BEHIND THE PICTURES

UNDERSTANDING PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES

SARA KINSBERGEN

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PROEFSCHRIFT

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The hand of compassion was faster than the calculus of reason

Otto Springer (in Monroe, 2006)

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Behind this thesis

As with any thesis, there is a story behind this one, a story that started with a fascination for all those thousands of 'ordinary' individuals who are committed, with unbridled passion and energy, to contributing to improved living conditions for people around the world. Fascination alone, however, would not have led to this result. Without the inspiration, support, confidence, advice, knowledge, information and stories of many, and the financial support of some, I would not have been able to bring this great challenge to a successful ending.

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Sara Kinsbergen
Zutphen, December 2013

Chapter 01

1. Introduction

'So we went on a wonderful safari. […] And there [when visiting an orphanage] we were really shocked; the showers were so dirty. Yeah, that really impressed us. And then we went on to the coast and at a certain moment we said to each other "We should do something about this". Back in the Netherlands, we looked at the pictures again and thought, "Can't we collect some money, so they can renovate those showers?"' […].[1]

[Male, 35-45; supermarket manager]
[Official registration foundation 2009; opening boys department 2008; budget: 20,000 euro]

'We always had it in mind to do something in a developing country. And when we went to the notary to register our company, we said to each other, "Actually, this is the moment we've been talking about it for years, now we are going to do it". So that is when we really started. We already had contact with a hospital in […]. When we were talking with the doctor he said, "I have big plans for this hospital. I want to extend it. And therefore I need many things. And one of the first things I want is a kitchen for the patients". So that was actually our first project.'

[Female, 45-55; journalist]
[Official registration foundation 2007; opening of a kitchen 2009; budget: 40,000 euro]

'The death of my daughter was the reason we started our foundation. She became ill; we went to the hospital where she was taken care of by Professor […]. He told me about the situation regarding child cancer in […]. He told me that he met a boy with leukaemia, whose parents had no money to pay for the treatment. I said to him, "Why didn't you tell me this before, then I would have arranged something so the treatment can be continued". […] Then, as a family, we started a foundation.'

[Male, 65-70; pensioner]
[Official registration foundation 2001; improving children's cancer department 1991; budget: 6,000 euro]

[1] The quotes are derived from interviews with founders/members of private development initiatives (see Chapter 5). The data are available on request.

1.1 Motivation and research question

The two decades since the mid-1990s have marked a worldwide trend of alternative players joining the traditional actors in the field of international development cooperation. Apart from well-known multilateral and civilateral agencies such as the United Nations and Oxfam International and, at the bilateral level, national governments, a wide variety of individuals and organisations have started to look for opportunities to join the struggle against worldwide poverty and inequality. For different reasons, celebrities, private foundations, companies and ordinary citizens have increasingly become active players in the field of international aid (Bishop & Green, 2008; Cameron & Haanstra, 2008; Develtere & De Bruyn, 2009; Samman et al., 2009; Yrjölä, 2009). Madonna is building schools in Malawi, Bono is addressing members of the G8 and G20, Nestlé helps farmers to grow coffee in China and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation spends around 800 million US dollars annually on global health. This present study focuses on the 'next-door Madonnas and Bonos' of today. These are the thousands of ordinary individuals that actively engage in the fight against poverty by starting their own small-scale, voluntary development organisation independent of direct government support. From here on we refer to them as private development initiatives (PDIs).

Our site of study is the Netherlands, one of the forerunners in the field of international development cooperation. Although PDIs are not unique to the Netherlands, as far as we are concerned, apart from a number of studies in Belgium, the Netherlands is one of the few countries where PDIs have been studied for several years (see Develtere & Stessens, 2006; Develtere & De Bruyn, 2009; De Bruyn, 2013; Godin, 2013 for studies on PDIs in Belgium). Apart from the fact that it is valuable per se to build on the results of these earlier studies, the Netherlands is an interesting site of study because it is known for its generous (private and government) donations to charitable causes in general and to international development cooperation in particular (Micklewright & Wright, 2004; OECD, 2012; Schuyt et al., 2013; WRR, 2010). International development organisations received 281 million euro from Dutch households in 2011, making international development cooperation – next to faith-based organisations and health care – the third largest charitable cause in the Netherlands (Bekkers & de Wit, 2013). To date, the Netherlands is one of the few countries to honour the agreement to contribute 0.7 per cent of its Gross National Product to official development aid (OECD, 2012).[2] The diversification of actors within the field of international development cooperation has been very pronounced in the Netherlands. There is a growing number and diversity of actors in the Dutch field of international development cooperation (IS Academie NGO Database), a third reason why the Netherlands is an interesting case study. In the 1990s, there were just over 100 Dutch non-governmental development organisations (NGOs), one of the important development actors in the Netherlands. Within ten years this number has almost doubled (IS Academie NGO database; Schulpen et al., 2011). Similarly, there is a large number of PDIs in the Netherlands (Brok & Bouzoubaa, 2005; van Voorst, 2005).

A final reason why we choose the Netherlands as our site of study is that political and public debate on international development cooperation and development organisations has been manifest for many years (Beerends, 2013; Ruyter, 2011; WRR, 2010). Political parties debate on a regular basis whether or not the Netherlands should continue to commit to the agreement to spend 0.7 per cent of its GDP on development cooperation and the appropriate actors to spend this budget on [see Parliamentary questions and answers: Minbuza, June 14, 2013; Minbuza, June 24, 2013, Minbuza, October 29, 2013 for examples]. Public debate continues on the efficiency and effectiveness of development organisations in general and PDIs in particular (see Bodelier & Vossen, 2007; Coumans et al., 2013; Halsema, 2013; Koch, 2007; Weisglas, 2012).

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[2] In the most recent coalition agreement the Dutch government announced a reduction in the contribution to international development cooperation to approximately 0.5 per cent of the GNP (Regeerakkoord, 2012).

In the Netherlands, the estimated number of PDIs varies from 6.400 to 15.000 (Brok & Bouzoubaa, 2005; van Voorst, 2005).[3] Development cooperation is not something exclusively done by the government, established development organisations or multilateral organisations, being decided upon only by professionals (i.e. trained paid staff) working in buildings or offices of established organisations. Development projects and fundraising plans are designed in living rooms, churches or schools and executed on a voluntary basis by 'ordinary citizens'. Development cooperation is becoming more and more the task 'of all of us', taking place in everyday life (Develtere, 2012). Stakeholders of PDIs, their private and institutional back-donors and the government have high expectations regarding the potential contributions that PDIs can offer in terms of local poverty reduction (in the South) and/or the strengthening of the domestic public support base for development cooperation (in the North) (Grotenhuis, 2012; Hivos, 2009; Man & van Hemert, 2006).[4] PDIs are welcomed as an attractive alternative or as a complement to traditional development actors. This holds true not only for private donors; the Dutch government and established development organisations also see value in (supporting) PDIs. In 2011, Dutch households donated approximately 34 million euro to PDIs (Bekkers & de Wit, 2013).[5] In the same year, the four largest development organisations that co-finance PDI development interventions (Oxfam Novib, Cordaid, Impulsis and Wilde Ganzen), provided nearly 10 million euro (CIDIN, NCDO & PI Wijzer, 2013).

PDIs are founded for different motives, as illustrated in the examples with which we started this chapter. They are organised in multiple ways and support a diverse range of activities in developing countries. We can see the results of their efforts in the pictures shown on their websites, in their leaflets and in other communications. Schools and orphanages have been built or renovated, micro-credit programmes launched and after-school programmes initiated. The accomplished results shown on the many pictures are appealing to (potential) donors: the results are visible (e.g. a school has been built) and the effects are clear (e.g. children can finish primary school). But what are the stories behind all these pictures? In this study we aim to provide a more detailed insight into the characteristics of PDIs, the driving forces and the individual motives for citizen engagement in PDIs and how the development interventions that PDIs undertake can be characterised and valued with respect to their potential sustainability. Each of the next four chapters presents a story *behind the pictures*; stories regarding the organisations (their foundation and structure), their members (their characteristics and motivations), their donors (their preferences and giving behaviour) and their interventions (type, sustainability). Studying PDIs from different perspectives and with different research methods results in a broad and in-depth insight into PDIs as alternative development actors. The central research question is:

> *Which factors shape the nature of private development initiatives and influence the sustainability of their development interventions?*

The emergence of alternative actors in the field of international development cooperation is not an isolated development (see Section 1.2). Different (public) sectors are faced with similar trends resulting in a debate at the macro level (society) on the significance of these agents. There is a broad range of studies available on the (rise of) informal citizen initiatives (Hurenkamp et al., 2006; van den Berg et al., 2011; van den Berg & de Goede, 2012; van den Brink, 2012). Generally, these studies take a rather broad sociological perspective, addressing questions related to the meaning and value of such initiatives for societies as a whole and their meaning for individual participants. An important issue relates to the question whether participation in informal groups is at the

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3 Caution is required when using these numbers, since not only is the margin between these estimates considerable but it is also unclear which definition of PDIs was used.

4 This thesis will not explicitly discuss the role of PDIs regarding the strengthening or enlarging of public support for development cooperation.

5 In 2011 there were in total 7,443,801 households in the Netherlands, each donating on average 57 euro (7,443,801* 8%) * 57 euro = 33,943,732.56 euro (www.statline.cbs.nl).

expense of participation in formal, institutionalised groups, and how these informal groups relate to the established order such as the government and (professionals of) official institutions. These studies are hence mainly concerned with analysing the phenomenon in order to interpret actual societal developments and to understand their meaning for societal change. They do not, or only to a limited extent, discuss the actual contributions offered by these private initiatives to the wider public interest.

At the meso level (i.e. the sector of international development cooperation) PDIs are part of the debate on the structure of the aid industry. PDIs emerge as alternative agents in the field of international development cooperation and sometimes challenge other, more traditional, aid organisations. The question arises as to what we might expect of these 'unusual suspects'. Should traditional development agents, such as governments, NGOs and multilateral organisations embrace PDIs that enter the development arena for their practical approach, is it proper to have high expectations of private foundations because of the resources they have at their disposal and their alleged independence and (why) should governments financially support, for example, PDIs? Without ignoring the debate at the macro and meso level, this thesis specifically adopts a micro perspective and studies in the first place the actor itself and its role as a development actor.

1.2 The rise of private development initiatives

Before we start with the empirical chapters, as an introduction to the more detailed micro-level study, we will shed light on the macro context in which PDIs emerge. The process of socialisation of development cooperation and the rise of PDIs are not isolated developments. Similar developments can be observed in different (public) sectors. In 2008, 3.5 million people in the Netherlands spent part of their time taking care of a family member, relative or neighbour; an increasing number of parents is organising their own daycare centre and currently around 154 local voluntary initiatives are providing transport for vulnerable groups (KpVV, 2013; Oudijk et al., 2010). Little by little, the social welfare state, where the government takes care of its citizens from 'cradle to grave', is transformed into a 'do-democracy' (WRR, 2006; WRR, 2012). Ordinary citizens are increasingly taking an active role in areas previously taken care of by the government (Hurenkamp et al., 2006; Veldheer et al., 2012). This development is referred to as 'socialisation' or 'mainstreaming' (Develtere, 2009; Develtere, 2012).

Socialisation is the result of both push and pull factors (Veldheer et al., 2012). On the one hand, the government makes an increasing appeal to its citizens to assume responsibility for areas formerly taken care of by the state, such as health care (push factor). This can be motivated either by economic drivers in times of economic recession or from a more ideological perspective. On the other hand, in this do-democracy citizens, for different reasons, clamour for more 'room to manoeuvre', starting for example a daycare centre with a group of like-minded parents (pull factor). In general, this 'do-it-yourself' attitude is transforming the way in which society is organised and the relationship between the government, the market and citizens. In particular, it influences the organisation of the provision of certain services. In this section we discuss the – sometimes – interrelated driving forces that underlie the process of socialisation in general and the socialisation of international development cooperation specifically. The reform of the social welfare state is discussed as an important push factor, followed by individualisation that is considered as an influential pull factor.

1.2.1 From social welfare state to 'do-democracy'

Whereas in the nineteenth century governments were mainly concerned with regulating 'law and order', in the twentieth century, they shifted their attention to creating welfare and providing basic care for their citizens (Arts, 2004). These provisions were previously non-existent or made within the family context, by religious charity institutions or by the market. It was the process of modernisation that increased governments' concern with the efficiency, effectiveness, calculability and structured planning of society. This made the organisation of social welfare thus far, in mainly local, informal settings, no longer appropriate (Arts, 2004). Governments thus started organising and institutionalising a broad package of social security measures to protect the public against social and economic deprivation from 'cradle to grave'. This marked the transformation of most Western societies to social welfare states.

Because of the increasing financial and administrative pressure which the welfare state exerts on government expenditure and the capacity of implementing organisations, from the early 1970s onwards the notion grew that governments rather than creating prosperous and careful societies can no more than stimulate and steer these types of societies. The role of government started to change from that of a 'parent protecting its children' into a 'guarantee state providing a shield for the weaker in the society' (Arts, 2004: 1). As a consequence, governments started to withdraw from welfare tasks and more than ever before citizens had to assume responsibility for preventing or curing social or economic deprivation. Giddens (1994, 1998) refers to this process as the transformation of the welfare state into the 'welfare-society'. In this society, citizens are no longer exclusively dependent on (semi)governmental institutions for their (social) well-being but rely on their own efforts or the activities of the private, civically organised sector. Governments increasingly see a role for the market and for civil society actors as key providers of (social and communal) services.

1.2.2 Individualisation

The transformation of the provision of social services is not only instigated by a changed approach by governments. The reform of the welfare state is accompanied by processes of individualisation characterising many Western societies today (Schnabel, 2004; van Praag & Uitterhoeve, 1998). Individualisation is considered as the process of a growing autonomy of the individual in relation to its direct environment (Veldheer & Bijl, 2011: 29). Also, in the Netherlands, increasingly citizens see themselves as designers and executers of their own life, making choices themselves (van der Velden, 2007: 6; Schnabel, 2004: 53). Until the 1960s, associational life in the Netherlands was organised around a strongly pillarised civil society. With the de-pillarisation of Dutch society in the 1960s, a breakdown of traditional associational life became manifest (Dekker & Ester, 1996; WRR, 2006). Individual people wanted to decide independently with whom and how they preferred to connect. A rising level of education enabled them to adopt a more critical attitude towards government services and made them capable of individual action (Veldheer & Bijl, 2011).

There are different views regarding the effect this process of individualisation has on the welfare state (van den Berg et al., 2011). One group of scholars considers the process of individualisation as a threat to further development of the welfare state. They fear that individualisation will break down the principle of solidarity, which is considered to be a crucial precondition for the persistence of the welfare state and they wonder whether citizens today should be seen as 'joiners' (members of civil society organisations) or 'loners' (individualists) (Putnam, 2000). Others see positive influences stemming from increasing individualisation (van Oorschot & Komter, 1998; WRR, 2006; Wuthnow, 2002). Van Oorschot and Komter (1998) conclude that with the diminishing influence of traditional ties (e.g. church, family) the process of individualisation offers opportunities for the establishment of new, more informal, networks of solidarity. According to these authors, individualisation should not be considered as 'a threat to solidarity but as an opportunity for it and even as a prerequisite for the functioning and viability of complex modern societies' (van Oorschot

& Komter, 1998: 5). In line with this reasoning, it is the process of individualisation that enables citizen initiatives to be established.

In summary, it can be concluded that although on the one hand government no longer solely wants to take full care of the well-being of its citizens (reform of the welfare state), on the other hand the citizens no longer want to be taken care of by the government (individualisation). The combination of these developments triggers the overall process of 'socialisation', resulting in a large number of citizen initiatives in a broad range of public fields such as education, health care, elderly care and, the focus of this thesis, international development cooperation.

1.2.3 Socialisation of international development cooperation

How do these broad societal tendencies rearrange the field of international development cooperation? And what sector-specific drivers are bringing about a changed playing field in international development cooperation? Van der Velden (2007: 5) defines the socialisation of this domain as the process of 'broadening and deepening of active involvement of people and groups in development cooperation'. In this socialisation process, two distinct phases can be distinguished: (1) the establishment of non-governmental development organisations (NGOs) and (2) the emergence of private development initiatives (PDIs).

First wave of socialisation: the rise of 'the big boys' of today

Until the mid-1960s the multilateral aid channel was predominant in the Dutch aid system. Most Dutch governmental development aid was transferred through multilateral organisations such as the United Nations and the World Bank. This changed when the Dutch government started to channel aid budgets directly to governments and development organisations in developing countries. The bilateral aid channel gained in importance (Hoebink, 2010). At that time, there was also a first upsurge of non-governmental development organisations (Beerends & Broere, 2004; Bieckmans & Muskens, 2012; WRR, 2010). Ordinary citizens felt themselves called to take action against the political, social or economic deprivation of people in developing countries and started to organise themselves (pull factor). It was at this time that the large-scale development organisations of today, such as Oxfam Novib, Hivos and ICCO, were established. This resulted in a growing third aid channel, the civilateral channel, through which financial support was transferred from the Dutch development organisations to local development organisations in developing countries. In 1964 for the first time the Dutch government started to financially support some of these civil society organisations (push factor). It did so in response to a growing call for financial support by these development organisations. There was also growing willingness to support these organisations since high expectations were held of these civil society organisations because of their presumed competitive advantage compared with multilateral or bilateral development aid actors (Banks & Hulme, 2012; Bebbington et al., 2007; Brodhead, 1987; Drabek, 1987; Dichter, 1999). In subsequent years the available budget for this civilateral aid channel increased from 5 million Guilders (6 per cent of Dutch Official Development Aid (ODA)) in 1965 to around 1 billion euro (23 per cent of Dutch ODA) in 2010.[6] The receiving organisations at the same time transformed themselves from small-scale voluntary support groups to large-scale, professional development organisations (Hoebink, 2010).

[6] Today, 5 million Guilders would be worth 2,268,901.08 euro.

Second wave of socialisation: 'your next-door Madonnas and Bonos'

Starting from the 1990s two interlinked sector-specific developments fostered a second wave of socialisation in development cooperation that still continues today. In it, the general process of globalisation functions as a major push factor. The 'shrinking of the world' thanks to mass media, the Internet and more accessible travel opportunities has made a rapidly growing number of people aware of the poor living conditions of fellow world citizens (Bauman, 1998; Held, 2000). This process is accelerated through the development and accessibility of new information and communication technologies (Veldheer & Bijl, 2011). More people go on long-distance holidays or work temporarily in a foreign branch of their company (NBTC-NIPO, 2008; PwC, 2010). These journeys form an important source of direct encounters between people living in (often) very different circumstances, encounters that turn out to be of great influence on the decision to offer an active contribution to the improvement of living conditions of people in developing countries by starting one's own development organisation (see the examples above). The process of globalisation in a strongly individualised society triggers citizen initiatives in the field of international development cooperation and can hence be seen as an important push factor for the socialisation of this field.

At the same time, traditional established development organisations (NGOs) originating from the first socialisation wave offer few opportunities to those individuals who feel urged to actively contribute to the fight against inequality, poverty and exclusion. The principles of new public management (NPM) have penetrated many organisations of the public sector since the 1980s. The premise of NPM is that 'more market orientation in the public sector through the adoption of managerialist ideas and practices will lead to better performance' (Elbers, 2011: 122). The co-financing system through which the Dutch government co-finances part of the established development organisations offers possibilities to impose principles of the NPM on civic development organisations as well, resulting in the profound formalisation and bureaucratisation of these organisations (Elbers, 2011). This transformed them from classic 'secondary' organisations, characterised by a democratic structure and a membership base, into more centralised 'tertiary' organisations (Dekker et al., 2004; Hustinx et al., 2013; Putnam, 1995 & 2000; Wuthnow, 1998). Many development NGOs turned into mailing-list organisations with often no more than a role as cheque-book activists (donors) reserved for their supporters (Putnam, 2000; Hustinx et al., 2013; van den Berg & de Goede, 2012). This type of organisation offers little room for citizens who are motivated to make a more extensive, active contribution to development cooperation. Established development organisations have outgrown their position as grassroots organisations 'by the people' (here), 'for the people' (there). It is therefore no matter of course that those people who today want to become actively engaged in the field of international development cooperation automatically approach and/or link up with those (organisations) that are already active players in the field. Some of these individuals start their own, small-scale, voluntary development organisation, commonly referred to as private development initiatives (PDI).

From the late 1990s onwards, the Dutch government has been supporting and facilitating the process of (second wave) socialisation in the field of international development cooperation (= push factor). In 1991, the Minister for Development Cooperation, Jan Pronk, started to facilitate small-scale development initiatives by introducing the 'Kleinschalige Plaatselijke Activiteit' (Small-scale Local Activity) programme. From the very start, the approach of the government has, however, been rather instrumental. Although the contribution to poverty reduction by citizen initiatives is not ignored, the main concern of the government is to increase the public support base for development cooperation through co-funding of these initiatives (Beerends & Broere, 2004). Since the beginning of 2000 the financing opportunities have substantially increased. At the request of Minister Eveline Herfkens (1998-2002) the established development organisations that received financial support from the ministry through the so-called *Medefinancieringsstelsel* (co-financing system) established a 'finance desk' where small-scale development initiatives of Dutch citizens could receive advice and financial support. Her successor, Agnes van Ardenne (2003-07) stated that individuals should take up more responsibilities in the field of international development cooperation (van der Velden,

2007). The policy framework of the next minister, Bert Koenders (2007-10), explicitly referred to socialisation as a goal of its co-financing programme for 2007 to 2010 (Minbuza, 2005). Even though in recent years the possibilities of established development organisations supporting PDIs with government money have been strongly restricted, State Secretary Ben Knapen (2010-12) and Minister Lilianne Ploumen (2012 onwards) continued to express their support for the work of PDIs (Knapen, 2012; Minbuza, 2013).

The reform of the welfare state combined with processes of individualisation and globalisation triggered the second wave of socialisation in the field of international development cooperation. The process resulted in a growing number of 'unusual suspects' active in the field of international development cooperation (Beerends & Broere, 2004; van der Velden, 2007). This thesis focuses on PDIs as a product of this second socialisation wave, and tries to understand more specifically the rationale, role and potential of these small-scale voluntary citizen initiatives as players in the field of international development cooperation.

1.3 Analytical approach and sub-questions

Since 2005, PDIs have been at the centre of the Dutch debate on alternative development actors. Supporters believe in their efficient and effective contribution to poverty reduction, in their potential to enlarge the public support for development cooperation and in their ability to restore the 'human face' of international development cooperation (Develtere & De Bruyn, 2009; Grotenhuis, 2012; Hart & van der Velden, 2010; Hivos, 2009; Schuil, 2010). Critics on the other hand sometimes doubt PDIs' professionalism and expect them to step into the same pitfalls as the established development actors did (van Genugten, 2013; Koch, 2007). Studies contributing to this debate have mainly studied PDIs from a micro or actor perspective: the organisations and their members are central to the analysis.[7] Within this micro perspective, three questions have been dominant in the field:

What are PDIs?	*Identifying distinguishing features of PDIs (Brok & Bouzoubaa, 2005; Develtere & Stessens, 2006);*
What do PDIs do?	*Typifying the activities that PDIs initiate and/or support in the Netherlands and/or developing countries (Schulpen, 2007);*
How do PDIs do it?	*Evaluating the activities initiated and/or supported by PDIs in the Netherlands or in developing countries (Chelladurai, 2006; De Bruyn, 2011, Schulpen, 2007; van der Velden, 2011).*

By posing these questions, earlier studies provided interesting first insights into, among other things, the organisational characteristics of PDIs and some valuable lessons have been learned regarding their contribution to the process of development (see Chelladurai, 2006; De Bruyn, 2011; Kinsbergen, 2007; Kamara & Bakhuisen, 2008; Schulpen, 2007; van den Berg & de Goede, 2012; van der Velden, 2011). Studies remained mainly in the explorative, descriptive sphere, however, and mostly addressed specific aspects of PDI organisation or performance. As a consequence, the insights gained so far have not been fully exploited for a more comprehensive understanding of PDIs as alternative development actor since the answers to these different questions have not – or only to a very limited extent – been related to each another. For example,

7 The term 'members' refers to those individuals who on a regular basis, either voluntary or paid, are actively involved in PDIs.

studies on the characteristics of PDIs demonstrate that the majority of PDIs are run only by volunteers or that they have relatively small annual budgets. The question remains: what does this mean for the functioning of the organisation and for the interventions it supports in developing countries? In addition, studies have presented a rather uniform picture of PDIs, paying little attention to the diversity that can be found within the group. This limits our understanding of PDIs as development agents, since empirical data show that – whereas PDIs have some basic features in common – they vary widely regarding their organisational structure, their intervention types and their intervention manners. All this results in a one-dimensional, uniform understanding of PDIs.

This study distinguishes itself from earlier PDI studies because of the selected analytical approach. This approach is based on two key principles: (1) integrated analysis and (2) contextualised analysis. The first premise implies that in order to analyse PDIs comprehensively, it is not sufficient to study different aspects of PDIs separately as we need to understand the linkages between 'what they are', 'what they do' and 'how they do it'. Understanding this link is fundamental to our understanding of PDIs in general and as alternative development actor in particular, as can be illustrated by the case of established development organisations of today, such as Oxfam or Save the Children. For a long time, expectations of these organisations were high because of their different nature. For example, their smaller operational scale and their (financial) independence from governments made them more flexible, and this was expected to favour their engagement with grassroots target groups, i.e. provision of bottom-up support and facilitating different types of (more politicised) activities or organisations. In the same manner, the growth and increased professionalisation and bureaucratisation characterising many of these NGOs are seen as compromising their alleged comparative advantage as alternative development actor (Banks & Hulme, 2012; Bebbington et al., 2007; Brodhead, 1987; Drabek, 1987; Dichter, 1999). It has become increasingly clear in this discussion that answers to the questions 'how NGOs are organised', 'what they are doing' and 'how they are doing it' are strongly related and therefore necessary components of the study and debate on understanding NGOs as development actors. The case of NGOs shows that in order to understand PDIs as an alternative development actor and to assess their potential contribution to poverty reduction, it is crucial to analyse in an integrated manner the different structural and behavioural aspects of PDI organisations, their members and their operations.

The second premise is that in order to understand PDIs it is necessary not only to study the actor itself (i.e. the organisations and their members) but also to take into account the broader environment wherein PDIs are positioned and how this environment (e.g. back-donors, other development actors, local governments and communities) responds to PDIs. PDIs do not function in a vacuum, but are surrounded by several actors and these contextual developments influence PDI activities and performance. An understanding of PDIs as development actor starts by analysing them in all their diversity, but also requires a detailed study of the social, institutional and governance environment wherein PDIs deploy their activities.[8]

Studies so far give a number of pieces of the puzzle, but limit our understanding of the whole, thus making it hard to understand and value PDIs as development actor to their full extent. Insights into their structure, activities and working method are valuable and necessary in order, but to appreciate their added value we need to relate these aspects to each other. This thesis will contribute to the micro debate by presenting a comprehensive insight into and understanding of PDIs, their members and their activities.

As a result of these two premises, instead of contributing to the understanding of PDIs by adding one piece of the puzzle, this thesis analyses different aspects of PDIs in a coherent way, focusing on the relations between the voluntary structure of PDIs and their function as development actors. In analytical terms, this motivated to employ the structure-conduct-performance framework as an overarching integrative approach to understanding of the interactions between these questions (Bain, 1956; Mason, 1939; McWilliams & Smart, 1993). The principal assumption of the SCP

[8] Although the context of developing countries wherein PDIs are operating is not ignored (see Chapter 5), here we especially refer to the Dutch context wherein PDIs are operating.

paradigm is that the performance of a sector is a function of the conduct of agents involved, which – in turn – is influenced by the structure of the sector (McWilliams & Smart, 1993: 64). In other words, in order to understand a particular sector and its internal performance, it is necessary to look at how the sector and its constituent parts (the individual participating actors) are organised and characterised (structure), what they are doing (conduct) and how they are doing it. In addition, as regards the interplay of these three aspects, key attention is given to the interfaces, e.g. the influence of actor motives on activity choice. This approach is applied as an overarching framework in the study, where each of the four central chapters addresses specific aspects of the PDI structure, conduct and performance and tries to unravel in conjunction the (mutual) interactions between them. Figure 1.1 gives an overview of the linkages between the research issues.



Figure 1.1 Analytical framework

Starting with our analytical approach, we distinguish four sub-questions to answer our central research question:

Chapter 2: What drives the start of PDIs and what characterises PDIs, their members and their activities?

Chapter 3: What determines time investment of PDI volunteers?

Chapter 4: How do characteristics of development organisations influence the decision making of potential donors?

Chapter 5: What determines the sustainability of PDI interventions?

In Chapter 2, the structure of the PDIs is central, although attention is also paid to the conduct and performance of PDIs. We analyse the distinguishing features of PDIs, their establishment motives and the internal management of PDI organisations. The specificity of PDIs relative to other development actors as well as the wide diversity within the group of PDIs is identified. These insights form the starting-point for subsequent chapters. It allows us later in the analysis to see if and how organisational features affect the type of activities PDIs undertake. Moreover, we discuss here the position of PDIs in Dutch society and the field of international development cooperation.

In Chapter 3, the *conduct* of PDI volunteers is studied. The structure of PDIs and their volunteers are included in the analysis as explanatory factors for the time investment of PDI volunteers. In this analysis we look at how financial and time restrictions of PDI volunteers influence their time investment. In addition, key behavioural aspects that are likely to influence the expected benefits of volunteering, such as the perceived distance between volunteers and beneficiaries and attitudes of volunteers towards development organisations, are examined. By studying one of the basic features of PDIs (i.e. their voluntary character), we can gain insight into if and how the specificity of PDIs affects their role as development actors. The innovative feature of this analysis is that volunteers' time investment is explained by looking not only at the supply side (i.e. considerations by the volunteer) but also at the demand side: the extent to which characteristics of PDIs (e.g. budget) affect time and resource investments of volunteers and ultimately also influence the ways in which PDIs operate in the field.

In order to understand PDIs as development actor it is not sufficient to study the conduct of PDI members since PDIs cannot exist only by grace of their members' efforts. PDIs are also strongly dependent on the conduct of private donors.[9] Therefore, in a similar vein to Chapter 3, Chapter 4 looks at the giving behaviour of potential private donors to development organisations. We analyse to what extent characteristics of development organisations affect the decisions of (potential) donors to donate money. The conduct of (potential) donors is hence studied in relation to the structure of PDIs. Consequently, the understanding of (the rise of) PDIs becomes more comprehensive by including how (potential) donors respond to the structure of PDIs compared with features of other development actors.

In the fifth and final chapter, the performance of PDIs in developing countries is analysed in the light of their (potential) sustainability. By outlining how PDIs intervene in developing countries and the type of activities they undertake, an effort is made to typify the potential sustainability of PDIs' intervention strategies based on a detailed multi-criteria classification of PDI interventions. To gain insight into the diversity of PDIs and their interventions, the conduct and performance of PDIs is thus related to their organisational structure. This finally allows us to present a classification of PDI field interventions in the light of their potential sustainability.

The concluding chapter presents a summary of the results based on a combined analysis of the structure, conduct and performance of PDIs. We summarise the key findings and focus on the linkages between what PDIs are, what they do and how they operate and perform.

1.4 Mixed methods

In order to answer the central research question and the four sub-questions a mixture of (different types of) data has been collected and several analytical approaches are applied. Both qualitative and quantitative data and analytical methods are used to address the research objective.

Because of the novelty of this field of research, there were no data available allowing us to study the structure of individual PDIs and PDIs as a group (Chapter 2) and the time investment of their volunteers (Chapter 3). A survey was selected as the most appropriate research method to collect the required data. Therefore, in 2008-2009 a standardised electronic survey was conducted among a large group of PDIs and their members.

[9] If not mentioned differently, donors refers to private contributors and hence excludes institutional donors.

This resulted in a unique dataset, the *CIDIN-PDI Database 2008-2009*. The survey gathered information both on the characteristics of nearly 900 organisations and on the background and motives of their members. Further details are provided in Chapters 2 and 3.

The third sub-question required detailed insight into giving behaviour and preferences of potential donors regarding a wide variety of development organisations. To obtain the required data we complemented the basic questionnaire of the fifth edition of the large-scale *Family Survey of the Dutch Population* (FSDP; Kraaykamp et al., 2009) with a selection of questions on attitudes regarding international development cooperation and development organisations. In addition we designed a factorial survey experiment that was included in the FSDP to gain insight into how organisational characteristics affect the giving behaviour of potential donors.

To answer the final sub-question a theoretically based analytical framework was designed to classify PDIs based on their potential sustainability. This framework has been applied in 49 different PDI interventions. By means of semi-structured interviews with PDI members in the Netherlands and their partners in Kenya and Indonesia qualitative data were collected. To gain an adequate insight into the intervention strategy of the PDI and its partner, the type of (and decisions about) PDI-supported interventions and the character of the implementation process were extensively addressed during the interviews. In addition, the roles of the different stakeholders (local partner, beneficiaries and the broader network) during the design and implementation of the intervention were raised as topics.

1.5 Thesis outline

This thesis is composed of four empirical chapters, each answering one of the sub-questions. These four chapters are preceded by this introductory chapter and are followed by a concluding chapter. Each chapter is based on an article published in or under review of a peer-reviewed scientific journal and can be read separately from the other chapters. The combination of the findings from the four chapters provides insights into the main research question. The structure of this thesis is summarised in Table 1.1

Table 1.1 Structure of the thesis

CHAPTER	RESEARCH QUESTION	STRUCTURE-CONDUCT-PERFORMANCE	METHODOLOGY	DATA
CHAPTER 2	What drives the start of PDIs and what characterises PDIs, their members and their activities?	Structure	Qualitative: literature review Quantitative: descriptive statistics	CIDIN-PDI Database 2008-2009[a]
CHAPTER 3	What determines time investment of PDI volunteers?	Conduct	Quantitative: multivariate (Poisson) regression techniques	CIDIN-PDI Database 2008-2009a
CHAPTER 4	How do characteristics of development organisations influence the decision making of potential donors?	Conduct	Quantitative / factorial survey experiment: cross-classified multilevel models	Family Survey Dutch Population 2009[b]
CHAPTER 5	What determines the sustainability of PDI interventions?	Performance	Qualitative: semi-structured interviews	Field research in the Netherlands and in Kenya/ Indonesia 2010-2011[c]

a Data are available on request from the author
b Data are deposited at the electronic filing system DANS
c Data are available on request from the author

Chapter 02

2. From tourist to development worker. Private development initiatives in the Netherlands[1]

'It crossed my path. They asked me for help and I said yes, and then you're stuck with Kenya. And now I'm addicted to Africa.'

Interview PDI founder[2]

[1] A slightly different version of this chapter is published in The Netherlands Yearbook on International Cooperation (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011) and in Mondes en Développement (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2013). The results were included in a public report (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2010).

[2] The quote is derived from an interview with a founder of a Private Development Initiative (see Chapter 5). The data are available on request.

Abstract

This chapter describes and analyses the rise of small-scale, voluntary development organisations (private development initiatives, PDI) in the Netherlands. The concept of PDI is disentangled and this alternative development actor is positioned in the 'philanteral aid channel'. Using data of almost 900 PDIs, the characteristics of the organisations, their founders and members are presented. Furthermore, we describe the support they offer to developing countries and shed a light on their involvement in development cooperation.

Keywords: Private Development Initiatives; development cooperation; sustainability

2.1 Introduction

Traditionally, as in other donor countries, three aid channels are distinguished in the Netherlands. Slightly less than 25 per cent of the total government budget for development cooperation runs through multilateral organisations like the UN and development banks. Around 30 per cent is routed through the bilateral channel directly by the Dutch government (including aid for private sector development). The remaining 25 per cent is disbursed via the civilateral channel. Although this includes direct funding of southern Nongovernmental Development Organisations (NGOs) by Dutch embassies, the largest part of civilateral aid funds go through Dutch NGOs (www.minbuza.nl). With this, the Netherlands is one of the biggest NGO-funders (Pratt et al., 2006).

Actors in these three channels are seen as 'traditional donors' in the sense that they find 'their raison d'être in international development co-operation' and they essentially form 'one community […] with a domain-specific set of values and norms, codes of conduct, and their own discourse and vocabulary' (Develtere & De Bruyn, 2009: 913). In recent years, these traditional actors receive increasing 'competition' from an onrush of alternative development actors in the Netherlands which here are grouped together under a fourth channel called the *Philanteral aid channel*. Within that Philanteral channel, we zoom in on one vast group of alternative development actors that is central to the Dutch debate of diversification: Private Development Initiatives (PDIs). This contribution is an introduction to PDIs in the Netherlands. The study presented in this chapter started to enlarge our understanding of (the rise of) PDIs as development actors, positioned in the Dutch society and field of international development cooperation. The central research question of this chapter reads:

> *What drives the start of PDIs and what characterises PDIs, their members and their activities?*

2.2 Data and methods

The main data presented in this contribution was collected in 2008-2009 from nearly 900 PDIs and their members (CIDIN-PDI Database 2008-2009). In 2008-2009 a standardised electronic survey has been conducted among PDIs in the Netherlands to get a thorough insight in the structure of individual PDIs and PDIs as a group. There is no national database in the Netherlands in which PDIs are registered. Therefore a list of 5,805 valid e-mail addresses of potential PDIs was made through an extensive web search and based on information provided by Dutch established large-scale development agencies (e.g. Oxfam Novib). These large-scale development agencies were or still are involved in co-funding of PDIs. 1,956 respondents started the web survey and of these respondents 1,238 completed the survey. Thereby a response of approximately 21 per cent was reached (100 * [1,238/5.805]). This is considered a fair response rate given that response rates for web surveys are in general between 20-30 per cent (Bernard, 2002). Of those 1,238, 893 met the criteria of being a PDI (see Section 2.3.2).[3] In the results section we discuss the representativeness of the sample.

The survey gathered information both on the respondents who filled in the questionnaire and on the organisations wherein they are active. The survey included a number of general questions on individual characteristics of the respondents and on their personal motivation for donating time and/or money. In addition, information was gathered on respondents' attitude towards development cooperation and their views regarding development organisations. Moreover, insight was gained in the structure and activities of the PDIs in which they are active. In order to answer the central research question, the data of the survey is complemented with a meta-analysis of different qualitative and quantitative studies on PDIs carried out by variousre searchers in the period 2005-2011.[4]

[3] Respondents required an average of 45 minutes to finish the survey. The length of the survey explains the relative high number of respondents who started the web survey but did not complete it.

[4] The data are available on request.

2.3 Private Development Initiatives in Perspective

2.3.1 The Philanteral aid channel

A driving force behind the diversification of the field of international development cooperation is the process of socialisation or mainstreaming. This refers to the adoption by social actors of tasks that previously belonged to the exclusive domain of, in the case of aid, traditional actors such as the government, NGOs and multilateral organisations (Develtere, 2009; De Bruyn & Huyse, 2009; Schulpen, 2007; Develtere & Stessens, 2006; Develtere, 2012). More and more companies, 'philanthrocapitalists', famous stars (or: celebrity humanitarians) and 'ordinary' individuals feel urged to actively contribute to the global fight against poverty (Severino & Ray, 2010; Develtere & De Bruyn, 2009; Samman et al., 2009; Yrjölä, 2009; Bishop & Green, 2008; Cameron & Haanstra, 2008). The most distinctive feature of these actors as compared to other development actors is the voluntary character: they undertake the activities in the field of development cooperation on a voluntary basis. We therefore decided to group these actors under the heading of a separate, fourth channel of development actors, referred to as the philanteral aid channel (Figure 2.1). The term philanteral refers to the definition of philanthropy as 'contributing money, goods and/or time, voluntarily supplied by individuals and organisations (funds, companies, churches) mainly to support the aims of public advancement' (Schuyt et al., 2009: 18).

The diversity among the different actors within the Philanteral channel is large. Looking at their origin, an important distinction can be made between the actors in this channel. There is first of all a group of organisations for which development cooperation is not the main activity. In principle, this group contains all social organisations and institutes which are predominantly active in a field outside development cooperation and decide for various reasons to initiate some development cooperation activities as well (see also: Brok & Bouzoubaa, 2005; Schulpen, 2007). Within this sub-group of the philanteral channel, we distinguish three different actors: (1) (semi) government services (e.g. police, fire brigade); (2) social, non-profit organisations (e.g. schools, hospitals, trade unions); and (3) organisations linked to business (e.g. water companies, banks).[5] Perhaps the most important feature of these institutional actors is that they, in principle, become involved in development cooperation based on their own expertise. Although there are certainly exceptions, fire departments work with other fire departments in developing countries, hospitals in the area of health and water companies focus their projects on development projects in water and sanitation. In other words, 'starting from their own field (institutional structure) they develop development activities, often with similar organisations in the same sector in the South' (De Bruyn & Huyse, 2009: 18). For the second group of organisations, development cooperation is their main task. They came into being in order to contribute to poverty reduction. Based on Schulpen (2007), we identify six types of actors within this second group: (1) political lobby groups, (2) fundraisers, (3) volunteers, (4) foundations, (5) individual supporters and (6) private development initiatives (Figure 2.1). While some of these groups consist of committed individuals (type 3, 5), others are organised citizens who want to contribute to development cooperation (type 1, 2, 4 and 6). Apart from that, some of these actors are involved in activities in the Netherlands, while others are (also) active in the developing countries themselves.

[5] Here one could also mention provinces, city councils or other local authorities although, in principle, they are part of the governmental or bilateral channel.



Figure 2.1 The philanteral aid channel – an initial classification
Source: based on Schulpen, 2007.

2.3.2 A Private Development Initiative

A PDI, the philanteral development actor central in this study, is defined as (1) a group of people who (2) give support in a direct way (3) to one or more developing countries. Accordingly, PDIs are not only active in the Netherlands and their task is not limited to (financially) supporting Dutch development organisations. They offer (4) structural support for organisations, communities or groups of people rather than one-off, individual support. The fact that (5) PDIs do not receive direct funds from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that they are (6) small in scale and their (7) voluntary character form the main distinction between PDIs and established development organisations.[6] The question hence is: when is an organisation characterised as 'small-scale' and 'voluntary'? The difficulty in defining PDIs and with that, distinguishing them from actors in the civilateral aid channel is the lack of a well-defined demarcation of the type of organisations this third aid channel consists of. Based on a comparison between the characteristics of organisations that are included in our database and that meet up to criteria 1-5 and data of NGOs in the Netherlands (IS Academie NGO Database) we came up with a more detailed elaboration of these two final and crucial features of PDIs.

Small-scale is interpreted in two ways. It means having fewer than 20 regular staff members, or an annual budget of less than 1 million euro. The voluntary character is defined on the basis of an upper limit of 20 per cent or less of paid members in charge of the running of the organisation. Staff member refers to both paid and non-paid staff. Although these demarcations are contestable, since organisations had to meet up to all the 7 criteria mentioned above, our sample consists of a group of organisations that distinguishes themselves from established development organisations or other alternative development actors.

Although we aimed at the strongest possible foundation of our PDI definition, a certain degree of arbitrary is insuperable because of the lack of clear boundaries and definition of other aid channels.

6 It should be noted that the criterion of no direct funding by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pertains to the Netherlands but might be quite different in other countries where the funding system is structured in other ways.

Estimates on the number of PDIs in the Netherlands vary from 6,400 to 15,000 (Brok & Bouzoubaa, 2005; van Voorst, 2005). Not only is the margin between these estimates considerable, it is also unclear which definition of PDIs the researchers involved used. Figure 2.2 shows that PDIs are not something new; some of the (still existing) PDIs have a history that goes back a century. Half of the PDIs in the CIDIN-PDI Database were founded after 2000.[7]



Figure 2.2 Establishment of PDIs (*N*=878)

It is important to mention that the database only contains information on those PDIs still existing at the moment the survey took place. It is therefore difficult to make hard statements on the growth of PDIs. However, knowing that travels or longer stays in development countries form an important trigger to start a PDI and that there is an increase in long distance holidays, there is a strong indication that the number of PDIs, as shown in Figure 2.2, has increased during the past years (NBTC-NIPO, 2008).

2.4 A profile of PDIs[8]

2.4.1 The people behind PDIs

PDIs are in general run by middle-agers, almost equally divided between women and men. Half of them regard themselves as belonging to a religious community. A majority of 60 per cent of the people actively involved in PDIs belong to the active working population and therefore combines voluntary work with a paid job. With regard to education level and income, the members of PDIs come from the average or above average layers of Dutch society: they have an average net monthly income of 1,536 euro and almost 70 per cent have completed a higher vocational or university education (CPB, 2009). The most important trigger for people to initiate or become actively engaged in a PDI is a holiday or longer stay in a developing country (34 per cent). More than 70 per cent of the people became active after having visited a developing country. For 21 per cent of PDI members, a request from an acquaintance was the reason for becoming actively involved in a PDI.

7 If not mentioned differently, the figures presented are based on data from the CIDIN-PDI Database 2008-2009.

8 If not mentioned differently, numbers mentioned in these paragraphs are coming from the CIDIN-PDI Database 2008-2009.

2.4.2 The organisations

The PDIs in the CIDIN-PDI Database have an average annual budget of 50,000 euro. About 40 per cent of PDIs have five or fewer active members. Organisations expand over the years and older organisations have significantly more members than younger organisations. The vast majority of these members are active on a voluntary basis. Only around 5 per cent of PDIs have one or more paid employees principally with those organisations that have been around for a number of years. PDI members devote an average of 42 (voluntary) hours per month to the PDI, with founders of PDI spending significantly more hours in the PDI than general members (Kinsbergen et al., 2013).[9] Many established development organisations rely partly on volunteers as well. However, the differences with PDIs is that in these organisations volunteers are responsible for the actual managing of the organisations whereas volunteers of established organisations are especially involved in more supportive task.

When looking more closely to the organisational characteristics of PDIs, the picture of PDIs becomes very diverse. Both within the group as a whole as between PDIs of similar age, the diversity is large. For example, within the group of PDIs with 15 years of experience, we find both an organisation with 4 voluntary members and an annual budget of 2,000 euro and an organisation with 10 members of which 2 of them are paid raising annually 120,000 euro.

The characteristics of our sample of PDIs are comparable to previous PDI samples from other studies (Brok & Bouzoubaa, 2005; Develtere & Stessens, 2006; Develtere & De Bruyn, 2009). It is, hence, likely that our results can be generalised to the entire population of PDIs in the Netherlands. However, since the total population of PDIs is unknown, a certain degree of caution is required when generalising the results of our study to the entire PDI population.

2.5 Public and governmental support for PDIs

For the majority of PDIs Dutch citizens are the main source of income. In past years, the rise of PDIs has been analysed in different studies from the perspective of the donor (WWAV, 2009; Ravelli & Verhoeven, 2008; Lampert et al., 2006). These studies demonstrate that the direct type of development cooperation attracts people and that they are impressed by the concrete results and the speed with which things are realised (Man & van Hemert, 2006). In 2011, 8 per cent of the Dutch households supported local small-scale charitable organisations in the field of development cooperation with an average amount of 57 euro per year (Bekkers & de Wit, 2013). Assuming that these small-scale charitable causes are equivalent to PDIs, they received an amount of nearly 34 million euro from Dutch households alone in 2011.[10]

In the past, established development organisations, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Dutch embassies in developing countries received frequent requests from Dutch citizens for operational and financial support for projects executed by them in developing countries. Neither the Ministry, nor development organisations had the capacity or the explicit mandate to deal with all these requests. However, both did recognise the potential of these PDIs to enforce the Dutch public support for development cooperation and to strengthen people's involvement with the work of development organisations. Therefore, in 2001, the then minister for development cooperation Herfkens asked five big Dutch NGOs and the National Committee for International Cooperation and Sustainable Development (NCDO) to combine their forces in offering financial and institutional support for PDIs. In the following years, (part of) these NGOs, the NCDO and the foundation Wilde Ganzen formed an important source of income for Dutch PDIs.

9 The term 'volunteer' has not been pre-determined and thus refers to all people that are considered as such by the PDI itself.

10 In 2011 there were in total 7,443,801 households in the Nederland (7,443,801* 8%) * 57 euro = 33,943,732.56 euro (www.statline.cbs.nl).

The three successive (vice) ministers of development cooperation continued to publicly express support for PDIs (Knapen, 2012; DGIS, 2009a; DGIS, 2009b; Van Ardenne, 2004). However, starting from 2011, severe budget cuts and reforms within the Dutch development cooperation resulted in the tightening of the criteria to qualify for subsidy and caused a strong decrease in the financial support of PDIs by established development organisations. In 2007 Wilde Ganzen, Oxfam Novib, Impulsis, Cordaid, Hivos and NCDO supported PDIs with approximately 40 million euro (Linkis, 2007; NCDO, 2007; Wilde Ganzen, 2007). This amount decreased to around 10 million euro in 2011 (CIDIN, NCDO & PI Wijzer, 2013).

In the period 2006-2007, 65 per cent of the PDIs in the CIDIN-PDI Database 2008-2009 submitted at least one request with one of the supporting organisations. Although this could be seen as a significant part of the PDIs, it means that 35 per cent of the PDIs functioned without support of any of these organisations during these years and mainly set their sights on private donors.

2.6 PDIs working on development

2.6.1 Poverty (visions)

Debates on PDIs as development actor focus on the 'effectiveness and efficiency', referred to as the success of their interventions. Before looking at how PDIs intervene in developing countries and the results of these interventions, it is first of all important to gain insight into the visions of PDIs on poverty and development aid and their type of interventions. PDIs see restrictive economical structures and the absence of, and faulty access to, resources like education and healthcare, as the two most important origins of poverty (see Figure 2.3). 25 per cent referred to (armed) conflicts as the most important cause of poverty.



Figure 2.3 Origins of poverty *(N*=712, in per cent)

When being asked what then should have priority in development cooperation, a large majority of 73 per cent attaches considerable importance to investments that result in improved access to basic services like education and health care (Figure 2.4). In second place (with only 10 per cent) is the development of the local economy. These two figures show that PDI members hold very different convictions concerning the origins of poverty, but that their ideas on the solutions are largely unanimous.



Figure 2.4 Solutions to poverty (*N*=721, in per cent)

2.6.2 Where and what?

The PDIs that took part in the CIDIN inquiry are active in 109 different countries. Three quarters of them are being active in one country. Some over the years, other PDIs from the start distribute their efforts over more than 1 country. 8 per cent is active in two different countries and a small number expand their activities to 3 or more countries. When looking at the spread of PDIs across the world, we see that well over a third (1/3) of PDIs are active in Sub-Saharan Africa, with Kenya and Ghana as leading countries. Asia follows in second (India and Indonesia), while Eastern Europe and Latin America compete for the third place (Figure 2.5). Whereas large part of the PDIs is active in more obvious tourist destinations (e.g. coastal areas in Kenya or the Gambia), other PDIs are active in less accessible countries or regions such as Afghanistan or the more isolated north of Kenya.

The importance of a holiday abroad as a trigger to initiate a PDI is clearly shown by the fact that 16 per cent of people became active in the field of development cooperation in the same year as their first journey to a developing country. Well over 60 per cent became active in the following years, and 20 per cent of these in the course of the following five years. Only a quarter of the people decided to become active first before visiting a developing country later. More than 70 per cent of the people who became active after having visited a developing country became active in that same country.



Figure 2.5 Countries in which PDIs are active (*N*=776, in per cent)

It comes as no surprise that PDI projects are mainly aimed at education and health care considering the importance attached to investments that result in improved access to basic services (see Figure 2.4). Besides, many PDI projects are intended to improve the living conditions of children and young people (47 per cent). PDIs mainly invest in concrete matters like supplying teaching aids, building schools and digging wells. In other words, in practice their preferred intervention type is direct poverty reduction. Although they also attach considerable importance to lobbying and influencing policy and civil society building, this is not reflected in the overall picture of their actual investments. This is not to say that all PDIs are exclusively involved in direct poverty reduction. Part of the PDIs extends these concrete investments with lobby & advocacy activities or with community building projects or focuses all their efforts on these types of interventions.

2.6.3 How?

While critics doubt the professionalism of PDIs and fear that they are unable to avoid known pitfalls, supporters are convinced that, due to their smallness of scale and direct approach, PDIs do make an essential difference to the lives of people in developing countries. Brok and Bouzoubaa (2005) investigated what PDIs themselves think about the contribution they can make to poverty reduction. 65 per cent expected that PDIs are indeed able to contribute despite their inadequacies. 36 per cent of the interviewees (*N*=290) are also convinced that PDIs can tackle the underlying causes of poverty. In the past years a number of researchers have carried out critical assessments of the work of PDIs in developing countries (see Chelladurai, 2006; De Bruyn, 2011; Kinsbergen, 2007; Kamara & Bakhuisen, 2008; Schulpen, 2007; van der Velden, 2011). These studies focus on a diversity of matters ranging from cooperation between PDIs and their partners and the effectiveness and sustainability of their projects in developing countries. Besides this, researchers investigated how the projects are evaluated and how PDIs learn and report. In the following we describe the working method of PDIs and subsequently reflect on three of the major risks – related to this working method – that came up in different empirical studies.[11]

[11] Daily practice will show many variations of the working method as presented. However, several studies reveal features typifying the working method of many PDIs.

2.6.4 Happenchance

Discussions with PDI members and their partners reveal that the collaboration often stems from a coincidental encounter and that in many cases there is no preconceived plan to start a PDI in the first place. They are founded mostly due to a concurrence of circumstances, with an inspired meeting with an individual, a local organisation or institution leading to a plan being drawn up for the joint implementation of a project. The initial phase of collaboration between PDIs and local partners is also characterised by tremendous enthusiasm on the part of the PDIs as regards 'bringing about' change. People are confronted by a certain issue and realise there are possibilities for improving the situation (Kinsbergen, 2007; Schulpen, 2007). Then implementation of the project can start straight away. In most cases, the collaboration between PDIs and their partners is characterised by joint responsibility for the projects, with both parties being able to exert some influence (Kamara & Bakhuisen, 2008; Wintraecken, 2008; Kinsbergen, 2006). Irrespective of how PDIs and their partners cooperate, at the general output level most of PDI projects are reasonably successful (Kamara & Bakhuisen, 2008; Kinsbergen, 2007). Orphanages have been built, hospitals renovated, schools enlarged and income-generating projects start and are used by the local population. The logistical problems that most initiatives inevitably come up against are faced with patience and creativity. During or after the implementation of a (first) project, part of the PDIs start right away implementing new projects or expanding their first project. At first sight, the working method of PDIs seems to be efficient (with regard to used time, money and manpower) and effective (goals are being achieved). However, various researches have made clear that some PDIs fail to complete some crucial steps before, during and/or after the implementation of the projects.

First of all, different studies conclude that the design or implementation of a development project is often not preceded by a sound context analysis (Schulpen, 2007; Chelladurai, 2006). As a consequence there is limited knowledge about and collaboration with other organisations or local authorities active in the same region. In addition participation of the beneficiaries is limited or absent (Kinsbergen, 2006). Because of this, there is a danger in all this of projects being insufficiently imbedded in the local context, not being (sufficiently) relevant and of duplication occurring (Chelladurai, 2006). This means as well, there is a risk for ignoring the underlying structures that cause the problems, which in turn could lead to the treatment of symptoms, while the structural causes, are ignored (Schulpen 2007; Chelladurai, 2006).

The second risk finds it origin in the cooperation between PDIs and their partners. As described above, many people throw in their lot with a local person they originally befriended (Kamara & Bakhuisen, 2008: 21), resulting in an informal, personal relationship between PDIs and their partners. Things can become complicated when the collaboration continues without making the step from being 'friends' to being 'partners'. Schulpen (2007) states that it is therefore difficult both for the PDI and for the partner

to develop a critical attitude towards each other. Furthermore, it means that discussions of each other's expectations and the division of roles and capacities are seldom held (Zindel, 2009). A series of important questions therefore remain unanswered, such as, how long will the PDI support the local partner, what kind of support is the PDI willing to offer and what capacities does the local partner and the PDI have? Findings of different studies demonstrate that this can result in disappointments, misunderstandings or projects exceeding the partner's or PDIs capacity (Kinsbergen, 2007; Schulpen, 2007).

The third risk we discuss here is related to the process of monitoring and evaluation. Various studies have demonstrated that (structured, external) evaluations are mostly lacking (Hento et al., 2011; Kamara & Bakhuisen, 2008; Bosmans, 2008; Schulpen, 2007; Chelladurai, 2006). As in the case of the project realisation, the focus of reports is mostly limited to the output of the projects. They describe the intended concrete results, what has been achieved and who has benefited. As a result, the back donor only receives limited feedback consisting of a description of how the project was executed, illustrated by photographs.

The lack of extensive evaluations hinders PDI learning processes. There is the risk that PDIs themselves will be convinced that all is going well and that there is no reason to make any changes to their procedures, those of its partner or their cooperation. There is a danger of going from one project to another without any structural changes being made to the working methods.

These three risks originating from the working method of PDIs mainly endanger the sustainability, as in longevity, of the projects supported and/or initiated by PDIs. Building the hospital (output) has provided a region of 5.000 inhabitants with health care facilities (outcome), but the question is who is going to pay for the management, doctors, nurses, medicines and maintenance today and in three years time period (sustainability)? The project may function today, but what about tomorrow, next year or in ten years time? Money is needed for salaries, training and maintenance. However, the question is whether the PDI is willing to invest in this and, if so, whether its back donors are willing to contribute. Clearly, if sustainability is not guaranteed up to a certain level, the project's output and outcome may be at risk. If there is no money to maintain the hospital and pay the staff members, it will not be long before the hospital will have to close its doors and the building will be left unused. The huge enthusiasm, the personal ties and the 'not talking but doing' mentality are, on the one hand, the driving force behind many PDIs and their projects but, on the other hand, it is clear that these are qualities that may in the end cause their downfall. The risks described find their origin in (1) a focus on the project, the execution and the results (Looij, 2008) and less attention being paid to processes and (2) a short-term focus neglecting long term challenges.

2.7 Conclusions

This chapter offers an introduction with Dutch Private Development Initiatives. These small-scale, voluntary development organisations contribute in particular to direct poverty reduction, especially in the field of education and healthcare. They are strongly represented in the (Sub Sahara) African and Asian continent, in countries such as India, Indonesia, Ghana and Kenya. Whereas as a group they have some organisational features in common, the results of the study show that diversity regarding the organisational structure and type of development interventions supported is large.

Research on the working method of PDIs shows that there is room for improvement. Whereas PDI members are strongly motivated and committed, the sustainability of the projects would improve if they started from the outset with more extensive and more rational assessments. In the meantime, it is advisable not to focus only on the (short-term) results and the 'here and now', but to look forward from the start and devote more attention to processes (e.g. cooperation between PDI and partner). This is linked to the need to slow down and to build in more time for critical (self-) reflection. The research results promote an open attitude by PDIs, based on the questioning and testing of their own ideas and work processes by entering into conversations and thus making the transition from 'meaning-well' to 'doing good'.

During the last few years, in the Netherlands a lot has been written about and a lot of discussions have taken place on PDIs as alternative actor in the field of development cooperation. Whereas some years ago, PDIs were still rather unknown and looked at with suspicion and sometimes-even disdain, in the past years research and debate contributed to the positioning of PDIs in the Dutch field of international development cooperation. This does not mean that critical voices are no longer there or that the influence of PDIs within the field of development cooperation is equal to that of established development actors. However, it does mean that in a few years a whole new sub-sector within the Dutch sector of international development cooperation became recognised. For various reasons, different actors decided to financially and institutionally support PDIs, training courses were developed, PDI networks were established and a PDI interest group was formed. Some PDIs are proponents of these developments, some even claim to have right to a position in the field of development cooperation. Others want nothing to do with the official development cooperation and consciously take a distance from it while some others are unaware of these developments. The

reforms and budget cuts taking place in the field of international development cooperation are a reason to reflect on this development of PDIs from outsiders to insiders. Are PDIs willing to comply with subsidy requirements from potential subsidisers and take up their 'common, field-specific language; manners; methodologies; instruments; values and standards' (Develtere, 2009: 231)? And what would becoming part of the development establishment mean for their own identity? Are established development actors willing to open their so far closed ranks (Develtere, 2009)? In this matter, there is a call for PDIs but also for established development actors to pay attention to and reflect on (possible consequences of) this development and decide for themselves how to respond to this.

Chapter 03

3. From tourist to development worker. Bringing the beneficiary closer: Explanations for volunteering time in Dutch Private Development Initiatives[1]

'And sometimes it has been very tough, because it takes a lot of our time and leaves little room for other things. But I never thought: I should not have started it.'

Interview PDI founder[2]

'And now [name of husband] has more time, we said to one another: we see this [involvement in PDI] as a way to give meaning to life. We do not want to suffer from the empty-nest syndrome. I have many friends who are playing golf, or tennis or bridge, … that is not my cup of tea. We are healthy, we are still capable of doing things and in the first place: we find it great fun to do this.'

Interview PDI founder

'I once said: I have never worked so hard as now, now I'm old. It costs a lot of time, but I do this with great pleasure. I'm not that kind of lady to go on a coffee all the time.'

Interview PDI member

'Right now, we are with the four of us. But the young ladies, they are having their first or second child. They just graduated as a doctor or they are still specialising. They are just very busy. They cannot go [on a fieldtrip] every year or once every two years. […] Lately I notice that it is getting a bit more exhausting, because you are getting older.'

Interview PDI member

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[1] A slightly different version of this chapter is published in Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly (Kinsbergen, Tolsma & Ruiter, 2013).

[2] The quotes are derived from interviews with founders/members of Private Development Initiatives (see Chapter 5). The data are available on request.

Abstract

In the Netherlands, charitable behaviour for international development purposes is subject to important changes. Whereas established development organisations suffer from a declining support base, private development initiatives (PDIs) that execute concrete, small-scale projects within direct personalised aid networks can count on increasing enthusiasm from individual donors of money and time. We investigate to what extent the cost-benefit evaluations of volunteers (supply side) and the characteristics of PDIs (demand side) affect the time allocation for volunteering in these organisations. The study is based on a survey of 661 volunteers active in Dutch PDIs. PDI volunteers face time and budget restrictions, partly due to their position on the (paid) labour market. Volunteers who are sceptical about established development organisations increase voluntary time investment in PDIs. Corroborating the proximity hypothesis, volunteers perceiving a smaller distance to beneficiaries spend more volunteering hours in PDIs. Volunteers also spend more hours volunteering for PDIs with larger budgets and more staff.

Keywords: Charitable behaviour; international development cooperation; volunteering hours; private development initiatives; distance to beneficiaries

3.1 Introduction

Numerous studies attempt to explain the charitable behaviour of individuals (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011; Sargeant & Woodliffe, 2007 for a recent review of the literature).[3] The evidence gathered largely centres on questions regarding who gives money to charitable causes and why people donate money. Other research has analysed the motivations and the time investment of volunteers (Allison et al., 2002; Bekkers, 2004; Hayghe, 1991; Okun, 1994; Okun et al., 1998; Rotolo & Wilson, 2004). Even though time investment can be regarded to be just as important for voluntary organisations and their beneficiaries as is the number of volunteers that are involved or the amount of money donated, the question concerning how much time people actually donate is still understudied (Van Ingen & Dekker, 2011). In this study we aim to explain differences in the time people spend on volunteer work. The focus of our study is volunteering in small-scale private development initiatives (PDIs), which have been growing in number in recent years both in the Netherlands (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011) and in surrounding countries such as Belgium (Develtere & De Bruyn, 2009).

In the Netherlands, established international development organisations can count on a relatively wide support from Dutch citizens. In 2011, this group of organisations received 281 million euro in total from Dutch households, which makes it – next to faith based organisations and health care – the third largest charitable cause in the Netherlands (Bekkers & de Wit, 2013). Financial donations are not the only way that Dutch citizens express their concern about developing countries. In 2008 1,4 per cent of the population claimed to have volunteered in a development-related organisation (Schuyt & Gouwenberg, 2009). However, in recent years, traditional development organisations have experienced declining public support in the Netherlands because of an emerging distrust regarding their effectiveness and efficiency.

At the same time, an increasing number of citizens voluntarily participate in – or even initiate – small-scale voluntary development initiatives (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011). This development is part of a larger international trend: worldwide, a growing diversity of actors is taking up an active role in the field of international development cooperation.

Companies, philanthropists, famous stars – referred to as celebrity humanitarians – and ordinary individuals feel urged to actively contribute to the global fights against poverty (Bishop & Green, 2008; Cameron & Haanstra, 2008; Develtere & De Bruyn, 2009; Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011; Samman et al., 2009; Yrjölä, 2009).

In contrast to traditional development organisations, private development initiatives can count on growing support and represent concrete opportunities for greater identification and active involvement with development activities (Lampert et al., 2006; Ravelli & Verhoeven, 2008; Bekkers et al., 2011). In 2011, 8 per cent of Dutch households donated to these small-scale development organisations with an average amount of 57 euro, resulting in a total amount donated of approximately 34 million euro (Bekkers & de Wit, 2013; Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011). However, it is unknown how many people in the Netherlands are actually active as volunteers in PDIs.

PDIs can be distinguished from other, traditional, development organisations by their small scale (i.e. limited number of staff and budget) and their voluntary character (i.e. low percentages of paid staff). The majority of these initiatives are initiated and entirely run by volunteers and have an average annual budget of less than 50,000 euro (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011). PDI volunteers are actively involved in fundraising, public awareness raising and the implementation of development projects.

In this contribution, we investigate how the financial and time restrictions of PDI volunteers influence their time investment. In addition, we examine aspects that possibly affect the benefits of volunteering, such as the perceived distance between volunteers and beneficiaries and attitudes of volunteers towards development organisations. A novel aspect of this study is that we not only aim

[3] When not specified, 'charitable behaviour', 'donations' and 'donors' refer both to donations and donors of time and money.

to explain time investment by looking at the supply side (i.e. the volunteers' considerations) but also at the demand side, namely the extent to which some of the characteristics of PDIs (e.g. budget) affect the time investment considerations of volunteers. The research question of this chapter reads:

What determines time investment of PDI volunteers?

This study also distinguishes itself from earlier studies since we focus on a specific group of volunteers, namely people that are active in small-scale private development initiatives with distant beneficiaries. We test our hypotheses using unique primary data on 661 volunteers – 316 of them being founders of PDIs – working in a similar number of small-scale private development initiatives with projects in 101 developing countries. We acknowledge that this hampers the generalisation of findings to a broader volunteer population. However, using this dataset enables us to tests hypotheses derived from a cost-benefit framework on the impact of a wide array of characteristics of volunteers and of voluntary organisations on time investment decisions.

3.2. Voluntary time investment in PDIs: supply and demand

Previous studies on charitable behaviour point to the strong influence of a donor's cost-benefit analysis on decisions regarding time and money donations (Allison et al., 2002; Bekkers, 2004; Okun 1994; Unger, 1991; Wiepking, 2008; Wilson, 2000). As Bekkers (2004) argues, the first thing people will do when considering whether or not to help is to weigh the immediate material costs for them compared to the social or psychological benefits involved. When the costs increase, higher benefits are needed to persuade a donor. On the other hand, it can be argued that when the benefits of donating are low, the willingness to donate decreases.

3.2.1 Constraints

The costs of volunteering depend on the value of people's time. This value is determined by the availability and the price of time (Bekkers, 2001; Bekkers, 2004; Van Ingen & Dekker, 2011; Wilson, 2000). When people have less leisure time available, it becomes more precious to them, making it more costly to engage in volunteering (Bekkers, 2004). The role overload theory predicts that people with a full-time occupation are more restricted in their time, and therefore they will be more reluctant to donate time compared to people working part-time or without any job (Markham & Bonjean, 1996). Indeed, being employed is found to negatively affect both the decision to volunteer (Bekkers, 2001; Hayghe, 1991) and – for those who do volunteer – the number of hours spent on volunteering work (Van Ingen & Dekker, 2011; Wilson, 2000). Thus, in line with findings from earlier studies, we expect that volunteers who have a paid job spend less time on voluntary PDI activities than volunteers who do not have a paid job.

The availability of time is not only determined by the employment status of people. Being engaged in numerous organisations implies that people have to distribute their time and have on average less time available to invest in each of these organisations, in comparison to people who are affiliated with only one organisation. Thus, in line with the role overload theory, we expect that people who are members of several civic organisations are more limited in their time and, hence, that the number of memberships negatively affects voluntary time investment.

The price of people's time is also an influence on the value of their time. Opportunity cost theory proposes that higher income groups are usually more willing to donate money than lower income groups (Bekkers, 2004). The contribution of a certain monetary amount represents a smaller share of income for higher income groups in comparison to lower income groups, which makes the marginal costs of a similar financial contribution relatively lower for high income earners, as is confirmed by findings from Wiepking (2008). On the other hand, for people with higher hourly wages, the costs of donating time are higher than for low-income groups, making it less evident for them to engage in volunteering (Bekkers, 2004) and to volunteer a large number of hours

(Freeman, 1997; Wolff et al., 1993). Although the results of earlier studies on the effect of income on voluntary time investment are ambiguous (Wilson, 2000), we anticipate that the income level determines the cost of volunteering and expect that higher income groups will spend less time volunteering compared to lower income groups. In summary, our constraint hypothesis reads:

H1. Volunteers (a) with a paid job, (b) who are members of multiple civic organisations and (c) with higher hourly wages spend fewer hours PDI volunteering.

3.2.2 Benefits and distant beneficiaries

An important benefit of donating is often referred to as 'the warm glow' (Andreoni, 1989). This psychological reward implies that donors feel that their contribution can make a real difference to the lives of beneficiaries (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011). The reward – the warm glow – that results from donating to international development organisations is usually judged to be rather low because these organisations are commonly dealing with geographical and psychological distant beneficiaries (Micklewright & Wright, 2004; Schuyt et al., 2007).

When there is a geographical distance between the donor and the beneficiaries it becomes more difficult to be aware of their needs and, most importantly, to observe the positive effect of a donation (Bekkers, 2004). In addition, the anthropological literature shows that people are more inclined towards pro-social behaviour when it concerns their own kin, tribe or community, with whom they can identify (Eberhard, 1975). Similarly, potential donors try to identify with the beneficiaries and find this harder when the psychological distance is larger, for example, when beneficiaries are inhabitants of an 'exotic' country with unfamiliar social and cultural norms and practices. Results of previous studies on charitable behaviour empirically showed that both geographical and psychological distance have a negative influence on people's willingness to donate time or money (Bekkers, 2004; Micklewright & Wright, 2004; Schuyt et al., 2007; Wiepking, 2008).

(Mass) media coverage is one way to inform people about the needs of beneficiaries and to bridge (geographical and psychological) distance through indirect contact. Media coverage increases the money raised for victims of disasters (Adams, 1986; Bennett & Kottasz, 2000; Simon, 1997; Wiepking, 2008). Direct contact between potential donors and distant beneficiaries is expected to have an even larger impact. Encounters with the local population and confrontation with their needs will decrease the distance between the donors and the beneficiaries. No longer are inhabitants of developing countries unknown and far away. They have a face and a name now. A possible obstruction to donating is removed. In line with this rationale, Kinsbergen and Schulpen (2011) showed that the most important trigger for setting up or participating in PDIs is a visit to a developing country. We not only expect the reduction of distance to influence the decision to volunteer per se, but also to affect the intensity of volunteering. We therefore expect that volunteers who visited one or more developing country spend more hours PDI volunteering.

Volunteers with a non-Western background engaged with an organisation supporting beneficiaries in their or their parents' home country tend to experience a smaller (psychological) distance from the beneficiaries and are hence expected to invest more hours than their counterparts with Western background.

Volunteers already active for some years in an organisation will get to know the country, the region and the beneficiaries that they are supporting. This will increase the involvement of volunteers in the lives of the beneficiaries and decrease the (perceived) inhibiting distance between the volunteers and the beneficiaries over the years. Following this line of reasoning, we expect that the number of years volunteers are active in a PDI positively affects time investment. We now formulate a proximity hypothesis:

H2. (a) Volunteers who visited (more) developing countries, (b) non-Western volunteers supporting projects in their (parents') home country and (c) volunteers who are active for a longer period will spend more hours PDI volunteering.

3.2.3 Benefits and volunteers' attitudes and motives

The warm glow people receive from volunteering is not only affected by their perceived distance from the beneficiaries. Previous studies demonstrated that the reward of a donation is negatively affected when people are uncertain that donations will make a valuable contribution (Bekkers, 2004; Micklewright & Wright, 2004). This can be the case when donors are uncertain that an organisation is capable of spending the money well (Bekkers, 2004) or when the problems at hand are so large that donors do not expect that their contributions will make a (substantial) difference (Micklewright & Wright, 2004). The psychological reward of volunteering increases when volunteers believe that development organisations can make a genuine difference in the livelihood of beneficiaries. Volunteers who have trust in the efficacy and efficiency of development organisations will gain greater benefits from volunteering and experience a stronger 'warm glow'. They are therefore expected to spend more hours volunteering.

In addition to the warm glow donors receive from volunteering activities, the fulfilment of certain personal motives is commonly referred to as a key benefit of volunteering, outweighing the costs involved in donating (Clary et al., 1998). The Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI), designed by Clary and Snyder (1991), takes a functional approach to people's motives for volunteering, arguing that these motives represent functions served by volunteering (Allison et al., 2002; Clary et al., 1998). According to the model of Clary and Snyder (1991), becoming a volunteer may serve six possible functions. People may volunteer (1) in order to express or act upon important values (values), (2) to gain a better understanding of the world (understanding), (3) to strengthen social relationships (social), (4) to improve one's career opportunities (career), (5) to protect oneself from negative feelings such as guilt (protective) and, finally, (6) to feel better about oneself (enhancement) (Allison et al., 2002; Clary et al., 1998; Clary & Snyder, 1999).

Previous research on time investment shows that motives not only influence the decision to volunteer but also the extent of volunteering (Allison et al., 2002; Okun et al., 1998). Volunteers who want to feel useful spend considerably more hours volunteering than volunteers not driven by the usefulness motive (Okun, 1994). On the other hand, people volunteering for social reasons, i.e. to strengthen social relationships, spend less time on their voluntary activities (Allison, et al., 2002). The study of Allison et al. (2002) also demonstrated that the values and understanding motives are positively related to time investment. Given the considerations above, we formulate the attitude and motives hypothesis as:

> *H3. (a) The higher the belief in development organisations, (b) the stronger the motivations to volunteer in order to give expression to important values and (c) in order to get a better understanding of the world, and (d) the weaker the motive to strengthen social relationships, the more hours volunteers will spend PDI volunteering.*

3.2.4 The demand side

A novel aspect of our study is that we assume that time investment is not only a result of the characteristics of volunteers affecting cost-benefit considerations, but that it is also related to the demand side, that is, the characteristics of PDIs. To date, the effect of organisational features on donations remains understudied (Sargeant et al., 2008). We first of all expect PDIs with more small-scale development programmes – determined by the number of countries in which a PDI is active and by the budget of the organisation – can be run with less (total) time investments of their volunteers. In line with this, it is anticipated that organisations with larger budgets supporting development projects in numerous countries offer more opportunities for volunteers to spend more hours volunteering, and that volunteers in such organisation are more likely to be asked to volunteer more. In addition, we expect that organisations with more staff are better able to divide the tasks among their volunteers. Our last, demand side, hypothesis reads:

> *H4. (a) The larger the budget of a PDI, (b) the more countries in which a PDI is active and (c) the fewer staff a PDI has, the more hours volunteers will spend PDI volunteering.*

We are of course aware that the number hours volunteered could also affect the size of the development programme. Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to make unambiguous statements about the direction of the effects of the demand side.

3.2.5 Controls

In this contribution we will take into account several individual characteristics known to influence volunteering decisions such as: educational attainment, age, religiosity and gender. In most studies, higher educated, younger and married people turn out to be more willing, or more frequently asked, to volunteer (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011; Rossi, 2001; Smith, 1994; Wilson, 2000). Protestants and frequent church attendees are generally more inclined to donate time and money and to do so not only for religious causes (Bekkers & Schuyt, 2008; Ruiter & de Graaf, 2006). Both the likelihood of being asked and the religious context, which includes pro-social values, have a positive influence on the giving behaviour religious donors and frequent church attendees (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011). The results of earlier studies on the effect of gender on volunteering are not consistent (Wilson, 2000). We will also control for the position of volunteers within the PDI, as we expect that the founders of PDIs spend more hours volunteering than regular volunteers.

3.3. Data, measurements and methods

3.3.1 Data

To address the research question, primary data was collected by conducting a standardised electronic survey in 2008 and 2009. There is no national database in the Netherlands in which PDI volunteers are registered. We therefore made a list of 5,805 valid e-mail addresses of potential PDI volunteers through an extensive web search and based on information provided by Dutch based large-scale development agencies (e.g. Oxfam Novib). These large-scale development agencies are involved in the co-funding of PDIs. 1,956 respondents started the web survey and, of these respondents, 1,238 completed the survey. We thereby reached a response of approximately 21 per cent (100 * [1,238/5,805]). This is considered a fair response rate given that response rates for web surveys are in general between 20-30 per cent (Bernard, 2002). After excluding respondents who did not fit our PDI volunteer definition (*N*=556), we started with a working sample of 682 respondents.[4] We excluded respondents who did not provide information on the dependent variable (volunteer working hours; *N*=10) and for whom we could not construct our VFI scales (*N*=11). Hence, our final sample consisted of 661 respondents. In the results section we discuss the representativeness of the sample[5]

3.3.2 Characteristics of volunteers

Time investment, the key dependent variable in this study, is measured with a single item. Respondents were asked how many hours per month on average they spend volunteering in the PDI. Two variables are included to assess the time restrictions of volunteers. First, the *occupational status* of respondents is registered in six categories: (1) employed; (2) unemployed; (3) disabled; (4) student; (5) household; (6) pensioned. Secondly, the variable membership refers to the number of

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4 Respondents required an average of 45 minutes to finish the survey. The length of the survey explains the relative high number of respondents who started the web survey but did not complete it. Respondents who did not complete the survey do not differ in relevant characteristics such as volunteering hours compared to respondents who completed the questionnaire. It was impossible to define prior to conducting the survey whether or not contacts included in the database belonged to the group of PDI volunteers. This would require information on the organisations in which they volunteer (e.g. Budget) upon which we base our PDI definition. Organisational characteristics are not publicly available and were thus collected through the survey.

5 The data are available on request.

organisations in which the respondent is engaged. Respondents were asked to indicate whether or not they are members of organisations other than PDIs.[6]

The variable *monthly net income* is constructed using both an open-ended question and a question measuring income in categories for those respondents unwilling to give their exact income. The income categories have been recoded into interval values by assigning the mean of each category to respondents. We subsequently substituted reported incomes of 0 euro with 20 euro and corrected for the skewness of this variable by taking the natural logarithm. Three variables were constructed to qualify the distance between the volunteer and the beneficiaries. *Countries visited* refers to the number of developing countries visited at least once. *Remittances* indicates whether respondents have a non-Western background and if they are supporting projects in their country of origin. This latter variable is divided into three categories: (1) Western; (2) non-Western, no remittances (3); non-Western, remittances. The interval variable *volunteering years* refers to the number of years the respondent has been active as a volunteer in a specific PDI.

We also constructed a scale-variable *belief in development organisations* that measures respondents' attitudes towards development organisations. It consists of nine statements such as: 'Development organisations spend too much money on staff and organisation' and 'Most projects of development organisations fail'. The Cronbach's Alpha of the belief in development organisations scale is 0.74, where higher scores indicate a more positive attitude towards development organisations.

Our survey also included information on the Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI) as outlined by Clary et al. (1998). The VFI consists of six different functions for engaging in voluntary activities: (*1) Values, (2) Social, (3) Career, (4) Enhancement, (5) Understanding, (6) Protective*. Each function is measured with three specific items, following the practice of previous research. All scales show sufficient reliability (Cronbach's Alpha range from 0.70 to 0.86).

3.3.3 PDI characteristics

Information on the organisational characteristics 'budget', 'number of staff' and 'number of project countries' are collected among the members of the PDIs themselves. A large majority of the PDIs in this study (*N*=661, 96 per cent) are entirely managed by volunteers (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011), implying that PDI volunteers are involved in or even responsible for the (financial) management of the PDIs. Hence, we assume that PDI volunteers are well informed concerning the budget, number of staff and the number of project countries. *Budget* refers to the annual budget of the PDI. Our questionnaire collected information on the budget in the year 2006 and 2007. For organisations founded before 2008 we calculated the mean budget across 2006 and 2007. If only information for one year was available, we used this information. We constructed the following categories: (1) first quintile (0 -5,850 euro); (2) second quintile (5,856-15,000 euro); (3) third quintile (15,001-28,636 euro); (4) fourth quintile (28,637-59,000 euro); (5) fifth quintile (> 59,000 euro); (6) PDI founded after 2007. We have no budgetary information for PDIs founded after this period (*N*=22, 3.3 per cent).

In addition, the *number of staff* active in the organisation is taken into account. Given the skewed distribution of this variable, we took the natural logarithm. The variable *project countries* refers to the number of developing countries in which the organisation is supporting projects.

3.3.4 Controls, missing values and estimation method

Age is included as an interval variable and the dummy variable *sex* refers to the gender of a volunteer. *Marital status* of respondents consists of five categories: (1) single; (2) couple; (3) married; (4) divorced; (5) widow/widower. *Education* is measured in years, covering seven categories: primary education (6 years); lower secondary vocational education (Lager Beroeps Onderwijs [LBO], 8

6 These include: Trade unions, political parties, religious groups, nature associations, youth associations, sport associations, school associations (such as parents' council), welfare associations and music or theatre associations.

years); lower general secondary education (Middelbaar Algemeen Voortgezet Onderwijs [MAVO], 10 years); upper secondary vocational education (Middelbaar Beroeps Onderwijs [MBO], 10.5 years); higher secondary education (Hoger Algemeen Voortgezet Onderwijs [HAVO], Voorbereidend Wetenschappelijk Onderwijs [VWO], 11.5 years); higher professional education (Hoger Beroeps Onderwijs [HBO], 15 years); university (16.5 years). The *denomination* of the respondents is measured with four categories: (1) non-religious; (2) Catholic; (3) Protestant; (4) other. *Church attendance* is measured in times per year, with non-religious respondents set to zero times a year. The dummy variable *founder* indicates if the respondent is a founding member of the organisation.

Missing values on interval variables were replaced by the average score. We included dummy variables in the explanatory model indicating whether or not missing values were replaced for respondents. For categorical variables, an additional category 'missing' was included if necessary. Interval variables were centred on their mean value to facilitate interpretation (i.e. $X' = X - \overline{X}$). Our dependent variable, time investment, is a count variable, and not normally distributed (see Figure 3.1). The mean and variance are approximately equal; we therefore opted for log-linear Poisson regression analyses (Land et al., 1996).



Figure 3.1 Distribution number of volunteering hours

3.4 Results

3.4.1 Descriptives

Descriptive statistics of the variables are summarised in Table 3.1. Nearly 60 per cent of the volunteers are male. Half of the volunteers consider themselves to be religious, almost a quarter of them being Catholic, close to 20 per cent Protestant and nearly 10 per cent consider themselves to belong to a different denomination. On average, the volunteers earn slightly more than modal income. In general, the volunteers can be considered as higher educated with more than 40 per cent having a higher vocational education degree (BA) and nearly 30 per cent having a university degree. 70 per cent of the volunteers are married. More than 60 per cent of the respondents have a paid job.

They volunteer specifically to obtain a better understanding of the world around them or to express important values.

PDI volunteers spend on average 37 hours per month volunteering, but some volunteer up to 190 hours per month. We find a significant difference (t-value= -5.48) between the average time spent by non-founders (Mean=28 hours per month) and that of PDI founders (Mean=46 hours per month).

Compared to other studies on volunteering in the Netherlands, PDI volunteers (both founders and non-founders) spend a relatively high number of hours per month volunteering (Schuyt & Gouwenberg, 2009; Van Herten, 2009, Van Ingen & Dekker, 2011). The average age of 55 years could explain the relatively high average of time spent volunteering, since it is known that volunteering reaches its peak after middle age (i.e. >40 years) when external obligations related to family and work decrease. The high average level of education could be another explanation for the comparatively high average number of volunteering hours of PDI volunteers (Smith, 1994; Van Ingen & Dekker, 2011; Wilson & Musick, 1997; Wilson, 2000).

The characteristics of our sample of PDI volunteers are comparable to previous PDI volunteer samples from other studies (Brok & Bouzoubaa, 2005; Develtere & Stessens, 2006; Develtere & De Bruyn, 2009). It is, hence, likely that our results can be generalised to the entire population of PDI volunteers. Just as the characteristics of PDI volunteers do not deviate from those reported in previous studies, the organisational characteristics of the PDIs we studied are highly comparable with other studies (Brok & Bouzoubaa, 2005; Develtere & Stessens, 2006; Develtere & De Bruyn, 2009). Since PDI volunteers differ from volunteers in general, we should be cautious about generalising the results of our study to all volunteers. However, the hypotheses derived from the charitable behaviour literature should also hold among the subgroup of volunteers.

Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics (*N*=661)

	MEAN	%	SD
DEPENDENT VARIABLE			
TIME INVESTMENT (1–336 HOURS)	37.23		41.37
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES			
TIME AND FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS			
MEMBERSHIP (0–8 TYPES OF ORGANISATIONS)	2.44		1.68
OCCUPATIONAL STATUS			
EMPLOYED		59.60	
UNEMPLOYED		0.80	
DISABLED		3.00	
STUDENT		1.80	
HOUSEHOLD		4.70	
PENSIONED		29.00	
MONTHLY NET INCOME (€ 0–50,000,–)	1,534.78		3,581.03
DISTANCE TO BENEFICIARIES			
COUNTRIES VISITED (0–100)	4.47		5.72
REMITTANCES			
WESTERN		93.50	
NON-WESTERN, NO REMITTANCES		2.10	
NON-WESTERN, REMITTANCES		4.40	
VOLUNTEERING YEARS	11.03		8.76
ATTITUDE			
BELIEF IN DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATIONS (1.41–4.65)	3.07		0.50
MOTIVES (VFI)			
VALUES	3.69		0.80
SOCIAL	3.22		0.75
CAREER	2.28		0.90
ENHANCEMENT	3.08		0.90
UNDERSTANDING	3.97		0.63
PROTECTIVE	2.56		0.80

Continued on next page>

<Table 3.1 continued

	MEAN	%	SD
ORGANISATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS			
BUDGET			
BUDGET<5,850		15.60	
BUDGET<15,000		18.00	
BUDGET<28,636		17.90	
BUDGET<59,000		18.30	
BUDGET>59,000		18.30	
PDI FOUNDED AFTER 2007		3.30	
PROJECT COUNTRIES (2–56)	2.51		5.05
NUMBER OF STAFF (2–100)	10.10		11.03
CONTROL VARIABLES			
AGE (22–82 YEARS)	55.12		11.25
SEX			
MALE		59.80	
FEMALE		39.90	
DENOMINATION			
NO RELIGION		50.00	
CATHOLIC		23.00	
PROTESTANT		18.30	
OTHER		8.50	
CHURCH ATTENDANCE (0–75 P.A.)	17.72		26.00
MARITAL STATUS			
SINGLE		14.20	
COUPLE		8.90	
MARRIED		70.30	
DIVORCED		3.30	
WIDOW/WIDOWER		2.70	
EDUCATION (6–16.5 YEARS)	14.17		2.43
FOUNDER		47.80	

Source: CIDIN-PDI Database 2008-2009

3.4.2 Bivariate relationships

Table 3.2 presents the bivariate relationships between time investment and the independent variables. Results show that there is a significant negative relationship between both financial and time restrictions and time investment. The available material resources (e.g. income) of the volunteers are clearly negatively related to the volunteers' engagement in PDI activities.

When the distance to beneficiaries is larger, volunteers devote significantly less time to their voluntary job; the more countries that volunteers have visited, the more hours they volunteer (r=0.09), and non-Western volunteers active in their home country volunteer more hours.

A stronger belief in development organisations is negatively related to PDI volunteers' time investment. Of the six functions related to volunteering benefits, only the function 'understanding' has a significant (positive) relation with time investment. Not only the characteristics of the volunteer, but also the features of the PDI are related to time investment. The number of volunteering hours relates significantly and positively to both the budget (F=1.45) and the number of staff (r=0.90) of the organisation.

Table 3.2 Determinants of time investment in Dutch PDIs: bivariate relationships

	MEAN TIME INVESTMENT	F	SPEARMAN CORRELATION
TIME AND FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS			
MEMBERSHIP			-0.12 **
OCCUPATIONAL STATUS		2.00 **	
EMPLOYED	31.41		
UNEMPLOYED	76.40		
DISABLED	53.15		
STUDENT	32.75		
HOUSEHOLD	47.55		
PENSIONED	42.71		
MONTHLY NET INCOME (LN)			-0.18 *
DISTANCE TO BENEFICIARIES			
COUNTRIES VISITED			0.09 *
REMITTANCES		2.13 **	
WESTERN	35.62		
NON-WESTERN, NO REMITTANCES	46.10		
NON-WESTERN, REMITTANCES	67.34		
VOLUNTEERING YEARS			-0.55
ATTITUDE			
BELIEF IN DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATIONS			- 0.14 **
MOTIVES (VFI)			
VALUES			-0.04
SOCIAL			0.02
CAREER			-0.02
ENHANCEMENT			-0.01
UNDERSTANDING			0.12 **
PROTECTIVE			0.05
ORGANISATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS			
BUDGET		1.45 *	
BUDGET<5,850	28.77		
BUDGET<15,000	29.10		
BUDGET<28,636	40.33		
BUDGET≤59,000	38.70		
BUDGET>59,000	47.44		
PDI FOUNDED AFTER 2007	37.72		
PROJECT COUNTRIES			-0.06
NUMBER OF STAFF (LN)			0.90 *

Source: CIDIN-PDI Database 2008-2009
~p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 (two sided test of significance)

3.4.3 Poisson regression analyses

We now turn to the multivariate model in order to test our hypotheses. Table 3.3 shows the results of the Poisson regression of the time investment of volunteers in Dutch PDIs.

First, we briefly discuss the impact of our control variables. Contrary to the findings of earlier studies, education negatively affects PDI voluntary time investment. In line with the results of previous research, men volunteer more frequently than women, married people spend more hours volunteering than singles, and older people spend a larger number of voluntary hours than younger volunteers. Whereas in other studies on charitable behaviour religious people often turn out to be more generous (both in financial and time donations), we find that in comparison to non-religious volunteers, religious volunteers spend fewer hours volunteering with PDIs. While church attendance is often referred to as an important, if not the most important, determinant for charitable behaviour, in this study the effect is insignificant. A recent study by Van Ingen and Dekker (2011) finds that church attendance positively affects voluntary participation, but it has no effect on voluntary time investment. The results of our study are thus in line with the results of this study and seem to affirm the suggestion of Van Ingen and Dekker (2011) that the recruitment function of religious communities is stronger than their function as stimulators of pro-social values.

Table 3 clearly shows that being a member of other civic organisations has a negative effect on the time volunteers spend in the PDIs in which they are actively engaged. Every additional organisation a volunteer belongs to, decreases PDI time investment with a factor 0.94 ($e^{-0.05}$), thus indicating that there is a clear trade-off between volunteering in different organisations. The negative effect of having a paid job on time investment is even stronger. In general, volunteers who also have a paid job volunteer 22 per cent less hours compared to volunteers without a paid job ($(1 - e^{-0.25})*100$). Time investment is negatively affected by financial restrictions too. The higher the income, the fewer hours that are spent volunteering; the parameter estimate is -0.18 and significant. We can thus conclude that both time and financial restrictions have the expected negative influence on time investments for PDI volunteering.

Next, we analyse the effect of distance to the beneficiary on PDI time investment. In our *proximity hypothesis,* we stated that the number of developing countries visited by a volunteer, the duration of volunteering, whether the volunteer has a non-Western background and if the volunteer supports projects in its country of origin will positively influence time investment. Our results largely corroborate this hypothesis. Visits to developing countries influence time investment, with the number of volunteering hours increasing with the number of developing countries visited, although effects are small, as indicated by the parameter estimate of 0.01. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to demonstrate that visits to development countries decrease the perceived distance between volunteers and beneficiaries and positively affect voluntary time investment. Non-Western volunteers spend more hours volunteering than volunteers with a Western ethnic background. In particular, non-Western volunteers supporting projects in their (parents') country of origin spend more volunteering hours compared to Western volunteers, namely twice as much ($e^{0.76}$=2.14). Surprisingly, in contradiction to our *proximity hypothesis*, the longer people have volunteered, the fewer hours they spend ($e^{-0.01}$ =0.99).

In contrast to what we formulated in our attitude and motives hypothesis – volunteers with less belief in development organisations (i.e. stronger doubts) invest more time in PDIs, as indicated by the parameter estimate -0.15. The more sceptical people are regarding the work of development organisations, the more they seem motivated to bring about change by means of small-scale PDIs.

Contrary to earlier studies (e.g. Allison et al., 2002) and hence to our expectations, we find a significant negative effect for volunteering as an expression of important values (i.e. values function). In further contrast to our expectation, volunteering for social motives is (significantly and) positively related to volunteering. We only find evidence for our attitude and motives hypothesis with regard to the volunteering function 'understanding'; volunteering in order to gain a better understanding of the world increases voluntary hours (the parameter estimate is 0.22 and significant).

As we described above, 47 per cent of our respondents are not merely volunteers of PDIs but also the founders of PDIs. PDI founders are more active than general PDI volunteers (the parameter estimate is 0.45 and significant). In additional analyses, we investigated whether the motives for volunteering, as expressed by the VFI, are conditional upon being the founder of the organisation. This proved to be the case (see Table 3.4). For non-founders the effect of the VFI functions 'values' and 'social' are in line with the results of earlier studies (i.e. respectively significant positive (parameter estimate is -0.13) and negative (parameter estimate is 0.07)). We hence conclude that the deviating results of Table 3.3 are due to a relative large number of PDI founders in our sample.

Finally, we included the organisational characteristics. Our expectation formulated in the *demand side hypothesis* that the budget of the organisation is positively related to PDI time investment is confirmed. But in contrast to this hypothesis, we did not find a significant effect for the number of countries in which a PDI implements development projects. This could imply that PDI volunteers are mainly involved in fundraising activities, i.e. concerned with increasing the PDI budget, and only to a lesser extent involved in the implementation of the actual development programme. Another finding that contradicted our expectations is that organisations with more staff are better capable of mobilising volunteering hours.

Table 3.3 Coefficients from Poisson regression: Time investment of PDI volunteers (*N*=661)[a]

	β	S.E.
INTERCEPT	4.59 **	0.09
TIME AND FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS		
MEMBERSHIP	-0.05 **	0.00
OCCUPATIONAL STATUS (UNEMPLOYED=REF.)		
EMPLOYED	-0.25 **	0.08
DISABLED	-0.51 **	0.06
STUDENT	-0.81 **	0.08
HOUSEHOLD	-0.58 **	0.06
PENSIONED	-0.64 **	0.06
LN (MONTHLY NET INCOME)	-0.18 **	0.02
DISTANCE TO BENEFICIARIES		
COUNTRIES VISITED	0.01 **	0.00
REMITTANCES (WESTERN=REF.)		
NON-WESTERN, NO REMITTANCES	0.21 **	0.04
NON-WESTERN, REMITTANCES	0.76 **	0.03
VOLUNTEERING YEARS	-0.01 **	0.00
ATTITUDE		
BELIEF IN DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATIONS	-0.15 **	0.02
MOTIVES (VFI)		
VALUES	-0.04 **	0.01
SOCIAL	0.02 *	0.01
CAREER	-0.06 **	0.01
ENHANCEMENT	-0.02 **	0.01
UNDERSTANDING	0.22 **	0.01
PROTECTIVE	0.10 **	0.01

Continued on next page>

< ***Table 3.3*** *continued*

	β	S.E.
ORGANISATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS		
BUDGET (>59,000=REF.)		
BUDGET<5,850	-0.57 **	0.02
BUDGET<15,000	-0.48 **	0.02
BUDGET<28,636	-0.24 **	0.02
BUDGET≤59,000	-0.20 **	0.02
PDI FOUNDED AFTER 2007	-0.53 **	0.04
PROJECT COUNTRIES	0.00	0.00
LN (NUMBER OF STAFF)	0.22 **	0.01
CONTROL VARIABLES		
SEX (MALE=REF.)	-0.12 **	0.02
AGE	0.01 **	0.00
DENOMINATION (NON RELIGIOUS=REF.)		
CATHOLIC	-0.25 **	0.02
PROTESTANT	-0.29 **	0.03
OTHER	0.03	0.03
CHURCH ATTENDANCE	-0.00	0.00
MARITAL STATUS (MARRIED=REF.)		
SINGLE	-0.02	0.02
COUPLE	0.04	0.03
DIVORCED	0.20 **	0.03
WIDOW/WIDOWER	0.11 **	0.04
EDUCATION	-0.01 **	0.00
FOUNDER (NO=REF.)	0.45 **	0.01
Δ DEVIANCE	21,424.29	
Δ DF	30[b]	

Source: CIDIN-PDI Database 2008-2009
*~p < 0.10; *p< 0.05; **p< 0.01 (two sided test of significance)
Notes:
[a]: Dummies for missing values are included but not shown
[b]: Compared to empty model.

Table 3.4 Coefficients from Poisson regression: Differential effects of personal motives (VFI) for founders and non-founders of PDIs on time investment [a]

	FOUNDERS		NON-FOUNDERS	
	β	S.E.	β	S.E.
INTERCEPT	3.78	0.14	3.83	0.16
MOTIVES (VFI)				
VALUES	-0.13 **	0.01	0.09 **	0.02
SOCIAL	0.07 **	0.01	-0.04 *	0.02
CAREER	-0.04 **	0.01	0.02	0.01
ENHANCEMENT	0.03 **	0.01	-0.07 **	0.01
UNDERSTANDING	0.12 **	0.01	0.44 **	0.02
PROTECTIVE	0.05 **	0.01	0.04 **	0.02
N	316		345	

Source: CIDIN-PDI Database 2008-2009
*-p < 0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 *(two sided test of significance)*
Notes:
[a]: Models were run separately for founders and non-founders, controlled for all other variables included in Table 3.3.

3.5 Conclusions

International development cooperation as a charitable sector is characterised by features known to have a discouraging effect on (potential) individual donors. It is first of all more difficult for potential donors to be aware of the needs of the beneficiaries from international development organisations in comparison to local charitable causes (Bekkers, 2004; Chueng & Chan, 2000; Macaulay, 1975; Unger, 1991; Wiepking, 2008). Secondly, the psychological and geographical distance to beneficiaries hampers the possibility for donors to identify with beneficiaries and to observe the effect of a donation (Bekkers, 2004). Finally, the size and the complexity of the problems dealt with by most international development organisations make it difficult for donors to be convinced that their donation will make a substantial contribution (Micklewright & Wright, 2004). For these reasons, donations to local charitable causes are more attractive to (potential) donors than to international development organisations (Bekkers, 2004).

In the Netherlands, charitable behaviour for international development purposes is subject to important changes. Established development organisations suffer from a declining support base. In contrast, new private development initiatives (PDIs), that execute concrete, small-scale development projects, can count on a strong support of money and time. This study investigates the determinants of voluntary time investment among a sample of 661 Dutch PDI volunteers. We aimed to understand which factors make donating time beneficial and interesting for those engaged in volunteering work with PDIs. We derived four hypotheses from cost-benefit considerations and took into account both the supply side (i.e. characteristics of the volunteer) and the demand side (i.e. characteristics of the organisation) of volunteering work.

Both financial and time restrictions are found to affect the time spent volunteering. When volunteers are restricted in their time, because they have a paid job or due to membership of other civic organisations, they tend to spend significantly less time volunteering. Also when free time is more costly, i.e. when volunteers receive a higher income for their paid job, volunteers spend less hours doing voluntary work. We thereby find corroborative evidence for our constraint hypothesis.

Frequent visits to developing countries are related to more voluntary PDI work. Previous research on PDIs demonstrated that encounters with people in developing countries represent the most important trigger to initiate or become actively engaged in PDIs (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011). This study shows that involvement in the lives of people in developing countries makes the distance to beneficiaries smaller and not only positively affects the willingness to volunteer in a PDI, but also increases the time investment of PDI volunteers. The distance to beneficiaries is also mediated through the ethnic background of the volunteer. Volunteers with a non-Western ethnic background implementing development projects in their country of origin – maybe even in their town or village of origin – are more strongly engaged in PDIs. In comparison to Western volunteers, the psychological distance between non-Western PDI volunteers and the beneficiaries is smaller, increasing the motivation to devote more voluntary hours. Contrary to our expectations, the number of years spent volunteering negatively relates to voluntary time investment. This could indicate that motivation levels decline with years resulting in a lower number of volunteering hours. Still, our proximity hypothesis met strong corroborative evidence.

On the other hand, our attitudes & motives hypothesis is only partly confirmed. Contrary to our expectations, we observed that volunteers with a stronger belief in development organisations volunteer fewer hours. PDI volunteers that have doubts about the effectiveness and efficiency of development organisations may perceive their voluntary time investment in PDIs as an alternative and more successful way to give expression to their involvement with the lives of people in developing countries and to contribute to poverty reduction than supporting established development organisations. The results of the VFI functions (motives for volunteering) demonstrate that volunteers' engagement in PDIs is seen as a way for them to buy off negative feelings such as guilt and to enlarge their understanding of the world around them. The impact of the VFI functions 'social' and 'values' on voluntary time spending deviates between PDI founders and non-founders. The results for founders are not in agreement with the results of earlier studies; we find a positive effect for volunteering for social reasons and a negative effect for volunteering to express important values for founders. Since we expect PDI founders to recruit volunteers mainly from their own network, it might be that – compared to general PDI volunteers – PDI volunteering is a way to spend time with their friends, family or acquaintances ('social' function) for PDI founders. Further research is required to explain how and why the impact of the VFI functions for PDI founders diverges from that of general (PDI) volunteers.

Asides from the characteristics of volunteers, organisational characteristics also influence voluntary time investment in PDIs. Volunteers in organisations with larger budgets spend more hours on voluntary work. Although we did not expect this, the same can be said for volunteers in PDIs with more staff. Contradicting our hypothesis, the number of project countries does not relate to the number of voluntary hours. Although our demand-side hypothesis is only partly confirmed, our study does demonstrate the importance of organisational characteristics for voluntary time investment. Future research – preferably with data that allows controlling for problems of endogeneity – is necessary to further extend our knowledge of how the demand side (i.e. organisation characteristics) affects voluntary time investment.

Whereas many (non PDI) organisations mainly engage volunteers in supporting their paid staff members, the existence of most PDIs is totally dependent on the efforts of volunteers. Most of them were initiated on a voluntary basis and a large majority continues to depend solely on the efforts of volunteers. Compared to general volunteers, PDI volunteers spend a much larger number of volunteering hours, but even among this specific group of volunteers time investment is the result of a deliberate decision-making process wherein both costs and benefits resulting from volunteering are included. More research is needed to explain why PDI volunteers spend more time on voluntary work than general volunteers. The specific characteristics of the PDI organisations may constitute an important part of the explanation.

Current developments in Dutch society indicate a growing donor-potential for PDIs. Our results suggest that PDI volunteering could be considered as a substitute for official development aid, fuelled by a sceptical attitude towards established development cooperation. In a time when established development organisations are criticised for not being fully effective and efficient, PDIs can attract volunteers by presenting their organisations as an alternative way to contribute to poverty reduction.

Travelling to developing countries seems to enable Westerners to bridge the geographical and psychological gap between them and the beneficiaries of development projects and hence brings the beneficiaries closer to a potential donor. The shrinking of the world through, among other things, increased travel possibilities and the internet, provides increasing possibilities for overcoming the limitations associated with donating to organisations with distant beneficiaries. Bringing the beneficiary closer could result in an increasing donor-potential for organisations that have distant beneficiaries, such as Private Development Initiatives.

We are aware that the sample used in this study is very particular: we tested our hypotheses on a group of volunteers active in international development cooperation and even more specifically in Private Development Initiatives. Hence, we should be cautious of generalising our results and conclusions to the volunteer population at large. The fact that the impact of motives to volunteer affect volunteering time differently for PDI founders and non-founders illustrates that the determinants of volunteering may be conditional on the type of volunteer. We have shown that the characteristics of PDI organisations affect the time investment decisions of PDI volunteers. It remains open for future research to establish which organisational characteristics are important for which type of voluntary sector and volunteer. Similarly, scholars in the field may wish to investigate how other types of voluntary organisations can bring the beneficiaries closer and to assess the extent to which a smaller perceived distance to these beneficiaries positively affects donating.

Chapter 04

4. Explaining monetary donations to international development organisations: A factorial survey approach[1]

'They [private donors] have trust in you, and you are running the foundation. If tomorrow we will tell them we are going to do something else, they will continue to support us. They trust us.'

Interview PDI member[2]

'In the beginning I have told many people about our plan. Of course, they all spontaneously donated money because they liked the idea and because others were donating as well. And all of them remained loyal as donor. Because they believe in what we believe.'

Interview PDI founder

'I noticed that having a good network is crucial; you can achieve many things through your network. When I post a very concrete story on Facebook or LinkedIn, within a month there is a new amount of money on our bank account. And then people want to know how it is going, and then I send them some pictures. It is all pretty amateurish, but people really like it.'

Interview PDI founder

[1] A slightly different version of this chapter is published in Social Science Research (Kinsbergen & Tolsma, 2013).

[2] The quotes are derived from interviews with founders/members of Private Development Initiatives (see Chapter 5). The data are available on request.

Abstract

This chapter investigates what type of international development organisations potential donors would prefer to donate to. We constructed 960 scenarios in which a fictive development organisation was described. The scenarios were randomly varied across eight characteristics of the organisation: size, familiarity, experience, religious character, number of different projects run by the organisation, number of countries in which the organisation is active, overhead costs and staff composition. A large representative sample of the Dutch population (*N*=2,758) received six randomly allocated scenarios and had to decide if, and if so, how much they would donate to the depicted (fictive) organisation. Results demonstrate that donors have a preference for familiar organisations with several years of experience. Although donors have a strong aversion regarding overhead costs, we find that donors seem to value the capacities of paid staff members and are, to a certain extent, willing to pay a price for these. The ideal development organisation combines features typical of small(er) scale voluntary development organisations (e.g. mainly run by volunteers) and large(r) scale professional organisations (e.g. running development programmes in numerous countries).

Keywords: International development organisations; trustworthiness; giving intentions; scenario study; factorial survey

4.1 Introduction

Why people donate to charitable organisations and how much they are willing to donate are questions that have been extensively investigated by marketers, (social) psychologists, economists, anthropologists and sociologists (see: Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011, Sargeant & Woodliffe, 2007 for reviews). Most previous studies focused on giving behaviour in general, on giving behaviour to a specific charitable sector (e.g. healthcare) and – to a lesser extent – on the preferences of donors for different charitable sectors (e.g. international development cooperation versus nature conservation) (Atkinson, 2008; Bennett, 2003; Micklewright & Wright, 2004; Schlegelmilch & Tynan, 1989; Wiepking, 2010). How characteristics of charitable organisations active within the same sector influence giving behaviour has received relatively little attention. A notable exception is Nunnenkamp & Öhler (2011). Thus far, insights on giving behaviour do not provide an answer to the question of why a given organisation is more attractive for potential donors than another operating in the same in the same sector. To fill these lacunae, the present study takes an intra-sector perspective in order to analyse how characteristics of international development organisations affect monetary donation decisions of potential donors. The research question of this chapter is:

> *How do characteristics of development organisations influence the decision making of potential donors?*

International development organisations are characterised by features known to have a discouraging effect on (potential) donors (Bekkers, 2010). First, it is more difficult for potential donors to be aware of the needs of the beneficiaries of international development organisations compared to those of local charitable causes (Bekkers, 2004; Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011; Chueng & Chan, 2000; Macaulay, 1975; Unger, 1991; Wiepking, 2008). Second, the psychological and geographical distance to beneficiaries hampers the possibility for donors to identify with beneficiaries and to observe the effect of a donation (Bekkers, 2004; Kinsbergen, et al., 2013). Third, the size and the complexity of the problems dealt with by most international development organisations make it difficult for donors to be convinced that their donation will make a substantial contribution (Micklewright & Wright, 2004). Finally, as compared to local charitable causes (such as 'health care' or 'arts & culture'), donations to international development organisations offer no direct, personal benefit for donors.

Unsurprisingly, public attitude towards international development organisations is sceptical. People are doubtful about the effectiveness of international development organisations and the efficiency with respect to how their money is spent (Bekkers & Boonstoppel, 2011; Carabain et al., 2012; Council on Foreign Relations, 2012; European Commission, 2010; Gijsbers & van der Lelij, 2010; Hento, 2011; Lindstrom & Henson, 2011; Pollet, 2012; PQR, 2010; Ravelli & Verhoeven, 2008). People are sceptical about the achievability of poverty reduction and pose critical questions on the share of the budget that international development organisations spend on overhead costs (PQR, 2010).

This critical tuning is accompanied by an increasing number and diversity of actors taking up an active role in the field of international development cooperation. Growing numbers of companies, philanthropists, famous stars – referred to as celebrity humanitarians – and 'ordinary' individuals feel the urge to actively contribute to the global fight against poverty (Bishop & Green, 2008; Cameron & Haanstra, 2008; Develtere & De Bruyn, 2009; Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011; Samman et al., 2009; Severino & Ray, 2010; Yrjölä, 2009). One of these rising alternative development actors is the group of Private Development Initiatives (PDIs) (Develtere & De Bruyn, 2009; Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011). These organisations are characterised by their small size (i.e. small budget and limited number of staff) and voluntary character (i.e. low percentage of paid staff members) (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011). As a consequence, nowadays, there is a wide range of development organisations – from small to large, from experienced to novice, from professionally

run, to run by volunteers only – competing for financial support. The question to which of these international development organisations the public prefers to donate money is more relevant than ever before.

Trust in philanthropic organisations is crucial, both for retaining existing donors and for attracting new donors (Bekkers, 2003a; Bekkers, 2003b; Bowman, 2004; Sargeant & Lee, 2002a; Sargeant & Lee, 2002b; Zalpha van Berkel & WWAV, 2005). In a study of Dutch citizens 60 per cent of donors trust charitable organisations, whereas only 12 per cent of non-donors do so (Zalpha van Berkel & WWAV, 2005). Moreover, donors that have trust in charitable organisations donate 50 per cent more than those without trust in these organisations (Independent Sector, 2002). Trust in charitable organisations thus results in both a higher number of donations and donations of larger amounts (Sargeant & Lee, 2004). Hence, our main expectation is that development organisations that are able to signal trustworthiness receive a larger number of donations and donations of a higher value. But in which cases are development organisations considered trustworthy? And do other characteristics, not (directly) related to trust, also influence the giving behaviour of individuals?

Our site of study is the Netherlands. Notwithstanding the negative features (described above) that all development organisations share, the Netherlands is known for its generous donations to charitable causes in general and to international development cooperation in particular (Micklewright & Wright, 2004; OECD, 2012; Schuyt et al., 2013). To date, the Netherlands is one of the few countries that honours the agreement to contribute 0.7 per cent of its Gross National Product to Official Development Aid (OECD, 2012).[3] International development organisations received 281 million euro from Dutch households in 2011, making international development cooperation – next to faith-based organisations and health care – the third largest charitable cause in the Netherlands (Bekkers & de Wit, 2013). The diversification of actors within this philanthropic sector has been very pronounced in the Netherlands. In the 1990s, there were just over 100 Dutch Non Governmental Development Organisations (here abbreviated as NGO's), one of the important development actors in the Netherlands. In ten years time, this number almost doubled (IS Academie NGO database). Similarly, there is a large number of PDIs in the Netherlands (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011).

To investigate to what extent characteristics of development organisations affect the decisions of (potential) donors to donate money, we included a factorial survey design in the fifth edition of the Family Survey of the Dutch Population (FSDP) completed by 2,758 respondents in 2009 (Kraaykamp et al., 2009). We constructed 960 standardised scenarios that each describes a fictive international development organisation. The scenarios varied systematically across 8 dimensions: (1) size (i.e. small or large), (2) familiarity (i.e. known or unknown to potential donor), (3) experience (i.e. in years), (4) religious character (i.e. denominational or non-denominational), (5) number of different projects run by organisation (i.e. few or many), (6) number of countries in which the organisation is active (i.e. one or several), (7) overhead costs (in percentages) and (8) staff composition (i.e. mainly volunteers or paid staff). Out of the 960 scenarios, six were randomly allocated to each respondent of the FSDP. Respondents were told they could donate 0 to 100 euro to each of the fictive organisations described in the scenario. We will investigate when people decide to donate and, if they do so, how much they decide to donate. The FSDP includes extensive measures for individual characteristics known from previous research to be predictive for donating to charitable organisations (e.g. age, education, general social trust) as well as information on the actual monetary donations of the respondent in the past (Kraaykamp et al., 2010). We will show below that the known determinants of donating behaviour and previous donations are related to fictive donation decisions. This demonstrates the internal validity of our design. Furthermore, the wide array of individual characteristics allows us to investigate heterogeneity in the impact of organisational characteristics on (fictive) donation decisions.

[3] In the most recent coalition agreement the Dutch government announced the contribution to international development cooperation will be reduced to approximately 0.5 per cent of the GNP (Coalition agreement, 2012).

4.2 Expectations

4.2.1 Characteristics of development organisations affecting monetary donations

Having trust in the effective and efficient use of their donation is pivotal in the decision-making process of donors (Bekkers, 2010; Cheung & Chan, 2000; Sargeant & Woodliffe, 2007; Supphellen & Nelson, 2001). Duncan (2004) uses the term 'impact philanthropists': donors want to have the feeling that they personally make a difference in the lives of the beneficiaries of a charitable organisation. They will be reluctant to donate when they are of the opinion that their contributions cannot make an immediate difference because the problems dealt with by the organisation are too big or too complex (Micklewright & Wright, 2004). Donors also want to be convinced of the organisation's capability to spend their money wisely and feel less rewarded and less willing to donate when they are uncertain that their donation will make a valuable contribution (Bekkers, 2010; Micklewright & Wright, 2004). Consequently, the psychological reward will increase when donors trust development organisations to make a genuine difference in the lives of beneficiaries because they 'do the right things' and 'do these things rightly'. For international development organisations dealing with complex, problems and distant beneficiaries, signalling trustworthiness is especially crucial and challenging (Bekkers, 2006; Wiepking, 2010).

According to Supphellen and Nelson (2001), when deciding if they should donate or not, the first important aspect for potential donors is whether they are familiar with the requesting charitable organisation. Donors' trust in the efficiency and effectiveness of charitable organisations will be enhanced if they are already familiar with the organisation (Saxton, 1995; Supphellen & Nelson, 2001). We therefore expect that people are more likely to donate money to known development organisations and also that donors donate more to known development organisations. We formulate the familiarity hypothesis:

> *H1. People have a higher probability of donating (more) money to a development organisation they know.*

To overcome barriers to donating to international development organisations, (potential) donors have to be convinced that their donation makes a difference in the lives of the beneficiaries of the organisation. Donors want to be able to assess the impact of their donations and to identify with the beneficiaries of the organisation as well. Small-size development organisations, organisations working in one developing country and organisations supporting fewer development projects will be better able to respond to these requirements. We will refer to these three features as the scale of the organisation. It is easier for donors to monitor the work of small-scale development organisations and see the impact of individual donations on their work (Borgloh et al., 2013; Duncan, 2004; Man & Van Hemert, 2006; Micklewright & Wright, 2004). In this study, we test whether donors really have a preference for small-scale development organisations. Our *scale hypothesis* reads:

> *H2. People are more willing to donate (more) money to (a) small development organisations, (b) organisations working in fewer development countries and (c) carrying out fewer development projects.*

The desire of donors to have an impact on the lives of the beneficiaries suggests a preference for organisations where the budget is mainly spent on development programmes rather than on management. Results of different studies show that, when assessing the performance of an organisation, people attach great weight to the overhead ratio, namely the ratio between administration and fundraising costs and total expenditures (Bekkers, 2003a; Bowman, 2006; Callen, 1994; Sargeant, et al., 2001; Tinkelman & Mankaney, 2007). Not only may high overhead ratios signal inefficiency, they may also be associated with malpractice or even corruption by (potential) donors. The effect this can have on the charitable organisation is illustrated by the case of the Dutch development organisation, 'Plan Nederland', who lost almost half of its donors after the media reported on 'overhead ratios reaching 50 per cent' and 'the exorbitant salary' of the interim manager (Velthuis, 2006). We therefore formulate the *overhead hypothesis*:

> *H3. People are more willing to donate (more) money to development organisations with a lower overhead ratio.*

Sargeant and Lee (2002a) argue that potential donors will consider the role competence of an organisation to spend money effectively and efficiently when evaluating the impact of their donation. They define role competence as the 'degree to which the non-profit has the necessary skills, abilities and knowledge for effective task performance' (Sargeant & Lee, 2002a: 784). They conclude that the higher the degree of perceived competence of the individual and the organisation pleading for a financial contribution, the more likely they are to earn the trust of the donor. We expect the age of the organisation – as a proxy for its experience – to positively affect the extent to which people perceive an organisation as competent. Moreover, potential donors will base their judgment of the competency of the organisation on the skills, knowledge and abilities of the staff carrying out the work. If this holds true, it is to be expected that people perceive an organisation with professional staff (i.e. people who are trained in a certain profession and earn a living from it) to be more competent than organisations mainly run by volunteers. Therefore, we formulate the *role competence hypothesis*:

> *H4. People are more willing to donate (more) money to (a) experienced development organisations and (b) development organisations run by professional staff.*

4.2.2 The combination of organisational characteristics

Although potential donors may have a preference for both professional staff *and* low overhead ratios, paid employees are obviously more expensive than volunteers and may therefore lead to higher overhead ratios. In the cost-benefit analysis of potential donors, a preference for organisations run by professional staff is likely to be accompanied by a higher tolerance towards overhead costs; competence does not come for free. We formulate the *staff and overhead (interaction) hypothesis:*

> *H5. The negative impact of overhead ratios on monetary donations is smaller for development organisations run by paid staff.*

Empirical studies find that overhead ratios decrease as the scale of organisations increases (Hager et al., 2001; Malki & Brown, 2011). Large-scale organisations experience the advantages of economies of scale, whereas small-scale non-profit organisations have to spend a larger proportion of their budget on administration costs. We therefore could expect a lower tolerance towards overhead ratios for larger development organisations, organisations active in more than one country and organisations running several development projects. On the other hand, qualitative research shows that (potential) donors assume small-scale development organisations to spend (nearly) all of their budget directly on their development programmes while they expect larger scale development organisations to have higher overhead ratios (PQR, 2010). This may result in a stronger aversion towards the overhead costs of small-scale development organisations.

In this contribution we will explore which of both argumentations is reflected in (potential) donors' decision-making process. Since we do not have a preference for either of these two argumentations, we do not formulate a hypothesis.

Furthermore, we expect that the age of the organisation – functioning as a proxy for its experience and reputation (Tinkelman, 1999; Weisbrod & Dominguez, 1986) – will moderate the effect of the familiarity of the organisation on the preparedness of donors to donate money. We expect that the familiarity of the requesting organisation will be less important to (potential) donors for organisations with more experience. We formulate the *experience and familiarity (interaction) hypothesis*:

> *H6. The positive impact of the familiarity of development organisations on monetary donations is smaller for experienced organisations.*

4.2.3 For whom do organisational characteristics matter more?

As stated above, in order to receive monetary donations it is important to signal trustworthiness, but not all potential donors are easily convinced that a voluntary organisation can be trusted. We expect the impact of organisational features to be conditional on characteristics of the donor. The Netherlands is traditionally considered a high trust country (CBS, 2012). Of our respondents, 67.6 per cent indicated that people in general can be trusted but generalised social trust varies considerably across individuals.[4] General social trust is positively related to trust in institutions, and individuals high in (general and institutional) social trust are more willing to donate to charitable organisations (Bekkers, 2003b). One could therefore expect that for potential donors low in trust, it is more important that an organisation signals trust, for example by being known. We therefore formulate the *trust and familiarity (interaction) hypothesis*:

> *H7. The positive impact of the familiarity of development organisations on monetary donations is larger for individuals low in general social trust.*

Similarly, scepticism regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of development organisations varies among potential donors (see Table 4.2). Sceptical donors are convinced that, in general, development organisations are ineffective and inefficient: money is being wasted on fundraising and administration. The sceptical donor, in particular, may perceive a high level of overhead costs in development organisations as an indication of this waste: the budget spent on, among other things, management, fundraising and staff is seen as money that has not been (directly) transferred to the projects of a development organisation. We therefore expect that overhead costs have a stronger negative effect on more sceptical (potential) donors. Our *scepticism and overhead (interaction) hypothesis* reads:

> *H8. The negative impact of overhead ratios on monetary donations is higher for people with a low belief in development organisations.*

Donors express a preference for those organisations that are in keeping with their values because 'philanthropy is a means to reach a desired state of affairs that is closer to one's view of the 'ideal world" (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011: 941). As different charities adhere to different worldviews and thus strive for different goals, donors can choose to donate to an organisation that fits their worldview best. Different studies demonstrate that people indeed donate to organisations that have similar values to their own (Bennet, 2003; Sargeant & Woodliffe, 2007; Saxton, 1995;

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[4] Following the statement 'In general, most people can be trusted', participants could give an answer on a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means 'completely disagree' and 5 'completely agree'. The mean value is 3.61 with a standard deviation of 0.85 (see also Table 4.2).

Supphellen & Nelson, 2001; Wiepking, 2008). Religious people are found to donate more than the non-religious and are especially inclined to donate both time and money to organisations with a religious character (Bekkers, 2003a; Bekkers & Schuyt, 2008; Ruiter & de Graaf, 2006; Wiepking, 2010). We expect this relationship to also be evident when potential donors have to choose between different organisations within one sub-sector, international development cooperation. Our, final, *religiosity (interaction) hypothesis* reads:

> *H9. The religious background of the development organisations will positively affect monetary donations for religious individuals.*

4.3 Controls

In this contribution we take into account several other individual characteristics known to influence the decision to donate to charitable organisations and we will also use the self-reported giving behaviour of respondents in the past to predict giving intentions. The inclusion of these known determinants of giving behaviour allows us to check the internal validity of the scenario design. In most studies, income, age and level of education positively affect people's willingness to donate (more) money (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011; Sargeant & Woodliffe, 2007). Protestants and frequent church attendees are generally more inclined to donate (more) and not only to religious causes (Bekkers & Schuyt, 2008; Ruiter & de Graaf, 2006). Both the religious context – including pro-social values – and the likelihood of being asked have a positive influence on their giving behaviour (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011). The results of earlier studies on the effect of gender on donating are ambiguous (Sargeant & Woodliffe, 2007). Most studies do not reveal differences between the giving behaviour of men and women. However, some studies revealed that although women are more likely to donate, men donate higher amounts (Andreoni et al., 2003; Bekkers, 2004). We include (the level of) people's general social trust and their belief in development organisations in the analysis, and we expect it to positively affect the giving intentions of respondents (Bekkers, 2003b; Bekkers, 2006; Wiepking et al., 2007). Lastly, we expect visits to development countries to decrease the distance between (potential) donors and beneficiaries resulting in a higher probability of donating (more) money (Bekkers, 2010).

4.4 Data and methods

4.4.1 Family Survey of the Dutch Population

We tested our hypotheses with the use of the fifth edition of the Family Survey of the Dutch Population (FSDP) wave 2009 (Kraaijkamp et al., 2009). The survey is designed by the Sociology Department of the Radboud University Nijmegen in the Netherlands and aims to gain insight into the living conditions and life course of the Dutch population. The target population of the survey are Dutch-speaking people aged between 18 and 70 years.[5] The data was collected from individuals within households, using Computer Aided Personal Interviewing (CAPI) and a written self-completion questionnaire. Field research took place in the period from January until December 2009. A response rate of 49.4 per cent (N=3,269) was obtained. We excluded respondents in our sample (about 14 per cent) that did not fill out the self-completion part of the survey because this part contains the relevant items for this study. After listwise deletion of respondents with missing data (about 1.5 per cent), our working sample consists of 2,758 respondents.

[5] For the present study we also include the 55 respondents (2 per cent) whose self-reported age was older than 70.

The FSDP consists of a large (more or less) representative sample of the native Dutch population.[6] For more information on the FSDP we refer those interested to the codebook (Kraaijkamp et al., 2010).[7]

4.4.2 Scenarios on development organisations

We used a factorial survey approach to assess people's preferences for particular development organisations. We constructed 960 standardised fictive scenarios. Each standardised scenario consisted of one or more short sentences in a fixed order that described a specific development organisation. The development organisations within the 960 scenarios were systematically varied on eight dimensions: (1) size of the organisation *(small-big),* (2) familiarity (*unknown- known*), (3) experience (*5, 10 or 20 years*), (4) religiosity (*non religious-religious*), (5) number of projects run by an organisation (*some-many*), (6) the number of countries an organisation is working in (*one-several*), (7) overhead ratio (*0%, 20%, 40%, 60% and 80%* spend on overhead costs) and (8) staff composition (whether the organisation is mainly run by *volunteers* or *paid staff).*[8] Randomly combining these features, resulted in 960 unique scenarios (2*2*3*2*2*2*5*2). The factorial survey design was incorporated in the Computer Assisted Personal Interview of the Family Survey of the Dutch Population. A laptop was given to the respondents. They started by reading an introduction. They were told they had, in each case, a maximum of 100 euro to donate to the organisation described.[9] Respondents could also decide not to donate to the depicted organisation. Each scenario was presented on a separate page, respondents could not return to a previous scenario. The outline of the scenario, including the introductory text, is described below:

> *[Introductory text]*
>
> *Six different development organisations will be presented to you. The organisations differ from one another in several of their characteristics. You will be requested to donate to each of these organisations, and each time you will have a maximum of 100 euro to spend. It is of course possible not to donate to the depicted organisation.*
>
> *[Scenario]*
>
> *Imagine you have 100 euro to spend on charitable causes. A [small-big] [unknown-known] development organisation with [5-10-20] years of experience asks for your support. [The organisation has a religious background-'blank']. The organisation is supporting [some-many] projects in [one country-several countries]. For each euro given to the organisation, [100-80-60-40-20] cent reaches the beneficiary. The organisation is mainly run by [volunteers-paid staff]. How much would you like to donate to this development organisation?*

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6 We observe no substantial differences in the explanatory variables of interest (e.g. age, church attendance, education, general social trust) between a weighted and unweighted dataset (results available on request). Therefore, we present results for an unweighted dataset.

7 The data are deposited at the electronic filing system DANS and available after permission of the researcher.

8 The size of the organisation refers to a combination of its budget and the number of staff members. We decided not to include both of these features separately in the scenarios since this would make it too complex for respondents to weigh all the different features in their decision-making process.

9 The endowment of 100 euro has been set in the same order of magnitude as the average annual donation to development organisations in the Netherlands (87 euro; Gouwenberg et al., 2011). We thought it was also a manageable number to work with for the respondents.

The 960 constructed descriptions of development organisations map most, if not all, real development organisations. The observed impact of organisational characteristics on intentions to donate can be generalised to development organisations, but not to different types of organisations.

Six scenarios out of the total of 960 were randomly allocated to every respondent. This resulted in 16,548 observations (N_o=2,758 * 6) on monetary donations. These 16,548 observations (N_o) are nested in respondents (N_i=2,758) and in scenarios (N_s=960). The nesting is non-hierarchical; observations are nested both in respondents (for each respondent we have 6 observations) and in scenarios (for each scenario we expect approximately 17 observations (16,548/960)). We therefore applied cross-classified multilevel methods in order to obtain non-biased standard errors (Shi et al., 2010; Luo & Kwok, 2009). Figure 4.1 presents the frequency distribution of the (intended) donations to development organisations. We constructed two dependent variables related to the willingness to donate to development organisations. First we recoded all observation into the variable *intention to donate* which takes up the value 0 (no donation) or 1 (donation) (see dashed black line Figure 4.1). We then selected only those observations in which a donation was made (10,323 observations, approximately 62 per cent) and recoded these observations into the variable *donate40.* This variable reflects whether donations were lower than 40 euro (the mean value is 40.7, dashed grey line Figure 4.1) or above 40 euro.



Figure 4.1 Histogram of (intended) donations to development organisations
Note: The spaces between the bars represent a frequency of zero. The two dashed lines represent the two cut-off values for our dependent variables (and thus not frequencies). Of all 16,548 donation observations, 10,323 are larger than zero, demarcated by the black dashed line. The mean value of all 10,323 positive donations is 40.7 (dashed grey line).

The factorial survey approach is a quasi-experiment within a survey (Bekkers, 2010; Rossi & Anderson, 1982). It incorporates the advantage of surveys and experiments. Whereas experiments often struggle with the rather low disparity of socio-demographic and personality characteristics due to relatively small samples, surveys have large sample of respondents (Bekkers, 2010). Randomisation within the scenarios and in their allocation gives the factorial survey the robustness of an experimental method (Taylor, 2006). An important challenge related to the factorial survey approach discussed in the literature is the correspondence between the intended and actual behaviour of individuals (Bekkers, 2010; Eifler, 2007, Tolsma et al., 2012). We dealt with this in the present study by including the self-reported giving behaviour of the respondents in the analysis. Unfortunately, the survey only contains information on whether or not respondents donated to development organisations in the past but does not provide information on the amount respondents' donated.

We decided to construct scenarios that could also include less true-to-life development organisations (e.g. organisation mainly run by professionals with 100 per cent of the donations reaching the beneficiary), because (1) we wanted to find out if people prefer organisations with (as yet) less likely combinations of features; and (2) in order to come as close as possible to a real experiment, all characteristics of the development organisation had to be randomly varied.

4.4.3 Individual characteristics

The dummy variable *Female* refers to the gender of a respondent, with male being the reference category. *Age* is included as a continuous variable. To see whether the religiosity of an individual affects monetary donations, we measured the *Denomination* of the respondents in four categories: (1) non-religious; (2) Catholic; (3) Protestant; (4) other. *Church attendance* is measured in times per year for both individuals who do and do not belong to a specific denomination. *Education* was measured in years: primary education (6 years); lower secondary vocational education (8 years); lower general secondary education (10 years); upper secondary vocational education (10.5 years); higher secondary education (11.5 years); higher professional education (15 years); university education (16.5 years). *Income* refers to the personal net monthly income of the respondent. We constructed four income categories of approximately equal size with the following ranges (1) 0-750 euro; (2) 751-1,500 euro; (3) 1,501-2,100 euro; (4) >2,100 euro. We also included a missing category. We measured respondents' *General social trust* with a single item: 'In general, most people can be trusted'. Response categories ranged from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree). We constructed a scale to measure people's attitude towards development organisations, *Belief in development organisations*. This scale consists of nine items related to the accountability, efficiency and effectiveness of development organisations (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Items 'Belief in Development Organisations'-scale

CONSTRUCT	ITEMS
EFFECTIVENESS	Many development organisations deliver a bad job.
	Most projects of development organisations fail.
	Development organisations are good at poverty reduction.
EFFICIENCY	Development organisations waste little money.
	Development organisations spend too much money on staff and organisation in the Netherlands.
	Development organisations could achieve the same results with less money.
ACCOUNTABILITY	Development organisations give enough information on their achievements in development countries.
	Development organisations only tell what goes right and hide their failures.
	Development organisations should not spend money on communication.

Notes:
[a] Answer categories: (1) Completely agree, (2) Agree, (3) Neither agree, nor disagree, (4) Disagree, Completely disagree.
[b] Items were (re)coded in the same direction so that higher scores indicate a more positive attitude towards development organisations.

For each item response categories ranged from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree). The Cronbach's Alpha of this scale is 0.77, where higher scores indicate a more positive attitude towards development organisations. We included the dummy variable *Visit to developing country*, indicating whether or not a respondent visited a developing country. The variable *Self-reported donation to development organisation* shows whether or not the respondent donated to a development organisation in the past year.

Because of the small number of missing values we applied listwise deletion. All metric variables are centred on their mean value to facilitate interpretation. Descriptive statistics of the individual variables are summarised in Table 4.2. Almost half of the respondents are male and their average age is 50 years. Nearly 60 per cent of the respondents are non-religious, 21 per cent belong to the Catholic Church and close to 15 per cent consider themselves as Protestant. On average, respondents attained 11 years of education. The mean score of 2.89 on the 'Belief in Development Organisations' scale is just above the 'neutral' midpoint of 2.5 and demonstrates there is, in general, only to some extent a positive belief in development organisations. Nearly 20 per cent of the respondents said they visited at least one developing country. In the past year, 40 per cent of the respondents reported to have donated to a development organisation.

Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics (Respondent level, N_i=2,758)

	MEAN	%	STANDARD DEVIATION
SEX			
MALE		48.91	
FEMALE		51.08	
AGE (20–92 YEARS)	50.41		11.55
DENOMINATION			
NON RELIGIOUS		58.92	
CATHOLIC		21.10	
PROTESTANT		14.93	
OTHER		5.04	
CHURCH ATTENDANCE (0–75 P.A.)	9.07		19.29
EDUCATION (6–16.5 YEARS)	11.42		3.26
MONTHLY NET INCOME			
0–750 EURO		19.36	
751–1,500 EURO		19.86	
1,501–2,100 EURO		18.02	
>2,100 EURO		18.99	
MISSING		23.74	
GENERAL SOCIAL TRUST (1–5)	3.61		0.85
BELIEF IN DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATION (1– 5)	2.89		0.53
VISIT TO DEVELOPING COUNTRY			
NO		79.91	
YES		20.08	
(SELF–REPORTED) GIVING TO DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATIONS			
NO		55.18	
YES		40.24	
MISSING		4.56	

Source: Family Survey Dutch Population, Wave 2009

4.5 Results

4.5.1 Internal validity

Table 4.3 presents the estimated logit coefficients of cross-classified multilevel logit models and the corresponding average marginal effects.[10] Before we discuss the effects of the organisational characteristics on donors' giving intentions, we discuss the results of the individual characteristics. The inclusion of individual level characteristics does not affect the estimates of the organisational level characteristics because the scenarios were successfully randomly allocated to respondents (results for models without individual level characteristics are available on request).

Our results are mostly in line with those of earlier studies on actual monetary donations to charitable organisations, affirming the internal validity of our design. In line with previous research, women have a higher probability to donate and, among donors, women are more likely to donate more than 40 euro, the respective estimated logit coefficients are 0.67 for Intention to donate and 0.47 for Donate40. Although, this latter finding contrasts with the studies on charitable behaviour of Andreoni and colleagues (2003) and Bekkers (2004), it is in line with Chang (2005).

The age of respondents negatively affects the intention to donate: older people have a lower probability to donate money to development organisations (β = -0.03 for Intention to donate). However, older donors are more often inclined to donate more than the mean donation of 40 euro (β = 0.01 for Donate40).

Protestants and Catholics donate more frequently (on average, the probability that Protestants and Catholics donate is approximately 0.1 higher than that non-religious donate, as indicated by the respective marginal effects). Church attendance positively and significantly affects both the intention to donate and, for donors, the intention to donate more than the mean donation of 40 euro. Education only positively affects the intended amount donated (β = 0.05 for Donate40).

In contrast to earlier studies, we find that income has no effect on giving intentions. This is likely the result of how we constructed the scenarios. We asked respondents to imagine they had 100 euro to spend on each of the six charitable causes presented to them in the vignettes. They could also decide to keep the 'fake' money for themselves. Because we are dealing with fictive money, this may make the actual income of respondents irrelevant. On the other hand, as stated above, in approximately 38 per cent of our observations respondents were unwilling to give 'fake' money to the presented organisation.[11] Although this seems to indicate that participants treated the 100 euro as real money – thereby lending credibility to our study design – it makes it harder to explain the null finding with respect to income.

A higher general social trust results in a higher probability to donate money to development organisations, but among donors it does not affect the chance to donate more than the mean donation. A more positive attitude towards development organisations does result in a higher likelihood of giving a donation to these organisations, as indicated by the significant coefficient 1.38 for Intention to donate. However, among those who decide to donate, the intention to donate more or less than the mean donation is not significantly affected by people's attitude towards development organisations (see Table 4.3).

Visits to development countries have a negative effect on the willingness to donate to international development organisations (β = -0.37 for Intention to donate). In contrast, for donors who visited a developing country the chance to donate more than 40 euro increases (on average) with 0.03. Kinsbergen and Schulpen (2011) argue that a visit to a developing country is of time invested in the voluntary organisation.

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10 The models are estimated in R (http://CRAN.R-project.org) with the function glmer of the package lme4. The command for the null model – without explanatory variables – looks like: model0 <- glmer (Y1~(1|RESPONDENT)+(1|SCENARIO), family=binomial, data=FSDP). To calculate the average marginal effects we took into account the predicted random parts, next to the values of the covariates, as well.

11 Approximately 13 per cent of respondents did not give anything to the six organisations presented to them (not shown).

However, both of these studies suffered from selection bias; their sample consisted only of already active volunteers. The results of the current study show that, for potential donors, visits to development countries have an inhibiting effect on their willingness to donate money to development organisations.

Finally, we find a strong positive effect of self-reported giving behaviour on the decision whether or not to donate: the odds of donating to a (fictive) development organisation is approximately twice as large (exp(0.72)= 2.07) for respondents who donated money to charitable causes as compared to respondents who did not donate to charitable causes in the past. Self-reported giving behaviour is not predictive for the intention to donate more or less than the mean donation of 40 euro (see Table 4.3).

4.5.2 Impact of organisational characteristics on monetary donations

We now discuss the effects of the organisational characteristics of donors' giving intentions. In line with our *familiarity hypothesis,* donors have a preference to donate (more than the mean of 40 euro) to development organisations that are familiar to them (β = 0.56 for *Intention to donate*, β = 0.37 for *Donate40*). In our *scale hypothesis*, we expected that the preference of donors would be to donate (more than the mean of 40 euro) to small size development organisations, which run only a few projects and are active in only one country, in order to be better able to control the effect of their donation. However, contrary to our expectations and Duncan's (2004) theory on impact philanthropists, we find insignificant effects from the size of the organisation and from the number of projects organisations run on both the willingness to donate and on the intention to donate more than 40 euro. In contrast to our expectation, we find that organisations running projects in several countries receive more donations and more donations above 40 euro (β = 0.13 for *Intention to donate*, β = 0.13 for *Donate40*). It seems that in their search for 'impactful' donations, donors prefer development organisations running development programmes in several countries.

In line with our *role competence hypothesis*, we find that for development organisations with 20 years of experience the odds of them receiving a donation is approximately 28 per cent larger than that of 5 year old organisations ($(1 - e^{0.24})*100 = 27.89$). The intention to donate more than the mean donation of 40 euro increases significantly for development organisations with 10 years of experience (β = 0.28 for *Donate40*). We also expected (potential) donors to prefer organisations mainly run by professionals. However, it emerges that – even if we hold overhead ratios constant – people prefer organisations mainly run by volunteers; they are less likely to donate if the organisation is run by paid staff (β = -0.47 for *Intention to donate)* and donors are less inclined to donate more than 40 euro to organisations run by paid staff (β = -0.69 for *Donate40*). Hence our role competence hypothesis meets only partial corroborative evidence.

Not surprisingly, higher overhead ratios of an organisation have a (very) strong negative influence on donation decisions. People prefer organisations that spend their money mainly on their programmes instead of on managing the organisations. Compared to an organisation spending its entire budget on its development programme, the chance to receive a donation for organisations with an overhead ratio of 80 per cent is (on average) decreased by 0.4 (as indicated by the respective marginal effect of -0.40). Our *overhead hypothesis* is corroborated.

Table 4.3 Cross-classified multilevel estimates on willingness to donate (more) to development organisations

	INTENTION TO DONATE (0–1)				DONATE40 (€1–40 OR >40)			
	LOGIT COEFFICIENTS		AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS[A]		LOGIT COEFFICIENTS		AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS[A]	
	β	S.E.	DY/DX	S.E.	β	S.E.	DY/DX	S.E.
INTERCEPT	1.94 **	0.24			0.13	0.24		
ORGANISATION SCENARIO CHARACTERISTICS								
FAMILIARITY (NON FAMILIAR=REF)	0.56 **	0.05	0.05 **	0.00	0.37 **	0.06	0.04 **	0.00
SIZE: LARGE (SMALL=REF)	-0.05	0.05	-0.00	0.00	0.01	0.06	0.00	0.00
PROJECTS: MANY (SOME PROJECTS=REF)	0.02	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.06	0.00	0.00
NUMBER OF COUNTRIES: SEVERAL (ONE COUNTRY=REF)	0.13 *	0.05	0.01 **	0.00	0.13 *	0.06	0.01 *	0.00
EXPERIENCE (5 YEARS=REF)								
10 YEARS	0.04	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.28 **	0.08	0.03 **	0.00
20 YEARS	0.24 **	0.06	0.02 **	0.00	0.27 **	0.08	0.03 **	0.00
RELIGIOSITY (NON RELIGIOUS=REF)	-0.52 **	0.05	-0.05 **	0.00	-0.08	0.06	-0.00	0.00
PAID STAFF (VOLUNTEERS=REF)	-0.47 **	0.05	-0.04 **	0.00	-0.69 **	0.06	-0.08 **	0.00
OVERHEAD RATIO (0%=REF)								
20%	-0.12	0.09	-0.01	0.00	-0.82 **	0.09	-0.10 **	0.01
40%	-1.05 **	0.09	-0.09 **	0.00	-2.00 **	0.09	-0.25 **	0.01
60%	-2.51 **	0.09	-0.25 **	0.00	-3.45 **	0.12	-0.42 **	0.01
80%	-3.83 **	0.09	-0.40 **	0.01	-3.91 **	0.13	-0.46 **	0.01
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS								
FEMALE (MALE=REF)	0.67 **	0.15	0.06 **	0.01	0.47 **	0.14	0.05 **	0.01
AGE (20–92 YEARS)	-0.03 **	0.00	-0.00 **	0.00	0.01 **	0.00	0.00 *	0.00
DENOMINATION (NON RELIGIOUS=REF)								
CATHOLIC	1.06 **	0.17	0.10 **	0.01	-0.14	0.17	-0.01	0.02

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<Table 4.3 continued

PROTESTANT	1.18 **	0.24	0.11 **	0.02	0.29	0.22	0.03	0.02
OTHER	0.24	0.35	0.02	0.03	0.45	0.33	0.05	0.04
CHURCH ATTENDANCE (0–75 P.A.)	0.00 ~	0.00	0.00 ~	0.00	0.00 *	0.00	0.00 *	0.00
EDUCATION (6–16.5 YEARS)	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.05 *	0.02	0.00 *	0.00
MONTHLY NET INCOME (<750 EURO=REF)								
750–1,500 EURO	0.00	0.22	0.00	0.02	0.28	0.21	0.03	0.02
1,501–2,100 EURO	0.08	0.23	0.00	0.02	0.15	0.23	0.01	0.02
>2,100 EURO	-0.02	0.24	-0.00	0.02	0.24	0.24	0.02	0.02
MISSING	-0.51 *	0.21	-0.05 *	0.02	-0.01	0.21	-0.00	0.02
GENERAL SOCIAL TRUST	0.16 ~	0.08	0.01 ~	0.00	0.06	0.08	0.00	0.01
BELIEF IN DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATIONS	1.38 **	0.13	0.13 **	0.01	0.13	0.14	0.01	0.01
VISIT TO DEVELOPING COUNTRY (NO=REF)	-0.37 *	0.17	-0.03 *	0.01	0.28 ~	0.17	0.03 ~	0.02
(SELF-REPORTED) GIVING TO DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATIONS (NO=REF)								
YES	0.72 **	0.15	0.07 **	0.01	0.01	0.14	0.00	0.01
MISSING	0.50	0.33	0.04	0.03	-0.11	0.32	-0.01	0.03
N_O	16,548				10,323			
N_1	2,758				2,384			
N_S	960				960			
VARIANCE COMPONENTS	**var**		**Δvar**[b]		**var**		**Δvar**[b]	
INDIVIDUAL (N_I=2,758)	10.69		-0.82		6.84		0.65	
SCENARIO (N_S=960)	2.22		-2.22		1.75		-1.75	

Source: Family Survey Dutch Population, Wave 2009

Notes:

[a] dy/dx denotes derivative or discrete change, depending on measurement level of covariate

[b] as compared to the null model ~p< 0.10; *p< 0.05; **p< 0.01 (two sided test of significance)

4.5.3 The combination of organisational characteristics

We present the estimated interaction terms in Table 4.4, which can be interpreted as the 'interaction effect' with respect to the logit. The interaction effect on the predicted probability depends, just as marginal effects, on other covariates (and random parts) as Ai and Norton (2003) show. We therefore include in Table 4.4 the average interaction effect (and the standard error thereof) on the probability as well. The interpretation of the true interaction effect is easiest to understand for an interaction between a continuous variable and a dummy variable. This interaction effect may then be interpreted as the difference in the marginal effect of the continuous variable between the two categories of the dummy variable (conditional on the covariates and the random parts). To calculate these interaction effects – there is no standardised function to calculate average interaction effects and the standard errors thereof for cross-classified multilevel models – we developed an R-script (available on request).[12]

When organisations are mainly run by paid staff potential donors are in general more tolerant towards higher overhead ratios. Remember that on average the probability to donate decreases with 0.4 when overhead ratios are 80 per cent as compared to organisations without overhead costs (Table 4.3). This decline is however 0.03 points less for organisations with paid staff as compared to organisations run by volunteers (Table 4.4). The same effect is observed for donors whether or not to donate more than 40 euro. We conclude that our *staff and overhead hypothesis* is corroborated: donors seem to value the capacities of paid staff members and are, to a certain extent, willing to pay a price for these.

Higher overhead ratios have the same negative impact on monetary donations for small and large organisations; the interaction terms referring to 'Overhead ratio*Size of the organisation' are not significant, neither are the interaction effects (Table 4.4).

We find that, among donors, the negative impact of (high) overhead ratios on monetary donation decisions is weaker when organisations run many projects; the average interaction effects referring to 60 per cent and 80 per cent overhead ratios and many projects are positive and significant (for *Donate40).* On the other hand, potential donors have a stronger reluctance to donate to development organisations with overhead ratios when organisations are implementing projects in several countries. Note that although the respective interaction terms are negative and significant, the average interaction effects are negative but do not reach significance.

We do not observe corroborative support for our *experience and familiarity hypothesis*. When organisations have more experience it remains just as important to be familiar among (potential) donors.

[12] The interaction effect is the cross-partial derivative of the expected value of y: d2F(x, β)/dx1dx2, where F(·) is the inverse logit (see Ai & Norton, 2003). Our models include interactions between two continuous variables, between a continuous variable and a dummy variable and between a continuous variable and a categorical variable. General formulas are provided in Norton et al. (2004) but only for interactions with continuous and/or dummy variables. For our somewhat more complicated interactions we followed the same principle: we took the appropriate derivatives and discrete differences.

Table 4.4 Interaction estimates of Cross-classified multilevel estimates on willingness to donate (more) to development organisations

	INTENTION TO DONATE (0-1)				DONATE40 (€1-40 OR >40)			
	LOGIT COEFFICIENTS		AVERAGE INTERACTION EFFECTS[A]		LOGIT COEFFICIENTS		AVERAGE INTERACTION EFFECTS[A]	
	β	S.E.	d^2y/dx_1dx_2	S.E.	β	S.E.	d^2y/dx_1dx_2	S.E.
INTERACTION EFFECTS BETWEEN DIFFERENT ORGANISATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS								
OVERHEAD RATIO*STAFF MEMBERS								
20%*PAID STAFF	0.27	0.18	0.02	0.01	0.37 *	0.18	0.04 *	0.02
40%*PAID STAFF	0.42 *	0.18	0.02 ~	0.01	0.39 *	0.18	0.05 *	0.04
60%*PAID STAFF	0.44 *	0.17	0.02	0.01	0.31	0.22	0.06 *	0.02
80%*PAID STAFF	0.54 **	0.17	0.03 *	0.01	0.34	0.24	0.07 **	0.02
OVERHEAD RATIO*SIZE OF THE ORGANISATION								
20%* LARGE	0.12	0.18	0.01	0.01	-0.15	0.18	-0.02	0.02
40%* LARGE	-0.03	0.17	-0.00	0.01	0.04	0.18	0.00	0.02
60%* LARGE	-0.08	0.17	-0.01	0.01	-0.04	0.21	-0.00	0.02
80%* LARGE	-0.01	0.17	-0.00	0.01	-0.05	0.24	-0.00	0.02
OVERHEAD RATIO*NUMBER OF PROJECTS								
20%* MANY PROJECTS	0.19	0.18	0.01	0.01	0.22	0.18	0.02	0.02
40%* MANY PROJECTS	0.27	0.18	0.02	0.01	0.09	0.18	0.01	0.02
60%* MANY PROJECTS	0.22	0.17	0.02	0.01	0.39 ~	0.22	0.04 ~	0.02
80%* MANY PROJECTS	0.30 ~	0.17	0.02	0.01	0.44 ~	0.24	0.04 ~	0.02

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< Table 4.4 continued

OVERHEAD RATIO*NUMBER OF COUNTRIES								
20%* SEVERAL COUNTRIES	-0.36 *	0.18	-0.03 ~	0.01	-0.07	0.18	-0.01	0.02
40%* SEVERAL COUNTRIES	-0.33 ~	0.18	-0.02	0.01	-0.15	0.18	-0.02	0.02
60%* SEVERAL COUNTRIES	-0.30 ~	0.17	-0.02	0.01	-0.15	0.22		0.02
80%* SEVERAL COUNTRIES	-0.31 ~	0.17	-0.02	0.01	-0.36	0.24	-0.04 ~	0.02
FAMILIARITY*EXPERIENCE								
FAMILIAR*10 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE	0.05	0.13	0.00	0.01	-0.14	0.16	-0.01	0.01
FAMILIAR*20 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE	-0.14	0.13	-0.01	0.01	-0.23	0.16	-0.02	0.01
INTERACTION EFFECTS BETWEEN ORGANISATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS								
FAMILIARITY*GENERAL SOCIAL TRUST								
FAMILIAR*GENERAL SOCIAL TRUST	-0.02	0.06	-0.00	0.00	0.06	0.08	0.00	0.00
OVERHEAD RATIO*BELIEF IN DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATIONS								
20%*BELIEF IN DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATIONS	0.16	0.17	0.01	0.01	0.26	0.18	0.03	0.03
40%*BELIEF IN DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATIONS	0.00	0.17	0.02	0.01	0.38 *	0.19	0.04 *	0.04
60%*BELIEF IN DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATIONS	0.09	0.17	0.04 **	0.01	0.27	0.23	0.02	0.02
80%*BELIEF IN DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATIONS	-0.11	0.18	0.02	0.01	0.25	0.27	0.02	0.02
RELIGIOSITY*INDIVIDUAL DENOMINATION								
RELIGIOUS*CATHOLIC	0.94 **	0.14	0.09 **	0.01	0.26	0.16	0.03	0.01
RELIGIOUS*PROTESTANT	1.19 **	0.17	0.11 **	0.01	0.86 **	0.18	0.10 **	0.02
RELIGIOUS*OTHER DENOMINATION	1.60 **	0.26	0.16 **	0.02	1.17 **	0.29	0.13 **	0.03
RELIGIOUS*CHURCH ATTENDANCE P.A.	0.02 **	0.00	0.00 **	0.00	0.01 **	0.00	0.00 **	0.00
N_O	16,548				10,323			
N_I	2,758				2,384			
N_S	960				960			

Source: Family Survey Dutch Population, Wave 2009
Notes:
The interactions have been added separately to the base models as presented in Table 4.3.
[a] d2y/dx1dx2 denotes the cross derivative, the discrete double difference or the discrete difference of the single derivative, depending on measurement levels of covariates.
~p< 0.10; *p< 0.05; **p< 0.01 (two sided test of significance)

4.5.4 For whom do organisational characteristics matter more?

The results of the cross-level interactions between organisational characteristics and individual-level characteristics are summarised in the bottom panel of Table 4.4. Familiar organisations attract more donations and more donations above 40 euro (see Table 4.3) and, as Table 4.4 shows, this effect does not depend on individuals' level of general social trust. Even for individuals with high levels of general social trust, it remains of importance that they are familiar with the requesting development organisation. We therefore refute our *trust and familiarity hypothesis* (see Table 4.4).

When deciding whether or not to donate to a development organisation, we find that potential donors with more positive attitudes towards development organisations are more tolerant towards overhead ratios of 60 per cent. Although the respective estimated interaction term does not reach significance, the average interaction effect does (the average interaction effect is 0.04). Among donors, a stronger belief in development organisations dampens the negative effect of overhead ratios of 40 per cent. We therefore find weak evidence in favour of our scepticism and overhead hypothesis.

Finally, corroborating our religiosity hypothesis, we find convincing evidence for our claim that in their search for value congruity, religious people and frequent church attendees are especially inclined to donate (more) to religious development organisations; with one exception, all interaction effects are in the predicted direction and significant.

4.5.5 The ideal development organisation

For each of the 960 scenarios we calculated the predicted probabilities, based on a model that solely included (main effects of) organisational level characteristics. In Table 4.5 we present the predicted probabilities for the five most ideal types of organisations and the five least ideal types of organisations. We do this both for the intention to donate (upper panel of Table 4.5) and for the intention to donate more than the mean donation of 40 euro (bottom panel of Table 4.5). The complete order is available on request.

Development organisations with the highest probabilities of receiving a donation and of receiving a donation higher than 40 euro are, in general, familiar, have 10-20 years of experience, have no religious background, are active in more than one country, do not have any overhead costs and are mainly run by volunteers. The least ideal types of organisations consist of unfamiliar organisations with 5-10 years of experience that are active in only one country, have 80 per cent overhead costs and are mainly run by paid staff. All but one of these least ideal types of organisations have a religious background.

It is almost eight times more probable that the most ideal type of development organisation will receive a donation ($p = 0.98$) than that the least ideal type will ($p = 0.12$). Although we find that potential donors do not prefer organisations with unrealistic combinations (e.g. run by paid staff and 0 per cent overhead costs), we do find that the ideal type of development organisation is more rare.

Table 4.5 Predicted Probabilities conditional on the variance components

PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF THE INTENTION TO DONATE

RANKING	SIZE	FAMILIAR-ITY	EXPERIENCE	RELIGIOSITY	NUMBER OF PROJECTS	NUMBER OF COUNTRIES	% OVER-HEAD	STAFF COMPOSI-TION	PREDICTED ESTIMATE
1	Small	Familiar	20 years	Non religious	Many	Several	0%	Voluntary	0.98
2	Small	Familiar	20 years	Non religious	Some	Several	0%	Voluntary	0.97
3	Large	Familiar	20 years	Non religious	Many	Several	0%	Voluntary	0.97
4	Large	Familiar	20 years	Non religious	Some	Several	0%	Voluntary	0.97
5	Small	Familiar	20 years	Non religious	Many	Several	0%	Voluntary	0.97
	Large	Unfamiliar	10 years	Religious	Many	One	80%	Paid	0.13
957	Small	Unfamiliar	5 years	Religious	Some	One	80%	Paid	0.13
958	Large	Unfamiliar	10 years	Religious	Some	One	80%	Paid	0.13
959	Large	Unfamiliar	5 years	Religious	Many	One	80%	Paid	0.12
960	Large	Unfamiliar	5 years	Religious	Some	One	80%	Paid	0.12

PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF THE INTENTION TO DONATE MORE THAN THE MEAN DONATION

RANKING	SIZE	FAMILIAR-ITY	EXPERIENCE	RELIGIOSITY	NUMBER OF PROJECTS	NUMBER OF COUNTRIES	% OVER-HEAD	STAFF COMPOSI-TION	PREDICTED ESTIMATE
1	Large	Familiar	10 years	Non religious	Many	Several	0%	Voluntary	0.82
2	Small	Familiar	10 years	Non religious	Many	Several	0%	Voluntary	0.82
3	Large	Familiar	15 years	Non religious	Many	Several	0%	Voluntary	0.82
4	Small	Familiar	15 years	Non religious	Many	Several	0%	Voluntary	0.82
5	Large	Familiar	10 years	Non religious	Some	Several	0%	Voluntary	0.82
956	Small	Unfamiliar	5 years	Non religious	Some	One	80%	Paid	0.02
957	Large	Unfamiliar	5 years	Religious	Many	One	80%	Paid	0.01
958	Small	Unfamiliar	5 years	Religious	Many	One	80%	Paid	0.01
959	Large	Unfamiliar	5 years	Religious	Some	One	80%	Paid	0.01
960	Small	Unfamiliar	5 years	Religious	Some	One	80%	Paid	0.01

Source: Family Survey Dutch Population, Wave 2009

4.5.6 Robustness checks

In this contribution we investigated the extent to which organisational characteristics affect the decision whether or not to donate and the amount of monetary donations. To investigate the latter, we constructed a variable that indicates whether donations were lower or higher than the mean of all donations (40.7 euro). Alternative cut-off points (e.g. lower or higher than the median of all donations (30 euro)) lead to similar conclusions.

We performed several other robustness checks. First we investigated whether possible sequence effects biased our results. Respondents are significantly more likely to donate in the third and fourth scenario offered to them as compared to the first. Moreover, some of the depicted organisations (i.e. 87 out 960) combined the unrealistic characteristics of being run mainly by paid staff members with a 0 per cent overhead ratio. We observed that potential donors, when being confronted with such a scenario, donate significantly, but not substantially, with greater frequency and more often make donations above the average donation of 40 euro. Why this is so is not clear to us, but it demonstrates that there are indeed sequence effects. However, controlling for these sequence effects does not alter our main conclusions because scenarios were randomly allocated to the respondents.

In contrast to previous research, we did not find that income positively affects the intention to donate or the amount of the donation. We ran alternative models that included a variable referring to the employment status of the respondent instead of income. For this we used a condensed version of the original eleven-category EGP classification scheme created by Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero (1979) with additional categories for the unemployed and non-employed. Donors of the higher service class (Class I) donate larger amounts more often than other categories. The self-employed (Class IVabc) are the least likely to donate more than the mean donation. However, using employment status instead of income does not alter our main conclusions. All our additional analyses are available on request.

4.6 Conclusions

There is a growing number and a growing diversity of international development organisations requesting financial support. In this contribution, we set out to determine which one of these organisations the public prefers to donate money to. In order to answer this question we used a factorial survey design. The results of our scenario study show that next to characteristics of (potential) donors, organisational features also affect whether or not potential donors decide to donate and the amount donors donate.

Potential donors are more likely to donate to familiar, experienced and voluntary development organisations, and donors are inclined to donate more than the mean donation of 40 euro to organisations with these characteristics. We argued that the familiarity of organisations signals trust. Based on our results, we conclude that for organisations it is just as important to signal trust to less sceptical potential donors high in social trust as it is to sceptical potential donors low in social trust.

Potential donors' quest for impactful donations results in a reluctance to spend money on overhead costs. Donors with stronger beliefs in development organisations are somewhat more tolerant towards overhead ratios. Steinberg (1986, 1988-1989) argues that the height of the overhead ratio should be meaningless to donors who are searching for an organisation with high output because, according to his findings, there is no relation between overhead ratios and the output of an organisation. Development organisations may wish to better communicate that overhead ratios do not necessarily signal mismanagement or inefficiency.

Hager and Flack (2004: 4) argue that donors' fixation on overhead ratios can even have an inverse effect on organisational management: it could induce an underinvestment 'in good governance, planning, compliance and risk management'; Tinkelman and Mankaney (2007) state that it might lead to underreporting of administrative expenses. The height of the overhead ratios is also central in the Dutch public debate on the functioning of international development organisations. Many Private Development Initiatives (PDIs), characterised by their small scale and voluntary character,

use their low overhead ratio as an important feature to distinguish themselves from larger scale development organisations, which they criticise for their (purportedly) high overhead ratios (Brok & Bouzoubaa, 2005). This strategy might explain, in part, the popularity of PDIs because our results indicate that the chances of receiving a (larger) donation are diminished with increased overhead ratios.

Critics of PDIs question the quality of PDI development projects and state that qualitative development work comes at a price (Aangeenbrug, 2011). They question how volunteers, some of whom have no education and/or no or little experience in the field of international development cooperation or organisational management, can cope with the daily challenges related to strategic choices concerning poverty reduction or the supervision of (co-)volunteers. Based on this conviction, making an impactful donation would not imply donating to a voluntary development organisation with no or low overhead costs, but instead entails looking for an experienced organisation with qualified, experienced staff. This argument may be used to convince potential donors because, as our results indicate, (potential) donors are willing to pay for competence; they more easily accept overhead ratios when an organisation is run mainly by paid staff than when an organisation is run by volunteers.

In conclusion, we reflect upon what constitutes the 'ideal development organisation' for a donor. Potential donors' decision-making processes indicate they are looking for experience and reputation without excessive amounts being spent on organisational management. They are looking for a hybrid type of development organisation combining a mixture of features of both large-scale, established, development organisations (experience, working in several countries) and small-scale, upcoming, voluntary development organisations (voluntary staff, low overhead ratio). Most, if not all, of the traditional, established, large-scale development organisations are run by professional (i.e. paid) staff. Hence traditional development organisations do not constitute the 'ideal' organisation. Since PDIs are mainly run by volunteers they can take their advantage of their voluntary character in their search for donors. In addition, many PDIs will be able to benefit from donors' preferences to donate to a familiar development organisation. Since PDI members look for financial support in the first place in their network of family, friends and relatives, there is a greater chance that potential donors will not only be familiar with the name of the organisations, but also with the person requesting for a donation. This in contrast to larger scale, established development organisations of which one is maybe familiar with the name, but most probably not with the person requesting for a donation. However, PDIs are, in general, not the ideal organisation either, as most PDIs are active in only one developing country and many have only been established recently (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011). We find that those PDIs that comply with the ideal type have a significantly larger budget than organisations that do not meet these criteria (CIDIN-PDI Database 2008-2009). We have to be careful in making causal relations: it could very well be that because of their experience, these organisations have a larger network allowing them to generate larger budgets. Although the 'ideal type' of development organisation is rather rare, it does exist and can be found within the group of PDIs.

As far as we know, this study is the first to analyse how a wide array of organisational characteristics affect the decision making process of (potential) donors. Building on the insights offered by this study, future research could further extend our understanding of this process. As we have shown, this could be done by adopting a factorial survey approach. Different scenarios could be constructed, for example, scenarios in which more specific information on the scale of the organisations (e.g. 100 paid staff members versus 10 paid staff members) or on the type of support offered to their beneficiaries (e.g. building schools versus handing out food) is mentioned. Additionally, in order to enlarge our understanding of the aversion of (potential) donors' to overhead costs, it would be worthwhile to include lower levels of overhead ratios and to introduce information on the competency of the staff. This would allow us to see if, and under which circumstances, certain levels of overhead ratios are acceptable to (potential) donors.

The Netherlands is known for the relatively high amounts it donates to international development cooperation. The extent to which our findings on the impact of organisational characteristics on donations to international development organisations can be generalised to other countries would prove an interesting topic for future research.

Chapter 05

5. Understanding Sustainability of Private Development Initiatives. What Kind of difference Difference do they make?

'We need the freedom of lots and lots of small, autonomous units, and, at the same time, the orderliness of large-scale, possibly global, unity and co-ordination.'

Schumacher (1973)

Abstract

In the Netherlands there is a large group of small-scale, voluntary development organisations, referred to as private development initiatives (PDIs). By classifying PDI interventions based on their potential sustainability, we aim to enhance our understanding of PDIs as alternative development actor and to gain insight into the diversity within this group. We rely on detailed data of 49 Dutch PDIs active in Kenya and Indonesia. The classification is based on a combined analysis of both the intervention type ('what' they do) and the intervention manner ('how' they work) of PDI activities. This results in a typology that outlines the potential sustainability of PDI intervention strategies. We find considerable diversity regarding the potential sustainability of PDI interventions. Whereas several organisational characteristics influence the choice of the intervention strategy (e.g. independence of local partner, budget), intrinsic drivers such as motivation and the personal or professional background of PDI members tend to have a great influence on the potential sustainability of the intervention strategies adopted by the PDIs.

Keywords: Private development initiatives; classification; intervention strategies; sustainability; Kenya; Indonesia

5.1 Introduction

For a long time, the field of international development cooperation was inhabited by three types of development actors: (1) national governments of donor countries (bilateral aid channel); (2) international agencies such as the World Bank and the United Nations (multilateral aid channel); and (3) non-governmental development organisations (NGOs) such as Oxfam or Save the Children (civilateral aid channel). The last two decades have marked a worldwide trend of alternative players joining these traditional actors in their struggle against worldwide poverty and inequality. For different reasons, celebrities (e.g. Madonna, Bono), foundations (e.g. Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation), companies (e.g. Nestlé) and ordinary citizens have increasingly become active players in this field. The rise of these alternative development actors is referred to as the socialisation or mainstreaming of development cooperation. This is the process in which societal actors adopt tasks that previously belonged to the exclusive domain of traditional development cooperation actors such as the government, NGOs and multilateral organisations (Develtere & Stessens, 2006; Develtere & De Bruyn, 2009; De Bruyn & Huyse, 2009; Schulpen, 2007).

Also, the playing field of international development cooperation is diversifying in the Netherlands. In addition to the three traditional channels mentioned above, the socialisation of development cooperation has resulted in a fourth channel of development cooperation: the philanteral aid channel. This channel consists of alternative development actors including social institutions (e.g. hospitals), foundations and ordinary citizens (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011). The term philanteral refers to the definition of philanthropy as 'contributing money, goods and/or time, voluntarily supplied by individuals and organisations (foundations, companies, churches) mainly to support the aims of public advancement' (Schuyt et al., 2009: 18).

A large group of ordinary citizens actively engaging in international development cooperation has long been the most prominent alternative development actor. In addition to one-off or regular monetary donations to existing development organisations, people, for different reasons, start their own development organisation, and these are referred to as private development initiatives (PDIs). Their voluntary character and their small scale characterise these PDIs.[1] Journeys to or longer stays in development countries represent the most important trigger for starting or becoming active in a PDI (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011) (see Box 5.1).

Box 5.1 Starting a PDI

> In 2006, Bob and Ann, both in their fifties, went on a two-week holiday to Kenya. They stayed in a hotel in the coastal town of Mombasa. During their stay, they met a local guide who took them to his hometown. Bob and Ann were appalled by the basic construction of the primary school in the village. The roof was leaking, and some of the children had classes outside. Ann and Bob decided they wanted to help to improve the school. Back home they celebrated their silver wedding anniversary and asked their friends and family for a donation to the school instead of gifts. At the end of the evening, they had collected 2,500 euro. One year later, they were running their own foundation, supporting the local villagers in different aspects of their lives.

[1] In this study small-scale is interpreted in two ways. It means having fewer than 20 regular members or an annual budget of fewer than a million euro. Voluntary character is defined on the basis of an upper limit of 20 per cent or less of paid members in charge of the running of the organisation (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011).

5.1.1 PDIs as development actors

PDIs hold rather positive expectations with regard to their role as development actors. In a study among 290 PDIs conducted in 2005, 65 per cent expected that they would be able to contribute to poverty reduction. Moreover, 36 per cent of the interviewees were convinced that PDIs could tackle the underlying causes of poverty (Brok & Bouzoubaa, 2005). In contrast, critics doubt the professionalism of PDIs and fear that they are unable to avoid the well-known pitfall of becoming sustainable development alternatives. They expect PDIs to support orphanages without orphans, build schools without thinking of the teachers' salaries or construct wells that no local person is able to maintain and that they will do all this in a top-down, paternalistic manner. Supporters on the other hand are convinced that PDIs turn every penny collected into low-cost support reaching the genuine poor and do all this in close cooperation with local people. Because of their smallness of scale and direct approach, they expect PDIs to make an essential difference in the lives of people in developing countries.

Since 2006, several studies have analysed the development interventions of PDIs (Chelladurai, 2006; De Bruyn, 2013; Kinsbergen, 2007; Kamara & Bakhuisen, 2008; Schulpen, 2007; van der Velden, 2011). These studies are rather positive with regard to the achievements of PDI interventions: schools have been built, credit programmes launched and hospitals equipped with up-to-date instruments. In addition to these positive, concrete results, van der Velden (2011) calls on us to 'celebrate and preserve the unique characteristics and comparative advantages [of PDIs] such as relevant activities, low overhead costs, committed volunteers, voluntary spirit' (2011: 41). Kamara and Bakhuisen (2008), studying PDI interventions and partners of PDIs in Ghana, were 'moved by the commitment and enthusiasm of many Dutch people [...] and the warm feelings for the country and its people. This passion is at the heart of the program, and has motivated many partners in Ghana in their continuous efforts to contribute to the development of the country' (2008: 4).

Notwithstanding these positive statements, independently of one another these studies also raise critical concerns about the interventions undertaken by PDIs and their local partners. The activities are mainly micro in nature, activity-based and focused on the immediate needs of specific target groups without tackling the structural causes of poverty (Chelladurai, 2006; van der Velden, 2011; De Bruyn, 2011). Not only is the type of intervention brought up as a concern, but the adequacy of local capacities to (independently) manage the interventions is also questioned in several studies (Kamara & Bakhuisen, 2008; van der Velden, 2011). In addition, many PDIs and their partners are not building on or linking to local government or other civil societies such as NGOs, people's organisations or community networks (Chelladurai, 2006). This could induce continued dependence of the project on external donors, since PDIs and their partners do not always approach the government to support their activities. Although they put it differently, these studies above all conclude that results are in general positive at output and outcome level, but that the prospects for sustainability of many interventions are certainly not guaranteed.

Because of the novelty of this field of research, studies performed so far have merely aimed at a general understanding of PDIs and their interventions. Moreover, available data on PDIs' interventions do not allow structural study of the diversity in the sustainability potential of PDI interventions. This limits our understanding of PDIs as development actors, since empirical data show that although PDIs have much in common they vary widely in their intervention strategies (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011). The main aim of this chapter is (1) to classify PDI interventions, and (2) to offer an in-depth analysis of the diversity of intervention strategies of PDIs in order to understand the likelihood of their sustainable contribution to poverty reduction. Our central research question is:

What determines the sustainability of PDI interventions?

Our approach includes three stages. We first construct an analytical framework that enables us to understand the potential sustainability of PDI interventions and to study the diversity that can be found within this group. Second, we apply this framework to an empirical sample of 49 PDIs and their interventions. The subjects of this study are in different stages of the project cycle. Some are completed; others are still in the process of implementation. We therefore decided not to focus on sustainability itself (ex post), but to assess the likelihood of the sustainability of PDI interventions by analysing the intervention type and the intervention manner of PDIs (ex ante). The third and final step in our analysis identifies attributes of PDIs that shape their intervention strategy. We therefore look for common denominators of PDIs (e.g. organisational characteristics, driving forces) with similar intervention types and intervention manners.

5.2 Towards a meaningful PDI classification

We start the study by designing a classification system to analyse potential sustainability of PDI interventions. Classifying non-profit organisations in general and development organisations in particular is a much studied and described challenge (Bebbington, et al. 2008; Brodhead, 1987; Elliott, 1987; Handy, 1988; Korten, 1987, 1990; Salamon & Anheier, 1992; Vakil, 1997). According to Salamon and Anheier (1992) formulating a classification of organisations entails systematically identifying differences among organisations and constructing an appropriate basis for grouping them. They point out that in the design of a classification system, two basic issues have to be clarified: (1) the unit of analysis and (2) the basis of classification (e.g. size, type and character of activity). For our purpose, the unit of analysis is clear: we focus on the development interventions of a specific type of development organisations, namely private development initiatives. The basis of the classification should provide insight into the potential sustainability of the development interventions of PDIs. That brings us to a more complex part of the intended classification since sustainability is still a rather elusive concept. Authors addressing sustainability in the context of development cooperation often start by stressing its importance and then pointing out the lack of a clear definition of the concept (Stockmann, 1997; Mog, 2004; Pretty, 1995). It is also difficult to pin down sustainability because it is very dynamic, largely indefinite and highly contested (Mog, 2004).

Since the 1980s, sustainability has been one of the five yardsticks by which development interventions are evaluated (Brown, 1998). It is related to other measures concerning relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact (OECD, 1986). In the literature on sustainability of development interventions, roughly two approaches can be distinguished. The first approach offers a more formal definition and focuses on the sustainability in lifetime of projects, programmes or institutions: do projects, programmes or organisations continue to exist after the withdrawal of external donor support (DAC; Brown, 1998; Finsterbusch & Van Wicklin, 1989)? The second approach provides a more substantive analysis with a stronger focus on the extent to which the interventions aim at fundamentally tackling structurally constraining factors that induce, maintain or strengthen poverty and inequality.

The first approach is widely adopted and illustrated by the description of sustainability by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC): 'measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn'; or as defined by the World Bank (2002: 2) 'to what extent will […] projects continue to produce net benefits as long as intended, or even longer?'. This implies that development projects or programs are considered sustainable when they are able to deliver an appropriate level of benefits for an extended time period after major financial, managerial and technical assistance from external donor is withdrawn (OECD, 1989: 13). Local ownership and sufficient local capacities (human and financial resources) are two important interlinked preconditions for project, programme or organisational sustainability (World Bank, 2002). In order to become sustainable, local stakeholders should feel responsible and should be able to continue the project, programme or organisation after external support ends.

Critics of this first sustainability approach generally point to its narrowness (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 1992; Edwards, 1999; Fowler, 2000; Stockmann, 1997; Wilkinson-Maposa & Fowler, 2009). Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (1992: 371) articulate their critique by stating that 'just because a project, program or organisation endures, does not necessarily mean it is valuable'. The main concern should not merely be whether the project, programme or organisation will last, but whether it makes a lasting impact on poverty (Edwards, 1999). In order to be sustainable, development interventions should be aiming at the causes of poverty and bring structural change. The most important difference between both approaches is that the formal approach could be considered purely analytical: why does one project, programme or institution endures whereas another one does not? The substantive approach poses the more fundamental question of whether or not it is desirable to support certain projects, programmes or institutions on the basis of what they contribute to structural change and poverty reduction (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 1992).

In this study we combine both approaches of sustainability. We analyse the sustainability of a PDI development intervention by assessing (1) the extent to which an intervention aims to address and change underlying causes of poverty, and (2) the extent to which the intervention is locally owned (and thus can be continued without external financial and technical support). The former criterion reflects the substantive sustainability dimension; the latter provides insight into the formal sustainability dimension.

Finally, we need to identify practical and observable aspects that characterise PDIs and their operations and are linked to the aforementioned sustainability dimensions. We therefore rely on two aspects: (1) the type of interventions PDIs carry out in developing countries (what activities are undertaken) and (2) the intervention manner of PDIs (how they are organised) as the basis for the empirical classification. Together these aspects will be referred to as the intervention strategy. This approach is comparable to that of Fowler (2000), who states that the probability a development organisation contributes to sustained change depends on both the content of a development intervention and the process through which change is brought. In the following we describe how we will analyse the intervention type (what) and the intervention manner (how) of PDIs.

5.2.1 Intervention types and prospects for sustainability

We classify the intervention types of PDIs in the light of their potential sustainability. The four generations of strategies distinguished by Korten (1990) in his attempt to classify non-governmental development organisations (NGOs) represent a helpful framework for assessing the sustainability of the intervention type of PDIs. (1) First-generation strategies, *relief and welfare*, are aimed at alleviating directly observable needs by service delivery; (2) second-generation strategies, *community development*, pursue the strengthening of local capacities of people to better meet their own needs; (3) in third-generation strategies, *sustainable system development*, there is a focus on the elimination of institutional and policy constraints; and (4) the fourth and final strategies, *people's movement*, are characterised by a vision of people-centred development with development organisations being facilitators of a global people's development movement.

The starting point of this classification is 'a pattern of evolution […] away from more traditional relief activities […] towards greater involvement in catalysing larger institutional and policy changes' (Korten, 1990: 115). Elliot (1987) and Brodhead (1987) also recognise this evolutionary process in the practices of NGOs. Progressive insights in and experience of limitations with certain intervention strategies can mean revising the strategic approach of a particular development organisation (Korten, 1990). For example, most NGOs start by taking a welfarist approach; they act as service deliverers and offer direct relief to meet immediate needs. The recognition that relief and welfare do not tackle underlying causes of poverty may result in a strategy with greater attention for self-reliant local action, referred to as second-generation strategies (Korten, 1990). Through similar processes, the main strategy of an NGO can evolve from systems development (third-generation strategies) into people's movement (fourth-generation strategies) (Korten, 1990).

In more or less explicit terms, all these authors imply that in order to be able to offer a sustainable contribution to poverty reduction, development organisations should focus on structural causes of exclusion and poverty.

To further refine the differentiation of intervention types of PDIs we also consider the level of operation. We distinguish four different levels: the individual or family level, the community level (micro), the regional level (meso) and the national level (macro). For every intervention we can identify the intervention type pursued (using the generation strategies of Korten) and the level at which the PDIs intervene.

5.2.2 Intervention manners and prospects for sustainability

Korten (1990) suggests that generational strategies are inextricably linked to specific intervention manners. First-generation NGOs are usually considered as 'doers', second as 'mobilisers', third as 'catalysts' and fourth as 'activists/educators'. This indirectly defines the position and role of both the local partner organisation and the beneficiaries. For example, in the first-generation strategy Korten (1990) describes the role of the NGO as 'the doer', whereas a passive position is reserved for the beneficiaries.

With regard to intervention manner, we will mainly assess sustainability by looking at the degree of participation of local stakeholders. Participation of local stakeholders is referred to as one of the most, if not the most, important preconditions for interventions to become sustainable (Chambers, 1994; Edwards, 1999; Finsterbusch & Wicklin, 1989; Fowler, 2000; Mog, 2004; Stockmann, 1997). By co-defining change, local actors are more committed and motivated to take ownership of processes needed to bring it forward (Fowler, 2000). The recognition in the 1970s that many development projects or programmes failed because of their top-down approach made the concept and practice of participation a major influence in the field of international development cooperation (Chambers, 1994; Cornwall, 2008).

Arnstein (1969: 216) defines participation as 'the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future'. According to Fowler, (2000) participation can be analysed from three different perspectives: (1) depth (measure of stakeholders' influence on decision-making); (2) breadth (measure of the range of stakeholders involved); and (3) timing (stage of the process at which different stakeholders are involved). We will mainly consider the *depth* dimension by characterising the role of stakeholders in the project cycle. In order to gain an insight into the *breadth* of participation we look at the degree of involvement of (1) beneficiaries, (2) local partners and (3) other local stakeholders (e.g. local government). This is done particularly for the design phase and the implementation stage of the interventions in order to obtain an impression of the *timing* of the participation. Figure 5.1 presents the analytical framework applied.

Because of the novelty of the research approach used in this study we do not want to foreclose the correlation between the intervention type and the intervention manner. In addition, in order to grasp the diversity among PDIs as much as possible we will look explicitly and separately at what PDIs do (intervention type) and how they intervene (intervention manner).



Figure 5.1 Analytical framework for classifying interventions of private development initiatives

5.3 Data collection

We started by selecting our sample from two target countries wherein PDIs intervene. Kenya and Indonesia were chosen because of the relatively large proportion of PDIs active in these countries (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011). We drew up a sample of 49 PDIs, 25 active in Kenya and 24 in Indonesia. The sample was drawn from a database of almost 900 PDIs. This database was the result of a large-scale survey conducted among Dutch PDIs in 2008-2009 (CIDIN-PDI Database 2008-2009). The sample was purposely diverse with respect to the background characteristics of the organisations: the age of the organisations, their budget and the number of members. However, the target group and themes where the PDIs focus on were not predefined leaving us with a diverse group of interventions. Although we aimed to arrive at a sample of PDIs and interventions that offered an adequate reflection of PDIs as a group, we need to be careful about generalising the results of this study to the entire PDI population.

Table 5.1 presents some of the background characteristics of our sample. The average age of the PDIs is 11 years. On average, PDIs have an annual budget of nearly 50,000 euro and almost nine members on whom they can rely. The majority of the PDIs are active in the field of education (e.g. school construction), followed by health care (e.g. dental clinic) and providing shelter for vulnerable groups (e.g. orphanage). A smaller group of PDIs supports interventions related to environmental issues, water & sanitation and art & culture. The diversity within the sample allows us to look for common denominators of PDIs with a similar intervention strategy.

Table 5.1 Background information on PDIs (*N*=49)

CHARACTERISTICS	RANGE	AVERAGE
Age of the PDI (in 2009)	1-45 years	11.21 years
Budget (in 2007)	€ 0-262,594	€ 49,783
Number of members (in 2009)	3-40 members	8.65 members

The main researcher executed the research with the help of two trained research assistants. The data collection started in the Netherlands (2.5 months) and continued in Indonesia and Kenya (five months). We opted for semi-structured interviews as the most appropriate method to obtain the required data. The approach during the interviews can best be typified as a reconstructing a 'life history' of the PDI, the local organisation and the intervention. With the use of an interview guide, we discussed the emergence of the PDI and the local organisation, their organisational characteristics, developments over the past years, donor profile, type of interventions in developing countries, (cooperation) partner/PDI relations, challenges, motives, future plans, visions and dreams. To obtain an adequate insight into the intervention strategy of the PDI and its partner, we extensively discussed the type of (and decisions about) PDI-supported interventions and the character of the implementation process. In addition, the role of the different stakeholders (local partner, beneficiaries and the broader network) during the design and implementation of the intervention was discussed.

Most interviews were conducted with the founder or key person of the PDI and the local organisation. In addition to interviews, PDI interventions were visited and observed during the field research. The data were processed with ATLAS.ti. Anonymity was guaranteed to the participating PDIs and their partners. This was done in order to stimulate an open, trusting atmosphere during the interviews. More importantly, in the central analysis of this study it is not the individual cases that make up the story but the collective emerging pattern that allows us to answer the central research question.[2]

5.4 Results

In this section we present the findings of our study. We first discuss the differences in intervention type of PDIs (what), followed by a review of major differences in the intervention manner (how). Here we discuss the role of the beneficiaries, the role of local partners and the role of the broader network in order to better understand the degree of local ownership. In Section 4 we classify the intervention strategies of PDIs in the light of their potential sustainability by combining the intervention type and intervention manner for every PDI, providing the basis for the classification of PDIs. In the final paragraph we identify common determinants of PDI types that share a similar intervention strategy and discuss their prospects for sustainability.

5.4.1 PDI intervention types

At first sight, there is a large variety in interventions that PDIs undertake: from installing solar panels to starting a community bank, and from assisting an orphanage to supporting a peace process. A closer look at the intervention types reveals that all PDIs in this study are involved in relief and welfare provision. Every single one of them undertakes activities that can be typified by what Korten (1987, 1990) defines as 'first-generation strategies'. In these cases PDIs respond to immediate, often visible, needs, mostly basic. They act in response to something that is, according to their or others' perspective, 'lacking': lack of (proper) schooling, lack of (proper) health care, lack of (proper) water and sanitation. This results most of the time in 'hardware' investments: construction, renovation and the supply of goods.

For the majority of PDIs in the study (N=38) relief and welfare type of interventions are their main and only focus. Within this first group a distinction can be made between those PDIs that support only one project (e.g. a specific orphanage) and those that support more of the same type of project (e.g. building several schools). For both of these groups, but especially for the former, it counts that they are strongly involved in a specific project, linked to a specific group of beneficiaries and a specific locality. Their interventions are directed at individuals, families or groups of individuals that share a common need (e.g. schoolchildren). Most of these PDIs intervene at the level of individuals or families; others spread their activities over several villages or a certain region.

[2] The data are available on request.

It is characteristic of PDIs in this group that they are strongly focused on the symptoms of poverty and not, or to a lesser extent, on the structural causes of poverty. Their interventions are aimed at visible needs and they tend to offer concrete solutions to these problems. This does not mean that these 'first-generation' type of PDIs are not tackling the root causes of poverty but that their interventions do not intentionally aim at it.

A smaller, second group of PDIs (*N*=7) complements its relief and welfare type of activities with interventions in the field of community development (i.e. Korten's second-generation strategies). For example, one of the PDIs in this study is supporting a waste-processing project. They cooperate with a community-based organisation (CBO). Group formation is an explicit part of this project. These types of interventions transcend the individual or family level and are focused at community or regional level. Interventions aim at a group of people and the strategies are often structured in such a way that the group and group formation are integral parts of the intervention.

A small minority of PDIs in our sample forms a third group (*N*=4). They undertake activities that are deliberately aiming at changing constraining structures. Following Korten (1990), their interventions can be typified as third-generational: they 'look beyond the individual community and seek changes in specific policies and institutions at local, national and global level' (Korten, 1990: 120). In that sense, they also look beyond the more visible needs, the symptoms of poverty, and try to address the underlying forces. They deliberately direct their interventions to (help to) restructure policies and institutions in order to overcome their disempowering function. PDIs within this group are all involved in lobby and advocacy activities, principally at local or regional level. These interventions are less visible, less concrete and have a longer-term horizon, but all of them combine third-generation strategies with first and/or second-generation types of interventions. For example, one of the PDIs in this group is supporting the construction and renovation of schools. The PDI and its partner have frequent contact with local government officials on future plans and policy development. Moreover, they try to stimulate the local government to contribute financially to the construction or renovation plans and motivate it to focus more on the quality of education in their policy and plans. Within our sample no PDIs undertaking fourth-generation strategies can be identified.

5.4.2 PDI intervention manner

In this paragraph we analyse how PDIs decide on the type of interventions they undertake, who is involved in the design and implementation of these interventions and how these roles are articulated. We therefore subsequently discuss the opportunities for local participation by beneficiaries, the type of cooperative relationships between PDIs and their local partners and the character of local and regional networks.

Role of beneficiaries

Our study shows that the role of beneficiaries during the design of an intervention is rather limited. In the most extreme case, PDIs may even disregard all opportunities to actively involve the local population. When asked if the local population is an active partner for the PDI, one interviewee responds:

> *'No, that is not an option.'*
> (Interview PDI founder)

In the initial phase of starting a PDI or a (new) intervention, however, the local population often functions as a source of inspiration. Encounters with local people and their living conditions usually instigate the decision to start a PDI or a certain intervention, as is illustrated by a PDI member:

> *'And we were so shocked, the showers were so dirty. Yes, that really appalled us. And then we continued our trip to the coast and at a certain moment we said to one another, 'We have to do something about this'.'*
> (Interview PDI founder)

The needs observed among the local population influence the choice of a specific theme (e.g. education) or a specific target group (e.g. children). For more than half of the PDIs in our sample (*N*=26), the role of the beneficiaries remains limited to that of 'receivers' throughout the design and implementation of the intervention.

A second, smaller group of PDIs (*N*=7) expands this role of the beneficiaries in the design and/or implementation phase. This is done by informing the beneficiaries about the (possible) plans of the PDI and its partner, by consulting with beneficiaries about their needs or by organising meetings during which they inform beneficiaries on the progress of an intervention or on future plans. A third group is made up of 12 PDIs that more actively engage their beneficiaries, mainly during the implementation. In most of these cases this is based on the beneficiaries being organised in small groups through which the intervention is implemented (e.g. group of neighbours managing a shared water pump). In a fourth and final group (*N*=4) the beneficiaries are not only actively engaged in the implementation but their representatives are also part of the design phase of the intervention, in the management of the organisation or in the planning of future projects. Consequently, beneficiaries have a greater, and sometimes decisive, influence on the actual design and execution of the intervention.

What most interventions have in common is that many PDIs and their partners request or oblige beneficiaries to offer a contribution in kind or in cash. By doing so they hope or expect to enlarge their feeling of responsibility, stimulate local ownership and/or preserve their dignity:

> *'Most of them do not have any money, and if they do not have it, they have to pay. That means that one time they bring along a bunch of wood or a chicken or whatever. There must be something in return. […] To prevent people too easily saying […] 'They will solve this'. Or make beggars of them.'*
> (Interview PDI founder)

> *'We do not sponsor the whole amount. We want the parents to contribute themselves, so that children cannot tell their parents 'You did not pay for my schooling, they [the PDI] did.' So that parents can keep their pride, and can continue to fulfil their parental role. That's what we find important.'*
> (Interview PDI founder)

Some of the PDIs seem to expect that local ownership, responsibility and dignity can be 'bought' by a contribution in kind or in cash by beneficiaries during implementation. Although the role of beneficiaries in this phase is in general more extended compared with their role in the design phase, in most cases beneficiaries are requested or even obliged to participate within a framework determined in a process from which they were excluded or in which they only participated in a limited way.

Cooperation relations between partners and PDIs

Looking at how PDIs and their partners cooperate, we can distinguish three groups based on the way roles are divided among PDIs and their partners. In the first group (*N*=21), the influence of the PDI on the type, design and implementation of the intervention is greater than that of its partner. PDIs adopt the role of manager and their partners are the executers of their ideas and plans. In some cases, the PDI is also active in the actual implementation of the intervention. When asked about the number of beneficiaries he expects to support in the future, one partner responds:

> *'I don't know, I think they [PDI] have big plans.' […] They have the vision in Holland, we carry it out. We share the vision.'*
> (Interview PDI partner)

When more direct involvement, through e-mail or telephone or personal visits, is difficult, some of the PDIs in this group make use of intermediaries (in many cases this is a Dutch person living in Kenya or Indonesia) to facilitate the cooperation between them and their partners: the PDI instructs the intermediary to go and check on progress or bookkeeping. Consequently, the go-between eases cooperation between the PDI and its partner and removes distrust within the PDI. Others opt for a more radical control mechanism and even become a member of the board of their local partner.

In a second group (*N*=18) the role division between PDI and partner is characterised by a higher degree of consultation. Compared with the first group, partners here have a stronger influence on design and implementation. The PDI and its partner are sparring partners, being jointly responsible for the design and implementation of a certain intervention.

A third and final group of PDIs (*N*=10) takes up a low profile and more distant position in cooperation with their partners. Their role is that of an adviser, coach and financier. The partner is the one in charge and is responsible for the development and implementation of the intervention.

> *'We support all projects of [partner]. Because she knows what to do there, what is needed there. […] [Partner] does what she thinks is good. And we give advice but if she doesn't want that, then it doesn't happen.'*
> (Interview PDI member)

> *'They decide what to do there; we sometimes make a suggestion, but not more than that. We are no big brother.'*
> (Interview PDI member)

In most cases, the relationship between PDIs and their partners is very warm and close. They give expression to this by using family and friendship terms.

> *'He sees me as… he says 'You are more like a brother to me'; that's how close we are. [name of partner] is great, we kiss and hug… when we are there, … that is also why we do not want to grow big. When we are there, we always go out for dinner with 10 to 15 people. That costs 50 or 60 euro and then we have a whole evening of fun.'*
> (Interview PDI founder)

In response to the question how the cooperation between a PDI and their partner is going, one PDI member responds:

> *'They are very good friends, we have a bond of trust.'*
> (Interview PDI member)

The local networks of partners and their knowledge of local circumstances, needs, customs and structures is an asset that gives most partners a significant amount of influence on, among others, the intervention type, the implementation and the selection of the beneficiaries. We find, however, that many PDIs remain relatively influential as they find it hard to leave the design, implementation and day-to-day management to their partners.

Making use of networks

During the design phase of an intervention most PDIs make limited use of broader networks. This is especially the case when it is the first intervention they support. At that stage, networks are rather small and PDIs in general do not invest a lot of time in developing this network. Through time, PDIs start to develop their (local) networks. The size and the composition of PDI networks differ strongly, varying from small solely Dutch PDI networks to large and more diversified networks consisting of, among others, other civil society actors, local government officials and private companies.

Looking at the type of network of PDIs and their partners and how they use it, we can distinguish three groups of PDIs. A first group (*N*=26) has a rather small network. The design and implementation of their intervention is mainly based on their own and their partners' insights and, to a greater or lesser extent, input gained from their beneficiaries. Most of these PDIs have no contact with local government. Some of them even fear the government. They are afraid of corruption when interference by government officials takes place, of losing control or that cooperation means compromising the quality of their intervention. This is illustrated by the following:

> *'It is risky to say, 'We have problems regarding the exploitation [of the school], let the government solve this'. That would be a logical solution, a quick solution, but when this same government subsequently decides to completely change the policy and decides to kick out the beneficiaries out of the project […].'*
> (Interview PDI founder)

> *'We do make ourselves known to the government. But we do not cooperate with the government. When the government asks us to do something, we do so. But we do not participate in the development discussions of the government. We are not involved in those local development programmes. The reason for this is that we do not trust the government for a penny […]. We only inform them of what we have done.'*
> (Interview PDI founder)

A second group of PDIs (*N*=21) has access to a larger, more diversified local network useful during the design and/or implementation of their intervention. These PDIs use their networks mainly to learn from others by sharing tips and tricks, to try to avoid duplication by informing other PDIs on their activities and to search for (financial) support, as is illustrated by the next quote:

> *'From the hotel where we are staying we got towels and we also asked for blankets, […]. Yes, I have to be this cheeky, it is just asking, asking, asking.'*
> (Interview PDI founder)

Most of the PDIs in this second group make sure to be on good footing with the government and to have their official blessing for their presence and interventions in the area. They therefore make 'mandatory' visits to local government officials in order to keep the relationship going. Their cooperation with the local government could be typified as 'formal-informative'.

> *'That is something we also do, visiting other children homes, how they work, […] maybe you can learn from each other, give each other ideas.'*
> (Interview PDI founder)

A very small third group (*N*=2) distinguishes itself, particularly from the second group, by its constructive cooperation with the local government. They request the government to contribute to their projects and vice versa, they are invited to participate in the design of new government policies, with their interventions they 'set a good example' and inspire and stimulate the government to take up their responsibilities. This type of relationship is illustrated by the next case:

> *'At a certain point the project is finished […]. With the handover [of the project], the government comes. The government is co-financing more and more of the projects in which we are involved. That is one of the great developments. Because in the end, they are responsible.'*
> (Interview PDI founder)

Whereas the size of the networks and their composition differ, PDIs have in common that they mostly start using and/or developing a network after they have decided on the target group, the theme and the intervention. They thus principally use their network within the framework of a pre-determined plan. When starting a second or third project, some PDIs start to involve their networks earlier on in the project cycle:

> *'And what I'm doing right now, with [name of the new project], I am mapping all organisations […]. I'm finding out which NGOs are working in school that has to do with HIV, hygiene, sanitation, to link this up with [project of PDI].'*
> (Interview PDI founder)

5.5 Classification of PDIs

5.5.1 Typology

In this section we apply the previously outlined approach for classifying PDIs based on their intervention type and on their intervention manner. Table 5.2 presents an overview of the different (sub) groups we distinguished and the score assigned to each category. There are two variables related to the intervention type (1.1 generation strategy and 1.2 level of operation) and three variables related to the intervention manner (2.1 participation of beneficiaries, 2.2 participation of local partners and 2.3 participation of other local stakeholders). Each PDI has been assigned a score for each of these variables. The sum of the scores on variables 1.1 and 1.2 characterises their intervention type. The total of the scores of variables 2.1 to 2.3 characterises their intervention manner. We apply categorical coding and thus assume equal distances amongst the scoring categories.

Table 5.2 Overview of different intervention types and intervention manners

	VARIABLES	TYPOLOGY	SCORE
1. INTERVENTION TYPE	1.1 Generation strategy	First-generation	1
		Second-generation	2
		Third-generation	3
	1.2 Level of operation	Individual/family	1
		Village/community	2
		Regional	3
2. INTERVENTION MANNER	2.1 Participation of beneficiaries	Inspirational role	1
		Consultative role	2
		Active in implementation	3
		Active in design & implementation	4
	2.2 Participation of local partner	Executive	1
		Shared responsibility	2
		In control	3
	2.3 Participation of other local stakeholders	Absent/limited	1
		Extended, formal relationship with local government	2
		Extended, constructive relationship with local government	3

Figure 5.2 presents the final results of our analysis. The total score for the intervention type and the intervention manner determines the position of the PDI on, respectively, the X-axis and the Y-axis. The size of the circles refers to the concentration of PDIs within a certain category: the larger the circle, the larger the number of PDIs relying on a certain intervention strategy. Looking at Figure 5.2 we can distinguish four categories of PDIs.



Figure 5.2 Categorisation of PDI intervention strategies

Group # 1

In the lower left side of the graph, we find the largest number of PDIs (group 1). Relief and welfare type of activities with strong involvement of PDIs in the design and implementation of the intervention characterise the intervention strategy of these PDIs.

From a sustainability perspective, both the intervention type and the intervention manner of the PDIs within this group are potentially risky in terms of sustainability. In particular, the limited participation of local stakeholders can have a strong negative influence here. Although it seems acceptable that certain needs of the local population are observed, it is harder to guess the (root) causes of needs, priorities in terms of needs and interventions that appropriately respond to the observed needs and underlying causes. There is a risk of subjective interpretation of needs with consequent development of projects without 'real' beneficiaries/suggested beneficiaries or the development of inappropriate projects. This is illustrated by the next examples, where the lack of beneficiary participation and limited role of the local partner resulted in projects with a short lifetime.

One of the PDIs recalls the story of a donor who joined him on a field trip. He was shocked when he saw the kitchen in which a group of women was preparing their food: a corrugated shack, with a lot of smoke in the absence of good ventilation. He decided that a new kitchen was needed and donated a certain amount of money to realise this project. Both the PDI and its local partner were convinced and, without any consultation with the women, the Dutch PDI built the new kitchen, with big kettles and an air outlet. To the astonishment of the PDI and the generous donor, the women did not use the new kitchen and continued to cook in their old kitchen. They did not know how to use the modern equipment installed in the new kitchen and therefore preferred their old one.

The data also show several interesting examples illustrating the consequences of limited ownership by local partners. In order to ensure the longevity of interventions, in several cases it was decided to start an income-generating project. Although in some cases this was a locally-owned idea, in others

the PDI came up with the idea. This was, for instance, the case in a school construction project. Before starting the construction, the PDI informed their local partner they would only support them with the construction of the school and that running and maintenance costs would be the responsibility of the school itself. Following their suggestion, the partner started to keep chickens and tried to sell the eggs to generate income. The poultry failed as there was not enough money to construct a proper shelter and there was insufficient experience and time to make the poultry project viable. Instead of a source of income it became a financial burden.

Group # 2

The intervention strategy of the second group of PDIs (group 2), in the upper left side of the graph, distinguishes itself from the first group by its higher levels of local ownership. Both groups of PDIs undertake similar intervention types but the way they intervene differs. They support the same type of interventions (first-generation) but the extent to which local stakeholders, in particular local partners, actively participate in the design and implementation of these interventions is stronger compared with PDIs in group 1. PDIs in this second group are more often active as funders and advisers of their local partner.

The different consequences both intervention have on the potential sustainability of the interventions is best illustrated by comparing the answers of the partners of group 1 and 2 to the hypothetical question: what would happen if the PDI stopped cooperating with you tomorrow? In their response to this question, the partners of the first group in general indicate they would be faced with severe financial problems and a drop in the necessary capacities needed to continue the intervention. As one of the partners of the first group stated:

> *'If they had not been here, the programme would not be going on. […] For a programme to run, it needs finance. If they were to stop, we would miss many things.*
> *We would be like a vehicle without gas. […] The programme would die.'*
> (Interview PDI partner)

A partner of a PDI from group two responds as follows to the same question:

> *'For the running costs it would not be a problem.*
> *It would only affect some renovation projects.'*
> (Interview PDI partner)

Although this partner (like other partners in group 2) affirms that if the cooperation with the PDI ended it would affect their (future) interventions, it would affect them only partly whereas in the first group the impact of the ending of the cooperation on the programme would be total.

Group #3

A small third group of PDI interventions can be typified as second-generation with strong involvement of the PDI. At first sight the potential sustainability of the interventions within this group looks more favourable compared with those within groups 1 and 2. PDIs within group 3 adopt second-generation strategies and by doing so they aim to contribute to lasting, structural change. Our results show, however, that the intervention manner opted by the PDIs within this group impedes the achievement of this objective. This is illustrated by an income-generating project which is designed in such a way that it has potential to contribute to local community development. On paper and to a certain extent in practice, the beneficiaries and the local partner involved have a rather large say in the implementation of the intervention. The relatively strong influence of the PDI, however, leaves the local actors involved little room to manoeuvre, thus jeopardising the possible achievement of their second-generation strategy.

The local manager indicates that at the start of cooperating with the PDI he had the idea they were starting a joint project based on shared responsibilities but gradually he started to feel like an employee at the service of the PDI.

Group # 4

Towards the top middle and right-hand side of the graph we find a group of PDIs that extended their relief and welfare type of activities with community development and sustainable systems development (group 4). To a greater or lesser extent all of these interventions are, compared with the interventions of group 1, characterised by a relatively high degree of local ownership.

From a sustainability perspective, the potential sustainability of the interventions in the fourth group is higher compared with those of groups 1 and 2 because of the chosen intervention type and the intervention manner. Albeit in a subtle way, these PDIs focus their interventions on the causes of poverty and try to contribute to structural changes. Also in this fourth group, however, we find examples of interventions whereof the sustainability is at risk. In the case of a waste project aimed at processing plastic waste into materials that could be sold to plastic-processing factories, initially not a lot of time was invested in mapping other actors involved in this subject and thoroughly studying the market for this product. After the machine was bought and installed, the local organisation had trouble in finding buyers for its product. It turned out that two other similar (commercial) projects had operated in the area for several years, both experiencing similar difficulties in selling processed plastic. The founder of the PDI involved had a professional background in waste management and clearly persuaded the local organisation to focus on this issue without investing enough time in getting to know the context wherein the intervention would take place.

5.5.2 Drivers of intervention strategies

In the final step of our analysis we aim to get an understanding of the dynamic drivers of the intervention strategies of PDIs. We therefore look for some common (organisational) features of PDIs within the different groups distinguished in Figure 5.2. In this analysis we will not include the fourth group since this group is too small to make any statements about their distinguishing features useful.

The influence of experience

A central starting-point in the generation strategies model of Korten (1990) is the idea of an evolutionary process: driven by their experience, development organisations will continue to redefine their strategy from more top-down, direct poverty relief to bottom-up interventions aimed at bringing structural change. Applying this line of thought to our study, we would expect age to be a common denominator of the PDIs within the different groups, with younger PDIs being dominant within group 1 and older organisations more represented within groups 2 and 4.

To a certain extent our results corroborate this idea. PDIs in the first group are generally indeed organisations with fewer years of experience; the average age of the organisations is 9 compared with 15 years of those of the second group. This suggests that the intervention manner (how) of PDIs is determined by the experience of the organisation, with older organisations using a more participatory approach. We find, however, that the average age of PDIs in the fourth group, with a similar intervention manner to those of the second group, is comparable to that of the first group.

We can make a similar conclusion regarding the relation between the age of the PDI and the intervention type (what). Since we do not find that PDIs characterised by second- or third-generation strategies (group 4) are on average older than those PDIs supporting first-generation strategies (first and second groups), our results do not affirm the idea that the intervention type is influenced by the age of the PDI. This is best illustrated by the next example.

The oldest PDI (part of group 3) included in this study started more than 40 years ago to support different types of projects in a certain region. One of the first projects was the improvement of the quality of the schools in the region. More precisely, it started to support the schools in renovating their roofs and providing chairs for the pupils. More than 40 years later, it is still renovating roofs and providing chairs. What changed is that nowadays parents are asked to contribute, the PDI has expanded the area it works in and it also supports the schools in constructing toilets. We hence do not find a clear correlation between the age of PDIs and their intervention manner and intervention type.

Dependence of the partner

The results of our study reveal that the majority of PDIs with an intervention manner with restricted participation of local stakeholders (group 1) cooperate with local partners that we refer to as mirror organisations. This means these organisations were not founded independently of the PDI, but started (often with the support of the PDI) when the PDI began to support a certain intervention. Partners of PDIs in the second and third groups are more often independent, experienced organisations with a larger group of (local) donors, making PDIs less influential regarding the local organisations and interventions.

(Professional) background PDI member

We find as well that the (professional) background of a PDI member can have a strong influence on the selected intervention type. Someone trained as a nurse runs the risk of viewing local circumstances from the point of view of one's own profession and lack a broader perspective. This can result in professional deformation whereby the perception of local stakeholders is dominated by the perception of an external professional.

> *'I saw that not a lot was done in the field of health care. And many children with burns, and I found that really sad. I am a nurse by profession, and I thought it should be very easy to do something about this.'*
> (Interview PDI member)

Back-donors

Private back-donors of PDIs have a strong influence on the intervention type of PDIs. PDIs, rightly or wrongly, expect their donors to have a strong preference for money being spent on concrete, small-scale projects. This makes first-generation strategies on a micro level more obvious for PDIs (e.g. in groups 1 and 2). In these cases, the influence of private donors on the choice of a certain type of intervention transcends the influence of, for example, beneficiaries, local partners or other local stakeholders.

> *'Sometimes we receive very large donations […] and they say, 'We have 10,000 or 15,000 euro, but we would like it to be spent on the maintenance of children'.'*
> (Interview PDI founder)

Private back-donors not only influence the intervention type of PDIs, but also affect the intervention manner. PDIs are related to many of their private back-donors or are friends with them and they want to ensure their money is spent well by demonstrating results in the short run. This drives PDIs towards greater influence and control.

Vision

We find that the vision of PDI members with regard to development cooperation in general and cooperation with local stakeholders in particular determines the intervention strategy. Most PDIs within group 4 combined their first-generation strategies (e.g. school building) from the start with second- or third-generation strategies (e.g. lobby activities). We find that, more than experience, it is the vision and attitude of PDI members that determine the intervention type. This is illustrated by a PDI that has since its establishment supported first-generation strategies. After eight years a new member, convinced that in order to bring change more was needed, joined the PDI. Since that time this PDI has increasingly complemented its first-generation interventions with second- and third-generation types of activity. This change was not driven by the experience of the PDI, but by the conviction of one member.

Small scale and the 'fun-factor'

Finally, we find the two central characteristics of PDIs to be of strong influence on their intervention strategy. First is the small scale (i.e. budget and number of staff) of the organisations. Some PDIs mention the limited time and money they have available as a reason not to start second- or third-generation strategies. They expect these processes to be more time-consuming and expensive compared with first-generation strategies and therefore out of their league. Others take into account a cost-benefit analysis in order to decide on the type of intervention they are going to support.

> *'[…] That girl, for example, she costs 300 euro per month, that is 3,600 euro per year. […] For the same amount of money you can send 10 healthy children to school. […] More and more we look at what else could we do with our money.'*
> (Interview PDI founder)

When comparing PDIs adopting first-generation strategies (groups 1 and 2) with those PDIs with second- or third-generation strategies (group 4) we find that on average this last group of PDIs has a larger budget at its disposal. The average annual budget of PDIs within group 4 is 65,000 euro compared with 47,000 euro and 43,000 euro of respectively groups 1 and 2. In addition, we find that PDIs of group 4 on average have more members than groups 1 and 2. Although we cannot draw firm conclusions, the results give the impression that a certain size of organisation is helpful in extending PDIs' first-generation interventions with second- or third-generation strategies. Our results are in line with Korten (1987) and Elliot who find that a certain level of organisational capacity is required for 'effective agents of change' (Elliot, 1987: 60).
Also, the voluntary character of PDIs affects the intervention strategy of PDIs. Many PDIs mention that involvement in the PDI is of great importance to them. Being a volunteer, many PDI members mention that in order to stay motivated the 'work should stay fun', as expressed by the founder of a PDI:

> *'And we always say it should have our personal interest. […] Time and again our secretary says: 'You should also have fun'. If you want to go for it [project], if you want to write about it in a local newspapers or if you have an interview on local television, than you have to fully stand behind it, also emotionally.'*
> (Interview PDI founder)

PDI members mention that being hands-on, especially in interventions with concrete, visible results, gives them the energy to design new interventions, to think of future plans, to make visits to their partner, the projects and the beneficiaries.

> *'I do not like the administrative tasks, I do it with reluctance. But being active in the field [project location], that is what I like.'*
> (Interview PDI founder)

> *'I can see the results, and that makes me feel comfortable.'*
> (Interview PDI founder)

Hence, in order to fulfil their aims, many PDI members are strongly involved in the design and implementation of the intervention. It not only affects the intervention manner, but also the intervention type. First-generation strategies, such as the construction of a school, are preferred over more abstract third-generation strategies. Salamon (1987) refers to this as 'philanthropic particularism', a tendency for non-profit organisations to provide certain types of services to specific groups of people based on their own particular interests and preferences.

Above we indicated that in the diversity of intervention strategies we find groups of PDIs with a (more or less) common approach. In addition, we can distinguish several denominators determining the intervention strategy adopted by a PDI. The results of our study show as well, however, that there is a high degree of coincidence involved in determining the approach of PDIs. The selection of the country, the region, the local partner or the central theme are in many cases not deliberate but are the result of a high degree of happenchance.

> *'I was teaching in a secondary school in [Kenyan town]. I could as well have ended up in Nigeria, Pakistan or India.'*
> (Interview PDI founder)

> *'By coincidence, we met with the waiter and decided to help him in supporting the orphans.'*
> (Interview PDI founder)

Looking at the denominators of the intervention strategies of PDIs, it is striking that nearly all of these factors can be typified as intrinsic drivers, most of them related to the PDI and its members and to a lesser extent to the local organisation or local circumstances. Without ignoring the importance of the context wherein PDIs operate, we do not find notable differences between PDIs operating in Kenya or in Indonesia regarding the potential sustainability of their interventions. They are distributed over the different groups in a similar way.

5.6 Conclusions

In this chapter we offered an in-depth analysis of the diversity of intervention strategies of small-scale, voluntary development organisations, referred to as private development initiatives (PDIs), in the light of their (potential) sustainable contribution to poverty reduction. On the basis of this analysis, we wanted to classify PDI development interventions in terms of their potential sustainability. Therefore, we first designed a framework for studying the diversity of PDI interventions. The intervention manner (how) and the intervention type (what) are used as the two central criteria in this framework and subsequently used to assess the potential sustainability of the interventions.

Second, we applied this framework in an empirical study of 49 PDIs and their interventions. We found that there is a relatively large group of PDIs whose intervention strategy puts at risk the sustainability of the intervention. This is mainly because the interventions are first and foremost aimed at the consequences of poverty by delivering direct relief, limiting the extent to which an intervention intends to bring structural change. In addition, the involvement of local stakeholders is rather limited, restricting the extent to which the intervention can be locally owned (and thus can be continued without external financial and technical support). So far, the results of our study confirm the results of previous studies on the interventions of PDIs (Chelladurai, 2006; De Bruyn, 2011; Kinsbergen, 2007; Kamara & Bakhuisen, 2008; Schulpen, 2007; van der Velden, 2011). The framework allowed a more diverse picture to emerge, however. The analysis of our data shows there is also a group of PDIs that adopts a different intervention strategy with a greater potential to make a sustainable contribution to poverty reduction. It is clearly demonstrated that – although PDIs share some common characteristics compared with other development actors – they are not a homogeneous group with respect to the potential sustainability of their interventions. Hence, a more refined assessment is required for an understanding of PDIs as development actors.

Subsequently, our analysis looked for common characteristics of PDIs sharing a similar intervention strategy. A close look at the intervention strategies of the 49 studied PDIs demonstrates that there is no evolutionary process guiding PDIs from first- to second- and third-generation strategies. There are PDIs with several decades of experience that still support relief and welfare types of activities in a top-down manner. In the same way, there are organisations with fewer than five or ten years of experience involved in programmes of community or systems development implemented in a participatory way. We find that it is not so much age of the PDI that is of influence on its intervention strategy. In this respect, our results warn against adopting an evolutionary perspective towards the development of PDIs. The external organisational characteristics that seem to influence the choice of the intervention strategy of a PDI are strongly related to the independence of the local partner and the size of the PDI (budget and number of staff). In addition, the results show that a number of intrinsic drivers influence the intervention strategy of PDIs whose influence is less obvious from a sustainable development perspective. These factors refer to the (professional) background of PDI members and their motivation to volunteer for a PDI.

The study shows that the framework we designed and applied is useful for studying the sustainability of PDI interventions in a structured style. The framework has proven to be valuable in terms of shedding light on the diversity of PDI interventions and their potential sustainability. In contrast to earlier studies concluding in general terms that the sustainability of PDI interventions is at risk, the framework used here to classify PDI interventions enabled us to ascertain that the potential sustainability of PDI interventions is diverse.

Third, we refined our insights into the sustainability of PDI interventions by looking separately at the way in which PDIs intervene and the type of interventions they undertake. Korten (1990), Elliot (1987) and Brodhead (1987) assume that the intervention type, which development organisations employ, comes along with a certain intervention manner. They suggest that first-generation strategies are characterised by a more top-down implementation and third- and fourth-generation strategies are more bottom-up in nature. We find, however, that the intervention

type and manner are not always inextricably linked. The second group of PDIs we distinguish is characterised by a first-generation strategy but the intervention manner is more participatory than Korten would probably expect. The dual approach undertaken in the study at hand allows us to identify more of the diversity among PDIs. In addition, this approach points to possible risks of the sustainability of PDI interventions in a more specific way. This in turn permits more tailor-made recommendations for how to increase the potential sustainability of PDI interventions.

Looking at the findings of our study, we have two important reservations. First, without undervaluing the results we found, caution is required in assuming over- simple, one-on-one causal relationships between characteristics of PDIs, the type of interventions supported and the sustainability of their interventions. The exact influence exerted by these factors is dependent – among others – on the exact circumstances in which the organisation operates and the characteristics of local actors, such as the capacity of their local counterpart.

Second, no actual comparison has been made between the functioning of PDIs and of other development actors, such as established development organisations. Hence, prudence is needed when comparing PDIs with other development actors on the basis of our results.

As the results of our study show that the potential sustainability of PDI interventions is diverse, our recommendations also need to reflect this diversity. PDIs within group 1 can enhance their potential sustainability in two ways. They can either increase the involvement of local stakeholders or they can start to complement their first-generation strategies with interventions more in line with second- or third-generation strategies. This latter recommendation could improve the potential sustainability of PDIs within group 2. Although the prospects for sustainability of the interventions of PDIs within group 4 look more favourable compared with those within groups 1 and 2, the results of our study show that there is still substantial room for improvement. By decreasing their influence on the implementation of the intervention and balancing their financial role and increasing investment in structural change (e.g. strengthening the role of the local government), the probability of PDIs contributing sustainably to structural poverty reduction increases. A general recommendation for enhancing the sustainability of PDI interventions, applicable to all PDIs in this study, is to decrease the role of internal drivers (e.g. private donors, personal motivation) and increase the influence of external, local drivers (e.g. contextual factors on the intervention strategy.

Chapter 06

6. Conclusions

'And that the boys are so healthy, that they are doing so well and therefore do not have to leave their house, … Well, I think that is great, that is a real success. I'm incredibly proud of it.'

Interview PDI founder [1]

'I do not think it is earthshaking what we have achieved. I do not think we have saved people's lives or saved children from famine. If we stopped, there would be no deaths. But I think it is quite nice what we have done.'

Interview PDI founder

'Everything we did, we always started by doing it a little bit wrong.'

Interview PDI founder

[1] The quotes are derived from interviews with founders/members of private development initiatives (see Chapter 5). The data are available on request.

6.1 Introduction

Worldwide, a growing number of alternative actors are engaging in international development cooperation. From celebrities to multinational companies, from large charitable organisations to individual citizens, a diversified number of actors want to contribute to the global fight against poverty, inequality and exclusion. This study is focused on one of these alternative development actors, private development initiatives (PDIs): ordinary citizens who start their own small-scale voluntary development organisation, through which they provide direct support to individuals, communities or local organisations in development countries, independent of direct government support. A sincere fascination with this passionate engagement was the personal motivation for starting this study. Who are these people who spend so many hours in a PDI, what motivates them to do so and what are the results of their efforts? This study tells the stories behind the pictures of renovated school buildings, income-generating goat-farming projects or installed solar panels. In addition on the one hand to the words of praise of their supporters and on the other the critics who see the work of PDIs as amateurish, this thesis aimed to bring to the fore facts, figures and nuances. This study offers a broad and in-depth insight into PDIs as alternative development actors. Our central research question is:

> *Which factors shape the nature of private development initiatives and influence the sustainability of their development interventions?*

The Netherlands, as one of the forerunners in the field of international development cooperation, is our site of study. The Netherlands is characterised by a high degree of generosity regarding charitable causes in general and development organisations in particular (Schuyt et al., 2013). In addition, the proliferation of the arena for international development cooperation – the background against which the establishment of PDIs is taking place – occurred quite early in the Netherlands (IS Academie NGO database; Schulpen et al., 2011). A final reason why the Netherlands is an interesting study in terms of PDIs is the fact that both in the political arena and in the public sphere the debate on the efficiency and effectiveness of development organisations in general and PDIs in particular has been very prominent for many years (Beerends, 2013; Bodelier & Vossen, 2007; Coumans et al., 2013; Halsema, 2013; Koch, 2007; Weisglas, 2012; WRR, 2010).

Studies on PDIs so far have offered interesting first insights into the characteristics of PDIs and their functioning as development actors. They generally lack an integrated and contextualised approach, however, resulting in an overly one-dimensional and uniform understanding of the PDI phenomenon. We therefore provide a more detailed insight into the distinguishing features of PDIs (i.e. the organisations and their members), the underlying driving forces and the individual motives for citizens' engagement in PDIs. This study pays major attention to the question of how the activities that PDIs undertake can be characterised and valued with respect to their potential sustainability.

The analytical approach used to disentangle the origin, operations and background of PDIs is intended to do justice to the broad diversity within the group of PDIs. It takes into account the context wherein PDIs are operating in the Netherlands and analyses in an integrated manner what PDIs are, what they do and how they do it. We therefore employed the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) framework as an integrative approach as it permits understanding of the interactions between these questions (Bain, 1956; Mason, 1939; McWilliams & Smart, 1993). In each of the four central chapters, specific aspects of the structure, conduct and/or performance of PDIs were central to the analysis. The central research question, combined with the SCP- approach, resulted in four sub-questions:

Chapter 2: What drives the start of PDIs and what characterises PDIs, their members and their activities?

Chapter 3: What determines time investment of PDI volunteers?

Chapter 4: How do characteristics of development organisations influence the decision making of potential donors?

Chapter 5: What determines the sustainability of PDI interventions?

6.2 Results

6.2.1 Characterisation of PDIs

The second chapter of this thesis offers insight into the distinguishing features of PDIs, their establishment motives and their interventions. Since no large-scale dataset was available for studying the structure of PDIs, a unique data set has been created (CIDIN-PDI Database 2008-09). The data were collected from nearly 900 PDIs with the use of a self-developed survey. We were particularly interested in understanding:

> *What drives the start of PDIs and what characterises PDIs, their members and their activities?*

What are PDIs?

The most distinctive feature of PDIs as compared with other development actors is their voluntary character: the majority of the PDI members undertake activities in the field of development cooperation on a voluntary basis, whereas the core tasks in established development organisations are carried out by paid staff members. Both regarding the annual budget and the number of members PDIs are small in scale. This is a second important distinguishing feature of PDIs compared with established development actors. The members of PDIs are in general middle-agers, almost equally divided between women and men and between those who consider themselves to be part of a religious community and those who do not. The majority of the members combine voluntary work in the PDI with a paid job. Regarding their income and educational level, the members of PDIs come from the average or above-average strata of Dutch society. The most important trigger for people to initiate or become actively engaged in a PDI is a holiday or longer stay in a developing country.

What do PDIs do?

We find that the convictions concerning the origins of poverty of PDI members do not always correspond to their ideas on the solutions to poverty. PDIs consider restrictive economic structures and the absence of, and irregular access to, resources like education and healthcare as the two most important causes of poverty. They attach special importance, however, to investments that result in improved access to basic services like education and health care. In practice, these small-scale, voluntary development organisations contribute in particular to direct poverty reduction, especially in the field of education and health care. They do so mainly in the (Sub-Sahara) African and Asian continents, in countries such as India, Indonesia, Ghana and Kenya. In other words, in practice their preferred intervention type is direct poverty alleviation. Although they also attach considerable importance to lobbying and influencing policy and civil society building, this is not reflected in the general picture of their actual investments.

How do PDIs do it?

At first sight, the working method of PDIs seems to be efficient (with regard to money and manpower) and effective (goals are being achieved). Various researches have made it clear, however, that some of the PDIs fail to take certain crucial steps before, during and/or after the implementation of development projects. A lack of thorough contextual analysis and evaluations and overly personal cooperation between PDIs and their partners often characterise the work of PDIs and jeopardise the sustainability (i.e. longevity) of their projects.

Chapter 2 clearly shows that notwithstanding that PDIs share some common denominators that distinguish them as a group from other players in the field, PDIs as a group are very diverse. Although we applied a well-defined definition of PDIs, we find a high degree of diversity within the group. Whereas Chapter 2 focuses on the organisations, their members and their activities, in Chapter 3, we zoom in on one of the core distinguishing features of the organisations: their voluntary character.

6.2.2 Time investment of PDI volunteers

In order to understand PDIs as development organisations and to gain insight into if and how the specificity of PDIs affects their role as development actors, it is essential to study volunteers' time investment as one of the basic features of PDIs. Consequently, the conduct of PDI volunteers was central to the analysis. With the use of the same dataset as in Chapter 2, in this third chapter we investigated the determinants of time investment among a sample of 661 PDI volunteers. We wanted to understand which factors make donating time beneficial and interesting for those engaged in voluntary work with PDIs. The following sub-question was formulated:

What determines time investment of PDI volunteers?

We first of all find that – compared with general volunteers – PDI volunteers give a much larger number of hours, on average 37 hours per month. The average age of 55 years and the high average level of education could explain the comparatively high average number of hours of PDI volunteers. In addition, the specific characteristics of the PDI organisations may constitute an important part of the explanation. Whereas many (non-PDI) organisations mainly engage volunteers to support their paid staff members, the existence of most PDIs is totally dependent on the efforts of volunteers. Most of them were initiated on a voluntary basis and a large majority continue to depend solely on the efforts of volunteers.

Notwithstanding the large average number of hours they give, PDI volunteers face time and budget restrictions. This is partly because of their position in the (paid) labour market. Volunteers who are restricted in terms of time because of having a paid job and with free time that is more costly because of higher income spend less hours doing voluntary work.

Differently from what we expected, we find that volunteers who are sceptical towards established development organisations increase time investment in PDIs. PDI volunteers who have doubts about the effectiveness and efficiency of development organisations may perceive their time investment in PDIs as an alternative and more successful way of expressing their involvement with the lives of people in developing countries and contributing to poverty reduction than supporting established development organisations.

Volunteers that bring frequent visits to developing countries spend more hours on PDI volunteering. This shows that empathy with the lives of people in developing countries – triggered by these visits – makes the distance to beneficiaries smaller and not only positively affects the decision to start a PDI and the willingness to volunteer in a PDI but also increases the time investment of PDI volunteers. The distance to beneficiaries is also mediated through the ethnic background of the volunteer: volunteers with a non-Western ethnic background implementing development projects in their country of origin are more strongly engaged in PDIs.

The results of this analysis show that not only does the supply side of voluntary hours (i.e. volunteers' considerations) affect time investment in PDIs. The demand side of voluntary hours (i.e. organisational characteristics) also influences time investment. We find that more 'professional' PDIs with larger budgets and more staff attract volunteers who spend more hours volunteering. Chapter 3 thus reveals that PDIs can count on a strong involvement of their PDI volunteers and that the degree of their participation is not only determined by personal considerations but is also affected by the organisational characteristics of the PDI. In Chapter 4 we focused on the conduct of another important player in the world of PDIs: private donors.

6.2.3 The quest for donors

Chapter 4 studies how (potential) private donors respond to the diversity of development actors. We included a unique experiment in the existing Family Survey of the Dutch Population (FSDP) and complemented the survey with a section of specific motivational questions (Kraaykamp et al., 2009). The survey experiment allowed us to study the effect of both individual characteristics and organisational features on giving intentions. More precisely, it addressed the question which type of international development organisations is preferred by potential donors. We therefore posed the following sub-question:

> *How do characteristics of development organisations influence the decision making of potential donors?*

Although this chapter focused on the relation between organisational characteristics and giving behaviour, the individual characteristics of (potential) donors were also included in the analysis. We find, among others, that women, religious people and frequent church attendees are more inclined to donate (more). Older people and better educated people are not more inclined to donate but those who donate have a higher probability of donating higher amounts. Interestingly enough – and seemingly contrasting with the results of Chapters 2 and 3 – we also find that, for potential donors, visits to development countries have an inhibiting effect on their willingness to donate money to development organisations. More in line with Chapters 2 and 3 we find that those people who already donate to development organisations are inclined to donate higher amounts when they have visited a developing country. Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate that bringing the beneficiary closer, among others, through visits to development countries positively affects the decision to become active in a PDI and increases the number of voluntary hours in a PDI. We need to acknowledge that the studies central in these two chapters could suffer from selection bias since they were conducted among a group of people already active in a PDI.

With regard to organisational characteristics, the results of our study first of all show that next to characteristics of (potential) donors, organisational features have a substantial effect whether or not potential donors decide to donate and the amount they donate. (Potential) donors are clearly in favour of experienced development organisations that are familiar to them and that are mainly run by volunteers. As we expected, overhead costs of development organisations have a strong negative influence on the giving intentions of (potential) donors. When, however, organisations are mainly run by paid staff potential donors are in general more tolerant of higher overhead ratios. By and large, organisational characteristics have the same effect on giving behaviour for different types of donors, but we find that religious people and frequent church attendees are especially inclined to donate (more) to religious development organisations. In addition, we find that those donors with stronger beliefs in development organisations are somewhat more tolerant of overhead ratios.

The ideal development organisation is a hybrid type combining features of small(er) voluntary organisations and large(r) professional organisations. Development organisations with the highest probabilities of receiving a donation and of receiving a donation higher than 40 euro are, in general, familiar, have 10 to 20 years of experience, have no religious background, are active in more than one country, do not have any overhead costs and are mainly run by volunteers. Most, if not all,

of the traditional, established, large-scale development organisations are run by professional (i.e. paid) staff. Hence traditional development organisations do not constitute the 'ideal' organisation. Although PDIs are mainly run by volunteers, they are, in general, not the ideal organisation either, as most PDIs are active in only one developing country and many have only been established recently. PDIs can, however, take advantage of donors' preference to donate to familiar development organisations since they mainly recruit donors in their personal network. Therefore there is a higher probability that (potential) donors are not only familiar with (the name of) the organisations, but also with the person requesting a donation.

This analysis clearly demonstrated the importance of organisational characteristics in the donors' decision-making process. Differently from what is sometimes assumed in the public debate on the diversification of the field of development actors, donors are not unambiguously in favour of small-scale development organisations. In other words, from the donor's perspective, small is not always beautiful. After focusing on the structure of PDIs and the conduct of their volunteers and donors (in Chapters 2, 3 and 4), Chapter 5 discusses the performance of the organisations.

6.2.4 The sustainability of PDI interventions

In the fifth chapter of this thesis, the performance of PDIs has been analysed. More precisely, PDI interventions are classified according to their potential sustainability. In addition, the determinants of different intervention strategies are distinguished. This analysis is based on unique qualitative data collected during field research in the Netherlands, Kenya and Indonesia among 49 PDIs, their local partners and their development interventions. The key question addressed in this chapter is:

What determines the sustainability of PDI interventions?

Our classification of PDI interventions results in four different groups. We find that there is a relatively large group of PDIs whose intervention strategy puts at risk the sustainability of the intervention because their intervention strategies are mainly aimed at delivering direct relief with rather limited involvement of local stakeholders. There is also, however, a group of PDIs that adopts a different intervention strategy with greater potential for making a sustainable contribution to poverty reduction.

We do not find evidence for an evolutionary process: we did not find age to be a straightforward determinant of the potential sustainability of PDI interventions. The different groups we distinguished cut across age, with some relatively young PDIs supporting interventions that are at lower risk regarding their sustainability compared with interventions of older PDIs. The results clearly show, however, that organisational features do relate to the sustainability of PDI interventions. The structure, conduct and performance of PDIs are hence not self-contained facets but strongly related parts. We find that the scale of the organisation (structure) affects the type of interventions PDIs (can) support (conduct) and by doing so the sustainability of the interventions (performance): PDIs mention that the available time (determined by the number of PDI members) and money are factors affecting the type of intervention they undertake.

In a similar manner, the fact that PDIs are mainly supported by private donors (structure) with an overall preference for investing as much money as possible directly in the development interventions (conduct) also determines the type of interventions PDIs support and the extent to which they are involved in the implementation and therewith the potential sustainability of these interventions (performance).

Finally, the voluntary character of PDIs turns out to be of decisive influence: most PDIs are mainly run by volunteers (structure) and they do so with great devotion (conduct). The fulfilment of their motives affects both the extent to which volunteers are involved in the design and implementation of the development interventions (and thereby, the extent of local ownership) and the type of interventions supported. Salamon (1987) refers to the latter as 'philanthropic particularism'.

This implies that the tendency of non-profit organisations to provide certain types of services to specific groups of people is (partly) based on their own particular interest and preferences. We do not suggest that the same inclination is absent among paid staff of established development organisations. We do find indications, however, that because of their voluntary character PDIs are potentially more vulnerable to philanthropic particularism. It is namely plausible that volunteers - possibly more than paid staff members - are driven by an internal motivation that can, as the data show, be powered by the type of interventions supported (e.g. visible results) or the extent and type of involvement in the work of the PDI (e.g. hands-on involvement).

Looking at the determinants of the intervention strategy, one could wonder whether the preference of private donors to donate to organisations mainly run by volunteers is – from a development perspective – in congruence with their desire to make impactful donations. In addition, the results from our study suggest that being an older organisation – with age functioning as a proxy for experience – does not turn out to be a guarantee of higher (potential) sustainability of PDI interventions.

The results of this final chapter show that PDIs are not only diverse regarding their internal structure but also vary considerably with respect to the potential sustainability of their development interventions. Moreover, the results show a certain link between the organisational characteristics of PDIs and the diversity that we found regarding the sustainability of their interventions. Two important points need to be made, however. First, although we aimed to compose a sample of PDIs and interventions that offered an adequate reflection of PDIs as a group, we must be cautious about generalising the results to the entire PDI population. Second, without undervaluing the results we found, caution is required in assuming excessively simple, one-on-one causal relationships between characteristics of PDIs, the type of interventions supported and the sustainability of their interventions. The exact influence exerted by these factors is dependent – among others – on the specific circumstances in which the organisation is operating as well as the characteristics of local actors, such as the capacity of their local counterpart.

Reflecting on the findings of the different chapters and relating them to our central research question, we find evidence that two crucial features of PDIs shape the nature of PDIs and the sustainability of their development interventions. As summarised above, both their voluntary character and their small scale (i.e. number of members and budget) are distinguishing features compared with other development actors. Second, more than merely typifying PDIs, these organisational features turn out to be important factors in understanding PDIs as development actors. These two structure-related elements are pivotal to understanding both the conduct and performance of PDIs as alternative development actors. In conclusion, it can be said that both features are key to the identity of PDIs as a phenomenon in general and to the understanding of PDIs as alternative development actor in particular.

6.3. Scientific relevance

In the introduction we argued that our study relies on a particular analytical approach based on two key principles: (1) integrated analysis and (2) contextualised analysis. The first premise means that attention is focused on the linkages between three PDI components: structure, conduct and performance ('what they are', 'what they do' and 'how they do it'). The second premise implies that we do not study PDIs in a vacuum but we take into account the (Dutch) context wherein PDIs are operating.

As shown in Section 6.2.4 the integrated character of structure, conduct and performance of PDIs becomes particularly apparent in the analysis presented in Chapter 5 and even more when these results are related to those of Chapters 2, 3 and 4. We found, for example, evidence that the characteristics of the volunteer to a large extent influence the voluntary work of PDI members. Whereas financial and time restrictions affect the time spent on voluntary work, frequent visits and direct encounters with people in developing countries initially enhance voluntary engagement. In a similar vein, time spent on PDIs is strongly enhanced by value motives and social encounter reasons, both by founders and members. In addition, available budget and staffing enhance volunteers' time spending whereas lifecycle aspects tend to counteract this tendency. Subsequently, in Chapter 5 this voluntary character of PDIs turns out to be of influence on the performance of PDIs.

The importance of contextual characteristics for PDI performance is addressed in particular in Chapters 2 and 4. In order to understand (the rise of) PDIs it is not sufficient to study PDIs and their members as we also must into account the broader environment wherein PDIs are positioned and how this environment responds to PDIs. The dependence of PDIs on private donors makes their perception of and their donation intentions to PDIs and other types of development actors crucial. Although we do not find unambiguous support for small-scale, voluntary development organisations, we do find that familiarity, governance costs (low overhead) and voluntary staffing are considered as key characteristics that can play to the strengths of PDIs in their quest for financial support.

Although we mainly paid attention to the Dutch context wherein PDIs operate, in Chapter 5 it becomes apparent that the context in the developing countries wherein PDIs intervene does not always receive sufficient attention. PDI members devote considerable importance to projects that focus on investments resulting in improved access to basic services like education and health care. The design or implementation of a development project is usually not preceded by a sound context analysis, however. Moreover, the PDI partnership is usually based on very personal relationships with local agents who may occupy a particular position in their communities. Whereas enthusiasm is widely available, implementation risks involved with reaching desired, sustainable, development outcomes tend to be high. This is indeed confirmed in the analysis of the prospects for sustainability of PDIs presented in Chapter 5. Even though there is a large diversity amongst PDIs, the fact that internal organisational characteristics to a large extent drive the choice of intervention strategies strongly challenges the likelihood of sustainability.

Understanding the linkages between the structure, conduct and performance and taking into account the context wherein PDIs operate is fundamental to our understanding of PDIs as an alternative development actor. The different central perspectives of the chapters in this thesis broadened our understanding of PDIs and brought to the fore a more diversified picture than hitherto known. The SCP paradigm combined with the contextualised approach has hence been valuable and perhaps even indispensable in answering the central research question and in reaching the research objective.

6.4 Methods, constraints and avenues for future PDI research

We did not only reach the research objective with the integrated, contextualised approach. Applying mixed methods throughout the different chapters on different type of data turned out to be beneficial in terms of reaching the central research objective and answering the central research question and sub-questions. A survey among PDIs made it possible to question a large number of them, which was necessary for defining and characterising PDIs as a group and understanding PDI volunteering. The survey experiment offered a unique opportunity to study the preferences of donors and to analyse the effects of both individual and organisational characteristics on giving behaviour. Since we had access to a large-scale database of PDIs, which contained a large amount of background information on the organisations, we were able to draw up a solid sub-sample of PDIs to participate in the field research in a structured manner. This strengthened the quality of the data collected during the field research and the subsequent analysis.

Looking at the findings of our study, we must make two important points. First of all, although every effort was made to compose a representative sample of PDIs, since the total population of PDIs is unknown caution is required as regards generalising the results of Chapters 2, 3 and 5 to the entire PDI population. Since we do not find strongly anomalous results regarding features of PDIs and PDI members compared with other PDI studies, we believe that we have been successful in obtaining a certain degree of representativeness.

Second, in this thesis, no actual comparison has been made between the functioning of PDIs and other development actors, such as established development organisations. Hence, prudence is needed in the comparison of PDIs with other development actors based on the results of our study. Although we were able to make some comparisons based on our findings and made some cautious statements about how for, example, differences in structure may affect differences in performance, for future research it would be worthwhile to compare the functioning of NGOs and PDIs in a structured manner.

The limitations formulated above and the insights gained in the different chapters and the thesis as a whole, suggest several new research topics. First of all, further research is needed to enhance our understanding of PDI volunteering and PDI volunteers. In particular, more research – preferably with data that allow controlling for problems of endogeneity – is required to explain why PDI volunteers spend more time on voluntary work than general volunteers and why volunteering of PDI founders differs from that of general (PDI) volunteers.

Second, a representative dataset including both PDI members and founders and (non) donors of development organisations would increase our understanding of the influence of the perceived distance to beneficiaries on charitable behaviour (i.e. voluntary time investment and financial donations) and on how encounters with these beneficiaries – through for example journeys to developing countries – affect this behaviour.

Both Chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis made a contribution to the study of charitable behaviour by analysing the relation between donating time & money and organisational characteristics. Our contributions showed that organisational characteristics have an influence on charitable behaviour and indicate that they require a more prominent position in studies on donations of time and money to charities. Further research could enlarge our understanding of the role of organisational characteristics in charitable behaviour. This could be done by studying this relation in different types of charitable sectors (e.g. health care) or by constructing different scenarios; for example, scenarios including information on the type of support offered to beneficiaries.

Building on the findings of this thesis, it would also be worthwhile enlarging our understanding of PDI interventions in developing countries by conducting ex post sustainability and impact studies. Such studies would make it possible to deepen our understanding of PDI interventions, and more precisely to gain a better insight into the effect of PDI interventions on the lives of the beneficiaries and a better understanding of the factors determining this. Over the past few years, PDIs have slowly become part of the system of development cooperation in the Netherlands, and are increasingly recognised as such. A large number of trainings have been developed for PDIs,

network days are organised and PDIs have even established their own branch organisation (Partin). Future research will learn what will happen to the PDIs of today. Will they transform into the 'Oxfams' of tomorrow? And if so, will a possible third wave of socialisation bring new blood to the sector of international development cooperation? Will the PDIs of today come to an end with the natural disappearance of the baby-boom generation that is in charge of many PDIs of today? Or will other generations take over?

6.5 In retrospect, in prospect

In the Netherlands, a large number of people are involved in several thousand PDIs. These people are part of the socialisation or mainstreaming of international development cooperation. Helping the poor in developing countries is increasingly becoming part of everyday life, with almost everyone knowing someone involved in a sector that used to be the exclusive preserve of a small number of actors. At the pay desk of your local bakery you can read about the baker's daughter who started a day-care centre in Ghana after she went there on a holiday, your neighbour is making a door-to-door collection to renovate a school in Ecuador which he visited during an exchange trip and during the annual flea market the staff of the local hospital are raising funds for their next medical mission trip to Indonesia by selling homemade cookies.

These thousands of individuals devote – paid or voluntarily and for different reasons – many hours to small-scale, development organisations aimed at improving the lives of individuals, families or villages across the world. Their strong, enthusiastic involvement in the work of these PDIs results in enormous recruiting power; the willingness among private donors to donate to PDIs is apparently large. Established development organisations and the Dutch government also see potential in this group of active world citizens. They perceive PDIs as intermediates that are able to inform and involve the Dutch public in the complex world of development cooperation and/or they expect the work of PDIs to complement the efforts of other development actors in developing countries.

In developing countries, too, local people can reap the benefits of the strong engagement of PDI members as a large number of valuable development projects are (successfully) initiated and/or supported by PDIs. The results lay bare the tension between what PDIs are (small-scale, voluntary development organisations) and what they (want to) do (contribute to poverty reduction). Considering the results of this study, we wonder whether PDIs can always live up to their own expectations regarding their role as development actor or the expectations of their supporters.

The results show that the strong engagement of PDI members is the driving force behind PDIs necessary – among others – for raising funds and for (co-) designing and implementing development interventions. At the same time, however, it is this engagement that can – among others – hamper the sustainability of PDI development interventions (see Section 6.2.4 and Chapter 5). Yet this thesis does not want to issue a call for the professionalisation of PDIs. At least not the type of professionalisation that led many development organisations established in the 1950s and 1960s away from their core values and turned them into overly managed institutions (Elbers, 2011). Such a process would abolish the passion of PDI members that keeps the organisations running.

This thesis instead wants to make a call for critical reflections by PDI (members) and their (institutional, governmental or private) supporters. PDIs are challenged to reflect on the change they want to see within the context where they are active, to think through what is needed (both 'today' and 'tomorrow') for such a change and critically asses their abilities to contribute to the transformations they envision. It is a balancing act between staying true to their identity and at the same time keeping in mind what is required for a valuable contribution to poverty reduction. Established development organisations and the government are called on to critically reflect on the 'why' and 'how' of their involvement with PDIs. In addition they are challenged to design a cooperation strategy that is – more than in the past – based on what PDIs are, what they do and

what they are capable of instead of what they expect PDIs to do or want PDIs to do. The results demonstrate that when studying PDIs as development actor or when supporting them because of their alleged contribution to poverty reduction we need to formulate expectations that take into account the individuality of PDIs as small-scale, voluntary development organisations. PDIs, those engaged in the work of PDIs and those who study them are all called to look critically behind the pictures.

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Summary

Introduction

The two decades since the mid-1990s have seen a worldwide trend of alternative players joining the traditional actors in the field of international development cooperation. From celebrities such as Madonna and Bono to multinational companies such as Nestlé, from large charitable organisations to individual citizens, a diverse number of actors want to contribute to the global fight against poverty, inequality and exclusion. Development cooperation is no longer the exclusive domain of professionals (i.e. trained paid staff) working in the offices of governments, multilaterals (e.g. World Bank) or established development organisations (e.g. Oxfam).

This thesis focuses on the 'next-door Madonnas and Bonos' of today; thousands of ordinary individuals who actively engage in the fight against poverty by starting their own small-scale, voluntary development organisations, independent of direct government support. In this thesis they are referred to as Private Development Initiatives (PDIs). They are characterised by their small scale (i.e. in budget and number of staff) and their voluntary nature. The site of study is the Netherlands.

We can see the results of the efforts of PDIs in the pictures shown on their websites, in their leaflets and in other communications. Schools and orphanages have been built or renovated, micro-credit programmes launched, and after-school programmes initiated. The accomplishments shown in the many pictures are appealing to (potential) donors: the results are visible (e.g. a school has been built) and the effects are clear (e.g. children can finish primary school). But what are the stories behind all these pictures?

Studies made so far provide interesting first insights into, among other things, the organisational characteristics of PDIs and their contribution to the process of development. They remain explorative and descriptive, however, and mostly address specific aspects of PDI organisation or performance (e.g. organisational features). As a consequence, the insights gained so far have neither been fully exploited nor been related to each other, meaning that a more comprehensive understanding of PDIs as an alternative development actor is still lacking. In addition, studies have presented a rather uniform picture of PDIs, paying little attention to the diversity that can be found within the group. All this results in a one-dimensional, uniform understanding of PDIs, which limits our understanding of them as agents of development.

This study distinguishes itself from earlier PDI studies due to the selected analytical approach. This approach is based on two key principles: (1) integrated analysis and (2) contextualised analysis. The first premise implies that in order to analyse PDIs comprehensively, it is not sufficient to study different aspects of PDIs separately. Instead we need to understand the linkages between 'what they are?', 'what they do?' and 'how they do it?'. The second premise is that in order to understand PDIs as an alternative development actor it is necessary not only to study the actor itself (i.e. the organisations and their members) but also to take into account the broader environment wherein PDIs are positioned, and how this environment (e.g. back-donors, other development actors, local governments and communities) responds to PDIs.[1] PDIs do not function in a vacuum, but are surrounded by several other actors and these contextual developments influence PDI activities and performance. An understanding of PDIs starts by analysing them in all their diversity, but also requires a detailed study of the social, institutional and governance environment wherein PDIs deploy their activities.

[1] The term 'members' refers to those individuals who on a regular basis, either voluntary or paid, are actively involved in PDIs

In this study we aim to provide a more detailed insight into the characteristics of PDIs, the driving forces and the individual motives for citizen engagement in PDIs, and how the activities that PDIs undertake can be characterised and valued with respect to their potential sustainability. Each of the chapters presents a story behind the pictures; stories regarding the organisations (their foundation and structure), their members (their characteristics and motivations), their donors (their preferences and giving behaviour) and their interventions (type, sustainability). Studying PDIs from different perspectives and with different research methods results in a broad and in-depth insight into PDIs as alternative development actor. The central research question is:

> *Which factors shape the nature of private development initiatives and influence the sustainability of their development interventions?*

We employed a structure-conduct-performance (SCP) framework as an integrative approach as it permits understanding of the interactions between the questions of what PDIs are (structure), what they do (conduct) and how they do it (performance). In order to answer the central research question a mixture of unique data has been collected, and several analytical approaches applied. Both qualitative and quantitative data and analytical methods are used to address the research objective. This thesis is composed of four empirical chapters, each answering one sub-question. The combination of the findings from the four chapters provides insight into the main research question. These four chapters are preceded by an introductory chapter and are followed by a concluding chapter. Chapter 2 to 4 are based on articles published in peer-reviewed scientific journals.

The structure of PDIs

In Chapter 2, the structure of the PDIs is central. The sub-question answered in this chapter is: *What drives the start of PDIs and what characterises PDIs, their members and their activities?* Since no large-scale dataset was available for studying the structure of PDIs, a unique data set has been created. The data was collected from nearly 900 PDIs with the use of a self-developed survey. We find that these small-scale, voluntary development organisations work mainly in (Sub Sahara) Africa and Asia, in countries such as India, Indonesia, Ghana and Kenya. They mainly focus on education and health care and have a strong preference for direct poverty alleviation as intervention type. Although they also attach considerable importance to influencing policy (e.g. lobbying) and civil society building, this is not reflected in the general picture of their actual investments. Notwithstanding that PDIs share some common denominators that distinguish them as a group from other players in the field, Chapter 2 clearly shows that as a group they are very diverse. Whereas some organisations with twenty years of experience and ten members have an annual budget of 25,000 euros, others with only five years of experience have four members and 70,000 euros to spend yearly.

Voluntary time investment

Whereas Chapter 2 focuses on the organisations, their members and their activities, Chapter 3 zooms in on one of the core distinguishing features of the organisations: their voluntary nature. By studying this basic feature of PDIs we gain insight into whether, and how, the specificity of PDIs affects their role as development actor. The sub-question central to this chapter reads: *What determines the time investment of PDI volunteers?* In order to answer this question, the same dataset as in Chapter 2 is used.

We find that – compared with general volunteers – PDI volunteers give a much greater number of hours, on average 37 hours per month. As do general volunteers, PDI volunteers face time and budget restrictions, partly because of their position in the (paid) labour market. A sceptical

attitude towards established development organisations increases the time investment in PDIs. PDI volunteers who have doubts about the effectiveness and efficiency of development organisations may perceive their time investment in PDIs as an alternative and more successful way of contributing to poverty reduction, rather than supporting established development organisations.

Volunteers who frequently visit developing countries spend more hours on PDI volunteering. This shows that empathy with the lives of people in developing countries – triggered by these visits – makes the (psychological) distance to beneficiaries smaller. The results demonstrate that this not only positively affects the decision to start a PDI and the willingness to volunteer in a PDI but also increases the time investment of PDI volunteers. The distance to beneficiaries is also mediated through the ethnic background of the volunteer: volunteers with a non-Western ethnic background implementing development projects in their, or their parents', country of origin, spend more voluntary hours in PDIs.

The results of this analysis show that not only does the supply side of voluntary hours (i.e. volunteers' considerations) affect time investment in PDIs, but the demand side of voluntary hours (i.e. organisational characteristics) also influences time investment. We find that more 'professional' PDIs, with larger budgets and more staff, attract volunteers who spend more hours volunteering.

Donor support

In order to understand PDIs it is not sufficient only to study the conduct of their members. PDIs cannot exist only by the grace of their members' efforts but are also strongly dependent on the conduct of private donors. Chapter 4 thus looks at the giving behaviour of potential private donors to development organisations. We analyse the extent to which characteristics of development organisations affect the decisions of potential donors to donate money. The sub-question reads: *How do characteristics of development organisations influence the decision making of (potential) donors?* This question is answered through a unique experiment.

The results show that the ideal development organisation is a hybrid type combining features of small(er) voluntary organisations and large(r) professional organisations. Development organisations with the highest probabilities of receiving a (higher) donation are in general, familiar, have 10 to 20 years of experience, have no religious background, are active in more than one country, do not have any overhead costs and are mainly run by volunteers.

Most, if not all, of the traditional, established, large-scale development organisations are run by professional (i.e. paid) staff. Hence, traditional development organisations do not constitute the 'ideal' organisation. Although PDIs are mainly run by volunteers, they are, in general, not the ideal organisation either, as most are active in only one developing country and many have only been established recently. PDIs can, however, take advantage of donor preferences to donate to familiar development organisations since they mainly recruit donors in their personal network. There is thus a higher probability that (potential) donors are not only familiar with (the name of) the organisations, but also with the person requesting a donation.

This analysis clearly demonstrates the importance of organisational characteristics in the donor decision-making process. Contrary to what is sometimes assumed in the public debate about the diversification of the field of development actors, donors are not unambiguously in favour of small-scale development organisations. In other words, from the donor's perspective, small is not always beautiful.

Sustainability of interventions

In the fifth chapter, the performance of PDIs in developing countries is analysed in light of their (potential) sustainability. We analyse the sustainability of a PDI development intervention by assessing (1) the extent to which an intervention aims to address and change underlying causes of poverty, and (2) the extent to which the intervention is locally owned (and thus can be continued without external financial and technical support). By outlining how PDIs intervene in developing countries and the type of activities they undertake, the potential sustainability of PDI intervention

strategies is typified, based on a detailed multi-criteria classification. In addition, the determinants of different intervention strategies are distinguished. This analysis is based on unique qualitative data collected during field research in the Netherlands, Kenya and Indonesia among 49 PDIs, their local partners and their development interventions. The sub-question addressed in this chapter is: *What determines the sustainability of PDI interventions?*

We find that there is a relatively large group of PDIs whose intervention strategy puts at risk the sustainability of the intervention because they aim mainly to deliver direct relief with a rather limited involvement of local stakeholders. There is also, however, a group of PDIs that adopts a different intervention strategy with greater potential for making a sustainable contribution to poverty reduction. These PDIs extend their relief and welfare type of activities to community development and sustainable systems development. In addition, their interventions are, to a greater or lesser extent, characterised by a relatively high degree of local ownership.

We do not find evidence for an evolutionary process: age is not a straightforward determinant of the potential sustainability of PDI interventions. The results clearly show, however, that organisational features do relate to the sustainability of PDI interventions. The structure, conduct and performance of PDIs are hence not self-contained facets but strongly related parts. We find that the scale of the organisation (structure) affects the type of interventions PDIs (can) support (conduct) and by doing so the sustainability of the interventions (performance): PDIs explain that the available time (determined by the number of PDI members) and money are factors affecting the type of intervention they undertake.

In a similar manner, the dependence of PDIs on private donors (structure) affects the (potential sustainability of the) intervention strategy of PDIs. PDIs explain that many of their private donors have a preference for spending their money mainly on concrete development projects (conduct). It is therefore that part of the PDIs does not proceed to support different types of interventions, aimed at, for example, community development.

Finally, the voluntary nature of PDIs turns out to be of decisive influence: most PDIs are mainly run by volunteers (structure) and they do so with great devotion. The fulfilment of their motives affects both the extent to which volunteers are involved in the design and implementation of the development interventions (and thereby, the extent of local ownership) and the type of interventions supported. A certain degree of 'philanthropic particularism' can be observed. This implies that the tendency of non-profit organisations to provide certain types of services to specific groups of people is (partly) based on their own particular interests and preferences. We do not suggest that the same inclination is absent among the paid staff of established development organisations. We do find indications, however, that because of their voluntary character, PDIs are potentially more vulnerable to 'philanthropic particularism'. Volunteers – possibly more than paid staff members – are driven by an internal motivation. PDI members frequently mention that 'the work should stay fun'. The data shows that their motivation can particularly be powered by intervention strategies characterised by concrete development projects with visible results and a 'hands-on' involvement in the design and implementation.

In short

Reflecting on the findings of the different chapters and relating them to our central research question, we find evidence that two crucial features of PDIs shape the nature of PDIs and the sustainability of their development interventions. As summarised above, both their voluntary character and their small scale (i.e. in number of members and budget) are distinguishing features compared with other development actors. More than merely typifying PDIs, these organisational features turn out to be important factors in understanding PDIs as development actors. These two structure-related elements are pivotal to understanding both the conduct and performance of PDIs.

Implications for research, policy and practice

Understanding the linkages between the structure, conduct and performance, and taking into account the context wherein PDIs operate turns out to be fundamental to our understanding of PDIs as an alternative development actor. The different central perspectives of the chapters in this thesis broadened our understanding of PDIs and brought to the fore a more diversified picture than hitherto known. The SCP framework combined with the contextualised approach has hence been valuable and perhaps even indispensable in answering the central research question and in reaching the research objective.

The results of this study lay bare the tension between what PDIs are (small-scale, voluntary development organisations) and what they (want to) do (contribute to poverty reduction). Considering the results of this study, the question is warranted of whether PDIs can always live up to their own expectations regarding their role as development actors or the expectations of their supporters.

The results show that the strong engagement of PDI members is the driving force behind PDIs necessary – among other things – for raising funds and for (co-) designing and implementing development interventions. At the same time, however, it is this engagement that can hamper the sustainability of PDI development interventions. Yet this thesis does not want to issue a call for the professionalisation of PDIs, at least not the type that led many established development organisations into overly managed institutions. Such a process would abolish the passion of PDI members that leads to their inception and keeps them running. This thesis instead wants to make a call for critical reflections by PDI (members) and their (institutional, governmental or private) supporters. PDIs are challenged (1) to reflect on the change they want to see within the context where they are active in close collaboration with local stakeholders; (2) to think through what is needed (both 'today' and 'tomorrow') for such a change and (3) to make a realistic assessment of their capabilities and limitations for contributing to the transformations they envision. It is a balancing act between staying true to their identity and at the same time keeping in mind what is required for a valuable, sustainable contribution to poverty reduction.

Established development organisations and the government are called on to critically reflect on the 'why' and 'how' of their involvement with PDIs. In addition they are challenged to design a cooperation strategy that is – more than in the past – based on what PDIs are, what they do and what they are capable of, instead of what they expect PDIs to do or want PDIs to do. The results demonstrate that when studying PDIs as development actor, or when supporting them because of their alleged contribution to poverty reduction, we need to formulate expectations that take into account their individuality as small-scale, voluntary development organisations. PDIs, those engaged in the work of PDIs, and those who study them, are all called to look critically behind the pictures.

Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)

Introductie

Vanaf midden jaren '90 is er wereldwijd sprake van een trend van alternatieve spelers die actief worden op het speelveld van internationale ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Van beroemdheden als Madonna en Bono tot multinationale ondernemingen als Nestlé, van grote charitatieve instellingen tot individuele burgers; meer dan ooit is er een gevarieerd aantal actoren dat een bijdrage wil leveren aan de wereldwijde strijd tegen armoede, ongelijkheid en uitsluiting. Ontwikkelingssamenwerking is niet langer het exclusieve terrein van professionals (lees: daartoe opgeleide, betaalde medewerkers), werkzaam in kantoren van overheden, multilaterale of gevestigde ontwikkelingsorganisaties. Dit proefschrift richt zich op de 'Madonna's en Bonos' van om de hoek'; duizenden individuen die zich actief inzetten in de strijd tegen armoede door het opzetten van een eigen kleinschalige, vrijwillige ontwikkelingsorganisatie, onafhankelijk van directe overheidssteun.

In dit proefschrift wordt hiernaar verwezen met de term 'Private Development Initiatives' (PDIs, private ontwikkelingsinitiatieven). Deze organisaties kenmerken zich door hun kleinschaligheid (budget en aantal leden) en hun vrijwillige karakter. Het onderzoek vertrekt vanuit de Nederlandse context.[1]

We zien de resultaten van de inspanningen van PDIs op de foto's op hun websites en in hun brochures. Scholen en weeshuizen zijn gebouwd of gerenoveerd, micro-krediet programma's zijn opgezet en naschoolse activiteiten worden geïnitieerd. De gerealiseerde projecten, getoond op de vele foto's, zijn aantrekkelijk voor (potentiële) donateurs: de resultaten zijn zichtbaar ('de school is gebouwd') en de beoogde effecten zijn duidelijk ('kinderen kunnen de basisschool afronden'). Maar wat zijn de verhalen achter al deze foto's?

Studies tot nu toe bieden interessante inzichten in onder meer de organisatiekenmerken van PDIs en hun bijdrage aan ontwikkelingsprocessen. Maar de onderzoeken blijven voornamelijk exploratief en beschrijvend en richten zich vooral op één bepaald onderdeel van PDIs (o.a. organisatiekenmerken). Als gevolg daarvan zijn de verworven inzichten tot nu toe onvoldoende met elkaar verbonden en daarmee niet ten volle benut. Hierdoor ontbreekt het tot op heden aan een meer alomvattend begrip van PDIs als alternatieve ontwikkelingsactor. Bovendien besteden onderzoeken tot nu toe weinig aandacht aan de diversiteit die vastgesteld kan worden binnen de groep van PDIs. Dit alles resulteert in een eendimensionaal, uniform begrip van PDIs als ontwikkelingsactor.

Het voorliggende onderzoek onderscheidt zich van eerdere onderzoeken door haar analytische benadering. Deze vertrekt vanuit twee centrale uitgangspunten: (1) een geïntegreerde analyse en (2) een gecontextualiseerde analyse. Het eerste uitgangspunt vertrekt vanuit het idee dat een analyse waarbij verschillende aspecten van PDIs afzonderlijk bestudeerd worden ontoereikend is om deze op een alomvattende manier te analyseren. In plaats daarvan is het noodzakelijk om de verbanden te begrijpen tussen de vragen: '*wat zijn PDIs?*', '*wat doen ze?*' en '*hoe doen ze het?*'. Het tweede uitgangspunt houdt in dat om te komen tot een goed begrip van PDIs het onvoldoende is om alleen PDIs zelf te bestuderen (zoals de organisaties en hun leden). Het is daarnaast noodzakelijk om ook de bredere omgeving waarbinnen ze opereren (zoals achterban, andere ontwikkelingsactoren, overheid) en de wijze waarop deze omgeving zich verhoudt tot PDIs in ogenschouw te nemen. Het begrijpen van PDIs als ontwikkelingsactor begint bij het analyseren van deze organisaties in

[1] De term 'leden' verwijst naar die individuen die op zich op regelmatige basis, vrijwillig dan wel betaald, actief inzetten in PDIs.

al hun diversiteit maar vereist daarnaast een gedetailleerde analyse van de sociale, institutionele en overheidsomgeving waarbinnen PDIs hun activiteiten ontplooien.

In deze studie beogen we enerzijds een meer gedetailleerd inzicht te krijgen in de kenmerken van PDIs, de drijvende krachten achter deze organisaties en de motieven van individuen voor burgerbetrokkenheid in PDIs. Daarnaast heeft deze studie tot doel de ontwikkelingsactiviteiten van PDIs te typeren en te waarderen met betrekking tot hun potentiële duurzaamheid. Elk van de hoofdstukken presenteert een verhaal *achter de foto's*; verhalen over de organisaties (de oprichting en structuur), hun donateurs (de voorkeuren en het geefgedrag) en hun interventies (types, duurzaamheid). Door PDIs vanuit verschillende perspectieven te bestuderen en door gebruik te maken van diverse onderzoeksmethoden ontstaat een breed en diepgaand inzicht in PDIs. De centrale onderzoeksvraag luidt:

> *Welke factoren bepalen de aard van PDIs en beïnvloeden de duurzaamheid van hun ontwikkelingsinterventies?*

We maken gebruik van het 'structure-conduct-performance' (SCP) raamwerk. Deze benadering maakt het mogelijk om de vragen *wat zijn PDIs* (structure/structuur), *wat doen PDIs* (conduct/gedragingen) en *hoe doen ze het* (performance/prestaties) op een geïntegreerde manier te bestuderen. Ten einde de onderzoeksvraag te beantwoorden is er een mix van unieke gegevens verzameld en zijn verschillende analytische benaderingen toegepast. Er is gebruik gemaakt van zowel kwalitatieve als kwantitatieve gegevens en analysemethoden.

Dit proefschrift bestaat uit vier hoofdstukken die elk een deelvraag behandelen. Door de inzichten uit de vier hoofdstukken te combineren wordt het mogelijk om de hoofdvraag te beantwoorden. Deze vier hoofdstukken worden voorafgegaan en afgesloten door een introducerend en een concluderend hoofdstuk. Hoofdstuk 2 tot en met 4 zijn gebaseerd op artikelen die gepubliceerd werden in 'peer reviewed' wetenschappelijke tijdschriften.

De structuur van PDIs

In hoofdstuk 2 staat de structuur van PDIs centraal. De deelvraag die beantwoord wordt in dit hoofdstuk is: *Wat drijft de start van PDIs en wat kenmerkt de PDIs, hun leden en hun activiteiten?* Aangezien er geen grootschalige dataset beschikbaar was die het mogelijk maakt om de structuur van PDIs te bestuderen, is er een eigen databestand opgezet. De gegevens werden verzameld onder bijna 900 PDIs met behulp van een zelf ontwikkelde vragenlijst.

We stellen vast dat deze kleinschalige, vrijwillige ontwikkelingsorganisaties overwegend actief zijn in (Sub Sahara) Afrika en Azië in landen als Ghana, Kenia, India en Indonesië. Ze zijn vooral gericht op de thema's onderwijs en gezondheid en hebben een sterke voorkeur voor directe armoedebestrijding als interventietype. Hoewel ze ook aanzienlijk belang hechten aan beleidsbeïnvloeding en gemeenschapsopbouw, is dit niet terug te zien in het algemene beeld van hun daadwerkelijke interventies. Hoofdstuk 2 laat duidelijk zien dat, hoewel PDIs een aantal kenmerken gemeenschappelijk hebben die hen onderscheidt van andere spelers in het veld, ze als groep erg divers zijn. Waar sommige organisaties met twintig jaar ervaring en tien leden beschikken over een jaarbudget van 25,000 euro, zijn er andere met vijf jaar ervaring die vier leden hebben en jaarlijks 75,000 euro kunnen besteden.

Vrijwillige tijdsinvestering

Waar hoofdstuk 2 zich richt op de organisaties, hun leden en activiteiten, zoomt hoofdstuk 3 in op één van de onderscheidende kernmerken van PDIs: het vrijwillige karakter. Door dit basiskenmerk te bestuderen kunnen we inzicht krijgen in, of en hoe het specifieke karakter van PDIs hun rol als ontwikkelingsactor beïnvloedt. De deelvraag van dit hoofdstuk luidt: *Wat bepaalt de tijdsinvestering van PDI vrijwilligers?* Om deze vraag te beantwoorden wordt gebruik gemaakt van dezelfde dataset als in hoofdstuk 2.

We stellen vast dat PDI vrijwilligers vergeleken met algemene vrijwilligers veel meer uren spenderen aan hun vrijwilligerswerk: gemiddeld genomen 37 uur per maand. Net als andere worden PDI vrijwilligers beperkt door de beschikbaarheid van tijd en geld. Dit heeft deels te maken met hun positie op de (betaalde) arbeidsmarkt. Interessant is de bevinding dat een meer sceptische houding ten aanzien van gevestigde ontwikkelingsorganisaties resulteert in een hoger aantal vrijwilligersuren in PDIs. PDI vrijwilligers die twijfelen over de effectiviteit en efficiëntie van ontwikkelingsorganisaties, lijken hun tijdsinvestering in PDIs te zien als een alternatieve en meer succesvolle manier om bij te dragen aan armoedebestrijding dan het ondersteunen van gevestigde ontwikkelingsorganisaties.

Daarnaast vinden we dat vrijwilligers die regelmatig een bezoek brengen aan ontwikkelingslanden meer uren besteden aan PDIs. Dit laat zien dat het medeleven met mensen in ontwikkelingslanden – versterkt door deze bezoeken – de (psychologische) afstand tot de doelgroep kleiner maakt. De resultaten laten zien dat dit niet alleen bijdraagt aan het oprichten van PDIs of het doen van vrijwilligerswerk in een PDI, maar ook de tijdsinvestering van PDI vrijwilligers positief beïnvloedt. De ervaren afstand tot de doelgroep wordt ook verkleind door de etnische achtergrond van de vrijwilligers. PDI vrijwilligers met een niet-Westerse achtergrond die projecten ondersteunen in hun land van herkomst of dat van hun ouders, spenderen meer vrijwilligersuren in PDIs.

Het blijkt niet alleen de aanbodzijde te zijn die het aantal vrijwilligersuren bepaalt (overwegingen gemaakt door de vrijwilliger). Ook de vraagzijde (organisatiekenmerken) is van invloed op de intensiteit van het vrijwilligerswerk. We stellen vast dat meer 'professionele' PDIs, met grotere budgetten en meer leden, vrijwilligers aantrekken die meer uren besteden.

Steun van donateurs

Om PDIs te begrijpen is het onvoldoende om de gedragingen en overwegingen van de leden te bestuderen. PDIs kunnen niet alleen bestaan dankzij hun inspanningen maar zijn ook sterk afhankelijk van de financiële ondersteuning door particuliere donateurs. Om die reden besteden we in hoofdstuk 4 aandacht aan de overwegingen gemaakt door (potentiële) donateurs van PDIs. We analyseren in welke mate kenmerken van ontwikkelingsorganisaties de beslissing van donateurs om geld te geven beïnvloeden. De deelvraag luidt: *Hoe beïnvloeden kenmerken van ontwikkelingsorganisaties de besluitvorming van potentiële donateurs?* Deze vraag wordt beantwoordt met behulp van een speciaal daartoe opgezet experiment.

De resultaten laten zien dat de ideale ontwikkelingsorganisatie een hybride vorm heeft en zowel kenmerken heeft van kleinschalige(re), vrijwillige organisaties als van grote(re), professionele organisaties. Ontwikkelingsorganisaties met de grootste kans om een (hogere) donatie te ontvangen zijn over het algemeen (voor de donor) bekende organisaties met 10 of 20 jaar ervaring, zonder religieuze achtergrond. Ze zijn actief in meer dan één land, hebben geen overheadkosten en worden vooral door vrijwilligers geleid.

De meeste gevestigde, grootschalige ontwikkelingsorganisaties worden geleid door professionele (lees: betaalde) medewerkers. Hierdoor voldoen de meeste van deze organisaties niet aan het 'ideaalplaatje'. Hoewel de meeste PDIs door vrijwilligers worden geleid komen ook zij in de meeste gevallen niet overeen met de ideale organisatie. De meeste van hen ondersteunen namelijk slechts in één land ontwikkelingsprojecten en zijn vaak recent opgericht. PDIs kunnen wel hun voordeel doen met de voorkeur van (potentiële) donateurs om aan bekende organisaties te doneren. De meeste PDIs werven geld in hun eigen persoonlijke netwerk. Daardoor is er een grotere kans dat

(potentiële) donateurs niet alleen bekend zijn met (de naam van) de organisatie maar ook met de persoon die om een donatie vraagt.

Deze analyse laat duidelijk het belang zien van organisatiekenmerken in het besluitvormingsproces van donateurs. Daarnaast tonen de resultaten aan dat, anders dan soms wordt beweerd in het publieke debat over de diversificatie van het speelveld van internationale samenwerking, (potentiële) donateurs geen eenduidige voorkeur hebben voor kleinschalige ontwikkelingsorganisaties.

Duurzaamheid van interventies

In het vijfde hoofdstuk worden de prestaties van PDIs geanalyseerd in het licht van de (potentiële) duurzaamheid van hun ontwikkelingsinterventies. We analyseren de duurzaamheid door te kijken naar (1) de mate waarin een interventie erop gericht is om de onderliggende oorzaken van armoede te veranderen, en (2) de mate waarin een interventie 'eigendom' is van lokale belanghebbenden (en dus voortgezet kan worden zonder externe financiële en technische ondersteuning). We doen dit door te kijken *hoe* PDIs in ontwikkelingslanden interveniëren en *wat* voor soort interventies ze ondernemen. Daarnaast worden de determinanten van de interventiestrategieën onderscheiden. Deze analyse is gebaseerd op unieke kwalitatieve data, verzameld tijdens een veldonderzoek dat plaatsvond onder 49 PDIs en hun lokale partners in Nederland, Kenia en Indonesië. De deelvraag die wordt behandeld in dit hoofdstuk luidt: *Wat bepaalt de duurzaamheid van PDI interventies?*

We stellen vast dat er een relatief grote groep van PDIs is wiens interventies risico lopen op het gebied van duurzaamheid doordat ze gericht zijn op het bieden van directe vormen van hulp en doordat de betrokkenheid van lokale belanghebbenden vrij beperkt is. Daarnaast is er een kleinere groep van PDIs die haar activiteiten, gericht op directe armoedebestrijding, uitbreidt met vormen van gemeenschapsontwikkeling en verandering van systemen en structuren. De activiteiten van deze groep PDIs kenmerken zich daarnaast door een relatief sterke mate van lokaal eigenaarschap.

We vinden geen bewijs voor een evolutionair proces: leeftijd van de organisaties blijkt geen factor te zijn die de potentiële duurzaamheid van PDI interventies op een eenduidige manier bepaalt. De interventies van zowel jonge als oudere organisaties lopen wisselend meer of minder risico op het gebied van duurzaamheid. Maar de resultaten maken inzichtelijk dat organisatiekenmerken wel degelijk van invloed zijn op de potentiële duurzaamheid van PDI interventies. De structuur, de gedragingen en de prestaties van PDIs zijn dus geen op zichzelf staande onderdelen, maar zijn sterk met elkaar verbonden. Zo zien we dat de grootte van de organisatie (structure) van invloed is op het type interventies die PDIs kunnen ondersteunen (conduct) en op die manier de duurzaamheid beïnvloedt (performance). PDIs geven bijvoorbeeld aan dat ze verwachten dat lobbyactiviteiten kostbaarder zijn wat tijd en geld betreft en dat hun capaciteiten daartoe ontoereikend zijn.

Op eenzelfde manier beïnvloedt de afhankelijkheid van PDIs van private donateurs (structure) de (potentiële duurzaamheid van hun) interventiestrategie. PDIs geven aan dat veel donateurs verkiezen om hun geld zoveel mogelijk in concrete ontwikkelingsprojecten te investeren (conduct). Dit maakt het voor sommige PDIs niet vanzelfsprekend om ander type projecten, gericht op bijvoorbeeld gemeenschapsontwikkeling, op te zetten of te ondersteunen.

Als laatste geldt dat er een sterke invloed uitgaat van het vrijwillige karakter van PDIs. De meeste van hen worden volledige gerund door vrijwilligers (structure) en deze doen dat met grote toewijding. Het vervullen van hun motieven blijkt zowel sterk van invloed op de manier waarop PDIs interveniëren als op het soort interventies dat ze ondernemen. Er is sprake van een zekere mate van 'philantropic particularism'. Dit verwijst naar de neiging van non-profit organisaties om bepaalde vormen van ondersteuning te bieden aan bepaalde groepen mensen op basis van hun persoonlijke interesses en voorkeuren. We suggereren niet dat deze neiging afwezig is onder betaalde medewerkers van gevestigde ontwikkelingsorganisaties, maar we stellen vast dat omwille van het vrijwillige karakter PDIs mogelijk meer vatbaar zijn voor 'philantropic particularism'. Vrijwilligers worden – misschien wel meer dan betaalde medewerkers – sterk gedreven door een interne motivatie. PDI leden geven veelvuldig aan dat het werk dat ze verzetten in het PDI 'wel leuk moet blijven'. Vooral interventiestrategieën die worden gekenmerkt door concrete projecten

die zichtbaar resultaat opleveren en een 'hands-on' betrokkenheid bij het ontwerp en de uitvoering worden door de PDI leden genoemd als motiverend.

In het kort

Wanneer we reflecteren op de bevindingen uit de verschillende hoofdstukken en deze relateren aan de centrale onderzoeksvraag, zien we dat twee cruciale kenmerken van PDIs de aard van PDIs bepalen en van invloed zijn op de potentiële duurzaamheid van hun interventies. Zoals hierboven samengevat, zien we dat zowel het vrijwillige karakter als de kleinschaligheid onderscheidende kenmerken zijn van PDIs ten opzichte van andere ontwikkelingsactoren. Maar deze twee factoren zijn meer dan louter typerende kenmerken van PDIs. Deze twee structuur-gerelateerde elementen vormen de sleutel tot het begrijpen van de gedragingen (conduct) en de prestaties (performance) van PDIs als alternatieve ontwikkelingsactor.

Implicaties voor onderzoek, beleid en praktijk

Dit onderzoek laat zien dat het begrijpen van de verbanden tussen de structuur, de gedragingen en de prestaties van PDIs en het in ogenschouw nemen van de context waarbinnen PDIs opereren, van fundamenteel belang is voor het begrijpen van PDIs als alternatieve ontwikkelingsactor. De perspectieven in de verschillende hoofdstukken hebben bijgedragen aan het verbreden van ons begrip van PDIs en aan een meer gediversifieerd beeld van deze actor. Het *Structure-Conduct-Performance* raamwerk en de gecontextualiseerde benadering zijn waardevol, misschien zelfs onontbeerlijk, gebleken in het beantwoorden van de centrale onderzoeksvraag en het behalen van de onderzoeksdoelstelling.

De resultaten van deze studie leggen een spanning bloot tussen wat PDIs zijn (kleinschalige, vrijwillige ontwikkelingsorganisaties) en wat PDIs (willen) doen (bijdragen aan armoedebestrijding). Kijkend naar de resultaten van deze studie is het gerechtvaardigd om de vraag te stellen of PDIs hun eigen verwachtingen of die van hun ondersteuners wel altijd kunnen waarmaken.

Het onderzoek laat zien dat de sterke betrokkenheid van PDI leden de drijvende kracht is achter deze organisaties, noodzakelijk voor onder andere het werven van fondsen en het (mede) ontwikkelen van ontwikkelingsinterventies. Tegelijkertijd is het diezelfde betrokkenheid die de duurzaamheid van PDI interventies kan belemmeren. Dit proefschrift doet geen oproep tot professionalisering van PDIs. Toch niet het soort dat veel gevestigde ontwikkelingsorganisaties maakte tot overmatig beheerde instituties. Zo een proces zou een einde maken aan de passie die PDIs in leven roept en houdt. Dit proefschrift wil vooral een oproep doen tot kritische reflecties door PDI (leden) en haar (institutionele, overheid of private) ondersteuners. PDIs worden uitgedaagd om (1) te reflecteren op de verandering die ze voor ogen hebben binnen de context waarin ze actief zijn en dit in nauw overleg met lokale belanghebbenden; (2) grondig te doordenken wat ter plekke nodig is (zowel 'vandaag' als 'morgen') en (3) een realistische inschatting te maken van hun mogelijkheden en beperkingen om bij te dragen aan deze beoogde verandering. Het is een balansoefening tussen trouw blijven aan hun identiteit en tegelijkertijd voor ogen houden wat er vereist is om een waardevolle, duurzame bijdrage aan armoedebestrijding te leveren.

Gevestigde ontwikkelingsorganisaties en de overheid worden opgeroepen om kritisch te overdenken 'waarom' en 'hoe' ze betrokken willen zijn bij PDIs. Ze worden uitgedaagd om een samenwerkingsstrategie te ontwikkelen die – meer dan in het verleden – gebaseerd is op wat PDIs zijn, wat ze doen en waartoe ze in staat zijn in plaats van wat men verwacht of wil dat PDIs doen.

De resultaten tonen aan dat, wanneer we onderzoek doen naar PDIs als ontwikkelingsactor of wanneer we hen ondersteunen omwille van hun veronderstelde bijdrage aan armoedebestrijding, het noodzakelijk is om verwachtingen te formuleren die rekening houden met de eigenheid van PDIs als kleinschalige, vrijwillige ontwikkelingsorganisaties. PDIs, zij die betrokken zijn bij het werk van PDIs en zij die hen onderzoeken, allen worden opgeroepen om kritisch *achter de foto's* te kijken.

About the author

Sara Kinsbergen (1982) holds a bachelor degree in Social Work (Karel de Grote Hogeschool, Belgium) and a master and an Advanced-master degree in (International) Development Studies (Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands). Her fascination for Private Development Initiatives (PDIs) brought her in 2006 to Sri Lanka for a comparative study on the way established development organisations and PDIs cooperate with their local partners and beneficiaries. In 2006-2007, while doing a traineeship at the Dutch development organisation Wilde Ganzen, she went to India to investigate critical factors for success of development projects of PDIs and their local partners. In 2008, she returned to the department of Cultural Anthropology and Development Sociology (CAOS) of the Radboud University Nijmegen for her PhD. Next to her own PhD research, she also supervised master students and contributed to several studies on public support for development cooperation and other studies on PDIs. Driven by the value she attaches to translating the results of her studies to the daily practice of policy makers, financers, and PDIs, she gives many presentations, guest lectures, workshops, and trainings based on the results of her studies. She currently works as a researcher at CAOS.

BEHIND THE PICTURES

UNDERSTANDING PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES

SARA KINSBERGEN

From celebrities to multinational companies, from large charitable organisations to individual citizens, a diversified number of actors wants to contribute to the global fight against poverty, inequality and exclusion. This study focuses on the 'next-door Madonnas and Bonos' of today. These are the thousands of ordinary individuals that actively engage in the fight against poverty by starting their own small-scale, voluntary development organisation.

We can see the results of their efforts in the pictures shown on their websites and in their leaflets. Schools and orphanages have been built or renovated, micro-credit programmes launched and after-school programmes initiated.

But who are those individuals and what motivates them? Are private donors in favour of this type of development organisations? And what can be said on the sustainability of their development interventions? This study sheds a critical light on the stories *behind the pictures.*