

# Stellingen

behorende bij het proefschrift

## Altruism, Conformism, and Incentives in the Workplace

door

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- I. When it comes to motivating employees, altruism in employer-employee relationships favors the use of a carrot whereas spite favors the use of a stick. *(Chapter 2)*
- II. In employer-employee relationships, a marginal increase in altruism may make both players worse off. *(Chapter 2)*
- III. Supervisor's altruism toward a subordinate can be useful in motivating the supervisor to report the subordinate's performance truthfully. *(Chapter 3)*
- IV. Even though top managers and lower-level employees rarely interact directly, top managers work very hard in order to motivate lower-level employees. *(Chapter 4)*
- V. Less hierarchy in an organization fosters the cultivation of effort norms for employees. *(Chapter 4)*
- VI. Relational contract models generally build on the assumption that players follow a trigger strategy that prescribes to punish players who deviate from the contract. To properly found this assumption, one needs to invoke the notion of social preferences.
- VII. A good economist has a strong intuition for what is in a player's utility function.
- VIII. The difference between theoretical and empirical research is overstated: both are means to explore unanswered questions.
- IX. If one had to choose, one should choose to be altruistic rather than conformist.
- X. By nature of the enterprise, it is hard to tell beforehand whether research will be successful. Scientists are therefore likely to be risk-tolerant or even risk-loving people.
- XI. The optimal share of surprising results of a theoretical analysis lies around 50 percent.