

NEW MOTIVES IN THE HUNGARIAN LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE NATIONAL IDEOLOGY OF THE FORTIES

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In the forties the economic criteria of a bourgeois nation, which reflected both the demands for industrial development and the very process of a political nation bourgeois transformations impulsed already by feudalism, came into the centre of attention. And the idea of the national state got an ever increasing importance in the liberal concept. Consequently, the sharp differences of opinion between Széchenyi and the conservatives on the one hand, and the Opposition led by Kossuth on the other one were reflected in the national ideology as well.

The new economic components of the one Hungarian uniform political nation*

The Hungarian reformist nobility (gentry) led by Kossuth recognized the feudal barriers that hindered the development of industry and made a fair assessment of the tasks that could have resulted in the establishment of the independent Hungarian industry. "... The foreign countries are thoroughly familiar with all these shortcomings — wrote Kossuth in one of his articles — Public opinion has very refined senses; those who possess the money, a lot of it that is required by our industrial enterprises may do something else or take to the road leading to such countries where they may find real security, decent position, and pleasant life regarding their person and possessions and not to such places where they are unprotected and rightless. Factories and trade can flourish only with wise freedom, rights and a guaranteed protection."

With Kossuth as Chairman, the objective of the establishment of the *Hungarian Industrial Association* in 1841 was the development of

Under the term "one Hungarian uniform political nation" we understand those ideas of the Hungarian nobility who considered the main features of a nation to be the historical and geographical factors and not those of the language and ethnical origin.

Hence as to them there was in Hungary only one Hungarian nation, the national minorities as the Slovaks, Serbs, Rumanians etc. (except the Croats) were considered to be a part of the Hungarian nation who spoke Slovak, Serbian, Rumanian etc. languages.

industry. The Association launched the *Hetilap* (Weekly) in 1845 with the view of eliminating the misunderstandings about the concept of manufacturing industry and trade and offering reliable data "in the dimness of the selfknowledge of the nation," the paper also wanted to present the industrial achievements to evoke sympathy towards "the humble merits of diligence and give directives to the utilization of the national treasures hitherto neglected." There were clear perspectives before the struggle for the development of Hungarian industry; Kossuth knew that the establishment of a modern bourgeois nation was impossible without industry: "Those who want to interpret the word «nation» in accordance with the exigencies of the 19th century cannot avoid the realization that it is no more a nation, but only a race, which does not possess the independent levers of civilization. Among these levers are inevitably the *independent national trade and industry*. Without these, there may be colonies and races in Europe but not nations. The Hungarians want to be a nation in the sense of the requirements of the 19th century."¹

The liberal Hungarian nobility was also aware that in the interest of bourgeois transformation the "supreme task" was the abolition of socage and the admittance of the people into the fold of the nation. "Do we believe — wrote Kossuth — that we can save the country by patchwork reforms? Do we imagine that we can safeguard the future of our nation if we have missed laying the foundation stone of the structure of future? And what else can this foundation be but the union with the people and, thus, the creation of a whole and healthy body of the nation, and how can we even dream about this until the separating wall of socage and breeding hatred is between us . . . All of us are members of the people of the country, and if the state is not for the interest of the people, than I do not understand why it exists."²

Hungarian reform nobility was much concerned about problems of customs, trade and railway construction. When Vienna suggested the idea of accession to the German customs union, Kossuth pointed out in a series of articles how serious its consequences could be upon the economic life of Hungary.³

During the fight against the accession to the Zollverein, Kossuth clarified for himself many questions related to customs. Contrary to his earlier views, he realized that the establishment of Hungarian industry and national market was impossible without the struggle against the economic dependence on Austria and without the introduction of a system of customs defence. "A nation — wrote Kossuth — which may not itself define its laws and administer its economy according to its own interest is not a farmer but a farm, not a cellerman but a tub; in other words, it is not a nation."⁴

The conservatives, representing the Hungarian landlords were against the demand for a system of customs defence and stood for a common customs territory with Austria. In the cross-firing of the heated debates stood Kossuth, who expounded his opinion in articles published in the

Hetilap. Against the view maintained by the *Budapesti Híradó* (Budapest Courier), the paper of the conservatives according to whom the customs border between Hungary and Austria should be abolished, he explained that the country could only accept a customs settlement that guaranteed free trade with all foreign countries, "or protect the market of our country against the oppressive competition of the monopolistic industry of Austria."⁵

Thus, the reformer Opposition did not want to do away with the customs barrier between Austria and Hungary, but they only wanted to alter it to the benefit of the country. Kossuth had also refuted the argument of the *Budapesti Híradó* that the establishment of the system of customs defence is "fanciful idealism" and the abolition of the customs barrier is a "practical idea".⁶

The plan of railways was closely related to these questions, and when it was raised, the Hungarian gentry found themselves confronted with the Croatian bourgeois elements and not with the Austrian bourgeoisie. The Hungarian reform nobility considered the building of the Pest – Vukovár – Fiume railway line of pressing importance. The aim of this line was to secure the overseas export of cereals grown in Hungary. Thus, the task served one of the vital and objective criteria of the development of the bourgeois nation, i.e. the establishment of economic unity and national market, and consequently paved the way of bourgeois progress. But this significant economic demand had seriously affected the most advanced national minority of Hungary, the Croats, who alike turned against the economic unity of a multi-national state that was about to evolve under Hungarian leadership. The only national confrontation of the period of an economic nature that indicated that the Croatian bourgeois elements wanted to create an independent Croatian national market developed in relationship with the plans of railway construction.⁷ Similar objectives among the other national minorities can be observed only later, during the period of the dual monarchy.

The facts mentioned above prove that the Hungarian liberal nobility had recognized the main criterion of the development of the bourgeois nation, i.e. the necessity for the establishment of the national market and economic unity. But this significant national idea could gain ground only by a hard ideological struggle in two directions, partly against the Austrian bourgeoisie and partly against the non-Hungarians, primarily the rising Croatian bourgeois layers. This struggle also manifests the dual nature, the progressive and the regressive aspects of Hungarian nationalism.

The economic elements represented a new colour in the concept of a one Hungarian uniform political nation and they particularly reflected its degree of bourgeois development. In other words, with the development of capitalist conditions an economic unity covering the whole of Hungary and a market common for all the peoples living in the country were about to take shape. The appearance of the outlines of a market common for the Hungarian and non-Hungarian inhabitants of the land

had strengthened the policy of the nationalities of the Hungarian gentry that hindered the national development of the non-Hungarian peoples of the country and blocked the further progress of their national movements. The gentry, aiming at the establishment of a Hungarian bourgeois state, considered multi-national Hungary to be its "national" market and wanted to align the strength of the whole country, including the nationalities, with a developing national movement against Austrian oppression. But the Hungarian nobility tried to achieve its objective by the amalgamation and assimilation of the national minorities and not by winning them over to the cause; they pursued a policy towards the nationalities that had identified the concept of the nation with that of the state. The basic principle was that "the nation is the same as the state, which can be created only by history." Accordingly a nation may consist of several nationalities, and these may demand their place within the state "not above the state, nor contrary to the interests of the state." Consequently, the nationalities are also within the framework of the state of the Hungarian nation, and their objectives should conflict with the interests of the Hungarian state.

A series of articles were published supporting this ideology using arguments similar to those described above. The nation of this land — wrote the periodical *Századunk* (Our Century) — consists of various elements only linguistically; during the course of centuries, however it has become one nation having common institutions and benefits and sharing a common destiny by the most suited element, which is undoubtedly de jure et de facto the Hungarian. . . . And if this amalgamation, this unity, which is the precondition of the future greatness of Hungary, has not yet become a reality because of the folly of circumstances; no one can say that it would not take shapes and that the means employed for the achievement of the objective represent a barbarous system.⁸

The ideology of "one nation", "one state" was supported on behalf of the liberal nobility who emphasized the ideas of the foundation of the state and the glorious past. In the meantime one of their arguments was that the nationalities did not have a free past and independent state; consequently, they did not constitute a nation, and their objectives had no ground and were against the Hungarian nation. Thus, Hungarian nobility regarded the majority of the non-Hungarian nations incapable of creating an independent state, treated them accordingly, and denied national equality arguing that they lacked historical background.⁹

The idea that the few thousand militant Hungarians of the time of the Conquest could not populate the whole country and, therefore, welcomed foreigners later on as well belonged to the above concept. The foreign peoples, i.e. their nobility, were even granted "constitutional freedom". According to the arguments it was a mistake that the freedom granted was not subordinated to certain conditions, and in this respect, as indicated by the liberal *Erdélyi Híradó* (Transylvanian Courier), "we cannot deny the negligence and overwhelming politesse of our ancestors. Indeed, how many thousand Wallachian families who still stick to their

Wallachian nationality and want to share the Hungarian privileges but not the knowledge of our language were uplifted by our Kings and monarchs to a privileged estate in the nation; whereas, we Hungarians negligently watch them with crossed arms and haven't even tried to limit the deterioration by them of our own Hungarian blood, which may be experienced occasionally."¹⁰ Thus, the theory of "accepting" the nationalities, i.e. feudalistic interpretation of historical rights, was closely intertwined with the modern bourgeois demands of the forties. This ambiguous ideology is explained, not only by the peculiar situation of the Hungarian gentry (oppressing and being oppressed all at the same time), but also by their feudal class interests though they stood for bourgeois development.

The identification of the nation with the state was closely linked to the unrealistically optimistic view held by the Hungarian liberal nobility that, if the oppressed national minorities were given civil rights, the whole question of nationalities would be solved once and for all without the creation of equality among the nationalities. "We strongly hoped — wrote Ferenc Pulszky in his memoirs as Opposition politician — that general freedom and the elimination of feudal bonds would terminate the agitation of the nationalities among the Protestant Slovaks, as well as among the Croats and Rumanians belonging to the Eastern Church."¹¹

This acceptance differs from the tolerant ideas of the early 19th century that rejected subjugation (the concept of József Reviczky, etc.).^{11/a} The concept of the forties, as proven by the subsequent events, was wrong, but due to its democratic content, it could secure the support of some sections of the masses of national minorities in 1848—49.

The intolerance and pessimism of Széchenyi and the conservatives

The tolerance as to the question of nationalities by Széchenyi and his moderate followers and also by the conservatives in the forties is well known in our historical literature. Opposite views, nevertheless may also be observed during the same period. In order to understand the obviously contradictory concept taking shape in the conflict of nationalities and classes, I have to point out a law that I have already dealt with in several of my works.

It is a well-known fact that the Opposition, led by Kossuth, had waged a bitter fight against the Austrian influence, and this struggle was closely linked to the modes of the involence of the masses which were more liberal than in the thirties. Differing from it, Széchenyi and his followers, not to mention the conservatives, wanted to moderate the national struggle by all means, because they saw that the policy of the Opposition may lead to inevitable clashes and even a breach with Austria; whereas, they wanted to maintain good terms with the Empire. In the meantime Széchenyi kept up his earlier liberal views concerning the involence of the masses, but he did not go any further in the forties either. This was also one of the causes of the conflicts evolving between

him and Kossuth and his group. All this suggested a policy of tolerance towards the national minorities. In this regard, Széchenyi expounded his views most characteristically in his famous speech delivered at the Academy of Sciences in 1842.

Thus, Széchenyi and those who were close to him had apparently more progressive views about the question of the nationalities than Kossuth and the Opposition. And if we stress that Széchenyi's tolerance towards the non-Hungarian peoples was objectively more progressive than the policy of the Opposition, which cannot be underestimated from the point of view of improving the relationships with the nationalities, we should make it also clear that Széchenyi's general views were no more progressive than those of the Opposition, but they were lagging behind them in social as well as national questions. The Opposition wanted to eliminate feudalism and wanted to safeguard bourgeois development more consistently than Széchenyi. And it was a well-known fact that the progress of national movements and the deepening of the contrast between the nationalities were all closely linked with bourgeois development or with its demand. As compared to the general approach of the nobility, Széchenyi had taken a significant step forward in demanding bourgeois development, but he could not go so far as the Opposition. Consequently his tolerance was neither more advanced nor progressive, but it was the result of his less consistent concept of the abolition of the feudal system (but far more progressive if compared to the feudal views) than that of the Opposition. It should be added that Széchenyi and his followers did not only lag behind Kossuth and the Opposition in the question of bourgeois transformation, but their Hungarian national programme, closely connected with the former one, could not reach so far either.

Thus it is understandable that those who were more modest in their Hungarian national objectives similarly towards their bourgeois demands, pursued a more tolerant policy towards the non-Hungarian peoples as well. And this holds true for the reverse too: those who conducted a more consistent struggle for the Hungarian independence, such as Kossuth and even more, the Radicals had a less tolerant policy towards the nationalities. The contradiction was a necessary consequence of the nationalism of the age. Those who expected a more progressive policy from Kossuth and the Radicals than from the more moderate Széchenyi and similar politicians in the forties, are wrong.

The conservatives and the most regressive stratum of Hungarian nobility, the aristocrats loyal to the dynasty and serving the Austrian Court with zeal, had advocated a policy of the nationalities that was even more tolerant than that of Széchenyi. Their tolerance was serving clearly visible political objectives. The loyal nobility wanted to preserve Latin as the official language. Metternich had a similar kind of tolerance towards the nationalities. The major motive of this tolerance was to leave everything as it had been to maintain the rule of Austrian absolutism and feudal system. And, if we have surveyed the right wing to its extreme

point, the connection revealed also throws light on the motive of the "understanding" policy of the Austrian government pursued towards the non-Hungarian people; i.e. that the support of the national movements of non-Hungarians promised favourable opportunities of counter-balancing the Hungarian national demands and the bourgeois transformation intertwined with them.¹²

Having mentioned these circumstances in advance, we may turn now to the presentation of the optimism of the liberal Opposition and, in this connection, to the introduction of the concept held by Széchenyi and his moderate followers and further on, the loyal nobility and the conservatives. These views were expressed in relation to several important questions of bourgeois transformation, such as the entailment and the right to possession linked to it, settlements allocated by landlords, and the introduction of bourgeois institutions. In these matters, contrary to the earlier ones, Széchenyi and the loyal nobles represented the *less tolerant view of the nation*. Yet, if we penetrate into the matter, we may discover that all this was related to their general political principles: i.e. the protection of the Hungarian nation was only a pretext to assert the interests of the nobility. Differing from them, the Opposition, which was struggling more consistently for the bourgeois transformation, turned against the false advertisement of the Hungarian national interests and enthusiastic of their progressive bourgeois objectives, was optimistic in believing that the Hungarian nation would widely gain ground.

The abolition of entailment was first raised by István Széchenyi in his work *Stádium* (Stage). "Whatever property... that is sold for good by somebody with the consent of the parties concerned cannot ever be taken back under any pretext by the seller or his progeny from the purchaser or his descendants; the sale for good can never be undone." This concept of Széchenyi did not restrict the right to possession according to which the land of nobles could be bought by anybody. Later, however, Széchenyi had expressed the idea of the "preservation of the nation," which limited the right to possession to some extent.¹³

This view was represented by the paper *Jelenkor* (Contemporary Age), which was close to Széchenyi and turned against the opinion of the loyal nobility as well as against that of the Opposition. The loyal nobles, pretending to be the champions of the national cause, did not feel ashamed to state that "the nation has been and is preserved by entailment." The columnist of *Jelenkor* was right in saying that "entailment does not preserve but lulls the nation," and he proved convincingly that the masses had preserved the nation: "he poor people who could only rely on their own helpless humanity and are left mainly outside the trenches of the constitution; have been serving their lecherous masters and keeping the interests of the nation on their bosom with bloody sweat. In the meantime, the author of the article in *Jelenkor*, contrary to the views of the Opposition and corresponding to those of Széchenyi, wanted to restrict considerably the right to possession: "nobody in this country who is not Hungarian should be permitted to possess a foot's length of land before

becoming, by means to be elaborated, Hungarian legally and linguistically and being admitted in to the bosom of the Hungarian nation."¹⁴ According to this view, those persons whose mother tongue wasn't Hungarian could not have a bourgeois land possession.

On the other hand, the Opposition did not want to employ any restrictions. It was expounded in the *Pesti Hírlap* that "the shift of the real estates of Hungarian nobles to foreign hands by individual sales does not endanger our nation, as such a purchaser himself and by all means his first successor would be assimilated to the other possessors." And the Opposition did not see any danger in grafting "a little German industry into the Hungarian trunk." Thus the Opposition was optimistic even in the matter of Magyarization, contrary to *Jelenkor*, which did not trust assimilation very much. "There are no doubt some examples, perhaps in Tolna county and elsewhere — says the paper — that Hungarians were victorious, but there are many more regions where, in the previous century, foreign spirit and language had spread all over, and the only indication, that earlier inhabitants used to be Hungarians are the name of the inhabitants and the settlements. Thus, we cannot expect anything from assimilation."¹⁵

Jelenkor had kept this question on its agenda later on as well, refuting the views of the loyal nobility as well as those of the Opposition. The paper also published a proposal according to which landed property may be obtained without political rights by people who had been residents in the country for ten years and had pursued trade or industry. Landed property with political rights was to be accessible only to those who knew the Hungarian language "properly in speech and moreover, in writing and reading." But a subsequent issue of the paper returned to the earlier view, and a sharp debate followed this detail of the question.¹⁶

After having surveyed the different views, let us analyse the cause of the apparent contradiction; i.e. that the loyal nobles and Széchenyi, together with the nobles close to them, had represented a less tolerant nationalism in this question; whereas, the Opposition was more tolerant.

The opinion of the loyal aristocrats is clear: they wanted to maintain feudal entailment and utilize it as an efficient argument in support of the idea of the "protection of the nation." Széchenyi and his followers also wanted to protect landed property against the bourgeoisie, because the essence of restriction according to nationality was that the local bourgeoisie, which was almost exclusively of German or Jewish origin and hardly spoke Hungarian, could not possess land. The similarity (the protection of the privileges of the nobles) between the views of the loyal nobility and Széchenyi and his followers can be observed along with the differences also.

The well-known optimism of the Opposition was only increased by the fact that a considerable part of the German and Jewish bourgeoisie supported the Opposition; its development — likewise, the reform nobility —, was hindered by the Austrian economic policy weighing heavily on the country.¹⁷ Under the circumstances, the German and Jewish

bourgeoisie were allies of the Hungarian Opposition, but they were also against the restrictions suggested by the *Jelenkor* and Széchenyi for nationalities in the sense of the bourgeois liberal demands of the gentry.

Similar trends were expressed in the debate on the question of settlements between the *Jelenkor* and the *Pesti Hírlap*. The former suggested that if the landlords cannot get Hungarian settlers to their farms, it was better to leave their estates unpopulated. "We do not consider advisable the settlement of our non-Hungarian fellow citizens; though the settlement grows large and strong quickly and the region from where they have come is filled soon by those who have remained there, . . . the population of the Slovak colonies, which turn Hungarian with great difficulties, has already grown at least ten times and has already issued new branches, i. e. it has produces new Slovak villages. We have quite a lot of trouble with them, so we should not bother the foreigners; they should remain in their own country with their own nationality, and we should try to teach Hungarian to the sons of our own country only."

The view of the Opposition was expounded by István Bezerédy, a gentry from Tolna, one of the leaders of the Opposition. He agreed with the proposals that in accordance with the possibilities the Hungarian peasants should be settled on the uncultivated lands, but he also raised the question as to whether it is more important for the Hungarian nation to leave the land barren or "to let it be populated by such inhabitants of our country who, under their present conditions, have not become Hungarians or by foreigners, who can hardly become Hungarians outside our country?" The answer was obvious: "the settlement of non-Hungarians is closer to that of the Hungarians than the deserted wilderness and lifeless lands. . . . The cultivation of the land of the country, its fertile, lovely, flourishing sight, industry with its thousand faces, transport that brings profit, progress and security, and all that derived and related to these are enormous factors in regard to the nation as well, and wherever they are lacking or stagnate, the matter of the nation also suffers the consequences." Thus, the settlement of population, even of peasants of the national minorities in the waste lands was one of the important demands of bourgeois national development.¹⁸ In the matter of the Magyarization of non-Hungarian settlers, the author of the article repeatedly expressed the familiar optimism; i. e. the Hungarian bourgeois development and liberal system would guarantee the most complete assimilation.

As far as the adoption of modern bourgeois institutions in Hungary was concerned, the loyal nobles advocated with a false nationalism that the feudal institutions should not be abolished; particularly serfdom should be maintained, for in their view, its elimination would mean the absorption of the Hungarian elements that are in minority. Count Aurél Dessewffy, criticizing a pamphlet of the liberal Károly Zay who advocated Magyarization, attacked the view, among others, that Zay had identified the Hungarian nation, the spread of Hungarian nationalization, and Magyarization with democratic rights. When the Opposition fought for the introduction of popular representation, the loyal aristocrats argued

in the following manner: "Do not base the future of Hungary on popular representation, — said Pál Somsich, delegate of County Somogy at the last Diet of the Estates — because by it, you would unwillingly provoke the struggle of the nationalities: it praises the wisdom of our ancestors that they had established the representation of authority in a polyglot country; do stick to that which, extended to the royal and larger market-towns, guarantees the superiority of the Hungarians for centuries; otherwise, though you may not be endangered yet, you will be exposed to constant attacks by the various nationalities."

The conservative *Budapesti Híradó* represented the characteristic opinion. It expounded the following in one of its articles: "In Hungary there is a cardinal point: it is nationality which decides the maximum in the granting of civil rights." On this basis the paper had sharply criticised the Opposition headed by Kossuth, who wanted to introduce civil rights to the detriment of the Hungarian national interests.¹⁹ Here again we may witness the phenomenon of the representatives of reaction branding the supporters of progress as unpatriotic.

Kossuth had given a suitable answer to the pseudo-patriotic demagoguery of the loyal aristocrats and expressed the democratic nature of the policy towards the nationalities of the Hungarian gentry. "1. *The freedom of the press* is not wanted, — wrote Kossuth summing up the view of the loyal nobility — because a stratum of intellectuals might develop among the non-Hungarian elements. 2. *Jury* is not wanted, because non-Hungarians would participate in meting out justice with Hungarians. 3. *General representation* is not wanted, because it would bring to political maturity the non-Hungarians as well. 4. *Manumission compensation by national effort* is not wanted, for it would emancipate the non-Hungarians as well, and all these would endanger the nation. In other words, . . . a gap as wide as possible should be created between the five million Hungarians and the ten million non-Hungarians; this is going to be the only means for the extension, or at least the maintenance of our nation." These ideas were strongly denounced by Kossuth on behalf of the Opposition and he was right to state about this policy that it was equal "to dooming the foreign elements living in Hungary to the fate of the Virginian blacks," and that "this is the political theory the price of which was dearly paid by Great Britain in Ireland".²⁰ Though this concept of Kossuth and his followers was pointing to the future, it still could not be neglected that the granting of democratic rights was rather insufficient, for the non-Hungarian peoples wanted more; they demanded collective national rights.

The questions discussed here prove that the concept of the Opposition and of Széchenyi should be analysed jointly if we want to see the relationships between the bourgeois and the national elements expressed by them and if we want to dissolve the apparent contradictions. In relation to the debate about the latter question we must differentiate between Széchenyi and the loyal aristocrats; it should not be neglected, though that Széchenyi's views were between those of the liberal Opposition and

the loyal nobility, and the deviations were due to his programme of bourgeois transformation, which was less consistent if compared to the first and more definite if compared to the second. The difference from the loyal opinion indicated that Széchenyi and his followers had taken serious steps towards the abolition of feudalism, though not to the same extent as was done by the Opposition. It should be noted here that Széchenyi and his group, due to the nature of their concept, were more afraid of the peasants, particularly of the non-Hungarian serfs, than of the Opposition, because they had taken into account the possibility of the non-Hungarian peasant movements being joined to the national movement, which might lead to the deepening of the national question, the moderation of which was one of the basic element of their policy.

Thus the progressive idea, which means the linking of advancement and nationalism and was primarily advocated by Széchenyi in the thirties, was taken over by the liberal Opposition; thus they became the protagonists of the ideology which was first expressed by Széchenyi.

Summing up, the loyal aristocrats strongly attacked the most positive element of the objectives of the Opposition, the liberalism of their policy towards the nationalities and their efforts to grant rights to the national minorities; the loyal nobility wanted to exclude the masses of Hungarians and non-Hungarians from the democratic rights by emphasizing patriotism. Their "patriotic concern" covered a chauvinistic opinion, and the "protectors" of the Hungarian nation and the non-Hungarian peoples were nothing more than the most faithful pillars of the Austrian government.

We believe that the views expressed here give an answer to the arguments of Domokos Kosáry that challenged the law I expounded earlier.²¹ Kosáry, when criticizing my concept, started by saying that historical phenomena developed through contradictions and not linearly" as it is in the case of a mathematical progression." Thus, he stressed, even if there was some truth in it that the politician struggling more consistently for bourgeois transformation could have followed less tolerant principles, it still cannot be accepted; indeed, Count József Dessewffy, who was further away from bourgeois objectives and closer to feudalism than Széchenyi, still was of an intransigent view in 1825 on the national question; I also quoted this opinion in one of my earlier papers. This sole reference cannot be convincing in itself if we take into account the series of facts recently revealed and discussed here.²²

The example of Dessewffy cannot be accepted because of a number of other important reasons. The Count had actively participated in the elaboration of the Hungarian national ideology in the early 19th century, and his later debate with Széchenyi also indicates that he had placed in the foreground the national elements, partly trying to divert attention from the internal class struggle. His activities may be compared to the movement of the nobility in 1790 and to the nationalism of the nobility in the twenties and thirties of the 19th century; here also Dessewffy, differed from the loyal aristocrats of the forties. On the other hand, the aristocrats of

the twenties did not generally follow the way of Dessewffy, but turned their back to their nation; they were not nationalists (not even feudal national!), but if we may use the term, they were cosmopolitans, "un-national", and they did not require a national phraseology in asserting their political interests. Thus, the loyal nobility of the twenties and thirties, as proved by the above analysis, differed from the aristocrats of the forties in this respect as well. The reasons may be found in the changing conditions.

My concept described here refers to the forties, and all my data are taken from those years; it is only too natural that these connexions are valid only for that decade. The sequence of events, i. e. of chronology, has a commonly accepted prominent role, and it requires no special verification that, while conflicts between the nationalities only appeared in the twenties, they had become quite sharp by the forties. And this phenomenon had primarily defined the policy of the loyal aristocrats that, in accordance with the views of the Court, had supported the movements of the national minorities against the strongest national-bourgeois trend of the Empire, i. e. against the Hungarian Opposition. In the meantime, it should not be forgotten either that the Hungarian Reform Movement only began after 1825 and developed in the forties; the Opposition was formed at that time, and only then did the Hungarian national movement become truly dangerous for Austrian absolutism. Therefore, it is not surprising that just in the national question the opinion of the loyal aristocrats went through a fundamental change when compared to that of the twenties.

These are the basic differences between József Dessewffy and his son Aurél. I mention it because Kosáry reasonably chose the words of József Dessewffy expressed in 1825; in this manner he used the example of the well-known loyal family of the forties, one which could hardly be suited of the refutation of a characteristic context of the forties.

Another problem of Kosáry's criticism is that, differing from my approach, he isolated the problem of internal transformation within the concept of Széchenyi separating from it the national question, the matter of the relationship with Austria, even though in the concept itself, bourgeois development and national demands were closely linked with each other.²³

The Slav question and Hungarian nationalism

The fear of the cooperation among Slav peoples had obtained a prominent place in the Hungarian national ideology. The joining of forces, by the related nationalities left to themselves and facing similar tasks was only natural and a necessary phenomenon. The liberal Opposition was more afraid of this cooperation than the conservatives; thus, the problem belongs to the subject of our analysis.

It is only too natural that the liberal Hungarian gentry, the national movement of which was intertwined with the struggle for civil rights, watched with great anxiety the great Slav power, the despotic Tsarist Russia, the "nothern colossus." They not only believed she was behind every Slav demand, but they also believed she actually directed all the steps of these nationalities. Here we cannot study in detail the complicated questions of Slav mutuality and Pan-Slavism and the often contradictory variants of Slav thought, because we have dealt with them earlier in several places.²⁴ Now we would only like to direct attention to those connections that are relevant to our subject.

The various views of the opposition were brilliantly summarized by Miklós Wesselényi in his work *Szózat a magyar és szláv nemzetiség ügyében* (Appeal on the Cause of the Hungarian and the Slav Nation), published in 1843. Here again, the idea of this work is that "danger threatens you, my country, danger that has never been." Based on historical rights containing feudal elements as well, Wesselényi saw the cause of danger in the ancestors not granting rights to the subjugated peoples and to the Hungarians not having privileges at the time of the Conquest. This danger had become more threatening as the various peoples began to have constitutional and national demands. The national objectives of the Slavs were made use of by the Tsarist Russian "propaganda". This propaganda was successfully pursued in countries with Slav population, excepting Poland. "In this manner, he (i.e. the Tsar — E. A.) acquired relationships concerning the countries, such that a mighty power can have on the castles of an other mighty power such a great party among the people of those castles who are ready to surrender the castle or to put to the sword the defending army and its commanders, and for this deed, they wait only for the opportunity and the sign of that one". In a more modern wording, it could be considered as a fifth column.

Wesselényi and the Hungarian public opinion could not realistically assess the foreign political situation, and they exaggerated the possible danger the Empire of the Tsar represented. The Tsarist Russia in the first part of the 19th century did not yet aim at "having a big party among the people of the castle" in Austria (and Hungary) which was an ally, and in Prussia and did not intend to crush the Austrian Monarchy and, together with it, Hungary, by winning the Slavs in Hungary and Austria. Even though the leaders and participants of the Slav movements were sympathetic towards the Russian people and read the works of Russian literature with great enthusiasm and were in touch with the liberal Russian politicians and the Russian Slavists who were close to Pan-Slavism, they weren't the agents of Tsarism, even though they might have cherished some illusions towards the foreign policy of the Tsarist Empire. All these offered sufficient ground for Hungarian public opinion to exaggerate, instead of to realistically survey, the endeavours of the Slavs for unity and cooperation and, particularly, the role of the Tsarist Russia in the Slav efforts. As a consequence, Wesselényi and the Hungarian public opinion could not differentiate between the democratic and

the reactionary Slav unity. And as a consequence of Slav nationalism, the Slavs regarded as their own all Slav unity, whether it was progressive or reactionary; similarly, Wesselényi and Hungarian nationalism summarily condemned all kinds of Slav cooperation.

Thus, Wesselényi had expounded the views of the entire Opposition when he explained the possible role of Tsarist Russia in an eventual revolutionary movement of the Slav peoples and the advantages she would have, even in the case the movement had liberal objectives and a course opposite to the Tsarist Russian interests. This concern about the Slav movements resulted in Wesselényi's opinion that it was necessary to strengthen the non-Slavs, i.e. those nationalities who were against the Tsarist Empire, such as the Rumanians and the Eastern Church, by granting them equality with the others. In the mean time, starting from the menace that he saw as threatening Hungary, and as disadvantageous to the country, in the political, religious, and national disunity of the people (i. e. the one Hungarian uniform political nation) and in the demands of the nationalities, particularly in these of the Slavs, Wesselényi also described the tasks that contained some of the positive elements of the policy of the gentry towards the nationalities. He suggested the fulfilment of the just demands of the Slavs and the necessity of consideration towards the Slavs. "In regard to the Slavs, we should not only refrain from doing anything which is wrong, but we should do all that is right. Thus, the foremost of our tasks is to recognize and fulfil those demands of our Slav fellow-citizens that are right." But under Slavs, Wesselényi mainly understood the Croatians, and he considered the demands of the other Slav nationalities less reasonable. He regarded the demand to use the mother tongue in Croatia to be a just one, but for the other nationalities, he thought sufficient the safeguarding of civil rights without national concessions.

Wesselényi also indicated among others "the rise and extension" of the Hungarian nation as an important task. Under the definition, Wesselényi partly meant the safeguarding of democratic culture, the teaching of Hungarian language even in the kindergarden and at school, and the bourgeois transformation and "constitutionality." "Inhabitants of the country speaking different languages may constitute a well-built body despite the separate languages, provided they are closely linked to one another by equal rights, duties, and interests. And the linguistic differences may disappear in the close contact and frequently and do disappear; whatever is closely knit civilly usually gets amalgamated *nationally* as well." In this manner, the granting of democratic rights (without the equality of the nationalities), the creation of a liberal Hungary, and the Magyarization of the national minorities got intertwined in this manner in the policy of the Opposition towards the nationalities. In the development of these views, German liberalism also had an important role. The German liberals, contrary to Herder, regarded the establishment of a national state important and possible. They did not even exclude the possibility of some languages eliminating the language of other national

minorities, and thus, two "major nations," the German and the Hungarian, would emerge that could stop the expansion of Tsarist Russia along the river Danube. Thus, the outlines of a Hungarian-German alliance began to take shape against Pan-Slavism.

The mature liberal ideas naturally could not guarantee the achievement of the important objective also indicated by Wesselényi, i.e. the trust of the Slavs. Moreover, Wesselényi, due to his fear of the Slavs, advocated the idea of a "close attachment to and a close alliance with the government" of Vienna and emphasized that, if during "the course of our history we did not put on the throne the imperial offspring of the Habsburg Counts, it would now be high time to do it."²⁵

In the national question, the centralists held views practically similar to those of the Opposition. If there was any difference at all, it was due to the fact that the centralists* were more afraid of the national minorities, particularly of the Slavs, than they were of Kossuth and his followers; thus, they more definitely supported the maintenance of the Austrian Empire. The consequence of this view was that the centralists wanted to rely upon Vienna much more against "Pan-Slavism" than the Opposition.²⁶

The same orientation may be noted with several prominent representatives of the Opposition. In fact, when the Hungarian liberal nobility fought against the Viennese Court for the independence of the country, they also approached the Austrian Court against the Slav national minorities joining their forces and expecting support against the Slav national movements. The Hungarian gentry thought that the coalition of the Slavs under the supposed leadership of Tsarist Russia necessitated the alliance of the dynasty and the Hungarians, for the movement of the Slavs equally endangers Austria as well as Hungary. In connection with the Slav threat, even Ferenc Deák stated that Hungary would protect Austria against the "Slav confederation" being formed under Russian leadership. He was also the person who said that the rapprochement of the Hungarian nation to the dynasty was a positive consequence of Pan-Slavism, for the Hungarians and the Court could resist only jointly the menace that unfolds by the strengthening of the Slav movements.²⁷

Kossuth himself had warned Vienna that it was in the interest of the Court to safeguard the unity of Hungary and to establish an alliance with the Hungarian nation. "Now the strength of the Government — wrote Kossuth — lays in winning over of the various nationalities living in its Empire and particularly, in the close contact with that one which does not feel any sympathy and which moreover, is quite averse to a certain foreign power: this being the Hungarian nationality." Kossuth in this article dedicated to the propagation of Hungarian language, had also

* The oppositionist group of centralists fancied the bourgeois transmutations in Hungary stiffly, doctrinairely applying to it mechanically the Western interpretation of social development. An attitude of indifference to the rather important question of national independence was shown by this group.

made the remark following in relation to Illyriism and Pan-Slavism: "And we would like to tear open our bosom to expose all the folds of our heart, so that all should see that it is no coward pretension, but a live conviction, when we would cry aloud and cry a thousand times that the Hungarians deserve trust, because the Hungarians are aware that their existence is linked to the glory of the Austrian dynasty."²⁸

It is worth mentioning that the conservative judge of a County Court, Lajos Baloghy, a landlord in Nógrád County, who similarly to Széchenyi represented a tolerant view in the question of nationalities, agreed at this point with the Opposition, though he expressed his opinion against the Opposition when he dealt with the Magyarization of the Slavs in the country. Thus he protested against the view, popular at a time, that Magyarization was required for defence against Tsarist Russia: "Therefore, I do not see a protective wall against the North in this, for neither language, nor physical force can be victorious in the political tactics of today; I rather trust the wise Austrian Government, which plays a significant role in European politics and defends the throne and, by it also the Hungarians and which released us from the Turkish yoke of 150 years; it can be hoped that by its force and that of its allies would not allow the Northern giant to enter through the Carpathians."²⁹

But the cooperation of the Austrian Court and the Hungarian Opposition had to face basic obstacles. The struggle of the Hungarian liberal nobility for the independence of Hungary and for bourgeois transformation had pushed into the background the orientation towards Austria which in the same time was directed against the Slav movements. And the Austrian Court, corresponding to its policy towards the nationalities, primarily supported the weaker national minorities of the country against the strongest one, i.e. the Hungarian. It should be noted, however, that this policy could not be applied long as the movement of the Slavs was gaining impetus, and consequently, it turned into its opposite in 1867 the Austrian Court concluded an alliance with the strongest nationality of Hungary against the other nationalities forging ahead. But the germs of the policy were present in the forties in the joint Austro-Hungarian measures slowing down and hindering Slav unity and represented the early antecedents of the compromise of 1867.

The fear of the Opposition from the Slavs was not by incidence criticized by the conservative elements, who primarily polemized with the Appeal of Wesselényi. There is no scope here to go through all the points that were discussed; we would like to refer to only one question, the most important one that was related to the menace of Tsarist Russia. The retired army officer and conservative Ferenc Kállay, member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, had challenged with remarkable arguments the imminent danger of the unity of the Slavs. Among the arguments, there were the difference of the various Slav languages, the religious differences among the Slavs, and their divergent views.³⁰ "Moreover — wrote Kállay — the loyalty of the Slav inhabitants towards the Austrian and Prussian courts has not yet sunk so low that one or two emissaries

or a handful of paid agitators could set to flames the provinces of Posen, the Czech and Hungarian, etc. lands. As regards Hungary, the Croats are all Catholics and their landlords are in some ways related to us; consequently, their religion and relationship are sufficient guarantees that the municipal rights hallowed by many centuries would not be easily sacrificed by them for the sake of a phantasm. . . ."³¹

Contradictions are of many aspects in the liberal and conservative national ideology. The Opposition was optimistic about the Hungarian nation gaining ground and about the success of Magyarization and were pessimistic about the assessment of the policy of Tsarist Russia supporting the Slavs, and a sharp opposition against the Habsburgs was expressed parallel to an orientation towards the Austrians. On the other side stands the tolerance of the conservatives and their national demagoguery. It is hoped, however, that the conceptual roots of these contradictory phenomena could be brought to light by the present analysis.

NOTES

- ¹ *Kossuth, A műipar akadályai és ellenszerek* (The obstacles and the remedies of the craft industry). Pesti Hírlap, No. 293, 1843; *Id.*, the Introduction to the Hetilap No. 1. 1845.; *Id.*, Legújabb iparmozgalmaink (Our newest industrial movements). Hetilap No. 8. 1845. The three articles were published in the volume *Kossuth Lajos hírlapi cikkei* (Articles of Lajos Kossuth), ed. by *Kossuth, Ferenc*, Budapest 1906. 2 Vol. pp. 225, 363–364, 376–377 (quotations in the same place). In connection with the importance of the development of industry see also: *Kossuth, Tájékozódás* (Orientation). Hetilap, No. 1. 1846. *Loc. cit.* pp. 379–383.
- ² *Kossuth, Földművelési érdekek* (Agricultural interests). Hetilap, No. 2. 1846. *Loc. cit.* pp. 386–391; *Id.*, A teendők legfőbbike (The most prominent of the tasks). *Loc. cit.* No. 60. 1846. p. 471 (quotation), pp. 473–478.
- ³ Vide the articles of *Kossuth: Vámszövetség* (Customs union). Pesti Hírlap, No. 110. 1842. *Loc. cit.* Vol. I. pp. 243–257; *Vámszövetkezési érdekek* (Interests in customs union). *Loc. cit.* No. 112. pp. 253–257; *Nemzetgazdasági kombinációk* (Combinations of national economy). *Loc. cit.* No. 113. pp. 257–262; *Pótlék a vámszövetségi kérdéshez* (Supplement to the question of customs union). *Loc. cit.* No. 115. pp. 267–271; *Vámszövetségi kacsintgatások* (Oglings at the customs union). *Loc. cit.* No. 178. pp. 390–399; *Vámszövetségi kilátások* (Prospects of the customs union). *Loc. cit.* No. 179. pp. 395–400.
- ⁴ *Kossuth: Védvám és szabadkereskedés* (Customs defence and free trade), Hetilap No. 5. 1846. *Loc. cit.* Vol. II. p. 395.
- ⁵ *Kossuth: Vámügy* (Customs affairs). *Loc. cit.* No. 41. p. 458.
- ⁶ *Kossuth: Budapesti Híradó a vámkérdésben* (The Budapesti Híradó on the question of customs). *Loc. cit.* No. 51. p. 465.
- ⁷ I have dealt with the question in detail in my work entitled *A nemzetiségi kérdés története Magyarországon 1790–1848.* (The history of the national question in Hungary between 1790 and 1848). Budapest 1960. 2. vol. pp. 5–11, 30–32, 223–225.
- ⁸ In connection with the writings of basic importance on the ideology of the nation in the forties see the articles of *Kossuth* published in the Pesti Hírlap: *Nyelvünk ügye* (The cause of our language). No. 3. 1841.; *Erdély és unió egysége a magyarnak* (Transylvania and the unity of Hungarians). No. 30, 1841.; *Virraszunk* (Let us keep vigil). No. 153. 1842.; *Bánat és gondolkodás* (Sorrow and thinking). No. 183. 1842.; *Igénytelen nézetek* (Humble views). No. 184. 1842. See these articles in Vol. I. of the collected *Articles of Lajos Kossuth*. See also the letter of *Miklós Wessclényi* addressed to the Editor of Pesti Hírlap, Freywaldau in June. Pesti Hírlap, June 26, 1842 and his famous work: *Szózat a magyar és szláv nemzetiség ügyében* (Appeal on the Cause of

- Hungarian and the Slav Nation). Leipzig 1843., Pillantás Magyarország állapotjára a nemzeti nyelv szempontjából (Glimpses at the condition of Hungary from the point of view of the national language). *Századunk*, June 28, 1841 (quotation in the same place).
- ⁹ *I. Tóth, Zoltán*, A soknemzetiségű állam néhány kérdéséről az 1848 előtti Magyarországon (On some questions of the multinational state in the Hungary of pre-1848). MTA Társadalmi-Történelmi Tudományok Osztályának Közleményei (Proceedings of the Department of Socio-Historical Studies of the HAS). Vol. VII. No. 4. pp. 270–271.
- ¹⁰ Nemzetiségi irányzatok (Trends of nationalities) Erdélyi Híradó, August 29, 1843.
- ¹¹ *Pulszky, Ferenc*: Életem és korom (My life and age). Budapest 1880. Vol. 2. p. 283.
- ^{11/a} *Arató, Endre*: Der ungarische Nationalismus und die nicht ungarischen Völker (1780–1825). *Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös nominatae. Sectio Historica* Tomus VIII. pp. 93–95.
- ¹² To the verification of the concept outlined above see: in the 2nd volume of my *op. cit.* pp. 34–72.
- ¹³ *Széchenyi, István*: Stádium. Budapest 1958. p. 63. *Gróf Széchenyi István beszédei* (Speeches of Count István Széchenyi). p. 372. (Széchenyi's speech on October 7, 1843 at the Upper Chamber). The contradiction of Széchenyi's views was first pointed out by *Sarlós, Márton* in his work: *Széchenyi István és a feudális jogrend átalakulása* (István Széchenyi and the transformation of the feudal legal system). Budapest 1960. pp. 25–26.
- ¹⁴ Ósiség és birhatlanság (Entailment and non-possession) (in the column entitled *Budapesti Napló*) *Jelenkor*, No. 61. July 30, 1842.; No. 63. August 6, 1842.
- ¹⁵ *Pesti Hírlap*, 1842. No. 127. (quotation) *cf.* the article entitled *Birtokolhatatlanság* (The state of no rights for possession). *Loc. cit.* March 20, No. 27, 1842, article of *Jelenkor* quoted from No. 63. 1842.
- ¹⁶ *Peláthy, István*: *Birtokképeség* (Ability of possession). *Jelenkor*, July 13, 1843. (See part one of the article in No. 54. July 9.); *Varga, Soma*: *Birtokképeség és még valami* (Ability of possession and something else). *Jelenkor*, July 27, 1843. No. 59.; *Peláthy, István* answered to this article in his writing: *Magyarázat a birtokképeség ügyében* (Explanation of the matter of ability of possession). *Loc. cit.* August 3, 1843. No. 61.; it was followed by the answer of *Varga, Soma*: *Egy kis észrevétel ezen homályos magyarázatra* (A small remark to this hazy explanation). *Loc. cit.* Finally: *Varga, Soma*: *Politikai jogok* (Political rights). *Loc. cit.* August 10, 1843. The opposing parties were discussing among others who had represented better the interests of the Hungarian nation.
- ¹⁷ To the viewpoint of the Germans living in Hungary and to their history see my *op. cit.* 1st Vol. pp. 57–62, 281–294. To the behaviour and orientation of the Jews see *Loc. cit.* pp. 300–301, and 2nd Vol. pp. 143–144, 270.
- ¹⁸ Nemzetiszilárdítási elvek (Principles of strengthening the nation) (in the column entitled *Budapesti Napló*) *Jelenkor*, October 8, 1842. No. 81. (The antecedents and the subsequent articles are to be found in Nos. 79, 102 and 103); *Bezerédy, István Jr.* Népesítés nemzetiségi tekintetben (Peopling from the point of nationalities) (Discussion column) *Pesti Hírlap*, September 15, 1842. No. 178.
- ¹⁹ *Desseuffy, Aurél*: *Közügy, Protestantizmus, Magyarizmus, Slavismus* (Public affairs, Protestantism, Hungarianism, Slavism). *Világ*, November 10, 1841.; the speech of *Somsich, Pál* is quoted by: *I. Tóth, Zoltán* in his study: *Kossuth és a nemzetiségi kérdés* (Kossuth and the question of the nationalities). *Emlékkönyv Kossuth Lajos születésének 150. évfordulójára* (Memorial volume on the 150th anniversary of the birth of Lajos Kossuth). Budapest 1952. 2nd Vol. pp. 249–250. The article of *Budapesti Híradó* referred to is quoted by *Andics, Erzsébet* in her book: *Kossuth harca az árulók és megalkuvók ellen a reformkorban és a forradalom idején* (Kossuth's struggle against the traitors and opportunists in the Reform Era and during the revolution). Budapest 1955. p. 60.
- ²⁰ See Kossuth's answer *Loc. cit.* pp. 60–61.
- ²¹ *Kosáry, Domokos*: *Széchenyi az újabb külföldi irodalomban* (Széchenyi in the recent foreign literature). *Századok* 1962. Nos. 1–2. pp. 290–291.
- ²² *Cf.* my *op. cit.* on Vol. VIII. of the *Annales Sectio Historica*, pp. 102–103, 107.
- ²³ The clarification of a misunderstanding also belongs to this set of questions. *Kosáry* had rightly pointed out the nationalism of Széchenyi, and he placed this statement

- against my concept. I would like to call the attention of my colleague that I myself consider Széchenyi to be a nationalist, and this does not contradict my concept. (Cf. p. 239, 2nd Vol. of my *op. cit.*) I am particularly sorry that my critic, as it is revealed by his work, had relied on an earlier and shorter version of my concept about Széchenyi (Magyarország története a feudalizmusról a kapitalizmusra való átmenet korszakában 1790–1849. The history of Hungary in the period of transition from feudalism to capitalism between 1790 and 1849. Budapest 1957. pp. 251–252.)
- ²⁴ Vol. I. of my *op. cit.*, pp. 127–129, 235–251, 256–280, 368–370, Vol. II. pp. 36–37, and another work of mine: Kelet-Európa története a 19. század első felében (The history of Eastern Europe in the first part of the 19th century) Budapest 1971. pp. 148, 160–162, 193.
- ²⁵ *Wesselényi Miklós, op. cit.* Leipzig 1843. pp. 1, 4, 50, 270, 285–286, 365–366. His letter in SZKK Quart. Germ. p. 644.
- ²⁶ *Sőtér István: Eötvös József* (second revised edition). Budapest 1967. pp. 125–127.
- ²⁷ *Miskolczy Gyula: A horvát kérdés története és irományai a rendi állam korában* (The history of the Croatian question and writings pertaining to it in the age of the feudal state). Budapest 1927. Vol. I. pp. 249, 266, 312–313; *Steier Lajos: Beniczky Lajos kormánybiztos és honvédeztredes visszaemlékezései és jelentése az 1848–49-i szabadságharcról és tót mozgalomról* (The reminiscences and reports of Lajos Beniczky, commissioner and army colonel about the War of Independence of 1848–49 and of the Slovak movement). Budapest 1924. pp. 366–384; *Vaso Bogdanov: Društvene i političke borbe u Horvatskoj 1848–49. Prilog historiji naše četrdesetsme* (Social and party struggles in Croatia in 1848–49. Addition to the history of fortyeight.) Zagreb 1949. p. 50.
- ²⁸ *Kossuth Lajos: Igénytelen nézetek* (Humble views). Pesti Hírlap, 1842. No. 184. His articles, Vol. I. pp. 414, 419.
- ²⁹ *Baloghy László*, his letters to Zay Károly: December 26, 1840., January 28, 1841. The archive of the Zay family. Pôdohospodársky archiv (Agricultural archive) Bratislava. 79. fasc. No. 181. 81. fasc. No. 185.
- ³⁰ *Kállay Ferenc: A Szózat criticalai bírálata* (The critical survey of the Appeal) Pest 1843. pp. 19, 38.
- ³¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 34.