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Yugoslav army is debatable. Another topic discussed in this part of the book concerns patriotic and paramilitary organizations which consisted of veterans but also of members of the “war youth generation”. Newman discusses in detail the *Organization of Yugoslav Nationalists* (ORJUNA) and its extremism and violence. He also writes about the *Serbian Nationalist Youth* (SRNAO) but fails to mention the *Croatian National Youth* (HANA O). He describes the conflict between ORJUNA and SRNAO seeking to point out its importance in the creation of the atmosphere of violence in Yugoslavia, but the reader cannot find a single word about the no less important conflict between ORJUNA and HANA O.

The third part of the book consists of two chapters and it addresses individuals and organizations mentioned in the first two parts now on the eve of and during the Second World War. While reading the first two parts of this book, one may notice some imbalance in the author’s approach to violence in interwar Yugoslavia and identification of those responsible for it. This last part of the book shows a marked lack of even-handedness. Newman’s account of the Second World War on Yugoslav soil is a biased one. He discusses the Nedić state, the Chetniks and their leader Dragoljub Mihailović, the Ustashe, and the Partisans. The author tries to explain that the Chetniks tried to “maintain the culture of victory” and that “this course seemed like the logical continuation

of the battles that had been fought by Serbia during the years 1912–1918” (p. 250). Newman claims that “violence against non-Serb, which was characteristic of the Chetniks’ fighting” (p. 251) had a political goal in sight – “an expanded and unified Serbia”. He insists on violence against non-Serbs while describing the Nedić state, and yet, while writing about the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and the Ustasha regime, he fails to mention the Jasenovac concentration camp or, for that matter, any other concentration camp formed on NDH soil. Newman observes that the Ustasha regime brought “a pleasing change of fortunes for many former Austro-Hungarian officers” (p. 256). Even though he provides examples of former Austro-Hungarian officers joining the fascist Ustasha regime, he states that the Ustasha programme was far too radical for former officers of the Dual Monarchy and that the study of their role has had mixed results.

Tremendous amount of archival research was done in preparation for writing this book. Newman researched his subject in the Archives of Yugoslavia, the Croatian State Archives, and the Archives of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. It should be noted, however, that the literature used lacks some relevant more recent titles. This book has its faults, but it offers an important study into veterans’ organizations and paramilitary violence during the interwar period.

ADAM TOOZE, *THE DELUGE: THE GREAT WAR AND THE REMAKING OF GLOBAL ORDER 1916–1931*. LONDON: PENGUIN BOOKS, 2015, 644 p.

Reviewed by Miloš Vojinović*

The Great War, with its aftermath, stands as the beginning of many narratives depicting the history of the contemporary world. Looked at from the European perspective, it was, in the words of Ian Kershaw, the beginning of the continent’s trip “To Hell and

Back”. Charles de Gaulle’s claim that it was just the first episode of a second European Thirty Years’ War has found many followers.

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The Great War marked the moment when industrialized societies unleashed, for the first time, all of their murderous potentials. As Tony Judt noted, it distorted employment, destroyed trade and devastated whole regions. Great enfranchisement in Europe which followed the war introduced social questions that would be crucial in political debates in the coming decades. Nineteenth-century ideologies were remodelled and reshaped to respond to the concerns, fears and expectations of women and men of the twentieth century. But the war was not only European. Many empires collapsed, and all were shaken in their foundations. The chronically unstable Middle East is still in the conundrum of problems of 1918. As David Fromkin has lucidly noted, the peace that supposed to end all war, for the Middle East was the peace that ended all peace. New research stresses that even South America felt the impact of this global conflict strongly and clearly, and more than previously thought.¹

By 1991 there were more than 25,000 articles and books written about the Great War, and the last quarter of the century saw a growing interest of historians.² The Great War was without doubt a momentous event, which profoundly shaped the course of twentieth-century history. However, the question arises: what is there left to be told? In plain English, do we need another overview of the Great War and its consequences? On the pages of his book, which is a demanding read in dense narrative form, Tooze attempts to convince his audience that the answer is yes. Therefore, he offers a sweeping revision of many widely held historiographical conclusions.

¹ See S. Rinke, *Latin America and the First World War* (Cambridge 2017).

² J. W. Langdon, *July 1914: The Long Debate 1918–1990* (Oxford 1991), 51; J. Winter and A. Prost, *The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies – 1914 to the Present* (Cambridge 2005), 16–17.

Tooze is an economic historian, whose previous work dealt with the history of the German economy.³ Bearing that in mind, it does not come as a surprise that economic arguments weigh strongly in his latest book. The book starts, rather unusually, not with 1914, but with 1916, when it became obvious to all belligerents that the war had become one of attrition, and when the relationship between Wall Street and the Entente began to loom heavily over the outcome of the war. The book ends with the first economic measures of Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration. The centrality of economic argument is, perhaps, not surprising, for ever since Keynes's *Economic Consequences of the Peace* historians of the period have been forced to deal with the financial aspect of the war's outcome. Tooze argues that it was precisely in that period that the world order, and the way in which it was created and understood, underwent a complete and revolutionary reconstruction whose significance has not yet been understood properly.

If we would pick up the daunting task of summing up more than 500 pages in just one paragraph, it would go like this: the crucial figure and the crucial country in this "deluge" of world order are the United States and Woodrow Wilson. The end of the war and its immediate aftermath brought about a twofold change. First, power transition happened, with the US emerging so powerful that everyone else was forced to pivot on it. There was no regional or continental political aspiration that did not take this new reality into account. Second, a new kind of world order emerged. The nascent world order was unlike the previous, where the

³ The *Deluge* is his third book. It is preceded by *Statistics and the German State, 1900–1945: The Making of Modern Economic Knowledge* published by Cambridge University Press in 2001, and the widely acclaimed *Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy* published by Allen Lane in 2006.

only power was hard power. In other words, Tooze argues that the power of Victorian Britain in its heyday cannot compare to the leverage the US had over its rivals during the closing stages of and after the Great War. Tooze writes that "this new asymmetrical financial geometry signalled the end to the great-power competition that had defined the age of imperialism" (p. 211). The US was so powerful that no historical comparison can be made. What was new in this era was the fact that unlike previous decades, or centuries, there could be no more separation between foreign and domestic politics. "Architects of the new 'world organization' were quite consciously playing the game of revolutionaries," Tooze argues (p. 9). The new order, embodied in the rise of the US, was multifaceted; the importance of old-style military power was still undiminished, but now it was interwoven with economic supremacy and a new economic model, on the one hand, and a kind of moral and political authority, on the other. Wilson is not portrayed as an idealistic preacher, whether that description be understood as apologetic or as critical. In his figure we can see a leader determined to establish a firm global leadership of the US. A new age required new methods, and Wilson was determined not to draw the US into great-power relations where the rules were set by empires of the old world. Therefore, when discussing Wilson's famous 14-point speech of 8th January 1918, Tooze shows that what Wilson was actually doing with this speech was not just about presenting his ideological worldview. Tooze finds that the speech is vague, that it does not contain key terms associated with Wilsonian internationalism, and that crucial for understanding it is the fact that it was prepared as a reply to Lloyd George's speech of 5th January, in which the British Prime Minister had tried to position Britain centrally in the alignment of the emerging world order. Wilson is remembered as an internationalist, but "the world he wanted to create was one in which the exceptional

position of America at the head of world civilization would be inscribed on the gravestone of European power" (p. 54).

The foundation of Tooze's argumentation is unusual and yet persuasive: he combines a lot of advanced statistics and economic data with sources more often seen in histories of international relations: diplomatic dispatches, minutes of government meetings, diaries and memoirs. Even though material preconditions and economy provide the solid background of the narrative, we can clearly see individuals and their own agency. His argumentation is not deterministic in any sense. When he speaks about the differences and conflicts between Clemenceau and Wilson, he explains them through different personal stories of the actors. A changing world acts as a stage of global politics, and this change provokes both Wilson and Clemenceau to try to adapt to it as well as they can. However, concepts of the future they envision hinge on their individual personalities, their education, life experience and political beliefs.

Tooze argues that there are two main schools of interwar history, the "dark continent" school, and the "failure of liberal hegemony" school. He offers revision and seeks to find a synthesis of the two. Sailing through the main events of the period his book covers, from Verdun and the Somme, the October Revolution and the Versailles negotiations, and through the French occupation of the Ruhr, the Locarno Treaty, the Kellogg-Briand pact and the Great Depression, Tooze is not just enumerating events. Instead, he tries to demonstrate that the changes that took place can best be understood if we assume that historical actors faced an unprecedented historical situation. That is why those who expect just another classical account of American isolationism will end up empty handed. Isolationism does not play an important role in Tooze's interpretation. Positioning himself against the historiography which sees the period as the moment when British power yielded to

American, Tooze concludes that, "This was not a succession. This was a paradigm shift" (p. 15). When it comes to Tooze's contention that the problems faced by decision-makers were unprecedented, it should be noted that the argument is not completely new. Zara Steiner in her 2005 book *The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919–1933*, has clearly stressed the uniqueness of the 1920s in this sense.⁴

Tooze's argument about the significance of a new relationship between foreign and domestic politics for global order can best be seen in the pages that deal with the question why the Entente survived the war. He claims that "Neither the military nor the economic effort would have mattered if the Entente Powers had not maintained their political coherence" (p. 173). Throughout the book Tooze demonstrates that decision-makers were aware of the new fact that actions in foreign policy cannot be separated from domestic affairs. We can see how German policy towards Russia from February 1917 to March 1918 was always shadowed by the question of what would happen with German political life. Inner German discussions before the Brest-Litovsk talks were not just about German policy in the East; they were even more about Germany's own political future, since it became more and more obvious that it was not possible, despite the German military victory in the East, to destroy the Tsarist regime and keep an autocratic regime at home (p. 115). Along the same lines, we can see that the true motivation behind Wilson's disarmament proposals was not his idealism, but his goal to avoid the Prussianization of America itself (p. 54).

It must be noted that Tooze's view of the world order is a top-down perspective. It is not like Erez Manela's *Wilsonian Moment*, where we can see the relevance of Wilson, and Wilsonianism, around the globe, and

where we can observe the world order also from the bottom of its hierarchy. Both historiographical schools that Tooze attempts to synthesize are essentially focused on interwar Europe. Therefore, even though Tooze claims that the aim of the book is to trace the ways in which the world came to terms with the new central position of the US (p. 7), the core of the book is devoted to the parts of the world most relevant for the US, the westernmost parts of Eurasia and the Pacific.

A century ago Tomáš Masaryk argued that the Great War was a World Revolution. *The Deluge*, a meticulously researched, well-argued and stimulating book, clearly demonstrates that Masaryk was right, perhaps even more than he knew. Tooze convincingly shows that the change brought about by the war was not just about what was defined in the peace treaties, furthermore, the change in the world order, its rules and performance, was intangible and yet omnipresent. The book opens with a quotation from Lloyd George's 1915 Christmas speech, which deserves to be re-quoted. "The war, he warned them, was remaking the world. 'It is the deluge, it is a convulsion of Nature... bringing unheard-of changes in the social and industrial fabric. It is a cyclone which is tearing up by the roots the ornamental plants of modern society... It is an earthquake which is upheaving the very rocks of European life. It is one of those seismic disturbances in which nations leap forward or fall backwards generations in a single bound'"

⁴ Z. Steiner, *The Lights That Failed: European International History 1919–1933* (Oxford 2005), esp. 602, 609, 630.