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ABSTRACT
OF THE THESIS ENTITLED
"TEXTUAL AND SEMANTIC STUDIES
IN CLASSICAL YOGA"

by G.A. Feuerstein

Notwithstanding that the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali has received more scholarly attention than any other yogic scripture, with the notable exception of the Bhagavad-Gītā, the existing translations and accounts of the Yoga-Sūtra are marred by serious misinterpretations. It is argued that these misapprehensions are due to (a) an almost naive reliance on the Sanskrit exegetists and (b) the want of a critical, in-depth analysis of both the textual structure of Patañjali's work and his conceptual and doctrinal edifice.

The present thesis represents an attempt to meet these desiderata by way of a strictly system-immanent interpretation of the teachings of Patañjali, founded on textual criticism. The data are arranged into two major parts. The first part (chapters 2-4) consists in a stringent examination of the textual structure of the Yoga-Sūtra on the basis of an explicit methodology postulating, in conscious contrast to the a priori assumptions of previous researchers, the intrinsic homogeneity of the text. This approach proved generative of significant new perspectives. Above all, it established that the Yoga-Sūtra is a composite of two sets of tradition, viz. Kriyāyoga and Aṣṭāṅgayoga, the latter being represented by a series of aphorisms which appear to be 'quoted' in the main text rather than arbitrarily interpolated.

This crucial finding furnished the starting-point for the critical

analysis, attempted in the second part of the thesis (chapters 5-7), of the conceptual framework of Classical Yoga as embodied in the Yoga-Sūtra itself. It was possible to cast new light on several key concepts - philosophical, psychological and practical - of Patañjali's system of thought. These analyses clearly evinced the full autonomy of Pātañjalayoga as a distinct darśana, thus correcting the popular misconception that Classical Yoga is merely Classical Sāṅkhya transmogrified along theistic lines.

TEXTUAL AND SEMANTIC STUDIES

IN CLASSICAL YOGA

Dissertation presented to the University of Durham

for the degree of Master of Letters

by

Georg Feuerstein

October 1975

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A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S

In the course of this study I have become indebted to a number of people. First of all, I must record my gratitude to Dr. K. Werner, of the School of Oriental Studies, for providing the initial impetus to undertake this piece of research under his supervision at the University of Durham and for granting me the greatest latitude possible both as regards the contents and the form of this thesis.

Next, I wish to express my deep obligation to Professor Corrado Fensa (Rome) and Professor Algis Mickunas (Ohio), whose friendly encouragement and abiding interest in my work have proven of inestimable value. This is the kind of rich nutriment which is so essential to any maverick researcher.

The past two years in Durham have been in many ways rewarding, largely thanks to the courteous welcome of several members of staff of the local Department of Anthropology. I particularly wish to thank Professor Eric Sunderland and Dr. Norman Long, not least for seconding my nomination as a Fellow of the Royal Anthropological Institute.

I am, finally, much obliged to Mr. Philip Rawson for allowing me to peruse an Indian PhD thesis which was in his custody at the time.

C O N T E N T S

PART ONE : INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1 : A Preliminary Definition of 'Yoga'	2
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PART TWO : TEXTUAL PROBLEMS

Chapter 2 : The Yoga-Sūtra in the Light of the Classical Exegetists	9
Chapter 3 : A Structural Analysis of the Yoga-Sūtra	24
Chapter 4 : Kriyā-Yoga and Aṣṭa-Aṅga-Yoga : A Comparison	80

PART THREE : SEMANTIC INVESTIGATIONS

Chapter 5 : Philosophical Abstracta

1. Īśvara	97
2. Puruṣa	116
3. Prakṛti	133
4. Kaivalya	174

Chapter 6 : Psychological Concepts

1. Citta	184
2. Vṛtti	189
3. Kleśa, Kliṣṭa-Akliṣṭa	191

4. Saṃskāra, Vāsanā, Āśaya	196
5. Nirodha	203
6. Pratyaya	207
Chapter 7 : Practice Concepts	
1. Abhyāsa, Vairāgya	211
2. Pratyāhāra, Dhāraṇā, Dhyāna	215
3. Samādhi	221
PART FOUR : CONCLUSION	
Chapter 8 : Pātañjala-Yoga and Classical Sāṃkhya	246
List of Publications Cited	264

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE

A PRELIMINARY DEFINITION OF 'YOGA'

It seems apposite to offer, at the very outset of this study, a preliminary definition of the subject-matter, viz. Yoga. In the past several tentative definitions or, more accurately, descriptions have been proposed. These were either far too specific or else too imprecise. What does it mean to speak of Yoga as a 'way of life', 'philosophy', 'Indian psychotherapy', 'religious union' or 'mysticism'? These concepts are themselves extremely vague, if not loaded, and hence quite inadequate as definitional tools. The rationale of a formal definition is the formulation of a set of propositions which are unconditionally valid. This means that only those components of the concept which are constant are to be singled out and logically related to each other within the specific semantic domain of that concept. The definition is expected to be both consistent and as complete as possible without at the same time violating the law of parsimony. Keeping these factors in mind I would suggest the following definition.

Yoga is a specifically Indian tradition consisting of sets of varyingly codified and/or systematised ideas, methods and techniques primarily intended to induce a transformation of consciousness in the

practitioner (yogin) and transmitted from one teacher to one or more disciples in a more or less formal setting.

By 'specifically Indian' I mean that Yoga is a part of the socio-cultural field of so-called Hinduism and its margins. This includes some of the neighbouring countries, especially Tibet and Kashmir, but excludes all other regions which cannot be said to have had more than a negligible cultural contact with Hinduism and its two great socio-cultural cousin configurations Buddhism and Jainism. Thus it would be misleading to talk of an 'Akkadian Yoga' or 'Hebrew Yoga' as did W.J.FLAGG (1898), but the designations 'Buddhist Yoga', 'Jaina Yoga' or 'Tibetan Yoga' are fully justified.

In view of the fact that Yoga is by no means a uniform tradition it is necessary to qualify the definition by speaking of 'sets' which, again, may be more or less complex according to the degree of codification and systematisation. By 'ideas' I mean simple concepts, fundamental suppositions, doctrines and even full-fledged ideological superstructures. It is assumed that the goal of all forms and schools of Yoga is the breakthrough onto a different level of cognition. This automatically excludes magic with its central concern for the acquisition and manipulation of 'power'. Yoga proper can be said to be primarily orientated towards gnosis, although it cannot be denied that some of the variants of Yoga display a more or less pronounced interest

in 'magic power' (siddhi, vibhūti).

Since there is no unanimity about the actual nature of the ultimate target of Yoga, as is evident from the contrasting definitions of kaivalya, brahma-nirvāna, nirvāna etc., it seems advisable to speak merely in general terms of a 'transformation of consciousness'. This takes also into account the extraordinarily multiform experiences encountered in the course of the various yogic programmes, e.g. the multifarious types of meditative absorption and samādhi. The 'teacher' who may or may not be a fully qualified adept must also be regarded as an essential feature of a complete yogic setting. His role is obviously analogous to that of the therapist or analyst in contemporary therapeutic procedures.

The 'setting' in which the tradition of Yoga is transmitted from guru to śiṣya can be as formal as the customary pupilage of upaniṣadic times, where the student lived in the teacher's hermitage (āśrama), or as informal as the occasional congregations of like-minded devotees of, say, Kṛṣṇa in medieval India. Specifications about the mode of transmission of the traditional knowledge remain outside the orbit of the definition, since there are far too many variables. For instance initiation by which a person is accepted into the teaching structure can be enacted on various levels of elaboration and formality. It may simply take the form of the teacher's silent consent, or else it can find ritualistic expression as in certain schools of Tantrism. The standards of selection differ greatly and particularly in

the more popular Yoga movements, such as the medieval bhakti-mārga, the threshold of tolerance can be unexpectedly low.

One more important point calls for consideration in connection with the present definition of Yoga. It is often maintained that Yoga is primarily, perhaps even exclusively, practice of one kind or another, and to be strictly distinguished from the various theoretical accretions. But such a distinction is fallacious. Theory and practice are not separable categories; they mutually inform each other. Nowhere has this intrinsic reciprocity of theory and practice/experiment been brought out more vividly than in the recent studies in the philosophy of science.¹

It is misleading to dichotomise the Gestalt of Yoga by identifying it either with the 'pure' practice of certain techniques of consciousness transformation or with a specific body of theorems. Thus, for instance, E. CONZE's rough-and-ready definition of Yoga as "a series of technical practices"² which in the course of history received various ideological underpinnings, leaves much to be desired. Though useful as a convenient analytical device, the clear-cut distinction between 'technical substructure' and 'ideological superstructure' — again E. CONZE's wording — must not be confounded with the actual data: Yoga is more properly characterised as a theory-practice continuum.

1 See e.g. T.S. KUEN (1970², 33)

2 E. CONZE (1962, 18f.)

This point has been vaguely appreciated by G.J. LARSON (1969, 124) who, in a footnote (117n), makes the following observation: "It should be noted, however, that Yoga is never just action or 'doing'. It has associated with it a number of doctrines which clearly distinguish it and give it an identity which goes beyond sheer 'doing'." These considerations are not of course meant to disclaim the fact that within the yogic tradition great emphasis is placed on ~~the~~ practical application in the form of personal commitment and daring experimentation.

It may be argued that the above definition is still not specific enough so as to permit a fully adequate demarcation of Yoga from cognate trends in India. But it must be remembered that Yoga is a highly polymorphous phenomenon which does not readily lend itself to formal analysis. As M. ELIADE (1973³, 50) aptly remarks: "If 'yoga' means many things, that is because Yoga is many things."

Finally, I wish to delimit the precise connotation of the concept 'Classical Yoga' as used in the title and throughout the main body of this study. By this term I mean to refer to that particular school and type of Yoga which is associated with the name of Patañjali and is codified in his famous Yoga-Sūtra. By way of extension I include in this concept also the subsequent commentarial tradition initiated as far as we know by Vyāsa's Yoga-Bhāṣya and continued through a long though not perfectly continuous chain of sub-commentaries and glosses. Thus 'Classical Yoga' does not so much mark a specific chrono-

logical event than constitute a particular genre of Yoga. Implicit in this is the idea that far from embodying a uniform tradition, Classical Yoga comprises a series of traditions which have as their common denominator a formal dependence on the Yoga-Sūtra.

PART TWO

TEXTUAL PROBLEMS

CHAPTER TWO

THE YOGA-SŪTRA IN THE LIGHT OF THE CLASSICAL EXEGETISTS

Patañjali's work, as is evident from its regular Sanskrit title,³ belongs to the so-called sūtra-literature which emerged as a distinct genre of Indian literary history in the centuries before the rise of Christianity. According to M. MÜLLER (1916⁴, 4) these systematic works "must be considered as the last outcome of a long continued philosophical activity carried on by memory only". The word sūtra means literally 'thread', and in the present context refers to what S.DASGUPTA (1963⁵, I, 62) calls "short and pregnant half-sentences" which "did not elaborate the subject in detail, but served only to hold before the reader the lost threads of memory of elaborate disquisitions with which he was already thoroughly acquainted". He continues: "It seems, therefore, that these pithy half-sentences were like lecture hints, intended for those who had had direct elaborate oral instructions on the subject."

It is exactly this extreme brevity and conciseness which renders the sūtras almost unintelligible to the uninitiated. On the other hand, this same condensation and obscurity guaranteed the great degree of flexibility witnessed in the diverse traditions, since doctrinal matter could easily be developed and

³ I say 'regular title' because according to the Yoga-Bhāṣya, Patañjali's work is also known as Sāṃkhya-Pravacana.

even reinterpreted on the basis of the sūtras. I.K. TAIMNI *(The Science of Yoga)* (1965², x) writes: "The language in which the Sūtras are constructed is an ancient one which, though extraordinarily effective in the expression of philosophical ideas, can lend itself to an extraordinary variety of interpretations." This remarkable feature is best exemplified in the Vedānta literature which spawned around the Brahma-Sūtra ascribed to Bādarāyaṇa (?200 A.D.).⁴ The unequivocal sanction of this treatise was claimed with equal emphasis and conviction by non-dualists⁵, dualists⁶ and the propagators of other intermediary religious and philosophical positions.⁷

This enormous elasticity of the sūtra was recognised by Vācaspati Miśra in his celebrated Bhāmati (I.1.1) where he points out that a sūtra is so called "because of the communication of wide meaning" (bahv-ārtha-sūcanāt).

The difficulties which the sūtra style entails for the translator are immediately apodictic. He is not only faced with a frequently highly enigmatic original text but also an extensive trail of commentaries upon commentaries which, in seeking to plumb the purport of the sūtras, offer a wealth of differing, often even hostile and mutually exclusive interpreta-

4 See S. RADHAKRISHNAN (1960) *(The Brahma Sūtra)*

5 See Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya

6 See Madhva's theistic commentary

7 See e.g. Rāmānuja's Śrī-Bhāṣya

tions. Of course, not each and every aphorism is obscure. Nor are the classical exegetists permanently vying for recognition or totally unhelpful in their explanations. Very often they supply useful cues and valuable background information which in a way compensate for their misleading, fanciful, dubious or simply irrelevant statements. I

Fortunately, the sūtra style of Patañjali's composition is not as recondite and impenetrable as for instance certain portions of the Brahma-Sūtra, and the general purport of most of its aphorisms can be grasped without the aid of the Sanskrit commentaries. Whereas the author of the Brahma-Sūtra shows a distinct predilection for extreme terseness of statement — many of his aphorisms consist of a single word or a compound of two or three members only — the Yoga-Sūtra has an average of ca. six words per sūtra. The shortest aphorism is I.23 (with two words, provided that Īśvara-pranidhāna is counted as one) and the lengthiest is II.34 (with nineteen words).⁸ 1e

The comparative tangibility of the sūtras of Patañjali's vade-mecum does of course not signify that the meaning of each and every aphorism is crystal clear, or else there would be little justification for the present study. The truth is that there is still an abundance of concepts which await more detailed analysis than was afforded to them by past researchers. Above all, it is

8 Sūtra I.23 runs: Īśvara-pranidhānād-vā; II.34 reads: vitarkā himsā-ādayaḥ kṛta-kārita-anumoditā lobha-krodha-moha-pūrvakā mṛdu-madhya-adhimātrā duḥkha-añjāna-ananta-phalā iti pratipakṣa-bhāvanam.

my contention that little progress has been made as regards the exposure of the dynamics of Yoga, in particular our understanding of the subtle interplay between the conceptual framework and the ritual (i.e. practical) aspect.

Even though the Yoga-Sūtra has received more scholarly attention than any other scripture of Yoga — with the notable exception of the Bhagavad-Gītā — it still represents a vast terra incognita. In a certain sense the position of the researcher on Classical Yoga is analogous to the position of those among the early Vedacists who, upon the discovery of Sāyana's commentary on the Rgveda, were perfectly convinced that this explanatory text would solve all their exegetical problems. For, in their interpretation of the Yoga-Sūtra the previous researchers have gone little farther than Vyāsa, the author of the oldest extant scholium. As a matter of fact they cannot even be said to have fathomed out the full depth of Vyāsa's commentary. As J.H. WOODS (1966³, ix) observes: "Even after a dozen readings the import of some paragraphs is not quite clear, such for example as the first half of the Bhāṣya on iii.14. Still more intractable are the single technical terms, even if the general significance of the word, superficially analysed, is clear. This irreducible residuum is unavoidable so long as one cannot feel at home in that type of emotional thinking which culminates in a super-sensuous object of aesthetic contemplation."

In a way Vyāsa, a brilliant scholiast, has kept previous scholars off a critical and sufficiently independent analysis

of the Yoga-Sūtra, just as he has exerted a strong influence on all subsequent native commentators. Even Rhoja, supposedly the most self-reliant glossist, who criticises in his Rāja-Mārtanda all his predecessors proudly dubbing them "distorters of the real meaning" (vastu-viplava-kṛtaḥ), relies heavily on Vyāsa's work and consequently also commits the very same exegetical blunders.

Hence the first step towards a competent study of the Yoga-Sūtra would appear to consist in a critical assessment of the exegetical literature. The first scholar to pay some attention at least to this important question was J.W. HAUER (1958). He recognised what any detailed examination will but confirm and amplify: There are marked discrepancies between the Yoga-Sūtra and the interpretations of the exegetists. In J.W. HAUER's (1958, 265) own words: "The commentaries subsequent to Vyāsa, even already Vyāsa himself, instead of presenting the genuine philosophy of Yoga often foist on Yoga the philosophy of Sāṃkhya. For this reason they are to be used with caution."

Some of these divergencies are quite obviously conceptual differences, others are of a terminological nature. They arise from the simple fact that between the composition of the original sūtras and the compilation of the commentaries there elapsed a considerable period of time during which many shifts of emphasis in both language and thought must have occurred. At any rate, none of the long line of exegetists can be said to be a proper representative of Patañjali's school of thought. This naturally

does not challenge the fact that they constitute authoritative traditions in their own right. Yet it does impair their value as research implements. Perhaps it is just tenable to say that their reliability as exegetical sources decreases in proportion to their chronological remoteness from the Yoga-Sūtra.

Thus clearly the most important commentary is the Yoga-Bhāṣya which is most proximate to the Yoga-Sūtra. The exact date of this scholium is still uncertain, but it cannot be later than ca. 650 A.D.⁹ Little is known about Vyāsa himself whom tradition identifies with the legendary Vedavyāsa who compiled the Samhitās, the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas. Since the Sāṃkhya teacher Vārṣaganya is quoted in the Yoga-Bhāṣya (III.53; IV.13), who was in all likelihood a contemporary of Vasubandhu (probably 270-350 A.D.)¹⁰, Vyāsa cannot have lived before 350 A.D. Thus the Yoga-Bhāṣya must be assigned to the period between 350-650 A.D. If the Yoga-Sūtra was composed in its present form in the second or third century A.D., as is assumed here,¹¹ the Yoga-Bhāṣya must be assigned to a date sufficiently removed from

9 See J.H. WOODS (1966³, xx-xxi). Strangely enough J.H. WOODS, after correctly assessing the evidence of MĒgha's Śiśupālavadhā (IV.55) which refers to YS I.33 and apparently the Bhāṣya thereon, makes the mistake of saying that "If this is trustworthy evidence, the Comment cannot be earlier than A.D. 650", whereas it should be "cannot be later than". This slip was already noticed by J.W. HAUER (1958, 472, fn.34). For a detailed discussion of the evidence of the Śiśupālavadhā see E. HULTZSCH (1927, 78-83).

10 See J.H. WOODS (1966³, xx). Cf. E. FRAUWALLNER (1961, 125f.).

11 Patañjali's date is notoriously problematic. For a discussion of some of the evidence see J.H. WOODS (1966³, xii-xix) who places

that of the Yoga-Sūtra in order to account for the many misunderstandings. For this reason J.W.HAUER (1958, 266) favours the end of the fifth or the beginning of the sixth century as a likely date for the Yoga-Bhāṣya. The aforementioned discrepancies also led J.W. HAUER to query whether Vyāsa really was a yogin who had access to the highest experiences, but this argument is invalid. J.W. HAUER also pointed out that Vyāsa's viewpoint is very much akin to the earlier theistic Yoga tradition as it is embodied, for instance, in the Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad, where the lord (Īśvara) is identified with Rudra-Śiva. J.W. HAUER deduces this from the opening stanza of the Yoga-Bhāṣya which runs:

yas-tyaktvā rūpam-ādyaṃ prabhavati jagato'nekadhā-
anugrahāya prakṣīna-kleśa-rāsir-viṣama-viṣa-dharo'
neka-vaktraḥ subhogī, sarva-jñāna-prasūtir-bhujaga-
parikarāḥ prītaye yasya nityaṃ devo'hi-Īśaḥ sa vo'
vyāt-sita-vimala-tanur-yogado yoga-yuktaḥ.

This may be rendered as follows:

[May He] who, having abandoned the primal form, [and
 who] arises to favour the world in many ways, [He],
 the bearer of deadly poison, with many mouths and
 beautifully hooded, [who] destroys the mass of

(fn. 11 otd.)

the Yoga-Sūtra in the period between 300-500 A.D., which is accepted by J.W. HAUER (1958, 266). However, in view of the fact that the terminus ad quem of Vyāsa's work is 650 A.D. and very likely much earlier, the Yoga-Sūtra may justifiably be placed

the causes-of-affliction, to whose delight the multitude of serpents eternally brings forth all knowledge — may He, the divine lord of serpents, protect you with His white, stainless body, [He] the giver of Yoga [who] is [Himself] yoked in Yoga.

Admittedly, J.W. HAUER's proposed equation of ahi-Iśa with Śiva is valid. Still, as S. DASGUPTA (1930, 55) observes: "The adoration hymn of Vyāsa (...) is considered to be an interpolation even by orthodox scholars." This seems to be confirmed by the fact that Vyāsa shows, to my knowledge, no sectarian bias in his commentary, even though there would have been ample opportunity for expressing personal convictions especially in connection with the sūtras I.23-28 which deal with the concept of Iśvara.

Vyāsa's precise intellectual home is difficult to determine. According to P. CHAKRAVARTI (1951, 72, fn.1, 138f.) the author of the Yoga-Bhāṣya represents the Sāṅkhya school of Vārṣaganya. Discrediting Vācaspati Miśra's testimony, P. CHAKRAVARTI suggests that most of the quotations in the Bhāṣya are not from Pañcaśikha but from Vārṣaganya, "a distinguished teacher of Sāṅkhya" (p.135) who "re-wrote the original Ṣaṣṭitantra of Pañcaśikha" (p.136) and also was the teacher of Vindhyavāsa (see p.138). This valuable hypothesis is indirectly confirmed by K.B.R. RAO (1966, 375) who points out that both Vyāsa (see YBh II.19) and Vārṣaganya¹² subscribe to the

(fn. 11 ctd.)

about 300 A.D. or possibly somewhat earlier. Terminological considerations would seem to confirm this.

12 This is according to the Yukti-Dīpikā, commenting on Sāṅkhya-Kārikā 25; the text reads: eka-rūpāni tanmātrāni-ity-anye, eka-uttaram vārṣaganyaḥ.

so-called eka-uttara-('increasing by one')theory. This is an ontogenetic model operating on the principle of progressive inclusion. Thus, in contrast with other schools of thought, every tanmātra or sensory potential has not merely one characteristic, but rather each subsequent tanmātra entails the characteristics of all previous tanmātras. This view can be tabulated as follows:¹³

- | | | |
|----------------------------|---|--|
| (1) <u>śabda-tanmātra</u> | = | <u>śabda</u> |
| (2) <u>sparsā-tanmātra</u> | = | <u>sparsā</u> + <u>śabda</u> |
| (3) <u>rūpa-tanmātra</u> | = | <u>rūpa</u> + <u>sparsā</u> + <u>śabda</u> |
| (4) <u>rasa-tanmātra</u> | = | <u>rasa</u> + <u>rūpa</u> + <u>sparsā</u> + <u>śabda</u> |
| (5) <u>gandha-tanmātra</u> | = | <u>gandha</u> + <u>rasa</u> + <u>rūpa</u> + <u>sparsā</u> + <u>śabda</u> |

Both the single characteristic theory and, as P. DEUSSEN (1920³,1,67f.) calls it, the 'accumulation theory' are expounded in the Mahā-bhārata. The former notion is probably the older one. In K.B.R. RAO's opinion the eka-uttara doctrine is also accepted by Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, but P. DEUSSEN (1920³,1,446) denies that it can be found in the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā.

Be this as it may, it is clear from what has been said so far that Vyāsa must be located somewhere in the ramifying tradition of Sāṃkhya. This is strikingly evident from the colophons of his commentary according to which his work is an exposition of Sāṃkhya.

13 For an explanation of the concept of tanmātra see below pp. 163f.

Notwithstanding that Vyāsa cannot be considered as belonging to pātanjāla-yoga proper, his commentary nevertheless does also not display the marks of bold innovation as is the case, for instance, with Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya to the Brahma-Sūtra. Vyāsa writes as a scholar with much insight and possibly a good deal of first-hand knowledge of yogic practice.

On a still more sophisticated level than the Yoga-Bhāṣya is the famous tīkā by Vācaspati Miśra, entitled Tattva-Vaiśaradī. Vācaspati, who can safely be placed in the ninth century A.D., was a scholar of great repute. As C. BULCKE (1947, 3) puts it: "He is a very remarkable figure in the history of Indian philosophy and fully deserves the title of sarvatantra-svatantra, 'master of all systems but reliant on no one of them in particular'..." The author of seven major exegetical Sanskrit works on Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta, he was a master of the philosophical style, the beauty and lucidity of which greatly impressed many a western savant (see e.g. M. WINTERITZ, 1922, III, 454).

His Tattva-Vaiśaradī is invaluable for understanding the more elusive passages of the Yoga-Bhāṣya, and it is a mine of interesting philological data. However, its expositional value is low. Vācaspati, ostensibly, was no authority on Yoga; he approached his subject-matter with great candour and sympathy but not from within the yogic tradition. This is corroborated by his whole style and his preoccupation with philological and epistemological matters as well as his anxious dependence on Vyāsa. It is furthermore illustrated by the following story current in paṇḍita circles,

as related by S.S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI & C.K. RAJA (1933, x):

In those days (as even today in part of Upper India), it would appear to have been customary to hold learned discussions on such occasions as marriages. Vācaspati, who listened to such a discussion on the occasion of his own marriage, was so struck by the vagaries of dialecticians that he resolved straightaway to devote himself to the task of setting forth authoritative expositions of all the darśanas. So great was his zeal, so mighty the task and such the patient and tireless devotion of his wife that the couple had grown old before Vācaspati could write finis to his labours. Then alone did Vācaspati realise the magnitude both of his neglect of his wife and of his wife's self-sacrifice; and as a tardy measure of reparation, he gave her name to the last and greatest of his works, so that she could live on perpetually in the Bhāmātī, though not in the bodies of children born of her. The story is so picturesque, so typical of the scholar's neglect and the true scholarly recompense, that it deserves to be true.

Commenting on the Bhāmātī, undoubtedly Vācaspati's magnum opus, S. DASGUPTA (1965⁴, II, 108) remarks that this great scholar "always tries to explain the text as faithfully as he can, keeping himself in the background and directing his great knowledge of the

subject to the elucidation of the problems which directly arise from the texts and to explaining the allusions and contexts of thoughts, objections and ideas of other schools of thought referred to in the text". This, mutatis mutandis, is true of his Tattva-Vaiśaradī as well. It is this uncommon impartiality which makes it so difficult to get a rounded picture of his personal philosophy, though his own viewpoint is most likely that expressed in the Bhāmatī.

In the eleventh century Bhoja, ruler of Dhārā, composed a much acclaimed commentary to the Yoga-Sūtra, known as the Rāja-Mārtanda or Bhoja-Vṛtti. Although the royal author contributes many original interpretations, his work is largely moulded on the Yoga-Bhāṣya and perhaps not quite as independent as he himself appears to have believed. J.W. HAUER (1958, 268) concedes to the possibility that Bhoja was a practising yogin, but this is pure conjecture. It is clear, though, from the introductory verse of his composition that he was a follower of Śaivism and a devout theist.

Easily the most self-reliant and fascinating of all the extant¹⁴ commentaries is the Yoga-Vārttika by Vijñāna Bhikṣu, who lived some time in the sixteenth/seventeenth century in Bengal. An abstract of this voluminous scholium is the Yoga-Sāra-Saṅgraha by the same author.

14 It is possible that Vyāsa was in fact not the first to comment on the Yoga-Sūtra. Thus according to J.W. HAUER (1958, 268f.) the Persian traveller al-Bīrūnī (973-1048 A.D.) apparently based his translation of the Yoga-Sūtra into Arabic on a commentary which does not appear to be either the Bhāṣya or the Tattva-Vaiśaradī.

Vijñāna Bhikṣu ranks among the great philosophical geniuses of India. Rejecting the non-dualist interpretation of reality which formed the dominant philosophical paradigm of the post-Śaṅkara period, he developed in his Vijñāna-Amṛta-Bhāṣya (to the Brahma-Sūtra) and in his other works a type of theistic Sāṃkhya not dissimilar to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga-Vedānta tradition of the Mahābhārata. As M. MÜLLER (1916⁴, 450) remarks, Vijñāna Bhikṣu was "a philosopher of considerable grasp" who "while fully recognising the difference between the six systems of philosophy, tried to discover a common truth behind them all, and to point out how they can be studied together, or rather in succession, and how all of them are meant to lead honest students into the way of truth".

He was a prolific writer and, in addition to the abovementioned treatises, also authored the Sāṃkhya-Pravacana-Bhāṣya, Sāṃkhya-Sāra, Upadeśa-Ratnamalā and a commentary on the Īśvara-Gītā (= Kūrma-Purāna II.1-11). He has the delightful habit of commenting on points which other exegetists conveniently ignore. For instance, he is the first to offer a comprehensive theory of the gunas. His statements are generally clear, and he makes no attempt to conceal the fact that his interpretations are simultaneously reinterpretations.

Roughly contemporary with Vijñāna Bhikṣu is Rāmananda, the author of a commentary entitled Maṅgiprabhā which is a work of little originality but which can be commended as a useful abstract of the leading ideas of the Yoga-Sūtra and Vyāsa's Bhāṣya. In this respect Rāmananda's work is typical of most of the later scholia which on the whole contain little that is new or particularly insightful.

A rare exception is Harihara's Bhāsvatī, a late nineteenth century composition. He also composed the so-called Yoga-Kārikā and a Sanskrit tract on Pañcasīkha and other sages which was edited and translated by J. GHOSH (1934).

To sum up: There is not only a considerable gap of several centuries between the oldest known commentary and Patañjali's Sūtra, but also an equally real and profound ideological interstice. As the chronological distance increased and the Yoga-Sūtra became more and more removed, the intervening commentaries filled in the blanks with new material and, as layer upon layer of secondary exposition was added, the original became successfully obscured. Although it is in most cases not possible to determine the exact outlook or bias of a commentator, there can be no question that any of the extant glosses and sub-glosses can claim unfeigned authenticity in their exposition of the Yoga-Sūtra. The 'distortions' of the Yoga-Bhāṣya have proved exceedingly resilient, and there is no certainty even that those commentators who offer more self-reliant interpretations are any more correct than their less original congeners. Even a cursory reading of the commentatorial literature evinces its basically impaired reliability. I do not think it necessary at this stage to introduce evidential details, since some of the data will be effectively dealt with in the analytical part and a complete documentation lies outside the scope of this study. I merely wish to observe that the evidence can be grouped under four headings:

- (1) Contradictions within the same text;

- (2) discrepancies between one text and another;
- (3) the silence of the commentators on vital issues;
- (4) the striking contrasts between the traditional expositions and a 'purged' interpretation of the Yoga-Sūtra on the basis of a text-immanent study of it.

From what has been said so far it is clear that the commentaries, however indispensable they may be, have to be taken cum grano salis, and that for an adequate comprehension of the Yoga-Sūtra it is imperative to concentrate on the information and cues contained in the Sūtra itself. This is precisely what P. DEUSSEN (1920³, I, 510) recommended long ago and what finally J.W. HAUER (1958) carried out more rigorously than any other translator. Despite all these misgivings, the intrinsic value of the majority of the commentaries is beyond question. Whatever their interpretational credibility may be, they were instrumental in the historical development of the yoga-darśana. In order to be able to detect and assess their individual contribution it is essential to study the Yoga-Sūtra on its own and carefully distinguish between the actual data of Patañjali's work as brought out by a critical analysis of it and the material in the commentaries.

CHAPTER THREE

A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE YOGA-SŪTRA

The conspicuous chronological and conceptual gap which exists between the commentators and Patañjali (or whoever may have been responsible for the final editing of the Yoga-Sūtra), evidently cancels the very possibility of arriving at an authentic understanding of the Yoga-Sūtra purely on the basis of the exegetical Sanskrit literature. Hence the only way of decoding the conceptual edifice of Patañjali is by means of a critical immanent interpretation of his text. In P. DEUSSEN's (1920³, 1, 510) words: "We adhere to the principle of gaining all information as far as possible from the sūtras themselves and seek the aid of the later expositions only where they fail us." However, like most translators before and after him, he did not really pursue his own strategy with sufficient consistency and consequently remained under the powerful influence of Vyāsa's scholium. P. DEUSSEN hoped to achieve his target with the help of textual criticism. Whilst most Indian scholars tended to emphasise the coherent architecture of Patañjali's manual, he questioned the inner unity of the Yoga-Sūtra, regarding it as a composite of several existent texts patched together rather randomly. This he deduced from the contents and its peculiar arrangement.

Thus P. DEUSSEN postulated a number of sūtra-texts

which, as he envisioned it, served contemporaneous schools as vademecums and which were then drawn together by the compiler of the vulgate as we know it. He tentatively suggested the following stratigraphy:

text A : I.1 - I.16
 text B : I.17 - I.51
 text C : II.1 - II.27
 text D : II.28 - III.55
 text E : IV.1 - IV.33¹⁵

P. DEUSSEN's conclusions were renewedly investigated and restated by J.W. HAUER (1958) who undertook the most stringent analysis of the textual corpus of the Yoga-Sūtra hitherto. J.W. HAUER in fact felt that already the native Sanskrit exegetists had been very much aware of the problematic nature of the composition of Patañjali's treatise. In this connection he drew attention to Vācaspati Miśra's opening words to aphorism II.1:

namu prathama-pādena-eva sa-upāyah sa-avāntara-
prabhedah sa-phalo yoga uktas-tat-kin-aparam-
avisīṣyate yad-artham dvitīya-pādaḥ prārabhyeta-
ity-ata āha udr̥ṣṭāṁiti, abhyāsa-vairāgye hi yoga-
upāyau prathame pāda uktau, na ca tau vyutthitasya
drāg-ity-eva sambhavata iti dvitīya-pāda-upadeśyān-
upāyān-apeksate sattva-śuddhy-artham.

15 According to most editions, there are 34 sūtras in chapter IV.

This may be translated as follows:

Objection: The first chapter [of the Yoga-Sūtra] having described Yoga with its means, subdivisions and results, what reason does there remain for a second chapter to be commenced? Reply: He [i.e. Vyāsa] answers: "It has been stated [in the first chapter what Yoga is for one whose mind is concentrated]." For in the first chapter practice and dispassion were stated to be the two means of Yoga. And since these two do not come into being at once for one who is of out-going mind, he requires the means taught in the second chapter in order to purify the sattva.

There are similar introductory remarks to the third and fourth pāda. If Vācaspati would have entertained any real doubts about the authenticity of the various chapters, as J.W. HAUER seems to imply, he would certainly have expressed them in his prologue to the fourth chapter which prima facie appears to initiate a natural break in the textual continuity.¹⁶ Yet Vācaspati accepts the traditional division without even the slightest hesitation.

Admittedly, even a cursory reading of the Yoga-Sūtra convinces one of the fact that it cannot possibly be an entirely homogeneous composition. As S. DASGUPTA (1930, 51) observes: "An analytic

¹⁶ This is in fact not confirmed by an in-depth study of the text.

study of the sūtras also brings conviction that they do not show any original attempt but are a masterly and systematic compilation, supplemented with certain original contributions." He isolates four factors which in his opinion seem to prove the compilatory nature of the text, viz.

- (1) the Yoga-Sūtra is divided into chapters (pāda) rather than into books (adhyāya) and lessons (āṅṅika);
- (2) the highly systematic character of the first three chapters with their precise definitions;
- (3) the absence of any missionary zeal or polemics;
- (4) the fact that at the end of the third chapter the author writes 'finis' (iti) which is repeated at the conclusion of the fourth chapter.

Valid as these points are in themselves, they do not amount to primary evidence. The most remarkable feature in favour of the hypothetical compilatory nature of the Yoga-Sūtra are the apparent discontinuities in the textual arrangement which strike the eye of even the most casual reader. But granted that Patañjali's work is a compilation of extant aphorisms, how must one proceed to be able to separate the various assumed sūtra-units from the accretions of the final editor? I do not think that this question has ever been faced properly, since none of the previous scholars bothered to justify his particular methodology of textual criticism.¹⁷

17 For the technical aspects of textual criticism see J. MACKIE (1947, 53-80) and also J. WHATMOUGH (1954, 441-446).

Past scholars, on the whole, proceeded from the assumption that the Yoga-Sūtra cannot possibly be a single homogeneous textual entity owing to its apparent disorganisation. In the following I shall commence from the opposite end as it were by presupposing the perfect homogeneity of the text. In other words, I shall look for points which seem to contradict, or at least seriously challenge, this basic working hypothesis. In this way I hope to avoid the fallacy common to all attempts of textual criticism so far, namely to cut more and more slices from the cake until it simply vanishes out of sight and nothing but disconnected fragments — quite meaningless in themselves — are left behind.

Instances of this kind of procedure are legend in Indology. It has been applied to the Bhagavad-Gītā, the Mahābhārata and with especial success to the Kātha-Upaniṣad which F. WELLER (1953) managed to dissect into up to fifteen layers. The contradictory results of this approach are indicative of its implicit fallacy. It has, therefore, justly been questioned by some scholars. For instance, E. CONZE (1967, 168) sounds this warning: "... such analytical studies of ancient writings are tedious to compose and unattractive to read, and when carried too far they threaten to shatter and pulverize the very text which they set out to examine, as we have seen in the case of Homer and the New Testament."

Speaking specifically of the Yoga-Sūtra, E. FRAUWALLNER (1953, I, 439) makes this perfectly valid point: "... one proceeded with the analysis as if the different parts were merely strung together and as if it would suffice for their separation

to simply ascertain the joints. But things are not as simple as that. In addition to the fact that in such cases the various component parts often had a long history of their own and also had undergone considerable alteration before they were finally put together, they moreover were subjected to adjustments and approximations in the very process of editing. For, the editors were surely not oblivious to the many differences and contradictions of the diverse texts, and they tried to remove these and thus create a real textual unity. It is this which must be taken into account in any genuine analysis. It is important to recognise these editorial interventions and to grasp the original form of the miscellaneous doctrines."

Still, past textual criticism has not been completely wasted, since it singled out all those points which could possibly be regarded as real breaks in the structure of the text. In the following I shall re-examine all these proposed 'fissure' points while at the same time keeping alert to other possible joints previously overlooked. Although it is fair to assume that there are few Sanskrit texts which have escaped interpolations and alterations altogether, especially if they belong to an early period, it nonetheless seems futile to consider every sentence as suspect. It must be remembered that the oral traditions of India and their subsequent embodiment in the shape of actual texts are astonishingly reliable. The Indians' healthy respect for tradition is well known.

Thus before one contrives distortions, interpolations etc.,

one must ask oneself seriously whether what seems to be 'corrupt', 'confused' or 'patched together' is not merely the result of an unwarranted demand for absolute logical consistency and rational clarity, symptomatic of our specific thought pattern. Our need for 'order' in the sense of logical neatness is not necessarily shared by non-western cultures. That this is in fact the case has been amply demonstrated, I think, by Social Anthropology, Cross-cultural Psychology and cognate disciplines.¹⁸ In other words, what to us is blatantly incongruous may still be quite consistent within the cognitive framework of the Indians. Especially archaic thought operates far less with dualisms and hence finds it much easier to reconcile contradictions and to uphold paradoxes. Past textual criticism has been remarkably blind to this all-important insight, or else it could not possibly have insisted on applying the rigid standards of Aristotlean logic so uncompromisingly as to whittle away whole texts.

I shall now attempt to identify and single out those parts of the Yoga-Sūtra which definitely defy the assumed homogeneity of this text. It seem pertinent to base this re-examination of the architecture of Patañjali's composition on a critique of previous endeavours of textual criticism, and for this purpose J.W. HAUER's detailed analysis is, I think, the optimum point of departure.

J.W. HAUER (1958, 221ff.) starts from the premise that the parallel and divergent treatment of certain topics in the different

¹⁸ See, for instance, G. MYRDAL (1973, 89-99).

chapters is denotative of the composite character of this work. He suggests that the vulgate is a compendium of several independent sūtra-texts belonging to various schools which flourished in diverse historical periods. He accordingly divides the vulgate into five distinct text traditions:

- | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|---|-------|---|--------|
| (1) <u>nirodha</u> -text | : | I.1 | - | I.22 |
| (2) <u>Īśvara-pranidhāna</u> -text | : | I.23 | - | I.51 |
| (3) <u>kriyā-yoga</u> -text | : | II.1 | - | II.27 |
| (4) <u>yoga-aṅga</u> -text | : | II.28 | - | III.55 |
| (5) <u>nirmāna-citta</u> -text | : | IV.1 | - | IV.34 |

J.W. HAUER regards the yoga-aṅga section as the oldest portion of the Yoga-Sūtra and attributes it to the grammarian Patañjali. He offers two reasons for assigning this section to such an early date. The first is that the yoga-aṅga text contains several important features in nuce as it were which were later on elaborated in the other sections (e.g. the item of Īśvara-pranidhāna and the kleśa doctrine). The second reason is that unlike the other (allegedly later) sections, the yoga-aṅga portion does not show any buddhist influence. Here one may argue that it also contains hardly any theoretical material on which one could study the possible impact of Buddhism. J.W. HAUER'S ascription of this section to the grammarian Patañjali is possible but unlikely.¹⁹

19 On p. 238 J.W. HAUER strangely contradicts himself: "Ich glaube die Verfasserschaft des Grammatikers Patañjali für den yogāṅga-Text des YS kommt nach den vorausgehenden Darlegungen ernstlich in Frage..."

Since, according to J.W. HAUER, the yoga-aṅga text does not consider certain significant aspects of Yoga, further sūtras were added to supplement it, such as the Īśvara-pranidhāna section belonging, in his view, to the Rudra-Śiva-Viṣṇu adherents, the kriyā-yoga section pertaining to those groups of yogins who were more inclined to the brāhmanical tradition, and still later the nirmāṇa-citta text. These were then assembled and supplied with a preface, the so-called nirodha text. As J.W. HAUER sees it, this final editing occurred some time in the fourth century A.D. This historical reconstruction is almost too neat to be convincing, and in fact J.W. HAUER lacks the material evidence to back up his inferences.

It is true that the Yoga-Sūtra displays a certain lack of methodical treatment. But must this necessarily point to a many-layered composition of the nature J.W. HAUER advocates? A more candid and less reductionistic reading of the text evinces that the different sections are far too coordinated to allow the deduction that they are of completely independent origins. Rather it seems that the apparent incongruities are due to the fact that the Yoga-Sūtra leans on already existing yogic traditions and partly incorporates the ideas and terminology of these earlier creations. J.W. HAUER's solution is also imperfect insofar as it does not provide a satisfactory answer to the question, posed by J.W. HAUER himself, as to why a 'superior Yoga guru' should have arranged these independent texts in such an haphazard manner.

In J.W. HAUER's opinion, the first pāda is a composite of

two distinct units. The first twenty-two aphorisms are, according to him, some kind of an introduction to the vulgate and originally had the function of defining certain psychological and philosophical termini, the central concept being nirodha. He takes this to be the key concept of these prefatory sūtras, and wrongly identifies nirodha with the terminal type of samādhi.²⁰ As will be shown in the semantic analysis of this important concept, nirodha has several levels of application, and the definition "Yoga is the restriction of the consciousness fluctuations" (I.2: yogas-citta-vṛtti-nirodhah) must be understood as a preliminary one.

J.W. HAUER thinks that the editor of the vulgate, whom he also holds responsible for the composition of the nirodha section, used the Īśvara-praṇidhāna material as his starting-point precisely because he could not find any better text in which the central term of his own contribution, viz. nirodha, had a more decisive position: sūtra I.51 equates sarva-nirodha or 'total restriction' with nirbīja-samādhi or 'seedless ecstasy'. J.W. HAUER's reasoning holds good only as long as (a) there is merely one type of nirodha, namely sarva-nirodha, and (b) sūtra I.23 really stands in no immediate relation to the preceding aphorism. He is wrong on both counts. As I will set forth in the semantic part nirodha has three strata, which leaves the second point for consideration.

Even though J.W. HAUER quite correctly recognises the intrinsic theistic nature of Yoga, he somehow fails to utilise this momentous

20 See J.W. HAUER (1958, 463, fn.1).

finding in his interpretation of the Yoga-Sūtra. The practice of Īśvara-pranidhāna is mentioned four times in the text (I.23, II.1, II.32 and II.45). Thus, following J.W. HAUER's segmentation, it appears once in the Īśvara-pranidhāna section, once in the kriyā-yoga part and twice in the yoga-aṅga text.

In the last-mentioned section it is counted as a constituent of niyama and is defined in II.45 as conducive to samādhi-siddhi. J.W. HAUER, misunderstanding this crucial compound, translates it with 'Vollkommenheit der Einfaltung' (perfection of enstasy). J.H. WOODS (1966³) and G. JHA (1907) have similar renderings, viz. 'perfection of concentration' and 'accomplishment of meditation' respectively. The term siddhi is thus given the meaning of 'perfection', but it can also be taken in the sense of 'attainment', as for example, R. PRASĀDA (1912) and SHREE PUROHIT SWAMI (1938) fully realised. As a matter of fact this appears to be the more credible rendering.

As is borne out by the history of Yoga, at least in its hindu form, Īśvara always played a signal role in yogic contexts. The yogins experienced him as a powerful entity whose 'grace' (anugraha) was an absolute prerequisite for obtaining samādhi. Hence the organic interrelation of meditative absorption and prayer in pre-classical Yoga. Even in contemporary Yoga, which is highly influenced by the non-dualist branch of Vedānta, devotion to a personified supreme being is regarded as axial to the attainment of samādhi. Ramana Mahārṣi's attitude on this issue is paradigmatic.²¹

21 See also the interesting footnote by A.K. MAJUMDAR (1968, 85, fn.5):
"Commenting on Yoga-Sūtra I.24 the Emperor [king Bhoja] writes
prakṛti-puruṣa-samyoga-viyogayor-Īśvara-icchā vyatirekeṇa-anupapatteḥ

With the realisation of the centrality of the belief in Īśvara, much of the strength of J.W. HAUER's conclusions about the so-called Īśvara-pranidhāna section is dispersed. Granted that 'devotion to the lord' was already at the time of the allegedly older yoga-aṅga section regarded as categorical to the attainment of samādhi and that therefore it did not (as J.W. HAUER supposes) stand in this text in a subordinate place, it is not really convincing that the Īśvara-pranidhāna text should constitute the 'manifesto' of an independent school of Yoga which emphasised proper 'devotion to the lord'.

J.W. HAUER's interpretation is opposed by yet another important fact. To justify the assumed independence of the Īśvara-pranidhāna section, he has to link up sūtra I.23 with I.12 and to put 'devotion to the lord' on a par with abhyāsa and vairāgya by conjecturing that the word vā of I.23 refers back to nirodha. But this link-up of I.23 with I.12 has been rejected already by D. LAUENSTEIN (1943), though J.W. HAUER (1958, 462, fn.11) rebuffs his objections without however supplying sound reasons for it. J.W. HAUER translates I.23 thus: "Or [nirodha] can be achieved by devotion to the lord." Yet to put this important gnostic practice on the same level with abhyāsa and vairāgya is totally misleading, for these two concepts refer to the dual axis of any type of Yoga, as will be made clear in the semantic part.

(fn. 21 ctd.)

(...) According to the editor [R.S.Bhattacharya], the Emperor was wrong in his estimation of Īśvara's power (Introduction, p.16), but late Mr. Kalipada Guha Roy, a famous Yogin, assured me that the Emperor was quite right."

Rather it appears that Īśvara-pranidhāna must be understood as one of the elements of abhyāsa or 'practice', the positive axis of the bi-polar path of Yoga. It may now be asked in what connection I.23 really stands to the preceding aphorisms. One of J.W. HAUER's reasons for connecting I.23 with I.12 is that the latter sūtra can explain the ablative employed in the former. But there is no compelling grammatical reason for this. Besides, there is also an ablative in I.17. As a careful examination of the aphorisms immediately preceding I.23 bears out, Īśvara-pranidhāna has to be related to I.17-I.20. In I.17 the four forms of samprajñāta-samādhi are mentioned; I.18 is a reference to asamprajñāta-samādhi.

J.W. HAUER completely misinterprets the latter sūtra: "The other kind of control [i.e. nirodha] has as its precondition the exercise of the idea of cessation and has only an activator residuum."²² As it stands this translation is unintelligible. The compound virāma-pratyaya-abhyāsa-pūrvah is preferably to be rendered as "the cessation of [all] presented-ideas in the former practice [i.e. in samprajñāta-samādhi]" . This aphorism has, incidentally, also not been quite understood by Vyāsa, whose usage of sarva-vṛtti implies that he equates pratyaya with vṛtti, which is incorrect. Vācaspati of course makes the same mistake, but Harihara interprets correctly: virāmasya sarva-pratyaya-hīnatayāh.

I.17-I.20 are references to various means of reaching the

22 J.W. HAUER's own words are: "Die andere Art der Bewältigung hat zur Voraussetzung das Üben in der Vorstellung vom Aufhören und hat nur noch einen Bewirker-Rest."

condition of samādhi (in its several grades and types). I.23 makes out 'devotion to the lord' as one of these implements. Its superior position among these means is apparent from the definition of Īśvara by which it is followed. This whole complex is succeeded by the enunciation of a series of other similar methods for effecting the state of inner calm (citta-prasādana), such as the regulation of exhalation and the fixation of the mind, etc. When all psychomental oscillations have come to a perfect standstill, the ground is prepared for the experience of samāpatti or 'coincidence'. This process will be examined separately.

On the basis of the above considerations, J.W. HAUER's proposition of the compound nature of the first chapter must be abandoned. The evidence adduced so far points rather to the unimpaired organic unity of the series of sūtras I.1-I.55. If there are any interpolations at all, it must frankly be admitted that these can no longer be ascertained. / 51 ?

The main problems inherent in the first pāda were also studied in some detail by the Czech scholar A. JANÁČEK (1954, 70ff.), whose principal arguments and hypotheses will be dealt with presently. After giving a brief account of previous efforts in deciphering the textual pattern of the Yoga-Sūtra, A. JANÁČEK poses the following question: "The Īśvara-pranidhāna text is supposed to be a self-contained writing of one Yoga movement. The questions that remain still unsolved are: Where does this text actually start at, what was the manner in which the Buddhist śraddhā etc., maitrī etc., became part of the text, what is the true function of the

Īśvara-prāṇidhāna method in the text, and a host of other problems..."²³

Although A. JANÁČEK remonstrates against his predecessors' method of breaking the text up into so many 'original' texts on the strength of mere textual analysis and although he instead prefers to ascertain first the nature, type and character of the diverse Yoga schools which may be represented in the Yoga-Sūtra, he nonetheless practically commits the same error as those who went before him when he states that "the text of I.23 till I.29 (and may be till I.31) discusses completely one whole Yoga school"²⁴. Furthermore, his endeavour to "keep in focus" the aphorisms I.20-I.22 (with their leading terms saṃvega and śraddhā-vīrya-smṛti-samādhi-prajñā) does not add more power of conviction to this renewed fragmentation of the text.

Leaving aside for the moment the arguments laid down above against such a division and also the fact of the extreme brevity of the thus isolated unit, A. JANÁČEK's proposed Īśvara-prāṇidhāna text lacks the most important ingredient of any treatise on Yoga which could possibly claim to be self-contained, viz. a pronouncement regarding the goal of the particular yogic path which it represents.

For, surely, the aphorism I.28 can hardly be taken as a statement of the ultimate terminus of the path outlined in the preceding sūtras, particularly since I.29 states quite unequivocally

23 A. JANÁČEK (1954, 78)

24 A. JANÁČEK (1954, 79). The author, for obvious reasons, wavers considerably in fixing the precise length of this section.

"Thence [results] the attainment of the in-turned consciousness and also the disappearance of the obstacles", which aphorism A. JANÁČEK himself still counts to the Īśvara-pranidhāna section. It is obvious from this sūtra that the attainment of which it speaks is but a transitional stage in the protracted process of yogic involution.

This may be an opportune point to glance at the term bhāvana occurring in I.28. As A. JANÁČEK aptly observes this technical word appears in the Yoga-Sūtra invariably in the immediate vicinity of the compound Īśvara-pranidhāna, and hence it seems a fair assumption that it should have a consistent meaning in all four cases. It occurs in the shape of the following compounds:

tad-ārtha-bhāvanam (I.28)

samādhi-bhāvana-^o (II.2)

pratipakṣa-bhāvanam (II.33, II.34)

It can be taken to signify the idea of 'realisation, cultivation, effecting' throughout. Vācaspati Miśra (on I.28) explains the term bhāvana as the "entering [or settling-down] again and again into the mind" (bhāvanam punah punaś-citte niveśanam). A. JANÁČEK paraphrases this concept by "quantitative increase, in other words a 'gradation of intensity'"²⁵ — a typical example of his dialectical approach and terminology which he is keen to apply wherever possible. Vācaspati's interpretation is corroborated by Vyāsa who makes it

²⁵ See A. JANÁČEK (1954, 82)

plain that the japa and bhāvana of om combined lead to the one-pointedness of the mind and not to kaivalya straight away. A. JANÁČEK's interpretation of bhāvana as an instance of abhyāsa, which he defines as 'effort' (yatna) or 'a manifestation of volition', (icchā, vīrya, utsāha), is quite sound. Yet his emphasis on the 'voluntaristic' feature of Īśvara-pranidhāna and nirodha is exaggerated.

Moreover, it makes little sense to split the text between I.28 and I.29 or even between I.31 and I.32 as he does, for the line of thought in this passage is absolutely continuous. One may possibly concede to the fact that the aphorisms I.23-I.32 constitute a unit of their own without, however, assuming that this must of necessity be of the nature of a separate text altogether. Clearly, if one insists on a rigidly tight concatenation of ideas in the presentation of the subject-matter, the Yoga-Sūtra, like any other piece of writing — with the possible exception of some rigorous works on logic or mathematics — could be divided into any number of sub-texts.

Although scholars like J.W.HAUER (1958) and A. JANÁČEK (1954) — triggered off by the word vā of I.23 — are preoccupied with figuring out the nature of the relationship between section I.23-I.31 and the so-called nirodha text (I.1-I.22), they take no notice of the aphorisms succeeding I.31. Or else they would realise that section I.34-I.40 delineates various ways of stabilising the inner world, i.e. of achieving the restriction (nirodha) of the fluctuations of the mind. There are also connective particles (i.e. vā 'or') in I.34, I.35, I.36, I.37, I.38 and I.39. Applying the yardstick of previous researchers, these sūtras should all have the status of independent texts! Also,

the argument that the section on Iśvara-pranidhāna (I.23-I.32) is more explicit does not warrant the conclusion that it must therefore be an interpolation. Rather it seems preferable and wholly consistent to regard it as conclusive evidence of the paramount importance of Iśvara in Classical Yoga.

Finally, A. JANÁČEK inadvertently reinforces the present argumentation when he advances his hypothesis of the common basis of the so-called nirodha text and the Iśvara-pranidhāna section. Both passages, he points out, have abhyāsa and nirodha as their central terms. He considers the type of Yoga outlined in the nirodha part as a reform of the Iśvara school of Yoga under the pressure of buddhist thought. This assumption is fallacious, for A. JANÁČEK thereby means to imply that there can be a Yoga without renunciation or vairāgya, namely his 'voluntaristic type' as represented in the Iśvara-pranidhāna section. I am not aware of any scripture within the fold of Hinduism which would not emphasise the fact that without dispassion or renunciation (internal or external) the goal of Yoga is unattainable.

In another paper, A. JANÁČEK (1958, 88-100), after a critical comparison of the vocabulary of the various 'texts' of the Yoga-Sūtra, introduces the idea that the nirodha section is a pre-requisite for the third chapter and that therefore the nirodha-yoga and the eightfold path (aṣṭa-aṅga-yoga) are 'interdependent'²⁶. Yet despite envisaging certain basic connections between the nirodha

26 See A. JANÁČEK (1958, 98)

section, the Īśvara-pranidhāna part and the asta-aṅga-yoga texts, he nonetheless aligns himself with J.W. HAUER (1958), P. DEUSSEN (1920³,I) and others in maintaining a priori the separateness of these portions. Consequently it is not surprising to find that much of what A. JANÁČEK adduces as supporting his own views is actually only a travesty of the facts.

A good example of this kind of unconscious misreading of the Yoga-Sūtra is his notion of the various 'starting points' of these supposedly independent schools of Yoga represented by the three sections mentioned above. Thus according to him the concept of vitarka or 'unwholesome deliberation' provides the starting point of the yoga-aṅga section, whilst the doctrine of kleśa fulfills the same function in the kriyā-yoga text, and in the Īśvara-pranidhāna part it is the concept of antarāya or 'hindrance' which serves as a suitable trigger. In the nirodha text, one must add, the notion of vytti appears to have an analogous position, provided of course that A. JANÁČEK's reasoning were sound.

But this neat arrangement is only apparently consistent with the data. Looked at more closely, it becomes evident that he disregards certain important aspects. First of all, his classification does not take into account that the 'hindrances' mentioned in I.29-I.30 are actually intimately linked with the process of disciplining the mental fluctuations (vytti). Sickness, languor, doubt, heedlessness, sloth, dissipation, false vision, non-attainment of the stages of meditative absorption and instability on these stages — all forms of antarāya — are most closely associated with any yogic path

and can only really be understood in their function with regard to the control of the mental oscillations. On what grounds should the list of 'obstacles' (I.29-I.30) be regarded as giving out a system of categories entirely unique to the Īśvara-pranidhāna school? It seems to me that the items cited in these aphorisms must be considered as recognised symptoms of failure within the framework of any yogic path. Conversely, it is unlikely that they should have been selected and turned into full-fledged doctrines by the protagonists of the Īśvara-pranidhāna school of Yoga.

It is also not patent why the concept of antarāya should parallel that of vitarka. Whereas the 'obstacles' are connected with the yogin's subjective endeavour to pacify his mind, the 'unwholesome deliberations' pertain to his moral behaviour. The aphorism II.34 leaves no doubt about this when it associates vitarka with the opposite of non-harming, truthfulness, non-stealing, chastity and greedlessness.

J.W. HAUER (1958) is on this issue at least one step ahead of A. JANÁČEK (1958), for his version of the Īśvara-pranidhāna text does not abruptly terminate with I.32, but extends to the end of the first chapter. Far from forming an insular entity the complex of aphorisms on Īśvara-pranidhāna is closely connected with the remainder of the first pāda. Thus the expression citta-prasādana (I.23) can safely be taken as a synonym of nirodha, and the subsequent aphorisms expound various alternative means of steadying the mind. Finally, I.42-I.51 definitely refer back to,

and constitute a detailed exposition of, the sūtras I.17-I.18.

These findings point all in the same direction. They demand the recognition of the first chapter as a consistent and self-contained thematic unit. Its traditional title, samādhi-pāda, is perhaps not quite as arbitrary as one might be tempted to think. It can be said to give a reasonably complete and satisfactorily clear outline of the principal mechanisms of Yoga, specifically the nirodha state.

The second chapter opens with a definition of kriyā-yoga which previous scholars have taken to be the commencement of an entirely new and independent treatise and not merely as the beginning of a new chapter. Following the lead of P. DEUSSEN (1920³, I) both J.W. HAUER (1958) and A. JANÁČEK (1954) assign to this allegedly autonomous text the series of sūtras from II.1-II.27. According to them, these aphorisms expound a different kind of conceptual tradition and consequently also employ a vocabulary which is distinct from that of the preceding sūtras. However, assuming the unmitigated homogeneity of the Yoga-Sūtra as demanded by the criteria specified in the present methodological programme, how much weight do these arguments bear? Is the vocabulary and the conceptual milieu of the kriyā-yoga text really independent from the first pāda? For the time being I am not concerned with the validity of the hypothetical terminal point of this 'text' (viz. II.27), but I propose to accept it pro tempore in order to develop my counter-arguments against such a division.

Probably the most striking point that can be, and indeed has

been, cited in favour of the autonomy of the kriyā-yoga section is the fact that sūtra II.1 constitutes what appears to be an independent definition of a particular type of Yoga which is in contrast with the definition given in sūtra I.2. But this carries far less weight than appears prima facie. One would expect a new chapter to commence with a suitable introductory statement epitomising the material to be proffered to the reader. In the present case this consists in a concise typological definition of the Yoga under discussion. The question is whether this definitional statement is in dissonance with the definition of Yoga as submitted in I.2, or whether both definitions have to be regarded as interrelated declarations.

The latter explanation is the more viable one, for the following reasons. As I have pointed out already the definition of I.2 cannot be deemed more than a prefatory statement of the initial function of yogic practice, and I have also drawn attention to the multi-level application of the concept of nirodha. This in itself would seem to vindicate the view that (a) the nirodha 'text' (I.1-I.23) is incomplete and that (b) there is every justification for further definitions, which either may be more comprehensive than the first one or else concern a different aspect of the path. The first point has been dealt with already. Still, the argument can be modified if one accepts the homogeneity of the first chapter. In that case it could be argued that the quasi-definition of I.2 finds its completion in I.51 where the expression sarva-nirodha is found.

This objection can only be answered in connection with the

second point. For, even though the outline of Yoga provided in the first chapter is in itself sufficient, it treats merely of a specific aspect of the yogic path but cannot be said to represent a full picture of it. The samādhi-pāda makes every impression of being an introduction only. There is an important formal difference between the definition of I.2 and that of II.1. Whereas I.2 entails a functional statement concerning the (preliminary) purpose of Yoga, II.1 is a statement about the componential features of the yogic path by which the purpose stated in the immediately following aphorism (viz. II.2) can be realised. Thus from purely formal considerations, I.2 and II.2 belong to the same category, while — as will be shown in detail — II.1 is of the same type as II.28- II.29. In contrast with I.2 which defines the preliminary goal — i.e. the pacification of the quivering mind — II.2 concerns the subtle mechanisms underlying this operation, viz. the 'attenuation of the causes-of-affliction' (kleśa-tanūkarana) which has as its overt correlate the 'realisation of ecstasy' (samādhi-bhāvana). Thus, rather than deeming the definitions of I.2 and II.1-II.2 as mutually exclusive, one is led to the conclusion that they are in fact complementary enunciations. This demolishes one of the points advanced in support of the alleged independence of the kriyā-yoga section.

The second point, which asserts the autonomy of the vocabulary employed in this part, stands on equally shaky foundations. For, what appears to be terminological divergencies can readily be explained by the simple fact that the subject-matter is bound to

determine to a certain extent the vocabulary in which it is embedded. And there can be little doubt that the topics discussed in the second chapter are not only different from those of the first chapter but are also more complex and hence demand a select phraseology. This very obvious circumstance does not seem to have occurred to past researchers, who were remarkably oblivious to such evidence as contradicted their pet theory about the composite nature of the Yoga-Sūtra. As might be expected, they fail to qualify their summary statements about the peculiarity of the terminology of this 'text' in relation to the vocabulary used in the first pāda. No specific instances are given which one could examine and pass judgement on. Their arguments can safely be assigned to the realm of impressionistic speculation.

On the other hand, there are certain points of contact which evince the intimate link between the first chapter and the so-called kriyā-yoga section of the second chapter. This link is not merely an accidental one, resulting from a thoughtful juxtaposition and matching of two independent texts possibly by eliminating blatant contradictions at the hand of a clever editor. On the contrary, it reveals a fundamental structural coherence which simply could not have been thus 'manufactured'.

These significant points of contact are the following:

- (1) The central concept of the kriyā-yoga section, viz. kleśa, is clearly implied in I.5 which uses the

perfect passive participle of the verbal root
 √kliś 'to be afflicted', both in the affirmative
 and the negative sense, as kliṣṭa and akliṣṭa.
 Also, in I.24 the term kleśa itself is found.

- (2) Asmitā, one of the kleśas according to II.3, is mentioned already in I.17 as one of the component features of samprañāta-samādhi.
- (3) Another key concept of the kriyā-yoga section is duḥkha (see II.5, II.8, II.15-II.16) which makes its appearance also in I.31 and I.33. Especially II.5 and I.33 invite comparison.
- (4) The concept of draṣṭṛ, first referred to in I.3, is also to be met with in II.17 and II.20.
- (5) The concept of rāga appears both in II.3, II.7 and in I.37.
- (6) The important aphorism II.11 in a way qualifies the definition of Yoga given in I.2.
- (7) The affiliated concepts of karman, vipāka and āśaya which hold a prominent place in the kriyā-yoga text are clearly present in I.24; their appearance in II.12 etc. can be interpreted as being due to the desire of the author to develop these important concepts.
- (8) Likewise, the term samskāra is used already in I.18 and I.50.
- (9) The term pratyaya occurs first in I.10, I.18-I.19 and then again in II.20.

- (10) The term prajñā offers another link. It appears in I.20, I.48-I.49 and then in II.27. Especially I.48 and II.27 seem to be closely associated.

These findings permit the conclusion that the so-called kriyā-yoga text is in fact a continuation of the first chapter. It elaborates certain ideas and concepts which are implied in the first pāda but for obvious reasons are not treated in depth. That in the course of this further exposition the author should have introduced several new terms and concepts is but natural. Among these newcomers are terms like śakti (II.6), pratiprasava (II.10), parināma (II.15), drśya (II.17, II.18, II.21), samyoga (II.17, II.23, II.25), the rare word bhoga (II.18), viśeṣa, aviśeṣa (II.19), liṅga-mātra (II.19), aliṅga (II.19), drśi-mātra (II.20), sva, svāmi (II.23), viveka-khyāti (II.26). However, none of these terminological novelties contradicts any of the previous conceptual elaborations. Most of them are synonyms of terms introduced already in the first chapter. The rest can be understood as a linear continuation of the material of the first pāda.

This overwhelming evidence allows but one conclusion, namely that far from being an interpolated piece, the kriyā-yoga section is consistent with the thought and language of the first chapter and hence is an integral part of the Yoga-Sūtra.

It must now be asked in what manner the kriyā-yoga section, which for the sake of the argument was taken to end with II.27, is related

to the subsequent body of aphorisms. This brings us to the consideration of the so-called yoga-aṅga text.

Previous interpreters are in unanimous agreement in two respects, namely that (a) the continuity of the text matter comes to an abrupt end after II.27 and that (b) II.28 initiates an entirely self-contained text, the so-called yoga-aṅga section. One may easily concede to both points. For, II.28 does in fact disrupt the hitherto fairly homogeneous and consistent textual presentation. Nor can it be denied that the relevant complex of aphorisms drawn together under the heading of yoga-aṅga is not only from the viewpoint of the content but also from purely terminological considerations incongruent with the preceding material.

As I have intimated above, the sūtras II.28-II.29 offer a quasi-definition of Yoga which is formally akin to the definition found at the outset of the second chapter where the constituents of kriyā-yoga are named (see II.1-II.2). It appears highly unlikely that in a continuously written text one would find such an obvious break in the treatment of the subject-matter, and one could expect a far smoother transition from one topic to the other. II.28 entails three interrelated semantic units, viz. (a) yoga-aṅga-anuṣṭhāna, (b) aśuddhi-kṣaya and (c) jñāna-dīpti, to which must be added a fourth unit which, on closer analysis, is evidently a later addition: (d) ā viveka-khyāti. These four units stand in a causal relation to each other. From (a) the performance of the various members of Yoga results (b) the dwindling of the impurities which, in turn, occasions (c) a flash of gnosis which leads (d)

up to the level of the vision of discernment. From this emerge at least three conspicuous points:

- (1) The use of the word anugāhāna rather than abhyāsa;
- (2) the use of the term dīpti nowhere else employed in the Yoga-Sūtra;
- (3) the rare use of the connective particle ā meaning 'up to'.

It is indeed rather surprising that none of the past researchers has remarked on the strange position of the phrase ā viveka-khyāti which is certainly suspect in this aphorism.

The term jñāna occurs in I.8 (mithyā-°), I.9 (śabda-°), I.38 (svapna-nidrā-°), I.42 (śabda-ārtha-°) in the straight forward sense of 'knowledge' without any gnostic implications. On the other hand, the term prajñā definitely stands for 'gnosis', e.g. in I.20 (samādhi-°), I.48 (ṛtam-bharā-°), II.27 (prānta-bhūmi-°) and even in I.49 (śruta-anumāna-°). Yet in the compound jñāna-dīpti, the word jñāna unquestionably has a gnostic significance. It may be objected that this is purely coincidental and that in one other case at least (viveka-jñāna: III.52, III.54) jñāna is given a gnostic slant, but this isolated usage can be explained from the fact that jñāna is used extensively in this particular stretch of the text (e.g. III.16-III.19, III.22, III.25-III.28, III.35) in the sense of 'knowledge'.

The reason for the editor's addition of the phrase ā viveka-

khyāti is not far too seek. For, he uses this core concept last in II.26. It is significant that in the yoga-aṅga section proper²⁷ neither the term viveka nor the term khyāti occurs other than in II.28. This very simple addition ingeniously bridges the considerable gap between the yoga-aṅga section (whatever its exact length may be) and the preceding portion of the Yoga-Sūtra.

II.28 and II.29 belong together. Whilst the former is a functional definition similar to I.2 (prefatory) and II.2 (advanced), the latter is a componential definition similar to II.1. The self-containedness of the yoga-aṅga section is, moreover, borne out by the fact that the three components of kriyā-yoga — viz. tapas, svādhyāya and īśvara-pranidhāna — are all listed in the yoga-aṅga text (see II.32) as members of niyama. There they are mentioned together with śauca and santoṣa. This series is evidently in contrast with the enumeration of II.1. Furthermore, there is also the circumstance of the absence of any reference to kleśa but the definite mention of lobha, krodha and moha in II.34.

Essentially the yoga-aṅga section consists of definitions of the eight components of aṣṭa-aṅga-yoga and their sub-divisions. In other words, it is a purely technical section with virtually no philosophical matter, unless one agrees with J.W. HAUER's (1958) and A. JANÁČEK's (1954) versions of this 'text' which, according to them, extends right to the end of the third chapter. No adequate

27 I add 'proper' because this interpolated section is, as I intend to show, much shorter than J.W. HAUER (1958) and A. JANÁČEK (1954) propose. In its main body it does not extend beyond III.3.

reasons are supplied by either scholar, and it is doubtful that this text continues much beyond the first few aphorisms of the third chapter.

This calls for a more detailed examination. That one can expect certain inconsistencies in the third pāda is foreboded by the fact that the actual topics discussed in it do not fully coincide with the traditional title of vibhūti-pāda. The 'supranatural' powers (vibhūti) with which it is supposed to deal are not at all mentioned before III.16. The artificiality of the division between the second and the third chapter is quite blatant; II.55 and III.1 are practically continuous.

Even a cursory glance at the exposition of the eightfold yogic path (II.28ff.) bears out that the material is absolutely homogeneous until III.3 and perhaps even up to III.8. From III.9 on, however, the text swings from the simple definitions to a number of somewhat enigmatic aphorisms in which the term pariṇāma figures prominently. This term occurs, significantly, only once before, namely in the kriyā-yoga section at II.15. This on its own does of course not warrant a connecting up of the passage III.9ff. with the kriyā-yoga portion. But there is ample evidence which makes such a link-up not only possible but inevitable.

- (1) The passage III.9ff. contains one of the nuclear terms of kriyā-yoga, viz. samskāra, nowhere to be found in the yoga-aṅga section.
- (2) In III.13 the compound bhūta-indriya is used, which

occurs only at one other place and that is in the kriyā-yoga section at II.18 as bhūta-indriya-ātmaka "in the form of elements and sense-organs". This is described drśya, 'the seen', i.e. the empirical reality or prakṛti. In III.13 the compound is actually employed in the locative plural as bhūta-indriyeṣu which J.W. HAUER (1958) translates with "in the element-built organs" thus giving another reading of this dvandva. Vyāsa, however, confirms the former interpretation: the 'seen' is split into elements, of coarse and subtle form, and into sense-organs by which the elements can be perceived. The compound bhūta-indriya clearly refers back to the drśya of the kriyā-yoga text.

- (3) III.10 contains the compound praśānta-vāhitā or 'calm flow', the second member of which is reminiscent of the word vāhin or 'flowing on' in sva-rasa-vāhī of II.9. Although it could be argued that the context necessitated the same word in both cases, but in reply to this one may say that the author could just as well have chosen another synonym (such as e.g. śru). His not doing so could well be explained as a possible instance of his personal preference within the boundaries of his active vocabulary.

These findings beyond doubt demand that one should allot the

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passage III.9-III.16 to the kriyā-yoga text. The question now arises whether the subsequent aphorisms (III.17ff.) belong to this section, as well or whether they are a continuation of the yoga-aṅga section. One has to bear in mind that the yoga-aṅga part (II.28-III.3 or III.8) does not make mention of the final goal, and unless one assumes a priori that this portion is all that is left of the text which expounds the eightfold path, one must look for the concluding part of it elsewhere in the Yoga-Sūtra.

From III.17 on, the aphorisms deal mainly with the outcome of samyama or 'constraint' in the shape of the supranatural powers and certain higher enstatic processes. If one regards the aphorisms III.4-III.8, defining samyama, as still belonging to the yoga-aṅga section, this litany of descriptions of yogic powers should also rightly be counted as part of it. But it is not yet settled whether III.4-III.8 pertain to the yoga-aṅga text or not. One fact may be thought of speaking in favour of this: The yoga-aṅga section, after defining the miscellaneous practices of the eightfold path also describes their results. Thus the sūtras II.35-II.45 state the fruit of the application of the disciplines of yama and niyama, II.48 that of the practice of āsana, II.52-II.53 of prāṇāyāma and II.55 of pratyāhāra. Only in the case of dhāraṇā, dhyāna and samādhi are the results not specifically stated. The reason for this may be that they are drawn together in the practice of samyama whose multiple results are listed in the third chapter.

However, in view of the fact that this enumeration of the effects of samyama on a wide range of topics is quite out of proportion in

comparison with the yoga-aṅga section one is forced to query the authenticity of this list. One must be prepared, therefore, to accept that the text from III.17 on to the end of the third chapter belongs only partially and perhaps only to a negligible extent to the yoga-aṅga material. The nature of these aphorisms on saṃyama is such that their number could be greatly increased without any difficulty — and this is probably what has happened: copyists and editors have added and presumably also altered to the best of their knowledge.

Returning to the question as to whether or not the complex of sūtras III.4–III.8 is an integral part of the yoga-aṅga section, there is one piece of evidence which would seem to gainsay this. For, in III.5 the compound prajñā-āloka occurs which can be taken as a synonym of jñāna-dīpti as found in II.28. The term prajñā does not occur in the yoga-aṅga section at all, but significantly enough it appears at II.27. Even more remarkable is the fact that III.6 seems to refer back to II.27. This indicates, I propose, that the kriyā-yoga text which was left off at II.27 is resumed at III.5, if not at III.4. J.W. HAUER (1958) and others have thought that the kriyā-yoga text, as outlined above, was complete and that II.26–II.27 represent a description of the final goal of this particular school. This is not confirmed by the present findings; the kriyā-yoga section is fragmentary. For, whatever the Sanskrit commentators make II.27 out to mean, this aphorism would be a very meagre and unsatisfactory statement of the ultimate target of this type of Yoga.

Thus one is confronted with two equally loose-ended sections.

However, as I have demonstrated one need not be satisfied with either J.W. HAUER's (1958) or A. JANÁČEK's version of the kriyā-yoga text. There is weighty evidence that the kriyā-yoga section continues after III.3. In fact the transition from the yoga-aṅga material back to the kriyā-yoga material is considerably smoother than the transition from II.27 to II.28. The treatment of śamyama (III.4-III.8) proves a very convenient means of effacing the edges of the interpolated or rather 'quoted' yoga-aṅga text. It remains next to establish the exact extent of this section.

Here, I think, it can hardly be denied that on the whole the aphorisms III.17ff display a distinct uniformity which in terminology and style suggests their intimate belonging to the first half of the kriyā-yoga section. There are a number of easily recognisable common denominators, such as the occurrence of samskāra (III.18; cf. I.18, I.50, II.15), pratyaya (III.19, III.35; cf. I.10, I.18, I.19, II.20), śakti (III.21; cf. II.6, II.23), asamyoga (III.21; cf. śamyoga II.17, II.23, II.25), maitrī (III.23; cf. I.33), āloka (III.25; cf. III.5), asamkīrṇa (III.35; cf. samkīrṇa I.42), grāhya (III.21; cf. I.41), bhoga (III.35; cf. II.13, II.18). In addition, at least one other concept emphasises the discontinuity between the yoga-aṅga and the kriyā-yoga material, namely the term kāya-sampat (III.45, III.46) which I understand as a synonym of kāya-indriya-siddhi (II.43).

This calls for an examination of the vocabulary of the yoga-aṅga section in relation to those aphorisms which have been identified as pertaining to the kriyā-yoga text. There are a number of conspicuous parallels which need to be explained. The following deserve special

attention:

- (1) mrdu-madhya-adhimātra: II.34 and I.22;
- (2) saumanasya: II.41; its antonym daurmanasya is used in I.31;
- (3) anabhighāta: II.48 and III.45;
- (4) prakāśa-āvarana: II.52 and III.43;
- (5) artha-mātra-nirbhāsa: III.3 and I.43;
- (6) sva-rūpa-sūnya: III.3 and I.43;
- (7) śaithilya: III.38 and II.47;
- (8) special use of samāpatti: II.47 and III.42;

These remarkable agreements between the yoga-aṅga section and the kriyā-yoga material can be interpreted in two ways. One may either take them as evidence in support of the claim that the author of the kriyā-yoga text and the author of the yoga-aṅga text are one and the same person, which would leave us with the question as to why the yoga-aṅga section should appear so highly self-contained. Alternatively, and this seems to be far more probable, these parallels can be explained as unconscious 'resoundings' of the phraseology of the older yoga-aṅga material which the author of the vulgate had before him.

Accepting this second possibility, the following questions remain to be answered: Why would the author of the vulgate want to insert the yoga-aṅga section after II.27 in particular? Did he have a complete text in front of him, or was it merely fragmentary material which was

available to him? Furthermore, how much of it did he actually incorporate in his own work?

With II.27 the train of thought that provides the aphorisms dealing with the kleśas etc. with their overt coherence comes to an abrupt stop. Still, as I mentioned earlier, the 'sevenfold gnosis' (saptadhā-prajñā) of II.27 is by no means a description of the ultimate destination of kriyā-yoga. The editor of the vulgate had thus the opportunity of prefixing his next topic, viz. the treatment of the vibhūtis, with the useful series of definitions of the eight members of Yoga as given out in the yoga-aṅga text. Sūtra III.3 then enabled him to switch over to the topic of samyama as the technique for producing the various types of vibhūti.

Although it seems likely that the yoga-aṅga aphorisms belong to, or constitute a textual unit of their own, no conclusions can be drawn from the available data as to the extent to which the author of the vulgate incorporated them into his own compilation, or even as to whether or not he took them over verbatim. The fact that he retained II.23 without adjusting it to his own material distinctly favours the conclusion that he did not adulterate the interpolated part too severely. The several intrinsic contradictions in the material between the two textual units also makes it improbable that he was responsible for the authorship of the yoga-aṅga text as well. The extreme brevity of this text would furthermore seem to speak against the notion that it is complete in itself. Most important, it lacks a proper definition of the yogic goal as conceived by the propounder of the eightfold path, for surely samādhi (III.3) refers merely to a

technical category of aṣṭa-aṅga-yoga.

The question which springs to mind is this: Could it be that the vulgate contains further fragments of this yoga-aṅga text? This seems more than likely. As I mentioned previously, some of the aphorisms subsequent to III.17 strike a somewhat dissonant note, and it is quite possible that some of them at least originally belonged to the yoga-aṅga material, or at any rate are an echo of it. Thus, for instance, the second half of III.43 (...tataḥ prakāśa-āvaraṇa-ksayah) is suspect not only because it constitutes a perfect semantic and syntactic unit of its own (to the extent that it could figure as an independent sūtra), but also because the phrase prakāśa-āvaraṇa is to be met with in the yoga-aṅga text at II.52. Linguistically the only difference between II.52 and III.43^b is that whilst the former aphorism employs the root ksi in its verbal form as ksiyate, the latter uses it as a noun. The other 'odd' aphorism is the concluding sūtra of the third chapter (III.55).

This aphorism is essentially a definition of kaivalya: sattva-puruṣayoḥ śuddhi-sāmye kaivalyam-iti. Ostensibly consistent with the preceding couple of sūtras, this aphorism is nevertheless remarkable in that it is the second reference to kaivalya towards the end of the third chapter. The first occasion is at III.50: tad-vairāgyād-āpi doṣa-bīja-ksaye kaivalyam. Admittedly, these two references about the ultimate goal are in no way contradictory, but the second instance (III.55) does not appear to be essential to the treatment, especially when one considers that the author of the vulgate deals with the emancipation processes in the fourth pāda (which as will be shown is also an

integral part of the kriyā-yoga text). The line of thought from III.49-III.54 strikes one as adequately homogeneous to argue the case for the superfluousness of III.55 in this context. Thus in III.49 anyatā-khyāti — a favourite concept of the author of the vulgate — is said to bring about omnipotence and omnipresence. But this is not the final stage of the yogic path of transformation as is evident from the qualifying statement of aphorism III.50 which declares that the yogin must detach himself even from this elevated condition; the precise word is vairāgya or 'dispassion' with ~~the~~ which we are already familiar from sūtras I.12 and I.15.

This final act of detachment causes the seeds of the defects (which lead to the externalisation of consciousness) to dwindle and this, in turn, 'transports' the yogin to kaivalya. It must be noted that this is not a definition of emancipation, but a summary description of the process leading up to it. Hence the next aphorism (III.51) is not really discontinuous. It contains a warning: The yogin must not let himself be tempted by higher beings to abandon his quest~~ing~~ at this point for some pseudo-heaven. After this negative statement follows a positive advice (III.52) which prescribes a way of actualising the gnosis born of discernment or viveka-ja-jñāna. III.53 is a further specification. And, finally, III.54 is a definition of viveka-ja-jñāna which conducts the yogin across the stream of phenomenal existence to the Unconditioned. Then follows III.55 which seems rather superfluous in this entire exposition. The conclusion suggests itself that this terminating sūtra does not belong to the kriyā-yoga material but is part of the yoga-śāstra text.

This is evidenced by two important facts. First, the phrase sattva-puruṣayoh śuddhi-sāmye is strongly reminiscent of the yoga-aṅga phraseology which operates a great deal with the concept of 'purity' or 'purification' as can be seen from II.28 (aśuddhi-ksaye), II.40 (śaucāt), II.41 (sattva-śuddhi) and II.43 (aśuddhi-ksayāt). By way of contrast, the kriyā-yoga material is couched more in terms of 'discernment' (viveka, anātā-khyāti etc.). The second point is the occurrence of the word iti or 'finis' at the end of III.55. This has been taken by J.W. HAUER (1958) and S. DASGUPTA (1930) as indicative of the fact that originally the Yoga-Sūtra ended at this point and that consequently the fourth chapter must be a later addition. However, as this hypothesis will be shown to be unsound, another explanation must be found. Could it not be that III.55 belongs to the yoga-aṅga section and that the word iti originally demarcated the end of this text and not of the third chapter of the vulgate? An alternative explanation would be that the author of the vulgate employed the word iti to denote the end of his quotation from the yoga-aṅga material, but this would imply that the yoga-aṅga text extends from II.28 to III.55 which seems unlikely unless one presupposes massive interpolations.

One possible objection which could be raised against this reconstruction is that III.50 does not pertain to the kriyā-yoga text and that therefore there is no question of duplicate statements about the goal, because of the use of the term doṣa and not its expected synonym kleśa. But this argument carries little weight, since the employment of the word kleśa in the kriyā-yoga text does not exclude the simultaneous use of the term doṣa. There is no evidence that

both are in fact synonyms. I think J.W. HAUER (1958, 238), following H. JACOBI (1929, 594), is mistaken in his belief that whilst kleśa is a genuine Yoga term doṣa belongs essentially to the Nyāya tradition. Both terms are found concurrently in the Nyāya-Sūtra, and they also occur together in other philosophical texts; in this case one term usually has a more precise meaning than the other. I suggest that this is the case in the Yoga-Sūtra as well. Whereas kleśa has a definite technical meaning, doṣa is used in III.50 in the more general sense of 'defect' or 'blemish' without any philosophical overtones.

To summarise the above findings concerning the vibhūti-pāda: It has been shown that this chapter is in essence a continuation of the kriyā-yoga exposition of the first and second pāda, with a lengthy interpolation, or rather quotation, extending from II.28-III.3 (?) which demonstrably influenced the conceptual and linguistic medium of the third chapter.

Turning to the fourth and final pāda of the Yoga-Sūtra there is ample evidence to suggest that it is also an integral part of the kriyā-yoga material. This conclusion runs counter to J.W. HAUER's (1958) and S. DASGUPTA's (1930) assertion that the kaivalya-pāda is a subsequent appendage. Especially the former scholar has given the fourth chapter much ingenious thought (1931, 122-133). He regards it as an attempt to present a systematic outline of the metaphysics of this school of Yoga. According to him, the central concept of this pāda is nirmāna-citta or 'created mind', and the clarification of this important notion must be regarded as J.W. HAUER's single most ~~important~~ outstanding contribution to the study of the Yoga-Sūtra.

However, his speculations about the independent origin of the kaivalya-pāda (= nirmāna-citta text) are untenable. There is no drastic change in style as claimed by S. DASGUPTA (1930) and endorsed by J.W. HAUER (1958). Quite on the contrary, the technical vocabulary is in remarkable consonance with the preceding kriyā-yoga material, and also the general trend of ideas is adequately continuous. The link existing between the kaivalya-pāda and the kriyā-yoga text is borne out by the following terminological agreements: parināma (IV.2, 14, 32, 33; cf. II.15; III.9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16), asmitā (IV.4, 5, 15, 16, 18, 21, 23; cf. I.17; II.3, 6; III.47), an-āśaya (IV.6; cf. āśaya I.24; II.12), vyavahita (IV.9; cf. III.25), viveka (IV.26, 29; cf. II.26, 28; III.52, 54), pratyaya (IV.27; cf. I.10, 18, 19; II.20; III.12, 17, 19, 35), kleśa (IV.28, 30; cf. I.24; II.2, 3, 12), khyāti (IV.29; cf. I.16; II.26; III.49), ksana (IV.33; cf. III.9, 52), śakti (IV.34; cf. II.6, 23; III.21), pratiprasava (IV.34; cf. II.10), drastr-drśya (IV.23; cf. II.17).

These linguistic parallels do not constitute the only evidence for the present hypothesis. It is, furthermore, supported by the obvious conceptual continuity between the kaivalya-pāda and the kriyā-yoga section. For instance, the exposition of the higher processes of Yoga terminating in emancipation would be inconceivable without the preceding kleśa theory. In fact this original doctrine is further developed and explained in the kaivalya-pāda. It is also significant that in the fourth chapter the main emphasis is not on purification but on discernment or viveka which is in keeping with the tenor of the kriyā-yoga section. In IV.12 there is a reference

to the dharma-dharmin speculation of III.13-III.16. In this connection the parināma concept reappears (IV.14) which was first mentioned in III.9ff. In addition, IV.28 is clearly a reference to the kriyā-yoga text; it reads: hānam-eṣām kleśavad-uktam ("Their removal is like [that of] the causes-of-affliction [as already] described.") The author obviously has in mind sūtra II.10. IV.8, finally, speaks of the Self's apperception of the mental fluctuations, which is an echo of II.20 where the 'seer' is defined as 'pure seeing' (dr̥ṣi-mātra).

The fourth chapter contains yet one more definition of the yogic goal. However, IV.34 is not merely an unnecessary replication; it forms an indispensable corollary of the whole set of aphorisms defining the final phases of the path of involution. Nor is it in dissonance with III.50 which simply states that the omnipotence resulting from sattva-puruṣa-anyata-kṛpāti must be renounced as well before the yogin can 'enter' kaivalya.

These findings unequivocally demonstrate, I think, that the fourth chapter is neither a reservoir of Patañjali's personal philosophy joined to the body of aphorisms extant before him, as proposed by S. DASGUPTA (1930, 52f.), nor a collection of fragments appended to the first three pādas, as asserted by P. DEUSSEN (1920³, I, 535), nor the résumé of an independent Yoga school as maintained by J.W. HAUER (1958, 230). The distinct philosophical tone of this section is more economically explained as the result of the natural development of the subject-matter.

Nonetheless, J.W. HAUER's analysis is an invaluable piece of

research. By freeing himself from the stereotypes of the classical commentators and relying on a strictly immanent interpretation of the Yoga-Sūtra, he succeeded in correcting an unfortunate and long-standing misconception about the intended purpose of the initial aphorisms of the fourth pāda. He was thus able to cast fresh light on this entire section, and his conclusions indirectly confirm the present hypothesis of the textual continuity between the third and the fourth chapter.

His crucial rectification concerns the key concept of nirmāna-citta. This compound was interpreted by the classical exegetists in the sense of 'created mind' or artificially produced mental vehicle used by the yogin as a dumping-ground for his karmic deeds in order to avoid the fruition of moral retribution. J.W. HAUER (1958) convincingly shows that this interpretation completely ignores the highly philosophical tenor of the subsequent aphorisms. He also raises philological objections against the ~~usual~~ usual translation of jāty-antara-parināma (IV.2) with "creating other beings". This profound misunderstanding of the nature and purpose of the fourth chapter also led, according to J.W. HAUER, to the fatal interpolation of IV.1 which, in turn, managed to dupe all later commentators. Indeed, IV.1 is entirely out of tune with the remainder of the kaivalya-pāda which does not treat of any of the siddhis at all. Their proper place is in the third chapter.

In this connection I wish to draw attention to C. PENSA's (1973^b) thoughtful observations on the concept of siddhi. Though primarily concerned with showing that both in Yoga and in Buddhism this concept

did not receive a persistently negative evaluation but often also a positive one, he has some remarks about III.37 which are pertinent to the present study. Usually this sūtra is explained as a total condemnation of the siddhis, yet as C. PENSA (1973^b, 13) points out originally it may not have had this wide scope at all. He thinks it possible that the word te ('these') most likely refers only to the five supranormal sensory activities and to pratibhā mentioned in the immediately preceding aphorism (III.36). However, he does not seem to be justified in his implicit assumption that the term siddhi is used in the Yoga-Sūtra in a technical sense. This word is also used as 'perfection' (II.43) and 'attainment' (II.45), and unless one regards the chapter headings of the vulgate as spurious (which is probably right) the proper technical term for the 'powers' is vibhūti. But this does not alter C. PENSA's main argument. If all the vibhūtis were intrinsic impediments to the state of transformed consciousness (samādhi), all those aphorisms which describe saṃyama and its magical results would have to be considered as outright falsifications.

In his attempt to determine the content of the concept nirmāna, J.W. HAUER (1958) observes that the root, mā combined with the prefix nis-^o has been employed since epic times to convey the notion of 'constructing' or 'creating'. He refers to a quotation in the Yoga-Bhāṣya (I.25) which, according to Vācaspati Miśra, stems from Pañcāsikha; it reads: ādi-vidvān-nirmāna-cittam-adhiṣṭhāya kārūṇyād-bhagavān parama-rṣir-āsuraye jijñāsamānāya tantram provāca, "The first knower

[i.e. Kapila], assuming an earthly mind out of compassion, the exalted, supreme seer unto Āsuri who desired to know declared the doctrine."²⁸ J.W. HAUER (1958) is certain that here nirmāna is used in the sense of 'earthly' rather than 'artificially created'. He gives the same interpretation to the compound nirmāna-kāya employed by Vācaspati Miśra (III.18) to explain the phrase tanu-dhara or 'wearing a body' occurring in the Yoga-Bhāṣya. The buddhist usage of the term nirmāna seems to confirm J.W. HAUER's interpretation. He himself mentions especially the Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra which must be placed in chronological proximity to the Yoga-Sūtra.

Thus nirmāna-citta denotes nothing else but the individualised consciousness complex as it appears in the terrestrial world. The one citta from which the many individualised cittas are said to derive (see IV.5) reminds one of the 'mind only' conception in the idealist schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism. J.W. HAUER likens it in fact to the dharma-buddha. Of course, the 'one mind' of the Yoga-Sūtra cannot be equated with the 'mind only' of a Vasubandhu or Asaṅga. The eka-citta is none other than asmitā-mātra. This is clear from IV.16 which contains a refutation of the idealist position, according to which the objective world is non-existent. Patañjali affirms the ontological reality of the world and denies that it is merely a product of mentation. There is, however, no evidence to bear out J.W. HAUER's suggestion that IV.16 is a direct attack on Vasubandhu's and Asaṅga's schools of thought. It could just as well refer to an earlier idealist school.

28 J.W. HAUER (1958) wrongly prints viññāsamānāya instead of jiññāsamānāya.

Having clarified the objective of the first few sūtras of the fourth chapter, the subsequent aphorisms present no further difficulties. They are strictly sequential and evince the thematic unity of the kaivalya-pāda. P. DEUSSEN's (1920³,1) assumption about the composite character of this chapter is thus shown to be entirely unfounded.

I will next turn to the important contributions by E. FRAUWALLNER (1953,I,427ff.) and G. OBERHAMMER (1965, 98ff.) who approach the Yoga-Sūtra from the angle of Gestalt analysis. Both scholars contend that there are two different types of Yoga present in Patañjali's work and that the main defect of the existing presentations of Classical Yoga is the lack of differentiation between these two Gestalten. This gives rise to an artificial unity which, they argue, is absent in the original. According to E. FRAUWALLNER (1953,I) the well-known eightfold path forms the nucleus of the work which, as we have seen, is also J.W. HAUER's (1958) contention. "In it widely held views are brought into a final shape, and therefore it is little surprising that this form of the yogic path should not be confined exclusively to the classical system of Yoga."²⁹ The exposition of the eightfold Yoga was then prefixed with some preliminary techniques drawn together under the name of kriyā-yoga.

E. FRAUWALLNER correctly recognises the homogeneity of the aṣṭa-aṅga-yoga type, but is mistaken in imputing to it a far greater significance within the Yoga-Sūtra than to the kriyā-yoga material.

29 E. FRAUWALLNER (1953,I,427).

He contrasts the aṣṭa-aṅga type with the nirodha type expounded in the first chapter, arguing that the conception of both path and goal of this nirodha-yoga is in stark contrast with that of the aṣṭa-aṅga type. While in the former emphasis is laid upon the cessation of all mental activity in order for the Self to abide in transcendental purity, the latter form of Yoga focuses on the distinction between Self and non-Self, as a higher kind of cognition by which emancipation is obtained. In E. FRAUWALLNER's opinion what is attempted here is an intensification of cognition rather than the reverse. From a textual angle he appears to isolate three distinct units:

- (1) pāda I : nirodha-yoga
- (2) pāda II-III : aṣṭa-aṅga-yoga prefixed by kriyā-yoga
- (3) pāda IV : later appendage³⁰

He considers the Yoga-Sūtra as an attempt to assimilate and integrate both types of Yoga. These conjectures about the architecture of the Yoga-Sūtra need no special refutation at this stage of the present analysis; the intimate relation that exists between the nirodha section and the subsequent aphorisms has been demonstrated already as also the precise length of the aṣṭa-aṅga-yoga part. Of additional interest is here A. JANÁČEK's (1958, 98f.) paper in which he considers the linguistic interdependence between the nirodha-yoga and the aṣṭa-aṅga-yoga on the basis of a statistical analysis of the vocabulary of these

³⁰ E. FRAUWALLNER (1953, I), strangely enough, says nothing definite about the kaivalya-pāda and its relation to the remainder of the Yoga-Sūtra.

sections. However, E. FRAUWALLNER's (1953,1) typology is not only not supported by the text, it is also unconvincing in other respects. For, practically speaking, nirodha is a pre-condition of all higher yogic states. Samādhi cannot occur until the externalising tendency of the mind has been brought under control in meditative-absorption whose function it is to achieve nirodha. For precisely this reason the term nirodha is not confined to the first chapter but also appears in an important aphorism in the third pāda (viz. III.9) which E. FRAUWALLNER counts to the aṣṭa-aṅga material! He quite evidently neglects to correlate his ideal typology with the actual textual reality.

Nevertheless, his distinction between what one might call a 'cognition-restrictive' and a 'cognition-affirmative' type of Yoga may possibly pay off in other areas of Yoga research. As regards the Yoga-Sūtra the most that can be said is that the kriyā-yoga school of Patañjali operates with the concept of nirodha without belonging to the conjectural 'cognition-restrictive' type. A further puzzling point is that although E. FRAUWALLNER equates the aṣṭa-aṅga tradition with the above 'cognition-affirmative' form of Yoga, he nonetheless regards the goal of this Yoga (see the concluding aphorisms of the third chapter) as perfectly consistent with his interpretation. This is unintelligible unless he reads these sūtras (III.49-50) differently, for they clearly imply that there occurs a discontinuation of cognition prior to the actualisation of kaivalya, which in this event must be understood as a meta-cognitive attainment. Unfortunately, E. FRAUWALLNER does not document his

inferences which would allow one to retrace his argumentation.

None of the above counter-arguments are raised by G. OBERHAMMER (1965) who accepts E. FRAUWALLNER's (1953, I) hypothetical typology ex cathedra and seeks to vindicate it in a detailed examination of the structure of meditation in Classical Yoga. He isolates three groups of statements dealing with meditation, namely I.2-I.18, I.41-I.50 and II.54-III.7. The first and second set correspond with the two types of Yoga as determined by E. FRAUWALLNER. The third group is considered by G. OBERHAMMER as being identical with the second group, for which assumption he advances the following reasons:

- (1) The equation of samāpatti with samprajñāta-samādhi, as favoured by the classical exegetists, must be rejected as improbable. The four stages of samprajñāta-samādhi (viz. savitarka, savicāra, ānanda, asmitā) of I.17 must be placed against the four stages of samāpatti (viz. savitarkā, nirvitarkā, savicārā, nirvicārā) of I.42-I.44. As an example of the difference between these two meditation schemata, G. OBERHAMMER states that in the case of samāpatti the highest meditational content is alīṅga (see I.44), whereas in the case of samprajñāta-samādhi it is 'the unity-consciousness of I-ness (asmitā)',³¹.

31 G. OBERHAMMER (1965, 103, fn.11)

(2) According to G. OBERHAMMER (1965) the 'dynamics' of samāpatti is essentially different from that of sampra.jñāta-samādhi of the second group (I.41-I.50) but is cognate with that of the third group (II.54-III.7). He draws attention to the Yoga-Bhāṣya which looks upon samāpatti and the samādhi of the third group as formally identical (i.e. interprets both as sva-rūpa-śūnya-iva-artha-mātra). He then argues that the fourth stage of sampra.jñāta-samādhi (second group) cannot be defined in these terms, since its content is only 'the unity-consciousness of I-ness'. Quite consistently he also contends that the dynamics of samāpatti and of the samādhi of the third group is in no way geared towards asampra.jñāta-samādhi.

How valid are these rather bewildering arguments? The answer to this must be that interesting as they are they simply lack the factual evidence to back them up. A different solution of the problem at issue is not only possible, but as will be seen also far more probable and economic. Thus, the reading of I.17 is perfectly plain: vitarka-vicāra-ānanda-asmitā-rūpa-anugamāt-sampra.jñātaḥ, which literally translated means "[The ecstasy resulting from nirodha is] 'cognitive' on account of [the occurrence of such] phenomena [as] cogitation, reflexion, joy [and] I-am-ness."

There is no positive indication in this aphorism that the four 'phenomena' (rūpa) listed are necessarily sequential and specific to certain levels of attainment in the enstatic involution process, though this assumption is implicit in G. OBERHAMMER's (1965) thesis. This is of course also the view of the Sanskrit exegetists. However, considering the available data on the phenomenology of enstatic experiences within and outside the purview of Yoga³² and also paying due respect to the pariṇāma doctrine, it seems ~~it~~ commendable not to insist on too watertight a compartmentalisation of these four rūpas.

I.42, then, turns out to be a qualification of the term vitarka and I.44 of the term vicāra, which is commonly accepted. The fact that the second group of statements mentioned by G. OBERHAMMER employs the feminine forms vitarkā and vicārā (as required because of samāpatti in I.41), prefixing these with the positive particle sā-^o and the negative particle nis-^o respectively, can quite simply be explained as a contextual requirement. That ānanda and asmitā are not mentioned separately would seem to confirm the above-made suggestion that they do not constitute segregated high-level experiences in samādhi. Perhaps they are symptomatic of all object-dependent forms of enstasy, that is, they constitute constant values in every type of samprajñāta-samādhi. This interpretation immediately confutes G. OBERHAMMER's contention that samāpatti has as its highest content the uncreate matrix of all physico-mental existence, viz.

32 See e.g. M. LASKI (1965²). Further references are supplied in connection with the semantic analysis of the various degrees of samādhi.

alīṅga, whereas in the case of samp^rajñāta-samādhi it is asmitā. The arbitrariness of such a distinction is self-evident. G. OBERHAMMER (1965) manifestly confounds the objective stimulus of the enstatic act— commonly known as ālambana or 'support' — with the subjective response (i.e. vitarka, vicāra etc.).

Nor is his second point, concerning the inner dynamics of samāpatti and samp^rajñāta-samādhi, particularly cogent. Since his insistence that asmitā (of I.17) represents the 'content' of a specific stage of samādhi has been exposed as entirely unfounded, his argumentation that one cannot possibly describe this particular enstatic stage in terms of artha-mātra and sva-rūpa-sūnya is also completely erroneous. In consequence of these fundamental misinterpretations G. OBERHAMMER's remaining pronouncements about the two types of Yoga allegedly traceable in the Yoga-Sūtra must similarly be regarded as invalid.

On the foregoing pages an attempt was made to examine the pros and cons of proposed interpretations from as many sides as possible (semantically, structurally, formally) and to weigh the various and often contrasting views against each other and also to grope for new explanations -- all the while scrutinising the findings in the light of the initial hypothesis that the structure of the Yoga-Sūtra is intrinsically homogeneous. The complementary hypothesis of the above methodological standard demanded that by reason of the manifest chronological and also ideological gap between the Yoga-Sūtra and the exegetical literature, all material evidence should be based on a text-immanent interpretation of Patañjali's

treatise. By applying these two criteria with the appropriate consistency, it was possible to disclose that the text of the Yoga-Sūtra is by far more self-contained and integrated than previous scholars were prepared to concede.

In conclusion of this re-examination the following précis of the key findings can be given: In contradistinction to those of my predecessors who have disassembled the Yoga-Sūtra into so many variant traditions or textual layers, the present study has established that the vulgate is a composite of merely two sets of sūtras apparently representing two independent though overlapping traditions. Linguistic, conceptual and textual considerations demand that the material should be regarded as adequately continuous from I.1-II.27. At this point the author of the vulgate seems to have introduced a series of aphorisms into the main body of his work which contain useful and succinct definitions of some important components of Yoga. This 'quotation' led conveniently over to the extensive discussion of samyama and its magical results. The exact length of this insert could not be fixed conclusively, though there is some evidence that it does not extend beyond the first three aphorisms of the third chapter, if III.3 (in view of its definitional similarity with I.43) does not already lie outside the boundary of this interpolated piece. The following aphorisms (III.3/4ff.) have been shown to belong in style and content to the sūtras I.1-II.27. However, it has been granted that this second half of the vulgate may contain some sporadic quotes from the interpolated section, but only in one instance could a sufficiently convincing identification

be made (viz. III.55). There are several other occasions where the author of the vulgate appears to have, if not quoted, so perhaps paraphrased some of the (no longer extant?) aphorisms before him. Except for these two fissure points (viz. II.28 and III.2/3 respectively), caused by the insertion of the yoga-aṅga material, all other stops in the text must be understood as thematic pauses. Although the possibility of further later interpolations cannot be excluded, only one instance (viz. IV.1) could be ascertained as a subsequent addition which was based on a serious misunderstanding of the fourth chapter and also caused considerable confusion among the exegetists.

Diagrammatically, the stratigraphy of the vulgate looks as follows:

KRIYĀ-YOGA TEXT (PART 1)

1. Introduction: nirōdha section (I.1-I.51)
2. Outline of the important features of kriyā-yoga (II.1-II.27)

AṢṬA-AṄGA-YOGA TEXT (= quotation, II.28-III.2 or III.3)

KRIYĀ-YOGA TEXT (PART 2)

1. Discussion of saṃyama and vibhūti (III.3 or III.4-III.54)

AṢṬA-AṄGA-YOGA FRAGMENT (III.55)

LATER INTERPOLATION (IV.1)

KRIYĀ-YOGA TEXT (PART 2) ctd.

2. Philosophical postscript (IV.2-IV.34)

How does this reconstruction relate to the traditional division of the Yoga-Sūtra into four chapters? Surprisingly, the pattern disclosed by the present exercise in textual criticism more or less confirms the arrangement of the vulgate into the well-known four pādas. Only the transition from II.27 to the quoted yoga-aṅga text and then back to the kriyā-yoga material at the beginning of the third chapter is somewhat clumsy. But this problematic point can be resolved if one moves the beginning of the vibhūti-pāda forward to II.28. This slight re-arrangement would give rise to the following picture:

<u>pāda</u> I	:	I.1-I.51	=	51 aphorisms
<u>pāda</u> II	:	II.1-II.27	=	27 aphorisms
<u>pāda</u> III	:	II.28-III.55	=	83 aphorisms
<u>pāda</u> IV	:	IV.1-IV.34	=	34 aphorisms

The awkwardness of the existing pāda division is probably due to the fact that at one stage an attempt was made to create chapters of fairly equal length. The correction proposed above best explains the otherwise inexplicable fact as to why the third chapter should disrupt the systematic treatment of the 'eight members' of aṣṭa-aṅga-yoga.

Thus the Yoga-Sūtra displays a marked tectonic coherence which cancels any suggestion that it is merely a hotchpotch of extant aphorisms badly patched together and furnished with a few personal remarks of the editor.

One last point, of a methodological nature, remains to be

sorted out. This is the possible objection that the above conclusions are really contingent on the presuppositional framework put to the test during the course of the present investigation. In other words, it could be argued that the results confirm merely what has been postulated at the outset. The correlation between the original premise that the text is homogeneous and the research findings cannot be denied. But this must not be construed to mean a selective bias in the examination of the data. This danger was far more prominent in the previous studies which failed to employ a strictly defined methodology.

In addition, I have naturally also tried to minimise any possibility of an unconscious carrying-over of the initial hypothesis by rigorously applying the procedural criteria irrespective of whether or not the findings were positive or negative in terms of the assumed homogeneity of the material. It is of course one of the drawbacks of analytical models of the kind utilised in the present study that they do establish a predeterminate selective pattern which on the one hand greatly facilitates the scanning of the data but on the other hand is functional only within its defined limits. Still, it is preferable to operate with a clearly specified model which is then consistently applied than with some a priori assumption which is neither appropriate nor competently tested. It is on these grounds that one must reject any textual criticism which assumes a text to be 'patched together', 'contaminated' or 'defective' etc. without any legitimate reason.

CHAPTER FOUR

KRIYĀ-YOGA AND AṢṬA-AṅGA-YOGA : A COMPARISON

In the previous chapter I have shown that the Yoga-Sūtra is a composite of two blocks of traditions; one is the so-called kriyā-yoga and the other the well-known aṣṭa-aṅga-yoga. I now propose to determine both traditions typologically and also to try to skeletonise their locus within the larger ethico-religious context of Indian thought. This will prepare the ground for the subsequent semantic studies.

I shall begin with the aṣṭa-aṅga tradition whose eight-phase model exercised a far greater impact on the other gnostic schools of India than did the kriyā-yoga, although the latter is theoretically of superlative significance. According to P. DEUSSEN (1920³, I, 523) the aṣṭa-aṅga section of the Yoga-Sūtra extends from II.28-III.55, and in his opinion is not the most valuable of the several tracts present in the vulgate. He rates the kriyā-yoga exposition (II.1-II.27) as the most important. For J.W. HAUER (1958, 234), on the other hand, the yoga-aṅga part (II.28-III.55) represents the most complete systematic sūtra compilation in Patañjali's work. He maintains that this section treats the entire Yoga with exhaustive completeness. He also considers this portion as the oldest since it does not mention either the kleśas or any other terms reminiscent of buddhist thought as active in the first centuries A.D.

E. FRAUWALLNER (1953, I, 427), similarly, seems to regard the

delineation of the eightfold path (II.28-III.55) as the nucleus of the vulgate. He looks upon this tradition as a variant of a basic conception of Yoga which is also represented by Buddhism, and contrasts this with the nirodha tradition as expounded in the first chapter of the Yoga-Sūtra:

With its doctrine of the eightfold Yoga the system of Yoga has not created anything essentially new, but has recast old elements in an extraordinarily happy form, whose clear classification and systematic numerical arrangement best suited the Indian mentality. No wonder that this form of Yoga quickly gained popularity and diffusion.³³

Of typological relevance is the fact that the yoga-aṅga material is conspicuous by virtue of its non-philosophical but strictly practice-oriented tone. Granted that the yoga-aṅga aphorisms quoted in the vulgate constitute a more or less complete 'text', it is necessary to explain this eight-phase model historically. First of all, the present thesis that there existed once a Yoga text which came to be incorporated into the vulgate has a logical consequence. This is that the yoga-aṅga tract as a separate whole is anterior to the vulgate. It would, however, be erroneous to assume that therefore the total conceptual content of this text must also precede that of the kriyā-yoga text into which it was inserted. For, as I have pointed out before, Patañjali (as the hypothetical author of the vulgate) did not erect

33 E. FRAUWALLNER (1953, I, 444-45)


his philosophical structure in an absolute vacuum. Rather his elaborate treatment was based on subjacent layers of philosophical formulation and systematisation, though it proves near impossible to disentangle the many strands of thought which led up to the creation of Classical Yoga.

J.W. HAUER (1958) suggests that asta-aṅga-yoga must be placed in the proximity of the Nyāya school of thought. This is certainly an imaginative attempt to resolve the difficulties but one which is not substantiated by the tenuous evidence supplied by him. On the other hand, a comparison between the asta-aṅga tradition and the ṣaḍ-aṅga-yoga seems more promising. The latter made its first appearance in the Maitrāyaṇīya-Upaniṣad and thus incontrovertibly precedes the classical eightfold model. The relevant reference is VI.18: tathā tat-prayoga-kalpah prāṇāyāmah pratyāhāro dhyānam dhāraṇā tarkah samādhiḥ ṣaḍ-aṅga-ity-ucyate yogah. In translation: "The standard for effecting this [unity of the One] is this: control of the life-force, sense-withdrawal, meditative-absorption, concentration, tarka, ecstasy — this is [what is] called the Yoga of six members."

A juxtaposition of this schema with the well-known eightfold model of the yoga-aṅga text shows up the differences and similarities between both systematisations:

ṢAḌ-ĀṄGA-YOGA

AṢṬĀ-ĀṄGA-YOGA



The most striking distinction between these two schemata is (a) the absence of yama, niyama and āsana in the sad-āṅga-yoga, (b) the reversal of the categories of dhāraṇā and dhyāna and (c) the appearance of a new element called tarka. Although the first three members of the classical eightfold path are missing in the six-phase model, they nonetheless are present in the Maitrāyaṇīya-Upaniṣad in a pre-systematic form. The transposition of dhyāna and dhāraṇā can easily be explained by the intimate relation which exists between these two yogic processes. This leaves the category of tarka to be explained.³⁴

J.W. HAUER (1958) fully recognises the importance of tarka in this series, and he relates it to the buddhist vitarka-dhyāna which he holds to be a development of the upaniṣadic tarka. S. DASGUPTA

34 The popular notion that these āṅgas are 'stages' or 'rungs' on a ladder is evidently wrong.

(1930) also seems to subscribe to the view that tarka is of hindu origin. He seeks to circumscribe this term in the following way:

Now, from the account of the sixty-two heresies given in the Brahmajālasutta, we know that there were people who either from meditation of three degrees or, fourthly, through logic and reasoning had come to believe that both the external world as a whole and individual souls were eternal. From the association of this last mentioned logical school with the concentration (samādhi) or meditation (dhyāna) school as belonging to one class of thinkers professing eternalism (śāśvatavāda) and from the inclusion of tarka as an accessory (aṅga) in concentration (samādhi), we can fairly assume that the list of the accessories (aṅga) given in the Maitrāyaṇa Upanishad represents the oldest list of the Yoga doctrine when the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga were in a process of being grafted upon each other and when the Sāṅkhya method of discussion had not stood as a method independent of the Yoga. The substitution of postures (āsana) for thinking (tarka) in the list of Patañjali shows that the Yoga method had now grown into a method separate from the Sāṅkhya.³⁵

Aside objections of a historical nature which one may raise against S. DASGUPTA's pronouncements, it is also highly improbable that

³⁵ S. DASGUPTA (1930, 65-66)

in the above-cited verse from the Maitrāyaṇīya-Upaniṣad, the term tarka has the meaning of 'thinking'. I can also not agree with M. ELIADE's (1973³, 125) rendering of this word with 'reflection' and 'strength of judgment'. However, he is correct in stating that this is a rare term in yogic texts. He quotes, interestingly enough, a stanza from the Amṛtabindu-Upaniṣad (16) where tarka is defined as 'meditation that is not contrary to the śāstra'.³⁶ I think this traditional explanation is far more in keeping with the original core meaning of this concept as employed in yogic contexts. This appears to have been on R. DAVIDS' (1936, 136) mind when explaining tarka as 'intellectual activity' with the added proviso: "...that tarka counted for much in yoga was not true. The mental activity which we are tending today to call intuition, an attitude the reverse of intellectual, i.e. analytical activity, is more akin to yoga."

This whole question has been opened up again by A. ZIGMUND-CERBU (1963, 128-34) and more recently by C. PENSA (1973^a, 9-24). In C. PENSA's (1973^b) opinion, the sad-aṅga-yoga is prior to the aṣṭa-aṅga path, although it was by no means only the latter which came to be widely accepted. Various versions of the sad-aṅga model were preserved and kept alive in later traditions, particularly in the krama system of Kāśmīrī Śaivism. According to C. PENSA (1973, 11) this type of Yoga "must have had a place of the greatest

³⁶ Upon checking I discovered that the quotation is not from the Amṛtabindu- but from the Amṛtanāḍabindu-Upaniṣad and reads: Āgamasya-avirodhena Uhanam tarka ucyate. See A.M. MAHADEVA SASTRI's edition of the text (1968², 17).

importance in later periods, within the Tantric, Hindu and Buddhist speculation and practice". He draws special attention to the central role which tarka plays in these northern schools emphasising that it does not mean, as commonly held, 'logic' or 'reasoning', but that it is defined as the equivalent of bhāvanā or śuddhā-vidyā, that is, the supreme realisation or enlightenment. It also has a second meaning, viz. 'reflection' technically known as cintāmayā (see e.g. Mālinīvijaya IV.28), being a propedeutic exercise conducive to bhāvanā. Thus in the Kāśmirī schools at any rate, tarka denotes both the supreme illumination and the means thereto. It is suggested that in the Maitrāyanīya-Upaniṣad, tarka is used in the instrumental sense, otherwise VI.20 would be unintelligible.

There appears to be a certain continuity between the ṣaḍ-āṅga tradition of the Maitrāyanīya-Upaniṣad and later hindu and buddhist schools. However, this six-phase model never achieved the same fixity as did the eightfold schema of āṣṭa-āṅga-yoga which is obviously an elaboration of the former type. Yet while the classical eightfold path was being formulated, other schools notably in Buddhism continued to favour sixfold models. It is not clear why tarka was dropped in the formulation of the eightfold path. But the most likely explanation is that it never has been a typical feature of hindu Yoga but rather should be seen as belonging to the doctrinal sphere of Buddhism. J.W. HAUER's (1958, 102) conjecture that the buddhist term vitarka-dhyāna is modelled on the tarka of the Maitrāyanīya-Upaniṣad puts the cart before the horse.

The buddhist influence on this scripture is beyond dispute.

As concerns the yoga-aṅga section, nothing can be said about any buddhist bias in it. Its semblance with the Buddha's doctrine does not go beyond the hardly significant fact that formally both aṣṭa-aṅga-yoga and Hīnayāna Buddhism subscribe to an eightfold classification system. The appalling lack of data makes it impossible to ascertain the exact place of the aṣṭa-aṅga tradition within the context of ancient Indian soteriological speculation.

Somewhat less enigmatic, albeit by no means perfectly manifest, are the connections between the kriyā-yoga and the ramifying network of contemporaneous ethico-religious traditions. P. DEUSSEN (1920, I, 561), like so many other scholars, fails to appreciate the significance of the kriyā-yoga tradition in the Yoga-Sūtra. He wrongly deems it to be a preparatory stage, out of which evolved the later haṭha-yoga. He also seems to entertain the strange notion that this tradition is dealt with only in the first two aphorisms of the second chapter.³⁷ The fanciful equation of kriyā-yoga with haṭha-yoga is also accepted by M. MÜLLER (1916⁴, 344f.) who likewise does not appear to be aware of the philosophical import of the sūtras commencing with II.1.

G. JHA (1907, x-xi), again, translates the compound kriyā-yoga with 'disciplinary Yoga', arguing that it is suited for the yujana, i.e. the second of the three stages of yogic accomplishment, whereas the aṣṭa-aṅga-yoga is allegedly for the beginner or ānuruksu. This

37 See P. DEUSSEN (1920, I, 509)

far-fetched explanation seems to be according to Vijñāna Bhikṣu's Yoga-Sāra-Saṃgraha (p.3), edited by G. JHA (1933²). Also E. FRAUWALLNER (1953, I, 427) subscribes to the view that kriyā-yoga leads up to aṣṭa-aṅga-yoga. M. ELIADE's (1973³, 39) standpoint is not evident. Only J.W. HAUER (1958, 236) and A. JANÁČEK (1954) recognise the independence of the kriyā-yoga tradition, though both again are mistaken about the extent of the kriyā-yoga 'section' in the Yoga-Sūtra.

With the exception of those aphorisms which deal with the eight 'members', the whole of Patañjali's work can be said to be an exposition of kriyā-yoga. Not only is kriyā-yoga not a preparatory stage to aṣṭa-aṅga-yoga, but it is a type of Yoga in its own right, and one which is theoretically far more advanced than the aṣṭa-aṅga tradition. The wide-spread misconception about this kriyā-yoga and the consequent over-evaluation of the aṣṭa-aṅga model is tentatively criticised in a paper by S. TAKAGI (1966, 451ff.). He examines the three components of kriyā-yoga, viz. tapas, svādhyāya and Īśvara-pranidhāna, in their historical context. Although his paper is basically a review of previous research and not too critical, the author rightly concludes that the kriyā-yoga "was not a mere arrangement on the part of the author, but that such had existed as an independent form of religious practice"³⁸. He furthermore makes the valuable observation that there are some striking parallels between the kriyā-yoga tradition in the Yoga-Sūtra and

38 S. TAKAGI (1966, 442)

the Mahābhārata. However, in the end he adopts E. FRAUWALNER's (1953,1) nonsensical distinction between nirodha-yoga and aṣṭa-aṅga-yoga.

The term kriyā-yoga is an interesting one. According to G.A. JACOB (1891) the word kriyā is not to be met with in the earlier upaniṣadic literature. Possibly its first occurrence is in Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī (III.3.100), and the compound kriyā-yoga is used in Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya (I.1.14). Presumably originally kriyā, like its synonym karman, simply denoted 'action' or 'activity'. Maybe as the word karman came to be increasingly more invested with an eschatological meaning, viz. 'action-determinant', the term kriyā gradually acquired the sense of 'rite' or 'ritualistic activity'.

In the Mahābhārata, one of the great landmarks in the history of Yoga, the compound kriyā-yoga is mentioned only twice. Both references were first pointed out by E.W. HOPKINS (1901, 366 & 371). He interprets the one instance (XIII.14.22: jñāna-siddhi-kriyā-yogaiḥ)³⁹ in terms of "the kind of Yoga-science characterized by necessary external actions as compared with that characterized by discarding this in favour of psychical perfection", in other words as haṭha-yoga, but the text fails to bear him out on this. Of greater interest in relation to the Yoga-Sūtra is the second reference, viz. III.2.22: tad-āsu-pratikāraṅga-ca satatam ca-avicintanāt, ādhi-vyādhi-praśamanam kriyā-yoga-dvayena tu, or: "These [physical afflictions are to be dealt with] by swift countermeasures and always by [proper] reflection, but the healing of [psychological] ailments (ādhi-vyādhi) is by means of

39 This is not according to the critical edition by V.S.SUKTHANKAR but probably to the Calcutta edition.

kriyā-yoga."

Even though E.W. HOPKINS (1901, 371) contends that the phrase kriyā-yoga-dvayena need not necessarily imply Yoga, this stanza reminds one immediately of the aphorism I.30 in the Yoga-Sūtra which lists the so-called citta-vikṣepas. In fact the first item to be mentioned is vyādhi. That this is not coincidental is evidenced by the entire tenor of the epic passage in question, which is all about suffering and its removal. Thus verse III.2.23 reads: mānasena hi duḥkhena śarīram-upatapyate, ayah pindena taptena kumbha-samstham-iva-udakam, or: "From mental pain the body is agonised, as [when] a hot iron bar is put in a pot of water." To alleviate this pain, gnosis or jñāna is recommended. Furthermore, it is emphasised that sneha ('attachment') is at the root of all pain (see III.2.26). Sneha, again, gives birth to trṣṇā or the 'thirst' for life which is said to lead a person to ruin. In subsequent stanzas the value of santoṣa or 'contentment' is praised.

One cannot avoid the conclusion that this epic kriyā-yoga foreshadows the kriyā-yoga of Patañjali. The obvious link between them is the doctrine of suffering or duḥkha as fully developed in the Yoga-Sūtra in the shape of the kleśa theory. Both versions of kriyā-yoga share the same 'clinical' approach to the alleviation of sorrow by means of gnostic illumination.

I now proceed with a brief description of the three components of kriyā-yoga 'proper', viz. tapas, svādhyāya and īśvara-pranidhāna. In the Yoga-Sūtra the term tapas seems to be used in a generic, multivalent way. No actual definition is provided, presumably

because the word was not intended in any technical sense. Hence it is best translated with 'austerity' or 'asceticism' or perhaps even 'spiritual exercise'. The difference between tapas and abhyāsa or 'practice' must be carefully registered. The latter is employed as a formal parameter of the yogic path in association with vairāgya or 'dispassion' which is its negative correlate as it were. Tapas, on the other hand, suggests a definite, concrete content. Strictly speaking, it pertains to the abhyāsa category.

In the yoga-aṅga section (see II.43) it is stated that "on account of tapas, as a result of the dwindling of the impurity, [there comes about] the perfection of the bodily organs" (kāya-indriya-siddhir-aśuddhi-kṣayāt-tapasah), but, again, this is no definition. In view of the secondary position of tapas in the yoga-aṅga tract, it is possible to speculate that it may have a more narrow connotation here than in the kriyā-yoga part.

A similar proviso must be made in regard to the interpretation of the objective of svādhyāya as given out in II.44, viz. "contact with the chosen deity" (iṣṭa-devatā-samprayogaḥ). In the kriyā-yoga tradition svādhyāya has probably a less sectarian meaning. However, that it simply stands for 'recitation', as maintained by S. TAKAGI (1966, 445) and others, is unlikely. Considering the philosophical, 'learned' character of Patañjali's tradition, one would rather expect svādhyāya to signify 'self-study', in the sense of adhyayana or 'reading of scriptures'. In the Tattvārtha-Sūtra (IX.25) of Umāsvāti (or Umāsvāmin), svādhyāya is described as having five forms, namely vācanā or 'teaching', pracchanā or 'con-

sultation', anuprekṣā or 'contemplation', āmnāya or 'revising' and dharma-upadeśa or 'preaching the law'.

The third constituent of the triad of practices characteristic of kriyā-yoga is Īśvara-pranidhāna. Quite possibly it is this feature which has misled so many interpreters into believing that kriyā-yoga is mere ritual activity and preparatory to the aṣṭa-aṅga path. This misconception was reinforced by the equally fallacious notion that Īśvara was introduced into Classical Yoga from the outside. The paramount significance of Īśvara-pranidhāna is borne out by the fact that it figures as an important element in both yogic traditions present in the Yoga-Sūtra.

As is apparent from I.23ff., Īśvara-pranidhāna is an intrinsic part of the practice structure of kriyā-yoga, though again, it is nowhere defined unless one turns I.28 into a definition. This aphorism runs as follows: taj-japas-tad-artha-bhāvanam, or: "Recitation of that [pranava, i.e. om] [leads to] the realisation of its content [ie. the Lord]". Vyāsa furnishes us with two, maybe complementary, explanations of what the practice of Īśvara-pranidhāna entails, and both are far removed from the notion of 'recitation' (japa) as referred to in I.28.

pranidhānād-bhakti-viśeṣād-āvarjita Īśvaras-tam-
anugrḥnāty-abhidhyāna-mātreṇa tad-abhidhyāna-mātrād-āpi
yogina āsanna-taraḥ samādhi-lābhaḥ samādhi-phalaṃ ca
bhavati-iti. (I.23)

"On account of pranidhāna, [that is] through a particular

love-attachment (bhakti) [towards him], the Lord inclines [towards the yogin], and favours him alone by reason of his [meditative-devotional] disposition (abhidhyāna). By this disposition only, the yogin draws near to the attainment of ecstasy and the fruit of ecstasy [i.e. emancipation]."

Īśvara-pranidhānam sarva-kriyānāṃ parama-gurāv-
aparnam tat-phala-samyāso vā. (II.1; also II.32)

"Pranidhāna to the Lord is the offering-up of all deeds to the supreme teacher, or the renunciation of their fruits."

Whereas the former interpretation echoes the bhakti-yoga of the Bhagavad-Gītā, the latter presents in a nutshell the essence of karma-yoga. Nonetheless, Vyāsa tells us nothing about possible technical devices employed externally or internally to execute this pranidhāna.

The history of the word pranidhāna, which I have left untranslated so far, is rather obscure. It is composed of the prefixes pra + ni and the root √dhā ('to put, place') and has the literal meaning of 'putting together, application'. In the Bhagavad-Gītā (XI.44) the gerund pranidhāya in the sense of 'prostrating [the body]' is used, but this seems to be the only instance throughout the earlier Upaniṣads (see G.A. JACOB, 1891). It appears that pranidhāna belonged originally to the buddhist phraseology.

Īśvara-pranidhāna is usually translated with 'devotion to the Lord', but 'devotion' is a somewhat ambiguous word, and I think that pranidhāna has none of the emotive overtones generally attached to this term in religious contexts. Perhaps the buddhist usage of pranidhāna provides the essential clue for understanding this important concept within the hindu realm of teaching. In the mahāyānic scriptures, such as the Śatasāhasrikā (X.1458) and the Abhisamayālaṅkāra (I.68), pranidhāna is employed in the sense of 'resolve'.⁴⁰ It is a kind of positive affirmation of, or respect for, the Lord. Again no ritualistic practice need be involved here. Perhaps pranidhāna entails the idea of 'emulation', which could be explained by the other buddhist usage in the sense of 'plans for the future', as in the Abhisamayālaṅkāra (IV.18) and the Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā (299).

Īśvara, unquestioningly, is the archetypal yogin. In order to attain to his lofty estate, that is to recover one's Self-identity as the transcendental puruṣa, it is natural to think of him as a guide or Vorbild. The grace which the Lord bestows on the yogin by virtue of his efforts in emulating the divine being, is not actually mentioned in the Yoga-Sūtra but it can safely be assumed in view of the antecedent developments leading up to the peculiar theism of Classical Yoga.

It has, I trust, become evident that the kriyā-yoga of Patañjali is not a mere preliminary ritual to the aṣṭāṅga-yoga tradition, but an independent type of Yoga with its specific practical and theoretical framework. Despite the fact that the triad of tapas, svādhyāya and

40 See E. CONZE (1967)

Iśvara-pranidhāna were understood in a ritualistic sense in the pre-classical traditions, in the Yoga-Sūtra this is no longer the case except perhaps in a metaphorical way if one concedes that all Yoga is internalised ritual.

It is interesting to observe that the ritualistic character of kriyā-yoga has been retained or revived, in the doctrinal sphere of the Purāṇas where the old association of kriyā with 'ritual action' has not been forgotten by reason of the active cultic worship among the Vaiṣṇavas and Śaivas. This leads one to conclude that only in the strictly philosophical yoga-darśana did tapas, svādhyāya and Iśvara-pranidhāna acquire a non-ritualistic meaning.

PART THREE

SEMANTIC INVESTIGATIONS

CHAPTER FIVE
PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTA

1. Īśvara

The ontology of Classical Yoga, or kriyā-yoga, has three foci, viz. Īśvara, puruṣa and prakṛti. These are deemed irreducible ontic ultimates. The most distinctive feature of the ontology of Patañjali's school of thought and, I wish to contend, of any form of hindu Yoga, is the concept of 'the Lord' or Īśvara.

The word Īśvara is a derivative of the verbal root √īś ('to rule'), current already at the time of the ancient vedic saṃhitās. Synonyms are īś, īśa and īśāna; Īśvara being the more prevalent form in later periods. It conveys the notion of a highest personal god, at times endowed with certain anthropomorphic characteristics but never totally divorced from the concept of the impersonal absolute, the brahman, of philosophical enquiry. The term Īśvara is intimately bound up with the history of theism in India. Repeated attempts have been made in the past to trace the evolution of this crucial religio-philosophical concept. One of the first scholars to apply himself to the study of the history of theism was F.M. MÜLLER. He distinguishes three major stages all of which can be evidenced in the vedic age; they are (1) Polytheism, (2) Henotheism (or Kathenotheism), (3^a) Monotheism and (3^b) Pantheism.

Thus on the most primitive level M. MÜLLER (1916⁴) envisages

a kind of theological pluralism in which the thirty-three known gods of the ṛgvedic pantheon were regarded as embodiments or abstractions of natural phenomena. On the basis of this diffuse conceptual stage the need arose for a unification of the multiple devas populating the heavens. According to M. MÜLLER the notion of the viśve-devas ('all-gods') was a first step in this direction. Certain gods were identified with each other or coupled together as in the case of Mitra-Varuna and Agni-Soma etc. On the next stage, as M. MÜLLER sees it, a single god was invoked under the temporary forgetfulness of all other gods. M. MÜLLER devises for this phenomenon the term Henotheism (also: Kathenotheism). From then on the development proceeded in a bifurcate line. On the one hand it gave rise to monotheistic conceptions and on the other hand to Pantheism with its impersonal absolute.

The entire problem was renewedly investigated by H. JACOBI (1923). In principle accepting M. MÜLLER's (1916⁴) classificatory system, he modifies somewhat his formulation of the nature of Henotheism in that he prefers to regard it not so much as a direct pre-stage to Monotheism, but as a rejection of the gods as totally independent entities and thus as a preparatory stage for the development of the concept of the impersonal quintessence (or brahman) of the manifest world.

The concept of brahman (neutr.) was of first-rate importance in the religious and philosophical speculations of the post-vedic period and, as S. DASGUPTA (1963⁵, I, 20) remarks, it "has been the highest glory for the Vedānta philosophy of later days". In one

sense it is antipodal to the idea of Iśvara, yet in another sense it can be said to complement it, or perhaps even partially define it. For in the formulation of the notion of a personal god the idea of the omnipresent and omnitemporal ground of being is never lost sight of.

The idea of the personal deity is anticipated in the vedic conception of the 'unknown god' (M. MÜLLER's phrase) eulogised in X.121, as also in the conception of Prajāpati, Dhātṛ, Viśvakarman, Tvaṣṭṛ and Puruṣa (see X.90). Whether or not one interprets these according to some preconceived evolutionist scheme as the culmination of a primitive polytheist medley, by the time the bulk of the Mahābhārata had been composed the concept of Iśvara was firmly established in the religious sector of Indian culture. The theism of the epic is largely analogous to that of the metric Upaniṣads, such as the Śvetāśvatara- and the Kaṭha-Upaniṣad and not least the Bhagavad-Gītā. This highlights an interesting point, namely it brings out the close relation which exists between the concept of Iśvara, Sāṅkhya ontological ideas and yogic practice. Their joint occurrence in the post-buddhist period is certainly remarkable and calls for an explanation.

B. KUMARAPPA (1934, 3), in a slightly different context, suggests that theological speculation was originally triggered off by the primary question "Whence this universe?". He thus links up theism with cosmological and etiologi- cal considerations, which would seem to have the supportive evidence of the many creation theories in the Upaniṣads. But perhaps this is merely one half of the full answer.

A different solution to this problem is possible if one places proper emphasis on the fact it is not only the speculative Sāṃkhya which is bound up with the Iśvara concept but also the age-old experimental tradition of Yoga. Basing myself on R. OTTO's (1959) acknowledgement of an innate capacity in man for numinous experiencing, I wish to propose that Iśvara is essentially and primarily an experiential construct arrived at through yogic self-absorption rather than theological ratiocination. In this respect it can be aligned with the other ontological categories of Sāṃkhya and Yoga which, as I will show, are most appropriately understood as being phenomenological distillations of meditative-enstatic experiences. However, I must emphasise that this line of argumentation does in no way imply either an affirmation or a denial of the objective reality of any of these categories of experience.

It has not always been appreciated that theism is woven into the very fabric of hindu Yoga. Thus in R. GARBE's (1896) opinion, Yoga is a theistic re-interpretation of the nirīśvara tradition of ancient Sāṃkhya. He speculates (p. 50) that this acceptance of Iśvara into Yoga was the likely result of an effort to make Yoga more acceptable to the popular strata of society. H. OLDENBERG (1915, 281) asks: "Did this belief originally pertain to Yoga as an essential element? Have Sāṃkhya and Yoga always been differentiated in the way the epic has it and as they are differentiated in their classical forms: as an atheistic and a theistic system respectively? This seems doubtful. The practice

of Yoga obviously does not necessarily presuppose the notion of god (...). Visible proof that a system greatly suffused with yogic elements could nonetheless reject the belief in god is supplied by the doctrine (...) of the Buddha."

This stance has been challenged early on in the controversy by H. JACOBI (1923, 39) who writes: "This assertion of Īśvara has been interpreted as a concession of Yoga to Brahmanism, which is surely wrong; rather one should admire the audacity and the courage of a school of philosophy which, in the face of the prevalent atheism in philosophical and orthodox circles, dared to put forward the existence of Īśvara (...) as one of its doctrinal axioms." H. JACOBI thus reaffirms L. VON SCHROEDER's (1887, 687) contention that "Yoga has a distinct theistic character". This has been definitively confirmed by more recent research into the pre-classical configurations of the Sāṃkhya school of thought. In an outstanding contribution, K.B.R. RAO (1966) has conclusively demonstrated the intrinsic theistic nature of the pre-classical Sāṃkhya schools. His comprehensive study fully corroborates and consolidates F. EDGERTON's (1924, 8) findings: "Where, then, do we find that 'original' atheistic view expressed? I believe: nowhere. A study of the epic and other early materials (...) has convinced me that there is not a single passage in which disbelief in Brahman or God is attributed to Sāṃkhya."

H. JACOBI (1923) sees a connection between the employment of tapas and the belief in Īśvara. He points out that not

infrequently the declared purpose of the fearful ascetic practices was to get the attention of a particular deity who, impressed and gratified with the tapasvin's self-inflicted harsh^dship and unflinching endurance, would bestow a boon on him. He mentions in passing that in such a context the deity was generally known as varada or 'bestower of the boon'. He then states (p. 29): "For the popular conception at least, the grace of the deity was a necessary precondition for the recompense of ascetic exertion. It seems but natural that Yoga should adopt the recognition of Īśvara into its system."

This view is reiterated in many modern studies, especially on the history of religions. Thus N. SMART (1968, 30), a typical proponent of this misconception, writes: "... Yoga has borrowed a concept from popular religion and put it to a special use." As he asserts elsewhere (1971, 163), Yoga is essentially an atheistic system. No reasons are supplied. H. JACOBI (1923) at least offers some kind of explanation even though it is unacceptable. For, what his interpretation amounts to is the reduction of the conception of a personal god to one of two actors in a process of bargaining: the ascetic excels himself and is rewarded or 'paid off' by the deity. I do not contest that this may be exactly the essence of many of the ascetic 'deals' recorded in the epic. But I find it unsound reasoning to take this as a historical prelude to the act of grace (prasāda) spoken of in later Yoga. I prefer to understand such legends as folkloristic interpretations of a phenomenon which could well

be a parameter of mystical experiencing: the ultimate crossing of the threshold of phenomenal existence as a transcendental act which appears to be initiated as it were from 'outside' or 'above'.

The idea implicit in H. JACOBI's (1923) suggestion that Patañjali in a way made a compromise to placate the orthodoxy is preposterous. Imputing to the famous Yoga teacher such hypocrisy, it is hardly surprising that his precise philosophical position has never been appraised in any detail.

Less objectionable but similarly unconvincing is M. MÜLLER's (1916⁴, 326) psychological explanation. Rejecting the historical argument according to which Patañjali merely sought to appease the orthodox brāhmaṇas, M. MÜLLER instead suggests that it was the natural human craving for a first cause which led Patañjali to the postulation of Īśvara. If this were correct one would expect Īśvara to have at least one definite cosmological function; yet 'the lord' is neither the creator, sustainer or destroyer of the universe. The 'first cause' of which M. MÜLLER speaks is, in Patañjali's system, the world-ground or prakṛti, the eternally creative matrix of the manifest world.

As against the above historical and psychological explanations of the concept of Īśvara, I wish to propose that its origins lie in the realm of yogic experiencing itself. This is also M. ELIADE's (1973³, 75) conclusion: "Patañjali nevertheless had to introduce Īśvara into Yoga, for Īśvara was, so to speak, an experiential datum..." This of course does not imply that Patañjali's formulation

of the concept is a creation ex nihil. It is obvious from a perusal of the Mahābhārata, especially certain portions of the twelfth parvan, that the conceptualisation of Īvara in Classical Yoga has its epic antecedents.

Philosophically the most important treatment of the theistic component in epic Yoga is to be found in section XII.296⁴¹ of the critical edition of the Mahābhārata. Here hiranyagarbha-yoga is dealt with which K.B.R. RAO (1966, 278) wrongly identifies as the philosophy of the epic Yoga system par excellence. However, this slip does not detract from the general merit of his acute analysis of this particular school of Yoga. On the basis of P.M. MODI's (1932) earlier work, he succeeded in undertaking a complete reinterpretation of the above passage which has been lamentably misconstrued by F. EDGERTON (1965) and others. He managed to reconstruct a good deal of the philosophy sketched in these extremely difficult and obscure verses.

Accepting in principle the general epic theories about the twenty-three evolutes of the unitary world-ground, the hiranyagarbha school of Yoga introduces the distinction between the Self which has recovered its innate enlightenment, viz. the so-called buddhyamāna, and the ever-enlightened buddha or prabuddha. In comparison with the latter, i.e. god, the enlightened Self is

41 K.B.R. RAO (1966) follows one of the earlier editions of the Mahābhārata where this passage is XII.308.

said to be abuddhimān (see vs. 17). Thus there is no straight identification of the twenty-fifth tattva, viz. buddhyamāna, with the twenty-sixth which is the supreme godhead. The latter principle is also referred to as īśvara, mahā-ātman and avyakta-brahman. The buddhyamāna is also called puruṣa and buddha (which confusingly enough is also applied to the twenty-sixth tattva). The twenty-fourth principle, which is the insentient world-ground, is known by the name of prakṛti, abuddha, avyakta and apratibuddha.

It is said of the buddhyamāna (see vs. 2) that it creates, upholds and withdraws the gunas of the world-ground and that it 'knows' or apperceives the world-ground (see vs. 3) whilst itself being nirguna (see vs. 4) and hence 'unknown' by the avyakta. On the other hand, the buddhyamāna does not apperceive the lord (see vs. 6) who is pure, incomprehensible, eternal and always apperceiving (see vs. 7). This mahā-ātman or great being permeates both the visible and the invisible (see vs. 8). When the buddhyamāna or Self identifies itself with something that is external to its being it is known as avyakta-locana (see vs. 10). Taking his cue from XII.296.18 (= XII.284.18 crit. ed.), K.B.R.RAO (1966, 282) interprets this term as "wearing the spectacles of prakṛti" or "seeing through the avyakta" by means of the organ of cognition (which is buddhi) rather than understanding this interesting compound in the plain sense of "seeing the avyakta".

The goal of this Yoga is naturally also quite different from that enunciated in the contemporaneous Sāṃkhya and Pāñcarātra schools which implies a merger of the phenomenal self with the universal Self.

This difference is evident from such phrases as buddhatva (XII.296.11), kevala-dharma (vs. 12) or kevalena samāgama (vs. 13). These imply that the buddhyamāna attains to the 'estate' of the twenty-sixth principle without becoming identical with it. In other words, Īśvara always remains transcendent (para). It never becomes involved with any of the lower tattvas. Thus emancipation can be said to be a condition of the buddhyamāna qua the buddhyamāna in the 'company' (samiti) of the lord (see XII.296.27ff.).

The metaphysics of this dominant school of Yoga in epic times undoubtedly provided the basis for the peculiar ontology of Classical Yoga. This was first pointed out by P.M. MODI (1932, 81): "The idea of God in the Yoga System was not arrived at by superimposing it on an atheistic Sāṃkhya System with twentyfive principles, but by distinguishing the Jīva from God on practical grounds." This is fully confirmed by K.B.R. RAO (1966, 290): "Probably the Epic Yoga lays the inchoate foundation for the classical Yoga conception of a detached Īśvara." However, he remarks (p. 291) that the conception of Īśvara in the ancient hiranyagarbha-yoga is "utterly naive and simple" since it depicts god as "a motionless and frigid witness" who is not even interested in the yogin's struggle for emancipation. He deems the more activist conception of god as expressed in the Yoga-Bhāṣya (I.25) a positive advance on this view. But K.B.R. RAO's criticism is biased. Although no mention is made in the epic passage in question of the lord's soteriological function, one must nevertheless ask oneself why a need should have been felt to philosophically recognise the superlative status of Īśvara if this

concept would not somehow have had an experiential content. This would seem to be corroborated by the strictly pragmatic approach of Yoga with its emphasis on experiment and personal verification. Nor is the absence of any reference in the above passage to the idea of grace or prasāda, which looms large in other contexts, a positive proof of its irrelevance in the yogic process as envisaged in hiranyagarbha-yoga.

After this brief excursion into the epic antecedents of Classical Yoga, I will next scrutinise Patañjali's theological formulations. He defines 'the lord' (Iśvara) in this way: kleśa-karma-vipāka-āśayair-aparāmr̥stah puruṣa-viśeṣa Iśvaraḥ, or: "The lord is a special Self untouched by the causes-of-affliction, [by] action [and its] fruit [and by] the deposit [of subliminal-activators]" (I.24). In the Yoga and Sāṃkhya ontology the entire spectrum of existence is analysed into the two primary modalities of Self (puruṣa) and non-self (prakṛti). The former embodies the principle of pure awareness corresponding with the Kantian 'trans-intelligible subject', whereas the latter is the womb of all creation. P. BOWES (1971, 168) circumscribes these as the 'principle of consciousness' and the 'principle of materiality' respectively. Understandably Iśvara could not but be included in the former category, as has been pointed out long ago by Vātsyāyana in his commentary to Nyāya-Sūtra IV.1.21.

Thus god is defined as a Self sui generis, and his separateness from the 'ordinary' transcendental Self or puruṣa is explained

in negative terms: The lord is unaffected by any of the modifications which the ordinary puruṣa is subjected to by reason of his involvement with the world-ground and its products. To put it differently, Īśvara at no time forsook or will forsake his perfect condition of transcendence as pure Being-Awareness. Because of his 'inactivity', by which is not meant mere abstention from action but the kind of condition which the Bhagavad-Gītā calls 'actionlessness' or naiṣkarmya, no vipāka ever accrues to him, and for the same reason he is also never subjected to the causes-of-affliction which are the natural concomitants of any implication in phenomenal existence.

M. MÜLLER (1946⁴, 321) remarks on this concept that the lord "may be primus inter pares, but as one of the Purushas, he is but one among his peers. He is a little more than a god, but he is certainly not what we mean by God". Yet Patañjali's definition of Īśvara has also a positive aspect. This is clear from I.25-I.28: tatra niratiśayam sarva-jñā-bījam; pūrvesām-āpi guruḥ kālena anavacchedāt; tasya vācakah pranavaḥ; taj-japas-tad-ārtha-bhāvanam, which can be rendered as follows: "In this [Īśvara] the seed of omniscience is unsurpassed. He was also the teacher of the former [yogins], since there is no temporal limitation [for him]. His signature is the pranava [i.e. om]. The recitation of that [pranava] [leads to] the realisation of its meaning." To these statements must be added the concept of Īśvara-pranidhāna which has already been discussed.

Aphorism I.25 is of special interest as it has always been understood as a 'proof' for the existence of god. Thus the Yoga-Bhāṣya (I.25) has: yatra kāṣṭhā-prāptir-jñānasya sa sarva-jñāḥ sa ca

puruṣa-viśeṣa iti, or "In whom the limit of knowledge is reached, he is all-knowing, and he is a special Self". By 'seed' Vācaspati Miśra understands 'cause' (kāraṇa), whereas Vijñāna Bhikṣu, in his Yoga-Vārttika, explains it as 'mark' (liṅga). Our 'supra-sensuous grasping' (ati-indriya-grahana), as Vācaspati Miśra observes, depends on the degree to which tamas obscures sattva. The moderate ability for knowledge displayed by the worldling contains the seed for higher knowledge and, even, omniscience. There comes an upper limit which cannot be surpassed, and this is the omniscience of the lord. As G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 61) correctly notes: "The absolute extension of the lord's knowledge is unambiguously asserted. But there is no word, no insinuation even that the lord's knowledge is different in essence, is a more perfect way of knowing." Vyāsa explains the unexcellible knowledge of Īśvara as the result of the utter purity of the sattva reflecting his transcendental Awareness. His knowledge extends to all objects and all periods, and it is this which distinguishes him from such seers as Kapila or the Buddha.

It is difficult to decide whether or not these observations by the classical exegetists were in fact intended as a kind of 'proof' for the existence of god. Patañjali himself, again, is far too concise to win such an interpretation from sūtra I.25. Probably it simply refers to the fact that in contrast with the awareness of the ordinary puruṣa, the Īśvara's awareness is perfectly continuous, that is to say, uninterrupted by prakṛti, since Īśvara at no time and not even for an instant falls victim to nescience or

avidyā. Thus maybe I.25 does not entail so much a grading of omniscience which would make little sense than a statement about the fact that what constitutes a potential for the ordinary being is a permanent actuality for īśvara. I cannot agree with S. RADHAKRISHNAN's (1951⁶, II, 369) assertion that "Patañjali proves the omniscience of God by means of the law of continuity, which must have an upper limit". I prefer to see in I.25 a parallel to the mahāyāna buddhist notion of the tathāgata-garbha as the seed of consummate enlightenment, temporarily covered with defilements of a cognitive and conative nature, viz. vikalpa and abhiniveśa, whilst in reality it is transcendental and nirvikalpa. As long as this seed has not sprouted, cognition is distorted and things are not seen as they are (yathā-bhūta).

That the lord is not conceptualised as a being who is of complete irrelevance to mankind clearly emerges from I.26 where īśvara is called "the teacher of the former [yogins]". This is in keeping with the traditional pre-classical interpretation of the concept of god as expressed, for instance, in the following stanza from the Bhagavad-Gītā (IV.1): imaṃ vivasvate yogam proktavān-aham-avyayam, vivasvān-manave prāha manur-ikṣvākave'bravīt, or: "To Vivasvat I expounded this imperishable Yoga; Vivasvat related it to Manu; Manu told it to Ikṣvāku". Unless one presumes this doctrine to be no more than a forced concession to śruti, which would be incongruous with Patañjali's generally self-reliant approach, there is one difficult question which calls for an answer. This is: How can a perfectly transcendental being assume a teaching

role? Vyāsa, in his Yoga-Bhāṣya (I.25), attempts to solve this problem by introducing anthropomorphic features: tasya-ātma-anugraha-abhāve'pi bhūta-anugrahaḥ prayojanaṃ, jñāna-dharma-upadeśena kalpa-pralaya-mahā-pralayesu samsāriṇaḥ puruṣa-anuddharisyāmi-iti, tathā ca-uktam-ādi-vidvān-nirmāna-cittam- ^{1/8} ^{1/8} ^{1/8} adhiṣṭhāya kārūṇyād-bhagavān parama-rṣir-āsurave jñānasamānāya- ^{1/8} ^{1/8} ^{1/8} tantram provāca-iti, or: "Although he has no [feeling of] self-gratification, [the lord's] motive is the gratification of beings: 'By instruction in knowledge and virtue, at the dissolution [of the world] [at the end of] a world-age [or] at the great dissolution [of the entire universe] , I will uplift the Selves [immersed] in conditioned-existence'. And likewise it has been said: 'The first knower, assuming a created mind out of compassion, the exalted, supreme seer declared this teaching to Āsuri who desired to know.'"

This passage epitomises the popular and orthodox belief that Īśvara is the author of the Vedas by whose teachings the staunch believer transcends all ill. Within the framework of Patañjali's philosophy such an interpretation makes little sense. A more sophisticated solution is called for which does not in any way interfere with the definition of Īśvara as transcendence per se. The classical exegetists are of no help here. Their interpretations of the nature of Īśvara are exclusive attempts to somehow relate his existence to the mechanisms of the world-ground and to the destinies of the sentient beings ensnared by prakṛti.

If one excludes the possibility of Īśvara actively entering into a teaching situation by somehow phenomenalising himself, there

remains only one logical alternative, and this is that his role as a teacher is entirely passive: His very existence is a sufficient challenge to the yogin who either has come through śraddhā to believe in him or whose spiritual discipline has brought him to the margins of conditioned existence where experiential proof of his existence is found. In other words, Īśvara is the archetypal yogin who 'instructs' by his sheer being.⁴² Pressing this metaphor still farther, one could say that 'communication' between him and the aspiring yogin is possible by reason of the ontic co-essentiality of god and the inmost nucleus of man, viz. the Self (puruṣa). M. ELIADE (1973³, 74) circumscribes this with the phrase 'metaphysical sympathy'.

On the transcendental level the relation between Īśvara and puruṣa is one of 'enclosure' by coalescence; the Self is eclipsed by the being of Īśvara. Empirically, however, the relation is a one-way affair in which the believing yogin emulates Īśvara's condition which is co-essential with the condition of his inmost Self. This is the idea implicit in the concept of Īśvara-pranidhāna which is a channeling of one's emotive and cognitive life to god by endeavouring to 'simulate' his unconditioned nature. For the purpose of this imitatio dei the yogin symbolises god in the form of the pranava which is the sacred phoneme om. As Vyāsa, in his Yoga-Bhāṣya (I.27), aptly points out this symbolisation is not due to convention

42 Cf. G. OBERHAMMER (1964, 197-207)

(saṅketa), but the relation between Īśvara and om is a natural and permanent one. In other words, om is an experience rather than an arbitrary verbal construction. It is thus a true symbol charged with numinous power. Experiencable in deep meditation it is a sign of the omnipresence of Īśvara as manifest on the level of sound. Access to this experience is gained, paradoxically, through the recitation of om. Thus om is both expedient and goal. The human voice is employed to reproduce a 'sound' which is continually 'recited' by the universe itself — an idea which in the Pythagorean school came to be known as the 'harmony of the spheres'. On the Indian side it led to the development of nāda-yoga.

By now it should have become evident that notwithstanding the precarious philosophical interpretation of Īśvara in Classical Yoga, god is of no mean importance in its practical sphere. I cannot therefore endorse G.M. KOELMAN's (1970, 57) contention that it "is striking how the mention of the Īśvara in the Yoga Sūtras is quite casual" and that, as he continues (p. 58) we "could very well cut out the sūtras relating to the Lord, without in any way impairing the systematic coherence of the Pātañjala Yoga, without even leaving a trace of the excision". This is of course a recapitulation of R. GARBE's (1917², 149) view which, incidentally, is also accepted by S. RADHAKRISHNAN (1951⁶, II, 371, fn.3). G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 63f.) elucidates his position further: "If we said that the Īśvara does not answer any logical need in the Pātañjala Yoga, we do not maintain that either Patañjali himself or

the Yogis in general cannot be true devotees of the Īśvara. The only thing we mean to say is that the whole Yoga philosophy and the psychological technique of liberation it stands for are atheistic in nature. If some oneyogi, even if all yogis, did admit Īśvara as somehow God, this would be due not to Yoga doctrine, but to the yogis' individual religious dispositions. We might say that Pātañjala Yoga technique prescind from whether someone admits a God or denies him." Yet, strangely enough, in the very next sentence the author states: "We believe that Pātañjala Yoga is essentially theistic." But as G.R.F. Oberhammer has proved (sic!), the Pātañjala doctrine of the Supreme Lord had to express itself in terms of a philosophical school, the Sāṅkhya School, which has no room for God." Despite his unusual objectivity on other points, the author — a Jesuit — obviously found it difficult to suspend his own conception of what god ought or ought not to be. How else can one explain the formidable ambiguity of his statements?

The fact is that the doctrine of Īśvara is an integral component of the philosophy of Classical Yoga and that, moreover, Īśvara figures prominently in the practice structure of Yoga, and any attempt to exorcise this concept would amount to a crippling of both the theoretical superstructure and the practical substructure of Yoga. It is correct, as M. ELLIADE (1973³, 73) observes, that Īśvara is a god only for the yogins, the spiritually awakened who are prepared to take him as their Vorbild. But since it is implied in the philosophy of Classical Yoga, as in all other darśanas,

that the summum bonum of human life is to transcend contingent existence, god can, and in terms of this ethical model should, be meaningful also to the laity. Shocking as this attenuated theism must be to the committed deist, it is a curious fact that rather cognate views can be found in the writings of some of the intellectual mystics such as Meister Eckehart or Plotinus. This may be instructive in that it entails the warning not to look at this question from a purely theoretical or logical point of view rather than from the angle of spiritual practice and experiential verification.

2. Puruṣa

Like the notion of Iśvara the concept of the Self or puruṣa is not a purely theoretical construct. It is best understood as circumscribing a particular yogic experience of the numinous. This 'experience' is not of the nature of what is ordinarily meant by this term. Owing to the radical dualism between the Self and the non-self (or prakṛti), as conceived in Classical Yoga, there can strictly speaking be no experience of the Self at all. This holds true of Iśvara as well, being defined as he is as a puruṣa sui generis. However, Patañjali does make certain provisions which allow one to speak of a 'vision of the Self' (puruṣa-khyāti) or 'Self gnosis' (puruṣa-jñāna). I will go into this later.

In view of the experiential derivation of the concept of puruṣa all explanations which seek to establish the logical necessity of the Self within the conceptual lattice of Classical Yoga, or which try to make a case for the theoretical inadequacy of this doctrine, must be relegated to a subsidiary position. This pre-eminently practical orientation of Yoga has not always been duly appreciated by western scholars. Thus when R. GARBE (1917², 356) insists that the puruṣa is primarily a philosophical postulate inferred from empirical data, he blatantly ignores the fact that whatever role ratiocination may play in Classical

Sāṃkhya, its foundations are, like those of Classical Yoga, to be found among the diverse traditions of consciousness technology current at the time of the Mahābhārata. The classical proofs adduced for the existence of the Self must therefore be looked upon as afterthoughts to consolidate what constituted originally an experiential (but not empirically observable) datum. Nonetheless, the 'rationalisation' and 'moralisation' — these are R. OTTO's (1959) terms — of the encounter with the numinous in Yoga are potent in themselves, because they are the building blocks of the soteriological formulations in the doctrinal structure of both Classical Yoga and the Sāṃkhya of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa. Treating the interrelation between Self and non-self, A. BHARATI (1970³, 204) offers another suggestion which lies midway between the experiential and the rationalistic answer. He regards the puruṣa as a "postulate of intuition rather than of discursive reasoning". Elsewhere (p. 16) he explains his use of the term 'intuition' which he sets off from gnosis or jñāna, and consequently one must appraise this interpretation as inadequate as the rationalist conjecture.

The history of the word puruṣa and its association with the experience of the numinous in Yoga is a long and interesting one. It is remarkable that the Yoga and Sāṃkhya traditions should have adopted this designation rather than the synonym ātman which enjoys such a great popularity in the Vedānta schools of thought. The etymological derivation of the word has given rise to a considerable amount of speculation. Native Indian tradition proffers

several, more or less fanciful, etymologies. The oldest reference is to be found in the Atharvaveda (X.2.28) which has a pun on the word pur or 'citadel' to the effect of stating that pur-usa is a derivative of it. This etymology is also mentioned in the Mahābhārata (XII.294.37) where purusa is analysed into "he who lies (śete) in the 'citadel' (pura)" of the unmanifest world-ground. In the Nirukta (??) a derivation from pur + sad (= purisāda) and / also from pr ('to fill') is suggested. A further etymology is given in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad (I.4.1) where the word is broken down into purva + us ('to burn'). According to R. GARBE (1917², 356) the correct etymology of the word purusa and its synonyms pums and pumāms is the one suggested by E. LEUMANN (??, 10-12), namely the compound pu-vṛṣa both components of / which signify 'man'.

In its earliest recorded conception, purusa stands both for the mortal 'person'⁴³ and, more significantly, for the cosmic creator who, like the giant Ymir in teutonic mythology, is the causa materialis and the causa efficiens of the manifest universe: He is the demiurge and the primordial substance from which the world is fashioned. This double role is possible because the act of creation is understood as the self-dismemberment of the macrocosmic Person. Symbolically this is interpreted as the first sacrifice (yajña), of archetypal importance to the pan-Indian sacrificial cult. In most instances, this gigantic purusa is

43 See e.g. Rgveda X.97.4-5

thought of as transcending the world which he emitted from his own body.⁴⁴ It is this cosmogonic model which was destined to exert a decisive influence on subsequent thought in India, as can readily be appreciated from a study of the Bhagavad-Gītā and other works of the Pāncarātra school.⁴⁵

In the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad (VIII.10.1) a record of a popular psychological theory has been preserved according to which the puruṣa, conceived as a 'mannikin', departs from the body of the sleeping person. This notion of an indwelling 'ghost' is part of many folk philosophies and figures, among other ancient non-Indian literary documents, in Homer's Odyssey (e.g. X.493). E.H. JOHNSTON (1937, 41ff.) speculates that the later 'soul theory' as he calls the doctrine of puruṣa was arrived at through the gradual fusion of the primitive notion of an immaterial principle or principles animating the human body and of the equally archaic notion of a separate psyche which acts as the carrier of a person's post-mortem identity. He thinks (p. 43) that the Rgveda "contains traces of both conceptions and of the beginning of their amalgamation". This historical approach, which seeks to establish a causal relation between conceptualisations of a different type and degree of complexity, is entirely inapt and inconclusive.

44 See e.g. Rgveda X.90.3-4 and I.164.45, as also Atharvaveda II.1.2.

45 See also the highly symbolic rites performed on the occasion of the installation of a temple which is regarded as a manifestation of the vāstu-puruṣa or supreme architect of the world. This is ably discussed in H. ZIMMER (1926).

Following up the development of the concept of puruṣa E.H. JOHNSTON (1937) observes that in the early metric Upaniṣads and in the Bhagavad-Gītā (except for the chapters XIII-XVIII) puruṣa denotes the individual psyche. He thinks (p. 53) that this term replaced the theory of the ātman-kṣetrajñā in the older texts. He also maintains that those epic passages which equate the puruṣa with ātman belong to a more recent period. J.W. HAUER (1958, 64) points out that the frequency of the word puruṣa is higher in the Atharvaveda than in the R̥gveda which far more often employs the term ātman. He even goes so far as to suggest that the word puruṣa is specific to the vr̥atyā tradition as recorded in the Atharvaveda (see especially book XV) and that it came to be introduced into the doctrinal sphere of orthodox Brāhmanism as a result of the large-scale conversion of the vr̥atyas. The heterodox origin of puruṣa is strongly indicated by the fact that the ancient litany on Rudra, the god of the vr̥atyas, viz. the so-called Śatarudriya found in the Kāṭhaka-Samhitā (XVII.11-17; cf. XXI.6) represents, according to J.W. HAUER, the oldest version of the famous gāyatrī-mantra. It links up Rudra with puruṣa: tad-puruṣāya vidmahe mahā-devāya dhīmahi tan-no rudrah pracodayāt, or: "This [litany] we have invented for the Puruṣa; let us meditate the great god; may Rudra promote ^(us) this [meditation]".⁴⁶


46 Cf. R̥gveda III.62.10: tat-savitur-vareṇyam bhargo devasya dhīmahi dhiyo yo naḥ pracodayāt (= savitrī-mantra).

H. OLDENBERG (1915, 224) makes a pertinent observation:

"It is significant that linguistic usage tends to connect ātman with the genitive case in order to express whose Ātman is referred to, whereas puruṣha occurs more often in conjunction with a locative in order to indicate wherein this Puruṣha dwells. In view of this I would suspect that the preference of the designation Puruṣha for the spiritual principle in Sāṃkhya is related to the strict separation and confrontation, peculiar to this system, between the spirit and nature." I am not sure to what extent this proposition is valid, but certainly puruṣa tends to be associated if not with spatial metaphors, so with the idea of rulership and proprietorship. This is quite evident in the phraseology of the Yoga-Sūtra which on this point reflects the general trend of the upaniṣadic period.

Patañjali employs the term puruṣa altogether eight times (viz. I.16, 24; III.35 twice; III.49, 55; IV.18, 34). He also avails himself of a number of synonyms such as draṣṭṛ (I.3; II.17, 20; IV.23), svāmin (II.23), grahītr (I.41), dr̥g-śakti (II.6), dr̥śi (II.25), dr̥śi-mātra (II.20), prabhu (IV.18), citi (IV.22), citi-śakti (IV.34) and para (IV.24). With the exception of the word para ('the other') these are all 'loaded' terms insofar as they are modelled on the empirical relations of perceiving, cognising and owning and for the sake of communication ascribe a content to something which is by definition without all differentiae (nir-guṇa) and hence strictly speaking incommunicable. The full latitude of the meaning of puruṣa is brought out when one maps the

above synonyms in the following manner:



If one were to place the concept of Īśvara into this semantic grid, it would have to be accommodated to the far right by virtue of the strong connotation of 'lordship' attached to this term. Most of these synonyms of the word puruṣa belong to the old stock of yogic terminology and occur already in the metric Upaniṣads and the Mahābhārata, but dr̥śi-mātra and dr̥g-śakti are more recent coinages which may possibly have originated in the doctrinal sphere of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Nowhere in the Yoga-Sūtra is there a full-fledged definition of the concept of puruṣa, and the most probable reason for this is that by the time of the composition of Patañjali's vade-mecum its precise meaning was perfectly evident. The opposite case must have been true of the concept of Īśvara which Patañjali carefully demarcates from its popular usage in the sense of 'creator'.

From the few references in the Yoga-Sūtra it is clear beyond doubt that the concept of purusa is remarkably akin to that delineated in the epic and other pre-classical Sanskrit literature. It expresses the notion of man's 'transcendental identity', here rendered with 'Self' or 'transintelligible subject', as distinct from the world-ground (prakṛti) both in its noumenal form as pradhāna and in its manifest form as the objective universe (dr̥śya). The Self is an aspatial and atemporal reality which stands in no conceivable relation to the composite world of phenomena nor to their transcendental source. It is sheer awareness as opposed to consciousness-of and in this respect is the exact antithesis to the world-ground which is by definition insentient. This Self is considered the authentic being of man.

Since the mental apparatus, with its consciousness-of, is regarded as an evolute of the world-ground, the Self is necessarily also quite distinct from the mind (citta). Viewed psychologically the Self is the 'seer' (draṣṭṛ) of the on-going psychomental processes or vṛtti (viz. I.3). As long as the empirical consciousness is operative and man's transcendental identity is obscured, this watchman is said to be 'of the same form' (sārūpya) as the psychomental whirls. This is to say, the loss of authenticity is due to the shifting identifications with the discontinuous states of experience: "I am this sensation; I am that thought" etc. This perpetual process of constructing false identities is known as asmitā or 'I-am-ness'. It is this power, generated by 'nescience' or avidyā, which is responsible for the erection of man's inner world, i.e. his motivations, cognitive schemata and emotive response patterns

and so forth. The Self is set apart from all these mechanisms which are founded on the energetic character of the primary constituents of the world-ground, the so-called gunas. Properly speaking, the puruṣa is neither an actor nor a passive enjoyer of the experiences which occur in the mind, even though some Sāṃkhya works speak of it metaphorically as the 'enjoyer' (bhoktr) of all experiences. The Self does not intend, feel or think. The involvement with the discontinuous contents of consciousness, as implied by the phrase sārūpya, is merely an apparent one. It is 'affected' (parāmrṣta) by the kleśa-karma-vipāka-āśaya sequence only insofar as these factors are instrumental in cluttering the empirical consciousness and thus in relinquishing its capacity for emptying itself which is the only way in which the presentation of the transcendental Self to the mind can take place. The 'correlation' (samyoga) between the 'seer' and the 'seen' (viz. II.17) is a peculiar one and ranks among the most problematic issues of the dualistic metaphysics of Yoga and Sāṃkhya. For it is difficult to comprehend how the Self, which is defined as dr̥ṣi-mātra and śuddha ('pure'), can apperceive the presented-ideas (pratyaya) as stated in II.20. The mental on-goings (vṛtti) are always apperceived because the puruṣa does not suffer any alteration but is a perfect continuum (viz. IV.18).

M. BOWES (1971, 169) sums up the situation in this way: "Indian philosophers, when faced with the objection that there is no such thing as consciousness as such, meaning that there is no empirical

experience of such a thing, stress that even if all consciousness is consciousness of something there must be a function called 'consciousness' to be conscious of this something. Many would object no doubt that this is hypostatizing consciousness which arises only in a particular context of contact with objects and which is not to be thought of as an entity by itself, but the Indians claim that consciousness performs a distinct function, that of manifestation (equivalent to Sartre's revelation and Husserl's constitution function) of the object it is conscious of as well as of itself — a function which cannot be performed by anything which is non-conscious~~ness~~ and so it must be thought of as there, as a reality of a distinct sort."

For Patañjali this puzzle is no puzzle at all, but an eminently practical issue. As long as samyoga prevails there is suffering (duhkha). Since the root of the correlation, rather phantom correlation, between Self and non-self is nescience (avidyā), it is this which must be terminated for samyoga to be abolished. The prescribed expedient for this is viveka-khyāti, the 'vision of discernment' as a high-level ecstasy which eliminates all one's false identities not by way of mere intellectual acrobatics but in a process of clarification and purification of consciousness. First the mind is withdrawn from the external stimuli, then all presented-ideas are obliterated and ultimately the subliminal traces or vāsanās themselves are rooted out which amounts to the total dispersion of the consciousness-of or citta.

Ordinary experience is possible only on account of the massive identity confusion arising from the overpowering influence of the subliminal traces which habitually throw the consciousness outside itself thus forcing it to gather in continually new impressions thereby replenishing the stock of vāsanās in the depths of the mind. In other words, the fundamental confusion about man's true identity is built into the psychomental organism whose growth and decay the individualised consciousness is witnessing. In fact, without this cognitive mix-up no experience would be possible. Experiencing, called bhoga in III.35, is an intrapsychic process which does not actively involve the Self; the puruṣa simply apperceives the presented-ideas in the experiencing mind. Patañjali promotes an extreme dualism when he insists that the Self and the most translucent aspect of the consciousness complex, the sattva, are eternally 'unmixed' (asamkīrṇa) (viz. III.35), and that precisely because of this perfect distinction the recovery of Self-authenticity is at all possible.⁴⁷

Parenthetically it may be observed that by reason of the transphenomenal nature of the Self any qualitative ascription is in the last analysis tantamount to a falsification. This is as true of the description of puruṣa in terms of awareness (see citi, citi-sakti) as it is of the more obvious tropological predications.

47 Cf. IV.22 where citi is said to be apratīsamkramā which J.H.WOODS (1966³) translates with "which unites not [with objects]".

Unlike the anonymous author of the Sāṃkhya-Sūtra, Patañjali does not seem to favour negative descriptions of the nature of the Self but prefers, as we have seen above, metaphors of seeing, cognising and owning which are in keeping with his psychological rather than metaphysical approach.

One last important point remains to be discussed. This is the controversial question of the singularity or plurality of the Self as conceived in Classical Yoga. M. ELIADE (1973³, 32-33) gives vent to the popular view on this matter when he says about Sāṃkhya and Yoga that they "affirm that there are as many puruṣas as there are human beings. And each of these puruṣas is a monad, is completely isolated; for the Self can have no contact either with the world around it (derived from prakṛti) or with other spirits. The cosmos, then, is peopled with these eternal, free, unmoving puruṣas — monads between which no communication is possible."

Apart from the objection which one may wish to raise against M. ELIADE's nonsensical use of concepts such as 'monad' and 'communication' as also against his blatantly wrong metaphor of the Selves' populating the cosmos⁴⁸, another more serious criticism must be brought against his unquestioning acceptance of the testimony of rival schools which ascribe to Yoga the doctrine of the plurality of the transcendental Selves. He obviously relies in his judgement on the work of his teacher S. DASGUPTA (1930, 167) and others.

48 For a similarly loose and misleading use of language cf. G.J. LARSON (1969, 183) who says about the Self that "it is simply present in the world".

But is this doctrine really a part of Patañjali's system of thought?

There can be no question that this strange doctrine is part and parcel of the philosophy expounded in the commentarial literature on the Yoga-Sūtra and also in Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's Sāṃkhya-Kārikā. The latter text has a stanza (18) which reads as follows: jana-marāṇa-karaṇānām pratiniyamād-ayugapat-pravṛtteś-ca, puruṣa-bahutvaṃ siddham trai-guṇya-viparyayāc-ca-eva, "The multiplicity of the Self is established by reason of the idiosyncrasy⁴⁹ of [a person's] birth, death [and] deed⁵⁰ and because of non-simultaneous activity and also on account of the alteration in the guṇa-triad". That the word bahutva in this stanza does not merely signify 'duplicity' but 'multiplicity' is borne out by the phrase prati-puruṣa-vimokṣa-artham or "for the sake of the release of every (prati) Self" in verse 46 of the same work. The word prati, a favourite expression with Īśvara Kṛṣṇa (viz. verses 5, 31, 37) has consistently the sense of 'every, each' in his Sāṃkhya-Kārikā.

The word bahutva is derived from bahu meaning 'abundant, much', and it signifies 'multiplicity, multitude'. In the Mahābhārata the cognate nānātva is generally employed to express the idea of 'manifoldness'. There is, however, at least one instance in which bahudha is used (viz. XII.296.2, according to the edition employed by K.B.R. RAO XII.308.1). According to K.B.R. RAO's (1966, 278) analysis of this verse the idea of the plurality of Selves is definitely implied in this passage, but F. EDGERTON (1924) thinks

49 G.J. LARSON (1969) translates pratiniyama in a more conservative fashion with 'diversity'.

50 The commentators take the term karaṇa as referring to buddhi etc.

that such a view is entirely untenable. As C.A.F. RHYS DAVIDS (1936³, 146) notes: "A heresy so startling would have needed to be rubbed in, as it is not." F. EDGERTON (1924) severely criticises E.W. HOPKINS (1901) for grossly misinterpreting the epic passage XII.303.11 (= XII.315.11 acc. to K.B.R. RAO):

avyakta-ekatvam-ity-āhur-nānātvam puruṣās-tathā
sarva-bhūta-dayā-vantaḥ kevalam jñānam-asthitāḥ.

E.W. HOPKINS (1901, 123):

"Those who have the religion of compassion ... say that there is unity in the Unmanifest but a plurality of spirits."

F. EDGERTON (1924, 26):

"It is a unity in the Unmanifest; so they explain the plurality (of the manifest, empiric universe),—men who, having compassion for all beings, resort to pure knowledge."

K.B.R. RAO (1966, 237):

"Men who are compassionate with all beings, and who have resorted to kevala jñāna, i.e. the knowledge of the Absolute, say that the Avyakta is eka and also nāna."

F. EDGERTON makes the undoubtedly valid point that the phrase "plurality of spirits" would require either puruṣa-nānātvam or nānātvam puruṣānām. It is his conviction that the epic view

coincides with that of the metric Upaniṣads, which is one "of a plurality in the empiric, finite world, but an underlying unity, realized by the enlightened, in which there is no longer any plurality, nor any consciousness, the attribute of plurality" (p. 25).

S. DASGUPTA (1930, 167) argues on the basis of II.22 that Patañjali recognises a plurality of Selves. In this he follows the cues provided in the Yoga-Bhāṣya and especially in the Tattva-Vaiśārādī. But what does this aphorism really convey? The Sanskrit text runs as follows: kr̥ta-artham prati-naṣṭam-āpi anaṣṭam tad-anya-sādhāranatvāt, or: "Though [the objective world] has ceased for [the one whose] purpose is accomplished, it has not ceased [altogether] since it is common to [all] the other [empirical selves]." It cannot be conclusively shown on the strength of this aphorism alone that Patañjali subscribed to the doctrine of plurality. Nor are there any other statements in his work which would vindicate such a view. I therefore wish to propose that it seems far more congruent to read this sūtra in the spirit of the epic tradition where kr̥ta-artha denotes the person who has become the Self, i.e. who has recovered Self-authenticity, beyond all plurality.

Availing himself of the stock arguments of the Sāṃkhya thinkers, S. DASGUPTA (1930, 167f.) sees an epistemological problem here. He asks how in view of the postulated reality of prakṛti one single puruṣa of equal reality could possibly be responsible for all the cognitive processes occurring in the multiple real organisms. He draws attention to the viewpoint of Advaita-Vedānta according to which the Self is at least not identified with the real experiencing subject, but which asserts that the notions of experiencing etc. are all false, produced

by the illusive action of māyā (which is itself inscrutable or anirvacanīya). He contends that if indeed only one puruṣa were 'associated' with the many psychosomatic entities, the release of a single being would imply the simultaneous release of all others. However, these arguments are lame, since the process of emancipation is a prakṛtic event which effects only a particular entity, whereas the Self is ex hypothesi neither ever in bondage nor in need of liberation.

Assuming that Patañjali does not maintain that there are innumerable Self monads which inhabit some a cosmic dimension, it must next be asked how this interpretation affects the conception of Īśvara in his system. For, Īśvara is defined as a 'special Self' which is untouched by the kleśas, by the propelling force of karman and so on. It may be thought that I.24 tabernacles the idea that the ordinary puruṣa is somehow 'touched' by the kleśas etc. which would be an indirect confirmation of the doctrine of plurality. But there can be no question of the puruṣa - be it Īśvara or not - ever being affected by the kleśas or any other prakṛtic phenomenon. The phrase kleśa-karma-vipāka-āśayair-aparāmrṣṭah must therefore be applicable as much to the ordinary puruṣa as to Īśvara. Unless one wants to stretch this aphorism beyond its capacity, it does not appear to entail either any real inconsistency or a hidden reference to the notion that there are multiple Selves, and that Īśvara is primus inter pares as M. MÜLLER (1916⁴, 325) argues.

Thus Patañjali seems to promulgate a variant of the pre-classical

epic Yoga tradition which affirms the singularity of the transcendental Self. Furthermore, he also appears to accept the theistic conception of his predecessors who understood Īśvara as eclipsing the puruṣa. Where he differs from them is in his insistence on the absolute separateness of puruṣa and prakṛti — thus developing the dualistic trends in the Mahābhārata and the metric Upaniṣads into a full-fledged dualism with the transintelligible subject on the one side and the objective universe on the other side. Philosophically unattractive, this Cartesian dichotomy is of considerable practical relevance.⁵¹

51 See G.A. FEUERSTEIN (1971, 38f.)

3. Prakṛti

The third of the transcendental principles which together constitute the tripod of the conceptual edifice of Classical Yoga is prakṛti. The word is composed of the preposition pra 'forth', the verbal root √kr 'to do' and the feminine suffix ti, and it conveys the idea of 'bringing forth'. In the Brahma-Vaivarta-Purāna (II.1.5) these three morphemes are explained symbolically as representing sattva, rajas and tamas respectively.

Although the word itself does not occur prior to the metric Upaniṣads⁵², the concept of prakṛti appears to be known in principle already in the R̥veda and Atharvaveda. K.B.R. RAO (1966, 99), for instance, conjectures that whilst the notion of ātman led to the formulation of the concept of purusa, the earlier concept of brahman as the substratum of the manifest world gave rise to the idea of aksara, avyakta and, then, prakṛti. He cites F.O. SCHRADER (1956) in confirmation of this hypothesis. However, D. CHATTOPADHYAYA (1959) proffers an entirely divergent view. He links up the evolution of this key concept with the fertility cult of what he regards as the original non-vedic Sāṃkhya-Tantrism. "Evidently the term prakṛti

52 See Bhagavad-Gītā III.27, 29, 33; IV.6; VII.5, 4, 20; IX.7, 8, 10, 12, 13; XI.51; XIII.19, 20, 23, 29; XVIII.59. Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad IV.10. Maitrāyaṇīya-Upaniṣad VI.10, 30; II.6. Mahānārāyaṇa-Upaniṣad X.8.

was not the invention of the early Sankhya philosophers because it was the basic concept of Tantrism, the history of which is traced back to a very remote antiquity. And it is impossible to deny that the prakṛiti originally stood for the female principle without questioning the Indian cultural tradition fundamentally."⁵³

Despite the persuasiveness of D. CHATTOPADHYAYA's tight-knit argumentation, I fail to be convinced by his sweeping reconstruction of the history of Indian thought and hence entertain certain reservations about his unilinear derivation of the philosophical concept of prakṛti from popular religious contexts. I have, however, similar misgivings about K.B.R. RAO's attempt to recognise in Rgveda I.164 and X.129 the earliest references to the proto-conception of purusa and prakṛti. I am not sure that he is justified in his conjecture that these two hymns must have "in no small measure contributed to the breaking of the original absolutism of Brahman as the Personal or Impersonal into the dual Principles, the Personal and the Impersonal"⁵⁴. It seems to me that the actual situation at the time must have been far more complex than is suggested by either view.

Besides, there are interesting references in the Atharvaveda which will have to be taken into account if one wants to arrive at a more comprehensive interpretation. Regrettably this whole hymnody has been rather neglected and underrated, but possibly the fullest survey of the Atharvaveda from the viewpoint of proto-Yoga and -Sāṃkhya

53 D. CHATTOPADHYAYA (1959, 404)

54 K.B.R. RAO (1966, 114)

materials is that by J.W. HAUER (1922; 1927; 1958). For instance, he (1958, 59) sees in Atharvaveda X.8 a definite link with the much later Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad which is one of the outstanding early Yoga texts,⁵⁵ and he perceives in X.8.29-31 a clear indication of the germ of the later notion of prakṛti. Of particular interest is here the use of the verbal root √ac/añc which J.W. HAUER regards as the origin of the later concept of vyakta and avyakta. What seems to be the essence of these early expressions is the idea of a primal, transcendental source or 'womb' (yoni) from which issues forth the multiform universe. This is precisely the meaning of the concept of prakṛti as the creative matrix, the ἀρχή, which holds in posse all things, itself being unbounded (ἄπειρον).

E.H. JOHNSTON (1937), in his admirable and still useful study, shows that the older term for prakṛti is avyakta, the 'unmanifest', still current at the time of the Kātha-Upaniṣad. In the Bhagavad-Gītā which is slightly older than the Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad,⁵⁶ both terms are employed interchangeably. Avyakta is mentioned, for instance, in VIII.18 and contrasted with vyakta (plural use), and in VIII.20 the word is employed to denote something which is higher than the ordinary avyakta, whilst in VIII.21 this higher avyakta is identified with akṣara. At that time prakṛti had not yet acquired a strictly technical sense (as 'nature')⁵⁷, whereas akṣara signifying the puruṣa is decidedly a technical expression in the Bhagavad-Gītā.⁵⁸

55 This strange relation between Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad and Atharvaveda is highlighted by the fact that IV.3 in the former scripture is a verbatim quotation from the latter, viz. X.8.27.

56 See K.N. UPADHYAYA (1971) on the age of the Bhagavad-Gītā.

57 See e.g. Bhagavad-Gītā III.33, IV.6 et al.

58 See P.M. MODI (1932, 5)

In the Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad (IV.10) the term prakṛti is found in the phrase māyām tu prakṛtim vidyān māyinaṃ tu mahā-īśvaram, or: "prakṛti is to be known as māyā [and] the great lord as the māyin". Here prakṛti = māyā (not in the sense of 'illusion') stands for avyakta which elsewhere in this text is denoted by the word pradhāna. E.H. JOHNSTON (1937, 27) points out that since this particular stanza is in the anustubh metre it must have been inserted into this series of triṣṭubh verses at a later stage. The regular use of prakṛti for this period is in the plural, which refers to the set of eight primary evolutes, viz. buddhi, ahamkāra, manas and the five ~~and~~ elements. This enumeration is according to the Bhagavad-Gītā (VII.4-5), but other variants are known. For example, in the Buddha-carita (XII.18) these eight constituents are said to be avyakta, buddhi, ahamkāra and the five elements. This text also mentions the complementary set of sixteen vikāras or secondary evolutes, viz. the five senses, the five sense-objects, the five organs of action and the manas (see XII.19). This double usage of the term prakṛti is also retained in the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā which speaks of prakṛti (in the later sense of avyakta) and of the various prakṛtis and vikṛtis, that is the primary and secondary evolutes of the world-ground.

Remarkably, this is also the way in which Patañjali applies the term prakṛti. It is mentioned a mere three times in the Yoga-Sūtra, namely in I.19 as prakṛti-laya and in IV.2-3. In IV.3, significantly enough, the word is used in the plural genitive (as prakṛtīnām). The two sūtras in question run as follows: jāty-antara-pariṇāmah prakṛty-āpurāt; nimittam-aprayojakam prakṛtīnām varaṇa-bhedas-tu tatah kṣetrikavat. In consonance with J.W. HAUER's (1958) revised interpretation

of the initial aphorisms of the fourth pāda, I propose this translation:
 "The transformation into another category-of-existence (jāti)
 [derives] from the pouring-over of the world-ground. — The
 incidental-cause (nimitta) [viz. the store of samskāras] does
 not initiate the prakṛtis, but [merely] singles out possibilities
 (varana) [in accordance with the karmic conditions], like a farmer
 [who irrigates a field by selecting appropriate pathways for the
 water]."

The plural prakṛtis has been subjected to various renderings and
 paraphrases, such as 'evolving-causes' (J.H.WOODS), 'Werdevorgänge'
 (J.W.HAUER), 'natural tendencies' (I.K. TAIMNI), 'die (schöpferisch
 sich betätigenden) Naturen' (P. DEUSSEN), 'material causes' (G. JHA),
 'creative-causes' (R. PRASĀDA) and 'constituents' (M.N. DVIVEDI).
 Because of the classical commentators' complete misunderstanding of
 the true intent of these sūtras which have nothing to do with
 magical feats, the obvious meaning of this plural use has never been
 spotted: Here we have not just a reference to some vaguely conceived
 process of creation, but very probably the plural prakṛtis refers to
 the well-known set of the primary evolutes emerging from the primal
 matrix. Of course, one cannot be sure that Patañjali had in mind
 the set of eight principles as enunciated, for example, in the
Bhagavad-Gītā or in other passages of the Mahābhārata. As a matter
 of fact his ontology - as will be seen - follows its own idiosyncratic
 pattern which is distinct from those promulgated in the epic, the
Caraka-Samhitā, the Buddhacarita or other coeval sources.

Patañjali's vocabulary includes several synonyms of the term
prakṛti. Thus he employs drśya (viz. II.17, 18, 21; IV.23), grāhya

(I.41), aliṅga (I.45; II.19), and sva (II.23). E.H. JOHNSTON (1937, 26) states that pradhāna is the regular term used in the Yoga-Sūtra, but this word in fact occurs only once in III.48. The term avyakta, on the other hand, does not appear at all. However, Patañjali employs vyakta (IV.13), contrasting it with sūkṣma ('the subtle'). These are said to be the two aspects of the dharmas which compose the universe; their essence are the guṇas. In this case vyakta and sūkṣma refer to the time dimension of things, vyakta being the generic term for those properties which are evident, i.e. present, and sūkṣma for those which are potential either because they existed in the past or will exist in the future.

The most common denotation for prakṛti is unquestioningly the term drśya, which covers both the unmanifest and the manifest component of prakṛti. This concept has an epistemological ring about it which is yet another indication of the psychological experiential orientation of Yoga. Thus drśya (from $\sqrt{\text{dṛś}}$ 'to see') signifies anything that is capable of becoming the object of the transcendental witness-Self, that is to say, anything that pertains to prakṛti in any of its modes, including the causal core (pradhāna) itself. In this respect three major aspects of prakṛti can be differentiated: (i) the transcendental dimension, (ii) the objective (physical) part and (iii) the subjective (psychic) aspect. G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 158) calls the last-mentioned, more appropriately perhaps, 'subjectivo-objective' by way of contrast with the 'objectivo-objective' energisations of prakṛti. The commentators appear to have taken drśya in a far more restricted sense. Thus the Maniprabhā (II.17) has drśyam buddhi-sattvam, "the seen is the translucent-aspect of the mind". Vyāsa, again, says in his Yoga-Bhāṣya (II.17): drśyā buddhi-sattva-uparūdhāḥ sarve dharmāḥ, "The

objects-of-sight (drśyāh) are all qualities [of prakṛti] which have affected the sattva of the mind". Vācaspati Miśra explains this further in his Tattva-Vaiśaradī (II.17): tad-etad-buddhi-sattvam śabda-ādy-ākāravat-drśyam-ayas-kānta-mani-kalpam puruṣasya svaṃ bhavati drśi-rūpasya svāminah, "Thus this same sattva of the mind, containing [the objects of] sound etc., [becomes] the 'seen' [acting] like a loadstone, it becomes the property (sva) of the Self, the proprietor of the form of Awareness". That Patañjali employs drśya in the widest possible sense is evident from II.18 where he delineates its main characteristics. He speaks of a 'disposition' (śīla) to (a) luminosity (prakāśa), (b) activity (kriyā) and (c) inertia (sthitī). This tripartition is the outcome of the presence of the three types of gunas, which is clear from II.19 which gives out the various levels of manifestation of these primary building-blocks of the world-ground. I will come back to this issue shortly.

I wish to conclude these pre-eminently linguistic observations with the following semantic matrix constructed on the basis of the above synonyms of the term prakṛti.

	comprehensive concepts	restricted concepts
PRAKṚTI :	<u>sva</u>	<u>prakṛti</u> (singular)
	<u>drśya</u>	<u>pradhāna</u>
	<u>grāhya</u>	<u>aliṅga</u>

		<u>prakṛti</u> (plural)

		<u>vyakta</u> - <u>sūkṣma</u>


It must next be asked what exactly prakṛti stands for. First of all, it is important to realise that it comprises two cardinal dimensions. On the one hand there is the noumenal matrix of creation, also called aliṅga (= avyakta = pradhāna), and on the other hand there is the realm of the multitudinous phenomena of contingent existence. The latter category is not exhausted by the visible universe of ordinary space and time. In its phenomenised nature, prakṛti also embraces the vast hidden dimension impervious to the senses but experientiable in yogic introspection and logically deducible from the spatio-temporal sense-derived data. This inner or 'subtle' (sūkṣma) aspect of prakṛti I propose to call deep structure in contradistinction to the surface structure, i.e. the visible, audible, tactual world.

The deep structure of prakṛti is stratified hierarchically, albeit in an aspatial sense. This stratification, which varies in its conception from one tradition to another, has also been referred to as 'ontological map', as it serves the yogin as a guide-beam in his programme of conscious involution.⁵⁹ Viewed dynamically rather than structurally, one can also speak of an evolution of ontic categories or tattva-antara-pariṇāma. The term tattva denotes such categories as buddhi, aḥamkāra, etc.

This conception implies a view of the universe as an essentially autonomous system of necessarily interrelated events. This particular aspect of prakṛti was precipitated in the vedic concept of ṛta or 'order', and later on came to be expressed for instance in the idea of adr̥ṣṭa 'the invisible law' in the philosophy of Nyāya and

59 See G.A. FEUERSTEIN (1974', 87f.)

Vaiśeṣika. Prakṛti can thus be looked upon as a system or 'field' composed of interdependent sub-systems arranged hierarchically according to the principle that each higher sub-system is progressively more inclusive. This is best illustrated on the example of the well-known schema utilised in Classical Sāṃkhya⁶⁰ which permits the following diagrammatic condensation:



The co-ordination and interdependence between the several sub-systems are defined in terms of causal relations of a specific type.

60 See Sāṃkhya-Kārikā 22 and 24.

It is traditionally known as the 'doctrine of (pre-)existent effect' or sat-kārya-vāda or, more specifically, as the 'doctrine of (real) transformation' or parināma-vāda. R.A. SINARI (1970, 38) calls this the "earliest and epistemologically the most valuable attempt made in Indian philosophy to set up a theory of causal order". This view is partly foreshadowed in the Bhagavad-Gītā (II.16) which contains these lines: na-asato vidyate bhāvo, na-abhāvo vidyate sataḥ, or: "Of the non-existent there is no becoming, of the existent there is no dis-becoming". The full-fledged doctrine, being a re-statement of the above notion, is to be found in the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā (9): asad-akaranād-upādāna-grahanāt-sarva-sambhava-abhāvāt, śaktasya śakya-karanāt-kāraṇa-bhāvāc-ca sat-kāryam, or: "[There is] pre-existent effect because of the non-productiveness of non-being, because of the need for a material-cause, because of the impossibility of derivation from everything, because of [a thing's] ability-to-produce [only what it is] capable [of producing] and because of the nature of the cause".

This somewhat obscure passage stands in need of elucidation: The pre-existence of the effect in the cause is based on five logical reasons. The first is that something which is not cannot be brought into existence nor can it bring anything else into existence. This is the famous axiom ex nihilo nihil fit. The second reason adduced by Īśvara Kṛṣṇa is that any effect requires a cause which in his opinion must be of the same material. Next, it is argued that the effect must have a specific cause and cannot be derived simply from the sum total of other effects; there must be a special relation between effect and

cause, and this is interpreted in the sense that the cause potentially contains the effect. Fourthly, not everything is capable of producing a specific effect which is yet another affirmation of the essential inherence of the effect in the cause. Finally, the pre-existence of the effect in the cause is demanded by the fact that the cause is of the same nature as the effect. These statements can hardly be said to amount to proofs unless it is admitted that a circular logic is put forward. Notwithstanding this criticism, it is interesting that Sāṃkhya and Yoga carefully distinguish between the material (upādāna) and the instrumental (nimitta) cause of a thing, subsuming both under the heading of kāraṇa which is set against kārya or 'effect'. Occasionally the effect is defined either as aupādānika or naimittika.

All phenomena, whether they belong to the surface structure or to the deep structure of prakṛti, are considered as 'transformations' (pariṇāma) of one and the same substratum, viz. the world-ground. Here applies, if ever, the phrase plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. The technical designation of this particular theorem is prakṛti-pariṇāma-vāda. It is one of four major theoretical positions on the issue of causality as developed in Indian philosophy. There is first of all the view of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools of thought - known as ārambha-vāda - according to which eternal atoms create by continual re-combination the multiform universe. Also the Ājīvikas, Jainas and materialists of ancient India must be reckoned as subscribing to this view. The best known representative of the second type of interpretation is Hīnayāna Buddhism with its dharma theory. This saṅghāta-vāda asserts that separate existential factors create the

individual and his external and internal environment by a process of co-operative collocation (saṅghāta). The third position is the vivarta-vāda which is characteristic of the non-dualism of Śaṅkara, according to which the one real brahman remains ever unchanged; all transformations are attributed to the contingent universe which is regarded as vivarta or an appearance quite different in nature from its cause. The Mahāyāna thinkers maintain a similar view. Finally, the pariṇāma-vāda asserts that the Many is created out of the One by way of a series of real transformations, and it is this position which is typical of Yoga, Sāṃkhya and the older Vedānta schools.

The pariṇāma-vāda claimed a considerable following, and its prominent place in Indian philosophical speculation can readily be appreciated when one considers the frequent refutations of it by other traditions, especially Buddhism.⁶¹ In later times Sāṃkhya and Yoga thinkers availed themselves also of such concepts as had been developed in opponent schools in order to buttress their position in the increasingly more competitive spirit of analytical philosophising. For example, Patañjali adopts the concepts of quality (dharma) and substance (dharmin) which played a decisive role in the heyday of Indian philosophy.⁶²

Intimately related to the concept of prakṛti is the doctrine of the gunas which I will proceed to discuss next. The world-ground as conceptualised in the Sāṃkhya and Yoga tradition has been

61 See W. LIEBENTHAL (1934)

62 See E. FRAUWALLNER (1953, I, 390)

described by some scholars as a kind of 'ultimate energy' transmuting itself into various conditions by means of a re-arrangement of its basic constituents, the so-called gunas, which invite comparison with the 'quantum packets' of modern nuclear physics.⁶³ The notion of the gunas is one of the central doctrines of Yoga-Sāṃkhya ontology and can safely be regarded as the single most original contribution of this proliferating tradition.

The word guna means literally 'strand, rope' and is also used to denote 'quality'. In the present context it is best rendered as 'primary-constituent' of the world-ground. Other frequent translations are 'aspect' (J.H. WOODS), 'quality' (S. DASGUPTA), 'attribute' (G. JHA). N. SMART (1964) prefers to translate it with 'strand-substances' and J.W. HAUER (1958) with 'Weltstoff-Energien', whilst others retain the Sanskrit term (see I.K. TAIMNI, G.M. KOELMAN).

The doctrine of the gunas has a protracted and rather recondite history. The idea was conceived long before the codification of either Yoga or Sāṃkhya, but its exact origins are shrouded in mystery. Various attempts have been made to trace the development of this important philosophical concept, with varying degrees of success.⁶⁴ The available historical data permit the conclusion that the guna theory was gradually developed out of much older speculations recorded in the vedic samhitās, the brāhmaṇa texts and also the Upaniṣads.

63 See for instance F. CAPRA (1972, 15ff.)

64 See the extensive bibliography by M. ELIADE (1973³). Not mentioned but of paramount importance is the study by J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN (1956⁷) in the Journal of the American Oriental Society, vols. 76 (pp. 153ff.) and 77 (pp. 88ff.). Also not listed are T. STCHERBATSKY (1934, 737-60) and A. WAYMAN (1962, 14-22).

There is no compelling reason to assume that it evolved within non-āryan traditions, though it may not have been the creation solely of the brāhmanic orthodoxy either. According to E.H. JOHNSTON (1937), the gunas were originally simply psychological qualities, and he refers to the use of the synonym bhāva or 'force of becoming, sentiment'. But as J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN (1956⁶⁵) shows beyond all doubt, there are two types of evolutionary schemata advocated by Sāṃkhya, namely a vertical and a horizontal theory of evolution which later on came to be integrated in some schools. He denies that the term guna (= bhāva) originally meant 'moral or psphical quality of the buddhi'.
 17

The original vertical version did not involve the gunas at all. J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN understands bhāva as a "form of being, cosmic phase evolved under the influence of a guna"⁶⁵. Thus guna in its most archaic conception stood for a triad of factors one of which was rajas. Their combined action on buddhi resulted in the evolution of the three bhāvas or states of being which, according to J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN's reconstruction of the epic evidence, may consist in manas, the indriyas and the bhūtas. The well-known triad of sattva-rajas-tamas is definitely a subsequent creation, though the principle implied in these concepts must have been present already in the earlier triadic conception.

What then are the gunas in their classical sense? Surprisingly enough this question has never been satisfactorily answered by any of

65 J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN (1956^a, 156).

the earlier thinkers, and it was in fact Vijñāna Bhikṣu who, as late as the 16th century, afforded this topic a first critical examination and discussion. The guṇas can be described as being the ultimate building blocks of the material and mental phenomena in their entirety. They are not merely qualities or properties, but actual entities or 'reals' (S. DASGUPTA) and as such non-distinct from the world-ground itself.⁶⁶ They are the indivisible atoms of everything there is with the exception of the Self (puruṣa) which is by definition nir-guṇa. The guṇas underly every appearance, and are the world-ground in its noumenal character. This is expressed by Īśvara Kṛṣṇa in this way: tri-guṇam-aviveki viṣayah sāmānyam-acetanam prasava-dharmi, vyaktam tathā pradhānam tad-viparītas-tathā ca pumān, or: "The manifest [world] and the primary-substratum [are both of the nature of] the triple guṇas, without discernment, objective, generic, without Awareness and productive. Yet the Self is the reverse of this".⁶⁷

Thus they are the very material of prakṛti. In fact in Classical Sāṃkhya prakṛti is defined as tri-guṇa-sāmya-avasthā or "the state of homoeostasis of the three guṇas"⁶⁸. In his study on the Bhagavad-Gītā S. DASGUPTA (1965⁴, II, 465) suggests that in this scripture the guṇas are not thought to constitute the world-ground, but this is obviously wrong, for he clearly overlooks VII.14 where Kṛṣṇa's māyā (= prakṛti)

66 See Vijñāna Bhikṣu's remarks to Sāṃkhya-Sūtra I.61: sattva-ādīni dravyāni na vaiśeṣikā guṇāḥ, that is, "sattva etc. are substances not qualities [as taught in the school of] Vaiśeṣika".

67 Sāṃkhya-Kārikā (11)

|Vācaspati Miśra on

68 Sāṃkhya-Kārikā (3) ; cf. Sāṃkhya-Sūtra (I.61): sattva-rajās-tamasām sāmānyā-avasthā prakṛtiḥ.

is called guṇa-mayī or 'composed of the guṇas'. Nor do we need to perceive any real conflict between this statement and such expressions as guṇāḥ prakṛti-sambhavaḥ (XIV.5) or 'the guṇas born of the world-ground'. Any argument to the contrary would be meaningless in view of the sat-kārya doctrine which demands that the guṇas in their noumenal state are mere potentialities which become actualised with the process of evolution. As K.B.R. RAO (1966, 52) states: "Guṇas are themselves prakṛti. Guṇas are not 'ingredients', or 'parts'". C.T. KENGHE (1958, 4) has a remark to the same effect: "The three forces Sattva, Rajas and Tamas cannot be said to be the parts of Prakṛti, for in themselves they are equally impartite and impartite things can never be parts of anything else". The author also calls prakṛti a 'suprapsychical substance' rejecting the widely prevalent translation of the term with 'matter'; but this is equally obscure.

Patañjali is perfectly cogent on this issue. In II.19 aliṅga which corresponds with the Sāṃkhya prakṛti-pradhāna, is said to be one of the levels (parvan) of the guṇas. There are four levels in all which will be dealt with in detail below. It is clear from this that for all practical purposes the guṇas can be equated with prakṛti (in the comprehensive sense).

The important question of the substantiality of the guṇas has been left untackled by both Vyāsa and Vācaspati Miśra, just as they ignored the problem of their multiplicity. The texts mention triple guṇas but do not explicitly state whether there are only three types of guṇas or a multitude of guṇas which may be classified into three categories in respect of their several functions. However, the postulation of a large number of guṇas seems a logical necessity if it is maintained that the plethora of phenomena are the direct outcome of infinite

guna permutations which is at least Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's proposition. In his opinion the entire phenomenal world and its deep structure are created by a process of continual re-combination of the primary-constituents of prakṛti. Indeed, if there were only three distinct entities the inordinate multiplicity of existing things could not be explained. On the other hand, it is convincing that a near infinite number of gunas of three different types should by way of collocation and perpetual re-combination produce the multi-faceted dynamic network of existence.

Maybe today this question can be resolved on a non-substantialist basis in the light of contemporary field theory which has successfully supplanted the classical conception of matter as a chunk of substance floating in empty space. Perhaps it is not too far-fetched to compare the gunas with the atoms of modern nuclear physics which are described as localisations of fields. As F.L. KUNZ (1963, 5) puts it: "An atom ... may be correctly thought of as a standing wave system in an open wave force field potential." It is surely not by accident that it is always the energetic nature of the gunas which is pushed into foreground by the later expounders of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga traditions. Although Vijñāna Bhikṣu characterises them as dravyas or 'substances' he does so only in order to refute the Vaiśeṣika position according to which the gunas are qualities, and had he known the expression 'energy parcel' he would probably not have hesitated to use it instead.

As G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 77) notes: "The gunas' nature is throughout expressed in terms of functional qualities, kinetic dispositions and causal urges." This is well illustrated by the Yoga-Bhāṣya (II.18) From this passage emerges that

- (1) although the gunas are quite distinct entities having different characteristics,
- (2) they nonetheless influence each other and by their interdependent functioning create the phenomenal universe, and thus
- (3) everything must be looked upon as a 'synergisation' (G.M. KOELMAN, 1970, 78) of the three gunas.

The energetic nature of the gunas is furthermore indicated by the fact that Patañjali associates them with the concept of pariṇāma or 'transformation' and that of pratiprasava or 'involution', the flowing back of the manifest gunas into the potentiality of the world-ground. Yoga ontology thus conceives Nature to be a quivering force field undergoing continuous transformations. The dynamism is sustained by the incessant interaction of the three types of gunas whose activity can be inferred from their phenotypes as experienced externally or internally.

The classic guṇa triad is headed by sattva. The word means literally 'being-ness' and is derived from sat 'being' and the abstract suffix -tva. A great variety of renderings have been proposed, such as 'intelligence-stuff' (S. DASGUPTA), 'essentiality' (R. PRASĀDA), 'goodness' (G. JHA) all of which hardly touch the core meaning of this term. J.H. WOODS (1966³) wisely leaves the word untranslated, but G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 10) contends that it is best rendered by its Latin equivalent entia (as in presentia, absentia), whilst the adjectival form sāttvika would correspondingly assume the appearance of 'entic'. I must admit that I fail to see the advantage of such a procedure. If one has to have recourse to a foreign language anyhow in order to convey the meaning of

sattva, might one not simply retain the Sanskrit term and maybe anglicise its adjective to sattvic?

The single most important study of the concept of sattva is that by J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN (1957^c), in which he criticises past scholarship for reading the classic expression of this concept into the older material. He remarks (p. 88): "One result of this classicism was the acceptance of sattva and the other gunas as factors only conditioning the individual soul's buddhi, their cosmological function being looked upon either as secondary or as superseded". Thus J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN completes the partial rectification of this aprioristic view by É. SENART (1915 and 1925).

In the pre-classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga traditions the term sattva was used in many different senses; it denoted the body-complex but also the psyche and the concretely existing entity or sentient being. J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN (1957^c, p. 105) says: "It would seem that sattva, undoubtedly a notion that was elaborated in circles where the idea of a personality — with increasingly microcosmic features — persisted, reflects in its functions the aspect of sat as the reified and created. As such it could easily become linked up with tripartite creation..." On page 106 he remarks: "It is not clear how sattva came to be associated just with rajas and tamas. Probably it succeeded to a principle like tapas or vyotis, which acquired the connotation of 'light of knowledge' and had its opposite in 'darkness' and 'obscuration'".

The second member of the gunā triad is rajas which according to J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN (1957^c, p. 106) probably "brought the triadic pattern along". Like sattva it has suffered various more or less adequate

renderings into English, such as 'energy-stuff' (S. DASGUPTA, F.V. CATALINA), 'energy' (R. PRASĀDA), 'foulness' (G. JHA). É. SENART (1915), the first to give a thorough examination to this term, shows that originally rajas signified the 'atmosphere'. This was recently challenged by T. BURROW (1948, 645) who relates it to 'dirt' → 'moral defilement' → 'cosmic principle'. However, this hypothetical reconstruction of the evolution of the concept of rajas is firmly rejected by J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN (1957, p. 92) who is most insistent that rajas had to begin with a purely cosmological significance and that only subsequently it acquired a psychological meaning. To cover both the cosmic and the psychic aspect of this term, G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 12) uses the Greek word ἔργον paraphrasing rajas with 'ergetic constituent'. It is the active principle which stimulates, initiates action and supplies the dynamic impulses without which the field of prakṛti would collapse.

Finally, there is tamas which has been translated with 'mass-stuff' (S. DASGUPTA, F.V. CATALINA), 'inertia' (R. PRASĀDA) and 'darkness' (G. JHA). Whilst rajas is derived from √raj/rañj 'to glow, be brilliant', tamas is a derivative of √tam 'to be exhausted, become rigid'. G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 12) connects it with the allied Latin term temus of which the ablative temere 'blindly, rashly' has survived. He calls this third member of the guna triad accordingly the 'temeric constituent'.

S. DASGUPTA (1963⁵, I, 242-3) makes an attempt to explain these gunas as 'feeling-substances'. According to him, feelings "mark the

earliest track of consciousness, whether we look at it from the point of view of evolution or of the genesis of consciousness in ordinary life (..) The feelings are therefore the things-in-themselves, the ultimate substances of which consciousness and gross matter are made up (..) The three principal characteristics of thought and matter (..) are but the manifestations of three types of feeling substances". This seems to be accepted prima facie by F.V. CATALINA (1968, 35), but interesting as S. DASGUPTA's perspective is it nevertheless implies an unwarranted psychologisation of the nature of the gunas. Such a one-sidedness must be avoided if one wants to do full justice to this complex concept. The gunas are both cosmogonic and psychogonic forces. This ambivalent nature of the primary-constituents is indeed confusing accustomed as we are to distinguish most carefully between material phenomena on the one hand and psychomental events on the other hand. But, again, we must take heed not to project our own cognitive patterns onto the Indian schemata.

One can sympathise with R. GARBE (1917², 272) when he styles the doctrine of the gunas a "strange theory", but he is decidedly mistaken in his further statement that it is "a pure hypothesis (..) which shares the fate with many other philosophical hypotheses not to be able to hold good in the light of ~~the~~ modern natural science" (p. 284). On the contrary, as I have intimated above, this striking teaching is far from being a weird product of early man's vivid imagination but that it can be explained most adequately with the help of such avant-garde sciences as field theory.⁶⁹ Moreover, the guna

69 See also J.W. HAUER (1958, 334)

model appears to be a perfectly cogent framework of explanation of reality as encountered by the trained yogin. Like the concept of prakṛti that of the gunas, too, cannot be regarded as based on mere fiction. Rather more compelling is the unpopular view that these are experientially derived concepts. To gansay this a priori is to deny the raison d'être of Yoga and of the older Sāṃkhya which are geared to experience rather than conceptualisation. Little wonder that S. RADHAKRISHNAN (1951⁶, II, 274) who seems to be oblivious to this explanation is constrained to make the following admission: "It is difficult to understand the precise significance of the Sāṃkhya account of evolution, and we have not seen any satisfactory explanation as to why the different steps of evolution are what they are. — The different principles of the Sāṃkhya system cannot be logically deduced from prakṛti, and they seem to be set down as its products, thanks to historical accidents. There is no deductive development of the products from the one prakṛti. Vijñānabhikṣu is aware of this defect, and so asks us to accept the Sāṃkhya account of evolution on the authority of the scriptures. But this is to surrender the possibility of philosophical explanation."

In rejecting Vijñāna Bhikṣu's answer, S. RADHAKRISHNAN simultaneously forfeits the only reasonable explanation of these concepts which are of an experiential nature, for what is the foundation of the authority of the scriptures if not 'revelation' in the sense of the experience of reality in non-ordinary states of consciousness (such as meditation or samādhi)? Admittedly, such an interpretation is seemingly contradicted by the fact that all these concepts have a history, that is, underwent a process of development and did not just spring into existence ready-made.

However, gradual conceptual refinement is an integral part of the life of any theory and this fact by no means undermines the raw data themselves which, in this particular case, are the subjective observations during meditative and enstatic states of consciousness. The question is rather to what degree the later doctrinal sophistications, especially those of Classical Sāṃkhya, can be said to reflect the original experiences.

But to come back to the word guṇa, we find that it is used altogether six times in the Yoga-Sūtra (viz. I.16; II.15, 19; IV.13, 32, 34). To these instances must be added sūtra II.18 which mentions the phenotypes (śīla) of the three guṇas, namely prakāśa or 'luminosity' (pertaining to sattva), kriyā or 'activity' (belonging to rajas) and sthiti or 'inertia' (connected with tamas). K.B.R. RAO (1966, 54), who is bold enough to speak of "the scientific character of the theory of guṇas" (p. 51), epitomises their respective nature as follows: Sattva is that "which makes for existence or beingness"; rajas is that "which makes for change in itself" and tamas is that "which denies annihilation through change". In other words, sattva represents the principle of existence, rajas that of discontinuity and tamas that of continuity.

These are said (II.18) to be 'bodied forth' in the elements and the senses. The exact Sanskrit phrase is bhūta-indriya-ātmakam which J.H. WOODS (1966³) renders as "with the elements and organs as its essence". R. PRASĀDA (1912) has "it consists of the elements and the powers of sensation", whilst J.W. HAUER (1958) agrees with the above interpretation ("körpertert sich dar in Elementen und Organen").

Of course these bhūtas and indriyas as the external aspects of the gunas merely constitute what I have previously called the 'surface structure' of prakṛti. To express the same idea, Patañjali employs the technical term viśeṣa or 'the particularised' (see II.19). The 'deep structure' of the gargantuan body of prakṛti, on the other hand, is stratified into three primary levels of increasing complexity and organisation; these are the so-called guna-parvans or 'levels of the gunas', namely aviśeṣa 'the unparticularised', liṅga-mātra 'the differentiated' and aliṅga 'the undifferentiated' which is the most generic stratum.

According to M.N. DVIVĒDI (1934³) these parvaṅs are identical with the 'four stages' allegedly described in I.45; but this particular aphorism does not mention any stages at all, and he himself quite correctly translates sūksma-viśayatvaṃ ca-aliṅga-paryavasānam with "The province of the subtle ends with the indissoluble". I.K. TAIMNI (1965², 180), again, attempts to correlate the levels of the gunas with the stages of gamādhī mentioned in I.17 and also with the vedāntic notion of the kośas or 'sheaths'. He proposes the following equations:

<u>vitarka-samādhī</u>	—	<u>viśeṣa</u>	—	<u>manomaya-kośa</u>
<u>vicāra-^o</u>	—	<u>aviśeṣa</u>	—	<u>vijñānamaya-^o</u>
<u>ānanda-^o</u>	—	<u>liṅga</u>	—	<u>ānandamaya-^o</u>
<u>asmitā-^o</u>	—	<u>aliṅga</u>	—	<u>ātman</u>

The apparent neatness of this tabulation is matched only by its total fictitiousness. First of all, it is misleading to equate the enstatic experience of aliṅga with the realisation of ātman in Vedānta. The latter is synonymous with the yogic puruṣa as the principle

of Awareness, whereas aliṅga is without question conceived of as an insentient category. If a comparison can be made at all, one would rather expect that it is the ānandamaya-kośa which corresponds with aliṅga as both are regarded as the root of spiritual nescience.

The viññānamaya-kośa, again, would seem to be more properly related to buddhi as the higher mental faculty, and the manomaya-kośa could then be put on a par with the manas and the sensory complex. The realm of the particularised (viśeṣa) entails also the five sthūla-bhūtas which, if one wanted to be consistent, would call for the inclusion of the fifth and lowest (or outermost) 'sheath' as well, namely the annamaya-kośa. Thus one would have to squeeze a pentadic classificatory system (i.e. the pañca-kośa doctrine) into a quaternary schema (i.e. the parvan doctrine) which is unsatisfactory and in this particular case misleading as well.

I.K. TAIMNI's second contention according to which there is a correlation between the four types of samādhi and the guṇa-parvans is on first sight more promising, but on closer examination it reveals itself to be equally fallacious. For, the vitarka-samādhi concerns only the sthūla aspect of prakṛti, that is, the manifold composites of the five categories of bhūtas, 'elements', existing in the space-time universe. On the other hand, the vicāra-samādhi comprises all subtle entities up to aliṅga (see I.45), that is, the entire deep structure of prakṛti. The ānanda-samādhi, again, is directed towards the instruments of knowledge (i.e. the senses) if we can rely on the testimony of the commentators, whilst the aśmitā-samādhi is orientated towards the principle of individuality.

Nor must one confuse the four 'levels' on which the guṇas manifest themselves with the ontogenetic series. It appears that Patañjali's four-level model is a structural view of the universe constituted by the primary-constituents or guṇas and is not meant to explain the actual evolutionary process in which the individual tattvas emerge from the world-ground. In fact Patañjali does not refer to the tattva evolution at all and merely mentions some of the emergent categories of existence, such as the bhūtas, the indriyas, the mind or manas. The term buddhi appears to be used in the sense of 'cognition' only. Ahamkāra is probably replaced by asmitā, and the tanmātras are nowhere mentioned and may have been unknown to the author of the Yoga-Sūtra. The crucial problem now is one of assigning the tattvas to Patañjali's four-level model. Vyāsa (II.19) advances this correlated schema:

tatra-ākāśa-vāyva-agny-udaka-bhūmayo bhūtāni śabda-sparsa-
rūpa-rasa-gandha-tanmātrāṇām-aviśeṣāṇām viśeṣāḥ, tathā
śrotra-tvak-cakṣu-jihvā-ghrāṇāni buddhi-indriyāni, vāk-
pāni-pāda-pāyu-upasthāni karma-indriyāni, ekādaśam manah
sarva-artham, ity-etāny-asmitā-lakṣaṇasya-aviśeṣasya viśeṣāḥ,
guṇāṇām-eṣa ṣoḍaśako viśeṣa-pariṇāmah, ṣaḍ-aviśeṣāḥ, tad-yathā
śabda-tanmātram sparsa-tanmātram rūpa-tanmātram rasa-tanmātram
gandha-tanmātran-ca, ity-eka-dvi-tri-catus-pañca-lakṣaṇāḥ
śabda-ādayaḥ pañca-aviśeṣāḥ, ṣaṣṭas-ca-aviśeṣo'smitāmātra iti,


ete sattāmātrasya-ātmano mahataḥ śad-aviśeṣa-parināmāḥ,
yat tat-param-aviśeṣebhyo liṅgamātram mahat-tattvam.

I propose the following translation:

"Of this [four-level structure] the elements 'ether', 'air', 'fire' and 'earth' are the particularised [modifications] of the unparticularised potentials (tanmātra), [viz.] sound, touch, form-percept (rūpa), taste and smell. Similarly, ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose are the cognitive organs, [whilst] voice, hands, feet, anus and genitals are the conative organs. The eleventh [particularised modification] is the multi-objective (sarva-artha) mind. These are the particularised (viśeṣa) [modifications] of the unparticularised, [which is] characterised as asmitā. This is the sixteenfold particularised [modification] of the gunas. The unparticularised [modifications] are six; they are the sound-potential, the touch-potential, the sight-potential (rūpa-tanmātra), the taste-potential and the smell-potential. Thus sound etc. [having respectively] one, two, three, four or five characteristics, are [known as] the five unparticularised [modifications]. And the sixth unparticularised [modification] is the 'substratum-of-I-am-ness' (asmitā-mātra). These are the six unparticularised modifications (aviśeṣa-parināma) of

the great entity, the 'substratum-of-beingness' (sattā-mātra). That which is prior to the unparticularised [modifications] is the 'substratum-of-(all that which bears)-characteristics' (liṅga-mātra), the great principle."

Whether or not this account is trustworthy cannot definitely be ascertained. However, it seems quite significant that Vyāsa here makes ample use of Patañjali's own specific terminology, while elsewhere often completely ignoring it and superimposing his personal nomenclature on that of the Yoga-Sūtra. The above excerpt from the Yoga-Bhāṣya can be reduced to the following diagram which shows up Vyāsa's correlation of the four parvans with the better known series of tattvas:



I will next analyse each of the four parvans separately. To begin with the concept of aliṅga, the word itself is composed of the negative prefix a- and liṅga (from √liṅg/lag 'to attach, adhere, cling to')

and has the meaning of 'that which is without mark or sign', here rendered as 'the undifferentiate'. Alinga is first used in the metric Upaniṣads where it designates the Self. However, in the Yoga-Sūtra it is clearly a synonym of prakṛti in its noumenal state as the matrix of the evolved cosmos. As such alinga is identical with the Sāṃkhya concept of avyakta or 'the unmanifest'. G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 88) describes it as the 'non-resoluble genetic entity', seemingly having in mind the traditional interpretation of the term liṅga as 'the mergent', that is, that which resolves into the world-ground upon the accomplishment of emancipation.⁷⁰ However, this interpretation of alinga is of a secondary nature only. Its primary connotation is 'the signless'.

From the ultimate substrative cause - alinga - derives the first of the series of ontic evolutes (natura naturata), namely liṅga-mātra or 'the differentiated'. The second half of this interesting compound, mātra, is customarily employed in the sense of 'only, mere', but in the present philosophical context it must be credited with a more substantial meaning. In its oldest usage mātrā signified as much as 'substance' or 'material'⁷¹, and the later form mātra as met with in such compounds as liṅga-mātra, asmitā-mātra or tan-mātra unquestionably has retained a shade of the original meaning. Hence in the above-quoted passage from the Yoga-Bhāṣya (II.19) I have risked to translate it tentatively with 'substratum-of-^o'.

70 See e.g. Vācaspati Miśra's Sāṃkhya-Tattva-Kaumudī on Sāṃkhya-Kārikā 40 and Aniruddha's Vṛtti on Sāṃkhya-Sūtra VI.69. This native view is refuted by R. GARBE (1917², 328).

71 See e.g. Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad IV.3.10 and Chāndogya-Upaniṣad II.24.16 and III.19.1.

But what does the concept of liṅga-mātra stand for?

Even though there is no definition of this term in the Yoga-Sūtra and in fact the word occurs but once (in II.19), its meaning can be fairly reliably inferred from the context and with the additional evidence of comparable ontological models. Vyāsa quite rightly identifies it as 'the great principle' (mahat-tattva) or 'mere beingness' (sattā-mātra). As the direct source of all further differentiations of the undifferentiated noumenal world-ground, liṅga-mātra itself has but a single characteristic which is 'existence'. No more can be said of it except that it exists; it is non-differentiated existence. In G.M. KOELMAN's (1970, 92) words: "This state of 'being-only' is not a state of functional activity, whereby it could be characterized (..) It is the level of pure non-functional existence. The only operation it may be said to possess is its self-differentiation into the following evolutes. But this is a cosmical energization, not a functional activity." In other traditions this threshold from the noumenal to the phenomenal is known as 'the golden germ' (hiranya-garbhā) or as 'the lord of creatures' (prajāpati), and it can be compared with the *vous* in the philosophy of Neoplatonism.

According to S. DASGUPTA (1920, 51) the term liṅga-mātra is a synonym of asmitā-mātra (as used in IV.4), but this is an unfounded assumption which is not corroborated by the evidence in the Yoga-Sūtra itself or in any of the scholia. J.W. HAUER (1958, 286), who usually displays a more critical acumen than his predecessors, unexpectedly commits the same blunder only to contradict and thus unknowingly correct

himself on p. 288. Nor must liṅga-mātra be equated with buddhi which, in Patañjali's philosophical jargon, stands for 'cognition' only and not for any ontic principle.

The third level (parvan) of the gunas is known as avīśeṣa or 'the unparticularised' (from √śiṣ 'to leave'). The word is used only twice in the Yoga-Sūtra, once in the general sense of 'not distinguished' (III.35) and then in the technical sense (II.19). Again, Patañjali offers no definition of this important concept. According to Vyāsa it is an umbrella term covering asmitā-mātra and the set of five tanmātras. This is a plausible enough explanation, but there is no degree of certainty about whether or not Patañjali included the concept of tanmātra in his ontogenetic theory. In view of the fact that virtually all ancient and modern commentators insist on the inclusion of the tanmātras, I will briefly delineate their essential nature.

The word tanmātra (lit. 'that only') is like most of these concepts difficult to translate. Various suggestions have been made, such as 'fine element' (J.H. WOODS), 'rudimentary element' (G. JHA), 'sensation' (I.K. TAIMNI), 'subtle element' (G.J. LARSON), 'Grundstoff' (R. GARBE) and 'Subtilenergie' (J.W. HAUER). Possibly S. DASGUPTA's rendering of the term with 'potential' best captures its meaning: "The tanmātras possess something more than quantum of mass and energy; they possess physical characters, some of them penetrability, others powers of impact or pressure, others radiant heat, others again capability of viscous and cohesive attraction."⁷² This interpretation is based on B.N. SEAL (1915) who defines the tanmātras as energy

72 S. DASGUPTA (1963⁵, I, 251)

pōtentials being the essences of the sensory faculties. However, this does not resolve any of the obscurity which surrounds this conception, and with G.J. LARSON (1969, 205) one is forced to admit that "[e]xactly what is meant by 'subtle element' is difficult if not impossible to determine".

G.J. LARSON also draws attention to the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā (38) which describes the tanmātras as aviśeṣa, thus opposing them to the bhūtas which are said to be viśeṣa. This appears to be the application of both these terms in the Yoga-Sūtra as well. Vyāsa proffers this explanation: There are six 'unparticularised' modifications of the primary substratum, the sixth being asmitā-mātra (which is excluded in Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's version). He arranges them in the following manner:

- | | |
|--------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| (1) <u>śabda-tanmātra</u> | — potential of sound |
| (2) <u>sparsa-^o</u> | — potential of touch |
| (3) <u>rūpa-^o</u> | — potential of sight (lit. 'form') |
| (4) <u>rasa-^o</u> | — potential of taste |
| (5) <u>gandha-^o</u> | — potential of smell |
| (6) <u>asmitā-mātra</u> | — substratum of I-am-ness |

No definitions are supplied by the author of the Yoga-Bhāṣya, but he makes mention of the fact that they are to be distinguished by their respective number of characteristics, which may be one, two, three, four or five. Vācaspati Miśra provides the proper attributions:

- | | |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------|
| (1) <u>śabda-tanmātra</u> | — one characteristic only |
| (2) <u>sparsā-</u> ^o | — two characteristics |
| (3) <u>rūpa-</u> ^o | — three characteristics |
| (4) <u>rasa-</u> ^o | — four characteristics |
| (5) <u>gandha-</u> ^o | — five characteristics. |

The number of characteristics inherent in each tanmātra is explained by the number of ways in which the corresponding bhūta can be experienced. Each subsequent bhūta incorporates the properties of all the previous bhūtas. Thus while the ether (ākāśa) pertaining to śabda-tanmātra can only be heard, the air (vāyu) pertaining to sparsā-tanmātra can be heard and felt; fire (agni) can be heard, felt and seen and hence its corresponding tanmātra which is rūpa-^o is stated to have three characteristics; water (udaka) can be heard, felt, seen and tasted and consequently its matrix which is rasa-tanmātra is said to display four characteristics; finally, earth (bhūmi) can be heard, felt, seen, tasted and smelled wherefore gandha-tanmātra must have five characteristics.⁷³

These tanmātras are, as G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 114) puts it, 'objective universals' which do not stand for any particular sound, taste or visual percept but are sound as such, taste as such. He, moreover, makes the valuable observation that they are not purely logical categories, but unlike the objectum formale of Scholasticism are experiencable ontic reals; however, as they are prior to sensation they can only be experienced by way of immediate apperception as

73 According to another theory each tanmātra has but one characteristic. See Yuktidīpikā on Sāṃkhya-Kārikā (25) eka-uttaram-iti vārsaganyah.

cultivated by the yogin. We merely recognise their effects in the properties of their material counterparts, the bhūtas.

Whether or not Patañjali was aware of the tanmātras, the concept of asmitā-mātra must definitely be assigned to the avīśeṣa category. Whereas līṅga-mātra is a tattva of which nothing can be predicated save that it exists, asmitā-mātra "differentiates and pluralizes the indetermined and universal principle of being (sattāmātra) into so many different centres of reference, so many sources of initiative"⁷⁴.

And: "These centres of reference constitute, so to say, distinct nucleations within the one Prakṛti, in such a way that there arise different suppositions or subjectivations, or numerically distinct units of centralization, adapted to the needs of each particularized Self. This supposition is sufficiently stable to be called a substantial entity, a tattva or a dravya."⁷⁵ Asmitā-mātra is, in other words, that agency which splits the primary substratum into subjects vis à vis objects in the form of a bifurcate line of evolution.

This concept corresponds with the Sāṅkhya notion of aḥamkāra. The author of the Yuktidīpikā (on Sāṅkhya-Kārikā 4) is therefore mistaken when he maintains that Patañjali does not know aḥamkāra as a separate entity but includes it in mahat.⁷⁶ Similarly erroneous is S. RADHAKRISHNAN's statement that Yoga "does not recognise aḥamkāra and manas as separate

74 G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 107)

75 ibid.

76 The Sanskrit text reads: evam tarhi na-eva-aḥamkāro vidyata iti patañjaliḥ, mahato'smi-pratyaya-rūpatva-abhyupagamāt, "Thus, then, there is no I-maker [says] Patañjali, on account of the admission of the appearance of the notion of I-am in the great [entity]".

from buddhi"⁷⁷.

This confusion could have been avoided by acknowledging the fact that Patañjali's vocabulary is not just a replica of Sāṃkhya terminology. Asmitā-mātra, with him, is the 'universal' principle of individualisation (corresponding with mahat of the Yuktidīpikā), but asmitā connotes the particularised 'I-am-ness'. Thus a distinction is made between the ontological (structural) and the psychological (functional) use of the word asmitā. Asmitā-mātra occurs only in IV.4 where it is unequivocally given out as the source of the multiple individualised minds or nirmāna-cittas. On the other hand, asmitā as a function of the phenomenal mind is mentioned in II.3, 6 and III.47, and as a particular experience in samādhi in I.17.

Of special interest is the use of asmitā-mātra, the pre-individualised ontic principle of subjectivity. The introduction of this special designation does away with much of the ^{guity} ambivalence connected with the equivalent term aḥamkāra which is used both in the sense of 'individualised ego-consciousness' and as 'pre-individualised generic principle of egohood'. Most commentators ignore the second meaning of aḥamkāra, and hence J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN (1957^b) dedicates considerable space to this concept in order to correct the past lop-sided interpretations by bringing out the 'I-maker's' "cosmic function of creator of the empirical universe"⁷⁸. His penetrating analysis is of relevance also to the study of the concept of asmitā-mātra in Classical Yoga.


J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN (p. 21) points out the mythological elements

77 S. RADHAKRISHNAN (1951⁶, II, 434)

78 J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN (1957^b, 15)

present in the notion of ahamkāra and makes it clear that "the origin of the creative ahamkāra must be sought in the ancient upaniṣadic speculations on a self-formulating, self-creating primordial personality" (p. 21). He criticises the current exclusive interpretation of the term as that organ which forms the conception of the ego, putting forward that "if this had been the intended meaning when the term was coined, one wonders why the responsible thinker, capable of such conceptual thought, did not express himself more accurately in ahantā-kāra. Besides, ^okāra has as a rule the much more concrete sense of 'fashioning, building, making and doing with one's hands'" (p. 16). He continues (p.17): "Side by side with ahamkāra we find in later texts mamakāra. Explications of ahamkāra take always the form of a quoted sentence with iti: 'I am .. I do..' etc.; of mamakāra: 'This is mine' etc. This points to another meaning of ^okāra, not as in kumbhakāra etc., but as in omkāra, vaśatkāra, svāhākāra, etc.: 'the cry, uttering or ejaculation: Aham!'"

It is this creative aspect of ahamkāra, as anticipated in the words aham bahu syām, "May I be many", of the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad (VI.2.3), which is crystallised in the concept of asmitā-mātra. Although Patañjali merely asserts that the nirmāṇa-cittas originate from asmitā-mātra, it is safe to assume that asmitā-mātra also acts as the source of the tanmātras (granted that Patañjali incorporated them in his ontology) and the bhūtas and indriyas. This successive evolution can be depicted graphically in the following way:



Vācaspati Miśra, for no apparent reasons, places asmitā-mātra and the tanmātras on the same ontogenetic level inasmuch as he regards both as evolutes of buddhi (= liṅga-mātra)⁷⁹. However, both on logical and on historical grounds the vertical arrangement suggested above makes more sense. As G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 115) observes: "Since the functions of cognition are evolved from the Ego-function, it seems plausible that the objective universals are evolved from the same Ego-function; this seems even more probable when we consider that the pure Ego-function on the existential level (asmitā-mātra) is also the prakritic subject of the activity of cognizing."

This brings us to the last guṇa-parvan, the level of the particularised phenomena or viśeṣa, that is, the 'surface structure' of prakṛti. Contrary to Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, the author of the Yoga-Sūtra does not equate aviśeṣa with the tanmātras and viśeṣa with the bhūtas⁸⁰ but includes in the category of viśeṣa also the indriyas. This is hinted at by the phrase bhūta-indriya-ātmaka (II.18) and possibly also by the

79 See Tattva-Vaiśaradī (II.19): tanmātrāṇi b/buddhi-kāraṇakāny-aviśeṣatvād-asmitāvad-iti.

80 See Sāṅkhya-Kārikā (38)

compound kāya-indriya (II.43). Besides, it is in perfect alignment with the epic traditions.

The word indriya occurs seven times in the Yoga-Sūtra: II.18 (bhūta-indriya), II.41 (indriya-jaya), II.43 (kāya-indriya), II.54 (indriyānām pratyāhāra), II.55 (vaśyatā indriyānām), III.13 (bhūta-indriya), and III.47 (indriya-jaya). Indriya is an old term, well known already to the composers of the early Upaniṣads. As a distinct ontogenetic set the indriyas are first mentioned in the Kaṭha-Upaniṣad (III.3-4) in the famous allegory of the chariot (= body) which is spun to horses (= senses) by means of reins (= mind) held by the chariot-driver (= buddhi).

The Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad contains an archaic passage — III.2.1-9 — in which we find one of the earliest analyses of the sensory tools. An interesting distinction is made between the eight 'graspers' (graha) and their corresponding 'super-graspers' (ati-graha).

- (1) the vital force (prāṇa) is 'supergrasped' by the in-breath (apāna)
- (2) speech (vāc) is 'supergrasped' by name (nāma)
- (3) the tongue (jihvā) is 'supergrasped' by taste (rasa)
- (4) the eye (cakṣus) is 'supergrasped' by form (rūpa)
- (5) the ear (śrōtra) is 'supergrasped' by sound (śabda)
- (6) the mind (manas) is 'supergrasped' by desire (kāma)
- (7) the hands (hastā) are 'supergrasped' by action (karman)
- (8) the skin (tvac) is 'supergrasped' by touch (sparsa)

In later times this somewhat random enumeration came to be replaced by the classical double set of five conative and five cognitive senses, known as the karma-indriyas and the jñāna- or buddhi-indriyas respectively. To these must be added the mind or manas as the relay station for all other sensory capacities. Its inclusion among the indriyas brings to the fore one all-important point, namely that correctly speaking these indriyas must not be confused with the sense organs themselves, but they represent their intrinsic capacities. This was recognised long ago by R. GARBE (1917², 320) who remarks: "These ten senses must not be mixed up with the visible organs (goloka) in which they have their seat (adhiṣṭhāna); they are in fact supra-sensory (atīndriya) and can only be deduced from their functions." However, his words have been heeded by very few translators.⁸¹


Manas is used thrice in the Yoga-Sūtra (III.48; I.35; II.53) and very probably has the usual denotation as that mental capacity which organises the sensory input, or as K.B.R. RAO (1966, 68) puts it "the synthesising factor of the experience got by the indriyas" which "converts the indeterminate percepts into a determinate idea". It is a mute point whether manas should be assigned to the aviśeṣa category or whether Patañjali conceived of it as just another indriya pertaining to the viśeṣa category. I tend to favour the former solution in view of the special nature of the manas.

Turning next to the set of five elements which together with the senses compose the viśeṣa-parvan, we find that Patañjali employs the term bhūta five times, viz. once in the sense of 'creature' (III.17)

81 G.J. LARSON (1969), for one, is oblivious to this whole argument.

once as a participle (III.20: aviṣayībhūtatvāt) and thrice in the sense of 'element' (II.18; III.13, 44). Although the elements — ether, air, fire, water and earth — are not specifically listed, Patañjali was undoubtedly acquainted with the bhūtas as ontogenetic factors. Parenthetically, it may be remarked that the Yoga-Sūtra contains no reference to the 'atoms' as the ultimate subdivisions of the elements, and the statements of the commentators must be taken cum grano salis. The word anīman 'fineness', denoting the yogic paranormal ability to reduce the size of the body (see III.45), does not implicate in the least that Patañjali subscribed to the atomic theory as developed in the Vaiśeṣika school. The word appears already in the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad (VI.6; 8) at a time when the notion of atoms was certainly quite unknown.

It should now be possible to attempt an overall reconstruction of Patañjali's implicit ontogenetic model as it can be ascertained on the basis of the Yoga-Sūtra and comparable sources. The findings presented on the preceding pages can be epitomised in the following diagram:



Granted that this conjectural model is correct, Patañjali apparently favoured a version of ontogenesis which has been grossly distorted by the classical commentators. Furthermore, the present reconstruction discredits all those misinformed efforts to reduce the ontology of Classical Yoga to that of Classical Sāṃkhya. On the other hand, it is equally incorrect to assert, as did J.W. HAUER (1958, 282), that Patañjali made no use of ontogenetic categories at all but rather subsumed everything under the generic heading of citta, as derived from asmitā-mātra. I will substantiate this criticism in some of the later chapters.

4. Kaivalya

In view of the preceding reappraisal of the ontology of Classical Yoga which led to multiple corrections of long-standing misconceptions about it, it seems desirable to re-examine also the concept of emancipation (kaivalya), "the greatest original contribution of Indian philosophy"⁸². For, if Īśvara and puruṣa must, as I have tried to demonstrate, be understood differently from what has commonly been assumed ever since Vyāsa superimposed the views of his particular school on the philosophy of Patañjali, this can be expected to have its logical reverberations necessarily also in the conception of liberation.

The technical designation for this concept is kaivalya which can be said to be a yogic term par excellence. Its earliest known occurrence is in the Yoga-Sūtra, where it is employed in II.25, III.50, III.55 and IV.26. Kaivalya is the gunated form of kevala meaning 'alone'. The latter word is frequently used in the epic, and in the philosophical sense occurs for instance in XII.294.43; 296.13, 29; 304.16, 26; 306.5, 74, 77, 79. The Śvetāsvatara-Upaniṣad (I.11; IV.18) also knows this usage. In the Maitrāyaṇīya-Upaniṣad (VI.21) the synonym kevalatva 'aloneness' is introduced, though it is doubtful whether this particular section belongs to the oldest material of the text. Finally, as H. ZIMMER (1953², 305f.) points out the words kevala and kaivalya

82 A.K. LAD (1967, preface)

played a significant role also in the philosophy of older Jainism. The word kevala is used for instance in the Tattvārthādhigama-Sūtra (I.9, 30; X.1), and in VIII.8 of the same text the compound kevala-darsana occurs. Moreover, the great pathfinders of Jainism, the tīrthāṅkaras /a were also known by the name of kevalins. But these are not the only points of contact between Yoga and Jainism; there are also striking parallels in the ethical sphere which it would be worthwhile to pursue in a separate study.

What kind of yogic experience does kaivalya denote? J. GONDA (1960, I, 312) offers this explanation: "The various members of Yoga which are as it were arranged in stages have but one purpose, the isolation of the spirit (Kaivalya), that is, the union with God. Kaivalya is the experience of the perfect simplicity and uniformity of the nucleus of the personality. This experience (..) is one of transcendental bliss infinitely superior to the ordinary state of consciousness, and in it the true being of the yogin expands immensely. The condition of enlightenment is indescribable: one has transcended nature and no longer stands in need of anything and experiences the unity of all existence." This description of the goal of Yoga is not only fragmentary but positively defective and misleading. Aside the fact that the 'members' of the yogic path cannot be regarded as rungs on a ladder, in what sense can one possibly speak of a union with god? Does kaivalya really contain an element of bliss? What does it mean: "the true being of the yogin expands immensely"?

To what degree these strictures are valid is borne out by the actual meaning of kaivalya as it emerges from an unprejudiced study of its context in the Yoga-Sūtra. Here we find that in II.25 kaivalya is

used to qualify the word dr̥ṣi or 'seeing' which is identical with the 'sheer seeing' (dr̥ṣi-mātra) of II.20. If any predication can be made at all of the Self it is this that the puruṣa is of the nature of pure unmitigated Awareness, or as Patañjali (IV.34) has it, citi-śakti.

Visual experience supplies the most illuminating metaphors to describe this transcendental Awareness, though in earlier days the other sensory and mental experiences also served the same purpose. In a famous passage in the Bṛhadāranyaka-Upaniṣad (III.7.22), for instance, Yājñavalkya instructs his disciple thus: "[The Self] is the unseen Seer, the unheard Hearer, the unthought Thinker, the unknown Knower — other than He there is no seer, other than He there is no hearer, other than He there is no thinker, other than He there is no knower. He is the Self, the Inner Controller, the Immortal."⁸³

The expression 'aloneness of seeing' (dr̥śeh kaivalyam, II.25) is not repeated elsewhere in the Yoga-Sūtra, but it can be taken to be implied in all other instances where the term kaivalya is mentioned. Kaivalya is primarily the 'aloneness of seeing (of the Self)' and only secondarily and by implication the 'aloneness of puruṣa'. This strange usage can be explained by those aphorisms which speak of the seeming involvement of the Self with the processes of prakṛti or, more precisely, with the states of the psycho-somatic organism. Kaivalya is the exact antithesis of samyoga or 'correlation', which refers to the Self's function as the 'seer' of the contents of consciousness.

83 adr̥ṣto draṣṭā aśrutah śrotā amato mantā aviññāto viññātā na-anyo'to'sti draṣṭā na-anyo'to'sti śrotā na-anyo'to'sti mantā na-anyo'to'sti viññātā eṣa ta ātma-antaryāmy-amṛtah.

This is the condition described in I.4 as vṛtti-sārūpya or 'conformity with the fluctuations (of the mind)'. In contrast to this, kaivalya denotes the 'own-form' (sva-rūpa) of the 'seer' (draṣṭṛ). It supervenes when samyoga, the correlation between the Self and the contents of consciousness, is disrupted.

Samyoga is defined in II.23 as the "cause of the apprehension of the own-form of the power of the 'owner' [and that of] the 'owned'" (sva-svāmi-śaktyoḥ sva-rūpa-upalabdhi-hetuḥ). In II.24 avidyā or 'nescience' is stated as the cause of samyoga. The correlation between puruṣa and citta is of a purely noetic nature. No real substantial intermixing takes place, since an unbridgable hiatus is postulated between the Self and prakṛti. However, because of the uniformity of the Self as the principle of Awareness, it is possible for the puruṣa to apperceive continuously the ongoing transformations of prakṛti as mirrored in a particular consciousness (see II.20) of a specific organism.

As is emphasised in III.35 puruṣa and sattva (= citta) are always 'unmixed' (asamkīrṇa), and yet somehow the ordinary unenlightened mind fails to perceive this fundamental distinction and confuses both principles. Puruṣa is always and irrevocably pure Awareness, whether the mind is operative or idle. Consciousness-of (citta) is in perpetual motion and can diminish to the point where one speaks of the inception of unconsciousness, but citi-śakti is in no way altered or reduced when a person is hypnotised, asleep or plain unconscious. The Self is quite unaffected by the behaviour of the mind.

This axiom, undoubtedly derived from yogic noumenous experiencing and therefore also only experientially verifiable, has caused some western critics considerable embarrassment, accustomed as they are to

regard consciousness as an attribute of the mental life. In a recent study on the nature of consciousness as seen from various philosophical angles, P. BOWES (1971, 170-71) makes the following pertinent observation: "One of the reasons why people are inclined to feel that consciousness is a function of the brain is that they identify the conscious with the mental, and the mental, as recent researches in neurophysiology and computer functioning show, can be identified with the physical with some gain in clarity and understanding. If the mental is the physical the conscious must be physical too, for consciousness is an attribute that sometimes qualifies the mental. But the conclusion that the conscious is the physical does not follow if the conscious is something distinct from the mental. This is where Sāṃkhya philosophy comes in, which may have a contribution to make, not in the details of its explanation, much of which is pretty archaic, but in its contention that the conscious is not the mental when the mental is characterised by intelligence, and that the mental has to be explained in terms of the material."

The notion of the Self as pure underived Awareness is only one side of the doctrine of emancipation; the other is the postulate that man's true identity lies outside the personality complex in the Self. It is this second point which provides the ethical imperative of Yoga which challenges man to dissociate himself from the impermanent states of the body-mind configuration in order to regain true Self-identity. Man's essence is thus the pure Awareness itself. Hence the empirical self must be a mirage. Criticising this interpretation

of reality as advocated in Yoga and Sāṃkhya, P. BOWES (1971, 184) contends that Sāṃkhya may be misled by the term 'pure' frequently prefixed to 'transcendental awareness' in order to demarcate it from the empirical consciousness-of or citta which always is a knowing of this or that.⁸⁴ She says: "But the term 'pure' has also a moral connotation which suggests that whatever is pure is far more desirable than what is not pure. So consciousness as such, pure consciousness, becomes something with which men ought to identify themselves rather than with empirical consciousness which is relative to its content and hence not pure."

The concept of freedom as conceived in Yoga is manifestly quite distinct from the western interpretations of it. In a sense man is, essentially, always free because the Self is never entering the mechanisms of prakṛti. Ergo emancipation is not something which could, strictly speaking, be attained or effected. But in another, empirical, sense there is a movement towards the Self via purification and noetic catharsis. Emancipation is total transcendence which amounts to the same as saying that when the essence of man is 'somehow' recovered, man ceases to be man as we know him.

The self-same transcendental Awareness 'shines forth' unalloyed and unabated. Its 'light' is 'mirrored' in those organisms of prakṛti which have evolved a sufficient degree of complexity, such as the human organism. It is at this point in time that there arises the vexed problem of identity: the self-reflective stage of the mind. Thus consciousness-of is in a way a function of pure Awareness and prakṛti

84 Cf. G. KAVIRAJ (1966, 128): "The term 'kaivalya' (..) conveys the sense of being 'kevala' or alone. It implies the idea of purity and freedom from defilement".

combined. By manipulating the organismic situation in the form of voluntaristic alterations of consciousness, the mind can be approximated to the pure Awareness. This process is couched in terms of purification (śuddhi): the yogin must endeavour to remove the 'veils' (āvarana) which prevent the transcendental Awareness from manifesting itself in the organism; he must burn up the 'defilements' (doṣa) which stain the mirror of his mind.

This is in principle a purely cognitive cleansing process as is brought home by such key terms as viveka-khyāti or anyatā-khyāti. This inner re-arrangement or mental purification consists in the main in a gradual but persistent effort of dispelling the various empirical mal-identifications. In other words, the yogin assumes a priori that the Self is the locus of his true identity and then proceeds to disentangle his multiple misconceptions about his own nature by retracting from everything that exposes itself to him as non-self. And 'non-self' is absolutely everything that proves to be unstable, finite and sorrowful. Thus severing all contacts with prakṛtic identities, the empirical consciousness ultimately collapses for lack of an objective prop. What remains is the pure Awareness itself.

Kaivalya ensues upon the disappearance of even the last trace of defilement (doṣa) at which point the sattva is, figuratively speaking, as pure as the Self (see III.55). This at least is the definition of kaivalya according to the aṣṭa-aṅga-yoga text. Here sattva does not signify one of the three guṇas, but it stands for a condition of the mind which is connected with the "upward progress of return to

to the original state"⁸⁵. It corresponds with liṅga-mātra in the structural schema of ontogenesis.

It is clear from what has been said hitherto that kaivalya, or rather the 'aloneness of seeing', transcends every known state of mind. Strictly speaking, it represents an unknowable. Hence to describe it as an 'experience', as did inter alia J. GONDA (1960, I), or worse still as an 'experience of joy', must be recognised as a serious distortion of the true position of Classical Yoga. Likewise, spatial metaphors are out of place, since the Self is an aspatial/atemporal reality. No 'expansion' of anything or into anything can occur.

Equally unsound is the popular idea, ostensibly subscribed to by J. GONDA, that kaivalya implies a union with the divine. Whatever the reality may be that kaivalya stands for — and I do not wish to discard the idea of a transcendental unity of numinous experiencing — the system of explanation proposed by Patañjali certainly does not leave a niche for such an assumption. Union presupposes a situation of separation, and īśvara and puruṣa are absolutely and irreversibly co-essential, wherefore the question of a re-linking does not even arise. In this respect Classical Yoga differs markedly from the teaching of the Bhagavad-Gītā where emancipation is conceived of as a kind of living in the eternal presence of God in a medium of mutual transcendental love-participation (bhakti). This is the concept of brahma-nirvāṇa as subsisting in the being of God.

Lastly, having demolished the repeated allegation that Patañjali

85 J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN (1957^c, 103)

affirmed the plurality of Selves, kaivalya can also not be said to represent a state in which each Self-monad is reinstated in utmost isolation from the world and from all other Self-monads, as is asserted by M. ELIADE (1973³, 32). Kaivalya is not anything separate from the Self. Nor is it properly speaking a condition or quality of the Self. Nor is it a goal for the Self. It is simply an empirical construct invented to mark off the Self as postulated in the mesh of psycho-somatic existence from the Self as 'verified' after the pseudo-event of liberation. I am not sure that H. ZIMMER (1953²) is right in emphasising that kaivalya denotes both 'isolation' and 'perfection'. Primarily kaivalya appears to be used in a more narrow sense, as describing the Self's uncontaminated purity. This seems to be confirmed by the use of apavarga or 'liberation' in II.18 which is regarded as the antithesis of bhoga or 'world-enjoyment'. Apavarga describes the ethical goal of the yogin, the movement towards the Self, and it is to this notion to which applies H. ZIMMER's transcription of the yogic target as 'integration'.

CHAPTER SIX
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTS

In response to its soteriological purposes Yoga has developed a peculiar psychology whose primary objective is the facilitation of the yogin's pursuit to reconstitute his consciousness so as to allow the transcendental Self-Awareness to become manifest in the mental complex. It is thus an eminently practical endeavour which cannot be separated from the over-all philosophical concerns of Yoga and its ethical goals. As a matter of fact there does not even exist a synonym for what is here called 'psychology'. This important circumstance is fully appreciated by M. ELIADE (1973³, 38) who places the word in quotation marks. It must be remembered that any compartmentalisation of the homogeneous structure of Yoga theory into such divisions as 'psychology', 'philosophy' or 'ethics' is no more than an artificial device in order to promote the analysis and understanding of a rather differently organised body of knowledge. Because of the prominent practical orientation of the 'psychological' aspect of Yoga, it has occasionally been compared to western psychoanalytical theories and procedures, but this comparison is only conditionally valid.⁸⁶

The fact is that the psychological dimension of Yoga is still a fairly unexplored territory awaiting a far-sighted explorer. There

86 See e.g. A.W. WATTS (1961)

exist a few tentative studies of various aspects of Yoga psychology, mostly by Indian authors, but these do not amount to a great deal and conceptually often leave much to be desired.⁸⁷ One of the principal reasons which invalidate, or at least render questionable, many of these well-meaning contributions, is a certain lack of semantic differentiation. More often than not these interpretations take little notice of the particular context in which concepts occur. Yet only a scrupulous analysis of the contextual meaning of a concept creates an adequate base for a comparative study and assessment. On the following pages, then, an attempt is made to determine the semantic content of a select number of concepts as they occur in the Yoga-Sūtra.

1. Citta

The single most important psychological concept employed in Classical Yoga is citta. A variety of translations have been suggested for this word, such as 'mind' (R. PRASĀDA, S. DASGUPTA), 'mind-stuff' (J.H. WOODS, H. ZIMMER), 'internal organ' (G. JHA, C.K. RAJA), 'innere Welt' (J.W. HAUER), 'mind-complex' (G.M. KOELMAN) and 'consciousness' (M. ELIADE).

⁸⁷ See e.g. R. RÖSEL (1928), S. LINDQUIST (1935), P.V. PATHAK (1931), S.K. SAKSENA (1944), E. ABEGG (1955) and SWĀMĪ AKHILĀNANDA (1946).

The word citta is a derivative of the verbal root $\sqrt{\text{cit}}$ meaning 'to recognise, observe, perceive' and 'to be bright, to shine'. It is applied wherever psycho-mental phenomena connected with conscious activity are to be expressed. Citta is used already in the Rgveda and the Atharvaveda besides the more frequently employed terms asu 'life' or 'vital force' and manas 'mind'. It is also a scarce term in the Upaniṣads. However, it was in constant use by the time of the composition of the Mahābhārata, and from then on belonged to the standard psychological vocabulary. Unlike manas which is used by most other orthodox hindu schools of thought to denote the concept 'mind', the term citta appears to be more specifically at home in Yoga. In Sāṃkhya the synonym 'inner organ' (antahkarana) is found which is taken to be constituted of buddhi, ahamkāra and manas.⁸⁸ The Yoga commentators, on the other hand, employ the terms buddhi, antahkarana and citta rather indiscriminately.

Notwithstanding the fact that Patañjali does not provide a definition of this concept, it is transparent from its twenty-two applications in the Yoga-Sūtra itself and from the commentaries that citta generally denotes the entire mental complex. It is an umbrella term comprising all the various functionings of the mind. As G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 100) trenchantly puts it, citta "is surely not a separate prakṛtic evolute" inasmuch as it is not distinct from its component factors, i.e. buddhi etc., whose emergence from the ground of prakṛti is the theme of the ontogenetic schema outlined above. This evinces yet again the holistic approach of Classical Yoga which

lays great stress on the organicity of the processes of consciousness and is only secondarily interested in an analytical categorisation of the inner states. Often citta conveys simply 'consciousness'. It is impossible to find a single label for it in English. 'Mind-complex' and 'consciousness' should both be borne in mind. ke

In any event, I believe S. RADHAKRISHNAN (1951⁶, II, 345) to be entirely wrong when he conjectures that citta is a synonym of the Sāṃkhya mahat. Nor do I understand his statement that it "is the first product of prakṛti, though it is taken in a comprehensive sense, so as to include intellect, self-consciousness and mind". Nowhere in the Yoga-Sūtra is citta regarded as the first evolute of the world-ground, and if it were thus considered how could it possibly be said to entail the other categories listed by S. RADHAKRISHNAN? P. TUXEN (1911, 99) and E. FRAUWALLNER (1953, I, 411) are likewise mistaken in regarding manas as equivalent to citta.⁸⁸ In one sense citta is a comprehensive operational concept which embraces the function of the sensorium commune or manas, and on the other hand it is 'consciousness' as a non-structural concept.

Precisely what citta entails can be pieced together from the relevant statements in the fourth pāda which deals more with the philosophical issues of Patañjali's teaching. The following points emerge from an analysis of these references:

- (1) Citta is in a way the product of both the transcendental Self-Awareness (puruṣa) and the insentient world-mechanism

88 Cf. also T.R. KULKARNI (1972, 69): "Patañjali clearly seems to have used the Sanskrit terms citta and manas interchangeably." ke

(prakṛti), for it is said to be 'coloured' (uparakta) by the perceived objects as well as by the Self (see IV.23). However, it is not an actual derivative of either. It can thus be characterised as a function of the relation between puruṣa and prakṛti. For this reason the translation with 'mind-stuff' must be rejected.

(2) In IV.4 citta is said to arise from asmitā-mātra.

It is important to know that no causal dependence is implied here. Citta is not a separate tattva which could be traced back to asmitā-mātra along a direct evolutionary line. Citta denotes the whole set of psycho-mental factors as the true evolutes of asmitā-mātra. Only inasmuch as citta is constituted by these individual tattvas of the psychic branch of ontogenesis can it be said to have derived from asmitā-mātra which is the point where the bifurcation into physical-objective and psychic-subjective tattvas takes place. In this sense alone can citta be regarded as a particularisation or nucleation of asmitā-mātra.

(3) Although citta is held to be born of the 'single mind' (eka-citta) which is none other than asmitā-mātra, there are nevertheless many distinct cittas which are all real (see IV.16) and not merely attributes of external

objects (see IV.15). Nor are they simply products of the imagination of the single mind.

- (4) Citta is suffused with, and in a certain way structured by, countless subliminal-impressions or 'activators' (samskāra) which form into 'traits' (vāsanā) (see IV.24), and it is they which feed the fluctuations (vṛtti) thus causing the centrifugality of the mind which actively prevents Self-actualisation.
- (5) However, despite the innumerable subliminal traits which are without beginning (see IV.10), the samskāras being stored in the depth-memory (smṛti) (see IV.9), the mind nonetheless serves the purpose of emancipation (see IV.24). This teleology of citta is explained by the 'proximity' of the Self.
- (6) When the Self shines forth in perfect purity, the gunas involute, and with the dissolution of the organism, the mental complex likewise is annihilated (see IV.34). This dissipation of the mental complex upon emancipation is inferred from the fact that the gunas are said to stream back into the transcendental core of prakṛti.

As is clear from the above, Patañjali operates with a remarkably sophisticated concept of mind which bears close semblance to certain modern psychological theories. According to him, mind represents a system of dynamic relations which have as their mainstay the complex neurophysiological (= objective-prakṛtic) organism. There are various

sub-systems — the evolutionary tattvas proper — such as manas which translates the sensory data into concepts, or asmitā which is the focal point of most of the occurring internal processes. There is also a deep structure, formed by the depth-memory as the storage centre of past mental activity which is not confined to this particular existence but extends backwards ad infinitum. Consciousness is energised by this network of vāsanās which set up a certain tension thereby causing the mind to incline towards sensory experience. Externalisation, in turn, leads to the formation of subliminal-activators (samskāra) which reproduce themselves by means of the vṛttis. The first and foremost task of the yogic process is to intercept this cycle (samskāra - vṛtti - samskāra ...) by way of the gradual introversion of consciousness or pratyak-cetanā.

In passing it may be pointed out that the question of the spatial extension of the mind which seems to pre-occupy especially the later exegetists, is really a pseudo-problem. The mind can be said to have a depth dimension but no location or extension. This is borne out by the ontogenetic model itself. The space-time universe is but the outermost rim of the vast body of prakṛti which is essentially aspatial and atemporal but holds the possibility of spatial/temporal existence.

2. Vṛtti

According to Patañjali, the centrifugal consciousness functions in five major ways. These are known as the vṛttis. The word stems

from the root $\sqrt{\text{vrt}}$ 'to revolve, whirl about' and can mean 'mode of action, conduct, manner of being' etc. G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 86) wrongly equates the term vṛtti with parināma, for the former always implies a local activity whereas the latter connotes serial change.

According to aphorism I.6 there are five modes of functioning in which the ordinary mind complex can engage, viz. valid cognition (pramāṇa), misconception (viparyaya), conceptualisation (vikalpa), sleep (nidrā) and memory (smṛti). The word vṛtti is applied to any mental content which falls into any of these categories. Used altogether ten times in the Yoga-Sūtra (viz. I.2, 4, 5, 10, 41; II.11, 15, 50; III.43; IV.18), vṛtti is employed both in a more general sense as 'function, mode of being' (e.g. II.15: guṇa-vṛtti, II.50 and III.43) and as a terminus technicus which refers specifically to such mental activity as falls into the above five behavioural categories of the mind. In this sense it is often used in the plural (viz. I.5; II.11; IV.18). In the light of this evidence it is completely incomprehensible why H. JACOBI (1929, 588) writes that "vṛtti is not a philosophical term and hence is not defined by the commentators". He is doubly wrong here because not only is vṛtti definitely a technical designation but it is also defined by Bhoja on at least two occasions. In his Rāja-Mārtaṇḍa (I.2) he states: "The vṛttis are forms of modification [of the mind] with a reciprocal relationship between them" (vṛttayah aṅga-aṅgi-bhāva-parināma-rūpas-tāsām), and elsewhere (I.5) he says "the vṛttis are particular modifications of the mind" (vṛttayah cittasya parināma-viśeṣah).

The fact that the term vṛtti in its technical sense refers to specific mental events and not, as is often assumed, to any odd mental content, is clearly borne out by the statement (II.11) that the vṛttis are eliminated in meditative absorption (dhyāna). This important sūtra has always been glossed over. What it says in effect is that no vṛttis whatsoever are carried over into samādhi but that their complete cessation is a precondition for enstasy to arise. The factors present in samādhi are not vṛttis but pratyayas (e.g. vitarka, vicāra etc.). From this it is also evident that aphorism I.2 does not represent a comprehensive definition of Yoga, and as opposed to M. SAHAY (1964) I consider it to be merely a preliminary announcement. M. SAHAY's contention that Patañjali meant to prefix sarva to the word vṛtti is of course nonsensical. In this particular context, nirodha is used in a restricted sense. As will be set forth shortly, the process of 'restriction' comprises several levels of application, and the statement of I.2 implies only the lowest degree of restriction (nirodha) and not sarva-nirodha.

3. Kleśa, kliṣṭa-akliṣṭa

The five kinds of vṛtti can be either kliṣṭa or akliṣṭa (viz. I.5). These terms were respectively translated with 'painful/non-painful' (R. PRASĀDA, M.N. DVIVEDI, G. JHA), 'impure/pure' (M. ELIADE), 'afflicted/non-afflicted' (S. DASGUPTA), 'hindered/unhindered' (J.H. WOODS) and 'Dranger-behaftet/-nichtbehaftet' (J.W. HAUER). G.M. KOELMAN (1970),

surprisingly enough, does not seem to be aware of these twin terms at all, though he refers to the concept of kleśa. Yet this conceptual triad — kleśa, kliṣṭa and akliṣṭa — constitutes a central aspect of Yoga psychology. All three words are derivatives of the root √kliś 'to torment, be troubled'. As H. ZIMMER (1953², 294) aptly remarks, kliṣṭa is used "as an adjective meaning 'distressed; suffering pain or misery; faded, wearied, injured, hurt; worn out, in bad condition, marred, impaired, disordered, dimmed, or made faint!'. He continues: "A garland, when the flowers are withering, is kliṣṭa (sic!); the splendour of the moon is kliṣṭa (sic!), when obscured by a veil of clouds; a garment worn out, or spoiled by stains, is kliṣṭa (sic!); and a human being, when the inborn splendor of his nature has been subdued by fatiguing business affairs and cumbersome obligations, is kliṣṭa (sic!)."

In contrast with this general usage of the word kliṣṭa, in the Yoga-Sūtra kliṣṭa and its antonym akliṣṭa are distinctly technical terms which must be juxtaposed to the concept of kleśa or 'cause-of-affliction' denoting, as H. ZIMMER (1953², 294) puts it, "anything which, adhering to man's nature, restricts or impairs its manifestation of its true essence". G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 127) offers a more precise explanation: "Man is born with certain psychological habits, congenital psychical passions that bind him to cosmic conditions. They blind him, prevent him from discovering what his genuine Self is, make him attached to cosmic life and its allurements, afflict his existence with an endless chain of woes, enmesh him more and more in the net of conditioned existence, and hinder his liberation."

Patañjali (II.3) distinguishes five types of kleśa: nescience (avidyā), 'I-am-ness' (asmitā), attachment (rāga), aversion (dveṣa) and will-to-live (abhiniveśa). Each category is carefully defined, and nescience is explained as the nurturing ground of all other types of kleśa. This doctrine entails many implications which cannot all be made explicit in this study. For the present purposes it will suffice to make the following observations. The kleśa theorem can be said to circumscribe the fact that every organism on attaining self-consciousness, finds itself in an existential situation where it has become aware of its own awareness but is confused as to the true nature of this awareness, and the organism is as it were compelled to act out of a false identity. This is what is meant by nescience or avidyā. It refers to the peculiar cognitive condition of man who fails to recognise that consciousness-of (citta) is an epiphenomenon of the transcendental Self-Awareness. Nonetheless, it would be misleading to ascribe, as does G.J. LARSON (1969), to nescience a cosmogonic function which would be more appropriate in the context of Advaita-Vedānta. He says (p. 191): "In the Yogasūtra the reason given for the emergence or evolution of the manifest world is avidyā ('ignorance'). In this respect there is a fundamental difference between Sāṃkhya and Yoga, for the appearance of the manifest world in classical Sāṃkhya is much more than the result of ignorance. It is the result, rather, of the very nature of puruṣa which must become what it is not in order ultimately to become what it is." Apart from G.J. LARSON's misapprehension of the precise viewpoint of Patañjali, one may also question his bold speculation that in Sāṃkhya prakṛti-pariṇāma is due to the impact of puruṣa. This appears to be

a later theory which is as yet absent in Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's formulation of Sāṃkhya thought. The recognition of an innate teleology in prakṛti does not contradict the simultaneous admission of the autonomous evolution of the tattvas.

At any rate, according to Patañjali avidyā is merely a cognitive distortion potent from the very moment self-consciousness occurs. In his own words: "Nescience is the [false] perception of the permanent in the impermanent, of the pure in the impure, of joyfulness in the sorrowful, of the Self in the non-self" (anītya-aśuci-duḥkha-anātmāsu nītya-śuci-sukha-ātma-khyātir-avidyā, II.5). Coterminous with this fundamental error is the establishment of a false identity: "'I-am-ness' is the seeming 'one-self-ness' [or identity] of the power of seeing [i.e. the Self] and that of vision [i.e. the mind]" (dr̥g-darśana-śaktyor-eka-ātmata-iva-asmitā, II.6). This mal-identification gives rise to emotive reactions of which Patañjali distinguishes two basic types, viz. attachment and aversion. "Attachment is that which dwells on pleasure" (sukha-anuśāyī rāgaḥ, II.7) and "Aversion is that which dwells on sorrow" (duḥkha-anuśāyī dveṣaḥ, II.8). The remaining constituent of this psychological web is the powerful thirst for life, eros, the survival instinct about which the Yoga-Sūtra states: "The will-to-live, flowing on by its own nature, is rooted even in the sage" (sva-rasa-vāhī viduso'pi tathā rūdho'bhiniveśaḥ, II.9).

The kleśas provide the dynamic framework of the phenomenal mind-complex. They urge the organism to burst into activity, to feel, to think. As the basic emotional and motivational forces they lie at the root of all misery, for Yoga favours the simple equation anātman = duḥkha, that is to say, as long as man lives out of a false identity

in ignorance of his essential nature (which is the Self, puruṣa) he remains subject to sorrow and suffering. Thus the normal human situation can be characterised as the product of a cognitive error, a positive misconception of reality, for which there is but one remedy: the recovery of the Self as the true identity of man.

These kleśas are thought to have four modes of appearance (see II.4). They may be latent (prasupta, lit. 'asleep'), attenuated (tanu, lit. 'thin'), temporarily suppressed (vicchinna, lit. 'cut off') or fully active (udāra, lit. 'coming up'). It is the objective of kriyā-yoga to effect their attenuation (tanūkarana) which amounts to the cultivation of ecstasy (samādhi-bhāvanā) (see II.2). No direct attack on the kleśas is possible, for every mental activity without exception merely increases the concatenations in the depth-mind. 'Attenuation' is achieved by refusing these forces an outlet in the form of consciousness processes. Their power is partly checked by sensory withdrawal and the accompanying stilling of the mind. In other words, the yogin plays the subliminal structures off against each other. By disallowing them to take effect in the conscious mind, he indirectly achieves that they annihilate each other. The underlying process is comparable to that of a mill-stone which grinds itself away for lack of grain. When even the last samskāra is exterminated the kleśas can be said to be fully destroyed as well.

This intriguing doctrine, "which is really the foundation of the system of Yoga outlined by Patañjali"⁸⁹, is contained in nuce in the two terms kliṣṭa and akliṣṭa. Quite correctly, Vyāsa (I.5) explains

89 I.K. TAIMNI (1965², 130)

kliṣṭa as 'caused by the kleśas' (kleśa-hetuka), but this makes little sense in view of the fact that akliṣṭa would consequently have to be understood as 'not caused by the kleśas' which is absurd since all mental activity is ex hypothesi engendered by the kleśas. Hence Vijnāna Bhikṣu, in his monumental Yoga-Vārttika (I.5), proposes a different interpretation of akliṣṭa paraphrasing it with 'resulting in akleśa' (akleśa-phalika). But what is the nature of this akleśa? The answer to this question is supplied in the Maṇiprabhā (I.5) by Rāmananda where we find the equations kliṣṭa = bandha-phala (i.e. having bondage as its result) and akliṣṭa = mukti-phala (i.e. having liberation as its result). In other words, akliṣṭa are those mental events which facilitate the yogic process of the self-destruction of the kleśas, whereas kliṣṭa describes all other mental activity which merely helps to maintain the potency of the kleśas. Thus akleśa designates that condition in which the power of the kleśas on the mind is partially or completely checked.

4. Saṃskāra, vāsanā, āśaya

Hidden behind the obverse mental processes lies a vast inexhaustible pool of stimuli, the so-called subliminal activators or saṃskāras, which power the machinery of consciousness. These are organised into configurations, known as vāsanās or subliminal traits, which partly manifest in the idiosyncracies of the individual. This large storehouse of dispositional factors is the dynamic aspect of the deep structure of human personality. The saṃskāras are formed continuously as a result

of the individual's world experience. In other words, every thought, feeling and impulse to action must be regarded as an actualisation of the tremendous tension inherent in the subliminal pool. On the other hand, overt mental activity in turn replenishes the subliminal deposit — in this manner perpetuating the vicious circle of phenomenal existence (samsāra).

The pool of subliminal activators is conceived as pre-individual. This means that although world experience (bhoga) somehow reinforces the samskāra grids, it does not originate them. The newly born individual is by no means a tabula rasa. Rather his very birth is the product of the irresistible pull of the subliminal traces. This conception in a way foreshadows the modern notion of the unconscious. However, it is far more simplistic and, furthermore, has been evolved in response to different kinds of questions, namely to explain certain occurrences during the process of radical introversion and especially during the terminal states of samādhi. Unfortunately, Patañjali does not develop this theory in detail but, as with so many other topics, presumes that the reader is acquainted with it. Nonetheless, it is clear from the scanty references in his work that this conception belongs to the core of his system of thought, though of course he cannot be hailed as the genius behind its invention or formulation.

Having sketched the general idea behind this intriguing theory, I will next look more closely at its constituent working parts. To begin with the term samskāra, this much used Sanskrit word has a wide spectrum of meanings. Composed of the prefix sam-s and the root √kr

'to do', its most general sense is 'preparation', but in addition also conveys the idea of 'embellishment, training, ritual action' etc. In yogic contexts, it is habitually translated with 'impression' (J.H. WOODS, G. JHA, S. DASGUPTA). R. PRASĀDA (1912) opts for 'habituation' which perhaps would be more appropriate in describing the concept of vāsanā. I prefer to render samskāra as 'subliminal-activator' thus stressing its dynamic nature. It is far from being a mere imprint as is suggested by the common translation with 'impression'. This active aspect of the samskāras is apparent especially from III.9 where two varieties of samskāra are distinguished, viz. those which lead to the externalisation (vyutthāna) of consciousness and those which induce 'restriction' (nirodha). Similarly, in I.50 the type of inverted samskāra is mentioned, which appears in the highest form of samādhi and which swallows up or rather obstructs all other samskāras.

Then, again, the fact that the samskāras are vestiges of previous mental activity can be inferred from III.18 which states that by means of the immediate apperception (sāksātkāra) of the samskāras the yogin can acquire knowledge of his former embodiments. Samskāra is thus an active residuum of experience. This concept is beautifully captured in the notion of bīja or 'seed' as used in I.51 and III.50.

Patañjali's concept of samskāra is ostensibly a mirror-image of the ancient buddhist notion of saṅkhāra signifying the conative factors in the paṭicca-samupatta or, more precisely, its second nidāna. In a way the five kleśas of Classical Yoga are comparable to the twelve-fold nidāna nexus or at any rate are equivalent to part of this schema. However, no direct borrowing from Buddhism need be involved

here. Speculations about avidyā, duḥkha and punar-janman are pan-Indian property.

The next term to be considered is vāsanā. Although often used by the exegetists and the modern interpreters as a synonym of samskāra, vāsanā really stands for a different concept. Vāsanā, which is a derivative of the root √vas 'to dwell, abide, remain', is mentioned only twice in the Yoga-Sūtra (viz. IV.8, 24) and in both instances in the plural. It has variously been translated with 'subconscious impression' (J.H. WOODS), 'impression' (G. JHA) or 'residual potency' (R. PRASĀDA). J.W. HAUER (1958) renders it as 'Einwohnung' and correctly delineates it in his translation from the concept of samskāra; however, in a footnote (p. 469, fn. 7) contradicts himself by making the unwise remark that vāsanā, samskāra and karma-āśaya can be regarded as synonyms. He fails to realise that Patañjali would hardly have introduced three different terms to express one and the same idea.

According to aphorism IV.8 the origination of the vāsanās is to be linked up with the fruition (vipāka) of man's activity. Whilst the activity of the adept yogin is thought to be (see IV.7) neither 'white' nor 'black', that of the ordinary mortal is threefold. This somewhat recondite aphorism is explained by the doctrine of moral retribution as it has been current in India ever since the early Upaniṣads in which it was announced first. What Patañjali appears to be saying is this: Ordinarily every action's fruition can be classified as either 'black' (kṛṣṇa), i.e. 'non-meritorious' (apunya, see I.33; II.14), or 'white' (śukla), i.e. 'meritorious' (punya), or, I presume, as mixed. In contradistinction the yogin, his mental complex being fully inclined towards total dissolution (pratiprasava), does not

generate any action which could be thus typified. By vipāka or fructification is not meant the 'outcome' of an act on the empirical plane, but its 'moral consequence' which is expressed in terms of the production of corresponding vāsanā configurations. These vāsanās, in their turn, act as the propelling force for the creation of a new individual organism after the death of the present subject. They must be considered as aspatial/atemporal constellations 'located' in the deep structure of the cosmos. The question as to how these subliminal configurations can bridge the gap between two existences is explained in a rather difficult sūtra (IV.9) which reads:
jāti-deśa-kāla-vyavahitānām-apy-ānantaryam smṛti-saṃskārayor
eka-rūpatvāt. J.H. WOODS (1966³) translates this as follows:

"There is an uninterrupted [causal] relation [of sub-conscious-impressions], although remote in species and point-of-space and moment-of-time, by reason of the correspondence between memory and subliminal-impressions."

In accordance with Vyāsa's scholium, J.H. WOODS links up ānantarya or 'uninterrupted (causal) relation' with the word saṃskāra, yet this lacks in clarity. Ānantarya, it seems, refers to the causal dependence between the original input into the vāsanā pool and the resultant re-translation of the vāsanā code into a specific spatio-temporal existence. This homogeneity between cause and effect is guaranteed by the 'uniformity' (eka-rūpatva) between the subliminal-activators (saṃskāra) and the depth-memory (smṛti). Hence I would rephrase the above translation as follows: "Although [the resultant spatio-temporal existence] is remote [in terms of] category, place and

time, [there is nonetheless] a causal-relation [between the original subliminal input and the resultant existence] because of the uniformity between the subliminal-activators and the depth-memory." I have rendered the word smṛti as 'depth-memory' to indicate that what is meant here is not really the ordinary 'memory' but the vāsanā concatenations peculiar to a particular individual. Furthermore, I propose that this is identical with asmitā-mātra which is said to be (see IV.5) the root of the individual mind-complexes or cittas. I suggest that smṛti in I.43 has the very same meaning, since it cannot stand for the ordinary memory — considered to be one of the five categories of vṛtti — which is eliminated in the process of meditative absorption. The above contention is not as fanciful as it may seem prima facie, if one recalls that Yoga postulates a 'subtle' (sūkṣma) counterpart to the overt reality as we know it.

In this connection, IV.10 must be taken into account which describes the vāsanās as 'beginningless' (anāditva) in view of the perpetuity of the primal-will (āśis). How could the ordinary memory be said to store the entire matrix of vāsanās shared by all beings? In passing I wish to draw attention to the word āśis, usually translated with 'desire', Patañjali employs this rare term to express the primordial drive inherent in prakṛti which, by means of the vāsanā patterns, leads to ever new phenomenalisations. Possibly the concept of abhiniveśa (see II.9) is identical with this notion; it can be regarded as a manifestation of āśis in the life of a particular entity.

In order to denote the total stock of samskāras which have been called into existence by the volitional activity in either the present incarnation or in past existences and which are the determinative factors of future embodiments, Patañjali introduces the concept of āśaya. The literal meaning of this word, mentioned only in I.24, is 'deposit' (from ā + śī 'to lie, rest').

G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 50, fn. 100) translates the compound karma-āśaya with 'moral-value-deposit' explaining it as "the sum-total of merits and demerits". The idea behind the theory of karma or, more accurately, karma-vipāka ('fructification of action') is this: No action, or volition, is value neutral. Every action has a value in terms of an objective framework of reference. In other words, the cosmic order is a moral one, and the physical law of causality is extended, mutatis mutandis, to the realm of ethical behaviour.

Driven by the kleśas the 'deposit' bears fruit, viz. birth, life and world-experience. Depending on the nature of the vāsanās or samskāra chains, which may be due to meritorious or demeritorious volitional activity, the world experience (bhoga) is characterised by either delight (hlāda) or distress (paritāpa) (see II.14). There is no doubt in Patañjali's mind that even though there may be moments of happiness and even euphoria in life, all joy is deceptive because it is intrinsically transient, and sorrow (duḥkha) is woven into the very fabric of phenomenal existence. In his own words (II.15): pariṇāma-tāpa-samskāra-duḥkhair-guṇa-vṛtti-virodhāc-ca duḥkham-eva sarvaṃ vivekinaḥ, or: "Because of the sorrow in the [continual] transformation [of the world-ground], [in] the anguish [and in] the

subliminal-activators and on account of the conflict between the movements of the gunas — to the discerning [yogin] all is but sorrow". Hence it is sorrow which is to be overcome (see II.16). The means by which duḥkha can be surmounted is the disconnection of the 'correlation' (samyoga) between the 'seer' and the 'seen', that is the realisation of the innate Self as being apart from all accidental or epiphenomenal events of the mind-complex. This brings us back to the yogic process itself.

5. Nirodha

Yoga utilises a great variety of implements to disrupt the continuum of phenomenal existence, to break the incessant revolution of prakṛti which holds no promise of stability or security. At the bottom of all these means lies an identical process, known as nirodha or 'restriction'. There is a good deal of misunderstanding about this term which has led astray already the classical exegetists. It is crucial for a fair comprehension of the yogic path to clarify this important concept. The source of this confusion is the fact that nirodha designates both the process of restriction and the state of restrictedness — a distinction which Vyāsa et al. have blatantly ignored.

The word is derived from ni + √rudh 'to restrain' and is mentioned in I.2, 12, 51 and III.9. In contrast to Vyāsa's conjectures, accepted tout court by his successors, the important sūtra I.2 (yogaś-citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ) does not use nirodha in the sense of 'restrictedness'. Vācaspati Miśra's contention that

"Yoga is that particular state of the mind-complex in which the fluctuations [such as] pramāna and so forth are restricted"⁹⁰ is definitely erroneous. Nor can this aphorism be interpreted as implying that "[the goal of] Yoga is the restrictedness of the fluctuations of the mind-complex", since the ultimate destination of the yogin is not the inhibition of the five modes of mental activity of the externalised consciousness but kaivalya. Rather it must be concluded that I.2 gives out a preliminary definition of Yoga as the process of restriction, commencing with the inhibition of the vṛttis.

This need not necessarily conflict with I.3 where the initial word tadā ('then') does not have to imply "immediately upon the restriction of the vṛttis". Also, the phrase draṣṭu sva-rūpe'vasthanam may not refer to kaivalya at all but simply to the Self as it appears in relative purity in samādhi: The stillness of the mind-complex permits a centralised experiencing in which, although the level of the transcendental Self has not yet been reached, the puruṣa's presence is keenly felt as the stable centre within the enstatic process.

As is borne out by a candid examination of the relevant parts of the Yoga-Sūtra, the process of restriction is not confined to the pentad of fluctuations but it is a multi-level happening which coincides with the yogic process of unification per se. This, incidentally, sheds new light also on the concept of abhyāsa or 'practice'. In point of fact, restriction comprises three distinct levels of application:

90 nirudhyante yasmin-pramāna-ādi-vṛttayo'vasthā-viśeṣe cittasya so' vasthā-viśeṣo yogah (Tattva-Vaiśaradī, I.2)

- (1) restriction of the fluctuations (vr̥tti-nirodha)
- (2) restriction of the presented-ideas (pratyaya-nirodha)
- (3) restriction of the subliminal-activators (samskāra-nirodha).

Nirodha sets in as soon as the yogin withdraws his senses from the external world by means of the technique of pratyāhāra conducive to one-pointed concentration. In III.9 it is stated that with the disappearance of the vyutthāna-samskāras, the nirodha-samskāras emerge. This means that during the normal waking or centrifugal condition of consciousness those subliminal-activators are effective which lead to wakefulness (vyutthāna), whilst the withdrawal of the senses involves such subliminal-activators as will countercheck the externalising tendency of the mind. Vr̥tti-nirodha means the partial as well as the complete (sarva) restriction of the five types of mental fluctuation, thus covering every phase of sense-withdrawal, concentration and meditative absorption. It is an on-going process with increasingly greater degrees of restrictedness.

Pramāna and viparyaya, both of which are dependent on an objective substratum, are the first to be eliminated in the internalisation procedure. There is no more contact with the external environment once meditative absorption (dhyāna) is established. Vikalpa or 'predicate-relation', as J.H. WOODS (1966³) translates this term, is also soon restricted. Far more difficult is the elimination of sleep (nidrā). It is a common experience that during the first attempts of meditative absorption, the mind instead of reaching the restricted (niruddha) state often lapses into sleep. The untrained

mind is unable to sustain the intense concentration required for more than brief spells only and quickly succumbs to exhaustion. However, the greatest hindrance of all is the powerful human memory which constantly populates the consciousness space with thoughts, images and moods. Its complete control can only be achieved after extensive practice of dhyāna. 'Memory' (smṛti) refers here to the actual process of remembering and not, as in I.43, to the depth-memory, though both are of course intimately related. In passing it may be pointed out that Patañjali's enumeration of the vṛttis is far from being arbitrary. His arrangement is according to the vṛttis' relation with the external environment, pramāṇa being as it were the outermost and smṛti the innermost of the diverse mental activities.


Since the stoppage of the fluctuations is clearly stated to be effected in dhyāna (see II.11), nirodha cannot possibly be identified with samādhi, and the classical commentators are definitely at fault on this important point. The essential happening in the enstatic states of consciousness can be described as the gradual restriction of the pratyayas. As will be shown, these must not be confused with the vṛttis. On a still deeper level of restriction, the very propensities to form pratyayas or vṛttis, as the case may be, are brought under control. This is samskāra-nirodha which, when completed successfully, is known as sarva-nirodha or total restrictedness and is commensurate with the final breakthrough to kaivalya. I will discuss this phase in conjunction with samādhi.

6. Pratyaya

The word pratyaya (from prati + √i 'to go') occurs no less than ten times in the Yoga-Sūtra (see I.10, 18, 19; II.20; III.2, 12, 17, 19, 35 and IV.27), and it is an important technical expression. This fact has not been recognised by the exegetists who employ pratyaya occasionally in the sense of 'cause' and then again as descriptive of some mental content. Neither the Yoga-Bhāṣya nor the Tattva-Vaiśaradī provides a definition of this term in its second meaning of 'idea, notion'. When we turn to Bhoja, slightly more information about the meaning of this concept can be obtained. He describes, in his Rāja-Mārtanda, pratyaya as knowledge (jñāna) (see III.2) and elsewhere (II.20) as "knowledge tinged by the object" (viśaya-uparaktāni jñānāni). He thus understands it as knowledge or awareness of something. This appears to be the meaning of the term throughout the Yoga-Sūtra. Even I.19 can convincingly be interpreted in this way. It is very unlikely that Patañjali should have used the word in more than one sense, and I consider it as belonging to the technical vocabulary of Classical Yoga, together with such termini as vṛtti, citta or nirodha etc.

In the commentaries pratyaya and vṛtti are frequently used synonymously, but this usage is incorrect if it is intended to reflect Patañjali's viewpoint. For, the presence of a pratyaya does not necessarily imply the simultaneous occurrence of a vṛtti. This is evident from the fact that there appear in samādhi various types of awareness units, e.g. vitarka, vicāra etc., which cannot be designated as vṛtti but which pertain to the pratyaya category.

It appears that the term pratyaya is specifically applied to the phenomenon of awareness as it presents itself in a consciousness that rests on an object of some kind. The analogue of vṛtti in the enstatic consciousness is not pratyaya but prajñā or gnostic knowing in which the object is apprehended directly and from within itself as it were. On the basis of these considerations I suggest the following taxonomy:



The term prajñā for the cognitive elements present in samādhi is inferred from its usage in such aphorisms as II.27 which speaks of a sevenfold gnosis, and III.5 which has the phrase prajñā-āloka and, above all, from the term samprajñāta describing all modalities of samādhi which have an objective 'prop' (ālambana). However, there is one single exception to this rule: In I.49 prajñā has the meaning of 'knowledge' usually designated by the Sanskrit word jñāna. This deviation can be explained from the context from which it is apparent that the author, for the sake of convenience, retained the word prajñā as used in the immediately preceding sūtra; maybe even a pun is intended which a modern writer would have expressed by means of inverted commas.

A. JANÁČEK (1957) attempts to show that pratyaya corresponds with the Pavlovian concept of 'impulse', but already J.W. HAUER (1958, 464 fn. 6) cast serious doubt on this interpretation, though he concedes that in the fourth pāda (which he regards as a later

appendix) the term pratyaya may possibly have the meaning suggested by A. JANÁČEK. As concerns the first three pādas, J.W. HAUER's translation wavers between 'awareness' and 'cause' as fit renderings of pratyaya. However, it is quite unnecessary to assume this double connotation, as all the relevant sūtras can satisfactorily be understood when one gives pratyaya the single meaning of a specific noetic factor. Unlike prajñā and vyrtti which are classified by their functional characteristics, pratyaya is more a relational concept in which the content of consciousness is defined in its relation to the transcendental Self as the permanent apperceiver of all ideation. Hence the most congenial translation of this term is the one proposed by J.H. WOODS (1966³), namely 'presented-idea'. This is accepted, for instance, by G.M. KOELMAN (1970) who is one of the few scholars to make an attempt at developing a critical vocabulary for expressing yogic concepts in English. Still, he fails to recognise the leading significance of this concept in the psychology of Classical Yoga and consequently also does not realise that 'presented-idea' is the constant meaning of the term pratyaya in Patañjali's work. The reason for this shortcoming is his extreme reliance on the commentaries.

To quote but one instance, what does it mean when G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 185) translates aphorism I.10 with "Sleep is a fluctuation supported by the coming to the fore of the absence [of the waking and dreaming states]"? It seems to me that the compound abhāva-pratyaya is far more intelligibly rendered as "the presented-idea of the non-occurrence [of conscious contents]". Since nidrā is a vyrtti it must

be based on a pratyaya of some kind; hence abhāva-pratyaya cannot really mean "the absence of pratyayas". This is fully recognised by K. BHATTACHARYYA (1956, I, 256) who writes: "Presentation of a content that is known as real is pramāṇa, of a content that is known as unreal is viparyaya and of a content that appears real even when it is known as unreal is vikalpa; while presentation of a content as presented — i.e. presentation of presentation is smṛti and presentation of the absence of presentation is nidrā." In this way nidrā is adequately demarcated from nirodha in which all vṛttis are restricted. This is in conformity with Vyāsa's exposition of 'sleep'. He attempts to demonstrate that there is mental activity of some kind even in deep sleep by pointing out that when a person awakes he usually 'recollects' that he has slept well or badly.

Likewise, the phrase bhava-pratyaya in I.19 need not be taken to signify "caused by worldly means" as is the contention of the exegetists (see also J.H. WOODS, 1966³). Rather it must be explained in conjunction with I.18. These two aphorisms read as follows: virāma-pratyaya-abhyāsa-pūrvah saṃskāra-śeṣo'nyah — bhava-pratyayo videha-prakṛti-layānām. I.18 undoubtedly defines asamprajñāta-samādhi, and virāma-pratyaya must be translated with "presented-idea of cessation" and is not to be confounded with abhāva-pratyaya. The "previous practice" (abhyāsa-pūrvā) refers to samprajñāta-samādhi in which pratyaya-nirodha is gradually effected. On the other hand, the compound bhava-pratyaya obviously signifies "presented-idea of becoming" which describes the contents of consciousness of those who have failed to transcend the realm of prakṛti and have lost sight of the goal of kaivalya.

CHAPTER SEVEN
PRACTICE CONCEPTS

1. Abhyāsa, vairāgya

The yogic path as formulated by Patañjali appears as a bi-polar process of gradual internalisation. All techniques are formally subsumed under the two categories of abhyāsa and vairāgya respectively. The former may be circumscribed as the actualisation of the One and the latter as the elimination of the Many. In L.A. SINGH's (1970, I, 108) words: "In modern terminology, abhyāsa may be conceived as the process of canalisation and re-conditioning; while vairāgya may be seen as a process of de-conditioning. By breaking the associations between motives and goals, of lower levels of psychological development by a process of de-conditioning and then forming new associations between motives and higher goals through a process of re-conditioning one gradually rises from lower to higher levels of affecto-motivational development."

Abhyāsa and vairāgya are thus the two poles of any form of Yoga and, indeed, of any spiritual discipline whatsoever. This point is seldom understood. Vyāsa illustrates the functional interdependence of both poles in a striking simile: citta-nadī nāma-ubhayato vāhinī vahati kalyāṇāya vahati pāpāya ca, yā tu kaivalya-prāgbhārā viveka-
viṣaya-nimnā sā kalyāṇa-vahā, saṃsāra-prāgbhārā'viveka-
viṣaya-nimnā pāpa-vahā, tatra vairāgyena viṣaya-srotah khilī-kriyate viveka-
darśana-abhyāseṇa viveka-srota udghāṭhyata ity-ubhaya-adhīnaś-citta-

vṛtti-nirodhah (I.12), "The stream of consciousness flows in both [directions]. It flows to the good, and it flows to the bad. The one commencing with discernment (viveka) and terminating in kaivalya flows to the good. The one commencing with non-discernment (aviveka) and terminating in conditioned-existence (samsāra) flows to the bad. Through dispassion (vairāgya) the flowing out to the sense-objects is checked, and through the practice (abhyāsa) of the vision of discernment the stream of discernment is laid bare. Thus the restriction of the fluctuations of consciousness is dependent upon both abhyāsa and vairāgya !".

This bi-polar model of the yogic path was first formulated in the Bhagavad-Gītā which, in fact, employs the very same terms used by Patañjali to designate the two poles, namely abhyāsa and vairāgya, and it is as good as certain that he was fully conversant with this old Yoga scripture. The stanza in question is VI.35 which reads: asamśayam mahā-bāho mano durnigraham calam, abhyāsena tu kaunteya vairāgyena ca gṛhyate, "The mind, o strong-armed [Arjuna], is undoubtedly unsteady and difficult to control. Yet through practice and dispassion, o son-of-Kuntī, it can be seized". This dyadic analysis of the yogic path has survived into the post-classical period of Yoga, as is evident from the encyclopedic Yoga-Vāsistha, and it can even be met with in the Sāṃkhya-Sūtra (III.36) and certain Vedānta texts such as Śaṅkara's Viveka-Cūḍāmaṇi (374).

Abhyāsa (from abhi + √ās 'to abide, engage in') does not occur in the earlier strata of hindu literature where it is replaced by the term śrama or 'exertion'. Its first mention is in the Bhagavad-Gītā (see VI.35, 44; VIII.8; XII.9, 10, 12; XVIII.36) and the Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad (I.14), and it is also widely employed in the epic. In its

non-philosophical usage the word abhyāsa has the meaning of 'repetition, habit', and some of this connotation is carried over into Patañjali's concept of 'practice' as is clear from the aphorisms I.13 and I.14:

tatra sthitau yatno'bhyaśah - sa tu dīrgha-kāla-nairantarya-satkāra-

āsevito dr̥dha-bhūmiḥ, "Practice is the [repeated] effort to stabilise [the mind-complex]. However, this [practice] [gains] firm ground [only when it] is cultivated for a long time, uninterruptedly [and with full] attention". Nonetheless, S. DASGUPTA's (1930, 331) rendering of abhyāsa as 'habit' is incorrect, and he in fact elsewhere (p. 61)

translates it quite appropriately with 'practice'. To sum up: "'Practice' stands for the concentrated inner application to the realisation of the transcendental Being which constitutes the essence of all yogic operations. It consists in the careful discrimination between the real and wholesome on the one hand and the transient and all that is unworthy of human motivation on the other. It is the inwardness and unification resulting from this enlightened discernment."⁹¹

It may be noted here that in I.32 (eka-tattva-abhyāsa) and in I.18 (virāma-pratyaya-abhyāsa), the word abhyāsa does not appear to be intended in the above formal sense but probably corresponds with the notion of 'exercise' as a specific instance of 'practice' per se.

Like its positive correlative the negative pole, vairāgya, pertains to the post-vedic vocabulary. It does not seem to have been in use prior to the Bhagavad-Gītā. Patañjali defines this second constituent of the path as follows: dr̥ṣṭa-anuśravika-viśaya-vitr̥ṣṇasya vaśīkāra-samjñā

91 G.A.FEUERSTEIN (1974, 35)

vairāgyam, "Dispassion is the consciousness of mastery of [the yogin who is] without thirst for seen and revealed objects". Dr̥ṣṭa denotes the things visible, that is, the ordinary objects of our pleasure seeking mind, whereas anuśravika (from anu + śru 'to hear') refers to objects revealed by the sacred tradition, such as the promised joys of heaven which are empirically non-verifiable. Dispassion, as understood by Patañjali, is not so much a specific act of non-attachment as a state of mind; it is the "consciousness of mastery" accruing from the persistent struggle to disengage the mind from everything that is inimical to its internalisation.

Patañjali knows of two orders of completeness of dispassion. tat-param puruṣa-khyāter-guṇa-vaitr̥ṣṇyam, "The superior [form of] this [dispassion] is the non-thirsting for the guṇas [which results] from the vision of the Self". The orbit of the lower degree of vairāgya embraces every prakṛtic entity or function except the triple primary forces or guṇas into which all manifest and immaterial objects ultimately resolve. But even from these the yogin must dissociate himself by realising the higher degree of dispassion which discloses the Self to his enstatic view. This implies the resolution of the entire cognitive apparatus and in the last analysis the complete delation of the individual cosmos.

It may be conjectured that the differentiation into two degrees of consummation as regards dispassion may have its parallel in abhyāsa. Tentative evidence for this assumption is found in I.18 where the practice of samprajñāta-samādhi is styled as "the other" (pūrva) abhyāsa, in contrast to asamprajñāta-samādhi whose essential feature is pratyaya-nirodha. Granted that this is tenable, the following

correlation is possible:

ordinary <u>vairāgya</u>	in combination bring about	}	<u>vṛtti-nirodha</u>
ordinary <u>abhyāsa</u>			↓ <u>pratyaya-nirodha</u>
higher <u>vairāgya</u>	in combination bring about	}	<u>samskāra-nirodha</u>
higher <u>abhyāsa</u>			↓ <u>sarva-nirodha</u>

2. Pratyāhāra, dhāraṇā, dhyāna

The restriction of the five modes of vṛtti or mental activity, as the first stage of a protracted process ending in the total abolition of consciousness, is effected by means of the combined practice of sense-withdrawal (pratyāhāra), concentration (dhāraṇā) and meditative-absorption (dhyāna). As these form three phases of a continuum as it were, I propose to treat them together. Patañjali himself prefers a different arrangement insofar as he combines dhāraṇā, dhyāna and samādhi denoting their collective practice by the concept of saṁyama. The reason for his exclusion of pratyāhāra would appear to be simply that this is not a purely mental exercise.

Pratyāhāra (from prati + ā + √hr̥ 'to hold') is defined in II.54 as "the imitation as it were of the own-form of the mind-complex by the senses disuniting [themselves from] their [respective] objects" (sva-visaya-asamprayoge cittasya sva-rūpa-anukāra-iva-indriyaṇām pratyāhārah). This fundamental process has been described in many

Yoga texts, and the favourite metaphor is that of a tortoise withdrawing its limbs. There is little ambiguity about this technique, and it can be perfectly understood on the basis of the psychology of attention. There is a certain degree of sensory inhibition in every kind of mental concentration. As the focus of attention narrows to a strictly confined locus, awareness of the surroundings is gradually lost. In Yoga, of course, complete cessation of all sensory activity is aimed at. This non-deployment of the senses is to be understood as a positive effort not to engage in sensory perceptions, as a deliberate attempt to disregard sensory stimuli. Initially arousal is still possible provided that the stimulus is sufficiently strong (e.g. a loud noise, a push etc.), but as the exercise proceeds control of the afferent functions becomes increasingly more perfect, until total sensory anaesthesia is achieved. This is what is meant by the expression paramā-vaśyatā or 'supreme obedience' of the senses (see II.55).

Incidentally, this 'generalised inhibition' is prepared and facilitated by the muscular control effected through the practice of posture or āsana and of respiratory stoppage or prāṇāyāma. Here modern neurophysiology confirms the experiential wisdom of Patañjali and his predecessors (see T.R. KULKARNI, 1972, 99ff.).

G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 175-76), who singles out four levels of yogic interiorisation, remarks on the practice of pratyāhāra that "it is difficult to situate" in the arrangement proposed by him. "Though it is in a sense somatic, inasmuch as physiologically the senses no longer react to external stimuli, and is also ethical in character to the extent that it is aimed at and brought about by

the heroic practice of universal detachment, yet we think it is already the threshold of the psychological level. 'Withdrawal of the senses' forms the bridge and is the cumulative result of the previous practices, and opens the door to one-pointed concentration." The four levels distinguished by G.M. KOELMAN are

- (1) the somatic level which has as its goal the pacification of the body;
- (2) the ethical level intended for the purification and stabilisation of the mind;
- (3) the psychological level entailing a frontal attack on the empirical mind which is to be transcended;
- (4) the metaphysical level which is identical with kaivalya or emancipation, that is, the transcendental realisation of the Self.

This is a useful model which in a way complements Patañjali's distinction between the 'external members' (bahir-aṅga) and 'internal members' (antar-aṅga) of the eightfold path (see III.7).

Perseverant practice of sense-withdrawal induces concentration or dhāraṇā, characterised by Patañjali as follows: deśa-bandhaś-cittasya dhāraṇā (III.1) or "Concentration is the binding of the mind-complex to [a single] locus". This technique consists in a focusing of attention, a mental zeroing-in on one topic to the exclusion of all others. It is also referred to in I.32 as "the practice of a single principle" (eka-tattva-abhyāsa). T.R. KULKARNI (1972, 118) aptly

describes the underlying process as "a general 'shrinking' of the mind leaving only a smaller portion of concentrated mental activity". He also suggests that the concept of the 'neuronal model' of sensory stimulus, as developed by E.N. SOKOLOV (1963), may possibly be an explanation of this phenomenon in neuro-physiological terms. However, it must be stressed here that however instructive these parallels are one must not succumb to the reductionist fallacy of taking them to be sufficient explanations of what is essentially a psychological happening.

In I.35 the expression "holding the mind in steadiness" (manasaḥ sthiti-nibandhanī) is found which invites comparison with the statement of III.1. Whereas the latter is intended as a formal description of an actual technique, the former aphorism evidently speaks of a result of this concentration, namely nibandhana, the 'steady' condition of the mind being in this case the concomitant phenomenon of a yogic experience known as pravṛtti or extra-ordinary sensory activity.

The centre of attention, or locus of concentration, can be any object whatsoever, as long as it is properly 'interiorised'. Preferred loci are the bodily centres such as the nābhi-cakra (III.29), kanṭha-kūpa (III.30), kūrma-nāḍī (III.31), hrdaya (III.34) and mūrdha-jyotis (III.32). Patañjali, moreover, lists such non-somatic 'topics' as sūrya (III.26), candra (III.27), dhruva (III.28) etc., and purely conceptual items like maitrī (III.23), bala (III.24) etc. In addition there is the recitation (japa) of the syllable om signifying īśvara (see I.27-28) which is an exercise of no mean significance in Classical

Yoga. Anything at all can serve as a 'prop' for concentration provided it is found fit (see I.39) to narrow consciousness to a spot sustaining it in this reduced state over a sufficient period of time. An object of some kind seems to be called for in order to avert the ever-present danger of a plain relapse into unconsciousness. The reduction of consciousness to a specific pre-selected point forestalls its premature collapse. In the light of these considerations one may hypothesise that where there is no definite objective support in meditation, the 'interiorised' body as a whole assumes this essential role.

Concentration is the persistent effort to arrest the natural inclination of the mind to engage in desultory activity thereby exteriorising itself. Patañjali mentions a series of 'obstacles' (antarāya) which impede the cultivation of 'inward-mindedness' or pratyak-cetanā. These impediments are sickness, languor, doubt, heedlessness, sloth, dissipation, false vision, the non-attainment of the stages of Yoga and instability in these stages. They are also known as the 'dispersions' (vikṣepa) and are said to be accompanied by certain physiological conditions, viz. pain, dejection, tremor of the limbs, faulty inhalation and exhalation (see I.33-34). Only by resolute application to single-mindedness can these obstacles and their negative side-effects be overcome (see I.32).

Patañjali mentions two synonyms of dhāraṇā, viz. ekāgratā (III.11-12) and ekāgrya, both meaning 'one-pointedness' (eka 'one' + āgra 'point'). M. ELIADE (1973³, 70) speculates that ekāgratā and dhāraṇā differ from each other insofar as the latter is a mental fixation for the purpose of comprehension which is absent in ekāgratā.

I see no evidence for this hypothesis in the Yoga-Sūtra itself, though M. ELIADE's suggestion is not without interest. As a formal constituent of the eightfold path, dhāraṇā is essentially a technique which can be said to have as its characteristic feature the one-pointedness of the mind.

We now come to meditative-absorption or dhyāna which, by way of contrast, is defined in III.2 as "the one-flowness of the presented-ideas"; this is a literal rendering of the Sanskrit compound pratyaya-ekatānatā. Implicit in this technical expression is the fact that dhyāna is so to speak a linear continuation of ekāgratā as achieved by the technique of dhāraṇā. Yet although meditative-absorption devolves from dhāraṇā, it is nevertheless a mental state with its own distinct properties. As T.R. KULKARNI (1972, 119) puts it: "While in dhāraṇā the mind remains bound up, as it were, in a restricted space, its continuation in that bound up state in such a way that the experiential state corresponding to it remains uniformly and homogeneously the same despite variations in the internal or external perceptual situation, constitutes dhyāna (...) In the state of dhyāna, the indeterminateness of perception disappears with the mind remaining unaffected by distracting stimuli."

J.W. HAUER (1958, 322), who is known to have personally experimented with Yoga, offers this insightful description of the nature of meditative-absorption: "[Dhyāna] is a deepened and creative dhāraṇā, in which the inner object is illumined mentally. The strict concentration on one object of consciousness is now supplemented with a searching-pensive contemplation of its actual nature. The object is,

so to speak, placed before the contemplative consciousness in all its aspects and is apperceived as a whole. Its various characteristics are examined till its very essence is understood and becomes transparent (...). This is accompanied by a certain emotive disposition. Although the reasoning faculty functions acutely and clearly, it would be wrong to understand dhyāna merely as a logical-rational process: the contemplator must penetrate his object with all his heart, since he is after all primarily interested in a spiritual experience which is to lead him to ontic participation and the emancipation from all constricting and binding hindrances."

Dhyāna, in other words, adds depth to dhāraṇā. Hence G.M. KOELMAN's (1970) rendering of the term with 'attention' is positively inadequate. Dhyāna is not just a prolonged dhāraṇā. It must be carefully demarcated from concentration by reason of its utmost and continuous clarity of consciousness, the relative voidness of the inner space, the looming large of the single object, the adjustment of all emergent noetic acts to the one object of consciousness, the slow-down of all cognitive and emotive processes and not least because of the underpinning of overwhelming peacefulness.⁹²

3. Samādhi

In dhyāna a restructuring of consciousness takes place the most

92 See C. ALBRECHT (1951)

conspicuous criterion of which is the increasing proximity between the meditating subject and the object filling the consciousness space. This monoideism brings the yogin to a natural threshold where suddenly and unpredictably consciousness undergoes a further radical reconstitution. This is samādhi, the symphysis of subject and object. The word samādhi, composed of sam + ā + √dhā 'to put, place', literally means 'putting together'. This does not always come across in the many renderings suggested for this term, such as 'trance' (M.N. DVIVEDI, R. PRASĀDA), 'meditation' (M. MÜLLER, G. JHA), 'concentration' (S. DASGUPTA, S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.H. WOODS), 'absorption' (H. ZIMMER, G.M. KOELMAN) or 'Versenkung' (E. FRAUWALENER) and 'Einfaltung' (J.W. HAUER). With the possible exception of the last-mentioned term these transcription are either too narrow or too vague to be acceptable. Hence M. ELIADE (1973³) borrows from the Greek language the word 'enstasis' or 'enstasy' which has the advantage of not being loaded with the same kind of unwanted associations that force one to reject the above-mentioned alternatives. For some inexplicable reason this useful coinage has not so far been assimilated into the general technical vocabulary of indologists, and the terminological confusion continues unabatedly. J. GONDA (1960, I, 204) suggests 'identification' as a possible alternative to M. ELIADE's unfashionable coinage. But the word 'enstasy' has the additional advantage of clearly demarcating the phenomenon of samādhi from that of 'ecstasy' with which it is not infrequently confused. Enstasy, as R.C. ZAEHNER (1969, 143) observes, "is the exact reverse of ecstasy which means to get outside oneself and which is often characterized by a breaking

down of the barriers between the individual subject and the universe around him".

Dhyāna is a necessary though not a sufficient condition for samādhi to ensue. This all-important point is apodictic from the fact that no genuine volitional acts are possible in meditative-absorption without instantly disrupting the meticulously built up mental continuum. What M. ELIADE (1973³, 80) says of the higher form of ecstasy, i.e. asamprañāta-samādhi, is in principle also true of any of the lower forms of samādhi: "... it comes without being summoned, without being provoked, without special preparation for it. That is why it can be called a 'raptus'". Samādhi occurs, or rather may occur, when the mind has reached a state of relative equilibrium, that is, when the five types of vṛtti are perfectly restricted (see II.11). The Yoga-Sūtra is quite unequivocal on this, and yet the exegetists have in many ways profoundly upset the conceptual and terminological neatness which makes Patañjali's work such a valuable and appealing document. These distortions are so obtrusive and so symptomatic of the general unreliability of the exegetical literature that I shall for the present purpose abandon my original strategy of ignoring the commentaries altogether. It seems more rewarding to proceed on the basis of a critique of the interpretations or, more precisely, misinterpretations of the classical commentators.

Aphorism III.3 seems an opportune starting-point. Here samādhi is characterised in the following way: tad-eva-artha-mātra-nirbhāsaṃ sva-rūpa-śūnyam-iva samādhiḥ, or: "[When] nothing but the object is shining forth [in] that [meditative-absorption], [and when the mind is] as it were void of [its] own-form, [this is known as] ecstasy".

Vyāsa, to be sure, understands this sūtra quite differently:
dhyanam-eva dhyeya-ākāra-nirbhāsam pratyaya-ātmakena sva-rūpeṇa
śūnyam-iva yadā bhavati dhyeya-śva-bhāva-āveśāt-tadā samādhir-ity-
ucyate, or: "When meditative-absorption shines forth in the form
of the meditated-object (dhyeya), as if void of [its] own-form
and being bodied-forth in presented-ideas, then, on account of
[its] fusing with the own-being of the meditated-object, it is
called ecstasy" (Yoga-Bhāṣya III.3). Vyāsa ostensibly relates
the words nirbhāsa and śva-rūpa-śūnya to meditative-absorption and
not as would seem more logical to the intended object and the
mind respectively. But in what sense can dhyanā be said to shine
forth as the object? And how is one to envisage the loss of its
own-form (śva-rūpa)?

Although Vyāsa's interpretation requires the minimum of
fill-ins inasmuch as he follows tenaciously the overt grammatical
structure of the aphorism in question, this is nevertheless achieved
at the cost of intelligibility. Hence rather than translating
"that [meditative-absorption] shining forth as the object only",
I suggest a reversal, namely "the object only shining forth [in]
that [meditative-absorption]". Similarly, it would seem to be
more cogent to speak of the mind instead of dhyanā as being void
of its own-form, in view of the fact that in the enstatic condition
consciousness, which normally is founded on the dichotomy between
subject and object, is deprived of this characteristic dualism.
Only in a very loose way could the same be said of dhyanā.

G. OBERHAMMER (1965, 104, fn. 11) makes the curious comment that the fourth stage of samprajñāta-samādhi, by which he means asmitā-samādhi, cannot be determined as artha-mātra and sva-rūpa-śūnya since its content is the unity-consciousness of I-am-ness. First of all, as I have shown there is no such stage of ecstasy, and consequently his criticism is unfounded. But even if there were an ecstatic state in which all contents of consciousness except the feeling of 'I am' are fully abrogated, still the very fact of the presence of asmitā would justify one to describe this samādhi as artha-mātra, for to the apperceiving Self (as draṣṭṛ) asmitā certainly represents an intended object or artha.

Furthermore, G. OBERHAMMER's conjecture that samāpatti and samyama pertain to a classification system which is different from that which operates with the concepts of nirodha and samprajñāta/asamprajñāta-samādhi is equally untenable. Samāpatti is defined in I.41 as follows: kṣīṇa-vṛtter-abhijātasya-iva maṇer-grahītr-grahana-grāhyeṣu tat-stha-tad-añjanatā samāpattiḥ, or:

"[In the case of the mind whose] fluctuations have dwindled [and which has become] like a precious [transparent] jewel, [there results], [in regard to] the 'grasper', the 'grasping' and the 'grasped', [a state of] coincidence with that on which [the mind] abides and by which [the mind] is 'anointed'". This sūtra describes the basic mechanism of any form of ecstasy other than asamprajñāta-samādhi. Again, I would content that samāpatti is descriptive of the underlying process of ecstasy whereas samādhi is a formal category denoting a technique. In other words, the relation between these two terms is analogous to the relation between ekāgratā and dhāraṇā and between


ekatānatā and dhyāna.

There are four types of samāpatti or 'coincidence': tatra śabda-artha-jñāna-vikalpaiḥ samkīrṇa savitarkā samāpattiḥ, smṛti-pariśuddhau sva-rūpa-śūnya-iva-artha-mātra-nirbhāsa nirvitarkā, etayā-eva savicārā nirvicārā ca sūkṣma-viṣayā vyākhyātā (I.42-44), "[As long as there is] conceptual knowledge [based on] the intent of words in this [samāpatti], [it is called] coincidence interspersed with 'deliberation'. - With the purification of the memory [i.e. the tranquilisation of thinking], [when the mind is] as it were void of [its] own-form [and when] the object only shines forth, [this is known as the coincidence] 'without 'deliberation'. - By these' [two types of samāpatti] [the other two kinds of coincidence], with 'reflection' and without 'reflection' [which have] subtle objects [as their meditative support] are explained".

The cognitive factors present in vitarkā- and vicārā-samāpatti represent a category of mental activity sui generis and must not be confused with the vṛttis. As is incontestably stated in I.41 samāpatti ensues after the vṛttis have dwindled. Vitarka and vicāra are specific to the transmuted consciousness of ecstasy. They belong to the category of prajñā or supra-cognition, i.e. gnostic knowledge. As G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 199) aptly remarks in regard to vitarka-samādhi: "We should not think, however, that a discursive reasoning is going on while one is in the state of 'cogitative coarse intentional identity' (...) Were it so, there would be no state of absorption, no yogic inhibition of mental activity. Such

mental fluctuations are absent, but the immobile intentional identity is in terms of and expressed in rationalizing and conceptualizing signs". This applies mutatis mutandis also to the vicāra type of enstatic realisation.

Whilst vitarka signifies a supra-cognition in relation to a 'coarse' (sthūla) object, that is, anything pertaining to the surface structure of prakṛti (such as one of the somatic centres mentioned by Patañjali or any other micro- or macro-structure of the tangible universe), vicāra denotes a supra-cognition in relation to a 'subtle' (sūkṣma) object which can be any phenomenon ranging from the tanmātras (provided Patañjali recognised these 'potentials') up to the transcendental core of the knowable world, i.e. the undifferentiate (aliṅga). In nirvitarka and nirvicāra-samāpatti the respective supra-cognitions are fully dispersed and what remains is a consciousness which, like a highly polished mirror, reflects the intended object with a modicum of refraction. In I.47 it is implied that nirvicāra-samāpatti is in fact the highest stage of this series which suggests the following hierarchic organisation:



There is no mention of any ānanda-samādhi or asmitā-samādhi in the Yoga-Sūtra which would validate the hypothetical models put

forward by Vyāsa, Vācaspati Miśra and their successors. The Yoga-Bhāṣya (I.17) contains this important passage: vitarkaś-cittasya-ālabane sthūla ābhogaḥ, sūkṣmo vicāraḥ, ānando hlādaḥ eka-ātmikā samvid-asmitā, tatra prathamaś-catustaya-anugataḥ samādhiḥ savitarkaḥ, dvitīyo vitarka-vikalāḥ savicāraḥ, trtīyo vicāra-vikalāḥ sa-ānandaḥ, caturthas-tad-vikalā'smitā-mātra-iti, sarva ete sa-ālabanāḥ samādhayah, or: "'Deliberation' [means] the mind's coarse experience of a [coarse] support; 'reflection' is [the mind's] subtle [experience of a subtle object]; 'joy' [means] gladness; 'I-am-ness' is the feeling [pertaining] to oneself. Of these [four types] the first, having [all] four associated together is the ecstasy with 'deliberation'. The second lacking 'deliberation' is [the ecstasy] with 'reflection'. The third lacking 'reflection' is [the ecstasy] with 'joy'. The fourth lacking that ['joy'] is [the ecstasy] with [the feeling of] 'I-am-ness'. All these are with supports [i.e. intended objects]". Arranged in a systematic fashion this looks as follows:

↑	<u>asmitā-samādhi</u>	=		<u>asmitā</u>
↑	<u>ānanda-samādhi</u>	=		<u>ānanda + asmitā</u>
↑	<u>vicāra-samādhi</u>	=	<u>vicāra + ānanda + asmitā</u>	
↑	<u>vitarka-samādhi</u>	=	<u>vitarka + vicāra + ānanda + asmitā</u>	

This is a beautiful illustration of the sat-kārya axiom according to which the effect is pre-existent in its cause. In this particular case the lowest degree of enstatic realisation contains in posse the supra-cognitive elements typical of the higher forms of ecstasy.

Thus Vyāsa assumes ānanda and asmitā to constitute the contents of separate stages of samādhi. It is unclear how he envisages the correlation between these postulated four types and the four varieties of samāpatti as cited in I.42-44. Does he take ānanda and asmitā-samādhi to be instances of nirvicāra-samāpatti? And what sort of experiences do they stand for? Vācaspati Miśra tries to disentangle these knotty problems.

In his Tattva-Vaiśaradī (I.17) we find this explanation:
ānanda iti indriye sthūla-ālambane cittasya-ābhoga āhlādaḥ, prakāśa-
 śīlāt-tayā khalu sattva-pradhānād-ahaṅkārad-indriyāny-utpannāni,
 sattvaṃ sukham-iti tāny-api sukhāni-iti tasminn-ābhoga āhlāda-iti
 (...) asmitā-prabhavāni-indriyāni, tena-eṣām-asmitā sūkṣmam rūpaṃ,
 sā ca-ātmanā grahītrā saha buddhir-eka-ātmikā samvid-iti, or: "Joy is the mind's gladdening experience [when directed towards] a sense-organ [which is to be understood as a] coarse support. The sense-organs of course arise from the 'I-maker' [insofar as they have] a disposition to enlighten because of the pre-eminence of sattva [in them]. [As] sattva [manifests] pleasure, these [sense-organs] too are pleasurable. Experience is thus gladdening [when directed towards] those [sense-organs] ... The sense-organs are produced from 'I-am-ness', [consequently] this 'I-am-ness' is their subtle form, and this ['I-am-ness'] together with the 'grasper' is [known as] buddhi, [i.e.] the feeling [pertaining] to oneself".

These remarks, not particularly enlightening in themselves, make more sense when viewed in conjunction with Vācaspati Miśra's proposed model of eight types of samāpatti. He states (I.46):

tena grāhye catasrah samāpattayo grahītr-grahaṇayoś-ca catasra ity-aṣṭau te bhavanti-iti, "Thus [with regard] to the 'grasped' there are four coincidences, [and there are a further] four [in respect to] the 'grasper' and 'grasping'. Thus there are eight of these [coincidences]". Diagrammatically this looks as follows:

	objective prop:	
<u>nir-asmitā-samāpatti</u>	}	'I-am-ness'
<u>asmitā-samāpatti</u>		
<u>nir-ānanda-samāpatti</u>	}	sense-organs
<u>ānanda-samāpatti</u>		
<u>nir-vicāra-samāpatti</u>	}	subtle objects
<u>vicāra-samāpatti</u>		
<u>nir-vitarka-samāpatti</u>	}	coarse objects
<u>vitarka-samāpatti</u>		

These conjectural stages of enstatic experience have been admirably analysed by G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 198ff.). However, whatever explanatory value they may be credited with they cannot be reckoned to be representative of Patañjali's viewpoint as it can be reconstructed from the evidence in the Yoga-Sūtra itself. At any rate the profound disagreements between the various exegetists on this crucial issue suffice for us not to accept any of their explanations precipitately. While Vācaspati Miśra boldly doubles Vyāsa's perhaps more convincing quartet of enstatic types, Vijñāna Bhikṣu in his Yoga-Vārttika (I.46) comes up with a six stage model. He explicitly rejects Vācaspati Miśra's view according to which the object of

vitarka- and vicāra-samādhi is grāhya, of ānanda-samādhi grahana and of asmitā-samādhi the category of grahītr. Instead he regards ānanda as a product of extreme vicāra-samāpatti which then is made the objective prop of the next higher form of ecstasy. Asmitā-samāpatti, again, is explained by him as kevala-purusa-ākāra-samvit, that is, the feeling which takes the shape of the transcendental Self. Vijñāna Bhikṣu adamantly denies that there is a nir-ānanda- or a nir-asmitā-samādhi.

G.M. KOELMAN (1970) opts for Vācaspati Miśra's interpretation which he seeks to vindicate in what must be considered the most penetrating analysis of this whole problem complex hitherto. However, he is sadly mistaken when he pleads that these eight types of samāpatti as delineated in the Tattva-Vaiśārādī "are the core of Patañjala mental discipline" (p. 223). They are indeed "a magnificent piece of psychology" (ibid), but it remains an open question to what degree this theoretical model is founded on experiential information. As I have pointed out at the outset of this study, Vācaspati Miśra was no doubt a conscientious and extremely erudite scholar, but hardly an initiated yogin who could speak authoritatively about such recondite phenomena as these enstatic states. In point of fact, as a close inspection of the Yoga-Sūtra itself bears out neither Vācaspati Miśra nor Vijñāna Bhikṣu are reliable guides in this complicated matter.

Patañjali's own view seems to be that he takes nirvicāra-samāpatti as the highest form of samprajñata-samādhi. He states: nirvicāra-vaiśāradye'dhyātma-prasādaḥ, rtaṁ-bhārā tatra prajñā (I.47-48), or:

"When [there is] autumnal-lucidity in nirvicāra [-samāpatti], [then] this is called] the clarity of the inner-being. - In this [state of] autumnal-lucidity knowledge is truth-bearing".

Vyāsa (I.47) paraphrases this enstatic condition with bhūta-artha-viśayaḥ krama-ananurodhī sphuṭa-prajñā-ālokaḥ or "the flashing-forth of full-blown (sphuṭa) gnosis, not conforming to [the law of] sequence [and having as its] objects the things themselves". At this culmination of the enstatic process of involution no specific pratyayas or 'presented-ideas' remain. There is merely a generic awareness of the essence of the intended object. All noetic acts of the supra-cognitive type (e.g. vitarka etc.) are suspended. Patañjali does not even mention the presence of ānanda (meta-bliss) or asmitā (meta-subjectivity) in this state, though this does not count as a proof of their actual absence. The gnostic illumination which occurs at this culminant stage is said to be without development. It is, as Vācaspati Miśra (I.47) observes, 'simultaneous' (yugapad), an atemporal knowing which has as its essential characteristic that it is 'truth-bearing' (ṛtam-bhara), that is, if one recalls the archaic overtones of the concept of ṛta, reflective of the universal order and harmony. This elevated enstatic state is likened to the clarity of the autumnal sky so typical of northern India.

In this connection Vyāsa (I.47) cites a stanza of unknown origin but identified by Vācaspati Miśra as a paramā-rṣī gāthā. It reads: prajñā-prasādam-āruhya aśocyāḥ śocato janān, bhūmi-ṣṭhān-iva śaila-ṣṭhāḥ sarvān prajño'nupaśyati, or: "Having ascended to the

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tranquillity of gnosis, griefless, he beholds, like [a person] standing on the mountain [-top] [and looking down upon] the valley-dwellers, all grief-stricken creatures". This is a popular metaphor which can be met with in the Mahābhārata (Calc. ed. XII.17.20; 151.11) and the Dhammapada (28).

This non-sequential gnosis is further explained in I.49: śruta-anumāna-prajñābhyām-anya-viśaya viśeṣa-arthatvāt, or: "The scope [of this gnosis] is distinct from the 'knowledge' [derived from] tradition or inference because of [its] particular purposefulness". J.H. WOODS (1966³) translates this sūtra differently: "Has an object other than the insight resulting from things heard or from inferences inasmuch as its object is a particular." Although this rendering is true to Vyāsa's diction, who argues that whilst śabda and anumāna deal with generic objects only, samādhi discloses the particular, nevertheless a far less sophisticated interpretation is possible and also preferable. J.W. HAUER (1958, 337), for instance, understands the phrase viśeṣa-arthatvāt as "weil sein Zweck ein anderer ist" explaining this purpose to be that of liberation. I find the simplicity of this solution convincing and therefore propose to translate the above phrase with "particular purposefulness".

The gnostic flash or prajñā-āloka spoken of in the Yoga-Bhāṣya (I.47) and in the Yoga-Sūtra (III.5) can tentatively be understood as the climax of the sevenfold gnosis (sapta-dhā prajñā) mentioned in aphorism II.27 (tasya sapta-dhā prānta-bhūmih prajñā)⁹³ and described as arising from viveka-khyāti (see II.26). A possible elucidation of

93 According to Vyāsa the word tasya refers to the yogin who has attained to the 'vision of discernment', but with Vijñāna Bhikṣu I prefer to relate it back to the compound hāna-upāya of II.26.

what might be entailed in this 'sevenfold gnosis' can be found in the Yoga-Bhāṣya (II.27): saptadhā-iti asuddhy-āvaraṇa-mala-apagamāc-cittasya pratyaya-antara-anutpāde sati sapta-prakarā-eva prajñā vivekino bhavati, tad-yathā-pari, jñātaṃ heyaṃ na-asya punaḥ pari, jñeyam-asti, kṣīṇa heya-hetavo na punar-eteṣāṃ kṣetavyam-asti, sāksāt-kṛtaṃ nirodha-samādhinā hānam, bhavito viveka-khyāti-rūpo hāna-upāyah ity-eṣā catuṣṭayī kāryyā vimuktiḥ prajñāyāḥ, citta-vimuktis-tu trayī carita-adhikārā buddhiḥ guṇā giri-śikhara-kuṭa-cyutā iva grāvāno niravasthānāḥ, sva-kāraṇe pralaya-abhimukhāḥ saha tena-astam gacchanti, na ca-eṣāṃ pravilīnānām punar-asty-utpādaḥ prayojana-abhāvād-iti, etasyām-avasthāyām guṇa-sambandha-ātītaḥ sva-rūpa-mātra-jyotir-amalaḥ kevalī puruṣaḥ, or: "Sevenfold' [means that] through the disappearance of the defilements from the cover-of-impurity, when no other presented-idea is produced by the mind, the gnosis of the discerner (vivekin) is of seven kinds, [viz.] (i) that-which-is-to-be-escaped (heya) [i.e. all future suffering] is full-comprehended; it need not be full-comprehended again; (ii) the causes of that-which-is-to-be-escaped have dwindled [namely the correlation between 'seer' and 'seen' etc.]; they need not dwindle again; (iii) through the ecstasy of restriction the [total] cessation (hāna) is realised; (iv) the means of cessation in the form of the vision of discernment has become manifested; this is the fourfold release of the gnosis to be effected; however, the release of the mind [as such] is triple: (v) the sovereignty of buddhi is obtained; (vi) the guṇas, like rocks [which have] fallen from the edge of a mountain-peak, are without support [and] of their own accord incline towards

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dissolution, [and] they go to rest with that buddhi; and once these [guṇas] are dissolved, there is no new origination [for them], because of the absence of the cause [viz. avidyā or 'nescience']; (vii) in this state the Self has transcended the connection with the guṇas [and is established as] the light of nought but [its] own-form, undefiled [and] alone".

Viveka-khyāti is the expedient by which the cessation (hāna) of the ominous correlation between Self and non-self is brought about (see II.26). It is also known as viveka-ja-jñāna or 'gnosis born of discernment' (see III.52, 54)⁹⁴. Aphorism III.52 is of special interest since it prescribes a method by which this non-sequential gnosis can be effected most directly: kṣana-tat-kramayoḥ samyamād-viveka-jaṁ jñānam, or: "By constraint on the moments-of-time and their sequence [the yogin gains] discernment-born gnosis". The topic of this particular exercise is the structure of time thought to consist of smallest intervals of duration (kṣana). In other words, time is made the meditative support by which the atemporal reality is to be actualised.

In III.54 this gnostic revelation is described as the 'deliverer' (tāraka) owing to its power which transports the yogin across the ocean of phenomenal existence into the Unconditioned. This gnosis is 'omni-objective' (sarva-viśaya) and 'omni-temporal' (sarvathā-viśaya) and 'non-sequential' (akrama) (see III.54). The quintessence of this vision of discernment is the abolition of the empirical ego. As Patañjali (IV.25) declares: viśeṣa-darśina ātma-bhāva-bhāvanā-vinivṛttih, or: "For the seer of the distinction [between Self and non-self] [there

94 J.H. WOODS' (1966³) index lists viveka-jaṁ dhyānam at III.52 which must be a slip since his translation clearly presupposes ^o-jñānam.

ensues] the discontinuance of the projection of the self's state". The decisive phrase ātma-bhāva-bhāvanā, here converted into "the projection of the self's state", is a problematic one as is witnessed by the existing translations. R. PRASĀDA (1912), for instance, takes it to mean "the curiosity as to the nature-and-relations of the Self" and G. JHA (1907) has "thought of the nature of self", whilst J.H. WOODS (1966³) prefers to translate it with "pondering upon his own states-of-being". However, I submit that these various renderings disregard the active component in bhāvanā which is closely allied to bhāvana meaning 'effecting, realising, cultivating'. I therefore propose to translate it with 'projection' which best conveys the element of 'mental construction'. Supportive evidence for this interpretation is found in Buddhism where bhāvanā is usually given the meaning of 'meditation' or 'visualisation' though, as DL. SNELGROVE (1959, I, 134) points out, "in the special sense of mental production or thought-creation". These considerations apply naturally also to aphorism I.33 which is the only other instance in which the word bhāvanā (as bhāvanātaḥ) occurs. This sūtra is of considerable interest insofar as it speaks of "the projecting of friendship, compassion, gladness and impartiality" (maitrī-karuṇā-muditā-upekṣānām ... bhāvanātaḥ) which establishes an immediate link with Buddhism in which this set of four mental attitudes is well known.

The term ātma-bhāva, again, denotes the empirical self complex which is abolished as soon as nirvicāra-vaiśāradya sets in, thus giving way to a state which Vyāsa circumscribes as "sheer existing" or sattā-mātra. The act of 'discernment' (viveka) which characterises

this enstatic elevation (prasaṃkhyāna)⁹⁵ is not an ordinary intellectual exercise of 'differentiation' or 'comparison'. Rather it is an immediate knowing (Innehaben) of the distinction between Self and self. This explains why the expedient by which the yogin propels himself into the next higher stage of ecstasy, viz. asampraññāta-samādhi, is not so much a noetic act as a conative one in the form of a total and irrevocable turning away from prakṛtic reality. I am referring of course to para-vairāgya or 'higher dispassion' (see III.50; I.16) as the only means of entering into asampraññāta-samādhi.

G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 237) displays a considerable degree of empathic understanding when examining this recondite phenomenon. Trying to determine the nature of this final volition to disengage entirely from prakṛti as such, he writes: "The rejection, however, should not be a violent effort, since this would impair peace of mind. There should be a tranquil suave disinterestedness, a peaceful refraining from thinking, rather than a rejection of the thought of inadequacy or of the thought of otherness, a constant refusal of consciousness and a sinking away into Awareness. The highest state of concentration (sic!) is, therefore, an effort of the will rather than an activity of the mind."

What happens once the vision of discernment has ceded? The answer is simple: When all conscious contents have been cleared and even the awareness of pure existing is no longer present, consciousness undergoes a total collapse. There is a gradual emptying of consciousness in the course of the enstatic journey, and then comes the critical point at which 'implosion' occurs owing to the extreme evacuation of the mind. This is asampraññāta-samādhi which

95 E. FRAUWALLNER (1953, I, 424) wrongly equates prasaṃkhyāna with dhyāna.

coincides with pratyaya-nirodha.

However, this absence of consciousness does not mean that asamprajñāta-samādhi is equivalent to a state of unconsciousness as ordinarily understood. Such an interpretation is not defensible on any count, since Yoga is careful to differentiate between consciousness and Awareness (cit).⁹⁶ For this reason one must also reject G. JHA's (1907) translation of the term asamprajñāta with 'unconscious'. A somewhat more appropriate rendering would appear to be 'ultra-cognitive' as suggested by M.N. DVIVEDI (1934³). As S. DASGUPTA (1924, 124) comments: "This state, like the other previous states of the samprajñāta type, is a positive state of the mind and not a mere state of vacuity of objects or negativity. In this state, all determinate character of the states disappears and their potencies only remain alive". G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 239), more punctiliously perhaps, puts it thus: "Concentration (sic!) without objective consciousness should not be conceived as total absence of knowledge; only knowledge by objectivation is absent".

This rather elusive condition is also called nirodha-pariṇāma in III.9: vyutthāna-nirodha-samskārayor-abhibhava-prādur-bhāvau nirodha-ksana-citta-anvayo nirodha-pariṇāmah, or: "[When there is] subjugation of the subliminal-activators of emergence and the manifestation [of the subliminal-activators] of restriction [this is known as] the restriction-transmutation [or] the connection of the mind with the moment of restriction". The immediately succeeding aphorism (III.10) complements this statement: tasya prasānta-vāhitā samskārat, or: "Its calm flow [is

96 For some useful observations on the interpretation of the nature of this type of enstatic experience, see J. MARÉCHAL (1964², 186ff.).

effected] by a subliminal-activator". The specialness of nirodha-parināma is brought out by the aphorisms III.11-12 which define the other non-ordinary 'transmutations' (parināma) of the mind: sarva-arthatā-ekāgratayoḥ ksaya-udayau cittasya samādhi-parināmah, tataḥ punaḥ śānta-uditau tulya-pratyayau cittasya ekāgratā-parināmah, or: "The dwindling of all-object-ness and the uprisal of one-pointedness is the enstasy-transmutation of the mind. - Then again, when the quiescent and the uprisen presented-ideas are similar, [this is] the one-pointedness-transmutation of the mind". Whereas III.12 is seemingly a description of the underlying process of the techniques of dhāraṇā and dhyāna, III.11 refers to the central happening in enstasy. The term sarva-arthatā, which occurs only in III.11, is decisive. Contrary to the contention of the classical exegetists who equate this expression with viśaya or external object, arthatā must be taken to denote 'intended object'. Nor can I accept S. DASGUPTA's (1924, 155) ~~opinion/that~~ interpretation of III.9 that "[e]ven when the mind is in the samprajñāta state it is said to be in vyutthāna (phenomenal) in comparison with the nirodha state, just as the ordinary conscious states are called vyutthāna in comparison with the samprajñāta state". He evidently reads slightly more into this aphorism than is actually there. It seems to me that the term vyutthāna merely qualifies the term samskāra and is not applied to the enstatic condition as such.

From the viewpoint of the empirical consciousness, asamprajñāta-samādhi is but a mass of subliminal-activators (see I.18) which devour each other step by step because they are prevented from conscious thematisation and also because there is no further feedback from

consciousness. This state is also designated as 'seedless' (nir-bīja, III.8) in contrast to the sa-bīja forms of samāpatti. The word bīja or 'seed' in all probability refers to the 'support' (ālambana) or the intended object.

Initially, asamprajñāta-samādhi is only a fleeting experience intercalating itself into the general enstatic continuum on the level of samprajñāta-samādhi. For by dint of the subliminal tensions the yogin reverts again and again to the lower forms of enstatic experience (see IV.27). Nonetheless, once the utmost boundary of nirvicāra-samāpatti is reached, he is carried as if by a powerful current towards kaivalya (see IV.26). This is so because despite of the innumerable vāsanās, prakṛti ultimately serves the end of the Self (see IV.24).

In conclusion I shall briefly glance at the terminal stage of the entire enstatic process of involution, namely the phenomenon of dharma-megha-samādhi. This concept makes its appearance in a single aphorism, namely IV.29, which reads as follows: prasamkhyāne'py-akusīdasya sarvathā viveka-khyāter-dharma-meghaḥ samādhiḥ, or: "For [the yogin who is] always non-usurious (a-ku-sīda) even in [the state of] elevated-insight (prasamkhyāna) [there follows] from the vision of discernment the ecstasy [known as] the cloud of dharma". The word akusīda describes the adept who applies himself to para-vairāgya by which asamprajñāta-samādhi is realised. The term dharma-megha-samādhi is used here either as a straightforward synonym of asamprajñāta-samādhi or else it refers to the consummate phase of this highest type of ecstasy. I shall argue in favour of the second alternative.

This important concept is surrounded by a certain enigma which the classical commentators have failed to illuminate as is clearly evinced by their contradictory and occasionally even self-contradictory interpretations of the precise location of dharma-megha-samādhi within the whole series of enstatic experiences. In his Yoga-Bhāṣya (I.2) Vyāsa makes the following statement: tad-eva rajo-leśa-mala-āpetam sva-rūpa-pratiṣṭham sattva-puruṣa-anya-tā-khyāti-mātram dharma-megha-dhyāna-upagam bhavati, tat-param prasamkhyānam-ity-ācakṣate dhyāyinaḥ, or: "[When] the defilement of the vestiges of rajas is removed from that [state] of sattva [and when sitta] is grounded in [its] own-form [and is] nothing but the vision of the distinction between Self and sattva, [then] it tends towards the absorption [known as] the cloud of dharma; that [sattva state] is designated as the supreme elevated-insight by the meditators".

Vijñāna Bhikṣu, in his Yoga-Vārttika (I.2) explains this passage thus: dharma-megha-dhyānam kim-ity-ākāṅkṣa-āyam-āha tat-param-iti 18/28/28
tad-dharma-megha-ākhyānam dhyānam paramam prasamkhyānam tattva-jñānam 18
viveka-khyāter-eva, or: "What is the absorption [known as] the cloud 18
of dharma? Anticipating this query [Vyāsa] says: 'that is the supreme [elevated-insight]'. That absorption called the 'cloud of dharma' is the supreme elevated-insight, true knowledge [born of] the vision of discernment". Clearly, this is a gross misconstruction of Vyāsa's stance. As is evident from subsequent statements in the Yoga-Bhāṣya (see I.15; II.2; IV.29) the author does not identify prasamkhyāna

with dharmameghasamādhi and consequently the word tat or 'that' in the last sentence of the above quotation does not refer to dharmameghadhyāna (= o-samādhi)⁹⁷, as Vijñāna Bhikṣu maintains, but to the state of unpolluted sattva. 6

G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 234) regards dharmameghasamādhi as the "passage from the state of Sublime Insight to the state of Restriction", that is, from prasaṃkhyāna to asamprajñāta-samādhi. He contends (p. 235) that the 'enstasy of the cloud of dharmā' "is the stage where there is absolutely uninterrupted discriminate intuition, at once apprehended and generously sacrificed, an uninterrupted experience of the fact that in our present state we do not square with our true Self...". But this is neither the view of Patañjali nor that of Vyāsa. G.M. KOELMAN (1970) tries to vindicate his interpretation by citing Vācaspati Miśra (I.18): dharmameghasamādhireva hi nitāntavigalitarajas-tamo-malāt-sattvād-upajātas-tat-tad-viṣaya-atikrameṇa pravarttamāno nanto viṣaya-avadyadarśī samasta-viṣaya-parityāgāc-ca sva-rūpa-pratiṣṭhaḥ san-nirālabhanah saṃskāra-mātra-śeṣasya nirālabhanasya samādheḥ kāraṇam-upapadyate sārūpyād, or: "When sattva is entirely freed from the defilements of rajas and tamas, the dharmamegha enstasy is effected. Its activity is transcendent to any object. [It is] unbounded, beholding [all] objects and on account of [the mind's] shunning of all objects [it remains] grounded in [its] own-form, being without support. It acts as the cause of the enstasy [which has] only a vestige of subliminal-activators [and which is] without support owing to [its] homogeneity". This exposition goes, probably unintentionally, against all the evidence in the Yoga-Sūtra and against the authority of Vyāsa. For instance,

97 This substitution of samādhi by dhyāna is most unwonted, but there can be no doubt that dharmameghadhyāna is in fact the same as dharmameghasamādhi.

in IV.30 it is stated that "thence [ie. as a result of dharmamegha-samādhi] [comes about] the cessation of [all] causes-of-affliction and of karman" (tataḥ kleśa-karma-nivṛttih). This interpretation is reinforced by the whole context of the concluding sūtras in which the concept of dharmamegha-samādhi is first introduced. Accordingly, one is forced to conclude that the dharmamegha ecstasy forms the terminal stage of asamprajñāta-samādhi and that it coincides with the yogin's exit from the prakṛtic realm in toto. For this reason one must also discard the equation, proposed in the Pātañjala-Rahasya (IV.29), of dharmamegha-samādhi with para-vairāgya. As has been shown, para-vairāgya serves as the means to asamprajñāta-samādhi.

Having clarified the position of this puzzling phenomenon on the enstatic scala, it remains for us to ascertain the meaning of the concept of dharmamegha. The older generation of indologists have focused on the ethical connotation of this flexible word and invariably translated it with 'virtue' (G. JHA, R. PRASĀDA, M. MÜLLER) or 'merit' (M.N. DVIVEDI). More recent researchers have found these renderings unsatisfactory and tacitly or openly queried that dharmamegha in the present context has a moral sense. Thus S. RADHAKRISHNAN (1951⁶) renders it with 'truth', G.M. KOELMAN (1970) with 'essence' and J.H. WOODS (1966³) suggests '(knowable) thing', whilst J.W. HAUER (1958) taking his cue from buddhist contexts understands it as 'tragende Urmacht'. Explaining this unexpected paraphrase, J.W. HAUER (1958, 470, fn. 22) writes: "The meditator is in this state enveloped by the supporting prime power [tragende Urmacht] of the world; he has become a dharmakāya like the 'great Muni'. This is an expression for Buddha who has entered Nirvāṇa".

I find this interpretation persuasive. For, the concept of dharmamegha does not appear to be mentioned by any hindu authority prior to Patañjali, though it is evidently an integral part of the technical nomenclature of early Mahāyāna Buddhism. There it figures as the tenth bhūmi or 'stage' of the bodhisattva's path to perfection, as can be seen, for example, from the Pañcaviṁśati-Sāhasrikā (p. 230, ed. by N. DUTT, 1934). I consider this to be the original usage of the concept of dharmamegha, whatever other shades of meaning it may have acquired in subsequent periods. And it must be in precisely this sense that Patañjali knew and probably also used the term. This raises anew the vexed question, broached by previous scholars (e.g. L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, 1936/37), of the relation between Classical Yoga and Buddhism.

PART FOUR

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER EIGHT
PĀTAÑJALA-YOGA AND CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA

Of the plethora of misinterpretations of Patañjali's darśana, both by foreign and indigenous scholars, none proved more inveterate and damaging than the claim that Classical Yoga is but a Spielart of Sāmkhya. This infelicitous assumption was first proposed by H.T. COLEBROOKE in his now classical essay on Yoga⁹⁸. According to him there is but a single difference between Yoga and Sāmkhya, namely the presence of the doctrine of Īśvara in the former and its denial in the latter school of thought. "In less momentous matters they differ, not upon points of doctrine, but in the degree in which the exterior exercises, or abstruse reasoning and study, are weighed upon, as requisite preparations of absorbed contemplation."⁹⁹ This mistaken view was destined to be echoed and re-echoed throughout the next century. The following statements, culled almost at random from the indological literature, are symptomatic of this fundamental misapprehension, and even in quite recent publications can this antiquated idea be found to ghost about.

In the same vein as H.T. COLEBROOKE, R. MITRA (1883, xviii)

98 H.T. COLEBROOKE (1873, I)

99 op. cit., p. 265

writes: "The Yoga Sūtra takes for granted the twenty-five categories of the Sāṅkhya as the basis of its doctrine, and copies some of its aphorisms almost verbatim". Similarly, M.N. DVIVEDI (1890, 1934³, xviii): "The Yoga subscribes to the Sāṅkhya theory in toto". M. MONIER-WILLIAMS (1894, 200), again, writes: "The Yoga, founded by Patanjali and regarded as a branch of the Sāṅkhya, is scarcely worthy of the name of a separate system of philosophy. Yet it has undoubted charms for the naturally contemplative and ascetical Hindū..."

Although correcting some of the mistaken notions about Yoga and displaying a far more liberal-minded attitude towards it than did his predecessors, M. MÜLLER (1916⁴, 312) nonetheless follows suit when he states: "... it may be quite true that, after we have once understood the position of the Sāṅkhya-philosophy towards the great problem of the world, we shall not glean many new metaphysical or psychological ideas from a study of the Yoga". R. GARBE (1917², 148), well known for his pioneer work on Sāṅkhya, makes no concessions to Yoga at all: "All Sāṅkhya teachings about cosmology, physiology and psychology were simply taken over into the Yoga system. Even the doctrine of salvation is the same ..." S. RADHAKRISHNAN (1927, 1951⁶, II, 342) expresses a more moderate but still not affirmative enough view: "Patañjali systematised the conceptions of the Yoga and set them forth on the background of the metaphysics of the Sāṅkhya, which he assumes with slight variations".

The first scholar to come to the defence of Classical Yoga and vigorously affirm its doctrinal autonomy is S. DASGUPTA (1930, 2) who, seeking to rectify past misinterpretations and sweeping generalisations, remarks: "It is true that Yoga owes much to the Sāṅkhya philosophy, but

it is doubtful whether the obligation is due to the Kapila Sāṅkhya as we have it now. My supposition is that we have lost the original Sāṅkhya texts, whereas the systems that pass now by the name of Sāṅkhya and Yoga represent two schools of philosophy which evolved through the modifications of the original Sāṅkhya school; Yoga did not borrow its material from Kapila Sāṅkhya (...) though the Yoga and the Kapila Sāṅkhya are fundamentally the same in their general metaphysical positions, yet they hold quite different views on many points of philosophical, ethical and practical interest". M. ELIADE (1973³, 7), a former student of S. DASGUPTA, blurs this fine distinction again when he writes: "As to the theoretical framework and the metaphysical foundation that Patañjali provides for these practices, his personal contribution is of the smallest. He merely rehandles the Sāṅkhya philosophy in its broad outlines, adapting it to a rather superficial theism in which he exalts the practical value of meditation. The Yoga and Sāṅkhya systems are so much alike that most of the affirmations made by the one are valid for the other".

F. CATALINA (1968, 19) is far more discerning: "In the main, the two systems are very much alike. However, there are some significant differences which warrant our calling Yoga a separate system of philosophy". This enlightened view has unfortunately not become as widely prevalent as one would wish. Too often Yoga is still being reduced to Sāṅkhya, with perhaps a few unimportant appendages of its own. For instance, CH. SHARMA (1960, 169) makes this wooly comment: "Yoga is intimately allied to Sāṅkhya. The Gītā

calls them one. Yoga means spiritual action and Sāṅkhya means knowledge. Sāṅkhya is theory; Yoga is practice. For all practical purposes, Sāṅkhya and Yoga may be treated as the theoretical and the practical sides of the same system".

However, as a perusal of the literature evinces not only Indian scholars are guilty of this kind of reductionism and over-generalisation. N. SMART (1968, 26), for example, writes: "The Samkhya system can hardly by itself be treated as a method of liberation, though it lays claims to being such, which is a main reason why it is coupled, and has been coupled over a very long period, with the Yoga system. The latter borrows its main features, with certain adaptations, from the Samkhya, so that it is not too misleading to treat Samkhya as the theoretical exposition and Yoga the practical account of how to achieve that clarity of consciousness which brings liberation from the round of rebirth and the suffering of the world".

Such inept statements could be multiplied almost ad libitum. They all betray a total lack of historical perspective which, in turn, is responsible for an almost incredible conceptual haziness. It is futile to attempt a comparison between two items which have not been clearly defined to begin with. Thus, in the above quotations Sāṅkhya is obviously used in a variety of meanings. Properly speaking, a valid comparison is possible only between Classical Yoga and Classical Sāṅkhya insofar as both have the status of a philosophical darśana. And in this sense, there can be no justification whatsoever for deriving Classical Yoga from Classical Sāṅkhya.

Recent research into the complex history of the Yoga and Sāṃkhya tradition has brought to light ample material to vindicate S. DASGUPTA's (1930) conclusion that Patañjali's Yoga is a specific type of Sāṃkhya-Yoga just as the system of Classical Sāṃkhya it so be regarded as a separate line of development of the same common ideological ground. As K.B.R. RAO (1966, 9) puts it succinctly: "We must guard against another obsession which has taken deep roots in our minds. It refers to the equation that is generally made of 'atheistic Sāṃkhya' expounded in the Sāṃkhya Kārikā, with the one expounded in the Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali, with the exception of Īśvara in the latter. It is an error of judgement to place the Sāṃkhya Kārikā and the Yoga Sūtras or Kapila and Patañjali, in juxtaposition and treat them as preaching Atheism and Theism respectively (...). The Yoga Sūtras have Sāṃkhyan elements as Vedānta itself has, but its difference with the classical Sāṃkhya is as great as the difference between Vedānta and the classical Sāṃkhya. The Yoga-Sūtra-Sāṃkhya is not simply classical Sāṃkhya plus God, nor the classical Sāṃkhya of the Sāṃkhya Kārikā is Yoga-Sūtra-Sāṃkhya minus God. They are fundamentally different in so many main principles".

Now, the precise nature of these differences has never been ascertained in any appreciable detail. The reason for this is obvious: the absence of an unprejudiced study of the Yoga-Sūtra preceded by a critical appraisal of the exegetical literature. However, on the basis of the purged reading of the Yoga-Sūtra, rendered feasible by the present study, we are now in a position to re-examine these differences and undertake a comprehensive

comparison between the Yoga-Sūtra and the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā. Such a formidable task, though, lies outside the compass of this investigation, and I must defer a detailed treatment of this promising line of research. For the present, I merely wish to point out the major divergencies between these two schools of thought as they have become apparent in the course of this study. I must emphasise at this point that I have certain misgivings about current interpretations of the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā as well, and that before any exhaustive comparison could be undertaken this text would have to be examined both from a textual and a semantic point of view, so that we may arrive at a sterling understanding of this important scripture unobscured by all later interpretations and likely distortions. Until then one has to remain content with the rough identification of three areas of contrast between Classical Sāṃkhya and Patañjala-Yoga, viz.

- (1) methodology
- (2) doctrinal framework
- (3) terminology

It is my contention that the different methodological approach of Classical Yoga is responsible for many of its conceptual and doctrinal as well as terminological idiosyncracies. I therefore / 5
commence this review with a brief examination of the methodological aspect. The importance of the distinct approach of Patañjali is pertinently emphasised by M. ELIADE (1973³, 7): "... whereas, according to Sāṃkhya, the only path to salvation is that of

metaphysical knowledge, Yoga accords marked importance to techniques of meditation". Elsewhere (p. 36) he remarks: "Patañjali takes over the Sāṃkhya dialectic almost in its entirety, but he does not believe that metaphysical knowledge can, by itself, lead man to final liberation. Gnosis, in his view, only prepares the ground for the acquisition (sic!) of freedom (mukti). Emancipation must, so to speak, be conquered by sheer force, specifically by means of an ascetic technique and a method of contemplation, which, taken together, constitute nothing less than the yoga-darśana".

In a nutshell, whereas Classical Sāṃkhya relies heavily on the power of ratiocination and discernment, Classical Yoga like any other yogic tradition is founded on a philosophy which encourages personal experimentation and direct 'mystical' verification. This basic difference is anticipated in a well-known stanza in the Mahābhārata (XII.289.7): pratyakṣa-hetavo yogāḥ sāmkhyaḥ śāstra-viniścayaḥ, ubhe ca-ete tattve tāta yudhiṣṭhira, or: "The Sāṃkhya-followers depend on [their] scriptures, [whilst] the Yoga-followers rely on direct-experience (pratyakṣa) ..." Even though on other occasions the unity of Yoga and Sāṃkhya is vigorously asserted, the above statement which is by no means unique clearly foreshadows the later bifurcation of both schools of thought into a 'rationalistic' and a 'mystical' system.

It is this experimental and experiential approach of Yoga, as opposed to the more traditionalist Sāṃkhya, which can be said to have been the great underlying stimulus in the doctrinal innovations and the creation of new schools within Hinduism as much as within Buddhism. The classical example of the seeker after truth who

discards all theory in order to probe the depths of reality by means of his own one-pointed mind, is the founder of Buddhism himself. After having pursued his search with the help of existing 'models', of a Sāṃkhya and Yoga type, which he found of no avail, the Buddha abandoned himself completely to a course of personal meditative exploration of his own device, which ultimately resulted in his sambodhi and in the formulation of one of India's most prodigious schools of thought.

The highly formalistic and rationalistic basis of Classical Sāṃkhya is borne out quite clearly by the opening stanzas of the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā which read: duhkha-traya-abhighātā-jijñāsā tad-abhighātake hetau, dr̥ṣṭe sa-apārthā cen-na-eka-anta-atyantato' bhāvāyat; dr̥ṣṭavad-anuśravikāḥ sa hy-avisuddhi-kṣaya-atisāya-yuktāḥ, tad-viparītāḥ śreyān-vyakta-avyakta-jñā-vijñānāt, or: "Owing to the tribulation [stemming from the] threefold suffering [there arises] the desire to know the means of its removal. If [it be argued that] this [inquiry] is futile because visible [means of removal are available], [we reply that, this is] not [the case] since [the visible remedies] are not final or abiding. - The revealed [cure for this tribulation] is like the visible [cure] [in the last analysis ineffective], [for it is also] connected with impurity, destruction and excess; different and superior to that is the discriminative-knowledge [by which is differentiated] the manifest, the unmanifest and the knower [i.e. the Self]".

Thus the central expedient by which the termination of suffering (duhkha) is effected is vijñāna or the careful holding apart of the three essential ontological categories postulated by Sāṃkhya. The technical terms vyakta, avyakta and jñā are explained in stanza 3

as the evolutes of the world-ground, the world-ground itself and puruṣa respectively, and they are further defined in stanzas 10-11. In stanza 64, whose importance is generally overlooked, viññāna occurs by the technical name of tattva-abhyāsa or the 'practice affirming (the truth) as taught by Sāṃkhya'. We also hear what this truth consists in. I cite the entire verse: evam tattva-abhyāsāna-asmi na me na-aham-ity-apariśeṣam, aviparyayād-viśuddham kevalam utpadyate jñānam, or: "Thus, on account of the practice of the truth [that] 'I am not', 'nothing is mine', 'I am not' [there arises] [that] knowledge [which] is complete, pure and solitary because [it is] free from error". Tattva-abhyāsa, which is applied viññāna, represents the effort to disrupt the habit of the empirical ego of identifying with the phenomenal contents of consciousness, so as to re-locate man's true identity in the transcendental Self. For, man is essentially puruṣa, and in order to reach authenticity he must divest himself of all phenomenal accretions, such as mind, body, external property or social relations.

That this intellectual distancing is not enough in itself is evident from the fact that Īśvara Kṛṣṇa also acknowledges the merit of moral purification. (see 44). Moreover, as emerges from stanza 45, viññāna must be accompanied by an act of renunciation of everything that reason - in keeping with tradition - has revealed to be 'non-self'. The verse in question reads: vairāgyāt-prakṛti-layaḥ saṃsāro bhavati rajasād-ragāt..., or: "From dispassion [comes] the dissolution [of the evolutes back into] the world-ground; from attachment [which is] passionate [comes] phenomenal-existence..." Here prakṛti-laya does not, as in the Yoga-Sūtra, denote a sinking away into the world-ground by the human personality, but laya

must be taken to refer to the dissolution of the evolutes coinciding with the recovery of the Self's authenticity. Any other reading would make no sense in the face of the fact that the avowed goal of Classical ~~Yoga~~ Sāṃkhya is the reinstatement of the Self in its untainted splendour of kaivalya. G.J. LARSON's (1969) rendering of the phrase vairāgyāt-prakṛti-layaḥ as "from non-attachment [comes] dissolution in prakṛti" is not specific enough to avoid confusion with the peculiar usage of the term prakṛti-laya in Patañjali's work.

The sole interest of the follower of Classical Sāṃkhya is the disentanglement of puruṣa and prakṛti. This objective is shared not only by the antecedent Sāṃkhya-Yoga schools but also by Classical Yoga. Yet one cannot avoid the impression that the Sāṃkhya method of holding apart the primary categories of Self and non-self (= prakṛti) is executed on a level entirely different from that recommended by the more meditation-oriented schools. For in the latter the confusion between Self and mind (as a product of insentient nature), is held to be removable only by means of a controlled introversion and transformation of consciousness. This does not appear to be the way of Classical Sāṃkhya. Vijñāna is by no means synonymous with prajñā or gnostic insight as acquired in samādhi; rather it is an intellectual act of continuously reminding oneself that one is not this body, this particular sensation, feeling, or thought. This is the famous neti-neti procedure of the upaniṣadic sages applied in the most rationalistic manner possible. In later Vedānta the same technique is known under the technical designation of apavāda or the 'annulment' of 'erroneous predication' (adhyāropa)¹⁰⁰. This intellectualistic refashioning of an essentially introspective-meditative practice compelled J.N. MUKERJI (1930, 8) to exclaim that

100 See e.g. Vedānta-Sāra (33)

"the point of view of Sāṃkhya is logical and not psychological", which is probably a far too one-sided interpretation.

Moreover, it is feasible that a perpetual distancing of oneself from the contents of consciousness might sooner or later induce altered states of awareness, nor is it entirely impossible that this was fully accepted and perhaps even intended by Īśvara Kṛṣṇa and his disciples. The question is whether the approach of Classical Sāṃkhya is, in the last analysis, adequate for realising the postulated goal of Self authenticity. This is tacitly denied by the adherents of Yoga who feel that the re-conditioning of the cognitive apparatus as achieved by the method recommended in Classical Sāṃkhya is not conducive to that complete rupture with the phenomenal which alone is capable of securing emancipation. As the Yoga authorities are quick to point out, there are powerful traces in the depth-mind which no amount of re-habitation will wipe out. These subliminal-activators (samskāra) must be rendered sterile by a restructuring of consciousness itself, which is achieved through disciplined introspection leading to samādhi. Hence in Yoga the Sāṃkhya vi-jñāna becomes viveka-khyāti or the gnostic vision of discernment. Similarly, vairāgya acquires a second dimension. On the ordinary level it is simply a letting go of externals, but in samādhi a second degree of detachment is called for which represents an act of will, subsequently leading to the much coveted asamprajñata-samādhi in which all subliminal-activators become obliterated. One may well speculate with K.B.R. RAO (1966, 432) that it is the accentuated rationalism of Classical Sāṃkhya which must be held responsible for the fact that this school of thought never

actually acquired the same recognition and prestige as the other darśanas. Be this as it may, for the present purpose it is vital to realise that the methodological differences between Classical Sāṃkhya and Classical Yoga as outlined above initiated important conceptual and doctrinal divergencies which further enhanced the chasm between both schools of thought.

There are three major points in the doctrinal structure of Classical Yoga which separate it from Classical Sāṃkhya, viz. theology, ontology and psychology. A fourth point occasionally suggested is the so-called sphoṭa doctrine which Patañjali is held to subscribe to, but as I will show wrongly so.

The single most striking conceptual difference between both darśanas concerns their respective interpretation or attitude towards theological reality. Whilst Classical Sāṃkhya is said to be nir-īśvara or 'atheistic', Classical Yoga (as apparently all forms of hindu Yoga) is most emphatically sa-īśvara or 'theistic'. This assertion is somewhat misleading. Although it is perfectly correct that Classical Yoga is intrinsically 'theistic', Classical Sāṃkhya cannot simply be styled 'atheistic'. The fact is that īśvara Kṛṣṇa, rather like the Buddha, does not mention or make any statement about God at all. This can mean either of two things. He may outright deny the existence of such a supreme being, or else he may merely not lend any significance to this question or postpone his judgement about it. In view of the absence of any positive denial of the existence of God and considering the evidence of the Sāṃkhya-Sūtra, I would rather conjecture that īśvara Kṛṣṇa assumed a typical agnostic stance. Ostensibly, if there be a God he can have

little or nothing to do with the actual path of salvation as envisaged in Classical Sāṃkhya.

This indifference to theological matters is clearly out of tune with Classical Yoga which is definitely theistic in nature. As I have suggested above and counter to B. HEIMANN (1930, 90), there may possibly be an experiential basis for the concept of Īśvara, though I do not thereby wish to say anything affirmative about either the reality of the experience or the authenticity of the interpretations attached to it. If this argument is valid, the methodological factor can justly be said to be the cause of this most conspicuous difference between both darsanas.

The pre-eminently practical orientation of Yoga and its full reliance on pratyakṣa rather than on traditional knowledge of a rationalistic slant is moreover responsible for subtle but nonetheless crucial divergencies in the ontological conceptions of the two systems. As I have tackled this question already there is no need here to repeat myself. Rather what I am interested in at this point is the question as to how to account for these differences. The ontogenetic models were originally and primarily maps for meditative introspection, intended to guide the yogin in his explorations of the terra incognita of the mind. Thus these models served a very practical psychological purpose. This hypothesis helps to explain why so many of these models, as given out in the Mahābhārata and other early texts, are without apparent logical coherence. These 'maps' are records of internal experiences rather than purely theoretical constructions. They are descriptive rather than explanatory.

The 'map' character of the ontogenetic model of Classical Yoga is beyond question. The prakṛtic multi-level edifice is an eminently practical ad hoc conception which helps the yogin to 'program' his enstatic journey, to sign-post his inward odyssey so to speak and to orientate himself properly so as not to depart from his original trajectory. Thus the levels of cosmogenetic evolution are simultaneously the levels of psychogenetic involution. Each subsequently 'deeper' layer within the prakṛtic organism becomes a target for the conscious involutory programme of the yogin, until all levels of manifestation of the world-ground, and even the world-ground itself, are completely traversed. This, however, is not a mere intellectual act. The process of samādhi with its various degrees of completeness cannot be equated with the technique, utilised in Classical Sāṃkhya, of discriminating Self from non-self on the basis of prefabricated categories of differentiation. Yoga demands more than that. Overt conceptual discrimination or viññāna is not enough. The categories of what represents the 'non-self' must become the object of direct experience. The ultimate destination is of course the Self, as the experiencer behind all manifest contents of consciousness. In Classical Sāṃkhya, on the other hand, the ontogenetic model has lost this 'map' character in a way and appears as a highly formalised structure typical of the extreme rationalistic position of this school of thought.

The rigorous meditative introspective discipline of Yoga, or as J.W. HAUER (1958) puts it, its "experienced metaphysics" is furthermore responsible for the distinct holistic approach displayed

by this tradition which finds congenial expression in Patañjali's conception of mind. Whereas Īśvara Kṛṣṇa is mainly concerned with showing the various constituents of the inner world separately and in their evolutionary dependence, Patañjali emphasises the homogeneity of the human personality complex. This is clearly evinced by his concept of citta. Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's parallel term liṅga (or karana),¹⁰¹ used to denote the collectivity of the thirteen evolutes (viz. buddhi, aḥmākāra, manas and the ten indriyas), is by no means synonymous with Patañjali's citta. It somehow lacks the unifying and integrating strength of the latter concept. Whereas citta is expressive of the dynamic interaction between the psychic structures - and thus is essentially a psychological concept -, liṅga fails to convey any sense of dynamism or functional unity; it is primarily a static, analytical concept.

The last point adduced as a specific feature of the conceptual framework of Classical Yoga is the so-called sphoṭa doctrine.¹⁰² This teaching, which originated among the early Sanskrit grammarians, contains the simple idea that a word is more than the sum total of its component letters. Sphoṭa, derived from $\sqrt{\text{sphuṭ}}$ 'to burst open', is conceived as eternal and as manifesting itself in the spoken word. It represents the concept, brought to expression in a configuration of letters. Neither each separate sound nor the total sound of a word is considered as being capable of evoking a particular concept. Therefore, the sphoṭa-vādins conclude, there must be something more that inheres

101 On the meaning of the term liṅga and its significance see R. GARBE (1894, 323ff.). See also E.A. WELDEN (1914, 32-51).

102 See e.g. S. DASGUPTA (1963⁵, I, 238, fn.1): "The most important point in favour of this identification [between the grammarian Patañjali and the author of the Yoga-Sūtra] seems to be that both Patañjalis

in a word which, when the word is heard, 'bursts forth' as meaning. On hearing the first sound we have a dark notion which becomes clearer as the word is uttered. However, as E. ABEGG (1914, 188ff.)¹⁰³ has shown, sphoṭa has a strong metaphysical ingredient which is absent in our standard notion of 'concept', wherefore a straightforward equation of sphoṭa with 'concept' cannot be made. For, sphoṭa is ultimately the plenum, brahman, and it is this aspect of the doctrine which was of cardinal importance to the Indians. As brahman is bodied forth in all contingent beings, so the concept of brahman is thought to be the root of all other concepts.

Now, if a definite reference to this recondite doctrine could be found in the Yoga-Sūtra, this would be a significant factor in support of the traditional claim that the author of the Yoga-Sūtra is identical with his namesake the grammarian. However, this does not seem to be the case. Patañjali himself nowhere mentions the word sphoṭa, and all later discussions about it are based on a single aphorism, namely III.17 which runs as follows: śabda-artha-pratyayanām-itarā-itarā-adhyāsāt-samkaraś-tat-pravibhāga-samyamāt sarva-bhūta-ruta-jñānam, which may be rendered thus: "Word, meaning and presented-idea of the corresponding object are [usually] present in a state of mixture because of their being each identified with each other. Through constraint (samyama) [on the distinction between] them, insight into the utterances of all beings is gained".

As I understand it, this simply means that by nature śabda, artha

(fn. 102 ctd.)

as against the other Indian systems admitted the doctrine of sphoṭa which was denied even by Sāṃkhya".

103 See also K.K. RAJA (1956, 84-116)

and pratyaya are experienced as one. A sound uttered by a living being is always the bearer of meaning. It is also accompanied by an image in the mind of the percipient. If the sound is unknown, it can be understood by directly perceiving the idea in the mind of the sender. To achieve this direct perception or sāksātkāra of the idea in the sender's consciousness, the yogin must make the distinction between word, meaning and image the subject of his meditative absorption and ecstasy. This seems to be the message of the above sūtra. There is no need here to assume that it contains any reference to sphoṭa. Considering the context in which it appears, it probably merely relates to the very practical matter of reading another person's mind which is a generally recognised yogic feat. The explanations of Vācaspati Miśra and others must be rejected as too far-fetched. Interestingly, Vyāsa makes no mention of the term sphoṭa at all. According to him the matching of sounds with objects is purely conventional (samketa), and the act of recognising the meaning of words is a question of memory. Thus the blame for this whole confusion must be put on Vācaspati Miśra.

It is but natural that out of these methodological and conceptual divergencies there should also arise differences in the terminology adopted by Classical Yoga and Classical Sāṃkhya respectively. The preceding pages contain numerous examples which document this fact, and hence there is no need for duplication here. I merely wish to remind the reader of such specific yogic terms as aliṅga, liṅga-mātra, asmitā-mātra, aviśeṣa, viśeṣa, citta, vṛtti and pratyaya which either are absent in the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā or, else, have an entirely different connotation. The autonomy of the technical vocabulary of Classical Yoga is, I think, indisputable.

To sum up: As is apparent from a critical examination of the Yoga-Sūtra, far from being a mere imitation of Classical Sāṃkhya, Pātañjala-Yoga has all the characteristic marks of a thoroughly independent philosophical school of thought. Patañjali, or whoever may have been responsible for the composition of the Yoga-Sūtra, emerges as a striking personality who must be counted among the most creative minds of India. It would be almost frivolous to deny that he was intimately connected with the Yoga tradition and that he himself must have been a yogin of considerable attainment. He shows an unparalleled insight into yogic processes and, contrary to H.T. COLEBROOKE's (1873, I, 265) biased opinion, was not "more mystic and fanatical" than Kapila who "makes a nearer approach to philosophical disquisition". He had little sectarian inclination, if any. He showed a healthy respect for tradition but not at the expense of the immediacy of personal verification. Far from burdening his epigones with unintelligible mumbo-jumbo, he produced a work of fine texture and remarkable insight which compares favourably with the philosophical creations of his contemporaries, and which has deservedly inspired countless generations of yogins of all denominations.

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