

Forgiving the Dead : Historical Consciousness in Civilizations That Do and Civilizations That Do Not

著者	YAMAORI Tetsuo
会議概要（会議名，開催地，会期，主催者等）	Historical Consciousness, Historiography, and Modern Japanese Values, 2002年10月末-11月，カナダ，アルバータ州バンフ
page range	1-18
year	2006-11-30
シリーズ	北米シンポジウム International Symposium in North America 2001
URL	http://doi.org/10.15055/00001477

Forgiving the Dead: Historical Consciousness in Civilizations That Do and Civilizations That Do Not

YAMAORI Tetsuo

International Research Center for Japanese Studies

Translated by Dennis HIROTA

I. The “Peace” Symbolized by the Hiroshima Genbaku Dome

In Japan, each August brings the memorial observances for the casualties of the atomic bombs. August 6 is the remembrance for Hiroshima. Every year, the Peace Memorial Services are held and the “Peace Bell” is rung. The Prime Minister delivers an address, with 50,000 people in attendance, including representatives from the different prefectures, surviving victims of the bomb, and other citizens. At 8:15 a.m., the exact time of the blast, silence is observed, and then the mayor of Hiroshima reads a “declaration of peace.” This “peace” observance has been conducted regularly during the half-century since the end of the war, and it has become ingrained, together with the national high-school baseball tournament, as a nationwide event of August.

In recent years, the annual Hiroshima observances have provided me an occasion to reflect on the Hiroshima dome. But together with the graphic image of the shattered dome, a strangely similar image of historical ruin appears before my eyes: the remnants known as the Wailing Wall or western wall in the ancient city of Jerusalem. It is a desolate image of a single portion of wall standing painfully exposed, stone vestiges bearing the wounds of history. I visited this site in 1995, a year of havoc during which the great Hanshin earthquake exacted a heavy toll in human life and buildings of the Kobe area in January. That March, members of the Aum Shinrikyō cult mounted their terrorist attack on the Tokyo subways using sarin nerve gas. Toward the end of October, on returning from a trip to Israel, I learned of Rabin’s assassination.

The Wailing Wall stands on the site of Solomon’s Temple, which was destroyed by Roman armies in 70 C.E. Thereafter, it survived the Islamic invasions and the battles of the crusades. These ruins gradually became a sacred site of the Jewish people. Jews driven from their native land came to embrace a fervent wish to restore the ruins of the Wailing Wall to the glory of the original Temple. To these remains, Jews come daily to pray for the reconstruction. It is an appeal for the advent of a messiah. Directly in front of the wall, however, stands the Golden Dome of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, sacred to Muslims because it enshrines the rock from which Mohammed ascended to heaven. As long as the Golden Dome exists, the dream of rebuilding the Temple of Solomon will surely not be realized. Nevertheless, Jews approach daily to pronounce ardent prayers, invocations that may never be fulfilled; herein lie the origins of the name, “Wailing Wall.” The more passionate the prayers, the deeper the resonance of despair.

Mysteriously, however, precisely because the Wailing Wall is but a section of ruins, it stands before us proclaiming with conviction the three thousand year history of the Jewish people. It possesses a palpable and compelling power emanating from the despair and sorrow of a people and compressed into the stones. Reflecting on the case of Japan, I wonder if the Hiroshima dome possesses the same power to move us. It is difficult to answer in the affirmative. It appears impossible to compare the Genbaku Dome, fifty years after the end of the war, with the accumulation of three thousand years of grief of a people in the case of the Wailing Wall.

In recalling the Wailing Wall, another persistent memory rises to mind, the Romanian Jewish novelist Elie Wiesel. His mother and younger sister were killed in the ovens of Auschwitz; his father died of starvation shortly after. Wiesel, who miraculously survived this ordeal, returned to the world and described his experiences in his memoir *Night* (1958). He was at Buchenwald when it was liberated, and from there he went to France and studied at the Sorbonne. Thereafter he wandered in Israel, the United States, and the Far East, eventually taking American citizenship and settling in New York, where he has lived and worked as a writer in French.

Wiesel was born in the small Romanian city of Sighet. Rabbis and beggars of the city, madmen and wandering preachers, appear in his works. These characters are embodiments of the history of the Jewish people since of time of the Hebrew bible. They remind one of the figures who appear in Jewish scriptures and of the tales of trials and sorrows. In Wiesel's novel *A Beggar in Jerusalem* (1968), the narrator provides a window through which the heavy fate of the Jewish people is vividly depicted. The setting is the time of the Six-Day War in 1967, when Israel defeated its Arab neighbors. In the novel, both survivors and dead appear before the Wailing Wall to speak of history, war, and love.

Among various such figures, a solitary, wraith-like beggar appears. Roaming as though present everywhere in the world with a countenance that has lost expression, he penetrates people's skin like a festering wound. He seems a phantom, hardly living in the world, but appears before us to speak from the depths of history at the Wailing Wall. Perhaps he exists only as a spirit wandering aimlessly through history. The author, however, keeps silent about this. Though never stated, the figure may be said to resemble the wayfaring god or beggar who met with agonizing death on the hill of Golgotha. Jesus also lived as beggar during the day and at night prayed to God in subterranean caves. After the terrorist attacks of 9.11, the area around the Wailing Wall has taken on an even deeper cast of devastation. The ruins that have absorbed three thousand years of sorrow have also become a site of repeated terrorist reprisal. Groans arising from it seem to crawl across the earth, and ceaselessly cries of curses echo in the skies.

What of Hiroshima's Genbaku Dome, where the breezes of peace quietly pass? Needless to say, it is not that the lamentation of Hiroshima has never been told. It is not that the demonic memories have not received narration and transmission. One such record is the novel *Black Rain* by Ibuse Masuji, who captures in this work the tragic and despairing strains of the people. He seeks to give voice to the inconsolable and grief-stricken silence, and his novel may be said to articulate a prayer of the Japanese people. The countless people who have continued to pronounce this prayer envelop Hiroshima, in many ranks of circles.

In spite of this, the area around the Genbaku Dome today, as a “Peace Park,” appears to have grown exceedingly weak in its character as a ruins. At very least, when compared with the fate of the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem, its serenity appears dazzling. Next to the shadow cast by the suffering of the Jewish people, an empty peacefulness seems to emanate from it. The Genbaku Dome appears to be in a process of transformation from a symbol reflecting the tragedy and suffering of the bombing to a “World Heritage Site,” a monument symbolizing the “peace” of postwar Japan. The distant Wailing Wall continues as before to be an outpost embodying the fervent aspirations of a people, but the Hiroshima dome serves just once a year as the site for the atomic bomb memorial.

What precisely is the origin of this “peace” of postwar Japan? From what memories of history did the ethos of “pacifist Japan” emerge? What does it show about the character of Japanese civilization? In order to consider these questions, it may be useful to consider the long periods in Japanese history during which peace largely prevailed in the Japanese archipelago, the 350-year span during the Heian period and the 250 years during the Edo period.

Samuel Huntington, author of the controversial book *The Clash of Civilizations*, delivered a lecture in Tokyo in December 1998, titled, “The Choice for Japan in the Twenty-first Century: The Reorganization of World Politics,” in which he offered predictions about the future of Japan. The Japanese version of this lecture later became part of a book, *Bunmei no shōtotsu to 21-seiki no Nihon* (The Clash of Civilizations and Twenty-first Century Japan, Shueisha, 2000). Huntington’s central themes are: “Japan, the isolated nation,” “non-Westernizing Japan,” and “Japan, which has never experienced a revolution.” These phrases aptly convey his understanding of Japan, but they are certainly not idiosyncratic. Rather, they probably express the most widely accepted images of Japan in the world today.

The first theme, “Japan, the isolated nation,” refers to the notion that, from the perspective of culture and civilization, Japan has formed a singular nation that does not share a foundation in common with any other country. Other major civilizations all span a plurality of countries, but in the case of Japan alone, a single civilization coincides with a single nation. For example, Japanese have emigrated to the United States and become naturalized in American society, but in general Japanese who have left Japan (except, perhaps, in some cases regarding Hawaii), are no longer members of the Japanese cultural community. In other words, in the case of Japan, there are no diasporas or scattering to other countries. Diaspora would apply where people have left their country to live as immigrants, but continue to possess the sensibilities of their original community and maintain cultural contact with their native land. That such forms of emigration are not seen in the case of Japan gives evidence of the country’s isolation.

Huntington’s second theme, “non-Westernizing Japan,” refers to the idea that although Japan has successfully modernized, in its values, patterns of daily life, personal relationships, and norms of behavior, it has on a fundamental level resisted Westernization. To be sure, the central theme of development in Japan since 1870 has been precisely to achieve modernization without becoming Westernized. For example, the United States and Japan have unquestionably built the most modern nations in the world. To this day, the United States remains Japan’s closest friend and single ally. Nevertheless, the two cultures of these

countries differ profoundly. The differences have been analyzed and expressed in countless ways: individualism vs. group consciousness, equality vs. hierarchy, freedom vs. authority, contractual relationships vs. blood relationships, guilt vs. shame, rights vs. duties, universality vs. exclusivism, competition vs. harmony, diversity vs. uniformity, and so on. One may feel skeptical about these stale and platitudinous oppositions, but the point is simply that, in terms of ordinary cultural values in daily life, Japanese civilization has indeed not Westernized.

Huntington's third theme refers to the idea that Japan has never undergone a violent political revolution. From the reverse side, this would suggest that Japan has been oriented toward internal stability and peace. What Huntington has in mind, however, is the "revolution" of the Meiji Restoration, the notion that Japan's modernization was accomplished for the most part without experiencing the general upheaval of a bloody revolution. This was not the situation with England, the United States, France, or Russia. Neither was it seen in China. Even in Germany, a kind of revolution occurred in the form of Nazism. In short, Huntington views the Meiji Restoration as a bloodless revolution. Moreover, interestingly, a similar event was repeated with the American occupation after World War II. Both the Meiji Restoration and the American occupation took place without the rending of society amid suffering and bloodshed. In this way, the unity of Japanese tradition was preserved while a highly advanced modern society was built (Huntington, pp. 45-49).

I have summarized Huntington's sketch of Japan in terms of his three themes. His sense of Japan seems to me to accord with the image of the Hiroshima dome that I described earlier. The three themes appear to hint at memories of history decisively different from those of the Wailing Wall. In a word, the Genbaku Dome provides an image of ruins redolent with the "peace" of an isolated nation, a scene of prayers for peace of a nation that has not Westernized. Here arise echoes of rites for the pacification of spirits and memorials of death for a Japan that is oriented toward peace and that has never had a violent revolution.

Of course, half a century earlier at the site of the ruins, a quite different scene could be seen. Documents do exist vividly recording the "lamentation of Hiroshima." Earlier I mentioned Ibuse Masuji's *Black Rain*. After the atomic bomb blast on August 6, "improvised priests" emerged to make coffins and rush about tending to corpses. Dead bodies were shifted to straw mats and carried to river banks on carts. At the river banks, the work of digging numerous pits was watched over by skulls. There were corpses with eye sockets fixed on a distant piece of sky, others with teeth clenched as though in rancor. In the shade of a rock lies someone who died in the street, another has fallen face-up with the whites of his eyes exposed and his mouth open, another with only a pair of shorts covering his alternately swelling and sunken stomach

There is a scene in the novel in which an "improvised priest" wanders to and from the river bank, where he recites Rennyo's epistle "On the White Bones." Facing a corpse whose head and legs alone have already become bone, he mutters it. Turning to a corpse in which maggots have begun to appear, he recites it haltingly.

Will I die first, or another? Perhaps it will be today, perhaps tomorrow. More numerous than the drops of dew are those left behind and those who have gone before. In the morning we may be flush with vigor, and in the evening become white bone. Once the winds of impermanence have passed, the eyes close instantly,

the breath runs out forever.

It is a scene with much in common with the sorrowful and despairing prayers of Wiesel's *A Beggar in Jerusalem*. It reminds one of the figure of the beggar wandering aimlessly before the Wailing Wall.

When we listen carefully in *Black Rain*, however, we find that the passage from the epistle on the white bones that flows like a deep bass through the novel is gradually drawn up into a voicing of spells to pacify the spirits of the dead, and its vision of impermanence is gathered into a rite to comfort the departed. Similarly, the Hiroshima dome is now enshrined as a symbol of the peace of the Japan that has experienced no revolution. Or, as a new cultural means for the pacification of spirits, it has come to possess a distinctive meaning as a symbol of isolated, non-Westernizing Japan.

II. Conflicting Attitudes toward the Dead

In 2002, various events were held to commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of the reestablishment of official diplomatic relations between Japan and China. At the International Research Center for Japanese Studies, Prof. Lu Yi, the director of the Japan research center at Jirin University, delivered a lecture on "China-Japan Relations and Mutual Understanding," which focused on his field of specialization, Japanese politics. He pointed out that, according to recent surveys, levels of mutual trust in both Japan and China were suddenly plummeting. For example, Chinese who felt that Japan could not be trusted were 34 percent in 1988, but in 1999 this number had increased to 62 percent. Correspondingly, 79 percent of Japanese held friendly sentiments toward China in 1980, but this number fell below 50 percent in 1998.

Reflecting his expertise in Japanese politics, Prof. Lu adduced as reasons for these trends the problem of Japanese history textbooks, the redefinition of the Japan-U. S. security treaty, and the worship of the Japanese prime minister at the Yasukuni shrine. Regarding Japanese attitudes, he listed as negative in impact the Tiananmen incident, Chinese nuclear testing, and the problem of illegal immigration from China into Japan. In addition, there was the incident involving North Korean refugees seeking asylum in a Japanese consulate in Shenyang in which the actions of Chinese police struck much of the Japanese public as both brutal and invasive of Japanese sovereignty, when videotape of the event was repeatedly broadcast here. Regarding the problem of the prime minister's worship at the Yasukuni shrine—which enshrines those who died for the country, chiefly in wars, including executed A-class war criminals—Prof. Lu remarked that while the Japanese do not hold the dead accountable, the Chinese do not forgive criminals even after they have died. He pointed out that this was one of the divides that deepened the difficulty in relations between China and Japan and their mutual distrust.

Prof. Lu's distinction between Japan as a culture that forgives the dead and China as a culture that does not pointed to themes in civilization that far transcend the issue of the Yasukuni shrine alone, going back five centuries or a millennium. I was reminded, for example, of Wu Zixu (?-485 B.C.E.). A political figure of the late Spring and Autumn period, he was widely known for whipping a corpse to vent his resentment. His life is vividly portrayed

in Sima Qian's *Records of the Grand Historian* (book 66). Concerning this man possessed by consuming rancor, Sima's comments are also revealing. Sima, a witness to history who had endured the humiliation of castration, was also a man of resentment who resisted the shame that had been inflicted on him. He gazed unflinchingly at the relentless fates that fixed human beings inextricably.

Wu Zixu's period corresponds to the time when Confucius endeavored to achieve political reform in the kingdom of Lu. Wu Zixu served King Ping of Chu, but his father and older brother had become embroiled in a political conflict and were killed by Ping. Barely escaping with his life, Wu Zixu fled to the kingdom of Wu, where he plotted the overthrow of Chu in order to avenge his father and brother. He succeeded in his scheme and brought down the capital of Chu, but it was too late, for King Ping had already died. Thereupon Wu Zixu destroyed Ping's grave, exposed the corpse, and applied three hundred lashes of the whip. The expression, "Beating a corpse" (*shisha ni muchi utsu*), has its origins here. By the poison of his bitterness, however, Wu Zixu met with a tragic end. Discord arose between him and the king of Wu, Fu Cha, and prompted by some slander, the king ordered Wu to commit suicide. At his death, Wu shouted out a ferocious command: Gouge out my eyes and hang them at the east gate of the capital, so I may look upon the decimation of the land of Wu! Saying this, he cut off his own head. Hearing this, the king of Wu was enraged. He seized Wu Zixu's body, and stuffing it into a bag of horsehide, let it float on the Yangzi river.

In this harrowing tale, we see that the king of Wu in his rage also sought to beat a corpse. If we transpose the feelings manifested in these events to the contemporary issue of the presence of the remains of Japanese war criminals in the Yasukuni shrine, perhaps the A-class war criminals would correspond to the objects of anger who appear in Chinese history. Even dead, they cannot be pardoned. The act of "beating a corpse" that we see in the Spring and Autumn period is not a fugitive anomaly in Chinese history. According to Prof. Lu, there is an expression in China for a bad reputation, "Leaving an odor for ten thousand years." Concerning this, there is the story of Yuefei and Qingui of the Southern Song dynasty (twelfth century). Qingui was a chancellor who enjoyed the favor of Gaozong of the Southern Song, and by contrast, Yuefei was the leader of a military clique that refused to submit to the control of the central government. By manipulating the other generals, Qingui was able to force Yuefei into a death in prison. Gradually, however, Yuefei's innocence of crimes Qingui had accused him of came to light, and his spirit was enshrined as a god. At the same time, Qingui came to be branded as a treacherous minister and reviled as a betrayer of his country. In Hangzhou, at the mausoleum of King Yue, Yuefei is enshrined as a hero of the country. In front of the grave stands an iron statue of Qingui and his wife in bonds. According to Prof. Lu, this scene manifests the traditional culture of love and hatred of the Chinese people.

Such figures as Wu Zixu and Yuefei that appear in Chinese history bring to mind another story from Korea, "Five-hundred years of grievance." This theme has been recounted in diverse contexts: the grief of separated families in the division of North and South Korea, the coercive removal to Japan and forced labor there during the Japanese colonization, the double-structured oppression under dictatorial political authority and Confucian family control, and recently, the history of Korean soccer, which has functioned to clear away the emotional scars of oppression. There are probably more such themes than can be counted

on the fingers of both hands. Of the various discussions of the legacies of grievance on the Korean peninsula, the book *Culture of Grievance: The Mind of the Korean People (Han no bunkaron: Kankokujin no kokoro no soko ni aru mono*, Gakuseisha, 1978) by Lee O-young (Yi Ō-nyōng 李御寧)¹ is particularly striking. In this book Lee analyzes folk songs and historical drama while comparing the emotional life of the Korean and Japanese peoples.

According to Lee, the matrix of Korean culture is formed by a “culture of grievance.” The Japanese word *urami* (bitterness, malice, discontent) is written with both the characters *on* 怨 and *han* 恨, which are used with roughly the same meaning, but in Korean these two characters are distinct in implication. While *on* is used to refer to emotion directed again others and harbored with regard to some external situation, *han* is a pent up sediment within one, a congested deposit of emotion.

On is feverish. It is quelled and purged by revenge. *Han*, by contrast, is cold. Unless one’s hopes are fulfilled, it cannot be dispelled. *On* is rage and indignation; *han* is sorrow. Hence, *on* flares up like flame; *han* accumulates like snow. (p. 268)

According to this explanation, it might be said that between the Chinese characters *on* and *han* as employed in Korean there is a difference in the condition of the emotion. Lee states that by distinguishing these two states, a difference in feeling between the Korean people and the Japanese people may be illuminated. This appears plausible. In listening to popular songs of the two countries, for example, one senses such a difference. This is highly impressionistic, but Korean songs seem to possess a coolness and lucidity. Lee expresses this in his image of *han* as sorrow piling up like snow.

To pursue this topic of popular songs in Korea and Japan, it is also possible to discover a resonance between the two countries. According to Mori Shōei in his study *The Straits of Popular Song: A Documentary History of Popular Song Spanning the Korean Straits (Enka no kaikyō: Chōsen kaikyō o hasanda dokyumento enka shi*, Shōnensha, 1981), the song-writer Pak Ch’un-sōk 朴椿石, who had many hit songs, subscribed to the theory of the culture of grievance. Pak visited Japan in the summer of 1980 and composed the music for the song “Kaze sakaba” for Misora Hibari. He spoke of the Korean folk song “Five Hundred Years of Grievance,” stating that “grievance” was the wellspring of folk song in Korea and that its tradition extended deeply into popular song. According to Pak, it is a deep bass that interweaves the sorrows of human life and the lament of the spirit.

In the 1980s the Korean singer Cho Yong-p’il 趙容弼 visited Japan and sang “Five Hundred Years of Grievance” along with a variety of Korean and Japanese popular songs. Although he spoke little Japanese, his performances attracted great attention. Speaking of his own strengths as a singer, he indicated as his particular themes “songs filled with emotion, love, and grievance.” “Five Hundred Years of Grievance” includes the lines, “Grievance has lasted for five hundred years, it’s useless to speak of it now.” “Grievance” is the anger deep in the hearts of the people, and at the same time it manifests itself as sorrow. Sorrow and anger, having long fermented, abruptly effervesce. The phrase “five hundred years of grievance” gives direct expression to this ripening of emotion.

Nevertheless, “five hundred years of grievance” is an intense and severe expression, one that transfixes the sensibilities of the Japanese. If, as Prof. Lee O-young has pointed out,

“grievance” possesses a coldness and accumulates in the heart like snow, when will it be assuaged? How can it be pacified? An answer to these questions is attempted by Chwe Kilsong (Ch’oe Kil-sŏng 崔吉城) in his book, *An Anthropology of Grievance (Han no jinruigaku)*, Hirakawa Shuppansha, 1994). Chwe, who has investigated Korean shamanism from an anthropological perspective, sets forth a number of significant theories on the basis of his many years of fieldwork and research.

Of particular relevance to our concerns here is the following observation. Buddhism entered Korea and functioned as a religious tradition leading to liberation in which human grievance and passion are sublimated. It has continued to teach such individual salvation. Thus, it has served as a faith oriented toward the overcoming of feelings of rancor and vengeance. In their daily lives, however, human beings inevitably come to harbor feelings of grievance that they cannot dispel. In Korea, it was shamanistic faith that aided people in facing their deepest sorrows. It may be said that while Buddhism has been an affirmatively oriented religion, shamanism has dealt with the negative. This situation was complicated on entering the Yi dynasty by the emergence of Confucianism as a force opposed to shamanism. Further, during this period, the state adopted a policy of actively suppressing Buddhism and promoting Confucianism. The rites of Confucianism, however, are based on veneration of one’s ancestors who lived out their lives in happiness. For persons who died in ill fortune, the rites are withheld. For this reason shamanism, in reaction to orthodox Confucianism, showed strong concern for the salvation of the spirits of those who had suffered adversity. Thus, a division of labor occurred between Confucianism and shamanism. (Chwe, pp. 161-162)

As stated above, prior to the Yi dynasty, it was Buddhism that functioned to pacify and alleviate the “grievance” of human beings. After the Yi dynasty, however, shamanism replaced Buddhism as the chief means of such pacification. There emerged a double structure of religious life, made up of Confucian society that ignored “superhuman powers and deranged gods” and shamanistic society that tended to such powers and spirits. Despite official disfavor, shamanism always occupied a place in the shadows of society as a negative faith. Chwe Kilsong has pointed out an example that accords with this rough sketch in the shamanistic rites of worship for the warlord Ch’oe Hyŏng 崔瑩 found in the central areas of Korea. Ch’oe was a military and political figure of the latter part of the Koryŏ dynasty (tenth-fourteenth centuries). He was captured and killed by the founder of the Yi dynasty, Yi Sŏng-gye, who destroyed the Koryŏ dynasty and began the five hundred years of the Yi dynasty. Ch’oe was regarded as a heroic if ill-fated and desolate figure who met with violent death during a time of upheaval at the change of dynasties.

Not long after the death of General Ch’oe, a narrative of pacification came to be told among the populace. It was a shamanistic tale that sympathetically urged worship of the general as a deity whose angry spirit has been purified. In his study, Chwe has provided rich resources for considering the characteristics of popular worship in Korea, and in conclusion, he points out the remarkable resemblances between the story of General Che’s death and pacification and the fate of Sugawara Michizane in Japan. Michizane was a gifted scholar-official, a hero to intellectuals, who had suffered a wretched end, having been entangled in political turmoil. A series of appalling disasters not long after his death were attributed to the agency of Michizane’s angry spirit, but gradually he came to be worshiped as a kami and was appeased. This is the source of the popular Tenjin faith.

In fact, however, the resemblance between the Korean and Japanese stories of quelling and pacifying angry spirits ends at a superficial level. This is because, as Chwe Kilsong emphasizes, the five hundred year period of the Yi dynasty was one in which Buddhism was suppressed and Confucianism dominated society, resulting in a situation in which the mechanism of the purification of angry spirits could not function openly and forcefully. The work of sublimating passions and calming spirits was taken up by the world of shamanistic faith that existed in the hidden byways. It was shamanism as negative religion. Lee O-young's image of "grievance" as cold and ineradicable like accumulated snow gives expression to this social background of its origins.

Thus, the history of the "five hundred years of the Yi dynasty," with its promotion of Confucianism as official religion, forms the matrix that gave birth to the ethos of the "five hundred years of grievance." The mechanism for the salvation of angry spirits through Buddhism was uprooted and in its place, the operation of such salvation was taken up as a negative work of spirit pacification by the socially suppressed shamanistic faith. It was in this way the culture of "grievance" arose.

Despite repeated protestations on the part of Japanese politicians who make visits for worship to the Yasukuni shrine, the harsh criticism of the Chinese and Korean governments has continued unabated. Perhaps we may sense some of the cultural elements behind such criticism in the ethos, seen above, in which the bodies of executed war criminals should be beaten and upon them the bitter tears of grievance should continue to flow. The mechanisms of spirit pacification and purification in the Buddhism of Japan appear inadequate, or do not function at all. In this debate, the influence of deeply rooted tensions and oppositions between a civilization that forgives the dead and civilizations that do not continues to dominate.

III. The Issue of the Meiji Restoration as a "Bloodless" Revolution

Above, I have suggested that the diplomatic and political controversy surrounding the worship by the Japanese prime minister at the Yasukuni shrine may be viewed in terms of deeper tensions between a civilization in which the dead are regarded as purified and those in which such a mechanism is rejected. This may be stated as an opposition between a culture in which the dead are forgiven and those in which they are not. There will no doubt be criticism of this formulation as completely arbitrary and self-serving. Nevertheless, the roots of the debate surrounding the Yasukuni shrine are not simple, and when we attempt to probe its background, we find that basic religious attitudes of Buddhism and Confucianism are involved. It is necessary to avoid a merely diagrammatic argument and to proceed with caution toward an understanding of the various dimensions of the problem.

In considering the role that has been played by Buddhism as the ideological means for pacifying the resentment or bitterness of the dead, the views the historian Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975) may be instructive. Late in life Toynbee took up the topic of Japanese civilization in his work, pointing out the importance of Mahayana Buddhist tradition, which he evaluated highly. Toynbee does not touch directly on our concerns here, but it may be useful to take note of his perspective in reflecting on the Buddhism that served as the matrix for the notion of the purification of the dead.

Toynbee first came to Japan in the fall of 1929 to attend the third international meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations. He was chief investigator of the English research center of international affairs, which formed the center of the British delegation to the Pacific Relations meeting, and thus came to Japan as a representative of the British government. On that occasion, the first site he chose to visit was Mount Kōya. Toynbee was acquainted with Indian religion, and in Japan he climbed the sacred mountain of Japanese Mahayana Buddhism.

After the war also, Toynbee visited Japan in 1956 and again in 1967. In Kyoto in particular he carried on a lively discussion with a number of scholars from Kyoto University, including Hara Zuien, Nishitani Keiji, Fukase Motohiro, Kaizuka Shigeki, and Kuwabara Takeo. This is described by Kuwabara, who remarks about Toynbee's interests in Japan and the sense of history they display:

In 1956 Toynbee met with a number of scholars in Kyoto. He recorded the meeting on a tape recorder, which was still a rarity at the time, and showed no fatigue during the lengthy exchange of opinions. On this occasion, his greatest interest was in Mahayana Buddhism, and he asked about it repeatedly. He also displayed some interest in the modernization of Japan, but said almost nothing about the conditions of postwar society or about popular culture. Even if his theory is correct that the general populace lacks creative power, nevertheless I felt rather skeptical about reflecting on the future of civilization without due attention to issues of popular culture. Perhaps his attitude was a reflection of the English spirit. ("Translator's Afterword," *Zusetsu rekishi no kenkyū*, 1976, p. 635).

On this occasion, Toynbee and the Sinologist Kaizuka Shigeki exchanged opinions on the topic of the Meiji Restoration. The discussion focused on the observation that it was largely a "bloodless revolution," and the question became, Why did the Meiji revolution occur without the catastrophic flow of blood seen in the French and Russian revolutions? The explanations of the two scholars are noteworthy. Toynbee suggested that it was the result of the influence of Buddhism, while Kaizuka responded that there was a tradition of Confucianism in Japan that worked both openly and covertly toward such an outcome. The discussion concluded without a resolution between these two positions.

The introduction of Buddhism and Confucianism into the discussion concerning the relative absence of bloodshed during the political reform of the Restoration was probably based, on the one hand, on the ideal of not harming of living things (*ahimsa*) in Buddhist thought and, on the other hand, the central concept of "reform through the change of emperor," referring to the notion that when a ruler loses the mandate of heaven, political change should take place. The Buddhist ideal of not taking life is of course directly related to nonviolence and avoidance of bloodshed. Further, underlying the principle in ancient Chinese political philosophy that the emperor rules by heavenly decree stands the affirmation of abdication to avoid armed conflict. Although these matters are not delineated by Kaizuka, they no doubt formed the basis of the discussion.

We see that Toynbee was intrigued by the absence of bloodshed during the Meiji Restoration. Similarly, as mentioned earlier, Huntington speaks of Japan as never having gone through a revolution in his discussion of Japanese civilization in *The Clash of Civilizations*.

In other words, the Meiji Restoration and the American occupation after World War II were in effect revolutions without large-scale armed struggle. Thus, though separated by half a century, both Toynbee and Huntington take note of the absence of violence during the Meiji Restoration and consider this indicative of a characteristic of Japanese civilization. Regarding this issue, a satisfactory response has yet to be made in Japan.

To begin, it is not strictly accurate to say that the Meiji Restoration occurred without bloodshed. It is well known that the handover of Edo castle from the Tokugawa to the new government was peaceful, pursuant to the negotiations between Saigō Takamori, leader of the restoration forces, and Katsu Kaishū of the shogunate army, but the entire series of events from the Boshin war of 1868-69 to the Seinan war of 1877 resulted in many deaths. It is said that in the Seinan war alone, the Meiji government forces suffered 18,746 deaths and casualties, and the Satsuma army suffered approximately 15,000 killed and injured (Takano Kazuto, ed., *Seinan sensō senpō nikki shashin shū*, Seichōsha, 1989). Thus, it cannot necessarily be asserted that no armed conflict took place. Nevertheless, the numbers do not compare with the loss of life in the French and Russian revolutions, and therefore a qualitative difference must be recognized as well. Why was this possible? In addition to the conjectures of Toynbee and Kaizuka, another answer has been suggested by the historical novelist Shiba Ryōtarō.

I asked Shiba about the matter during a televised conversation (NHK, “Shūkyō to Nihonjin,” June 1995). Shiba suggested that it had to do with the influence of the neo-Confucian thought of Zhu Xi (*Shushigaku*). This thought, which developed in China in the Song dynasty, entered Japan during the Edo period and became established as *Shushigaku*. It was highly doctrinaire and abstract, but according to Shiba, it exerted tremendous influence by becoming intertwined with the clear and simple slogan of the times, “Revere the Emperor and drive out the barbarians!” This phrase was chanted in a chorus of shouts as the Meiji Restoration was set underway. Further, the last shogun, Tokugawa Yoshinobu, was an offspring of the Mito house, which functioned as a center for the dissemination of *Shushigaku* study.

Shiba focused on this strong connection between the Mito branch of the Tokugawa and *Shushigaku*. From early on, the Mito clan figure Tokugawa Mitsukuni set about editing a “great history of Japan” (*Dai Nihon shi*). This work was an attempt to interpret Japanese history from the perspective of *Shushigaku*, and comprises a *Shushigaku* discourse on moral duty. The climax of the work is a simple and unambiguous discussion on determining whether an emperor is legitimate or not, that is, of direct lineage or collateral, good or bad. By applying these determinations, Ashikaga Takauji, who supported the northern collateral line, is declared a villain, and Kusunoki Masashige, who allied himself with Emperor Godaigo of the southern court, is judged virtuous.

This is a system of values based on revering the emperor and reviling a subjugator. It is the warp dyed in the Mito school, and as ideology it deeply influenced the fifteenth shogun, Yoshinobu, born to the Mito clan. In short, Yoshinobu desired above all to avoid becoming an Ashikaga Takauji, whatever the cost. Thus, acting at his own discretion, he fled back to Mito and entered a life of complete submission. According to Shiba, this was the main reason for the “bloodless revolution.” Shiba commented that the question was perhaps not a religious problem, but nevertheless involved the world of religion. He seemed to waver between considering the Mito *Shushigaku* an ideology of righteousness and a kind of religious attitude.

Regarding the question of the absence of bloodshed during the Meiji revolution, two alternatives emerge: considering it in relation to the ideology of Buddhism, as Toynbee did, or considering it in relation to the ideology of righteousness based on Mito thought, like Shiba. It is probably not a simple choice between the two. Even if one takes into consideration the immediate impact of the ideology of righteousness, it is still possible to give weight to the long-term influence of Buddhist ideology, and I believe this latter perspective is important here. This would be a matter of taking into account Toynbee's view, or perhaps the perspective of Buddhism as a means for the purification of the dead and pacification of their spirits, an ideology that assuages the bitterness of those who sacrificed themselves for the revolution and calms their feelings of rancor. Without such power to save penetrating the society from the depths of history—that is, by means of the *Shushigaku* ideology of righteousness alone—it is surely impossible to explain the restricted violence of the Meiji revolution.

Let us return to Arnold Toynbee, who has frequently been called the greatest historian of civilizations of the twentieth century. Late in his career he grew critical of the Eurocentric views of earlier studies of civilization and attempted to develop a broader perspective. In his earlier work, *A Study of History* (twelve volumes), he described Japan as a satellite of Chinese civilization. Later, his thinking began to change. Seeing the 230-year long domination of the world by the West crumble in the period of World War I, he gradually turned his interest toward Asia. Toynbee felt from the beginning that the core of civilization was formed by religion. In Asian civilizations, a plurality of religions developed side by side, but as mentioned earlier, the tradition that Toynbee appraised most highly was Mahayana Buddhism. He saw in Mahayana a potential for overcoming the limitations of Western monotheistic civilization, which had reached an impasse. His two trips to Japan after the war were undoubtedly to evaluate this matter personally. Probably his interest in the absence of bloodshed during the Meiji revolution stems from such considerations.

As mentioned before, when Toynbee came to Japan, he met with Japanese intellectuals and delivered lectures. One result of these activities was a book, *Lessons from History (Rekishi no kyōkun, Iwanami Shoten, 1957)*. Of particular interest for our concerns is a section, "Japan in World History," which was originally broadcast on NHK television, and which undertakes a comparison of Japan with England. Toynbee begins by pointing out that one of the conspicuous features of Japanese history is Japan's character as an island country. England likewise is an island country lying off the European continent, and the English, like the Japanese, possess an insular spirit or narrowness. Nevertheless, England's geographical isolation was far less extreme than Japan's.

Secondly, however, although England possesses an insularity, it has been subjected to repeated invasions and conquests in recorded times, including those of the Romans and Normans. As a result, England was able to adopt the arts and other benefits of civilization, but of far greater value was the psychological effect. The experience of being subjugated taught the English the lesson that they were not supermen or a people chosen by God, but were merely one small part of humanity, no different from any other nation. The experience of being invaded functioned as an antidote to the insularity of the English. While the English people had the epochal experience of being occupied by the Normans in 1066, however, until the American occupation in 1945, the Japanese had not once been under an occupation.

Toynbee's observation is telling, and may account for the current fearfulness of many Japanese regarding "globalization." The sense that the opening of the country in the Meiji era was a period of rape by the "black ships" surely has its origins here. The opinion that the occupation of Japan after World War II was an experience of the pillaging of the Japanese spirit by American righteousness is still heard. Debates continue over such problems as the "occupation" of the Japanese economy by Anglo-Saxon powers through an insistence on free world markets. It is said that a half century after the military occupation has ended, Japan suffers the hardships of economic occupation.

Some may say that such feelings, and perhaps even the display of the fangs of nationalism, are inevitable. Even though we hear a chorus of anti-Americanism together with calls for a return to a self-enclosed tradition, there is no help for it. When we are dejected and burdened with dark feelings of national sentiment, it will be Toynbee's words that provide relief—invasive globalization is a method for dispelling the poisons of insular narrowness, teaching us that the Japanese are neither Nietzschean supermen nor Calvinist elected.

Such a script is utterly impossible to accept. Toynbee's view may contain acute insight, but I doubt it can be said to reflect a common understanding among ordinary English people, or even among intellectuals. Rather, it is the perspective of a historical consciousness available to a person like Toynbee, with his interests in Mahayana Buddhist tradition. The problem of the absence of bloodshed during the Meiji revolution must be considered within the context of the closed condition of country, of insular narrowness baptized by Mahayana Buddhism.

IV. The Meaning of Spirit Pacification in Japanese Tradition

Toynbee sought to trace the influence of Mahayana Buddhism at work in the restrained scope of violence during the Meiji revolution. An island nation that had absorbed Buddhism engendered an intellectual orientation different from that of the Anglo-Saxon nation. Perhaps for this reason, the Meiji state determined a distinctive path for development. This seems to be the course of Toynbee's thought.

Toynbee's sketch of the situation in Japan has not received the discussion it may deserve, perhaps because it has seemed overly broad and rough. From a positivist perspective based on evidence, it has been dismissed as a mere generalization. It may be illuminating, however, to bring the issue of forgiveness of the dead into conversation with Toynbee's observations. What emerges into view if we set, as a backdrop for the notion of a civilization that forgives the dead, the motif of a Buddhist means for purifying the resentment and rancor of the dead? This concerns the historical development of the purification of anger as it arose in the insular nation of Japan.

The problem of the anger of the dead takes concreteness as curse or retribution (*tatari*). This topic may seem to belong to the peculiar realm of the other world, but that is not my concern here. If one examines the social and political history, and the history of natural disasters and epidemics that has colored the flow of events in this island country of Japan, one finds that fear of the retribution of the dead remains a constant and preeminent motif throughout. The mechanism of *tatari* fuses the history of disease and catastrophe with social and political history. The unified social process of the prognosis, diagnosis, and treatment of *tatari* developed into an extremely refined form.

Origuchi Shinobu explored the roots of *tatari*, tracing the original meaning of the word to the appearance of kami in the world. For example, kami may leave an imprint in a tree or crag or rock and then quickly recede into the background of the world. For an instant, they allow a glimpse and then vanish. The flash of lightning splitting the sky or a sudden shower were considered phenomena of this kind. Gradually, *tatari* as moments of manifestation became *tatari* as retribution in which an invisible will came to be sensed. Intimations of malice or curse were apprehended. According to Origuchi, the word *noru* (to declare) evolved into *norou* (to curse), paralleling the changes in meaning of *tatari*.

Origuchi does not, however, clearly indicate how or when the transformation in the meaning of *tatari* occurred. There is no explanation of why this change took place. These questions require careful treatment, but my own view is that the influence of Buddhism from the Asian continent may be seen in the process of change. The new sense of *tatari* reflects the impact of the mode of thinking of the imported Buddhism, and specifically, of the rites of empowerment and prayer of the esoteric tradition. Under these pressures, the *tatari* of Shintō tradition evolved into an altered form.

As stated above, *tatari* as the manifestation of kami was originally the descent of the spirit of the kami to rock (*iwakura*) or tree (*himorogi*). Gradually, this was extended to the possession by the kami spirit of particular persons. Here, the acts of delivering divine messages and oracles emerged. We seen in the *Kojiki* and *Nihon shoki* that such figures as Amenouzume-no-mikoto, Yamatototobimomoso-hime-no-mikoto, and Empress Jinkō were suddenly possessed by kami, danced in frenzy, and communicated the will of the kami spirits. Such phenomena are widely labeled shamanism. Today, the practices of calling down spirits and kami (*hotoke-oroshi*, *kami-oroshi*) transmitted among the *itako* mediums of the Shimokita peninsula and the *yuta* of Okinawa belong to the traditions of this *tatari* phenomenon.

At some point, however, the spirits of the kami, taking as allies the spirits of the dead, changed into symbols of natural calamity and devastation. Here, the consciousness of *tatari* as retribution arose. The anger of kami and the rancor of the dead, without being purified, floated about in the air and took on the robes of evil spirits and demons. The angry spirits (*goryō*) and specters (*mononoke*) that were feared particularly in the Heian period were such. Angry spirits were figures who met with politically contrived and untimely ends. They were regarded as the causes of epidemics, earthquakes, fires, and so on. An example is Prince Sawara, the younger brother of Emperor Kanmu, who was defeated in a struggle for power and suffered an ignominious death. His angry spirit was dreaded as one of the most powerful, and in 863, he was enshrined at Shinsen-en in Kyoto together with other feared spirits of political figures. In this way, the rites for pacifying spirits, the Goryōe, were begun as a method for calming and dispelling the anger of kami spirits and the rancor and malice of the dead.

Parallel to this, the phenomenon of *mononoke* began to appear frequently, recurring persistently during the Jōwa era (834-848) in particular. They leave deep marks in literary works such as *Genji monogatari* and historical writings such as *Eiga monogatari*. What is crucial in such cases is that the actual identities of the *mononoke* are the living spirits of specific people who have suffered bitter indignities or spirits of persons who have died harboring such feelings. They were considered to be pathogens triggering sickness and difficult births, deaths and natural disasters. They may be said to belong to another dimension of the world arising

from the pathologically closed environment of the court society. Further, a constant fixture of this pathological space at court was the esoteric monk performing rites of empowerment and prayer. Such monks poured their energies into the recitation of mantras and dharanis and the formation of mudras with their hands in the enactment of rituals for dispelling *mononoke* and eliminating angry spirits. Murasaki Shikibu vividly describes these activities in *Genji monogatari*.

Goryō spirits and *mononoke* were the chief actors in the *tatari* phenomena occurring in ancient society. These two strains of spirits come together in the events surrounding Sugawara Michizane, which may be said to be the culmination of such episodes. During the reign of Emperor Daigo, Michizane, who had ascended to the position of Minister of the Right, became the object of slander by his political adversary Fujiwara Tokihira and was exiled to Dazaifu in Kyushu, where he died. Soon, mysterious occurrences commenced in Kyoto. Lightning fell on palace buildings, the family of Tokihira suffered misfortunes, and Emperor Daigo suddenly died. Rumors spread that these social and personal calamities were caused by the angry spirit of Michizane. These rumors were probably deliberately instigated out of political motives, but they shook the society to its roots and drove a stake into the political center. Here, political history and the history of natural disasters abruptly fused.

Measures were immediately taken to protect society. Procedures for pacifying Michizane's angry spirit and enshrining it as a kami were put into motion. He was worshiped as the kami Tenjin at Kitano. The most potent spirit of retribution in the Heian period came to be venerated as Kitano Tenjin, and gradually he came to be transformed into the god of scholarship. The consummate spirit of *tatari* changed into a powerful protector deity, and faith in Tenjin rapidly began spreading among the populace. We must note here that this transformation was made possible by the majestic power of the prayer rites performed in esoteric Buddhism. These were the most basic system of rites of the Mahayana Buddhism that became indigenized in Japan. This matter has not been widely noted, but the empowerment and prayer rites fulfilled an extremely significant leavening role in the purification of the dead, and they cannot be ignored in probing the characteristics of Japanese civilization.

The interrelationship between *tatari* as retribution and the pacification of spirits became a matter of acute consciousness. As mentioned earlier, one aspect of this concern is the psychopathology of daily life in the closed society of the court. But as Buddhist faith penetrated the lives of the common people, a significant change took place. The operation of *tatari* retribution and the pacification of spirits came to play a general role in the diagnosis and treatment of untoward events in society and personal sickness. Such treatment came to be considered a method for dissolving at a stroke the disasters that were beyond human comprehension and the vortex of implacable emotion that flowed from political conflicts. In periods of transition in political power and authority in particular, intense attention was given the pacification of spirits. At such times, large numbers of people met violent and untimely ends, a situation which threatened imminent disaster. Interestingly, or mysteriously, the transmission of such memories continues as an undercurrent in present Japanese society. The political issue of the Yasukuni shrine is an example.

Worship at the Yasukuni shrine has been regarded as the worship as kami of soldiers who sacrificed themselves for the country, and as the offering of solace for the immense suffering.

When we turn to the historical roots of the Yasukuni shrine, however, a different motive emerges for the enshrining of the war dead. It is to pacify their spirits, thereby releasing them from the political crimes and misdeeds of the country and warding off beforehand the appearance of *tatari* retribution. The mechanism of the purification of the dead effected by esoteric rites of empowerment and prayer gradually emerges into the picture here.

We must note in this connection the prominent place of new religious movements in popular Japanese religion. Most of these new movements teach that the cause of personal misfortune and sickness is to be found in the *tatari* retribution of the spirits of ancestors, and they urge the performance of rites of offerings to ancestors in order to dispel the *tatari*. When a person is remiss in performing offerings to the ancestors, frightening retribution may follow. Though somewhat muted, in the term “offering” (*kuyō*) there percolates the thinking behind the esoteric rites of empowerment and prayer.

There emerges visible here a cultural ethos in which it is believed that intense human attachments and vindictiveness congeal to become spirits of malediction. Through the infection of this functioning, all the abnormal and calamitous events of the world arise. Although a distant resonance, the notion of spirits of malediction is reminiscent of Nietzsche’s conception of *ressentiment*, feelings of envy coupled with a desire for vengeance against the strong by the weak who feel themselves powerless and dispossessed. When one traces the direction of Nietzsche’s thinking, however, one quickly discovers that it diverges greatly from what the Heian period court nobility believed. Nietzsche’s intent at the outset was to explain the formation of early Christianity and the occurrence of the French Revolution in terms of the function of *ressentiment*. That is, he sought to explain, through the psychological motives of *ressentiment*, the origins of the belief in equality of early Christianity and of the social leveling of the French Revolution. According to him, these arose from the morality of resistance of those in adversity and oppression.

Compared with the genesis of the notion of *tatari* in Japan, Nietzsche’s idea forms an illuminating contrast. This is because in Japan, people’s feelings of *ressentiment* have always been perceived as social-pathological phenomena occurring within the community. For this reason, the feelings of resistance and revenge of the weak never became a fuse for social upheaval, as they did in Nietzsche’s thought. Rather, the real intention behind the traditional notion of *tatari* in Japan was to seek to eliminate beforehand or allay the *tatari* that functioned as the cause of disease. The accumulation of *ressentiment* that might give rise to social unrest was nipped in the bud by the practices of spirit pacification, which were broadly arrayed in society. The political equipment was always in readiness for swiftly dispersing, through spells and religious practices, the psychological motives leading to revolution. That which vitalized to this political mechanism was Mahayana Buddhism as an ideology for the purification of the dead and the system of empowerment and prayer rites of the esoteric tradition.

Thus, the operation of *tatari* retribution and spirit pacification may have played an anti-revolutionary role in eradicating the motive force for fundamental social change or upheaval. The *mononoke* pattern seen in *Genji monogatari* and *Eiga monogatari* was perceived chiefly in terms of a technique of examination for detecting changes in the emperor or persons of the nobility and expelling any incipient disease. The occurrence of *ressentiment* (*mononoke*) was to be alleviated and suppressed on an individual level. By contrast, the Goryōe ritual service

and the angry spirit (*onryō-goryō*) pattern seen in the example of Tenjin worship developed as a network for pacifying and defusing beforehand mishaps on the level of society at large. In both cases, the monk performing the empowerment and prayer rites played an important role as master-physician of spells.

I have described the implementation of spirit pacification as an anti-revolutionary force in Japanese society, but from the opposite point of view, it may also be seen as a healing of angry spirits arising from nonviolent attitudes. This may be called a pacifism through the calming of vengeful spirits. If this is the case, then it may be possible to treat the problem of the Meiji Restoration as a bloodless revolution by viewing it in this context. The Meiji political reformation was actually a political drama played out within the tradition of anti-revolutionary spirit pacification. In other words, as long one views the matter merely with the method and perspective of Nietzsche described above, one cannot grasp the true structure of the political revolution that unfolded in Japan.

We must note here that at the roots of the notion of *tatari* retribution is fear of other people, a fear regarding feelings of *ressentiment* and rancor in others. It is a terror at the thought of living and dead spirits rising against one, and it drives people to urgent acts of spirit pacification and to prayers for their repose. It has turned people's attention and concern toward forming intricate rituals in order to alleviate the anger and bitterness of other people.

This means that beliefs surrounding angry spirits were originally beliefs regarding other human beings. They involved shuddering at the violence of love and hatred harbored in the human heart, and thus manifest a subtle and acute social sensitivity. In this sense, the phenomena of *tatari* retribution and spirit pacification formed in Japan derive less from beliefs about kami than from beliefs about human beings. This sense of fear directed to other human beings extended to fear of the dead and developed particularly into fear regarding those who had died in misfortune.

The impetus for regarding human beings as kami has its origins here and quickly grew in force. Then, the skillful hand of Buddhism entered, and the esoteric teachings of empowerment rites and prayers spread in influence. As a result, at some point, human beings came to be enshrined as buddhas (*hotoke*). Not only living persons, but even the dead were raised just as they were to the level of buddhas. The notion that "the dead person is a buddha," which was not conceived of by Buddhists in India, spread swiftly in Japan. That the dead are buddhas has become part of the pervasive popular morality; perhaps it should be called conventional Buddhism. This notion has no connection whatsoever with Buddhism as it existed in its birthplace in India, but is a manifestation of the beliefs regarding human beings that developed in the Japanese islands.

We see, therefore, that the belief in kami as it developed in Japan, together with the belief in buddhas, has its roots in attitudes toward human beings. The notions of *tatari* retribution and of pacifying spirits were born from the matrix of beliefs about humans. The "pacifist" thought of lavishing praise on persons and exalting the dead was gradually kneaded and shaped. Over time, an anti-revolutionary "pacifism" in which the wrongdoing of humans was forgiven and the defilements of the dead were purified was given a degree of aesthetic refinement. It was in this way that a civilization that enshrines the dead—that forgives them—was given birth.

NOTE

¹ Korean names and terms in this essay are romanized according to the McCune-Reischauer system, which at this time remains favored by Western scholars over the system adopted officially by the Republic of Korea in 2000. However, when a Korean scholar has himself or herself chosen a different romanization, as is the case with Yi Ŏ-nyŏng (Lee O-young) and Ch'oe Kil-sŏng (Chwe Kilsong), all references here after the first follow the scholar's own preferred spelling.