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Should Republicans be Cosmopolitans?

Abstract: Contemporary liberalism and republicanism present clearly distinct programs for domestic politics, but the same cannot be said when it comes to global politics: the burgeoning literature on global republicanism has reproduced the divide between cosmopolitan and associational views familiar from long-standing debates among liberal egalitarians. Should republicans be cosmopolitans? Despite presence of a range of views in the literature, there is an emerging consensus that the best answer is no. This paper aims to resist the emerging consensus, arguing that republicans should be cosmopolitans. The considerations offered against cosmopolitanism generally rest on an incomplete understanding of the relationship between economic inequality or poverty on the one hand, and domination on the other. Insofar as republicans agree that promoting freedom from domination should be our central political aim, they should regard the reduction of economic inequality and poverty at home and abroad as equally pressing.

Keywords: republicanism, cosmopolitanism, associationalism, economic justice, non-domination

While having partially entwined historical origins, contemporary liberalism and contemporary republicanism are now generally seen to present clearly distinct programs for domestic politics stemming from, among other things, different conceptions of political freedom and differing stances on the role of the state and the public promotion of civic virtue. The same cannot be said when it comes to global politics, however. The burgeoning literature on global republicanism has more or less reproduced the divide – familiar from long-standing debates among liberal egalitarians – between cosmopolitanism on the one hand, and various associational views on the other, together with a corresponding range of intermediate positions. When it comes to global politics, in other words, the most interesting and pressing debates may cut across the two traditions. All of which presents us with an obvious question: Should republicans be cosmopolitans?

Despite presence of a range of views in the literature, there seems to be an emerging consensus that the best answer is no. While disagreeing somewhat on the range and strength of our obligations with respect to global distributive or economic justice, for the most part contemporary republicans seem to agree that such obligations are weaker than our corresponding obligations with

respect to domestic distributive or economic justice.¹ In this paper, I aim to resist the emerging consensus. Republicans, on my view, should be cosmopolitans. The considerations offered against cosmopolitanism, I argue, generally rest on an incomplete understanding of the relationship between economic inequality or poverty on the one hand, and domination on the other. Insofar as republicans agree that promoting freedom from domination should be our central political aim, they should regard the reduction of economic inequality and poverty at home and abroad as equally pressing.

Of course, we cannot really answer the question of whether republicans should be cosmopolitans without first having a clear idea of what being a cosmopolitan in the relevant sense entails. The first section of this paper is addressed to this problem. The second explores the considerations raised by various republican authors against cosmopolitanism, and finally the third explains why these considerations should fall away once the relationship between economic justice and domination is fully understood.

What is Cosmopolitanism?

Considering the concept's centrality to global justice debates, it is surprisingly difficult to pin down a specific meaning to cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitans themselves often assert that their core commitments are quite simple and straight-forward, and can be stated basically as follows:

‘Cosmopolitanism [...] is a moral stance consisting of three elements: individualism, equality, and universality. Its unit of value is individual human beings; it does not recognize any categories of people as having more or less moral weight; and it includes all human beings.’²

1 Among those republicans who argue against cosmopolitanism are Steven Slaughter, *Liberty Beyond Neo-Liberalism: A Republican Critique of Liberal Governance in a Globalizing Age* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Francis Chevenal, ‘Multilateral Dimensions of Republican Thought’, in Samantha Besson and José Luis Martí (eds.), *Legal Republicanism: National and International Perspectives* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Quentin Skinner, ‘On the Slogans of Republican Political Theory’, *European Journal of Political Theory* 9 (2010), 95–102; Philip Pettit, ‘A Republican Law of Peoples’, *European Journal of Political Theory* 9 (2010), 71–94; Philip Pettit, *Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for A Complex World* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2014); Cécile Laborde, ‘Republicanism and Global Justice: A Sketch’, *European Journal of Political Theory* 9 (2010), 48–69; John Maynor, ‘Should Republican Liberty as Non-Domination Be Outsourced?’ in Barbara Buckinx, Jonathan Trejo-Mathys and Timothy Waligore (eds.), *Domination and Global Political Justice: Conceptual, Historical, and Institutional Perspectives* (New York: Routledge, 2015); and Cécile Laborde and Miriam Ronzoni, ‘What is a Free State? Republican Internationalism and Globalisation’, *Political Studies* (Forthcoming). Apart from myself (Frank Lovett, ‘Republican Global Distributive Justice’, *Diacrítica* 24 (2010b) 13–30), only Bohman James Bohman, ‘Republican Cosmopolitanism’, *Journal of Political Philosophy* 12 (2004), 336–352; James Bohman, ‘Nondomination and Transnational Democracy’, in Cécile Laborde and John Maynor (eds.), *Republicanism and Political Theory* (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2008); James Bohman, ‘Cosmopolitan Republicanism and the Rule of Law’, in Samantha Besson and José Luis Martí (eds.), *Legal Republicanism: National and International Perspectives*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); and José Luis Martí, ‘A Global Republic to Prevent Global Domination’, *Diacrítica* 24 (2010), 31–72, explicitly endorse cosmopolitanism in some form.

2 Brian Barry, ‘Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique’, in Ian Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer (eds.), *Nomos 41: Global Justice* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), pp. 35–36; cf. Thomas Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights* (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), p. 169; Simon Caney, *Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 3–4.

This is far too general and abstract to be of much use, however. While some communitarians and others might reject these claims at least in part, many others such as John Rawls or Thomas Nagel can accept them while nevertheless advancing theories of global justice that are definitely not cosmopolitan.³ In light of this difficulty, some have been tempted to simply drop the term altogether.⁴ In my view, this would be a mistake. Apart from the fact that discussions of cosmopolitanism are deeply ingrained in the literature on global justice, it can indeed serve as a valuable conceptual category provided it is properly defined.

Cosmopolitanism is best understood as a claim about the nature of certain duties or obligations we might have.⁵ It is not, however, merely the claim that there exist at least some universal obligations – obligations we owe to all persons, regardless of how they might or might not be related to us, deriving from, perhaps, our common humanity. Hardly anyone denies this claim. Even Michael Walzer, who is about as distant from cosmopolitanism as anyone, admits that some of our obligations are universal.⁶ Conversely, neither is cosmopolitanism the claim that *all* of our obligations are in principle universal. Strong moral monists such as utilitarians might perhaps hold such a view, but other cosmopolitans certainly do not. Brian Barry, as committed a cosmopolitan as anyone, acknowledges that we have at least some first-order associative obligations deriving from our membership in particular groups.⁷ Cosmopolitanism is thus rather the claim that some *important obligations in particular* are equally strong with respect to compatriots as they are with respect to non-compatriots.⁸

Which obligations specifically? Usually, it is said our obligations of *distributive justice*. Unfortunately, this term is not ideal. Understood simply as our obligations relating to the distribution of benefits and burdens among individuals, the term is too broad: cosmopolitans and their opponents might

3 So too Pettit, who explicitly endorses ‘normative individualism’ (Petit (2010), p. 76) and nevertheless advances a non-cosmopolitan account of global justice.

4 Mathias Risse, *On Global Justice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), pp. 9–10, advises that we stop using the term ‘cosmopolitan’, except ‘to describe a love of humanity or the evanescence or fluidity of culture.’

5 Here I set aside what is sometimes called ‘institutional’ or ‘legal’ cosmopolitanism – roughly, the program of transcending the state system by creating stronger global institutions. Some republicans advocate cosmopolitanism in this sense, e.g., Martí (2010).

6 See Michael Walzer, *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), which offers a somewhat unconventional communitarian account of our universal obligations.

7 Barry (1999), pp. 59–60, notes that, provided two communities face similar resource constraints, they should be free to tailor their social insurance schemes to their own values; individuals are then obligated to contribute only to their own community’s particular scheme.

8 Note that here and throughout I will use the terms ‘compatriots’ and ‘non-compatriots’ in abstraction from the complicated question of whether the relevant associative units are communities, states, nations, peoples, polities, or whatever. The burden, of course, is on the opponent of cosmopolitanism to give an account of the relevant associative unit.

agree that obligations to fairly distribute political rights and responsibilities, for instance, are associative in character. Perhaps we should that say the dispute concerns only *economic* distributive justice – especially, the distribution of income and wealth. Understood in this way, however, the term is probably too narrow: it might exclude, for instance, working conditions or other issues of relational justice that would be of obvious concern to cosmopolitans. For lack of any better alternative, then, I will use the term *economic justice*, including under this heading not only the issue of income and wealth distribution, but also access to economic opportunities, the quality of working conditions, control over the means of production, and so forth. With this in mind, we can say that being a cosmopolitan in the relevant sense means holding the view that, whatever the nature of our economic justice obligations happen to be, those obligations have more or less the same character and weight with respect to non-compatriots as they do with respect to compatriots. In other words, if we owe our compatriots some measure of economic equality, say, then we owe a similar measure of economic equality to non-compatriots. To reject this view – to argue that our economic justice obligations to non-compatriots are for some reason or other substantially different in kind or degree – is to be a non-cosmopolitan. For reasons that will soon become obvious, I refer to the latter view as *associationalism*.⁹

Roughly speaking, there are main two routes by which one might arrive at a non-cosmopolitan or associational position.¹⁰ Suppose one believes that duties of economic justice are in some sense inherently context-dependent: in other words, *A* owes economic justice to *B* only if *A* and *B* stand in the right sort of relationship with one another. Perhaps *A* and *B* must share the bonds of community, or be governed by the same coercive institutional structure, or be engaged in a single system of cooperation, etc. One obvious way to arrive at the associational view is therefore to simply deny that the relevant relationships hold (or might plausibly be made to hold) between non-compatriots.¹¹ Such is roughly speaking the view of Walzer, Nagel, Rawls, and many others. For example, Rawls believes that duties of economic justice – specifically, the

9 One might similarly imagine a divide between cosmopolitan and associational views with respect to other categories of obligation – obligations of political justice, for example. Since the existing debates focus on economic justice, however, I leave such topics aside.

10 The discussion that follows is partially indebted to Michael Blake and Patrick Taylor Smith, 'International Distributive Justice', in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2015), <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/international-justice/>>.

11 Notice that I here abstract from the question of our obligations to bring about such relationships when they do not exist: I am persuaded by Miriam Ronzoni, 'The Global Order: A Case of Background Injustice? A Practice-Dependent Account', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 37 (2009), 229–256, that we do have such obligations, and so associative views are most plausibly interpreted as indicated in the main text.

difference principle and the principle of fair equality of opportunity – obtain only among mutual participants in a system of social cooperation governed by a single basic structure. Since, on his view, there is no global basic structure (and it would be neither feasible nor desirable to construct one) equivalent duties do not obtain among non-compatriots. Instead, non-compatriots are bound only by much weaker and indirect duties of assistance. Unlike the far-reaching and ongoing principles of domestic economic justice, the global duty of assistance is temporary and limited to helping burdened societies become well-ordered: it requires economic assistance only to the extent that inequality or poverty happen to be an obstacle to their becoming so.¹²

The other way to arrive at the associational view is to accept that the relevant relationships hold (or might plausibly be made to hold) among non-compatriots, but argue that they hold to a lesser degree or extent than they do among compatriots. Such is roughly speaking the view of Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel, Andrea Sangiovanni, and others. For example, Cohen and Sabel argue that duties of economic justice obtain whenever people are mutual participants in ‘a consequential scheme of organized, mutually beneficial cooperation under rules’.¹³ Certainly compatriots are bound by such a scheme, but so too are non-compatriots in ‘an attenuated but significant way,’ through complex global institutions such as the World Trade Organization.¹⁴ It follows that we lie under at least some direct and ongoing duties of economic justice with respect to non-compatriots. Since the latter scheme is less dense and consequential than the former, however, our duties with respect to compatriots remain considerably stronger: while we owe compatriots some significant degree of equality, we owe non-compatriots only procedural and substantive inclusion.¹⁵

Just as there are two routes to non-cosmopolitanism, so there are two routes to cosmopolitanism. The first and more obvious route is simply to reject the claim that obligations of economic justice are context-dependent. On this view, it simply does not matter whether *A* and *B* stand in any particular relationship with one another. Perhaps the simple fact that *B* is suffering is sufficient to

12 John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), esp. sections 15–16. Some especially strong associationalists, such as Thomas Nagel, ‘The Problem of Global Justice’, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 33 (2005), 113–147, argue we have no obligations of economic justice to non-compatriots, not even weak or indirect ones; most, such as Risse (2012) and Samuel Freeman, ‘The Law of Peoples, Social Cooperation, Human Rights, and Distributive Justice’, *Social Philosophy and Policy* 23 (2006) 29–68, follow Rawls on this point.

13 Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel, ‘Extra Republicam Nulla Justitia?’, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 34 (2006), 147–175, p. 153. Technically, this is one of three possible grounds they offer for having duties of economic justice towards others; an analogous argument could be made with respect to the other two.

14 Cohen and Sabel (2006), p. 168.

15 Analogously, Andrea Sangiovanni, ‘Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State’, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 35 (2007), 3–39, argues that duties of economic justice flow from the provision of collective goods. Since the global economic system produces some such goods we may have direct ‘obligations of distributive justice at the global level,’ but ‘these are different in both form and content from those we have at the domestic’ (Sangiovanni (2007), p. 4).

generate an obligation to relieve that suffering, as Peter Singer argues¹⁶; or perhaps the simple fact that, let us suppose through no fault of his own, *B* is on some dimension worse off than *A* is sufficient to generate an obligation to redress that unfairness, as Simon Caney argues.¹⁷ Since whatever relationships *A* and *B* happen to have or not have simply do not figure into the question in such arguments, it follows trivially that duties of economic justice among non-compatriots will be the same as those among compatriots. Cosmopolitans of this variety are sometimes referred to as *non-relational* cosmopolitans.¹⁸

One need not reject the relational view in order to arrive at cosmopolitanism, however. The other route is to accept the claim that obligations of economic justice are indeed context-dependent, but then argue that the relevant relationships do in fact hold (or could feasibly be made to hold) in more or less the same way among non-compatriots as they do among compatriots. It follows that duties of economic justice hold among non-compatriots just as much as they do among compatriots. Such is roughly speaking the view of Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge. For example, Beitz starts with a broadly Rawlsian view that duties of economic justice obtain only among the mutual participants in a system of social cooperation governed by a basic structure. On his view, however, the increasingly dense network of global institutions do in fact constitute – or at any rate could feasibly be made to constitute – a global basic structure in the relevant sense, and it follows that Rawls's difference principle should be made to apply globally.¹⁹ Between these two varieties of cosmopolitanism there is this small difference: namely, that the second sort would entail that, hypothetically, in a different time or place where the relevant relationships do not or could not hold, our duties of economic justice with respect to non-compatriots would correspondingly weaken.

One final comment. Cosmopolitanism is the view that our obligations of economic justice towards compatriots and non-compatriots are more or less the same *at the level of principle*. This qualification is necessary to avoid an important confusion. The issue between cosmopolitans and associationalists concerns the *principles* that should govern global institutions and practices. Obviously, when it comes to practical application, a given normative principle can and should yield different policies or institutions as different contexts require. It is virtually certain that we will have to discharge our obligations of economic justice to compatriots and non-compatriots through very different

16 Peter Singer, 'Famine, Affluence, and Morality', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 33 (1972), 229–243.

17 Caney (2005), Ch. 4.

18 Following Sangiovanni (2007), p. 5, and Risse (2012), p. 9. Non-relationalism of the second variety, incidentally, is connected with the view pejoratively termed 'luck egalitarianism.'

19 Charles Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), Part 3.

policies and institutions. Given that, whatever its faults, for the time being we have no feasible alternative to the international state system, it will simply not be possible to implement global economic justice in the same way that we implement domestic economic justice. Admitting this, however, in no way undermines the cosmopolitan view as such: the point is that in designing global and domestic institutions and practices we should be applying more or less the same normative principles of economic justice.

Civic Republicanism and Cosmopolitanism

Should civic republicans be cosmopolitans? Public philosophies or political doctrines do not, in any deterministic sense, dictate particular positions in the range of possible views on global economic justice. This is because various intermediate steps are necessary to transpose a theory of domestic politics into the global realm: vary those intermediate steps this way or that, and the path from domestic to global justice can turn from one direction to another. Nevertheless, we might suppose that each political doctrine has an inherent tendency or disposition to favor particular views on global justice. Let me illustrate.

Suppose one holds a broadly speaking consequentialist political doctrine. Political and social institutions and practices, on this view, should be regarded as just or unjust according to their effects on the well-being of individuals. The most prominent consequentialists are of course utilitarians, who argue that the best institutions or practices are those we expect to maximize the sum total happiness, counting the happiness of everyone the same. Many others hold similar views, however, built on accounts of basic human needs, human flourishing, or something else. It should be fairly obvious that consequentialist political doctrines have a natural affinity with cosmopolitanism. The reason we should care about economic justice, on the consequentialist view, is simply that the organization of economic institutions and practices can have significant effects on people's well-being. When a given economic practice or policy is detrimental to the happiness or flourishing or whatever of some individual, why in principle should it matter whether she happens to be our compatriot or no? Thomas Pogge neatly illustrates this chain of reasoning from, in his case, a commitment to human flourishing, to the various effects of domestic and global institutions on that flourishing, to a rejection of any patriotic bias in our duties of economic justice.²⁰

²⁰ Pogge (2002), especially Chs. 1, 4–5. Note that on Pogge's view, to call something a human right is simply to say it is an institutionally necessary means to securing a sufficient level of human flourishing; he rejects the more conventional understanding of human rights as pre-institutional moral side constraints (Pogge (2002), especially Ch. 2). Human rights thus do not provide an independent grounds for his rejection of patriotic bias.

Suppose instead that one holds a broadly speaking consent-based political doctrine. Political and social institutions and practices, on this view, should be regarded as just or unjust to the degree that they reflect the institutions and practices reasonable people would choose for themselves under suitable conditions. While holding a consent-based political doctrine does not preclude one from being a cosmopolitan, nevertheless such a view does tend to pull away from that position. This is because the traditional and most natural way to develop the consent model is in terms of a social contract, the parties to which have been enrolled from birth in a complex shared cooperative scheme for mutual benefit. Accordingly, it matters a great deal what our relationship to a given person happens to be. The reason we care about economic justice, on such a view, is that we want to be able to justify the terms of cooperation to all those fellow participants from whose largely involuntary cooperation we benefit. Since it is more difficult to see our interactions with non-compatriots as being mutually entwined in the required manner, it is not surprising that Rawls, Nagel, Freeman, and many other liberal-contractualists have turned out not to be cosmopolitans.²¹

What then is the tendency of contemporary republicanism when it comes to global justice? Let us say that republicanism is any public philosophy or political doctrine in which a principle promoting freedom from domination is given central place. Call this the ‘non-domination’ principle:

(ND) Public policies, institutions, and so forth ought to be designed with the aim of reducing domination, so far as this is feasible.

There are, of course, many views as to what counts as domination, but following the more or less standard account we can say that persons or groups experience domination to the extent that they are dependent on a social relationship in which some other person or group wields arbitrary power over them. Arbitrary power, in turn, might variously be defined as the unconstrained or uncontrolled ability to interfere with or frustrate the choices and actions of others.²² For present purposes a precise definition is not necessary; however, domination in the relevant sense is paradigmatically experienced by slaves at the hands of their masters, wives at the hands of their husbands under traditional family law, unprotected workers at the hands of their employers in markets with structural unemployment, and citizen at the hands of tyrannical or despotic governments.

²¹ The most important exception here is Beitz, of course. Pogge moved away from a consent-based theory in his earlier work to one based on human flourishing, as observed above.

²² See Philip Pettit, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 52–73; Philip Pettit, *On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 49–69; Frank Lovett, *A General Theory of Domination and Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010a), Chs. 2–4.

It is terribly wrong for persons or groups to be subject to domination when this can be avoided. Without rehearsing at length arguments that can be found elsewhere, we might say this is because possessing some degree of freedom from domination is an important condition of human flourishing: when subject to domination, people are exploited, hindered by uncertainty from developing life plans, and deprived of self-respect.²³

While each of these claims is certainly worth further elaboration and support, let us set that task aside so as to consider the conception of economic justice most naturally implied by these broadly republican views. According to standard accounts, the degree to which persons or groups experience domination is a function of the political and social institutions and practices that govern (or fail to govern) their relationships with others: as Pettit says, our freedom from domination is ‘institutionally constituted.’²⁴ Suppose that *A* is considerably stronger than *B*, and that *B* depends on *A* for protection. In the absence of any institutions or practices otherwise effectively governing their relationship, we would say that *B* is subject to domination since *A* is clearly in a position to wield arbitrary power over him. Alternatively, suppose that *A* and *B* are married in a patriarchal society governed by institutions and practices that foreclose opportunities to women outside of marriage, and simultaneously grant husbands considerable discretion in the treatment of their wives. In this case, we would say that *A* is subject to domination since *B* is clearly in a position to wield arbitrary power over her. Given that human beings will always be to some extent dependent on one another, the only way to secure some measure of freedom from domination is to create institutions and practices that enhance opportunities, reduce imbalances of power, and constrain arbitrariness with effective and reliable rules and procedures.

Now does this republican view of things suggest any particular way of understanding the nature of economic justice? To begin with, it will no doubt embrace the relational view that duties of economic justice are necessarily context-dependent. Specifically, republicans will want to say that *A* owes economic justice to *B* only when *A* has at least some influence over actual or possible economic practices that effect the degree to which *B* will experience domination. In the case where she does, the non-domination principle entails that she lies under a defeasible obligation to implement whatever practices among the set of plausible alternatives will tend to minimize *B*’s domination. When *A* and *B* are not related in this way, however, she will have no such obligation.²⁵

23 Pettit (1997), pp. 85–89; Cécile Laborde, *Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 152–156; Lovett (2010a), pp. 130–134.

24 Pettit (1997), p. 106.

25 She may, of course, have other humanitarian obligations.

Accepting the relational view, however, merely rules out one of the two possible routes to cosmopolitanism: absent further discussion, nothing we have said to this point necessarily commits republicans to the associational view. And indeed, we might have some reasons to expect contemporary republicans would follow the second route to cosmopolitanism. This is because many contemporary republicans have developed their own principles within a broadly consequentialist framework, while opposing consent-based approaches.²⁶ If, from this point of view, the reason we should care about economic justice is simply that the organization of economic institutions and practices can effect the levels of domination people will experience, why should it matter whether a given individual happens to be our compatriot or no? The emerging anti-cosmopolitan consensus among contemporary republican writers, noted in the introduction to this paper, is thus on its face surprising. Let us examine, therefore, the further steps by which republican authors divert what might seem to be the natural path of argument to arrive at associationalism.

Since the relevant argument is complex and often presented in a fragmentary manner, it might be useful to first summarize what seems to me the standard main line of reasoning as follows:

1. Securing freedom from domination necessarily requires services that only states can provide.
2. States will not compromise freedom from domination only to the extent that their activities are democratically accountable.
3. Severely impoverished states may lack the capacity to secure the non-domination of their own people.
4. Given [1] and [3], but since well-ordered states cannot secure the non-domination of people in other, severely impoverished states (without violating [2]), the former have an obligation to help the latter acquire the capacity to secure non-domination for themselves. Call this the duty of assistance.
5. Socio-economic inequality among compatriots undermines their ability to hold their own state democratically accountable.
6. Given [2] and [5], compatriots have an obligation to secure for themselves a degree of socio-economic equality sufficient to ensure the democratic accountability of their own state. Call this the duty of civic equality.
7. Since the duty of civic equality is both different in kind and more demanding than the duty of assistance, cosmopolitanism is false.

²⁶ See for example, Pettit (1997), pp. 97–102; Pettit (2012), pp. 157–160; Laborde (2009), pp. 152–156; or Lovett (2010a), pp. 130–134, 167–168.

Different republican authors of course emphasize some of these steps rather than others, and flesh out particular steps in rather different ways, but the underlying argument is always more or less the same.

The first two steps are well-established in contemporary republican theory and relatively uncontroversial. For example, many emphasize the connection between the rule of law on the one hand, and freedom from domination on the other, and point out that only coercive states have a demonstrated capacity to reliably secure the rule of law. Thus Pettit observes that ‘there is no real possibility of establishing social justice without relying on the coercive power with which the state, as a functional necessity, imposes laws’.²⁷ Slaughter likewise argues that republican freedom ‘requires a state capable of enacting law and policies that identify and intercede’ in various ‘forms of domination’,²⁸ while Laborde and Ronzoni agree that states ‘are uniquely able to combine the rule of law, democratic control, and relational equality under the same institutional structure,’ and thus secure ‘optimal non-domination’.²⁹ Significantly, the second step rules out not only a world state, but also one state servicing the people of another: in either case, it is difficult to see how the required democratic accountability might be secured. In ‘a world where cultures vary enormously’ and ‘where trust is often in short supply across cultural divides’ it is unlikely that shared norms and standards will be available for holding transnational public authorities accountable. It follows that ‘each state has special obligations towards its own citizens,’ since only ‘their own state can serve this function’ in a manner consistent with the non-domination principle. Thus, ‘if the citizens of other regimes are to fare well [...], that depends on the performance of their own state’.³⁰

The third step is a reasonably intuitive empirical claim. Different authors elaborate on the intuition in different ways, however. Pettit, for instance, suggests that severe poverty is a problem mainly because it undermines state capacity: when a state is ‘so bereft of resources’ that ‘it is unable to discharge some of the most basic functions of a state,’ it will ‘not have the capacity to represent its people’ in the required manner.³¹ Laborde suggests instead that severe poverty is a problem because it hinders the establishment of democratic accountability: the people ‘in poor and destitute states will be unable to set up republics if the inequalities of power and wealth that they suffer [...] mean

27 Pettit (201), pp. 157–158.

28 Slaughter (2005), p. 196.

29 Laborde and Ronzoni (Forthcoming), p. 10.

30 Pettit (2014), pp. 158–159. Among republicans, Martí (2010) notably dissents from this view. Most republicans will of course also be concerned with the concentration of power entailed in creating a world state (see Laborde and Ronzoni (Forthcoming), p. 8), but this is an separate issue.

31 Pettit (2014), p. 152.

that even basic non-domination is not within their reach'.³² In either case the consequence for freedom from domination is the same, but we should observe that only the most severe poverty will have that consequence: even some very poor communities have been able to establish internal democracy and the rule of law.

Given the first four steps, it is easy to see that the republican non-domination principle entails some sort of global duty of assistance. Here there is an interesting disagreement among republican authors as to the nature and scope of that duty, corresponding to the two different varieties of associationalism discussed previously. Recall that the issue between them concerns whether the relationships relevant for generating obligations of economic justice hold (or could plausibly be made to hold) among non-compatriots. On the republican view, the relevant relationship is one in which *A* has at least some influence over an actual or possible economic practice or institution effecting the degree to which *B* experiences domination. Are there global economic institutions of the relevant kind? Though he does not explicitly address the question, Pettit's discussion proceeds on the assumption that there are not.³³ Not surprisingly, therefore, he arrives at more or less the same conclusion as Rawls: the duty of assistance, on Pettit's view, is merely an indirect and remedial obligation to 'relieve poverty and oppression' so far as this will allow disadvantaged countries 'to assume their place as representative states in a just and stable international order'.³⁴

Laborde and Ronzoni have a different view. They argue that global economic institutions as such can have consequences for the levels of non-domination experienced in disadvantaged countries:

'Supranational institutions often act as channels that amplify, rather than bind, interstate power. Powerful countries have been able almost unilaterally to shape those very institutions [...] to their advantage. [...] Weak states have little choice but to join these organizations, yet, as members, have limited influence over them. What is more, their integration within global institutions, while hardly voluntary, often entails severe restrictions on domestic policy options...'³⁵

³² Laborde (2010), p. 53.

³³ He does, however, consider the possibility that the WTO and other global organizations might constitute group agents, and as such themselves directly inflict domination on individuals around the world; he doubts their capacity to do so in any significant manner, however (Pettit (2010), p. 79).

³⁴ Pettit (2014), p. 176. Note that in Pettit (much as in Rawls), there may be further non-economic aspects to the duty of assistance, insofar as there may be obstacles other than severe poverty to the ability of a people to constitute themselves as a free republic.

³⁵ Laborde and Ronzoni (Forthcoming), p. 4.

Insofar as global economic institutions such as the World Trade Organization restrict the domestic policy options of impoverished states, the latter may be less able to achieve a level of development that would permit them to constitute themselves as free republics. It follows that the duty of assistance must also include a direct and ongoing obligation to ensure that global economic institutions help rather than hinder the establishment of democratic institutions in disadvantaged countries.³⁶ Notice that, much as Pettit's assumptions lead him down the same path as Rawls, so too the assumptions made by Laborde and Ronzoni lead them down the same path as Cohen and Sabel.

Steps five and six remain somewhat underdeveloped in contemporary republican theory, which is not to say they are false necessarily. In support of the empirical claim that democratic accountability depends requires some significant measure of socio-economic equality, many simply refer to J.-J. Rousseau's famous remark that 'no citizen should be so rich as to be capable of buying another citizen, and none so poor that he is forced to sell himself'.³⁷ Popular as this slogan might be, it is not of course actual evidence. Suitable evidence can no doubt be produced, but one wonders whether it would show that democratic accountability requires as robust a degree of equality as many apparently assume: it might turn out that strong democratic institutions – at least provided they are properly designed – can operate perfectly well in the face of considerable socio-economic inequality. Nevertheless, let us grant the point and proceed.

Notice that the domestic duty of civic equality only calls for intra-state equality, not inter-state equality. Provided all the citizens of state *A* are reasonably equal to one another, and that all the citizens of state *B* are reasonably equal to one another, each may succeed in holding their respective states democratically accountable: the relative prosperity of the people in state *A* to the people in state *B* is irrelevant. The final and seventh step thus follows easily: since the domestic duty of civic equality is both more demanding than, and different in kind from, the global duty of assistance, our obligations of economic justice to compatriots and non-compatriots are not the same.³⁸ A commitment to the republican non-domination principle seems to entail that we reject cosmopolitanism.

One final comment. This paper is framed as a discussion of global economic justice in particular. Obviously, there are many other global obligations worth considering. This only goes to show that there are many different ways in which

36 Laborde and Ronzoni (Forthcoming), pp. 10–13; cf. Ronzoni (2009), pp. 246–253.

37 Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Donald A. Cress, trans.), *The Basic Political Writings*, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2011), p. 189.

38 Unaddressed here or in the literature is the relative priority of the two duties: perhaps the duty of assistance, though easier to satisfy, should be performed first. Holding this view does not by itself make one a cosmopolitan, however.

our choices can affect the freedom from domination experienced by people in other countries. The global effects of economic institutions and practices are not always – or even often – the main focus in many discussions. Pettit, for example, is centrally concerned with the possibility that some states might dominate others, and thereby reduce the freedom from domination experienced by the citizens of the latter.³⁹ Such issues are here left aside. It is my own view, though I will not fully defend it here, that the extraordinary level of global inequality and poverty is a significant source of domination around the world. The issue between cosmopolitan and associational republicanism does not hinge on an empirical dispute concerning the relative significance of non-economic and economic factors: for present purposes, it is necessary only that we agree the latter are one possible source of domination. The following section explains how.

Republican Global Economic Justice

Why do so many contemporary civic republicans – despite beginning with consequentialist foundations – unexpectedly arrive at the associational view when it comes to global economic justice? The explanation can be found in an implicit assumption regarding the connection between inequality and poverty on the one hand, and domination on the other.

The standard republican accounts argue that we should be concerned with inequality and poverty for the indirect reason that they might impinge on the ability of a people to constitute themselves as a free state. Robust democratic accountability requires a certain degree of socio-economic equality among citizens, and this may generate strong obligations of economic justice with respect to our compatriots. Externally, however, it requires only that a people not be so desperately poor as to render them incapable of establishing a free state in the first place. Our obligations of economic justice with respect to non-compatriots are thus comparatively weaker: once a people are able to constitute themselves as a free state, our obligation to assist them has been discharged. Of course we may benevolently *choose* to continue helping them beyond this point. Indeed, as Pettit observes, when a democratic community does choose to help more generously, its government lies under an obligation to implement that choice.⁴⁰ But the choice itself is voluntary, not a requirement of economic justice as such.

Let us grant that severe impoverishment can render a people incapable of establishing a free state, and to that extent deprive them of some measure of freedom from domination. It does not follow that this is the *only* mechanism

³⁹ Pettit (2010), pp. 77–78.

⁴⁰ Pettit (2014), pp. 175–177.

by which economic institutions and practices generate domination, nor even necessarily the most important: economic institutions and practices can also undermine our freedom *directly*, by making us vulnerable *as individuals* to domination. This can be seen as follows.

Certainly, most people regard their freedom from domination as a particularly important good. Why else would so many struggle to free themselves from despotism, for example, even at considerable personal risk? Nevertheless, freedom from domination is only one good among others. People also have what might be called basic needs – the need for an adequate level of nutrition and health, for clothing and shelter, for an education sufficient to function in their community, and so on. In order to secure her basic needs, a person must have entitlements to the goods or services that doing so requires. If someone needs life-saving HIV treatment, for example, then she must have either the money to pay for it, or else an insurance plan that covers it, or else a publicly-funded entitlement to receive it, or some other equivalent. Since reasonable people do not typically regard failing to secure what they view as their basic needs as an option, it follows that they might be willing to trade away some of their freedom from domination – highly valued as that may be – in order to do so.⁴¹ Among the innumerable examples of this phenomenon, we might cite those who, in the desperate hope of providing for themselves and their families, seek employment in local sweat-shops or as undocumented workers in wealthy societies. Despite the fact that it means placing themselves under the arbitrary power or domination of their bosses, people facing dismal choice scenarios may reasonably feel that doing so is their best option.

The exact level at which reasonable people begin to trade away their freedom from domination in order to secure basic needs varies according to the time, place, and individual in question, of course. The minimum level of education people regard as acceptable, for instance, differs widely according to their culture, level of economic development, and expectations. Significantly, this means that not only absolute levels of poverty, but also to some extent relative degrees of inequality can generate domination: the success of the comparatively advantaged may raise general expectations, and thus induce the comparatively disadvantaged to accept higher levels of domination in order to keep up. It follows that republicans should have strong reasons for being concerned with inequality and poverty wherever it might be found: the more inequality and poverty there is in the world, the more often people will feel

⁴¹ The familiar language of basic needs is here used for expositional purposes only. Strictly speaking, the argument requires only that most people have subjective utility functions in which all goods (including non-domination) are subject to diminishing marginal returns. For a more thorough and technical discussion, see Lovett (2010a), pp. 193–196, 200–203.

themselves compelled to accept domination in order to meet whatever they regard as their basic needs.

Now one sometimes hears the objection that, since these people have acquiesced to domination voluntarily, that domination need not concern us normatively speaking: it is a familiar maxim of law that what is agreed to is not an injury (*volenti non fit injuria*). Elsewhere I have argued this objection is a non sequitur. It is indeed natural to want to respect the choices that people make, and it would seem particularly unfair and disrespectful to interfere with the choices of people who, after all, are only trying to do the best they can for themselves under difficult circumstances. But this perfectly reasonable sentiment is relevant only if we propose to reduce their domination by restricting their choices. It presents no objection at all if we propose to reduce their domination by improving their opportunities, and the fact that domination is bad even when agreed to is precisely why we should.⁴²

Considering impoverished persons around the world, we must next inquire as to main reasons they might lack a full measure of freedom from domination. In some cases, no doubt, they lack freedom *in part* because they live in countries that have been unable to constitute themselves as free states: the dismal conditions in some regions of sub-Saharan Africa here come to mind. The people in such regions do not have the ability to exercise their collective will free from the arbitrary interference of local despots, powerful neighbors, international agencies, and so forth. But is this the only – or even most significant – source of whatever domination they experience as individuals? What about the fact that extreme inequality and poverty renders them *personally* vulnerable to oppression and exploitation?⁴³ Consider some unscrupulous multinational corporation that dominates its employees whenever and to whatever extent it can. Why should it matter, other things being equal, whether one of its potential victims happens to be a compatriot of ours or no? The strength of our obligation to secure her freedom from domination should track her degree of vulnerability rather than her citizenship.

It is hard, of course, to judge the comparative severity of these competing sources of domination in particular cases. My own view is that the direct effect of economic inequality and poverty on levels of domination experienced by individuals is often as strong or stronger than the indirect effect of hindering those same individuals from constituting themselves as a free people and

42 For further discussion, see Lovett (2010a), pp. 147–151.

43 Of course if I am right about the direct effect of impoverishment on domination, we may have additional reasons for strengthening free states: other things equal, more robust free states might have a greater capacity to protect their own vulnerable citizens. Cosmopolitan and associational republicans will in many cases advance similar policy prescriptions. More on this below.

holding their state democratically accountable. (Even if one does not agree, there is certainly no good reason to ignore the former effect altogether, which is what the standard discussions do.) Policies sufficient to address the former problem should therefore be more than sufficient to address the latter. This is because the degree of socio-economic equality required to ensure that individuals are not personally vulnerable to oppression and exploitation is surely more than enough to enable democratic accountability. In discharging our obligation to prevent direct economic domination, we will thus discharge the duty of civic equality and the duty of assistance along the way. When it comes to economic justice, the obligation that controls, so to speak, is equally strong with respect to non-compatriots as it is with respect to compatriots.

What are the practical implications of adopting a cosmopolitan view as a republican? Is there anything really at stake in this debate? Among other proposals, both Slaughter and Laborde and Ronzoni support a global Tobin tax on financial transactions, democratization of the World Trade Organization, and increased regulation of global capital. Slaughter further calls for wealthy nations to increase their development assistance to at least the 0.7 percent of GDP recommended in the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, while Laborde and Ronzoni urge establishing a global resource dividend.⁴⁴ Since these proposals are no doubt stronger than any we are actually likely to see implemented anytime soon, one might wonder whether there is any point in adopting potentially even stronger views about our obligations of global economic justice. Perhaps debating whether republicans should be cosmopolitans is idle: even the weaker associational view takes us further than we are likely to get.

There is some truth in this complaint. Nevertheless, there are several ways in which the dispute between cosmopolitans and associationalists will have practical consequences even if we assume overall level of global assistance will continue to fall well short of what either would ideally prefer.

First, decisions have to be made about where to direct whatever economic assistance wealthy nations are willing to provide. Consider a country in which considerable inequality and poverty coexist with a reasonably functioning democratic regime – India, perhaps. Some 300 million people in India live on less than \$1.25 a day, more than a third of children under the age of five are malnourished, and millions lack access to clean water and proper sanitation facilities.⁴⁵ Cosmopolitan republicans would argue that people in India are thus exceptionally vulnerable to domination (at the hands of local or foreign employers, for instance), and thus have strong claims to our assistance. Not so

44 Slaughter (2005), pp. 206–217; Laborde and Ronzoni (Forthcoming), pp. 14–15.

45 Figures from the World Bank (<data.worldbank.org/country/india>).

associational republicans: on the associational view, priority should be given to those countries in which poverty presents a roadblock to the establishment of democracy. However much poverty remains in India – either in absolute terms, or relative to wealthy countries such as the United States – it has not undermined India's ability to constitute itself as a free state. Economic assistance should therefore be directed elsewhere.⁴⁶

Second, decisions have to be made about the relative priority of economic and political assistance. Consider a country that is both poor and saddled with a dysfunctional political system – Zimbabwe, perhaps. As in India, though on a smaller scale, there are millions of people living in poverty, suffering malnourishment, and lacking in clean water or proper sanitation facilities. On top of this, Zimbabwe has been saddled with single-party rule under Robert Mugabe for almost thirty years. Cosmopolitan and associational republicans would no doubt both support extending economic and political assistance to such a country, but their prioritization would differ: the cosmopolitan republican might prioritize economic assistance, and incorporate political assistance insofar as the dysfunctional political system presents an obstacle to economic development, whereas the associational republican might prioritize political assistance, and incorporate economic assistance only insofar as poverty presents an obstacle to the establishment of democracy.

The first two cases both concern foreign aid policy. However, there are other sorts of decisions made in wealthy nations that have economic effects on poor ones – and thereby impact the levels of domination experienced by people in the latter. These lead to what might be the most interesting and consequential differences between cosmopolitan and associational views. One example might be domestic agricultural subsidies in wealthy nations: by increasing the supply of inexpensive crops on the global market, these policies stunt the progress of economic development in poor nations. Another example might be the border policies of wealthy nations: by hindering global labor mobility, restricted borders limit the economic opportunities available to individuals born in poor nations.

The extent to which republicans have so far evaded the issue of immigration policy in particular is remarkable. Some republicans have rightly argued against second-class citizenship, and also for the non-arbitrary implementation of whatever border controls are imposed, but none have explicitly discussed

⁴⁶ As observed earlier (see n. 43 above), both associational and cosmopolitan republicans would support reforming global institutions so as to give countries like India more flexibility in protecting their own citizens from economic domination. Here I focus on the differences between the views.

the question of how open or closed borders ought to be.⁴⁷ No doubt this is in part because many fear that open borders might undermine domestic democracy. Perhaps it might, and if so this would count in favor of relatively closed borders. The associational view offers no further considerations on either side. The cosmopolitan view, in contrast, offers a strong argument on the side of relatively open borders: greater global labor mobility would make it harder to exploit vulnerable workers in poor nations. How to properly balance these competing considerations is, of course, a complex question. If republicans are cosmopolitans, however, they will at least have some reasons for favoring more open borders.

Conclusion

The form that our obligations of economic justice to non-compatriots should assume in practice depends on many factors. It might be that wealthy countries lie under an obligation *either* to invest heavily in global economic development *or* to open their borders, for instance. But the main point is this: in principle, we should be just as concerned about the domination experienced by non-compatriots as we should that experienced by compatriots. Since extreme inequality and poverty can impact both in more or less the same way, our duties of economic justice are equally strong to both. Republicans should be cosmopolitans.⁴⁸

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47 On second-class citizenship and arbitrary border controls, see Meghan Benton, 'The Problem of Denizenship: A Non-domination Framework', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 17 (2014), 49–69; and Iseult Honohan, 'Domination and Migration: An Alternative Approach to Migration Controls', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 17 (2014), 31–48, respectively.

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