

Dual Character Art Concepts*

Shen-yi Liao, Aaron Meskin, Joshua Knobe

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming)

Abstract

Our goal in this paper is to articulate a novel account of the ordinary concept ART. At the core of our account is the idea that a puzzle surrounding our thought and talk about art is best understood as just one instance of a far broader phenomenon. In particular, we claim that one can make progress on this puzzle by drawing on research from cognitive science on *dual character concepts*. Thus, we suggest that the very same sort of phenomenon that is associated with ART can also be found in a broad class of other dual character concepts, including SCIENTIST, CHRISTIAN, GANGSTER, and many others. Instead of focusing narrowly on the case of ART, we try to offer a more general account of these concepts and the puzzles to which they give rise. Then, drawing on the general theory, we introduce a series of hypotheses about art concepts, and put those hypotheses to the test in three experimental studies.

Here is a fictional version of a conversation one might overhear in the Los Angeles County Museum of Art while standing in front of Jeff Koons's *Michael Jackson and Bubbles* (1988):

- Alfie:* This is not art. I know many people think it is art, but when you think about what art really is, you will realize that it is not art at all.
- Betty:* Of course this is art. It is in the Los Angeles County Museum of Art!
- Alfie:* I know. But it's impersonal factory-produced rubbish.¹

We think it is pretty obvious that this sort of conversation (or something very close to it) is commonplace. Contemporary art, especially the avant-garde, frequently generates public resistance. This resistance often leads to conversations like that between Alfie and Betty. These conversations, and their persistence, call for explanation.

* All authors participated in design of the studies and in manuscript preparation and revision. Shen-yi Liao led the data collection. Shen-yi Liao and Joshua Knobe performed the data analyses. We thank audiences at the Buffalo Experimental Philosophy Conference, Conference of the International Association of Empirical Aesthetics, London Aesthetics Forum, Swiss Center for Affective Science, University of Georgia, University of Reading, and University of Vienna for their feedback. In addition, we thank Dominic McIver Lopes and many anonymous referees for their comments. This research was supported by a European Community FP7 Marie Curie International Incoming Fellowship, grant PIIF-GA-2012-328977.

¹ As art critic Jed Perl (2014) writes, 'Everything Koons produces has a factory-produced impersonality'.

We want to know why disputes about the artistic status of various objects are so common. After all, people do not typically engage in similar debates about the vast majority of artifact categories. If we were to overhear Alfie and Betty engaging in a similar dispute about whether something was a washing machine or a clock radio we would likely think that they were joking or perhaps deeply confused. However, we do suspect this sort of conversation takes place with many other art categories. It would not surprise us to overhear Alfie and Betty having a very similar debate about whether or not Blink-182 is truly punk or whether Macklemore is truly hip-hop.

Our goal in this paper is to articulate a novel account of the concept ART that helps to address this question.² At the core of our account is the idea that the puzzling phenomenon associated with our thought and talk about art is best understood as just one instance of a far broader phenomenon, one that extends considerably beyond this domain. In particular, we try to make progress on this puzzle by drawing on a theory from cognitive science on *dual character concepts*. Thus, instead of focusing narrowly on the case of ART, we try to offer a more general account of these concepts and the puzzles to which they give rise. Then, drawing on the general account, we introduce a series of hypotheses about art concepts in particular and put those hypotheses to the test in three experimental studies.

1. Accounts of ART

Our aim is to develop an empirical theory about the structure of folk art concepts.³ In this respect, our interest diverges from most aestheticians, who have been more interested in determining what art really is than in understanding the folk concept of art (Lopes 2014: 12–13). Nevertheless, the two endeavors are also not wholly disconnected from one another. In his presidential address to the American Society of Aesthetics, Kendall Walton remarked:

... part of the job of aestheticians is to get a clear picture of the actual folk theories and concepts that our experiences and attitudes and activities involve. [...] If we are to understand the thoughts and actions of the folk, we must characterize accurately the theories and concepts with which they are working, all warts included. (2007: 154–155)

Since folk art concepts underlie actual artistic attitudes and activities, it would not be surprising that a better understanding of the structure of folk art concepts can indirectly aid aestheticians in their project of uncovering what art really is. In this spirit, Jeffrey Dean (2003) and Alessandro Pignocchi (2012) have independently

² Note on conventions: We will use small caps for concepts, italics for technical terms and emphasis, single quotes for linguistic items and quotations.

³ Given that our study participants are located in the United States, our empirical theory only targets folk art concepts of Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies (Henrich et al. 2010). Even within this scope, we do not assume that everyone shares the same art concept; rather, we follow others in the philosophical literature who hold that there are generally, but perhaps not universally, shared concepts.

articulated ways in which cognitive scientific findings on concepts can constrain aestheticians' theorizing about the nature of art and other artistic categories.

In the same presidential address, Walton (2007: 151) also remarked that 'Adherents of the *conceptual analysis* view of philosophy might say that philosophers are especially or uniquely interested in our concepts. But why should the investigation of our concepts not be a job for empirical psychology?' We think we can do both: our aim is to use the tools of empirical psychology to better theorize about the structures of concepts that aestheticians might be especially or uniquely interested in. Our starting point is the sophisticated literature that directly takes up questions about the concept of art. A good deal of this literature focuses on whether or not the concept is evaluative, descriptive, or both.⁴

The *descriptive account of ART* says that there is a single non-evaluative concept of art. Richard Wollheim is, at least on one natural interpretation, a defender of the view that the only literal sense of art is a descriptive one. In response to those who claim that 'art' has a primary 'classificatory' sense as well as an 'evaluative' sense and, perhaps, an 'honorific' one too, Wollheim reasons as follows:

Senses of a term are not to be multiplied beyond necessity, and these examples fail to establish in the case of the term 'art' any such necessity. What they do show is that 'art' is often used idiomatically or in ways which cannot be understood simply on the basis of knowing its primary [classificatory] meaning. ... More specifically, the evaluative sense of 'art' can be explained as a case of ellipsis and the courtesy sense as a case of metaphor. The examples that the Institutionalists cite no more provide evidence for special senses of art than Mark Antony's epitaph on Brutus ('He was a man') requires a special (presumably evaluative) sense of 'man', or Plautus's judgment upon man ('Man is a wolf to man') calls for a special (presumably courtesy) sense of 'wolf'. (Wollheim 1980: 159)

In this short passage, Wollheim makes two important arguments. The first is a linguistic debunking argument. Wollheim says that we have no reason to think that the concept ART is evaluative because the appearance of evaluative uses of the term 'art' can be explained away as non-standard uses that are not indicative of the concept that the term tracks. The second is a conceptual parsimony argument. Wollheim says that we should not posit multiple concepts, or ambiguous concepts, unless we have to. And the linguistic debunking argument is supposed to have shown that, for the concept ART, there is in fact no need to posit multiple senses associated with it.

The *evaluative account of ART* says that there is a single evaluative concept of art, or—a bit less strongly—that there is a single ordinary or 'folk' concept of art which is evaluative. So, for example, Berys Gaut argues that that 'only notion of 'art'

⁴ We are focusing on what we shall call, for want of a better term, the artistic concept(s) of art. That there is a distinct non-artistic 'skill' or 'techné' concept of art (as in 'the art of motorcycle maintenance') is not in dispute. Since we are focusing on a puzzling phenomenon that goes beyond the concept ART, it is worth noting that analogous accounts can be found for other art concepts. For example, with LITERATURE, David Davies (2007: 1-3) gives an ambiguity account and Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugen Olsen (1994: 255) give an evaluative account.

is an evaluative one' (2000: 39), and Alan Goldman suggests that '[i]f you are not a present-day philosopher, your very concept of art is probably evaluative' (1995: 2). Ben Tilghman's review of Goldman's book claims that he 'is surely right' that the 'ordinary concept of art ... is evaluative' (1999: 81). Variants of this account differ in what the evaluative aspect of ART amounts to. Our focus is on arguably the most natural construal, which says ART essentially involves *positive evaluation*. So, for example, Goldman claims that the folk concept of art makes implicit reference to some sort of value or valuable experience (1995: 2). Tilghman says that '[t]o call something a work of art is to suggest it is worth contemplation' (1999: 81). And Stanley Cavell asserts 'that works of art are valuable is analytically true of them' (1976: 216). As such, the terms associated with the concept, such as 'art', are essentially commendatory. To call an object 'art', on such a view, is to convey a positive evaluation of it.⁵

Despite their obvious disagreement, evaluativists share the implicit assumption held by our arch-descriptivist, Wollheim. Gaut argues that there is no 'distinct, classificatory sense of "art"' (2000: 39). Even more strongly, Matthew Rowe argues that 'the "classificatory sense" of "art" does not fit our aesthetic practice and discourse' and that 'such a sense could not exist' (1991: 221). In other words, these proponents of the evaluative account take showing the descriptive account and the ambiguity account to be mistaken to give support for the evaluative account.

The *ambiguity account of ART* says that there are both descriptive and evaluative concepts of art. Morris Weitz provides a canonical statement of the view: 'As we actually use the concept, "art" is both descriptive (like "chair") and evaluative (like "good"); i.e., we sometimes say, "This is a work of art," to describe something and we sometimes say it to evaluate something. Neither use surprises anyone' (1956: 33). George Dickie agrees that there are both descriptive and evaluative senses of 'work of art' (1997: 51), but in some of his work he distinguishes three senses: 'the primary or classificatory sense, the secondary or derivative sense, and the evaluative' (1974: 25).⁶ Many other authors, e.g., Shusterman (1984: 38), Telfer (1996: Ch. 3) and Anderson (2000: 83), articulate variants of the ambiguity account.

For these ambiguity theorists, not only are the descriptive and evaluative concepts of art distinct, they are disconnected from one another.⁷ Weitz suggests

⁵ Note that the positive evaluation need not be an all things considered positive evaluation. Catherine Abell gives a similar general characterization of the evaluative account: 'Evaluative definitions of art pursue the projects of definition and of value elucidation simultaneously, by defining artworks as things with value of a certain kind. However, they have the undesirable consequence that *to be art is necessarily to be good art*.' (2012: 671; our emphasis). But there also exist some evaluativists who are not *positive* evaluativists. Berys Gaut, for example, holds that the concept of art is evaluative in the sense that a 'cluster of properties relevant to establishing something as art includes evaluative properties' and, hence, although no positive evaluation or praise are necessarily involved in characterizing something as art, 'the question of whether these good-making features are possessed is always relevant to the question of whether something is art' (2000: 39). Our focus is not on this more sophisticated variant of the evaluative account, but we take our account to be relevant to its assessment since we ultimately offer evidence in favor of an alternative account of the concept of art.

⁶ The 'derivative sense' is used, according to Dickie, when an object (e.g., a seashell) 'has many properties in common' with a paradigmatic work of art.

⁷ Even linguists who grasp the abstract distinction admit that *ambiguity* and *polysemy* can be difficult to distinguish in practice. We use the term 'ambiguity' in order to emphasize that, on the ambiguity account, the descriptive and

that while the descriptive concept merely describes, the evaluative concept ‘praises’ and includes ‘certain preferred properties or characteristics of art’ (1956: 34). Similarly, while Dickie suggests that the evaluative sense of ‘art’ is used when various properties of the object are ‘found to be valuable by the speaker’, he says that the classificatory sense of ‘art’ ‘indicates simply that a thing belongs to a certain category of artifacts’ (1974: 26). It is clear that both theorists take the relevant notion of evaluation involved in the evaluative concept of art to be *positive evaluation*. Using ‘art’ in this sense is essentially linked to praise. In contrast, the descriptive or classificatory concept of art is understood by both theorists to lack this notion of evaluation. In other words, for ambiguity theorists, to go from one sense of ‘art’ to another sense of ‘art’ is to simply change the topic.

Extant accounts of ART can explain the puzzling conversation between Alfie and Betty that we started with. But we claim that they offer unsatisfying explanations. A descriptivist might claim that Betty is right and Alfie is wrong because Koons’ work meets the descriptive criteria for being art. However, on this account, Alfie’s error is a straightforward consequence of the nature of ART. Alfie, then, suffers from conceptual confusion. Similarly, an evaluativist might hold that Alfie is right and Betty wrong because Koons’ work really is terrible, and that Betty’s error is a straightforward consequence of the nature of ART. Betty, then, suffers from conceptual confusion. Finally, on the ambiguity account, Alfie and Betty may both be right (or, for that matter, wrong), but they fail to recognize that they are talking past one another. Thus, all three standard approaches explain our initial puzzling conversation by appealing to one or both of the parties suffering from a fundamental misunderstanding about the concept(s) of art.

All three standard approaches focus on variations in the *content* of the concept(s) of art in diagnosing the puzzling conversation. Consequently, they each offer an interpretation that is, we suggest, uncharitable to one or both of the parties in the conversation. We shall now argue that an alternative account—one that focuses on the *structure* of the concept(s) of art—can do better.

2. Dual Character Concepts

At the core of our hypothesis is the idea that the puzzling conversations found in the domain of art are just one instance of a far broader phenomenon. For an initial example, take the concept SCIENTIST. The same puzzling judgments we find with ART can be found with this concept as well. Indeed, one can easily imagine a conversation that would be highly analogous to the one with which we began.

Alfie: She is not a scientist. I know many people think she is a scientist, but when you think about what scientists really are, you will realize that she is not a scientist at all.

evaluative concepts associated with the term ‘art’ are disconnected from one another. To preview, our own dual character account is importantly different from the ambiguity account in part because it posits two aspects of the concept ART that are connected to one another.

Betty: Of course she is a scientist. She is skilled at running experiments and publishing in scientific journals.

Alfie: That is not what I meant! What I meant is that she does not possess a genuine willingness to revise her beliefs in light of empirical evidence.

Or take the concept CHRISTIAN. Here too, we can imagine an analogous dialogue.

Alfie: She is not a Christian. I know many people think she is a Christian, but when you think about what it really means to be a Christian, you will realize that she is not a Christian at all.

Betty: Of course she is a Christian. She goes to church every week and believes that Jesus is the son of God.

Alfie: That is not what I meant! What I meant is that she does not show genuine compassion.

It seems that we can now draw a quite general distinction between a whole class of concepts for which these patterns of judgment arise and another class of concepts for which they do not. In other words, we can pick out the concepts for which people make the kinds of judgments found in these dialogues (SCIENTIST, CHRISTIAN, SOLDIER) and distinguish them from concepts for which people would not make such judgments (CASHIER, WAITER, OPTICIAN). Concepts for which people do make these sorts of judgments have been referred to as *dual character concepts* (Del Pinal and Reuter 2017; Guo, Dweck, and Markman 2018; Knobe et al. 2013; Leslie 2015; Newman and Knobe in press; Tobia, Newman, and Knobe in press; building on Machery and Seppälä 2009; see Reuter 2019 for an overview).

One of the most salient facts about dual character concepts generally is that each such concept appears to be associated with two distinct criteria.⁸ Many things will satisfy both criteria or neither, but there will also be cases in which a single thing satisfies one criterion but not the other. It is precisely this sort of case that one finds in the dialogues in the preceding section. In each dialogue, Alfie adopts one criterion and concludes that a person does not fall under the relevant concept, while Betty adopts another criterion and concludes that this same person does fall under the concept.

The kind of criterion that Betty adopts in these dialogues does not seem to involve anything unique to dual character concepts. It seems to be a kind of criterion that one might also find for concepts of many other types. Following existing work in this area, we assume that these criteria are best understood in terms of a set of different descriptive features.⁹ For example, the concept SCIENTIST might be associated with descriptive features like running experiments and publishing in

⁸ For simplicity, we will often speak of *the* descriptive features criterion and *the* characteristic values criterion. However, we in fact think that most concepts include multiple descriptive features criteria and multiple characteristic values criteria. So, for example, when we speak of the descriptive feature criterion, we really mean to pick out the cluster of descriptive features criteria, whatever they turn out to be.

⁹ The existing literature on this topic is enormous and highly complex. For helpful reviews, see Murphy (2002) and Smith and Medin (1981).

scientific journals. Similarly, the concept CHRISTIAN might be associated with descriptive features like going to church and believing that Jesus is the son of God. There has already been a great deal of valuable research on how people use lists of features like these as criteria for concepts, and we will not be contributing anything new to the study of this topic here. In what follows, we will refer to this first criterion as the *descriptive features criterion*.

By contrast, the kind of criterion that Alfie adopts in these dialogues seems to be more distinctive to dual character concepts in particular. In general, one can pick out this second criterion by adding the modifier 'true'. Thus, Alfie could make it clear which criterion he is employing by saying something like 'She is not a true scientist' or 'She is not a true Christian'. Our focus in what follows will be on judgments of this type.

Note to begin with that this second criterion is very different from the familiar idea that certain people or objects count as 'prototypical' members of categories (as explored, e.g., in the work of Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Indeed, it often makes sense to say that a person fulfills this second criterion even when that person doesn't even come close to being a prototypical category member. Consider a six-year-old child who has rarely, if ever, gone to church and who has only the vaguest sense of who Jesus is. This child is clearly not the prototypical member of a category of Christians, but all the same, if she were to display a striking capacity for compassion or forgiveness, we might be inclined to say that ultimately it is her, and not the more prototypical category members, who should be seen as the best illustration of what it means to be a 'true Christian'.

So then, what exactly is involved in this second criterion? Broadly speaking, it seems in some way to involve values. However—and this point will be crucial in what follows—it does not seem to be simply a matter of whether something is *good*. As Del Pinal and Reuter (2017) have shown, people are perfectly willing to apply dual character concepts even to entities that they do not regard as straightforwardly good. To illustrate, consider a person who is unskilled with respect to all of the various descriptive features involved in being a scientist (unskilled at running experiments, unskilled at publishing in scientific journals, etc.). This person would certainly be lacking in something of value, but it would not be correct to say just for that reason that she did not fulfill the second criterion and was therefore not a 'true scientist'. On the contrary, there might be cases in which we could hold up such a person as the very paradigm of what being a true scientist is all about. For example, suppose that a person was lacking in these various skills but that she nonetheless showed an extraordinary willingness to subject her beliefs to empirical scrutiny and to revise even her most cherished commitments in the light of empirical evidence. In such a case, we might acknowledge that she is not an especially good scientist, but it would still make perfect sense to say that she perfectly fulfills the second criterion on for the concept SCIENTIST. For example, we might pick this person out and say: 'When you think about what it really means to be a scientist, you would have to say that this person is a true scientist'.

Within existing work on dual character concepts, one hypothesis is that the second criterion is to be understood not in terms of being good but rather in terms

of embodying certain *characteristic values* (Knobe et al. 2013). For example, in addition to whichever descriptive features we might associate with the concept SCIENTIST, we seem to associate this concept with some values (e.g., a commitment to revise one's beliefs in light of empirical evidence). To the extent that a person embodies this value, she fulfills the second criterion and counts as a 'true scientist'. Similarly, we might associate CHRISTIAN not only with various descriptive features but also with some values (e.g., compassion), and to the extent that a person embodies these values, she counts as a 'true Christian'. We therefore refer to the second criterion for dual character concepts as the *characteristic values criterion*.

Note that the question as to whether something fulfills the characteristic values criterion is deeply different from the question as to whether it is good. For example, to say that an individual is a 'true Christian' is not to say that she is a good human being; it is to say that she embodies the characteristic values of Christianity. Some people might believe that the characteristic values of Christianity are not good, or that they are not nearly as important as certain other values. Such people might think that a given individual does embody the characteristic values of Christianity but that she is still a terrible human being. The key point now is that one could not express such an opinion by saying: 'She is not a true Christian'. In short, the characteristic values criterion is a matter of embodying the characteristic values associated with a particular concept rather than of being good per se.

What is the relationship between descriptive features and characteristic values criteria? Within research on dual character concepts more broadly, it has been suggested that people pick out the values by in some way reflecting on the features. For example, one view is that people determine which values are associated with a particular concept by looking at the features associated with that concept and asking which values those features serve to realize (Knobe et al. 2013). If this more general view turns out to be correct, and if it applies also to the concept ART, we arrive at a different conception of the relationship between the two criteria associated with that concept. On the traditional ambiguity account, although the word 'art' can be used to express either a descriptive concept or an evaluative concept, those two concepts are disconnected from one another. Thus, when a person switches from the descriptive to the evaluative, she is basically just changing the topic. By contrast, on the dual character account, the two criteria are very closely related. When a person moves from the descriptive features criterion to the characteristic values criterion, she is not simply abandoning her previous topic and switching over to a different one. Rather, there is some important sense in which she is just reflecting more deeply on the significance of the very same descriptive features she had been considering before.

3. Dual Character Account of ART

Our hypothesis is that ART is a dual character concept. We therefore suggest that some of the puzzling conversations we find about whether or not a given artifact counts as a work of art are not best explained by positing something highly

distinctive about the concept ART in particular. Instead, they are best explained in terms of general facts about the structure of dual character concepts.

This hypothesis yields a simple explanation of the dispute in the dialogue with which we began. Betty is relying on the features criterion, while Alfie is relying on the characteristic values criterion. Alfie's claim is that the object does not count as a true work of art because it does not embody the characteristic values of art. In this sense, the dialogue is no different from the analogous disputes one might find using SCIENTIST, CHRISTIAN, or any other dual character concept.

In the specific case of ART (and a select few other dual character concepts), there are certain additional factors that obscure this structure and make it especially difficult to understand the nature of the debate. The problem is simply that almost all people regard the characteristic values of ART as good. For this reason, one may initially be drawn to a hypothesis that is more or less unrelated to the framework developed in the previous section. Specifically, one may be drawn to the hypothesis that the evaluative criterion that sometimes guide people's use of the concept ART are simply a matter of determining whether a given artifact is good. In other words, one may be drawn to the evaluative account of ART or the ambiguity account of ART, both of which say that 'art' can connote a positive evaluation.

We will argue against this hypothesis. We suggest that the question as to whether an artifact is a 'true work of art' is not fundamentally different from the question as to whether a person is a 'true Christian' or even whether a person is a 'true gangster'. In all cases, we are asking whether an object embodies the characteristic values associated with the relevant concept. The only difference is that, in the case of art, it happens that just about everyone regards the characteristic values as good.

To explore these issues, we adopt a distinctive approach. Instead of zeroing in on the concept ART in particular, we focus on the ways in which this one concept resembles or differs from concepts of other types. Accordingly, we conducted a series of studies examining people's use of the concept ART along with

- a. a variety of concepts that had already been shown in previous studies either to have dual character (e.g., FRIEND) or not to have dual character (e.g., CATALOG)
- b. a variety of other art concepts (LITERATURE, BALLET, BREAKDANCING, etc.) which, we will argue, differ in that some have dual character and some do not

If one looks just at the patterns in people's application of ART, we acknowledge that a number of quite different hypotheses would be possible. However, we suggest that the full pattern observed across all of these concepts provides strong evidence in favor of our hypothesis that ART is dual character.

4. Pretest

We will be arguing that some art concepts, including ART, have dual character and others do not. As a first step in this argument, we need to assemble a list of art

concepts that we claim to have dual character and a list of art concepts that we claim not to have dual character. We construct these two lists using a simple pretest.

The pretest borrows a method used to generate a list of non-art dual character concepts in Knobe et al. (2013). Participants were presented with twenty-eight different art concepts (see Table 1) and, for each concept, asked to consider a brief dialogue. The dialogue is shown here with the concepts ART (the bolded and italicized texts are as shown to participants).

Suppose that someone says: ‘That’s **art**.’ And now suppose that another person replies:

I completely disagree. That’s not really art at all. In fact, if you think that it is really art, I would have to say that there is something fundamentally wrong with your values.

Participants were then asked whether the second speaker’s talk about values made sense or whether this talk of values was just beside the point. To the degree that people thought that the reference to values made more sense for a given concept, we inferred that people saw the concept as involving a judgment with respect to the characteristic values criterion that is distinctive of dual character concepts.¹⁰ By contrast, to the degree that people thought that the reference to values made less sense, we inferred that people saw the concept as purely descriptive. We use this simple pretest to assemble the lists of concepts that will play a key role in our subsequent studies.

4.1. Methods

One hundred two participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk.¹¹ All participants were presented with 28 art concepts in randomized order. The concepts were: ARCHITECTURE, ART, ARTWORK, BALLET, BREAKDANCING, COMIC, COMEDY, CONCEPTUAL ART, DOCUMENTARY, FICTION, FILM, HORROR, LIMERICK, LITERATURE, NON-FICTION, NOVEL, OPERA, PHOTOGRAPH, PLAY, PUNK, RAP, SCIENCE FICTION, SCULPTURE, SHORT STORY, SONNET, STREET ART, SUSPENSE, VIDEO GAME.

¹⁰ A referee rightly notes that although the method used in this pretest makes it possible to distinguish between descriptive concepts and value-laden concepts, it does not by itself make it possible to distinguish between different types of value-laden concepts. In particular, this method does not make it possible to distinguish between dual character and thick concepts. This an important issue for further research, and difficult questions arise about whether the normativity involved in dual character concepts is the same as the normativity involved in thick concepts (Reuter 2019: 5–6). Hence, while for this pretest we follow the method of previous empirical work on dual character concepts, we also acknowledge the limitations of this method. Note, however, that in Study 2, we empirically demonstrate a difference between dual character concepts and concepts that have a positive evaluative component, such as MASTERPIECE and HERO, which are plausibly regarded as thick concepts.

¹¹ 54.9% of participants self-identified as female. The mean age of participants was 34.79 years, with a standard deviation of 11.801. For all studies reported in this paper, we recruited from a pool of participants with registered location in the United States. Participants were paid market rate. See Paolacci and Chandler (2014) for an overview of the demographic characteristics of the Amazon Mechanical Turk participant pool, its validity for conducting social scientific research, and favorable data quality comparisons with traditional university lab studies.

For each concept, participants were presented with the dialogue described above. Participants were then asked whether the second speaker’s reply made sense or whether the reference to values here was just beside the point and made no sense. Ratings were recorded on a scale from 1 (‘doesn’t make sense’) to 7 (‘makes sense’).

4.2. Results and Discussion

The mean ratings for each concept are displayed in Table 1. As the table shows, there is great variation within art concepts in terms of the degree to which participants believe that their application has something to do with values. Participants clearly judged some art concepts, such as *STREET ART* and *PUNK*, to have some connection to values, but they judged other art concepts, such as *LIMERICK* and *COMIC*, not to involve such a connection. Importantly, the concept *ART* fell into the former category.

	Mean	Std. Deviation
<i>LIMERICK</i>	2.48	1.739
<i>COMIC</i>	2.54	1.645
VIDEO GAME	2.60	1.842
<i>SONNET</i>	2.63	1.734
<i>BREAKDANCING</i>	2.75	1.784
<i>SHORT STORY</i>	2.76	1.719
<i>ARCHITECTURE</i>	2.89	1.823
PLAY	3.03	1.821
BALLET	3.03	1.771
SUSPENSE	3.13	1.778
SCULPTURE	3.18	1.869
DOCUMENTARY	3.18	1.890
NOVEL	3.18	1.853
OPERA	3.20	1.851
SCIENCE FICTION	3.23	1.845
FILM	3.35	1.953
RAP	3.35	1.933
PHOTOGRAPHY	3.37	1.944
FICTION	3.40	1.941
<i>PUNK</i>	3.66	2.099
NON-FICTION	3.66	2.056
HORROR	3.66	1.827
<i>STREET ART</i>	3.87	2.003
ARTWORK	3.92	1.984
<i>CONCEPTUAL ART</i>	3.96	1.980
<i>LITERATURE</i>	4.15	1.895
COMEDY	4.26	1.985
<i>ART</i>	4.39	2.102

Table 1. Means and standard deviations for concepts examined in the pretest. Italicization indicates that the concept was selected for further investigation in Study 1 and Study 2.

Although the aim of this pretest was simply to generate stimuli that could be used in the subsequent studies, it is perhaps interesting in itself to see that some of these concepts are quite different from others. For example, why is it that LITERATURE scores more highly on this measure than ARCHITECTURE? One possibility would be that art concepts are more dual character when they are more subsumed under the concept ART. In other words, the concept LITERATURE seems to refer only to those works of fiction or poetry that embody certain artistic values. By contrast, the concept ARCHITECTURE is not reserved for buildings that embody artistic values but is instead applied more broadly to all buildings, regardless of the values they embody. Future research could explore these questions more directly, perhaps by randomly assigning participants to receive different art concepts that differ systematically just in certain specific properties.

In the studies that follow, we took concepts with relatively high mean ratings as exemplars of **dual character art concepts** (ART, LITERATURE, CONCEPTUAL ART, STREET ART, PUNK), and concepts with relatively low mean ratings as exemplars of **descriptive art concepts** (ARCHITECTURE, SHORT STORY, BREAKDANCING, SONNET, COMIC). In what follows, we compare these different kinds of concepts to each other, and also to certain non-art concepts.

5. Study 1

One striking property of dual character concepts, as established in Knobe et al. (2013), is that people generally find it appropriate to use them in what we will call an *ultimately-not sentence* (illustrated here using the concept FRIEND):

There is a sense in which she is clearly a friend, but ultimately, when you think about what it really means to be a friend, you would have to say that she is not a friend at all.

By contrast, people usually do not regard such sentences as appropriate when used with non-dual character concepts (illustrated here using STROLLER):

There is a sense in which that is clearly a stroller, but ultimately, when you think about what it really means to be a stroller, you would have to say that it is not a stroller at all.

Our hypothesis now is that this same effect should arise within art concepts. Thus, we predict that the trademark reaction obtained for dual character concepts outside the domain of art (such as FRIEND) should also be regarded as appropriate for the art concepts picked out by our pretest as dual character (including the concept ART). People should therefore regard sentences like this one as appropriate:

There is a sense in which that is clearly art, but ultimately, when you think about what it really means to be art, you would have to say that it is not art at all.

For this study, we compared four concept sets, which varied along two dimensions, concept domain (art vs. non-art) and concept type (dual character vs. descriptive), with four exemplars each:¹²

- *Art / Dual Character*: ART, CONCEPTUAL ART, STREET ART, PUNK
- *Art / Descriptive*: COMIC, SONNET, BREAKDANCING, ARCHITECTURE
- *Non-Art / Dual Character*: FRIEND, CRIMINAL, MUSEUM, LOVE
- *Non-Art / Descriptive*: CHAIR, STROLLER, OBITUARY, CATALOG

For each concept, participants were presented with an ultimately-not sentence and asked to rate the sentence on a scale from ‘sounds weird’ to ‘sounds natural’. We predicted that the results for the art concepts would mirror the results for the non-art concepts, showing the same basic distinction between dual character concepts and descriptive concepts. If we do obtain this result, it would provide evidence that the puzzling patterns of judgment associated with art concepts are best understood as instances of the same basic phenomenon that can be seen in people’s use of non-art dual character concepts.

5.1. Methods

Forty-nine participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk.¹³ Each participant was presented with all concepts, in randomized order, in a completely within-subject design. For each concept, participants were given an ultimately-not sentence. Participant responses to each sentence were then recorded on a scale from 1 (‘sounds weird’) to 7 (‘sounds natural’).

5.2. Results

For each participant, we calculated the mean response for each concept set. The mean responses for each condition are displayed in Figure 1. As the figure shows, participants thought that the ultimately-not statement sounded more natural when applied to dual character concepts than when applied to descriptive concepts. Importantly, this pattern emerged not only for the non-art concepts (replicating previous results) but also for the art concepts.

Results were analyzed using a 2 (concept domain: art vs. non-art) x 2 (concept type: dual character vs. descriptive) repeated-measures ANOVA. As predicted, there was a large main effect of concept type whereby dual character concepts received higher ratings than descriptive concepts, $F(1, 48) = 98.734, p <$

¹² The art concepts were selected partly on the basis of the pretest and partly on the basis of theoretical and pragmatic considerations. The non-art concepts were selected partly on the basis of the lists provided in Appendix A of Knobe et al. (2013) and partly on the basis of theoretical and pragmatic considerations. A referee rightly notes that it was actually the concept ART MUSEUM, instead of MUSEUM, that appeared in Knobe et al.’s (2013) list; but we made the modification to avoid confounding the art vs. non-art distinction between concept sets. Indeed, when we scrutinized the results further as prompted by the referee’s comment, we discovered that the mean rating of MUSEUM is the lowest of all non-art dual character concepts tested (but still higher than all non-art descriptive concepts tested). Perhaps this exploratory result suggests that the dual character property that Knobe and colleagues discovered is significantly attributable to the ART component of the concept, in keeping with our hypothesis.

¹³ 65.3% of participants self-identified as female. The mean age of participants was 34.06 years, with a standard deviation of 11.799. 100% self-identified as native English speakers.

0.001, $\eta^2_p = 0.673$. In addition, there was a small main effect of concept domain such that art concepts received higher ratings than non-art concepts, $F(1, 48) = 9.517$, $p = 0.003$, $\eta^2_p = 0.165$, as well as a small but significant interaction between concept type and concept domain, $F(1, 48) = 8.842$, $p = 0.005$, $\eta^2_p = 0.156$. An inspection of the means showed that the interaction arose because the difference between dual character and descriptive concepts was greater for the non-art concepts. Nonetheless, pairwise comparisons between cells showed a significant effect for both types of concepts. Within non-art concepts, the dual character concepts ($M = 5.03$, $SD = 0.945$) received higher ratings than the descriptive concepts ($M = 3.17$, $SD = 1.250$), $t(48) = 9.832$, $p < 0.001$, effect size $r = 0.643$. Similarly, within art concepts, the dual character concepts ($M = 4.96$, $SD = 1.117$) received higher ratings than the descriptive concepts ($M = 3.77$, $SD = 1.121$), $t(48) = 6.188$, $p < 0.001$, effect size $r = 0.469$.




Figure 1. Sinaplots of mean naturalness ratings of concept sets in Study 1. Colored points show the mean rating for each individual participant for each concept type. Grey circles show the overall mean for each concept type. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Since we started this investigation by thinking about the nature of the concept ART, we examined more closely participant responses to an ultimately-not sentence with 'art'. Participants agreed that the ultimately-not statement sounded natural when used with the word 'art' (giving it a mean rating of 5.39, with a

standard deviation of 1.57). This rating was significantly higher than the rating they gave on average to the descriptive art concepts, but it was not significantly different from the rating they gave on average to the dual character art concepts. In fact, it was, if anything, slightly higher than the rating given on average to the dual character art concepts, indicating that the concept ART very clearly showed the trademark dual character pattern in this study. A pairwise comparison did not show a statistically significant difference between ratings of ART and the average of participant ratings of non-art dual character concepts, $t(48) = 1.771, p = 0.083$. However, pairwise comparisons did show differences between ratings of ART and the average of ratings of descriptive art concepts, $t(48) = 6.315, p < 0.001$, effect size $r = 0.511$, as well as between ratings of art and the average of ratings of descriptive non-art concepts, $t(48) = 8.830, p < 0.001$, effect size $r = 0.617$.

5.3. Discussion

The results of the pretest enabled us to generate a list of exemplars for dual character art concepts and descriptive art concepts. In Study 1, we sought to demonstrate that the dual character art concepts we have identified exhibit a striking property of non-art dual character concepts—namely, their appropriateness with ultimately-not sentences. Accordingly, we also sought to demonstrate that the descriptive art concepts we have identified do not exhibit the same striking property.

Previous work had shown that participants were more inclined to regard the ultimately-not sentence as natural-sounding for dual character concepts than for descriptive concepts. This study showed that a closely parallel effect arises for art concepts. Participants are more inclined to regard the ultimately-not sentence as natural-sounding for the dual character concepts (e.g., PUNK) than for the descriptive concepts (e.g., BREAKDANCING). In particular, the concept ART clearly exhibits a striking property of dual character concepts.¹⁴

Returning to the debate on the concept of art, this study suggests that there is something to our hypothesis. We found that ART and several art concepts were found to exhibit a striking property of dual character concepts. In the next study we set out to find further support for our claim that the dual character account of these concepts is correct. In particular, we wanted to provide more evidence that the descriptive, evaluative, and ambiguity approaches to these art concepts were mistaken.

6. Study 2

Remember that the notion of evaluation in the evaluative account and the ambiguity accounts is that of *positive evaluation*: to call a work ‘art’ is to express a positive evaluation of it. Again, to emphasize, the dual character account adopts a very

¹⁴ In addition, this study also produced two other noteworthy results. First, we replicated the distinction between dual character and descriptive non-art concepts that Knobe et al. (2013) reported. Second, we found a small difference between art and non-art concepts that invites further investigation.

different notion of evaluation, on which to call a work ‘art’ is to say that it embodies the characteristic values of ART—regardless of whether it is good or not.

In this study, we hypothesized that ART and other dual character art concepts that were identified in Study 1 and validated in Study 2 behave distinctly from clear cases of positive evaluative concepts, and distinctly from clear cases of descriptive concepts. If the results turn out as we hypothesized, then that is a powerful reason to think that ART is not evaluative, not descriptive, and not ambiguous between evaluative and descriptive. Instead, ART is dual character.

For the descriptive concepts, we used the descriptive art concepts that were identified in Study 1. For the positive evaluative concepts, we chose concepts that standardly express a positive evaluation. For example, consider the concept MASTERPIECE. This concept unquestionably expresses a positive evaluation: whether a work is a masterpiece or not essentially depends on the degree to which it is good. If a work is not good, then it just cannot be a masterpiece. To call a work ‘masterpiece’ is to say that it is good—indeed, that it is exceptionally good.

We compared three concept types, with five exemplars each, as follows:

- *Dual Character*: ART, CONCEPTUAL ART, STREET ART, PUNK, LITERATURE
- *Positive Evaluative*: MASTERPIECE, STROKE OF GENIUS, HERO, SAINT, TRIUMPH¹⁵
- *Descriptive*: COMIC, SONNET, BREAKDANCING, ARCHITECTURE, SHORT STORY

For each concept, participants were presented with what we will call a *not-good-but-true sentence*. These sentences took the following form (illustrated here using the concept ART):

That is not good, but it is true art.

Participants were then asked to rate the sentence on a scale from ‘sounds weird’ to ‘sounds natural’.

The hypothesis was that such sentences would sound relatively natural only with dual character concepts. With positive evaluative concepts, the first part of the sentence—‘that is not good’—would make the sentence sound internally contradictory. It standardly makes little sense to say that a work is ‘a masterpiece’ but at the same time that it is ‘not good’. To bring out the internal contradiction, we intentionally used the locution ‘that is not good’ simpliciter instead of, say, ‘that is not good art’ because we wanted ‘good’ to represent positive evaluation rather than, say, good-for-art. Similarly, with descriptive concepts, the second part of the sentence—‘but it is true...’—would also make the sentence sound relatively unnatural. This construction is licensed for dual character concepts, such as ‘true scientist’ and ‘true Christian’, but sounds wrong when used with concepts that do not have dual character, such as ‘true doorman’ and ‘true stroller’ (Knobe et al. 2013).

¹⁵ Note that not all the positive evaluative concepts are art concepts. On our view, besides MASTERPIECE and STROKE OF GENIUS, there are relatively few clear cases of positive evaluative art concepts. Since domain constancy is not essential for the result we are interested in, we decided to choose clear cases of positive evaluative concepts, even if they are not clearly art concepts.




Figure 2. Sinaplots of mean naturalness ratings of concept sets in Study 2. Colored points show the mean rating for each individual participant for each concept type. Grey circles show the overall mean for each concept type. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

6.1. Methods

Fifty participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk.¹⁶ Each participant was presented with all concepts, in randomized order, in a completely within-subject design. For each concept, participants were given a not-good-but-true sentence. Participant responses to each sentence were then recorded on a scale from 1 ('sounds weird') to 7 ('sounds natural').

6.2. Results

The mean responses for each concept type are displayed in Figure 2. Overall, ratings for the not-good-but-true sentence with dual character concepts were significantly higher than ratings for positive evaluative concepts, and were also significantly higher than ratings for descriptive concepts.

¹⁶ 60.0% of participants self-identified as female. The mean age of participants was 32.06 years, with a standard deviation of 11.350. 100% self-identified as native English speakers.

We began by conducting a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA. Mauchly's test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for the main effect of concept type: $\chi^2(2) = 21.485, p < 0.001$. Therefore, degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity ($\epsilon = 0.752$). The ANOVA showed a significant difference between the three concept types, $F(1.504, 73.694) = 9.665, p = 0.001, \eta^2_p = 0.165$. Further tests revealed that participants gave higher ratings to not-good-but-true sentences with dual character concepts ($M = 4.62, SD = 1.333$) than with either positive evaluative concepts ($M = 4.01, SD = 1.595$), $t(49) = 2.615, p = 0.012$, effect size $r = 0.204$, or descriptive concepts ($M = 3.81, SD = 1.146$), $t(49) = 6.315, p < 0.001$, effect size $r = 0.310$. The effects detected in Study 2 are, as the statistics show, subtler than the effects detected in Study 1.

Again, given the starting point of our investigation, we examined ART more closely. Here again, this concept clearly showed the trademark dual character pattern. Participants rated the not-good-but-true statement as sounding natural when used with 'art' (mean rating of 4.92, with a standard deviation of 1.64). This rating is significantly higher than the rating for the average of the descriptive concepts and also significantly higher than the rating for the average of the evaluative concepts. Pairwise comparisons showed a difference between participant ratings for ART and the average of participant ratings of positive evaluative concepts, $t(49) = 3.812, p < 0.001$, effect size $r = 0.130$, as well as a difference between participant ratings for art and the average of participant ratings of descriptive concepts, $t(49) = 5.875, p < 0.001$, effect size $r = 0.162$.

6.3. Discussion

The aim of this study is to assess the dual character account of ART against its competitors. We hypothesized that ART and other dual character art concepts would behave differently from clear cases of positive evaluative concepts and clear cases of descriptive concepts. Specifically, we hypothesized that participants would be more inclined to regard the not-good-but-true sentence as natural when it was used with the dual character concepts than when it was used with either positive evaluative concepts or descriptive concepts.

The results confirmed our hypothesis. First, it is noteworthy in itself that people are willing to use phrases like 'true art' and 'true punk'. Existing research suggests that willingness to use these phrases can serve as a test of whether a concept has dual character (Knobe et al., 2013), and these results therefore provide additional support for the claim that these are dual character concepts. Of course, it would always be possible to argue for some alternative explanation, but we find it hard to think of any alternative explanation that could make sense of the exact pattern of results obtained here. For example, one might think that the word 'true' could be used to indicate that something is a prototypical category member (so that, e.g., 'true art' would simply mean prototypical art), but it is hard to see how this hypothesis would make sense of people's reluctance to use our true-but-not-good sentence with concepts like BREAKDANCING (since we can surely make sense of the notion of prototypical breakdancing). Pending further suggestions regarding alternative

hypotheses, we therefore take these results as evidence that ART is not a purely descriptive concept.

Second, participants thought that it did not sound internally contradictory to say, for example, ‘That is not good, but it is true art’. Moreover, participants were significantly more willing to use these sentences with concepts like ART than they were with positive evaluative concepts like MASTERPIECE. This result indicates that ART and other similar art concepts (PUNK, STREET ART, etc.) are not merely used to express a positive evaluation.

Finally, it is implausible that ART and the other art concepts are merely ambiguous between descriptive and positively evaluative; since there is only one instance of the relevant concept involved in each *not-good-but-true* sentence, the ambiguity account would seem to predict that subjects would respond as if the concept was either positively evaluative or descriptive. As such, the dual character account better explains the structure of these accounts than competitors in the existing literature.

7. General Discussion

Before going further, let us summarize our experimental results. The pre-test and Study 1 gave us evidence that prominent art concepts such as ART function like other dual character concepts. Study 2 then gave us evidence that dual character art concepts do involve some kind of evaluation, but that this evaluation is not just a matter of assessing the degree to which a work is good. Taken together, these studies both affirm the existence of dual character art concepts and partially illuminate their structure.¹⁷

If this is right, then we can gain a better understanding of certain art concepts by learning more general facts about dual character concepts. In particular, our suggestion is that ART exhibits the typical structure of dual character concepts because its application involves both a descriptive features criterion and a characteristic values criterion. Of course, we will not be able to address all theoretical questions about the concept of art. Specifically, we will not contribute to the debate about the exact content of its descriptive features criterion and its characteristic values criterion.¹⁸ However, in what follows, we do want to briefly explore ways in which research on art concepts—including ART—can benefit from the research on dual character concepts.

¹⁷ Our empirical studies only address *social kind* art concepts, such as ART, but not *social role* art concepts, such as ARTIST. In this respect, our research differs from most extant research on dual concepts; indeed, Del Pinal and Reuter (2017: 477) contend that dual character concepts are ‘paradigmatically expressed by social kind terms.’ This difference raises multiple questions for future research. Do social kind and social role dual character concepts share the same conceptual structure? Or are there subtle differences between, say, type of normativity at play for ART and the type of normativity at play for ARTIST? Are the dual character status of related social kind and social role concepts independent? Or, for example, is ARTIST a dual character concept because ART is a dual character concept (or vice versa)?

¹⁸ That is, we will not directly contribute to the debate on what art really is. As discussed at the start, it is plausible that our empirical theory of *the folk concept of art* can indirectly contribute to that debate as a constraint on or a pro tanto consideration for some theories of art.

7.1. Dual Character Concepts: Dichotomy or Continuum?

In our initial presentation, we have been writing as though there were a simple dichotomy, such that some concepts do have dual character (e.g., LITERATURE) and others do not have dual character (e.g., COMICS). Yet the actual pattern of our experimental data reveals a more complex picture. As Walton (2007: 155) emphasized, 'If we are to understand the thoughts and actions of the folk, we must characterize accurately the theories and concepts with which they are working, all warts included.' In each of our studies, we do not find a clear division whereby some concepts receive very high ratings and others receive very low ratings. Instead, we always find a whole continuum of ratings, with many concepts receiving ratings at some intermediate level. How exactly is this pattern to be understood?

To begin with, we should note a further fact about the pattern of our data. At least in principle, it would be possible for the mean rating of a concept to be intermediate even if no individual participant gave it an intermediate rating. (If half of the participants give it a high rating and the other half give it a low rating, the mean rating will be intermediate.) However, that is not what occurred in the present case. In Study 1, for example, the proportion of participants who choose the midpoint of the scale was greater than the proportion who choose either extreme point. Thus, the phenomenon to be explained is not pattern whereby different participants give different extreme responses but rather a pattern whereby many participants give intermediate responses.

One possible explanation would be that the intermediate responses simply reflect uncertainty. Many participants presumably feel that they do not know very much about conceptual art, about street art, or about breakdancing, and they may therefore feel understandably reluctant to express definite opinions about these art forms. On this first explanation, people's use of intermediate ratings is just an attempt to say something like: 'I am not quite sure'.

A second possible explanation would be that participants genuinely see certain categories as having an intermediate status. On this second explanation, the intermediate ratings are not an attempt to express uncertainty. Rather, they are an attempt to say something like: 'This art form truly is intermediate between the two extremes'.

Further research could explore more specific hypotheses about this intermediacy. Suppose we start out with the idea that whether a concept has dual character is determined by whether there is a characteristic value that the superficial features associated with the concept serve to realize. Plausibly, this approach would lead not to a dichotomy but rather to a continuum. At one extreme would be the case in which all of the superficial features are perfectly suited to realize a single characteristic value. At the other would be the case in which the features simply arose from random historical contingencies and do not realize any characteristic value in any way. But many actual concepts would lie between these extremes. There is no single characteristic value that all of the features serve to realize, but even so, some of the features serve, at least to some degree, to realize one or more abstract

values. One hypothesis worth exploring would be that people's intuitions in such cases will themselves be intermediate.

7.2. *The Nature of Disagreements about Dual Character Concepts*

Since descriptive features standardly pick out and realize characteristic values, standard instantiations of dual character concepts satisfy both the descriptive features criterion and the characteristic values criterion. However, disagreements can arise when only one of the two criteria are satisfied and people disagree about which criterion to use. For example, suppose there were a person who exhibits skill at running experiments and publishing in scientific journals but also exhibits a lack of commitment to revise their beliefs in light of empirical evidence. There might be disagreements about whether this person is a scientist or not.

Beyond this brief gloss, though, we are genuinely not sure about how to best characterize the nature of such disagreements. There are a few possibilities. Although we cannot yet determine which one is correct, we want to emphasize that all of these possibilities can explain such disagreements without appealing to implausibly uncharitable interpretations of one or more of the interlocutors.

One possibility would be that people have a *weighting* on each of these sets of criteria (in a sense familiar from prototype theory) and that different people's weightings are slightly different. Thus, it might be that everyone thinks that the descriptive features criterion is relevant and that everyone thinks the characteristic values criterion is relevant but that different people assign different weights to these competing criteria. In such scenarios, different people may arrive at different conclusions about the same case.

Another possibility would be that people think that different criteria are relevant in different *contexts*. There might then be certain contexts in which everyone agrees that the descriptive features criterion is relevant and others in which everyone agrees that the characteristic values criterion is relevant. However, there might also be contexts in which people have opposing views, with some people taking the descriptive features criterion to be relevant and others taking the characteristic values criterion to be relevant. In contexts of this type, different people may arrive at different conclusions about the same case.

Finally, there may be people who genuinely have only one criterion while lacking the other entirely. On this view, certain individuals would show only *partial grasp* of the concept. The concept is characterized by two different criteria, but they have only grasped one. In scenarios that involve individuals with opposite partial grasps of the same concept, different people may arrive at different conclusions about the same case.

Note that in all three cases, interlocutors *might* go on to engage in what Plunkett and Sundell (2013) have called 'metalinguistic negotiation' about how best to use the word associated with the concept in question; for example, metalinguistic use of the term 'scientist' in a debate about how to properly weigh the descriptive and values criteria associated with SCIENTIST. But if our hypothesis is right,

metalinguistic negotiation is not the whole story—the need for such negotiation arises precisely because of the dual character structure of the concept in question.

7.3. Understanding Puzzling Conversations About Dual Character Art Concepts

Recall Alfie and Betty’s conversation about art:

- Alfie:* This is not art. I know many people think it is art, but when you think about what art really is, you will realize that it is not art at all.
- Betty:* Of course this is art. It is in the Los Angeles County Museum of Art!
- Alfie:* I know. But it’s impersonal factory-produced rubbish.

Here is our basic diagnosis of this conversation. ART is a dual character concept which combines descriptive criteria and a characteristic values criterion. Both Betty and Alfie are using the same dual character concept but focusing on different criteria. Betty is claiming that *Michael Jackson and Bubbles* is art on the basis of a descriptive feature of art: that it is exhibited in an art museum. However, Alfie is claiming that *Michael Jackson and Bubbles* is not art on the basis of some characteristic value of art—specifically, some value that implies that impersonal factory productions cannot be art.

As we note above, this diagnosis can be made more nuanced by considering the different possibilities under which disagreements involving dual character concepts might arise: perhaps Alfie and Betty differentially weigh the criteria, perhaps this is a context that makes ambiguous which criterion is relevant, or perhaps Alfie and Betty each have opposite partial grasps of the concept ART. Regardless of the specifics, general facts about dual character concepts allow us to explain the conversation between Alfie and Betty without interpreting either uncharitably.¹⁹

The diagnosis can also be made more nuanced by considering the intermediacy of people’s ratings. Remember that our ultimate goal is to explain the fact that debates about artistic status are frequent or commonplace. The suggestion that ART exhibits an intermediate, but relatively high, dual-character rating is well-suited to explain such a phenomenon. It explains why debates about artistic status are frequent but also gives us a way to understand why there are many contexts in which such debates do not occur.

Remember that other accounts of ART diagnose the puzzling conversation uncharitably: each of them makes at least one conversant obviously mistaken. In contrast, on the dual character account of ART, it is a substantive and difficult question whether *Michael Jackson and Bubbles* is art because this is a non-standard case in which the descriptive features seem to fail to pick out and realize the

¹⁹ Again, the conversation might also turn out to be an instance of metalinguistic negotiation about how the word ‘art’ should be used. But we claim that it is the dual character nature of the art concept which leads to this metalinguistic negotiation.

characteristic values. So, in engaging in this conversation about whether *Michael Jackson and Bubbles* is art or not, Alfie and Betty are really asking substantive and difficult questions about the relationship between the descriptive features and characteristic values of the concept ART. And that, we think, is why such conversations about ART and similar art concepts remain commonplace.

References

- Abell, C. (2012). 'Art: What it Is and Why it Matters', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 85(3), pp. 671–691.
- Anderson, J. (2000). 'Aesthetic Concepts of Art', in N. Carroll (ed) *Theories of Art Today*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 65–92.
- Cavell, S. (1976). 'A Matter of Meaning It' in *Must We Mean What We Say?*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 213–237.
- Davies, D. (2007). *Aesthetics and Literature*. London: Continuum.
- Dean, J. (2003). 'The Nature of Concepts and the Definition of Art', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 61(1), pp. 29–35.
- Del Pinal, G. and Reuter, K. (2017). 'Dual Character Concepts in Social Cognition: Commitments and the Normative Dimension of Conceptual Representation', *Cognitive Science* 41(S3), pp. 477–501.
- Dickie, G. (1974). *Art and the Aesthetic*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Dickie, G. (1997). *Introduction to Aesthetics: An Analytic Approach*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gaut, B. (2000). 'Art as a Cluster Concept', in N. Carroll (ed) *Theories of Art Today*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 25–44.
- Goldman, A. (1995). *Aesthetic Value*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Guo, C., Dweck, C. and Markman, E. (2018). 'Gender Categories as Dual-Character Concepts?', *Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society*, pp. 1754–1759.
- Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., and Norenzayan, A. (2010). 'The Weirdest People in the World?', *Brain and Behavioral Sciences* 33, pp. 61–135.
- Knobe, J., Prasada, S., and Newman, G. E. (2013). 'Dual character concepts and the normative dimension of conceptual representation', *Cognition* 127(2), pp. 242–257.
- Lamarque, P. and Olsen, S. H. (1994). *Truth, Fiction, and Literature: A Philosophical Perspective*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Leslie, S. J. (2015). "Hillary Clinton is the only man in the Obama administration": Dual Character Concepts, Generics, and Gender', *Analytic Philosophy* 56(2), pp. 111–141.
- Lopes, D. M. (2014). *Beyond Art*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

- Machery, E., and Seppälä, S. (2009). 'Against hybrid theories of concepts', *Anthropology and Philosophy* 10, pp. 97–125.
- Murphy, G. L. (2002). *The Big Book of Concepts*. MIT press.
- Newman, G. & Knobe, J. (in press). 'The Essence of Essentialism', *Mind and Language*.
- Paolacci, G. and Chandler, J. (2014). 'Inside the Turk: Understanding Mechanical Turk as a Participant Pool', *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 23(3), pp. 184–188.
- Perl, J. (2014). 'The Cult of Jeff Koons', *The New York Review of Books*. (25 September 2014.)
<http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/09/25/cult-jeff-koons/>
- Pignocchi, A. (2012). 'The Intuitive Concept of Art', *Philosophical Psychology* 27(3), pp. 425–444.
- Plunkett, D. and Sundell, T. (2013). 'Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms', *Philosophers' Imprint* 13(23), pp. 1–37.
- Reuter, K. (2019). 'Dual Character Concepts', *Philosophy Compass* 14(e12557), pp. 1–10.
- Rowe, M. W. (1991). 'Why "Art" Doesn't Have Two Senses?', *British Journal of Aesthetics* 31(3), pp. 214–221.
- Shusterman, R. (1984). *The Object of Literary Criticism*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- Smith, E. E., and Medin, D. L. (1981). *Categories and Concepts*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Telfer, E. (1996). *Food for Thought: Philosophy and Food*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Tilghman, B. H. (1999). 'Review of *Aesthetic Value* by Alan H. Goldman', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 57(1), pp. 81–82.
- Tobia, K. Newman, G. & Knobe, J. (in press). 'Water Is and Is Not H₂O', *Mind and Language*.
- Walton, K. (2007). 'Aesthetics—What? Why? and Wherefore?', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 65(2), pp. 147–161.
- Weitz, M. (1956). 'The Role of Theory in Aesthetics', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 15(1), pp. 27–35.
- Wollheim, R. (1980). *Art and Its Objects*, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.