKMENISTAN
Samarkand
TAJIKISTAN
Chardzhou
Dushanbe
Ashkhabad
IRAN
Mary
AFGHANISTAN
0 100 200 300 400 500
Kilometers
0 100 200 300
Miles

Source: Bremmer, I. & Taras, R. (eds.) 15.1. Central Asia *New States New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations*, CUP, Cambridge, 1997, p 546.

Map 2. Independent Kazakstan


RUSSIA
Kazakhstan
International boundary
Oblys boundary
National capital
Oblys capital
Railroad
Road
CHINA
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
KYRGYZSTAN
TAJIKISTAN
AFGHANISTAN
IRAN
PAKISTAN
Caspian Sea
Aral Sea
Almaty
Bishkek
Tashkent
Dushanbe
Ashgabat
Tehran
Kabul
Islamabad

Source: Bremmer, I. & Taras, R. (eds.) 15.2. Kazakstan *New States New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations*, CUP, Cambridge, 1997, p 547.

Map 3. Independent Uzbekistan


Uzbekistan
International boundary
Wiloyat or respublika boundary
National capital
Wiloyat or respublika capital
Railroad
Road
The city of Tashkent (Toshkent Shahri) has status equal to that of a wiloyat.
0 100 200 Kilometers
0 100 200 Miles
Lambert Conformal Conic Projection, SP 47N62N
KAZAKHSTAN
Aral Sea
QORAQALPOGHISTON RESPUBLIKASI
NAWOIY
BUKHORO
KHORAZM
JIZZAKH
SAMARQAND
QASHQADARYO
SURKHONDARYO
SIRDARYO
TOSHKENT
NAMANGAN
ANDIJON
FARGHONA
TURKMENISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
KYRGYZSTAN
AFGHANISTAN
PAKISTAN
IRAN
Tashkent
Bishkek
Dushanbe
Ashgabat
Kabul
Emba
Shalqar
Zhezqazghan
Aral
Beyneu
Qyzylorda
Mŭynoq
Qŭnghirot
Nukus
Urganch
Dashhowuz
Uchquduq
Navoiy
Bukhoro
Samarqand
Qarshi
Termiz
Chärjew
Mary
Turkistan
Zhambyl
Shymkent
Chirchiq
Angren
Namangan
Andijon
Osh
Jalal-Abad
Farghona
Qŭqon
Gulistan
Jizzakh
Khujand
Kŭlob
Khorugh
Mashhad
Neyshabur
Sabzevar
Bojnurd
Meymaneh
Mazar-e Sharif
Konduz
Chitral

Source: Bremmer, I. & Taras, R. (eds.) 16.1. Uzbekistan *New States New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations*, CUP, Cambridge, 1997, p 561.

1. Introduction

1.1. The Objectives of The Thesis

The aim of this research is to examine three selected security challenges which confronted the newly independent states (NIS) of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, during the period of 1991-6. It is not the intention of this study to provide a detailed discussion of the entire security milieu of the republics, but rather illustrate this through the case-studies. Security has been selected as an example of the wider political debate. The issues studied, all non-military in character, the author regards as indicative of the broader political issues and processes within these transitional societies. The comprehensive security approach acknowledges the multiplicity of sources of threats and vulnerabilities, and the need for a spectrum of economic, political and social policies, as well as, strictly military responses to these. The research aims to illustrate that military threats and confrontation are essentially the obvious and ultimate manifestations of serious underlying problems. It is the latter that are the focus of the thesis. Examination of these is, therefore, a means of assessing post-1991 trends in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan.

The three security concerns under examination are:

- The presence, and political treatment of minorities in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, respectively: the Russian and Tajiks. The principal focus is the government-minority relationship, rather than that between the titular and minority groups *per se*. The reason for this direction is that government policies in Almaty and Tashkent, particularly in the early independence period, on nation-/state-building, citizenship, and political participation influence communal relations.[1] Group mobilisation and competition over identification with and control of the state also encourage this analytical approach.

- Competition over riverine water resources. This case-study examines the potential for intra- and inter-state conflict resulting from competition over this resource. By undertaking this investigation the regional influence of human and natural degradation, inequitable distribution, economic reliance on a single resource, and industrial and population growth pressures will be highlighted. The declining quantity and quality of resources, often unintentionally and indirectly, affects a state's ability to function coherently. These issues will be analysed through a pro-environmental security perspective.

- Islam as an ideological and physical threat to regime and state security: As the state is a political construction, as well as, a physical entity, it is equally susceptible to challenges to its organisational ideology as it is to physical military aggression. The former are far more pervasive and ambiguous in their threat potential, and consequently more difficult to respond to. The Islamic revival in Central Asia, increased availability of alternative information sources, and the economic and population pressures suggest an enhanced political role for religion.

None of the three subjects under discussion are intrinsically direct military threats nor traditionally examined in Realist International Relations (IR.). In fact, their selection was a deliberate attempt to illustrate the limitations of this perspective in analysing the contemporary security milieu, in particular of transitional states. Although the thesis is critical of the Realist tradition and its over-emphasis upon the state as an unitary autonomous actor, the state and national security remain central to the study. Whatever the effectiveness or justification of the state in dealing with security in general and the subjects discussed in the case-studies in particular, it, or more accurately the regime, remains a key source of in/security, and the instrument and objective of the parties engaged in competition. The case-studies explore the relationships between government and the subjects under examination. The state therefore remains axiomatic to the security debate.

The three issues chosen have the ability to undermine the political and social stability of the republics. In the case of water-resources this is frequently indirect, and from Islam, the challenge is primarily ideological. Neither, however, are any less real. All three have previously resulted in physical conflict in the region and have the potential for future violent incidents. They therefore could be regarded as principally or solely as military security issues. As the thesis demonstrates, however, the causes, implications and management of the issues are essentially political not military. Traditional Realist IR. is therefore an inadequate analytical tool in explaining the processes at work.

Crucial to the selection of the case-studies is the manner in which they force one to analyse the domestic and external spheres of the state in conjunction rather than isolation. The trans-national character of all three poses one of the greatest challenges to their effective management and a direct and persuasive criticism of the Realist domestic-stability/external-insecurity dichotomy. The domestic-international nexus questions the primacy and effectiveness of autonomous unilateral state action. The state is susceptible to the influence of not only other states but also local, regional and global agents and trends, which the case-studies highlight.

A Comprehensive Security analysis based upon the Pluralist IR. perspective has therefore been adopted. This approach acknowledges and emphasises the multiplicity and interaction of security threats and the need for a broad range of policies and responses to address such problems, which are particularly acute during periods of transition. (This is discussed further in Chapter 2.)

It is the author's belief that the thesis' structure of three detailed case-studies is the most effective manner to conduct this debate. In contrast to either a single issue thesis or a broad examination of the general security environment, this approach enables individual in-depth analysis of each of the issues but also allows for the interdependency of political-security issues to be demonstrated. Both of these considerations, the author believes are crucial. Without sufficient depth of analysis the processes that determine the transition from legitimate political debate to violent conflict or management cannot be understood. This would be lost in a more universal survey. The question of interdependency between the case-studies and other factors is central to this work and therefore dictates the selection of two or more case-studies. As the research demonstrates, the case-studies have common and/or shared causes, contributory influences, traits and interactions between them. These are frequently negative and reinforce the problems and impede successful resolution of them on an individual basis. As Vasilii Vasilenko, an environmental politics analyst at the Kazakstan Institute of Strategic Studies, noted the region's "ecological problems cannot be solved without the resolution of its economic and political ones."[2]

1.2. The Thesis: Its Contribution to Contemporary Research on Central Asia

The thesis is an original and valuable addition to the body of research on post-Soviet Central Asia. It can be regarded as such because of four integral features:

- The combination of issues selected;
- The application of an established although relatively recent theoretical perspective to a new regional case-study;
- The date and time-span of the study; and
- The presentation of original primary material.

Whilst all three of the case-studies selected have been present in existing literature on the region's political and security situation, either in isolation or as components of broader surveys, there has been only a limited attempt to demonstrate their commonalities, interaction or the political implications emanating from this combined challenge.[3]

The thesis is principally empirical but it has clear theoretical assumptions rooted in the Pluralist IR. Given the republics' recent independence and the presence of trans-national issues, Central Asia provides a new region to evaluate established theoretical assumptions and models. The contemporary regional ascendancy of issues such as inter-state water competition, the revival of national and religious identities and economic and political transformations offer new opportunities for research. Literature on environmental security and political Islam, particularly empirical works on areas with common or relevant features can now be applied, assessed and expanded upon via this study.

The five year time span, from the republics' independence, was selected as a means of demonstrating the trends that the states have underwent during this important transitional period. With hindsight this has also become a useful denouement because of regional changes. These are the Russian-sponsored talks, in December 1996, between Tajikistan's President Imomali Rahmonov and Said Abdullo Nuri, leader of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), which led to the 27 June 1997 Moscow accord between the parties; and the northward advances of the Taliban in Afghanistan.[4] Both of these events have altered the region's political environment. The thesis is therefore an addition to and progression from the early post-independence publications which were expedient and valid responses to the major transformations of the period. Since the brief tumultuous period between 1989-92, when nationalism, inter-ethnic violence and Islamic "fundamentalism" were regarded as ascendant, omnipresent and malevolent, there has been a "second generation" of publications and research which has been able to undertake a more long-term assessment of regional trends. This thesis locates itself within this reassessment.

The thesis' primary claim to originality and advancement of regional research is not the presentation of new primary material, rather it is its synthesis of existing English and Russian language sources into a comprehensive and original argument. New material, principally a result of fieldwork in the republics, is however presented in the research. This is particularly the case for the study on the Tajik minority in Uzbekistan. To date, there are only two articles in English specifically focusing upon the community. Both are by Foltz and whilst valuable research they are essentially cultural in orientation.[5] The Tajik minority is cited in numerous general texts on Central Asia. The discussions contained within these are, however, limited in detail, scope and frequently in the reliability and expanse of their sources. The historic Tajik-Uzbek cultural conflict, Tajik irredentism in Bukhara and Samarkand and territorial claims between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are regularly cited as serious security concerns without any detailed analysis or critical examination of the actual basis and saliency of these issues.[6] The author's research on the subject has a high degree of information collected during the period of fieldwork in Uzbekistan, both printed material and interviews with Tajik academic, cultural and political representatives, a considerable element of which is presented in English for the first time.

The two states offer a comparative analysis of regional security challenges. Uzbekistan and Kazakstan were the first and last of the Central Asian republics to declare independence from the USSR, Uzbekistan on 31 August 1991, and Kazakstan on 16 December 1991. They provide an original opportunity to study the political stability and development of transitional states. Both are new states, with no precedents of modern statehood, although their Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) status was accompanied by considerable cultural, economic and political functions. Critical issues of statehood, for example, civil society, citizenship and sovereignty are in transition.

Although the republics contain the nuclei of titular nations, as political and territorial entities they are essentially Soviet constructions. The legacies of Soviet political norms and structures including the restricted nature of civil society are significant. Whilst the region does contain parallels with other post-colonial examples, there are crucial distinctions which make the region unique. These are principally related to the nature of the Soviet *empire*, which prevents an easy division between the coloniser and colonised. This was referred to by Spechler, with reference to Central Asia, as "Welfare Colonialism."[7]

As well as the shared Soviet experience there are other common themes. The republics are the most important of the five Central Asian republics (the other three are Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan), in terms of population, gross domestic product (GDP), and regional and global political status. Both are faced with sizeable minority populations, environmental degradation, economic difficulties and are neighboured by states with internal conflicts or potential expansionist ambitions.

Having acknowledged these common themes there are crucial differences between the republics. At the time of this study's initiation, 1994, the republics' economic and political direction were divergent. Kazakstan was pursuing a vigorous reform agenda and Uzbekistan a "gradualist" approach, retaining an authoritarian political culture and state-regulated economy. By 1996, the differences were less emphatic, although they remained considerable and justify the comparative element of the study.

There are also significant underlying differences between the republics in terms of the case-studies. These, discussed in greater detail in the relevant chapters, are:

- The republics' demography and the relative balance between their titular and minority communities: As a region, Central Asia is sparsely populated, with an average density of 13.4 people per km^2.[8] This conceals enormous variations. The Uzbekistani *viloyet* of Andijon, within the Fergana Valley, has a population density of 427 persons/km^2, whilst in the Kazakstani desert *oblast* of Qyzlorda, the figure is 3 people/km^2.[9] Uzbekistan is the most populous and densely populated of the Central Asian states. It has a population of approximately 23 million, 56% of Central Asia's total population.[10] In 1997, Kazakstan had a population of 18,600,700, the second largest in Central Asia.

Both republics have heterogeneous populations, each containing in excess of 100 ethnic groups. In Kazakstan, the titular and Russian communities were roughly equal throughout the late-Soviet period, although the Kazak proportion had been naturally increasing since the genocide and out-migration of the 1920-30s and the European immigration of the 1950s. In the 1989 census the Kazak proportion of the total population was 40% and the combined Russian and Ukrainian proportion 43%.[11] Only in 1997 did the Kazaks achieve an absolute majority in the republic.[12] Unlike Kazakstan, the Uzbeks have dominated their eponymous republic's population, throughout its existence. They accounted for 77.5% of the total population in 1996.[13]

There is another key difference between the republics' titular-minority relationships. The cultural boundary between Kazak and Russian is marked by a series of ethno-cultural indicators; religion, language and historical modes of production.[14] The Uzbeks, like the Russians, arrived as conquerors but rapidly assimilated the culture of their subjects, including sedentarisation, greater adherence to Islam and Persian literary high culture for example.[15] The division between the Tajiks and Uzbeks is now blurred. Language is a key disinction. The Tajik language is a branch of the Iranian linguistic group whilst modern Uzbek is based upon Chaghatai Turkic with similar origins to Kazak, but with Tajik influences.[16] Even the Tajik-Uzbek linguistic distinction is fluid. Bilingualism is common, particularly amongst the minority. Approximately 10% of Uzbekistani Tajiks considered Russian or Uzbek as their first language in the 1989 census.[17] The Uzbekistani Tajik dialect has considerable Turkic linguistic characteristics too.[18]

- The geography and hydrology of the republics. The majority of the region's land is steppe or desert. Combined, these flat and arid lands stretch from southern Siberia and the Kazak Steppe to the Kara Kum Desert and Kyzl Kum Deserts of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The region is fringed to the south and east by the Kopak Dag, the Pamirs (which cover approximately 90% of Tajikistan) and the Tien Shan mountains. Crucial to the four Aral Sea basin republics of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan plus the two southern Kazakstani oblasts of Shymkent (Chimkent) and Qyzlorda (Kyzl Orda), are the two main rivers in the region, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya. With the exception of these two oblasts, Kazakstan is geographically external of this eco-system.[19]

- The status of Islam in the two republics. Both states, although dominated culturally, demographically and politically by Muslims, are constitutionally secular.[20] The political, social and security implications of religion in the two republics is markedly different. In Kazakstan, the division is between the non-Muslim (*kafir*) European/Slav community, the secular though culturally Muslim government and the majority of the Kazak community, and a minority of more devout Muslims. In Uzbekistan, Islam is more universally and devoutly professed by Tajiks and Uzbeks alike. The division is essentially intra-Muslim, between a secular though Muslim-based government, a moderate Muslim majority, and a sizeable minority of more committed believers.

1.3. Methodology

The thesis is essentially an empirical study, for which a variety of English and Russian language primary and secondary printed sources were consulted. This work is underpinned by a Pluralist theoretical perspective which is discussed in detail in Chapter Two and to a lesser extent in the theoretical introductions to each of the case-studies. The assumptions and debates contained within the theoretical literature consulted are also discussed in the relevant sections. (See particularly 4.2) There are however general concerns about the motives, methodology and objectives of academic research on the FSU. This section will discuss this and the related issues surrounding fieldwork methodology.

Like its predecessor, Sovietology, the study of the post-Soviet republics has been subject to intense debates concerning its coherence, methods and objectives. The core issues pertinent to this thesis are: the accessibility and reliability of primary material and the objectivity and motivation of actors and commentators.

To some extent, these problems have legitimate causes. Whilst the republics and information pertaining to them has become more accessible in comparison to the Soviet era, particularly the pre-*glasnost* period, deliberate government censorship, self-censorship and mis-information remain evident. There has also been reversals in freedom of information and speech, particularly in Uzbekistan. These difficulties have not clarified events in Central Asia or aided research. This paucity, unreliability and control of information consequently is a constant difficulty for those attempting to provide a comprehensive analysis of regional events. A key problem is avoiding relying upon such information to a degree that its limited nature and reliability does not suggest. Such problems were evident in some of the publications which emerged after the disintegration of the USSR. Initial predictions of a strong Turkish regional role post-1991 were revised when greater realism was injected into the analysis of Ankara's ambitious views on economic and cultural ties with the NISs, the pro-Turkish statements of Central Asian elites, and foreign policy aims and capabilities of the Central Asian republics themselves.[21]

Two other problematic issues when consulting primary and secondary material are recognised by the author. These are the differences in intellectual standards and values between the Soviet and non-Soviet academic traditions, and the political impartiality and objectives of both scholastic communities.

In the case of the former Sakwa highlights a long-standing debate in Sovietology, the extent to which Western political science's assumptions discourse, and methodology are relevant for the FSU.[22] Although Sakwa focuses upon Russia, this concern is equally applicable for Central Asia. Authors such as Gleason and Wittfogel have, for example, emphasised the centrality of water in the region's culture and politics.[23] It is argued that this factor has been influential in the establishment of regional traits of deference to authority, and the priority of the collective over the individual. The region's distinctive political and social development makes concepts including *civil society, democracy* and *freedom of speech* central to western political traditions, not necessarily easy or relevant to apply to Central Asia. Elite and popular political attitudes are regarded as axiomatic in the development and/or alleviation of the problems discussed in the case-studies. Therefore whilst the application of western political concepts is problematic the debate surrounding their inclusion is acknowledged and even cultivated in the thesis.

A more disturbing concern is the objectivity and motivations of authors involved in this field. Academic interest in Soviet and post-Soviet affairs has been highly charged and a sensitive arena. The issue of impartiality of the region's indigenous scholars is noted by Sakwa, re-emphasising Pusic's work.[24] Both are sceptical about the development of "an objective social science that would be neutral in relation to politics and the state and adhere to its own scholarly criteria" in the region.[25] The work of Kazakstani and Uzbekistani authors, frequently schooled in Soviet-era academia, has frequently paralleled and supported government views. To some extent this is understandable given the nation- and state-building projects that have been undertaken after seventy years of Soviet monopolisation of all aspects of public affairs. The constraints upon academic independence and the level of research standards amongst post-Soviet scholars are however major concerns posing serious questions about the reliability of such material. One interview which the author conducted demonstrated both the close academic-political elite relationship and the unreliability of information accessible in the region. In this meeting the Kazakstani analyst complained that Russian research on northern Kazakstan was biased and inaccurate whilst he offered migration statistics at odds with Almaty's own official and easily available figures.[26] (See 3.4.v.) Similar charges of chauvinism and questionable research methods should also be recognised in elements of relevant Russian material.[27]

Whilst indigenous criticism of the accuracy and motives of extra-regional writers has been frequently alarmist, one needs to acknowledge that the objectives of the latter group are at times moot. Western and in particular US interests in oil/mineral resources, the threat of Islamic Fundamentalism and Iranian and Russian regional interests have infused the debate. Starr's "Making Eurasia Stable" is an obvious example of this.[28] The article's acceptance of authoritarianism in Uzbekistan is related to its favourable view of a Tashkent-Washington alliance against Iranian, Islamist and Russian regional ambitions.

In addition to the use of printed primary and secondary sources, the thesis also drew upon material collected during fieldwork conducted between September and November 1996 in the two republics. This exercise had a series of objectives:

- To test the working hypothesis of the thesis;
- To furnish distinct and additional primary information, that was unavailable outside of the republics, and;
- To provide the author with a working knowledge of regional political and social norms, i.e. the broader environment in which the case-studies are taking place.

The principal activity of the fieldwork was the conducting of over 40 elite interviews. Interviewees were involved in politics, whether at the national and general level or more specifically related to one of the subjects discussed in the case-studies. They were drawn from academic, cultural, environmental and political bodies and institutions as well as representatives of international organisations (IOs.). This group had several attributes which made them ideal for selection in the interview programme. These centred around their access to relevant information and direct experience of the issues under discussion.

- The interviewees' vocational experience meant they had intellectual and practical proximity to the issues under examination. This was a key reason for their selection. Rafik Saifulin, Deputy Director of the Uzbekistani Institute of Strategic and Regional Studies for example was an advisor to President Karimov, whilst Vasily Vasilenko of the Kazakstan Institute of Strategic Studies co-authored *the Conception of the Environmental Safety of the Republic of Kazakhstan.*[29] In the case of the Tajik case-study, active members of the minority, whether in the Samarkand movement, at Tashkent Cultural Centre or scholars at the Samarkand State University (SamGU), had direct experience in the group's cultural and political revival in the last decade and Tashkent's response to this.[30] The interview programme sought to establish a survey, albeit limited, of the views of figures closely involved in or holding relevant information on the issues in the thesis.

- Interviews with this elite group, all representatives of recognised bodies and institutions which had previously publicly commented upon the relevant topics meant that their responses could be examined in the context of existing statements by these individuals, peers and their and other organisations. It was therefore possible to evaluate whether there was consistency in attitudes towards the issues over time and in relation to different audiences for this information.

- The target group was also selected due to its collective familiarity in discussing the topics in a structured format.

- Given the two month duration of the field study it would have been difficult to conduct a quantitative-based survey programme. The thesis emphasises the role of political elites and central government in determining the development of the issues under examination and the instrumentalist and political manipulation of them. A broader sociological approach would not have necessarily provided relevant or detailed information. Popular limited access to and interest in politics; unfamiliarity, scepticism and even suspicion over publicly voicing their own opinions reduced the value of this research approach.[31] (This is discussed further below.) Another constraint on public opinion surveys was its requirement of a large body of interviews. Financial, language and time considerations precluded such an approach.

The interviews followed a common format. The majority were formal with standard general questions concerning the republics' problems and trends asked of all the interviewees. These questions were then supplemented by detailed questions tailored to the interviewee's field of expertise. Again a relatively consistent range of case-specific questions were asked, about inter-ethnic relations, environmental affairs, international relations or security for example. The application of a common framework for all the formal interviews established a comparative and cumulative, although small, analysis of elite attitudes and knowledge. Individuals were given an opportunity at the end of the interview to offer any information that the closed questions had not raised.

Informal interviews were also conducted whenever the opportunity arose, with both relevant elites and general acquaintances of the author. These were useful in providing the personal dimension towards key topics and gauging general opinions on contemporary life.[32]

In addition, the author attended the *OSCE Seminar on Sustainable Development in the Aral Sea Basin Region*, in Tashkent 30 October-1 November 1996, which not only provided valuable transcripts and documentation on the region's environmental crisis but also an insight into the dynamics of regional diplomacy and government- IO/Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) relations. Russian-language printed material was also obtained during the visit. The collection of original material in the republics was of particular importance for the Tajik case-study.

Whilst the material collected from interviews and more informal contacts during the period of fieldwork proved valuable, its constraints, as with some of the printed sources discussed above, must be acknowledged. These centre around the question of obtaining reliable information in the restricted political culture of post-Soviet societies. Information is frequently regarded as a valuable commodity to be restricted as much as possible. In fact given the legacy of closed politics in the Soviet period, the continued association between access to information and power is understandable. The two governments continue to attempt to monopolise and regulate the dissemination of information. This issue has been raised by Lubin, Sakwa and Wixman.[33] Another consideration also highlighted by Lubin and Wixman is that of interviewees providing answers that they think are either expedient for their own safety or what they feel the interviewer wishes to hear.[34] Wixman found that the most open replies on ethnic identity and inter-ethnic relations were articulated by the young, students and mothers, especially in mixed marriages, whilst academics, institution staff and all officials replied with answers that "read like standard textbooks."[35]

As this section has emphasised primary resources, whether oral or printed, and secondary literature frequently contains areas of concern, relating to the accuracy, impartiality and reliability of information, and the accountability and objectivity of concerned individuals. Whenever possible information has therefore been corroborated with other sources. In fact, the reliability of source material, produced in a region where government and self-censorship remains endemic and information channels are limited in number and variety meant that a cautious approach has been adopted throughout.

1.4. The Structure of the Thesis

The research is divided between the five .subsequent chapters. These are as follows:

- Chapter Two: This will establish the theoretical framework of the study. As such it will discuss the debates relating to the concepts of *state* and *security*. It will also provide an overall literature review on security theory in general and comprehensive security in particular.

Chapters Three, Four and Five, will examine the case-studies on government-minority relations, water resources, and Islam respectively. Within each will be a theoretical section which will examine specific debates not included in Chapter Two, an historical section indicating the background and precedents of the subjects under discussion and finally the actual case-study. In the case of Chapter Three, the two republics will be examined, as far as, possible as separate entities. In Chapter Four, on water resource competition, and to a lesser extent Chapter Five, on Islam, a more thematic rather than state-based approach will be adopted. This is a consequence of the regional and trans-national nature and implications of the issues.

Chapter Six, the conclusion, will summarise the case-studies, emphasising the inter-action between them and with other factors, in particular economic issues, that have not been specifically discussed in the main chapters. It will then assess the case-studies in the wider economic, political and social milieu indicating the implications for the republics' contemporary and future political development and stability.

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[1] Almaty was known as Alma-Ata during the Soviet period. The capital was moved to Astana on 10/6/98. Astana was previously known as Tselinograd and between 1991-6 as Aqmola. *The Economist*, 6/6/98, p 78.

[2] Vasilenko, V. Kazakstan Institute of Strategic Studies. Author's interview, Almaty 2/10/96.

[3] For useful texts on regional inter-ethnic relations see: Tishkov, V. *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflicts In and After the Soviet Union*, PRIO/Sage, London, 1997.

Environmental Security: deBardeleben, J. & Hannigan, J. (eds.) *Environmental Security and Quality After Communism: Eastern Europe and the Soviet Successor States*, Westview, Boulder, 1995; Klötzli, S. "The Water and Soil Crisis in Central Asia - A Source for Future Conflicts?" *ENCOP Occasional Paper*, No. 11, Center for Security Policy and Conflict Research/Swiss Peace Foundation, Zurich/Berne, May 1994; & Smith, D.R. "Environmental Security and Shared Water Resources in Post-Soviet Central Asia" *Post Soviet Geography*, Vol. 36, No. 6, 1995, pp. 351-370.

Islam and Regional Politics: Haghayegni, M. *Islam and Politics in Central Asia*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1995; & Splidsboel-Hansen, F. "The Official Russian Concept of Contemporary Central Asian Islam: The Security Dimension" *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 8, 1997, pp. 1501-17.

General political and security trends: Akiner, S. "Conflict, Stability and Development in Central Asia" in Dick, C.J. (ed.) *Instabilities in Post-Communist Europe*, Carmicheal and Sweet, Portsmouth, 1996, (iv); Gleason, G. *The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1997, (iv); Petersen, P. "Security in Post-Soviet Central Asia" *European Security*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1995, pp 132-219; & Sagdeev, R. & Eisenhower, S. (eds.) *Central Asia, Conflict, Resolution, and Change* CPSS, Chevy Chase, 1995.

[4] RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 1 No. 78, Pt 1, 22/7/97; & Pannier, B. "A Year of Violence" *Transitions*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 7/2/97, p 97.

[5] Foltz R. "The Tajiks of Uzbekistan" *Central Asian Survey*, 1996, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 213-6. Also see Haghayeghi, M. op cit., pp. 195-7; Schoeberlein-Engel, J. "The prospects for Uzbek National Identity" *Central Asian Monitor*, 1996, No. 2, pp. 12-20; & Horsman, S. "The Tajik Minority in Contemporary Uzbekistani Politics" in K. Cordell, (ed.) *Ethnicity and Democratisation in the New Europe*, Routledge, (Autumn 1998).

[6] See Rumer, B. "The Potential For Regional Instability and Regional Conflicts" in Banuazizi, A. & Weiner, M. (eds.) *The New Geopoltics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands*, I.B. Tauris, London, 1994; & Helgesen, M. "Central Asia: Prospects for Ethnic and Nationalist Conflict" in Duncan, W.R. & Holmes, G.P (eds.) *Ethnic Nationalism and Regional Conflict in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia*, Westview, Boulder, 1992, pp. 145-6.

[7] Spechler argues that "Welfare Colonialism" was neither traditional economic exploitation nor selfless benevolence but an attempt to combine three diverse elements: genuine inter-ethnic economic equality, social welfarism, and prudent policies towards the burgeoning Muslim population. Spechler, M. "Regional Development in the USSR 1958-87. The Soviet Economy in a time of Change" *A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of USA*, Vol. 1, Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, 1979, p 145. Quoted in Rywkin, M. *Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia*, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 1982, p 57.

[8] Based upon figures from Gleason, G. Table 1.1. States, Populations, Territories, op cit., p 14. (iv)

[9] The administrative province previously known as an *Oblast* has been renamed *Viloyet* in Uzbekistan. Smith D.R. Table 3 Indicators of Regional Susceptibility to Water-Related Conflict in Central Asia op cit., p 361.

[10] Bohr, A. Table 1 Ethnic Composition of Uzbekistan in *Uzbekistan: Politics and Foreign Policy*, RIIA, London, 1998, p 33 (ii)

[11] Bremmer, I. & Taras, R. *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States*, CUP, Cambridge, 1993, Appendix B, p 555.

[12] Kazak-50.6%, Russian and Ukrainian-36.7%, and Others-12.7%. *Kazakhstanskaia pravda*, 27/5/97. Quoted in Bohr, A. Table 7.1. Ethnic Composition of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan "The Central Asian States as Nationalizing Regimes"

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in Smith, G. *Nation-building in Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities*, CUP, Cambridge, 1998, p 22. (i)

[13] Bohr, A. Table 1 Ethnic Composition of Uzbekistan op cit., p 33. (ii)

[14] Admittedly this is a generalisation and there are exception to this division. Urban Kazaks had by the end of the USSR undergone a major process of Russification. Fredrik Barth defined mode of production. as "an economic regime plus its associated context of social organisation." Barth, F. *Process and Form in Social Life, Selected Essays of Fredrik Barth*, Vol. 1, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1981, pp. 188 & 192. Quoted in Subtelny, M.E. "The Symbiosis of Turk and Tajik" in Manz, B.F. (ed.) *Central Asia in Historical Perspective*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1994, p 46.

[15] See Subtelny, M. op cit.

[16] The contemporary Uzbek literary language is based upon the Tashkent and Fergana dialects plus Chaghatai and to a lesser extent Kipchak, Oghuz, and Karaluk-Uighur influences.

[17] The 1989 Soviet Census on CD-ROM, Eastview Press Publications, 1996.

[18] See Foltz, R. op cit., pp. 214 & 216.

[19] This was indicated by the fact that during the Soviet period, the term *Srednia Aziia* (Middle Asia) was applied to the Kyrgyz, Tajik, Turkmen and Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs). The Kazak SSR excluded. In 1993, the presidents of the five republics declared that the term *Tsentralnia Aziia* (Central Asia) should include Kazakstan. Brown, B. "Kazakstan Is Also Part of Central Asia" *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Daily Report*, 5/1/93, p 2.

[20] See Article 2 *Konstitutsiia Respubliki Kazakhstan*, Almaty, 1995; & Articles 18 & 61, *The Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan*, Uzbekiston, Tashkent, 1993.

[21] See for example Dannreuther, R. "Creating New States in Central Asia" *Adelphi Paper*, No 288, IISS/Brassey's, London, 1994, pp. 62-3.

[22] Sakwa, R. "Russian Studies; The Fractured Mirror" *Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1996, pp. 180-1.

[23] Gleason, G. "The Struggle for Control over Water in Central Asia: Republican Sovereignty and Collective Action" *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3, 21/6/91, p 11. (ii); & Wittfogel, K.W. *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1957; Also see Lubin for discussion on the popular desire to maintain social stability even if this requires authoritarianism. Lubin, N. *Central Asians Take Stock: Reform, Corruption and Identity*, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, 1995.

[24] Sakwa, R. op cit., p 179-80; & Pusic, V. "Intellectual Trends, Institutional Changes and Scholarly Needs In Eastern Europe" *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 7, no 1, pp. 1-13. Quoted in ibid.

[25] Pusic, V. op cit., p 2. Quoted in Sakwa, R. op cit., p 179.

[26] Sadit Zhisipov, Kazakstan Institute of Strategic Studies. Author's Interview, Almaty, 1/10/96.

[27] Kulchik for example cites that 85% of the Kazak deputies elected in 1994 were from the Big Zhuz, although the information he based this upon was only able to indicate their geographical rather than clan background. Kulchik, Y. "Central Asia after the Empire: Ethnic Groups, Communities, and Problems" in Sagdeev, R. & Eisenhower, S. (eds.) *Central Asia, Conflict, Resolution, and Change* CPSS, Chevy Chase, 1995 , p 110. This point was brought to the author's attention by Dr S Akiner.

[28] Starr, F. "Making Eurasia Stable" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 1, 1996, pp. 80-92.

[29] "The Conception of the Environmental Safety of the Republic of Kazakhstan" *Noosfera - Ustoitchzivoe Razitie*, Almaty, 1, 1996, pp. 159-69.

[30] The author was unable to arrange formal interviews with representatives of the Russian cultural and political movements in Kazakstan.

[31] For further information on the problems of a sociological approach to studying the FSU see Lubin, N. op cit., p 16; & Sakwa, R. op cit., p 180.

[32] Criticism of politicians and disenchantment with politics was easier to be voiced in such contacts. At the popular level common topics of debate were economic difficulties of transition, fear of Islamic fundamentalism and in Kazakstan anti Chinese and Semitic attitudes.

[33] Lubin, N. op cit., p 16; Sakwa, R. op cit., p 179; & Wixman, R. "Ethnic Attitudes and Relations in Modern Cities" in Fierman, W. (ed.) *Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1991, p 160.

[34] Lubin, N. op cit., p 16.

[35] Wixman, R. op cit., p 160.

2. Defining The State and Security

2.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to establish the theoretical framework for the subsequent case-studies. Although this thesis is principally an empirical study, it has clear theoretical assumptions rooted in the Pluralist International Relations (IR.) tradition which will be discussed in this chapter.

The central theme *security,* is a highly contested concept, as the subsequent discussions in this chapter and on environmental security in Chapter 4.2 indicate. The concept can be directed towards the individual, group, regime, state or globe. Its most common form *national security,* and its reference, the *state*, are themselves contested concepts. This thesis seeks to move beyond the limitations of Realist concepts and theories of the *state* and *security.* It is the author's contention that security threats are more varied in form and origin than traditional IR. theory acknowledges. The domestic realm of the state is as equally liable to produce security problems, for the state, as the external arena is. Equally, without attempting to provide inclusive security for the entire population the integrity of the state, both as a physical entity and a legitimate social structure, is weakened. In multi-ethnic entities, such as Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, the need for such an interpretation is vital. In common with the majority of the world's states, Kazakstan and Uzbekistan do not bear close resemblance to the theoretical model advanced by traditional political theory. Although the inconsistencies between theory and reality are not unusual, the need to define concepts and terminology remains imperative. Discussion upon *state* and *security,* particularly the internal dynamics of the former and the expansion in the application of the latter, will form the basis of this chapter.

2.2. The State

2.2.i. Introduction: The basis for the definition of the state is the trinity of "territory, people and a government."[1] The term is as much an abstract notion based upon political theory and international law as it is an empirical entity.[2] This definition only partially explains the state's dynamics. It remains a description of the constituent elements of the state.

The state is greater than the sum of its parts. The difficulty in understanding the state is the fact that it is both ideological and physical. Its *de facto* existence and ideological identity are of equal relevance. It is easier to classify those influences which belong to the ideological nature of the state rather than those which are explicitly physical. Organisational ideology, political theory, international law, all exist in the realm of the former. Many of its components, such as society, government, territory and nation, have abstract relevance, as well as, a physical existence.

Similarly, definition is not aided by the divergence of academic approaches towards the subject. IR. has sought to focus almost exclusively upon the external context, neglecting the state's internal dynamics. For traditional Realists, the state is "an independent political community"[3] or "(a) territorial association of people recognised for the purpose of law and diplomacy as a legally equal member of the system of states ... for the purpose of their participation in the international system."[4] As such the state is an equal and unitary competitor in international affairs. The domestic and external arenas are artificially divorced and imbued with different qualities. The former is regarded as stable and the latter anarchical and competitive. This division helps explain the traditional external-orientation of security studies.

Alternatively, Sociological and Political Science interest has been focused towards the domestic arena. These disciplines regard the state as a "set of administrative, policing and military organizations, more or less well-coordinated, by an executive authority."[5] As such the state consists of the institutions and structures that control the state entity described by IR. thinking. Although Buzan believes that the Sociological interpretation of the state "is too narrow to serve as a basis for thinking about security," its significance is that it questions the assumed compatibility and homogeneity of *state* and *society*, espoused by Realist thinking.[6] In its place, this more specific definition recognises the divisions between the central executive and political elite and society and within society itself.

The state exists and functions on both the domestic and international fronts. It and its constituent elements are subject to both internal and external influences. A comprehensive definition that combines both the IR. and Sociological perspectives is an effective means of analysing the state. As Buzan comments "[t]here is nothing other than the momentum of habit and argument to prevent the merger of these two views."[7]

In accepting that security threats can originate from within the state, as well as, externally it becomes necessary to explore the internal dynamics of the state, as highlighted by Skocpol. As a result, sources of competition and friction between the state components can been assessed and also the inter-action between the state's internal and external arenas.

2.2.ii. The Domestic Dynamics of the State: The complexity of the state can be illustrated through the study of the relationship between the constituent elements of the state: "the idea of the state"; society; state apparatus; and territory. Unless the trinity of territory, population and government are subjected to serious analysis the internal dynamics and functioning of the state remain ignored and the state is perceived, incorrectly, as an autonomous and coherent organism impervious to the influence of other agents. Domestic security challenges consequently remain hidden. A failure to accept the susceptibility of the state to internal and non-military external influences prevents the construction of a comprehensive approach towards state security.

2.2.ii.a The State and State Apparatus: This is possibly the key distinction to highlight. It is essential to indicate the separation of these two terms for this work. This is because the relationship between the two is possibly the most intimate and ambiguous. It has particularly sensitivity in the security sphere. The central apparatus, represents the state entity and under international law has the monopoly to employ force as a political instrument, both domestically and internationally. As the representative of the state, the government's domestic sovereignty demands the loyalty and respect of its citizens. The government is able to derive political legitimacy and support from social identification with the state. It is therefore easy for the distinction between government and that state to become blurred and abused. As 2.2.ii.d. and Chapter 5 demonstrate, however, a regime's authority and legitimacy may also be eroded by these social forces. The distinction between the two is not aided by the dual use of the term *state*, as previously noted. With a domestic-orientation the Sociological definition of the state is,

> "an organisation composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state's leadership that has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people, as well as, the parameters of rule making for other social organizations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way."[8]

This conceptualisation, corresponding to that of Skocpol, will be referred to by the author as the *central executive, government* or *regime*. The central executive is the ultimate source of authority within the state. It includes the legislative, executive and judiciary, enforcement and defence agencies, the civil service, and the personnel within these bodies. The term *state* will refer to the combination of government, "the idea of the state," population and territory.

It is because the central executive assumes the role of representative of the state that government and state have been often perceived as synonymous. Historically, regimes have frequently attempted to legitimise and strengthen their own position by associating their own identity and survival with that of the state. In states where state-building is in its infancy, the distinction regime security and *national* security is regularly abused and regimes may protect their own survival by "provoking national security concerns."[9]

The survival of the state is not, however, dependent upon the retention of a particular form of government. "Governing institutions can change without interrupting the continuity of the state."[10] In Buzan's terminology, it is the *organisational ideology*, the intellectual basis of the state that has changed. (Discussed below in 2.2.ii.d.) As Vincent acknowledges "[i]f governments were totally identified with the State (sic) then each removal of government would entail a crisis in the State. ... This point should make us very wary of linking up all practices of government with the State."[11] Dramatic transformations, including changes in the state's organisational ideology or territorial fragmentation may take place whilst its international recognition and domestic coherence and responsibilities remain intact or are assumed by the successor state(s). In the case of the USSR, Russia assumed its international obligations including its permanent seat on the

UN Security Council whilst many of the other successor states although they had little or no precedent as sovereign states were integrated into the international system.[12] The cross-fertilisation and mutual support between the domestic and external duties and spheres of the state act as a stabilising factor when individual components of the state are under crisis or transformation.

The conclusion is, however, stark, state and government cannot be equated. The central executive, as the sociological approaches emphasises is an element of the greater state totality with its own distinctive characteristics and ambitions. Buzan's conclusion that "the reduction of the state to mean simply the institutions of central government does not work at the international level" is equally applicable to the domestic arena.[13]

2.2.ii.b. The State and Domestic Society: The mistaken direct identification of state with society is common and most noticeable in reference to the term *nation.*[14] *State* and *nation* have tended to become synonymous to a degree that leads many to refer to *national interests* when in fact they mean *state interests*, while others simply refer to a world of *nation-states.* Stoessinger's declaration that the contemporary world is comprised of over one hundred *nation-states* and that the *nation-state* has become globally ubiquitous is incorrect.[15] Beetham also promotes a similar claim, stating that "in the second half of the present century ... since the break-up of the colonial empires ... this formation [the nation-state] has become universal across the globe."[16] Nation and state are not, however, synonymous.

The Westphalian concepts of state and sovereignty may have now achieved global predominance, and nationalism played a central role in this process but the international system is not inhabited by *nation-states.* The majority of the world's states are multi-ethnic in composition. According to the result of one study, only one quarter of the world's states can be equated with "the conventional concept of the nation-state."[17] Only 12 of the 132 states in existence in 1972 had homogenous populations. In 40%, the population was divided into at least six significant groups.[18] Throughout the Former Soviet Union (FSU) many of the successor republics have heterogeneous populations. Kazakstan and Uzbekistan both have in excess of one hundred national groups.

The issue of the *nation* demonstrates the fragmented nature of society. Societal divisions may occur along religious, geographical, gender or economic fissures, for example. What is vital for the integrity of the state is its ability to produce a coherent focus for popular loyalty and identification, which supersedes or placates other allegiances, in order to secure consent.

The state-society relationship is asymmetrical if not hierarchical.[19] Axiomatic to the state's dominant position to domestic society is the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty functions at the two levels of the state, the domestic and the international. At its most basic state sovereignty has been defined as the "idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in the political community ... and no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere."[20] The state is supreme over its domestic charge and equal to all other states in the international system. It is this supposition which has enabled the state to transcend, assimilate and frequently destroy "all other political units to the extent that it has become the universal standard of political legitimacy."[21]

Internationally, state sovereignty is recognised and guaranteed by the international community. "States are [viewed as] the persons of public International Law" with equal rights to exist and pursue their own domestic agendas as they see fit, in return for the mutual respect of other states' territorial and political integrity.[22] The state system bestows upon its members a self-sustaining legitimacy. As Walzer noted "it is not [the] purpose [of] international society to establish liberal or democratic communities, but only independent ones."[23]

Domestically, sovereignty offers, theoretically at least, the state "unlimited power over its citizens, unrestrained by law."[24] Sovereignty assumes that the "state is able to enforce decisions and ... maintain order within the state. Thus the capacity to exercise coercive authority is an essential ingredient."[25] Internal sovereignty sets the state apart from its population as the ultimate authority in their lives, and is able to conduct its internal policies towards them without censure. Sovereignty does not presuppose that the goals and security of state and society are necessarily conterminous. Sovereignty provides the state with the right to exist even if opposed by the majority of its own population. In "the modern world, ... states can be less responsive to, and less representative of their societies precisely because of their international role, is submerged, *ab initio*, by the assumption of the 'national-territorial' concept."[26]

The domestic authority and freedom from interference that sovereignty provides the state with have become increasingly conditional. Opinion within the international community, particularly since the end of the Cold War is gradually accepting the possibility of (humanitarian) intervention.[27] As former UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar noted that,

> "we are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes towards the belief that the defence of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over *frontiers* and legal documents."[28]

This re-appraisal has allowed for legislation to promote humanitarian intervention.[29] Sovereignty is, therefore neither an absolute legal protection from external criticism and intervention, nor guarantee of domestic legitimacy.

The state demands and requires the obedience of its citizens. The state, through its central executive enforces compliance. The state apparatus is able to fashion social norms through its plethora of administrative, legislative and coercive instruments and other indirect mediums, including, education policy, official historiography and government appointments and contracts, for example. The degree to which the state apparatus has consent and legitimacy acceptance is paramount to internal peace and stability. Coercion cannot, however, indefinitely maintain the state's authority and legitimacy. In fact "[c]oercion and consent are not mutually exclusive but complimentary."[30] The balance between the two is delicate. The state apparatus, whether democratic or dictatorial in ideology and function requires popular support, as well as, the means of enforcement. Consent is one of the requirements of the long-term survival of a state, and regime. Although the state can exist for short historical periods without societal consent, especially through coercion, there is a need for "a widespread ... deep-rooted idea of the state among the population" for it to ultimately succeed.[31] It is widespread consensus which provides the cohesion and legitimacy of the state, and determines much of its character and authority.[32] (Also see below 2.2.ii.d.)

The more fragmented a society is, the potential for intra- and state-society tension is enhanced. This is because the idea and the cohesion of the state is less developed and vulnerable to challenges. However, if the state attempts to forcibly establish an unitary state identity, coercing groups to adhere, or to assimilate into the dominant identity, conflict is equally possible as non-mainstream groups may resist this process, fearful of the threat to their distinct identity and objectives.

As well as the state's executive authority posing a threat to its own population, domestic groups may constitute a challenge to the integrity of the state. Internal threats may range from political opposition to the existing government, to irredentism or separatism.. As previously mentioned, however, a change of organising ideology does not necessary imply the collapse of the state. The dilemma in analysing domestic-oriented state security is the question of when a government is entitled to employ force to sustain its own position and the integrity of the state. Governments often employ national security requirements to justify and increase "their powers against domestic opponents."[33] Frequently these proclamations are more to do with the maintenance of regime security than state security. The state-society, or more correctly government-society relationship frequently results in a problem Buzan and Sorensen have recognised - the state as the primarily source of threat to the individual's security.[34] This is a fundamental concern of this work, requiring the need to establish a form of state security which is able to confront the multiplicity of threats emanating from and directed at both the state and society.

2.2.ii.c. The State and Territory: The issue of territory can be divided into two related spheres, the physical landmass that a state occupies, and the abstract identification of a state with a "homeland."

At its most basic, territory provides the space and boundaries of a state. The state usually occupies a defined and delimited area. Borders, many artificial in origin, have become entrenched. "Mutual territorial recognition ... is the foundation of contemporary international society."[35]

This connection between a particular state and a specific geographic area is not always static, although the territorial space of the world's present states is less flexible than it was in previous eras. Territorial expansion or contraction, although it may indicate the state's stature in the international system, or internal demographic, economic or political transformations does not necessarily imply the total cessation of the state. Temporary loss of the trappings of statehood and sovereignty including the forcible integration into another state, such as the incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR or a major move of territory such as Poland's post-W.W.II approximate 300 km westward shift did not obliterate the existence or the "idea of state" of these republics.

The other aspect of the state-territory equation is abstract in nature, equally emotional as theoretical. As a metaphysical idea, territory provides considerable sustenance for nationalism and the state. In the case of Kazakstan, the Kazaks' cultural affinity with the nomadic lands, and the Soviet degradation of these lands through agricultural, industrial and military practices were significant factors in the rise of late-Soviet Kazak nationalism. The Kazakstani Constitution is a prime example of the cooption of *land* and *nation* in legitimating the state. The preamble to the 1995 Kazakstani Constitution declares that "[w]e, the people of Kazakstan ... create a state on primordial Kazak land."[36] This example demonstrates the manner in which politicians and society alike attempt to construct a concept of the state which derives its origins from a previous association between ethnicity and territory and mould the state components into a single homogenous ideal.

2.2.ii.d. The Idea of the State: As a political entity with an ideological, as well as, physical foundation the state is exposed to non-material challenges. "Security is as much a psychological concept as it is a physical one."[37] "The idea of the state is the most abstract component of the model [the state], but also the most central."[38] Its main sources are the concepts of the *nation* and *organising ideology*.[39] The idea of the state is likely to be based upon, and reflect, the cultural and political norms of the dominant group. The Soviet idea of the state, although officially internationalist was deeply infused by the cultural, linguistic, and political values of the Russian population. Opposition from the other fourteen republics towards the centre was often critical of Moscow's perceived Russo-phile stance. The termination of the Sibaral project, for example, was regarded as indicative of the preferential treatment of Russian interests within this avowed multi-cultural and egalitarian state. (See Chapter 4.)

Consent from non-dominant groups is important for the stability and survival of the state. The idea of the state must be perceived to encourage their input and promote their interests. A number of multi-ethnic post-colonial states have found it difficult to establish social cohesion in the face of deep internal divisions. The establishment of nation- and state-identities in Newly Independent States (NISs), including the balancing the interests of the different social groups is problematic. Ethnic or national identity can act as a precursor to the fragmentation of heterogeneous states, if poorly managed by governments or fuelled by nationalist politicians.

The organisational ideology of a state and claims to legitimacy to authority can be based upon various intellectual sources: democratic consensus; nationalism; divine mandate; or the removal of or distancing from foreign domination, for example.[40] The latter is of interest given the differing approaches of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan towards Russia and the role Islam in the establishment of post-Soviet state identities. Security and demographic considerations also affect the differing postures. Kazakstan's potential for distancing itself from Russia is restricted and not politically advantageous. Negative ideological stances, such as opposition to Islamic fundamentalism, can also be used. An effective and accepted ideological foundation can enhance state cohesion, regime legitimacy and mitigate pressures for material benefits. Park and Parks' work on North Korea and China note that,

> "in order to generate popular support whilst denying the people substantial improvements in material well-being the government needs to make extraordinary efforts to legitimize its powers. In these efforts, the leadership invariably adopts an official ideology with which to indoctrinate and mobilise the people. With the help of such an ideology, a regime that is incapable of providing the people material incentives and economic opportunities can solidify its power base by means of mass mobilization."[41]

Legitimacy is not dependent upon a specific form of government, rather it is related to refers to whether citizens regard the existing system as competent, "proper and deserving of support."[42] If it is perceived as such consent may be granted.

The idea of the state may be deep-rooted and widely accepted or superficial, its support limited to perhaps the ruling clique. Narrower ideas are more difficult to implement and gain consensus. If the foundation myth is strong and broadly accepted then the state may be able to survive periods of crisis, without a serious threat to its integrity emerging.[43]

Failure to achieve support from the majority influential sections of society can weaken legitimacy, and ultimately stability. "If the ideas themselves are weak; or if they are weakly held within society; ... then the state stands on fragile political foundations."[44] Challenges are particularly effective if state-building is still in process or the government's legitimacy is weak. Consequently "regime legitimacy is a fundamental requisite for national security in many contemporary Third World countries."[45]

Erosion of legitimacy frequently occurs when the material progress of the state is faltering. The failure to provide benefits, both physical and metaphysical, to its population, seriously weakens support for the ideological project. The crisis of legitimacy and related political and social instability can weaken the security capabilities of the state and perceptually enhance the relative strength of internal and external threats. "All of this suggests that no government can sustain a sound security posture for any length of time if its popularity and bureaucracy have grown apathetic and indifferent."[46]

In response, the regime "may invent a new national security ideology and attempt to indoctrinate and contain those who oppose the regime."[47] This can include the "creation" of new threats, legitimising the repression of domestic opposition and suggest such groups are disloyal and associated with tangible external opponents. Azar and Moon, however, declare that the creation of "enemies", for repression purposes can be hazardous and counter-productive, potentially destroying both state and regime security.[48]

The state's poor security capabilities in this heightened security environment may also result in the establishment of alliances with more powerful states. These alliances are liable to be asymmetrical with the legitimacy-weak state finding itself in a dependent position. As discussed in Chapter Five, the issue of foreign dependency has been a core source of Islamist critiques of Muslim governments.

Attempts to protect the state through this policy can further erode domestic legitimacy.

Gasiorowski's work on the Pahlavi regime in Iran, illustrated the difficulty in establishing and perpetuating an effective and popular foundation ideology, in the face of material difficulties and a viable alternative. The dynasty sought to identify itself and the Iranian state with ancient figures and traditions including the Persian leaders, Cyrus and Darius, and Islam. The regime's legitimacy was seriously weakened by material factors; corruption, political repression, economic inequalities, and foreign dependency and manipulation. Anti-Pahlavi protest which culminated in the 1979 Revolution was a fusion of nationalism and a radical interpretation of Shi'ism. This combination, which appealed to the working and middle classes, was able to undermine the ideological foundation of the regime, as well as, criticise its material deficiencies "through the metaphor of Shia Islam."[49] Buzan, however, interprets the fall of the Shah not solely as the triumph of political Islam but as an example of the twentieth century phenomenon of populist victories over autocratic regimes. He concludes that it is difficult to understand how dictatorships manage to retain power in this era of the masses and ultimately questioned their long-term survival.[50]

As the Iranian example demonstrates, the idea of state is a contested concept. Political autarky has become increasingly difficult to achieve. Physical borders are permeable to the infiltration of ideas and information. The reported presence of Korans printed in Afghanistan and tapes of the Ayatollah Khomeini, in Soviet Central Asia demonstrated the difficult in intercepting such material in even the most regulated states.[51] In fact, it is under these conditions that such imports become serious threats. The distinction between acceptable dissemination of information and cultural expression, and hostile propaganda and ideological penetration is unclear. Governments are faced by a difficult if not impossible task in filtering the import of ideas into the state.[52]

Ideological security challenges emphasise the blurred nexus between the external and domestic, and the subjective and objective. In the case of the former, it is not always possible to identify the origins of hostile ideas with a specific location. Internal opponents may or may not be linked to an external enemy with similar ideological stance. Risk perception is significant in this debate. The recipient, may perceive an ideological statement in a manner very differently to that in which it was intended or in respect of the capabilities supporting it. "Although actors are aware of the difficulty of making their threats and warnings credible, they rarely believe others will misinterpret [them]."[53] One state's "idea of the state" may intrinsically contradict that of another. This mutual incompatibility may inhibit dialogue and confidence between the parties.

Equally problematic is that whilst "[t]he idea of the state is a central issue in national security ... [it is problematic] how to apply a concept like security to something as ephemeral as an idea."[54] Political threats are directed at the organisational stability of the state and because "the state is essentially a political entity, political threats may be as much feared as military ones."[55]

2.2.iii. External Influences Upon the State: The state and its internal components do not function in isolation. Traditional IR. accepts, if not bases the state's foundation and *raison d'être* on its international status. It exists to compete in the international system. The international system does legitimate an individual state through international agreements, diplomacy and mutual recognition of borders. This is frequently an acceptance of previous events. States regularly establish *de facto* sovereignty before the international community's recognition. The state's creation and survival is therefore not exclusively a consequence of the international system.

There are a plethora of external influences upon the state and state security. Issues such as cross-border nations with separatist or irredentist ambitions, and international organisation (IOs) can exist within the Realist paradigm. Other influences upon the state challenge Realist assumptions.[56] These agents are not just those physically outside of the state, but also those excluded from the traditional conceptualisation of the state and international affairs. The term *external* is as much an issue of analytical compartmentalisation as of geographical location. The structure and influence of international economics and environmental issues cannot be fully explained from a Realist perspective. The two have forced states to accept a degree of interdependence and co-operation that the Realist image of the "Anarchical Society" would find unrecognisable. The state, as an unilateral actor, is unable to deal with some regional and global issues, whose trans-national and non-state characteristics are indicative of the international system's complexity and interdependency.[57]

International interdependency frequently regarded as a source of cooperation and integration, also has the potential for increased conflict. The latter is a consequence of the fact that states and individuals are competing for the same resources, and also the tensions between assimilation and competition between local and global identities. Globalisation and interdependency have a significant and contradictory impact upon group identities too. Paradoxically, the proximity they have brought can establish sources of tension to the extent that,

> "humanity is becoming simultaneously more unified and more fragmented. ... Humanity is becoming more integral and intimate even as the differences in the conditions of separate societies are widening. Under these circumstances proximity, instead of promoting unity, gives rise to tensions promoted by a sense of global congestion."[58]

Bull, in fact, argues that this level of intimacy is inherently unstable and confrontational as he does not believes that "the growth of communications [between society of great divergence] ..does anything to promote global ... perspectives and institutions."[59] Other authors recognise the contradictory impact of the process in that the

> "same globalizing technologies are also encouraging localization processes. The loss of autonomy that individuals and groups have experienced through the globalization process [leads them to] seek to protect their physical and mental interests by reverting to more reassuring affiliations."[60]

The revival in ethnic and religious identification are examples of this localising dynamic generated by globalisation. Thus Kazakstan and Uzbekistans' integration into the international system may heighten domestic tensions.

It is important to emphasise the manner in which interaction and interdependency are vital in the understanding of state security. It is impossible to isolate the domestic and international spheres of the state from each other, as the case-studies will demonstrate. It is perhaps this association that is the most damning criticism of the sovereignty of the state. The domestic-international relationship destroys the myth of state autonomy. The conventional division between sociology and politics is an artificial academic construction. A multi-disciplinary approach is needed to understand the position of the state in complexities of an interdependent world.

States, by consent and necessity, are renouncing a degree of sovereignty to manage issues clearly beyond their unilateral capabilities. International agreements and organisations have managed to elicit some sovereignty away from the state, even though these bodies are founded by and organised on behalf of their member states. International regimes are engaged in all aspects of international activity. These organisations have established their own identities and agendas. Membership of these inter-state bodies restricts the state's ability to act independently. As a result,

> "regimes and international institutions are coming (sic) to form new centres of authority that challenge the authority of national governments. Increased levels of institutionalisation are therefore placing growing constraints, practical and normative, on the sovereignty of states."[61]

The erosion of sovereignty by international regimes has, however, been limited. The internationalisation of global problems and processes may in fact be increasing the state's political authority. These new organisations and mechanisms are based on collective state membership and co-operation. State's may be "willing to trade a degree of legal freedom ... on a particular issue in return for a greater degree of practical influence over policies of other states and over the management of common problems."[62]

There has, however, been a transformation in international society. No longer are states seen to be independent, self-reliant actors in an anarchical society but participants in a complex network, with common responsibilities and goals. The international system is moving "beyond Westphalia."[63] "Sovereignty has always been a socially constructed right: not something that could be claimed solely on the basis of power, but a quality grounded in a common and evolving set of understandings between a group of states."[64]

Newly independent states, frequently post-colonial constructions, and their governments are more dependent upon the norms of the international system to maintain their legitimacy and integrity than the more developed and homogenous states. The lack of internal cohesion and legitimacy can force them to rely on *external* support and norms. This reliance may in fact force them to recognise other norms of human rights and political representation as well as principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. As Bess Brown, OSCE Human Dimension Officer, in Tashkent, informed the author, "the successor states have signed on to be part of Europe, so they must play by Europe's basic [political] standards."[65]

Trans-national corporations (TNCs) have been even more effective in highlighting the complexities of international affairs. These non-state businesses have wielded considerable influence over individual states, particularly developing states, and the international system as a whole. Trade has throughout history sought to establish networks external of the state system. The main focus of interest in the global economy, for this thesis, is the manner in which its actions and agents limit the independent decision-making abilities of the state. Rosenau believes that economics offer the greatest example of boundary shifts in the international system, lessening loyalties to the state and encouraging activities and ties "to wider and narrower organisational units."[66] The capacity of states is "constrained by the pressure and constraints of an increasingly globalized world economy."[67] The fact that TNCs require political goods from the state, including economic stability and security and therefore has to enter into a bargaining process with the state emphasises networks between state and non-state actors.

With the exception of the territorial component of the state, the role of the environment in IR. has until recently been neglected. For Hurrell, the saliency of interdependency and the permeability of state sovereignty is emphasised by the recent inclusion of the environment into IR. discourse. He declares that,

> "[e]cological challenges force us to reopen questions about the nature and limits of state sovereignty. Claims to sovereignty are being called into question by the limited capabilities of states to deal with environmental threats, by the mobilisation of new social actors around environmental issues, by the loss of state control of the workings of the global economy, and by the increasingly dense set of international institutional arrangements designed to manage environmental problems. Moreover ... growing awareness of environmental problems and environmental interdependence has created a new sense of planetary consciousness which is leading to a new form of non-territorial based political identity and new mechanisms of political organisation and action."[68]

States are unable to isolate themselves from the trans-national influences of the environment or their ability to act independently. The influence of the environment is frequently regional if not global, indirect, and non-specific requires a response that is co-operative and regional, even if the independent state is acting for self-interested objectives. (These issues are expanded in 4.2.)

2.2.iv. Conclusion: The State Defined: The purpose of this discussion was to illustrate the dynamics of the state and recognise the multiplicity of influences creating and constraining it. The constituent elements of the state: the idea of the state; society; central executive; and territory, all required by the state can be temporarily absent or separated. Their character can also change over time. Equally their interactions and individual goals are not always harmonious or symbiotic. The state is able to sustain major transformations without its survival being imperilled. It is apparent that the state can survive changes to its constituent elements including territorial loss, a revolutionary change in government, or massive human losses providing its governmental and societal base are strong.[69]

A constant theme is the manner in which the relationship between these elements affects the integrity and security of the state totality. Buzan has established a division between weak and strong states, based upon their socio-political cohesion.[70] The weak-strong state dichotomy examines the coherence and political validity of the state rather than the relative economic and military power of states, external in its projection, that has been IR.'s traditional focus. Weak states, Buzan argues, are those in which the idea of the state, the institutions of the state and social consent fail to create a clearly defined and coherent basis for the state. Social and political fragmentation, frequently along ethnic divisions, is a distinct possibility, with the ultimate destruction of the state, resulting in either anarchy or the establishment of numerous smaller state entities. For Buzan, a majority of weak states are post-colonial constructions in which the relationship between their multi-ethnic society and state have not been consolidated. The NISs' state-building projects are likely to include domestic violence, as had been the case with the European states in previous centuries. This initial period of independence and state-building is a problematic time. Domestic threats and vulnerabilities are the principal concern for the recently established governments. As Buzan concludes, within the weak state the "idea of the state" and the institutions are contested. Threats to the individual, community and regime emanate from within the state.[71] "Factional interests are provided with a legitimacy they do not merit," as competing groups strive to control the state.[72]

Statehood is maintained through their external role, membership of the international community, rather than their domestic authority and legitimacy.

Strong states, implying a greater sense of societal consent and identification with the state, have had a long history to achieve ethnic homogeneity and consolidation of state authority. Domestic consent about the "idea of the state" and institutions is well developed. Government policies and state security bear greater correlation with the interests of wider society. The majority of security threats for these integrated states are external in origin.

This dichotomy is of value in analysing Kazakstani and Uzbekistani security. The issue is whether Kazakstan and Uzbekistan can achieve the status of strong state. The state components of the two republics are under transition. The "idea of the state", society, state apparatus and territory all have ambiguous historical legacies and contemporary status. If they are to be successful in the state-building enterprise and achieve strong state status then the governments have to be aware that the states are neither autonomous nor static structures and cannot be simply equated with one of the constituent elements. The states are subject to multiple influences and only through addressing the whole of this network can the state expect to achieve security. The conclusion will briefly examine the historical legacies and current position of the state components in the two republics.

Beyond the elevation of Kazakstan and Uzbekistans' state apparatus from republican to sovereign status and the move towards democratisation, the Soviet legacy remains highly evident. The present politicians and civil servants, although increasingly titular in composition, are drawn from the former-Communist *nomenklatura*. Both Presidents Karimov and Nazarbaev were previously First Secretary of their respective SSRs.

Post-Soviet political developments have been problematic. Constitutional balance of powers between Executive, Legislative and Judiciary have been ignored or revised in favour of the Executive. The Uzbekistani president has wide-ranging powers including the appointment of the prime minister, cabinet ministers, *hokims* (regional governors) and the right to dissolve the *Oli Majlis*, Uzbekistan's unicameral parliament.[73] Karimov and Nazarbaev have attempted to personalise their presidential rule and imply that the well-being even survival of the republics are closely related to the maintenance of their own rule, a sentiment mirrored in

Olcott's reference to Nazarbaev as "Kazakhstan's 'Unconventional Weapon.'"[74] (This point is discussed further in 3.4.ii.b.)

The authority and status of the parliamentary systems, in the two republics, have been unstable. In Kazakstan, for example, a presidential slate appointed approximately a quarter of the *Majlis*, and seven of the 42 members of the upper house, the Senate.[75] (Both were created after the *Supreme Kenges* was dissolved in December 1994.) Their authority in relation to the Executive has been eroded. (See 3.4.ii.b.) In Uzbekistan, a nascent multi-party democracy has been curtailed. Genuine democratic movements including Birlik, Erk and the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), were outlawed and replaced by government-sponsored parties, the Social Democracy Party of Uzbekistan (Adolat), the Progress of the Homeland Party (*Vatan Taraqqiyoto Partiyasi*), the Popular Democracy Party of Uzbekistan (the successor to the Communist Party), and the nominally non-affiliated regional bloc.

The two republics' societies have seen cultural changes since independence. In both the cultural and political status of the titular nations have become axiomatic to the states' identities. This has implications for communal relations.

In Central Asia individual and group identification with the state is uncertain. Traditional identities have been local or supra-national. Although both were eroded by Soviet-instigated "nation-building from above" and more natural national consolidation trends, sub-state identities remain significant.[76] Prior to the Soviet national-delimitation, 1920-36, the political entities were not based upon the nation. Group and state boundaries were not synonymous. Although groups such as the Kazaks and Pamirs by the nature of their lifestyle were concentrated in specific areas, the Steppe and Tien Shan mountains, respectively, within the heart of Transoxania the proximity of various topographies encouraged contact between groups and inclusion into large loose political entities. The khanates of Bukhara, Khiva (Khorezm) and Kokand were explicitly multi-ethnic in composition. In fact, politics in the khanates functioned by balancing the influence and interests of the ethnic groups. Sedentary interest groups, including the multi-ethnic army and administration, and the Sufi orders, in particular the Naqshbandiyya, were used by the khans to counter Uzbek rivals.

Kazak society was based around a nomadism. This form of existence favoured small socio-political structures, most notably the *aul* and *zhuz*.[77] Larger political formations were temporary expedients, used for arbitration, and the raising of taxes, men and animals for war. Prolonged or extensive state activity, such as excessive demands for manpower, was injurious to the social and economic well-being of the society. Migrations would be disrupted, family units dispersed and ultimately the state (khan) would be unable to prevent men returning to their *auls*. The ecological interpretation, associated with Masson Smith, regards "the nomadic state [as]... weak, and discontinuous [and] the nomad.. a natural anarchist." [78] Consequently neither a well-defined sense of a Kazak nation or state was developed prior to the influence of Russian colonial administration in the nineteenth century.[79]

Sub-state units, such as the Kazak *zhuz* and Uzbek *mahalla* (neighbourhood) have seen a cultural and political renaissance since independence. Supra-national identities, including Islam, Persian and Turkic appellations, have been less resistant to national-consolidation.

The societal divisions with the greatest poignancy for state integrity and security are ethnicity in Kazakstan (i.e. Kazak-Russian), and intra-ethnic regional divisions in both Kazakstan and Uzbekistan between the three *zhuz*, and between the regions of Bukhara-Samarkand, Fergana, Kashka-Darya--Surkhan Darya, Khorezm and Tashkent, respectively.[80] The cross-border nature of the two republics' populations is significant. The titular and Russian and Tajik minority groups are all present in other states. In fact, the minorities selected are titular nations in neighbouring republics. As a result inter-state relations are imbued with issues concerning diasporas, irredentism and minority rights.

The implications from these territorial issue for Kazakstan and Uzbekistan are unclear. Buzan's contentions that inter-state territorial conflict is a "characteristic of an immature state system" and that it is only "as states acquire longer histories themselves [that] they begin to identify permanently with quite closely defined territories" are not encouraging for the two NISs.[81] Their existing forms were constructed by Moscow. The Socialist Soviet Republics' (SSRs) territorial delimitation were arbitrary and fluctuated. In the case of Kazakstan any sense of a defined Kazak space was only achieved through Tsarist colonial administration.

The transient nature of the SSRs saw a series of land transfers between the Central Asian SSRs and the Russian Socialist Federation of Soviet Republics (RSFSR), did not provided consistent borders in the Soviet period.[82] As a consequence, territorial claims, although not advanced by the respective governments, remain a sensitive issue. (The cases of Russian territorial interest on northern Kazakstan and Tajik and Uzbek counter-claims over Bukhara-Samarkand and Khojent are discussed 3.4.v. & 3.5.v.c.)

Conversely, for Uzbekistan, two of the pre-Russian khanates, Bukhara and Khiva retained their territorial integrity until the Soviet administrative restructuring of the 1920s. Carlisle argues that the territorial basis of Uzbekistan has remained constant because the Uzbek SSR was a successful expansion of Bukhara, lobbied by the Young Bukharans, under Faizulla Khojaev.[83] The mutual recognition of existing borders, the basis of the international system, offsets the potential plethora of counter-claims of the republics.

The idea of the state in both republics have, at least superficially, undergone major transformation. The Marxist-Leninist ideological framework has been replaced by a mixture of democratic, free-market and "Asian values." The latter has been particularly evident in Uzbekistan.[84] However, the lack of a clear separation between the Communist and post-Communist regimes compromises the legitimacy of the Almaty and Tashkent governments.[85]

Consequently, the republics of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan have brief historical legitimacy, whilst sub-state identities have remained influentual. Their physical existence and political legitimacy are founded upon external decisions with limited domestic inputs. It is these considerations that pose serious threats and vulnerabilities to the political and territorial integrity of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan.

2.3. The Comprehensive Security Concept

2.3.i. Introduction: The aim of this section is to locate the three case-studies within the field of security studies. Their incorporation into security is only possible through a perspective that acknowledges a role for non-state actors and processes. Consequently a comprehensive security approach, based upon the Pluralist IR. discourse is advanced. The theoretical and empirical needs for advancing this broader image of security will be discussed, in reference to the limitations, often self-imposed and acknowledged, of the traditionally dominant theories in IR. and security, the Realist and neo-Realist schools. Due to Realism's intellectual near-hegemony over IR. and security it is necessary, firstly, to examine and challenge Realist assumptions, especially in relation to empirical realities and, secondly, to define and justify the expansion in the scope of security.

2.3.ii. Realist Security Re-examined: The initial post-World War I Idealist genesis of the discipline of IR. foundered upon the empirical crises which beset the international system: the failure of the League of Nations; the rise of rogue states in the 1930s; W.W.II; and the onset of the Cold War. It is understandable that in such a climate of continued threat to individual states and the state system that security discourse became acutely focused upon these concerns.

For Realists, state sovereignty and autonomy, the anarchical nature of the international system, and the military and external origin of threats to the state are axiomatic. Self-help, including the use of force, is regarded as the best means of achieving national security. Systematic stability is achieved primarily through unilateral military defence and the balance of power.[86] Security is both clear and limited in its application.[87] Ayoob summarises these points succinctly when he states that security is traditionally underpinned by,

> "two major assumptions: one, that most threats to a state's security arise from outside its borders and two, that these threats are primarily, if not exclusively military in nature and usually require military response."[88]

The first assumption is related to the rather two-dimensional nature of Realist state conceptualisation, previously discussed. It is, however, difficult to sustain this view that the sole threats to the state are external, and result of military aggression from other states. The state's security is also influenced by the network of relationships between *internal* and *external* actors. In fact, evidence indicates that since 1945 inter-state conflicts have been the exception.[89] All the 47 conflicts active in 1993 were intra-state in character.[90] Admittedly many of these conflicts are struggles for control of the state apparatus or secessionist and therefore support the contention that the state is the prime political unit of human organisation. The intra-state origins of these conflicts, however, weakens the Realist hypothesis that security should be primarily concerned with state-state relations and the division between domestic stability and international anarchy. Allison's statement that in the FSU "internal threats to regime stability are ... more immediate and challenging than direct external threats, although the principal internal threats are often perceived as external instigated" also endorses this argument.[91]

Azar and Moon argue that intra-state conflicts were ignored by traditional security discourse as they were regarded as internal threats to *social order* rather than *national security*, and would decline as a result of successful state-building programmes.[92] Domestic unrest was also regarded as internal policing problems not a security threat. The supposed separation of the internal and external spheres of the state, the former equated with stability and the latter insecurity is unfounded. It fails to expose sub-state security issues, including the relationship between an individual's security and his/her ethnicity, class, gender and other social identities that may cross state boundaries, as well as, the relationship between individuals and communities and the state regime. Examination of inter-state conflict does not fully explain the wider security dilemmas facing a considerable percentage of the world's population and, by implication, its states. As Buzan acknowledges "national security cannot be considered apart from the internal structure of the state, and the view from within not infrequently explodes the superficial image of the state as a coherent object of security."[93]

The second of the core Realist principles, as summarised by Ayoob, is the pre-eminence of military solutions in addressing state insecurity. This prescriptive element of Realist security theory is highly problematic, resulting in the *security dilemma*, discussed below. If one can use a medical metaphor, the Realist approach seeks only to addresses the symptoms, military threats, rather than the causes of the illness. Management or containment of a threat is achieved through further reliance on military defence. As a consequence military threats become perceived as the source of tension and the underlying non-military sources are neglected. Whilst security policies, defence forces and weaponry are increasingly destructive in themselves, they are merely instruments, and it is the underlying fundamental concerns that lead to a state resorting to military action that require the greatest attention.[94] (See 2.4.iii.b., 2.4.iii.c.; & Chapter 4, for the socio-economic costs of defence expenditure, and the health and environmental consequences of modern military defence.) Military action is only one possible response. Due to the security dilemma it is debatable whether it is the most effective.

Ullman argues that security has remained inextricably linked to military threats because this is intellectually less demanding than an attempt to re-appraise the definition and remit of *security*. For Ullman this singular focus is,

> "doubly misleading and therefore doubly dangerous. First, it causes states to concentrate on military threats and ignore other and perhaps more harmful dangers. Thus it reduces their total security. And second, it contributes to a pervasive militarization of international relations. That in the long-term can only increase global insecurity."[95]

It is contentious whether a reliance on arms hardware actually solves the long-term and underlying sources of state insecurity. Counter-productive internal and external repercussions are common. The 1982 Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues *Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival* (also known as *The Palme Report*) recognised the inherent contradictions of Realist security thinking. The Commission argued that unilateral military security will not provide complete defence from modern high-technology weaponry or alleviate the underlying tensions. Increased military spending whilst attempting to counter external threats may increase domestic social-economic vulnerabilities and heighten regional tensions.[96]

In terms of external implications, excessive emphasis upon military defence, including state arms procurement, is ambivalent and unpredictable. The "security dilemma" is a consequence of the state's independent attempt to achieve total security, in an anarchical world. They compete with each other for limited resources, including security. Total security, the aim of each state (a necessary requirement because of the international system's insecurity Realists would argue) is, however, impossible to achieve. One state's attempt to defend itself through military protection fuels the insecurity of other states, who will perceive that their own security is being compromised and attempt to rectify this through their own military build-up. Where the underlying regional political environment is unstable "(t)he durability and robustness of a relationship based upon a mutual deterrence must surely be suspect."[97] In periods of tension, incidents may escalate rapidly given each sides fear of the opponent's ability to launch a pre-emptive strike. Stability and trust are not encouraged in such an environment. Arms are seen as the panacea, as well as, cause of insecurity. Modern weapon systems, particularly missile technology combined with nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) payloads, make such scenarios more precarious, because of their ability to deliver highly destructive warheads rapidly with little warning and ease of penetrating defensive systems. This makes pre-emptive strikes the most effective and best means of achieving victory.[98] The security dilemma has become increasingly acute due to the difficulty in distinguishing between purely defensive and offensive systems and the resulting inability of states to indicate to each other their true intentions.[99] "[D]ecision makers seem oblivious to the fact that increasing their arms can have undesirable and unintentional consequences."[100] There is almost a negation of the implications, "for all is unpredictable-although hardly unexpected."[101] Realists would counter that a balance of power can be reached but such a conclusion requires a confidence, rationality and transparency that does not fit easily with the anarchical assumptions of Realism.[102]

The Cold War nuclear balance of power between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) on the European Continent had serious deficiencies. It was achieved through an arms escalation of epic economic proportions; strategic assumptions grounded in nuclear deterrence; and the failure to curtail, and in many cases the encouragement of conflicts elsewhere around the globe. This precarious equilibrium had little positive impact on the rest of the world, demonstrating the exclusive and competitive nature of Realist theory and practice. The Cold War stand-off in Europe probably encouraged an export of conflict to the "periphery" and "increased Southern insecurity."[103] Of the 127 conflicts between 1945-88, all but two were situated in the Third World.[104] This point illustrates the highly selective empiricism of the Realist argument. Its Euro-centric and super-power focus failed to recognise the bipolar balance of power's role in peripheral but real conflicts.[105]

The security dilemma argument may not be directly and universally applicable to the Central Asia in terms of advanced weapon systems, although all the Central Asian republics have relatively advanced weapon systems, of Soviet origin, and neighbours and potential adversaries with similar systems.[106] The concern over pre-emptive strikes and rapid delivery systems has some relevance for Central Asia. Although Kazakstan's territorial expanse would enable it to sustain an invasion to a greater degree than Uzbekistan, however, one of the reasons cited for the move of capital from Almaty to Astana was the former's proximity (300 km) to the Chinese border.[107]

The security dilemma is more relevant for Central Asia in assessing the intentions of competing groups, particularly over the issue of offensive-defensive ambiguity. Within the FSU region, Posen suggests, that the successor states, in this initial period of state-building, are facing this dilemma, uncertain of their own internal stability and legitimacy, and unsure of the intentions of their neighbours. As a result, they are "doubly vulnerable."[108] This analysis emphasis the internal considerations for the newly independent states. As yet neither of the governments has had to test its domestic legitimacy and support in a period of regional crisis. In this transitional period there are "windows of vulnerabilities and opportunities" in which states and groups are working out their positions in Central Asia's security structure.[109]

In conclusion, Rothstein's critique of Realist security exposes the problematic at the heart of its theory and practice.

> "Realism has the ring of truth to it for men compelled to work in an environment which they can not always understand and can never adequately control. It provides a few simple keys which facilitate understanding (if only, inevitably, by oversimplification) and intellectual justification for the failure to control (for all is unpredictable-although hardly unexpected) ... What it has done has been to foster a set of attitudes that predisposed its followers to think about international politics in a particular narrow and ethno-centric fashion, and to set out very clear bounds around the kinds of policies which it seemed reasonable to contemplate. And once decisions have been made, it has provided the necessary psychological and intellectual support to resist criticism, to persevere in the face of doubt, and to use any means to out wit or to dupe domestic dissenters."[110]

2.3.iii. Economics and Security: This section will briefly examine the relationship between economics and security as although it is an important subject, the influence of economics upon Kazakstan and Uzbekistans' security has not been included as a case-study and therefore a brief discussion is required to indicate its significance. Economics has not been selected as a case-study for two reasons. Firstly, the relevance of global economics and the transformation of the Soviet centrally planned system on contemporary Central Asian politics has already been widely acknowledged and therefore as a consequence been studied to a far greater degree than other regional issues.[111] Secondly, due to the interdependency between the factors within the case-studies, the influence of economics will be duly recognised in all the subsequent chapters.

The focus will be upon two concerns. These are: the manner in which global economics influences regional and local instability through serious economic disparities and competition; and the economic cost of defence expenditure. By implication, the examination of economic aspects of security, will further highlight the deficiencies in the Realist perspective.

States only have limited influence over the structure and behaviour of the international economic system. As such, it is difficult for individuals, groups and states to achieve economic security. The national economy, however, is part of the physical base of the state, affecting its domestic and external capabilities and well-being. It is also related to the ideological foundations of the state.

2.3.iii.a. Economics and Domestic Stability: The crucial relationships between economics and comprehensive security are in the fields of interdependency and justice.[112] According to Buzan "[t]he link between economy and political stability generates a set of wide-ranging questions about development that could, not unreasonably, be seen as national security issues."[113] This statement is consistent with the discourse of economic, political and social justice incorporated in Pluralist IR. theory. Persistent underdevelopment or rapid economic decline can weaken social cohesion and exasperate other sources of friction. Internal conflicts often arise because elites are unwilling to alter exploitative social and economic relations and structures which work to their advantage.[114]

2.3.iii.b. The Cost of Defence: Economists have long shown concern about the impact of military expenditure upon other areas of a state's social and economic development.[115] This concern is particularly acute during arms races, a cause and consequence of the security dilemma. Attempts to enhance state security through increased military spending may be counter-productive and accelerate a state's relative economic, military and political decline.[116] The development, production and acquisition of modern weapon systems can transfer economic, political and human resources from other spheres of state activity hindering economic progress and increasing societal economic hardship and competition.[117] Peacetime military expenditure creates less employment than other forms of public spending and has been linked to inflationary trends.[118]

The social-economic consequences of military expenditure are qualitatively worse for low Gross Domestic Product (GDP) states. Developing World military expenditure increased six fold between 1960-86.[119] One report highlighted a close inverse correlation between levels of state spending on defence, and civilian economic development; and between increased military spending and ability to withstand the economic crises.[120] Another survey, of 69 states found that military spending has a negative impact upon rates of growth in developing states.[121] In these states, investment and agricultural production were notable sufferers. On average a 1% increase in the military share of a state's GDP, according to this report, was linked to a 0.23% and 0.18% reduction in the GDP budget on investment and agriculture, respectively. The resultant effects upon agriculture suggest decline in food output, increased agricultural import dependency, food scarcity and greater percentage of income spent on food. Social tensions and competition are highly probable.

In conclusion, the debate on interdependence is advanced by the examination of economics and security. One should not ignore the penetrative nature of the global economic system on the domestic front. With the exception of the environment, it is this issue that has most seriously eroded the distinction between the two spheres and the state's ability to act autonomously.

2.3.iv. Expanding the Parameters of Security: A growing body of academics and practitioners recognises the need for a re-appraisal of the concept of security, with greater reference to global realities and the specifics of individual scenarios.[122] If, as discussed above, the Realist analysis is an insufficient explanation of security realities then how inclusive must the boundaries of comprehensive security be? Security is applicable to all levels of human affairs. Klare and Thomas, for example, favour an universal application, directed to the welfare and health of humanity.[123] As Ayoob warns, however, a too expansive conceptualisation may result in the term becoming of little analytical value, lacking clarity and precision.[124] This concern can be demonstrated by one vague definition, which refers to security as the "assurance of future well being."[125] Constructing a comprehensive security structure is, therefore, problematic, due to the need to balance analytical precision and a security-focused concept, with the breadth of influences relevant to the case-study. A broad but coherent security concept is required in which traditional military security is an element. This work aims to establish a synthesis between the interdependency of human affairs, a multi-disciplinary approach favoured by advocates of comprehensive security and a recognition of the state's continued significance as a key political unit.

A related problem is the intellectual and semantic connotations that *comprehensive* and *security* imply. *Comprehensive* refers to "a broad scope or content; including all or much," whilst *security* has customarily been applied in an exclusive manner, related to boundaries and external enemies and threats.[126] Central to the premise of a Realist security concept is the external origin of threats. Several authors note that in traditional security discourse exclusion and division, and *self* and *other* are promoted.[127] The presence of these boundaries and the language of security is the antithesis of global interdependency and co-operation.[128] "These dichotomies, which reflect conventional understandings of political space, are necessary for the legitimisation of the concept of national security but are incompatible with the search for world security and the security of individuals."[129] The stifling of debate due to the near-monopoly of Realist thinking on the subject in the post-W.W.II period, has led to uniform and narrow academic and empirical interpretations of the term. There is, however, no reason to assume that security must remain within these narrow confines. The positive and universal aspects of security need to be emphasised. Comprehensive security analysis is thus a dramatic, though pragmatic, refocusing of the core issues of the debate from Realist concerns.

The idea of comprehensive security has been arrived at through awareness of the limitations and possible tensions within Realist IR. theory and empirical evidence which places doubt upon its ability to provide "a means of explaining the world, let alone providing for stable and peaceful relations, even more so as we have moved out of a period dominated by the Cold War into a more complex period."[130] Comprehensive security has its origins in Pluralist IR. literature. The Palme Report was perhaps the watershed for this approach.[131] It questioned the effectiveness of mutual deterrence and unilateral military action. Instead, it advocated common security through co-operation not because of altruism but mutual self-interest in a complex, small and interdependent world. States, it concluded,

> "cannot achieve security at each others expense. Only through co-operative efforts and policies of interlocking national [state] restraint will all the world's citizens be able to live without fear of war and devastation."[132]

The Palme Report, The World Commission on Environment and Development, and subsequent comprehensive security texts have argued that the basis for a secure world is progress on the interdependent issues of economic and social development, political justice and human rights. Non-military issues and non-state agents are influential, whilst the impervious nature of state boundaries and the distinction between internal and external are challenged. Security is not regarded as solely related to the state and military. Realist assumptions and concerns are of relevance in particular circumstances but their position requires empirical support on a case-by-case basis. In fact, this is a core argument of comprehensive security. It is the specific network in which numerous agents interact together under certain circumstances that transform them from acceptable political influences to sources of conflict. For example, the economic, demographic and military disparity between Belgium and Germany has remained relatively constant throughout the twentieth century but the potential security threat to the former has fluctuated widely as a result of one highly subjective factor, the political intentions of Germany's political elites. It is only through a close examination of all the influences and the interaction between them that security can be effectively understood. The selection of the three studies will demonstrate these points. Competition for water resources; the government-minority relations; and an alternative organisational ideology promote an acceptance of the role of non-state actors within the state and the region, and the interdependency between actors and agents.

2.3.iv.a. Security for Whom?: Moving beyond the narrow confines of the Realist approach, "(s)ecurity analysis must resist ... boundary distinctions which obscure global structures of inequality that contribute to making certain individuals and groups, ... more insecure."[133] Booth urges that the "fundamental referents of security" should be the individual and not the state.[134] The interests of these two are rather difficult to reconcile. Given the fact that Kazakstan and Uzbekistan are the subject of this research, the security of sub-state groups and individuals are implicitly incorporated into the concept of *state security*. The discussion below highlights the intrinsic contradictions within the *national security* concept and advances in its place a comprehensive concept, *state security* which moves beyond the interest and protection of the governments, accurately termed *regime security*.

The term, *national security*, Buzan regards as "the ability of states to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity ... [A] conservative concept, in as much as it relates to existing states... [no matter] their desirability [or] viability."[135] This indicates that the state, or at least its central apparatus, may not provide any tangible benefits to its citizens. If one accepts that the state has responsibilities towards its citizens and that its own security is enhanced as a result, revision in the understanding and purpose of what has traditionally been referred to as *national security*. This re-definition will be entitled as *state security*. The term will be used to describe the security of the (complete) state rather than the frequently used term *national security* which continues the misguided connection between the state and nation. *National security* will be used in this work to describe the security of national (ethnic) groups. Azar and Moon partially acknowledge this problem in relation to multi-cultural states and their security. The security of ethnic groups cannot necessarily be equated with that of their host states, which is traditionally referred to as *national security*. They state that,

> "in such situations, the security of a 'nation' is quite separate from the security of the 'state'. It is perhaps more accurate to argue that national security is equated with communal security and that state security with that of a ruling 'regime' that represents a segment of social or communal interest."[136]

Ra'anan also recognises the distinctions within the concepts of state and security when he notes that "many refer to the 'national' interest when in fact they mean state interest.'"[137] Whilst these statements recognise the state's internal divisions, they fail to establish or define an inclusive security construction for the whole state entity. It is this that *state security* will be used for.

This redefinition also allows for the inclusion of the domestic dimensions of security and thus removes the Realist assertion that societal threats should not be regarded as part of the national security debate unless they "precipitate conflict *between* states."[138] *State security* is comprehensive and progressive in its inclusion and goals whilst retaining the state as the focus of study. Common dangers and collective responsibilities need to be incorporated in to the agenda. Tickner's holds that,

> "[g]enuine security for all individuals requires a less militarized model of citizenship that valorizes different types of activities which allows women and men to participate equally in building the type of state institutions that are responsive to the security needs of their own people as well as to those on the outside. Such *reformulated states* could satisfy people's need for identity ... while providing a type of security that is not achieved at the expense of the security of others."[139]

This emphasises the need to construct progressive, inclusive forms of state and security.

The more inclusive security concept is expedient in order to address the variety of previously neglected concerns. Feminist critiques of security are at the vanguard of exposing the structural inequalities and violence not just for women but other under-represented groups within societies.[140] Axiomatic to all these issues is a challenge to the assumption that international political theory is neutral and positivist.[141] Traditional security literature and policy fail to recognise the unequal consequences of their ideas and actions for a host of "non-core" groups. Many feminists along with peace researchers argue that comprehensive security can only be achieved after the recognition and reformation of hierarchical social structures.[142] Smith's conclusion that this is not the case and that "(i)nternational theory is not so much gender neutral as gender blind," is equally applicable to other periphery subjects, such as the environment, or minority rights, to which it should be responsive to.[143]

National security has been implicitly elite-, and ethnic- (national-) specific in its construction and objectives. It has also neglected, frequently intentionally, the internal dynamics and tensions within the state, particularly between the central executive, and the individual and sub-state groups. The traditional emphasis on elites blurs the distinction between *regime security* and *state security*. As a result, governments frequently implement policies which are neither democratically formulated nor advance or protect the interests of wider society, especially those of marginalised groups. Unfortunately, many elites regard the security of the state and the maintenance of their own position as synonymous. This has enabled regimes to usurp the rhetoric of national security in order to repress legitimate domestic opposition. As a result, "internal security" is often used not to provide individual and group security, or just and harmonious relations but the maintenance of the *status quo*. As political elites are responsible for reacting to challenges to the state and formulating policies, their perceptions and concerns are valid areas of concern, but the distinction between their own security interests and those of the wider state need to be recognised.

In fact, central government is often the prime source of domestic insecurity. According to Buzan, individuals and communities face four categories of threat from the state. These result from:

- Domestic law making and enforcement;
- State administrative and policing action against its own citizens;
- Competition over the control of the state apparatus; and
- The state's external security policies.[144]

The latter three are the most significant to this study. They encourage a critical view of the state apparatus-society relationship and the difficulty in distinguishing between the internal and external arenas.

A Human Rights Watch report on 53 cases of ethnic violence concluded that deliberate government action is as likely cause of conflict as supposed traditional communal antagonisms.[145] The period of state-building allows for, if not requires some would argue, a greater degree of coercion than would normally be acceptable. Government action against sections within society is often accompanied by accusations that internal dissent is sympathetic to or actively co-operating with external enemies. These fears and charges have been evident in Almaty and Tashkents' attitudes towards their respective minorities and Islamist opponents.

The transfer of authority within the state also has the potential for internal instability. Violent power struggles between rival political elites or communal factions pose a direct threat to sizeable, and often uninvolved, sections of the population and the political and territorial integrity of the state itself. The manner in which political power is transferred in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan have yet to be tested. The former Soviet republican elites have managed to retain and legitimate their positions through elections and referenda even though the legitimacy and impartiality of these have been questioned by domestic and international observers.[146] The relationship between political and ethno-regional allegiances in the two states and the example of Tajikistan do not encourage an optimistic prognosis for the transfer of power in the region. Kazakstan and Uzbekistans' respective populations may become involved as participants and victims of any such struggle. A possible and destructive scenario in both republics would be ethnic or regional based competition for power. The potential for state fragmentation along these lines is possible.

A state's foreign policy can also have negative consequences upon its citizens. At its most extreme, is the impact of inter-state war. The individual and the community will be effected as participant and/or victim either directly or indirectly. Within Uzbekistan, ethnic Tajiks, and the secular and Islamic opposition to Karimov's regime have all found their position *vis-à-vis* the state apparatus worsen due to Uzbekistan's involvement in the Tajikistan Civil War. Arguably a primary reason for Uzbekistan's involvement in the war was to provide a pretext for domestic repression.[147] (See 3.5.v. & 5.13.)

2.3.iv.b. Assessing Threats and Vulnerabilities: When do non-military issues become security concerns? This is a crucial point, if one accepts both that numerous issues can constitute security concerns and any conceptualisation needs to be coherent and specific. Vague all-encompassing definitions, noted previously and also in 4.2. fail to distinguish security from the broader political processes.

Some threats, economic blockades or enemy troop mobilisation, for example, are direct and obvious and therefore easy to interpret and respond to. Other issues are, however, far more difficult to distinguish from the normal processes of economic, political and social affairs. It is the ambiguousness and unpredictability of potential security threats that constitutes both the problem of and the need for a comprehensive security concept.

It is the application of "security resources", both material and intellectual, to certain issues that in one sense identifies them as security threats. However, threats exist and are potentially more dangerous when left unrecognised or not responded to. Equally, misapplication of "security resources" or mis-identification of threats can also increase a state's vulnerability. The more obvious, immediate and direct the potential threat is, the greater likelihood is that resources will be allocated and prioritised to addressing it. The case-studies under examination in this thesis, more pervasive and less obvious in terms of security thinking are therefore relatively underrepresented in security analysis, policy, and resource allocation.

Ayoob, who synthesises the multi-dimensional nature of comprehensive security analysis with a focus upon the state, argues that issues are elevated to the status of threat when "they either affect the survivability of state boundaries, state institutions, or governing elites or weaken the capacity of states and regimes to act effectively in the realm of both domestic and international politics."[148] "The political realm ... informed by other areas of human activity" is the prime concern of his analysis.[149]

For Splidsboel-Hansen, national security is the interaction of three elements: threats, values and vulnerabilities. The threat is the principal focus for security thinking, "since without one or more threats the whole notion of achieving national security would be rendered superfluous."[150] A *threat* can be defined as "an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or private non-governmental entities ... within a state."[151] Security theories, although not all, recognise five different types of threats: military, economic, ecological, political and societal. All these threats share one characteristic, in that "they are aimed at one or more value; evidently, none of the threats can exist in itself, but is only given its existence .. when directed at a value."[152]

These values are, according to Splidsboel-Hansen: the idea of the state; the institutional expression of the state; and the physical base of the state. The values must have an element of vulnerability for the threat to be effective. A weak state by its nature is more vulnerable and perceives a greater number of threats to its security as a consequence. Security can be improved either by reducing the value's vulnerability, or reducing or eliminating the threat itself.[153]

The problematic nature of including issues within the remit of security is well described by Buzan, who notes the need to contextualise the issue. He writes that,

> "(s)ince threats can only be assessed in relation to a particular state as a target, security policy has to take into account not only threats themselves, but also the vulnerabilities of the state as an object of security. This is no straightforward matter, especially for weak states. Cause-effect relations between threats and vulnerabilities are poorly understood at best, even for relatively calculable forms of military attack. ... For economic and political threats [for example], the problem of distinguishing threats from normal, or at least acceptable, activity is much more difficult to begin with. Any sound security policy must therefore address threats in both of these ways: dealing with them as they come, such as reducing vulnerability by preparing defences against invasion; and dealing with their causes, such as seeking peaceful settlement of the dispute."[154]

The existence of threats and vulnerabilities, whilst detrimental to state security does not necessarily lead to conflict. Explaining why some scenarios can be resolved peacefully and others descend into conflict has proved problematic for security study scholars. Numerous politically sensitive situations are referred to as *latent* or *potential conflicts*. Many of these scenarios do not result in open hostilities.[155] Those which do result in conflict follow some general patterns, however. The resort to force may be for several reasons, including:

- Attempts at structural change for either or both of two reasons:

  a) "legitimate" action against a closed system which promotes unjust socio-political characteristics and prevents democratic participation and voluntary incorporation within the state; and

  b) rejection of the structures and values of the established system.[156]

- Attempts to redress perceived, or actual, victimisation which can be the result of;

  "a) a denial of separate identity of parties involved in the political process,

  b) an absence of security of culture and valued relationships,

  c) an absence of effective political participation through which victimization can be remedied."[157]

The last point is crucial for the transformation of protest to become violent.[158]

A model with particular validity for all of the three case-studies, is advanced by Lewer and Ramsbotham. They argue that the transformation from peaceful debate to violent methods, requires three factors:

-Distinct identity groups;

-The groups must perceive that they have mutually incompatible goals "which cannot be accommodated within the existing political structures;" and

-The groups pursue these incompatible goals.[159]

Intrinsic to all of these explanations is that conflict is a response to the denial of perceived needs. Debate, compromise, and protest through peaceful channels have either proved ineffective, been unavailable or rejected by at least one of the parties involved, whether these be communal groups, political elites or states. Armed conflict is regarded as an effective and valid means of achieving their goals.

2.4. Conclusion

Security is a core requirement for the state. The monopolisation of violence is often regarded as the state's most fundamental function. The relationship between the state and security is not, however, static or necessarily benign. The security milieu is complex.

The Realist paradigm is unable to fully explain the internal dynamics of the state and multiplicity of security threats. The state itself is often a source of insecurity for its citizens. One must remain vigilant about the political origins and intentions of a government's security policies. With this qualification duly acknowledged it is possible to advance a comprehensive security agenda which recognises the internal dynamics and tensions of the state and to attempt to accommodate the needs of the various actors and address the multiplicity of threats and vulnerabilities. Security cannot be dependent solely upon force, military capabilities and regime interests. Consensus between government and society, issues of development and economic and political justice and inter-state cooperation are part of an effective management of security problems. As Booth has stated, "without justice, there is potential for conflict."[160]

To reinforce both Buzan's and Ayoob's assertions, security issues, threats and vulnerabilities are highly contextual and subjective. Blanket conceptualisation is problematic. As a consequence the security theory and empirical implications of the individual case-studies are discussed further in the respective chapters.

The security milieu of NISs are particularly acute because of the reformulation of national and state identities, the political system and domestic and foreign relations. The republics of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan face a difficult initiation into the arena of the state system. Sovereignty and other trappings of international recognition do not protect them from a variety of security challenges. The initial period of independence is beset by uncertainty principally within its domestic environment.

Kazakstan and Uzbekistan are no longer part of a single powerful state, whose periphery had limited decision making requirements or ability. Its centre, Moscow and the Politburo, had ultimate responsibility over a whole spectrum of issues, from foreign policy to language laws, environmental to inter-republican trade policy. It was apparent that the USSR was unable to deal with many of the problems confronting Central Asia, such as environmental degradation, inter-ethnic conflict or the penetration of Islamist ideology, for example. It was unable to protect the long-term survival of the state (the USSR), its regime, ideological foundation, or the well-being of the Central Asian economy, environment or population. The political and security environment of Central Asia has been dramatically transformed by the collapse of the USSR. The vulnerabilities of the Central Asian republics has been increased by the fragmentation of the region's decision-making process into five sovereign republics, each with their own "national" agendas, less experience in international diplomacy, limited economic resources and the restructuring of political and social relations. Kazakstan and Uzbekistans' physical existence, political legitimacy and structures are essentially external in origin, including the *de facto* and *de jure* independence which was provided by the collapse of the centre rather than a regional commitment to nationalism or independence. It is under these conditions, that the two republics are confronted by a series of individual and systematic threats; hostile or collapsed neighbouring states, ideological "infiltration", communal tensions and water-resource competition.

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[1] James, A. *Sovereign Statehood,* Allen & Unwin, London, 1986, p 13, Quoted in Halliday, F. *Rethinking International Relations,* MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1994, p 254. (i)

[2] Halliday. F. op cit., p 78. (i)

[3] Bull, H. *The Anarchical Society,* MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1977, p 8.

[4] Northedge, F.S. *The International Political System,* Faber & Faber, London, 1976, p 15. Quoted in Halliday, F. op cit., p 78. (i)

[5] Skocpol, T. *States and Social Revolutions,* CUP, Cambridge, 1979, p 29. Quoted in ibid, p 79.

[6] Buzan, B. *People, States and Fear,* Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1991, p 59.

[7] Ibid, p 60.

[8] Held, D. "Central Perspectives on the Modern State" in McLennan, G. Hall, S. & Held, D. (eds.) *The Idea of the Modern State,* Open University Press (OUP), Milton Keynes, 1984, p 29.

[9] Azar, E. & Moon, C. "Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity: The 'Software Side of National Security'" in Azar, E. & Moon, C. (eds.) *National Security in the Third World: Management of Internal and External Threats,* Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1988, p 83.

[10] Buzan, B. op cit., p 87.

[11] Vincent, R. *Theories of the State,* Blackwell, New York, 1987, p 32.

[12] Sakwa, R. *Russian Politics and Society,* Routledge, London, 1993, p 301.

[13] Buzan, B. op cit., p 60.

[14] For the purpose of this thesis the term *nation* will refer to a group of people who share a perceived common cultural identity based upon ethnic, linguistic, racial or religious heritage. The term will be used in conjunction with *ethnos,* and *ethnic group.* The ambivalent location of the *nation,* both intellectually and physically, between identification with the state and the ethnic community which establishes the potential for instability. Society will be defined as the institutions, individuals and activities outside the direct control and financing of the state apparatus. Society contains the whole human population of a state, irrespective of their ethnic, religious or other non-state allegiances. For definition of society see Halliday, F. "State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda" *Millennium,* Vol. 16, No. 2, p 219. (ii)

[15] Stoessinger, J. *The Might of Nations* Random House, New York, 1973, p 7. In Stoessinger, J."The autonomy of the nation-state and the nature of power" in Little, R. & Smith, M. (eds.) *Perspectives on World Politics,* Routledge, London, 1991, p 23.

[16] Beetham, D. "The future of the nation state", in McLennan, G. Hall, S. & Held, D. (eds.) op cit., p 209.

[17] Nielsson, G. "State and nation groups: A global taxonomy" in Tiryakan. E. & Ragowski. R. (eds.) *New Nationalisms of the Developed West,* Allen & Unwin, Boston, 1984, Quoted in Lewer. N. & Ramsbotham, O. *"Something Must Be Done:" Towards An Ethical Framework For Humanitarian Intervention in International Social Conflicts,* Peace Research Report 33, University of Bradford, Bradford, 1993, p 10.

[18] Snyder, L. "Political Disintegration in Developing Countries: Theoretical Orientations and Empirical Evidence", *International Interaction,* Vol. 11, No.. 2, 1984, pp 137-66.

[19] Hall, S. "The Idea of the Modern State" in McLennan, G. Hall, S. & Held, D. (eds.) op cit. p 15.

[20] Hinsley, F.H. *Sovereignty,* CUP, Cambridge, 1986, p 26.

[21] Buzan, B. op cit., p 58.

[22] Schuman, F.L. *International Politics,* McGraw-Hill, New York, 1969, p 117.

[23] Walzer, M. *Just and Unjust Wars,* Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1977, p 94.

[24] Bodin, J. Quoted in Schuman, F.L. op cit., p 69.

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[26] Halliday, F. op cit., p 81. (i)

[27] See interview with Bernard Kouchner, French Minister For Health And Humanitarian Affairs, *Le Monde,* 30/4/91, p 1. Quoted in Weiss, T.G. & Campbell, K.M. "Military Humanitarianism" *Survival,* Vol. 33, No. 5, 1991, p 455; & Davies, P.W, "Liberal Democrats Urge Rethink On UN Intervention" *The Independent,* 31/08/92, p 2.

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[28] "Secretary Peres de Cuellar Sees A Change In Basic Non-Interference Doctrine", *Diplomatic World Bulletin*, Vol. 22 No. 6, p 1. Quoted in Weiss, T.G & Campbell, K.M, op cit., p 455. Italic added.

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[30] Hall. S. op cit., p 15.

[31] Buzan, B. op cit., p 64.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid, p 89.

[34] See ibid; & Sorensen, G. "Individual Security and National Security: The State Remains the Principal Problem" *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1996, pp. 371-86.

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[38] Buzan, B. op cit., p 69.

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[40] Gasiorowski, M.J. "Regime Legitimacy and National Security: The Case of Pahlavi Iran" in Azar, E. & Moon, C. (eds.) op cit., p 229.

[41] Park, H.S & Park, K.A. op cit., p 109.

[42] Gurr, T.E. Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1970. pp 183-5. Quoted in Ahrari, M.E. op cit., p 189 Also see Azar, E. & Moon, C. op cit., p 81

[43] Buzan, B. op cit., p 82.

[44] Ibid, p 79.

[45] Gasiorowski, M.J. op cit., p 244.

[46] Azar, E. & Moon, C. op cit., p 85.

[47] Ibid, p 83

[48] Ibid.

[49] Gasiorowski, M.J. op cit., p 243.

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[51] *The Observer*, 21/11/82. Quoted in Dawisha, K. & Carrere D'Encause, H. "Islam In The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union: A Double Edged Sword?" in Dawisha, A. (ed.) *Islam in Foreign Policy*, RIIA/CUP, Cambridge, 1983, pp. 174-5.

[52] Buzan, B. op cit., p 81.

[53] Jervis, R. "Security Regimes" in Krasner, S. (ed.) *International Regimes*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1983, p 96.

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[56] The English School of IR. and Wight in particular have been criticised for their failure to envisage "notions of a world community or individual rights external of the state." Such political thinking has "cut [the English school of IR.] off from the classical theme of political thought", and therefore neglected to establish a more holistic approach to global affairs. Butterfield. H. & Wight. M. (eds.) *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1966 p 20; & Jones, R. "The English School of International Relations: a case for closure" *Review of International Studies*, No. 7, 1981, p 2. Both quoted in Smith, S. "The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory" in Booth, K. & Smith, S. (eds.) *International Relations Theory Today*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995, p 8.

[57] Interdependency is still poorly defined, "little more than a metaphor that describes an extraordinary complex political phenomenon. The essence of interdependency is that it describes connections between actors that are costly for both or all of them to break." Clarke, M. "Politics as Government and Politics as Security" in Clarke, M. (ed.) *New Perspectives on Security*, Brassey's London, 1993, p 53.

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[66] Rosenau, J.N. op cit., p 259.

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[79] Ibid.

[80] See Vaisman, D. "Regionalism and Clan Loyalty in Political Life of Uzbekistan" in Ro'i, Y. (ed.) op cit., pp 107-8.

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[87] See Lawrance, P. op cit., p 218.

[88] Ayoob, M. op cit.; & Saferworld, *European Security: The New Agenda*, Saferworld Bristol, 1990, p 1.

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[103] Ayoob, M. op cit., p 91.

[104] Luard, E. *The Blunted Sword: The Erosion of Military Power in Modern World Politics*, I.B. Tauris, London, 1988, p 61. Quoted in Tickner, J.A. op cit., p 178.

[105] See Rothstein on the conservative, pro-*status quo* and anti-democratic aspects of US-led theory and policy, which he believes were concealed or ignored during the Cold War confrontation. Rothstein, R.L. op cit., p 414.

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[142] See Tickner, J.A. op cit., p 192. The ambiguous position of women in Soviet Central Asia, combined with the re-evaluation of women's roles in contemporary Central Asia due to the "revival" of Muslim traditions, the collapse of Communist egalitarian rhetoric and social and employment policies makes this a highly poignant issue for this study. Under the Communist system, women faced the "double burden" of paid employment and domestic work, although there were some advances for women, particularly in health care and education Post-Soviet economic decline and the restoration of "traditional" social values have eroded the advances women gained previously. Job security and social services have been the most notable areas of reversal. The status of Slavic female employment in post-Soviet Central Asia, and female labour in the cotton industry are discussed in Chapters 4 & 5. "Editorial" *Transition*, Vol. 1, No. 16, 8/10/95, p 3; & Morvant, P. "Bearing the 'Double Burden' in Russia" *Transition*, Vol. 1, No. 16, 8/10/95, pp. 4-9 & 60.

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[146] See OMRI Daily Digest, No. 50, pt 1 10 March 1995 on the Kazakstan Constitutional Court ruling that the Parliamentary Elections were unconstitutional; "Predictable Result in Kazakh Vote" *International Herald Tribune*, 1/10/95, p 6, on the questionable referendum results in Kazakstan. See SWB SU 2266 G/7, 31/3/95 on the 99.6% vote for President Karimov's extension of office until the year 2000.

[147] See Horsman, S. "Constructing an External Role for Domestic Consumption: Uzbekistan's Involvement in Tajikistan" *MacArthur Regional Security in A Global Context Conference*, Wilton Park, 21-25 April 1997.

[148] Ayoob, M. pp. 9 & 5.

[149] Ibid, p 9.

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[153] Ibid.

[154] Buzan, B. op cit., p 142.

[155] See Lewer, N. & Ramsbotham, O. op cit., pp. 14 & 22.

[156] Azar, E. & Burton, J. *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, Wheatsheaf, Brighton, 1986, p 29.

[157] Ibid, p 30.

[158] At times Azar and Burtons' conceptualisation of Protracted Social Conflicts is too broad and incorporates conflicts ranging from the Lebanese Civil War to the Cold War. Also Azar's view that those involved in protracted social conflicts "have difficulty in articulating what it is that leads them to violent protest and even war" is patronising. Ibid, p 29.

[159] Lewer, N. & Ramsbotham, O. op cit., p 14.

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3. Ethnic Minorities and Security

3.1. Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to examine the relationship between the Russian and Tajik minorities with the respective governments of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, with reference to potential intra-state instability. The hypothesis of this chapter, is that ethnic minorities can and need to be voluntarily incorporated into the political and civil society structures of the states for there to be stability. This can and should be achieved through a balance between acceptance by the central executive and the dominant population of the legitimate needs of minority group and the reciprocal acknowledgement by the minority that their demands and rights are related to obligations to and respect of the state and other citizens. The protection and in some instances the promotion of cultural, economic and political minority rights can ease social friction and centrifugal forces upon the state.

The chapter will be divided into four sections. The first will discuss the conceptualisation of ethnic politics and conflict. The key area of interest is the politicisation and mobilisation of ethnicity. The two case-studies, will examine the respective government-minority relations over contested demographic, economic and political issues. These sources of tension are particularly acute in the period of state-building and transition that the two republics have undergone. The concluding section will assess the potential for inter-ethnic violence in the republics, including the influence of economic and political processes and trends.

3.2. Theoretical Background

Terminology concerning *ethnicity*, *minority* and *nation* is often ambiguous. A useful politically-oriented definition of the term *minority* is provided by the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The Commission defines a minority as,

> "a group of citizens of a State, constituting a numerical minority and in a non-dominant position in that State, endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the majority of the population, having a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated, if only implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose aim it is to achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law."[1]

This statement emphasises the political inequality of the minority. It is this issue and the attempt to rectify it by the minority that is a major source of confrontation.

This political interpretation is applicable to both case-studies. The numerical size of Uzbekistan's Tajik population has been in itself a source of political dispute. Kazakstan's Slavic population does not immediately correlate with preconceived views of a minority. During the post-Soviet period, however, demographic and political trends coincided to lead to a major revision in the fortunes of ethnic Russians.[2]

The boundaries between ethnic and national identity are unclear. Kellas regards *ethnicity* as a narrow group identity, based upon a common ancestry, which is more exclusive than that of a *nation*.[3] Ethnicity in Soviet nationalities policy, although linked to language and territory, was ascriptive and inflexible. Kozlov, aware that such an interpretation of ethnic identity was impractical, stated that,

> "national affiliation is not a biological but rather a social category which is not determined by birth, but is formed in the process of the individual's socialization."[4]

Whilst language is a key distinction between the groups, bilingualism is common amongst the non-Russian groups. For many Kazaks and Tajiks their first language is Russian and Uzbek, respectively, rather than their titular language. Cultural assimilation has been a common feature in both cases and all four groups, especially the three non-Russian groups, share some common characteristics; partially the result of shared Soviet experiences. Seventy years of Sovietification have not, however, eradicated significant distinctions between them.

Group identity is as much what distinguishes the group from others as any "intrinsic" characteristics of the group itself. The fluidity of ethnic identity is evident in Pilkington's research on ethnic Russian immigrants to the RF. One returnee from Bishkek highlighted this, stating that, "here [in Russia] we are not Russians (*russkie*), we are Kirghizs, [but] in Kirghizia, we are Russians."[5] What initially appear as a homogeneous group is often superficial, with internal divisions. Acceptance of these divisions may be beneficial, dismissing the myth of the nation-state and allowing for "debate on citizenship and nation, and avoid the politics of polarity."[6]

Inter-ethnic conflict has increasingly become the focus of Security Studies interest. To some extent this is a result of the collapse of European Communism. Between 1990-4, there were fifteen secessionist conflicts, equal to the whole of the 1980s.[7] This resurgence in this form of violence was a result of structural change in the international system, indicating a relationship between inter-ethnic conflict and transition.[8] State-societal and inter-ethnic relations in the FSU region have been in flux. States, and titular nations, have sought to establish their own hegemony within the NISs. Kazakstan and Uzbekistan were not immune from inter-ethnic violence. Since independence, although neither of the republics witnessed inter-ethnic conflict, the issue remained a major regional security concern.

The upsurge in academic interest in ethnic conflict is also related to an intellectual shift in security thinking. Until the 1980s ethnic conflicts were neglected by Western political theorists.[9] The "existing anti-secessionist international normative edifice" has been seriously undermined by post-Cold War World events.[10] In response, greater interest has been devoted towards domestic security concerns, as their relative significance has increased. Inter-ethnic conflict has also encouraged a multi-disciplinary approach to studying security. This is because "ethno-cultural conflicts often centre on questions which political theorists have simply ignored, from the boundaries and powers of political communities to language rights."[11]

3.2.i. Group Mobilisation and Sources of Tension: It was assumed that modernisation would replace ethnicity with other loyalties, such as the state.[12] The contemporary wave of ethnic conflicts has shown that modernity has failed to do so. Ethnic identity and conflict have in fact been a response to modernity.

Discussion on ethnicity's revival has focused upon two explanations. The first, is that ethnicity is primordial, more persistent and fundamental than other forms of identification.[13] For primordialists, ethnic conflict is not the consequence of economic or geo-political competition but "exclusively a result of the ethnic principle."[14] The second approach, regards ethnicity as fluid and no more salient than other group identities. Ethnicity becomes significant when it is "involved by entrepreneurial political leaders in the instrumental pursuit of material and political benefits for a group."[15]

This study will apply the latter, essentially an instrumentalist approach that recognises periods of transition can increase awareness of ethnic differences.[16] As Horowitz notes, ethnic conflict is a recurrent phenomenon, in which "shifting contexts make ethnicity now more, now less prominent."[17] The instrumental and political value of ethnicity is emphasised by events in late-Soviet elite politics. The weakening and ultimate collapse of one trans-national ideological hegemony, Communism, saw the emergence of alternative social constructions. By 1989, republican elites were assuming the mantle of *national nomenklatura* to enhance their legitimacy whilst attempting to wrestle power from the centre without implementing major economic or political reforms.

Ethnicity is not in itself a precursor for conflict, rather it is simply one means of advancing group interests and demands. One must look beyond ascription for causes of inter-ethnic conflict at the wider economic, political and social structures. Ethnic conflicts are linked to competition for material and non-material resources in which at least one group perceives itself to be aggrieved and unable to rectify these grievances through legal or political channels.[18] "The greater the *competition* and *inequalities* between groups in heterogeneous societies, the greater the salience of ethnic identities and the greater likelihood of open conflict."[19] Ethnic conflicts are, therefore, not just struggles for resources and power but also for the recognition and protection of non-material issues.[20]

3.2.i.a. Political Causes: Central to the minority issue are "the conflicting principles of territorial integrity of states and self-determination of peoples."[21] As Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former UN Secretary General, has commented,

> "If every ethnic ... group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and economic well being for all would become even more difficult to achieve.
>
> One requirement for solutions to these problems lies in the commitment to human rights with a special sensitivity to those of minorities ...
>
> The sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the State ... and the principle of self-determination for peoples ... must not be permitted to work against each other."[22]

Ghali's statement acknowledges the delicate balances between territorial integrity and self-determination; authority and human rights; and majority and minority. Feasibly these relationships are manageable. Legitimacy and order are prerequisites for effective and representative government.

Self-determination is problematic, frequently linked to irredentism. Consequently, state elites, dominant societal groups and the international community are wary of claims for minority rights and self-determination. Managed properly self-determination is not necessarily the cause of extreme nationalism and secession but "the only realistic remedy for those conditions of power, subjection and fear from which nationalism are born."[23] Unfortunately, when "(f)aced with a stark choice between the territorial integrity of the state and democratisation, state elites will invariably opt for territorial integrity."[24]

The demands of minorities within in a state are often contradictory, seeking both equal treatment before law and the preservation of their separate identity. The provision of collective rights acknowledges the presence of a distinct cultural group within its boundaries and is far more threatening to the state's social, cultural and territorial integrity, than individual rights legislation.[25] Majority and state regime respect for distinct group rights and culture should be reciprocated by the minority's respect of the legitimate territorial integrity of the state.[26]

If peaceful political channels are blocked to minority groups and domestic autonomy is resisted, resort to force and outright independence may be advanced instead.[27] Snyder, for example, argues that groups actively seek secession from the state when they perceive that the state is failing to provide them with political access and recognition.[28] The longer these failures are perpetuated the greater the potential for conflict and the greater the intensity of the struggle is liable to be. There is the need to regard minority demands as a potential security issue and respond to them as early as possible and in a manner which will not be ultimately counter-productive.

3.2.i.b. Economic Causes: The Minorities at Risk Project research indicates that there is only a "negligible correlation" between "ethnonationalist grievances" and domestic economic problems.[29] The Project concluded that active nationalist groups are not necessarily the most economically disadvantaged within the state.[30] Whilst these findings are not disputed by the author, economic dislocation and disparity are frequently cited as a cause of inter-ethnic tensions.[31]

In Soviet Central Asia, economic deterioration and political uncertainties of the late-Soviet period exasperated socio-political tensions.[32] Zaslavsky argues that the USSR's economic downturn undermined internal stability and the regime's legitimacy.[33] The previous social policies and welfare, and material growth, which had secured a level of consensus, could not be maintained. The inter-republican economic interdependency of the system, even when successful, was problematic for Central Asia. The disparity between economic realities and popular aspirations was particularly felt by the burgeoning and educated young population. Declining economic prospects in the region encouraged the coalescence of ethnic identity for resource competition. Economic and political advancement was frequently based upon patronage systems, itself linked to ethnicity. (See 3.4.ii.b., 3.4.ii.c. & 3.4.iii.)

3.2.i.c. Demographic Causes: A final consideration, of great significance for Central Asia, is the impact of population change. Absolute population growth increases pressure on resource supplies, including access to land and water, accommodation and political representation. The relative growth or decline of a group's influence can also be detrimental to inter-ethnic relation. The latter issue is raised in Nevada's study of titular-Turkish minority relations in Bulgaria. The minority's more rapid growth, fuelled Bulgarian apprehensions over cultural, demographic and political relations between the groups including fears of *Islamification, Turkification* and irredentism.[34] The issue of different growth rates was a feature of late-Soviet politics. The Russo-phile attitudes of Moscow was evident in official concern over the four-times greater birth rate in the Muslim SSR than in the RSFSR.[35]

Migration, both internal and external pose serious concerns for the region's social stability. The UNHCR cites economic decline, environmental degradation and fear of conflict as the origins of population displacement and potential hostilities between incoming and settled communities in Central Asia, emphasising the close relationship between transition and conflict.[36] This problem is most evident in relation to rural over-population and underemployment, and resultant rural-urban migration. It is feared that immigrants to the cities, unable to find employment and housing or return to their original communities because their accommodation and jobs will be taken by other locals, will form an urban underclass. This underclass, "dissatisfied, alienated and angry", it is argued, is susceptible to extremist and violent rhetoric and action.[37] Whilst the migrants' grievances may not be explicitly ethnic, manipulation and misinformation, as well as, the ethno-stratification of labour may result in such a perspective.[38]

3.2.ii. Conclusion: The Minority at Risk Project concluded that a crucial influence on whether ethnopolitical agitation escalates to sustained violent confrontation is the government's behaviour in the initial period of debate.[39] It found an average gestation period of 13 years between the emergence of ethnic-oriented political movements and the first occurrence of violence.[40] Ethno-politics is a long-term and gradual process. The sudden explosion of violence is in fact the visible culmination of long-term governmental inability, or unwillingness to address minority demands.

The length of time that ethno-politics takes to become violent and the role of the authorities in this process are important points to emphasise. This work does not believe that ethnic conflict in the two republics is a short-term possibility. However negative trends; economic decline, increased wealth disparity, political malaise; population growth; and worsening environmental and social conditions offer the potential for ethnic polarisation in the long-term.

The incorporation of minority issues into the security debate can be manipulated by a government. A government may portray the group as threats to "national" security, principally through accusations of irredentism, and act against it. Minorities have traditionally been perceived by state majorities and elites as a source of insecurity, who should prove their loyalty towards the state, beyond that expected from the titular nation. This is of utmost significance in a NIS where questions of state- and nation-building, citizenship, and territorial integrity are still weak. Ethnic groups are more able to co-exist if they are able to "share a common image of their mutual history, and of one another's current conduct and character whilst self-justifying historical myths or ... distorted pictures of the group's and other groups' past and present behaviour and characteristics can encourage intolerance and antagonism."[41] This negative security implication is recognised by Buzan, who declares that internal societal threats are a sign of a vulnerable state.[42] Government denials, manipulation and portrayal of legitimate minority demands as negative and potentially threatening to state integrity, is often counter-productive, triggering minority discontent and demands for increased self-determination. Minority-oppressing behaviour can cause wars by either provoking violent secessionist ambitions from the minority, or by encouraging the "homeland" of a diaspora minority, to aid their co-nationals by force.[43] The latter point is most applicable to the Kazakstan case-study, but elements in Afghanistan and Tajikistan would be able to provide moral and physical support should relations between the Uzbekistani government and the Tajik minority become more confrontational.

3.3 Inter-Ethnic Relations in the Soviet Period

Prior to Soviet national delimitation policies, initiated in 1920, ethnicity had been amorphous and of little significance to those outside of the region's politics.[44] Tsarist conquest did not dramatically transform this situation. Although Kazak-Russian contacts were increasingly important and regular from the seventeenth century onwards a significant colonial presence on the Steppe did not take place until the late-nineteenth century. Tsarist expansion further south was completed more rapidly with the conquest of the Uzbek khanates in the 1860-70s.[45] Here Russian cultural, demographic and political influences were more limited than it had been upon the Kazak Steppe.

The imposition of Soviet rule transformed ethnic and territorial issues. Soviet policies dramatically accelerated if not instigated the subsequent ethno-national consolidation and established the Central Asian republics. Amorphous ethnic groups with ill-defined territories were transformed into titular nations with eponymous republics, official histories and distinct languages. The process has been referred to as "nation-building from above."[46]

A Kazak Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, (initially known as the Kirgiz ASSR) existed within the RSFSR between 1920-36.[47] The Kazak SSR underwent a series of territorial configurations, with land transfers between it and the RSFSR, and the Turkmen and Uzbek SSRs. The Kazak SSR lost its southern Siberian lands to the RSFSR. The temporary acquisition of Karakalpakia and Syr Darya regions including the Tashkent environs from the Uzbek SSR were returned to the latter in 1963, although part of Syr Darya oblast was ceded to the Kazak SSR in 1971.[48]

The Uzbek SSR was created in 1925. Subordinate to it until 1929 was the Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. After this date, the latter received Union republic status, too. The Uzbek SSR received the bulk of the former Bukharan khanate, the Samarkand region, the Tashkent area, and most of the Fergana Valley and Khiva.

The Soviet territorial division left latent tensions. The complex ethnic pattern of Central Asia did not correspond well to the restructuring of the region, creating diasporas and territorial problems. This was acknowledged by Bartold in a 1924 memorandum, which was only made public in 1992. The artificiality of the Tajik-Uzbek delimitation in particular was emphasised in this report.[49] As Subtelny recorded,

> "(i)n view of the difficulties involved, the 'solutions' arrived at could never have been entirely satisfactory and they eventually engendered a whole new set of problems which the era of *glasnost'* brought out in full relief."[50]

The most controversial aspects of the process, for Tajik-Uzbek relations, was the division of the multi-ethnic but integrally coherent Fergana Valley between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Similar problems resulted from the allocation of the Tajik-dominated cities of Bukhara and Samarkand to the Uzbek SSR and the heavily Uzbekified Khojent region (known as the Leninabad oblast during the Soviet period) to Tajikistan.[51]

In Kazakstan, the key contested areas are the Kazakstan-Russian border and the northern Kazakstani oblasts, which nationalists from both communities have contested. (See 3.4.v.) These problems and related cultural allocations have proved problematic for the NIS to build cohesive state loyalties and identities.[52] As Akiner notes, because much of Central Asian heritage was universally shared throughout the region Soviet efforts to divided it resulted in "distorted and grossly anachronistic interpretations of history."[53]

During the Soviet period, the balance between the Kazaks and Russians underwent major transformations. Disease, economic dislocation and hostilities with Tsarist and Bolshevik governments between 1916-30s decimated the Kazak population. In 1959 the Kazak population was 900,000 less than it had been in 1929.[54] This decline was compounded by three waves of Slav migration, associated with the emancipation of the Serfs (1861) and the Stolypin reforms (1906-12), Stalinist deportations (1920s-40s) and the Virgin Land Schemes (1954-65) These factors resulted in the Kazaks becoming a minority in their own republic. (See Table 3.1.) Demographic dominance reinforced the impact of Russian political supremacy.[55]

The Soviet era saw increased Uzbek regional political dominance, within the limits that Moscow allowed. Despite criticism from Moscow about Tashkent's treatment of Tajik and Turkmen minorities, the Uzbek SSR acted as the provincial agent for the centre.[56] This proved advantageous to both parties and helped legitimate its regional dominance, especially *vis-à-vis* Tajikistan and Tajiks.[57]

Moscow allowed a policy of native cadre control of the SSRs provided republican elites complied with the centre's core directives and strategic sectors of the economy and administration remained the preserve of Slavs. Titular groups controlled lower level administration, including oblasts and raions and traditional agriculture. Under the leaderships of First Secretaries Dinmukhamad Kunaev (1960-86) and Sharaf Rashidov (1959-83) the Kazak and Uzbek *nomenklaturas* consolidated their authority and personalised and nationalised the republics' power structures. This was a feature common throughout Central Asia in the Brezhnev era. The selection of and composition of republican administration was relatively autonomous. "The undemocratic pyramidal structure of power built with Moscow's consent and support, [and] a complete absence of civil society in Central Asia inevitably led to a situation in which the actual dispensation of power was connected to a network of personal trust, power and patronage."[58]

In both republics, the elites promoted the interests of the titular nations. In the Kazak SSR, Kunaev's reign saw the initiation of social and economic improvements and a Kazakification process in which the patronage networks were the main recipients.[59] In the Uzbek SSR, relations with the centre became more assertive. Widespread corruption and nepotism were investigated during the Andropov and Gorbachev periods, in what became known as the Cotton Affair.[60] Many in the Uzbek SSR's political elite regarded the resultant trials, cadre changes and criticism of the republic by Moscow as directly anti-Uzbek in tone and intent. The Virgin Land Scheme, nuclear testing at Semipalatinsk and Gennadi Kolbin's appointment as First Secretary in the northern SSR, and the resultant Kazak affront bore considerable similarities.

3.4. The Russian Minority in Kazakstan

3.4.i. Introduction: Upon independence Kazakstan's Russian community made up approximately 43% of the republic's total population and was larger than the titular group. (See Table 3.1.) In the nine northern oblasts of Kazakstan, over 50% of the population is ethnic Russian.[61] A high concentration of Russians has also recorded in Almaty. (See Map 3.1) Many settlers are second or third generation inhabitants who regard Kazakstan as their home and have a distinct identity from Russians in the RF.[62] There are also three Cossack Hoste within Kazakstan: the Semirechie, located south of Almaty; the Siberian north-eastern Kazakstan and the Uralsk in the north west.

Since independence, a constant theme of Kazakstani politics has been the maintenance of stable Kazak-Russian relations. The reasons for this are:

- Historical Kazak grievances against Russian and Soviet colonisation, including the systematic cultural and physical destruction of the Kazak nation, and massive Slav immigration;
- The recent reversal in demographic and political balance between the two groups;
- The vocal and antagonistic nationalism of nationalists from both communities during the late-Soviet period;
- The territorial homogeneity of the Russian community; and
- Russia's regional influence and relationship with its diaspora.

These influences will be explored in four key areas crucial in determining the republic's stability: politics; economics; demography; and relations with Russia.

Map 3.1: Russians in Kazakstan


High concentration of Russian settlers
Significant settlement by Russians
0
Km
800
RUSSIA
RUSSIA
Omsk
Petropavlovsk
Kokchetav
Orenburg
Pavlodar
Akhmola
Uralsk
Semipalatinsk
Karaganda
Ust-Kamenogorsk
KAZAKHSTAN
Aral Sea
Lake Balkhash
Almaty
UZBEKISTAN
KYRGYZSTAN
Caspian Sea
AZERBAIJAN
TURKMENISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
CHINA
IRAN

Source: Melvin, N. Distribution of Russian settlers in Kazakhstan, *Russians Beyond Russia: The Politics of National Identity*, RIIA/Pinter, London 1995.p 102.

3.4.ii. Politics

3.4.ii.a. National Politics: Independence was accompanied by a policy of harmonisation (*garmonizatsia*), which has attempted to assert a Kazak identity over previously Russified aspects and regions of Kazakstan.[63] The nativisation policy (*korenizatsiia*) has impacted upon all spheres of Kazakstani affairs. This has been an understandable reaction to the near-decimation of the Kazaks as a physical and cultural entity and the Russification that accompanied Tsarist and Soviet control of the Steppe. This Kazakification programme was regarded by Argingay Baltabaev, Vice-Director of International Affairs at the Kazakstan Institute for Strategic Studies, as a natural act of a sovereign Kazakstan. In his opinion, "Russification occurred intensely here from the 1960s to the 1980s. It is difficult to leave the past behind and it is natural that we must now move to redress the balance."[64]

Such a process may have had a detrimental impact upon non-titular groups, concerned by the promotion of the titular culture, preferential treatment for the titular group in the administration and employment, and support for the return of the Kazak diaspora. This has been recognised by Konovalov and Evastafiev, who state that "historical problems and negative experiences cannot justify ethnic minority rights violations from either a moral or a *realpolitik* point of view."[65] This statement expects a far greater degree of rationalism than usually accompanies the euphoria that follows independence.

Historically, Kazak over-representation in the republic's power structures was sanctioned by Moscow.[66] Under the Soviet system, Kazakstani Russian interests were channelled through the RSFSR and All-Union structures. These lines of communication were closed by independence. Since 1991, Almaty's moderate nationalist agenda has marginalised the interests of the Russian community at the national level. This was demonstrated in the debate on the 1993 Constitution. Article 2 defined the republic as "a democratic, secular and unitary state ... self-determined by the Kazakh nation [although it] guarantees equal rights to all."[67] The revised 1995 Constitution removed this statement but the new preamble declared that the state was founded "on primordial Kazak land."[68] Amerkulov, an ethnic Kazak academic, has criticised the implicate preference given to Kazaks by the Constitution. He believes that such discourse has categorised all other groups as second class citizens, and that "the principle of group privilege ... [has] won out over democracy and human rights [and] principles of equality for everybody regardless of nationality."[69]

Elections to the lower and upper chambers of the revised Kazakstan Parliament the *Majlis* in March 1994 and the Senate in December 1995 were seen as further demonstrations of the pro-Kazak emphasis of politics. In 1994, 60% of the 177 lower house deputies were ethnic-Kazaks, and only 33% were Russian or Ukrainian.[70] Of the 47 Senate members in 1996, 32 were Kazak and 13 Russians.[71] Russian candidates found it difficult to register for both elections.[72] The Semirechie Cossack *Ataman*, Nikolai Gunkin, and the Russian Centre movement's leader, Nina Sidorova were prevented from standing in the 1995 election, accused of making unconstitutional remarks.[73] In both elections, CSCE/OSCE observers complained of numerous electoral abuses.[74]

Important central ministries, the Judiciary, law enforcement and most important spheres of public administration are dominated by Kazaks.[75] In the upper echelons of power, the near-domination is more evident. Titular consolidation of the political elite saw Kazaks in the offices of President, Vice-President, Prime Minister and First Deputy Prime Minister, by November 1994. At the same time, all five State Councillors, 6 of the 7 Vice Premiers and over 80% of the senior Presidential staff were Kazaks.[76]

Russian and Cossack political and social organisations have faced government censure. After a Semirechie Hoste demonstration in Almaty, December 1994, and accusations that its social organisation was pursing objectives not stated in its charter, the social organisation was outlawed by the Justice Ministry.[77] In 1994, Boris Suprunyuk, editor of a Petropavlovsk Russian-language paper, was charged with inciting discord. Although the conviction was overturned at appeal, demonstrating some judicial impartiality, the Court and Suprunyuk criticised the local officials' lack of accountability and the political nature of the charges, respectively. As Suprunyuk is a Russian citizen, the case against him contravened an inter-republican agreement.[78]

Government censure of Russian political groups was accompanied by similar actions against other movements including Kazak nationalist groups. In fact, Alash, the Islamist and pan-Turkic organisation, ceased to effectively exist due to considerable government hostility. (See 5.10.iii.) Whilst Almaty has therefore not acted in an explicitly ethnic manner, Olcott argues that as a result Russian nationalists, and other independent groups, have been left with limited constitutional channels to pursue their interests.[79] The government, essentially Nazarbaev appointees, have not regarded the incorporation of other groups into the political decision-making process as essential to retaining widespread legitimacy or addressing these groups' apprehensions over the lack of representation.

3.4.ii.b. The Influence of Elites in Inter-Ethnic Relations: The role of political elites in the mobilisation of ethnicity must be emphasised. Elite rivalries during the 1980s saw the politicisation of ethnicity. Ro'i believes that there is considerable evidence to suggest that the ethnic violence in late-Soviet Central Asia, was at least partially the result of top-down manipulation.[80] The rapid dissemination of rumours which fuelled the tension, the rioters' ability to locate their victims' homes, the political capital that the republican and central elites made from these incidents, and the similarity between the various incidents imply some central co-ordination.[81] The Soviet authorities used the fear of,

> "inherent hostility between ethnic groups ... particularly in the southern tier, in the hope that these nationalities would prefer the domination of Moscow ... to the anarchy that would necessarily result from their independence."[82]

This "cult of stability" continued to be promoted by the post-Soviet republican leaderships.

In Almaty December 1986, demonstrations took place against Gorbachev's replacement of Dinmukhamed Kunaev, the long-serving ethnic Kazak First Secretary of the CP of the Kazak SSR, with Gennadi Kolbin. Kolbin was a Russian with no connection to the republic. The leadership change was part of Moscow's anti-corruption and the restoration of "internationalism" campaigns. Similar to the consequences of the investigations into the Cotton Affair, the indigenous republican elite were confronted by potentially great reversals. Moscow's policies struck "at the heart of the ... clan power structure that had infiltrated the Communist Party under Kunaev's rule."[83] It was perceived as a re-Russification of political life. Kazak elite acquiescence to or encouragement of the protest cannot be discounted. The demonstrations ended in violence when KGB and Ministry of Interior (MVD) troops were used to end the protest, resulting in upto 258 deaths, and mass arrests.[84]

Although the protests were not anti-Russian *per se*, the demonstrators were predominately Kazak. The demonstrations and subsequent repression "stimulated the development of Kazak nationalism."[85] Official reaction and rhetoric to the events exasperated the problem. The escalation from demonstrations to riots has been linked to the overreaction of anti-Kunaev officials to peaceful and genuine protests. These officials attempted to portray the events as purely ethnic.[86] Such a portrayal was not, however, widely accepted. As Olcott notes,

> "[e]verybody with any connection to Alma Ata knew that the government was lying, that regardless who was at fault, the protest over Kunaev's dismissal were far larger than reported and far more peaceful ... [The] Kazak sense of victimization by Moscow continued to deepen during Kolbin's time in office."[87]

The role of elites in managing contemporary Kazakstani inter-ethnic relations is equally disturbing. Considerable attention has been paid to Nazarbaev's self-professed role in maintaining social harmony. As a means of maintaining stability this is disconcerting for two reasons.

Firstly, the arbitrary, centralised and highly personalised system of government inevitably results in the reliance upon the individual rather than office cannot be relied upon. The careful and pragmatic balance between the titular and non-titular interests, crucial in retaining Nazarbaev's authority, means that the government has been unable to offer major concessions or reassurances to either group without alienating the other. As a result inter-ethnic tensions have been managed in an *ad hoc* and temporary manner. A long-term strategy has not been developed.[88]

Nazarbaev's professed commitment to a multi-ethnic state may not necessarily be maintained by any future leadership. Succession, in itself an unstable process in quasi-democratic systems, may revive these concerns. Whilst noting Nazarbaev's relative youth and health, his departure, combined with the increased concentration of power in the office, and more significantly the person, of the president, may have serious implications for the state's political stability. Any future president, Olcott argues, will be perceived as either pro-Kazak or pro-Russian, unable to retain Nazarbaev's universal appeal.[89] Even this is contested by Critchlow who claims that by 1995 the two main ethnic communities were less willing to uncritically accept Nazarbaev as guarantor of civic peace.[90] Critchlow directly associates this decline in popular support for the government with poor economic performance.[91] Popular disquiet was, however, directed towards the succession of Ministers rather than President Nazarbaev, who has sought to place blame for economic and political failings on his appointments. Nazarbaev, for example, accused the Tereshchenko government of political inertia which "not only discredited the last government but deprived it of credibility on the part of the president and society."[92] How long such a policy can be maintained is unclear.

Secondly, the commitment of Nazarbaev, and the government in general, to a democratic and non-discriminatory polity has been ambiguous. Nazarbaev has demonstrated authoritarian tendencies. For example, in August 1995 Nazarbaev won the referendum on revising the Constitution which gave the executive increased authority, restricted the legislative creating ability of Parliament, and replaced the Constitutional Court with the weaker Constitutional Council.[93] The enhanced constitution powers of the President led to Warren Christopher, former US Secretary for State, to voice concerns over the republic's political direction.[94]

3.4.ii.c. Intra-Kazak Divisions and Inter-Ethnic Relations: Social stability is not solely based upon the Kazak-Russian fracture. It is the contention of this thesis that intra-ethnic factors also affect inter-ethnic stability. The indigenous community is not monolithic. Within the Kazak nation there are a series of potentially damaging fractures: north-south; rural-urban; and the Zhuz.

The key historical division within the Kazak nation was the Zhuz. The Big, Middle and Little (Ulu, Orta and Kichi respectively) Zhuzs emerged from the Kazak khanate in the early sixteenth century.[95] They were associated with "temporary military unions" and pastoral migration routes. Membership was not rigid. It was possible for clans to transfer from one Zhuz to another. Geographically the Big Zhuz was located in the South and East around Lake Balkhash, the Middle in central and northern Kazakstan and the Little north of the Aral and Caspian Sea.[96] The Zhuzs briefly held political significance after the disintegration of the khanate in the eighteenth century, with *de facto* sovereign rights. The combination of internal dissent, and Jungars and subsequent Chinese and Russian expansion destroyed their political relevance.[97]

There has been intense speculation concerning the Zhuzs' contemporary cultural and political significance. As Edmunds has noted the term has two overlapping applications.[98] The first is anthropological, related to actual and imagined clan heritage and its contemporary cultural role. The second is an appellation for political patronage networks within Kazakstani society. It is the latter this thesis is principally interested. The blurring of the two applications, however, has complicated analysis of this sensitive issue.

Patronage networks were endemic in Communist Kazakstan. In fact the deliberate courting of national cadres enhanced titular patronage structures. Kunaev's 26 year reign as First Secretary was a particular significant era for this trend. These informal and predominantly, although not exclusively Kazak, structures developed loosely along clan lines.[99] As the nuclei of the patronage structures are based upon close contacts and associates they consequently appear as clan or regionally exclusive. This characteristic is enhanced by the fact that the each of the Zhuz (as a social unit) is associated with a particular area of Kazakstan.

These networks survived the collapse of the USSR far more successfully than the Slavic power structures. They subsequently gained considerable influence in key economic and political spheres. There are suggestions that these structures have had negative implications for intra-Kazak relations as well as been detrimental for non-titular groups. The former have been highlighted in interviews conducted by Edmunds. As one interviewee noted,

> "[d]uring the Soviet times, if a Kazak became important in Moscow, then all Kazak people were proud of him. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, people started thinking carefully about which Zhuz you represented and who occupied the higher official positions. These subdivisions have become clearer and distinct since independence, especially at the top level of government."[100]

It is apparent, however, that the selection of administrative and political personnel has not been solely determined by Zhuz membership (in the anthropological sense of the term.) For example, to connect Nazarbaev's Big Horde background and the predominance of this Zhuz in post-independence politics with an explicit clan supremacy fails to recognise the subtle and flexibility of this form of personalised politics. Personal connections (whether through family and clan ties or friendship, shared educational, employment or military experience) and perhaps most significantly loyalty towards the centre have determined cadre selection.[101] As Edmunds records members of the networks were not even necessarily Kazak.[102] Pragmatism understandably also affected appointments. Tazhkora Shardabayev's, of the Little Horde, appointment as Oil and Gas minister, in 1994, was perceived as expedient because the Tengiz reserves are located on territory associated with the Little Zhuz.[103]

Even though these power structures are not explicitly clan-based, access to economic and political benefits and positions has been arbitrary and personalised. Individuals and groups including Kazaks therefore have felt excluded. Consequently the Zhuz may assume an instrumentalist political role that absent from its present social and political role, particularly once the allocation of appointments reaches an *impasse*. If this takes place it could develop in either of two directions. It may increase Kazak nationalism with intra-Kazak competitors attempting to use a Kazak national identity to either "out-Kazak" opponents, or provide a source of common solidarity to subsume Zhuz divisions. The adoption of a strong nationalist dimension in domestic and foreign policy may be used to divert attention from internal divisions towards a "common enemy", the Russian minority.[104]

To date, however, these intra-Kazak fractures have had a positive influence on inter-ethnic relations. The loose Kazak identity and Russified nature of the northern Kazak community and their sense of exclusion from national political power, shared with the Russian community, has meant that co-operation between the two ethnic groups has been witnessed. In spring 1993, Russian and Kazak inhabitants of Pavlodar protested together against the replacement of the ethnic Russian director of the regional television station with an Almaty loyalist from southern Kazakstan and perceived as an outsider and Big Zhuz candidate.[105] Similarly, the Peoples' Congress of Kazakstan also sustained multi-ethnic political activism. Founded by Olzhas Sulemeinov, poet and former leader of Nevada Semipalatinsk, the Party's core support came from Russified Kazaks in the eastern and northern oblasts and Almaty, and the Russian intelligentsia. The Peoples' Congress Party established ties with moderate Russian nationalist movements, over common objectives including the protection of Russian language in education, and criticism of Big Zhuz political dominance due to cadre replacements with Nazarbaev loyalists.[106] Additionally, these sub-national affiliations may have restricted the consolidation of a Kazak identity.[107] Kazak-Russian political cooperation was symbolic of the limited mass appeal for Kazak nationalist movements such as Alash and Azat.[108] The key issue within the Zhuz debate has not been ethnic politics but rather the role of the arbitrary and patronage over openness and meritocracy in politics.

An additional concern is the rural-urban division. The rural population is larger, more conservative and Kazak-speaking but has lacked the degree of political access that urban Kazaks have achieved. The urban Kazak community, Melvin believes, has suffered an identity crisis because of the adoption of "what many of them see as an essentially peasant culture and use [of] a language with which they are often extremely uncomfortable."[109] Kazak nationalism has not provided a common bond for these two groups. As one interviewee, Murat Laumulin, confirmed to the author, that central government failed to respond to extreme rural hardship because of the lack of political communications and organisation outside of the urban areas.[110] The immense economic and welfare crisis in the provinces whilst resulting in major localised demonstrations had minimal impact upon politics in Almaty. This unwillingness to represent the rural Kazak population in mainstream politics may lead to rural communities seeking more radical political representation. Kazak nationalist groups, in particular the extremist groups, have been vocal advocates of agrarian problems. What makes this feasible and alarming is that the strength of Islam and lack of Russian contact in the South, the principal area of agricultural decline, dovetails with the combined but varying anti-Russian, Islamic, and pro-Kazak economic emphasis of Alash, Azat and Zheltoqsans' manifestos. (Also see 3.4.iii.)

3.4.ii.d. Centre-Regional Relations: Previously the political preserve of the local Russian community, the top tier of northern Kazakstan's administration has been replaced by titular centre-loyalists. What has been initially portrayed as essentially an ethnic dispute is as much a centre-periphery power struggle. This assertion of Almaty's control over the northern and eastern oblasts, and the Russian reaction to it, may partially be explained by the fact that during the Soviet era these oblasts were politically and economically relatively distinct from Almaty, closely integrated to Moscow, the RSFSR border regions and All-Union structures.[111] With the collapse of the USSR, these ties were curtailed. Almaty replaced Moscow as the centre of ultimate authority. This ambition was affirmed in the 1995 Constitution which declared the state as unitary and increased presidential authority through the regional prefects (*akims*), directly responsible to the president.[112]

The sense of alienation was considerable in Bremmer's 1993 study of Oskemen's Russian population.[113] The article indicated a high level of discontent within the Russian community to their treatment by the new government. Central government was viewed as solely promoting the interests of Kazaks, at the expense of Russians.

Politics in Oskemen (previously known as Ust-Kamenogorsk), for example, has assumed an ethnic dimension. On a vote over whether the region should become autonomous, the city's Soviet of Peoples' Deputies was split along ethnic lines.[114] Whilst the lower level city and oblast officials in Oskemen remained Russian, the percentage of Kazaks in the city administration rose from 10% in 1989 to 18% in 1993 and at the oblast level from 20% to 40%.[115] The Russian-led city authorities attempted to resist Kazakification, delaying the building of a mosque by a year, returning Kazak educational material to Almaty and preventing the sale of Kazak language material in street kiosks.[116] The continual replacement of regional leaders has weakened oblast political structures. In the Eastern Kazakstan *oblast*, for example, there were four akims between 1991-96.[117] In 1994, Kazaks in northern urban centres reported regular physical harassment from the Russians.[118] Similarly, Chechens and Cossacks complained about racially-motivated police harassment.[119]

Throughout the FSU, the proper location of authority has been under debate. What makes this debate more volatile in Kazakstan is that the new centre is *Kazak* whilst much of the periphery is *Russian*. Bremmer believes that the northern oblasts Russians clearly associated their apprehensions with central government, and not Kazaks *per se* and "claim that most Kazaks are themselves uneasy with the Kazak state policy; but are dissuaded from voicing their dissent from fear of retribution."[120] As well as the obvious anger and disempowerment, centralisation weakened Russian identification with the state and removes channels to address their concerns. The local Russian and Kazak communities initially reacted with disquiet to these appointments. Somewhat ironically given the Russian discontent over this process, the Chairman of the Eastern Kazakstan oblast, Amangeldy Bektemisov, a career politician and Nazarbaev loyalist was given the mission of improving inter-ethnic relation in the oblast.

Devolution could mitigate a crisis, equally it may be the embryonic stage of a secessionist movement. The opportunity for devolution does not exist, as the Constitution expressly forbids challenges to the unitary structure of the state, which would allow the Russian community to maintain its distinct identity. Although it is understandable that the new republic has been unwilling to foster potential separatist movements, a highly centralised system does not alleviate justified concerns from the new periphery.

3.4.iii. Economic Grievances: Ethnic-stratification has dominated the region's economic structures. Euro-Caucasians were and remain the backbone of technical and scientific sectors, whilst the titular populations have been employed in service sectors, republican administration, law enforcement and unskilled sectors of industry and non-mechanised agriculture.[121]

The role of economic disparity in inter-ethnic violence was demonstrated in Novy Uzen, 1989. Caucasian migrant labourers were employed in the western Kazakstani oil fields, in preference to local workers, at the time when 18,000 youths were unemployed in the SSR.[122] Demands for the replacement of the Caucasians with local workers resulted in riots. Five people were killed and 118 injured, Caucasian-owned businesses were destroyed and 3500 Caucasian fled the republic.[123] The incident illustrates the problems of inter-ethnic competition for limited economic resources.

It is difficult to determine whether the ethnic stratification of Kazakstan's labour force has had negative or positive implications for social stability. This Soviet legacy may have aided complementarity rather than competition, a view supported by Horowitz.[124] However, ethnic Russians have been markedly affected by reductions in state-subsidised employment. Increased titular competition has forced them unsuccessfully to seek employment in other sectors. Between 1991-4, a disproportionate percentage of Russians were unemployed in all of the Central Asian republics.[125] Their lack of transferable and language skills plus perceived and actual pro-titular selection may enhance fears of ethnic discrimination. (Also see 5.12.i.) Kazakstan saw major internal migration from Chimkent and Almaty to the northern oblasts.[126] As Russians are involved in technically skilled and economically strategic sectors Kazakstan can ill-afford to allow the mass emigration of non-titular groups that has taken place.

Numerous Kazakstani political commentators regard economics as crucial in determining the state's domestic stability and are pessimistic about the future.[127] This was borne out by economic statistics: Kazakstan's GDP in 1994 was approximately 60% of its 1991 level.[128] There was only a minimal rise of 1.1% between 1995-6.[129]

Kulchik argues that in Kazakstan the state or at least *nomenklatura's* control over the economy after 1991 increased since the final years of the USSR.[130] The Soviet economic system was transformed into sovereign *nomenklatura* capitalism.[131]

Access to political and economic information has allowed well-connected individuals to prosper whilst the majority of the population has faced serious economic hardship. This is implicitly ethnically-oriented. Those who have benefitted, however, from this process are the new *nomenklatura*, primarily Kazak. With representatives of the settler population being steadily forced out, political and economic power has been concentrated in the hands of a single ethnic group."[132] Corruption has also weakened the government's legitimacy, an issue which is frequently a central Islamist critique of Muslim governments. (5.4 & 5.12.iii) In 1994, approximately 1400 high ranking officials were arrested for abuse of office and accepting bribes.[133] As *Kazakstanskaia pravda* declared,

> "if people lost their faith in the representatives of presidential authority, and if people turned their back not only on the representatives but also on the authority itself, what kind of radical reform and rebirth of the republic can we speak about here?"[134]

Privatisation has raised inter-ethnic concerns, particularly over land privatisation. The concept of private ownership of land is an anathema to traditional Kazak ethics. The Virgin Lands Scheme was both at the expense of the Kazaks and also excluded them from the economic benefits.[135] This development insulted and alienated traditional Kazak society and aided the nexus between environmental and anti-Russian attitude in Kazak nationalism. Kazak nationalist groups such as Azat have expressed opposition to land privatisation arguing that the Kazaks would lose out to other groups. Azat's *pro-Kazak* manifesto argued that the titular nation should be the principle recipients of economic and political reform. The Republican Party of Kazakstan, a successor to Azat, has also been a prominent advocate of the rural Kazak community's problems. These ethnic considerations led to the 1996 "Law on Land" which allowed private ownership of land, but avoided serious antagonism by ruling that privately owned agricultural land can only be used for a limited number of purposes.[136]

The republic's economic difficulties have already resulted in embryonic demonstrations. Dissatisfaction with economic progress was expressed throughout 1996. Kazak nationalist movements such as Azat, Alash and Russian groups including LAD, Slava and Edinstvo all drew sustenance from the population's dissatisfaction with their economic plight.[137] The majority of the demonstrations were, however, non-ethnic in composition and objective. In Almaty and other major cities mass protest took place on 17 October 1996, organised by the Federation of Trade Unions of Kazakstan and the Confederation of Independent Kazakstani Trade Unions. Government action over socio-economic problems, in particular the failure to pay salaries and wages, the excesses of privatisation and the decline in living conditions were cited as the reason for the demonstrations. The action also offered an insight into the republic's political culture. The organisers forbade political party leaders to address the demonstrators in order to disassociate the event from accusations of political bias, and posing a political challenge to the government.[138] Problems associated with the electricity, gas and telephone systems in southern Kazakstan resulted in similar large-scale public demonstrations in Shymkent.[139] However, whilst the situation was described as on the threshold of a social explosion in 1994, economic hardship did not resulted in serious social instability.[140] As Laumulin commented that whilst "the economic situation may be endless, people will not protest, because there is a lack of political tradition, weak opposition, and it is difficult to mobilise opposition in such a sparsely populated country."[141] Notwithstanding this, the impact of the economy on political stability will be noticeable during the period of succession after Nazarbaev, and that,

> "[u]nless economic prosperity by that time high enough and equal enough- so that the country's major ethnic groups perceive that they have an interest in preserving the *status quo*, then the outlook for long-term political stability in Kazakhstan is dim."[142]

3.4.iv. Demographic Issues and Inter-Ethnic Relations: Population growth throughout Central Asia is seen as a key concern for regional stability. As discussed in 4.2. rapid growth increases pressures on economic, ecological, infrastructure and political resources. Given the incidents of resource-related conflict in the late-Soviet period this is a disturbing prospect.

Absolute population growth has been negative since 1993. A 3.5% decline was recording between this date and 1996.[143] This was a result of non-titular emigration and increased morbidity rates.[144] Demographic tensions have remained, however, over the issues of: the titular and minoritys' different rates of relative growth; Kazak immigration into the republic in general and specifically into the northern oblasts; and non-titular emigration.

Table 3.1. Kazakstan's Population by Nationality 1926-97 (as percentage)

	Kazak	Russian/Slavic	Others
1926	57.6	21.7	20.7
1959	30.0	52.1	17.9
1970	32.6	51.1	16.3
1979	36.0	48.1	15.9
1989	40.0	43.3 (Russian & Ukrainian)	16.7
1993	43.2	41.6 (Russian & Ukrainian)	15.2
1997	50.6	37.7 (Russian & Ukrainian)	11.7

Sources: Bohr, A. Table 7.1 Ethnic Composition of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, in Smith, G. *et al. Nation-building in The Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities*, CUP, Cambridge, 1998; *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 27/5/97; Bremmer, I. & Taras, R. (eds.) *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States*, CUP, Cambridge, 1993, Appendix B, Figure 17, p 555; Clem, R.S. Table 5. Ethnic Composition of Kazakhstan, by Oblast in 1926, 1959, and 1989. "Interethnic Relations at the Republic Level: The Example of Kazakhstan" *Post-Soviet Geography*, Vol. 34, No 4, p 231; Kazakstan State Committee for Statistics (SWB SU 1724 B6, 25/6/93); & Olcott, M, *The Kazakhs*, Hoover Institute Press, Stanford, 1987, Appendix 1, p 258.

The two nationalities' different rates of growth has caused anxiety for Kazakstani Russians. In 1994 the average age of the Kazak community was 23 years old, whilst that of the Russians was 46 years old.[145] This demographic disparity exemplifies the minority's sense of alienation and decline. In the future, this problem may be further worsened by the fact that the large young Kazak population, with little connection to the Russified Soviet past, may demand greater Kazakification within the republic. Although present communal relations remain relatively stable, there are disturbing signs for future relations. A 1993 survey registered evidence of ethnic animosity. 55% of Russian interviewed had been subjected to nationality-based hostility on public transport, 40% on a daily basis and 30% of Kazaks blamed their difficulties on the presence of non-titular groups. The survey concluded that the "younger generations of Kazakhs had absorbed an atmosphere of hatred for Russians."[146] This latter point is of significant interest. Post-Soviet societies are in the process of losing their shared (Russian) cultural experiences and norms, as a generation grows up with limited positive identification with Russia. Given the rapid population growth amongst the Muslim nations, in a period of enhanced national awareness, this suggestion is foreboding for future communal stability in the region.

Population transfers have been a major component of the *garmonizatsia* programme. Implicate in van Evera's suggestion that a government may find it more acceptable to allow secession by a homogenous and distinct region is the reason for the settlement of the Kazak diaspora.[147] The potential for secession from an ethnically-homogenous Russian territory, contagious with the RF., has been weakened by the programme. Almaty has diluted the cultural distinctiveness of the northern oblasts and attempted to incorporate them into a Kazakstani state. International and internal migrants have been provided with limited government assistance to relocate. Almaty, via the "Resolution of the Qurultay" document recognises members of the Kazak diaspora as refugees and provides limited financial and social incentives to "return" to the republic. This encouraged, at least in the first years of independence, large-scale migration.[148] 155,000 returned from the diaspora in China, Mongolia, and the FSU between 1991-6.[149] 30,000 Kazaks were settled in northern Kazakstan in 1991 and 45,000 in 1993.[150] In Oskemen, the housing of ethnic Germans who emigrated to Germany was reallocated to Mongolian Kazaks.[151]

The programme whilst reducing the ethnic homogeneity and distinctiveness of the oblasts has increased tensions within them. Cultural differences between the Russians and newly arrived Kazaks from the densely populated rural oblasts of Almatinsk, Zhambyl, Taldy-Kurgan and Southern Kazakstan, diminished the potential for social interaction and integration. The Kazaks' rural, conservative and Muslim background is liable to cause friction with local Russians accustomed to bi-lingual Russified Kazaks.[152] The problems of integrating these two groups has been further complicated by the arrival of Kazakstani Russians from the southern oblasts and Russian refugees from Tajikistan.[153] These Russian migrants have already left what they perceive to be a hostile traditional Muslim communities and an Islamic-inspired conflict, respectively.[154]

The disparity between population growth and employment opportunities is particularly acute in rural regions. In the Kazak SSR, the highest levels of economic backwardness and unemployment were recorded in the Kazak dominated oblasts.[155] Agrarian problems are likely to increase in the near-future due to the decline in the carrying capacity of Kazakstan's agricultural lands, a consequence of desertification, erosion and salination. It has been predicted that by the year 2000, 50% of all Kazakstan's pasture land will be affected by serious erosion.[156] Competition for increasingly scarce resources and rural-urban, south-north migration are likely. Disaffected rural Kazaks settling in the cites may be susceptible to political Islam and nationalism.[157] This author would accept that the detrimental impact upon stability will be felt in the long-term future, 10-20 years, rather than in the short-term that Shashenkov favours.[158]

Since 1991, out-migration particularly by Russians to Russia, has continually exceeded in-migration. Net out-migration from Central Asia is, however, not a new phenomena. The average annual net in-migration into Central Asia fell from 63,818 pa during the 1959-70 period to a negative balance of 58,916 during the 1979-87 period.[159] This suggests that the relaxation of employment and residency laws since independence rather than concerns over ethnic discrimination may have caused this increase (rather than a reversal) in migration trends.

Table 3.2.: Net Out-migration from Kazakstan 1991-1996

Year	Net Out-Migration
1991	49,000
1992	179,000
1993	222,000
1994	411,000
1995	238,000
1996	175,538

Source: "CIS Migration Report" IOM International Organization for Migration, 1997, pp 56-60. In "Migration in Kazakstan" *Eurasian File*, No 96, April, 1998, p 7.

It has been argued by some authors that continued out-migration of non-titular groups may alleviate ethnic tensions, and provide housing and employment for the titular population and reduce government social expenditure.[160] Although this may be the case the massive and continued haemorrhaging of the skilled sections of the settler community suggests non-titular groups feel that the state has failed them. Economic hardship, including, job insecurity, low wages and poor living conditions, and educational and employment discrimination and psychological concerns, linked to the collapse of the USSR were cited as the main reasons for leaving by emigrants.[161]

Whilst there has been a decline in non-titular emigration and titular immigration, the process has the potential for self-perpetuation.[162] The greater number of Russian who leave Kazakstan, the greater the influx of ethnic Kazaks into formerly Russian-dominated areas, further increasing Slav fears of discrimination, encroachment and insecurity. It is difficult to regarded the combined psychological impact upon local Russians, who have seen their cultural, political and now demographic position eroded within a decade as positive. The immigration of white-collar Russians has removed the cadre of the community's social and political structures.

The loss of their skills and education will have serious consequences for Kazakstan's economic development. This is an additional reason why it is vital that Almaty must seek to incorporate this community, rather than alienate them by over-emphasising the *Kazakness* of the republic. The only positive feature of this trend is that the minorities have not actively protested against actual and perceived discrimination, with implications for political and social stability, although avoidance and migration are not ideal solutions.

There is considerable evidence to suggest that since the initial militancy of the 1991-93 period when Russian community was discussing the status of northern Kazakstan and their citizenship, a situation common throughout the FSU, there has however been growing acceptance by the Russians that their future is linked to that of the republic. In a 1997 opinion poll, 57% of Kazakstani Russians interviewed regarded themselves as permanent residents of the republic, and only 25% as potential emigrants. Only 3% of all respondents irrespective of their ethnicity considered themselves as citizens of Russia.[163] Similarly, two thirds of Kazakstan's 122,000 immigrants between 1991-4 were Slavs and only 19.8% Kazak.[164] 54,000 "non-native" citizens of Kazakstan who had previously left the state since independence have returned.[165] These statistics imply that non-titular immigrants perceived the economic and inter-ethnic situation in the republic as no worse than elsewhere in the FSU and that Kazakstani immigration policy has not been explicitly pro-Kazak.

3.4.v. The External Dimension: Russia's Role in Kazakstan: Without any doubt potentially the most dangerous and unpredictable influence on Kazakstani stability, and in particular inter-ethnic relations, throughout the period was Russia. Its effects upon Kazakstan's stability have been wide-ranging in their origins, although the emphasis of this section will be upon Russian foreign policy.

Kazakstani politicians have been acutely aware of Russia's axiomatic role in Kazakstani affairs as Nazarbaev noted at the International Conference on Disarmament, Geneva in 1995, stating that "Russia ... [and] her choice will to a large extent determine the stability and changes in Eurasia."[166] Almaty has striven to maintain close economic, military and political relations with Russia. This has been a recognition of Kazakstan's interdependency with its northern neighbour, the need to reassure its own Russian community, and a means of seeking dialogue and cooperation over the diaspora and other sensitive issues, including military security.

This has been achieved with difficulty because Moscow's Near Abroad policies and interventions have not aided confidence in its neighbours. The Federation's erratic views and actions towards the Russian minority has failed to satisfy any of Kazakstan's interested parties, whilst providing all groups with material for advancing their own critiques of Moscow. Initially, liberals such as Andrei Kozyrev, the former Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, were reticent to see Russia as a "guarantor of regional stability." A subsequent change in Russian foreign policy resulted in a more assertive concept with a self-proclaimed right to intervened in the Near Abroad. By March 1993, Yeltsin argued that,

> "Russia continues to have a vital interest in the cessation of all armed conflicts on the territory of thc former USSR. Moreover, the world community is increasingly coming to the realise *our* country's special responsibility in this difficult matter. I believe the times has come for authoritative international organisations, including the UN, *to grant Russia special powers as a guarantor of peace and stability in this region.*"[167]

Similar interventionist attitudes and policies were expressed in the *Basic Provision of the Russian Federation's Foreign Policy Concept*, for example.[168]

The diaspora has attained a central position in Russian foreign policy. Numerous official statements from Moscow have stated its willingness to protect the interests of Russians and Cossacks. Ambartsumov, for example, has argued that forcible methods as a means of solving problems, including the protection of the

Russian diaspora are legitimate.[169] The confused concepts of *Russia* and *Russian* have complicated post-Soviet Russian Foreign Policy. The Federation has sought to connect the diaspora to the Russian *nation* and by implication the Russian *state*, and via "[t]he emphasis on common ethnicity" ensure "that the diaspora is seen as an object of the Russian state" rather than as solely a domestic concern for Almaty and the other Near Abroad capitals.[170]

Elements within Russia, and not solely extremists, hold views that have not assisted stability in Kazakstan and good diplomatic relations between the two capitals. Vladimir Zhirinovski, the Liberal Democrat leader, exemplifies Russian nationalism at its most bellicose and has played a key role in promoting the diaspora in politics.[171] Similarly, Solzhenitsyn's ideas on a "Greater Russia" which would include northern regions of Kazakstan heightened diplomatic tensions.[172] Key RF decision-makers and policy advisers have also questioned the territorial integrity of Kazakstan.[173] One must note that the extremist Kazak nationalist movement, Zheltoqsan, demanded the incorporation of "historic" Kazak lands including the RF. regions of Astrakhan, Kurgan, Omsk, Orenburg and Tomsk.[174]

The differences in Kazakstan and Russia's respective treatment of the Cossacks have affected the former's inter-ethnic relations. Cossack membership is subject to three core articles:

- Acceptance of Russian Orthodox faith;
- A strict code of discipline; and
- The belief in the integrity of Russian lands.[175]

The Federation's recognition of the Cossacks as a distinct nation with the right to self-rule, including the formation of armed militias contrasts with Kazakstan's view that the Cossacks are a sub-section of the Russians, rather than a distinct ethic group.[176] This may be explained by the Cossacks' militaristic and territorial character. The Cossacks have presented Almaty with the greatest challenge to its territorial integrity.[177] Ataman Gunkin, was arrested and sentenced for three months for "agitating" for the unification of northern Kazakstan into the RF, in contrivance of the Kazakstani Constitution. Upon release, Gunkin unrepentantly declared that,

> "all [Kazakstani] Cossacks ... will take Russian citizenship ... In other words, the Semirechensk Cossack Horde should become the Russian Semirechensk Cossack Horde on Kazakhstan's territory."[178]

The Kazakstani authorities have regarded the Cossacks as a fifth column for Russian interests. The paramilitary character of the Cossacks and alleged military contacts with Russian Armed Force Cossack units has increased such apprehensions.[179] The Siberian Hoste, cross-border in distribution with its headquarters in Omsk, has been more confrontational than the other two Hostes towards Almaty.[180] The political activism of this Hoste's Kazakstani members has, however, been limited.[181]

Armed Cossack troops have been deployed to patrol Russia's 5000 km border with Kazakstan, an arrangement which Almaty complained about. Kazakstani commentators have been critical of this close relationship, to the extent that one Presidential Apparat figure charged Moscow with supporting "criminal" *ataman* such as Gunkin.[182]

Difference of opinions and policies between the two states on the treatment of the Russian-speaking minority has also acted as a source of friction. Both capitals claimed that the other has failed to appreciate the real situation. Russian media sources have been highly critical of Almaty's unwillingness to discuss minority problems. When the Kazakstan ambassador to the Russian Federation, Tair Mansurov, spoke to the Duma Committee for CIS Affairs hearing on Russian-Kazakstani relations his denials of any ethnic related problems "were so equivocal that they could not satisfy anybody [present],"according to *Pravda*.[183]

Mirroring these views, Kazakstani charges have been levelled at Russian commentators and politicians that they "lack knowledge about Kazakstan ... know nothing about the real situation or even migration statistics."[184] Throughout the period Kazakstani elites frequently complained, with some justification, that Russian journalists and politicians deliberately exaggerated the situation for their own objectives. Several figures interviewed by the author reported conversations with unspecified Russian Federation officials, who they regarded as having incredulous views on Kazakstan.[185] Abdigaliev argues that discrimination towards Russians and intra-Kazak divisions were primarily creations of Russian "conflict-provoking articles."[186] Such statements contain echoes of previous Soviet denials of internal problems and display a lack of substantial change in the political culture of the post-Soviet decision-makers, which will hinder effective policy making, and conflict prevention. In such an environment any deterioration in inter-ethnic relations in Kazakstan could easily escalate to become a regional issue.

Moscow's erratic policies towards Kazakstan have been dangerous. Russian politicians alternatively encouraged and neglected the interests of Kazakstani Russians. In fact, relations between Moscow and the diaspora have been more strained than between the capitals. In interviews with Melvin, the Russian population expressed a sense of betrayal by Moscow, over the issues of dual citizenship; snubs by Russian Federation politicians to appeals and delegations; and a reduction in the purchasing of military equipment manufactured in the Kazakstan's northern oblasts.[187] This has led to the Kazakstani Russian community adopting a pragmatic view of Moscow's ability to act on its behalf and may account for the decline in irredentism and militancy.

Kazakstan-Russian relations remain amicable. Russia has acknowledged Kazakstan's territorial integrity. Co-operation and dialogue have been the norm for inter-state relations. Given the customary sensitivity and independence of national military security, Kazakstan-Russian security cooperation including the stationing of Russian troops on Kazakstan's Caspian and Chinese borders is indicative of a relatively close and transparent level of inter-state relations.[188] Some Kazakstani security advisors suggest that co-operation between the two republics has improved because northern Kazakstan is no longer a source of contention.[189]

3.5. The Tajik Minority in Uzbekistan

3.5.i. Introduction: Beyond charges of ancient and intractable ethnic enmities, Uzbek chauvinism and Tajik irredentism, discussions on Tajik-Uzbek relations has been limited, unlike the situation of the Russian minority in Kazakstan.[190] This section aims to examine this neglected area of post-Soviet inter-ethnic relations.

The case-study will be examined predominately through Tashkent's relationship with the Tajik social-political movement, Samarkand. Whilst the broader Tajik community will be discussed, the government-Samarkand relationship was selected because Samarkand is one of few areas of the minority's affairs that is sufficiently documented.

In the Tajik-Uzbek scenario there are significant points of departure from the Kazakstani example. These include:

- The close and long Tajik-Uzbek relationship;
- The ill-defined cultural demarcation between them;
- The fact that power relationships between Tajiks and Uzbeks have remained unaltered by independence;
- The continued reliance of an authoritarian political culture;
- The manipulation of national (state) security for explicit regime security requirements; and
- A tense regional security environment in which the Tajik's eponymous republic was embroiled in conflict.

Of the 4.6 million Tajiks recorded in the 1989 Soviet census, 3 million lived in their titular republic and 933,560 in Uzbekistan.[191] In the latter, Tajik-dominated regions include the cities of Bukhara and Samarkand, the Chorvok area, parts of the Fergana Valley; Jizzakh province, Surkhan Darya and Kasha Darya.[192] Another 3 million Persian-speakers, identifying themselves as Tajiks, are in Afghanistan.[193] The number of ethnic Tajiks in Uzbekistan is contested. (See 3.5.iv.) The Tajiks dispersal between three republics, two of which have been beset by conflict, and an eponymous republic with a smaller Tajik population than in either Afghanistan and Uzbekistan has complicated questions of nation-diaspora relations and irredentism.

Table 3.3. Ethnic Composition of Uzbekistan 1996

Ethnic Group	Number	Percentage
Uzbek	17,925,750	77.5
Russian	948,330	4.1
Tajik*	1,179,630	5.1
Others	3,076,290	13.3
Total	23,130,000	100

Source: Bohr, A. Table 1 Ethnic Composition of Uzbekistan, *Uzbekistan: Politics and Foreign Policy*, RIIA, London, 1998, p 33 (ii); & The Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan/TACIS, Population Development 1990-98 (thousands) *Uzbekistan Economic Trends 1997 (First Quarter)*, Tashkent, 1998p 43. (* This is the official Tajik figure which is contested.)

In 1996, the Uzbeks comprised 77.5 percent of Uzbekistan's population, itself the most populous state in Central Asia. They are the region's largest ethnic group with a diaspora in all of the other four republics.[194] Prior to the Tajik Civil War upto 25% of Tajikistan's population was ethnically Uzbek, located along the republican border and especially in the Khojent oblast, (known as the Leninabad oblast between 1929-91).[195]

3.5.ii. Politics: Tajik-Uzbek tensions were reported in 1987 in the Samarkand oblast.[196] As with Kyrgyz-Uzbek violence in the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan, in 1989, these clashes were associated with land and water access. (See 4.10.ii.a.3.) The *glasnost* period saw debate on Tajik-Uzbek issues.[197] Interviews were published in which Tashkent acknowledged that there had been discrimination towards the minority in the past, accepted the group's fears of Uzbek assimilation and sought bilateral solutions with the Tajik SSR on these problems.[198]

The first signs of an organised revival in Tajik cultural and political action was the establishment of the Social-Cultural Association of Tajiks and Tajik-speaking people (SCA) in March 1989, under Uktum Bekmuhammadov.[199] The next year, saw the SCA augmented with the foundation of the National Cultural Centre (NCC). The joint movement is commonly referred to as *Samarkand* and was co-chaired by Bekmuhammadov and Jamol Mirsaidov. Although it is difficult to gauge the movement's popularity, according to one Samarkand leader, 60,000 Tajiks signed an open letter presented to President Karimov in 1991.[200] As with other independent political movements throughout Central Asia, due to government hostility, general dissatisfaction with politics and economic hardship, it is probably that this support has been much reduced.

Samarkand, although primarily concerned with promoting Tajik aspirations, in its platform and political methods was compatible with the numerous moderate reform-oriented movements that were emerging throughout the USSR in the late-1980s. As Samarkand's published material demonstrate its nationalist objectives were moderate, pluralist and principally focused upon four broad themes: national education; the use of Tajik language in politics and mass communication; culture and heritage; and political and legal rights.[201] Tajik-specific demands were accompanied by a wider desire for political reform. The movement sought to provide "constructive proposals about how to resolve ethnic problems and to meet the lawful demands of our ethnic group" and "facilitate the provision of real equality of all the citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan, regardless of their nationality, social status, position, political views or faith."[202]

After an initial and brief period of government dialogue with the Tajik movement there was a dramatic reversal in their fortunes.[203] The early modest advances were lost in the restoration of authoritarianism in 1992 related to the Shukurulla Mirsaidov-Karimov power struggle, demonstrations in Tashkent and Tajikistan's descent into civil war.[204] Samarkand's cursory connection with Birlik, the main opposition movement in the early 1990s also complicated its relationship with the government.[205]

The CSCE has reported routine harassment of the Samarkand Movement.[206] This harassment has ranged from bureaucratic obstinacy to kidnappings. By 1992, the authorities were accusing SCA-NCC of taking on political aspirations, essentially offer a political alternative.[207] The organisation fell foul of the 1993 law forcing all political movements to apply for re-registration. A government-sponsored Tajik association using the designation, the *Tajik Cultural Association-Samarkand*, was registered. The independent movement was thus prevented from registering, even after the Samarkand oblast court ruled against the Justice Department's decision.[208]

Bureaucratic harassment has been accompanied by frequent gross violations of Samarkand activists' rights. From June 1991, leading members of the movement have been arbitrarily arrested, beaten or forced to leave Samarkand city.

Bekmuhammadov was been subject to considerable government attention. In 1991, he was initially jailed for four months.[209] In December of the same year, Uzbekistani security service agents kidnapped Bekmuhammadov, along with Abdumannob Polat, the founder of Birlik, and another Birlik member, Takhir Bakaev, who were attending a human rights conference in Bishkek, Kygyzstan. Although Polat's argument that Bekmuhammadov and Bakaev were arrested to prevent them from reporting Polat's abduction is probably correct, the case illustrates the extent to which the regime has been prepared to go in order to silence opposition figures.[210] Bekmuhammadov, who received a 10 day jail sentence, has since been accused of being a Russian spy, and emigrated.[211]

Tajik activists have also been prevented from meeting with international organisations. Since 1992 the Uzbekistani authorise have been prevented Tajiks from attending the annual World Congress of Tajiks, in Dushanbe, even though the Constitution guarantees that (a)ny citizen ... shall have the right to ... free entry to and exit from [the republic] except in the events specified by law."[212] Similarly, an arranged meeting between an US State Department delegation and *Samarkand* members resulted in the detention of 36 individuals associated with the movement. The incident indicated the continued surveillance of dissent.[213]

Other reports suggest that ethnic Tajik candidates were prevented from standing in the December 1994, *Oli Majlis* elections, although five Tajik candidates from approved and registered parties were elected.[214] Ethnically-based parties are illegal, therefore independent Tajik candidates would have been prevented from standing.

Numerous arbitrary and unconstitutional actions by the central government, *viloyet*, *hokim* and security service (SNB) and police figures have been directed to the Tajik movement. These include the prohibition of Tajik cultural centres in Syr Darya, Surkhondarya, Kashkadarya and Fergana *viloyet.*[215]

Both Tajiks and government officials were keen to highlight the existence of a Tajik-media to the author, even though its was rather superficial in nature.[216] With censorship endemic in Uzbekistan discussion on the Tajik issue has been curtailed.[217] The publication of appeals for humanitarian aid to Tajikistan and historical tresises on good government have been labelled seditious. More direct forms of repression have also been evident, including the physical harassment of the editor of *Ovozi Tadjik*, who was subsequently forced to retire.[218] This gap in the service has been more pronounced because after the onset of the Tajik Civil War, transmissions from the republic were jammed by Tashkent, depriving the minority of "its links with their national-state education."[219]

Tajik cultural aspirations have been problematic for Tashkent which has sought to portray a strong unified and uniquely Uzbek identity. The community's demands for increased access to native-language education and media material ran counter to the government's attitudes towards free speech, and Uzbek history and national identity. Similarly, Tajik demands for the expansion of Tajik-language in education, and cultural links with the broader Perso-phone community would have allowed non-sanctioned information and influences to reach the minority.

The Tajik minority scenario has been enacted in a wider political environment founded upon the preservation of "stability at all costs."[220] Authoritarianism and an homogenous identity have been justified as expident. As Karimov declared such conditions are necessary,

> "during historic periods when a country gains its own statehood, the more so, during a transition period from one system to another [in order] to prevent bloodshed and confrontation and the *preserve ethnic and civil accord, peace and stability* ... It is necessary for democracy's progress"[221]

A pluralist political culture in which an assertive Tajik identity could be articulated would not have aided this. The Tajik Civil War was symbolic of the stability and security the Uzbekistani population would forsake should they engage in the "pseudo-revolutionary upheavals" for which neither Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were prepared for.[222] The Uzbekistani Foreign Ministry paper, *Jahon*, ststed that opposition groups should be "constructive and patriotic" and not compete for power, for such behaviour would result in a Tajikistani situation.[223] Groups that fail to meet with these criteria are regarded as unpatriotic and extremist.[224]

Equally important in the call for stability have been objective considerations. Inter-ethnic violence in Osh, in Kyrgyzstan in 1989, the temporary breakdown of central authority in Namangan and the instability in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, all illustrate the regional political insecurities in which republic's government has had to formulate domestic and foreign policies. With the exception of the Namangan incident, discussed further in the Islamic chapter, ethnicity was politically divisive in these situation.

Tajikistan's disintegration has had a striking resonance for Uzbekistan. (See 3.5.v.) Sub- and supra-national loyalties from the *mahalla* to Islam are evident within the Uzbek nation. Regional rivalries remain a key source of division within the republic, both at the elite and popular level.[225] The Fergana Valley, has proved a particular challenge to Uzbekistan's integrity from the perspective of the government. The Valley's ethnic composition; division between three republics; deep-seated and conservative Islamic affiliation and proximity to Tajikistan's events pose unresolved problems for Tashkent. Carlisle claims that the state's territorial divisions are so acute that the possibility of an autonomous or even independent Bukhara in the near-future is feasible.[226] This author would dispute this conclusion. Regionalism within in Uzbeksitan has not developed irredentist ambitions. The presence of Tajik communities in the alternative centres, Bukhara-Samarkand and the Fergana Valley, however, has blurred the distinction between regional and ethnic political competition and heightened Tashkent's apprehension of insecurity.

The construction of an Uzbekistani identity has attempted to subsume these alternative local and ethnic loyalties. This has been demonstrated in the historical manipulation of the republic's demographic figures and the re-defining of different nationalities as Uzbek. Writing specifically on post-Soviet Uzbekistan, Schoeberlein-Engel declares that the creation of an homogenous nation can be achieved through the creation of a government-sponsored identity,

> "compelling both to its own population and the world at large ... The most common way of establishing a state's identity is through asserting that the identity of the state represents the identity of its population. ... [N]ew states are keen [to] promote themselves as having a deep history and important presence in the world."[227]

A strong unitary Uzbekistani identity has been perceived as vital to maintaining territorial and civil stability, according to the present regime's philosophy. A constant theme of Uzbekistan's state-building programme has been the centrality of authority, stability and strength. The centre's revival of Timur, the fifteenth century empire-builder and Rashidov have focused upon the benefits of authoritarianism. Timur's rehabilitation "is no accident [for] he unified the peoples of the region [and] instilled a sense of order during a time of chaos."[228] The re-interpretation of Uzbekistan's historical significance has been central to this elevation in which "the Timurids are inextricably linked with the [Uzbek] nation, making Uzbeks feel they share a tradition of statehood that, though interrupted, has no parallel in the region ... and shapes Uzbeks attitudes towards surrounding powers."[229]

Tajik cultural demands have challenged the ideological foundation of post-Soviet Uzbekistan, as established by the Karimov regime. Uzbek claims to a dominant role in the region's history have been undermined by their understandable desire to reaffirm their historical origins and the relationship with the territory and culture of what is now Uzbekistan.

It is uncertain whether Tashkent's assertive nation-building is expedient. The failure to establish effective cohesive nation and state identities may lead to the fragmentation of the state. Tajikistan has been perceived as, or at least portrayed by Karimov amongst other post-Soviet leaders, the result of the failure to construct such loyalties and used to "justify the nastier aspects of nation-building" including discrimination, and the suppression of diversity.[230] There are serious doubts, however, as to the effectiveness of an unitary Uzbek identity. As Schoerberlein-Engel concludes,

> "[i]n Uzbekistan, there is such tremendous cultural diversity that any attempts to promote a clear cut homogenous national identity would inevitably make outsiders of a substantial part of the population unless they suppress their own culture in favour of the national one. I would like to challenge this notion of nation-building imperative and suggest that with all its rich diversity, Central Asia would do better to seek its models of pluralism."[231]

The assertiveness of contemporary Uzbek identity may alienate non-titular groups either because of fears of exclusion and discrimination or conversely fears of assimilation and encroachment. Both of these concerns have been felt by the Tajiks. Their culture and history have been assimilated into an Uzbek construction, whilst their political aspirations portrayed as subversive and disloyal. The fact that the group has not held any irredentist ambitions makes these attacks even more perverse. If alternative identities are radicalised and strengthen, Uzbekistan's political structures and environment will find these difficult to accommodate.

The paucity of reliable information, however, makes it difficult to determine the level of oppression although the author has anecdotal evidence of individual discrimination and harassment of ethnic Tajiks by government official, and security officers.[232] The difficulty is in gauging the level of such harassment and determining whether these were officially sanctioned or the actions of rogue individuals. Mirsaidov's address to the President concerning the arbitrary and unconstitutional behaviour of the *hokim*, police officers and other officials in Samarkand oblast indicated regular harassment of the Tajik community, and also the government's failure to control its own personnel.[233] No matter its origins such actions do not endear citizens from minorities to the agents of the state and by implication the state itself. Considerable evidence suggests, however, that there has been no significant communal enmity between the republic's Tajik and Uzbek communities. Novak and Wixmans' individual research support the assertion of relatively harmonious interaction between the two communities.[234]

This is concurrent with this work's hypothesis that the treatment of the Tajik minority by the government has been politically motivated rather than a consequence of intractable and ancient hostilities, the result of an ongoing "Uzbek-Tajik conflict which is the [partial] ... product of the millennium-long relationship between Turkic and Iranian peoples."[235] The primary focus, has therefore been centred upon the more obvious "elite" level of political discrimination and abuse towards Samarkand and its activists. The government's repression of the Tajik opposition was arguably more a result of the ex-Communist elite's attempts to retain personal power than concern over a militant minority. Regime security supplanted state security. Haghayeghi argues that the evidence supports such an analysis "when one considers the methods by which the present leaders have secured their power, their reaction to the coup of 1991, and the manner in which the opposition has been treated."[236] Underneath the this behaviour is the legacy of Soviet political culture and mentality. The failure to achieve a wholesale transfer in political ideology and personnel and structures has allowed for this continuation. Arbitrary actions, combined with a culture of deference and a lack of official recourse have stifled political initiative and independent thought in Uzbekistan. Ethnicity does not appear to be the principle cause of harassment and discrimination that the state's Tajiks face. The Tajik movement and community has been subject to the same level and methods of oppression as have ethnic Uzbek opponents of the regime, whether secular, Muslims, nationalist, or democratic. The Tajik example has simply been a microcosm of the systematic abuse of power practised in the republic.[237]

3.5.iii. Economic Grievances: Ethnic stratification of labour was essentially tripartite; indigenous, European, and Caucasian. Employment demarcation between Tajiks and Uzbeks has been therefore less emphatic than that between Kazaks and Russians. Tajiks are on the whole bilingual and urban with a tradition as artisans and small traders. Consequently, they may find it possible to thrive in the republic's economy with little explicit discrimination.[238] There are, however, four key economic-oriented spheres which have had serious implications for Tajik-Uzbek relations. These are:

- Historical examples of inter-ethnic resource competition;
- The general economic situation related to transition and population growth;
- The state's coercive use of employment; and
- Intra-republican trade;

As noted previously, Uzbeks were involved in a series of economic-related conflicts with other nations during the late-Soviet period. The Fergana Valley witnessed Uzbek violence against Meskhetian Turks, deported by Stalin in 1944. The violence, between 23 May and 25 June 1989, claimed 100 lives and required 9000 MVD troops to restore order.[239] The incident demonstrated a network of factors which generated and maintained the violence including: a lack of reliable news sources in which rumour created an environment of insecurity; ethno-economic inequality and stratification, and the involvement of party figures in the disturbances; and the authority's failure to respond to early signs of tensions and the victims' requests for protection. Meskhetian leaders regarded Tashkent's inaction as a sign that the group was deemed as a unwanted immigrant group.[240]

Economic disparity contributed to the pogrom. With upto 30,000 Uzbeks unemployed in the Fergana Valley, in 1989, the relative economic prosperity of the Meskhetians was regarded by the Uzbeks as an acute affront.[241] The brutality and intensity of the pogrom towards the Meskhetians, in Haghayegni's opinion, can "only be rationalised if one took into account the centuries-old Uzbek sense of supremacy that had been profoundly frustrated by the presence of the Meskhetian Turks who enjoyed a relatively higher economic status in Fergana."[242] This nationalistic chauvinism, Haghayegni believes, is even more pronounced towards the Tajiks.[243] It is difficult to ascertain the potential for similar violence between these two groups as the cultural and economic demarcation between them is less pronounced than between the Uzbeks and Meskhetians.

In 1990 Osh oblast, Kyrgyz SSR, "[u]nder conditions of low living standards, socio-economic crisis and political destablization, inter-ethnic tensions erupted" between Kyrgyzs and Uzbeks.[244] Increased group competition for land, accommodation and political positions, rural-urban divisions (i.e. Kyrgyz-Uzbek), and high unemployment all contributed to the outbreak of violence. Political inequalities were stark. Although the Uzbeks comprised 26% of the oblast's population, only 5.8% of Osh town administration was staffed by Uzbeks, who dominated the "less prestigious but materially rewarding positions in trade and services."[245] Tishkov, citing other authors, emphasises the role of a weak oblast administration, unable to cope with nationalist groups, as a major contribution to the violence.[246]

The general economic situation, linked to rapid growing population and transitional problems, is a serious source of concern for future stability. Over 60% of Uzbekistan's population is under 25 years old, and between 1990-7 grew by 15%.[247] There are already underlying economic tensions. By the late-1980s, 20% of all those entering the employment market in the Fergana oblast were unable to find a job.[248] Whilst the economy has proved relatively resilient to the detrimental effects of transition due to major state involvement, the lack of economic reform and population growth are liable to disturb this calm. GDP revived in 1996, having previously dropped to 50% of its 1990 figure.[249] Privatisation and reforms have been cautious. Land privatisation, in particular, has been constrained by concerns over communal competition and problems of water access and pricing.[250]

The Fergana Valley is perhaps the most likely location for these confrontations. The Uzbek section of the Valley saw a 13.1 % rise is population between 1991-6 and an average population density of 338 people/km^2 in 1997.[251] This burgeoning multi-ethnic population has resulted in competition for increasingly scarce resources. A much debated concern has been the question of rural-urban migration. It is feared that arrivals from traditional rural communities, with lower education and employment skills, enter the urban underclass and are susceptible to alienation and political radicalisation. (This issue is discussed further in 4.2; 4.12; 5.4; & 5.12.) Should this process take place, the prognosis for Uzbekistan is far worse than that for Kazakstan. In the latter out-migration and population decline have acted as a release to competition and tensions. Whilst many of the southern rural Kazaks migrating to northern and urban areas are devout Muslims, Islam is stronger amongst the Uzbekistani rural community and potential migrants. The arrival of rural Uzbeks including refugees from Tajikistan, whose poor economic and social status may lead to resentment and violence towards the already established Tajik inhabitants.[252] (An estimated 300,000 ethnic Uzbek refugees fled Tajikistan.) Competition for accommodation and employment, as well as, possible animosity towards Tajiks in general may heighten communal tensions.[253]

Under-represented in state-run employment Tajiks have called for a fairer quota system.[254] These demands have not been met. As state employment is a key employer, (30% of total workforce), the government has used appointments as a weapon against opponents including Tajik activists.[255] The threat or use of dismissal from employment has been a highly effective method of stifling dissent, given the present hardships and the deference and patronage of republic socio-economic life. Several Samarkand figures, mostly academics, have been removed from their positions.[256] Members of Samarkand State University (SamGU), that the author spoke to, were unwilling to discuss these cases and the wider issue of discrimination.[257] This may have resulted from their concerns over employment security. The double standard between the titular and non-titular groups has seen the removal of non-Uzbeks first when redundancies are required. (Inequality has also been recorded in the legal system where titular group defendants have received more lenient sentences than non-titular co-defendants for the same crimes.[258])

The economic tensions between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have been problematic, partly as a consequence of the artificial nature of Soviet border policy, and the republican governments' inability to consistently enforce their law agencies and legislation. There has been a failure in codifing and normalising inter-republican trade "between Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, [as] customs wars have acquired ethnic coloration."[259] Tajikistani Tajiks have been excluded from entering Uzbekistan for trade purposes, by Uzbekistani border guards, and ethnic Uzbeks given exclusive export rights.[260]

3.5.iv. Demographic Issues and Inter-Ethnic Relations: Tajik-Uzbek demographic disputes have been more ambiguous and complex than that found in Kazakstan. Questions of absolute population growth and migratory pressures and the resultant group competition for resources have influenced the republic's social stability, as witnessed in the 1987 tensions in Samarkand oblast. Another issue, government-orchestrated, indicates the sensitivity of ethnicity in the republic. Unlike Kazakstan, where the physical relocation of Kazak migrants has used as a means of enhancing state cohesion, Tashkent has used a more subtle assimilation practice; the manipulation of statistics and national identity. Uzbekistani state-building programme including the construction of a foundation myth and an Uzbekistani identity has sought a narrow and strict, rather than pluralist conceptualisation. "The Government of Uzbekistan seems to partake of the notion that Uzbekistan can achieve the stature of a great nation if the number of Uzbeks is large and if they have a strong sense of their identity."[261]

Throughout the Soviet period, the figure was artificially low because of official assimilatory practices and Tajiks perceiving it advantageous to assume a public Uzbek identity.[262] During the 1920-30s, the republic's Tajiks complained about increased pressure on them to identify themselves as Uzbeks. Tajiks at the time of the creation of the Tajik SSR, 1929, were given a stark choice, either to remain in the Uzbek SSR and accept an Uzbek identity or move.[263] "It was thus apparent that the Tajiks [in Uzbekistan would] not be accommodated in maintaining their cultural independence, a dire fact that most Tajiks resentfully accepted."[264] It was highly probably that the 1926 census was falsified.[265] Between 1872 and 1926, the official number of Tajiks in Samarkand dropped from 95% of the city's inhabitants to 10%, whilst the Uzbek population rose from below 1% to 41%.[266] The introduction of internal passports in 1932, further eroded the Tajik's status, as by the end of the 1930s, the holder's nationality was non-transferable and had to correspond with that of ones' parents.[267]

There appears to have been no re-assessment of the Tajik population in independent Uzbekistan. Consequently, the number of citizens who regard themselves as Tajiks remains difficult to determine. Tajiks within and outside of the republic, SamGU academics and international commentators suggest that there may be between 6-7 million Tajiks in Uzbekistan, approximately 30 percent of the republic's, rather than the official figure of 5.1 percent.[268]

A legitimate reason for the discrepancies between the official statistics and the actual number of Tajiks in the republic has been the weak ethnic consciousness of the Tajik community, in relation to that of other ethnic groups, most notably the titular nation. It is suggested, including by Tajik activists, that this has helped to account for the group's under-representation in official records.[269] Tajik acquiesce of referring to themselves as Uzbeks has not been wholly benign, however. Although Articles Four and Eighteen of Uzbekistan's Constitution guarantees respect of and equal right to all citizens irrespective of nationality, there are claims that Tajiks have been forcibly dissuaded from identifying themselves as such since 1991, for fear of incurring official displeasure and possibly discrimination.[270] Foltz's work illustrates the continuation of a climate in which Tajiks are unsure whether to disclose their identity.[271] "Just as in the early Soviet period, many Tajik-speakers sense advantages in claiming Uzbek identity and perhaps fear anti-Tajik prejudice if they don't."[sic][272] Equally, the weakness of the Tajik consciousness in Uzbekistan has been at least partially the result of government attempts to assimilate the minority into the Uzbek nation and official discouragement at members of the minority from taking an interest in their distinct Persian background. Mesbahi has called Uzbekistan's policy towards its Tajik minority an attempt at "cultural cleansing."[273] Nissman suggests that discrimination towards the Tajik population has been a consciously designed policy to foster greater Uzbek cohesion.[274] This under-representation has enabled the authorities to promote nation-state linkage whilst demoting the historic role and influence of the Tajik community.

3.5.iv.a. The Weakness of Tajik Identity: The paucity of the Tajik national consciousness has its roots in the blurred Tajik-Uzbek historical interaction and the Soviet construction of a Tajik identity for a disparate group of Persian-speakers with limited historical cohesion. (See Figure 3.1.)

The Uzbekistani Tajik community has had a vague notion of its nationality, to the extent that many have assumed a "superficial Uzbek identity."[275] Tajik activists have complained about their co-national's lack of knowledge towards their own heritage and the broader Persian culture.[276]

Figure 3.1. Confusion Over The Tajik Identity



Two individuals in Tajikistan are considering their choice of ethnic identity The one on the left has darkened his face, but is informed by the other that "From your fair skin and black eyes, you belong to the Tajik nationality. Why be an Uzbek?"

Source: *Mushtum*, No. 17, 28/10/24. Allworth, E. Figure 12.1. E. *The Modern Uzbeks; From the Fourteenth Century to the Present*, Hoover Institute Press, Stanford, 1990.

Equally important for this weakness and the contemporary Tajik-government scenario has been Tajikistan's recent history. The republic was perhaps the most artificial of all the Soviet territorial constructions in the region. Cultural, political and territorial cohesion within Tajikistan are weak. The Pamirs of Gorno-Badaskhshan, which makes up half of the republic, are Ismaili eastern Farsi-speakers whilst the majority of the Tajik nation is Sunni Muslim and western Farsi-speaking. Clan networks reinforced intra-Tajik divisions and inequalities, assisting the Khojent clan's political and economic control from 1929-92. The Kulyab clan dominated the security structures, whilst the democratic-Islamic movements which emerged in the late-Soviet period, obtained the majority of their support from the economically and politically underrepresented Garm and Pamirs regions. Regional affiliations have consequently been established to the detriment of any cohesive state and national identities. This lack of national identity further aggravated by the war has had negative implications for the Tajik diaspora. One NCC member declared that "the conflict in Tajikistan [was] the main cause of the cultural problems for Uzbekistan's Tajiks."[277]

3.5.v. The Impact of the Conflict in Tajikistan: The internal and external security of Uzbekistan have been closely connected, a fact that Tashkent has emphasised if not manipulated for its political advantage. The security implications of the Tajik minority cannot be examined without reference to regional instability.

After independence, in September 1991, political competition, in Tajikistan, between democratic, nationalist and Islamic groups, including the Democratic Party, Rastokhez and the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), on the one hand and the ruling former-communist on the other, led to the region's first contested Presidential elections, in November 1991. The victor, Rahmon Nabiev, the former Communist Party First Secretary, promptly sought to restore the dominance of his clan, the Khojent. Popular protests in the capital, Dushanbe, in the spring of 1992 lead to concessions, and the establishment of the National Reconciliation coalition, which included the aforementioned secular democrats and moderate Muslims. The reformist ousted the President and for a brief period in the autumn of 1992 assumed governmental responsibility.

Politics became increasingly factional and violent. Conflict in the 1992-3 winter led to the restoration of the conservative Kulyabi and Khojent clans to power, with Russian and Uzbekistani assistance.[278] At least 50,000 people were killed and

10% of the republic's population became refugees in this period.[279] Sporadic fighting continued between 1993-6. With Imomali Rahmonov's appointment as President, the Kulyab clan has dominated government and attempted to erode the political position of their former allies, the Khojent and ethnic-Uzbeks.

In early 1996, former loyal ethnic Uzbek Popular Front forces invaded from Uzbekistan into the Khojent and rose in the Kurgan-Tiube, under the command of Ibudollo Boitmatov and Makmud Khudaberdiyev, respectively.[280] The United Tajik Opposition (UTO) took advantage of these rebellions and by mid-1996 central Tajikistan was engulfed in conflict. After a series of failed cease-fires, a successful agreement was concluded in December 1996 between Rahmonov and Said Abdullo Nuri, leader of the UTO, which acted as the basis for further agreements between the parties. Low level violence has remained endemic and local militia leaders relatively autonomous.[281]

Although Uzbekistani officials have stressed a security policy based upon non-interference and neutrality towards Tajikistan, its involvement in the war suggest that its professed concern about an escalation in regional instability and communal tensions did not deter it from becoming involved in a partisan manner.[282]

After an initial period of neutrality, the possibility of a democratic-Islamic government and increased violence in Tajikistan led to Uzbekistani involvment in the conflict. While discussions on the formation of the CIS peacekeeping force were being conducted, in November 1992, Uzbekistan trained a pro-Nabiev MVD force crucial in removing the Islamic-democratic forces from Dushanbe, in December 1992. Since this action, Uzbekistan's involvement was regularly reported including air strikes on opposition camps in Afghanistan.[283] Similar accusations of Uzbekistani interference in Afghanistan, has also discredited Uzbekistan's self-publicised role of guarantor of stability, and concern about the spread of inter-ethnic enmities.[284]

The neighbouring wars have had serious implications for Uzbekistan's security and inter-ethnic relations. Tashkent's manipulation of these situations for domestic objectives has, however, been noted by several commentators, who question Uzbekistan's perceived fear of nationalism and political Islam emanating from the Tajik conflict.[285] Interviews conducted by the author and Petersen demonstrate that Uzbekistan's political elite regarded the strengthening and maintenance of regional stability as the paramount objective of the republic's security policy.[286] The same group, however, did not feel that their position was militarily threatened.[287] The fact that Uzbekistan flouted its own arms embargo proposals questions its own alleged concerns about the regional proliferation of conflict.

The possibility of a fragmentation of Uzbekistan similar to that found in Tajikistan has been an understandable concern for Tashkent. Limited identification with the state due to regional, clan and ethnic divisions and the establishment of Islamist local government in the Fergana Valley, 1991-2, have endorsed these fears.[288] Irredentism within the republic has, however, received negligible support.[289] Tashkent's centralist policies towards regional sources of opposition and attempts to strengthen the centre's power *vis-à-vis* local elites may, in the long-term, prove to be counter-productive and lead to greater alienation and radicalisation.

Brown closely links the removal of Nabiev, in May 1992, with the onset of political oppression in Uzbekistan.[290] Uzbekistan sought to portray Tajikistan's democratic and Islamic movements as radical, inherently unstable and ill-suited for contemporary Central Asia. By associating the threat of regional instability with the events in Tajikistan, Tashkent created a discourse of stability in which Uzbekistani pluralism, including Tajik demands, were been marginalised. Domestic groups were to be associated with external enemies attempting to destabilise Uzbekistan. The ability to associate Uzbekistan's Tajik community with instability in the neighbouring republic was beneficial to the regime.

A key and oft-repeated accusation by Tashkent has been the minority's challenge to the republic's territorial integrity. In the late-1980s, a Tajik Liberation Front was based in Samarkand, and, according to Rotar, the city was at the time renowned for irredentism.[291] A Greater Khorasan was advanced by the "Greater Ariana" society, in the Tajik SSR.[292] By late 1992, possibly because of the Civil War and Tashkent's limited concessions and isolation of radical figures, including Bekmuhammadov and Mirsaidov these irredentist, pan-Tajik ambitions ceased to be promoted.[293] Even before the war, however, such ambitions lacked mass support. The conflict with an associated rise in regionalism destroyed such objectives.

Since the 1980s there has been little to indicate that the minority has any such ambitions. Samarkand has regularly affirmed its respect for Uzbekistan's territorial integrity. In a letter to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Mirsaidov emphasised the non-territorial nature of their goals and stated that,

> "the national-cultural development of this ancient ethnic group ... [does not require any] revision of the Tajikistan-Uzbekistan current border or the formation of a Tajik national-territorial autonomy for the age-old Tajik communities in Uzbekistan, even though all the pre-conditions for this are present."[294]

Obviously, irredentism would not be raised lightly or necessarily openly in Uzbekistan's restricted political climate. The Uzbekistani Constitution, for example, declares that the frontiers and the territory of the Republic "are inviolable and indivisible."[295] This in itself does not suggest that the movement has not advocated a hidden territorial agenda. In the brief period of open debate between 1988-91, other groups proposed territorial challenges to the *status quo*. The People's Party of Turkestan, for example, advocated a single political entity incorporating all of the Central Asian states.[296] It is important to illustrate that when there was open discussion of radical objectives in this period Samarkand did not promote these. This should be recognised when analysing the official response towards the minority's demands. Implicit in much Uzbekistan official and some secondary source material is the charge of Tajik secessionist ambitions. During 1992, the authorities began to accuse Samarkand of political aspirations and irredentism.[297] The ability to associate Uzbekistan's Tajik community with instability in the neighbouring republic was emphasised by the regime. One report claimed Tajikistani Islamic agents had attempted to ferment Tajik-Uzbek enmities in Surkhan Darya and Kasha Darya provinces.[298] "Conventional wisdom has it that the government of Uzbekistan sees Tajik nationalism as a threat interwoven with that of Islamic fundamentalism."[299] The Tajik community became a security threat *per se*, because it was an autonomous body, outside of the Uzbek mainstream, and by implication of its alleged association with external opponents of Tashkent.

There is, however, no evidence to suggest that Uzbekistan's Tajik community has given any assistance to either of the belligerent parties in Tajikistan, beyond humanitarian assistance.[300] The level of militant Tajik nationalism in Uzbekistan and its relationship with political Islam is difficult to determine and is probably exaggerated.[301] Authors who have had direct experience of Uzbekistan's Tajik community, believe that these accusations have not been borne out by experience and that irredentism or aggressive nationalism have not been part of the Tajik cultural and political identity.[302] Numerous domestic and international commentators have criticised Tashkent for exaggerating the regional threat of Islamic fundamentalism and Tajik nationalism, emanating from the Tajik conflict.[303] Akiner notes, that even if there were calls from within Tajikistan for the integration of Tajik populated territory in Uzbekistan, the former does not have "the human or material resources to maintain a successful challenge to its larger neighbour" and dismisses Karimov's fears of overspill from the Tajik conflict.[304]

This has not prevented the regime attempting to gain political benefits by upgrading the issue of Uzbekistan's Tajiks from a mildly disaffected but peaceful minority to an internal subversive group linked by ethnicity to neighbouring violence.[305] In advancing and support this line of argument, the government's justification for repression have been endorsed, although such claims lack substance.[306]

3.6. Conclusion: The Potential for Inter-Ethnic Conflict in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan

Based on the evidence above it is unclear whether inter-ethnic violence is a likelihood in the two republics.

Both republics witnessed a series of inter-ethnic conflicts and bellicose nationalist rhetoric in the 1985-92 period, in which cultural and territorial counter claims were made and communal violence enacted. As numerous studies, including this author's own research, indicate that throughout the 1991-6 period there was a high level of antagonistic political discourse from all the parties involved. The chairman of the Society of Slavic Culture, stated that,

> "[I]f we are forced to leave, then we will take everything with us, and we will tear this place to pieces. In the future if there will be blood let there be blood."[307]

In Kazakstan between 1991-93, inter-ethnic conflict and secession may have been feasible, as Azat Perushov, Deputy for Staff for Co-ordination of Political and National Processes Presidential Apparatus, acknowledged when interviewed by the author. He stated that "we had a mini-crisis in 1992-3 with the rise of nationalist political parties."[308] Russian militancy and irredentism was accompanied by assertive Kazak nationalism. Many observers at the time understandably regarded Kazakstan as volatile. Similarly, late-Soviet Tajik nationalists inside and outside of Uzbekistan were advancing cultural and territorial claims. One Tajik nationalist, Mirobobo Mirrakhamov (latter known as Abdullah Said Nuri), is reported to have spoke out against Uzbeks in the Tajik SSR, who were next on his list for expulsion after the Russians.[309] These xenophobic arguments were matched by Uzbek chauvinism.

During the 1994-6 period inter-ethnic relations appear to have improved. Ethnicity failed to translate into a mass political force. Its failure to do so is all the more significant given the major political and economic upheavals.[310] This has been the consequence of several factors.

The "cult of stability" promoted by both presidents has been widely and understandably accepted by the populations.[311] Events in Tajikistan, Afghanistan and the memories of the sporadic violence between 1985-90 made the republics' inhabitants acutely aware of the dangers of the new political environment.

In Kazakstan, nationalist groups on both sides have moderated their views. Lad, for instance, has urged ethnic Russian to reconsider plans to emigrate, encouraged them to allow their children to study Kazak and respect Kazak culture, and emphasised the traditional good nature of Russian-Kazak relations.[312] When anti-government protests have taken place the two communities have worked together. Lad, Alash and Azat were involved in the Civil Committee of Social Salvation, established in late 1994.[313] It is also questionable whether the high level of nationalism activism, in early independent period, was as serious as many commentators suggested. Similarly, inter-ethnic tensions within Uzbekistan did not result in physical confrontation. The alleged association between the domestic minority's irredentism and militant Islamists in Tajikistan has not materialised.

A key factor has been the restricted nature of independent political activism in both republics. There are two major factors which have caused this; deliberate government action, and the absence of a tradition of popular political activism.

The governments have hampered the establishment and continued existence of nationalist movements. In Kazakstan, during the late-1980's titular nationalism, channelled through Alash and Azat rather than republican structures, was strictly controlled.[314] As a result Russian nationalism has been tempered, and unable to coalesce in opposition to a "nationalistic" government. Its direction and strength were weakened as a consequence. Nationalist parties, both Kazak and Russian have had limited success. Russian political mobilisation has been hampered by the collapse of their Soviet-era Moscow-oriented institutions and the rise of the clan-based patronage system.[315] All independent political organisations have found it difficult to mobilise support in such a large and sparsely populated state. The post-independent decline in the fortunes of the Socialist Party (the Communist Party's successor) which was dominated by the Slavs, and the co-option of the settler economic elite into the presidential networks via the People's Union of Kazakstan have served to further isolate the settler population.[316]

In Uzbekistan, the political fate of the Tajik minority has been symbolic of wider authoritarian trends. All ethnic and religious based parties were banned in 1993 because, the government argues, their objectives are divisive and destabilising.[317] Registration for other parties has been difficult or impossible. Birlik and Erk, the two main movements of the independence period, were unable to re-register, in 1993, because they lacked headquarters.[318] A relative "thaw" in the government's human rights related behaviour from late-1994 onwards, especially in terms of dialogue with outside human rights organisations, has not resulted in "tangible improvements in abusive practises ... used to maintain strict control on all citizens."[319] As one commentator has noted that after this date the authorities were able to easy the level of repression, because there no longer existed any effective political opposition at least in the open, that could benefit from the modestly improved situation.[320]

In both cases, the ethnic consciousness of the minority remains ill-defined. The Russian settler community is an uncohesive community, subject to continued waves of immigration. This and post-Soviet emigration have deterred the consolidation of lasting social and political networks within the community.[321] North-South ethnic Russian divisions have been reported. Those remaining in the south and central oblasts it is suggested are less favourable to autonomy or secessionist moves.[322] An inability to consolidate a Russian political consciousness within Kazakstan, and throughout the FSU may prevent any effective militant nationalist action. (The Cossacks are the exception to this. As already suggested they pose a more serious and distinct threat to Kazakstan's integrity, having a more developed and well-organised sense of collective identity than the other Russian settler communities.[323])

The Tajik identity is weak because of their close, long and at times ambiguous relationship with the Uzbeks, and the failure to subsume regional affiliations in Tajikistan. Thus whilst Uzbek-centric state-building has marginalised alternative identities it is unclear whether there a deep-seated and distinct national identification within the minority has been established and whether the community perceives the discrimination it faces as a consequence of ethnicity. Communal relations appear to be stable, the potential end of the Tajik Civil War and the possibility of compromise between the two sides may lessen the extreme security environment Uzbekistan has had to operate in and may lead to a reappraisal of its domestic and foreign policies, including its attitudes towards the Tajik community.

Lewer and Ramsbothams' explanation of group conflict which requires distinct identity groups, who pursue what they perceive as mutually incompatible goals has yet to materialise in either of the republics. Exclusive identities and objectives are lacking, explicit political mobilisation shunned and there is not indication that alternative violent methods are regarded as any more effective than the limited legitimate political channels.

To focus primarily upon the present stability of communal relations is, however, unwise and fails to recognise the real sources of competition and confrontation. Arrayed against the limited and superficial safeguards are deep-seated economic and political structural trends, with long-term negative implications.

The arbitrary, authoritarian and stagnation nature of Central Asia's politics, combination with the economic hardships and psychological dislocation involved in the period of transition, this author believes, are detrimental to future inter-ethnic relations.

The governments' behaviour in relation to this case-study, and in the wider political context, is perhaps the most important and potentially destabilising factor. In both cases, government rhetoric and behaviour indicates a closed political system, which has alienated and may radicalise opposition. Domestic challenges to the regimes, whether ethnic, regional, religious or secular, have been stifled. The absence of discussion on the subject and the lack of mass participation in the political process offers pessimistic outlook. In parallel with the Minority at Risk Project research this author regards the governments' failure to develop inclusive and open political structures will have a long-term negative impact upon inter-ethnic relations.

Legal and structural safeguards in situ are inadequate. It is these areas that need further examination, recognition and redress. Nazarbaev has destroyed an independent Judiciary and centralised power through the appointment of loyalists, reducing the authority and autonomy of the regions, in the case of the northern oblasts the key political conduit for ethnic Russians. Admittedly, a Presidential Committee for Human Rights was established, in 1994. Part of its remit was to manage inter-ethnic tensions, through the protection of citizen's rights and promotion of co-operation and understanding between communities.[324]

In Uzbekistan, a Human Rights Commissioner was appointed in February 1995, and established a Commission on the Observance of the Constitutional Rights and Liberties of the Citizens.[325] This action should be treated with scepticism given the arbitrary character of politics in the republic. A Presidential commission was established after Samarkand campaigning. The objectives of the institution was to monitor Tajik minority-related problems, counter ethnic discrimination, provide the President with information on their situation and grievances, help establish dialogue and confidence between the minority and the authorities and resolve

Tajik minority-Government questions in a mutually beneficial manner. The Commission was criticised strongly by Samarkand who claimed that it failed to investigate the minority's concerns and was only established for appearance.[326]

Although throughout the period the Tajik-Uzbek situation was more benign than the Russian-Kazak scenario this is deceptive and unrepresentative.[327] The governments differed in their control of opposition, Almaty principally through constitutional and political methods, and Tashkent via confrontational and at times illegal means. This divergence leads the author to suggest that conflict in Uzbekistan is a far greater long-term probability and liable to be more intense. There is little evidence to suggest the Uzbekistani Tajik community is a security threat *per se*. The government-Tajik relationship demonstrates a regime attempting to use national security and the threat of irredentism as means of securing its own position. Tashkent has used ethnicity to further its political objectives. The contemporary state-sponsored Uzbek identity is a key component in the political culture of the Karimov regime. Unlike Kazakstan, where the government has expediently sought a moderate multi-cultural citizenship, Tashkent has pursued an Uzbek-centric policy which has alienated non-titular groups. It is this authoritarian response to cultural and political demands that is liable to increase political and social tensions within the republic. Moderate domestic opposition has been eliminated. The proscription of ethnic and religious parties is difficult to justify on democratic and pragmatic grounds, as ethnicity and especially Islam are immediate sources of identity for the mass of Uzbekistan's population. The externally-imposed politicisation and radicalisation of the Tajik identity in Uzbekistan may ultimately be counter-productive. Constitutional methods have failed to provide benefits for the Tajiks. The lack of political alternatives, a consequence of government actions, may lessen the possibility for future compromise between the incumbent and its rivals. HRW/H's former representative in Uzbekistan, Jonathan MacLeod has endorsed the view that stability and development are most likely in an environment where of open debate, freedom of expression and human rights are guaranteed.[328]

The Kazakstani situation has been more open and this in itself may be a positive factor. Emigration and political accommodation or apathy have been the standard response to the economic and political problems that the Russian community has faced in Kazakstan.[329] This has therefore allowed for a relatively stable and tolerant social milieu. Equally the Russian question has had far greater input into regional/international affairs, because of the involvement of a global actor, Russia.

Thus the consequences of any irredentism in northern Kazakstan are immediately accessible to the outside world, as is the language of debate, Russian and public. This accessibility and familiarity may aided resolution.

In both republics economic differentiation has increased. Wealth accumulated through connections and corruption will weaken social cohesion and respect for the existing structures. These problems offer a catalyst for nationalist but also Islamist activism which may indirectly affect inter-ethnic relations. Economic hardships in Kazakstan has already resulted in popular protest throughout the republic and criticism of the government. The impact upon government policy, particularly economic and social, has, however, been minimal. Whilst Uzbekistan's economy has not undergone the same level of dislocation, the implementation of necessary wholesale reforms will prove more difficult in the future as the population continues to increase and vital economic activities, most noticeably irrigation agriculture deteriorate in efficiency.

"Inter-ethnic relations ... are complex, contextual and highly situational. People who get along well under certain conditions may be virtual enemies under others."[330] Central Asian ethnic groups are not inherently hostile towards each other but "like any people who have been lied to, manipulated, cheated and abused long enough, any of these peoples *could* be provoked to seek quick and easy answers to the host of complex problems that beset them."[331]

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[1] UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/31, para. 181. Quoted in Gyurcsik, I. "New Legal Ramifications of the Question of National Minorities" in Cuthbertson, I.M. & Leibowitz, J. (eds.) *Minorities: The New Europe's Old Issue*, Institute for East-West Studies/Westview, Boulder, 1993, p 22.

[2] The term ethnic Russians will refer to the combined Belarus, Cossack, Russian, and Ukrainian population in the republic except when there are explicit differences in opinions, intentions or characteristics in this grouping.

[3] Kellas, J. *The Politics of Nation and Ethnicity*, MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1991, p 4.

[4] Kozlov, V.I. *Natsionalnosti SSSR Ethnodemographeskii obzor*, Statisikia, Moscow 1975, p 256. Quoted in Zaslavsky, V. "Success and collapse: Traditional Soviet nationality policy" in Bremmer, I. & Taras, R. (eds.) *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States*, CUP, Cambridge, 1993, p 34.

[5] Quoted in Pilkington, H.A. "Going home? the implications of forced migration for national identity formation in post-Soviet Russia" *BASEES Annual Conference*, Cambridge, 30/3-2/4/96, p 13.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Heraclides, A. "Secessionist Conflagration: What Is To Be Done" *Security Dialogue*, vol. 25, No. 3, p 283.

[8] Ibid, pp. 283-4.

[9] Kymlicka, M. (ed.) *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, OUP, Oxford, 1995, p 2.

[10] Heraclides, A. op cit., p 283.

[11] Ibid.

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[12] Gurr, T.R "Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System" *International Studies Quarterly*, No. 38, 1994, pp 347-8.

[13] After Gurr. Ibid, p 348.

[14] Ijgyarto, I. "The Codification of Minority Rights" in Cuthbertson, I.M. & Leibowitz, J. (eds.) op cit., p 273.

[15] Gurr, T. op cit., p 348.

[16] Ibid, p 350.

[17] Horowitz, D. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, University of California, Berkeley, 1985, pp. 3-4.

[18] DeNevers, R, "Democratization and Ethnic Conflict" *Survival*, Vol. 32, No. 2, p 32.

[19] Gurr, T. op cit., p 348.

[20] Kellas, J. op cit. p 72.

[21] Ghebali, V.Y & Sauerwein, B. *European Security in the 1990s: Challenges and Perspectives*, UNIDIR, New York, 1995, p 60.

[22] Ghali, B.B. *An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, UN New York, 1992, paras. 17-19.

[23] Bibo, I. "The Paralysis of International Institutions" Quoted in Gyurcsik, I. op cit., p 38.

[24] Ayoob, M. *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1995, p 182.

[25] For the debate on collective and individual rights see Freeman, M. "Are There Collective Human Rights?" *Political Studies*, Vol. 43, Special Issue Politics and Human Rights, 1995, pp. 25-40.

[26] See for example Heraclides, A. op cit., p 288; Nevada, I. "Democracy Building in Ethnically Diverse Societies: The Case of Bulgaria and Rumania", in Cuthbertson, I.M & Leibowitz, J. (eds.) op cit., p 144. Bibo, Konovalev & Evstafiev, and Held argue for a similar interaction. See Bibo, I. Quoted in Gyurcsik, I. op cit., p 40; Konovalev, A.A. & Evstafiev, D. "The Problems of Ethnic Minority Rights Protection in the Newly Independent States" in Cuthbertson, I.M & Leibowitz, J. (eds.) ibid, 161, & Held, D. (ed.) *Political Theory Today*, California State University Press, Stanford, 1991, p 220.

[27] Bibo, I. Quoted in Gyurcsik, I. op cit., p 39.

[28] Snyder, J.N. "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State" *Survival* Vol. 35, No. 1, 1993, p 26. Also see Konovalov', A.A. & Evstafiev, D. op cit., p 157; & Gyurcsik, I. op cit., p 19.

[29] Minorities at Risk Project. Quoted in Gurr, T. op cit., p 358.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Fridman, L. "Economic Crisis as a Factor of Building up Socio-Politcal and Ethnonationalist Tensions in the Countries of Central Asia and Transcaucasia," Naumkin, V.V. (ed.) *Central Asia and Transcaucasia: Ethnicity and Conflict*, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1994. p 31.

[33] Zaslavsky, V. op cit., p 29.

[34] Nevada, I. op cit.

[35] Lubin, N. *Labor and Nationality in Soviet Central Asia: An Uneasy Compromise*, MacMillan Princeton, 1984, p 50.

[36] Jalali, A. "Central Asia: Migration" *Voice of America*, 7/2/96.

[37] Khazanov, A. "Underdevelopment and Ethnic Relations in Central Asia" in Manz, B.F. (ed.) *Central Asia in Historical Perspective*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1994 p 146. (iii)

[38] See Galiev, A.V "Bezrabotitsa v Srednei Azii i Kazakhstane na sovremennometape" *Vsesoiuznaia nauchnaia sessiia po itogam polevykh ethnografheskikh i antropologicheskikh issledovanii v 1988-89 gg*, Alma Ata 1990, pp. 127-8.

[39] Gurr, T. op cit., p 365.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Buzan, B. *People, States and Fear*, Wheatsheafer Harvester, Hemel Hempstead, 1991, p 123.

[43] Van Evera, S. "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War" in Lynn-Jones, S. & Miller, S. (eds.) *Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1995, p 260.

[44] Manz, B.F. "Historical Background" in Manz, B.F. (ed.) op cit., p 48.

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[45] Kokand was annexed in 1877 whilst Bukhara and Khiva became Russian protectorates.

[46] Carlisle, D. "Geopolitics and Ethnic Problems of Uzbekistan" in Ro'i, Y. (ed.) *Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies*, Frank Cass, London, 1995, p 73.(ii)

[47] Throughout their history several ethnonyms have been applied to the Kazaks: initially the Uzbek Kazaks, indicating their origins within the Uzbek khanate; then the Kazaks; Kirgiz-Kazaks, the Russians called them the Kirgizs and finally their chosen ethnonym was restored to them by the Bolsheviks. Porkhomovsky, V. "Historical Origins of Interethnic Conflicts in Central Asia and Transcuasasia" in Naumkin, V.V. (ed.) op cit., p 15. Akiner, S. *The Formation of Kazakh Identity: From Tribe to Nation-State*, RIIA, London, 1995, pp 35-6. (ii)

[48] Ibid, p 36; & Schwartz, L. "The Political Geography of Soviet Central Asia: Integrating the Central Asian Frontier" in Lewis, R.A. (ed.) *Geographical Perspectives on Central Asia*, Routledge, London 1992, p 62.

[49] Bartold. V.V "V.V. Bartold o natsionalnom razmezhevanii v Srednei azii" *Vostok-oriens*, Moscow, No. 5, 1991. Quoted in Porkhomovsky, V. op cit., p 20.

[50] Subtelny, M.E. op cit., p 51.

[51] See Carlisle, D. Map 5.4 Disputed Areas, op cit., p 97. (ii)

[52] Zaslavinsky, V. op cit. p 34.

[53] Akiner, S. "Uzbekistan and the Uzbeks" in Smith, G. (ed.) *The Nationalities Question in Post-Soviet States*, Longman, London, 1996, p 336. (iii)

[54] Akiner, S. op cit., p 45. (ii)

[55] Melvin, N. *Russians Beyond Russia: The Politics of National Identity*, RIIA/Pinter, London 1995, p 103. (ii)

[56] See Carlisle, D. "Soviet Uzbekistan: State and Nation in Historical Perspective" in Manz, B.F. op cit. p 120. (i)

[57] See Gretsky, S. "Civil War in Tajikistan: Causes, Development and Prospects for Peace" in Sagdeev, R. & Eisenhower, S. (eds.) *Central Asia, Conflict, Resolution, and Change* CPSS, Chevy Chase, 1995, pp. 222-223.

[58] Khazanov, A. op cit., p 149.

[59] See Edmunds, T. "Power and Powerlessness in Kazakstani Society: Ethnicity Problems in Perspective" *Third Manchester Conference on Central Asia and Caucasus*, University of Manchester, 3-4/3/97. (i)

[60] The Cotton Affair centred around the manipulation of Cotton harvest figures, highlighted endemic political corruption, nepotism, and financial gains in Uzbekistan described by Carlisle as "oriental despotism." Carlisle, D. op cit., p 81. (ii) For an overview of the Cotton Affair see Gleason, G. "Uzbekistan: from statehood to nationhood" in Bremmer, I. & Taras, R. (eds.) op cit., pp. 339-40.

[61] Olcott, M.B. *Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security*, US Institute for Peace, Washington, 1996, p 60. (vi)

[62] See Pilkington, H.A. op cit. p 8.

[63] Clem, R.S. "Inter-ethnic Relations at Republican Level: The Example of Kazakstan" *Post-Soviet Geography*, Vol. 34, No. 4, April 1993, p 229. Harmonisation is also known as Kazakificaion (*Kazkhisatiya*).

[64] Interview with Bremmer, I. Quoted in Bremmer, I. "Nazarbaev and the North: Statebuilding and ethnic relations in Kazakstan" *Ethnic and Religious Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1994, p 623.

[65] Konovalov, A.A. & Evastafiev, D. op cit., p 160.

[66] Melvin, N. op cit., p 109. (ii)

[67] Ibid.

[68] *Constitution of the Republic of Kazakstan*, Almaty, 1995. Quoted in Bohr, A. "The Central Asian States As Nationalizing Regimes" in Smith. G. *et al. Nation-building in The Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities*, CUP, Cambridge, 1998, p 14.

[69] Amerkulov, N. "Inter-Ethnic Conflict and Resolution in Kazakhstan" in Sagdeev, R. & Eisenhower, S. (eds.) op cit., p 159.

[70] *The Economist*, 12/3/94, p 77; & Kulchik, Y. "Central Asia after the Empire: Ethnic Groups, Communities, and Problems" in Sagdeev, R. & Eisenhower, S. (eds.) op cit., p 110.

[71] Bohr, A. in Smith, G. *et al* op cit., p 72.

[72] See Akiner, S. op cit., p 71. (ii)

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[73] OMRI, Daily Digest, No. 30, Pt 1, 12/2/96.
[74] OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Press Release On Kazak Elections, 11/12/95.
[75] Galenko, V. "O nekotorykh protivorechiiakh v Konstitutsii Kazakhstana" *Birlesu*, No. 14, 1993. Quoted in Melvin, N. op cit. p 164. (ii)
[76] Ibid.
[77] SWB, SU 2173, G 1, 8/12/94.
[78] Kozlov, S. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 8/9/94, p 3. *CDPSP*, Vol. XLVI, No. 36.
[79] Olcott, M.B. op cit., p 68. (vi)
[80] Ro'i, Y. "Central Asian Disturbances and Riots 1989-90: Causes and Context" *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1991, p 21. (iii)
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid, p 22.
[83] Melvin, N. op cit., p 107. (ii)
[84] Olcott, M.B. "Kazakhstan: a republic of minorities " in Bremmer, I. & Taras, R. (eds.) op cit., p 317. (iii)
[85] Ibid, pp. 318-9.
[86] Olcott, M.B. "Ethnic Violence in Central Asia: Perceptoins and Misperceptions" in Sagdeev, R. & Eisenhower, S. (eds.) op cit. p 118. (iv)
[87] Olcott, M.B. op cit., p 319. (iii)
[88] For a discussion of Nazarbaev's political strengths and weaknesses see Akiner, S. op cit., pp. 73-5. (ii)
[89] Olcott, M.B. op cit., p 85. (vi)
[90] Critchlow, J. Quoted in "Kazak Elections" *Voice Of America*, 7/12/95.
[91] Ibid.
[92] SU 2129 G 1 18/10/94; also see Nazarbaev interview with Kazakh TV 1500 gmt 11/10/94 SWB SU 2125 G1 13/10/94; & RFE/RL Newsline Vol. 1, No. 48, Pt 1, 29/10/97 on Nazarbaev's criticisms of Akezhan Kazhegeldin after his resignation as Prime Minister.
[93] Opposition groups claimed that only 34% of the electorate participated in the referendum rather than the required 50%. The election officials claimed a 90% turn out. "Kazak Elections" *Voice Of America*, 7/12/95.
[94] Ibid.
[95] The khanate, which spread from Lake Balkhash, to the Syr Darya and north west of the Aral Sea, was a loose confederation of Turkic-speaking nomads.Olcott, M.B. *The Kazakhs*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1987. p 9. (i) See Akiner, S. Map 1 Approximate Territorial Limits of Kazakh Hordes c 1750, *The Formation of Kazakh Identity: From Tribe to Nation-State*, RIIA, London, 1995, p 6. (ii)
[96] Olcott notes that the term Horde implies consanguinity and common ancestry, whilst the term Zhuz does not. As these Zhuz were not based on common ancestry but simply *ad hoc* and temporal unions of tribes it seems appropriate to use this term. Ibid, p 11.
[97] Akiner, S. op cit., p 21. (ii)
[98] Edmunds, T. *Nation-building in a Multi-ethnic Kazakstan: Identity, Power and Politics* PhD Thesis, University of Sheffield, 1998, p 128. (ii)
[99] Edmunds, T. op cit. (i)
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[252] Much of the everyday discrimination may be explained by the sense of grievance that rural and poorer titular individuals feel towards the urban and more successful members of the Tajik community. Author's private correspondence.

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[258] In one murder case, the two Tajik defendants, Bahodir Sharipov and Sukhrob Sobirov, found guilt were executed whist their Uzbek co-defendants received lighter sentences. There were strong suspicions that ethnicity "not the level of guilt." determined the verdict. Author's personal correspondence.

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[317] OMRI Daily Digest, No. 5, Pt. 1, 8/1/97.

[318] Bichel, A. op cit., p 6.

[319] Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, (HRW/H) *Uzbekistan: Persistent Human Rights Violations and Prospects for Improvements* Vol. 8, No. 5(D), p 2. (i)

[320] Author's Interview, Tashkent November 1996.

[321] Melvin, N. op cit., pp. 110-111. (ii)

[322] Russian Press Digest 06/3/94.

[323] Melvin, N. op cit., p 115. (ii)

[324] ITAR-TASS, 1404 gmt, 17/2/94. SWB SU 1928 G 2/3, 22/2/94.

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[325] Nissman, D. "The Sad Fate of Opposition in Central Asia" *Prism*, Pt 2, 15/7/95.

[326] Mirsaidov, J. op cit., p 8. (ii)

[327] See Rotar, I. op cit.

[328]. MacLeod, J. Quoted in Bakshian, D. "Uzbekistan Rights" *VOA*, 1242 pm, 12/9/96.

[329] Ibid.

[330] Wixman, R. op cit., p 160.

[331] Olcott, M.B. op cit., p 125. (vi)

4. Environmental Security in Central Asia

4.1. Introduction

This chapter will examine the linkage between environmental change and security. The specific focus, in both the theoretical section and case-studies will be upon water resources and intra- and inter-state conflict. After discussing the debate on environmental security, the main focus of the chapter will be upon the use of the trans-boundary Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers. These rivers are essential to the region's economic and social development and stability. Other regional environmental issues, particularly nuclear testing at Semipalatinsk (now known as Semey), will be examined to illustrate the relationship between environmental issues and the broader understanding of environmental security.

Environmental activism is widely perceived in the West as indicative of a progressive and vibrant civil society. Evidence from late- and post-Soviet Central Asia highlights an antagonistic dimension, in which an environmental-nationalist nexus was facilitated by their shared characteristics and the context of Soviet polity. Individually and combined, they provided effective critiques of Moscow's legitimacy. The linkage was also evident in the communal violence witnessed in Central Asia, notably in the Fergana Valley, during the declining years of the USSR. These conflicts were frequently associated with resource allocation and notional concepts of group ownership. Independence and statehood divorced the two agendas and weakened the political significance of environmental issues. The author would suggest that this trend is temporary and does not indicate the successful management of regional environmental crises or their social-political consequences. In fact, aggressive environmental-nationalist activism, particularly at the sub-state level is liable to re-emerge with greater saliency and volatility than has previously been the case.

4.2. Environmental Security: The Intellectual Debate

Discussion about the environment's incorporation into IR. and Security Studies can be seen as part of the wider re-evaluation of these disciplines that has taken place in the last two decades.

Traditional Realist thinking can to some extent explain inter-state resource wars, and the role of resource on the balance of power between states.[1] These explanations, however, fail to explore the wider implications which fundamentally challenge the Realist approach. The distinction between domestic and international, for example, cannot be maintained if one examines the loci of environmental problems and their security implications.

The incorporation of the environment into IR. has been encouraged by three key events: the 1973 Oil Crisis in which the strategic leverage of a resource was demonstrated; evidence of ozone depletion and associated global climate implications; and the collapse of the bi-polar rivalry of the Cold War.[2] At the forefront of the broadening of security was the Brandt Commission and the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (Palme Report). The Palme Report advanced the idea of common security.[3] Subsequently, The World Commission on Environment and Development emphatically linked peace, security, development and the environment and a common approach to international security.[4] Superpower policy from the late-1980s began to accept a role for environmental issues in international affairs. Gorbachev's "New Foreign Policy" acknowledged the role of non-military issues including environmental degradation within the sphere of international security. The USA has sought to incorporate the environment "into the mainstream of. foreign policy" with the establishment of the Environmental Initiative in April 1996.[5]

The incorporation of the environment has not, however, been universally accepted. Whilst environmental security is essentially a creation of the Pluralist school, critics of the concept are from both ends of the Realist-Idealist spectrum.

The holism of the environment as a concept, the interdependency of interrelated eco-systems and the lack of distinct boundaries makes the establishment of an environment security problematic. This is compounded by the absence of universally adhered to terminology which has confused the debate. For Buzan, environmental security is concerned with "the maintenance of local and planetary biosphere as the essential support system."[6] This author would argue that this is a definition of environmental protection, rather than an acknowledgement of the influence of environmental issues on security. Sarty, aware of the difficulties intrinsic in a broad definition of environmental security, believes that the term should cover "the probable linkage between environmental degradation and the outbreak of violent civil or interstate conflict."[7] It is this narrow interpretation that shall guide this study.

There are valid reasons for upholding a division between security and the environment. A central argument of both groups is the differences in character and values of military and environmental threats and required responses. Dyer is critical of attempts to include environmental security within existing national security thinking as they "are alternative values [based upon]... alternative world-views."[8] Deudney, from a Realist perspective, argues that traditional national security issues are predominately source and target specific, short-term and zero-sum situations, whilst environmental problems are unintentional, non-specific, regional or global, long-term, pervasive and incremental.[9]

These divisions exist but create a false exclusivity between the two spheres. This is especially the case with the distinction between the assumption that all military scenarios are zero-sum and the environmental ones win-win. Perceptions of the actors and the context of the situation can lead to autonomous or collective, co-operative or conflictual approaches in either case. Dyer cites the example of a downstream state's dependency on an upstream state for its water supply. The downstream state may not be able to reciprocate the environmental threat to the upstream state but may use military response as a substitute, bringing traditional security concerns back in.[10]

Others are wary of the association between the environment and security because of the implications of militarising the environment. The assimilation of military values including non-democratic decision-making and zero-sum assumptions, and the unsuitability of military solutions, it is argued, deter an association. There is considerable merit in these concerns. Clearly, military solutions will not be suitable for economic and social problems. Military action, as Realists would acknowledge, is, however, only part of an effective security policy. The recent broadening of the security concept can only be strengthened and legitimised by the involvement of other practitioners in relevant disciplines.

A related concern over the value of environmental security, with relevance for the post-Soviet region, has been voiced by Sarty. In common with concerns raised about the increasing Security Studies interest in non-military issues, one must be sceptical of the motives and mindsets of these converts. Sarty argues that the "'us versus them' mentality", which helped propel Cold War thinking, has been perpetuated by the former-Sovietologists. Their objective is to re-invent themselves and their scholarly field, and maintain funding and intellectual distinctiveness by perpetuating a threat to the West emanating from the FSU.[11] The intellectual linkage between the environment and security are not invalidated by these hidden agendas.[12]

The lack of analytical rigour evident in a considerable section of pro-environmental-security writing has also aided its critics. Levy correctly criticises the "existential" connection between the environment and (national) security.[13] Advocates of this existential approach, including Mathews and Myers, attempt to establish a moral relationship between environmental degradation and security.[14] Mathews discusses the widest interpretation of environmental security; economic development and quality of life, but fails to establish any relationship between environmental problems and conflict, either at an empirical or a theoretical level.[15]

As Levy notes, it is "probably not a coincidence that advocates of the existential link between security and environment provide the loosest definitions of security."[16] In fact, Mathews fails to either define or redefine the term security. The weakness of such environmental-sympathetic authors arguments does not, however, mean that the concept is redundant, rather that it needs greater coherence and rigour.

Deudney and Levys' critiques of environmental security remain fundamentally rooted in the Realist paradigm. Levy, for example, defines security as that which "emphasizes protection of national values against foreign threats" in which "the actions of foreigners are involved."[17] Such a definition enables the disengagement of the two concepts with relative ease.

Deudney and Levy both maintain that there is nothing particularly "national" about environmental degradation, because it is often unintentional and non-specific in its target. The environment therefore cannot be incorporated into the "national" security agenda. This negates the fact that environmental degradation is a threat which affects a state's economic, military and social capabilities. The assumption that environmental threats are unintentional negates them a position in security discourse whilst correct for some environmental threats, denies human intervention and responsibility in numerous situation as well as the impact it has upon specific states. Central Asia's environmental predicament is man-made and has led to the politicisation of the environment.

Levy's argument is that because numerous factors intervene between the environment and violent conflict there is no direct link between the two. It is therefore argued that the environment *per se* should not be regards as a cause of conflict.[18] This seems rather circumspect. Other sources of antagonism, religion or ethnicity, for example, are not in themselves inevitably conflictual. Rather it is the "intervening" social and political factors that determine the eventual outcome of a situation. Water shortages faced by the Palestinians, a consequence of Israel's capture of aquifers and upstream supplies, are intrinsic to the parties' relationship, although they are not the primary cause of tension between them. Perversely, the acute environmental situation in Karakalpakstan is unlikely to lead to conflict. Only by placing the environmental issue within the broader political situation can these differences be understood as either a routine political or security concern.

Authors including Buzan and Deudney, unconvinced by comprehensive security arguments, do, however, acknowledge the inability of Realist theory to cope with trans-national environmental problems.[19] Buzan accepts that collective action is required to deal with macro-scale ecological threats, including water resource competition.[20] IR. theory needs to accept and expand from its traditional narrow focus of interest, if it is to be capable of dealing with recently recognised and increasingly salient cross-border environmental concerns. Axiomatic to environmental security literature is an awareness of interdependence. If *security* is to cope with potential threats to core values and the establishment of conditions conducive to the promotion of these values, as Stern argues, it must be capable of dealing with all potential threats.[21]

4.3. The Scope of Environment Security

The environment security debate usually revolves around three direct issues and one indirect concern:

1) The environment as a cause and/or objective of conflict;
2) As an instrument of war;
3) Environmental degradation as a result of military action; and
4) The indirect influence upon security via development and welfare issues.

The third is the weakest link in establishing an environment-security relationship. Military actions, including acquisition of strategic resources, military-industrial production, military tests, and the disposal of military waste, for example, all have had environmentally harmful results.[22] This author would argue, that these problems are essentially consequences of an entire economic system, of which the above military actions are an integral part. "[M]ost of the causes and most of the cures of degradation must be found outside of the traditional national security system related violence."[23]

This chapter will principally focus upon the first concern and, to a lesser extent, the fourth.

The Project on Environmental Change and Acute Conflict, led by Homer-Dixon has been seminal in examining the relationship between the environment and conflict.[24] The Project's objective was to establish a theoretical framework for environmental security. Through empirical studies, the Project tested a series of hypothesis on environmental-inspired conflicts and sought to establish a theoretical foundation for environmental security. By examining environmental change, the objective of the Project was to answer two questions:

- Does environmental scarcity cause violent conflict? and
- If so, in what manner?

The Project initially selected six environmental changes but revised this to focus more specifically upon four because the impact of these on political and social affairs was more evident and immediate to analysis.[25] These were:

a) Degradation and loss of good agricultural land;
b) Degradation and removal of forests;
c) Depletion and pollution of fresh water supplies; and
d) Depletion of fisheries.

These were analysed as potential conflict-"instigators" under three conflict scenarios:

1) Simple Scarcity Conflicts;
2) Group Identity Conflicts; and
3) Relative Deprivation Conflicts.[26]

The Project's case-studies found these, and specifically the degradation and loss of good agricultural land, had the greatest potential for leading to conflict. For the purpose of this chapter, the emphasis will be upon *a* and *c*; degradation and loss of good agricultural land, and the depletion and pollution of fresh water supplies, respectively.

Environmental scarcity was defined as the combined affects of environmental change, population growth and material expectations, and unequal social distribution of resources.[27] This tripartite model, Homer-Dixon argues, sought to integrate the frequent examination of resource depletion, population growth and political and economic resource allocation, as "(e)mpirical evidence suggests ... that the first two sources are most pernicious when interacting with unequal resource distribution."[28]

Homer-Dixon argues that the creation of an environment-security relationship must be "highly detailed" and situation specific. Political, social, and demographic structures and trends and determine the potential for environmental conflict. As Homer-Dixon states,

> "(w)ithout a full understanding of these intervening factors we cannot begin to grasp the true nature of the relationships between human activity, environmental change, social disruption and conflict. ... Recognition of the role of these factors distinguishes simplistic environmental determinism from sophisticated accounts of the nature of environmental threats posed to humankind."[29]

This latter point is an effective counterpoise to Levy's view that intervening factors prevent the base environmental problem from being regarded as a security concern. Resource scarcity is context specific and subjective. Rather than solely determined by physical constraints, social perceptions of distributive justice and the quality of life influence the notion of resource scarcity and the manner in which the environment is articulated in politics.

Homer-Dixon sees two common environmental scarcity interactions resulting from resource scarcity. In the first, resource capture, a decline in the quantity and quality of a renewable resource combined with population growth, can encourage a dominant group to attempt to direct resource distribution to their benefit. The second situation, ecological marginalisation, is a result of unequal resource access and population growth. The consequence is migration and increased human pressure on an already fragile ecosystem of the receiving region. The result is severe environmental damage and chronic economic decline.[30]

A modified version of these interactions, with particular emphasis on ecological marginalisation, is perhaps suitable for Central Asia, although population movement is a factor in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. In the latter, however, population pressure is principally domestic, a consequence of increased indigenous birth rates rather than migration.

The Project's findings suggest the importance of group relations and political power in instigating environmental conflict. In the case of resource capture on the Senegal River, a large-scale development project in 1989 which included the construction of dams for irrigation, Hydro Electric Power (HEP) and river flow regulation had major economic and political consequences. This included the manipulation of environmental development programmes for sectarian interests, population movement and communal violence.[31]

4.3.i. Simple Scarcity Conflicts: Simple scarcity conflicts, according to Homer-Dixon, are explained and predicted by structural theories, in which actors rationally calculate their interests in zero-sum or negative-sum situations.[32] As Homer-Dixon notes "they are easily understood within the Realist paradigm of international relations theory."[33] "While the threat of resource wars is not new to international relations, this line of analysis points up the clear and growing connections between contemporary mismanagement of the environment and the security challenges of tomorrow."[34]

According to Homer-Dixon's findings, there is little empirical evidence to support the contention of inter-state conflict over renewable resources, although there is greater evidence for non-renewable resource interstate conflict, in particular over mineral and oil deposits.[35] Of greater significance for this thesis, however, is the Project's findings that the most feasible source of intra- and inter-state conflicts concerning a renewable resource is the issue of river water.[36] "Conflict is most probable when a downstream riparian is highly dependent on river water and is strong in comparison to the upstream riparians. ... This is particularly dangerous if the downstream country also believes it has the military power to rectify the situation."[37] This description is analogous for the Tajikistan-Uzbekistan and, to a lesser extent, Kazakstan-Kyrgyzstan situations.

Homer-Dixon cites the examples of South Africa and Lesotho, and Egypt and Ethiopia. In the former, South Africa unsuccessful negotiated for the allocation of Lesotho's water for agriculture in the Transvaal for 30 years. Homer-Dixon argues that South Africa's support for the 1986 military coup in Lesotho as well as being a means of denying the African National Congress guerrilla bases, was also motivated by water. Within a year, the two states had agreed upon the Highlands Water Project, to supply water to South Africa.[38]

The Project concluded that riverine water competition is more liable to cause intra- rather than inter-state conflict. Water projects such as HEP and irrigation systems, cause major social disruption including population movements. This has the potential for conflict between local and resettled peoples, competition over economic or political control of irrigable and irrigated lands, and land price changes.[39]

4.3.ii. Population Movement and Group Identity Conflicts: According to Homer-Dixon, there is considerable empirical evidence to suggest that environmental scarcity causes large-scale population movement and group-identity conflict.[40] Group identity conflict is not specifically due to the allocation of resources but questions of cultural encroachment and assimilation for example. The potential for group identity conflict is increased if there is a direct association between a region and an ethnic group. The recent arrivals are, therefore, alienated from and perceived as a threat to the existing community.

This debate is, however, unresolved. The recent examples of Islamic fundamentalist sympathies developing in the deprived sections of Egypt's conurbation's and communal violence in Indian cities, indicate a linkage between urban poverty and increased political violence.[41]

The frequently assumed correlation between rapid urbanisation, with its associated underclass, and radicalisation, social conflict and revolution, has been questioned. Tilly and Ullman argue that the urban underclass has not provided the genesis or critical mass for revolution this century.[42] The ability of this group to politically and physically challenge the existing political structures is, therefore, debatable. Migrants are frequently the marginalised and weak in their original location. Their poor status remains, if not further eroded in the receiving society.[43] "This limits their ability to organize and make demands."[44] Ullman argues that this is because they are more concerned with maintaining and enhancing their economic situation in the new environment.[45] Political and social organisations should also be examined when assessing the weakness of political consciousness of migrant group. Migration is less likely to "produce violence than silent misery and death, which rarely destabilizes states."[46]

The Project, however, concludes that there is an association between land scarcity, a consequence primarily of population growth, and communal violence between environmental migrants and host communities.[47]

4.3.iii. Relative Deprivation Conflicts: According to the Project's research, environmental scarcity is liable to increase economic deprivation and weaken social institutions.[48] Hurrell similarly believes that the most important dimensions of environmental security is the risk of environmental degradation, undermining the social fabric of weak states, and provoking internal social disruption and violence.[49] Relative deprivation perspectives suggest that conflict is most feasible under certain conditions. These are:

1) Clearly defined and well-organised social groups;
2) At least one of these groups believes that its economic and political position is unjust; and
3) The aggrieved group feels that peaceful methods for change are unavailable and that non-peaceful means are feasible.[50]

Political activism will be more effective if articulated through well organised, financed and autonomous movements, possibly based around social cleavages such as ethnicity, religion or class.[51]

The Project believes that key contextual factors determine whether economic decline, weakening state institutions will result in "deprivation conflict." There is, however, no clear correlation between actual economic inequality and social conflict.[52] The catalyst, according to Homer-Dixon, for deprivation conflict is the social perception of economic justice. For civil conflict to emerge, recent research has indicated that there has to be a "severe, persistent and pervasive" economic crisis which erodes "the legitimacy of the dominant social order and system of government."[53] The absence of legitimate, peaceful channels to express demands makes the potential for conflict greater. "[A] state debilitated by corruption, by falling revenues and rising demands, for services, or by factional conflicts within elites will be more vulnerable to violent challenges by political and military opponents, also vital to state strength is the cohesiveness of its forces and its loyalty to civil leadership."[54] The Project suggested that the state's legitimacy and capabilities are brought into question by the impact of environmental security. To rectify an environmental crisis a state will have to divert financial resources from other activities. Those involved in resource exploitation will seek state compensation if state environmental policy restricts their business. The economic and political implications of state intervention can result in increased economic inequalities.[55]

4.3.iv. Combined Model:[56] Homer-Dixon believes that there are important links between population movement-group identity conflicts and environmental scarcity inspired deprivation conflicts. Population movement can be a direct consequence of resource scarcity, but more frequently it is a result of poverty which results from this scarcity. Equally, Homer-Dixon suggests that the weakening of the state not only offers opportunities for deprivation conflict but also group-identity conflict. He therefore argues it is useful to create a combined model of environmental conflict.

4.4. Water as a Security Issue

Fresh water has been predicted as the renewable resource most likely to become a source of conflict in the near future, "due to population pressure, environmental degradation and unequal distribution of resources."[57] In the mid-1980s, US intelligence services catalogued ten potential water-related conflict zones.[58] Since the collapse of the USSR, Central Asia has been cited as a prime region vulnerable to fresh water competition.[59] This is a departure from history. Traditionally the majority of water-related conflicts have been concerned with navigation access rather than potable supplies.

There are several attributes which make water a contested and "strategic resource."[60] It is required for all human activities, is a limited resource, is without substitute, "used in vast quantities and at prices which normally do not reflect replacement costs" and is frequently trans-border, or extra-border in source.[61]

For Gleick, a contributor to the Project on Environmental Change and Acute Conflict, the factors that make fresh water a strategic issue are:

1) Its degree of scarcity;
2) The extent to which water is shared by more than one party;
3) The relative power of the riparian parties; and
4) The potential for access to alternative fresh water supply.[62]

Gleick established four indices of water resource vulnerability. These are:

1) Annual water demand;
2) Annual per capita water availability;
3) Source of water supply; and
4) Dependency upon HEP.

These demonstrate a state's water demands, availability of supply and economic reliance upon a water source. States with high indices are expected to be those most vulnerable to water-related conflict, and where regional co-operation and/or international assistance would be most valuable.[63]

The ratio between annual water demand (withdrawals) and annual renewable water availability (supply), as a percentage, demonstrates the sustainability of an individual state's water supply. Gleick lists seventeen states which withdraw at least 50% of their annual renewable supply, including nine states with an indices above 100%.[64] The latter supplement their renewable resource, with imported water, ground water supplies beyond annual replenishment rates, or expensive desalination programmes.[65]

Annual per capita water availability indicates a state's capability for economic and social development. The UN recommends that 1000 cubic metres per person per annum (p.a.) is the minimum per-capita water requirement for an effective industrialised state.[66] Water availability levels in Israel and the Palestinian Occupied Territories, for example, are 375 and 180 m^3/person/p.a., respectively.[67] Water scarcity places serious constraints on many state's economic development with consequences for population growth, industrial expansion and social stability.

A further indices of vulnerability is the percentage of the required water supply originating from external sources. Potentially, this can lead to tensions between upstream and downstream state.[68]

The final measure of vulnerability is the dependency upon HEP, as a percentage of total electricity supply. The greater the reliance on this form of power, the more significant the possibility of coercion or the threat of coercion by opponents of the said state. Such actions include the threat to destroy dams or restrict water supply. HEP only indicates one aspect of the economic value of water. (For Central Asia this index will be enlarged to include the direct economic value of water-related activities.)

Although these quantitative indices are suitable as a basis for examination of water-security in Central Asia, they lack detail and fail to illustrate the complexities of water use and security. Neither do they indicate the subjective nature of (environmental) security. The possibility of water-related conflict is dependent upon political considerations, as well as, simply scarcity. Naff and Matsons' study of Middle Eastern water-related conflict noted the significance of three subjective influences:

1) Perceived interests and issues of riparian states;
2) Relative location to other riparian states; and
3) "External and internal power considerations."[69]

In the Jordan river basin, whilst Arab-Israeli negotiations on technical aspects of water allocation have been relatively successful, "[b]oth sides, but especially the Arabs, have been reluctant to enter into binding agreements, even on technical matters, in the absence of a political settlement on the core issue of dispute: the future status of the territories occupied by Israel."[70] The resolution of water disputes is closely related to the political relationships between the parties. A fraught and distrustful regional political environment will not be conducive to the settlement of water issues.[71]

As well as being a cause or objective of conflict, it can also be used as an instrument of war.[72] As a military weapon, water has some key advantages, for example, it is essential to life and easy to pollute.[73]

The security challenges posed by what are essentially non-military water projects was illustrated by North Korea's proposed construction of the Kumgansan HEP dam on a tributary of the Han river, upstream of the South Korean capital, Seoul.[74] South Korea feared that the dam could be used to disrupt its agriculture, or even used as an offensive weapon. The sudden release of the whole dam's capacity would have flooded Seoul to a depth of 50 metres, according to South Korean claims. South Korea formally opposed the project and built a series of levees and dams as safeguards. The development was latter abandoned. Whatever the feasibility or intention of the dam, it was perceived by as a "national" security concern.

A similar but more explicit case is the Turkish construction of the Ätaturk Dam, part of the Grand Anatolia Project on the River Euphrates. In 1990, Turkey threatened to restrict water supply to Syria, if the latter did not end its assistance to Kurdish guerrillas in southern Turkey.[75]

4.5. Solutions for Water-Resource Conflict

Gleick regards International Law (IL.) as a core means of managing water allocation.[76] Glieck notes that although most water disputes are resolved through negotiations, in regions including Central Asia, where scarcity and competition are acute, water has become part of "high politics" and "the probability of water-related violence is increasing."[77]

In the last 20-30 years, IL. has sought to create a body of principles for fresh water resources. Gleick believes that the International Law Association's Helsinki Rules (1966) and the International Commission of United Nation (1991) have been crucial in the establishment of general principles including:

- Equitable utilisation;
- Prevention of harm to other users;
- Obligation to notify and inform;
- Obligation to exchange hydrological and other relevant data and information on a regular basis; and
- Co-operative management of international rivers.[78]

4.5.i. Equitable Utilisation: This is a difficult concept to define, and in practice to quantify. According to this principle, expressed in the Helsinki Rules on the Use of Waters of International Rivers, and the International Law Association, riparians are entitled to a reasonable and equitable share of inter-state water resources. This is dependent upon population, geography, alternative resources and other factors.[79] It does not imply equal allocation. Equitable utilisation is contrary to the Harman Doctrine under which a state is entitled to use the water within its boundary without consideration of other states' requirements. In the last 100 years, almost all river treatise have rejected the doctrine and restricted the freedom of upstream state in favour of equitable use.[80]

4.5.ii. Prevention of Significant Harm to Other States: The Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Water Resources (1991), for example, obliges states not to harm other states through their use of international waterways. Harmful action can, however, be permitted if compensation is provided. A major problem with this principle is determining the acceptable level of downstream harm that can be inflicted, ascertaining the upstream state's responsibility, and the level of compensation for these actions.

4.5.iii. Obligation to Notify and Inform: The Helsinki Rules and International Law Association, both cite that states should notify and inform other states of actions that will affect their use of shared water. Such notification does not necessarily imply that a state's actions will be open to change or even consultation, nor necessarily mitigate tensions.

4.5.iv. Obligation to Share Data: Effective water management practices are dependent upon access to relevant information. Gleick believes that sharing this data is a necessary part of the confidence building process, as well as, essential to the establishment of a viable water management programme.[81] Although this principle is gaining greater acceptance, in some regions water-resource information is not easily accessible. India and Israel, for example, regard much of their water data as classified.[82] In Middle Eastern water negotiations, adequate reliable data, data sharing, and mutual confidence in the information provided are frequently absent.[83] Similar issues are evident in Central Asia.

4.5.v. Co-operative Management of International Rivers: The International Law Commission has proposed the "principle of participation", in which all basin state have a duty to be involved "in the development, use and protection of shared water resources" via "joint basin commission empowered to negotiate disputes and resolve questions of resource allocation."[84] Treaty based water-management structures, with bi- or multi-lateral signatories, have been "more effective, albeit on a far more limited regional basis, than the broader principles described above."[85]

The political and economic weakness of the state are major obstacles to effective environmental management. Weak states are frequently those that require an environmental security concept the most, as limited resource and fiscal alternatives make the fragility of their ecological situation more vulnerable to conflict. Environmental scarcity conflict is liable to result in either state fragmentation or authoritarianism.[86]

Homer-Dixon believes that a society is best able to avoid environmental scarcity-inspired conflict by two strategies. The first is a more sustainable use of indigenous resources and the provision of alternative employment for those involved with the scarce resource. Economic measures including pollution taxes, incentives for more efficient use, as well as, social programmes such as family planning and literacy campaigns may also ease pressure on the resource. He also cites the use of labour-intensive rural industries, as a means of alleviating pressure on agricultural land. The second is for a state to lessen its dependency upon the depleted resource.[87] "If either strategy is to succeed, a society must be able to supply enough [social and technical] ingenuity at the right time and place."[88]

4.6. Conclusion to Theory Section

Environmental issues, because of their regional or global location, challenge the effectiveness of independent state action and the theoretical values that underpin these. Realisation of environmental constraints to growth, material expectations, and environmental degradation have also led to a reappraisal of the environmental-security correlation. Gleick is convinced of the relevance of this relationship, to the extent that he argues security analysts should now examine "*when* and *where* resource-related conflicts are most likely to arise, not *whether* environmental concerns can contribute to instability and conflict."[89]

The Case Study

4.7. Introduction

Numerous authors cite the high probability of water-related conflict in Central Asia.[90] Most however fail to elaborate the mechanism involved in regional environmental conflict. For example, Petersen states that "(c)ompetition for finite resources-such as water irrigation in Central Asia ... will be keen. [E]nvironmental-caused conflict potential has drastically escalated."[91] Petersen, like others sympathetic to an environmental security relationship, does not detail the manner in which this relationship develops, beyond stating that economic competition and a "rise in international stress overall" are influential.[92]

The key environmental issues to be examined are:

1) Water access and competition, and the related issues of irrigation, cotton agriculture and associated economic and social consequences;

and the security implications of other regionally significant topics;

2) The Aral Sea;
3) Nuclear testing; and
4) The Caspian Sea and related oil reserves.

The latter two have particular relevance for Kazakstan and the discussion of these will focus upon the northern republic, as at the state level, water security has limited applicability to Kazakstan.

The environmental security dimension of these issues will be analysed in two manners. Firstly, and most significantly, the narrow environmental security understanding will be applied to analyse whether a particular environmental concern may directly contribute to violent conflict. Secondly, the broader conceptualisation will be used to examine the manner in which environmental crises affect development, economic and health spheres and whether such problems ultimately impact upon the narrower conceptualisation.

The twofold approach will demonstrate the differing saliency of the issues in relation to the two states, and the relevance of different management approaches as the capitals differing conceptualisation of *environmental security*. Also it will illustrate that whilst the broader conceptualisation of the term *environmental security* is ill-defined, it deals with issues that indirectly contribute to the more specific interpretation. An example of this is the health implications of "Cotton Optimal" regional agricultural directives. This policy limited and polluted water supplies, directly damaging the health of cotton workers and reducing indigenous food production and calorific intake. The poor medical condition of Central Asian military draftees has been directly associated to such non-security problems. (See 4.11.)

4.7.i. Geographical and Hydrological Background: The Aral Sea basin encompasses the majority of Central Asia. This 1.3 million km^2 ecosystem, incorporates all of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan plus the two southern Kazakstani oblasts of Qyzlorda and Shymkent and parts of northern Afghanistan and north-west Iran. The basin supports a population in excess of 32 million people and contains 90% of Central Asia's surface water.[93] (See Map 4.1.) Northern Kazkastan contains the Ural, Ishin and Tobol and Irtysh rivers in the west, centre and east of the republic.

Two rivers dominate the region, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, both of which drain into the Aral Sea. The former rises in the Pamir mountains. It flows through Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan before entering the Sea. The Syr Darya's source is the Naryn in Kyrgyzstan. Its subsequent route to the Aral Sea travels through Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakstan.

The Zeravshan river which rises in the Pamirs ends in Qyzlqum desert, west of Bukhara, due to evaporation and heavy consumption. The Kashkadarya also terminates before reaching the Amu Darya.

The drainage basins of the Amu Darya (including the Kara Kum Canal, Kashkadarya and Zeravshan) and Syr Darya have a combined annual flow of 109.5 km^3, although the flow may vary from in excess of 141 km^3 to less than 81 km^3, both of which have a one in twenty year probability.[94] The 1989 inflow into the Aral Sea, however was less than one tenth of the figure recorded in 1959.[95] The prime reason for this has been water use for irrigation.[96]

Between 1950 and 1985, there was a 60% increase in irrigated lands.[97] 50% of the region's irrigated lands was located in the Uzbek SSR.[98] Between 1965 and

1990 its irrigated land expanded from 2.7 million hectares to 4.2 million ha., three times the size of the second largest irrigator, Turkmenistan.[99] The latter's irrigation has been chiefly provided by the Soviet constructed Kara Kum Canal, stretching westward from the Amu Darya for 1200 km. (See Map 4.1.) This is a major drain on the river's flow. 15 km^3 of the Amu Darya is diverted to this canal. Poor construction, maintenance and management account for approximately a third of capacity lost to leakage.[100]

The principle recipient of this water has been cotton. Cotton production in Soviet Central Asia expanded from 2.6 million tons in 1955, to approximately 7.5 million in 1986.[101] Of the 8.2 million tonnes of raw cotton planted in the USSR in 1986; 61% in the Uzbek SSR, 14% in Turkmen SSR, Tajik SSR 11% and Kazak SSR 4% and Kyrgyz SSR 1%.[102] There was a decline in land under cotton in the 1980s.[103]

Domestic and industrial water use expanded in the post-1945 period, although overshadowed by agricultural withdrawals. (See Table 4.4.) Between 1959-89, the population of the four Aral Sea basin states rose from 13.6 million to 32.8 million, an increase of 140%. During the same period agricultural production rose by 100%.[104] Output by "industrial enterprises involving *substantial abstraction or diversion of water*" expanded by 200% for steel, 470% for cement and electric generation twelve fold.[105]

Consequently withdrawals from the river system have reached full utilisation of riverine supplies, and the near-cessation of inflow into the Aral Sea. Total Central Asian water withdrawals, including Kazakstan, in 1980 were 118% of average annual flow. The figure for the Aral Sea basin was 130%.[106] Micklin suggests that water withdrawal figures are misleading, as total withdrawals can exceed total supply because returned waters can be used repeatedly.[107] He suggests consumptive use plus evaporation from reservoirs is a better means of indicating the sustainability of water use.[108] Consumptive use and reservoir evaporation in Central Asia were 91 km^3, 74% of average annual flow and for the Aral Sea basin 81%. With the addition of pan-basin evapo-transpiration loses rose to 93%.[109]


N
KAZAKHSTAN
Caspian
Sea
Aral
Sea
Syr Darya
Karakalpak
Republic
Qyzlqum
(Desert)
UZBEKISTAN
Tashkent
Almaty
Bishkek
KYRGYZSTAN
Tyan
Shan
Darya
Syr
TURKMENISTAN
Qoraqum
(Desert)
Zeravshan
River
Amu Darya
Ashgabat
IRAN
TAJIKISTAN
Mountains
CHINA
Dushanbe
Amu
Darya
Pamir
Kara Kum Canal
Murgab
River
AFGHANISTAN
KASHMIR
(Pakistan)
0
200
400 km
Major irrigated areas
Canals

Map 4.1 Rivers and Irrigated Areas in Central Asia Source: Smith, D.R. Figure 2 Phyiscal geography and irrigated area in Central Asia. "Environmental Security and Shared Water Resources in Post-Soviet Central Asia" *Post Soviet Geography*, Vol. 36, No. 6, 1995, p 354.

4.8. The Historical Background to Environmental Politics and Conflict in Central Asia

The allure of sedentary communities, agriculturally rich, with prosperous crafts, enticed nomadic conquest. After the Uzbek conquest, Transoxania's territorial integrity, however, remained relatively intact until the late-nineteenth century. It was in fact the resource-poor Kazak khanate which suffered the greatest reversals. Extensive lands were required to compensate for nomadic agricultural and environmental fluctuations. Unequal military competition against Jungars and Russian expansion pushed the Kazaks into smaller and more frequently grazed lands further weakening their economic and political well-being and social structures. Overgrazing within these confined lands further weakened political resistance to Russian expansion.

Traditionally, the Uzbek khanates' political culture, including deferential collectivism, was a consequence of water scarcity and the organisational requirements of the construction and maintenance of irrigation systems.[110] Irrigation required considerable human and financial resources, organised by the state. This collective effort transcended family and clan authority. Irrigated land "belonged quite naturally to the state."[111] Land was given to individuals to cultivate, who were expected to take part in canal maintenance. "Thus in Bukhara [and Khiva], as often in the Orient, irrigation appears as one of the principle functions of state power, its function in a sense."[112] In the khanates water management systems were localised, corresponding to particular rivers and oases.[113] Until the 1950s, most of the water required for irrigation was drawn from small tributaries of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya.

The political and security significance of irrigated land can also be realised in the fact that popular revolts in nineteenth century Bukhara were focused around land and harvests' taxation.[114] This trend was replicated in Tsarist and Bolshevik Central Asia. In the former, a report declared that "the fundamental cause of banditry is in all probability, the growth of a landless proletariat."[115] The concentration of land ownership and the arrival of Russian farmers had caused landless peasants to seek a living through banditry. As part of an attempt to politically placate, as well as, pacify the Basmachi opposition in the Fergana Valley, the Soviets introduced a series of land and water reforms. Land and water rights belonging to the *bays* (the feudal elite) were confiscated and redistributed to the *dekhane* (peasants). The project, initiated in 1921, although it never reached its full potential received popular support. The collectivisation programme of 1929 onwards brought this period of economic stabilisation to an end.[116]

Environmental issues had a significant role in late-Soviet politics, establishing numerous links between environmental degradation, resource allocation and political mobilisation. Centre-periphery relations, and the evolution and toleration of nationalism were deeply influenced by environmental critiques of the Soviet system. Environmentalism was frequently used as a substitute for nationalist/anti-Moscow activism, as well as, a source of friction between non-Russian groups.

The politicisation of environmental issues, made possible by *glasnost* reforms, was engendered by the Chernobyl incident, 1986. *Glasnost* saw the relaxation on non-state organisations. The transition can be illustrated well by noting Nikita Khrushchev and Mikhail Gorbachevs' differing opinions on environmentalism. Khrushchev described an ecologist as,

> "a healthy guy in boots who lies behind a knoll; through binoculars watches a squirrel eat nuts. We can mange quite well without these bums."[117]

Whilst the latter stated that,

> "growing ecological environmental awareness is one of the manifestations of the democratisation of society and a key factor of *perstroika* ... We must welcome this in every way possible."[118]

The two statements emphasise elite attitudes towards the relationship between politics and environmentalism. The latter clearly recognised participation in environmental issues as symptomatic of a wider nascent civil society. Environmentalism was tolerated as it was not perceived as a challenge to the power base of the Communist Party. Official tolerance of environmentalism was also an acknowledgement that "the degradation of national areas which people identify with their national dignity, aggravates relations between ethnic groups."[119]

As with other aspects of *glasnost*, the Centre found, however, it was unable to control the development and direction of environmentalism. It proved an effective critique of the system, as "[t]he destruction of nature ... epitomised everything that was wrong with Soviet development, Soviet economics, and the Soviet state itself, and these great injustices against nature were obvious and ease focuses for action."[120] Environmental and nationalist movements in Central Asia draw upon the exploitative nature of centre-periphery relations.[121] This sense of outrage was reinforced by what was perceived as Moscow's pro-Russian stance, chiefly centred upon the status of the RSFSR and Russians within the USSR, and the "continuation" of Tsarist colonisation of Central Asia under the Soviet aegis. Environmental and economic policy decisions endorsed this perception. The core incidents were the degradation of Central Asia's water courses, and related cotton agriculture and desiccation of the Aral Sea, and nuclear weapons testing at Semipalatinsk. The Cotton Affair investigations, the cancellation of the Sibaral water diversion project in 1986, and the different government policies over development and conservation around the Aral Sea and Lake Baikal further engendered this view.[122] The Sibaral Project was a proposal to re-direct Siberian waters to replenish Central Asia's rivers. For over two decades, Moscow had promised that the region's water deficit, a result of centrally planned cotton production, would be rectified by diverted Siberian waters.[123] This was never fulfilled. The plan was shelved primarily for economic reasons, although Russian nationalist-environmental objections were also acknowledged.[124] Cancellation was regarded by Central Asia's nationalists and republican elites as an attempt by Moscow to placate Russian interests, whilst pressing economic, environmental and health problems in Central Asia remained unresolved and an affront to supposed equality in the USSR.

Whilst Moscow had benefited economically from the distorted and destructive development of Central Asia, the region and its inhabitants bore the brunt of its costs: environmental degradation; water shortages and pollution; unskilled menial labour; and related health problems including high rates of infant mortality, respiratory illnesses, and typhoid, for example, without receiving any significant material benefits.[125]

The sense of nationalist affront was further enhanced by Moscow's accusation that the region's elites and traditions were solely to blame for the environmental and economic crisis.[126] The local *nomenklatura* were accused of "fulfilling the cotton plan at all costs."[127] During Gorbachev's visit to the Uzbek SSR, the First Secretary informed his audience that their sacrifice was compensated by inter-republican trade, but the SSR's inability to feed its own residents was purely its own "fault" without acknowledging the fact that the mono-culture was directed by Moscow.[128] The survival (*perczhitki*) of traditional (i.e. Islamic and feudal) customs and practices, including large families were also cited as reasons for Central Asia's poor economic development and environmental conditions.[129] One of the customs criticised was the size of Central Asian families. It was recommended that Central Asian women prone to illness should "refrain from pregnancies for 3 to 4 years so their systems could recover and their future children can be healthier."[130] Given the late-Soviet centre's concern over the change in the population balance in favour of the Muslim component, such statements were not perceived as wholly altruistic.

In the Uzbek SSR, cotton became a useful nationalist-political weapon against the Moscow.[131] As well as the negative ecological, economic and health consequences of the cotton agriculture, the Uzbek leadership perceived the investigations into the manipulation of harvest figures as an attempt to re-assert the centre's authority over the industry and SSR. In the Kazak SSR, the Virgin Lands scheme and nuclear testing were symbolic of the destruction of the nomads pastoral lands.

Social-political movements were able to draw sustenance from these and other environmental-economic issues. Two of the most influential political movements of the period, Nevada-Semipalatinsk (now known as Nevada-Semey) and Birlik, in the Kazak and Uzbek SSR, respectively, were closely associated with environmentalism. The Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement was founded in 1989 as a pressure group, by the poet Olzhas Suleimenov, against nuclear testing at the Polygon proving ground near Semipalatinsk. It also campaigned over other issues including industrial pollution and agricultural land degradation. (Also see 4.11.ii.a) Birlik's platform was more explicitly nationalist. It campaigned for Uzbek to become the republic's official language, sovereignty, as well as opposing environmentally destructive economic developments in the SSR.

The understandable and legitimate environmental and nationalist criticism of the Soviet system, were highly compatible. The former was instrumental in advancing the latter. As a nationalist instrument, environmental activism had considerable value and provided a front for nationalist ambitions. "In several cases it was clear from the very beginning that environmental concerns [were] never ... essential."[132] During the 1980s, the two were frequently indistinguishable and mutually reinforcing.[133]

Both provided a nuclei for popular mobilisation but were often exclusive and hostile in character and objective. The environment was used in a distinctly exclusive manner in order to promote nationalist objectives. Although this was particularly directed against the centre, it was also targeted against other indigenous and settler groups. Demonstrations were organised in the Uzbekistani section of the Fergana Valley by the titular group against pollution from the aluminium smelting plant in Isfara, Tajikistan. The issue was articulated along ethnic lines, with the activists accusing Dushanbe and the plant managers of polluting *Uzbek* villages.[134] According to KGB sources, Mirobobo Mirrakhamov, a Tajik nationalist, blamed non-Tajiks for all the republic's ills including environmental destruction.[135] As Ziegler notes, "[g]reen politics, frequently praised as direct democracy unmediated through hierarchical organisations, dovetails easily with the populist politics of nationalism."[136] The two objectives share common traits, both are emotionally charged and related to questions of identity and territoriality. Rather than provided the basis for civil society, environmental activism reinforced the centrifugal tendencies in late-Soviet politics.[137]

These characteristics were clearly demonstrated in group resource-competition during the 1980s. These events can be viewed in the broader context of the ethno-stratification of resources and the ongoing struggle for control of these including land and water. Sporadic conflict between Kyrgyzs of Batken and Tajiks of Isfara, between 1982 and 1991, was associated with "shortages of land and [a] deficit of water," strong group-territory affiliation and the forced settlement of the Kyrgyzs.[138] Inter-ethnic violence in Osh oblast in 1989 had some similar features to that of the Kyrgyz-Tajik case. Conflict between Tajiks and Uzbeks in Samarkand oblast in 1987, was also linked to land disputes.[139] The individual incidents of late-Soviet resource conflict in the region are discussed in detail below as part of the assessment of the present situation. (See 4.10.ii.)

A common theme in the communal violence in Central Asia was the influence of Soviet modernisation policies including sedenatarisation and collectivisation. Tishkov argues that these created and institutionalised rivalries.[140] Already settled groups, were now forced to share resources with "recently" settled groups. Competition became acute as both parties now required the same resources for the same use, sedentary agriculture.

By the collapse of the USSR, environmental activism had functioned effectively on several levels: (nationalist and non-nationalist) grassroots opposition to environmental degradation and exploitation; inter-ethnic competition for land, water and other economic resources; and as a conduit for nationalist and republican elite challenges to Moscow's authority.

4.9. Assessing the Potential for Environmental-Related Conflict in Contemporary Central Asia

With the exception of "the *kolkhozes* war" between the Kulyabis and deported Garmis clans in the Kurgan Teppa, in Tajikistan 1992, which was linked to land competition, open resource conflict has been absent since independence, and the aggressive nexus between environmentalism and nationalism has declined in political saliency.[141] Sources of potential environmental conflict have not, however, been resolved. In fact, the post-Soviet scenario is probably more precarious due to a complex of environmental, political, economic and social factors. The environmental-nationalist linkage has only been superficially and temporarily suspended. All indicators suggest that water scarcity is increasing, environmental degradation continuing, sustainable development programmes inadequate and the economic and political milieu are not conducive to environmental reforms. Political debate, particularly in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, has been curtailed, without the fundamental problems being addressed. This has case serious implications for regional water management and relations between the two republics.

The following discussion on water security will examine the 1991-6 situation through a combination of statistical evidence and the subjective factors of economics and politics, for both inter- and intra-state disputes.

Table 4.1. Indicators of Regional Susceptibility to Water-Related Conflict in Central Asia

	Population[a]			Water Available				
	Size (000) 1995	Change 1989-95 (%)	Density pop/km^2	Water available per capita /pa. (000m^3/ per/p.a.)	Total indigenous water supply (000m^3/ per/p.a.)	% from external source	intra-republic	extra-republic
Kazakstan (in ASB)	2,544	N/A	9.5	42,319	2133	84.5		
Kyrgyzstan	4,476	5.1	22	11,080	10,969	1	x	x
Tajikistan	5,777	13	37	17,731	8,846	50		x
Turkmen-istan	4,455	26.8	8	18,847	304	98		x
Uzbekistan	22,633	14	46	5,215	459	91		x

Syr Darya Total Water Available p.a. (inc. ground water) 44.10 km^3								
	1991	1979-89	1989					
Yssyk-Kol[b]	426	19	10	28,169	24859	9		x
Naryn	259	8	5	53,846	37,130	30	x	
Chuy	791	11	42	5,827	1,327	23	x	
Talas	199	34	10	87,940	39,678	55	x	
Jalal-Abad	782	38	32	6,394	5,830	23	x	
Osh	1,324	37	32	21,920	12,098	44	x	
Andijon	1,795	27	427	3,900	0	100		x
Namangan	1,558	34	197	15,406	327	98	x	x
Fergana	2,226	26	314	5,839	0	100	x	x
Leninabad[c]	1,636	30	63	18,949	3,607	81		x
Tashkent	4,299	18	276	9,639	923	82	x	x
Sirdarya	580	24	114	32,402	17	99		x
Jizzak	780	43	38	385	372	1	x	x
Shymkent	1,879	16	16	12,239	1,983	70		x
Qyzlorda	665	14	3	30,080	150	99	x	

Zeravshan River Total Water Available p.a. (not inc. ground water) 5.27 km^3								
Leninabad[c]	1,636	30	63	18,949	3,607	81		x
Dushanbe	1,774	113	62	15,445	12,740	18	x	
Samarkand	2,386	37	146	2,515	193	92		x
Bukhara[c]	1,708	85	11	4,098	53	99	x	x
Amu Darya Total Water Available (inc. ground water) p.a. 81.80 km^3 (inc. Zeravshan) 67.53 km^3 (without Zeravshan)								
Gorno-Badakshan	167	25	3	155,689	95,751	39		x
Kulab	668	43	56	40,413	4,101	90	x	x
Kurgan-Tiube	1,114	39	88	56,553	117	99		x
Surkhon-darya	1,336	40	64	50,154	2,216	96		x
Qashqa-darya	1,638	42	60	2,356	754	71		x
Bukhara[c]	1,708	85	11	4,098	53	99	x	x

Lebap	775	28	8	86,485	490	99		x
Khorazm	1,069	35	170	29,949	0	100	x	x
Dashhowuz	738	31	10	42,005	0	100	x	x
Karakalpakistan	1,274	34	8	48,673	0	100	x	
Kara-Kum Canal 12 km^3								
Mary^d	859	30	10	9,308	372	96		x
Ahal (Ashgabat)^d	871	110	9	4,024	597	95		x
Krasnovodsk^d	352	10	3	1,250	653	52	x	
Total Aral Sea basin (1991 population by oblast)	35,928	33	26	3,519	2,971	75		

Total Aral Sea basin (population by republic 1995)	39,885	12	29.2	3,170	2,971	75		

Key: [a] Absolute population for republics 1995 and oblasts 1991 data.

[b] Post 1991 spellings used for names of provinces (oblasts). Figures for Bishkek, Dushanbe, Tashkent and Ashgabat and Krasnowodsk cities are not included in their respective oblasts.

[c] Leninabad occupies both the Syr Darya and Zeravshan basins, and Bukhara the Amu Darya and Zeravshan.

[d] All three receive water from the Amu Darya via Kara Kum Canal, as well as local rivers.

Sources: Bremmer, I & Taras, R. (eds.) Appendix B Soviet census data, union republic and ASSR, 1989, *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States*, CUP, 1993, pp. 555-9; Micklin, P. Table 1 Central Asia: Area and Population Characteristics, & Table 2 Central Asia Drainage Basin Characteristics *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies*, No 905, University of Pittsburgh, 1991, pp 98-9; Zaharchenko, B.T. *Kratkaia istoriia postroeniis niiszov-Kara-Kumskogo Kanala*, Ashgabat, 1994, Quoted in O'Hara, S. "Agriculture and Land Reform in Turkmenistan Since Independence" *Post Soviet Geography and Economics*, No. 38, 1997, (draft version). (ii) p 4; & Smith, D.R. Table 3 Indicators of Regional Susceptibility to Water-Related Conflict in Central Asia[a] op cit., pp. 361-2.

A cursory initial review of water statistics for Central Asia based upon Smith's research gives an initially benign outlook for regional water security. (See Table 4.1.) Smith's work, drawing upon Glieck's water scarcity indices, is useful as a starting point to indicate whether the region is facing a serious water crisis and provide a comparison between Central Asia and other water vulnerable regions, such as the Nile and Jordan basins. It attempts to construct a comprehensive oblast level breakdown of water vulnerability in the Aral Sea Basin.

This is, however, problematic. It is unclear how the water figures were constructed and fails to indicate whether the figures used for individual provinces are based upon the whole river, or specific to the individual province. Returned and re-used waters make it difficult to establish accurate figures at the intra-basin level, thus weakening any assessment solely based upon statistics. The use of returned water has both positive and negative consequences. It allows for multiple withdrawals and therefore increased efficiency but returned waters are frequently contaminated, thus providing a depleted resource for downstream users. Intra-basin figures must therefore be used with caution, although those for the Aral Sea basin and complete drainage systems can be employed with greater certainty. They do, however, provide an initial foundation for assessing water conflict which is as dependent upon subjective factors as much as resource scarcity or inequitable distribution. The incorporation of the political context, as studied by Naff and Matson, will enhance the examination beyond the "simplistic environmental determinism" that Homer-Dixon is concerned about. An approach which recognises and records the different uses of water, domestic, irrigation, industry, as well as, the excessive use and wastage prevalent in Central Asian water allocation, is required. With greater detail on the indices and the incorporation of subjective considerations the prognosis becomes more pessimistic.

4.9.i. Degree of Scarcity: The degree of scarcity has to be seen as relative rather than absolute. Annual average water supply would initially suggest that at the region, and at a state level, none of the Central Asian states hav been subject to immediate water crisis. Water availability is above the UN minimum recommended for development. Table 4.1. indicates that the regional average per capita figure in the period was three times above the 1000 m^3 per person UN recommendation for development, at 3170.3 m^3/person/p.a. Uzbekistan had the lowest state average, at of 5,215 m^3/per person/p.a. This was still five time above the recommended UN minimum. Similarly the only province to had a total water supply below 1000 m^3/per person/p.a. is Jizzak, in Uzbekistan.

Smith's simple population-supply equation has resulted in his conclusion that the republics "at present appear to have sufficient total water supplies per person."[142] In the case of Central Asia, blanket water availability per capita figures has failed to recognise intra-state sector distribution, wastage and contamination of what is essentially an adequate supply. 83% of water is allocated to irrigation agriculture, whilst domestic consumption is only 13% of total water used in Uzbekistan.[143] (See Table 4.2.) Irrigation has seriously depleted the quantity and quality of what is essentially an adequate and sustainable water supply, for other users. The problem is not that there has not enough water but rather the manner it has been allocated and managed. Turkmenistan, for example, in fact has enough water but these figures failed to recognise water lost to seepage and contamination, and the poor quality of available water quality.[144] Cotton production per tonne in Turkmenistan required a supply three times that used by Israel's cotton production.[145] Domestic consumption was 1% of total water used in the republic. This highlights the problem of attempting to quantify security threats. By 2025, estimated population growth will reduce water availability in the Aral Sea Basin to approximately 1900 m^3/person/p.a.[146]

Scarcity does become apparent when water availability is examined through the Annual Water Demand:Annual Renewable Water Availability ratio. In Glieck's global survey, prior to the collapse of the USSR, 17 states had withdrawal rates above 50%, nine above 100%. Whilst it is not possible to provide complete data for individual Central Asian republics, water uses as a percentage and the ratios for the Aral Sea basin and Central Asia river inflows and withdraw information is available. Surface water diversion:Inflow for the river basins are recorded in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2. Water Use By River Basins

	Supply	Demand p.a.		Demand as % of Available Water	
	Total Water Available p.a. (km^3)	Water withdrawn (km^3) (a)	Water consumed (km^3) (b)	(a)	(b)
Amu Darya (including Zeravshan)	81.80	61.61	36.25	75.3	44.3
Kara Kum[a]	0.55 12	13.86 13.86	6.69 6.69	2520 115	1216 55.8
Syr Darya	44.10	56.51	35.16	127.2	70.7
Aral Sea Basin	126.45	131.98	78.10	104	61.7
Central Asia[bc]	139.75	134.3	79.2	96.1	57

[a] The first figure does not include water withdrawn from the Amu Darya.

[b] Including ground water.

[c] Central Asian Drainage Basin total of Amu Darya, Syr Darya Kara-Kum Canal, Lake Issyk-Kul and Caspian Sea east coast.

Sources: Micklin, P. Table 2. Central Asia: Drainage Basin Characteristics & Table 3. Central Asia: Water Use by Sector in 1980, op cit., pp. 99, 100-1.

Table 4.2. indicates that as a region the Aral Sea Basin is water vulnerable. On both rivers demand has been above 44%, in terms of withdrawals and more significantly consumptive rates. The Syr Darya and Kara Kum have been particularly vulnerable. Additional surface water withdrawals are highly probable, given population growth and industrial expansion. These place further pressure on the resource and the situation is predicted to become worse in the near future.[147]

4.9.ii. Source and Distribution of Water: The external sourcing of water is the key to whether water scarcity is liable to result in conflict. Whilst regionally, the sense of competition and crisis is not explicitly demonstrated by the above indices, this is not the case with this index. All the river systems are shared between at least two states. Amu Darya and Syr Darya both cross four states.

With the exception of Tajikistan at least 50% of the water supplies for the Aral Sea basin states and southern Kazakstani oblasts was extra-republican in source. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan had nearly total dependency upon external-sourced water.

Sub-state water requirements was even more acute. Whilst all the provinces with the exception of Jizzak, had total available water supplies above $1000m^3$/per person/p.a. Table 4.1. indicates the precarious nature of this supply. Of the 30 Central Asian provinces, 18 (60%) had indigenous supplies below the $1000m^3$ mark, and ten provinces (33%) had an indigenous available supply below $200m^3$. 22 of the provinces derived at least 50% of their supply from external sources. None of Turkmenistan's provinces had indigenous water supplies and with the exception of Jizzak viloyet, all of Uzbekistan's provinces water supplies were externally sourced, to levels of between 71% to 100% of total supply. Jizzak indigenous-dominated water supply was only total $385m^3$ person/p.a. Although some of the region's oblasts were supplied from within the same republic, given the evidence of past intra-state competition and conflict this in itself does not suggest water competition will be easily managed domestically.[148]

The perception of being held hostage by upstream parties, or inequitable distribution of these shared supplies, transfers water competition from simple scarcity to political disputes.

4.9.iii. Reliance on HEP/Direct Economic Value of Riverine Water: In "many arid regions ... irrigation agriculture is an economic mainstay, with water, therefore, being an essential ingredient for economic stability."[149] As a measure of vulnerability, reliance upon on HEP production (as a percentage of total electricity supply) is ambivalent in Central Asia. In Central Asia, this index should be broadened to include other economic activities directly based upon fresh water supplies and acknowledge the political context of regional HEP production.

Over 50% of both Kyrgystan and Tajikistans' electricity production has been generated by HEP.[150] They have not been confronted by water shortages but by political pressure from downstream states. Their use of HEP would be considerably larger if it were not for the continuation of cotton-driven water policies, instigated by Moscow, which favour downstream irrigation demands. Existing Central Asian HEP figures, therefore, fail to acknowledge these states' unequal relations with downstream neighbours, and the significance of the latter's irrigation-based agricultural economies. Attempts by the two republics to increase HEP production alarmed Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. The latter threatened to destroy Kyrgyz dams, although this was not converted into action.

Table 4.3. Electricity Production by HEP as a Percentage of Total Electricity Produced

Republic	Total
Kazakstan	<25%
Kyrgyzstan	>50%
Tajikistan	>75%
Turkmenistan	0%
Uzbekistan	<50%
Central Asia	c35%

Source: Klötzli, S. Table 3. Importance of Hydropower in Aral Sea Basin (number of power plants for differing categories of electricity production per year) "The Water and Soil Crisis in Central Asia - A Source for Future Conflicts?" *ENCOP Occasional Paper*, No 11, Center for Security Policy and Conflict Research/Swiss Peace Foundation, Zurich/Berne, May 1994.

The nexus between nationalism, development and water management is well illustrated by the issue of HEP. Post-independence Slav emigration saw the temporary closure of half of Uzbekistan's Syr Darya HEP plants because of the exodus of trained staff.[151] Individual perceptions of personal security must be incorporated into state development and security. This incident also adds a further and subjective dimension to Glieck and Smiths' more quantative-based approaches.[152]

As Table 4.4. indicates, irrigation has remained the largest water consumer. Further demands from actual and proposed industrial developments, irrigation plans and demographic growth, will affect the ratio of withdrawals as well as absolute withdrawals.

Table 4.4. Water Used by Sector 1990 (%)

	Irrigation	Industry	Domestic
Kazakstan	N/A	N/A	N/A
Kyrgyzstan	90	7	3
Tajikistan	90	5	4
Turkmenistan	88	11	1
Uzbekistan	83	13	4
Aral Sea Basin	88	9	3

Source: Smith, D.R. Table 2 Water Use by Central Asian Republics 1990 (million m^3) op cit., p 357. Informatsentr Goskomstata SSSR, *Okhrana okruzhayushchey sredy i ratsional'noye ispol'zovaniye priodnykh resursov*, Goskomstata SSSR, Moscow, 1991, pp. 80-86; Gleason, G. *Water and Land Conflict among the New States of Central Asia*, Analytical Brief of a Project Report for the National Council on Soviet and East European Research, Contract No 806-13, 1992; World Bank, *Tajikistan: A World Bank Country Study*, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Washington D.C. 1994, p 104.

This broader analysis of water indicates that it is not the HEP states that have been most dependent upon water for economic survival, or vulnerable to water scarcity. Rather this is the situation the cotton producers, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, have been confronted by.

Although it is difficult to quantify the broader economic value of water accurately, 90% of the region's crop production has come from irrigated land.[153] Cotton has been the leading GDP and employment provider for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Cotton production employed 44% of Turkmenistan's workforce in 1991 and was responsible for 76% of Uzbekistan's hard currency revenue.[154] Even Levy's strict definition of a security threat that it must be directly detrimental to a "vital national interest", allows water to be regarded as such for these two republics.[155]

4.9.iv. Relative Power of Riparian Parties: In terms of economic, military and political strength, the riparian states can be divided into three groups: Kazakstan and Uzbekistan; Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; and Turkmenistan. Although both Kazakstan and Uzbekistan are powerful downstream states, the strategic importance of water to the two republics has been very different. In most "crude" analyses of water politics, upstream Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would be regarded as relatively powerful due to their upstream positions. This, however, ignores the more significant non-water issues.

Turkmenistan's position has been highly constrained. 98% of its water supply has been exterally sourced from the Amu Darya, the Kara Kum Canal, Atrek and Murgab which rise in Afghanistan, and the Tedjen from Iran. Economically, cotton production, a copious user of water, has dominated GDP earnings and employment. Turkmenistan' upstream neighbour, Uzbekistan, has dwarfed it demographically, economically, militarily and as international actor. The latter is partially a consequence of Ashgabat's neutral if not isolationist stance. External control of both its principal water supplies may fuel Ashgabat's sense of insecurity. The uncertainties of the Afghanistan war also poses problems for Turkmenistan in the near-future.[156]

The question of relative strength of the parties can also be directed to sub-state competition. Centre-periphery relations and ethno-politics influence this situation. Kazakstan's irrigated regions of Shymkent and Qyzlorda, and Karakalpakstan Autonomous Republic (AR) in Uzbekistan have depended totally upon extra-oblast waters and lacked political influence in their relations with the centre. (See below 4.10.ii.c. for Karakalpakstan)

4.10. Water and the Potential for Conflict

4.10.i. The Potential for Interstate Conflict: Interstate relations between the republics have beeen infused, but not solely determined by, the issue of water. Power relations between Kazakstan and Uzbekistan on the one hand, and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, on other, were unequal. In reality, the upstream states have been in a far weaker position than an initial examination would suggest. Whilst only 1% of Kyrgyzstan's water originated from outside of the republic, like Tajikistan, it was unable to use its water in the most economically beneficial manner due to the continued cotton optimum policy. Uzbekistan's economic and military involvement in Tajikistan strengthened its already strong position.

Conflict along the Syr Darya is far less likely to emerge than between the Amu Darya riparians. This is because the Syr Darya has been a more marginal economic resource for its littoral states when compared to the larger, southern river and its riparian.

In terms of water vulnerability, the situation of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan were distinctly different. Consequently, their political responses to water issues have been different as is the likelihood of their future involvement in inter-state water conflict. At the state level, Kazakstan has not been vulnerable to water-related problems. Geographically and strategically, northern Kazakstan has been excluded from the water-conflict debate. Whilst Kazakstan has had its own "domestic" environmental and water problems, and the southern oblasts relied upon externally sourced water, nationally water has not been regarded as a scarce strategic resource, as it has been for Uzbekistan. Although Shymkent and Qyzlorda have relied upon extra-republican water, the majority of Kazakstan's total available water has been sourced indigenously or from Siberian rivers. In contrast, the percentage of extra-republican derived water for Uzbekistan was 91% of total water available. During the period of study Almaty regarded water distribution as an internal problem. Intra-republican re-distribution was seen as the prime means of resolving the southern oblasts' water requirements. "Water resources should be available for the whole republic. If somewhere in the republic water is lacking, we should have the right to allocate water to where it is needed."[157] Only 17.5% of Kazakstan's exports, by profit, were cotton related.[158] (See 4.11.ii. for Kazakstan's environmental security concerns.)

Uzbekistan's water requirements, and political and economic significance, have been and will continue to be central to the entire region's stability. For Uzbekistan water has been a strategic resource and cotton a vital economic activity. The republic has been confronted by water-related inter-state tensions with both its upstream and downstream neighbours, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, respectively.

Competition between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on the one hand, and Kazakstan and Uzbekistan on the other has resulted primarily from their different requirements and capabilities. The upstream states, whose mountain reservoirs store and regulate water flow, require large quantities of water, primarily in winter, for HEP, and have relatively small irrigated lands. During the Soviet period this integrated agricultural, industrial and power policy, was to some extent mutually beneficial. The power needs of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were compensated by Kazak SSR and Uzbek SSR produced electricity. The upstream states' economic development was, and remains, subservient to the needs of their more powerful neighbours, enshrined in Soviet-instigated water allocation quotas. The present water management body, the Interstate Co-ordinating Water Commission (ICCW), has allocated supplies based upon these historical patterns. (See 4.12.i.. for discussion of the institutional framework.)

Relations between Uzbekistan and its upstream neighbours have remained tense, however. In 1995, after Kyrgyzstan used water allocated for cotton for domestic energy production, an agreement was reached between Bishkek and Tashkent. Under this, Kyrgyzstan was to maintain a "cotton optimal" policy, even though its winter water reserves were low and Uzbekistan was to provide electricity to its neighbour. Kyrgyzstan stated it would have preferred hard currency transactions for the reciprocal trade of water and electricity but had to accept a barter arrangement.[159] Kyrgyzstan plans to terminate the existing Soviet water use principle of 1981 in 2010.[160] Kyrgyzstan which spends $4 billion p.a. to maintain its reservoirs, does not believe that it has received equitable economic benefits from this framework.[161]

Attempts by the upstream states to re-allocate the existing water quotas and increase their own irrigation agriculture were countered by Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. One report claims that Uzbekistan threatened to use military force to seize the Toktogul dam on the Kyrgyzstani section of the Syr Darya, if the latter attempted to alter the existing distribution policy.[162] Previously, elements in Tajikistan discussed the idea of using the Syr Darya as "an offensive weapon in any territorial dispute with Uzbekistan."[163] It is unlikely that these threats would have been enacted as the collateral damage would have been non-specific, even counter-productive. It does, however, illustrate the political milieu in which confidence and mutual guarantees are absent.

During talks on water allocation in January 1996, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan proposed to expand their irrigated lands. Uzbekistan was able to force the former to retract its proposal, but not Tajikistan's plan for a 200,000 ha. expansion. Previously, Tajikistan had also expressed an interest in withdrawing an additional 600 million m^3 p.a. from the upper reaches of the Zeravshan.[164] It has been suggested by a Tajik *RFE* correspondent, that water tensions hampered good Tajikistan-Uzbekistani relations, specifically citing an agreement between

Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, which excluded Uzbekistan.[165] Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have not as yet established a bilateral agreement over shared water resources.[166]

Smith argues that the potential for Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan conflict "seems to be high."[167] This has not taken place to date and the author would argue that near-term conflict is unlikely because of non-water factors. Whilst the present situation is not ideal nor liable to maintain long-term stability, it is unlikely that either Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would be able to use the threat or implementation of military action in their disputes with Uzbekistan over water. The constraints on the upstream states has been apparent to Kyrgyzstan's politicians. The opposition figure, Doonbek Sadyrbayev recognised the limited choices the republic has had when bargaining with Uzbekistan. He has stated that, "if the Uzbeks want to play rough there are a hundred ways they can make sure life is difficult including the cutting of winter electricity supplies or raising export tariffs."[168] However, Kyrgyzstan's Deputy Prime Minister, Karimsher Abdimunov, believes that "the matter [water pricing] will be resolved in a civilized way."[169]

Kazakstan has criticised Kyrgyzstan for withholding water for HEP use and water-pricing suggestions.[170] Although beyond the time span of this study, Almaty has also criticised Uzbekistan's reduction by 70% the flow of the Druzhba Canal, which supplies 100,000 hectares in the southern Kazakstan.[171] This saw localised Kazak protests, showing the potential for communal tension along the borders. Negotiations resulted in a limited increase from this new quota. Kazakstan, however, is not solely dependent upon these supplies and it is unlikely that Kazakstan would seek to escalate these disputes.[172]

At present it appears unlikely that the *status quo* will be seriously challenged. The water demands of the more powerful downstream states have been met at the expense of the upstream riparians' demands. The downstream states, as yet, do not have to pay for water, whilst the upstream states are responsible for the financial burden of maintaining the reservoirs and dams.

The second zone of potential conflict is the lower Amu Darya, between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Water distribution has been central to Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan relations. The republics are the two largest cotton producers in the FSU, the industry being the major employer in both. The establishment of international borders divided water resources on the lower Amu

Darya between Dashhowuz viloyet in Turkmenistan, and Khorazm viloyet and the Karakalpakstan AR in Uzbekistan. Inter-state hostilities are more likely in this region and Smith claims this "may be the single most serious regional resource-related dispute."[173] The reasons for this prognosis are: the more equitable balance between the two states; the taut personal relationship between presidents Karimov and Niyazov; the economic significance of irrigation agriculture; and the near total dependency upon the Amu Darya to supply both states.

Since independence Turkmenistan and Uzbekistans' political relations have been tense. Water has been elevated from a political dispute to a potential cause of conflict, re-emphasising Gleick's and Marawi's views that the political context in which water disputes are discussed, determines whether it can be settled in a negotiated manner or via force. Border and water disputes between the two capitals have heightened the stress levels between the capitals.[174] The political rivalry between two leaders, both of whom have promoted authoritarian leadership styles and their states as self-reliant regionally-significant actors, have restricted the potential for compromise. Unlike Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan has followed a neutral, isolationist approach. This stance in which multilateral organisations "shall not infringe upon our [Turkmenistan's] sovereignty" seems rather naive.[175] Turkmenistan's ability to independent action has not resolved its water difficulties. The two presidents did not met each other until 16 January 1996, in response to border tensions of the previous year.[176] This was five years after the collapse of the USSR. At this meeting water management was discussed, and a border-protection agreement signed.[177] Niyazov's antipathy to Karimov's appointment as head of the International Aral Sea Salvation Fund hindered the organisation's Almaty summit, in February 1997.[178]

Military tensions along the Bukhara-Lebap border were recorded during late-1995, and water may have been the source of this situation.[179] A Russian newspaper reported that there are Uzbekistani contingency plans for the occupation of north-eastern Turkmenistan.[180] The alleged plan does little to establish confidence between the two states.

Smith argues that if Turkmenistan continues to extend the Tuyamauvun Canal, westward of Dashhowuz, this increased water diversion could "further heighten [regional] tensions."[181] The political and environmental disputes between these states are intertwined and suggest that co-operation between them will be difficult to achieve. Without mutual trust and cooperation, however, water disputes will not be resolved. Kangas has stated that peaceful relations with Turkmenistan would allow Uzbekistan to "concentrate on the more pressing problems in Tajikistan."[182] The resolution of Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan water disputes would ease Tashkent's regional commitments. It is debatable whether this can be achieved, and to what extent Tashkent wishes to see a stable Tajikistan, as the war is to some extent fuelled by Uzbekistan.

A final variable for the Amu-Darya system is the eventual outcome of the wars in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. The political attitudes, economic development and foreign policies of the post-settlement governments are presently unclear. According to 1985 figures, Afghanistan withdrew only 1.5 km^3p.a. from the Amu Darya, 2.2% of the river's annual flow.[183] As the republic covers 23% of the Amu Darya basin, and also is the location of the Murgab headstream, potential post-conflict expansion in withdrawals will have inevitable consequences for downstream states. Given that total expenditure of the river already outstrips inflow by 3.16 km^3/p.a., any resumption in normal economic activity in northern Afghanistan would place further pressure on the system.[184] In 1978, the World Bank reported that the Amu Darya could provide Afghanistan with half of the republic's HEP potential, but only through joint projects with other riparians. During the occupation, Soviet authorities restricted Afghanistan's HEP and irrigation schemes in order to favour downstream Soviet users. Projects established in this period were integrated into the Soviet Central Asian infrastructure.[185] Afghanistan has not been party to any regional water sharing agreements, although unconfirmed reports indicate that negotiations between Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have been held.[186] The World Bank has voiced concern over the exclusion of Kabul form international water agreements.[187] Similarly, peace and economic stabilisation of Tajikistan will see increased water withdrawals and implications for regional allocations.

4.10.ii. The Potential for Sub- and Trans-State Conflict: Water competition has greater security significance at the trans- and sub-state levels. Smith used population growth, population density, per capita water availability and ratio of water externally sourced to rank the Aral Sea Basin provinces for potential water-related conflict. In addition, this thesis recognises the need to incorporate the direct economic reliance on water and ethnic composition of the provinces into this assessment.

According to Smith's indices there has been a wide variation in provincial water vulnerability. The ten provinces with the most acute water problems were Andijon, Bukhara, Karakalpakstan, Khorazm, Namangan, Samarkand, Sukhandarya and Sirdarya, (all in Uzbekistan), Khatlon (the merged Kurgan-Tiube and Kulyab provinces, Tajikistan) and Ahal (Turkmenistan). The regions of acute inter-state water-tension are also those most liable to sub-/trans-state disputes.

The identification between ethnicity and territory has been most accentuated in Uzbekistan. The republic has lacked significant indigenous control of its water supply, whilst containing Kyrgyz and Tajik minorities, whose eponymous republics control Uzbekistan's water sources. Eight of the ten regions, which Smith cited as those with the highest water vulnerability, were in Uzbekistan, and two of the four most vulnerable were in the Fergana Valley.[188]

4.10.ii.a. The Fergana Valley: The Fergana Valley has already witnessed inter-ethnic conflict for resources. The aggregate of a burgeoning, dense and heterogeneous population, important but ailing industries, and the region's contested division between three newly sovereign states could make water a near-term political problem. It is interesting to note that three of the four disputed areas of irredentism and/or the subject of territorial claim in the Valley, discussed in a 1992 *Nezavisimaya gazeta* article have also been subject to environmental resource competition.[189] The three are Isfara-Batken border, the Zeravshan river basin and Osh oblast. (See Map 4.2)

Unequal resource access and population growth, Homer-Dixon suggests, leads to migration which due to the influx of migrants, increases environmental pressure in the host region. This author suggests that non-migratory growth can create similar problems. The components for group-identity conflict were present in Fergana Valley: heterogeneous, high density and growing population, well-defined ethnic groups with political and cultural structures and resource scarcity. A third of Uzbekistan's population resided within the Valley. Between 1979-89, population growth in the Valley's provinces was considerable: 27% in the case of Andijon and 34% in Namangan.[190]

Tishkov sees inter-ethnic water conflict as symptomatic of the difficulties that Central Asia encountered during its integration into the USSR. Modernisation and collectivisation, he argues, eroded traditional modes of production and social networks.[191] The Soviet national delimitations, sedentarisation and collectivisation processes "could not reflect the complex local systems of land and water use" nor the historical norms of co-existence.[192] This inflexibility created and institutionalised rivalries. Competition for water escalated with the already settled groups forced to share the resource with more recent settlers. With both groups now requiring the resource for the same purpose, sedentary agriculture, demand and therefore competition was increased.

4.10.ii.a.i. Isfara-Batken: Violence between Kyrgyzs of Batken (Osh oblast) and Tajiks of Isfara (Khojent oblast) was recorded in 1982, 1988, 1989 and 1991.[193] "Shortages of land ... [a] deficit of water," and the Tajik SSR's closure of the Bokent Canal which supplied the Kyrgyz oblast were cited as reasons for the conflict.[194]

Tishkov argues that the Tajik-Kyrgyz dispute arose from the ending of "economic-complementarism."[195] The waters of the Isfara river were traditionally viewed by the local Tajik population as their "property" because they cultivated the immediate vicinity and constructed the irrigation systems in the Isfara Valley. In winter, the Kyrgyzs traditionally used the fallow land to pasture their animals. The sedentarisation of the Kyrgyzs, which began in the nineteenth century, led to increased competition for irrigation and land. The Tajik community has found it difficult to reconcile this "encroachment" with their view "that all cultivated land and potentially arable land, as well as, the waters of the Isfara, are historically *their* territory and most importantly *their* water."[196]

Competition in the Isfara-Batken was affected by massive demographic growth and different rates of population growth between the Kyrgyzs and Tajiks. The Isfara raion, with a 75% Tajik population, saw a 4.7 fold growth in population between 1970 and 1990, whilst Kyrgyz-dominated Batken's population rose by 2.5 fold, between 1964 and 1990.[197]

The two republics have not resolved the Batken-Isfara border issue, suggesting that a communal resource situation could potentially lead to an international dispute.[198]


'Disputed' areas
BISHKEK
KAZAKHSTAN
UZBEKISTAN
TASHKENT
OSH
KHUDZHAND
KYRGYZSTAN
SAMARKAND
BUKHARA
TAJIKISTAN
1
2
3
4

Map 4.2. Disputed Areas in the Fergana Valley and Lower Zeravshan

Source: Rotar, I. "A Mine Laid By The Kremlin Mapmakers" *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 25/12/92, pp. 1 & 3. *CDPSP* Vol. 45, No. 1, p. 7.

4.10.ii.a.2. The Lower Zeravshan: Since communal violence in 1987 over irrigated lands further Tajiks-Uzbek conflict on the issue is unlikely to take place. Whilst this source of tension was latent between 1991-96, a series of other conflict-instigating factors remained. These included: Tashkent's discriminatory policies towards Tajik minority cultural and political claims; harassment by local officials and security agents, particularly in the Samarkand oblast; and the existence of arms and experienced combatants in neighbouring Tajikistan.[199] Post-conflict economic re-development in Tajikistan, including expansion in irrigated agriculture, already mooted, could also re-invigorate downstream communal competition. Tajikistan's plans to increase withdrawals from the Zeravshan would mean reductions for other downstream consumers. The ulitisation of the river has already been reached. Inflow to the Zeravshan is 5.2 km^3.[200] Surface diversions in Uzbekistan alone, 10.76 km^3/p.a., exceed this.[201] Should the Tajikistani proposal to expand irrigation be implemented then the Tajik-Uzbek conflict in Samarkand oblast may resurface.[202] With increased water scarcity in Uzbekistan it is not unfeasible that the titular group will seek to retaliate against members of the group that has caused this scarcity.

That said, the Tajik-Uzbek situation has proved particularly resilient to a wide-range of conflict-inducing catalysts and academic predications. Unless government repression is increased, resulting in the minority becoming radicalised, this will remain the case. A peaceful and united Tajikistan, in which Islamist are active within government, may lead the diaspora to re-appraise its identity and interest in Tajik nationalism, and closer co-operation with it homeland. Dushanbe is, however, unlikely to promote any activity that would aggravate its relations with Tashkent. Similarly, during the Soviet period the Tajik SSR was the poorest of the SSRs, and after four years of war it is unlikely to be able to construct the HEP and irrigation infrastructure its plans require.

4.10.ii.a.3. Osh: During 1990, the Osh oblast administration granted Uzbek irrigated land for Kyrgyz settlement. Land and housing pressures in the oblast were acute. The local Uzbek community responded with a plethora of political demands including regional autonomy. The failure to withdraw the land grant, or offer concessions to the Uzbeks, and the local official encouragement of Kyrgyz nationalism, resulted in a week of rioting.[203]

Inter-ethnic relations in the oblast have remained sensitive since independence. Counter accusations between Bishkek and Tashkent about the treatment of the

Uzbek minority in Osh, and the presence of Islamist movements in the oblast, originally Uzbek-dominated, have not aided stability. (See 5.12.ii.a.2.)

4.10.ii.b. The Lower Amu Darya: The lower Amu-Darya scenario as well as being a situation of interstate tensions has implications for cross-border inter-ethnic relations. The dichotomies between domestic and international, and economic development and international security can be demonstrated by the situation.

The republics share a 200 km border. 121,578 Turkmen live in Uzbekistan, principally in the Khorazm region, and 300,000 Uzbeks reside in the Turkmenistani province of Dashhowuz, neighbouring Karakalpakstan and along the south-eastern reaches of the Amu Darya.[204] Karakalpakstan and Khorazm in Uzbekistan, and the Turkmenistani province of Dashhowuz, compete for water within the lower stretches of the river. Cross-border water poaching, diversions of irrigation systems, resultant vigilante actions and destruction of pumping stations and canals have been reported along the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan border.[205] Although to date there has been no evidence of these incidents escalating to state level, relations between the two capitals have been tense and the region is possibly the prime site for such a scenario.[206]

Since independence, Turkmenistan has not addressed severe crises in the republic's agricultural and water sectors. Lack of basic maintenance of the Kara Kum Canal since independence, combined with poor construction, has led to silting, leakage and structural failures. In 1993, 50% of agricultural soils were classified as unsatisfactory due to water logging and/or salination.[207] In fact, President Niyazov's *Ten Years of Prosperity* programme has been essentially the continuation of Soviet style policies, to increase agricultural production without improving irrigation practices.[208] O'Hara concludes that with predicted population growth, and declining crop yields and water supplies "Turkmenistan could be faced with a future of severe food shortages which will undermine development and could ultimately result in increased social and political tension."[209] Should this prediction prove correct it poses serious regional implications for both Turkmen-Uzbek inter-ethnic and Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan state relations.

4.10.ii.c. Karakalpakstan: The link between environmental degradation and inter-ethnic conflict is not, however, inevitable or unequivocal as the environmental situation in Karakalpakstan illustrates.

Karakalpakstan's status as an AR was preserved in Uzbekistan's 1993 Constitution.[210] The AR has been confronted by one of the worst environmental situations in Central Asia. The reduced and frequently absent flow into the Aral Sea, and the resultant decline in water availability, desertification and destruction of habitat and fisheries have devastated the AR.[211] The supply was further diminished by the high concentration of agricultural, domestic and industrial pollution and toxins. At a time when the Soviet average life expectancy was 69 years of age, the figure in the ASSR was less than 42.[212] (See 4. 11.)

Massive environmental stress and related economic and social problems are not, however, expected to lead to inter-ethnic conflict. Environmental degradation and its economic and social consequences have not become divisive. Contrary to predications of group and periphery-centre conflict models, which propose that the lack of political access frequently drives groups to seek other alternative means of advancing their grievances, Karakalpakstan has so far remained calm. Politicisation and conflict has not arisen in this case because the conditions required are not evident. These are:

- Clearly defined and well-organised social groups;
- The belief by at least one of these groups that they are economically or politically disadvantaged; and that
- Peaceful means are unavailable to the group and non-peaceful methods are feasible.

For the Karakalpak case, demarcation between inter-ethnic groups has been difficult. The three main ethnic groups relatively are evenly balanced: 32% Karakalpaks, 33% Uzbeks and 26% Kazaks, and share common cultural roots.[213] The Karakalpaks and Kazaks are linguistically close, both are from the Kipchak group, and Uzbek linguistic assimilation of the Karakalpaks has been a noticeable trend. Where as other inhabitants of Karakalpakstan have emigrated to "homelands", Karakalpaks leaving the region have no defined recipient community.[214] Assimilation of Karakalpak migrants has been common, reducing inter-ethnic tensions in host regions too.

The multi-ethnic population of the region does not necessarily predispose harmonious relations, given the "acute shortage" of potable water and other resources, including employment, in the AR. Inter-ethnic violence between other

Central Asian groups, frequently linguistically, religiously and culturally close, does not suggest that such commonalties will prevent future conflict. Neither does the numerical balance between the three groups provide a permanent deterrence. The greater cultural affinity between the Kazaks and Karakalpaks may aid an alliance against local Uzbeks and the centre, if these were perceived as the cause of the AR's problems.

The political weakness of Karakalpakstan and the alienation of the titular group has been striking, but ambivalent in its consequences. Political decision-making has remained Tashkent's prerogative. Well-organised political communities have not emerged in the AR, and the province's relationship with Tashkent has been asymmetrical, preventing Karakalpakstan from establishing a political identity or agenda. The AR's economic status has also been poor. Only Jizzak and Sirdarya viloyets contributed less to Uzbekistan's post-independence industrial output.[215] Karakalpakstan was the only region not to witness industrial growth after 1994.[216] This sense of disempowerment may account for the lack of militancy amongst the Karakalpaks. As Tishkov argues, conflict has not emerged in the AR because it is not the groups that have been most discriminated against who normally initiate violence. Rather it is dominant and well-defined groups, "to be precise, their elite elements" that instigates "the suppression of 'others.'"[217] This is borne out by the Novy Uzen, Osh and anti-Meskhetian incidents.

The Aral Sea-Karakalpakstan situation developed in a radically different manner to water allocation issues in the Fergana Valley and between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The latter two cases were ultimately inter-group competition for the utilisation of a resource. The protagonists and the subject of their interest have been immediate and obvious. The situation in Karakalpakstan has been essentially a question of "survival." It has been engaged in an unequal competition with upstream, "over the horizon" parties. It has also been affected by a series of external competition between upstream parties, without the ability to influence these situations. The potential for conflict is less likely, as opponents are less obvious. It has been difficult for Karakalpakstani inhabitants, of whatever nationality, to find an adversary or articulate any definitive solution. As one Karakalpakstani author concluded,

> "(a)ll the efforts of our [Karakalpak] nation are focused on one thing now, and that is physical survival. We are not capable of anything more: not anger, not the search for culprits. We think only of one thing: to survive and save ourselves."[218]

4.11. The Broader Concept of Environmental Security And Its Implications For Central Asia

The analysis of this wider definition of environmental security, directed to quality of life, health, social welfare and development will focus principally upon Kazakstan. The aim of this examination of the broader concept is two-fold. Firstly, to highlight the difference between the two republics' situation and therefore emphasise the saliency of water in Uzbekistan's environmental security agenda. Secondly, to demonstrate the implicit influence of other environmental issues on the region's, and in particular Kazakstan's, security agendas. The key environmental problems, in this respect are:

- The Aral Sea;
- Irrigation agriculture;
- The legacy of nuclear testing;
- Caspian Sea, and oil resources.

Before examining these topics it is valuable to return to the Project On Environmental Change and Acute Conflict's research. Smil, a member of the Project, has produced an environmental audit of the environmental situation in China. The study provides a quantifiable assessment of environmental degradation upon China's economic and political activities. Smil has calculated that at least 15% of China's GNP is lost to environmental problems. The principal causes of this deficit are: air, land and water pollution; loss of agricultural land, from nutrient loss, flooding, erosion and conversion to other land uses; the resultant crop yield reductions; and increased human morbidity.[219] Placing financial figures upon environmental degradation makes incorporation of the environment into economic and political and ultimately security thinking more tangible, removing Levy's criticism of existentialism in environmental security literature.

Economic inequalities between China's regions, the failure of the one-child policy and the increasing influence of free-market economics, indicate further pressure upon China's environmental and political infrastructure. The state "may have already crossed key thresholds of unsustainability."[220] Smil argues that the greatest pressure from environmental degradation will be experienced in north-west China, including Xinjiang.[221] Goldstone believes that the already evident political violence in Xinjiang is liable to escalate. This is because of the association of ethnicity, in this case between the indigenous Muslim Turkic Uighurs and Han

Chinese central government and settlers; Bejing's unwillingness to democratise power (which he regards as the best means of long-term stability in China) and the environmental situation.[222] It is difficult to see how environmental degradation-related insecurity in Xinjiang, with its existing ethno-political tensions and shared border and diasporas with Kazakstan will not have a detrimental impact upon the latter's stability.[223]

In a similar economic vein, the World Bank has calculated the economic costs of short life expectancy, workdays lost to ill-health, and the degradation of agricultural lands for the whole of the former Communist bloc. It estimated that 30,000 people die and over 65 million working days are lost p.a. as a direct result of industrial pollution in the region.[224]

Smil and the World Banks' research have considerable parallels with and relevance for Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. These are the influence of a centrally planned economic system, closed to political debate, and in the case of China, contiguity with Central Asia. China's environmental-related economic and social dislocation is liable to have negative impact upon Central Asia in general, and Kazakstan in particular.

A plethora of demographic, health and economic problems created by the "cotton first" policies suggests future political and social discontent, if not instability. These issues are clearly situated in the wider environmental security context, associated with development, social and political tensions. The economic loss from degradation of the Aral Sea was estimated in the 1980s at 100 million Roubles p.a.[225]

Health problems have resulted from the effects of a pro-irrigation economy. Half of Central Asia's rural population use contaminated water.[226] In Karakalpakstan, infant mortality rose from 35 per 1000 in 1935, to 180 per 1000 in 1994.[227] The AR's average age of death declined from 64, in 1987, to 57 in 1991.[228]

Cotton-dependent national economies have reduced indigenous production of food crops and the calorific intake. During 1958-75, the Aral Sea basin oblasts' calorific intake was 81-85% of the Soviet average. It has since declined further.[229] Consumption of fish, meat, and eggs and milk products in the Uzbek SSR were 21, 6 and 12 times below the Soviet averages.[230] Per capita consumption of foodstuffs was even lower in rural areas. Central Asian *Kolkhoz* consumption of milk and meat was as low as 14% of the Soviet average.[231] Given that the oasis agriculture system historically provided a wealth of produce, the over-emphasis of cotton production clearly bears a responsibility for this.

These welfare issues have had implicit security implications. The most obvious of these is the health of Central Asian conscripts: 40% of the Uzbek SSR's male youths were considered too unfit to be drafted into the Red Army.[232] The author met individuals with serious medical conditions who still passed examinations for the independent Kazakstani Armed Forces.[233] To date, the military leaderships in the republics have not publicly voiced concern about the health of their troops. This, however, does not detract from the military implications of what are essentially welfare issues.[234]

The rural population has been the principal victim of environmental degradation. This has implications for inter-ethnic, and inter-state stability. Rural population growth increased in the Aral Sea basin by 13.7 million (149%) between 1951-89, whilst the total Soviet rural population declined by 9.8%.[235] Since independence, population growth in Uzbekistan remained steady at 17% whilst rural population increased its percentage of the total population from 60 to 62%.[236] Whilst this increase was taking place, 107,000 agricultural jobs were lost between 1994-7, a 1% decrease p.a.[237] It is estimated that 20% of agricultural posts in the republic are superfluous.[238] This under-employment may translate into major rural population movement. Ecological deterioration led to the internal migration of 70,000 Kazakstanis in 1996.[239] Thus, population growth and environmental decline have increased pressures upon the agricultural sector. Although rural emigration increased in Central Asia throughout the post-1945 period, it has been low and insignificant compared to rural population growth. This low level of emigration is a consequence of insufficient urban employment opportunities and housing, preference for traditional life and the migrant's lack of industrial skills. It suggests that irrigation agriculture will be difficult to replace as a core source of employment by less-water-intensive activities.

4.11.i. The Aral Sea: Environmental Conservation or Security Concern? The level of the Aral Sea fluctuated throughout history. As late as the 1960s the Sea received a regular annual input of 45 km^3 from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya and sustained a thriving and diverse ecology.

Rapid expansion in irrigation which began in the 1950s, reduced this inflow to approximately 7 km^3/p.a. by the 1990s.[240] The Sea's volume declined by 73.4% and its area by 49.5%.[241] The implications of these changes include massive destruction of habitat and species. The region's large fishing industry based at Aralsk and Muynaq was devastated with 60,000 jobs lost between the 1950s and 1991.[242] Airborne particles picked up from the expansive dried seabed containing pollutants and salts, and highly saline and contaminated water have been blamed for the high incidents of respiratory illnesses, typhoid, short life expectancy, high infant mortality rates and other diseases.[243]

Whilst riverine waters has been politically-sensitive to the extent that conflict may arise from this issue, the Aral crisis falls within the broader environmental security category. The commitment and ability of the states to resolve the problem has been questionable. The republics agreed a programme of action to redress the economic, environmental and social problems of the Sea, at Qyzlorda, on 26 March 1993. Initial financial pledges by the republics to the International Save the Aral Fund have not been honoured. Kazakstan only provided 30% of its commitment, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan 2%, whilst Tajikistan and Turkmenistan failed to pay anything.[244]

Whilst financial assistance, and political co-operation and have been lacking, this does not suggest that violent conflict over the Aral Sea is probable. There has been little to incite the littoral states to conflict. Cynically, one could ask that beyond Karakalpakstan, which other regions or politicians has been directly affected or concerned about the situation? The immediate costs of even maintaining the Sea at its present level dramatically overshadow any potential benefits from such an action. Suggested solutions including a three year moratorium on irrigation, or reduction of irrigated land by 50%, plus improved irrigation techniques capable of reducing the consumption of water by a third.[245] The magnitude of the problem and the drastic nature of solutions required, including the restructuring of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistans' economies with minimal economic or social benefits, make redress unlikely and unpopular.

Map 4.3 The Decline of the Aral Sea 1960-2000



YEAR	AVERAGE LEVEL (meters)	AVERAGE AREA (sq.-km)	AVERAGE VOLUME (cu.-km)	AVERAGE SALINITY (grams/liter)
1960	53.41	66,900	1090	10
1971	51.05	60,200	925	11
1976	48.28	55,700	763	14
1991		33,800	290	
large sea	37.31	31,000	270	~30
small sea	38.41	2,800	20	~30
2000		21,421	140	
large sea	31.90	19,701	131	65-70
small sea[1]	38.00	1,720	9	~36

[1] Eastern part, which receives flow from the Syr Dar'ya, only.

P. M. 1992

compiled and calculated from various Soviet data

Source Micklin, P. Figure 1. The changing profile of the Aral Sea "The Aral Sea Crisis: An Introduction to the Special Edition" *Post-Soviet Geography*, Vol. 33, No. 5, 1992, p 275.

4.11.ii. Kazakstan's Indigenous Environmental Security Concerns:

> "Ecological problems cannot be solved without economic and political issues being addressed too."
>
> Vasily Vasilenko, Kazakstan Institute of Strategic Studies.[246]

The narrow, conflict related, definition of environmental security, especially in terms of water has limited application for Kazakstan with the exception of the southern oblasts. Although Almaty voiced concern over Kyrgyzstan's water pricing proposals, and Kyrgystan and Uzbekistan withholding of water to Qyzlorda and Shymkent oblasts, it has not perceived these problems in the stark confrontational manner that similar disputes have been by other Central Asia states. Water, therefore, at the state level, has not been a strategic problem for Kazakstan. Interstate conflict over water resources is therefore unlikely to involve Kazakstan. There are, however, issues within Kazakstan that have had and continue to have indirect security implications, as this section will demonstrate.

The fact that Kazakstan has a far less acute environmental milieu has not prevented its political elite embracing environmental security in the national security debate to a far greater extent than has been the case in Uzbekistan.[247] *The Conception of the Environmental Safety of the Republic of Kazakhstan* states that,

> "environmental protection is one of the strategically basic components of national security ... [and the] refusal to undertake measures [to redress the environmental problems] may cause ... a threat to social stability."[248]

The same document recognised the interdependency of economics, the environment and security.[249] Kazakstani interpretations of *environmental security* have been concerned with environmental *protection* or *conservation* rather than explicitly conflict-related. This was demonstrated by the former head of the Arms Control Division of Kazakstan's Internal Affairs Ministry, Leonid Bakaev, description of the Chinese nuclear tests at Lop Nor as an *environmental* rather than *security* threat for Kazakstan.[250]

4.11.ii.a. The Consequences of Nuclear Testing: Semipalatinsk was the seminal environmental issue in Kazak SSR, comparable to the political catalyst that cotton provided in the Uzbek SSR. It has had major international political and security repercussions.

It is estimated that approximately 40% of Kazakstan's territory was used by the USSR Ministry of Defence.[251] Olcott argues that massive "military colonisation" of Kazak land helps explain the political significance of Nevada-Semipalatinsk, which was established in as pressure group to end nuclear testing on Kazak SSR territory.[252] Semipalatinsk was one of the USSR's two main military nuclear test sites. Between 1949-89, 470 nuclear tests were conducted at the range.[253]

The health implication of these tests and related atmospheric, ground and water pollution has been immense.[254] The local population were rarely warned or evacuated before tests took place. Consequently, 800 settlements and approximately 1.5 million people have been affected.[255] Cancer deaths in the Semipalatinsk oblast rose sevenfold between 1975-85, and still births and serious mental defects commonly recorded.[256]

These events acted as a catalyst for the *glasnost*-era foundation of Nevada-Semipalatinsk. The movement's political significance cannot be overestimated. Throughout 1989 it organised a series of demonstrations and was influential in halting 11 of the 18 tests planned for that year.[257] In 1989 the movement obtained 1 million signatures demanding the closure of the base. By 1991, Nevada-Semipalatinsk was the largest and most influential public organisation in the Kazak SSR. The Polygon was closed on 21 August 1991.

The issue of nuclear testing in the Kazak SSR, between 1989-92, fits within the parameters of the broader environmental security concept. It was an example of the detrimental influence of military action upon the region's environmental and social well-being. This led to the politicisation of an environmental issue, which had international implications. Soviet and independent Kazakstani defence policies have been, to some extent, constrained by popular protest. The anti-nuclear campaign nurtured late-Soviet Kazak nationalism. Independence was accompanied by disarmament. Almaty saw political advantages in its anti-nuclear stance; domestic legitimacy, international recognition and economic assistance.

The continued nationalist-political dimension of environmental protest was witnessed in Attan, Nevada-Semey and Lop Nors' (the Kyrgystan anti-nuclear movement) campaigns against Chinese nuclear testing. These tests took place at Lop Nor in Xinjiang, 1000 km east of the Kazakstani border.[258] As well as the effects on the Kazakstani population and environment their campaigns also emphasised transborder sympathies.[259] Kazaks, Kyrgyzs and Uighurs communities are located on either side of the border. Sievers stated that the Uighur diaspora in Kazakstan used the issue in a similar nationalist manner that the Kazaks had done with Semipalatinsk.[260] Cross-border relations soured during 1993, because the newly elected president of Nevada-Semey was an ethnic Uighur and the grandson of the last president of Eastern Turkestan. Beijing was fearful of the potential cross-fertilisation of Muslim-nationalist irredentism in Xinjiang, and externally-located environmental protest may provide the catalyst for this.[261] As Olcott notes, China's leadership are clearly aware how the direction of political activism in Central Asia "has potential consequences for their own country's security."[262]

Relations improved with the ending of the tests in 1996 and Beijing successfully lobbied Almaty to restrain Uighur groups in Kazakstan.[263] In April 1996, Kazakstan's Foreign Minister, Daulet Sembaev, declared he was totally opposed to "certain forces pushing for the right of people of northwest China to self-determination."[264]

As with the case of cotton in Uzbekistan, protest against Soviet and Chinese nuclear testing demonstrates the manner in which politically tolerated environmental activism can easily contain a nationalist dimension and implicit political criticism (of another state).

4.11.ii.b. The Caspian Sea, Oil and Geopolitics: The Caspian Sea and associated oil reserves are internationally contested issues.[265] This situation is, however, a traditional *resource* rather than *environmental* security concern. It has been included, however, to demonstrate the diversity of thought on the concept of environmental security and the relationship between political and economic competition within a state.

The scramble for hydrocarbons has seen fierce inter-state competition, with "geo-political" overtones. US-Russian tensions have been heightened by the former's concern to exclude Iranian participation in multi-state extraction agreements, and Russian involvement in ousting the Azerbaijani president, Elbajay Elchibey. Under the rule of his successor, the former Soviet Politburo member, Gaidar Aliyev, 10% of the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) consortium was granted to the Russian oil company, Lukoil.[266] Whilst Kazakstan was on the periphery of these diplomatic tensions, its political and geographic proximity to Russia may draw it into any conflict. Bellicose Russian diplomacy has been matched by US statements. Senator Robert Dole for example has commented that,

> "the security of the world's oil and gas supplies remain a vital interest of the US ... areas under US interest include the Caucasus, Siberia and Kazakhstan. Our forward-military presence and diplomacy need adjustments."[267]

Within Kazakstan, oil also raised questions about the distribution of economic and political resources. The oil-rich western region containing the Tenghiz and offshore reserves is also the home of the Little Zhuz. Almaty has voiced concern about this linkage.[268] Although beyond the time span of this research, the appointment of Nurlan Balgimbayev to prime minister in 1997, was perceived as an attempt to placate growing western Kazakstani disquiet over their "economic exploitation" and lack of political representation at the centre.[269] (Balgimbayev, from the Caspian town of Atyrau, was formerly the oil minister.) This example endorses the argument advanced in 3.4.ii.c that arbitrary, closed and personalised resource allocation, both economic and political, has created a sense of inequality. The combination of patronage and regional rivalries combined to suggest that such problems are clan-based disputes.

4.12. Managing Central Asia's Environment Crises: Co-operation or Conflict?

Central Asia's poor environmental milieu has significantly affected the region's economic, political and social affairs. It is essential, therefore, that problems in the former are addressed. The historical precedent is not encouraging. Previous mismanagement, inefficient practices, wastage, population growth and dependency upon irrigation agriculture are the underlying causes of the present predicament. Future developments are dependent upon the political and technical responses to water allocation. Contemporary political attitudes, policies and management and technical capabilities, indicate that co-operation and effective management although feasible, may be difficult to achieve. Elite rivalries, between Niyazov and Karimov in particular, have hampered inter-republic dialogue and co-operation on this vital issue.

The continued use of Soviet political traditions has been compounded by problems related to the break-up of the USSR: the division of the region into independent states, with implications for divergence in political consensus and economic development; and economic transition for example. The key (political) problem for water management has been the division of the region into the five republics. This has not aided regional co-operation over water distribution. In other regions where water is either scarce or in dispute the issue gradually evolved with the development of relations between the riparians. This has not been the case in Central Asia. "All of a sudden, a very complex water management problem became a very complex **transboundary** water management problem."[270]

4.12.i. Regional Institutions and Water Management: Previously the region's water management was regulated via numerous, and often competing, ministries. There was, however, a central agency, the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, based in Moscow. It was renamed as the Ministry of Water Management Construction (MinVodKhoz) and then restructured as a scientific research institute, in 1990.[271] In the Uzbek SSR five ministries plus other organisations, including the Uzbek Supreme Soviet Water Resources Commission and the Department of Agriculture were involved in the decision-making process.[272] The other Central Asia SSRs had similar structures.

With independence a network of interstate organisations, based upon Soviet institutions, with responsibilities for Aral Sea basin water issues was established. (See figure 4.1.) These bodies and their related policies and interactions, however, imperfect, have been a bulwark against inter-state conflict.

The Interstate Council for Addressing the Aral Sea Crisis (ICAS): Membership of the ICAS has been drawn from the five republics, plus Russia holding observer status.[273] The ICAS's role has been to "avoid disputes before they arise."[274] In terms of institutional structure, under the ICAS's Executive Committee, based in Tashkent, are two committees, the Interstate Coordinating Commission for Water Resources (ICCW), and the Interstate Commission of Socio-Economic Development and Technical and Ecological Co-operation. Subordinate to the ICCW are the two river basin agencies (BVOs) one each for the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya.

The ICCW consists of the republics' water ministers and meets four times per year, or at a time of interstate crisis. Its role is to act as a conduit for the riparians to notify other parties of intentions to act. The BVOs' role is to allocate riverine water amongst the states. The quotas allocated by the BVOs remain based upon Soviet plans, although the Aral Sea was granted a defined minimum inflow.[275]

Figure 4.1. The Structure of the Institutions Managing the Aral Sea Basin


HEADS OF STATES
INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR ARAL SEA
INTERSTATE COUNCIL FOR ADDRESSING THE ARAL SEA CRISIS
BOARD OF GOVERNORS ARAL SEA FUND
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE BOARD
ARAL ECONOMIC BANK
INTERSTATE COORDINATING COMMISSION FOR WATER RESOURCES
INTERSTATE COMMISSION FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SCIENTIFIC TECHNICAL AND ECOLOGICAL COOPERATION
PROJECT AND PROGRAM EXPERTS
REGIONAL BRANCHES OF THE FUND
- QYZL-ORDA
- NUKUS
- TASHAUZ
BVO SYR DARYA
BVO AMU DARYA

Source: Veiga da Cunha, L. Figure 6 The Institutional Framework Established in Central Asia for Addressing the Aral Sea Basin Problems. *The Aral Sea Crisis: A Great Challenge in Transboundary Water Resources Management*, NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Transboundary Water Resources Management: Technical and Institutional Issues, Skopelos, Greece, May 1994, p 12.

The International Fund for the Aral Sea (IFAS): This organisation was established to finance joint actions to improve the situation in the basin, in particular the immediate coastal regions.

The Fund has a board of governors with a rotating chair, selected from Central Asian heads of state. The IFAS is supposed to rely upon member-state contributions. Initially, the recommended level was 1% of GNP, with additional international donations.[276] A 1% levy is unlikely to resolve the crisis. Previously *Goskompriroda* suggested that 1.3% of GNP would be required simply to maintain the then present condition in the Aral Sea basin, and 7-9% of GNP would be required to decisively reverse the situation.[277] "To date, [its] accomplishments have been limited, as significant variations in inherited fiscal resources and physical infrastructures in the basin republics make equitable apportionment extremely difficult."[278]

Equitable Use: The ICCW and BVO allocate water quotas. A key question, which Gleick and Smith both fail to address in their conceptualisation of water-related security, is how equitable water use can be achieved between upstream HEP requirements and downstream irrigation needs, or how externally and non-consentual imposed quotas can be re-structured. For example, only 12,000 m^3 of the 50 million m^3 of water collected in Kyrgyzstan's reservoirs and lakes is used within the republic. Kyrgyzstan has been able only to irrigate one million hectares whilst downstream the water has supplied four million hectares in Uzbekistan.[279] Without economic compensation, it is difficult to perceive this as equitable. Kyrgyzstan has a legitimate claim for readjustment of the existing water quotas.

Prevention of Significant Harm to Other States: Soviet environmental policies failed to protect downstream users from the affects of water withdrawals including the contamination of returned waters. The environmental, health and social consequences of these actions in the Aral Sea basin demonstrates the need for these mechanism to be implemented in Central Asia.

More disturbingly have been the ominous though unfulfilled Tajikistani and Uzbekistani threats to use water in future conflicts and to destroy the former's dams, respectively. The poisoning of wells was rumoured to have been carried out by Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

MISSING

PAGES

NOT

AVAILABLE

Obligation to notify and inform: This principle was accepted by the members of the ICCW. Notification does not necessarily led to compromise or resolution. Tajikistan's notification, in 1994, of planned increased withdrawals from the Zeravshan, upstream of Bukhara and Samarkand, did not alleviate Uzbekistan's concerns.[280] Similar notification by Kyrgystan and Tajikistan of water pricing and increased extraction proposals were met with Kazakstan and Uzbekistans' disapproval.

Obligation to share data: This has been a major problem. Access to scarce and frequently unreliable information has been treated with scepticism if not hostility. Political culture has played a significant role in water management and co-operation. Agricultural and hydrological information has been "jealously guarded as a privileged commodity."[281]

Shared management of water supply: Co-operative management and the International Law Commission's "principle of participation" have been poorly adhered to in Central Asia. The region's record on multi-lateral co-operation has been poor, water politics being no exception. Turkmenistan did not sign the international accord nor participate in the follow-up Nukus Conference in August 1993, because it is unwilling to make any financial contributions.

Alarmingly, the allocation agreements lack legally enforcement. The World Bank and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development have criticised these agreements for failing to acknowledge the water interests of Afghanistan, China and Iran.[282] The absence of Afghanistan from the Amu Darya BVO and the ICCW seriously weakens any long-term and regional institutional solution.

Obligation to the peaceful resolution of disputes: The principles of sustainable and co-operative water management have had mixed results in the region. Although institutional frameworks have been established, their effectiveness, technical capabilities, and monitoring and management skills have been questionable. Over 300 agreements have been signed concerning the Aral Sea region with minimal positive results.[283] These agreements need to be accorded IL. status, as is the norm for other treaty-based river basin commissions. The BVOs need to be transformed from inter-republican to treaty based international organisations, and complemented with the establishment of further BVOs, for all the region's other international rivers. The BVOs' management policies should also integrate attempts to rehabilitate the Aral Sea.[284]

4.12.ii. The Political Context: Politics, not absolute water scarcity, is the determining factor for future water-related conflict management. The weakness of the institutional structures can be traced to endemic political problems. Without political reforms, the necessary precursor measures to alleviate environmental scarcity inspired conflict, either through more sustainable use of indigenous reserves or provision of alternative employment, cannot be effectively implemented.[285]

Regional leaderships have been unwilling to provide more than token political or financial support to environment issues. "[W]hilst this is ostensibly because of the need to tackle more 'urgent' priorities, it seems to reflect a short-sighted view that does not take account of the far greater costs that will be paid later."[286] The reasons for this failure include:

- The lack of political change;
- Lack of sense of responsibility;
- Ineffective relevant political and technological acumen; and
- Economic reliance upon environmental damaging activities.

Key decision-makers and institutions were involved in previous environmental mismanagement. Consequently they often have had a vested interest in minimising independent criticism of previous and contemporary practices. As Critchlow comments,

> "despite Uzbekistan's responsibility for the Aral problem and the fact that the brunt of the consequences are being borne by its population ... President Karimov has effectively distanced his government from primary responsibility for a solution."[287]

This culture of denial is a vestige of the Soviet period.[288]

The issue is further complicated by the fact that any effective regional management needs to be an integrative system incorporating "autonomous local irrigation system administration to inter-republican directive organisations for strategic water distribution."[289] This would re-introduction local responsibility for monitoring and control of water, promoting greater social understanding of water management problems and respect for "the precious resource."[290] Pre-Soviet water-management functioned in this manner.[291] As Gleason notes, however, the successes of this system were possible because irrigation was localised, and relied upon communal respect for *mirabs* (water masters) and Islamic tenets on water use. The *mirabs* were independent from state institutions and had the authority to allocate water and settle disputes.[292]

Based on this historical evidence, subsidiarity may be advantageous, establishing a complex of localised and inter-state institutions.[293] Zolotarev and Klötzli emphasises the role of the informal, moral and popular norms in engendering a more responsible attitude to water-use.[294] Unfortunately, traditional social respect for water and other users established through customs, norms and laws were eroded during the Soviet period. Since independence neither of the governments have indicated that subsidiarity in resource management, or popular participation in the decision-making process, would be welcome. Civil society and NGOs have been viewed with suspicion and frequently coopted by regional governments.[295] Discussion on environmental issues has been restricted. Republican elites, since independence the authors of cotton, irrigation, health and environmental policies and the recipients of cotton profits have been sensitive to criticism. It is therefore unlikely that the integrated system will by implemented, for it would challenge the political leaderships' authority.

The collapse of the integrated Soviet space further *nationalised* environmental issues. The republics enacted property laws in which water and land became state assets.[296] Kazakstan's post-independence water law has been criticised as a continuation of Soviet legislation. Water has remained the property of the state and cannot by bought or sold.[297] Kygyzstan's parliament initially established a land law in which land and natural resources became the property of the titular population. President Akaev vetoed the relevant article, mindful of the tensions between Kyrgyzs and Uzbeks in Osh oblast. An alternative article was successfully passed though Parliament, which declared that land is the property of all of the people of Kyrgyzstan.[298]

After independence, environmental issues declined in political status. The causes of this have been threefold. Firstly, the *external* exploitation of the region's natural assets has been removed. Moscow no longer provided an easily identifiable focus for common action by ambitious republican elites, nationalists and environmentalists. Political events made the symbolic anti-Russian character of Soviet-era environmentalism irrelevant. The removal of this central and populist tenet weakened popular identification with the cause.[299] Secondly, transitional economic and social hardships have superseded less immediate issues.

In one survey, although approximately 50% and 33% of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan citizens, respectively, agreed that the environment in which they lived was dangerous for habitation, economic and political problems were cited as more pressing issues.[300] Only 4.5% of all Uzbekistani respondents placed environmental problems as the most significant concern they were faced by, including those surveyed in Karakalpakstan. Only 3.6% of Uzbek SSR respondents regarded the environment as the first priority.[301] The economic and political constraints of post-*glasnost* Central Asia have also curtailed political activism. Thirdly, the successor regimes have discouraged criticism of their previous and present roles in the region's economic and environmental mismanagement.

Environmental platforms have disappeared as other political issues have become more salient. Some green organisations transmuted into more comprehensive political parties and all have faced the problems common with other independent movements. Birlik, like other independent political movement in Uzbekistan was banned in 1993. Where independent social-political environmental movements survivied their popular and fiscal support has been limited. Environmental politics in Kazakstan has been able to develop more freely than in Uzbekistan. Green Salvation, Nevada-Semey and Ecofund have maintained political discussion on the subject. Nevada-Semey formed a political party, the People's Congress. Its fortunes have declined, especially since its founder, Olzhas Suleimenov, was appointed Ambassador to Italy; a move which many saw as a form of political exile, preventing him and his party from challenging the president.[302] Charges of financial impropriety within Nevada-Semey also weakened its popular mandate.[303]

There has also been a growing sense that the previous pro-environment actions did not provided tangible results. In Kazakstan, compensation for the effects of nuclear testing have been negligible and misappropriated.[304] Equally, Kazakstan's non-nuclear stance has not provided the republic with a significant international profile, a particularly sensitive issue given the continued nuclear status of neighbouring China and Russia.

Republican elites must accept that they are now the key actors responsible for rectifying the situation. It is debatable, however, whether the present elites and technical staff have either the political will or technical acumen to resolve water problems.

The Soviet legacy has had a major influence upon contemporary water management. As well as the infrastructures of irrigation and agriculture, the region has seen the persistence of Soviet scientific and technological knowledge and planning, and institutional frameworks. These and the level of environmental awareness proved inadequate when confronted by the enormities of the problem. One western environmental activist has stated that in the FSU awareness of environmental science, and its capabilities to resolve problems, have been rather sketchy and unrealistically optimistic.[305] Similarly, Critchlow criticises the evasive, non-committal and "ill-informed" attitudes towards the region's environmental crisis.[306] This author has had personal experience of these attitudes among some elements of the region's academia and politicians. Solutions to the region's environmental crises, it was suggested, would be found in the innate environmental acumen of the indigenous population, the resurrection of the Sibaral scheme, or continued faith in similar ill-planned large-scale projects.[307]

As the critique of the statistical indices indicates, environmental competition and potential conflict have not been primarily rooted in the physical plane. Political calculations, ambitions and rivalries influence sub-state disputes, as well as, inter-state relations. Cultural perceptions on distributive justice influence the notion of whether a resource is scarce, or being unfairly allocated. Such beliefs in contemporary Central Asia are difficult to determine, because in the transitional period the region's population has been confronted with a range of competing cultural and political norms. Soviet values never entirely accepted in the region, have been openly challenged by those rooted in Muslim and capitalist traditions. Environmental reforms, such as land privatisation and water-pricing, run counter to Muslim and Soviet values.

4.12.iii. Economics and Environmental Security: The direction of reforming water use in post-Soviet Central Asia has been ambiguous. Political continuity has been accompanied by the continuation of Soviet-style environmental and economic practices.

From the 1980s onwards, there was a deliberate attempt to reduce water-hungry economic activities. Diversification and economic restructuring saw a decline in the area under cotton during the Soviet period. Within the Syr Darya, cotton acreage declined by 25%.[308] Rice production in southern Kazakstan, since 1989, was reduced and similar trends were recorded in Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.[309] Such restructuring, however, was limited and negated by failures to implement fundamental improvements in irrigation practices, and subsequent increases in irrigation acreage in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan's area under cotton production increased between 1996-7 by 24,600 hectares.[310]

After independence, Turkmenistan's severe agricultural and water crises have not been addressed, whilst the *Ten Years of Prosperity* plan in fact attempted to increase agricultural output.[311] The plan was, however, ambitious if not unrealistic, demonstrating the poor environmental awareness of post-Soviet planners. State and collective farms were abolished, but private farmers have had to sell their produce to the state at (below free market) regulated prices and are unable to sell their land. Agricultural output according to *Ten Years of Prosperity* should have risen by 11% p.a.[312] Poor irrigation practices and the use of marginal lands in fact resulted in declining yields and further degradation of these marginal soils.[313] Rather than radically and efficiently restructuring its agricultural sector and water management, Turkmenistan has compounded Soviet-instigated economic and environmental problems. In the face of existing and escalating water demands throughout the Aral Sea Basin it is difficult to perceive that Ashgabat's action will do anything but heighten regional tensions.

The present level of cotton production is not environmentally sustainable, but any attempt to diversify will cause massive socio-economic disruption. "Irrigation as a means of meeting Central Asia's growing employment and food needs has much to recommend it."[314] Irrigated agriculture provides large-scale intensive unskilled labour. Nor would diversification necessary lead to an improved environment regionally. Major industries in Kazakstan, fertiliser and uranium production are also major polluters.[315]

As the states' Soviet-based economic ties diminish and their economies diverge, co-operative action may be relegated as national interests are promoted. The states' respective economic development and priorities may lead to mutually incompatible water demands. The precursors to such a scenario have already been witnessed with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistans' plans for water-related industrial expansion.[316]

The continued economic reliance upon exploitative industries eroded the previous environmental-nationalist critique of Soviet regional development policies, encouraged by the region's elites. What was once a valuable political weapon against *external* exploitation cannot be discussed, as it has become a domestic problem and major contributor to the national economy. In Uzbekistan, debate concerning student labour in the cotton harvests has been suppressed.[317] Uzbekistan and Turkmenistans' financial profits from cotton production are the prime examples of this trend. The capitals' unease has been further enhanced because the leaderships lack remedies to the present predicament. The main reasons for this are political inertia, and the absence of economic and technical capabilities. The detrimental impact of cotton on the region's water availability, ecology and health are indisputable, but motivation to reduce its economic dominance would be difficult, if not unwanted, as it provides both a source of hard currency and employment.

A contentious point is whether market competition and increased links with international markets will make resource prices more responsive to costs, including environmental costs or increase social friction. Market mechanisms, it is argued, would make former-Soviet producers improve efficiency in use of resources and quality of output. Structural adjustments, it is argued, would provide incentives for re-investment and increase efficiency in the agricultural sector. This argument is supported by the relative efficiency of Kyrgyzstan's privatised agricultural sector, when contrasted to the less-liberalised agricultures of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

Reforms such as land privatisation, polluter-pays taxes, and water-pricing are politically sensitive. Privatisation of land is problematic: questions of access to water, agricultural machinery, quality of land allocated, access to markets (free or state controlled) and social perceptions of the process must all be considered. "Traditionally, water in Central Asia has been 'free' ... Accordingly, water in Central Asia will continue to be wasted until its value is fixed in the pricing structures."[318] Experimental water-pricing in Kyrgyzstan, saw a 1.5 time reduction in withdrawals without any affect on yields.[319] Similar small-scale pricing schemes were implemented in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. In these cases water use was more efficient and responsible.[320] Privatisation of water rights is problematic, however. It is dependent upon the instillation of expensive metering systems, and effective policing, to deter the likelihood of water poaching and competition.[321] Water pricing may in fact increase communal tensions. Small-scale acts of violence between individual water users, including armed and unarmed confrontations and water-poaching, indicate community tensions.[322] Inefficient farmers may be forced off the land, increasing social tensions, migration or acting as an impetus for industrial development. Land privatisation and water pricing may cause serious sub-state problems.[323] Water pricing will also be difficult to achieve, because there is grassroots opposition to pricing and the costs incurred by the instillation of metering equipment.[324]

4.13. Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that whilst environmental security is a nebulous concept, and that whilst environmental issues frequently appear as minor contributory factors in the security debate, they can also act as major catalysts in exasperating already existing divisions.

Simple resource scarcity (quantitative) approaches to environmental security and water-related conflict in Central Asia are unable to acknowledge the complex origins of such crises and also more significant for Central Asia, indicate the full extent of the seriousness of the present and future situation. Political and cultural factors heavily influence the physical situation.

Kazakstan has been affected by all of the major environmental crises present in Central Asia; water scarcity and the desiccation of the Aral Sea in southern and western Kazakstan; and on the northern steppe, subject to erosion and overgrazing; industrial and nuclear contamination has polluted the region's cities. These problems have not perceived as security challenges. They remain essentially and principally related to environmental management and economic development. Their consequences remain within the economic and social spheres. This has been reflected in the republic's less confrontational approach to southern Kazakstan's water problems, than that of its southern neighbour.

Environmental activism played a significant and positive role in late-Soviet polity. Popular political participation expanded beyond the bounds that Gorbachev had envisioned, and the development of political environmentalism and nationalism were mutually assisted by their ideological and functional proximity. Both provided valid and effective critiques of the Soviet system but also saw inter-ethnic violence. Whilst this relationship diminished in the post-Soviet period, this can be accounted for by political changes which have temporarily undercut the linkage. In reality, however, expedient and wholesale reform of the ecological and political situations have not been attempted. Independence and associated nation-building processes have provided sufficient physical and political concerns for the linkage to find a renewed salience. Foreign economic intervention in Central Asia may also provide new external targets for environmental-nationalist agitation, particularly if environmental safeguards are not implemented and these developments are associated with unequal wealth distribution (either actual or perceived).[325]

There is some acknowledgement in the region of the need for a comprehensive approach to environmental problems, and the relationship between environmental stress and economic and social disruption. Alarmingly, however, political inertia and financial constraints suggest that decisions and structures will not be in place, or effectively implemented in the near future, whilst the causes of environmental conflict, rising demand and declining availability are set to continue.

Effective water management emphasises the need for co-operative political action and an integrated management system,

> "based upon ... local governance at the micro level ... larger institutions, also independent, that severe entire drainage basins not republics [and] institutions at inter-republican level (that would address coordination of sectoral priorities, such as the balance between agricultural and industrial development and crop diversification.)"[326]

These are clearly politically dependent options, with wider implications to which the present regimes may be averse to implementation. It is uncertain whether a future incident of competing state claims reaching regional crisis point will result in conflict or the implementation of effective interstate co-operation and agreements. Clearly, the establishment of institutional structures prior to this "crisis point" would enhance a peaceful resolution of such an incident.

International evidence, particularly from the Middle East where inter-state relations are more strained and water supply more acute, suggests that water-based conflict is the exception. Co-operation on water issues is attainable as long as other more deep-seated political differences can be managed. Inter-state relations in Central Asia have been, to date, far less tense than those in the Middle East, suggesting co-operation and negotiated settlements of water disputes are possible. Future inter-state conflict over water in the region is unlikely. The resolution of economic and demographic problems Klötzli believes are essential for inter-republican water disputes to remain within the realm of politics rather than security.[327] Whilst it appears that these and water-use pressures are unlikely to be resolved in the near-future, the probability of interstate conflict over water is limited because of the comparable evidence from the Middle East, and the existing institutional framework and shared political norms at the elite level in Central Asia. Whilst there has been considerable political tensions between all the republics, the transition to sovereignty has not been marred by physical confrontation over water access. With the possible exception of the lower Amu Darya interstate water conflict is unlikely.

The sub-state situation is more disturbing and has greater potential for the revival of late-Soviet resource conflict because of several water-related and more significantly non-water-related issues. The non-water issues explain why acute-environmental stress in Karakalpakstan is unlikely to result in conflict, but likely to in the Fergana Valley and Zeravshan regions. Whether these sub-state rivalries will lead to inter-state conflict is difficult to determine, though historical evidence suggest that this is unlikely. The reasons for greater likelihood of sub-state water conflict are:

- The historical precedent of environmental activism, as a form of political protest and as a source of group resource competition;
- Proximity of sub-state actors and resource; and
- Ineffective sub-state institutions and regulations.

As described above, Central Asia witnessed a series of water and land related inter-ethnic struggles of during the last years of the USSR, and environmentalism was used to articulate essentially nationalist political critiques and demands. Whilst the antagonistic nationalist dimension of environmentalism has declined since the establishment of the independent states, this nexus has not been permanently broken, nor the environmental issues resolved. With major population growth predicted throughout the region, a continuation of water-intensive activities and the possibility of peace in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, increased water demands may be liable to lead to the re-emergence of communal tensions.

The immediacy of the actors and resources is to be found on two levels. The first is the proximity of the actors to the contested resource. The absence, contamination or withdraw of water, by other groups at the communal level is immediately and acutely felt, to an extent that is not directly noticeable at the state level. At the communal level, the access to alternative resource supplies or economic activities are limited.

The second level is the proximity of the protagonist to each other. Individual provinces have witnessed phenomenal population growth rates, for example, Jizzak-43%; and Dushanbe-113%, between 1979-89.[328] 50% of the region's population lives in 20% of its area: the Fergana Valley; the Tashkent-Khojent corridor; and along the Zeravshan river between Bukhara and Samarkand.[329] Water demands will therefore rise but without additional supplies being available.

Due to the region's heterogeneous and dense demography, particularly in Fergana, inter-ethnic communication, and at times competition, is already a regular occurrence. "To date, there have been no mass violent manifestations, but in a situation of political instability and growing social deprivation, the Fergana Valley area with its high population density (308.2 people/km^2) could will experience open conflict."[330] Communal fissures and competition for scarce resources may reinforce each other.

Existing interstate mechanism may not be able to manage these future local, cross-border, water-based conflicts.[331] Sub-state water disputes have not been provided with the same level of institutional regulation as inter-state problems have. Local participation in water-management, seen by Klötzli as essential, has been absent. Centre-periphery and inter-ethnic relations are liable to become tense as resource scarcity, environmental degradation, burgeoning populations, and lack of substantive economic and political reforms combine to increase social tensions and provide a source for identification with radical and aggressive political activism. The lack of local participation in water-management is symptomatic of the limits of regional politics and suggests that communal water-disputes are liable to transform into violent conflict, because channels for dialogue and compromise are absent.

Regime legitimacy and capabilities are undermined by environmental degradation and attempts to address such troubles, according to findings by the Project on Environmental Change and Acute Conflict.[332] If a government attempts to deal with the situation, resources will have to be diverted from other state activities. Should the government fail to act or find itself incapable of resolving such crises, its authority and legitimacy may be challenged. Moscow's unwillingness and/or inability to act undermined its legitimacy and aided the political elevation of the present regimes. Continued lack of political intervention and debate on pressing environmental concerns may erode popular support for the new leaderships.

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[1] See Myers, N. "The Environment and Security" *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 74, pp. 23-41; Deudney, D. "The Mirage of Eco-War: The Weak Relationship among Global Environmental Change, National Security and Inter State Violence" in Rowlands, I. & Greene, M. (eds.) *Environmental Change and International Relations*, MacMillan, London, 1992 (ii); & Vogler, J. "Introduction" in Vogler, J. & Imber, M. (eds.) *The Environment and International Relations*, Routledge, London, 1996, p 3.

[2] See Sarty. L. "Environmental Security After Communism: The Debate" in DeBardeleben, J. & Hannigan, J. (eds.) *Environmental Security and Quality After Communism: Eastern Europe and the Soviet Successor States*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1995, p 16.

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[3] The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, *Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival*, Simon & & Schuster, New York, 1982.

[4] The World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future*, OUP, Oxford, 1987, pp. 290-307.

[5] Pifer, M. "Regional Environmental Diplomacy" *OSCE Seminar on Sustainable Environmental Development in the Aral Sea Region*, 30/10/96-1/11/96, p 3.

[6] Buzan, B. *People, States and Fear*, Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1991, pp. 19-20.

[7] Sarty, L. op cit., p 19.

[8] Dyer, H. "Environmental security as universal values: Implications for international theory in Vogler, J. & Imber, M. (eds.) op cit., p 13.

[9] Deudney, D. op cit., 179. (ii)

[10] Dyer, H. op cit., p 28.

[11] Sarty, L. op cit., p 19.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Levy, M. "Is the Environment a National Security?" *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1995, p 36.

[14] Mathews, J.T. "Redefining Security" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 2, pp. 162-177; & Myers, N. op cit.

[15] Only two paragraphs in "Redefining Security" comment upon the potential for environmental-inspired conflict. See ibid, pp. 164 & 168.

[16] Levy, M. p 44.

[17] Ibid, pp. 37 & 40.

[18] Ibid, p 44.

[19] See Buzan, B. op cit., p 132 & Deudney, D. op cit., p 179, (ii).

[20] Buzan, B. op cit., p 132.

[21] Stern, E.K. "Bringing the Environment In: The Case for Comprehensive Security" *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1995, p 213.

[22] See for example Gizewski, P. "Military Activity and Environmental Security: The Case of Radioactivity in the Arctic" in DeBardeleben, J. & Hannigan, J. (eds.) *Environmental Security and Quality After Communism: Eastern Europe and the Soviet Successor States*, Westview, Boulder, 1995, pp. 25-42.

[23] Deudney, D. op cit., p 174. (ii)

[24] Homer-Dixon, T. "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict"; & -- "Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases", in Lynn, S. & Miller, S. (eds.) *Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1995, pp. 43-83 (i) & pp. 144-82, (ii).
The Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University and the Institute of Peace Research, Oslo (PRIO) have been involved in similar research.

[25] Homer-Dixon, T. op cit., pp. 156-157. (ii)

[26] See ibid.

[27] Ibid, p 147.

[28] Ibid., p 148.

[29] Homer-Dixon, op cit., p 54. (i)

[30] Homer-Dixon, T. op cit., p 150. (ii)

[31] Ibid, pp. 150-3.

[32] Homer-Dixon, T. op cit., p 73. (i)

[33] Ibid., p 73.

[34] Sarty, L. op cit., p 18.

[35] Homer-Dixon, T. op cit., p 157-158. (ii)

[36] Ibid., p 158. Also see Gleick, P.H. "Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security" *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 1, Summer 1993, pp. 79-112 also in Lynn-Jones, S. & Miller, S. (eds.) op cit., pp. 84-117.

[37] Homer-Dixon, T, op cit., p 158. (ii)

[38] Ibid., p 159. Also see "Pretoria has its way in Lesotho" *Africa Report*, March-April 1986, pp. 50-1.

[39] Homer-Dixon, T, op cit., p 159. (ii)

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[40] Ibid.

[41] See for example Hazarika, S. "Week of Rioting Leaves Streets of Bombay Empty" *New York Times*, 12/1/93, p A3.

[42] Ullman, R.E. "Redefining Security" in Lynn-Jones and Miller, (eds.) op cit., pp. 27-29; and Tilly, C. "Urbanization, Crime, and Collective Violence in 19th Century France" *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 79, No. 2, September 1973, pp. 296-318.

[43] Ullman, R.E. op cit., p 28.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Homer-Dixon, T. op cit., p 160. (ii)

[47] Homer-Dixon, T. op cit., pp. 159-62. (ii)

[48] Ibid, pp. 162-3.

[49] Hurrell, A. "International Political Theory and the Global Environment" in Booth, K. & Smith, S. (eds.) *International Relations Theory Today*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995, p 140.

[50] Homer-Dixon, T. op cit., p 77. (i)

[51] Homer-Dixon, T. op cit., p 166. (ii)

[52] Ibid, p 165.

[53] Ibid.

[54] See Moshiri F. "Revolutionary Conflict Theory in an Evolutionary Perspective" in Goldstone, J. Gurr, T. & Moshiri, F. (eds.) *Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1991. Quoted in ibid, p 166. (ii)

[55] See Homer-Dixon, T. op cit., p 164.

[56] Ibid, pp. 170-4.

[57] Westing, A.H. *Global Resources and International Conflict*, OUP, Oxford, 1986, p 509.

[58] Starr, J. "Water Wars" *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 75, No. 1, 1996, p 17.

[59] Gleick, P.H. op cit., p 85. The other regions he cites are southern Africa, central Europe and the Middle East.

[60] Westing, A.H. op cit., p 509.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Gleick, P.H. op cit., pp. 89-90.

[63] Ibid, p 104.

[64] Ibid, pp. 104-5. Libya's withdrawals:supply ratio was 374%. The Central Asian states do not figure in the list because at the time of the survey were part of the USSR.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid, p 105. Falkenmark, M. "Fresh Water: Time for A Modified Approach" *Ambio*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1986, pp. 194-200.

[67] Kessel, J. "Realistic new attitudes reduce threat of water wars" *The Guardian*, 25/7/94, p 10.

[68] See Gleick op cit., P.H. pp. 107-108.

[69] Naff, T. & Matson, R. (eds.) *Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation?* Westview Press, Boulder, 1984. Quoted in Smith, D.R. "Environmental Security and Shared Water Resources in Post-Soviet Central Asia" *Post Soviet Geography*, Vol. 36, No. 6, 1995, p 357.

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[71] See Garfinkle for a review of literature upon the interdependency of water distribution and the peace process in the Middle East. Garfinkle, A. "Hung Out to Dry or All Wet? Water in the Jordan Valley" *Orbis*, Vol. 39, No. 1, 1990, pp. 129-38.

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[75] Cowell, A. "Water Rights: Plenty of Mud to Sling" *New York Times*, 7/2/90, p A4. Quoted ibid., p 94.

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[76] Gleick, P.H. op cit., p 85.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Ibid, pp. 111-114.

[79] Ibid., p 112.

[80] Ibid.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Ibid, p 113.

[83] Lowi, M. op cit., p 118

[84] UN International Law Commission Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Fourth Session, UN, New York, 1991. In Gleick, P.H. op cit., p 113.

[85] Ibid, p 114.

[86] Homer-Dixon, T. op cit., p 179. (ii)

[87] Ibid, p 155.

[88] Ibid.

[89] Gleick, P.H. op cit., pp. 87-8.

[90] For example see Akiner, S. "Conflict, Stability and Development in Central Asia" in Dick, C.J. (ed.) *Instabilities in Post-Communist Europe,* Carmicheal and Sweet, Portsmouth, 1996, p 14 (iv); Gleason, G. *The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence,* Westview Press, Boulder, 1997, pp. 163-4 (iv); Glieck, P.H. op cit.; & Petersen, D.J. *Troubled Lands: The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destruction,* Westview Press, Boulder, 1993, p 187.

[91] Petersen, D.J. ibid.

[92] Ibid.

[93] 59.75% in the Amu Darya and 30.12% in the Syr Darya. Micklin, P. Table 2 Central Asia: Drainage Basin Characteristics, "The Water Management in Soviet Central Asia", *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies,* No. 905, University of Pittsburgh, 1991, p 99. (i); Kes', A.S. Krenke, A.N. Minoyeva, Y. Rashehetkina, N.M. Tsigeli'naya, I.D. *Vod'nyye resuroy Sredney Azii yuzhnozo Kazakhstana Gidrologiya i Melioratsiya,* 1982, No. 2, pp. 67-80. Quoted in Craumer, P. "Agricultural change, Labour Supply and Rural Out-Migration in Soviet Central Asia" in Lewis, R.A. (ed.) *Geographical Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia,* Routledge, London, 1992, p 135; & Smith, D.R. op cit., p 354.

[94] Amu Darya - 72.8 km3 and Syr Darya 36.7 km3. Micklin, P. Table 2 Central Asia Drainage Basin Characteristics op cit., pp 99 & 5. (i). The 1996 figures are: Amu Darya - 78.5 km3; and Syr Darya - 37.2 km3, and Aral Sea Basin - 125 km3. *Water Resource Management and Agricultural production in the Central Asian Republics,* (WARMAP) 1996. Quoted in O'Hara, S. "Water and Conflict in Central Asia" *Contemporary Political Studies 1998,* 1998, p 172. (iii)

[95] Micklin, P. "The Aral Sea Crisis: An Introduction to the Special Edition" *Post-Soviet Geography,* Vol. 33, No. 5, 1992, p. 274 (iii); & Sinnott, P. "The Physical Geography of Soviet Central Asia and the Aral Sea Problem" in Lewis, R.A. (ed.) *Geographical Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia,* Routledge, London, 1992, p 87.

[96] Smith, D.R. op cit., p 356.

[97] Craumer, P. op cit., p 135.

[98] Micklin, P. op cit., p 10. (i)

[99] Smith, D.R. op cit., p 356.

[100] O'Hara, S. "Irrigation and land degradation: Implications for agriculture in Turkmenistan, Central Asia" *Journal of Arid Environments,* No. 37, 1997, p 169. (i)

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[102] Ibid.

[103] Haskin, P. Hansen, E. Zhu, U. Iwra, M "Simulation of Water Supply sand Demand in the Aral Sea Region" *Water International,* Vol. 17, p 56.

[104] In Gleason, G. "The Struggle for Control over Water in Central Asia: Republican Sovereignty and Collective Action" *RFE/RL Report on the USSR,* 21/6/91, p 12. (ii)

[105] *Narodnoe khozyaitvo SSSR 1922-72,* Moscow, Finansh statistku, 1972 pp. 545, 632, 646, & 671; *Narodnoe khozyaitvo SSSR 1989,* Moscow, Finansh statistku, 1989, pp. 375, 378 & 399. Ibid.

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[106] Annual water resources are made up of annual surface water flow and usable ground water. Total withdraws can exceed total supply because of the use of return flow waters and non-surface supplies too. Micklin, P. op cit., pp. 5-6. (i).

[107] Ibid, p 6.

[108] Consumptive use records water "largely" lost from the system to evaporation, transpiration incorporation into animal, plant or producc mass, and leakage losc. Ibid.

[109] Ibid.

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[112] Ibid.

[113] Gleason, G. op cit. p. 12. (ii)

[114] Carrere D Encausse, H. op cit., p 36.

[115] Babaev, S. & Khudaibergenov, S. *O Namaze premkulove ob Revolyutsiya 1905-1907 v Uzbekistane* Tashkent, 1955, p 136. Quoted in Carrere D Encausse, H. op cit., p 7.

[116] Rywkin, M. *Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia*, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 1982, p 42.

[117] Quoted in Petersen, D.J. op cit., p 193.

[118] Quoted in ibid.

[119] Tsygankov, A. "Gde ugodno: tol'ko ne u nas" *Pavitel'stvennyi vestnik*, No. 20, 1989, p 9. Quoted in ibid, p 215.

[120] Ibid, pp. 215-6.

[121] Goldman, Z. "Environmentalism and nationalism: an unlikely twist in an unlikely direction" in Massey Stewart, J. (ed.) *The Soviet environment: problems, policies and politics*, CUP, Cambridge, 1992, p 9.

[122] See Martin, K. "Central Asia's Forgotten Tragedy" *RFE/RL Report*, Vol. 3, No. 30, 29/07/94 p 36.

[123] Rumer, B. *Soviet Central Asia: "A Tragic Experiment"* Unwin Hyman, Boston, p 100. Also see O'Hara, S. op cit., p 175. (iii)

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[125] Carley, P. "The Price of the Plan: Perceptions of Cotton and Health in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan" *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1989, pp. 1-38. (i)

[126] For an overview of the Cotton Affair see Gleason, G. "Uzbekistan: from statehood to nationhood" in Bremmer, I. & R. Taras, R. (eds.) *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States*, CUP, 1993, pp. 339-40.

[127] Carley, P. op cit., p 15. (i)

[128] "Myslit'ponovomu deistovovat' energichno" *Pravda*, 8/4/88, p 1. Quoted in ibid, p 16.

[129] Bukhromov, S. "A Healthy child is a mother's happiness" *Soviet Ozbekiston* 30/8/86, p 3. Quoted in ibid, p 20.

[130] Bukhromov, S. op cit., p 3. Quoted in ibid. See ibid, pp. 20-22 for the centre's criticism of Central Asia's traditions in the region's economic and political development.

[131] See Gleason, G. "'Birlik' and the Cotton Question" *RFE Report on the USSR*, 15/06/90, pp. 11-19 (i)

[132] Tishkov, V. *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflicts In and After the Soviet Union*, PRIO/Sage, 1997, p 71.

[133] Petersen, D.J. op cit. p 215.

[134] Tishkov, V. op cit., p 79. Italics added.

[135] *Kommunist Tadjikistana* 16/10/89. Quoted in Ro'i, Y. "The Islamic Influence on Nationalism in Soviet Central Asia" *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 39, July-August 1990, p 62 & footnote 80, p 62. (ii).

[136] Ziegler, C.E. "Political participation, nationalism and environmental politics in the USSR" in J. Massey Stewart. (ed.) op cit., p 36.

[137] Ibid.

[138] *Pravda*, 19/7/89, p 6. Quoted in Petersen, D.J. op cit., p 218.

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[139] Ro'i, Y. "Central Asia Riots and Disturbances, 1989-90: Causes and Context" *Central Asian Survey*, 10/3, 1991, p 24. (iii)

[140] Abashin, S. & Bushkov, V. *Sotsial'naya napryazhennost i mezhnatsional'nye Konflikty v severnykh raionah Tadjikistana*, Document 24, IEA, Moscow. Quoted in Tishkov, V. op cit., p 73.

[141] Roy, O. "Islam in Tajikistan" *The Project on Open Society in Central Eurasia Occasional Paper*, No. 1, Open Society Institute, July 1996, p 7. (ii)

[142] Smith, D.R. op cit., p 358.

[143] Such a view also fails to indicate unequal social resource distribution. Labour in heavily polluted cotton fields, or the daily collection of domestic water supply, frequently from unsanitary sources are gender specific for example. These debates fall within the broader understanding of environmental security.

[144] These rates are less than in irrigation systems in Egypt, India, and Turkey. O'Hara, S. op cit., p 169. (i).

[145] O'Hara, S. "Agriculture and Land Reform in Turkmenistan Since Independence" *Post Soviet Geography and Economics*, No. 38, 1997, (draft version) p 13 (ii)

[146] World Development Report 1994, OUP, p 210. In Saltmarshe, D. "Civil Society and Sustainable Development in Central Asia" *Central Asian Survey*, 15/3-4, 1996, p 397.

[147] Ibid, p 356.

[148] For regional divisions within Uzbekistan, see Carlisle, D. "Geopolitics and Ethnic Problems of Uzbekistan" in Ro'i, Y. (ed.) *Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies*, Frank Cass, London, 1996.

[149] Smith, D.R. op cit., p 352.

[150] Klötzli, S. Table 3. Importance of Hydropower in Aral Sea Basin (number of power plants for differing categories of electricity production per year) "The Water and Soil Crisis in Central Asia - A Source for Future Conflicts?" *ENCOP Occasional Paper*, No. 11, Center for Security Policy and Conflict Research/Swiss Peace Foundation, Zurich/Berne, May 1994, Section 3.4.1.

[151] Lubin, N. "Uzbekistan" in Pryde, P. (ed.) *Environmental Resources and Constraints in the Former Soviet Republics* Westview , Boulder, 1995, p 295. (ii)

[152] Ibid.

[153] Vasil'yev, N.F. "Land reclamation in the front line of perestroika" *Gidrotekhnika i melioratsiya*, No. 11. Quoted in Micklin, P. "The water crisis in Soviet Central Asia" in Pryde, P. *Environmental management in the Soviet Union*, CUP, Cambridge, 1991, p 217. (ii)

[154] 1991 figures. UNDP, Turkmenistan: Human Development Report, Ashgabat, 1997. Quoted in O'Hara, S. op cit., p 4 (ii); & Carlisle, H. "Forced Student Labor in Central Asia's Cotton Fields" *Surviving Together*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1996, p 31.

[155] Levy, M. op cit., p 45.

[156] See Loyn, D. "The Taliban's one-eyed strongman hides in his lair and laughs at the rest of the world" *The Observer*, 9/3/97, p 11.

[157] Guldarshev, A. Personal correspondence with Klötzli, S. Quoted in Klötzli, S. op cit., p 5.4.1.

[158] The Government of Kazakstan/TACIS, Table 9.2 Commodity Structure of Exports, *Kazakstan Economic Trends, First Quarter 1997*, Center for Economic Reforms/TACIS, Almaty, 1997, p 136.

[159] Branslen, J. "Kyrgyzstan/Uzbekistan: The Politics of Water" *RFE/RL*, 14/10/97.

[160] "In Central Asia Water is Worth Blood" *Focus Central Asia*, No. 52, 21-22/11/97.

[161] RFE/RL Newsline Vol. 1, No. 53, Pt 1, 16/6/97.

[162] Roberts, B "More on water in Central Asia" *Cenasia. Email Discussion Group*. 14/4/96.

[163] Akiner, S. op cit., p 14. (iv)

[164] Fomina, Y. "It is Not Safe to Drink the Water in the Republic: Alot of Money Will be Needed to Set Things Right" *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 23/11/94, p 3 FBIS-JPRS-TEN-94-030, 30/12/94, pp. 94-5. Quoted in Smith, D.R. op cit., p 358.

[165] Aioubov, S. "Relations warming between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan" *RFE News Briefs*, 20/2/97.

[166] Ibid.

[167] Smith, D.R. op cit., p 358.

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[168] Doonbek Sadyrbayev. Quoted in Branslen, J. op cit.
[169] Ibid.
[170] *Inside Central Asia*, 25/3/-31/3/96, p 4.
[171] RFE/RL Vol. 1, No. 78, Pt 1, 22/7/97.
[172] In June 1997 Kyrgyzstan stated it was planning to charge Kazakstan and Uzbekistan for water. RFE/RL Vol. 1 No. 53, Pt 1, 16/6/97.
[173] Smith, D.R. op cit., p 358.
[174] See Gleason, G. op cit. pp. 351-3. (iii)
[175] Niyazov, S. *Komsomolskaia pravda*, 27/10/94. Quoted in Nourzhanov, K. "Turkmenistan: Halfway through to the Golden Age?" *Central Asian Monitor*, No. 1, 1995, p 12.
[176] Kangas, R. "Taking the Lead in Central Asian Security" *Transitions*, Vol. 2, No. 9, 3/5/96, p 54.
[177] Ibid.
[178] See OMRI Daily Digest, No. 45 Pt 1, 5/3/97. Karimov was eventually appointed head of the Fund in 1997. OMRI Daily Digest, No. 43, Pt 1 3/3/97.
[179] OMRI Daily Digest, No. 13 Pt 1, 18/1/96. The OMRI report appears to link this situation to Turkmenistani-Uzbekistani water negotiations.
[180] Nourzhanov, K. op cit., p 13.
[181] Smith, D.R. op cit., p 363.
[182] Kangas, R. op cit., p 54.
[183] Smith, D.R. Table 1 Water Balances for the Syr Darya, Amu Darya, and Zeravshan River Basins, 1985 (km3/year.) op cit. p 355 & p 358.
[184] Ibid.
[185] Girardet, E. *Afghanistan: The Soviet War*, Croom Helm, London, 1985.
[186] *Ekonomika i Zhizn*. Roberts, B. "More on water in Central Asia" *Cenasia. Email Discussion Group*. 14/4/96.
[187] Smith, D.R. op cit., p 366.
[188] The ten provinces are Andijon, Bukhara, Karakalpakistan, Khorazm, Namangan, Samarkand, Sukhandarya and Sirdarya, (all in Uzbekistan), Khatlon (Tajikistan), and Ahal (Turkmenistan). Smith, D.R. op cit., pp. 361-2.
[189] Rotar, I. "A Mine Laid By The Kremlin Mapmakers" *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 25/12/92, pp. 1 & 3. *CDPSP* Vol. 45, No. 1, p. 7.
[190] Smith, D.R. op cit., pp 361-2.
[191] Tishkov accepts that it is not a problem specific to the USSR. Tishkov, V. op cit. p 73.
[192] Ibid.
[193] Abashin, S. & Bushkov, V. *Sotsial'naya napryazhennost i mezhnatsional'nye Konflikty v severnykh raionah Tadjikistana*, Document 24, IEA, Moscow. Quoted in ibid.
[194] *Pravda*, 19/7/89, p 6. Quoted in Petersen, D.J. op cit., p 218; & Aioubov, S. op cit.
[195] Tishkov, V. op cit., p 73.
[196] Ibid, p 74.
[197] Bushkov, V. *O nekotorykh aspektah mezhnatsional'nikh otnoshenii v Tajikskoi SSR*, Doc 11, IEA, Moscow, 1990, pp. 4-5 & 7-9. In ibid, p 74.
[198] Ibid.
[199] See Mirsaidov, J. Mirsaidov, J. *Perechen' Faktov Politicheskoi Diskriminatsii Demokraticheskikh Organizatsii Tadzhikov i ikh Aktivistov*, 26/3/94. (ii).
[200] Returned waters allow for this figure. Smith, D.R. op cit., p 358.
[201] Ibid
[202] Ibid.
[203] Huskey, G. "Kyrgystan: The Politics of Frustration" in Bremmer, I. & Taras, R. (eds.) op cit., p 406.
[204] Gleason, G. op cit. (iii); & Klötzli, S. op cit., Section 3.3.
[205] Khisamov, I. "Voda kak prichina pozhara" *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 16/1/91. Quoted in Gleason, G. op cit. p 353 (iii); & *RM News* "Water Loss Sparks Fight" 18/12/92, p 74. Quoted in Smith, D.R. op cit., p 358.
[206] See for example Akiner, S. op cit., p 14. (iv)
[207] O'Hara, S. op cit., p 4. (ii)

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[208] See ibid.

[209] Ibid, p 16.

[210] The AR has the right to secede, although whether this is more substantial than the old Soviet SSRs' right to secede is difficult to determine. The Republic of Uzbekistan, Chapter 17, *Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan*, Uzbekiston, Tashkent 1993.

[211] The Aral Sea is only receiving approximately 7 km3 p.a. Veiga da Cuhna, L. *The Aral Sea Crisis: A Great Challenge in Transboundary Water Resources Management*, NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Transboundary Water Resources Management: Technical and Institutional Issues, Skopelos, Greece, May 1994, p 9.

[212] Carley, P. "Worse than Chernobyl" *The Financial Times*, 29/7/89, p 22. (ii)

[213] *Natsional'ny sostav naseleniia SSSR po dannym Vsesiouznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989 goda*, Finansy i Statistika, Moscow, 1991, p 29. Quoted in Tishkov, V. op cit., p 79.

[214] Tishkov, V. op cit., p 18.

[215] Karakalpakistan 2.4%; Jizzak 1.2%; & Sirdarya 1.4%. The Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan/TACIS, *Uzbekistan Economic Trends 1997 (First Quarter)*, Tashkent, 1998, p 36.

[216] Ibid, p 37.

[217] Tishkov, V. op cit., p 136.

[218] Tulpbergen Kaipbergenov, *Sovetskaya kultura*, 31/3/.90. Quoted Tishkov, V. op cit. p 79.

[219] Smil, V. "Environmental Change as a Source of Conflict and Economic Loss In China" *Project on Environmental Change and Acute Conflict*, Occasional Paper No. 2, December 1992. Quoted Homer-Dixon, T. op cit., p 163. (ii)

[220] Ibid.

[221] Ibid, p 177. Only two other developing states, Bangladesh and Egypt, have less arable land per capita than China. Also see Goldstone, J. "Imminent Political conflict Arising From China's Environmental Crisis" Occasional Paper No. 2, *Project on Environmental Change and Acute Conflict*, December 1992. Quoted Homer-Dixon, T. op cit., p 178. (ii)

[222] Ibid, p 54. Quoted Homer-Dixon, T. op cit., p 178. (ii)

[223] For the situation in Xinjiang see Bezanis, L. "Uighurs Casualty of 'Confidence Building' in Asia" *RFE Analytical Brief*, Vol. 1, No. 75, 2/4/96; & OMRI Daily Digest, Pt 1, 33, 17/2/97.

[224] *RFE/RL* Daily Digest, Pt 1, 25/10/95.

[225] Dukhovnyy, V.A. & Razakov, R.M. "Aral: looking the truth in the eye" *Melioratsiya i vodnoye khazyaystvo*, No. 9, 1988, pp. 27-32. Quoted in Micklin, P. op cit., p 54. (i)

[226] Carley, P. op cit., p 11. After Yaroshenko, V. *Kommunist*, No. 4, March 1988, pp. 99-100.

[227] The figure for Western Europe was 7 per 1000. Veiga da Cunha, L. op cit., p 5.

[228] Ibid, p 5.

[229] *Karachikyan o Proizvodstvo i Potrebheniye Sel'skhozyaystvennykh Produktov*, Izdatel'stovo AN Armayankoy SSR, Yervan, 1977. Quoted in Craumer, P. op cit., p 147.

[230] Carley, P. op cit. pp. 8-9.

[231] Micklin, P. op cit., p 14. (i)

[232] Khazanov, A. "The Ecological Situation and the National Issue in Uzbekistan" *Environmental Policy Review*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1990, p 22.

[233] Author's conversations, Almaty, October 1996. Also see Critchlow, J. "Central Asia: How to Pick Up the Pieces?" in DeBardeleben, J. & & Hannigan, J. (eds.) op cit., pp. 163-65.

[234] The expansion of the welfare system in Edwardian Britain was partially a consequence of British commanders' in the Boer War concerns about their troops poor dietary and social conditions. See Bourne, J.M. *Britain and the Great War 1914-18*, Edward Arnold, London, 1989, p 201.

[235] Goskomstat *Tsentral'noye Statisticheskoye Upraveniye* 1988, pp. 16-33 & Gomskomstat 1960-88 Narodnoye Khozyaystvo Uzbekskou SSR, Statistchesky Yezhegodnik, Tashkent. Quoted in Craumer, P. op cit. p 149.

[236] The Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan/TACIS, op cit., p 43.

[237] Ibid, p 49.

[238] Ibid.

[239] "CIS Migration Report" IOM International Organization for Migration, 1997, pp. 56-60. In "Migrations in Kazakhstan" *Eurasian File* No. 96, April 1998, p 7.

[240] Veiga da Cunha, L. op cit., p 9.

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[241] Ibid.

[242] Micklin, P. op cit., p 225. (ii)

[243] See Veiga da Cunha, L. op cit., p 4.

[244] Kazak TV Almaty, 1600 gmt, 5/3/95. SWB SU 2248 G1 10/3/95.

[245] King, J. Noble, J. & Humpherys, A. *Central Asia: Lonely Planet Travel Guide*, Lonely Planet, London, 1996, p 51. Information provided by Micklin, P.

[246] Vasily Vasilenko, Kazakstan Institute of Strategic Studies. Author's interview, Almaty, 2/10/96.

[247] See for example Petersen, P. op cit.

[248] "The Conception of the Environmental Safety of the Republic of Kazakhstan" *Noosfera - Ustoitchzivoe Razitie*, Almaty, 1, 1996, p 159.

[249] Ibid.

[250] Bakaev, L. Interview with Dave, B. 2/11/95. Quoted in Dave, B. "Kazakstan Staggers Under Its Nuclear Burden" *Transitions* Vol. 1, No. 21, 17/11/95, p 13. Also see Mukitanov, N. Director of the National Institute of Geography, Kazakstan Academy of Science. Quoted in Petersen, P. op cit., p 163.

[251] Cooper, J. *The Soviet Defence Industry: Conversion and Reform*, RIIA, London, 1991, p 23. Quoted in Olcott, M.B. *Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy and Regional Security*, USIP, Washington, 1996, p 72. (vi)

[252] Ibid.

[253] Edwards, M. "Lethal Legacy: Pollution in the Former USSR" *National Geographic*, Vol. 184, No. 2, 1994, p 92.

[254] See Martin, K. op cit., pp. 46-7.

[255] Ibid.

[256] Carley, P. op cit. (ii)

[257] Dave, B. op cit., p 13.

[258] Ibid.

[259] Critchlow, J. op cit., p 145.

[260] Sievers, E. Quoted in ibid.

[261] Ibid.

[262] Olcott, M.B. op cit., p 17. (vi)

[263] Dave, B. op cit., p 13.

[264] Bezanis, L. op cit.

[265] The oil reserves of the Tenghiz field alone is estimated at 25 billion barrels. Olcott, M.B. op cit., p 78. (vi)

[266] The AIOC contains BP, the Azerbaijani government, US and numerous other oil companies. Walker, M "Battle of the Black Stuff" *The Guardian*, 3/11/95, p 6. See Kasenov, O. "Russia, Transcaucasia and Central Asia: Oil, Pipelines and Geopolitics" in Sagdeev, R. & Eisenhower, S. (eds.) *Central Asia, Conflict, Resolution, and Change* CPSS, Chevy Chase, 1995; & Meek, J. "Oil fuels debate on whether sea is ocean or lake" *The Guardian*, 31/5/95, p 10.

[267] Senator Robert Dole. Quoted in Walker, M. op cit., p 6.

[268] See Edmunds, T. "Power and Powerlessness in Kazakstani Society: Ethnic Problems in Perspectives" Third Manchester Conference on Central Asia and the Caucasus, University of Manchester, 3-4/2/7. (i)

[269] Clover, C. "Kazakhstan oil at heart of power struggle" *The Guardian* 14/10/97, p 11.

[270] Veiga da Cunha, L. op cit., p 6.

[271] Ibid, p 17.

[272] Gleason, G. op cit., p 17. (ii)

[273] ICCW agreement February 1992, Article 4. Quoted in Klötzli ,S. op cit., Section 5.4.4.1.

[274] Smith, D.R. op cit., p 366.

[275] ICCW agreement February 1992, Article 4. Quoted in Klötzli, S. Section 5.4.4.1.

[276] Veiga da Cunha, L. op cit., p 13.

[277] "Gosudarstvennya progamma okhrany okruzhayushcheisiedyz" *Ekonomkia i zhizn*, No. 41, 1990, p 6. Quoted in Petersen, D.J. op cit., p 236.

[278] Smith, D.R. op cit., p 365.

[279] Craumer, P. Table 6.1 Area of irrigated land op cit., p 138.

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[280] Fomina, Y, op cit., p 3. Quoted in Smith, D.R. op cit., p 365.

[281] McCray, T. "Completing Agricultural Reforms in Uzbekistan: Observations of the Lower Zeravshan Basin (Pt 1)" *Central Asian Monitor*, No. 1 1997, p 7.

[282] The World Bank *The Aral Sea Crisis: Proposed Framework of Activities*, p ii. Quoted in Klötzli, S. op cit., footnote 291.

[283] Ibid, Section 5.4.

[284] Ibid.

[285] See Homer-Dixon, T. op cit., p 155.

[286] Martin, K. op cit., p 38.

[287] Critchlow, J. op cit., p 149.

[288] For example "Blame is generally laid somewhere outside the exiting system, in some distortion of the norm or incompetence of the people involved, where responsibility can be comfortably placed without serious challenge to the regime's past and present policies in the area" Carley, P. op cit., p 15. (i)

[289] Klötzli, S. op cit., Section 6.

[290] Ibid.

[291] See Wittfogel, K.A. op cit. Quoted in Gleason, G. op cit., p 11. (ii)

[292] Ibid.

[293] See O'Hara, S. op cit., pp. 172-4. (iii)

[294] Zolotarev, E. "Agrar naya reforma: novoe otnosheniyev k vode i zemle" in *Tchelovek, demokratiya*, Tashkent, Mart-Aprel 1993, p 14. Klötzli, S. op cit., Section 5.4.3.

[295] Critchlow, J. op cit., p 144.

[296] Gleason, G. op cit. p 17. (ii)

[297] *Ecokur'yer* 24/9/92, p 6. Quoted in Klötzli, S. op cit., 5.4.3.

[298]. Bohr, A. "The Central Asian States as Nationalising Regimes" in G. Smith *et al*, *Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities*, CUP, 1998, p 149.

[299] See Dawson, J. "Anti-Nuclear in the USSR and Its Successor States: A Surrogate for Nationalism?" *Environmental Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1995, pp. 445-7.

[300] Lubin, N. *Central Asian Take Stock: Reform, Corruption and Identity*, USIP, Washington, 1995, p 13.

[301] Ibid, p 14.

[302] Dave, B. op cit., p 72.

[303] Ibid.

[304] Ibid.

[305] Suzanne Belcher, Greenpeace's Children of Chernobyl Project. Quoted in Petersen, D.J. op cit.,. p 252.

[306] Critchlow, J. op cit., p 150.

[307] Tleubergenov, S. Peoples' Academy "Ecolog". Author's interview, Almaty, 9/10/96.

[308] Gularshev, Director of Fergana Canal Administration, Section IV, Fergana, Ministry of Agriculture Kyrgyzstan. Quoted in Klötzli, S. op cit., Section 5.3.2.2.1

[309] Klötzli, S. op cit., Section 5.3.2.1; & O'Hara, S. op cit., p 2.(ii)

[310] The Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan/TACIS, op cit., p 30.

[311] O'Hara, S. op cit., p 2. (ii)

[312] Ibid, p 6.

[313] Ibid, pp. 7-10.

[314] Micklin, P. "Water Management in Soviet Central Asia" in Massey Stewart, J. *The Soviet Environment: problems, policies and politics*, CUP, Cambridge, 1992, p 94. (iv)

[315] Petersen, D.J. op cit., p 240.

[316] See for example *RFE/RL Newsline* Vol. 1, No. 53, Pt 1, 16/6/97.

[317] See Saltmarshe, D. op cit., pp. 387-98 for discussion on NGO-government relations.

[318] Gleason, G. op cit., 1991 p 18. (ii)

[319] Sorokin, D. "Dekhkaninu nuzhnazdorovaya zemlya" *Kommunist Tadzikistana*, 4/4/91, p 2. Quoted in ibid, p 18, (ii)

[320] Klötzli, S. op cit., Section 5.3.2.2.

[321] Gleason, G. op cit., p 18. (ii)

[322] Personal conversations with Dr S O'Hara.

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[323] Akiner, S. op cit., p 14. (iv)

[324] Karimov, V. “Tsenavody” *Pravda vostoka,* 1/4/91, p 1 & Bezverkhov, A. “Plataza voda otmenyaetsya?” *Pravda vostoka,* 25/12/90, p 2. Quote in Gleason, G. op cit., p 18. (ii)

[325] Petersen, D.J. op cit., p 255.

[326] Gleason, G. op cit., p 19. (ii)

[327] Klötzli, S. op cit., Section 6.

[328] See Smith, D.R. op cit., pp. 361-2.

[329] Micklin, P. op cit., p 89. (iv)

[330] Ibid.

[331] Smith, D.R op cit., p 367.

[332] Homer-Dixon, T. op cit., p 164.

5. Islam and Security in Central Asia

5.1. Introduction

"Power belongs to God, His Apostle and the believers."[1]

This chapter aims to explore the relationship between Islam and stability in the two republics. The focus will be upon Islam's political application, principally the nature and objectives of its political mobilisation, and ideological role in both supporting and challenging regime legitimacy. Within the case-study, the focus will be upon the government-Islamist relationship and competition for political authority and power, both on the physical and ideological planes. The core subjects of debate are regime security and the "idea of the state". Whilst the theory chapter emphasised the distinction between regime and state, the former is the guardian and promoter of the "idea of the state." It is these, the seat of power and its ideological foundation, that government and Islamists contest. The latter pursue this through political activism, electoral or force, or for neo-fundamentalism via a more wholesale social transformation and thus undermining "the secular hegemony 'from below'"[2]

5.2. Islam, Politics and Security: The Historical and Theoretical Background

5.2.i. The Historical Origins: When examining this topic, reference to the ideological basis of the state and its security implications, discussed in 2.2.ii.d, will be of relevance.

Islam's roots as an organisational ideology can be traced to Mohammed's rule in Yathrib (renamed Medina), which began in 622. The Prophet's political authority and legitimacy were "based upon his prophetic calling and Koranic mandate."[3] Islam is an all embracing religion, containing temporal codes of conduct, as well as, spiritual guidance. Human existence independent of the religion is denied and "presumes political duties for the believers."[4] Neither the Koran nor *Hadith* (traditions and sayings of the Prophet) however, provide explicit guidance for political authority within the *umma* (community of believers) and "[t]here is no concrete political ... model inherent in Islam."[5] Consequently there is considerable debate over the political application and implications of Islam.

The essential tenets of classical Sunni political theory, are:
- God is the absolute sovereign;
- The *Sharia* is the sole source of law and personal morality;
- Temporal authority serves as God's vice-regent, defends Islam and the *Sharia*, and enable its population to live as good Muslims; and
- The state in itself has no intrinsic authority or significance.

However, although not supported by any Islamic political theory a *de facto* autonomous political space has always existed in Muslim history.[6] Abid Al Raziq, an Egyptian Muslim secularist, argued that whilst Islamic rules relating to spiritual affairs were constant, those relating to temporal affairs are subject to re-interpretation in accordance with society's needs."[7] Similarly, Ayubi and Vatikiotris individually argue that Islam is not a particularly political religion.[8] Between the eleventh and twentieth century, with the exception of Ismaili Fatimid Egypt, religion and state politics remained autonomous.[9] In opposition, many authors argue that the linkage between religion and state are indivisible.[10]

The nexus between politics and religion is more evident in Shi'ism.[11] Although historically an Arab phenomena, Shi'ism was adopted by the Safavid dynasty, in sixteenth century Persia. This was a politically motivated action, the establishment of an independent and stable state.[12] Shi'ism has an organised clergy, the *ulama* (*mullahs* in Persian) influential in the Safavid state, in opposition to the Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties and since 1979, involved in government.[13]

Historically, strong executive powers have been present in Islamic society, originating in Mohammed's leadership followed by that of the caliphs. Some critics have argued that there is an intrinsic autocratic character to Islam. The religion has frequently been used to legitimising absolute rule by attempting to associate political subservience with religious devotion. Lewis has argued that, "this sort of justification is also responsible for the prevailing authoritarianism of the 20th [sic] century."[14] The use of Islam in legitimising a regime is, however, frequently problematic. In parallel to the numerous theological interpretations of Islam there is also "more than one political language of Islam."[15] Leaderships of Muslim states do not have a monopoly over the use of Islam.[16] It also provides a critique of Muslim regimes and an ideological focal point for opponents to coalesce around.[17] Historically, revolts and successions were frequently regarded as religious as well as political events. The constraints and compromises necessitated by government diminish the purity of Islamic economic and political maxims. These expedient deviations allow for fundamentalist critiques of the administrations. The Muslim-based state may find itself regarded as failing both its secular and religious constituent. Should the government be perceived as favouring either party this can alienate the other. Central Asia's former Communist elites, for example, are still regarded by their Islamic opponents as atheists even though the leaderships have symbolically, albeit superficially, embraced Islam.

5.2.ii. The Position of Non-Muslim Minorities: In Islamic law, non-Muslim (*kafir*) minorities are regarded as second-class separate communities. Provided they are loyal to the state and pay a poll tax they are free to practice their own faith and customs. In reality, most Muslim states, however, grant equal citizenship irrespective of faith.

Non-Muslim and members of Muslim sectarian minorities are usually apprehensive of Islamist movements. Given the highly specific and frequently unorthodox doctrine of political Islam movements, this is understandable. Tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims have increased in locations where Islamist movements have been expanding and after the establishment of Islamic states.[18] Non-Muslim minorities are often perceived as having co-operated and benefited from the previous non-Islamic regime.

Islamic activists also question whether these minorities should be entitled to hold influential public positions. This is contrary to the professed non-domination selection in most modern Muslim states. Even in these states, in practice, non-Muslims are frequently absent from top posts. "This is caused not only by their limited numbers but also by government recognition and acceptance of widely held traditional attitudes toward the place of non-Muslims in an Islamic-oriented state."[19] In Kazakstan and to a lesser extent Uzbekistan, the previous high employment status of non-Muslims has been eroded by preferential treatment of the titular population in the post-Soviet employment market.

5.3. Contemporary Islamism

In this chapter *Islamism* will be used as a generic term to refer to both *political Islam* and *neo-fundamentalism*. A distinction should be made between *political Islam* and *neo-fundamentalism*. The term *political Islam* indicates its temporal and political orientation. *Neo-fundamentalism* refers to de-politicised social activism interested in enhancing popular Islamic consciousness, linked to the observance of Islamic practices and benevolent societies, rather than mainstream political activism. Beinin and Stork argue that the term *fundamentalism* is intellectually located within the Christian Protestant tradition. To apply the term fundamentalism to contemporary Islamic thinking they argue is incorrect because the Koran is literal. The divine origin of the text is not a subject of debate, only interpretations of its application. Fundamentalism also implies a restoration of the authentic and original. Contemporary Islamic activists frequently refer to this return. This is spurious as their conceptualisation of an Islamic society is novel.[20]

Islamic movements are difficult to place in a left-right political dichotomy. Revolutionary, democratic, conservative, free-market and centre-led economics ideas, for example, have all been incorporated into various Islamic political thought and activism. In the twentieth century, the majority of Muslim political parties have been moderate, successfully participating within the confines of the mainstream political process.

Political Islam is a product of and reaction to the modernisation of Muslim societies.[21] The intellectual origins of contemporary politicised Islam can be found in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Pakistani Jamaat-i Islami. These two movements and post-1979 Iran have provided the foundation for the ideas, structures and themes for most twentieth century Islamic movements. Jamaat-i Islam has been a key influence for the more conservative groups.

Political Islam is a novel and radical departure from mainstream and traditional Muslim political thinking. "[The] fundamentalists who base their political ideology upon the Sharia have removed this jurisprudence from its historical and political context and infused it with "essentialist and everlasting qualities."[22] Political Islamist doctrines are based upon a "very selective choice and rather unorthodox interpretation of older texts."[23] Where as traditional Muslim jurists "forged a link between politics and religion by giving religious legitimacy to political power," contemporary political Islam is seeking to politicise particular interpretations of the religion.[24] It is also a radical departure because it proposes rule by clergy or jurists, a concept eschewed by most Muslim states throughout history. The Islamic state has traditionally been a *nomocracy* - the rule of law, in this case the Koranic and shariat, rather than a theocracy. Thus despite claims to authenticity, political Islam and in particular the conservative neo-fundamentalism are modern constructions and can be traced back to the end of the Ottoman empire, and the Indian Islamist thinker and founder of Jamaat-i Islami, Abu al-'Ala Mawdudi and Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, both of whom were active in the first half of the twentieth century.[25]

The objective of political Islam is the attempt to (re-)introduce the *Sharia*. Islamist opinions diverge on what this means and how this should be achieved. The core arguments are, however, relatively coherent and represent a "general ideological framework of contemporary Islamic revivalism."[26] These are:

1) *Din wa Dawla:* Religion (*din*) and state (*dawla*) are inseparable. The Koran provides the law and the state implements it;
2) *Qur'an wa Sunna*: Muslims need to return to the early roots of Islam, for authenticity and renewal, by the application of the Koran and *Sunna* (traditions of the Prophet and his initial followers);
3) *Puritanism and Social Justice:* Divergence between political Islam and neo-fundamentalism is most noticeable on this issue;
4) *Allah's Sovereignty and Sharia Rule:* The ultimate objective is the establishment of God's sovereignty upon earth, through the creation of Islamic society; and
5) *Jihad*: In order to achieve an Islamic society Muslims are allowed to commit themselves to action. This requires the destruction of the existing *jahiliyya*, the pre-Islamic society of ignorance and impiety and removal of the authority of worldly leaders through the *jihad* (holy war).

Dekmejian identifies four Islamist categories. These are: the Gradualist-Adaptationist; revolutionary Sunnism; revolutionary Shi'ism; and Messianic-Primitivism. The majority of Sunni movements including the Muslim Brotherhood are gradualists. These groups are mainly involved in legally recognised political activities. Revolutionary Sunnism has a long historical tradition which can be traced back to the ninth century. Al-Banna, and Mawdudi can be included in this tradition. Shi'ism is more susceptible to radicalism for a number of factors. These are: its "sense of history, millenarianism, idea of social justice, the devaluation of temporal power and martyrdom, and its organised clergy's wider read of non-Muslim philosophy and politics.[27] Messianic-Primitivism is puritanical and neo-fundamentalist in approach and objectives.[28]

Islamist activist have adopted three strategies:

1) Entry into official mainstream politics;
2) Re-investment in the social sphere; and,
3) Formation of small groups, either ultra-orthodox religious movements or terrorist groups.[29]

The ideology and methodology of the movements are also affected by their social context and nature of the crisis. The three cover the political Islam - neo-fundamentalism continuum. Consensus amongst Islamists is confined to the five central tenets. The differences can be seen in the spectrum of groups' hermeneutics of the Koran, the Sunna and early Islamic history. There is no clear distinction between the two approaches rather a differences of emphasise. Their attitudes towards women, the *Sharia* and politics are the key criteria in distinguishing political Islam, such as Khomeini-era Iran, from the conservative fundamentalism of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, for example. Briefly, political Islamists see a political role for the faith, women in public life, and the implementation of the Sharia following the population's complete adherence to the faith. Fundamentalists regard religion's role as principally cultural, restrict women's roles in public life and are more insistent upon the immediate application of the Sharia.[30] Neo-fundamentalism places personal piety over politics.

Roy argues that the political activist of the 1970s has transmuted into neo-fundamentalism. He believes that the quest for power has been abandoned by most Islamic activists. Existing political and economic values are being challenged only in rhetoric and the discourse on the state has been replaced by a discourse on society.[31] This shift has weakened the faith's political vitality. Neo-fundamentalism, which Roy regards as a regression from radical Islam, is more reminiscent of a sect "than a society confident about its identity."[32] It is obsessed with internal enemies and homogeneity of the community.[33]

The reasons for neo-fundamentalism's ascendancy and the decline in involvement in the body politic, Roy believes, are:

1) The subordination of politics to morality, within Islam;
2) The loss of revolutionary direction, a result of Iran's economic difficulties and internecine fighting in Afghanistan; and
3) Cooption of Islamic symbols and movements by Muslim governments.[34]

5.4. Islamism Activist and Crisis

If Islam is essentially no more political than other religions and its guidance upon politics ambiguous, when and why does a politicised form emerge? A common feature of Islamist activism and challenges to Muslim rulers have emerged in periods of economic, political and social crises.[35] Islam has proved to be able to resist and react to these problems. During the twentieth century, these common themes accompanied by identity-conflicts, legitimacy crises, military impotency and cultural uncertainty and state collapse, have influenced the growth of Islamist consciousness.

The Muslim world has confronted issues such as the creation of "nation-states" and secular political culture in a far shorter timespan than western Europe. From a neo-fundamentalist perspective

> "modernity ... appears to be the polite name for an authority that protects an alien project on native soil, where as the [Islamist] call for authenticity appears to be a means to negate such an authority and deprive it of legitimacy."[36]

Political Islam and more significantly neo-fundamentalism provide a reassuring identity, a response "to the confusion and anxiety of modernity and a challenge to repressive and corrupt regimes."[37] The failure of Muslim states' modernisation/state-building projects and contemporary Western (secular) dominance over the triumphs of classical Islamic cultural and political history, have created a sense of dislocation. Islamism calls to reclaim a lost identity and moral purpose and provides a substitute to kinship, security and "cultural authenticity."[38] This is particularly acute amongst the neo-fundamentalist approach. These attributes have applied to disposed groups affected by modernity and transition, including rural-urban migrants.

As well as indicating the secularism's failure to become the accepted ideology of Muslim society, Islamism responds to the Muslim governments' difficulties in implementing the modernist and secular objectives.[39] Initially, states such as Algeria and Egypt were relatively successful in providing both material and subjective benefits to their populations, whilst countering dependency on external states and ideologies through modernisation and nationalist policies. Reversals in these projects enabled political Islam to offer a viable alternative. This implies Islamism is a long-term problem in Central Asia, once the initial "successes" of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan secular policies and state-building falter.

Modernisation in the Muslim world has been rapid and uneven. Economic inequalities have provided a receptive audience for Islamism's politicised form of Islamic social justice. Economic disparity has been influential in garnering support for political Islam in Algeria, Egypt and Morocco, for example. The rise of the Islamic Salvation Front is associated with Algeria's serious economic crisis - a 20% inflation rate, 25% unemployment rate, and 70% of its population below the age of 25.[40] As with the case of environmental security, the issue of relative deprivation has been perceived as a cause of political instability in Muslim societies, particularly enhanced by the low levels of social mobility.[41] In fact, Dekmejian links social-economic injustice, official corruption and the lack of cohesive state identities as the prime (combined) cause of the crisis of legitimation in Muslim states.[42] The rise in Islamic activities has been closely associated with urbanisation. At the time of the 1979 Revolution, 50% of Iran's total population was urban. The growth of Islamic politics accompanied similar demographic trends in late-1980s Algeria, Egypt and Morocco.[43]

The rapid social-economic transformation which has provided Islamic activism with a cause also helps explain the social composition of its support. The urban supporters of political Islam differ from the traditional urban community. In Muslim urban areas social structures have been weakened as old and influential families and communities have moved to the suburbs, being replaced by the new rootless migrants. The lack of traditional social structures and the state's failure to organise the cultural and political space and infrastructure of these new communities has allowed for Islamist organisations to develop. Unions and left-wing political movements, regarded as bourgeois in orientation, have not been able to penetrate these communities, whose employment is unreliable, short-term and menial. A social and political niche has been filled by the Islamist movements.

The movements' memberships are predominantly the recently urbanised, educated, middle-strata, and youthful. With the exception of Iran, Islamist movements are lead by young educated men rather than the clergy. They are rivals to the *ulamas* who have compromised themselves by their association with temporal authorities. This is borne out by Ansairi's work on the Egyptian Jihad movement.[44] Jihad's members were recent arrivals to the peripheral regions of Cairo and inhabitants of Upper Egypt, the pre-migration home of the majority of its Cairene members. (See Table 5.1. and 5.2.)

Table 5.1. Distribution of Jihad Members by Occupation. (by Percentage)

Occupation	Percentage
Students	43.9
Workers	14.6
Professionals	12.5
Unemployed	10.7
Shopkeepers	5.7
Government officials	5.4
Police and Military	5.0
Farmers	2.2
Total	100% (280)

Source: Ansairi, H. "The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics" *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 16, No 1, March 1984, p 133. Quoted Piscatori, J.P. *Islam in the Political Process*, RIIA/CUP, Cambridge, 1983, p 163. (The figures are based upon arrests after the assassination of Sadat.)

Table 5.2. Distribution of Jihad Members by Age. (by Percentage)

Age	Percentage
<20	17.5
21-30	70.0
31-40	10.7
>40	1.8.
Total	100% (280)

Source: Ansairi, H. op cit.

This new "middle class" provides the majority of political Islam's adherents. This is because of their relative expansion in size in comparison to the newly industrialised-urban proletariat, who would normally be expected to be a major political constituent. The former group have been susceptible to radicalisation even though they are essentially conservative because of their middle-class aspirations for upward mobility and fears of downward mobility.[45] Raised and then dashed expectations for education, employment and social advancement have encouraged support for political Islam. Because of their social aspirations and previously modestly successful lives, they have been highly sensitive to such negative trends. Roy calls this social concern a fear of "reproletarization."[46] The lower middle class merchants, conservative by nature, are attracted to the ideology because of poor or arbitrary economic policies and their frequent exclusion from profitable sectors controlled by members of the ruling clique. Unemployment, overpopulation, poor conditions, alienation and social "descent" have affected these newly urbanised, ambitious groups, as have archaic power structures which restrict the social mobility of the aspirant educated. This issue has relevance for the Soviet-educated population (both Russian and indigenous) who have lost prestigious employment and stable living standards in the post-Soviet states.

Islamic movements have not been successful in attracting the industrial proletariat nor agrarian workers. The least educated and most traditional sections of society are least involved in political Islam.[47] Political Islam has little attraction in rural area, where forms of neo-fundamentalism and populist Islamic practices such as Sufism are more significant.

The transformation from political Islam . to neo-fundamentalism has been associated with a deterioration in the intellectual qualities of ideology and leadership. Since the 1970s, activists have had a less intellectual background, because of declining education standards, overcrowded universities and the replacement of academic *lingua franca* (i.e. colonial) with titular languages in many universities.[48] The new activists are mix of graduates, especially from technical colleges, and secondary school educated individuals. Members of this generation are more likely to be neo-fundamentalists than political radicals, partially because they are less Westernised than the previous activists.[49] "Intellectual research ... already deficient in the Islamist movement, is absent from neo-fundamentalism and has been replaced by fideism, a reliance on faith."[50] The activists' greater involvement in preaching than politics has also diminished the intellectual vigour of the moment.

Training of activists takes place in independent madrasas (Islamic schools), separate from state-sponsored institutes. Private organisations funded these madrasas, frequently with external support from Saudi Arabia through intermediary groups such as the World Muslim League, Muslim Brotherhood and Tablighi Jamaat. During the Afghan Civil War, for example, new mullahs were recruited from refugee camps in Pakistan, sometimes trained in Saudi Arabia. Returned to the camps they supplanted the older generation of Islamist militants such as Ahmad Shah Massoud.[51] The rise of these new activists highlights government concerns about the threat from externally-supported groups and inter-generation conflict over restricted social mobility.

Although neo-fundamentalism is not explicitly involved in politics, compromise or accommodation between it and secular government is more difficult to achieve, if not impossible, than between government and political Islam. This suggests that states confronted by neo-fundamentalist opposition, which is more susceptible to grassroots support and populist sentiments than political Islam, may find that any political confrontation will be less resolvable. In defence of the strength of neo-fundamentalism, Roy states that its degradation of political Islam has enabled it to appeal to communities that are less receptive to an explicit political approach.

5.5. The Islamist Challenge And The State's Response

The government-Islamist debate is influenced by three factors, according to Dekmejian: government policies, external stimuli and the militant's own objectives and capabilities.[52] In the struggle between the Muslim government and Islamist opposition, the latter has several advantages. As a political challenge, the nebulous nature of the Islamist ideology is useful, a self-sufficient discourse which "ignores political issues in favour of advancing a politicised religious manifesto."[53] Islamist opposition is able to use a particular interpretation of the religion and the Sharia as a means of evaluating the Muslim government's legitimacy.[54] This enables it to attack the regime on its own ideological ground, forcing the government to engage in debate according to the Islamist discourse. It is, ideologically and spiritually, an asymmetrical struggle with the government tainted by the expedient compromises of temporal power, including accusations of corruption and apostasy. The Islamist opposition is unburdened by the legacy of governance and as yet the potential failures or compromises of political participation. Unlike its opponent, the "modern" secular nationalist Muslim state, political Islam and neo-fundamentalism do not (necessarily) offer a social-economic manifesto. Rather it can remain concerned with non-material issues - the protection of Islamic norms.

Islamist movements because of this nebulous political basis draw together disparate groups with different social attitudes and political objectives, who share "a sense of alienation, a quest for authenticity, and demand for the enforcement of public morals."[55] The lack of intellectual coherence and the different political assumptions and objectives of the Islamist supporters becomes more apparent as the movement becomes more deeply immersed in politics and expected to produce policy decisions and solutions rather than simply critique the existing system.

As the conflict is essentially an ideological one, the dissemination of information is an important factor. The material is often produced by internationally active groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Jamaat-i Islam and World Muslim League. Its audience is large but usually poorly educated, a factor which Roy believes enables the blurring of the distinction between political Islam and neo-fundamentalism.[56] Muslim Brotherhood literature, translated into Russian, distributed through the Afghanistan mujaheddin bases in Peshawar, found its way into Soviet Central Asia.[57]

In response to the Islamist challenge, governments with large Muslim populations have adopted different strategies. These include:

- The integration of moderate Islamist parties into the political process, without granting them any particular concessions, forcing the Islamist parties to become involved in the temporal and compromise-oriented nature of politics;
- Ideological concession towards the re-Islamisation of society, without allowing Islamist parties a role in politics, attempting to undercut their *raison d'être*; and
- No concessions at all because the state ideology and Islamism are incompatible.[58]

Moderate groups and the official-sponsored clergy have been employed to divide the Muslim community and remove support from independent and radical elements. The official clergy have been used as a means of regulating and utilising the religion. State sponsored Islamic universities, madrasas and appointments to muftiates have all been part of this process. Governments can use the mainstream religious body to demonstrate that radical Islamic opponents are beyond the consensus (*ijma'*) of the Sunni community.[59]

Incorporation of political Islamist parties into the country's political process has demonstrated they are as susceptible "to the vagaries of electoral preference" as are other parties.[60] Involvement and acceptance of electoral process has shown that "Islamic ideology can be tempered by *realpolitik*."[61] Their integration into mainstream politics is not therefore necessarily altruistic. It forces Islamist movements to compete in the "marketplace of ideas" and promise and provide, if politically successful, political and material goods. When Islamists achieve political power they are then confronted with economic and political issues, which their rigid dogmatic approach, wielded effectively in opposition, have frequently avoided. Provision of economic and social goods will ultimately determine their success and survival. If political Islam is to be successful in the body politic it has to ultimately replace its populist rhetoric with pragmatic policies.[62]

Wider political reforms including the creation of secular and moderate Muslim parties can also be used to channel support from Islamist groups. Such policies were temporarily implemented in Egypt after Sadat's assassination. President Mubarak weakened support for the Islamic opposition through a combination of security measures, lenient treatment of moderate Islamic opponents, and limited relaxation on press restrictions. Moderate secular groups were also encouraged to expand, in order to split the opposition camp.[63] In Central Asia it is debatable whether such a policy will be effective as secular parties have limited appeal.

Tal argues that governments should also acknowledge the positive role Islamists can have in political and social affairs. They can provide educational and medical functions that the state is unable or unwilling to offer. The apolitical neo-fundamentalists are highly suitable for such roles.[64] A key issue in this debate is whether the state is willing to accept these non-state actors and able to coopt them.

Political, economic and social reform, is also advanced by Dekmejian, as key response to the Islamist challenge, as it is the crisis in these spheres that has provided the environment for its emergence and saliency. Many governments are unwilling or unable to implement such comprehensive reforms.

> "When all outlets for political expression are closed, extremism is only a step away. By forcing Islamist to operate outside the system instead of addressing the legitimate grievances they raise - poverty, corruption, lack of political accountability - rulers ... only build support for their adversaries. As the Jordanian experience illustrate, bringing Islamist into government is the best way of eroding the mystique of opposition."[65]

The Jordanian case indicates that cooption and inclusion are far more effective means of managing political Islam than repression.[66] The case provides lessons for other governments. Regimes should recognise the heterogeneity of Islamism and adopt a range of approaches to different movements: cooption, assimilation and legal status for moderate and popular movements for example; and repression and counter-insurgency measure against avowed terrorist organisations, rather than label all groups as a fundamentalist threats and implement wholesale repression. As Hadar notes "[t]he crusade against political Islam is in danger of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy."[67]

5.6. Conclusion: The viability of the threat

Dekmejian and Roy are sceptical about political Islam's ability to accumulate popular support and ultimate success due to its intellectual exclusivity, extremism and intellectual paucity.[68] Islamism has serious deficiencies as an effective challenge to existing Muslim governments. These are:

- Nebulous and impractical objectives; Its intellectual incoherence attracts diverse support but is only a temporary advantage.

- Its frequent extremism in both method and objectives; Militancy and the objective of a sharia-based society have alienated mass Muslim support. Many Muslims in principle favour some form of enhanced social role for the religion but are apprehensive of militant behaviour and the complete implementation of the Sharia. The violence and chaos of Afghanistan and Tajikistan, combined with the biased nature of information in Central Asia about Muslim movements in these states may also dissuade support from political Islam in the region.

- The failure of the revolutionary path; The vigour and inspiration of the Iranian revolution has foundered upon economic difficulties; Sunni extremists have marginalised themselves; and Shi'a radicals groups become the instruments of state interests, Iran and Syria.

- Islamism de-politicisation; Neo-fundamentalism's populist and conservative moral and social agenda lacks the cursory ideological underpinning of political Islam.

- Its failure to establish unified pan-faith political activism;It has not provide an ideological trans-national movement. Instead it has worked on two levels, as a domestic form of protest against individual governments and as an agent of external sponsors, notably Iran, Pakistan and Syria.

This pan-national character is central but ambiguous in understanding the security implications of the ideology. Its trans-national nature, characterised by the *umma* enhances the domestic-international nexus and increases regime's perception of acute insecurity because of link between international and domestic opponents. Islamists frequently regard nationalism as un-Islamic and claim to seek the termination of *nation-state* system. Where as states and governments are legitimated by sovereignty and self-determination, political Islam does not necessarily acknowledge this and the state has no intrinsic value other than advance and protect the believers. Neo-traditionalists, such as Mawdudi, and modernisers, including Iqbal, perceived nationalism as an instrument of colonialism and means of dividing Muslim unity.[69] Modern nationalism is opposed because of its western secular origins rather than its organisational division of the *umma*, which had always existed.[70] Islam's trans-nationalism is circumspect, however. Although independent Islamism movements and governments support organisations throughout the *umma*, e.g. Iranian involvement in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabian support for Sunni fundamentalism, this does not presuppose a trans-national political identity or solidarity. Islamic and Muslim states have attempted to establish pan-Islamic co-operation, when it serves their own state interests, whilst retaining their own state identities, rather than strive for political unity. Indigenous Kazakstani and especially Uzbekistani interest in the religion and foreign religious assistance poses intriguing questions. The alleged associations between Afghan and Tajik Islamists with the Islamic opposition in Uzbekistan has allowed Karimov to link outside conflicts with domestic political dissent. Domestic opposition groups have been marginalised by this relationship.

However, although nationalism is ideologically incompatible with Islam, most, and all successful, political Islam movements have been confined to the territorial boundaries of individual sovereign states.[71] Roy believes it is more appropriate to examine the present manifestation of political Islam as a series of Islamonationalist movements with common traits than a unified pan-Muslim movement.[72] Ethnic, sectarian, regional and national divisions within the *umma* appear to be resistant to calls for Islamic solidarity and are recognised, by Muslims, as political and sociological features. "This imaginary solidarity still has the power to mobilise popular support ... [although] it cannot provide the basis for an international Islamic union."[73]

The Islamic revolution and state may be politically ineffective, but as an instrument for mobilisation and opposition political Islam has continued significance.[74] Whilst Roy professes that political Islam is not a coherent or effective political force or threat and that any Islamist victory will be superficial and short-term, he concludes that the "illusions it creates will not be without effects."[75] These he, however, suggests are related to the neo-fundamentalist ambitions in the social sphere rather than political consequences.[76]

Ultimately, the political success of political Islam in attaining positions of governance is dependent upon the existing governments ability to manage major economic crises, made worse by burgeoning and youthful populations and the political acumen of the Islamists rather than religious piety.[77] To be politically successful Islamists have had to accept compromise with the state and win popular support. Neo-fundamentalism's preoccupation with social and individual piety would suggest that success will be the exception. It is impossible to isolate political Islam's political salience from the social and economic conditions as it is a response to and functions within. States have proved on the whole, resilient to the Islamic challenge, mixing compromise and selective repression in order to counter this opponent.

The Case-Studies

5.7. Introduction

Islam has been crucial in Central Asian affairs because of its universalist character. The Muslim tradition of large families, for example, has had implications for resource competition and was previously a source of contention between the Soviet centre and the Muslim peripheries.

After discussing the historical context of Islam in Central Asia, the case-study will examine the political and security implications of the Islamic "revival" through three key arenas. These are:

- The popular and cultural revival in Islam in Central Asia since the 1980s;
- The manner in which the two governments have approached the religion for their own purposes, including regime legitimacy and state-building, the role of the officially sanctioned clergy and their response to independent Islamist trends; and
- The development of independent Islamism in the region. This will include the political methods and objectives adopted, popular support, the implications of the wars in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, and the influence and contacts that extra-regional Islamist actors have established.

The previous review of contemporary research on Islamic politics in the Middle East has relevant parallels which can be drawn upon for this case-study. Common features include political modernisation and secularisation, the post-colonial situation, economic modernisation and inequalities, high birth-rates and the weakness of civil society.

5.7.i. Religious adherence in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan: The majority of Central Asia's Muslims are Hanafi Sunnis. The regional dominance of this doctrinal school may have considerable implications for local acceptance of political Islam and neo-fundamentalism. Hanafi theology is regarded as a liberal, "tolerant belief system."[78] It views "'[d]ifference of opinion in the community as a token of divine mercy' ... [a principle which] unequivocally places the Hanafi school farthest away from the conservative or dogmatic understanding of Islam."[79] Hanafi theology may in fact preclude neo-fundamentalism's call for a "return to orthodoxy" because it accepts that the transitions in socio-economic conditions. In Central Asia, it has allowed for the incorporation of pre-Islamic customs.

Sufi brotherhoods have had considerable political, social and spiritual role in the region. Sufi membership is selective, frequently based upon clan lineage. The Naqshbandi is the most widespread brotherhood. Its present core areas are Bukhara and Samarkand, the Fergana Valley, (as well as eastern and southern Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan). It has proved adept at accommodating changing social and political situations. The Qadiryya retains a greater presence in the Fergana Valley. There is a small but growing Wahhabi community in the Fergana Valley.[80]

Shi'ism has a small presence in the region. There are Shi'ite communities in Bukhara, Samarkand and Tashkent and 300,000-400,000 Ismailis in Gorno-Badakhshan. According to Roy, the Ismailis are highly secularised and have little interest in religious practice.[81]

Muslim proclivity in Kazakstan follows a north-south division. This characteristic is influenced by the South's historical association with sedentary Muslim Uzbeks, and the latter abandonment of nomadic life in the north, complemented by the influx of Slav, Christian settlers. Shymkent and Qyzlorda *oblasts*, bordering Uzbekistan, and containing large Uzbek minorities, are the most religiously devout of Kazakstan's provinces. 75% of Shymkent's 2 million inhabitants and 80% of Qyzlorda's 0.25 million population claim to be practising Muslim.[82]

Even in Uzbekistan, where Islam has had the most developed and widespread impact, regional variations in adherence exist. The Fergana Valley, most notably the cities of Andijon and Namangan are "considered the bastion of Islamic activism in the whole of Central Asia."[83] Andijon viloyet has recorded a 75% figure for practising Muslims, Namangan 47%, and Fergana 41%. This compares to a 25% figure for Tashkent and 13-20% in western Uzbekistan. Karakalpakistan, with a strong Sufi tradition, and Bukhara and Samarkand, with their considerable Islamic heritage, are also noticeable for their strong religiosity. Approximately 40% of the latter two and Syr Darya viloyets' population claim to be practising Muslims.[84] Atheism is far more prevalent in urban regions of both republics.

5.8. The Historical Role of Islam in Central Asian Politics and Security

5.8.i. The Arrival of Islam in Central Asia: Muslim Arabs first crossed the Amu Darya in 651, laying siege to Merv. Their defeat of the Chinese at the battle of Talas, 751, saw the Arab-Islamic hegemony secured. Between the eighth and fourteenth centuries, the faith spread throughout the region. Its adoption was more rapidly and comprehensively accepted in the settled Transoxanian communities than amongst the nomads. From the ninth to the sixteenth centuries, Transoxania was the third most important region of Muslim culture and learning. Islamic art, culture and sciences flourished under the region's succession of dynasties.

Later geographic and political isolation, particularly after the eclipse of the Silk Road by maritime routes, led to Islam in the khanates becoming conservative and authoritarian in character. Islam was entrenched in the khanates' political and social affairs. In Bukhara, Islam was both the ideological basis of the regime, and the only social force autonomous of the emirate's authority and thus a potential balance to it.[85]

Buddhism, Shamanism and Zoroastrism retained cultural and spiritual value for the nomads even after their nominal conversion. Orthodox practices and rituals including the role of the imam and mosque could not be easily incorporated into the nomadic lifestyle. By the tenth century, what is now central and southern Kazakstan were nominally Islamic. Proximity to Transoxania and the existence of Khoja Ahmet Yasavi's tomb (the founder of a Sufi sect successful in converting the Kazaks) at Turkestan, meant that Islam was adopted more wholesale in this region than in northern Kazakstan. The superficial adherence to the religion, its combination with older religious practices, and the north-south division are still noticeable and significant in the republic.

5.8.ii. Islam in the Tsarist and Soviet Periods: Tsarist expansion in the region did not dramatically alter its religious life. Russian imperialist policies, in fact, sought to increase the Kazaks' affiliation with Islam. Tatar missionaries were used to proselyte the faith and *civilise* the Kazaks, in order to incorporate the nomads into the empire more effectively. The policy had limited success, only a small member of the Kazak elite were converted and Russified.[86]

After the nineteenth century annexation of the khanates, Tsarist policy did not attempt to disrupt traditional religious structures. This was a lesson from previous anti-Muslim policies by St Petersburg which had strengthened Islam consciousness and resistance in the empire.[87]

The political and economic crises of late-Tsarist Russia produced Muslim reformist groups in the region, influenced by Tatar pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic activists. A distinct character which emerged amongst Turkestan's reformist circles was the promotion of a common and unified Turkestani identity. A major movement in the region was Jadidism (*usul-i jadid* - Arabic for new education) founded by Tatar intellectuals. This secular Muslim movement sought wholesale political and social reform. Its objectives and organisational weakness bear close resemblance to contemporary political Islamic movements. Politically, the Jadidist sought to elevate the position of the most deprived and least integrated members of Turkestan's society. However, their aims and political success were constrained by the capricious nature of its supporters and the privileged and conservative background of its leadership. Also active in nineteenth century Central Asia were a small number of Turkish-trained Shiites. Their contact with Turkey imbued them with an avowed anti-Russian stance.[88]

Traditionally, Shi'a and Sunni communities in the region had co-existed. Relations between them soured in the late-nineteenth century for political reasons. Emir Abd al-Ahad of Bukhara sought to undermine the Uzbek chieftains' position by appointing Farsi-speaking Shi'ites. The ruling Uzbek Sunni elites grew fearful of losing their political power whilst madrasa students saw their employment opportunities decline. In 1910, tensions led to anti-Shi'ite pogroms. Russian troops had to be used to restore order.

The balance that Muslim leaders have to master between secularism and modernism, and placating traditional Muslim expectations was demonstrated during this period with the Sufi-led revolt against Khan Isfendiyar of Khiva. The khan's reformist policies, influenced by his Russian protectors, administrative corruption and personal immoral behaviours (mild - consisting of the introduction of alien objects such as a cinema) were declaimed as violations of the *Sharia*.[89] Medieval Islamic jurisprudence was drawn upon in an attempt to incite his Muslim subjects overthrow the khanate.[90] The political and material connections between the Khivan government and *kafir* Moscow, may prove a salutary lesson for the present regional elites, attempting to placate international duties with the interests of their Muslim citizens.

In the aftermath of the 1905 revolt, nationalist Muslim groups were formed. With the 1916 rebellion which swept throughout Central Asia, these groups became engaged in anti-Russian activities. The rebellion was the coalescence and culmination of several issues: mobilisation of Muslims for second-line units; unequal legal status; the loss of agricultural lands - emancipated serf colonisation of the northern pastoral areas resulted in environmental degradation of the remaining lands, and absentee Russian landlords in the south; and peasant hardship. The revolt only lasted a few weeks in Transoxania, although it continued on the Steppe until the February 1917 Revolution.

After the February 1917 Revolution, an alliance between some Muslim nationalists, conservative *ulema* groups and the elites of the khanates, especially in Kokand, was forged in the Basmachi revolt.[91] (Liberal Muslim groups cooperated with the Provincial and Bolshevik governments to varying degrees and often for purely tactical purposes.) It has been estimated that upto 18,000 rebels were involved in Basmachi activities, particularly concentrated in the Fergana Valley, Lokay, Bukhara and around Khiva.[92] A *jihad* was proclaimed by some combatants. The Sufi brotherhoods were influential within the Basmachi movements. They had provided similar organisational and leadership functions for previous *jihads*.[93] The Basmachi were, however, localised and disunited. The causes of the rebellion were similar to the 1916 revolt: economic hardships; Soviet food-requisitions; and the continued mobilisation of Muslim conscripts. As famine increased in the region, so did support for the Basmachi. The objectives of those involved were broad. These ranged from limited autonomy to complete independence and the creation of an Islamic Turkestan. This is understandably as the participants ranged from the Emir of Bukhara, to Enver Pasha and landless *dektanes*.

From 1922 Moscow responded with political, as well as, military initiatives to undermine the rebels support. The *kazi* (religious courts) were temporarily re-established, *waqf* lands returned and taxes reduced by 50%. A series of land and water rights reforms were also implemented.[94] The Bolsheviks were concerned about the ideological challenge that pan-Islam and pan-Turkism posed in the region. The combination, an united Muslim opposition from within and without, it was feared would prevent the consolidation process of the USSR.

Accommodation with Islam, expedient in the Civil War, was reversed with Stalin's elevation to First Secretary in 1924. In 1927, Sharia courts and madrasas were phased out and *waqf* lands confiscated. Soviet secular schools began to replace Islamic educational establishments. Religion was restricted to the performance of religious rites and rituals. Repression escalated throughout the 1930's.

A modest liberalisation took place during the Great Patriotic War, chiefly as a means of bolstering popular support for the war. Four Muslim Spiritual Directorates were established. Tashkent was the location for the Muslim Spiritual Directorate for Central Asia and Kazakstan (DUMSAK). Its Mufti was the *de facto* head of all Soviet Muslims.[95] The establishment of four directorates may indicate Moscow's concern over a united Soviet Muslim community with a sole institutional representing their interests, a potential rival to its authority. The Directorate's roles as an officially sanctioned organ and supporter of the Communist regime resulted in Islamist criticisms. The principle criticism was its dependency upon a militant atheist regime. Nepotism also enhanced criticism of the organisation.

Anti-religious drives were more piecemeal after 1953. Khrushchev re-instigated a short-term offensive between 1960-4. Anti-Muslim policies were increased again in 1979 after the Iranian revolution and the invasion of Afghanistan. Moscow was concerned about their implications on its Muslim republics. A key concern of Moscow was the infiltration of external and proscribed ideas. To some extent these apprehensions were justified. Under the example of the Iranian revolution, Central Asian Muslim demanded greater religious freedoms and undertook a series of anti-Soviet demonstrations, with Islamic characteristics, in Alma-ata, Dushanbe, and other cities in 1979-80.[96] Consequently, Moscow sought to isolate its Muslim community from the wider *umma* and responded with three policies: political support, on the international stage, for Iran's anti-imperialist victory; enhanced security in the southern republics and along their borders with Afghanistan and Iran; and increased anti-Muslim propaganda in Central Asia.[97] These measures failed to significantly reduce the regional influence of domestically and externally sourced Islam.[98] Islamic propaganda and material infiltrated Soviet Central Asia principally from Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. Atkin is, however, unsure to what extent there was a direct correlation between the proximity to Islamic information and states, and the religious revival in Central

Asia. Soviet media and political interest in the religious revival in the Tajik SSR did not focus particularly upon the border regions.[99]

Under Gorbachev's leadership, initially a strongly anti-religious agenda was pursued. A speech the First Secretary made in Tashkent, 1986, was so inflammatory it was not published in full.[100] In the reshuffle of regional *nomenklatura* numerous officials were removed for tolerating religious activities, as well as, allegations of corruption, and nationalist attitudes. In a six months period, 53 members of the Uzbek CP members were expelled for "organizing religious rituals and taking part in them."[101]

By 1989, however, Islam was afforded a more positive official status. Its ethical stance on social justice, crime, drugs, alcoholism and corruption were recognised as "Useful Points of Collaboration" as the title of a *Kommunist Uzbekistana* article recorded.[102] There was also a *volte face* in republican elites' attitudes towards Islam. They realised its intellectual and political challenge but also the opportunities it offered, in replacement of the crumbling ideological foundation of the USSR. Opposition had to be accommodated and coopted if the leaderships were to retain their position and legitimacy.

With the deepening of *glasnost*, however, independent Muslim criticism of the secular state and coopted official clergy grew. State-sponsored Islamic institutions and individuals became the targets of increasingly confident Islamist movements. Genuinely spontaneous demonstrations in Tashkent, December 1988, forced the removal of the Chief Mufti of the DUMSAK, Shamsuddin Babakhanov, in February 1989, accused of licentiousness. This was "possibly the first and only direct public attack on the legitimacy of the official clerical establishment in Central Asia."[103] Olcott sees the appointment of his replacement, Muhammad Sadiq Muhammad Yusuf, as nothing less than a "rebellion by believers" organised by an independent and informal movement, Islam and Democracy.[104] The popular strength of Islam was duly noted by Karimov.

Tashkent initially thought Yusuf would prove a complaint ally. He was brought in to give the government credibility. He was a member of a delegation led by the First Secretary which visited the Fergana Valley after the anti-Meskhetian violence of May-June 1989. It became apparent, however, that he was more independent than Tashkent had expected, speaking on behalf of further reform. Elected to the Uzbek Supreme Soviet he declared, at its second session, June

1990, that the region's ethnic groups were a single Muslim people, a view not endorsed by Karimov's increasingly nationalist objectives.[105] Yusuf was latter forced to resign due to loss of government and popular support. (See 5.10.ii.)

Despite seventy years of government suppression, including the physical attack on the personnel and material of Islam, it was never eliminated from the daily life of Central Asia. This was acknowledged by a 1989 CPSU Central Committee Institute of Scientific Atheism of the Academy of Social Sciences survey which stated that,

> "a comparatively extensive practice of traditions, festival and rites among all socio-demographic groups of the population [continues], ... which indicates ... a mass basis for Islam's continued existence in the USSR."[106]

These activities were most evident in rural areas. Regional Communist elites tolerated and even participated in these. In 1963, whilst there was only 33 officially registered Muslim prayer houses in Kyrgyz SSR, there were an estimated 200 unregistered prayer groups in existence.[107] This independent religious activity has been referred to as *parallel Islam.* One source claims that by 1989, 10,000 people directly involved in parallel Islam, and their influence was probably far greater than their numbers suggested.[108] The survival of parallel Islam in Soviet Central Asia indicates the difficulty if not impossibility of government attempts to control this arena of society, autonomy, through the most repressive measures.

5.9. The Contemporary Revival

5.9.i. Introduction: The revival in regional interest in Islam has been multifaceted. The events surrounding the fall of Mufti Babakhanov, mirrored in Kazakstan, exemplified this range of issues: increased government attempts in coopting and regulating the religion; attempts by the state-sanctioned clergy to increase their own autonomy and authority; and the presence and influence of independent interest in the religion.

5.9.ii. The Popular Revival: A considerable element of the revival has been benign, a genuine and popular return to Muslim cultural and spiritual traditions. This has been encouraged by the governments as a means of national consolidation. Official support has not been the principle force behind this trend. The revival in Islam can be illustrated through the fortunes of the region's mosques. In 1912 there were in excess of 26,000 mosques. This was reduced to a nadir of only approximately 450 official mosques in 1976. The resurgence in the late 1980s and 1990s saw approximately 10,000 mosques being recorded in 1995, half of which were in Uzbekistan.[109] During 1991, 10 mosques were opened per day in Central Asia.[110]

The real political and spiritual adherence of those professing Islamic beliefs is unclear. Ambiguity towards faith is evident in many social surveys. Lubin's work shows that within the titular groups there are substantial number of people who claim to be believers. (See Table 5.3) In terms of numbers, Derluguan and Tabyshalieva claim that the number of practising believers did not increase between 1986-96.[111] Others have even suggested there was a decline in religious adherence. One argument for this has been that the novelty and fashionablity of faith may have dissipated. If this interpretation is correct, it indicates a superficiality to religious belief and probably its political and social implications. Another more politically oriented explanation, for Uzbekistan specifically, is that the faithful have become jaded and disillusioned with the corruption and state-apologist dimensions of the official clergy, which includes blessings for President Karimov in the Friday prayers.[112] This implies a degree of political and religious autonomy and the potential for increased popular support for the independent sector.

The depth of religious knowledge among many believers has been circumspect. A third of "practising" Muslims in Uzbekistan and two thirds in Kazakstan were unable to correctly translate "there is no God other but Allah, and Mohammad is his prophet" from Arabic. A fifth of the Kazakstani Muslims respondents did not even agree with this fundamental tenet.[113]

Table 5.3. Religious Belief in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan (by Percentage)

	Islam (%)	Russian Orthodox (%)	Other (%)	Non-believer (%)	No answer /Don't know (%)
Kazakstan					
Kazak/Central Asian	48	0	1	45	7
Slav	<1	10	25	58	7
Other	15	3	29	44	11
Average	21	4	18	49	8
Uzbekistan					
Uzbek/Central Asian	54	0	1	44	2
Slav	0	14	29	50	7
Other	39	1	10	45	7
Average	31	5	13	46	5

Source: Lubin, N. Table 2. Religious Belief By Nationality, & Table 3 Professed Religious Belief by Nationality and Religion, *Central Asians Take Stock: Reform, Corruption and Identity*, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, 1995, pp. 16-7.

It is unclear whether popular misconceptions and poor understanding of theology amongst Central Asia's population has negated Islam from holding a political role. One survey indicated some grassroots sympathy for the political application of Islam. In Uzbekistan, 50% of the titular population agreed with the statement that "in Islam, one can find the solution to many of Uzbekistan's problems."[114] Only 27% of Uzbeks disagreed. Interest in an Islamic state has been confused. In 1991, a survey in Uzbekistan, 88% of the respondents favoured the implementation of *sharia* laws.[115] However, in Lubin's survey, only 2% of Kazakstani respondents and 10% of Uzbekistanis favoured such a state.[116] Similarly interviewees were unsure about the concept of the Islamic state. A majority of Uzbekistanis surveyed supported Karimov as the head of a potential Islamic state, despite his avowed anti-Islamic position.[117] Correspondents felt that Islamic figures had little influence or power.[118]

In common with other Muslim states where the clergy have been used in official capacities, parallel Islam has continued to be a feature Central Asia's religious life. It enabled popular piety to be practised and also acted as a conduit for more explicit political activities. Thus although at present Central Asian Islamism remains interested in increasing personal piety, the structures for politicisation exist. However the divisions within parallel Islam between piety and fundamentalism, and political activism is often exclusive. Equally, the gulf between the nominal and poor religious education of Central Asian Muslims and the minority of committed fundamentalism may prove irresolvable.

The fact that after independence Central Asians were able to travel abroad and receive foreign broadcasts with greater ease may aid their Islamic education and recognition of the numerous political and social variants of the faith. This could weaken Tashkent's, and to a lesser extent Almaty's, portrayal of political Islam as intrinsically divisive and radical. It may, however, remove support for radical Muslim groups as awareness of events in Afghanistan, Iran and Tajikistan becomes more widespread. As an example of the poor popular awareness of Islam, one western educated Uzbekistani women, the author spoke to, who claimed to be Muslim was unaware of the segregation of the genders in the mosque.[119]

5.10. The Governments and The Islamic Revival

Both Almaty and Tashkent have attempted to incorporate Muslim traditions into their avowed secular political systems. The intellectual collapse of Communism has meant that the former Communist leaderships have sought new foundation myths to bolster support for their regimes and place them in an historical continuum. Government sponsorship has also aided control of the faith and undercut autonomous and more radical religious movements.

To date, this policy has only been moderately successful in both republics. The use of religion in legitimising the regimes has been a double-edged sword. Both leaderships retained a strong legacy of the Soviet mindset which has influenced their opinion of Islamist activists. Equally their previous atheism and opportunistic and highly publicised conversion to Islam has antagonised more devout critics.

5.10.i. Islam's Role in Nation- and State-building: Karimov has attempted to enhance his Muslim credentials. He has made the *hajj*, sworen the presidential oath on the Koran and made public displays of his Muslim practices. Uzbekistan has been active in its rehabilitation of its Islamic heritage. The *Kurban bairam* and *Uruza bairam* celebrations have been legally enshrined.[120] The 675th anniversary of Khoja Bahoutdin Naqshband's birth was celebrated in 1994. He was claimed as "our countryman [and] great ancestor" although his religious activities were practised in fourteenth century Bukhara, prior to the Uzbeks arrival.[121]

Whilst Karimov has declared that Islam is a cornerstone of contemporary Uzbek national identity, Nazarbaev has been more cautious. It was the only republic not to grant official recognition to Muslim celebrations. Nazarbaev with a far smaller and less vociferous Muslim constituency and a large secular Kazak, as well as Russian, community has been far less inclined to emphasise deep-rooted affinity with Islam. The goal of these policies was the maintainence of inter-ethnic harmony and an inclusive Kazakstani identity. As Nazarbaev has stated, "one must take into account that in our republic there are various faiths ... But none of them can be become [a] state [religion]."[122] To date, Almaty has successfully sought to create a moderate government controlled indigenous Islamic culture. Kazak separation from the "dogmatic and radical" Islam of the Uzbeks and Tajiks is emphasised. The more superficial adherence of Kazaks traditionally to the faith has aided this.

Almaty has pursued a pro-active but moderate revivalist policy to undercut independent Islamism. The popular Muslim revival has been directed by the government seeking to maintain a monopoly over Muslim affiliation and prevent independent mobilisations, to the extent that Dave regards it as "far from spontaneous."[123] This has included state-sponsoring of mosque building, and a controlled number of Islamic programmes on radio and television. The government has also successfully been able to outflank radical Islamic groups such as Alash and Attan, although it must be acknowledged these groups had minor popular support anyway.

Both republics have attempted to regulate mosque building. Non-state mosques are associated with independent thinking and conduits of foreign penetration because of external funding. The Uzbekistani Committee for Religious Affairs, linked to the Cabinet of Ministers, has controlled the country's religious institutions and Ministry of Justice permission required prior to a religious organisation training students. Despite this official control of religious education and activities, independent religious activities have continued. It is estimated that there were 5000 unofficial religious schools in the republic in 1993.[124]

The differences in the presidents' public display of their beliefs has been indicative of the relative concern that the two governments have felt that the religion poses to their ideological foundation. In Uzbekistan, the government has attempted to monopolise of the religion as political and social force, whilst in Kazakstan a second goal has been not to overemphasise the role of Islam, in order not to alienate the Russian community.

5.10.ii. The Role of Official Clergy: The official clergy have continued to be used as an instrument for state policies, although this has not been wholly successful.

Almaty established a separate Spiritual Board for Muslims of Kazakstan (DUMK) in January 1990. The old Tashkent Directorate, responsible for the entire Central Asian region, was regarded as an Uzbek institution. No Kazak cleric had ever held the position of Chief Mufti. The independent DUMK provided an impetus for enhancing Kazak national consciousness, nation-building and isolating the republic's Muslims from a pan-Central Asian identity which Almaty feared could radicalise its Muslims.[125] The Mufti appointed, Ratbek Nysanbai Uli, owed his position entirely to Nazarbaev and has enjoyed limited support from the Muslim community.[126]

The balance of faiths and ethnic groups in Kazakstan emphasised by the President's statement that "Islam and Christianity are the two flanks of Kazakhstan's spiritual legacy" has also manifested itself in political structures.[127] As with Islam, the Russian Orthodox Church has also seen a revival. Nazarbaev has endorsed the Kazakstani Orthodox Archbishop, Aleksei, as well as, Mufti Ratbek. Both institutions have pursued pro-government agendas. The Archbishop a strong advocate of Christian and Muslim friendship, has stated that there are "no preconditions for conflict on religious or ethnic grounds."[128] He has also denied Church premises to Cossack movements for their Easter and Christmas "holy marches."[129] Almaty has sought to create and regulate a moderate and compliant form of Christianity as it has a Muslim faith. For international consumption at least, Tashkent has sought to portray itself as a multi-faith society.[130]

The Uzbekistani Mufti, Shaykh Mukhtar Abdulayev, between April 1993 and April 1997, was apolitical and had little personal authority.[131] Until his appointment as ambassador to Egypt, in 1994, the real power in the Directorate resided with Abdulayev's deputy, Babakhan, the Soviet-era Mufti.[132] Consequently, he was an experienced advocate of the government's agenda and indicates the retrenchment of the *status quo ante* since 1992. Abdulayev's lack of spiritual and temporal authority led to his replacement with Abdurashid qori Bakhromov, who has not managed to increase popular respect for the Muftiate.[133]

The political benefits for the governments of an official clergy have been ambiguous and even detrimental. The officially sanctioned clergy have not always remained compliant. Their criticism has been particularly directed against government interference in religion. The synthesis between formal and informal Islam has worried the authorities as it demonstrates the popular and political influence of the Muslim clergy and their desire to retain autonomy from temporary leaders.[134]

The example of Mufti Yusuf's dual relationship with President Karimov and independent groups was symbolic of this. Yusuf's position was a delicately balance between grassroots expectations and the goodwill of the government. Muslim opponents accused him of proximity with the authorities, KGB ties and profane behaviour. His public opposition to the IRP, which in turned increased its hostility towards him, forced Yusuf to increase his reliance upon Karimov's support.[135] Initially, fearful of allowing the ascendancy of radical independent Islamic figures, Tashkent provided him with political support. This was problematic for the Mufti. To remain credible he had to demonstrate his autonomy and in turn alienated himself from Karimov, his political master. Yusuf's increasingly independent opinions over issues including a greater political role for religious leaders and support for the Tajikistani opposition leader and Qazi (Chief Mufti) of Tajikistan 1988-92, Hojiakbar Turajonzade, became a source of embarrassment for Tashkent and his position became untenable.[136] Olcott argues that the Mufti was an electoral asset and therefore was placated until the December 1991 election. Two attempts to unseat him failed before he resigned, partly as a consequence of a physical assault on him, which was probably state-instigated.[137] He was finally replaced by Abdulayev, a less independent figure, in April 1993 and went into exile.[138]

At the behest of the governments, the Chief Muftis of both republics have been used by the governments to seek accommodation with the Islamic opposition. Mufti Ratbek attempted dialogue with IRP-sympathetic clergy from Zhambyl and Shymkent, and Mufti Yusuf met representatives of the Islamic opposition.[139] Both approaches were unsuccessful. At one meeting in Uzbekistan, 26 February 1992, the IRP turned down the deputy mufti posts offered and complained of government interference in religion.

The machinations surrounding the removal of Babakhan and Yusuf demonstrated to Karimov the potency of religion in the republic's social affairs. It also illustrated the balance the state and establishment clergy have had to maintain between government policy and independent religious belief if popular Muslim criticism is not be brought forth.

Soviet-era official Islam was unable to eliminate parallel Islam. In the post-independence era, official Islam's close proximity to the authorities may erode its standing and encourage further growth in parallel Islam. This may be particularly significant if official Islam retains its appearance as a political tool of the government. Olcott argues that the synthesis between the formal and informal branches of Islam has provoked anxiety in Tashkent.[140] The fear is that this association will result in sanctioned religion becoming autonomous and radicalised. Such a trend is a rare occurrence, perhaps the Iranian example being the only major example. The reverse has been the norm, with the incorporation of Islamists into the political mainstream and their political moderation. What is not clear, perhaps with the exception of Tajikistan, is whether this synthesis has been political significance.

5.10.iii. Attitudes Towards Independent Islam: Accompanying the governments' assimilatory policies and attempts to coopt Islam into the state-building projects more repressive measures have been pursued in order to control Islam.

Freedom of conscience has been guaranteed by statute in both republics. The Uzbekistani "Law On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations" (1991) and Articles 31 and 61 of the Constitution guarantee the right to practice religious beliefs free from harassment or coercion and equal treatment of religious organisations.

These rights have not applied to religion when it has been politicised or autonomous. The Uzbekistani Law on Freedom of Conscience has since been enhanced by proscription on religious organisations funding political parties and the banning of all religious parties.[141] Religious figures have been prescribed from holding office, irrespective of their party affiliation.[142] Unsanctioned madrasas have been closed and non-state religious education prohibited.[143] The thinking behind this heavy censure, Brown believes, is a result of the secular and Communist origins and beliefs of Uzbekistan's ruling elite.[144] However secular parties were suppressed prior to the religious-based movements. There appears to have been a conscious decision by Tashkent to systematically repress and remove independent Muslim figures once secular opposition had been removed.[145] The focus of state repression has increasingly been transferred from the emasculated secular opposition to Islamists. Independent Islamic activities and groups have become such target because they offer one of the few unregulated arenas of social and intellectual (political) thought and activity, and because of the government's accusation of financial and political connections with foreign Islamic actors. The informal alliances between secular and Islamists parties in glasnost-era Uzbekistan aided subsequent government opposition to all independent groups, without providing either secular or Islamic movements with any significant gains. Birlik supported the right for the IRP to exist but not its Islamic state goal.[146]

Since the period of study, Uzbekistan has stepped up its control of independent religious activities, by forcing all religious communities, mosques, and churches for example, to register with the Ministry of Justice. There is no guarantee that communities will be granted legal status. Only state sanctioned organisations can provide religious education or publish related material. All private attempts to do so are proscribed even though a considerable proportion of the new law and many of the legal penalties violate Uzbekistan's commitments to international human rights agreements.[147]

During the early post-Soviet period the lack of trained and approved clergy necessitated the use of previously unofficial clergy to serve the growing popular interest in religion. It is clear that by 1994, Tashkent was concerned for either purely regime security or more general state security motives about the presence and influence of the independent clergy. Since then, non-establishment religious figures have been the chief victims of government repression. The crackdown has been particularly acute in the Fergana Valley cities of Kokand and Namangan. HRW/H cites systematic detentions, and harassment of Muslim individuals and the closure of mosques.[148] *Informatsionn'i biulleten'* lists six imam removed from their posts in Tashkent and Samarkand between October-December 1995 alone.[149] The majority of the clergy arrested in the Valley were associated with the Adolat movement.[150]

Three factors may have influenced the latter implementation of suppression of Islamists than secular opponents. Firstly, the strength and growth of the Islamic revival may have taken Tashkent by surprise. Secondly, the initial courting of Muslim opinion in the early period of independence was more vital to Karimov, than the smaller democratic secular constituency. With his position secured and having displayed his Muslim credentials, repression could begin. Thirdly, the Tajik Civil War, whether as a pretext or real concern was an important external factor in determining Uzbekistan's domestic policies.

Whilst Kazakstan has been faced by a less immediate "Islamic threat" and has pursued a more selective and less physical policy against opposition groups in general, it has been decisive in its actions against radical Islamist groups. The suppression of the Alash movement has been symbolic of the government's regulated approach to faith. Alash members were involved in protest against the election of Mufti Ratbek to the head of the DUMK. The Mufti was criticised for his un-Muslim conduct and possible KGB-links. Alash proposed an ethnic-Uzbek from Shymkent as a replacement. Ratbek was elected and scuffles between the militia and protesters broke out. Forty one Alash members were arrested, and warrants for the Alash leadership were issued. Dave argues that few Kazaks were interested in the events and even less supported the Alash's cause.[151] The incident demonstrated, as have similar events in Uzbekistan, the tensions between state-sponsored clergy and independent Muslim activists.

Alash has not been allowed to register and it newspaper, *Khak*, banned. Although the party dropped its *Sharia* and Russian repatriation objectives, it has remained outlawed. Its leadership, fearful of further governmental repression, is now in exile in Moscow. By 1996, Alash was no longer able to function as a political movement, except secretly and on a small scale.[152] Dave asks why such a poorly organised, supported and intellectually incoherent movement has faced such government hostility. The answer she arrives at is that Alash questioned the legitimacy of the post-Soviet elite and proposed an alternative, offering an ideological challenge to the foundation of the present state. Alash's explicit opposition to the Nazarbaev government was illustrated in articles in *Khak*, which described the President as a traitor and "collaborator in Kolbin's crimes."[153] "The vilification of Alash confirms the government's own paranoia about the dangers of an "Islamic movement."[154]

Government harassment was directed towards Zheltoqsan too. Its registration application was lost by the Ministry of Justice prior to the local and *Majlis* elections of March 1994.[155]

5.11. Independent Islamist Movements

Islamism has seen a relatively small growth in comparison to its cultural revival. This restricted activity is partly a consequence of government hostility but equally the result of deficiencies in the movements' intellectual, organisational and social foundations. This section will assess the saliency and strength of indigenous and extra-state Islamists as viable political actors, their challenge to the regimes and ideas of the state in the two republics, and more explicitly their actual and perceived security implications. This is clearly a difficult issue. Government statements, inflammatory declarations by Islamists (often spontaneous in nature and latter retracted), and the blurred distinction between the natural reaffirmation of cultural traditions and the establishment of aggressive ideologies with the support of foreign states with their own regional objectives, all make determining the true security implications of Islamism difficult. As Splidsboel-Hansen recognises, a considerable element of the (perceived) Islamist threat is unintentional, a feature shared with environmental security problems.[156]

The Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), founded in 1990 as an all-Union party, fragmented into independent national parties. Only 40 delegates from throughout the FSU attended its third all-Union congress in 1992.[157] The party's inter-republican leadership was divided between political Islamists and neo-fundamentalists. It established contacts with Muslim countries including Egypt, Iran, Pakistan and Sudan, to increase its financial security, a move which understandably concerned the two governments.[158] It is difficult to determine whether its lack of extremism or violence has been the result of successful government repression or lack of popular support.

Its branches in Uzbekistan (and Tajikistan) have been more successful as republican movements. Despite not being granted registration in the Uzbek SSR, the republic's branch held its founding congress in Tashkent, 26 January 1991.

The meeting was broken up by police, who arrested 400 delegates. After its suppression under the Law on Public Associations, February 1991 it acted clandestinely. Its 1990 policy statement indicated a mixture of democratic and Islamic objectives. These included:

- Opposition to all forms of discrimination, alcoholism, crime and other un-Islamic behaviour;
- The strengthening of relations with the rest of the Muslim world and also with other religions on an equal basis;
- Co-operating with other democratic parties and state bodies;
- Providing social welfare for all in need;
- Promoting the principles of an Islamic economy and regain "ecological purity"; and
- Educating the population in Islam and solving "the problems of the people according to the holy Koran and *hadith*."[159]

It has opposed the authority of state-sponsored religious institutions and advocated an alternative decentralised religious framework with greater autonomy for regional organisation.[160] This is a clear challenge, not only to Tashkent's highly-regulated form of control over religion but in social and political affairs too. Tashkent's failure to coopt the IRP with offers of deputy mufti posts indicates the difficult that governments face in dealing with ideological committed and uncompromising movements.[161]

The Uzbekistani IRP has renounced its stance on the creation of an Islamic state and declared that its objective is the establishment of a multi-party system, with a universal franchise and legal protection for minorities and private property.[162] Influential fundamentalism clerics, such as Abdulwali Qari and Aqilbeq Ishanbaev, claimed not to be members of the IRP, although given the illegality of the party, it would have been unwise for them to publicise this association.[163]

Another key Islamist group in Uzbekistan, Adolat posed a major political challenge to the Karimov regime. Formed in 1991, its power-base was in the Fergana Valley, principally Namangan. It acted as a vigilante movement, interested in enforcing the adherence to Islamic codes of behaviour. Adolat temporarily led an Islamist coalition administration in Namangan. This was suppressed. (Adolat and the events in Namangan are discussed further in 5.12.ii.a.1.)

Islam and Democracy symbolic of the *glasnost*-era organisations, in that it was informal, poorly organised and transient. The movement backed Yusuf's appointment and was pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic in objective. It was not, however, fundamentalist. Its leader, Almaz Yetekov, an Uzbekistani Kazak even denounced the Sharia as obsolete.[164] Haghayeghi believes that its membership was absorbed into other Islamist movements during the early 1990s.[165]

A number of clandestine Islamist movements in Uzbekistan have also been recorded. Ascertaining their existence, manifestos and significance has, however, been problematic due to government mis-information and repression, and the organisations' secrecy. The movements include:

- The People's Front of Uzbekistan, a radical group based in Tashkent;
- The Islamic Democratic Party, based in Namangan. Its leadership favoured a theocracy based upon the Iranian model but refuted force as a means of attaining power.[166] During the "golden period" of Uzbekistani politics its party congress was broadcast on a local Namangan radio station.[167]
- Hezbollah, a predominately Shi'ite movement, which aimed to establish a *Sharia*-based society in Uzbekistan. It was active during the period of 1989-92.[168]

A more uncompromising challenge to Tashkent has been the small but noticeable growth in Wahhabism. This neo-fundamentalist doctrine, opposed to mysticism, spread from its Uzbekistani Fergana centre into Krygyzstan. The debate surrounding Wahhabism is deeply confused. The Soviets had traditionally applied the term pejoratively to any Islamic group or trend they wished to label as seditious. It correctly refers to a Saudi neo-fundamentalist school of thought. The security implications of its regional presence are unclear. It initially arrived in the region in the nineteenth century via India but after the late-1980s saw an indigenous revival, with Saudi assistance. The sect survived under the tutelage of the Tajik Qari Muhammad Haji Hindustani (1892-1989). His disciples Abdulwali Qari and Allama Rahmatullah pursued a more politicised interpretation of its teaching.[169] Although Hindustani's teachings were also used by Tajikistani IRP (*Hizb-i Nehzat-i Islamic*) founders including Abdullah Said Nuri (aka Mirobobo Mirrakhamov and Saidov), the Wahhabis have refused to foster links with the IRP for ideological and political reasons. They have criticised the IRP for being willing to compromise with the government and participate in elections. These accusations are, however, academic as Tashkent prevented the IRP from pursing any legitimate political activism and has repressed both movements with equal vigour. Abdu Ahd, a leading Uzbek Wahhabi cleric, stated that,

> "the IRP wants to be in parliament. We have no desire to be in parliament. We want a revolution."[170]

However, it is essentially a neo-fundamentalist and therefore an apolitical movement. Its opposition to Sufism and shrine veneration, key features in regional religious practices, may deter large-scale support from Central Asian Muslims brought up on liberal Hanafi theology and Sufism. Similarly, its explicit militancy and ideological differences with the IRP and political Islam in general, may also deter mass support. Wahhabists did, however, participate in the Namangan events and its members were prominent in the city's short-lived Islamic administration.

All these factors suggest that whilst Wahhabism may prove a small uncompromising and possibly violent irritant to Tashkent and Bishkek, it is unlikely to receive widespread support for its.radical ambitions.

In Kazakstan, Islamist movements have had limited success and failed to establish state-wide structures. IRP-associated activities have remained within the southern oblasts of Shymkent, Zhambyl and Qyzlorda. The IRP has been registered in the first two.[171]

The most prominent, Alash, was formed in 1990. Islam and "Turkism" were described as central to its agenda but it rejected fundamentalism and anti-Russian policies.[172] Dave is highly critical of Alash's leader, Aron Atabek, arguing that he lacked both political expertise and ideological coherence.[173] The movement has had limited political success and faced considerable government hostility. After being declared illegal Alash moved its headquarters to Moscow and dropped its call for an Islamic state.

Other explicit Islamist movements have faired poorly in Kazakstan. Zheltoqsan, a small movement, whose explicitly anti-Russian nationalist agenda had a strong Islamic as well as environmental dimension. Its extreme Islamic and nationalist policies proved politically unpopular.

The contemporary political role and significance of the Sufi brotherhoods in the region has been unclear. Decentralisation, localism, and opposition towards fanaticism made Sufism an entrenched and widely supported movement. These characteristics also suggest limited accommodation with radical Islamism.[174] The brotherhoods were politically active during the Soviet period, publishing *samizdat* material, opposing the "Soviet socialization of the younger generation" and encouraging evasion of the military draft and Komsomol membership.[175] As a rule Sufi movements militancy have been more frequently directed towards external enemies rather than challenging domestic political authority.[176] This suggests that Sufism is unlikely to become a force for political Islam in the region. Their main contribution in the post-Soviet period has been in the advancement of individual and social piety rather than political action. Although Sufism and neo-fundamentalism both share apolitical characteristics, Sufism has itself been a target of neo-fundamentalist movements. Sufi-Wahhabi violence was reported in Dagestan, in the Caucasus.[177] The presence of these incompatible schools may result in similar conflict in Central Asia.

Whilst the intellectual development of Islamists movements in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan has been essentially limited in nature and domestic in origin, research on Afghanistan and Tajikistan demonstrates the role of external factors in politicising religion.

In the Afghan war, Islamist politics developed in response to a crisis-situation. The intellectual and organisational foundation of Islamist groups underwent a modernisation process. The Soviet invasion politicised resistance to central authority. Opposition to the central authority of Kabul, traditionally non-political, tribal and holding a narrow-conceptualisation of conflict, became politicised and constituted an ideological adversary to Marxism-Leninism. The form of conflict changed from traditional tribal low-intensity combat, which separated domestic and public space and had limited objectives, to total war in which politics and the state were the contested ground and objective. Militarisation rather than ideological discourse led to the politicisation of Islamic political culture.[178]

This example indicates that neo-fundamentalism's political impotence may be temporarily dropped when action is required. The combination of an inflexible intellectual basis, grassroots appeal and a hostile political milieu created by a repressive and ideologically-opposed government may encourage this process. It is feasible that a similar process could develop in Uzbekistan.

According to Roy, Islam's political radicalisation in Tajikistan occurred via a dual process: through indigenous grassroots networks and the assimilation of Islamist ideas by the official clergy whilst studying abroad.

In the case of the former, informal networks were established around clandestine religious teachers. The Tajik IRP leadership, Said Nuri, Mohammadsharif Himmatzade and figures in the Uzbek Fergana Valley Islamic movement, were taught by one such figure, Hindustani, the Wahhabi cleric.[179] These groups studied both traditional religious literature held by the Tajik mullahs and imported pro-reform literature including those by Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-i Islami.[180] The invasion of Afghanistan further radicalised the republic's movements and enhanced links with the *umma* via the Afghan mujaheddin.[181] Nuri's background was similar to that of other Islamists world-wide. Nuri opposed the Afghan war, had a modern and scientific education and is described by Roy as a "member of the new middle class."[182] There are disturbing parallels for Karimov with Uzbekistan's clergy. Yusuf was trained in Libya, and also possibly under Rahmatullah, the Andijon fundamentalist and an influential figure in the current growth of regional Wahhabism.[183]

Radicalisation also took place through the native clergy's studies abroad led to contact with foreign Islamic thought. Turajonzade was influenced by the literature of the Muslim Brotherhood whilst in Amman, for example. A parallel may be drawn with contemporary Uzbekistan which has withdrawn its trainee clerics from Turkey, whilst Kazakstan has shown no concern about sending clerics to the same destination.[184]

5.10.i. The Structure and Support of Islamist Movements: Very little information is available concerning membership structures of Islamist movements. This is partly a result of government repression of such movements and partly a result of the transient nature of many. Popular support for explicitly political movements in both republics is difficult to determine, beyond the fact that it has been restricted to a minority. Zheltoqsan's limited support was indicated by the inability of its chairman, Hassan Kojakhmetov, to acquire the necessary 100,000 signatures to qualify for the December 1991 presidential election.[185] There was a significant decline in popular awareness of the IRP in Uzbekistan between surveys conducted in January 1992 and March 1993. Initially, 57% of those surveyed were confident that they could trust the movement whilst 31% were not confident and 12% had no opinion or were unaware of the movement. In 1993, the figures had altered to 19%, 50% and 30%, respectively.[186] As Kangas records, the change in attitude either indicated "an effective policy of eliminating Islamic radicalism or, more likely, the government had successfully instilled the fear of reprisal."[187]

At present, it is unclear whether the typical youthful profile of Islamic movements, as witnessed in other cases, has been evident in Central Asia. There has been a mild inter-generation division within the region's faithful, which initially dismisses the potential for a radicalised Muslim youth. Although Lubin's survey indicated a lower level of religious adherence among 18-29 year olds (39% of this age group) compared to 50-59 age group (47%), the difference is not huge.[188] Critchlow believes that the older are more prone to superstition and elaborate rituals, whilst the younger believers are more orthodox in their belief.[189] It is unclear whether this difference in religious behaviour will mean that the young will be susceptible to neo-fundamentalism's claims to authenticity, or simply a decline in Sufism and greater adherence to mainstream Hanafi principles. The marked youthfulness of regional demography suggests that there is, however, a significant potential for a linkage to emerge in the near-future. There is some limited information to suggest that this is the case. It was estimated, in 1989, that 70% of 18-30 year old in the Tajik SSR were believers.[190] Similarly, the 1988 Tashkent demonstrations, which Critchlow links to Muslim and secular cultural demands, were student-led.[191] Zheltoqsan's membership, in common with Islamist movements throughout the world, is young and educated.[192] Other factors also indicate the feasibility of Islamism increasing its influence in Central Asia. A generation of *glasnost* births have been educated, socialising and seeking employment in a more Islamic-sympathetic society than the two previous generations. Independence and state-building replaced atheist and internationalist values with nationalist and Muslim norms. A final factor is the question of employment. Present and future opportunities for the burgeoning population are particularly poor for rural Kazaks and inhabitants of the Fergana oblasts, essentially those areas with the strongest religious identification. This combination of factors may see this and subsequent generations adopt a more politicised interpretation of the faith.

Dave estimates that Alash's power-base has been restricted to perhaps only 3-5% of all Kazaks and principally rural. "Urban Kazakhs display a marked aversion towards its Islamic platform."[193] A government official claimed that Alash only had 85 members in the capital.[194] A larger support base has been suggested in Shymkent.[195] The Uzbekistani IRP, it was estimated had between 40-50,000 members in 1992, primarily in the Fergana Valley, especially in Andijon and Namangan, and other rural regions.[196] The majority of the Tajik IRP's 40,000 supporters have come from Dushanbe and its environs' unemployed, and parts of Khojent, Garm and Khatlon oblasts.[197]

5.12. Islamism's Association With Other Political Issues

Whilst the religious consciousness of the two republics' population has been limited and superficial, and therefore unlikely to be the fundamental cause of any political conflict, "it can be a powerful political tool in fomenting conflict ... [acting as] an umbrella or vehicle for expressing other grievances that are far more immediate causes of dissension and despair."[198] Its universialist character has meant that it has contributed to debates over environmental degradation, and economic and social justice, for example. Similarly, regional groups' intellectual and physical contacts with extra-republic Islamist movements have aided government charges of international conspiracies and perceptions of insecurity. These charges must be viewed with scepticism as they are often government attempts to detract attention from the domestic origins of political problems.

5.12.i. Islamism's Relationship With Nationalism: As stated previously, the Islamic community, the *umma*, is trans-national, although regional and ethnic identities are acknowledged by the religion. Political Islam has been most successful when it has been associated with a nationalist agenda.

In Central Asia, there has been only a cursory relationship between faith and ethnicity. Islam has provided a boundary marker between the indigenous population and Slavic settlers. Within the indigenous population, with the exception of the Ismaili Pamir Tajiks, religion and ethnicity have not been conterminous, although there are differences between ethnic groups over the degree to which they have incorporated Islam into their national culture.

The late-Soviet centre-periphery debate between Moscow and the republics contained an element of Muslim protest against their perceived and actual inequality in comparison to the Russian Orthodox community. It took over a year and then only after public protests by Central Asian Muslims, for Muslims to receive the same religious concessions that Christians and Jewish believers were granted in 1988.[199] Poignantly, the Muslim millennium was not marked in the USSR, as it passed prior to this relaxation in religious laws.

Islam and the concept of the *jihad* were not, however, incorporated into late- and post-Soviet anti-Moscow and anti-Russian discourse to any significant extent. The Tajik cleric Said Nuri was perhaps the most explicit and exceptional figure to link exclusive nationalism with religion, declaring in 1988 that within ten years there would be no Russians within the republic and would become an Islamic state.[200]

The absence of Russian-directed Islamist discourse has been particularly noticeable in Kazakstan where it would have been particularly divisive. Kazakstan's leadership consciously avoided an overt incorporation of Islam into its nation- and state-building programmes. Given the sensitive issue of the Kazakstani Russians, it has been the only Central Asian republic whose constitution has not provided Islam with a special significance in the heritage of the titular population.[201]

The region's Russians' perception of the contemporary Islamic revival has varied from those of the titular populations. Interestingly, 43% of Uzbekistan's Russians surveyed agreed with the statement that "in Islam, one can find the solution to many of Uzbekistan's problems", suggesting only limited apprehension of Islam from this community.[202] This curious and benign attitude is, however, countered by the fact that Russians in both Kazakstan and Uzbekistan believed that Muslim leaders have greater influence and power than the titular respondents ascribe to them. Intra-regional migration towards Tashkent and northern Kazakstan from rural Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and southern Kazakstan have been partly caused by such concerns.[203]

The nexus between employment, ethnicity and religion have been combined by the re-introduction of Islamic values into public life. Employment opportunities for ethnic Russian women have been particularly affected. Muslim employers, and society in general, have been wary of employing females in perceived male and white collar positions. As a consequence, they have been frequently the first to be sacked. This has been particularly noticeable in the public sector, a key employer of Slav women. The problem is compounded by the introduction of titular language requirements, with Slav women having an even lower level of bi-lingualism than their male counterparts.[204]

Although Islam is a pan-national identity, numerous groups have sought to synthesise regional and/or national agendas with Islam into a political force rather than establish a pan-Islamic, international construction. This has been most evident in Tajikistan.[205] What distinguishes the Tajik example from others is that the majority of non-Communist Tajik political parties incorporated Islam into their manifestos. Tajik nationalist groups, including Rastokhez, used Islam in their construction of a Tajik identity.[206]

In the other four republics, Islamist groups have been most evident in regions with sizeable Uzbek communities, emphasising the link between national identity and religious affiliation rather than its supposed pan-Islamic, pan-Turkic attributes. The southern oblasts of Kazakstan, home to an Uzbek minority, have been the centre of the republic's Islamist movements. Similarly, Uzbeks have dominated the Wahhabi movement in Kyrgyzstan. As yet the inter-ethnic implications for "Uzbek-dominated" movements in surrounding republics are not clear. These groups have not espoused irredentist or ethno-centric policies.

Mainstream and state promotion of Islam in Kazak nationalism has been modest. As well as, a means of distinguishing the Kazaks from other Central Asian groups, particularly the Uzbeks, this helped placate Russian concerns and create a Kazak Muslim identity free of the alleged dogma and extremism of the Uzbeks. Fringe nationalist and Islamist groups have, however, combined the two issues to create a perverse and exclusive synthesis. Alash, Attan and Zheltoqsan have used faith in a nationalist manner. Thus the president of the Kazak environmental-nationalist movement Attan, Amantai Asilbekov, declared that,

> "we [the Kazaks] *did not assimilate* with others. Our Islam was given to us straight from Mohammed, *without chauvinism*, *extremism* or *antagonism*."[207]

As a counter to these discriminatory traits, Islamic discourse has also transcended ethnic divisions and promoted positive social goals. An example of this has been the Kazakstani movement organised by Oleg Rubets. Rubets, an ethnic Ukrainian and convert to Islam, established an organisation involved with the rehabilitation of Afghan war veterans.[208] Alash attracted Slav and German members, interested in the group's pro-democracy platform.[209] Similarly, in Uzbekistan the green movement Ecostan has used the *ulema* to promote environmentally responsible behaviour amongst their congregations.[210]

5.12.ii. Islamism's Relationship With Regionalism: Connections between sub-national identities and divisions and Islamist politics have been evident in the region. These contacts have provided the most cohesive and effective form of Islamism, and its greatest political challenge to the existing region's regimes. Tajikistan's has been most affected by this nexus, although as the examples below indicate Kazakstan and Uzbekistans' centre-region relations have contained an Islamic dimension.

A brief examination of the former indicates the political strengths and weaknesses of this nexus. Sahib Nazrov, a member of the Communist-dominated Tajik Parliament in 1991, stated that the Civil War was a "battle between two ideologies: Islam and Communism", a widely held interpretation of the conflict.[211] However, ideology has been determined by the fundamental consideration of Tajik politics, namely regional identification. Islamism was not able to provide an effective and unifying alternative capable of overcoming the regionalism of Tajik politics. The Tajik IRP, in common with all of Tajik politics has contained a regional character. Most of its founders are from the Garm Valley and in particular from the Garmi population deported to the Kurgan Teppa in the 1950s. Non-Garm Islamists have been cautious about renouncing their regional affiliations for pan-Tajik Islamic solidarity.[212] Political Islam in the republic has not been able to overarch such fractures. Regional identities rather than the secular-fundamentalist division has determined Tajikistani politics. This regional character deconstructs the view that Islam is monolithic or a pan-national ideology. It also indicates the manner in which it is applied in an instrumentalist manner.

5.12.ii.a. The Fergana Valley: In addition to the Fergana's distinctive characteristics - multi-ethnic, contested borders and acute demographic, economic and environmental stresses - historically the region was been renowned for its strong association with Islam. In 1993, 75% of Uzbekistani Fergana Valley residents, where a third of Uzbekistan's population live, considered themselves practising Muslims in contrast to the 25% in Tashkent and 20% in western Uzbekistan who identified themselves as such.[213] This proclivity has expressed itself politically.

5.12.ii.a.1. Namangan: Islamists in the Valley in 1991-2 posed a serious ideological and physical challenge to Tashkent's authority. The IRP and Adolat were independently active in the Valley.

IRP-led protest in the Valley which called for the removal of Karimov's "Communist" regime and the introduction of the *Sharia* attracted thousands of demonstrators, during late 1991.[214] The protest has also been linked to grassroots Muslim outrage at the involvement of official clergy in Karimov's presidential election campaign. The IRP successfully forced the Namangan *hokim* to resign, 26 January 1992, and assumed administrative responsibilities.

At the same time, Adolat established neighbourhood vigilante patrols in Namangan implementing Islamic laws and combating crime. It is probable that the local administration provided tacit support for Adolat's activities. By the December 1991 presidential election, Adolat's influence in Namangan was considerable. Karimov addressed an Adolat-organised demonstration prior to the elections and received a petition, whose demands included the adoption of Islam as the state religion.[215]

The Islamic victory was short-lived. Having paid lip-service to the Islamists' goals when visiting the region during the election campaign, Karimov instigated a crackdown in March 1992. Interior Ministry troops were drafted in to patrol the region. On 17 March 1992, the Islamic administration's headquarters, the former city Communist Party committee office, was ransacked. This was followed by the suppression of the Islamic city government. Birlik members were also arrested, suggesting less a fear of Islamic extremism than a drive against any independent activity. Numerous Adolat members managed to avoid arrest and went to ground, although the IRP leader Abdulla Utaev has not been seen since his arrest in December 1992.[216] The government's delayed response may have been an indication of its initially weak control of the region. Repression of the IRP and Adolat could only be implemented once Karimov's position in Tashkent was secure.

The Namangan events may be seen as the sole breakdown of central authority, the only region to have been in open defiance of Tashkent. The incident was easily placed within Tashkent's discourse of externally supported and inspired extremism which required a strong response and the strict control of religious activity. Bohr and Brown both recognise the political benefits Tashkent derived from this episode. These were:

- The repression of independent thinking and action;
- Legitimisation of authoritarianism; and
- The stigmatising of alternative approaches as destabilising.[217]

Uzbekistan's state television, in 1998, listed a series of other Islamic organisations operating in the Valley between 1989-92. These were the Islam Lashkarlari (Islamic Army), Amirlar (Emirs), Tavba (Repentance) and other unnamed groups.[218] It is unclear what happened to these although, interestingly, it was claimed that the 1998 killing of four policeman in Namangan was carried out by the remnants of these groups with assistance from Tajikistan and Pakistan.[219] This may be an admission that the government's repressive measures have failed to eliminate all Islamic opposition.[220] In response hundreds of people were detained before an alleged Wahhabi activist was arrested. It is unclear if the murders were actually carried out by Islamist activists. Other sources suggest the murders were crime-related rather than political.[221] As a BBC report stated,

> "[w]hether or not the armed group in Namangan really has anything to do with Islam is only part of the point. What's [sic] important is the authorities have pinned blame on Muslim elements and despite enormous efforts, have not so far managed to restore order."[222]

5.12.ii.a.2. Osh and Jalalabad: The rise of religious sects has been cited as a primary cause, along with poor governmental policies, for the continued tense nature of inter-ethnic relations in the southern Kyrgyzstani towns of Batken, Jalalabad and Osh. This, combined with the memory of the 1989 violence and the presence of Tajik opposition guerrilla bases in the republic, has concerned Bishkek. According to a survey by Bishkek Polytechnical Institute, only 10% of Kyrgyzs in Osh oblast favoured the establishment of an Islamic state. The corresponding figure for the Uzbek minority was 25%.[223]

Kyrgyzstan's relatively liberal religious laws encouraged the arrival of groups expelled from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Initially, these organisations were dominated by ethnic Uzbeks but, by 1995-6, Kyrgyzs and Tajik refugees were also involved.[224] *Vecherniy Bishkek* argued that these movements and their related madrasas were resulting in declining educational standards and a breakdown in social relations.[225] The republic's National Security Council has shown concern over this "Muslim offensive."[226] As Nissman concludes, however, it is inter-ethnic relations rather than religion that has been the underlying source of instability in the republic.[227]

5.12.ii.b. Southern Kazakstan: Just as the southern Kazaks were the more dedicated converts to Islam amongst this nation, the contemporary Islamic revival has been most pronounced in Zhambyl, Qyzlorda and Shymkent and other southern cities.[228] This regional character was highlighted by Azat Perushov, Deputy for Staff for Coordination of Political and National Processes Presidential Apparat. He commented on the presence of a pro-*shariat* sect in southern Kazakstan.[229] The north-south migration of Kazakstani Russians has been associated with concerns about increased Kazakification and Islamification of the south.

There is confusion over the political challenge to the governments that these regional movements pose. National and mainstream political participation and support has alluded both the Kazakstani and Uzbekistan groups. "The organizational reach and moblization capacity of the IRP have been severely hampered by the geographical isolation of the Fergana, ... by [the movements] predominantly rural constituency, and by its lack of financial resources. As such, the party has been less successful than its counterpart in Tajikistan in establishing local networks outside its sphere of influence of Fergana."[230] Contradictory, Haghayeghi declares elsewhere in his book, *Islam and Politics in Central Asia*, that,

> "[a]s the most densely populated region of Uzbekistan, the valley has historically espoused various religious trends that have spread into other parts of Central Asia."[231]

This argument is also applicable to the Wahhabi expansion in the Valley, although its uncompromising radicalism has not encouraged widespread support for the sect. The politicisation of regional differences in religious adherence may play a decisive and divisive role in centre-periphery relations in both republics, if coupled to inter-regional political competition. For both the Fergana and southern

Kazakstan this religious factor has acted as a key means of identification from the centre.

5.12.iii. Islamism and Economic and Social Justice: As in other parts of the world, Central Asian Islamism has been associated with other sensitive issues. These include: economic inequalities; social hardship; corruption; and the already discussed issues of environmental degradation and land and water privatisation, for example.

It has been suggested that the saliency of Islamism, and in particular the popularity of Wahhabism, in the Fergana Valley has been as much a consequence of the high level of unemployment in this industrialised and densely populated region, as it is related to the region's traditional religiosity.[232] Unemployment rates in the Valley were as high as 35% in 1991.[233]

Throughout Central Asia, the IRP has incorporated economics into its manifesto as a means of questioning the legitimacy of the new governments. Paragraph 26 of the IRP's programme declared that the party supports "the relegating, on the basis of the Sharia over-accumulation of wealth in the hands of some people."[234] Muslim demonstrators campaigned against food price rises in Fergana, 1992, and unemployment and accommodation issues have been raised by Islamist activists in Tajikistan.[235]

In Kazakstan, Attan, Zheltoqsan and other Islamist groups have organised protest on wages, pensions, unemployment and poor provision of utilities.[236] Nationalist-Islamist parties have also been vocal about government corruption. Secular organisations, including trade unions and the People's Congress, have also been active on these issues, indicating that Islamists do not offer the sole means of protest in the republic. In fact, most disgruntled and active Kazakstanis preferred other organisations to represent their interests.

Competition for economic and political power have influenced the adoption of Islam as a political instrument. This was illustrated in Tajikistan with the Garm clan's association with the IRP. As Roy notes, emphasising the nexus between regional identity and economic and political objectives,

> "economic competition helps to explain the civil war against a background of population growth, poverty, competition for land, and scarcity of water. The conflict was one based on both territorial claims between groups (all of them Tajiks and Muslims) and on ideological differences (Islam versus post-Communism.)"[237]

Political Islam provided a channel for the political aspirations of the alienated Garm clan. There is little reason to suggest that it cannot provide a similar vehicle for the disposed in Uzbekistan, possibly coupled to a Fergana regional political identity.

The interesting fact is that as yet these issues have not drawn supporters to the Islamist cause in either of the republics. Should this connection be bridged then the two governments may face a serious challenge which provides both ideological and social-economic critiques and alternatives. The fear of instability, a consistent theme in regional social surveys, and understandable given the examples of Afghanistan and Tajikistan, may partially account for the limited Islamist agitation on such issues. Another reason for the lack of popular support for Islamism may be because enough members of the Muslim community have a sufficient economic stake in the republics' development and therefore do not want destabilise them. Olcott argues that it is probably not a coincidence that the first of the large privatisation auctions, in Uzbekistan, was held in Namangan.[238] Having acknowledged this, such policies will only have limited success. It is difficult to envisage an economic redistribution programme capable of providing for the burgeoning population of unemployed, underemployed and "downwardly mobile."

The economic implications of an Islamist-inspired heightened security environment were discussed in the Russian Foreign Policy Doctrine, and Military Doctrine, adopted April and November 1993 respectively. "[A]lthough touching only indirectly on the issue of Islam, the doctrines do contain a number of relevant provisions suggesting that Islam [is] a threat to be reckoned with."[239] The doctrines highlighted the potential for domestic social unrest and political instability from the combined affects of economic boycotts, trade re-alignments, increased defence spending, and refugee pressures, often unintentional and indirect consequences.[240] The economic threats include:

- Deterioration in regional trade with the newly established Islamic state, which it is alleged would see a decline in its GNP.
- The economic and social impacts of refugee flows from Islamic-related crises. Refugees seeking accommodation, employment and other resources, causing the host state financial hardship. 300,000 refugees fled from Tajikistan to Uzbekistan, an increase of approximately 1% of the Uzbekistan population. As far as can be

ascertained, these refugees have to-date had little impact on Uzbekistan's social stability, although the arrival of a smaller number of refugees in northern Kazakstan has been less pacific.

- The establishment of an Islamic state, in Central Asia, would increase regional insecurity and require heightened (Russian) military preparedness and hence spending.[241]

For Kazakstan, which has not perceived Islamism as a national security threat, a military response has not been a high priority. Uzbekistan's military programme has, however, been associated with the *Islamic threat*.[242]

5.13. Islam's External Links: Ideological and Physical Threats

Prior to 1991, indigenous Islamists were continually portrayed as agents of external enemies. The term *Wahhabi* was widely employed by the authorities to suggest an alien and radical enemy. Such policies continued after independence, particularly in Uzbekistan. The continued restricted nature of politics and the clandestine and frequently transient nature of Islamic movements in Central Asia make such accusations difficult to qualify, although Soviet and post-Soviet concerns about extra-regional influences have to some extent been justified. There is evidence that prior to 1991, ideological and physical penetration did take place. Islamic broadcasts and literature produced in Afghanistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia were received in the region.[243] It was estimated that a third of Turkmen youth listened to one of the 38 stations along the Iranian-Soviet border which the Soviet media accused of attempting to export the Islamic revolution.[244]

Given the relative relaxation of politics and border controls since the Soviet's inability to isolate Soviet Muslims from the rest of the *umma*, it is to be expected that post-independence contact has increased dramatically. This has alarmed the regional government, particular Dushanbe and Tashkent, and infused security debates.

The recent establishment and unsecured legitimacy of the governments, concerns over social-political stability, and lack of experience in managing domestic civil society and foreign and diplomatic relations, have meant that the leaderships have been uneasy about the influence of foreign Muslim actors in their republics. The external situation has some valid causes for concern. Islamism has been influential in Afghanistan and Tajikistans' civil wars, whilst external patrons of Central

Asia's Islamic revival - Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia - each have had distinct assertive political interpretations of the faith in their domestic and foreign policies.

Almaty and Tashkent have approached foreign assistance to their indigenous religious expansion with caution. Financial aid when directed to state-sponsored activities, including mosque building, has been welcomed as it is relatively ease to control. Tashkent approved Iranian Tajik and Uzbek language broadcasts in the region and its funding of Shi'ite mosques in Bukhara, Samarkand and Tashkent.[245] A new mosque under construction in Almaty, has been funded by Saudi Arabia.[246]

In line with the governments' attitudes towards all autonomous political activities, foreign assistance to non-state religious groups has been regarded with suspicion. The governments have benefited from attempts to associate regional Islamists with external Islamic states. As an example, one Uzbekistani imam who received financial and material support from Saudi Arabia for his mosque was questioned by the police on why his mosque rather than the state should receive this aid.[247] The same cleric was accused of aiding the opposition in Tajikistan, and of failing to read the Directorate's official statements at Friday prayers.[248] Equally alarming for Tashkent has been the financial and ideological support that Wahhabists in the Fergana Valley have received from the Saudi Arabian Ahl-e Sunnah origination. The organisation provided an estimated $1.3. million for the construction of mosques and madrasas by the end of 1993, with the objective of training a regional Wahhabi cadre.[249]

Numerous Uzbekistani politicians, defence officials and analysts have sought to portray Islamic fundamentalism as the key threat to Uzbekistan's stability. Uzbekistan's Foreign Minister, Abdulaziz Komilov warned Islamic states not to "expand their influence" in the region.[250] This statement may be as much to do with Uzbekistan's regional interests as much as fears about political Islamism's encroachment. When interviewed at the time of the Taliban's major drive northwards in late 1996, Rafik Saifulin, Uzbekistani Institute of Strategic and Regional Studies, cited the conflicts in Afghanistan and Tajikistan and Islamic fundamentalism in the Fergana Valley as the main threats to the republic's security. He blamed the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Valley upon the involvement of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan.[251]

Despite the limited and moderate Islamic nature of the Tajikistani opposition, Karimov portrayed it as a springboard for a fundamentalist penetration of Central

Asia which would incite similar trends in Uzbekistan, even after he entered into dialogue with the UTO.[252] Tashkent's negotiations and accommodation with the UTO from April 1995 onwards suggests that either the Islamic threat diminished or never existed.[253] This *volte-face* dialogue with the UTO undermines Tashkent's proclaimed fear of Islamic fundamentalism. Kangas argues that Uzbekistan was keen to see an end to the conflict because of the fear of the export of Islamic fundamentalism and violence from Tajikistan.[254] This argument does not correspond with its political and material interventions in the conflict and in Afghanistan.[255] Uzbekistan, "the staunch enemy of the [Tajik] Islamic opposition and the key promoter of Islamic threat", has accepted accommodation with the UTO as a means of retaining influence in Tajik domestic politics and of checking Russian regional ambitions.[256] This suggests its anti-Islamic policy has been principally an instrument for its own regional objectives. It can be removed when it no longer provides political benefits.

As part of their response to the alleged external physical Islamist threat, Kazakstan and Uzbekistan have both been party to collective and bilateral military measures, including the CIS Collective Security Treaty, May 1992. The Treaty, together with subsequent bilateral agreements between Russia, and Kazakstan and Uzbekistan respectively, signed within weeks of the initial treaty, were regarded as a direct response to Tajik Civil War.[257]

Interestingly, Splidsboel-Hansen states that Russian analysts accept that whilst it is feasible to temporarily halt or lessen the potency of Islamic extremism in the region, a comprehensive bulwark against the ideology is impossible.[258] Security policies, even outright repression, have proved incapable of preventing the less-tangible political threat, including the dissemination of Islamic fundamentalism into the region.[259] As *Novoe Vremya* stated, the CIS agreement was an attempt "to resist the 'Islamification' of the region which would take place through the conduit of Tajikistan, according to Karimov."[260]

The practical affects of these security agreements has, however, been limited. Kazakstan was unwilling to meet its CIS commitment in Tajikistan, indicating a lack of immediacy of the Islamic threat to the northern republic as well as the poor material basis of its Armed Forces.[261] Unlike Uzbekistan, Islamism has not be perceived as the most pressing external security threat. For Kazakstan, China and Russia have been seen as more immediate concerns. Uzbekistan's partisan involvement in the Afghan and Tajik Wars have questioned its professed commitment to resolving the conflicts via peaceful means. Tashkent was criticised by Kyrgyzstan, a fellow contributor to the peacekeeping operation, for escalating tensions in the republic.[262]

The Tajik Civil War has had domestic implications for Uzbekistan. Had the democratic-Islamic movement been successful in Tajikistan in 1992, Uzbekistan may have been vulnerable to similar reformist pressures. One international observer, sceptical of Karimov's real intentions for intervention, has stated that "it is evident that Karimov was not too worried about the Islamic neo-Communist conflict but he objected to the IRP being incorporated into a coalition government."[263] The presence of the IRP in the government highlighted Karimov's greatest fear. Islam was, and remains, the only viable popular source of competition to his regime, and thus it could not be allowed to succeed in a neighbouring state. It was therefore in Tashkent's interests to discredit and destroy any potential regional challenge at its source, Tajikistan.[264] Whilst Dushanbe was controlled by the Islamic-democratic coalition, Uzbekistan jammed broadcasts from Tajikistan's capital, indicating the considerable concern that Tashkent had about alternative information being received by its own population.[265]

Uzbekistan's anti-Islamic perception of the war provided a means of attacking the ideological challenges to the Karimov government. Uzbekistan sought to portray Tajikistan's democratic and Islamic movements as radical, inherently unstable and ill-suited for Central Asia in this transitional period. Tajikistan was "an object lesson of what could happen to other ... states" according to Tashkent's analysis.[266] Under these conditions domestic authoritarian rule was justified as a temporary measure which will provide a firm and stable basis for gradual political and economic reforms.[267] In the Uzbekistani conservative analysis of events in Tajikistan, it was the proliferation of political movements and demands for "radical" political reforms that were responsible for the collapse into civil war. Domestic groups were associated with external enemies attempting to destabilise Uzbekistan, who by "making threats, spreading rumours, ... are seeking to sow the seeds of confrontation and strife and draw us into the orbit of Islamic Fundamentalism."[268]

Karimov immediately condemned the Islamic-democratic government as "tantamount to a Muslim fundamentalist take-over", and thus established a climate of imminent instability in which it was possible to launch a counter-attack on the nascent pluralist political culture in Uzbekistan.[269] Uzbekistan's domestic opposition, including Islamist groups, quickly felt the pressure of this association. Other forms of government repression included accusations of financial assistance by Uzbekistan's Muslim community to "fundamentalists" in Tajikistan.[270]

A *Nezavisimaya gazeta* article in 1994 claimed that governmental reports warned Karimov of an upsurge in Islamic activism, using Tajikistan and the Fergana Valley as an entrance into the republic. The report stated that, in 1993, 53 Islamic fundamentalists were expelled from Uzbekistan.[271] A more reliable source alleged that Uzbeks from Namangan fought against the Tajikistani government.[272] In 1998, Deputy Interior Minster, Major-General Kutbitdin Burkhonov, re-iterated the accusations of close co-operation between Uzbekistani Islamist and the Tajik opposition in 1991-3 period. He claimed that the latter were attempting to destabilise Uzbekistan during the said period, having "lured young Uzbeks and trained them as saboteurs and propaganda workers."[273] The Minister suggested that many of these activists who had "committed grave crimes on the territory of Uzbekistan" returned via Kyrgyzstan.[274] The underlying implication of this suggestion is that it was Kyrgyzstan's liberal laws and security that have lead to increased Islamic activism in the region.[275] Kyrgyzstan, in response, criticised Uzbekistan's over-zealous anti-fundamentalist drive.

Elements in the Russian leadership have voiced similar fears to Tashkent. *Interfax*, in May 1995, cited an unspecified Russian MFA source which claimed massive fundamentalist penetration of the region by unnamed Islamic states, and Saudi and Iranian financial support "to virtually every mosque" in Uzbekistan.[276] The same report claimed that Afghanistani Uzbeks were providing military and theological training for Uzbekistani radicals, with Egyptian and Saudi assistance.[277] At the end of 1996, at the same time as its military advances in Afghanistan, the Taliban made claims on Bukhara and Samarkand and expressed a desire to export its brand of Islam beyond Afghanistan.[278] In response, Russia and Uzbekistan increased their support for General Dostum's anti-Taliban forces.[279] The Taliban's fundamentalist position on society is far removed from current Central Asian ideas and practices and is unlikely to receive popular support in the region. The fact that the Taliban are ethnic-Pushtan and that the opposition forces are Tajik and Uzbek also deters the spread of such a form of fundamentalism into Central Asia. The Taliban has since recanted its claims on Bukhara and Samarkand.[280]

The situation in Afghanistan and Tajikistan has without doubt been serious security concerns for Uzbekistan, but there has been a credibility gap between rhetoric and practice. Numerous domestic and international commentators have criticised Tashkent for exaggerating the regional threat of Islamic fundamentalism.[281] Tashkent's rhetoric and repression seem to have elevated the sense of danger and radicalised rather than incorporated political Islam that exists with in the republic. Interviews conducted by the author and Petersen demonstrate that Uzbekistan's political elite have regarded "the strengthening and maintenance of regional stability" as the paramount objective of the republic's security policy.[282] The same group, however, did not feel that their position was militarily threatened.[283] Defence Minister, Rustam Akmyedov, supported this view of a secure Uzbekistan, capable of countering any potential aggressor.[284] The fact that Uzbekistan flouted its own peace proposals in both Afghanistan and Tajikistan questions its own alleged concerns about the proliferation of conflict, regionally. Uzbekistan's military strength would be capable of halting the Taliban's ambitious, and possibly entirely rhetorical, goal of incorporating Bukhara and Samarkand into a greater Afghanistan.[285] The neighbouring conflicts and Islamic states have, however, offered a feasible and potent ideological challenge rather than a physical threat to the two republics. This was emphasised by Saifiddin Jurayev, a member of the Progress of the Homeland Party, who stated that "[t]he threat from Afghanistan is the *influence* of Islamic fundamentalism."[286]

The case of Iran illustrates the ambiguities of foreign involvement in Central Asia.[287] Transnational cultural affinity with Tajikistan; Iranian "assertive" foreign policy since 1979; and the historical cultural competition between Persian and Turkic have made Almaty and Tashkent wary of its regional interests. Allegations of an Iranian pro-Islamic regional policy are, however, difficult to defend. Rather than seek to export revolution, Iran has pursued a moderate pragmatic policy with economic relations prominent in its agenda. Its policy towards Tajikistan, "especially in the critical months between May and October 1992, when the opposition might have had a chance [of success], was hesitant if not passive."[288] Tehran (correctly) perceived that the war was a power struggle between competing regions rather than between neo-Communist and Islamist ideologues. Tehran also felt that the Tajik opposition was insufficiently Islamic in character. As a result Tehran felt that the promotion of a Islamist and revolutionary policy was not advantageous and not likely to be successful. It "portray[ed] the crisis in Tajikistan in non-ideological terms, as an internal conflict with disturbing regional consequences."[289] Iran refused to arm the Tajik opposition and provided only cursory diplomatic assistance.[290] The discussion of Iranian foreign policy demonstrates that the republic was extremely cautious about advancing an explicitly ideological and revolutionary policy. Nor did it use cultural solidarity in its foreign policy discourse, even though these would have been advantageous for its relationship with Afghan and Tajik groups.[291] Instead Iran acted as a traditional regional power, partly concerned about countering pan-Turkism and Sunni fundamentalism, the latter supported by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.[292] Iranian influence in the region should not therefore be regarded as an Islamic ideological threat, but rather in a typical Realist manner.

Similarly, Tajik politicians have been very cautious about emphasising the nation's association with Iran and Iranian-ness. The Iranian association with Shi'ism and "fundamentalism" proved problematic for the majority of Tajik nationalists and politicians. This has been a particularly sensitive issue for Tajik-Uzbek relations. The Iranian component of the Tajik identity has therefore focused upon cultural rather that religious or ideological links.[293]

A final external consideration for Almaty and Tashkent has been the potential for domestic Islamist-nationalist criticism of their associations with foreign secular states. Given Russia's previous *colonial* role in Kazakstan, the republics' close economic and political relations have produced very little explicit Islamist-nationalist hostility in the southern republic. The stark economic and diplomatic realities that Kazakstan is confronted by, together with the limited Islamist and nationalist element in its politics may account for this. The situation for Tashkent has been more inflammatory. Uzbekistan's post-independent regional policy has a distinct anti-Islamic fundamentalist posture. This aided its recognition by the international community, particularly Russia and the USA. Uzbekistan's pragmatic and autonomous foreign policy enabled the US to view it as "an island of stability" capable of resisting Islamic and Russian ambitions in the region.[294] The benefits for Uzbekistan were twofold: confirming its international stature, assisting the promotion of its self-image for internal and external consumption; and forcing the international community to temper its criticisms of the government's domestic oppression. Uzbekistan's political and military alliance with Russia and its recent rapprochement with the USA, both secular states, may provide a key source of criticism for domestic Islamic and (nationalist) critics. However the careful promotion of an assertively independent foreign policy, and the lack of reliable news may prevent this.

5.14. Conclusion: Assessing the Islamic Threat

There has clearly been a revival in "folk Islam", the re-integration of Islam into national cultural identities and as a religious practice. The popular commitment to these trends has been ambiguous, with many believers lacking a well-grounded knowledge of fundamental religious tenets and adhering only cursorily to principles such as the prohibition on consuming alcohol or pork. Equally, there is some evidence to suggest that popular interest in Islam may have declined since its peak between the late-1980s and early-1990s, when identification with the religion was a symbolic gesture of the independence and nationalist trends. These inconsistencies have been most noticeable in Kazakstan, where traditional religious adherence was cursory. However, it must be remembered that throughout the Soviet period a committed minority continued to practice the faith in a relatively unadulterated and comprehensive manner, whilst the wider community was influenced by Muslim values. After independence a more Islamic-sympathetic environment was created in both republics. Domestic and foreign clerics, literature and finances have assisted in the dissemination of more genuine Islamic information to a wider and receptive audience.

It is uncertain whether the relatively benign contemporary cultural and spiritual trends, frequently superficial, will transform into political Islam, echoing Roy's conclusions on contemporary Islam's retreat from politics.[295] Political Islam, and Islamic fundamentalism have not dominated the political cultures of either of the republics and the governments have emphasised the secular nature of their political systems whilst acknowledging the traditional influence of Islam in their cultures.

The modest Islamification of the two societies and the governments' careful regulation of Islam has not prevented either Almaty or Tashkent from regarding Islamism as a challenge to regime and state security. In fact, the authorities' careful regulations indicated these apprehensions.

To what extent are these concerns about an Islamist threat justified? Autonomous Islamist movements and popular activism have had a role in the political affairs of both republics. They have campaigned on a variety of issues including the appointments of the Chief Muftis, official corruption and economic grievances over wages, pensions and food prices. The established clergy have not always remained acquiescent. The Chief Muftis' forays into politics and contacts with independent Islamic movements have forced the governments to realise that their patronage of Islam is equivocal. However, unlike several Middle Eastern states and others in closer proximity - Afghanistan; Iran and Tajikistan - political Islam has not, either through the political process or military/direct methods, been able to challenge central authority in a sustained republican-wide manner. To some extent Almaty and Tashkents' pro-active policies have contributed to this. Islamist parties have been harassed and outlawed in both republics, although in the case of Kazakstan it is likely that Islamism would have been a fringe activity anyway.

Similarly, popular support for explicit radical Islamist groups has been lacking. Whilst surveys indicated modest interest in an enhanced role for Islam in politics and society, the respondents held confused opinions about both the political and religious characteristics of Islam. The majority of republics' Muslims have favoured the Islamic revival remaining in the cultural and spiritual spheres. They have percieved that Islamic politics, based on the examples of Afghanistan and Tajikistan, are unable to provide social stability and economic progress.[296] This has deterred pro-Islamic sympathies. The involvement of Islamist movements in the collapse of Tajikistan, and the radical nature of the Taliban, have harmed its image in the region. This perceptual factor has been highly significant. This argument has been an integral component of the governments' maintenance of authoritarian politics.

The Islamist groups themselves weakened their political salience. Insufficient popular support, poor organisational and ideological structures, and serious government censure restricted their development. None have been able to offer consistent and popular manifestos. In Kazakstan the overtly anti-Russian and sharia-state objectives of Zheltoqsan alienated support. Alash's involvement in the anti-Ratbek violence and its confused stance on the shariat signified a small, ideologically weak and unpopular movement. Islamist parties in Uzbekistan have faced far greater government harassment, with the arrest and disappearance of party leaders and independent clerics. This is probably the key reason for the Islamists' political failure in Uzbekistan.

The movements have also been constrained by internal deficiencies, primarily the regional character of the three main groups, Adolat, the IRP and the Wahhabist; and the unwillingness to form a tactical alliance between the latter two. In both republics, memberships has been minimal and lacked nation-wide appeal. Party ideologies and manifestos have been confused, particularly in relation to the issue of the end-goal - the *Islamic state*. When the full force of the government, including security services, has been directed against them, the Islamist parties have been easily defeated. The Islamists, forced underground and denied participation in the political process, have not, as yet, resorted to terrorist action.

A convincing factor in suggesting the limited politicisation of faith in the region is that historically parallel Islam has not been antagonistic. It has acted rather as a means of continuing religious customs and rites. "Underground Islam was a stable, not radical, force in [Soviet] Central Asia."[297] Hanafi and Sufi traditions influenced this apolitical character. The respected position of Sufism in Central Asian faith with its focus upon prayer, individual piety and "neo-fundamentalist" activist may encourage an apolitical future. The brotherhoods are not centralised, with loyalty directed to an individual *pir* (spiritual leader) rather than the order. There is the potential for Sufi-led political activism as the Brotherhoods have historically acted as a vanguard of militant resistance to non-Muslim invaders. It is unclear whether this could be re-directed towards indigenous Muslim targets.

The key consideration for the poor standing of Islamic politics in Uzbekistan has been government censure. In Kazakstan, similar though less forceful opposition has been less influential because of the already restricted appeal of political Islam. This factor is, however, equivocal. Bezanis' suggestion that Islamic politics has not emerged because of the present leaderships' hostility to Islamic extremism negates the near-consensus of academic research on the development and radicalisation of Islamic politics.[298] It is these deliberate state policies, presently restricting the movement's influence, that will ultimately prove the single most important catalyst for political Islam in the region. Political Islam is reactive, a source of inspiration for opposition to secular politics. Almaty and Tashkent have implemented wholesale opposition to all independent Islamist groups, rather than selective accommodation. This is liable to create the political environment for political Islam to adopt radical methods and objectives. OSCE Chairman, the Polish Foreign Minister Bronislov Geremek, informed Karimov that Islamic Fundamentalism's political credibility and popular support are enhanced by government repression. This action he argued transforms moderate Islamist politics into extremism.[299]

The banning of Islamist movements, including Adolat, Attan and the IRP, has reduced their political strength considerably. There is considerable consensus amongst observers that the repression of Islamism has simply forced the movements underground rather than eradicate them.[300] The long-term implications of this are liable to be negative. Particularly in Uzbekistan, the suppression of moderate secular and Muslim opponents may produce a vacuum into which underground radical Islamic movements can establish themselves. "The repression of democratic Uzbek nationalists [Birlik and Erk] may prove to have removed an important moderating force from the political scene."[301] Moderate domestic opposition has been eliminated whilst the only credible challenger to the regime, political Islam, has been forced underground. Ironically, the very ideology that the repression was directed against may have been strengthened and radicalised. The lack of political alternatives, a consequence of government actions, may lessen the possibility for compromise between the incumbent and its rivals. The distinctions between democratic and undemocratic, and moderate and extremist methods and objectives have not been used as criteria for inclusion or exclusion. Haghayeghi is explicit about the counter-effect consequences of extreme repression of Islamist movements in Uzbekistan. He argues that,

> "[e]xpereince has shown that such authoritarian policies, almost invariably, strengthen the legitimacy of such organizations while at the same time adversely affecting the legitimacy of thc government, with devastating long-term consequences. This has been the case in Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco; Central Asia may not been much different."[302]

Haghayeghi's proposed solution, re-iterating Tal's conclusions, is democratisation.[303] This would help to undermine Islamists' populist appeal and reduce their radicalism by forcing Islamic groups to adhere to the political process. Other ideologies and parties would diminish their strength too. The opposing cases of the creation of an Islamic opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Jordan's use of political inclusion also indicate such conclusions.

If the Uzbekistani press reports of the existence of underground Islamic groups in the Fergana Valley in 1998 are correct, and the groups are remnants of the overt movements extant in 1992, this indicates Tashkent's failure to control politics through coercive actions. As late as 1996, popular independent Islamic activism, a considerable feat in Uzbekistan, was reported. Parishioners interrupted a pro-Karimov speech by Toxtabi mosque's imam, in February 1996, and called for the return of their previous imam, Abud Khan Kori. This took place whilst the mosque was surrounded by the Uzbekistani Secret Services, the SNB, and Interior Ministry troops.[304] According to *Informatsionn'i biulleten'*, 200 believers later protested outside the *Oli Majlis* over the latter disappearance of imam Kori.[305]

Other factors also indicate that Islamism's present weak position in the two republics may only be temporary. One of these is the acknowledgement by the fundamentalist clergy that their present goal is the establishment of a committed cadres "properly versed in Islam" before seeking the pursuit of an Islamic state.[306]

The typical demographic features for an Islamist growth have been evident in Central Asia. Students and the young have been central to the cadres of contemporary Islamist movements. Burgeoning populations, related decline in employment opportunities and the replacement of internationalist educational and social norms with narrower national values provide the potential for increased association between the region's youth and Islamism. Neo-fundamentalism rather than political Islam is likely to be the chief beneficiary of these trends, as Roy's research has indicated. Large-scale Saudi investment in the region and the corresponding increase in Wahhabi activities·support this conclusion. This author would argue, however, that whilst neo-fundamentalism has traditionally been apolitical, Sufi-Wahhabi violence in the Caucasus and the politicisation of Afghanistan's Muslim community in response to the ideological as well as military, Soviet onslaught indicate that it can also evolve into a physical political force.

The uneven dissemination and adoption of Islam in the region may prevent a regional revival capable of crossing national and state affiliations.[307] In the twentieth century, however, Islamist movements have been most successful when operating from within a national or regional context. Central Asia has not be an exception to this trend. Stalin explicitly established four spiritual directorates in 1941 to prevent a pan-Soviet Muslim identity. Within Central Asia political and religious authority was nationalised with the establishment of republican religious directorates, in the independent republics.

Where political Islam has been successful, the Fergana Valley and Tajikistan most notably, it has assumed either an ethnic or regional characteristic. Combined with national or regional affiliations such a renaissance could prove more appealing but also exclusive and antagonistic. The possibility of Uzbekistan like Tajikistan fragmenting along ethnic or regional lines is an understandable concern for Tashkent. Adolat-IRPs' temporary control of Namangan was an indicator of the limited identification with central authority in the republic in 1991-2, although irredentism within the republic has not attracted much support.[308] Nazarbaev's chief concerns about regional divisions within the republic have focused upon the division between the Russian-populated north and Kazak south, to the extent that Kazak migration and the transfer of the capital to the north have been implemented. As yet there does not appear to be concern about a southern, Islamic-infused, challenge to the state's integrity.

The final consideration that may increase Islamism as an instrument of opposition is the economic development of the republics. Given the region's economic dislocation since the Soviet period and economic inequalities and accusations of *nomenklatura* corruption, the Islamists have singularly failed to use this issue to their advantage. The future politicisation of this issue will be event-led, with Islamists able to draw sustenance from popular disquiet over their material position which, as Azar and Moon have argued, frequently preclude the erosion of regime legitimacy.[309]

Domestically, rather than act as a source of tension between Muslims and non-Muslim groups, Islam has been more effective in defining national groups and acting as a weapon against Muslim governments or other Muslim groups. Although, therefore, Islam has acted as a boundary marker between Slavs and "indigenous" communities conflict along this fracture has been minimal. In fact, all inter-ethnic violence witnessed in the region during the last two decades, with the exception of Alma-Ata December 1986, has been between Muslims. Muslim-non Muslim tensions have not resulted in violence.

With the exception of Namangan, domestic Islamist activities have remained within the normal remit of legitimate political debate. As such, it is difficult to conclude that it has constituted a national security threat. Whilst Almaty has not attempted to portray it as such, Tashkent has. This was essentially a self-interested regime response and recognised as such by Ibrahim Pulatov, co-chair of Birlik and participant in the establishment of the IRP.[310] Pulatov noted that the Islamic opposition has been able to reach the population through the mosque far more successfully than the urban and intellegensia based and outlawed Erk and Birlik.[311] Pulatov also recognised the greater ideological strength and popular resonance of Islamism than secular movements in Uzbekistan, stating that "people who have already lost their faith in the Communist regime are afraid to join the democrats but not the Islamic movement."[312] Islamism is essentially a legitimate political challenge to Karimov. The government's refusal to allow it to participate in the political process may transfer it from this position to a security one. Lacking any broad grassroots status in Kazakstan, its contemporary and future political and security affects will be minimal.

The security implications for the two republics from external Islamism diverge quite considerably. Conflicts in neighbouring Afghanistan and Tajikistan clearly required political and military responses. Uzbekistan's behaviour towards events in these states has been partially motivated by justifiable threats to its integrity and stability. As Carlisle notes, although Tashkent may have exaggerated the Islamic threat this does not necessary imply that such concerns have been totally unfounded.[313] The existence of these problems cannot be ignored although those emanating from the Tajik conflict have been manipulated in order to legitimise the continuation of authoritarianism and to discredit and repress domestic Islamic politics.

Although beyond the period of study, if current agreements can lead to long-term peace in Tajikistan, with the incorporation of the UTO into a post-war government, and the Taliban maintain their advances in northern Afghanistan, this would locate ideological opponents to Karimov's rule in enhanced positions on Uzbekistan's borders. Although Tashkent, after 1993, sought a more conciliatory role in Tajikistan's affairs, Karimov's emphatic linkage between domestic and regional adversaries, and the predominantly confrontational manner employed against them may prove disadvantageous now that the regional political map has altered. A reappraisal of its foreign policy with repercussions for the domestic situation may be expedient.

The UTO's incorporation into a post war coalition government in Dushanbe may see it moderate its Islamist platform as it is forced to become involved in the compromises of mainstream politics. This would counter popular perceptions of Islamism as inherently radical and conflictual, a view regional governments have been keen to perpetuate. This transformation is dependent upon the provision of reliable and unbiased news, itself a rare commodity in the region. As yet it is unclear what the Taliban's regional policy will be. It may seek to export its revolutionary ideology or support similar movements, partly as a means of securing its own position, as was the case of Khomeini-era Iran.

The effect of these changes are indirect and less significant for Kazakstan. Almaty was less implacably opposed to Tajikistan's Islamists, to the extent that its involvement in CIS operations in the republic was circumspect. As Sadit Zhisipov, of the Kazakstan Institute of Strategic Studies noted, “Afghanistan is explicitly a problem for Uzbekistan, it is not an immediate security concern for us,” although he was concerned about the domino effect upon Central Asia.[314]

Interestingly, Kazakstan, with its a combined Christian-Muslim and ethnic division and more secular leadership, has managed political Islam more successful than Uzbekistan, with its more established Muslim culture and a leadership keen to claim this legacy. Even though Almaty forcibly responded to Islamist movements, particularly Alash, it is clear that the government has not perceived Islam as serious a threat as its colleagues in Tashkent have. Zhisipov stated that, “Islam is not a major problem in Kazakstan [because] Islam is like a hybrid in Kazakstan.”[315] Presently, Islam’s political influence has remained limited in Kazakstan. Government policies, the underlying modest Kazak identification with the religion, and the poor standing of radical groups because of their internal weaknesses and popular resistance to their ideologies, have all deterred Islam’s greater and more extreme role.

Islam’s long-term influence on the social stability of the two republics is likely to be different. The less intense adoption of Islam by the Kazaks historically, the presence of a large non-Muslim community, more democratic political culture and the small number of Islamist movements in Kazakstan indicates a limited and relatively benign role for Islam. On the most dangerous fracture, Russian-Kazak relations, religion has played a minor role. In Uzbekistan, Islam is liable to play a far greater role in social and political affairs. It has been influential and positive in the re-interpretation of the Uzbek national and state-identities. Politically, however, it has become a contentious issue. Government hostility towards independent thought, Islamism included, have polarised attitudes. The present growth in interest in Islamic culture and education in the republic, combined with the suppression of informal Islam may provide a breeding ground for the emergence of a strong, well-informed and radical form of Islamism.

Uzbekistan, due to its demographic size, and Islam’s historical importance is central to the development of political Islam in the region. “In short, without Uzbekistan in turmoil, the prospect of a region-wide Islamic wave being unleashed is reduced virtually to zero.”[316] “Whether there really is an Islamic threat ... is perhaps secondary to the leadership’s perception of it.”[317]

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[1] Quranic Sura, liv: 8. Quoted in Vatikiotris, P.J. *Islam and the State*, Croom Helm, New York, 1987, p 25.
[2] Armstrong, K. "Fundamentalist fervour" *Sunday Times*, 9/1/94, Section 6, p 4.
[3] Esposito, J. *Islam and Politics*, Syracuse University Press, New York, 1991, p 6.
[4] Vatikiotris, P.J. op cit., pp. 25-30.
[5] Roy, O. *The Failure of Political Islam*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1994, p 195. (i)
[6] Ibid. pp. 13-4.
[7] Al Raziq in Khadduri, M. (ed.) *Political Trends in The Arab World*, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1970, p 217. Quoted in Ahrari, M.E. "Islam as a Source of Conflict and Change in the Middle East" *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1994, p 185.
[8] Ayubi, N. *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*, Routledge, London, 1991, p 120; & Vatikiotris, P.J. op cit., p 58.
[9] Ibid.
[10] See for example Piscatori, J.P. "Introduction" in Piscatori, J.P. (ed.) *Islam in the Political Process*, RIIA/CUP, Cambridge, 1983.
[11] The tenets of the Shi'a branch are based upon the legitimacy of the Prophet's family and succession through his first cousin, Ali, to the Caliphate, and the language of the imams.
[12] Roy, O. op cit., p 170. (i)
[13] Beinin, J. & Stork, J. "On Modernity, Historical Specificity, and International Context of Political Islam" in Beinin, J. & Stork, J. (eds.) *Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report*, I.B. Tauris, London, 1997, p 6.
[14] Ahrari, M.E. op cit., p 189.
[15] Hourani, A. "Conclusion" in Piscatori, J.P. op cit., p 229.
[16] Political leaders are rarely the most religiously knowledgeable or devout, nor are they expected to be. The *ulama* hold considerable intellectual and moral authority and the *imam*, social influence.
[17] Ahrari, M.E. op cit., pp. 189-190.
[18] Esposito, J. op cit., p 29.
[19] Ibid, p 292.
[20] See Beinin, J. & Stork, J. op cit.
[21] Roy, O. op cit., p 50. (i)
[22] Piscatori, J.P. op cit., p 2.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid, p 3.
[25] Ibid, p 123.
[26] Dekmejian, R.H. "Islamic Revival: Catalysts, Categories, and Consequences" in Hunter, S. (ed.) *The Politics of Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and Unity*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1988, p 10.
[27] Roy, O. op cit., p 174. (i)
[28] See Dekmejian, R.H. op cit., pp. 12-4.
[29] Ibid, p 14.
[30] See Roy, O. op cit., pp. 38-9. (i)
[31] Ibid, p 76.
[32] Ibid, p 85.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid, p 76.
[35] Piscatori, J.P. op cit., p 124. Also see Dekmejian, R.H. Table 1 Causes of Islamist Resurgence op cit., p 7
[36] Piscatori, J.P. op cit., p 223.
[37] Hadar, L. "What Green Peril?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 2, 1993, p 35.
[38] See Dekmejian , R.H. op cit., p. 11.
[39] Vatikiotris, P.J. op cit., p 13.
[40] Murphy, K. "Islamic Party Wins Power in Algeria" *Los Angeles Times*, 28/12/91, p A15. Quoted in Dawisha, K. & Carrere d'Encausse, H. "Islam In The Foreign Policy of the Soviet

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[41] Dekmejian, R.H. op cit., p 8.

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[44] Ansairi, H. "The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics" *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1984, p 133. Quoted Piscatori, J.P. op cit., p 163.

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[46] Roy, O. op cit., p 49. (i)

[47] Piscatori, J.P. op cit., p 159. See Munson, H. *Islam and Revolution in the Middle East*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1988.

[48] Roy, O. op cit., pp. 80-1. (i)

[49] Ibid, p 51.

[50] Ibid, p 84.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Dekmejian, R.H. op cit., pp. 16-7.

[53] Piscatori, J.P. op cit., p 125.

[54] See Aharai, N. op cit., p 189.

[55] Piscatori, J.P. op cit., pp. 174-5.

[56] Roy, O. op cit., p 112. (i)

[57] See Atkin, M. *The Subtlest Battle: Islam in Soviet Tajikistan*, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, 1989, pp. 36-7

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[60] Tal, L. "Dealing with Radical Islam: The Case of Jordan" *Survival*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1995, p 139.

[61] Ibid.

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[64] Tal, L. op cit., p 150.

[65] Ibid, p 153.

[66] See ibid, pp. 139-56.

[67] Hadar, L. op cit., p 38.

[68] Dekmejian, R.H. op cit., p 17, & Roy, O. op cit., p 85. (i)

[69] See Esposito, J. op cit., p 293.

[70] Ibid, p 295.

[71] Vatikiotris, P.J. op cit., p 10.

[72] Roy, O. op cit., p 129. (i)

[73] Ibid, p 124. Brackets added.

[74] Ibid, p 27.

[75] Ibid, p 195.

[76] Ibid.

[77] Tal, L. op cit., p 139.

[78] Haghayeghi, M. *Islam and Politics in Central Asia*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1995, p 81.

[79] Ibid.

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[81] Roy, O. "Islam in Tajikistan" *The Project on Open Society in Central Eurasia Occasional Paper*, No. 1, Open Society Institute, July 1996, p 1. (ii)

[82] Ibid, p 78.

[83] Ibid, p 79.

[84] Lubin N. *Central Asians Take Stock: Reform, Corruption and Identity*, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, 1995, p 16.

[85] Carrere d'Encausse, H. *Islam and the Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, I.B. Tauris, London, 1988 p 31.

[86] See Akiner, S. *The Formation of Kazakh Identity: From Tribe to Nation-State*, RIIA, London, 1995, p 28. (ii)

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[87] Haghayeghi, M. op cit., p 7.
[88] Carrere d'Encausse op cit., p 91.
[89] The legal procedure for the duty of disobedience was never fully explained, rather it was left to an informal decision by the religious elite. Yaroshevski, D. "The Central Government and Peripheral Opposition in Khiva, 1910-24" in Ro'i, Y. (ed.) *The USSR and the Muslim World: Issues in Domestic and Foreign Policy,* Allen & Unwin, 1984, p 24. (i)
[90] Ibid.
[91] The term *Basmachilik* originally was applied to highway bandits but came to symbolise Central Asian Islamic warriors defending their religious and national heritage. Haghayeghi, M. op cit., p 17.
[92] Ibid, p 18.
[93] Voll, J. "Central Asia as Part of the Modern Islamic World" in Manz, B.F. (ed.) *Central Asia in Historical Perspective,* Westview Press, Boulder, 1994, p 65.
[94] Yaroshevski, D. op cit., p 24.
[95] The other directorates were located in Ufa (Bashkir), Baku and Makhachkala (Dagestan).
[96] Haghayeghi, M. op cit., p 35.
[97] The number of anti-Islamic books increased from 24 in 1981 to 72 in 1983, whilst 11,000 anti-religious lectures were delivered in Namangan in 1979 alone. Ibid, p 37.
[98] Ibid.
[99] The north (Leninabad) and centre of the republic featured twice as much in media reports, as the southeast (Gorno-Badakhshan AO) and south (Kurgan Tuibe & Kulab), even though the Gissar mountains interfered with the north's reception of Iranian broadcasts. Atkins, M. op cit., p 39.
[100] *Pravda vostok,* 25/11/86. Quoted in Critchlow, J. *Nationalism In Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic's Road To Sovereignty,* Westview Press, Boulder, 1991 p 175.
[101] *Pravda vostok,* 12/8/87. Quoted ibid.
[102] Usmanov, N. "Useful Points of Collaboration" *Kommunist uzbekistana,* June 1989, pp. 47-8. Quoted ibid.
[103] Haghayeghi, M. op cit., pp. 66-7.
[104] Hanks, R. "The Islamic Factor in Nationalism and Nation-Building in Uzbekistan: Causative Agent or Inhibitor?" *Nationalities Papers,* Vol. 22, No. 2, 1994, p 315.
[105] Muhammad Sadiq Muhammad Yusuf, *Esi-by my vse byli nabozhnymi,* Chulpan, Tashkent, 1992, p 10. Quoted in Olcott, M.B. "Islam and Fundamentalism in Independent Central Asia" in Ro'i, Y. (ed.) *Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies,* Frank Cass, Ilford, 1995, p 27. (v)
[106] *Sostoianie religoiznosti i ateisticheskogo vospitaniia v regionakh traditsonnogo rasprostraneniia Islama,* Moscow, Akademiia obshchestvennykh nauk pri TsK KPSS, Institut nauchnogo ateizma, Sovetskaia sotsiologicheskaia assotsiatsiia, 1989, pp. 5-8. Quoted in Ro'i, Y. "The Secularization of Islam and USSR's Muslim Areas" in ibid, p 14.
[107] Ibid.
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[109] Rywkin, M. *Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia,* M.E. Sharpe, New York, 1982, p 88 & Kedzie, C. "Religion and Ethnicity in Central Asia" *Central Asia Monitor,* No. 3, May-June 1992, pp. 14-5. Quoted in Kangas, R. "The Three Faces of Islam in Uzbekistan" *Transitions,* Vol. 1, No. 24, 29/12/95, p 18. (i)
[110] Wight, R. "Report from Turkestan" *The New Yorker,* 6/4/92, p 52. Quoted in Juergenseyer, M. *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State,* University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993, p 129.
[111] Derlugauan, G. & Tabyshalieva, A. "'The Religious Factor' in Central Asia and the Caucasus" Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Chevy Chase, 1997.
[112] See Bohr, A, *Uzbekistan: Politics and Foreign Policy,* RIIA, London, 1998. (ii)
[113] Lubin, N. op cit., p 15.
[114] Grant, S. "Faith in Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Islam" *USIA Opinion Analysis,* 14/2/95. Quoted in Kangas, R. op cit., p 19 (i)
[115] Ilkhanov, A. "Usbekistan [sic] Ethno-Social Problems of the Transitional Period" *Sotsiologicheskie Issledovannia,* Moscow, No. 8, 1992, pp. 12-17. Quoted in Malashenko, A.

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[256] *Interfax*, Moscow, 1506 gmt, 14/4/95, SWB SU 2279, G2, 17/4/95; ITAR-TASS Moscow, 2042 gmt, 1/4/95, SWB SU 2269, G 2, 4/4/95; & ITAR-TASS, Moscow, 1418 gmt, 4/1/95, SWB SU 2272, G 2, 7/4/95.

[257] Kangas, R. op cit., p 54. (i)

[258] See for example Bourke, G. "Enemy forces unite for final attack on Afghan leader" *The Guardian*, 11/3/94, p 15; & *Voice of Free Tajikistan*, 0300 gmt 1/5/97, SWB SU 2908, G 2, 2/5/97.

[259] Mesbahi, M. op cit., footnote 56, p 158

[260] Splidsboel-Hansen, F. op cit., pp. 1508-10.

[261] Ibid, p 1504.

[262] Ibid, p 1507.

[263] Dubnov, A "Fundamentalizma Mozhno ne boiat'sia" *Novoe Vremia*, No. 8, 1995, pp. 10.

[264] Its peacekeepers took nine months to arrive in Tajikistan. Olcott, M.B. op cit., p 73. (vi)

[265] *Slovo Kyrgyzstana*, 20/1/95, p 2. SWB SU 2225 G 5, 1/2/95.

[266] Author's interview, Tashkent, 4/11/96.

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[268] Mirsaidov, J. *Perechen' Faktov Politicheskoi Diskriminatsii Demokraticheskikh Organizatsii Tadzhikov i ikh Aktivistov*, 26/3/94. (ii)

[269] Olcott, M.B. op cit., p 121. (vi)

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[274] Usmanov, L. "Will the Islamic Factor Determine The Country's Future?" *Nezisimaya gazeta*, 6/1/95, p 3. *CDPSP*, XLVI, No. 1, 1994, p 17.

[275] *Central Asian Brief*, Vol. 10, No. 6, June 1994, p 13. Quoted in Haghayeghi, M. op cit., p 241.

[276] Deputy Interior Minster, Major-General Kutbitdin Burkhonov, *Uzbek TV*, 26/1/98. *Inside Central Asia*, Issue 209, 26/1-1/2/98, p 3. Also see *Narodnoye Slovo*, 4/2/95, p 1. SWB SU 2221 G 6, 7/2/95.

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[281] Gannon, K. "Afghanistan's worried neighbours helping anti-Taliban alliance" *Associated Press*, 17/4/97.

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[286] Ibid.

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[150] Malashenko, A. op cit. (ii)

[151] Dave, B. op cit., pp. 24-5. (ii)

[152] Edmunds, T. *Nation-building in a Multi-ethnic Kazakstan: Identity, Power and Politics* PhD Thesis, University of Sheffield, 1998. (draft version) (iii)

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[171] SWB, SU 1234, B 9, 20/11/91 & *Central Asian Brief* No. 2, 1992, p 6. Quoted in Haghayeghi, M. op cit., p 91.

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[189] Critchlow, J. op cit., p 176.

[190] Bashirov, "Islam in Our Time" *Slovo lektora*, No. 1, 1989, pp. 39-40. Quoted in Haghayeghi, M. op cit., p 154.

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[194] Zhounisbek Soultanmurtatov, Press-Service Consultant to the President of the Republic of Kazakstan. Interview with Haghayeghi, 7/6/93. Quoted in Haghayeghi, M. op cit., p 86.

[195] Ibid.

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[198] Lubin, N. op cit., p 17.

[199] Haghayeghi, M. op cit., p 66.

[200] *Kommunist Tadjikistana* 16/10/89. (The authors were a KGB "press group") Quoted in Ro'i, Y. op cit., p 62. (ii)

[201] Olcott, M.B. op cit., p 22. (v) Both of the republics constitutions declare that the states are non-domination and secular.

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[222] *Inside Central Asia*, Issue 203, 15-21/12/97, p 1.

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[226] Nissman, D. "Islam As Political Tool In The New Muslim Republics" *Prism*, Vol. 1, No. 20, 22/9/95.

[227] Ibid.

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[279] Ibid.

[280] Ibid.

[281] See Mirsaidov, J. for domestic criticism. Quoted in Polat, A. "Political Prisoners in Uzbekistan: Five Pardoned Eight on Trail" *Central Asian Monitor*, No. 6, 1994, p 36.

[282] Jurayev, S. Member of the Progress of the Homeland Party (*Vatan Taraqqiyoto Partiyasi*). Author's Interview, Tashkent, 16/11/96. Also see Petersen, P. "Security in Post-Soviet Central Asia" *European Security*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1995, p 134.

[283] Ibid.

[284] Uzbek Radio, 0500 gmt, 8/5/95. SWB SU 2298 S 1/2 9/5/95.

[285] Uzbekistan has developed the most comprehensive defence programme in Central Asia. The republic was the first Central Asian state to establish a National Guard, in January 1992, within six months had proposals for a fully integrated military and established within a year of independence a 25-35,000 strong force. Uzbekistan has the only military academy in Central Asia and between 1992-6 the percentage of Uzbek officers in the Force rose from 6% to 60%. For the regional divisions of Uzbekistan and their political implications see Carlisle, D. "Geopolitics and Ethnic Problems of Uzbekistan" in Ro'i, Y. (ed.), op cit.

[286] Jurayev, S. op cit., Italics added.

[287] In 1998, Kazakstan accused Iran of spying which it said "represent[ed] a threat to the country's security." It is unclear whether there was any foundation to the charges or the perceived threat was Islamic in nature. *RFE/RL* Vol. 2, No. 39, pt 1 26/2/98.

[288] Mesbahi, M. op cit., p 149.

[289] Ibid.

[290] ITAR-TASS 28/10/92, FBIS-SOV 30/10/92, p 11; & Mesbahi, M. op cit., p 150.

[291] For the Khomeini-period government, the medium for foreign policy discourse was pan-Islamism, revolutionary, and Shi'ism. Roy, O. op cit., p 183. (i)

[292] Ibid, p 184.

[293] Mesbahi, M. op cit., p. 145.

[294] Uzbek TV, 1630 gmt, 6/4/96, SWB SU 2275, G 8, 11/4/95 & Kangas, R. op cit., p 52 (i).

[295] See Gleason, G. *The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1997, pp 173-5. (iv).

[296] Uzbek TV has made much use of Taliban summary executions in its news portrayals of Kabul's form of Islam. Author's private conversation.

[297] Bezanis, L. "Why the 'Green Wave' of Islamic Fundamentalism Is Unlikely to Wash Over Central Asia" *Transitions*, Vol. 1, No. 24, 29/12/95, p 9.

[298] Ibid.

[299] Geremek, B. Tashkent 20/4/98. In *RFE/RL Newsline* Vol. 2, No. 87, pt 1, 7/5/98.

[300] See Haghayeghi, M. op cit., p 209; Brown, B. op cit., pp 4-6. (i); & RFE/RL Newsline Vol. 2, No. 87, pt 1, 7/5/98.

[301] Brown, B. op cit., p 6. (i)

[302] Haghayeghi, M. op cit., p 209.

[303] Ibid.

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[304] *Informatsionn'i biulleten'*, No. 3 (43) op cit., pp. 19-21.

[305] Ibid.

[306] Qazi-Kolon Hojiakbar Turajonzade, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 27/08/93, p 7. Quoted in Olcott, M. op cit., p 30. (v)

[307] Olcott, M. B. *Christian Monitor* , 29/1/90. Quoted in Ro'i, Y. op cit., p 63. (ii)

[308] See Mirsaidov, J. *Letter to the UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali*, 2/10/93.

[309] Azar, E. & Moon, C. "Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity: The 'Software Side of National Security'" in Azar, E. & Moon, C. (eds.) op.cit., p 85.

[310] Haghayeghi, M. op cit., p 124.

[311] Ibid.

[312] Ibrahim Pulatov, interview with Haghayeghi, 15/4/95. Quoted in ibid.

[313] Carlisle, D. op cit., p 91.

[314] Zhisipov, S. Author's Interview, Almaty 1/10/96.

[315] Ibid

[316] Bezanis, L. "Exploiting the Fear of Militant Islam" *Transitions*, Vol. 1, No. 24 29/12/95 p 6.

[317] Kangas, R. op cit., p 21.(i)

6. Conclusion

The thesis has highlighted the ambiguities and difficulties that confront states during the initial stage of independence. Security issues were examined because they were a key and confused concern during this period and were illustrative of the wider political environment. This was a consequence of the new regimes seeking to establish their authority and legitimacy whilst defining their relationships with and responsibilities to the other components of the state, society and territory, and other actors.

The Pluralist/Comprehensive Security perspective has proved applicable for the analyses of Kazakstan and Uzbekistans' political and security situations. Based upon this perspective the thesis has demonstrated the internal dynamics and contradictions of the state and the resultant implications for political stability. The government's responsibility as the central administration, and domestic and international representative of the state totality imbue it with moral, legal and physical authority. It is this status that places the government as a central concern of the thesis. The ambiguous government-state association and manner of government relations with and responsibilities towards the social and territorial elements are essential in determining the development and stability of the state. The Comprehensive Security analysis which recognises the multiplicity of actors and trends which influence the security milieu are particularly valid for this regional examination. The subjective, indirect and non-specific character of the threats and vulnerabilities examined and the importance of contextualising them are acknowledged by this perspective.

The saliency of the threats and vulnerabilities that the NISs have faced are essentially consequences of their recently established and unsecured statehood. With time and concerted government policies, the republics may develop into strong states capable of managing their security milieu more effectively and confidently, particularly in relation to internal concerns. Until Kazakstan and Uzbekistan can achieve this status, however, their political stability remains uncertain. Challenges and vulnerabilities assume a degree of significance and threat beyond their actual potency. As a result, the governments' perceptions and responses are often alarmist, confrontational and consequently unconstructive.

As each of the case-study chapters has included an individual conclusion it is the aim of this chapter to draw together the significant themes in origins, character and implications between the case-studies.

In terms of their origins, the contemporary regional significance of inter-ethnic relations, the environment and Islam all share two common traits. The first is the role of Soviet politics. Decision-making from the divisive construction of nationalities and territories of the 1920s and 1930s, to the massive expansion of irrigation agriculture and the dual cooption and hostility towards Islam have left strong legacies in contemporary Central Asian politics. The continuation of broader political attitudes, norms and personnel have been influential. The second cause is the influence of the transition from SSR to sovereign republic, and the political and economic changes (albeit limited) from Communism to post-Communism. The long-term affects of this are more unpredictable. The pinnacle of activism concerning the case-studies during the period of *inter-regnum* can be seen as associated with the temporary freedom and uncertainty of this period. After the early 1990s there was a marked decline in the volatility of the subjects. As Olcott notes,

> "Central Asia has suffered virtually every social ill, hyperinflation, rising unemployment, rising death rates, falling birth rates, deteriorating health care, government corruption and crumbling infrastructure which could be expected to increase social tension and so make inter-ethic violence more likely, yet Central Asia has recorded no large-scale inter-ethnic-based disturbances since 1991"[1]

This resilience to extreme political and social distress has been a noticeable feature of regional politics. With the exception of Tajikistan, disputes on all of the issues have remained essentially in the realm of political debate and when they have escalated into physical violence they have remained sub-state and limited in character. The diminishment of the issues in the post-Soviet period can be accounted for by political changes which have undercut their relevance. These are: the loss of the *external* enemy (Moscow); euphoria of independence; and superficial regime change. In reality, however, expedient and wholesale reform of the subjects under examination and politics in general have not been attempted. Consequently their political sensitivity if not volatility has only been temporarily annulled and they are liable to re-emerge with renewed vigour.

There have been common characteristics, and cross-fertilisation and interaction between the political articulation of ethnicity, environmentalism and Islam. A significant common trait has been their ideological and functional proximity, which assisted their individual and combined saliency. All provided valid and effective critiques of the Soviet system but also created less benign political processes. Environmental activism, for example, played a seminal role in transforming late-Soviet polity in Central Asia. It acted as a catalyst and pretext for other political demands and movements. Its relationship with nationalism proved particularly important in eroding the legitimacy of Moscow. Its association with nationalism, however, also enhanced the salience of group identification with and competition over land and water.

Popular and political identification with the issues under examination have been cursory, ill-defined, and frequently transient. In both Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, the boundary markers between the titular and minority groups have been blurred. Assimilation and shared historical experiences have weakened exclusive nationalist traits. Given the reversals in fortunes between the Kazaks and Russians, the lack of Kazak triumphalism or calls for retribution have been noticeable by their absence. Whilst Almaty has pursued a moderate nationalist policy for pragmatic political considerations, radical Kazak nationalist groups have found the Kazak community unreceptive to their platforms. Similarly, the bellicose and irredentist rhetoric of ethnic Russians in the early period of Kazakstan's independence has been transformed into political accommodation and apathy, and emigration. The community has increasingly accepted Kazakstan as a sovereign state and their own distinct Kazakstani Russian identity, separate from that of ethnic Russians in the RF.[2]

In Uzbekistan, the indistinct boundaries between Tajik and Uzbeks and the weakness of the Tajik identity have restricted the minority from establishing an effective political consciousness. Ethnicity has not been perceived by the minority as determining their political fate, apart from a small group of ethnic Tajik intellectuals and political activists linked to the Samarkand movement. The *externally*-imposed politicisation and radicalisation of the Tajik identity by Tashkent may, however, ultimately be counter-productive for Karimov. Constitutional methods have failed to provide benefits for the minority.

The political and popular strength of Islamism has numerous comparisons with the issue of ethnic identity. In the religious revival that accompanied the collapse of the USSR, bellicose statements calling for the implementation of the Sharia and the expulsion of Russians from the republics were articulated. These did not evolve into a coherent radical political force. The level of religious adherence and knowledge has been cursory, modest and moderate. As with the extremist nationalist groups, Islamist movements have been widely perceived as radical and violent by the region's population and therefore not attracted broad support.

The nexus between the case-studies is illustrated effectively by the existence of regional "hotspots". The disputed areas of the lower Zeravshan, the two southern oblasts of Kazakstan and the Fergana Valley, as recorded in the previous chapters, have each borne witness to a complex of problems. These include inter-ethnic and land/water-inspired tensions and/or physical violence, and the expansion of Islamist influence. In the cases of the Fergana Valley and the lower Zeravshan latent border disputes are also evident. The absence of the majority of Kazakstan from this list, emphasises the marked differences between the two republic's security environments.

As well as creating areas of complex vulnerability, the nexus between ethnicity, religions and water problems poses a problem for managing the issues individually and the affects of one issue upon the others. This is highly evident in the case of economic reform and privatisation. Nomadic and Muslim sensibilities have been popular restraints to expedient reforms on land privatisation and water-pricing. Almaty's relatively successfully management of Islam has been at least equally a means of reassuring the Russian minority as it was a concern about a political Islamist challenge. Similarly Tashkent's policies towards its domestic Tajik minority, and Islamist and secular opposition have been difficult to disengage from its foreign policy discourse on Islamic Fundamentalism and involvement in Afghanistan and Tajikistan.

What the thesis has demonstrated is that the subjects of study are not intrinsically destabilising. None have been able to maintain the political heights that they attained prior to 1991. Inter-ethnic relations have been fluid and highly contextual. Equally, the temporal application of Islam has proved diverse. Interpretations of the religion's political and social implications have ranged from the conservative and apolitical Sufism and Wahhabism, to the politicised radicalism of Adolat and Alash, and the attempts by Almaty and Tashkent to coopt and regulate the faith. Similarly the political and security implications of environmental scarcity are highly dependent upon subjective factors. Absolute scarcity has not provoked dispute, rather conflict has been a result of perceptions of economic injustice. As a result it is evident that ethnicity, religious affiliation and environmental awareness are not primordial, essentialist or conflictual in themselves. Rather they have been used in a instrumentalist manner. This does not mean, however, that they will not re-emerge as sources of political dispute. In fact, the fluctuating and manipulative attentions that the two governments have directed towards the issues are legitimate sources of concern for the region's future development. The absence of the case-studies' intrinsic security (negative) implications and the economic, political and social context have been key themes of the thesis.

It is, in fact, these *external* issues that lead the author to argue that the region's long-term stability is not secure. The three generic factors contributing to this conclusion are: the behaviour of central government; economic trends; and social factors.

As the Minority at Risk Project and Tal have noted, the methods selected by the governments in managing inter-ethnic and Islamist problems are central to the long-term development of these concerns. Soviet authoritarianism, with its repression of dissent, one party system and hierarchical power structures, has been indelibly marked upon Central Asia's political consciousness. Lubin's research has demonstrated that this legacy has had both psychological and structural consequences.[3] A moderate degree of elite continuity, from the Soviet to post-Soviet regimes, it has been suggested, is compatible with and conducive for democratisation. The period of transition could have "presented a golden opportunity for varying groups outside the old Communist network to compete for a greater share of power."[4] This has, however, not been the case, because "[i]n the zero sum game of politics, political opposition has been actively or passively repressed since independence."[5] A large-scale retention of the *nomenklatura* has, however, been associated with serious deficiencies in democracy.[6]

To date stability has been as much a consequence of suppression of independent movements as it has been an expression of political acquiescence and apathy. As such it is essentially artificial and temporary. "[T]he calm and the stability that seem to reign in the region are illusory ... [and] the region's stability is mostly a short-term development."[7] It is widely regarded by commentators that the present restrictions on political life are counter-productive.[8] In Uzbekistan, moderate domestic opposition has been eliminated whilst the only credible challenger to the regime, political Islam, has been forced underground. It has possible been radicalised and strengthened by this process. The lack of political alternatives, a consequence of government actions, may lessen the possibility for compromise between the incumbent and its rivals. As Brown points out, "the repression of the democratic Uzbek nationalists may prove to have removed an important moderating force from the political scene."[9] Even in Kazakstan, political culture has been stifled by a centralised power structure.

A recurrent theme in all of the case-studies has been the omnipresent influence of economics. Inter-ethnic violence in the late-1980s was associated with resource competition ranging from access and "ownership" of land and water to indigenous hostility towards the Meskhetian Turks and Caucasians' *niches* in the region's economy.

Post-1991, neither of the republics witnessed major economic-related social unrest. This stability, the author believes, cannot be maintained indefinitely. Escalating domestic and industrial demands will further increase the need to resolve these issues whilst restricting the room for manoeuvre. The financial costs of improving and/or reducing the economic reliance upon irrigation agriculture makes the likelihood of committed and decisive redress unlikely. The contemporary and predicted expansion of political Islam and Wahhabism in the Fergana Valley has been associated with the region's high rates of under-employment and unemployment. In southern Kazakstan the combination of rural under-employment, economic backwardness, Islamic proclivity and lack of political representation at the centre may establish a comparable though less acute security complex. As the case of Karakalpakistan, however, demonstrates "simple deterministic models" are unable to predict the areas of conflict accurately. The AR has the worst environmental situation in Uzbekistan and an economic growth rate which exceeds only that of Jizzak and Sirdarya viloyets.[10] It has, however, not witnessed inter-ethnic violence or anti-Tashkent moves. Political and social factors have to be consulted to understand this. The issues of indistinct ethnic identity, poor political mobilisation and the extreme hardships of the AR's inhabitants make survival rather than struggle the norm.

There is considerable debate over the relative merits and implications for social stability of the two republics' economic programmes. Kazakstan which has embraced economic reform more comprehensively, has seen considerable economic hardship and resultant demonstrations. Uzbekistan which has pursued a more gradualist reform programme, has seen only limited protest. Whilst Kazakstan appears to have withstood the limited political discontent that economic transformation and dislocation have provoked, the author is less sanguine about Uzbekistan's progress. Its economy remains state-regulated with a non-convertible currency. Reform of its economic system is liable to prove more difficult due to the detrimental combination of a declining industrial base and demographic growth.

A final economic feature liable to escalate social tensions is the redistribution of wealth from the new economic system. Privatisation and the role of the *nomenklatura* in this process are particularly sensitive issues. Critiques of this process may acquire a nationalist (Russian) dimension in Kazakstan and an Islamist one in Uzbekistan given the ethnic and nominal Muslim composition and character of the two respective elites.

The social factors can be divided between demography and social-political attitudes. The first has been markedly different in the two republics. Kazakstan saw a net population decline of 3.5% between 1993-96, whilst Uzbekistan witnessed an average annual growth rate of 2.1%.[11] As noted previously the region's 2025 predicted population is expected to be in excess of 100 million. Under these conditions, the incongruity between the aspirations of this burgeoning population and the bleak prospects for educational, political and social advancement will become more apparent in the southern republic. The opportunities for Islamist activism in Uzbekistan and to a lesser extent nationalist movements in Kazakstan, is enhanced by this trend.

The social and political attitudes of the republics' populations whilst important are difficult to ascertain. Civil society in both republics has been particularly weak. A plethora of factors may account for this deficit. These range from the Soviet legacy, a tradition of deference, to the opposition's weak intellectual and organisational status, political apathy, and the present circumstances in which "immediate" problems such as employment and food take precedent over political activism. All of these explanations are credible and have serious implications for the development of a vibrant and stable political culture.

Autonomy and protest has been costly for the individual. This ranges from arbitrary arrest and physical assaults to employment blacklists, and the financial costs and efforts that such activism entails. This partly explains the limited nature of political activism in the two republics. In addition there appears to have been a considerable degree of consent, or at least acquiescence, by all social groups towards the existing regimes. This is illustrated in several surveys. In one, 63% of

Kazakstani respondents and 49% of Uzbekistani respondents said they would accept any political system provided that it brought order.[12] As ITAR-TASS reported, within Kazakstani society an uncritical attitude towards authority has existed, especially prevalent in the Kazak rural areas, implying that custom and deference have contributed to the republic's peace.[13] Similar social acceptance have been evident in Uzbekistan.

Whilst the previous factors explain the low level of political activism to some extent, there also appears to be a deep-seated problem, related to the absence of a civil society tradition and the continuation of authoritarian political and deferential social cultures. As one Uzbekistani official noted "it is impossible to change the population's mentality by commanding."[14] The role of local initiative, crucial to more efficient and sustainable water management, has been hampered by the lack of subsidiarity and autonomous decision-making. In conversation with the author, one international organisation representative described the region's political consciousness as one in which the *private* and the *public* (political) are divorced to the extent that "it is not just fatalism but an active abdication of political involvement because this is seen as an irrelevance."[15] In this milieu, politics has not been perceived as essential to the broader issues of economic and social welfare. The interviewee concluded that there is no appreciation that "if politics goes the right way then the rest of society will too."[16] Similar sentiments of popular disinterest in and distrust of politics were regularly expressed to this author.[17] One interesting example of this trend was the deliberate absence of party politics at the demonstrations organised by the Federation of Trade Unions of Kazakstan, in Almaty, October 1996.[18] This was partially to reduce accusations from Almaty that the protest was a political challenge to Nazarbaev.[19] The decision was also undertaken because of the low regard in which politicians are held by members of the public.[20] Similar popular mistrust of politicians was displayed in Lubin's research, which found that 61% of Kazakstanis surveyed believed that "highly placed state officials" were either members of or were connected to the mafia.[21] Interestingly, a higher percentage of ethnic Russians regarded government and business relations with the mafia as close, perhaps suggesting non-titular concerns over the indigenous patronage networks in Kazakstani politics.[22]

Kazakstan rather than Uzbekistan initially appeared to be the state most vulnerable to instability. It was subjected to serious challenges and vulnerabilities including: nuclear pollution; a large vocal and potentially irredentist minority; and a neighbour with regional interests and a bellicose foreign policy. However its contemporary and future situation are relatively stable and benign. Almaty has through pragmatic and conciliatory policies and a relatively benign political and social basis been able to achieve a more stable security position than Tashkent has.[23]

Given Tashkent's assertive policy towards domestic and external threats, this is particularly ironic although not totally unexpected. External difficulties have accompanied domestic problems. Tashkent's behaviour has been partially motivated by justifiable threats to its integrity and stability. Intra-Uzbek divisions, the presence of a sizeable minority, and the instability of neighbouring Afghanistan and Tajikistan all presented Uzbekistan with serious security challenges. As Carlisle notes, although Tashkent may have exaggerated the Islamic Fundamentalist threat, this does not necessarily imply that such concerns were totally unfounded.[24] The existence of these problems cannot be ignored but as this thesis has demonstrated, Tashkent has manipulated these in order to legitimise the continuation of authoritarianism and to discredit and repress potential adversaries. If current agreements can lead to long-term peace in Tajikistan and the Taliban maintain their advances in northern Afghanistan, this would locate ideological opponents to Karimov's rule in enhanced positions on Uzbekistan's borders. Karimov's emphatic linkage between domestic and regional adversaries and the predominantly confrontational manner employed against them may prove disadvantageous now that the regional political map has altered. A reappraisal of its foreign policy with repercussions for the domestic situation may be expedient.

Given the bleak predictions for Uzbekistan, and by implication the rest of the region, the implementation of a comprehensive security agenda appraisal would be an expedient measure for both capitals. As Ayoob notes regime self-interest can be enhanced by such a move. He argues that,

> "[the] recent wave of democratization in the Third World arose largely from the realization by ruling elites that the survival of their states and regimes depend upon defusing the crisis of legitimacy they face. Others ... have resisted this trend at what may turn out to be greater cost to their states and societies. They refuse to countenance political participation largely because they know they will lose power if the political systems in their countries become genuinely participatory. In such cases, considerations of regime security- which are shortsighted even for the interests of the ruling elites- clash directly with those of state security, and in the view of ruling elites, take precedent over state security. This situation threatens the survival of the state."[25]

The implementation of such a perspective in Central Asia is problematic. Regional politicians and security advisors have recognised the complexity of the problem facing Central Asia and the need for relevant management policies. Whilst the leaderships "are making the right noises" it is clear that their true commitment to reform and pluralism, expedient in addressing the problems discussed in the thesis, have been circumspect.[26] "Comprehensive security, human rights and pluralism in general are perceived [solely] as a way to strengthen ties with the West. It is the price that [Karimov and Nazarbaev] have to pay."[27] During the 1991-6 period the two governments did not successfully address security threats and vulnerabilities. Based on this study it is uncertain whether they are sufficiently committed to and capable of managing these in the future.

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[1] Olcott, M.B. "Ethnic Violence in Central Asia: Perceptions and Misperceptions" in Sagdeev, R. & Eisenhower, S. (eds.) *Central Asia, Conflict, Resolution, and Change* CPSS, Chevy Chase, 1995, p 116.

[2] See Pilkington, H.A. "Going home? the implications of forced migration for national identity formation in post-Soviet Russia" *BASEES Annual Conference*, Cambridge, 30/3-2/4/96, p 8.

[3] Lubin, N. *Central Asians Take Stock: Reform, Corruption and Identity*, USIP, Washington, 1995, p 2.

[4] Haghayeghi, M. op cit., p 134.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Higley, J. Kullberg, J. & Pakulsk, J. "The Persistence of Post-Communist Elites" *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 7, No. 2, p 138.

[7] Panarin, S.A. op cit., p 86.

[8] See Haghayeghi, M. op cit., p 209; Brown, B. op cit., pp 4-6. (i); & RFE/RL Newsline Vol. 2, No. 87, pt 1, 7/5/98.

[9] Brown, B. "Tajik Civil War Prompts Crackdown in Uzbekistan" *RFE/RL*, Vol. 2, No. 11, 1993, p 6. (i)

[10] The Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan/TACIS, *Uzbekistan Economic Trends 1997 (First Quarter)*, Tashkent, 1998, p 36.

[11] The Government of the Republic of Kazakstan Table 2 Population, Employment, GDP and GNP & Table 4.1 Selected Time Series of Employment, op cit., pp. 20 & 84; Uzbekistan/TACIS, op cit., p 43.

[12] Lubin, N, op cit. Figure 1, p 5.

[13] ITAR-TASS, 1019 gmt 21/4/95. SWB SU 2285, G 1, 24/4/95..

[14] Khabibalaev, A. Chairman of Uzbekistan's Goskompriroda (State Committee for Nature Conservation,) *OSCE Seminar on Sustainable Development in the Aral Sea Basin Region*, Tashkent, 31/10/96.

[15] Author's interview, Tashkent, 4/11/96.

[16] Ibid.

[17] In conversation with the author one Uzbek student for example stated that "[w]e have too much politics in Uzbekistan" Tashkent, 31/10/96.

[18] "Demonstrations in Kazakhstan: Political or non-political" *Labyrinth* Vol. 3, No. 4, p 3.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Lubin, N. op cit. p 10

[22] Ibid.

[23] There are some contributory factors that the two governments have little ability to influence. As Berik Abdigaliev stated "a small population in a big country aids inter-ethnic relations, whilst unemployment and poor education aid conflict." Abdigaliev, B. Kazakstan Institute of Strategic Studies. Author's interview, Almaty 2/10/96.

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[24] Carlisle, D. "Geopolitics and Ethnic Problems of Uzbekistan" in Y. Ro'i, (ed.) *Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies*, Frank Cass, London, 1995, p 91.

[25] Ayoob, M. *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1995, p 180.

[26] Author's Interview, Tashkent, 4/11/96.

[27] Ibid.

Appendix

Chronology of Political Events

1917 February	First Revolution establishes the Provincial government under Kerensky.
October	Second Revolution leads to the establishment of Bolshevik power.
1 November	Bolsheviks seize Tashkent.
15 November	Third All Muslim Conference in Tashkent demands autonomy for Turkestan.
1918	Basmachi rebellion follows treaty between Emir of Bukhara and the Tashkent Soviet.
April	Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Republic created.
May	Kazakh (Kirgiz) AR established.
1920	Khorezm becomes People's Soviet Republic.
26 August	Kazak (Kirgiz) AR elevated ASSR established.
	General France captures Bukhara, People's Soviet Republic established.
1924	Stalin becomes General Secretary of Russian Communist Party (Renamed Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1925).
October	Major territorial reforms in Central Asia. The Turkmen and Uzbek SSRs created from the Bukhara and Khorezm People's Soviet Socialist Republics and the Turkestan ASSR. Kazak (Kirgiz) ASSR transferred to the RSFSR.
1929 June	Tajik ASSR granted SSR status, and Khojent (Leninabad) oblast transferred to it.
1930-1	Forced collectivisation of nomads, thousands killed or migrate.
1936 December	Kazak SSR established.
1941 June	Germany invades USSR.
1943 October	The Four Spiritual Directorates are created. Tashkent becomes the central Directorate The other directorates were located in Ufa (Bashkir), Baku and Makhachkala (Dagestan).
1953	Stalin dies, replaced by Nikita Khushchev as First Secretary of the CPSU.

1954	Virgin Lands Scheme is initiated in the Kazak SSR.
1959	Sharif Rashidov becomes First Secretary of zbek CP.
1960	Dinmukhanad Kuneav becomes First Secretary of Kazak CP.
1979	February Islamic Revolution in Iran.
December	Soviet invasion of Afghanistan begins.
1983 October	Rashidov is removed from office and charged with corruption. Dies in the same month.
1985 12 March	Gorbachev appointed CPSU First Secretary.

1986

February	Gorbachev launches glasnost and perestroika and intensifies the anti-corruption drive at the Twenty-seventh CPSU Congress.
17 December	Dinmukhamed Kunaev replaced as party leader of the Kazakh Communist Party, by Gennardi Kolbin. Demonstrations which transmute into riots follow.

1988

	Celebration of a millennium of Christianity in Russia.
February	Gorbachev agrees to withdraw all Soviet troops from Afghanistan within a year.
1 December	Two major reform bills passed in the USSR Supreme Soviet, law on elections and constitutional amendment.

1989

January	Demonstration against Mufti Shamsuddin lead to his resignation as head of Spiritual Directorate in Tashkent.
26 February	Muhammed Sadiq Muhammed Yusuf becomes Mufti of DUMSAK after popular protests.
28 February	Nevada-Semipalatinsk environmental movement established.
March	Elections held for the USSR congress of People's Congress.
April	Uzbek nationalist demonstrations in Tashkent.
23 May	Birlik Party founded.

23 June	Karimov elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan.
June	Nazarbaev becomes First Secretary of CP of Kazakstan.
June	Violence between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks takes place in Fergana region, and between Kazaks and Caucasians in Novy Uzen Kazakstan.
	Karimov replaces Nishanov as First Secretary of the Uzbek CP.
August	Balts commemorate 50th anniversary of Nazi-Soviet Pact with human chain across Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Lithuania declares 1940 Soviet annexation invalid.
December	Lithuanian Communist party secedes from USSR CP.

1990

January	Fighting breaks out between Armenians and Azerbaijanis after Armenian Supreme Soviet votes to unite with Nagorno-Karabkh.
12 January	Ratbek Nysanbai Uli appointed Chief Mufti of Kazakstan after establishment of Kazakstani Muslim Directorate (DUMK).
February	Thousands of Tajiks riot in Dushanbe after rumours that Armenians were to be given preferential treatment for housing in the capital.
	Uzbeks demonstrations in Samarkand over official suppression of the Uzbek Popular Front results in violence.
22 February	Nazarbaev re-elected as First Secretary.
	Erk splits from Birlik.
12 March	USSR Congress of People's Deputies opens, the first popular elected deliberative assembly since 1918. Gorbachev elected President by the Congress.
	Lithuanian Supreme Soviet declares Lithuania independent. Moscow responds with military occupation.
	Estonia declares its independence.
24 March	Islam elected as President.
11 June	RSFSR Congress of Peoples' Deputies votes for sovereignty.
20 June	Uzbekistan declares sovereignty.
	Violence between Kyrgyzs and Uzbeks takes place in Osh oblast.
	Islamic Renaissance Party founded as an All-Union organisation.

1991

January	Soviet troops kill 14 Lithuanian whilst attempting to regain control of Vilnius.
19-21 August	Coup staged by conservative Communists. Gorbachev under house arrest. Coup fails to gain popular and military support. President Niyazov of Turkmen SSR declares coup authority in republic. Karimov declares coup invalid. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuanias' independence are recognised.
31 August	Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan declare independence.
23 September	Rakhmon Nabiev becomes head of Tajikistan. Anti-government protests begin in Dushanbe.
October	94% of popular referendum vote for Turkmenistan's independence.
26 October	Kazakstan declares its sovereignty.
24 November	Tajikistan hold presidential elections Nabiev wins.
1 December	Nazarbaev elected President of Kazakstan. (Nazarbaev was the sole candidate and received 99.8% of the vote.)
8 December	Leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus propose the creation of CIS.
11 December	IRP seize Namangan oblast CP headquarters and demand establishment of Islamic state.
16 December	Kazakstan declares independence.
21 December	Commonwealth of Independent States established by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
25 December	Gorbachev resigns and USSR formally dissolved.
29 December	Presidential Elections in Uzbekistan. Karimov wins with 85.6%.
30 December	FSU states possessing nuclear weapons, Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, and Ukraine sign agreement on non-proliferation.
31 December	USSR officially ceases to exist.

1992

16 January	Student-led riots in Tashkent.
30 January	All five Central Asian republics become members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
	Demonstrations by Tajik opposition movement in Dushanbe.
17 March	Crackdown on Islamists in Namangan begins.
20 March	CIS Military and Security Summit in Kiev signed by all Central Asian republics except for Turkmenistan.
26 March	Demonstration begin outside the Presidential palace in Dushanbe.
23 April	Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan meet in Bishkek to co-ordinate regional security.
5 May	Nabiev declares state of emergency after armed groups attempt to occupy the Presidential palace.
7 May	National Reconciliation government formed in Tajikistan. Violence begins in the republic.
15 May	Collective Defence Treaty signed between Russian, Armenia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan at the Tashkent CIS Summit.
20 May	Leninabad authorities raise the issue of assimilation with Uzbekistan, as sign of their opposition to government in Dushanbe.
25 June	President Karimov and Nazarbaev sign mutual-assistance treaty and pledge cooperation on economic, cultural and environmental issues.
30 June	Head of Birlik, Abdurlrahim Pulatov, assaulted.
28 July	Cease-fire agreed in Tajikistan and Nabiev's resignation demanded.
7 September	Nabiev forced to resign. Kulyab forces attack Kurgan Tiube.
24-5 October	Kulyab coup attempt.
19 November	Ali Rahmanov replaces Akbarsho Iskandorov as President of Tajikistan.
4-10 December	Pro-Communist forces capture Dushanbe.
8 December	New Constitution passed in Uzbekistan.
9 December	Birlik and Samarkand members kidnapped from Bishkek human rights conference. Birlik is banned.
11 December	Communist militias seize Dushanbe. Fighting continues throughout December and early months of 1993. Uzbekistan and Russian involved.

1993

January	CIS troops deployed along Tajik-Afghan border.
28 January	Kazakstani Parliament passes new constitution, Kazak made official language.
9 August	Yeltsin urges Dushanbe to enter dialogue with UTO.
December	Kazkastan's Supreme Kenges, the successor to the Communist Supreme Soviet resigned to prepare for elections to the *Majlis* and Senate.

1994

11 January	Presidents of the republics meet in Nukus to sign agreement on create fund to save the Aral Sea.
7 March	Elections take place in Kazakstan for the *Majlis*, the Lower House. Observers note irregularities.
3 June	Mass strikes in Karaganda, Kazakstan, which are revived throughout 1995 and 1996.
5 June	Protest against social spending cuts, in Almaty.
22 June	Demonstrations in Almaty against Lop Nor nuclear test.
18 September	Temporary cease-fire agreed in Tajikistan. Negotiations follow.
25 December	Elections to the *Oli Majilis* in Uzbekistan.

1995

13 January	In excess of 100,000 miners strike in northern Kazakstan over lack of wages.
7 February	Treaty between Russia and Kazakstan on joint force for patrol of Chinese border.
11 March	Kazakstan's Constitutional Court declares 1994 elections invalid. Parliament dissolved.
26 March	Karimov's presidency extended until 2000. 99.6% vote in favour.
7 April	Opposition forces in Tajikistan start new offensive.
29 April	Karimov's mandate extended until 2000 by popular vote of 99.6%.
31 May	Three month cease-fire agreed in Tajikistan.

6 September	New Kazakstani Constitution adopted. Presidency provided with increased powers.
5-23 December	Senate elections held in Kazakstan.

1996

25-6 January	Makmud Khudaberdiyev mutinies in the Kurgan-Tiube, and troops under Ibudollo Boimatov enter the Khojent from Uzbekistan.
September	Taliban capture Kabul.
3 October	Russian and Central Asian governments attend regional summit, in Almaty, in response to the Taliban's advances in Afghanistan.
17 October	Demonstrations held in Almaty and other cities to highlight the government's failure to address social problems including wage and pension arrears.

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