

DISCUSSION PAPER

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I think Professor Berton wanted me to discuss his paper because he used the Japanese words *amae* and *tatemaie* in characterizing the psychological aspect of Japanese diplomacy. They are the words of everyday use, not easily translatable into English and quite handy in describing Japanese behavior. This does not mean, however, that the characteristics of Japanese behavior cannot be described in English. Only the use of those words makes the Japanese characteristics more visible, just as the use of English words, like freedom or fair play or foul play for that matter, makes the characteristics of American politics stand out more sharply.

I have, therefore, no quarrel with Professor Berton in his characterization of Japanese politics or diplomacy in terms of *amae* and *tatemaie*. There are places, however, where I should like to elaborate on his statements. For instance, he says, "It seems to me that in discussing *amae* relationships, we have to consider the power relationship between individuals, groups, or nations." I understand why he feels it necessary to consider the power relationship with regard to *amae*. But I should say that the viewpoint of power might obscure the subtlety of the nature of *amae*. Because *amae* is by definition a function of dependency need. And the fact that we have a rich vocabulary relating to *amae* means that such a need is accessible and acceptable to Japanese people. Thus the relationship that involves *amae* is unbalanced not necessarily in terms of power, but in terms of *amae* need or rather its awareness. Of course in many cases the one who is at the receiving end of *amae* is inferior in power or helpless compared to the other who gives. However, it can happen that the ostensibly powerful side harbors a secret desire of *amae* while vigorously repressing it. In other words, one has to keep in mind that *amae* relationships and power relationships do not always run in parallel.

Now this reasoning, it seems to me, goes straight to the heart of the matter, if you want to consider the vicissitudes of the Japanese-American relations for the past decades. The golden days of *amae* for Japan were in the first decade after the end of the Pacific War. Japan, a defeated nation, was at the mercy of U. S., a former enemy turned liberator. No doubt Japan indulged in American generosity, a case of pure *amae* so to speak which set the pattern for their relationship to this day. In the meantime, the power relationship between the two countries has been shifting and that is why we now have a serious trade friction between us. No doubt the *amae* psychology of Japanese people contributed a great deal to the development of the conflict, as Professor Berton makes it out quoting from Kitamura Hiroshi's monograph.

But I should like to go further than simply attributing the conflict to unfulfilled *amae*. For that purpose let me borrow the term Nicolson's Dilemma, which I have learned from Professor Zartman's presentation at this conference, "Development of the Concepts of Negotiation and Mediation and their Mechanism in the Contemporary International Community."

According to Professor Zartman, Nicolson's Dilemma concerns a situation when a Shopkeeper meets a Warrior. The Shopkeeper cannot negotiate with the Warrior except in the Warrior's terms, but if he wants to fight off the Warrior, he himself has to become a Warrior and that is his dilemma. I think this fits in perfectly with Japan's self-image vis-à-vis U. S. But the trouble is that U. S. also has a comparable self-image vis-à-vis Japan, inasmuch as they feel that Japan is impinging on American vital interests. It's a pity, however, that they cannot behave like a gentle shopkeeper. They behave like a self-righteous warrior. No wonder that U. S. and Japan cannot resolve their conflict. I believe that if Japan is awakened to her potentiality as a warrior and the U. S. in turn becomes more accepting and admitting of her own plight, they may realize that they are really on equal grounds. Only then they will learn to compromise with each other.

I would like to tell you a little anecdotal episode which I read in the newspaper that covered the most recent negotiation between U. S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor and Japan's Minister of International Trade and Industry Ryutaro Hashimoto. This illustrates very well the point I have made above. Hashimoto told Kantor during the meeting that he couldn't accept the tactic of brandishing Super 301, that it was like a threat at gun-point. To which Kantor replied that the gun was directed at himself also, meaning that he will be severely criticized if he fails to gain a favorable outcome. Apparently this reply was sufficient to silence Hashimoto then and there. He would not and could not pursue Kantor further along this line, since he instinctively identified with 'helpless' Kantor. I don't know if Kantor made this reply with the knowledge of Japanese psychology. Whether he did or not, it was a clever remark if he meant to elicit a sympathetic response from the Japanese side. Suppose Hashimoto was skilled in confrontation, he could have made the following response to Kantor's remark. "You mean you have to hurt us in order to save your *own* skin? That's not fair." To this Kantor of course would have made a rebuttal, saying: "Don't say that you are going to be hurt. It is we who are hurt by your trade policy." Hashimoto then could have wound up the verbal exchange by saying: "So you have to hurt us because you think we hurt you? Look! We are not engaged in war, are we? Let's call it quits. Let's get down to the business of talking over our differences and see what we can, I mean without Super 301." I think you can see that I played with imaginative dialogue in order to reassure myself that our Japanese delegation will eventually learn to overcome Nicolson's Dilemma.

Finally, I shall make one short comment on Professor Berton's statement with regard to *tatemaie*. He states that *tatemaie* concerns only the in-group and does not extend to out-groups. That is certainly true, because *tatemaie* is by definition a token of agreement of the members of a group. So Professor Berton is quite right. But let me say that this logic of *tatemaie* also explains why Japanese politicians or diplomats have the reputation of being poor negotiators.

They are much too eager to reach an agreement. They feel that once they reach an agreement, they have a room to move about within that framework which constitutes *tatema*. In other words, *tatema* is a token satisfaction of *amae* and that is why it is not conducive to ironing out fundamental differences of interest.