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French Leaders Look at The United Nations

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FRENCH LEADERS LOOK AT THE UNITED NATIONS

The changing world arena of the past few years has touched
each of its participants more or less deeply. Among the nations of
the West, none has been more deeply transformed than France. Among
the international organizations that figure in world politics, none
has been more dramatically involved than the United Nations. That
French perspectives on the United Nations should have changed during
this period seems a natural outcome of events. Some of these events,
such as Suez and Algeria, brought the French Republic and the United
Nations into direct conflict. These produced rapid alterations in
French views of the United Nations, although not always in the direc-
tion that seems most obvious. A more profound impact, it would seem,
has been registered by the transformation of France itself during
the past few years -- independent of, but parallel to, the continuing
evolution of the United Nations as an international force.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the perspectives
which govern the opinions of French leaders toward the United Nations.
Having identified them, we shall seek to characterize the differences
between them in terms of their motivation, content, and outcome. It
will not do to say simply that "the French" are hostile to the United
Nations because they are nationalists. While traditional nationalism
is still a powerful political emotion in France, it is expressed in
various ways among contemporary Frenchmen. The varieties of French

nationalism today include -- and the paradox is more apparent than real -- commitments to internationalism and loyalties to supranationalism.

The principal forms of international action that have involved French participation over the past decade are the European Community, the Atlantic Community, the United Nations. A prevailing Western view, one might almost say the official view, is that these three levels of collective action are mutually compatible and even reciprocally reinforcing. Nothing in the institutional design and functional tasks of these communities excludes full participation in either of the others. Indeed, excepting only Germany, the member nations of the European Community also participate in the Atlantic Community and in the United Nations.

Nevertheless, they represent quite distinct levels of collective action, operating through separate institutions to accomplish separate (even if compatible) purposes. What has become clear, during the past few years, is that they are also capable of arousing quite distinct emotions and quite different loyalties. To comprehend the full array of French attitudes towards the United Nations, it is indispensable to collate and compare their attitudes towards the other instruments of collective international action. Some of the more dramatic alterations of French political attitudes have their locus here.

Our interest, then, is not to deliver any summary conclusion that "the French" are against the United Nations because they are nationalists or for the United Nations because they are internationalists. Our concern is, rather, to differentiate the nuances of French opinion along a continuum of international attitudes which runs from total

hostility to total advocacy toward the United Nations. Both extremes, pro and con, are represented among current French leaders. The more numerous, realistic and ultimately, we believe, the most important atti-tudes lie between these extremes.

This conclusion emerged from a continuing survey of attitudes towards collective international action among the French elite. Our survey began in September 1954, a fortnight after the defeat of EDC, and was repeated annually until the spring of 1956. In the course of this survey, some 2000 leading Frenchmen were interviewed on a full array of issues concerning France's position in the international arena, including the United Nations. Our panel of respondents included leading figures in seven principal sectors of French public life -- government and politics; business and labor; the military; the church, and the secular intelligentsia. This was not a contact poll of public opinion, but a prolonged attitude survey among the French elite. We were concerned to determine how this well-informed panel of policy-advisers and decision-makers perceived the world political arena, and evaluated the place of France in that arena.

Our inquiry was focused on the issues of collective interna-tional action. Given the depressed condition of Europe in the imme-diate postwar decade, and given the slowly spreading recognition that world power was no longer lodged in the European continent, how were the European leaders perceiving the problems of collective action at the start of the second postwar decade? Our survey posed the same set of questions simultaneously to comparable panels of leaders in France, Britain and Germany. We were thus in a position to compare the elite attitudes in all three countries during each year of our survey, and

also to compare the evolution of such attitudes in all three countries during the years 1954-56. We have already reported the comparative evolution of European attitudes toward problems of economic growth and military security.[1] In this paper we focus on French attitudes toward the issues of collective international organization with special attention to the United Nations.

One finding of our 1954-56 survey was that French attitudes differed rather sharply from the others. The quality that differen- tiated French from other European attitudes toward the United Nations was its cool indifference. The phrase cool indifference is used as an empirical description of our survey result. Coolness was manifested by the tendency to make relatively unfavorable rather than favorable judgments on the performance and prospects of the United Nations. Indifference was manifested by the relatively low intensity of such unfavorable judgment (and by the relatively low inclination to express oneself at all on questions concerning the United Nations).

While this finding may appear to be no news for observers con- vinced that the French are systematically hostile to the United Nations, nevertheless it shows certain features that are not easily compatible with the hypothesis of systematic hostility. Considered as a continu- um of attitudes, coolness does lead at one extreme to explicit hostility, and indifference does lead at another extreme to explicit contempt. But the plain fact of our survey is that relatively few respondents in our French panel expressed either overt hostility or explicit contempt.

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1. See D. Lerner and M. Gorden, "European Leaders Look at World Security", (CENIS Document, C/60-7).

These extreme attitudes were found to exist only among marginal sectors of the French elite. There was no evidence to show that these extreme attitudes are more widely distributed, or more centrally located, among the elite in France than elsewhere.

What was distinctive among the French elite was the characteristic tonality of attitude toward the United Nations -- i.e., the relatively negative valence of judgment integrated with the relatively low intensity of interest. In many countries the general level of detailed information about the United Nations is low, even among the elite of the nation. But, in other countries, ignorance is typically coupled with a dominant attitude of warm interest and sympathetic approval. People may not know very much about the structure and functioning of the United Nations, but they tend to approve of its existence and hope that "some good" will come of its activities. In France, on the contrary, the modal quality of response was cool indifference. Among those who neither know nor care about the United Nations, this attitude tended toward absolute hostility or contempt. Among those French respondents who did know or care in some measure, the prevailing indifference was rather more qualified by their greater interest in other issues of international cooperation (as compared with the advocacy of United Nations manifested by the elites of Britain and Germany).

The profile of French attitudes toward the United Nations was more complex and nuanced than we had expected. Analysis of our 1954-56 materials showed that a just appreciation of these responses would have to set them in the full context of French perceptions of

the world political arena. Moreover, it was clear that the shifting
scene of international politics would be likely to produce greater
changes in French attitudes toward the United Nations than in the
more stable and generally favorable attitudes of the British and German
elites. While this analysis was in process, during the years of
1957-58, two dramatic events directly involving France with the United
Nations in fact occurred -- Suez and Algeria. Accordingly, in the
spring of 1959, we returned to Europe and made a fresh survey of atti-
tudes toward the United Nations. Our interest was to determine which
attitudes had remained constant, which attitudes had changed and in
what ways. The present paper reports on the stable and shifting ele-
ments, as between 1956 and 1959, in the attitudes of French leaders
toward the United Nations. We begin with a summary of the picture
that emerged from our 1956 survey.

The Situation in 1956

In the course of our 1956 survey, we asked the French panel:
"Do you think the United Nations will play an important role in the
future?" This vague and diffuse question was designed to differentiate
the French panel in terms of their general orientation, quite inde-
pendent of specific motivations or judgments. The panel in fact divided
quite neatly on this question: 48% said yes, 43% said no, and 9% did
not respond. This sharp division was characteristic of the French
panel; in the other countries a considerably larger proportion of re-
spondents said yes. French "cool indifference" was expressed in this
disinclination to believe in the United Nations as an important in-
strument of collective international action

orientation manifests hardly anything more than a tone of voice, it made a good starting point for our inquiry.

Accordingly, we sought to establish some defining characteristics of the two groups -- were the yea-sayers (pro-UN), as compared with the nay-sayers (anti-UN) older or younger, more or less educated, better or worse informed? If the two groups could be differentiated by such overt biographical characteristics, then we might be able to explain their different orientation in terms of their life history. Such differences between the two groups turned out, in fact, to be too small to provide any convincing explanation. The marginal differences that appeared, however, were fairly suggestive. Since each group contained about a hundred respondents (99 yea-sayers and 89 nay-sayers), we considered that differences exceeding five percent on such biographical characteristics were noteworthy.

Thus, while the age variation between the two groups was consistently small, we note that the nay-sayers are more centrally located in the age group of 50-60. The yea-sayers disperse somewhat more among both older and younger groups. There was no noteworthy variation in level of education, since the whole elite panel is a highly educated group. The variations in education which exist are more clearly reflected in the occupational differences between the two groups. The yea-sayers are more heavily concentrated in politics and the universities; the nay-sayers are more heavily recruited from the higher civil service, journalism, and the professions.

An interesting variation appeared in the responses dealing with public information. Our panel as a whole is clearly a well-informed segment of the French population. The majority believe they have

adequate information to evaluate international events, while only one out of three respondents considers the information available to him as insufficient. They are highly exposed to all channels of information, including the press and the periodicals, the mass media, travel, and personal contacts. Variation occurred when respondents were asked to rank the various sources of information in order of importance. Here the nay-sayers quite substantially consider that "personal contact" is their most important source of information (35% as compared with 22% of the yea-sayers). This may reflect the occupational concern of journalists with "inside dope" from personal sources. Alternatively, it may reflect a somewhat larger skepticism about public information among the nay-sayers.

There is some collateral evidence to indicate that the nay-sayers are, on the whole, a more skeptical and "hard-headed" group than the yea-sayers. One such indication is the typical distribution of responses across the full array of questions posed in our interview. Typically, the yea-sayers tend to be more uncertain; more of them consistently "don't know" or "can't decide" how to answer our questions. Among those who do respond, however, the yea-sayers rather consistently give an affirmative response to questions, where the nay-sayers tend to give a negative response (regardless of the content of the question). There is a substantial literature in psychological journals which suggests that "yea-saying" and "nay-saying" in the interview situation is often an expression of more profound personality differences between respondents.[2]

2. Arthur Couch and Kenneth Keniston, "Yeasayers and Naysayers: Response Set as a Personality Variable", Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol.60, March, 1960, No.2, pp.151-174.

We can illustrate the point, in the present instance, by reference to responses to four quite diverse topics. One set of questions dealt with the role of public opinion in politics. When asked whether public opinion should have more influence on political decisions, 49% naysayers said no as compared with 40% yea-sayers. When asked specifically whether public opinion should have more influence on foreign policy, the difference between the two groups became even wider: 55% nay-sayers as compared with 42% yea-sayers.

Another set of questions dealt with the role of science in society. When asked whether science can change man, only 52% nay-sayers believed that it could, whereas 59% yea-sayers did so. When asked more specifically whether science was capable of improving political life (determining policy in a more rational way), the nay-sayers were clearly more skeptical. Whereas 3% yea-sayers believed science could improve policy, only 42% of the nay-sayers said definitely no.

An especially interesting demonstration of skepticism came in the response to our question: "Do you believe that the world is evolving in a determined direction?" While the specific form of determinism that might occur to most Frenchmen in the spring of 1956 was Marxism, our question designed to differentiate all sorts of determinists from the skeptics. It is noteworthy that only 17% of the yea-sayers were skeptical of all determinism as compared with 29% of the nay-sayers.

The foregoing indicates that nay-sayers -- those who are skeptical about the future importance of the United Nations -- are also more skeptical and "hard-headed" about many other questions. In earlier studies, we have seen that "hard-headedness" can be an important differentiating factor among Frenchmen. The tradition of difference

in committing onseself to risky new enterprises, to preferring a skep-
tical no over an optimistic yes, is fairly well established among the
French elite.[3]

Accordingly, it is worth noting where the hard-headed skeptics
deviate from their accustomed pattern of negativism on new and strange
propositions involving international collaboration. One set of
questions began by asking respondents whether they would approve the
integration of French armed forces into an international army. We
then asked whether respondents considered it preferable for France
to produce its armaments entirely at home or in an international arma-
ments pool. On both these questions, a majority of all respondents
favored the international solution, but the nay-sayers gave conspi-
cuously more approval than the yea-sayers. This, paradoxically, sug-
gested that those Frenchmen cool to the UN were more warmly "inter-
nationalist". A more plausible hypothesis seemed to be that the nay-
sayers were more concerned with security matters. The final question
in the set appeared to corroborate this. When asked: "Should France
manufacture thermo-nuclear weapons?", the nay-sayers again gave con-
spicuously more approval to this activity than the yea-sayers. The
proportions saying yes on all three of the foregoing questions are
shown in Table 1:

Table 1:   UN Orientation and Security Issues

	Yea-Sayers	Nay-Sayers
Approve International Army	59%	62%
Approve Armament Pool	57	67
Approve Nuclear Weapons	51	62

3.   See "The Hard-Headed Frenc......, ...
......, 1957.

Rather consistently, then, those French respondents who took a dim view of UN prospects showed a greater concern with security issues. Substantially more of them approved extreme measures designed to advance the French security posture, such as the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Substantially more of them approved every proposal for collective international action in the arena of security -- including an international army (widely identified with UN in 1956). That the diffidence and skepticism of the nay-sayers should break down at this point, that the issues of security should evoke so strong an "internationalist" response among them, provided the key needed to unlock the puzzle. Further analysis of our data indicated that the nay-sayers were a different breed of "internationalists" from the yea-sayers. They strongly advocated other forms of international action while remaining cooly indifferent to the United Nations, because they had a quite different image of the world political arena.

These contrasting images emerged in response to a set of questions concerning the present shape and future prospects of world politics. We asked: "Do you think that your generation will see a third world war?" Fewer nay-sayers were prepared to be optimistic on this question: Only 45% said no, as compared with 52% of the yea-sayers. More of them were prepared to say that they definitely did expect a third world war within their own lifetime. The qualitative difference in these responses is more profound than the quantitative difference. The expectation of war is perhaps the most fundamental element in a person's political perspective. A man who believes that a war will happen within his own lifetime is likely to make different choices, award

different priorities, stress different issues than a person who ex=
pects peace.

The contrast in political perspectives between the two groups
was further extended when we asked whether the shape of world politics
was more aptly characterized as coexistence or cold war. The yea-
sayers were significantly more inclined to say coexistence: 38% as
compared with 25%. The nay-sayers were significantly more inclined to
describe the structure of international politics as cold war: 28%
as compared with 17%. It is worth recalling, in this connection, that
the nay-sayers had expressed much greater skepticism when asked whether
the world was developing in a determined direction. Yet, while skepti=
cal of determinism in general, the nay-sayers clearly were more ready
to foresee the determined evolution of world politics as continuing
cold war erupting into hot war within their own lifetime.

Their darker perspective on the political future probably ac-
counts for their greater concern with the issues of security. It sug-
gests also the particular sense in which they are more "internationalist"
than those French yea-sayers who support the UN, but do not foresee
a continuing cold war or an erupting hot war, and are therefore less
intensely concerned with armies and armaments.

The "internationalism" of the naysayers turned out to be quite
definitely a preference for collective action among the European
nations. On every question which gave respondents a choice between
various forms of international cooperation, the non-UN people con-
sistently preferred the European Community and its institutions over
all other forms. One question asked directly which form of interna-
tional cooperation they considered preferable for France -- giving

respondents a choice between European, Atlantic, United Nations, Free World, and world institutions. The nay-sayers strongly preferred European institutions, as manifested both in the Europe of Six (Coal-Steel Community) and the Europe of Fifteen (OEEC). These European institutions together received a preference of 44% nay-sayers as compared with 36% yea-sayers.

Not only do the nay-sayers prefer the European form of collective action, but, despite their accustomed skepticism, they are considerably more optimistic that these institutions will be successful. When asked to identify the most influential countries in the world balance of power, the responses of the two groups were virtually identical on all points except one. About one third in each group named the United States and another third named the U.S.S.R. Other countries (e.g., China, India) were named by small identical reactions in both groups, the important difference being in respect to Europe. Whereas only 19% of the yea-sayers ranked Europe as "most influential" in the present balance of world power, 28% of the nay-sayers did so -- nearly as many as gave the palm to either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. When asked what changes they foresaw in the future balance of world power, the nay-sayers again expressed greater confidence in the increasing influence of Europe.

The greater confidence in the present and future of Europe expressed by the nay-sayers showed itself in interesting variations between the two groups concerning the role of individual countries. The nay-sayers were considerably more confident about the power of Britain. This may explain why, as we saw earlier, the nay-sayers

expressed a much greater interest in "getting along" with the British despite their general diffidence about foreigners as compared with the more diffuse xenophilia of the yea-sayers. Similarly, in forecasting a role of increasing influence for Europe in the world balance of power, the nay-sayers were much more inclined than the yea-sayers (over 2 to 1) to forecast a significant rise in German power. This appeared to be associated with the greater determination of the nay-sayers to count on strong Franco-German cooperation as the basis for collective international action in the future. For example, when asked whether they foresaw any obstacles to Franco-German understandings, the yea-sayers were much more inclined to foresee obstacles (76% as compared with 61%) and to specify these obstacles, usually in terms of the historic antagonism between the two countries. The nay-sayers, on the other hand, were much more inclined to state explicitly that there would be "no obstacles", 31% of them expressing this optimistic view as compared with 14% of the yea-sayers.

This sequence of findings puts us in a better position to understand the differences between the two groups, particularly the form which "internationalism" has taken among those French respondents who are skeptical about the future of the United Nations. In summarizing these results, it is important to bear in mind that the quantitative differences between the two groups are relatively small. This indicates that on many issues Frenchmen tend to agree, regardless of their orientation toward the United Nations. What is striking about these differences is their qualitative significance -- i.e., their consistency of direction and the intensity of the attitudes involved. Thus, there is a high level of "internationalist" sentiment among the French all

as a whole -- not a systematic hostility based on traditional nationalism as is usually supposed.

But this sentiment attaches itself to two quite divergent lines of policy thinking. For those Frenchmen who pin their confidence on the United Nations, the meanings traditionally associated with "internationalism" still retain their validity. These respondents are more optimistic about the future of the world. They foresee no third world war, and they foresee the shading of cold war into peaceful coexistence. They are less concerned with security issues, hence they are less ready to advocate the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the internationalization of French armaments in a pool, the internationalization of the French armed forces. This perspective makes a critical difference in the priorities they assign to the policy choices that face Frenchmen in the field of international cooperation. The yea-sayers are more concerned with, and more substantially favorable to, the United Nations and its institutions than to any other form of international cooperation.

The nay-sayers are led into quite a different sequence of policy preferences. We recall that they are not hostile to the United Nations. The question which differentiated them from the yea-sayers was whether they thought the United Nations would play an important role in the future. The nay-sayers said no; but the apparent inference from this judgment that the nay-sayers were anti-internationalists turned out to be false. Without being hostile to the UN, the nay-sayers are less concerned with it because they are less confident that it can solve those problems which they consider most important. These are the problems of collective security. On this range of issue

the nay-sayers are neither xenophobic nor nationalistic. Indeed, on precisely these issues they are more "internationalist" than the yea-sayers. They are more convinced that these are the crucial issues which require hard-headed imagination, invention, internationalism.

The quality of hard-headedness concerns us here not as a virtue or defect of the French character, but rather as a habit of mind which differentiates the thinking on current issues of Frenchmen who, in other respects, think alike. If the nay-sayers appear to be more hard-headed, this does not imply that the yea-sayers are soft-headed. A skeptical habit of mind is ingrained in most Frenchmen, and the smallness of the differences between the two groups, which represent only two general orientations toward the future importance of the United Nations, may reflect only a difference of attitude toward questions of international politics rather than a more general disposition. The two groups tend to pick different things to be hard-headed about.

For example, at first glance, the yea-sayers appear to be generally better disposed toward foreigners. More of them consider that contact with foreigners is "very useful" as a source of information on international problems. Conversely, more of the nay-sayers consider such foreign contact to be of "little use", and more of them read foreign books.

An interesting clue to these differences came when we asked respondents with which foreigners they had the best "understanding". In response, one third of the yea-sayers (twice as many as the nay-sayers) refused to choose among foreigners; a substantial proportion evaded a direct choice by saying that they "liked all foreigners".

The nay-sayers, generally less reticent about making definite choices
and explicit commitments, were much clearer on their preferences.
They gave a substantial vote to the British and the Latins, while on
most other nationalities the two groups were roughly similar. (We
note with interest, in passing, that the Germans rated first on the
yea-sayers list with 15%, second on the nay-sayers list with 13%).
This suggests to us that the nay-sayers are not significantly more
xenophobic than the yea-sayers, but they are somewhat more "hard-
headed" about foreigners in the sense that they select their contacts
more deliberately. This may explain why the nay-sayers, while they
consider personal contact at home to be far more useful than such con-
tacts abroad, nevertheless tend to listen more to foreign radio than
the yea-sayers.

We do not dare to push this suggestive line of inquiry too
far, for our data on the biographical characteristics and intellec-
tual style of the French panel are too limited to permit a really
systematic differentiation between optimists and pessimists with
respect to the future of the United Nations. Indeed, we might have
omitted this aspect of our findings altogether did it not seem to be
connected with the more significant differences that turned up when
we compared the two groups of French respondents with respect to more
overt political and ideological issues. These differences emerged
when we investigated the specific meaning of internationalism.

From Internationalism to Collective Action

To comprehend the dramatic transformation of internationalism
among the contemporary French elite, it is necessary to

from the conventional meanings assigned to this term by Americans.
Internationalism means for us, as it has until recently for most
people, advocacy of active good will and effective cooperation among
nations. Since 1945, however, internationalism has increasingly been
identified among us with the particular institution of the United
Nations. It has become axiomatic that an internationalist supports
the United Nations; a person who does not support the United Nations
is not an internationalist. There has been no reason to question
this identification because none other of our commitments to inter-
national cooperation -- e.g., the Organization of American States, or
our various regional alliances with NATO, CENTO, SEATO, ANZUS -- has
come into conflict with our allegiance to the United Nations.

Internationalism has taken a different turn in France during
the past few years. A substantial number of French leaders have per-
ceived a conflict of interest -- or at least a conflict of political
priorities -- between the United Nations and other forms of interna-
tional cooperation which they consider more important for France.
The particular focus of this issue is the European Community.

It seems likely that the current commitment of Frenchmen to
the European Community is not precisely identical with our conventional
understanding of internationalism. The genuine internationalist
favors cooperation among nations for the mutual benefit of all parti-
cipants. It is part of his commitment, usually implicit but neverthe-
less well understood, that the arena of international cooperation
should be as wide as possible -- i.e., that any nation willing to abide
by certain minimal rules of cooperation should be admitted to the co
operative community. It is also implicit in the internationalist co
as a profound article of faith, that international cooperation wil

gradually dissolve the petty play of nationalist interests within the larger focus of the common good of a world community.

Internationalism has taken on a different valence among a substantial segment of the contemporary French elite. The idea of a European Community has animated a drive towards collective international action which diverges from some of the basic attitudinal commitments traditionally associated with internationalism. Its goal is not an ever-enlarging world community, but a small (and perhaps narrowing) continental community. It seeks not the common good of all nations, but the common good of those nations directly participating in the European Community. Its motivation is not to dissolve national interests, but to increase the power of the European nations to maintain their interests. For many Frenchmen, it seems fair to say, the European Community is a way of restoring the French nation to its former greatness. This involves international cooperation, but with a different sequence of ends and means, of perspectives and procedures. It is internationalism harnessed directly to the national welfare.

In sketching the new version of internationalism found among the French elite so sharply, we have run ahead of our story. The reader will properly ask on what basis we have reached these conclusions. With the reminder that these are not firm conclusions, but interpretations suggested by our 1956 survey that we were to recheck in 1959, we can indicate the data underlying this analysis. The trail of our hypothesis began when we asked our 207 French respondents: "Do you think that France can decide her future on her own, or must she cooperate with other nations?" The clear preponderance of opinion

was that the national capability of France was not sufficient to decide her future, that France must cooperate with other nations.

However, when we compared the responses given by yea-sayers and nay-sayers to the United Nations, a rather surprising result emerged. Fewer "internationalists" were convinced of the necessity for international cooperation! Whereas 72% of the yea-sayers said international cooperation was indispensable, 82% of the nay-sayers said this. How, the question arose, was it possible for "internationalists" to be less committed to the need for international cooperation than others? A suspicion that interpreting this result in terms of conventional "internationalism" would put us on the wrong track arose when we noticed the response to the next question: "Do you think that France can avoid a choice between the two camps (East and West)?" We had to put this question next in our interview schedule on the view that those who believed that international cooperation was indispensable would, by the political logic of 1956, be less committed to the idea of a neutralist position between the East and West camps and therefore more committed to the idea of the Western alliance as a form of international cooperation. This expectation was utterly confounded, as was the parallel expectation that those more convinced that France needed international cooperation would a fortiori be more committed to the United Nations. The response, indeed, was precisely the reverse of what we had expected. The yea-sayers, who supported the UN and believed in its future, considerably outnumbered the nay-sayers (32 to 19) in responding that France could avoid a choice between the two camps. Conversely, the nay-sayers were considerably more definite in asserting (48 to 36) that France could not avoid a choice between the two camps

These results appeared to be either meaningless (with respect to the intent of our questions) or else paradoxical. For, if they meant anything, it was that the official "internationalists" (UN supporters) were in some sense _less_ internationalist than those who took a dim view of the UN. To see whether our questions were irrelevant or our a priori expectations erroneous, we ransacked our interviews and our statistical tabulations for additional enlightenment. The set of questions dealing with military matters provided the clue needed to qualify our interpretation of "the new internationalism" in meaningful fashion.

For it was on just this range of issues -- and only on issues related to security -- that the nay-sayers consistently proved to be stronger advocates of collective international action. We have seen that the nay-sayers are more inclined to foresee a world arena in which continuing cold war will erupt into hot war within their own lifetime. The expectation of World War III shapes their perspective on most issues of current policy. It explains why the nay-sayers give greater priority, in the scheme of France's international relations, to the need for a strong system of collective security.

Thereby hangs the tale of "the new internationalism". For the nay-sayers believe the European Community to be a more effective basis for collective security than the United Nations. This variation in their judgment entails, moreover, a systematic divergence on many current policy issues. In particular, they diverge from the attitude traditionally associated with the term "internationalism". They are less concerned with internationalism as the way to a peaceful world community; they are more concerned with collective action for the world

of a strong European community. This transition from "internationalism"
to "collective action" underlies their thinking about the full range
of European and world issues. The difference between the two groups,
which we have already seen in their divergent views of international
cooperation, emerged even more clearly from a set of questions dealing
explicitly with the European Community.

PRIORITY OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

We began by asking the respondents to state whether they were,
in general, "for" or "against" the European idea. Only a tiny frac-
tion of all respondents declared themselves "against". However, a
significantly larger proportion of nay-sayers declared themselves
"for" the European Community without reservations: 77% as compared
with 56% yea-sayers. The latter, who assign the UN top priority in
international cooperation, were much more inclined to qualify their
approval. Over twice as many yea-sayers declared themselves "for
Europe, but with reservations".

Unfortunately, we did not ask respondents to specify the sub-
stance of their "reservations", (an oversight we corrected three years
later in the 1959 survey). But in 1956 it was already clear that for
many French leaders an inverse relationship existed between the United
Nations and the European Community in terms of policy priority.
Greater concern with the European Community entailed lesser concern
with the United Nations, and vice-versa. This inverse relationship
emerged as a specific point of policy tension among French leaders in
1956. No such relationship appeared in our 1956 survey of Britain or

Germany. This point of tension seemed to grow directly out of specifically French concerns and perspectives of that period.

Another point of special interest in the French data was the direct relationship exhibited between general approval of the European Community and intensity of commitment. That is, the more one approved of the European idea the more one was willing to endorse extreme commitments (i.e., sacrifices of national sovereignty) to insure the efficient functioning of its institutions. As compared with their cool indifference to UN, the nay-sayers exhibited warm advocacy of Europe. This is shown by a question that asked: "What form should the European idea take?" Choices were arranged in increasing order of supranational commitments that would diminish national sovereignty: reciprocal alliance, confederation, federal state. The yea-sayers tended to prefer the less committal form of a reciprocal alliance; the nay-sayers tended to prefer the most supranational form: 35% nay-sayers opted for a federal state as compared with 30% yea-sayers.

This relationship was confirmed, and even extended, when respondents were asked to express approval or disapproval of the existing European organizations. The nay-sayers gave significantly more approval to the more binding forms of supranational organization, particularly those concerned with military and economic cooperation. The yea-sayers tended to approve more highly of the looser organizations with more diffuse political purposes. The distribution of approval between the two groups is shown in Table 2:

Table 2. Approval of European Organizations

	Nay-Sayers	Yea-Sayers
Coal-Steel Community	82%	70%
NATO	80	64
OEEC	79	69
Council of Europe	61	64
Paris Agreements (WEU)	46	52

There are several points of interest in these figures. The differences are greatest with respect to the Coal-Steel Community and NATO. These were, respectively, the "tightest" institutions of international cooperation in the military and economic fields extant in 1956. To these institutions the nay-sayers gave their greatest approval; the yea-sayers, while certainly not hostile, were much less enthusiastic. Even the OEEC, which had produced its "binding" effect by utility rather than legality, was less highly favored by the yea-sayers. Only the two loosest, least focused, and probably least effective of the European organizations drew more approval from the yea-sayers than the nay-sayers. It is noteworthy that the yea-sayers gave just as much approval to the Council of Europe as to NATO. This probably reflects their greater concern with political rather than military issues, and possibly indicates their "reservations" about the European idea. The nay-sayers, on the contrary, approve the most tightly knit organizations concerned with military and economic issues, and show relatively less concern with looser institutions designed mainly for political discussion. Indeed, the Paris agreements failed to muster a majority of approval among the nay-sayers.

This is a particularly interesting result, in the context of 1956, and merits some explanation. The Paris Agreements, which created the West European Union (WEU), were essentially a device designed to secure the admission of Germany into NATO. They were regarded as a consolation prize after the defeat of the European Defense Community (EDC). Under the EDC, a fully integrated European army had been designed to incorporate both French and German along with the other continental armed forces under a supranational command. The defeat of EDC by the French National Assembly appeared calamitous to the pro-Europeans. The alternative solution of WEU, which was hastily rushed through the National Assembly in a dramatic New Year's Eve session, was regarded by strong "Europeans" less as a consolation than as certifying the end of their hopes for a genuinely integrated European Defense Community.

On this basis, one might expect the lukewarm attitude toward WEU expressed by the nay-sayers in 1956 to signify mainly that they would have preferred EDC. And so, indeed, it turns out. When we asked respondents whether they had favored EDC, 56% nay-sayers said yes as compared with 46% yea-sayers. Here, again, the tighter form of supranational organization for collective security was approved by significantly more nay-sayers.

A similar tendency appeared with respect to collective economic action. Respondents were asked whether they believed the extension of the European Coal-Steel Community (ECSC) to other fields was feasible. This was a point of earnest French debate in 1956. While the ECSC principle was widely approved, the debate hinged upon its feasibility. Skepticism was widespread. Yet, despite their usually greater

skepticism on other issues, fewer nay-sayers (11% as compared with 16% yea-sayers) were willing to express doubt that the extension of ECSC was feasible. Since such extension subsequently occurred through the Common Market, it is worth looking more closely at those Frenchmen who, in 1956, preferred European Community to United Nations. The issue was formulated, at the time, as supranationalism.

Supranationalism Versus Internationalism

To obtain a clearer view of the presumed conflict of loyalties between United Nations and European Community -- the conflict, so to speak, between internationalism and supranationalism -- we constructed a matrix which showed the joint distribution of responses to both institutions. In order to do this, we were obliged to omit the 27 respondents who failed to give a clear answer on either. The remaining 180 respondents were classified into pro-UN(+) and anti-UN(-) groups. We then tallied the number of persons in each group who approved (+), approved with reservations (0), or opposed (-) the European idea. The result is shown in Table 3:

Table 3.   The Europe-UN Matrix

	Pro-UN(+)	Anti-UN(-)
Pro-Europe (+)	55	68
Pro- with reservations (0)	34	16
Anti-Europe (-)	5	2

N = 94   86   = 180

Several interesting features of French thinking on international
issues are here expressed in numerical form. Clearly, attitude toward
Europe is the dominant feature, and attitude toward United Nations the
recessive feature, of this simultaneous distribution. There is virtu-
ally no opposition to the European idea among the French elite, re-
gardless of their orientation toward the United Nations. While there
is a substantial amount of negativism ("cool indifference") to the
United Nations, this is very largely confined to the pro-Europeans.
Those who are less firmly committed to Europe ("pro- with reservations")
tend to be considerably less negative and more favorable to the
United Nations. These points become clearer when we arrange the
groups in order of decreasing size, as in Table 4.

Table 4. The Europe-UN Subgroups

Group		N	Europe	UN
A	(D)	68	+	-
B	(A)	55	+	+
C	(B)	34	0	+
D	(E)	16	()	-
X		5	-	+
Y		2	-	-

Group A thus contains the 68 respondents who are pro-Europe but
anti-UN; group B contains the 55 respondents who are pro-Europe and
pro-UN; etc. Since groups X and Y are too small to permit statisti-
cal analysis (reflecting the virtual absence of hostility to the

European idea among the French elite), we shall drop them from consideration and confine our attention to the four top groups.

Our first concern is to compare groups A and B. Among those who are pro-European, what differences occur as between the pro-UN and anti-UN subgroups? As our earlier analysis had suggested that differences between these groups followed from their divergent images of the political future, we looked first at this range of issues. Group A, those who oppose the UN, are less confident than group B (who support both institutions) that there will be no third world war, that the trend of international politics is toward peaceful coexistence. Indeed, they are the least optimistic of all four groups on these issues and the most convinced (by nearly 2 to 1) that continuing cold war will shape the political future.

It is consistent with this darker view of the future, therefore, that group A should be more intensely concerned with security issues and give more substantial support to military measures designed to strengthen France's security position. The differences are clear on three security issues that were highly controversial in 1956 -- i.e., French commitment to NaTO, French manufacture of atomic weapons, French participation in a European armament pool. The proportions of groups A and B expressing unqualified approval on each of these issues are compared in Table 5:

Table 5. Security Measures

	NaTO	Atomic Weapons	Arms Pool
Group A	87%	64%	77%
Group B	69	46	65

This does not mean that the pro-UN group B is indifferent to security problems or to international cooperation in this field. For example, group B gives slightly more support to the idea of an international army (which was usually associated with the United Nations in the discussions of 1956). It does mean that the group B people are less convinced that security issues should take top priority in French policy thinking.

The situation is rather similar in the field of economic activity. The two main models of economic cooperation available in 1956 were the Coal-Steel Community (Europe of Six) and the OEEC (Big Europe). As the more tightly knit institution, with some features of supranational control, the Coal-Steel Community (ECSC) was preferred by strong advocates of European collective action. A controversial question of the day was whether the ECSC model could be extended into other fields (along the lines of what has subsequently become the European Common Market). On all three of these questions, as shown in Table 6, group A expressed significantly higher approval than group B:

Table 6. Approval of Economic Measures

	ECSC	OEEC	ECSC Extension
Group A	87	86	81
Group B	78	75	76

The greater concern of group A with collective action among the European economies derives from their rather different image of the

economic future. This appeared when respondents were asked whether a rising standard of living could be maintained in France, and in the rest of the world? Table 7 shows the proportion in each group who believed that a rising standard could be maintained:

Table 7. Rising Economical Levels

	In France	In World
Group A	82%	75%
Group B	71	80

While both groups of European supporters are optimistic in general, there is a clear divergence in their imagery of the economic future. The pro-UN subgroup B is considerably more optimistic about the rest of the world than it is about France; the anti-UN subgroup A reverses this expectation. This is consistent with group A's greater concern with collective economic action in the Europe of Six.

These differences of expectation appear to account for the divergence on policy priorities. It explains why the anti-UN subgroup A is more negative (25%) toward such organizations as the Council of Europe than the pro-UN subgroup B (15%). Group A is less receptive to anything that smacks of parliamentary discussion of international cooperation and much more intensely concerned with international institutions for collective action. Since such institutions have been more directly associated with the supranational organs of the European Community, their interest is focused on this direction. This appears to be the critical point in differentiating the internationalists from the supranationalists among the French elite.

Nationalism Versus Internationalism

While groups A and B clearly diverge on the issue of suprana-
tionalism, it is also obvious that they have much in common. Indeed,
when compared with groups C and D, they are more alike than different.
Groups C and D, in turn, differ from each other on many issues much
less than they differ from the two preceding groups. This suggests
that intensity of commitment to the European Community remains a cri-
tical factor differentiating the full spectrum of political attitudes
among the French elite.

This line of cleavage emerged rather consistently in all questions
which offered respondents a choice among various levels of interna-
tional cooperation ranging from the traditional forms of alliance to
much tighter institutions with supranational elements. In the question
dealing with foreign policy cooperation, for example, the most supra-
national option was a "federal state". Similarly the most suprana-
tional form of military cooperation was EDC. Other such issues con-
cern the integration of the French armed forces into an international
army, the integration of French armaments into an arms pool. On all
these questions groups A and B were closer to each other and more
distant from groups C and D. The distribution of the four groups on
all the foregoing questions is shown on Table 8:

Table 8. Internationalism versus Nationalism

	Common Council	Federal State	EDC	International Army	Arms Pool	Atomic Pool
Group A	31%	44%	62%	71%	77%	40%
Group B	25	44	65	74	65	36
Group C	12	18	30	47	59	24
Group D	19	6	44	44	25	19

It is striking that, in every case, the differences between Groups
C and D are smaller than between these two groups and the top two
groups. Those who give unqualified approval to the European Com-
munity have more in common, despite their differences about the
United Nations, than those who approve the European Community only
"with reservations". Where the issue of supranationalism was ex-
plicitly involved, as in EDC and the federal state, the differences
are quite sharp. The pattern of divergence persists, however, even
when the issues are less clearly supranationalist and more explicitly
internationalist -- as in the international army and the arms-atoms
pools. It seems fair to draw the line of cleavage with groups A and
B together as "internationalist" as contrasted with groups C and D
labeled "nationalist".

There are some interesting variations between groups C and D,
which are clearly associated with their acceptance of rejectance of
the United Nations. For example, the pro-UN subgroup C gives some-
what greater support to an international army (connected in 1956
public discussion with the UN) but gives considerably less support
than group D to EDC. Similarly, again, they give greater support
to a pool of conventional armaments (again associated with the UN in
public discussion) than to an atomic pool, which has always been
discussed as a purely continental affair involving the Europe of Six
(or at most with the cooperation of Britain).

These variations, however, are less striking than the cleavage
between the pairs of groups. That groups C and D are considerably
less committed to international cooperation, whether through the United

Nations or the European Community, is indicated by their answer to
fairly direct questions. When asked whether France can avoid the
choice between the Eastern and Western camps, an average of 51 re-
spondents in groups A and B felt that France could not avoid such
a choice as compared with an average 35% in groups C and B. Another
question asked whether France could decide her own future alone or
only in cooperation with other peoples. In Groups A and B, an
average 83% believed that cooperation with other peoples was indis-
pensable, whereas only an average of 75% in groups C and D tended
to express attitudes which, if not intensely "nationalistic" in the
traditional sense, showed a far less widespread and less intense
commitment to any of the more compelling forms of modern interna-
tionalism and collective action.

The 1956 Syndrome: Implications For The Future

The 1956 survey thus corrected some widespread, but erroneous,
impressions of the French posture in international life. It demon-
strated that, at least among the French elite, the notorious nationa-
lism of the French was no longer a major obstacle to international
cooperation. Indeed, our survey demonstrated that the French leaders
had moved considerably beyond nationalism in their thinking about
France's place in the world scene. Relatively few believed that France
could go it alone in the contemporary world -- i.e., could resolve
the problems of the French future exclusively by national means. A
great majority believed that France will be able to solve its problem
only in cooperation with other nations. Internationalism thus was

perceived as necessary and, again by a very substantial majority, as desirable.

Having come this far togst ier, however, the French elite di-vided at this point. The question of the United Nations divided our respondents into two substantial and approximately equal groups. About half of the panel believed that the United Nations would play a "very important role" in the future of world politics. The other half believed that the United Nations would be of "little use" in solving the main problems of the future. We have seen that this di-vision corresponds to divergent expectations of the future between the two groups. The yea-sayers foresee a world without war, a world of coexistence -- a world in which it is reasonable to put top priority on political institutions that will build an ever-expanding world com-munity. The nay-sayers foresee a world in which continuing cold war will erupt into a third world war within their lifetime -- a world in which it is reasonable to put top priority on military and economic institutions designed to strengthen the European Community for survival in the stormy years that lie ahead.

These two divergent images of the future clearly entailed pro-found differences in the interpretation of current events and the evaluation of current institutions. The United Nations played a crucial role in differentiating these groups -- on no other question did the panel divide so deeply into two halves. A baffling concomitant of this division, however, was that the line of cleavage on the United Nations did not correspond to the line of cleavage on "internationalism" as a political attitude. The substantial group that took a dim view of

United Nations, the nay-sayers, did not turn out to be anti-internationalists.
Indeed, they were not even deeply hostile to the United Nations. The
quality of their attitude was marked rather by "cool indifference".
They were indifferent, because they considered the United Nations of
relatively little importance on the problems that concerned them.
They were cool, probably, because they regarded the confidence of
their countrymen misplaced. Strong support for the United Nations, in
their view, tended to drain valuable political emotion from the issues
and institutions they considered more important. As a result, there
appeared the inverse relationship, whereby those more favorable to
the United Nations were considerably less favorable to European insti-
tutions; those more favorable to the European Community were considerably
less favorable toward the United Nations. This appeared to be the
specifically French tension point on questions of international policy
in 1956.

This interpretation of the 1956 syndrome in turn raised questions
that the 1956 survey could not answer. One basic question concerned
the stability of the 1956 syndrome among the French: Was this inverse
relationship between approval of the European Community and of the
United Nations likely to be a permanent, or at least persistent, com-
ponent of political judgment among the French elite? A second basic
question concerned the inner mechanisms of this "cool indifference"
toward the United Nations: On what interpretation of the structure
and function of the United Nations did the nay-sayers reach the con-
clusion that this institution was of little importance and indeed
likely to hinder the development of the European Community which they

preferred? For a better understanding of the answers to these
questions, we returned to France for a supplementary survey in the
spring of 1959.

II.

The Situation in 1959

Several months after our survey was completed, in the autumn
of 1956, the Suez incident erupted. France and Britain launched
a combined military operation against Suez, with apparent design
of occupying the port and regaining control over the Canal. Simul-
taneously, Israel launched a ground attack which rapidly carried
its army across the Sinai Peninsula. While the precise Israeli ob-
jective and the degree of its coordination with French and British
operations has never been officially clarified, there was no doubt
about the joint military action of the two European powers. The
United States disavowed the operation, as did the United Nations.
The operation was a failure, in that it accomplished no military
purpose or policy objective. It brought widespread censure upon
both France and Britain, largely through the forum provided by the
General Assembly of the United Nations. The aftermath of Suez
seemed likely to irritate many Frenchmen, and convert their "cool
indifference" into quite explicit hostility toward the United Nations.

The events of the following year seemed further calculated to
intensify French hostility toward the United Nations. Throughout
1957, Algeria remained the burning issue of French public policy.

It remained also, a recurrent item, on the agenda of the United
Nations. While no overt action was taken against France -- since
Algeria was officially regarded as an "internal problem" discussion
in the General Assembly provided opportunities for Arab and other
antagonists of French policy. The United Nations thus served as a
constant irritant among Frenchmen.

By the spring of 1959, with Algeria in a state of crisis the
French parliamentary system seemed incapable of solving, General
DeGaulle returned to power. The Fourth Republic was declared de-
funct, and the Fifth Republic was created. A new period opened for
French international policy, employing the language of "grandeur".
Among its elements was a reconsideration of French commitments to
international organizations at all levels. There was a studied in-
difference, generally interpreted to bespeak a deep hostility,
toward the United Nations.

The events of these three years seemed likely to have produced
important changes in French attitudes toward collective international
action as expressed in 1956. To determine their scope and depth, we
returned in the spring of 1959 for a final survey among the elites
of France, Britain and Germany. In each country, we reinterviewed
100 persons from our established panels*. We repeated a substantial

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* The German panel actually included 200 newly-selected respondents
  treated here as equivalent to 100 old respondents. As this report
  makes no statements requiring a test of "statistical significance",
  we do not require a technical account of our procedures.

number of earlier questions, to see which attitudes had remained

constant and which had changed. Several sets of new questions were

introduced, to test reactions toward the intervening events and

their impact on more general attitudes toward international problems

and policies.

Orientation to United Nations

To map the new distribution of international attitudes in 1959,

we asked the following two questions: "Which type of international

community do you consider the most effective in this century? which

do you consider the most desirable?" The options given our respon-

dents included the European, Atlantic, United Nations, and World

Communities. Only 18 British and 26 German respondents designated

the United Nations as "most effective". A somewhat larger fraction

in both countries regarded the United Nations as "most desirable" --

26 in Britain and 36 in Germany. This level of explicit advocacy

of the United Nations was considerably lower, especially in Britain,

than it had been in 1956. The most striking result was, however,

that not a single French respondent designated the United Nations

as both the most desirable and most effective form of international

community.*

While the 1959 numbers cannot be directly compared with those

in 1956, owing to the change in question wording, we can compare the

relative size of the group withholding endorsement of the United

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* Through a technical error in reproducing our interview form, the United
Nations option was inadvertently omitted from the schedule. It is possible
that a number of early interviews, recorded before this error was detected,
may have included some choices of the United Nations as either most effec-
tive or most desirable. However, it is likely that the number of French
respondents choosing this option, if any, must have been very small.

Nations in both years. These respondents are not to be labeled as
"anti-United Nations". They have in common, rather, that they con-
sider other forms of collective international action as more effec-
tive, more desirable, or both. Their attitudes may range from diffi-
dence to hostility, with their general orientation best described
as "cool indifference". In this sense we note an increase in all
three countries of cool indifference toward the United Nations: in
Germany from 27% to 31%; in Britain from 11% to 30%; in France from
43% to 65%. It is safe to conclude that advocacy of the United
Nations thus decreased in all three European countries, and most
markedly in France.

If the United Nations had been effectively downgraded by French
leaders, what difference did this make in their attitudes on other
international issues? In what measure was their greater diffidence
a reflex to recent events, notably at Suez and Algeria? In what di-
rection was their international posture likely to be altered? To see
what differences were associated with general orientation toward the
United Nations, we classified as "pro-Un" the 35 respondents who con-
sidered United Nations the most desirable form of international co-
operation and as "con-UN" the other 65 respondents. We compared
these groups on Suez and Algeria, the most acute foci of political
controversy involving the United Nations between 1956 and 1959.

SUEZ and ALGERIA

The role of Suez in the post-1956 downgrading of the United
Nations is clarified by comparing the 1959 responses in Britain and

France, the two nations most directly affected. Our first question
posed the issue directly: "Would you say that Britain (France) was
an aggressor at Suez?" The responses distributed as follows:

Table 9. Aggression at Suez

	Britain	France
Yes	63	43
No	33	48
Don't know	4	9

The British clearly are more willing to say explicitly that Britain
was an aggressor at Suez, considerably less willing to deny aggression,
and less inclined to avoid the question by saying "don't know". The
magnitude of this attitudinal divergence is shown by the difference
between the two poles in each country. In Britain the difference
is 20%, with the majority affirming aggression; in France the differ-
ence is only 5%, with the majority denying aggression.

How did this picture look in Britain, when the panel was divided
according to contrasting attitudes toward the United Nations? One
would expect the strong advocates of United Nations to be most in-
clined to affirm British aggression at Suez, those cool to the United
Nations to be most inclined to deny British aggression. The result
obtained by cross-tabulation confirmed this expectation in unmistakably
significant fashion:

Table 10. Suez and the UN in Britain

	Pro-UN	Con-UN
Yes Aggression	77	30
No Aggression	20	63
Don't know	3	7

Only 1 out of 5 pro-UN respondents denied British aggression at Suez, whereas 3 out of 5 con-UN respondents did so. Conversely, 2 out of every 3 British respondents diffident about the United Nations explicitly denied British aggression at Suez.

A different relationship between UN-orientation and Suez judgement was exhibited by the French respondents. Since fewer of them advocated the United Nations, and even fewer acknowledged French aggression at Suez, the association between these two responses was bound to be less clear-cut than in Britain. In fact, there turned out to be no significant relationship at all. The con-UN groups did deny Suez aggression by a slight margin (7%), but the pro-UN group split exactly in half (46% on each side).

The foregoing indicates that there is a marked difference, as between Britain and France, in the impact which pro-UN orientation exerts upon attitudes toward other political issues. In Britain, while strong UN advocacy has diminished somewhat, there remains a fairly widespread favorable orientation. Moreover, this orientation is taken seriously. British pro-UN respondents judge other issues in a manner more consonant with the axioms of traditional "internationalism". They are more disposed to affirm that their own nation's

action at Suez was aggression, whereas those diffident about the United Nations are consistently less disposed to do so.

The situation is quite different in France. There esteem for the United Nations, never very high, has diminished considerably. Furthermore, favorable orientation toward the United Nations does not appear to modify other French attitudes nearly so consistently as it does in Britain. Fewer French than British respondents are prepared to acknowledge that their country committed aggression at Suez. Further, the UN-orientation (pro or con) seems to make less difference among French than among British respondents on this issue.

The point is rather dramatically illustrated when we take account of French attitudes toward the Algerian issue. When we asked "Do you think the maintenance of French sovereignty in Algeria is indispensable for France?", 59 respondents said yes as compared with 29 who said no (the remaining 12 saying "don't know"). A clear majority thus considers French sovereignty in Algeria indispensable, but it is noteworthy that a substantial minority (nearly 1 out of 3 respondents) does not. If favorable orientation toward United Nations influences their thinking on colonial issues, one would expect this group of pro-Algeria Frenchmen to be virtually identical with the pro-UN group (also about one-third). This, however, is decidedly not the case. Again the pro-UN respondents divide exactly -- 43% each pro and con on the question of French sovereignty in Algeria.

To obtain a clearer view of the relationship between attitudes on Suez, Algeria, and the United Nations, we worked out a table which expresses these attitudes simultaneously. In one group we put all

respondents who expressed a consistently "internationalist" attitude --
affirming that French action at Suez was a gression and denying
that French sovereignty in Algeria is indispensable. In the other
group we placed the consistently "nationalist" respondents --
those declaring Suez non-aggressive and French sovereignty in Algeria
indispensable. We then cross-tabulated these two groups by
orientation toward United Nations. One would expect pro-UN respond-
ents to dominate the "internationalist" group and vice versa. The
results actually obtained, as shown in Table 11, were quite different:

Table 11. Suez, Algeria, and the UN in France

	Pro-UN	Con-UN
Suez-Algeria "Internationalist"	29%	18%
Suez-Algeria "Nationalist"	29	42

While the pro-UN group is more "internationalist" and the
con-UN group is more "nationalist", these horizontal differences are
considerably less striking that the vertical differences. The
greatest magnitude of difference is within the con-UN column.
Those diffident toward the United Nations clearly do not express
internationalist judgments of Suez and Algeria. In the pro-UN
column, however, there is no divergence at all. Being generally
well disposed toward the United Nations appears to make no diff-
erence whatsoever in the judgment of French respondents on Suez and
Algeria. If orientation toward the UN makes no difference on these
issues, we are then inclined to ask on what issues can it matter
at all?

The Crucial Issue: Collective Security

To answer this question, we reviewed an array of responses
given on all questions involving the United Nations. Our aim was
to locate the attitudinal areas in which pro-UN and anti-UN groups
differed most.

One such question asked: "In what way has the United Nations
been most useful in the past 10 years?" All responses were grouped
under the categories: international forum, preventing war, promoting
peace. Few respondents in any country (only 7 in France) considered
the UN to have been most useful in "promoting peace". In every
country, a substantial proportion considered the UN most useful as
an "international forum". The real line of division within each
country came on the evaluation of the UN role in "preventing war".
In France, the pro-UN and con-UN groups divided as follows:

Table 12. Defining the UN Role

	Pro-UN	Con-UN
International Forum	37%	36%
Preventing War	31	18

There is virtually no difference between the two groups on the utility
of the UN as an international forum. There is a substantial difference,
however, in evaluating the UN role in preventing war. The pro-UN
group is considerably more inclined to assign the UN high utility in
this role than the con-UN group. This is an important indication
that the con-UN respondents are not actively hostile owing to some

ideological animus. Rather, their cool indifference seems based on the judgment that UN activity has not been useful on the issues that they consider most important. In short, they consider "preventing war" a major function and the UN does not meet their test of performance on this function.

This interpretation is confirmed by a second question, which asked: "In the past 10 years, the spread of local conflicts has been prevented in several instances. How would you rate the importance for this of the following factors: United Nations, NATO, American policy, Soviet policy, Western H-bomb, mutual fear?" Respondents were asked to rate each of these factors as major, important, or minor in preventing the spread of local conflicts. In every country, mutual fear received by far the largest number of ratings as major. The number of respondents rating UN as a major factor varied sharply between countries: 25% in Britain, 20% in Germany, as compared with only 10% in France.

When the French response on these two factors is differentiated between pro-UN and con-UN groups, the result is as follows:

Table 13. Major Factors in Preventing War

	Pro-UN	Con-UN
Mutual Fear	83%	82%
UN	54	34

Again, there is virtually no difference between the two groups in assigning a major role to mutual fear. There is, however, considerable

difference in their evaluation of the UN.

That the pro-UN group considers the United Nations important in preventing war, while the con-UN group judges it to be relatively ineffectual in this field, is associated with their sharp divergence on most issues related to collective security. A subsequent question asked: "Would you approve the integration of the French armed forces into a permanent international army -- under European, NATO, or UN command?" The French panel as a whole expressed the least approval of a UN command (30% as compared with 51% in Germany and 57% in Britain). The French panel alone expressed disapproval of a UN command by an absolute majority.

When differentiated into the two subgroups, the French responses distributed as follows:

Table 14. UN Command of International Army

	Pro-UN	Con-UN
Yes	49%	20%
No	34	60

Among the con-UN group, there is not much doubt: by a clear 3 to 1 vote they reject the idea of UN command. The pro-UN group is much less consistent. A substantial proportion of this group (1 out of 3) opposes a UN command although its general orientation is favorable towards the UN. On security issues, their position as a group is ambiguous and lacking in definition. The con-UN group's low estimate of UN in matters of collective security shapes their general orientation

toward UN, because they assign greater importance to the security
range of issues than does the pro-UN group.

Another set of questions in our interviews shows that the con-
sistent pattern of differences between the two groups on security
issues is based on divergent expectations of the political future.
The con-UN group is more prepared to believe that this century will
see a third world war (14% as compared with 3% pro-UN). Even more
strongly, the con-UN respondents believe that the last few years,
since Khrushchev, have been cold war rather than coexistence (77%
as compared with 48% pro-UN) and that the cold war will continue
for the years ahead (49% as compared with 26% pro-UN). Nor, in
the continuing years of cold war ahead, do they foresee bright pros-
pects for international disarmament. When asked whether they
believed that a general disarmament agreement covering both conven-
tional and nuclear weapons would be reached in the next few years,
52% con-UN said no as compared with 31% pro-UN.

As a consequence of these expectations, the con-UN group are
obviously obliged to assign a higher level of importance to issues
of collective security. When asked "In military matters, would
you give t op priority to deterrence or disarmament?", the two groups
divided as follows:

Table 15. Disarmament and Deterrence

	Pro-UN	Con-UN
Disarmament	54%	28%
Deterrence	20	55

Their greater concern with deterrence leads the con-UN group to
significantly stronger advocacy of a modern weapons-system for France.
A subsequent question asked: "Do you favor the manufacture of thermo-
nuclear arms by France of ballistic weapons?" The proportion saying
yes to both these questions distributed as follows:

Table 16. French Weapons

	Pro-UN	Con-UN
Yes, Thermonuclear	40%	56%
Yes, Ballistic	51	71

A very striking feature of the con-UN group's concern with
security is that it reposes neither on traditional nationalism
nor on the current language of grandeur. On the contrary, the
con-UN group appears to be much more widely convinced that the days
of national glory, independent of collective international action,
are gone for France. One of our questions asked: "Do you think
that in the next few years France will take a more independent
position between Eastern and Western camps?" Nearly half of the
con-UN group (49%) said no as compared with 28% pro- UN. We then
asked: "Should France do so?" Again the con-UN group showed a
stronger committment to collective action: 48% said no as compared
with 26%of the pro-UN group.

This belief that France will not and should not seek a more
independent position appears to be associated with their conviction
that collective security is the top priority issue of French policy

today. As a group who foresee the possibility of a third world war, continuation of cold war, improbability of general disarmament, these respondents are diffident about the United Nations mainly because it does not satisfy their concern with collective security. They are not anti-internationalist, nor even systematically hostile toward the UN. They care less about the UN because they care more about those issues on which the UN seems to them least effectual.

Accordingly, while opposed to UN command over an international army, they give stronger support to NATO and especially European commands. This is shown when the proportions approving the three types of command are compared:

Table 17.   UN, NATO, European Commands

	Pro-UN	Con-UN
Approve UN Command	49%	20%
Approve NATO Command	46	51
Approve European Command	31	48

This is an important indication of the direction in which collective security has been taking many French leaders over recent years. In 1956, it was already clear that security issues were the main divisive force within the French elite. Those less concerned with security tended to favor the United Nations, with its opportunities for reaching international agreements by political discussion and legal negotiation. Those more intensely concerned

with security issues were correspondingly diffident about the
United Nations. Their orientation was rather toward the European
and Atlantic communities, with institutions more specifically
designed to maintain and augment national power through collective
military and economic action. By 1959, this line of cleavage had
grown even wider, as shown by the data bearing on the Atlantic and
European communities.

The Atlantic Community

The institutional expression of the Atlantic Community is NATO.
The Atlantic Community is not wholly without a _mystique_, since the
dramatic wartime proclamation of the Atlantic Charter by Churchill
and Roosevelt. The _mystique_, however, has not widened its original
meaning as an Anglo-American affirmation of solidarity with Western
Europe. Hence, the Atlantic concept has never carried much
resonance to those segments of the British Commonwealth that are
remote from the Atlantic basin. Also among the French, possibly
because they were not represented in the original declaration, the
Atlantic concept has remained a military institution rather than a
political _mystique_. Despite much discussion about the expansion of
its non-military functions through Article 2, the Atlantic Community
has continued to mean NATO and little more.

It is only in this narrow military sense that the Atlantic
Community is supported among French leaders. It is understandable
therefore, that support for NATO is consistently more widespread
among the con-UN than pro-UN group. Every question in our interview
which gave respondents an opportunity to evaluate the importance of
NATO showed this pattern.

An example is the question concerning the prevention of the spread of localized conflicts over the past 10 years. Respondents were asked whether each of six factors had played a major or minor role in this process. As a matter of historical fact, NATO had not been directly involved in preventing the spread of any local conflict during the past decade. Nevertheless, in ranking the six factors, 23% of the con-UN group ranked the NATO role as "major", whereas only 17% of the pro-UN group did so.

Another example illustrates the relationship between NATO and the European organizations. As we shall see, the con-UN groups give consistently more support to all the institutions of Europe, particularly the little Europe of Six. Nevertheless, when asked which existing European organization was more valuable for France than NATO, 31% of the con-UN group (as compared with 23% pro-UN) said that no European organization was more important. In addition, 34% of the con-UN group responded that the European and NATO organizations were "not comparable". We interpret this to mean that they advocate both types of institutions and refuse to choose between them. This is more noteworthy by contrast with their willingness to choose between European-Atlantic institutions and UN institutions, to the disadvantage of the latter. Their relative willingness to downgrade the UN, indeed, gives the con-UN group its defining characteristic.

A final example concerns the historic problem of Germany. The French panel was asked: "Is it better to keep West Germany in NATO as now, or to see Germany re-unified outside NATO?" This is a

dramatic issue which has played a major role in French policy over the past decade. All the more striking, then, is the clear divergence on this question between the two groups of respondents. Keeping West Germany inside of NATO was endorsed by 57% of the pro-UN group, but by a resounding 77% of the con-UN group.

There are several dimensions involved here, each capable of being stressed independently. Our interpretation would stress the inter-relatedness of this sequence of judgments among the con-UN French leaders: that the NATO institution, which brings Anglo-American military support, is essential to the security and growth of continental Europe; that the security and growth of continental Europe are essential to France's position in the world; that neither continental nor NATO power can be maintained efficiently without the participation of West Germany; that the participation of West Germany in both European and NATO institutions must therefore be endorsed by all right-thinking Frenchmen.

This is a terse summary of a fairly complex chain of political reasoning. To elaborate its components, we must comprehend French thinking about the European Community as the chosen instrument of continental security, and growth, and thereby as the guarantee of France's place in the world.

The European Community

French approval of the European institutions rose consistently from 1956 to 1959. This approval was expressed with reference to the European principle of collective action and to the particular European institutions actually in operation. Moreover, while approval

rose across the board, it rose rather more sharply toward some institutions than others. Both of these findings are exhibited in Table 18:

Table 18. Rising Approval of European Institutions

	1956	1959
Common Market (EEC)	73%*	85%
Coal-Steel Community (ECSC)	74	79
Euratom	70**	78
OEEC	73	71
Council of Europe	62	66

The largest increases were registered for Euratom (8%) and for the Common Market (12%). It is noteworthy that these institutions did not even exist in 1956. As indicated above, our 1956 questions related to proposals then under discussion which ultimately led to the creation of Euratom and the Common Market. It was the creation of these two institutions, notably the Common Market, that gave the European movement its great impetus during the intervening years. This is evidenced by a set of questions in which the strong Europeans consistently favor the Common Market and Euratom over other forms of European organization and over all other forms of collective action as well. This set of questions also indicates why these strong

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* In 1956: "Do you think the principle of the Coal-Steel Community can be extended to other sectors?" (i.e., leading toward a Common Market?)

** In 1956: "Should the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy be left to an international authority?" (i.e., leading toward Euratom?)

Europeans are con-UN, whereas the pro-UN respondents tend to be less strongly European.

A measure of the general intensity of European conviction was given by the question: "Do you think that French participation in the European institutions diminishes or augments France's position in the world?" A resounding 89% of the con-UN group said "augments", as compared with the 72% pro-UN; 11% of the latter said "diminishes" as compared with 3% con-UN. Differences of this magnitude appeared rather consistently on questions involving intensity of commitment to European institutions. Much later in our interview, we asked: "Do you think that France's obligations within the new French-African Community hinder the fulfilment of its role within its European Community?" Only 18% con-UN said "yes" as compared with 29% pro-UN; conversely, 77% con-UN said "no" as compared with 63% pro-UN. (It is noteworthy in this connection that the con-UN group are considerably more committed to the French-African Community: 66% of them consider it "basic for the position of France in the world" as compared with 51% pro-UN).

A similar divergence appeared in comparative judgments of the European institutions. When asked to designate "the most valuable" of these institutions, 46% con-UN chose the Common Market as compared with 37% pro-UN. We then asked two questions designed to locate respondents in the controversy between the Inner Six and Outer Seven, which was just getting under way in the spring of 1959. The first question asked: "Do you think that the Common Market as now constituted will work well in the long run?" Optimism was expressed by

79% con-UN as compared with 66% pro-UN respondents. We then asked: "Do you think its extension into a Free Trade Area with Britain and other countries is desirable?" Here the pro-UN group was much more ready (69% as compared with 52% con-UN) to expand the Common Market into the Free Trade Area. The more strongly European con-UN group, who considered that expansion into a Free Trade Area would strip the Common Market of its real powers, were much less inclined to sacrifice continental controls in order to avoid controversy with the British.

This does not mean that the con-UN group was anti-British. It means, rather, that they were more strongly committed to the Europe of Six as a major organizing principle for collective action. This view they expressed quite consistently. When asked whether they had favored EDC at the time it was proposed, 63% con-UN said "yes" as compared with 48% pro-UN. Yet this attitude does not imply either an anti-British or an anti-NATO sentiment. On the contrary, when asked which European organization they considered more important than NATO, considerably more of the con-UN group, despite their stronger support for Europe, said that no European organization was more important than NATO. Similarly, as we have seen, the con-UN group gave far stronger support (77% as compared with 57% pro-UN) to keeping West Germany within NATO rather than a re-unified Germany outside of NATO.

The foregoing presents an apparently paradoxical array of attitudes toward internationalism among French leaders. It appears that one type of respondent is more internationalist on some issues, less

internationalist on others. It appears also one type of internationalist differs quite radically (and consistently) from the other. What is clear, finally, is that our traditional conception of an "internationalist" no longer operates as a descriptive category. The ideological character of political beliefs is no longer so marked in France as it once was. An "internationalist" can now choose between a variety of ways of organizing collective international action. Some prefer the image of a peaceful world in which all nations are subordinated to a common rule of law; accordingly, they become strong supporters of the United Nations. Others prefer forms of collective action that contribute more directly to regional economic growth and military security; these consider the United Nations relatively unimportant as compared with the European and Atlantic Communities. Both consider themselves internationalists.

Indeed, a major finding emerging from these data is that France has passed beyond nationalism. This is to say, in effect, that the French elite is passing beyond ideology. The process of reshaping traditional ideologies has gone quite far in a few years. Loyalties to old ideological conventions have been breaking down. What now matters is one's imagery of the current world scene, the place of France on this stage, and "realistic" rather than ideological expectations about future events (i.e., estimates rather than wishes). The passing of inherited ideological schisms has brought into French political thinking a new line of cleavage based on probabilistic imagery and pragmatic expectations. This has reshaped the area of political emotion, in which explanations of current cleavages now lie,

so that observation framed by traditional perspectives can easily
go awry. Let us consider explicitly the shift in political optics
that has occurred in France.

France, The West, and The Future

The passing of ideology is, for the student of political
psychology, the major hypothesis emerging from our data. It is no
longer easy for Frenchmen, even at the extremely high level of
leadership which constitutes our panel, to differentiate themselves
along traditional lines of ideological commitment. One question in
our interviews asked French respondents how they would identify their
own attitude toward current events -- giving them a choice of nationa-
list, internationalist, supranationalist. Perhaps the most striking
single result in our survey, in terms of the psychology of political
attitudes, is that our respondents were virtually identical in the
distribution of their answers to this question:

Table 19. Political Self-Image

	Pro-UN	Con-UN
Nationalist	28%	27%
Internationalist	30	30
Supranationalist	35	34

There is virtually no variation between the pro-UN and con-UN
groups. The plain inference is that the United Nations does not matter
very much to Frenchmen. Whether one is positive or negative regarding

the United Nations does not change one's view of oneself as a political creature. What does divide French leaders is their attitude towards security. Despite their equivalence (i.e., indifference?) with respect to internationalism, they divided sharply when we asked: "In terms of military strategy, would you give top priority to disarmament or deterrence?" Here, as we reported earlier in Table 15, the two groups divided quite sharply:

Disarmament and Deterrence

	Pro-UN	Con-UN
Disarmament	54%	28%
Deterrence	20	55

The security issue has become paramount for French leadership. Along this line they divide quite clearly with respect to many specific problems, as we have seen. The key variable here is not political ideology but security imagery. As the traditional conventions of ideological commitment became increasingly incongruent with the contemporary lines of world politics, French leaders went through the extremely difficult task of revising their imagery of France in the world. The stimulus was security; the response was politics.

Political imagery begins with the political self. The political self is the nation. A coherent image is one in which expectations about the future of the nation, and its role among the nations of the world, is consistent. This part of our story begins with the differential expectation, as between our pro-UN and con-UN groups, regarding

the prospects of France in the world. We asked: "Would you say that the present position of France regarding the future is rather good or rather bad?" The responses were:

Table 20. France's General Position

	Pro-UN	Con-UN
Rather Good	83%	92%
Rather Bad	17	5

The con-UN Frenchmen are clearly more optimistic about the prospects of their country than the pro-UN group. This contrast of expectations remained constant when French respondents were asked whether "a rising standard of living can be maintained over the long run" in various areas of the world. The distribution of responses was as follows:

Table 21. Rising Standard of Living

	Pro-UN	Con-UN
In Soviet Union	91%	74%
In China	83	74
In Underdeveloped Areas	80	42
In France	77	83

It is striking that the pro-UN group were consistently more optimistic about Russia, China and the underdeveloped areas than they were about France. Equally striking is the evidence that the con-UN group, while substantially more skeptical that these areas will

continue to prosper, were rather more optimistic that France itself will maintain a rising standard of living.

This is a fairly basic expectation. What one imagines about the future well-being of nations is often decisive in one's thinking about how to behave with current issues and prospective problems. It appears that, in their image of the world political scene, the con-UN group are less "defeatist" than the pro-UN group. We asked the French panel: "Which nations would you rank as the five most powerful in the world today, in order of importance?" This produced a fairly complicated series of rank orderings among the nations. The salient points of divergence are given in Table 22:

Table 22. Ranking The Nations Today

	Pro-UN	Con-UN
US First	54%*	68%*
USSR First	54 *	52 *
France Third	6	12
Britain Fourth	37	43
Germany Fourth	11	35
China Third	34	20

On the big, perhaps primary, question whether America or Russia is the stronger power, the pro-UN group divided exactly in half. Just as many of them (54%) believe that the US is first as believe that the USSR is first. The con-UN group is rather less ambivalent on this question. Significantly more of them believe that the US is first (14% horizontally and 16% vertically). Another interesting

* Since multiple choices for each rank were allowed, each column totals over 100%.

difference appears in assigning France third place among the nations. While both figures are low, reflecting the general expectation that France's national power is and will remain limited, the con-UN group are considerably more inclined to place their bets on the future of France. This is true also with a respect to the other European powers, since the con-UN group consistently rank both Britain and Germany higher than do the pro-UN group. By contrast, the pro-UN group expresses significantly higher expectations about the power of China: 34% of them, as contrasted with 20% of the con-UN group, believe that China is already today the third power in the world.

We followed up this question by asking: "What changes do you foresee in the ranking of the nations by the end of the century?" The responses to this question are shown in Table 23:

Table 23. Ranking the Nations at End of Century

	Pro-UN	Con-UN
US first	23%	29%
USSR second	31	14
China first	23	15
China third or higher	52	40
Britain fourth	47	29
France fourth	14	25
Germany fourth	9	25

The table shows only significant differences in the great variety of rankings permitted by this question. In the competition for first place, the con-UN group continues to give the US a slight

margin, while the pro-UN group gives a very substantial margin to the USSR in second place.

Rather more striking is the decline of both the US and USSR in the imagery of Frenchmen, when contrasted with the dramatic rise of China to top power. Even among the con-UN group, a shade more of respondents believe that China rather than Russia or America will be the first power in the world, an image held, consistently, by more of the pro-UN group. The imagery involved here is even more dramatic when we combine the estimates that China will be the third or higher power in the world. There is clearly more consensus among our panel on the rising power of China than on any other expectation evoked by our questions. Among the con-UN group 40% believe that China will be the third of higher power among the nations of the world. Among the pro-UN group, 52% believe this - the only occurrence of an absolute majority opinion in the responses to this question. After the top three nations have been ranked, the remaining estimates reveal mainly the consistently greater optimism about the European nations among the con-UN group than among the pro-UN group.

This margin of confidence in the future of Europe is perhaps the most directly relevant element in our survey. It may well be the key to the paradox that the con-UN group are no less "internationalist" in their own way, than those Frenchmen who favor the UN. This interpretation is suggested by the responses to our question: "By the end of this century, do you think the world balance of power will favor the East or the West?" The responses distributed

as follows:

Table 24. East-West Balance, End of Century

	Pro-UN	Con-UN
Favor the East	40%	36%
Favor the West	3	9
Neither Side	26	23
Don't know	31	31

The smallness of these differences is the most impressive feature of the table. The pro-UN group slightly favor the belief that the world balance will favor the East; the con-UN group marginally believe that the world balance will favor the West. The differences are small, particularly when viewed by the major factor of uncertainty which motivates large proportions of respondents in both groups to say "neither side" and "don't know". Equally striking is the very widespread belief in both groups that the world balance of power will favor the East.

Yet, this picture changes radically when we move from expectations to policy preferences. We have already reported this result, but it is worth repeating in the present context. Our next question was: "Do you think that in the next years France will take a more independent position between the East and West

camps? Should France do so?" The responses distributed as follows:

Table 25. French Independence Toward East-West

	Pro-UN	Con-UN
Will not	28%	49%
Should not	26	48

Despite their nearly congruent expectations that the world balance-of-power would favor the East, the two groups divided quite sharply on this question which asked how Frenchmen should respond to this expectation. The pro-UN Frenchmen were largely convinced that France will, and should, take a more independent position - fairly obviously related to their preference for a "neutralist" position. The con-UN Frenchmen, despite their hardly less bleak expectation about the future, believed that France will not and should not seek to play an independent role between the two bipolar camps.

The data already reported indicates that there is, among the con-UN group, a stronger sense of identification with the Western Community. Quite apart from the rationality of their judgment on these questions, there is a clear preference among the con-UN group to believe that "the West", as such, must survive. This group also prefers to believe that France has a role to play in this survival by its attitudes and actions.

Our final survey was made in the spring of 1959, when Europeans were just beginning to realize that the world had passed

from the air-age through the atomic-age to the space-age. These
excessively rapid transitions have left people in every country of
the world unsettled. In France we asked two questions dealing with
these issues: "Do you think the launching of Sputniks proves that
Russia is ahead in missile technique? If so, is the lead decisive
or will it be matched?" Such questions, which have perplexed
Americans even more than others, are relatively meaningless except
in terms of imagery. How one answers such questions is based not
on knowledge, but on preference and expectation. All the more
striking, then, in view of their consistently greater diffidence and
skepticism on other matters, is the substantially greater optimism
of the con-UN group on these issues:

Table 26. Sputniks and the Missile Race

	Pro-UN	Con-UN
Sputniks do not prove Russian superiority	9%	31%
Russian lead will be matched	68	92

The optimism of the con-UN group on this point is quite striking.
By more than three to one they rejected the idea that the Soviet
sputniks prove a lead in missile technique - which is the essential
security question. By a very substantial minority, approaching
unanimity, the con-UN group believed that the Russian lead, if any,
is not decisive and will be matched (obviously by the U.S.)

The political consequences of this difference-of-opinion are
very great. The base from which the difference arises is less clear.

We face a group of French leaders whose habits of mind are skeptical and diffident, whose expectations are relatively glum, but who opt nevertheless for positive action by France. Somehow, they prefer to believe that French policies may make a difference in the future shape of the West and the world. In this respect, they stand in sharp contrast to a large group of French "internationalists" of the traditional persuasion - who favor the United Nations, but who appear to have neither confidence that the West can survive nor the will to stake French policy on Western survival.

What manner of men are differentiated by these two groups? Are we talking about real people or merely ideal types? Our understanding of the data presented in this study will be more vivid if we know what sorts of living Frenchmen are actually represented in these "pro-UN" and "con-UN" groups about which we have been reporting.

Who are these Frenchmen?

There is a clear and consistent line of cleavage between two groups of French leaders, starting from their respective imagery of the world political arena and their judgment on the security issues which divide the world today. This line of cleavage produces quite regular differences in expectations about the future shape of world power, and in the policy priorities advocated for dealing with the salient problems foreseen by the two groups. The pro-UN

group foresees the relative decline of Western power, downgrades
the importance of military problems (since they are less inclined
to foresee a continuing cold war that will erupt into a third world
war), emphasizes the importance of political discussion and dip-
lomatic negotiation. The con-UN group, on the other hand, is far
more concerned with security issues - being more inclined to fore-
see continuing cold war that may erupt into a third world war.
They are somewhat more optimistic about the feasibility of main-
taining Western strength and give priority to all activities
designed to strengthen the West. Accordingly, they downgrade
United Nations and other channels of political and diplomatic
activity; instead, they place a much higher valuation upon the
European and Atlantic institutions designed for collective inter-
national action on military and economic problems.

Once the line of cleavage is clear, however, the question
arises: Which sorts of Frenchmen compose these two groups? To
the extent that we are talking about real people, one would expect
the pro-UN group to have certain common characteristics that
differentiate them from the con-UN group. To identify such differ-
ences, we reviewed the personal data gathered on all respondents
and compared their distribution between the two groups. Certain
clear differences in their biographical attributes, and indeed
in their psychological attributes, did appear.

For example, there is a fairly representative age distribution
in both groups, but the pro-UN group clusters more strongly around
younger men: 20% of them are under forty years old, as compared with

9% of the con-UN group. Again, the panel as a whole is highly
educated. However, the con-UN group includes a higher proportion
of graduates from the University at Paris: 66% as compared with
54% of the pro-UN group. This educational pattern appears to be
directly related to their occupational distribution:

Table 27.   Occupations

	Pro-UN	Con-UN
Business	23%	12%
Journalism	23	8
Trade Unions	17	3
Politics	9	23
Civil Service	3	26

The pro-UN group clusters most heavily in business, journalism,
and the trade unions. The con-UN group is represented most heavily
in politics and the higher civil service (les grands corps de l'état).
Their professional concern with politics and government may explain
why the con-UN group consistently shows a "hard-headed" attitude
toward current issues. Conversely, the prevalence of journalism
and trade unionism may explain the more "liberal" profile of
attitudes found among the pro-UN group. It is noteworthy, in this
regard, that the "liberal" perspective is shared by a substantial
number of French business leaders.

The relationship of these contrasting political perspectives
to political affiliation is evident when we compare the distribution
of the two groups among the parties. Since the French parties are
numerous and somewhat confusing, we have grouped the distributions

according to the usual French classifications as Left, Center
and Right:

Table 29. Political Affiliations

	Pro-UN	Con-UN
Left	38	14
Center	23	32
Right	11	14
None	20	31

As we might expect, the pro-UN group clusters more heavily
toward the Left, the con-UN group more heavily toward the Center.
It is noteworthy that the con-UN group rather more frequently avow
explicitly that they have no political affiliation. This probably
reflects the apolitical character of the higher civil service in
France. The substantial minority of pro-UN respondents who
classified themselves as Center reflect the moderate political
outlook of business leaders. The prevailing "liberalism" of the
pro-UN group is reconfirmed by their attitude to the traditional
issue of religion. When we asked respondents to state their relig-
ion, 78% of the con-UN group identified themselves as Catholics as
compared with only 60% of the pro-UN group who did so. As a
correlary, a much higher proportion of the pro-UN group explicitly
disavowed any religios affifliation: 23% as compared with only
6% of the con-UN group. Secularism (including anticlericalism and
nonaffiliation) is a component of traditional "liberalism"

The fairly clear division along ideological lines -
corresponding to patterned differences of age, education, occupation -

becomes blurred when we consider differences in attitude towards
foreign countries and peoples. Traditionally, the internationalist
is the man who responds more favorably to foreign ideas, things,and
people than the nationalist. But we have already seen that, while
the pro-UN respondents can be considered as "internationalists",
it is not possible to label the con-UN group as "nationalists".
They arejust as favorably inclined toward the world around them,
but they put different priorities for different purposes on their
contacts with the rest of the world. These differences come out
rather clearly in response to a set of questions dealing with
information and travel.

One such question asked respondents to designate the domestic
means of information they considered most useful in keeping informed
about world affairs; they were then asked to designate the most use-
ful means of information. The results distributed as follows:

Table 29.   Domestic and Foreign Information Means

	Pro-UN	Con-UN
Domestic		
Radio	40%	31%
Television	26	11
Books	46	52
Conversation	31	37
Foreign		
Radio	14	8
Television	6	0
Books	14	19
Weeklies	20	32
Conversation	11	14

Among the domestic means of information, the pro-UN group tend
to prefer radio and television, the con-UN group to prefer books

and conversation. It may be that the higher civil servants are
perforce more heavily involved with books, and the politicians
more heavily involved with conversation, than would be true case
of the business and labor leaders in the pro-UN group. A more
relevant point, however, is that these preferences remain constant
with respect to foreign means of information. Again the pro-UN
group tend to find radio and television most useful, while con-UN
group prefer books and conversation. The contrast is emphasized by
the item of "weekly" magazines, which the con-UN group find con-
siderably more useful than the pro-UN group. Supplementary inform-
ation given by the respondents indicates that they are referring
to serious journals of information and opinion, such as the <u>Economist</u>,
the <u>New Statesman</u>, and the leading American weeklies.

A similar set of responses was given to questions concerning
travel. We asked respondents whether they have been abroad last
year, whether they ha . ever visited Russia, whether they had ever
visited America. In each case, the con-UN group turned out to be
more travelled that the pro-UN group:

Table 30.   Past Travel

	Pro-UN	Con-UN
Abroad last year	72%	80%
Ever visited Russia	20	34
Ever visited America	60	75

Not only has the con-UN group done more travelling in the past,
but it has stronger and more definite preferences for   future
travel. We asked respondents whether they would prefer to visit
Russia or America in the near future. Their answers distributed

as follows:

Table 31. Future Travel Preferences

	Pro-UN	Con-UN
Russia	34%	51%
America	20	28
Both	29	6

Along these lines, a rather striking result emerged when we asked
the respondents: "If you had to live in another country, which would
you choose?" Table 32 shows the distribution of first choices given
to countries outside of the European continent:

Table 32. First Choice of Residence Abroad

	Pro-UN	Con-UN
United States	6%	22%
Canada	0	6
South America	0	5

Clearly the con-UN group cannot be suspected of xenophobic national-
ism when I out of 3 (as compared with I out of 16 pro-UN) are ready
to choose an alternate homeland outside of Europe. If anything, the
con-UN people seem to be less domesticated and more xenophilic.

It is noteworthy that the pro-UN people, although consistently
less enthusiastic about European policies, appear to be more closely
bound to the Old Continent in their imagination. A projective type
of question asked: "What would you do in a Communist France?"
Virtually identical proportions in both groups imagined that they
would "adapt" (I out of 3) or that they would "be harmed" (I out of 5)
The significant difference between the groups appeared among those
respondents who imagined themselves in a less passive role and opted

for a more vigorous course of action. Here the proportions choosing
to resist or to emigrate were precisely reversed between the groups:

<u>Table 33. In a Communist France</u>

	Pro-UN	Con-UN
would resist actively	17%	9%
would emigrate	9	17

If the con-UN people are again more "hardheaded" -- in their
skepticism about the utility of active resistance to a communist
regime -- they are also more flexible about their bonds to the home-
land. They may be readier to imagine changes in the political future
because they are more secure (or satisfied) in their personal present.
On two interesting projective questions, the con-UN people showed a
somewhat more stable attitude toward their present situation. One
asked: "Which generation do you think the best to live in -- your
parents', your own, or that of younger people today?" In the
con-UN group 68% chose their own generation as compared with 60%
pro-UN. The latter, by the same 8% margin, imagined life was
(or would be) better in the younger generation. To the question
"If you had your life to live over again, what would you change?"
48% con-UN replied that they would make no change as compared with
43% pro-UN.

Those French leaders who are coolly indifferent to the United
Nations turn out, then, to be real people with specific and consistent
differences from those French leaders who strongly advocate the UN.
The con-UN people are somewhat older, have more often graduated from
the University of Paris, cluster more strongly in politics and
government as a vocation. They find books and conversation more

useful sources of information than the mass media, both at home and abroad. They travel abroad more frequently and widely - at least significantly more of them have visited both America and Russia in the past. Their future travel preferences are much more definite.

They show a much greater inclination - if they had to live elsewhere that France - to choose a new homeland overseas (North or South America). Similarly, they are much readier to emigrate if France should go communist. Thus, despite their stronger advocacy of European policies, they are less bound to the European soil in imagination. We cannot say whether this indicates that they are more imaginative individuals in general, or whether they are simply readier to face the hazards of a political future in which emigration from Europe might be the most practical course of action.

In the latter case, it is noteworthy that they are rather more secure in the present. They tend to prefer life in their own generation over the past or future (whereas   pro-UN people incline rather more toward the future generation). If they had their lives to live over again, fewer of them would make any significant changes. Their attitudes towards child-raising are also consonant with their greater readiness to face a hazardous future - and to endorse policies that will either prevent dangers or minimize their harmful effects. In a separate study of responses to the question "Should one praise a good child before others?" we noted that 62% pro-UN people said yes as compared with 42% con-UN. Yet, as further analysis made clear, the con-UN people were not necessarily more disciplinarian, nor even more severe, in their attitudes toward children. They seemed, rather, more committed to a principle of "guided democracy" in child-raising - i.e., that children should be taught to face the risks of reality,

and thereby to forestall dangers and minimize unnecessary losses.

We perceive, then, that attitudes toward the UN differentiate two rather clear sorts of real Frenchmen. Their attitudes differ consistantly on the present and the future, politics and policies, themselves and their children. In perceiving these lines of cleavage, we gain a deeper appreciation of what the United Nations "means" to contemporary French leaders.