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Globalization, East Asian Regionalization, and Japan's Role in Euro-Asian Interregionalization

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INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War era the ideological poles of capitalism and communism structured global and regional orders around modes of order-building based especially on the military might of nations. Military alliances were built around ideology, irrespective of the spatial separation of the member states, with the nuclear superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, binding their respective allies to a non-spatial understanding of "East" and "West." Now, with the ending of the Cold War, the tripolarization of the global economy is structuring global and regional orders around modes of order-building based especially on the economic might of nations. Economic alliances are being built around space, with the three core regions of the United States and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Germany and the European Union (EU), and Japan and East Asia emerging as the new economic cores of global and regional orders. In the Cold War, observers focused overwhelmingly on the military aspect of power; in the post-Cold War, tripolar economic competition has led observers to focus overwhelmingly on the economic aspects of power. Thus, in the same way that an analysis of military might was at the heart of studies of order in the Cold War era, so economics is now placed at the center of studies of order in the post-Cold War era.

Nevertheless, global and regional orders emerge out of a particularly complex process of order-building involving not only the military and economic dimensions of power, but also the political and cultural. For order is based on both consensual as well as coercive elements of power. What is more, as in the

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Cold War the non-aligned movement sought to puncture the bipolarism and bilateralism at the heart of the global and regional orders, so in the post-Cold War era initiatives to interregionalism and interregionalization processes are puncturing order-building based on tripolar economic alliances. In this sense, the restructuring of global and regional orders can be said to involve the military, economic, political, and cultural dimensions of power, on the one hand, and globalization, regionalization, and interregionalization, not just triadic economic regionalization, on the other.

The main purpose of this paper is to discuss globalization, East Asian regionalization, and interregionalization between Asia and Europe by examining the four dimensions of power as manifest in economy, politics, security, and culture (on power, *see* Cox, 1987; Strange, 1996). The first section, which begins with a brief introduction of global order and power, highlights the relative decline in American hegemony and the structural transformation in global order suggested by the rise of Japan and Europe. This is followed by a discussion of the four aspects of power at the global level. Next, we go on to an examination of globalization of economics, politics, security, and culture. This discussion draws attention to how, in the post-Cold War era, global forces are exerting an impact in all these dimensions. The next section focuses on regionalization in East Asia, with particular reference to the Japanese role in the region. Here we highlight how, with the end of the Cold War, Japan's role is moving gradually beyond the primarily economic role of the Cold War era. The final section deals with interregionalization between Asia and Europe, with our focus again being on the role of Japan in developing links with Europe. Here Japan is regarded as the core of the East Asian region, if not a "region" itself. This section goes into the detail of the emerging relationship in economics, politics, security, and culture. Beyond this, we seek in the Conclusion to broaden our perspective by addressing the issue of how, in the process of globalization, regionalization, and interregionalization, late-comer East Asian economies are catching up with early-starter European economies and forcing them to respond. In essence, therefore, this paper seeks to: 1) address the restructuring of the global and regional orders, taking a multidimensional approach including the economic, political, security and cultural dimensions; 2) demonstrate how Japan is playing a key role in the East Asian region in all four dimensions; yet, 3) erode the image of the new world order as being rooted in three economic blocs, by demonstrating how interregionalization is as much a part of the emerging post-Cold War order as is regionalization; and, finally, 4) reflect on the broader question of how the early starters of Europe can respond to the East Asian challenge.

GLOBAL ORDER AND POWER

The rise and decline of hegemonic powers and transformations in global and regional orders involve complex interactions among economy, politics, security, and culture as dimensions of power in global, regional, and interregional dynamics. These interactions are set in motion by agents who, by routinizing their practices, reproduce the structures that as historical legacies and nascent regularities impose constraints on, yet provide opportunities for, change in global and regional orders (Cox, 1981). Thus, global and regional orders are not static, but are transformed in the process of interactions between agents and structures. The rise and decline of hegemonic powers, the transformation of global and regional orders, and the persistence and emergence of patterns of interaction result from the actions of non-state as well as state actors (agents). In trying to understand global, regional, and interregional changes, therefore, the roles of both state and consistent non-state or nonstate actors in shaping the global and regional orders need to be taken into account.

Second, by paying attention to the structural embeddedness and dynamic interactions arising from these four dimensions of power, both "hard" and "soft" power can be taken into account (on "soft power," see Nye 1990). This dual meaning of power problematizes an understanding of global and regional orders as being rooted solely in "hard" military and economic (material) power. Equally important is the need to examine the links with "soft" cultural (values, ideology) power. In other words, these orders are transformed in the context of structures and processes of interactions involving all four dimensions of power, with their specific complexity differing over time and space.

Third, by addressing these different dimensions of power both the coercive elements of power represented by military might as well as the consensual elements of power represented by ideologies, norms, values, and expectations can be taken account. It thus is not enough for a state simply to amass material capabilities to become hegemonic; it must also provide an ideology which satisfies, at least to some degree, the less powerful actors who acquiesce in the distribution of power and values represented by the established or emerging orders. The hegemon's ideology helps to glue together the interactions of agents in economics, politics, security, and culture in a way to make sense of global and regional orders and processes. In other words, the power of a hegemonic state emanates from ideology as well as from material capabilities. By highlighting the consensual as well as coercive aspects of power as embedded in structures and social practices, therefore, we can try to come to grips with the transformation of both global and regional orders in all their complexity.

Structural transformations

The structural transformation expressed by the decline of American global hegemony and the ending of the Cold War have brought into sharp relief a number of features of persistence and change in world order. The rise of Japan and the European Community (EC; now European Union, EU) during especially the last decade or two epitomizes the decline of the United States economically. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system at the beginning of the 1970s following President Richard Nixon's devaluation of the dollar pinpoints the structural transformation of the global economic order. True, the legacies of the US's economic predominance remain in the power it is able to exercise through the international institutions of the global economic order, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as newer, less institutionalized forms (e.g. the meeting of the G-10, G-7, G-5, etc.). But the sources of economic power have been transformed dramatically, as seen in the way the burgeoning economic power of Japan and the EU has eaten into the US's share of world Gross National Product (GNP). Between 1950 and 1990, for instance, the Japanese share of world GNP more than tripled, from 5 per cent to 18 per cent, with this forty-year period witnessing the nation's economy grow dramatically from 10 per cent to over 60 per cent of that of the United States. At the same time, flows of capital now increasingly originate from Japan and the EU as well as from the United States. In 1993, for instance, the top three rankings for cumulative Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) were respectively the United States, Germany, and Japan, with Japan increasing and the decreasing in recent years. Finally, Japan is strengthening its presence in international institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, and so on, moving beyond a role largely carved out in regionally focused institutions like the Asian Development Bank. The prominent role played by Japan in response to the 1997 currency crisis in East and Southeast Asia reflects the continuing strength of the Japanese economy, despite the fragility of the financial system in the wake of the bursting of the Japanese bubble.

Reflecting these changes, Japanese and European transnational corporations now compete intensely with their American congeners in both domestic and foreign markets. Their political, business, and intellectual elites increasingly view the world and act in terms of triadic capitalist power. In this way, the global economy in the late Cold War, and especially in the newly emerging post-Cold War order, has become overwhelmingly dominated by the three core regions centering on the United States, Japan, and the EU, with state and non-state actors interacting and conceiving of the world in terms of a tripartite economic division of the world. The acceleration of this trend after the ending of the Cold War is plain to see: with the socialist mode of production and economic organization no longer viewed as a viable alternative to capitalism, the

“two worlds” (Heiwa Mondai Danwakai, 1950) have given way to “one world” made up of three economic cores, with the former socialist states and societies scrambling to institutionalize market principles as a precondition to fuller if not full integration into the emerging order.

This economic transformation has influenced profoundly the political role of the United States. No longer enjoying the economic power of the early post-1945 years, the political leaders of the United States have grown less willing and able to shoulder global responsibilities. The political goal of Cold War containment, whether through the build up of the nuclear arsenal or through conventional wars in the Korean peninsula, Vietnam, and elsewhere, entailed economic cost. The decline of U.S. economic power meant that these costs were harder progressively to bear. Although in the 1980s the Reagan administration sought to reassert American power through military build-ups and “Reagonomics,” even this partially successful attempt to recapture the glories of early postwar hegemony could only go forward with financial and other support from the other cores. The government and the political, bureaucratic, and economic elites of the United States exerted growing pressure on Japan and the EU to shoulder more of the burden in the confrontation with the communist alternative. The economic competition between the triadic centers within the capitalist world thus went hand in hand with political cooperation between the three in the larger confrontation between capitalism and socialism. Although the latter world has all but disappeared, the United States has failed to implement a political project to fully integrate these states into the newly emerging global order. At the same time, economic competition between the three cores intensifies as political cooperation moves slowly forward now that the “common enemy” of the Soviet Union no longer poses a threat to the capitalist project.

In the Cold War world, security was structured globally in terms of a militarized confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The two nuclear superpowers sat at the apex of a nuclear and conventional military alliance system, which divided the world into countervailing forces, if not into a clear-cut military divide in all corners of the world. It is emblematic of this military confrontation that, in regions not clearly integrated into one of the “two worlds,” military sustenance was offered to conflicting parties as part of the global confrontation between capitalism and communism. The military served to support the economic and political goals of maintaining and extending American power if not global hegemony, on the one hand, and the Soviet empire, on the other. In this situation, the “soft power” of the United States came to penetrate ever more regions of the globe, especially in the wake of the Soviet's gradual withdrawal of military and financial support for states and political movements seeking to challenge the capitalist order and follow the

path of socialist development.

Despite the decline of the United States economically, in the 1980s the Reagan administration sought to suck the Soviet Union into a vortex of military build-ups and competitions, on the one hand, and Japanese and other savings into the U.S. economy, on the other. The Soviet Union was unable to sustain the economic costs of this competition. Yet the powerful U.S. pressure on allies such as Japan to "share the defense burden," especially during the 1980s, also illustrates the inability of the United States alone to sustain that competition. The U.S. "victory" over the U.S.S.R., whether resulting from an unsustainable arms race, the internal failings of the Soviet Union, the disintegration of the East European empire, or a combination of these and other factors, means that the United States is now preeminent militarily. Lacking the political will, resources, or legitimacy to employ military force alone in the shaping of a new, post-Cold War order, however, the United States now seeks the support of other states or international institutions before employing military force. The gradual institutionalization of financial contributions toward the cost of maintaining a U.S. presence overseas during the late Cold War culminated in international contributions at the time of the Gulf War, when Japan and Germany, as the economic cores of the newly emerging triadic order, were subject to pressure to pay enormous sums toward the cost of fighting the war, with Japan's contribution totalling U.S.\$13 billion (on Japan's response, see Hook, 1996). In this way, the Japanese government made a major contribution toward the costs of fighting the Gulf War as the government makes a major contribution toward the costs of the deployment of U.S. troops in Japan.

Finally, the ideological battle at the heart of the Cold War cultural confrontation between capitalism and communism was sustained by an appeal to two different ways of organizing political and economic life. In this sense, the military and ideology were instruments employed by the United States and the Soviet Union in order to maintain or extend their respective forms of political and economic organization. In maintaining these forms of organization at home, and seeking to spread them abroad, both appealed to democracy, whether implemented through open elections or the "dictatorship of the proletariat." What is more, both state-led socialist development as well as capitalist, free market development sought to satisfy the rising consumer demands of the citizenry. The difference, of course, lies in the fact that Soviet hegemony failed to achieve the people's acquiescence in the state's project, relying more on the coercive than the consensual elements of power (Cox, 1983). The recent triumph of "free-market capitalism" and "liberal democracy" as the twin fountainhead of legitimacy in the organization of political and economic life in the post-Cold War era symbolizes a triumph for the ideological princi-

ples of the United States. But this does not mean the "end of history" (Fukuyama, 1992), even if it does mean acquiescence in the capitalist project. For the United States no longer possesses the political will, resources, or legitimacy to relaunch itself as a global hegemon seeking to impose these principles on the areas of disintegration and fragmentation around the world, as much a part of the emerging post-Cold War world as is integration and unity.

GLOBALIZATION

Economy

The reason for this is linked inextricably to the impact of processes of globalization, regionalization, and interregionalization on the structures of the global and regional orders. For these are dialectic processes, containing within themselves the seeds from which these contradictory trends sprout. The globalization of economics, politics, security, and culture has brought about a fundamental shift in the structure of power (for details, see Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Kofman and Youngs, 1996; Mittelman, 1996). The attempt made by the United States to shore up its decline in the 1970s and especially the 1980s by appealing for support from the emerging cores of Japan and the EU occurred in the context of increasing symmetric and asymmetric economic interdependence, globally and regionally, with a time lag in the degree of regionalization evident between Japan and East Asia, and the economies making up the present EU. The globalization of the economy is taken as the process resulting from the transborder actions of a wide range of agents, especially multinational corporations. Many of these activities are non-purposive, that is, the agents of globalization are not necessarily seeking to promote a globalist project. Business may simply be pursuing profits.

Whether or not the term was used, globalization of the world economy is not a new phenomenon, being manifest concretely in the outward expansion of European powers during the era of imperialism and colonialism. The integration of region after region of the world into the capitalist economy prior to 1917 is one aspect of globalization, as is the gradual, partial, and fragmented integration of the socialist economies into the capitalist economic system in the wake of the Russian revolution. The collapse in the early 1970s of the Bretton Woods system established in the post-1945 era spurred further globalization of the economy. The advanced states facilitated economic globalization by liberalizing the movement of capital and promoting global trade. The capital flows from Japan changed the structure of global investments, with Japanese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) becoming central to the recycling of surplus as well as in financing the American deficit, especially in the post-Plaza

years prior to the bursting of the Japanese bubble. At the same time, multinational corporations and other economic actors globalized in order to sustain themselves (Hook, 1998). For some companies the solution was to move production facilities to the developing regions of the world in order to take advantage of cheaper factors of production. For others the solution was to invest in other advanced regions of the world economy in order to exploit market opportunities and competitive advantages in North America and Europe. Such actions spurred globalization of the economy during the 1970s and 1980s. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the alternative to the capitalist market economy in the early 1990s, a new impetus has been given to globalization processes, as seen in the increasing flows of capital, production, and trade to other parts of the world, and the ongoing process of integrating, albeit unevenly, the former socialist states into the emerging global market economy.

Politics

In the case of politics, purposive agents may be involved in promoting globalist projects, such as promoting the institutionalization of global economic organizations, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). At the same time, however, the globalization of politics is evident from the growing globalization of political issues; the globalization of agents, especially political and policy-making elites, and to a lesser extent social movements; and the institutionalization of policy-making processes at the global level, as for instance in the case of environmental issues. In the Cold War era globalization of political issues often was constrained by the existence of the "two worlds," but the need to deal with issues such as the vertical and horizontal nuclear arms race, the disparity in the distribution of global resources as manifest in the North-South gap, and global warming and other transnational environmental issues, meant that certain political issues were understood increasingly as "global issues," even if the ideological confrontation between the "two worlds" precluded the issues always being dealt with from a global perspective. Now, political and policy-making elites and social movements increasingly act on the basis of identities and solidarities transcending the boundaries of a single state. This is not to suggest the "demise of the territorial state" (Herz, 1957, 1968), which is itself a manifestation of globalization processes, as seen in the state-building endeavors of former European colonies and the recent burst of micro-state building in the wake of the Cold War's end; but rather to suggest that especially the advanced states' political elites are enmeshed intricately in globalizing processes, such that their expectations, calculations, and actions often are global in orientation and impact. These elites have been in the vanguard of the efforts to create and strengthen international institutions and regimes, recognizing the importance of international and transnational cooperation in

order to implement domestic as well as international policies.

The institutionalization of policy-making processes at the global level is evident in the burgeoning number and type of international organizations involved in global issues. Although these organizations lack the coercive instruments of power enjoyed by states, a growing consensus often can be identified on the need to deal with global issues, as in the case of the environment, AIDS, and so on. The end of the Cold War has strengthened many of these underlying tendencies toward the globalization of politics, although the contradictions embedded in globalization processes also has led to fragmentation of solidarities and interests. In this way, the globalization of politics has set in motion forces of integration as well as disintegration both within and between states and social groups.

Finally, the breakdown between domestic and international politics can be seen in the activities of social movements, which take up issues of global and not just national significance. During the early Cold War, the universal appeal to humanity contained in the Russell-Einstein Declaration is symbolic of the attempt of those involved in antinuclear activities to break down the barriers between nation states in favor of an all-embracing "species identity." This was impeded by the Cold War division of the world. With the end of the Cold War, the transnational coalition of social forces put together in order to protest the infringement of human rights in different parts of the globe, protect the environment, or provide aid for the starving, illustrates the globalization of interests and identities at the mass level. Indeed, in this new "age of relativity" some states are even moving beyond the narrowly conceived "non-interference in domestic affairs" in order to protect the interests of people beyond their own sovereign territory (Sakamoto, 1997).

Security

During the Cold War, the globalization of security was most salient in the globalization of threats to security in the wake of the development of nuclear weapons. In a fundamental sense, the Cold War threat of nuclear war between the East and West was a global threat to security implying the possibility of not "one Rome, but two Carthages" (Heiwa Mondai Danwakai, 1950: 129). The territorial boundary of the state, which traditionally symbolized the sovereign state's impermeability, was punctured radically by the advent of the nuclear era. Although the globalization of threats to security was manifest concretely under an apartheid system of nuclear discrimination against non-possessors, the international regimes established with the aim of preventing the globalization of the "nuclear club" was premised on a commitment by the nuclear powers to disarm, as seen in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In this sense, the implementation of nuclear disarmament measures by the United States and the former Soviet Union in the post-Cold War era serves

to reduce global, not simply bilateral, threats to security based on a newly emerging consensus on the need to reduce weapons of mass destruction.

Similarly, the alliance structures set in place during the Cold War era were global in their dynamics, even if neutral states and the non-aligned movement resisted these global dynamics. Fundamentally, each side sought to extend outward, beyond the bounds of spatial contiguity or propinquity, with ideology rather than space defining the boundaries of the "two worlds." The hallmark of the Cold War era, the division of the world into a confrontation between militarized alliance structures led by the United States and the USSR, represents an attempt to deal with the globalization of threat by non-global means. It is not surprising, therefore, that the end of the Cold War has led to a continuing outward expansion of institutional frameworks meant to deal with the latent threats of the nuclear yet post-Cold War era, on the one hand, and nuclear disarmament and other measures seeking to globalize security, on the other.

Culture

Finally, the globalization of culture is evident in the outward expansion of material ("hard") and value ("soft") culture to different parts of the globe. Irrespective of whether consumer "hard" and "soft" culture is regarded as a "universal" aspect of modernization or a predominantly "American" aspect of Westernization, the popular acceptance of the outward flow of consumer products, values, life styles, and patterns of consumption, which transcends the boundaries of both space and time, is a part of an asymmetric globalization processes. Many cultural forms are produced, distributed, and consumed globally, but this does not mean a "global culture" has emerged (Street, 1997). On the one hand, the homogenization of tastes in food, clothes, music, and the popular appeal of material culture symbolized by the scramble to acquire modern conveniences and comforts has eroded differences between cultures. On the other hand, however, the flowering of new cultural forms and the preservation of cultural identities both within and between different regions of the world highlight the uneven nature of globalization processes. In this sense, the intersecting of globalization processes with the end of the Cold War is not so much the harbinger of a "clash of civilizations" (Huntington, 1993), but rather a confirmation of how, in proceeding unevenly, globalization has eroded the relationship between space and culture, with elements of a variety of cultures and civilizations coexisting, mutating and emerging as "new culture" or "crossover culture" in different parts of local, national, regional, and global space. In other words, the globalization of culture does not mean the homogenization of culture, but rather the increase in contact between different cultural forms, both hard and soft, in ways to lead to plural cultural forms.

REGIONALIZATION IN EAST ASIA

The uneven impact of globalization processes can be seen in the spur these processes have given to regionalization, with the regional repercussions of globalization emerging as a nascent triadic division of the world into the three core regions of the United States and the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), Germany and the EU, and Japan and East Asia (*see* Gamble and Payne, 1996). The emergence of these putative regions expresses how regionalization is not only a response to globalization, but also an integral part of that process. Some regionalist projects may seek to establish "closed regionalism," with economic, political, security, and cultural structures erected as dams to seal off the region from the flow of globalization processes, or "open regionalism" (*see* Drysdale and Garnaut, 1993). Such are the dynamics of globalization, however, that most if not all elements of "closed regionalism" presently seem unable to face the onslaught of globalization processes, although their dialectics spur uneven fragmentation as well as unity. Certainly the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the move to market economies in China and Vietnam, and the gradual opening of Myanmar, North Korea, and Cuba highlight how even the most closed states have been unable to remain isolated from the all-embracing power of the globalizing trends embedded in the world economy.

These globalizing trends mean that regions are constructed in the process of social forces reproducing and reconfiguring regional structures, as historical legacies as well as nascent patterns of interaction. In this sense, regions are socially constructed (Hook, 1996a). This social construction of regions makes for political contestation; that is, regionalism as one state's project can collide with regionalism as another state's project. This is precisely the situation in East Asia/Asia Pacific. The U.S. attempt to construct a region based on the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) regionalist project, on the one hand, and the attempt by Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia to construct a region based on the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) regionalist project, on the other, epitomizes the struggle between different regionalist projects (Higgott and Stubbs, 1995; Hook, 1996b). APEC is trumpeted as "open regionalism," whereas the fear on the part of those outside of East and Southeast Asia is that, by excluding the United States and other "non-Asian economies" like Australia and New Zealand, EAEC would become a form of "closed regionalism," if not an economic or trade bloc. But in the sense that regions are constructed from both material and ideational elements, the material aspects of economic regionalization, such as trade flows in Asia Pacific or production networks in East Asia, need to be imputed with ideational meaning

as the "Asia Pacific" or "East Asian" region in order to construct new regional identities. In other words, the emergence of "closed regionalism" in the material sense is linked to the construction of a regional identity giving meaning to that region in an ideational sense. As it is, the contradictions inherent in the two projects have constrained the development of a clear regional identity, although the Japanese state is coalescing around APEC, not EAEC, as seen in the creation of the APEC "wisemen's group" and the holding of the APEC meeting in Osaka.

Economy

The regionalization of the economy in East Asia revolves around Japan as the core of an emerging pattern of especially production networks, as well as trade and investment linkages, which tie the region together in an expanding web of symmetric and asymmetric relationships. In many respects, regionalization in East Asia can be traced back to the regionalist project embarked upon by the Japanese state in the 1930s, when it trumpeted the goal of establishing the "East Asian Coprosperity Sphere," in part as a response to the globalization of Western economies in the interwar period. Such a project is also part of the postwar settlement, as Japan's defeat meant that the nation's economic relations with the outside world were reconfigured around the two poles of the United States, on the one hand, and capitalist East Asia, on the other. The United States helped to push the Europeans out of the region, back to the European heartland, with Japan moving in to take their place. The export of Japanese manufactures to the U.S. market, as well as to the emerging markets of East and Southeast Asia, and the latter's export of key resources for the economic development of Japan, embedded the region in the asymmetric structures of the expanding postwar capitalist economy. But the success of Japan's economic recovery and growth, as manifest in the emergence of the economic superpower on the global stage, was set to transform the nature of the postwar settlement engineered by the United States.

The rise of Japan in the context of the globalization of the world economy meant that regionalization moved forward on two fronts. The implementation of the state's regionalist project to create Asian business opportunities for Japanese corporations within the framework of the postwar settlement was facilitated by an aid policy seeking to support and link asymmetrically the authoritarian developmentalist regimes of East and Southeast Asia with Japan under the banner of economism. The Japanese state's reach to the region was now extended by aid and other forms of "economic cooperation," rather than military might, as in the imperialist era. War reparation payments starting with Burma and the Philippines in the mid-1950s, and the build-up of economic infrastructures, created the opportunities for Japanese corporations to exploit the region's resources and markets (Hasegawa, 1975; Murai, 1992).

Thus, the penetration of East Asia by Japanese business served to link the economic development of the region with the dynamics of the Japanese economy and statist project, with first East Asian and then Southeast Asian Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs) being integrated into an emerging structure of economic linkages and networks centering on Japan (on networks, *see* Katzenstein and Shiraishi, 1997).

At the same time, the economic and ideological pull exerted by the United States structured the regional economy within the broader context of the development of Japan's Pacific wing, with the political and business elites of both Japan and the United States sharing a fundamental consensus: pro-capitalism, on the one hand, anticommunism, on the other. The nation's political and economic elites proposed projects linking East Asia and the Pacific, as seen in the creation of the Pacific Basin Economic Council, the Pacific Trade Development Council, and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (for details, *see* Korhonen, 1994). This meant the neglect of the Japan Sea side of Japan, *ura Nihon* (Furumaya, 1997; Hook, 1997). These organizations have exerted far greater influence in defining the region than the recent efforts of maverick politicians such as Ishihara Shintarō, who is seeking to enhance an East Asian identity of interests by building links with Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia (Ishihara and Mahathir, 1994), although the newly emerging economic power houses of the region have adopted many of the strategies used by Japan in seeking to catch up with the Western front runners. In this sense, no consensus exists in Japan on a future strategy, now that the nation has itself emerged as a front runner and is itself challenged by a new phalanx of late comers from other parts of East Asia.

These aspects of regionalism were given greater salience by the globalization of the world economy. For the regionalization of the East Asian economies moved forward as part of the dynamic linkage between Japan's emergence as an economic challenge to the United States, on the one hand, and the pressures on the Japanese state and corporations to respond to globalization, on the other. As a result, a complex web of symmetric as well as asymmetric relations started to emerge in East Asia as production processes moved offshore, especially in the 1980s, with the functional links between the Japanese and other East and Southeast Asian economies providing an opportunity for the ideological as well as structural reshaping of the East Asian region. In this the role of Japanese capital and corporations was crucial.

More specifically, the march of Japanese capital and corporations into the region speeded up after the restructuring of the global economy in the wake of the surge in the value of the yen following the Nixon shocks at the beginning of the 1970s, the "oil shocks" in 1973 and 1979, and the intensification of trade conflict between Japan and the United States thereafter. The appreciation

of the yen after the G-5 Plaza Accord of 1985 further "pushed" Japanese capital and corporations overseas; cheap factors of production and emerging markets "pulled" them to developing East and later Southeast Asia. But unlike in the "flying geese" pattern of development, with second-tier or obsolete technologies and production processes moving offshore, the late 1980s and early 1990s have witnessed the emergence of a complex regional production network, involving symmetric and asymmetric linkages, and state-of-the art as well as second-tier technology and production systems (Bernard and Ravenhill, 1995). With the end of the Cold War, many of the processes of economic integration have intensified, with China and Vietnam also being embedded gradually into the regional production system, capital transfers, and trade flows. In this we are witnessing the all-embracing power of economic globalization, with spillovers and new political solidarities being molded in the process of the emerging patterns of economic interactions and emerging regional structures.

Politics

During the Cold War, the omnipresence of the United States, the legacy of Japanese imperialism, and the asymmetry in trade between Japan and other parts of the region constrained the regionalization of politics. Indeed, no consensus emerged in the region on how to respond to Japan politically. The main regional initiative, the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, went ahead without Japanese participation. For nations struggling with nation building and development, the asymmetric economic relations forged during the 1960s and 1970s evoked images of Japan's successful realization of the East Asian Coprosperity Sphere project by non-military means. The boycott of Japanese products and the anti-Japanese riots at the time of Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei's visit to Thailand and Indonesia in 1974 symbolize the confrontational nature of political relations on the mass level, even if interstate collaboration was forging ahead on the economic front. In the wake of the American defeat in Vietnam and Japan's replacement of the United States as the No. 1 trader with ASEAN, however, a new political relationship began to emerge.

The specter of a recrudescence of Japanese militarism in the wake of the American withdrawal reinforced the need for this new relationship. The establishment in 1977 of the ASEAN-Japan Forum, the Japanese participation in the ASEAN summit, and the announcement of the "Fukuda Doctrine," suggest how Japan's political partnership with ASEAN was developing within the transformation of regional and global structures. The Fukuda Doctrine, which included a commitment not to become a military big power, was an attempt to develop a "special relationship" with Southeast Asia (Sudo, 1987). A new consensus was starting to emerge on integrating Japan into the region's political

dialogue. Although regional political relations have been strengthened in the interim, as seen by Japan's role as an ASEAN Dialogue Partner, and by Foreign Minister Nakayama Tarō's promotion of the ASEAN Regional Forum, they remain weak, with U.S.-Japan bilateralism continuing to take precedence over regionalism. It is to APEC, rather than EAEC, that Japan thus has turned, with the political and economic elites of Japan being integrated into trans-Pacific and East Asian relationships, rather than into relationships which strengthen the East Asian dimension of political and economic relations and identities. In this the regionalist project is emerging as an Asia-Pacific project, where the legacies of Cold War bilateralism constrain the implementation of a regionalist state project excluding the United States.

Security

The U.S.'s restructuring of the regional security order based on the institutionalization of bilateral security links during the early Cold War years fragmented security relations in the East Asian region. The "hub and spokes" security structure in East Asia contrasts sharply with that in Europe, where NATO confronted the Warsaw Pact. The regional attempt at a security structure, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), proved unworkable. Apart from geostrategic differences, which meant land-based forces predominated in Europe and sea-based forces in East and Southeast Asia, the security situation in the latter was complicated by the legacy of Japanese imperialism, on the one hand, and the perceived link between European and Asian security, on the other. In a sense, the Cold War in Europe was sustained at the cost of hot wars in Asia, with the linkage between the two regions being part of the legacy of the imperial mind set as well as of the fear of falling dominoes in the anticommunist mind set.

The fear of a revival of Japanese militarism as well as the fear of communist threats imputed a dual significance to the U.S.-Japan bilateral security treaty in the minds of nation-building Asian elites. The two Asian hot wars could not have been fought without Japanese bases. Nor could the nuclear threat system against the Soviet Union and China have been maintained. But for many of the nationalist elites of East and Southeast Asia, the treaty served not only as part of the means to protect their newly emerging states from the external threat of communism; it also served in protecting the region from a remilitarized Japan. In this sense, the deployment of U.S. forces in and about Japan acted as a "cap in the bottle" of Japanese militarism (*Daily Yomiuri*, 20 March 1990). The role of the United States in keeping Japan "down" precluded the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) from developing force projection capabilities, as did antimilitaristic popular opinion in Japan and the opposition to a remilitarized Japan in East Asia. The East Asian fear of a revival of militarism, on the one hand, and antimilitaristic public opinion, on the other, worked to constrain the

Japanese state from responding to the decline in U.S. hegemonic power by an all-out build-up of the Japanese SDF. The Japanese military build-up in equipment and the expansion in military roles, as seen in the wake of the adoption of the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation in 1978, subordinated Japanese forces and strategies to those of the United States in an asymmetric structure of cooperation (Hook, 1996). The pressure for Japan to "share the defense burden," which called for payments to support the continued deployment of U.S. forces in Japan, provided another means to shore up the decline in U.S. hegemony. By the early years of the post-Cold War 1990s, Japan was paying around 70 percent of the cost of deploying American troops, excluding salaries and other incidental expenses, making deployments in Japan more attractive to the United States than home-based deployments from the financial point of view. The deployment of the vast majority of U.S. troops on the island of Okinawa also served to distribute the costs of hosting U.S. forces disproportionately within Japan, although in the wake of the rape of a twelve-year-old school girl by American service personnel the call by Okinawans for a reduction in U.S. bases has grown more vociferous (for details, see *Okinawa Times*, 1997).

At the same time, however, the decline in American power has served gradually to build up pressures for the regionalization of security. The Cold War's ending has spurred this process. In the Cold War era, regionalization of security was constrained by bilateral pressures generated by the United States. In the early 1980s, for instance, the Maritime Self-Defence Forces started to participate in the biannual Rimpac exercises, bringing Japanese forces into closer contact with other navies in the region. Moreover, despite remaining fears of a revival of Japanese militarism, the military elites of Japan and East and Southeast Asia started gradually to build up contacts, with a consensus slowly starting to emerge that Japan should play some sort of military role in the region, as seen in the general support for the deployment of the SDF in Cambodian peace-keeping. This followed a trend from earlier years. From the end of the 1970s, for instance, visits of high-ranking military officers started to take place between Japan and South Korea. Visits and exchanges between Japan and Southeast Asia, and later China, also started during the late Cold War era. With the end of the Cold War, moreover, closer links are starting to be forged between the militaries of Japan and those of South Korea and the ASEAN nations (for details, see Hughes, 1996). In this way, the bilateral security links which started to be strengthened in the region during the Cold War and early post-Cold War years have laid a foundation for the emerging multilateral cooperation between Japan and other East and Southeast Asian nations.

This has gone hand in hand with Japan playing a role in the regionalization

of confidence-building measures (CBMs) in the early 1990s. The bilateral nature of security structures during the Cold War had constrained Japan in playing a role in the development of regional security regimes, but in the post-Cold War era a number of initiatives have been taken in order to promote a security dialogue. This has gone forward on a bilateral basis with South Korea, China, and to a lesser extent Russia, as well as multilaterally. The salient example of emerging multilateral cooperation is the institutionalization of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), with the first meeting taking place in 1994. A number of issues relevant to promoting transparency in the region has been discussed at the ARF, such as the need for all members to publish defense whitepapers. The Defense Agency also has sought recently to complement the growing security links between Japan and other parts of East and Southeast Asia with a call to promote a variety of CBMs, such as despatching observers to war games and other military exercises in the region. Similarly, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) has taken the initiative in strengthening controls on the regional flow of weaponry. In this way, steps are being taken to develop a region-wide security regime, albeit without excluding the United States.

Culture

As a process involving the expansion of economic interaction and interconnectedness, economic regionalization is accompanied by the flows of material culture, on the one hand, and the human carriers of cultural values, on the other. The asymmetric outward flow of material culture from Japan to other parts of East and Southeast Asia has made Japan the center of an emerging "regional culture" (Funabashi, 1993). The Japanese human presence in the region also has stimulated interest in Japanese culture. The flows back to Japan, such as raw materials or manufacturing parts, do not form part of a regional culture, only in so far as they become part of "Japanese culture." Others, such as unskilled migrant workers, might have helped stimulate the recent interest in Asian culture in Japan, but this is insignificant in comparison with the boom in the region centering on the culture of Japan. In the recent emergence of "regional culture," therefore, Japanese influence is overwhelming, as seen in the spread not only of material consumer culture, but of image-based popular-fiction Doraemon comics (*manga*) (Shiraishi, 1997).

In the early years of emerging economic links, however, the legacy of Japanese imperialism, the fear of "neocolonialism," and the emergence or renewal of national identities in the process of nation-building engendered anti-rather than pro-Japanese feelings in the region. In the protests against the visit of Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei in the early 1970s, for instance, the tubes of Lion toothpaste, Asahi mirrors, and Sony electrical products used daily by the people of Thailand and Indonesia symbolized how national cul-

ture was being swallowed up by the newly emerging Japanese economic leviathan. The legacy of Japanese colonialism in South Korea, moreover, still creates barriers to the flow of Japanese culture, especially "soft culture," as witnessed by the restrictions placed on Japanese language and music. But in other parts of the region, the "soft" and "hard" aspects of Japanese culture are welcomed, not least among the younger generation of the emerging middle classes. The popularity of Japanese language, entertainment, and food, on the one hand, and electrical products, cameras, and cars, on the other, has spread throughout the region. Indeed, the 1990s has witnessed a burgeoning interest in Japanese culture among the new urban middle classes of both East and Southeast Asia, with many of their material desires being satisfied by Japanese department stores and relocated production facilities. Although this reflects in part the globalization of consumer culture, whether "modern" or "American," the regional dynamics give a prominent place to Japan as the supplier of the cultural icons of economism.

What is more, the Japanese development model offers an ideological prop for the development strategies employed by the Newly Industrializing Economies (NIES) and the ASEAN tigers like Malaysia. The "Asian Development Model" espoused by Lee Kuan Yew, Mahathir Mohammad, and others, which gives a central place to "Confucian values," such as the primacy of the family, plays centrally an ideological role in supporting the authoritarian developmental regimes of East Asia. True, the NIES and the ASEAN tigers can be seen to be part of a cultural legacy influenced by Confucianism (Zakaria, 1994), but this is hardly to say such traditions are the only traditions in these societies. Indeed, the commitment to democracy and human rights, the hallmark of declaratory Western and Japanese policy, is shared by at least some of the political leaders in the region. Democracy and human rights are not without their champions, such as Kim Dae Jung (Kim, 1994).

The early success of Japan as the first non-Western state to join the advanced economies gives salience to Japanese culture and practices, especially in the economic field. It is economic culture, in particular, which is creating the dynamics for the spread of a regional culture, to supplement if not replace the legacy of European culture and civilization remaining from the earlier Western penetration of East Asia. The institutions of Japanese cultural diplomacy, such as the Japan Foundation, which is budgeted through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and is under the supervision of the Minister's Secretariat in the MOFA, support this endeavor. This ensures that opportunities exist for Asians to "learn from Japan" and imbibe the lessons of Japan's economic success as well as the material and value aspects of the first Asian success story. At the same time, these institutions of cultural diplomacy serve to spread interest in "soft" culture, especially Japanese language and Japanese studies.

JAPAN'S ROLE IN EURO-ASIAN INTERREGIONALIZATION

The globalization and regionalization of economy, politics, security, and culture have gone hand in hand with interregional developments. As in the case of globalization and regionalization, interregionalization is uneven, creating constraints on, yet opportunities for, change in relations in and between different regional and global orders. Here interregionalization refers to the growth in the economic, political, security, and cultural links between the emerging tripolar regions of the world. The interregional links among the three cores of Japan, the United States, and Germany in the EU are being strengthened, maintained, or weakened as aspects of regionalist projects and regionalization processes within the broader context of globalization. Given the Allied Occupation and the economic, political, security, and cultural integration of Japan into the capitalist world order under the asymmetric structure of power topped by the United States, on the one wing, and the EC and general commitment to the Atlantic alliance, on the other, interregionalization processes linking Japan, as the lead nation of East Asia, to the EC during the early Cold War years were constrained severely by omnipresent bilateralism centering on the United States. It was only after the end of the Cold War that Euro-East Asian interregionalism was given fledgling shape in the form of the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM), held for the first time in Bangkok in 1996 (on ASEM, see Gilson, 1999).

With the restructuring of global power in the 1970s, strategic attempts to develop elite links among the three cores emerged, as seen in the setting up of the Trilateral Commission (Gill, 1990), but the Euro-Japanese leg of the triad always has been weaker. With restructuring again in the mid-1980s, and now with the ending of the Cold War, however, this bilaterally constrained interregionalization is moving gradually beyond the mainly economic links of the Cold War years into the development of fledgling political and security links as well as the strengthening of cultural links. In this sense, the ending of the Cold War has provided new opportunities for change in Euro-Asian relations, although the legacies of existing structures continue to constrain relations. In the development of interregional links, Japan is crucial. In moving forward to a new relationship, therefore, both Japan and the EU are seeking to promote "dialogue and co-operation on, inter alia, political and security, economic as well as cultural matters," as recognized at the Japan-EU 1995 summit (Joint Press Statement, 1995: 1).

Economy

The interregionalization of economy emerged in the wake of the asymmetric penetration of Japanese manufacturers in key sectors of European economies.

As with the United States, the surge of Japanese exports in automobiles, color televisions, video-cassette recorders and other key product sectors, especially in the 1980s, engendered trade conflicts, with resultant calls in Europe for the implementation of Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) in these and other areas. Such measures were implemented bilaterally as part of the overall measures by the EC to try to reduce the huge trade surplus enjoyed by Japan as a major exporter, with exports to the EC rising from 13.6 to 20.2 percent between 1984 and 1993. Another tactic was the implementation of antidumping duties, although Japan in 1990 successfully fought the EC under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) over the issue of local content. Similarly, the Europeans joined the American chorus in demanding the "opening" of the Japanese market. Their demands have ranged from sectoral issues, such as pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, through services, such as access for lawyers and openness and transparency in financial markets, to the revamping of economic structures, such as the distribution system and keiretsu relationships. Some success in boosting EC exports clearly has been achieved, with exports rising from 7.2 to 12.5 per cent between 1984 and 1993, and in loosening restrictive practices, as in the liberalization of financial markets. In this sense, both the United States and the EU have shared interests in modifying the Japanese political economy, both externally and internally, in order to address trade conflicts and reduce the Japanese trade surplus.

Nevertheless, in pursuing this two-pronged approach of restricting Japanese imports and expanding EC exports, the EC is in the weaker position. For unlike in the case of the United States, pressure from the Europeans, whether exerted bilaterally or through EC and now EU institutions, cannot be reinforced by a "security lever," which has offered the United States an additional means to exert pressure on Japan, especially during the Cold War. The Commission recognizes as much: "it can be argued that Japan has done much to accommodate US economic demands in order not to damage their overall relationship, including the security alliance (Commission of the European Communities, 1995: 5).

Nor has the EC been able to manipulate the levers of global finance like the United States, as these are in the hands of member governments with different if not competing policy goals. The recent setbacks over the establishment of a single European currency and a European Central Bank highlight the difficulty for the EU in seeking to use financial instruments in the reshaping of the global, regional, or interregional economic order. By strategically trying to reduce the competitiveness of made-in-Japan by boosting the value of the yen, therefore, the United States has been able to exert global and regional as well as bilateral influence, far beyond the reach of the EU. As a consequence, the Europeans have been less effective than the United States in restricting

Japanese exports, with differences between the member states enabling Japan to exploit policy gaps; and in boosting European imports, with the United States being able to exert greater leverage to open the Japanese market, as seen in the case of the semi-conductor agreement (Tsuchiya, 1995).

Finally, the EU's commitment to "open regionalism" as an integral part of the European elite's regionalist project, has been cast into some doubt by the implementation of VERs against exports from Japan, on the one hand, and restrictions on Japanese transplants in exporting to other parts of the Community, on the other. The erection of barriers to external and internal trade reflects the intra-European dilemma over exposure to the sharp breeze of East Asian competition. During the 1980s, the laissez-faire U.K. was at odds with the French strategic traders, as seen in the 1988 cross-Channel stand off, when the French sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to prevent intra-EC exports of automobiles from Japanese transplants in the U.K. (Julius and Thomsen, 1988).

Thus, despite a commitment to "open economic regionalism" on the part of Europe's business and political elites, their call to "open Japan" has gone hand in hand with concrete measures to constrain the activities of Japanese enterprises in the European market. The 1993 implementation of EC-wide VERs on automobiles, whether exported from Japan or from Japanese transplants located in the Community, points to the continuing resistance to open certain sectors of the European economy to the full power of Japanese competition. It must also be noted that, under the Maastricht Treaty, antidumping measures and countervailing duties no longer require a qualified majority, but only a simple majority, with Article 130 of the Treaty also seeking to ensure "the conditions necessary for the competitiveness of the Community's industries" (Sideri, 1995: 238).

Still, the general direction in European attitudes regarding the Japanese presence has been toward convergence with the British in supporting the benefits of Japanese and other FDI, especially in the post-Cold War era. In this sense, a consensus seems to be emerging among the European political elite that the benefits of Japanese FDI outweigh the costs: the Japanese, and the presence of other East Asian corporations, can serve to make EU businesses competitive, create employment opportunities, and introduce cutting-edge technology and efficient management practices. As noted by the Commission's Sir Leon Brittan, the Japanese should "ensure that their massive investment in Europe — which I wholeheartedly welcome . . . is seen and felt to be mutually beneficial" (Brittan, 1991: 6).

At the same time, the Europeans have expressed strong support for multilateral, rather than bilateral, solutions to trade conflicts through the WTO, as seen in the Commission's attitude to the recent U.S.-Japan automobile-sector

dispute (Commission of the European Communities, 1995a: 73). In this, Japan and the EU have found common ground for cooperation in support of “globalism” and “open regionalism,” in contrast to the Clinton Administration’s confrontational approach and attempt to establish a bilateral framework for the resolution of U.S.-Japan trade conflicts. The Euro-Japanese stance is clear from the statement issued after the 1995 Japan-EU summit, where the two sides agreed: “It is vital for the operation of the WTO, that all its Members, without exception, respect fully the obligations as set out in the WTO Agreement. Disputes between Members of the WTO which cannot be resolved through bilateral consultations should be referred to the new, strengthened dispute settlement procedures, on which all have agreed” (Joint Press Statement, 1995).

In this situation, the Japanese elite has sought to gain support for the beneficial effects of Japanese competition, technology, and investment within the Community. The Japanese tactic of exploiting differences among members, playing off one country, national region, or even city against another in the feverish European battle to attract Japanese investments and manufacturers, has turned the political and certain of the economic elites of Japan and those of especially Britain into collaborators. By setting ceilings on the incentives member states are supposed to offer to Japanese investors, the Commission is able to ameliorate to some extent the competition and conflict among the membership in seeking to attract Japanese investments, but the discretion on incentives allowed under EC rulings, which make U.K. carrots especially tasty, together with the added advantage of the City, low corporation taxes, English as the medium of communication, and the Conservative’s and now Labour’s proactive support for Japanese FDI has meant that Britain emerged in the late 1980s and has remained in the 1990s as the mecca for Japanese investments. This followed the radical shift in British policy in 1988 (Nuttall, 1995: 7), with the clarion call of the conservative government changing from “bash the Japanese” to “boost the Japanese investment” in Britain.

Under the conservative government, establishing Britain as a key, low-cost production platform, with no minimum wage, no Protocol on Social Policy (as annexed to the Maastricht Treaty), and no “Japan bashing” (unlike France in 1989-91 à la Mme. Edith Cresson) served centrally the Conservative’s statist project of making British workers and businesses both swallow the bitter pill of East Asian competition. Smashing worker solidarity, on the one hand, and introducing efficient management practices and production techniques, on the other, were part of a strategy to ensure the U.K.’s survival in a globalized economy. In weeding out the weak in the face of cut-throat Asian competition, therefore, the Conservatives sought to make British manufacturers and other industries globally competitive. For the globalization of the economy has

meant that, by supporting "open regionalism," the European economies must face the competitive pressures from the newly rising economic power houses of East Asia, even if located in the EU. In this sense, whereas interregionalization has been strengthened due to a fear of "closed European regionalism" on the part of the Japanese elite, and angst at "closed Japanese economism," on the part of the European elite, it also has been strengthened as a result of especially the British government's support for Japanese FDI within a global and regional context. In this sense, Thatcherite conservatism embraced two "special relationships," with the United States, in the areas of security and foreign policy, and with Japan, in the areas of investment and industrial policy. Despite the Labour commitment to sign up to the social chapter and establish a minimum wage, the new government remains committed to pursuing a policy, as with the Conservatives, of attracting Japanese investment to the U.K.

The dynamic overseas march of Japanese capital and business into Europe in the wake of global restructuring in the mid-1980s thus was a reaction to global, regional, and interregional pressures. The rise in the value of the yen after the Plaza Accord made Europe an attractive outlet for surplus capital, with a surge in Japanese investments occurring in the late 1980s, but the Japanese advance also was spurred regionally by the signing of the Single European Act in 1986 and the fear that the completion of the Single Market in 1992 would restrict if not totally exclude the service sector, manufacturing, and other investors from European market opportunities (for details, see Hasegawa, 1998). Investments focused on real estate, finance, and insurance as well as on electronics, chemicals, and automobile manufacturing, with the bulk of Japanese FDI in the non-manufacturing sector. Reflecting Britain's regional and global role, by far the largest proportion of investments has been located in the United Kingdom, with 45 percent of the cumulative total between 1951 and 1995, followed by the Netherlands (25 percent), Germany (10 percent), and France (10 percent). The City's continuing power in global finance as well as the attractiveness of the investment climate for regional manufacturers, as seen in the location of over one-quarter of the total number of Euro-Japanese manufacturers in the U.K., suggests the important position Britain now occupies in the Euro-Japanese relationship.

Politics

It is in the context of the interregionalization of the economy that the interregionalization of politics has gone forward (for details, see Gilson, 1997). Thus, up until the end of the Cold War, political dialogue between Japan and the EC was quintessentially economic dialogue, with the sole purpose of meetings between the political and bureaucratic elites of Japan and the EC being to address outstanding economic issues. The main issues continued to be trade and the "opening" of the Japanese market. The EC's competencies on trade

were set out in the Treaty of Rome, and were strengthened immeasurably in 1970, when the Commission formally gained the power to negotiate a common commercial policy, with Japan as the first nation with which it carried out trade negotiations. At the same time, however, bilateral negotiations were set to continue, as seen in the bilateral agreements between member states and Japan on VERs.

The demands to open the Japanese market similarly went forward along the dual track of EC and bilateral pressure on Japan. This created a “unity of purpose” between the Europeans and the Americans (Commission of the European Communities, 1995: 6). Nevertheless, the omnipresent bilateralism at the heart of Japan-U.S. relations, on the one hand, and bilateralism embedded in multilateralism in EC-U.S. relations, on the other, stumped the growth of Euro-Japanese political relations during the Cold War, with even trilateralism largely centering on the “thick but inflexible leg” of Japanese-American relations and the multilateral relations between the United States and the EC member states (Nakanishi, 1995). In the nascent global order of the post-Cold War era, the new political relationship between Japan and the EU is being pushed forward not simply in terms of a new interregional relationship, “but as a counterweight to the US” (Commission of the European Communities, 1995: 19). In this we can see the significance of the Cold War’s ending for the development of the European and Asian wings of the world economy.

At the same time, however, creeping institutionalization of elite political dialogue between Japan and the EC, and recognition of the EC as a political entity, was moving forward slowly along with the continuing predominance of the member states in the political relationship. True, the limited nature of the EC’s political competency has constrained the development of the political side of the relationship. The start of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970 occurred outside the formal treaty framework of the EC, and foreign and security policy remains outside the competency of the Commission under the terms of the 1985 Single European Act and the 1991 Maastricht Treaty — a far different situation than in trade, with the move to a common foreign and security policy having failed to make much headway.

Nevertheless, the institutionalization of political links has been central to interregionalization, with a number of frameworks being set up over the past twenty years. At the outset, the Commission established a delegation in Tokyo in 1974. Then, in the 1980s, an institutional framework for political dialogue was established: meetings between the Japanese Foreign Minister and the Foreign Ministers of the Community (the troika) began in 1983 on a biannual basis; and ministerial-level meetings between the Japanese government and the Commission began in 1984, albeit with a gap between the 1986 and 1990 meetings. Both sides also have carried out briefings on foreign policy, with the

EU briefing Japanese representatives on the EPC. Finally, in 1993 the Japanese side set up a Consulate-General in Strasbourg in order to monitor developments in the European Parliament (for details, *see* Tanaka, 1995).

These and other activities laid a somewhat shaky foundation for the development of the political relationship in the post-Cold War era, as expressed by the signing of the Hague Declaration in 1991. The EU and Japan decided at that time "to intensify their dialogue and to strengthen their cooperation and partnership in order that the challenges of the future may be met" (Joint Declaration, 1991). Thereafter, a Euro-Japanese summit was set to take place annually following the first meeting in the Hague, although the continuing weakness of the political relationship is evident from the failure to hold a summit in 1994, partly due to the political turmoil in Japan. Still, a new importance has been given to firmly institutionalizing the political dialogue in the emerging post-Cold War global order, as seen in the Commission's recent call for the EU to "actively support and participate in Japan's greater political involvement in global foreign and security policy" (Commission of the European Communities, 1995: 3). Similarly, the Japanese government supports the increased political role of the EU. This strategy of the two sides mutually reinforcing each other's aspirations to carry out global and regional political roles was confirmed at the Fourth Japan/EU summit in June 1995 (Joint Press Statement, 1995).

The concrete areas of political cooperation are still limited, but can be expected to move forward in the context of the strengthening of the two poles of the tripolar global structure. The Euro-Japanese attempt to give shape to the newly emerging global order can be seen from a number of areas of cooperation. The following are representative, rather than exhaustive. In the first place, as far as the United Nations is concerned, the two sides have cooperated by submitting a joint proposal for the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, which was successfully instituted in 1992, with the first report issued in 1993 (Chalmers et al., 1994). This serves to enhance Japan's political profile in the UN, apart from the security aspects of the initiative. Second, the emergence of a Euro-Japanese role in global politics is symbolized by the EU's endorsement of Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (Commission for the European Communities, 1995: 8), a central plank in the statist Japanese project of carving out a more powerful role for the nation in the newly emerging order. In this, Japan and the EU share ambitions to play a greater political role in world affairs.

Third, Japan and the EU have implemented cooperation in the use of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), in line with the two side's commitment to free-market ideology and interregional support in the use of aid for

the development of the Asian and the East European (former Soviet Union) wings of the newly emerging global order. In the case of the European wing, the Japanese have joined in developing the emerging market economies of the former Soviet Union, and also are assisting Central and East European economies, as seen in the Japanese membership in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In the case of the Asian wing, the EU follows Japan as the second most important aid donor (Commission of the European Communities, 1994: 5), with a focus on South Asia, and also has been involved in discussions to offer aid to Mongolia and Cambodia. The two have complementary aid strategies in terms of overall geographic focus and amounts, with the Asian share of EU aid having declined from 33.7 percent to 18.5 percent between 1981-82 and 1991-92 (Sideri, 1995: 228), whereas Japan still remains Asia's number one donor. As the Commission recognizes: "The Community has a strong and well-established presence in Africa, Middle-East and Central and South America whereas Japan has tended to concentrate on Asia" (Commission of the European Communities, 1992: 13).

Fourth, EU-Japan political cooperation has moved forward in the area of the environment, with the institutionalization of the Japan-EU High Level Meeting on the Environment taking place in 1992. In particular, the two sides now seek to work together on carrying out research in areas of global concern, such as global warming, acid rain, and the prevention of destruction of tropical forests.

Fifth, with the end of the Cold War the interregionalization of politics is taking place regionally as well as in the cores. Indeed, the EU has set the evolving political relationship with Japan within the context of the Commission's new Asia strategy (Commission of the European Communities, 1994; Commission of the European Communities 1995: 3). A number of regional fora facilitate the broadening of interregionalization. The EU signed a formal agreement with ASEAN in 1980. Political dialogue takes place at the annual ASEAN Postministerial Conference, where Japan and the EU are both dialogue partners. The meetings of the ASEAN Regional Forum, which also involve both Japan and the EU, serve as a forum for political as well as security dialogue. Finally, the ASEM meeting provides a forum for Asia and Europe to meet together without the presence of the United States. In light of the Commission's lack of bilateral dialogue with individual members of ASEAN, these regional fora can be expected to take on increasing importance in the development of a strategy of cooperation between Japan and the EU politically, albeit within a broader context of competition in the economic field and the emerging ASEM relationship.

Finally, if we take a broadened understanding of politics, which includes social forces outside of the governing elites, then interregionalization of poli-

tics can be said to have gone forward with the asymmetrical penetration of Japan by European political ideals. In this sense, Marxist philosophy, ideas of the welfare state, Eurosocijalism, social democracy, and so on have exerted a profound influence on the political make up of Japan. Now, with the end of the socialist party as a political force in Japan, the Euro-Japanese relationship is firmly embedded in the ideology of democracy and free-market economics, as confirmed in the Hague Declaration. At the other end of the political spectrum, the continuation of the Japanese imperial system ensures that strong political links are maintained with Britain. Of course, the links between the Japanese and British imperial institutions are bilateral, but the meeting of President Jacques Delors with the emperor of Japan in 1991 suggests how, in institutionalizing political relations between Japan and the EC, the traditional trappings of sovereignty can be used as a force for political legitimization.

Security

The interregionalization of security remains the most constrained by the legacy of the Cold War security structures set in place by the United States as well as by the domestic constraints on the use of the military as a legitimate instrument of Japanese state policy (Hook, 1996). On the EU side, the lack of competency in security affairs, which remain the preserve of the member states, has limited the development of cooperation. In this situation, Euro-Japanese initiatives have gone forward outside the traditional paradigm of "security through strength," with attempts to promote confidence-building measures in the newly emerging post-Cold War order. This can be seen in the case of the Conventional Arms Register mentioned above, in the commitment to act jointly to prevent "the dissemination of antipersonnel mines" (Joint Press Statement, 1995), which has gone forward following the untimely death of Diana, Princess of Wales, and in the EU proposal to launch a satellite with Japan in order to monitor maritime activities in the region. In this way, interregionalization of security is contributing to the establishment of a framework of restraint on the proliferation of weapons, with Japan and Germany in the EU carving out a fledgling role as "civilian powers" (on civilian power, see Maull, 1991).

In the broader context, external and internal constraints on a military role for the SDF limited the links with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during the Cold War era, and even in the post-Cold War era, these links have proved less important than those outside of the traditional paradigm of "security through strength." It is true that, at the time of the controversy over the response to take over the SS-20 deployments in the early 1980s, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro linked European and Japanese security, but this was within the context of trilateral cooperation in the West, rather than interregional cooperation between Japan and Europe. Although no for-

mal links exist with NATO, informal links gradually have been developed following the 1985 visit of the Japanese Foreign Minister to NATO Headquarters, with the Director of the Defense Agency making several visits to NATO, and a reciprocal visit to Japan in 1991 by the NATO Secretary-General. On another level, Japanese and European bureaucratic and academic elites have participated in the NATO High Level Seminar on Global Security, first held in 1990, thereby starting to strengthen elite interactions on military affairs. More formally, Japanese links have been gradually forged with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, with Japan gaining observer status in 1992, although this precludes participation in CSCE decision-making. In this way, the ending of the Cold War has created opportunities for the development of new security links between Japan and Europe through both formal and informal mechanisms.

Finally, interregionalization of security is at the same time the interregionalization of ideas about security. During the Cold War, this was manifest in the ideological swing from Europe to Asia, where the threat of communist expansion in the Euro wing of the global confrontation was transferred to the Asian wing, where nationalist aspirations, North-South disparities, and post-colonial tensions were inserted into the Western ideological framework of understanding security. In the post-Cold War era, the most significant aspect of interregionalization is the attempt to institutionalize European ideas of regional security, as in the Australian and Canadian proposal to establish an Asian version of the CSCE (*Far East Economic Review*, 13 December 1990: 25), and the attempt to introduce CBMs through the ASEAN Regional Forum. In the field of security, therefore, interregionalization still remains dominated by the European wing of the newly emerging regional and global orders, where security issues have been more central in the transformation processes following the Cold War's end.

Culture

Interregionalization of culture mostly has gone forward within the structure of the bilateral relations between Japan and the member states of the EU, but the "hard" and "soft" aspects of culture also have influenced the evolution of the Euro-Japanese relationship. The legacy of European cultural influence in Japan means that, in the globalization of the Japanese economy, the interregionalization of culture has proceeded with Japanese "soft culture" in the process of "catching up" with the advance of Japanese "hard culture" into the EU. It is in the process of doing just that: it is not only in East Asia that Japanese comics are read, with the eleven-volume series of Otomo Katsuhiro's *Akira* enjoying a wide readership among well-educated French youth.

On the European side, the flood of made-in-Japan and FDI has promoted a genuine interest in Japanese language and culture, on the one hand, as well as

the need to promote studies of Japan in order to penetrate the Japanese market, on the other. There has been an increase in the provision of Japanese language programs in schools and universities, especially from the 1980s onward, as in the case of Britain. Indeed, Britain is both the center for Japanese cultural diplomacy as well as the country where Japanese studies have been promoted actively by the government. The British government increased the provision of Japanese language at universities, boosting the number of posts under the "Parker initiatives" of the late 1980s, and has sought to promote an understanding of Japan as a way to penetrate the Japanese market, as in the Department of Trade and Industry's Opportunity Japan Campaign. Similarly, the EU has taken the initiative in promoting Japanese language and culture as a way to penetrate the Japanese market, as in initiatives like the Gateway to Japan and the Executive Training Programme. The strategy of pushing forward with this use of culture was highlighted in early 1995, when the Commission suggested the possibility of "promoting a network of universities in Europe which offer joint diplomas combining business or economics with a first-hand knowledge of Japan," and "encouraging teaching of modern Japanese in higher education throughout the EU." (European Report, 1995: 6).

In terms of ideology, the EU and Japan have both clearly espoused a shared commitment to "democracy" and the "free-market economy," as part of the Hague Declaration. In pushing forward with interregionalization, therefore, these principles can be employed as political tools by both sides. In the case of the former, for instance, the Commission has noted how the transformation of the party political system in Japan shows "a desire to change the bureaucratic system so that it becomes more responsive to the democratic will" (Commission of the European Communities, 1995: 3). In this, the EU is seeking to employ "democracy" as a way to bring about changes in the economic structures blocked by the bureaucracy, as in the EU desire for further deregulation. Similarly, in pressing for the "opening" of the Japanese market, the EU has used free-market ideology, calling on Japan to remove obstacles to market access, as EU exports "can benefit the consumer and lower the costs of intermediate manufactured products and services to industrial buyers" (Commission of the European Communities, 1995: 9). In this way, the EU seeks to make allies of Japanese consumers in their struggle to break the stranglehold of the distribution system and the keiretsu. In the case of Japan, appeals to "free-market" principles have served in its attempt to block or remove VERs and "antidumping" measures proposed by the EU. In the context of the historical legacy of democratic developments in Europe, however, failings in "European democracy" have not played a role in Japan's attempt to legitimize attacks on European practices. At the same time, their commitment

to these two principles can be used in their joint efforts to spread the post-Cold War ideology to other parts of the globe, enforcing discipline on the newly emerging market economies, if not necessarily putting a high priority on democratization in either wing of the emerging order.

From the Japanese perspective, the Japan Foundation seeks to develop Japanese studies in Europe, as in East Asia, with support being offered to stimulate the learning of the Japanese language and the advanced study of Japan. Similarly, a number of Japanese transplants, such as Nissan, have helped to fund Japanese studies in Britain and elsewhere. In line with the growing attempt to promote interregionalization, the Japan Foundation also has instituted a program to promote academic cooperation between the EU and Japan in areas of global concern to both partners, as in the case of disarmament and the environment. In this sense, the promotion of an understanding of Japanese language and Japanese culture can be seen as part of a broader political and economic strategy to increase the acceptability of Japan, on the one hand, and in pushing forward with the new Euro-Japanese relationship, on the other. Such efforts serve to erase the negative image of Japan left over from the war, ameliorate the impact of the European "Japan bashers," and build up a sense that, far from being "different," Japan is a key player in the restructuring of the global and regional orders. Indeed, the end of the Cold War has highlighted how, increasingly, the Japanese are being regarded "like us," as both Europe and Japan face similar issues, such as defining a new role in the world, dealing with an aging population pyramid, and restructuring the economy in the face of globalization processes.

In the broadest sense, therefore, cultural interregionalization between Japan and Europe has set in motion the "Japanization" of Europe, but within the framework of the guiding principles of the emerging post-Cold War order. It is "Japanization" as a process of increased understanding of Japan, on the one hand, and "Japanization" as a process of Europe meeting the Japanese challenge, on the other. In this we are witnessing how, in a late-comer's attempt to catch up with the front runners, a degree of "cultural convergence" is underway between Japan and the EU in the context of the deeper and wider dynamics of globalization processes. The expansion of the EU's interest from Japan to other East and Southeast Asian economies, as witnessed by the promulgation of the Community's new "Asia policy," suggests the dialectic relationship between the front runners and late comers will lead to a boost in interest in "Asian culture" and language in an attempt to remain competitive in the face of globalization processes.

CONCLUSION

The globalization, regionalization, and interregionalization of economy, politics, security, and culture have forged a multifaceted, complex set of symmetric and asymmetric relations within and among different state, regional, and non-state actors, thus transforming global and regional orders. The increasing scale of global and regional trade, the significant rise in the level of FDI, and the emergence of regional production networks have structured regional and inter-regional economic interdependence, as witnessed in the Japanese penetration of East Asia and Europe. The decline of U.S. hegemony, and the need to respond to economic and security issues on global as well as regional levels, have pushed forward political cooperation, as seen in East Asia, in Euro-Japanese relations, and in the United Nations. The breakdown of the Cold War structures has started to erode the centrality of U.S.-centered bilateral security structures, with fledgling attempts at regional multilateralism, as in the ASEAN Regional Forum, and interregional cooperation, as in the implementation of the Euro-Japanese proposal for a Conventional Arms Register. The expansion in the reach of culture, both "hard" and "soft," has brought about the rise of Japan as a regional, interregional, and global cultural presence, but within the overall embrace of "consumer culture" and the ideology of the "free market" and "democracy." Its popular culture, as with comics, has spread both to the East and to the West. In these ways, the transformation in regional and global orders is taking place in the context of the transformation in the structures and agents of globalization, regionalization, and interregionalization in economy, politics, security, and culture.

Competition and cooperation among the three poles of the newly emerging world order are moving forward in the context of increased cooperation within each region, as in the case of NAFTA and especially the EU, but the emergence of the EAEC regionalist project in competition with the APEC project punctures any simplistic scenario of the world dividing into three, tight "closed regions" or "blocs." For in the struggle to implement these regionalist projects, domestic and international forces of opposition ineluctably emerge, as witnessed in the United States at the time of the NAFTA debate (Payne, 1996), where regional, industrial, and political differences of interest surfaced, and in the EU, where the gap between the Euronizing political elites ran up against resistance on the popular level, as seen in the Danish and French referenda, and the outcries of the anti-Maastricht political elites, as in the case of the British Eurosceptics. In this sense, globalization and regionalization have eroded, if not completely destroyed, the power of state actors to seal a region into "closed regionalism," in the same way that the state itself has become

permeable to transnational economic and increasingly social forces.

In the dynamic interaction between globalist and regionalist forces, Japan remains embedded in Asia-Pacific and Euro-East Asian economic, political, security, and cultural structures, despite the emergence of economic and cultural interactions strengthening regionalization within East Asia. Domestically, it is true, the "new Asianists" represented by politicians such as Ishihara and a phalanx of pro-Asian bureaucratic elites seek a reconfigured Japanese role in the region, but the key economic and political elites within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party as well as within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs still continue to coalesce around the bilateral axis with the United States. In this sense, although bilateralism is not as omnipresent as in the Cold War, the relationship with the United States still continues to constrain the behavior of the Japanese state. Japanese corporations continue to rely on the United States as an absorber of a large proportion of their exports, the government continues to support the U.S.-Japan security treaty and to pay "tribute" for the stationing of troops in Japan, despite the cries of Okinawans, and the attempt to carve out a new Asian role within Asia remains within the overall framework of maintaining the central relationship with the United States, even if competition and conflict continually flare up in trade and other relations.

In the development of interregional relations with the EU, the Japanese economic penetration of Europe, first in trade and then in investment, has brought to the forefront of European concern the question of how to respond to the Japanese, and more broadly East Asian, challenge. In the post-Cold War era interregionalization is moving beyond economics to embrace more fully than in the past political, security, and cultural dimensions. New forms of cooperation between Japan and the EU have partly emerged as a balance to the predominance of the United States, partly as a response to the reconfiguration of the global order, with the two wings of the U.S.-centered world order increasingly taking on a political role, and partly as a reaction to the fear of "closed regionalism." Overwhelmingly, however, Euro-Japanese cooperation has emerged in response to the structural transformations brought about in regional and global orders as a result of the economic ascendance of Japan and other East Asian mini-economic superpowers.

The shape of the emerging world order remains indeterminate, with forces for integration and disintegration, fragmentation and unity interacting in a complex of constraint and opportunity. Within this context, what is the power of the Asian new-comers to transform the global and regional orders? More specifically, how can the rise of Japan be understood in the context of Euro-Japanese interregionalization? We have seen how the Japanese penetration of Europe set in motion internal dynamics of change. In the battle between the "Japan bashing" school of thought and the "Japan benefits" school of

thought, European political forces now have coalesced around the "benefits" school, as seen in the EU's new East Asia strategy. In the face of competition from the new-comers, internal structural changes are being forced on European nations, with the introduction of highly competitive East Asian transplants and the continuing flow of competitive goods into the markets of the EU transforming industrial and social relations. The fears on the part of especially the weak and downtrodden that, in the face of globalizing economic and other forces, the victories won by labor in the struggle with capital, as seen in the creation of the welfare state and other institutional structures, are being abandoned in the face of the East Asian challenge, which once led to continental charges of Britain's "social dumping," are now being confirmed in other parts of Europe.

In identifying Japan as a "benefit," the political and economic elite of Britain and the EU have recognized the permeability of the state and the Union in the present world order. In building the institutions to protect workers at home, the early-starter European powers penetrated and exploited the late comers of Asia. These late comers now have mounted a challenge to the early starters, with Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir Mohammad seeking to legitimize this challenge by introducing a new ideology, giving central place to the caring services of the family, rather than the state, an ideology not unfamiliar to Thatcherite Britons. Asian strength is in economic competitiveness, but this competitiveness can erode the safety nets for protecting the weak in Europe as well as sharpen the competitive edge of European business. In choosing the latter course, certain members of the EU have determined to risk the welfare developments of the modern European states, with Britain in particular seeking to respond to the Asian challenge by maintaining a competitive edge over other European nations.

Thus, the question of how Europe should respond to the Asian challenge cannot be answered fully by reference to different forms of capitalism (Albert, 1993). Rather the more fundamental question is how, in the process of late-comer modernization and the erosion of the power of military force as an effective and cost-efficient instrument in the protection and pursuit of state interests, the advanced states can sustain the quality of life already achieved, on the one hand, and enable the poor and deprived both within the advanced economies and in the developing regions of the world to enjoy at least the basic minimum, on the other. In striving toward a global transformation bringing about a more equitable distribution of life chances and resources, the role of nonstate social forces, not only the state, emerges as crucial. As relations are strengthened between the political, bureaucratic, and business elites of Europe and Japan, a similar need arises for the growth of transnational social movements as a countervailing force. Thus the Euro-Japanese elite

emphasis on “free market” needs to be complemented by a popular emphasis on transnational “democracy.” In this new “double movement” (Polanyi, 1957), the role of social movements in promoting the transformation of the domestic, regional, and global order needs to be confirmed.

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