

Lost Boomerangs, the Rebound Effect and Transnational Advocacy Networks: A discursive approach to norm diffusion theory

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Abstract:	<p>This article demonstrates that using a discursive approach to study transnational advocacy networks helps understand better the outcomes of norm diffusion in post-conflict contexts. I argue that constructivist approaches to norm diffusion fall short as an explanation of norm adoption because they assume an automatic process of norm propagation through socialization mechanisms. The article first discusses how the internal dynamics of discourse negotiation in transnational advocacy networks impact the diffusion of international norms. The article then proposes the concept of the rebound effect and to explore the conditions under which it takes place. Through data collected during extended fieldwork, the paper examines a prominent case, namely the transnational campaign for the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in Burundi and Liberia. I ask why the campaign was understood as a success in Liberia and as a failure in Burundi. I argue that there is another way of looking at these cases in less dichotomized ways. The article demonstrates how in both cases a very particular discourse on gender security is (re)produced through power relations between local and transnational activists limiting the type of policies that are advocated for and depoliticising the grassroots.</p>

Lost Boomerangs, the Rebound Effect and Transnational Advocacy Networks:

A discursive approach to norm diffusion

Abstract

This article aims to show the added value of studying transnational advocacy networks through a discursive approach in order to better understand the outcomes of norm diffusion in post-conflict contexts. I argue that constructivist approaches to norm diffusion fall short as an explanation of norm adoption because they assume an automatic process of norm propagation through socialization mechanisms. The first goal of the article is then to discuss how the internal dynamics of discourse negotiation in transnational advocacy networks impact the diffusion and implementation of international norms. The second goal is to propose the concept of the rebound effect and to explore the conditions under which it takes place. Through data collected during extended fieldwork, the paper examines a prominent case, namely the transnational campaign for the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in Burundi and Liberia. I ask why and how the campaign was understood as a success in Liberia and as a failure in Burundi. I argue that there is another way of looking at these cases in less dichotomized ways. Crucially, my findings demonstrate how in both cases a very particular discourse on gender security is (re)produced through power relations between local and transnational activists limiting the type of policies that are advocated for and depoliticising the grassroots.

Keywords: Burundi, constructivism, gender, discourse, Liberia, norm diffusion, post-structuralism, Resolution 1325, subject-position, transnational advocacy networks

Introduction

On 31 October 2000, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR1325) after intensive advocacy by a transnational advocacy network of feminist organisations constituting the UN NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security¹. The network insisted on the fact that the Security Council needed to recognise the ways in which gender plays a role in conflict situations and in peacebuilding and security policies. The Resolution calls on UN institutions and Member States to prevent sexualized violence and other forms of violence against women during conflict, to protect women against such forms of violence and to ensure women's participation in decision-making and in peace and security governance. The unanimous vote at the Security Council of the Resolution sparked high hopes and enthusiasm from a transnational community of feminist activists who had managed to put gender security at the top of the global agenda. In contrast, there has been much cynicism about the way in which UNSCR1325 has been implemented as an international norm², particularly through the drafting of National Action Plans (NAPs). These Plans designate measures, targets and benchmarks for the full implementation of UNSCR1325 in a specific country or region. In spite of the fact that, to a great extent, a coalition of international NGOs and local women's associations were behind the language of the different NAPs, local activists argue that their original intentions when campaigning for the implementation of UNSCR1325 and the drafting of NAPs in their

¹ The UN NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security is a consortium of 14 international NGOs with headquarters in New York whose mission is to conduct policy analysis, monitoring and advocacy for the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda.

² Keck and Sikkink define norms as "shared ideas, expectations and beliefs about appropriate behaviour" and they are "what gives the world structure, order and stability". Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 894.

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3 respective countries have been lost.³ They claim that a narrow understanding of gender
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5 security has deprived the Resolution from its transformative potential.⁴ Instead, it has
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7 become a sort of affirmative action model in which quotas for women in government,
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9 military and police institutions in post-conflict contexts have been adopted as a
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11 universal panacea for reducing sexual and gender-based violence in the aftermath of
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13 conflict, neglecting other representations of gender security. Nevertheless, the
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15 transnational advocacy network on Women, Peace and Security has qualified its
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17 campaign for the implementation of UNSCR1325 as a success in Liberia.⁵ Conversely,
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19 the implementation of UNSCR1325 in Burundi is qualified as a failure by international
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21 and local activists alike.⁶ In both cases UNSCR1325 has been used to encourage
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23 governments to implement quotas for women in government and in the security forces.
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25 In Liberia UNSCR1325 has also been successfully used by women's organisations to
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27 fight against sexual and gender-based violence, women organisations in Burundi have
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29 considered it a tool to advocate for the right to inherit land. These different approaches
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31 to advocacy have provoked disagreements between local activists and international
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33 organisations in Burundi on what the resolution is for. This observed variation
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35 represents a fascinating puzzle for International Relations and social movements'
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37 theory. Yet, it also represents a paradox for the existing constructivist literature on norm
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39 diffusion, which has advanced a particular understanding on how norms spread and
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41 become internalised in different contexts.
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47 ³ WPSAC, *Creating a transnational people's plan for UNSCR1325*, available at:
48 <http://wpsac.wordpress.com/2013/05/21/creating-a-transnational-peoples-plan-for-unscr-1325/> accessed
49 27 June 2014.

50 ⁴ Audrey Reeves, 'Feminist knowledge and emerging governmentality in UN peacekeeping', *International*
51 *Feminist Journal of Politics*, 14:3 (2012), pp. 348-369; Angela McRobbie, *The aftermath of feminism:*
52 *gender, culture and social change* (Los Angeles and London: Sage Publications, 2009).

53 ⁵ Fieldwork notes, Monrovia, Liberia, August 2013.

54 ⁶ Fieldwork notes, Bujumbura, Burundi, April 2013. , Interview (a) INGO international staff member,
55 Bujumbura, Burundi, 10 December 2012; Interview (b), ex-project manager for a national women
56 organisation, Bujumbura, Burundi, 12 June 2012; Interview (c), staff member at UNWOMEN, Bujumbura,
57 Burundi, 20 June 2012.
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5 Over the past 20 years, Liberia and Burundi have been marked by violent civil wars and
6 international peace negotiations in which women participated as “representatives of
7 women’s civil society with an observer role”.⁷ The two countries were chosen as case
8 studies because the international community has seen them as good examples of female
9 participation and a best practice to be promoted in the broader context of UNSCR1325.
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11 In Liberia, the Women of Liberia Mass Action Plan for Peace played a key role in the
12 peace process ending the war in 2003. In Burundi, grassroots women’s activities started
13 right after the beginning of the war in 1993 and women’s activists participated as
14 observers in the Arusha Accords of 2003. In both cases a women’s movement already
15 existed locally prior to the arrival of international organisations, which was then helped
16 in their efforts build larger networks and increase their visibility and budget.
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31 In explaining the emergence, institutionalisation and internalisation of international
32 norms, the literature on norm diffusion has given a critical role to *norm entrepreneurs*,
33 such as epistemic communities,⁸ international organisations⁹ and transnational advocacy
34 networks (TANs).¹⁰ True and Mintrom demonstrate that the diffusion of international
35 norms on gender mainstreaming is made possible by the role played by TANs,
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46 ⁷ UNIFEM, “Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections between Presence and
47 Influence” (New York: UNIFEM), August 7, 2010.

48 ⁸ Peter Haas, *Knowledge, power, and international policy coordination* (Columbia CA: University of
49 California Press, 1997).

50 ⁹ Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press,
51 1996).

52 ¹⁰ Transnational Advocacy Networks comprise “relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who
53 are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and
54 services”. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in
55 International Politics* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998). These include international
56 and domestic NGOs, social movements, international organisations, national governments and
57 individuals.
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2 particularly by the transnational feminist movement.¹¹ Working through a *boomerang*
3 *effect*, TANs can help local social movements gain leverage and information to
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5 circumvent domestic indifference or apply pressure by transferring the debate to the
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7 international level.¹² Although the formation of a TAN almost always results in
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9 struggles over the meaning of norms, in which “frame disputes can be a significant
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11 source of change within networks”,¹³ once a norm is created and a new advocacy
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13 campaign is put in place for its implementation in local contexts, the norm is no longer
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15 understood as vulnerable to contestation.¹⁴ Constructivist approaches obscure the
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17 potential of local constituencies in navigating this contestation when diffusion and
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19 implementation of norms is depicted as unambiguous.¹⁵
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26 By taking up Bucher’s proposition to focus on *norm politics* rather than on norm
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28 diffusion,¹⁶ this article does two things. First, it points to an alternative conception of
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30 norm theory that focuses on productive power and on the co-constitution of agents and
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32 the norms for which they advocate. Second, the article develops the concept of the
33
34 *rebound effect* to identify discursive shifts during the campaign for the implementation
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36 of an international norm. The *rebound effect* refers to the moment where the
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38 intelligibility boundaries between the thrower of the boomerang and the receiver are so
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40 impervious that the boomerang bounces back and never reaches its destination. Such a
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45 ¹¹ Jacqui True and Michael Mintrom, ‘Transnational networks and policy diffusion: The case of gender
46 mainstreaming’, *International Studies Quarterly*, 45: 1 (2001), pp. 27-57.

47 ¹² Keck and Sikkink (1998), p. 12; Donatella Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow, (eds) *Transnational protest*
48 *and global activism* (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005).

49 ¹³ Keck and Sikkink (1998), p. 8

50 ¹⁴ Mona Krook and Jacqui True, ‘Rethinking the life cycles of international norms: The United Nations
51 and the global promotion of gender equality’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 18:1 (2012),
52 pp. 103-127.

53 ¹⁵ Kees Van Kersbergen and Bertjan Verbeek, ‘The politics of international norms: Subsidiarity and the
54 imperfect competence regime of the European Union’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 13:2
55 (2007), pp. 217-238.

56 ¹⁶ Bernd Bucher, ‘Acting abstractions: Metaphors, narrative structures, and the eclipse of
57 agency’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 20:3 (2014), pp. 742-765.
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2 rebound may be the result of *exclusion* or *annulment* of certain subject positions and
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4 discourses.
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9 The article follows a discursive approach to norm diffusion that identifies norms as
10 processes.¹⁷ I argue that this approach helps us understand better not why norms diffuse,
11 but rather the outcome of that diffusion. That is, how a particular understanding of a
12 norm is fixed and how this implies a particular “politics of reality”.¹⁸ Like other
13 feminist scholars who have raised concerns about the accountability and
14 representativeness of TANS,¹⁹ I show how certain understandings and subject positions
15 come to be excluded, shifted, annulled or incorporated in the (re)production of
16 international norms. I follow critical strands of norm analysis, which have apprehended
17 norms as not simply diffusing from one site to another, but rather as conveyers of
18 various exclusions in the international system.²⁰ More specifically, I use a discursive
19 approach in order to identify and untangle the power relations and normative structures
20 involved in, and the political implications of, the competing and contradictory
21 constructions of the concept of gender security as a master frame for the implementation
22 campaign of the UNSCR1325 on WPSomen, Peace and Security in Burundi and in
23 Liberia.
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47 ¹⁷ Krook and True (2012).

48 ¹⁸ Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in international relations: the politics of reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge
49 University Press, 2002).

50 ¹⁹ Vandana Desai, ‘NGOs, gender mainstreaming, and urban poor communities in Mumbai’, *Gender and
51 Development*, 13:2 (2005), pp. 90-98; Breny Mendoza, ‘Transnational Feminisms in Question’, *Feminist
52 Theory*, 3 (2002), pp. 295-314.

53 ²⁰ Rebecca Adler-Nissen, ‘Stigma management in international relations: transgressive identities, norms,
54 and order in international society’, *International Organization* 68:1 (2014), pp. 143-176; Ayşe Zarakol,
55 ‘What made the modern world hang together: socialisation or stigmatisation?’ *International Theory*, 6:2
56 (2014), pp. 311-332; Charlotte Epstein, *The power of words in international relations: birth of an anti-
57 whaling discourse* (Boston: MIT Press, 2008).
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3 The next section provides an overview of different approaches to norm diffusion and
4 norm contestation, as well as their shortcomings. The subsequent sections offer a
5 discursive reading of norm diffusion theory. First, I outline the research design and
6 methodology. Second, based on significant fieldwork, including the use of semi-
7 structured interviews and participant observation in Burundi and Liberia during 2012
8 and 2013, the paper uses the campaign for the implementation of UNSCR1325 in both
9 countries in order to demonstrate how previous approaches ultimately take for granted
10 the fixedness of the content of a norm, limiting its possible meanings as well as the
11 range of conceivable implementation practices. Third, the paper uses a discursive
12 approach to norm diffusion and the concept of the rebound effect to propose an
13 alternative reading. I argue that this reading offers a better explanation on the outcomes
14 of norm diffusion and on the impact of the interaction between transnational and
15 domestic actors on processes of norm implementation. Finally, the paper discusses how
16 this approach could improve further theory development and comparative empirical
17 research in similar post-conflict contexts.
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38 **A literature review on norm diffusion theory**

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40 This section argues that although good at explaining how norms come into existence
41 and why advocacy networks form, all variants of norm diffusion theories do poorly at
42 explaining the outcomes of international norm diffusion and their implementation in
43 national and local contexts.²¹ First, they fall short as an explanation of the internal
44 constitution of norm diffusion by assuming an automatic process of norm propagation,
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54 ²¹ Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Ethan Nadelmann, 'Global prohibition regimes:
55 The evolution of norms in international society', *International Organization*, 44:4 (1990), pp. 479-526;
56 Rodger Payne, 'Persuasion, frames and norm construction', *European journal of international*
57 *relations*, 7:1 (2001), pp. 37-61.
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3 where norms “acquire life on their own”,²² once a critical mass of actors automatically
4 adopt a norm and its content. Second, they have neglected the performative dimension
5 running through this “automatic” process of norm propagation, in which identities and
6 ideas are co-constituted. Consequently, they reproduce existing hierarchies in the
7 international system, in which local civil society activists are constituted by the
8 international, but do not have the capacity to constitute, resist, subvert and transform.
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16 The first critique of the literature relates to the way in which it accounts for the internal
17 constitution of international norms as “shared understandings”.²³ Most scholars have
18 presented a very static and linear conceptualisation of the life cycle of international
19 norms²⁴ where norm entrepreneurs are able to form a transnational advocacy campaign
20 to push for the creation of a new norm²⁵ and then help local activists diffuse it in
21 domestic contexts.²⁶ This understanding assumes that this ‘new’ norm did not exist
22 already and was not implemented in the domestic context, particularly in developing
23 and post-conflict states.²⁷ In addition, norm diffusion is treated as a dynamic process,
24 but the content of the norm is considered as a stable concept. This understanding is
25 contradicted by the empirical observation that people have different understandings of
26 the same norm and that therefore, there are different interpretations of the practices and
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41 ²² Bucher (2014), p. 748.

42 ²³ Friedrich Kratochwil, *“Rules.” Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning*
43 *in International Relations and Domestic Affairs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

44 ²⁴ Audie Klotz and Cecilia Lynch, *Strategies for research in constructivist international relations* (New
45 York: ME Sharpe, 2007); Finnemore and Sikkink (1998); Martha Finnemore, *The purpose of intervention:*
46 *Changing Beliefs about Intervention* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); Richard Price, ‘Reversing
47 the gun sights: Transnational civil society targets land mines’, *International Organization*, 52:3 (1998),
48 pp. 613-644.

49 ²⁵ Jutta Joachim, *Agenda Setting, the UN and NGOs: Gender Violence and Reproductive Rights*
50 (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2007).

51 ²⁶ Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, *The Power of Human Rights: international norms*
52 *and domestic change* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

53 ²⁷ Ryan and Basini explain how many of the provisions contained in UNSCR1325 were already being
54 implemented in Liberia and Sierra Leone before being named as such. Caitlin Ryan and Helen Basini,
55 ‘UNSC Resolution 1325 national action plans in Liberia and Sierra Leone: An analysis of gendered power
56 relations in hybrid peacebuilding’, *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 11:2 (2017), pp. 186-206.
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3 policies needed to adopt a norm in domestic contexts.²⁸ Sometimes these interpretations
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5 lead to “misinterpretation”,²⁹ “resistance”³⁰ or even multi-level norm-emergence.³¹
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7 More critical works on norm diffusion have talked about norm-collapse,³² norm-
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9 regress,³³ norm localisation,³⁴ norm translation,³⁵ “partial compliance”,³⁶ “incomplete
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11 internalization”³⁷ or norm contestation³⁸ and point to norm diffusion results beyond full
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13 adoption or rejection.³⁹ Although norms are understood as having fuzzy rather than
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15 crisp borders⁴⁰ that attain their “meaning in use”,⁴¹ the shared understanding of norms
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17 as “things” or “concepts” where structural characteristics allow for the diffusion of its
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19 essential meaning is not questioned. Rather, it is assumed that “norms emerge, norms
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26 ²⁸ Amitav Acharya, ‘How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional
27 Change in Asian Regionalism’, *International Organization*, 58: 2 (2004), pp. 239–275; Andrew Cortell
28 and James Davis, ‘When norms clash: international norms, domestic practices, and Japan’s
29 internalisation of the GATT/WTO’, *Review of International Studies*, 31: 1 (2005), pp. 3-25; Jeffrey
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31 *International organization*, 59:4 (2005), pp. 801-826; Lisbeth Zimmermann, ‘Same same or different?
32 Norm diffusion between resistance, compliance and localization in post-conflict states’, *International
33 Studies Perspectives*, 17:1 (2016).

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34 ²⁹ Cristina Badescu and Thomas Weiss, ‘Misrepresenting R2P and Advancing Norms: An Alternative
35 Spiral?’ *International Studies Perspectives*, 11:4 (2010), pp. 354-374.

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36 ³⁰ David Capie, ‘The responsibility to protect norm in Southeast Asia: framing, resistance and the
37 localization myth’, *The Pacific Review*, 25: 1 (2012), pp. 75-93.

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38 ³¹ Nicole Deitelhoff and Lisbeth Zimmermann, *Things we lost in the fire: How different types of
39 contestation affect the validity of international norms*. (Frankfurt am Main: PRIF Working Papers, 2013).

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39 ³² Cortell and Davis (2005).

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40 ³³ Ryder McKeown, ‘Norm regress: US revisionism and the slow death of the torture norm’, *International
41 Relations*, 23: 1(2009), pp. 5-25.

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42 ³⁴ Acharya (2004); Amitav Acharya, ‘Norm Subsidiarity and Regional Orders: Sovereignty, Regionalism,
43 and Rule-Making in the Third World’, *International Studies Quarterly*, 55 (2011), pp. 95-123.

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44 ³⁵ Susanne Zwingel, ‘How do Norms Travel? Theorizing International Women’s Rights in Transnational
45 Perspective’, *International Studies Quarterly*, 56 (2012), pp. 115-129.

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46 ³⁶ Gergana Noutcheva, ‘Fake, partial and imposed compliance: the limits of the EU’s normative power in
47 the Western Balkans’, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 16:7 (2009), pp. 1065-1084.

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48 ³⁷ Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, ‘Incomplete internalization and compliance with human rights
49 law’, *European Journal of International Law*, 19: 4 (2008), pp. 725-748.

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50 ³⁸ Antje Wiener, ‘Contested compliance: Interventions on the normative structure of world
51 politics’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 10: 2 (2004), pp. 189-234.

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52 ³⁹ Roger Mac Ginty, *International peacebuilding and local resistance: hybrid forms of peace* (London:
53 Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

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54 ⁴⁰ Kratochwil (1989); Mervyn Frost, *Ethics in International Relations: a constitutive theory* (Cambridge:
55 Cambridge University Press, 1996); James Davis, *Terms of Inquiry: on the theory and practice of political
56 science* (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2005).

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57 ⁴¹ Antje Wiener, ‘Enacting meaning-in-use: qualitative research on norms and international
58 relations’, *Review of International Studies*, 35:01 (2009), pp. 175-193.
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3 diffuse and norms cascade” mechanically.⁴² Even the most critical scholars propose
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5 models that only permit cultural adaptation to local norms - localization- or translation
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7 to the domestic context that do not contest “the core of its fixed meaning”.⁴³ Hence,
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9 norm conceptualisation is particularly problematic when it comes to explain
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11 transnational campaigns for norm diffusion in domestic contexts and the intersubjective
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13 ontology of norms in a “constant process of negotiating and re-negotiating”.⁴⁴ That is,
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15 “despite emphasis on the dynamic nature of actor behaviour, behavioural change is
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17 appraised as the passage from one stable state to another along the trajectory of
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19 internalization of a new norm”.⁴⁵ More recently, scholars such as Betts and Orchard
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21 have tried to overcome the static and linear conception of the internalization trajectory
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23 by differentiating between two distinct, but simultaneous, processes: institutionalisation,
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25 which primarily reflects an international process, and implementation, triggered at
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27 national level once the state commits to the new norm.⁴⁶ They argue that these processes
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29 feed into one another and that national dynamics can reverse international progress on
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31 norm making. Even with this additional insight, their model is still one where
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33 international actors design norms that are then disseminated into national contexts.
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35 Ultimately, institutionalisation and implementation are not differentiated processes, but
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37 rather they constitute the same process that is taking place at different levels of analysis
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39 - the international and the domestic. More particularly on the implementation of the
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41 UNSCR1325 in post-conflict settings, Irvine proposes the concept of the “double
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49 ⁴² Bucher (2014), p. 742.

50 ⁴³ Holger Niemann and Henrik Schillinger, ‘Contestation ‘all the way down’? The grammar of
51 contestation in norm research’, *Review of International Studies*, First view (2017), pp. 1-21.

52 ⁴⁴ Zwingel (2012), p. 122

53 ⁴⁵ Charlotte Epstein, ‘Who Speaks? Discourse, the Subject and the Study of Identity in International
54 Politics’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 17: 2 (2011), p. 334.

55 ⁴⁶ Alexander Betts and Phil Orchard, ‘Conclusions: Norms and the politics of implementation’, Alexander
56 Betts and Phil Orchard (eds), *Implementation and World Politics: How International Norms Change
57 Practice* (Oxford: OUP, 2014).

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3 boomerang effect”.⁴⁷ She argues that in post-conflict situations where international
4 actors play a crucial role, the simple boomerang mechanism, by which international
5 actors help local activists force a state to comply with a norm is not enough. Indeed, in
6 the Balkans, local women organisations added a reverse boomerang, by which they
7 mobilised local support to make the international community comply with their own
8 norm. Although it offers the tools to study two levels of analysis at the same time, the
9 double boomerang does not question either the shared understanding of what
10 UNSCR1325 means or what policies need to be put in place.

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21 The second weakness of constructivist models to explain the outcomes of norm
22 diffusion is related to the fact that advocacy networks and their local beneficiaries are
23 understood as constituting a stable platform of interest, identity and shared meaning
24 through a process of *socialization*,⁴⁸ rather than being a “contingent outcome” of social
25 interaction.⁴⁹ For example, Finnemore and Sikkink highlight how “conformity and
26 esteem” are needed in the socialization process into a new norm.⁵⁰ The model fails to
27 take into account the performative dimension of individual and collective identity, by
28 which an actors’ understanding evolves with the circumstances and within a complex
29 network of interdependencies.⁵¹ A common identity and a common master frame are
30 therefore not something that precedes collective action in a TAN, but something that
31 gets constructed, negotiated and developed through performances in campaigning for
32 the creation, institutionalization and implementation of an international norm. As
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47 Jill Irvine, ‘Leveraging Change’, *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 15:1 (2012), pp. 20-38.

48 Cass Sunstein, ‘Social norms and social roles’, *Columbia law review*, 9: 4 (1996), pp. 903-968; Peter Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Finnemore and Sikkink (1998).

49 Judith Renner, *Discourse, Normative Change and the Quest for Reconciliation in Global Politics* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013).

50 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), pp. 903-904.

51 Xavier Guillaume, ‘Unveiling the ‘International’: Process, Identity and Alterity’, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 35: 3 (2007), pp. 741–759; Nicholas Onuf, *World of our Making* (Columbia, SC: USCP, 1989).

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3 performative, this identity is fluid and unstable, and therefore, in continuous
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5 negotiation. Consequently, TANs are not stable *socialization* platforms where meaning
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7 is shared, but rather performing sites of struggle for meaning of norms, identities and
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9 interests.

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12 The concept of *socialization* implies a universalization of what necessarily is a localized
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14 set of values and beliefs, as well as a conceptualization of a movement that runs in one
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16 direction: from the international to the local, silencing the voice of the latter.⁵² This
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18 conceptualisation denies the option that these norms themselves are under contention
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20 between activists,⁵³ leaving only two possibilities: either a boomerang effect will take
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22 place if international and local activists decide to cooperate; or nothing will happen at
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24 all if cooperation is deemed impossible.

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28 Furthermore, it is argued that phenomena such as socialisation and information cascades
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30 are in part the result of some idea sharing and persuasion on certain values and
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32 principles defended in the norm to be implemented, not only on states and decision-
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34 makers, but also amongst members of a transnational campaign.⁵⁴ However, to place all
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36 causal explanation on the principle in itself as the driver of the process of norm
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38 socialisation means that some ideas or principles are inherently better or more right than
39
40 others, depoliticising and naturalising them, forgetting that any form of “socialization
41
42 inherently involves discursive inequalities”⁵⁵ and material differences. It becomes
43
44 difficult to appreciate that norm qualities are part of processes of knowledge production
45
46 and political construction. Ayoub, for example, shows how new EU member-states
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50 ⁵² Charlotte Epstein, ‘Stop Telling Us How to Behave: Socialization or Infantilization?’, *International*
51 *Studies Perspectives*, 13 (2012), pp. 135-145.

52 ⁵³ Shareen Hertel, *Unexpected Power. Conflict and Change among Transnational Activists*, (Ithaca and
53 London: Cornell University Press, 2006).

54 ⁵⁴ Zachary Elkins and Beth Simmons, ‘On waves, clusters, and diffusion: A conceptual framework’, *The*
55 *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 598: 1 (2005), pp. 33-51.

56 ⁵⁵ Audie Klotz and Cecilia Lynch, *Strategies for research in constructivist international relations* (New
57 York: ME Sharpe, 2007), p. 92.
58
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1
2
3 exposed to similar norms and regulations differ greatly in their social attitudes and legal
4
5 implementation of international norms on sexual minorities. He demonstrates how this
6
7 variation has to do with visibility of activists at national level⁵⁶ and the perceived threat
8
9 they pose to the cohesion of the state.⁵⁷ Looking at intranetwork dynamics, Hertel
10
11 claims that different normative understandings within networks can have a significant
12
13 impact on both norms evolution and policy outcomes as different norm interpretations
14
15 are in competition with one another.⁵⁸ Consequently, contestation of norms emerge not
16
17 only from an overlap with other culturally specific norms, but from different
18
19 interpretations and ideas contained in those norms.⁵⁹
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22
23 I argue that social power relations within a TAN performed through the discursive
24
25 practices of its activists will play a role in determining not only how norms are
26
27 understood, adopted and propagated, but also how local grievances are constructed.
28
29 Studying intranetwork dynamics of transnational advocacy networks involved in norm
30
31 diffusion deviates the focus of the study from how “the ought becomes the is”⁶⁰ to how
32
33 “an ought is made an is”.⁶¹ Ultimately, I argue that looking at norm diffusion as
34
35 discourse and subject positions reproduction or contestation amongst the members of
36
37 advocacy networks provides insight into how to “theorize with the unfixity”⁶² of norm
38
39 meaning.
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47 ⁵⁶ Phillip Ayoub, *When States Come Out: Europe's Sexual Minorities and the Politics of Visibility*, (New
48 York: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

49 ⁵⁷ Phillip Ayoub, 'Contested Norms in New-Adopter States: International Determinants of LGBT Rights
50 Legislation', *European Journal of International Relations*, 21:2 (2015), pp. 293-322.

51 ⁵⁸ Hertel (2006)

52 ⁵⁹ Krook and True (2012), p. 104.

53 ⁶⁰ Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), p. 916.

54 ⁶¹ Bucher (2014), p. 755.

55 ⁶² Charlotte Epstein, 'Constructivism or the eternal return of universals in International Relations. Why
56 returning to language is vital to prolonging the owl's flight', *European Journal of International Relations*,
57 19:3 (2013), p. 501.
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A note on discourse as theory and methodology

This article follows the line of critical constructivism and post-structuralism-influenced discourse analysis methodology.⁶³ I follow a foucauldian understanding of power as a “productive network which runs throughout the whole social body”.⁶⁴ Power is not something that can be owned, but rather power produces and is produced through social relations, through the practices of actors or subjects, and these practices also determine the boundaries of what can and cannot be said and who can and cannot speak.⁶⁵ Epstein’s work on the analysis of the international whaling regime offers a far-reaching approach on discursive power relations in an advocacy campaign and how they determine the imposition of what is considered acceptable and not. This means that advocacy campaigns aimed at shifting policy and politics are made “in and through language”,⁶⁶ through key concepts as crucial sites of political struggle. These key concepts are ‘inescapable, irreplaceable parts of the political and social vocabulary’ which become fixed as a single signifier that contains a range of different meanings.⁶⁷

Following this poststructuralist logic, a discourse is not simply language, but rather it is a system of significations and representations that fixes certain interpretations of the

⁶³ Stephan Engelkamp and Katharina Glaab, ‘Writing Norms: Constructivist Norm Research and the Politics of Ambiguity’, *Alternatives*, 40: 3-4 (2015), pp. 201-218; Charlotte Epstein, *The power of words in international relations: birth of an anti-whaling discourse* (Boston: MIT Press, 2008); Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (London: Routledge, 2006); Laura Shepherd, *Gender, Violence and Security: Discourse as Practice* (London: Zed 2008).

⁶⁴ Michael Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Vol 1: An Introduction* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), p. 119.

⁶⁵ Hansen (2006)

⁶⁶ Sam Cook, ‘The ‘woman-in-conflict’ at the UN Security Council: a subject of practice’, *International Affairs*, 92: 2 (2016), p. 355.

⁶⁷ Melvin Richter and Michaela Richter, ‘Introduction: Translation of Reinhart Koselleck’s “Krise,” in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 67: 2 (2006), pp. 343-356.

1
2
3 world, reproducing power relations.⁶⁸ However, due to their ambiguity and abstraction,
4
5 these representations are only fixed in a temporary and incomplete manner.⁶⁹ Activists
6
7 have to constantly confront a multiplicity of competing discourses or master frames⁷⁰
8
9 that form the connections between subjects and objects, and provide ‘subjects positions
10
11 with which social agents can identify’.⁷¹ Under this framework, the *rebound effect*
12
13 enables us to think about the power relations involved in *norm spreading*,⁷² as it
14
15 determines the limit between the discourses and subject positions accepted by the TAN
16
17 and those that reach deaf ears. Such an approach facilitates a study of the iterative norm
18
19 contestation and negotiation process, as state and non- state actors compete to identify,
20
21 define and implement a policy.⁷³ In this approach, *discourses* and *subject positions* are
22
23 perceived as the consequence and not the cause of interactions amongst activists.
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29 The collective “I/We” versus the “Other” activists’ identity is therefore produced in a
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31 very precise way, as the subject position is established when the subject speaks within a
32
33 particular discourse.⁷⁴ In our case, the subject who speaks of a gender security as socio-
34
35 economic security, discards and positions itself outside the security as affirmative action
36
37 discourse proposed by the “Other”. It is a much more dynamic and active process than
38
39 the static identity acceptance of constructivist models or the culturalist explanations that
40
41 presume change and contestation comes from cultural validation.⁷⁵ An actor takes up
42
43 and transforms an understanding of a norm rather than internalizing a discursive
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47 ⁶⁸ Shepherd (2008), pp. 20-23.

48 ⁶⁹ Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and socialist strategy* (London: Verso, 1985)

49 ⁷⁰ Robert Benford, ‘Master Frame’, in David Snow, Donatella della Porta, Bert Klandermans and Doug
50 McAdam (eds), *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements* (New York: Wiley-
51 Blackwell, 2013).

52 ⁷¹ David Howard, Aletta Norval and Yannis Stavrakakis, *Discourse Theory and Political Analysis. Identities,*
53 *Hegemonies and social Change* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 4.

54 ⁷² Bucher (2014), p. 750.

55 ⁷³ Krook and True (2012)

56 ⁷⁴ Epstein (2008)

57 ⁷⁵ Zehfuss (2002), p. 92

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2
3 construction of gender security through a socialization process.⁷⁶ Agency and collective
4
5 identities emerge from the subject-position given by a certain discursive construction of
6
7 gendered subjects in global politics,⁷⁷ while other subject positions are precluded,
8
9 allowing or foreclosing the possibilities for future actions, including those actions
10
11 pertaining to the implementation efforts of UNSCR1325 in Burundi and Liberia. This
12
13 also makes activists not only subjects of discourse as they would be in a rigorous
14
15 poststructuralist approach, but also powerful agents able to privilege and evaluate the
16
17 advocacy network discourses and master frame according to their position.⁷⁸
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21 Discourse analysis techniques have been applied to a wide variety of texts from reports
22
23 and memorandums,⁷⁹ to policy documents⁸⁰ and even news media.⁸¹ Shepherd engages
24
25 with interview transcripts as legitimate discursive artefacts “rather than individual
26
27 ‘truths’ about a given context”.⁸² I focus my analysis on both, my 600 pages of
28
29 transcripts generated by more than 60 semi-structured interviews and policy documents
30
31 as discursive artefacts allowing for the examination of a wide range of discursive
32
33 practices. The interview transcripts in particular provide a rich ‘counter-archive’ of
34
35 knowledge about (gendered) threats and (in) security.⁸³ This permits a more democratic
36
37 account on the analysis of norm diffusion, because it includes voices that rarely print
38
39 their discourses in written documents, such as rural women activists in post-conflict
40
41
42

43 ⁷⁶ Jeffrey Checkel, ‘International institutions and socialization in Europe: Introduction and framework’,
44 *International organization*, 59: 04 (2005), pp. 801-826.

45 ⁷⁷ Hansen (2006); Shepherd (2008); Laura Shepherd, ‘Gendering Security’, in Burgess P (ed.), *Handbook*
46 *of New Security Studies* (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 72-80.

47 ⁷⁸ Eschle (2013)

48 ⁷⁹ Lee Jarvis, *Times of Terror: Discourse, Temporality and the War on Terror* (Basingstoke: Palgrave
49 Macmillan, 2009); Jutta Weldes, ‘Constructing national interests’, *European Journal of International*
50 *Relations*, 2:3 (1996), pp. 275-318.

51 ⁸⁰ Penny Griffin, *Gendering the World Bank: Neoliberalism and the gendered foundations of global*
52 *governance* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Shepherd 2008.

53 ⁸¹ Francois Debrix, *Tabloid terror: War, culture and geopolitics* (London: Routledge, 2008).

54 ⁸² Laura Shepherd, ‘Constructing civil society: Gender, power and legitimacy in United Nations
55 peacebuilding discourse’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 21: 4 (2015), pp. 890.

56 ⁸³ Michael Shapiro, *Studies in Transdisciplinary Method: After the Aesthetic Turn* (London: Routledge,
57 2013), p. 85.
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3 Burundi and Liberia. A detailed deconstruction of the rhetorical structure and predicates
4
5 in these texts is undertaken in order to expose continuities and shifts in the constructions
6
7 of a master frame on gender security.
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11 Through the empirical material obtained during several months of fieldwork, I studied
12
13 the most recurrent combinations of the discourses on gender security in the advocacy
14
15 campaign to implement UNSCR1325 in Burundi and Liberia. The aim of the analysis is
16
17 to obtain certain discursive identification or “predication/subject positioning”.⁸⁴ For
18
19 example, some international activists have declared that attempts by some Burundian
20
21 activists to include the right to inherit as part of the UNSCR1325 implementation
22
23 campaign was to go too far because it was not to be found in any part of the
24
25 resolution.⁸⁵ That is, discursive identification redefines not only what is possible to say
26
27 – or what the boomerang will collect - but also what is not possible to say – or what
28
29 will rebound. It refers to the creation of new horizons of possibility regarding what is
30
31 heard in discourse. In conceptualizing discursive identification I use a political
32
33 ontology that takes into account features of gender security discourses such as conflict,
34
35 processes of inclusion and exclusion, and power relations. This illuminates the
36
37 examination of subject positioning in terms of a “process of linking”, whereby a series
38
39 of discourses are connected to a particular subject position, and a “process of
40
41 differentiation”, whereby these discourses try to differentiate a certain identity from
42
43 their opposite.⁸⁶
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55 ⁸⁴ Shepherd (2008)

56 ⁸⁵ Several interviewees – INGOs staff and local NGOs staff - noted this fact.

57 ⁸⁶ Hansen (2006), pp. 19-21.
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Contested frames of mobilization for gender security

Conceptualizations of both gender and security rest upon a particular set of logics understood as “the ways in which various concepts are organized within specific discourses”.⁸⁷ A particular logic of gender security depends on how “gender” and “security” are constructed as well as the “assumptions that inform them and the policy prescriptions that issue from them”.⁸⁸ There are different logics of what “gender security” might look like.⁸⁹ We are thus enjoined to enquire into “multiple and competing discourses about gender ... and security ... [which] articulate specific subjects, ascribe identities to these subjects and position them in relation to each other”.⁹⁰ This is important because when a state has been unwilling to implement international or national legislation, local civil society organizations will try to bypass their state and send a boomerang to directly search out international allies and bring pressure on their national government. In our case, a coalition between local and international allies will only work if their gender and security logics are compatible. That is, the boomerang effect only takes place when activists forming a transnational advocacy network share compatible discourses that can be contained in the same master frame. Otherwise, the boomerang sent by local activists will bounce back because differing logics of gender and of security held by international allies might be based on incompatible sets of assumptions and policy prescriptions. This will result in the rebound effect.

⁸⁷ Laura Shepherd, “‘To Save Succeeding Generations from the Scourge of War’: The US, UN, and the Violence of Security”, *Review of International Studies*, 34: 2 (2008), p. 294.

⁸⁸ Shepherd (2008), p. 294.

⁸⁹ Laura McLeod, ‘Configurations of post-conflict: Impacts of representations of conflict and post-conflict upon the (political) translations of gender security within UNSCR 1325’, *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 13: 4(2011), p. 595.

⁹⁰ Shepherd (2010), p. 76.

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2
3 I found five recurring combinations of discourses on gender security amongst the
4
5 activists taking part in the international advocacy campaign for the implementation of
6
7 UNSCR1325 in Burundi and Liberia.⁹¹ These 5 discourses on gender security are ideal
8
9 types for analysis and by no means isolated from other discourses or from elements of
10
11 other discourses. The objective here is not to establish a typology of discourses, but
12
13 rather to understand the meaning of interactions amongst them. As ideas and agents are
14
15 co-constituted, the discursive combinations found below also represent a certain
16
17 subject-position and are promoted almost uniformly by a certain type of actor
18
19 (governmental, grassroots group, NGO). I argue that the master frame on gender
20
21 security for the implementation campaigns of UNSCR1325 in Burundi and Liberia
22
23 could have been constructed otherwise, but the particular power asymmetries within the
24
25 TAN have promoted the use of a discourse on gender security understood as civil and
26
27 political equality. Other sets of articulations and meanings proposed were discarded.
28
29 The discourses are contained in a table that should be read from up to down, starting
30
31 from the first discourse on gender security as inclusion, which is the discourse
32
33 contained in the UNSCR1325, and ending with the last discourse on gender security as
34
35 reconceptualization of spaces, which is the discourse produced mostly by rural
36
37 grassroots women organizations. Presenting discourses on a scale, from those closer to
38
39 the Resolution to those that are further away in the scale of representations and subject-
40
41 positions offers the advantage of identifying which discourses are going to be accepted
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43 by the TAN as adequate for the campaign on the implementation of UNSCR1325 in
44
45 Burundi and Liberia and which discourses are going to be discarded because of their
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47 unintelligibility.
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55 ⁹¹ I found inspiration for this approach on previous similar work conducted by Laura McLeod (2011) and
56 Catherine Eschle (2013)
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GENDER SECURITY DISCOURSE	SUBJECT-POSITION OF WOMEN	PROMOTED BY
Inclusion	Perfect peacebuilders	UNSCR1325 & UN bodies
Equality	Women in action	NAP & national experts
Countering sexual violence	Victims of sexual and gender-based violence	INGOs
Freedom	Free individuals	National associations
Transformation of spaces & structures	Community mediators	Grassroots

Table 1. Discourses and subject positions on gender security

Gender Security as inclusion of women in peacebuilding and decision-making instances

This frame is put forward by the Security Council and is contained in the drafting of UNSCR1325. It is based upon the logic that full participation of women in political instances and in security forces, such as military bodies or the police, are the best means to achieve sustainable peace. The idea is that female decision-makers and female peacekeepers are expected to have the social skills and innate characteristics of a peaceful and caring individual male decision-makers or military lack.⁹² The female subject is understood as the perfect peacebuilder and consequently, if UN institutions and post-conflict countries improve gender balance in public institutions and security governance structures, episodes of gender insecurity will disappear or at least diminish. Indeed, certain international NGOs, such as International Alert and Human Rights Watch organized workshops on the Women, Peace and Security Agenda and funded local associations who started working as NGOs at the beginning of the 2000's in post-

⁹² Heidi Hudson, 'A double-edged sword of peace? Reflections on the tension between representation and protection in gendering liberal peacebuilding', *International Peacekeeping*, 19: 4 (2012), pp. 443-460.

1
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3 conflict countries such as Burundi and Liberia with the help of UNIFEM, the EU,
4
5 USAID and other donors. As one international NGO worker in Burundi put it:
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7
8

9 *“We hired two women as coordinators of our project for peacebuilding and they set*
10 *up a network of informal groups in a lot of the provinces [...] They have a captive*
11 *audience to which we can provide training and capacity building.”⁹³*
12
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16
17
18 Initially, international NGOs are looking for groups that can serve as motors of
19
20 peacebuilding. One of these two women hired as a coordinator described herself by
21
22 using the discourse in which women are inherently peaceful, making for excellent
23
24 peacemakers:
25
26
27

28 *“And why use women? Because women are more sensible. A woman does not cut*
29 *her neighbor’s throat, and then a woman carries children in her womb. So if she carries*
30 *a baby inside her during 9 months, it is not easy for her to cut a kid’s throat. So it was*
31 *good to make these women peacemakers because they have a heart. [...] And because*
32 *women are not immediate actors in the war, they are going to be able to determine*
33 *easily what are the causes of the war, they will be able to tell you what she saw and*
34 *what she thought.”⁹⁴*
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46 ***Gender Security as equality before the law***

47
48 This frame is deployed in the NAPs of Burundi and Liberia.⁹⁵ It represents the views of
49
50 the national experts who, with the help of international NGOs and UNWOMEN
51
52

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54 ⁹³ Interview (a)

55 ⁹⁴ Interview (b)

56 ⁹⁵ Government of Burundi, *Plan d’Action National pour la mise en oeuvre de la Résolution 1325*, 2011,
57 available at : http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/NationalActionPlans/burundi_nap_2012-16.pdf
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1
2
3 personnel, drafted the NAPs. These experts are activists coming from national women
4
5 associations, governmental actors, and local staff working for missions of international
6
7 organizations. This frame is based on a subject position of a woman-in-action who is the
8
9 main character of the struggle for women's rights against a patriarchal culture and
10
11 traditional practices that render women second-class citizens and as servants of men. It
12
13 implies a justification for the creation of women-only organizations funded by
14
15 international donors and trying to connect private and public spheres in order to change
16
17 cultural patterns of gender roles conduct in society. Connected with these progressive
18
19 assumptions is the logic that instrumental equality through the law is a way of achieving
20
21 gender security. The recommendations for the draft NAPs in Burundi and Liberia
22
23 emphasize measurable, quota-based indicators of the participation and involvement of
24
25 women in the Burundian and Liberian government and defense sector. As illustrated
26
27 below, security is understood as quantitative equality in state processes and structures.
28
29 In this frame, rather than shifting the meaning and subject of security, gender security is
30
31 about inclusion of groups currently not involved in government or involved in
32
33 reforming the security sector processes.
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40 *“Some argue that ok, numerically, we have a lot of women in politics, but beyond that,*
41
42 *has anything changed? Personally, I think it is a social change. People say that women*
43
44 *in the institutions are not there to serve the interests of women, but the interests of the*
45
46 *whole of the population. And so it is not an easy issue. So now what we are doing is to*
47
48 *work with women in Parliament and to explain their role in the National Assembly.”⁹⁶*
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53 accessed 14 April 2017; Government of Liberia, *The Liberian National Action Plan for the Implementation*
54 *of United Nations Resolution 1325*, 2009, available at:

55 [http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/NationalActionPlans/liberia_nationalactionplanmarch2009.pd](http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/NationalActionPlans/liberia_nationalactionplanmarch2009.pdf)
56 [f](#) accessed 14 April 2017.

57 ⁹⁶ Interview (c)
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Gender Security as countering sexual violence

This frame is promoted by donors, international NGOs and leaders of the women's movement in Liberia. It emphasizes that the core regulatory preoccupation on the WPS agenda has to be sexual violence in war and post-war settings, and in particular "rape as a weapon of war". It establishes therefore an understanding of women as victims of male (sexual) violence. Any discussion of other types of gender security are distinctly cut off from rape discourses, and impunity analysis has no connection to advocacy around advancing economic and political equality for women. Notably it is rape that has garnered the most international legal and policy discourse and action, sharing the logics underpinning events such as the Global Summit to end Sexual Violence in Conflict that took place in London June 10-12 2014, co-chaired by British Foreign Secretary William Hague and Angelina Jolie, Special Envoy for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Indeed, for this frame the WPS agenda is mostly about sex. This type of frame is very present in Liberia, where women's organisations use funds to promote campaigns related to rape and HIV/Aids or infant rape.

Gender Security as freedom

This frame is mostly used by leaders of urban, national women's organizations. Based on a feminist perspective on human security,⁹⁷ this frame offers a subject position of the woman as an individual who should be free from fear – physical security - and free from want – socioeconomic security in their private and public lives. It is based upon the logics that there is a lack of accountability from the part of the governmental institutions that ensure an environment in which the interrelated nature of gender inequality and the sociocultural, biological, economic and political subordination of women should be

⁹⁷ Heidi Hudson, 'Doing security as though humans matter: A feminist perspective on gender and the politics of human security', *Security Dialogue*, 36:2, pp. 155-174.

1
2
3 challenged. The solution is to transform the institutional and legal landscape that
4
5 separates socio-economic and physical security:
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7

8
9 *“Gender security means a lot of things. A girl needs to be leading an acceptable life;*
10 *she cannot be having worse living conditions than a man just because she is a woman.*
11 *So there is economic security and then also physical security, you know, people victims*
12 *of rape and gender-based violence. We are much more independent if we work. For*
13 *instance, I can get by because I work, whereas a woman who works at home, well, she*
14 *has to accept everything. I think we are freer, and I think that helps.”⁹⁸*
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24 This human security frame put the accent on the *I* as an individual female and not on the
25 *We* as a collective femininity. Their proponents do not put the accent on strategic
26 framing of women as heroines in post-conflict contexts, but they emphasize practical
27 and material needs based on the ordinariness of the women involved, and link these
28 everyday experiences with broader national, regional and global political processes and
29 structures:
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31
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37 *“If you are not economically active, even at the level of your home, there is no*
38 *respect. Your husband does not respect you. [...] So this is an opportunity to different*
39 *levels of violence: violence at the level of the home, violence at the level of the*
40 *environment, at the regional level, etc. Because if you are economically weak, they can*
41 *come to you and convince you of everything. But if you are economically strong, then*
42 *you can negotiate.”⁹⁹*
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54 ⁹⁸ Interview (d), a legal affairs staff at national women association in Bujumbura, Burundi, 12 December
55 2012

56 ⁹⁹ Interview (f), a project manager of a national women organisation in Bujumbura, Burundi, 8 April 2013
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Gender Security as a transformation of spaces and structures

This frame where women are understood as community mediators is mostly found amongst local grassroots women groups. The frame puts an emphasis on socioeconomic security and it considers the habits and institutions of the current political and social system as major impediments for its achievement. If the frame on gender security as freedom is based on changing the legal status of women as a remedy against women's subordination, this frame seeks recognition of the way in which post-war gender arrangements contribute to the perpetuation of socio-economic inequalities.

“When we came back here after the war, we were asking for money on the streets. But people were chasing us [her and her children] because we did not have a place to live and nobody [a husband] to protect us. Life is still hard, hard. The women have helped me be part of their cooperative.”¹⁰⁰

Although it shares with the gender security as inclusion frame the belief in a greater common femininity, it conceptualizes war and peace, private and public as a continuum rather than as opposites and in so doing, it goes against traditional conceptions of violence and security as an identifiable thing:

“Security is a very wide term. Security goes together with peace, which is at the same time an interior peace and a material peace. [...] The bare minimum for a woman to feel in security is to have food security and the security of having a home, the security to have something to wear, to be able to be at home.”¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰ Interview (g), activist from grassroots group, Cibitoke province, Burundi, 9 April 2013

¹⁰¹ Ibidem

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3 Femininity is synonym here of an aptitude for the relationship between the local
4 communities and the land they live in. This makes a collective “we, the women”
5 suitable agents for the management of resources:
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10
11 *“Now women at the community level have understood that this is not the problem that it*
12 *is not because you are a Hutu or a Tutsi that we have to kill each other. The problem is*
13 *the bad management of resources; it is the bad management of resources at the*
14 *community level. Now women have understood that and they are raising awareness to*
15 *other women indicating that we need to take care of the management of resources.”¹⁰²*
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25 Drawing on recent systematizations of poststructuralist-influenced feminist
26 methodology in gender and security studies that enquiry toward the discursive
27 construction of master frames and (gendered) subject positions, I have shown in this
28 section that there is not one, but at least five different discourses on gender security that
29 could be used as master frame for the transnational campaign for the implementation of
30 UNSCR1325 in Burundi and Liberia. The next section explains how in both countries
31 the result of the intra-network negotiations on which gender security logics will
32 compose the master frame resulted in a rebound and not in a boomerang effect.
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46 **The Rebound Effect: Naming lost boomerangs**

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49 In this section, I suggest that processes of alliance making in post-conflict contexts
50 result most likely in a rebound effect, not in a boomerang effect or in a complete lack of
51 cooperation between international and local civil society. I argue that when international
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55 ¹⁰² Interview (f), a project manager of a national women organisation in Bujumbura, Burundi, 8 April
56 2013
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3 activists agree to coalesce with local constituencies in order to launch a domestic
4
5 campaign for the implementation of an international norm, a new dialogical process
6
7 starts during which the discursive logics underpinning the master frame, and its
8
9 associated subject positions and policy proposals are negotiated. That is, there is a
10
11 renewal of discourses regarding what the campaign is about, in which “at least one
12
13 ideational element in the idea is replaced by an element of meaning that was not present
14
15 before”.¹⁰³ This results in either *dichotomization* of the members of the TAN, in
16
17 *absorption* of one of the discourses and groups of activists by the strongest one or in a
18
19 hybrid form of these two mechanisms.¹⁰⁴ More specifically, a *dichotomization* of the
20
21 network happens when the TAN can no longer tie together the different subject
22
23 positions and discourses, and activists separate into different groups that become
24
25 autonomous and pursue different ways. Here, divergences become big breaches and
26
27 they tend to delegitimize the other group, “whose actions are either ignored as useless or
28
29 perceived as counterproductive and even dangerous for the movement”.¹⁰⁵ This is what
30
31 happened in the Burundian case when the campaign for the implementation of UNSCR
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33 1325 became the campaign for the right to inherit. It provoked a *rebound effect of the*
34
35 *boomerang by exclusion*.
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41 In other situations, the configuration of the ideational map of discourses is such that the
42
43 tension between the two main oppositional discourses disappears under the strongest,
44
45 hegemonic one.¹⁰⁶ Hence, one discourse within the network is *absorbed* by the other
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47 and attracts media, political and social attention. It therefore becomes more stable, being
48
49 reproduced and strengthened over time. It does not allow other discursive
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
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53 ¹⁰³ Martin Carstensen, ‘Conceptualising ideational novelty: A relational approach, *British Journal of*
54 *Politics and International Relations*, 17: 2 (2015), pp. 284-297.

55 ¹⁰⁴ Geoffrey Pleyers, *Alter-globalization: Becoming actors in a global age* (Cambridge: Polity, 2010).

56 ¹⁰⁵ Pleyers (2010), p. 185.

57 ¹⁰⁶ Pleyers (2010), p. 191.
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3 configurations to develop. This was the case in Liberia, where the absorption provoked
4
5 a *rebound effect by annulment* of alternative voices. As Pratt and Richter-Devroe ask:
6
7 “When 1325 calls for empowering women and supporting so-called indigenous
8
9 women’s peace strategies, we thus need to ask critically which women and which
10
11 indigenous strategies?”¹⁰⁷ A careful examination of the interactions between local
12
13 women’s groups in Burundi and Liberia and international activists forming the UN
14
15 NGO Working Group on WPS indicates that the fine line between the positive outcome
16
17 of the boomerang effect and the less desirable rebound effect, between which strategies
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19 get accepted and which get excluded, is located between the frame of gender security as
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21 countering sexual violence and gender security as freedom.
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Figure 1. The negotiation process and possible results of an advocacy coalition master frame.

¹⁰⁷ Nicola Pratt and Sophie Richter-Devroe, ‘Critically examining UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security’, *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 13: 4(2011), p. 498.

From tension to opposition in Burundi

There is currently no law governing land inheritance in Burundi, but the customary practices exclude girls from inheritance because according to the patrilineal system, “they do not perpetuate the family line”.¹⁰⁸ The second most populated country in the African continent after Rwanda, Burundi is overcrowded and its land management system is the source of deep socioeconomic divisions that were one of the main causes of civil war. Research shows that the majority of land conflicts are conflicts amongst members of the same family, same clan and ethnicity that generate episodes of exceptional violence,¹⁰⁹ leaving female members of the family without any chance to access family property. This also makes women more prone to sexual and gender-based violence and polygamy.¹¹⁰

Burundian activists have used international norms on gender equality such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), as well as collaborations with international organisations and NGOs as political resources for the land issue.¹¹¹ After decades of advocacy that started in 1975 and the persistent failure to bring the issue of women’s land inheritance to a vote at the Burundian Parliament, women’s organisations found UNSCR1325 and the creation of a NAP for its implementation constituted a new opportunity to request international help from organisations that were putting in place awareness projects against gender and

¹⁰⁸ Gertrude Kazoviyo and Pélagie Gahungu, *The issue of inheritance for women in Burundi* (Bujumbura: FRIDE and Ligue ITEKA, 2011).

¹⁰⁹ International Crisis Group, *Les terres de la discorde (I): la réforme foncière au Burundi*, Rapport Afrique n. 213, (2014) p. 7.

¹¹⁰ Association des Femmes Juristes du Burundi et Association des Juristes Catholiques du Burundi, *Impact du vide juridique observé en matière des successions, des régimes matrimoniaux et des libéralités*, 2012, Final report RML, p. 42.

¹¹¹ For a detailed account on women’s collective action on land inheritance in Burundi, see Marie Saiget, ‘(De-)Politicising women’s collective action: international actors and land inheritance in post-war Burundi’, *Review of African Political Economy*, 43: 149 (2016), pp. 365-381.

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2
3 sexual violence and on women's political representation.¹¹² Acting as a good compliant
4
5 with international norms, the Burundian Ministry of Gender created in 2007 a
6
7 Committee in charge of drafting and following up the implementation of the NAP. The
8
9 Committee was formed by the Ministry of Gender, UNWOMEN, international NGOs
10
11 part of the UN NGO Working Group on WPS, such as Femmes Africa Solidarité (FAS)
12
13 and International Alert, and civil society organisations, such as Dushirehamwe,
14
15 CAFOB, le Réseau des Femmes et alliées artisans de la Paix, and the Association des
16
17 Femmes rapatriées du Burundi (AFRABU). During negotiations of the drafting process,
18
19 women's organisations were successful in incorporating several paragraphs and
20
21 proposed activities on the economic independence for women and the need to give
22
23 equal rights to brothers and sisters to inherit their parents' land.¹¹³
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29 As one member of a national women's organisation in Bujumbura¹¹⁴ participating in the
30
31 drafting of the NAP explained, gender security in post-war Burundi could not be
32
33 guaranteed unless socio-economic protection for women was enacted by law. Another
34
35 Burundian activist who previously worked for an international NGO¹¹⁵ argued that
36
37 without allowing women to own land, it did not make any sense to advocate for
38
39 women's political representation through quotas: the power inequalities in the society
40
41 remained untouched, preventing "effective" political participation in peacebuilding and
42
43 development. The NAP gave new momentum to the advocacy campaign on land
44
45 inheritance in the early 2010's and international activists started a coalition with
46
47 women's organisations under the presidency of Association des Femmes Juristes du
48
49 Burundi [Burundi Association of Female Lawyers] and the vice-presidency of ACORD
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53 ¹¹² Interview (c)

54 ¹¹³ Burundi National Action Plan (2009)

55 ¹¹⁴ Interview (f)

56 ¹¹⁵ Interview (h), woman activist, ex- staff member of an international NGO Burundi desk office,
57 Bujumbura, 12 April 2012
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3 Burundi to fund awareness campaigns and studies as well as to draft a joint action plan
4
5 in 2011. However, international funding and support on the right to inherit campaign
6
7 ended abruptly after a public speech on transitional justice on 28 July 2011 by the
8
9 President of the Burundian republic, Pierre Nkurunziza.¹¹⁶ The President ordered the
10
11 immediate cease of all activities concerning the legislative and political process on land
12
13 inheritance, arguing that they were a source of ethnic and political conflict.
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18 Although the campaign has not been successful up until now, by reinterpreting UNSCR
19
20 1325 and formulating a critical feminist conceptualization of security in which socio-
21
22 economic rights are taken into account, women's organizations in Burundi have utilized
23
24 the Resolution and the NAP to provide an element of international legitimacy to support
25
26 visions of how future gender security can be achieved. Ultimately, a new period of
27
28 intranetwork negotiation between local women's organisations and international
29
30 activists on how to proceed followed the Presidential speech. Several women's
31
32 organisations complained that although a good number of NGOs were critical in their
33
34 reports and several governments pushed the Burundian government to improve the
35
36 social, economic and political situation of women in the country, they failed to spend
37
38 more resources and efforts on what became a more controversial issue than previously
39
40 expected.¹¹⁷ Donors and many INGOs decided to stop collaborating with local activists
41
42 in advocacy projects for the drafting of a law on inheritance provoking a rebound by
43
44 exclusion. One of my interviewees deplored the situation and indicated that what
45
46 seemed to be an agreement between international and national activists, was no longer
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48 so after intervention of Pierre Nkurunziza.¹¹⁸
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55 ¹¹⁶ Interview (d)

56 ¹¹⁷ Interview (d)

57 ¹¹⁸ Interview (f)

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3 As the national government asked for the campaign to stop, the response of
4 UNWOMEN and international NGOs has been very ambiguous and consists of a
5 disaggregation of discourses and campaigns on security and development: On the one
6
7 hand, they have kept advocacy work for participation of women in electoral processes
8
9 and awareness-raising against gender violence under programs funded by
10
11 implementation funds for WPS projects, and therefore under a gender security frame.
12
13 On the other hand, they have de-securitized the campaign on inheritance rights by
14
15 reframing (economic) gender security into “women’s economic empowerment”. That is,
16
17 while land rights for women was an objective of the Burundian NAP on UNSCR1325,
18
19 once the Burundi government opposed its implementation and local women activists
20
21 sent a boomerang to international organisations, the response from the TAN was to
22
23 change venue and to focus on another international agenda on female empowerment
24
25 underpinning a logic of “smart economics” that assumes that investing in girls and
26
27 women promotes a society’s economic growth. Indeed, the Burundi Development
28
29 Partner Conference in Geneva on 29th and 30th October 2012 was organised with the
30
31 objective of mobilising financial support for Burundi’s second Strategic Framework for
32
33 Growth and Poverty Reduction (SFGPR II), which outlines the government’s
34
35 commitments for the country’s economic growth and development from 2012 to 2016.
36
37 This Framework is a requirement set up by donors and lenders, such as the International
38
39 Monetary Fund, before low-income countries can receive aid. Funded by the UN and
40
41 supported by International Alert, a group of Burundian women travelled to Geneva and
42
43 read a declaration in which they advocated for access to “means of production and land”
44
45 for rural women as well as other socio-economic rights under the national SFGPR II.
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47 However, advocating for smart economics and women’s access to micro-credits and
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49 other small-scale activities so that they can participate in neo-liberal economics is not
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3 the same as advocating for equal rights. This advocacy fails to convey a transformative
4 understanding of gender security in which political stability and socio-economic
5 development are seen as intertwined.¹¹⁹ In this way the boomerang rebounds as local
6
7 activists can no longer use the international agenda on WPS to advocate for gender
8
9 security. What is more, the alternative frame of women's economic empowerment does
10
11 not target all women, but only those that qualify as "women from rural communities"
12
13 targeted by the SFGPRII.
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17 18 *Hegemonic captivity in Liberia*

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21 Liberia's strong women's movement for peace played a key role in putting an end to the
22
23 civil war in 2003. The movement was given international recognition in 2011 after the
24
25 film entitled *Pray the Devil Back to Hell* acted as the catalyst for a Nobel Peace Prize to
26
27 the social worker Leymah Gbowee and leader of WIPNET (Women in Peace Building
28
29 Network), an association created out of the Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace.
30
31 The movement mobilized a wide set of symbolic resources. Apart from slogans and
32
33 songs, these women activists wore white t-shirts and white handkerchiefs symbols of
34
35 unity during their peace campaigns. In an almost unavoidable way, they linked war
36
37 violence to sexual and gender-based violence, and security to physical integrity and to
38
39 participation in public and political affairs. Moran and Pitcher claimed "that there was
40
41 far more peace-oriented activity by explicitly women's organizations going on in
42
43 Liberia; furthermore, these organizations existed at all levels from the most powerful
44
45 urban elites to illiterate villagers".¹²⁰ International funding and peace-oriented projects
46
47 directed at building capacity with the organizations behind the 2002 Women Mass
48
49 Action for peace, such as WIPNET, followed. Inevitably, the international master frame
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55 ¹¹⁹ Claire Duncanson, *Gender and Peacebuilding*, p. 138.

56
57 ¹²⁰ Mary Moran and Anne Pitcher, 'The "basket case" and the "poster child": Explaining the end of civil
58
59 conflicts in Liberia and Mozambique', *Third World Quarterly*, 25: 3 (2004), pp. 504.
60

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2
3 of gender security as defined by the inclusion and of women in this capacity building as
4 good peacemakers was rapidly adopted by the main local associations.¹²¹
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9 Local and international activists alike pointed at the empowerment of rural women and
10 grassroots peace movements through the Peace Huts project as the biggest success on
11 the campaign for the implementation of UNSCR1325 and the Liberian NAP. These
12 Peace Huts are community-led peace building groups, established by WIPNET and
13 financially supported by UNWOMEN.¹²² A group of women meet on Thursday
14 mornings in these Peace Huts to discuss the diversity of conflicts that had arisen within
15 the community, issues related to rape, land or tribal problems. In addition, Peace Huts
16 were used in the majority of cases to fight the issue of domestic and gender-based
17 violence: *“the issue of domestic violence is a security issue, because after the conflict*
18 *domestic violence has gone up, so it is a personal security issue for women. I wanted to*
19 *flag that in the advocacy that we did on 1325”*.¹²³ It is easy to find the link between
20 Peace Huts and the transnational discourse on international security, peace-building and
21 gender that see women as peacebuilders and gender security as inclusion. Indeed, the
22 Global Study on the implementation of UNSCR1325¹²⁴ used Peace Huts as the example
23 of grassroots women’s organizations inclusion in post-conflict peacebuilding and the
24 collaboration of these grassroots groups and the Liberian National Police on sexual and
25 gender-based violence prevention.
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47 ¹²¹ Petra Debusscher and Maria Martin de Almagro, ‘Post-conflict women's movements in turmoil: the
48 challenges of success in Liberia in the 2005-aftermath’, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 54: 02
49 (2016), pp. 293-316.

50 ¹²² For more information on the Peace Huts, see UNIFEM (October 2007) *Women building peace and*
51 *preventing sexual violence in conflict-affected contexts: A review of community-based approaches*, at
52 [http://www.unwomen.org/~media/Headquarters/Media/Publications/UNIFEM/0202_WomenBuilding](http://www.unwomen.org/~media/Headquarters/Media/Publications/UNIFEM/0202_WomenBuildingPeaceAndPreventingSexualViolence_en.pdf)
53 [PeaceAndPreventingSexualViolence_en.pdf](http://www.unwomen.org/~media/Headquarters/Media/Publications/UNIFEM/0202_WomenBuildingPeaceAndPreventingSexualViolence_en.pdf)

54 ¹²³ Interview (i), staff member of a women’s community based radio station in Monrovia, Liberia, 1
55 September 2013

56 ¹²⁴ UNWOMEN, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace* (New York: UN, 2015), p.
57 204.
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3 Significantly, the Peace Huts were set up through the National Rural Women Structures
4 of Liberia, a civil society organisation created by the Ministry of Gender.¹²⁵ The
5 Structures were founded in 2009 as a way to channel funding to the internationally
6 admired superheroines¹²⁶ and are composed of county divisions under a national
7 presidency. The Ministry directly appoints the leaders of each of the divisions. The
8 Structures also act as a link between rural women grassroots groups and international
9 NGOs. It is difficult to see how after having been selected by the national government,
10 they can provide an independent account on the situation of rural women and their
11 priorities in the country. That is, the few alternative discourses that could appear and
12 that differed from gender security as inclusion or gender security as equality were
13 erased or captivated by hegemonic governmental and international forces. The
14 discourses and related subject-position, offered by the grassroots are, once again, co-
15 opted and silenced. Women become community mediators, as the discourse on gender
16 security as transformation proposes, but they do so under the direction and rules of a
17 national structure controlled by the Ministry of Gender and funded by the international
18 community.

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When asked whether there is any campaign for the enforcement of the Liberian inheritance law, one staff member of an international NGO country office in Liberia commented that there was no organisation working on the issue, and that rural women

¹²⁵ This data was presented by the Liberian Minister of Gender at the time, Julia Duncan Cassell, at the 56th session of the Commission on the Status of Women: "The Empowerment of Rural Women and their role in poverty and hunger eradication, development challenges and the way forward", available at: <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/csw56/general-discussions/member-states/Liberia.pdf> accessed 09 August 2014.

¹²⁶ Laura Shepherd, 'Sex, Security and Superhero (in) es: From 1325 to 1820 and Beyond', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 13: 4(2011), pp. 504-521.

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3 were “looking at natural resource management problems”.¹²⁷ This is reminiscent to the
4
5 change of discourse in Burundi from the right to inherit to access to resources. Peace
6
7 Huts are the example I use to demonstrate how the subject position of Liberian women
8
9 as peacebuilders as it appears in the international peace-building discourse coordinates
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11 and blurs different experiences and distorts what subsequently can and will be
12
13 advocated for. The idea of mediation through women as an approach to reconstructing
14
15 social relations and building civil society has been naturalised through the use of the
16
17 ancestral Palava Huts transformed into Peace Huts. No other collective identity is
18
19 possible and a certain understanding of gender security prevents other voices coming
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21 directly from the political subject of (in) security from emerging.
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27 This does not mean that there has not been international help for campaigns on socio-
28
29 economic rights for women. To the contrary, once the peace accords that put an end to
30
31 the Liberian civil war were signed in 2003, the biggest objective of the women’s
32
33 movement in the country - supported by international activists - was to have a more
34
35 institutionalized participation in political and economic affairs for women. They
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37 campaigned for access to land, employment and the enforcement of existing equality
38
39 laws.¹²⁸ Indeed, WIPNET exposed some rhetoric in the “Women’s national agenda for
40
41 peace, security and development in post-war Liberia” in which they argued that the
42
43 control over means of production and access to land and other primary resources was
44
45 considered key in order to achieve economic equality.¹²⁹ Nevertheless, these petitions
46
47 are not interpreted under a discursive framework based on Security Council resolutions,
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51 ¹²⁷ Interview (j), local staff from the local branch of an International NGO in Monrovia, Liberia, 8 August
52 2013

53 ¹²⁸ Veronika Fuest, ‘Contested Inclusions: Pitfalls of NGO Peace-Building Activities in Liberia’, *Africa*
54 *Spectrum*, (2010), pp. 3-33.

55 ¹²⁹ WANEP and WIPNET, *Women’s National Agenda for Peace, Security and Development*. Adopted on
56 30 March 2006, presented to the Government of the Republic of Liberia (Monrovia: Women in
57 Peacebuilding Network, 2006).
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3 but on a “national agenda”, and the socio-economic realm is clearly separated from
4
5 what are considered high politics issues on war and peace. If the internationals use the
6
7 boomerang to help on the socio-economic equality struggle, a securitization of the
8
9 matter that could concede a global nature to it is excluded. The pass of a land
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11 inheritance law that regulates women’s marriage rights, rights to property, and access to
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13 their children after divorce or death of the husband has not been much of a problem in
14
15 Liberia. The law passed without too much resistance in 2003, although there is no
16
17 enforcement mechanism and rural communities follow customary practices of
18
19 inheritance that tend to be detrimental to women.¹³⁰
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23 **Conclusion**

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26 This article argues that one can understand better the outcomes of norm diffusion by
27
28 using a discursive approach to study the internal power dynamics inside a transnational
29
30 advocacy campaign. Constructivist approaches to international norm diffusion have
31
32 focused mainly on understanding how norms emerge, cascade, become institutionalised
33
34 and then accepted as given, with no more room for interpretation during
35
36 implementation. In particular, I first suggest that norms are processes and not things
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38 whose meaning remains fixed once they have been institutionalised. To the contrary,
39
40 their content may change during implementation campaigns during which there will be
41
42 attempts to stretch their meaning. Second, I propose that TANs are not stable platforms
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44 of ideas and identities. Rather, these are co-constituted through discursive performance.
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49 In both countries, the challenges and controversies regarding the transnational campaign
50
51 for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on WPS are translated into a struggle in which
52
53 competing discourses within the advocacy network resulted in the production,
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55 ¹³⁰ Interview (k), staff member and lawyer of a women professional association in Liberia, Monrovia, 6
56 August 2016.
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3 circulation and naturalization of hierarchical power relations that condition the political
4
5 economy of the global order. The Burundi case study shows patterns of exclusion and
6
7 dichotomization of local women activist discourses in the implementation of
8
9 UNSCR1325 and the fluctuation of the internal dynamics between members of the
10
11 advocacy campaign. It also demonstrates the abilities of Burundian activists to
12
13 denaturalise mainstream discourses around gender and security by trying to push for a
14
15 frame where gender security is understood as freedom. The Liberia case study shows
16
17 patterns of hegemonic captivation and annulment of other possible emerging discourses
18
19 as international and governmental organisations control the availability of subject
20
21 positions. In sum, local women's organisations looking for "a more radical agenda of
22
23 social and political transformation" than that offered by the "liberal peacebuilding
24
25 agenda" of UNSCR1325 will only find their boomerang bouncing back.¹³¹ The
26
27 solidarity links created in the campaign are not necessarily framed in the Burundian or
28
29 Liberian context or through their own framing of the campaign. Rather, the complexity
30
31 of the security situation in Burundi or Liberia is framed through concepts that resonate
32
33 with global audiences and donors. The situation on the ground is reconstructed through
34
35 a selection of events and key problems in order to create solidarity across boundaries
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37 and pass the message to those with the power to allocate resources and attention. A
38
39 certain "gender security", the acts of violence committed against women at war, and the
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41 need of quotas to solve the problem, act as reference point for the solidarity.
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43 Nevertheless, it is not clear whether these reference points are aligned with local
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45 experiences and claims.
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53 ¹³¹ Pratt and Richter-Devroe, cited in Soumita Basu, 'The Global South writes 1325 (too)', *International*
54 *Political Science Review*, 37:3 (2016), pp. 362-374.
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3 The article advocates for a discursive approach to norm diffusion theory that makes
4
5 productive power visible in order to highlight the fact that norms do not spread in the
6
7 absence of politics. Such an approach enables the researcher to name “lost boomerangs”
8
9 by using the concept of the *rebound effect* and to argue that in post-conflict contexts, the
10
11 most likely outcome is a rebound, and not a boomerang effect. In sum, such an
12
13 approach can offer a situated account to the study of transnational advocacy networks
14
15 and their role in the spreading of international norms. Additionally, it offers possibilities
16
17 for theorizing the encounter between transnational and local activists in which more
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19 space is left for the experience of difference in processes of collective identification and
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21 discourse normalization.
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