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## **Brexit: a requiem for the post-national society?**

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### **Abstract**

The ‘fourth freedom’ of freedom of movement of persons – somewhat misleadingly labelled ‘European citizenship’ – lay at the normative heart of the European project. Although sceptics have often suggested it was part of the building of a European fortress, or even a last gasp of elite European colonial privilege, the essential point of EU freedom of movement was its revolutionary introduction of a regionally expansive non-discrimination by nationality, going well beyond established abstract notions of ‘personhood’ and human rights on which other global egalitarian movements depend. For sure, it had been battered by roll back in national courts, suspension of Schengen, and new external borderings, well before the Brexit vote. Yet the practice of the fourth freedom in terms of everyday transactions and interactions struck at the heart of the core of the modern Hobbesian nation-state: its sovereignty to decide on the boundaries of its own, increasingly de-territorialised, population, which was also its power to shore up the most potent source of global inequalities—the birthright lottery which protects the ‘wealth of nations’ and the privileges of democratic ‘peoples’ from the unbounded effects of de-territorialised mobilities. As we are also seeing – and hearing among many ostensibly progressive academic voices – the putatively egalitarian voice of people’s democracy, can be used to further bolster the shrinkage of moral community *within* the nation-state. The essay takes upon itself to evaluate what is being lost normatively in terms of the return of the national – methodologically as much as politically – as the slow motion car crash of Brexit and after takes place.

## **Brexit: a requiem for the post-national society?**

Adrian Favell

It might be argued that one of the limits of Europe that has been revealed most starkly by Brexit are the EU's 'normative power' claims to represent universalisable political values (Manners 2002)—that is, values beyond the nation-state. Most leading EU scholars are of a generation and career formation which viewed the EU as the best likely vehicle of carrying forward what was left of the 'enlightenment project', amidst the sharp breakdown in the 1970s and 80s of belief in utopian teleologies, heralded by post-modern and post-colonial thought. The European 'dream of the nineties' (for that is what it was) was most famously articulated in the writings of Habermas and Beck on post-national ideals and the cosmopolitan potential of the EU (Habermas 1998, Beck and Grande 2007; see also Delanty and Rumford 2005, Delanty 2009). Yet, the most potent 'Leave' arguments articulated in university debates around the UK before the referendum, were those by agitated, internationalist-minded left wing students: aware they might be losing the rights of European citizenship, but prepared to say that the EU's regional protectionism had been a disaster for agriculture and other forms of domestic industry in the developing world, as well as for the graphically desperate migrants seeking to find a way through the heavily policed, security cordon in the Mediterranean imposed by EU agencies such as Frontex, and washing up on Greek, Italian and Spanish shores. What on Earth could be 'post-national' or 'cosmopolitan' about such politics?

In this essay, I acknowledge this critical question, while mounting a normative defence of the core 'post-national' claim at the heart of the EU project: the idea of the

‘fourth freedom’, or the freedom of movement of persons (Favell 2014). Little may be said perhaps in response to some the EU’s neo-colonial ‘empire’- like effects on the development of the Global South, or the exclusionary drift of its North-South border politics; but other plausible counterfactuals suggest far worse versions of Europe-in-the-world, as well as of other increasingly likely scenarios of international power politics. The return of an unashamed political nationalism in Europe, obviously, negates directly the validity of post-national claims. But perhaps even more insidious are the effects of methodological nationalism – that is, the in-built bias in most social science research to assume the nation-state as the fundamental functional and normative unit of politics and society (Beck 2000; Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002) – in discussing progressive aspects of the European project. This was notably present even among cosmopolitan scholars – in reified ideas of European identity and citizenship that projected nationally-rooted conceptions to a supra-national scale – and is now again strongly present among progressive voices seeking a return to more notionally egalitarian national scale welfarist social democracies. The allure of these utopias have also facilitated the return of the national as the ‘natural’ horizon of normative power: the apparent triumph of conventional political demography inscribed in the claims of sovereignty and ‘people’s democracy’ that have carried Britain to the brink of Brexit, and the EU towards potential dissolution.

### **The EU and Global Inequalities**

The EU as ‘enlightenment project’ was clearly at risk if its impact on global inequalities could be seen as negative. As defined starkly in the work of World Bank

economist Branko Milanovic (2011), the EU's self-sustaining protectionism (on agriculture, especially) and its approach to restraining South-North migration look to be very much part of the problem not the solution, particularly as the liberal optimism of the 1990s about development went sour in the following decade (de Haas 2010). There are now a plurality of political sociologists willing to argue that European integration has *also* in fact exacerbated inequality *within* European societies: the 'Euroclash' of the 'winners and losers' of globalisation at a regional scale (Fligstein 2008; Kriesi et al 2008; Emmenegger et al 2012; Beckfield 2019). This verdict may prove dangerously insular, if the point is only to affirm the equality claims of the (white, native) 'left behind' of the rich West as victims of 'neo-liberalism', with no cross-reference to Milanovic's rather mixed global big picture on global inequality since 1990, which partly emphasised the rise of new global middle classes—in China, South East Asia, India, Turkey, Brazil, and so on. Perhaps the (alleged) angst of Euro-American working classes (Gest 2016), is that these (mostly) black and brown people around the world are now in fact catching them up? Should we really pity those white natives 'left behind' in their own rich, highly developed countries, while their own highly globalised elites made off with all the money? This, rather provincially-focused verdict, appears to be the message of a wave of 'anti-liberal' post-Brexit analysts in the UK (Goodhart 2017; Eatwell and Goodwin 2018; Kaufmann 2018), offering analytical apologetics for the frank neo-fascism expressed by much of the new populist politics.

Leaving aside this debate, the EU's righteous 'post-national' claims are certainly going to look self-regarding and hypocritical, if it can be argued that the European project *normatively* was, in the end, only *for* Europeans and *only* about preserving

European privilege—as ‘Eurocentric’ as post-colonial and decolonial critics have always charged the self-regarding, abstract ideals of European modernity to be (Mignolo 2011).

To this charge, Brexit poses the potential of a counterfactual. Were any of the left wing idealists voting ‘Leave’ in the UK – along, covertly, it is suspected, with long time anti-EU Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn – right in thinking that a vote for Brexit could help deliver a fairer, more globally-minded, Europe? It is doubtful. Talk of Global Britain is for most of the politicians articulating this vision, nothing but a cover for an ‘Empire 2.0’ operation, as nicely characterised by Kehinde Andrews (2016). But the strong suspicion that the EU was nothing but an updated replication of European colonial privilege in the world (along with its universalising ‘normative power’ pretensions), was surely not lost on the still unclear numbers of British BME voters who decided to vote with the Leave camp—and despite its often blatant white English St. George iconography. When they did, they usually cited the blatant inequity of freedom of movement rights for EU citizens that had, they thought, locked out family and friends from the New Commonwealth via the ever more draconian anti-immigration laws against non-EU citizens, developed through the New Labour years to Theresa May’s ‘hostile environment’ of the 2010s (Ehsan 2017).

There is perhaps little to say in defence in the EU’s political economy of agriculture subsidies and its impact world wide. Nor can there be much normative justification mustered to defend how the EU enabled police, military and state border agencies from coordinating laws and policy practices and utilising ever more advanced technologies in trying to secure the self-styled European fortress, amidst the chaos of

its response to the refugee crisis. But of course the counterfactual here has to be how a different Europe of uneasily independent sovereign nation-states would have combined to enforce collective economic interests or preserve the privilege of its rich populations and territory in an unequal world? Would a Europe-of-the-nations put its exploitative, dominant position any less ‘first’ than Donald Trump’s nationalist America? If history is any guide, Europe’s track record in the world prior to its embrace of a cosmopolitan mission in the post World War Two era is a salutary reminder. The old Europe of industrial might and imperial power was hardly in a better place to deliver the enlightenment values of its philosophers than the ‘new old Europe’ of Community and Union (to echo, argumentatively, Anderson 2011). Nor, in any credible political view could it be imagined that a *more* democratic – or even a plurally populist *demosi-cratic* (Nikolaidis 2018) – European Union, in which peoples and their national political parties were allowed to articulate *more directly* their preference on their global economic interests, population change, or the global redistribution of their historical wealth, would ever deliver a fairer, *more* equitable ‘post-national’ arrangement, or be *more* likely to welcome asylum seekers and poverty migrants from the East or South with open arms. On these points, the attempt to build an enlightened, rational law and bureaucracy based, collective governance of otherwise rapacious European sovereign economies, surely offered more hope, however tepid a version of internationalist liberal capitalism it posed—as I will argue further below.

For the time being, other hyper- or anti- capitalist alternatives beckon. A post-EU Europe could resemble – in its more successful North-Western parts – the kind of offshore, unfettered dream of anarchist global libertarians—returning us to a sharply

hierarchical world of imperial diversity and great power maneuvering, run by elite castes. Or, if we are true believers, after the ‘neo-liberal’ European Union has collapsed, we may wait for the rise of a re-nationalised socialist Europe, in which Corbynista and Podemos style parties rise to power to implement a new internationalist globalism—yet somehow minus the global institutions which sustained the evil order of global banking, finance and dependent development. If his *Buying Time* (2014) proves, as some think, the definitive Critique of Political Economy of our own troubled times, we may await statues of Wolfgang Streeck in proud national capitals, where once there were statues of Marx and Engels (a discussion pursued in Favell 2014 and Parker 2017).

### **European Citizenship as Social Closure?**

Leaving aside this speculation, it does still need to be asked what claim can the EU make, such as it was, to have been in any sense a cosmopolitan project – given the blatant Eurocentricity of its territorial membership? European citizenship – attributed solely via national citizenship to its holders (Hansen 1998) – clearly negated the non-membership of others who were not EU nationals—as do all formal citizenships as forms of ‘social closure’ (Brubaker 1992). The EU for many years made a virtue of this membership as the foundation of a constitutional pan-European identity that would transcend the bounded form of the national. Certainly, republican voices – Habermas uppermost – saw it so: as the foundation of some kind of grand European democratic superstate. Its cosmopolitan constitutional ‘unity in diversity’ would anchor its ‘normative power’ (see Delanty in this volume ??). A Europe of citizens,



identifying with and sustaining a benign, enlightened federal power, driven by all inclusive, rational institutions, influencing the world as a benign, imperial exemplar. On the way towards some United Nations (only: there already was a United Nations, with its own hubris about universalisable cosmopolitanism; see Mazower 2013).

European citizenship thus implied a teleology, and as such a ‘people’ of peoples, that could only be as diverse as its constituent populations. Internally, much was needed before any kind of ‘starting line’ on non-discrimination towards ethnic and racial minorities – notably Europe’s very large constitutive muslim population – might be realisable (Niessen 2000); many national member states’ very patchy track record on anti-discrimination and treatment of minorities, and significant differences in campaign goals between representatives of different migrant and minority voices across the continent, held this back for years (Guiraudon 2001). Meanwhile, ‘migration management’ to the exterior was instituted, and in the 1990s was also largely still dedicated to enlightened, ‘opening not closing’ ideas about porous, interactive, cooperative borders with neighbours, and win-win-win mobility/demography/development goals. However, progress towards an equal inclusion of Third Country nationals – post-national rights for all on the basis of residence (Kostakopoulou 2008) – remained very slow. The EU remained a post-national club paradoxically which required naturalisation to a EU member nationality in order to access free movement benefits.

The EU’s impact on global inequalities via a ‘post-national’ redistribution of rights and opportunities in a more gently integrating global world economy was thus largely limited to its economic effects, not those thus might have been extended via more

extensive recognition of human rights protection for foreigners (Jacobson 1996). Yet, the ideal of neighborhood policies and (in particular) the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership could be argued as mildly benovolent – at least in comparison to the blatantly empire-like exploitation of the planet’s population and productive resources pursued by the US (Hardt and Negri 2000), or (in a different way), ‘Belt and Road’ China (Shambaugh 2013). But any effects on global inequalities could only be incremental, as fast as the straight-out-of Adam Smith prescribed win-win-win development in the wealth of nations might allow, via foreign direct investment, fair trade, migrant remittances, brain circulation and rising middle classes, and assuming no distorting mercantilist exploitation or monopolisation—and all this from enlightened peoples who only two hundred years before had been shipping their black and brown colonials around the world as slaves (see especially Hansen and Johnsson 2014 on the EU’s hidden history of ongoing colonialism).

The liberal economic globalist prescription, anchored in (frankly unsustainable) growth models at a global scale, was as far as progressive thought got in the expansive, idealist 1990s (de Haas 2010). It was the EU as an *Economist* editorial. Europe’s more convincing normative mission was instead trained internally: through the effects of the four freedoms, on inequality *within and across* the European territory. European integration was of course premised on the highly optimistic assumption of market equilibrium, functional distribution of labour/production, and thereby inclusive, equalising, redistributive development across the currency area. Economists do believe in this kind of thing; an economic theory of regional integration has always driven the Commission’s ideas (Recchi 2015). Miraculously, we might say, it worked in some cases, up to a point: the post-Franco case of the re-

integration and modernising trajectory of Spain (*la movida*) being the EU's greatest vindication. Further eastward enlargements followed, and the defining geo-political triumph of the EU as it was: to transcend the territorial division of the continent imposed by the Cold War. Again, only the cynical amongst those most critical to the European 'empire' being built (i.e., Böröcz and Kovacs 2001), would deny the effects on the equality of peoples in Europe of this enlargement. The 'fourth freedom', as it deserves to be called, put people(s) on the move; and, if and when they were young people, seizing opportunity, and moving Europe transactionally, it can only be said that it was via these movements East to West that the greatest blow in a century to regional inequality – physically, psychologically, ethnically – was delivered. Even economically, until it went politically sour at both ends in the 2010s, Polish and Romanian pendular and transnational mobilities, and eastwards economic remittances and investment, worked very well according to the theory.

Was this 'fourth freedom' a zero-sum loss for those not yet, or never to be, part of the European club – the 'non-EU' populations at the borders and beyond? This is not clear, but is worth debating. It is like discussing whether they were also a zero-sum like cost to the supposedly 'left behind' native populations who faced the presence of EU free movement as a competition for jobs or social resources. That 'competition' with 'natives' can in a broad sense be shown to be generally false, although its spatial concentration can account for a part of the enmity which arose in some places in provincial England (see Portes 2016; Vargas-Silva 2017). Generally though, the place of East European movers – consisting also of significant numbers of young educated or skilled workers, as well as highly entrepreneurial in nature – was in fact a complementary relation. Its negative effects relative to its transformative powers on

the British economy and British society, were at least nowhere near any economic threshold by which the cosmopolitanism of, say, the British economy in the 1990s and 2000s could be argued to have been harmful. There may have been some sense of a relation of ‘white’ European demand-driven migration replacing some of the global migrants – and relatives of British BME citizens – who might have been able to come had there not been Theresa May’s draconian hostile environment (Favell 2008a). But overall, the fourth freedom was normatively extraordinary because it put something new in the world that in fact reinforced the deep, cosmopolitan tendencies embedded in anti-racist, anti-discriminatory norms that had shakily emerged in the European post war—and most boldly in the UK’s policy and legislation in response to post-colonial and then global new migrations.

A case can be made then that the fourth freedom of movement of persons, and the rights it gave – packaged rather deceptively under the rubric of ‘European citizenship’ – were indeed the instituting of a very real, concrete form of ‘post-national membership’ in the famous historical line of T.H.Marshall (1950); and extending rather further in their individualising rights-based properties than the fragmented ‘post-national’ social rights of Third Country Nationals (i.e., the Turkish in Germany), identified by Yasemin Soysal in her *Limits of Citizenship* (1994). The Marshallian logic was for the first time taken beyond the nation-state, and rights attributed to individuals in ways that could not be limited by nationality (Soysal 2012). In a country such as the UK, which favoured the economic benefits of a genuinely open labour market in most sectors *and* had heavily policed organisational and institutional norms of anti-discrimination, the addition of non-discrimination by nationality to these powers had an extraordinary impact. Anti-discrimination law had

always suggested this diasporic implication: that in legislating against race, gender, ethnic, religious or disability discrimination, it was protecting the individual *qua* individual against the privilege of normal, mainstream *national* society. In its extension to *all* those present in the territory legally, regardless of origin or length of stay – dramatically making discrimination by nationality analogous to all other forms of discrimination – it was a direct undermining of the nationalised privilege of citizenship as (passport carrying) membership. An argument comes full circle here to unify the claims of European non-nationals in the UK, with those articulated famously (and tragically, in political terms) by the report on the *Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain* (in 2000, known as *The Parekh Report*), informed by Stuart Hall’s diasporic, post-national vision of the post-colonial. The UK in the 2000s was therefore on the cusp of becoming Europe’s first genuinely post-national society – despite itself, certainly, in many ways – and not only because, as documented (in)famously by the right wing demographer, David Coleman (2016), Britain would soon no longer be a majority ‘white British’ society. When the *Daily Telegraph* led the vitriol against the Parekh report before its publication, it knew very well what it was fighting: its struggle against the diasporic, post-national and cosmopolitan vision of multi-ethnic Britain in 2000, *was one and the same thing* as its struggle against the post-national and cosmopolitan consequences of EU freedom of movement fifteen years later. New Labour panicked at the nationalist backlash; and a crucial progressive dimension was lost forever from their transformative vision. Officially, then, the party got cold feet over diasporic multiculturalism (Joppke and Morawska 2003); instead the transformation took the form of open door migration policies that followed the East European accessions of 2004, and (with more restriction) 2007.

## The Triumph of Political Demography

Britain as a migration country certainly was, on the ground, utterly transformed by the highly mobile, mostly youthful, and generally white, new European migrations of the 2000s. We are now seeing the consequences of undoing the post-national rights that many of these migrants enjoyed—as Brexit will do. Obviously, EU nationals in the UK will become outside ‘im-migrants’ and ‘foreigners’ again, rendered unequal by definition to ‘nationals’, rejoining some laborious path to equal membership, at some unclear point in the future, if they accept and are able to ‘naturalise’. Until then, they will find their rights to equal treatment re-differentiated by skills and education, ‘whiteness’, cultural proximity, South-isms and East-isms again; i.e. not treated as equal ‘citizens’—as they had been, as post-national ‘free movers’. Even in some of the most sophisticated academic debates, these populations routinely and falsely have long been referred to as ‘immigrants’ or part of ‘immigration’ policy (see, for example, the public opinion analysts who have explained Brexit in terms of ‘EU immigration’: Evans and Mellon 2015, Goodwin and Milazzo 2017; on this, see Favell and Barbulescu 2018). The sovereign island nation has resolutely been unable to understand the porous, transient, transactional and transnational nature of the European mobilities its economy and society so openly welcomed. EU non-nationals had already become ‘immigrants’ well before Nigel Farage plastered his infamous ‘breaking point’ image on a lorry in London—the threatening hordes of Syrian male asylum seekers in Central Europe coming *our* way (a group also *not*, legally speaking, *immigrants*). This reflex of methodological nationalism – of seeing all actual and potential resident foreigners as ‘immigrants’ – is overwhelming in public discourse. And the more visibly ‘Eastern’ or racially distinct the population was, the more they

were said to be *unwanted* ‘immigration’. Even some supposedly progressive campaigns in their name (such as the misguided, progressively intended, ‘I am an immigrant’ campaign), fell into the same methodologically nationalist trap. Britain on all sides could only imagine discourse about international mobilities in nationalist terms: of ‘immigrants’ and ‘foreigners’ we could (still) welcome to this island nation. And so free movers living in this corner of Europe will after Brexit be *just* foreigners again, with no right to be on UK territory or claim equality of treatment, *unless* they accept to naturalise ‘British’ (if they are able—which is far from given due to the rules and expense). In order to access and maintain the normative benefits of equal membership, they will be forced to ‘integrate’ as British citizens—rather than the post-national European individuals they had been under freedom of movement laws. The default acceptance of methodological nationalism by all sides has rendered this notion reasonable to most people: EU non-national residents after Brexit will just have to like it or lump it.

It was no coincidence though that this enforcement of the nationalist basis of membership in British society should coincide with the surfacing of the Windrush scandal, in which children of the first waves of post-war migration to the UK from the Caribbean discovered, amidst recent new procedures for checking resident status, that they were lacking any proof of British citizenship. In many cases, they then faced deportation even though they had grown up and lived decades in the UK. Hundreds of second generation UK BME residents were thus left high and dry by this exposure of the thin-ness of their British empire membership—a direct consequence of the harshness of Theresa May’s bureaucratic ‘hostile environment’. BME British, bred and socialised on these shores, became visibly, ‘immigrants’ again – British citizens

who never had passports being put through the indignity of proving their right to reside, alongside all the other ‘immigrants’ questioned about their documentation or told to ‘go home’. How quickly the proud veneer of multi-racial Britain was exposed. They were part of a post-colonial ‘immigration’ who had so successfully become ‘Black *British*’ that it had been unacceptable (since the 1970s) to speak of them as ‘immigrants’—as so indignantly proven by the ascendent moral argument of Paul Gilroy’s *Their ‘Aint no Black in the Union Jack* (1987). Yet all it took was a bureaucratic enforcement of routine national documentation for their British-ness to be exposed as less secure than the ‘true’ English people around them; the ones whose immaculately white British-ness demographers and other influential commentators claim can be traced to ancient roots (Coleman 2016; Collier 2013). Once again an ‘immigration’ story of ‘foreigners’ crossing a border and settling on the island had to be imposed, even though they had all been born as subjects in the British empire, and the borders had in fact crossed them (Bhambra 2016). Nearly fifty years in which it was incorrect to talk about Commonwealth movers as ‘immigrants’ had been swiftly reversed; with pundits and politicians cementing the story by re-imposing false progressive narratives—of Britain being a selective immigrant settler nation just like Canada, or Australia, seeking a new middle way (Goodhart 2017; Collier 2013).

The fate of the 3 million (EU nationals) in this conceptual trap is a sad one; but a bigger casualty surely is the still smouldering notion of Britain as a post-national space of diasporas—in which national origin is irrelevant, in which ‘being British’, as opposed to being generically non-national something (whether ‘European or ‘Global’, or just ‘young’, ‘LGBT’, a ‘goth’, or an ‘Arsenal fan’, or whatever), is an indifferent or empty, open category.



We all know the manifold post-national identities and interactions of what is often called ‘superdiversity’ exist (Vertovec 2007): on the streets, in the city, anywhere in fact, where somehow the question ‘where are you from?’ is no longer important, or merely a designator of another ‘non-national’ place. One can almost imagine or touch this place ethnographically, sitting on the tube in London or walking through Dalston market in East London (see Wessendorf 2010). But these realities clearly are marginalised in the everyday world by the cognitive infrastructure of ‘democratic’ media and politics, in which membership of the discussion, is always *national*; of a ‘people’ and society, however diverse, constituted by national membership of an island territory. Ironically, for all kinds of reasons, the contemporary UK in the 1990s and 2000s, offshore from Europe, but the most Europeanised member state on these key dimensions, was the place in Europe where the true normative power of the EU as the harbinger of post-national society was being realised. This was put to the ‘people’ – as it were, gerrymandered, as the electorate was, to exclude resident ‘foreigners’ – in June 2016, and the ‘people’ rejected it. They reasserted sovereignty over a society that was indeed, however unstably, partially, imperfectly, no longer *theirs* (as Nigel Farage correctly claimed)—because it had become, in fact, *everyone’s*. Yet Leviathan spoke: the body politic asserted its exclusive unity over the notion of population, banishing the constructed foreign to its borders again—the triumph of the political over transnational society and demography; or, to put it another way, vindicating the triumphant nation-constituting power of political demography.

Our requiem should not overstate the exclusive role of the UK vote on Brexit in killing the notion of non-discrimination by nationality in Europe. Already other

member states, notably Denmark and Germany, have moved to remove social rights of EU non-nationals in their territories, in line with David Cameron's negotiated opt outs for Britain—and this despite Angela Merkel's continual incantation of the inviolability of the four freedoms. European case law has turned away from expansive interpretations of EU citizens' rights in recent years; Schengen open borders have frequently become optional whenever states needed or chose to impose borders again (on these shifts, see Pennings and Seeleib-Kaiser 2018). And, in any case, labour markets across most of Europe have always mostly been *de facto* discriminatory towards non-nationals – according to insider credentialism, unionised privileges, or simply cultural barriers – which made the genuine openness of much of the British labour in the 1990s and 2000s market so remarkable (Favell 2014). The offshore UK of these two decades was in fact an exemplar of Europeanisation in this respect, at the heart of EU values and regional integration (Gerhards 2007), with London its capital (Favell 2008b). That heart may already be moving to Paris, Amsterdam, Frankfurt and Berlin, rival cities that will reap the benefit of its unexpected, but very British, rejection.

As I have argued, the British dilemma on immigration, as well as its violent attempt to de-Europeanise itself with Brexit, reveal the limits of Europe in several ways. In throwing away the fruits of the post-national society that emerged in the 1990s and 2000s, the ethno-national origins of British (in fact: English) nationhood have been exposed: the 'immigrant' stigma of EU nationals and the Windrush generation being substantially the same fate of all diaspora populations in countries which impose complete national 'integration' as a condition of full membership. Britain's failure also casts a sharp light on the limitations of a 'European citizenship' which has never

been able to embrace the post-national rights of resident non-EU nationals, and the claims of global inequality beyond the bounds of Europe. Minus the UK, it is likely that other member states will drift back towards re-nationalisation and further restriction on the remarkable post-national mobilities enabled and extended by the ‘fourth freedom’: a requiem indeed will be called for.

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