

ROUMANIAN—HUNGARIAN ATTEMPTS AT RECONCILIATION IN THE SPRING OF 1849 IN TRANSYLVANIA

Ioan Dragoş mission

by

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Early May in 1849 Roumanian—Hungarian appeasement aspirations ended in the Transylvanian Ore-mountains (Erdélyi Érc-hegység, Munț Apuseni, Erzgebirge) with an episode fitting into a tragic play. The scenario seems to be a simple one. Ioan Dragoş, a Roumanian for his nationality, representative of the Hungarian parliament, arrived to the Transylvanian Ore-mountains (the last stronghold of Transylvania's Roumanian uprising) with the peace conditions of Governor-President Louis Kossuth, to restore peace in the area. His mission was about to succeed when Hungarian troops led by Imre Hatvani marched into Abrudbánya (Abrud) where the peace talks were taking place and thereupon the flames of civil war flared up again. Dragoş himself also became one of its victims. Simple as the history of these days may seem to be, plenty of its details have still not been cleared up. Memoirs and historical research are trying to decide which side was responsible for the renewal of hostilities. The contemporaries accused one another of intentions of mislead and ambush, though most of them shifted the responsibility upon Hatvani. Hungarian historiography generally condemns Hatvani too¹, in the Roumanian historiography we can read sometimes about Kossuth's "double game".² It seems to be justified to complete the ideas formed in the question of responsibility with some fresh data, unknown so far or just not taken into consideration. But first we have to analyse the social and political factors which so considerably determined the complicated relation of the Roumanian and Hungarian national aspirations. The different programs and trends within the Roumanian national movement itself should be put into proper light, all the more as two lines of the Roumanian national aspirations also turned against each other tragically in the spring of 1849.

I

The Roumanian—Hungarian coexistence and national movements were determined by geographical and social factors. About half of the approximately 6—7 million Roumanians lived in the Roumanian principa-

lities, one-third of them in the territories under the Hungarian Crown, a half of the latter group in the Eastern parts of the Kingdom proper and the other half in Transylvania. More than one-tenth of the some 5–6 million Hungarians lived in Transylvania.³ As the sporadic groups of transcarpathian Hungarians had not declared any concrete national programme just adhered to their popular culture, so the historic territory of Hungary became the scene of the Roumanian–Hungarian coexistence where after the national awakening serious problems appeared. The ethnic borderline between the two populations was never a single line. We can hardly find a region without influential minorities living close together. The most important minorities due to their number of social significance beside the Roumanians and Hungarians are the Serbs and Germans, among the latter the Transylvanian Saxons. Another characteristic of this coexistence is that each of the nationalities occupied a practically determined position in the social hierarchy, so we can rightly speak of an ethnosocial division of labour, developed during the centuries.⁴

These Roumanians who advanced from the leadership of their people to the ruling class in the middle ages, were assimilated to the majority of nobility in language and religion. When the question of nationality became a political one, they either declared themselves Hungarians or identified themselves with Hungarian national aims. Their attitude served as a model for the masses of Roumanian sandaled nobility.

Thus they did not join the Roumanian national movement, we can rather meet intellectuals emerging from the lesser nobility and priesthood while many personalities of the Roumanian *intelligenția* emerged from the peasantry. That's why in the consciousness of the masses the Hungarian–Roumanian coexistence appeared in the simplified model of the Hungarian landlord and Roumanian serf. This pattern was often seen and sometimes used for propagandistic purposes by rebellious intellectuals living in the world of romantic and democratic ideas, and this pattern helped them to identify themselves with the destiny of their peasant people. The spontaneous assimilation of the Roumanian nobility however had more considerable effects on the bourgeois national development. When explaining these phenomena, our historiography generally points out that national movements proceed from the claim to secure and promote bourgeois development as a starting point even if the demands for social and economic changes appeared in the consciousness of the contemporaries as subordinated to national claims. As East of the river Elbe there could not evolve a bourgeoisie like that of Western Europe, a part of the nobility thus played the main role in creating legal conditions for modern national development and the bourgeois transformation. This nobility was politically experienced and interested in the market-oriented production and beside that it could make use of the feudal institutions.

In the case of those peoples where the nobility became estranged from its original ethnic community, clerical and secular intellectuals took the lead in the national movements. In the long run the importance of this intelligentsia depended on the process of the bourgeois development of

the peasantry, on its ability in the market-oriented production and in taking advantage of the former nobility's economic decline.

Nobody could foresee in the middle of the century that in the next 30-40 years banking would give this intelligentsia the field of activity for social emergence and as a result this social group would lose its former marginal role and as a bourgeois stratum would be able to cease to be bureaucracy's simple reserve army. In the critical period of the bourgeois transformation however the importance of this intelligentsia depended on political ups and downs. As a result of this the standpoint of the peasantry became important; under what circumstances it would accept the leadership of the intelligentsia which had no doubt about being powerless without any mass basis, and the less it had to lose the more radical it became against its imaginary or real enemies.⁵

The regional variety of the tensions determining the existence and the ways of emergence for the peasantry and the possible national leading forces, the peculiarities in the attitude of these social strata and groups foreshadowed the regional variety of the Roumanian national aspirations in Hungary, as early as the 30s and 40s of the 19th century.⁶ The revolution of 1848 nevertheless brought the possibility for the development of this variety, which was naturally blended with aspirations deriving from claims to integration. As far as it was possible, cohesion and solidarity were kept alive between the Roumanian movements in different countries and sometimes one of these trends regarded itself as the only true representative of the national interest.⁷

II

Within the territory under the Hungarian Crown, the dividing line between the trends of Roumanian national movement could be drawn at the Királyhágó, the historical border of Hungary proper and Transylvania. While significant forces of the Roumanian and Hungarian national aspirations faced each other passionately in the belief of an existential threat beyond the Királyhágó in Transylvania, on the other side of the Királyhágó the different groups—with just a few exceptions—cooperated with the bourgeois revolution and with the Hungarian liberals in power. But there is a striking difference between the aspirations of the northern and southern regions of Hungary proper as well, partly because of the different social-economic development, partly because of the religious and political-cultural traditions. In the Northern region of the country, where the development took place perhaps in the most archaic way, in Máramaros, the conversion to Greek-Catholic religion had been successful and the relatively strong Roumanian nobility had a great prestige in the social life of that country. This nobility, which called itself "Roumanian speaking Hungarian citizens", backed the Hungarian government's policy up to the hilt.⁸ In Bihar and in Bánság, in the Southern parts of the country, the opposition of Hungarian Lords and Roumanian peasants was more conspicuous. But on the other hand these regions were effected by agricultural

prosperity which meant that wide strata of society could make use of commodity production and occupy even some of the local leading positions. And there were such centers of Roumanian culture and education as the University Press of Buda, the Greek-Catholic Theology at Nagyvárad (Oradea) and the Teacher's training college in Arad, with a network of regular schools.

Roumanian national consciousness was getting stronger within the „Hungarus” consciousness. We have several examples when the scholars of the two peoples had been seeking the connective elements in the past of the Roumanian – Hungarian coexistence. So much that Petru Maior (an eminent participant in the movement aiming at equal rights of the Roumanian nation with the feudal nations in Transylvania) after getting to Buda and working there as a censor of the University Press, published a book in 1812, regarded as a bible of national revival in the 1830s, in which he emphasized that “the Hungarian nation had never done any injustice to the Roumanians”.⁹

The 1830 Buda Calendar gave voice to a rather general and lasting conviction in 1830, when it advised “every Roumanian to follow his father Ioan Corvinus de Huniad (János Hunyadi) in matters of the homeland, follow his Roman ancestors in matters of national culture”.¹⁰

The Roumanian national education was the basic object, but they did not regard the Hungarian national aspirations as a danger threatening their existence, which meant for the Roumanian “nationalists” in Transylvania “that *magyarism* had its heyday”.¹¹ Among the Roumanians in Hungary, national political aspirations appeared only in the form of conspiracy before the revolution. In Lugos (Lugoj) for example, a secret society, called “Constitution” was working around 1830, the activity of which was reminiscent of free masonry. Later, in 1848, Professor Eftimie Murgu, respected throughout the two Principalities but expelled from Wallachia in 1841 as a “K. K.” subject taking part in a conspiracy, was arrested with the charge of conspiracy. In his homeland, in Bánság (Banat) he tried to combine his legal practice with national and antifeudal agitation in such a manner that while meditating on territorial self-government he proposed the driving away of “newcomers” i. e. among others: the Hungarian landlords, but this deviation from the idea of bourgeois liberty proved to be ephemeral.¹²

The development of national ideology and the Roumanians' starting on the way of bourgeois development consequently took national aspirations from the cultural programme to the field of political action. The Hungarian revolution and the fresh bourgeois constitutionalism guaranteed the success of the Roumanian national movement on the political field, but at the same time kept it in the derived channel. Murgu for example was released from jail by the Hungarian government. Only about 20–21 Roumanians – six of them from Transylvania – were among the more than 400 members in the House of Representatives of the Parliament in Pest. And while the Transylvanian elite could not represent itself in Parliament, or did not even want to do so, at least nearly all the trends of the

Roumanians of Hungary proper could be present there, though the national movement was so poorly organized that for example a butcher had been elected to parliamentary deputy.¹³

As the liberal nobility had started liberating the serfs in the spring of 1848 and created the system of institutions of the bourgeois constitutionalism, it became the most important issue for the Roumanians of orthodox religion to assure the autonomy of their Church, to separate it, after so many futile attempts, from the Serbian orthodox Church. This effort was stimulated by the fact that the Serbian national movement claimed a territorial autonomy which included larger pieces of land inhabited by Roumanians, too. The radical Roumanian faction wanted to arm the Roumanians of the Bánság with the aid of the Hungarian government, referring to the Serbian military threat. With the support of an independent armed force, they thought they would be able to take more effective actions for the sake of the Roumanian territorial autonomy. Murgu, the leader of the radicals, hoped to arrange the support of the Roumanian soldiers in the Military Border against the imminent intervention of Tsarist Russia which threatened the two Roumanian principalities. Apart from that, he wanted to take steps towards concluding an alliance between Hungary and the two Roumanian principalities, which was also congruous with the aims of a revolution in the principalities.¹⁴ The June revolution in Wallachia was prepared in the hope of a "Swiss type" confederation based on a Roumanian—Hungarian alliance.¹⁵ While Murgu and his few followers wanted to mobilize the masses by summoning popular meetings, other Roumanian intellectuals and the bourgeoisie tried to outline the national political aims at—larger or smaller—conferences. They demanded education and public administration in the vernacular, and the autonomy of the Church. Ioan Dragoş begun his Roumanian political career in these movements. At the same time his role illustrates how the national aspirations, influenced by the bourgeois transformation, got over from the cultural field to nationwide politics.

III

Ioan Dragoş was a peculiar character of the times of great changes. As a conscious Roumanian patriot, he supported the national culture by subscription to Transylvanian Roumanian papers and to publications from Wallachia. As a nobleman it was possible for him to become sheriff (*szolgabíró*) in Bihar County.¹⁶ The Hungarian liberals however watched him distrustfully with good reason. He, as a "provincial soldier" of Metternich's system—a quotation from himself—played an active role in suppressing the Hungarian liberal opposition in the county even on the eve of the Revolution.¹⁷ On the other hand, however, he must have been an excellent official well arranging the different troublesome cases of the people. It was this quality that he referred to when offering his services to the Hungarian government in the summer of 1848. He emphasized that his career up to then had already enabled him to diminish the distrust of the people,

which arose among others because the Act emancipating the serfs had been published only in Hungarian, and the county officials did not speak Roumanian, and because the people considered the conscription of parliamentary electors as an intention of reintroducing the feudal burdens.¹⁸ Certainly, his aspirations reflect the Roumanian intellectuals' wish for social and individual rising. But his attitude was also motivated by the fact that during the revolution he regarded the opposition and the future struggle between the constitutionalism based on popular sovereignty and the feudal absolutism as the great question of the age. His liberalism had not always been consistent, he gave voice to such ideas against the Serbian aspirations in Parliament in Pest as "well, if we feel so, speak it out that Serbians can not live on this land".¹⁹ His general attitude was determined basically by a double loyalty, reminiscent of "hungarus" consciousness which bound him on the one hand to the common homeland, and to his ethnical nationality on the other hand. He considered himself "a Hungarian patriot" and emphasized—with a reference to Hunyadi as an example—that "nationality and patriotism are two different ideas".²⁰

This idea meant substantially the assertion of the *one-state-several-nations* conception against the *one-state-one-nation* theory, without breaking up the unity of the state, and he had always accepted the priority, i. e. (to use the contemporary term) the "diplomatic character" of the Hungarian language. As a parliamentary deputy he presented a Bill to guarantee the right to use the vernacular for the Roumanians in the county administration making clear that "the Roumanian nation is the natural ally of the Hungarian nation".²¹

And as he had to convince the two in many respects opponent parties, he had to outline a different way of solution in the case of Hungarians and again a different one in the case of Roumanians. He wanted to convince the Hungarians that the Roumanians admitted the Hungarians' merit in not defying historical evolution but fighting for the people's rights, but they did not conclude on this to the rightfulness of the Hungarian demand that they should give up their national identity and aspirations. "These assimilating efforts of the zealous Hungarian fellow-citizens arouse the jealousy of the Roumanians, a painful shame for their despised nation, from which logically emerged the longing for lawful emancipation to put an end to the shame of a thousand years of suffering and mockery." . . . "For the Hungarians to be afraid would not be less than cowardice, as the moral superiority of the Hungarian nation is so strong that the Roumanians, just disentangling themselves from a longlasting apathy, could not overtake the Hungarians for centuries. . ." On the other hand, when the Roumanians come to share its glory and honour, the Hungarian nation can count on the Roumanians as defenders of that glory and honour, which already can be said about the descendants of the former privileged class.²²

When he wanted to convince the Transylvanian Roumanians about the possibilities to rise, he argued in his unpublished manifesto as follows: "Now the Hungarian goes before me and breaks a track for me and I follow him, but the time will come when I shall go before him and he will

follow me whether he likes it or not".²³ Dragoş, and generally those from Hungary, however, turned to the leaders of the Transylvanian Roumanians in vain to make them cooperate with the Hungarian government in trying to reach their national purposes.

IV

The national despair of a considerable part of the Roumanian leaders in Transylvania spurred on rebellion, just like the social discontent of the peasantry which was a consequence of a more archaic social development. The principle of the feudal double possession was not so deep-rooted in the landlord - serf relation beyond the Királyhágó that the legal status of the rustical and dominical lands would have been sharply separated by the feudal right. The state power could not even standardize the system of feudal burdens. The peasantry of Transylvania was generally poorer than that of Hungary, on average the peasant holding was less than half of that in Hungary proper. The nobility beyond the Királyhágó - though it was an integral part of the Hungarian nobility - was weaker and poorer compared to its Hungarian counterpart. Its institutions of representation (the diet and the counties) were more subordinated to the central power. So, due to the more archaic social and political conditions the reactionary forces could relatively easily break down the liberal nobility and took over the initiative at the diet of 1846/47. They wanted to rule the landlord-serf relation and the size of peasant holdings in a way that many of the contemporaries were afraid of a mass impoverishment and/or uprising.

It can be explained also by the more archaic conditions why the Roumanian - Hungarian relation developed in Transylvania nearly as a reverse of that in Hungary. Most of the Roumanians considered the Hungarian national aspirations as an attack against their national existence, and the situation got so much worsened in the 40s that the preparation of a Bill declaring the equal rights of the orthodox religion had no considerable positive reaction among the Roumanians though the former laws, still from the 17th century, had only tolerated the Orthodoxy, preventing many Roumanian intellectuals from rising. The Roumanian intellectuals coupled their despair with a solidarity with the peasantry, and while the great generation of the 18th century denied any solidarity with Horea's peasant revolt in 1784 the radical youth of the 1840s kept its memory alive as a heroic tradition. The wish for cooperation with the Hungarians seemed to overcome the discontent for a short time in the spring of 1848. But the forces of bourgeois transformation tragically dispersed. While the liberal Hungarian nobility held out the prospect of serf emancipation and achieved the convocation of the Diet in Kolozsvár (Cluj, Klausenburg) by the end of May, the illusion of the "good Kaiser" - the belief that the monarch is working for the welfare of the people, but the Hungarian noblemen (landlords) keep him back from doing so - became stronger and stronger among the serfs. But besides this, as they had seen the righteous kings of the fairy tales in those few Rumanian intellectuals who - by

taking up the demand of serf emancipation – could draw up a mass of 30–40 thousand by mid-May, at a national assembly convoked with the approval of the government-authorities in Balázsfalva (Blaj, Blasendorf). Having a firm mass base and in the hope of favourable international developments, the strongest faction of the leading Roumanian intelligentsia refused the union of Transylvania and Hungary though the union secured fundamentally the emancipation and the creation of a bourgeois constitutionalism in June.

In the Summer after the serf emancipation, however, the general serf-landlord opposition disintegrated to smaller local disputes, the militant Roumanian intellectuals were either prosecuted for their activity or they had to go underground. In the autumn of 1848, when the Habsburg counterrevolution took the offensive against the Hungarian revolution, the Austrian military leaders of Transylvania felt themselves strong enough to take undisguised steps only when they thought they would be able to launch a peasant rising in favour of the Monarch. And as the Hungarian liberals had set about to satisfy the Roumanian demands too late and they abandoned them very soon, the Roumanian militant intellectuals did not feel obliged to refuse the alliance offered by the Austrian military leaders. Hoping that Austrian constitutionalism will establish their national autonomy and/or national hegemony, preachers, lawyers, students volunteered to call to arms, in the name of the Emperor, 195 000 people. The former serfs on the other hand firmly resisted the military conscription ordered by the Hungarian government and were certainly eager to take a revenge on their landlords. A civil war broke out, which was put an end only when the Polish emigrant general Bem, after tough and weary battles, drove out the Austrians and the Russian troops which were called in from Wallachia to support them. The Roumanian revolvers withdrew to the Ore-mountains which separate Transylvania from Hungary. That was the scene of the peasant revolt in 1784 as well, and now more and more people fled here away from the revenge of certain landlords. The Roumanian resistance in the Ore-mountains became a Hinterland for Gyulafehérvár (Alba Iulia, Karlsburg), one of the most up to date fortresses of the age, and so it would be more easily defended by the Austrian forces. The settlement of the nationality problem of the Roumanians in Transylvania was getting more urgent.²⁴

V

Early April in 1849, those Roumanian representatives of Parliament – which had already fled to Debrecen by that time – who stood up for the self-defensive struggle of the Hungarians, 14 out of 21 or 22, decided to try to mediate between the combatants in order to make peace. They feared that a Hungarian breaking down of the Roumanian armed resistance would cause damage to them and to the cause of the Roumanians in Hungary as well; it would deprive the “Roumanian nation of all her prestige”.²⁵ The Roumanian representatives offered Kossuth to mediate between

the government and the revolvers in the Ore-mountains. Kossuth—emphasizing the dangerous character of the mission²⁶ chose Ioan Dragoş to get into touch with the revolvers. Kossuth “made no commitments . . . Dragoş acted, therefore, on his own initiative”.²⁷ The representative of Bihar really intended to inspire confidence in the Hungarian leadership in every possible way. Kossuth said about him that he arranged the conditions of the clergy of the Roumanian diocese in Arad with the “most fortunate success”, and he was the one who made the proposal that Parliament should decide to declare Hungary’s independence on April 14 in the greater church of Debrecen, where, in public, even those who wanted a compromise with Austria were not likely to go into open opposition.²⁸ This may have contributed to the fact that Kossuth signed a letter of credence for Dragoş still on the day of the Declaration of Independence, which ordered the local authorities to promote his mission.²⁹

The Dragoş’ mission was one of the possible ways and methods of reconciliation. Opposed to bilateral negotiations with conditions of agreement put down like in a treaty, we can call his mission—for lack of a better term—a mediation. The method of this mediation was appropriately described in a memorial, written by Sigismund Pop, representative of Kővárvidék, in early April, to László Madarász, one of Kossuth’s co-workers who conducted the home affairs. According to this document, the government had had to send to Transylvania such Roumanian individuals who—in accordance with the plenipotentiary commissioner representing the leadership of the Hungarian state—could try to negotiate with the heads of the Roumanian revolvers. These individuals should not act as government deputies because it would decrease the trustworthiness of their mission, but they had had to appear as private persons,” as saving angels who take care of the Roumanians’ liberty. The success of the mission depends on the tactfulness of the individuals.”³⁰

Accordingly Dragoş turned to the “leaders of the Roumanian revolvers” in a letter on the 19th April. He wrote that the Roumanian representatives of the Parliament in Debrecen (they were fourteen including him), all agreed to declare to the Hungarian government that “recognizing the spirit of this century”, they were ready to promote “the liberation of peoples from the yoke of absolutism”. As Kossuth, “for the sake of this cause, commissioned me to come here and mediate doing my best with consideration for the people and to secure peace for our land”.³¹

Dragoş could meet the leaders of the uprising as early as 23 April. They assured him that “for the good of Hungary and the possible establishment of her independence” they should lay down their arms if the government let them doing it with honour.³² In Debrecen Dragoş could have drawn a picture of his experiments painted in bright colours, because Kossuth announced on the 26th of April in Parliament that the Roumanians in Transylvania, “realizing their deception, will lay down their arms and return to obedience to the law”.³³ On the same day, upon Dragoş’ request, the Governor-President wrote down his ideas and conditions.

In the wake of the repeated Hungarian victories over the Austrians, the Hungarian government's policy towards the nationalities seems to have tended to be more open-handed and to adjust itself to realities. As early as on the 14th of April, Kossuth made clear his ideas in a letter to the authorized government commissioner of Transylvania, László Csány: "I sincerely admit that my heart is bleeding on still seeing this unfortunate people as a mere tool for the Austrian intrigues. And my heart is bleeding on thinking of the constraints that might be necessary in the future, if the people can not be enlightened and brought back to legality, it should be treated severely by force of arms in order that peace and order as well as Transylvania should at least be completely secured for the nation. My true wish is then, as far as it can be squared with the nation's dignity, that both out of humanity and a consideration towards the Roumanian people as well as to spare our strength and be saved from burdens, the case must be brought to an end by means of peaceful reconciliation."³⁴

The Roumanian standpoint being yet unknown for him, Kossuth did not want to define the conditions before contracting the Roumanians. On April 26, however, in the letter written upon Dragoş' request, he clared emphatically that besides vindicating "the diplomatic character" of the Hungarian language in the administration and in Parliament, "we do wish not only to guarantee the free development of all the nationalities and their languages but we also want to promote this development in the interest of civilisation". And although he did not go into details about the question of the use of the vernacular in the county-administration, he continued to guarantee the free use of the mother-tongue in communities, schools and the church. As to the question of amnesty with which the Roumanians of the Transylvanian Ore-mountains were at that time mainly concerned, Kossuth emphasized that "as a return for the allegiance towards the country I am willing to consign the political offences of the past to oblivion in the name of peace and affection." Although they could not meet all the expectations, these conditions served as a basis for the future progress. Kossuth wrote about an "honest peace" and he also stressed that, unlike the commander of the Austrian forces from the Hungarians in January, he did not demand an unconditional surrender. He was waiting for deputies from the mountains though not in order to start the negotiations but rather he expected them "to pay their homage and to obtain guarantees for the favours granted" and he expressed his hope to see Roumanian volunteers in the Hungarian army in the future.³⁵

The optimistic tone of the letter, suggests to forget the fact that the Hungarian political leaders looked upon the Roumanian insurgents as rebels, and in compliance with the prestige of the revolution and the struggle for independence they demanded, above all, a return to loyalty to the state as well as surrender whereas the Roumanian population of the Transylvanian Ore-mountains, also strong in the justice of their cause, demanded strict guarantees and, perhaps, also contractual ones in the course of the "peaceful reconciliation".

In any case, Dragoş set out for the Mountains once again in the hope of an assured success. On April 28, he reported self-confidently from Nagyvárad (Oradea) to Kossuth that, "I think that arms are for fighting out victory whereas the labour of the mind is to arrange and secure what the arms have won".³⁶ And towards this end, he at once made the proposition that in case a new government commissioner is sent to Transylvania, he should be supported by Roumanian representatives, as well. He also suggested that Murgu should be asked to make a proposition for the improvement of the Roumanian schooling conditions. On arriving in the Hungarian camp at Brád (Brad), however, he realized that his undertaking would face more difficulties than he had expected. He was anxious about the mistrust of the Roumanians in the Ore-mountains and he did not consider the formulation of the Hungarian promise concerning the prospective amnesty explicit and convincing enough. Yet he was mostly uneasy about the militancy of the Hungarian camp. He feared that during his negotiations the Hungarian troops would continue the operations. And since he felt that he had not been given effective help from the Hungarian government to prevent it, he tried to make Kossuth sign an armistice presumably so as if it appears he had tried to shift upon him the responsibility for the possible failure. "In case I fell victim to my zeal" he wrote to Kossuth on May 2, before leaving for the camp of the Roumanian guerillas, "I bind it on your patriotic honour that you should make these words of mine public so that all could see that it is the wrong of others, not mine, that caused my fall. If only you had given me power enough that I could achieve a 48-hour ceasefire, I would be completely sure and quiet about the success, but in the present situation, *all depends on conceptions, mood and good luck*".³⁷ (My italics, A. M.)

We do not know if Dragoş had asked for an armistice in Debrecen. We could see that Kossuth, from the very beginning, emphasized that the action was endangering to life, and it is possible that Dragoş propounded the possibility of an armistice only at that time. And tragically enough, the militant and mistrustful atmosphere was also against armistice. On April 26, Kossuth was given a cheer in Parliament, but outside Parliament, both the left and the right spoke differently. The journal of the so-called Peace-Party (whose social base was the nobility, that was loyal to the revolution but disapproved the efforts for independence) considered the Roumanian guerillas' willingness to peace as a trick, and demanded to call the leaders to account and to neglect punitive sanctions against the people, in compliance with the time-honoured method in the suppression of the peasant revolts.³⁸ As one of the county government commissioners in the Transylvanian Ore-mountains put it in a letter written weeks before: "Those who are guilty should pay, the innocent should have the benefit of the favours of law in constitutional freedom."³⁹

There were much more serious consequences of the fact that the radical youth in Pest, who had hardly any military experiences, driven by a vocation of their generation as well as a revolutionary Messianism, began to organize irregular troops which could be used for guerilla warfare

and they were preparing for war in terms of the relentlessness of the French revolution's actions towards the reactionary forces. Paradoxically, it was the journal of the Peace Party again which published an article by Pál Vasvári, an influential radical, in which he demanded the relentless elimination of the Roumanian resistance and made the Hungarian aristocracy too responsible for the civil-war in Transylvania. At the same time, on April 10, he planned to start a concentrated attack against the Transylvanian Ore-mountains, that he himself began on the 5th of May.⁴⁰

Vasvári's preparations were obviously in connection with the plan for the operations, which was worked out by the end of March in Debrecen.⁴¹

In spring the two squadrons of the German legion as well as the irregular troops recruited by the radical Imre Hatvani have been also directed to the Hungarian camp at Brád; although Hatvani wanted to gain distinction by fighting against the Serbian uprising and he wanted to act "as a republican should, and to follow what the French revolutionists did against the revolting towns and what they confessed their principles".⁴²

The Ministry of War however does not seem to have urged the concentrated attack. On April 17, the Ministry definitely commissioned the chief commander of the forces at Brád, Kálmán Csutak, "to restrict to defence and to initiate attacks only in case they are adequate to your potential, whereby success will be guaranteed".⁴³ General Bem, however, did not bother about what the Ministry had ordered in this case, either. While marching against the Austrian forces in Southern-Hungary, he gave order to relieve from his position and to arrest Csutak, because of his inefficiency,⁴⁴ however, it seems that this soldier now out of favour had learnt how difficult it is to achieve a lasting success with that small force he had, and in order to support Dragoş' undertaking, he promised an 8-day long ceasefire which was known by the Roumanians to be valid for an undefined length of time.⁴⁵ The Polish general's favourite soldier, count János Bánffy, brought the warrant of arrest. Bánffy was claimed, but there are no positive data that he would have encouraged the newly appointed, ambitious chief commander, Imre Hatvani, to be more militant.⁴⁶ On April 26, Hatvani, as a partisan of "peaceful reconciliation", demanded that the Roumanians⁴⁷ enter into personal negotiations, but only one of the Wallachian emigrants, whom the Roumanian guerillas trusted, stayed for a longer period in the Hungarian camp as Dragoş' guide. The tension of the atmosphere was increased by the news which said that the Hungarian population of Abrudbánya, a small town occupied by the Roumanians, is in danger of death. Thus Dragoş was right in realizing that "*all depends on conceptions, mood and good luck*".⁴⁸

It was his extraordinary courage and determination that made him leave for Abrudbánya, on May 3, where the talks were to be held, before Kossuth's answer would have arrived. After his arrival he asked Hatvani in a letter not to try to march on Abrudbánya, because "even if you do not mind sacrificing my life"—the Hungarian troops can also be destroyed and there is no reason for intervention because the Hungarian population of Abrudbánya was not assaulted either.⁴⁹

At last, on 3 May, the actual talks could begin. On April 23, the only intention of Avram Iancu, the "King of the Mountains", the best known leader of the Roumanian resistance, was to gain extra-time when he got in touch with Dragoş. In the belief that considerably big Austrian forces are stationed in the neighbourhood, he asked for military aid on 24 April since he thought that the resistance could not last over two weeks.⁵⁰ When he was informed of the repeated defeat of the Austrians two days later as well as when he realized the neutrality of the Hungarian military leaders, he let it be known to the commander of the fort at Gyulafehérvár that "in the present hopeless situation we either resort to a final effort to resist or surrender as we have been called on to."⁵¹

The Roumanian leaders of the Transylvanian Ore-mountains could not come to a common stand. Some of them wanted peace, some of them were willing to fight to the very end even if they feared that their own people, exhausted in warring, might deliver them into the hands of the enemy, just like the leaders of the peasant-revolt in 1784.⁵² The most prominent Roumanian leaders considered their own struggle as a part of the European national struggles for liberty and therefore they put trust in the European public opinion. By then, however, they had to realize that, from an objective point of view, they had supported the counterrevolution, and the monarch had proved to be ungrateful and their ally was an "untrustworthy friend". Moreover, Ioan Buteanu, who was examining the European power relations perhaps the most carefully, went so far as to say that "the aim of the present Austrian policy" . . . "is to slaughter each other and, so weakened, we shall be exposed to our enemies' will".⁵³ And in the meantime the half-dozen emigrants of the suppressed revolution in Wallachia were also bent on persuading the Transylvanian Roumanian leaders to cooperate with the Hungarian government.⁵⁴ This cooperation demanded self-consistence. So as it was formulated by Avram Iancu in his letter to the commander of Gyulafehérvár: "Even if it comes to surrender, the Roumanians would remain watchful. It would not be either at the expense of theirs or that of the country because they are ready to die rather than break their oath on the Field of Liberty".⁵⁵ On May 15 in 1848 in the Field of Liberty in Balázsfalva the people were made to take an oath on their loyalty to the Austrian house, to the emperor and on the safeguard of the Roumanian nation's interests as well as on showing respect for "all the nations in Transylvania".⁵⁶ Now the question is, whether Kossuth's letter from April 26 and the Hungarian policy could be given an interpretation so that the past should not have to be totally denied. Our data give a positive answer.

In the report, dated from the end of 1849, which should have been compiled by Iancu, but which in fact was made by the open-minded Ioan Maioreşcu in close cooperation with Iancu on the ground of the "protagonists" data, Kossuth's letter was estimated positively. Since "in that letter Kossuth guaranteed for the Roumanians' equality before the law as well as the free use of their language not only in the church and schools but also in the communities, and he made it possible for them to

put forward their request in Roumanian to the government; he provided state support for the schools and other educational institutions, he promised church-autonomy and pay for the Roumanian as well as all the other religions' priests."⁵⁷ And they did not doubt the seriousness of the promise of amnesty for Roumanians. Of course, we must not forget that this report dates, as we have already mentioned, from the end of 1849. But some documents of the Roumanians' conditions for the negotiations of May 1849, which were compiled to be discussed in public have been preserved. They recognized the union of Transylvania with Hungary and added that they stick to being recognized as a fourth nation in Transylvania only in case the former system of the nations would be maintained there, and their demands concerning the use of language went beyond the frame drawn by Kossuth only in a few respects, namely, they demanded the use of the Roumanian language in the counties, but as we have seen, this question was left open by Kossuth as well.

It seems that in the given situation it was not the national problem but rather the general political orientation which made the opinions vary. The first item of the Roumanians' conditions stressed the loyalty towards the imperial house and the emperor who is referred to as Emperor Ferdinand, though, he was made to resign a year before.⁵⁸ The leaders of the Roumanian insurrection, however, had to continue to take into account the people's loyalty towards the emperor, which was so often emphasized. And since the maintenance of the resistance was basically dependent upon the mood of the people, public meetings were convened in and in the neighbourhood of Abrudbánya to see clearly, how Dragoş' arguments and promises were reacted to. There are some who claim that Dragoş actually failed just because of his critical remarks on the imperial house.⁵⁹ According to others some of the communities soon came to the decision of surrender as Dragoş promised not only food to the starving people but he also succeeded in dispelling some beliefs having extraordinarily mobilizing effects among people. According to the "authentic"⁶⁰ account of one of the eyewitnesses, who took part on the meeting at Topánfalva (Cîmpeni, Topesdorf) on the 5 of May, "the Roumanians had thought so until now that the Hungarians wanted to deprive them of the divine grace of liberty as well as their nationality, religion and language, but now, realizing just the opposite of all these, they are ready to shake hands with the Hungarians on condition that they will not send armed forces against the Roumanians, who, on the other hand, can send a delegation to the Hungarian government in order to pay homage and put forward their requests."⁶¹

Iancu, however, did not take sides. And we will probably never get to know what he would have decided. In the afternoon on May 6, the approach of the Hungarian troops put an end to the negotiations that had been going on for three days. It was all in vain that Dragoş and the Roumanian chief magistrate of Abrudbánya went before them, trying to prevent their marching into the town, saying that the peace was accomplished and the Roumanians were ready to lay down their arms. Hatvani could not be dissuaded. One would say he was influenced by a mysterious letter⁶²,

another would say the he and his troop were thrown into fever by the news about the ill-treatment of the Hungarian population of Abrudbánya and later he tried to justify himself by the same reasons.⁶³ Unfortunately, Hatvani's very report in which, for the first time, on 6 May, he presented "the reasons that made me come to the decision that I should attack Abrudbánya at any rate, before the end of Dragoş' negotiations" is missing.⁶⁴

The hasty, adventorous marching in spoiled everything. The negotiations continued for a while, though Iancu escaped and the lesser and greater atrocities became the inevitable consequences of the situation. In vain did Dragoş try to persuade Iancu to continue the negotiations, suggesting that he would not be able to resist Hatvani's forces.⁶⁵ The Roumanians of the Transylvanian Ore-mountains, realizing their numerical superiority, after a series of advance-guard actions, started an offensive on 9 May. After two days' fights, Hatvani, in lack of ammunition, was to make a headlong flight.⁶⁶ Until the outrageous revenge was not calmed down, only those Hungarian citizens could feel safe in town who were hidden by their daring Roumanian acquaintances. As for Dragoş, he was put to the sword by the soldiers of a confident of the Austrian military expert.⁶⁷ On the other hand, Hatvani ordered the execution of those Roumanian leaders — Petru Dobra and, a week later, Ioan Buteanu — who would have liked to go to Debrecen to continue the peace talks.

Parallel with the events in Abrudbánya, the atmosphere of distrust became more and more prevailing in Debrecen, too. A Roumanian letter, dated from the beginning of April and including a threat for the burning down of the Hungarian town Torda caused serious concern.⁶⁸

At the same time, the Transylvanian government commissioner Csányi sent back Kossuth's letter of 26 April, and warned Kossuth that the Roumanians had been informed of the delay of a possible Moldavian invasion by the Emperor and the Tzar but they were called upon to be on the alert in the future, too. Therefore, "the Roumanian leaders cannot be left here even if they are obedient. At least they should be transported to Hungary".⁶⁹ His reason for this suggestion was that, when in the autumn of 1848, some priests and minor officials were released after being arrested for taking part in lesser actions in the Transylvanian western mountains during the summer of 1848, they immediately joined in the preparations for the Roumanian uprising. In this atmosphere Kossuth's standpoint also turned more uncomplaining. He obviously looked upon the Roumanian attitude a policy of trying to gain time. Therefore, at the time when he could not yet be informed of the bloody events at Abrudbánya, on 10 May, he asked the Ministry of War to appoint somebody to the post of the chief commander in the western mountains and to continue the war, "because if the revolvers can install themselves in the forests before they have turned green, it will cause a lot of troubles to get rid of them".⁷⁰ And he let Dragoş know of this issue still on the same day, rejecting firmly the ceasefire and to go into details concerning his promise of the amnesty. And, after finding it credible what Hatvani wrote in his formerly mentioned, lost report, he also gave

Hatvani order, "to continue his work forcefully, paying no attention to any by-interest", but he also added that he would subordinate him and his irregular troops to the new professional commander, who is soon to be appointed by the Ministry of War.⁷¹ The reason why Kossuth's standpoint brought about especially harmful consequences was that Hatvani, being unable to form a realistic judgement on the situation and, in the possession of this order to continue the war, could feel entitled to try to put things right before giving up his post of commander-in-chief. In the belief that, if Dragoş had not dissuaded him from starting an immediate attack in the first days, he could have destroyed the Roumanian resistance, Hatvani, neglecting the fact that the Roumanians' numerical superiority had been multiplied, a week after the catastrophe, occupied Abrudbánya again and he was defeated still more ignominiously this time. Kossuth's order was also caught by the Roumanians, which was one more argument for them to justify the wait-and-see policy.

These issues, containing a lot more details still unknown to us, provided opportunity for Kossuth's attitude to be considered as a "double-game". Characteristically, the same historian who first used this phrase in his posthumous work published in the 1960s⁷², in 1947 relying on the same sources and data voiced the necessity of a "brotherly" solution of the Roumanian — Hungarian disagreements. In 1947 concluding from the fact that Kossuth did not promise a ceasefire, he emphasized Dragoş' responsibility and suggested that the final judgement in the question of responsibility could not be passed without knowing the content of Hatvani's lost report from the 6 May 1849.⁷³

The above-mentioned facts seem to make it clear enough that neither of the opposing sides can be made unambiguously responsible. It is the ambiguity of the whole situation rather than that of the individual attitudes that should be emphasized.

Characteristically, the same General György Klapka, who wanted to court-martial Hatvani in 1849,⁷⁴ when emphasizing the necessity of avoiding ambivalent situations, in his letter to Kossuth in 1862, recalled Hatvani's "treachery": "But for his activity, the Roumanians and Hungarians would have come to an agreement since long. But this bloody monument of a contemptible perfidy as a phantom has ever since been standing in between the two parties to set them apart."⁷⁵ And we might as well quote similar opinions from a number of Hungarian contemporaries, but we have to emphasize the fact that "phantoms" of this sort were brought to life not only by the feeling of pain caused by the sacrifice of human lives but they are also distorted expressions of real contradictions, which can also be made use of for manipulative purposes.

VI

Never did the "peaceful reconciliation" seem to be so near and at the same time so distant as it was in the May of 1849.

"It is my sad experience"—government commissioner Csány wrote — "that the peaceful reconciliation remains only a desired but unrealiz-

able hope of ours, thereby the rebels can be calmed down only by weapons and force."⁷⁶ In vain was the military expedition launched in the Transylvanian Ore-mountains a month later, conducted by an experienced soldier, Farkas Kemény this time, although without heavy losses, it also ended in a failure.

At the end of June, Iancu could well react to a Hungarian attempt at reconciliation by saying that, "in Transylvania and Hungary, in these brotherly countries, neither the Hungarians can ignore the Roumanians, nor the Roumanians the Hungarians when it comes to existence and future and weapons can never be judges between us."⁷⁷

The teaching of the issues at Abrudbánya suggested a warning and were also encouraging. Encouraging in the sense that there is a chance for hope in the reconciliation of the common problems and that there will always be people to run the risk of initiations. And warning in the sense that the rules of the game should be defined far more carefully. This is why Dragoş' lot did not frighten back those Roumanian representatives who started a mediatory action for peace. At the beginning of June, they proposed a similar but more carefully prepared action to the Hungarian government which, also under the influence of the Russian intervention, at that time set it as a definite aim to "reconcile" the armed Serbian and Roumanian resistance fighters.⁷⁸

It was not, however, mediation between the parties in opposition but negotiation and to define the conditions in a written agreement that proved to be the realistic way of solving these problems. As a result of the initiative activity and unyielding persistence of the leading figure of the Wallachian revolutionary emigration, Nicolae Bălcescu, around the middle of July, the Rumanian emigrants and the Hungarian government concluded an agreement, the "projet de pacification", which declared the principles of the relationship between the two nations in a mutually acceptable way, and what is more, according to this agreement Iancu was to take part in the common struggle as the head of a legion vowed loyalty to "Roumania and Hungary".⁷⁹ At the end of July Parliament passed a resolution regulating those rights of the use of mothertongue, which made "the free national evolvment" possible for the nationalities in Hungary.⁸⁰ First it was Bălcescu, then E. Murgu, who gave up his so far passive attitude, left for the Transylvanian western mountains in order to convince the leaders of the Roumanian insurrection of the necessity to hold together, by showing them the documents that promised of decisive significance. But there was no time left to realize this. The attempt at reconciliation still had become more than an exemplary trial to settle the question of nationalities. It was the result of these events that Iancu showed a benevolent neutrality instead of being revengeful, when the superior force of the reaction had consumed the energy of the Hungarian war of independence. Overmore, after the main body of the Hungarian army had surrendered to the troops of the Tzar, Iancu the "King of the Mountains" made a gesture by releasing a few hundred Hungarian captured soldiers, to the greatest annoyance of the Austrian military expert, while fights still went on to indicate the

continuation of the civil war.⁸¹ The victory of the Habsburg counterrevolution and the common oppression justified the efforts for a reconciliation, of which the mission of Dragoş, was a chapter, rich in illuminating details.

NOTES

- ¹ *I. Tóth, Z.*: Kossuth és a nemzetiségi kérdés 1849-ben (Kossuth and the nationality question in 1848–1849). In: Emlékkönyv Kossuth Lahos születésének 150. évfordulójára (Studies published in honour of Lajos Kossuth on the occasion of the anniversary of his birth). (Budapest, 1952), Vol. II. pp. 329–330.; *Idem* A nemzetiségi kérdés története Magyarországon 1848–1849-ben (The history of the nationality question in Hungary in 1848–1849). In: *Idem*, Magyarok és románok (Hungarians and Roumanians) (Budapest, 1966), pp. 241–242.; *Spira, Gy.* Polgári forradalom (1848–1849) (Bourgeois revolution) In: *Kovács, E.* (ed.), Magyarország története (History of Hungary). (Budapest, 1979), Vol. VII. 414–415.; recently: *Hanák, P.*: Abrudbánya, 1849 május (Abrudbánya, May 1849). Élet és Irodalom 1979, 12 May.; *Miskolczy, A.*: Ioan Dragoş küldetése (The mission of Ioan Dragoş), História, 1981, (in press).
- ² *Dragomir, S.*: Avram Iancu. (Bucureşti, 1968), p. 186.
- ³ For lack of adequate data we can give only some vague estimations. It is characteristic of the inexactness of the contemporary estimations that while many Roumanian contemporaries estimated the number of all the Roumanians at 8–9 million, according to the book of *Bogdan – Duică, G.*: Viaţa şi ideile lui Simion Bărnuţiu (The life and the ideas of Simion Bărnuţiu). (Bucureşti, 1924), p. 19, Miklós Wessclényi, a leader of the Hungarian national movement overestimated the number of all the Roumanians when he wrote about 7 million in the middle of the 1840s. According to the census of 1850, in Hungary 4,8 million declared themselves Hungarians. The 7/1863 issue of the Gazeta Transilvaniei however accepted the estimation of 7 million Hungarians. In 1880 in Hungary, only 6,4 million declared Hungarian as their mother tongue and 2,4 million Roumanian. In 1889, 4,46 million out of Roumania's 5,03 million inhabitants declared themselves Roumanians. See also, de *Martonne, E.*: La Roumanie. (Paris, 1900), p. 45.
- ⁴ *Berlász, E.*: Seigneur hongrois-paysan roumain en Transylvanie. Revue d'Histoire Comparée 1946. pp. 225–258.; *Makkai, L.*: Magyar–román közös múlt (Hungarian–Roumanian common past). (Budapest, 1948).
- ⁵ *I. Tóth, Z.*: Quelques problèmes de l'État Multinational dans la Hongrie d'avant 1848. Études des Délégués Hongrois au X^e International des Sciences Historiques. Rome 4–11 Septembre 1955. (Budapest, 1955), pp. 123–149.; *Arató, E.*: A nemzetiségi kérdés története Magyarországon (The history of the nationality problem in Hungary). (Budapest 1960), Vol. I. pp. 17–24.; *Idem*, Kelet-Európa története a 19. század első felében (The history of Eastern Europe in the first half of the 19th century). (Budapest, 1971), pp. 110–126.; *Niederhauser, E.*: A nemzeti megújulási mozgalmak Kelet-Európában (The national renaissance movements in Eastern Europe). (Budapest, 1977), pp. 33–61.
- ⁶ *I. Tóth, Z.*: Az erdélyi és magyarországi román nemzeti mozgalom, 1790–1848 (The Roumanian national movement in Transylvania and Hungary, 1790–1848). (Budapest, 1959), pp. 87–110.; *Arató, E.*: A nemzetiségi kérdés története Magyarországon. (The history of the nationality problem in Hungary). (Budapest, 1960), Vol. II. pp. 163–193.; *Prodan, D.*: Supplex Libellus Valachorum. (Bucureşti, 1967), pp. 415–442.; The interweaving of the peasant and national movements is illustrated among others by many Transylvanian movements in *Arató, E.*: Die Bauernbewegungen und der Nationalismus in Ungarn im Frühling und Sommer 1848. Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös nominatae, Sectio historica 1967, pp. 61–103.; 1970, pp. 45–86.
- ⁷ A precise classification of the different trends is given by *Dragomir, S.*: Studii şi documente privitoare la revoluţia Românilor din Transilvania în anii 1848–49. (Studies and documents concerning the revolution of the Roumanians in Transylvania). (Cluj), Vol. V.; The aspirations for unity are emphasized by *Bodea, C.*: Lupta românilor pentru unitatea naţională, 1834–1849 (The struggle for unity national of the Roumanians, 1834–1849). (Bucureşti, 1967).; On the different regions see *Cheresteşiu, V.*: A balázsfalvi nemzeti gyűlés, 1848 május 15–17 (The national meeting at Balázsfalva 15–17 May 1848).

- (Bukarest, 1967).; *Suciu, I. D.*: *Revoluția de la 1848-1849 în Banat* (The Revolution in the Banat 1848-1849). (București, 1968).; *Hitchins, K.*: *The Roumanian National Movement in Transylvania, 1780-1849.* (Cambridge, Mass. 1969).
- ⁸ *Boșdan-Duică, G.*: *Eftimie Murgu* (București, 1937), p. 138.; *Várady, G.*: *Máramaros-megye 1848-ban* (Máramaros County in 1848). *Hazánk* 1885, pp. 173-186.; A declaration of Roumanian noblemen from Máramaros was published in *Pesti Hírlap* no. 50, June 9, 1848.
- ⁹ *Papiu-Ilarianu, A.*: *Istoria Românilor din Dacia Superiore* (History of the Roumanians in Dacia Superior). (Vienna, 1852), Vol. II. p. CV. considers this opinion as a refusal of the 1790 Transylvanian Roumanian-national aspirations. Recently on the University Press in Buda see *Miskolczy, A.*: *Az Egyetemi Nyomda szerepe a román művelődésben* (The role of the University Press in the Roumanian cultural life), *Uj Aurora* No. 2, pp. 93-100.
- ¹⁰ *Em. Marica, G.* - *Hajós, I.* - *Mare, C.* - *Rusu, C.*: *Ideologia generației române de la 1848 din Transilvania* (Ideology of the Roumanian generation before 1848 in Transylvania). (București, 1968), p. 167. considers this view very characteristic of the age.
- ¹¹ *Papiu*: *Istoria* (see note 9.) Vol. II. p. CXVIII. The participants in the national movement called themselves nationalists.
- ¹² *Arató, E.*: *A nemzetiségi kérdés* (see note 5.) Vol. II. p. 193, 291.
- ¹³ *Csizmadia, A.*: *A magyar választási rendszer 1848-1849-ben.* (The Hungarian electoral system in 1848-1849) (Budapest, 1963), pp. 261-310.
- ¹⁴ *Dragomir*: *Studii și documente* (see note 7.) 327-389.; *I. Tóth, Z.*: *A magyar-román szövetség kérdése 1848-1849-ben* (The question of the Hungarian-Roumanian alliance). In: *Magyarok és románok* (see note 1.) pp. 195-244.
- ¹⁵ On the antecedents of the "confederational" ideas, see *Miskolczy, A.*: *A román nemzeti egység kérdése és az 1840-es havasalföldi forradalmi mozgalom* (The Roumanian national unity and the Wallachian revolutionary movement in 1840). *Századok* 1973, pp. 406-426.
- ¹⁶ *Sterca Șuluțiu, I.*: - *Ioan Dragoș*. *Transilvania* 1898, pp. 25-30.
- ¹⁷ *Közlöny* 1848, 28 August, No. 80.
- ¹⁸ *Deák, I.*: 1848. *A szabadságharc története levelekben, ahogyan a kortársak látták* (1848. The history of the struggle for liberty in letters as the contemporaries saw it). (Budapest), pp. 131-133.
- ¹⁹ *Közlöny* 1848, 2 August, No. 54.
- ²⁰ *Közlöny* 1848, 11 August, No. 63.
- ²¹ *Beér, J.* - *Csizmadia, A.*: *Az 1848/49. évi népképviselői országgyűlés* (The representative parliament in 1848-1849). (Budapest, 1954), pp. 862-863.
- ²² *Drăgoș, J.*: *A románok* (The Roumanians). *Kossuth Hírlapja* 1848, 17 September, No. 68.
- ²³ *Șuluțiu, Dragoș* (see note 16.) pp. 44-46.
- ²⁴ On the peculiarities of the Transylvanian development and their political effects, see *Trócsányi, Zs.*: *Az erdélyi parasztság története, 1790-1849* (The history of the peasantry in Transylvania, 1790-1849). (Budapest, 1956).; *Idem*, *Wesselényi Miklós*. (Budapest, 1965).; *Cheresteșiu*, *A* *balázsfalvi nemzeti gyűlés* (see note 7.); *Miskolczy, A.*: *Társadalmi és nemzeti kérdés az utolsó erdélyi rendi országgyűlésen* (Social and national problems at the last diet in Transylvania). *Századok* 1979, No. 5, pp. 851-853.; *Idem*, *Az erdélyi magyar liberális ellenzék társadalmi reformtörekvései* (Attempts at social reform of the Hungarian liberal opposition in Transylvania) *Jogtudományi Közlöny* 1980, No. 10, pp. 654-662.; *Idem*, *Népesség, társadalom és gazdaság Erdélyben a feudalizmus válságának idején* (Population, society and economy in Transylvania during the crisis of feudalism). *Történelmi Szemle* 1980, No. 3, pp. 509-529.
- ²⁵ Quotation from the memoirs of the Roumanian representative Constantin Papfalvi, see *I. Tóth, Z.*: *Kossuth, Dragoș és Papfalvi*. In: *Magyarok és románok* (see note 1.) p. 328.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.* 329.
- ²⁷ *Hitchins*, *op. cit.* (see note 7.) p. 269.
- ²⁸ *Barta, I.*: (ed.) *Kossuth Lajos 1848/49-ben* (Lajos Kossuth in 1848-49) *Kossuth Lajos összes munkái* (Collected works of Lajos Kossuth). Vol. XIV. p. 889. Hereafter cited as *KLÖM*
- ²⁹ *Ibid.* p. 890.
- ³⁰ Quoted by *I. Tóth, Z.*: *A Szemere kormány nemzetiségi politikája* (The nationality policy of the Szemere government). In: *Idem*, *Magyarok és románok* (see note 7.) pp. 352-353.
- ³¹ *Dragomir*, *Studii* (see note 7.) (Sibiu, 1944), Vol. II. p. 105.

- ³² Dragoş to the government commissioner of Zaránd County, 25 April, 1849, see *Hegyesi, M.*: Biharvármegye 1848–49-ben (Bihar County in 1848–1849), Nagyvárad, 1885, p. 333.
- ³³ *KLŐM*, Vol. XV, p. 134.
- ³⁴ *KLŐM*, Vol. XIV, p. 890.
- ³⁵ *KLŐM*, Vol. XV, pp. 136–139.
- ³⁶ OL (Hungarian National Archives), Országos Honvédelmi Bizottmány (National Defense Committee), hereafter cited as *OHB*, 1849: 6360.
- ³⁷ Parts of this letter were first quoted in *Dragomir, S.*: Tratatívele române-maghiare din vara anului 1849 (Roumanian–Hungarian negotiations in the Summer of 1849). (Cluj–Kolozsvár, 1947), p. 12.
- ³⁸ *Esti Lapok* 1849, 30 April, No. 57.
- ³⁹ OL, Hadügyminisztérium (Ministry of War), hereafter cited as *Hm.* 1849: 9864.
- ⁴⁰ *Esti Lapok* 1849, 23 April, No. 51.
- ⁴¹ The Ministry of War handed the plan over to the National Defence Committee at the end of March (*OHB*, 1849: 3891) and though it was returned, it has not yet been found. The newspaper *Esti Lapok* 1849, 23 April, No. 51, published a war bulletin referring to a concentrated attack, dated from 10 April, by Vasvári. On the humanitarian attitude of Vasvári during the operations, see the notes of István Popovics from the end of the century. *Hadtörténeti Levéltár* (Military Archives), hereafter cited as *HL*, 1848–49. évi iratok (Documents of 1848–1849)
- ⁴² OL, *Hm.* (see note 39.). 1849: 5094.
- ⁴³ OL, *Hm.*, 1849: 13379.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid*
- ⁴⁵ *Közlöny* 1849, 27 April, No. 90.
- ⁴⁶ *Czutat, K.*: Aradi fogságom alatt írt adatok az 1848/9 éviszabadságharc különösen az Erdély havasai ellen vezetett hadjáratról (Notes from the prison of Arad on the struggle for liberty mainly on the war against the Transylvanian Mountains in 1848–1849). (Pest, 1868), pp. 75–76, is a source of apologetical character.
- ⁴⁷ *Dragomir, Studii* (see notes 7. and 31.) Vol. II, pp. 106–107.
- ⁴⁸ See note 37.
- ⁴⁹ OL, *Hm.* (see note 39.) 1849: 13379
- ⁵⁰ *Dragomir, Studii* (see notes 7. and 31.) Vol. II, p. 254.
- ⁵¹ *Deák*, 1848 (see note 18.) p. 362.
- ⁵² Simion Balint, a Roumanian leader according to one of his letters was afraid of extradition however wanted to continue the armed struggle to the end (*Biblioteca Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, Bucureşti*, Ms. 1061, p. 48). Ioan Buteanu, though he was also afraid of extradition stood up for the peaceful reconciliation with Hungarian Government. *Dragomir* (see notes 7. and 31.) Vol. II, pp. 71–74.
- ⁵³ *Op. cit.* p. 63.
- ⁵⁴ *Op. cit.* Vol. I, p. 177.
- ⁵⁵ *Deák*, 1848 (see note 18.) p. 362.
- ⁵⁶ *Cheresteşiu*, A balázsfalvi nemzeti gyűlés (see note 7.) p. 469.
- ⁵⁷ *Ranca, I. – Nişu, V.*: Avram Iancu, documente si bibliografie (Documents and bibliography). (Bucureşti, 1974), p. 181.
- ⁵⁸ *Dragomir, Studii* (see notes 7. and 31.) Vol. II, p. 109.
- ⁵⁹ *Ranca – Nişu*, Avram Iancu (see note 57.) p. 168.
- ⁶⁰ *Dragomir*, Avram Iancu (see note 2.) p. 168.
- ⁶¹ *Şterca – Şuluşiu*, Dragoş (see note 16.) pp. 30–31.
- ⁶² Without giving the source, see Jenő Gyalokay, Az erdélyi hadjárat 1849 nyarán (Transylvanian War in the Spring 1849), (Budapest), p. 20.
- ⁶³ *Szilágyi, E.*: Alsófehér vármegye 1848–49-ben (Alsófehér County in 1848–49), (Nagyenyed, 1896); *Şterca – Şuluşiu, I.*: Din istoria munţilor apuseni (From the history of the Western Mountains). *Gazeta Transilvaniei* 1892, No. 97. Hatvani's quoted report was also published in the contemporary press (*Közlöny* 1849, 18 May, No. 108). Nothing was published, however, about the reasons for Hatvani's marching-in, in the notes of Simon Csorba, a citizen of Abrudbánya, put down soon after the tragic events, see Országos Széchényi Könyvtár Kézirattára, (National Széchényi Library, Manuscript Collection), Quart. Hung. 2585. According to the notes of an unknown conservative-minded man

- Iancu would have promised the bloody revenge in the case of Hatvani's marching in, see OL, Dessewffy Emil iratai (Papers of Emil Dessewffy), Fasc. 2. 5. b.
- ⁶⁴ *Dragomir*, Tratatavele (see note 37) p. 12. Cf. *Czetz, J.*: Bem's Feldzug in Siebenbürgen in den Jahren 1848 und 1849. (Hamburg, 1850), pp. 305-306.
- ⁶⁵ *Șterca-Șuluțiu*, Dragoș, (see note 16), p. 51.
- ⁶⁶ The reports of Viktor *Klein*, chief-lieutenant in the 3. compagnie of the German Legion, (see note 41), 1848-1849: 27/251, 27/271, 27/272, 27/452.
- ⁶⁷ *Dragomir*, Studii, (see notes 7. and 31) Vol. I. 178.; Idem, Avram Iancu, (see note 2.) p. 185.
- ⁶⁸ Esti Lapok 1849, 5 May, No. 62.; Márczius Tizenötödike 1849, 12 May, No. 20.
- ⁶⁹ OL, *OHB*, 1849: 6576, first quoted by *Dragomir*, Iancu (see note 2.) p. 195.
- ⁷⁰ *KLÖM*, Vol. XV. p. 262.
- ⁷¹ *Ibid.* pp. 273-274.
- ⁷² *Dragomir*, Avram Iancu (see note 2.) p. 186.
- ⁷³ *Dragomir*, Tratatavele (see note 37.) pp. 12-13.
- ⁷⁴ General György Klapka demanded the investigation of the Army Court in the affair Hatvani on 24 May (*OHB*, 1849: 7389), on 2 June Károly Szentiványi, the successor of Csányi, too (*OHB*, 1849: 7873). The investigations were urged by Kossuth himself, see *KLÖM*, Vol. XV. p.610.
- ⁷⁵ OL, *György Klapka* iratai (The papers of György Klapka) Fasc. 11. I have to thank Mr. Béla Kálmán for this information. A typical contemporary manifestation can be found in a letter to Kossuth by a lieutenant of Hatvani's guerilla troop: "bad luck devastated to such a great extent perhaps in order to punish us by the revengeful God for the sins of the Commander". See OL, Hm (see note 39) 1849: 18875.
- ⁷⁶ *Csányi's* letter to colonel Farkas Kemény, see Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Könyvtárának Kézirattára (Manuscript Collection of the Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Csányi László levéltára, másolatok, (Papers of László Csányi, Duplicates), XXXI. 23.
- ⁷⁷ Transilvania 1877, pp. 54-56.; Ion *Lupaș*, Avram Iancu. Anuarul institutului de istori 1924-1925. Cluj, Vol. III. pp. 53-54.
- ⁷⁸ *Deák*, 1848 (see note 18.) pp. 373-374.
- ⁷⁹ *KLÖM*, Vol. XV. p. 436.
- ⁸⁰ *Beér-Csizmadia*, 1848/49 (see note 21.) p. 868.
- ⁸¹ Kriegsarchiv, Wien, Kriegsministerium, Präsidialakten (CK) 1849: 9825.