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INTRODUCTION

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The present volume of *Phenomenology and Mind* is dedicated to the topic of habit, especially in its personal and social aspects. The phenomenological tradition has produced a number of interesting and fruitful reflections on habits, importantly challenging the often too sharply drawn distinction between nature and culture. The notion of habit is crucial in understanding Husserl's phenomenology. The ante-predicative framing of types in perception and the felt movement of the lived-body, the framing of position-takings in logically, evaluatively, and practically formed judgments, the rational stances one can adopt, e.g., in interpersonal discourse, or the attitudes shaping one's conceptual grasp of the world – in all these instances conscious life decisively involves elements of habit (types, positions, stances, attitudes, etc.).

The notion of habit, of course, does not first emerge within the intellectual milieu of the phenomenological movement. Indeed, the discourse on habit in phenomenology's precursors may prove quite helpful in making sense of certain currents in (especially Francophone) phenomenology. It has been a significant subject of discussion and controversy throughout philosophy's history, ranging from Aristotle's treatment of *hexis* and its reception as *habitus* in Thomas Aquinas' psychology, to Hume's critical analysis of 'powers', and further on to the French vitalists and Bergson, who had an important role also in Merleau-Ponty's transformation of Husserl's phenomenology of the lived-body. In the 20th century the concept was imbued with great social relevance. Gehlen's philosophical anthropology, for instance, gave a foundational role to 'habits' in the stabilizing of social institutions. Schütz and some of his followers, like Berger and Luckmann, analyzed habits in relation to the life-world. But it was perhaps Bourdieu's sociology that really made the concept of 'habitus' prominent within the social sciences and the humanities.

We think that phenomenology has far from exhausted its potential to clarify the concept of habit and advance the discussion further. To that end, the current volume, on "Mind, Habits and Social Reality," brings together a number of contributions in an attempt to put on display both the profound depth, systematic import, and the thematic breadth that a phenomenological treatment of the notion of habit can possess. Session I introduces genetic phenomenology with an overview of Husserl's

broad and differentiated understanding of the habitual self (**Moran**) and offers a specific focus on the phenomenology of types, with an eye to Hume's account of induction (**Lohmar**), as Husserl's most original account of habits, as well as on the quasi-existential application of genetic phenomenology to situational intentionality (**Ferencz-Flatz**) and also to the social structure of the life-world (**Da Costa**). In Session II, habit is elucidated ontogenetically (**Sheets-Johnstone**) and its peculiar teleological sensitivity to circumstances (**Zhok**) is brought to the fore. The history of the concept of habit is also mobilized to engage the problem of the naturalization of the mind (**Efal**), while Merleau-Ponty's and Ricoeur's phenomenology are shown to assuage certain problematic assumptions about habit (**McGuirk**), and, lastly, habit is argued to be pertinent to the current debate on extended mind. Session III is dedicated to the social and normative character of habit, critically taking stock of Bourdieu's seminal sociological theory of habit (**Crossley**) and enhancing it phenomenologically to make room for social creativity (**Kokoszka**). On the other hand, from a non-Bourdieuian point of view, a reciprocal habitual influence of individual and society on values is posited (**Scalambrino**), and, turning toward the individual, we are given an analysis of the intertwining of passive and active habits in personal position taking (**Arango**). Finally, in Session IV we offer two further resources for understanding habits: the English version of **Rochus Sowa's** article on episodic and non-episodic intentionality ("Episodische und nicht-episodische Intentionalität Zur konstitutiven Funktion der epistemischen Habitualitäten des Wissens und Glaubens bei Edmund Husserl", published in *Fenomenologia*, Vol. 12, 2014) and an annotated bibliography on habits edited by **Marco Cavallaro**.

Returning now in a little more detail to the present volume's contents, **Session I** introduce genetic phenomenology, focusing on its most characteristic contribution to our understanding of the realm of habits: its theory of habituality and types.

Dermot Moran's contribution "The Ego as Substrate of Habitualities: Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology of the Habitual Self" analyzes and contextualizes many different terms Husserl uses to theorize about the domain of habit. Although Husserl rarely gives an explicit methodological reflection on its operative value, habit appears to be the key concept of genetic phenomenology. **Moran** collects therefore the main occurrences of terms related to habit in the Husserliana volumes and elucidates their systematic relevance, showing how phenomenology reveals habit as present

at all levels of human behavior, from the lower drives, bodily intentionality right up to rationality in theoretical, practical and emotional life. The transcendental clarification of epistemic attitudes relates methodologically to the role of scientific habits and their sedimentation. Convictions, decisions and sentiments are all habits “layered over on each other in very complex intertwined ways” that constitute selves as stable and abiding egos, giving them their “weight” in individual and social life. Disclosing the operative concept of habit in Husserl’s disparate phenomenological analyses and juxtaposing the latter with (among others) Heidegger’s, Gadamer’s and Bourdieu’s own developments, **Moran’s** article clears the ground for further in-depth studies on the phenomenology of habits.

In his article “Types and Habits. Habits and their Cognitive Background in Hume and Husserl”, **Dieter Lohmar** explores Husserl’s most original development of genetic phenomenology. The concept of type refers to pre-predicative forms of knowledge. Lohmar defines ‘type’ as a form of pre-knowledge of singular objects or events (individual types) or of a class of objects or events (general types). Types are contrasted with empirical concepts of everyday life, respectively as a similarity group bound to a finite number of experiences and as the result of idealizations that grasp what is common to an infinite manifold of possible objects. Types show a unique aspect of mental life characterized by preservation of knowledge and gradual adaption to changing circumstances. Despite this conservatism, types, as leading and guiding operations in perception and action, are quite flexible frameworks of sense, being powerful and effective tools of pre-knowledge. Lohmar underlines their role in various pre-predicative realms of cognition, which, as he claims, the human mind shares with other animals, too. Finally, he sketches some systematic comparisons between Husserl’s genetic phenomenology and Hume’s understanding of habits.

Against the background of Husserl’s theory of types, **Christian Ferencz-Flatz** gives a phenomenological account of the notion of ‘situation’ in his paper “A Phenomenology of Automatism: Habit and Situational Typification in Husserl”. Moving from the existential tension between situational facticity and the demand of free decisions, the author discusses the details of Husserl’s genetic-phenomenological understanding of situation as a peculiar form of total-configuration (*Gesamtkonfiguration*). The apperceptive unity of situational typification is treated both in its noetic as in its noematic character, stressing the dynamic role of expectations and embodied potentialities. Thus, situation is defined as the “intentional

living unity of horizontal context and subjective potentiality”. Ferencz-Flatz focuses his attention on three main aspects of the phenomenology of situation: the role of interests in the shaping of experience, periodicity, and the emergence of a secondary normativity. Situations are organized through complex processes of time patterns contingent on subjective and environmental constraints and rhythms. They are structured by habitual interests which commit the subject to forms of ‘secondary normativity’, i.e. the “secondary passivity of practical preference in an intersubjective, generative context.”

Intersubjective types or ‘stocks of knowledge at hand’ are the core topic of **Tomas Da Costa’s** “Between Relevance Systems and Typification Structures: Alfred Schutz on Habitual Possessions”. Da Costa contextualizes the concept of type in the work of the founder of Phenomenological Sociology, Alfred Schutz. Schutz’s notion of type lies in between Weber’s sociological tool of ideal-type and Husserl’s genetic account of typical presentation. Because of this twofold source, Schutz’s understanding of types is related both to forms of idealizations (typifications) and to an empirical concept of generality (typicality). Typicalities and ideal-types are at the generative core of Schutz’s description of the structures of the life-world and are conceived in his account as essential social features of both mind and environment: even more, they are the instruments through which the social world becomes real. In this regard, the pragmatic turn of Schutz’s phenomenology slightly modifies the terms of Husserl’s understanding of types, stressing more the role of higher-order idealizations, such as the interchangeability of standpoints and the congruency of the system of relevancies, rather than focusing on the basic genetic operations that lead from previous pre-predicative levels of cognition to the disparate realm of idealizations.

The suite of papers comprising **Session II** of this volume takes on the general themes of how habits figure in our mental constitution and mode of access to the world. Fittingly, **Maxine Sheets-Johnstone**, in her article “On the Origin, Nature, and Genesis of Habit,” opens up the section by tackling the question of the mind’s beginnings. Her concern is the relation of genesis to *ontogenesis*. More specifically, the aim is to gain clarity about the phenomenon of habit by taking into account precisely the relation of habit to ontogenetic development. The investigation is inspired by her observation that in the analysis of conscious life nothing may be taken for granted, or, positively, that every minute detail has its origin and history

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in past experience. This is precisely what the notion of habit suggests – no habit is given, all habits are acquired. In her analysis, which focuses on habits as patterns of movement, Sheets-Johnstone highlights the individuality of habit-acquisition by describing the phenomenon's relation to the related phenomenon of style. The specifically ontogenetic dimension of habit is then related to instinctive behaviour, where Sheets-Johnstone stresses, following Husserl, the character of persons both as free agents and natural beings comes to light.

In light of that analysis, Sheets-Johnstone takes issue with recent phenomenological work on embodiment and the sense of self, arguing that it misconstrues its phenomena of interest by unwittingly assuming an adultist stance. If one instead recognizes the primacy of felt bodily movement – something easily overlooked by phenomenologist who, as a matter of fact, occupy the standpoint of adults while carrying out their investigations, but filling the awareness of the infant at every moment – one can avoid such pitfalls. Lastly, Sheets-Johnstone indicates how her ontogenetic approach to habit might connect with the phenomenology of intersubjectivity and social understanding, inasmuch as we understand others so often by recognizing their habitual style.

While the importance of habit for our mental constitution is widely recognized, there is a current within philosophy that nevertheless sees habit in a somewhat negative light. This is even apparent in the word's semantic often negative associations with words like “rote,” “mechanical,” “blind,” etc. **Andrea Zhok** devotes his article, “Habit and Mind,” to tackling this issue and defending habit's dignity in our mental economy. Indeed, since habits are necessary for learning, and we can follow no rule, i.e., master no concept or meaning, without learning, a great deal is at stake with habit. In his mission to put on display habit's merits, Zhok marshals the philosophical resources of Peirce and Husserl to show how an urge to repeat makes habit possible in the first place.

Though it is thanks to Peirce's notion of abduction that we can recognize the need for such an impulse, it is Husserl who presents in more detail the shape it might actually take. Zhok locates this impulse in Husserl's account of time-consciousness and the process of “temporalization.” Consciously retained past experience is transformed and projected in protention, which seeks out the same in the further course of experience. What emerges in this analysis, Zhok claims, is the purposive and intelligent character of

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habit. Indeed, habit has its own logic, being both sensitive to circumstances (and so not mechanical) and purposive (and so not blind). Having redeemed the notion of habit, he notes that the conception of habit he develops resists any thoroughlygoingly reductive naturalization because of its teleological elements. Nevertheless, in stressing its embodied and embedded character, Zhok admits that his view is amenable to a more liberal take on the project of naturalizing the mind.

Habit is also pertinent to the discourse on naturalization in a more historical register, as **Adi Efal's** work, titled "Naturalization: habits, bodies, and their subjects," shows. Efal charts the conceptual geography and philosophical lineage of the notion of habit prior to and leading up to its appropriation in the phenomenological tradition. Indeed, the work undertaken by Efal is essential genealogical work providing important background information for understanding how Francophone phenomenologists have conceived of habit. Her task is to relate, in particular, how the Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of habit that keeps the material body at a relative distance is overturned in the 19th century discourse on habit among such figures as Biran, Ravaisson, and Bergson. Despite their nuanced differences, the latter, she explains, conceive of habit as essential to life precisely as its material presupposition. She contends that this idea opens up the possibility to think of habit in a unified way as both material and moral, rather than prising these aspects apart as in the Aristotelian-Thomistic strategy, an idea that is in need of further exploration.

James McGuirk, picking up near where Efal's article leaves off, represents the post-Husserlian phenomenologies of Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur in his article "Phenomenological considerations of habit: reason, knowing, and self-presence in habitual action," in which he maintains along with Zhok that any conception of habit as *merely* blind, automatic, and mechanical is mistaken. Indeed, to put it positively, habit can be a genuine form of knowledge. McGuirk conceives it as containing both the potential for authentic self-expression and a sensitivity to circumstances, *pace* the negative allegations advanced by Ryle and Heidegger against habit. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology makes prominent the deft, even creative, manner in which habit allows one to navigate through the world, while Ricoeur, especially when he views the phenomenon in *hermeneutic* terms, explains for us how habit can be both opaque (i.e., at least in part beyond our conscious grasp) and authentic at the same time.

The specifically Merleau-Pontian view of habit may also be relevant to current debates over the extent of cognition and the so-called extended mind hypothesis (EMH), namely, the proposal that some cognitive processes may be partially constituted by what lies beyond a cognizer's boundaries as an individual organism. **Richard Strong** connects the dots between Merleau-Pontian habit and EMH in his article "Habit and the Extended Mind: Fleshing out the Extended Mind Theory with Merleau-Pontian Phenomenology." His goal is not to alter or expand upon the thesis in any way, or even to suggest that habit itself extends the mind in any way. Rather, he argues that the classic presentation of EMH in Clark and Chalmers (1998) and its subsequent elaboration in Clark (2011) overlooks an important way in which *embodied* habits might figure in the kinds of examples used to support EMH. One need not address this problem beginning *ex nihilo*, Strong shows, because Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology already illustrates the way embodied habit, in the form of the "body schema," facilitates the acquisition and employment of extended cognitive accessories. This does not end the discussion, Strong suggests, but rather brings into view the variety of real strategies subjects may make use of in co-opting their environment to better pursue their cognitive ends.

Session III offers phenomenologically driven insights into the methodological debate of the social sciences about the tensions between individual agency and the social structures.

Nick Crossley approaches the concept of habit from a sociologist's point of view. After having given a historical introduction on the relevance of the concept of habits in sociology and in related phenomenological accounts, he aims to clarify the proper validity and the conceptual limitations of the term as the main explanatory tool for regular and enduring patterns of social interaction. In this regard, the concept of habits is in Crossley's account both crucial and limited. He explores the methodological strength and the conceptual limits of the term contrasting it with concepts which have been often presented as alternative accounts: rules and conventions. In the context of 'theory of practice' habit is coined by Bourdieu's understanding of it as 'structuring structures' that gives the enculturated subject a 'feel for the game'. With this understanding of habit, one nowadays quite familiar in social sciences and humanities, Crossley compares Winch's theory of social rules and Lewis' conception of convention.

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According to Crossley, in contrast to rules and conventions, habit cannot grasp the relational nature of social structures, provided it is understood as the sedimentation of individual instantiations of social actions in dispositions of discrete individuals. Therefore, social structures, if conceived only through habits, are methodological fragmented and individualized in the collection of individual dispositions for social tasks and skills. On the other hand, Winch's account can elucidate the fact that rules refer to rational normativity, since social practices governed by rules can (and ought to) be viewed in terms of their rightness or wrongness. Thus, this peculiar aspect of social rationality can be captured by rules, not by habits, which tends to reduce it to matters of fact. The same goes for Lewis' definition of convention as coordination and agreement for social action. Both Winch and Lewis underline aspects of social reality that are intrinsically relational and cannot be reduced to individual dispositions.

Crossley shows, moreover, how habits can lend stability to both rules and conventions and durability by anchoring them within the embodied subject, beneath the level of reflective decision. Habits both enable the naturalisation of behaviour and put them outside of the realm of discourse, as embodied knowledge of something taken-for-granted. Finally, he concludes his conceptual clarification showing how habits, rules and conventions need to be considered not as key concepts of alternative accounts, but as related conceptual tools within an all-compassing frame for a future theoretical sociology.

While Crossley gives a sociological clarification of the concept of habit as an explanatory tool for regular and enduring patterns of social interaction, i.e. for social structures, **Valérie Kokoszka** enhances Bourdieu's concept of habitus phenomenologically by elucidating how social creativity (therefore agency in a strong sense) is linked to, but not exhausted by habitual dispositions. She refers to Bourdieu's understanding of habitus as a "generative scheme of practices adapted to objective circumstances" as a means to give an account both of social regularities without reducing them to inanimate mechanism and of creativity in social interactions without taking recourse to a powerful, rational subjectivity capable of decoupling itself from social structures. She calls Bourdieu's rejection of structuralism and subjectivism into question. On one hand, his concept of habitual dispositions seems to be linked to a strong "noetisation" of habit, i.e. internalisation of all its performativity as a form of Kantian schematism, and, on the other hand, the objectivity of the social environment is presupposed as a static field and never analysed in its structural relation to

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the dynamic life of the bearer of habits. Kokoszka's suggested enhancement moves from her original interpretation of Husserl's genetic phenomenology.

Kokoszka suggests a terminological distinction between habits as noetic dispositions and types as noematic schemes. In her original account, she distinguishes genetic phenomenology from static phenomenology by decidedly sublating the static tendency "to noeticize" the intentional field, drawing it into the immanence of the transcendental ego. She then applies this phenomenological innovation to Bourdieu's account where the concept of habits replaces the role of transcendental consciousness. Since the systematic correlation of habits as subjective dispositions and of types as objective dispositions of the life-world stresses the intertwining of embodied subject and environment, the social environment can no longer be presupposed as a given field of social objectivities and norms that are stabilized by internalized habitual dispositions, but as an enactively framed habitat. Inhabiting the life-world, the bearer of habits is not only intertwined with its environment, but also called to reply to its affordances and to cultivate it by creating material correlates that make it habitable. Thus, she subtly describes the intertwining of passive and active habits, showing how in taking a stance in relation to its own cultural environment the hiatus between disposition and disposed subject provides the latter the leeway of a relative framework of spontaneity and personal cultivation, something absent in Bourdieu's account. Finally, she addresses Sartre's description of social institutions as material devices for incorporation and embodiment of goals, as well as their tendency to degenerate in goal-blind devices for self-conservation.

As Crossley's and Kokoszka's contribution already suggest, there is a rich field of phenomenological research having to do with the sociality of habits. **Frank Scalambrino**, in his article "From a phenomenology of the reciprocal nature of habits and values to an intersubjective ground of normative social reality," approaches the same matter from a non-Bourdieuian perspective, taking as his primary philosophical resource a phenomenological appropriation of Aristotle. There is, Scalambrino shows, a challenging problem concerning the place of the individual and the place of the social with respect to normativity, namely, about whether the validity of values (in their basic experiential, proto-rational form) has its source in the former or the latter. He negotiates this dilemma by pursuing a phenomenological analysis that ultimately doesn't force one to take sides (i.e., in favour of the

individual or the social). One can, instead, strike a balance by conceiving of a reciprocal interrelation of the individual and the social insofar as these co-contribute to the validity of values. This is made possible by locating the ground of values in habit, which is at the same time an individual and a social affair. Only in interpersonal intercourse, Scalabrino argues, can we come to an adequate evaluation of the value of a given situation, provided that the habitual background of all the individuals involved mutually serve as evaluative constraints. In that way, Scalabrino presents a complex picture of habit as the site where the individual and the social come together to engender the norms that bind social subjects together in interpersonal encounters.

Shifting focus to theorize more specifically about the place of habit in the constitution of an individual subject, **Alejandro Arango's** paper, titled "Husserl's concept of position-taking and second nature," contains a treatment of the notion of second nature. He views the latter not as comprised of habits *per se*, but more specifically of those dispositional tendencies termed "position-takings" [*Stellungnahmen*]. Arango first takes pains to carefully distinguish between pure passivity, e.g., in the form of instincts, acquired habits, and, more narrowly, active position-takings. He argues that only position-takings are suitable elements for comprising a second nature based on their peculiar motivational character. The latter gives one a kind of self-consistency that is integral to a person's unity, yet a consistency that is not some kind of natural given but which, rather, requires active self-formation. Hence, Arango concludes, position-takings, as acquired principles of self-unification, are precisely what the notion of a second nature is meant to capture. Despite this distinction between second nature as comprised of position-takings over against one's more "natural" or passive tendencies, Husserl's phenomenology, Arango notes in closing, weaves the active and the passive together into a non-dualistic, multi-stratum whole.

With **Session IV**, the present volume closes with the inclusion of a translation into English of an article by **Rochus Sowa**, titled "Episodic and Non-Episodic Intentionality: On the Constitutive Function of the Epistemic Habitualities of Knowledge and Belief in Edmund Husserl." The article seeks to clear up some problematic aspects of Husserl's phenomenology, to which end a renewed reflection on the domain of the habitual figures importantly. Sowa begins by explaining the difference between the project of a static and

of a genetic phenomenology. The difference can be cashed out in terms of a development in Husserl's theory of intentionality: Static phenomenology concerns discrete episodes of particular conscious intentional acts, while genetic phenomenology concerns non-conscious habits, i.e., horizons consisting of empty intentions in which intentional acts are contextualized. In particular, Sowa shows, habit, in the form of *knowledge*, is not an occurrent moment within the complex of lived-experiences that comprise one's conscious life. It is, rather, a way one is disposed. One doesn't know, truly, by executing a one-off intentional act, but only inasmuch as something *holds good*, i.e., is accepted as valid. This is a condition, a disposition, exceeding conscious awareness, thanks to which one tends to produce appropriate acts (empty intentions in perception, judgments in knowledge) in appropriate circumstances.

The threatening consequence emerges, then, that the phenomenologist is cut off from these putatively noetic "phenomena," as they do not properly *appear*, and accordingly cannot be *described*. Indeed, the threat is, as Sowa sees it, to the very idea of intentional correlation. His solution comes with the notion he introduces of "*Gewusstsein*," for which the best we can do in English is "knownness." So explains that nothing new is thereby added to the contents of conscious awareness. Rather, knownness follows from the recognition that our acts have motivational antecedents of which we are not aware. Prior experience, belief, or knowledge may fall into complete obscurity for consciousness. Yet it remains "present" and even "in view" inasmuch as our acts in the present continue to have it for their motivation, though without its coming to conscious awareness. This is how, moreover, our belief in the world functions, Sowa argues, as something that holds good beyond our awareness.

The last piece in the volume is an extensive, lightly annotated bibliography of literature on the topic of habit, generously compiled by **Marco Cavallaro**. For ease of use, the bibliography is divided into four main parts. The first part covers Edmund Husserl's engagement with the topic of habit, which, in turn, is grouped into three categories: His primary published works; the published manuscripts, lectures, and essays; and references to yet unpublished manuscripts. The second part of the bibliography lists primary works by other authors working in the phenomenological tradition, and the third covers the secondary literature dealing with the notion of habit in phenomenological terms. Lastly, the fourth part presents a sampling of

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work on habit exemplifying perspectives beyond phenomenology, including figures in the history of philosophy, more recent philosophy (analytic and continental), and some offerings from outside of philosophy altogether (e.g., psychology, neuroscience, sociology, aesthetics, literary theory).

In that spirit, we hope this collection of papers will be of service in ongoing phenomenological and philosophical research. Its value will lie not in settling disputes or definitively answering questions concerning habit, but in opening up avenues for further research and discussion. This is possible, in part, due to its systematic import, i.e., in clarifying the major fault line within Husserlian phenomenology demarcating static and genetic phenomenology in a way that makes the notion of habit indispensable. The phenomenon of habit is also made to appear in this volume in its concreteness, i.e., in the broad range of topics that it can help shed light on, whether in the way habit relates to the temporal depths of an individual life in its development, or in its constant presence as what enables individuals to creatively and authentically navigate their surroundings and negotiate their interpersonal relations in ways that have cognitive, practical, and ethical significance. Additionally, in their analyses of habit, several contributions in this volume not only offer an expansive take on phenomenology's domain of research, but also draw attention to points of contact, e.g., between phenomenology as an approach to philosophy and alternative philosophical outlooks (e.g., analytic philosophy of mind and cognitive science) and theoretical paradigms (e.g., praxeological sociology), sites in which we would like to see much more interdisciplinary dialogue on these themes.