

DOI: 10.22363/2312-8674-2018-17-2-462-481

**WEST AND RUSSIA
IN THE SECOND PART OF THE 15TH–17TH CENTURIES:
POLITICAL FORMS OF MUTUAL ACTION**

*“History is really not only about the past.
It is part and parcel of present and future.”*

Bruce Mazlish¹

Natalia G. Georgieva^a, Tatiana V. Chernikova^b

^aRUDN University
6 Mikluho-Maklaya St., Moscow, Russia, 117198
navladi@list.ru

^bUniversity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
76, Vernadsky prospect, Moscow, Russia 119454
tchernikova@mail.ru

Global History is one of the phenomena and a consequence of the process of globalization, stimulating intercultural dialog as the basis for improved mutual understanding between people. Numerous modern historians recognize that there is a need to abandon the construction ‘the West and the Rest’ that has dominated for a long time in the historiography. Global History should focus on the study of communication and interaction between governments and nations. Modern historiography refers the beginning of a process of globalization to the 15th century. In connection with this chronological milestone this essay considers the initial phase of the process establishing sustainable relationships between Western Europe and Russia. It began in the second half of the 15th century. In the 17th century all the contacts with Western Europe became a constant of Russian socio-cultural devices and one of the phenomena of Russian history. Despite the support provided to aliens by the Russian government, relationship of the foreigners with the Russian society was contradictory. However, by the end of the 17th century, in attitude of Russian society to everyone who had come from the West began to develop two parallel lines. A negative attitude to the innovation and commitment to old, spiritual and household traditions remained by the peasantry and part of the elite of society. The urban population and the other part of the noble elite of

¹ Bruce Mazlish, “Comparing Global History to World History,” *Journal of interdisciplinary History* 28, no. 3 (Winter 1998): 396. http://www.culturahistorica.es/mazlish/global_history.pdf [accessed 29 December 2016].

society showed tolerance and willingness to accept much of the new that had appeared in Russia thanks to its rapprochement with the West.

Keywords: globalization processes, Western Europe, Ottoman Empire, Russia, historiography, Global History, Europeanization, ‘the West and the Rest’

Introduction

Professional historians are well aware of Herodotus’s recommendations “to preserve the memory of the past by placing on record the achievements of both own and Asiatic People.”² Since that time, the World has expanded significantly and now it includes not only Europe and Asia, but also North and South America, Australia, Oceania, etc. Therefore, in the view of Global History, there should be all the regions of the Earth.

The modern era is characterized by an objective process, defined by the term “globalization”. Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, there have been global changes in the system of international order and geopolitical shifts, and then, in the second half of the 1990s, they expressed influence on all the spheres of political, economic, social and cultural life in different parts of the globe. American historians “see the globalization as a global process in which numerous participants are creating a new ‘civilization’”³. Russian historians admit that globalization as an inevitable historical and political process implies virtual intersection of national borders, expansion of communication, creating a global market, global dissemination of achievements of sciences and “the formation of global consciousness”⁴.

In the global information space, globalization stimulates intercultural dialogue as the basis for improved mutual understanding between people. At the same time, it encourages the intellectual elite (scientists) from different countries to develop new approaches, not only when creating a historical narrative, but also in studying the history of the science of history (historiography).

Our global world really needed global history knowledge, and such a novel field of study as Global History. It appeared in the early 1990s, but the theoretical substantiation of its ideas arose in the mid-20th century. It was associated with the name of Fernan Braudel (Braudel, 1902–1985). He revolutionized historical

² J. Evans, *Herodotus: Explorer of the Past* (Princeton: NJ, 1991), 67.

³ Mazlish “Comparing,” 392.

⁴ Sergey A. Voronin, “Protseess globalizatsii ili proekt neoliberalizma? Chto nas ozhidaet” [The process of the globalization or neo-liberal project? What awaits us], *RUDN Journal of World History* 7, no. 4 (2015): 11.

scholarship, suggested taking into account the economic and geographic factors in the analysis of the historical process, demonstrating the effectiveness of this approach in his writings: *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (1949), *Civilisation Matérielle, Économie et Capitalisme, XV–XVIII*, (translated as *Capitalism and Material Life, 1400–1800*) (1967–1979) etc. Global History is connected with the past, present, and future. According to Global Economic History Network (GEHN): “Global history seeks to broaden and deepen people’s understanding of themselves, their cultures and their states by extending the geographical space and lengthening the chronologies that most historians normally take into their narratives and analyses”⁵.

It is the historians who dealt with the study of global history that played a particular role in performing this task. On the one hand, the social responsibility of historians is predetermined by the changing world epistemological situation, which creates the necessity and the possibility of recognition and awareness of the transformation of the “image of historiography, its problematic field and its subject.”⁶ On the other hand, the emergence of a new understanding of the correlation of different cultures, traditions and main aspects of the development of historical science gradually becomes dominant in both world public opinion and world historical consciousness.

Bruce Mazlish (1923–2016), Professor of the Department of History at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, one of the “founding fathers” of the American School of Global History, admitted that “the history of globalization is the heart and the novelty of global history.”⁷ According to him and Patrick Karl O’Brien (born in 1932), Professor of Economic History at the London School of Economics, who is another founder, global history remained (1998, 2008) “an emerging project with many aspects to study.”⁸ Mazlish said: “Global historians, or at least historians of globalization, are trying to establish a more deliberate research agenda. They know that each of the factors of globalization requires rigorous empirical study...”⁹

⁵ Global Economic History Network 2011. Mission Statement, <http://www2.ise.ac.uk/economicHistory/Research/GEHN/network/GEHNMission.aspx>; see also Tatyana L. Shestova, “Global History as a Trend of Global Studies,” in Leonid E. Grinin, Ilya V. Ilyin, Peter Herrmann, and Andrey V. Korotayev eds., *Globalistics and Globalization Studies – Big History & Global History*, 4 (Moscow, 2015), 104, <http://docviewer.yadex.ru/>

⁶ Ol’ga V. Vorob’eva, “Istorii istoriografii kontsa XVIII – nachala XXI v. V svete knigi G. Iggersa i E. Vana ‘Global’naya istoria sovremennoy istoriografii,’” [Histories of historiography, late 18th – early 21st cc. in the context of the ‘Global history of modern historiography’ by G. Iggers and E. Wang’] *Dialog so vremenem* 37 (2011): 49.

⁷ Mazlish, “Comparing,” 390.

⁸ Mazlish, “Comparing,” 393.

⁹ Mazlish, “Comparing,” 392.

Explaining the peculiarities of the research method of the historians belonging to the Global History school, Mazlish wrote: “Although global history is mainly transnational in its subjects of study, it would be a grave error to neglect the study of the nation as well. National history merits reexamination in light of how the forces of globalization have affected the nation-state, and vice-versa. Nations will not go away. They are still the preferred settings for large numbers of people to organize in behalf of common ends – protection of territory and property, economic production, and, last but not least, group identity. ... In short, global history, though it seeks to transcend national history, nevertheless is engaged with the nation-state as a major actor on the international and global scene”.¹⁰

O’Brien supported this idea: “Everything and everyone has a history which has become a consensual presumption of modern history”. However, there is one problem in behalf of global history, “how to best integrate our ever widening and deepening historical knowledge of the world into narratives...” of the professional historians that seek to inform global as well as national Histories.¹¹

To solve the problem of correlation of global and national history, numerous modern historians admit that there is a need to give up the expression ‘the West and the Rest’ that has dominated for a long time in the content of historiography traditions.

For example, back in 1982, in his book “Europe and People without History”, anthropologist Eric Wolf opposed the idea of ‘the West and the Rest’, arguing that such an approach was counterintuitive for “no people with history” and that historical consciousness always took place in all the cultures.¹² In 2000, the University of Chicago Professor Dipesh Chakrabarty supported this idea, urging to give up Eurocentrism and to push the boundaries of historical research, while considering Western history only as one of the forms of world history.¹³

In 2008, Georg Iggers and Edward Wang insisted on the need to study the interaction of different national cultures and their historiography traditions, proving that history and historiography as scientific disciplines were not exclusively a privilege of wealth and the West.¹⁴

¹⁰ Mazlish, “Comparing,” 393.

¹¹ Patrick O’Brien, “Global History for Global Citizenship,” *Global History and Maritime Asia Working and Discussion Paper Series, Working Paper*, no. 7 (2008), http://www.history.ac.uk/makinghistory/resources/article/global_history.html

¹² Eric Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley: CA, 1982), 23.

¹³ Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History,” in *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton University Press, 2000), 27–46.

¹⁴ Georg J. Iggers, and Q. Edward Wang, *A Global History of Modern Historiography* (Harlow, England: Pearson Longman, 2008), 15–16, 394.

In 2011, “Journal of Global History,” as one of the main platforms where the subject of global history was brought up, wrote that it was necessary to revise the dichotomy ‘the West and the Rest’ when examining political and cultural history.

As a rule, in historiography, the term “all the rest” means large areas (Asia, Africa, Latin America and other regions of the globe), and their history. However, in the context of globalization, there can be neither national nor local history.

According to Russian historian Olga Vorobyeva, the logic of modern historiography development, “should imply (not exclude) the multiplicity of national/local options and trajectories of the development, focusing on their uniqueness and diversity.”¹⁵

Obviously, in early 21 century, the concise slogan “the West and the Rest” enhanced globalization going through its last days in the global historiography space, as historians studying the history of different countries and peoples should equally be able to discover and synthesize the local in the global and the global in local, as well as when exploring its native national history. Obviously, the recovery and understanding of universal (global) history are impossible without researching the particular facts, events, cases *etc.*, their causes and consequences which have taken place in the history of different countries. It is obvious (or not – for some anti-Russian figures) that Russian history is an important part of world history. Therefore, without studying the events of Russian history, its causes and results, the restoring of world history would be impossible or can lead to inadequate restoration of global history.

According to the scientists, Global History should focus on the study of communication and interaction between people, countries and governments. Historians, proponents of the research area, called Global History, use a specific approach to the study of history, focusing their research not only on the problem of interaction of people or states, but also on the problem of their struggle to preserve their identity in conjunction with representatives of other national or state traditions. For better understanding General (universal, global) history, historians should consider both the history of the development of individual countries or regions and their interaction (international and inter-state communications).

Russia and the West: the Beginning of Europeanization

Modern historiography refers the beginning of the globalization process to the 15th century. In connection with this chronological milestone, as well as due to the fact that the method of Global History guides researchers to examine

¹⁵ Vorob’eva, “Istorii istoriografii,” 62.

inter-state relations (among many other important political, social and cultural problems), this essay considers the initial phase of the process establishing sustainable relationships of Western Europe and Russia on the basis of the examination of a wide range of Russian and foreign sources and the synthesis of facts and assessments accumulated in the historical literature.

In the 10th – 12th centuries, Ancient Russian State [in Russian: *Drevnyaya Rus'*] was well known in Europe. However, Russian ties with Western Europe were splintered after the invasion of the Mongol-Tatars and establishment of the yoke [in Russian: *igo*] of the Golden Horde.

There is a widespread perception in public historical consciousness that the first steps in Russia's inclusion to the European innovations in various areas refer to the beginning of the 18th century. However, the problem of the definition of the initial point of the chronological framework of the stable relations between Russia and Western Europe needs to be corrected. In order to solve this problem, there are many works of foreigners who visited Russia in the 15th–17th centuries and collected valuable information for historians on the arrangement of Moscow State and its relations with Western Europe.¹⁶

The Europeanization of Moscow power started from its inception as a unified and powerful state. Moscow Russia had to define its geopolitical role in the international arena and to take its rightful place among European States.

While uniting the Russian lands and creating a new state, Grand Prince Ivan III (1462–1505) understood that it was necessary to use Western European experience for the development of the country. He was the first of Moscow rulers who ventured upon the adoption of the Western innovations in the military, technical, and partly scientific (medicine) and cultural (building and architecture) spheres. In this case, the intermediaries were the foreigners, who had been invited to the service by Moscow authorities from the second half of the 15th century. These first foreigners were mostly of Greek-Italian origin. The presence of Greeks in Moscow after the fall of the capital city of the Byzantine Empire in 1453 was not surprising. Being a spiritual daughter of the Byzantine Empire and a part of the Patriarchate of Constantinople (formally until 1589, in fact, up to 1439) from the tenth century, Russia was used to receiving the Greek East staff and accepting religious ideas. Moreover, although The Union of Florence 1439 diminished respect for the Greeks, as the paladins of the true Orthodox faith, the old habit did not disappear completely. The Greeks were treated almost like

¹⁶ Marshall Poe, *Foreign descriptions of Muscovy. An Analytic Bibliography of Primary and Secondary Sources* (Slavica Publishers, 1995); Marshall Poe, *The Use of Foreign Descriptions of Russia as Sources for Muscovite History: A Methodological Guide*, http://works.bepress.com/marshall_poe/44.

their compatriots, and hoped to use their intellectual capacity in understanding the mission of Moscow Russia, which after the fall of Byzantium was the only world's independent Orthodox state.

During the reign of Grand Princes Ivan III and Vasily III (1505–1533), the number of foreigners in Russian service was constantly increasing. Siegmund Herberstein, who came to Moscow in 1517 and 1526, noted that in the Russian capital, there were many immigrants from different Western countries in the Russian capital.¹⁷ Apart from the Italians [in Russia they were called *fryagi* or *fryazi*], there also appeared the Germans (not necessarily from Germany) [called *nemtsy* in the Russian interpretation of the word *nemoy* meaning dumb, i.e. a person who does not speak Russian]. According to S. Herberstein, almost all the aforementioned foreigners were associated with military affairs as the involvement of foreign military experts obtained a priority from the beginning of the 16th century. The success of the use of their knowledge and skills was evident in the course of the military expeditions of that time.

The Muscovite government highly appreciated foreign experts and provided them with high patronage, and gunsmiths (gunners) [in Russian: *pushkari*] made a significant contribution to the creation of Russian artillery, which according to Western contemporaries, became one of the most powerful in Europe. While appreciating foreign experts, at times the government forgave their misdeeds, unacceptable for the Russians. In contrast to the high administration, middling warlords and Russian people were not inclined to appreciate strangers. The awareness of the mutual differences and the low compatibility of their views went on growing in the process of exploring the Russian and Western European worlds. The policy of the authorities faced disapproval from the general population.

On the one hand, Russians' strong dislike of foreigners was largely due to the deep historical, social and cultural differences between the West and Russia, as well as particular mentality and conservatism of the Russian society not accepting innovations for fear of losing their identity. On the other hand, the foreigners themselves did not seek rapprochement with the Russians in order to preserve their identity. In practice, this meant that Western experts settled apart from the Russians in the separate areas [in Russian: *nemetskie slobody* – so called German settlements].

In the reign of Feodor I (1584–1598), Boris Godunov (1598–1605), Feodor II (1605), False Dmitry I (1605–1606), there was no growth in the number of serving foreigners; rather there was a real chase after them. Meanwhile, the old

¹⁷ S. Herberstein, *Zapiski o Moskovii* [The Notes on Muscovy], (Moscow: MGU University Press, 1988), 212.

model of using serving foreigners practically did not change, with the exception of Boris Godunov's deliberate policy of using foreigners to create in Europe a favorable image of Russia. Thus, there was an attempt to marry Xenia Godunov to the son of the king of Denmark.

The policy of Ivan III on overcoming the isolation of Russia from Europe

The relationships between the young Muscovite state and Western Europe countries included not only the invitation of foreign specialists and the use of their knowledge and skills. In the second half of the 15th century, there began the transformation of Russia into a significant player in the European geopolitical space. Ivan III made a real revolution in the foreign policy of North-Eastern Russia: the isolation from Europe was the thing of the past and the geography of Russian foreign policy activity was significantly expanded.

By the end of the 15th century, the Muscovy state had come to the European arena with a solid reserve of military victories: successful wars in the west of Russia (with Lithuania and the Livonian order), the fall of the Golden Horde yoke in 1480, and expanding the Russian borders to the North-East. Ivan III's vast foreign-policy programme was based on the fact that he did not doubt the military potential of his own Power. He believed in the religious and moral superiority of his people over the "heretical" West and the Muslim East.

The appearance on the Eastern Europe border of the new Moscow state possessing a vast territory surprised many Western European rulers. Russia's closest neighbors (Poland, Lithuania, the Livonian order and Sweden) were greatly alarmed by a new balance of geopolitical forces.

Ivan III established contacts with the Papal Curia and the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, signed a military-political Union with Denmark. There was the regular exchange of embassies with the rulers of Northern Italy, in particular Venice. The exchange of embassies of Ivan III with the Vatican led to the "political and sacred" marriage of the Moscow Sovereign and the Byzantine Princess Zoe. The negotiations of Rome and Moscow showed a positive mutual interest.

The desire of the West to cooperate with Russia was due to the Turkish invasion into Europe. Insisting on the marriage of Princess Zoe with the Moscow Great Prince Ivan III, Pope Sixtus IV had two goals: the accession of the Muscovy to the Florentine Union and urging Russia to the beginning of active operations against the Turks. However, the Pope did not succeed in either direction.

When Zoe arrived in Moscow on 12 November 1472, she was immediately baptized in the Orthodox Church and received the name Sophia. Then, according to the Orthodox rite, she was married to Grand Prince Ivan III that served as a confirmation of her belonging to the Orthodox faith in the eyes of others.

In the second half of the 15th century and until the mid-17th century, Russia had no power, and therefore a desire to struggle with the Turks, and its “intractable” position buried the project of creating a common European and Christian front against Turkey. The “collapse” of the project, conceived by Rome, began long ago. The Western world, with the exception of Hungary, Venice and Genoa, once demonstrated its indifference to this idea. Probably, if there had been a successful crusade, proclaimed by Pope Eugene V in 1440, shortly after the adoption of the Florentine Union, the situation would have changed. However, the army of the crusaders, which consisted mainly of Hungarians and crossed the Danube in 1444, had little chance for the victory in the war against the Turks.

Only the peacefulness of Sultan Murad II (1421–1444, 1446–1451), who wanted to leave the throne to his 12-year-old son Mehmed, led to the conclusion of the peace treaty. However, in Rome the reasons for the concession of the Sultan Murad were seen as his weakness. Therefore, the Pope took the decision to continue the military actions, but they were unsuccessful. The crusaders were defeated on the shores of the Black Sea. It led to an extreme weakening of the troops of Hungary, which was a major European power restraining the onslaught of the Turks.

Therefore, in 1472, the Vatican’s plan to include the Orthodox North-East Muscovy in the anti-Ottoman forces, to create a United Christian front against Turkey or at least to stop the Ottoman expansion in the Balkans and in Central Europe, was doomed to failure. “The position of Ivan III, not hearing the call of the Pope to the European Christian Alliance against the Ottoman aggression... seems logical and purely European. ...Ivan III knew that to compete with the Ottomans in South-Eastern space was meaningless, and it was physically impossible”.¹⁸ The Moscow Sovereign had the opportunity to soberly assess the position of other European countries and Turkey’s potential. The aggressive capability of the Ottoman Empire was on the rise. If Ivan III had started the fight, joining the anti-Osman Vatican plan of the Alliance, “it might, and would weaken the onslaught of the Turks on the Austrian border, Croatia and Hungary, but

¹⁸ Tatiana V. Chernikova, *Europeizatsiya Rossii vo vtoroy polovine XV – XVII vekakh* [Europeanization of Russia in the second half of the fifteen to seventeen centuries] (Moscow: Moskovskiy gosudarstvennyi institut mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy (universitet) MID Rossii, 2012), 82.

there would be the expansion of Turkey to the North of Crimea” that threatened the development of Russia.¹⁹

Thus, Moscow based its foreign policy exclusively on the national state interest, which was consistent with the policy of France, England and most other Western European States in the fight against the Turkish expansion. In early new time, the political and commercial interests of the main Western countries meant already a lot more than the desire for religious solidarity.

They were all right, but the division of the Christian world started to grow. In 1494, Naples and Rome requested aid of Sultan Bayezid II (1481–1512) in the straggle against France, and in 1498 Milan and Ferrara against Venice. In 1510, German Emperor Maximilian (1493–1519) was offered the Port to act jointly against France. In 1513 Venice appealed to Sultan Selim I (1512–1520) for help. “Christian countries began to consider the Muslim state not only as an enemy but as a potential ally in European conflicts.”²⁰ French Catholic king Francis I (1515–1547) concluded a Treaty of Alliance with Sultan Suleiman (1520–1566) in the struggle for influence in the continental Europe against the Austrian Habsburgs, provided that Turkey had to increase the attack on the Austrian border from the South-East. At the same time, the Sultan signed the Treaty of the capitulations, which provided the French merchants with extensive trade, judicial and consular privileges on the territory of Turkey. This Treaty laid the foundation for the friendly relations of the Ottoman Empire and France in many subsequent centuries.

In the mid-16th century the process of Europeanization of Russia underwent significant changes, but not because of the increasing number of Western experts or their circumstances change, and growing introduction of Russia in European international relations. It occupied its place on the political map of Europe and played its geopolitical role as a major pole of power in Eastern Europe. Western European countries (Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, Denmark, Sweden, England) and the Papal Curia in the 16th century sought to use Russia in their interests. Habsburgs and the Pope were attracted by the hope of the alliance with Moscow against Turkey; Denmark and Sweden – by the feud with each other; England – by the benefits from the actively developing trade. Even in the aristocratic circles of Poland and Lithuania, there were supporters of the rapprochement with Russia; they feared the continuation of the former clashes with it.

¹⁹ Tatiana V. Chernikova, *Evropeizatsiya*, 82–83.

²⁰ Mikhail Yu. Zolotukhin, Vladimir A. Georgiev, and Natalia G. Georgieva, *Istoriya mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy i vneshney politiki Rossii v Novoe vremya. XVI – nachalo XIX veka* [The History of international relations and Exterior Policy of Russia in the New Time. From 16th to the beginning of 19th century] (Moscow: INFRA-M Publ., 2015), 70.

Russia itself wanted to join a part of the Baltic coast, though it knew that it was a tasty morsel for many neighboring countries, including Sweden and Denmark. For Russia, the returning of the lands of the Novgorod's Principality was particularly vital for the development of Maritime trade with Western European countries and military mercenaries from the Netherlands, England, Scotland and German states. The Livonian order repeatedly infringed upon Russia's interests. It limited the travel of Russian diplomats and merchants, forbade import of non-ferrous metals and weapons, detained the invited foreign experts.

In 1554, the Livonian order concluded a treaty with Russia, which guaranteed Moscow's navigation and trade. However, the authorities of the Livonian cities were constantly violating its terms. The attempts of Tsar Ivan IV (1533–1584) to militarily force the Livonian order to fulfil the contract led to the outbreak of the Livonian war (1558–1583). In 1558–1563, the army of Moscow, modernized with the help of Western professionals (English and German artillery), won a series of victories. As a result, the Order ceased to exist as an independent military force. Russia's success prompted the neighboring states to intervene in the war. Sweden captured the northern part of the possessions of the Livonian order, Denmark – the Central part, and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (from 1569) occupied the Southern part. The Agreement (1559) of Gotthard Kettler, the Grand Magistrate of the Order, and Zygmunt II August, Grand Prince of Lithuania (from 1529) and the King of Poland (1530–1572) established a Protectorate over the Livonian order. In 1561, an act was signed on the annexation of Livonia to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In 1562, there was signed the Treaty of Riga, symbolizing the cessation of the juridical existence of the Livonian order.

The situation posed a great danger for Russia, because the military actions continued. The army of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth laid siege to the Russian fortress of Pskov (1581). In 1570–1583, Sweden and Denmark captured a number of Russian forts and much of the coast of the Gulf of Finland extremely complicated Russia's access to the Baltic Sea. The attack of the troops of the Crimean Khan (1571–1572) on Moscow further complicated the situation for Ivan IV. However, the heroic defense of Pskov broke the aggressive plans of the enemies of Tsar Ivan and resulted in the more favorable outcome of the war for Russia than one would have expected. In 1582, the peaceful treaty in Yam-Zapolsky put an end to the war of Russia and Poland. In 1583, the truce in Plyussa ended the Russia-Sweden war.

After the war, Western Europe realized that Russia was a dangerous opponent, despite its defeat and the losing of all the conquests on the coast of the Baltic Sea. Moreover, in Western Europe they realized that Russia wanted to move

not only eastward, but also westward and, therefore, it was necessary by all means to restrain its attempts to conquer the Baltic coast. This opinion explains the active intervention of Poland and Sweden into Russia in early 17th century, when the events of “Time of Troubles” [in Russian: *Smutnoe Vremya*] took place. The foreign policy of Poland and Sweden considered two opposite approaches. The first came from the idea that despite the ensuing civil war, Russia was still strong and might be either a potential ally or a strategic enemy. The second approach proceeded from the idea that the civil war had weakened Russia so much that it was possible for the Western countries to divide it into several colonies.²¹ The policies of Russia’s two neighboring countries affected both approaches. Protestant Sweden, the enemy of Catholic Poland, demonstrated willingness to the alliance with Russia, and in 1609 they signed the Treaty in Vyborg. The pretext was the need to fight against False Dmitry and Polish invaders. However, seeing the growing weakness of Russia, the actual destruction of the Central government after the overthrow of Tsar Shuisky, Sweden rejected the alliance with Russia and switched to the policy of expansion of the Russian territory. Poland took advantage of the Union of Russia and Sweden as a pretext to the beginning of the open intervention in Russia. All these political actions were the direct result of the weakening of the state power in Russia and, therefore, changed the old model of Europeanization, which for two centuries was under the state control.

Thus, during the Livonian war and the “Time of Troubles”, Russia’s relations with Western Europe were not a communication for borrowing the experience, but the confrontation.

Russia on the way of rapprochement to the European countries in the 17th – early 18th centuries

In the early 17th century, there was a new form of convergence of Russia with European countries – creating the projects to invite foreign princes to the Russian throne. There were three main contenders: Polish king Sigismund III Vaza (1587–1632); his son, Prince Wladyslaw (1595–1648), future king of Pjland and grand Prince of Lithuania, under the name Wladyslaw IV (1633); younger son of the king of Sweden Carl IX (1599–1611) Prince Carl Philip (1601–1622). The text of the Russian-Polish and Russian-Sweden treaties on the invitation of princes indicates that theoretically these documents did not have anti-Russian character. However, the practical implementation of these treaties

²¹ Tatiana V. Chernikova, *Evropeizatsiya*, 327.

could become a cover for a direct colonization of Russia. In 1610, Sigizmund III expressed similar intentions at the talks with Metropolitan Filaret and V.V. Golitsyn. The plans of the colonization of Russia were developed even in England and in the Netherlands²². However, the Thirty-year war of 1618–1648 distracted the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden from Russia.

During the Thirty-year war, Russia actively sought allies in Europe among the participants of anti-Habsburg, knowing that without them it would not be able to implement a successful foreign policy on the continent. The Western states also sought to strengthen ties with Russia through the conclusion of various treaties. Russia exported from the Netherlands a huge amount of modern European weapons, as well as recruited military and other professionals. In 1623, Russia and England, which had close trade relations, signed an agreement confirming the trading privileges of the English Muscovy company. In 1629, France signed a treaty extending the Russian-French trade relations.

The Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty-year war and changed the geopolitical situation in Western Europe. The Holy Roman Empire of the German nation lost its leadership in Europe, and the French monarchy took its place. Sweden became a great power in Northern Europe, established its dominance in the Baltic Sea, turning it into the “Swedish lake”. In this balance of forces, for Russia it was favorable to enter an alliance against Sweden due to their continuing territorial conflict. In 1656–1658, Russia tried to regain the lands seized by Sweden during the “Time of Troubles”, but as there was the war against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1654–1667), it was unable to retain these areas. The Kardissky peace of Russia and Sweden (1661) confirmed the boundaries established between those states by the Treaty of Stolbovo.

In 1667, Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth signed the agreement on cease-fire in Andrusovo. Russia regained the lands occupied by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the “Time of Troubles”, retain the territory on the left bank of the river Dnieper and Kiev, located on the right bank. The territory on the right bank remained the possession of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Treaty stipulated a number of joint diplomatic and military measures to deter claims of the Khan of the Crimea and the Sultan of Turkey to the lands of Ukraine. This was indicative of the awareness of the ruling circles of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and Russia had to join forces to repel the attacks from the South.

Sultan Mehmet IV (1648–1687) and the Khan of the Crimea threatened Warsaw by the war in response to the Treaty of Andrusovo, making it clear that

²² Tatiana V. Chernikova, *Evropeizatsiya*, 452, 462.

they claimed to the entire territory of Ukraine. Moscow offered peace in exchange for its non-interference in the confrontation of Poland and Turkey. Warsaw left the Ottoman threats unattended and continued to consider that the right-bank Ukraine was its possession. In 1672, Sultan and Khan moved their troops to the North. The huge power of the Ottomans was opposed by a small part of the Polish forces. After several victories, Sultan offered peace talks, but the Polish Sejm rejected its terms. In 1673, Jan Sobieski defeated the Turkish army near Khotyn. In 1674, he came to the throne of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, under the name Jan III (1674–1696), but further hostilities between Poland and Turkey took place with varying success.

Moscow was closely watching the events in Ukraine; it realized that in case of Poland's defeat, Russia would become the next target. In 1672, Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich (1645–1676) sent a letter to Sultan with a warning that in case of an attack on Poland, the Christian Sovereigns would come to its defense. At the same time, Moscow launched an unprecedented diplomatic action. Russia organized the special Embassies in the Holy Roman Empire, France, England and Persia, urging all of them to give the overall resistance to the Ottoman aggression. However, Europe did not hear the call of Russia, as on the continent there grew a conflict caused by the French invasion in the Netherlands. In the summer of 1674, the negotiations of Russia and the Poland on the Union remained fruitless due to the territorial disputes. Russia entered the war against Turkey without any ally. The hostilities continued until the armistice, signed in 1681 in Bakhchisarai. This Treaty contained the first territorial delimitation of the possession of Russia and Turkey. It was the river Dnieper which became the border. The rejection of Russia of the territory on the right bank of the river Dnieper formed the basis for new negotiations with Poland.

In 1686, Russia and Poland signed the “Eternal peace”, meaning a lot more than the resolution of territorial disputes. Under the agreement, Smolensk land was recognized forever as the possession of Russia. The same was with the left bank of the river Dnieper, and Kiev, for which Moscow paid to Poland 146 000 rubles as a compensation. One of the most important consequences of the signing of this Treaty was the participation of Russia in the activities of the Holy League.

It was an international European organization, established in 1683 on the initiative of Pope Innocentius XI to fight against the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean khanate. The League consisted of the Holy Roman Empire, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Venice, and the Papal state. Bavaria, Saxony, Brandenburg, and some Italian principalities, as well as numerous volunteers

from France, England, Holland, Spain, Sweden and Denmark joined them. De jure, Russia joined the League in 1697, signed by Emperor Leopold I (1658–1705) and Venice offensive Union. For Russia, the membership in the League became a symbol of its recognition as equal with other European States and the adoption of new forms of cooperation with Europe. For Western Europe, Russia's participation in the League meant the realization of the hopes, which Papal Curia planned in the 15th century.

The campaign of the Russian army in 1687 and 1689 prevented the raid of Tatar cavalry to the territory of Central European countries and its connection with the main forces of the Turks. However, amid the victories of the League members on the Balkan Peninsula and on the Danube, especially at Zenta in September 1697, the results of the operation of the Russian army were very insignificant. Russia's Crimean campaigns were the first attempts of large offensive operations. After coming to the Russian throne, Peter I began to fulfil the allied obligations. In the spring of 1695, he decided to attack two new areas. One goal was the capture of Azov, the purpose of the other was the capture of Turkish outposts on the river Dnieper. The Azov fortress withstood the siege for three months and did not surrender. The Turkish fortresses in the lower reaches of the river Dnieper were taken by the Russian troops. In the summer of 1696, Peter used the experience of the first campaign. He created a fleet in Voronezh and with its help used the captured Azov. Planning to continue the war against the Ottoman Empire and realizing the need for stronger joint efforts of all members of the League, in 1697–1698 Peter organized the Great Embassy in Western Europe. However, the negotiations in some European countries showed that Russia would not be able to find new allies for the successful continuation of the struggle against Turkey. Many members of the League prepared to negotiate with Sultan Mustafa II (1695–1703). On the Karlovyts Congress 1698–1699, the participants of the League seemed to have forgotten that they were allies. Each delegation solved its problems with the Turkish representatives separately. The Habsburgs used their military success to strengthen their positions in Hungary and subordination of Transylvania. Poland restored of the borders of 1672, returning to the Sultan six Moldavian cities occupied during the war. Russia signed with Turkey a truce for two years, reserving for further discussion of all controversial issues.

In 1700, there were the talks in Istanbul; the both sides were ready for concessions. The Sultan, who was impressed by the Russian warship arrival in its capital, was willing to make concessions and agreed to give Azov and the part of the coast of the Sea of Azov to Russia. Russia, which had created the Nor-

thern Union of the Baltic States during Peter's visit to Europe, was preparing for the war for the access to the Baltic Sea and thus was in a hurry, giving Mustafa Dnieper fortifications. The agreement for a 30-year armistice, signed on 14 July 1700, marked the result of Russia's external policy in the 17th century.

Conclusions

In conclusion, the process of establishing stable relations of Russia with the countries of Western Europe began in the second half of the 15th century. It was one of the consequences of the creation of the unified Moscow State.

In the first phase, which lasted until the end of the 16th century, the relationship was expressed mainly in the invitation to the Russian service of foreign experts from other countries. The bordering states witnessed a gradual growth of the military and political potential of Russia. They had a fear for the development of Russia and were constantly creating obstacles in recruitment of foreigners in the Russian service. However, Moscow constantly managed to find new ways to attract specialists from the West.

In the second half of the 17th century, all the contacts with Western Europe and borrowing from its innovations in various fields became a constant of the Russian socio-cultural ties, and its participation in international relations was more active.

The first foreigners, who arrived in Russia in the second half of the 15th century, were immigrants from Greece and Italy. The number of the different invited foreign experts steadily increased during the reign of Ivan III, and under his son Basil III and grandson Ivan IV. The nationality of the mercenaries gradually changed and expanded. In the 16th and 17th centuries, in addition to the Greeks and Italians, other foreigners came to Russia from Germany, Holland, Austria, Scotland, England, Spain and other Western European countries. Russia also hired deserters from Lithuania and Poland.

Despite the support provided to foreigners by the Russian government, their relationship with the Russian society was contradictory. A lot of foreigners preferred to settle in separate villages, which preserved their traditions, faith, and the usual way of life, without assimilating and dissolving in the world of the Russians. However, the execution of professional duties inevitably led to a dialogue and even rapprochement. The indigenous population of the country, with the encouragement of the Orthodox clergy, were wary of the foreigners, who manifested other religions, wore unusual clothing, did not know the Russian language and did not respect the Russian household traditions. However,

by the end of the 17th century, in the attitude of the Russian society to everyone coming from the West, there had appeared two parallel lines. There remained the negative attitude to the innovation and commitment to the old, spiritual and household traditions on the part of the peasantry and some representatives of the elite of the society. The urban population and the other part of the noble elite of the society demonstrated tolerance and willingness to accept much of the new that appeared in Russia thanks to its rapprochement with the West.

In the foreign relations with the countries of Western Europe, Russia defended its national interests and took account of its military-political and economic opportunities. However, the Moscow line was not much different from the behavior of the other European powers. Whenever possible, Russia was ready to engage in fierce competitions inside the European world. The same strategy and tactics were typical for many European countries that became the key to their economic and military-political power in the 18th and 19th centuries. Russia's foreign policy in its relations with Western Europe evolved from the marriage, dynastic unions, to bilateral ones, and finally to equal participation in major multilateral alliances.

Under the influence of Western Europe, Russia studied very quickly, not forgetting its geopolitical and national interests. All this made it possible to confidently join the circle of great powers and become a full-fledged European power in later centuries.

The modern process of globalization, including the forms of close political, economic and intellectual communication between states and peoples, involves conducting researches aimed at bridging the gap between the study of Western and Eastern history, at rejecting the habitual and outdated method which divides the West and the rest of the world (“the West and the Rest”), or Eurocentrism. Obviously, the objective and adequate understanding of all aspects of Global History is impossible without a comparative approach to the analysis and comprehension of local history in the general course of the world civilization and the manifestations of the universal in the history of individual countries. Consequently, the study of Russian history in connection with the European one is a necessary component of studying Global History.

The specific facts reflecting various forms of communication between Russia and Western European countries demolish the popular view in historiography that Russia got involved in the process of Europeanization only in the early 18th century. It was the formation of the unified Russian state in the second half of the XV century which became the impetus to this process.

From ancient times, Russia has perceived itself as a European country, as well as Western European states, whose rulers willingly came into political

contacts with the ancient Russian princes. From the second half of the XV century, this cohesiveness (mutual attraction) developed into Europeanization of Russia – on the one hand, the process of its borrowing a variety of Western European experience, and on the other hand, attempts by Western European states to turn Russia into a satellite, using Russian (military and raw materials) resources to solve their international problems. Europeanization of Russia (or Westernization, in the terminology of Western historiography) was superficial, without changing its state, socio-political and religious (Orthodox) identity. At the same time, the introduction of the Russian society to the Western sociocultural achievements contributed to the overcoming of medieval traditional culture and the emergence of cultural manifestations of modern times, while expanding the opportunities for further cultural exchange between Russia and Western Europe.

REFERENCES

- Chakrabarty, Dipesh. "Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History." In *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, 27–46. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000 (in Russian).
- Chernikova, Tatiana V. *Europeizatsiya Rossii vo vtoroy polovine XV – XVII vekakh* [Europeanization of Russia in the second half of the 15th to 17th centuries]. Moscow: Moskovsky gosudarstvennyi institute mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy (universitet) MID Rossii Press, 2012 (in Russian).
- Evans, J. *Herodotus: Explorer of the Past*. Princeton: NJ, 1991.
- Global Economic History Network 2011. Mission Statement. <http://www.2.ise.ac.uk/economicHistory/Research/GEHN/network/GEHNMission.aspx>.
- Herberstein, S. *Zapiski o Moskovii* [The Notes on Muscovy]. Moscow: MGU University Press, 1988 (in Russian).
- Iggers, George J., and Q. Edward Wang. *A Global History of Modern Historiography*. Harlow; England: Pearson Longman, 2008.
- Mazlish, Bruce. "Comparing Global History to World History." *Journal of interdisciplinary history* 28, no. 3 (Winter 1998): 385–395.
- Marshall, Poe. *The Use of Foreign Descriptions of Russia as Sources for Muscovite History: A Methodological Guide*. http://works.bepress.com/marshall_poe/44.
- O'Brien, Patrick. "Global History for Global Citizenship." *Global History and Maritime Asia Working and Discussion Paper Series, Working Paper*, no. 7 (2008). http://www.history.ac.uk/makinghistory/resources/article/global_history.html.
- Poe, Marshall. *Foreign descriptions of Muscovy. An Analytic Bibliography of Primary and Secondary Sources*. Columbus, Ohio: Slavica Publishers, 1995.
- Shestova, Tatyana L. "Global History as a Trend of Global Studies." In *Globalistics, Global Studies, Globalization Studies*. Moscow: Max-Press, 2012 (in Russian).

- Vorob'eva, Ol'ga V. "Istorii istoriografii kontsa XVIII – nachala XXI v. V svete knigi G. Iggersa i E. Vana 'Global'naya istoria sovremennoy istoriografii'." [Histories of historiography, the late 18th – early 21st cc. in the context of the 'Global history of modern historiography' by George J. Iggers and Q. Edward Wang'] *Dialog so vremenem* 37 (2011): 45–65 (in Russian).
- Voronin, Sergey A. "Protsess globalizatsii ili proekt neoliberalizma? Chto nas ozhidaet." [The process of the globalization or neo-liberal project? What awaits us] *RUDN Journal of World History* 7, no. 4 (2015): 7–18 (in Russian).
- Wolf, Eric. *Europe and the People without History*. Berkeley: CA, 1982.
- Zolotukhin, M.Yu., Georgiev, V.A., and Georgieva N.G., *Istoriya mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy i vneshney politiki Rossii v Novoe vremya. XVI – nachalo XIX veka* [The History of international relations and Exterior Policy of Russia in the New Time. The 16th – early 19th century]. Moscow: INFRA-M Publ., 2015 (in Russian).

© Natalia G. Georgieva, Tatiana V. Chernikova, 2018

Submitted: 22 January 2018

For citation: Georgieva, Natalia G., and Chernikova, Tatiana V. "West and Russia in the second part of the 15th – 17th centuries: Political forms of mutual action." *RUDN Journal of Russian History* 17, no. 2 (2018): 462–481. DOI: 10.22363/2312-8674-2018-17-2-462-481

ЗАПАД И РОССИЯ ВО ВТОРОЙ ПОЛОВИНЕ XV – XVII ВВ.: ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ ФОРМЫ ДВИЖЕНИЯ НАВСТРЕЧУ

Н.Г. Георгиева^а, Т.В. Черникова^б

^а Российский университет дружбы народов
117198, Россия, Москва, ул. Миклухо-Маклая, 6
navladi@list.ru

^б Московский государственный институт международных отношений
(Университет) МИД России
119454, Россия, Москва, проспект Вернадского, 76
tchernikova@mail.ru

В связи с развернувшейся в научном сообществе дискуссией авторы статьи на примере взаимоотношений России и стран Запада анализируют соотношение глобальной и национальной историй. Они приходят к заключению о необходимости

отказаться в условиях глобализации от конструкции “the West and the Rest”, которая долгое время определяла содержание историографической традиции противопоставления Востока и Запада. В статье опровергается широко распространенное мнение о том, что первые шаги в использовании Россией западных достижений относятся лишь к началу XVIII в. Авторы строят свою концепцию на конкретных фактах, доказывающих, что европеизация Московской державы началась с самого ее рождения как единого и мощного государства. Московской Руси предстояло определить собственную геополитическую роль на международной арене и занять достойное место среди европейских государств. Авторы рассматривают эволюцию в отношениях русских и иностранцев. Первоначально, несмотря на поддержку со стороны русского правительства, эти взаимоотношения имели напряженный и неприязненный характер, что авторы объясняют двумя причинами: особой историко-культурной ментальностью и традиционным консерватизмом русского общества, с одной стороны, и стремлением иностранцев отстоять свою самоидентификацию – с другой. К концу XVII в. в отношениях русского общества с иностранцами наметилось две параллельные линии: крестьянство и часть родовой элиты сохраняли свою негативную позицию; городское население и часть дворянства проявляли толерантность и готовность воспринять многое из того, что пришло с Запада в русскую культуру и быт. Авторы приходят к выводу, что несмотря на известную консервативность русского общества, в нем зарождались элементы принятия тех социокультурных «новин», которые проникали в Россию под влиянием развития ее отношений с западноевропейскими странами и использования профессиональных знаний и умений их отдельных представителей.

Ключевые слова: процесс глобализации, Западная Европа, Османская империя, Россия, историография, глобальная история

© Георгиева Н.Г., Черникова Т.В., 2018

Рукопись поступила: 22 января 2018

Для цитирования: *Георгиева Н.Г., Черникова Т.В.* Запад и Россия во второй половине XV–XVII вв.: политические формы движения навстречу (на английском яз.) // *Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: История России*. 2018. Том 17. № 2. С. 462–481. DOI: 10.22363/2312-8674-2018-17-2-462-481